



Classe di Scienze politico-sociali

Corso di perfezionamento in
Transnational Governance

XXXV ciclo

*Champions of Diversity Governance? City
Approaches to Cultural Heterogeneity in Europe,
Japan, and South Korea*

Settore Scientifico Disciplinare SPS/11

Candidato

dr. Beniamino PERUZZI CASTELLANI

Relatore

Prof. Anna LORETONI

Supervisione interna

Prof. Guglielmo Giuseppe Maria
MEARDI



Anno accademico 2024/2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	6

PART I – A THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION	15

CHAPTER 1: CONTEXTUALIZING CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF CITIES

1.1 - The Global Transition to Democracy	20
1.2 - The Neoliberal Turn	24
1.3 - The Local Turn and the Rise of Cities: Between Democratization and Entrepreneurialism	27
1.4 - Framing <i>Governance</i>	31
1.5 - The Contemporary Ecosystem of City Networks	34
1.6 - Migration-related City Networks	38

CHAPTER 2: THE EMERGENCE OF *CULTURE* AND THE INVENTION OF HOMOGENEITY

2.1 - Meaning(s) of <i>Culture</i> : History of a Polysemic Term	42
2.2 - From the Linguistic Turn to the Cultural Turn	44
2.3 - Tensions and Criticism within the Cultural Turn	47
2.4 - Framing <i>Race</i> and <i>Ethnicity</i>	50
2.5 - Cultural Heterogeneity Throughout History: Alterity and Multicultural Coexistence	53
2.6 - The Invention of Homogeneity	56
2.7 - Rise and Fall of the Sociological Theory of Assimilation	59

CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL PLURALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF DIVERSITY

3.1 - The Normative Principle of Cultural Pluralism and the Invention of Multiculturalism	63
3.2 - The Global Diffusion of Multiculturalism	65
3.3 - Cultural Pluralism and Multiculturalism in the Academic Discourse	68
3.4 - The Babel of Multiculturalism(s)	71
3.5 - The Crisis of Multiculturalism	73
3.6 - Framing <i>Diversity</i>	77
3.7 - Integration and Interpersonal Contact in Empirical Studies	79
3.8 - Reframing Management of Cultural Heterogeneity: <i>Diversity Governance</i> as a Framework and the Rise of Interculturalism	83
3.9 - Interculturalism vs. Multiculturalism	86

CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALIZING THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: THE DIFFUSION THEORY

4.1 - The Origins of Diffusion Studies	90
4.2 - The Classical Theory of Diffusion	92
4.3 - The Evolution of Diffusion Theory in Social Sciences: The Geographic and Organizational Focuses	95
4.4 - Critical Perspectives on Diffusion	97
4.5 - When Policies Spread: The Rise of Policy Diffusion Studies	99
4.6 - The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion	101
4.7 - Towards a Consistent Framework for Policy Diffusion	105
4.8 - Research Methodologies for Policy Diffusion	108

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION FOR THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

5.1 - A Methodological framework for the Study of Diffusion of Diversity Governance	111
5.2 - Multiscalar Analysis and Cities as Entry Points	113
5.3 - A Framework for Case Selection: The Intercultural City Network	117
5.4 - Cases Selection: Barcelona (Spain), Hamamatsu (Japan), and Ansan (South Korea)	123

5.5 - An Overview of the Empirical Study.....	126
5.6 - An Overview of the Fieldwork	130
5.7 - Reflections about the Empirical Study: Challenges and Positionality.....	134
CONCLUSION.....	139

PART II – EUROPEAN UNION

INTRODUCTION	142

CHAPTER 6: GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

6.1 - The Origin of the European Union.....	147
6.2 - The EU's Multi-Level System of Governance.....	150
6.3 - The Rise of Municipalism in the Europe of the States	153
6.4 - Sistering Cities, from Europe to the World	155
6.5 - City Networking and the European Union.....	157
6.6 - The Growing Role of the Civil Society in EU Governance.....	160

CHAPTER 7: EU APPROACH TO CULTURAL HETEROGENEITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN INTERCULTURALISM

7.1 - The Onset of the European <i>Cultural Turn</i>	164
7.2 - Developing a European Approach to Cultural Management	167
7.3 - <i>Europeanising</i> Europe's Culture(s)	169
7.4 - Emergence and Uses of <i>Intercultural</i> in the Official Discourse of European Institutions	172
7.5 - Formulating a European Approach to Cultural Heterogeneity in the New Millennium.....	175
7.6 - Early Developments and Diffusion of the European Intercultural Approach.....	179
7.7 - Towards the Year of Intercultural Dialogue: Framing a Comprehensive Intercultural Approach	181
7.8 - Guidelines for Inclusive, Intercultural Societies: The <i>White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue</i>	184
7.9 - Behind the <i>Intercultural City</i> : The Think Tank Comedia and the <i>Creative City</i>	186
7.10 - Contextualizing the Origins of the <i>Intercultural City</i> : The Challenges of Cultural Heterogeneity in the UK	189
7.11 - Framing the <i>Intercultural City</i> as the European Ideal of Diversity Governance	192

CHAPTER 8: GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN SPAIN

8.1 - <i>Baptizing</i> Spain: The Historical Formation of a Complex Peninsular Identity	197
8.2 - The Vicissitude of <i>Las Españas</i> and the Emergence of the Spanish Nation	201
8.3 - Instability under Constitutional Spain and the Experiment of the First Republic	205
8.4 - Spain's Restless Political Reshaping: Monarchy, Republic, and Fascist Dictatorship.....	207
8.5 - Democratic Transition and Consolidation after the Authoritarian Dictatorship.....	210
8.6 - From the Centralist Fascist State to One of the World's Most Decentralized Democracies	212

CHAPTER 9: SPAIN'S NATIONAL AND LOCAL APPROACHES TO CULTURAL HETEROGENEITY

9.1 - National Pluralism Throughout the Emergence of the Spanish Nation.....	218
9.2 - Spain's Religious Minorities and Catholic Homogenization.....	222
9.3 - An Ethnocultural Minority across Spanish History: The Roma People	227
9.4 - Shaping Early Migration Governance Approaches to Integration in Democratic Spain.....	232
9.5 - Recent Developments of Immigration Laws and the Consolidation of a National Approach to Integration	237
9.6 - Spain's Migration Governance and Integration at the Local Level	242
9.7 - Developing a <i>Catalan Way</i> for Integration and Diversity Governance	245
9.8 - Emergence and Consolidation of <i>Interculturality</i> in Catalonia's Approach to Cohesion and Inclusion.....	248

CHAPTER 10: CASE STUDY: BARCELONA AND THE *CITY OF INTERCULTURALITAT*

10.1 - Origins and Rise of Barcelona: The Evolution of a Mediterranean Political and Economic Hub	252
10.2 - Municipalism, Urban Entrepreneurship, and Politics in Modern Barcelona	256
10.3 - The "Barcelona Model"	260
10.4 - Lights and Shadows of the Capital of Democracy.....	262
10.5 - City Branding through the Mega-events.....	267
10.6 - The New Visions of Barcelona: A <i>Creative, Sustainable, and Inclusive City</i>	271
10.7 - The Origins of Migration and Diversity Governance in Barcelona.....	274

10.8 - The Rise of <i>Interculturalitat</i>	279
10.9 - The <i>Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat</i>	282
10.10 - The Consolidation of Diversity Governance in the Intercultural City: Phase 1	285
10.11 - The Consolidation of Diversity Governance in the Intercultural City: Phase 2	290
10.12 - Re-tuning <i>Interculturalitat</i>	293
10.13 - The Governance System of the <i>City of Interculturalitat</i>	297
10.14 - Frames and Trajectories of the <i>City of Interculturalitat</i>	305
10.15 - Entering the <i>City of Interculturalitat</i>	312
CONCLUSION	320
 PART III – JAPAN	
INTRODUCTION	328
 CHAPTER 11: GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN	
11.1 - The Dawn of the Nation in the Land of the Rising Sun	332
11.2 - Building Modern Japan	335
11.3 - The Difficult Path to Democracy in Centralist Japan	339
11.4 - Towards Decentralization	342
11.5 - The Local Turn in Japanese Governance	346
11.6 - Challenges and Opportunities for Japan's Vibrant Civil Society	350
 CHAPTER 12: MINORITY STRUGGLES FOR RECOGNITION IN MULTI-ETHNIC JAPAN	
12.1 - Homogeneity and Multiethnicity in Japan	355
12.2 - Japan's <i>Indigenous People</i> : The Ainu	357
12.3 - The Quest for Okinawan Paradise: Colonialism, Post-colonialism and Commodification in Okinawa	359
12.4 - The Long Shadow of Feudal Japan: The Complex Struggle of the Burakumin Between Discrimination, Assimilation, and Recognition	362
12.5 - The Earliest Foreigners in Japan: The Zainichi	366
12.6 - Children of Discrimination: The Hāfu	371
12.7 - Returnees in their Homeland or Japan's First International Immigrants? History and Challenges of the Nikkei jin	372
12.8 - The Slow Opening of Japan's Doors: The Era of International Migration to Japan	378
 CHAPTER 13: EMERGENCE AND DIFFUSION OF <i>TABUNKA KYŌSEI</i>	
13.1 - The Invention of Homogeneous Japan	380
13.2 - Pioneers of Japanese Diversity Governance in the Era of Progressive Local Governments	383
13.3 - The Opportunities of <i>Internationalization</i>	386
13.4 - From <i>Kokusaika</i> to <i>Tabunka Kyōsei</i>	389
13.5 - Emergence and Reformulation of <i>Tabunka Kyōsei</i> in the National Discourse	392
13.6 - The Beginning of the Era of Diversity in the Country of <i>Tabunka Kyōsei</i>	396
 CHAPTER 14: CASE STUDY: HAMAMATSU AND THE CITY OF <i>TABUNKA KYŌSEI</i>	
14.1 - Origins and Development of the Industrial City	402
14.2 - Governing the Growing City	405
14.3 - Branding Hamamatsu: The Birth of the <i>City of Music</i>	407
14.4 - The Emergence of the <i>Global City</i>	410
14.5 - From the <i>Global City</i> to the <i>Creative City</i>	415
14.6 - The Arrival of Foreigners	418
14.7 - Governing Early Migration	421
14.8 - Racism and Rights Struggles	423
14.9 - Championing <i>Tabunka Kyōsei</i> at the National Level	426
14.10 - Laying the foundation of the <i>City of Tabunka Kyōsei</i>	428
14.11 - The <i>Tabunka Kyōsei</i> Plans	432
14.12 - The Governance System of the <i>City of Tabunka Kyōsei</i>	436
14.13 - Framing Cultural Heterogeneity in Hamamatsu	442
14.14 - Entering the <i>City of Tabunka Kyōsei</i> : Successes and Challenges	445
CONCLUSION	453

PART IV – SOUTH KOREA

INTRODUCTION	461

CHAPTER 15: GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH KOREA

15.1 - The Roots of the Nation in the Korean Peninsula	465
15.2 - Joseon's Kingdom	467
15.3 - Lights and Shadows of Modernity and the End of the United Korea	469
15.4 - South Korea Under the Dictators: Industrialization and Growth.....	472
15.5 - South Korea's Transition towards Democracy and Decentralization	476
15.6 - The Rise of the Civil Society	478

CHAPTER 16: SOUTH KOREA'S CULTURAL MINORITIES AND MIGRATION

16.1 - The Myth of Homogeneity and the Reality of Cultural Heterogeneity in South Korea	483
16.2 - Almost South Koreans: The Return Migrants.....	485
16.3 - Heroes, Country Bumpkins, or Spies? The Complex Challenges for Integration of the Talbukja.....	488
16.4 - Foreign Women in the Korean Countryside: The Peculiar Case of Marriage Migrants.....	491
16.5 - The Arrival of Non-ethnic-Korean Migrants in South Korea.....	493
16.6 - Pioneers for an Inclusive Future: The Children of Multicultural Families	495

CHAPTER 17: EMERGENCE AND DIFFUSION OF *DAMUNHWA*

17.1 - The Invention of <i>Koreanness</i>	498
17.2 - The Rise of Pro-migrant Activism and Human Rights Movements in Democratic South Korea	500
17.3 - The Politicization of Minority Struggles	502
17.4 - Building a Global South Korea: Emergence and Transformations of the Ideal of <i>Segyehwa</i>	504
17.5 - Towards Multicultural Policies	507
17.6 - Emergence and Diffusion of <i>Damunhwa</i>	509

CHAPTER 18: CASE STUDY: ANSAN AND THE *CITY OF DAMUNHWA*

18.1 - The Birth of Korea's First Planned City	515
18.2 - Demographic Transformations in a City of Migrants.....	517
18.3 - The Early Phase of Ansan's Diverse Community: Spontaneous Bottom-up Activism.....	519
18.4 - The Rise of the <i>Borderless Village</i>	521
18.5 - Governing the Planned City: The Fragmented Visions of the First Mayors	525
18.6 - From the <i>Borderless Village</i> to the <i>Multicultural Village</i>	527
18.7 - The End of Ansan's Bottom-up Diversity Governance	530
18.8 - Promoting the City of <i>Damunhwa</i>	533
18.9 - Adopting the Intercultural City Brand	536
18.10 - Ansan as a <i>Safe, Smart, and Global City</i>	538
18.11 - The Governance System of the <i>City of Damunhwa</i>	541
18.12 - Framing <i>Damunhwa</i> in Ansan?	548
18.13 - Entering the <i>City of Damunhwa</i> : Successes and Challenges	551

CONCLUSION.....	557

DISCUSSION

I: MODELING THE RISE OF DIVERSITY: *HOMOGENEITY* AND *HETEROGENEITY* AS PARADIGMS

1 - Framing Ideational Revolutions: The Concept of <i>Paradigm Shift</i>	563
2 - Paradigms in Social Science: The Concept of <i>Policy Paradigm</i>	564
3 - Paradigms and the Study of Governance of Cultural Heterogeneity	567
4 - Homogeneity as a Paradigm	570
5 - Paradigm Shift from <i>Homogeneity</i> to <i>Heterogeneity</i>	572
6 - From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity in Spain and the EU	575
7 - From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity in Japan	579
8 - From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity in South Korea	583

II: THE DIFFUSION OF HETEROGENEITY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

1 - Homophily and Homogeneity.....	587
2 - The Diffusion of Heterogeneity	589
3 - Mechanisms of Diffusion.....	593
4 - Comparing the Local Systems of Governance of Cultural Heterogeneity	596

III: HOMOGENEITY AND CULTURE IN THE ERA OF DIVERSITY

1 - The World's Last Homogeneous People	601
2 - Defining Culture in the Era of Diversity.....	603
3 - Culture and Habitus	606
4 - Research and Culture in the Era of Diversity	610

CONCLUSION:	613

APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS DIRECTLY QUOTED IN THE TEXT	623

BIBLIOGRAPHY:	624

INTRODUCTION

Societies across our increasingly interconnected world are experiencing an unprecedented increase in their diversification: we have entered an *era of diversity*. This is a widely accepted view amidst the myriads of discourses regarding diversity, with their varied tones of enthusiasm and criticism. Nobody seems to deny the *fact* and the *novelty* of diversity, which are often presented as blatant truths that do not need further explanation.

To grasp the *fact* of diversity, is it not sufficient to walk around in a big city and observe the kaleidoscopes of languages, customs, religions, and, in general, identities that characterize most contemporary urban life? As for its *novelty*, many believe that the root of today's extraordinary and ever-growing diversification is to be found in the contemporary relentless movement of people across national borders driven by globalization and facilitated by modern technology and infrastructure.

Yet, as self-evident as these observations may appear, we do actually need some more explanation. If *diversity* refers to differences in languages, religions, customs – and, in general, what we broadly call *culture* – then it is hardly a new phenomenon. Ancient Rome, for instance, could be arguably considered as culturally diverse than many contemporary cities. Some observers go further, arguing that globalization and the global reach of capitalist markets might actually *reduce* cultural differences compared to past eras, creating more uniform practices worldwide (e.g., Hynes, 2021, Chapter 3).

Given these nuances, what seems truly *novel* about the era of diversity is not so much the underlying social reality itself – heterogeneity has, in some sense, always been with us – but rather the way in which we have begun to *frame* it. *Diversity* has emerged as a lens for comprehending social differences, offering new perspectives on identity and heterogeneity. In particular, diversity contrasts with earlier frameworks, which emphasized the group dimension and leaned toward essentialism, interpreting collective identities as resistant to change and transformations. Instead, contemporary discourses on diversity emphasize individual-level dimensions of identity, as well as the intersections and fluidity that shape how people belong, participate, and coexist.

Traditionally, *homogeneity* has been seen as the bedrock of social cohesion against the disruptive potential of heterogeneity. Dominant groups exercised substantial control over narratives of homogeneity, leaving little room for alternative voices or different conceptual frameworks. Today, in the context of transnational discourses on rights, equality, and pluralism, old homogeneity-based

narratives are being challenged by a new appreciation for cultural heterogeneity as a fundamental dimension of collective life.

This shift naturally invites a series of theoretical and practical challenges, especially around how best to organize society in what might be called a *post-homogeneity* world. Indeed, a central question is: How can communities, institutions, and governments sustain social cohesion, equity, and mutual understanding when people's identities are increasingly fluid and unbounded by older, consolidated categories?

Scholars, policymakers, and civil society actors have all joined in addressing this puzzle. The discussion transcends disciplinary lines – sociology, anthropology, political science, education, economics, law, and history – revealing profound complexity. Unsurprisingly, the resulting body of literature and approaches is as vast and multifaceted as the subject it seeks to explore. For a researcher entering this domain, the experience can feel like navigating a labyrinthine library, where each text speaks, do to say, a different dialect – if not, literally, in a different language. The deeper one delves, the clearer it becomes that the field is plagued by a lack of conceptual clarity and shared analytical frameworks.

One of the most pervasive challenges within the scholarship is a *parochial* bias manifesting across three dimensions: disciplinary, geographical, and linguistic. Disciplinary parochialism reflects the fragmentation of research within specific fields or schools of thought, impeding the integration of findings and fostering the repetition of arguments long since refuted. Geographical parochialism compounds this issue, as researchers often confine their analyses to specific national contexts, forming isolated research clusters. This limitation is further linked to what critics have termed “methodological nationalism” (Beck, 2002; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; 2003; Amelina et al., 2012; Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2018), which restricts analysis within nation-state boundaries and overlooks broader global interconnections.

Linguistic parochialism further fragments the field despite the widespread use of English as a *lingua franca* in academic discourse. This segmentation operates on two levels. First, natural language barriers hinder communication between scholarly traditions written in different languages. Second, researchers targeting international audiences often use English uncritically, even when discussing contexts where sociocultural structures are deeply embedded in other linguistic frameworks. The study of cultural heterogeneity – which is inherently tied to the specific frames and structures of language – suffers from a surprising neglect of this dimension. Consequently, the dominant use of English risks amplifying a Western-centric bias in the literature, privileging European and North American perspectives while overshadowing valuable insights and approaches emerging from non-Western contexts.

These forms of parochialism significantly hinder a comprehensive understanding of how diversity emerges and operates within societies. They often limit the analysis to context-specific factors, neglecting their interconnected nature and, thus, the possibility of diffusion of discourses and approaches to cultural heterogeneity across different regions. This narrow focus obscures some critical questions: How have diverse societies come to adopt similar discourses about pluralism despite differing histories, cultures, and institutional structures? Is this similarity a result of independent convergence, or does it reflect diffusion mechanisms? If diffusion is at play, what exactly is being diffused, and how do these mechanisms operate?

Additionally, the scholarship has seldom reconciled the tension between *entrepreneurial* or market-driven motives behind diversity policies and practices (often linked to city branding or global competitiveness) and *ideological* or moral reasons centering on rights, justice, and equity. Recognizing these coexisting rationales is essential for developing a more nuanced comprehension of how diversity frameworks are adopted and adapted in local contexts.

This lack of inquiry into the interconnected nature of diversity governance highlights the need for more holistic approaches to understanding societal transformations in the age of diversity. To navigate the complexities of contemporary pluralistic communities, it is crucial to embrace frameworks that are critical, transdisciplinary, transnational, and translinguistic.

This dissertation seeks to address these shortcomings with two main objectives:

- a) Lay the groundwork for a unified framework: It aims to propose analytical tools that cut across disciplinary, national, and linguistic boundaries, forging a cohesive way to examine how societies conceptualize and manage cultural heterogeneity. This entails revisiting long-standing debates – e.g., about homogeneity vs. pluralism, ethnicity vs. culture – and integrating them with contemporary notions of “diversity governance” emerging from diverse global contexts.
- b) Investigate the emergence and diffusion of diversity approaches: The dissertation specifically focuses on how intercultural, multicultural, or related models become diffused across different societies. Such diffusion may involve learning, emulation, coercion, or competition, as suggested by policy diffusion theories. By delving into the where, how, and why of these processes, the study sheds light on the practical ways in which normative commitments (like human rights or inclusion) and strategic motives (like economic branding or city diplomacy) are translated into real-life governance structures.

Building on the above objectives, this dissertation revolves around three main central research questions and some key sub-questions:

1) **How has *diversity* emerged as a key category for understanding cultural heterogeneity?**

- What sets this category apart from previous conceptual frameworks (e.g., those centered on homogeneity)?
- Which historical, social, or geopolitical factors contributed most to the waning appeal of homogeneity and the ascendancy of diversity across different regions and socio-cultural contexts?

2) **Is the global rise of diversity the outcome of convergence or diffusion?**

- If diffusion is taking place, which ideas, policies, or narratives are being transmitted, and through what channels?
- Which actors – such as local governments, international organizations, or civil society movements – play pivotal roles in fostering, endorsing, and spreading these frameworks?

3) **How do pluralistic frames and discourses translate into concrete policies and practices?**

- In particular, how do localities – especially cities – balance and integrate normative (rights-based) goals with entrepreneurial (market-driven) considerations when adopting and implementing diversity governance?

This dissertation is divided into eighteen chapters across four parts and a conclusive discussion. Parts I and II each comprise five chapters, while the remaining two parts each contain four chapters. Chapters are further subdivided into sections.

Part I lays the groundwork for this dissertation by discussing the key concepts and establishing the theoretical and methodological frameworks that guide the study. Chapter 1 explores the major historical shifts in governance, detailing how the global transition to democracy, the neoliberal turn, and the rising significance of cities have contributed to profoundly reshape how societies address contemporary challenges. It specifically underscores the emergence of cities as pivotal actors in global governance, noting how city networks facilitate collaborative efforts, especially regarding migration and diversity management. Chapter 2 focuses on the historical and theoretical evolution of the concept of *culture*, examining its intersections with *race* and *ethnicity*, and then considers the emergence of *homogeneity* as a societal ideal. In particular, this chapter examines how these constructs shaped early sociological theories and influenced perceptions of cultural differences. Chapter 3 transitions to conceptual and practical frameworks for managing cultural heterogeneity. It discusses the emergence and diffusion of *multiculturalism*, critiques of the framework, and the rise of *diversity governance* as a new framework to address cultural heterogeneity. The chapter concludes

with an exploration of the rise of *interculturalism* in the European context as a *brand* for diversity governance. Chapter 4 turns the focus to the development of diffusion theory, providing a methodological foundation for analyzing how ideas and practices of diversity governance spread across different contexts. It emphasizes the mechanisms of policy diffusion and their relevance to diversity governance. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the dissertation's methodological framework and case selection process for the empirical study carried out for the dissertation. It outlines the rationale for the selection of three cities as case studies – Barcelona (Spain), Hamamatsu (Japan), and Ansan (South Korea) – offering a comprehensive overview and critical discussion of the empirical research and fieldwork conducted.

Part II investigates the emergence and diffusion of approaches to cultural heterogeneity in the European Union with a specific focus on the Spanish context. Chapter 6 analyzes the EU's historical and institutional development, highlighting its multi-level system of governance and the growing role of cities and civil society as key actors in the formulation and implementation of European strategies. Chapter 7 explores the EU's cultural policies and the emergence of *intercultural dialogue* as a major framework for managing cultural heterogeneity. It analyzes the development of the *intercultural city* as the European ideal for diversity governance, examining its institutionalization and diffusion through the Intercultural Cities Programme. Chapter 8 shifts the focus to Spain, providing an overview of the historical formation of Spanish national identity, exploring the country's transformation under evolving forms of government, and, finally, tracing its transition to democracy and a decentralized governance structure. Chapter 9 continues the discussion about Spain, focusing on pluralism and cultural heterogeneity. After reconsidering its history under this lens, it examines the development of the contemporary approach to migration and diversity governance, with a particular emphasis on the case of Catalonia. Finally, Chapter 10 provides a detailed case study of Barcelona, tracing the city's historical development and its role as a pioneer in diversity governance. It explores the emergence of interculturality in Barcelona's policies and the implementation of the *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat*, offering a nuanced analysis of its successes and challenges.

Part III delves into the historical, cultural, and political contexts that shape diversity governance in Japan, investigating the emergence of *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) as the dominant framework to address cultural heterogeneity and providing a detailed case study of Hamamatsu as a model for local-level Japanese diversity governance. Chapter 11 outlines the evolution of governance in Japan, from the nation's early formation to its modern structures. It highlights the challenges of democratization, the process of decentralization, and the growing role of civil society in addressing social challenges. Chapter 12 focuses on the struggles of Japan's cultural minorities, challenging the perception of the country as a homogenous society. It explores the historical experiences of the Ainu,

Okinawans, Burakumin, Zainichi, and other minority groups alongside Japan's engagement with international migration. Chapter 13 traces the development of *tabunka kyōsei* as a framework for diversity governance. It examines its emergence from local initiatives, its integration into national discourse, and the shifting perceptions of cultural diversity in Japan. Chapter 14 provides a case study of Hamamatsu, analyzing its history, demographic changes, and branding strategies. It examines the city's approaches to cultural diversity governance, focusing on its three *Tabunka Kyōsei Plans* and their impact on shaping inclusive policies and practices.

Part IV turns to South Korea, focusing on the emergence and diffusion of *Damunhwa* (multiculturality) as the dominant framework to address cultural heterogeneity and its implementation in Ansan, a city nationally and internationally renowned as the South Korean pioneer of diversity governance. Chapter 15 provides a historical overview of South Korea's governance structures, from the formation of national identity to the era of industrialization and subsequent democratization. It highlights the role of civil society in advocating for social change, including the promotion of human rights and social justice. Chapter 16 examines South Korea's evolving relationship with cultural heterogeneity and migration, focusing on the experiences of the country's cultural minorities. Chapter 17 traces the development and diffusion of *Damunhwa* as a framework for framing and managing cultural heterogeneity. It explores the historical construction of *Koreanness*, the rise of pro-migrant activism, and the integration of diversity policies into national strategies. Chapter 18 provides a case study of Ansan, analyzing its transformation into the *City of Damunhwa*. It examines grassroots initiatives, the municipal government's strategies, and the city's branding efforts, offering insights into its evolving diversity governance systems.

Finally, the conclusive discussion synthesizes the findings of the research, addressing the dissertation's central questions regarding the emergence and diffusion of diversity governance across the different geographical and socio-cultural contexts considered from a transnational and multiscalar perspective. In particular, it reflects on the interplay of local, national, and transnational dynamics that shape approaches to cultural heterogeneity and identifies potential diffusion mechanisms driving convergence in these frameworks. The conclusion also emphasizes the broader implications of this research for the study of diversity governance, proposing an agenda for future research, including the need for further empirical studies to examine the practical impacts of these governance models, and calling for greater engagement with underrepresented regions and contexts.

My research intends to move some first steps in addressing critical gaps in the discussion of cultural heterogeneity by proposing a comprehensive and systematic analytical framework that unites disparate strands of academic discourse on diversity. In doing so, it aims at enhancing conceptual clarity and reinforcing integration of both theoretical and empirical studies across disciplines.

Drawing on a broad range of fields and exploring case studies in distinct geographical and socio-cultural contexts, this dissertation underscores the necessity of transdisciplinary, transnational, and translinguistic approaches. It also addresses the often-overlooked role of language and frames in shaping cultural boundaries and analytical biases, illustrating how the dominance of certain linguistic frameworks can perpetuate Western-centric perspectives on diversity.

Building on empirical examples from Europe and East Asia, the study intends to highlight not only the complexities within each context but also their intersections, decentering the perspective and moving beyond simplistic West/non-West dichotomies. This comparative lens reveals how discourses of diversity emerge, diffuse, and adapt in varied environments, enabling a richer understanding of the transformative processes at play in the era of diversity. The dissertation also foregrounds the influence of local governance actors – such as municipal administrations, civil society groups, and city networks – showing that what might appear as locally specific innovations often circulate globally through interconnected policy arenas. By tracing these flows and revealing the actors involved, the dissertation illuminates paths by which shared strategies and discourses of diversity evolve, gain legitimacy, and reshape social life.

The potential practical relevance of the research emerges from the strong interest in my topics expressed by activists and policymakers encountered during the fieldwork, who frequently pointed to the Western-centric bias of mainstream debates on cultural heterogeneity. Their curiosity about alternative approaches and strategies characterizing different geographical and sociocultural contexts reinforces the idea that broadening our analytical horizons can invigorate public discourse and policy innovation. By writing in an accessible style, this dissertation seeks to encourage ongoing dialogue and create avenues for the mutual exchange of ideas between stakeholders grappling with cultural diversity in various socio-political settings.

Furthermore, my findings point to the critical role of scholarly endeavors in shaping how societies negotiate their transition from established narratives of homogeneity toward frameworks emphasizing pluralism. Theoretical debates about diversity frequently serve to underpin concrete, on-the-ground policies, granting them a veneer of scientific legitimacy. This underscores the power of academics themselves as diffusion agents: by circulating concepts, analytical tools, and policy frameworks, they help shape public agendas, influence local experiments, and inform broader governance approaches.

Through this interplay of theory and practice, the dissertation aspires to stimulate better-informed participation in the rapidly evolving era of diversity, whether as policymakers, activists, researchers, or community members. Ultimately, it intends to encourage more inclusive and reflexive strategies for addressing cultural heterogeneity, recognizing that rigorous scholarship can play a pivotal role in guiding societies toward more thoughtful and sustainable forms of coexistence.

Notes on the Use of non-English Words in the Text

In this dissertation, I frequently employ non-English words to preserve the integrity of original terms and concepts. All such words appear in italics, with their English translations provided in parentheses.

With regard to Japanese and Korean specifically, I have followed several conventions to ensure consistency. First, unless referencing personal names, group categories, city names, or the titles of books, documents, and articles, I do not capitalize Japanese or Korean words. Second, I have used the English-style naming order – given name followed by family name – rather than the traditional family name–first format common to both languages.

In terms of romanization, I employ the Hepburn system for Japanese, including the use of macrons to indicate long vowels. This convention extends even to city names – such as in *Tōkyō* or *Ōsaka*.

For Korean, due to my current level of proficiency, I have relied on Google Translate's romanization system; however, I am aware that this tool sometimes introduces inaccuracies. As I continue to study Korean, I will soon be able to revise any such instances in accordance with a more precise and standardized romanization system.

PART I

A THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Countless articles and volumes from a variety of disciplinary perspectives have been dedicated to investigating the challenges and opportunities represented by cultural differences. As often happens in such cases, this vastness results in a babel of conflicting voices and an intricate conceptual maze. The opening of a text I stumbled upon during the fourth year of my doctoral journey caught my attention with a humorous take on this complexity: “Cultural diversity is a thicket into which no sane person ought to enter. It is a subject that is hopelessly complicated, often corrupted by political posturing, and, if one digs very deeply, intellectually exhausting if not indeterminate. No one walks away satisfied” (Brooks, 2012, p. 17). I was lucky enough to read these words when I was nearing the end of my thesis, and, to the author’s claim, I was already “walking away satisfied.”

One of the primary challenges for researchers studying diversity lies in conceptualizing the term and providing an analytical framework for its study. Surprisingly, this foundational task is rarely undertaken in the relevant scholarship. During my research, I reviewed an extensive body of social science literature on diversity and found that only a handful of authors had seriously engaged with defining the concept (examples, in this sense, can be found in Kerwin, 2009; Reus-Smit, 2018). Even in these cases, definitions often relied on equally complex notions, such as *ethnicity* or *culture*, which themselves require thorough unpacking and critical analysis.

Outside the academic context, terms like *diversity*, *ethnicity*, and *culture* are widely used in everyday conversation, often carrying an intuitive sense of their meaning. Moreover, definitions of *diversity* can easily be found in dictionaries – the term is typically defined as “the state of being diverse” or “the practice or quality of including or involving people from a range of different social and ethnic backgrounds and of different genders, sexual orientations, etc.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2023). However, academic research demands more than intuitive meanings or generalized dictionary definitions. For analytical purposes, it is essential to critically engage with the concepts behind the terms and provide a clear framework for their operationalization.

For my research, addressing these conceptual challenges is not merely a foundational exercise but an integral part of the study itself. The emergence and diffusion of diversity as a category of analysis, alongside the evolution of diversity governance as a framework for discourses, policies, and practices, lie at the heart of my investigation. This necessitated a deep engagement with the complexities of these terms and their contextual nuances.

Clarifying my use of the term *diversity* necessitates, first and foremost, a reflection on the linguistic structures employed in this research – specifically, my decision to write the dissertation in English.

The impact of language choice on the shaping of research seems often underestimated in academic discussions. Yet linguistic structures are anything but neutral; the terms we use are deeply rooted in historical and cultural practices shaped by specific spatiotemporal contexts. This consideration is especially significant for my study, which traverses vastly different linguistic and socio-cultural environments – Europe, Japan, and South Korea – and draws upon literature and interactions in six languages: English, Italian, French, Spanish, Japanese, and Korean.

Although the use of English in this dissertation was a practical requirement, being the language of my doctoral program, it is important to critically reflect the implications of adopting a particular language system – especially as I use it also to reference discursive frames rooted in other linguistic contexts. Even when considered a critical perspective, English proves to be a uniquely advantageous tool for navigating the complexity of diversity across these varied discursive spheres. Its widespread dominance in academia, while indicative of a Western-centric bias in much of the literature, provides a shared framework for global scholarly dialogue. Increasingly, scholars from non-English-speaking countries utilize English to reach broader audiences, positioning it at the nexus of local, national, and transnational discussions. While the prominence of English in academia requires critical reflection, it simultaneously serves as a practical platform for bridging diverse perspectives and fostering global conversations about the challenges and opportunities of diversity governance.

Having narrowed the focus to a specific linguistic framework, I can now clarify how the term *diversity* is employed in this dissertation. By *diversity*, I refer to an analytical category used to frame forms of *heterogeneity* among individuals which has gained widespread global currency at least since the 1990s. It is essential to distinguish *diversity* from the earlier, prevalent category used to conceptualize social heterogeneity, which I refer to as *cultural differences*.

In everyday discourse, terms like *cultural differences* and *diversity* are often used interchangeably. At first glance, insisting on a distinction between the two might appear to be an exercise in semantics or even sophistry. However, this distinction is central to my research. The shift from *cultural differences* to *diversity* reflects profoundly different ways of conceptualizing heterogeneity within groups and reimagining key concepts such as identity and culture. This is not merely a theoretical nuance: the framing of these categories has directly influenced how boundaries between social groups are constructed, how minority groups articulate their demands using conceptual and normative tools, and how policies and practices are designed to address these demands effectively.

The distinction between diversity and cultural differences is rooted in a broader discursive and philosophical shift often referred to as the *cultural turn* (e.g., Chaney, 1994; Jameson, 1998; Ray & Sayer, 1999, Introduction). This intellectual movement gradually positioned *culture* as a central lens for analyzing social phenomena. Today, the term *culture* is so pervasive that it feels somehow

intrinsic to our linguistic repertoire; yet, same as *diversity*, its widespread prominence in public discourse – in everyday conversations as well as in political and legal language – can be traced to specific historical and spatial contexts. The origins of this conceptual framework can be located in European philosophical thought of the 19th century, but a mature phase of the cultural turn can be identified between the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, *culture* emerged globally as a dominant category for framing identity distinctions among social groups.

From the moment the concept we now refer to as *culture* – previously framed in terms of *customs*, *norms*, *nationality*, or *ethnicity* – was adopted as a means of marking identity distinctions between groups, the analytical category of *cultural differences* emerged as a key lens through which heterogeneity was understood. This framework was characterized by its primary focus on three identity categories: nationality, ethnicity, and, later, culture. It leaned heavily toward essentialism and groupism, treating these identity markers as fundamentally group-bound and largely immutable. Within this perspective, identities were viewed as either unchangeable or subject to transformation only through significant effort and over long periods. Moreover, heterogeneity framed as cultural differences was often seen as an inherent source of tension, a challenge to the stability and cohesion of society. The prevailing ideal in this framework was cultural homogeneity, which was perceived as the bedrock of a cohesive and harmonious social order.

In contrast, *diversity* represents a new way of framing heterogeneity, encompassing a broader, individual-focused, and more dynamic spectrum of identity markers. Unlike the earlier focus on nationality, ethnicity, and traditional conceptualizations of culture, diversity extends to an open-ended list of categories, including religion, social class, age, sex, gender, sexual orientation, and disability. These categories are examined through an *intersectional lens*, which highlights the interconnected nature of identity markers and their capacity to combine in ways that create new forms of heterogeneity.

Furthermore, diverging from the essentialist and group-bound tendencies of the *cultural differences* framework, *diversity* emphasizes the individual dimension of identity markers, viewing them as dynamic and continuously evolving. Even categories traditionally regarded as *objectively* fixed – such as ethnicity, gender, sex, and age – are rediscovered as fluid, open to transformation, and subject to renegotiation by individuals. Finally, while *cultural differences* often framed heterogeneity as a source of tension and a threat to social stability, *diversity* positions heterogeneity as a positive force. It is associated with ethical enrichment, social creativity, and, by extension, economic and social development.

With this foundational distinction between *cultural differences* and *diversity* in mind, the first part of this dissertation outlines the theoretical and methodological framework underpinning the empirical

analysis. The emergence and diffusion of these frames – as well as the ways in which societies have addressed heterogeneity leading to the contemporary rise of diversity governance – must be situated within the broader context of significant historical transformations. Notably, the development of diversity governance cannot be fully understood without examining the profound changes in governance structures and practices over recent decades. These transformations are deeply intertwined with broader socioeconomic and political shifts, such as globalization and democratization, both of which have been accelerated by technological advancements. A thorough theoretical and methodological discussion is therefore essential to establish the context for the empirical research presented in the following sections.

This first part is divided into five chapters, each comprising several sections that collectively outline the theoretical, historical, and methodological frameworks for this dissertation.

Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive overview of the key transformations in governance that have shaped contemporary social landscapes where cities have emerged as key players. Section 1.1 begins by exploring the global transition to democracy, examining how democratization processes have influenced governance structures and practices worldwide. In Section 1.2, the discussion shifts to consider the neoliberal turn, a pivotal shift where market-driven ideologies redefined governance priorities, often emphasizing efficiency and competition over inclusivity. Section 1.3 delves into the emergence of cities as central actors in governance, focusing on their efforts to balance democratic ideals with entrepreneurial ambitions. Building on this background, Section 1.4 introduces the concept of *governance*, reviewing its contemporary interpretations and theoretical foundations. Section 1.5 examines how cities have increasingly adopted collaborative strategies, such as city networks, to address shared challenges. Finally, Section 1.6 focuses on migrant-related city networks, emphasizing their role in diversity governance.

Chapter 2 shifts to the historical and theoretical underpinnings of *culture* and the emergence of *homogeneity* as a key ideal for social stability and cohesion. Section 2.1 introduces the term *culture*, tracing its evolving meanings and usages through history. Section 2.2 examines two intellectual shifts – the *linguistic turn* and the *cultural turn* – that elevated *culture* as a key framework for understanding social phenomena. Section 2.3 addresses critical theoretical tensions that arose from these shifts, while Section 2.4 expands the discussion by introducing the concepts of *race* and *ethnicity* and exploring their historical and evolving definitions. Section 2.5 offers perspectives on cultural differences from a historical point of view, and Section 2.6 examines the emergence of *homogeneity* as a central ideal for maintaining social stability. The chapter concludes in Section 2.7 by reviewing early sociological theories of assimilation, which upheld the notion that cultural differences would eventually dissolve.

Chapter 3 advances the discussion focusing on conceptual and practical frameworks for managing cultural heterogeneity. Section 3.1 introduces the theoretical underpinnings of *cultural pluralism* and the rise of *multiculturalism* as a framework for addressing cultural differences. Section 3.2 discusses the global diffusion of multiculturalism at the programmatic-political level, while Section 3.3 examines its diffusion at the academic level. Section 3.4 reviews the expanding meanings of *multiculturalism*, leading into Section 3.5, which reviews critiques against this framework. Section 3.6 transitions to the emergence of *diversity* and *diversity governance*, with Section 3.7 addressing empirical studies on *integration* and *contact*. The chapter concludes with Section 3.8, which discusses the emergence of *interculturalism* as term to label diversity governance, and Section 3.9, which explores the rise of a contemporary debate framed as *interculturalism vs. multiculturalism*.

Chapter 4 reviews the formulation and development of diffusion theory, establishing a methodological foundation for the analysis. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 provide a historical overview of diffusion studies and the consolidation of classical diffusion theory. Section 4.3 reviews the evolution of diffusion studies in the social sciences, highlighting the geographic and organizational focuses. Section 4.4 critiques diffusion theory, while Section 4.5 introduces the tradition of policy diffusion studies. Section 4.7 reviews recent attempts to construct a cohesive framework for policy diffusion, and Section 4.8 concludes with methodological reflections for the study of diffusion.

In Chapter 5 I present my methodological framework and empirical research design. Section 5.1 outlines the general framework adopted for studying the diffusion of diversity governance, drawing on the discussions in Chapter 4. Section 5.2 integrates this framework with a *multiscalar analytical approach*, identifying cities as key entry points for comprehensive analysis. Section 5.3 explains the rationale for case selection, while Section 5.4 identifies Barcelona (Spain), Hamamatsu (Japan), and Ansan (South Korea) as the primary case studies. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 provide overviews of the empirical study and fieldwork research. The chapter concludes with reflections on the challenges encountered during the research process and considerations regarding my positionality in Section 5.7.

CHAPTER 1

Contextualizing Contemporary Governance and the Role of Cities

1.1

The Global Transition to Democracy

Democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike (Plato VIII, 558c)

The term *democracy* originates from the ancient Greek word *demokratia*, which combines *demos* (the people) and *kratia* (power or rule). This etymological meaning has persisted as we continue to use the term to refer to a form of government where citizens collectively engage in decision-making. Over time, democracy has also come to represent ideals such as human rights, equality, and social progress, extending to economic development. Yet, the assumption that democracy naturally fosters equality has been questioned by the persistence of inequality within democratic societies. Furthermore, while economic development has often been viewed as a prerequisite for democracy (a view popularized by Lipset, 1959; see also Boix, 2011), history shows that democratic practices have sometimes emerged in relatively underdeveloped societies (Stasavage, 2020, pp. 22-23).

The concept of *democracy*, along with its terminology, emerged in Athens around the 6th century BCE. Accordingly, a traditional Western-centric view holds that democracy's origins are firmly rooted in ancient Greece. Although Greece did indeed coin the term and formalize key aspects of democracy, democratic structures are a far more ancient and widespread phenomenon than this narrative suggests (Stasavage, 2020, Chapters 1-2). While electoral practices like those of Athens were rare, early forms of democracy—where rulers required the consent of councils or assemblies to govern—were common in many small-scale societies across history. Without state bureaucracies or

strong control mechanisms, leaders depended on the cooperation of their communities, particularly for resources or military support. Here, the legitimacy of rule was often contingent on communal recognition rather than hereditary rights alone.

It is relevant to underline that these early democracies differ significantly from modern forms. In place of elections, these early systems were mostly based on constant and direct participation, which differs sharply from the representative systems and episodic public participation central to contemporary democracies. Additionally, while universal suffrage is now a hallmark of democratic systems, participation in early democracies was often restricted by criteria like gender, age, and social status.

Over time, early democratic structures began to decline as societies expanded, rulers developed bureaucratic tools for government, and opportunities for people to resist autocratic systems decreased. This shift led to the rise of autocratic rule, supported by the precursors of the modern administrative systems.

The path of democracy evolved differently across regions. In Europe, democratic practices persisted in part due to the relatively weak influence of medieval rulers, who lacked strong bureaucratic mechanisms and had to negotiate with local communities. In contrast, China saw an earlier development of autocracy, supported by advances in agriculture that enabled rulers to levy taxes independently. Similarly, in the Middle East, the rise of Islam and the legacy of the centralized Sasanian Empire (224-651 CE) facilitated the transition from early democratic structures to autocratic rule.

What we recognize as modern democracy first began taking shape in England (Stasavage, 2020, Chapter 9). While other parts of Europe placed strict limits on council power, binding deputies tightly to mandates from their constituents, English monarchs in the late 13th century took a different path. They began appointing representatives to Parliament with *plena potestas* – the authority to make decisions without needing explicit approval from those they represented. This innovation laid the groundwork for a parliamentary system based on majority rule. Ironically, England's shift toward democracy was driven in part by monarchical power, which lent an autocratic undertone to its democratic evolution. Even after Parliament achieved supremacy in 1688, centralized control remained strong, preserving a degree of monarchical influence within England's emerging democratic framework.

The development of modern democracy accelerated with the spread of Enlightenment ideals and constitutionalism. A pioneering role was played by the United States, where broad suffrage rights for free white males were already established in the colonial period due to labor shortages and the need for political cooperation. Although colonial governments initially attempted top-down rule, they were

forced to share power with assemblies. The U.S. Constitution of 1787 marked a turning point, formalizing a democratic structure where representatives were less frequently elected, no longer bound by mandates, and supported by a central state bureaucracy. However, democracy in the U.S. also faced significant challenges, including the tragic institution of slavery, which subjected Africans to labor exploitation and severe restrictions on freedom, contrasting sharply with the rights enjoyed by white settlers.

The French Revolution (1791) was another pivotal event, greatly contributing to the consolidation and diffusion of a general “*rights consciousness*” (e.g., Kymlicka, 2007; Engels, 2012), whereby demands for equality and justice started being articulated in terms of universal rights. As nationalism and colonialism intensified between the 18th and 19th centuries, this new consciousness became precious for the formulation of new discourses that questioned absolute political authority and promoted limitations on its scope.

Modern democracy, first rooted in Anglo-American contexts, gradually spread to other European-settled regions and, eventually, to nations gaining independence from colonial powers. By the late 20th century, democracy’s appeal had become so universal that even non-democratic governments adopted democratic labels. Factors such as state weaknesses, leaders’ reliance on popular support, and traditions of practices of collective ruling have all played roles in this global diffusion of democratic ideals.

The global transition to modern democracy is traditionally divided into three waves, as famously identified by political scientist Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1991). Each wave brought substantial increases in the number of democratic governments worldwide but was followed by “reverse waves” (Huntington, 1991, p. 17), during which authoritarian regimes re-emerged in response to setbacks in democratic momentum.

The first wave of democratization, which Huntington called the “long” wave (Huntington, 1991, p. 12), began in the early 19th century and continued until 1926. This shift was sparked by the expansion of suffrage in the United States in the 1820s, as voting rights extended to a broader portion of the male population. Democratic movements then spread across Europe and Latin America, establishing democratic structures in countries like France, Britain, and several newly independent Latin American nations. During this period, voting rights for women also began to gain ground in these nascent democracies. By 1926, around 29 democratic governments had emerged globally.

Several factors underpinned the first wave, including the rise of liberal thought, the influence of Enlightenment ideals on individual rights, and the models provided by the American and French Revolutions, which inspired other nations to pursue democratic reforms. However, this wave also met resistance. The first significant reverse wave occurred in the 1920s, as authoritarian and fascist

regimes gained traction, with Benito Mussolini's ascent to power in Italy in 1922 serving as a notable example. By 1942, the number of democracies had dwindled to just 12, as many countries fell to fascism, communism, or military rule.

The second wave of democratization unfolded after World War II, lasting until the early 1960s. This wave was largely driven by Allied efforts to instill democratic institutions in Germany and Japan, as well as by the widespread decolonization movements that saw the rise of new democracies across Asia and Africa. These developments were closely intertwined with another significant shift arising from the global trauma of World War II: the establishment of a new world order, often referred to as the "human rights revolution," cementing a global right consciousness and affirming the value of equality (Iriye et al., 2012).

This shift was formally marked by the adoption of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948, which catalyzed a decline in entrenched social hierarchies, bolstered the spread of democratic principles, and encouraged the development of institutions that limited the power of dominant groups over individuals and minority communities. The rise of international organizations like the United Nations reinforced this new framework, acting as a global guardian of these democratic and human rights ideals (Bantekas & Oette, 2013). By 1962, the number of democratic governments worldwide had increased to 36, reflecting the influence of this transformative period.

Nonetheless, the second wave encountered its own reverse wave starting in the 1960s, as political instability, economic underdevelopment, and social unrest destabilized new democracies, particularly in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. This led to the resurgence of military coups, authoritarian regimes, and one-party states, reducing the number of democracies to around 30 by the mid-1970s.

The third wave, which began in the 1970s, marked one of the most dramatic expansions of democracy. Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries transitioned to democratic systems, nearly doubling the global count. This wave was catalyzed by multiple factors, including the growing legitimacy crisis faced by authoritarian regimes, which found it increasingly difficult to justify their rule as democratic values became more globally accepted. The economic challenges of the 1970s also highlighted the inefficiencies of authoritarian governments, further weakening these regimes.

Several unique dynamics fueled the third wave. One was the global economic growth of the 1960s, which elevated living standards, expanded access to education, and nurtured a larger, more politically active middle class that began demanding greater participation in politics. Changes within the Catholic Church also played a role. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) marked a shift in the Church's stance, as it began opposing authoritarian regimes and supporting democratic movements, particularly in Latin America and Southern Europe. External actors, including the European

Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union, also influenced democratization by promoting or withdrawing support for authoritarian governments.

The third wave spread through a “snowballing” (Huntington, 1991, p. 13) effect, with early democratic transitions in Spain and Portugal inspiring similar movements across Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. The collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe further accelerated this trend, leading to the fall of communist regimes in countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia by 1990.

This wave, however, faced its own challenges as some new democracies struggled to consolidate, and authoritarianism re-emerged in nations like Sudan and Nigeria in the early 1990s. These reverse waves were fueled by factors such as weak democratic values among elites, severe economic crises that incited social unrest, and interference from non-democratic powers. Moreover, challenges like political polarization, the rise of populist movements, and weak institutions made it difficult for some countries to sustain democratic norms.

In conclusion, the global transition to democracy reflects a dynamic evolution of political systems striving to balance power between citizens and rulers, embodying the enduring aspirations for collective decision-making and individual rights. Yet, the expansion of democracy has not been a linear process but rather an intricate and often uneven evolution, marked by significant progress, as well as periods of regression. Persistent inequalities within democratic societies continue to expose the limitations of achieving true political equality. Economic crises, political polarization, and weak institutional frameworks further threaten the stability and consolidation of democratic governance. The trajectory of democracy is shaped by the complex interplay of socioeconomic forces, cultural transformations, and international dynamics, underscoring its reliance on both internal reforms and favorable external conditions.

1.2

The Neoliberal Turn

Neoliberalism, as a political-economic framework, encompasses a set of ideas that have profoundly shaped modern capitalism, influencing policymaking and administrative systems across much of the

globe (Harvey, 2005; Steger & Roy, 2010; Springer et al., 2016; Biebricher, 2018). At its core, neoliberal thought centers on the belief that individual freedom is best secured through free markets and free trade (Harvey, 2005, p. 7). Advocating for minimal state intervention, neoliberalism seeks to position market forces as the most efficient means of resource distribution. This approach sharply critiques state-led economies, such as those seen in socialist and Keynesian welfare states, viewing them as restrictive to individual liberty and prone to resource misallocation (Hayek, 1944). However, the real-world implementation of neoliberalism has often resulted in tendencies toward authoritarianism, increased social inequality and insecurity, and uneven geographical development (Navarro, 2007; Peck et al., 2009; Palley, 2021).

Neoliberalism's discourse and impact have varied significantly across different countries, shaped by each nation's unique pragmatic and historical contexts. This diversity suggests that neoliberalism is best understood not as a cohesive ideology but as a "loose bundle of processes" (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 353) adapted to local histories, geographies, and societal structures.

Despite these variations, two consistent themes emerge. First, there is a recognizable global diffusion of neoliberal ideologies and policies, constituting what can be framed in terms of a *global neoliberal turn*, beginning in earnest from the 1990s. Second, neoliberalism consistently aims to the *restoration of class power*, coupled with the entrenchment of social inequalities (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; see also Harvey, 2005, p. 16).

Neoliberal policies were first implemented during the economic restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s, especially in Chile (Edwards, 2023), the United States (Rasmus, 2020), and the United Kingdom (Ledger, 2018). The reforms undertaken by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK (*Thatcherism*) and President Ronald Reagan in the U.S. (*Reaganomics*) are often seen as landmark examples of neoliberalism in practice, influencing economic policies across much of the developed world. Later, under the so-called *Third Way* politics, successors like U.S. President Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair extended neoliberal principles, blending them with more socially interventionist approaches (Peck & Tickell, 2002).

The spread of neoliberalism was not merely restricted to the sector of financial management; its success was anchored in a carefully constructed strategic consensus that aligned corporate interests with populist, cultural, and religious movements (Harvey, 2005, Chapter 2). Neoliberal leaders skillfully appropriated the language of the 1968 political upheavals – which emphasized personal freedoms – to legitimize an agenda of deregulation, privatization, and an ostensibly hands-off government approach. By framing free markets and entrepreneurialism as essential to economic growth and personal liberty, neoliberalism resonated with postmodern ideals of consumer choice, individual responsibility, and autonomy.

Paradoxically, while neoliberalism advocated for minimal state interference, its creation and sustenance have required significant state intervention, especially to embed and expand market-driven systems. This dependence on state power has been most evident in times of crisis when neoliberal policies have survived only through extensive government support for financial and business sectors.

In general, neoliberal states have naturally prioritized capital accumulation and pro-business environments over public welfare and democratic principles. In particular, the emphasis on market dynamics has often cast trade unions and collective social movements as obstacles to economic growth, leading to policies that eroded these institutions. This shift resulted in lower wages, diminished job security, and a reduced social safety net. This approach frequently fostered an authoritarian stance that placed the interests of capitalist elites above those of the working class, undermining collective efforts toward equality and social justice.

This approach is further reflected in the systematic privatization of public sectors, including welfare, education, and healthcare, under neoliberal ideals of accountability, cost-efficiency, market-driven principles, and outcome-focused management. This shift was justified by critiques of previous public management as inefficient, with the neoliberal lens framing many resource allocations as *wasteful*. Accompanying privatization reforms, a narrative emerged around personal responsibility, often portraying systemic inequalities as individual failures. In this view, sectors like health and education are perceived not as shared responsibilities but as burdens that individuals, rather than the state, should shoulder.

New Public Management (NPM) emerged as a primary vehicle for implementing neoliberal ideals within the public sector, promoting close collaboration between the state and private corporations, often through public-private partnerships that shift risks to the public while benefiting private interests (for an overview of NPM, see Lane, 2000). At its core, NPM applies business-oriented models to public administration, championing efficiency through competition, outsourcing public services to private firms, and incentivizing performance in public organizations.

Unlike traditional bureaucratic models, which rely on hierarchical control and strict procedural norms, NPM encourages *flexibility*, *autonomy*, and a *results-oriented approach*. Public employees are urged to view citizens as *customers* and to deliver services that maximize value and satisfaction. *Accountability* is another key dimension of NPM against the opacity of traditional hierarchical systems. This is ensured through rigorous performance metrics, holding managers and employees accountable for outcomes rather than processes, and fostering a culture that prizes efficiency, productivity, and innovation.

The privatization and adoption of NPM in neoliberal states have contributed to a blurring of state and corporate interests, weakening representative democracy and supplanting it with an elite-driven decision-making process rooted in business priorities and corporate logic. The rise of corporate lobbying exemplifies the corrupting influence of money in politics, reinforcing class inequalities under a business-centered ethos.

Another contradiction within neoliberalism lies in its relationship with nationalism. Although neoliberal theory advocates for global market integration, states frequently invoke nationalism to secure citizen loyalty and facilitate neoliberal reforms. For example, Margaret Thatcher harnessed nationalist sentiment during the Falklands War (1982) and expressed opposition to European integration as part of her broader neoliberal agenda (Steger & Roy, 2010, pp. 45-49).

The inherent instability of neoliberalism has, in some instances, created fertile ground for neoconservatism, a movement that similarly aims to restore class power but emphasizes order and traditional values. Neoconservatism often focused on militarization and authoritarian ruling, particularly in response to perceived internal and external threats, such as radical Islam or dissident movements. This shift toward authoritarianism was evident in the United States, where neoconservatives have leveraged concerns over security to justify increased militarization, surveillance, and the promotion of conservative values, including family-centered morality and opposition to progressive movements such as feminism and LGBTQ+ rights (Harvey, 2005, pp. 81-86).

1.3

The Local Turn and the Rise of Cities: Between Democratization and Entrepreneurialism

In the broader context of a global shift toward democracy and neoliberalism, another significant trend has been emerging: political decentralization often conceptualized as a *local turn* in politics. This shift represents the movement of political focus from the national to local dimension, where regional and municipal authorities gain greater autonomy to address local needs, and preferences, and engage citizens directly in political decision-making (see, for example, Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983; Regulski, 1988; Falleti, 2005; Carrasco et al., 2023).

Political decentralization can take many forms, including devolving power to local governments, increasing citizen participation in politics, and empowering community-based organizations. By bringing political authority closer to the people, decentralization ideally fosters transparency, accountability, and responsiveness, contributing to a more inclusive and representative political system. However, its implementation has often been intertwined with neoliberal ideologies, which influence its goals and outcomes in ways that may diverge from purely democratic ideals.

The global trend toward decentralization gained momentum alongside the third wave of democratization beginning in the 1970s, accelerating after the Cold War as many countries transitioned from authoritarian to democratic systems. Decentralization became a tool for fostering democratic transitions, particularly in developing nations emerging from centralized rule. It was seen as a mechanism for building legitimate political systems, establishing checks and balances, and preventing power from re-consolidating in a single authoritarian center.

International organizations, including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), began promoting decentralization as part of their democratization agendas. They argued that decentralization could help mitigate conflicts, reduce corruption, and enhance social inclusion in transitioning countries. This global push for decentralization also aligned with human rights efforts, reinforcing pathways for marginalized and previously oppressed groups to participate in policymaking.

The rise of neoliberalism has significantly shaped this local turn (see Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck et al., 2009). Rooted in the belief that the state should act primarily as an enabler, neoliberalism regards the centralist state as an impediment to efficient administration. In contrast to hierarchical, centralized structures, neoliberal ideals emphasize flexibility, accountability, and efficiency. In particular, centralized governments are seen as poorly suited to address the diverse social, economic, and cultural needs of varied communities within a nation, with inefficiencies in resource allocation and service delivery.

From this perspective, political decentralization naturally aligns with fiscal decentralization, transferring financial management from central to local governments. Local governments, being closer to their communities, are seen as better positioned both to understand local needs and to manage resources effectively, with greater accountability to their constituents. Understandably, decentralization has become a cornerstone of New Public Management, which seeks to bring decision-making closer to service providers, improve responsiveness to local needs, and enable managers to allocate resources flexibly and efficiently.

Within the general context of this local turn, cities have emerged as pivotal actors, both advancing democratic principles and navigating neoliberal policies (Work, 2002). First, cities have become new

frontiers for democratic engagement, fostering inclusive and accessible platforms that encourage bottom-up participation from civil society and build social capital (Barber, 2013). Mechanisms like participatory budgeting, neighborhood councils, and local referenda empower residents to influence local politics, reinforcing democratic participation in ways often unattainable at the national level (Lefebvre, 1996).

Cities have also become spaces where a new concept of political belonging has been taking shape: *substantive citizenship* (Marshall, 1950). Unlike *formal citizenship*, which is the abstract recognition of legal status within a specific normative framework, substantive citizenship emphasizes individuals' actual engagement with civic life, from exercising rights to participating in public decision-making (Isin & Turner, 2007). Cities, with their proximity to residents, provide fertile ground for fostering this form of citizenship, where individuals feel empowered to engage with local politics, assert their rights, and meaningfully influence their communities. Urban policies focused on social capital and community-driven projects further enable marginalized groups to integrate and participate in urban life.

Cities are also crucial in advancing minority rights and addressing social exclusion – a key area of focus in this dissertation. As hubs of migration and cultural differences, cities are continually adapting to changing demographics. Increasingly, cities implement policies that support historically marginalized communities, such as immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities (Varsanyi, 2006). This aligns with Lefebvre's "right to the city" concept, which asserts that all inhabitants deserve full participation in urban life, regardless of their background (Lefebvre, 1996). This shift toward local, inclusive politics is especially evident in migration and integration policies (Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014, Introduction; Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017; Caponio et al., 2019). Thus, cities represent not only physical spaces of contemporary democratic life but also conceptual spaces where new forms of citizenship and democratic engagement are envisioned and enacted.

While cities play a pivotal role in advancing democratic ideals, they also act as focal points for neoliberal agendas. Cities have become strategic spaces for attracting capital and reshaping urban policies, institutions, and administration to prioritize market-driven growth (Harvey, 1989; Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Peck & Tickell, 2002). In an era of fiscal constraints, neoliberal governments often rely on cities to implement market-driven policies and scale back national welfare systems (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck et al., 2009; Morange & Fol, 2014). This environment has fostered increased intercity competition for funding and investment, especially in the context of global financial capital flows and location strategies of transnational corporations (Baycan-Levent et al., 2010, p. 1187).

Scholars have conceptualized this shift of cities towards growth-centric, innovation-oriented administrations in terms of "urban entrepreneurialism" (Harvey, 1989; 2005; Parkinson & Harding,

1995; Jessop, 1997; 1998; Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Brenner & Theodore, 2002). David Harvey famously defined urban entrepreneurialism as an administrative approach centered on public-private partnerships, targeting external funding, investment, and speculative ventures like property development (Harvey, 1989). This approach includes efforts to revitalize city images by building commercial, cultural, and industrial centers – strategies usually referred to as “the political economy of place” (Logan & Molotch, 2007).

This entrepreneurial model is evident in high-profile projects designed to attract investors and tourists. However, urban entrepreneurialism has progressively expanded to include goals such as attracting public finance, fostering innovation, and enhancing resident well-being (e.g., Kim, 2000; John, 2001; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Geddes, 2005; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Considine & Giguère, 2008; Choi et al., 2009; Kersting et al., 2009). Practices like city marketing, tax incentives, and land zoning have become common strategies for driving economic growth and urban development (e.g., Ashworth & Voogd, 1990; Kearns & Philo, 1993; Paddison, 1993; Gold & Ward, 1994; Ward, 1998; Kotler et al., 1999; Bradley et al., 2002; Doel & Hubbard, 2002; Kavaratzis, 2007). In this setting, *city branding* – also in terms of *remaking* the city image and *repositioning* it on both national and international levels – has emerged as a general tactic for cities striving to cultivate competitive identities (Jessop 1997; 1998; Jessop & Sum, 2000; Wu, 2003; Donald et al., 2009; Dinnie, 2010). Crucially, branding often entails reconfiguring urban policies and political approaches to align with the desired image

An important aspect for this dissertation is the intersection of economic growth, migration, and cultural heterogeneity, which has increasingly become a focal point in urban studies (Baycan-Levent, 2010; Syrett & Sepulveda, 2011; 2012). High-skilled migrants are widely seen as assets that enhance a city’s global competitiveness and prestige (e.g., Lam, 2000; Saxenian, 2000; 2002; Sassen 2001; Florida, 2003; Ewers, 2007; Florida et al., 2008; Yeoh, 2005). In particular, migrant entrepreneurs are viewed as vital drivers of local economic development (Rodríguez-Pose & Hardy, 2015). Moreover, cities are increasingly incorporating ethnic diversity into tourism and urban planning, with neighborhoods like Chinatowns serving as cultural hubs that attract visitors, thus demonstrating the potential intersection of diversity, economic development, and local politics (e.g., Rath, 2007; Syrett & Sepulveda, 2012; Schmiz, 2017).

The intersection of decentralization, neoliberalism, and democratization brings both opportunities and challenges. Decentralization has empowered local governments to innovate, granting them autonomy to address local issues more effectively. Successful cases have improved public services and enhanced civic engagement and political participation. By enabling local governments to manage resources independently, decentralization potentially fosters accountability and transparency.

However, decentralization also faces challenges, especially when implemented without adequate institutional or financial support. Neoliberal-inspired decentralization often prioritizes cost-cutting and efficiency over social equity, leading to disparities between affluent and less affluent regions. As fiscal responsibility shifts to local authorities, economic inequalities can deepen, leaving under-resourced regions struggling to meet basic needs (e.g., Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012). In countries with underdeveloped local capacities, decentralization can amplify existing inequalities and power dynamics.

Moreover, decentralization can result in a fragmentation of the administration, where coordination gaps between local and national policies create inefficiencies. Competing local governments may implement conflicting policies, leading to overlapping responsibilities and reduced efficacy in policymaking and policy implementation. Additionally, there is a risk of *local capture*, where powerful local elites dominate, reducing transparency and inclusivity.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of political decentralization is highly context-dependent, requiring not only the transfer of power to local governments but also robust institutional support, adequate resources, and accountability mechanisms. Yet, cities remain the crucial actors in this process, shaping both the democratic and neoliberal transitions and redefining urban life in an evermore interconnected world.

1.4

Framing Governance

The term *governance* originates from the Latin root *gubernare*, itself derived from the Greek verb *kybernan*, meaning *to pilot* or *to steer*. The Greek term was adopted into Latin, retaining its original meaning, and from the Latin *gubernare* came the noun *gubernum*, which referred to a *ship's wheel*. Over time, *gubernare* and *gubernum* evolved into the meanings we now associate with *govern* and *government*. From the root *gubern-*, the Medieval Latin term *gubernantia* emerged, laying the foundation for the modern concept of governance.

Since ancient times, thinkers like Boethius and Thomas Aquinas used *gubernantia* to describe methods for guiding and governing diverse entities, from boats to families and cities (De Mauro,

2006). The term traveled through languages like Spanish (*gobernanza*) and French (*gouvernance*) before arriving in English as *governance*.

Until the latter half of the 20th century, *governance* remained relatively marginal in the social sciences and humanities (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 5). This changed dramatically in 1979 with Oliver Williamson's seminal work, *Transaction Costs Economics: Governance of Contractual Relations*, which soon became one of the most cited texts in economic literature. Williamson explored how firms and markets govern economic transactions, defining *governance structure* as "the institutional framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided" (Williamson, 1979, p. 240).

Williamson's work ignited significant interest in governance, and in the following decades, *corporate governance* became a dominant area of study. By the early 21st century, the concept of governance had expanded considerably, establishing itself as an analytical category across various research fields and disciplines (Levi-Faur, 2012, pp. 5-6; Peters, 2012, p. 19).

Despite its widespread use, *governance* remains a fluid and multifaceted concept, with interpretations that scholars adapt creatively to suit their needs. Traditionally, governance was understood as "the general exercise of authority" in both public and private institutions, aimed at maintaining control and ensuring accountability (Lynn, 2012, 49; Michalski et al., 2001, 9). This understanding often equated governance with government, reflecting a state-centered approach to societal management.

Since the 1990s, however, new interpretations of governance have emerged, distinguishing it from government and focusing on decentralized, pluralistic forms of governing rooted in civil society. This broadened perspective views governance as encompassing "the structures and practices that coordinate social relations marked by complex, reciprocal interdependence" (Jessop, 2011, 2). More specifically, governance is understood as operating within a multi-level framework that spans:

- *A transnational dimension*, involving conventions, agreements, and regulations across nations, including national governments, NGOs, and network-based structures operating in transnational contexts.
- *A national dimension*, grounded in national legal and political frameworks, with contributions from government institutions and civil society organizations.
- *A local/regional dimension*, based on local/regional frameworks and practices promoted by local governments and civil society actors.

Out of this reconceptualization, two distinct approaches to governance have emerged: *governance with government* and *governance without government* (Lynn 2012, 50). These approaches reflect

different perspectives on the role of governmental and non-governmental actors in decision-making and social coordination.

The expression of *governance with government* refers to a model where government institutions, while still important, are no longer the sole actors responsible for managing societal issues. Instead, governance becomes a collaborative process that involves a wide range of actors, including public institutions, private companies, NGOs, and civil society organizations (Klijn, 2008; Skelcher, 2010). The government retains a central role but shares power and responsibility with other stakeholders to collectively address societal challenges. In this way, the government's role shifts toward that of a facilitator or coordinator rather than an all-powerful authority.

The idea of *partnership* emerges as a key feature of the model of *governance with government* (e.g., Davies, 2011; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Berardo et al., 2020). Governments recognize their limitations and partner with non-state actors, leveraging their resources, expertise, and legitimacy. This collaborative approach frequently aims to foster more democratic decision-making by encouraging citizen participation and ensuring that diverse voices are represented. Although power is distributed, the government still holds formal authority, particularly in creating legal frameworks, setting standards, and enforcing compliance.

In contrast, *governance without government* conceptualizes governance as driven primarily by non-governmental actors. Scholars suggest this model is increasingly prevalent in advanced industrial democracies (Peters & Pierre, 1998). In this approach, governance mechanisms function without depending on government authority or sanctions (Stoker, 1998). Instead, non-state actors – including private companies, civil society organizations, and global networks – take on governance roles, influencing outcomes even in the absence of direct government control.

This model implies that governance can emerge organically from social interactions and agreements among non-governmental stakeholders, with horizontal networks, rather than state-led hierarchies, shaping governance processes. This perspective has gained traction in sectors like environmental governance, where global organizations, transnational corporations, and local communities often bypass governments to tackle challenges such as climate change.

In recent years, definitions of governance have moved beyond the binary distinction between government and non-government actors to develop a more comprehensive framework for understanding how societies are managed. From this perspective, governance is defined as “institutionalized modes of social coordination” that enable the establishment of binding rules and the provision of collective goods (Risse, 2013, p. 83). This definition encompasses governance by the state, through public-private networks, and via non-state actors, reflecting the multifaceted and interconnected structures that characterize contemporary governance.

Today, it is widely accepted that a shift in governance has taken place in the past few decades, arising from the interplay of democratic transitions, the diffusion of neoliberal policies, and the local turn in politics. Together, these forces have spurred a move away from traditional, hierarchical government structures toward more networked and participatory approaches. These transformations reflect a changing nature of power and authority: centralized state control is increasingly giving way to governance frameworks that incorporate a diverse range of actors operating at multiple levels. This evolution is often described as a transition from *government to governance* (Rhodes, 1997; Milward & Provan, 2000; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Bellamy & Palumbo, 2010).

This expanded view acknowledges the limitations of traditional government structures, especially in addressing transnational or cross-border issues. The rise of global networks and the growing role of cities and civil society actors have all become essential features of the modern governance landscape. Today, governance is increasingly focused not on centralized authority but on managing complex relationships and fostering cooperation across diverse, interconnected actors.

1.5

The Contemporary Ecosystem of City Networks

“While nations talk, cities act” together with “The future belongs to the city” are two frequently heard slogans well capturing a widely held belief in the increasingly pivotal role cities and local governments play on the global stage. Although now commonly recognized as key actors on the global stage, cities did not always command this level of importance.

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, as nationalism flourished, cities were often regarded as peripheral players in a world dominated by nation-states (Abrams, 1978, p. 27). Max Weber, one of the era’s most influential thinkers, noted the diminished role of cities due to the rise of centralized bureaucracies and state diplomacy (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, p. 328). According to Weber “as the State took over the city, the city disappeared” (Sutcliffe, 1983, p. 263), a view echoed by Don Martindale, who famously declared in his 1958 preface to Weber’s *The City* that “the age of the city seems to be at an end” (Weber, 1958, p. 190).

Yet, even under the shadow of powerful nation-states, cities managed to retain their unique identity and agency. Their economic, political, and sociocultural dynamics demonstrated resilience, showing

that their development and paths, while subject to the influence of national and global shifts, were not wholly determined by them (Rodger, 1993; Jansen, 2001). Not only did cities represent the stage for pivotal events driving historical change – such as the protests and revolutions of the 19th century –, but they also began to actively engage in movements with international scope. Notably, the city planning movement emerged as a means of collective spatial and architectural expression through municipal action (Ward, 2000; Meller, 2001). Already in the late 19th century, planning techniques and ideas were spreading globally across cities through conferences, lecture tours, and study visits (Saunier, 2001). Within these emerging networks, modern municipalist ideas began to take root, foreshadowing the prominent role cities would eventually assume.

Throughout the 20th century, it progressively became clear that cities were more than mere pawns in state politics. The local turn in politics highlighted the growing influence of cities as actors in both national and international arenas, while globalization propelled some cities into critical hubs of international commerce and finance. Jerome Friedman’s “world city hypothesis” (Friedmann, 1986) and Saskia Sassen’s concept of the “global city” (Sassen, 1991; 1994) captured this transformation, depicting these cities as centers of capital accumulation and as critical nodes within global politics and economics. By the turn of the millennium, both the academia and public discourse had rekindled interest in the role of cities – as the title of a recent Sciences Po Paris project aptly summarized: “Cities are back in town”¹.

Today, cities are widely acknowledged as key players in tackling the major challenges of our time – challenges that are often shaped by global dynamics beyond any single government's control. However, cities frequently lack the authority and resources necessary to address these issues effectively. As a result, they must continually negotiate their role within multi-level governance frameworks, working to influence national and international agendas to create policies and frameworks that better align with their needs (De Losada & Abdullah, 2019, pp. 19-20).

One of the primary ways cities have asserted their influence is by forming formal, institutional networks. Research shows that city networks offer numerous advantages (e.g., Jarillo, 1993; Castells, 1996; Van den Berg et al., 2001). According to Roberta Capello’s *city network paradigm*, networks not only provide cities with the critical mass required to exert political weight but also function as platforms for sharing experiences, exchanging knowledge, and initiating joint projects (Capello, 2000). Adam Marshall further conceptualized the strategic value of city networks by distinguishing between a “download” and an “upload” dimension (Marshall, 2005). Specifically, through networking, cities learn how to cooperate and gain benefits from the international arena (download) while also advocating for their priorities on international agendas (upload).

1

Accompanying the global shift from government to governance and the advent of new communication technologies, city networks proliferated toward the late 20th century. Beginning in the late 1980s, this trend accelerated, leading to an unprecedented boom in the number and scope of city networks, which have continued to expand rapidly on the global stage (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Visual representation of the yearly increase in the number of city networks (Acuto et al. 2016: 7).

Given the central role city networks play, studying them is essential to fully grasp how local governments are responding to today's pressing challenges and the pivotal role they occupy in this context. Surprisingly, however, research on city networks remains limited, as often highlighted by scholars in the field (Payre, 2010; Garcia-Chueca 2019). While case-specific studies exist, no comprehensive effort has been made to systematically examine or map the phenomenon.

The first challenge in studying city networks lies in defining the subject itself. City networks are complex, constantly evolving structures that span multiple governance levels, addressing diverse topics and involving a wide range of actors. Navigating this intricate ecosystem requires a systematic approach, which can be organized around five dimensions:

- *Size*: City networks range widely, from small groups of select cities to expansive international networks encompassing thousands of members.
- *Membership*: Alongside traditional city networks – often referred to as “public membership networks” (De Losada & Abdullah, 2019, p. 19) – that are composed exclusively of local or regional governments, today many platforms have mixed memberships, incorporating civil society organizations, private sector actors, foundations, universities, and research institutions.
- *Administrative structures*: Organizational structures vary significantly, often reflecting the origins, developmental histories, and specific interests of each network. Some networks, especially national ones, are member-administered, while others, such as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), have dedicated administrative offices and staff. Privately led city platforms like the Global Parliament of Mayors, C40, and 100 Resilient Cities, often founded by philanthropic organizations or influential individuals, tend to have well-funded, efficient administrative frameworks.
- *Coverage*: City networks address a wide array of social and political issues. Environmental concerns are currently among the most prominent areas of focus (Acuto & Rayner, 2016, p. 1153), but networks also tackle issues like poverty, gender inequality, migration, and social justice. While many networks specialize in certain areas, most operate as multipurpose platforms.
- *Scope*: While national city networks remain numerically dominant, the presence of regional and global networks is steadily increasing (Acuto & Rayner, 2016, p. 1151).

Another major challenge for the study of city networks is the lack of standardized methods for data collection, which hampers efforts to gather consistent information on networks, including active membership data. Recent estimates suggest that approximately 200 city networks operate internationally (Acuto & Rayner, 2016, p. 1148). However, this figure is tentative, based on a sample of 170 cases, with the authors acknowledging its subjective nature. Although member lists are often publicly available, determining which cities actively participate – and which are only nominal members – is difficult. Moreover, information on specific representatives within the network, their expertise, and their degree of authority in representing their cities is rarely disclosed.

A productive starting point for addressing these challenges is to provide a proper historical contextualization, offering insights into the development of today’s rich ecosystem of city networks. Indeed, much of the related literature, unfortunately, tended to present city networks as a sort of ahistorical, existing solely as byproducts of globalization, connectivity, and internationalization (Payre, 2010). This perspective overlooks the reciprocal relationship between city networking and

these global dimensions. Rather than city networks existing purely because of globalization and connectivity, cities themselves often become more globally integrated through their network participation.

Furthermore, a historical analysis of city networks reveals how ideological and socio-cultural factors have significantly shaped their evolution. This perspective highlights that city networks are not merely reactive to global trends but are also active in shaping them, underscoring the deeper, more complex dynamics that influence their role in the modern world.

1.6

Migration-related City Networks

Migration governance, including the management of cultural heterogeneity, has undoubtedly emerged as one of the foremost challenges facing contemporary societies. Traditionally, the regulation of migration has been considered a core responsibility of national governments. Even today, control over borders remains a key aspect of national sovereignty, despite efforts by supranational bodies (such as the EU) and international treaties (such as the 1951 *UN Refugee Convention*) to influence these prerogatives (see Joppke, 1998). The broad acceptance of states' authority to control migration flows has also led to the assumption that national governments should lead in addressing migration-related issues, including the integration of migrants. This perspective has long shaped both policymaking and migration research, often sidelining the potential role of local governments in migration governance.

However, as national competencies have increasingly been decentralized and as cities have become crucial players in multi-level governance, there has been a shift in focus toward local-level involvement in migration management. Cities are now emerging as key actors in the governance of migration, cultural diversity, and social inclusion, a development closely connected to the rise of a specific category of new transnational actors: namely “migration-related city networks” (Lacroix, 2021).

The roots of migration-related networks can be traced back to the 1980s, with the birth of the *sanctuary city* movement in the United States. In 1985, mobilized by civil society activists,

particularly Christian groups advocating for asylum seekers' rights, San Francisco passed the *City of Refuge* resolution. This measure, driven by opposition to federal deportation policies, committed city employees, including law enforcement, to refrain from reporting undocumented migrants to immigration authorities. San Francisco's actions set a powerful example that quickly spread, creating a decentralized movement that united like-minded cities across the country (De Graauw, 2014; Bauder, 2017).

In Europe, migration began appearing on the agendas of city networks in the early 1990s. Initially, only a few established platforms, such as the Council of European Municipalities and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, incorporated migration into their initiatives. By the turn of the millennium, however, Europe experienced a notable surge in migration-focused city networks. This growth was not solely a reaction to evolving migration dynamics but was also part of the broader city network boom that marked the late 20th century (Lacroix, 2021, p. 11-15).

In this initial phase, European migration networks were largely influenced by national governments or European institutions, which actively encouraged the creation of new migration-focused networks or advocated for the inclusion of migration issues within existing platforms (Lacroix, 2021, pp. 7-8). This dynamic stands in contrast to more contentious approaches characterizing the North American context, where cities frequently aligned with civil society groups to challenge federal immigration policies.

However, since the so-called migration crisis of 2015, Europe has also seen a rise in activist city networks, particularly in the Mediterranean region (see Furri, 2017; Oomen, 2019; Russell, 2019; Del Biaggio et al., 2019; Lacroix et al., 2020). Confronted with national governments' limited response to the humanitarian influx from the Middle East and Africa, grassroots networks of cities took shape across Europe, reminiscent of the sanctuary city movement in the United States. Civil society organizations played a pivotal role in the spread of these networks in Europe as well, highlighting how grassroots activism remains essential in the formation of migration-focused city networks on both a local and global scale (Lacroix, 2021, p. 15).

This brings us to the current ecosystem of migration-related city networks. The most comprehensive categorization and mapping of these platforms was recently conducted by Thomas Lacroix (Lacroix, 2021), who analyzed a database of 64 prominent migration-related city networks worldwide. As Lacroix acknowledges, this inventory is not exhaustive, particularly with regard to non-Western cases – for example, my research has identified at least five migration-focused city networks across Japan and South Korea, while Lacroix's inventory includes only two networks for the whole of Asia. Yet, this systematization remains a significant resource for getting an overview of the scope and characteristics of these networks.

First, Lacroix's database identifies four categories of actors involved in migration-related city networks: (a) specialized platforms dedicated to integration, migration, or asylum issues; (b) generalist organizations where migration features as a prominent focus; (c) project-based networks with a limited lifespan, usually initiated by national or international institutions; and (d) institutional forums representing local authorities.

In terms of geography, Lacroix's data indicate that migration-related city networks are still predominantly a European phenomenon, with a growing presence in Africa and the Americas. Despite the risk of being flawed by a Western-centric bias, this observation aligns with Europe's longstanding institutionalized political space for local governments, which has fostered the emergence of a high quantity of regional networks (see Ewen & Hebbert, 2007; Baycan-Levent et al., 2010).

Lacroix categorizes migration-related city networks according to their mode of creation and their national or transnational scope. At the national level, he identifies two main types of networks:

- *Grassroots activist networks* – Formed independently or with minimal state support, these networks range from those openly challenging national policies (e.g., sanctuary cities) to those filling a policy void where national guidance is absent (e.g., the Committee of Cities with a Concentration of Foreign Population).
- *National coopted organizations* – Typically composed of national municipal associations (e.g., the Federation of Canadian Municipalities), these organizations operate within official state frameworks. Consequently, they tend to be less politically outspoken compared to grassroots networks.

At the transnational level, Lacroix outlines three categories:

- *Grassroots generalist organizations* – These platforms address a range of issues, including migration, and were created to advocate for specific city interests at the regional (e.g., Eurocities) or global level (e.g., the Global Parliament of Mayors).
- *Coopted generalist organizations* – Unlike grassroots organizations, these represent local authorities and are linked to large international bodies (e.g., United Cities and Local Governments, or UCLG).
- *Specialized networks focused exclusively on migration* – These include both spontaneous activist networks promoting a pro-immigrant agenda on an international scale (e.g., the International Cities of Refuge Network) and coopted networks initiated by international organizations (e.g., the International Coalition of Cities Against Racism).

Based on available data, several distinctions between grassroots and coopted networks emerge. Coopted platforms, with greater financial resources, engage in a broader range of activities. In contrast, grassroots networks focus primarily on knowledge-sharing and the dissemination of best practices, reflecting their limited access to project funding. Despite their smaller budgets, grassroots networks tend to engage more actively in policy advocacy and lobbying, emphasizing their commitment to driving change from the bottom up.

CHAPTER 2

The Emergence of *Culture* and the Invention of Homogeneity

2.1

Meaning(s) of *Culture*: History of a Polysemic Term

Ranked among the 1,000 most frequent words² in a language with over a million lemmas,³ *culture* stands out as one of the most intricate English words (Williams, 1997, p. 49). As a prime example of a polysemantic word, *culture* finds application in various contexts, ranging from everyday conversations to specialized disciplines. The term originated from the Latin *cultura*, which, in turn, has its roots in the verb *colĕre*. The uses of the verb encompassed three distinct meanings:

- *To inhabit*, that is a meaning preserved in the English word *colony* and all its derivatives, such as *colonization* and *colonialism*.
- *To honor*, which gave rise to the modern term *cult*, denoting devotion, worship, or even a lay form of reverence for a specific entity (in this sense, for example, we talk about a *cult movie*).
- *To cultivate*, referring to the act of cultivating the land.

In ancient times, *cultura* primarily referred to the *cultivation* of land, though traces of its additional meanings – *honor* and *worship* – appear sporadically through the Middle Ages (Williams, 1997, p. 49). Even in its early usage in ancient Rome, however, *cultura* began to acquire metaphorical significance. By the 1st century BCE, Cicero famously described philosophy as “the culture of the human soul” (*cultura animi philosophia est*), underscoring the development of one’s intellectual and

² “Culture” ranks 706 in the dataset of the top 60,000 lemmas of the Word Frequency Data (<https://www.wordfrequency.info/samples.asp>).

³ The approximate total number of English words recorded by a team project carried out by researchers at Google and Harvard University is 1,022,000. The dataset is available in the platform “Culturomics” (<http://www.culturomics.org>).

moral capacities (Cicero, TD, II, 5, 13). This figurative use gained traction during the Renaissance, a period characterized by renewed interest in human potential and intellectual growth.

By the 18th century, in the context of the Enlightenment, *culture* had evolved further, coming to signify the broader processes of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic refinement – not only for individuals but for entire societies and, more expansively, for humanity as a whole. In this context, *culture* was often used interchangeably with *civilization*, reflecting ideals of societal advancement.

However, with the emergence of anthropology in the 19th century, *culture* took on yet another meaning: it became associated with the distinct ways of life and habitual practices of different groups. This anthropological use became particularly influential following Edward Tylor's landmark work, *Primitive Culture* (1871), in which he defined culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 1871, p. 1). Over time, the term's scope broadened yet again to encompass the products and practices of creative and artistic activity.

In contemporary usage, *culture* retains this layered polysemy, a testament to the term's historical depth. While the word is still occasionally used to convey its literal meaning – most often in relation to the *cultivation* of crops, cells, or bacteria – such instances are rare, with *cultivation* preferred for precision. Instead, its metaphorical applications dominate, particularly in the following three primary senses:

- *Culture as intellectual refinement*: This usage refers to a person's education, intellectual capacity, aesthetic sensitivity, and moral qualities – expressed in phrases like *a person of culture*.
- *Culture as the arts*: Here, culture encompasses artistic and creative practices and their outputs, often categorized as *material* or *immaterial culture*.
- *Culture as collective ways of life*: In this sense, culture denotes the distinctive behaviors, customs, and habits that characterize specific groups – such as *local culture* or *minority culture*.

Beginning in the 1970s, culture experienced a remarkable rise in prominence, particularly with an emphasis on *culture as the arts* and *culture as collective ways of life*. This period marked a shift that placed culture at the center of social analysis, viewing it as a vital framework through which to interpret social, political, and economic realities. The concept became pervasive across the social sciences and humanities, soon permeating the media and public discourses. Anthropologist Adam Kuper succinctly captured this shift at the turn of the 21st century, observing that “everyone is into culture now” (Kuper, 2000, p. 2).

Today, *culture* is much more than a word; it has become a lens through which we interpret and navigate the complexity of human experience, particularly the diversity and richness of collective life. This significant discursive shift that has elevated culture to this central role is widely known as the *cultural turn* (e.g., Chaney, 1994; Jameson, 1998; Ray & Sayer, 1999).

2.2

From the Linguistic Turn to the Cultural Turn

The term *cultural turn* first appeared in the early 1990s within translation studies, marking a significant shift from a narrow focus on linguistic accuracy toward a more comprehensive approach that considers the broader context, history, and cultural conventions of a text. The term was coined by Susan Bassnett and Andre Lefevere, who used it in the introduction to their influential work *Translation, History, and Culture* (1990) to describe this new approach to translation that incorporates the reader's perspective and attempted to enhance the text's literary qualities. Soon after, the use of the term *cultural turn* expanded beyond translation studies, gaining popularity across disciplines as a way to describe the growing emphasis on culture as a central framework for interpreting social realities in both academic and public discourse.

Pinpointing an exact starting point for what is now called the cultural turn is challenging, as it is generally seen as an outgrowth of an earlier *linguistic turn*, whereby the focus of philosophical discussions was redirected to the complex relationship between language, its users, and the world. The term *linguistic turn* itself emerged in the 1960s, coined by Gustav Bergmann (1964) and popularized by the works of Richard Rorty – particularly its famous anthology, entitled precisely *The Linguistic Turn* (1967), which aimed to document “the most recent philosophical revolution, that of linguistic philosophy” (Rorty, 1967, p. 2).

Scholars have traced the linguistic turn to several intellectual origins. Some attribute its roots to modern hermeneutics, beginning with Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) and later enriched by thinkers like Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). The works of these authors eventually influenced 20th-century philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, who became key protagonists of the linguistic turns (Medina & Lafont,

1999). Others see this philosophical shift as stemming primarily from early 20th-century analytical philosophy of language, grounded in landmark works such as Gottlob Frege's *On Sense and Reference* (1892) and Bertrand Russell's *On Denoting* (1905) (see Wolf, 2006; Hacker, 2013). These foundational texts set an agenda for analytical philosophers, further developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922; 1953), the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle (see Uebel, 2006), and Alfred Tarski (1933; 1944). Finally, some interpret the linguistic turn as part of the postmodernist philosophical movement, heavily influenced by 20th-century French thinkers like Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, and Jacques Derrida, whose ideas urged literary scholars and critics to rethink the links between language, subjectivity, and the external world (Rorty, 1967; Armstrong, 2001, p. 18; Lawson, 2006, p. 18).

Against this philosophical backdrop, scholars in the humanities and social sciences began turning to culture as a critical lens, challenging dominant frameworks that privileged economic structures, technological determinism, or class relations as society's primary forces. Early signs of this cultural shift appeared as far back as the 1940s, in works such as *The Cultural Approach to History* (Ware, 1940), published by the American Historical Association, which acknowledged that each era interprets history through the lens of its own values, tools, and perspectives. In Britain, the publication of Richard Hoggart's *The Uses of Literacy* (1957) and Raymond Williams' *Culture and Society* (1958) marked a turning point. These works set the stage for key developments of the so-called *cultural theory* – a multidisciplinary field examining how meaning is created and communicated within societies – and laid the foundation for cultural studies, which later emphasized power dynamics, domination, subordination, and resistance, exploring how politics, economics, and historical contexts shape culture.

By the 1970s, the cultural turn had gained significant momentum across diverse intellectual traditions within the humanities and social sciences. Mapping its complexity is a challenging task; some scholars even came to refer to it as “cultural turns” to underscore its pluralistic nature (Bachmann-Medick, 2016). Yet, despite this diversity, several prominent strands illustrate the cultural turn's broad impact (Lawson 2006, Chapter 2).

One prominent strand of the cultural turn is found in *constructivism*, a form of social theory which itself has different disciplinary manifestations. What all these have in common is the emphasis on the active role individuals play in shaping meaning and knowledge. Rather than passively receiving information, constructivism posits that people actively build their understanding through selective, organized perception. This approach holds that how individuals interpret reality is deeply influenced by their frameworks of knowledge, perception, and value, suggesting that our understanding is as much a product of personal and social construction as it is of objective reality.

A closely related strand is *contextualism*, which incorporates elements of constructivism but places greater focus on the *context* in which events, conversations, or texts are produced. Contextualism emphasizes that understanding is situated within a particular socio-cultural framework, which shapes the standards of knowledge accordingly. Culture, in this sense, functions as a shorthand for the contextual attributes that influence behavior and meaning-making, highlighting that what counts as knowledge varies by context and is socially constructed through intersubjective interactions.

A more radical strand of the cultural turn emerged from critical theory, structuralism, and postmodern thought, often reflecting profound dissatisfaction with the intellectual assumptions underlying Western rationalism and positivism. This perspective questioned the intellectual foundations of modern science and social sciences, critiquing their reliance on a narrow rationalist and often reductionist understanding of knowledge. Critical social theory, in particular, emphasized the dynamic relationship between individual agency and social structures, proposing that individuals and societal systems shape each other in complex, reciprocal ways. Here, agency and structure are seen as mutually constitutive, with individuals possessing the potential to reshape social norms and institutions.

Critical theory, especially the work of the Frankfurt School figures like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, also contributed to shaping the cultural turn, by highlighting the impact of mass culture on individual autonomy and democracy. In their critique, mass media and popular culture are manipulated to reinforce capitalist ideologies and discourage critical thinking (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1944). This insight led subsequent scholars to view culture not merely as an outcome of economic forces but as an arena where power and social meaning are actively constructed, contested, and negotiated.

Structuralism, pioneered by 20th-century French thinkers such as Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics and Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, introduced the concept of underlying structures that shape human thought and behavior. This perspective opened the way for poststructuralist thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes, who further interrogated the nature of knowledge, power, and identity. These authors highlighted how language, social practices, and cultural artifacts embed meanings that shape power relations and individual identities, showing that knowledge itself is neither neutral nor fixed.

Another critical strand of the cultural turn that emerged prominently in the 1970s is postcolonialism, which brought the impact of colonial histories into sharp focus. Often seen as originating with Edward Said's influential study *Orientalism* (1978), postcolonial theory scrutinized the ways European narratives had historically conceptualized, exoticized, and marginalized non-European societies. Said's work opened discussions on how colonial rule influenced the political, economic, and social

lives of both colonized and colonizers, framing culture as an essential lens through which to understand the lasting legacies of colonial power. Postcolonialism thus became a vital framework for examining how historical power dynamics continue to shape cultural identities, global relations, and the politics of representation.

2.3

Tensions and Criticism within the Cultural Turn

Though the origins, scope, and effects of the cultural turn remain widely debated, it is undeniable that since the 1970s, this shift has profoundly reshaped how the humanities and social sciences have been engaging with social phenomena. The cultural turn introduced several key concepts into academic discourse, most notably focusing on *discourse*, *identity*, and *representation*.

Discourse analysis became a central methodology, examining how language and symbols shape societal norms, identities, and power structures. By studying the discourses surrounding topics like gender, sexuality, and race, scholars uncovered the ways power subtly operates through language, legitimizing certain identities while marginalizing others. Meanwhile, the concept of identity was reimagined, moving from fixed categories to more fluid, socially constructed understandings. Identity was increasingly seen as a product of social interactions and cultural practices rather than a static essence, encouraging a rethinking of traditional classifications based solely on race, gender, class, or nationality. Representation also became a focal point, as scholars investigated how media, literature, and visual culture shape public perceptions and attitudes. This emphasis prompted critical questions about who controls cultural narratives and whose stories are left untold.

The cultural turn closely aligns with the rise of identity politics, which are also focused on the importance of cultural recognition, representation, and inclusivity. Identity politics grew alongside social movements that prioritized issues of race, gender, sexuality, and other identity markers, challenging the universality of class-based struggles. Movements such as feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, and racial equality increasingly focused on visibility and inclusion in public life, media, and policy. The cultural turn thus provided a theoretical foundation for identity-based activism, framing these struggles as both material and symbolic battles.

Despite its transformative influence, the cultural turn has faced criticism (e.g., Rojek & Turner, 2000; Barnett, 2004). A primary critique lies in the ambiguity surrounding the concept of culture itself. Some critics argue that framing social phenomena through culture risks either essentializing it – offering rigid definitions that can reinforce stereotypes – or relativizing it – emphasizing fluidity and subjectivity to the point of undermining shared standards for truth and knowledge. On one side, vague definitions can lead to reductive generalizations, perpetuating cultural clichés. On the other, highly subjective approaches resist objective critique and make consensus-building difficult, potentially weakening collective action in an increasingly fragmented society.

Another central tension within the cultural turn concerns the relationship between culture and political economy. While the cultural turn rightly brought culture out from its secondary status, freeing it from reductionist views that cast it as merely a reflection of material conditions, this shift has also raised complex questions about how economic dimensions fit within a culturally framed analysis of social phenomena.

Scholars have proposed several ways to conceptualize this relationship. Some argue that culture and political economy, while irreducible to each other, are practically interdependent, influencing one another while remaining analytically distinct (e.g., Ray & Sayer, 1999; Jessop & Sum 2001; Sayer, 2001; Hudson, 2004). Others view culture and economy as deeply entangled phenomena or even consider economics as inherently cultural (e.g., Du Gay & Pryke, 2002; Amin & Thrift, 2004). Additionally, postmodernist perspectives emphasize the "culturalization" of the economy, where culture increasingly influences the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services (Lash & Urry, 1994).

Economic activities are now frequently studied for their cultural dimensions, especially in sectors like the cultural industries, which generate economic value through cultural expression, or consumer practices, understood as inherently cultural acts. Separating culture and economy within specific phenomena becomes challenging, and focusing on just one aspect can yield only a partial understanding. As Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift have suggested, we might consider culture and economy as “a hybrid process of aggregation and ordering that cannot be reduced to either” (Amin & Thrift, 2004, p. XII).

Yet, some critics argue that global issues are driven more by economic inequalities than by cultural differences. Despite its insights, the cultural turn has been critiqued for sidelining material issues like class inequality and economic exploitation. Scholars such as Nancy Fraser contend that an overemphasis on cultural identity and representation can dilute critiques of structural capitalism, unintentionally aligning with neoliberal agendas that favor individualism and cultural pluralism over collective economic justice (Fraser, 2009).

One of the most striking ways in which the cultural turn converged with neoliberalism lies in their shared emphasis on individualism (Rose, 1996). The cultural turn reframed identity as something shaped by personal choice, expression, and agency. This focus resonated with neoliberalism's vision of the autonomous, self-sufficient individual who succeeds through personal effort and market-based competition. The cultural turn's celebration of *self-making* and authenticity paralleled the neoliberal ideal of self-reliant entrepreneurship. As neoliberal subjects were encouraged to view themselves as autonomous, accountable, and capable of self-management, the cultural turn reinforced this view by positioning identity as a project individuals could actively shape through their choices and lifestyles.

This focus on personal expression also found a natural home within the neoliberal marketplace. By championing self-creation and agency, the cultural turn reinforced neoliberal values, cultivating a culture that celebrated individual choice and identity formation through market participation. For example, as consumer culture expanded, so did the notion that identities could be constructed through purchasing decisions, echoing neoliberalism's emphasis on consumer choice as a primary form of personal and social expression (Baudrillard, 1998).

Accordingly, on the one side, the cultural turn contributed to creating new ways to conceptualize identities, lifestyles, and expressions as fluid, diverse, and deeply personal; yet, on the other side, these conceptualizations often served market logic. Cultural symbols, lifestyles, and identities became profitable commodities, easily commodified and marketed. Subcultures and marginalized identities that gained visibility during the cultural turn – such as LGBTQ+ identities, feminist ideals, and ethnic styles – were quickly adopted by the marketplace, and transformed into consumer niches (e.g., Skover & Testy, 2002; Pedroni, 2013). This commodification allowed the market to promote and accommodate diversity, but primarily as a profitable endeavor.

Advertising, media, and branding soon learned to capitalize on personal expression, presenting individual identity as something that could be constructed through consumption. This process not only reinforced the market's centrality in daily life but also subtly suggested that identity and meaning could be bought, sold, and curated. In this way, the cultural turn's focus on diversity and personal identity contributed, often inadvertently, to a neoliberal agenda, where cultural expressions were increasingly treated as products rather than as shared social experiences.

Furthermore, the cultural turn's focus on subjective identity, personal experience, and symbolic meaning has also been critiqued for undermining class-based solidarities and collective political movements. By emphasizing diverse identities and individual narratives, the cultural turn inadvertently fragmented traditional movements – such as labor unions and socialist coalitions – that had previously focused on class solidarity and economic reform (see Fraser, 1997). This

fragmentation dovetailed with neoliberalism's own objectives, as it aimed to weaken unions and other collective forces that could push back against market-driven policies.

The evolution of the cultural turn, despite its internal tensions, has been foundational in shaping contemporary understandings of diversity and approaches to diversity issues, including those related to migration. Before delving into these topics, however, it is essential to consider two additional concepts that have traditionally been used as diversity makers that have deeply influenced how these discussions unfold today: these are *race* and *ethnicity*.

2.4

Framing *Race* and *Ethnicity*

The origin of the word *race* is unknown. Its first appearance can be traced back to the 16th century in both French (*race*) and Italian (*razza*) (Williams, 1997, p. 190). From its earliest uses, the term conveyed three main meanings:

- *Offspring*, in the sense of a line of descent.
- *Species* of plants or animals.
- *General classification* of a group of beings.

By the 17th century, these meanings began to overlap, and *race* came to classify groups within a single species, distinguished by common descent. Over time, this usage expanded from referring to traceable offspring to groups characterized by shared physical characteristics. Originally used primarily for plants and animals, the term eventually came to classify different human groups as well.

This usage solidified in the 18th century, alongside the development of racial studies within physical anthropology. Inspired by the methods of Carl Linnaeus – author of the modern classification of living organisms and commonly considered the father of modern taxonomy – some authors began to categorize human races based on somatic traits like skull shape and skin color. Johann Blumenbach (1752-1840), in his influential *Institutiones Physiologicae* (1787), introduced one of the most widely known human taxonomies, identifying five human races: *Caucasian* or white (Europeans and Middle Eastern populations), *Mongolian* or yellow (East Asians), *Malayan* or brown (Southeast Asians and Pacific Islanders), *Ethiopian* or black (sub-Saharan Africans), and *American* or red (Native Americans).

Blumenbach's classification was initially intended as descriptive, with no implication of superiority or inferiority among groups. In fact, Blumenbach himself opposed hierarchical categorizations of human races. He saw racial distinctions as the result of environmental influences like climate and diet and believed that a rigorous scientific classification of human races was impossible. As he noted, "differences in the form and colour of the human body... run so insensibly, by so many shades and transitions one into the other, that it is impossible to separate them by any but very arbitrary limits" (Junker, 2019, p. 98).

However, despite Blumenbach's intentions, racial studies – and his taxonomy – were swept up in the tide of what came to be known as *scientific racism*. The conviction of inherent superiority among human groups was not new; similar beliefs had appeared in religious and philosophical doctrines worldwide. Yet, scientific racism distinguished itself by using scientific methods to legitimize these long-standing ideas. Drawing from racial taxonomies and evolutionary theories, pseudoscientific explanations emerged that sought to establish deterministic links between physical traits and characteristics like personality, abilities, and intelligence.

These racial distinctions were often presented as evidence of varying evolutionary levels among human groups, some allegedly closer to animals than to humans. Natural selection was sometimes invoked to explain historical conflicts, portraying certain peoples as inherently weaker or inferior. Such views justified political domination, imperialism, and practices aimed at protecting and improving *racial purity* through eugenics. In doing so, scientific racism provided a foundation for some of the darkest chapters of modern history.

Because of its historical baggage, using the concept of *race* to distinguish human groups has become taboo in many places, especially in Europe, where racial ideologies led to horrific consequences during World War II. In these contexts, race is viewed as inherently evaluative, carrying implicit ties to traditional hierarchies that once justified the superiority of certain groups. However, this perception is not universal; in countries like the United States or Singapore, race often appears in a descriptive capacity to classify groups based on physical traits, without evaluative implications.

Conversely, the term racism is universally understood to denote discrimination based on racial or cultural prejudice, underscoring any form of judgment or exclusion rooted in such biases. While the historical weight of race varies by region, the universal rejection of racism reflects a shared commitment to resisting the discriminatory ideas once reinforced by scientific racism.

Especially in those contexts where the use of *race* is discouraged, *ethnicity* has often emerged as a preferred term to refer to a connection between certain racial traits and cultural identities. The origins of ethnicity can be traced back to the Ancient Greek word *éthnos*, meaning "nation." This evolved

into *ethnikós*, used to describe a *heathen* or *pagan person*. When the term *ethnic* entered the English language in the 14th century, it initially carried this religious connotation, referring to a *heathen*, *pagan*, or *Gentile* (Williams, 1997, p. 78).

With the rise of anthropological and racial studies, however, ethnicity began to signify specific cultural groups distinguished by certain physical traits. In the 1830s and 1840s, this evolving meaning led to terms like *ethnology* and *ethnography*. In this context, ethnicity began to converge with the concept of *culture*, describing identifiable groups based on shared ancestry and characteristics. Similarly, just as culture took on meanings related to the arts, ethnicity developed a parallel use, particularly in the American context, where the term became associated with popular folklore, especially aspects of dress, music, and food – this use originated expressions like *ethnic clothing*, *ethnic music*, or *ethnic cuisine*. By the mid-20th century, this usage had spread worldwide (Williams, 1997, p. 78).

Today, this second interpretation of ethnicity often aligns with marketing strategies, where cultural (in the sense of *culture as the arts*) products labeled as *ethnic* are framed to attract consumers with a cosmopolitan interest in the *exotic* or *authentic* aspects of other cultures. In this sense, the concept of *ethnicity* is used to convey positive associations meant to appeal to a mainstream audience in search of unique and immersive experiences. We can refer to this use of *ethnicity* in terms of *ethnicity as marketing*.

At the same time, another, more widely used concept of ethnicity has evolved globally. This is used to denote a specific social group positioned at the intersection of culture and race. An ongoing debate has naturally emerged around this concept, to clarify the relationship of ethnicity with cultural identity and race (for an overview, see Alcoff & Mendieta, 2003; James & Burgos, 2024). Broadly speaking, a shared understanding has emerged that differentiates culture and ethnicity: ethnicity typically implies a connection to racial characteristics, a link that is not, *per se*, present in the concept of culture.

One of the most widely cited definitions of ethnicity is provided by Anthony Smith in *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (1995). Smith distinguishes between *nation* and *ethnicity* – he employs the term *ethnie*, referring to a specific ethnic group. According to Smith, a nation is “a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for its members” (Smith, 1995, p. 57). An *ethnie*, on the other hand, is defined as “a named unit of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory, and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites” (Smith, 1995, p. 57).

Building on Smith’s definition and integrating it with the conceptual framework of culture, we can propose the following definition of ethnicity: a distinct form of cultural identity where racial traits —

often including shared ancestry and physical characteristics — are perceived as central to defining group membership. In other words, ethnicity assigns culturally significant meanings to these racial traits, effectively *inventing* them as markers of identity. This connection to specific racial traits serves as a marker for recognition and acceptance within the group, defining *ethnic groups* as a category that relies on both cultural and racial identifiers.

However, while specific racial traits may serve as a baseline for membership, they do not fully determine an individual's cultural identity. Racial traits alone do not automatically make someone part of an ethnic group; they are necessary but not sufficient. A person may possess these physical characteristics yet not identify with or belong to the corresponding cultural group, as cultural identity is shaped by more than appearance alone.

We can refer to this second concept as *ethnicity as an intersection between race and culture*. From this point forward, unless otherwise specified, the term *ethnicity* will denote this sense. Accordingly, when I refer to an *ethnic group*, I am indicating a cultural group identified *also* by shared racial characteristics such as ancestry and physical traits.

2.5

Cultural Heterogeneity Throughout History: Alterity and Multicultural Coexistence

Though terms like *culture*, *race*, and *ethnicity* are relatively modern inventions, the perception of *alterity* in encounters with strangers has deep historical roots. Throughout history, human migration, exploration, trade, and warfare have brought different social groups into contact, where differences in language, customs, values, and norms were readily perceived and often linked to ancestry. In fact, even in ancient times, notions resembling what we now call *culture* and *ethnicity* were discernible. Social groups often identified themselves as distinct *nations* or *peoples* – what in Ancient Greece was framed in terms of *éthnos* (Schön, 2024, pp. 47-75).

References to cultural differences across peoples are abundant in classical literature worldwide. One striking example comes from *The Histories by Herodotus* (ca. 440-429 BCE), often considered the *father of history*.⁴ He recounts an anecdote where Persian King Darius the Great was confronted with the differences and incompatibility of different cultures – framed in terms of *customs*:

⁴ This title was first given to Herodotus by the ancient Roman orator Cicero in his work *De legibus*, (Cicero [1928], I(I), 5)

When he [Darius] was king of Persia, he summoned the Greeks who happened to be present at his court and asked them what they would take to eat the dead bodies of their fathers. They replied that they would not do it for any money in the world. Later... he asked some Indians, of the tribe called Callatiae, who do in fact eat their parent's dead bodies, what they would take to burn them. They uttered a cry of horror and forbade him to mention such a dreadful thing. So firmly rooted are these beliefs; and it is, I think, rightly said in Pindar's poem that custom is lord of all. (Herodotus [1996], III, 38, 219–220)

Lacking modern concepts to frame and interpret cultural differences, pre-modern societies generally approached such alterity with a mix of *fascination* and *suspicion*. Foreign customs could evoke admiration, especially if they appeared innovative or beneficial; however, the more typical response was connected to hierarchical judgments, where one's own society was regarded as inherently superior, relegating outsiders to an inferior status. Even without a systematic framework, a common pattern emerged across diverse civilizations – from Ancient China, the Middle East, and Greece to Rome, Islamic societies, and Medieval Europe. In each, demeaning terms such as *barbarian* surfaced to label outsiders, encapsulating assumptions that these groups were somehow deficient in their customs, values, or practices (Huang & Dan, 2017).⁵

A typical justification for these hierarchies rested on physiological differences between *ethnic* groups. This belief in a natural order of superiority was often supported by philosophical doctrines. Aristotle, for example, articulated this concept, asserting that “barbarians are more servile in their nature than the Greeks, and the Asiatics than the Europeans; they endure despotic rule without any resentment” (Aristotle, *Politics*, LCL 264: 248-249). Such views, codified in influential philosophies, established a framework that treated certain ethnic groups as inherently *lesser*.

Throughout history, interactions among cultural groups tended to produce tensions, reinforcing boundaries between *us* (ingroups) and *them* (outgroups). These tensions naturally resulted in forms of intergroup *negotiation*, in which power dynamics played a significant role. While such interactions did not always culminate in violence, they frequently led to broader dynamics that could escalate into conflict. One outcome of these encounters, particularly when involving war or migration, was the establishment of various forms of what we might now call *multicultural coexistence*: forms of social organizations where individuals from diverse cultural groups live within the same societal framework.

The structures of this coexistence varied widely, but as long as alterity was perceived – framed in terms of ancestry, customs, or values – they were typically inscribed within hierarchical social frameworks. Cultural differences reinforced the boundaries of belonging and, consequently, social

⁵ The very word barbarian – from the Ancient Greek *bárbaros* – originate from the Proto-Indo-European root *barbar-*, echoing unintelligible speech of foreigners (compare Sanskrit *barbara-* meaning *stammering* and *non-Aryan*; Latin *balbus*, meaning *stammering*; Czech *blblati*, that is *to stammer*).

stratification. Other dimensions, such as gender, age, and class, also shaped social hierarchies and inequalities, yet cultural distinctions – especially when visibly marked by racial or ethnic traits – frequently became a foundation for constructing social structures in dialogue with these other factors.

Because the definition of groups based on cultural traits was closely tied to power dynamics, there was always a cultural group whose members had privileged access to shaping societal structures, effectively positioning themselves as hegemonic over other groups. Thus, in any context where different cultural groups existed together, this power imbalance created a distinction between the *majority* culture and one or more *minority* cultures.

In societies marked by strong hierarchies, particularly in the pre-modern era, coexistence was generally regulated by the hegemonic group through various forms of exclusion directed at minorities. Exclusion consisted of form of limiting minorities' rights and privileges, restricting their access to certain social roles, and enforcing segregation, both socially and physically. Such exclusion, in turn, reinforced the sense of alterity connected to cultural differences, strengthening, at the same time, collective identities within both the majority and minority groups.

Exclusion in multicultural coexistence historically translated into various degrees of marginalization, from labor segregation or prohibitions on intermarriage with majority members to more extreme measures of physical separation – such as the confinement of Jewish communities in *ghettoes*, beginning with the Venetian Ghetto in 1516. Marginalization could lead to episodes of violence and confrontation between the majority and minorities. When these conflicts reinforced the *status quo*, maintaining minority marginalization within hierarchical structures, multicultural coexistence persisted.

As it connected to intergroup tension, marginalization inherently creates an unstable situation. Relations between majority and minority groups are always subject to change as social meanings and perceptions evolve. The boundaries between ingroups and outgroups are constantly shaped by interactions, and in cases of heightened tension, by negotiations or conflicts that have the potential to reshape both collective identities and power dynamics. Cultural minorities, in particular, have demonstrated a remarkable ability to find strategies that improve their social status over time while preserving their distinct collective identities (see examples in Goffman, 1990; Scott, 1992; Keene et al., 2009; Ramírez, 2020).

Yet, since ancient times, tensions arising from the marginalization of cultural minorities have not always been resolved through negotiation or gradual adaptation where multicultural coexistence could endure. Another path to resolving these tensions has been the *disappearance* of cultural differences altogether. Unlike marginalization, which varies widely in its forms and degrees, there are only two ways in which the disappearance of cultural differences can be produced: (1) the *physical*

disappearance of cultural minorities or (2) the transformation of cultural traits through *assimilation*. Each path, in turn, has a limited range of methods.

The physical disappearance of cultural minorities has historically occurred through one of three courses of actions: (a) *voluntary exile*, (b) *forced deportation*, or (c) *extermination*. Voluntary exile, where cultural groups willingly leave without significant external pressure, is exceedingly rare. Far more common, and tragically abundant in history, are instances of forced deportation and extermination as means of eliminating minority presence.

Assimilation, on the other hand, refers to a process of cultural transformation where cultural distinctions gradually lose their significance. Complete assimilation is rare and generally unfolds over a long period, given the resilience of collective identities and the persistence of social meanings and group dynamics. Typically, assimilation emerges through sustained coexistence and interaction between groups, gradually diminishing perceptions of *us* and *them*. It requires both the majority and minority groups to undergo shifts in perception that erase boundaries between ingroups and outgroups. For assimilation to take root, a process of *acculturation* usually occurs, where minorities adopt key cultural traits of the majority.

While assimilation can sometimes evolve naturally from extended intergroup interactions, minority groups may also actively pursue it to escape marginalization. For example, minorities might adopt the religion, customs, or behaviors of the majority as a means of integration. Likewise, majority groups may promote assimilation as a strategy to manage cultural tensions, avoid social conflict, and reinforce the values and norms underpinning their dominant position. This pursuit of assimilation can lead to enforced acculturation practices, compelling minority groups to conform to majority standards.

Many historical examples exist of acculturation and gradual assimilation of minority groups (e.g., Simons, 1901; Curchin, 1991; Ramírez, 2020). However, in pre-modern societies, where there was no clear conceptualization of cultural differences, these processes mostly unfolded inconsistently. Each case was shaped by unique historical, social, and political contexts, reflecting the diverse ways in which societies have been navigating the complexities of cultural difference and cultural belonging.

2.6

The Invention of Homogeneity

Despite its intrinsic instability, multicultural coexistence has historically proven to be a common and remarkably resilient form of social organization. Many of the world's great civilizations, including the ancient Roman, Holy Roman, Ottoman, and Chinese Empires, openly acknowledged their multicultural composition. These societies, while united under common governance structures, contained a diverse range of peoples who maintained distinct identities and traditions. Social hierarchies were organized in ways that reflected the multiplicity of groups within them, each possessing unique customs, languages, and collective identities.

A significant shift occurred with the rise of nationalism and colonialism, particularly after the *Treaty of Westphalia* in 1648, which laid the groundwork for the modern *nation-states*. In this new political landscape, dominant groups began to prioritize a specific, unified identity for these emerging political entities, increasingly viewing cultural differences as a threat to the project of nation-building. The nation-state concept rests on a tight linkage between *nationhood*, rooted in common ethnicity, and *statehood*, defined by territory (Brubaker, 1989; 1998; Castles, 1997, 1999; Jacobson, 1997; Piper, 1998). Accordingly, nationalism promoted an “imagined” ethnic and cultural homogeneity, grounded in the “invention” of common racial and cultural traits, as the foundation of national identity (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986; Hobsbawm, 1992; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992; Skey & Antonsich, 2017; Salzborn, 2021; Dalle Mule, 2023).

In this context, the modern concepts of *race* and *ethnicity* emerged and gained traction as key dimensions for defining collective identity. Their diffusion was further propelled by the rise of racial and cultural studies in the 18th century, which often served to justify and reinforce colonial ambitions. These racial theories, cloaked in a veneer of scientific authority, provided ideological backing for the hegemony of dominant groups, fueling both nationalist ideologies and colonial expansion.

The pseudo-scientific ideal of *racial purity*, combined with the emphasis on cultural homogeneity as the bedrock of nationhood, significantly hindered the potential for minority assimilation. Even when minorities sought cultural integration, they were still seen as inherently *others* due to perceived racial differences. Legislation discouraging or prohibiting intermarriage – common in racist legal systems – further obstructed any blending of racial traits over generations.

The pernicious effects of racial theories on minorities, often leading to policies of exclusion and oppression, produced some of the darkest chapters in human history. These events starkly illustrate how academic theories can shape perceptions of cultural identity and influence approaches to managing differences, particularly when theoretical frameworks shift from research analysis to prescriptive doctrines.

Ultimately, racial theories were discredited on scientific and ethical grounds and globally condemned. However, the decline of these theories was only one aspect of a larger, transformative shift that challenged the ideal of homogeneity itself. This shift was driven by significant socioeconomic and political changes arising from globalization and democratization, both of which were furthered by modernization and key technological advancements. These forces progressively reshaped the foundations of national identity and the perception of alterity, encouraging a move toward inclusivity and redefining approaches to cultural differences.

On one hand, the socioeconomic transformations triggered by globalization revealed that modern nation-states could no longer rely solely on their native populations; instead, they were entering an era of intensified international migration. While this transformation took shape in the 20th century, its roots stretch back much further. Starting with European colonial expansion in the 15th century, technological advances in transportation set the stage for unprecedented migration flows that were further accelerated by the Industrial Revolution.

Following the two World Wars, demographic shifts in developed nations, marked by declining birth rates, coupled with the consolidation of a global market economy, reinforced the need for migration. Faced with an increasingly competitive global economy and native labor shortages, developed countries found themselves transforming into migration destinations (see Munck, 2008). Initially viewed by some as a temporary response to labor needs, international migration quickly became an integral element of the socioeconomic structures of developed societies, reshaping them in lasting ways (see Martin & Miller, 1980; Castles, 1986). Scholars soon began to recognize a blend of *push factors* in migrant-sending regions and *pull factors* in receiving countries, contributing to solidifying and sustaining migration flows (see Massey et al., 1993; 1994).

On the other hand, the global trend of democratization fundamentally altered power dynamics between dominant groups and minorities within nation-states. Democratization introduced frameworks that emphasized states' responsibilities to protect minorities despite cultural differences. This shift was propelled by a growing right consciousness (Section 1.1, p. 23), particularly following the global "human rights revolution" in the aftermath of World War II, which reinforced ideals of democracy and equality for all races and peoples (Iriye et al., 2012). This evolution was closely tied to the emergence of international legal frameworks, beginning with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948, a cornerstone document actively promoted by international organizations like the United Nations (Bantekas & Oette, 2013).

The integration of democratic principles and human rights into national constitutions and legal systems significantly curtailed the power of hegemonic groups over minorities, offering new avenues for minorities to advocate for recognition and protection. This fostered an environment where

minority groups could mobilize politically, prompting less hierarchical, more egalitarian intergroup dynamics. In a virtuous cycle, democratization, rights-based claims, and political mobilization reinforced one another, contributing to a more inclusive social framework (see seminal works by Habermas, 1992; Rawls, 1999; Kymlicka, 1995; and overviews in Della Porta, 2009; Tom & Bajaj, 2024).

Yet, despite their diminishing prominence in official discourse, racist ideologies and attitudes persisted in society, reemerging periodically. Simultaneously, the ideal of cultural homogeneity as a basis for social cohesion remained dominant for many years, supported by the belief that, while physical removal of minorities was no longer feasible, cultural differences would eventually vanish, with cultural minorities dissolving into the *melting pot* of the majority culture.

For decades, this expectation was legitimized by a robust tradition of sociological thought known as *assimilationism*. Not to be confused with policies and ideologies of forced assimilation, assimilationism is a sociological theory built around the prediction that, over time, cultural minorities would naturally and inevitably assimilate into the majority culture. The theory of assimilation can be traced to the works of early 20th-century scholars, who had the chance to observe the development of what was, at the time, one of the world's fastest-growing cities: Chicago.

2.7

Rise and Fall of the Sociological Theory of Assimilation

When it was first organized as a *town*, in 1833, Chicago had a population of just around 200 people (Aleo, 2016). Within four years, the population had grown to 4,000, allowing Chicago to be incorporated as a *city* in 1837. From that point forward, Chicago underwent spectacular industrial and economic growth, drawing in massive waves of migrants. By 1900, the city's population had reached 2,783,726, with 77.4% of residents being either first-generation (34.6%) or second-generation migrants (42.8%) (Chisholm 1911, 124). Given this extraordinary context, it is not surprising that the newly established University of Chicago (1890) soon became home to one of the most influential schools of urban and migration sociology: the Chicago School of Sociology.

Chicago provided a unique vantage point for examining how migrants adapted to life in a new

society. A key pattern soon emerged: cultural differences within migrant communities were fading rapidly. Various structural factors seemed to be at play, including opportunities for social mobility, intermarriage between members of the majority and minorities, and generational turnover.

Building on these observations, influential figures of the Chicago School, notably William Thomas (1863-1943), Robert Park (1864-1944), and William Warner (1898-1970), developed a model describing the adaptation of cultural minorities to the majority culture as a natural, gradual process that would, over time, lead to complete assimilation (e.g., Thomas et al., [1921] 1971; Warner & Srole, 1945; Park, 1950). Central to this model was Park's famous concept of the *race relations cycle*, that is, a succession of four stages – *contact*, *competition*, *accommodation*, and *assimilation* – that was viewed as both “progressive and irreversible” (Park, 1950, p. 138; see also Lai, 1990, pp. 41-45; Barkan, 1995, pp. 39-40).

According to this framework, initial intergroup contact would lead to a phase of competition, conceived as an inherently unstable stage whose “natural outcome” (Lai, 1990, p. 43) is a more stable period of accommodation. Accommodation consists of as an arrangement between culturally distinct groups where “elements more or less antagonistic to each other” are temporarily united through “an arrangement which defines the reciprocal relations and respective spheres of action of each” (Park & Burgess, [1921] 1969, p. 360). No matter how stable this arrangement might seem, its typically unequal social structure would eventually be undermined by personal relationships that cross group boundaries, leading to full assimilation. Interestingly, Park and his colleagues posited that, although specific institutional measures – including incentives for learning and adopting the majority language and customs – could accelerate the process of assimilation, cultural differences would ultimately disappear with or without such interventions.

For several decades, assimilation theory consisted of fragmented research strands lacking a unified framework. In 1964, Milton Gordon took on the challenge of creating a systematic synthesis of assimilation theory, producing what is now known as the “canonical account” of assimilation (Alba & Nee, 2003, pp. 23-27). In his pivotal work, *Assimilation in American Life* (Gordon, 1964), Gordon reconceptualized assimilation as a multidimensional process, offering clear, consistent frameworks that enabled the systematic study of assimilation among individuals and groups.

Gordon identified a sequence of seven dimensions of assimilation, each reflecting a distinct process or condition related to migrant groups. The critical transition occurred between the first and second dimensions, that is, between *acculturation* and *structural assimilation* (Gordon, 1964, pp. 70-71). In particular, structural assimilation, defined as the large-scale integration of migrants into the primary social networks of the host society – those involving close, personal, and informal interactions – was considered the necessary and sufficient condition for full assimilation. Indeed, according to Gordon,

while acculturation was a natural adaptation to life in the host country, structural assimilation did not necessarily follow, and a phase of “acculturation only” could persist indefinitely (Gordon, 1964, p. 77). Conversely, once structural assimilation takes place, Gordon argued, “all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow” (Gordon, 1964, p. 81).

Gordon’s dimensions of assimilation could be readily converted into quantitative variables and indicators suitable for quantitative research methods, which, precisely in those years, were receiving increasing attention thanks to the new opportunities opened by the rise of high-speed computing (Sorensen, 1998, p. 240). As Gordon’s model gained acceptance, subsequent research expanded and refined his framework.

Shortly after *Assimilation in American Life* was published, Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan observed that Gordon had overlooked a major dimension: *socioeconomic assimilation* (Blau & Duncan, 1967). Traditionally, socioeconomic assimilation was equated with reaching average or above-average status based on indicators such as education, occupation, and income (Neidert & Farley, 1985, pp. 840-850; Alba & Nee, 2003, p. 28). However, this view was repeatedly criticized for assuming that migrants invariably start at the lowest socioeconomic levels. Later studies shifted the focus from socioeconomic achievement alone to equality of treatment, defining socioeconomic assimilation as the point at which minorities enjoy “the same life chances in the pursuit of contested goods, such as desirable occupations” as members of the majority (Alba & Nee 2003, p. 28).

Another dimension omitted by Gordon but later – largely through Douglas Massey’s work – was incorporated into assimilationists’ quantitative research was *residential* or *spatial assimilation*. Massey’s *spatial assimilation model* (Massey & Denton, 1985) posited that the residential mobility of ethnic families, which often follows acculturation and socioeconomic assimilation, serves as a stepping stone toward structural assimilation. Three analytical strands emerged in this area (Alba & Nee, 1997, 837): the first examined how closely the residential patterns of minority groups resemble those of the majority; the second, focusing on individuals, investigated differences in residential opportunities – such as housing choice and ownership – between minority and majority members with similar resources; and the third explored the influence of ethnic neighborhoods on cultural distinctiveness.

Finally, the famous notion of *straight-line assimilation*, popularized by Herbert Gans (Gans, 1973) and Neil Sandberg (Sandberg, 1973), added a dynamic dimension to the canonical account. Focusing on the role of generational turnover in driving assimilation, this model introduced a deterministic scheme where each successive generation represents a step closer to complete assimilation.

However, during the very period when the canonical model of assimilation was taking shape, new empirical insights were emerging, suggesting that assimilation was a much slower and less

predictable process than previously assumed. As early as 1963 – one year before the publication of Gordon’s *Assimilation in American Life* – Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan famously observed that “the point about the melting pot is that it did not happen” (Glazer & Moynihan, 1963, p. V). Even within assimilationist circles, voices and empirical results began to question the *inevitability* of assimilation, which the traditional model assumed would follow once the shift from acculturation to structural assimilation was achieved.

A pivotal contribution to this reassessment came from Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan’s influential work, *Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach* (Shibutani & Kwan, 1965). Drawing on an extensive comparative study of ethnic dominance systems across diverse historical and societal settings – including the Roman Empire and the Qing dynasty – Shibutani and Kwan argued that assimilation was not the typical outcome of intergroup contact. Instead, they found that intergroup interactions often resulted in the establishment of a dominant group that institutionalized an *ethnic stratification order*, maintaining minorities in lower socioeconomic positions.

Once established, this ethnic stratification tends to be stable and enduring. Its persistence is maintained on two levels: informally, through social norms, customs, and conventions at the micro-sociological level, which gain acceptance among both majority and minority groups. This often leads the dominant group to view its position as a natural outcome of inherent differences, while minority groups internalize their subordinate roles. Formally, ethnic stratification is reinforced through institutional mechanisms and coercive means that align with political and economic interests, ensuring that minorities remain in subordinate positions. According to Shibutani and Kwan, only major social shifts – driven by technological advances, demographic changes, or evolving social values – have the power to disrupt these hierarchies, creating a pathway for genuine assimilation.

The concept of ethnic stratification received further theoretical backing in subsequent studies (e.g., Noel, 1968; Wang, 1977; Lautard & Loree, 1984), encouraging scholars to question traditional assimilationist assumptions with new empirical approaches. By the early 1970s, it was becoming increasingly evident that cultural differences would not simply fade away. This realization catalyzed a shift in normative discourse, challenging the ideal of homogeneity and underscoring the responsibility of societies to acknowledge and support the claims of minority groups.

CHAPTER 3

Cultural Pluralism, Multiculturalism and the Emergence of Diversity

3.1

The Normative Principle of Cultural Pluralism and the Invention of Multiculturalism

Early formulations of normative arguments in favor of the protection and promotion of cultural differences in society can be traced back to the works of a group of prominent American philosophers associated with the pragmatism movement. A key founding figure was William James (1842-1910), who, in his seminal work *A Pluralistic Universe*, criticized the monistic idealism and intellectualism prevalent in Western philosophy, advocating for pluralistic ideational frameworks that better represent the complexities of daily experiences (James, [1909] 1977).

His ideas were expanded and specifically refocused on the dimension of culture by two of his most renowned followers, John Dewey (1916) and Horace Kallen (1924). In particular, Kallen, often credited with coining the term *cultural pluralism*, developed one of the earliest theoretical frameworks supporting the ideal of a multicultural society.

In his collection of essays published in the volume *Culture and Democracy in the United States* (1924), Kallen argued that culture is essential to individual development, and particularly fundamental to personal growth and potential (for further analysis, see Gordon, 1964, pp. 145-147). On this basis, he asserted that a society committed to democratic and liberal values must also be committed to cultural pluralism, actively recognizing and protecting the distinct identities of its cultural minorities. According to Kallen, cultural pluralism enriches society: each cultural group contributes unique elements from its heritage, while a pluralistic society nurtures opportunities for creativity and innovation.

The principle of cultural pluralism quickly gained traction both within and beyond the United States, thriving especially in the context of the human rights revolution (Vertovec, 2012). With the rise of minority movements for recognition, epitomized by the US civil rights movement (1954-1968), issues of inequality and discrimination rooted in cultural differences took center stage, highlighting the essential value of cultural pluralism in a just and democratic society.

A significant leap from civil rights discourse and protests to concrete practice occurred with the enactment of the U.S. *Civil Rights Act* of 1964, which officially prohibited discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. The measure specifically targeted the unequal application of voter registration requirements, racial segregation in schools and public spaces, and employment discrimination. By enforcing desegregation and promoting equal opportunity, it fostered more inclusive educational and professional environments, opening doors for African Americans and other minorities who had long been denied access.

The civil rights legislation embodied an ideal of social justice that acknowledged the state's responsibility to address historical injustices against minorities. Recognizing that prohibiting discrimination alone was insufficient for genuine equality, it introduced affirmative action policies and practices to actively counteract entrenched marginalization. A central rationale for affirmative action was the concept of "statistical proportionality" (Prewitt, 2002), which proposed that significant disparities between a group's representation in particular sectors and its share of the overall population could signal structural discrimination.

The impact of the civil rights legislation was profound and enduring (see Skrentny, 2002). While initially aimed at addressing discrimination against Black Americans, the legislation established a general framework for identifying and supporting disadvantaged minorities. This framework opened doors for other marginalized groups, allowing them to draw a "Black analogy" by paralleling their experiences of oppression with those of Black Americans (Skrentny, 2002). This approach was utilized by traditionally marginalized ethnic groups, such as Latinos, American Indians, and Asian Americans, as well as by non-ethnic minorities, including women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and people with disabilities.

The influence of civil rights legislation extended well beyond the U.S., serving as a pioneering model that contributed to the global diffusion of policies and practices moving away from the ideal of cultural homogeneity. Beginning in the 1960s, principles and practices of cultural pluralism began circulating internationally, particularly in the English-speaking world, bolstered by civil rights, post-colonial, and democratic movements.

Following the U.S., other countries that pioneered institutional approaches to cultural heterogeneity based on cultural pluralism included Canada and Australia. In these contexts, cultural pluralism soon became known by a new term that would quickly gain widespread popularity: *multiculturalism*.

3.2

The Global Diffusion of Multiculturalism

The term *multicultural* has long served as a descriptive label for socially diverse contexts, particularly those characterized by the presence of individuals from various ethnic or racial backgrounds. Often used interchangeably with terms like *plural*, *multinational*, *multiethnic*, and *multiracial* (Clayton, 2020), *multicultural* conveys a broad sense of cultural plurality without necessarily implying any specific normative or political stance.

Scholars widely agree that it was in Canada, beginning in the early 1960s, that *multicultural* began to take on a normative meaning, with multiculturalism emerging as a formal political concept (e.g., Richter, 2011, p. 36). Like the United States, Canada at this time was undergoing social transformations that challenged its longstanding assimilationist policies, which had historically excluded groups deemed unable to fully integrate (Day, 2000, Chapters 4-7). Furthermore, the Canadian federal government had strong motivations to embrace cultural pluralism, particularly to address the complex dynamics between Canada's Anglophone majority – predominantly dominant within the Confederation – and the Francophone minority, which, while constituting a minority within Canada as a whole, represented the majority population in Québec – Canada's largest province by area and the second-largest by population.

Following Québec's 1960 general election, significant socioeconomic and political transformations led to increased Francophone resistance against the Anglophone dominance over Québec's economy. Drawing on rising awareness of minority cultural rights, a Quebecois political movement emerged, asserting that an independent state was necessary to safeguard Québec's language and culture. In response to this separatist movement, the Canadian Liberal Party established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963 to explore paths to equitable partnership between Canada's British and French cultural groups.

Following Québec's 1960 general election, significant socioeconomic and political transformations fueled a growing Francophone resistance to the dominance of the Anglophone presence in Québec's economic landscape, which heavily influenced its financial, commercial, and industrial sectors (Durocher, 2013). Amid a broader surge of interest in cultural minority rights, a political movement emerged, asserting that Québec required a separate state to safeguard its language and cultural heritage. In response to this rising separatist sentiment, the Liberal Party, which led the Canadian Confederation, established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963 to seek new avenues for equitable partnership between Canada's British and French elements.

In a strategic move to counter the separatist narrative, the commission shifted the focus from biculturalism to Canada's multicultural identity, highlighting the country's multicultural identity beyond the Anglo-Franco divide. Rather than validating the notion of two distinct cultures warranting separate states, the commission promoted the now-iconic metaphor of the *Canadian mosaic*, emphasizing the presence and contributions of various cultural minorities. In its 1965 *Preliminary Report*, the commission introduced the concept of "multiculturalism" as an official framework for Canadian politics (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965).

Conceptually, multiculturalism closely aligns with cultural pluralism; however, its emergence as a political label was a strategic branding choice. Specifically, *multiculturalism* was framed in direct opposition to Québec's insistence on *biculturalism*, creating a captivating *brand* in response to the separatist argument. Unsurprisingly, while Québec broadly supports pluralism, it has remained ever since a vocal opponent of multiculturalism as a political strategy.

Although theoretically grounded on cultural pluralism, at the practical level Canada's multiculturalism came with unique implications and a clear political agenda designed to foster a unified, liberal Canadian Confederation. For the Liberal Party, this approach served two strategic goals: strengthening its electoral base in Western Canada by appealing to migrant communities and diluting the specificity of Francophone cultural claims, thus countering the separatist vision of a monocultural, French Québec (Hawkins, 1991, p. 221).

By institutionalizing multiculturalism, the Canadian government could address Francophone demands for cultural preservation without encouraging separatist sentiments. Accordingly, while depowering the arguments for Anglo-Franco biculturalism, the commission could safely reaffirm Canada's commitment to officially recognizing English-French bilingualism. Shortly after the release of the commission's final report in 1969, Canada passed the *Official Languages Act*, enshrining bilingualism as a foundational principle of the Confederation.

Two years later, in 1971, in a famous statement by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, multiculturalism was officially embraced as a governmental policy framework. In his speech, Trudeau emphatically

condemned Québec's ideal of biculturalism, peremptorily stating that "while there are two official languages [in Canada], there is no official culture" (Proulx-Chénard, 2021).

In the years that followed, Canada firmly established multiculturalism as a core national policy, embedding it within key constitutional and legislative frameworks, including the *Immigration Act* (1976), the *Canadian Constitution* (1982), the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), and the *Multiculturalism Act* (1988) (for details, see Hosein, 1992, p. 610; Gagnon, 2000, p. 9). Canada's pioneering approach to multiculturalism prioritized four main objectives (Wayland, 1997, p. 47): (a) supporting the development of cultural groups, (b) removing barriers to full societal participation, (c) fostering creative exchanges between groups, and (d) assisting immigrants in learning French or English.

Multiculturalism quickly revealed its potential as an effective and appealing label for promoting political programs rooted in cultural pluralism across the English-speaking world. Just a few years after Trudeau's landmark declaration, Australia – a country with socioeconomic and cultural parallels to Canada – adopted *multiculturalism* as a brand to reframe its approach to cultural differences.

At least since the 1960s, Australia had also begun reassessing its coercive assimilation policies, particularly regarding immigrants and Indigenous populations. Finally, by the early 1970s, this reflection led to a transformative decision: adopting a comprehensive policy rooted in cultural pluralism. In his influential 1973 speech *A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future*, Australian Minister for Immigration Al Grassby explicitly cited the Canadian model, suggesting that Australia should also embrace multiculturalism as a foundational principle for regulating migrant settlement, welfare, and social policies (Grassby, 1973). By 1977, a committee chaired by Frank Galbally was established; its report endorsed multiculturalism and recommended expanding welfare and educational services for migrants (Galbally, 1978, p. 1-2). Acting on these recommendations, Australia enacted its first official multicultural policy in 1978, setting in motion a series of reforms framed in terms of *multiculturalism* that continue to evolve today (for an in-depth review of Australian multicultural policies up to 2010, see Koleth, 2010, pp. 1-26; for developments since 2010, see Love, 2021).

Between the 1970s and 1990s, a growing number of countries – including the UK, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, South Africa, India, Taiwan, and Singapore – began embracing cultural pluralism. While many did not explicitly designate multiculturalism as an official policy, these nations adopted similar approaches and often used the term to define their goals. By the 1990s, most immigrant-receiving democracies were engaging with multiculturalism, implementing policies inspired by cultural pluralism.

The widespread embrace of multiculturalism stemmed from a growing recognition of cultural pluralism as an ethical principle. Official discourses increasingly acknowledged that homogeneity

was not only impractical but also ethically problematic when pursued as a political objective. This pluralist ethic was bolstered not only by minority rights movements but also by international organizations promoting multiculturalism, particularly in the context of human rights law (see Pentassuglia, 2003; Yee & Morin, 2009). Economic and political incentives for joining international organizations further propelled the spread of norms and standards centered on cultural pluralism.

International recognition endowed multiculturalism with positive associations tied to cosmopolitanism and entrepreneurialism. Over time, beyond its ethical foundations, multiculturalism became a kind of global *brand* or *status symbol* that governments could leverage to boost international standing and appeal.

Although shared factors drove the global spread of multiculturalism, the specific motivations and ways in which governments incorporated multiculturalism into their agendas varied widely. Canada's adoption of multiculturalism well illustrates how political strategies tailored to specific contexts can shape the official embrace of cultural pluralism and the use of multiculturalism as a guiding principle.

3.3

Cultural Pluralism and Multiculturalism in the Academic Discourse

The academic discourse closely mirrored the successful diffusion of multiculturalism, both through empirical research and normative analysis, closely intertwined with the rise of the cultural turn. Scholars turned renewed attention to understanding how social life is reshaped in multicultural settings and to examining the theoretical foundations and implications of cultural pluralism.

On the empirical front, various sociological studies delved into the dynamics of cultural transformation beyond the rigid confines of the canonical assimilation model. In particular, two sociological theories emerged from within assimilation studies, criticizing the traditional assimilation framework: *segmented assimilation theory* and *acculturation theory*. Both have significantly influenced contemporary approaches to understanding and engaging with cultural differences.

Segmented assimilation theory, developed in the early 1990s by Alejandro Portes and collaborators (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), directly challenged the straight-line assimilation theory by identifying two alternative generational outcomes beyond full assimilation: downward

assimilation or upward mobility with bicultural retention. Supported by extensive empirical research (e.g., Zhou & Bankston, 1998; Waters, 1999; Menjívar, 2000; Zhou & Kim, 2006; for a detailed literature review on segmented assimilation see Xie & Greenman, 2011; Waters et al., 2010), segmented assimilation theory highlights the critical role of various factors – including parental human capital, family structure, institutional support, and even transnational ties – in shaping the generational progression of assimilation. This theory suggests that societies cannot rely solely on traditional models of assimilation; rather, they must recognize, embrace, and effectively navigate their multicultural futures.

Acculturation studies further expanded the discourse by exploring a range of possible interaction outcomes between cultural groups beyond assimilation (see Berry, 1980; 2019; Padilla, 1980; Chun et al., 2003; Berry & Sam, 2006; Schwarz & Unger, 2017). Originally, acculturation was conceived as part of the traditional assimilation framework, understood as a unidimensional process, with heritage culture retention and new culture adoption as opposing ends of a single continuum. In this view, acculturation necessitated the loss of one's original culture. However, as the inevitability of assimilation was called into question, scholars began re-examining acculturation. The concept progressively evolved from being a mere step toward assimilation to represent a more complex framework in which assimilation emerged as just one of multiple potential outcomes.

John Berry's *model of acculturation* (Berry, 1980) redefined acculturation as a bidimensional process, where heritage culture retention and new culture acquisition function as distinct dimensions. Visualized on two intersecting axes, these dimensions form four acculturation categories: *marginalization* (rejection of both cultures), *separation* (retention of heritage culture and rejection of the new culture), *assimilation* (adoption of the new culture while discarding heritage culture), and *integration* (adoption of the new culture alongside heritage culture retention), often referred to as *biculturalism* (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). Within this framework, the concept of *enculturation* sometimes emerges to describe the selective acquisition or retention of cultural elements during acculturation (e.g., Weinreich, 2009).

Building on empirical research, scholars also turned their focus to the normative implications of cultural pluralism – a principle that, by the 1980s, was widely referred to as *multiculturalism* in academic circles, reflecting the broader social trend. This shift sparked a significant debate centered on questions such as: To what extent do societies have a duty to accommodate cultural differences? How can societies reconcile the intergroup tensions that cultural differences may provoke? And given the power imbalance between majority and minority groups within democratic structures, what does equality and justice entail in the context of cultural minority recognition?

Numerous theoretical approaches were developed to address these questions and to provide a solid foundation for multiculturalism (for reviews, see Laden & Owen, 2007; Song, 2010; Shorten, 2022). These theories share a common goal: to justify the principle of cultural pluralism by acknowledging culture's inherent value and to clarify its normative implications.

One foundational contribution came from Charles Taylor, who argued for multiculturalism as a “politics of recognition” within a communitarian critique of liberalism (Taylor [1992] 1994; 1995). Against the liberal emphasis on individual rights and autonomy, which can reduce society to a mere aggregate of individuals, Taylor emphasized the importance of collective identities shaped by social interaction and mutual recognition. Viewing culture as central to identity formation, Taylor contended that cultures are essential for developing human agency and a sense of self, concluding famously that we must recognize “the equal worth of all cultures” (Taylor, 1994, 66). Although Taylor acknowledged potential tensions between individual and collective interests, he proposed a solution through a politics of reciprocal recognition, grounded in “judgments about what makes a good life,” in which cultural integrity plays an essential role (Taylor, 1994, 61).

Will Kymlicka's account of multiculturalism has arguably been the most influential (Kymlicka, 1989; 1995; 2007). Rooted in liberal values, Kymlicka's account addressed critiques from communitarian perspectives by asserting that while *intrinsic value* lies only in individual freedom and equality, culture – conceptualized in terms of *societal culture* – has *instrumental value* as a *context of choice* for individuals. In this sense, culture offers individuals the resources they need to understand their world and make informed choices. Societal cultures, marked by shared territory, language, and history, “tend to be national cultures” (Kymlicka, 1995, 76). Kymlicka argued that even the most liberal state cannot avoid promoting the majority culture, thereby disadvantaging minority groups in terms of access to their own cultural context. Consequently, he maintained, the state has a duty to recognize and protect cultural minorities, rejecting the liberal stance of *benign neglect* that assumes cultural neutrality; in truth, no state is culturally neutral.

Additional influential perspectives emerged from civic-republicanism and post-colonial thought. Frank Lovett, for example, defended multiculturalism by prioritizing freedom from domination as essential to human well-being, criticizing the idea of state neutrality, which often masks the intrinsic domination of majorities over minorities (Lovett, 2009; 2010). He argued for proactive state intervention to prevent majority interference in minority communities. Post-colonial perspectives, on the other hand, emphasized historical injustices against minority groups as grounds for recognizing Indigenous rights and self-governance. Radical thinkers like Iris Marion Young critiqued traditional notions of inclusion as veiled cultural imperialism, advocating instead for a “cultural revolution” through differentiated citizenship and group representation to counter systemic oppression (Young

1990).

By the close of the 20th century, multiculturalism had become the dominant framework for addressing cultural differences and structuring relationships between majority and minority groups in both political and academic discussions. Policies and discourses on minority rights were increasingly framed in *multicultural* terms, with principles of cultural pluralism – redefined as *multiculturalism* – becoming the primary lens through which social group dynamics were interpreted. This climate of the late 1990s is well captured by the telling title of Nathan Glazer’s influential work, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now* (Glazer, 1997).

3.4

The Babel of Multiculturalism(s)

It is at this point that what began as a promising field of discussion soon turned into a gargantuan conceptual babel, where term *multiculturalism* started being used inconsistently, blurring analytical boundaries and conflating normative arguments, policy agendas, and empirical findings. While some scholars took on the demanding task of organizing and systematizing the diverse strands of multiculturalism, this effort often led to even more intricate meta-discussions. David Bennett humorously remarked on this phenomenon, comparing it to Victorian ethnographers’ race taxonomies, noting that “cultural analysts now construct taxonomies of ‘multiculturalism,’ distinguishing such species and hybrids as ‘conservative or corporate multiculturalism,’ ‘liberal multiculturalism and left-liberal multiculturalism,’ ‘critical’ or ‘radical,’ ‘polycentric’ and ‘insurgent’ multiculturalisms” (Bennett, 1998, p. 1).

To clarify the complexities and avoid further confusion in the discourse on cultural pluralism, those entering the debate are often compelled to engage in a sort of *meta-meta-discussion*, striving to categorize the many existing typologies of multiculturalism. We can trace a basic level of systematization by focusing on the term’s meanings and usages, which provide a foundation for understanding the different ways in which *multiculturalism* is applied.

Most scholars identify two primary meanings of multiculturalism (e.g., Goldberg, 2004; Clayton, 2020). First, there is the original *descriptive* meaning – usually expressed through the adjective

multicultural – which refers to the simple existence of cultural differences. This descriptive usage often carries aesthetic associations, referring to visible manifestations of diversity, such as physical features, clothing, food, and other customs. It is also sometimes used to suggest the increasing cultural heterogeneity in societies as a result of international migration.

Yet, *multicultural* and *multiculturalism* have also acquired normative connotations, especially in discussions on cultural pluralism. In this sense, these terms serve as general labels for approaches that question the ideal of homogeneity and uphold that cultural identities hold intrinsic value. This perspective assumes a societal responsibility to accommodate cultural differences and promote equality without discrimination.

Christine Inglis proposed a finer distinction by identifying a third meaning, distinct from the normative one, which she calls “programmatic-political” (Inglis, 1996, p. 15). This refers specifically to translating normative approaches into policies and practices, as seen in multicultural frameworks adopted by countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Within this terminological framework, various typologies have emerged to distinguish the theoretical and practical approaches that fall under the umbrella of multiculturalism – whether in its normative or programmatic-political sense. These taxonomies, however, tend to be open-ended and vary significantly depending on the level of detail in differentiating one approach from another. Beyond Bennett’s distinctions, for instance, Steven Vertovec identifies at least eight different forms of multiculturalism (Vertovec, 1998), while Gerard Delanty proposes a list with nine types (Delanty, 2003).

A key issue with many multiculturalism taxonomies is their tendency to merge the normative and programmatic-political dimensions, which blurs the line between theoretical frameworks and practical applications. As a result, these taxonomies often fail to accurately represent either dimension and overlook the context-specific motivations that drive the adoption of particular multicultural policies. The cases of U.S. civil rights legislation and Canada’s official adoption of multiculturalism clearly illustrate that such policies are not mere extensions of theory but are influenced by distinct political strategies and interests. In this sense, it is no surprise that, in practice, multiculturalism resembles a “patchwork” of policies and practices rather than a “singular set of well-integrated policies and institutions” (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010, p. 2).

Recent efforts have been made to develop taxonomies that specifically focus on the programmatic-political level, facilitating comparisons of multicultural approaches across countries (e.g., Koopmans, 2013; Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). These models employ a range of indicators to quantify a country’s commitment to multiculturalism, commonly including metrics such as state recognition of diversity, religious freedom, political representation for minorities, affirmative action policies addressing

historical inequalities, and funding for ethnic cultural activities and education (see, for example, Clayton, 2020, p. 213).

While questions arise regarding the suitability of specific indicators and their efficacy in capturing a country's multicultural engagement, these models do succeed in focusing on the programmatic-political dimension. However, as they still rely on specific theoretical approaches to multiculturalism without fully integrating normative distinctions, some overlap remains between analytical levels. Nevertheless, these pioneering models are significant for drawing attention to the potential for comparing multicultural theories and practices across different geographic and cultural contexts, opening new avenues for studying the evolution and spread of systems of governance of cultural differences.

The distinction between descriptive, normative, and programmatic-political meanings of multiculturalism served well until the late 1990s. However, a powerful wave of criticism against both theoretical and practical multicultural approaches soon emerged, sparking a substantial shift in how cultural differences and their management were discussed. In this climate, the meanings and uses of *multiculturalism* began to evolve further, reflecting a new chapter in the discourse.

3.5

The Crisis of Multiculturalism

[T]he cultural pluralism idea, remarkable and germinal as it is, tends to be embodied in a general framework of rhetoric and philosophical analysis which has not pushed to the fore that kind of rigorous sociological inquiry which the crucial importance of the idea ultimately demands. (Gordon, 1964, p. 149)

Ironically, since their earliest formulations, arguments favoring cultural pluralism faced criticism from both conservative and progressive perspectives. Conservatives have seen these arguments as subversive to social order, while progressives often dismissed them as utopian or hollow. With the rise and global diffusion of multiculturalism, this opposition intensified, manifesting in both popular dissatisfaction with multicultural policies and academic critiques aimed at theoretical justifications for multiculturalism.

The natural result of this dual critique was a widespread questioning of previously held positions

on cultural pluralism and multiculturalism, revealing a lack of preparedness to address emerging issues. Not even a decade after Nathan Glazer's confident proclamation, "we are all multiculturalists now" (Glazer, 1997), the media and academic publications were already declaring what seemed like the "death of multiculturalism" (e.g., Kundnani, 2002; Modood, 2008; Connolly, 2010).

The magnitude of this critical wave, which quickly spread across multicultural nations, indicated the presence of forces beyond country-specific circumstances. Once again, at the root of this trend we can identify the deep shifts associated with advancing democratization, globalization, and rapid technological progress.

At the societal level, growing dissatisfaction with multicultural narratives was, first of all, fueled by the increased political mobilization of cultural minorities, who, empowered within democratic systems, began advocating more assertively for recognition. This activism heightened politicization around cultural differences and amplified social polarization (Van der Brug et al., 2015). In turn, ethnic riots and public unrest associated with minority movements dampened public support for multicultural policies among the majority population.

While often context-specific, the impact of these movements was widespread, as they crucially contributing to highlighting broader social issues, including entrenched inequalities in majority-minority relations, spurring both national and international concerns. Accordingly, events in one locality could easily reinforce existing prejudices elsewhere and bolster conservative arguments about the risks posed by majority-minority dynamics and the alleged incompatibility between certain cultural differences and liberal-democratic values. This view resonated with Samuel Huntington's influential "clash of civilizations" thesis, which framed these tensions as part of an inevitable cultural conflict (Huntington, 1996).

In this climate, the influence of new communication technologies became especially significant. The advent of the Internet and social media amplified the spread of information, and the resulting media pervasiveness allowed radical groups to exploit social issues related to migration and cultural heterogeneity, often exacerbating polarization. This trend took a stark turn in the wake of the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks, which unleashed a global wave of fear around cultural extremism and radicalization. This wave, particularly strong in non-Muslim countries, fueled sharp Islamophobic sentiments and reinforced skepticism toward multiculturalism on a global scale.

These socio-political factors tied to minority politicization and heightened concerns about security and public order converged with sweeping transformations in global and national economies following the 1973 oil crisis. This crisis marked a pivotal shift, not only triggering prolonged economic stagnation and periodic financial crises but also signaling the decline of Keynesian economics and a broad pivot toward neoliberalism (Section 1.2). With finance becoming a primary

force in global regulation, the emphasis shifted to free trade, deregulation, globalization, and reduced government spending. Neoliberal policies reinforced market-driven approaches, competition, and individualism, which, in turn, weakened collectivist ideals and exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities, fostering a resurgence of class power and the rise of neoconservatism.

Naturally, these growing inequalities also manifested along ethnocultural lines, heightening competition and tensions among cultural groups and sparking fresh scrutiny from majority groups regarding the socioeconomic costs of multiculturalism. This impact was felt particularly at the local level: as neoliberalism accelerated decentralization, responsibilities traditionally managed by national governments were increasingly delegated to local authorities, including the complex task of managing cultural differences.

Simultaneously, neoconservative ideologies revived nationalist and identitarian narratives, championing ethnocultural homogeneity as the cornerstone of social cohesion. These narratives fueled xenophobia, reinforced rigid group boundaries, and laid fertile ground for the rise of right-wing populism, which capitalized on local tensions between cultural groups (Moffitt, 2016). The situation was further intensified by a series of refugee crises in the 2010s, which thrust issues of humanitarian migration and asylum-seekers into the forefront of political debates worldwide.

Alongside these socio-political shifts, academic discussions around cultural heterogeneity also began to pivot toward individual and localized perspectives, prompting a critical re-evaluation of traditional frameworks. Drawing from a post-WWII consensus in liberal social and political theory (e.g., Claude, 1955; Glazer, 1975; Porter, 1965; 1975), conservative commentators argued that only a culturally neutral civic sphere, embodied in liberal-democratic nation-states, could uphold personal autonomy, equality, and common citizenship. They contended that multiculturalism, in both theory and practice, destabilizes and disrupts the shared bonds of nationhood (e.g., Bullivant, 1981; Hughes, 1993; Schlesinger 1991; 1992; Ravitch, 1992; Gitlin, 1995; Huntington, 1996; Rorty 1999; Barry, 2001). By introducing what they termed a “cult of ethnicity” into the civic sphere, multiculturalism risks entrenching ethnic boundaries and reinforcing majority-minority divides, potentially leading to the *balkanization* of previously cohesive nation-states (Schlesinger 1992, pp. 119-139).

Ironically, while conservatives accused multiculturalism of replacing universal values with culturally particularist ones, progressive-liberal and radical critics often argued the reverse. Pointing to what they called multiculturalism’s “groupist tilt” (Joppke, 2017), these critics maintained that such frameworks subordinated individual voices and rights to those of cultural groups.

As multiculturalism continued to conceptualize cultural differences in terms of ethnicity and nationality, its focus remained on collective identities, inadvertently reinforcing a view of society as a collection of culturally homogeneous groups. Critics argued that this framework was inherently

essentialist, disregarding the dynamism and *hybridity* of cultural identities (e.g., Hall, 1992; Gilroy, 1993; Bhabha, 1994), and failing to fully break away from the myth of homogeneity that multiculturalism purported to challenge.

Among the so-called academic Left, three major strands of criticism have emerged. First, progressive liberal perspectives highlight the risks of subordinating individual rights to purported group rights (e.g., Hannerz, 1992; Kukathas, 1995; 2003; Waldron, 1995; Benhabib, 2002; Appiah, 2005). Second, feminist perspectives focus on the plight of “internal minorities” or “minorities within minorities” (e.g., Green, 1994; Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev, 2005). Specifically, they argue, by neglecting *intersectionality* (Crenshaw, 1989), multiculturalism risks leaning toward cultural relativism and overlooking power imbalances within cultural groups. This oversight often harms vulnerable members, such as women and gender minorities, perpetuating inequalities under the guise of cultural preservation (e.g., Coleman, 1996; Okin, 1999; Shachar, 2000). Finally, post-colonial perspectives criticize multiculturalism for failing to address power imbalances rooted in colonial histories, which continue to uphold majority hegemony (e.g., Mullard, 1982; Troyna, 1987; 1993; Apple, 1996; McCarthy & Crichtlow, 1993; Coulthard, 2007).

Criticism has also focused on the programmatic-political dimension of multiculturalism. Drawing on feminist and post-colonial critiques, some argue that while multicultural policies aim to promote recognition and representation, they overlook the third crucial dimension of social justice: redistribution. By shifting focus toward cultural recognition, multicultural policies risk diverting attention from economic justice and undermining public support for redistributive efforts (e.g., Gitlin, 1995; Rorty, 1999; Barry, 2001; Van Parijs, 2004; Miller, 2006; Hero & Preuhs, 2007; Putnam, 2007).

Further criticisms suggest that, in practice, multicultural policies often reduce to superficial celebrations of ethnocultural folklore, identified by the so-called *3Fs* – food, festivals, and fashion (e.g., Meyer & Rhoades, 2006). Also dubbed the *3Ss* – saris, samosas, and steel drums – (e.g., Alibhai-Brown, 2000), *boutique multiculturalism* (e.g., Fish, 1997), or *cosmetic multiculturalism* (e.g., Morris-Suzuki, 2002), these approaches tend to trivialize and commodify culture, reducing it to consumable elements that reinforce stereotypes and dilute cultural depth. Critics argue that by promoting a “Disneyfied” version of cultural heterogeneity, these policies distract from the actual issues facing minority communities, particularly those tied to inequality and socioeconomic disadvantage (Bissoondath, 1994).

3.6

Framing *Diversity*

By the early 2000s, though some remained skeptical of multiculturalism's announced *death*, there was broad consensus that a significant "retreat from multiculturalism" (Joppke, 2004) or "multiculturalism backlash" (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010) had taken place, especially within Western democracies. Intensified criticism and polarization led to a crisis in the conceptual and discursive structures that had previously shaped discussions of cultural differences.

Criticism resulted in a shift from the group-centered approach of earlier multicultural approaches to liberal accounts of cultural pluralism, such as Kymlicka's, that emphasized individual-level dynamics. Increasingly, scholars recognized cultural identities as self-defined, multidimensional, and fluid, allowing for complex, hybrid identities that might encompass multiple affiliations. Consequently, mainstream discourse moved beyond the traditional categories of ethnicity and nationality to include other intersecting identity markers such as gender, sexual orientation, age, and social class.

Accompanying these shifts, the term *diversity* gained prominence, capturing the evolving, layered understanding of cultural identities. The notion of cultural difference was reframed in terms of diversity, highlighting the perceived increase in cultural variation in contemporary societies, often linked to patterns of global migration. To describe, in particular, this intensified *diversification* of identities, scholars started increasingly employing the concept of *super-diversity*, introduced by Steven Vertovec in 2007 (Vertovec, 2007).

This reframing of cultural differences also brought two other significant shifts in the discourse on cultural pluralism. First, a renewed focus on *integration* emerged, with efforts directed toward resolving cultural tensions through positive intergroup and interpersonal engagement within local communities. Second, cultural heterogeneity was increasingly celebrated as an *asset* to socioeconomic development rather than merely a social challenge. Let us examine each of these aspects in turn.

Initially, integration was not connected to cultural pluralism. The concept's roots lie in the works of Émile Durkheim, who examined social bonds and solidarity in the transition to modernity (Durkheim, [1893] 2014; [1897] 1951; [1912] 2008). Durkheim argued that pre-industrial societies maintained cohesion through what he referred to as *mechanical solidarity* – a homogeneity of work, values, and beliefs reinforced by robust social institutions like family, religion, and shared moral

values. Industrialization and labor specialization, however, dissolved this homogeneity, giving rise to a new form of solidarity – *organic solidarity* – based on interdependence among individuals in a diverse, specialized workforce. For Durkheim, social integration in this new context required cooperation regulated by social institutions. This discussion was significantly expanded throughout the 20th century by influential thinkers like Talcott Parson (1951; 1967), Jürgen Habermas (for a review, see, for example, Finlayson & Rees, 2023), Manuel Castells (1996), and Robert Putnam (2000).

The shift away from assimilation theory, alongside the growing influence of biculturalism in acculturation studies, brought integration to the forefront as a goal for a culturally pluralistic society (e.g., Szapocznik et al., 1980; Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Coatsworth et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Tadmor et al., 2009; Schwarz & Unger, 2017). This was solidified when Berry included integration in his acculturation model as the optimal outcome of cultural adaptation, beneficial both to minority groups and to the broader society (see Berry, 2019).

Simultaneously, the concept of *dialogue* gained traction, envisioned as an ideal, non-discriminatory mode of negotiation that respects individual agency while fostering mutual understanding. Dialogue-based frameworks aim to resolve intergroup tensions through egalitarian and open interaction, offering a pathway to integration that respects diverse identities (for theoretical overviews, see Womack 2011; Slep et al. 2013; Grillo 2017).

Alongside the new emphasis on integration, the reconceptualization of cultural differences as diversity brought with it a significant shift in how these differences are viewed within society. Rather than seeing differences as challenges to be managed, a new perspective emerged: diversity could be seen as an asset with substantial potential for social and economic development. This positive reframing finds its roots in recent developments within management theory.

Historically, dominant management models, such as Frederick Taylor’s classical *theory of scientific management* at the turn of the 20th century, emphasized process standardization with minimal regard for cultural differences (for an overview, see Drury, [1915] 2008). Workforce management was primarily viewed through the lens of operational efficiency and uniformity (for reviews of major management theories, see McGrath & Bates, 2013; Appel-Meulenbroek & Danivska, 2022). During the cultural turn and the initial enthusiasm for multiculturalism, however, issues of cultural difference began to receive attention, particularly in terms of ethical and legal compliance, highlighting the need to address systemic discrimination and inequalities (see, for example, Kumra & Manfredi, 2012). Yet, initially, cultural differences were mostly framed as a challenge to productivity or as an ethical consideration in business management.

Only in recent years, as globalization advanced and internationalization grew, did diversity begin

to emerge in management theory as a critical driver of innovation, performance, and societal progress. A pivotal moment came in 1991 with the publication of *Managing Cultural Diversity: Implications for Organizational Competitiveness* by Taylor Cox and Stacy Blake (Cox & Blake, 1991). This influential paper introduced what became known as the *theory of diversity advantage*. Synthesizing prior discussions and data, the authors argued that diversity could be a strategic resource for enhancing organizational competitiveness in a global market. They identified six areas where diversity management could offer advantages: (a) *efficiency*, (b) *good reputation*, (c) *adaptation*, d) *creativity*, (e) *problem-solving*, and (f) *flexibility* (Cox & Blake, 1991, pp. 47-52).

Subsequent research expanded the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of diversity advantage, leading to the development of various diversity management approaches (e.g., Cox, 1993; Benschop, 2001; Richard et al., 2004; Barney & Clark, 2007; Pitts, 2009; Yang & Konrad, 2011; Ozgen, 2021). The *cognitive diversity hypothesis*, which links diversity to a broader range of cognitive resources and heightened creativity, remains a central pillar of this theory. Concurrently, discussions have increasingly focused on the relationship between diversity and sustainability, as well as on the need to incorporate principles of equality and inclusion to fully realize diversity's benefits (e.g., Barak, 2022).

While critiques of diversity advantage have highlighted issues such as theoretical ambiguity and questioned its empirical basis (e.g., Lorbiecki & Jack, 2000; Prasad et al., 2006; Lentin & Titley, 2008; Dobbin & Kalev, 2016; Köllen, 2019; Ely & Thomas, 2020), the concept is firmly entrenched in the corporate world. With the spread of market-oriented logic in governance and policymaking under neoliberalism, the principle of diversity advantage has influenced broader discussions of cultural differences. This shift has been instrumental in reframing cultural heterogeneity from a potential issue to a strategic benefit, one that enhances creativity, sustainability, and the overall appeal of societies and communities.

3.7

Integration and Interpersonal Contact in Empirical Studies

As integration emerged as the ideal goal for multicultural coexistence, empirical research began

focusing on the mechanisms that facilitate or hinder it. This shift brought integration to the forefront of theoretical discussions on cultural differences, intersecting with a growing body of sociological research on interpersonal contact between people from diverse cultural backgrounds. The field of *contact studies*, which developed in parallel with assimilation theory, has roots in early 20th-century thought.

Early studies on intergroup contact largely reflected the pessimism of assimilationists, assuming that such encounters would breed hostility and conflict. In his foundational work *Folkways* (1906), William Sumner argued that group cohesion depends on a sense of in-group superiority over out-groups, thus positioning intergroup contact as a potential source of friction. This view remained dominant until the late 1940s (e.g., Baker, 1934; Horowitz, 1936; Sims & Patrick, 1936; Newcomb & Hartley, 1947; Saenger & Gilbert, 1950). Yet, many of these early studies lacked empirical grounding or a unified methodology, resulting in largely speculative findings (see Dovidio et al., 2005).

The situation started changing after World War II, when scholars sought to develop scientific methodologies for studying intergroup contact (e.g., Brophy, 1946; Watson, 1947). Empirical evidence soon began to reveal a more optimistic perspective on intergroup contact. A significant turning point occurred with Robin Williams's *Research on Intergroup Relations* (Williams, 1947), which offered 102 testable propositions on contact's social impacts. Williams demonstrated that, contrary to the prevailing view, contact under certain *optimal* conditions could reduce intergroup prejudice and prevent conflict. These conditions included: (a) shared status, interests, and tasks; (b) situations fostering personal and intimate intergroup contact; (c) participants who do not fit stereotyped conceptions; and (d) cross-group collaborative activities.

Williams's insights spurred further research into the positive effects of contact. In 1949, Samuel Stouffer and his collaborators conducted an extensive field study with American soldiers who had served in the Battle of the Bulge (1944-45) (Stouffer et al., 1949). Their findings showed that white soldiers who fought alongside African American soldiers developed more positive attitudes toward Black Americans, highlighting the transformative power of shared experience in fostering empathy and reducing prejudice. This study, among others, paved the way for further research into Black-White relations (e.g., Kramer, 1950; Mussen, 1950; Deutsch & Collins, 1951; Jahoda & West, 1951; Wilner et al., 1952; Gray & Thompson, 1953).

Finally, in 1954, Gordon Allport's landmark book *The Nature of Prejudice* (Allport, 1954) provided a theoretical framework that formalized contact studies into a cohesive *theory of contact*. Allport introduced what became known as the *contact hypothesis*, asserting that intergroup tensions and prejudices could be reduced through positive contact. Building on Williams's findings, Allport

outlined four conditions for effective intergroup contact: (a) equal status between groups, (b) common goals, (c) intergroup cooperation, and (d) institutional and societal support for contact.

Allport's work spurred a wave of enthusiasm for studying intergroup contact, an interest that grew with the rise of multiculturalism (for in-depth reviews, see Dovidio et al., 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006; 2011; Hodson & Hewstone, 2013; Vezzali & Stathi, 2017). However, through the late 20th century, many studies focused narrowly on Allport's framework, adding to his four optimal conditions to create what some scholars have criticized as overly detailed "unworkable laundry lists" (Pettigrew, 1998, p. 69; Dixon, 2017, p. 174).

The emergence of critical perspectives that eventually contributed to the crisis in multiculturalism also led to a re-evaluation of the traditional framework of contact theory, moving beyond Allport's model. A significant contribution in this area came in 2006 from the analytical review by Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The authors analyzed a vast dataset – 714 independent samples and 1,365 non-independent tests across 515 studies published between the 1940s and the 2000s – to distill the findings of contact theory research. Their work affirmed the validity of Allport's conditions for reducing prejudice but also revealed that these optimal conditions, while helpful, are not strictly necessary for positive intergroup contact to occur.

More specifically, optimal conditions are recognized as *facilitators* of positive contact. Instead, other mechanisms can be identified, which work as *mediators* of contact effects, clarifying *why* contact may reduce prejudices. These are factors that can be identified only by refocusing at the individual level. Two categories of variables emerged as key drivers for fostering positive contact: *cognitive variables*, such as knowledge of outgroups' history, values, and customs; and *affective variables*, including reduced anxiety and increased empathy toward out-groups.

Thus, reflecting the broader criticism of a *groupist* approach to cultural differences, also contact studies shifted their focus from the group to the individual. Recent research demonstrates that affective factors, especially, play a central role in improving intergroup relations (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Hodson et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2013; Hodson et al., 2015). This individual-level focus also helped identify *moderators* of contact – factors that strengthen or predict positive outcomes from contact. For instance, studies now explore drivers of cross-group friendships, examining how such friendships can enhance intergroup relations (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; González et al., 2010; Grütter & Meyer, 2014; Schachner et al., 2015; Stefanek et al., 2015).

This renewed emphasis on the mechanism of interactions among individuals as an essential aspect of integration has substantially influenced sociological research on migration, assimilation, and acculturation. Concepts like *everyday multiculturalism* and *multiculture* have gained traction among scholars investigating the dynamics of encounters between culturally diverse individuals and the ways

cultural heterogeneity is reshaped through these interactions (e.g., Amin, 2002; Gilroy, 2004; Wise & Velayutham, 2009; Neal et al., 2013; Nowicka & Vertovec, 2014; Neal et al., 2018; Berg & Nowicka, 2019).

In studying assimilation, scholars have abandoned the traditional assumption that cultural differences inevitably disappear. At the heart of *new assimilation theory* or *neo-assimilationism*, introduced by Richard Alba and Victor Nee in their influential work *Remaking the American Mainstream* (Alba & Nee, 2003), is the idea that assimilation represents a gradual “decline” in the salience of cultural differences as minorities integrate into mainstream society (Alba & Nee, 2003, p. 286).

This modern approach requires analysis rooted in the local context while recognizing the influence of broader factors. Neo-assimilation theory identifies two primary mechanisms driving assimilation: *proximate causes*, which operate at both the individual and group levels and are influenced by forms of capital and welfare-maximizing incentives; and *distal causes*, which are embedded in larger structures – such as institutional frameworks or labor market conditions – and may affect the proximal drivers.

Acculturation scholars, like assimilationists, have increasingly focused on empirical studies of local interactions and integration, emphasizing that acculturation outcomes cannot be viewed solely as natural results of larger structural factors. Rather, they argue that individual agency and subjective factors must be considered, as the acculturation process is shaped by personal choices and adaptation strategies within cultural differences. This distinction between structural and subjective factors in acculturation parallels the neo-assimilationist framework’s concepts of distal and proximate causes. While structural forces undeniably influence individual choices and interests, acculturation ultimately reflects how social agents navigate and adapt to cultural differences.

From the substantial body of research collecting empirical data within the acculturation framework, three primary strands have emerged, examining the impact of acculturation on distinct dimensions (for a comprehensive review, see Schwartz et al., 2010):

- *Cultural Practices*: This includes language use, media preferences, social affiliations, and adherence to cultural customs and traditions.
- *Cultural Values*: These are the belief systems associated with specific cultural contexts or groups.
- *Cultural Identifications*: This dimension explores the forms of attachment individuals feel toward cultural groups and the sense of pride or esteem they draw from these connections.

A related area of research focuses on how acculturation affects individuals’ health outcomes (see

Schwartz & Unger, 2016). Since the early 2000s, scholars have expanded and refined the traditional acculturation model to better integrate new findings and diverse research strands into a unified theoretical framework (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2010; Berry, 2019). This evolving model reflects a more nuanced understanding of how individuals and groups adapt in culturally plural contexts, acknowledging both the role of larger social structures and the unique agency of individuals within them.

3.8

Reframing Management of Cultural Differences: Diversity governance as a Framework and the Rise of Interculturalism

The profound transformation in how cultural differences were framed, along with new approaches to studying multicultural dynamics, significantly influenced discussions among political scientists and experts on governance in multicultural societies. Even at this level, cultural differences began to be framed in terms of *diversity* (or *super-diversity*), emphasizing a more intersectional and multifaceted understanding of cultural identity beyond nationality or ethnicity.

Reflecting broader trends, diversity was increasingly viewed not as a challenge but as a strategic asset and resource for social and economic advancement. Unlike earlier approaches, which focused on ethical imperatives or public order, the emerging framework of *diversity governance* highlighted the idea that, when properly managed, diversity could become a catalyst for societal growth. This concept rapidly gained traction, solidifying as a crucial factor in envisioning the future of societies in the third millennium, which are marked by deepening cultural complexity.

Crucially, informed by the democratic transition, the neoliberal shift, and the growing focus on individuals and interpersonal contact, political scientists and experts also re-centered discussions on the local level. Urban areas, in particular, were identified as focal points for diversity governance. Local governments, civil society organizations, and even private enterprises emerged as pivotal agents in fostering inclusive, cohesive communities and promoting equality. By the 2010s, a consensus among scholars suggested that also migration studies had experienced their own “local turn” (e.g., Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017; Caponio et al., 2019;

Pisarevskaya & Scholten, 2022).

In this context, a renewed emphasis was put on the need for diversity governance to promote integration as a pathway to social inclusion within local communities. The aim was to respect and even celebrate diversity, benefiting both minorities and the broader community, while upholding substantive equality that encompasses the pillars of social justice – recognition, representation, and redistribution. A renewed focus was also placed on the concept of *citizenship*, distinguishing between its *formal* aspect (an abstract legal status) and its *substantive* aspect, which pertains to genuine community membership (Marshall, 1950).

A growing consensus emerged around the idea that diversity governance should foster *substantive citizenship*, incorporating diversity into social and political practices through intersectional and post-colonial perspectives in both policymaking and social engagement. This aligned with the principle of *mainstreaming* (see Hankivsky, 2005), whereby governance transcends group-specific policies and majority-minority distinctions, instead creating comprehensive frameworks that respect and include all voices and differences.

As the discourse around cultural differences shifted and diversity governance gained prominence, new terms and frameworks emerged to reflect these evolving approaches. In particular, in connection to the crisis of multiculturalism, an increasing number of scholars started turning to a new term that appeared better suited to capture the principles and practices of diversity governance: *interculturalism*.

The term *intercultural* has been in use since at least the early 20th century, initially referring to educational approaches that promoted the inclusion of immigrant children in host countries' school systems (e.g., Grillo, 2017, pp. 24-27). These approaches were rooted in early discussions on cultural pluralism, particularly influenced by the work of John Dewey. Intercultural education often involved integrating school curricula with specific lessons or workshops focused on the language, culture, and heritage of immigrant children's families (Perotti, 1994; Allemann-Ghionda, 2008). Though *intercultural* was the preferred term for these practices, the spread of *multiculturalism* often led to the *terms* *intercultural* and *multicultural* being used interchangeably in educational contexts. In practice, intercultural education was considered part of the broader multicultural framework – though many later critiqued these efforts as superficial “3Fs multiculturalism” (focusing on food, festivals, and fashion) (Grillo, 2017, p. 13).

During the 1960s and 1970s, influential scholars in education, such as Paulo Freire (1970), popularized concepts like *intercultural education* and *intercultural communication*, spurring discussions on educational strategies in multicultural societies (see Lustig, 1997; Jia, 2005; Sun, 2011). Practical approaches flourished alongside these discussions, leading to the growth of a transnational industry offering services and training in intercultural awareness, such as those provided

by the Society for Intercultural Education, Training, and Research (SIETAR), founded in 1974 – the work of this organization was notably studied by Swedish anthropologist Tommy Dahlen in his *Among the Interculturalists* (1997). Simultaneously, the concept of *intercultural dialogue* gained traction, tied to emerging ideas around integration and the ideal of dialogue as a framework for addressing cultural differences.

By the 1980s, interculturalism started being employed as a label to refer to a distinct political approach to managing cultural differences, rooted in cultural pluralism but positioned as an alternative to multiculturalism. This shift first took place in Canada, in response to ongoing cultural and political tensions between Anglophone Canada and Francophone Québec. Following Canada's adoption of multiculturalism as an official policy framework, Québec officially declared interculturalism as its preferred model for managing cultural differences in the early 1980s (for detailed analyses of Québec's interculturalism, see Talbani, 1993; Rocher et al., 2007; Bouchard, 2012; Bouchard & Scott, 2015).

The differences between these two approaches were closely tied to the contrasting political agendas of Canada's federal government and Québec's provincial government. As noted earlier (Section 3.2), Canada's embrace of multiculturalism aimed not only to affirm cultural pluralism but also to neutralize Québec's calls for linguistic and cultural recognition, which were fueling a secessionist agenda. Canada's multicultural approach promoted a separation between linguistic and cultural issues: while acknowledging two majority languages, it downplayed distinctions between dominant and minority cultures by affirming the equal worth of all cultures under the principle of cultural pluralism.

In response to this move, Québec's interculturalism emphasized the inherent link between language and culture, along with the distinction between majority and minority cultures. First, Québec's approach argued that linguistic recognition should be seen as a fundamental aspect of cultural pluralism. Second, anticipating future academic and sociopolitical discourse, Québec underscored the importance of addressing cultural differences at the local level, asserting that cultural differences should be managed by local governance to reflect the specific needs and identities of communities.

Québec's approach, while upholding the cultural pluralist principle that all cultures hold equal value, advocated for a common linguistic and cultural framework. This would serve to both recognize minority groups and foster integration, ultimately shaping a cohesive, pluralist society. Within this framework, Francophones in Québec – though a minority within Canada's confederation – should be recognized as the cultural majority within Québec itself. This approach may easily support the argument that protecting Francophone culture from the broader influence of Anglophone Canada requires formal recognition of Québec as a distinct entity, potentially independent of the confederation.

Understanding the historical and socio-political backdrop of these two approaches – Canadian multiculturalism and Quebecois interculturalism – helps clarify their distinctions without overestimating them. While programmatically and politically distinct, Québec’s decision to frame its approach as *interculturalism* was ultimately more a strategic choice to position itself in contrast to Canada’s multicultural policy than an attempt to introduce a fundamentally new framework for managing cultural differences. As some scholars suggest (e.g., Bouchard & Scott, 2015), Québec’s adoption of the term *interculturalism* emphasized its unique stance, rather than signaling a departure from the broad, multifaceted set of policies generally classified as multiculturalism.

In other words, Québec’s interculturalism distinguished its approach as unique within the Canadian context, even as it continued to align with the broader principles of multiculturalism on a global scale. From a holistic perspective, Québec’s approach might well be seen as a form of multiculturalism, with some categorizing it as *weak* multiculturalism in contrast to Canada’s *strong* multiculturalism.

This clarification also sheds light on the background and dynamics that, in the early 2000s, helped propel the narrative of interculturalism as a new and distinct approach within the emerging framework of diversity governance. Particularly within Europe, *interculturalism* became a prominent label to describe approaches framed as an evolution of multiculturalism, sparking discussions about diversity governance and positioning interculturalism as a response to multiculturalism’s perceived limitations.

3.9

Interculturalism vs. Multiculturalism

Amid mounting criticism from academics, activists, and policymakers against various forms of multiculturalism, a notable shift began in how the term itself was understood and used. Rather than employing *multiculturalism* as a broad, descriptive label for all approaches based on cultural pluralism, critics began to use it to signify a stereotyped and somewhat simplistic vision of the framework of cultural difference management – more precisely, that framework that had emerged in the post-World War II era as a counterpoint to the traditional framework of cultural homogeneity. This reframing cast multiculturalism’s theoretical and practical approaches as specific, rigid strategies within a common, somewhat outdated ideational framework.

More specifically, multiculturalism began to be characterized as a pre-diversity framework marked by two main limitations: (a) an essentialist view of culture, treating cultural differences as fixed collective identity markers (mainly related to nationality and ethnicity) and largely overlooking the individual, fluid nature of cultural identities; and (b) a state-centered approach to promoting cultural pluralism that downplayed the importance of local dimensions, integration, and the role of interpersonal contact.

This simplified view, which overlooked the concept's complexity and the diversity of both theories and practices it had encompassed, fed into a larger narrative of multiculturalism's "rise and fall" (Kymlicka, 2010). According to this perspective, the enthusiasm for cultural pluralism and minority rights that began in the 1960s had ultimately failed, leading to the *multiculturalism backlash* as a natural reaction to what critics saw as the approach's essentialist, group-focused emphasis, which only reinforced social barriers and fueled intergroup tensions (e.g., Sartori, 2002; Giménez, 2003; 2010; Cantle, 2012; Zapata-Barrero, 2015; 2017). In this view, multiculturalism had not fulfilled its promise of fostering inclusive, cohesive societies but had instead contributed to the creation of cultural divides and parallel communities, calling for the rise of diversity governance as inaugurating a "post-multicultural era" (Zapata-Barrero, 2017a; 2019).

It was within this context that *interculturalism* emerged as a favored term among scholars and policymakers, seen as a sort of *deus ex machina* for managing cultural heterogeneity in contrast to the perceived shortcomings of multiculturalism (e.g., Zapata-Barrero, 2015; 2019; for a comprehensive review of interculturalism literature, see Elias & Mansouri, 2020). Interculturalism aims to address many of multiculturalism's perceived weaknesses by embracing the reconceptualization of cultural differences as *diversity* (or super-diversity). This new model emphasized the individuality, complexity, and fluidity of cultural identities, promoting approaches that minimize the duality between majority and minority groups. By focusing on the diversity within individuals rather than simply between groups, interculturalism sought to build on shared commonalities rather than differences.

Furthermore, interculturalism redefined cultural differences as a potential asset for social and economic development, in contrast to previous views that saw them as a challenge to be managed. A significant focus of interculturalism is integration, achieved by fostering meaningful interpersonal contact between individuals of diverse cultural backgrounds. Drawing from theoretical discussions on dialogue and empirical insights from contact studies, interculturalism proposed a straightforward, intuitive approach to easing tensions: promote positive, face-to-face interactions as the foundation for social cohesion and inclusion.

Branding the framework of diversity governance as *interculturalism* proved to be a strategically

effective move, especially in regions like Europe, where the backlash against multiculturalism had become particularly intense in both academic and public spheres. The adoption of a fresh label helped address two key challenges: first, it countered the term multiculturalism, which had grown increasingly ambiguous and sprawling in its meanings and uses, and second, it signaled a clear shift from past approaches.

The choice of *interculturalism* was especially advantageous for two main reasons. Firstly, this term naturally aligned with the new framework's emergence from widespread critiques of multiculturalism, positioning the new approach in oppositional terms. Interculturalism already had a precedent as an alternative to multiculturalism, exemplified in the contrast between Québec's interculturalism and Canada's multiculturalism. Although this original context concerned two distinct political approaches within a broader multicultural framework, it provided a model for framing interculturalism as a rebirth from multiculturalism's perceived failures

Secondly, the term *interculturalism*, thanks to its prefix *inter-*, is naturally associated with interaction—a concept deeply connected to integration, local engagement, and interpersonal relationships within diversity governance. This association evokes visions of interconnectedness, integration, and cohesion. In contrast, *multiculturalism* may intuitively suggest the coexistence of distinct cultures side by side, potentially reinforcing perceptions of separation rather than integration.

Interculturalism rapidly gained traction, particularly in Europe, replacing multiculturalism across various levels of discussion. However, like its predecessor, interculturalism soon inherited some of multiculturalism's challenges, and, particularly, its ambiguity. As with multiculturalism, scholars sometimes blur the lines between interculturalism as a normative ideal and as a practical, policy-driven approach.

In contrast to those who enthusiastically embraced interculturalism as a fresh start, some scholars argue against the rise-and-fall narrative of multiculturalism and the call for a post-multicultural era, viewing it as misguided to cast diversity governance as a break from the past (e.g., Meer & Modood, 2012; 2016). These authors emphasize continuity, advocating to retain the term *multiculturalism*. These critics also resist the wholesale adoption of *interculturalism* – a term historically limited to educational approaches – as a catch-all label for diversity governance. While they acknowledge that diversity strategies must adapt to changing social contexts, they see *multiculturalism* as a more effective brand. They argue that *interculturalism*, with its intuitive association with interaction, might best serve to describe specific approaches within an updated multiculturalism, one reoriented within the broader diversity governance framework.

Beyond the authors dueling on the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism ring, many voices have called for a ceasefire, suggesting that this prolonged discussion often veers more toward rhetorical

sparring than substantive academic discourse (e.g., Kymlicka, 2010; 2016; Grillo 2017; Joppke, 2017). Critics note that interculturalists frequently portray multiculturalism as a “handy scapegoat,” deflecting criticisms about managing cultural heterogeneity to elevate the perceived legitimacy of interculturalism (Kymlicka, 2016, p. 161). This strategy, they argue, seems to have much more to do with mere branding than with advancing meaningful theoretical insights.

Moreover, the polarization between multiculturalist and interculturalist camps risks undermining their shared goal of supporting cultural pluralism. Such divisions not only detract from empirical realities and create confusion at the theoretical level but also risk reinforcing conservative and populist narratives, which capitalize on perceived disunity among advocates of dialogue and inclusion.

Recently, calls for greater dialogue between the two perspectives appear to be gaining ground, with prominent scholars acknowledging that multiculturalism and interculturalism – while emphasizing different aspects of diversity governance – are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they can proceed “alongside but separate” (Zapata-Barrero, 2018) or even be seen as complementary (Stokke & Lybæk, 2016; Mansouri & Modood, 2020).

In sum, the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism debate may be less a true ideological divide than a contest over terminology – whether to label approaches as *multicultural* or *intercultural* – and symbolism, centered on whether to emphasize continuity or a break from past frameworks. While individual scholars may differ in focus – some emphasizing the state’s role, others highlighting local contexts – these variations reflect a spectrum of emphases rather than an entirely separate set of principles. Notably, these distinctions often stem more from regional, cultural, and intellectual traditions than from any firm allegiance to multiculturalism or interculturalism.

It is also worth noting that this debate is shaped by parochial influences, both disciplinary and geographic. Academically, it largely stems from theoretical perspectives within sociology, political science, and education, and often lacks strong empirical grounding. Geographically, the conversation is predominantly confined to Europe and Canada, with most literature published in English or, occasionally, in other languages of these regions, such as French, Spanish, Italian, and German. In other linguistic and cultural contexts – such as in South Korea and Japan – even where terms like multicultural and intercultural appear, they seldom reference the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism debate at all.

CHAPTER 4

Contextualizing the Research Methodology: The Diffusion Theory

4.1

The Origins of Diffusion Studies

On November 27, 1888, the renowned anthropologist Sir Edward Burnett Tylor presented an ambitious lecture at the Royal Anthropological Institute, aimed at introducing a scientific methodology for studying the evolution of human institutions. His intention was to prove that anthropology, akin to the so-called *hard sciences*, can investigate issues by employing systematic methods such as classification and variable analysis. To demonstrate his point, Tylor presented a study on the development of marriage and descent laws, drawing on an analysis of customs from approximately 350 distinct cultures, “ranging from insignificant savage hordes to great cultured nations” (Tylor 1889, p. 246). By categorizing these customs and identifying patterns and correlations, Tylor proposed a general societal progression from “maternal” systems – where authority rests primarily on the wife’s side – to “paternal” systems, in which power shifts to the husband (Tylor 1889).

Tylor’s work stands as an early example of cross-cultural survey methods. However, a critical flaw in his argument was soon pointed out by the president of the Royal Anthropological Institute, none other than Francis Galton – a polymath, cousin of Charles Darwin, and inventor of the modern concept of eugenics. While Tylor had treated each case as an independent example, Galton observed that it might well be that “some of the tribes had derived them from a common source so that they were duplicate copies of the same original” (Tylor 1889, p. 270). In other words, Tylor had overlooked the potential diffusion of cultural traits across groups. This apparently simple objection posed a significant challenge to Tylor’s methodology. This objection gave rise to what became known as the

Galton's problem, which still represents a major issue for comparative studies, underscoring the importance of considering diffusion in cross-case analysis (e.g., Schnegg, 2014).

The concept of diffusion refers to the spread of socio-cultural elements from one society or setting to another. It represents much more than a descriptive concept, inviting two fundamental questions: *How* does the diffusion of specific traits occur? *Why* does it occur? A vast body of research has since explored these questions, examining the dynamics of diffusion in various contexts.

Although interest in diffusion may be found even in the writings of the ancient historian Herodotus (Kinnunen, 1996, p. 432), the field of diffusion research is often traced to *The Laws of Imitation* ([1890] 1903), published in 1890 by Gabriel Tarde, an early pioneer in sociology and social psychology. Not long after the Tylor-Galton debate, Tarde introduced his own interpretation of how social institutions and customs evolve. He argued that the ultimate driver of social change is *invention*, conceptualized as a rare product of genius (Kinnunen, 1996, p. 433). Social change, he suggested, unfolds as these inventions spread through *imitation* – a concept that foreshadows what later scholars would call the *adoption* of innovations.

Another early sociologist who explored the theme of imitation was Georg Simmel. In his celebrated essay *Fashion* ([1904] 1957), Simmel analyzed fashion as a form of imitation, discussing how the figure of the *stranger* can act as an innovator and emphasizing the significance of communication networks for disseminating innovations within a social system. The works of both Tarde and Simmel greatly influenced American sociology, particularly scholars at the Chicago School, whose work expanded on these foundational ideas. Together, these early discussions laid crucial groundwork for the future study of diffusion in the developing fields of sociology and anthropology.

In the first half of the 20th century, diffusion emerged as a key analytical concept for a new school of thought in anthropology known as *diffusionism* (Upadhyay & Pandey, 1993, pp. 99-161). This perspective stood in open contrast to the evolutionary approach, which viewed human cultural development as a series of independent, *parallel inventions* in isolated contexts. In particular, diffusionists argued that humans are generally *uninventive*, with a few significant exceptions where major cultural innovations arose in specific societies. These breakthroughs spread across the globe through processes of imitation and re-adaptation.

Three prominent diffusionist schools developed, each based in a different country with distinct views on the origins of civilization. The British School of Diffusion, led by Grafton Elliot Smith (1871-1937), posited Ancient Egypt as the cradle of all human cultures and institutions. The German School, initiated by Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), rejected the notion of a single origin and proposed multiple sources emerging over time. The American School of Diffusion, founded by Franz Boas (1858-1942), also acknowledged multiple origins and focused particularly on the human ability to

adapt and modify inventions. Boas and his followers identified and examined distinct *cultural areas*, that is geographical regions defined by shared cultural traits.

Although diffusionism was eventually sidelined within anthropology, it played a significant role in inspiring scholars from other fields to recognize the importance of diffusion (Rogers, 1962, p. 42). The concept soon gained traction in a wide array of disciplines, including education, public health, marketing, geography, rural sociology, and political science. This shift is reflected in the increasing number of publications on the topic. In the 1920s and 1930s, only a handful of empirical diffusion studies existed. By the 1940s and 1950s, however, interest surged, with the number of studies growing from just 27 in 1941 to an impressive 423 by 1959 (Katz et al., 1963, pp. 238-240; Rogers, 1995, p. 45).

4.2

The Classical Theory of Diffusion

For some decades, diffusion research evolved within isolated intellectual communities, each constrained by strict disciplinary boundaries and largely unaware of parallel work in other fields. This situation began to change in 1962 with the publication of Everett Rogers' influential book *Diffusion of Innovations*. In this work, Rogers reviewed diverse strands of diffusion research, noting that, despite their specialized approaches, many shared similar insights into the dynamics of diffusion. Motivated by these commonalities, Rogers crafted the first theoretical synthesis of diffusion studies, aiming to make the concept accessible and inspire new research. Across five editions of his book – concluding with the 2003 edition – Rogers continually updated his synthesis, which came to be regarded as the main framework for the *classical theory of diffusion*.

Rogers introduced two models to explain diffusion processes at different levels: the *Innovation-Decision Model*, which outlines the stages of adoption by individual decision-makers, and the *Standard Diffusion Model*, which describes how innovations spread within a social system.

The *Innovation-Decision Model* consists of four core steps – *knowledge*, *persuasion*, *decision*, and *implementation* – with a fifth, *confirmation*, sometimes added. This model describes how a decision-making unit initially learns about an innovation (*knowledge*) and then forms an attitude toward it

(*persuasion*), leading to the choice to adopt or reject it (*decision*). Upon adoption, the idea is put into practice (*implementation*) and, if successful, may become normalized as a routine practice, losing its novelty. In some cases, adopters seek *confirmation* that the innovation is beneficial, and at this stage, they may still choose to discontinue its use.

The *Standard Diffusion Model*, which illustrates how innovations spread within social systems, is arguably Rogers' most significant contribution. Supported by extensive empirical findings, the model shows that diffusion follows a bell-shaped curve when the adoption rate is plotted and an S-curve when cumulative adoption is represented (Figure 2). Initially, diffusion progresses slowly, then accelerates as adoption peaks, and finally slows as the pool of new adopters is exhausted. Rogers categorized adopters into five groups, creating terminology still used in diffusion research: a) *innovators*, b) *early adopters*, c) *early majority*, d) *late majority*, and e) *laggards*. His model, typically visualized in an S-curve, highlights how diffusion naturally saturates over time.




Figure 2. Visual representation of the process of standard diffusion of innovation, showing both the frequency (bell-shaped curve) of adoption and the cumulative number of adopters (S-shaped curve). The frequency is broken into categories of adopters. (Wikimedia Commons)

Building on the results of empirical research, Rogers also provided a profile for each adopter category, identifying trends in socioeconomic status, personality traits, and communication behaviors. His analysis famously showed that early adopters tend to have higher socioeconomic status, more dynamic, entrepreneurial personalities, and greater communication resources than later adopters.

Additionally, Rogers identified two other critical actors driving diffusion: *opinion leaders* and *change agents*. Opinion leaders are individuals within a social system who influence others' attitudes and behaviors informally, leveraging their conformity to system norms and their central position in communication networks. Change agents, on the other hand, are those who influence "clients' innovation-decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency" (Rogers 2003, p. 67). Often positioned outside the social system, change agents work to bridge the gap between change agencies and potential adopters, frequently collaborating with opinion leaders to foster adoption within the target community.

Having outlined how innovations spread, the remaining task for a comprehensive theory of diffusion was to clarify *why* certain ideas are successfully adopted while others are not. To address this issue, Rogers synthesized key factors from the diffusion literature that help explain and predict adoption rates. He first identified five attributes of the innovation itself that strongly influence its adoption:

- *Relative Advantage*: The degree to which an innovation is perceived as superior to what it replaces. Importantly, perceived advantage, rather than actual advantage, is what matters most.
- *Compatibility*: How well the innovation aligns with existing values, past experiences, and the needs of potential adopters.
- *Complexity*: The extent to which an innovation is seen as difficult to understand or use. Greater complexity typically hinders adoption.
- *Trialability*: The degree to which an innovation can be experimented with before full adoption.
- *Observability*: How visible the results of the innovation are to others, which can encourage adoption through social influence.

Beyond these *attributes of an innovation*, Rogers also identified additional factors that play a critical role in the diffusion process. One key factor is the nature of the innovation-decision process – that is, who makes the decision to adopt or reject the innovation and how it is made. Traditional diffusion studies primarily examined what Rogers termed *optional innovation-decisions*, where individuals freely choose to adopt or reject. However, innovations can also be adopted through

collective innovation-decisions (consensus among members of a social system) or *authority innovation-decisions* (imposed by a central authority). Additionally, *contingent innovation-decisions* arise as a sequence of other types, highlighting that the decision-making process itself influences the pace and success of diffusion. Depending on the nature of the decision-making unit and of the decision process itself, diffusion can vary significantly.

The *context* in which diffusion occurs is another critical factor. Rogers emphasized the *structure* of a social system, which includes how communication and interactions are organized. A key concept here is *homophily*, defined as the degree of similarity among members within communication flows. While homophilous groups communicate more effectively, fostering quicker diffusion, homophily can also inhibit the spread of truly novel (*heterophilous*) ideas that disrupt familiar norms. Additionally, a system's prevailing norms and values influence members' openness to innovation, as do socioeconomic and sociocultural factors, where higher status often correlates with a greater propensity to adopt new ideas.

Finally, the channels and tools used for diffusion, along with the efforts of change agents promoting an innovation, significantly impact diffusion outcomes. Effective use of communication channels and proactive support from change agents can help explain why some innovations, despite favorable attributes, may underperform in adoption if they lack strong promotional efforts.

4.3

The Evolution of Diffusion Theory in Social Sciences: The Geographic and Organizational Focuses

We might, somewhat ironically, view Rogers' work as a powerful *change agent* that spurred the diffusion of diffusion theory itself within academic circles. His book was an instant success, igniting a fresh wave of interest in diffusion phenomena, which was reflected in a sharp increase in studies on the subject, totaling 1,799 by 1969 (Rogers, 1995, p. 45).

The scope of diffusion research also expanded considerably, encompassing an ever-broadening array of disciplines and types of innovations. By the late 1960s, Rogers identified nine primary "diffusion research traditions" across rural sociology, communication, education, marketing, general

sociology, public health and medical sociology, anthropology, geography, and early sociology (Rogers, 1983, pp. 42-79). Additionally, emerging fields such as economics and political science were beginning to adopt diffusion as a key research focus.

Within the social sciences, early diffusion studies generally emphasized a *client focus* that centered on the individual decision-maker. However, two new perspectives gained traction: the *geographic focus* and the *organizational focus* (see Savage, 1985). These approaches shifted attention away from individual decision-making units to explore the influence of spatial variables on diffusion, as well as the systemic impacts of innovation within organized social structures.

Swedish geographer Torsten Hägerstrand was a pioneer in the geographic study of diffusion. Although his initial research, conducted in the 1950s, was published in Swedish, limiting its early impact, the 1967 release of *Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process* (1967), translated with a postscript by American geographer Allen Pred, sparked substantial interest. Hägerstrand's work became foundational in examining how spatial distance shapes diffusion patterns.

Hägerstrand introduced a simulation approach to diffusion, using a mathematical model to represent the theoretical spread of innovations over time and across space. By comparing these simulations with real-world diffusion patterns, Hägerstrand identified several spatial dynamics, including the *neighborhood effect* – the observed tendency for innovations to spread more readily between individuals or entities in close proximity.

A few years after the initial enthusiasm for geographic factors in diffusion research, *Innovations and Organizations* (1973) by Gerald Zaltman and colleagues introduced another fresh perspective: the study of innovation diffusion within organizations. This emerging organizational focus distinguished itself by concentrating on the implementation of innovations rather than merely their adoption. Researchers became less concerned with what drives the decision to adopt and more interested in what actually happens when an innovation is integrated into an organization. They soon recognized that adoption often involves a dual process: innovations are typically modified to fit the adopting organization, while the organization itself often needs structural adjustments to accommodate the new innovation.

This shift in focus led to renewed attention on the concept of *re-invention*, that is the degree to which innovations are altered during adoption and implementation. Until the 1970s, most diffusion studies treated adoption as a direct replication of an innovation's use by previous adopters, viewing deviations as rare anomalies or “noise” (see Rogers, 2003, p. 39). This view cast adopters as passive recipients of innovation rather than active agents reshaping it to meet their unique needs. Only with the systematic collection of data on implementation did researchers begin to recognize that re-invention is often the rule, not the exception.

The organizational focus also brought attention to an overlooked dimension in diffusion research: the consequences of innovation diffusion. Specifically, it shed light on the changes adopters undergo as a result of adopting (or rejecting) an innovation – especially pronounced within organizational settings. Implementing a new innovation can necessitate creating new infrastructure or entire organizational units, sometimes reshaping the structure of an organization to accommodate particularly transformative innovations. Analyzing these changes led to typologies that categorized the various impacts of innovation on organizational structures.

Simultaneously, this focus on consequences introduced an evaluative lens to diffusion research for the first time. Traditionally, diffusion studies assumed that adopting an innovation was inherently beneficial. Now, researchers have begun differentiating between *positive* (desirable) and *negative* (undesirable) outcomes, acknowledging that not all consequences of innovation diffusion are beneficial for the adopting organization.

4.4

Critical Perspectives on Diffusion

For some time, what was notably absent from diffusion research was a critical perspective. It was not until the revitalization of diffusion studies in the 1970s that the first substantial critiques emerged. Once again, Rogers stepped in to assess the field's progress, identifying four main limitations and biases that had shaped diffusion research up to that point (see Rogers, 2003, p. 45-52):

- *Pro-Innovation Bias*: This bias assumes that innovation adoption is inherently beneficial and that diffusion should be as rapid and widespread as possible. This perspective often leads researchers to overlook or dismiss certain aspects of diffusion, such as ignorance about innovations, the decision to reject or modify them, and even anti-diffusion efforts intended to halt the spread of harmful innovations.
- *Individual-Blame Bias*: Diffusion researchers often place responsibility for diffusion obstacles on individuals, attributing any challenges in the process to personal choices or limitations. This focus frequently overlooks broader social factors within the systems in which these individuals operate.

- *Recall Problem*: Much diffusion research depends on respondents' recollections of when they adopted an innovation. Solely relying on memory can lead to inaccuracies, which can, in turn, create significant issues when determining the causal patterns within the diffusion process.
- *Issue of Equality*: Although diffusion is often linked to socioeconomic development, studies have shown that in developing countries, innovation adoption can actually widen socioeconomic gaps among community members, intensifying inequalities rather than reducing them.

Even today, diffusion research grapples with these potential pitfalls. As in other social sciences, the primary safeguard against these biases is awareness – researchers must recognize these limitations and implement all possible measures to mitigate them.

A particularly relevant issue raised in this critical discussion relates to the fact that much diffusion research is funded by change agencies, which often sponsor these studies with the goal of gathering data that will help them manage and control the diffusion process. This reliance on agency-funded research has not only contributed to the traditionally dominant client-centered focus and fostered pro-innovation and individual-blame biases, but it also highlights inherent limitations in the classical diffusion model itself. Because this model synthesizes findings from diffusion literature largely through the lens of change agencies, it typically portrays diffusion as a centralized process flowing from expert sources to potential adopters. However, diffusion scholars have gradually recognized an alternative model: decentralized diffusion.

In particular, the classical diffusion model faced a major challenge in 1971 when Donald Schön, in *Beyond the Stable State* (1971), observed that in some complex systems, diffusion does not proceed top-down but rather originates from multiple local sources, spreading through horizontal networks. Since then, numerous studies have examined these decentralized systems. In such models, innovations often begin with certain lead users and spread through peer networks, with users frequently adapting these innovations to fit their specific needs. Thus, decentralized diffusion depends on users' ability to manage their own diffusion systems, which requires either (a) users with advanced knowledge and technical competence or (b) innovations that do not demand high levels of technical expertise.

Decentralized diffusion seems to offer several advantages over centralized models. Due to the higher degree of user control, decentralized diffusion aligns closely with local needs, often resulting in innovations that are better suited to users' specific problems. This approach generally garners greater public engagement and support, while minimizing potential conflicts and issues stemming

from differences between change agents and adopters. However, the decentralized approach also comes with disadvantages, mainly related to the lack of technical expertise. These include lower levels of quality control, which can allow ineffective innovations to spread, and a lack of systematic diffusion strategies, which can reduce the overall success of diffusion. Additionally, in many cases, those in control of the system may lack the resources to gather data on user needs and challenges, as well as to identify relevant innovations that could help to address them.

Thus, decentralized diffusion systems tend to work best only in those cases when the innovations being adopted do not require extensive technical expertise and when they are being introduced to a relatively homogeneous user base with similar needs and conditions. Notably, aspects of centralized and decentralized diffusion can be combined into hybrid diffusion systems tailored to meet specific situational needs.

4.5

When Policies Spread: The Rise of Policy Diffusion Studies

While the early ancestors of diffusion studies, such as the scholars of the Royal Anthropological Institute and the diffusionists, focused on the spread of social institutions and customs, for much of the 20th century, traditional diffusion research largely centered on the adoption of new technologies. As a result, studies examining policy diffusion were sparse until the end of the 1960s, with only four papers addressing the spread of new policies across states (Savage, 1985, p. 1) – the most recent of these being *The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws* (Sutherland, 1950), published in 1950.

The situation changed in 1969 with Jack Walker's influential article, *The Diffusion of Innovation among the American States* (1969), which sparked a renewed interest in the study of policy diffusion. Walker's work examined why some states adopted new policies more quickly than others. His analysis revealed a complex picture with no single, universal pattern for how policies spread. However, certain patterns did emerge, primarily driven by dynamics of emulation and competition. Walker found that states were more likely to adopt a policy if it had already been implemented by another state viewed as a valid point of comparison. Political leaders, in particular, appeared motivated to adopt new policies if they believed not doing so would leave their state at a disadvantage.

Walker also highlighted the role of interstate communication networks, strengthened by professional associations among state administrators, as key conduits for policy diffusion.

Walker's study catalyzed further research, drawing political scientists into the study of diffusion. By 1985, more than sixty studies had been conducted, establishing policy diffusion as a recognized field within diffusion research traditions (see Savage, 1985).

Today, hundreds of studies can be found which examine the spread of specific policies – such as those in education, health, civil rights, and lotteries – or broader themes like the diffusion of democratic institutions (for an extensive literature review, see Graham et al., 2013; meta-analyses include Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016; State Policy Innovation and Diffusion database; and Policy Diffusion Results database). Informed by classic diffusion theories, such as Rogers' model, as well as the geographic and organizational perspectives in diffusion literature, policy diffusion research has developed its own approaches and theoretical frameworks.

Policy diffusion is commonly defined as the process by which policy decisions and outcomes in one context influence policymaking and outcomes in others (e.g., Simmons et al., 2006, p. 781; Graham et al. 2013, p. 675; Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016, p. 89). Within public policy studies, scholars have distinguished policy diffusion from *policy transfer* (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000), which refers to the process of using knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, or institutions from one setting to inform policy development in another (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 5).

Although policy diffusion and policy transfer are closely related, their exact relationship remains debated. Some scholars argue for conceptual integration (Evans & Davies, 1999; Newmark, 2002; Braun & Gilardi, 2006), while others contend that policy transfer is simply a form of diffusion (Newmark, 2002) or, conversely, that policy diffusion is a subset of policy transfer (Busch & Jörgens, 2005).

No matter the stance one takes, it is undeniable that a distinct literature on policy transfer has developed within public policy research. This body of work, while aligned with the broader theoretical framework of policy diffusion, diverges in its unique focus and methodological approaches (see Benson & Jordan, 2011, p. 367; Graham et al., 2013, 675-684). In a recent discussion, David Marsh, a leading expert in policy transfer, and his colleague Jason Sharman suggested bypassing the conceptual debate to focus instead on the distinct contributions and characteristics of the two respective research strands (Marsh & Sharman, 2009).

One notable difference highlighted by Marsh and Sharman is that policy diffusion studies tend to emphasize structural factors to explain how policies spread, whereas policy transfer literature places a greater emphasis on agency. Secondly, diffusion research often employs quantitative methods to

identify general patterns and causal relationships within the diffusion process, while transfer studies typically use qualitative methods to trace the specific nuances of policy transfer processes in depth.

Analyzing these differences reveals both the compatibility of the two literatures and the need for their integration. A comprehensive understanding of how policies spread requires acknowledging the interplay between structural influences and agency, alongside an examination of both diffusion patterns and process-specific characteristics. While no single integrated approach can resolve all tensions between quantitative and qualitative methods – a recurring issue in comparative research – this does not preclude combining both approaches. Integrated, context-specific methodologies can address these limitations, offering a richer understanding of policy diffusion and transfer.

Beyond policy transfer, another related concept is *policy convergence*, defined as the process by which policies in multiple countries become more similar over time (Knill, 2005, p. 766). Often, convergence is not an independent process but rather the outcome of diffusion itself. Thus, convergence serves as an important indicator for diffusion researchers to assess whether specific policy changes are indeed part of a broader diffusion process. Although theoretically possible, it is quite rare to find cases eluding the famous Galton's problem – that is, instances in which convergent policy changes are the product of entirely unrelated domestic factors.

4.6

The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion

From a theoretical point of view, policy diffusion research has traditionally centered on the study of the mechanisms through which policy choices in one context influence those in others. Four primary mechanisms are commonly identified: (a) *learning*, (b) *competition*, (c) *coercion*, and (d) *emulation*.

a) Learning

Learning refers to the acquisition of new information that updates beliefs about the outcomes of a policy (Meseguer, 2004; 2005). In diffusion research, learning suggests that policymakers adopt new policies after assessing the outcomes of similar policies implemented elsewhere (Gilardi &

Wasserfallen, 2019, p. 1247). This mechanism highlights the role of information, with policy adoption driven by perceived effectiveness (Braun et al., 2007, p. 47). Learning-based diffusion is often linked to rational decision-making: governments emulate foreign policies that appear to yield more efficient results (Rose, 1991; Meseguer, 2003). Thus, the more successful a policy is perceived to be in one context, the more likely it is to be adopted in another, with *policy experts* playing a key role in evaluating policies and facilitating governments' learning.

However, this classical view has faced criticism for its rationalist bias. Assessing policy success is rarely straightforward, especially when effectiveness is hard to measure. This does not exclude learning as a diffusion mechanism but rather emphasizes that policymakers may rely on bounded rationality and cognitive heuristics, leading to diffusion patterns that diverge from idealized rational learning (McDermott, 2001; Weyland, 2004; 2005;). At the same time, researchers may investigate the effects of the "opportunities to learn" as a proxy for direct evidence of learning (Shipan & Volden 2008, p. 842).

b) Competition

Competition describes the strategic adoption of policies by governments to attract economic activity (Simmons & Elkins, 2004, p. 173). Basic competition models suggest that people, businesses, and investors weigh multiple locations for their activities, prompting policymakers to adopt favorable policies to attract these resources (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019, p. 1247). Here, relative deprivation is central: policymakers may implement pro-investment policies, such as privatization, deregulation, and strong property rights, to avoid losing economic ground to other regions (Marsh & Sharman, 2009, pp. 271-272). As a result, competition often drives states toward similar policies, especially as mobile capital flows to locations offering better returns.

Most research on competition has focused on tax policy at international and subnational levels, challenging the notion that competition improves welfare – as famously posited in the so-called *Tiebout model* (Tiebout, 1956). Instead, competition is often associated with a *race-to-the-bottom* effect, where states reduce welfare standards to remain competitive (e.g., Oates 2001; Marsh & Sharman, 2009, 271; Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2019, 1247). This phenomenon was initially highlighted by William Cary in his critique of Delaware's corporate laws, thus becoming known as the *Delaware effect* (Cary, 1974).

However, recent research questions this perspective, suggesting that competition can also lead to *race-to-the-top* dynamics, where states adopt higher standards to attract a quality-driven market (see, for example, Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Drezner, 2001; Volden, 2002; Hays 2003). This line of criticism was famously initiated by David Vogel, who, in the late 1990s, found that California enacted

comparatively high automobile emissions standards to retain a competitive edge in a quality-conscious market (Vogel, 1997). Building on Vogel's study, this phenomenon soon became known as the *California effect*, gaining significant traction in diffusion policy literature as an alternative to the Delaware effect. Further studies have since confirmed that competition can foster race-to-the-top effects, especially in areas like process standards and labor rights (Prakash & Potoski, 2006; Greenhill et al., 2009), demonstrating that under certain conditions, competition can drive policy innovation and improved social outcomes.

c) Coercion

Coercion occurs when powerful governments or international organizations influence policy adoption through some form of pressure. Unlike other diffusion mechanisms, coercion operates through a top-down, vertical approach, leading some scholars to question whether it truly fits within the concept of diffusion, which typically implies "voluntary" policy changes (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016; Blatter et al. 2022, p. 809). Accordingly, coercion is often framed as a form of conditionality, where policies are adopted as prerequisites for receiving grants, aid, or loans (see Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019, 1247).

Classic studies on coercion focus on how federal grants in the U.S. shape policy changes at state and local levels (e.g., Walker, 1973; Welch & Thompson, 1980; Allen et al., 2004; Karch, 2006; Shipan & Volden, 2006; Douglas et al., 2015) or examine the influence of the IMF and World Bank on recipient countries' policy decisions (e.g., Mosley et al., 1995; Vreeland, 2003). A well-known example is the European Union's conditional requirements for membership or access to the common market (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2008). Across these cases, the defining feature of coercion is the way powerful entities use economic incentives to shape policy adoption in target regions. In this sense, coercion shares some commonalities with competition, as both are driven largely by economic motivations. However, coercion differs in that it is rooted in an asymmetrical relationship, where the interests of the more powerful entities – not those of the adopting countries – predominantly dictate the direction of policy change.

d) Emulation

Often called *imitation* or *mimicry*, emulation is considered a residual analytical category employed to explain policy adoption when rational, fact-based assessments of policy efficacy are not the primary drivers (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019, p. 1249). Instead, emulation occurs under symbolic or normative pressures, where policymakers adopt certain policies to enhance their organization's reputation or legitimacy, or simply because the policy has become a widely accepted standard in its

context. Scholars have further refined emulation into subcategories like “conformity to common norms,” “taken-for-grantedness,” and “legitimacy-seeking” (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). Emulation is therefore rooted in the idea that aligning with socially valued policies can yield reputational and status-related rewards, ultimately shifting the comparative appeal of policy options (Braun et al., 2007; Douglas et al., 2015). Consequently, policies recognized as a “stamp of legitimacy” may spread even amidst uncertainty about their effectiveness (Martin, 2001, p. 477).

Prominent examples of emulation include the diffusion of human rights and educational policies (e.g., Meyer et al., 1992; Simmons, 2009; Greenhill, 2010) and the establishment of independent central banks (Polillo & Guillén, 2005; McNamara, 2002). Research also highlights the role of “model” countries and international organizations in shaping the norms that drive emulation (for some literature about the role of model contexts, see Shipan & Volden, 2008, p. 843; for key studies on the role of international agencies and organizations see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Bearce & Bondanella, 2007). Some researchers even suggest that emulation explains the global spread of Western policies, as non-Western countries adopt these policies to project a modern image (Blatter et al., 2021, p. 810).

Empirical indicators of emulation in diffusion research often include the number of countries adopting a policy, shared membership in international organizations and networks, and the rates of adoption by influential nations (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019, p. 1249). Emulation, however, frequently results in superficial or localized adaptations of policies that diverge from the original design (Blatter et al. 2021, 810). Research shows that emulating countries often use just the label of a policy, sometimes radically distorting its content to suit domestic conditions (e.g., Meyer et al. 1992; Rose, 1993; Chorev, 2012; Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019). This adaptation allows policymakers to balance the expectations of international stakeholders with domestic constraints (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019, p. 1251), a process that John Meyer and Brian Rowan famously described in their 1977 seminal study *Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony* (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

To sum up, the four traditional mechanisms at the center of policy diffusion literature offer, respectively, four possible answers to the central question of *why* a policy may spread:

- *Learning* – a policy spreads because it is perceived as effective.
- *Competition* – it spreads because not adopting it would place a context at a disadvantage relative to others that have adopted it
- *Coercion* – it becomes widespread due to external pressures, direct or indirect, that make adoption necessary
- *Emulation* – diffusion is driven by the goal of enhancing status and reputation.

For each of these mechanisms, scholars have explored the roles of various actors and processes that address *how* policies diffuse.

4.7

Towards a Consistent Framework for Policy Diffusion

Identifying four primary mechanisms of policy diffusion – learning, competition, coercion, and emulation – presents three major interconnected challenges in the literature, relating, respectively to theoretical, operational, and methodological aspects. First, these mechanisms lack a unified theoretical foundation: while learning, competition, and coercion often rely on rationalist, utility-maximizing assumptions, emulation operates from a constructivist perspective. This theoretical divergence creates ambiguity in the relationship between the mechanisms, as each can activate unique diffusion processes involving different actors and distinct interests. Consequently, it remains unclear how these mechanisms should be consistently applied in analysis.

At the operational level, a major issue arises from the need for interdisciplinary analysis. The current mechanisms, rooted in political science, overlook insights from sociological diffusion studies that may enrich the understanding of policy diffusion. These insights include factors from classic diffusion theory, along with spatial proximity and network influences highlighted in geographic and organizational diffusion research. Such elements are essential, as the psychological and social characteristics of adopters, as well as their spatial and network contexts, significantly impact policy diffusion.

These theoretical and operational challenges naturally lead to methodological concerns. Identifying and analyzing diverse mechanisms and diffusion factors calls for distinct research methodologies. Although this lack of theoretical cohesion poses fewer challenges to exploratory studies – which often take a more flexible approach by including as many mechanisms as data allow – it does present risks for more theory-driven research. Many empirical studies have resolved to use the whole package of this “patchy set of mechanisms” (Blatter et al., 2021), avoiding mono-causal and adopting an *additive*

approach that treats each mechanism as independently sufficient to increase the likelihood of policy adoption and simply adding their effects together (Braun et al., 2007, p. 44).

While practical, this approach risks oversimplifying the diffusion process by ignoring the potential for “conjunctural” and “multiple” causation, which considers complex interactions among factors (Braun et al., 2007, pp. 44-45). Moreover, the theoretical imbalance – where three out of four mechanisms align with rationalist approaches conducive to quantitative analysis – often results in the underrepresentation of constructivist perspectives and qualitative methodologies, as these require data that are harder to quantify and analyze.

In response to these limitations, recent efforts have been made to develop a unified theoretical framework for policy diffusion. For example, some researchers have sought to differentiate mechanisms along dimensions such as temporality and conditionality – a pioneering attempt, in this sense, was made Charles Shipan and Craig Volden (Shipan & Volden, 2008) in their study on the diffusion of antismoking policies across 675 American cities. Although such distinctions may enhance clarity around specific factors involved in different diffusion processes, they do not fully address the foundational issues of theoretical and methodological integration.

A significant step toward a unified theoretical framework for policy diffusion was made by Dietmar Braun and Fabrizio Gilardi in their article *Taking 'Galton's Problem' Seriously: Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion* (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). The two authors sought to unify the four diffusion mechanisms within an *expected-utility* model of policy change. This model posits that policy change occurs when the expected utility of a new policy outweighs that of maintaining the status quo. The expected utility itself is shaped by four parameters: (a) payoffs, which can be ideological or tied to electoral rewards; (b) the policy’s effectiveness; (c) the search costs of finding an alternative; and (d) the uncertainty surrounding the reform’s legislative approval. Each diffusion mechanism influences these parameters by introducing various interdependencies among countries. Although this model is not without its critiques, particularly those raised against the concept of expected utility, it has marked a substantial advance in the theoretical discussion on policy diffusion.

Building on this foundation, together with Fabio Wasserfallen, Gilardi more recently further expanded the discussion, emphasizing the political dimensions of policy diffusion (Wasserfallen & Gilardi, 2019). Whereas prior literature predominantly focused on policy effectiveness and technocratic factors, Gilardi and Wasserfallen highlighted the crucial roles of electoral impacts and ideological motivations in shaping diffusion. These political factors reveal their full significance when examined across different stages of the policy cycle – a classic heuristic in policy analysis that segments the decision-making process into five stages: 1) *issue definition*, 2) *agenda-setting*, 3) *policy adoption*, 4) *implementation*, and 5) *evaluation*. While diffusion studies traditionally focused almost

exclusively on the policy adoption phase, the political factors driving mechanisms of diffusion play a major role already at the issue-definition stage.

Following a similar approach, Johanna Kuhlmann and her collaborators introduced a “refined model of diffusion” that forgoes the four traditional mechanisms, proposing instead four “constellations of diffusion,” each distinguished by different types of actor interrelations, including international organizations (IO) (Kuhlmann et al., 2020): (a) country-to-country diffusion; (b) IO-to-country diffusion; (c) country-to-IO diffusion; and (d) imperial diffusion. A key strength of this model lies in its focus on power asymmetries within the diffusion process, which many empirical studies have previously overlooked. Each constellation is analyzed across three diffusion stages – 1) *perception and translation*, 2) *cooperation and conflict*, and 3) *collective decision-making*. At each stage, varying actors from the participating units engage within political and institutional environments that differ in formalization, capturing the complex, staged nature of diffusion. This model also incorporates micro-level analysis, identifying people, money, and procedures as the principal drivers of diffusion, thus addressing a common criticism that previous models oversimplified the diffusion process.

Finally, a very recent attempt to propose a unified theoretical framework was made by Joachim Blatter and colleagues in their article *Theorizing Policy Diffusion: From a Patchy Set of Mechanisms to a Paradigmatic Typology* (Blatter et al., 2021). Their *typological theory of policy diffusion* stands out for its comprehensive integration of key insights from previous models, seeking to provide a coherent and unified theoretical framework that reflects the field’s multifaceted findings.

The proposed framework identifies four *ideal types* of policy diffusion mechanisms, each further divided into two distinct pathways with specific prototypical actors central to the diffusion process:

- *Interest-driven mechanisms* position governments as pivotal actors making strategic decisions based on self-interest derived domestically. The first pathway involves information exchange among states in response to external issues affecting multiple jurisdictions, while the second focuses on externalities, where a policy change in one polity necessitates adjustments in others to maintain policy effectiveness.
- *Rights-driven mechanisms* include a hierarchy-based pathway and a conditionality-based pathway. In the hierarchy-based pathway, governments on lower levels are legally compelled by higher-level institutions to align policies with common standards. The conditionality-based pathway relates to policy adjustments required for membership in international organizations.

- *Ideology-driven mechanisms* include a process where Transnational Party Families (TPFs) are key actors, with principled beliefs guiding policy diffusion, and another one dominated by Transnational Advocacy Coalitions, driven by shared policy beliefs.
- *Recognition-driven mechanisms* include a policy-centered pathway, where Transnational Epistemic Communities play a leading role, and a pathway focused on popular attention, where Transnational Instrument Constituencies facilitate cross-polity policy diffusion.

By structuring these mechanisms into mutually exclusive pathways, this model addresses the operational challenges of the additive approach in traditional diffusion studies. It incorporates political factors highlighted by Gilardi and Wasserfallen in their 2019 study, as well as power asymmetries emphasized by Kuhlmann and colleagues in their 2020 work. Additionally, distinguishing these pathways enables a nuanced analysis of diffusion mechanisms at different policy cycle stages and offers a micro-level perspective on the actors involved.

In terms of theoretical coherence, this model balances rationalist and constructivist perspectives, moving beyond the inconsistencies affecting the additive approach. While interest-driven and rights-driven mechanisms align with rationalist theories, ideology-driven and recognition-driven mechanisms draw on social constructivist principles. This unified typology provides a comprehensive and balanced approach to understanding policy diffusion across diverse contexts and actors.

4.8

Research Methodologies for Policy Diffusion

The theoretical discourse on policy diffusion is closely tied to methodological choices in research. For a significant period, quantitative methodologies have predominated in policy diffusion literature. However, since the early 2000s, a growing body of work has embraced qualitative approaches to systematically examine diffusion processes. This includes purely qualitative studies (e.g., Jacoby, 2000; Mossberger, 2000; Weyland 2005; 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010; Resende-Santos, 2007; Orenstein, 2008; Schmid & Götze, 2009) as well as mixed-method designs (e.g., Horowitz, 2010; Karch, 2007). While some researchers adopt qualitative methods due to the challenges in gathering quantitative data

on historical events or complex policy areas, an increasing number of scholars argue that qualitative approaches are particularly well-suited for exploring the causal mechanisms driving diffusion (see George & Bennett, 2005).

A comprehensive review of methodologies for studying diffusion was recently conducted by Peter Starke (Starke, 2013). When approaching horizontal diffusion, both qualitative and quantitative studies face a dual challenge: first, to identify a diffusion effect distinct from independent or *vertical* causation, and second, to differentiate between various diffusion mechanisms. Quantitative approaches typically address these challenges by adding the outcomes from other cases – referred to as the “spatial lag” – to the right side of a regression model, along with variables controlling for domestic conditions and shared external factors (Starke, 2013, p. 565). This approach demonstrates whether there is a temporal or spatial clustering of outcomes.

To examine specific diffusion mechanisms, quantitative research often infers them indirectly through conditional effects based on the type and degree of interlinkages between cases. This is achieved using “weighted spatial lags” in a regression model, where the spatial lag variable for each observation is weighted according to the connectivity between cases (Starke, 2013, p. 565). This refined approach allows researchers to assess the influence of networked relationships on policy diffusion, offering insights into the underlying dynamics and patterns of policy adoption across comparable contexts.

In qualitative research on policy diffusion, most studies combine two methodologies: (a) *cross-case analysis* to examine covariation in independent and dependent variables across cases, and (b) *process tracing* to investigate the causal mechanisms connecting these cases. Cross-case analysis systematically compares qualitative similarities and differences in theoretically relevant variables across cases. Unlike quantitative approaches, which typically select cases randomly, qualitative studies use “intuitive regression” (Collier et al., 2004, 94), a non-standardized approach that focuses on nominal or ordinal comparison across key theoretical dimensions, enabling researchers to test competing explanatory claims.

The initial phase of cross-case analysis involves deriving expected patterns of spatiotemporal clustering of policy changes from a specific diffusion theory. These patterns are then described in narrative form or quantified through basic measures. Researchers may use diffusion curves or geographic maps to illustrate cross-national clustering visually. Beyond describing patterns, cross-case comparison also involves controlled contrasts between a small subset of strategically chosen cases, often selected from those featured in the initial diffusion curve or map. Inferences for this smaller subset rely on straightforward nominal and ordinal comparisons, similar to intuitive regression.

Because cross-case analysis relies on interconnected bivariate correlations and is often limited in scope, it is rarely used in isolation. Most studies incorporate process tracing as a complementary within-case method. Process tracing aims to “identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and mechanism – linking independent variables to an outcome” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206). This approach examines the within-case implications of alternative causal mechanisms, emphasizing timing, sequence, and causal conjunction (see for example, Bennett, 2008; Collier et al., 2010; Mahoney, 2010; Grzymala-Busse, 2011).

Rather than controlling for variables across a broad sample, as in spatial regression, process tracing enables qualitative researchers to reconstruct diffusion through historical reconstruction of decision-making at the actor level. Most often, this strategy aims at finding “smoking gun” evidence (Van Evera, 1997, pp. 30-34) of transnational interactions, migration, and policy learning across jurisdictions.

While process tracing is recognized as a powerful tool for identifying diffusion processes, some question its capacity to analyze diffusion mechanisms directly (Starke, 2013, pp. 573-574). In particular, qualitative researchers may lack privileged access to causal mechanisms, especially when these are unobservable – such as cognitive processes central to policy learning theories. However, even if the mechanisms themselves remain unseen, their influence often leaves empirical traces, albeit scattered or unsystematic. Once diffusion mechanisms are clearly defined within a coherent theoretical framework, process tracing becomes an invaluable method for detecting and analyzing these empirical markers, allowing researchers to piece together the underlying diffusion dynamics.

CHAPTER 5

Methodology and Case Selection for the Empirical Research

5.1

A Methodological framework for the Study of Diffusion of Diversity Governance

The research methodology I employed for the empirical study in this dissertation built on recent advances in diffusion studies, as reviewed in the preceding chapter. My aim was to investigate the dynamics of emergence and transnational diffusion of diversity governance, informed by the theoretical framework I established through extensive literature review in the first three chapters. Set within the broader context of democratic transition (Section 1.1), the neoliberal shift (Section 1.2), the intertwined evolution from government to governance (Section 1.3), the cultural turn (Section 2.2), my study closely examined how cultural differences have gained prominence in political agendas worldwide and how the contemporary framework of diversity governance has diffused across national and local contexts. Specifically, I analyzed how this framework has progressively transformed into policy standards, influencing national and local discourses, and has ultimately been translated into concrete policies and practices.

To investigate both the diffusion of discursive frames (insofar as they relate to policymaking) and the implementation of policies and practices, I adopted the comprehensive methodological framework formulated by Joachim Blatter and colleagues in 2022 (Section 4.7, pp. 107-108). This model incorporates earlier developments in diffusion theory, including classical diffusion models (Section 4.2), the unified approaches to policy diffusion by Fabio Wasserfallen and Fabrizio Gilardi (Section 4.7, pp. 106-107), and the contributions of Johanna Kuhlmann and her team (Section 4.7, p. 107).

Thus, my study drew on traditional concepts in diffusion theory, particularly the categorization of adopters, such as change agents and opinion leaders, and the four primary policy diffusion

mechanisms – learning, competition, coercion, and emulation – as analytical categories. However, my analysis was grounded on Blatter’s reformulation, which distinguishes four ideal diffusion types – interest-driven, rights-driven, ideology-driven, and recognition-driven mechanisms – each with its own pathways. Given the complexity of my subject and its diffusion across multiple governance levels, I also considered both centralized (top-down) and decentralized diffusion systems, as well as possible hybrid combinations of the two (Section 4.4, p. 99).

This methodological framework effectively bridges the gap between policy diffusion and policy transfer, which traditionally emphasize structural factors and agency, respectively (Section 4.5). Indeed, a comprehensive understanding of policy spread requires recognizing the interplay between structural influences and agency, along with a focus on both diffusion patterns and process-specific characteristics.

This compatibility extends to my approach for data collection. Given the broad, multi-dimensional nature of diversity governance – spanning various governance levels and stages in the policy cycle – I employed qualitative analysis (Section 4.8, pp. 109-110), which is particularly well-suited to capture the complexity and nuances of the diffusion process. Although diffusion studies often favor quantitative methods, this qualitative approach aligns more closely with the typical methodologies in policy transfer studies, thus fostering a more integrated perspective that bridges these two research strands.

The expansive nature of my topic, which required extensive contextualization over several chapters in the first part of this study and necessitates a qualitative and flexible methodology, proves to represent an advantage insofar as it comes to identifying *smoking gun* evidence for diffusion, as I have been working within an interconnected, transnational framework where the global scope of diversity governance is already well-documented. This topic resides at the core of political agendas for transnational organizations and is central to migration governance and the work of numerous transnational networks. Consequently, the challenge lied less in finding signs of diffusion than in analyzing the specific factors and mechanisms driving it and identifying what exactly is being diffused.

Following an established methodological framework for qualitative analysis of diffusion (Section 4.4) my approach combined cross-case analysis with a focus on patterns of spatiotemporal clustering of policy changes. This cross-case analysis was based on process tracing within selected case studies, which I presented primarily through narrative form. Importantly, my approach involved a thorough, in-depth historical reconstruction of decision-making processes at the actor level.

In analyzing results, I addressed both geographical and organizational perspectives in diffusion studies (Section 4.3). First, I paid attention to spatial patterns, investigating the level and mechanisms

of spatial diffusion, with a particular focus on identifying any manifestation of the *neighborhood effect* (Section 4.3, p. 96). From an organizational standpoint, I examined how diversity governance is implemented within policies and practices, focusing on social organizations at various levels to observe how innovations integrate into organizational structures. This analysis was especially attentive to variations (re-invention) within diffusion processes and to the structural and representational changes that accompany diffusion. I also cautiously addressed the consequences of policy adoption. While an absolute evaluative approach is not feasible due to limited data, I considered both positive (desirable) and negative (undesirable) outcomes relative to the expectations of adopters, change agents, and opinion leaders, providing a perspective grounded in the intentions of these stakeholders.

This methodological approach addresses common critiques of diffusion studies by avoiding the typical biases (Section 4.4). By conducting a critical evaluative analysis without presuming an inherent positive effect of diversity governance, we sidestep pro-innovation bias and address equality concerns. Additionally, by focusing on discourses and policies within social organizations and examining social factors underlying adoption, we avoid the individual-blame bias. Lastly, though my data collection is largely qualitative and includes interview-based information, this study does not rely solely on first-hand accounts. The analysis incorporated a holistic view supported by various resources, including secondary sources and cross-interviews, mitigating risks of misinformation or biases inherent to single-source data.

5.2

Multiscalar Analysis and Cities as *Entry Points*

Given the vast and multifaceted nature of my subject, it was essential to establish a clear “entry point” (Kahn, 2014; Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2018, pp. 7-10) for empirical analysis. In line with the local turn in migration studies and the discussion around cultural differences – and recognizing that diversity governance increasingly centers on local settings – the urban context served as an ideal focal point. The local dimension is especially well-suited for qualitative analysis and process tracing, as it offers visible interconnections among stakeholders, easier access to interviewees through networked

contacts, and an expandable respondent pool via snowball sampling. Furthermore, it enables cross-verification of responses through interviews until data saturation is reached – that is, when additional data collection ceases to yield new insights.

To support my cross-case analysis at the urban level, I drew on the *multiscalar framework* introduced by Ayşe Çağlar and Nina Glick Schiller (Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2018, pp. 1-31; 2021). This approach effectively situates research across interconnected scales, aligning well with the scope of my study. The framework stems from the critical discussion against *methodological nationalism* – the tendency to study social and historical processes as though confined within national borders (Beck, 2002; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002; 2003; Amelina et al., 2012). Methodological nationalism often limits social concepts to national boundaries, assuming shared histories, norms, and institutions within state borders.

Çağlar and Glick Schiller’s framework builds on comparative relational methodologies advanced by urban geographers (e.g., Ward, 2010; Robinson, 2015; Hart, 2016; Bodnár, 2019; Brenner, 2019), developed in response to critiques that cities are too path-dependent and unique for comparison (see Coté, 2007). During the early 2000s, comparative urban studies experienced a revival, reorienting towards a relational focus as geographers began to view cities as embedded in global neoliberal institutions that shape urban development (see Nijman, 2007; McFarlane & Robinson, 2012). From these perspectives, cities are understood to be “open, embedded, and relational” (Ward, 2010, p. 407).

Central to the comparative relational approach is the understanding that “urban social and economic processes and groups, elite and marginal, professional and domestic, are embedded in wide-ranging transnational associations – cities are constituted through broader networks of relationships and flows” (Robinson, 2011, p. 137). This framework allowed urbanists to go beyond comparing cities with similar characteristics to studying cities that may appear “radically different” in geography, power, history, or culture, enriching our understanding of urban interconnectedness within global contexts (e.g., McFarlane & Robinson, 2012, p. 766).

However, scholars in relational comparison apply the term “relational” in varied ways, capturing methodologically distinct forms of interconnection (see Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2021, p. 208). Some scholars (e.g., McCann & Ward, 2012), while acknowledging global city interconnectedness, focus on relational comparisons as linkages between specific cities. Others (e.g., Ward, 2010, p. 480) suggest that interconnected trajectories imply “different cities are implicated in each other’s past, present, and future.” This perspective shifts the focus from merely seeking similarities or differences between isolated contexts to a view where “different cities pose questions of one another” (Ward, 2010, p. 480).

Several studies have also explored reciprocal relationships between cities, examining dynamics such as urban policy exchanges, neoliberal agendas, or city twinning projects (e.g., McFarlane & Robinson, 2012, p. 769). Meanwhile, scholars researching *world cities* or *global cities* often draw on a distinct concept of relationality introduced by Charles Tilly, centered on an *encompassing comparison* (Tilly, 1984). This approach constructs comparisons by situating “locations within the [global] structure or process and explaining similarities or differences as consequences of their relationships to the whole” (Tilly, 1984, 125). In this view, interconnections arise from a single, globe-spanning set of structures and historical processes.

Building on these interpretations of relationality, Gillian Hart (2016), following earlier work by Philip McMichael (McMichael, 1990), offered a form of relational comparison that considers global processes yet remains rooted in more specific, constitutive forces (see also Hart, 2002). Hart’s approach examines relational processes across multiple scales, identifying networks of social relations and power-infused interactions formed through entanglements and connections with dynamics at work in other places, as well as in broader regional, national, and transnational arenas (Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2021, pp. 208-209).

Hart’s work aligns with recent relational comparative frameworks proposed by Judit Bodnár (2019) and Neil Brenner (2019), which provide key reference points for Çağlar and Glick Schiller’s framework. Together, these authors propose a multiscale approach to comparative analysis, reframing traditional multi-level analysis to reveal networks of differentiated economic, political, and cultural power.

As early as 1979, comparative urbanists Paul Lubeck and John Walton had already suggested a form of relational, multiscale comparison that accounts for variations across time, space, and local class configurations (Lubeck & Walton 1979; see also Robinson, 2014). For these scholars, the local does not merely emerge from an abstract, actorless process of “globalization” but is formed through ongoing, intersecting trajectories that connect local, national, and transnational realms (see also Bodnár, 2019). Within these dynamics, such trajectories become embedded in the unique characteristics of each place.

The term *multiscale* serves as “shorthand to describe socio-spatial spheres of practice that are interrelated within complex hierarchies of power networks” (Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2018, p. 8). Unlike traditional approaches, which often conceive of analytical levels as a hierarchy with the global *macro* level overlying the *micro* level of daily life (Marcus, 1986; Neal, 2013), the multiscale perspective builds on the work of critical policy scholars, geographers, and historians who see multiscale processes as mutually constitutive rather than strictly hierarchical (see Jones et al., 2004;

Clarke et al., 2015). In this view, hierarchy is not a rigid institutional structure but a dynamic network of unequal power relations.

Multiscalar analysis treats *scales* as relational, interpenetrating, and territorially referenced entry points for understanding globe-spanning processes. While drawing on longstanding debates around the concept of *scale* (e.g., Smith, 1995; Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner, 1999; 2001; 2009; 2011; Hoefle, 2006), Çağlar and Glick Schiller's use of scale in a multiscalar context diverges from the work of urban geographers who typically delineate scale, territory, place, and network as separate categories. Instead, they align with critical geographers in treating scales as relational and mutually constituted across local, regional, national, and global levels. Simultaneously, they incorporate Saskia Sassen's concept of multiscalarity (Sassen, 2013) to recalibrate urban studies by emphasizing urban spaces as structured by multiple, spatially articulated power relations.

This rethinking of scale moves away from the conventional analytical *levels* – macro, meso, and micro – and from hierarchical, nested concepts of scale that imply fixed boundaries for territorial units (such as household, neighborhood, city, nation-state, and globe). Instead, it traces social processes as they unfold, capturing interconnections through both formal and informal networks of differentiated economic, political, and cultural power (see Çağlar & Glick Schiller 2011; Glick Schiller 2012; 2015).

Central to the multiscalar concept is the understanding of “urban space and state space as intricately entangled, mutually co-constitutive, and conflictually co-evolving formations of scale-differentiated sociospatial relations under modern capitalism” (Brenner, 2019, p. 7). Multiscalar processes resist reduction to any single level of analysis and cannot be fully understood without examining the various forms of capital accumulation occurring across these interconnected scales. Relational comparisons thus do not presume a singular global dynamic but recognize that intersecting power trajectories are reinterpreted by actors in specific locations over time (see Smith, 1995; Hart, 2016).

The relational and process-oriented concept of rescaling offers an alternative to the *multisited* approach widely used in anthropology where each site is usually treated as a discrete entity (Falzon, 2009; Coleman & Von Hellermann, 2011). In particular, Çağlar and Glick Schiller's approach emphasizes that ethnography's focus on personal narratives and everyday life is invaluable for understanding social practices and relationships while also underscoring that every site is interconnected across time and space (Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2018, p. 10). They argue that no site exists in isolation; each is inherently multiscalar, embedded within power networks that connect it to other locations.

Thus, even single-site studies can reveal “translocal linkages” and “interconnections” traditionally emphasized in multisited research (e.g., Hannerz, 2003, p. 206), as ethnographers examine these

global interconnections within a single location. By tracing these interconnections of power within a single site, ethnographers can uncover the multiscalar structures that link distant places and power networks (Feldman, 2011). Consequently, every urban space – whether a building, congregation, neighborhood, or city – can be considered multisited due to its position within intersecting power trajectories (Massey, 2005).

Accordingly, the decision-makers and practitioners interviewed in this dissertation are seen as key players, continuously creating new social relations and sustain existing ones as they settle into particular locations. These networks reshape the institutional landscape at city, regional, national, and global levels. Reframed under this multiscalar approach, stakeholders are not isolated entities but active political, economic, and cultural actors within institutionally structured and interconnected power scales. Cities themselves, reconceptualized under this perspective, are active participants in global dynamics and evolving governance forms. Given their unique position as concrete nodal points within governance regimes, economic development strategies, and administrative powers, cities provide the most valuable analytical vantage points for observing and studying global transformations.

5.3

A Framework for Case Selection: The Intercultural City Network

The case selection for this empirical study was guided by the theoretical and methodological discussions in the previous chapters. My aim was to identify cities from diverse geographical and cultural contexts that are explicitly committed to diversity governance and could serve as relevant entry points for studying the diffusion of discursive frames, policies, and practices related to diversity governance. This focus led naturally to begin by considering migration-related city networks, particularly those centered on managing cultural differences and promoting diversity governance. Such networks not only offer a compelling *smoking gun* evidence of diffusion but also represent themselves key catalyzers of diffusion.

A specific city network emerged as providing the best vantage point to proceed with the case selection and a valuable starting point for analyzing diffusion: the Intercultural Cities (ICC) Network. Representing one the world's biggest migration-related city networks, its development has been

deeply intertwined with the emergence of the diversity governance framework and the development of the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism debate.

The ICC Network originated from a joint pilot project by the Council of Europe and the European Commission – the *Inter-Cultural Cities Programme* – launched as one of the flagship initiatives for the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008. This project was centered on the idea of an *intercultural city* – a model of a city that actively integrates diversity governance as a key strategic priority. The program’s stated aim was “to explore the potential of an intercultural approach for integrating communities with diverse populations” (European Commission, 2008). Eleven cities initially joined the pilot, each committing to embedding intercultural principles within their municipal integration policies.

A primary objective of the pilot was to test an *intercultural policy assessment grid*, developed by Council of Europe experts as an analytical tool with indicators for measuring a city’s level of interculturality (see Wood, 2009). This grid outlined the essential elements of a strategic approach to intercultural integration, providing questions and criteria for assessing city policies through what was conceptualized as an *intercultural lens*. It was designed as a standardized, systematic reference, enabling member cities to assess and enhance their diversity governance practices while supporting data-driven comparisons across policy areas through a shared ranking system.

After receiving strong positive feedback from the pilot cities, the grid was validated and the pilot project expanded into a long-term initiative aimed at promoting interculturalism as a framework for managing cultural heterogeneity. This program became the foundation of the ICC Network, organized as a shared platform managed by the program’s staff to support cities’ commitments to diversity governance. Specifically, the ICC Network’s mission is to “support cities in reviewing their policies through an intercultural lens and developing comprehensive intercultural strategies to help them manage diversity positively and harness the diversity advantage”⁶. Since 2015, the ICC Programme has been fully funded by the Council of Europe’s structural funds, without additional contributions from the European Union. The network’s data and resources are largely accessible through its official website, linked to the Council of Europe’s platform.

The initial policy grid evolved into an official *Intercultural Cities Index* (ICC-Index), continuously refined and expanded. Originally, the Index featured nine core indicators⁷. Following an in-depth review by Council of Europe experts (e.g., Rubicondo, 2016; Zapata-Barrero, 2016) and external consultants such as Bak Basel (Müller et al., 2011), the ICC-Index was updated and published in its

⁶ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities>.

⁷ Specifically, these are: 1) *Commitment*; 2) *Intercultural Lens*; 3) *Mediation and Conflict Resolution*; 4) *Language*; 5) *Media and Communication*; 6) *Open and International Outlook*; 7) *Intelligence/Competence*; 8) *Welcoming Newcomers*; 9) *Governance*. In addition, the indicator *Intercultural Lens* is further specified in six dimensions: (a) *Education*; (b) *Neighbourhood*; (c) *Public Service*; (d) *Business and Employment*; (e) *Cultural and Civil Life*; (f) *Public Space*.

current form in 2019: the number of indicators was extended from nine to twelve, based on a total of 83 questions⁸. Today, the ICC-Index is promoted as a key framework for analyzing and comparing cities' intercultural policies and governance strategies.

After the official launch of the platform, a formal membership process for cities joining the Intercultural Cities (ICC) Network was progressively established. Cities interested in membership first submit an official expression of interest (typically a letter or email from the mayor). Membership is formalized through a statement of intent signed by both the city and the Council of Europe.

Next, the city completes a questionnaire with two parts. Part A gathers general information about the city, such as demographics and economic profile, to help determine meaningful comparisons with other cities. Part B focuses on the city's policies and initiatives for managing cultural heterogeneity, aligned with the ICC-Index's thematic indicators. Using the data from Part B, the city's interculturality score is calculated.

After the analysis of the questionnaires member cities receive a report which includes scores for each intercultural indicator on a 0-100 scale, along with an overall score (the arithmetic mean) representing their intercultural level. After the analysis, an expert team, including at least one specialist and a Council of Europe representative, conducts a site visit. They meet with city officials and local stakeholders to validate the ICC-Index results and provide a comprehensive *diagnosis* of the city's achievements and needs in intercultural policies and governance. The visit concludes with an official report that includes the city's *Intercultural Profile*, along with examples of good practices from similar cities facing comparable challenges.

To maintain membership, cities contribute an annual fee of €5,000, which partially covers the program's administrative costs. Additional expenses, including the index analysis, expertise, international meetings, and visits, are covered by the Council of Europe, although non-European cities bear the cost of travel and accommodation for expert visits and international events.

Upon becoming members, cities are officially listed and indexed on a dedicated page of the ICC website⁹. The ICC-Index, accompanied by a visual representation (Figure 3), enables cities to identify strengths and weaknesses and prioritize areas for improvement to enhance their profile as intercultural cities. The Index also allows for direct comparisons with other cities, providing an interactive tool on the ICC website¹⁰ where cities can be selected by name, population, or foreign-born population share and compared across various Index scores.

⁸ Existing indicators were left unchanged except for *Governance* which was reframed in terms of *Leadership and Citizenship*. Moreover, three new indicators were added: 10) *Anti-discrimination*; 11) *Participation*; 12) *Interaction*.

⁹ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/index-results-per-city>.

¹⁰ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/interactive-charts>.




Figure 2. Visual representation of the ICC-Index of the city of Campi Bisenzio (Italy) in 2011 and 2013.

The ICC website offers extensive resources, including studies, discussions, and case studies on intercultural cities, migration, and diversity governance. In the *Thematics* section¹¹, resources are organized into macro-topics such as *Intercultural Competence*, *Multi-Level Governance*, *Placemaking*, *Refugees*, and *Gentrification*. There is also a section for recognized *Good Practices*¹², accessible by country, city, year, theme, or keywords. Additionally, an *Online Capacity-Building* section¹³ provides interactive learning tools on interculturalism, including an *Intercultural Citizenship Test* and *Escape Roomours*, an online game.

Once part of the network, member cities are expected to establish an intercultural support group and begin reviewing urban policies through an intercultural lens. This review draws on the ICC experts' recommendations and the city's own assessment based on the ICC-Index and its intercultural profile report. Ideally, cities progressively reshape their diversity policies into a comprehensive

¹¹ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/thematic-initiatives>.

¹² <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/good-practice>.

¹³ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/capacity-building-tools>.

intercultural strategy. To support this, the Council of Europe published a step-by-step guide to building the Intercultural City (CoE, 2013), providing practical tips and procedures for enhancing a city's intercultural profile.

The ICC Programme offers additional services to member cities, such as providing moderators and advisors to assist with designing and discussing intercultural policies. To encourage city officials and stakeholders to learn from each other's experiences, the ICC organizes thematic workshops and study visits, often with funding for travel and accommodation. Several meetings are also held to foster commitment among city leaders. Cities are encouraged to update their ICC-Index scores annually by re-submitting the questionnaire, allowing them to track their progress and improvements in interculturality over time.

Since the conclusion of the pilot project and the establishment of the long-term ICC Programme, the ICC Network has grown steadily. From its initial 11 pilot cities in 2008-2009, membership had expanded to approximately 60 cities by 2013 (CoE, 2013). When the programme celebrated its ten-year anniversary in 2018, membership had more than doubled, reaching 134 cities (CoE, 2018), and it has continued to grow, now including a declared total of 164 cities – there is most likely a mistake in this number as the official membership list currently displays only 148 names¹⁴. While most member cities are located in Europe, the Network has gradually diversified, now including cities from North Africa (Morocco), the Middle East (Israel and Turkey), North America (Canada and the U.S.), South America (Mexico), Australia, and East Asia (Japan and South Korea).

In the early years, membership growth faced challenges due to the cost of membership fees and the need to appoint dedicated staff to manage relations with ICC representatives. To address this, the ICC staff developed a new recruitment strategy in partnership with member cities, encouraging the formation of national intercultural city networks. In cases where national networks on diversity already existed, they could be rebranded under the ICC Programme. These national networks receive technical, financial, and strategic support from the ICC, although cities are not required to join the international network and pay the membership fees to participate. This approach has contributed to further extending the ICC Network's reach.

Despite the ICC Network's continued promotion and expansion, several challenges remain (see also White, 2022, pp. 1079-1083). A key, ongoing issue is the limited material resources. Although the program has grown in membership and geographic diversity, the ICC team remains small, with only six full-time employees as of 2022. This limited staffing has led to increased workloads and staff turnover. While the ICC's budget has nearly doubled since 2016, it remains modest by Council of Europe standards, leaving the program's core mission underfunded.

¹⁴ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/list-of-participating-cities>.

Engaging elected officials in member cities has also posed a challenge. Encouraging these officials to prioritize intercultural policies and participate actively in ICC initiatives has proven difficult, especially given the common shortage of time and personnel in both the ICC management and city administrations. High turnover rates among officials – both in the ICC and in municipal administrations – further complicate efforts for long-term strategic planning and consistent relationship-building. This turnover has led to cases where ICC has completely lost contact with the administration of some member cities – which sometimes even lack institutional memory of past involvement with the network.

A clear example of this is represented by Campi Bisenzio, an Italian municipality with a population of 47,676 as of 2022¹⁵, located about 10 kilometers northwest of Florence. Campi Bisenzio is still listed by the ICC as a member city and, notably, is recognized as the most intercultural city in Italy according to the ICC-Index. Given my university's location in Florence, I saw an interesting research opportunity in this nearby city, identified by the ICC as a leading intercultural model – a potentially ideal setting to test field analysis tools for my study.

However, after reaching out to various municipal offices to connect with someone responsible for intercultural policies or ICC relations, I found that no one had any knowledge of the ICC. Staff were surprised, with some even laughing upon hearing that Campi Bisenzio was officially recognized as an intercultural city – let alone the top-ranking one in Italy.

Further discussions with city officials revealed that the ICC connection had initially been established by a councilor from the former left-wing administration under Mayor Adriano Chini, who governed for four terms until his defeat in 2018. Following the election of Mayor Emiliano Fossi, who led a center-left civic coalition, the administration underwent significant restructuring, with new appointments for both councilors and key administrative staff. During this transition, the ICC affiliation appears to have been lost. Former councilor Nadia Conti, who had managed Campi Bisenzio's ICC relations under the previous administration and was responsible for completing the ICC-Index questionnaires in 2011 and 2013, later confirmed this information (Conti, Interview).

The case of Campi Bisenzio well illustrates the challenges the ICC staff may face in establishing sustainable, long-term relationships with member cities. It also suggests that the official ICC membership list may not accurately reflect active participation and could benefit from revisions to highlight actively engaged members.

Finally, linguistic barriers add another layer of complexity. English was adopted as the program's working language since its early stages, yet some cities sometimes face difficulties in consistently designating English-speaking representatives. For some, the exclusive use of English feels like a form

¹⁵ <https://ugeo.urbistat.com/adminstat/it/it/demografia/dati-sintesi/campi-bisenzio/48006/4>.

of linguistic marginalization, conflicting with the ICC's mission of promoting pluralism and effective diversity management. This concern is particularly notable among cities in Québec, where there has been resistance to what is perceived as an "Anglo-Saxon cultural bias" in ICC operations (White, 2022, p. 1082).

5.4

Cases Selection: Barcelona (Spain), Hamamatsu (Japan) and Ansan (South Korea)

Following the overview of the ICC Network's development and functioning, I began analyzing data from the ICC Programme available through its website. My primary goal was to identify a suitable European case study to explore the mechanisms of emergence and diffusion within Europe of diversity governance – primarily framed as *interculturalism* in this context. To broaden the scope of the analysis and examine these mechanisms from a transnational perspective, I also aimed to select two additional case studies from non-European regions, ideally from culturally and geographically distant areas where European diversity governance frameworks and practices had nonetheless made an impact.

For the European case, given the large pool of European cities in the ICC Network, I sought a city that was not only deeply interconnected with the intercultural movement but also influential in shaping it as an early and committed adopter. Specifically, I looked for a city with a substantial population (over 500,000, following the ICC Programme's criterion), visibility, economic influence, and a demonstrated commitment to diversity governance. Barcelona quickly emerged as the most fitting choice for an in-depth European case study.

Barcelona, the capital of the autonomous region of Catalonia, is Spain's second-largest city by both population (1,702,814 as of 2024¹⁶) and area (101.35 km²), after the national capital Madrid. The city's global prominence is widely recognized in international rankings. For example, Resonance Consultancy recently ranked Barcelona as the 8th best city in the world (Resonance, 2024), noting its livability, climate, cultural richness, and leisure offerings. Barcelona also ranks as the 10th most

¹⁶ https://www.barcelona.cat/infobarcelona/en/tema/city-council/the-citys-population-continues-to-grow-and-reaches-1-7-million_1405179.html.

attractive city for digital talent (Strack et al., 2021) and is Europe's 6th most-discussed city online (Ing, 2024). It consistently appears among the top 30 cities in the Global Power City Index (Mori Foundation, 2024), currently at 22nd, recognized for its magnetic appeal to people, capital, and enterprises worldwide.

Barcelona's extensive participation in city networks further highlights its role as a global urban hub. The city actively participates in 47 international city networks (including as a co-founder of Eurocities) and has established 22 twinning agreements, 27 collaboration agreements, and 248 active international cooperation projects¹⁷. This networked presence places Barcelona at the heart of circulating discourses and practices in urban governance, with significant influence over global economic, political, and policy frameworks.

Crucially, Barcelona stands out for its steady commitment to diversity governance. The city proudly positions itself as one of Europe's most diverse urban centers, with official data showing that 25.4% of its population is foreign-born as of 2024 – a figure that rises to 33.6% when including residents born abroad who hold Spanish citizenship¹⁸. Overall, Barcelona hosts about 180 different nationalities within its population.

Most importantly, Barcelona was a pioneer of interculturalism as an integration framework. The city launched its first intercultural policy initiative, the *Municipal Plan for Interculturality (Pla Municipal per a la Interculturalitat)*, in 1997 – even before *interculturalism* had gained widespread recognition at the European level. Although it was not one of the initial 11 cities in the ICC pilot project, Barcelona joined the ICC Programme as soon as it transitioned to a long-term initiative. Officially recognized as an ICC member in 2010, Barcelona has actively engaged with ICC initiatives and remained firmly committed to intercultural principles.

The same year it joined the ICC, Barcelona's municipal government adopted interculturalism as a central, comprehensive city policy, launching a ten-year *Barcelona Interculturality Plan (Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat)*. Unique within Europe, this plan has been recognized by ICC representatives as a model for embedding an intercultural approach in city governance. In 2011, Barcelona further strengthened its commitment by actively fostering the establishment of Europe's first national networks of intercultural cities: the Red de Ciudades Interculturales (RECI). Over time, Barcelona's officials and diversity governance experts developed a close working relationship with ICC staff, with some even taking on roles in network management, strategic planning, and recruiting new ICC member cities. Notably, Barcelona is the only city that has

¹⁷ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/relacionsinternacionalsicooperacio/en/international-relations/city-networks-and-associations>.

¹⁸ <https://www.barcelona.cat/internationalwelcome/en/news/one-of-every-four-people-in-barcelona-is-now-a-foreign-national-1408362#:~:text=Specifically%2C%20on%201%20January%202024,has%20been%20experiencing%20for%20years>.

completed the ICC-Index questionnaire three times, underscoring its strong engagement with both interculturalism and the ICC Programme.

Barcelona continues to lead in diversity governance, actively participating in migration-related networks and readily adapting its practices and strategies to evolving challenges. At the end of the initial ten-year *Barcelona Interculturality Plan*, the city reaffirmed its commitment by enacting an updated plan extending through 2030.

In sum, Barcelona represents a central node in the discourse surrounding diversity governance and has emerged as a reference point and a dynamic laboratory for implementing innovative intercultural strategies and best practices. Unlike the fragmented implementation of interculturalism seen in many ICC member cities, Barcelona demonstrates a sustained and systematic commitment to institutionalizing a coherent intercultural governance model. As I have argued elsewhere (Peruzzi Castellani, 2023a), Barcelona has not only embraced European interculturalism but has actively shaped the EU's and CoE's vision of the intercultural city, emerging as a key driver of Europe's discourse on diversity governance. Thus, Barcelona stands out as an ideal entry point for studying the dynamics of diversity governance's emergence and diffusion within the European context.

Selecting the other case studies was a more straightforward process. I focused on non-European ICC member cities in geographically and culturally distinct regions to ensure a chance to better examine patterns and mechanisms of emergence and diffusion that extend beyond the so-called *neighborhood effect* – that is, influences arising from geographic proximity (Section 4.3, p. 96) – or direct socio-cultural similarities.

Accordingly, I prioritized cities in countries farthest from Europe in terms of geography, history, culture, and language. This approach quickly led to identifying two cities as ideal candidates: Hamamatsu (Japan), the first Asian city to join the ICC Network in 2017, and Ansan (South Korea), the second in Asia to join in 2020. Interestingly, much like Barcelona in the European context, both Hamamatsu and Ansan are recognized within their own socio-political landscapes as dynamic, entrepreneurial cities pioneering innovative approaches to managing cultural differences.

Demographic data further highlighted these cities' relevance as case studies, as both are notable in their respective contexts for their diverse populations, with significant percentages of foreign residents. Hamamatsu hosts Japan's largest population of Nikkeijin Brazilian migrants – 9,462 residents as of 2023¹⁹ – with a total foreign population of 27,036 as of 2024, which is about 3.4% of its total population of 788,371, slightly above Japan's national average of 2.7%²⁰. Meanwhile, Ansan

¹⁹ https://www.hi-hice.jp/uploads/doc_kokusaika-gaiyou_2023.pdf

²⁰ <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/gyousei/library/index.html>

stands out as the South Korean city with the largest foreign resident population in the country: 97,536 people, making up 15.58% of its total population of 626,166²¹.

Both cities are also recognized as national pioneers in diversity governance policies and practices. Remarkably, like Barcelona, each has played a central role in founding national migration-related networks within its respective country. Hamamatsu promoted the establishment Japan's Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents (*gaikokujin-shūjū-toshi kaigi*) as early as 2001, and the South Korea's National Council of Multicultural Cities (*jeongug-damunhwa-dosi-hyeob-uihoe*) was launched in Ansan in 2012.

These characteristics make Hamamatsu and Ansan compelling cases for a multiscalar cross-case analysis that traces the emergence and diffusion of diversity governance within their unique contexts. My intention was to carry out an in-depth investigation of diversity governance's rise in these urban settings as an entry point for a broader analysis of transnational diffusion dynamics, shedding light on how diversity governance is interpreted and implemented at different scales across global regions.

5.5

An Overview of Available Sources for the Data Collection for the Empirical Study

The data collection for my empirical study involved an extensive review and analysis of primary and secondary sources, integrated by fieldwork using qualitative methodologies – specifically, interviews and participant observation – in Spain, Japan, and South Korea, focusing primarily on the three selected case study cities. These two dimensions of analysis were deeply interconnected, each informing and enriching the other. The review of available sources provided essential context, guiding the field study and helping to shape its focus. In turn, participant observation in real-world settings and interviews with various stakeholders – including scholars and experts, policymakers, city officials, and civil society representatives – clarified much of the information gathered from secondary sources (particularly historical and regulatory frameworks) and revealed additional insights and references considered crucial by practitioners themselves.

²¹

https://www.ansan.go.kr/stat/common/bbs/selectBbsDetail.do?key=&bbs_code=B0685&bbs_seq=1600057&sch_type=sj&sch_text=%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%AD%EC%9D%B8&currentPage=1

My analysis began with a critical review of materials available on the ICC website for each of the three selected cities. I focused on ICC-Index results, intercultural profile reports, and lists of good practices. These resources provided helpful coordinates that were valuable in the fieldwork context, with the listed good practices offering a solid starting point to orient myself within each city's diversity governance framework. Furthermore, these documents sometimes provided contacts for relevant offices or organizations – governmental or civil society's ones – as well as names and contact details of key individuals.

However, I soon noticed significant shortcomings in the ICC materials, particularly within the ICC-Index results. Although each ICC report cautions that the scores and rankings in the ICC-Index are “strictly indicative” and “intended only as a tool for benchmarking, to motivate cities to learn from good practice” (e.g., ICC 2022, p. 4), I encountered basic typos and calculation errors that undermine the professionalism of these reports. Such errors discourage the use of ICC-Index data in research, even as a reference for comparing intercultural city rankings.

Although I did not initially set out to review the accuracy of the ICC-Index calculations, I could not help but notice a high frequency of transcription errors between the scores reported in official documents and those on the ICC-Index webpage. In particular, I found transcription errors in two of the three selected cases – and interestingly, the errors affected the same indicators in each instance. While I did not conduct a systematic review of all ICC-Index data, I decided to conduct a more thorough review of the data at least for my three case studies.

Specifically, in the 2022 Barcelona report (ICC, 2022), the city scored 50 in the *Public Space* indicator, yet this was recorded as 55 on the webpage; similarly, Barcelona scored 89 in *Intelligence/Competence* in the report, but this was recorded as 67 online; and in *Leadership and Citizenship*, the report listed 43, while the webpage showed 55. Ansan exhibited similar errors: the report (ICC 2020) listed a score of 69 in *Public Space*, recorded as 75 on the webpage, and 78 in *Intelligence/Competence*, listed as 83 online. For *Leadership and Citizenship*, Ansan scored 100 in the report but this score on the webpage has become 75. While I did not examine other cities for similar issues, these consistent transcription errors in two of the three cases suggest the possibility of a systematic issue in data digitization, at least for these three indicators.

Even more concerning than these transcription errors were inaccuracies in the overall interculturality score calculations. While the ICC does not detail how the overall score is calculated, the visual representation of the results (Figure 2 in section 5.3, p. 120) suggests it is an arithmetic mean of various indicators – including the overall score of the indicator *Intercultural Lens*, which itself is an average of six sub-indicators. In several cases, the arithmetic mean matched the expected results (rounded to the nearest whole number), confirming this method. However, in my three case

cities, I identified calculation errors in the ICC reports for both Barcelona and Ansan. Based on the report's data, Barcelona's overall score should be 82 instead of the reported result of 77. As for Ansan, the result should be 78 and not 80. Furthermore, transcription errors from the reports to the webpage occurred for the overall score as well: Barcelona's score is recorded as 79 and Ansan's as 76. Instead, the overall score for Hamamatsu was calculated correctly (54), and no transcription errors were present – though Hamamatsu was no longer available as a selectable option in the ICC-Index interactive chart on the webpage the last time I checked (in November 2024).

Although I hope these observations, which I plan to share with ICC staff, will lead to corrections, the limitations of the ICC-Index are not particularly relevant to my analysis, as my work was not supposed to rely on the ICC-Index as a framework. Accordingly, I have simply resolved not to take into account ICC criteria or indicators for framing the research.

The data collection for the empirical study centered on three main themes:

- Development of the contemporary governance model, particularly in relation to the broader context of democratic transition, neoliberal shifts, and local dynamics.
- Development of strategies for managing cultural differences, linked to the cultural turn.
- Emergence and diffusion of the diversity governance framework.

For each case study, the analysis was conducted across multiple governance scales:

- For Barcelona: European Union, national government (Spain), regional government (Catalonia), municipal government, and civil society organization.
- For Hamamatsu: national government (Japan), municipal government, and civil society organizations.
- For Ansan: national government (South Korea), municipal government, and civil society organizations.

Both secondary and primary sources were used in data collection. Secondary sources consisted primarily of academic literature, including articles, essays, and books. Texts concerning the European and Japanese contexts were reviewed in their original languages (English, French, Italian, Spanish, Catalan, and Japanese), while texts in Korean were translated using the DeepL online platform.

Primary sources included legal texts, policies, and fieldwork data. Laws and policies relevant to the research were obtained from official online platforms wherever possible.

For European sources, I mainly relied on five online platforms:

- EUR-Lex²²: Official online archive of European legal documents, including treaties, legislative acts, and preparatory documents.
- Council of Europe Archives Catalogue²³: Institutional archives for papers and publications.
- Spain's State Agency for the Official State Gazette²⁴: Official gazette of the Spanish State and publishes laws, provisions and acts of compulsory publication.
- Generalitat de Catalunya Website²⁵: This website offers a wealth of information in Catalan, Spanish, and English, including texts of Generalitat's policies and projects.
- Barcelona City Council Website²⁶: This website offers a wealth of information in Catalan, Spanish, and English, including texts of local policies and administrative acts, statistics, news, project details, and lists of civil society associations with relevant links.

For Japanese sources, I primarily utilized the following platforms:

- E-Gov Hōrei Kensaku²⁷: The official online archive of Japan's laws, decrees, Cabinet and parliamentary acts, Imperial decrees, ministerial ordinances, and various regulations.
- Japanese Law Translation²⁸: Operated by the Ministry of Justice, this site provides official English translations of Japanese laws and regulations.
- Hamamatsu City Council Website²⁹: This website contains extensive information in Japanese and English, including local policies, historical records, statistics, and best practices.
- HAMAPO Website³⁰: Managed by the Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communication and Exchange (HICE), this website provides information in Japanese, English, and other languages on topics related to migration, diversity promotion, inclusion, and links to civil society associations.

In the South Korean context, my research relied on two main platforms:

²² <http://eur-lex.europa.eu>.

²³ <http://coe.ent.sirsidynix.net.uk>.

²⁴ <https://www.boe.es/index.php?lang=en>.

²⁵ <https://web.gencat.cat/ca/inici>.

²⁶ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/ca>.

²⁷ <https://laws.e-gov.go.jp>.

²⁸ <https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp>.

²⁹ <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp>.

³⁰ <https://www.hi-hice.jp/en/>.

- Korean Law Information Center³¹: Managed by the Ministry of Government Legislation, this site offers comprehensive access to South Korean laws and decrees in Korean and English.
- Ansan City Council Website³²: This website provides extensive information in Korean and English, including local policy texts, historical information, statistics, and best practices related to initiatives and projects.

These resources provided essential context and background for the fieldwork research, allowing me to conduct a well-rounded analysis across the different governance scales and thematic areas central to each case study.

5.6

An Overview of the Fieldwork

Additional data for this empirical study were gathered firsthand through extensive fieldwork conducted in Spain, Japan, and South Korea. The primary objective was to examine the emergence and evolution of diversity governance at the local level in each of the three selected cities, and to understand the roles, interests, and strategies of various actors and stakeholders within local administration and civil society. This approach enabled me to analyze the practical functioning of diversity governance in these cities and explore their interactions with other local, national, and international actors.

Fieldwork in each context involved:

- Semi-structured interviews and focus groups with local actors, including political and administrative officials, and representatives and activists from NGOs, NPOs, and other civil society organizations.
- Participant observation of the planning, organization, and implementation of activities, projects, and events related to diversity governance.

³¹ <https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/eng/engMain.do>.

³² <https://www.ansan.go.kr>.

The fieldwork spanned approximately two years, beginning in the summer of 2021 and concluding in the summer of 2023, with occasional data collection continuing through November 2024 as I was sometimes invited to attend key events relevant to my research. In total, I spent six months in Barcelona, eight months in Japan (based in Tōkyō but primarily working in Hamamatsu), and three months in South Korea (based in Seoul but focusing on Ansan).

In Barcelona, I was accepted as a visiting researcher at the Institute of Government and Public Policy (IGOP) at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. During this period, I conducted a total of 60 interviews with key stakeholders in diversity governance and social inclusion. On the political and administrative side, I interviewed 20 representatives from various departments within the Barcelona City Council involved in coordinating and implementing the *Barcelona Interculturality Plan*³³. On the civil society side, I conducted 25 interviews with representatives from leading NGOs and civil society organizations promoting social inclusion, minority rights, and intercultural and interreligious dialogue³⁴, as well as 15 interviews with representatives of projects officially recognized by the municipality as *Good Social Practices*³⁵ related to social inclusion³⁶. I also organized two focus groups with a total of 10 of my interviewees from the civil society.

During my stay in Barcelona, I also participated in events promoting active, participatory citizenship in local neighborhoods, as well as the social inclusion of minorities and migrant residents, and interreligious and intercultural dialogue³⁷. I became a member of the Barcelona Anti-Rumor Network³⁸ – one of the primary groups involved in implementing the *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat* – and participated in seminars, workshops, and the planning of municipal projects and events aimed at promoting interculturalism. Notably, I contributed actively to drafting the *Barcelona Intercultural Decalogue*, a ten-point manifesto created through a series of focus groups with civil society representatives to summarize citizens' perspectives on interculturalism.

³³ Among others, I could interview the former municipal representatives who drafted the first *Barcelona Intercultural Plan* in 2010, Dani de Torres and Ramon Sanahuya, the current Commissioner for intercultural dialogue and religious pluralism, Khalid Ghali, the Director of the Area of Culture, Education, Science and Community, Nuria Serra, and members of the Municipal Intercultural Team.

³⁴ Such as Acatí, Audir, the Open Cultural Center, the Museu d'Història de la Immigració de Catalunya (MHIC), the Federació Catalana, the Union of Cities and Local Governments (UCGL)", and many others.

³⁵ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/dretssocials/ca/bones-practiques-socials>

³⁶ Specifically, the representatives of the following projects: Temps de barri temps per tu; Projecte més amb menys; Projecte Esforça't; Programa làbora; Projectes casba i sasba; Casc Antic i Sants sense barreres; Projecte compartim pis?; Acord ciutadà - Per una barcelona inclusive; El barem social per accedir a habitatges d'inclusió per part dels serveis socials bàsics; La colla cuidadora de l'Eixample; Espai d'inclusió de les corts; Projecte Xarxes; Programa Nausica; Redescobrir Barcelona.

³⁷ Such as, the Trobada BCN Ciutat Diversa organized by the Municipal Council of Immigration in Barcelona, seminars for interreligious dialogue organized by Audir, intercultural festivals, and many others.

³⁸ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/bcnacciointercultural/es/estrategia-bcn-antirumores/participacion/red-bcn-antirumores>.

After completing my fieldwork in Barcelona, I spent six months as a *special research student* at the University of Tōkyō. As I was less familiar with the Japanese context, while keeping my primary focus on Hamamatsu, I broadened my fieldwork to include additional cities renowned for their work in diversity governance – namely Kawasaki, Yokohama, Ōsaka, and Kōbe – in order to deepen my understanding of how diversity governance emerged and spread in Japan.

As in Barcelona, my Japanese fieldwork involved interviews with key municipal officials and civil society leaders dedicated to advancing social inclusion, minority rights, and intercultural dialogue. In Japan, the local Multicultural Centers served as invaluable entry points to the local diversity governance system. These semi-independent institutions, often operating under the influence of local government, are typically responsible for overseeing the implementation of diversity governance policies and practices, playing a central role in connecting political officials with civil society organizations.

In Hamamatsu, I conducted a total of 25 interviews: 3 with representatives from the Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communication and Exchange (HICE), which manages the local Multicultural Center, 5 with political representatives³⁹, and 17 with civil society leaders⁴⁰. In the other four cities, I conducted an additional 43 interviews across these same categories of actors⁴¹.

Throughout my fieldwork, I also actively participated in various events closely tied to diversity governance practices in the city⁴². Notably, I attended a public consultation event where local civil society members contributed to shaping the third *Hamamatsu Intercultural City Vision*. This engagement provided valuable insights into the participatory processes driving diversity governance. Additionally, I participated in three annual symposia organized by Hamamatsu's municipal government, where stakeholders from the local administration and civil society showcased their work and shared perspectives on diversity governance – offering invaluable networking opportunities.

The 2022 and 2023 symposia focused on interculturalism and Japanese approaches to diversity governance, attracting primarily Japanese participants. During these gatherings, I had the privilege of meeting Yasutomo Suzuki, the former Mayor of Hamamatsu and asking him some research-related questions that enriched my understanding of the dynamics underlining the development of the city's

³⁹ In particular, with representatives from the Internationalization Office, the Education Office and the Cultural Office.

⁴⁰ Such as, the Filipino NPO Nagkaisa, the Brazilian Youth Association Colors, the League of Brazilian workers, and many others.

⁴¹ 22 interviews in Osaka with administrative (4) and civil society (18) representatives; 6 in Kobe with political (1) and civil society (5) representatives; 10 in Kawasaki with political (4) and civil society (6) representatives; 5 in Yokohama with administrative (1) and civil society (4) representatives.

⁴² Such as, for example, a series of meeting organized by the Japanese Interational Cooperation Association (JICA), the meetings of the Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents in Kawasaki, public meetings focusing on the promotion of interculturalism in Hamamatsu, events and activities organized by NGOs in Ōsaka, such as the CommCafe organized by the Minoh Association For Global Awareness (MAFGA) and the inauguration of the Ikuno Park, and the constitution of a multicultural team in Kōbe.

policies and practices. In October 2024, I attended the Asia-Europe Summit Intercultural Cities Symposium held in Hamamatsu, co-organized by the municipality with support from the Japan Foundation and the ICC Programme. This event brought together representatives from European and South Korean cities, including Jakub Mazur, the First Deputy Mayor of Wroclaw (Poland), and Min-Geun Lee, the Mayor of Ansan (South Korea).

This summit was the fourth in its series and marked the second to be held in Hamamatsu. The series began in Tōkyō in 2012, followed by a summit in Ansan in 2013, but had been on hiatus for over a decade. Its resumption in 2024 provided a renewed platform for dialogue between Europe, Japan, and South Korea on diversity governance – a development of particular significance to my research. Exploring the history of these summits offered valuable context for understanding the diffusion of intercultural frameworks and strategies across these regions, making it especially meaningful to witness the event firsthand.

During the symposium, I also had the opportunity to engage with Yusuke Nakano, Hamamatsu's newly elected mayor who succeeded Suzuki in 2023, as well as with Min-Geun Lee, the Mayor of Ansan. Once again, these interactions were precious to deepen my understanding of evolving leadership perspectives in diversity governance.

The symposium concluded with the mayors of Hamamatsu and Ansan, alongside the Vice-Mayor of Wroclaw, signing the 2024 *Hamamatsu Declaration*. This declaration reaffirmed their commitment to “the principles of the Intercultural Cities (ICC) Programme” and their shared intention to “embrace interculturalism as a strength and characteristic of our cities” (HC, 2024). Witnessing this declaration underscored the growing international resonance of interculturalism and highlighted its potential as a unifying framework for fostering collaboration and inclusivity among diverse urban communities.

Finally, between 2022 and 2023 I conducted a total of three months of fieldwork in South Korea as a visiting researcher at the Migration Training and Research Center in Seoul. Similar to my approach in Japan, I sought to deepen my understanding of the South Korean context by broadening my research focus. While Ansan remained the primary site for my study, I also conducted interviews and participant observations in other municipalities known for their active engagement in diversity governance, including Guro-gu, Siheung, Incheon, and Gimpo.

During my time in Ansan, I conducted a total of 16 interviews. I had the opportunity to repeatedly meet with a representative from Ansan's Intercultural Policy Division, the primary municipal body overseeing the city's diversity governance strategies. Through his introductions, I was able to connect with representatives from various NGOs and organizations dedicated to migrant support, cultural

pluralism, and social inclusion. This led to 13 interviews with leaders of these organizations⁴³, along with 3 interviews with professors at Hanyang University in Ansan, including Professor Christian Park, Director of the Institute for Globalization and Multicultural Studies. Professor Park, who had repeatedly been acting as a consultant for the Ansan municipal government on diversity governance strategies, provided valuable insights into academic and policy-oriented perspectives on this topic.

I also had the chance to participate in several meetings and events focused on diversity governance practices and strategies, including migrant support activities and training sessions organized by the Intercultural Policy Division, school visits organized by the Ansan World Cultural Experience Center, and the 2023 Ansan Street Art Festival – one of the city’s major annual cultural events, featuring multicultural performances in collaboration with local stakeholders.

In addition to my research in Ansan, I conducted 13 interviews in other South Korean cities. Key interviews included conversations with representatives from the Intercultural Division Office in Guro-gu, the Multicultural Family Support Center in Gumi (Gyeongsangbuk-do), a former government official from Siheung involved in managing the South Korean National Council of Multicultural Cities, and leaders from various religious and civil society organizations⁴⁴. I also attended a national conference on promoting cultural pluralism in South Korea, organized by the National University of Changwon, which provided further context on national-level approaches to diversity governance.

5.7

Reflections about the Empirical Study: Challenges and Positionality

Research does not take place in a vacuum; even in its most theoretical forms, it is rooted in specific times and places – the very environments where the researcher is situated. When conducting empirical research, especially qualitative fieldwork, researchers find themselves positioned at the intersection of complex social relations. This requires a reflexive approach, acknowledging the researcher’s

⁴³ Such as Mir; Ansan Global Multicultural Center; Ansan World Cultural Experience Center; Ansan Masjid and Islamic Center, and many others.

⁴⁴ Such as representatives of Incheon Filipino Church and Myanmar Christian Community, and representatives of Gimpo’s Multicultural Family Support Centers.

presence as part of the studied social world and recognizing how their positionality inevitably shapes both the research process and its outcomes.

In my case, it is, first of all, essential to consider that my research occurred during a unique historical period marked by a global event that deeply disrupted daily life and hindered realistic planning for almost two years: the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic struck just four months into my Ph.D., at a critical time when I was finalizing the framework and structure of my research.

Like many of my colleagues, I was initially caught off guard by the situation, which forced me to adapt and reframe both my overall research plan and my empirical methods as the circumstances evolved unpredictably. Notably, my six-month stay in Japan, initially scheduled for March 2021, was postponed due to Japan's government decision to extend visa restrictions for all foreign nationals. I rescheduled for September, only to face another extension in August, ultimately delaying my departure until April 2022. Although I was able to conduct my fieldwork in Barcelona during this period, these last-minute adjustments meant I could not engage in meaningful planning prior to entering the field, often uncertain if I would even be able to conduct my research at all.

In hindsight, however, these disruptions had a silver lining. The extended time in Europe allowed me to thoroughly test and refine my fieldwork methodology in a familiar context before moving to Asia. It also gave me valuable time to learn Japanese and establish connections with key contacts several months before my stay in Japan.

Beyond these pandemic-related challenges, the spatial dimension of my research presented inherent complexities. Conducting fieldwork in diverse socio-cultural contexts was both an intentional choice and a formidable challenge. First, particularly during my time in Asia, I faced various everyday challenges associated with adapting to unfamiliar socio-cultural environments, which at times caused considerable stress. Second, each context required me to adapt my research methods and strategies to new social norms. I not only had to navigate different languages but also familiarize myself with distinct social codes that shaped my approach to connecting with people and conducting research.

For example, I quickly needed to learn that in Japan and South Korea, it is essential to carry a supply of business cards when meeting new contacts – a practice I had never used in Europe. I also found that both cultures have intricate social etiquettes, which, while unfamiliar and complex, were important to observe even as a foreigner. To give another example, while email was the most effective way to arrange interviews in Barcelona, I found that, in Japan and South Korea, direct outreach methods were often more successful than *cold* emails.

In addition to the objective challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to adapt to diverse socio-cultural contexts, several reflections on my positionality as a researcher emerged during my fieldwork. For researchers analyzing social phenomena and the construction of social meanings,

it is essential to recognize that our social and cultural backgrounds, knowledge, and values interact dynamically with our research processes – particularly when forming relationships with participants in the field.

Language, naturally, is one of the most critical elements in empirical research, as it mediates the researcher's connection to both the subject of study and, in qualitative research, the participants. My fluency in six languages – English, Italian, French, German, Spanish, and Japanese – and my beginner skills in two others – Chinese and Korean – helped me to overcome many linguistic barriers during my fieldwork research, ensuring direct communication in most cases, especially in Spain and Japan. South Korea, however, was more challenging in this regard, as my Korean skills are limited. Fortunately, most of my South Korean interviewees had strong English proficiency, allowing us to conduct interviews in English. Occasionally, I met respondents fluent in Japanese, which enabled us to converse in that language. In other instances, I conducted written interviews, sending questions in Korean via email and translating responses back into English. Finally, on some occasions, Korean colleagues kindly volunteered to provide simultaneous interpretation during interviews.

My status as a researcher was instrumental in securing interviews and gaining access to relevant events and activities. Overall, I encountered an open and supportive attitude toward researchers among my respondents. This may be due in part to the specific focus of my study: academic work has frequently underscored the benefits of diversity governance practices, with researchers' insights often promoting, publicizing, and helping to refine these strategies for both institutions and civil society. As stakeholders are generally eager to present their work as models of best practice, participants were often enthusiastic to speak with me and welcomed my involvement in activities and projects.

Many of such initiatives are designed to attract as many participants as possible, so my presence was frequently embraced, especially as someone knowledgeable on the topic who could contribute meaningfully. Though I always offered to participate strictly as an observer, I was often encouraged to engage more actively. In such cases, I adapted as needed, clearly outlining my role as a researcher, and taking care to avoid any behavior that might alter the activity's dynamic or create tension with organizers or participants.

Additionally, my affiliation with prestigious academic institutions – both my home universities and the universities and research centers that hosted my fieldwork – significantly facilitated my work. For example, the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona has strong connections with activists, civil society organizations, and political representatives in Barcelona. Through the support of my supervisor and colleagues, I was able to connect with key respondents when other contact methods were unavailable. Similarly, as the University of Tōkyō is widely considered Japan's most prestigious university, my

position there as a visiting researcher lent credibility when organizing interviews and requesting access to events. In South Korea, a fortuitous coincidence turned out extremely precious for my work: my supervisor at the Migration Research and Training Center was unexpectedly appointed to a Presidential Committee focused on migration governance and local government. This new role placed her in direct contact with representatives from various ministries, local administrations, and migration-related experts and civil society stakeholders, enabling her to facilitate my access to key respondents at both institutional and civil society levels.

Of course, despite my language skills and cultural knowledge, I was often perceived as a foreigner and outsider, given my Italian background. Surprisingly, this frequently proved advantageous, as many interviewees seemed more comfortable discussing sensitive topics with a foreigner rather than a fellow national. The ability to conduct interviews in participants' native languages often created a positive atmosphere and fostered openness.

Moreover, my background as a white Italian undoubtedly influenced the positive reception I generally received. Unlike some colleagues from economically disadvantaged countries or those with darker skin who shared their experiences with me, I never felt discriminated against because of my nationality or skin color. In fact, being Italian seemed to work in my favor, as it provided a natural icebreaker at the start of interviews, where interviewees would often ask me about Italian culture and popular tourist destinations. My age also seemed beneficial: while young enough to receive a friendly reception, I was not so young as to evoke condescension or paternalism, which helped establish a respectful and productive rapport with participants.

As a foreign researcher, I remained constantly aware that my empirical work was exposed to potential risks of misinterpretation or misunderstanding of certain socio-political dynamics observed and discussed during fieldwork. To mitigate these risks, I made every effort to carefully analyze and interpret my findings, regularly cross-referencing my understanding with existing scholarship and, when possible, with my interviewees themselves, often seeking their feedback and insights to validate my interpretations.

Given that this research marked my first extended stay in each of the three countries, my prior knowledge and expectations inevitably influenced how I structured and approached my study. As my work increasingly focused on themes of cultural invention, branding, and marketing, I found myself reassessing the images I had previously held of these countries and their socio-political landscapes. I came to realize that many of these images were themselves stereotypes that I had unintentionally absorbed as (also) the result of intentional branding efforts by the very societies I was studying. To capture this reflexive insight, I chose to include an introductory reflection in each of the subsequent chapters, describing my pre-existing perceptions and the moments when these impressions shifted or

evolved. This framing allows to see how the subject of my study is intertwined with the ways I – and likely others from similar backgrounds – had previously pictured these places.

Another key aspect of my positionality involved my sex and gender. While I hold strong convictions about gender equality, I must acknowledge that my identity as a male researcher presented significant advantages during fieldwork, a realization that became more apparent as I compared my experiences with those of female colleagues researching similar topics. Notably, I rarely felt vulnerable in male-dominated environments, a common setting in the institutional and representative positions relevant to my study. Regrettably, gender inequality persists globally, and I observed that men still largely occupy leadership roles in many of the contexts I engaged with. Unlike my female colleagues, I was never the target of gender-based behavior that made me uncomfortable, such as unwanted advances or inappropriate comments. Instead, my gender occasionally facilitated rapport with interviewees, leading to informal dinners or drinks after interviews, which often provided additional insights and fostered friendly connections.

Sadly, in all three research contexts, I observed that this kind of informal relationship-building happens less frequently for female colleagues or carries different social implications that could place them in uncomfortable or even risky situations. This experience highlights the often-overlooked gender dynamics within fieldwork, underscoring – once more – how factors beyond one's control, like gender, can profoundly shape a researcher's access, interactions, and experiences in the field.

Conclusion

This first part of the dissertation establishes a critical foundation for exploring diversity governance by tracing its conceptual, historical, and socio-political trajectories and outlining a robust methodological framework for its study. By contextualizing the socio-cultural transformations within which the management of *cultural differences* and, later, *diversity governance* emerged and evolved, this part provides a comprehensive theoretical background for analyzing diversity governance as both a dynamic concept and a practical framework for managing cultural heterogeneity.

In the first chapter, I identified and analyzed the global transformations that have shaped governance practices over recent decades. The discussion began with an exploration of the global transition to democracy, reviewing how the evolution of democratic institutions has been progressively reshaping governance structures, promoting inclusivity, participation, and rights-based approaches. This was followed by an analysis of the neoliberal turn, which emphasized market-driven ideologies, efficiency, and competition, often at the expense of welfare and social cohesion. The chapter also examined the local turn, emphasizing the pivotal role cities have assumed in governance innovation. Balancing their dual identities as democratic agents and entrepreneurial actors, cities have emerged as key players in addressing global challenges, including migration and diversity. The rise of city networks, as explored in the final sections of the chapter, revealed how urban centers are not only responding to local issues but also shaping global governance practices through collaboration and shared solutions. By focusing, in particular, on migration-related city networks, this chapter demonstrated how cities are actively reframing diversity governance in response to complex, multi-scalar challenges.

Building on this governance framework, Chapter 2 turned to the historical and theoretical underpinnings of culture and the construction of homogeneity as an ideal for social stability. The chapter traced the evolution of the term *culture* from its polysemic origins to its contemporary prominence in intellectual and public discourse. Through an exploration of the linguistic and cultural turns, the chapter highlighted how culture emerged as a dominant lens for understanding social phenomena. However, this intellectual evolution was not without tension, as critiques within the cultural turn exposed the risks of essentialism and groupism in cultural discourses and analysis.

Then the chapter expanded the discussion, examining the constructs of *race* and *ethnicity*, situating them within broader narratives of identity and social differentiation. It also explored the emergence of *homogeneity* as an ideal for social stability and its gradual unraveling in the face of shifting sociological and political ideologies. This is accompanied by the rise and fall of sociological theories

of assimilation, which initially posited the eventual natural disappearance of cultural differences. By tracing this historical and theoretical shift, Chapter 2 set the stage for understanding the transition from group-bound, essentialist notions of cultural differences to the more fluid, individual-focused concept of diversity.

Chapter 3 advanced the discussion by examining the conceptualization and management of cultural differences and the rise of *diversity governance*. It began by introducing the principles of *cultural pluralism* and their political development under the framework of *multiculturalism*. The chapter then explored the global diffusion of multiculturalism and its impact on both political practices and academic discourse. While multiculturalism initially appeared to provide a promising framework for addressing cultural differences, the chapter highlighted its limitations and critiques, which paved the way for the emergence of *diversity governance*. The chapter concluded with an exploration of *interculturalism*, emphasizing its role in framing diversity governance and its positioning by proponents as both a complement to and a critique of multiculturalism.

In Chapter 4, the focus shifted to methodological considerations, with a review of diffusion theory to establish the foundation for analyzing the spread of diversity governance. The chapter traced the origins and evolution of diffusion studies, situating them within broader trends in social science research. It covered the theoretical foundations of policy diffusion, examined its key mechanisms, and engaged with critical perspectives. The chapter concluded by reviewing recent efforts to construct a cohesive framework for understanding the diffusion of ideas, practices, and policies, as well as the methodological tools developed for such analysis.

Finally, Chapter 5 outlined the methodological framework and research design for the empirical study presented in subsequent parts of the dissertation. The chapter began by integrating the diffusion framework discussed in Chapter 4 with tools from multiscalar analysis, positioning cities as key entry points for studying diversity governance. It then outlined the rationale for case selection, identifying Barcelona (Spain), Hamamatsu (Japan), and Ansan (South Korea) as the most fitting case studies based on data from the ICC Programme. The chapter concluded with reflections on the challenges and positionality of the researcher, underscoring the importance of critical reflexivity throughout the research process.

In short, Part I has focused on providing a thorough theoretical and methodological foundation for the discussion that follows. By contextualizing the dimensions of governance and diversity conceptually and within their broader historical, cultural, and socio-political landscapes, this section equips the study with the tools necessary for a critical empirical analysis. The subsequent parts will bridge this theoretical inquiry with detailed fieldwork and empirical research, offering insights into the dynamics of emergence and diffusion of diversity governance across specific context.

PART II

EUROPEAN UNION

Introduction

Born in 1994, just two years after the *Maastricht Treaty* formally established the European Union, I might be considered a native EU child. However, I only became aware of this identity at the age of seven, when the upcoming launch of the euro currency introduced me to the concept of the European Union. I vividly remember the moment my parents handed me a *Euro starter kit* – a small sachet containing the eight new coins that would have become the official currency of the eurozone. This very visible transition from the Italian lira that I had been using until then to a new shared European currency marked what I remember as my first encounter with the EU.

From that moment, discussions about a united Europe began to surface in school, often framed through idealized depictions of children from France, Germany, Spain, and even farther afield, holding hands in friendship. As I grew older, the EU became a recurring theme in daily life, particularly during pivotal events like the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Gradually, I started to appreciate the privileges that came with EU citizenship – the ease of crossing borders without visas, using a single currency across countries, and, more recently, enjoying mobile data without roaming charges. These conveniences subtly yet powerfully reinforced my awareness of belonging to a broader European community.

Raised as a bilingual French-Italian speaker with relatives in France, the blending of national identities felt entirely natural to me. Growing up in Florence, just about five hours by car from France and near countries like Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia, I was accustomed to proximity and connection with other countries. My grandmother's birthplace, Aidussina – once part of Italy, now Slovenia – alongside my mother's Swiss-French upbringing, further underscored my personal experience of the fluidity of borders and identities.

Today, the European narrative is more embedded in education and common discourses than during the Union's formative years at the time of my childhood. Contemporary challenges, such as EU enlargement, the refugee crisis, Brexit, and the rise of Islamophobia and xenophobia, have intensified debates about the role and identity of the European Union. These discussions have given rise to multifaceted narratives about European culture, citizenship, and governance.

Despite ongoing tensions between nation-states interested in safeguarding their sovereignty and European institutions striving for unity, European integration has progressed steadily, albeit slowly. Cities have emerged as pivotal actors in this process, often outpacing national governments in advancing the European project. This interplay between local and supranational dynamics is

particularly evident in discussions surrounding diversity management, with cities demonstrating remarkable capacity for innovation and adaptation.

The European Union's motto, *United in Diversity*, underscores the importance of cultural pluralism. The 1997 consolidated *Maastricht Treaty* explicitly calls for action to respect and promote cultural diversity (EUR-Lex 1997, Art 128/4). Yet translating this principle into actionable policies presents significant challenges. How does the EU balance its commitment to respecting cultural differences with its goal of fostering social cohesion and inclusion?

The EU's answer materialized in 2008, designated the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. This initiative, marked by information campaigns, events, and programs, elevated intercultural dialogue as the cornerstone of Europe's approach to diversity. The Council of Europe further formalized this framework in its 2008 *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue*, a conceptual guide for policymakers and practitioners. Though not legally binding, the document legitimized efforts to promote inclusion and diversity governance across Europe.

Since 2008, intercultural policies have flourished across various levels of European governance. While European nations had long been grappling with the challenges of cultural heterogeneity, 2008 marked a turning point with the formal adoption of a unified European approach, which was then articulated and implemented through the framework of the *intercultural city*. However, this evolution was not sudden; discussions around intercultural dialogue had been shaping European discourse since the late 1980s.

This second part of the dissertation examines the evolution and diffusion of *intercultural dialogue* and the concept of the *intercultural city* as central frameworks for Europe's approach to cultural heterogeneity. A particular emphasis is placed on Barcelona, analyzed as a key case study. Barcelona serves as a vital entry point for exploring the emergence and dissemination of discourses and practices related to managing cultural heterogeneity and diversity governance within a multiscale framework encompassing cities, regional and national governments, and European institutions.

Chapter 6 sets the foundation by tracing the historical and institutional development of the European Union. Section 6.1 examines the political and economic conditions leading to the EU's formation, while Section 6.2 explores the evolution of its multi-level governance system, emphasizing the interplay among national, regional, and local policymaking. Section 6.3 highlights the rise of municipalism in Europe, showcasing how cities emerged as key players in addressing transnational challenges. The discussion continues in Section 6.4 with an analysis of early city sistering practices, which laid the groundwork for contemporary city networking. Section 6.5 examines the role of cities and city networks in EU policies, emphasizing urban centers as hubs of innovation and collaboration.

The chapter concludes in Section 6.6 by discussing the role of grassroots movements and non-governmental organizations within the EU governance framework.

Chapter 7 focuses on the EU's evolving approach to cultural heterogeneity, beginning with Section 7.1's analysis of the European cultural turn, where culture increasingly became a central lens for addressing societal challenges. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 explore the development of Europe's first cultural policies and their role in constructing a shared European identity. Section 7.4 traces the rise of intercultural discourse within European institutions, while Section 7.5 examines the re-evaluation of cultural heterogeneity as a positive asset at the European level. Sections 7.6 and 7.7 analyze the emergence of *intercultural dialogue* as a comprehensive European approach to cultural heterogeneity, culminating in the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. Section 7.8 reviews the Council of Europe's *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue*, emphasizing the role of cities as stakeholders in this framework and introducing the concept of the intercultural city. Sections 7.9 and 7.10 shift focus to the UK context, analyzing the foundational work of the Comedia think tank, particularly its conceptualization of the *creative city*, which laid the groundwork for the *intercultural city* model within the broader context of UK discourses about cultural heterogeneity. Section 7.11 concludes with an analysis of the framing of the *intercultural city* within the Intercultural Cities Programme, highlighting its role as Europe's ideal for diversity governance.

Chapter 8 shifts the focus to the Spanish context. Section 8.1 explores the early development of Spain's territorial and cultural identity, highlighting the role of the diverse populations in shaping its foundations. Section 8.2, examines the fragmentation and eventual unification of Spain, emphasizing the challenges of consolidating a singular national identity in an extraordinary plural and dynamic sociopolitical context. The discussion continues in the following Section 8.3, which overviews the political turbulence of the 19th century as Spain grappled with constitutional governance and republican experiments. Section 8.4 moves to the 20th century, tracing the country's tumultuous trajectory, culminating in Franco's authoritarian regime. The chapter then shifts to consider the democratic era. Section 8.5 focuses on analyzing Spain's peaceful transition to democracy and the subsequent consolidation of democratic institutions. The chapter concludes with Section 8.6, which examines how Spain evolved from one of Europe's most centralized states to one of the most decentralized, granting significant autonomy to its regions while maintaining national cohesion.

Building on the historical and political context outlined in Chapter 8, the following Chapter 9 explores how Spain has approached cultural heterogeneity at both the national and local levels, with particular attention to integration and diversity governance. Section 9.1 sets the stage for the discussion, emphasizing how Spain's national identity has historically grappled with its internal pluralism, including linguistic, cultural, and regional diversity. Section 9.2 turns to examine the

historical marginalization of religious minorities, exploring, in particular, the case of Jews, Muslims, and Christian Protestants. Section 9.3 continues the discussion focusing on other cultural minorities, whose *otherness* was more shaped by ethnocultural factors rather than by religion, considering, in particular, the case of the Roma people until their contemporary engagement for inclusion and recognition. The chapter then turns to analyze the development of Spain's migration and integration policies. Section 9.4 introduces the topic, presenting the early approaches formulated in the context of the country's democratic transition and consolidation. The discussion continues in Section 9.5, which analyzes the further development and reforms of immigration laws until the present day, also overviewing the process of consolidation of a national approach to integration. The narrative shifts to the local level with Section 9.6, which examines how local governments have engaged in formulating and implementing policies to address cultural heterogeneity in the initial absence of national directives and guidelines. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the case of Catalonia, exploring the process of development of integration policies and the frames adopted in this context. Section 9.7 begins by highlighting the early efforts of Catalonia's government, until the consolidation of a *Catalan way to integration (via catalana d'integració)*, while Section 9.8 examines more recent developments, focusing on how Catalonia has progressively embraced *interculturality* as a framework for fostering inclusion and social cohesion, positioning the region as a leader in diversity governance within Spain.

Chapter 10 concludes Part II with an in-depth case study of Barcelona, illustrating how a European city addresses the challenges of cultural diversity and innovates within the European approach. Section 10.1 introduces Barcelona's history, emphasizing its development from a modest trading port into a major Mediterranean hub. Section 10.2 explores the rise of municipalism and its interplay with the city's entrepreneurial strategies, while Section 10.3 focuses on the emergence of the *Barcelona Model* as a framework for urban planning and innovation and Section 10.4 critically assesses this model's strengths and limitations. Section 10.5 turns to examine Barcelona's branding strategies, particularly its use of mega-events to enhance its international image. Section 10.6 discusses the shift from mega-events to a focus on branding Barcelona as a *creative, sustainable, and inclusive city*. Section 10.7 contextualizes the rise of discourses about cultural heterogeneity within migration governance in Barcelona, introducing the phenomenon of international migration to the city. Section 10.8 examines how these discourses were progressively framed in terms of *interculturality (interculturalitat)* in the city's policies and strategies. Building on this analysis, Section 10.9 overviews the development of the first ten-year *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat*, whereby interculturalism was conceptualized and adopted as a comprehensive city policy for managing cultural heterogeneity. Sections 10.10 and 10.11 trace the consolidation of diversity governance in

Barcelona within the framework of the *Pla*, across successive municipal governments, highlighting advances in stakeholder engagement, resource allocation, and monitoring processes. Section 10.12 analyzes the *re-tuning* of the first *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat* and the drafting of a second ten-year plan, focusing on how shifting demographic trends and new governance challenges tested the adaptability and resilience of the city's intercultural model. The last three sections analyze specifically the contemporary system of governance of what can be called Barcelona's *City of Interculturalitat*. Section 10.13 synthesizes Barcelona's governance architecture designed to sustain intercultural policies, evaluating the roles of municipal departments, community actors, and transnational networks and emphasizing how coordination and collaboration serve as the backbone of a robust diversity governance system. Section 10.14 uncovers the conceptual frames and trajectories that shaped and continue to guide Barcelona's *City of Interculturalitat*, analyzing the interplay between local identity narratives, policy evolution, and broader global trends. Finally, the chapter concludes by metaphorically *entering* the *City of Interculturalitat*, analyzing the successes and challenges of the system, presenting the last findings from my fieldwork and, particularly, the point of view of institutional stakeholders and civil society actors.

CHAPTER 6

Governance in the European Union

6.1

The Origin of the European Union

Europe existed as a geographical reference long before politicians started considering the possibility of creating a united supranational organization. It is featured in the most ancient maps of the Western world made in Ancient Greece, where the known world was usually divided into three major regions: Europe, Libya (Africa), and Asia. Initially, Europe referred to the part of Thrace (modern-day Greece and Bulgaria) and the land north of the Aegean Sea. Over time, the name expanded to encompass the entire western landmass, roughly aligning with what we now recognize as Europe.

The etymology of the word *Europe* remains uncertain. Some scholars suggest it comes from the ancient Greek words *eurys* (wide) and *ops* (face/eye), possibly alluding to the continent's broad shoreline as seen from the shipboard perspective of the maritime Greeks. Others argue that it may have Semitic origins, particularly from the Akkadian word *erebu*, meaning *sunset*, used by the people of Mesopotamia to denote the western lands where the sun appeared to set. According to this theory, *erebu* is contrasted with *asu*, the Akkadian word for *sunrise*, which is believed to be the root of the word *Asia*, referring to the lands east of Mesopotamia.

A different explanation locates the eponym for Europe in Ancient Greek mythology, specifically in the legend of Europa, which has been told in various forms over the millennia. The oldest versions identify Europa as one of the Oceanides, the sea nymphs of Greek mythology. Other accounts connect her with Demeter, the goddess of the earth and agriculture, suggesting that Europa was a pre-Greek name for an earth goddess. In the most famous version of the myth, Europa – the daughter of either Phoenix or Agenor, the king of Phoenicia – was abducted by Zeus, who had disguised himself as a

white bull. Zeus carried her from Phoenicia to Crete, where she became the mother of several of his sons, thereby embedding her name in the mythology and identity of the continent.

Europe as a geographical designation is distinct from the political project that is the European Union (EU), a supranational organization designed to prevent the devastating conflicts that had historically ravaged the continent. For centuries, Europe was characterized by intense rivalry between nation-states, leading to wars and territorial disputes. The European Union, by contrast, was envisioned as a solution to these historical tensions, aiming to forge a future of peace and prosperity through economic, political, and socio-cultural cooperation and integration.

The dream of a politically united Europe emerged from the ashes of World War II. After the unprecedented devastation, European leaders were determined to find new ways to prevent future wars, rebuild shattered economies, and ensure stability. Cooperation, rather than competition, was recognized as the key to peace. In 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman introduced what came to be known as the *Schuman Plan*, a bold proposal that called for the pooling of French and German coal and steel production. By integrating the industries crucial for war-making the possibility of international conflict would be, as Schuman put it, “not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (McKesson, 1952, p. 19).

The same principles led to the 1951 *Treaty of Paris*, where six countries – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was the first real step in European cooperation, placing coal and steel production under a common authority, thus ensuring that these essential resources could not be used for military purposes. Its success inspired further collaboration and laid the foundation for deeper economic integration.

The ECSC’s success inspired further collaboration. In 1957, these six countries signed the *Treaty of Rome*, establishing two new communities: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC aimed to create a common market by gradually eliminating trade barriers between member states, while Euratom sought to coordinate the development of nuclear energy. The *Treaty of Rome* was a pivotal moment, committing its signatories to “an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe” (EUR-Lex - 11957E/TXT; my translation) and laying the groundwork for what would eventually become the European Union.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the EEC focused on economic integration, abolishing tariffs and creating a common market. However, political integration remained limited, and the EEC was largely viewed as a merely economic entity. This began to change in the 1980s, particularly with the signing of the *Single European Act* in 1986. This treaty set a deadline for completing the Single Market by 1992 and aimed to remove the remaining barriers to the free movement of goods, services, people,

and capital. At the same time, political cooperation began to gain momentum, particularly in areas such as foreign policy and security.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s provided a new impetus for European integration. In 1992, the *Maastricht Treaty* was signed, officially establishing the European Union in 1993. The treaty expanded the scope of European cooperation beyond economics, laying the foundations for a political union. Most notably, the *Maastricht Treaty* introduced the concept of European citizenship, allowing citizens to move, reside, and work freely across member states, and laid the groundwork for the euro, the EU's common currency, which would launch in 1999.

The European Union continued to grow, as more countries sought membership to benefit from the political and economic advantages it offers. The first major enlargement came in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the original six members. In the decades that followed, the EU expanded further, incorporating Southern European countries like Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (both 1986), which had recently transitioned to democracy.

The most significant expansion occurred after the end of the Cold War, as Central and Eastern European countries, newly freed from Soviet influence, sought to join the EU. In 2004, ten countries, including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, became members in the largest single expansion in EU history. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007, and Croatia joined in 2013, becoming the EU's 28th member state.

Notwithstanding this successful progressive enlargement, the EU has repeatedly faced significant challenges that have tested its unity and resilience. One of the most severe of such challenges was the Eurozone crisis, which began in 2009 as a consequence of the global financial downturn. Several member states, particularly Greece, Spain, and Ireland, were hit hard by deep economic recessions, skyrocketing unemployment, and unsustainable levels of national debt. The EU's response, especially within the Eurozone, drew sharp criticism, as the austerity measures imposed on struggling economies exacerbated social unrest and fueled discontent across Europe. Many questioned the rigidity of EU economic policies, as these measures often seemed to deepen the hardships experienced by already vulnerable populations.

Another major challenge to the EU's cohesion came with Brexit. In 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum on its membership in the EU, and 52% of voters opted to leave the union. After several years of complex negotiations, the UK officially departed from the EU at the beginning of 2020. Brexit marked a historic precedent: the voluntary exit of a member state from the union. This event raised profound questions about the future of European integration while simultaneously reflecting the rise of populist and nationalist sentiments not just in the UK, but across many European

countries. The UK's exit sent ripples through the continent, challenging the EU's ideals of solidarity and shared governance.

Despite these setbacks, the European Union remains a powerful actor on the global stage. Notably, it has positioned itself as a leader in addressing climate change, exemplified by its ambitious Green Deal, which aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The EU also continues to play an active role in tackling pressing global challenges such as migration, terrorism, and cybersecurity, and its unified approach to trade negotiations and foreign policy lends it considerable influence in international affairs.

As the EU moves into the future, it faces both opportunities and ongoing difficulties. The COVID-19 pandemic was a decisive test for the union's solidarity, pushing member states to confront the realities of shared vulnerability and interdependence. In response, the EU launched the *NextGenerationEU* recovery plan, a massive initiative designed not only to rebuild Europe's economies but also to promote green and digital transitions.

Yet, internal tensions continue to simmer within the EU. Disagreements over migration policies, the rule of law, and democratic values have caused rifts, particularly with countries like Hungary and Poland, which have been criticized for straying from the EU's foundational principles. The rise of populism and nationalism in various member states poses an ongoing threat to the union's vision of integration and cooperation. These forces challenge the EU's core values, pushing it to reconcile national sovereignty with the shared benefits of collective governance.

6.2

The EU's Multi-Level System of Governance

The European Union (EU) stands as a unique political and economic entity, unprecedented in global history. Unlike other multinational organizations, the EU blends supranational governance – where member states cede portions of their sovereignty to collective institutions – with intergovernmental collaboration, ensuring that key decisions are made cooperatively by national governments. This intricate system of governance has continuously evolved since the constitution of the first European Community after World War II, adapting to the diverse political, economic, and

cultural landscapes of its member states while striving to foster unity, peace, and prosperity across Europe.

The turning point for the formal establishment of the EU's governance system came in 1992 with the signing of the *Maastricht Treaty*. Building upon earlier treaties, such as the *Treaty of Paris* (1951) and the *Treaty of Rome* (1957), Maastricht transformed the European Economic Community (EEC) into the European Union, signaling the transition from an economic partnership to a more political union. The treaty introduced the famous three-pillar structure, organizing EU governance into three broad areas: (1) European Communities, focusing on economic, social, and environmental policies; (2) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and (3) Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.

Since Maastricht, the EU's system of governance has evolved through several treaties, reforms, and enlargements. The *Treaty of Amsterdam* (1997) expanded EU powers in areas such as immigration and civil rights, while the *Treaty of Nice* (2001) prepared the EU's institutional framework for the 2004 enlargement, which welcomed 10 new members from Central and Eastern Europe. The 2007 *Lisbon Treaty* was a crucial reform, simplifying the EU's structure by abolishing the three-pillar system and enhancing the powers of EU institutions. Today, the EU comprises 27 member states, following the departure of the United Kingdom (Brexit) in 2020.

The EU's governance is often described as *multi-level* (see Hooge & Marks, 2001; Bran et al., 2019), with power shared across different levels – supranational institutions, national governments, regional authorities, and civil society. This system combines elements of federalism, intergovernmentalism, and transnationalism, allowing for a balance between member states' sovereignty and collective European interests.

The EU's major institutions represent the backbone of its governance system, each playing distinct roles:

- The *European Commission* acts as the EU's executive body, proposing legislation, implementing decisions, managing the EU's budget, and ensuring that EU law is correctly applied. It represents the interests of the EU as a whole and is led by a President and a college of Commissioners, each responsible for different policy areas.
- The *European Parliament* represents EU citizens exercising legislative and budgetary powers. It co-legislates with the Council of the European Union and plays an essential role in ensuring democratic oversight of EU decision-making. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are directly elected by EU citizens every five years and are grouped by political affiliation, not nationality.

- The *Council of the European Union* (Council of Ministers) is where member state governments are represented, with ministers meeting to adopt laws and coordinate policies. Its composition varies depending on the policy area under discussion, giving member states a critical role in the legislative process. This body is particularly relevant in shaping foreign and security policies.
- The *European Council*, composed of heads of state or government, sets the EU's overall political direction and priorities. It does not pass laws, but its decisions shape the EU's strategic agenda. The European Council's President serves a two-and-a-half-year term, renewable once.
- The *Court of Justice of the European Union* (CJEU) ensures the consistent interpretation and application of EU law across member states, resolving disputes and upholding the legal order.
- The *European Central Bank* (ECB) manages the euro and formulates monetary policy for the Eurozone, working to maintain price stability and support economic growth across the EU.

Despite the influence of supranational institutions, member states remain central to EU governance, especially in areas like defense, education, and taxation, where they retain sovereignty. However, in areas where competence has been delegated to the EU – such as trade, competition policy, and certain social and environmental issues – national governments must align with EU laws and regulations. The principle of subsidiarity guides this division of powers, ensuring that decisions are made at the most effective level, whether local, national, or supranational.

The size and political clout of member states play a role in EU decision-making. Larger states like Germany and France wield considerable influence, but smaller nations can still shape policies, particularly through strategic alliances in the Council of the EU and the European Parliament.

While European governance has been shifting towards the supranational level, cities and regional authorities have increasingly solidified their roles as pivotal actors in shaping the political landscape of the EU. More specifically, local governments have emerged as influential players in European policymaking and policy implementation, particularly in areas such as urban development, climate action, and social inclusion. Cities like Barcelona, Berlin, and Amsterdam have led the way in promoting green energy initiatives, smart urban planning, and inclusive migration policies, often serving as testing grounds for broader EU strategies. Their initiatives in these areas reflect not only local innovation but also align with and sometimes shape EU priorities.

In parallel, mechanisms have been established at the EU level to amplify local voices within the broader framework of European governance. The Committee of the Regions (CoR), established in 1994, is a notable example of this institutional consolidation. The CoR represents local and regional authorities within the EU, ensuring that the perspectives and needs of cities and regions are integrated into EU policymaking.

The crucial role of cities in EU governance can be traced back to the historical significance of urban centers in the European context. Throughout history, cities have been at the heart of European political, economic, and cultural life. This legacy has been particularly enhanced since the 19th century, with the rise of city networks and transnational cooperation among urban areas.

6.3

The Rise of Municipalism in the Europe of the States

European cities have long engaged in proactive networking, particularly through informal exchanges aimed at learning from one another. By the 19th century, sustained networking practices were well established, primarily based on interests in technological and scientific innovation. Municipal study trips, where delegations of politicians, administrators, and technicians visited other cities to exchange ideas, became common in places like France and Northern Europe (Gaspari, 2002, p. 604; Payre, 2010, p. 269).

Alongside national-level city networks – still a major feature in the landscape of urban cooperation – the late 19th century saw the rise of international networking. This was particularly visible in the context of international conferences and exhibitions held in cities like Paris and London, which aimed at positioning themselves as hubs of knowledge creation and dissemination (Claude, 1989; Moore & Rodger, 2007). The participation of delegations from other municipalities at such events fostered the creation of transnational networks of municipal expertise (Hietala, 1993; 2003).

This growing interaction across borders was part of a larger wave of administrative modernization, where local governments sought to address common problems by sharing technical and political innovations (Hietala, 1987; Saunier, 2002). Such exchanges strengthened national networks while simultaneously promoting international cooperation. For example, Scandinavian municipalities often conducted self-funded study tours to German cities, establishing joint platforms to address global issues such as unemployment through collaboration with social movements (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, p. 330).

As the 20th century approached, the informal nature of these networks began to formalize with the establishment of the first official international platforms, requiring formal membership and

participation. These early networks focused on specific technical aspects of city governance. Examples include the International Federation of Fire Brigades (Paris, 1900), the General Association of Municipal Engineers, Architects, and Hygienists (Paris, 1905), and the International Garden Cities and Town Planning Association (London, 1913).

The most significant development in early municipal networking came with the founding of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) in 1913 with the founding of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), also known as the Union Internationale des Villes (UIV), during the International Congress of the Art of Building Cities and Organizing Community Life in Ghent. This organization sought to bring together diverse municipal institutions, fostering the exchange of knowledge while promoting democracy and world peace. Montagu Harris, president of the IULA/UIV in 1939, summarized the mission of the organization with the following words:

[T]o discover new and better means of satisfying the domestic needs of the people: to create a pool of knowledge that shall be available to all, and to formulate new and better standards of municipal service, thereby increasing the sum of happiness in the world (Harris, 1939, p. 159)

This marked the official inauguration of the international municipalist movement, with the IULA/UIV envisioned as a "nerve center" for urban international relations (Dogliani, 2002, pp. 584-585; Saunier & Payre, 2000).

Naturally, city networking was disrupted by the devastating impact of the two World Wars. During the conflicts, states dominated the international political stage, relegating cities and their efforts toward social and political change to the background. The ability of cities to engage in transnational cooperation was significantly curtailed, especially at the international level, leading to a greater nationalization of inter-municipal connections.

However, following the long, forced interruption caused by the wars, international city platforms re-emerged in the postwar period, playing a critical role in rekindling transnational cooperation and helping to spread shared cultural and political values. This resurgence was particularly evident in Europe, where the destructive actions of nation-states had twice driven the world into conflict and displayed some of the most extreme consequences of unchecked nationalism. Cities, in this context, took on a crucial role in rebuilding war-torn neighborhoods and advocating for democratic values, positioning themselves as key players in the movement toward lasting peace and European unity (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, pp. 331-335).

This postwar environment saw the formation of new international city networks, many of which emerged from within the IULA/UIV and contributed to the broader movement for the creation of a European supranational organization. These networks often coalesced around specific political or

economic interests. The Association des Maires de France and the Union Internationale des Maires, both founded in Paris toward the end of the 1940s, represented a Franco-German federalist vision for Europe, contrasting with a unionist approach. They were soon followed by the Council of European Municipalities (CEM), established in Geneva in 1951 (Gaspari, 2002, p. 612; Vion, 2002, pp. 624-627).

One of the most influential initiatives to emerge from this period was the European sister-city movement, which sought to promote direct interactions between municipalities. Closely linked to the activities of other city networks, the sister-city movement received substantial support from existing platforms and, in turn, helped foster the creation of new networks. The Fédération Mondiale des Cités Unies (FMCU), known in English as the United Towns Organisation (UTO), was founded in Aix-les-Bains in 1957 specifically to promote town twinning. This movement aimed to rebuild relationships between cities, strengthen cultural ties, and, over time, became a critical mechanism for asserting local governments' interests in the international arena.

6.4

Sistering Cities, from Europe to the World

Initially, the sister-city movement primarily involved French and West German municipalities, driven by the goal of reconnecting cities divided by the ravages of war and fostering cross-cultural relationships. The intention was to heal the wounds of conflict through dialogue and cooperation, but as the movement progressed, it quickly evolved into something much broader and more significant.

These relationships soon began to transcend mere symbolic gestures, becoming powerful tools for local governments to assert their interests in the international arena (Vion, 2002). Town twinning, as it was known, became one of the primary vehicles for spreading European ideologies and values at the local level. It not only promoted reconciliation but also paved the way for economic relations, business opportunities, and shared cultural understanding (Zelinsky, 1991; Cremer et al., 1996; 2001; Ramasamy & Cremer, 1998; Baycant-Levent et al., 2010).

In the postwar context, where the centrality of nation-states – responsible for the horrors of the two World Wars – was being deeply questioned, the sister-city movement contributed significantly to the

emergence of what we could call, the contemporary *city-networking culture*. This movement allowed cities to step out of the shadow of national governments, taking a more active role in shaping a new European identity and promoting peace. The city networks, with their focus on collaboration rather than competition, marked a shift in international relations, showing that cities could be leaders in diplomacy and global cooperation. It was not long before these sister-city initiatives extended far beyond Europe's borders, spreading the European ethos of unity and cooperation across the globe.

The first wave of this expansion saw cities rekindling relationships with former colonies, signing agreements that built on historical ties. In the aftermath of the ideological and economic conflicts between East and West Germany during the late 1950s, cities in both countries sought partnerships with African cities and geographically closer locations like Finland (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, p. 334). As expected, these relationships were often framed as *Patenschaften* (sponsorships) rather than true partnerships, with European cities offering practical guidance, political development assistance, seminars, and vocational training to their African counterparts (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, p. 334). A pioneering example of such collaboration was the twinning between Marseille and Abidjan in 1958, which opened the door for French cities to focus their energies on former colonies.

Yet, it was not just about colonial connections. European cities began formalizing relationships with cities in regions where they sought to develop new trade ties, particularly through the export of European technologies, aid, and ideas (Ewen and Hebbert, 2007, p. 334).

One significant turning point came after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, when China began opening up to the world under Deng Xiaoping's reforms. European cities started seeking out Chinese sister cities, with Zurich, Switzerland, inaugurating the first twinning with Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province. This new wave of global city networking coincided with Europe's recognition of its growing role in a globalized world. In the 1990s, as European cities increasingly became destinations for global migration, they began twinning with cities from which these migration flows originated, creating an international dialogue on migration, culture, and cooperation.

At the same time, European cities began reaching out across the Atlantic, rekindling sister-city agreements with North American cities after a four-decade hiatus following initial enthusiasm in the 1950s. Spanish and Portuguese cities also renewed relationships with municipalities in Latin America, where colonial ties had left a strong cultural and linguistic imprint. These efforts helped revive connections with the Americas and expanded European influence through the global city network.

By this time, town twinning had already grown into a global phenomenon. No longer confined to European cities alone, the movement had become a worldwide practice (for an overview, see Garrard & Mikhailova, 2018). However, while European cities played a crucial role in the global spread of the city network culture, it is important to recognize that this culture developed differently across

various socio-cultural contexts. Although heavily influenced by European networking models, cities around the world have also created their own versions of these networks, shaping them according to local needs and challenges.

Despite the complexities of studying city networks – such as the lack of precise data on the number and distribution of sister cities – it is widely acknowledged that Europe maintained the highest density of twinning agreements globally (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, p. 334; Baycan-Levent et al., 2010, p. 1118). These agreements remain central to European city diplomacy, and they continue to evolve as cities across the continent – and the world – find new ways to cooperate, share knowledge, and promote peace through urban international relations. The sister-city movement, in its growth and reach, has become a symbol of the power of local governance in shaping global narratives, fostering connections that transcend national boundaries and paving the way for a more interconnected world.

6.5

City Networking and the European Union

The contemporary consolidation of the networking culture among European cities has been driven by two key dimensions: institutional recognition and economic support. Both have played a crucial role in strengthening cities' ability to collaborate across borders and assert their influence within the broader framework of European governance.

First, in terms of institutional factors, it is important to recognize that local governments were already developing channels to project their voices onto the international stage in the postwar period. This evolution built upon earlier city networks that had successfully gained recognition from international bodies. A prime example is the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA/UIV), which had achieved such status well before the mid-20th century.

By 1957, this trend of institutionalizing city cooperation progressed further with the creation of the Conference of Local Authorities of Europe under the Council of Europe. This body expanded its scope in 1975, transforming into the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe to include regional representatives. This shift reflected an increasing acknowledgment of the essential role local and regional governments play in shaping policies that transcend municipal borders.

A pivotal moment came in 1985 when, after extensive negotiations between local and national governments, the European Charter of Local Self-Government was signed by all member states of the Council of Europe. The Charter was revolutionary in that it formally enshrined the principle of subsidiarity, asserting that public affairs should be managed at the most local level possible and only escalated to higher levels when necessary. This legal framework not only recognized the political, administrative, and financial independence of local governments but also protected it. The Charter mandated that the principle of local autonomy be incorporated into national laws and constitutions, giving municipalities the legal tools to assert their roles in governance effectively.

The Charter's provisions also established protections for territorial boundaries, administrative structures, and the resources needed for local governments to carry out their functions effectively. Furthermore, it set out conditions for the fair exercise of local elective office and offered legal protection for local self-government, creating a comprehensive framework that empowered municipalities.

Further strengthening these institutional foundations was the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, which was launched in 1980. Over time, as more member states ratified the Convention, it facilitated the creation of nearly 100 transnational city networks. These networks developed into a unique phenomenon in international law, allowing cities to interact across borders and build meaningful relationships that transcended national boundaries (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, pp. 334-335). Together, the Charter and the Convention provided a strong institutional basis for city networking, encouraging local authorities to actively engage in international cooperation to address transnational challenges.

A prime example of this renewed momentum in city networking is Eurocities, launched in 1986, which remains one of the most influential city networks in Europe today. Its origins stem from a group of six cities with similar industrial backgrounds – Barcelona, Birmingham, Frankfurt, Lyon, Milan, and Rotterdam – commonly regarded as *second cities* in their respective countries. These cities, through previous collaborations, recognized that they faced shared challenges and objectives, particularly the need for a dedicated platform to represent the interests of large urban centers. Existing organizations, such as the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA/UIV) and the Committee of the Regions, were too broad and diverse to adequately address the specific needs of major cities.

Initially focused on cities with populations exceeding 250,000, Eurocities has since grown to include 216 member cities across Europe. The network's successful expansion is attributed to its comprehensive approach, featuring a cross-cutting system of policy forums that focus on key areas such as culture, economic development, the environment, knowledge exchange, mobility, and social affairs. This structure has established Eurocities as a highly reputable and technically proficient

organization, known for its effective lobbying efforts on behalf of urban Europe (Ewen & Hebbert, 2007, p. 336).

The *Maastricht Treaty* of 1992 marked a turning point for local governments in European governance. Responding to pressure from local and regional authorities, the *Treaty* led to the creation of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994. The CoR serves as a consultative body comprising representatives from local and regional governments across Europe. Its role is to ensure that the interests of these governments are considered in EU policymaking. The European Commission and the Council of the European Union are required to consult the CoR on legislative proposals that affect regional or local matters, and the CoR can offer its opinions on other issues as well. This institutionalization of local government input at the EU level significantly reinforced the legitimacy and influence of city networks.

In addition to city networks' recognition within the EU's institutional framework, economic support has also been a key driver in consolidating the contemporary city-networking culture across Europe. While city cooperation has long been motivated by natural incentives like knowledge exchange and economic partnership, the EU's financial backing has significantly bolstered these efforts. Substantial support to local governments mainly channeled through the EU's Structural Funds and its septennial EU Cohesion Policy, has been central in promoting key European goals, such as economic growth, social cohesion, and environmental sustainability (Hooge & Marks, 2001, pp. 83-86).

Before the URBAN I (1994-1999) and URBAN II (2000-2006) programs, these funds did not specifically target cities, but they provided resources to urban projects. With the establishment of more structured municipal networks, local governments could access these resources more effectively, fostering partnerships, shared project management, and inter-city connections. The URBAN programs were a game changer, positioning cities at the heart of EU agendas and making them essential players in implementing European policies at the local level (see, for example, Benz & Eberlein, 1999; Leitner et al., 2002; Marshall, 2005; Kübler & Piliutyte, 2007).

Cities such as Birmingham, Lille, and Lyon were among the first to develop expertise in navigating these opportunities, leveraging their international connections and networks to access EU funding. Their success became models of how city cooperation could generate not only financial resources but also greater capacity to address urban challenges, from economic development to environmental sustainability (Cole & John, 2001).

The importance of cities in realizing EU policy goals has only grown in recent years, especially in areas such as climate change, urban development, and social cohesion. Building on the success of the URBAN programs, the EU has continued to support sustainable urban development through

initiatives like the ongoing series of URBACT programs⁴⁵, which began in 2002. These programs focus on fostering knowledge exchange and cooperation between European cities to drive economic, social, and environmental progress.

URBACT was complemented by other initiatives, including the Covenant of Mayors, launched by the European Commission after the adoption of the EU's climate and energy package in 2008. Recognizing the key role of cities in mitigating climate change, the Covenant encouraged local authorities to increase energy efficiency and promote renewable energy sources. Signatory cities committed to reducing CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020, aligning with the EU's broader climate objectives.

Another major initiative, the Urban Agenda for the EU, launched in 2016, reinforced the role of cities in implementing EU policies. It encouraged cooperation between cities, member states, and EU institutions, while also promoting policies focused on sustainable urban development. This approach was further strengthened with the European Urban Initiative, starting in 2021, which provides additional support for capacity building, sustainable development, and the communication of urban policies.

The combination of institutional recognition and financial backing from the EU has been instrumental in solidifying the role of city networks in European governance. These networks have empowered local governments, fostered cross-border cooperation, and allowed cities to directly engage with European-level policymaking. Through this support, Europe has cultivated a vibrant culture of city networking, which continues to shape the governance of individual cities and contribute to the broader project of European integration.

6.6

The Growing Role of the Civil Society in EU Governance

Within the EU multi-level governance system, also the civil society has emerged as a crucial player, increasingly influential in shaping the EU's policies, priorities, and collective identity. In particular, civil society organizations serve as a bridge between EU institutions and its citizens, ensuring that

⁴⁵ Urbact I (2002-2006); Urbact II (2007-2013), Urbact III (2014-2020) Urbact IV (2021-2027).

diverse voices are heard and that decision-making processes remain transparent and legitimate. role to play.

Civil society encompasses a broad spectrum of organizations and groups operating independently of the state, aiming to advance various social interests. In the EU context, this includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, trade unions, professional associations, environmental advocates, human rights defenders, consumer organizations, and labor unions. These entities represent myriad interests and concerns, striving to influence EU policies to reflect the needs and aspirations of their constituencies.

The role of civil society in European governance has evolved alongside the EU's own development. As European integration deepened and the EU expanded its competencies into areas such as environmental regulation, labor rights, migration, digital policy, and consumer protection, civil society actors became indispensable partners in both policymaking and implementation. They advocate for citizens' concerns, monitor the actions of EU institutions, and hold them accountable, thereby enhancing the democratic fabric of the Union.

One of the most critical functions of civil society within the EU governance system is the enhancement of democratic legitimacy. The EU has often faced criticism for its perceived *democratic deficit*, attributed to its complex decision-making processes that can seem distant from the everyday lives of European citizens (see Liargovas & Papageorgiou, 2024, pp. 159-184). Civil society organizations help bridge this gap by representing a wide array of public interests and ensuring that citizens' voices are integrated into EU policymaking.

Mechanisms such as public consultations, petitions, and direct engagement with EU institutions allow CSOs to provide invaluable feedback on policies and legislative proposals. For instance, the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI), introduced by the *Lisbon Treaty* in 2009, empowers citizens to directly influence the EU legislative agenda. By gathering at least one million signatures from citizens across at least seven member states, an ECI can prompt the European Commission to consider new legislation. This tool fosters grassroots participation and gives civil society a formal avenue to shape policy, promoting a sense of ownership over EU decisions.

Civil society plays a crucial role in promoting transparency and accountability within the EU governance system. Given the technical complexity and multi-institutional nature of EU policymaking, processes can often appear opaque to the general public. CSOs act as watchdogs, scrutinizing EU actions and decisions to ensure they align with democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.

Environmental organizations, for example, have been instrumental in advocating for stronger climate policies, pushing the EU to adopt more ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas

emissions. Human rights groups have scrutinized EU migration policies, highlighting the need for humane treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. By engaging in lobbying, advocacy, and public campaigns, civil society holds EU institutions accountable, ensuring that policy decisions reflect societal values and ethical considerations.

A foundational value of the EU is the promotion of human rights, diversity, and social inclusion. Civil society organizations are essential in advancing these values, giving voice to marginalized and underrepresented groups. They provide platforms for vulnerable populations—such as refugees, ethnic minorities, the LGBTQ+ community, people with disabilities, and others—to advocate for policies that support their rights and address their specific needs.

During crises like the European refugee crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, civil society has been on the front lines, delivering humanitarian aid, advocating for inclusive policies, and fostering solidarity among member states. By addressing the needs of diverse communities, civil society contributes to building a more equitable and cohesive European society, helping to bridge divides and promote social harmony.

The EU has developed several mechanisms to ensure civil society's active involvement in its governance system. These channels range from formal advisory bodies to public consultations and funding programs designed to support civil society initiatives.

Established in 1957, the European Economic and Social Committee serves as a vital institutional link between EU decision-makers and civil society. The EESC is an advisory body comprising representatives from various economic and social sectors, including employers, employees, and diverse interest groups. It provides opinions on EU legislation and policies, ensuring that the perspectives of organized civil society are considered during the legislative process. By fostering dialogue and consensus-building, the EESC enhances the democratic legitimacy of EU governance.

The European Commission frequently conducts public consultations on proposed policies and legislative initiatives, inviting input from civil society organizations, businesses, and individual citizens. These consultations enable CSOs to contribute during the formative stages of policy development, ensuring that a broad spectrum of views is considered. Additionally, structured dialogues between civil society and EU institutions are organized on specific policy areas, such as environmental protection, social rights, health, and digital transformation.

To promote transparency in lobbying and advocacy activities, the EU maintains the Transparency Register, which lists organizations and individuals engaged in EU policymaking processes. This tool provides public access to information about their activities, funding sources, and objectives, enhancing accountability and allowing for informed public scrutiny.

The EU offers various funding opportunities to support civil society's work across multiple domains. Programs like Europe for Citizens aim to strengthen democratic engagement by funding projects that promote civic participation, historical awareness, and intercultural dialogue. The Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC) program provides financial support to organizations working on anti-discrimination efforts, gender equality, combating racism and xenophobia, and promoting fundamental rights.

These funding mechanisms are crucial in enabling civil society organizations, especially smaller ones that might lack substantial resources, to carry out their advocacy, research, and grassroots activities effectively. By providing financial support, the EU helps ensure that a diverse range of voices can participate in shaping policies that affect European citizens.

Despite the essential role civil society plays, several challenges limit its impact within EU governance. First, access to decision-makers can be uneven, with larger, well-established organizations often having more influence due to greater resources, professional networks, and expertise. This can lead to an imbalance in representation, where certain interests dominate the policy agenda, potentially sidelining smaller or less-resourced groups that represent marginalized communities.

Moreover, civil society in the EU is diverse and reflects the historical, cultural, and political contexts of its member states. This diversity can lead to fragmentation, making it challenging to build a unified voice on EU-wide issues. Differing priorities and capacities among CSOs across countries can hinder coordinated advocacy efforts, reducing their overall effectiveness at the EU level.

Finally, the intricate nature of EU policymaking, with its multiple institutions, procedures, and legal frameworks, can be a barrier to civil society engagement. Smaller organizations often lack the expertise or resources to navigate this complexity effectively. Additionally, the perceived distance between EU institutions and citizens can contribute to apathy or alienation, making it harder for civil society to mobilize public support for their causes.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the role of civil society continues to grow in importance. As the EU confronts complex global challenges – including climate change, digital transformation, migration, and public health crises – civil society will remain a crucial partner in crafting policies that are democratic, inclusive, and sustainable. By leveraging their advocacy, expertise, and grassroots connections, civil society organizations help ensure that the European Union remains responsive to its citizens and upholds its foundational democratic principles.

CHAPTER 7

EU Approach to Cultural Heterogeneity and the Emergence of European Interculturalism

7.1

The Onset of the European *Cultural Turn*

Leading a political organization composed of multiple states, such as the European Union, naturally places the challenge of managing cultural heterogeneity at the heart of its strategic priorities. This focus is eloquently captured in the EU's motto, *United in Diversity*, which elevates cultural heterogeneity to a defining feature of European identity. Far from being a peripheral concern or a byproduct of the Union's formation, the management of cultural heterogeneity has become a deliberate and essential pillar of the European integration project, embodying the ideals and aspirations that underpin the Union's vision.

Yet, the prominent focus on *culture* and *diversity* as cornerstones of EU identity is a relatively recent development. The motto itself was adopted only in 2000, and none of the founding treaties made any mention of *culture*. For the early architects of European unity, cultural heterogeneity was not a priority. Its prominence in today's EU policies is the outcome of specific historical and political developments that gradually transformed the role of *culture* within the European project.

The so-called European *cultural turn* took shape in the 1970s, amid a reassessment of strategies to advance European integration and reinforce the legitimacy of European political authority (Shore, 2006, p. 14). Previously, for about two decades following the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, integration had been largely guided by the classical theory of *neofunctionalism*, as articulated by political scientists Ernst Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963). Neofunctionalism posited that regional integration would naturally evolve through a series of incremental steps toward harmonization and regulation, driven by the European institutions (see Nelsen & Stubb, 1998). This

process, known as the *spillover effect*, suggested that careful intervention in non-controversial areas would gradually lead to integration in more sensitive domains, without overtly threatening national sovereignty.

During the “Golden Age” of European economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s (Crafts, 1995), the legitimacy of the European Community was primarily based on the tangible benefits of economic prosperity and stability, rather than on democratic representation or the development of a shared European identity. However, the early 1970s marked a turning point. Until 1972, the European Community seemed set for further success, with the first major enlargement set for 1973, bringing Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom into the fold. Yet, this optimism was soon overshadowed by the economic turmoil of the 1973 oil crisis, which triggered a severe recession. The economic downturn not only weakened public support for European integration but also highlighted that economic prosperity alone was insufficient to legitimize the European project. The EU needed a unifying narrative that transcended economics and that could foster a sense of shared identity and purpose among its diverse member states.

It was during this period that the ideal of a common European cultural identity began to take shape as a potentially unifying force. Although the notion of a *European culture* had been discussed by European elites since the early days of integration – formalized as early as 1954 in the *Council of Europe's European Cultural Convention* – it was not until 1973 that European institutions officially embraced this narrative. This was reflected in the publication of the *Declaration on European Identity*.

The *Declaration* stands as a key manifesto of the European cultural turn. It acknowledged the historical disunity of Europe, stating that countries had often been “pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests” (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973, p. 2). Yet, it declared that “unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they [the nine member states] have in common” (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973, p. 2).

The document went on to define European unity through the lens of a common cultural identity:

The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common, and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism. (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973, p. 2)

This marked a watershed moment in European integration. *Culture* was no longer seen as a peripheral issue but as a fundamental component of European unity. By embracing cultural differences as a unifying force, the EU sought to strengthen its cohesion and address challenges that

could not be solved by economic integration alone. The recognition of a shared cultural identity provided a new basis for solidarity and cohesion among member states, one that emphasized common values while celebrating the richness of Europe's diverse cultures.

Like any discourse that ascribes intrinsic cultural traits to a group, the notion of a distinct *European identity* is fundamentally a rhetorical construct – what Roy Wagner famously framed in terms of “invention” (Wagner, 1975). It is a “fiction” shaped by selective ethnic generalizations and arbitrary geographic boundaries (see Stråth, 2000). It is one thing to suggest that geographically proximate populations, with long histories of exchange, often intertwined with expansion and conquest, may share certain cultural elements. It is a far greater leap to claim the existence of a timeless, common cultural identity exclusive to those populations – for instance, communities in Southern Europe may arguably have more in common with populations in the Maghreb than with those in Northern Europe.

Nevertheless, this is precisely the narrative that European institutions introduced: European identity was framed as something that had always existed, inherently accompanying the development of civilizations across the continent. More precisely, European culture was presented as a self-evident truth, underlying essence shared by all European peoples. This approach is emblematic of a typical strategy used by political and cultural elites to foster national unity and legitimize political structures – we will observe similar dynamics in the cultural policies of Japan (Part III) and South Korea (Part IV). Symbolic resources are skillfully leveraged to craft historical narratives supporting the notion of a transcendent, unified identity.

What distinguishes the invention of European culture from other similar cases is the way it grapples with cultural heterogeneity. Usually, narratives about of a common identity rest on the assumption of cultural homogeneity. However, in the European context, ignoring or downplaying the significant cultural differences – proudly revendicated by individual member states – was simply not a viable option. Instead, European elites chose to reframe these differences as a defining strength and a central element of European identity.

Specifically, the varied cultures of European nations were presented as the multifaced, distinct expressions of a single, unified European identity. Rather than being a hindrance, this heterogeneity – rebranded as *cultural diversity* – was celebrated as an asset, enriching the fabric European civilization. Unity, in this framework, was not only compatible with cultural heterogeneity but essential to its preservation and growth: only through unity could Europe avoid fragmentation and conflict and prevent the dissolution of its cultural achievements.

This narrative was soon reinforced by a range of strategic cultural policies designed to support and solidify the imagined collective identity. Initiatives promoting cross-cultural exchange, fostering multilingualism (with a particular emphasis on European languages), and commemorating shared

historical milestones became central to this effort. Ancient civilizations, notably Greece and Rome, were prominently positioned as the foundational pillars of a common European heritage, symbolizing the roots of a unified cultural legacy.

The message behind these policies was clear: Europe faced a choice between two paths. The first, the path of unity championed by the European Community, promised economic prosperity, a flourishing shared identity, and the transformation of cultural heterogeneity into a source of collective strength and wealth. The second, the path of division, would lead – just as it had throughout European history – to war, suffering, and the ultimate disintegration of European values and identity.

7.2

Developing a European Approach to Cultural Management

The first European supranational *cultural* initiative was launched in 1973, when the European Parliament established a Committee on Cultural Affairs and Youth, tasked with developing European approaches to education. The topic of education had already attracted the attention of European leaders, particularly as plans for the first enlargement of the European Community were underway. Already in 1972, the European Commission had enlisted Professor Henri Janne to draft a first report for developing a comprehensive European education strategy. Published in 1973, the *Janne Report* laid the groundwork for the Committee's work and became the foundation for European education policies.

The report underscored the importance of promoting a “European dimension in education,” fostering the development of a shared European “cultural identity” (Janne, 1973, pp. 26-29). Its main recommendations included integrating school curricula with programs designed to strengthen the narrative of a shared European cultural identity and encouraging greater mobility and exchanges among students and researchers across Europe.

In 1974, the Committee on Cultural Affairs and Youth released a new report on European education, elaborating on Janne's arguments while adding a critical new focus: the inclusion of migrant children in educational systems. This brought attention to a growing challenge in Western Europe, particularly in France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, where post-World

War II migration from former colonies and other nations was constantly increasing. Within this context, the concept of *intercultural education* gradually entered the discourse of European institutions.

The term *intercultural* had already begun to feature prominently in pedagogical discussions across European countries since the 1960s. It was commonly used to refer to educational approaches that recognized and incorporated the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of migrant communities, often through the integration of tailored teachings or workshops into school curricula (Allemann-Ghionda, 2008, p. 1). Unsurprisingly, this concept quickly caught the attention of the European leading human rights and anti-discrimination organization: the Council of Europe (CoE). Throughout the 1970s, the CoE actively supported an increasing number of research projects and publications focusing on intercultural education, which played a critical role in its popularization and adoption across the continent (Porcher, 1986).

Although the European Community had not yet formally adopted the term *intercultural education*, the 1974 report by the Committee for Cultural Affairs and Youth brought the need for pedagogical approaches aimed at including migrant children in national education systems at the center of the discussion. Finally, in response to growing concerns, the Council of the European Communities issued the *Directive on the Education of the Children of Migrant Workers* in 1977. This directive encouraged immigration-receiving countries to enhance their curricula with programs aimed at helping migrant students develop proficiency in both their family languages (L1) and the language of instruction (L2). By doing so, the Council sought to address the dual needs of preserving cultural heritage and facilitating integration, setting a key precedent for future European educational policies in the region.

In parallel with this educational focus, European cultural strategies began to extend to the preservation of art and material culture. Once again, the CoE took the lead, launching a three-year campaign in 1973 to raise public awareness about the preservation and restoration of Europe's cultural heritage. This initiative culminated in the adoption of the *European Charter of the Architectural Heritage*. The charter emphasized the shared responsibility of European nations, stating that “Recognizing that the architectural heritage, an irreplaceable expression of the wealth and diversity of European culture, is shared by all people and that all European States must show real solidarity in preserving that heritage,” and further stressing that conservation efforts “are common to the whole of Europe and should be dealt with in a coordinated manner” (CoE, 1975).

These proactive measures by the CoE, coupled with growing recognition among member states of the need for institutional intervention, paved the way for greater European engagement in cultural matters. A notable moment came in 1976, when Luxembourgish Member of the European Parliament,

Willy Dondelinger, raised concerns about the fragile state of cultural heritage in Venice (EUR-Lex, 1976, Q. 554/75) and Ravenna (EUR-Lex, 1976, Q. 651/75). Initially, the European Commission dismissed these concerns, arguing that it lacked the authority under existing treaties to intervene in cultural conservation or allocate funds for preserving works of art.

However, less than a year later, the Commission issued a communication titled *Community Action in the Cultural Sector* (EUR-Lex, 1977). This document marked a pivotal moment in the European cultural policy sector, as it formally outlined the commitment to protecting and promoting European cultural heritage and production. The communication also called for harmonizing related policies and initiatives across Europe. For the first time, the European institutions identified culture as a “sector” within their competencies (EUR-Lex, 1977). Importantly, the definition of this cultural sector was left intentionally broad, allowing it to encompass a wide range of fields, including the arts, cultural heritage, education (particularly youth initiatives), sports, information and media, communication, and technologies related to audiovisual media and conservation. By leveraging the inherent flexibility of the term *culture*, the European Union was soon able to cast a wide net over numerous domains of cultural life, setting the stage for a more integrated and comprehensive approach in the years to come.

7.3

Europeanising Europe’s Culture(s)

During the 1980s, European institutions began shifting from theoretical discussions to the practical implementation of their cultural strategies. The numerous statements and reports on cultural affairs, drafted since the 1970s, were finally leveraged to shape and execute tangible actions. Two key factors drove this transition.

First, the enlargement of the European Community in 1981, with Greece’s entry, reignited discussions on the pace of European integration. This expansion presented a unique opportunity: the country needed support in preserving and promoting its rich cultural heritage, particularly its Ancient Greek legacy, which is widely recognized as a cornerstone of European civilization. This allowed European institutions to undertake relatively uncontroversial cultural interventions while establishing a precedent for future policies.

More significantly, the drive for effective cultural strategies was spurred by growing concerns about the *democratic deficit* within European institutions. This concept, introduced by British academic David Marquand in 1979, pointed to the paradox of the European Community claiming to champion democracy, while its Parliament members were not directly elected by citizens (Marquand 1979). Although the first direct elections for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were held that same year, the problem persisted. Voter turnout in 1979 was about 62%, dropping further to 59% in the 1984 elections, reflecting a persistent disconnect between European institutions and the citizens of member states. The European Community risked appearing as a democratic system without a cohesive *demos* – that is without a “body politic” (Herrero de Miñón, 1996).

Confronted with these challenges, European institutions took decisive action, implementing a series of cultural strategies designed to strengthen the European narrative and connect more deeply with citizens. These efforts aimed to reconfigure the public imagination by “Europeanising some of the fundamental categories of thought” (Shore, 2006; for a more detailed anthropological analysis on this topic, see Shore, 1996; 2000; Abélès, 2000).

One of the earliest steps in this effort was the creation of a European ritual calendar, marked by initiatives such as the European Year (launched in 1983) and the European City of Culture (introduced in 1985). The European City of Culture program was particularly significant, as it directly involved cities as active participants in European cultural policies for the first time.

Further cultural strategies were famously formulated by the Committee for a People’s Europe, chaired by Italian MEP Pietro Adonnino – hence commonly referred to as the Adonnino Committee. This committee, established by the European Council in response to the disappointing 1984 European elections, proposed several landmark initiatives (Adonnino Report, 1985, pp. 21-24):

- Promotion of a European audiovisual area: The creation of a truly European, multilingual television channel to foster a shared media space.
- Establishment of a European Academy of Science, Technology, and Art: Celebrating and advancing European achievements in these fields.
- Launch of a Euro-Lottery: A pan-European lottery aimed at funding cultural and social projects.
- Dissemination of factual information: Enhancing communication about the activities of European institutions and their significance for citizens.
- Formation of European sports teams: Promoting unity and camaraderie through sports.
- Educational exchange programs: Facilitating student and teacher exchanges to foster mutual understanding. Multilingual Teaching and a European Dimension in Education: Developing new textbooks and teaching materials that incorporate European perspectives.

The committee also underscored the importance of adopting symbols to express European identity. It urged the adoption of the now-familiar European flag – a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background – and advocated for Beethoven’s *Ode to Joy* to be officially recognized as the European anthem, as it was deemed “representative of the European idea” (Adonnino Report, 1985, pp. 29). Additionally, the committee recommended the annual celebration of Europe Day on May 9 to commemorate the *Schuman Declaration* of 1950, which had laid the foundation for economic cooperation between France and West Germany and ultimately led to the creation of the European Community.

These initiatives aimed to foster a deeper sense of European identity and unity, addressing the democratic deficit by engaging citizens more directly with European institutions and values. By leveraging cultural strategies that highlighted shared heritage, common values, and symbols, the European Community sought to create a more cohesive and participatory European society.

A significant challenge in developing systematic cultural policies within the European Community was the lack of formal institutional authority over cultural matters – as noted, none of the founding treaties explicitly addressed culture. To overcome this limitation, Community representatives often relied on economic arguments (Forrest, 1994, p. 12). This approach was famously articulated by Jacques Delors, then-President of the European Commission, in his 1985 speech to the European Parliament:

Under the terms of the Treaty, we do not have the resources to implement a cultural policy; but we are going to try to tackle it along economic lines. It is not simply a question of television programmes. We have to build a powerful European cultural industry that will enable us to control both the medium and its content, maintaining our standards of civilization and encouraging the creative people among us. (Delors, 1985, p. 64)

Delors’ frank statement not only revealed the European institutions’ intention to expand their influence into the cultural sector but also pointed toward the early development of the “creative economy” (Howkins, 2001), which would soon become a key element in European discussions about cultural differences and diversity. By framing cultural policy within an economic context, European institutions gained legitimacy and could draw on precedents set by the Council of Europe. While the CoE’s recommendations, declarations, and conventions were not legally binding for EU institutions, their ratification by member states created a permissive environment for further cultural action.

By the early 1990s, European institutions, in partnership with the CoE, were increasingly engaged in unofficial or indirect cultural initiatives. These actions involved no fewer than eight different

Directorates-General, with an annual budget estimated at around 500 million euros (Shore, 2006, p. 15).

Finally, in 1992, with the signing of the *Maastricht Treaty*, culture was, for the first time, officially recognized as an area of competence for the newly established European Union – on par with education, which, by then, had been separated from the cultural sector and designated as a distinct field. This development marked a significant expansion of the EU's authority in the cultural realm. However, as the famous adage goes, *with great power comes great responsibility*: the European institutions now had the opportunity to engage fully in cultural strategies to advance European integration, but they also had to prove they could deliver on their promises – that is, bringing prosperity and unity to a continent that was growing increasingly diverse.

The traditional narrative of a shared European identity needed to be rethought and reinforced, not only to foster the development of an official European cultural industry but also to reassure citizens that the EU could successfully address the complex challenges posed by cultural differences, particularly in light of the profound socio-cultural changes of the 1990s. These challenges included the continued enlargement of the Union, the increased movement of people and information within European borders, and the constant growth of migration from non-EU countries.

While it remained important to emphasize the notion that diversity was a pillar of a common European identity – catchy slogans like *Unity in Diversity* contributed further popularizing this narrative – the European institutions faced a pressing need to clarify how this unity could be achieved amidst growing diversity. It was at this critical juncture that *intercultural dialogue* emerged as the conceptual framework to resolve the dilemma.

7.4

Emergence and Uses of *Intercultural* in the Official Discourse of European Institutions

The term *intercultural* first made its appearance in an official European institution document in 1987. On June 22 of that year, Belgian socialist politician and Member of the European Parliament, Raymonde Dury, raised a question that would have later been published in the *Official Journal of the European Communities*. She asked the European Commission to explain the disparity between

Belgium's two policies on educating immigrant children: "a policy of harmonious integration on an *intercultural* [my emphasis] basis in the Dutch-speaking sector, and assimilation, with rejection of such measures in the French-speaking sector" (EUR-Lex, 1987, WQ 87/C 163/150). Interestingly, already in this initial instance, *intercultural* was used in opposition to *assimilation*, specifically in the context of education. This usage reflected the understanding established in national discourse since the 1960s, which had been further developed by the Council of Europe (CoE) in the 1970s to describe educational methods for integrating migrant children into national school systems.

In the following years, references to *intercultural* remained sporadic in official documents, largely tied to the growing challenge of integrating migrant children into European schools. Terms like *intercultural approach* and *intercultural education* were often used interchangeably, though their meanings were somewhat vague, pointing broadly to inclusion strategies.

A notable shift occurred in 1989, when the European Parliament passed a resolution outlining actions in the cultural sector. For the first time, the resolution introduced the concept of *intercultural dialogue* into the European institutional discourse, expanding the scope of *intercultural* beyond the realm of education (EUR-Lex, 1989, No C 69/190). Although the notion of *dialogue* had long been associated with intercultural education, the specific term *intercultural dialogue* had not been formally adopted until this point. Interestingly, its first supranational mention had occurred just a year earlier, in a CoE publication on the Lisbon conference entitled *Interdependence and Cultural Development*, where Guinean author Jorge Miranda Alfama presented his work on *Traditions, Modernity, and Intercultural Dialogue*. Yet, despite this early reference, the CoE did not further engage with the concept over the next decade, focusing instead on intercultural education. In this case, European institutions were quicker than the CoE to integrate the term into their official discourse.

In its 1989 debut, *intercultural dialogue* was framed as a tool for promoting European values and expanding European influence globally. However, the resolution carried unmistakable colonial undertones, suggesting that this dialogue should extend Europe's cultural reach and overcome East-West divisions, ultimately aiming to "create a new impetus and project an image of the Community throughout its sphere of influence," including in the "Third World" (EUR-Lex, 1989, No C 69/190). This framing reflects a kind of engagement that would have later been strongly critiqued by post-colonial and feminist scholars, who pointed out that, when framed in this manner, dialogue serves less to foster genuine mutual recognition and more to obscure power imbalances, reinforcing inequalities under the guise of cultural exchange (e.g., Stokke and Lybaek, 2016).

The early 1990s brought dramatic demographic changes to Europe, driven by the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany in 1990. These changes intensified concerns about cultural differences across member states of the European Community.

From 1991 onward, the concepts of *cultural differences* – mostly framed in terms of *cultural diversity* – and *intercultural* became more prominent in the discourse of European institutions, and even more after the founding of the European Union in 1993, which made particularly urgent the need for a unified, inclusive narrative.

During this period, the term intercultural remained inconsistently defined, employed differently depending on context. In most cases, *intercultural* was used to refer to *intercultural education*. This concept soon expanded beyond its original focus on migrant children to include also national cultural minorities, such as the Roma community. Over time, it grew to encompass all efforts aimed at promoting, in general, cultural heterogeneity within the education sector, including international exchanges and collaborations between educational institutions. As the field evolved, specific dimensions like *intercultural learning* and *intercultural communication* emerged, further enriching the scope of intercultural education.

Though less frequently mentioned, the concept of *intercultural dialogue* also gained traction within European discourse. It was primarily linked to the EU's role in fostering international relations, cultural exchanges, and cooperation. By promoting an ideal of European culture, intercultural dialogue aimed to enhance mutual understanding and collaboration between Europe and other regions, reflecting the EU's broader commitment to cultural exchange and global partnership.

Another turning point came in 1995, following the EU's enlargement to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden, alongside the implementation of the Schengen Convention. This expansion brought about a sudden rise in the perceived cultural differentiation within the Union and increased migration flows due to the newly introduced visa-free regime. As a result, issues like xenophobia, racism, and prejudice emerged as critical challenges that threatened not only local social cohesion but also the broader European integration process.

In this context, education was widely regarded as a key tool in addressing these issues, and intercultural education quickly became the conceptual framework for developing effective strategies. Toward the end of 1995, the European Committee of the Regions was tasked with drafting a comprehensive report on intercultural education.

However, European institutions also recognized that focusing exclusively on education would not be sufficient. A broader principle was needed to shape an effective European narrative on cultural differences – one that could effectively promote anti-discrimination, social inclusion, and the overarching goal of European integration. It was during this period that *intercultural dialogue* properly emerged as a central concept in European discourse. Although initially lacking a precise definition, the broad and adaptable nature of the term made it an ideal framework to capture the positive effects of cultural exchange and interaction. Its flexibility allowed for the promotion of

intercultural engagement without committing to specific normative implications or restricting the discussion to particular social dimensions, such as education.

From 1995 onward, *intercultural dialogue* began to spread as a general framework for addressing cultural heterogeneity. For instance, the European Parliament's 1995 *Resolution* acknowledged that "in view of the multicultural nature of European society, explicit reference should be made to the need to promote *intercultural dialogue* [my emphasis] aimed at improving mutual understanding and tolerance" (EUR-Lex, 1995, No C 151/61). Similarly, the Council of Europe's *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* recognized *intercultural dialogue* as a core principle for promoting mutual respect and understanding among people, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious identity, particularly in the fields of education, culture, and media.

The celebration of the European Year Against Racism in 1997 further advanced discussions on strategies for tackling challenges related to cultural differences. This occasion also provided a platform for European discourse to engage with the growing theoretical debate between multiculturalism and interculturalism. From this point forward, European official documents began distinguishing between the two concepts, offering more detailed definitions.

For example, the 1997 *Opinion on Intercultural Education* by the European Committee of the Regions made a clear distinction:

The term 'multicultural' is a descriptive understanding of how things stand and involves simply examining the coexistence of various cultural references in a single country, whereas the term 'intercultural' connotes the dynamic interaction and cooperative interchange between cultures (EUR-Lex, 1995, No C 215/21).

This approach aimed to foster "understanding and respect for cultural diversity" while actively countering "cultural indifference, the leveling down of cultures, and the growth of racist and xenophobic attitudes" (EUR-Lex, 1995, No C 215/22). It also sought to avoid ethnocentrism and eliminate "stereotypical portrayals of other cultures" (EUR-Lex, 1995, No C 215/23). In other words, by adopting intercultural dialogue as a guiding principle, European institutions aimed to build a more cohesive and inclusive society. They recognized that active engagement and mutual understanding between diverse cultures were essential for the success of European integration, ensuring that cultural heterogeneity became a source of strength rather than division.

Formulating a European Approach to Cultural Heterogeneity in the New Millennium

The start of a new year carries a powerful symbolic weight both individually and collectively. Throughout history, the dawn of a new century has been celebrated as a significant point of transition, as a time to leave the past behind and embrace the future. Even more so, the beginning of a new millennium holds profound symbolic significance. When analyzing political and cultural narratives – often fueled by the strength, legitimacy, and inspiration that symbols provide – such pivotal moments should not be overlooked.

For societies that adhere to the Gregorian calendar, the year 2000 offered a perfect opportunity to launch new initiatives and projects, capitalizing on the optimism and sense of a fresh start it inspired. It is no surprise, then, that European leaders seized precisely that year to set into motion two major strategic plans centered around socioeconomic development and culture.

To tackle the economic stagnation and low productivity that had plagued the European Union in the 1990s, the *Lisbon Strategy* was launched with an ambitious vision: to transform the EU into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council, 2000). While *social cohesion* was identified as a key goal, the strategy still did not specifically address cultural differences or diversity.

In contrast, *cultural diversity* was placed as the focal point of the *Culture 2000 Programme*, which marked the introduction of the first cohesive EU cultural strategy, overcoming earlier, fragmented initiatives to promote European culture. Indeed, preceding programs such as *Ariane*, *Raphael*, and *Kaleidoscope*, running between 1996 and 1999, had focused on specific aspects of culture, such as literature, heritage, and the arts. However, Culture 2000 sought to go further, providing a more unified framework for the EU’s cultural initiatives.

Although the Culture 2000 Programme largely concentrated on traditional cultural domains – such as art, heritage, and cultural events – its most groundbreaking feature was the explicit recognition of a crucial link between cultural heterogeneity and socioeconomic development. The decision approving the program highlighted the European Parliament’s call for “a better balance between the economic and cultural aspects of the Community, so that these aspects can complement and sustain each other” (EUR-Lex, 2000). More specifically, one of the program’s main objectives was to promote “explicit recognition of culture as an economic factor and as a factor in social integration and citizenship” (EUR-Lex, 2000).

This acknowledgment marked a strategic shift, positioning culture no longer just as a vague inherent value but, more precisely, as a key driver of economic growth and social cohesion. By integrating cultural heterogeneity into its broader economic vision, the European Union sought to leverage its *diversity* as a source of innovation, creativity, and unity among its member states. Culture 2000 thus laid the foundation for a more holistic approach to cultural policies – one that recognized the mutual reinforcement of cultural richness and economic vitality.

The cornerstone of this renewed European narrative for the new millennium, which, crucially, reflected the emergence of discursive frames of diversity governance at the European level, can be found in the Council of Europe's report, *Diversity and Cohesion*, authored by Jan Niessen. Published just a few months after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy and Culture 2000, this pivotal report provided a thorough review of both the European Union's and the Council of Europe's initiatives in migration governance and community relations. It clearly identified cultural heterogeneity not just as one of Europe's greatest challenges but also as a critical opportunity for socioeconomic and cultural growth.

From the outset, Niessen emphasized that addressing cultural heterogeneity raises complex questions about social cohesion, which cannot be tackled solely through art or cultural production. His report asserted that "integration of immigrants and national minorities is one of the pillars of social cohesion" (Niessen, 2000, p. 10). Recognizing that "immigrants and minorities are often depicted as groups that have and/or cause problems," Niessen claimed that societies should "learn to use and appreciate the contributions of these groups" (Niessen, 2000, p. 13).

This perspective marked a significant departure from traditional approaches that often sidelined immigrant and minority populations. Instead of viewing diversity as a challenge, Niessen urged policymakers and society at large to see it as a valuable asset capable of enriching European societies both culturally and economically. By harnessing the unique perspectives and skills of diverse groups, Europe could unlock new potential for innovation and creativity, essential to tackling future challenges.

One of the report's most groundbreaking arguments is that "acceptance of diversity and the interaction between cultures foster harmonious relations between people, enrich their lives, and provide them with creativity to respond to new challenges" (Niessen, 2000, p. 11). While the idea that the intercultural principle of interaction between cultures – a few pages later referred to as "interculturalism" (Niessen, 2000, p. 21) – could represent a pathway to social cohesion was not new in the European discourse, Niessen introduced a fresh dimension: cultural heterogeneity, far from being a barrier, could become a social asset, particularly when linked to creativity.

In other words, Niessen argued that diversity should be embraced not just as an element of a shared European identity, as traditional narratives had suggested, but because it offers substantial opportunities for socioeconomic development. By reframing diversity as a source of creativity and innovation, the report laid the groundwork for a more dynamic and inclusive approach to policymaking.

This argument resonated powerfully at a time when creativity was emerging as a key driver of socioeconomic progress in the new millennium. Creativity, tied closely to innovation, was hailed as the resource that could rejuvenate and revitalize stagnant economies. An era of “cool capitalism” (McGuigan, 2009) was on the horizon, heralded by influential ideas like the “creative economy” (Howkins, 2001), “creative capital” (Howkins, 2001), the “creative class” (Florida, 2002), and the “creative city” (Landry, 2000).

The European Union had already embraced this trend with the Lisbon Strategy, which aimed to make the EU the most successful knowledge-based economy in the world. Niessen’s report further emphasized how the European cultural narrative could be aligned with this trend, insisting on the creative potential within cultural heterogeneity. Very importantly, this alignment had the potential to represent an innovative, comprehensive approach to addressing economic stagnation, social cohesion, and cultural enrichment all at once. The report suggested that embracing diversity could cultivate new ideas, products, and services, thus driving economic progress while fostering a more inclusive society.

In essence, Niessen proposed an approach to governance of cultural heterogeneity rooted both in cultural pluralism, “which implies equality, tolerance, and non-discrimination” (Niessen, 2000, p. 11), and in interculturalism, defined as “the exchange and interaction between cultures” (Niessen, 2000, p. 21). He explicitly framed this as a key strategic dimension for European socioeconomic development. He also identified a broad array of stakeholders essential to this effort: governments at all levels, political parties, businesses, trade unions, faith communities, NGOs, artists, intellectuals, and sports organizations were all called upon to engage migrants and minorities through various strategies.

Crucially, Niessen emphasized that “good governance entails empowering immigrants and minorities to address their specific problems and valuing their contributions in responding to society’s overall challenges” (Niessen, 2000, p. 27). This approach advocated for a participatory model where diverse voices were not only included but instrumental in shaping societal solutions.

Niessen’s vision was remarkably forward-thinking, laying the foundation for many of the debates that would later shape European policy. By linking cultural heterogeneity with creativity and socioeconomic development, the report provided a blueprint for the emergence of diversity governance in at the European context. It called for moving beyond mere tolerance to active

engagement and empowerment, ensuring that all members of society contribute to and benefit from Europe's collective progress.

7.6

Early Developments and Diffusion of the European Intercultural Approach

The reframing of cultural heterogeneity as a social asset and source of creative capital was quickly embraced by the Council of Europe in its *Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, adopted at the end of 2000. Drawing directly from the European vision for socioeconomic development outlined in the Lisbon Strategy, the document affirmed that “cultural diversity has an essential economic role to play in the development of the knowledge economy” (CoE, 2000). It further stated that “cultural industries which encourage linguistic diversity and artistic expression, when reflecting genuine diversity, have a positive impact on pluralism, innovation, competitiveness, and employment” and “can stimulate creativity” (CoE, 2000). UNESCO echoed similar views in its *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* in 2001, attesting to the global diffusion of this narrative.

The further step in the evolution of the European approach to diversity governance was marked by three major developments in the early 2000s:

- The rise of islamophobia: Concerns about integrating Europe’s growing Muslim population, which had been simmering since the 1990s, escalated sharply in the early 2000s. This rise in Islamophobia was largely driven by extremist terrorist attacks, beginning with the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and subsequent incidents across Europe. The integration of Muslim communities emerged as one of the most pressing and challenging issues in addressing cultural heterogeneity within the EU.
- The rise of anti-immigrant and anti-democratic right-wing populism: During this period, public fears over immigration combined with discontent over widening socioeconomic inequalities, exacerbated by waves of economic recession and financial crises. These conditions fueled the rapid rise of right-wing populist movements across Europe. Such movements exploited episodes of ethnic rioting and civil unrest to deepen societal

polarization and rally opposition to cultural pluralism, integration policies, and democratic values.

- An unprecedented enlargement of the European union: In 2002, the EU formally approved the accession of ten new member states – Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary. The accession treaties were signed in 2003 and entered into force in 2004, marking the largest enlargement in the Union's history.

In response to these significant developments, both the European Union and the Council of Europe progressively placed diversity governance – now legitimized by a revitalized narrative – at the core of their agendas, progressively adopting intercultural dialogue as the primary framework to address these emerging challenges.

In 2002, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Education and Culture organized a conference in Brussels titled, precisely, *Intercultural Dialogue*. In its concluding declaration, the conference emphasized the shared responsibility for peace and human rights in the wake of the September 11 attacks, stating:

After the dramatic events of 11 September... the governance of peace in the region [i.e., the EU] and the respect for human rights are set within a shared responsibility. Accordingly, a policy of intercultural dialogue by the European Union needs to be adopted to make the Mediterranean region an exemplary area of common values, rooted in a shared respect of human rights, tolerance, solidarity and mutual comprehension, aware of cultural diversity and the religious dimension. (European Commission, 2002)

It is no surprise that by 2003, European institutions were heavily focused on advancing the discourse surrounding cultural heterogeneity. Two key declarations were drafted that year: the *Opatija Declaration* and the *Athens Declaration*, which addressed the two traditional dimensions of the intercultural approach – intercultural dialogue and intercultural education. These documents were clearly paving the way for a significant shift in the European approach to diversity governance, heralding the emergence of a more comprehensive and coherent European strategy on managing cultural heterogeneity.

The *Opatija Declaration* – as its title *Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention* suggests – centered on intercultural dialogue as a key tool to achieve conflict prevention, implicitly addressing concerns over the so-called *Muslim Question*. Following the example of the CoE, this document marked the first departure from the traditional narrative treating cultural heterogeneity as a problem to be addressed – this narrative was still also in the discourse of European institutions in the early

2000s, as can be seen, for instance, in the *Declaration on Cultural Diversity* adopted by the European Committee of Ministers in 2000. In particular, the *Opatija Declaration* introduced an optimistic perspective, suggesting that through “good governance in cultural policy” – which involves cooperation between governmental institutions, the private sector, and civil society – cultural heterogeneity could become “beneficial to human capital, both individual and collective, with a view to sustainable development” (European Council, 2003a, p. 7).

This reconceptualization of cultural heterogeneity in the *Opatija Declaration* echoed the positions adopted in UNESCO’s *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, which had positioned cultural heterogeneity as a “factor in development” in terms of both individual growth and broader social and economic progress (Article 3). UNESCO also stressed the importance of cultural policies (Article 9) and partnerships between public, private, and civil sectors to “guarantee the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity” (Article 11).

Meanwhile, the *Athens Declaration* also contributed to evolving the discourse around a comprehensive European approach to managing cultural heterogeneity. While the *Opatija Declaration* did not directly address the specific challenges posed by the EU’s enlargement, the *Athens Declaration* focused on the role of intercultural education in maintaining social cohesion within an expanding Europe. Crucially, this necessitated a redefinition of intercultural education to encompass objectives traditionally associated with intercultural dialogue. By framing intercultural education as a tool for “maintaining and developing the unity and diversity of our European societies” (European Council, 2003b, p. 2), the distinctions between intercultural education and intercultural dialogue began to blur. Unsurprisingly, dialogue is frequently referenced as a core component of intercultural education in the text.

Together, these declarations signaled a turning point in how European institutions approached cultural heterogeneity. They reflected a growing recognition that intercultural dialogue and education were not just complementary but intertwined, essential to fostering unity while embracing the richness of diversity within an increasingly interconnected Europe.

7.7

Towards the Year of Intercultural Dialogue: Framing a Comprehensive Intercultural Approach

At last, both the European Union and the Council of Europe were ready to embrace a pivotal shift, formalizing and presenting to the wider public the European approach to diversity governance. In 2004, the European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture, and Youth proposed dedicating the year 2008 to intercultural dialogue. This proposal was approved in 2006, and four primary objectives were established (EUR-Lex, 2006):

- 1) Promoting intercultural dialogue.
- 2) Highlighting the opportunities intercultural dialogue offers for a diverse society.
- 3) Raising awareness of the value of active citizenship.
- 4) Emphasizing the contribution diversity makes to the heritage of European Union countries.

From the outset, the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue was more than a symbolic gesture. It was seen as a vital opportunity to actively publicize intercultural dialogue as the cornerstone of the EU's approach to managing cultural heterogeneity. The language used in the supporting documents revealed a clear alignment of interests, framing intercultural dialogue as the ideal solution to many of the EU's most pressing challenges. Beyond asserting that intercultural dialogue is "essential for creating respect for cultural heterogeneity, improving coexistence in today's diverse societies, and encouraging active European citizenship," he also claimed that intercultural dialogue "reflects a number of priorities defined under the Lisbon Strategy" and "may contribute to the achievement of these economic objectives" (EUR-Lex, 2006).

By 2005, it was clear that the Lisbon Strategy had fallen short of its ambitious goals and was losing traction – critics were already labeling it a significant failure (e.g., Zgajewski & Hajjar, 2005). As the original strategy had not emphasized cultural heterogeneity, European institutions sought to reinvigorate it by incorporating a narrative that linked effective diversity governance, based on intercultural dialogue, to creativity and socioeconomic development.

In addition to elevating intercultural dialogue within the broader context of a revitalized Lisbon Strategy, the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue aimed to "increase the visibility, efficiency, and coherence of all European programs and actions that contribute to intercultural dialogue" (EUR-Lex 2006). Key initiatives included the new *Culture Programme* (which replaced Culture 2000) and the *Europe for Citizens Programme (2007-13)*, which aimed to engage citizens in the process of European integration by fostering a deeper sense of European identity. Furthermore, the European Year sought to "integrate, as far as possible, intercultural dialogue into other European policies, actions, and programs" (EUR-Lex 2006).

Meanwhile, the CoE had laid a solid foundation, continuously emphasizing the importance of intercultural dialogue and spearheading initiatives that reinforced this commitment. Following the *Diversity and Cohesion* report, the CoE's Third Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Warsaw in 2005, endorsed intercultural dialogue "as a means of ensuring that the diversity of European cultures becomes a source of mutual enrichment" (CoE, 2005a).

This momentum was further amplified at the conference *Intercultural Dialogue: The Way Ahead*, held in Faro, Portugal, which concluded with the *Faro Declaration*. This document – aptly titled *Strategy for Developing Intercultural Dialogue* – called on the CoE to craft a "political vision" on which to base its strategy for promoting intercultural dialogue (CoE, 2005b). It also outlined specific actions for implementing this strategy by leveraging the various facets of the CoE's work and its extensive networks. Among its commitments, the declaration emphasized the need for a "White Paper on integrated policies for the management of cultural diversity through intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention" (CoE, 2005b).

In this context, the long-standing, often ambiguous distinction between intercultural dialogue and intercultural education was finally clarified. For the first time, intercultural dialogue was explicitly recognized as the overarching framework guiding the European approach to cultural heterogeneity, with intercultural education acknowledged as one of its key dimensions. This resolution marked a critical step in establishing a comprehensive strategy for diversity governance within Europe, rooted in dialogue and education as tools for fostering mutual understanding and unity.

Framing a comprehensive approach built around the concept of intercultural dialogue was a strategically astute decision. First, intercultural dialogue had evolved beyond its earlier, controversial colonialist connotations, with its core now focused on promoting equality and rejecting ethnocentrism. This reframing made the concept less vulnerable to criticism and, instead, highlighted the *relational* and egalitarian nature of the European approach to diversity governance.

Furthermore, while the term *intercultural dialogue* had become normalized in European discourse, its meaning remained broad and adaptable, making it an ideal vessel for the diverse array of initiatives aimed at managing cultural heterogeneity. This flexibility allowed European institutions to unite various efforts under the inclusive banner of the intercultural ideal. Additionally, invoking the concept of dialogue reaffirmed Europe's commitment to addressing the Muslim Question. In the European context, dialogue carries with it rich connotations of peacebuilding and interreligious understanding, making it a powerful tool for emphasizing the importance of conflict prevention and fostering interfaith cooperation.

Guidelines for Inclusive, Intercultural Societies: The *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue*

Building on its newly articulated conceptual framework, the European Union and the Council of Europe initiated a series of efforts to embed intercultural dialogue at the core of European policies and societal practices. The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008 served as a pivotal moment, catalyzing a wide range of projects, events, and educational programs across member states. These were all initiatives framed under the intercultural principles of fostering mutual understanding, respect, and a shared sense of purpose among Europe's diverse populations.

A central outcome of these efforts was the recognition that intercultural dialogue is not merely a theoretical ideal but a practical necessity for achieving social cohesion, preventing conflict, and promoting human rights. By encouraging open and respectful exchanges, intercultural dialogue was positioned as an essential tool to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and the marginalization of minority groups. In this context, the Council of Europe published its landmark *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* (CoE, 2008), a document that synthesized developments in European discourse on cultural heterogeneity since 2003 while introducing a formal conceptual framework and guidelines for implementing a European approach to diversity governance.

The *White Paper* emerged from an extensive drafting process involving numerous scholars and experts and drew heavily from the emerging theoretical *interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism* debate (Section 3.9). Early in the text, the Council of Europe took a decisive stance, asserting that the previously favored policy framework of multiculturalism had proven insufficient and required a shift toward a new approach framed under the principles of *intercultural dialogue* (CoE, 2008, p. 9). Acknowledging that the term *intercultural dialogue*, despite its widespread usage, lacked a clear and consistent definition, the Council proposed the following definition:

[I]ntercultural dialogue is understood as a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. It requires the freedom and ability to express oneself, as well as the willingness and capacity to listen to the views of others. Intercultural dialogue contributes to political, social, cultural and economic integration and the cohesion of culturally diverse societies. It fosters equality, human dignity and a sense of common purpose. It aims to develop a deeper understanding of diverse world views and practices, to increase co-operation and

participation (or the freedom to make choices), to allow personal growth and transformation, and to promote tolerance and respect for the other. (CoE, 2008, p. 17)

While still broad and quite vague, this marked the first official definition of intercultural dialogue, accompanied by a detailed discussion of its scope and strategies for implementation.

The *White Paper* innovated in two critical areas of European diversity governance. First, it cemented the reconceptualization of cultural heterogeneity as a driver of socioeconomic development. Building on earlier narratives from the *Opatija Declaration* and UNESCO's 2001 *Declaration*, the *White Paper* expanded on the idea of diversity as an asset, stating, "Diversity does not only contribute to cultural vitality but can also enhance social and economic performance. Indeed, diversity, creativity, and innovation provide a virtuous circle" (CoE, 2008, 13). This narrative served as a strategic counterweight to rising right-wing populism and anti-immigrant rhetoric, while also reinvigorating the vision of European innovation and growth that had faltered after the Lisbon Strategy's failure to establish "a Europe of Innovation and Knowledge" (EUR-Lex, 2005).

Second, the White Paper recognized the pivotal role of cities and local actors in implementing the intercultural approach. While the document emphasized the responsibilities of national governments in managing cultural heterogeneity, local authorities and civil society representatives were recognized as key "stakeholders" in advancing intercultural strategies (CoE, 2008, p. 11). In particular, regional and municipal authorities, civil society organizations, migrant and religious communities, media, and social partners, were referred to as the pivotal players in advancing intercultural strategies. This recognition marked a significant shift in focus toward the local level as a key site for operationalizing intercultural dialogue.

Since 2008, intercultural dialogue has been integrated into various policy domains, including education, culture, youth, and external relations. Programs such as Erasmus+ have expanded opportunities for cross-cultural exchanges, emphasizing the importance of intercultural competencies in an increasingly interconnected world. The focus on intercultural dialogue has also shaped the EU's migration and integration policies, promoting a delicate balance between respecting diversity and fostering social cohesion. Policymakers have sought to combat discrimination, support integration, and empower marginalized communities, reflecting a nuanced approach to managing cultural identities.

The legacy of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue continues to influence European strategies for management of cultural heterogeneity at multiple levels of governance. However, the years following 2008 revealed that the primary arena for implementing intercultural approaches lies at the local level. While the *White Paper* continued emphasizing state oversight in cultural diversity governance, it is at the municipal level – particularly in urban settings – that intercultural policies are

being designed, tested, and implemented. Cities have emerged as central actors in advancing and executing Europe's vision for cultural diversity management. By fostering collaborative strategies and engaging with diverse stakeholders, urban centers have become the driving force behind the evolution of intercultural dialogue and diversity governance in Europe.

7.9

Behind the *Intercultural City*: The Think Tank Comedia and the *Creative City*

Successful cities of the future will be intercultural. They will be capable of managing and exploring the potential of their cultural diversity, to stimulate creativity and innovation and thus to generate economic prosperity, community cohesion and a better quality of life. (CoE, 2008, p. 43)

The *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* was particularly forward-looking in identifying cities as a key dimension for the implementation of the European intercultural approach. As we can read in the above-quoted passage, the vision of the *intercultural city* delineated by the Council of Europe presents a context capable to reframe cultural heterogeneity in terms of “creativity,” “innovation,” “prosperity,” “community cohesion,” and a “better quality of life.” In this context, the Council of Europe briefly mentioned the intention to launch a project related to intercultural cities by the end of 2008, aimed at helping cities “excel as spaces of intercultural dialogue, through peer review and the exchange of good practice on governance, media, mediation and cultural policy” (CoE, 2008, p. 43). This is, of course, the pilot project that laid the foundation of the current ICC Programme (Section 5.3), which would have soon emerged as a major force in diffusing and implementing the intercultural approach throughout Europe.

At this point, a question may naturally arise: Where does this vision of the intercultural city come from? To be sure, it is not surprising the fact that the Council of Europe mentioned the cities among the crucial stakeholders for diversity governance. However, this emphasis on cities, and, most of all, the vision of the intercultural city represented a relevant innovation in the European discourse on diversity governance.

The concept of the intercultural city has a specific origin⁴⁶: it was developed by *Comedia*, a UK-based think tank, publisher, and consultancy founded in 1978 by Charles Landry, best known for his influential framework of the *creative city* (Landry, 2000). In fact, the idea of the intercultural city was initially conceived by Comedia's researchers precisely as one of the dimensions of the creative city. To fully understand the development and spread of the intercultural city concept, we must first explore the creative city ideal that underpins it.

The concept of the *creative city* emerged in response emerged in the context of the economic and political restructuring that accompanied the acceleration of globalization in the late 20th century (Segovia & Hervé, 2022). Following the decline of the Fordist economic model and the transition to a post-industrial society, marked by a shift from goods to services (Bell, 1976) and the expansion of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Biebricher, 2018), cities were compelled to rethink their role and future in this new landscape. The United Kingdom, particularly affected by the offshoring of industrial production, saw “urban decline” become a central issue in public discourse (Cheshire & Hay, 1989). Thus, it is no surprise that the UK became a key player in reimagining the potential of urban environments (Segovia & Hervé, 2022).

In this context, Comedia emerged as one of the most influential think tanks on urban revitalization. Originally, Comedia's mission – as reflected in its name, which is a combination of the words *communication* and *media* – was to explore how people and organizations create and disseminate narratives and visions. However, this focus naturally shifted toward urban environments, specifically examining how cities and their citizens could actively shape the future of human social life at the local level. From here, the idea began to take hold that cities could realize their potential and regain prominence on the global stage through *creativity*, understood as a renewed dynamism fueled by culture and innovation.

Underlying the creative city vision was the widespread belief that economic growth is essential for social welfare (Cochrane, 2004). More controversially, it also rested on the conviction that cultural policies and cultural development could be powerful drivers of such growth (see, for example, Belfiore, 2004).

Before becoming a theoretical framework for urban development, the concept of the creative city first emerged as an operational idea. Comedia introduced it during the urban transformation of Glasgow, which had been designated the 1990 European City of Culture. As a consultant for the project, Comedia crafted a strategic plan that reimagined Glasgow as a city capable of creatively turning its weaknesses into strengths. The resulting document, *Making the Most of Glasgow's Cultural Assets: The Creative City and Its Cultural Economy* (Comedia, 1991), reflected this vision.

⁴⁶ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/origins-of-the-intercultural-concept>.

It was not long before Comedia recognized the broader potential of the creative city concept. The idea became a synthesis of various analyses and practical experiments across Europe, all of which sought to link development and culture at the city level. By then, a focus on urban creativity had already emerged in both academic circles and among other European organizations. For example, the German cultural policy consultancy STADTart, which would eventually collaborate with Comedia, shared this emphasis on the role of creativity in addressing urban challenges. The discourse was gradually shifting from merely recognizing culture as an asset for addressing urban decline to viewing it as a dynamic force that permeates all aspects of urban life. Creativity began to take center stage in debates about the future of cities (Segovia & Hervé, 2022, p. 5).

Drawing on this widespread theoretical and empirical groundwork, Comedia proposed an initial conceptualization of the creative city in a short book published in 1995 (Landry & Bianchini, 1995). However, the concept did not gain widespread attention until a few years later, when Charles Landry presented a more developed and cohesive version of the idea in his influential book, *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators* (Landry, 2000). Despite its success, Landry's proposal attracted some criticism, particularly for its overly optimistic tone, its corporate language emphasizing economic reasoning, and its entrepreneurial rhetoric surrounding the creative sector. It was also somewhat overshadowed by Richard Florida's *creative class theory* a few years later (Florida, 2002). However, these critiques are beyond the scope of this discussion. What is important here is that Landry's ideas found significant resonance within contemporary discussions on urban policy.

In 2001, UNESCO formally adopted the underlying principles of Landry's framework in its *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* (2001). The declaration emphasized creativity as a key concept, reaffirming that culture is central to the development of a "knowledge-based economy" and should be understood not only in terms of economic growth but also as a way to achieve "a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral, and spiritual existence" (Article 3). Moreover, UNESCO acknowledged cultural heritage as the "wellspring of creativity" (Article 7) and recognized cultural policies as catalysts for creativity (Article 9). The declaration also provided operational guidelines for strengthening cultural creation and dissemination worldwide, particularly through partnerships between the public and private sectors, as well as civil society.

To implement these ideas, UNESCO launched the *Global Alliance for Cultural Diversity* in 2002, followed by the creation of the *UNESCO Creative Cities Network* (UCCN) in Edinburgh in 2004. Cities joining this network commit to placing creativity and cultural industries at the heart of their local development plans and to actively cooperating at the international level. While the network grew gradually in its first decade, it witnessed a sudden surge of new memberships since 2014. Indeed, in just one year the number of members nearly doubled, rising from 41 cities at the beginning of 2014

to 69 in 2015. The number has continued to climb rapidly totalizing, in 2023, more than 300 members from about 90 different countries.

UNESCO's enthusiasm for reconceptualizing culture and recognizing the centrality of creativity, along with the rapid expansion of the Creative Cities Network, demonstrates the global influence of Landry's ideas. Meanwhile, the discourse surrounding the creative city continued to evolve, incorporating new dimensions such as sustainability, human rights, and social inclusion – elements already present in the early stages of the concept. This evolution is reflected in recent global agendas, such as the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, which is the first international framework to explicitly recognize culture's role in fostering economic growth while simultaneously addressing inequality, protecting the environment, promoting gender equality, and building peaceful, inclusive societies (Mechtild, 2018).

The concept of the *intercultural city* was included as an integral aspect of the creative city framework since its earliest formulation in 1995. At this initial stage, the intercultural city was envisioned as the local dimension within the creative city where diverse cultures could interact, leading to the emergence of hybrid identities (Landry & Bianchini, 1995, p. 29-30).

This idea was further developed in Landry's 2000 articulation of the creative city, where a section is dedicated to exploring the role of creativity in fostering an intercultural way of living (Landry, 2000, pp. 264-265). Recognizing that most cities are either already culturally diverse or destined to become so, Landry advocated for moving beyond traditional multiculturalism and embracing interculturalism. He argued that interculturalism “builds bridges, fosters cohesion and reconciliation, and produces something new from the multi-cultural patchwork of our cities” (Landry & Bianchini, 1995, p. 264).

This forward-thinking call for interculturalism anticipated and, at the same time, influenced the growing discourse on the limitations of multiculturalism and the push toward recognizing interculturalism as the ultimate, effective approach to diversity and inclusion. Over the following years, this shift gained traction in both academic and political discourse.

7.10

Contextualizing the Origins of the *Intercultural City*: The Challenges of Cultural Heterogeneity in the UK

It is hardly surprising that, as early as the 1990s, a UK-based organization was advocating for moving beyond multiculturalism and embracing more innovative approaches to managing cultural heterogeneity. By this time, cultural differences had become a central issue in British political discourse, especially following nearly two decades of Conservative Party rule under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1992), and later John Major (1992-1997).

By the early 1980s, the UK had – at least at the level of its official discourse – moved away from assimilationist approaches to cultural differences to embrace the principles of cultural pluralism under the banner of *multiculturalism*. However, under Thatcher’s government, the recognition and promotion of cultural differences were largely restricted to the education sector and focused on superficial aspects of ethnic folklore – often criticized as “multiculturalism of the 3Ss” (saris, samosas, and steel bands) (e.g., Alibhai-Brown, 2000, p. 17). Notably, the Conservative Party sought to disengage discussions of cultural differences from issues related to racism and the struggles for minority rights. In this *deracialized* version, multiculturalism had the effect of diverting attention away from the power dynamics and historical legacies shaping relationships between cultural groups (see Mullard, 1984, p. 12; Grinter, 1990, p. 212; Modood & May, 2001, p. 308).

Critics argued that multiculturalism during Thatcher’s era was ultimately used to undermine the growing anti-racist movements of the 1970s by creating opposition between multicultural and anti-racist agendas. In this way, the government could apply the classic *divide et impera* strategy. This deracialized version of multiculturalism created what scholars call a “Janus-faced” approach (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2017): on the one hand, superficially celebrating *internal* cultural heterogeneity, recognizing and promoting the cultural differences of *national* minorities, while on the other hand, maintaining anti-immigrant stances, including restrictive migration policies and racially discriminatory practices. Ultimately, beneath the veneer of a progressive multicultural Britain, the message to marginalized cultural minorities was clear: assimilation into the dominant culture was the only viable path.

The growing backlash against the Conservative approach to cultural differences helped politicize the issue further. The Labour Party, particularly during Thatcher’s time, developed an oppositional discourse in response to the Conservatives’ narrow and deracialized multiculturalism. With local control over education and housing, Labour engaged in anti-racist activism, amplifying minority voices and supporting their demands. This set the stage for a significant shift when, on May 2, 1997, the Labour Party, led by Tony Blair, secured a landslide victory, ending 18 years of Conservative

rule. This marked the beginning of a new era in British politics, including a rethinking of the approach to managing cultural heterogeneity.

Blair's leadership, beginning in 1994, had already initiated a profound transformation of the Labour Party, rebranding it as *New Labour*. Inspired by the US New Democrats and Third Way politics (see Giddens, 1998), New Labour shifted from traditional socialism toward social liberalism, reframing the party's core objective of equality as social justice – centered on equal rights and opportunities within a market economy (see Beech, 2006). Within this new ideological framework, the management of cultural heterogeneity took on a crucial role in the party's agenda. During its 13 years in government, Labour put a strong focus on issues related to racial discrimination, minority relations, and immigration.

One of the first tests for the New Labour government came just three months after its establishment. The government commissioned Sir William Macpherson, a retired High Court judge, to reopen the investigation into the infamous case of Stephen Lawrence, a Black British teenager murdered in a racially motivated attack in 1993. The case, initially closed in 1997 without convictions due to insufficient evidence, had sparked widespread public outrage. The inquiry led to the 1999 Macpherson Report, which exposed institutional racism within the Metropolitan Police and other organizations, marking a watershed moment for race relations in Britain. The report resulted in sweeping changes in law enforcement and the legal treatment of racist crimes, including the partial revocation of the double jeopardy rule⁴⁷, which eventually led to the conviction of two of Lawrence's murderers.

This “multicultural moment” culminated in the government's commitment to creating a more inclusive Britain, where “every color is a good color,” racial diversity is celebrated, and everyone is treated with equality (Meer & Modood, 2019). The peak of this commitment came in 2000 with the publication of *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* (Parekh, 2000), authored by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB), chaired by Bhikhu Parekh. However, a series of events soon led to a backlash against multiculturalism and a reevaluation of how the country managed cultural heterogeneity.

The real turning point for New Labour's multicultural policies came with the Bradford riots in July 2001. Bradford, home to one of the UK's largest South Asian populations, was the site of violent confrontations between far-right activists, anti-racist protesters, and local Muslim youth. The government's immediate response was to place the blame on the rioters, particularly the South Asian Muslim youth, framing the violence as a consequence of their refusal to integrate into British society. There was a notable reluctance to address deeper issues such as racism and social deprivation. Instead,

⁴⁷ The normative principle preventing an accused person from being tried again on the same (or similar) charges.

the narrative that emerged from New Labour's representatives – including members of ethnic minorities – focused on criminalizing the South Asian communities for their failure to assimilate (see, for example, Bagguley & Hussein, 2005; Curran-Vigier, 2008).

This narrative was further reinforced by two government-commissioned reports. First, the *Ouseley Report*, released just one day after the riots, highlighted racial segregation in Bradford, pointing to Asian gangs as part of the problem and accusing Muslim communities of tolerating criminal behavior to preserve traditional ways of life. A broader investigation by Ted Cante, known as the *Cante Report* (Cante, 2001), extended these findings to other areas of Britain, describing ethnic polarization and self-segregation in urban centers – resulting into “a series of parallel lives” (Cante, 2001, p. 9) – as contributing factors to social unrest. Mobilizing conceptual tools typical of communitarian and Third Way political discourses, the report advocated for the ideal of *community cohesion*, conceived as an approach to inclusion and pluralism whereby diversity is promoted within the framework of a basic system of shared values considered basic and non-negotiable.

These developments marked a turning point in Britain's approach to cultural heterogeneity. Multiculturalism, once a hallmark of progressive governance, was now viewed with growing skepticism, and the challenges of integrating a diverse society became a central focus of political debate. The growing concern over parallel societies resulting from cultural segregation—often framed as self-segregation – and the need to address it through community cohesion sparked a major rethinking of Britain's approach to cultural heterogeneity. This discourse quickly became part of a broader European critique of multiculturalism and the progressive emergence of diversity governance.

7.11

Framing the *Intercultural City* as the European Ideal of Diversity Governance

As cities increasingly became focal points for addressing diversity and interest in interculturalism as a novel approach started gaining momentum in the Europe context, Comedia found fertile ground to expand its early ideas on the role and potential of diversity in urban spaces. In 2004, Phil Wood, a key member of Comedia, spearheaded a research initiative within the think tank aimed at developing a comprehensive framework for the concept of the *intercultural city*. This project sought to establish

both theoretical and empirical foundations for reimagining how cultural heterogeneity could be managed in cities – not as a problem, but as an opportunity. The publication of two seminal volumes, *The Intercultural City: A Reader* (Wood, 2004) and *Planning for the Intercultural City* (Bloomfield & Bianchini, 2004), positioned Comedia at the forefront of discussions on urban diversity and drew the attention of the influential Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

The Joseph Rowntree Foundation, a prominent force in shaping political and social reform in the UK, had already garnered recognition in 1988 when it was named by the Conservative government as a significant supporter of the Labour Party (Davies, 2004). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the foundation played a pivotal role in driving Labour's ideological evolution, shaping policy narratives, and influencing legislative efforts after Labour's 1997 electoral victory (Anheier & Leat, 2002; Davies, 2004). During a period when New Labour and many European governments were revisiting their narratives on cultural heterogeneity, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation became actively engaged in shaping these discussions.

Having supported several of Comedia's earlier initiatives, the foundation recognized the transformative potential of positioning cities as drivers of social innovation. By framing cultural heterogeneity as a valuable asset, cities could evolve into laboratories for inclusion. From the foundation's perspective, Comedia was uniquely equipped to articulate a compelling narrative and offer actionable policy proposals to harness the benefits of cultural heterogeneity at the urban level and advancing discourses about diversity.

In 2005, with the Joseph Rowntree Foundation's generous support, Comedia launched the international project *The Intercultural City: Making the Most of Diversity*. Through an extensive series of case studies spanning multiple countries, the project explored how cultural heterogeneity could catalyze innovation, creativity, and social cohesion. The initiative aimed to provide clear, practical guidelines for policymakers and civil society actors to foster intercultural cities. Over the next two years, this work generated a wealth of research and publications, culminating in the 2008 release of *The Intercultural City: Planning for Diversity Advantage* (Wood & Landry, 2008), which synthesized and systematized the project's findings.

The evolution of Comedia's work since 2005 coincided precisely with the critical period during which the European Union and the Council of Europe were actively refining the intercultural approach. As part of the planning of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, these institutions were precisely looking for operational frameworks to translate the principles of interculturalism into practical strategies and policies. It was not long before the Council of Europe recognized Comedia's contributions as a powerful means to ground the intercultural approach in actionable practices, facilitating its implementation at the local level.

The opportunity for active collaboration between the Council of Europe and the Comedia group came with a European Union funding call for projects aimed at implementing intercultural practices. With a recommendation from Robert Palmer, then Director of Culture at the Council of Europe, Irena Guidikova, head of the Division of Cultural Policy, Diversity, and Dialogue, started engaging with Comedia experts – particularly Phil Wood – to submit a proposal for the call. The proposed project aimed to build on Comedia’s foundational work, exploring “the potential of an intercultural approach to integration in communities with culturally diverse populations and offering methodological support to cities willing to implement the intercultural integration model proposed” (European Commission, 2008).

The proposal was successful, securing funding to launch the one-year pilot project *Inter-Cultural Cities* at the end of 2008. This initiative was presented as a flagship project for the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The project was framed around an idealized definition of an intercultural city, developed from Comedia’s earlier conceptualizations:

The intercultural city has a diverse population including people with different nationalities, origins, languages or religions/beliefs. Most citizens regard diversity as a resource, not as a problem, and accept that all cultures change as they encounter each other in the public space. The city officials publicly advocate respect for diversity and a pluralistic city identity. The city actively combats prejudice and discrimination and ensures equal opportunities for all by adapting its governance structures, institutions and services to the needs of a diverse population, without compromising the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In partnership with business, civil society and public service professionals, the inter- cultural city develops a range of policies and actions to encourage greater mixing and interaction between diverse groups. The high level of trust and social cohesion help to prevent conflicts and violence, increase policy effectiveness and make the city attractive for people and investors alike. (Wood, 2009, p. 17)

The pilot project’s primary goal was to test analytical tools developed during Comedia’s 2005-2008 initiatives, particularly a policy assessment framework known as the *Ten Steps to an Intercultural City* designed to analyze and reconsider city governance systems through an *intercultural lens* (Wood, 2009, p. 20). Central to the framework was a comprehensive grid of *intercultural indicators* that incorporated: (a) *objective data*, consisting of measurable factors such as demographic composition, institutional structures (e.g., laws and governance frameworks), and social characteristics obtained through surveys and questionnaires; and (b) *subjective data*, which captured citizens’ opinions and perceptions concerning diversity and interpersonal interaction with diverse people in their urban spaces. The aim was to use these data sources were supposed to get a nuanced understanding of the effectiveness of intercultural policies and their capacity to foster inclusive urban communities.

A cohort of eleven cities⁴⁸ both from EU and non-EU Council of Europe member states, participated in the pilot. Between 2008 and 2009, the project made significant strides in creating and validating a comprehensive methodology to guide local authorities in designing and implementing intercultural policies and strategies. The outcomes of this work were documented in a *Final Report* by the Council of Europe and in Phil Wood's publication *Intercultural Cities: Towards a Model for Intercultural Integration* (2009).

The pilot's most notable achievement was the development of principles and criteria that placed intercultural dialogue at the core of diversity management. These principles were synthesized into the Intercultural Cities Index (ICC-Index) (Section 5.3, p. 118), which became a shared framework for analyzing city policies through an intercultural perspective. The ICC-Index indicators were refined through an in-depth review of existing practices among pilot cities and tested collaboratively with local governments. This participatory process engaged policymakers, experts, and practitioners, ensuring the tools were both theoretically robust and practically applicable.

Another significant outcome of the pilot was the establishment of a network of experts dedicated to supporting cities in adopting intercultural diversity management principles. This network provided municipalities with the expertise needed to translate theoretical frameworks into actionable strategies. It also institutionalized the practice of ICC expert visits, enabling cities to receive tailored guidance as they implemented the principles of intercultural governance. This initiative laid a solid foundation for expanding the intercultural approach across Europe and beyond, ensuring its sustainability and continued evolution.

After the publication of the pilot project's results, the initiative was extended as a long-term program. Initially co-funded by the Council of Europe and the European Union, it has been solely supported by the Council of Europe since 2015. The concept of the *intercultural city* was re-articulated around three core, interconnected principles that public authorities – in partnership with civil society organizations and businesses – ought to embrace and actively promote in order to foster inclusive and cohesive communities:

- *Equality*: Ensuring non-discrimination while adapting governance, institutions, and public services to meet the needs of diverse populations.
- *Diversity*: Advocating for cultural pluralism and framing cultural heterogeneity as a resource for resilience, creativity, and innovation.
- *Interaction*: Encouraging meaningful, positive contact between diverse individuals to break down barriers and foster mutual understanding.

⁴⁸ Namely, Berlin-Neukölln (Germany), Izhevsk (Russian Federation), Lublin (Poland), Lyon (France), Melitopol (Ukraine), Neuchâtel (Switzerland), Oslo (Norway), Patras (Greece), Reggio Emilia (Italy), Subotica (Serbia), Tilburg (the Netherlands).

In 2023, after a thorough review by experts and staff within the ICC Programme, a fourth principle was officially added: *Participation*. This principle emphasizes active and substantive citizenship, ensuring that everyone, including those without formal citizenship, has a voice in shaping their local communities.

Since its official long-term launch in 2010, the ICC Programme has become a leading platform for developing and promoting European discourse on diversity governance and implementing related policies and practices. It has also established itself as the principal network for cities committed to advancing diversity governance. The network's growth has been significant, surpassing 100 member cities within a few years. The majority of ICC member cities remain European, largely due to the logistical and cultural proximity that facilitates the Council of Europe's outreach efforts. Additionally, many European cities see the network as an opportunity to build partnerships and access European funding for diversity governance initiatives.

Today, the intercultural city is championed by both the Council of Europe and the European Union as the ideal European model for diversity governance. It serves as the practical embodiment of interculturalism in the political and social spheres, offering a framework for creating innovative, sustainable, and inclusive communities towards an increasingly diverse future.

CHAPTER 8

Government and Governance in Spain

8.1

Baptizing Spain: History of a Complex Peninsular Identity

Spain, formally known as the *Reino de España* (Kingdom of Spain), stands as the largest country in Southern Europe. With a population of 48,946,035 as of 2024⁴⁹, it is also the fourth-most populous member of the European Union, following Germany, France, and Italy. Its territory spans most of the Iberian Peninsula and extends to the Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean, the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean Sea, and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa.

The origins of the name *España*, along with the more ancient name *Iberia* – still used to refer to the peninsula that now includes Spain and Portugal –, remain the subject of various debates. The term *Iberia* is closely tied to the Ebro, Spain's largest river, though the etymology of the river's name itself is uncertain. A widely accepted theory suggests its origin lies in the root *iber-/ibar-*, meaning *river* in the language of early civilizations inhabiting the peninsula's eastern and southern regions during the 1st millennium BCE⁵⁰. The diffusion of the term is attributed to Greek colonists, who began settling along the northern Mediterranean coast between the 8th and 7th centuries BCE. The Greeks adopted the term and used it broadly, referring to the entire peninsula as *Iberia* and its inhabitants as *Iberians*. Over time, this nomenclature spread and was embraced by other Mediterranean peoples, progressively embedding itself in the region's historical identity.

The origins of *España* may also have roots in the Iberian language. One theory suggests it derives from the word *izpanna*, meaning *edge* or *border*, referring to the peninsula's position at the westernmost limits of the known ancient world, bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and the

⁴⁹ <https://www.ine.es/dyngs/Prensa/en/ECP3T24.htm>.

⁵⁰ This root is present also in the contemporary Basque language.

Mediterranean Sea. Another interpretation ties it to the word *hispalis*, meaning *Western city*, which may have initially described a principal settlement before being extended to encompass the entire territory.

Mythology has traditionally enriched the debate surrounding the origins of Spain's name. Ancient writers frequently connected the name to the myths of the Greek hero Heracles, who was believed to have ventured to the western edges of the known world – the westernmost reaches, identified with the Strait of Gibraltar, still commemorate his journey, with the promontories flanking the strait famously known as the Pillars of Hercules⁵¹. Some legends suggest that the hypothetical city of *Hispalis* and the name *Hispania* were connected to the name of two mythical kings, Hispalo and his son Hispano, who were said to be descendants of Heracles. Others trace the name *Hispania* to the Greek word *hēspēros*, meaning the *evening star* which appears in the western sky, thus symbolizing the west. This interpretation aligns with the mythological Garden of the Hesperides, a paradisiacal realm at the western edge of the world that Heracles was said to have visited during his legendary labors. Through this mythological lens, the Iberian Peninsula would have come to be identified as *Hesperia*, a term that eventually evolved into Hispania.

More recent studies point to Phoenician influences in the name *España*, reflecting the impact of their colonization along the Iberian Peninsula's Mediterranean coast, which began in the 1st millennium BCE and peaked between the 6th and 3rd centuries. One popular theory posits that the Phoenicians mistook the region's abundant rabbits for hyraxes – small mammals native to the Middle East and North Africa – and named the area *I-shapan-im*, meaning *land of the hyraxes*. Another interpretation ties the name to the Phoenician word *span*, associated with metalworking. In this view, the Phoenicians referred to the territory as *I-span-ya*, that is, the *land where metals are forged*, referring to the mineral wealth of the peninsula (Cunchillos & Zamora, 1997).

Some scholars have sought to harmonize mythological and linguistic interpretations. One particularly compelling idea suggests that España might originate from the name of the Semitic deity *Baal Sapanu* (*B'l Spn*), meaning *Lord of Sapanu*. Sapanu referred to a mythical mountain associated with the symbolic north. According to this theory, the Phoenicians imported the belief of Baal Sapanu to their colonies in southern Iberia, where Sapanu gradually became a way to describe the unexplored northern regions of the peninsula. Over time, the term expanded to encompass the entire region, ultimately giving rise to the name *España* (Gascón, 2002).

Regardless of its precise origins, the name used by the Phoenicians for the Iberian Peninsula would eventually be transformed through the course of Roman conquest. Indeed, Phoenician expansion in the Mediterranean eventually clashed with the growing dominance of the Roman Republic, leading

⁵¹ Hercules is the Latin name of the Greek Heracles.

to a series of armed conflicts. The First Punic⁵² War (264–241 BCE) resulted in the defeat of the Phoenicians and the loss of their territories in Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica to Rome. In response, the Phoenicians turned their focus to the Iberian Peninsula, expanding their dominion there and using it as a strategic base to launch another war against Rome in 218 BCE. However, the Second Punic War (218–201 BCE) ended in another catastrophic defeat for the Phoenicians, marking the definitive fall of their civilization. By 206 BCE, the Romans had expelled the Phoenicians from the Iberian Peninsula and swiftly completed their conquest of its Mediterranean territories. The name used by the Phoenicians for the peninsula was adopted and Latinized by the Romans into *Hispania*, the direct precursor of the modern name *España*. This term was subsequently used to define the Roman provinces established in the region.

Following the Phoenicians' defeat, Roman influence steadily expanded across the Iberian Peninsula, initiating a systematic process of *romanization* among the indigenous populations. This transformation, which unfolded over centuries, saw the widespread adoption of the Latin language, Roman customs, and integration into the Roman economic system. By the end of the 2nd century BCE, these cultural and societal shifts had taken root, reshaping the social fabric of the region (for details, see Curchin, 2003). The Romans completed their conquest of the peninsula in 19 BCE, with the subjugation of the northern territories, marking the full incorporation of Iberia into the Roman Empire following the transition from republic to imperial rule.

As the Roman Empire began its gradual decline during the 3rd, 4th, and 5th centuries CE, instability spread across its territories, including Hispania. In 406 CE, Germanic tribes – the Vandals, Suevi, and Alans – breached the northern borders of the Empire. They advanced into Roman lands, eventually crossing the Pyrenees and occupying large areas of central and western Hispania.

A few years later, the Visigoths entered Roman territories, marking a significant shift in the power dynamics of the Western Empire. After sacking Rome in 410 CE, they continued their westward expansion and established a kingdom centered in Toulouse, located in present-day France. From this base, the Visigoths embarked on a gradual conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. By the mid-5th century, they had decisively defeated the Vandals and Alans, driving these groups into North Africa. In 584 CE, they also overcame the Suevi, who had established a kingdom in the regions now corresponding to Galicia and northern Portugal. With this victory, the Visigoths succeeded in unifying the Iberian Peninsula under their rule. Their capital was initially relocated from Toulouse to Barcelona (507–542) before being permanently established in Toledo.

⁵² The name *Punic* originates from the Latin term *Poenus*, which itself is derived from the earlier Greek term *Phoinix*, the root of the contemporary name Phoenician. The Romans used *Poenus* specifically to refer to the Carthaginians, a Phoenician people who established a powerful civilization in North Africa between the 9th and 3rd century BCE.

Some historians have identified the Visigothic Kingdom as the earliest vestige of an independent Spain (Payne, 2011, p. 43). This notion is particularly tied to the conversion of King Recaredo I to Catholicism in 587, an event that marked the introduction of the ideal of a Catholic Christian monarchy within the territory – an ideal that would later become a cornerstone in shaping the identity of the future Spanish nation. By the 7th century, the role of the ruler had undergone profound sacralization, elevating the Visigothic king beyond the status of a mere earthly sovereign. Notably, the Visigothic monarch was the first Western ruler to receive a royal anointing upon coronation, symbolizing divine sanction. However, the kingdom's attempts to establish lasting political unity were undermined by persistent aristocratic rivalries. Efforts by church leaders and others to formalize succession through constitutional mechanisms – creating one of the most advanced systems of its time – ultimately failed. This internal instability contributed to the Visigothic Kingdom's rapid collapse at the start of the 8th century.

In 711, Tariq ibn Ziyad, a Muslim Berber governor under the Umayyad Caliphate, entered the Iberian Peninsula with his army, landing at the base of a mountain that would forever bear his name: Gibraltar (from *Jabal Tariq*, that is, *Mount of Tariq*). Facing little resistance, Tariq swiftly advanced, capturing much of southern Spain and taking the Visigothic capital, Toledo. The Muslim conquest continued apace, and, by 716, most of the Iberian Peninsula was under Islamic rule. The new rulers named their territory *Al-Andalus*, a name that endures today in the southern region of Andalusia.

The origins of the name *Al-Andalus* remain also widely debated (see González, 2004; García-Sanjuán, 2017; Molins, 2021). One early theory, originating from the 13th-century chronicle *De Rebus Hispaniae*, suggested that Al-Andalus derived from *Vandalusia*, a Latinized term referencing the Vandals, who briefly occupied the region before their defeat by the Visigoths. However, linguistic and historical evidence has since discredited this theory. Other interpretations propose that *Andalus* was used to signify *the West* and may have derived from the Greek term *Atlantis*, referring to the mythological island of Atlantis, believed to have dominated the Western world before its fabled submersion (Vallvé, 1986). Another possibility links the term to the Coptic words *emender/lēs*⁵³, meaning *southwest* (Corriente, 2008). Yet, early Islamic texts provide no clear substantiation for these theories. Alternatively, some scholars propose a Germanic origin, tying Al-Andalus to terms like *landlose* (landless) to refer to the Germanic tribes that settled in the peninsula (Molins, 2021, p. 831), or *landahlauts* (land allotments), potentially reflecting the name Visigothic used for territorial divisions (Molins, 2021, p. 830).

⁵³ According to this theory Arabs would have heard as *am/andalīs* and, most of them being of Yemeni origin, would have identified *am* as an article, using it under the form *al/andalīs*.

For over four centuries, Al-Andalus defined the reality of the Iberian Peninsula. Yet, despite the rapid Muslim expansion, one Visigothic stronghold had managed to resist the conquest. In 718, Pelagius, a Visigothic nobleman, led a rebellion in Asturias and achieved a decisive victory over Muslim forces at the Battle of Covadonga. This triumph is traditionally regarded as the beginning of the *Reconquista*, the centuries-long campaign by Christian forces to reclaim the Iberian Peninsula. Over the next seven centuries, the region became a stage for nearly constant conflict, as Muslim rulers and an evolving network of Christian polities vied for dominance. While the Christian kingdoms often united against their Islamic adversaries, they were also competitors, locked in complicated struggles for power and territory.

By the 13th century, most of these Christian realms – except the Kingdoms of Portugal and Navarre – had been incorporated under the dominance of either the Kingdom of Castile or the Kingdom of Aragon. These two powerful entities laid the foundations for the complex political systems known as the Crown of Castile and the Crown of Aragon. Together, they would play a pivotal role in shaping the peninsula's subsequent history and guiding the gradual emergence of the Spanish nation.

During this medieval period, Christian elites began to refer to these realms collectively as part of a broader entity called *España* and to its inhabitants as *españoles* (for details, see Payne, 2011, pp. 93-97). Derived from the Latin *Hispania*, the term appeared in various spellings – *Espanha*, *Espanya*, and others – reflecting the emergence of vernacular languages. Chronicles of the time often described the rulers of these territories collectively as *reges Hispaniae* (kings of Spain), and phrases like *toda España* (all of Spain) highlighted a nascent sense of unity, albeit within a fragmented political landscape. Interestingly, the term *las Españas* (the Spains) also came into frequent use during this era. This pluralistic label, emphasizing the diverse yet interconnected nature of the peninsula's identity, persisted well into the 18th century.

This evolving sense of shared identity among the Christian kingdoms was also reflected in the ambitions of rulers from Asturias, León, and Castile, who sought to assert hegemony over the entire peninsula. Although true unification would not occur for several centuries, these early aspirations laid the foundation for the eventual emergence of a unified Spain, shaped by a rich interplay of cultural, religious, and political influences.

8.2

The Vicissitude of *Las Españas* and the Emergence of the Spanish Nation

A pivotal moment in Spanish history occurred in 1212, marking a turning point in both the *Reconquista* and the broader political trajectory of the Iberian Peninsula. In that year, the peninsula's major Christian powers – the Crowns of Castile and Aragon, and the Kingdoms of Portugal and Navarre – joined forces and decisively defeated the Muslim army at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. This victory triggered an unprecedented wave of Christian conquests, which, by the close of the 13th century, had reduced Muslim rule in the peninsula to the Emirate of Granada. These campaigns significantly expanded the territories of Portugal and the Crown of Aragon, but it was the Crown of Castile that gained the most, solidifying its growing hegemony across the peninsula.

A defining event for the emergence of a Spanish nation came two centuries later with the death of Castilian King Henry IV in 1474. His passing ignited a fierce war of succession between his daughter Joana, supported by Portugal and France, and his half-sister Isabella, who, in 1469, had secretly married Ferdinand II, heir to the Crown of Aragon. The conflict concluded in 1479 with Isabella's coronation as Queen of Castile. This victory not only secured her reign but also established a dynastic union between the Crowns of Castile and Aragon. Though the two kingdoms retained separate laws and institutions until 1707, their union laid the foundation for the eventual creation of the Spanish Empire.

Under the unified rule of Isabella and Ferdinand, later known as the *Catholic Monarchs* (*Reyes Católicos*) – a title originally bestowed by Pope Alexander VI in 1493 – the final chapter of the *Reconquista* unfolded. In 1492, they defeated the Emirate of Granada, the last bastion of Islamic rule, annexing its territory to Castile. Their reign also oversaw significant territorial expansion, including the completion of the conquest of the Canary Islands, the establishment of colonies in North Africa stretching from Morocco's Atlantic coast to Tripoli in Libya, and a war against the Kingdom of Navarre, culminating in its annexation in 1515. The Basque territories – neighboring Navarre – had already aligned with the Crowns at the end of the 15th century, pledging allegiance to Isabella in exchange for advantageous terms in overseas trade. Concurrently, colonization efforts began in the New World, marking the start of Spain's global empire.

During this period, the concept of a unified Spanish identity began to take shape, reflecting the growing political and cultural consolidation under the Catholic Monarchs. Writers in Castile and occasionally in Aragon referred to *la nación de España* (*the Spanish nation*), though the more prevalent term was *la Monarquía Hispánica* (*the Hispanic Monarchy*) (Payne, 2011, p. 105).

After Isabella's death in 1504 and Ferdinand's in 1516, their grandson Charles ascended to the thrones of both Castile and Aragon. Charles, the son of Joana (*the Mad*) and Philip of Habsburg (*the Handsome*), inherited not only the unified crowns of Castile and Aragon but also extensive Habsburg territories, including the Netherlands, Franche-Comté, and parts of Germany. In 1519, he was elected Holy Roman Emperor, becoming Charles V, and emerged as the most powerful figure in Christendom. Under his reign, the unified Spanish crowns became the nucleus of a vast empire that extended across Europe and into the Americas, solidifying Spain's position as a dominant global power.

In the following decades, Spanish settlers expanded their reach across territories now known as Mexico, Florida, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. At the same time, a new wave of colonization began in the Philippines, extending Spain's influence into Asia. Through the marriage of Charles V's son Philip to Isabella, the daughter of the King of Portugal, Charles secured the eventual unification of the Iberian crowns under Philip, inaugurating the so-called *Iberian Union*. While Portugal retained formal autonomy and its cultural identity, its empire was effectively integrated under the powerful Spanish monarchy. By the end of the 16th century, these territorial expansions had elevated the Spanish Empire to the status of the world's largest economic and military power.

However, by the mid-17th century, Spain's maritime dominance began to wane. Mounting defeats against the Dutch Republic and England during conflicts such as the Anglo-Spanish War (1654-1660) exposed the Empire's vulnerabilities. By the 1660s, Spanish control over its overseas possessions faced growing threats from pirates and privateers. Compounding these challenges, the Protestant Reformation embroiled Spain in a series of religiously charged wars. In 1640, Portugal revolted against Spanish rule, ultimately regaining its independence with the *Treaty of Lisbon* in 1668.

Spain's decline reached a critical point following the death of King Charles II in 1700, which left the throne without a direct heir. The resulting War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) became a far-reaching international conflict intertwined with a civil war. The war drained the kingdom of resources, led to the loss of many European territories, and marked the end of Spain's position as a preeminent European power. It also forced Spain to cede naval dominance to its imperial rival, Great Britain.

Following the war, a new ruling dynasty, the Bourbons, ascended to the Spanish throne. Determined to strengthen centralized authority and achieve administrative uniformity The Bourbons enacted sweeping reforms. Among their key measures was the abolition of many regional privileges and laws, particularly within the Crown of Aragon. These centralizing efforts were accompanied by interventionist economic policies, focusing on infrastructure development and agricultural colonization, as part of broader attempts to modernize the empire.

However, the stability of the Bourbon monarchy was soon challenged by the tumultuous events of the French Revolution. In 1792, the revolutionaries overthrew the French Bourbon monarchy, disrupting the alliance between the French and Spanish branches of the dynasty. Initially opposing revolutionary France during the Napoleonic Wars, Spain suffered early defeats that left its armies in disarray. This prompted King Charles IV to shift strategies, aligning with Napoleon Bonaparte against Great Britain. However, in 1808, Napoleon turned on his Spanish allies, invading the country and installing his brother Joseph Bonaparte as ruler. This betrayal ignited widespread resistance across Spain, sparking the brutal Peninsular War. Employing *guerrilla* tactics – a term first coined precisely during this conflict – Spaniards waged a relentless campaign against French forces, transforming the Iberian Peninsula into a stronghold of resistance that inspired anti-Napoleonic movements throughout Europe.

Meanwhile, Spain's colonies in the Americas seized the opportunity to assert their independence. Between 1808 and 1826, a series of uprisings swept across the New World, leading to the loss of nearly all of Spain's North and South American territories, with the exceptions of Cuba and Puerto Rico. These twin crises – domestic resistance to French occupation and the loss of its overseas empire – marked the end of Spain's era as a global superpower and ushered in a period of profound transformations.

During the Spanish War of Independence, the concept of the Spanish nation took a definitive shape with the drafting of the country's first constitution, known as *La Pepa*⁵⁴, in 1812. This groundbreaking document enshrined the principles of national sovereignty, the separation of powers, and equal rights for all citizens, including those born in the American, African, and Asian territories under the Spanish Crown. It established a constitutional monarchy governed by a unicameral parliamentary system. Widely celebrated as a cornerstone of European liberalism, *La Pepa* has been lauded as one of the most “judicious and reasonable” constitutions of the early 19th century (Payne, 2011, p. 144).

The French Revolution had profound consequences not only for the united Spanish crowns but also for its border territories, including the Basque Country, which had traditionally enjoyed a high degree of self-governance. This strategic region became a contentious point, with the northern Basque territories absorbed by France and the southern ones claimed by the Spanish monarchy. Following the revolution, France's centralized government abolished Basque autonomy in the north, suppressing local identity through deportations and political repression. Traditional participatory governance structures, including the historic *Biltzars* (local assemblies), were dismantled. In Spain, the 1812 Constitution similarly ignored Basque autonomy, sparking resentment among the residents and

⁵⁴ This nickname stems from the fact that the constitution was approved on Saint Joseph's Day (*Día de San José*). In Spanish, *Pepe* is a common nickname for *José*. Since the word *constitución* (constitution) is feminine in Spanish, the document came to be affectionately called *Pepa*, the feminine counterpart of *Pepe*.

demands for the restoration of their historic institutions. Although some elements of Basque self-governance were reinstated in the following years, continued interference by Spanish authorities gradually eroded their independence. By the close of the 19th century, the Basque provinces had been fully integrated into the Spanish state.

After Napoleon's abdication in 1814, the War of Independence ended, and the Bourbon dynasty was restored to power under King Ferdinand VII. The king promptly repealed the 1812 Constitution, re-establishing an absolute monarchy. However, facing political instability and near-bankruptcy, Ferdinand struggled to assert control both in Spain and across its faltering American colonies. In 1820, a military uprising forced him to capitulate and allowed liberal forces to reinstall the Constitution, initiating a second experiment in constitutional governance.

The following three years, known as the *Three Liberal Years* (*Trienio Liberal*), were turbulent, marked by absolutist conspiracies and widespread opposition from conservative monarchies across Europe. Ultimately, French intervention crushed the liberal government in 1823, restoring Ferdinand VII's absolute authority. The decade that followed, remembered as the *Ominous Decade* (*Década Ominosa*), was characterized by harsh repression of liberal ideals and severe crackdowns on dissent.

8.3

Instability under Constitutional Spain and the Experiment of the First Republic

The death of Ferdinand VII ushered in a period of intense political tension over succession, ultimately placing on the throne his daughter, Isabella II, who was still an infant at the time of his death. This precarious situation further weakened the monarchy, providing fertile ground for the resurgence of liberal forces advocating for constitutional monarchy. In the wake of this shift, parliament was reorganized by liberals into two principal factions: the Moderate Party (*Partido Moderado*), established in 1834, which championed conservative monarchism, and the Progressive Party (*Partido Progresista*), a majority faction committed to national sovereignty and the restoration of the 1812 Constitution.

Although the progressives held a parliamentary majority, they were compelled to compromise with the moderates to enact a new constitution. The resulting Constitution of 1837 was a streamlined

document that balanced progressive ideals with key concessions to moderates. It reaffirmed national sovereignty and included a tentative declaration of rights but also granted significant authority to the Crown, including executive power, a veto over laws, and the ability to dissolve the Cortes and call new elections. The unicameral legislature of 1812 was replaced with a bicameral system: a popularly elected lower house (the Chamber of Deputies) and a Senate appointed by the king from voter-nominated candidates, designed to integrate conservative perspectives and soften the separation of powers. Additionally, suffrage was limited to taxpayers who paid at least 200 reales, restricting the vote to roughly five percent of the population (Santirso, 2012, pp. 34-35). Despite these compromises, the progressives secured a framework that recognized individual rights and established a balance of power between the monarchy and parliament.

By the mid-1840s, however, internal divisions began to erode the strength of the Progressive Party. A rift emerged between the majority, who believed universal suffrage should be deferred until the populace was sufficiently educated and prosperous, and a democratic faction advocating for its immediate implementation (see Vilches, 2001, p. 42). Seizing on this fragmentation, the moderates drafted the Constitution of 1845, which reflected their conservative agenda. It replaced national sovereignty with shared sovereignty between the king and parliament, curtailed fundamental rights, and reconfigured the Senate into a body wholly controlled by the monarch. Wealth requirements for voting were further tightened, reducing the electorate to less than one percent of the population (Congreso de los deputatos, 2022, p. 3).

The polarization within the progressive movement deepened after the French Revolution of 1848, which inflamed radical factions. Meanwhile, growing discontent with Isabella II's reign coalesced amid a severe financial crisis beginning in 1866, exacerbated by a subsistence crisis. These pressures culminated in the Spanish Revolution of 1868, known as *La Gloriosa* (The Glorious Revolution), which deposed Isabella II and sought to establish a democratic political regime in Spain.

In the immediate aftermath, elections were held for a constituent parliament under universal male suffrage for the first time in Spanish history. The resulting Constitution of 1869 marked a bold step toward progressive ideals. It reasserted national sovereignty as the foundation of governance, strengthened representative institutions, and introduced an ambitious declaration of rights, including the unprecedented guarantee of freedom of worship. The bicameral parliamentary system was retained, but with significant reforms: the Senate was now indirectly elected by the people through delegated electors meeting certain criteria, while the Congress of Deputies was chosen by universal suffrage.

In 1870, the Spanish Parliament elected Amadeo of Savoy – the third son of the King of Italy and a relative of Spain's Habsburg dynasty – as king. However, his reign was fraught with turmoil.

Persistent tensions within the population and political factions, compounded by an army rebellion, led Amadeo to famously declare the Spanish people *ungovernable*. In 1873, he abdicated the throne and left the country.

Amadeo's abdication marked a watershed moment, paving the way for a revolutionary experiment in Spanish history: the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the country's First Republic. The new Parliament drafted a constitution that embraced a federal system within a republican framework. Yet, from the very beginning, the Republic was plagued by instability, with four presidents rotating through power in less than a year. This political turbulence culminated in a military coup in early 1874, which dismantled the Republic and restored the Bourbon monarchy, placing Isabella II's son, Alfonso XII, on the throne.

The restoration marked the beginning of a new conservative era under the Constitution of 1876. This new charter reinstated the principle of shared sovereignty between the king and the nation. While it included a declaration of rights, these were more restricted than those in the 1869 Constitution. The Senate was aristocratic in composition, with members holding seats by hereditary right, royal appointment, or election by state corporations. The election of Congress representatives also remained restricted by a censitary system until 1890 when universal male suffrage was reintroduced.

Spain's political landscape remained turbulent in those years. In 1898, following the Spanish-American War, the country suffered the loss of its last major overseas colonies, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. As the 20th century dawned, ideological divisions deepened, with the rise of nationalism, socialism, and anarchism intensifying political polarization. This unrest was exacerbated by the disintegration of traditional political parties into personalist factions and the growing influence of revolutionary committees, military juntas, and hired gunmen. Meanwhile, widespread public discontent, fueled by industrialization and unaddressed societal changes, highlighted the monarchy's inability to adapt to a rapidly modernizing world. The system soon demonstrated its inadequacy face to the ambitions of the burgeoning bourgeoisie, the rise of nationalist tensions, and growing demands for democratic institutions.

8.4

Spain's Restless Political Reshaping: Monarchy, Republic, and Fascist Dictatorship

Although Spain remained neutral during World War I, the conflict brought profound economic upheaval. On one hand, foreign demand for Spanish products surged, and imports dwindled, creating an economic boom. On the other hand, inflation soared, shortages of basic goods worsened, and income inequality deepened, sparking widespread social distress. By 1917, Spain faced a triple crisis:

- a) *A military movement*: The Juntas de Defensa emerged, representing Spanish officers frustrated by their lack of advancement opportunities, particularly when compared to the rapid promotions experienced by soldiers in the belligerent nations.
- b) *A political movement*: Catalan nationalism gained momentum as economically prosperous Catalan elites, emboldened by the region's wartime success, demanded greater regional autonomy.
- c) *A social movement*: In August 1917, a revolutionary general strike erupted, supported by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the country's leading trade unions, bringing widespread unrest to the nation.

To address this multifaceted crisis, the monarchy resolved to strategically strengthen ties with the military and, in this way, violently suppress Catalan nationalists and crush workers' uprisings. These measures, however, paved the way for further instability as the military suddenly strengthened its political role in the country. In 1923, Captain General Miguel Primo de Rivera led a military coup tacitly endorsed by King Alfonso XIII. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, which lasted until 1930, was marked by brutal repression of workers and intellectuals and a failure to bridge the gap between the regime and the bourgeoisie. The global Great Depression in 1929 triggered economic collapse, leaving the dictatorship unpopular and financially unsustainable.

The monarchy, weakened and discredited, removed Primo de Rivera, but it was too late to recover public trust. Local elections in 1931 acted as a *de facto* referendum on the monarchy, with urban voters overwhelmingly supporting republican parties opposed to the existing political system. Faced with mounting opposition, King Alfonso XIII fled the country, paving the way for a new political experiment under the Second Spanish Republic.

A new constitution was promptly drafted that marked a decisive break from its predecessors. It was founded on several key principles: the establishment of a republican and democratic state rooted in the popular sovereignty of its citizens; strict secularism, with a clear separation between Church and State; a commitment to political decentralization, enabling the formation of self-governing communities; and the recognition of fundamental socioeconomic rights. Structurally, it introduced a unicameral Parliament, a President of the Republic, and a government led by a Prime Minister subject

to parliamentary confidence. Notably, for the first time in Spanish history, women were granted the right to vote in general elections.

The early years of the Republic were marked by the victory of a center-left government. Leveraging the constitutional commitment to decentralization, Catalonia sought and achieved recognition of its autonomous government, leading to the establishment of the current Generalitat de Catalunya. This restored the regional autonomy that Catalonia had lost in 1714. Inspired by Catalonia's success, nationalist and leftist forces in the Basque territories and Galicia also pushed for autonomy. However, divisions among right-wing, conservative, and monarchist factions delayed their efforts.

Between 1931 and 1933, the Republic faced mounting challenges, including economic instability, significant national debt, and rapidly shifting governing coalitions. Political violence escalated, and attempted coups were launched by factions from both the right and left. In the 1933 elections, the leftist coalition lost support, and a right-wing government aligned with Catholic and conservative forces came to power. This government bolstered the military's influence and invigorated radical right-wing and fascist groups.

In response to the right-wing victory, the Generalitat de Catalunya self-declared the establishment of a Catalan State within the Spanish Federal Republic. The insurrection was swiftly crushed, Catalonia's ministers were imprisoned, and the region's autonomy was temporarily suspended. However, the political tide shifted again with the 1936 victory of the left-wing Popular Front (*Frente Popular*). The new government pardoned the Catalan leaders and fully restored Catalonia's self-government. Autonomy was also granted to western Basque territories and Galicia, where nationalist and leftist republican forces had successfully mobilized support for Statutes of Autonomy.

The Republic's fragile stability was short-lived. Just months after the Popular Front took power, a military coup led by General Francisco Franco plunged Spain into a devastating civil war. The conflict divided the nation. On one side stood the Republican government, supported by the Soviet Union, Mexico, International Brigades, and grassroots anarchists who launched a partial social revolution. On the other side were Franco's rebel forces, bolstered by critical support from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

The victory of Franco's forces marked the end of the Spanish republican experiment and the beginning of a lengthy dictatorship that would shape Spain's history until his death in 1975. This regime institutionalized through the *Fundamental Laws*, centered entirely on Franco himself, who wielded absolute authority. Formal institutions such as the Parliament and the Council of the Kingdom held minimal influence, serving primarily as instruments of the regime. Political freedoms were virtually nonexistent, and any that were nominally recognized remained tightly subordinated to the regime's principles.

Political pluralism was effectively eradicated, with all parties banned except for the Traditionalist Spanish Phalanx of the Councils of the National Syndicalist Offensive (*Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista*, or *FET y de las JONS*), a fusion of nationalist and syndicalist groups created by Franco in 1937. The legislative body, operated within an authoritarian corporate framework and was dominated by Francoist sectors, offering no genuine parliamentary function. Centralism defined the regime's territorial governance, with policies enforcing a unitary national identity. These measures were deeply intertwined with National Catholicism, which promoted conservative social values and religious orthodoxy while suppressing regional languages, cultures, and political autonomy.

Though Franco's Spain remained officially neutral during most of World War II, the regime was sympathetic to the Axis Powers and sent Spanish volunteers to fight alongside the Nazi Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. Following the war, Spain became politically and economically isolated, excluded from the United Nations, and shunned on the international stage. This changed in 1955 during the Cold War, as Spain's strategic location made it a valuable ally for the United States, which sought to counter potential Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean. This alliance led to the establishment of U.S. military bases on the Iberian Peninsula, drawing Spain out of its international isolation.

The 1960s brought an era of unprecedented economic growth for Spain, spurred by industrialization, large-scale internal migration from rural areas to major cities such as Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao, and the rise of a thriving tourism industry. These developments, coupled with Cold War-era modernization efforts, began to reshape the nation, setting the stage for the transformative changes that would follow Franco's death.

8.5

Democratic Transition and Consolidation after the Authoritarian Dictatorship

When Francisco Franco died in 1975, Spain faced a widespread societal demand for a new political system rooted in Western-style democracy – one that recognized individual rights and freedoms, embraced political decentralization, and aligned with the broader European framework. Rather than

reforming the existing Francoist regime, Spain embarked on the complex process of establishing an entirely new system. This transformation unfolded amidst significant challenges, including an ongoing economic crisis and the struggle against Basque separatist terrorism.

At the forefront of this transition was King Juan Carlos I, who played a pivotal role in steering Spain away from a radical *ruptura* (rupture) that could have led to abrupt and destabilizing changes. Instead, he championed a gradual approach, advocating for negotiation and alliance-building as the foundation of the democratic transition (Bernecker, 1998, pp. 73-74). In 1976, the king appointed Adolfo Suárez as President of the Government, entrusting him with the delicate task of engaging political and social leaders to establish a democratic regime.

The turning point came with the *Political Reform Act (Ley para la Reforma Política)*, a new fundamental law crafted by the government and ratified through a national referendum. This law marked the formal end of the Francoist system, introducing shared sovereignty between the people and the king, establishing a democratically elected bicameral Parliament, and creating an executive branch derived from the legislature. Political parties and trade unions were legalized, including, after considerable debate, the Communist Party. Spain also ratified international treaties on human rights and enacted an electoral law, paving the way for the first free elections since 1936.

These historic elections, held in 1977, were won (though without an absolute majority) by the Union of the Democratic Centre (*Unión de Centro Democrático, UCD*), a short-lived coalition of leaders from diverse centrist and rightist factions, identifying as Christian democrats, liberals, social democrats, and independents – the latter often comprising conservatives with ties to the Franco regime. The UCD government immediately began drafting a new Constitution, which was promulgated in late 1978, marking a defining moment in Spain's democratic transition. This Constitution transformed the dictatorship into a “social and democratic State of law,” enshrining “freedom, justice, equality, and political pluralism” as the highest values of the legal system (Art. 1.1). It affirmed the principle of “national sovereignty” residing in the Spanish people (Art. 1.2) and established a “parliamentary monarchy” as the form of government (Art. 1.3).

The “culmination” of Spain's democratic transition is usually identified with the victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) in the general elections of 1982, which established the country's first left-wing government in 43 years (Tusell, 2007, p. 321; Casanova & Gil Andrés, 2014, p. 291). This marked the beginning of the consolidation of Spanish democracy, bolstered by Spain's integration into the European Economic Community in 1986, which later evolved into full membership in the European Union in 1992. The democratic restoration revitalized political associations, trade unions, and civil rights movements, paving the way for the rise of a dynamic and participatory civil society.

After scandals involving the government's role in the so-called *Dirty War* (*guerra sucia*), where illegal death squads were employed to combat Basque terrorism, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, or *PSOE*) was replaced in government by the liberal-conservative People's Party (*Partido Popular*, or *PP*). Positioned ideologically between the center-right and right, the PP's ascension marked the beginning of a political oscillation between the PSOE and the PP that continues to this day.

In 2004, under the leadership of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the PSOE returned to power, governing until 2012. Zapatero's administration enacted notable reforms, including the legalization of same-sex marriage, making Spain the third country worldwide to do so. Recognizing the growing proportion of Spain's foreign-born population, his government also implemented significant immigration reforms, including the largest regularization programs for undocumented immigrants in the country's history.

However, the PSOE's popularity waned during the 2008–2016 financial crisis, which led to austerity measures and widespread public dissatisfaction. This unrest culminated in the large-scale *Indignados* (outraged people) movement, also known as the 15-M movement (as it began on May 15, 2011). In the 2012 elections, the PSOE lost to the PP. Yet, the PP's tenure was soon marred by revelations of corruption: in 2018, Spain's National Court confirmed the existence of an illegal financing structure within the party. This scandal prompted a motion of no confidence that brought down the PP government and ushered in a minority PSOE-led administration. In 2019, the PSOE won general elections and formed a coalition with the left-wing party *Unidas Podemos* (or UP).

8.6

From the Centralist Fascist State to One of the World's Most Decentralized Democracies

The transition from a dictatorial, autocratic government to democracy in Spain was deeply intertwined with a parallel transformation: the evolution from one of Europe's most centralized nations into a leading example of decentralized governance (Pi-Suñyer, 2010). This dramatic shift was fueled by bottom-up pressures, particularly from regions like Catalonia and the Basque Country, which had long fought for self-government and briefly experienced autonomy during the Second

Republic. These demands led to the inclusion of decentralization – in the form of recognition of regional autonomy – as a cornerstone of Spain's 1978 Constitution (Articles from 137 to 158).

Crucially, the Constitution did not restrict the recognition of autonomy to regions actively advocating for it. Instead, it created a framework for all regions of Spain to establish self-governing structures. The Constitution delineated powers reserved for the central government while allowing for the creation of *autonomous communities* (*comunidades autónomas*), which could assume all powers not explicitly retained by Madrid. It also permitted the central government to delegate further responsibilities to these communities, harmonize legislation on matters within regional jurisdiction, and maintain ultimate authority in cases of conflict between national and regional laws. Additionally, the central government was empowered to enforce constitutional obligations if an autonomous community failed to comply or acted against the national interest.

Unlike traditional federal constitutions, the Spanish Constitution lacked several defining elements, such as a formal enumeration of federal entities, their boundaries, or their financing and governance structures. These omissions reflected a desire for flexibility and avoided contentious debates during the drafting process. Instead, Parliament left the development of specific structures to be determined by individual Statutes of Autonomy.

The Constitution envisioned two distinct paths for the creation of autonomous communities:

- Fast-Track (*vía rápida*) (Art. 151): Designed for regions like the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, which had initiated autonomy processes during the Second Republic, this path allowed for immediate access to maximum autonomy.
- Slow-Track (*vía lenta*) (Art. 143): For other regions starting the autonomy process from scratch, this approach allowed a five-year period to establish administrative structures and competencies before revising their Statutes of Autonomy.

Another significant feature of the way the Constitution framed regional powers was its distinction between “nationalities” (*nacionalidades*) and “regions” (*regiones*) (Art. 2⁵⁵). The term *nationality* referred primarily to historical nationalities such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, which had experienced autonomy during the Second Republic and followed the fast-track process.

However, in recent statutory reforms beginning in 2003, the concept of *nationality* – usually reframed in terms of *historical nationality* – has been expanded to encompass all autonomous communities that choose to identify themselves as having a distinct collective, linguistic, or cultural identity different from the rest of Spain. Consequently, Andalusia, Aragon, the Balearic Islands, the

⁵⁵ “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.”

Canary Islands, and the Valencian Community have incorporated self-recognition as *historical nationalities* into their statutes of autonomy. Other regions have adopted alternative designations, such as *historical community*, *historical region*, or *historical identity*. These identity-based designations align with Section 143 of the Constitution, which emphasizes historical criteria as a basis for forming autonomous communities⁵⁶.

Since the Constitution's adoption, debates have persisted over the interpretation of the term *nationality*. During the constitutional debates in the Congress of Deputies, many drafters viewed *nationality* as synonymous with *nation*, proposing that Spain should be conceptualized as a *nation of nations*. This perspective emphasized the historical plurality of the country, reflecting its evolution from a collection of distinct political entities. Over time, this interpretation gained passionate support, particularly from representatives of regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, which have consistently sought greater territorial autonomy.

However, in a landmark 2010 ruling, the Constitutional Court clarified that within Spain's constitutional framework, *nation* and *nationality* are not synonymous (*Sentence 31/2010*). The Court affirmed that the Constitution recognizes only one *nation* – the Spanish nation – and autonomous communities cannot legally define themselves as nations. This decision had significant repercussions, particularly for Catalonia, as it invalidated a provision in the 2006 Statute of Autonomy that defined Catalonia as a *nation*. The ruling further clarified that the designation of historical nationality does not confer greater competencies or powers to a region, nor does it create any distinct administrative or legal status. Instead, it serves as a symbolic recognition of cultural and historical identity, without granting any additional constitutional privileges.

The establishment of Spain's autonomous communities began as a largely bottom-up process, led by the historic nationalities of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia. In these regions, regional parties or branches of national parties drafted their statutes with minimal interference from the central authorities⁵⁷. However, the drafting process for the remaining 14 statutes gradually shifted toward a more top-down approach following the enactment of the 1981 *First Autonomic Pacts* (*Primeros pactos autonómicos*) (Pi-Suñyer, 2010, pp. 8-9). This provision preemptively established the number and borders of the autonomous communities and largely standardized the content of their statutes.

Accordingly, while the Spanish Constitution formally required a bottom-up approach to drafting statutes, in practice, the process adhered closely to guidelines set by the central government. Except in Andalusia, the procedures for statute approval did not allow regional legislative bodies to debate

⁵⁶ The only exception in the inclusion of such frames is Madrid, whose statute was not established on the same constitutional basis.

⁵⁷ The constitutions (statutes of autonomy) of Catalonia and the Basque Country were approved in December 1978 and April 1981, respectively.

draft statutes before submission to the Commission for Constitutional Affairs in the Spanish Parliament. Instead, these drafts were processed like any other piece of legislation.

Although the Autonomy Pact curtailed regional agency and advocacy in the drafting process, it significantly accelerated the implementation of Spain's Constitution. Between 1981 and 1983, the 14 additional statutes of autonomy were passed, creating Spain's current administrative division into 17 autonomous communities⁵⁸. This division was completed in 1995 with the recognition of Ceuta and Melilla as autonomous cities. The autonomous communities varied significantly in size, history, and cultural identity.

From the initial transfer of powers until 1986, funding for the autonomous communities operated under a *transitory* financial system based on the real-cost principle (Pi-Suñyer, 2010, p. 19). Under this system, the central government provided funding equivalent to the actual costs of services being transferred, with annual calculations negotiated by joint commissions comprising representatives from the Spanish government and the respective autonomous community. In practice, these calculations often relied heavily on political negotiations due to the difficulty of establishing precise real costs.

By 1987, the major transfer of powers was largely complete, and the governance framework of Spain's autonomous communities had taken shape. This framework involved a combination of exclusive and shared competencies between the central government and the autonomous communities: exclusive powers are fully exercised by either the central government (e.g., national defense, international relations, justice, immigration, and trade) or the autonomous communities (e.g., agriculture, industry, and local transport); instead, shared powers involve collaboration, where the central government set basic legislation, and the autonomous communities legislated and implemented within that framework (e.g., health, education, social security, environmental protection, and economic planning) (for a detailed list of exclusive and shared power, see Pi-Suñyer, 2010, pp. 10-14). Notably, *culture* represents the only field in which both levels of government share equal powers. In 1987, the transitory financial system was replaced with a new, supposedly *definitive* framework. This system moved away from the real-cost principle and introduced a revenue-sharing model based on criteria such as population, tax base, and regional shortfalls in infrastructure and social services.

The financial system established in 1987 for Spain's autonomous communities relied heavily on revenue sharing with the central government, limiting the communities' financial autonomy to spending rather than revenue generation. Indeed, as taxation on items already taxed by the central

⁵⁸ Specifically: Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile and León, Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Community of Madrid, Region of Murcia, Basque Country, Valencian Community, and Navarre.

government was prohibited, the volume of autonomous communities' own revenues is almost irrelevant.

Yet, despite the standard system, special fiscal arrangements were introduced for the Basque Country and Navarre. These regions were granted the authority to collect most taxes directly, remitting only a portion to the central government to cover shared expenses and services provided at the national level. This arrangement provided these regions with significantly greater fiscal autonomy and higher revenue levels compared to other autonomous communities, making their financial system a notable exception.

Crucially, the decentralization process also elevated the role of local governments – provinces and municipalities – creating a third tier of governance. Municipalities, in particular, played a significant role in shaping Spain's governance model, influencing the drafting of statutes of autonomy and the administrative consolidation of autonomous communities.

Today, the competencies of municipal and provincial governments vary significantly, shaped by the influence of cities in regional legislation. Beyond the basic functions outlined in national law – such as waste collection, water supply, and road maintenance – these governments often take on responsibilities in urban planning, social welfare, cultural programs, and anti-discrimination efforts. Municipalities hold the majority of local powers, while provincial governments focus on coordinating supra-municipal initiatives related to economic development and territorial planning.

Despite the structured division of powers, Spain's governance system exhibits a tendency toward centralization (Pi-Sunyer, 2010, pp. 13-14). The central government often extends its influence into areas intended for regional autonomy through mechanisms such as conditional grants tied to national objectives and the principle of supra-territoriality, which allows it to assert jurisdiction over issues affecting multiple regions. These practices have curtailed the capacity of autonomous communities to set independent policies, reducing self-governance to largely administrative functions.

Additionally, the mixed governance model in Spain, while avoiding a strict dualistic division of competencies, presents significant imbalances. Indeed, autonomous communities theoretically enjoy political freedom through exclusive powers, yet their flexibility is constrained by the central government's authority over fundamental rights and constitutional interpretations. The absence of mechanisms to involve autonomous communities in national decision-making further exacerbates these issues, creating a centralized dynamic under a nominally decentralized framework.

The 2011 constitutional reform addressed some fiscal decentralization issues, introducing a 50/50 income tax split between the central government and the regions. Regions gained the ability to set their own tax bands and additional rates, with revenues accruing directly to them. While this reform

enhanced fiscal autonomy, critics argue that it has increased regional inequalities and fostered competition rather than cooperation among regions (Agrawal & Foremny, 2018).

Despite these challenges, Spain's decentralization arguably stands as one of the world's most successful examples. In a relatively short period and without traumatic ruptures, the country transitioned from a highly centralized system to a politically decentralized model. This transformation established three tiers of governance: the central government, regional governments (17 autonomous communities and 2 autonomous cities), and local governments (50 provinces and 8,132 municipalities as of 2023⁵⁹). Fiscal decentralization has complemented political reforms, with government spending averaging 42.84% of GDP between 1995 and 2023, peaking at 51.4% during 2020 (Trading Economics 2024). Municipalities have dynamically renegotiated their role, acquiring more competencies and innovating in key areas, including migration management and cultural diversity.

⁵⁹ https://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/codmun/cod_num_muni_provincia_ccaa.htm.

CHAPTER 9

Spain's National and Local Approaches to Cultural Heterogeneity

9.1

National Pluralism Throughout the Emergence of the Spanish Nation

The history of the Spanish nation blatantly defies any traditional narrative of an *ethnic* homogeneity of the Spanish people. From the very beginning, the peninsula was home to a diverse array of groups, including Iberians, Celts, and Tartessians. Subsequent arrivals of Phoenicians and Greeks further enriched its cultural tapestry. Even during Roman rule, when Hispania was reduced to a province of the empire, the process of romanization failed to erase the deep-seated differences among the various tribes and communities.

The collapse of the Roman Empire ushered in an era of even greater complexity. Waves of Germanic invaders swept through the region, dismantling the remnants of Roman institutions. Although the Visigothic Kingdom briefly stabilized the peninsula, it never achieved true political unity and ultimately fell to the Muslim invasion. Al-Andalus, the Islamic polity that followed, became one of the most diverse and socially intricate societies of the medieval world – though it was not quite the utopia of harmonious *convivencia* (coexistence) that is sometimes romanticized (see Payne, 2011, pp. 54-71).

Even from the 12th century onward, when the term *españoles* (Spanish people) began to be used, it referred to a profoundly heterogeneous population. The Christian political units that emerged during the *Reconquista*, each with its own institutions, customs, social structures, and sometimes distinct languages, underscored the pluralistic nature of medieval Spain. This pluralism was so central to Spain's identity that the emerging political entities were often referred to in the plural as *las Españas* – literally, the Spains (Section 8.1, p. 201)

If any unifying forces existed in medieval Spain beyond geography, they were religion and monarchy. Under the Visigoths, a form of Catholic Christianity intertwined with monarchy began to take root, providing a foundation for unity. Similarly, the Islamic rulers of Al-Andalus relied on a religious identity – this time tied to Islam and monarchy – to unify their diverse territories. Later, Catholicism and monarchy became the core identity around which the Christian kingdoms rallied during the Reconquista, fostering cooperation against a common enemy. These twin pillars would ultimately shape the united monarchy of the Catholic Monarchs, Isabella and Ferdinand, the direct precursor to the modern Spanish nation.

Under the influence of the united crown of Castile and Aragon, Spain expanded both geographically and politically, evolving into the Spanish Empire and later the unified Spanish nation. However, this process was far from harmonious. The union was fundamentally unbalanced in favor of Castile, with most other political entities assimilated through diplomacy, royal marriages, military alliances, or outright conquest. After 1714, under the Bourbon dynasty, previously autonomous regions lost their privileges and were subjected to Castilian institutions, consolidating the centralization of power.

Despite this centralization, distinct sociopolitical and cultural identities – particularly those of the Catalans and Basques – persisted. These groups maintained their own languages and cultural traditions and repeatedly sought to recover their lost autonomy. The instability of Spanish governance throughout modern and contemporary history further highlighted this pluralism. The Second Republic appeared poised to grant greater autonomy, and perhaps even independence, to regions like the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia. However, these efforts were abruptly cut short by the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent Franco dictatorship.

The 36 years of Franco's regime, with its emphasis on centralization and homogenization, represented the most forceful attempt to erase Spain's pluralism (see, for example, Aparicio, 2017; Simón, 2018). Francoism did not represent a break from historical precedent. Like earlier monarchies, Franco's policies were grounded in Catholicism and enforced through violence, repression, and absolutist centralism. Nevertheless, his efforts failed to eliminate regional distinctiveness, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country. These regions continued to assert their identities, through both democratic protest and, at times, violent resistance.

Following the end of Franco's dictatorship, *political pluralism* was enshrined as one of the foundational principles of Spain's new democratic state, prominently articulated in the very first article of the 1978 Constitution. This commitment to pluralism was not only political but also cultural and territorial, setting the stage for the country's transformation into a decentralized state, with the establishment of autonomous communities and the recognition of some as *historical nationalities*.

While these regions are not recognized as nations, the framework allows for a level of self-governance that acknowledges their cultural and historical specificities. Today, Spain's decentralized model, despite its challenges, continues to reflect the country's diverse and multifaceted identity.

Before concluding this section, we should not forget to address – at least briefly – another significant chapter in Spain's history of national pluralism: its colonial experience in the New World and Asia Pacific. Initially established as dependencies of the Crown of Castile, these colonies operated under a hierarchical yet decentralized bureaucracy. The crown asserted its sovereignty over territories and vassals, managing taxation, public order, justice, and governance for vast indigenous populations through a blend of centralized authority and local administrative structures.

In the early phase of colonization, the crown relied heavily on ecclesiastics for governance. Key institutions such as the *Casa de Contratación* (House of Trade), established in 1503 under Archbishop Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca, played a pivotal role. This institution regulated trade, migration, and fiscal policies, ensuring that only individuals officially recognized as *Old Christians* (*cristiano viejos*), that is, free from Jewish or Muslim ancestry, could migrate to the colonies (for details about the social category of Old Christians, see Fernández, 2018). The Casa also controlled the judicial and organizational aspects of trade with overseas territories, marking the beginning of a sophisticated colonial administration.

Colonial expansion was formalized through contracts (*capitulaciones*) between the crown and expedition leaders (*adelantados*). These agreements detailed the terms of exploration, conquest, and settlement, with expedition leaders funding their ventures in exchange for territorial rewards. The early history of conquest, however, remains deeply marred by the brutal treatment of indigenous peoples at the hands of the *conquistadores* (conquerors).

As the era of conquest gave way to consolidation, governance became more structured, albeit at a high human cost. Enslavement of indigenous populations was widespread until the enactment of the *New Laws of the Indies* in 1542, which sought to curb such practices. Nevertheless, the colonies turned to African slavery, perpetuating a system of forced labor that persisted until the late 19th century.

The sheer scale of the Spanish Empire necessitated the creation of new institutions. Colonies were organized into governorates or provinces, which proliferated as territories were conquered and settled. In 1524, the Council of the Indies was established to oversee colonial governance, drafting legislation, appointing officials, and adjudicating judicial matters. This body was charged with balancing the interests of the crown, the Catholic Church, and indigenous populations.

Given the impossibility of direct royal oversight in the colonies, viceroys – acting as the monarch's representatives – were appointed to govern the largest administrative units, the viceroyalties. These

officials held authority over both civil and ecclesiastical matters, ensuring that the boundaries of secular and religious governance overlapped to maintain crown control. Initially, there were two viceroyalties: New Spain (established in 1535), covering North America, the Caribbean, and the Philippines; and Peru (established in 1542), encompassing South America. In the 18th century, reforms created additional viceroyalties in New Granada (1739) and Rio de la Plata (1776).

Viceroy, often of high social standing and almost exclusively peninsular-born, wielded immense power but served fixed terms, limiting their long-term influence. In contrast, the *Audiencias* – judicial and administrative councils – played a more enduring role. Functioning as courts of appeal, they also shared executive and legislative responsibilities with the viceroys. Appointed for life, judges (*oidores*) ensured continuity and stability within the colonial administration, acting as a counterweight to viceroys and maintaining direct correspondence with the Council of the Indies.

The Audiencias became a significant base of power for American-born elites by the late 16th century, with nearly a quarter of appointments being granted to individuals born in the colonies by 1687. However, this access to power was systematically curtailed during the Bourbon Reforms of the 18th century, as the crown centralized authority and increasingly appointed peninsular-born Spaniards to key positions. This alienated colonial elites, fostering resentment and sowing the seeds of independence movements.

The instability of the Spanish Crown during the Napoleonic Peninsular War further catalyzed these sentiments. Inspired by liberal ideals, the *Libertadores* (liberators) – American-born elites of European descent – initiated independence movements across the Americas. These conflicts, paralleling Spain's own war of independence, pitted royalists seeking a unitary monarchy against patriots advocating for independent republics or plural monarchies. The first declarations of independence emerged in 1809 in the Viceroyalty of Peru, followed by Mexico in 1810 and other territories thereafter. By 1826, Spain had lost all its American colonies, retaining only Cuba, Puerto Rico, and its Asia-Pacific holdings.

Spain's remaining colonies were eventually seized by the United States in the Spanish-American War of 1898, marking the definitive end of the Spanish colonial era. This legacy of colonial governance, characterized by a blend of decentralization, hierarchy, and exploitation, left a profound impact on the political and cultural trajectories of the former colonies, shaping their paths toward independence and nationhood.

Spain's Religious Minorities and Catholic Homogenization

In its quest to forge a unified national identity, Spain has long grappled with the challenge of its inherent pluralism. Central to this homogenizing drive was the pivotal role of Catholicism, which became the defining element of Spanish national identity. This emphasis on religious conformity naturally led to framing non-Catholic minorities as *others*, fueling a long history of marginalization and oppression. Among these minorities, Jews, Muslims, and Protestants stand out as the most visible groups, whose distinct religious identities marked them as targets of exclusion throughout Spanish history.

a) Sephardic Jews

Jewish tradition traces the arrival of Jews in the Iberian Peninsula as far back as the Babylonian exile in the 6th century BCE⁶⁰. However, historical evidence places the first significant Jewish presence during Roman rule in the 1st century CE, with the oldest archaeological findings dating to the 4th and 5th centuries (see PUR, 2011). As Roman citizens, Jews played an active role in provincial life, engaging in agriculture, trade, and local affairs, and maintaining amicable relations with their non-Jewish neighbors. However, the rise of Christianity within the empire disrupted this coexistence, altering the dynamic profoundly.

A turning point came around 300 CE with the Synod of Elvira in the Roman province of Hispania Baetica. This ecclesiastical council imposed a series of edicts aimed at separating Christians from Jews (see Rutgers & Bradbury, 2006, pp. 509-551). These included prohibitions on intermarriage, shared meals, and Jewish blessings on Christian crops. These measures marked the beginning of institutionalized discrimination. Under Visigothic rule, such repression escalated dramatically as the Christian monarchy solidified its power. Forced conversions and violent persecution became common, making life increasingly untenable for Jewish communities.

Unsurprisingly, the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in the early 8th century was initially welcomed by many Jews as liberation from Visigothic oppression. Muslim rulers often relied on Jewish communities for administrative support during their conquest, granting them significant roles

⁶⁰ This tradition traces back to a singular reference in the *Book of Obadiah* (1:20), which mentions exiled Jews settling in *Sefarad*, a term that later came to signify *Spain* in Hebrew. However, the connection between Sefarad and Spain is not definitively established, and it remains uncertain whether this mention in the biblical text actually refers to the Iberian Peninsula.

in governance. The early consolidation of Al-Andalus during the 8th and 9th centuries ushered in the Golden Age of Spanish Jewry, a period of remarkable cultural, theological, and scientific flourishing for Sephardic Jews.

However, this era of relative tolerance ended with the rise of the Almoravid dynasty in the 11th century and the Almohad dynasty in the 12th century. These more conservative regimes reintroduced persecution and forced conversions, prompting many Jews to flee either to more tolerant Muslim regions or to Christian territories expanding under the *Reconquista*. Initially, Jewish expertise in diplomacy, administration, and linguistics was highly valued in the Christian kingdoms – much as it had been under early Muslim rule.

Yet, as Christian power grew during the 13th century, so did religious fanaticism. Although Jews were granted certain protections under Christian monarchs, they were subjected to marginalizing measures, such as wearing distinguishing yellow badges, and endured periodic waves of persecution. This precarious position was exacerbated by the Black Plague in 1348 when Jews were scapegoated for the calamity. A particularly violent anti-Jewish riot in Seville in 1391 quickly spread across the Iberian Peninsula, leading to widespread massacres, looting, and forced conversions.

The consolidation of a hegemonic political power in the Iberian Peninsula under the *Catholic Monarchs*, Isabella and Ferdinand, ushered in a period of intensified oppression. Persecutions escalated dramatically, often targeting also Jews who had been forcibly converted to Christianity (*onversos*) who were accused of secretly practicing Judaism – by the late 15th century, the derogatory term *marranos* to refer to crypto-Jews came into widespread use.

In 1478, the monarchs established the notorious Spanish Inquisition, ostensibly to safeguard Catholic orthodoxy within their realms. Initially focused on identifying and prosecuting *marranos*⁶¹, the Inquisition quickly expanded its reach, becoming a powerful and often ruthless institution. Its influence extended far beyond its original mandate, evolving into an oppressive mechanism targeting anyone suspected of deviating from Catholic doctrine. Functioning as both an instrument of the monarchy and a vehicle for advancing the Vatican's interests, the Inquisition wielded significant power over Spanish society and politics, cementing its place as one of history's most infamous tools of religious persecution.

In 1480, the Catholic Monarchs ordered the segregation of Jews into designated neighborhoods (*juderías*) and prohibited them from leaving at night. By 1483, Jews were expelled from Andalusia

⁶¹ The origin of the term remains uncertain. One popular theory traces it to the medieval Latin root *mar-*, commonly found in derogatory terms used to describe *scoundrels* or individuals who were perceived as *failures*, *deviants*, or *frauds*. Another perspective links it to the Spanish verb *marrar*, meaning *to cut*, particularly in the context of cutting pork meat. In this interpretation, *marrano* carries a derogatory connotation tied to the impurity associated with *pork*, symbolizing an *unclean* or *cursed individual* (Dizionario Etimologico 2024). A third possible origin derives the term from the Arabic word *maḥram*, meaning *forbidden* or *illicit*, emphasizing the notion of *transgression* or *prohibition*.

at the behest of the Inquisition, which argued that continued contact between Jews and conversos hindered efforts to eradicate crypto-Judaism. This set the stage for the Alhambra Decree of 1492, issued shortly after the conquest of Granada. The decree ordered the expulsion of all Jews from the united Crowns of Castile and Aragon, leading to the forced displacement of tens of thousands of people (Pérez, 2007, p. 138).

The expulsion marked a centuries-long hiatus in Jewish life in Spain. Although the Constitution of 1869 enshrined freedom of worship, paving the way for some Jews to return, the Alhambra Decree remained formally in effect until 1968, when it was repealed following the Second Vatican Council's rejection of the deicide charge against Jews.

In 2015, Spain took a significant step toward reconciliation by passing a law offering citizenship to descendants of Sephardic Jews expelled during the Inquisition. Applicants were required to be vetted by the Spanish Federation of Jewish Communities (FCJE) and to demonstrate a *special connection* to Spain, including proficiency in the Spanish language and knowledge of its culture. By March 2018, over 6,400 Jews had obtained citizenship under this program, which was extended to October 2019. As of 2022, Spain's Jewish population is estimated at 13,000 affiliated members and up to 50,000 residents, concentrated in Madrid, Barcelona, Malaga, and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla⁶².

b) Spanish Muslims

The relationship between the Catholic Kingdoms and Islam was profoundly shaped by the *Reconquista* and the emergence of the Spanish national identity as a Catholic Monarchy. Throughout the 13th century, Christian victories steadily brought territories of Al-Andalus under Christian control. For the Muslim populations of these regions, the options were stark: migration to other Muslim-held territories or acceptance of terms of surrender that allowed them to remain. Christian rulers, recognizing the economic value of a stable labor force, often preferred to keep the resident population in place. These Muslims who chose to stay were referred to as *mudéjares* – a term borrowed from Arabic, possibly derived from *mudajjan* (subjugated/tamed) or *al-madjun* (those who remained).

Like their Jewish counterparts, *mudéjar* communities, while officially granted certain protections, faced discrimination, persecution, and pressure to convert to Christianity. The situation deteriorated significantly after the fall of Granada in 1492, which marked the conclusion of the *Reconquista* and a fervent consolidation of Catholic orthodoxy in Spain. Following the expulsion of the Jews, the focus of the Catholic Monarchs and the increasingly powerful Spanish Inquisition shifted toward the *mudéjares*.

⁶² <https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/about/communities/es>.

The turning point came in 1499 with a campaign in Granada to force conversions through torture and imprisonment. This provoked a Muslim rebellion, which was swiftly quashed and used to justify revoking the legal and treaty protections previously afforded to Muslims in the city. Conversion efforts intensified, and by 1501, Islam was officially eradicated from Granada. Buoyed by this outcome, Queen Isabella issued an edict in 1502 banning Islam throughout the Crown of Castile. Muslims were forced to convert or face expulsion. The policy extended to Navarre in 1515, following its annexation to Castile.

In contrast, the Crown of Aragon initially maintained religious freedom for Muslims, a promise tied to the coronation oaths of its monarchs to preserve stability in its heavily Muslim-populated territories. However, growing anti-Muslim sentiment in the region, fueled by persecutions elsewhere, eventually pressured Charles I of Spain to petition Pope Clement VII for release from this oath. In 1525, an edict outlawing Islam was enacted in Aragon, completing the eradication of openly practiced Islam across the Spanish Monarchy.

Much like the *marranos*, Muslims who converted to Christianity – referred to disparagingly as *moriscos* (moorish) – were placed under the watchful and often brutal scrutiny of the Spanish Inquisition. Accused of insincerity in their conversions, *moriscos* faced relentless suspicion, harassment, and persecution. Despite these pressures, elements of crypto-Islam persisted in Spain for several decades.

However, throughout the early 17th century, anti-Muslim sentiment among religious and political elites rose, with *moriscos* often accused of treachery, alleging collaboration with Barbary pirates and conspiracies to instigate uprisings. Eventually, under security pretexts, King Philip III issued a decree in 1609 expelling the Moriscos from Spain. Over the next seven years, an estimated 300,000 people were forced out, effectively ending centuries of Muslim presence in Spain (Jónsson, 2007).

The absence of a significant Muslim presence in Spain endured until the democratic transition of the late 20th century, which coincided with a resurgence of international migration. Eventually, contemporary migration waves brought Islam back to the Iberian Peninsula, primarily through African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian migrants seeking opportunities in Spain. As of 2023, the Muslim population in Spain is estimated at approximately 2.41 million, with the largest groups holding Spanish (about 800,000) and Moroccan (around 800,000) nationalities; Catalonia is home to the largest Muslim community in the country, numbering around 660,000 individuals⁶³.

c) Spanish Protestants

⁶³ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/989902/muslims-in-spain-by-nationality/>.

Christian Protestants represent another visible religious minority that has faced oppression in Spain, particularly during specific periods of the country's history. Initially, the Reformation had minimal influence in the Catholic kingdoms due to the relentless persecution of Protestants by political institutions and the Spanish Inquisition. However, the late 18th and early 19th centuries witnessed the growth of Protestant missions, spurred by migration during the nascent Spanish industrial revolution. By the early 19th century, Protestant communities began to form clandestinely, often practicing their faith in secret. Reports from the time highlight the surreptitious printing and distribution of Bibles despite the risk of persecution.

The establishment of freedom of worship under the 1869 Constitution marked a turning point for Protestant communities. For the first time, they could openly practice their faith, leading to the opening of the first Protestant church in Madrid's Plazuela de Santa Catalina and the publication of *La Luz* (The Light), the first Protestant newspaper in Spain, which continues to exist. This newfound freedom catalyzed significant growth in Protestantism, further accelerated during the Second Republic. By the onset of the Spanish Civil War, the Protestant population had grown to approximately 30,000 followers (Vincent, 2015, p. 40).

However, the victory of Francisco Franco's forces and the establishment of a Fascist confessional state ushered in a renewed period of persecution. Under Franco's regime, freedom of conscience was abolished, Protestant churches were destroyed or shuttered, and non-Catholic Bible translations were confiscated. Protestant worship was forced underground, often taking place secretly in private homes. Persecution extended beyond religious practices to include fines, arrests, job dismissals, imprisonment of soldiers, denial of passports, and significant delays in authorizing civil marriages for Protestants.

After World War II, amid the emergence of the European human rights revolution, Protestant churches began cautiously organizing to advocate for their rights. In 1956, the Spanish Evangelical Defense Commission was established, initiating dialogue and pressure on Fascist institutions. In 1967, after years of lobbying, Franco's government enacted the *Law Regulating Civil Law in Matters of Religious Freedom* (*Ley Reguladora del Derecho Civil en Materia de Libertad Religiosa*), which provided the first rudimentary framework for religious rights under Fascism. Protestant worship spaces could display external signs, seminaries were permitted to open, and non-Catholics could marry civilly. Yet, significant restrictions persisted, including the prohibition of proselytism and ongoing discrimination, particularly within the Armed Forces.

The death of Franco in 1975 and Spain's transition to democracy brought fundamental changes to the nation's approach to religious freedom. The 1978 Constitution enshrined the principle of non-denominationalism, recognizing religious freedom as a basic right for all citizens. This constitutional

guarantee was further solidified with the enactment of the 1980 *Law on Religious Freedom* (*Ley de Libertad Religiosa*), which established the legal framework for Spain's religiously pluralistic society.

In 1986, the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain (FEREDE) was founded to represent Protestant communities at the national level. A key milestone followed in 1992 with the signing of the *State Agreements of Cooperation* (*Acuerdos de Cooperación del Estado*), which aimed to promote equality for religious groups officially recognized as having a *significant societal presence* (*notorio arraigo*), including Protestantism. These agreements removed many obstacles preventing the effective exercise of religious freedom.

In 1993, the Evangelical Council of Madrid was established to foster unity among Protestant churches and institutions in the Madrid region. By 2018, approximately 2% of Spain's population – equivalent to around one million people – identified as Protestant, according to the Justice Ministry's Observatory of Religious Pluralism (ORP 2018).

9.3

An Ethnocultural Minority across Spanish History: The Roma People

Throughout Spanish history, alongside religious minorities, other minorities emerged, whose distinct identity and ascribed *otherness*, while intertwined with religion, were shaped predominantly by cultural and ethnic factors. Among the most notable of these are the Spanish Roma, commonly known as *gitanos*⁶⁴ or by their endonym *Calé*⁶⁵.

The first documented arrival of the Roma in the Iberian Peninsula dates back to the early 15th century when groups led by a self-proclaimed “Count Tomás of Little Egypt” appeared in the Pyrenees (Mirga-Kruszelnicka, n.d., Footnote 1). The term *Little Egypt* likely referred to regions

⁶⁴ This denomination for the Roma people evolved from the word *egiptano* which was the Old Spanish demonym for someone from *Egipto* (Egypt). In this sense, *gitano* is etymologically equivalent to the English term to indicate the Roma people, *gypsy*, which also originates from the word *Egyptian*. These terms started being used to refer to the Roma people because of the belief in their Egyptian origin.

⁶⁵ The term likely derives from the Romani word *kalo* or *calo*, which translates to *black* or *absorbing all light*. This name may have emerged as a Romani adaptation of an exonym that referred to the Roma people in terms of their darker complexion or as a metaphorical marker of difference, often emphasizing their perceived otherness. Some scholars suggest that this term reflects the intersection of linguistic self-identification and the external framing of Roma identity by surrounding populations (e.g., Hübshmanová, 2003).

along the western coast of the Hellenic Peninsula, which these groups traversed after migrating from their ancestral homeland in Punjab, India (Gómez Alfaro, n.d., p. 1). Claiming to be Christian pilgrims journeying to the tomb of Saint James and other sacred sites, they secured safe-conducts from the authorities of Aragon, Navarre, and Castile. The political upheavals of 15th-century Spain facilitated their settlement.

With the end of the *Reconquista* and the intensification of the Catholic Monarchy's drive for homogenization, the case of the Roma people started attracting the government's attention. In 1499, the first provision concerning the Roma people – the *Pragmatic Sanction of Medina del Campo* (*Pragmática de la Medina del Campo*) – decreed that all *gitanos* were to abandon their itinerant lifestyle, acquire a trade, and serve local lords in designated professions, primarily agricultural labor. Over the next three centuries, more than 250 anti-Roma decrees were issued, aiming to dissolve the Roma as a distinct ethnic group.

While some officials initially proposed expelling the Roma, as had been done with Jews and Muslims, the labor shortages following the expulsion of the *moriscos* under Philip III convinced the government to adopt a different strategy: the Roma were to be subjected to increasing pressure to assimilate and serve the needs of the Spanish society. Punishments for non-compliance were severe, with many Roma sentenced to forced labor, typically as rowers on galleys – a practice that intensified during the 16th and 17th centuries as naval demands grew. Entire groups, including other marginalized individuals labeled as vagrants, were indiscriminately detained to meet labor needs. This persecution forced the Roma into isolated camps on the city outskirts, while women ventured into towns to sell handicrafts or practice fortune-telling. Interestingly, the Spanish Inquisition typically tolerated fortune-telling, viewing it more as a method of extracting financial support than genuine heresy (ivi, 2).

The 18th century, marked by the consolidation of the Bourbon dynasty, saw a renewed focus on national homogenization. In 1749, the Spanish government launched *La Gran Redada* (The Great Gypsy Round-Up), one of the darkest chapters in Roma history. Thousands of Roma were arrested, deported, interned, or killed in a coordinated effort to eradicate their culture.

The groundwork for this devastating campaign began in 1717, when Roma were ordered to settle in designated towns chosen for their work opportunities and judicial infrastructure. To prevent population concentration, authorities imposed quotas allowing only one Roma family per 100 inhabitants. Parallel negotiations with the Holy See sought to curtail ecclesiastical immunity, aligning Church and Crown policies across Spain. Once Roma communities were resettled and papal support secured, the government began planning the round-up. The operation sought to exploit the concentration of Roma to systematically dismantle their presence before they could disperse again.

In July 1749, the plan was executed with chilling precision. Men were arrested and sent to naval arsenals for forced labor, while women and children were confined to workhouses. The operation was partially financed by auctioning the confiscated belongings of Roma families, with proceeds used to cover the costs of arrests, imprisonments, and operational expenses.

While the round-up initially appeared successful, its costs and logistical challenges soon led the government to reconsider. By the late 1750s, amnesties began to be granted, first to individuals deemed assimilable and eventually to larger groups. Despite these partial releases, the round-up inflicted profound harm on the Roma community, disrupting family structures, undermining traditional practices, and significantly altering their language – the Caló – transforming it into a hybrid of Romani and Castilian.

The persecution of the Roma continued in various forms until 1783 when King Carlos III issued the last Pragmática concerning the Roma. This decree granted them citizenship and legal protections but demanded their full assimilation, prohibiting the preservation of their distinct cultural practices. This legislation remained in force until the early 20th century. Notably, until the beginning of the Second Republic in 1931, the constitutional documents of modern Spain made little mention of the Roma, effectively neglecting their rights and contributions. Finally, the second republican constitution marked a turning point, affirming the principle of equality for all citizens, including the Roma. However, societal discrimination persisted, leaving the group marginalized in many aspects of Spanish life.

The history of the Roma during the Spanish Civil War remains largely underexplored, though individual Roma participated on both sides of the conflict. Notable figures include Helios Gómez, a poet, painter, revolutionary, and anarchist-communist who fought against Franco, and Ceferino Giménez Malla, known as El Pelé, a Roman Catholic catechist and martyr executed by Republican militias in 1936 and then beatified in 1997 by Pope John Paul II (Mirga-Kruszelnicka, n.d.).

Under General Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975), repressive policies against the Roma resumed. The use of the Caló language was strictly prohibited, and in 1943, the *Guardia Civil* was tasked with monitoring and controlling Romani communities. It was only with the end of Franco's regime and the enactment of the democratic Constitution of 1978 that Roma people were afforded full recognition of their human and civil rights. Article 14 of the Constitution guaranteed protection against discrimination based on "birth, race, sex, religion, opinion, or any other personal or social condition or circumstance". The Francoist measures of 1943 were repealed, symbolizing a new era for Roma rights.

The transition to democracy offered unprecedented opportunities for the Roma to engage in political and social activism, fostering an era of ethno-political mobilization (see Mirga-Kruszelnicka,

n.d.). Roma were granted full legal equality and the constitutional right to associate (Art. 22). This shift catalyzed the formation of a genuine Romani associative movement, initially supported by the philanthropic efforts of the Catholic and Evangelical Churches. The first secular and independent Roma organizations emerged in the late 1960s, such as the Asociación de Desarrollo Gitana in Madrid, founded in 1968 (formally registered in 1972). The 1970s saw the rise of various Roma organizations, including national groups like the Asociación Nacional Presencia Gitana (1972, registered in 1979) and local initiatives like Catalonia's Centro Cultural Gitano de la Mina (1978).

The democratic transition also opened the door for Roma participation in formal politics. In 1977, during Spain's first democratic elections after Franco, Juan de Dios Ramírez-Heredia became the first Roma elected to the Spanish Parliament as a candidate for the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). Significantly, the 1978 Constitution bears also his signature.

Growing socio-economic challenges faced by Roma communities during this period necessitated coordinated governmental intervention. In 1979, the Inter-Ministerial Commission was established to study Roma issues, and in 1985, the *National Plan for Roma Development (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Gitano)* was approved. A dedicated budget line for Roma measures was introduced in 1986, following impassioned advocacy by Ramírez-Heredia. In 1989, a second *Plan for Roma Development* further institutionalized these efforts, reflecting the increasing visibility of Roma issues in public discourse. These first plans inaugurated a series of other comprehensive provisions until the current *National Strategy for the Equality, Inclusion, and Participation of Roma People (Estrategia Nacional para la Igualdad, Inclusión y Participación del Pueblo Gitano)*.

Ramírez-Heredia remained a pivotal figure in advancing Roma rights. In addition to his parliamentary work, he was instrumental in fostering the Roma associative movement. He encouraged the establishment of local organizations, represented Spain at the First World Romani Congress in London (1971), and co-founded the International Romani Union (IRU). In 1986, he founded the Unión Romani Española (UR), the first national umbrella organization, and launched *Nevipens Romani*, Spain's only Roma-focused newspaper, published biweekly.

Ramírez-Heredia's influence extended beyond Spain. As the first Roma Member of the European Parliament (MEP) from 1986 to 1999, he tirelessly advocated for Roma rights within the European Union. He organized two landmark international events in Spain: the First Romani Congress of the European Union in Seville (1994) and the First European Congress of Roma Youth in Barcelona (1997).

During the 1990s, the Roma associative movement in Spain experienced significant growth, driven by the gradual development of Roma-related policies, increased investments, and a heightened awareness of the benefits of activism within the Roma community. Between 1997 and 2004, the

number of Roma associations more than doubled, growing from approximately 200 to 400 organizations (Mirga-Kruszelnicka, n.d.). This rapid expansion necessitated a parallel process of internal consolidation. Reflecting Spain's broader decentralization process, Roma activists prioritized the formation of regional federations over national ones to address local needs effectively.

One major step toward consolidating Roma organizations at the national level came through governmental support. The so-called *Foro*, initially hosted by the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, provided a platform where Roma, pro-Roma advocates, and regional and national organizations could engage in dialogue, allocate budgets, and negotiate policy initiatives. In 2005, the *Foro* evolved into the State Council for Romani People (*Consejo Estatal del Pueblo Gitano*), established by Royal Decree 891/2005. This council formalized the representation of Roma interests and enhanced collaboration between Roma organizations and the state.

Other efforts to unify Roma activism included the establishment of platforms focused on specific claims and objectives. For instance, Romipen, the Platform for the Statute of Romani People, was created in 2000 – though it ultimately failed to sustain its activities. Notable achievements were made at both regional and national levels. In 2001, the Catalan Parliament recognized the value of Roma identity and culture, leading to the inclusion of Article 42.7 in the 2006 Statute of Catalonia, urging the government to safeguard Romani culture. At the national level, the Spanish Congress approved a motion in 2005 to promote Romani culture, history, identity, and language. In 2007, the Institute of Romani Culture (*Instituto de Cultura Gitana*) was established in Madrid to further these objectives. The celebration of International Romani Day, first officially marked in Spain in 2002, has also become a significant event, increasingly recognized by public institutions.

In Spain, ethnopolitical parties are not seen as a viable strategy for representing minority interests, given the low likelihood of electoral success under current legislation. Despite this, efforts have been made to form Roma-based political parties. Notable examples include the Partido Nacionalista Caló (PNCA), founded in 1999, and the Partido Alianza Romani (ARO), established in 2004. While these parties participated in several elections, they were ultimately unsuccessful.

Finally, a peculiar chapter in the history of Spanish Roma's activism is represented by Roma women's movements. Romani women have historically faced marginalization within both feminist movements and male-dominated Roma associations. To address their specific needs and create spaces for empowerment, Romani women began organizing independently. The first Romani women's association in Spain was founded in Granada in 1989, led by María Dolores Fernández Fernández. In 1991, the Asociación de Mujeres Gitanas Romí began hosting annual seminars in Granada, bringing together Roma men and women to discuss strategies for women's empowerment. These meetings inspired the establishment of similar organizations across Spain.

By the 1990s, the Romani women's movement had gained momentum, with organizations proliferating in every Autonomous Community. In 1999, Kamira became the first national federation of Romani women's organizations in Spain and one of the first of its kind in Europe. Spanish Romani women's activism has since served as a model for similar movements internationally. Notable leaders like Beatriz Carrillo de los Reyes, former president of the Romani women's federation FAKALI, have broken new ground. Carrillo became the first Romani woman elected as vice-president of the State Council for the Roma in 2017. In Barcelona, the Municipal Council of Roma has also seen strong female leadership, with its last two presidencies held by Juana Fernández Cortés and María Rubio.

In recent years, the Roma associative movement in Spain has diversified, with newer organizations focusing on specific issues and objectives. Examples include initiatives protecting the rights of street vendors, political organizations such as POLITIRROM and Kale Amenge, and Roma LGBTQI advocacy groups like Ververipen. Romani women's organizations now encompass a broad spectrum of ideologies, from conservative to radical groups like Feministas Gitanas por Diversidad.

Younger generations of Roma, particularly university-educated individuals, are playing increasingly active roles in shaping the movement. This new wave of leadership is fostering stronger international collaborations, further enhancing the visibility and influence of Spanish Roma organizations on the global stage.

9.4

Shaping Early Migration Governance Approaches to Integration in Democratic Spain

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as Spain transitioned from dictatorship to democracy, it emerged as a prominent destination for global migration. In 1981, Spain counted approximately 200,000 foreign residents, representing just 0.52% of the total population. By 2001, this number had increased tenfold to nearly 2 million (3.33% of the population)⁶⁶. Since then, the foreign-born population has continued to grow, with some fluctuations during the economic crisis (2010-2018)

⁶⁶ <https://www.ine.es/dyngs/Prensa/en/ECP1T24.htm>.

and the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021). By 2024, foreign residents reached 6,581,028 (13.5% of the population), while the foreign-born population topped 8,915,831 (18.31% of the total)⁶⁷.

Spain's normative framework (*Ley de Extranjería*) has evolved alongside its demographic transformation (see, for example, Morén-Alegret, 2008; González Ferrer & Cebolla Boado, 2008; Pinyol-Jiménez & Caraballo, 2018; 2023). At the core of the normative development of migration governance lies the Spanish Constitution, which, in its first Article embraces the principles of *freedom, equality, non-discrimination, and political pluralism*. Among these principles, equality emerges as particularly pivotal throughout the Spanish normative framework. Article 9.2 of the Constitution establishes the obligation of the public authorities to ensure that the equality of individuals is real and effective. In addition, Article 10 recognizes the “dignity of the person” and that the norms relating to fundamental rights shall be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Finally, Article 14 specifies that Spaniards are equal before the law and may not be discriminated against on the grounds of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion, or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.

The first major legislative effort addressing immigration was the *Organic Law [Ley Orgánica] 7/1985 on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners*. Enacted primarily to satisfy the requirements for Spain's accession to the European Community, this law reflected the prevailing perception of immigration as a temporary phenomenon. Its primary focus was on regulating labor migration and fortifying border controls, aiming to position Spain as a stronghold against unauthorized entry into Europe.

Crucially, the 1985 law fell short of establishing a comprehensive framework for protecting immigrants' rights or fostering their integration into Spanish society. Instead, it leaned heavily on earlier legislation – particularly, *Law 5/1984 on Refugee Status and the Right to Asylum* – and Constitutional Court rulings to outline foreigners' rights. This fragmented approach left significant room for administrative discretion, often leading to restrictive interpretations of the law. Critics widely condemned it for its repressive stance, with some labeling it one of the harshest immigration systems in Europe at the time (González Ferrer & Cebolla Boado, 2008, p. 242).

As Spain evolved into a major receiving country in the 1990s, public and policy discussions began shifting toward labor rights, the regularization of undocumented migrants, and immigrant integration. The introduction of the first national *Plan on Social Integration of Immigrants (Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes, PICI)* in 1994 represented a significant step, signaling growing institutional recognition of the importance of integration. While the PICI's impact was limited due to insufficient funding and coordination (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2008, p. 21) it established a

⁶⁷ <https://www.ine.es/dyngs/Prensa/en/ECP1T24.htm.p>.

foundation for future initiatives. At the same time, discussions began around reforming Spain's restrictive immigration laws.

The *Organic Law 4/2000 on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and Their Social Integration* marked a watershed moment in Spain's immigration policy, reversing earlier criticisms of its approach. While the 1985 law had been criticized as retrograde, the 2000 law was hailed as one of the most progressive immigration laws in the European Union. Acknowledging immigration as a long-term phenomenon, it prioritized the social integration of immigrants, granting migrants constitutional equality with Spanish citizens and expanding their rights significantly. Key provisions included access to free legal aid, healthcare, education for minors, and social services, as well as the right to strike and unionize. It also introduced family reunification measures and delegated significant integration responsibilities to Spain's autonomous communities, aligning with the country's decentralized governance structure.

The 2000 law also established two critical institutions that have since become central to migration and integration policy:

- a) The Forum for Social Integration of Immigrants (*Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*): This advisory and consultative body provides recommendations to the government on immigration issues. Its structure features balanced tripartite representation, including members from public administration, immigrant associations, and social support organizations such as trade unions and employer groups.
- b) The Spanish Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia (*Observatorio Español del Racismo y la Xenofobia*, OBERAXE): Focused on promoting equality and combating discrimination, OBERAXE works in coordination with public and private entities, both nationally and internationally, to foster non-discriminatory practices.

However, the conservative Popular Party (PP) government argued that the 2000 law would trigger a *pull effect* for migrants and quickly introduced restrictive reforms. The *Organic Law 8/2000* rolled back several rights granted to undocumented immigrants, restricting their ability to assemble, associate, and unionize while reducing protections against administrative actions. A new program for migration governance launched for 2001-2004, GRECO (*Programa Global de Coordinación y Regulación de la Extranjería y la Inmigración*), sought to balance immigrant reception and integration with stricter regulation of migration flows and combating irregular immigration.

While GRECO provided logistical and financial support to regional and municipal governments, NGOs, and civil society actors, it remained primarily focused on controlling migration rather than fostering immigrant integration. Investments were heavily directed toward border surveillance,

detention centers, and development projects in origin countries rather than substantive rights or settlement policies (Schweitzer et al., 2022, p. 7).

The restrictive turn in immigration policy faced significant opposition from NGOs, trade unions, the Catholic Church, and regional governments, resulting in constitutional challenges. Although the Supreme Court invalidated some provisions in 2003 – particularly those limiting family reunification and free movement – the PP government responded with even stricter measures under *Organic Law 14/2003*. This law facilitated expulsions, streamlined administrative processes, imposed new obligations on transport companies, and enhanced police surveillance through municipal registries.

With the election of the socialist government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in 2004, Spain witnessed a pivotal shift in its approach to migration governance. The progressive provisions of *Law 4/2000* were reinstated through *Royal Decree-Law 2393/2004*, setting the stage for an ambitious regularization program aimed at addressing the significant number of undocumented workers in the country. This initiative targeted foreign workers who had resided in Spain for over six months, held no prior criminal record, and secured a bona fide work contract for at least six months (three months for agricultural work). The program became Spain's last and most extensive extraordinary regularization campaign, granting legal status to an impressive 576,506 non-EU workers (Schweitzer et al., 2022, p. 61).

Coherently with this policy, Zapatero's government placed significant emphasis on integration policies. In 2004, the Secretariat of State for Immigration and Emigration (*Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración*) was established under the Ministry of Labor, accompanied by a government fund to support regional and municipal integration efforts. Tasked with drafting a comprehensive integration program, the Secretariat undertook a thorough review of existing policies, which until then had primarily been developed at the regional level.

By this point, national leadership in integration policy was challenging, as autonomous communities had established their own systems, and some, such as Catalonia, claimed immigrant reception and integration as their exclusive competence (as asserted in the 2006 Catalan Statute, Article 139). Consequently, the Secretariat's role shifted to creating a framework that synthesized and supported existing regional and municipal approaches rather than imposing new national guidelines. This strategy allowed the national government to allocate financial support (approximately €200 million annually) without requiring local actors to restructure their established practices while promoting across regions policies which have proven successful in order to encourage a more uniform integration approach.

In 2006, these efforts culminated in the *Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración, PEI)*, covering the period 2007–2010. PEI became the

first comprehensive national framework for integration policies and practices in Spain, centering on the concept of integration and officially adopting the framework of diversity governance (Section 3.8) and the concept of *interculturality*, which had been gaining traction in European discourse and were already integral to local policies in Spain.

In accordance with the framework of diversity governance, cultural heterogeneity – referred to as *diversity* (*diversidad*) – was recognized as a potential social asset⁶⁸, with integration serving as the key mechanism for managing and harnessing its benefits. Integration was defined as a “continuous and dynamic process that occurs in different phases and aspects, in the short, medium and long term”, and which is naturally “bidirectional, because it affects both immigrants and the host society” (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2006, p. 116; my translation). Responsibility for integration was described as “shared” (*compartida*) among public administrations, social actors, immigrants, and society at large (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2006, p. 118; my translation). In this sense, integration needs to be promoted through a “comprehensive or global approach” (*enfoque integral o global*) approach based on an, capable of addressing its various facets, from economic and social dimensions to cultural and political participation (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2006, p. 119; my translation).

Within this framework, three foundational principles to guide integration efforts (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2006, p. 120-123; my translation):

- *Equality* (*Igualdad*): Emphasizes equal rights and obligations for all individuals, regardless of origin, while fostering a society free from discrimination based on gender, race, or nationality.
- *Citizenship* (*Ciudadanía*): Expands the concept of citizenship beyond legal status to include full civic, social, and cultural participation, recognizing immigrants as active contributors to society.
- *Interculturality* (*Interculturalidad*): Promotes interaction and dialogue among diverse cultures, rejecting assimilation in favor of mutual respect and communication. It encourages shared values while appreciating cultural differences.

The frames of *integration*, *diversity*, and *interculturality* adopted in the PECI had deep roots in local policies. Autonomous communities and municipalities had already been implementing these approaches, particularly in education and social services. Notably, the term *interculturality* (*interculturalitat*) was already popular in Catalonia at least since 1990, when an annual Summer

⁶⁸ “In the field of culture, immigration is contributing to a cultural diversity full of opportunities, which cannot but be enriching for a plural society like the Spanish one” (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2006, p. 8; my translation).

School on Interculturality (Escola d'Estiu sobre Interculturalitat) was established in Girona (see Besalú i Costa, 2008; Morén-Alegret, 2008, pp. 11-12). This initiative served as a catalyst for the dissemination of the concept, both within Catalonia and across other regions.

Over time, *interculturality* emerged as a key concept for addressing cultural heterogeneity, with scholars and practitioners in Catalonia and beyond emphasizing its relevance in fostering social cohesion and integration (Aramburu & Zegri, 1994). Local and regional governments began institutionalizing the concept, incorporating intercultural mediators into their policies, and designing a wide range of initiatives – particularly in the educational sector – around the principles of intercultural dialogue and mutual respect (Navarro et al., 2002).

This local innovation extended to comprehensive policies, where *interculturality*, alongside the broader frameworks of *diversity* and *integration*, emerged as a guiding principle. As noted in the PEGI (ivi, 106-107), autonomous communities implemented a variety of initiatives reflecting these principles. Municipalities also innovated in their own contexts. For instance, Barcelona's *Municipal Plan for Interculturality* (1997) became a reference point for municipalities seeking to develop policies addressing cultural diversity. Beyond Catalonia, other regions also adopted similar approaches. For example, the Official State Bulletin (BOE) highlighted a 2005 resolution by the city of Móstoles (Madrid Community), which announced a public tender for the development of a municipal intercultural project (*proyecto de interculturalidad*) (BOE-B-2005-274110).

9.5

Recent Developments of Immigration Laws and the Consolidation of a National Approach to Integration

In the period in which the *Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration* (PECI) was unfolding, Spain underwent significant political and economic changes. In 2008, the conservative Partido Popular (PP) returned to power as the country entered a severe economic crisis. These developments brought about a new wave of reforms in immigration policy, marked by stricter border controls, the criminalization of unauthorized crossings, and a strategic focus on attracting high-skilled migrants.

However, despite these shifts, the PP government maintained and even strengthened its commitment to integration efforts.

In 2009, the government passed *Organic Law 2/2009*, which aimed to reinforce mechanisms for monitoring and controlling migration, combat irregular immigration, and align legal migration pathways with labor market demands. Key measures included enhanced border controls, tougher penalties for violations, and streamlined processes for expelling individuals in irregular situations. While tightening immigration controls, this reform also strengthened certain rights for immigrants, such as the right to freedom of association and the right to strike. Protections for vulnerable groups, including victims of human trafficking and unaccompanied minors, were bolstered with legal assistance and access to specialized services. However, family reunification policies became more restrictive, and access to the labor market for migrants was heavily regulated to align with economic needs. Despite these constraints, the situation for long-term legal residents improved, reflecting a nuanced approach that balanced control with the protection of established residents' rights (see also Rodríguez-Piñero y Bravo-Ferrer, 2010).

Notably, the law reaffirmed the government's commitment to integration, identifying it as one of its four key objectives⁶⁹. This paved the way for the launch of a second phase of the *Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration* (PECI) for the period 2011-2014. In this new version of the plan, the concepts of *diversity* and *integration* were further developed in a declared attempt to align them more closely with European frameworks and discourses. A major evolution in this plan was its expanded understanding of *diversity*, which was no longer solely linked to migration but recognized as a structural feature of social life⁷⁰. At the same time, the plan adopted the typical frame that contemporary migration had contributed to increasing diversification, necessitating effective management strategies⁷¹.

In accordance with this discursive shift, the plan introduced a conceptual distinction between *integration of immigrants* (*integración de los inmigrantes*) and *management of diversity* (*gestión de la diversidad*) which previously were practically considered synonyms. In particular, integration was reframed as one dimension within the broader scope of diversity management.

⁶⁹ Ley Orgánica 2/2009, V/4: "Strengthening integration as one of the central axes of immigration policy which, taking into account the European Union's acquis on immigration and international protection, aims to achieve a framework for coexistence of identities and cultures".

⁷⁰ "Diversity is an inherent part of reality and life. In the case of human societies, all have components of diversity to a greater or lesser degree and with different profiles and relationships between diverse groups" (SEIE 2010, 109; my translation).

⁷¹ "Today, in the globalized world, along with processes of standardization, there are other processes of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversification. Internal and international migrations are one of the processes that generate diversity. All countries, regions, municipalities and even each citizen face the challenge of how to address the surrounding diversity, what attitude to adopt and what behaviors to consider valid." (ibid.)

The plan also explicitly adopted the narrative of *diversity advantage*, specifying it in two key passages:

The diversity generated by immigration, if well managed, can provide a competitive advantage and be a source of dynamism for European economies. (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2010, p. 86; my translation)

Diversity is not understood as a problem or a deficiency, but as an enriching reality that must be respected and managed positively. (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2010, p. 96; my translation)

The three guiding principles from the previous PEGI – *equality*, *citizenship*, and *interculturality* – were retained but further refined to address the structural causes of exclusion and the need for redistributive measures. They were also explicitly linked to national and European policy frameworks. Notably, the principle of interculturality was significantly elaborated, reflecting the *interculturalism*-*vs.-multiculturalism* frame that had gained prominence in the preceding years in debates across Europe. Accordingly, *interculturality* (*interculturalitat*) was connected to *interculturalism* (*interculturalisme*) as a sociopolitical and ethical model for inclusive diversity management, distinguishing it from *multiculturalism* in oppositional terms:

This Strategic Plan is guided by the principle of **interculturality** [*interculturalidad*], understanding **interculturalism** [*interculturalismo*] as a sociopolitical and ethical model of inclusive diversity management... interculturalism places emphasis – unlike **multiculturalism** and in a complementary but also critical and alternative way to it – on what is common and what unites, in the positive interaction between different people, to develop relationships not only of respect but of mutual learning, cooperation and peaceful and preventive regulation of conflict. (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2010, p. 110; my translation; my emphasis)

In addition to the three principles grounding the previous plan, PEGI 2011–2014 introduced a fourth principle: *inclusion* (Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, 2010, p. 107-109). This new focus highlighted the importance of addressing socioeconomic barriers to rights, resources, and opportunities. It emphasized the creation of equitable conditions through measures like education reform, wealth redistribution, and the dismantling of stereotypes, aiming to foster a more inclusive and cohesive society.

Following a renewed emphasis on integration, one of the most transformative reforms to the immigration law was introduced in 2011 through the *Royal Decree-Law 557/2011*. For the first time, this reform outlined institutional pathways for the regularization of undocumented immigrants who, despite their irregular status, had established meaningful social ties within Spanish society. This regularization process was defined under the legal framework of *arraigo* (*rootedness*), a concept

initially introduced by the pioneering *Law 4/2000* as an exceptional circumstance under which temporary residence could be granted. While earlier legislation had left the term ambiguous, with no clear guidance on its application, *Royal Decree-Law 557/2011* provided much-needed clarity by specifying three distinct forms of *arraigo*: *labor-based*, *social*, and *family-based*, along with the requirements for residency recognition under each category⁷².

Yet, this progressive focus on integration was accompanied by contradictory measures that heightened the marginalization and criminalization of undocumented migrants. In 2012, *Royal Decree-Law 16/2012* imposed significant restrictions on undocumented migrants' access to the healthcare system, excluding them from most services, including emergency care, maternal care, and pediatric services. This policy faced widespread condemnation from human rights organizations, who decried its potentially devastating humanitarian consequences.

In 2015, another controversial reform was introduced with *Law 4/2015*, which authorized *hot returns* (*devoluciones en caliente*) at the border in Ceuta and Melilla: these measures allowed authorities to expel migrants crossing borders irregularly without conducting individualized assessments of their cases. Critics, including international human rights advocates, argued that this practice violated international law and Spain's human rights obligations, prompting legal challenges and sparking heated public debate.

Conversely, aligning with the reinforced diversity-advantage narrative promoted in the second version of the *Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration* (PECI), the government enacted *Law 14/2013* to attract foreign investment and talent. This reform introduced a category of residence permits, often referred to as the *Golden Visa*, aimed at stimulating economic growth. It offered facilitated residency for foreign investors, streamlined entry and residence procedures for entrepreneurs with innovative business projects, simplified the hiring of non-EU professionals for Spanish companies, and eased visa and residency requirements to attract research talent and international students.

After the end of the second version of the PEGI, a hiatus followed until 2023, during which no national-level comprehensive plan for diversity management were enacted. This seven-year gap was

⁷² Specifically:

- (a) *Arraigo laboral*: Individuals who have worked in Spain without a formal contract for at least six months and continuously resided in the country for two-year can obtain a one-year residency and work permit, with retroactive recognition of work for social security purposes.
- (b) *Arraigo social*: Individuals who have resided in Spain for at least three continuous years and have an offer of employment or a pre-contract for at least one year, or, alternatively, individuals who are studying, living with family, or having familial ties with a resident, if they get a Social Integration Report and demonstrate basic language skills may obtain a one-year work and residency permit.
- (c) *Arraigo familiar*: Individuals who are parents of Spanish children or children of Spanish citizens by origin receive a residency and work permit valid for one year, with no geographic or activity restrictions.

influenced by political instability, economic challenges, and the increasing consolidation of local policies and practices, which reduced the perceived need for national coordination and support. Consequently, investment in integration and diversity initiatives significantly declined, leaving much of the momentum from earlier efforts to be carried forward at the regional and municipal levels.

Nevertheless, the government continued introducing several significant legal reforms concerning marginalized groups and migrants. After the PP's tenure ended in 2018, the *Royal Decree-Law 7/2018* repealed the restrictive healthcare measures imposed in 2012, restoring universal access to free public healthcare for all residents, including undocumented immigrants. This reform marked an important step in ensuring equitable access to basic rights. A few years later, *Royal Decree 903/2021* brought substantial improvements for unaccompanied foreign minors and young adults. The decree streamlined processes for these individuals to obtain residence permits, granted work permits to minors aged 16 and above and offered greater support for their social and economic integration as they transitioned to adulthood.

Another critical reform was *Royal Decree 629/2022*, which expanded the provisions for granting temporary residency to undocumented migrants under the *arraigo* framework established in 2011. This decree relaxed requirements, creating a more accessible path to regularization and preparing the ground for a comprehensive reform of immigration policy introduced in *Royal Decree 1155/2024*.

This 2024 reform represented the last update to the *Organic Law 4/2000*, aimed at simplifying administrative processes by reducing redundant documentation and aligning Spanish immigration policy with European standards. Notably, this measure has greatly enhanced the protections for vulnerable groups – particularly victims of sexual violence and refugees. In addition, conditions for residence and work permits were eased, a job-seeker visa for skilled professionals was introduced, and the eligibility criteria for family reunification and transitions from temporary to permanent residency were eased. Crucially, the reform also redefined and expanded the *arraigo* framework, introducing two new forms:

- *Second-chance arraigo (arraigo de segunda oportunidad)*: for individuals who previously held a residence permit but were unable to renew it.
- *Socioformative arraigo (arraigo socioformativo)*: allowing individuals enrolled in training programs to regularize their status and facilitate workforce integration.

During this period, Spain also strengthened its focus on integration and inclusion, guided by the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination and the ideal of social inclusion (*inclusión social*). These principles were reflected not only in migration governance but also in

legislation aimed at other minority groups. Between 2022 and 2023, three significant laws were enacted:

- *Law 6/2022*, updating and refining the 2013 *General Law on the Rights of People with Disabilities and Their Social Inclusion*
- *Law 15/2022*, focusing on the promotion of equal treatment and non-discrimination.
- *Law 4/2023*, ensuring real and effective equality for transgender individuals and protecting LGBTI rights.

This legislative progress culminated in 2023 with the Council of Ministers' *Strategic Framework for Citizenship and Inclusion, Against Racism and Xenophobia* (*Marco Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inclusión, contra el Racismo y la Xenofobia*), prepared by OBERAXE. Covering the period until 2027, this programmatic document updated Spain's previous integration plans while aligning them with contemporary European directives. Building on the foundational principles of earlier strategies, this new measure crucially expanded the scope of inclusion, moving beyond a migrant-focused lens to adopt a broader perspective addressing the challenges faced by all marginalized groups. This shift was rooted in an intersectional approach, recognizing the interconnected nature of social exclusions and the compounded vulnerabilities experienced by individuals belonging to multiple minority groups.

Naturally, the framework maintained a strong emphasis on improving the inclusion of migrants, yet it put a renewed focus on the unique challenges faced by foreign women and unaccompanied minors, highlighting their need for tailored support and integration efforts. Importantly, for the first time, the strategy extended its lens to include other marginalized communities, reflecting a broader understanding of diversity and inclusion. In particular, religious minorities, women and LGBTI individuals, the Roma people, and people with disabilities were explicitly included within the scope of this measure.

9.6

Spain's Migration Governance and Integration at the Local Level

The Spanish Constitution grants the state exclusive authority over matters of “nationality, immigration, emigration, status of aliens, and right of asylum” (SC 1978, Art. 149/2). Despite this broad mandate, until the early 2000s, national immigration policy was almost entirely preoccupied with border control and regulating entry, primarily to meet the growing demand for foreign labor. Immigration was framed predominantly as a matter of national security, overseen by the Ministry for the Interior, and closely linked to labor market demands, managed by the Ministry of Labor. Successive immigration policy reforms often focused on finding administratively controllable pathways to grant legal status to the many individuals excluded by these early cumbersome regulations, both upon arrival and during the renewal of residence permits (see also Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012).

Meanwhile, the responsibility for addressing the settlement and integration of migrants fell largely to local governments. For nearly three decades, these had to develop their own approaches to manage the rapidly growing migrant population in the absence of comprehensive national directives or frameworks. Regional governments provided some normative and financial support, but the onus ultimately remained on municipalities. The visible surge in migration during the 1990s coincided with Spain’s decentralization process, which empowered autonomous communities and municipalities, particularly in areas crucial to migrants’ settlement and integration, such as healthcare, welfare, education, employment, and housing. This overlap fostered a *laissez-faire* approach at the national level – often described by some as a “non-model” or “absent model” of integration (Terrón, 2010) – and solidified the role of local governments in migration and diversity governance (see also Pajares, 2006; Cebolla & González, 2013).

By the time integration gained prominence in national discourse and migration-related policymaking, local governments were already deeply involved in migration and diversity management. Coherently with the ideals of decentralization, a consensus emerged that while the regulation of immigration flows was a national prerogative, integration should be managed by local authorities. This reasoning was also grounded in the rationale that local entities are closer to the realities of migration and possess jurisdiction – shaped by diverse regional policy frameworks and cultures – over key areas related to integration. Several autonomous communities even enshrined exclusive competence in integration within their Statutes of Autonomy.

As a result, national integration programs, including the most comprehensive ones, such as the PEI, were primarily designed to provide financial support for existing local practices. This support was particularly critical during the economic crisis when municipalities faced pressures to implement austerity measures. These national frameworks also sought to encourage broader engagement in

integration efforts among local authorities by codifying and promoting successful policies and practices that were already operational.

However, over time, the ideal division of competencies in Spain between a national focus on regulating migration flows and a local emphasis on integration began to blur, particularly in the management of the growing population of undocumented migrants. This shift was driven by a tension between efforts to criminalize and combat irregular migration on the one hand, and obligations to adhere to international – primarily European – standards that require the protection of basic rights for all residents, regardless of their legal status. In this evolving context, municipalities found themselves on the frontlines of migration management, a position reinforced by the unique Spanish legal instrument of the *municipal census*, known in the Spanish normative framework as *padrón* (see Llorens, 2006; Garcés-Mascreñas, 2011).

The *padrón* represents more than a simple administrative tool: it is the cornerstone for granting access to basic rights and services in Spain. Registration in the *padrón* – *empadronamiento* – is a prerequisite for receiving municipal services, regardless of an individual's immigration status. The roots of this system trace back to 1813 when a royal decree required local authorities to maintain periodic records of births, marriages, and deaths. It became integral to democratic Spain with the passage of *Law 7/1985*, which, in Article 15, established the framework for democratic town councils and mandated the registration of both Spanish and foreign residents in the municipal census (for a detailed history of the development of the *padrón* system, see Ruipérez, 2012).

As Spain's migrant population grew significantly around the turn of the millennium, the *padrón* emerged as a crucial tool for managing this demographic shift. During the massive regularization campaign of undocumented residents launched by the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, registration in the *padrón* became a mandatory condition for regularization. Since the enactment of *Law 4/2000*, and particularly with *Real Decreto 2393/2004*, the *padrón* has been indispensable for regularization through the *arraigo* process. Although the *Real Decreto 557/2011* formalized the responsibility of autonomous communities to oversee *arraigo* reports, municipalities have retained practical authority in producing these reports, often with significant discretionary leeway in the procedures for *empadronamiento*.

This discretionary authority became especially evident during the period following the *Royal Decree-Law 16/2012*, which – until its repeal by *Royal Decree-Law 7/2018* – restricted access to public healthcare for undocumented migrants and foreigners not contributing to Social Security. Health services, under the jurisdiction of autonomous communities and municipalities, were unevenly applied across regions. While some municipalities adhered strictly to the state decree, others, such as the Generalitat de Catalunya and the city of Barcelona, sought to mitigate its exclusionary impact.

They established programs to ensure healthcare access for those excluded by the decree and continued using the *padrón* as the primary requirement for accessing services like education, healthcare, and language courses. These municipalities also refused to use the *padrón* for immigration control, fostering trust between irregular migrants and local institutions.

While this discretionary flexibility has allowed innovative and inclusive models to emerge, it has also resulted in uneven treatment across Spanish territories, particularly regarding the right to healthcare. Nonetheless, the evolving role of the *padrón* has significantly consolidated the role of municipalities within Spain's broader migration governance framework, especially in addressing the needs of irregular migrants.

9.7

Developing a *Catalan Way* to Integration and Diversity Governance

Catalonia has emerged as a pioneering model in Europe for integrating migrants, particularly in addressing the challenges of those arriving without legal status. As a region at the forefront of Spain's decentralization process, Catalonia has consistently asserted its role and competencies in managing migration. As early as 1993, the Generalitat de Catalunya launched the *Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration (Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració)*, a seven-year policy spanning until 2000. This groundbreaking plan – the first of its kind in Spain – laid the foundation for subsequent national integration frameworks. Catalonia has since implemented five additional plans:

- 1) 2001-2004: The second *Interdepartmental Plan for Immigration* (2001-2004).
- 2) 2005-2008: The *Citizenship and Immigration Plan (Pla de Ciutadania i Immigració)*
- 3) 2009–2012: The second *Citizenship and Immigration Plan*
- 4) 2014-2016: The *Citizenship and Migrations Plan (Pla de ciutadania i de les migracions)*
- 5) 2017-2020 (then extended until 2022): The second *Citizenship and Migrations Plan*.

While these plans do not explicitly include the term *integration* in their titles, they all address this dimension comprehensively serving as foundational frameworks for the development and implementation of numerous initiatives.

Despite the shifts in regional government leadership over the years, these plans exhibit remarkable consistency in framing migration and cultural heterogeneity and in formulating approaches to managing them. A central premise shared across these documents is the portrayal of Catalan society as inherently plural and open, with immigration as an integral and defining element of its identity. This view is rooted in Catalonia's self-perception as a *land of welcome* (*tierra de acogida*), a narrative that gained traction during the late Franco era (Falguera & Serra, 2021, pp. 232-233). Prominent figures such as Jordi Pujol – Catalonia's president from 1980 to 2003 and a driving force behind the first two *Interdepartmental Plans on Immigration* – and Paco Candel, a writer known for his poignant depictions of immigrant life in Barcelona's suburbs, helped shape this discourse (Domingo, 2014). This inclusive concept eventually became a cornerstone of Catalonia's identity, enshrined in the preamble of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. Alongside the narrative of Catalonia as a land of welcome, the plans emphasize the region's commitment to democratic values and human rights, closely linked with the principle of pluralism.

Regarding immigration itself, the plans consistently highlight its positive impact on Catalonia's society, particularly in demographic terms. For much of the 20th century, Catalonia experienced one of Europe's lowest fertility rates. Immigration has been seen as a critical factor in offsetting these demographic challenges, contributing to population growth, higher birth rates, and a younger demographic profile. Immigration has thus been framed as an essential component of the Catalan system of reproduction, where historically low fertility rates have been counterbalanced by a steady influx of migrants (see, for example, Cabré, 1999).

While immigration is portrayed as a positive force, these plans also recognize the challenges it presents, particularly in ensuring adequate institutional responses. The needs of migrants must be met to promote integration and cohesion, paying special attention to the inclusivity and accessibility of public services, especially those related to welfare (Bommes & Geddes, 2000).

Within this shared framework, the plans reflect the evolution of Catalonia's approach to migrant integration and cultural diversity. The initial plan laid the groundwork for subsequent provisions, introducing a core principle of *equality* (*igualtat*). This principle emphasizes equal enjoyment of rights and opportunities, requiring proactive measures to combat social, economic, and political exclusion. By stimulating immigrant participation and combating discrimination, the plans underscore the commitment to building an inclusive, participatory society that reflects Catalonia's pluralistic values.

The second *Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration* published in 2001 marked a significant evolution in Catalonia's approach to integration, explicitly articulating what was called “a Catalan way to integration” (*una via catalana d'integració*) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001, p. 7; my

translation). This was defined as “a model that achieves the maximum balance between respect for diversity and the feeling of belonging to a single community... designed to ensure that immigrants assume the importance of respecting democratic coexistence, the Catalan language and culture” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001, p. 7; my translation). At its core, this approach was grounded in the principle of equality, viewed as the basic prerequisite for achieving meaningful integration.

A key condition for ensuring equality was the “normalization or universality of services” (*normalització o universalitat dels serveis*), which aimed to prevent the segregation of foreigners by avoiding parallel structures and, instead, *mainstreaming* integration into public administration (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001, p. 130; my translation). This commitment to mainstreaming was further enhanced by the adoption of an *intersectional perspective*, sensitive to socioeconomic and gender differences (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001, pp.131-135). Another interconnected element was the *transversalization* of integration policies and practices. Recognizing that integration touches on all aspects of life – such as health, education, housing, and social services – the plan emphasized the need for comprehensive coordination across all administrative departments and policymaking dimensions.

Consistently, the plan also highlighted the importance of *holistic coordination*, advocating for robust inter-administrative cooperation. Crucially, this collaborative effort was envisioned to extend well beyond the confines of public administration, emphasizing the *co-responsibility* of all social and economic stakeholders within Catalonia. As stated in the plan: “The response to the challenges of immigration and the development of a Catalan model of integration is the responsibility of the population of Catalonia as a whole, including public administration, entities and associations, and social agents” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001, p. 131; my translation). Immigrants themselves were seen as essential contributors to this collective effort, with the plan explicitly rejecting a top-down approach: “We cannot work for immigrants without immigrants” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001, p. 131; my translation).

A transformative era for Catalonia’s integration policies began with the election of Pasqual Maragall as president of the Generalitat in 2003. This charismatic leader, who had previously served as Barcelona’s mayor from 1982 to 1997, brought a renewed emphasis on citizenship and the vital role of cities in fostering integration. His leadership coincided with a period of general innovation in migration and diversity governance, driven in part by the sweeping reforms introduced at the national level by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s government, primarily the extraordinary regularization campaign and the establishment of the *padrón* as a cornerstone of migration governance, which underscored the importance of local governance in managing migration. This convergence of progressive leadership at both the regional and national levels created fertile ground for reimagining

integration policies, positioning Catalonia – and its cities – as key players in Spain’s broader system of migration and diversity governance.

Accordingly, at the end of the period covered by the second *Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration*, a new comprehensive measure was enacted in 2005: the *Citizenship and Immigration Plan (Pla de Ciutadania i Immigració)*. Building on the framework of the previous plans, this new policy significantly expanded and refined Catalonia’s approach. As indicated by its title, the new plan introduced a distinctive focus on the interplay between migration, integration, and citizenship, a theme that would define subsequent plans. Central to this approach was the concept of *resident citizenship (ciutadania resident)*, a transformative idea rooted in the notion of *substantive citizenship* (Section 3.8, p. 84). This concept decoupled citizenship from state nationality, instead anchoring it on “material residence and the person’s will to remain effectively and permanently” as part of the local community (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005, pp. 33-34; my translation).

Crucially, resident citizenship was practically defined through the *padrón*, which the plan reframed as an expression of the immigrant’s intent to settle and share public spaces with Catalonia’s long-term residents. Registration in the *padrón* was equated with the acquisition of resident citizenship, granting individuals recognition as equals within the local community. This recognition entitled them to basic human rights, equal opportunities in socioeconomic and cultural life, and civic participation. Acknowledging the structural barriers migrants often face, the plan emphasized the need for tailored support to ensure equitable access to rights and opportunities. Yet, it adhered firmly to the principle of policy mainstreaming, stipulating that such measures should only be applied to migrants when structural disadvantages impede their ability to access rights and opportunities – just as they would be for any other vulnerable group within the community.

The focus on citizenship also brought attention to the *duties* that came with rights. Embracing democratic values and learning Catalan were identified as essential conditions for meaningful participation in the local community. More specifically, while the cultural and linguistic heritage of migrants was to be respected within the bounds of Catalan values and law, Catalan language proficiency was seen as the gateway to social, economic, political, and cultural opportunities (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005, p. 116; my translation).

Emergence and Consolidation of *Interculturality* and *Interculturalism* in Catalonia's Approach to Cohesion and Inclusion

Together with the introduction of the key frame of citizenship, the 2005 plan also introduced *diversitat* (diversity) and *interculturalitat* (interculturality) as key frames for the region's policies and discourse on cultural heterogeneity. This represented a dramatic departure from the preceding 2001 Plan, where *diversitat* was mentioned only twice without substantive elaboration, and *interculturalitat* was entirely absent. In contrast, the 2005 Plan referenced *diversitat* 86 times and devoted a specific subsection (5.1.1) to defining *interculturalitat*.

The new plan explicitly embraced a dynamic view of culture, aligning with the broader European framework of diversity governance emerging at the time. It defined diversity as “an inevitable historical fact” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005, p. 34), emphasizing that the rapid growth of international immigration had profoundly amplified societal diversification. Interestingly, at this stage, diversity was not yet framed as a social asset or advantage. Instead, diversity management (*gestió de la diversitat*) was characterized in terms of “a new obligation of our society” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005, p. 34; my translation) to support the overarching ideal of substantive citizenship that underpinned the plan.

In this framework, *interculturality* was introduced as an operational concept. It was not positioned as a comprehensive framework akin to *interculturalism*, but rather as “an attitude and behavior based on empathy and mutual understanding,” which the plan identified as essential for achieving integration (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005, p. 116; my translation). This definition resonated with the concept of *intercultural dialogue*, which was gaining traction within European institutions during the same period, and which was explicitly referenced within the plan (e.g., Generalitat de Catalunya, 2005, p. 117).

The inclusion of interculturality at the regional level was likely directly influenced by Pasqual Maragall, who, before becoming president of the Generalitat, had promoted Barcelona's *Municipal Interculturality Plan* of 1997, which had identified *interculturality* as a guiding principle for integration. In any case, the 2005 *Citizenship and Immigration Plan* marked the moment when interculturality scaled up from a municipal initiative to a regional policy framework in Catalonia.

The year following the publication of the plan, the current Statute of Catalonia was adopted, further cementing the Generalitat's exclusive competencies in immigration and integration. Article 139 enshrined these responsibilities, granting the Generalitat authority over the “initial reception of immigrants,” the “development of integration policy for immigrants,” and the authorization of work

permits for foreigners employed in Catalonia in coordination with the State – this last point was later clarified by *Real Decreto 1463/2009*.

Before the 2005 *Plan* concluded, the Generalitat initiated a participatory process to validate its principles and objectives through the *National*⁷³ *Pact on Immigration (Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració)*. Signed in 2008, the agreement was aimed at fostering the long-term sustainability of the plan's framework by securing broad political and social consensus. It was endorsed by the Catalan Government, most political parties represented in the government (with the notable exception of the right-wing PP), and major social and economic stakeholders.

After the *Citizenship and Immigration Plan* concluded in 2008, a new version with the same title was published in 2009, building on the framework established by its predecessor. This plan also incorporated refinements validated through the *National Agreement on Immigration* and the participatory process that had informed its drafting. While the updated plan did not introduce significant innovations as for the core tenets of Catalonia's integration strategy, it marked a significant development: the introduction of the *diversity-advantage* narrative into Catalonia's integration policy. Here, cultural heterogeneity, framed as *diversitat*, was celebrated as “a driving force not only for economic development but also a means for intellectual, emotional, moral, and spiritual fulfillment” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009, p. 126; my translation).

A year later, the Catalan Parliament reinforced this framework by approving *Act 10/2010* on the reception of immigrants and returnees. This legislation aimed to establish a comprehensive framework for immigration and integration, reflecting both regional priorities and alignment with European Union principles. In continuity with prior integration policies, the law reaffirmed Catalonia's identity as a *land of welcome (tierra de acogida)* and grounded its approach to integration in the principles of equality and resident citizenship. It recognized immigration as a shared societal responsibility, emphasizing the collaboration of political institutions, economic actors, social organizations, and individuals. Alongside its recognition of immigrants' rights, the legislation underscored their duties, particularly emphasizing the centrality of the Catalan language as a cornerstone of integration and social cohesion. Accordingly, language learning was framed as a prerequisite for normalization under the *arraigo* framework.

In 2014, the Generalitat released a new regional integration plan titled *Citizenship and Migrations Plan (Pla de ciutadania i de les migracions)*, which was designed to cover the period until 2016. While its title reflected a slight shift, its content largely reiterated the established framework. In fact, the 2014 plan served as a concise summary of prior strategies, condensed into just 62 pages – less than half the length of earlier plans, which typically averaged 140 pages.

⁷³ This term referred to Catalonia not the Spanish Nation.

In 2016, the Generalitat introduced a second iteration of the *Citizenship and Migrations Plan* to span 2017-2020, which was then extended until 2022. This plan, notable for its brevity – just 20 pages – provided a succinct overview of Catalonia’s integration approach before outlining strategic goals and actions. Despite its condensed format, the plan introduced a key development: the adoption of the *interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism* narrative, which led to the reframing of Catalonia’s approach to cultural heterogeneity through the lens of interculturalism. Specifically, the plan presented Catalonia’s approach in oppositional terms with *assimilationism* and *multiculturalism*, describing these as inadequate models for managing diversity. Instead, the plan stated that “we want to approach the diversity of Catalan society from the perspective of interculturalism [*interculturalisme*], from which the ideas and actions of any person or group with specific cultural identities are not allowed to be above any other” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009, p. 6; my translation).

Interculturalism was defined as a perspective that “aims to develop a common public culture based on the values of democracy, freedom, and the defense of human rights, in a framework of respect for cultural diversity, positive experience of this diversity, and fostering interaction” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009, p. 6; my translation). By embracing interculturalism, Catalonia’s integration approach achieved full alignment with both national and European frameworks for migration and diversity governance. The focus on interculturalism underscored Catalonia’s commitment to fostering a cohesive society that respects diversity while prioritizing shared democratic values and meaningful interaction among all residents.

This new way of framing Catalonia’s approach was, once again, further strengthened through an extensive participatory process aimed at building broad political and social consensus among key stakeholders, including institutions, political parties, civil society organizations, enterprises, and individual citizens. This collaborative effort culminated in the publication of the *National Pact for Interculturality* (*Pacte Nacional Per La Interculturalitat*) in 2019. The pact solidified interculturalism as the cornerstone of Catalonia’s framework for managing diversity and fostering social cohesion and inclusion within local communities.

CHAPTER 10

Case Study: Barcelona and the *City of Interculturalitat*

Arriving in the field...

Barcelona (Image 1) is a city located in North-Eastern Spain, close to the border with France and overlooking the Mediterranean Sea. As of 2024, it has a population of 1,702,814⁷⁴ and it covers a total area of 101.35 km². This makes Barcelona the second-largest city in the country, following the capital, Madrid. The city is characterized by a significantly numerous foreign residents: 432,556 people as of 2024, amounting to the 25.4% of the total⁷⁵.



Image 1. Urban landscape of Barcelona (iStock Images)

⁷⁴

⁷⁵

When I first arrived in Barcelona in June 2021, the narrow, winding alleys of El Born immediately captivated me. This neighborhood, nestled between Barceloneta and the Barri Gòtic, with its small shops and cafes, is a popular residential area for expats. It was a far cry from the image I had of Barcelona – a vision shaped by friends’ stories, literary accounts, and online depictions. I had imagined a city of vibrant nightlife, dancing, and freedom, where young people and expats could easily blend into its energetic, entrepreneurial pulse. The Barcelona I pictured was a place teeming with life, defined by its *Modernista* architecture, a proud anti-fascist and leftist spirit, and, of course, the home of FC Barcelona, one of the world’s most formidable soccer teams.

But Barcelona also carries a reputation, like Rome and Paris, as one of Europe’s main hotspots for pickpocketing (e.g., O'Donoghue, 2024). This reputation became all too real for me on my very first day when my headphones were snatched from my backpack. During my fieldwork, I faced again this issue more than once – twice my phone was taken right out of my pocket. Eventually, I adopted a local solution: using an anti-theft safety rope, I slung my phone over my shoulder for added security.

Living in Barcelona gave me the opportunity to explore the city’s many layers. There is the Barcelona of tourists, dominated by Gaudí’s architectural masterpieces and the artistic heritage of Miró and Picasso. There is the Barcelona of nightclubs and beach parties, where people dance until dawn, as well as hidden getaways in the surrounding hills and mountains. But beyond these, there is also the Barcelona that is the subject of my study: the vibrant, diverse, and entrepreneurial city, in constant evolution. But beyond these familiar images lies the Barcelona that drew me in as a researcher: a vibrant, diverse, and entrepreneurial city, constantly evolving. During my time there, I witnessed how these different facets – shaped by history, culture, and modern life – emerge, intersect, and sometimes clash, each playing a part in creating the rich, complex tapestry that makes Barcelona unique.

10.1

Origins and Rise of Barcelona: The Evolution of a Mediterranean Political and Economic Hub

The first settlements on the plain where modern-day Barcelona now stands date back to the fifth millennium BCE. Little is known about the early history of these native peoples except that, by the first millennium BCE, they began to encounter cultural influences from Phoenician and Greek merchants. Attracted by the strategic location of what is now Catalonia, these merchants established key settlements and trade centers nearby. Around the third century BCE, a specific Iberian group known as the Laietani (*Laiesken*), or the *people from Laie*, had established dominance in the region. It is believed that during this period, a city named Barkenos was founded, eventually coming under the influence of the Carthaginians.

A medieval legend claims that the city was founded by the mythological Greek hero Heracles. According to this tale, Heracles decided to establish the city after one of his fleet's nine boats, lost in a storm, was found safe and sound in this area. Medieval authors creatively linked the name Barcelona to the Latin *Barca Nona*, referring, precisely, to this *ninth boat*. A more plausible version suggests that Barkenos was one of several cities founded by the Phoenicians on the Iberian Peninsula, possibly named after the famous Barca⁷⁶ family, known for their opposition to Rome's growing hegemony in the Mediterranean during the Punic Wars (264-241 BCE and 218-201 BCE).

Regardless of Barkenos' true origins, it is certain that after the Phoenician defeat in the Punic Wars, the area gradually came under the influence of the Roman Republic. By the end of the first century BCE, the Romans had established a colony that would eventually evolve into modern Barcelona. This colony was initially named *Barcino*, a Latinized version of Barkenos. The name evolved into *Barchinona* during the Visigothic period (5th-8th century CE) and later into *Barshiluna* under Muslim rule after becoming part of the Umayyad Caliphate in 720 CE. In 801, *Barshiluna* was conquered by Louis the Pious, son of Charlemagne, marking the southernmost Christian territorial gain from the Moors.

Known as Barcelona thereafter, the city grew in importance as an administrative center during the Middle Ages. It temporarily served as the capital of the Visigothic Kingdom from 507 to 542, and then regained prominence as the capital of the County of Barcelona under Frankish rule. In 1162, it was incorporated into the Crown of Aragon, eventually becoming the capital of the newly established Principality of Catalonia. By the 13th century, Barcelona's strategic location at the frontier between the Islamic and Christian worlds solidified its status as a major trading center and maritime power in the Mediterranean, accompanying the development of one of the most sophisticated constitutional systems of medieval Europe.

⁷⁶ Most scholars trace the origins of the name Barca to the Phoenician "Barak", meaning "thunderbolt," "lightning". According to another interpretation, Barca's name would derive from "Baruk" or "the blessed one".

Starting in the 15th century, internal political and social conflicts, culminating in the Catalan Civil War (1462-1472), led Catalonia into a prolonged period of decline, marked by population loss and economic downturn. This situation weakened the Crown of Aragon and bolstered the rising Crown of Castile's dominance on the Iberian Peninsula. After the two monarchies were unified with the marriage of Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon in 1469, priorities shifted toward Castilian interests, further marginalizing Catalonia. Notably, the region's once-thriving enterprises were excluded from the lucrative affairs in Spanish America.

Catalan opposition to the Bourbon dynasty during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) resulted in severe cultural and political repression. Following Barcelona's fall in 1714, Catalonia lost most of its long-standing local autonomy and was reduced to a mere region within the newly established Bourbon Spain. The public use of the Catalan language was increasingly suppressed, and cultural production was tightly controlled by central authorities. To prevent any resurgence of rebellion, Barcelona was transformed into a military stronghold for the Bourbon government. Military barracks and forts were established within the city, often repurposing civilian or religious buildings. The ancient Montjuïc Castle was renovated and expanded, and the La Ribera district was partially destroyed to make room for the fearsome Citadel (*Ciudadella*), a symbol of the repressive militarization against the city.

Despite the shadow of repression, centralization, and militarization, the restoration of peace marked the beginning of a new era of extraordinary prosperity in Catalonia. Barcelona progressively reemerged as a major economic, socio-political, and cultural hub. Innovations in agriculture and manufacturing led to surpluses and the accumulation of capital, much of which naturally flowed into the city. With its strategic port, trading expertise, and significant regional and national connections, by the end of the 18th century, Barcelona had become the center of the Catalan regional market and one of Spain's main exporters of agricultural products and manufactured goods. The Free Trade Decree (*Reglamento para el comercio libre*) issued by King Charles III in 1778 allowed Barcelona to engage in direct trade with Spanish colonies, significantly boosting its economy.

These economic developments coincided with the rise of a commercial and manufacturing bourgeoisie, which became the most active social group in Barcelona. In the early 19th century, this new elite spearheaded the city's industrialization, beginning with the opening of the first steam-powered cotton factory in 1832. Barcelona rapidly transformed into one of Spain's major industrial centers. This bourgeoisie, soon joined by the *Indianos* – Catalans who had migrated to Spanish colonies and returned with wealth to invest in industries and businesses – also played a key role in the so-called *Renaixença*, an intellectual movement aimed at reviving Catalan language and culture.

While the industrial elite increased its wealth and power, Barcelona also saw the emergence of what can be considered Spain's first true proletariat. This consisted of a growing number of migrants, mainly from southeastern Spain, drawn to the city by its remarkable economic expansion and industrialization. As a result, Barcelona's population doubled from 100,106 inhabitants in 1787 to 235,060 in 1857 (McDonogh & Martinez-Rigol, 2018). This rapid demographic growth continued, reaching 405,913 inhabitants in 1887 and 544,617 in 1900 (*ibid.*). Barcelona's workers became known for their skill in organizing trade unions and social cooperation, as well as their strong ideological inclination toward anarcho-syndicalism (Payne, 1971, p. 22). The tensions between the industrial bourgeoisie and the organized urban proletariat defined the city's social landscape from the late 19th to the late 20th century.

During this period, Barcelona underwent significant urban and architectural developments that shaped the city we know today. The demographic boom of the 19th century led to overcrowding within the old medieval walls, creating pressure for urban expansion. The industrial elite's interest in urban development and modernization aimed at transforming Barcelona into a modern economic and trade capital. Between the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, Barcelona was dramatically transformed: the medieval walls were demolished in 1854, making way for the urban grid known as the *Eixample* (expansion), which began unfolding in 1860; the hated Ciutadella was destroyed in 1868 and converted into the city's main public park by 1881; several surrounding municipalities, such as Gràcia, Sants, and Horta, were incorporated in 1897; *Modernista* architecture began to shape the city's buildings; and metropolitan infrastructure, including the subway (starting in 1863) and the Via Laietana (1908-1913), was developed.

10.2

Municipalism, Urban Entrepreneurship, and Politics in Modern Barcelona

Starting in the second half of the 19th century, European capital cities began systematically engaging in city branding and city diplomacy through the organization of international mega-events. This trend was inaugurated by London in 1851 with the first Universal Exhibition and quickly followed by Paris in 1855. These events were used by cities and their national governments to boost

their international visibility and reputation as centers of innovation and culture. International exhibitions not only showcased modernity through technical and architectural innovations but also strengthened cities' entrepreneurial momentum by attracting international partners and investors, forging political, economic, and cultural relationships, and establishing them as key nodes in an increasingly interconnected world.

Inspired by prominent capital cities, ambitious and competitive non-capital cities like Barcelona also began organizing international exhibitions. Unlike capital cities, which typically received substantial support from central governments, non-capital cities relied on local governments and private promoters for organization and financing (Espuche et al., 1991, p. 140). Despite having fewer resources and a more modest scope, these events allowed local elites to pursue specific goals without being constrained by national interests.

The 1888 Barcelona Universal Exhibition followed directly in the footsteps of other European non-capital cities. Initiated as a private initiative by Eugenio Serrano, a Galician entrepreneur living in Barcelona who had coordinated Spanish displays at various European exhibitions⁷⁷, the idea was soon embraced by the local government, which took the lead in organizing the event. An organizing committee was formed, including the mayor, the city's two richest bankers, a prominent industrialist, the dean of the bar association and law school, and other influential urban figures (Jacobson, 2011, p. 79). The exhibition was held in Ciutadella Park, a location chosen for both practical and symbolic reasons. While public parks were commonly used for such events⁷⁸, the local government purposefully decided to use the occasion to transform the Ciutadella Park, once the site of a fortress symbolizing central government repression, into the venue celebrating Barcelona's success as a modern city.

Although the 1888 Exhibition achieved modest results in terms of content and direct impact (Jacobson, 2011, p. 102; Espuche et al., 1991). It showcased no major new inventions, featured no groundbreaking scientific discoveries, saw limited participation from other countries, and brought minimal urban development aside from expanding the electric lighting system and urbanizing the Ciutadella Park and Passeig de Sant Joan. Additionally, the exhibition left the city with significant debt, which was covered by municipal bond issues (Jacobson, 2011, p. 102).

Despite its shortcomings, the exhibition was a crucial turning point in Barcelona's development. It marked the city's entry into the international municipalism movement and established a strategy of using international cultural events to promote the city's image, drive urban development, and stimulate the local economy. This formula was replicated in subsequent events, such as the 1929

⁷⁷ Namely, in Frankfurt (1881), Bordeaux (1882), Amsterdam (1883), Nice (1884) and Antwerp (1885).

⁷⁸ E.g., Hyde Park in London, the Champs de Mars in Paris, the Prater in Vienna, Fairmount Park in Philadelphia

Barcelona International Exposition, the 1992 Summer Olympics, and the 2004 Universal Forum of Cultures.

The 1888 Universal Exhibition also had significant political repercussions. The prolonged celebration and international recognition fueled local debate about Barcelona's role within Spain and its relationship with the central government (Jacobson, 2011, pp. 76-78). Drawing on historical memories of Barcelona as the capital of a county and then of a principality, the event sparked aspirations of regaining local autonomy. This catalyzed the spread of Catalan nationalism, or *Catalanism*, across all social levels.

By the turn of the century, Catalanist parties began to dominate municipal politics in Barcelona and other Catalan cities. During this time, various civil society groups, inspired by both Catalanism and anarchist ideologies, experimented with collectivization and self-management in industry and public services. These efforts culminated in the shortly-lived autonomous government under the Second Republic (Section 8.4, 208-209) and, after the beginning of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the one-year experience of anarcho-sindicalist government known as Revolutionary Catalonia (1936-1937) – a period still vivid in the city's collective memory.

Despite tensions and clashes between the industrial elite and the urban proletariat, the city's social groups opposed the putschist faction, fiercely resisting the militias led by General Francisco Franco. After Franco's victory, Barcelona and Catalonia, much like in 1714, faced harsh repression aimed at dismantling the municipalist momentum created by their socioeconomic development and cultural revival, as well as the ideologies of Catalanism and anarchism. Oppositional movements were crushed, autonomous political institutions were abolished, and the use of the Catalan language was banned. However, Catalonia, particularly Barcelona, maintained its role as one of Spain's major industrial centers and economic drivers, preserving the spirit of entrepreneurial and municipalist ambitions.

During the dictatorship, new actors from the private sector, particularly savings banks known as *caixas* (boxes), emerged as pivotal players in the context of Barcelona's development and politics. In fact, between the 1950s and 1970s, finance had become one of the strongest sectors of the Spanish economy. Most major commercial and industrial banks were headquartered in Madrid, close to the centralized Francoist government, which needed financial partners to fund its modernization and industrialization programs. Meanwhile, Barcelona's urban expansion and demographic boom throughout the 20th century led to the rise of some of Spain's largest savings banks.

These savings banks primarily managed middle-class savings and provided mortgages and small loans to the working class. However, they were much more than financial institutions: they consistently invested part of their profits into social infrastructure and cultural activities. In a city

whose population soared from 581,823 in 1910 to 1,005,565 in 1930, reaching an all-time peak of 1,906,998 in 1979⁷⁹, these banks reaped significant benefits from the city's growth.

The social and cultural engagement of these successful enterprises became one of the few spaces that maintained a sense of Catalan identity during the regime (Luna-Garcia, 2008, pp. 151-153). Indeed, despite the harsh political and cultural repression, some exceptions were granted to savings banks, allowing them to promote traditional Catalan festivals and events. This earned them a positive public image and reputation, contributing to their lasting influence in many aspects of the city's governance, including those concerning social inclusion and, later on, cultural heterogeneity (we come back to this point in Section 10.13).

The death of Franco in 1975 marked the end of 36 years of dictatorship and the beginning of Spain's transition to democracy. The first democratic elections were held in 1977, and the new Spanish Constitution was approved via a national referendum the following year. The Constitution initiated Spain's administrative decentralization, allowing regions and cities to establish self-governing entities, known as *autonomous communities*.

Between 1979 and 1983, the Statutes of Autonomy for the autonomous communities were drafted and approved, and by 1987, new local governments were established. Spain was divided into 17 autonomous communities with both administrative and political autonomy, granting them a full legislative capacity and the ability to set public policy guidelines in certain areas (for details, see Pi-Suñyer, 2010).

Catalonia was among the first regions to draft its Statute of Autonomy and establish its government, the *Generalitat de Catalunya*. For the first time since 1714, Catalonia was officially acknowledged by the national government with a degree of independence. As the capital of the new autonomous community of Catalonia, Barcelona began to rise again, renewing its engagement with international municipalism and striving to establish itself on the global stage as an economic, political, and cultural hub. In this context, a unique system of local governance emerged, and the city began to shape its image as a global city. As we shall see, it was at this point that diversity became an important issue to address, as well as a valuable resource and a key element of the city's governance and entrepreneurial strategies.

79

<https://www.ine.es/intercensal/intercensal.do?jsessionid=34ADEFCA185D2A9EFE0B32ED1B8CFD2E.intercensal02?sarch=1&error1=Debe+introducir+un+nombre+de+municipio.&error2=Debe+introducir+al+menos+3+caracteres.&cm bTipoBusq=1&textoMunicipio=Barcelona&btnBuscarDenom=Consultar+selección>.

10.3

The “Barcelona Model”

The democratic transition in post-Francoist Spain was marked by the decentralization of the previously centralist Fascist state. This process, which gained momentum with Spain's entry into the European Community in 1986, was also characterized by increasing integration into European politics and economics. Barcelona's historical inclination towards municipalism and urban entrepreneurialism allowed the city to adapt seamlessly to this new context of multilevel governance, continuing its traditional strategies. The continuity of power dynamics and interests within the city also played a significant role. Notably, many of the key political figures who emerged in Barcelona's first democratic elections in 1979, such as Mayor Narcís Serra i Serra from the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya*), were descendants of families that had ruled the city at the beginning of the century and had maintained their aspirations for Barcelona throughout the dictatorship (McDonogh, 1986).

The newly elected political elites in democratic Barcelona faced significant internal challenges. The city's population had grown dramatically during the dictatorship, mainly due to continuous migration from southeastern Spain. However, the centralized Francoist regime's rigid administration prevented the local government from addressing the needs of its citizens. As a result, Barcelona in the early 1980s was a decaying industrial city with a large, disorganized metropolitan area lacking basic urban and social infrastructure, especially in its poorest neighborhoods.

It was clear that the city's administration, which had functioned as an appendage of the central government for nearly four decades, could not manage these issues alone. The local government lacked financial resources and effective mechanisms for urban and social development, and its personnel lacked the necessary expertise (Blakeley, 2005, p. 151). At the same time, civil society and economic powers pressured the local government to open channels for advocacy and participation, spurred by the wave of enthusiasm for democratization.

In a strategic move that benefited both sides, a system of public-private partnership began to take shape, where the ideal of democratic participation in city governance was combined with traditional strategies of city branding and city diplomacy. This was achieved through massive urban regeneration projects and active engagement in city networks. Thanks to 32 years of uninterrupted local governance by representatives from the Catalonia Socialist Party (until the victory of the Christian-

conservative party *Convergència i Unió* in 2011), this system progressively consolidated and institutionalized, surviving to the present day.

Scholars have long referred to the dynamics shaping local governance in Barcelona as the “Barcelona Model” (e.g., Borja, 1995; Marshall, 2000; 2004; Balibrea, 2001; Blakeley, 2005; Casellas, 2006; Delgado, 2007; Blanco, 2009a; Degen & García, 2012; Illas, 2012; Rius & Sánchez-Befando, 2015; Climent-Ferrando & Triviño-Salazar, 2024). This literature is starkly polarized between proponents and detractors of the model.

On one side, there is little doubt that Barcelona has achieved remarkable international success, becoming a well-known venue for business and scientific conferences, trade fairs, and cultural festivals (e.g., Trullén, 2001; García, 2004; Julier, 2005; González, 2011; Majoor, 2011). This success is evident in various aspects of the city’s economic activity, with a clear indicator being the relentless increase in international visitors, jumping from about 2.4 million in 1993⁸⁰ to 15.6 million in 2023⁸¹. Among the most ardent supporters of the Barcelona Model are some of the city’s political representatives, such as two former Councilors of Culture, Ferran Mascarell (Mascarell, 2005) and Jordi Pascual (Pascual, 2008).

On the other side, several criticisms have been raised about the Barcelona Model. Some authors highlight its inconsistencies as a city model (Blanco, 2009b), the transition from a model to a commodified city brand (Balibrea, 2001), and the favoritism of urban transformation towards the interests of the new middle classes (Julier, 1996). Critics also point to contradictions between the entrepreneurial turn and citizen participation, noting a mercantilist and authoritarian drift, which became especially evident in the organization and management of the 2004 Universal Forum of Cultures (Blakeley, 2005; Borja, 2010; Secchi, 2010; Majoor, 2011; Degen & García, 2012).

Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the appropriateness and utility of the concept of a Barcelona Model (e.g., Blanco, 2009b). While patterns of local governance in Barcelona can be recognized and analyzed, they have significantly transformed over the years and are less coherent and consistent than the term *model* implies. Others argue that the Barcelona Model may not be exceptional or representative of a particular type, but rather an extreme case of the general tendency of contemporary cities to simultaneously engage in democratization and entrepreneurship, particularly focusing on culture as a central dynamic of urban organization and development (Morató, 2008).

In light of this critical discussion, the concept of the Barcelona Model carries a problematic legacy of assumptions and implications. To avoid confusion, I prefer the broader concept of a *system*, which better captures the dynamism and transformations of Barcelona’s local governance. Within this

⁸⁰ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/estadistica/angles/Anuaris/Anuaris/anuari97/cap13/A1302017.htm>.

⁸¹ <https://www.observatoriturisme.barcelona/es/noticias/el-destino-barcelona-cierra-el-año-2023-con-26-m-de-turistas-y-un-impacto-económico-del>.

system, two core principles can be differentiated, which are connected to two visions for the city: a) *citizen participation*, to build a *capital of democracy*; and b) *city branding* through urban revitalization and cultural policies, to make Barcelona an attractive and dynamic *entrepreneurial hub*. Let us consider these aspects in turn.

10.4

Lights and Shadows of the Capital of Democracy

Following the start of Spain's democratization process, the long-ruling socialist local government in Barcelona made citizen participation a central priority in its political agenda. As early as 1982, this commitment took shape with the creation of Civic Centers (*Centres Cívics*), sociocultural facilities designed to facilitate community gatherings and promote social cohesion at the neighborhood level.

The creation of these centers initiated a process of local decentralization, extending at the city level Spain's broader devolution of power from the central government to the regions. This led to a significant transformation of Barcelona's local administration in 1984, resulting in the division of the city into 10 administrative districts (*districtes*). Human and material resources, as well as various competencies and functions suitable for local delivery – such as welfare, social, and leisure services – were transferred from the municipal government to the districts.

Under this administrative reorganization, which remains in effect today, the City Council retains overall strategic control, especially in areas requiring economies of scale or a global strategy. However, districts independently decide and manage their budgets and exercise considerable autonomy in policy implementation. Each district is governed by a District Council (*Consell de Districte*), composed of at least 15 councilors and chaired by a Council President (*Regidor/a del Districte*). While the president is directly elected by the mayor, councilors are nominated from different party lists in proportion to the electoral results for each district. This ensures that districts' political representation reflects the specific district's majority rather than the overall municipal government majority, promoting political pluralism. In 2006, the administrative structure was further refined with the establishment of 73 neighborhoods as additional lower administrative units.

The decentralization process was accompanied by the consolidation of institutional channels for citizen participation. The first regulatory document for district governance, published by the local government in 1986, was the Regulatory Norms of the Organization of the Districts and Citizen Participation (*Normes Reguladores de l'Organització dels Districtes i de la Participació Ciutadana*). This document laid down mechanisms to enable citizen participation in local governance, including citizen representation at the district level through District Councils, the creation of citizen councils for each district, and regulations for public hearings, popular referendums, and citizen initiatives.

Additionally, the local government actively strengthened civil society by dedicating increasing human and financial resources to promoting associationism. This included logistical and infrastructural support, grants, and subsidies. In 1988, the Municipal Social Welfare Council (*Consell Municipal de Benestar Social*) was established as a participatory body involving civil society in social welfare, quality of life, and social services. The Citizen Participation Division (*Direcció de Participación Ciutadana*) was later created to oversee these various aspects of Barcelona's engagement with civil society in public co-management practices.

These mechanisms significantly empowered Barcelona's civil society organizations, giving them visibility and socio-political recognition as key local actors. This, in turn, encouraged networking and cooperation among civil society stakeholders, allowing them to address context-specific needs and advocate for their interests with the local administration through established channels.

However, ever since the creation of the first Civic Centers in 1982, there was a growing perception that participatory policies were ultimately a top-down operation, requiring civil society to conform to a government-regulated participation model, sacrificing previous bottom-up, independent practices. Over time, it became apparent that the 1986 Regulatory Norms, along with their 2002 updated version, the Regulatory Norms of Citizen Participation (*Normes reguladors de participació ciutadana*), were insufficient to ensure the ideal practice of citizen participation in city management.

First, the participatory mechanisms were merely advisory. While citizens could draft reports, formulate allegations, monitor municipal management, and make proposals and suggestions, the final decisions rested with the City Council (Colomer & Pérez, 2024, p. 6). Additionally, the system did not effectively include individual citizens; most participatory channels were accessible only to registered entities and associations. The only spaces for individual citizen participation were public hearings and citizen initiatives, which were limited in scope. This led to the "professionalization" of participation and the "participation of the notables" (Blakeley, 2005, p. 161), where only a limited circle of experts or professionals was engaging with the citizen participation system. As a result, many ordinary citizens remained largely unaware of the existence and functioning of these participatory mechanisms.

As has been observed, participation can easily become “less a tool of empowerment and more an instrument of control” (Blakeley, 2005, p. 160). While many doubts could be raised about the representativeness of citizen participation, these mechanisms provided the government with a strong base of legitimacy for its policies and initiatives. Strategically, Barcelona’s political elites focused on facilitating participation for associations perceived as having the greatest potential for opposition and disruption, particularly the powerful neighborhood associations (known as *associacions de veïns i veïnes*) that played a significant role in the struggle against the Francoist regime. By institutionalizing a constant relationship with these potential troublemakers and granting them recognition, the government reduced the risks of civil unrest. The various advisory councils and other participatory mechanisms created and managed by the municipal government effectively transformed civil society organizations into a sort of “municipal organs” (Blakeley, 2005, p. 160), largely financed and managed by the local government.

The economic dependence of many associations on local government grants and subsidies tended to generate a perverse addiction to governmental funds, leading to increased competition for financial resources (Peruzzi Castellani, 2023a, 157). This dependence provided the administration with an opportunity to direct civil society according to its interests through *divide et impera* strategies. The reliance on government funds constrained associations’ ability to criticize the administration’s initiatives, threatening the ideal of participatory democracy to which Barcelona officially committed. Indeed, a significant dimension of civil society’s agency and political participation is, to some extent, connected to its ability to take stances against government directives.

Another problematic aspect is that citizen participation was also conceived as a tool to deliver territorialized welfare services in a context where the local government lacked the human and financial resources and the know-how to fend for itself. In this way, associations were transformed into the main implementers of municipal policy. While this arguably represents an integral element of true democratic social co-management, it affects associations’ ability to implement their own autonomous projects and socio-political agendas. Most of Barcelona’s institutional participatory mechanisms are labor-intensive, draining associations’ time and human resources. In this way, civil society organizations risk being transformed into a mere extension of the municipal administrative structure (Blakeley, 2005, p. 160).

Finally, opening spaces for co-management and granting recognition to civil society’s role in specific areas of city administration – especially welfare services – did not mean that channels of citizen participation were included in all policymaking and policy implementation processes. Decisions concerning controversial issues, particularly large infrastructural projects where significant economic interests were at stake, were often excluded from spaces of dialogue and deliberation open

to citizens. Such decisions were made in non-public forums involving business elites and private actors. Although these decisions lacked democratic legitimacy, they were often implemented by strategically leveraging alleged public economic interests. This was the case with most of Barcelona's entrepreneurial and boosterist efforts to brand itself as a global city, particularly contemporary mega-projects of urban development and cultural policies that provided few spaces for citizen participation.

To sum up, the 1986 Regulation (and the 2002 updated version) had undoubtedly the merit of opening spaces of democratic participation for civil society and empowering its associational fabric, consolidating a practice in which local government actions – especially in the area of welfare – were legitimized and co-managed by civil society. However, over time, this framework generated dynamics that, instead of enhancing democracy, reinforced the control and “steering role” (Taylor, 2002, p. 49) of the local government, enabling it to harness both economic development and participatory mechanisms to fulfill its political and strategic goals.

This tension reflects the controversy between celebrating network governance as a sort of “orthodoxy” for a genuine participatory democracy (e.g., Marinetto, 2003; Marsh, 2008; Davies, 2011), and the criticisms that have underlined that this practice is nothing else than a fundamental facet of neoliberal hegemony (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005; Geddes, 2006; Fuller & Geddes, 2008; Davies, 2011; Davis, 2012). As critics argue, the ideal of horizontality underlying the network paradigm ultimately obscures the real power dynamics, with the municipal government maintaining firm control over the city.

Although these tensions still exist in the current city's system of governance, significant social, economic, and political developments since the end of the first decade of the 2000s have addressed and improved some of its critical issues. As practices of opaque co-management by economic and political elites strengthened after the turn of the millennium, resulting in an increasingly top-down approach to urban development and cultural policies, bottom-up opposition began to rise. Protests escalated during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent austerity policies, leading to the large-scale *Indignados* (outraged people) movement, also known as the *15-M* movement (as it began on May 15, 2011), between 2011 and 2012.

The *Indignados* – whose initiatives had a significant impact, particularly in Barcelona – called for an end to austerity and to the subservience of politics to global financial markets (Charnock et al., 2012). As a result of these protests, new political movements known as the *parties of change* (*partidos del cambio*) emerged, giving rise to a “new municipalism” in Spain (Eizaguirre et al., 2017; Blanco et al. 2018). The newly founded citizen platform, Barcelona en Comú, presented an innovative agenda focusing on social justice, community rights, and participatory democracy, and won two rounds of municipal elections (2015 and 2019).

Led by Ada Colau, Mayor of Barcelona from 2015 to 2023, this group significantly reformed and strengthened mechanisms for citizen participation, enhancing effective citizen involvement and control within the public sector (Eizaguirre et al., 2017). The 1986 and 2002 regulations were replaced in 2017 by a new Regulation of Citizen Participation (*Reglament de Participació Ciutadana*), which was further updated in 2022. Under these new frameworks, citizen participation mechanisms and channels were revolutionized, ensuring a much greater role for civil society in decision-making processes. This included innovative participatory budgeting (*pressupostos participatius*), where citizens can propose, define, and vote on projects for their district, with the municipal government committing significant funds to implement these projects (30 million euros for the period 2020-2023). Moreover, the new regulations apply to all individual citizens registered in a Municipal List, whether or not they are members of a civil society organization.

One of the most revolutionary aspects of the new organization was the digitalization of many citizen participation mechanisms through the development of the e-democracy platform *decidim.barcelona*⁸² (for details, see Peña-López, 2017; 2019). The institutional management of citizen participation has also been reorganized within the municipal area currently called Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles (*Àrea de Drets Socials, Cultura, Educació i Cicles de Vida*).

Although the Citizen Participation Division still manages various participatory mechanisms, including the platform *decidim.barcelona*, the mission of strengthening Barcelona's associational fabric has been entrusted to the Community Action Division (*Direcció Acció Comunitària*). This division organizes platforms and projects aimed at promoting and supporting local associationism, notably *Energies comunitàries* (Communitarian Energies), *Associa't* (Let's Associate), *Els casals de barri*, and the organization *Torre Jussana* (for more details about these projects, see AdB, Acció Comunitària n.d.).

The efforts of the Colau government have borne fruit not only in strengthening democratic participation mechanisms but also in consolidating Barcelona's international image as an innovative model of local democracy. In 2023, in the framework of a newly launched EU project aimed at promoting citizen participation and debate on democracy, Barcelona was elected as the first European Capital of Democracy. For one year, until the end of October 2024, the city will host events, activities, and lectures showcasing its most relevant democratic innovations. In addition to initiatives like the aforementioned deliberative citizen assemblies, participatory budgeting, and the digital platform *decidim.barcelona*, a major focus will be put on two standout projects. First is the Superblock Project, a bold reorganization of the city's road system designed to reduce automobile traffic, expand urban

⁸² <https://www.decidim.barcelona>.

greenery, and create pedestrian-friendly streets that prioritize community interaction and environmental sustainability. The second is the Canòdrom Digital Innovation and Democracy Centre, an experimental athenaeum-laboratory that serves both as a training hub to empower citizens in the use of technology and as a collaborative meeting space. This dynamic venue brings together grassroots organizations, social projects, research centers, and citizens, fostering innovation, democratic engagement, and community-driven solutions.

10.5

City Branding through the Mega-events

While committing to decentralization and the promotion of citizen participation, the local government in post-Francoist Barcelona also revived the ambition to establish the city as an economic, political, and cultural hub, aiming to position it as a leading global city. This goal was pursued through the active engagement of political and business elites in operations of city branding and city diplomacy, which often clashed with the core ideals of democratization.

The first key opportunity for the socialist local government to develop its entrepreneurial agenda came in 1986, the same year Barcelona's system of democratic governance started taking shape with the enactment of the Regulatory Norms. Barcelona was selected to host the 1992 Summer Olympics, an event meant to celebrate Spain's entry into the European Community and mark the beginning of the country's integration into this political-economic organization. Consequently, Barcelona emerged as a key strategic player for European interests, enabling the local government to attract European subsidies for the Olympic organization and maneuver operations to its advantage.

The nomination as the host city for the Olympics allowed Barcelona to formulate its first comprehensive vision and *Strategic Plan (Pla Estratègic Metropolità Barcelona)* in 1988, intended to guide city development until 2000. This first city vision was grounded on three core ideals (PEMB 2020, 4):

- Making Barcelona a competitive city on an international scale, transforming it into the axis of the northwestern Mediterranean macro-region.

- Completing the transition from an industrial city to a metropolis whose economic activities are centered around advanced services.
- Strengthening social cohesion, preventing the risk of social segregation.

The Olympics served as the first key opportunity to advance these goals. Emulating the practices of the universal exhibitions of 1888 and 1929, Barcelona's government capitalized on the pre-Olympic period to transform the mega-event into a catalyst for major urban development interventions. Preparation for the Olympics led to massive transformations of the Barceloneta and Poblenou areas, including the construction of the Olympic Village (*Vila Olímpic*).

It was evident that the public administration alone could not manage these operations or the mega-event. Consequently, the second elected mayor of Barcelona, Pascual Maragall from the Socialists' Party of Catalonia – who ruled the city for four consecutive terms from 1982 to 1997 – revived Barcelona's tradition of co-management of urban development by political and business elites. By uniting key actors from the public and private sectors, he fostered what has been labeled as “growth coalitions” (Blakeley, 2005), consisting of mixed-public companies, public consortia, and other collaborative arrangements (Casellas, 2006).

In the aftermath of the 1992 Olympics, Barcelona faced an economic crisis and unemployment, caused by global economic instability and context-specific budget imbalances from organizing the mega-event. The local government's response reflected Barcelona's shift towards neoliberalism: economic growth and employment were prioritized as essential conditions for funding social welfare and urban development, leading to both internal and external transformations of Barcelona's urban policy and governance (Blanco, 2015).

Internally, the local government embraced New Public Management and cultural policies. Public service management was outsourced to private actors, with economic stakeholders (banks, firms, corporations, hotels, restaurants, shops, etc.) joining public investments and becoming involved in various aspects of city management. The local government reconfigured its cultural policies to promote both local culture (Catalan traditions and arts) and innovations, aiming to make Barcelona an attractive tourist destination and a dynamic city for living, investing, and growing businesses. To oversee and coordinate the implementation of the city's cultural policies, the local government established the Barcelona Cultural Institute (*Institut de Cultura de Barcelona*, or ICUB) in 1996.

Externally, the local government actively engaged in strategies of city branding and city diplomacy to boost Barcelona's image and reputation. The goal was to enhance the city's role on the international stage, making it a competitive global player by integrating it into global markets, attracting foreign

investments and EU funds, and lobbying international agendas for recognition of its priorities and claims.

Building on its previous experiences and established practices, the local government promoted the organization of international events and the city's participation in international networks. Large festivals, fairs, and congresses attracted international attention, bringing people and innovations from around the world, establishing elite networks, and securing funds and benefits for their organization and management. Local entrepreneurship was supported by Barcelona Activa, the local development agency established in 1986 and subsidized by the municipality. Active participation in city networks enabled Barcelona to learn about innovations and best practices, promote its role as an international stakeholder, and cooperate and lobby with other global actors.

Initially, the local government identified the organization of mega-events linked to urban revitalization as an opportunity to synergize its internal and external entrepreneurial strategies. In 1997, Mayor Maragall initiated a project to overcome the post-Olympic crisis, which was then implemented by his successor, Mayor Joan Clos (1997-2006): the controversial 2004 Universal Forum of Cultures. Organized in partnership with the Generalitat de Catalunya, the Spanish Government, and UNESCO, the Forum consisted of 141 days (from May 9th to September 26th, 2004) of art festivals, thematic conferences, and civil forums focusing on peace, sustainable development, human rights, and cultural diversity. The ambitious goal of the Forum was to *Move the World* (*moure el món*), as stated in its opening performance which was precisely titled this way.

The event provided both the occasion and resources to significantly advance the massive urban redevelopment planned for the Poblenou area in the Sant Martí District, which had been initiated during the 1992 Olympics. During the golden age of industrial Barcelona, this area was considered the epicenter of the Spanish industry, earning it the nickname *Catalan Manchester*. However, in post-industrial Barcelona, it stood as a decayed neighborhood characterized by large relics of its industrial past, such as abandoned factories surrounded by working-class residential areas.

Due to its strategic location – close and easily connectable to the city center – its need for basic infrastructure, and the potential for converting former factory spaces into valuable building land, the local government selected Poblenou for its most ambitious urban development plan. The project aimed to restore the area's former role as the economic engine of Barcelona by transforming it into the city's hub for hi-tech, innovation, and business. Between 1999 and 2005, vast portions of the industrial neighborhood were demolished, paving the way for the rise of the brand-new Innovation District (*Districte de la Innovació*), or 22@ – a name derived from the identifier 22a for the pre-existing industrial plots, with the *a* replaced by @ to symbolize the area's new hi-tech identity. The

district is now dominated by the Torre Glòries, completed in 2005, one of the city's most distinctive buildings.

The Universal Forum of Cultures, which was located on the eastern end of 22@, played a crucial role in shaping the Innovation District. A new area was built at the mouth of the Besòs River, now known as Barcelona Forum, or Forum Park (*Parc del Fòrum*). This project was presented as a model for revitalizing a decayed area and developing innovative and sustainable infrastructures. Avant-garde design facilities, such as the Forum Building (*Edifici Fòrum*) and the Barcelona International Convention Centre (CCIB), were constructed, setting European benchmarks for event and congress venues. Additionally, a waterfront park, an efficient water treatment plant, and a photovoltaic energy system were developed (Majoor, 2011).

The Forum attracted significant international attention, and following the intentions of its original promoters, UNESCO adopted the format for future events to be held every three years in different cities. However, after editions in Monterrey (Mexico) in 2007, Valparaíso (Chile) in 2010, and Naples (Italy) in 2013, Québec, selected for the 2016 edition, decided not to proceed due to high costs and local lack of enthusiasm, compromising the project's continuity.

The evaluation of the Barcelona edition is less positive when considering its effects (Rius-Ulldemolins et al., 2015). The event soon came to represent a significant shift in the role of citizens in the city's developmental strategies. An obscure directive consortium, comprising the local government and an anonymous partner corporation, managed the planning and organization of the Forum and related urban revitalization in an opaque, top-down manner, excluding residents' voices – even those of the powerful Federation of Neighborhood Associations of Barcelona (FAVB). Consequently, the event attracted popular discontent from the earliest stages.

As the project advanced, discontent erupted into open protests and boycott campaigns, joined by international actors such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, targeting what was perceived as the entrepreneurial hypocrisy of the event (Delgado, 2007). In particular, critics highlighted the contradiction of an event purportedly focused on minority issues being sponsored by multinational companies accused of negative practices, capitalist exploitation in Third-World countries, and oppression of cultural minorities, including Endesa, Toyota, Nestlé, and Coca-Cola. Additionally, despite the Forum's declared intent to promote world peace, it included participants involved in the promotion of war, such as Indra, a Spanish military technology company, and the Spanish government, which was supporting the Iraq War at the time. Protesters summarized their major points in a booklet distributed during the inauguration, titled *The Other Side of the Forum of Cultures*, with the subtitle *Two Reasons not to Go to the Forum – Barcelona 2004: Postmodern Fascism; Fucked 2004: Globalization as Spectacle* (Espai en Blanc, 2004; my translation).

Criticisms and discontent continued after the event, focusing on allegations of irregularities and corruption in the Forum's management (Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya, 2014) and its failure to deliver the expected economic and urban developments. Most importantly, hostility grew within civil society against the long-standing government of the Socialists' Party of Catalonia. Many pointed to the hypocrisy of a government that, while declaring its commitment to promoting citizen participation in local governance, frequently stifled citizen voices and subordinated the democratization agenda to entrepreneurial interests.

10.6

The New Visions of Barcelona: A *Creative, Sustainable, and Inclusive City*

After the controversies surrounding the 2004 Forum of Cultures, the local government avoided reproducing the strategic formula of mega-events. Consequently, Mayor Jordi Hereu, who governed from 2006 to 2010, had to find a new balance between the ideal of Barcelona as a democratic capital with the well-established system of urban entrepreneurship. During this period, a crucial discourse emerged and began to take hold: that of the *creative city*. Within this framework, Hereu attempted to reconnect entrepreneurial strategies with social welfare, rethinking the role of civil society in the city's governance.

In response to calls for greater civil society involvement in cultural policies, the local government enacted a *Strategic Plan for the Cultural Sector* in 2006, establishing an institutional, citizen-led body for participation, relations, debate, coordination, and monitoring of the strategic plan's objectives (ICUB, 2006, p. 61). This measure led to the creation of the Barcelona Culture Council in 2010. That same year, the management of the Civic Centers, previously outsourced to various private organizations, was entrusted to the ICUB, intending to open additional channels for local communities to participate in the implementation of cultural policies.

Despite these initiatives, criticism from civil society persisted. The Culture Council played only an advisory role, and its composition favored actors based on their economic influence, fostering the consolidation of an elitist circle of stakeholders that did not effectively include civil society and various sectors of the artistic community. Additionally, centralizing the management of Civic Centers

under the ICUB reinforced the perception that the local government was merely instrumentalizing citizen participation for its entrepreneurial interests.

Civil discontent against the socialist government grew, exacerbated by the economic recession following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Mayor Hereu attempted to revitalize the city through a comprehensive rebranding operation, entrusted to city branding expert Juan Carlos Belloso and its non-profit organization Barcelona Global – co-founded by Belloso in 2010 with the aim of improving Barcelona’s competitiveness and attractiveness for business and talent.

In November 2010, after extensive collaboration involving over 650 experts from different fields⁸³, a new *Strategic Metropolitan Plan* of Barcelona, known as *Barcelona Vision 2020*, was published. The vision aimed to make Barcelona “one of the most attractive and influential European regions for innovative global talent and as the best setting for economic and business growth”⁸⁴.

Yet, it was too late for the socialist government to turn the tables. In the 2011 local elections, the 32-year socialist rule was interrupted by the victory of Mayor Xavier Trias from the Christian-conservative party *Convergència i Unió* (Convergence and Union). The new government implemented a fresh vision for Barcelona, supported by the same team of experts and organizations consolidated during 2010, particularly Barcelona Activa and Barcelona Global. By 2013, the new city brand, *Barcelona Inspires*, was defined, promoting Barcelona as a hub for innovation, business, and entrepreneurial talent, with a high quality of life⁸⁵.

To address the economic recession, the *Barcelona Growth* program was launched to transform Barcelona into a *smart city*, focusing on positioning it as a hub of knowledge and innovation. Cultural policies, tourist promotion, and city networking continued, oriented by the ideal of the creative city. Barcelona was frequently recognized internationally as a prime creative city and officially joined the UNESCO Creative Cities Network as a City of Literature in 2015.

However, Trias’ government was overwhelmed by the wave of social movements in 2011-2012 and was unable to secure another term in office. The citizens’ platform Barcelona en Comú, which won the local elections in 2015, intended to revolutionize Barcelona’s development strategies. Particularly, Mayor Ada Colau aimed to prioritize democratic advancement, ensuring wealth redistribution, welfare services, and employment over traditional entrepreneurial approaches.

However, even the *partido del cambio* had to balance with the established dynamics subservient to the city’s economic elites. These pressures became particularly effective when Colau had to manage the serious repercussions on Barcelona’s national and international image after two major events in 2017: the terrorist attack on Las Ramblas on August 17 and the large-scale social movement for a

⁸³ <https://placebrandobserver.com/rebranding-barcelona-city-branding-case-study/>

⁸⁴ <https://placebrandobserver.com/rebranding-barcelona-city-branding-case-study/>

⁸⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bCJCst1kwg>

Catalonia independence referendum on October 1 (known as 1-O referendum), leading to high tensions and violence between police and protesters. Like her predecessors, Colau embarked on a comprehensive rebranding operation to reaffirm the city's attractiveness and leadership as a prime smart city and creative city. The new brand, expressed through the motto *Always Barcelona*, was presented in 2019 after a long participatory process involving Barcelona Global and designed by the branding and consultancy agency Summa Branding, known for designing brands for major groups such as Inditex, Santander, RTVE, and FC Barcelona.

Barcelona's rebranding set the stage for a new long-term comprehensive *Strategic Plan*, covering the decade from 2020 to 2030. This plan needed to incorporate emerging sustainability discourses, particularly following the United Nations' adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015. Additionally, it had to address the tragic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, establishing an agenda to relaunch and guide the city's economic development.

Published in 2021 as the new Economic Agenda for the city, known as the *Barcelona Green Deal*, the plan proposed a ten-year vision for Barcelona. It outlined an open roadmap for all economic and social stakeholders, defining strategic lines to guide the city's future. The vision was built on three major pillars:

- *Competitiveness*: Focusing on a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem, digital advancement, talent attraction, and a global outlook.
- *Sustainability*: Prioritizing a circular economy, innovation incentives, and sustainable tourism.
- *Fairness*: Ensuring equality of opportunity, social cohesion, and solidarity-based practices.

To achieve these goals, five key city ideals – referred to as “aspirations” (ivi, passim) – were formulated:

- a) Barcelona as an *international city*: creating high-tech companies, attracting talent, setting up innovation hubs, and developing a benchmark visitor economy model.
- b) Barcelona as a *sustainable city*: Leading the fight against the climate emergency through the efforts of institutions, economic stakeholders, and active civil society.
- c) Barcelona as an *accessible city*: Featuring an advanced public transportation network and services that support residents' daily lives.
- d) Barcelona as an *inclusive and feminist city*: Promoting anti-discrimination and actively combating gender inequalities across all dimensions of the city.
- e) Barcelona as a *green jobs city*: Investing in new jobs in key sectors such as the green and blue economies.

Within this vision, several concrete strategic guidelines and initiatives were outlined, divided into 10 goals and 66 specific actions.

Although the Socialists' Party of Catalonia returned to power in the 2023 local elections, it is unlikely that significant changes will occur in the principles, values, and strategies formulated under Colau's government. The new Mayor, Jaume Collboni, previously served as vice-mayor under Colau, and his victory was supported by Barcelona en Comú, ensuring continuity between the two administrations. Moreover, Collboni himself closely monitored and oversaw the formulation of the Barcelona Green Deal, further reinforcing this continuity.

Barcelona's current international role and position reflect the success of the entrepreneurial strategies implemented by various democratic governments. In just 45 years, Barcelona transformed from a declining industrial city in 1979 to one of the most attractive, successful, and dynamic urban centers in Europe and the world.

The extent of Barcelona's influence is evident in its active engagement in city diplomacy. The city participates in 47 international city networks (some of which it co-founded, such as Eurocities), has 22 twinning agreements, 27 collaboration agreements, and 248 active international cooperation projects⁸⁶.

International recognition of Barcelona's leading role is reflected in various transnational reports ranking the city's global influence. Barcelona is currently listed as the 8th best city in the world by Resonance Consultancy (Resonance, 2024), particularly praised for its livability, climate, scenery, services, cultural life, and leisure opportunities. It ranks as the 10th most attractive city for digital talent globally (Strack et al., 2021) and Europe's 6th most talked-about city on the Internet and social media (Ing, 2024). Notably, Barcelona has consistently ranked among the top 30 most competitive cities in the Global Power City Index (Mori Foundation, 2024), currently standing at 22nd, recognized for its *magnetism*, attracting people, capital, and enterprises globally.

10.7

The Origins of Migration and Diversity Governance in Barcelona

⁸⁶ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/relacionsinternacionalsicooperacio/en/international-relations/city-networks-and-associations>.

Since the late 19th century, when Barcelona became one of Spain's main industrial hubs, the city has been a major destination for a growing number of internal migrants, mostly from southeastern Spain. This trend continued during Franco's dictatorship, and by 1975, about 44% of Barcelona's residents were born outside Catalonia (Bermúdez et al., 2018, p. 104). With the end of the dictatorship and Spain's transformation into an immigration country, Barcelona progressively emerged as a major destination for new flows of international migrants.

The first significant group of international migrants arrived in the city by the end of the 1970s, mainly consisting of refugees from dictatorial regimes in Latin America. Despite their distinct legal status as refugees, their linguistic and cultural similarities facilitated their integration into Barcelona's social fabric.

During the 1980s, the city experienced a rapid influx of international working migrants from Latin America, the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia. By the turn of the millennium, 53,428 foreign nationals (about 3.5% of the total population) were living in Barcelona⁸⁷. This number continued to grow, reaching 284,632 (about 17.5%) in 2010, and 432,556 (about 25.5%) in 2024.

While the diversity of nationalities within the city's migrant population has increased, the proportions by geographic origin have remained relatively stable. To this day, the largest group has consisted of European migrants, followed by those from South America, South Asia, East Asia, and the Maghreb. Since the early 2000s, Italians have been the largest group of migrants, followed by Colombians, Peruvians, Pakistanis, Chinese, French, Moroccans, and Filipinos.

Initially, the challenges of migration were primarily addressed by civil society organizations. However, as the number of migrants increased, institutional intervention became necessary. The first response from the local administration was the creation of the Care Service for Immigrants, Emigrants and Refugees (*Servei d'Atenció a Immigrants, Emigrants i Refugiats*, or SAIER) in 1989, based on the report of a Working Group on Refugees and Aliens organized by the Municipal Social Welfare Council. Since then, in partnership with several local NGOs, SAIER has provided migrants with assistance in areas such as housing, employment, and legal matters.

During the 1990s, especially after the 1992 Olympics, the steady growth of migrant residents drew the attention of the local government. Local political elites, now actively engaged in entrepreneurial strategies, anticipated and hoped for an increase in international migrants due to Barcelona's promotion as a global city. Migration governance practices were mainly coordinated by SAIER, but a dual structure developed within the local administration, with political supervision divided between the Department of Social Welfare (*Departament de Benestar Social*) and the Department of Civil

⁸⁷ <https://portaldades.ajuntament.barcelona.cat/ca/estadistiques/rydjdcfebm>

Rights (*Departament de Drets Civils*). Eventually, these were unified under the Department for Immigration, initially established within the Department of Citizen Participation, Solidarity, and Cooperation, and later integrated into the current Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles (*Àrea de Drets Socials, Cultura, Educació i Cicles de Vida*).

The Barcelona municipal government's focus on migration and cultural diversity mirrored trends set by the Generalitat de Catalunya and the European Union in the 1990s. The Generalitat's first *Interdepartmental Immigration Plan (Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració)* for 1993-2000 aimed to integrate immigration as a strategic asset for Catalonia and promote interaction between different cultural groups under the ideal of building a pluralistic society (Section 9.7, p. 245). In 1997, the European Union inaugurated the European Year Against Racism, adding a new article to the treaty establishing the Union (now Article 19 TFEU), empowering the Council to address discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability, and sexual orientation (Section 7.4, p. 175). In this context, the concept of *interculturalism* started emerging as an alternative to assimilation, promoting integration within a common cultural and linguistic framework while preserving the unique cultural and linguistic characteristics of minority groups.

Reflecting these shifts, Barcelona's local administration formulated its first integration policy in 1997, known as the *Municipal Plan for Interculturality (Plan Municipal para la Interculturalidad)*. Although the percentage of international migrants in the city was only about 2% at the time⁸⁸, the local government anticipated a sharp increase due to ongoing entrepreneurial strategies. This first integration plan explicitly connected migration governance with the broader goal of promoting community cohesion.

Interculturality, as defined by the plan, involved “agencies and services shared with the associative fabric and with the entire citizenry” targeting “foreign immigrants and ethnic minorities” considered bearers of cultural diversity (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1997, p. 9; my translation). Following emerging trends at the provincial and European levels, the core principle of this document was that cultural diversity could be a key resource for city development, particularly in cultural policies and tourism. The plan closely aligned with the Generalitat's approach, emphasizing the protection of rights and equality within a common framework represented by Catalan culture and language.

The plan was notably progressive in its envisioned measures, leading to the establishment of several diversity governance structures that continue to function today. Among the most significant are the Barcelona Municipal Immigration Council (*Consell Municipal d'Immigració de Barcelona*) and the Office for Non-Discrimination (*Oficina per la No Discriminació*, or OND). Established in 1997, the Immigration Council is a consultative body composed of immigrant entities and associations, social

⁸⁸ <https://portaldades.ajuntament.barcelona.cat/ca/estadistiques/rydjdcfebm>

officers, municipal political groups, and observers, with the aim of advising on social, cultural, and political matters to ensure immigrants can fully exercise their citizenship rights. The OND, originally part of the Office of the Commissioner for Safeguarding Civil Rights (from 1992) and later the Office of Councillor for Civil Rights (from 1995) has remained a pioneering municipal service addressing human rights violations related to discrimination.

However, without a clear programmatic agenda, many of the plan's provisions remained unimplemented. Notable but still unrealized proposals at this stage included granting access to municipal services based on residency rather than transient status and alternative mechanisms to justify residence if census registration was not possible (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1997, p. 14). Additionally, the document generally emphasized the importance of promoting anti-discrimination initiatives, ensuring adequate access to information for foreign residents, and fostering a positive image of cultural minorities. Achieving these goals required the institution to secure civil society cooperation and strengthen local associationism.

As the number of foreign residents continued to soar in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching over 9% by 2002 (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2002, p. 144), it became clear that the general guidelines of the municipal plan needed to be translated into a concrete programmatic agenda. The administration of then-Mayor Joan Clos, who took office in 1997, recognized that migrant presence would continue to increase and feared that, as in other European cities, the migration issue might be used to foster political polarization or lead to tensions and conflicts between the native population and newcomers. These concerns led the local administration to assess the migration phenomenon and formulate an operational program for its management. Additionally, the Generalitat de Catalunya reinforced its focus on migration with the enactment of a second *Interdepartmental Plan for Immigration* (2001-2004), fueling interest in the topic within the Barcelona context.

Accordingly, in 2001, Mayor Clos established the Immigration Policy Committee (*Comissió Política d'Immigració*) to develop the city's first comprehensive immigration policies. This resulted in the publication of the city's first *Municipal Immigration Plan* in 2002, which set the basic framework and outlined the first concrete strategic lines for Barcelona's migration and diversity governance.

The plan's primary goal was "the real integration of immigrants in all levels of city life in Barcelona" (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2002, p. 158; my translation). After providing a broad contextualization of the migration phenomenon in Europe, focusing particularly on Spain and Catalonia, the plan presented nine guiding principles to be translated into concrete lines of action. These principles became the basis for all subsequent plans concerning migration and diversity in Barcelona. They were: 1) *Equality*; 2) *Social Cohesion*; 3) *Coexistence*; 4) *Cultural Diversity*; 5) *Normalization* (i.e.,

policy mainstreaming); 6) *Participation*; 7) *Temporality* (i.e., long-term planning); 8) *Obliquity* (i.e., transversality across different municipal areas); 9) *Consensus* (both within the local government and among civil society organizations).

The principle of *Consensus* became a defining strategy for all subsequent crucial steps in developing Barcelona's system of diversity governance, contributing significantly to its sustainability. Consensus was pursued in both the external and internal dimensions of city politics. Externally, Barcelona's local government sought institutional agreements with the national government and the Generalitat de Catalunya, advocating for transparent policies and mechanisms for migration governance and advancing the devolution of competencies from national to local governments. Internally, significant efforts were directed toward achieving a unanimous consensus among all political groups represented in the local government. Simultaneously, the administration sought the engagement of all local stakeholders, including social workers and civil society organizations, to formalize public-private partnerships and co-management practices for implementing the plan's strategic lines.

Within the broad framework of the nine principles, three main strategic lines were delineated:

- Promoting integration in the frame of social cohesion.
- Defending and spreading the values of diversity and cohabitation.
- Implementing coexistence practices and strategies for preventing conflictive situations.

From these principles, 16 goals and 90 measures and actions were formulated. Despite some redundancy and occasional ambiguous and cumbersome formulations, this first *Municipal Immigration Plan* became a crucial precedent for Barcelona's subsequent diversity governance strategies.

It is noteworthy that, while integration was a major focus of this plan, the term *interculturality* (*interculturalitat*), which had been central to the 1997 municipal plan, does not appear even once in the text. The term *intercultural* appears only five times, mostly referring to specific provisions for establishing assistance services supporting migrants regardless of their origin. In this sense, the institutional use of the concept of intercultural in the early 2000s was restricted to intercultural education and mediation rather than denoting a comprehensive approach to integration.

Following the plan's provisions, the local government established the Intercultural Mediation Service (*Servei de Mediació Intercultural*) at the end of 2002. This service aimed to bridge the gap between immigrants, collectives of different cultural origins, administration professionals, and the native population. Although the concept of interculturality was downsized compared to the 1997 plan, the creation of this service helped draw attention to the topic of interculturality among private

organizations and civil society actors, further promoting the association between integration and intercultural practices.

Two years after the publication of the immigration plan, the reform of the national immigration law and the introduction of the 2004 Regulations greatly reinforced the involvement of local governments in Spanish migration governance. In particular, the municipal census (*padrón*) became the key mechanism for providing access to basic rights, such as health and education, as well as an essential condition for regularizing residency status. This crucial reform required the local government to adjust its strategies. However, this was not the only issue prompting the local government to review and rethink its migration and diversity governance system.

10.8

The Rise of *Interculturalitat*

Mayor Jordi Hereu, who succeeded Joan Clos in 2006, strategically elevated migration to a central theme of his administration. Hereu faced a challenging political landscape: the longstanding socialist local government was grappling with increasing public discontent, exacerbated by the perceived failure of the 2004 Universal Forum of Cultures (Section 10.5, pp. 269-271). With his party visibly losing support, migration risked becoming a potentially divisive issue that opposing parties could exploit to their advantage. This local political context coincided with two pivotal developments: the Generalitat's forward-thinking 2005 Citizenship and Immigration Plan, introduced under former Barcelona Mayor Pasqual Maragall's presidency (Section 9.8, pp. 249-250); and the national socialist government's launch of Spain's first national integration policy in 2006, the Programme for Citizenship and Integration (PECI) (Sect.). Together, these initiatives placed integration and the role of cities at the forefront of Spain's migration and diversity governance.

Hereu adeptly aligned Barcelona's strategy with the Generalitat's priorities and, more significantly, with broader European trends emphasizing *intercultural dialogue* as a cornerstone of integration. The intercultural frame soon became a key element of Hereu's rebranding of Barcelona as a progressive, inclusive city. Shortly after his election in 2006, he established the role of Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (*Comissionat/Comissionada d'Immigració i Diàleg*

Intercultural) within the Area of Education, Culture, and Welfare (*Àrea d'Educació, Cultura i Benestar*). The newly appointed Commissioner, Dani de Torres, was tasked with developing a new, updated immigration plan, emphasizing integration and social cohesion. Building on the strategy of the 2002 *Municipal Immigration Plan*, de Torres initiated extensive dialogues and negotiations with the city's political groups and key civil society stakeholders.

To support this effort, de Torres assembled a team including Ramon Sanahuja, a city official with long expertise in welfare and social inclusion, and Carolina Astudillo, a representative from QSL Serveis Culturals – a policy consultant organization, founded in 1994 by policy expert Jesús Poza, aimed to promote local culture, social inclusion, and democracy. Leveraging Sanahuja's bureaucratic knowledge and Astudillo's civil society connections, de Torres consolidated a huge network to facilitate large-scale participatory mechanisms for drafting the immigration plan.

As the planning progressed, de Torres' team realized that the concept of interculturality (*interculturalitat*), introduced in the 1997 municipal plan, could be a more effective resource for promoting integration and social cohesion than that of intercultural dialogue. Interculturality, which predated the now more common term interculturalism in Europe, offered a comprehensive approach to integration. It allowed for defending diversity and pluralism while emphasizing integration within a common (Catalan) cultural and linguistic framework. As a result, interculturality emerged as a powerful brand for integration policies, capable of gaining approval even from conservative representatives.

To effectively adopt interculturality, a clear narrative and theoretical framework were necessary. At this point, Sanahuja fortuitously encountered at a conference Carlos Giménez, a Madrid-based philosopher and anthropologist who had been developing the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism discourse since the late 1990s (Interview A) (for Giménez's conceptualization of interculturalism, see, for example, Giménez 2002; 2010). Impressed by Giménez's clear explanation of interculturalism and its contrast to assimilationism and multiculturalism, Sanahuja invited him to collaborate with de Torres' team. This collaboration led to connect *interculturalitat* with the theoretical framework of *interculturalism* that was gaining popularity at the European level. *Interculturalitat* was specified as Barcelona's key approach to frame and address cultural heterogeneity, based on three core principles:

- *Equality*: Focusing on anti-discrimination and equal opportunities.
- *Recognition of Diversity*: Valuing and respecting all forms of socio-cultural diversity, promoting it as a driver of innovation, creativity, and socioeconomic and human development.
- *Positive Interaction*: Promoting contact, mutual knowledge, and dialogue among all citizens to inspire a sense of belonging and social cohesion.

The designation of 2008 as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue presented a prime opportunity for de Torres to highlight interculturality. He organized the Barcelona Intercultural Dialogue Programme, inviting civil society to collaborate in organizing hundreds of activities and debates focused on integration and diversity. During this initiative, de Torres invited representatives from the Council of Europe, including Irena Guidikova, who had recently become the coordinator of the pilot project that would evolve into the Inter-Cultural Cities Network (Interview B). This established a direct link between Barcelona's local government and the ICC Network, which Barcelona soon officially joined. Enthusiasm for interculturality was further boosted by the publication of the Council of Europe's *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* (Council of Europe, 2008). De Torres realized that emphasizing interculturality could attract attention and support from European institutions and organizations, including financial subsidies.

In October 2008, after several months of work, the municipal government unanimously approved the *Immigration Work Plan 2008-2011*. Although updated to adapt to the contemporary situation, this new policy strongly resembled the previous 2002 plan in its structure and founding values. The same list of guiding principles was re-proposed although they were reduced from nine to seven – by that time, *consensus* and *temporality*, previously presented as separate principles, had become integral parts of the consolidated strategies of the city's migration policies. In addition, this local plan incorporated and readapted some of the provisions of the *Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2005-2008* formulated by the Generalitat de Catalunya (Section 9.8, pp. 249-250). Notably, the plan followed the Generalitat's position in recognizing as citizens all residents registered in the *padrón* (municipal census).

A significant shift in the new plan was the elevation of *interculturalitat*, which had been barely mentioned in the previous plan, to “a central feature of the city's immigration policy” and as an approach enabling to “strengthen coexistence and cohesion from a comprehensive view of the migration phenomenon” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2008, p. 3). Within this framework, five general goals were outlined, each accompanied by several concrete measures:

- 1) *Strengthen and disseminate knowledge about migration*: In addition to enhancing existing communication channels (such as information materials, events, and working groups), the plan emphasized the need for specific indicators to provide a comprehensive understanding of the migration phenomenon, monitor its transformations, and assess the effectiveness of related policies; a webpage dedicated to new residents, the current *Nova Ciutadania* (new citizenship) webpage⁸⁹, was also created.

⁸⁹ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/novaciutadania/ca>.

- 2) *Consolidate and adapt the city's reception strategy*: This involved improving available services (such as those of the SAIER), institutionalizing a city's Reception Network (*Xarxa d'Acollida*) consisting of those civil society organizations working in the field of migrant reception, and recognizing and incentivizing private actors promoting integration, particularly language teaching (Catalan or Castilian Spanish).
- 3) *Improve the management of municipal responsibilities in matters of foreigners*: This goal required compiling in-depth reports both on migrants' settlement to improve integration services and on their housing situations to promote family reunification, in accordance with the law, for migrants who can prove they could provide suitable accommodation for family members.
- 4) *Promote interculturality and encourage participation*: The plan aimed to guarantee full integration by promoting events and providing incentives to the civil society to celebrate diversity and combat exclusion and segregation through positive contact; the drafting of a municipal plan for interculturality was established as a key component for achieving this goal.
- 5) *Guarantee transversality and comprehensive approach to immigration*: This goal emphasized the inclusion of all sectors and areas of the administration in migration governance, particularly by clarifying the scope of competence for each sector to ensure proper coordination of immigration policies and strengthen both interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation with the districts.

Following the publication of the plan, while supervising the implementation of the different lines of action by the specific institutional stakeholders, de Torres' team immediately engaged in the drafting of a comprehensive integration plan based on the concept of interculturality, in accordance with the provisions of the immigration plan (fourth goal). This new plan was intended to serve as the basic framework for all the city's social integration strategies for the next decade.

10.9

The Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat

The *Barcelona Interculturality Plan 2010-2020* (*Pla Barcelona interculturalitat 2010-2020*) is the result of two years of extensive work by de Torres' team, spanning from late 2008 to early 2010. The drafting was based on two methodological principles: (a) *participatory design*, which actively involved institutional representatives and civil society in both the plan's formulation and implementation; and (b) *transversalization*, ensuring that all areas and departments of the municipality were integrated into the plan. The basic idea was that interculturality should become a *lens* through which all of Barcelona's governance processes are reimagined. In concrete, the plan provided specific guidelines for initiatives aimed at fostering social inclusion and coexistence within diversity.

To engage Barcelona's institutions, representatives from all municipal areas (Sport, Urban Planning, Culture, etc.) were gathered in an advisory council tasked with monitoring and supervising the plan's development alongside de Torres. Each municipal area was required to conduct a survey-based diagnosis within its domain to assess the current status of policies promoting social inclusion and identify potential strategies for improvement. Additionally, technicians from various municipal areas were asked to hold meetings to analyze the current level of cultural coexistence in the city and determine the specific needs required to implement interculturality and address the challenges posed by increasing diversity.

Concurrently, made significant efforts to involve a broad range of representatives from Barcelona's civil society (for details, see Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2010, pp. 16-29). Over 170 interviews were conducted with individuals from various sectors (associative, cultural, religious, academic, etc.), collectives, and also the general public (professionals, students, unemployed or retired people, etc.). In addition, 36 working sessions were organized involving over 400 people from different territorial and sectoral councils of the city. Several participatory sessions were also held across the city through the various sectorial and territorial councils and networks of entities⁹⁰. Additionally, 12 in-depth interviews on various aspects of cultural diversity management were held with selected experts⁹¹.

⁹⁰ Specifically, 8 sectoral sessions with about 100 participants; 10 sessions with different networks and platforms with about 100 participants; 19 sessions in all city's districts with about 225 participants.

⁹¹ Specifically, the following interviews were conducted: Ricard Zapata, Professor of Political Theory and Director of the GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration); Gemma Pinyol, Political Scientist and Coordinator of the CIDOB's "Migrations" Programme; Jordi Sanchez, Director of the Jaume Bofill Foundation; Francisco Collazos, Coordinator of the Transcultural Psychiatry Programme at the Vall d'Hebron University Hospital; Jordi Moreras, Director of the Tr[ans]its consultation service and expert in matters of religious pluralism; Joan Subirats, Political Scientist and Professor of Political Sciences at the Autonomous University of Barcelona; José Luis Molina, Director of EgoLab and Professor of Anthropology; Myrtha Casanova, President of the Foundation for Diversity; Silvia Carrasco, Doctor in Anthropology and Head of the Infancy and Immigration Area of the CIIMU (Infancy and Urban World Institute), Carlota Solé, Head of the Sociology Department of the UAB; Carlos Giménez, Head of the Social Anthropology Department and Director of the University Institute of Research into Migrations, Ethnicity and Social Development; Miquel Angel Essomba, Director of UNESCOAT and LINGUAPAX and Director of the ERIC Research Group (Research Team on Interculturality and Immigration in Catalonia). The transcripts of the interview are available.

The Department of Commerce Services (*Direcció de Serveis de Comerç*) also conducted an Omnibus Municipal public opinion survey, involving 1,000 telephone interviews focusing on questions related to coexistence in diversity. Contributions from a consistent number of young Barcelonians were also collected through Barcelona's Public Audience – a participatory format in which students aged 12 to 18 from public and subsidized schools in Barcelona reflect on a specific issue and present their opinions and requests in a manifesto submitted to the mayor. During the 14th Public Audience, entitled *Barcelona Dialogue, Proposals for an Intercultural Citizenship*, approximately 1,200 young people worked on themes of diversity and intercultural dialogue, producing a manifesto with over 100 proposals for intercultural citizenship and education in Barcelona.

Another key channel for promoting active participation of civil society in the plan's drafting was the newly created website www.interculturalitat.cat. Through this website, citizens could monitor the plan's drafting process by reading the contributions of the participants and accessing over 75 news providing regular information on the evolution of the plan. Additionally, all the documents relevant to the plan's drafting were made available on the site, and interested individuals could participate in surveys to provide their perspectives on cultural diversity and coexistence in Barcelona and submit proposals for specific measures (215 forms were received).

The findings from this extensive participatory process were analyzed using Atlas.ti software, which allowed for the organization and coding of the diverse text, audio, and video materials collected. This analysis produced a detailed overview of the participatory process, which served as a crucial reference for the final drafting of the plan. In 2010, the ten-year *Barcelona Interculturality Plan* was unanimously approved by all political groups represented in Barcelona's local government.

Of course, *interculturalitat* represented both the brand and the central concept animating the entire plan, whose ultimate goal was precisely to “incorporate the principle of interculturality as a fundamental variable in the definition of the entire body of municipal policies of the present and the future” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2010, p. 17). The plan began by clarifying the theoretical framework of *interculturalitat*, drawing on the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism discursive frame: “The countries that for years opted to apply their version of the multiculturalist model, mainly the English-speaking countries, share the fact of having placed great emphasis on a respect for and recognition of differences, and, in contrast, having dedicated less effort to reinforcing the common elements that unite their citizens” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2010, p. 10). It then introduced Barcelona's conceptualization of *interculturalitat*, based on the three aforementioned principles – *equality, recognition of diversity, and positive interaction*.

The plan's framework included a detailed "Interculturality Decalogue", consisting of ten strategic linchpins, aimed at guiding the implementation of integration policies and initiatives. For each linchpin, three strategic lines were formulated, each of which was, in turn, connected, to three practical measures. As a result, the plan's operative section comprised 10 linchpins, 30 goals, and 90 measures aimed at reshaping various aspects of Barcelona's urban life in light of *interculturalitat*.

Although reframed under the ideal of interculturality, many strategic lines of this plan did not stray far from those of the two previous immigration plans of 2002 and 2008. The plan continued to focus on fostering social cohesion, strengthening the civic fabric, promoting contacts, and celebrating diversity as a city asset by combating discrimination and prejudice. Unsurprisingly, some of these guidelines were influenced by the second *Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2009-2012* enacted by the Generalitat de Catalunya (Section 9.8, pp. 249-250). Once again, the protection of rights and equality was coupled with a strong emphasis on promoting Catalan culture and language as a common framework for achieving effective integration and enhancing social cohesion.

Unsurprisingly, in 2010, just a few months after the publication of the *Interculturality Plan*, Barcelona officially joined the Intercultural Cities Network. The city was immediately recognized as a major benchmark, exemplifying a municipality capable of committing to an intercultural approach over the long term. The *Interculturality Plan* and the success of the initiatives implemented by the city within this framework served the ICC representatives as proof of the effectiveness of the principles of interculturalism in guiding the development of diversity governance systems. In other words, Barcelona quickly became regarded as one of the most innovative and pioneering laboratories of diversity in Europe, and, more specifically, as a leading *intercultural city*.

10.10

The Consolidation of Diversity Governance in the Intercultural City: Phase 1

For a decade following the publication of the *Barcelona Interculturality Plan*, the city has worked to implement the planned policies and initiatives. While the complex system of diversity and migration governance that developed in Barcelona since 2010 cannot be reduced to the scope of this single policy, the plan played a pivotal role in energizing such a system. Most importantly, it helped

establish a renewed focus on diversity and positioned interculturalism as a foundational principle for promoting minority rights and social cohesion in an increasingly plural city.

During the ten years covered by the plan, the political color of the local government changed twice. These shifts naturally brought about major transformations in the administration and city governance, which deeply impacted the management of the plan and the broader context of migration and diversity governance. A distinction can be made between two phases: the first, under Mayor Trias' government, which saw the implementation and consolidation of diversity governance structures, and the second under Mayor Colau, extending to the present.

The 2011 local elections marked a significant shift in Barcelona's political landscape with the defeat of the Socialists' Party of Catalonia by the nationalist-conservative party *Convergència i Unió*. The socialists had governed the city uninterruptedly for over three decades, so this change brought about dramatic and, in many ways, traumatic transformations in the overall governance of the city. To signal a clear departure from the previous administration, Mayor Trias made sweeping changes to the city's administrative structure, including renaming and reorganizing various municipal areas (departments, divisions, and offices) and replacing or relocating many city officials who held key positions under the previous government. This drastic overhaul inevitably caused significant confusion within the city's already complex administrative machinery, leading to slowdowns and disruptions in the implementation of policies initiated by the socialist government.

The institutional structure that was being built to manage the implementation of the *Interculturality Plan* was naturally affected by these changes. The planning team was dismantled, and the position of Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue was removed. However, the consensus-building strategies adopted by the socialist government proved effective in ensuring the continuity of policies despite the leadership change. Since *Convergència i Unió* had supported the *Interculturality Plan*, the Trias government continued its implementation, albeit with a focus on aspects that aligned more closely with its own policy agenda, which differed from that of the socialist administration that had drafted the plan.

To supervise and coordinate the implementation of the plan's strategic lines, the local government established the Barcelona Intercultural Action (*Barcelona Acció Intercultural*) division within the Area of Culture, Education, Science, and Community⁹². This division consisted of a team of experts and city officials, with the new administration wisely ensuring some continuity in the plan's management. Sanahuja was appointed as the director of the team, while de Torres and Astudillo played advisory roles. After being removed from its institutional role, de Torres decided to continue engaging in the promotion of Barcelona's diversity governance from the side of city diplomacy,

⁹² Currently reformed as the Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles.

convincing the local government to support the foundation of the Spanish Network of Intercultural Cities (*Red de Ciudades Interculturales*, or RECI). Officially constituted in 2011, this national network, inspired by a similar initiative in Reggio Emilia, Italy, represents a sub-group within the ICC Network, aimed to promote cooperation among Spanish cities in diversity governance. De Torres has since directed RECI, with Barcelona playing a major role in reinforcing its image and position as a model of interculturality at both the national and international levels.

Meanwhile, the team of the Barcelona Intercultural Action was entrusted with the supervision and coordination of the municipal Barcelona Interculturality Programme (*Programa Barcelona Interculturalitat* or PROGBI), which set the operational agenda for the implementation of the *Interculturality Plan*. The main initiatives implemented in the framework of the Programa Barcelona Interculturalitat included (a) the Barcelona Anti-Rumor Strategy, (b) the Espai Avinyó - Language and Culture Center, (c) Intercultural Training programs, and (d) the municipal Intercultural Projects.

a) Barcelona Anti-Rumor Strategy

During the drafting process for the *Interculturality Plan*, interviews and workshops with civil society representatives identified a key obstacle to harmonious diversity as the lack of knowledge about the cultures and histories of minority groups. This ignorance was seen as the primary driver of fear and mistrust, leading to stereotypes and prejudices, commonly referred to as rumors (*rumores*).

In July 2010, in response to these concerns, the team of Barcelona Acció Intercultural encouraged civil society organizations and informal groups to establish an official network to organize systematic actions against *rumores*: the Barcelona Anti-rumor Network (*Xarxa Barcelona Antirumors*, or *XBCNA*). The network, which remains active today, is dedicated to anti-rumor actions and training, targeting both its members and the general public. With the logistical and financial support from the local administration – which is also one of its prominent members – the Anti-rumor Strategy (*Estratègia Antirumores*) was formulated, focusing on three main actions:

- 1) *Anti-rumor awareness campaigns* and dissemination of information in different formats, including comics, badges, cups, guides, handbooks, websites, and social media.
- 2) *Projects and free activities* (e.g. workshops, plays, debates, etc.) targeting organizations, services, facilities, and schools to raise awareness of rumors and encourage intercultural reflection; a complete list of the network's activities is provided in the annually updated Catalogue of Anti-Rumor Activities, available since 2012.
- 3) *Free training as certified anti-rumor agents*, aimed at equipping the public with anti-rumor content and communication tools.

Since its official launch in 2010, the network's membership has continued to grow. The Anti-Rumor Network now includes more than 500 members, both organizations and private individuals. The network offers various forms of participation, with different levels of commitment, from simply receiving and sharing information about its activities to actively participating in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the Anti-Rumor Strategy in different contexts. As of 2022, the network had four working committees (Territory, Communication, Formation, Strategy) focused on different dimensions of the strategy and areas of intervention.

b) Espai Avinyó

The Espai Avinyó was launched in March 2011 by the local government in partnership with the Consortium for Linguistic Normalisation (CPNL). Until the present day, its main purpose has been to promote diversity by providing spaces and resources for cultural and artistic events directly including, or closely related to, the city's cultural minorities. Through a quarterly planning process, Espai Avinyó organizes a vast range of activities, including lectures, guide tours, screenings, exhibitions, concerts, etc.

Initially, due to the sponsorship of the Consortium for Linguistic Normalisation, the initiatives of the Espai Avinyó maintained a major focus on the use and teaching of the Catalan language. were heavily focused on the use and teaching of the Catalan language. This strategy aligned with the provisions of the *Interculturality Plan* and the Generalitat's integration policies. However, over time, Espai Avinyó has gradually gained independence in planning its activities, and Catalan is no longer the predominant language used.

c) Intercultural Training

Since 2010, a dedicated team of experts has been working to foster intercultural practices and perspectives across various professional and social areas of the city, such as organizations, facilities, professional associations, political groups, trade unions, media outlets, and businesses. This team is responsible for organizing free training courses tailored to the specific needs of different municipal areas or sectors. Additionally, the team actively establishes contact with social partners to identify areas where training is needed and to design new training programs that address these demands.

d) Intercultural Projects

Some specific interventions were planned within the Barcelona Interculturality Program aimed at ensuring the circulation of intercultural initiatives across the city's districts and neighborhoods, thereby involving local communities. To this aim, the local government periodically allocated special

funding, inviting civil society organizations or neighborhood-level administrative offices to propose and implement intercultural activities.

The main categories of activities sponsored by the local government in the period between 2010 and 2020 included:

- *Target-specific intercultural activities* organized by Civic Centers, local cultural associations, etc.
- *Initiatives planned by local authorities* in cooperation with local social workers (community development plans, networks of civil society organizations, etc.).
- *The Sounds of Intercultural Barcelona*, a series of workshops organized with community centers and the Phonos Foundation (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), to collectively create a sound map of Barcelona's cultural diversity.
- *The Imagine Barcelona. Intercultural Collection Project*, aimed at raising awareness and promoting reflection on cultural diversity in high schools.
- *The Rossinyol Project*, which provided social mentoring between young mentees and college student mentors from different cultural backgrounds.
- *The Barcelona Asia Choir and Forum Theatre Workshop*, consisting of initiatives fostering cultural creation by bringing together participants from diverse backgrounds to work towards common objectives.

The efforts of Barcelona Acció Intercultural and the strategies outlined in the *Interculturality Plan* represent only part of the city's complex system of diversity governance. This system involves many other actors and sectors within the local administration, each focusing on different aspects of the city's diversity. The resulting complexity can sometimes be confusing for both institutional and civil stakeholders. While the *Interculturality Plan* serves as a comprehensive benchmark for the city's diversity efforts, many other actors and initiatives outside the scope of this plan also use the terms *interculturalitat* and *diversitat*. This diffusion of terminology reflects both the decentralization of the diversity governance system and, to some extent, its inefficiency and cumbersomeness.

Even during the initial implementation phase under Mayor Trias, some dimensions of diversity governance, while discursively aligned with *interculturalitat*, were managed independently of the PROGBI. Several initiatives related to migration and diversity, established before the new administration, continued to operate autonomously. Notably, this includes the Barcelona Municipal Immigration Council and the Office for Non-Discrimination (OND), as well as the Religious Affairs Office (*Oficina d'Afers Religiosos*, or OAR), which is the primary entity concerned with religious pluralism.

Religious pluralism was first incorporated into Barcelona's administrative agenda by Mayor Clos with the establishment of the Barcelona Inter-Religious Centre in 1999, within the municipal area of cultural policies (now the Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles). This institutional structure was tasked with guaranteeing the right to religious freedom and peaceful coexistence for all religious and lay groups. Following a series of institutional workshops on religious diversity during the 2004 Universal Forum of Cultures, the Inter-Religious Centre was reorganized into the (still active) OAR in 2006.

The OAR serves as a reference point for religious and spiritual matters and for all issues related to the city's religious and faith-based organizations and communities. It maintains contact with all religious communities in the city and assists, informs, and advises citizens on matters of religious plurality and its application in daily life in Barcelona. To support these efforts, the office created the platform *Coneix les religions* (Know the Religions)⁹³, which introduces the various religions present in Barcelona and maps the locations of their communities. Additionally, the OAR organizes training initiatives, dissemination activities, debates, and dialogues to promote interreligious dialogue and religious pluralism.

10.11

The Consolidation of Diversity Governance in the Intercultural City: Phase 2

The victory of Ada Colau at the 2015 local elections marked a new reorganization of the local administration which, once again, deeply impacted not only the implementation of the *Interculturality Plan* but the whole structure of diversity governance. Given the vast and pragmatic political plan of the Barcelona en Comú change party, this shift in leadership brought about changes that were perhaps even more dramatic than those experienced during the transition from Hereu's government to Trias'. Several city officials from the previous administration were either relocated or discharged, municipal areas were reorganized, and new issues were brought to the forefront of the political agenda.

Mayor Colau was generally supportive of the *Interculturality Plan*, as its principles and strategic lines aligned well with her political vision. Although the management structure of the plan –

⁹³ <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/coneixlesreligions/>.

comprising Barcelona Intercultural Action and the PROGBI – remained intact, the new administration restructured the technical team, dismissing Sanahuja, which led to notable changes in the management of the initiatives. Additionally, Colau placed a strong emphasis on new themes that, while often framed in terms of *diversitat* and *interculturalitat*, extended beyond the scope of the *Interculturality Plan* and its associated administrative structures.

One of the key issues that garnered Colau's attention was the refugee crisis, which came to the forefront during her election year amidst the so-called European refugee crisis. Colau's administration was clear in its vision: Barcelona was to become a European model of a welcoming city. To this end, the Department of Immigration and Refuge (*Direcció de Serveis d'Immigració i Refugi*) was established, tasked with managing all major services for refugees and newcomers. The information, services, and assistance offered were systematically organized through the *Nova Ciutadania* web platform, originally created under the provisions of the *2008-2011 Immigration Work Plan*.

In September 2015, in partnership with several civil society organizations, the Department of Immigration and Refuge published the *Barcelona Refugee City Plan (Pla Barcelona Ciutat Refugi)*, which outlined the main strategic lines for the city's response to the refugee crisis. This plan aimed to prepare Barcelona to effectively receive and support refugees, provide necessary services, and guarantee their rights. It also included advocacy efforts urging states – beginning with the Spanish government – to uphold humanitarian law by relocating refugees, establishing safe and legal passage, and addressing the root causes of the refugee crisis.

Colau also placed renewed emphasis on gender and sexual minority rights, which fell outside the scope of the *Interculturality Plan*. To address these issues, the municipal area concerning social rights was reorganized into the Area of Social Rights, Global Justice, Feminism, and LGBTI Affairs⁹⁴ (*Àrea de Drets Socials, Justícia Global, Feminismes i LGTBI*). Within this area, the Councillor's Office for Feminism and LGBTI Affairs (*Regidoria de Feminismes i LGTBI*) was established as the primary institutional body responsible for coordinating all policies, projects, and activities related to gender and sexual diversity, as well as promoting equality within the local administration. Two of the most significant initiatives connected to this office are the *Centre LGTBI de Barcelona* and the *Barcelona Antimasclista* platform.

The Centre LGTBI is a public facility offering a wide range of information, advisory, and direct assistance services in cooperation with several civil society organizations. It presents cultural and community action programs and awareness-raising activities open to all citizens, complementing the initiatives organized by various associations that use its facilities, whether on a permanent or

⁹⁴ Later this area was incorporated into the current Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles.

occasional basis. Barcelona Antimasclista is a platform providing different services to the LGBTI community, including information, support, recovery, and shelter.

Within the same Area of Social Rights, Global Justice, Feminism, and LGBTI Affairs, the Department of Citizenship Rights and Diversity (*Direcció de Drets de Ciutadania i Diversitat*) was also established (this department is now known as the *Departament de Drets Humans*). In cooperation with the Barcelona Intercultural Action team, this department aimed to promote “a diverse and intercultural city model where everyone has real and effective access, under equal conditions, to all human rights recognized and guaranteed in the city” (AdB n.d., official webpage). The Department was entrusted with two key municipal programs that have become integral components of the city’s diversity governance: Barcelona Diverse City (*Barcelona ciutat diversa*) and Barcelona City of Rights (*Barcelona ciutat de drets*)⁹⁵.

The Barcelona Diverse City program aimed to promote diversity as an integral element of Barcelona’s urban life. As part of this initiative, the Department took over the coordination of the existing Barcelona Anti-Rumor Strategy and the Intercultural Training programs. It also launched the Local Strategy for the Roma Community (*Estratègia local amb el poble gitano*), which includes goals and initiatives to promote inclusion, social cohesion, awareness, and knowledge of Roma culture through equality and non-discrimination. Additionally, the Department worked closely with the Religious Affairs Office on a strategy to defend and empower all rights related to religion, thereby promoting the city’s religious diversity.

The ongoing Barcelona City of Rights program focuses on incorporating a human-rights-based approach into public policies, promoting substantive citizenship for all residents, and combating hate speech and discrimination. Many of the initiatives organized within this framework address the needs of migrants and cultural minorities. The Department was given responsibility for managing the already established OND and Barcelona Municipal Immigration Council, both of which received increased public funding.

The OND has become one of Barcelona’s major points of reference for individuals facing discrimination. The Office offers free legal advice and assistance, as well as psychological care, to any victim of discrimination or human rights violations. When a violation does not constitute a crime, the OND assists in seeking out-of-court solutions and can mediate between the parties involved. Additionally, the Office is committed to disseminating information and organizing training and awareness campaigns on equal rights. It also works to identify and address structural problems that contribute to human rights violations, with the aim of developing proposals to tackle these issues.

⁹⁵ Later, Barcelona Diverse City has been incorporated into Barcelona City of Rights.

The Immigration Council developed a working plan that institutionalized its activities around four key thematic areas: 1) *substantive citizenship*, 2) *interculturality*, 3) *associationism*, and 4) *participation and dissemination*. Within this framework, the Council periodically organizes conferences, talks, and working sessions. At the same time, some annual events are organized, such as the commemoration of World Refugee Day on June 20, the Immigration Council Awards around December 18, and the Barcelona Diverse City Gathering (*Trobada Barcelona Ciutat Diversa*), a festival celebrating civic diversity and interculturality.

Along with these two already established entities, two new institutional bodies were created under the Barcelona City of Rights: the Coexistence Office (*Oficina de Convivència*)⁹⁶ and the Human Rights Resource Center (*Centre de Recursos en Drets Humans*). The Coexistence Office is dedicated to preserving public spaces as areas where coexistence is fostered and where everyone has the freedom to engage in community activities. The office collects data, presents reports, and makes proposals to the local government to ensure these spaces remain inclusive and welcoming.

The Centre de Recursos en Drets Humans serves as a key resource for the prevention, respect, and protection of human rights in the city, aligning with the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The Centre offers training and education activities on human rights and anti-prejudice targeting schools, organizations, association networks, and local administration itself. These activities are detailed in the Centre's Training Catalogue. Additionally, the Centre compiles documents and resources related to human rights and non-discrimination, and it actively advises the local government on measures and policies to uphold these values. A specific focus of the Centre's work is the promotion of women's rights and gender equality. In collaboration with the OND, the Centre established the Barcelona Discrimination Observatory (*Observatori de les Discriminacions*) in 2018. Since then, the Observatory has published an annual report on local discrimination levels, detailing the anti-discrimination actions taken and outlining future challenges.

10.12

Re-tuning *Interculturalitat*

⁹⁶ Currently, the Coexistence Office is entrusted to the Municipal Area of Prevention, Safety, Coexistence, and Internal Affairs.

In 2019, as the period covered by the *Interculturality Plan* was about to end, an extensive analysis was undertaken to assess the achievements in diversity governance, particularly focusing on identifying successes and ongoing challenges of the system that had taken shape over the past decade. Ada Colau's re-election in 2019, which secured another four years for Barcelona en Comú, ensured that this evaluation process proceeded smoothly without the disruptions that often accompany a change in government.

To coordinate and supervise this work, Colau reinstated the role of Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue, now rebranded as Commissioner for Intercultural Dialogue and Religious Pluralism (*Comissionat/Comissionada de Diàleg Intercultural i Pluralisme Religios*). Khalid Ghali, who had previously served as the director of the OAR, was appointed as Commissioner. He was tasked with using the evaluation findings to develop a new long-term strategic plan that would serve as the foundation for diversity governance strategies: a second *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat*.

Between 2019 and 2021, Ghali assembled a working team consisting of the staff from Barcelona Intercultural Action and several contracted experts, including de Torres, who had formulated the first *Interculturality Plan*. The drafting process followed the same methodology as ten years earlier, beginning with efforts to secure consensus among all political groups represented in the local government. However, this time, unanimous consensus was not achieved, as the conservative People's Party of Catalonia (*Partit Popular de Catalunya*, or PP) refused to endorse the document. Although the PP held only a small fraction (5%) of seats in the local government, their dissent was seen as a setback for the consensus-driven approach that had been a hallmark of Barcelona's migration and diversity governance since the first *Municipal Immigration Plan* in 2002.

With the political negotiations concluded, Ghali and his team turned to data collection for the drafting process, emphasizing both transversalization and participatory design. In line with the principle of transversalization, representatives from all municipal areas were brought together in an advisory council to monitor and guide the plan's development. Data were collected through surveys and working sessions, and local research centers were commissioned to produce reports containing action plan proposals and studies on key issues related to migration and diversity.

For the participatory process, various channels were created to gather input despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented in-person meetings. Numerous effective methods were employed, allowing the collection of a substantial amount of information, including specific ideas and proposals from different social agents, the general public, and municipal staff. A

total of 15 in-depth online discussion sessions were held⁹⁷, with participants divided into smaller groups to evaluate the diagnosis from the sessions, identify main challenges and priorities, and assess the effectiveness of previous municipal actions in implementing the three core principles of Barcelona's intercultural approach: equality, recognition of diversity, and positive interaction. They also discussed the action lines and goals of intercultural dialogue.

An additional step in the drafting process involved conducting an online survey through the e-governance platform decidim.barcelona, created under Colau's administration. The survey included questions about public perceptions of equal rights, opportunities, fairness, and non-discrimination, as well as intercultural dialogue, interaction, and the acknowledgment of diversity. The survey was available from October 21 to November 24, 2020, and received 126 responses. The final step involved conducting online interviews with experts and professionals in various fields, such as intercultural policies, intersectionality, and linguistic diversity⁹⁸.

The result of this extensive process was the *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat 2021-2030*. Unlike the first plan, this new version placed a strong emphasis on embracing dynamism as a core principle of diversity governance. Rather than presenting interculturality as a definitive solution for creating a successful, diverse city, it was now understood as “a transforming and dynamic process in a constant state of learning and construction” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021, p. 5). Accordingly, the plan acknowledged that “the intercultural approach must be sensitive to social change and keep an open and critical attitude based on what we learn from it and the results of its practical application... to avoid dogmas to gradually fine-tune policies while simultaneously enriching intercultural narratives” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021, p. 5).

This commitment to dynamism was a response to the perceived ideological rigidity of the first plan, as highlighted by the extensive evaluation process conducted prior to the new drafting. As a result, the plan itself was described as “something “living” and dynamic” with implementation involving all areas and districts, each outlining their own intercultural action plans for a 2-to-3-year period (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021, p. 19). In other words, the plan acts as a flexible framework, adaptable to the city's evolving reality and the outcomes of ongoing evaluations and policy impacts.

The first part of the new plan reviews Barcelona's current situation in light of the three core principles that underlie the city's interculturality. Regarding the principle of *equality*, it was observed

⁹⁷ List of participants: Women's Council and Municipal LGBTI Council; Barcelona Anti-Rumour Network; Municipal Social Welfare Council; Elderly People's Advisory Council; Barcelona Municipal Immigration Council; Municipal Roma People Council; Municipal Schools Council; Sports Council; Religious Pluralism in the framework of the new PBI; 4 city's association networks; 2 local municipal services and facilities; Municipal technical staff; Municipal technical staff from the Services for People departments; Social Services municipal technical staff; Communication technical staff.

⁹⁸ More specifically, 7 interviews were conducted with: representatives of the youth in Barcelona; leading figures from the world of culture; Barcelona Anti-Rumor Network; healthcare professionals; language diversity and multilingualism experts and professionals; intersectionality experts; and intercultural policy experts and trainers.

that the city is currently facing increasing inequality, exacerbated by the economic recession and the COVID-19 pandemic, which threatens social cohesion. Specifically, disparities in legal status have affected access to essential services like healthcare, employment, housing, and political representation for non-EU nationals. Barriers to accessing various municipal services, spaces, and facilities on equal terms were also identified, partly due to insufficient adaptation to the city's diverse reality, leading to instances of discrimination.

The analysis also highlighted that the issues related to equality and diversity recognition were reflected in the low representation of minority groups at the institutional level (city officials, police, teachers, etc.). Additionally, insufficient efforts had been made to adapt municipal services and facilities to reflect diversity, which hindered the acknowledgment of diversity and trust in the system. Collected data clearly showed that most minority groups do not feel represented in, or have access to, local political and cultural life.

Finally, regarding the principle of positive interaction, the analysis showed that people in the city were more likely to coexist rather than genuinely interact. Public spaces were not effectively designed to promote intercultural interactions, and there was a lack of data on the nature and intensity of such interactions.

Building on the lessons from the previous plan and the current situation, nine strategic aspects were identified as essential for successful intercultural policies:

- a) Taking the context into account.
- b) Promoting interculturality as a public policy approach and a proposal for society as a whole.
- c) Emphasizing the relevance of the local sphere, while not forgetting the multi-level dimensions involved in the governance of cultural diversity.
- d) Undertaking explicit political commitments.
- e) Mainstreaming and promoting the territorialization of the interventions.
- f) Incorporating feminist and intersectional perspectives.
- g) Promoting participation and cooperation with civil society.
- h) Adopting proactive and critical attitudes by creating appropriate indicators for measuring and evaluating intercultural policies.
- i) Embracing creativity and flexibility.

Within this strategic framework, the plan outlines 5 pillars, 26 goals, and 106 measures. Following the plan's publication, a 2022 government measure titled *Move Towards Interculturality. Governance Instruments and Mechanisms* set the initial programmatic agenda for the plan's implementation,

establishing a list of priority goals and strategies for the first three years. This measure covered the period until 2023 – the date of the last local elections.

10.13

The Governance System of the *City of Interculturalitat*

The history outlined in the previous sections highlights the development of a particular dimension of Barcelona that we might call the *City of Interculturalitat*. Until now, I have referred to this concept in terms of an *image*, *vision*, or *brand* – terms that, while illustrative, may be somewhat misleading as they emphasize its idealized, conceptual aspects. While the City of *Interculturalitat* does, indeed, function as a mental construct, it is also deeply rooted in tangible spaces, institutions, and practices, emerging from a governance system shaped by a diverse array of actors. In this sense, it operates as a real city, embedded in both the policies and structures of municipal institutions and the activities of civil society.

Of course, the City of *Interculturalitat* does not encompass the entirety of Barcelona's complex and multifaceted governance system. Many other *Cities* coexist within the broader cityscape, shaped by diverse priorities such as ecology, business, technology, etc. These dimensions often intersect and intertwine, forming a rich, multifaceted tapestry of meanings and governance frameworks that collectively define Barcelona. Before metaphorically *entering* the City of *Interculturalitat* to present findings from my fieldwork – examining its frames, trajectories, successes, and challenges – this section offers a synthesis of its governance structure, providing a foundation for understanding how this unique dimension of the city is organized and operates.

The normative, regulatory, and administrative foundation of the City of *Interculturalitat* is anchored in the two *Barcelona Interculturality Plans*, whose implementation has been overseen by the municipality through the Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles and, specifically, a Commissioner⁹⁹. The Barcelona Intercultural Action team, comprising an average of

⁹⁹ In early 2023, Khalid Ghali concluded his tenure as Commissioner for Intercultural Dialogue and Religious Pluralism and returned to the Religious Affairs Office as its director. Under Mayor Jaume Collboni's administration, the role was redefined as *Commissioner for Citizen Relations and Cultural and Religious Diversity* (*Comissionat/Comissionada de Relacions Ciutadanes i Diversitat Cultural*). In August 2023, Sara Belbeida Bedoui was appointed to this position (AdB 2023)

five staff members, is tasked with implementing this plan as part of the Barcelona Interculturality Programme.

Currently, Barcelona Intercultural Action coordinates the activities of the Espai Avinyó and the Antirumores Network. It also directly organizes a variety of free training courses and workshops, targeting critical sectors within the city, including municipal technical staff, professionals in public services and facilities, community organization members, and individuals involved in grassroots projects.

These initiatives form part of a broader, long-term strategy to mainstream the intercultural approach across Barcelona's policies and practices. This strategy operates along the two key interconnected paths of *transversalization* and *territorialization*. More specifically, on the one hand, Barcelona Intercultural Action works to integrate intercultural approaches into city policymaking and implementation across all departments and areas of the municipal administration (*transversalization*). This involves advising and supporting various City Council departments to promote the incorporation of interculturality principles in their strategies and actions. On the other hand, the team offers resources and guidance to district administrations and grassroots organizations, enabling them to design and execute intercultural programs and projects that respond to local challenges and needs (*territorialization*). Through these dual approaches, the City of *Interculturalitat* strives to create a cohesive framework for governance that promotes diversity, dialogue, and inclusion, reinforcing Barcelona's position as a leader in intercultural governance and practice.

The small team at Barcelona Intercultural Action faces significant constraints in human resources, making it impossible to directly manage or implement all the initiatives it organizes. Instead, since the launch of the first Barcelona Interculturality Plan, the management of most projects has been outsourced to consultancy organizations. Two key consultancy groups have played a pivotal role:

- QSL Serveis Culturals, an organization closely associated with Barcelona Intercultural Action since its inception – notably, Carolina Astudillo, a representative of QSL, was instrumental in drafting the first Barcelona Interculturality Plan alongside Dani de Torres (Interview A; Interview B).
- Spora Sinergies, which has more recently taken on a significant share of PROGBI's project coordination and implementation.

These consultancy organizations provide professional moderators to ensure the effective coordination and execution of initiatives and the drafting of reports.

The implementation of intercultural projects and practices is predominantly managed by civil society organizations, with occasional involvement from specific municipal teams. This approach

operates within the framework of a public-private partnership, rooted in the legacy of the *Barcelona Model* (Section 10.3). This model emphasizes collaboration between local government and civil society organizations to address complex social issues that exceed the capacity of municipal institutions alone, fostering shared responsibility and resource synergy to achieve common goals.

Universities, cultural institutions, and research centers also play a critical role in the planning and implementation of intercultural initiatives. Their contributions include:

- Conducting research and producing reports that provide feedback, guidelines, and relevant data for planning strategies and initiatives.
- Enhancing the legitimacy and visibility of certain proposals, increasing their impact and attracting interest from stakeholders.
- Expanding networks of expertise by engaging researchers and students, who may contribute to the practical implementation of initiatives, either as part of their academic research or through personal involvement.

This collaboration strengthens the credibility and effectiveness of intercultural practices, fostering innovation and broadening their reach.

While Barcelona Intercultural Action serves as the backbone of the governance system sustaining the City of *Interculturalitat*, other institutional actors also contribute to its development. Through an analysis of the operations of various municipal departments, I identified several branches of Barcelona's government that explicitly highlight *diversitat* as a key area of intervention, aligning their objectives with the goals outlined in the *Interculturality Plan*.

As of 2023, Barcelona's political structure is divided into four municipal areas:

- Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles (*Àrea Drets Socials, Cultura, Educació i Cicles de Vida*).
- Area of Economy, Tax, Economic Promotion, and Tourism (*Àrea d'Economia Hisenda, Promoció Econòmica i Turisme*).
- Area of Urban Planning, Ecological Transition, Urban Services, and Housing (*Àrea d'Urbanisme, Transició Ecològica, Serveis Urbans i Habitatge*).
- Area of Prevention, Safety, Coexistence, and Internal Affairs (*Àrea de Prevenció, Seguretat, Convivència i Règim Interior*)

The results of my review are summarized in Table 1.

Unsurprisingly, *diversitat* is central to much of the work undertaken by the expansive Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles, extending far beyond the specific scope of

Barcelona Intercultural Action. Given space constraints, I have opted not to examine every municipal division and entity engaged in *diversitat*-related interventions. Instead, I focused on the overarching municipal sectors under which these offices and organizations operate. Of the 20 sectors identified as emphasizing *diversitat* as a key area of intervention, 11 explicitly include the management of diversity as an integral part of their core responsibilities.

Beyond the Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles, *diversitat* also emerges as a key focus for two executive offices within the Area of Economy, Tax, Economic Promotion, and Tourism, for one sector in the Area of Urban Planning, Ecological Transition, Urban Services, and Housing, and for one office in the Area of Prevention, Safety, Coexistence, and Internal Affairs.

MUNICIPAL AREA	SECTOR	OFFICE
Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles (<i>Drets Socials, Cultura, Educació i Cicles de Vida</i>)	Adolescence and Youth (<i>Adolescència i Joventut</i>)	
	Caring City (<i>Ciutat cuidadora</i>)	
	Childhood (<i>Infància</i>)	
	Citizenship Participation (<i>Participació ciutadana</i>)	
	Citizenship Rights (<i>Drets de ciutadania</i>)	
	Community Action (<i>Acció comunitària</i>)	
	Culture (<i>Cultura</i>)	
	Democratic Innovation (<i>Innovació democràtica</i>)	
	Education (<i>Educació</i>)	
	Global Justice and International Cooperation (<i>Justícia global i cooperació internacional</i>)	
	Health (<i>Salut</i>)	
	Immigration (<i>Immigració</i>)	

	Interculturalism and Religious Pluralism (<i>Interculturalitat i pluralisme religiós</i>)	
	Old People (<i>Persones grans</i>)	
	People with Disabilities (<i>Persones amb discapacitat</i>)	
	Sexual and Gender Diversity. LGBTI (<i>Diversitat sexual i de gènere. LGTBI</i>)	
	Social Participation (Participació social)	
	Social Services (<i>Serveis socials</i>)	
	Sports (<i>Esports</i>)	
	Women and Feminisms (<i>Dones i feminismes</i>)	
Economy, Tax, Economic Promotion, and Tourism (<i>Economia Hisenda, Promoció Econòmica i Turisme</i>)	Enterprises (<i>Empreses</i>)	Barcelona Active (<i>Barcelona Activa</i>)
		Barcelona Information and Communication (<i>Informació i Comunicació de Barcelona</i>)
Urban Planning, Ecological Transition, Urban Services, and Housing (<i>Urbanisme, Transició Ecològica, Serveis Urbans i Habitatge</i>)	Citizens' Commitment (<i>Compromís ciutadà</i>)	
Prevention, Safety, Coexistence, and Internal Affairs (<i>Prevenició, Seguretat, Convivència i Règim Interior</i>)	Coexistence (<i>Convivència</i>)	Coexistence Office (<i>Oficina de convivència</i>)

Table 1. *Administrative bodies within Barcelona's municipal governance structure that explicitly recognize cultural heterogeneity (diversitat) as a core aspect of their competencies and mission. Special emphasis is placed on institutional bodies that explicitly include diversity management (gestió de la diversitat) within their mandates.*

Most of these institutional bodies operate in a manner similar to that of Barcelona Intercultural Action when it comes to managing and implementing diversity-related initiatives and strategies. Specifically, due to limitations in economic and human resources, these municipal sectors, departments, and divisions primarily assume a supervisory role. The actual management and coordination of initiatives are often outsourced to professional enterprises, while the practical implementation is typically undertaken by civil society organizations.

This approach has naturally spurred the growth of an entire business sector composed of private entities, such as consultancies, dedicated to providing skilled personnel and experienced practitioners for managing municipal projects and services. At the same time, many civil society organizations have adjusted their interests and priorities to align with those of the municipality, fostering relationships with institutional actors to secure continuity in their activities.

Finally, an essential aspect of the governance system for the City of *Interculturalitat* is its economic structure, supported by three primary funding sources:

- **Municipal Government:** In addition to operating institutional services that participate in the governance of the City of *Interculturalitat*, the municipal government dedicates a specific budget to PROGBI. This funding is the most transparent financial data available regarding the system's maintenance, as it is officially recorded. For example, the initial budget allocated for implementing the *Interculturality Plan* (2020–2023) was €14,861,957.53 (AdB 2021, 16). Additionally, the municipality provides annual funding to support initiatives that contribute to intercultural practices and strategies.
- **Private Foundations:** Periodically, private foundations offer one-time funding opportunities for projects – both research-based and practical interventions – connected to *interculturalitat*. Notably, La Caixa Foundation plays a significant role, continuing a legacy of social intervention rooted in the activities of savings banks during Franco's dictatorship (Section 10.2, p. 258).
- **European Union:** Substantial financial support also comes from EU funding, aimed at promoting research and practical initiatives tied to interculturalism and social inclusion. These funds are accessed either directly by civil society organizations and research institutions or with the mediation and support of institutional actors.

Most of these institutional bodies functions in the same way as the Barcelona Action Intercultural as concerns the management and implementation of *diversitat*-related initiatives and strategies. That is, on many occasions, the specific municipal sector, department, or division lacks the economic and human resources to directly manage and implement the mission in practice. Thus, it mostly play a supervising role, with the actual management outsourced to a professional enterprise and the implementation in practice usually devolved to civil society actors. This has naturally led to a proliferation of private entities-such as consultancies-dedicated to providing qualified personnel and experienced practitioners for the management of municipal projects and services. At the same time, it has led various civil society organizations to veer their interests by aligning them with those of the municipality to build or keep alive a relationship with institutions to ensure continuity in their engagement. In this dynamic can still be found the lights and shadows of the New Public Management (Section 1.2, pp. 26-27) model and the Barcelona Model (Section 10.3), as we will see more in details in the next section.

One last aspect to be taken into consideration is the economic dimension nurturing the system of governance of the City of *Interculturalitat*. The fundings for the implementation of intercultural activities come from three main sources:

- *Municipal government*: Besides running the institutional services, some of which participate to the governance system of the City of Interculturality, a special budget is dedicated to the PROGBI. This is the most transparent data that can be found about the economic maintenance of the governance system of the City of Interculturalitat, as this budget is recorded and available. For instance, the starting budget for the implementation of the *Interculturality Plan* allocated by the government covering the period 2020-2023 was 14.861.957,53 € (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021, p. 16). Moreover, the municipality allocates annually specific fundings for supporting initiatives contributing to the implementation of intercultural practices and strategies.
- *Private foundations*: Periodically, private foundations intervene opening *una tantum* fundings opportunities for projects – both research and practical interventions – connected to *interculturalitat*. A key role in this sense is played by La Caixa Foundation, whose commitment in financial support to address social issues date back to the legacy of interventions by savings banks under Franco’s dictatorship (Section 10.2, p. 258).
- *European Union*: A significant support comes also from European fundings aimed at promoting research projects or practical initiatives connected to interculturalism and social inclusion. These fundings are accessed either directly by civil society organizations and/or research institutions, or with the mediation and support of institutional actors.

Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis, offering a visual representation of the governance system of the City of *Interculturalitat*.




Table 2. Visual synthesis of the City of Interculturalitat's governance system, outlining the various scales of governance – including their respective roles and the mechanisms shaping their engagement through a multiscale lens. The focus then narrows to the municipal level, detailing the core principles that underpin the City of Interculturalitat and mapping the ecosystem of actors involved in its governance, together with their specific roles.

10.14

Frames and Trajectories of the City of *Interculturalitat*

Diversitat serves as the foundational dimension around which Barcelona's City of *Interculturalitat* revolves. Beyond its central role in shaping municipal administration and framing policies aimed at promoting social inclusion and cohesion, *diversitat* has become a buzzword in Barcelona's everyday life and politics. From municipal working documents and political debates to social projects and media discourse, the term frequently appears as a sort of mantra. It is often invoked to highlight Barcelona's highly heterogeneous society while simultaneously celebrating the city's ability to maintain its unique and cohesive identity, transforming this diversity into a social and economic asset.

Today, it is unthinkable for any political party to run for office in Barcelona without addressing *diversitat*. For instance, in the 2023 municipal elections, every party referenced *diversitat* in their electoral programs¹⁰⁰. Barcelona en Comú led the way with 83 mentions, and even the far-right party Vox – albeit in the context of a nationalist, anti-immigrant narrative – referred to the “rica diversidad” (rich diversity) of Spanish culture (Vox, 2023, p. 9).

As with any buzzword, *diversitat* risks losing its precise meaning as its usage expands and becomes increasingly vague. However, the localized context of Barcelona makes it possible to circumscribe its analysis and investigate its specific meaning within the governance framework of the City of *Interculturalitat*.

In the key normative and administrative framework of the *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat*, *diversitat* is described as an intrinsic element of social life, encompassing various dimensions that shape individual and collective identities. The plan articulates this perspective as follows:

¹⁰⁰ Documents are available at: <https://beteve.cat/politica/programes-electorals-eleccions-municipals-2023-barcelona/>

The intercultural perspective has served to remind us that diversity does not stem solely from migratory processes and that our societies are plural and diverse by definition, even if this diversity (in terms of origin, ethnoracial group, religion, language, sex, age, etc.) has not always been sufficiently acknowledged. (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2021, p. 3)

To gain a more concrete understanding of how *diversitat* is framed in practice, we can analyze how the term is used by those municipal sectors and departments identified in the previous section, whose missions explicitly feature diversity as a key area of intervention. By reviewing the content of initiatives by various public administration actors, it is possible to identify what social groups, in particular, are included under the umbrella of *diversitat*.

Based on publicly available documents from the Barcelona City Council webpage as of late 2023, my analysis offers a preliminary overview of how institutional actors frame *diversitat*. It is important to note that this review is intended to provide indications of trends in framing rather than a rigorous assessment of frequency or the relative importance of specific social categories for the city’s public administration.

The findings, summarized in Table 3, indicate that the majority of municipal actors use the term *diversitat* to refer to *migrants*, *women*, or *LGBTI* minorities. A smaller group of actors applies the term to specific groups such as the *Roma people* or *non-Catholic religious communities*. Additionally, some actors focus on *people with disabilities* or the *elderly*. Notably, a subset of these actors adopts *diversitat* to address multiple overlapping social categories, reflecting a more nuanced framing of diversity.

GROUP REFERRED	SECTOR	OFFICE
Migrants	Adolescence and Youth (<i>Adolescència i Joventut</i>)	
	Enterprises (<i>Empreses</i>)	Barcelona Active (<i>Barcelona Activa</i>)
		Barcelona Information and Communication (<i>Informació i Comunicació de Barcelona</i>)
	Citizens’ Commitment (<i>Compromís ciutadà</i>)	
	Citizenship Participation (<i>Participació ciutadana</i>)	
	Citizenship Rights (<i>Drets de ciutadania</i>)	

	Coexistence (<i>Convivència</i>)	Coexistence Office (<i>Oficina de convivència</i>)
	Community Action (<i>Acció comunitària</i>)	
	Culture (<i>Cultura</i>)	
	Democratic Innovation (<i>Innovació democràtica</i>)	
	Education (<i>Educació</i>)	
	Global Justice and International Cooperation (<i>Justícia global i cooperació internacional</i>)	
	Health (<i>Salut</i>)	
	Immigration (<i>Immigració</i>)	
	Interculturalism and Religious Pluralism (<i>Interculturalitat i pluralisme religiós</i>)	
	Social Participation (Participació social)	
	Social Services (<i>Serveis socials</i>)	
	Sports (<i>Esports</i>)	
	Women and Feminisms (<i>Dones i feminismes</i>)	
<i>Women / Females</i>	Enterprises (<i>Empreses</i>)	Barcelona Active (<i>Barcelona Activa</i>)
		Barcelona Information and Communication (<i>Informació i Comunicació de Barcelona</i>)
	Caring City (<i>Ciutat cuidadora</i>)	
	Citizens' Commitment (<i>Compromís ciutadà</i>)	
	Citizenship Rights (<i>Drets de ciutadania</i>)	
	Coexistence	Coexistence Office

	(Convivència)	(Oficina de convivència)
	Community Action (Acció comunitària)	
	Culture (Cultura)	
	Education (Educació)	
	Global Justice and International Cooperation (Justícia global i cooperació internacional)	
	Interculturalism and Religious Pluralism (Interculturalitat i pluralisme religiós)	
	Sexual and Gender Diversity. LGBTI (Diversitat sexual i de gènere. LGTBI)	
	Social Participation (Participació social)	
	Social Services (Serveis socials)	
	Sports (Esports)	
	Women and Feminisms (Dones i feminismes)	
LGBTI	Enterprises (Empreses)	Barcelona Information and Communication (Informació i Comunicació de Barcelona)
	Caring City (Ciutat cuidadora)	
	Citizens' Commitment (Compromís ciutadà)	
	Citizenship Rights (Drets de ciutadania)	
	Community Action (Acció comunitària)	
	Culture (Cultura)	
	Education (Educació)	

	Global Justice and International Cooperation (<i>Justícia global i cooperació internacional</i>)	
	Interculturalism and Religious Pluralism (<i>Interculturalitat i pluralisme religiós</i>)	
	Sexual and Gender Diversity. LGBTI (<i>Diversitat sexual i de gènere. LGTBI</i>)	
	Social Participation (Participació social)	
	Social Services (<i>Serveis socials</i>)	
	Sports (<i>Esports</i>)	
	Women and Feminisms (<i>Dones i feminismes</i>)	
Roma People	Enterprises (<i>Empreses</i>)	Barcelona Information and Communication (<i>Informació i Comunicació de Barcelona</i>)
	Citizenship Rights (<i>Drets de ciutadania</i>)	
	Coexistence (<i>Convivència</i>)	Coexistence Office (<i>Oficina de convivència</i>)
	Culture (<i>Cultura</i>)	
	Education (<i>Educació</i>)	
	Interculturalism and Religious Pluralism (<i>Interculturalitat i pluralisme religiós</i>)	
	Social Participation (Participació social)	
	Social Services (<i>Serveis socials</i>)	
	Enterprises (<i>Empreses</i>)	Barcelona Information and Communication

<i>Non-Catholic Religious Groups</i>		<i>(Informació i Comunicació de Barcelona)</i>
	Citizens' Commitment <i>(Compromís ciutadà)</i>	
	Citizenship Rights <i>(Drets de ciutadania)</i>	
	Coexistence <i>(Convivència)</i>	Coexistence Office <i>(Oficina de convivència)</i>
	Culture <i>(Cultura)</i>	
	Education <i>(Educació)</i>	
	Interculturalism and Religious Pluralism <i>(Interculturalitat i pluralisme religiós)</i>	
<i>People with Disabilities</i>	Enterprises <i>(Empreses)</i>	Barcelona Information and Communication <i>(Informació i Comunicació de Barcelona)</i>
	People with Disabilities <i>(Persones amb discapacitat)</i>	
	Social Services <i>(Serveis socials)</i>	
	Sports <i>(Esports)</i>	
<i>Elderly</i>	Old People <i>(Persones grans)</i>	
	Social Services <i>(Serveis socials)</i>	

Table 3. *Conceptualization of cultural heterogeneity by the administrative bodies of Barcelona's municipal government that explicitly recognize it as a core aspect of their competencies and mission. The left column identifies the categories of groups referenced by each actor, while the central and right columns list the specific bodies. This provides a comprehensive understanding of how the term diversitat is applied within the framework of municipal governance.*

Through two focus groups involving twelve civil society representatives, as well as my participation in several initiatives and events focused on the planning, management, and

implementation of intercultural strategies, I was able to gain deeper insight into how *diversitat* is framed in practice. The findings reveal a persistent tendency to use *diversitat* primarily to refer to traditional categories such as *nationality* and *ethnicity*, albeit with the implicit or explicit acknowledgment that these markers intersect with other identity dimensions, particularly *gender*, *sex*, *sexual orientation*, *religion*, and *age*.

That said, I observed that aspects such as *old age*, *disability*, and *social class* are rarely encompassed within the semantic scope of *diversitat* as defined by practitioners. While these dimensions receive attention in specific services and initiatives at both institutional and civil society levels, they remain on the periphery within the framework of the City of *Interculturalitat*. Significantly, in these instances, *diversitat* tends to lose its positive connotation as a socioeconomic asset to be celebrated and leveraged. Instead, it is more frequently used to characterize the *difference* of minority groups considered *vulnerable*, emphasizing their experiences of marginalization and exclusion rather than their contributions or potential within society.

In addition to examining how *diversitat* is framed, I have investigated the aims and areas of intervention of *diversitat*-related services and initiatives within Barcelona's strategic agenda.. This exploration reveals two primary pathways through which interculturalitat is translated into action:

- a) *Interventions to combat exclusion*: These initiatives are generally framed around anti-discrimination efforts and the empowerment of minorities, grounded in the three core principles of *interculturalitat* – namely, equality, recognition of diversity, and positive interaction (Section 10.8, p. 280). Falling under the welfare dimension, these interventions rely on partnerships between institutions and civil society organizations, with the latter playing a significant role in planning and directing implementation.
- b) *Entrepreneurial strategies*: These strategies emphasize the positive role of *diversitat* as one of Barcelona's key socioeconomic assets. Typically framed within the scope of cultural and internationalization policies, they are associated with city branding and city diplomacy. These strategies are primarily managed by institutions in collaboration with private business actors, with civil society organizations playing a more limited role in decision-making.

The distinction between these two pathways is, of course, not absolute. Interventions to combat exclusion often incorporate elements of entrepreneurial strategies, just as entrepreneurial strategies can contribute to combating exclusion. However, these two paths tend to pursue distinct goals, each aligned with broader ideals and visions central to Barcelona's strategic agenda. More precisely:

- The *anti-exclusion pathway* supports the vision of Barcelona as an *Inclusive* and *Cohesive City*, emphasizing social justice and equity.

- The *entrepreneurial pathway* advances the vision of Barcelona as a *Creative and Smart City*, leveraging diversity as a driver of innovation and global connectivity.

These ideals converge under the broader framework of *sustainability*, which has gained increasing prominence since the launch of the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015. This global shift has gradually shaped the overarching vision of Barcelona as a *Sustainable City*, integrating inclusion, creativity, and environmental responsibility into a broader comprehensive strategy. Within this context, the City of *Interculturalitat* emerges as a key dimension of Barcelona's efforts to navigate the complexities of urban life in the 21st century.

10.15

Entering the *City of Interculturalitat*: Successes and Challenges

From the outset of my fieldwork in Barcelona, beginning with the first focus group I organized, I aimed to identify focal points to reconstruct how the governance system of the City of *Interculturalitat* is perceived by its key actors. These include the individuals who play a critical role in sustaining the system, planning, and implementing intercultural strategies, policies, and practices. Specifically, I focused on the perceived successes and challenges of the City of *Interculturalitat*.

The insights gathered from the first focus group helped refine the focus of subsequent interviews and discussions, enabling the identification of several key themes. Early on, two distinct perspectives on the system's successes and challenges began to emerge, depending on whether stakeholders were institutional actors or civil society representatives. While these perspectives were not necessarily in conflict, they emphasized different aspects and revealed varying critical approaches and priorities. These findings were further enriched by my own field observations – particularly from planning meetings and activities related to the implementation of intercultural strategies – and by synthesizing all the information collected during the research process.

From the perspective of government officials, one of the key successes of Barcelona's diversity governance system lies in its *sustainability*. This refers to the local government's ability to maintain a long-term commitment to *interculturalitat*, supported by a well-defined political and normative

framework, articulated through specific, enduring policies. Two pillars were identified as fundamental to this sustainability:

- *Broad political consensus*: The capacity to achieve strong levels of agreement among the various political powers represented in the City Council.
- *Stable partnerships with a vibrant civil society*: The local government's ability to establish a synergistic and enduring collaboration with civil society organizations. This is further bolstered by the unique responsiveness and activism of Barcelona's civil society.

Additionally, officials emphasized the system's strong commitment to *monitoring and evaluating* intercultural initiatives as another crucial element of the City of *Interculturalitat*'s success. This commitment is demonstrated through robust data collection and collaboration with experts, ensuring that the implementation of policies and practices is grounded in evidence. This is coupled with the system's *dynamism* – its ability to remain adaptable and responsive to changing circumstances and emerging research findings. This flexibility allows the governance framework to evolve in alignment with new challenges and opportunities, reinforcing its effectiveness and long-term sustainability.

The most pressing challenge identified by government officials pertains to *communication inefficiencies* within the bureaucratic structure of Barcelona's administration. The sheer scale and dynamism of the administration – with departments and offices frequently reorganized or rebranded – often result in poorly defined communication channels, hindering effective cooperation and synergy between actors. This inefficiency directly impacts the goals of transversalization and mainstreaming, which require stronger investments in improving communication and coordination across institutional actors.

Other challenges include:

- *Resource limitations*: Insufficient personnel and financial resources pose significant barriers to the full implementation of strategies, limiting the system's reach and impact.
- *Lack of minority representation*: There is a notable lack of representation of diverse groups within the city's administrative structure, which weakens the inclusivity and legitimacy of intercultural policies.
- *Saturation in participation*: While the system has successfully engaged an increasing number of practitioners and users of *diversitat*-related services, officials noted signs of *saturation* in expanding the capacity and scope of *interculturalitat*. To maintain momentum, further efforts must be made to scale the system sustainably while addressing emerging needs and challenges.

Civil society actors also expressed enthusiasm for the *supportive role of the government*, recognizing it as one of the key successes of the City of *Interculturalitat*. Many participants emphasized that the technical and financial assistance provided by governmental institutions was critical in enabling them to organize and develop their practices.

While civil society actors acknowledged the government's steering role – particularly in shaping priorities and frameworks through fund allocation – this did not generate concerns about manipulation. On the contrary, there was general agreement that their interests largely aligned with government directives and strategies. Furthermore, they felt that when criticisms arose, they had *adequate channels to voice their concerns* and trusted that these would influence government decisions. As a result, civil society actors generally perceived themselves as part of the decision-making process for *diversitat*-related strategies and shared in recognizing dynamism as one of the key strengths of the City of *Interculturalitat*.

Despite their enthusiasm, civil society actors raised concerns about the *long-term sustainability of government support*. While all interviewees acknowledged that Barcelona's institutions play a critical role in launching social projects and supporting their early phases, they also noted a lack of resources and support for expansion and consolidation. This gap often jeopardized the long-term viability of many initiatives. Interviewees emphasized that after the initial phase, additional investments and resources are crucial to address new challenges and ensure the project's sustainability. Without such support, many initiatives struggle to stand on their own and eventually disappear.

At the same time, this system results in strong incentives for projects to emancipate themselves from dependency on governmental support and, accordingly, from its supervision. In practice, this encourages initiatives to innovate, mobilize new resources, and explore alternative funding channels to survive in the medium and long term.

One recurring theme in interviews was the emphasis on report writing and data collection once institutional support mechanisms are established. On the positive side, all interviewees unanimously recognized the importance of supervision and monitoring to ensure high standards in project implementation, as well as the transparent and responsible use of resources. However, this was accompanied by expressions of a widespread *bureaucracy fatigue*. The frequent requirements for preparing reports, completing documentation, adhering to procedures, and attending various meetings with government representatives consumed significant time and energy, limiting opportunities for innovation and creativity. Both interviewees and field observations pointed to the need for more efficient monitoring processes to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining accountability.

Similar to governmental officials, civil society actors raised significant concerns regarding *communication inefficiencies*. Representatives cited challenges not only in their interactions with

governmental offices but also among themselves. The multiplicity of events, the administrative complexity, and the absence of clear and unified communication channels often led to *redundancy* and *fragmented efforts*. This lack of coordination *diminished opportunities for synergy and cooperation* among civil society actors, undermining the potential for a more cohesive approach to *diversitat*-related strategies.

Integrating the perspective from government officials and civil society actors with my own field observations highlights several critical issues that warrant further attention. A key issue concerns the limits in *inclusivity and accessibility* within the governance system. Participation, whether as practitioners or as users, is largely restricted to individuals associated with specific organizations. This narrow scope of governance primarily engages with organized civil society and lacks effective strategies to directly reach individuals. Instead, it relies heavily on local networks to promote engagement and disseminate information. This raises important questions about the effective reach of the City of *Interculturalitat* and its capacity to involve broader sections of the population.

Another critical issue lies in the way resources and funding for civil society actors are allocated through municipal calls for projects. This approach fosters a *climate of competition* and encourages the *professionalization* of civil society actors, which, paradoxically, undermines the inclusivity of the governance system. Indeed, civil society organizations that possess the expertise to navigate the application process often establish advantageous relationships with the public administration and become recognized as *experts*. This dynamic creates what Grace Blakeley describes as the “participation of the notables” (Blakeley, 2005, p. 161), where only a small circle of professionals actively engages with the governance system.

In a context where resources are not increasing to accommodate new actors, this exclusivity risks creating a *saturation threshold*. The same participants repeatedly take part in decision-making processes, leading to stagnation. During my fieldwork, I often encountered the same individuals across different planning contexts, even when the activities varied significantly. Furthermore, the repetitiveness of institutionalized events contributes to a *decline in interest and participation*. At several strategic planning meetings for projects led by networks that, on paper, include dozens of members, actual attendance was disappointingly low.

The *sustainability of individual intercultural practices* also emerges as a significant challenge. While the governance system as a whole demonstrates its sustainability, the continuity of specific practices often depends on factors beyond their evaluated success or recognized quality. Instead, it is influenced by the allocation of funding and human resources. Even initiatives recognized as *good practices* and producing excellent outcomes may face discontinuation due to the *expiration of specific funding opportunities* or the *turnover of municipal staff*.

Staff turnover is particularly problematic in this context. While the provisional nature of funding can often be accounted for during the planning stages of an initiative, sudden personnel changes introduce unforeseen disruptions. Such turnover may result from internal administrative shifts, changes in government, or personal career decisions. Regardless of the cause, it is especially detrimental because institutional practitioners play a vital role in building and maintaining local networks and act as key intermediaries between local actors and the government. Over time, these practitioners develop valuable institutional knowledge and expertise, forming relationships that are critical to the success and continuity of initiatives. When a new practitioner assumes the role, these established relationships and knowledge networks are disrupted, often setting the project back as stakeholders and the new practitioner must adapt to the changed dynamics. This adjustment period can delay progress, reduce efficiency, and jeopardize the momentum of even the most promising practices.

This issue has also affected the Barcelona Intercultural Action team, undermining the consistency of long-term planning and the implementation of strategies outlined in the *Interculturality Plan*. However, a significant turning point occurred in 2023 with the return of Ramon Sanahuja – a key architect of the first *Interculturality Plan* and former director of the PROGBI (Section 10.8, p. 280) – to an administrative role. His reintegration brings invaluable historical knowledge and expertise that could strengthen the continuity and sustainability of Barcelona’s intercultural policies.

The key actors involved in planning and implementing Barcelona’s *interculturalitat* acknowledge that the city is still far from achieving the inclusive and cohesive vision outlined in the Interculturality Plan, which emphasizes equality, recognition of diversity, and positive interaction. The City of *Interculturalitat*, while still under construction, has nonetheless given rise to a sustainable diversity governance system that has activated and empowered a growing number of institutional and civil society actors.

Moving forward, the focus should be on thoroughly investigating and constantly monitoring the system’s reach and its tangible outcomes in promoting equality, diversity recognition, and positive interaction. By addressing these challenges, Barcelona can continue evolving as a model of intercultural governance, advancing toward its goal of becoming a truly inclusive, cohesive, and, finally, sustainable city.

The following table (Table 4) systematizes the findings of my fieldwork, highlighting the main perceived successes and challenges of the governance system of the City of *Interculturalitat*. These findings are presented from the perspectives of government officials and civil society actors and are further enriched with my own critical insights

THEME	INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS' PERSPECTIVE	CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS' PERSPECTIVE	ADDITIONAL CRITICAL INSIGHTS
Long-Term Sustainability	- Success: Sustained commitment (bolstered by consistent political and normative frameworks). - Success: Cross-party agreement in City Council. - Success: Stability (rooted in the City's formal structures and long-standing practice of intercultural governance).	- Success: Sustained commitment (bolstered by consistent political and normative frameworks). - Success: Cross-party agreement in City Council. - Success: Stability (rooted in the City's formal structures and long-standing practice of intercultural governance).	- Success: Strong political consensus has facilitated the creation of enduring policies. - Challenge: political shifts or leadership changes could disrupt continuity if consensus wanes. - Success: The (re)appointment of key figures (e.g., Ramon Sanahuja) can reinforce sustainability.
Public/Private Partnerships	- Success: Collaborative relationships with active NGOs and grassroots associations. - Success: Civil society as co-implementers in delivering intercultural strategies, reliant on a shared vision of <i>diversitat</i>.	- Success: Financial and technical support from government, vital to launch and scale projects. - Success: Generally feel their interests align with government priorities. - Success: See themselves as contributors to decision-making via open channels of communication.	- Challenge: Partnerships often hinge on personal relationships and specific networks rather than formal processes, raising concerns about inclusivity. - Challenge: heavy reliance on local networks can exclude independent or less-organized communities.
Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms	- Success: Strong commitment to data-driven policymaking. - Success: Collaboration with experts to inform evidence-based strategies. - Success: Regular collection of statistics to adapt and improve initiatives.	- Success: Acknowledge the importance of monitoring to ensure accountability and responsible resource use. - Success: Feel their input is taken seriously, enhancing trust and sense of co-ownership.	- Challenge: While data collection ensures accountability, excessive reporting requirements can overwhelm smaller organizations with limited capacities. - Challenge: Need for streamlining procedures to maintain quality without creating "bureaucracy fatigue."
Dynamism and Adaptability	- Success: Flexibility to react to emerging social trends and research findings. - Success: Regularly update programs and policies to stay relevant.	- Success: Generally positive about the system's responsiveness to evolving needs. - Success: Openness to new ideas and pilot initiatives in early phases.	- Challenge: Frequent institutional reorganization can hamper the long-term implementation of sustained actions. - Challenge: Need to maintain a balance between adaptability and consistency.
Communication	Challenge: Rapid organizational changes and frequent rebranding of departments create unclear communication channels, affecting transversalization and mainstreaming across different areas of the administration.	Challenge: Difficulties in communicating and coordinating among themselves, resulting in fragmented efforts and redundancy. Challenge: The complexity of administrative structures adds to confusion and inefficiency.	- Challenge: Poor communication contributes to missed synergy opportunities and duplicative efforts. - Opportunity: A centralized or more streamlined communication approach could strengthen both government-civil society cooperation and inter-associational collaboration.

Resources	- Challenge: Insufficient staff and funding constraints limit the system's capacity. - Challenge: Difficult to expand or deepen programs without secure, adequate budgets.	- Challenge: Prolonged or larger-scale funding is not always available. - Challenge: Problems for long-term viability of projects once initial funding ends.	- Challenge: Scarcity of resources fosters competition among civil society organizations (CSOs), potentially sidelining smaller or newer players. - Challenge: Over-reliance on government grants can stifle creativity and autonomy if not supplemented by alternative funding streams.
Minority Representation	- Challenge: Limited diversity within the administration, undermining policy legitimacy and inclusivity.	- Challenge: Same individuals participating across different initiatives, leading to fatigue and reduced engagement over time. - Challenge: Broadening outreach without losing cohesion.	- Challenge: Lack of representation can perpetuate power imbalances and limit truly intercultural perspectives in policy design. - Challenge: High turnover in municipal staff can exacerbate difficulties in diversifying the workforce.
Participation	- Challenge: Difficulty in scaling up intercultural programs without diluting their quality. - Challenge: Growing participant numbers stress existing infrastructure and resources.	- Challenge: Same individuals participating across different initiatives, leading to fatigue and reduced engagement over time. - Challenge: Broadening outreach without losing cohesion.	- Challenge: Governance processes rely heavily on "usual suspects," risking stagnation. - Opportunity: Expanding inclusivity requires new, innovative outreach strategies and potential restructuring of resource allocation.
Professionalization	- Challenge: Municipal "calls for projects" can help identify capable and experienced actors but risk incentivizing competition over collaboration. - Challenge: Tendency to rely on recognized "experts" within civil society.	- Challenge: Frequent application processes demand specialized grant-writing skills, favoring established organizations. - Challenge: Smaller or informally structured groups face barriers to participating.	- Challenge: Phenomenon of "participation of the notables," which can perpetuate exclusivity and limit opportunities for emerging grassroots movements.
Overall Outlook	- Officials see the governance system as "under construction" but demonstrating a strong foundation of policies, stakeholder engagement, and adaptability. - Committed to refining processes and addressing challenges to reach the vision of inclusive, intercultural coexistence.	- Civil society actors generally appreciate the framework, acknowledging progress yet recognizing that more inclusive and sustained efforts are needed. - Express willingness to partner in evolving the system but ask for deeper structural support and simplified processes.	- Despite obstacles, the <i>City of Interculturalitat</i> has mobilized a wide array of stakeholders who share the goal of fostering intercultural coexistence. - Ongoing monitoring is needed to ensure that expansion and sustainability move beyond rhetoric, promoting genuine equality, diversity recognition, and positive interaction.

***Table 4.** Structured synthesis of the fieldwork findings, distinguishing the key themes that emerged from the interviews and outlining the perceived successes, challenges, and opportunities of the City of Interculturalitat's governance system from the perspectives of both government officials and civil society actors. These insights are further enriched by my critical reflections and observations, offering a comprehensive view of the system's dynamics.*

Conclusion

In this second part of the dissertation, I examined the rise of cultural heterogeneity as a pivotal theme in European political discourse and strategic agendas, as well as the diffusion of approaches addressing this complexity across different scales of European governance. Over time, a distinctly intercultural framework for managing diversity emerged in the European context, which gradually permeated the policies and practices of member states.

The *human rights revolution* (Section 1.1, p. 23) and the global rise of *multiculturalism* (Section 3.2) laid the groundwork for the diffusion and institutionalization of the principle of cultural pluralism in Europe. Championed by activists, scholars, and practitioners, this principle began to shape national immigration and welfare policies, aligning with broader trends of democratization and decentralization. Initially, however, European institutions paid little attention to *culture*, lacking specific competencies in this domain.

A significant turning point was triggered by the 1973 oil crisis, which precipitated an economic recession that deeply challenged the legitimacy of European institutions and the broader integration project. It became clear that economic prosperity alone could not unify the culturally diverse member states of the European Community. In response, policymakers turned to *culture*, crafting a narrative of a shared European cultural identity. This identity was framed as a force for both legitimizing European integration internally and reinforcing Europe's influence on the global stage.

As the European Community expanded and extra-communitarian migration increased, cultural heterogeneity – often referred to as *cultural diversity* – began to attract greater institutional attention. Early efforts, particularly in education, aimed to promote social inclusion for cultural minorities. By the late 1980s, these efforts were increasingly framed in terms of *intercultural education*, a field that gained traction at both the European and national levels.

Following the establishment of the European Union in 1993, intercultural education expanded to address not only migrant inclusion but also the broader celebration of cultural heterogeneity, encompassing national minorities and fostering intercultural learning and communication. Meanwhile, *intercultural dialogue* gained prominence as a pillar of the EU's international relations, symbolizing commitments to cultural exchange and cooperation.

The 1995 EU enlargement and the Schengen Convention further elevated the focus on cultural heterogeneity. Increased migration and perceptions of cultural differentiation underscored the urgency of addressing issues such as xenophobia, racism, and prejudice. The EU framed intercultural dialogue as essential for promoting social cohesion, democracy, and human rights. Meanwhile,

progressively engaging with the emergent narrative of the *diversity advantage* (Section 3.6), European discourses reframed cultural heterogeneity from a challenge to an opportunity. At the turn of the millennium, two strategic initiatives – the Lisbon Strategy and the Culture 2000 Programme – explicitly linked cultural diversity to socioeconomic development. These strategies reflected a growing consensus on the diversity advantage, highlighting cultural heterogeneity as a driver of innovation and growth.

Concurrently, this period also saw an increasing need to focus on the management of cultural heterogeneity due, in particular, to three key developments:

- The rise of Islamophobia following the 9/11 attacks and subsequent incidents.
- The growth of anti-immigrant and anti-democratic right-wing populism, fueled by economic inequality and ethnic riots.
- The unprecedented EU enlargement in 2002, when ten new countries joined the Union.

Against this backdrop, intercultural dialogue was recognized as the overarching framework for addressing cultural heterogeneity, with dialogue and intercultural education as a central pillar. Together, these tools were seen as vital for fostering mutual understanding, unity, and conflict prevention.

The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008 marked a defining moment in the institutionalization of intercultural dialogue as the European approach to managing cultural heterogeneity. This initiative provided a platform for European institutions to formally articulate intercultural dialogue as a practical necessity for fostering social cohesion, upholding human rights, and preventing conflict. In particular, the Council of Europe's *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* offered a comprehensive theoretical and practical framework, synthesizing years of discourse on cultural heterogeneity and establishing clear guidelines for implementing the European model of diversity governance. Drawing heavily from the *interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism* debate (Ch. Section 3.9), the *White Paper* conceptually reframed intercultural dialogue in terms of *interculturalism*, positioning it as the basic framework of this approach.

Crucially, from the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue onward, growing emphasis was placed on the role of cities as central actors in the implementation of intercultural strategies. This shift also reflected broader changes in European governance, where local governments were increasingly recognized as strategic partners in advancing the European integration project. This strengthened focus on urban contexts culminated in the conceptualization of the *intercultural city*, envisioned as the ideal framework for applying intercultural principles at the local level.

The concept of the intercultural city was shaped by the work of the UK think tank Comedia, which developed a set of standardized variables and indicators to measure and enhance a city's level of interculturality. In collaboration with Comedia's researchers, the Council of Europe and European institutions launched the Intercultural Cities Programme (ICC). Following a successful pilot phase in 2008-2009, the program was established as a long-term initiative. Following a successful pilot phase in 2008-2009, the ICC was established as a long-term initiative, fostering a global network of cities committed to interculturalism. Today, the program includes cities from Europe to the Far East and Far West, reinforcing interculturalism as a globally relevant framework for diversity governance.

Within this diffusion of the intercultural city model, Barcelona emerged as a pioneer, excelling both as an innovator in urban diversity governance and as a key player in shaping the concept. Notably, Barcelona began adopting policies framed in intercultural terms as early as 1997, with its *Municipal Plan for Interculturality*, well before the framework gained traction at the European level.

Barcelona's proactive engagement with the ICC was equally notable. The city began collaborating with ICC organizers during the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008, even before the program's pilot project formally began. It was also the first city to draft and implement a comprehensive, long-term intercultural strategy – its ten-year *Intercultural City Plan*. This plan laid the groundwork for a sustainable diversity governance system, built on a structured public-private partnership comprising:

- Municipal actors, serving as supervisors.
- Professional consultants, coordinating activities.
- Civil society organizations, acting as implementors.
- Scholars and volunteers, contributing on an *ad hoc* basis.

This system was primarily funded by the municipality, with additional resources from private foundations and the European Union.

Barcelona's governance framework soon became a model for other cities, both within Europe and globally, demonstrating the feasibility and benefits of a cohesive and sustainable approach to diversity governance. As an active participant in major migration-related city networks, Barcelona emerged as a nodal point for circulating theoretical and practical approaches to diversity governance. Over time, it became the city that most comprehensively tested and implemented effective strategies and best practices, consolidating a sustainable system of diversity governance.

To fully understand Barcelona's pivotal role in shaping and diffusing the European model of diversity governance, I began by exploring how cultural heterogeneity was addressed across interconnected scales of governance. In particular, this analysis focused on the migration and diversity

management strategies developed at Spain's national level and within the regional framework of the Generalitat de Catalunya.

First, I focused on Spain's national and regional approaches to migration and diversity governance, beginning with a historical and sociocultural overview of the country's evolving relationship with cultural heterogeneity. Spain's history is defined by its deep and enduring pluralism, which has profoundly shaped its identity over centuries. The Iberian Peninsula has been home to a diverse array of peoples, including Iberians, Romans, Visigoths, and Muslims, all of whom contributed to the rich tapestry of its political, cultural, and linguistic traditions.

This pluralism has given rise to complex relationships between regional identities, religions, and ethnicities, marked by periods of coexistence and conflict. The coexistence of Christians, Jews, and Muslims and the distinctiveness of several political units during the era of the medieval *Spains* (*Españas*), and the progressive consolidation of the Catholic Monarchy as a national unifier reflect this dynamic interplay. Attempts at homogenization under the two *Catholic Monarchs* – Isabella and Ferdinand –, the Bourbon dynasty, and Franco dictatorship ultimately failed to erase the distinct sociopolitical identities of groups such as the Basques and the Catalans. The colonial era added another layer of complexity as Spain's overseas empire attempted to balance the need for decentralized governance with centralized control. While fostering cultural and economic exchanges, colonial administration also perpetuated exploitation and marginalization, leaving a lasting legacy in the former colonies.

Religious minorities, including Jews, Muslims, and Protestants, experienced cycles of tolerance and persecution, illustrating the oscillation between pluralism and repression. Similarly, the Roma people, as an ethnocultural minority, faced centuries of marginalization and forced assimilation.

The situation changed with the beginning of the Spanish democratic transition after the end of Franco's fascist regime, as Spain embarked on a democratic transition that embraced human rights and political pluralism as fundamental principles and was accompanied by a remarkable decentralization process. The establishment of the 17 autonomous communities and 2 autonomous cities granted significant autonomy to regional governments while maintaining national cohesion. This decentralization also empowered municipalities to renegotiate their roles, positioning them as critical players in Spain's governance framework.

Within this broader contextualization, I turned to consider Spain's national and local approaches to migration and diversity governance. The evolution of a national normative framework for the regulation of immigration and cultural heterogeneity reflects a complex interplay of historical legacies, demographic changes, and evolving political contexts. The transformation from a marginal

recipient of immigrants to one of the world's most prominent migration destinations was accompanied by a profound reshaping of policies and institutional frameworks.

The early years of migration governance in democratic Spain, shaped by the 1985 Organic Law and influenced by Spain's accession to the European Community, prioritized border control and labor migration regulation. Regional and municipal governments were left to deal with the effects of migration and elaborate their solutions to integration without any comprehensive normative framework or substantial support from the state.

However, as the principles of democracy and human rights consolidated in public discourse, integration started emerging as a central theme in national policymaking. The landmark Organic Law 4/2000 marked a turning point, introducing progressive measures, establishing key institutions like the Forum for Social Integration of Immigrants and OBERAXE, and recognizing integration as a cornerstone of migration policy. Progressive reforms under the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero further advanced the discourse on migrants' rights, with policies emphasizing *arraigo* (rootedness) and the *padrón* system to regularize undocumented migrants.

As integration policies and practices had already developed and solidified at the local level – with some regions even enshrining their exclusive authority over integration in their statutes – the national government faced limitations in taking the lead over integration. Instead, it was compelled to recognize and support existing local models and roles. This dynamic shaped the *Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration* (PECI) published in 2006, which represented a pivotal development that marked the national adoption of the diversity governance framework already consolidating at local and European levels. Grounded in the principles of *equality*, *citizenship*, and *interculturality*, PECI primarily synthesized local approaches, aiming to provide economic resources rather than prescriptive guidance. Within this context, particularly with the introduction of the *padrón* system, regional and local governments officially emerged as central actors in integration initiatives and Spain's broader migration governance system.

The economic crisis and the return of a conservative government ushered in a period of stricter border controls and selective immigration policies. While these measures prioritized economic alignment, they retained a commitment to integration. The second version of PECI (2011-2014) reflected increasing alignment with European frameworks, emphasizing the narrative of *diversity advantage* and refining integration strategies. By 2023, Spain adopted the *Strategic Framework for Citizenship and Inclusion, Against Racism and Xenophobia* (2023-2027), which fully aligned with European directives. Crucially, this comprehensive measure expanded integration from a mostly migrant-centered focus to include all marginalized groups.

Shifting to the regional context, I explored how Catalonia consolidated its approach to integration, emerging as a Spanish pioneer region in integration and diversity governance in Spain. The Generalitat de Catalunya laid the groundwork with the publication of the *Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration* in 1993, the first of its kind in Spain. The framework was further refined in the 2001 version, built on the principles of *equality*, *transversalization*, and *co-responsibility*.

Catalonia advanced its approach in 2005 with the introduction of *resident citizenship*, which emphasized the critical role of cities in diversity governance. This plan also marked the Generalitat's first adoption of *interculturality* as a guiding framework for integration, reflecting concepts already prevalent among municipalities and civil society within the region. Over time, interculturality gained prominence. The region's subsequent integration plans fully embraced interculturality as a key principle, aligning with the European *interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism* frame.

Finally, I turned specifically to consider the emergence of a system of diversity governance in Barcelona. The development of this system is deeply rooted in the city's historical tradition of municipalism and its aspirations for national and international prominence. After the repression of local autonomies under Franco's regime, Barcelona reemerged during Spain's democratization and decentralization, implementing innovative urban and social policies to rebuild its economy and political influence. The city leveraged its vibrant, participatory civil society to institutionalize public-private partnerships and establish a unique model of urban and social governance, widely known as the *Barcelona Model*.

This model, characterized by its strategic consistency, owes much to the long-standing governance of the Socialists' Party of Catalonia. The party's leadership ensured continuity in vision, strategy, and long-term planning. However, the broader neoliberal turn introduced tensions, as civil society's demands for social policies were increasingly subordinated to economic development and city branding priorities. Amid successive economic recessions and financial crises, *culture* emerged as a unifying framework, balancing competing interests by reframing Barcelona's international image and addressing local challenges of social cohesion and inclusion.

By the early 2000s, within the general context witnessing rising migration, discrimination, and socioeconomic inequality, coupled with growing Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment fueled by populist movements, placed cultural heterogeneity at the forefront of Barcelona's political agenda. In response, the socialist government sought to rebrand its vision and regain legitimacy by prioritizing migration and diversity governance. This effort culminated in the creation of a Commissioner for Migration and Diversity Governance, tasked with developing a comprehensive, long-term strategy. Supported by a team of administrative officials and scholars, the Commissioner launched an extensive participatory process, ultimately resulting in the publication of the *Intercultural City Plan* in 2010.

The plan grounded Barcelona's diversity governance framework in the concept of *interculturalitat* (interculturality), a term referring to the European framework of *interculturalism* as conceptualized within the *interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism* debate. *Interculturalitat* was adopted as a comprehensive framework for managing cultural heterogeneity and fostering social cohesion, underpinned by the principles of equality, recognition of diversity, and positive interaction. As Barcelona introduced this approach, interculturalism was simultaneously consolidating in Spain's national framework, beginning with the second *Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration* (PECI) in 2010 and later adopted by the Generalitat in the 2016 *Citizenship and Migrations Plan*.

Barcelona's system of diversity governance has demonstrated remarkable sustainability and adaptability, capable of aligning seamlessly with broader strategic agendas. More specifically, on one hand, it has been supporting welfare policies and democratic participation; on the other, it has advanced the city's entrepreneurial goals, cementing Barcelona's position as a significant economic and political actor nationally and internationally. As a result, the *City of Interculturalitat* has been fully integrated into Barcelona's overarching city branding and diplomacy strategies, enhancing the city's image as *Creative, Smart, Inclusive, and Sustainable*.

Through active participation in the Intercultural Cities Network and other international city networks, Barcelona has championed its governance model as an exemplary realization of the *intercultural city* ideal. Its leadership has further legitimized the intercultural framework, inspiring other cities to adopt similar strategies and reinforcing the global diffusion of the intercultural city model.

The overview of Barcelona's successes and challenges offers valuable insights into the factors enabling its emergence as a leader in diversity governance. These findings provide essential elements for intercity comparison and learning, helping cities assess and refine their approaches to diversity governance. Nevertheless, while the diffusion of the framework of diversity governance has been significant, the specific policies and practices implemented remain deeply context-dependent. Barcelona exemplifies how local political dynamics, social challenges, and historical contexts shape such initiatives. While studying policies and best practices in other contexts may offer inspiration and solutions, what typically circulates are conceptual frames rather than replicable practices. These frames are subsequently reshaped and adapted to address unique local circumstances.

This conclusion underscores the need for targeted research and data collection to inform contextually aware interventions. Such research should explore the implications, reception, and impact of diversity governance measures, ensuring strategies are tailored to local realities. Barcelona's experience underscores the benefits of integrating intercultural frameworks into broader urban strategies. By aligning diversity governance with goals of sustainability, creativity, and

inclusion, Barcelona demonstrates how cities can lead in fostering sustainable, adaptive, and inclusive systems of diversity governance. Cities' unique position at the intersection of local, regional, national, and European policymaking enables them not only to adopt and adapt diversity governance models but also to innovate and lead in this domain.

PART III

JAPAN

Introduction

I believe that the first time I first became aware of Japan's existence in 2003, at the age of eight, when my parents took me to see Hayao Miyazaki's acclaimed masterpiece, *Spirited Away*, newly released in Italian cinemas. Before that, I had likely encountered Japanese cultural phenomena such as *Pokémon* or *Dragon Ball*, as anime culture was already popular in Italy. However, these mainstream productions often followed narrative structures that closely mirrored Italian and European adventure stories and epics, preventing me from recognizing their origins in a distant and culturally distinct context.

Moreover, the portrayal of Japanese anime in Italy at the time was heavily mediated through censorship and adaptation (see Parini, 2012). Dialogues were translated into Italian with meanings often altered, scenes were edited or removed, and references to Japanese culture were replaced with elements more familiar to Italian audiences, such as Christian imagery. This process further obscured the unique cultural context from which these works emerged.

Spirited Away was different. As a child accustomed to Disney's artistic and narrative language, I could not help but feel I was encountering a culture profoundly distinct from my own. Only later did I learn that Miyazaki's unique style often bewilders even Japanese audiences. Reflecting on this, it strikes me that until I saw *Spirited Away*, Japan was not even a concept in my mind. And until I began my Ph.D., my understanding of Japan and its cultural exchanges with Europe remained minimal. This is a common experience for many Europeans, shaped not only by Japan's geographical and cultural distance but also by Eurocentrism, which narrows our perspective to the so-called Western world.

Today, Japan is more accessible to Europeans through entertainment, technology, cuisine, and spiritual movements often associated with Buddhism. Yet, this visibility has not necessarily led to a deeper understanding of the country. It was unsurprising, then, to encounter raised eyebrows when discussing my research topic in European contexts. Questions like "Is there even diversity in Japan?" or "Are there even migrants?" were common, both in casual conversations and academic discussions.

Such questions stem from persistent clichés about Japanese society, not only in Europe but even within Japan itself, particularly in conservative and nationalist narratives. One of the most enduring stereotypes is that of Japan as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation. This image is rooted in a lack of nuanced understanding of Japanese society within Western contexts. However, the invention of this narrative is not solely an external phenomenon. Many Japanese also describe their country in terms of homogeneity, further legitimizing the stereotype.

This image, however, quickly unravels when confronted with reality. Traveling across the Japanese archipelago or even moving between a major city and the countryside reveals stark cultural differences in traditions, habits, and even language. Equally significant distinctions exist between men and women, cisgender and LGBTQ+ individuals, young people and the elderly, and those with or without disabilities. Japan has long been home to various cultural and ethnic minorities, including indigenous groups such as the Ainu, Okinawans, Burakumin, and Hāfu; communities stemming from older migrations, like Zainichi Koreans and Chinese; and more recent immigrant populations, such as South American Nikkeijin, Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Nepalese.

A closer examination of Japan's self-representation as a homogeneous nation reveals it to be a deliberate construct, shaped by the Japanese hegemonic class to serve specific political, social, and economic interests. Contrary to the assumptions of those who have internalized this narrative, its origins are relatively recent. While its foundations can be traced to the 19th century and the *Meiji Restoration*, the modern discourse of Japanese ethno-cultural homogeneity fully emerged only after World War II, particularly during the period of rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. This constructed narrative reflects not the realities of Japanese society but the strategic interests of its creators.

This third part of the dissertation delves also into the narrative construction surrounding cultural heterogeneity in Japan, providing a comprehensive exploration of the historical, cultural, and political contexts that shape diversity governance in the country. Through four interconnected chapters, it examines the evolution of governance structures, the struggles of minority groups for recognition, the emergence of *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) as a central framework for cultural diversity governance, and the role of local contexts, using Hamamatsu as a case study.

Chapter 11 begins with a historical and institutional overview of Japanese governance, tracing its evolution from the rise of the nation-state to its current structures. Section 11.1 explores the early formation of Japan as a unified state, followed in Section 11.2 by an analysis of the Meiji Restoration and the establishment of a centralized modern state. Section 11.3 addresses the challenges of democratization, emphasizing struggles with centralism, while Section 11.4 examines the gradual decentralization process, transferring competencies and functions from the national to local governments. Section 11.5 focuses on the *local turn* in Japanese governance, highlighting the growing role of local governments in policy innovation and community engagement. The chapter concludes with Section 11.6, emphasizing the pivotal role of civil society in shaping governance practices and addressing social challenges.

Chapter 12 shifts to trace a historical overview of the presence and struggles of cultural minority groups in Japan, challenging the constructed perception of Japan as a homogenous society. Section

12.1 critiques this self-image of cultural uniformity, while subsequent sections provide a detailed analysis of Japan's most prominent cultural minorities. Section 12.2 explores the historical marginalization of the Ainu people and their fight for recognition. Section 12.3 investigates Okinawa's colonial history, post-colonial struggles, and the commodification of Okinawan culture. Section 12.4 examines the enduring discrimination faced by the Burakumin community, and Section 12.5 discusses the experiences of Japanese residents with Korean and Chinese ancestry (Zainichi). Section 12.6 explores the challenges faced by mixed-race individuals, and Section 12.7 investigates the experiences of Nikkeijin, Japanese descendants who have migrated back to Japan. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Japan's immigration policies and its increasing engagement with international migrants in recent decades.

Chapter 13 builds on this background, exploring the development of *tabunka kyōsei* as a framework for diversity governance in Japan. Section 13.1 critically examines the historical construction of Japan's identity as an ethno-culturally homogeneous nation. Section 13.2 highlights the early initiatives by *progressive local governments* in addressing cultural diversity. Section 13.3 discusses how globalization and internationalization influenced Japan's attitudes toward cultural heterogeneity, focusing on the emergence of the *kokusaika* (internationalization) ideal. Section 13.4 traces the development of a new discourse around cultural diversity framed through *tabunka kyōsei* and explores the transition from *kokusaika* to *tabunka kyōsei*. Section 13.5 examines how this framework has been adopted into Japan's national discourse, while Section 13.6 analyzes the declining dominance of homogeneity and the rising prominence of diversity perspectives, driven by demographic and social changes.

Chapter 14, the final chapter of Part III, provides an in-depth case study of Hamamatsu, a city that has positioned itself as a leader in *tabunka kyōsei* and diversity governance both nationally and internationally. Section 14.1 outlines the city's history, illustrating its transition from a modest settlement to a thriving industrial center. Section 14.2 examines the development of its governance system, and Section 14.3 explores Hamamatsu's branding efforts to project itself as a cultural hub, particularly as a *city of music*. Sections 14.4 and 14.5 discuss Hamamatsu's ambitions to establish itself as a *global city* and later as a *creative city*. The following sections analyze how the city's approaches to cultural diversity have evolved within its broader policy framework. Sections 14.6 and 14.7 address the arrival of foreign residents and the city's initial responses to demographic changes brought by migration. Section 14.8 investigates the challenges faced by migrants and the push for greater inclusion. Sections 14.9 and 14.10 trace the emergence of a systematic commitment to cultural diversity governance in Hamamatsu, setting the stage for the analysis in Section 14.11. Here, the focus shifts to Hamamatsu's three *Tabunka Kyōsei Plans*, offering a detailed examination of their

development, objectives, and impact. Finally, the last three sections of the chapter conclude by analyzing the system of governance of what can be called Hamamatsu's *City of Tabunka Kyōsei*. After analyzing its structure of governance in Section 14.12 and how *diversity* is framed in the practices and discourses of the different institutional actors involved, the last Section 14.14 discusses the successes and challenges of the mechanisms of the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei* from the perspectives of institutional actors, civil society actors, and my own analysis.

CHAPTER 11

Government and Governance in Japan

11.1

The Dawn of the Nation in the Land of the Rising Sun

Japan is an island nation in East Asia, composed of an extensive archipelago of 14,125 islands that collectively cover a total area of 377,973 km². In 2023, it was home to a population of about 124.5 million people (Sōmushōtōkeikyoku, 2023). Its unique geographical and geological setting makes Japan one of the world's most disaster-prone countries, a vulnerability that has significantly shaped its social fabric and environmental planning. Extreme climatic variations bring seasonal rain fronts that often result in floods, as well as typhoons, cyclones, and heavy snowfalls, particularly affecting the northern and northeastern regions. The terrain itself is rugged and irregular, marked by steep inclines and seismic fault lines.

Most notably, Japan is situated along the Pacific *Ring of Fire*, a volatile zone characterized by frequent seismic activity and numerous volcanoes. With 111 active volcanoes – comprising one-tenth of the world's total – and regular occurrences of earthquakes and tsunamis, natural disasters are an integral part of life in Japan. These environmental challenges have not only shaped Japanese architecture and urban planning but have also deeply influenced the country's culture and religious practices (Maebayashi, 2016; Pastrana-Huguet et al., 2022).

The origins of Japanese civilization are intertwined with mythology and legend. According to tradition, the nation's founding dates back to 660 BCE, when Jimmu, a descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu, became Japan's first emperor, establishing the world's oldest continuous monarchy. Today, the Japanese Imperial House recognizes the current emperor, Naruhito, as the 126th in this unbroken line of succession. Historical and archaeological records suggest that by the 3rd century CE, various tribes and clans gradually unified into a centralized state in the Yamato region, now modern-day Nara Prefecture. This early Japanese state engaged in extensive cultural and technological

exchanges with China and Korea, which introduced Chinese characters, architecture, scientific innovations, and Buddhism to the archipelago.

The diplomatic efforts of early Japanese rulers, particularly with China, produced the first written references to Japan as a country. Initially, in ancient Chinese texts, Japan was referred to by the character 倭 (read *wa* or *yamato*), meaning *dwarf* or *distant*. By the 7th century, Japanese scribes replaced this character with 和, signifying *harmony*, to avoid the derogatory connotations. Around the 8th century, the country adopted its current written name, 日本国, meaning *the land* (国) *at the origin* (本) *of the sun* (日), due to its position as the easternmost country in the Sinocentric world. The reading of 日本, initially pronounced *yamato*, evolved to the current *nihon* or *nippon*, influenced by Chinese linguistic variations (*ji-bon* or *ni-bon*).

The name(s) of the country spread to the West through early trade routes. By the 13th century, Marco Polo mentioned the nation as *Cipangu* or *Zipangu* (from the Chinese reading *ji-bon*) in his travelogue *The Million*. By the late 16th century, the Portuguese adapted it to *Jippon*, which eventually transformed into the modern English name, *Japan*.

The foundations of Japan's modern governance structure can be traced back to the Tokugawa Shogunate, a period of military dictatorship established in 1603 by the *shōgun* (military ruler) Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616) and lasting until 1868. The Tokugawa regime swiftly unified three of Japan's four main islands – Honshū, Shikoku, and Kyūshū – as well as the Ryūkyū archipelago (now Okinawa). Although Hokkaidō, the fourth main island, experienced periodic occupations, it remained largely unconquered during the shogunate. To govern this expansive territory, the Tokugawa established a centralized system of control, extending their authority over local governments through an intricate and pervasive bureaucracy (see, for example, Fulcher, 1988; Pempel, 1992).

This era saw a dramatic acceleration of urbanization, with key cities rising as administrative and political hubs (see Howell, 2012). Edo (modern-day Tōkyō), chosen as the seat of the central government, grew to an estimated population of one million by the 18th century, making it the world's largest city at the time (Gordon, 2003, p. 23).

Internally, the Tokugawa rulers enforced a rigid social structure based on the *Four Occupations* – a classification system borrowed from Ancient China – which divided society into four hereditary classes: samurai (*shi*), peasants (*nō*), artisans (*kō*), and merchants (*shō*). This system regulated every aspect of daily life, from employment to dress and dietary habits, and strictly controlled interactions between classes. Mobility between classes was virtually impossible, creating a highly stratified and stable society.

Externally, the Tokugawa enforced an isolationist foreign policy known as *sakoku* (locked country), which barred nearly all foreigners from entering Japan and forbade ordinary Japanese from leaving.

Foreign trade was confined to the port city of Nagasaki and limited to only Dutch and Chinese merchants (see Cullen, 2017).

Japan's era of seclusion ended abruptly in 1853 when Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States sailed into Tōkyō Bay with a fleet of warships, demanding that Japan open its ports to American trade. Taken by surprise and unable to defend the capital from the formidable firepower of the American ships, the *shōgun* at the time, Tokugawa Ieyoshi, was forced to agree to the terms of the *Kanagawa Treaty* in 1854. This treaty mandated that Japan open the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to American vessels, guarantee the safety of shipwrecked American sailors, and allow for the establishment of an American consulate in Japan.

The shock of Perry's incursion exposed the Tokugawa shogunate's inability to protect Japan's sovereignty and quickly led to similar demands from other Western powers. Domestically, this humiliation weakened the shogunate's authority and galvanized anti-Tokugawa factions, which had long been plotting to end the military regime. To legitimize the envisioned post-shogunate government, these rebels turned to the figure of the emperor.

Although largely a symbolic figure confined to the religious sphere for centuries, the emperor retained reverence as a divine descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu and the ultimate source of political legitimacy. A stable and long-standing institution like the Tokugawa shogunate could not simply be replaced by another military regime; only the emperor could confer the higher authority necessary to establish a legitimate new order. It was at this juncture that the narrative of the *Restoration* started emerging. Though fundamentally new and distinct from any prior experience, the envisioned government was presented as a revival of the only legitimate rule – the ancient and divine authority of the Japanese emperors. Within this constructed narrative, the shogunate was recast as a historical aberration, its legitimacy abruptly undermined in favor of a return to imperial sovereignty.

A powerful military alliance emerged, led by the feudal lords of Satsuma (present-day Kagoshima Prefecture) and Chōshū (now Yamaguchi Prefecture), united under the ideal of imperial restoration. In 1867, their combined military pressure forced the last Tokugawa shogun, Yoshinobu, to cede power back to the emperor, marking the end of the shogunate and the dawn of the *Meiji Era* – *Meiji* meaning *Enlightened Rule*.

Although the Meiji Restoration was officially portrayed as the establishment of imperial authority, the reality was far more nuanced. The Meiji Emperor, Mutsuhito, was only 16 years old at the time of the shogunate's fall, and actual power lay with a group of former anti-Tokugawa leaders. This oligarchy, composed of visionary reformers, embarked on an ambitious project to modernize and transform Japan from a fragmented feudal society into a centralized, industrialized state.

11.2

Building Modern Japan

The establishment of the Meiji government ushered in a period of profound administrative, socio-cultural, and economic transformation that reshaped nearly every aspect of Japanese life (see Jansen and Rozman 1986; Jansen 2000). After more than a thousand years with Kyōto as the imperial capital since 794 CE, the new government made a symbolic and strategic decision to officially relocate the capital to Edo, renaming it *Tōkyō* (Eastern Capital), thereby reconfirming its role as the political and administrative center of the nation.

Once its headquarters had been established, the government swiftly initiated sweeping reforms. Within three years, the old feudal system was dismantled, and a new administrative framework was established. By 1871, the feudal nobility had been stripped of its privileges, and the nobles' vast estates were nationalized and reorganized into prefectures (*ken*). Additionally, the Meiji government completed the occupation of Hokkaidō, integrating it into this modernized administrative system.

Determined to modernize and strengthen Japan, the Meiji leaders looked to the West for inspiration, reflecting a mindset of *internalized colonialism*, wherein a colonized society measures itself against and seeks to emulate the perceived superiority of its colonizers (David, 2014). Specifically, the Japanese elites viewed Western civilization as the epitome of progress, contrasting sharply with their perception of Japan as backward and vulnerable. Despite the humiliation of having been forced to open the country's borders through Western gunboat diplomacy, admiration for the West endured and increased.

Even Western theories of colonialism, race, and evolution – which were growing increasingly popular in the 19th century – began to be embraced by Japanese political and intellectual elites. A powerful nationwide movement for Westernization progressively arose in Japan, embodied in the slogan *bunmei-kaika* (civilization and enlightenment). This movement not only spurred a broad adoption of Western cultural elements but also became a crucial part of the broader nation-building project, wherein the Japanese government recognized the need to establish a cohesive national identity grounded in shared social and cultural symbols. This process gave rise to new narratives emphasizing the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the Meiji Empire's subjects, narratives that were

often rooted in reinterpreted Western theories of race and ethnicity (for foundational discussions on this topic, see Gluck, 1985; Morris-Suzuki, 1997; Lie, 2001; Oguma, 2002; McVeigh, 2003; Weiner, 2009).

The challenge facing the Meiji government, however, was Japan's inherent cultural and regional diversity. The archipelago was home to a remarkable pluralism of customs, languages, religions, and traditions that could not be easily homogenized. Nevertheless, the state pursued its goal of cultural unification, leveraging its newly centralized and highly efficient bureaucracy to propagate an official version of *Japaneseness* – one that served both the needs of modern nation-building and imperial legitimacy.

One strategy was the systematic promotion of Japan's founding myths, such as those enshrined in the *Kojiki*, a chronicle that anchored the emperor's rule in divine ancestry. These myths were repurposed as tools of statecraft, designed to not only assert the emperor's legitimacy as a sacred ruler but also to frame the Japanese people as a *nation-family* (*kazoku kokka*), bound by a shared lineage that ultimately traced back to the imperial family. In this narrative, the emperor was positioned as the spiritual father of the nation, presiding over a people who were portrayed as distant relatives united under his divine authority.

This vision of Japan as a unified nation-family was further reinforced by the structuring and spread of State Shinto, a new form of religious practice that merged political and spiritual authority (Hardacre, 1989). As State Shinto became the official ideology, it brought with it a suite of new traditions, rituals, and norms designed to reshape the nation's cultural landscape. Through carefully orchestrated ceremonies, the promotion of imperial worship, and the establishment of national holidays, the state sought to ingrain a standardized sense of Japaneseness that transcended regional identities and local customs. The dissemination of these state-sanctioned traditions, in turn, served to consolidate the power of the central government, making the emperor a symbol of both political and spiritual unity.

In tandem with this religious and cultural standardization, the Meiji government also embarked on a project of linguistic unification. Recognizing the crucial role language plays in forging national identity, the state began efforts to create and establish a form of Japanese that would serve as the national language. The promotion of a single, standardized *kokugo* (national language) in the early 20th century was aimed at overcoming the *babel* of dialects and regional languages that characterized the archipelago. The chosen standard was based on the speech patterns of the educated middle class in Tōkyō's Yamanote district, and through education reforms, media, and literature, the government sought to promote it as the linguistic norm across Japan.

A pivotal step in Japan's modernization journey was the Iwakura Mission – a diplomatic expedition to Europe and the United States that took place over 18 months between 1871 and 1873. Led by the statesman Tomomi Iwakura, the mission included 46 of Japan's most influential politicians and intellectuals. Its primary official objectives were to secure international recognition for the new Meiji government and to initiate the renegotiation of the unequal treaties imposed on Japan following Perry's arrival. Equally significant, the mission sought to comprehensively study Western industrial, political, fiscal, legal, military, and educational systems (Kunitake, 1934, p. 298).

The findings of the Iwakura Mission were meticulously analyzed and used to shape Japan's modernization strategies, encapsulated by two guiding slogans: *fukoku kyōhei* (enrich the country, strengthen the military) and *shokusan kōgyō* (promotion of industry). On one front, the government focused on building a powerful military to reassert Japan's strength and safeguard its sovereignty. On the other, it invested heavily in technological advancements, infrastructure, and industrial development, which, in turn, accelerated urbanization and transformed the traditional rural social structure.

It was during this period that the foundation of Japan's distinctive development model, which persisted into modern times, began to take shape. This model involved significant initial state investment in enterprises, followed by a gradual transfer of control to private actors (Nakamura, 1983). Development was managed through a robust bureaucratic system led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, established in 1881. Soon, powerful private entities emerged to take the reins of these state-initiated enterprises, becoming key players in the Japanese economy and politics: these were the *zaibatsu* (financial cliques), large conglomerates controlled by influential families such as the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups (Morikawa, 1992).

The Iwakura Mission also inspired further administrative reforms. In 1888, the initial administrative structure established in 1871 was revised, creating a two-tier system of local governance that resembles the one in place today. The upper tier consisted of 47 prefectural governments, organized into three urban prefectures (府, *fu* – Tōkyō, Ōsaka, and Kyōto), 42 rural prefectures (県, *ken*), and two special prefectural regions (Hokkaidō and Okinawa). The lower tier comprised municipalities divided into cities (市, *shi*), districts (郡, *gun*), towns (町, *chō/machi*), and villages (村, *son/mura*).

A key part of these administrative reforms was the Great Meiji Consolidation (1888-1889), the first Japanese large-scale municipal merger (see Yokomichi 2006). At the time, Japan had 71,314 small municipalities, most with fewer than 300 households, making it difficult to carry out essential administrative tasks such as tax collection and school management. The government mandated the formation of larger units, reducing the number of municipalities to 15,859 by 1889, thereby

centralizing and streamlining the administration. The relationship between the central and local governments was regulated through the so-called *Agency-Delegated Function System*, where local officials effectively acted as agents of the central government (Wataru, 2000; Ikawa, 2008).

Naturally, the revolutionary changes imposed by the Meiji government did not proceed uncontested. Between the 1870s and 1880s, numerous uprisings erupted across the country. Discontented former samurai, stripped of their privileges, and peasants, burdened by new economic policies, staged several revolts. Simultaneously, inspired by liberal Western ideals, civil rights movements advocating for a constitution and broader public participation began to coalesce, culminating in the Freedom and People's Rights Movement (*jiyū minken undō*), led by prominent figures such as the politician Taisuke Itagaki (see Matsuzawa, 2016).

Faced with mounting unrest, the government responded with a mix of repression and concessions. While anti-Meiji rebels were subdued by the newly formed military, the government placated civil rights activists by promising a constitution. Following the precedent of the Iwakura Mission, the statesman Itō Hirobumi was dispatched to Europe in 1882 to study Western constitutional models for a year and a half. Upon his return, he drafted Japan's first constitution, which was promulgated in 1889.

With domestic stability restored, the Meiji government shifted its focus outward, embarking on an aggressive foreign policy that rapidly expanded Japan's sphere of influence. Its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) marked the beginning of Japan's emergence as a dominant military power in East Asia and the Pacific. One conquest followed another: Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910, the southern part of Sakhalin Island in 1907, Micronesia in 1914, and Manchuria in 1931. Drawing from insights gained during the Iwakura Mission, Japan adopted Western colonial models, establishing sophisticated colonial structures and implementing assimilation policies designed to strengthen its imperial reach (Caprio, 2009).

These victories ushered in an era of prosperity and rapid economic and political development. The early 20th century, especially the *Taishō Era* (1912-1926), witnessed a surge in democratic institutions and a blossoming of civil society, a period often referred to as *Taishō Democracy*. Opposition parties gained momentum, and social movements – such as early campaigns for women's rights – began to challenge the traditional power structures. This political liberalization culminated in the enactment of universal male suffrage in 1925, laying the groundwork for a more representative democracy.

However, the democratic gains of the Taishō period were short-lived. By the late 1920s, a wave of right-wing ultranationalism, influenced by the rise of Italian Fascism and German Nazism, swept through the nation. Militarists and nationalist groups gained political influence, leading to the suppression of dissent and a dramatic shift in governance. The state's development model was swiftly

transformed into a war economy, managed by Japan's powerful bureaucracy and dominated by the *zaibatsu* – massive industrial conglomerates that played a key role in Japan's militarization.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, established in 1925 after a reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, took center stage in coordinating Japan's war economy. The Ministry's influence grew rapidly, and by 1938 it had been reorganized into the Ministry of Munitions, becoming the core institution that fueled Japan's wartime industrial machinery.

Japan's increasing militarism ultimately led to its alignment with Italy and Germany during World War II, setting in motion a catastrophic chain of events. Following a series of devastating military defeats and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan's imperial ambitions crumbled. The nation was left shattered, stripped of all its colonies, and subjected to occupation and administration by the Allied powers, with the United States playing the leading role in overseeing Japan's postwar reconstruction and reformation.

11.3

The Difficult Path to Democracy in Centralist Japan

The postwar era ushered in a transformative period of reform in Japan, much of it driven by the occupying United States forces. The most far-reaching change came with the introduction of a new Constitution in 1947. This groundbreaking document stripped the emperor of his political power, relegating him to a purely symbolic role while instituting sweeping democratic reforms. It also imposed a strict prohibition on military operations, allowing only self-defense, and established a comprehensive framework of individual rights, including gender equality and universal suffrage.

A key feature of the new constitution was its emphasis on empowering local governments. It required the election of heads and assemblies for all local entities and mandated that laws specifically affecting local regions be approved by residents. These provisions were further codified in the *Local Autonomy Law* of 1947, which laid the foundation for Japan's modern system of local governance. This law defined the types and powers of local governments, set out the roles of executives and legislatures, and established the rights of residents and the framework for intergovernmental relations.

Complementary regulations, such as the *Local Public Service Law*, *Local Finance Law*, and *Public Offices Election Law*, provided detailed guidance on specific aspects of the local governance system.

The democratization efforts led by U.S. occupation authorities sought to dismantle the authoritarian, centralized governance system established during the Meiji era, which was perceived as having fueled nationalism and militarization. These reforms were part of a broader narrative endorsed by both U.S. and Japanese elites, viewing Japan's defeat as an opportunity to reshape the nation into a truly democratic society (Hein & Pelletier, 2006, p. 9). However, despite these sweeping changes and the occupation's strong push for rapid democratization, many of Japan's prewar political, administrative, and socioeconomic structures proved remarkably resilient, continuing to shape the postwar landscape (Dower, 1999; Hein, 2003).

The onset of the Cold War further complicated this scenario. With the rise of the Maoist regime in China in 1949, Japan assumed a new strategic significance for the U.S. as a bulwark against communist expansion in Asia. This shift in geopolitical priorities led to a dramatic change in U.S. occupation policy. The purging of Japanese military and political leaders was halted, and many former officials were reinstated into prominent administrative roles (Hein, 2003). As a result, Japan's role evolved from a defeated nation under occupation to a key ally and a model for economic development and political stability in the region.

This evolving geopolitical context gave the Japanese central government greater leeway, particularly after the *Treaty of San Francisco* in 1952, which officially ended the U.S. occupation and restored Japan's sovereignty. With its newfound autonomy, Japan embarked on a path of rapid and sustained economic growth that spanned from 1955 to 1991, a period now known as the era of *High Economic Growth*. This remarkable economic expansion was, in fact, a recalibration of the country's prewar development model (see Tsuboi, 2019). Japan's wartime economy was restructured into a state-directed capitalist system, variously described as the "construction state" (*doken kokka*) (McCormack & Field, 1996), "Japan, Inc." (Schlesinger, 1998), or a "developmental state" (Johnson, 1996).

The continuity with Japan's prewar economic structure was evident in the re-emergence of familiar actors from the Meiji era. The Ministry of Munitions, which had managed the wartime economy, was reorganized in 1949 as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which became a powerhouse in guiding postwar industrial policy. The MITI continued the practice of heavy public investment, collaborating closely with private industry. While the Allied forces had disbanded the powerful *zaibatsu* due to their pivotal role in supporting Japan's war machine, these entities re-emerged in a new form: the *keiretsu* (conglomerate/system). Although *keiretsu* were ostensibly distinct from their prewar predecessors, in reality, they were more a rebranding of the *zaibatsu* than

a departure from the established model. The family-owned structure of the *zaibatsu* gave way to group-based ownership, but the influence and power dynamics remained largely unchanged (Addicott, 2017).

In essence, despite the dramatic reforms of the postwar era, much of Japan's economic and political system retained a remarkable continuity with its past. The names and outward appearances may have changed, but the core patterns—state-guided development, collaboration between public and private sectors, and the dominance of powerful business conglomerates – remained intact, tracing their roots back to the Meiji era's original blueprint for modernization and growth.

The key distinguishing feature of Japan's postwar political structure, compared to the previous era, was the establishment of a stronger democratic foundation, including competitive elections and a free press that could no longer be suppressed by the state. Yet, this newfound democracy was soon compromised by the emergence of a dominant-party system (Arian & Barnes, 1974; Pempel, 1990). Since 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has held an unbroken grip on power, functioning as a near-monolithic authority marked by nepotism and corruption (for an in-depth analysis, see Reed & Carlson, 2018). As a result, many aspects of the decision-making process remain shrouded in opacity, and a powerful, faceless bureaucracy continues to wield significant influence – like a ghost of prewar Japan haunting its ostensibly democratic present.

Prewar structures also lingered in the regulation of intergovernmental relations. Although the 1947 Constitution and the *Local Autonomy Law* theoretically expanded local governments' powers, the centralized Agency-Delegated Function System – a relic of the prewar era – remained largely intact. Under this system, the central government maintained extensive supervisory authority over local administrations, and prefectural governments retained similar control over municipalities. Between 1955 and 1999, an overwhelming 70% to 80% of the responsibilities handled by prefectures and 30% to 40% of those managed by municipalities fell under this system's purview (Ikawa, 2008, p. 8).

Local autonomy was further undermined by fiscal centralization, severely limiting the ability of local governments to implement independent policies (Sunahara, 2011, p. 25). With local economies heavily reliant on subsidies from the central government, this financial dependency fueled a culture of clientelism. In particular, rural politicians were incentivized to cultivate close ties with the ruling party to ensure the flow of funds necessary for local development. This created a political landscape where local support for the LDP became almost synonymous with economic survival, reinforcing the party's dominance and stifling local opposition (Muramatsu, 1988). Additionally, the scramble for limited resources fostered a competitive environment among municipalities, further entrenching their dependence on central funding.

The central government's control was further strengthened through repeated waves of municipal mergers. The first of these postwar consolidations, known as the *Great Shōwa Consolidation* (1953-1961) – named after the *Shōwa* (Enlightened Peace) era (1926-1989) – was initiated under the *Municipality Merger Promotion Law* of 1953, which was later expanded by the *Municipality Creation Promotion Law* of 1956. The objective was to create municipalities robust enough to manage the new administrative duties assigned to them under the postwar legal framework, including operating junior high schools, overseeing disaster prevention efforts, and handling social welfare matters. The new standard required municipalities to have a minimum population of 8,000 residents. Since the Great Meiji Consolidation, the number of municipalities had already been drastically reduced—from 15,859 in 1889 to 9,868 by 1953 (Yokomichi, 2006, p. 4). The Great Shōwa Consolidation further cut the number of municipalities to just 3,472 by 1961 (Yokomichi, 2006, p. 4).

11.4

Towards Decentralization

The initial steps toward decentralization in Japan began in the 1960s when the government set out to promote regional development to address the country's growing geographical imbalances. At the time, Japan faced an unsustainable concentration of population and industry in the Tōkyō metropolitan area, as well as in the major cities of Ōsaka and Nagoya. This rapid urban growth led to severe challenges, including housing shortages, traffic congestion, pollution, and various environmental and health concerns, while other areas experienced stark decline and depopulation.

In response, the government launched a series of Comprehensive National Development Plans overseen by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) under the framework of the *Comprehensive National Land Development Law* enacted in 1950 (see Yamaguchi, 1985; Yamashita 2003). The first plan, introduced in 1962, aimed to develop 15 strategically selected urban areas into *New Industrial Cities* to serve as regional growth poles. The second plan, published in 1969, focused on promoting industrial decentralization through the creation of a nationwide network of expressways, high-speed railways (*shinkansen*), and large-scale regional industrial projects.

While these strategies spurred economic development, they also fueled political discontent at the local level due to concerns about overcrowding, environmental pollution, and overreliance on traditional heavy industries. The two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 further underscored the risks associated with dependence on outdated industrial models. Consequently, MITI shifted its focus toward high-technology industries centered on innovation and high-value-added production. Drawing inspiration from Silicon Valley, MITI envisioned a new development model: the *Technopolis*¹⁰¹, that is, high-tech industrial hubs combining research, innovation, and quality-of-life enhancements to revitalize rural areas and counteract the pull of urban centers (see Tatsuno, 1986; Castells & Hall 1994, 112-143; Higashi, 1995; Fujii 2009).

The Technopolis concept, officially presented in MITI's *Vision for the 1980s*, integrated elements of Silicon Valley's high-tech entrepreneurship with the classic garden city ideal. These hubs were to include research universities, science centers, industrial parks, joint R&D consortia, venture capital foundations, and residential communities (Sase, 1982; Tatsuno, 1988, p. 1; Castells & Hall 1994, p. 115). Unlike previous interventions, this new vision focused on developing *soft infrastructure*, including trained personnel, new technologies, information services, venture capital, and telecommunications services (Tatsuno 1986).

The aim was to revitalize rural areas through production, education, and improved quality of life, fostering a return of migrants from congested metropolises to their regions of birth (Broadbent, 1989, p. 238). Additionally, MITI aimed to discourage offshoring by creating incentives for companies to establish their manufacturing plants in Japan's underdeveloped peripheral regions instead of exporting them to Taiwan or Malaysia (Douglass, 1988; Castells & Hall, 1994, p. 115).

In 1983, MITI formalized this vision with the *Technopolis Plan Laws for Accelerating High-Technology Industrial Development* (commonly known as *Technopolis Laws*), identifying 26 sites across Japan as prospective Technopolis zones. By 1998, Technopolis projects had been established in these areas with mixed outcomes: while some sites thrived, others fell short due to poor planning, misalignment of resources, and lack of local economic cohesion (Castells & Hall, 1994, pp. 137-143; Hein & Pelletier, 2006, p. 13).

Despite the groundwork laid by these regional development initiatives, the most substantial strides in decentralization occurred later, as Japan's economic growth began to slow in the 1980s and concerns arose over the rising costs of local public services (Narumi, 1994). A major turning point came with the collapse of Japan's economic bubble in 1991, which resulted in a dramatic shift in the political landscape. In 1993, the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost its parliamentary

¹⁰¹ The term *Technopolis* was first introduced in Japanese politics by Toshiyuki Chikami, mayor of Kurume (Fukuoka Prefecture), inspired by the title of a pop song about Tōkyō by the Yellow Magic Orchestra, which had become Japan's number-one hit in 1980 (Industrial Structure Council 1980; Tatsuno, 1986, p. 118-120)

majority for the first time since 1955, ushering in a brief coalition government with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and an era of political realignment. These political shifts opened a window of opportunity for various reforms, including those related to decentralization.

In 1995, under the leadership of the socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama – who came to power as part of the coalition between LDP and JSP – the government enacted the *Decentralization Promotion Act*. This Act established the Committee for the Promotion of Decentralization, which laid the foundation for a series of sweeping reforms aimed at recalibrating the balance of power between central and local governments. In particular, three key sets of decentralization reforms followed:

- 1) The *Omnibus Decentralization Promotion Act* (2000): This landmark reform abolished the outdated Agency-Delegated Function System, clearly defining the respective roles and powers of local and national governments. It also established rules governing central intervention in local affairs and created mechanisms for resolving intergovernmental disputes.
- 2) The *Trinity Reforms* (2002-2006): These fiscal reforms sought to empower local governments by transferring tax revenue sources to them, reforming the allocation of national taxes, and significantly reducing subsidies and transfers from the central government. The goal was to foster financial autonomy and reduce local dependency on central funding.
- 3) The *Promotion of Decentralization Reform* (2006 onward): Building on earlier reforms, this phase focused on reducing ministerial oversight over local services and devolving additional policy authority to lower-level governments. Between 2010 and 2019, nine omnibus laws were enacted to streamline regulations and grant local entities greater control over various policy areas.

As in the Meiji and Shōwa eras, the reorganization of relations between the central and local governments in Japan was accompanied by a wave of municipal mergers, this time known as the *Great Heisei Consolidation* (1999-2010). Named after the *Heisei* (Peace Everywhere) era, which lasted from 1989 to 2019, this merger aimed, once again, to strengthen the administrative and financial foundations of local governments to ensure they could efficiently carry out their responsibilities. However, it was also driven by broader concerns about the economic stagnation of the 1990s, as well as the looming demographic challenges of a declining birthrate and an aging population, which were beginning to severely impact many municipalities (Yokomichi, 2006, pp. 5-7).

In 1999, the government revised the *Municipal Merger Law* of the Shōwa era, reissuing it as the *Special Law for Municipal Mergers*. This new legislation introduced, for the first time, substantial financial and economic incentives to encourage municipalities to merge. A subsequent *Municipal*

Merger Law was enacted in 2005 to promote additional amalgamations. Before this new wave of mergers, the number of municipalities had only slightly declined from 3,472 in 1961 to 3,229 by 1999 (Yokomichi, 2006, p. 5). However, by 2006, this figure had nearly halved to 1,821, and as of January 2024, it has further decreased to 1,724¹⁰².

Recognizing that mergers could exacerbate intra-municipal inequalities – particularly by reducing public services in newly peripheral areas – the central government presented three alternative governance models for merged municipalities to mitigate these risks (Nishihara & Fujii 2018, 107):

- *Centralized Headquarters System*: All administrative functions are concentrated in a central headquarters, with only small satellite branches providing basic services to outlying areas.
- *Comprehensive Branch System*: While central administrative functions are maintained at a headquarters, the offices of the former municipalities are transformed into branches, retaining much of their pre-merger authority and decision-making power.
- *Multi-locational Headquarters System*: The mayoral departments of the new municipality are distributed across multiple former municipal offices, creating a network of sub-headquarters.

The Comprehensive Branch and Multi-locational Headquarters systems were considered more effective for preserving service quality and reducing inequalities in geographically large municipalities. However, in practice, these decentralized models were rarely adopted because they were less efficient in streamlining administrative processes and achieving cost reductions. Consequently, recent evaluations of the consolidation's impact have shown a clear correlation between centralized governance in merged municipalities and increased disparities in service delivery (Nishihara 2014; Maruyama, 2016; Nishihara & Fujii, 2018).

Overall, Japan's decentralization reforms have been criticized for their top-down nature, ultimately driven by the central government's desire to offload administrative burdens rather than empower local communities (Niimura, 2018, p. 104). Fiscal decentralization, in particular, has not resolved the persistent issue of local governments' financial dependence on national subsidies and, in some cases, has exacerbated economic disparities between wealthier urban centers and poorer, often rural, areas. This uneven distribution of resources has fueled intercity competition and hindered the equitable development of local economies.

These outcomes have naturally eroded public support for both political decentralization and the broader market deregulation – reforms that were initially touted as solutions to revitalize local communities and achieve balanced economic growth across the country. As urban-rural disparities

¹⁰² <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/municipalities/number-of-municipalities>

have widened, many rural voters have felt increasingly marginalized by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which they saw as favoring the needs of major urban centers at the expense of rural areas. This growing sense of disenfranchisement has led to an electoral backlash in rural regions, marked by declining political engagement and a waning of the LDP's traditional dominance (Hijino 2022). Some scholars suggest that these decentralization efforts were, in fact, part of a broader LDP strategy to reallocate fiscal resources from rural constituencies to more economically vibrant urban areas, which are also politically more significant (Saito & Yamada, 2011, p. 114).

11.5

The Local Turn in Japanese Governance

Japan's local government system has maintained the two-tier structure first established in 1871, consisting of prefectures and municipalities. While the basic framework has remained largely intact, there have been three notable variations since the 1888 administrative division into 47 prefectures: (a) Tōkyō has been recognized a special status as the country's capital (都, *to*), (b) Okinawa has been incorporated as a proper prefecture (県, *ken*), and (c) Hokkaidō is considered as a regional prefecture, also known as a *circuit* (道, *dō*).

Despite these distinctions, all prefectural governments share the same broad responsibilities they were originally assigned, including managing large-scale infrastructure such as prefectural roads, harbors, and river conservancy; overseeing public health centers and vocational training; and maintaining the police force. Prefectures also play a vital role in coordinating with municipalities and providing supplemental support for areas like high school education, museums, and public hospitals.

Municipalities, on the other hand, continue to be divided into cities (市, *shi* – 792), towns (町, *chō/machi* – 743), and villages (村, *son/mura* – 189). However, significant changes have occurred since the enactment of the *Local Authority Law* in 1947. First, the district-level administrative divisions were abolished. Second, Tōkyō's 23 wards (区, *ku*) were reclassified as *special wards* (特別区, *tokubetsu-ku*), granting them the same status and functions as municipal governments. Third, a new classification system for cities emerged based on population size: cities with 50,000 to 200,000

residents are categorized as *ordinary cities*, those with over 200,000 are designated as *core cities* (中核市, *chūkaku-shi*), and the largest cities, with more than 500,000 residents, can apply for designation as *ordinance-designated cities* (政令指定都市, *seirei-shitei-toshi*) – these are also known simply as *designated cities* (指定都市, *shitei-toshi*) or *government ordinance city* (政令市, *seirei-shi*). Initially, only cities with populations exceeding one million were eligible for this status, but following the Great Heisei Consolidation, the threshold was lowered to 700,000.

Although local governments still operate under a framework that leaves them heavily dependent on the central government for financial resources, their administrative functions have gradually expanded to include a wide range of public services. These responsibilities encompass resident registration (e.g., family registry), health and safety management (e.g., fire services, garbage collection, water supply, and sewage), welfare services (e.g., public assistance, nursing care insurance, and national health insurance), urban development (e.g., municipal roads and parks), and the establishment and operation of public facilities (e.g., daycare centers, elementary and junior high schools, libraries, and public halls) (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations 2017).

Ordinance-designated and core cities have emerged as special cases within the municipal system, holding a level of authority and responsibility that sets them apart. Ordinance-designated cities, which are granted an administrative status akin to prefectures, wield extensive authority in fields such as public education, social welfare, sanitation, business licensing, and urban planning – though prefectural governments retain control over key decisions. These cities are required to divide into administrative wards (区, *ku*), which, unlike Tōkyō’s wards, do not have autonomous municipal status but instead function as administrative sub-divisions with local offices handling tasks like resident registration and tax collection. Core cities, while not required to establish wards, share similar authority to ordinance-designated cities, albeit primarily in the welfare sector.

Despite the mixed results of the decentralization reforms, there is no denying that a *local turn* has taken place in Japan, elevating local governments to a crucial role in the governance landscape. This shift is evident not only in the scale of their administrative reach but also in the number of public servants they employ and the size of their expenditures. As of 2017, prefectures and municipalities together employed 2.74 million public servants – nearly five times the number of central government bureaucrats and public officials (Hijino, 2022). In the fiscal year 2016, local government expenditures amounted to 58.5 trillion yen, representing 10.9% of the country’s nominal GDP and more than twice the national government’s expenditure (22 trillion yen) (*ibid.*). Local governments primarily allocate these funds to public welfare, educational services, debt servicing, public works, and general administrative expenses.

Local governments have also shown a significant capacity to shape Japanese politics and society. This was first revealed during the era of the so-called *kakushin jichitai* (progressive local governments). This phenomenon emerged when non-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) forces – primarily the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) – gained control over key executive positions in major cities. These progressive administrations began to challenge national policies on environmental regulation, fiscal strategies, and welfare provision (Rix, 1975; Steiner et al. 1980; Calder, 1988; Reed 1986; Muramatsu 1988; Okada 2016; Hijino 2017; 2022).

Early cases of progressive governments appeared in the immediate aftermath of World War II, at the beginning of the Japanese democratic transition. Following the enactment of Japan's new constitution and the country's first local elections, four Socialist governors were elected in 1947 in the prefectures of Hokkaidō, Nagano, Tokushima, and Fukuoka, while eleven Socialist mayors won in cities across the nation. Despite these early gains, many of these administrations lasted no more than a single term due to entrenched opposition within local bureaucracies, which were still oriented toward prewar norms and lacked a collective drive for reform (Rix, 1975, p. 531). Furthermore, there was little sense of unity or shared purpose among the progressives, making it difficult to establish a coherent political force.

A more pronounced wave of *kakushin jichitai* began in the late 1950s, as progressive mayors were elected in several mid-sized cities such as Sendai, Omiya, and Okayama in 1959, followed by larger urban centers like Yokohama, Kyōto, Ōsaka, and Kitakyushu in 1963. This trend is often viewed as a reaction to the social strains caused by then-Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's high economic growth policies, which led to urban problems such as pollution, housing shortages, and traffic congestion. By the late 1960s, this movement culminated in the historic victory of socialist Ryokichi Minobe in the Tōkyō gubernatorial election in 1967, marking the beginning of an even broader wave of leftist successes in local elections throughout Japan.

The era of *kakushin jichitai* brought new visibility to progressive politics in Japan, not merely at the local level but also as an alternative vision to LDP-dominated national politics. These local governments were characterized by their emphasis on social justice, public welfare, and citizen participation. They championed policies that prioritized healthcare, education, housing, and environmental protection – often in stark contrast to the LDP's focus on rapid economic growth and industrial development. As a result, progressive local governments implemented a range of social welfare measures and environmental protections that emphasized egalitarian principles and challenged the central government's top-down approach to economic management.

One of the defining features of these progressive administrations was their engagement with citizens through *jimin undō* (citizens' movements) and *jimin sankā* (citizen participation) in the

regular administrative processes. This fostered a sense of political inclusion, flexibility, and responsiveness at the local level that contrasted sharply with the paternalistic and technocratic governance style of many LDP-controlled areas. In urban planning, these governments pursued balanced growth, environmental sustainability, and anti-pollution initiatives, which stood in opposition to the unchecked industrial expansion typically endorsed by conservative administrations.

The influence of *kakushin jichitai* began to wane in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to a confluence of factors. First, the economic downturn following the oil crises of the 1970s imposed severe fiscal constraints on local governments, making it difficult to sustain expansive welfare programs. Second, the conservative resurgence led by the LDP capitalized on public concerns over fiscal responsibility and law and order, thereby undermining the appeal of progressive administrations (Stockwin, 1999). Finally, internal divisions within left-leaning parties, coupled with the JSP's declining influence at the national level, further eroded the political base of *kakushin jichitai*.

Despite the decline of progressive local governments, their legacy persisted. They underscored the potential of cities to serve as counterbalances to the shortcomings of central government policies and solidified the role of local governments as key actors in Japanese governance. Additionally, the era of *kakushin jichitai* had a lasting impact on the professionalization of local bureaucracies, significantly enhancing the expertise, skills, and policymaking capabilities of local administrators. This shift laid the groundwork for a local governance culture that could adopt innovative policies independently, without relying on large-scale citizens' movements or electoral mandates. As a result, local bureaucracies became more capable of autonomously launching new policies, reflecting the professionalization and institutional maturity brought about by this transformative period.

Even today, local governments continue to challenge the dominance of the LDP's national stronghold. While the LDP maintains a firm grip at the prefectural level, opposition parties frequently gain control of key urban centers, demonstrating the enduring impact of *kakushin jichitai* and highlighting the potential of cities to function as *loci* of alternative political power (Hijino 2022).

In recent decades, a new political phenomenon has emerged at the urban level, reflecting the broader neoliberal turn and the rise of a populist style of governance. Since the 2000s, several prefectural governors and city mayors have established their own political parties, including figures like Shiga's governor Yukiko Kada (2006-2014), Ōsaka's Tōru Hashimoto (2008-2011, later Ōsaka mayor, 2012-2014), and Tōkyō's current governor Yuriko Koike (2016-present). These leaders have often employed populist strategies to appeal to floating voters by pledging to reduce "wasteful" spending and combat entrenched "vested interests" within the political establishment (Arima, 2017). Some of these local successes have translated into national political movements, as seen in

Hashimoto's Ōsaka-based Japan Innovation Party (*Nippon Ishin no Kai*), better known as *Ishin*, which became the third-largest opposition party by 2016.

Finally, Japanese local governments have also emerged as important players on the international stage. Tōkyō has long been considered a prime example of a “global city” since the concept was first articulated by Saskia Sassen (Sassen, 1991). Other large cities such as Ōsaka and Nagoya have similarly become active participants in global networks, asserting their roles as key actors in transnational economic and cultural exchanges. This transformation highlights the evolving role of Japanese local governments – not just as administrators of domestic policy but as dynamic players in the broader global arena.

11.6

Challenges and Opportunities for Japan's Vibrant Civil Society

In academic discourse, Japanese civil society has often been characterized as weak and compliant (e.g., Yamamoto, 1999; Yoshida, 1999; Vosse, 2000; Broadbent, 2002; Barrett, 2005, pp. 166-177; Ogawa, 2009, pp. 11-13; 2022; Dryzek, 2013, p. 159). This perception emerged prominently during the 1980s, rooted in three interconnected factors. First, the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) entrenched a political system that effectively marginalized civil society from institutional decision-making, which remained tightly controlled by closed networks involving the LDP and powerful economic players like the *keiretsu*. Second, until the late 1990s, third-sector organizations were regulated under an archaic legal framework dating back to 1898. The stringent requirements for economic and social capital to gain formal recognition, combined with an opaque and discretionary approval process managed by national or prefectural authorities, gave the government significant leverage to shape civil society to its advantage. Large, government-aligned organizations were favored, while those perceived as potential challengers found it difficult to survive or expand (Pekkanen, 2006; Reimann, 2010). Third, the absence of prominent public protests and confrontational activism in the 1970s and 1980s rendered Japanese civil society seemingly “invisible” compared to the vibrant social movements flourishing in Western democracies at the time (Shibuichi, 2016).

However, characterizing Japanese civil society as fundamentally weak based on these criteria overlooks the broader historical context. Japan has a long history of civil resistance and grassroots activism, with numerous movements challenging central authority even before the 1970s. During the Tokugawa period, despite the strict rule of the shogunate, popular uprisings were not uncommon (e.g., Bix, 1989; White, 1995). Similarly, the Meiji era saw frequent rebellions and the emergence of civil rights movements that occasionally compelled the government to adjust its policies in response to public demands.

The 20th century was marked by several waves of significant social upheaval. One of the most dramatic episodes was the Rice Riots of 1918, triggered by a sudden spike in rice prices, which unleashed violent mass demonstrations and riots across the country. These events, which included attacks on political figures, underscored the volatility of the so-called Taishō Democracy.

In the postwar period, Japan witnessed a surge of intense and sometimes violent street politics, as rival parties and civil groups clashed for influence amid the nation's social and political transformation. The top-down interventions by the central government in the 1950s and 1960s, aimed at decentralizing industrial concentration in Tōkyō, Ōsaka, and Nagoya as part of the first two national development plans, further fueled powerful waves of protests and civil unrest. During this period, the emergence of progressive local administrations across the country played a pivotal role in energizing civil society, empowering grassroots organizations, and fostering citizen participation. It was in this context, between the 1950s and 1970s, that the concept of *shimin shakai* (civil society) gained traction among Japanese social scientists (Avenell, 2006).

However, by the 1970s, as Japan's dominant-party system became firmly entrenched and the era of progressive local governments waned, also large-scale social movements began to lose momentum. The central government's tighter control over local authorities further stifled the ability of civil society actors to influence decision-making at the national level. Yet, while activism on the national stage may have quieted, local civil society continued to thrive. Robust local organizations, particularly neighborhood associations known as *chōnaikai* or *jichikai*, played a critical role in shaping community governance and ensuring local participation (Pekkanen et al., 2014). Moreover, the postwar era saw the proliferation of grassroots civic participation and bottom-up initiatives in municipalities across Japan, best exemplified by the participatory city-planning movements known as *machizukuri* (city-making/community-building) (Yorifusa, 2006; Satoh, 2019). These forms of local activism led scholars to describe Japanese civil society as “social capital without advocacy” (Pekkanen, 2004).

A turning point for Japanese civil society came in the early 1990s, spurred by the bursting of the economic bubble in 1991 and the temporary defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1993.

This political shift opened a window of opportunity for policy changes. The real catalyst, however, came in 1995 with the Great Hanshin Earthquake, which laid bare the deficiencies of the central government's disaster response and highlighted the crucial role of civil society in local governance.

The earthquake devastated large parts of Hyōgo Prefecture, particularly Awaji Island and the Hanshin region (Ōsaka-Kōbe), making it the most destructive natural disaster in postwar Japan at the time. The central government's response was sluggish and ineffective, and local institutions were similarly unprepared and under-equipped (Aldrich, 2011, 3; Yamamura, 2013, p. 7). Stepping into the void, Japanese civil society mobilized *en masse*: local groups, private enterprises, and an unprecedented 1.8 million volunteers became the true leaders in the initial recovery efforts (Peruzzi Castellani, 2023, pp. 533-534).

This powerful grassroots response created the momentum for a large-scale movement, supported by political and business elites as well as the media, to pressure the central government into reforming its rigid control over the third sector. The movement's success was amplified by the central government's political instability at the time. Finally, in 1998, the government enacted the *Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities*, commonly known as the *NPO Law*. This landmark legislation drastically simplified the process for organizations to gain official NPO status, paving the way for civil society to become an integral player in Japanese governance. As a result, nearly 70,000 NPOs were established within two decades (Cabinet Office, 2019), many of which took on significant responsibilities in providing social welfare services traditionally managed by the state.

Nevertheless, as some scholars have noted (e.g., Reimann, 2010; Ogawa, 2020), it is important not to idealize the role of civil society in contemporary Japan. The financial dependence of NPOs on local and central government funding allows the state to exert considerable influence over them through targeted subsidies and tax incentives, reinforcing Japan's image as an "activist state" (Pharr, 2003). Yet, despite these limitations, the involvement of NPOs in local co-management has opened new channels for bottom-up advocacy.

Beyond the rise of NPOs, the aftermath of the Great Hanshin Earthquake ushered in a broader wave of civil society dynamism across Japan. Leveraging new communication technologies, networks of small, often informal activist groups have proven adept at influencing Japan's traditionally rigid and insular political institutions through coordinated campaigns (Shibuichi, 2016; Shipper, 2018).

This renewed civic energy played a pivotal role in resisting the centralization of local governance during the Great Heisei Consolidation (1999-2010). While these municipal mergers aimed to strengthen local governments and support decentralization, the creation of larger municipalities risked diluting the voices of local communities. In response to mounting protests, the government revised the *Local Authority Law* in 2004, allowing for the creation of *local autonomy districts* (*chiikijichi-ku*)

within municipalities and establishing *local councils* (*chiikikyōgi-kai*) composed of resident representatives to ensure local interests were not overlooked.

Since the turn of the millennium, Japan has also witnessed the rise of new large-scale social movements, particularly those focused on environmental issues (Chiavacci & Obinger, 2018). This activism gained further momentum in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, which once again revealed the limitations of both the central and local governments in crisis management. The disaster coincided with another temporary loss of the LDP's dominance to the Democratic Party of Japan (2009-2012), providing a brief opening for civil society actors to push for more comprehensive environmental and energy reforms.

Ultimately, the resurgence of civil society over the last three decades has become a defining feature of Japan's broader *local turn* in governance. Today, local actors have emerged as crucial stakeholders, not only in managing local affairs but also in shaping national policy, positioning civil society as a vital force in steering and shaping Japan's future.

CHAPTER 12

Contextualizing Minority Struggles for Recognition in Multi-ethnic Japan

12.1

Homogeneity and Multiethnicity in Japan

“Japan has one ethnicity (*minzoku*), one state (*kokka*), and one language (*gengo*).” This bold and controversial statement was famously made in 1986 by then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Terazawa, 1990, pp. 64-65). Unsurprisingly, this sparked a significant backlash. While it is relatively straightforward to assert that Japan is a single nation-state – despite the presence of a few radical groups advocating for independence or even the transformation of Japan into a federation – claiming that the country has only one ethnicity and one language is far more contentious.

When it comes to language, Japan's reality is more complex than Nakasone's assertion suggests. Comprising thousands of islands, the Japanese archipelago is home to a remarkable diversity of languages. What is known today as *Standard Japanese* is, in fact, nothing but an artificial construct of the early 20th century (Section 11.2, p. 336). Part of deliberate nation-building efforts during the Meiji era, the *kokugo* (national language) was created to impose linguistic unity in a country where mutually unintelligible dialects once necessitated interpreters for communication – the linguistic diversity of Japan in the early Meiji period is vividly captured in Inoue Hisashi's play *Kokugo Gannen* (Year One of Japanese National Language) (1985), which portrays the chaotic state of language in the country. Meiji intellectuals like Ueda Kazutoshi (1867-1937) spearheaded the project of creating a common language as part of a broader political agenda to forge a unified national identity. Their vision of Standard Japanese was a tool for nation-building, designed to facilitate a cohesive national discourse in a fragmented linguistic landscape (Shimoda, 2010).

Remarkably, this project of linguistic standardization has succeeded to a great extent. Today, most Japanese citizens speak this standardized version fluently. Yet, despite its ubiquity, we must not forget

that Standard Japanese is not the *official* language of Japan in a legal sense – it has never been formally given this status. Most importantly, while many local dialects have faded over time, Japan’s linguistic diversity remains vibrant. Standard Japanese is just one variant of the Japonic languages spoken in the archipelago.

The Ryūkyūan languages, for example, are distinct enough to be considered a separate branch of the Japonic family. They are spoken in Okinawa and the Amami Islands (part of Kagoshima Prefecture) and are unintelligible not only to speakers of Standard Japanese but often even to those who speak other Ryūkyūan languages. Beyond the Japonic family, languages such as Ainu and Korean are also spoken by specific communities of Japanese citizens, further underscoring the linguistic pluralism that Nakasone’s statement denied.

Nakasone’s claim that Japan has only one ethnicity is equally misleading. When people refer to *Japanese ethnicity*, they mostly mean the so-called *Yamato* people or *Wajin* (people of Wa) – two names derived from the old names of the country (Section 11.1, pp. 332-33) – who are considered the majority ethnic group. However, the Yamato are actually just one of several ethnic groups that historically inhabited the main islands of the Japanese archipelago. The Yamato originally hailed from a specific region in Honshu (modern-day Nara) and gradually expanded their influence over other groups – such as the Izumo and Ezo people. These groups – each with their own distinct cultural and social identities – did not disappear but continued to maintain their identitarian specificities. During the Meiji period, the term *Yamato people* started being employed by nationalist intellectuals as a way to unify all these groups under a single national identity (see also below, Section 13.1, p. 382). However, traces of the distinctions between different Japanese ethnic groups remain to this day, however, for example in the identity references of some people who live in the Izumo area and continue to refer to themselves as *Izumo people*.

Modern research has further complicated the narrative of a homogenous Japanese ethnicity. Studies conducted in the 21st century using advanced DNA analysis reveal high genetic diversity within the Japanese archipelago, particularly in Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku, confirming the existence of very different genetic groups across the country (Shinoda, 2007; Sakitani, 2008; 2009; see also Okamoto, 2015, 154). Culturally, the regional diversity within Japan is also extraordinary. Distinct customs, traditions, and social practices vary not just between the different islands but even within different regions of the same island. From cuisine and festivals to dialects and folklore, these variations reflect a rich tapestry of local identities that defy the idea of a monolithic Japanese culture.

The assertion that Japan has only one ethnicity becomes even more problematic when considering the presence of marginalized minorities outside the mainstream. Unlike the regional variations within the so-called Yamato population, these minority groups – including the Ainu, Okinawans, Zainichi,

and Burakumin – have faced systematic discrimination and marginalization. For them, Nakasone's statement was more than a mere misrepresentation; it was a denial of their very existence and a rejection of their distinct identities and complex histories within the Japanese nation.

While one could interpret Nakasone's monoethnic rhetoric as an attempt to promote national unity during a period of social and political uncertainty, it also served – willingly or unwillingly – a far more insidious function: silencing minority voices. Within the dominant Yamato group, regional linguistic and cultural heterogeneity might be regarded with curiosity or, at worst, dismissed as rural eccentricities. Yet, for those outside the mainstream, being told that Japan has only one ethnicity was a message that they either had to assimilate completely or continue to be viewed as perpetual outsiders.

Today, Japan's emerging discourse on diversity and multiculturalism reflects a slow but steady shift toward acknowledging the country's rich and complex social fabric. To fully understand this emerging narrative, it is essential to recognize the unique cultural landscapes and the varied struggles faced by Japan's minority groups. Let us clarify this point by reviewing what can be considered Japan's main ethnic minorities outside that so-called mainstream Japanese population.

Seven minority groups, in particular, are central to the contemporary discourse on diversity and cultural pluralism in Japan. These groups can be categorized based on their historical roots, migration patterns, and socio-cultural identities. Three groups can be considered native to Japanese territories:

- a) The Ainu: Indigenous to the northernmost regions of Japan, including Hokkaidō and the Kuril Islands, who belong to an ethnic group different from the mainstream Japanese population, and have their own language, religion, and cultural traditions.
- b) The Okinawans: Native to the Ryūkyū Islands, Okinawans have a distinct cultural identity shaped by their historical status as an independent kingdom before annexation by Japan in the 19th century.
- c) The Burakumin: Though not racially or ethnically distinct, the Burakumin are considered a caste-like minority, historically relegated to outcaste status and still facing deeply ingrained social stigmatization.

The origins of two other groups are connected to ancient migration to Japan and the country's history of colonialism. These are:

- d) The Zainichi: Descendants of Koreans brought to Japan during its colonial period, the Zainichi Koreans have struggled for generations with ambiguous citizenship status, discrimination, and identity conflict.
- e) The Hāfu: A relatively newer social category, Hāfu refers to individuals of mixed Japanese and non-Japanese parentage.

The two last groups represent a newer wave of diversity, shaped by Japan's modern immigration policies and global economic shifts:

- f) International Migrants: With the influx of workers from other parts of Asia, Southeast Asia, and beyond, this group has become an essential yet often marginalized part of Japan's labor force.
- g) The Nikkeijin: A specific group of international migrants composed of ethnic Japanese from countries like Brazil or Peru, whose ancestors emigrated generations ago. Their "return" to Japan, often motivated by economic factors, has highlighted the gap between cultural expectations of ethnic affinity and the reality of integration

While these categories offer a basic framework, they cannot fully capture the intricate and evolving nature of these communities' experiences. Each group's encounter with discrimination and marginalization is shaped by a unique blend of historical circumstances, socioeconomic positions, and evolving identities. This complexity makes it difficult to define them using a single concept of ethnicity or to weave them into one cohesive narrative of exclusion.

Nonetheless, their shared struggles have fostered a strong sense of collective identity and solidarity within each group, giving rise to vibrant social movements that advocate for recognition and justice. Over time, these movements have leveraged both local and international platforms to voice their demands, pushing the boundaries of Japan's conventional understanding of identity and citizenship. One effective strategy employed by many of these minority groups – mirroring the broader trend in Japanese social activism – is the use of *gaiatsu*, or "foreign pressure." Japan's sensitivity to its international reputation has provided these communities with a powerful tool to push for domestic reforms through external scrutiny and advocacy (Lewallen, 2008; Stevens, 2014).

12.2

Japan's *Indigenous People*: The Ainu

The Ainu – whose name means *humans* in their native language and who are also known as *Utari* (comrades/people) – are the indigenous people of the lands surrounding the Sea of Okhotsk, including the Japanese northernmost island of Hokkaidō. As of 2017, an estimated 13,118 Ainu were living in Hokkaidō (Ainu Policy Promotion Headquarters, n.d.). The Ainu people have usually distinct somatic features compared to the Yamato Japanese and possess a unique cultural heritage encompassing their own religion, traditions, and language. The Ainu language, recognized as a *language isolate*, is unrelated to Japanese and remains a linguistic enigma, as it has no known genealogical connections to other languages.

Although the precise origins of the Ainu remain uncertain, archaeological findings in Hokkaidō point to cultural continuities with the peoples of maritime Siberia and the Amur River basin, as well as historical links with the Japanese main island of Honshū. Over the centuries, the Ainu experienced a fluctuating relationship with the populations of Honshū and other nearby islands, alternating between conflict and peaceful coexistence. However, at the onset of the Meiji era, Hokkaidō was formally annexed by the Yamato Japanese, and the Ainu were subjected to a harsh regime of colonialist and assimilationist policies.

The early 20th century saw the formation of the first Ainu associations, established to combat discrimination and advocate for the recognition of their rights as a minority group. The most prominent of these associations is the umbrella organization Hokkaidō Ainu Association (*Hokkaidō Ainu Kyōkai*), which has been at the forefront of Ainu social movements since its founding in 1930.

In the postwar era, Ainu activists forged alliances with opposition parties, notably the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). While these parties viewed the Ainu issue as a potential political asset, Ainu activists leveraged these connections to strengthen their negotiating position with the government (Siddle, 1996). During this period, Ainu activists also began networking with other indigenous groups globally, presenting their situation regularly at the United Nations.

Despite their efforts, by the 1990s, these advocacy campaigns had only led to the implementation of local welfare measures by the Hokkaidō prefectural government. Enacted in 1974 under the Hokkaidō Utari Welfare Measures, these initiatives aimed to improve the living standards, employment opportunities, and education levels of the Ainu but failed to secure national recognition of their rights as an indigenous minority.

However, in 1994, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) temporarily lost its parliamentary majority, creating a rare window for Ainu activists to advance their cause at the national level. Leveraging their established connections with the Japan Socialist Party, they intensified their advocacy during the brief administration of Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama (1994-1996). After two years of

negotiations, the *Act on the Promotion of Ainu Culture and Dissemination of Knowledge about Ainu Traditions* was passed in 1997.

While this law marked a historic step, its focus was primarily cultural, emphasizing the promotion of the Ainu's "language, music, dance, and handicrafts" (Article 2), rather than addressing the discrimination and social issues they faced (Siddle, 2002). Critics argued that the measure served more as a way for the state to depoliticize the Ainu issue and distance it from the broader international struggle for indigenous rights. Instead of engaging meaningfully with the Ainu's demands, the policy seemed geared toward sustaining ethnic entrepreneurship to bolster local cultural industries and tourism, benefiting only a small portion of the Ainu community.

Despite concerns that the new law might dampen activism by presenting the Ainu issue as resolved, the movement continued to press forward. A significant breakthrough came in 2007, when Japan ratified the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICEAFRD). Around the same time, Hokkaidō was chosen as the host site for the 2008 G8 summit. Seizing this opportunity, Ainu activists, armed with years of experience participating in international indigenous forums, lobbied local politicians and organized events to raise global awareness of their plight. Fearing international scrutiny, the Japanese government opted to preempt negative publicity by taking proactive measures to improve its reputation (Larson et al., 2008; Lewallen, 2008; Stevens, 2008; 2014; Bukh, 2012). Just one month before the summit, the Japanese government officially recognized the Ainu as Japan's *indigenous people* and pledged to introduce new legislation to protect their rights.

The promised law was eventually passed in 2019, driven once again by external factors, including the desire to enhance Japan's image ahead of the 2020 Tōkyō Olympics (Charbonneau & Maruyama, 2019; Godefroy, 2019; Komai, 2021). This new law reiterated and expanded commitments to promoting Ainu culture and raising public awareness of their heritage. It required all prefectural governments to develop regional plans for implementing Ainu cultural policies and, crucially, included a provision banning discrimination against the Ainu based on ethnicity. It must still be understood if this law is proving capable of representing an effective framework for addressing the longstanding social and economic disparities faced by the Ainu community.

12.3

The Quest for Okinawan Paradise: Colonialism, Post-colonialism and Commodification in Okinawa

At the opposite end of Japan from Hokkaidō lies the Okinawa archipelago, home to a distinct Japanese minority: the Okinawans, numbering 1,469,628 people within the islands, plus several communities living in other parts of the country. Historically, Okinawa was part of the independent Ryūkyū Kingdom, a region caught between the competing spheres of influence of China and Japan. This unique geopolitical position fostered the development of a rich cultural tapestry characterized by a blend of different traditions, religions, and languages. The Ryukyuan languages, part of the Japonic language family, are unintelligible to Japanese speakers, further underscoring the cultural distinctiveness of the region.

The independent status of the Ryūkyū Kingdom began to unravel in 1609 when the archipelago was invaded by the feudal lord of Satsuma (modern-day Kagoshima Prefecture). Although effectively under Satsuma's control, the Ryūkyū kings retained nominal power throughout the Tokugawa period, allowing the kingdom to continue its formal ties with China and enabling Satsuma to benefit from lucrative trade despite Japan's strict isolationist policy (*sakoku*).

Like Hokkaidō, Okinawa was formally annexed during the Meiji period. Neglected in the rush to modernize Japan, the archipelago later became a tragic battleground during World War II. It was then effectively sacrificed at the war's end when, under the terms of Japan's surrender, Okinawa was ceded to the United States. The archipelago remained under American military control until 1972, when it was finally returned to Japan. Despite Okinawans' vehement protests, the U.S. forcibly confiscated land and constructed numerous military bases – installations that still occupy over 20% of the archipelago's land area and account for roughly 70% of the U.S. military presence in Japan.

The unique history of the Okinawan archipelago, including its 27 years of U.S. rule, coupled with a widespread sense of neglect by the Japanese government and society, gave rise to a strong and distinctive Okinawan identity. This identity has fueled movements for the preservation and revival of Okinawan cultural heritage, including the Ryukyuan languages, traditional folk music and dance, weaving techniques, and indigenous spiritual practices. Despite these efforts, Okinawans often felt alienated from mainstream Japanese society, which for decades showed little solidarity with their struggles for compensation and recognition. Meanwhile, Okinawan migrants living on the Japanese mainland have long been facing discrimination due to their perceived ethnic and cultural differences (e.g., Cho, 2015).

The portrayal of Okinawans and their cultural identity began to shift in the 1990s, in part due to a newfound interest from Japan's cultural and tourism industries in the archipelago's ethnic heritage. A pivotal moment in this transformation was Japan's "healing boom" (*iyashi būmu*), which emerged in response to the anxiety and stress following the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991 (Roquet, 2009; Kühne, 2012; Matsui, 2013). The demand for products and experiences promoting physical and psychological healing expanded rapidly, and Okinawa's culture and tourism offerings soon became central to this burgeoning market. The archipelago was marketed as Japan's *Healing Islands* (*iyashi no shima*), a subtropical paradise surrounded by pristine oceans and inhabited by warm, easygoing people known for their boundless optimism and unparalleled hospitality.

The "Okinawa Boom" (Kühne, 2012; Fujiki, 2013), which took off in the early 2000s, was further fueled by the popularity of films, TV dramas, and pop songs that idealized the region. While this romanticized image contributed to reducing negative stereotypes and discrimination against Okinawans, it came with unintended consequences. Activists noted that the commodification of Okinawan culture often served to distract from the region's ongoing struggles with political and social marginalization (e.g., Cho 2015, pp. 169-172). Ethnic entrepreneurship, while providing economic opportunities for some, was perceived as diluting the urgency of movements for land reclamation and justice, leading to a state of passive acceptance of the *status quo*.

Following a similar approach to the Ainu, some Okinawan activists began engaging with international Indigenous forums, aiming to leverage global support to pressure the Japanese government through international channels. In 1996, a group of these activists participated in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, later founding the Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the Ryukyus (AIPR) in 1999. Since its establishment, the AIPR has led movements advocating for the recognition of Okinawans as Indigenous people, seeking compensation for land expropriation and stronger protections for Okinawan culture, landscapes, and seascapes – beyond the superficial benefits of commodification and tourism.

Although AIPR succeeded in gaining recognition from the United Nations for Okinawans as an Indigenous group and garnered international support for their cause, the strategy has not had the same impact on the national government as it did in the case of the Ainu. As early as 2001, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) urged the Japanese government to investigate potential human rights violations concerning Okinawans. After Japan's formal recognition of the Ainu as Indigenous people in 2008, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) explicitly called on the Japanese government to extend similar recognition to the Okinawans and promote their Indigenous rights (Art. 32). These appeals were reiterated by both the CERD and the

HRC in 2014 and 2018. Yet, despite this consistent international pressure, Japan has remained unmoved and taken no steps toward acknowledging the indigeneity of the Okinawans.

This reluctance is not solely due to geopolitical considerations, such as prioritizing the U.S. military presence over Okinawan land rights. It is also rooted in internal divisions among activist groups and limited grassroots support within Okinawa itself (McGrogan, 2010, p. 366; Yokota, 2015; Minami, 2018). Notably, there is no consensus among activists regarding the objectives tied to Indigenous recognition. For instance, while the AIPR focuses on reclaiming land occupied by U.S. military bases and securing specific cultural and educational rights, other groups – such as the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans – view recognition as the first step toward restoring full political independence for Okinawa (Minami 2018, pp. 18-19). Moreover, although successful on the international stage, these activists have struggled to connect with local communities and build a strong base of support, undermining their legitimacy as representatives of the Okinawan people.

Another significant obstacle is the limited understanding of international Indigenous rights frameworks and widespread misconceptions about the concept of *Indigenous people* within Japan. The term *Indigenous people* is translated into Japanese as *senjū minzoku*, an expression that often carries negative connotations, evoking images of primitive or underdeveloped societies. This linguistic and cultural disconnect has made many Okinawans hesitant to embrace the term and the associated cause for recognition (Uemura et al., 2013, pp. 153-154; Minami, 2018, 16-17). The ambiguity surrounding the concept has even fueled the rise of an Okinawan neo-nationalist countermovement opposed to pro-Indigenous activism (Nishiyama, 2023).

Ultimately, the Japanese government has capitalized on these divisions and ambiguities, arguing that the push for Indigenous recognition does not reflect the true will of the Okinawan people (e.g., Kikuzato, 2009). By framing the issue in this way, the government has found it easy to sideline the claims for indigeneity, deflecting international scrutiny while maintaining the situation unchanged.

12.4

The Long Shadow of Feudal Japan: The Complex Struggle of the Burakumin Between Discrimination, Assimilation, and Recognition

Unlike the Ainu and Okinawans, the Burakumin – literally, *people of the hamlets* – are not any sort of Indigenous population. They do not hail from a specific territory historically conquered by the Yamato Japanese, nor do they possess distinct racial features clearly differentiating them from the majority population. Rather, what sets the Burakumin apart is the deep-seated discrimination they have endured for centuries, rooted in their lineage and social status – a legacy of Japan’s historical caste system during the Tokugawa era. Although there are no official statistics, estimates of the Burakumin population range from one to six million people¹⁰³.

Burakumin are believed to be the descendants of those groups of people that, during the Tokugawa period, were referred to as *eta* (filthy/unclean) or *hinin* (non-human). These outcaste groups existed outside the rigid social hierarchy of the time and included those considered impure due to the nature of their work or physical conditions. This category encompassed individuals afflicted with leprosy, as well as those engaged in occupations considered tainted, such as butchery, leatherworking, or other tasks associated with death, as well as begging and street entertaining. Subjected to harsh regulations aimed at isolating them from mainstream society, these communities were often confined to segregated quarters on the fringes of towns and villages.

Although the Meiji reforms of the late 19th century abolished the official hierarchical social divisions, the stigma associated with the Burakumin persisted, continuing to marginalize them in education, employment, and marriage. Against this backdrop of enduring prejudice, a sense of collective identity began to coalesce within the Burakumin community during the Meiji era, giving rise to early anti-discrimination movements in the 1890s.

The movement rapidly gained traction, expanding from local to national levels. By 1922, Burakumin activists formed a prominent national organization, the *Suiheisha*, or *Levelers’ Association* – a name taking inspiration from England’s historic Leveller movement. The *Suiheisha Declaration*, issued in 1922, is often regarded as Japan’s first declaration of human rights, highlighting the movement’s significance and aspirations¹⁰⁴.

Alarmed by the growing momentum of Burakumin activism, the Japanese government responded with a series of programs starting in 1933 under the banner of *yūwa* (conciliation). However, these initiatives were ultimately rooted in a paternalistic narrative that attributed Burakumin exclusion to perceived deficiencies within the community – such as poverty, lack of hygiene, or low levels of education – rather than addressing the systemic discrimination they faced. Consequently, *yūwa* programs focused primarily on improving living conditions without confronting the deeper social

¹⁰³ <https://minorityrights.org/communities/burakumin-buraku-people/>.

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2002/03/declaration-of-human-rights-in-japan.html#:~:text=At%20the%20founding%20assembly%20of,issued%20by%20a%20social%20movement.>

injustices. This governmental approach sparked intense debate within the Suiheisha, polarizing members into those who rejected the programs as palliative measures that masked true inequities and those who saw them as an opportunity to gain leverage for the movement.

After World War II, Japan's new Constitution, with its emphasis on human rights, provided a critical foundation for Burakumin activists to combat discrimination and push for affirmative action (McCormack, 2018). Several constitutional provisions explicitly prohibit discrimination (Articles 11, 13, 14), with Article 14 specifically banning discrimination based on "social status or family origin." It is believed that this clause was included due to lobbying efforts by Burakumin representatives in the Socialist Party (Masumi, 2009, pp. 20-21). Additionally, the Constitution guarantees the right to "minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living" (Article 25), equal educational opportunities (Article 26), and fair employment (Articles 22, 27).

Activists effectively demonstrated that these rights were systematically denied to Burakumin communities. During the postwar period, many Buraku neighborhoods were haphazardly reconstructed, often left out of formal urban redevelopment plans, leaving these areas with deplorable living conditions and substandard infrastructure (Yamagishi & Sato, 2022). Discriminatory practices, such as background checks by schools and employers, remained commonplace, further entrenching educational and employment disparities between Burakumin and the general population. These patterns of exclusion were starkly reflected in national statistics, which consistently showed that Burakumin residents lagged significantly behind in educational attainment and job placement compared to the rest of the country.

Several factors, both political and economic, drove the Japanese government to address the Burakumin issue through affirmative action measures. The rapid economic growth of the postwar period provided the state with ample financial resources, while accelerating urbanization created a need for large-scale infrastructure planning and improvements in education and employment in urban areas. Additionally, the government faced a unique political challenge: the Burakumin movement, led by the National Committee for Burakumin Liberation (NCBL), positioned itself within the broader framework of working-class struggles and formed alliances with the emergent Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). This alignment posed a significant threat to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which feared the rise of a unified front capable of disrupting its political dominance and pushing for radical reforms (McCormack, 2018).

To counter this, the government revived its earlier *yūwa* programs under a new label: *dōwa* (harmonious assimilation). In 1969, the *Dōwa Projects Special Measures Law* was enacted as a ten-year initiative, later extended multiple times before being replaced by the *Regional Improvement Projects Special Measures Law* in 1982. These *dōwa* programs provided substantial funding for joint

national and local initiatives aimed at raising living standards in Buraku areas and bridging educational and employment gaps between Burakumin and the national average.

However, once again, the *dōwa* programs sparked division within the Burakumin movement. Some activists viewed the initiatives as a significant opportunity to elevate their communities, while others criticized them as reinforcing differences between Burakumin and mainstream society, thus hindering true integration. A radical minority argued that *dōwa* was simply a government strategy to control the movement and undermine broader struggles against the oppression of all marginalized groups, framing it as a class-based conflict under communist ideologies.

Despite these internal tensions, the three major national Burakumin organizations – the Buraku Liberation League (BLL), affiliated with the JSP; the National Federation of Buraku Liberation Movements (NFBLM), aligned with the JCP; and the All-Japan Assimilation Association, linked to the LDP – ultimately collaborated with the government to implement the *dōwa* measures. Notably, because the national policy did not clearly define *who* qualified for the programs, the task of designating Buraku areas and identifying Burakumin residents fell to these organizations in coordination with local authorities (Okuda & Murai, 2008, p. 72; McCormack, 2018).

By the late 1990s, reports indicated that the *dōwa* programs had effectively reduced the disparities between Burakumin and the national average in terms of living conditions, education, and employment (McCormack, 2018). This progress led the government to declare the Burakumin issue resolved, ending the *dōwa* programs in 2002. As a result, many branches of the Burakumin movement, whose primary role had been to facilitate these government initiatives, dissolved, significantly weakening grassroots participation and diminishing the movement's political influence (Fudesaka & Miyazaki, 2010, pp. 14-15; Tanba, 2014, pp. 51-53).

Unfortunately, while the statistical gaps may have narrowed, discrimination against Burakumin did not disappear. Cases of prejudice, particularly in employment and marriage, continued to be reported, and many individuals still concealed their Buraku heritage due to fear of social stigma (see, for example, Saitō, 2014; Kyōto City, 2015; Kamikawa, 2016). Ironically, the official interventions to address Burakumin discrimination inadvertently created a social taboo around the very term *Burakumin*, making it almost unmentionable in public discourse. This taboo has, in turn, fueled misperceptions and stereotypes that are disconnected from the modern reality of Buraku communities (McCormack, 2018, 18).

Despite these challenges, Burakumin activists – particularly those in the BLL – continued their advocacy, situating the Burakumin cause within the broader struggle against all forms of discrimination. They strengthened alliances with other minority groups in Japan and embraced the ideal of creating a “Suiheisha for the whole world” (Kaiho Shimbun, 1995, pp. 9-10).

One of the BLL's key contributions was the founding of the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR), which gained official NGO status from the United Nations in 1993. The BLL played a crucial role in pressuring the Japanese government to ratify the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1995.

The BLL has also actively campaigned to break the social silence surrounding the Burakumin issue, advocating for the official recognition of a *Buraku ethnicity* (Toshiyuki, 2004, pp. 164-168). This effort has included establishing visible markers in Buraku neighborhoods, such as memorial statues, museums, and Liberation Halls (Bondy, 2010, pp. 104-109), as well as promoting the concept of a distinct "Burakumin culture" (Ōta, 2006), expressed through performing arts, drum-making traditions, and culinary practices.

In recent years, these efforts, along with strategic connections with prominent LDP figures like Nikai Toshihiro (McCormack, 2018, pp. 20), culminated in the passage of the 2016 *Law for the Promotion of the Elimination of Buraku Discrimination*. Yet, the law's enactment reignited tensions within the movement. Some activists opposed it as a counterproductive measure that risks reinforcing divisions between Burakumin and non-Burakumin, while others – particularly those who do not wish to identify with the Burakumin label – argue that maintaining this identity perpetuates social stigma and prevents the group from achieving true equality.

12.5

The Earliest Foreigners in Japan: The Zainichi

Japan's history has been deeply intertwined with its neighbors China and Korea since ancient times. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was through these early exchanges that Japan adopted its written language, embraced Buddhism, and absorbed core elements of its bureaucracy, architecture, and urban planning – elements that later became integral to what is considered traditionally Japanese (Section 11.1, pp. 332-333). When considering these cultural, diplomatic, and commercial interactions from a contemporary perspective, it is easy to overlook the *physical* dimension involved in these transactions. Yet, in a world without our modern communication technologies, all such

exchanges implied the movement of people – individuals who sometimes settled far from their homeland, establishing new lives in foreign territories.

One of the earliest encounters between the indigenous peoples of the Japanese archipelago and foreign populations dates back to around the 3rd century BCE when increasing numbers of migrants began arriving from continental Asia, particularly from the Korean Peninsula. Many of these migrants were refugees, fleeing the conflicts and upheavals brought on by the expansion of the Chinese Empire and rivalries among Korean kingdoms. Among them were the Yayoi people, originally from the Korean Peninsula, whose Japonic language significantly influenced the development of early Japanese.

Of course, these interactions were not always peaceful. Hostilities between Japan and China can be traced back to ancient times, most notably during the Battle of Baekgang in 663 CE, which ended in a decisive defeat for Japan. For centuries, piracy plagued the waters between Japan, Korea, and China, with raiders pillaging coastal settlements and attacking ships. The relationship turned even more tumultuous during Japan's failed invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597, and it reached its peak during the aggressive colonial expansion of Imperial Japan, which extended its reach into Korea, Taiwan, and parts of China and Manchuria. Given this complex history, it is unsurprising that communities of Chinese and Korean origin have been present in Japan long before the wave of contemporary international migrations.

While the Tokugawa shogunate either assimilated or expelled many of the early Chinese and Korean settlers during its isolationist period, a notable exception was the established Chinese community in Nagasaki, which managed to endure (Uchida 1949). However, with the dawn of the Meiji era and Japan's imperial ambitions, new waves of Chinese and Korean communities began to form, some of which persisted through the turbulent postwar years and remain in Japan today. These longstanding communities, known as *Zainichi* (literally, residing in Japan) Chinese and Koreans, differ in many respects from the more recent arrivals who began migrating to Japan in greater numbers toward the end of the 20th century.

Following the end of *sakoku* – Japan's long period of self-imposed isolation –, Chinese merchants began to flood Japanese port cities, initially serving as intermediaries between Western and Japanese businesses. Over time, these merchants established themselves as prominent figures in trade, eventually monopolizing the commerce between Japan and China (Vasishth, 1997). Around these thriving commercial hubs, Chinese communities began to develop, many of which have since evolved into Japan's vibrant modern-day Chinatowns. In addition to trade, Chinese migrants expanded into various service industries such as restaurants, barbershops, and textile workshops. Their cultural

influence was profound, particularly in the culinary domain, where Chinese cuisine integrated with Japanese tastes to create the now popular Japanese-Chinese fusion known as *Chūka*.

Of the diverse groups of Chinese migrants who made Japan their home in the early 20th century, Chinese students were among the most numerous, contributing significantly to the cultural and intellectual exchange between the two nations. However, darker chapters were also written: with Japan's entry into World War II, many Chinese – particularly those from occupied Manchuria – were forcibly brought to Japan as laborers for its war industries.

The postwar experiences of Zainichi Koreans – those Koreans who remained in Japan after World War II – differed significantly from their Zainichi Chinese counterparts. While the Chinese community in Japan remained relatively small and less politically active, the Zainichi Koreans emerged as a prominent and vocal minority group, actively reshaping their identity and advocating for their rights in a highly centralized and assimilationist society.

The origins of the Zainichi Korean community date back to Japan's formal annexation of Korea in 1910. As colonial subjects, Koreans were granted limited rights to travel and work within the Japanese Empire, which led to a steady influx of Korean migrants. This migration increased significantly during the rapid industrialization that followed Japan's entry into World War I, as the demand for low-cost labor surged. Excluded from the mainstream housing market, many Korean laborers were concentrated in substandard tenements near factories or confined to makeshift work camps operated by employers. Their status as migratory labor also hindered union membership, further isolating them socially and economically. By 1945, approximately two million Koreans resided in Japan, and around 600,000 chose to stay after the war's end (Weiner, 2009).

The *Treaty of San Francisco* in 1952 brought significant upheaval for Zainichi Koreans. With Japan officially relinquishing its colonial claims over Korea, the Korean residents in Japan, who had been considered Japanese nationals – albeit with a subordinate status – suddenly lost their citizenship. Deprived of basic rights and left in a precarious legal limbo, Zainichi Koreans faced the constant threat of deportation.

This profound shift galvanized a strong sense of group identity and solidarity, prompting the establishment of networks and organizations dedicated to advocating for their rights. Because the discrimination they faced was rooted in Japan's colonial legacy, the Zainichi Koreans became key players in the emergence of postcolonial discourse, pushing for the recognition of their human and civil rights as part of a broader struggle against the remnants of colonial oppression in Japanese society (see, for example, Chapman, 2007).

The outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953) and the subsequent division of Korea into a communist North and capitalist South further deepened the political engagement of the Zainichi

Korean community. Numerous organizations were formed, reflecting the ideological split of the Korean Peninsula, and two dominant factions eventually emerged: the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (*Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai*), or *Sōren*, aligned with North Korea, and the Korean Residents Union in Japan (*Zai-Nihon Daikan Kyōryū Mindan*), or simply *Mindan*, associated with South Korea.

The polarization between these groups, along with internal divisions, intensified as residency rights for Zainichi Koreans became a contentious issue during the negotiations of the 1965 *Normalization Treaty* between South Korea and Japan. The treaty granted *special permanent resident (tokubetsu eijusha)* status to Zainichi Koreans with South Korean nationality, giving them access to some social benefits, public education, and healthcare services. However, the *Sōren* vehemently opposed the treaty, condemning it as discriminatory against Zainichi North Koreans. Simultaneously, within both the *Sōren* and *Mindan*, divisions deepened between those who viewed the treaty as a step toward gaining civil rights and political representation, and those who saw it as a tactic to assimilate Koreans into Japanese society, thereby undermining their identity as an ethnic minority.

These divisions grew sharper in the 1970s, as generational differences emerged. While the first generation of Zainichi Koreans remained wary of any concession that did not explicitly recognize their status as an ethnic minority, younger generations – second and third-generation Zainichi Koreans – were more focused on achieving equal rights, even if it meant softening the emphasis on their distinct Korean heritage (Chapman, 2004).

Young activists engaged in a process of *generational change (sedai kotai)*, replacing the first-generation leadership and advocating for a new narrative, shifting from the perception of Zainichi Koreans as a displaced diaspora at risk of assimilation to that of a permanent Japanese minority capable of contributing to Japanese society. They sought to break free from the dualistic framework of their elders, which defined the Zainichi identity as either fully assimilating into Japanese culture or clinging to an anti-Japanese, nationalist stance. Instead, they proposed a “Third Way” (Tong-Myung, 1999), one that recognized their unique identity and experiences as integral to the multicultural fabric of Japan.

By the early 1980s, the generational change within Zainichi Korean communities had succeeded in unifying various factions into a cohesive movement centered on the demand for equal civil rights. This newfound solidarity enabled Zainichi organizations to emerge as influential players at both the local and national levels. Nationwide campaigns advocating for political representation, equal access to welfare, and public service employment quickly gained momentum.

One landmark struggle in this context was the battle against the mandatory fingerprinting imposed on all foreign residents, including Zainichi Koreans, since the end of World War II. The movement

took off in 1980, sparked by an act of civil disobedience by Zainichi Korean Jong-seok Han, who refused to be fingerprinted at the Shinjuku Ward Office in Tōkyō. This defiant act ignited a nationwide protest that ultimately culminated in the complete abolition of fingerprinting in 1999 (for details, see Nakamura, 2005).

Crucially, as the fingerprinting issue affected all foreign residents in Japan, the Zainichi movement garnered the support of pro-migrant and migrant-led organizations. This collective struggle forged strong networks of cooperation between Zainichi Koreans and other migrant communities, establishing Zainichi groups – who, unlike many newcomers, did not face language barriers and possessed in-depth knowledge of Japanese laws and bureaucratic systems – as key advocates for the rights of foreign residents in Japan.

Another major focus of Zainichi activism has been the fight for political representation for permanent residents. Guided by the principle famously encapsulated in the slogan *No taxation without representation*, Zainichi Koreans have long pointed out the contradiction inherent in requiring permanent residents to pay taxes without granting them voting rights.

In 1995, in response to mounting pressure from Zainichi activists, the Supreme Court ruled that the Japanese Constitution does not explicitly prohibit local voting rights for non-citizens. This ruling, while not binding, opened the door for some municipalities to establish mechanisms for foreign residents' participation. Mostly in response to Zainichi Korean activists' pressures, some municipalities, via local ordinances, have been occasionally setting up spaces and mechanisms – such as consultive bodies or local referendums – to allow the inclusion of foreign residents in local policymaking.

However, these measures have been sporadic and limited in scope, never extending to the prefectural level or enshrined in national legislation. Ultimately, decision to recognize any form of local political representation for foreign residents remains entirely at the discretion of individual municipalities. This leaves non-citizens, including Zainichi Koreans who have not naturalized, with only one official route to political participation: obtaining Japanese nationality – a process that is notoriously complex and requires applicants to relinquish their original citizenship.

For many Zainichi Koreans, giving up Korean nationality is seen as an unacceptable concession to assimilation, making naturalization a deeply contentious issue. In recent years, Zainichi organizations have focused their efforts on advocating for a revision of the rigid nexus between nationality and citizenship enshrined in the Japanese Constitution, aiming to decouple political representation from the strict confines of nationality.

12.6

Children of Discrimination: The Hāfu

The Japanese term *Hāfu*, derived from the English word *half*, emerged in the 1960s as a way to describe children of mixed parentage, where one parent is Japanese and the other is not. The very existence of this label underscores a broader societal bias rooted in notions of racial purity and national identity. While differences in appearance or cultural background can influence the nature and intensity of discrimination, the only defining element of the Hāfu identity is the perceived impurity of not being fully Japanese. Unlike other Japanese minority groups, Hāfu identity does not arise from a shared community experience; rather, it is shaped primarily by a common experience of exclusion and prejudice.

Accurately determining the number of Hāfu currently living in Japan is challenging. However, birth records offer some insight: since 1987, around 1.5% of all newborns in Japan – approximately 15,000 children annually – have been born to mixed couples (Kokuritsu Shakai Hoshō Jinkōmondai Kenkyūjo, 2022). This suggests a Hāfu population somewhere between 400,000 and 800,000.

Although mixed parentage is not a new phenomenon in Japan, it remained relatively rare until the end of World War II, primarily involving children of high-status families, such as missionaries, business leaders, and scholars (Fish, 2009). Due to their small number and high social status, these early Hāfu did not attract much attention from the general public.

However, after the war and during the Allied occupation, the number of Hāfu surged, particularly in prefectures with large military bases like Kanagawa. This increase coincided with a shift in perception. Beyond the broader ideal of racial purity, several factors contributed to the stigmatization of Hāfu. Their presence became associated with the occupying forces – linked in the public mind to the trauma and destruction of the war. Moreover, many of these children were born out of wedlock – a condition heavily stigmatized in Japanese society – and were often raised in single-parent households from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Yamashiro, 2017, pp. 65-66). The government took note of the Hāfu issue as early as the 1950s, initiating campaigns to encourage their integration into public schools (Fish, 2009). Nevertheless, these children faced enduring social marginalization and prejudice.

As Japan gradually embraced a more global outlook and international migration increased, the Hāfu identity diversified, and public perceptions began to evolve. Hāfu were no longer seen merely as symbols of military occupation or single-parent households but began to be celebrated in certain contexts, particularly in the realms of fashion and entertainment, as symbols of beauty and modernity (e.g., Murphy-Shigematsu, 2001; Sato, 2009). A turning point came in 2015, when Ariana Miyamoto – born to an African-American father and a Japanese mother – was crowned Miss Universe Japan, showcasing a more inclusive image of Hāfu in Japanese media.

Despite these positive shifts, Hāfu continue to grapple with a duality in their public portrayal. They are simultaneously celebrated as cultural icons and yet often perceived as perpetual outsiders, with their *non-pure-Japaneseness* still marking them as different (Dooley, 2018). This complexity is thoughtfully captured in the documentary *Hafu: The Mixed-Race Experience in Japan* (Perez Takagi & Nishikura, 2013), which explores the nuanced realities of living as Hāfu in contemporary Japan.

Today, the Hāfu experience is influenced by a range of factors, including gender, socioeconomic status, and the national or racial background of the non-Japanese parent. In particular, the legacy of Western anti-Black racism has influenced attitudes in Japan, making skin color a significant factor in shaping the experiences of black and white Hāfu (Russell, 2009; Houston, 2017).

Regardless of these intersecting factors, Hāfu often struggle to be accepted as fully Japanese. As Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu poignantly puts it, “Whether denigrating or worshipping, the person labeled as ‘hafu’ is vulnerable to being seen as different, making it difficult for them to be treated as individuals or as ordinary Japanese” (Murphy-Shigematsu, 2000, 214). This sentiment was echoed by a Hāfu woman in an interview: “We’re not upset that we’re hafu; we’re upset that people think we’re different [...] I’d just prefer not to be called anything” (Interview in Jozuka & Jones, 2020).

12.7

Returnees in their Homeland or Japan’s First International Immigrants? History and Challenges of the Nikkeijin

It is fair to say that, at least until the 1970s, Japan was not a land for immigrants. Even after the end of *sakoku* – the isolationist policy that characterized the Tokugawa shogunate – and the onset of

industrialization, the country relied primarily on internal migration to meet its labor needs. These demands were typically filled by workers from Japan's extensive rural areas, with the only major exceptions being the forced laborers brought in from its colonies during wartime. Thus, in terms of international migration, Japan was historically a country of emigrants, sending low-wage labor abroad rather than receiving it.

Japanese emigration began in earnest during the Meiji era (1868-1912), a period marked by profound social transformations and the government's aggressive push for modernization. The Meiji government sought to rapidly industrialize and strengthen Japan's economic and military power, leading to significant social upheaval. The resulting urbanization triggered a dramatic exodus from rural areas, as large numbers of people moved to cities in search of better opportunities. However, this rapid shift also led to overpopulation and economic hardships in urban centers, compelling many Japanese – especially those from rural areas who struggled to find stable employment – to seek livelihoods overseas (Yamanaka, 1993).

The first significant wave of Japanese emigrants headed to Hawaii and the mainland United States. In 1868, about 150 Japanese contract laborers arrived in Hawaii to work on sugar plantations (Niiya, 1993). These migrants, who inaugurated Japan's labor emigration era, were later known as the *Gannenmono* (First-Year Men), a name referring both to their status as pioneers and to the fact that they left during the first year of Emperor Meiji's reign. Migration to the U.S. mainland soon followed, with many settling along the West Coast. Despite facing harsh working conditions and widespread discrimination, these early migrants laid the foundations for enduring Japanese communities abroad.

By the early 20th century, anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States had reached a boiling point, fueled by the racist *Yellow Peril* rhetoric, which cast Asians as an existential threat to Western civilization (Odijie, 2017). Japan's victory over the Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) further inflamed these fears. The war was seen as proof of the growing power of Asian nations, which many in the West viewed as a direct challenge to their global supremacy.

In response, discriminatory policies targeting Japanese immigrants proliferated. In 1906, California imposed legislation requiring children of Japanese descent to attend racially segregated schools. This provision was eventually rescinded in 1907, when Japan agreed not to issue passports to laborers emigrating to the United States, except for certain categories of businessmen and professionals – a pact known as the U.S.-Japanese Gentlemen's Agreement. Tensions continued to escalate, and by 1924, the United States passed the Immigration Act, which banned all Japanese immigrants from entering the country.

With doors closing in the United States, Japanese emigrants began looking elsewhere, particularly to Latin America, where opportunities seemed more accessible. This shift was actively encouraged

by recruitment campaigns from countries like Peru and Brazil, both of which were eager to attract new labor for their growing agricultural sectors (Masterson & Funada-Classsen, 2004; Endoh, 2009).

Peru was already renowned as the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with Japan as early as 1873, and the first group of Japanese immigrants arrived there in 1899 to work on coastal plantations (Takenaka, 2004). By the 1930s, the Japanese community in Peru had grown significantly, with many transitioning from agricultural labor to urban areas, where they engaged in commerce and established small businesses.

However, it was Brazil that soon emerged as the primary destination for Japanese emigrants. Following the abolition of slavery in 1888, Brazil's coffee plantations were in desperate need of workers. In 1908, the first group of 781 Japanese immigrants arrived in Santos aboard the *Kasato Maru* (Lesser, 1999). Between 1908 and 1941, around 190,000 Japanese migrated to Brazil, making it home to the largest community of Japanese emigrants (Tsuda, 2003). From Brazil, Japanese migrants spread to other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, creating enduring communities across the continent.

Japanese immigrants in Latin America faced numerous challenges, including language barriers, cultural differences, and exploitation by employers. Many contracts promised fair wages and working conditions, but the reality was often harsh. In Brazil, laborers faced grueling work on plantations with little support (Lesser, 1999). Discrimination and xenophobia were common, exacerbated by the economic depression, rising nationalism in the 1930s, and, finally, the outbreak of World War II.

Despite challenges, these migrant communities began to establish themselves, building schools, cultural organizations, and businesses. They maintained the Japanese language and traditions while adapting to their new environments. Notably, in Peru, Japanese immigrants became prominent in retail and services, with some ascending to significant economic positions. In Brazil, Japanese immigrants contributed to the development of agriculture, introducing crops like tea and improving cultivation methods (Masterson & Funada-Classsen, 2004). However, their achievements often aroused suspicion and led to increased scrutiny, especially during periods of economic hardship or political instability.

Japan's postwar economic boom marked a pivotal turning point in the nation's migration history, signaling the end of its era as a major source of emigrants and its transformation into an immigration country. The nation's rapid economic growth not only made it an increasingly appealing destination for international migrants but also generated dramatic labor demands, particularly in sectors that involved so-called 3K jobs – *kitanai* (dirty), *kiken* (dangerous), and *kitsui* (demanding). Despite the mounting pressure to address these shortages, the Japanese government remained staunchly resistant to opening its doors to large-scale international migration. In particular, the exclusion of low-skilled

foreign workers became a cornerstone of Japan's immigration policy – a stance that continues to shape the country's approach to immigration today (Yamanaka, 1993; Cornelius, 1994; Weiner & Hanami, 1998; Komine, 2014).

However, as the labor demands could no longer be met by dwindling supplies from rural areas – already decimated by decades of urbanization – the rigidity of Japan's immigration policies inevitably led to a rise in illegal migration from labor-exporting countries, particularly from China, Korea, and South Asia. Faced with this growing issue and the urgent need to address labor shortages, the Japanese government finally began revising its immigration policies in the late 1980s, culminating in the enactment of the *Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act* in 1990.

Although this new framework marked a shift in policy, it remained one of the most restrictive immigration laws among advanced industrialized nations. While creating limited opportunities for high-skilled migrants, it continued to shut out low-skilled foreign workers, except for one notable exception: the Nikkeijin, or *people of Japanese descent*.

The Nikkeijin, encompassing the descendants of Japanese emigrants up to the third generation, were granted renewable, quasi-permanent residence status under the 1990 law, allowing them to work in Japan without restriction. This policy was deeply rooted in ethnic and racial ideologies, reflecting a desire to continue the established tradition of meeting labor shortages by relying on individuals who were regarded – at least ethnically – as Japanese. However, the outcome did not quite align with the government's plans.

Naturally, the immediate result of this policy shift was, as expected, an influx of hundreds of thousands of Nikkeijin migrants, predominantly from Brazil – a country that was, coincidentally, grappling with a severe economic crisis at the time (Tsuda, 1999). Yet, the Japanese government's assumption that shared ancestry would equate to cultural compatibility quickly unraveled. Apart from some superficial physical similarities, most Nikkeijin were culturally and linguistically distinct Brazilians, Peruvians, or Argentinians, who bore little resemblance to the idealized image of long-lost compatriots. Instead of the expected overseas Japanese nationals returning to their ancestral homeland, Japan found itself confronted with hundreds of thousands of Latin American quasi-permanent residents who fundamentally challenged traditional assumptions about Japanese identity and ethnicity (Tsuda, 2003).

For the Nikkeijin themselves, the reality of migration proved equally disheartening. Many had maintained strong identity bonds with Japan while living abroad, where their somatic features often marked them as different from the majority non-Asian populations of their countries of birth. For decades, they had been recognized – and, in turn, had self-identified – as Japanese. Starting from the 1970s, Japan's rapid economic growth fueled a sense of nationalist pride within overseas

communities, reinforcing Nikkeijin's desire to connect with their ancestral homeland. However, upon arriving in Japan, they were not welcomed as long-lost relatives returning home.

Instead, due to their unfamiliarity with Japanese customs, language, and work culture, they were labeled as foreigners and treated as outsiders. As low-skilled workers, they were relegated to precarious jobs in sectors such as manufacturing and construction, often facing long hours, low wages, and little job security (Yamanaka, 1993). Their status as quasi-permanent residents offered scant protection against exploitation, and their lack of fluency in Japanese made them easy targets for discrimination. Many employers took advantage of their vulnerable position, failing to uphold labor rights and leaving the Nikkeijin isolated and disillusioned.

The situation was exacerbated by the government's initial failure to implement integration policies, making it extremely difficult for the Nikkeijin to navigate their new environment. Despite their quasi-permanent residence status, the absence of linguistic and cultural support left them struggling to settle in a country that regarded them with suspicion. Disheartened, many eventually decided to abandon their migration dream and return to their countries of birth, disillusioned by the harsh reality of life in Japan.

Nevertheless, over time, those Nikkeijin remaining in Japan began to establish support networks, forming organizations that provided language classes, cultural activities, and legal assistance. These groups played a pivotal role in helping other freshly arrived Nikkeijin navigate life in Japan and advocate for their rights. These groups have played a crucial role in helping Nikkeijin navigate life in Japan and advocate for their rights and recognition against discrimination (Yamanaka, 2000).

As more Nikkeijin learned the language and adapted to Japanese society, many naturalized as full citizens. The second generation, born and raised in Japan, often fully assimilated into the mainstream or grew up in an increasingly multicultural society, experiencing far less marginalization (e.g., Watanabe, 1995, p. 56; Yamashita 2001, p. 90). They enjoy a relatively privileged status compared to other minorities due to their mostly Japanese appearance, mastery of the language and culture, and citizenship status.

However, the memory of the harsh discrimination faced in the 1990s – still far from being entirely eradicated – has made Nikkeijin, especially the newer generations, prominent voices in Japan's ongoing debate on migration and diversity governance. Their experiences underscore the complex realities of identity, belonging, and the struggles inherent in navigating a society that is grappling with its own perceptions of homogeneity and multiculturalism.

The Slow Opening of Japan's Doors: The Era of International Migration to Japan

With the only exception of the Nikkeijin, Japan was determined to keep its doors firmly closed to immigration. The government has consistently upheld its foundational migration principle: no foreign immigrants – especially no low-skilled foreign immigrants – and, until recently, it showed little inclination to reverse this stance.

The first notable shift in Japan's migration governance occurred during the 1970s under rather problematic circumstances. This era saw, first of all, an influx of women from other Asian countries recruited into Japan's domestic sex industry. Shortly thereafter, following the end of the Vietnam War (1955–1975), Japan began accepting Indochinese refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, ultimately granting asylum to about 10,000 individuals.

This initial foray into humanitarian migration – notably intertwined with Japan's strategic aim to enhance its international reputation – culminated in Japan's ratification of the UN Refugee Convention in 1981 (Kondo, 2002). The commitment to international standards necessitated a series of reforms in social security laws concerning the treatment of foreign residents, laying the groundwork for the first modifications to Japan's notoriously restrictive immigration policies.

By the 1980s, confronted with mounting labor demands from its rapidly growing economy, Japan began experimenting with bilateral visa waivers, signing agreements with several Asian and Middle Eastern countries, including Bangladesh, Iran, and Pakistan. However, these measures did not signal a departure from Japan's closed-door policy. Officially, they only allowed for short-term stays – many of which evolved into illegal overstays.

While the *front door* of Japan's immigration policy remained firmly locked, a few *side doors* began to open following the 1990 immigration law revisions, allowing for the controlled entry of foreign workers to fill essential labor gaps. The first of these was a professional visa category linked to the entertainment industry, which primarily was utilized to continue the recruitment of women for Japan's ever-growing sex industry. The second pathway came through student visas, which were sponsored by educational institutions. This led to a surge in language schools that, while ostensibly focused on education, became de facto expensive entry channels for migrants. However, the most significant and enduring side door for low-skilled foreign labor has been through trainee programs.

In 1993, the government introduced the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). Officially, the program was designed to contribute to global development by transferring skills to workers from developing countries. However, the TITP also served a more immediate purpose: securing a steady flow of cheap labor to address Japan's shortages in less desirable sectors. In practice, the TITP allowed small- and mid-sized companies to hire low-skilled foreign workers under temporary trainee visas. Predictably, the program has been widely criticized for being exploited as a source of inexpensive labor and for perpetuating significant rights violations (Komai, 1992; Oishi, 1995; Piyada, 2021). Additionally, due to the high demand for low-skilled labor, many workers were incentivized to overstay their visas and continue working illegally.

Despite escalating demand for low-skilled migrant workers and the growing issue of undocumented laborers – raising serious human rights concerns – Japan's approach remained largely unchanged for nearly two decades. The first signs of policy evolution appeared in 2009 with the enactment of the *Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act*, which replaced the old alien registration system based on an *alien registration card* (*gaikokujin tōrokusho*) issued by local authorities with a new system based on a *resident card* (*zairyū kādo*) issued by the central government.

Another shift came in 2012 when the government introduced a point-based system aimed at attracting high-skilled foreign professionals. However, this reform did not address the needs of low-skilled migrants. Instead, it focused on providing incentives to high-skilled professionals, offering advantageous settlement conditions to attract them. Yet, the number of high-skilled applicants remained significantly lower than expected.

Until 2018, the only concessions made for low-skilled workers were incremental adjustments to the TITP: in 2016, the government expanded the range of sectors eligible under the program, and in 2017, it extended the maximum training period from three to five years. Finally, in 2018, the government yielded to pressure and introduced a significant revision to the point-based system, establishing new visa categories for medium-skilled foreign workers.

Implemented in 2019, the new system represented a departure from Japan's traditional bifurcation between high- and low-skilled migrants. It introduced two categories for *medium-skilled* workers. The first category, *Specified Skilled Worker 1* (SSW1), allows temporary stays of up to five years but prohibits family accompaniment. The second, *Specified Skilled Worker 2* (SSW2), permits unlimited visa renewals and family reunification, offering a potential pathway to permanent residency and even citizenship.

This new medium-skilled visa system, however, is closely linked with the Technical Intern Training Program, and many of its controversial mechanisms seem poised to persist. The SSW1 category, in particular, enables TITP participants to transition into medium-skilled positions,

potentially replicating the same exploitative dynamics. While SSW1 workers can extend their stay to a maximum of 10 years, they are still prohibited from bringing their families, severely limiting their ability to integrate into Japanese society. The stated rationale behind this policy is to recognize the skills acquired by trainees during their five-year training period, thereby justifying their eligibility for specific working visas (Tarumoto, 2018). This measure, however, seems more like a strategic way to uphold the long-standing principle of not accepting low-skilled laborers while providing new incentives for enduring the often-problematic trainee process.

At the beginning of 2024, the government announced its intention to abolish the current Technical Intern Training Program altogether. The proposed legal revision aims to establish a new training and employment system designed to offer a more transparent and secure immigration pathway for low-skilled foreign workers (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2024).

As of 2023, according to official statistics, Japan is home to 3,223,858 foreign residents—representing 2.6% of the total population—hailing from over 21 different countries (Minister of Justice, 2024). The largest groups, each exceeding 100,000 people, are, in descending order: Chinese (including Zainichi), Vietnamese, Koreans (including Zainichi), Filipinos, and Brazilians.

CHAPTER 13

Contextualizing the Emergence and Diffusion of *Tabunka Kyosei*

13.1

The Invention of Homogeneous Japan

In 1986, when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone declared that Japan was a nation of “one ethnicity, one state, and one language,” he was not casually voicing a mere personal belief. Rather, he was articulating ideas that had been vigorously propagated by a genre of literature and academic discourse that became particularly popular between the 1970s and 1980s: the *Nihonjinron*, or *theories of the Japanese people* (see Dale, 1986; Yoshino, 1992; Weiner, 1997; Morris-Suzuki, 1997, pp. 110-160; Sugimoto, 1999; Befu, 2001; Oguma, 2002). Encompassing works across fields such as sociology, psychology, history, and anthropology, *Nihonjinron* emphasized Japan's supposed cultural and ethnic homogeneity, positing this uniqueness as the foundation of the nation's identity (e.g., Masuda, 1967; Ishida, 1974; Reischauer, 1988; Ueyama, 1990; Kawakatsu, 1991).

The historical roots of *Nihonjinron* stretch back to the Meiji era when Japan underwent rapid modernization and state-led nation-building. In this period, intellectuals and policymakers sought to craft a coherent narrative of *Japaneseness* that could unite a newly formed nation-state. Influenced by Western theories of race and ethnicity, many of these early voices framed Japanese culture and the Japanese race as exceptional and superior, promoting the idea that Japan had a unique role in leading Asia toward civilization and progress.

However, it was only after World War II that *Nihonjinron* truly flourished as a genre, reflecting and responding to Japan's postwar social, economic, and political environment. In the aftermath of defeat and occupation, Japan's sense of national identity was severely shaken. The nation had not only lost the war but had also experienced the humiliation of occupation and the enforced rewriting of its political and cultural narratives. *Nihonjinron* emerged as a phenomenon that expressed the need

to restore national pride and self-confidence by emphasizing Japan's distinctiveness and reconstructing a new image of the nation – one that was modern, economically powerful, and yet culturally non-Western. As such, it became a tool for reasserting Japan's identity in contrast to the overwhelming influence of the West, asserting the uniqueness of Japanese society and people.

The popularity of *Nihonjinron* was also closely tied to Japan's complex relationship with globalization. As Japan became increasingly integrated into the global economy, the need to preserve a distinct national identity grew stronger. Thus, *Nihonjinron* served as both a cultural defense against external influences and a means of articulating Japan's place in the international order. It allowed Japanese intellectuals and policymakers to portray Japan as a country that had successfully modernized while maintaining a unique, unbroken cultural essence.

Furthermore, *Nihonjinron* helped consolidate Japan's transformation from an extremely hierarchical society – characterized by the feudal structures of the Tokugawa shogunate and, later, by the military order of the Japanese Empire – into a seemingly horizontal, democratic society of *salarymen*. This narrative positioned Japan as a cohesive, unified nation that embodied democratic and capitalist values, capable of serving as a model for the rest of Asia. Ironically, this vision harked back to prewar imperial rhetoric of Japan as a *family-nation* (*kazoku kokka*), albeit without the emperor's divine status as the nation's *father*.

By the 1970s, *Nihonjinron* reached its peak, coinciding with Japan's emergence as an economic superpower. Texts proliferated, largely focusing on themes related to the so-called *nihon bunkaron* (theories of Japanese culture), highlighting qualities such as harmony, social conformity, and prioritizing group interests over individualism. These characteristics were often juxtaposed against the supposed Western traits of individualism and rationality, thereby reinforcing a sense of Japanese exceptionalism.

Interestingly, the genre's influence extended beyond Japanese intellectual and political circles. Western academics and journalists also contributed to shaping the perception of Japan as an enigmatic and exceptional society. A prominent example is Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* (1979), which portrayed Japan's social systems and business practices as models for the world to emulate, thereby reinforcing the ideas of Japanese distinctiveness.

As Japan's postwar economic boom began to decelerate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the *Nihonjinron* narrative evolved to serve a new political function. It was employed to maintain social stability and order, promoting a vision of a harmonious mono-ethnic society (*tan'itsu minzoku shakai*) that could withstand adversity due to its unique cultural attributes. This was precisely the period when Nakasone and other high-ranking officials amplified these narratives, giving voice to an ideal of mono-ethnic and mono-cultural pacifism that resonated with the public during times of uncertainty.

What is most remarkable is not only the rapid spread of this narrative but also its enduring impact. Despite being a recent postwar construct, the myth of Japanese homogeneity became deeply ingrained in Japan's domestic rhetoric and international image. Even after being systematically deconstructed by scholars in the context of the cultural turn – when the flaws of essentializing cultures were widely acknowledged – the narrative of a homogeneous Japan persisted. It even exerted a sort of retroactive power, giving the impression that this narrative had *always been there*, shaping Japan's identity across its modern history.

However, a more accurate historical perspective reveals that the myth of Japan's cultural and ethnic homogeneity is, in fact, a relatively recent construction. During the Tokugawa era (1603-1868), Japan was a mosaic of extraordinary regional diversity, consisting of approximately 250 semi-autonomous domains, each with distinct customs, languages, and traditions. This variety was not perceived as a threat to the state, as the primary concern of the Tokugawa shogunate was maintaining political stability and ensuring the collection of taxes, rather than enforcing cultural uniformity.

The discourse started changing during the Meiji era, as the government sought to transform Japan into a modern nation-state. This project of nation-building entailed promoting shared cultural symbols and narratives, including the conceptualization of the *Yamato people* as a unifying emblem of Japanese ethnicity. The term *Yamato* started gaining prominence only in the late 19th century, after being popularized in 1888 by Shiga Shigetaka, co-founder of the nationalist journal *Nihonjin* (Okamoto, 2011, p. 82). Before this, there was no widely accepted notion of a *Yamato Nation* representing all Japanese people.

Nevertheless, the intellectual climate of the Meiji era continued to acknowledge Japan's diversity. Many scholars and thinkers of the time viewed the country as inherently multiethnic. In 1904, Ei Hiyama observed: "Anyone who has traveled throughout Japan must have noticed a very great difference between Kyushu, the Kinki, the Tohoku, and the southern and northern parts of Kyushu in terms of appearance, language, character, and customs" (Hiyama, 1904, pp. 43-44). A decade later, historian Sadayoshi Kida similarly remarked: "If you go to a fair where many people attend, you will see that there are all sorts of faces and different races in Japan" (Kida, 1916, p. 49).

This perspective fostered a socio-political narrative that was not based on mono-ethnic nationalism (*tan'itsu-minzoku-ron*) but rather on an ideal of *composite nationalism* (*fukugō minzoku-ron*) (Okamoto, 2011, p. 78). This narrative gained further traction during Japan's colonial expansion when subjugated populations in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria were recognized as citizens of the Japanese Empire. The broader vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was thus built not on the premise of a monoethnic and monocultural society but rather on the vision of a multiethnic empire led by Japan.

Of course, this does not entail by far that Japanese composite nationalism was founded on a genuine respect for cultural pluralism. While there was no intention to establish a strictly mono-ethnic and monocultural society, any minority customs or practices that appeared to conflict with social norms - or, more importantly, the political and economic interests of the Japanese Empire – were perceived as threats to be suppressed. In this sense, Japan's composite nationalism was consistent with the assimilationist policies it pursued in its colonies, often modeled on Western practices observed by the Iwakura mission (see Caprio, 2009).

However, in contrast to the imperialistic composite nationalism, the image of a culturally and ethnically homogeneous Japan became dominant only after World War II. This shift was the result of a deliberate postwar effort to redefine Japan's national identity and suppress the memory of its multiethnic but belligerent imperial past – a process akin to a *damnatio memoriae* of previous ideologies and narratives. Nakasone's 1986 declaration was not an echo of a long-standing paradigm but rather part of an ongoing attempt to construct and solidify a new vision of Japanese society.

This postwar narrative has proven to be remarkably successful, becoming a powerful lens through which Japan's identity is understood, both domestically and abroad. Even today, the myth of homogeneity and extraordinariness of Japanese culture and society continues shaping Japan's self-perception and its representation to the rest of the world. Very importantly, this rhetoric has been critically influencing emerging contemporary debates on diversity and social inclusion.

Yet, as Japan gradually evolves into a more diverse society, this narrative is increasingly challenged. The critique of Nihonjinron, the activism of marginalized groups, the growing awareness of human rights, and the emergence of new academic frameworks have all contributed to the gradual deconstruction of the myth of homogeneity. As a result, new discourses centered on cultural pluralism and diversity are beginning to take root, paving the way for the emergence of more nuanced and inclusive visions of Japanese society.

13.2

Pioneers of Japanese Diversity Governance in the Era of Progressive Local Governments

Ironically, while the militarized and authoritarian Japanese Empire exhibited some degree of openness to discussions of pluralism in line with its vision of composite nationalism, postwar democratic Japan was extremely closed to discourses that could have challenged the new, dominant narrative of mono-ethnic nationalism. In the context of the rapid economic boom, political and intellectual elites were striving to cement an image of a unified, homogeneous Japan, both domestically and on the global stage. However, this top-down narrative clashed sharply with the realities unfolding at the local level, where mounting tensions and a growing rights consciousness among minority groups revealed a much more complex social fabric.

Marginalized minorities – including the Ainu, Burakumin, and Zainichi Koreans – were gradually solidifying their collective identities and refining their political strategies in response to continued discrimination (Chapter 12). In addition, new challenges arose as Japan began to experience increasing international migration. While national elites were intent on upholding a vision of postwar Japan as a mono-ethnic nation, local realities were increasingly defined by the struggles of marginalized communities asserting their rights and identities. As a result, the friction between national policies of non-recognition of minority rights (as in the exclusion of Zainichi Koreans from many civil rights) or forced assimilation (as seen with the Ainu and Burakumin) and these communities' demands for equality and social inclusion became increasingly evident.

Amidst the central government's reluctance to address these issues, the real pioneers of diversity governance and social inclusion in Japan were local governments, especially the *kakushin jichitai* (progressive local governments) that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (Section 11.5, pp. 348-349). These administrations spearheaded innovative welfare policies and fostered new channels of citizen participation, positioning themselves as leaders in addressing the complex challenges faced by minority communities (see, for example, Kashiwazaki, 2000; 2003; Tegtmeier Pak, 2000; Takaya, 2022).

Ōsaka stood as a prime example of progressive local governance in action, particularly in the realm of educational reform. During the 1960s and 1970s, Ōsaka's progressive administrations, in collaboration with civil society organizations and minority activists, implemented a series of social programs aimed at addressing the systemic discrimination faced by the city's substantial Zainichi Korean and Burakumin populations. A pivotal moment came in 1971 with the formation of the Ōsaka Municipal Teachers' Association, which eventually evolved into the national organization known as the Ōsaka National Council of Korean Education and Research in Japan, or *Zencho-kyo Ōsaka*. This organization played a central role in advocating for more inclusive educational policies and practices.

Responding to the pressures from Zencho-kyo Osaka and other advocacy groups, the Osaka City Board of Education revised its *School Education Guidelines*, explicitly calling for measures to protect

the human rights of Zainichi Korean children, enhance their career guidance, and promote intercultural friendship among all students. This marked the first formal commitment by a Japanese public educational institution to actively support the education of foreign residents, setting a critical precedent for similar initiatives nationwide (Takaya, 2022).

Building on this success, Zencho-kyo Osaka expanded its focus to include the development of ethnic classes and the institutionalization of ethnic education in public schools. The organization's dual aim was to promote the recognition and celebration of cultural identities while ensuring that minority students had access to the same educational opportunities as their Japanese peers. One of the group's central demands was the establishment of ethnic classes in all schools and the use of students' real names – a symbolic but significant step to affirm ethnic identity and counteract assimilationist pressures.

Ōsaka's model of inclusive education did not remain an isolated case. By the early 1980s, other municipalities, inspired by Ōsaka's example, began adopting similar policies to support their minority communities. Cities such as Tōkyō, Toyonaka, and Kawasaki established their own educational frameworks for foreign residents, particularly targeting the needs of Zainichi Koreans. These local policies included measures such as career counseling, support for ethnic schoolteachers, and the creation of supplementary educational materials to promote intercultural understanding.

Beyond educational reforms, these progressive municipalities developed comprehensive welfare programs to address disparities in housing, employment, and healthcare among minority residents. Kawasaki, which had a significant population of Korean and Chinese residents, pioneered inclusive housing policies and legal aid programs that set new standards for local governance in Japan. By embedding minority rights and social inclusion into the very fabric of local governance, these cities became leaders in promoting a more equitable society.

However, the onset of the neoliberal turn following the oil crises of the 1970s dealt a severe blow to many of these inclusive local models. Austerity measures imposed harsh fiscal constraints on local administrations, and as the influence of progressive governments waned, the momentum for minority inclusion eroded. While some municipalities, like Kawasaki, managed to sustain a degree of continuity in their social justice initiatives, others saw their inclusive policies systematically dismantled.

Ōsaka, once a beacon of progressive governance, experienced a steady political shift towards conservatism. By 2012, the city had come under the control of the radical conservative Ishin Party, which originated as an independent political movement in Ōsaka. Despite the city's strong tradition of grassroots activism, the current administration has significantly reduced public welfare funding,

including resources for minority inclusion programs, reflecting a broader trend of retrenchment that has undermined Ōsaka's legacy as a leader in progressive governance.

Although the *kakushin jichitai* era may have waned, its legacy continued to shape the contours of contemporary Japanese governance. The experience of progressive local governments showcased the capacity of municipalities to serve as catalysts for social change and champions of minority rights, even in the face of central government opposition. This period left an indelible mark on the professionalization of local bureaucracies, empowering them with the expertise and confidence to develop and implement innovative policies independently. Moreover, it underscored the significant role local governments could play in the realm of diversity governance.

13.3

The Opportunities of *Internationalization*

With the end of the progressive local governments' era and the intensification of austerity measures in the early 1980s, both minority activists and local administrations were compelled to devise new strategies to address issues of cultural integration and social inclusion. This task became even more urgent as native minorities gained proficiency in navigating Japan's legal and bureaucratic systems and became more vocal in asserting their rights. Meanwhile, international migration introduced new complexities into local communities, presenting local governments with unprecedented challenges ranging from language barriers and legal ambiguities to cultural misunderstandings that frequently sparked tensions over local norms, such as waste disposal practices and maintaining quiet residential environments.

Left without guidance or financial support from the central government – whether through policies, regulations, or targeted funding – local administrations, businesses, hospitals, and schools were forced to manage these complex situations independently. Even conservative local governments began to recognize the necessity of creating mechanisms to carve out institutional space and find resources to address these emerging issues.

A pivotal opportunity for local governments to navigate these challenges emerged through the central government's promotion of *kokusaika* (internationalization), a national strategy gaining

momentum in the late 1970s and 1980s. *Kokusaika* can be understood as a postwar heir to the *bunmei-kaika* (civilization and enlightenment) ideal of the Meiji era (Section 11.2, pp. 335-336): once again, under this new slogan, Japan's elites aimed to position the nation as a global player by embracing elements of Westernization while redefining Japan's place in the world. As Japan's economy flourished and its global ambitions expanded, the government developed a variety of programs under the banner of *kokusaika*, targeting both external and internal dimensions of international engagement.

Externally, these strategies – collectively referred to as *sotonaru kokusaika* (external internationalization) – sought to extend Japan's influence and solidify its role as a major player in global affairs. This agenda included promoting Japanese culture and language abroad while providing developmental aid to emerging countries. Two pivotal institutions emerged to advance these goals: the Japan Foundation, established in 1972, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), founded in 1974. Simultaneously, Japan intensified its participation in global networks and international organizations, with a strong emphasis on expanding its presence within the United Nations

Domestically, *uchinaru kokusaika* (internal internationalization) initiatives encompassed a diverse array of activities, such as promoting international exchanges, establishing sister-city partnerships, revitalizing local cultural industries to attract international tourism, and incorporating foreign innovations into local practices. At the core of such initiatives was an economic objective: “to revitalize localities through the creation of a community that is connected with the global society” (quote in Kashiwazaki, 2003, p. 67). One particularly notable project that was born out of the national enthusiasm for internal internationalization is the JET Program, launched in 1987, which aimed to enhance English language education by placing young graduates from prestigious overseas universities in schools throughout Japan. Although the program has since become widely celebrated, its initial phases faced significant logistical challenges, particularly in rural areas that were unprepared to accommodate these young foreign teachers (McConnell, 2000).

The national strategy for local-level internationalization gained further definition with the release of the 1989 *Guidelines for the Local International Exchange Promotion Plan*, which directed prefectures and the twelve largest cities to create comprehensive policy packages to advance international exchange. This directive was accompanied by financial support for new initiatives in this domain, resulting in the rapid development of an organizational infrastructure dedicated to local internationalization efforts. The Ministry of Home Affairs outlined several anticipated outcomes for these exchange promotion plans (Kashiwazaki, 2003, p. 66):

- a) The development of government-led international exchange programs, along with financial and logistical support for private sector initiatives (e.g., sister-city affiliations, cultural, academic, and athletic exchanges, festivals, and awareness campaigns for citizens).
- b) The internationalization of local industries and economies, alongside increased tourism.
- c) The creation of an inclusive environment where local Japanese and foreign residents could comfortably coexist, supported by improved administrative services and educational assistance for returnee children adjusting to the local syllabus.

While *kokusaika* was not explicitly designed to promote cultural pluralism, its emphasis on openness and adaptation provided a valuable framework for local governments to address issues related to minority inclusion. Japan's growing engagement with the UN under the *sotonaru kokusaika* framework created new channels for advocacy and external pressure, which played a decisive role in pushing Japan to ratify key international treaties, such as the UN Refugee Convention in 1981, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1985, and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1995 (Gurowitz, 1999; 2006).

At the same time, *uchinaru kokusaika* – and, particularly the government guidelines and funds tied to these programs – opened new opportunities for local administrations. Under the frame of *kokusaika*, local governments began implementing a variety of initiatives, such as language courses, multilingual translations of local regulations, and grants to support minority organizations, which effectively served as integration programs for foreign residents and historically marginalized communities (see, for example, Kashiwazaki 2003).

A new significant window of opportunities was thus opened between grassroots activists and local administrations for advancing the recognition of civil rights to minorities and fighting against discrimination and marginalization. In this context, some new narratives started to emerge, envisioning inclusive communities where everyone – including not only cultural minorities and foreigners, but also elderly, children, and disabled people – could be fully recognized as members of the same local community and participate fully in the social life (Kim Y., 2007, pp. 122-123). These narratives were often framed under the slogan of *tomoni ikiru* (living together), which became particularly popular among Zainichi Korean activists (Kashiwazaki, 2016, p. 4).

These innovative efforts of local administrations and communities spread rapidly, driven by the emulation of successful local models and the formation of new inter-municipal platforms and networks starting in the 1980s. One of the most influential organizations to emerge from this movement was the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), established in

1988. CLAIR played a critical role in facilitating the exchange of best practices and resources, supporting local governments in navigating the complexities of diversity management and enhancing Japan's internationalization efforts. Through networks like CLAIR, local governments were able to share experiences, tackle challenges, and collectively advocate for greater autonomy in addressing the diverse needs of their communities.

The legacy of the *kokusaika* era, particularly in the context of local governance, has had lasting implications for Japan's approach to diversity management. Building on the professionalization of local administrations that began under the *kakushin jichitai*, the *kokusaika* framework empowered local governments to become key players in shaping new narratives around cultural differences. This was especially true as Japan entered the 21st century, when the economic rationale of *kokusaika* began to align with a broader recognition of the principles of cultural pluralism and of diversity as an asset to promote local economies.

13.4

From *Kokusaika* to *Tabunka Kyōsei*

A major turning point for diversity governance and minority inclusion in Japan can be traced back to 1995, spurred by a tragic event that also catalyzed the rise of Japanese civil society: the Great Hanshin Earthquake (Peruzzi Castellani, 2023b). The catastrophe struck an area with a high concentration of foreign residents, particularly in Kōbe and Ōsaka, which included the large Zainichi Korean community and about 80,000 recent migrants (Suzuki, 2013).

Prior to the earthquake, interactions between Japanese and foreign residents were limited, and public discourse largely ignored the presence of minority groups. The dominant narrative held that foreigners were either temporary sojourners or effectively nonexistent, rendering them invisible within Japanese society. However, the aftermath of the earthquake fundamentally shifted this perception. The disaster highlighted the language and cultural barriers faced by foreign residents, emphasizing the need to address these differences both for their own rescue and to enable their participation in relief efforts.

In the midst of the government's inadequate response and lack of preparedness, civil society stepped in. Japanese activists and volunteers, working with bilingual foreign residents, quickly organized networks to provide multilingual assistance, disseminate vital information, and integrate foreign communities into the recovery efforts. Numerous innovative initiatives emerged, including pirate radio broadcasts in multiple languages, medical assistance for foreign nationals – including those with uncertain legal status – and the creation of mutual aid centers (Peruzzi Castellani, 2023b, pp. 546-537).

The intense media coverage of the disaster, combined with unprecedented civic engagement, brought foreign residents into the public eye for the first time. Japanese society began to recognize not only the challenges these communities faced but also their capacity to contribute to the well-being of the local community during a crisis. This newfound visibility sparked a shift in public discourse, promoting the idea that not only existing cultural differences should be acknowledged and recognized, but that minority groups, despite their cultural differences, were integral members of Japanese society and practices needed to be established to ensure their inclusion and recognize their role as members of Japan's social fabric. This shift in perception was framed by activists under a new term: *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence), which quickly gained traction in Japanese public discourse.

It is unclear exactly when the term *tabunka kyōsei* first appeared. The word *kyōsei* (coexistence) was already in use in the early 1990s, initially to describe the ideal of coexistence between humans and nature (*shizen tonō kyōsei*), and later to refer to marginalized groups such as disabled people, women, and foreigners (Kim 1999, 31-38). At the same time, the concept of *tabunkashugi* (multiculturalism) existed as an academic term, used to translate into Japanese the term *multiculturalism* when referring to debates about cultural pluralism in countries like Canada, Australia, and the United States (Kondo, 2011, pp. 7-8).

Anthropologist Yasuko Takezawa notes that the earliest official mention of *tabunka kyōsei* appeared in the Japanese newspaper *Mainichi Shimbun* in a 1993 article reporting on a conference in Kawasaki (Takezawa, 2009, pp. 89-90). That same year, the Kawasaki municipal council introduced the *Kawasaki New Era 2010 Plan*, which included the “promotion of a city of *tabunka kyōsei*” as one of its key principles (Kato, 2008, p. 23). However, it was in the wake of the Great Hanshin Earthquake that *tabunka kyōsei* began to systematically serve as a framework for grassroots initiatives focused on integrating cultural minorities.

The popularization of *tabunka kyōsei* among activists catalyzed its spread nationwide, both as a discourse and as a set of practical measures. Several grassroots practices framed under this concept soon became institutionalized and were replicated by local governments across Japan. One notable example is the Foreigners' Earthquake Information Center, a volunteer-led organization that

supported foreign residents during the recovery. The center was later rebranded as the Ōsaka Center for *Tabunka Kyōsei*, and its success in disaster response inspired many other municipalities and prefectural governments to establish their own Centers for *Tabunka Kyōsei*.

Furthermore, many of the local initiatives that emerged during the earthquake recovery phase were institutionalized and circulated as best practices for inclusive disaster prevention and management (Peruzzi Castellani, 2023b, pp. 537-540). This was also facilitated by the 1998 *NPO Law*, which greatly eased the requirements for civil society organizations to gain official recognition from the government. The proliferation of these initiatives not only attracted media attention but also spurred increasing interest from academic scholars, who began to study *tabunka kyōsei* from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, further legitimizing the efforts of local activists and governments.

This unprecedented flourishing of local-level discourses and practices promoting the inclusion of cultural minorities in Japanese society coincided with broader shifts in the country's governance system. Amidst decentralization reforms and the growing dynamism of local governments, *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) found fertile ground to be incorporated into municipal policies and practices. This renewed enthusiasm for diversity prompted a wave of innovation aimed at advancing social justice and fostering models of substantive citizenship for minority communities.

In 1996, following early experiments by the Ōsaka prefectural government, Kawasaki became the first city in Japan to institutionalize a formal mechanism for including its foreign resident community in policymaking. The Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents, which is still active today, granted a legally enshrined voice to foreign residents, a move that showcased Kawasaki's commitment to inclusion and inspired similar efforts in other municipalities with large foreign populations (Day, 2018).

By the turn of the millennium, *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) had firmly established itself as a key narrative in many urban centers with perceived cultural heterogeneity (Green, 2021). Cities with a legacy of progressive governance emerged as leaders in embedding this new narrative into their local policies, driving forward socio-cultural change. Ōsaka was one of the early adopters, incorporating *tabunka kyōsei* into its *Basic Plan for the Policy on Foreign Residents* as early as 1998. Similarly, in 2005, Kawasaki cemented its commitment to multiculturalism by introducing the *Promotion Plan for a Multicultural, Harmonious Society (tabunka kyōsei shakai suishin shishin)*, making *tabunka kyōsei* a central pillar of its comprehensive integration strategy (Aiden, 2011; Kashiwazaki, 2016, p. 8).

Other cities with significant foreign populations, such as Yokohama and Hamamatsu, soon followed suit, adopting *tabunka kyōsei* as a key principle in their governance (e.g., Aiden, 2018; Green, 2013; Kobayashi, 2014; Day, 2018). These cities became genuine laboratories for social

inclusion, setting benchmarks for diversity management across Japan. The diffusion of these innovative approaches at the urban level demonstrated, once again, how Japanese local governments could lead the way in fostering cultural pluralism and the creation of more inclusive and cohesive communities.

A major milestone in the rise of *tabunka kyōsei* in urban governance was the increased horizontal cooperation and networking among cities committed to integrating cultural minorities. This collaboration not only facilitated the sharing of information and best practices but also provided new avenues for bottom-up lobbying of the central government. Established platforms, like CLAIR (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations), turned their attention to *tabunka kyōsei*, further reinforcing the spread of this narrative across Japan.

In 2001, a notable initiative was launched when the city of Hamamatsu, along with 12 other municipalities with large populations of Nikkeijin (foreigners with Japanese descendants), founded the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents (*gaikokujin-shūjū-toshi kaigi*). This council became a crucial platform for intercity learning and cooperation, while also advocating for policy changes at the national level (Shipper, 2018). Although its membership has fluctuated, with 29 cities at its peak in 2011 and 11 by 2023, the council's influence has persisted, with Hamamatsu playing a central role. The decline in participation reflects, in part, the evolving strategic goals of some cities and the decreasing relevance of the council's original focus on Nikkeijin, as new migration trends reshaped urban challenges (Interview C).

Beyond municipal governments and civil society, even Japan's business elites began to embrace *tabunka kyōsei* as a crucial principle for the country's future. The Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), the nation's leading business association, advocated for a multicultural society in its 2004 *Recommendations on the Issue of Accepting Foreigners*. Keidanren emphasized the importance of *tabunka kyōsei*, urging Japan to actively accept foreigners to foster a society characterized by diversity, dynamism, empathy, and trust. The recommendations called for coordinated efforts from the national and local governments, businesses, universities, and civil society organizations to tackle issues related to the integration of foreigners, from employment and education to social security and public safety.

Emergence and Reformulation of *Tabunka Kyōsei* in the National Discourse

Pressured from multiple fronts – civil society, local governments, and even the business sector—the Japanese government eventually began to shift its stance, allowing the narrative of *tabunka kyōsei* to penetrate the national discourse. This marked the first significant departure from the postwar ideal of mono-ethnic nationalism and the insistence on Japan's cultural homogeneity.

In 2005, a decade after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) took a pivotal step by establishing the Study Group on the Promotion of *Tabunka Kyōsei*. Drawing on the group's findings, the MIC, in 2006, introduced Japan's first national conceptual and political framework for the inclusion of migrants: the *Regional Plan for the Promotion of Tabunka Kyōsei*. This plan provided official guidelines for municipalities, outlining ways to promote migrant inclusion in various social dimensions, including welfare services, education, and, notably, disaster prevention and management.

The Ministry encouraged local governments to compile policy plans that would allow them to systematically implement programs promoting *tabunka kyōsei*, or the social integration of foreign residents. MIC's plan defined *tabunka kyōsei* as “a condition where people with different nationalities, ethnicities, or other attributes live together as members of the local community, respecting each other's cultural differences while striving to build relationships as equals” (Minister of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2006; my translation). While this definition offered flexibility, the plan's structure seemed to emphasize linguistic assistance for non-Japanese speakers. Indeed, the introductory notes explicitly highlighted foreign residents with language barriers as the primary target group.

The focus on non-Japanese speakers was consistent with Japan's broader internationalization agenda, aligning *tabunka kyōsei* with existing policies aimed at advancing *kokusaika*. Specifically, MIC positioned *tabunka kyōsei* as the “third pillar” of local internationalization, alongside “international exchange” and “international cooperation” (Minister of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2006; my translation). As a result, *tabunka kyōsei* was often intertwined with or seen as part of the broader goal of promoting internationalization.

The plan was soon complemented by the *Comprehensive Measures for Foreign Nationals as Residents*, published at the end of 2006. These measures further emphasized the need to build a multicultural society, focusing on strategies for integrating newcomers into Japanese society.

The enactment of these policies marked the first time that national discourses explicitly recognized cultural differences as a key element of Japan's present and future. This greatly contributed to further

accelerating the rapid diffusion and normalization of *tabunka kyōsei* as a buzzword, drawing growing attention across Japanese society. Universities and research centers began offering courses and programs under the *tabunka kyōsei* label, and academic publications on the topic proliferated, cementing the term in both academic and public discourse.

Following the release of the MIC circular, several prefectures and municipalities began drafting their own *tabunka kyōsei* policy plans. Within a few years, five prefectures – Gifu, Yamanashi, Gunma, Saitama, Aichi, and Mie – along with several municipalities, issued policy plans explicitly dedicated to *tabunka kyōsei*. Other local governments integrated *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives into their broader internationalization plans.

Over time, the term's meaning expanded to encompass not only migrant-related initiatives but also those practices of internationalization traditionally framed under *kokusaika*. Given that many migrant-related programs had been organized under the banner of *kokusaika* before the institutionalization of *tabunka kyōsei*, the overlap between the two concepts was somewhat natural. However, this also led to occasional conceptual confusion, as the boundaries between these terms blurred.

The increased use of *tabunka kyōsei* as both a slogan and policy area has invited skepticism and criticism. Activists, scholars, and commentators on the progressive side – those who believe that minority rights and cultures should be fully recognized and respected – have voiced concerns about the superficiality of *tabunka kyōsei* as it is often employed. Drawing on critical debates about multiculturalism in other parts of the world, these critics have been arguing that, although plural cultures may appear to be equally valued, in practice, the culture and values of the dominant group, the Japanese, remain privileged. This critique suggests that, also in Japan, the celebration of diversity often does not extend beyond a superficial enjoyment of *the three F's* – Food, Fashion, and Festivals – without addressing the deeper structural inequalities that marginalized groups continue to face (Takezawa, 2009, p. 91).

In Japan, the historical context adds further complexity to this critique. Given Japan's long legacy of assimilation policies imposed on minorities and colonial subjects – including the Ainu, Okinawans, Taiwanese, and Koreans – the emphasis on the acquisition of Japanese language and culture within *tabunka kyōsei* programs raises alarms from a liberal perspective. In particular, critics fear that, rather than promoting genuine inclusion, these programs may perpetuate an assimilationist agenda. Furthermore, *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives have been criticized for narrowly focusing on multilingual information services and treating immigrants mainly as passive recipients of administrative support, rather than as active participants in community-building (Takezawa, 2009, p. 92).

Conservatives, on the other hand, hold a different set of concerns. For those who value ethnic and cultural homogeneity, the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei* is naturally seen as a threat. They associate increased immigration with higher crime rates, unemployment among Japanese workers, and the erosion of native culture. This perception has been exacerbated by media portrayals that emphasize negative aspects of immigration, further fueling resistance to ethnic diversity (e.g., Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004, p. 470).

These negative attitudes extend not only to recent immigrants but also to long-established minorities, particularly Zainichi Koreans. Right-wing groups such as the Zaitokukai (*Zainichi tokken o yurusanai kai*, or the Association Against Special Privileges for Zainichi Koreans) have staged hate-speech demonstrations across Japan, exploiting public resentment toward Koreans and Chinese – resentment that has worsened with strained diplomatic relations between Japan and its neighbors (Higuchi, 2014).

Another set of criticisms concerns the effective scope of the national policy of *tabunka kyōsei* for the institutionalization of inclusion policies in Japan. Indeed, while the government's 2006 *Regional Plan for the Promotion of Tabunka Kyōsei* provided local governments with a much-needed framework for migrant integration, it failed to address one of the most critical challenges: funding. Despite offering guidelines, the national government did not commit to providing financial support for the implementation of *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives. As a result, cities were often forced to incorporate these initiatives into existing sectors like social welfare, cultural policies, or *kokusaika*, redirecting resources from other areas. In an era of decentralization and austerity, this created conflicts of interest and competition for limited resources among local actors, often generating animosity toward *tabunka kyōsei* (Interview D).

Finally, critical voices among minority activists also pointed out that, while *tabunka kyōsei* initially emerged from grassroots movements and civil society activism, the government reinterpreted it before adopting it. The national discourse narrowed the focus of *tabunka kyōsei* to primarily benefit newcomers, excluding longstanding ethnic minorities like the Ainu, Okinawans, and Zainichi Koreans. This selective application of *tabunka kyōsei* reinforced the marginalization of these groups, signaling that they were not considered part of Japan's contemporary multicultural landscape. As such, while the concept of *tabunka kyōsei* ostensibly aimed to foster inclusion, it ended up sidelining the very minorities whose struggles for recognition had shaped the discourse in the first place.

This selective application has fueled frustration and mounting aversion at the grassroots level. Originally, *tabunka kyōsei* was advocated precisely by minorities, who sought to draw attention to the diversity of Japan's social fabric, especially after the Great Hanshin Earthquake. The narrative of multicultural coexistence was closely connected to the fight for minority recognition and anti-

discrimination. However, once the central government co-opted the term, it diluted its meaning, turning it into a top-down discourse that ultimately served to further divide cultural minorities. Rather than fostering a multicultural society, the government's version of *tabunka kyōsei* merely acknowledged the presence of newcomers and provided minimal assistance to meet their basic needs, leaving deeper structural inequalities unaddressed.

As one activist summarized: “Originally *tabunka kyōsei* meant what in English you could translate as ‘multicultural conviviality,’ but in the national discourse, it has become only ‘multicultural coexistence’ where Japanese citizens, migrants, and minorities are supposed to carry on their lives in parallel” (Interview D; my translation).

The full extent of this transformation becomes clear when considering that migrants are still officially viewed as temporary guest workers, not as long-term members of Japanese society. Critics warn that in this context, *tabunka kyōsei* risks becoming a narrative that upholds the rhetoric of Japan's homogeneity rather than challenging it. Indeed, rather than reconfiguring Japanese society to embrace cultural pluralism, the government's version of *tabunka kyōsei* formulated in 2006 may suggest that multicultural coexistence is only necessary insofar as migrants are present – and that the only path to true inclusion is through assimilation. Thus, *tabunka kyōsei*, in this state-sanctioned form, implies that once migrants' basic needs are met, the work of coexistence is complete, and cultural differences need not fundamentally alter Japan's homogeneous society.

13.6

The Beginning of the Era of Diversity in the Country of *Tabunka Kyōsei*

While critiques of *tabunka kyōsei* raise valid concerns, the term has brought meaningful changes to Japan's societal and political landscape. On a discursive level, *tabunka kyōsei* challenges the longstanding notion of Japan as a mono-ethnic and culturally homogenous society. For decades, Japan has actively promoted the depiction of its self-image as a mono-ethnic society (*tan'itsu minzoku shakai*), with ethnic homogeneity often credited for its economic growth and social stability (Lie, 2000, pp. 81-84). In contrast, *tabunka kyōsei* implies a recognition of pluralism as an intrinsic aspect of Japanese society, and its promotion as a positive force, rather than a threat to peace and stability, thus facilitating recognition of Japan's ethnic and cultural heterogeneity and empowering minority

groups. Additionally, the term underscores the need for public policy and culturally sensitive social services, as reflected by the growing number of courses and programs on *tabunka kyōsei* in universities, affirming its relevance to contemporary Japanese society.

In this sense, *tabunka kyōsei* also has a much bigger potential than *kokusaika* (internationalization), which typically emphasized a dualistic distinction between Japanese and foreigners, with Japan remaining conceived as a mono-ethnic entity (Kashiwazaki, 2003). In contrast, *tabunka kyōsei* transcends nation-to-nation relations, allowing for a more inclusive approach that calls for a transformation of the Japanese society through immigration.

Furthermore, as a policy framework, *tabunka kyōsei* has yielded concrete benefits for the integration of immigrant populations. It has spurred institutional responses, such as the creation of dedicated government offices at city and prefectural levels to oversee multicultural coexistence initiatives. Following the 2006 MIC plan to promote *tabunka kyōsei*, many local governments developed their own policy plans, incorporating these goals into broader city strategies and allocating budgets to support relevant programs. International associations and NPOs have become key partners in implementing these initiatives, often funded by subsidies through CLAIR. As a result, there has been progress in areas like preschool programs for immigrant children, Japanese language instruction, and training for multicultural social workers and medical interpreters.

Furthermore, the national government has made strides in refining its vision for *tabunka kyōsei*. In particular, since 2018, with the introduction of the *Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Nationals*, there has been a renewed commitment to promoting social inclusion. This plan finally updated the 2006 *Comprehensive Measures for Foreign Nationals as Residents*, putting a renewed focus on equal access to public services for non-nationals and promoting human and civil rights under the banner of *tabunka kyōsei*.

These new *Comprehensive Measures* have been updated annually to address the evolving needs of foreign residents. In response to the challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, the government established the Advisory Panel of Experts for Realizing a Society of Harmonious Coexistence with Foreign Nationals in 2021. The panel was tasked with developing medium- and long-term strategies for creating a more inclusive society. Based on the panel's recommendations, the *Roadmap for the Realization of a Society of Harmonious Coexistence with Foreign Nationals* was published in 2022, providing a guiding framework for diversity management until 2026.

The core vision of a society based on *tabunka kyōsei* included three key aspects:

- Inclusion of foreign nationals as equal members of society: Ensuring that foreign nationals can fully participate in social life by overcoming language barriers and gaining a thorough understanding of systems like taxation and social security.

- A diverse and vibrant society: Encouraging diversity by enabling all residents, including foreign nationals, to contribute to their communities and fully demonstrate their skills, thereby enriching Japanese society.
- Respect for dignity and human rights: Fostering a society where all individuals respect one another's dignity, ensuring that discrimination and prejudice have no place.

To achieve these goals, the government outlined four primary points of action:

- 1) Japanese language education: Providing foreign nationals with opportunities to learn Japanese to ensure effective communication and facilitate integration.
- 2) Information dissemination and consultation systems: Strengthening systems to ensure that foreign nationals have access to support during both normal times and emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
- 3) Support throughout life stages: Offering tailored support to foreign nationals at various life stages—childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and senior years – through education, employment, and other services.
- 4) Laying the foundation for coexistence: Implementing policies that reflect the living conditions of foreign nationals and promoting cooperation among government organizations and other support groups to foster harmonious coexistence.

While *tabunka kyōsei* in the national discourse still predominantly focuses on foreign nationals, mostly excluding other minority groups, its institutionalization has marked a significant step towards fostering cultural pluralism in Japan. The adoption of this concept and the implementation of its related policies contributed to brining the notion of diversity to the forefront of public discourse, framing the present and future of Japan as an *Era of Diversity* (*tayousei no jidai*). This vision extends beyond foreigners to include all minorities, such as national cultural minorities, women, the LGBTQ+ community, the youth, the elderly, and people with disabilities.

Although polarization persists, with tensions rising between radical viewpoints, Japan's self-image is gradually shifting toward a more diverse and inclusive society. The ideal of mono-ethnic nationalism, once central to Japan's identity, is becoming increasingly untenable as symbols of diversity gain prominence across the social landscape.

A striking example of this shift toward accepting diversity can be seen in the transformation of Japan's beauty standards, particularly through a series of national beauty contest victories by women who do not belong to the mainstream Japanese population. This change began in 2015 when Ariana

Miyamoto, the daughter of an African-American father and a Japanese mother, won Miss Universe Japan. groundbreaking not only because it was the first time that a Hāfu won the title but also because it challenged traditional beauty standards in Japan, where fair skin has long been idealized. While her win stirred criticism, especially from those who felt that Miss Universe Japan should conform to conventional Japanese aesthetics, Miyamoto's success represented a significant step in broadening Japan's perception of beauty and diversity.

Building on Miyamoto's breakthrough, Priyanka Yoshikawa, of Indian and Japanese descent, was crowned Miss World Japan in 2016. Miyamoto's earlier win helped shield Yoshikawa from much of the potential criticism, signaling a slow but meaningful shift in Japan's beauty standards and a growing acceptance of diverse racial backgrounds as part of Japan's evolving identity.

This progression continued in 2024 when Karolina Shiino, a naturalized Japanese citizen of Ukrainian origin, won the Miss Universe Japan title. Unlike Miyamoto and Yoshikawa, Shiino had no Japanese ancestry, having moved to Japan as a child and becoming a citizen in 2022. Her win reignited debates about whether someone without any direct Japanese lineage could genuinely represent the Japanese beauty standard on a global stage. Nevertheless, her victory, along with the ensuing debate, marked another significant step toward acknowledging and normalizing diversity in Japan.

Shiino's reign was cut short, as she decided to resign after the media made public a scandal involving an extramarital affair. Her replacement was Kaya Chakraborty, a Hāfu born to a Japanese mother and Bengali father. While, unlike Miyamoto and Yoshikawa, Chakraborty had retained her Bengali family name, her succession after Shiino's resignation did not provoke significant criticism, indicating growing public acceptance.

These milestones in the beauty pageant world are just a small reflection of the broader societal changes taking place in Japan. Members of minority groups are becoming increasingly visible in politics, education, and other fields. Although their participation remains relatively limited, these developments signal a shift toward greater inclusivity and the gradual dismantling of the mono-ethnic ideal that has long shaped Japan's national identity.

While national discourse has contributed to this transformation, local governments and civil society organizations have been particularly instrumental in driving this shift. Cities and local governments, in collaboration with diverse civic groups, are leading the way in experimenting with new approaches to building inclusive communities. These local initiatives provide the institutional space for minority voices to be heard and included in Japan's evolving discourse on diversity. In many respects, it is these grassroots efforts that continue to spearhead Japan's journey into the *Era of Diversity*.

CHAPTER 14

Case Study: Hamamatsu and the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei*

Arriving in the field...

Hamamatsu (浜松市) (Image 2) is a city located on the western side of Shizuoka Prefecture, bordering Aichi Prefecture. It is the most populous city in the prefecture, with 788,371 residents as of 2024 (HC 2024). Spanning an area of approximately 1,558 km², it ranks as Japan's second-largest municipality by land area, following Takayama City in Gifu Prefecture (approximately 2,178 km²). Hamamatsu is well-known as a hub for some of Japan's most prominent industries, as well as for hosting the country's largest population of Nikkeijin Brazilian migrants – 9,462 residents as of 2023. The city's total foreign resident population stands at 27,036, or about 3.4% of the population, slightly above the national average of 2.7%¹⁰⁵.



Image 2. Urban Landscape of Hamamatsu (Pixta Images)

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/gyousei/library/index.html>

Hamamatsu is easily accessible by high-speed train (*shinkansen*), with its main station located at the very middle of the historic Tōkaidō Line, about one hour and a half from its two ends, Shin-Ōsaka Station and Tōkyō Station. This may well seem a trivial detail, but one would soon realize that this strategic location along what for centuries has represented Japan's busiest commercial route and currently represents the country's busiest railway route – also known as Tōkaidō Main Line – must not be underestimated.

When I first arrived in May 2022, my initial impression was that Hamamatsu seemed like any other mid-sized Japanese city in a high seismic risk zone: squarish concrete buildings of modest height, mostly gray and white, framed my view as the train neared the station. However, it took just ten minutes from stepping off the train for some facets of the city's distinctive character to reveal themselves.

As soon as I stepped off the station, my attention was immediately drawn to the Act Tower, the tallest skyscraper in Shizuoka Prefecture. Its unique design, purposefully shaped like a harmonica, intends to hint at the city's role as one of the world's leaders in musical instrument manufacturing. A few steps from the station brought me to Servitu, a Brazilian restaurant and supermarket, where I had planned to begin my fieldwork. Servitu, with its strategic location close to the station and space for cultural events, has become a key hub for the foreign community in the region¹⁰⁶. While the restaurant offers Brazilian dishes, the supermarket caters to a broader range of tastes, selling Vietnamese, Korean, and Filipino goods, as well as Halal meat.

It was here that I had my first encounter with Hamamatsu's vibrant diversity. Speaking a mix of Spanish, Portuguese, and Japanese, I quickly bonded with a group of nikkeijin Brazilians enjoying a meal. That moment, my introduction to this part of the city's multicultural fabric, also marked the beginning of a series of hearty Brazilian meals I had not initially expected to be part of my Japanese residency.

My research in Hamamatsu continued in the same lively atmosphere—amid steaming plates of feijoada, Brazilian and multicultural festivals, and events promoting integration, all held in spaces provided by the municipality. The city's diverse population came together under the shadow of towering buildings adorned with familiar names like Yamaha, Honda, and Suzuki. It was a reminder that Hamamatsu, though seemingly ordinary at first glance, is a city where history, industry, and multiculturalism coexist in a unique, complex, and ever-changing way.

¹⁰⁶ Servitu sadly went out of business in 2023 after his owner passed away.

14.1

Origins and Development of the Industrial City

Archaeological remains show that the area where Hamamatsu is located has been inhabited since the Paleolithic era (approximately 16,000 years BCE). The early settlement from which the city developed was called *Hamatsu*, written with the characters 濱津 or 浜津, which referred to a landing place for boats. The first occurrence of the name (written 濱津) was found on a wooden letter dating back to the Nara period (710-794 CE). While little is known about the settlement's nature during this time, by the 10th century, *Hamatsu* (浜津) was officially recorded as a town in the *Wamyō ruijushō*, Japan's oldest surviving dictionary (Hamamatsu City, 2022, p. 25). For unknown reasons, by the Kamakura period (1185-1333), the name had evolved into Hamamatsu (浜松), meaning *pine seashore*, as recorded in the *Izayoi Nikki (Diary of the Waning Moon)*, a travel diary by the poet Abutsu-ni around the 1280s (Hamamatsu City, 2022, p. 25).

Hamamatsu thrived during the Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1868) thanks to its already-mentioned strategic location. As the Tokugawa government established the city of Edo (modern-day Tōkyō) as its administrative center, five key highways, known as the *Gokaidō* (Five Routes) were developed to connect Edo with the then-capital Kyōto. Situated halfway along the Tōkaidō – the most important of these routes –, Hamamatsu became a vital rest stop for travelers and caravans, helping to spur the city's trade, particularly in cotton textiles.

The status of Hamamatsu rose further with the advent of the Meiji era (1868-1912). In 1871, during Japan's modern administrative reorganization, Hamamatsu briefly became the administrative center of a short-lived Hamamatsu Prefecture, which, only five years later, was absorbed into Shizuoka Prefecture, originating the current administrative division. Officially recognized as a town in 1888, Hamamatsu was incorporated as a city (*shi*) in 1911. Despite its status as the second-largest city in Shizuoka Prefecture, with a population of only 36,782 (HC 2023), Hamamatsu was dwarfed by neighboring urban centers like Tōkyō, which had over two million residents by 1910, and Ōsaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyōto, and Kōbe, each with populations counting hundreds of thousands. Despite its small population size, Hamamatsu was already on the path to becoming one of Japan's major trade and industrial hubs.

Among the inhabitants of Hamamatsu and the western part of Shizuoka, there is a deeply rooted belief in a regional culture characterized by open-mindedness and entrepreneurial spirit. Locals refer to it in terms of *yaramaika*, a dialectical expression that means *Let's do it!* This entrepreneurial attitude is often contrasted with the *yamamaika* (*Let's give up...*) mentality attributed to Shizuoka, the prefectural capital. Whether or not this cultural distinction holds true, Hamamatsu's development is undeniably marked by creativity, talent, and a readiness to embrace modernization.

Since the late 19th century, Hamamatsu's cotton textile production was revolutionized by the prompt adoption of technological advances. In 1898, Sakichi Toyoda, an inventor from nearby Kosai City, created an innovative steam-powered loom that had much success in the region, helping him launch the enterprise that would later develop in the giant Toyota Motors (Aichi Prefecture). A decade later, Hamamatsu native Michio Suzuki perfected a mechanical loom that boosted cotton and silk production, establishing Hamamatsu as a major textile center and one of Japan's largest producers of *yukata* (light cotton clothing).

Beyond textiles, other industrial sectors soon began to thrive in the city. By 1897, two mines of cobalt and copper were opened, both of which remain active today. In that same period, a fortuitous turn of events also led to Hamamatsu becoming a hub for musical instrument manufacturing. In 1886, Torakusu Yamaha, a skilled repairman native of Wakayama who had recently moved to Hamamatsu, was asked to fix a US-made reed organ purchased by a local elementary school for its music classes. Intrigued by its mechanisms, Yamaha drew the organ's blueprint and, with the support from local elites interested in sponsoring technological developments, he launched a small reed organ business in 1887. This venture grew into the Nippon Gakki Company, Limited, which later became the Yamaha Corporation, a world leader in musical instruments. Yamaha's first apprentice, Koichi Kawai, launched Kawai Gakki in 1927, which also became a major global distributor of acoustic and digital pianos.

The success of Yamaha and Kawai sparked the growth of numerous other musical instrument manufacturers in the area, including the Tōkai Gakki Company, Ltd., founded in 1947. Initially specialized in harmonicas and pianos, in the 1970s Tōkai Gakki shifted its focus to the production of electric and acoustic guitars, basses, and autoharps, becoming one of the leading companies in the sector within Japan. The presence of these three giants – Yamaha, Kawai, and Tōkai Gakki – helped foster a rich ecosystem of smaller manufacturers, with the number of active firms at one point reaching around 120 (Aoyama, 2009, p. 500).

The 1930s marked the beginning of the rise of Hamamatsu's automotive industry. Building on his success in loom manufacturing, inventor Michio Suzuki ventured into designing and creating cars and motorcycles, eventually founding the world-renowned Suzuki Motor Corporation in 1952.

Around the same time, Sōichirō Honda, a native of a nearby village, began producing motorcycles after making a fortune with a piston ring manufacturing company which had managed to become a major subcontractor for Toyota. Established in Hamamatsu in 1948, his company would later evolve into the globally leading Honda Motor Corporation, Limited.

Honda also played a key role in fostering the development of another major automotive firm: the Enkei Corporation, now a major manufacturer of vehicles for motorsport, including Formula 1 racing. Originally an alloy foundry producing pots, kettles, and hot water bottles, Enkei was established in 1950 by Kenji Suzuki (not related to Michio Suzuki). After Sōichirō Honda consulted Suzuki about the possibility of using hot water bottles as fuel tanks for mopeds, his company began making motorcycle parts for Honda. By 1967, Enkei was manufacturing its own vehicles, initially targeting specifically the US market.

Inspired by the rise of these companies, also the Nippon Gakki Company, Limited (later Yamaha Corporation) grew interested in the automotive sector. The company had already started diversifying its production during World War II by building airplane propellers for the Japanese government. In 1955, Genichi Kawakami, the then-company's chairman, repurposed the wartime facilities to produce motorcycles, establishing Yamaha Motor Company, headquartered in the neighboring city of Iwata.

Hamamatsu also gained a global reputation in electronics. In 1926, Hamamatsu native Kenjiro Takayanagi built the world's first all-electronic television receiver, which earned him the title of the Father of Japanese Television. His student, Heihachiro Horiuchi, went on to found Hamamatsu Photonics K.K. in 1953, which has since become a leading manufacturer of optical sensors, electric light sources, and applied instruments for scientific, technical, and medical use. The city's burgeoning electronics industry was further boosted by the interest of the musical instrument giants Yamaha and Tōkai Gakki, which began to integrate electronic components into their products.

By the turn of the millennium, Hamamatsu had firmly established itself as one of Japan's most prominent industrial cities. Its factories were responsible for producing 62% of motorcycles, 34% of subcompact cars, and 100% of pianos in Japan (Hamamatsu Chamber of Commerce, 2000). The city also boasted the highest number of businesses in Shizuoka Prefecture, with wholesale and retail trade businesses (8,062) and manufacturers (3,862) leading the way (Hamamatsu City, 2021). As Hamamatsu's industries gained global recognition, the city attracted other major companies, such as Roland Corporation, a prominent multinational manufacturer of electronic musical instruments, electronic equipment, and software, which relocated its headquarters from Ōsaka to Hamamatsu in 2005.

14.2

Governing the Growing City

The development of Hamamatsu has been intrinsically linked to the history of the remarkable success of its industries. Yet, this would have never been possible without the consolidation of a granitic governance system based on close cooperation between the city's political and economic elites. This partnership was steered by a succession of charismatic mayors, whose leadership and political longevity were ensured by the backing of industrial lobbies, provided that the city's economic interests remained as the compass for policymaking. Especially since the end of WWII, when Japan's democratization led to the consolidation of power dynamics and influence relations allowed economic elites to maneuver the mobilization of votes, mayors held office for decades, often stepping down only upon retirement rather than being unseated by political rivals. This centralized model of governance guided Hamamatsu through a period of rapid demographic and territorial growth.

Indeed, as the city's industries flourished, so did its population, spurred by the growing demand for workers in the city's expanding businesses. From a modest 36,782 residents in 1911, the population quintupled to 176,331 by 1920¹⁰⁷. Growth continued at an unstoppable pace, with the population doubling again by 1960 (365,652) and reaching 582,095 by the turn of the millennium. Alongside this population surge, Hamamatsu's administrative boundaries expanded as well. The city gradually absorbed surrounding villages and municipalities, and today stands as Japan's second-largest municipality by area.

The expansion began in the early 20th century, actively promoted by Konishi Shirō, the first mayor (1911-1915) governing Hamamatsu after its official establishment as a city¹⁰⁸. This process naturally accelerated in the 1950s, in the context of the Great Shōwa Consolidation, when the government promoted Japan's second wave of municipal mergers (Section 11.3, p. 342).

The most dramatic expansion came during the third wave of municipal mergers, known as the Great Heisei Consolidation (1999-2010). The then-Mayor Yasuyuki Kitawaki (1999-2007) managed to lead the extraordinary endeavor of incorporating into Hamamatsu 12 surrounding municipalities,¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Data from Hamamatsu City's official website.

¹⁰⁸ The details of the process of expansion of Hamamatsu can be found at the following link: <http://www.hamamatsu-books.jp/en/alacarte/detail/4.html>.

¹⁰⁹ Hamakita City, Kosai City, Tenryu City, Maisaka Town, Arai Town, Yutou Town, Inasa Town, Mikkabi Town, Haruno Town, Sakuma Town, Misakubo Town, and Tatsuyama Village.

increasing the city's territory sixfold and adding nearly 100,000 new residents. This last merger was strongly desired by Hamamatsu's political and economic elites, who saw an enlarged city as the key to implementing large-scale industrial policies and infrastructure development (Maruyama, 2016, p. 74). The merger would have also boosted the city's population to over 700,000, making Hamamatsu eligible for recognition as an *ordinance-designated city* (*seirei-shitei-shi*), granting it administrative powers akin to those of a prefectural government (Section 11.5, p. 347). The merger agreement was concluded in 2005 and, in 2007, Hamamatsu officially became an ordinance-designated city.

The necessary administrative reorganization following the merger opened for the first time a window of opportunity to move beyond the city's traditionally centralized governance model. Mayor Kitawaki's initial vision, introduced in 2005, consisted of a Comprehensive Branch System (Section 11.4, p. 345) based on the principle of *One City, Multiple Administrations* (*ichi shi ta-seido*). This system transformed the governments of 11 of the merged municipalities into comprehensive branches, which operated under the city's central headquarters while retaining many of their pre-merger functions. In line with revisions to Japan's *Local Authority Law* (Section 11.5, pp. 346-347), Kitawaki also established *local autonomy districts*, each led by a *local council* composed of civil society representatives.

Kitawaki's decentralized approach to local governance aimed at preventing the expected deterioration of administrative functions and services in those municipalities that would have become peripheral areas of the new, enlarged Hamamatsu. In fact, a key part of the merger agreement was the protection of the local institutions and cultures of the 11 municipalities being absorbed into the city. Even after Hamamatsu became an ordinance-designated city, Kitawaki maintained this decentralized vision. According to the *Local Autonomy Law*, ordinance-designated cities must divide their territories into wards (*ku*) with offices handling essential tasks like resident registration and tax collection. Under Kitawaki's leadership, Hamamatsu was organized into 7 wards, and 12 local branches were established to maintain a sense of local autonomy (Nishihara & Fuji, 2018, p. 111).

While Kitawaki's system had the merit of safeguarding local governance and offered a long-term vision of a decentralized and more democratic city, it proved complicated, inefficient, and costly in practice. More critically, the concept of One City, Multiple Administrations clashed with the interests of economic elites, who viewed decentralization as an obstacle to the envisioned large-scale development projects in the newly merged areas. Unsurprisingly, in the 2007 mayoral election, Kitawaki was defeated by Yasutomo Suzuki, a new candidate backed by industrial lobbies. Suzuki ushered in an era of strong, centralized governance that lasted four terms (2007-2023), promoting a vision of One City, One Administration (*ichi shi ichi seido*), based on the principles of bureaucratic efficiency, cost-cutting, and social cohesion in a unified, strong Hamamatsu (Komeito, 2007).

Already by 2008, Suzuki had reduced the number of local branches from 12 to 8. In 2012, he dismantled the local autonomous districts and councils, significantly downsizing the remaining local branches and reducing them to mere local posts. Recent studies have shown that this centralization has increased inequality in accessing administrative services and rising discontent with the municipal government, especially in peripheral areas (Maruyama, 2016; Nishihara & Fujii, 2018).

In 2021, a special committee was convened to explore further reorganization of Hamamatsu's administrative structure. By 2023 it was announced that the city's 7 wards would be reduced to just 3. As a result, from 2024, Hamamatsu, along with Shizuoka City and Sagami City (Kanagawa Prefecture), has become one of the ordinance-designated cities with the smallest number of administrative districts. Notably, this reorganization has created a striking contrast, with Hamamatsu now housing Japan's most populated ward (Chūō-ku, 607,645 people) alongside the less populated one (Tenryū-ku, 25,494 people).

In summary, Hamamatsu's governance today is marked by strong centralization under the leadership of its mayor, crucially oriented by the interests of the city's economic elites. However, although civil society does not find much room for advocacy and participation in policymaking, the growing disparities resulting from the recent administrative centralization have sparked renewed grassroots activity, particularly in suburban areas. Neighborhood associations, NGOs, NPOs, and informal groups are increasingly stepping in to address social issues, especially in the realm of welfare, where the local government's reach often proves inadequate.

14.3

Branding Hamamatsu: The Birth of the *City of Music*

Throughout its history, Hamamatsu has been remarkably successful at attracting people to settle and work in the city. While chronic demand for workers from its growing industries was a primary draw, this was not the only factor to sustain the city's growth. As welfarism, globalization, and urban entrepreneurship gained momentum, Hamamatsu needed to distinguish itself from other industrial centers by cultivating a vibrant, multifaceted, and dynamic urban environment. Thus, Hamamatsu's success can also be credited to the tireless efforts of the city's political and economic elites, who

invested heavily in improving the quality of urban life and elevating the reputation of the city of *yaramaika* both nationally and internationally.

As early as 1911, the city's first mayor, Konishi Shirō, worked diligently to position the then-small Hamamatsu as a regional center of attraction, establishing schools and hospitals. Notably, he inaugurated the Hamamatsu Normal School, the Hamamatsu Prefectural Kamoe Hospital, and the Hamamatsu Municipal Hospital. Even after retirement, Shirō made significant contributions to the city's development, notably donating funds to help build the prestigious Hamamatsu College of Technology, now the Faculty of Engineering at Shizuoka University. Established in 1922, this institution – initially a high school that then developed into a university – played a key role in drawing young talents to the city, who significantly contributed to the development of local firms (ao, 1996).

Some years later, Mayor Rikuhei Nakamura (1928-1932) took this vision further, bringing national attention to Hamamatsu, which by then was already a thriving industrial city with over 200,000 people. In 1930, Nakamura convinced Showa Emperor Hirohito to visit the city, highlighting its potential as an industrial powerhouse. Building on this success and leveraging the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the official establishment of Hamamatsu as a city, Nakamura was accorded by the national government the possibility to organize a National Industrial Exposition in Hamamatsu. This large-scale event significantly boosted Hamamatsu's national reputation, cementing its status as one of Japan's key industrial centers.

After World War II, Hamamatsu's promotion as an industrial hub gained renewed momentum, riding the wave of Japan's rapid economic growth and democratization. The city's role in national politics and economics strengthened significantly during this period, bolstered by stable leadership and the growing influence of its economic elites. A pivotal figure in this transformation was Mayor Hirayama Hakuzo, who served an impressive 20 years (1959-1979) and is often credited with laying the foundation of modern Hamamatsu¹¹⁰. Under Hakuzo's leadership, Hamamatsu's strategies of city-building and city branding expanded beyond industry to encompass broader aspects of urban life, including welfare, infrastructure, and culture.

Hakuzo's administration aimed to elevate the city's quality of life through massive investments in infrastructure and cultural policies. Guided by two core visions – *Building a Comprehensive Welfare City* (*sōgō fukushi toshi no kensetsu*) and *Building a Great Hamamatsu as a Base City* (*kihon toshi to shite no dai hamamatsu no kensetsu*) (Shizuoka Shimbun, 1991, p. 396-397) – Hamamatsu experienced significant urban development from the 1960s to the late 1970s. Key advancements included improvements in water purification, sewerage, housing, and transportation. Notably, in 1964,

¹¹⁰ <http://www.hamamatsu-books.jp/category/detail/4cf34c7894818.html>.

the city was connected to Japan's high-speed Shinkansen network, placing it firmly on the map as a vital transit hub along the new Tōkaidō route.

In the welfare sector, the municipal government focused on healthcare, establishing medical facilities and hospitals, and in 1974, inaugurated the Hamamatsu University of Medicine. Pioneering initiatives during the 1970s included providing free medical care and bus fares for the elderly. The city also prioritized creating recreational spaces, establishing parks such as Flower Park and Hamamatsu Castle Park, further enhancing the quality of urban life.

Hakuzo's administration made also significant strides in education and culture, promoting the opening of schools and universities, and placing, for the first time, major attention on the city's cultural resources and tourist sector. Several museums were inaugurated, such as the Hamamatsu City Museum of Art (1971) and the Hamamatsu City Museum (1979). On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the city in 1971, the Hamamatsu City Industrial Exhibition Hall was inaugurated, soon becoming a central venue for regional exhibitions and trade fairs celebrating both the city's industrial achievements and cultural significance.

By the end of the 1970s, industry, welfare, and culture had consolidated as the three pillars of Hamamatsu politics and economics. This not only improved the quality of life for its residents but also helped project an image of a dynamic, innovative city on the national stage. Hakuzo's tenure also marked Hamamatsu's increasing involvement in national politics within the broad context of Japan's democratization. In 1975, he became the first mayor of Hamamatsu to be appointed chairman of the Japan Association of City Mayors¹¹¹, a position that enabled the city's elites to strengthen their connections with central government officials and promote Hamamatsu's interests on a broader scale.

Hakuzo's legacy was carried forward by his successor, Masaru Kurihara, who governed Hamamatsu for another two decades (1979-1999), completing five terms. Kurihara's vision for the city was summarized by the catchphrase adopted during his government: *A Rich and Human City Where Industry and Culture Coexist in Harmony* (*sangyō to bunka no chōwa aru yutakana ningen toshi*). Holding true to its slogan, the mayor balanced industrial development with cultural growth, shaping Hamamatsu into a model of coexistence between innovation and heritage.

As regards industry, Kurihara promptly engaged in making Hamamatsu being chosen as one of the strategic areas for the establishment of a Technopolis in the framework of MITI's *Vision for the 1980s* (Section 11.4, p. 343). For more than ten years, his administration supervised the realization

¹¹¹ The Japan Association of City Mayors (JACM) is a council of local government officials composed of Japan's city mayors (including the mayors of Tōkyō's special wards). Established in 1898 as the Kansai Municipal Joint Council, it underwent several name changes before adopting its current name in 1930. The JACM advocates for local government support at the national level.

of the Hamamatsu Technopolis, completed in 1993, which contributed to solidifying the city's reputation as a forward-looking industrial hub.

Yet Kurihara's ambitions extended beyond industry, influenced by the general cultural shift that was sweeping Japan in the 1980s. He aimed to rebrand Hamamatsu not only as a *city of industry* (*seizō-gyō no machi*) and a *city of craftsmanship* (*mono-dzukuri no machi*) but also as a *city of culture* (*bunka no machi*). While he continued his predecessor's efforts to expand the city's museums and tourism, Kurihara especially focused on Hamamatsu's most distinctive cultural asset: music.

Building on the global success of Hamamatsu's renowned musical instrument manufacturers, Kurihara embarked on a mission to shift from the vision of a *city of musical instruments* (*gakki no machi*) into a *city of music* (*ongaku no machi*). In 1981, on the city's 70th anniversary, he unveiled a long-term plan known, precisely, as the "Creating a City of Music" (*ongaku no machizukuri*) initiative, accompanied by a *Comprehensive Basic Plan* (Hamamatsu City, 2023a). From that moment, the city took active steps to nurture its music culture. This included the establishment of organizations like the Hamamatsu City Cultural Association (1986) to provide funding for local music initiatives and groups, and the creation of Japan's first public museum dedicated to musical instruments, the Hamamatsu Museum of Musical Instruments (1995).

Kurihara's administration also organized large-scale music events featuring both national and international performers, aimed at attracting increasingly diverse audiences. To accommodate these events, Kurihara, who had a background in architecture, ensured the construction of striking new venues that would significantly redefine Hamamatsu's skyline. His architectural vision, combined with the city's industrial identity, symbolized Hamamatsu's transformation into a city where music and industry stood side by side.

A prime example of his urban renovation is represented by the Act Tower, inaugurated in 1994 near the city's main train station. Purposefully designed to resemble a harmonica, the tower is not only home to Hamamatsu's leading musical instrument companies – Yamaha, Kawai, and Tōkai – but also houses huge event halls hosting some of the city's main events. As the tallest building in Shizuoka Prefecture, the Act Tower has become the defining feature of Hamamatsu's skyline, a visible testament to the city's dual identity as both a center of industry and a vibrant cultural hub.

The Emergence of the *Global City*

The cultural shift in Hamamatsu politics during Kurihara's tenure was complemented by another key strategy: elevating the city's international profile. Moving beyond merely enhancing Hamamatsu's national reputation, Kurihara sought to position the city and its industries on the global stage, helping local firms establish themselves in international markets and showcasing the city's potential as a key player in the increasingly interconnected global economic networks. Just as the small town of Hamamatsu had embraced industrialization during the Meiji era, the rapidly growing industrial city of the 1980s seized the opportunities presented by Japan's wave of enthusiasm for internationalization (*kokusaika*), which accompanied the nation's rapid economic ascent.

From the very beginning of his administration, Kurihara made international relations a priority. In 1981, he inaugurated Hamamatsu's first sister-city agreements with Camas (Washington), and Porterville (California). Recognizing the need to support business travelers and tourists alike, the volunteer-based Hamamatsu International Communication and Exchanges Association (*hamamatsu kokusai kōryū kyōkai*) was established within the Hamamatsu Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1982. Through active collaboration between the local government and private sector, the city organized international festivals, fairs, and tourism campaigns. These efforts paid off in 1988 when Hamamatsu was officially recognized by Japan's national government as an International Convention City.

This engagement in *kokusaika* was often strategically connected to the movement for the creation of the city of music. In 1990, Hamamatsu signed an agreement with Warsaw (Poland), aimed at encouraging "City Exchanges to Promote Music Culture and Friendship" (*ongaku bunka yūkō toshi kōryū no suishin*) (Hamamatsu City, 2023b). Five years later, a similar agreement was made with Rochester (New York), with which Hamamatsu had established a sister-city relationship in 1990.

At the same time, the city also heavily invested in attracting international musicians to perform. In 1991, as part of its 80th anniversary celebration, the first Hamamatsu International Piano Competition was held. The event was a resounding success, earning international acclaim and establishing itself as a triennial event. By 1996, Hamamatsu was also hosting the Shizuoka International Opera Competition in collaboration with Shizuoka Prefecture. Both initiatives were later recognized by the World Federation of International Music Competitions, making Hamamatsu the only city in Japan to host two Federation-recognized competitions.

The early 1990s marked a pivotal moment in Hamamatsu's journey toward internationalization, as the city began to embrace demographic changes that would reshape its future, transforming it from

a place focused primarily on city branding and cultural promotion into one grappling with the realities and opportunities of an increasingly diverse society. Following the revision of Japan's *Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law* in 1990, Hamamatsu emerged as a major destination for Japan's first substantial waves of international migration.

Even before the legal reform, foreign workers with irregular status had been entering Hamamatsu's small and medium factories. Unlike larger firms, these smaller businesses struggled to attract workers and had less to lose if their illegal practices were exposed. When the Japanese government finally opened the door to immigration ajar, allowing a specific category of low-skilled migrants – the *Nikkeijin*, or foreigners of Japanese descent (Section 12.7) – to obtain long-term working visas, Hamamatsu's firms naturally rushed to attract as many migrant workers as possible. In a few months, Hamamatsu became Japan's top destination for *Nikkeijin* residents, primarily from Brazil.

From this point forward, the city's internationalization strategies began to take two distinct paths. On one hand, Hamamatsu focused on promoting tourism, organizing international events, and participating in city diplomacy, all designed to boost its image as both a city of industry and a city of music. On the other hand, the demographic changes brought by the increasing influx of international migrants, along with the resulting linguistic and cultural challenges, made it essential to develop new welfare policies to prevent social tensions and conflicts.

To manage both aspects of *kokusaika*, the municipal government established the International Exchange Office (*kokusai-kōryū-shitsu*) in 1991 – the office was reorganized into the International Affairs Office (*kokusai-shitsu*) in 1999, finally evolving into the current International Affairs Division (*kokusai-ka*) in 2003 (see Ikegami, 2016, p. 62). Upon its founding, the International Exchange Office assumed control of the Hamamatsu International Communication and Exchanges Association, which was concurrently restructured as a foundation and became widely known by its acronym, HICE. From that moment, the implementation of most of Hamamatsu's internationalization strategies was outsourced to HICE, including, as will be discussed later, all key initiatives related to migration management.

Naturally, promoting the city on an international level went hand in hand with its efforts to increase its reputation at the national level. As part of this strategy, Hamamatsu promptly became an active participant in CLAIR since its establishment in 1988 (Section 13.3, pp. 388-389). Additionally, in 1991, Kurihara, like his predecessor Hakuzo, was appointed chair of the Japan Association of City Mayors. This helped to strengthen ties with national politics and attract attention to Hamamatsu's internationalization efforts. This role further strengthened Hamamatsu's ties to national politics and drew attention to its internationalization efforts. In 1992, the city was designated by the Ministry of Home Affairs as one of the areas to implement the International Exchange Promotion Project, a

national initiative supporting municipalities committed to fostering international exchanges, tourism, and projects catering to foreign residents. That same year, Hamamatsu unveiled its *Basic Plan for Promoting a City of International Exchange* (*kokusai-kōryū-no-machi-suishin-kihon-keikaku*).

In line with the plan, the city introduced multilingual interpretation services at administrative counters, and foreign advisors were appointed to the International Exchange Office, HICE, the Board of Education, and the Public Health Center (Ikegami, 2016, p. 62). These efforts paid off when, in 1994, Hamamatsu became the first city to receive the national award for a City Open to the World (*sekai ni akareta machi*), established by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ikegami, 2001, p. 38-59).

By the late 1990s, Hamamatsu's internationalization strategies and cultural policies had evolved into a cohesive vision framed under the captivating concept of *global city* (*sekai-toshi*), that integrated city diplomacy, city branding, and city-cohesion promotion. These various efforts culminated in the 2001 city's strategic agenda, known as the *Hamamatsu Global City Vision* (*hamamatsu-shi-sekai-toshi-ka bijon*). The *Vision* was the result of a year-long effort by a panel of experts and four working groups and was aimed at guiding the city's politics over five years (2001-2005).

Two definitions of *sekai-toshi* were presented. The first drew from sociologist Saskia Sassen's concept of the "global city" (Sassen, 1991), that is, a city emerging as a major node in global networks of information and capital, and capable of performing a wide range of functions, exemplified by metropolises like Tōkyō, New York, and London. The second definition came from Japan's National Land Agency's 1992 *Globalization Strategy for Local Cities* (*chiho toshi no sekai-ka senryaku*), which stated that "a global city is a city that excels at a global level in a specific field or sector, such as theatrical activities or event activities" (National Land Agency, 1992).

Based on these definitions, four pillars were identified for the development of Hamamatsu into a global city, each accompanied by a guiding slogan¹¹²:

- *Social Cohesion* (*kyōsei*), for *A City We Live-in Together and Build Together*. This pillar encompassed initiatives for city diplomacy and city-cohesion promotion. In particular, it focused on: (a) promoting the inclusion of foreigners in local networks and establishing foreigners' networks to include them in policymaking; (b) providing essential welfare services to foreigners like language support and medical insurance; and (c) fostering internationalization practices among the native population through education on human rights, global issues, and foreign language instruction.
- *Exchange and Cooperation* (*kōryū / kyōryoku*), for *A City That Promotes Resident-led International Exchange and Cooperation*. This aimed at advancing city branding and city

¹¹² I adopt the translation from <https://www.debito.org/hamavisioneptoc.jpg>.

diplomacy through fostering sister-city relationships, facilitating cultural and technological exchanges, and encouraging international citizen exchanges.

- *Collaboration (renkei)*, for *A City Joining Hands with Our Local Region, Japan, and the World*. This goal bridged, once again, city diplomacy and city-cohesion promotion, emphasizing networking to strengthen both the local community and Hamamatsu's national and international sphere of influence. In particular, it called on the one side, for the creation of local networks with private actors to enhance cooperation and, on the other side, for the expansion Hamamatsu's participation in national and global city networks.
- *Promotion (hasshin)*, for *A Unique City Open to the World*. This pillar focused on cultural policy, proposing (a) the organization of international symposia, global conventions, and large-scale international events; (b) the promotion of Hamamatsu as a global *city of music*, particularly through international music competitions; (c) the enhancement of local technological innovations; and (d) the active support to cultural activities by foreign residents, which may also further empower their role and inclusion in the local community.

Crucially, as we are going to discuss in more details below, this plan represented the first clears of cultural heterogeneity – framed in terms of the different cultural background of foreigner residents – as a positive resource for the city. This marked the first step toward embracing the narrative of *diversity advantage* (Section 3.6). From this point forward, the inclusion of Hamamatsu's foreign population became increasingly interconnected with cultural promotion strategies and the city's ambitions to establish itself as an *international* – and, ultimately, *global* – city.

The publication of the *Vision* coincided with the city's 90th anniversary, but the timing was also motivated by another pivotal development: the start of the Great Heisei Consolidation in 1999. Indeed, one implicit goal of the *Vision* was to lay the groundwork for the major municipal merger that would result in the creation of contemporary Hamamatsu in 2005. By branding itself as a global city, Hamamatsu aimed to make itself an attractive partner for surrounding smaller municipalities, presenting the promise of a city capable of playing a significant role on the global stage while addressing local needs.

In the four years that followed the *Vision's* release, Hamamatsu engaged in a whirlwind of activities to solidify its profile as a global city. In addition to organizing numerous festivals and events, the city deepened its participation in national and international city networks. Notably, in 2001, Hamamatsu founded the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents, and in 2003, it joined the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), which became the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) in 2004.

In terms of its goal to facilitate the 2005 merger, the *Vision* was a clear success. After the merger was completed and Hamamatsu was recognized as an ordinance-designated city in 2007, a second, updated *Hamamatsu Global City Vision* was published. This new plan covered another five-year period, refining some of the specific actions while reducing the strategic pillars from four to three by incorporating *Collaboration* into *Exchange and Cooperation*.

14.5

From the *Global City* to the *Creative City*

The change of government following the defeat of Mayor Kitawaki and the takeover of Mayor Suzuki not only, as discussed above, reshaped Hamamatsu's governance but also introduced a new vision for the city under the captivating concept of the *creative city*. Popularized by Charles Landry (Landry, 2000) and Richard Florida (Florida, 2002), the concept was introduced in Japan by Masayuki Sasaki, a professor at Ōsaka University (e.g., Sasaki, 2001).

The idea of the creative city gained traction in Japan, especially after the establishment of the UNESCO Creative Cities Network in 2004, and, in 2007, it was officially adopted by Japan's Agency for Cultural Affairs – an organization under the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology – which established a *Cultural and Artistic Creative City* category in the context of its Commissioner for Cultural Affairs Award. Referring to the UNESCO definition, the Agency described creative cities as “local governments that use the creativity of culture and the arts across a range of fields to promote regional development, tourism, and industry, and work to solve regional issues” (Creative Cities Network Japan, n.d., my translation).

Suzuki's adoption of the creative city concept in 2007 was a strategic move. It provided a fresh, modern brand for his administration, setting it apart from the legacy of his charismatic predecessor. At the same time, it seamlessly connected with the visions that had shaped Hamamatsu under former mayors Hakuzo and Kurihara: that is, Hamamatsu as a city where innovation and development were tied to a high quality of urban life (Hakuzo), and as a city where industry and culture coexisted harmoniously (Kurihara).

Accordingly, while Kitawaki's concept of a global city was quietly set aside, relegated mainly to internationalization initiatives, Suzuki's administration published Hamamatsu's first *Basic Comprehensive Plan*, unveiling a new vision summarized by the slogan *A Creative City, Built on Civil Collaboration, Shining into the Future*. All the repertoire of concepts and slogans that had defined Hamamatsu's city branding, city diplomacy, and city-cohesion promotion over the years – such as the *yaramaika* spirit, the city of industry, the city of music, and the global city – were not discarded. Instead, they were woven together under the umbrella of the *Creative City Hamamatsu*.

The creative city ideal gained further momentum following the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, which hit Japan particularly hard and exposed vulnerabilities to external shocks in its economy. In a city as intertwined with the global market as Hamamatsu, the impact was especially severe. This spurred renewed interest in the creative city concept, which offered a vision of sustainable development that leveraged local resources, reimagined through the lens of creativity. Numerous initiatives aligned with this vision began to take shape.

In 2011, Hamamatsu's efforts received national recognition, with the city winning the Commissioner for Cultural Affairs Award in the category of Cultural and Artistic Creative City. That same year, a second *Basic Comprehensive Plan* was introduced, which once again embraced the vision of a creative city but placed a sharper focus on addressing three pressing challenges: (a) population decline, (b) economic stagnation, and (c) intensified inter-city competition.

To tackle specifically the issue of population decline, the plan prioritized creating a more supportive environment for child and youth development. Key initiatives included expanding childcare facilities, enhancing support for children with disabilities, fostering community-led youth development programs, and improving both education continuity and teacher quality. Taking a more holistic view of these challenges, the plan also recognized the potential of inclusion strategies for the migrant population to simultaneously mitigate demographic decline and stimulate economic growth. Migrant workers and their families were identified as vital contributors to both population sustainability and the labor market. Consequently, efforts were intensified to integrate migrant children into the educational system while improving employment opportunities for foreign residents.

Economic stagnation and inter-city competition were also tackled through a comprehensive approach deeply connected to the narrative of the creative city, aimed at raising Hamamatsu's international profile and attractiveness. The plan emphasized promoting cultural industries and enhancing the city's appeal as a tourist destination. Once again, the inclusion of migrants was viewed as an especially significant asset. Their diverse cultural backgrounds could be integrated into cultural policies, offering a strategic opportunity to enrich Hamamatsu's image and distinguish it as a globally unique and attractive city.

In 2014, Hamamatsu took a bold step in its creative city journey by becoming Asia's first UNESCO City of Music, joining the UNESCO Creative Cities Network. This further cemented Hamamatsu's reputation as a cultural hub, reinforcing its global stature as a leader in creative city development and a pioneer in leveraging cultural diversity as a strategic resource.

At the end of 2014, the municipal government presented a new comprehensive *Hamamatsu City Vision*, designed to guide the city's policies for the next 30 years, from 2015 to 2044. This vision was built around three key challenges that were identified as central to the city's future. The first challenge is creating a sustainable city and society that efficiently utilizes its internal resources while minimizing energy and material waste. The second is transforming Hamamatsu into a "place of choice," that is an appealing city capable of attracting people "in all stages of life, as a place to work, give birth and raise children, learn, play, and relax" (Hamamatsu City, 2024a; my translation). The third challenge is addressing the demographic decline by fostering work-life balance and investing in welfare programs that support families and make it easier to have and raise children.

To tackle these challenges, the *Vision* centers around the concept of Hamamatsu as a *Creative City, Built on Civil Collaboration, Shining into the Future*. Each of the three components of this vision – (a) *Creative City*, (b) *Built on Civil Collaboration*, and (c) *Shining into the Future* – is detailed through a specific slogan, clarifying their scope in the context of the city management:

- a) *Creative City* is intended as *A Creative City in Technology and Culture with an International Flavor*: this pillar essentially encapsulates all Hamamatsu's established city branding and diplomatic initiatives that promote its industries and its reputation as a city of music.
- b) *Civil Collaboration* is framed in terms of *Small Gears Working Together to Move Big "Things."* Within this point, various city-cohesion promotion strategies are grouped together, particularly referring to cultural and welfare policies.
- c) *Human Development* is specified through the slogan *Connecting Traditions that Create Innovation for the Future*. This aspect focuses on cultivating Hamamatsu's human capital, particularly through initiatives that support youth, education, and skill development.

In line with this long-term vision, the city enacted its third *Basic Comprehensive Plan* for Hamamatsu as a creative city in 2015. Unlike previous plans, this one spanned a 10-year period, from 2015 to 2024. As the end of this period approaches, evaluations are underway, and a new *Basic Comprehensive Plan* is expected to be published by the end of 2024, covering the years 2025 to 2035. Although the creative city concept remains central and will likely continue to shape policy for nearly two more decades, in recent years, Hamamatsu has also embraced the idea of becoming a *sustainable city*. In 2019, the Japanese government designated Hamamatsu as an SDGs Future City, and the

municipality drafted a voluntary report that reframed the city's policies and practices through the lens of the Sustainable Development Goals (Hamamatsu City, 2019). In 2022, the city furthered its commitment to sustainability by joining ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, a global network focused on sustainable urban development.

Within this evolving framework – from its *global city* ambitions to its *creative city* and *sustainable city* visions – another important image of Hamamatsu has emerged: that of a city that welcomes people from diverse backgrounds and promotes cultural heterogeneity as a creative resource. This identity has gradually taken shape as Hamamatsu increasingly embraces its role as a *City of Tabunka Kyōsei* (multicultural conviviality) or, as it now refers to itself in English, an *Intercultural City*.

14.6

The Arrival of Foreigners

“Hamamatsu was born as a welcoming city. *Kyōsei* [conviviality] has always been a basic component of our civil culture.”
(Interview E, my translation)

When Hamamatsu residents proudly celebrate the entrepreneurial spirit they believe defines the regional culture of western Shizuoka Prefecture, they often emphasize its connection to an attitude of openness and acceptance toward outsiders. This mindset, considered an essential component of *yaramaika*, is believed to date back to the hustle and bustle along the Tōkaidō road during the Tokugawa period (Otsuka, 1986; Aoyama, 2009, p. 505). Accordingly, Hamamatsu is often portrayed as a city that has historically pioneered social inclusion and pluralism, promoting cohesion, collaboration, and enhancement of its residents' human capital, regardless of background or culture. However, when we look more closely at the city's historical approach to migration, a more nuanced and complex picture emerges than this retrospective creative city narrative suggests.

One thing is certain: like many industrial cities, Hamamatsu's growth story is deeply intertwined with migration. For decades, the public administration's attention to migration focused mainly on managing population growth through housing and welfare policies, since most migrants were internal, arriving from other parts of Japan. Issues related to their settlement and integration into local life were

mostly left to employers and neighborhood associations, which played a key role in helping new arrivals transform into citizens.

Moreover, until the 1980s, Hamamatsu did not have a significant presence of ethnic minorities. Only one notable incident with an ethnic dimension occurred in the city's history: the so-called Hamamatsu Incident of 1948. At the time, a gang of Zainichi Korean residents, leveraging international contacts, organized a black market of contraband goods with unofficial support from the local police. This activity clashed with the interests of the Hattori-gumi, a Japanese gang that operated the local black market. Tensions eventually escalated into open conflict, with the Hattori-gumi receiving backing from the police and local Japanese residents, leading to dozens of arrests, mainly of Zainichi Korean individuals. After this incident, the small Zainichi Korean community in Hamamatsu – never exceeding a few thousand – kept a low profile, even during periods of large-scale social movements by Zainichi Koreans elsewhere in Japan.

A significant turning point in Hamamatsu's approach to cultural heterogeneity came in the 1980s with the arrival of its first international migrants. Notably, in 1982, a religious private association invited a group of Vietnamese refugees to settle in the city (Tegtmeyer Pak, 2000, p. 265), marking the first instance of non-Japanese speakers and non-citizens needing support for the settlement. Coincidentally, the Hamamatsu International Communication and Exchange Association had been established that same year within the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, staffed by city officials. The Vietnamese refugees' struggles brought issues of language and integration to the Association's attention. In response, it began offering Japanese language classes and practical information about daily life, with much of the funding coming from private donations, particularly from the local Rotary Club, and the work carried out by volunteers. This early experience laid the foundation for the Association to become the key administrative body providing support for migrant residents, working closely with local civic organizations to address the evolving needs of the city's increasingly diverse population.

Following the reform of Japan's immigration laws in 1990, Hamamatsu experienced a dramatic influx of migrants, primarily Nikkeijin from Brazil. The number of registered Brazilians in the city jumped from just 26 in 1987 to 3,488 in 1990, and 6,313 by 1992 (Yamanaka, 2003, p. 240). Alongside the growing Brazilian community, migrants from other parts of South America, the Philippines, China, and Vietnam also began to arrive in smaller but notable numbers. Many Nikkeijin migrants arrived in family groups, with a significant proportion of women and children. In 1992, women accounted for 41%, and children under 14 made up 8% of the Nikkeijin population; by 1998, these numbers had increased to 55% and 14%, respectively (Yamanaka, 2003, p. 240).

From the outset, the presence of foreign migrants led to various challenges. Cultural differences sparked mutual prejudices and tensions, while Japan's regulatory system created barriers that hindered migrants' access to essential services. Language barriers further isolated foreign groups, slowing their ability to adapt to the numerous informal community rules that shape everyday Japanese life. This sense of "otherness" made their differences more visible, fueling xenophobic prejudices among native Japanese residents (Yamanaka, 1996; 1997; Ikegami, 1998).

As in many other Japanese cities, Hamamatsu soon saw a rise in complaints from native residents about the behavior of foreign newcomers. Issues like improper garbage disposal, late-night gatherings, and noisy congregations in public spaces – actions that often conflicted with Japanese norms of public decency and sometimes were punishable by law – triggered widespread resentment. In many cases, such behaviors were enough to raise deep resentment among Japanese residents, consolidating representations of foreigners as uncivilized and undesirable. The media played a significant role in reinforcing negative stereotypes by sensationalizing every crime or legal infraction involving foreigners, linking them to criminality and disorder.

For the migrants themselves, the challenges of integration were compounded by their precarious status. Many, particularly non-Nikkeijin, did not intend to settle in Japan for the long term, which reduced their incentive to learn the language or navigate Japan's complex social norms. Discrimination and exclusion further discouraged efforts to assimilate. At the same time, migrants faced significant hardships in accessing basic rights, including fair employment, healthcare, and education, leaving them in a vulnerable position within Japanese society.

Solidarity movements, particularly those led by religious organizations, were among the first to mobilize in support of migrants in Hamamatsu. These efforts were voluntary and primarily funded through private donations. A notable example is Hamamatsu Overseas Laborers Solidarity (*herusu no kai*), a group of volunteers established in 1990 at a Catholic church. The group provided migrants with free language support, legal advice, and assistance to workers when possible (Yamanaka, 2012). However, as the cases they encountered often involved migrants with unauthorized status, serious injuries, illnesses, or exploitation by employers, these civil organizations lacked both the resources and expertise to meet the growing demands for help.

The local government, like many others across Japan, found itself overwhelmed and unsure of how to proceed. There were no national or prefectural guidelines, no designated funding, and no personnel trained to handle the unique challenges of assisting migrants. This confusion is well reflected in the perspectives of three individuals I interviewed during my fieldwork: a civic officer, an activist volunteer, and a Brazilian migrant.

The civic officer, who was then employed in the International Exchange Office, admitted, “We didn't know what to do. The national government wasn't giving any directives, and many of the requests we received were technically illegal. It felt like no one wanted to take responsibility. Without clear regulations, anything we did could be seen as illegal, so we felt paralyzed” (Interview E my translation).

The activist volunteer, who worked with informal groups supporting foreigners, explained: “There obviously weren't enough staff who spoke the languages, and they didn't have the necessary skills. But we understood that. Still, they had to do something because the rights of these people were clearly being violated.” (Interview F; my translation)

The Brazilian migrant shared: “I never met my first employer... at that time, everything was mediated by a family friend who spoke good Japanese. I never had any problems, so I didn't particularly have to deal with the administration. However, I do know that in those years, some took advantage because no one would go to the administration anyway. Either because they didn't speak the language or because they couldn't do anything anyway.” (Interview G; my translation).

14.7

Governing Early Migration

Thanks to its involvement in city networking, Hamamatsu's administration became aware of how other Japanese local governments were addressing the challenges represented by migration. Following the common trend, also Hamamatsu municipality framed the migrant issue as part of the city's internationalization strategies, assigning the management of migrant-related concerns to departments focused on *kokusaika*, specifically the International Exchange Office and HICE.

In 1992, the Hamamatsu City International Exchange Center was established by the municipality as the facility to offer administrative services and assistance to foreign residents, with HICE taking charge of its operations. This marked the consolidation of the system that still governs migrant-related issues in Hamamatsu today. The International Exchange Office (now the International Affairs Division) oversees all initiatives within the *kokusaika* framework, designing strategies and implementing policies under the direct supervision of the mayor. The execution of these initiatives is

outsourced, with HICE managing projects related to foreign residents, funded through both public and private channels. In turn, HICE relies on volunteers and civil society organizations subsidizing them within the possibilities of its available funding. Individuals with migrant backgrounds and organizations with migrant presence have, of course, always represented precious partners to effectively implementing the initiatives.

This structure reflects a top-down approach, with the mayor playing a central role in decision-making. Meanwhile, outside this institutional framework, both migrant and native activists, along with their formal or informal organizations, attempt to highlight issues not adequately addressed by the International Affairs Division's policies.

Despite contemporary narratives that portray Hamamatsu as a pioneer in migrant reception and social inclusion, the reality in the 1990s was far less progressive. The International Exchange Office and HICE were small entities, initially more focused on city branding through large international events and city diplomacy through international networking than on migration governance or social inclusion. Mayor Kurihara's priorities aligned with these internationalization goals rather than addressing the complexities of migration.

Accordingly, as in most Japanese municipalities, Hamamatsu avoided taking initiatives that were not explicitly outlined in the national regulatory framework. Notably, in 1993, rather than leading on inclusive policies, the city followed a restrictive national directive, which significantly impacted migrant workers (Ikegami, 2001, pp. 228-251; Yamanaka, 2003, p. 244). This policy barred newcomers of foreign origin from enrolling in the low-cost National Health Insurance, instead pushing them into the more expensive National Social Insurance System, which combined health insurance with a costly old-age pension plan.

As most migrants intended to stay in Japan for only a few years, they were naturally unwilling to pay for a pension they would not benefit from, and thus often chose to forego health insurance altogether. Furthermore, employers, especially small-scale labor brokers who hired many foreign workers, were hesitant to enroll them in the system due to the high costs they were also required to pay to enroll workers in the National Social Insurance System. Consequently, a large proportion of migrants lost access to health insurance, leaving them in a vulnerable situation, especially given their employment in hazardous 3D jobs.

Another critical issue that the local government long overlooked was the education of migrant children. By 1996, only 372 out of the 1,134 Brazilian children under 14 years of age were enrolled in the school system (Ikegami & Kinpara, 1997, p. 17). The sudden arrival of students with limited – if any – Japanese language skills left both teachers and the city's Board of Education unprepared to address their educational needs.

The city's administration attempted to mitigate the problem by hiring bilingual advisors and assistants to support Brazilian children in Japanese classrooms. However, these measures were clearly insufficient to ensure proper access to education. Since Brazilian children, as non-citizens, were not legally required to attend school, there was little incentive for them to enroll or stay in the system. Many teenagers opted to work in factories to earn money, while others idled in groups on the streets, which only deepened the local community's negative perceptions of Brazilians, further fueling tensions and reinforcing harmful prejudices (Yamanaka, 2003, p. 245).

14.8

Racism and Rights Struggles

As civil society actors – both natives and migrants – and institutional representatives gained more experience, their understanding of migrant-related issues deepened, and the strategies used by institutions to address these challenges shifted. Migrant and civil society groups gradually formed cognitive networks capable of systematizing what initially seemed like a chaotic and confusing landscape of problems, with each migrant facing a different set of challenges. Gradually, common categories of issues were identified, and the best strategies to address them – whether through direct action or institutional advocacy – were developed.

As the language skills and economic conditions of many migrants improved, and as they became more familiar with the social dynamics of life in Japan, more competent advocacy groups emerged. These groups, often composed of both natives and migrants, became increasingly effective in addressing migrant issues.

The enthusiasm for activism and the growing sensitivity to migrant-related problems, sparked by the Great Hanshin Earthquake, resonated in Hamamatsu as well. In the following years, several pro-migrant civil society organizations were established. One such group was Medical Aid for Foreigners (MAF), a still-active volunteer organization established in 1996 that, thanks to the sponsorship of the Hamamatsu Rotary Club and other charity-minded organizations, has been offering ever since annual free medical check-ups to migrant workers, with both regular and irregular residency status. Another well-known organization was the Group of Justice and Peace (*Grupo Justiça e Paz*) established in

1997 by former members of *Herusu* and a Nikkeijin Catholic priest. This group was aimed at campaigning to urge the Hamamatsu municipal government and the Shizuoka Prefectural government to address the problem of the large proportion of foreigners lacking health insurance.

A pivotal moment occurred in 1998 with a case of racial discrimination that gained widespread media attention (Yamanaka, 2003; Webster, 2007). Ana Bortz, a Nikkeijin Brazilian journalist, was aggressively ordered to leave a local jewelry store that had a sign reading *No foreigners allowed in this shop*. Learning that this was far from an isolated case (Bortz, 1998), Bortz decided to sue the store owner, Mr. Suzuki. As Japan lacked any anti-discrimination laws, she invoked the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which Japan had ratified in 1995. Suzuki defended himself, citing his right to choose his customers under Article 22 of the Japanese Constitution – which guarantees freedom of choice of occupation –, claiming foreigners were unpredictable and prone to criminal behavior, thereby putting store owners at risk.

In 1999, Bortz won the case. The judge in the Shizuoka District Court (Hamamatsu Branch) ruled, in a precedent-setting decision, that ICERD provisions could be used to provide standards by which the court can determine discriminatory acts and assure reparation for victims; expelling a customer based on nationality was deemed an act of racial discrimination that interfered with public order. Notably, the New York Times compared the case to “the Japanese equivalent of Rosa Parks’ defiance of bus segregation in Montgomery, Ala¹¹³” (French, 1999). Bortz’s Japanese lawyer noted, “Frankly speaking, this case’s influence will be very big. Just as I didn’t know of the existence of this treaty beforehand, neither did most other lawyers” (French, 1999).

Bortz’s case highlighted the serious lack of awareness about human rights issues among Japanese citizens, sparking a wave of pro-foreigners and pro-rights movements. Leveraging Bortz’s victory, local activists and their organizations began pressuring Hamamatsu’s administration to enact a local anti-discrimination ordinance, deemed necessary in a city with such a high concentration of foreigners. The proposed law aimed to protect not only foreigners but also other marginalized groups, including women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and other minorities facing discrimination.

Unsurprisingly, the proposal did not gain support from the municipality. Enacting such a law would have been politically unpopular and might have harmed electoral prospects, especially since foreign residents did not have voting rights. However, it became clear that the growing awareness of minority rights and the demand for equality could no longer be ignored. Without action, Hamamatsu risked fostering social polarization and tarnishing its reputation. For a city that intended to boost its

¹¹³ In 1955, African-American Rosa Parks rejected bus driver James Blake’s order to vacate a row of four seats in favor of a white passenger according to a city ordinance in Montgomery (Alabama) establishing bus racial segregation in favor of White passengers over Black. Her act of civil disobedience is often regarded as one of the key episodes sparking the American Civil Rights Movement.

image internationally, it was necessary not to rise to the headlines for violations of international standards. Moreover, as Hamamatsu, with the beginning of the Great Heisei Consolidation precisely in 1999, was preparing to proceed with the great merger, it could not afford to present itself as divided or conflict-ridden. The image of a unified, harmonious city was essential for gaining the trust of neighboring areas.

In 1999, Hamamatsu witnessed another significant change. After two decades under Kurihara's administration, Mayor Kitawaki took office with a clear vision: to create an expanded Hamamatsu with a strong international image. Kitawaki recognized that managing migration and cultural heterogeneity had to be central to the city's strategic agenda. Early in his term, he introduced 10 key policies, with the fourth emphasizing the importance of "reinforcing the conviviality [*kyōsei*] with foreign residents" (Ikegami, 2018, p. 63; my translation).

Nevertheless, despite his expressed support for migrant communities, Kitawaki was cautious about taking concrete actions that might prove unpopular with the native Japanese population. At a meeting with a group of foreigners in late 1999, when discussing a potential anti-discrimination ordinance, Kitawaki made his stance clear:

I do not intend to legislate such an ordinance, but I do agree that racial discrimination should not be tolerated. I will make every effort to eliminate it short of legal enforcement. As for causes of racial discrimination, I think that Japanese people may not be used to interacting with foreigners because they have long lived in an island country. Therefore, I believe that, if the Japanese come to know well about foreign residents in Hamamatsu, their ideas and their activities, this will eventually lead to better understanding of them among Japanese. (Quoted in Yamanaka, 2003, p. 250)

Kitawaki's strategy was to address local concerns without pushing for legislative changes that might upset native residents. He chose instead to shift the responsibility for substantial intervention to the national government. While carefully promoting rights awareness at the local level, he simultaneously started championing migrant rights by lobbying the national government to make policy changes. By the end of 1999, Hamamatsu's administration had already submitted a formal request to the national government, urging a review of the public health insurance system for foreign residents and calling for the repeal of the directive that excluded them from National Health Insurance.

Although these efforts did not immediately transform the daily lives of migrants in Hamamatsu, Kitawaki's administration officially adopted the discourse of human rights. This marked a turning point for the city. The case of Ana Bortz and the local struggle against discrimination demonstrated how the strategy of external pressure (*gaiatsu*) (Section 12.1, p. 347) could be leveraged also at the municipal level. Under persistent pressure from pro-migrant activists and organizations, Kitawaki's government began laying the groundwork for the emergence of the ideal of the Hamamatsu as the city of *tabunka kyōsei*.

14.9

Championing *Tabunka Kyōsei* at the National Level

Kyōsei (social cohesion) quickly became a cornerstone of Mayor Kitawaki's government, referring to the need to strengthen the connections between migrants and native residents in Hamamatsu. Just months after his election, Kitawaki established several Councils for Local *Kyōsei* (*chiiki-kyōsei-kaigi*) in areas with high concentrations of foreign residents. These were local assemblies composed of representatives of local Japanese organizations – especially neighborhood associations – and foreign residents, aimed to discuss and address issues related to the growing foreign presence in the local community (Ikegami, 2018, p. 63). Additionally, to provide foreigners with a direct channel to engage with the local government, the Hamamatsu City Foreign Citizens Conference (*hamamatsuichi-gaikokujin-shimin-kaigi*) was launched in 2000.

As previously noted (Section 14.4, p. 413), *kyōsei* also prominently featured as the first pillar of the *Hamamatsu Global City Vision*, published in 2001. While not explicitly referring to *tabunka* (multiple cultures), it called for the inclusion of foreigners in local networks and policymaking, the provision of essential welfare services, and the promotion of human rights awareness in line with international standards. Ultimately, this vision set a forward-thinking agenda aimed at fostering social justice through representation, redistribution, and recognition of foreign residents. Notably, the vision also highlighted, under the pillar of *hasshin* (promotion), the encouragement of cultural activities by foreign residents. By positioning cultural heterogeneity as a valuable resource for the city, the plan marked the first explicit adoption of the *diversity advantage* narrative, signaling a shift toward recognizing the benefits of immigrants' inclusion in Hamamatsu's development strategy.

These initiatives were not unprecedented in Japan. Several local governments, including Ōsaka and Kawasaki, had already established political representation mechanisms for foreigners through local councils during the 1990s (Section 13.4, p. 391). Kawasaki, in particular, had introduced a strategic plan similar to *Hamamatsu Global City Vision* as early as 1993 with its *New Era 2010 Plan*, which set an example soon followed by several other municipalities.

What truly set Hamamatsu apart on the national stage was Kitawaki's decision to create a national network of cities to exchange information, share best practices, and advocate for national policy reforms on migration governance. In 2001, Hamamatsu hosted the formation of the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents (*gaikokujin-shūjū-toshi-kaigi*), uniting 13 Japanese mayors. This council was not really designed for cities with high percentages of migrants in general, but specifically for those with large Nikkeijin populations. Since the central government had granted long-term settlement rights to Nikkeijin, these cities found themselves as legitimate stakeholders in migration management and believed they were entitled to receive national support for their unique challenges.

As it represented the city with the largest Nikkeijin population, Hamamatsu quickly emerged as the leading voice in this network. The Council's establishment marked a significant moment when migration governance became a national issue, and Hamamatsu asserted its role as a primary stakeholder in shaping Japanese migration and integration policies.

During the Council's establishment, the *Hamamatsu Declaration* was ratified and brought to the attention of the national government, which centered on Kitawaki's concept of *kyōsei*. Entitled, precisely, *local kyōsei*, opened by stating that "Due to the progress of globalization, the declining birthrate, and aging population, local cohesion [*chiiki kyōsei*] is emerging as a key issue in many Japanese cities" (Hamamatsu City, 2001; my translation). On this basis, the 13 congregating cities declared the following:

We recognize that foreign residents, who are increasingly settling down, live together in the same community and are a major force supporting the local economy, as well as being important partners in the creation of new local cultures and town development brought about by the coexistence of diverse cultures, and we must establish rules and systems for community coexistence... based on respect for rights and fulfillment of obligations, which are essential for healthy urban life.

Several concrete measures were then listed as conditions for achieving *kyōsei*, organized around the three core dimensions (Hamamatsu City, 2001):

- (a) *Education*: Guarantee equal access to education for all migrant children, incentivizing and supporting their integration into the national school system or alternative education pathways; create spaces for interaction between migrant and native children and adults to foster mutual understanding.
- (b) *Social Security*: Ensure that all migrant workers have access to medical insurance, either through the National Health Insurance or a special health plan for non-Japanese residents, with coverage provided by their employers; strengthen penalties for employers who fail to comply;

and create a multilingual medical care and information system in collaboration with civil organization

- (c) *Alien Registration*: Simplify documentation and procedures, making them available in multiple languages and, when possible, accessible online.

While these measures required commitment from individual municipal governments, they also called for national policy reforms. In 2002, the network produced a follow-up document framed as a “Joint Appeal” (*kyōdō apīru*), in which the cities requested the national government to “quickly establish an organization that will compile basic guidelines on the acceptance of foreigners and foreign residents in Japan, and comprehensively coordinate policies between ministries and agencies” (Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents, 2002; my translation).

As the national government remained largely unresponsive, the Council reconvened in Toyota City (Aichi Prefecture) in 2004 and ratified a new, more detailed document – the *Toyota Declaration* – to urge for reforms. Notably, without any substantial conceptual change, the term *local kyōsei* adopted in the *Hamamatsu Declaration* was replaced by *tabunka kyōsei*, which, by then, was emerging as a key term in discussions on migration and management of cultural heterogeneity. To strengthen their appeal, the cities highlighted how their requests aligned with the Japan Business Federation’s *Recommendations on the Problem of Accepting Foreign Nationals*, issued that same year. The declaration also emphasized that the Council “will strengthen cooperation with the business community” to carry out its campaigning.

The Council’s lobbying played a crucial role in prompting the central government to enact the *Regional Plan for the Promotion of Tabunka Kyōsei* in 2006 (Section 13.5, p. 393). Many parts of this plan, including the definition of *tabunka kyōsei* and the recommended measures for local governments, closely followed the Council’s recommendations and echoed the language used in the Hamamatsu and Toyota declarations. This recognition from the central government served as an important precedent, reinforcing the Council’s influence on national policy. Although participation in the Council has fluctuated – peaking at 29 cities in 2011 and dropping to just 11 in 2023 – it continues to meet annually, submitting reports and policy appeals to both central and prefectural governments.

Laying the foundation of the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei*

Hamamatsu's prominence in championing *tabunka kyōsei* did not go unnoticed. Scholars and the media followed the city's efforts, often praising its initiatives and further cementing its reputation as a progressive and innovative municipality in migrant-related policies. By the time Hamamatsu became an ordinance-designated city in 2007, it was already widely regarded as a national model of *tabunka kyōsei*.

This was not just rhetoric. Hamamatsu truly emerged as a city with exceptional expertise in managing migration and cultural heterogeneity, where innovative policies were actively implemented. The city's expertise grew steadily over time, thanks to a range of contributing factors on both the administrative and civil society fronts.

First, know-how naturally increased through continuous evaluation of previous practices, learning from trial and error, improving communication channels between institutions and residents, and the steady improvement of language skills among the Nikkeijin population. Second, collaboration with scholars played a key role. Researchers with active agendas not only provided support for specific policy programs but also produced books, articles, and reports that informed city officials and civil society actors. Their work offered scientific validation for the creation of new policies. Lastly, Hamamatsu's participation in city diplomacy provided opportunities to learn from other municipalities and adopt innovative strategies.

Based on this accumulated knowledge, the city implemented a growing number of initiatives aligned with the *Global City Visions* of 2001 and 2007, as well as the *Hamamatsu Declaration* (2001) and *Toyota Declaration* (2004). Policymaking gained further momentum when some of the demands from the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents were addressed by the national government in the 2006 *Regional Plan for the Promotion of Tabunka Kyōsei*. While the plan did not come with any real financial commitment from the state, it offered important normative legitimacy to Hamamatsu's progressive initiatives. Being grounded in national directives allowed the municipality to implement these policies with less fear of political backlash or public discontent.

Between 2008 and 2011, Japan was shaken by two major events that led to widespread socioeconomic instability: the global financial crisis and the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. These crises prompted a rethinking of local strategies and strengthened the focus on community cohesion and resilience.

In Hamamatsu, the financial crisis accelerated the city's adoption of the creative city narrative while

also contributing reshaping its approach to migration. After years of consistent growth in the number of foreign residents, the city experienced a sharp decline starting in 2009 – the first since 1990. The population of foreign residents dropped from a peak of 33,326 in 2009 to just 20,920 by 2015, before gradually increasing again¹¹⁴. This reduction eased some of the pressure on migrant services and presented an opportunity to reassess the city's strategies. Concurrently, the Great East Japan Earthquake drew renewed attention to the need for disaster preparedness and, particularly, to importance of fostering community ties at the neighborhood level, including engaging foreign residents in these efforts.

These dynamics contributed to reinforcing Hamamatsu's commitment to the ideal of the creative city, emphasizing the strategical importance of harnessing all its local resources to ensure sustainable development. Within this framework, the administration of Mayor Suzuki – which entered in charge in 2007 – put a renewed attention on *tabunka kyōsei*, recognizing it both as a tool for social cohesion and as a way to promote diversity as one of the city's cultural strengths. Unsurprisingly, *tabunka kyōsei* was officially incorporated as a strategic priority in Hamamatsu's second *Basic Comprehensive Plan* of 2011.

Importantly, *tabunka kyōsei* was identified as a key transversal strategy to address the city's three primary challenges: population decline, economic stagnation, and intensified inter-city competition. As previously discussed (Section 14.5, p. 416), migrant workers and their families were seen as essential contributors to addressing these issues by bolstering demographic sustainability, strengthening the labor market, and enriching Hamamatsu's cultural identity, thus enhancing its global appeal.

While the plan acknowledged the significance of *tabunka kyōsei*, it fell short of providing comprehensive measures for the social inclusion of migrant workers. Nevertheless, it led to the creation of a flagship initiative that has since become a hallmark of Hamamatsu's identity as an inclusive and creative city: the Zero School Refusal for Foreign Resident Children Project (*gaikoku-hito-no-kodomo-no-fu-shūgaku-zero-sakusen*).

The 2011 plan had placed a strong emphasis on education, highlighting the alarming rate of school absenteeism among children of migrant families. Unlike Japanese nationals, foreign children were not legally required to attend school, but it was evident that the absenteeism was connected to significant barriers to foreign children participation due to systemic inadequacies, such as insufficient language support and a lack of incentives. This phenomenon not only undermined the city's ability to uphold children's rights to education but also created risks of social unrest, reinforcing the marginalization of migrant families and teenager foreign residents. Moreover, it hindered young

¹¹⁴ <https://www.hi-hice.jp/en/organization-overview/inspection/data/>

migrants' ability to access the labor market, contribute to local economic growth, and unlock their creative potential, which could otherwise enrich Hamamatsu's cultural policies and harness its diversity advantage.

To address this urgent issue, the local government launched the Zero School Refusal for Foreign Children Project, aiming to eliminate absenteeism among migrant children by 2013. A so-called *Hamamatsu Model* was developed and progressively refined, based on four key interventions (see Suzuki, 2021):

- 1) Introducing foreign residents to schools upon arrival, ensuring that all migrant families are immediately informed about educational opportunities
- 2) Monitoring school attendance by (a) conducting annual surveys in elementary students, (b) tracking new residents every two months, (c) monitoring dropout rates bi-monthly, and (c) establishing a register for foreign children of school age, linked to the basic resident register.
- 3) Providing comprehensive enrollment support, offering personalized assistance to guide migrant families through the school enrollment process.
- 4) Ensuring attendance retention through collaboration in a partnership with stakeholders across Hamamatsu in order to create support systems that promote sustained school attendance.

By 2013, Hamamatsu announced that the project's ambitious goal had been achieved: all foreign resident children in the city were effectively enrolled and attending local schools. Beyond this immediate success, the initiative had several meaningful side effects that influenced the city's *tabunka kyōsei* policies. It galvanized civil society organizations, increasing public awareness of migrant issues and fostering greater mutual understanding between Japanese and foreign residents. Additionally, the project strengthened partnerships between city officials, Japanese civil society groups, and organizations representing foreign residents, creating a collaborative framework that helped further developments of Hamamatsu's efforts towards social inclusion.

The renewed focus on *tabunka kyōsei* in the 2011 *Basic Comprehensive Plan*, coupled with the success of key initiatives like the Zero School Refusal Project, inspired Hamamatsu's government to consider drafting a dedicated plan to properly frame a comprehensive approach to guide foreign-related initiatives. Coincidentally, around the same time, the Japan Foundation became interested in the Council of Europe's Intercultural Cities Programme (ICC) and facilitated exchanges between Japanese and European experts on diversity governance.

Having heard about these initiatives, Mayor Suzuki formed a Study Group on Intercultural Cities in 2011, inviting Professor Keizo Yamawaki (Meiji University) – who had been involved in the exchanges with the ICC Programme since their very beginning – to present a report entitled

Intercultural Cities and Tabunka Kyōsei Cities: Towards the Next Stage of Multicultural Coexistence in Local Communities. As both Hamamatsu’ and ICC’s city visions were framed within the broader framework of the creative city, Suzuki immediately realized a close alignment between his ideal of a *tabunka kyōsei* city and the European *Intercultural City*.

Suzuki quickly recognized the potential of this alignment to bolster Hamamatsu’s national and international reputation as the Japanese pioneer in *tabunka kyōsei*. In January 2012, he attended the first Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities in Tōkyō, meeting with several European, Korean, and other Japanese mayors, as well as experts of integration policies, and European promoters of interculturalism. Among the European presenters was Phil Wood, one of the very formulators of the concept of the creative city that Suzuki had adopted. Seizing the opportunity, Suzuki proposed hosting the next summit in Hamamatsu, and in October 2012, the second Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities was held there, co-organized by Hamamatsu municipality, the Japan Foundation, the Council of Europe, and CLAIR.

At the conclusion of the summit, a new *Hamamatsu Declaration* was ratified, in which participating cities recognized “cultural diversity as a source of the city’s dynamism” (Hamamatsu City, 2012). The declaration affirmed a commitment to “bring together people of different cultural backgrounds to foster innovation and creativity” and to explore “a new urban vision in the age of globalization based on the realization of the diversity advantage” (Hamamatsu City, 2012). Additionally, Asian cities pledged to implement concrete policies and promote global partnerships among intercultural cities to share knowledge and experience.

14.11

The *Tabunka Kyōsei* Plans

The year following the Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities organized in Hamamatsu, the first strategic plan focusing specifically on *tabunka kyōsei* – the *Hamamatsu Tabunka Kyōsei Vision* – was introduced, setting the guidelines for a four-year period from 2013 to 2017. This plan was developed primarily under the leadership of Mayor Suzuki and the International Affairs Division, with contributions from experts such as Professor Keizo Yamawaki and Professor Shigehiro Ikegami

from Shizuoka University of Art and Culture. No mechanism for civil society advocacy or participation was established, except for the inclusion in the plan of a general proposal from the Foreign Residents Council (Hamamatsu City, 2013, p. 12).

The *Vision* posited *tabunka kyōsei* as a crucial element of Hamamatsu's broader vision based on the ideal of a Creative City, Built on Civil Collaboration, Shining into the Future. This emphasis was reflected in the plan's subtitle, consisting of a rephrasing of such a slogan, that is, *Creating Our Bright Future Together*. The first half of the document provided extensive context for the plan's development, explaining how the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 highlighted the need to refocus on *tabunka kyōsei* as an integral part of the city's *Basic Comprehensive Plan* (Hamamatsu City, 2013, pp. 1-2). It also offered an overview of Hamamatsu's history of migration, past and present initiatives for migrant integration (Hamamatsu City, 2013, pp. 7-12), and a discussion of national and international trends in diversity governance, particularly highlighting the European ideal of the intercultural city as a model (Hamamatsu City, 2013, pp. 13-14).

Within this background, the second half of the plan outlined Hamamatsu's vision for *tabunka kyōsei* and the strategies for its implementation. Three main pillars were identified, each of which, following the typical framing of the city's strategic policies, was defined by a slogan:

- *Collaboration (kyōdō)*, for *A City Built Jointly by Everyone, Hand in Hand*. This pillar emphasized initiatives to promote dialogue and exchange between different cultural groups, with a specific focus on education to enhance mutual understanding.
- *Creativity (sōzō)*, for *A City Achieving Development by Making the Most of Its Diversity*. This point covered cultural policies aimed at promoting minority cultures as sources of creativity, as well as city diplomacy initiatives at the national and international levels, focusing on participation in networks related to migration and diversity governance.
- *Safety (anshin)*, for *A City where Everyone Can Live Comfortably*. Framed under the influence of the 2011 Great East Earthquake, this goal called for including foreign residents in disaster prevention efforts and providing communication support, mediation services, and welfare measures, particularly concerning health and housing.

Within this framework, several strategic measures and performance indicators were established to guide Hamamatsu's migration and diversity governance over the next four years. In 2017, as part of its city diplomacy strategy, Hamamatsu officially joined the Intercultural Cities (ICC) Network, reaffirming the alignment of its *tabunka kyōsei* vision with interculturalism, which had been highlighted as a leading global approach to diversity integration. By joining the ICC Network,

Hamamatsu became the first city in Asia to be part of this initiative by the prestigious Council of Europe, in which Japan's national government participates as an external observer. Membership in the ICC not only provided Hamamatsu with opportunities to learn from other cities' intercultural strategies but also strengthened its city diplomacy and enhanced its symbolic standing within Japan.

In that same 2017, the city conducted an evaluation of the initial *Tabunka Kyōsei Vision*, and a new plan was drafted for the period from 2018 to 2022. The second plan maintained the structure and conceptual foundation of its predecessor, providing a comprehensive overview of past achievements and the city's present circumstances while outlining strategies for fostering an inclusive and cohesive community. The plan reaffirmed Hamamatsu's dedication to promoting *tabunka kyōsei* as a central pillar of its governance.

Compared to the first plan, the second vision updated the discussion of the principles of *Collaboration*, *Creativity*, and *Safety*, identifying more specific future challenges to address (Hamamatsu City, 2018, pp. 3-5):

- *Collaboration*: The plan reaffirmed the need to foster intercultural understanding among Japanese residents by creating opportunities for cultural exchange and encouraging interaction between Japanese and foreign communities. In particular, it emphasized the importance of strengthening networks among organizations involved in promoting *tabunka kyōsei* and enhancing information sharing between them.
- *Creativity*: To advance this principle, the vision focused on promoting active participation in community life for young foreign residents, incentivizing employment opportunities for foreign exchange students, and creating avenues for foreign residents to express their cultural identities.
- *Safety*: The vision aimed to develop inclusive tools for disseminating information, improve consultation and information services, and strengthen Japanese language training for foreign residents.

While the first plan of 2013 predated Hamamatsu's adoption of the comprehensive creative city vision in 2014 (the *Hamamatsu City Vision*), the second *Tabunka Kyōsei Vision* explicitly aligned itself with this broader thirty-year framework (Hamamatsu City, 2018, p. 2). In particular, the plan positioned *tabunka kyōsei* as a key component of the city's creative city aspirations, emphasizing its role in fostering social cohesion, economic vitality, and cultural innovation. Like the first *Tabunka Kyōsei Vision*, also this second vision was conceived as a sectorial plan within the city's broader *Comprehensive Basic Plan* – which had been updated in 2015. After providing a contextualization of the scope of *tabunka kyōsei*, the vision included an evaluation of the first plan and an overview of

Hamamatsu's evolving socioeconomic landscape, supplemented by input from the Foreign Residents Council (Hamamatsu City, 2018, pp. 3-11).

Building on the national and international trends in migration and diversity governance reviewed in the first vision, the second plan introduced a deeper focus on global best practices. Notably, it drew inspiration from Barcelona's *Interculturality Plan*, which was taken as a reference model for formulating Hamamatsu's updated vision. The plan explicitly acknowledged this influence, stating:

To help formulate this new vision, we conducted an investigation through the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations regarding intercultural policies in Barcelona, Spain, a leading European representative of the Intercultural Cities Network, of which Hamamatsu is now a member. (Hamamatsu City, 2018, p. 14)

This connection to Barcelona was not coincidental. In late 2015, Hamamatsu officials had met with Dani de Torres, former Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue in Barcelona and the architect of the city's first *Interculturalitat Plan*. Indeed, De Torres had been invited to Tōkyō by the Japan Foundation to deliver a lecture titled *The Frontier of the Intercultural City – The Case of Barcelona* (Tokuhashi, 2016). During this event, he shared insights alongside Professor Keizo Yamawaki, who had previously collaborated with de Torres during his visits to European intercultural cities, including Barcelona.

By 2022, also the second plan came to an end, and a third *Tabunka Kyōsei Vision* was formulated for the period from 2023 to 2027. Once again, the structure, conceptual framing, and overarching policies of *tabunka kyōsei* remained consistent with the two preceding plans. However, three notable updates were introduced in this iteration.

First, while reconfirming the position of *tabunka kyōsei* as a core component of Hamamatsu's *creative city* framework, a stronger emphasis was put on its alignment with the ideal of *sustainability*, with was consolidating in the city, particularly since its designation as an SDGs Future City in 2019. Specifically, the vision underlined that “in order to achieve our SDGs, Hamamatsu will also put an ever more directed focus on diversity and show how foreign personnel working in the city are indispensable to the city's growth” (Hamamatsu City, 2023, p. 1). This marked a more explicit connection between diversity governance and sustainable urban development, recognizing the essential contributions of foreign residents to the city's long-term prosperity.

Second, shifting away from the previous focus on Barcelona, the third vision turned its attention to Oslo's intercultural education policies as an international benchmark. This shift reflects a continued effort to draw inspiration from successful global models while tailoring these practices to its specific local context.

Third, the plan placed a greater emphasis on data collection through surveys and questionnaires to better understand the experiences of foreign residents and evaluate the effectiveness of inclusion efforts. This data-driven and evidence-based approach was designed to refine and inform policy decisions and intervention, strengthening their legitimization as responses to detected needs of the community.

At the end of 2023, a significant political transition occurred with the conclusion of Mayor Suzuki's fourth term, which was the last of its long tenure. Indeed, Suzuki decided not to run for re-election, instead pursuing and winning the governorship of Shizuoka Prefecture in 2024. His successor, Yusuke Nakano, assumed office in the spring of 2023 with Suzuki's endorsement, ensuring a smooth transition of leadership. Nakano immediately declared his commitment to continuing Suzuki's vision of Hamamatsu as a *Creative City, Shining into the Future*, signaling continuity in the city's political and strategic priorities. Suzuki expressed confidence that the systems and practices established under his leadership would remain robust and effective, even beyond his tenure (Interview H). His new role as governor of Shizuoka Prefecture also positions him to maintain influence over Hamamatsu's policies, potentially opening new opportunities for collaboration between the city and the prefectural government.

In his inaugural year as mayor, Nakano has, indeed, upheld his predecessor's emphasis on *tabunka kyōsei*. Not only has the local government continued to implement the projects outlined in the third vision but it also actively explored opportunities to strengthen its initiatives further. One of Nakano's notable accomplishments has been the organization of a new Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities, marking a return of this significant event after an 11-year hiatus since the last summit was held in Ansan. The 2024 summit, hosted in Hamamatsu in October, featured prominent international representatives, including Jakub Mazur, First Deputy Mayor of Wrocław (Poland), and Min-Geun Lee, Mayor of Ansan (South Korea). The event brought together stakeholders from local administrations and civil society to showcase their work, exchange perspectives, and discuss innovative approaches to diversity governance.

14.12

The Governance System of the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei*

In the same way we explored the *City of Interculturalitat* in Barcelona (Sections 10.13-10.15), these concluding sections of the chapter examine the key dimensions of the system of governance in what we may call the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei*. The analysis begins in this section by outlining the governance structure that underpins this system, before discussing the conceptual frames it is based upon and, finally, evaluating the successes and challenges of Hamamatsu's approach to cultural heterogeneity from the perspective of its stakeholders.

The normative, regulatory, and administrative foundation of the system of governance of the City of *Tabunka Kyōsei* is anchored in Hamamatsu's three *Tabunka Kyōsei Visions*. The responsibility for overseeing the implementation of these visions lies primarily with the municipal International Affairs Division (*kokusai-ka*). However, much of the operational work is outsourced by the division to the Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communication and Exchange (HICE), which plays a pivotal role in coordinating initiatives and directly managing key projects.

HICE's major functions include creating platforms for cultural exchange and community building within the framework of *tabunka kyōsei*, facilitating dialogue and the sharing of best practices among all the actors involved. Additionally, the foundation provides essential support for foreign residents by offering multilingual resources, consultation services, and practical assistance to promote social inclusion.

HICE implements most of its projects in partnership with civil society actors and educational institutions, such as schools and universities. Notably, the foundation has established and coordinates a network of organizations and individuals dedicated to promoting *tabunka kyōsei*. This network also encourages the formation of new groups and stakeholders focused on addressing specific aspects of foreign presence and cultural heterogeneity. Participation in these initiatives often relies on volunteers and informal connections, with information widely shared via social media and other communication platforms.

Representatives from this network periodically convene in two key consultative bodies:

- Hamamatsu City Intercultural Unity Promotion Council: Comprising local organizations and institutional stakeholders, this council focuses on managing cultural heterogeneity and reviewing strategic developments.
- Hamamatsu City Foreign Residents' Unity Deliberative Council: Composed of foreign residents, including activists and representatives from civil society organizations focused on foreign affairs, this body provides insights and proposals to enhance multicultural coexistence.

Under HICE's leadership, civil society organizations and volunteer groups play an active role in supporting foreign residents and fostering multicultural exchange. Noteworthy initiatives include Japanese language classes offered through the Hamamatsu Foreign Resident Study Support Center (U-ToC). These classes provide comprehensive learning opportunities for both children and adults while encouraging cultural exchange facilitated by local volunteers. HICE also supports NGOs in organizing events that celebrate cultural diversity, providing social welfare support, and translating materials to enable foreign residents to participate actively in community activities.

Educational institutions also make critical contributions by collaborating with HICE to raise awareness about cultural diversity and *tabunka kyōsei*. They host lectures, workshops, and events on international understanding, aimed at fostering social inclusion and promoting intercultural awareness among the Japanese population. Additionally, schools and universities occasionally provide career development opportunities for young people with foreign heritage, particularly for those aspiring to become intercultural mediators or educators in local schools. Research projects further enhance the city's approach to *tabunka kyōsei*, offering valuable data on cultural heterogeneity and the challenges faced by foreign residents. Academic findings have been instrumental in planning effective solutions and validating initiatives, ensuring that Hamamatsu's diversity governance is both informed and impactful.

Beyond the initiatives directly managed or coordinated by HICE, numerous other projects support the city's vision for *tabunka kyōsei*. While the supervision of these initiatives is essentially centralized under the International Affairs Division, a wide range of other institutional and civil society actors contribute to the management of cultural diversity, creating a deeply interconnected governance framework.

Much like Barcelona's City of *Interculturalitat*, Hamamatsu's City of *Tabunka Kyōsei* operates on a transversal model, integrating efforts across multiple municipal departments to address the diverse needs of migrants. This comprehensive approach reflects the multifaceted nature of migration-related challenges, which span education, employment, public safety, and cultural integration. Of Hamamatsu's 15 municipal departments, 11 are actively involved in implementing the *Tabunka Kyōsei Visions*, with various divisions within these departments taking on specialized roles. This extensive engagement underscores the city's commitment to embedding *tabunka kyōsei* as a core dimension of city management. Table 1 offers an overview of the scale of the administrative structure of the City of *Tabunka Kyōsei*, illustrating its integration across the municipal administration. The table highlighting the departments contributing to the system of governance, alongside the specific divisions and offices actively engaged in implementing the strategies outlined in the *Tabunka Kyōsei Visions*.

DEPARTMENT	DIVISION / OFFICE INVOLVED
Crisis Management Department	Crisis Management Division
Planning and Coordination Department	Public Relations and Information Division
	International Division
~~Digital and Smart City Promotion Department~~	/
General Affairs Department	Personnel Division
Finance Department	Municipal Tax Division
Citizen Department	Citizen's Counseling Center
	Civic Partnership and Regional Policy Division
	Universal Design and Gender Equality Division
	Creative City and Cultural Promotion Division
	Central Library
Health and Welfare Department	Welfare General Affairs Division
	Human Rights Education Center
	Senior Citizens' Welfare Division
	Long-Term Care Insurance Division
	National Health Insurance and Pension Division
	Mental Health Welfare Center
	Health Promotion Division
Child and Family Department	Childcare Support Division
Environment Department	Waste Management Facilities Division
Industry Department	Industrial Promotion Division
	Startup Promotion Division
Urban Development Department	Housing Division
Civil Engineering Department	Road Planning Division
~~Carbon Neutral Promotion Department~~	/
~~Wellness Promotion Department~~	/

Accounting Department	/

Table 5. List of the administrative departments of Hamamatsu's municipal government, distinguishing those actively involved in managing cultural heterogeneity within the framework of the Visions of Tabunka Kyōsei.

Working in a partnership with these administrative bodies, several other institutional and civil society actors play pivotal roles in supporting *tabunka kyōsei*. Notably, representatives from the business community and employment support organizations contribute to efforts aimed at promoting economic integration, internationalizing local enterprises through foreign talent recruitment, and fostering entrepreneurship among foreign residents. In 2020, the Foreign Resident Employment Support Desk was established by the International Affairs Division in collaboration with the Industrial Promotion Division. This initiative facilitates consultations for both foreign job seekers and local businesses, creating a matchmaking system that aligns foreign talent with labor market needs.

To further encourage foreign talent retention and improve workplace conditions, the city launched the Project for the Certification of Hamamatsu Businesses with an Active Global Workforce, which offers public recognition and visibility incentives for enterprises that hire foreign workers and establish foreigner-friendly environments. Complementing this, the International Affairs Division provides workplace support programs, including language training and guidance on labor standards compliance.

Additionally, in partnership with the Start-up Promotion Division, Hamamatsu introduced a Foreign Resident Start-up Promotion Program. This initiative offers visa assistance and other incentives to high-skilled entrepreneurs aiming to establish businesses in the city. Collaborative efforts with Hello Work (Public Employment Security Office) and the Labor Standards Inspection Office have also led to programs that enhance awareness of employment rules and improve labor conditions for foreign workers.

Municipal departments responsible for police, fire, and emergency services also contribute to *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives. Collaborating with neighborhood associations and civil society organizations, these departments implement localized programs to promote crime prevention, road safety, and emergency preparedness. These efforts often include multilingual bulletins and public awareness campaigns tailored to engage foreign residents effectively.


In disaster prevention and management, the International Affairs Division, in partnership with the Crisis Management Division, has established the Multicultural Disaster Support Center. This center produces multilingual emergency materials, coordinates notification systems, and organizes periodic

training sessions for multilingual community leaders. It also facilitates foreign-friendly disaster drills and educational classes, ensuring that foreign residents are equipped to respond effectively during emergencies.

Finally, the International Affairs Division manages Hamamatsu’s contact with national and international organizations, fostering partnerships that advance the city’s multicultural agenda. Notable collaborations include those with the Japan Foundation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), national city networks such as the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents, and international city networks – primarily the Intercultural Cities Network.

Funding for Tabunka Kyōsei initiatives predominantly comes from public sources, including central government allocations to support local internationalization (*kokusaika*) and municipal budgets designated for strategic plans. Occasionally, private foundations provide additional funding for specific projects. Budgetary details can be found in HICE’s financial reports, which indicate an average annual budget in the range of several tens of millions of yen (equivalent to several hundred thousand euros). This investment underscores Hamamatsu’s prioritization of cultural diversity management.

Table 6 summarizes the results of this analysis, offering a visual representation of the governance system of the City of *Tabunka Kyōsei*.






Table 6. Visual synthesis of the City of Tabunka Kyōsei’s governance system, outlining the various scales of governance – including their respective roles and the mechanisms shaping their engagement through a multiscalar lens. The focus then narrows to the municipal level, detailing the core principles that underpin the City of Tabunka Kyōsei and mapping the ecosystem of actors involved in its governance, together with their specific roles.

14.13

Framing Cultural Heterogeneity in Hamamatsu

The City of *Tabunka Kyōsei* is explicitly embedded within Hamamatsu’s broader vision of itself as a *creative* and *sustainable city*. This alignment is evident not only in the evolving political discourse surrounding cultural heterogeneity, *kyōsei* and, later, *tabunka kyōsei*, but also in the strategic integration of these themes into the city’s strategic planning. Ultimately, the foundational framework, articulated in the 2014 *Hamamatsu City Vision for a Creative City, Built on Civil Collaboration, Shining into the Future* and further detailed in the third *Basic Comprehensive Plan* published in 2015, systematized *tabunka kyōsei* as a key dimension for the long-term city vision.

Since the inception of the first *Tabunka Kyōsei Vision* in 2013, the framework of *tabunka kyōsei* has been guided by three core principles: *collaboration* (*kyōdō*), *creativity* (*sōzō*), and *safety* (*anshin*).

This structure aligns closely with the broader diversity governance framework. It emphasizes integration and social inclusion, rooted in the recognition of human rights and equality of opportunity, while also embracing the diversity advantage narrative. This narrative, especially prominent under the principle of *creativity*, envisions Hamamatsu as a *City that Brings Forth New Value through Diversity* (Hamamatsu City, 2018, p. 26; Hamamatsu City, 2023, p. 21)¹¹⁵.

Interestingly, the Japanese term *tayōsei* (*diversity*) is not extensively used in Hamamatsu's discourse on *tabunka kyōsei*. Instead, cultural heterogeneity is primarily referred to through the term *tabunka*, which translates literally to *multiculturalism* in English. Notably, both terms are mostly used to refer to ethnicity and nationality, specifically in the context of migration and foreign residents. Thus, the focus of *tabunka kyōsei* remains narrowly confined to issues related to immigration and foreign populations, without expanding to other identity categories or reimagining cultural heterogeneity as an intrinsic element of broader social diversity. In this sense, contrary to Barcelona's *interculturalitat*, Hamamatsu's *tabunka kyōsei* does not pursue the mainstreaming of cultural heterogeneity into policies that address broader identity markers beyond ethnicity or migrant status. Instead, its interventions are framed as targeted, specific measures designed to address the unique needs of foreign residents. These measures are often extraordinary in nature, rather than systemic or integrated into general social policies.

While limited to foreign populations, the focus of *tabunka kyōsei* does incorporate an intersectional approach. This perspective highlights specific issues faced by subgroups within the foreign population, with particular attention to gender and age. For instance, targeted initiatives ensure access to public services such as welfare, pensions, and healthcare for these subgroups. A special emphasis is placed on migrant children, including second- and third-generation residents, to facilitate their inclusion in the education system – this focus is exemplified by the aforementioned highly successful Zero School Refusal for Foreign Children Project launched in 2011 (Section 14.10, p. 430). Additionally, *tabunka kyōsei* addresses the specific needs of migrant women, such as those who are victims of violence, ensuring their access to necessary support services.

As Hamamatsu's engagement with *tabunka kyōsei* is deeply intertwined with its ambition to enhance its international image, a key aspect of the framing of its approach to cultural heterogeneity lies in the English translations chosen by the municipality (particularly by the International Affairs Division) to represent its core principles. Central to this is the term *tabunka kyōsei* itself. Initially, it was translated in terms related to *multicultural* – for instance, the title of the first *Tabunka Kyōsei Vision* was originally translated in English as *Multicultural Vision*.

¹¹⁵ In the first *Tabunka Kyōsei Vision*, this vision was framed in terms of a *City Developed by Making the Most of Its Diversity* (Hamamatsu City, 2013, p. 28).

However, following Hamamatsu's decision to join the Intercultural Cities Network and its engagement with European *interculturalism*, the terminology underwent a strategic shift. Starting with the second vision plan, *tabunka kyōsei* was rebranded in terms of *interculturalism*. Consequently, the titles of the *Tabunka Kyōsei Visions* were translated into *Intercultural City Vision* – a change that has since been retroactively applied to earlier plans, so that, currently, even the first vision plan is now presented under this title in its English version. Despite this lexical change, the underlying conceptual framework of *tabunka kyōsei* remains consistent. This transition to intercultural terminology, therefore, reflects a calculated choice to align with global narratives rather than a substantive shift in how cultural heterogeneity is approached or managed in Hamamatsu.

A similar evolution is evident in the translation of the third principle of *tabunka kyōsei*, *anshin*, which was initially rendered as *safety*. While *safety* well captures the original Japanese term's meaning – as well as its origins in disaster prevention following the Great East Japan Earthquake – it proved problematic in an international migration context, where *safety* often evokes notions of securitization and control. Accordingly, recognizing that from an international perspective, the connection of *safety* with disaster prevention and management may not be immediately clear, the municipality started exploring alternatives. At one point, *anshin* was translated as *comfort*, but this choice proved equally fraught, as it risked connotations of *convenience* or, even worse, it may somehow evoke totally unrelated associations with highly problematic themes, such as that of *comfort women* – women and little girls forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in occupied countries and territories before and during World War II. Currently, the term is translated as *peace of mind*, a more nuanced expression intending to capture the ideal of *anshin* as a state of security and freedom from worry, achieved through effective risk management and prevention.

This discussion makes it evident that the selection and application of English terminology within the context of *tabunka kyōsei* are frequently influenced by factors and considerations that extend beyond the conceptual framework underpinning the approach to cultural heterogeneity. These linguistic choices often reflect strategic or pragmatic concerns, such as aligning with global narratives or ensuring resonance with international audiences, rather than offering a precise representation of the foundational principles of *tabunka kyōsei*.

Under the leadership of Mayor Yusuke Nakano, there appears to be little likelihood of significant changes to the framing of *tabunka kyōsei*. This continuity was evident at the already mentioned 2024 Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities, organized by Nakano's administration to reinvigorate dialogue between Japanese, South Korean, and European cities engaged in diversity governance. At the summit's conclusion, Mayor Nakano, Mayor Lee of Ansan, and First Deputy Mayor Mazur of

Wroclaw signed the 2024 *Hamamatsu Declaration*, which underscored shared commitments to interculturalism.

The declaration articulated three key resolutions (Hamamatsu City, 2024b):

1. To “share the principles of Intercultural Cities with our citizens and develop concrete and practical action plans for their implementation in efforts to make diversity a part of everyday life.”
2. To “promote mutual exchange and dialogue with residents of diverse cultural backgrounds to foster a greater sense of belonging in the regional community, which shall promote the creation and sharing of new culture that contribute to community revitalization.”
3. To “actively embrace interculturalism as a strength and characteristic of our city, sharing best practices and striving to create a vibrant community where everyone can thrive.”

The phrasing employed in this declaration strongly reaffirms the *diversity advantage* narrative, emphasizing integration through positive interaction and exchange. However, the scope of “diverse cultural backgrounds” remains, once again, confined to ethnic and national minorities – whether recent migrants, descendants of earlier waves of immigration, or recognized ethnocultural groups. This was not reflected only by the words chosen in drafting the *Declaration*. During the summit, in which I participated, discussions about cultural heterogeneity consistently centered on ethnicity and nationality.

This reveals an ongoing limitation in Hamamatsu’s approach compared to the broader framework of diversity governance. Specifically, the perspective underlying this approach fails to incorporate all identity markers into the scope of cultural heterogeneity, remaining confined to the traditional categories of ethnicity and nationality. As a result, it lacks the recognition of diversity as an inherent and fundamental characteristic of social life. Instead, diversity is viewed as an external attribute that, as emphasized in the *Declaration*, must be actively integrated to become “a part of everyday life.”

14.14

Entering the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei*: Successes and Challenges

During my fieldwork in Hamamatsu, I had the opportunity to interview various institutional and civil society representatives and participate in planning meetings and activities related to the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei*. Additionally, I attended three major conferences where Hamamatsu's approach to managing cultural heterogeneity was presented and discussed with key stakeholders, researchers, and experts. Drawing on my earlier fieldwork experience in Barcelona, I focused on the perspectives of different categories of stakeholders regarding the main successes and challenges of Hamamatsu's approach. Interestingly, despite the distinct contexts, some findings mirrored those I had encountered in Barcelona.

Institutional actors widely praised the *sustainability* of Hamamatsu's *tabunka kyōsei* system. Many, including the city's mayors during my research period – Yasutomo Suzuki and, from 2023, Yusuke Nakano – attributed this sustainability to Hamamatsu's cultural ethos of welcoming and entrepreneurship, encapsulated in the narrative of the spirit of *yaramaika*. In addition, local government officials all recognized the city's mayors as key figures in promoting and supporting the city's vision in the long-term. Mayor Suzuki, in particular, was celebrated for his steady *ideological commitment* to social inclusion and his progressive openness toward foreign residents. Another key factor highlighted by institutional actors was the active *engagement and resilience* of civil society organizations and volunteer groups, which form the backbone of many initiatives related to the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei*.

Hamamatsu's approach was also commended for its ability to *integrate seamlessly into the city's broader strategic agenda*, synergistically contributing to overall urban development. The *transversal nature* of the initiatives – engaging multiple municipal departments and leveraging diverse competencies – was also recognized as a hallmark of the approach.

Finally, institutional stakeholders consistently emphasized Hamamatsu's strong commitment to data collection, monitoring, and evaluation, which they regarded as exemplary practices in evidence-based policymaking. These efforts were frequently highlighted as key contributors to the effectiveness and positive impact of the city's institutional interventions. One standout example often cited was the already mentioned Zero School Refusal for Foreign Resident Children Project (Section 14.10, p. 430), celebrated for its success in leveraging data-driven insights to address challenges and deliver meaningful outcomes. This approach not only ensured the project's achievements but also reinforced Hamamatsu's reputation for employing rigorous methodologies in its pursuit of inclusive governance.

Despite their enthusiasm in the Hamamatsu's approach, several challenges emerged during discussions with institutional actors. One major issue highlighted by local political representatives – particularly, by Mayor Suzuki – was the limited support to the system of governance of cultural

heterogeneity from the national government. Municipalities like Hamamatsu face significant constraints in political autonomy and resources, making it essential for the national government to provide clearer legislative frameworks, funding, and logistical support. Without such backing, efforts to mainstream *tabunka kyōsei* within the broader functioning of local administrations cannot but remain limited.

Another pressing significant challenge identified by both government officials and representatives from HICE is *engagement saturation*. Participation in *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives has largely been confined to a narrow group of activists, interested individuals, and those with direct access to information about available services. Many officials acknowledged that a significant portion of the city's population – both Japanese and foreign residents – might not even be aware of the existence of these municipal plans and initiatives. This lack of broader civic involvement undermines one of the system's core objectives: fostering widespread and meaningful interaction between Japanese and foreign residents, which is essential for genuine integration.

A final challenge which emerged from interviews and discussions was the need to strengthen *relationships with the city's business sector*, a critical stakeholder given that many foreign residents come to Hamamatsu for work. Employers play a pivotal role in the settlement and integration of foreign workers and their families, yet their involvement in the *tabunka kyōsei* framework remains limited. Strengthening connections between the labor market and *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives is seen as a vital direction for the future, reflecting the job-centered nature of many Japanese social dynamics. Accordingly, not only greater collaboration with businesses could enhance workplace inclusion and provide a stronger foundation for the city's efforts to support its foreign residents.

Civil society representatives also pointed to the *active engagement* of Hamamatsu's mayors and local administration as a key strength of the city's approach to *tabunka kyōsei*. Then, their praise mostly focused on specific areas of competence and expertise, with stakeholders commending successes in addressing particular migrant-related issues and advancing their work. This positive feedback was consistently supported by data and other tangible evidence provided by the representatives.

As for the challenges, many civil society stakeholders emphasized the problem of the excessive *reliance of the city on volunteers* to implement initiatives related to *tabunka kyōsei*, which results in fluctuating attendance and inconsistent outcomes for certain projects. This dependence is also connected to a problematic *lack of stable funding*: indeed, most funding opportunities are one-time grants, which hinder long-term planning and require an extraordinary level of flexibility and adaptability to maintain program continuity.

Drawing on my own observations, it was clear that compared to my previous fieldwork in Barcelona, Hamamatsu's civil society actors engaged in *tabunka kyōsei* perceived far less of a coherent and effective system for managing cultural heterogeneity. In Barcelona, the principles of *interculturalitat* were well-known and consistently invoked by all stakeholders as a guiding framework. In Hamamatsu, by contrast, *tabunka kyōsei* was frequently described by my respondents as a vague, aspirational ideal rather than as a framework grounding a structured system for addressing cultural heterogeneity. Notably, few actors were familiar with the comprehensive *tabunka kyōsei* plans or the guiding principles of *collaboration*, *creativity*, and *safety*. This lack of shared understanding suggested a major *fragmentation and fragility* in the Hamamatsu's governance system compared to Barcelona. Yet, this was compensated by the extraordinary resilience of Hamamatsu's grassroots practices.

Although the resilience of civil society actors indicates a *more organic and multifaced* way to frame and address cultural heterogeneity in the city, nevertheless, the overall system remains distinctly *top-down*, with decisions centralized in the International Affairs Division and ultimately emanating from the mayor's office. Interestingly, only a few stakeholders identified this centralized structure as a critical issue. Nevertheless, the system provides limited opportunities for civil society actors to participate meaningfully in policymaking.

Notably, civil society actors described their relationship with the local government as *collaborative* and devoid of opposition or antagonism. Many of these actors had been either directly supported or encouraged by the municipality to engage in *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives, meaning their work aligns closely with municipal priorities. As a result, there is little perceived need – nor practical possibility – for civil society actors to challenge the system or advocate for significant bottom-up changes.

The same dynamics apply to meso-level actors, such as HICE employees, who act as intermediaries between grassroots practitioners and government officials. While HICE maintains a close connection with the local government, its scope for independent action is constrained by *bureaucratic limitations*. HICE's interventions must align strictly with directives from the mayor, communicated through the International Affairs Division.

This centralized governance model also limits the potential for expanding the scope of cultural heterogeneity beyond categories of nationality and ethnicity to include other minority groups within the framework of *tabunka kyōsei*. Any such expansion remains closely tied to the priorities of the local government and, ultimately, to the *personal vision and ideology* of the mayor. Currently, the prevailing view in Hamamatsu continues to prioritize migration-related issues, reflecting the mayor's belief that these require a focused and targeted approach.

Finally, the reliance on volunteers in implementing strategies for *tabunka kyōsei* is intricately linked to a deeper systemic challenge: a prevailing perception among many Japanese citizens that promoting social inclusion is a voluntary, informal activity to be undertaken in *one's spare time*, rather than an essential and structured societal responsibility. Further complicating this issue is a pervasive *not in my backyard* (NIMBY) mindset, where individuals may support the concept of social inclusion in theory but resist personal involvement or engagement in practice.

These two attitudes – *inclusion in spare time* and *not in my backyard* – appear rooted in a longstanding cultural legacy in Japan that emphasizes mutual aid and strong neighborhood cohesion as organic, self-sustaining aspects of communal life. Within this traditional framework, social issues are typically viewed as challenges to be addressed through informal, grassroots mechanisms rather than through formalized systems or institutional intervention. However, this approach naturally proves inadequate in addressing the complexities surrounding interactions with foreign residents, where unique barriers intervene, such as language differences, cultural misunderstandings, and legal complications related to foreigners' residency status. These challenges contribute to the NIMBY mindset, where many Japanese individuals avoid engaging with these issues unless they are directly affected. Even then, the response is often to seek institutional intervention not with the intention of resolving the underlying problem but rather with the hope of *removing* or *relocating* it elsewhere.

This perspective reflects a broader societal tendency to view efforts toward social inclusion as an ideological or voluntary commitment, lacking the normative weight to make it a shared, structured responsibility. Social inclusion is frequently relegated to the realm of personal or leisure-time activities and is not recognized as part of the *serious* domains of work or civic obligation. This diminishes the importance of the *tabunka kyōsei* ideal and undermines the recognition of the co-responsibility required to create a community where foreign residents are integrated as effective and valued members. Consequently, the responsibility for addressing these issues often falls on a small group of dedicated volunteers and civil society actors. These dynamics reveal a critical need to shift societal perceptions, reframing social inclusion as a collective, structured endeavor rather than a discretionary activity, and ensuring that it becomes an integral part of the community's shared responsibility.

A promising future direction for *tabunka kyōsei* lies in rethinking the concept of cultural heterogeneity within the broader framework of diversity governance. This shift could help mainstream the theme of diversity in Japanese society by challenging the often unquestioned assumption of national homogeneity. Such an approach would illuminate the constructed and problematic nature of this homogeneity, which various Japanese minority groups still experience as restrictive and alienating. By acknowledging diversity as an intrinsic aspect of social life, rather than

as an external element to be *accepted*, society can begin to cultivate greater awareness of minority conditions and foster a sense of collective responsibility for addressing issues within local communities.

This reimagining of diversity could also catalyze innovative, grassroots approaches to addressing social challenges. By encouraging flexibility within local government institutions and amplifying the plurality of voices and perspectives in civil society, it would create fertile ground for bottom-up practices that are more responsive and effective. These practices could, in turn, further enhance the inclusivity, adaptability, and resilience of local governance systems.

The following table (Table 7) systematizes the findings of my fieldwork, highlighting the main perceived successes and challenges of the governance system of the City of *Tabunka Kyōsei*. These findings are presented from the perspectives of government officials and civil society actors and are further enriched with my own critical insights.

THEME	INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS' PERSPECTIVE	CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS' PERSPECTIVE	ADDITIONAL CRITICAL INSIGHTS
Long-Term Sustainability	- Success: Welcoming and entrepreneurial culture (<i>yaramaika</i> spirit). - Success: Consistent mayoral support (Mayor Suzuki and Mayor Nakano). - Success: Resilience of civil society and volunteer groups.	- Success: Active engagement and openness from the city's mayors and local administration.	- Challenge: Mayoral leadership serves as a double-edged sword: strong top-level advocacy provides focus and visibility, but centralizes decision-making. - Challenge: The system's durability hinges on mayoral backing, rendering it vulnerable to potential leadership changes.
Integration with Broader Urban Agenda	- Success: <i>Tabunka kyōsei</i> is embedded within wider city planning and development strategies. - Success: Multiple municipal departments collaborate, enhancing holistic approaches.	- Success: <i>Tabunka kyōsei</i> can address multifaceted social and migrant issues that intersect with other urban priorities (education, welfare, health, etc.).	- Challenge: Despite transversality on paper, actual coordination often remains limited by central control of the International Affairs Division. - Challenge: Some projects lack sustained cross-departmental engagement, leading to fragmentation and uneven results.
Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms	- Success: Robust institutional monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. - Success: Exemplary practices for inclusive governance.	- Success: Evidence-based approaches allow for more targeted interventions and accountability. - Success: Institutional efforts to track progress and adapt projects to evolving needs.	- Challenge: Data collection is praised, but it is mostly top-down; civil society lacks full access to data or involvement in shaping monitoring indicators. - Challenge: The system prioritizes quantifiable outcomes, risking neglect of qualitative factors crucial for long-term integration (e.g., social bonds, sense of belonging).
Resources	- Challenge: Local political representatives (including Mayor Suzuki) express frustration about insufficient legislative frameworks, financial support, and resources from the national level. - Challenge: Constraints in political autonomy hamper efforts to mainstream <i>tabunka kyōsei</i>. - Challenge: One-time grants are common, limiting long-term program continuity.	- Challenge: Lack of governmental funding undermines long-term planning and the potential expansion of local initiatives. - Challenge: Unstable funding forces organizations to constantly adapt, undermining strategic planning. - Challenge: The city alone cannot fully sustain <i>tabunka kyōsei</i> without broader governmental support.	- Challenge: National-level ambivalence toward cultural heterogeneity limits local innovation and resource mobilization. - Challenge: Local activism and policy experimentation remain somewhat isolated efforts, limiting larger systemic transformations. - Challenge: Lack of stable funding perpetuates project stop-and-go cycles, hampering continuous improvement.
Participation	- Challenge: Participation mostly involves a small circle of activists and those with direct access to information. - Challenge: A large portion of both Japanese and foreign residents remains unaware of tabunka kyōsei opportunities and services.	- Challenge: Narrow outreach impedes meaningful interaction between Japanese and foreign residents. - Challenge: Limited awareness fuels misconceptions, slowing progress toward deeper integration and reducing volunteer or participant pools.	- Challenge: Limited communication channels and minimal outreach efforts constrain the system's reach. - Challenge: Struggles to broaden engagement reflect a deeper issue of insufficient co-responsibility for social inclusion.
Relationship with the Business Sector	- Challenge: Gap in cooperation with local employers, although many foreign residents are in Hamamatsu for work. - Opportunity: Want to involve businesses more in worker integration and family support.	- Challenge: Businesses often remain on the sidelines, offering limited resources or partnerships for <i>tabunka kyōsei</i> initiatives. - Opportunity: Greater corporate responsibility could bolster inclusive workforce practices and community development.	- Opportunity: Strengthening business involvement is key given the job-centered nature of foreigner settlement in Japan. - Opportunity: Collaboration with employers could generate more stable funding and foster long-term

			integration pathways for foreign workers and their families.
Volunteers	- Challenge: City-led programs often depend on ad hoc volunteer efforts for implementation. - Challenge: Inconsistent volunteer engagement affects project outcomes.	- Success: Resilient volunteer engagement as a reflection of the dynamism of civil society. - Challenge: Excessive dependence on volunteers produces fluctuations in attendance and uncertain results.	- Challenge: Relying on volunteers reflects broader societal attitudes that social inclusion is a leisure-time activity, not a structured civic responsibility.
Centralization	- Success: Efficiency and sustainability thanks to mayoral engagement. The International Affairs Division acts as the linchpin, shaping policy under mayoral directives. - Challenge: HICE (Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communications and Exchanges) is a key intermediary but closely follows bureaucratic constraints and mayoral instructions.	- Success: Supportive local government. - Success: HICE's close ties to the city facilitate access to resources - Challenge: Top-down approach, with limited scope for bottom-up policy development and experiments.	- Success: Centralization ensures consistent policy direction. - Challenge: A top-down approach restricts broader stakeholder input and innovation. - Challenge: The top-down structure is rarely contested publicly, reflecting both alignment with official priorities and limited dynamics of civil society opposition.
Overall Outlook	- Success: Officials see value in mainstreaming tabunka kyōsei, but progress is incremental. - Opportunity: Potential to broaden focus beyond ethnicity/nationality but depending on mayoral and departmental priorities.	- Opportunity: Calls for a more inclusive view of diversity, extending beyond migrant status to other minority conditions. - Opportunity: Encourage creative, community-rooted solutions and increased local government flexibility to foster bottom-up innovations.	- Opportunity: Reframing diversity governance could challenge national homogeneity assumptions, paving the way for more inclusive practices. - Opportunity: Expanding <i>tabunka kyōsei</i> to address other marginalized groups could cultivate broader societal awareness and co-responsibility. - Opportunity: Potential for synergy between top-down vision and grassroots creativity if greater autonomy and participation are encouraged.

***Table 7.** Structured synthesis of the fieldwork findings, distinguishing the key themes that emerged from the interviews and outlining the perceived successes, challenges, and opportunities of the City of Tabunka Kyōsei's governance system from the perspectives of both government officials and civil society actors. These insights are further enriched by my critical reflections and observations, offering a comprehensive view of the system's dynamics.*

Conclusion

In this third part of the dissertation, I examined the emergence of cultural heterogeneity as a key theme in Japan's public and political discourse and explored the diffusion of strategies to address this complexity across various levels of governance. Following World War II, Japan resisted the transition into a full-fledged immigration country, striving to uphold a narrative of imagined ethnocultural homogeneity. However, as the new millennium progressed, this stance became increasingly untenable. Today, Japanese public discourse acknowledges that the country has definitely entered what is often termed the *Era of Diversity* (*tayōsei no jidai*).

Within this evolving context, *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) has emerged as a central framework for addressing and managing cultural heterogeneity. This concept has gained momentum from the grassroots level, with a growing number of stakeholders engaging in efforts to foster pluralism, uphold equal rights, and promote social cohesion and inclusion within diverse local communities. Cities have increasingly taken the lead in these efforts, solidifying their position as central actors in managing cultural diversity and driving progressive change in this field.

First, I began by tracing the historical, cultural, and political developments that shaped Japan's governance structures, and laid the basis for its traditional narrative of ethnocultural homogeneity. A pivotal moment in the formation of Japanese national identity occurred during the rise of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868), which established a centralized feudal system. Tokugawa's complex administration maintained stability through rigid class structures and isolationist foreign policies, a strategy that endured until Japan was forced to open to the West in 1854. This pivotal event exposed the vulnerabilities of the Tokugawa regime, leading to its collapse.

The Meiji Restoration (1868) ushered in Japan's transformation into a centralized, industrialized state under the guise of restoring imperial authority. Sweeping reforms during the Meiji era reshaped the administration, accelerated industrialization, and standardized cultural practices, often modeled after Western institutions. The government placed great emphasis on consolidating a cohesive national identity. This was achieved by leveraging the emperor's constructed legitimacy – rooted in tradition and mythology – along with shared cultural symbols, the promotion of State Shinto, and language standardization.

Japan's modernization bolstered its rise as a dominant military power in East Asia, marked by territorial expansion and colonial ambitions. While democratic developments gained momentum during the Taishō Era (1912-1926), they were reversed in the 1930s as ultranationalism and militarism took hold. The war economy, dominated by *zaibatsu* conglomerates, fueled Japan's imperial

ambitions, culminating in its involvement in World War II. Japan's defeat in 1945 marked the end of its colonial empire and initiated a period of Allied occupation, during which the nation underwent profound reconstruction and reformation. These postwar changes laid the foundation for Japan's democratic system and the decentralization efforts that characterize contemporary governance.

Japan's postwar governance has been defined by enduring centralization, reinforced by rapid economic growth. The state-guided capitalist model relied heavily on institutions like the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and *keiretsu* business conglomerates. While democratic mechanisms were established, the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) created a centralized and often opaque political landscape. Local governments remained fiscally dependent on national subsidies, perpetuating clientelism, intercity competition, and rural-urban disparities.

Despite these constraints, efforts toward decentralization gained momentum in the late 20th century. Initiatives such as the *Decentralization Promotion Act* (1995), *Trinity Reforms* (2002–2006), and the *Great Heisei Consolidation* (1999–2010) sought to recalibrate power between central and local governments. Although these reforms did not manage to fully overcome centralization, they signaled a shift that empowered local governments and fostered policy innovation.

Ultimately, the local turn in Japanese governance has effectively elevated the role of local governments and civil society in addressing societal challenges. Progressive local administrations (*kakushin jichitai*) in the mid-20th century pioneered policies emphasizing social justice and citizen participation. While this movement waned due to economic and political changes, its legacy shaped the professionalization of local governance and inspired independent policymaking.

In the context of this *local turn*, Japanese civil society, once perceived as weak in its advocacy capabilities, has progressively gained influence, particularly after the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake. Grassroots mobilization during this disaster exposed the limitations of centralized responses, catalyzing reforms such as the 1998 *NPO Law*, which simplified the establishment of nonprofit organizations. Since then, civil society has played a critical role in delivering social welfare, advocating for local interests, and challenging centralization. New social movements have emerged to address pressing concerns, such as environmental sustainability following the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

After contextualizing the Japanese system of governance, I turned to consider the complex dynamics of minority recognition within the evolving framework of Japan's national identity and governance. This examination revealed how Japan's ethnocultural minorities have persistently resisted and challenged the enduring myth of homogeneity – a narrative that solidified in postwar Japan. By highlighting the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity that has long characterized the Japanese archipelago, I delved into the struggles of major *native* ethnocultural minority groups – the

Ainu, Okinawans, Burakumin, Zainichi Koreans, and Hāfu – for recognition, equality, and justice. I also examined their specific challenges, strategies, and successes.

The discussion then shifted to the experiences of newcomers, including Nikkeijin and other categories of international migrants. I analyzed how Japan's historically restrictive immigration policies have gradually evolved to address labor shortages while still maintaining systemic barriers, such as restrictions on family accompaniment. These restrictions reflect lingering resistance to immigration and adherence to the ideal of ethnocultural homogeneity.

Alongside the struggles of minorities, cultural heterogeneity has gradually emerged as a pivotal theme in Japanese public discourse. This shift has underscored the need for active promotion of equality and social inclusion, necessitating intervention from both government and civil society to protect human rights, prevent public discord, and foster community cohesion. During the rapid economic growth of postwar Japan, the national government propagated the myth of a *homogeneous* Japan to restore national pride and unity after the traumas of war and amidst ongoing globalization and Western influences.

However, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, progressive local governments in cities such as Ōsaka and Kawasaki began to pioneer efforts to recognize minority voices and promote pluralism. These administrations implemented educational reforms, welfare programs, and grassroots initiatives to address issues faced by marginalized groups, including Zainichi Koreans, Burakumin, and Ainu.

The neoliberal turn of the 1980s, which ushered in austerity measures, eroded many of these progressive gains by constraining local government resources. Yet, the legacy of these earlier initiatives showcased the potential of municipalities as agents of social change and inclusion. During this period, Japan's *kokusaika* (internationalization) strategy provided a new framework for addressing cultural heterogeneity. While largely driven by economic objectives and global ambitions to position Japan as a global power, *kokusaika* also facilitated the creation of programs to integrate minorities and foreign residents, such as language courses and legal support.

Local governments capitalized on *kokusaika* ideals and funding to foster collaboration between grassroots activists and municipal administrations. These efforts inspired narratives of inclusive communities under slogans like *tomoni ikiru* (living together). Platforms such as the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) further supported these initiatives, enabling local governments to share best practices and shape new approaches to managing cultural diversity.

A pivotal moment in advancing pluralism and raising awareness of cultural heterogeneity occurred with the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995. This disaster exposed the challenges faced by foreign residents, particularly regarding access to disaster response systems, and catalyzed the rise of the *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence/conviviality) ideal. Rooted in earlier concepts of

coexistence and multiculturalism, *tabunka kyōsei* emphasizes the integration and equal participation of cultural minorities in society. Initially championed through grassroots slogans, the concept gained traction as local governments institutionalized practices inspired by grassroots initiatives, such as disaster response centers for foreigners and inclusive policymaking.

By the late 1990s, these localized practices laid the groundwork for *tabunka kyōsei* to escalate into national policy. Pressured by local actors advocating for an official framework to sustain their efforts, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) introduced the Regional Plan for the Promotion of Tabunka Kyōsei in 2006. This policy acknowledged the importance of promoting mutual respect and equality among diverse groups but largely focused on language and integration programs for immigrants, aligning with Japan's *kokusaika* agenda. The policy notably neglected longstanding minority groups, such as the Ainu and Zainichi Koreans, and faced criticism for limiting *tabunka kyōsei* initiatives to cultural events without addressing structural inequalities. Simultaneously, conservative opposition portrayed *tabunka kyōsei* as a threat to Japan's social order.

Despite its limitations, the emergence and diffusion of *tabunka kyōsei* have significantly reshaped Japanese public discourse, policies, and cultural norms. The concept has challenged the ideal of mono-ethnic nationalism, introduced pluralism as a fundamental aspect of Japan's identity, and promoted the narrative of diversity as an asset. Since 2018, comprehensive government plans have expanded policies supporting immigrant inclusion, including language programs and access to public services. This institutionalization has fostered broader societal acceptance of cultural pluralism, signaling the decline of the ideal of homogeneity. Local governments and civil society have been instrumental in driving these changes, creating inclusive policies, and fostering minority participation.

Finally, after having traced this wide contextualization and emphasized the key role of municipalities in the context of Japan's management of cultural heterogeneity, I focused on Hamamatsu as a case study, examining the dynamics leading to the construction and promotion of its identity as Japan's *Number One City of Tabunka Kyōsei*. The analysis began with an exploration of the development of governance systems and discourses surrounding cultural heterogeneity in the city, emphasizing the dynamic interplay between political leadership, economic priorities, and evolving urban needs.

Hamamatsu's transformation from a small town into one of the world's most important industrial hubs has been shaped by a governance model rooted in centralization and close collaboration between political and economic elites. This model facilitated industrial and demographic growth but also presented challenges, particularly in ensuring equitable access to services across its vast territory.

The postwar era saw a succession of long-serving mayors whose leadership steered Hamamatsu's trajectory. Their strategies, supported by economic elites, placed industrial interests at the center of

policy-making. Landmark events, such as the Great Heisei Consolidation and Hamamatsu's designation as an ordinance-designated city, underscored the strategic importance of unified governance. However, these achievements also highlighted the tensions between centralization and local autonomy, particularly during Mayor Kitawaki's tenure, whose decentralization efforts clashed with economic priorities and were reversed by his successor, Mayor Suzuki.

Under Suzuki's leadership, a centralized governance system was established, emphasizing administrative efficiency and cohesion. While effective in streamlining operations, this approach exacerbated service inequalities, particularly in peripheral areas, prompting grassroots activism to address unmet local needs. These dynamics reflect broader challenges faced by rapidly expanding urban centers as they navigate the balance between economic ambition and social equity.

Throughout the city's development, Hamamatsu's mayors have consistently prioritized branding the city through cultural and industrial identity. Early initiatives under Mayors Hakuzo and Kurihara focused on welfare, education, and urban quality of life, while leveraging the city's global reputation as a hub for musical instrument manufacturing to brand Hamamatsu as the *City of Music*. During the 1980s and 1990s, the city embraced globalization (*kokusaika*) by promoting tourism, hosting international events, and engaging in city diplomacy. This period coincided with a significant influx of Brazilian Nikkeijin immigrants, further diversifying the city's demographic landscape.

Building on these foundations, Mayor Suzuki advanced the vision of a *Creative City*, integrating Hamamatsu's industrial, cultural, and international strengths into a cohesive strategy. This vision emphasized sustainable development and innovation, tackling pressing challenges such as population decline, economic stagnation, and inter-city competition. Within this framework, cultural heterogeneity became a central theme in the city's strategic agenda.

Hamamatsu's public discourse around cultural heterogeneity has historically focused on international migration, which surged in the 1980s and peaked following Japan's immigration policy reforms in 1990. The arrival of substantial numbers of foreign residents, particularly Brazilian Nikkeijin, created challenges such as discrimination, language barriers, and limited access to basic services. Civil society, including religious groups and volunteers, provided early support, while the local government initially struggled with unpreparedness and limited national guidance.

Like other Japanese municipalities, Hamamatsu's early migration policies were embedded within its internationalization strategies, focusing more on city branding than effective migration management. However, as civil society activism advocating anti-discrimination measures grew, the local government, under Mayor Kitawaki, began promoting *kyōsei* (conviviality) and lobbying the national government for policy changes. By 2001, Hamamatsu had established itself as a national leader in migration governance by organizing local councils for *kyōsei* and spearheading the launch

of the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents. This council played a key role in prompting the national government to adopt *tabunka kyōsei* as a policy framework in 2006.

Hamamatsu's reputation as a pioneer of *tabunka kyōsei* grew through collaboration with scholars, civil society, and international networks. Initiatives such as the Zero School Refusal Project, which addressed school absenteeism among migrant children, showcased the city's commitment to fostering social cohesion and building partnerships between residents and officials. These efforts aligned with Hamamatsu's broader *Creative City* vision, reflecting the narrative of diversity as an advantage.

Since 2013, Hamamatsu has institutionalized *tabunka kyōsei* through a series of strategic plans known as the *Tabunka Kyōsei Visions*. These plans emphasize the principles of *collaboration*, *creativity*, and *safety*, engaging multiple municipal departments and addressing a wide range of city management issues. Concurrently, Hamamatsu has linked its focus on cultural heterogeneity to city diplomacy and branding, leveraging its participation in global networks like the Intercultural Cities Network to enhance its national and international reputation. Hamamatsu became Asia's first intercultural city upon joining the network in 2017.

To date, the three *Tabunka Kyōsei Visions* have established *tabunka kyōsei* as a cornerstone of Hamamatsu's strategies for addressing demographic and economic challenges, migration governance, and social inclusion. The system is overseen by the mayor, implemented by the International Affairs Division, and operationalized through partnerships with the Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communication and Exchange (HICE). It integrates diverse stakeholders, including civil society, educational institutions, and businesses, across various municipal departments.

The City of *Tabunka Kyōsei* has proven its sustainability and its capability to integrate into the city's comprehensive visions and strategies. Yet, the system remains target-specific and has not yet been effectively mainstreamed into city politics. Compared to the ideal of an intercultural city based on the framework of the diversity governance framework, although embracing the narrative of diversity advantage and focusing on integration, Hamamatsu's approach limits the scope of cultural heterogeneity to traditional categories of ethnicity and nationality, neglecting other identity markers. This means that cultural heterogeneity is still considered something *external* to Japanese society instead of an intrinsic aspect of social life.

In conclusion, the analysis in this third part of my dissertation underscores the vital role of local actors in reshaping the discourse around cultural heterogeneity and advancing frameworks that promote equality, minority rights, and social inclusion. The diffusion of innovative approaches to managing diversity has predominantly occurred at the municipal level, with cooperative strategies enabling local actors to influence national policy.

Hamamatsu exemplifies how and why a Japanese city has strategically placed cultural heterogeneity at the center of its agenda, pioneering practices that push the national discourse toward pluralism and diversity. While the city's successes highlight its innovative leadership, the challenges and limitations of its approach offer critical insights into the future development of *tabunka kyōsei*. Addressing these challenges will be essential to further expand the inclusivity and effectiveness of Japan's diversity governance systems.

PART IV

SOUTH KOREA

Introduction

“From the ashes of war to one of the world’s largest economies; from a recipient of foreign aid to a donor that now helps other nations develop. And of course, around the world, people are being swept up by Korean culture – the Korean Wave. And as I mentioned to President Park, my daughters have taught me a pretty good Gangnam Style.” With these words, U.S. President Barack Obama opened a joint press conference with South Korean President Park Geun-hye in 2013 (White House, 2013), succinctly capturing South Korea’s remarkable transformation and its growing influence on the global stage.

Obama’s remarks mirrored the way South Korea was portrayed in Western media and public discourse at the time. The nation’s extraordinary economic ascent, often referred to as the *Miracle on the Han River*, had secured its reputation as a global powerhouse, culminating in its admission to the G20 in 2010. Simultaneously, South Korea’s cultural industry embarked on an ambitious campaign to export its popular culture worldwide, with robust support from the government to extend the country’s soft power (for a detailed review, see Lim, 2022). From K-pop and K-dramas to Korean fashion and cuisine, the so-called *Korean Wave*, or *Hallyu*, successfully spread from Asia to the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas.

Personally, I was not initially “swept up by Korean culture,” but I vividly remember dancing to *Gangnam Style* in 2012, much like the Obama family. The song became the first YouTube video to surpass one billion views, introducing me – and millions of others – to the Korean language for the first time. For several years, my knowledge of South Korea was limited to identifying it as *the country of Gangnam Style*. While some of my peers followed the meteoric rise of K-pop idols like BTS and Red Velvet, Korean pop culture remained relatively niche in Italy until the COVID-19 pandemic. The surge in Netflix subscriptions during lockdowns propelled Korean hits like the dramas *Crash Landing on You* (2020) and *Squid Game* (2021) into the mainstream.

As I was not particularly drawn to popular music or television, the expansion of Korean popular culture largely passed me by. However, as I cultivated an interest in arthouse cinema, I was soon captivated by Korean films making waves at international festivals like Cannes and Berlin. By chance, Florence, my hometown, hosts Europe’s oldest film festival dedicated to Korean arthouse cinema – the Florence Korea Film Fest, founded in 2002. Anyone familiar with this genre knows these films are not for the faint-hearted, often featuring extremely brutal and graphic depictions of humanity’s darkest aspects. Consequently, when I began studying South Korea for my Ph.D. in late 2021, my mental image of the country was, somehow, one of a deeply violent and unsettling place.

My Korean friends were amused when they learned that my perceptions of their country were shaped by arthouse films. Directors like Kim Ki-duk or Hong Sang-soo, whose works I admired, were largely unknown or underappreciated within mainstream Korean culture – apart from Bong Joon-ho, whose *Parasite* (2019) was both a domestic and global sensation. Korean arthouse films represent a small, independent niche within the industry, often deploying surreal violence to critique societal norms. In contrast, everyday life in South Korea is strikingly safe, especially compared to Mediterranean cities like Barcelona, where public spaces often feel more precarious.

Still, no society is free of contradictions, and South Korea is no exception. Issues of physical and psychological violence, particularly in domestic and private spheres, persist (e.g., Kim et al., 2015; Park et al., 2021). Many of these challenges stem from the country's rapid transformations, driven by relentless capitalism, extraordinary economic growth, urbanization, and political instability. Amid these changes, traditional state centralism in South Korea is giving way to a local turn, marked by the emergence of decentralized governance, with local governments and actors progressively becoming pivotal in shaping the nation's future. At the same time, a previously dominant ideal of ethno-cultural homogeneity is progressively making room to new discourses and approaches to cultural heterogeneity, where diversity is emerging as the present and future of South Korea.

In the fourth part of this dissertation, I explore the historical, cultural, and political context of diversity governance in South Korea, focusing on the emergence and diffusion of related frameworks and policies. The city of Ansan serves as a detailed case study, illustrating how diversity governance is implemented at the local level and highlighting the interplay between national policies and grassroots initiatives.

Chapter 15 provides a foundational historical and institutional analysis of South Korea's governance structures. Section 15.1 traces the early formation of Korean national identity and governance, focusing on cultural and political developments in the peninsula. Section 15.2 delves into the rise and organization of the Joseon Kingdom, which established Korea as a stable political entity and laid the groundwork for a centralized modern state, while also emphasizing the enduring influence of Confucian ideals on governance and societal norms. Section 15.3 shifts the discussion to the challenges of modernization and the division of the Korean Peninsula. Section 15.4 examines the era of rapid industrialization and economic growth under authoritarian rule, highlighting the strategies underpinning South Korea's centralized governance. The transition to democracy and the subsequent shift toward decentralization after the era of dictatorship are analyzed in Section 15.5, presenting South Korea's contemporary governance system. Finally, Section 15.6 underscores the role of civil society as a catalyst for social change, driving initiatives toward inclusivity and diversity governance.

Chapter 16 investigates South Korea's complex relationship with cultural heterogeneity and migration by reviewing the history and struggles of minority groups. Section 16.1 critiques the constructed notion of Korea as an ethnically and culturally uniform society. Section 16.2 examines the experiences of ethnic Koreans returning from abroad and their struggles for recognition. Section 16.3 focuses on Talbukja (North Korean defectors) and their integration challenges. Section 16.4 analyzes the unique dynamics of marriage migration in rural areas, while Section 16.5 highlights the increasing presence of non-ethnic-Korean migrants following the loosening of South Korea's immigration policies, emphasizing their fight for rights and inclusion. The chapter concludes with Section 16.6, which discusses the role of multicultural families and their children in shaping South Korea's multicultural future.

Chapter 17 examines the rise of *Damunhwa* (multiculture) as South Korea's primary framework for addressing cultural heterogeneity. Section 17.1 explores the historical construction of *Koreanness* and its implications for policies and societal perceptions of diversity. Section 17.2 highlights the critical role of civil society in advocating for migrants and minorities, while Section 17.3 shows how these movements gained traction and entered the national political agenda. Sections 17.4 and 17.5 analyze key shifts in South Korea's national approach to cultural heterogeneity, focusing respectively on the emergence of the *Segyehwa* (globalization) ideal and the development of early policies addressing cultural diversity. Finally, Section 17.6 explores the evolution of *Damunhwa* as a comprehensive framework for managing cultural diversity and examines its diffusion across various governance scales.

Chapter 18 concludes this part with an in-depth case study of Ansan, a city recognized as a national model for diversity governance. Section 18.1 traces Ansan's history as a planned urban center developed to decentralize industrial facilities from Seoul. Section 18.2 highlights the city's shifting demographics, shaped by waves of migration. Sections 18.3 and 18.4 explore grassroots initiatives responding to these demographic transformations, culminating in the establishment of the *Borderless Village* – a bottom-up movement advocating an inclusive and pluralistic city. Section 18.5 contextualizes Ansan's governance system, examining the fragmented strategies of its early administrations and their gradual consolidation into a comprehensive vision in the early 2000s. Sections 18.6 and 18.7 discuss how the municipal government co-opted grassroots initiatives, transforming the Borderless Village into the top-down *Multicultural Village* project, positioning diversity as an economic asset to boost tourism and promote ethnic businesses. Section 18.8 analyzes Ansan's strategic branding as the South Korean *City of Damunhwa*, while Section 18.9 examines the city's decision to join the Intercultural Cities Network. Section 18.10 investigates how Ansan's engagement with *Damunhwa* has been integrated into its broader strategic vision to become a *Safe,*

Smart, and Global City. The last three sections of the chapter offer a comprehensive overview of Ansan's current governance system for managing cultural heterogeneity focusing on what I referred to as the *City of Damunhwa*. Section 18.11 traces an overview of Ansan's system of diversity governance, analyzing the interplay between the different actors engaged in its framework. The following Section 18.12 critically examines how *damunhwa* is framed in Ansan, emphasizing that the city still lacks a coherent framework of reference for policies and practices related to cultural heterogeneity. Finally, Section 18.13 concludes with an analysis of the successes and challenges of the system of governance of the *City of Damunhwa* from the point of view of its stakeholders, integrated with other findings from the fieldwork.

CHAPTER 15

Government and Governance in South Korea

15.1

The Roots of the Nation in the Korean Peninsula

South Korea is a peninsular country in East Asia, spanning a territory of about 100,339 km² and with a population of approximately 51.7 million as of 2024¹¹⁶. It covers the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, sharing a border with North Korea along the heavily fortified Korean Demilitarized Zone. Interestingly, the names *North Korea* and *South Korea* are exonyms – terms used by English speakers – while the two countries refer to themselves quite differently in their native languages.

The English term *Korea* comes from the name *Goryeo*, which translates to *high and beautiful*, and was originally used as an alternative way to refer to what is commonly known as the ancient Kingdom of *Goguryeo* (old castle) that lasted from 37 BCE to 668 CE. By the 5th century, *Goryeo* became the kingdom's official name. Instead, North Korea refers to the peninsula as *Joseon*, and the country's official name is *joseon-minjujuui-inmin-gonghwaguk*, which can be literally translated as *Democratic People's Republic of Joseon* (*joseon-minjujuui-inmin-gonghwaguk*). In South Korea, on the other hand, the peninsula is called *Hanguk*, meaning *Han country*, and the official name of the state is *daehan-minguk*, that is, *Republic of the Great Han*. The choice of these names is deeply symbolic, reflecting each nation's ideological stance and claim to legitimacy over the entire peninsula. These divergent names highlight the ideological division that has existed since the two Koreas were officially established in 1948.

¹¹⁶ <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korea-s-declining-demographics-a-national-security-issue#:~:text=The%20current%20population%20of%20South,to%2036.22%20million%20by%202072.>

According to Korean mythology, the origins of Korea trace back to the founding of a kingdom known as Ancient Joseon in 2333 BCE by the god-king Dangun, the offspring of the god Hwanung – son of the God of Heaven Hwanin – and the bear-woman Ungnyeo. While the historical reality of the origins of Ancient Joseon remains uncertain, by the 4th century BCE, this kingdom controlled much of the Korean Peninsula. However, as China rose as a unified empire under Qin and Han dynasties, Ancient Joseon faced repeated invasions, eventually succumbing to Chinese forces in 108 BCE.

The southern parts of the kingdom that avoided Chinese conquest fragmented into smaller states and tribes by the 1st century BCE. Over time, these coalesced into three major kingdoms: Silla, Baekje, and the above-mentioned Goguryeo, from which the English word *Korea* ultimately derives. Known as the Three Kingdoms of Korea, or *sam-han* – where *sam* means *three* and *han* means *great* – the three kingdoms were embroiled in centuries of conflict, alliances, and betrayals. In 668 CE, Silla succeeded in uniting the peninsula, defeating Baekje in 660 and Goguryeo in 668. Despite Silla's efforts to enforce a top-down unification, integrating the displaced populations of Baekje and Goguryeo proved challenging, leading to internal unrest and external threats from China and Japan for several centuries.

Eventually, in 918, a coup led by rebels claiming ancestry ties to the Goryeo dynasty succeeded in overthrowing Silla, achieving what historians have dubbed the first “true national unification of the Korean peninsula” (Kim, 2012, p. 120). The new rulers sought to legitimize their reign by emphasizing both their noble lineage and appealing to the narrative of the *Mandate of Heaven* – a doctrine borrowed from Chinese political tradition, according to which the right to rule was grounded on a mandate bestowed by heavenly divinity on the most virtuous among men. While also the Goryeo Kingdom faced ongoing rebellions and warfare, it endured for over four centuries. It was during this period that the name Goryeo and its derivatives became widely recognized, even reaching European ears – Marco Polo famously referred to the country as *Cauli* in his travelogue *The Million*.

The Goryeo dynasty's golden age, marked by flourishing trade, art, literature, and the spread of Buddhism as the state religion, lasted until the 12th century. But by the time Marco Polo wrote of Cauli, the kingdom was already in decline. The 13th century brought mounting internal strife, as powerful families challenged the government, while external pressure came in the form of Mongol invasions. By the century's end, although the Goryeo dynasty nominally remained, the kingdom had effectively fallen under the sway of the Mongol-led Chinese Empire.

The final blow to the Goryeo Kingdom came when General Seong-gye Yi (1335-1408), one of its most powerful military leaders, rebelled and executed the last Goryeo rulers. In 1392, Yi established Korea's final and longest-lasting dynasty. To justify his coup and solidify his legitimacy, Yi

mobilized the same narrative adopted four centuries earlier by that very dynasty he had just overthrown: invoking the Mandate of Heaven, he depicted the last Goryeo kings as corrupt and unworthy, their downfall an act of divine justice, and his ascent as the victory of the rightful ruler, blessed by heaven.

Yi also sought to link his reign with Korea's ancient past, particularly with the glorious Ancient Joseon, which came before all the division in the Three Kingdoms and had allegedly been founded by the grandson of the God of Heaven. To this aim, he purposefully named both his kingdom and dynasty Joseon, connecting his family and ruling to this glorious, divine lineage. To further cement the new beginning, he moved the capital from Kaesong (today an area in North Korea), where it had been for nearly five centuries, to Hanseong – a city that, after World War II, was renamed Seoul, that is, *capital city*.

15.2

Joseon's Kingdom

Once the new dynasty secured its position, the ruling class undertook a sweeping administrative reorganization that laid the groundwork for the governance structures still in place on the Korean Peninsula today. In 1413, Goryeo's former divisions were abolished, and the peninsula was reorganized into eight provinces – a division that heavily influenced the current administrative boundaries of both North and South Korea. These provinces were further subdivided into numerous counties.

While the Goryeo Kingdom had struggled to appoint officials to every local unit, the highly centralized Joseon administration ensured that each county was overseen by a centrally dispatched magistrate. At the local level, however, self-governing bodies known as Local Agencies (*yuhyangso*, later renamed *hyangcheong*) existed. These assemblies, made up of leading residents, held considerable sway over local governance. Each Local Agency maintained a connection to its own Capital Liaison Office (*kyongjaeso*) in Seoul, headed by a prominent government official from that county. This setup not only served as a bridge between local and central governance but also allowed the central government to maintain control over local affairs.

The establishment of the Joseon dynasty ushered in five centuries of political stability, a period crucial for Korea's transition into the modern era. Much of modern Korean culture, etiquette, norms, bureaucracy, and even the spoken and written Korean language developed under Joseon rule. While Buddhism had been the dominant religion during the Goryeo period, Joseon kings gradually embraced Neo-Confucianism, a doctrine that had its roots in China during the Tang dynasty (618-907 CE) and gained prominence during the Song era (960-1279 CE).

Although Neo-Confucianism influenced political and philosophical thought across Asia, its principles were adopted in Korea with unparalleled enthusiasm, fundamentally reshaping every aspect of Korean political and social life (Seth 2010, 124). At the core of this philosophy were three cardinal principles (*samgang*): loyalty (*chung*) to the ruler, filial piety (*hyo*) toward one's parents, and the differentiation of roles (*yeol*) between men and women. The rigid enforcement of Neo-Confucian ethics had long-lasting consequences for women in Korean society. Identified through the specific social category of *naeja* (inside people), women were increasingly confined to domestic roles, expected to focus solely on child-rearing and housekeeping.

Much like Japan during the Tokugawa era, Joseon Korea was also a caste-based society. At the top were the gentry (*yangban*), a class composed of intellectuals and military elites, followed by the upper middle class (*jungin*), made up of bureaucrats, and then the commoners (*sangmin*). As in Japan with the case of Burakumin (Section 12.4), also Korea had its own outcast group, known as the *cheonmin*, that is, the *mean people*. The majority of *cheonmin* were slaves, but this group also included innkeepers, ferrymen, prostitutes, entertainers, leather workers, and butchers.

As the 19th century drew to a close, also Korea's *cheonmin*, just like Japan's Burakumin, began organizing social movements to combat discrimination. Particularly active in Korea were activists belonging to groups of butchers (*baekjeong*). However, while Burakumin still face prejudice today, Korea's last *baekjeong* organization disbanded in 1935, declaring that its goals had been achieved. This was largely due to the widespread influence of both Christianity and Marxism in modern Korea, which played a significant role in promoting the recognition of dignity and rights for this long-discriminated minority (Lee, 2013).

Neo-Confucianism significantly influenced also the governance system in Joseon. While the king formally held autocratic power, in practice, his authority was often curtailed by factions of powerful Confucian scholar-officials, who ensured that the kingdom was governed according to the Confucian doctrine. These scholar-officials were the true drivers of Joseon's intricate bureaucracy and administrative apparatus. Despite their commitment to Confucian principles of wisdom and righteousness, they were often divided by differing political visions and interests, leading to complex and, at times, violent power struggles.

This factional strife, a hallmark of Korean politics that persists to this day, gradually undermined administrative efficiency, particularly during the 16th century. As internal conflicts crippled the government, external disasters compounded the kingdom's troubles. Two major Japanese invasions in 1592 and 1598, though eventually repelled, left Joseon weakened. Before it could fully recover, the kingdom faced two further invasions from China in 1627 and 1636-1637, forcing Joseon to become a tributary state of the Chinese Empire, formally accepting a subordinate status.

For the following two centuries, Joseon continued to suffer from internal power struggles and ideological tensions, especially with the growing influence of Catholicism in urban areas. A turning point came in 1864, when Myeong-bok Yi, later known by his royal name Gojong, ascended the throne at the age of 12. His father, Ha-eung Yi, became the *daewongun* (Lord of the Great Court) and ruled in his son's name with an iron hand, quickly setting about restructuring the kingdom's governance.

Daewongun Yi strategically purged corrupt high-level officials, dismantled political factions, and restored the monarchy's absolute power. His economic and tax reforms aimed to stabilize the nation's finances by increasing revenues and equalizing tax burdens. Yi also enforced a strict isolationist policy, fearing the influence of Western powers, particularly after witnessing China's defeat in the Opium War (1840-1842). In an attempt to preserve Joseon's traditional values, he sought to purge the kingdom of foreign ideas, especially Christianity. This isolationist stance, combined with Korea's historically limited contact with the West, earned the country the nickname *Hermit Kingdom*, a term popularized by William Eliot Griffis in his 1882 book, entitled, precisely, *Korea: The Hermit Kingdom*.

15.3

Lights and Shadows of Modernity and the End of the United Korea

Japan was the first nation to challenge Joseon's isolationist policy, viewing the Korean Peninsula as a strategic area for the expansion of its newly emerging empire. While Western nations, until the 20th century, largely overlooked Joseon as a key trading or diplomatic partner, Japan had its sights set on the region. Drawing from its own experience of forced engagement in 1853, when the U.S.

compelled Japan to open its borders, in 1875 the Meiji government deployed a warship along the Korean coast, pressuring Joseon to follow suit.

By this time, Yi Ha-eung's rule had ended (1873), and the young King Gojong, who was more open to foreign influence than his father, was at the helm. Faced with Japanese gunboat diplomacy, rather than resisting, the government opted to negotiate, leading to the signing of the *Treaty of Kanagawa* in 1876. This agreement, also known as the Japan-Korea *Treaty of Amity*, effectively marked the end of Joseon's isolationist stance and opened its doors to the world.

The opening of Joseon sparked a wave of modernization reforms aimed at strengthening and *civilizing* the country, much of which was modeled on Japan's own modernization under the Meiji Restoration. Japan's policies of *fukoku kyōhei* (enrich the nation, strengthen the military) and *bunmei-kaika* (civilization and enlightenment) provided the blueprint. Joseon reframed this approach with its own guiding principle, *dongdo seogi* (Eastern ethics, Western technology), initiating the development of infrastructure and military capabilities.

Unsurprisingly, these reforms faced fierce opposition from conservative Confucian scholar-officials who championed the ideology of *wijeong cheoksa* (defend orthodoxy, reject heterodoxy). Conservatives argued that adopting foreign ideas would erode traditional values and threaten the kingdom's independence, advocating instead for a return to isolationism to prevent Joseon from becoming a colony of Western powers.

As the progressives and conservatives became two distinct and opposing factions, Japan saw an opportunity. By supporting the progressives, Japan could increase its influence in the region, potentially replacing China as the dominant power over Joseon. While the progressive elite established relationships with Japan, they also reached out to the U.S. and Russia, seeking support for their modernization efforts and diplomatic assistance in breaking free from Chinese suzerainty. Meanwhile, political instability at home, coupled with the rapid changes brought by modernization, had significant effects on the kingdom's economy. Rural areas, in particular, felt the strain, leading to widespread protests and unrest across the country, foreshadowing the turbulent times that lay ahead for Joseon.

After China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan seized the opportunity to assert dominance over the Korean peninsula, replacing China as the hegemonic power. Japanese military officials were swiftly dispatched to Korea under the pretense of assisting the progressive elites in implementing reforms, but in reality, they were interfering in the kingdom's internal affairs. In a desperate bid to reclaim Korea's sovereignty and elevate its status alongside China and Japan, King Gojong declared the end of the Joseon Kingdom and established the Great Han Empire (*daehan jeguk*). The term Han harkened back to the ancient Korean kingdoms, including the Sam-Han of the

Three Kingdoms era. However, despite this symbolic change with the formal elevation of the kingdom to the status of empire, the situation remained largely the same.

Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 removed another competitor vying for influence over Korea, and the Great Han Empire soon became a Japanese protectorate, effectively under semi-colonial rule. The Korean army was disbanded, the emperor was reduced to a powerless figurehead, and Japan took control of the country's courts, prisons, and police. Five years later, the *Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty* of 1910 officially ended the Great Han Empire, transforming Korea into the Japanese colony of *Chōsen* – the Japanese pronunciation of Joseon.

The 35 years of Japanese colonial rule were marked by harsh repression, tight police control, and policies of forced assimilation that sought to suppress Korean political and cultural identity. These oppressive measures naturally fueled a surge in Korean nationalism and solidified anti-Japanese sentiments that linger to this day. Yet, paradoxically, Japan also set Korea on the path to modernization and industrialization, establishing an efficient government, modern infrastructure, and the foundations of the contemporary education system.

Japan's defeat in World War II and the dissolution of its empire brought an end to colonial rule in Korea. The Allies had already discussed plans for a trusteeship to oversee Korea's transition to independence. The plan envisioned three stages: joint military occupation by the Allied powers, the creation of a unified military government, and finally, the transfer of power to a provisional Korean government under international supervision. However, the reality played out differently. As the U.S. focused on Japan, military operations in Korea were entrusted to the Soviet Union, which swiftly occupied northern Korea. Once American forces could turn their attention to the peninsula, they hastened to occupy the southern half, keen to curtail Soviet influence and prevent the formation of a communist Korean state – a goal clearly within Stalin's vision.

When the United States realized it lacked the military capacity to secure the northern part of Korea, the U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) made the arbitrary decision to propose to the Soviet Union a division of the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel. This division marked the end of more than a thousand years of Korean national unity, as two foreign powers – driven by vastly different ideologies and political interests – took control of separate halves of the country. With the Cold War looming, any hope of a unified administration between U.S. and Soviet occupation forces quickly vanished.

In the north, the Soviet Union had already positioned Il-sung Kim (1912-1994) as its chosen leader and worked to suppress any opposition to a communist regime. Meanwhile, in the south, the U.S. backed a right-wing military administration led by Syngman Rhee, a fervent anti-communist nationalist who had studied at Harvard and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton. Rhee's government

mirrored the Soviet efforts in the north, cracking down on leftist groups suspected of communist sympathies.

In 1948, the division became official with the establishment of two separate nations: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Both governments, drawing on centuries of Korean symbolism and nationalist rhetoric, claimed legitimacy as the rightful rulers of the entire peninsula. Each state, in its own way, invoked a secularized version of the Mandate of Heaven, portraying itself as the true protector of Korean culture and identity against the corrupting ideology of the other – whether it was North Korea's communism or South Korea's right-wing liberalism.

This ideological struggle was also reflected in the names each government chose. North Korea, following the example of historical Korean monarchs, referred to itself as *Joseon*, harking back to the ancient Kingdom of Joseon and its origins as a unified Korea. South Korea, seeking to distance itself from its northern rival, adopted the term *Hanguk* (country of the Han) to refer to the peninsula, and *Daehan* (the Great Han) as its own name. This choice was symbolic, linking South Korea's identity with the resilient southern kingdoms that had withstood Chinese invasion in ancient times. Just as the three Han (*sam-han*) had eventually been united, South Korea positioned itself as the modern Daehan, the true guardian of Korean identity that would ultimately overcome the division, this time caused by the Russian-backed North.

Tragically, any hopes for swift reunification were shattered by the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953), a brutal three-year conflict that left the peninsula deeply scarred and ensured that the division between North and South Korea would persist for the foreseeable future. With the end of the fights in 1953, under the weight of a complex socio-political legacy, South Korea's history began.

15.4

South Korea Under the Dictators: Industrialization and Growth

The more than 70 years since the end of the Korean War until today can be divided into two distinct periods. The first, spanning from 1953 to 1987, was marked by a turbulent succession of authoritarian regimes, military coups, and political upheaval. During this time, South Korea saw the creation of

five different Republics and underwent nine revisions to the 1948 constitution, four of which were complete rewrites. The second period, beginning in 1987 and continuing to the present day, was ushered in by large-scale social movements that initiated South Korea's gradual transition to democracy, decentralization, and a growing openness to immigration.

The roots of South Korea's authoritarian phase lie in the aftermath of the Korean War and the intense rivalry with North Korea. Syngman Rhee, the country's first president, used the fear of insecurity to consolidate his power, dismantling democratic institutions and building a dictatorship based on heavy repression, widespread corruption (particularly within the police), and rampant electoral fraud. The situation reached a boiling point with the 1960 general election, in which Rhee's blatant vote rigging triggered mass protests, notably led by university students and professors. These demonstrations, now known as the *April Revolution*, ended Rhee's reign, with the dictator being evacuated to Honolulu by the CIA. The revolution is remembered as one of the most significant victories for Korean civil society and served as an inspiration for the country's later democratic movements.

In the wake of Rhee's destitution, there was a brief surge of political activity by leftist groups, students, and trade unions. The Second Republic, a parliamentary democracy, was established in 1960 under Prime Minister Myon Chang, a pro-democracy leader. The first local elections in South Korean history were held during this time. However, the country's democratic hopes were quickly dashed in 1961 when General Chung-Hee Park (1917-1978) staged a military coup, bringing an end to the Second Republic and installing what would become the longest-lasting rule in South Korea's history.

Chung-Hee Park's nearly 18-year dictatorship, marked by the creation of the Third Republic in 1963 and the Fourth Republic in 1972, left a lasting impact on South Korea. Despite his authoritarian methods, Park gained legitimacy through his ability to address South Korea's dire economic conditions, which had been neglected during Rhee's rule. Upon seizing power, Park swiftly implemented political and economic reforms. He suppressed dissent and opposition, aided by the newly established Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which became a feared arm of his regime.

Concurrently, Park actively engaged in promoting the country's industrialization and economy, launching the first *Five-Year Economic Plan* in 1962, followed by six more, the last two of which included a focus on social development. His approach was heavily influenced by the Japanese model of state-driven economic growth, which he had observed firsthand while serving in colonial Manchuria. Park's government invested heavily in industrialization, employing a top-down management style to direct the country's development. This era also saw the close collaboration between political and business leaders, a system dubbed *Korea Inc.* (Smith, 1999), which fostered the

rise of the country's powerful *chaebol* (large, family-owned conglomerates), such as Samsung and Hyundai, which can be considered the Korean equivalent of Japanese *zaibatsu/keiretsu*.

In just ten years, South Korea made remarkable strides in industrial development, triggering impressive economic growth. While Park Chung-hee's policies undeniably spurred this success, his authoritarian rule and reliance on political repression left a complex legacy that would deeply influence the country's slow transition toward democracy. The rapid industrialization, often described as "compressed modernization" (Chang, 2010), also brought significant challenges. Massive urbanization, especially concentrated in the Seoul area where most industrial investments initially took place, created issues like overcrowding, pollution, economic imbalance, and hyper-urbanization (see, for example, Park & Jeong, 2004).

By the time of the third *Five-Year Economic Plan* in 1972, Park aggressively pushed South Korea toward heavy industrial development, with efforts to decentralize the industrial concentration around Seoul. He guided the creation of industrial hubs in smaller provincial cities in the south and relocated some of the most polluting small- and medium-sized factories from Seoul to the countryside (Park & Markusen, 1995, pp. 82-101).

This was all part of Park's broader vision to transform South Korea into a global economic power. While light industries fueled initial economic growth, heavy industry was seen as essential to building a militarily and economically robust nation, less reliant on the United States and capable of matching the highly industrialized North Korea. At the same time, Park took inspiration from Silicon Valley, strategically planning for the integration of high-tech industries and research centers with regional development (Oh, 1995; Link & Yeong Yang, 2018). The crowning achievement of these efforts was the establishment of Science Town in Daedeok in 1973, now known as Innopolis Daedeok.

Contextually, in 1972, in a sort of second *coup d'état* against the system that he was already heading, Park imposed a new authoritarian constitution, known as *Yusin* (revitalization). This constitution crushed political dissent and centralized power in Park's hands, effectively making him president for life. Political organizations were disbanded, political activities were banned, and the population lived under constant surveillance by the KCIA.

Through the iron fist of his autocratic developmental state and guided by the principle of "grow first, clean up later" (Moon & Lim, 2003), Park propelled the country toward rapid industrialization and economic expansion. However, the cost of this growth was high. Among the things left to "clean up later" were major social justice issues, including inequality in redistribution, recognition, and participation. Welfare programs were largely neglected or left to private initiatives, with the few introduced by Park, such as the *Industrial Accident Insurance Law* (1963) and the *Medical Assistance Law* (1963), benefiting only specific segments of society – mainly large firm employees. These

programs were often used more to suppress political opposition and bolster electoral support than to address broader societal needs (Kim, 2010, pp. 176-177). Meanwhile, democratic participation and representation were actively stifled under the dictatorship.

In a sort of dramatic twist, it was Chung-hee Park's own confidant and head of the KCIA who ended his dictatorship by assassinating him during a dinner in 1979. This sudden turn of events unleashed pent-up frustrations across South Korea. Civil society, long suppressed under the Yusin constitution, surged back to life, with democratic movements erupting and calling for the establishment of a democratic government. But before any such government could take root, General Doo-hwan Chun (1931–2021) staged yet another military coup, establishing the Fifth Republic and plunging the nation back into dictatorship.

Initially, the desire resisted and gained momentum, particularly among students, inspired by the April Revolution. Chun's regime, much like Park's, promptly suppressed any opposition. The Gwangju Uprising, a massive pro-democracy protest in the southern city of Gwangju, became a pivotal moment. Chun's military government crushed the uprising with brutal force, leaving deep scars and a lasting legacy of resistance. Chun's seven-year rule is remembered as one of the darkest periods in South Korean history, with many viewing him as the nation's worst president (Kim, 2012, p. 482).

Although Chun stayed in office until 1988, the tide began to turn in 1987, marking the true beginning of South Korea's journey toward democracy. Chun had announced that his successor would be chosen the following year, but in a parliamentary election, not by popular vote as many had hoped. This strategic move to ensure his hand-picked successor, Tae-woo Roh, would take power ignited the largest mass protests in South Korean history. This time, it was not just students and activists leading the charge; millions of people all across the country, including salary workers, housewives, and managers, joined the movement, demanding a democratic constitution.

Several factors contributed to the success of these protests. South Korea was in a vulnerable transitional phase, and the country had secured the 1988 Summer Olympics, a spotlight moment for its international reputation. Global pressure, especially from the U.S., was applied to Chun's government to avoid a violent crackdown on protesters, unlike in the past. Faced with overwhelming public opposition and international scrutiny, the Chun government agreed to hold a national referendum, which resulted in the approval of South Korea's current democratic constitution, thus establishing the Sixth Republic.

With this, the authoritarian regime's grip on South Korea began to fade, and the nation embarked on its path to democracy. The new constitution introduced direct presidential elections with a single five-year term and significantly empowered the legislature, granting it the authority to investigate

state affairs and approve key appointments. For the first time in decades, South Korea enjoyed the freedom of political activity, speech, assembly, and press. Despite these advancements, the first president of the Sixth Republic was none other than Chun's chosen successor, General Tae-woo Roh. However, Roh, realizing the shifting political landscape, embraced the people's demand for change, guiding South Korea through its first significant steps toward genuine democratization.

15.5

South Korea's Transition towards Democracy and Decentralization

The dawn of South Korea's democratic era was marked by the highly anticipated 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul. The event served as a showcase to the world of what had come to be known as the *Miracle on the Han River*. In just 40 years, South Korea had transformed from a war-ravaged, pre-industrial nation into one of the most dynamic market economies in the world – a feat that defied the expectations of prevailing economic theories such as dependency theory (Prebisch, 1970) and world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974), which held that countries on the economic *periphery* were unlikely to ascend to the *core*. To the great pride of South Korea and the dismay of its northern rival, even communist countries like the Soviet Union and China participated in the global celebration of the country's achievements, which soon earned it a place among the *Four Asian Tigers* alongside Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

In the wake of the Olympics, the South Korean government had to reckon with growing demands for political and economic participation. On one side, a burgeoning group of activists – comprising university professors, students, journalists, and lawyers – organized and became increasingly politicized, pushing for greater democratization. This movement aligned with broader social and cultural shifts, particularly the rise of a middle and industrial working class, growing social mobility, and the spread of Christianity and egalitarian ideals. The decline of traditional Confucian values also sparked the first significant movements for gender equality. A major victory for women's rights came in 1989 when, after pressure from powerful activist organizations – such as the powerful Korean Women's Association created in 1987 – the *Family Law* was revised, eliminating many patriarchal provisions regarding inheritance and women's responsibility for the care of elderly parents.

While civil society pushed for social justice, *chaebol*, were advocating for greater influence over economic policy and more freedom from state control to better compete in global markets. This set the stage for a sweeping restructuring of the South Korean economy, characterized by the offshoring of industrial production, a shift toward high-tech, value-added industries, and the growth of the service sector. One of the key initiatives in this transition was the government's 1989 *Technopolis Plan* (e.g., Oh, 1995), which built upon President Park's earlier science town developments, drawing inspiration from Japan's own efforts to foster high-tech innovation (Section 15.4, p. 474).

The process of decentralizing South Korea's previously authoritarian administration created new channels for increased representation and civic participation. In 1991, after more than 30 years, South Koreans were able to vote in local elections again, selecting district, city, and county councilors. This was a major step toward re-establishing democracy at the grassroots level. A year later, the election of President Young-sam Kim (1927-2015) marked the end of military-led governments and ushered in an era of civilian leadership that continues today. By 1995, the first provincial and municipal elections since Chung-hee Park's military coup were held, institutionalizing a system of local elections every four years under the revised *Local Autonomy Act*, which had been initially enacted in 1949 but was largely inactive during the authoritarian years.

This marked the creation of the two-tier system of local governance in South Korea that exists today. The upper tier is made up of 17 regional governments, including 1 special city (*teukbyeolsi*; Seoul), 1 special self-governing city (*teukbyeol-jachisi*; Sejong), 6 metropolitan cities (*gwangyeoksi*; Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan), 6 provinces (*do*; North Chungcheong, South Chungcheong, Gyeonggi, North Gyeongsang, South Gyeongsang, South Jeolla), and 3 special self-governing provinces (*teukbyeol jachido*; Gangwon, Jeju, Jeonbuk).

The lower tier of local government consists of cities (*si*), counties (*gun*), and districts (*gu*) – as of 2023, there are 228 municipalities, divided into 77 cities (including the 2 Administrative Cities of Jeju and Seogwipo in Jeju Island), 82 counties (including 5 Metropolitan Counties), and 69 districts (25 Seoul's Special Districts and 44 Metropolitan Districts). Finally, there are three additional administrative subdivisions of the lower tier, that is, towns (*eup*), townships (*myeon*), and neighborhoods (*dong*) – as of 2014, there are 216 towns, 1,196 townships, and 2,076 neighborhoods¹¹⁷.

Under the *Local Autonomy Act*, local governments are tasked with handling a range of functions, including welfare, economic development, education, public safety, and environmental protection. However, the central government still retains the authority to intervene in local matters when deemed necessary. As for the financial aspect, although local governments in South Korea account for a

¹¹⁷ Data available at http://nationalatlas.ngii.go.kr/pages/page_1266.php.

slightly higher share of total public expenditure than the OECD average, their levels of investment, staffing, and debt remain significantly lower by comparison (OECD, 2018).

The number of cities (*si*) in South Korea saw a dramatic rise, particularly between 1945 and 1990, driven by the country's rapid industrialization and urbanization. Following liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the Korean peninsula had only 11 cities¹¹⁸. However, during the economic boom led by the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s to 1980s, massive urban planning projects and incentives for rural mergers increased the number of cities to 70 by 1990. Even after the transition to democracy, the number of cities continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace, reaching 75 today. Despite the demographic crisis affecting urban areas and the financial challenges many cities face in performing their administrative functions, decentralization in South Korea has not yet led to a reduction in the number of municipalities.

A major turning point for democratization and decentralization came with the 1997 financial crisis, which abruptly halted South Korea's extraordinary economic growth and is often considered the most significant national crisis since the Korean War. The collapse of the economic structure, which had been based on the promise of continuous growth, sparked profound political and economic restructuring. Economically, this restructuring led to neoliberal reforms that increased labor market flexibility, as well as a renewed focus on high-tech industries. The government responded with an ambitious five-year plan for Technoparks, continuing its long-term strategy of fostering high-tech industrial conglomerates linked to regional development. The first six Technoparks were designed in 1997, followed by additional parks in the early 2000s (Rhee, 2022).

Politically, the crisis fractured the longstanding government-*chaebol* alliance that had been central to the Korea Inc. management system. Faced with this shift, the government had to reconsider its legitimacy and seek broader popular support. The crisis thus opened the door for new social actors, particularly local governments and civil society, to play a more significant role in the country's evolving governance.

15.6

The Rise of the Civil Society

¹¹⁸ <https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Development-Overview/all/renewing-balanced-regional-development--92.do>.

Under the leadership of President Dae-Jung Kim (1925-2009), who served from 1998 to 2003, South Korea embraced the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm, a shift that sought to streamline government by delegating responsibilities to market actors and the voluntary sector, including firms and NGOs (Kim, 2010, 168; for a critical analysis of the adoption of NPM in South Korea, see Kim & Han, 2015). In 1999, a pivotal moment in the country's decentralization process occurred with the enactment of the *Law to Facilitate the Devolution of Central Public Administrative Authorities*. This law provided the first legal framework for transferring authority from the central government to local governments. To oversee this transition, a Presidential Commission for the Promotion of Local Empowerment was established, granting decision-making authority to accelerate the process of decentralization.

The 1997 financial crisis also forced the government to confront the weaknesses in the South Korean welfare system. The neoliberal economic reforms had led to widespread layoffs, rising unemployment, and increasing inequality, leaving the middle class in disarray (Kim, 2010, p. 178). In response, Kim's administration expanded welfare services and revamped health policies under the slogan of *productive welfare*. This slogan was intended to counter neoliberal critics who argued that welfare spending would undermine national productivity and global competitiveness (Kuhnle, 2004).

Key reforms included the *National Basic Livelihood Security Act* of 2000, which significantly broadened social assistance programs. The national health insurance system was restructured, consolidating all health funds into a unified national fund, while the national pension system was expanded to cover all social groups. Recognizing the vital role that civil society organizations would play in this evolving welfare state, Kim's administration actively intervened to foster and encourage the creation and engagement of civil society organizations. As a result, a new legal framework for the third sector was introduced, which made it easier for NGOs to gain legal recognition, in a manner similar to Japan's 1998 *NPO Law*.

These reforms were further reinforced by the administration of President Moo-hyun Roh (1946-2009), who governed from 2003 to 2008. A former human rights lawyer, Roh positioned his government as the *Participatory Government*, emphasizing decentralization and participatory democracy as central pillars of his vision. In 2003, the *Special Act for Local Decentralization* was passed, leading to the formation of the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization. This committee was tasked not only with devolving central administrative functions to local governments but also with promoting financial decentralization and creating mechanisms to enhance citizen participation. The committee was divided into five thematic divisions, each focusing

on critical areas: (a) public management, (b) decentralization, (c) e-government, (d) finance and tax, and (e) public personnel management.

Under the framework of the *Special Act for Local Decentralization*, President Moo-hyun Roh's administration pursued further administrative reorganization, driven by the ideal of *balanced national development*. One of Roh's key initiatives was to address the population congestion and economic concentration in Seoul by relocating many state agencies to the south of the country. His initial attempt through the *Special Act for the New Administrative Capital Construction* (2003) was, at first, declared unconstitutional. Roh quickly pivoted and, in 2005, he enacted the *Special Act for the Multifunctional Administrative City*, paving the way for the planning and construction of a new administrative capital: Sejong City, located in South Chungcheong Province, expected to be completed by 2030.

In tandem with the Sejong project, Roh initiated the first of a series of comprehensive *Five-Year Balanced National Development Plans* in 2004. These plans aimed to create *innovation districts* – large clusters of strategic industries and local businesses – to revitalize regional economies and promote local governance. Since then, the government, alongside local authorities and *chaebol*, has directed funding toward mega-projects for building the Korean *Innovation Cities*, now referred to by the most widespread term *Smart Cities*.

Roh remained steadfast in his commitment to participatory governance, working to complement decentralization with increased citizen participation and co-management of social welfare by local administrations and civil society. Three main types of participatory mechanisms were established (Kim, 2010, pp. 172-175): (a) direct democracy through local referenda, initiatives, and recalls; (b) public involvement in local policymaking via participatory budgeting, citizen juries to review policy issues, and the honorary auditors' system, where experts monitor local governance; and (c) the creation of online and offline platforms for citizen engagement, such as e-governance systems for feedback and discussions, public surveys, and government-citizen committees comprised of officials and policy experts.

Continuing the previous administration's focus on welfare, Roh rebranded Dae-jung Kim's *productive welfare* as *participatory welfare* (Chan, 2006), aligning it with his vision of a participatory government. He emphasized the involvement of citizens and civil society organizations in the provision and delivery of social welfare services. In 2005, Roh's administration launched *Hope Korea 21: Collaborative Welfare*, a program designed to build an integrated, customized welfare service system through public-private partnerships. Notable examples of these co-management practices include *Korea Foodbank*, which distributes surplus food to low-income families; the *Hope Start program*, which channels donations and services to children from disadvantaged backgrounds; and

the *Local Councils on Social Welfare* (LCSWs), which coordinates efforts between local governments and the third sector to prevent overlap or gaps in social welfare services.

Despite the significant progress in South Korea's democratic transition since Roh's leadership, critics continue to highlight persistent challenges that hinder the full emergence of local governments and civil society within the country's governance system (e.g., Kim, 2006; Kim, 2010). First, while local autonomy has gained some traction, the central government still holds most of the administrative powers. Economic decentralization, although initiated, has yet to break the strong financial dependency of local governments on national funding – especially in rural areas. As a result, much like in Japan, the central government can easily manipulate local administrations to serve its own interests, fostering intense competition between cities for funds and reinforcing clientelism between local and national political and economic elites.

Similar issues affect South Korea's third sector and broader civil society. Many of the mechanisms designed to encourage citizen participation and civil society co-management have been implemented in a top-down manner, heavily reliant on government funding. This has not only entrenched clientelism within civil society but has also enabled the state to use controlled public consent as a tool for legitimacy, leading to the rise of populism. Consequently, many organizations have shifted their focus toward national rather than local struggles, aiming their efforts at the central government rather than addressing local administrations.

While this nationalization of NGOs has bolstered their political advocacy, it has also created two significant problems. First, it has distanced these organizations from grassroots efforts, turning them into authority-focused entities with limited direct participation and a heightened risk of political co-optation. Some have even argued that in comparison to Japan's case, where civil society has been famously described as “social capital without advocacy” (Section 11.6, p. 351), the case of South Korea risks becoming that of “advocacy without social capital” (Lee & Arrington, 2008, p. 93). Second, the nationalization trend has drawn activists and organizations toward Seoul, exacerbating the drain of social capital from more peripheral regions and making it easier for local institutions in those areas to exert control over their populations.

Additionally, the fact that citizen participation and co-management practices are largely controlled by the state makes them vulnerable to the whims of national elites, raising concerns about their sustainability. For instance, many of the participatory mechanisms established by Moo-hyun Roh's government were significantly scaled back during the conservative administration of his successor, President Myung-bak Lee. As the recent succession of South Korean governments has shown, the state can substantially influence the pace of democratic transition, accelerating or stalling progress based on the interests of individual administrations.

Despite these challenges, the process of democratization in South Korea, fueled by local empowerment and the growing role of civil society, is now largely irreversible. NGOs have become critical actors, consistently contesting political processes in areas such as economic justice, welfare policy, migration, and women's rights. While political institutions often face public distrust, dynamic and politicized NGOs enjoy strong public and media support. Civil society has clearly established itself as a powerful watchdog, holding both government and businesses accountable (see Cho 2000; Joo 2001; Park 2001; Kim 2002; Kim & Moon 2003).

A notable example of civil society's influence is the Blacklist Movement of 2000, when a large coalition of organizations published a list of allegedly corrupt politicians, resulting in many of those individuals failing to get re-elected. Additionally, large-scale social movements like the famous candlelight protests have proven capable of shaping the country's political landscape. Meanwhile, though decentralization is still constrained by the central government, it is empowering local civil society actors and helping some local governments emerge as key drivers of social development – particularly in areas like diversity governance, as we will soon explore.

CHAPTER 16

South Korea's Cultural Minorities and Migration

16.1

The Myth of Homogeneity and the Reality of Cultural Heterogeneity in South Korea

The Koreans today are one of the world's most ethnically homogeneous peoples. In recent times there have been no significant ethnic or linguistic minorities. (Seth, 2010, p. 9)

Culturally and genetically Koreans are one of the most homogeneous peoples in the world... Koreans all share a sense of destiny and a perception of themselves as a unique people, bound together by a common language, culture, and religion (Kim, 2012, p. xix)

Upon reading this, many may roll their eyes and think, “Oh no, not this again!” The Korean Peninsula, like Japan, has long been influenced by the belief in its ethnic and, consequently, cultural homogeneity. However, the real issue here is that these words were not uttered by a nationalist politician in the 1980s. They were written just a decade ago by two respected scholars – one Korean, one non-Korean – whose works are considered essential reading on South Korean history.

It is difficult to comprehend how these scholars, who have detailed the history of a country repeatedly invaded by China and Japan, colonized by the latter, occupied by the U.S. and Russia, and forcibly divided into two rival nations, could assert that Koreans are “one of the most homogeneous peoples in the world.” What about the vast ideological, social, political, and—obviously—cultural differences between South Koreans and North Koreans? As bold as it may sound, I’m inclined to provocatively suggest that, in some ways, South Koreans may have more in common culturally with Italians (however we might define them) than with North Koreans.

Even before Korea's division, the rigid caste system, which mirrored that of Japan, created outcast groups who were marginalized and treated as ethnic-cultural minorities. And, while genetics is

beyond my expertise, if we consider Korea's history, it is impossible to ignore the significant intermingling with Chinese, Japanese, and Russian populations over centuries. Add to this the increase in mixed marriages due to colonization, occupation, and modern Korean emigration, and the claim of genetic homogeneity becomes even shakier.

If we focus solely on South Korea since its establishment in 1948, the depiction of a culturally homogeneous nation becomes even more untenable. The country was born during American occupation, with a significant foreign military presence – primarily from the U.S. but also from various UN nations – shaping its early years. Even Syngman Rhee, South Korea's founding father and first authoritarian leader, was a Harvard and Princeton graduate, married to an Austrian woman. Foreign influence and presence on the territory have continued until today, with 28,500 U.S. troops still stationed across 15 military bases in South Korea, occupying a considerable portion of its land.

The statement in the second quote that Koreans are “bound together by a common... religion” also crumbles when one looks at the vibrant religious diversity in South Korea, where Protestant and Catholic Christian churches coexist with traditional Buddhist orders. As for linguistic homogeneity, South Korea has a range of different regional dialects (see Yeon, 2012). Notably, the Jeju dialect is often unintelligible to speakers from other areas of the Peninsula and is even regarded by some linguists as a distinct Koreanic language (e.g., Juha 1996).

Finally, South Korea's diversity has only grown since the 1980s, as it has emerged as a major destination for international migrants. For more than half of its postwar history, the country has been home to a steadily increasing number of foreign residents, reaching about 2.2 million in 2019 (approximately 4.3% of the population)¹¹⁹.

In light of these considerations, it is fair to say that South Korea far from being a culturally homogeneous society. Our focus here is not on the nuanced cultural differences among those typically considered mainstream South Koreans. Instead, we turn our attention to the social groups that have emerged as key players in the contemporary discourse on cultural heterogeneity in the country. Broadly speaking, five primary categories of cultural minorities can be identified:

- a) *Return Migrants*: Although these individuals are ethnically Korean, their experiences and cultural backgrounds differ significantly from the mainstream population.
- b) *North Korean Defectors (Talbukja)*: Despite being ethnic Koreans and holding South Korean citizenship, North Korean defectors have very distinct cultural norms, values, and behaviors compared to the mainstream South Korean population.
- c) *Marriage Migrants*: This group comprises foreign-born individuals who have married mainstream South Koreans.

¹¹⁹ http://nationalatlas.ngii.go.kr/pages/page_2691.php.

- d) *Non-Ethnic-Korean Migrant Workers*: Since the early 1990s, this category has seen a significant influx, contributing to the country's labor force.
- e) *Children of Multicultural Families*: Although still quite young, this group is rapidly growing in numbers.

While these categories help highlight the main issues and interests of diverse cultural minorities, they are generalizations that inevitably overlook the complexity of cultural differences in South Korea. It is also important to remember that these categories are *porous*. For example, some return migrants may also identify as marriage migrants, sharing common concerns with non-ethnic Korean migrant workers, while many marriage migrants may simultaneously fall under the category of migrant workers.

16.2

Almost South Koreans: The Return Migrants

The presence of visible groups of return migrants in South Korea is deeply connected to the country's history of emigration. Throughout the ages, Korea has maintained diplomatic and commercial ties with neighboring China, which facilitated the constant movement of people and the gradual settlement of Koreans in the Manchurian region. After part of Manchuria was ceded to the Russian Empire in 1860 (Convention of Peking), many Koreans found themselves in Russian territory, prompting an increase in migration toward Siberia. There, they established permanent villages, seizing the opportunity for a new life. The movement of Koreans to Manchuria and Siberia soared, in particular, when the country's isolationist policies began to wane in 1876 and tensions with China and Japan started surging.

The Japanese occupation starting in 1910 saw hundreds of thousands of Koreans conscripted for labor in mainland Japan and its colonies, including Sakhalin Island. Many were also forcibly relocated to Manchuria when Japan established its puppet state there in 1931. Following the invasion of Manchuria, Soviet authorities halted Korean migration and required existing migrants to naturalize as Soviet citizens. However, suspicion grew among Russian leaders, who feared potential spies

among the Korean population. In 1937, Stalin initiated the deportation of Koreans from the Russian Far East, relocating them to Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The children of these deported families were forced into the Soviet education system, leading to a rapid loss of the Korean language.

Fast forward a few decades to the late 1960s, when a significant wave of emigration began from South Korea, spurred on by Chung-hee Park's military regime, which viewed migrant remittances as a strategy for economic growth. This new wave primarily targeted South America (especially Brazil), West Germany, and the United States. In 1972, the government established the Korea Overseas Development Corporation (KODC) to facilitate the export of labor abroad.

By the 1980s, however, South Korea's rapid industrialization and economic expansion created a pressing demand for labor that native workers could not satisfy. This situation caught the attention of Korean emigrants, particularly those in China and the Soviet Union, who were experiencing economic hardships due to the transformations in their respective countries. The fact that many of these communities had continued to be regarded as Korean cultural minorities contributed to preventing complete assimilation and maintaining a strong connection to their ethnocultural roots. Thus, when South Korea normalized diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union in 1991 and with China in 1992, many began visiting their ancestral homeland and soon reconnected with social networks. The high demand for low-cost migrant labor for 3D jobs further fueled a rise in illegal immigration through visa overstays.

Pressured by the burgeoning needs of its domestic labor market, the South Korean government took decisive action to incorporate migrant workers on a temporary basis. Drawing inspiration from similar systems emerging in Japan during that same period (Section 12.8, pp. 378-379), Korea introduced the Overseas Investment Company Training Program in the early 1990s, which allowed foreign-invested companies to hire local workers. By 1993, this initiative had evolved into the more comprehensive Industrial Technology Trainee Program, designed to enable small- and medium-sized companies -which were struggling against the dominance of large chaebol – to recruit foreign workers as trainees (Seol & Skrentny, 2004, p. 493; for a comprehensive review of South Korean immigration policies, see Oh et al., 2011).

This program specifically targeted workers from select Asian countries with whom South Korea had established strategic agreements. Notably, China was included as one of these countries, reflecting the government's strategy to legally employ return migrants, who were deemed particularly suitable due to their ethnic ties to Korea. This approach shared similarities with Japan's policies encouraging the integration of Nikkeijin migrants based on racial and ethnic connections. As expected,

initially, most migrant workers entering South Korea under this trainee arrangement were return migrants from China.

In 1999, the *Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (Overseas Korean Act)* was enacted, offering further incentives for specific groups of return migrants to resettle in South Korea. This legislation created a special visa category, now known as the F-4 visa, which was designed for high-skilled return migrants and afforded them nearly the same rights as South Korean citizens (for details, see Oh et al. 2011, 51). Initially, the provision was designed to specifically target returnees from emigrant communities established post-1948, thus effectively excluding many high-skilled ethnic Koreans from China and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This exclusionary clause led to accusations of discrimination, culminating in a ruling by the South Korean Constitutional Court that declared the measure unconstitutional. The government was subsequently compelled to amend the measure to encompass all ethnic Koreans.

The initial efforts South Korea made to welcome immigrants before the 2000s fell short of addressing the growing demand for migrant labor. The domestic market continued to face acute labor shortages, prompting companies to find ways to retain migrants who had initially entered as trainees, even after their training period had ended. This resulted in an increasing number of trainees overstaying their visas, which exacerbated the issue of undocumented workers.

It was not until about a decade after the introduction of the Industrial Trainee System that the government made a notable step toward opening its doors to low-skilled migrants: the enactment of the Employment Management Program (EMP) in 2002. This program continued to prioritize return migrants, allowing ethnic Koreans with family ties in South Korea to obtain a three-year working visa. In 2007, this preferential treatment was further expanded with the introduction of the Visit and Employment Program. This new initiative broadened eligibility for all return migrants to a special visa category (H-2), enabling them to take various low-skilled jobs without needing family connections in the country. With this move, South Korea finally opened its doors wide to low-skilled ethnic Korean migrants.

Today, return migrants in South Korea represent a diverse community, typically categorized by their nationality. The largest and oldest group is made up of ethnic Koreans from Chinese territories, known as *Joseon-jok* (Joseon ethnicity) – a name reflecting the historical roots of the first Korean communities established in China during the Joseon Kingdom. As of 2022, the Joseon-jok population stood at 626,729, down from a peak of 728,539 in 2018, primarily due to naturalization¹²⁰.

Most Joseon-jok originate from communities near the Korean Peninsula, particularly in the Manchurian region, and are often fluent in both Chinese and Korean – a dual language proficiency

¹²⁰ Migration data and statistics are available at <https://kostat.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20108050000&bid=11745>.

that greatly enhances their social integration and mobility in South Korea. While many began their lives in Korea working in low-skilled or manual labor positions, a significant number have managed to climb the socioeconomic ladder, establishing their own businesses, particularly in the food service and trade sectors. Despite these strides, they still grapple with xenophobic prejudice and discrimination, often perceived as foreign and culturally distinct from the mainstream Korean population.

While the Joseon-jok are recognized under the amended *Overseas Korean Act*, their profile often overlaps with that of the *Hwagyo* – the non-ethnic-Korean Chinese residents in South Korea. Despite being relatively recent arrivals, some Hwagyo have lived in South Korea for decades, are bilingual, and have similarly advanced economically, blurring the lines between these two groups within the broader mosaic of South Korea's immigrant population.

Return migrants from the former Soviet Union are known as *Goryeo-saram* or, more commonly *Goryeoin*, both terms referring to the *people of Goryeo* – this name was chosen to reflect the historical origins of Korean emigration to Russian territories, which began after the Joseon Kingdom's era when the Korean Peninsula was widely referred to as Goryeo. As discussed earlier, Goryeoin were subjected to forced assimilation under Soviet rule, which led to the loss of the Korean language and many traditional Korean customs. As a result, they often face steeper challenges in integrating into South Korean society compared to the Joseon-jok. The number of Goryeoin has steadily increased, reaching 94,540 in 2022, with the majority coming from Uzbekistan (40,706), followed by Russia (34,220), and Kazakhstan (19,614).

Another notable group within the broader category of return migrants is that of Korean Americans (*Hanguggye Migug-in*), who typically include high-skilled professionals such as managers in Korean companies or university professors. A smaller portion of this group consists of retirees who have returned to South Korea. The Korean American population in South Korea rose steadily until reaching around 45,000 in 2013 and has since stabilized at 45,752 as of 2022.

16.3

Heroes, Country Bumpkins, or Spies? The Complex Challenges for Integration of the Talbukja

An exceptional case within the broader category of ethnic-Korean migrants is represented by *Talbukja* – North Korean defectors/refugees, that is, those who risk their lives to escape the authoritarian regime of the North in pursuit of a better life in the South. The phenomenon of North Korean defections dates back to the early stages of the Korean War (1950-1953), when tens of thousands of people fled from the communist North to the South, hoping to escape war and political persecution.

The first large wave of North Korean defectors to the South began in the mid-1990s. This period, known as the *Arduous March*, was triggered by severe famine and economic collapse in North Korea during the years 1994-1998, which left millions starving and desperate (Haggard & Noland, 2007). This led to a surge in defections, with many fleeing to China and then taking arduous routes through Southeast Asia before eventually seeking refuge in South Korea. From 1998 onward, an average of 1,300 *Talbukja* arrived each year. However, since the outbreak of COVID-19, this number has plummeted to around 100 per year (Wallach, 2023). As of 2019, the total number of *Talbukja* living in South Korea stood at 33,523 (Kim, 2020).

The legal framework for *Talbukja* has evolved significantly over time. What remained unchanged is that they are legally regarded as South Korean citizens according to Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution, which asserts: “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands”¹²¹ (Art. 3). This constitutional provision grants them immediate entitlement to citizenship upon entering South Korea.

The first policy specifically addressing *Talbukja* was the 1962 *Special Law to Support National Heroes and North Korean Returnees*, which was later amended in 1979 to include special compensation and economic aid for these individuals. Under this early framework, *Talbukja* were treated – and referred to – as heroic *returnees*, equated with those who fought for Korea’s independence or made notable contributions to the nation. Specifically, South Korean nationalist rhetoric proudly portrayed their journey to the South as a perilous homecoming to the only true Korea, the Daehan (Great Han).

This status changed in 1993 with the enactment of the *North Korean Compatriot Returnee Protection Law*, which downgraded their representation from national heroes to beneficiaries of basic welfare programs. In 1997, the law underwent another transformation with the enactment of the *North Korean Defectors Protection and Settlement Support Act*. This new legislation officially classified *Talbukja* as refugees, expanding the scope of government support for their resettlement under the guidance of the Ministry of Unification.

¹²¹ https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?lang=ENG&hseq=1.

Today, the integration process for Talbukja begins with a preliminary investigation by the National Intelligence Service to determine the level of protection and support each individual might require. This is followed by a compulsory three-month social adaptation program at a designated training center. Upon completion of the program, they are granted full South Korean citizenship and become eligible for government assistance for up to five years. This support covers a range of services, including education, employment, housing, and personal security. The North Korean Hana Foundation, established in 1997 under the Ministry of Unification, oversees this process, with additional support from various civil society organizations.

Despite these institutional efforts, Talbukja face profound social, economic, and psychological obstacles in integrating into the society of their new homeland, where they often experience widespread discrimination and marginalization. First, language barriers, despite speaking the same Korean language, also play a significant role, as North Korean dialects, vocabulary, and speech patterns can sound outdated or strange to South Koreans. Most importantly, the abrupt transition from a state-controlled economy to a capitalist society leaves many defectors ill-prepared for the job market.

Because of their significant cultural background, despite being officially recognized as ethnic Koreans and South Korean citizens, North Korean defectors mostly find themselves treated as outsiders (e.g., Lankov, 2006; Matherly, 2020). South Korean society places a premium on education, family background, and socioeconomic status – criteria that many defectors cannot easily meet. As a result, they are frequently stigmatized as “country bumpkins” (e.g., Fifield, 2015) or even potential spies, facing prejudice in employment, education, and social relationships.

The most significant challenges arise in the labor market, where defectors are often trapped in low-wage, menial jobs, suffering a much higher unemployment rate than the national average (Bidet, 2009). Even when employed, defectors earn significantly less than their South Korean counterparts, with many earning less than the minimum wage. Discrimination in the workplace is common, as defectors report being treated as less competent, excluded from social gatherings, or even facing open hostility from colleagues who harbor suspects and negative stereotypes about them.

In the educational system, young North Korean defectors face intense bullying and exclusion (Kim & Kim, 2023). Many have gaps in their schooling or are unfamiliar with the academic culture in South Korea. As a result, North Korean students often struggle to keep up academically, and some drop out due to social isolation and discrimination.

In addition to economic and educational challenges, social integration is a persistent struggle. North Korean defectors often find it difficult to build relationships with South Koreans not only because of the widespread prejudices against them but also because of their peculiar psychological condition (Lee et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2022; Ryu et al., 2024). Many suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD), depression, and anxiety stemming from their harrowing experiences in North Korea and during their escape. Their struggles to adapt to life in South Korea often exacerbate these conditions. Many defectors report feelings of loneliness and isolation, with some turning to defector-only communities for social support.

16.4

Foreign Women in the Korean Countryside: The Peculiar Case of Marriage Migrants

One of the most dramatic transformations in South Korean society during its rapid economic growth has been the equally swift demographic transition, resulting in an astonishing drop in the birthrate. In 1960, South Korea was among the high-fertility countries, with a total fertility rate of 6.0. By 1970, this figure had already decreased to 4.53 and continued to plummet: 2.87 in 1980, 1.59 in 1990, and 1.47 in 2000 (Kim, 2012, p. 548). When the fertility rate fell to 1.08 in 2005, South Korea became the country with the world's lowest birthrate – a situation that has persisted to the present day, with the fertility rate bottoming out at 0.78 in 2022 (Lendon & Bae, 2023).

While demographic transitions have occurred in all developed countries, in South Korea this decline was imprudently encouraged and accelerated by government intervention. Inspired by other nations, particularly neighboring China, the government saw birth control as essential for achieving modernization and economic growth. Beginning in 1962, South Korea launched a national family planning campaign, providing information, basic maternal and child health services, and family planning supplies. Under the banner of the “small and prosperous family,” the government set a target of a two-child, replacement-level fertility rate by the end of the 1980s (Kim, 2012, p. 548). The government's goals were all too successfully achieved, but the trend did not stabilize at the replacement level as expected. Instead, birthrates continued their downward spiral, culminating in the critically low levels seen today.

This demographic crisis has led to multiple social challenges, including a rapidly aging population and an increasing marriage gap. The combination of low birthrates and a cultural preference for male children has resulted in a shortage of women, particularly in rural areas. As young women pursue greater empowerment and opportunities in urban settings, fewer are willing to marry men in the

countryside. This imbalance has created high demand for wives among rural men, fueling the rise of international marriage agencies since the early 1990s. By 2006, over a third of male Korean farmers were married to foreign women (Seth, 2010, p. 487).

The most numerous and visible group of marriage migrants are the Joseon-jok, who, due to their ethnic and cultural connections to mainstream South Koreans, were expected to integrate more smoothly into traditional family structures (Abelmann & Kim, 2005). Following the Joseon-jok, other prominent groups of marriage migrants include women from Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, and various Southeast Asia countries.

Due to the unique nature of their migration, marriage migrants face specific challenges during their integration into South Korean life. Typically women moving alone, they find themselves abruptly cut off from familiar cultural and social environments and are forced to adapt to the patriarchal, traditionalist settings of rural Korea (for more details, see Kim, 2014; Kim et al., 2017). Compared to urban areas, rural communities lack the resources necessary to bridge linguistic and cultural gaps, leaving the responsibility of adjustment largely on the shoulders of the women themselves. Traditional gender roles and ethnic nationalism intersect to create additional barriers, as these women are not only expected to assimilate but are also further marginalized as but are also further marginalized as *outsiders* in mainstream South Korean society (Kim, 2014, p. 287).

The isolation and marginalization they experience, combined with their subordinate position within the patriarchal family structure, often place these women in highly vulnerable situations, leaving them particularly susceptible to domestic abuse. Generally, familiarity with the Korean language and culture can ease this transition. Consequently, Joseon-jok migrants tend to face fewer integration issues compared to non-ethnic Korean women.

In response to the growing number of marriage migrants, the South Korean government began organizing institutional support in 2004, led by the newly established Ministry of Gender Equality (founded in 2001) and financially supported by AmorePacific Corporation, one of the nation's largest cosmetics chaebols. The Ministry entrusted the non-profit Women Migrants' Human Rights Center of Korea with the responsibility of administering Korean language courses and support programs tailored for marriage migrants. Initially, only five support centers were set up in regions with high concentrations of these migrants.

In 2006, the government solidified its commitment by introducing the *Plan for Supporting the Social Integration of Women Marriage Immigrants and Families*. This comprehensive policy, managed by the Ministry of Gender Equality (reorganized into the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2005), aimed to establish a nationwide network of services and support programs – including assistance with child-rearing and protection against domestic violence – accessible to all

marriage migrants. These initiatives were implemented locally through the establishment of a growing number of Marriage Immigrant Family Support Centers all across the country, with the first 38 centers opening at the beginning of 2007.

That same year saw a power struggle between the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and the Ministry of Health and Welfare over jurisdiction in youth and family affairs (Kim, 2014, p. 286). Eventually, the Ministry of Health and Welfare prevailed, and with the enactment of the *Multicultural Family Support Act* in 2008, it took over the management of the Marriage Immigrant Family Support Centers, which were subsequently renamed Multicultural Family Support Centers. This marked a significant expansion of their scope and services, reflecting the government's growing recognition of the diverse needs of multicultural families.

In 2010, the first *Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Support* was introduced, covering the period until 2012. This led to an amendment of the *Multicultural Family Support Act* in 2011, which mandated the enactment of comprehensive five-year plans. The second *Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Support* was published in 2013, followed by a third plan (2017-2022), and, most recently, a fourth version launched in 2023, covering the period through 2027. These plans progressively advanced measures to address the unique challenges faced by marriage migrants, enhance their rights, and promote their inclusion in South Korean society.

Already by 2019, the network of support centers had grown substantially, with 218 centers operating nationwide (Kim 2020), serving approximately 159,499 marriage migrants. This robust infrastructure reflects South Korea's ongoing commitment to fostering social inclusion and ensuring that multicultural families receive the support they need to thrive.

16.5

The Arrival of Non-ethnic-Korean Migrants in South Korea

During the 1990s, South Korea underwent a remarkable transformation, shifting from a country of emigration to one increasingly reliant on immigration (Oh et al., 2011; Kee, 2015). This change was driven by mounting economic and demographic pressures, contributing to making the demand for low-cost workers ever more urgent. To address these needs, the South Korean government began

opening its doors, albeit cautiously, to migrant labor. While a preferential entry pathway was always maintained for ethnic Korean workers, the introduction of the Industrial Trainee System in 1993 allowed for the first time non-ethnic Koreans – mostly from countries such as China, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, and Mongolia – to enter the domestic labor market.

Although officially conceived as a temporary program to provide skill training for workers from developing countries, the Industrial Trainee System quickly turned into a *de facto* labor program. Many companies began using it to fill low-skilled positions rather than for its intended purpose of skills transfer. Consequently, a substantial number of trainees ended up overstaying their visas, taking up illegal employment in small and medium-sized enterprises as undocumented workers. By 2002, irregular migrant workers accounted for an astounding 78.4% of the total foreign workforce in South Korea (Kim, 2003, p. 246). Recognizing the unsustainable nature of this situation and facing mounting criticism – both domestically and internationally – the South Korean government was eventually compelled to reconsider its rigid immigration policies.

The process of reform started in 2004 with the introduction of the Employment Permit System (EPS), and finally, in 2007, the much-criticized Industrial Trainee System was abolished. Modeled after Germany's guest-worker programs, the EPS aimed at providing a more structured and legally transparent framework for hiring foreign workers (Lim, 2014, p. 43). Under this new system, workers from 16 countries¹²² that had signed special Memoranda of Understanding with South Korea became eligible for a special working visa category known as E-9, allowing them temporary employment in specific sectors such as manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and fisheries.

However, the EPS was deliberately structured to limit long-term settlement opportunities. Indeed, while South Korea grants permanent residency after five years of continuous residence, the E-9 visa permitted a maximum stay of three years, with the possibility of an extension of a maximum of 22 months – falling just two months short of the required duration for long-term residency eligibility.

Over time, the limitations of the EPS became increasingly apparent. The rigid regulations, lack of pathways for long-term integration, and continued prevalence of undocumented workers created frustration for both employers and laborers. Recognizing the need for reform, the government introduced a new system in 2021 aimed at providing greater stability for long-term foreign laborers. Under the new system, migrant workers who had been legally employed under the E-9 category for at least five years became eligible for a new visa type – the E-7-4 visa – granting a *quasi*-permanent residency status that acknowledges their contribution to the economy.

¹²² Specifically: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Inspired by a similar system implemented in Japan in 2018 (Section 12.8, pp. 378-379), the E-7-4 visa shifted the status of long-term low-skilled migrants to *skilled workers*, enabling them to stay in the country indefinitely, provided they met specific criteria. This reform signaled a new approach, acknowledging the growing role of foreign workers in the national economy and offering a clearer path to stability and security for those who had already integrated into South Korean society.

In 2023, the government went a step further by relaxing the eligibility requirements for the E-7-4 visa. The mandatory period of legal employment was reduced from five years to four, and the annual quotas for visas were expanded to allow more workers to qualify. These changes were part of a broader strategy to tackle labor shortages and respond to South Korea's ongoing demographic decline.

As a result of these policy shifts, the number of non-ethnic Korean migrant workers has continued to grow steadily in recent years. By 2022, their total population had reached 499,270, reflecting South Korea's increasing reliance on foreign labor. The largest groups, in descending order, included Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai, Filipino, North American, Uzbek, Cambodian, and Indonesian workers. This diverse influx of long-term foreign residents has not only reshaped the labor market but has also begun to significantly transform South Korea's demographic landscape.

16.6

Pioneers for an Inclusive Future: The Children of Multicultural Families

Despite the ongoing decline in birth rates among native South Korean couples, the number of children born to so-called *multicultural families* (*damunhwa-gajeong*) has been rising rapidly. In South Korea, the term *multicultural family* refers to households where at least one spouse is not a mainstream South Korean. This broad category encompasses three main sub-groups: (a) rural families formed through marriages between native Koreans and marriage migrants; (b) migrant families where at least one spouse is a foreign worker; and (c) families with at least one North Korean refugee spouse. While many of these children are born in South Korea, some were born abroad and joined their families later, after their migrant parent settled in the country.

Although many multicultural children are still very young, it is essential to include them in any discussion of South Korea's cultural minorities because they highlight the unique challenges faced

by second-generation immigrants. One of the key characteristics shaping their experiences is that, much like Japan's *Hafu* (Section 12.6), they are often identified based solely on their appearance and/or prejudices about their mixed-bloodiness rather than actual cultural differences. Many of these children grow up in households where the cultural identity of the migrant spouse is downplayed in favor of mainstream Korean culture. As a result, many of these children speak only Korean and have limited knowledge of their non-Korean heritage.

The challenges faced by children of multicultural families are particularly pronounced in rural areas, where they are frequently subjected to xenophobic and racist discrimination. Even in cases where both parents are ethnically Korean – such as marriages between a South Korean and a Joseon-jok – the family's migrant background is enough to make these children targets of prejudice. In urban settings, the situation is not necessarily better, especially for children who stand out due to their physical features. Skin color, in particular, plays a significant role in shaping the severity of discrimination: for instance, children with darker skin tones often face heightened exclusion and bullying compared to those who can pass as more ethnically Korean (Lee, 2017).

A distinct group within the category of multicultural families includes children with at least one North Korean refugee parent. Here, the usual xenophobic and racist biases against multicultural families intersect with deep-seated nationalist prejudices against North Korean defectors, resulting in a unique form of discrimination that is both complex and entrenched.

In contrast to Japan, where a growing number of *Hafu* are gaining social acceptance and even being celebrated as symbols of modernity and cosmopolitanism (Section 12.6), South Korea is yet to embrace this trend. One of the reasons for this disparity is the socioeconomic profile of most multicultural families in South Korea. They tend to occupy lower rungs of the social ladder, which reinforces a widespread perception of mixed-heritage children as being of *impure blood* (Lee, 2017). This perception is further complicated by the notion that such children are somehow inherently inferior – a stigma that persists despite rare cases of mixed-heritage individuals achieving success, such as the Afro-American-Korean singer Michelle Lee or the Korean-American basketball player Lee Dong-jun.

To counteract these negative perceptions, the South Korean government has only recently begun to provide support to children of multicultural families, especially by integrating elements of multicultural education into curricula to help children of mixed families feel proud of their diverse backgrounds (Kong, 2014). Although these efforts are not yet systematic or widespread, they represent a small but positive step toward creating a more inclusive environment for the next generation.

The number of children from multicultural families has been steadily increasing since the early 2000s. As of 2017, there were approximately 222,000 children from such backgrounds, with the majority born in South Korea. Notably, 55.5% of these children live outside the greater Seoul metropolitan area, underscoring their significant presence in rural and provincial regions (National Atlas, 2019). The sex ratio among these children was about 104.5 males per 100 females, and their age distribution reflects the relatively recent nature of the multicultural trend: 51.7% were under six years old, 36.8% were of elementary school age (7-12 years old), 7.1% were in middle school (13-15 years old), and just 4.4% were high school-aged (16-18 years old).

CHAPTER 17

Emergence and Diffusion of *Damunhwa*

17.1

The Invention of *Koreanness*

The history of the Korean Peninsula has been shaped by internal conflicts and a complex geopolitical environment, driven by the ambitions of neighboring powers such as China and Japan, as well as later influences from Russia and Western nations. These external pressures, combined with Korea's internal struggles, ultimately resulted in the division of the peninsula into two separate states: South Korea and North Korea. The formation of a modern national identity in Korea has been profoundly influenced by this turbulent history, with one of the most pivotal moments being Japan's colonization of the peninsula from 1910 to 1945.

As Korea entered the modern era, it was quickly overtaken by Japanese imperial ambitions, and the years of Japanese colonial rule left an indelible mark on Korean identity. A vast body of scholarship has shown how anticolonial ideologies and resistance movements during the colonial period laid the foundation for the modern concept of the Korean nation and people (e.g., Lee, 1963; Shin, 2006; Caprio, 2009; Park, 2009). In particular, it was in reaction to Japan's harsh colonial policies, particularly the assimilation efforts of the 1930s, that modern Korean nationalism began to take shape.

Japan sought to erase Korean culture, language, and traditions, intending to mold Koreans into loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire. However, these attempts at forced assimilation ironically backfired, intensifying Korean resistance and reinforcing a strong sense of national pride and cultural uniqueness. As a result, Japan's efforts to suppress Korean identity only served to solidify it further,

laying the foundations for the post-liberation ideologies that would define the Korean Peninsula as a proudly monoethnic and monocultural nation (Lie, 2014, p. 7).

However, the aftermath of liberation in 1945, quickly shattered any hope of a unified Korean nation. The peninsula, instead of becoming a single, united country, was occupied by foreign forces and torn apart by the Korean War (1950-1953), leading to the creation of two rival states. From 1948 onward, both North and South Korea embarked on the construction of their own distinct nationalist narratives, each seeking to establish itself as the legitimate Korean state. This competition between the two regimes intensified their focus on defining *Koreanness* as a pure and unique ethnocultural identity.

Both North and South Korea framed themselves as the true protectors of Korean cultural heritage. This led to policies aimed at purging foreign influences, including reducing the use of Chinese characters in the written language and discriminating against minority groups, particularly Korean-Chinese communities (Cheon, 2008). What had started as a movement against colonial domination evolved into a powerful driver of xenophobic nationalism, with each state reinforcing the idea that foreign interference was responsible for Korea's division.

South Korea's immediate postwar nationalism, particularly during the presidency of Syngman Rhee (1948–1960), was marked by contradictions. While Rhee's regime played a significant role in shaping early nationalist discourse, the president's personal identity – a pro-American Christian, partially schooled in the United States, married to an Austrian woman – stood in contrast to the cultural ideal of pure *Koreanness* that his government promoted. Understandably, his nationalist rhetoric was primarily focused on anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment rather than the cultural aspects of nation-building.

It was under the authoritarian rule of Chung-hee Park (1961–1979) that nationalism became systematically ingrained into the fabric of South Korean society. Park's government actively translated the rhetoric of Korean ethnic and cultural homogeneity into state policy. Beginning in 1974, his administration launched the first *Five-Year Cultural Development Plan* (1974-1978), aimed at building a new national identity centered on Korea's traditional heritage, promoting cultural consciousness among citizens, and exporting Korean culture abroad to boost South Korea's soft power (Kim, 1976, p. 19).

Even after Park's assassination in 1979, his brand rhetoric of identitarian nationalism continued to dominate South Korea's political and cultural landscape. During the large-scale pro-democracy movements of the 1980s, which brought foreign ideologies like Marxism into South Korean discourse, the fundamental framework within which civil society articulated its demands remained anchored in Park's brand of populist nationalism, centered on the idea of a homogeneous nation (Lie, 2014, p.

16). This deep-seated belief in cultural purity shaped South Korea's attitudes toward both internal diversity and its growing interactions with the international community well into the late 20th century.

As South Korea evolved into a modern, globalized nation, the legacy of this homogeneous nationalism presented new challenges, particularly in dealing with immigration and multiculturalism. Nonetheless, the historical emphasis on a pure, unified Korean identity continues to influence contemporary debates about national identity, cultural heterogeneity, and the integration of minority groups within South Korean society. Despite these challenges, the changing demographics and growing diversity within South Korea are slowly prompting a reexamination of what it means to be Korean in a more interconnected, globalized world.

17.2

The Rise of Pro-migrant Activism and Human Rights Movements in Democratic South Korea

The end of South Korea's authoritarian regimes and the subsequent transition to democracy, coupled with economic fluctuations and the arrival of the first sizable cohorts of international migrants in the early 1990s, set the stage for profound changes in the country's social landscape and cultural narratives. For many of these early migrants, pioneering the formation of cultural minorities outside the mainstream Korean society came at a high personal cost. South Korea had never officially faced the challenge of reorganizing its social structures to accommodate cultural minorities, and those who arrived in this period often encountered harsh conditions and systemic discrimination.

Yet, despite these formidable challenges, immigrants to South Korea displayed remarkable resilience and an ability to mobilize resources for social and political change. Their efforts were bolstered by the active engagement of South Korean civil society, which integrated migrants' struggles for labor and citizenship rights into the broader framework of the country's growing anti-government and pro-democracy movements (e.g., Lie, 2018; Kim, 2020). This convergence of migrant activism and domestic civil society marked the beginning of a new chapter in South Korea's social history.

The earliest protests centered around the appalling conditions faced by low-skilled migrants working under the Industrial Trainee System. Trainees were not entitled to basic labor rights, and the

system's inherent flaws often pushed them into overstaying their visas, thereby transforming them into irregular workers living and working in conditions akin to “modern-day slavery” (Korea Research Institute for Workers' Human Rights and Justice, 1995). Several highly publicized incidents in the early 1990s brought these issues to light, prompting the formation of South Korea's first migrant advocacy organizations (Kim, 2020).

One of the most significant moments came in 1994, when the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) – led by the evangelical pastor Reverend Kyung-suk Soh – helped organize the first visible migrant protest in South Korea. The protest, consisting of a sit-in held in Seoul, sought to draw attention to the severe exploitation and lack of rights faced by migrant laborers. The media coverage that followed generated widespread public sympathy, putting pressure on the government to act. In response, just a few days later, President Young-sam Kim announced plans to extend medical coverage to all foreign workers, regardless of their immigration status. By the end of 1994, the Ministry of Labor began drafting measures to address labor rights violations involving migrant workers (Park, 2010).

The success of this initial protest sparked a wave of activism and the creation of several more migrant advocacy organizations dedicated to expanding labor rights for both trainees and undocumented workers. As these protests gained national prominence, the various groups united under a central organization: the Joint Committee with Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK), founded in 1995. Led by another evangelical minister, Reverend Kim Hae-sung, who had been engaged in pro-migrant solidarity efforts since the late 1980s, the JCMK emerged as a powerful voice advocating for migrant workers' rights (Kim, 1998).

At this point, some of the most prominent South Korean pro-human rights NGOs – such as People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Sarangbang Center for Human Rights, and MINBYUN Lawyers for a Democratic Society – joined forces with the migrant rights movement. Collaborating closely with the JCMK, these organizations began lobbying the government to align South Korean labor policies with international standards. They mobilized a range of international conventions to which South Korea is a signatory, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, (CRC) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEAFDW), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICEAFRD) (Kim, 2005, p. 408).

The synergy between migrant activists and South Korean civil society organizations, many led by church leaders, established an ethical and often bible-based framework that humanized migrant workers and countered the dominant narrative of migrants as economic or cultural threats (Kim 2020).

This shift in perspective was further supported by the media. Numerous television programs and newspapers began featuring stories that highlighted the struggles and contributions of migrant workers. Such coverage not only raised awareness of the hardships faced by migrants but also initiated national debates about cultural pluralism and the potential benefits of a more diverse society.

The first significant legal victory for migrant workers occurred in 1995, following a highly publicized protest in which 13 Nepalese workers chained themselves together outside the historic Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul. In response to the outcry, the Supreme Court of Korea ruled that the protections of the *Labor Standards Act* must be extended to all foreign workers, regardless of their legal status (Park, 2010). This ruling provided a crucial legal tool for combating labor rights violations and enabled migrant trainees to seek compensation for job-related accidents.

17.3

The Politicization of Minority Struggles

The Supreme Court's landmark ruling of 1995 galvanized pro-migrant activists, who intensified their protests and interventions between the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this period, a distinctive feature of South Korean pro-migrant solidarity began to emerge: the political alliance between labor unions and immigrant advocacy organizations. While in many other countries trade unions have historically opposed migrant labor to protect their own interests (e.g., Lacovetta et al. 1996), the powerful Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) took a different path by throwing its full support behind the migrant workers' cause.

This alignment was no coincidence. South Korean labor unions, having endured decades of repression under authoritarian governments, were now mobilizing to expand labor rights. Their struggle naturally intersected with other anti-government protests and highlighted the vulnerabilities of marginalized segments of the workforce. The KCTU's involvement significantly strengthened the advocacy and visibility of pro-migrant organizations, lending them a powerful ally in the broader fight for workers' rights.

Meanwhile, immigrant advocacy groups continued to expand their efforts during the second half of the 1990s, focusing on lobbying the government for legal protections for vulnerable groups of

migrants. Although business leaders strongly opposed these initiatives, they succeeded in raising public awareness about migrant issues and further rallying civil society support for pro-migrant solidarity.

By the early 2000s, hundreds of independent organizations had emerged, dedicated to assisting foreign workers with issues such as unpaid wages, industrial accidents, physical abuse, residency status, repatriation, and interethnic marriages. One notable outcome of this growth was the establishment of medical mutual-aid organizations to address the increasing number of industrial accidents and health problems faced by foreign workers. Beginning in 1999, a network of medical professionals and volunteers formed a coalition to offer centralized information and provide low-cost or free medical services to migrant workers (Medical Networ, 2002).

Significantly, by the late 1990s, the migrant rights movement had forged a powerful alliance with the women's rights movement, uniting around the demand for a revision of the 1948 *Nationality Act*. Under the law's original provisions, citizenship was passed only through the father, meaning that a child born to a South Korean mother and a foreign father was not granted South Korean nationality. This discriminatory law became a central target for feminist activists seeking to reform South Korea's patriarchal legal framework governing family affairs. In 1997, after sustained grassroots protests and legal challenges, the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional, prompting the government to amend it in the name of gender equality.

This first intersection of the struggles for gender equality and migrant rights consolidated a common front between feminist and pro-migrant organizations. Their combined efforts subsequently focused on securing protections for migrant women employed in the South Korean sex industry (see Kim & Fu, 2008) and marriage migrants, whose numbers began to rise significantly at the turn of the millennium.

The advocacy for migrant women's rights was built on the foundations laid by pro-migrant movements led by the Joint Committee with Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK), strategically mobilizing international norms and standards. Activists drew on international conventions ratified by South Korea, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other global frameworks. Institutional support also came from the Ministry of Gender Equality and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, established by President Dae-jung Kim in 2001 as part of his pledge to promote human rights and democracy at the national level. This independent commission worked to monitor, analyze, and advance human rights protection across the country.

In parallel, activists engaged in large-scale public campaigns to spread awareness and educate the broader public, utilizing educational programs and targeted initiatives to shift societal attitudes toward

migrants. Over time, these efforts coalesced into a few influential national umbrella organizations that emerged as the primary intermediaries between national and international bodies and local communities. Among the most prominent were the Korea Women's Associations United (KWAU), established in 1987 and a key player in the campaign to revise the *Nationality Act*, and the aforementioned Women Migrants' Human Rights Center of Korea, founded in 2005, which has been instrumental in shaping policies for the support and protection of marriage migrants (Section 16.4).

In conclusion, the emergence of discourses around cultural minorities in South Korea initially took the form of confrontations between pro-migrant grassroots movements and the central government. These early discussions were not framed explicitly in terms of diversity and not even an overhaul of the ideal of national homogeneity. Instead, they were anchored in a broader discourse centered on human and civil rights, democracy, and social justice.

17.4

Building a Global South Korea: Emergence and Transformations of the Ideal of *Segyehwa*

In the late 1990s, the South Korean government finally began to abandon its long-standing rhetoric of cultural homogeneity, embracing a more inclusive discourse centered around the ideal of cultural pluralism. This shift was driven by two interconnected factors. First, the forces of globalization, coupled with economic challenges, made it increasingly clear that the country's economy would depend on migrant labor and that, despite efforts to maintain a temporary workforce through restrictive guest-worker policies, many migrants would inevitably settle in Korea for the long term. Second, while the government could ignore the permanent presence of some migrant workers, the growing phenomenon of marriage migrants and the visible rise in multicultural families posed undeniable challenges to the nationalist rhetoric of homogeneity.

The government's initial response was to focus on assimilation, launching programs and initiatives designed to integrate these new residents through Korean language and cultural education. However, despite the success of some of these efforts, deep-rooted discrimination and marginalization – embedded in the dominant discourse of homogeneity and fueled by racism and xenophobia –

continued to persist. As legal and social recognition of minorities improved, the stark contrast between official acceptance and everyday discrimination became more evident.

This discrepancy spurred a resurgence of ethnic and cultural identities among minority communities, who began mobilizing for the recognition of their distinct identities and rights. In other words, the contradiction inherent in the assimilationist model – between the emphasis on cultural essentialism and the reality of cultural dynamism – exposed tensions within the homogeneity ideal, laying the groundwork for the emergence of a new vision of cultural pluralism.

At the same time, South Korea's democratic transition, which gained momentum after the economic crisis of 1997, created an environment more receptive to grassroots movements and bottom-up discourses, particularly those championed by the increasingly vibrant civil society. Many of the new political leaders, having emerged from the nation's own democratic struggles, were open to revising the governance models and narratives inherited from the authoritarian era. Consequently, the expanding discourse on human rights and cultural pluralism that began to take root in the 1990s found a more fertile ground to influence national policy.

This window of political opportunity was critical for cultural minorities in South Korea. Unlike in Japan, where local governments have played a pivotal role in driving social and political change, local authorities in South Korea lacked the resources and capacity to effect meaningful reforms until relatively recently. Thus, it was the powerful lobbying efforts of civil society, combined with the central government's increasing willingness to engage, that propelled the country's transformation.

In a remarkably short span – just a decade since the first major influx of international migrants – the country evolved from a nation of emigration into a fully-fledged country of immigration. During this time, the government not only formulated and revised comprehensive immigration policies but also established a range of regulatory frameworks and administrative structures, allocating significant resources to effectively manage its growing migrant population.

This dynamism continued into the following two decades, fueled by the collaborative efforts of civil society, the central government, and, increasingly, local governments as they began to take on a more active role. One of the most pivotal periods of this transformation occurred under the leadership of President Dae-jung Kim. This does not come totally as a surprise, considering the personal profile of the president. Known for his lifelong commitment to democracy and human rights, as well as his dedication to fostering peace and reconciliation with North Korea and Japan, his efforts earned him the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize and international recognition as the *Nelson Mandela of Asia*.

Under President Kim's administration, South Korea embarked on its genuine democratic transition, accompanied by the first comprehensive review of its immigration policies. Yet, his legacy extends even further, as he initiated the first significant shifts in the national narrative surrounding cultural

heterogeneity. At the center of this operation lies President Kim's adoption and redefinition of the progressive ideal of *segzehwa* (globalization/internationalization), originally adopted as a slogan by his predecessor, President Young-sam Kim.

Segzehwa is the South Korean equivalent of the Japanese concept of *kokusaika* (Section 13.3), a term reflecting a positive vision of the nation's economic and political emergence on the global stage. Just as *kokusaika* has its ideological roots in Japan's 19th-century modernization slogan *bunmei-kaika* (civilization and enlightenment) (Section 15.3, p. 470), *segzehwa* can be traced back to the Korean concept of *dongdo seogi* (Eastern Ways, Western Techniques), which shaped the country's response to Western influence in the same era. During President Young-sam Kim's administration from 1993 to 1998 *segzehwa* was adopted as a strategic slogan to legitimize his sweeping reforms aimed at transforming the nation's economic landscape. Under the banner of a *Global South Korea*, Kim implemented a series of reforms focused on liberalizing the domestic market, increasing labor market flexibility, and improving public sector efficiency (Saxer, 2024, p. 5-6).

However, the optimism surrounding the country's integration into the global economy was abruptly shattered by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The task of managing its aftermath fell to Young-sam Kim's successor, President Dae-jung Kim. Far from discarding the vision of a globalized South Korea, Kim doubled down on it, seeing international engagement as central to the nation's recovery and future development – a commitment that contributed to his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet, to continue using *segzehwa* as a guiding principle, it was necessary to redefine the term, distancing it from the purely economic focus of the previous administration.

President Kim skillfully reframed *segzehwa*, transforming it from a predominantly economic strategy into a broader sociocultural agenda that resonated with the shifting dynamics of South Korean society in the late 1990s. By that time, the *cultural turn* had taken hold in the country, and concepts of globalization and internationalization were increasingly seen not just in economic terms but through a cultural lens (Park, 2022). The new narrative of *segzehwa* emphasized the need for South Korea to present itself as a cultural innovator on the global stage. This meant not only embracing foreign cultures, as evidenced by the heightened focus on English education but also showcasing South Korea's own cultural creativity and dynamism to the world.

In essence, the revised *segzehwa* narrative called for a dynamic transformation of Korean identity. On one hand, it advocated for an open, outward-looking society that embraced global influences. On the other, it sought to project a new, vibrant vision of Korean culture onto the world stage, positioning South Korea as an emerging leader in global cultural trends.

Reflecting this dual approach, President Kim announced his vision for a "Second Nation Building," calling on all South Koreans to become "active agents of national reform" by evolving into "global

citizens” (Kim, 1999). Simultaneously, the government began promoting South Korean culture abroad, much like President Chung-hee Park had done in earlier decades to bolster national identity. This time, however, the focus was not on traditional values but on the export of contemporary cultural products. With active governmental support, South Korea’s cultural industry entered an era of unprecedented growth, laying the foundation for what would become the Korean Wave (*Hallyu*) – the global spread of K-pop, K-dramas, and other cultural exports that have since captivated audiences worldwide.

17.5

Towards Multicultural Policies

The rise of a new cultural discourse in South Korea marked the first meaningful shift toward recognizing the value of cultural heterogeneity. Under President Dae-jung Kim's leadership, the narrative of diversity began to gain traction, introducing the idea that cultural differences could be viewed as social assets.

Initially, this shift was limited in scope, influencing only a small segment of cultural policies. Nonetheless, it was instrumental in spreading the concept of cultural pluralism in public and institutional dialogues. As seen in other countries, this emerging narrative of diversity created new opportunities that caught the attention of various social, economic, and political actors. Before long, a *business of diversity* began to take shape, often resulting in what is commonly referred to as *3F multiculturalism*, where diversity was reduced to the superficial celebration of *food, fashion, and folklore*.

This commodification of diversity was eagerly embraced by political elites. At the national level, it served to strengthen cultural policies, while at the local level, it provided a boost to regional revitalization efforts by promoting cultural industries and tourism. This approach offered a convenient dual benefit: it aligned with economic interests while also serving as a form of *panem et circenses* – a strategy to placate pro-minority movements by appearing to celebrate cultural differences without any actual commitment to addressing the deeper social issues faced by these communities.

Yet, the emergence of this narrative of diversity cannot be reduced to a mere instrument of economic and political interests. It also provided new tools that could be leveraged by pro-minority activists to challenge the dominance of the ideal of cultural homogeneity. By framing cultural differences in a positive light, it created resources that could be mobilized against entrenched biases, setting the stage for a reimagined vision of South Korea as a multicultural society.

Following Dae-jung Kim's efforts to introduce cultural pluralism into institutional discourse, it was only natural that the next administration, led by President Roh Moo-hyun, would deepen this commitment and solidify the narrative of diversity within the country's official rhetoric. President Roh, known for his strong connection to civil society and his sensitivity to human rights issues, explicitly sought to advance South Korea's democratic transition by fostering greater participation and civic engagement. Notably, before entering politics, Roh had earned a reputation as a human rights lawyer, advocating for the protection of marginalized communities – an experience that shaped his policy priorities as president.

Roh's administration not only reformed South Korean immigration policies, including the abolition of the controversial Industrial Trainee System, but also introduced some of the most progressive measures in the region to safeguard the human and civil rights of migrants. A pivotal moment came in 2005 when the government amended the election law to grant local voting rights to foreign residents with permanent residency. Starting with the 2006 local elections, all foreign residents who had held permanent residency for at least three years and were over 19 years old gained the right to vote in regional and municipal elections.

This groundbreaking reform made South Korea the first – and, to date, the only – country in Asia to extend suffrage to non-citizens. The move reflected the government's growing commitment to a multicultural vision, as it sought to involve foreign residents in local decision-making processes, paving the way for policies that directly addressed the needs and realities of migrant communities. This inclusion of non-citizens in local governance also marked a turning point for the role of cities and local governments in migration and diversity management, establishing them as key players alongside the central government.

Roh's focus on enhancing foreign residents' rights continued throughout his tenure. In late 2005, he directed the Ministry of Justice to establish a system addressing issues faced by foreign nationals, emphasizing human rights as a central tenet. This led to the formation of a task force and a presidential committee, culminating in the enactment of the *Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea* (Act No. 8442, May 17, 2007). This landmark legislation laid the foundation for the rights and welfare of foreign residents, aiming to improve living conditions, promote social integration, and combat discrimination against all foreign nationals.

Roh's administration also prioritized addressing the unique challenges faced by marriage migrants, a growing demographic at the time. In 2006, the government enacted the *Plan for Supporting the Social Integration of Women Marriage Immigrants and Families*, highlighting a commitment to tackling the social and cultural barriers encountered by these communities. By this point, the central government had embraced cultural pluralism – at least in principle – as a cornerstone of the nation's future. As the narrative of *segyehwa* (globalization) began to recede, a new term emerged to frame South Korea's multicultural aspirations: *damunhwa*, literally translating to *multiculturalism*.

Damunhwa quickly gained traction in political and social discourse, reflecting a shift in how cultural heterogeneity was understood and managed. The Roh administration solidified this concept with the enactment of the *Multicultural Family Support Act* (*damunhwa-gajogji-wonbeob*) in 2008. This legislation formally embedded *damunhwa* into South Korea's legal and political framework, establishing it as a central tenet of South Korea's evolving identity.

17.6

Emergence and Diffusion of *Damunhwa*

Until the turn of the millennium, the term *damunhwa* was a rarely used academic expression, largely confined to niche scholarly discussions about Western debates on multiculturalism. Between 1990 and 1999, it appeared only 235 times in the headlines of South Korea's mainstream vernacular press (Kim, 2009, p. 43). By contrast, between 2005 and 2008, the term exploded into the public consciousness, appearing in no fewer than 99,222 articles (Kim, 2009, p. 43). This dramatic surge in popularity was closely tied to the broader globalization agenda but, more specifically, to the creative discursive strategies employed by pro-minority activists.

After the successful diffusion of Dae-jung Kim's reformulation of *segyehwa* and the subsequent embrace of diversity narratives, *damunhwa* began to be reframed as a new code of social ethics for a global South Korea (Jun, 2014, p. 85). By the early 2000s, pro-migrant movements recognized that, with some strategic adaptation, *damunhwa* could become a powerful rhetorical tool for advancing their political agenda. Activists leveraged the concept by positioning it in opposition to *tanilmunhwa*

(monoculture), thereby creating a compelling bottom-up narrative that called for the recognition of cultural differences as an integral part of South Korean society.

Operationally, this approach meant moving beyond traditional assimilationist policies and advocating for the recognition of the human, civil, and cultural rights of minorities, enabling them to participate as equal members of society. The reformulated *damunhwa* narrative was further promoted through academic scholarship, which provided the movement with a degree of *scientific legitimacy*. Scholars began to incorporate theoretical insights from Western discourses on multiculturalism and interculturalism, thereby enriching the debate on whether and how South Korea could evolve into a country of *multiculturality*.

Similar to how *interculturalism* in Europe and *tabunka kyōsei* in Japan gained traction during the same period, *damunhwa* in South Korea quickly became a catch-all term for anything related to migrants and cultural heterogeneity (see Jun, 2014). During its grassroots diffusion, however, the term also became intertwined with the growing business of diversity and was diluted into more superficial strategies. This process culminated in 2008, when the *Multicultural Family Support Act* was passed, marking the official adoption of *damunhwa* by national politics and setting the stage for South Korea's first formal multicultural policies.

Initially, this state-led *damunhwa* took the form of top-down interventions, with the central government crafting strategies for local implementation. These programs focused primarily on familiarizing migrants with the Korean language and culture, often with the implicit goal of assimilation rather than celebrating cultural differences. This approach drew harsh criticism from pro-minority activists, who argued that the government had co-opted and distorted *damunhwa*, transforming what had originally been a term of empowerment and recognition into a thinly veiled tool for assimilation.

Moreover, the early form of state-led *damunhwa* was narrowly defined, targeting only marriage migrants and excluding other cultural minorities from its scope. Even the official definition of a *multicultural family*, for legal reasons, was restricted to households in which one spouse was a South Korean citizen and the other a marriage migrant, thereby excluding couples where both spouses were migrants. This selective application mirrored the Japanese government's strategic reinterpretation of *tabunka kyōsei* and resulted in what critics described as a "divide and rule" policy (Oh, 2007, p. 35), pitting different minority groups against each other and fragmenting solidarity among them.

Although the central government promoted *damunhwa* at the national level, its implementation relied on partnerships between the national administration, local governments, and pro-minority civil society organizations. Ironically, some of the most vocal critics of state-led *damunhwa* were the very NGOs tasked with its implementation. This distinctive dynamic differentiates the South Korean

experience from Japan's more rigid top-down system and instead aligns it more closely with European cases, where civil society has a stronger role in shaping integration policies.

Despite being financially dependent on the government, South Korean NGOs have not been subservient to its interests. After enduring decades of repression under authoritarian regimes, civil society has emerged as a robust force, refusing to be silenced by the state. The government, in turn, cannot easily dismiss these organizations, as it lacks the capacity to address social issues at the local level without their cooperation. This complex and often contentious relationship between civil society and the state is a defining feature of South Korean governance and serves as a critical driver of social and political change.

The bottom-up wave of criticism against the government's initial implementation of *damunhwa* had a significant impact, leading to two major outcomes. First, the pressure from civil society forced the government to rethink its approach. This shift became apparent with the introduction of the *First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy* in 2008, based on the vision of *Making Korea a Leader in Embracing Foreigners* (IPC 2013, 12). This plan marked a turning point in how *damunhwa* was conceptualized, expanding the scope of *damunhwa* to include all categories of migrants, rather than restricting it to marriage migrants alone. More importantly, it explicitly linked the promotion of *damunhwa* to the protection of human rights, asserting that both principles should be at the core of South Korea's immigration policy. This is evident in the plan's stated goals, with point 1.2 emphasizing: "Developing into a more mature, multicultural society where human rights are respected" (FBPIP 2009, 12).

This perspective was not only sustained but further expanded in subsequent iterations of the *Basic Plan for Immigration Policy*. The *Second Basic Plan for Immigration Policy* (2013-2017) underscored the dimension of social inclusion, advancing a vision of a *Vibrant Korea Growing with Immigrants* (KIS 2013). This vision was built around five key pillars: *Openness, Social Integration, Human Rights, Public Safety, and Cooperation*. The *Third Basic Plan for Immigration Policy* (2018-2022) retained these pillars while reimagining the vision as *A Korea Made by Warmhearted People, where Diversity, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law Are Treasured* (KIM 2018).

Over the years, these policy developments signified a progressive shift in the government's approach to cultural diversity. Traditional support programs, which had previously centered narrowly on assimilation, were restructured to include initiatives that celebrated and preserved cultural differences. These efforts ranged from educational programs teaching migrants' native languages to awareness campaigns highlighting their cultures and countries of origin (see Pak 2011; Kang 2014; Lim 2014; Lee et al. 2023).

The second outcome of this grassroots pushback was the creation of a space for new actors to step in: namely, local governments. Although South Korea's decentralization process has been slow and most local administrations still have limited autonomy and even more constrained financial resources, the gradual advancement of the local turn in governance has allowed municipalities and provinces to emerge as pivotal players in managing diversity. Many local governments, particularly in rural areas, have found themselves on the front lines of accommodating a growing number of migrants, driven by a pressing need to revitalize local economies and counteract population decline.

In the absence of a comprehensive national integration strategy beyond the limited focus on marriage migrants, local governments were compelled to devise their own solutions to navigate an increasingly complex and evolving situation. This challenge prompted local authorities to propose new discourses on diversity management, ones more attuned to the specific needs of their communities and more reflective of local civil society's perspectives.

As a result, innovative forms of co-management between local governments and civil society organizations began to emerge, paving the way for creative approaches to diversity governance at the local level. These collaborations have led to the establishment of new services tailored to the unique needs of cultural minorities, as well as the creation of spaces for minority participation and representation. South Korean cities, like those in other countries, also began forming cooperative networks to share knowledge, exchange best practices, and advocate for policy changes at the national level.

One prominent example of this local-level initiative is the formation of the National Network of *Damunhwa* Cities (*jeongug-damunhwa-dosi-hyeob*) in 2012, inspired by the Japanese Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents founded by Hamamatsu. Spearheaded by the city of Ansan, this network has become the primary platform for intercity collaboration in South Korea. It serves as a conduit for horizontal cooperation among member cities and provides a unified voice for city-level advocacy at the national level. Through this network, cities have been able to send recommendations to the central government and propose more comprehensive and inclusive national diversity policies.

CHAPTER 18

Case Study: Ansan and the *City of Damunhwa*

Arriving in the field...

Ansan (安山) (Image 3) is a city situated on the southwestern coast of Gyeonggi Province, covering an area of 156.53 km² and encompassing several islands, the most famous of which is Daebudo. Renowned as South Korea's first planned city, Ansan is also famous for being the municipality hosting the largest foreign resident population in the country. As of 2024, Ansan's population stands at 626,166, with 97,536 residents, or 15.58%, being foreign nationals¹²³



Image 3. Urban Landscape of Ansan (iStock Images)

123

https://www.ansan.go.kr/stat/common/bbs/selectBbsDetail.do?key=&bbs_code=B0685&bbs_seq=1600057&sch_type=sj&sch_text=%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%AD%EC%9D%B8&currentPage=1

Hop on a Line 4 train from downtown Seoul, and in just an hour and a half, you will arrive at Ansan Station. Step outside, and you find yourself in the neighborhood of Wongok-dong, known as South Korea's *Multicultural Village* and the area with the highest percentage of foreign residents in the whole country. Once the beating heart of the city, the neighborhood around Ansan station now feels somewhat on the outskirts, overshadowed by newer hotspots like Gojang and Jungang. These areas have become the city's hub of revitalization, with fresh energy, cultural events, and dynamic urban development.

My first visit to Ansan was in November 2022. With no clear understanding of the city's geography, I naively expected to arrive at its bustling center. But when I stepped off the train, the scene was different from what I had envisioned. While the train was nearing Ansan Station, I could see through the window the familiar sight of *apatu* complexes – those towering, uniform high-rise blocks that define much of Korea's urban landscape. But as one gets to Ansan Station, those high-rises gave way to squat, boxy buildings, no more than four stories tall.

Before entering the main street of Wongok-dong, signs welcomed me to the Multicultural Village, celebrating the district's ethnic diversity and its many global culinary offerings. Yet, as I walked through the neighborhood, it became clear that this was not a polished tourist spot. The branding may promise a vibrant cultural experience, but the reality was more subdued: weathered buildings, littered streets, and shops focused on the practical needs of migrant workers – money transfer services, currency exchanges, and other everyday essentials.

As I ventured deeper, restaurants and markets began to appear, many run by Chinese-Koreans. One thing quickly became obvious: English is not the common language here. Conversations with locals were halting, often depending on my limited Korean or Chinese, or requiring an interpreter. Occasionally, I encountered someone fluent in Japanese. I was fortunate that one of my key contacts in Wongok-dong – a city official involved in managing the area's diversity policies – was among the rare few who spoke fluent English.

During my fieldwork, I was able to truly appreciate the diversity of Wongok-dong, a neighborhood that might be one of the most culturally varied in Korea. But the idealized image of the Multicultural Village as a vibrant hub of inclusion was often at odds with the day-to-day reality. Wongok-dong feels like a place caught between two worlds. It is not the carefully curated ethnic enclave you might expect to find in a central Seoul district. Instead, it is a working-class neighborhood, still grappling with a past marked by tension, poverty, and controversy.

What stands out about Wongok-dong is precisely this dual nature. On one hand, it is a showcase for Korean multiculturalism, where people from various backgrounds live side by side. On the other, it is a neighborhood that has, at times, felt like a neglected enclave for foreign residents. The top-

down creation of the Multicultural Village was a well-intentioned effort to celebrate diversity, but it has also highlighted the neighborhood's ongoing struggles with inequality. While other parts of Ansan, like Gojang, enjoy the benefits of urban development and cultural events, Wongok-dong remains in a state of transition – revealing all the complexities and contradictions of diversity governance.

18.1

The Birth of Korea's First Planned City

The earliest traces of human settlement in what is now the city of Ansan date back to the Neolithic period, around 7,000 BCE. While little is known about the area's settlements during the Three Kingdoms period (1st century BCE-668 CE), it is documented that during the Silla Dynasty (668-918 CE), a county called Janggu-gun, that is the *Water Deer's Mouth County*, was established. In 940, under the Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392), the county was renamed Ansan-gun, meaning *County of the Gentle Mountains*, a reference to the area's soft, rounded hills, which stand in contrast to the steeper mountains characterizing the rest of the region.

In 1018, Ansan was downgraded to a sub-county (*hyeon*), but between the late 13th and early 14th century, the popularity of a legend claiming that King Munjong (1019-1083) was born in the region led King Chungnyeol (1236-1308) to reinstate it as a county. Sometimes referred to through the popular name Yeonseong, that is *Lotus City* – likely a nod to ancient lotus cultivation in the area –, until the beginning of the 20th century, Ansan-gun remained a low-densely populated territory, known for its fish market, salt farms, and rice paddies. The region's agricultural and fishing economy flourished thanks, in particular, to its strategic location along the trade routes between China and Korean Mapo Port – and, later, Incheon Port. During the Goryeo and Joseon Dynasties, it was also favored by aristocrats for establishing estates.

In 1914, during Japanese colonial rule, Ansan underwent a major administrative reorganization. The county was dissolved and divided into three townships: Gunja-myeon and Suam-myeon, both of which became part of Siheung County to the east, and Banwol-myeon, which joined Suwon County to the west. In 1937, a railway was constructed through the former Ansan territory to connect Suwon

County to Incheon, facilitating the transport and export of rice and salt. This greatly contributed to the area's modernization and economic growth.

This administrative division remained in place until 1976, when, as part of the South Korean government's third *Five-Year Economic Plan* (1972) (Section 15.4, pp. 473-474), the area was selected for a major industrial project aimed at decentralizing industries from Seoul. In 1977, the Ministry of Land, Transportation, and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) unveiled the *Banwol New Industrial Complex Construction Plan*, which envisioned a radical transformation of the region over a ten-year period, from 1977 to 1986. The project aimed to create a vast industrial complex producing electronics, machinery, textiles, and other goods, alongside South Korea's first fully planned city (Park & Markusen 1995, 93). Modeled after the city of Canberra (Australia), the design of this Korean planned city incorporated elements of the Garden City Movement and the functionalism of the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). The result was a sort of "hybrid town" where the enlargement of green spaces was supposed to proceed with a rapid industrial expansion (Yun 2011, 52).

The central government purchased all the land for the project, and construction began immediately, under the strict supervision of the MLTM. In addition to the industrial site, seven residential complexes were built nearby to house the migrant workers, who would also become the future citizens of the planned city. By 1979, a District Office was established to manage the construction area. As the building process progressed, a large influx of Korean migrant workers moved into the city, leading to an unprecedented population boom. From 31,140 residents in 1980, the population nearly tripled by the end of the construction period in 1985, reaching 96,616¹²⁴.

Most migrants settled in Wongok-dong, a new residential complex located strategically near the city's main train station and the entrance to the Banwol Industrial Complex, just across the railroad tracks. As the number of migrants grew, many original residents left the area, as the compensation they received for their land was insufficient to build new homes in the planned city. Only a small number, mainly elderly residents, chose to remain in Wongok-dong.

Initially, the area was referred to as Banwol, and the plan was to officially incorporate it as Banwol City at the conclusion of the ten-year construction period. However, local politicians and historians opposed this, arguing that the name given during Japanese colonial rule should be replaced with the historical name of Ansan. The central government accepted the petition, and at the end of the construction plan in 1986, the city was officially incorporated as Ansan.

Even after the city was established, the central government continued to oversee its development through new projects. In 1986, they selected a site east of the Banwol Industrial Complex for the

¹²⁴ Data are available at <https://kosis.kr/eng/>.

construction of a new industrial district, the Sihwa Industrial Complex. This project included the creation of a 12.7 km seawall to form a freshwater lake that would provide industrial and domestic water, as well as reclaimed land.

Construction of the Sihwa complex and seawall began in 1987 and was completed in 1994. However, the plan failed to consider the environmental impact of the surrounding industrial complexes, and the lake became heavily polluted from rain runoff and illegal wastewater dumping. Much later, in 2011, the area was repurposed into the world's largest tidal power installation. After completing the Sihwa project in 1994, the central government finally transferred control of Ansan's development to the municipal government. This marked the beginning of the history of contemporary Ansan-si.

18.2

Demographic Transformations in a City of Migrants

As Ansan's industrial complexes expanded, so did its population, which grew exponentially through the 1980s and 1990s. From 96,616 residents in 1985, the population doubled to 252,418 by 1990 and then doubled again, reaching 510,314 in 1995.

During this period of rapid growth, Wongok-dong soon became the city's most densely populated and bustling area. The increase in residents led to the construction of essential public facilities such as community centers, schools, and welfare centers. This growth spurred a booming housing market, with new low-cost multi-family homes being built to accommodate the rising demand. Alongside this, a thriving commercial district emerged, with markets, restaurants, grocery stores, and other businesses catering to the needs of the growing population. Banks, hospitals, and other services soon followed.

However, the situation changed dramatically toward the end of the 1990s. The transformations within South Korea's industrial sector starting in 1987 (Section 15.5, pp. 476-477), combined with the 1997 financial crisis, brought Ansan's population boom and industrial growth to a halt. Many Korean workers left the city in search of better opportunities elsewhere. To fill the labor gaps, Ansan's small and medium-sized industries began recruiting foreign migrants, especially after the introduction

of the Industrial Trainee System (ITS) in 1993. The foreign population increased significantly, transforming the city's demographics. In just ten years, 1993 and 2002, the number of foreign residents in Ansan jumped from 1,278 to 20,062 (Oh, n.d., p. 350).

Wongok-dong was a prime area to observe these changes due to the particular demography that consolidated in the neighborhood during the 1990s. Initially, many families had settled in the area, but as the Banwol Industrial Complex flourished, a specific category of residents began to dominate: young male workers. The commercial district quickly adapted to cater to this group, with a growing number of businesses focused on entertainment and leisure for the workers. This shift gradually weakened the sense of community in Wongok-dong and heightened the potential for crime and disruptive behaviors. Families with young children, concerned about the changing atmosphere, started relocating to other areas (Oh, n.d., p. 348).

When the industrial crisis hit, these single male workers, unencumbered by family ties, could easily move elsewhere in search of better opportunities. As a result, after reaching a peak population of 33,706 in 1989, the neighborhood saw a steady decline, losing an average of 2,000 residents per year and shrinking to just 17,933 by 1997 (Oh, n.d., p. 347).

The exodus of migrant workers resulted in a severe recession in Wongok-dong's housing market, with property prices falling sharply. This downturn created strong incentives for foreign migrants to settle in the area, particularly after the 1997 financial crisis. The neighborhood's housing market and commercial district quickly adapted to target this new demographic. With the rise of democratization and South Korea's human rights movement (Section 15.6), civil society organizations and self-help groups were formed to support the growing foreign population.

By the turn of the millennium, Wongok-dong was consolidating as one of South Korea's most concentrated areas of foreign residents (for an in-depth analysis of the transformation of Wongok-dong, see Park & Jeong, 2004; Min-woo Seo, 2009; Oh, 2010a; 2010b; Yu-kyung Shin, 2013; Jeong & Kong, 2016). In 2009, the neighborhood was home to 33,235 foreign residents – almost the same number as Korean residents at the peak in 1989¹²⁵. Representing 55 nationalities, the major groups included Chinese-Koreans (19,683), non-ethnic-Korean Chinese (3,650), Vietnamese (2,000), Filipinos (1,381), Indonesians (1,365), and Uzbek-Koreans (695).

This growth of the foreign population during the 1990s was accompanied by the consolidation of a deeply negative public image of Wongok-dong, fueled by the media. Reports often highlighted how many foreign migrants, unfamiliar with local garbage disposal regulations, left bags of trash piled up along the streets, which reinforced the perception of the neighborhood as dirty and degraded by the presence of foreigners.

¹²⁵ <https://www.mbn.co.kr/news/society/5010018>.

This negative portrayal of the neighborhood's cleanliness quickly intertwined with fears about its safety. Incidents, such as street fights involving drunken individuals, became sensationalized in the media, reinforcing stereotypes that foreigners were dangerous and prone to criminal behavior. These narratives ignored the fact that similar disturbances frequently occurred in many other Korean neighborhoods without foreign residents. By the turn of the millennium, Wongok-dong had earned derogatory labels such as a "blind spot for foreign criminals," a "paradise for foreign sex crimes," and a "hideout for foreign criminal gangs" (Oh, n.d., 391). These harmful perceptions created a lasting stigma around the neighborhood and its diverse population.

18.3

The Early Phase of Ansan's Diverse Community: Spontaneous Bottom-up Activism

For the neighborhood's commercial district and community services, it was easy to adapt their businesses to the new residents. Foreign migrants were no different from the previous Korean workers, neither in their life routine nor in their leisure and entertainment interests. However, rebuilding a sense of local community and normal urban life proved more challenging. Many foreign workers, especially those under trainee visa status – or worse, undocumented overstayers – were deprived of basic human, civil, and labor rights. This left them vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination in both their workplaces and daily lives, further complicating their integration into the local community.

The first responses to these issues emerged from grassroots initiatives led by migrant and Korean activists. Early on, migrant workers spontaneously formed informal self-help groups, typically organized by nationality. Some of these groups evolved into more formal organizations. The Bangladeshi community was the first to establish an official group in 1991, the Bangladesh Workers Welfare Association (BWWA). Other migrant communities soon followed this example, creating their own support networks (Oh, n.d., pp. 374-379). At the same time, several Korean organizations that had previously focused on supporting domestic migrant workers began collaborating with migrant activists, shifting their efforts towards promoting human rights and solidarity for foreign workers.

Religion played a pivotal role in fostering these early activist efforts. For migrants, religious gatherings became essential for building a sense of community, providing spaces for networking, and reinforcing cultural and linguistic identities. Moreover, many of the Korean organizations involved in supporting migrants were also religiously affiliated. Notably, a major catalyst for these institutional support practices in Wongok-dong was the Ansan Missionary Church, a Protestant institution founded in 1992. The church quickly became a hub for assisting and supporting migrants, with pastors establishing direct contact with migrant community leaders.

Two other major pro-migrant organizations emerged from these efforts, soon gaining influence not only in Wongok-dong and Ansan but also at the national level, where they played a crucial role in shaping immigration and integration policies. First, in 1994, Pastor Park Cheon-eung founded the Ansan Foreign Workers Center (renamed Ansan Migrant Center in 2006). Initially focused on providing advice and support to migrant residents and advocating for local policy reforms, the center soon became a leader in nationwide networks of NGOs lobbying for pro-human rights reforms. Meanwhile, in 1996, the Catholic-based Galilee Pastoral Center was established in Wongok-dong. By 1997, it launched South Korea's first formal migrant return program, aimed at creating self-reliance systems for migrants returning to their home countries.

Around the neighborhood's three major pro-migrant organizations – Ansan Missionary Church, the Ansan Foreign Workers Center, and the Galilee Pastoral Center – a vibrant network of smaller Korean NGOs emerged. These organizations often collaborated with migrant-led groups, which continued to flourish in Wongok-dong, largely organized along national lines. The strategies of Bangladeshi activists, who pioneered self-support groups in Ansan, remained a model for migrant activism. They quickly mastered the Korean language and gained significant expertise in navigating the country's legal frameworks for addressing migrant issues. In 1998, the Bangladesh Workers Welfare Association (BWWA) achieved a significant milestone by opening South Korea's first foreign worker counseling center, run entirely by migrant workers.

Alongside the Bangladeshi, communities from the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka were also highly active. Filipino organizations, such as the Ansan Filipino Community (AFC), El-Shaddai Group, the Filipino Migrant Workers Association in Sihwa (FMWAS), Bismin Community, and Anak ti Amianan, became key players in the neighborhood from the mid-1990s. Despite representing various social classes and regions of origin, the Filipino community was deeply unified by the Catholic faith. Catholic churches became central meeting places, fostering cohesion within the community, which tended to form strong bonds with the Catholic-based Galilee Pastoral Center. This strong sense of community often made Filipino activists reluctant to mingle with immigrants from other countries.

The Indonesian community followed a similar pattern. Despite their internal diversity – spanning regions, social classes, and religious affiliations – they found unity through a national organization: the Indonesian Community in Korea (ICC). Notable Indonesian groups in Wongok-dong included the Iswara Community, Komunitas Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (KMKI), and Antioch Indonesian Community (AIC), with religious spaces once again playing a crucial role in community-building efforts.

Nepalese and Sri Lankan communities also exhibited strong national ties, with many of their initiatives focused on addressing the needs of their members and supporting their home countries, especially in times of crisis, such as natural disasters or political revolutions. These groups tended to resist assimilation, maintaining their native languages and viewing themselves as short-term migrants.

In contrast, the Chinese and Vietnamese communities, which represented some of the largest migrant populations in Wongok-dong, displayed less communitarian activism. For issues that could not be handled privately, they often turned to Korean NGOs for support, and individual Chinese or Vietnamese activists usually join Korean groups rather than trying to establish organizations with their compatriots.

Chinese migrants, in particular, typically do not hold community gatherings and have been rather showing a strong individualistic tendency and competitive inclinations, usually coupled with a generally negative perception of non-governmental organizations (Oh, n.d., p. 376). Rather than forming community groups, they have shown a tendency to lean on informal networks with their compatriots, known as *guanxi* (關係), mostly aimed at business-related interactions. Vietnamese migrants usually maintained strong connections to their hometowns and typically engaged in small, informal gatherings based on shared regions of origin or religion rather than larger communal organizations.

18.4

The Rise of the *Borderless Village*

By the late 1990s, a unified civic movement began to emerge from the diverse landscape of informal self-help groups, organizations, and NGOs in Wongok-dong. This movement coalesced

around a singular vision and social program, offering both a bottom-up vision for Wongok-dong and a broader proposal for Korean society: the Borderless Village. Launched in 1999 by the Ansan Foreign Workers Center, which represented the main pro-migrant groups in the neighborhood, the initiative was formalized through the announcement of the “First Five-Year Plan for a Borderless Village” (Oh, n.d., 342; my translation; see also Park, 2002; Oh & Jeong, 2006; Park, 2007; Oh 2010a).

This civil society-led plan was born from the realization that isolated interventions by local NGOs and activists were insufficient to address the systemic racism and discrimination faced by foreign workers. Activists identified that beyond institutional and legal flaws, the core issue was the lack of social acceptance of migrant workers as neighbors and members of the local community. The plan sought to promote a vision of substantive citizenship, aiming to create South Korea’s first “experimental local community (multicultural community) where Koreans and foreigners live together as proud members of the same community” and “where diversity coexists” (Oh, n.d., pp. 341-342; my translation).

The plan was built on three pillars: 1) *human rights*, 2) *sharing*, and 3) *community*. It called for initiatives across these areas to bring about changes in public awareness, institutional frameworks, and social practices. The goal was “to overcome national, linguistic, racial, religious, economic, and cultural divides, fostering a truly inclusive community” (Oh, n.d., pp. 341-342; my translation). In essence, the movement argued that offering assistance and support alone was not enough; it was also necessary to spread awareness of rights and ensure that civic institutions were actively committed to upholding the social rights of all residents, both Korean and foreign.

Thirteen strategic goals were outlined along the three lines of (a) civil rights, (b) political rights, and (c) social rights. These goals addressed both local concerns and national policy demands, reflecting the movement’s engagement with broader social justice initiatives across Korea. The goals were as follows (Oh, n.d., pp. 341-342; my translation):

a) *Civil Rights*:

- Ensure the right of foreign workers to form associations and organizations.
- Allow remittances regardless of legal status.
- Establish an institutional system for providing legal assistance to foreign workers.

b) *Political Rights*:

- Create committees for foreigners within local governments.
- Support the self-organization of foreign workers.

c) *Social Rights:*

- Officially register the family members of migrants in the national residents' registry.
- Promote the inclusion of foreign workers' family members (e.g., limiting forced deportations).
- Establish a permanent residency system for undocumented foreign migrants.
- Abolish fines against undocumented migrants.
- Eliminate the Industrial Trainee System and introduce legislation to allow migrants to live and work legally.
- Abolish the overseas investment corporate training system to prevent labor exploitation.
- Open the social welfare system to foreign workers.
- Expand specialized welfare facilities for foreign workers.

Under the leadership of the Ansan Foreign Workers Center, the Borderless Village movement began by focusing on training activists and pro-migrant groups, conducting surveys with local residents and migrant representatives to assess community awareness around human rights, migration, and local issues. From these surveys, the main sources of tension between foreign and Korean residents were identified, leading to the development of intervention strategies designed to foster contact and cooperation between the two groups. These strategies were implemented collaboratively, with the guidance of the movement's organizations.

For instance, one ongoing source of conflict identified was the issue of garbage disposal. To address this, beginning in 2000, the movement organized periodic neighborhood clean-up days, where both foreign and Korean residents worked side by side to collect and properly dispose of accumulated waste. This effort not only tackled a practical problem but also fostered mutual respect and interaction between residents.

The movement also reinvigorated a series of *multicultural festivals* that had been held in the neighborhood since the mid-1990s. These events provided opportunities for meaningful interaction between foreign groups and Korean residents, while also promoting multicultural awareness and respect for diversity. Some festivals were specific to a particular migrant group, such as the Sri Lankan Sinhala and Tamil New Year's Festival, the Thai Traditional Songkran Festival, the Mongolian Naadam Festival, and the Han Filipino Migrant Festival. Other festivals, however, were designed to celebrate a mix of cultural traditions, such as the Together Day Festival and the Chuseok Festival, which featured booths from various countries, traditional performances, singing competitions, and food sharing.

Building on earlier successes, like the Foreign Workers' Friendship Olympics, first held in 1997, the movement also began organizing regular sports competitions aimed at fostering a shared local culture and a sense of common identity. Since 2002, for example, the annual Ansan Borderless Village World Cup has brought together diverse residents through sports.

These activities laid the groundwork for the development of inter-communitarian organizations in a neighborhood previously marked by significant fragmentation along national lines. Activists from different communities – particularly from Bangladesh and Nepal – united to form local branches of migrant labor unions. Marriage migrants from various countries joined forces to create the Multicultural Family Association, while inter-communitarian music bands, artistic groups, and sports teams also began to flourish in the neighborhood.

The Borderless Village movement also organized numerous rallies and campaigns advocating for migrant rights. While many of these initiatives focused on Ansan's local government, the movement was also active in national efforts, co-organizing and participating in broader movements, such as the Labor Day rallies, the ASEM 2000 Seoul Day of Action Against Neo-Liberal Globalization, and protests against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In 2003, Wongok-dong's activists took part in a significant sit-in protest demanding the abolition of the Industrial Trainee System (ITS) and forced deportation practices, as well as the enactment of the Employment Permit System (EPS) (Section 16.5, p. 494). This protest played a pivotal role in strengthening a nationwide lobbying movement, which ultimately led to the introduction of the EPS in 2004 and the abolition of the ITS.

Unsurprisingly, the Borderless Village movement not only rode the wave of enthusiasm for *damunhwa* (multiculturality) that emerged in the early 2000s but also played an active role in shaping it. The growing appreciation of cultural heterogeneity in South Korean society provided a powerful boost to the movement, amplifying its innovative initiatives and helping to transform the previously negative image of Wongok-dong. Researchers, activists, and media alike flocked to the neighborhood to study and draw inspiration from what was rapidly being recognized as the country's first true *damunhwa* community. By 2005, the once infamous, dirty, and dangerous neighborhood was celebrated as a "Borderless Village," a "Small Liberation Zone" free from socio-cultural discrimination, and "South Korea's First Pioneering Model of *Damunhwa*," commonly depicted as a beacon guiding the rest of the nation toward a more inclusive future society.

What makes Wongok-dong's transformation particularly remarkable is that, until the early 2000s, the model of *damunhwa* it embodied was entirely built from the ground up, driven by activist-led private organizations advocating for substantive citizenship in the neighborhood. This naturally raises the question: what role was the local government playing while Wongok-dong was developing the Borderless Village? The short and rather blunt answer is: very little. While many of the movement's

initiatives had the approval of the local government, there was little active engagement from the administration in addressing the needs of the neighborhood's growing foreign population until 2005. The local government's attention was elsewhere.

As long as Wongok-dong was seen as a hub of filth and crime, the municipality preferred that the area remain out of the spotlight, leaving civil society to deal with its challenges. However, as the neighborhood's image began to shift – now viewed as a national model of *damunhwa* – the local government's stance changed. To fully understand how the local government's role evolved in the governance of Ansan's diversity, it is important to consider what the city administration had been focused on while one of its neighborhoods housed South Korea's largest concentration of foreign residents throughout the 1990s.

18.5

Governing the Planned City: The Fragmented Visions of the First Mayors

The history of Ansan as a city officially began in 1986. However, as previously mentioned, the central government, through the Ministry of Land, Transportation, and Maritime Affairs (MLTM), continued to oversee the city's development plans until the completion of the Sihwa Industrial Complex and Seawall in 1994. Accordingly, during the first eight years of the city's history the local government had but a very limited authority and policymaking power, mostly confined to managing day-to-day administrative tasks without a clear, long-term vision. It would take several years before Ansan's local administration could evolve from a purely managerial role to a more dynamic, entrepreneurial model of governance.

Until the late 1990s, Ansan's administration was marked by instability, with a series of mayors coming and going, some holding office for just a few months (for details, see Ansan City, n.d.). The city's first mayor, Chang-seon Jeon, served from 1986 to 1988. During his tenure, he laid the groundwork for Ansan's administration and set an early agenda for community-building with the slogan *Building a New Ansan as a Vibrant City* (*hwalgichandosi saeansangeonseol*). One of the core pillars of Jeon's program was promoting welfare through "creative development," a concept that would become integral to Ansan's future growth (Ansan City, n.d.). Notably, Jeon secured funding

for extending Seoul's Subway Line 4 to reach Ansan, which proved to be a key development for the city's connectivity and future expansion.

Jeon's successor, Mayor Eui-jin Jang, took office with the ambitious program of making Ansan *A City Where People Want to Live* (*salgijoh-eun saeansangeonseol*), but he was quickly replaced after only four months, making his term the shortest in the city's history. Between 1988 and 1995, five more mayors took office, each with lofty ambitions for the city – such as Soon-sik Choi's goal of *Making Ansan the Best Place to Live in the Whole Country* – but none stayed long enough to effect meaningful change. In fact, as during this period, the city's development was still largely under central government control, these mayors could do little more than take care of everyday administration.

A turning point came in 1995 when Ansan held its first local elections. Jin-seop Song, the city's first elected mayor, brought stability to its administration, serving a full four-year term. In 1997, under Song's leadership, the city published its first long-term comprehensive strategy, the *Urban Basic Plan for a 2016 Ansan* (*2016nyeon-ansan-dosigibonggyehoeg*), a 20-year vision that marked Ansan's entry into structured urban planning. Song also shifted Ansan's governance from a purely administrative model to a more entrepreneurial one, placing culture at the forefront of the city's strategic agenda. Notably, he secured central government approval for the Gyeonggi Technopark, a significant initiative as part of South Korea's industrial restructuring following the 1997 financial crisis (Section 15.5, p. 478). Despite these achievements, Song's tenure was marred by allegations of corruption and bribery, casting a shadow over his otherwise transformative administration.

Song's successor, Sung-gyu Park (1998–2002), continued the entrepreneurial governance approach, leveraging the symbolic transition to a new millennium to launch the *Vision for a 2010 Ansan* (*2010 bijeon ansan*). This long-term plan aimed to transform Ansan into a *Green Advanced Industrial City* (*nogsaegecheomdansan-eobdosi geonseol*), emphasizing sustainability and industrial innovation. Leveraging his experience as a central government figure in the national Danwon Art Competition, Park placed particular emphasis on cultural policy and tourism development. In 2000, he finally established what would become the cornerstone of Ansan's cultural initiatives: the Ansan Art Center (later reorganized into the Ansan Cultural Foundation in 2013). This institution had been in planning since 1994 and became instrumental in advancing the city's cultural policies. However, like his predecessor, Park's career ended in scandal, with charges of real estate speculation leading to his prosecution.

In the 2002 local elections, former Mayor Jin-seop Song returned to office, promising to elevate residents' quality of life with the experience he had gained as the first locally elected mayor. He built upon his predecessor's strategies, continuing to promote Ansan through cultural policies and tourism,

primarily utilizing the newly completed Ansan Art Center, that he inaugurated in 2003. Thanks to the support of the local government, the center started hosting various large-scale artistic events, with the yearly Ansan Street Art Festival, launched in 2005, quickly becoming one of the region's most popular cultural attractions, drawing over 100,000 participants in its inaugural year. It has since grown into one of Gyeonggi Province's most renowned festivals.

During his second term, Song also initiated work to update the Urban Basic Plan, reflecting significant governance reforms enacted in the early 2000s, such as the *Special Act for Local Decentralization* (2003) and the *Special Act for the Multifunctional Administrative City* (2005) (Ch. Section 15.6, p. 480). The updated plan, aimed at covering the period until 2020, emphasized, for the first time, citizen participation and social cohesion, particularly addressing the needs of Ansan's growing foreign population, foreshadowing the city's eventual focus on coexistence. However, Song's efforts were once again interrupted by legal trouble. He faced charges related to a sports complex project initiated during his first term and was eventually convicted of bribery, resulting in his suspension from office.

The repeated judicial inquiries and convictions of Ansan's mayors during these early terms hindered the city's ability to implement a cohesive long-term vision. It was not until Joo-won Park's election in 2006 that the situation began to stabilize politically. By this time, Ansan had reached its 30th anniversary, and a genuine sense of local identity and citizenship had begun to emerge. With this growing sense of community, the local government finally had the opportunity to think beyond short-term challenges and address long-term development goals. Central to this new focus was the theme of cultural heterogeneity, which brought increased attention to Wongok-dong and its pioneering Borderless Village movement.

18.6

From the *Borderless Village* to the *Multicultural Village*

Until the early 2000s, Ansan's early local governments had largely left the governance of Wongok-dong to private associations, both formal and informal, that had developed in the neighborhood. While these administrations placed welfare and community-building at the heart of their agendas, political

instability prevented them from fully committing to these goals. As a result, the local government welcomed, and when possible, supported the efforts of civil society and the bottom-up development of the Borderless Village initiative.

When the Borderless Village began to gain national recognition in the early 2000s as a model of *damunhwa* and a key civil movement influencing national migration and integration policies, the Ansan government started to pay closer attention to Wongok-dong. The civic movement itself was increasingly pressing the local government for policies to improve conditions for foreign residents, and the rising enthusiasm for *damunhwa* gave the municipality a chance to rebrand itself as South Korea's multicultural pioneer. However, this increased government involvement also had unforeseen consequences for the activists who had initially led the movement.

In 2005, the Ansan government formally began addressing the issues raised by neighborhood organizations regarding the protection of foreign residents' rights. That year, the Ansan Foreign Workers Division was established in Wongok-dong, representing South Korea's first government department dedicated to foreign affairs. Initially, the center's staff had little experience assisting foreigners and primarily connected them with religious or private organizations that had been providing support (Seo, 2009; Shin, 2013). Contextually, the government formed an advisory committee of foreign resident representatives, aiming to give them a voice in local policymaking.

In 2006, as part of the *National Plan for Supporting the Social Integration of Women Marriage Immigrants and Families*, Ansan opened its Marriage Immigrant Family Support Center (later renamed the Multicultural Family Center). This center became a vital resource for marriage migrants, helping form the Multicultural Family Association and supporting their advocacy efforts, including campaigning for the *National Multicultural Family Support Act* (see Song et al., 2011; Lee, 2013).

With the election of Mayor Park Joo-won in 2006, the local government's engagement with diversity governance deepened. Park publicly declared his intention to make Ansan a "benchmark for *damunhwa* policy" and "an open international city of *damunhwa*" (Jeong & Kong, 2016, p. 51). After the central government passed the *Act on the Treatment of Foreign Residents* in 2007 (Section 17.5, p.), Ansan enacted its own Local Ordinance for Foreign Residents. In line with this, the city increased resources for the Foreign Workers Division, reorganizing it into the Foreigners Welfare Division with a staff of 17 people (Oh, n.d., p. 389). This body was tasked with overseeing all foreign resident-related initiatives in Wongok-dong.

With a growing staff and expanding budget, the division emerged as the key player in the neighborhood's diversity governance, gradually replacing the leading role that the NGO Ansan Foreign Workers Center (by then, already renamed Ansan Migrant Center) had until then (see, for example, Seo, 2009; Kwon, 2020, pp. 165-169). By 2010, the Foreigners Welfare Division had grown

to 19 staff members across five departments – Foreigner Policies; Foreigners’ Human Rights; Multicultural Exchange; Multicultural Education; and Multicultural Children (Oh, n.d., p. 389). The division also began running several facilities, such as a multicultural library, a free medical center, and a migrant support center with multilingual services.

Initially, Wongok-dong’s civil society groups welcomed this governmental involvement, as it offered relief and resources that these organizations had long struggled to provide on their own. Yet, over time, activists began to realize that this shift toward government-led diversity governance was not solely focused on protecting human rights or fostering substantive citizenship. The increasingly entrepreneurial local government began using Wongok-dong’s reputation as a *damunhwa* model to enhance Ansan’s brand, promote tourism, and bolster its cultural industries. This created tensions between the humanitarian ideals of the Borderless Village movement and the interests of the local government.

What had once been a cooperative relationship between civil society and government gradually turned into a competitive dynamic for hegemony in diversity-related initiatives. The Ansan Migrant Center, which had long been the main voice in Wongok-dong’s diversity governance, now found itself in opposition with the government-run Foreigners Welfare Division. This competition led to two distinct approaches to *damunhwa*: the Borderless Village’s focus on human rights and citizenship, and the local government’s vision of diversity as a cultural asset to boost Ansan’s image.

This polarization reached its peak in 2007 when Mayor Park announced plans to apply for Wongok-dong’s designation as a *Multicultural Village Special Zone* and its decision to insert it in a new version of the city’s *Basic Urban Plan*. The proposal included a 10-year development plan, aimed at leveraging the central government’s sudden enthusiasm for *damunhwa* to secure central government funding to support urban redevelopment and promote ethnic businesses to boost tourism in Ansan. This move, while promising significant financial resources, was seen by many as a top-down approach that conflicted with Wongok-dong’s long-standing tradition of grassroots, participatory governance.

The neighborhood’s residents, especially the Borderless Village activists, quickly opposed the plan. They criticized the lack of transparency and consultation with the community, particularly regarding the details of the redevelopment projects, which had not been shared with those most affected. Residents feared that the designation would lead to skyrocketing real estate prices and rents, disproportionately impacting foreign residents who would struggle to keep up with the rising costs.

The protests were strong enough to force Mayor Park to withdraw the plan, though it was not a full retreat. Instead, the mayor saw it as a temporary setback, a chance to regroup and better prepare for future implementation. In 2008, the local government, through the Foreigners Welfare Division,

doubled down on its efforts in Wongok-dong. The country's first government-led Foreign Residents Community Center was established, and more than 25 *damunhwa* projects were launched, including the World Taekwondo Academy and the *Damunhwa* Mentors' Training Program (Oh, n.d., p. 354). The following year, Ansan stood out as the first South Korean local government to enact a Local Ordinance on the Promotion of the Human Rights of Foreign Residents, and, in the same year, it was awarded the Gyeonggi Province Best International City Award. These initiatives helped the administration strengthen its position in the neighborhood, connect with key stakeholders, and erode the leadership of the Borderless Village movement.

In 2009, with the socio-political landscape shifted in its favor, the local government reintroduced the plan to designate Wongok-dong as a Multicultural Village Special Zone. This time, the government took a more cautious approach, organizing public hearings and sharing more information about the project. The scope was also scaled down to a five-year plan with a reduced budget, easing some concerns.

Despite lingering skepticism from many residents, the local government's strategy proved successful. With the local stakeholders now financially and politically tied to the Foreigners Welfare Division, resistance from the activist community was weaker than before. That same year, Mayor Park secured approval for the project. The Ministry of Knowledge Economy officially designated Wongok-dong as a Multicultural Village Special Zone, securing a budget of 18.6 billion won (approximately 12.5 million euros) for the five-year redevelopment from 2009 to 2013. Although many residents harbored resentment toward the project, redevelopment work began, marking a new chapter in Wongok-dong's transformation.

18.7

The End of Ansan's Bottom-up Diversity Governance

The implementation of the Multicultural Village Special Zone plan brought significant changes to Wongok-dong, transforming the neighborhood both visually and culturally. One of the most notable initiatives was the revitalization of the central street, which runs through the neighborhood from Ansan Station and was rebranded as the *Multicultural Food Street*. The Ansan local government

actively supported the establishment of ethnic food businesses, even securing a special provision from the central government that allowed it to issue employment recommendations for foreign chefs to work in the area. Between 2009 and 2010, 225 new foreign-run businesses were opened, bringing the total to 266, with owners hailing from 14 countries¹²⁶.

Throughout the streets of Wongok-dong, particularly along Multicultural Food Street, multilingual signs and vibrant *damunhwa*-themed visuals, such as images, artwork, and slogans, were installed. A key feature was the transformation of the central square of the neighborhood, previously known as Children's Park, into the Meeting Plaza, which became a venue for multicultural events and festivals. Nearby, a Multicultural Safety Police Center was established, and by 2012, the World Culture Exhibition Hall opened at the end of the street. This exhibition hall has since hosted educational programs promoting multicultural awareness, primarily targeting schools and cultural institutions.

Another major development was the renovation of the Ansan Foreign Residents Community Center, which became the headquarters for the Foreigners Welfare Division. This building now serves as the operational hub for diversity governance in Ansan, overseeing services for foreign residents. Outside the building, a giant logo depicting the ideal of *damunhwa* was installed – a rendition of Daddy-Long-Legs (a character from Jean Webster's novel that popular in Korea after it was adapted into the popular drama *Kidari Ajeossi* in 2005¹²⁷) whose body is made up of national flags and whose arms, raised above the head, form a heart, symbolizing unity and acceptance.

However, as critics had anticipated, the top-down approach of the *Multicultural Village Plan* had deleterious consequences for the grassroots, community-driven practices that had previously flourished under the Borderless Village initiative. Many of the spontaneous, bottom-up activities that once defined Wongok-dong faded away, unable to compete with the larger, well-funded government programs. As these civic organizations diminished, so did the sense of community and cohesion that had once thrived in the neighborhood.

The urban revitalization efforts, while transforming Wongok-dong, inadvertently disrupted the informal social networks that had developed around key public spaces. A prime example is the aforementioned transformation of Children's Park into the Meeting Plaza (Kwon, 2020, p. 168). Previously, Children's Park had been a popular gathering spot for local meetings and group activities,

¹²⁶ Specifically: China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand, the Philippines, Russia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Cambodia, and Nigeria.

¹²⁷ The epistolary novel, entitled *Daddy-Long-Legs*, was published in 1912. The story tells the story of a female orphan – Jerusha "Judy" Abbott – who is capable of leaving the orphanage and entering a college thanks to the economic support of an anonymous benefactor. For many years Judy will not know the identity of this character. Only on one occasion, she manages to catch a glimpse of the shadow of her benefactor from the back, understanding that he is a tall, long-legged, man – hence the nickname Daddy-Long-Legs. Eventually, she discovers that the benefactor is her uncle, who proposes and marries her. The novel was often criticized as representing an example of grooming, but, at the same time, the initial positive image of the benefactor who decides to remain anonymous, represented by the character of Daddy-Long-Legs, became a popular metaphor of the gratuitousness of charity.

valued for its informal, intimate atmosphere created by its cozy layout and tree cover (Kwon On, 2011, p. 221-223). However, after its expansion and redesign as the Meeting Plaza, it became a formalized, symbolic center of the Multicultural Village Special Zone, losing its previous charm. The local government frequently used the space to stage multicultural events, which made residents feel alienated from a place they once saw as their own. As a result, the space has been mostly avoided by the local community ever since.

Disillusioned with the direction the area was taking, many activists left Wongok-dong to rejoin organizations or movements elsewhere. Additionally, as housing prices and the cost of living increased, as expected, the foreign resident population naturally began to decline.

In 2013, after the initial five-year designation of the Multicultural Village Special Zone ended, the local government secured an extension for another five years, lasting until 2018. The budget was increased from 18.6 billion won to 26.08 billion won (approximately 17.5 million euros). By this time, the voices critical of the top-down governance approach had either left or been marginalized, resulting in far less resistance to the new development plan. In contrast, local businesses, which had thrived under the Multicultural Village project, welcomed the additional funding, as it further supported the revitalization of the area and their economic interests.

The services provided to foreign residents also benefited from this extension. In 2014 In 2016, the Ansan Migrant Community Service Center was reorganized into the Multicultural Support Headquarters (*damunhwa-jiwon-bonbu*), which remains in operation today (Kang, 2020, p. 8). This new entity was structured into two divisions: the Multicultural Policy Division and the Multicultural Support Division, each comprising three specialized teams. Within the Multicultural Policy Division are the Multicultural Policy Team, the Foreigners' Human Rights Team, and the Multicultural Special Zone Support Team. The Multicultural Support Division includes the Multicultural Welfare Team, the Global Culture Team, and the Multicultural Education Team. With this reorganization, the staff expanded to 24 public officials.

Building on existing advocacy networks, the Multicultural Support Headquarters established and coordinated four committees to amplify the voices of foreign residents: the Ansan Public-Private Joint Council for Supporting Foreign Residents, the Ansan City Council of Foreign Residents, the Ansan City Committee for Foreigners' Human Rights Promotion, and the Ansan Goryeoin Support Committee. Additionally, the increased budget facilitated stronger collaborations with local partners – including private organizations, the press, universities, schools, law firms, hospitals, and foundations – leading to new joint initiatives such as training programs and multicultural events and festivals.

In 2018, the designation of Wongok-dong as a Multicultural Village Special Zone was extended once again for another five-year term, lasting until 2023, with a substantial increase in budget from 26.08 billion won to 41.68 billion won (approximately 28 million euros). This funding enabled the launch of new initiatives, including South Korea's first childcare subsidy program for foreign children, approved in 2018. The additional financial support proved especially crucial during the global COVID-19 pandemic, helping not only to sustain businesses amid economic challenges but also to provide targeted services for foreign residents. Notably, Ansan became the first city in South Korea to extend living security subsidies to foreign residents during the emergency, following a recommendation from the central government.

However, it appears that the central government's investment in Ansan's Multicultural Village may be winding down. In 2023, the plan was extended for only two more years, until 2025, signaling possible future changes in Wongok-dong, which continues to host the largest concentration of foreign residents in South Korea.

Over the 15 years since the first municipal plan for the redevelopment of Wongok-dong was approved in 2009, the neighborhood has undergone significant transformation, both as an urban space and as a focal point for diversity governance policies. The initial vision of Wongok-dong as a Borderless Village, championed by grassroots civil society, has shifted to a top-down model of a Multicultural Village shaped by local government. While the promotion of human rights and substantive citizenship remained, they were gradually overshadowed by the city's economic interests, with a focus on place marketing, cultural commodification, and boosting tourism.

In this shift, the role of civil society – particularly the neighborhood residents who were once central to diversity governance – was diminished by the administration. As Wongok-dong gained national attention as a model of *damunhwa* due to its large foreign population and grassroots initiatives, the local government capitalized on the neighborhood for its own economic strategies. A telling example of this shift is the dissolution of the NGO Ansan Migrant Center, the key organization behind the Borderless Village movement. When I first visited Wongok-dong in the fall of 2022, the center's headquarters still stood, albeit sparsely populated with pamphlets. However, by my return in the spring of 2023, the center had been permanently dismantled, marking the end of an era in the neighborhood's civic activism.

Promoting the *City of Damunhwa*

As the mid-term plans for the development of the Multicultural Village progressed, Ansan's local government undertook an ambitious initiative to craft a comprehensive long-term vision for the city. This effort, which had not been possible during Mayor Park's tenure – partly due to his involvement in a bribery trial – was undertaken by his successor, Mayor Cheol-min Kim, who served from 2010 to 2014. Mayor Kim recognized the need for Ansan to position itself not only as a leader in domestic urban development but also as a key player on the national and international stage. In addition to continuing the development initiatives of his predecessors, including the expansion of the Wongok-dong plan, Mayor Kim placed a strong emphasis on city branding and city diplomacy as central elements of his political agenda.

To guide the city's future, Mayor Kim commissioned the Gyeonggi Research Institute, a think tank established in 1995 to enhance Gyeonggi Province's competitiveness and advise local governments, to formulate a long-term vision. The drafting process was comprehensive, involving extensive citizen and expert engagement through workshops and reporting sessions¹²⁸. In 2013, the *Long-Term Vision for a 2025 Ansan (2025 ansanbijeon jang-gibaljeongyehoeg)* was unveiled, aimed at providing the main strategic framework for the city's policies and initiatives over the next 12 years. The vision sought to establish Ansan as *A Symbiotic Green City on the West Coast (seohaean, nogsaeggongsaengdosi)*, capitalizing on its geopolitical location, emphasizing ecological sustainability, and fostering a future-oriented image of communication and cooperation. Mayor Kim set three key goals at the heart of this vision¹²⁹:

- a) *Tourism*: Position Ansan as the top tourist destination in the metropolitan area by investing in cultural assets.
- b) *Industry*: Establish Ansan as South Korea's most successful industrial city.
- c) *Damunhwa*: Develop Ansan into a global model of *damunhwa*, inspiring multicultural integration worldwide.

At the local level, the pursuit of *damunhwa* was a dual effort, blending innovative policies for foreign residents with the continued development of the Multicultural Village. Mayor Kim saw the integration of *damunhwa* as not only a local initiative but also a strategic tool for city diplomacy. By

¹²⁸ <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/RPR20130717013200353>

¹²⁹ <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/RPR20130717013200353>

promoting Ansan's image as a model of multiculturalism, he aimed to attract national and international attention, further enhancing the city's global reputation and indirectly boosting tourism.

Ansan's participation in the first Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities, held in Tōkyō in January 2012, and the subsequent summit in Hamamatsu later that year, was a reflection of this strategy. These engagements were part of Mayor Kim's broader vision to elevate Ansan's profile on the world stage. The connection between the Intercultural Cities Programme (ICC) and South Korean cities was facilitated by Han-up Jang, a professor in the Department of French Language and Literature at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, who also served as the director of the Center for Damunhwa Research. Professor Jang developed a deep interest in intercultural education during his studies at the University of Rouen in France and became an enthusiastic proponent of European interculturalism and the Council of Europe's ICC.

Since 2009, Jang worked tirelessly to introduce these concepts to South Korea through his research and translations of four key books on interculturalism into Korean. When the Japan Foundation and the Council of Europe advocated for South Korean cities to participate in the summit, Jang played a pivotal role in bringing the idea of interculturalism to Ansan's local government, serving as an advisor on one of the city's advisory committees (Interview I).

Ansan's participation in the two summits was both a reflection of its evolving city branding as a model of *damunhwa* and a catalyst for refining its city diplomacy strategies. The local government quickly recognized parallels between Ansan's vision and that of Hamamatsu, a Japanese city renowned for positioning itself as a pioneering model of *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence). More than Hamamatsu's specific diversity-related policies, Ansan was particularly inspired by its approach to self-promotion through city diplomacy.

Taking inspiration from Hamamatsu's success in founding the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents in 2001 (Section 14.9, p. 427), Ansan saw an opportunity to take on a leadership role in migration and diversity governance within South Korea. In November 2012, Ansan brought together the mayors of 26 other South Korean cities to launch the National Council of Multicultural Cities (*jeongug-damunhwa-dosi-hyeob-uihoe*). The Council's stated mission is to "promote the development of a multicultural society by sharing multicultural policies among member cities and jointly seeking solutions to common problems" (National Council of Multicultural Cities, 2020).

To achieve this, the Council outlined four strategic action areas:

- a) *Benchmarking*: Creating platforms for sharing domestic and international best practices on diversity governance and encouraging city-to-city exchanges.

- b) *Research*: Sponsoring studies to gather data on cultural minorities and *damunhwa* strategies and evaluating their effectiveness.
- c) *Policy Advocacy*: Using their collective expertise and political influence to propose multicultural legislation at the national level.
- d) *Shared Projects*: Funding intercity collaborative projects through association fees, with periodic calls for proposals aimed at fostering cooperation in *damunhwa* initiatives.

The Council swiftly formalized its role by signing Memorandums of Understanding with key ministries, in order to establish advocacy channels to push for policy reforms related to *damunhwa*. Ever since its launch, the Council is chaired by the mayor of a member city on a two-year rotating basis. Ansan, under Mayor Kim Cheol-min, held the chairmanship for the Council's first two terms (2012-2016), with Kim's successor, Mayor Je Jong-gil, continuing the leadership. After Ansan's tenure, the chair passed to Guro-gu (one of Seoul's special districts) from 2016 to 2020, followed by Siheung (2020-2022) and most recently Gimpo.

Currently, the Council is working on seven key policy agendas, including the establishment of information channels for foreign residents and six practical agenda items, such as organizing the National Sports Festival for Foreign Residents. The member cities are also collaborating on a proposal for a new national immigration policy aimed at improving the overall integration framework (Park 2024).

18.9

Adopting the Intercultural City Brand

Beyond emulating Hamamatsu's creation of a national city network focused on diversity governance, Ansan also mirrored the Japanese city's strategies for international city diplomacy. Hamamatsu had successfully leveraged its hosting of the second Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities to elevate its reputation as a champion of diversity governance both at home and abroad. Ansan's local government recognized that organizing such an event provided Hamamatsu a platform to showcase its achievements and gain recognition on a broader scale.

Seizing the opportunity, Mayor Kim proposed that the next summit be held in Ansan, and in October 2013, the city hosted the third Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities. Although the summit would be the last of its kind due to strained relations between South Korea and Japan, it gave Ansan a valuable moment to solidify its standing as a leader in diversity governance. The event celebrated the city's efforts in developing Wongok-dong as a Multicultural Village – though the complexities and tensions between the Multicultural Village and the grassroots Borderless Village movement were carefully avoided in official narratives.

Mayor Kim's successors continued his vision, extending Ansan's prominence both locally and internationally. His immediate successor, Mayor Jong-gil Je (in office from 2014 to 2018), focused on cultural and foreign-related policies that often intersected. He secured the third five-year extension for the development of the Multicultural Village and collaborated with the Ansan Cultural Foundation to enhance the city's cultural scene. One of Mayor Je's signature achievements was the creation of the Ansan Culture Plaza, a mega-project designed to revitalize the commercial area of Gojan and to form a key part of Ansan's so-called tourism belt, which includes Daebudo Island, the Multicultural Village, Wa Stadium, Lake Park, and Reed Marsh Park. The Cultural Plaza became a central hub for the city's major cultural events, including the popular annual Ansan Street Arts Festival, managed by the Ansan Cultural Foundation.

Mayor Je's focus on promoting Ansan's cultural and artistic landscape aligned perfectly with the broader *creative city* discourse, which was gaining traction across South Korea, particularly in Seoul and its surrounding districts. Inspired by Hamamatsu's example, Je led Ansan's application to join UNESCO's Creative Cities Network as a Learning City in 2018. The city also began considering membership in the Intercultural Cities (ICC) Network after Hamamatsu joined in 2017, signaling Ansan's intent to further enhance its global presence as a leader in diversity governance and creative city initiatives.

Mayor Je's successor, Hwa-seop Yoon (in office from 2018 to 2022), was equally committed to enhancing and modernizing Ansan's brand. Early in his term, he focused on securing central government support and investment for transforming the Banwol and Sihwa industrial complexes into high-tech Leading Smart Industrial Special Zones, marking Ansan's shift toward becoming a *smart city*.

One of Mayor Yoon's key strategic moves, advised by experts like Professor Han-up Jang, was joining the ICC Network in 2020. This decision further positioned Ansan as a key player in both migration and diversity governance on the national and international stages.

Internationally, membership in the ICC Network brought Ansan recognition as *South Korea's first intercultural city*, strengthening its global connections and opening doors to new opportunities and

resources. However, the ultimate focus of Ansan's ICC membership was national. The city saw this international recognition as a way to solidify its position as a leading model of *damunhwa* within South Korea.

Ansan was particularly eager to be scored within the ICC Index, as these data – backed by the prestige of the Council of Europe – would further legitimize its status in front of other South Korean cities and the central government. After carefully considering the variables used in the Index, there was also confidence that the intercultural score of Ansan would outperform that of Hamamatsu, its Japanese counterpart. This would have allowed Ansan to claim the title of *First Intercultural City in Asia*. However, that primacy was soon claimed by Guro-gu, another South Korean city that, imitating Ansan, joined the ICC Network and received a higher score.

Like in the case of Hamamatsu, Ansan's joining the ICC Network did not lead to significant changes in diversity governance policies, as the city was already following strategies compatible with the narrative of European interculturalism. Instead, the impact was more discursive. Ansan began adopting ICC's language when describing its initiatives, especially in English. For example, where *damunhwa* had previously been translated by referring to *multicultural* or *multiculturalism*, since 2020 the city started using *intercultural* and *interculturalism* in some contexts. This change was particularly visible in the government-led Multicultural Support Headquarters, which began to be referred to as the Intercultural Support Headquarters. Similarly, its two departments – the Multicultural Policy Division and the Multicultural Support Division – were rebranded with *intercultural* replacing *multicultural* in their names.

Though it is difficult to measure the exact success of this rebranding strategy, Ansan's role as a national leader in migration and diversity governance continued to grow. In 2022, the Ministry of Justice significantly expanded the jurisdiction of Ansan's Immigration Office. Previously responsible for Ansan and the nearby city of Siheung, the office's reach was extended to cover three additional municipalities: Gunpo, Anyang, and Gwan Myeong. This expansion further cemented Ansan's role as a pivotal hub for managing migration and promoting diversity in South Korea.

18.10

Ansan as a Safe, Smart, and Global City

The current mayor of Ansan, Min-geun Lee, elected in 2022, has demonstrated a heightened focus on city branding and diplomacy, surpassing his predecessors in ambition and scope. With the *Vision for a 2025 Ansan* (2013) nearing its expiration, Mayor Lee promptly initiated the development of a new long-term comprehensive framework to guide the city's growth over the next decade. This effort built on a series of workshops and discussions involving citizens and experts that had been conducted since 2019¹³⁰.

The blueprint for the vision aims to create a *compact, connected, and smart* Ansan, built around six strategic pillars (Kim, 2024):

- 1) Establish a compact (high-density) city centered around key transportation hubs like train stations.
- 2) Develop attractive luxury residential complexes to enhance the city's residential appeal.
- 3) Improve the accessibility and efficiency of transportation systems.
- 4) Transform Ansan into a high-tech, innovative, and smart industrial city.
- 5) Promote Ansan as a global city that fosters a cosmopolitan mindset and nurtures creative talent.
- 6) Build a green, eco-friendly city that offers a pleasant and sustainable living environment.

Damunhwa, which remains part of this vision, is explicitly reconceptualized as a cornerstone of Ansan's creative identity. The emphasis has definitely shifted from promoting equality and human rights to leveraging cultural diversity as a unique asset in building the city's global image.

To achieve these goals, Mayor Lee has anchored his current initiatives around three key ideals: the *Safe City*, the *Smart City*, and the *Global City*. First, to make Ansan more attractive on both a national and international scale, Lee is determined to eradicate the lingering negative stereotypes of the city as *unsafe*. This perception, rooted in prejudices against areas with high concentrations of foreign residents like Wongok-dong, has hindered Ansan's appeal. To address this, Lee has prioritized investments in public safety, announcing plans for a community safety network that integrates innovative technologies, rapid police response, and enhanced victim support services.

Second, following the successful beginning of the process of transformation of Banwol and Sihwa into high-tech industrial complexes, Ansan has reaffirmed its commitment to becoming a *smart city*. Mayor Lee is advocating for the designation of Ansan Science Valley (ASV) – which includes Gyeonggi Technopark and the high-tech zones developed in recent years – as a Korean Free Economic Zone (KFEZ). This designation would offer tax incentives for foreign companies and investors, streamlined regulations, and a favorable living environment, thereby boosting the city's

¹³⁰ <https://news.nate.com/view/20240904n06063>

economic growth and appeal to international investors. In late 2022, Ansan was shortlisted as a potential candidate for this designation, which, if secured, would solidify its role as a hub for innovation and economic growth.

Finally, Lee's vision for Ansan as a *global city* has been propelled by the South Korean government's recent announcement of plans to establish a separate Immigration Agency under the Ministry of Justice. This critical decision, unveiled in 2022 by President Suk-yeol Yoon after extensive debate within the ruling People Power Party (PPP), signals a transformative step in the nation's migration and integration policies.

The announcement sparked fierce competition among cities vying to host the agency, recognizing it as a significant political and economic asset. Hosting the Immigration Agency would position the chosen city as the national hub for migration and diversity management, create thousands of jobs, and attract substantial investments for urban regeneration, thereby enhancing its overall appeal.

Seizing the potential of this opportunity, Mayor Lee swiftly positioned Ansan as a leading contender, viewing this as a chance to elevate Ansan's status beyond its current reputation as the *City of Damunhwa* to what he ambitiously described as "a global city such as New York" (Koo, 2024). Accordingly, Lee promptly initiated a strategic campaign to promote Ansan's candidacy. Under the slogan *Ansan's Way, Korea's Way*, he emphasized the city's unique qualifications as South Korea's premier *damunhwa* hub.

Ansan's credentials are compelling: it hosts the nation's largest foreign resident population, has pioneered innovative *damunhwa* policies, and remains the only city in South Korea with a designated Multicultural Special Zone. Furthermore, its active participation in prestigious networks like the National Council of Multicultural Cities and the Intercultural Cities Network underscores its leadership in diversity governance. Lee's close ties to the central government, bolstered by his role within the PPP, add a layer of political influence that strengthens Ansan's competitive advantage.

The establishment of the Immigration Agency is poised to bring profound changes to South Korea's migration and diversity governance. For Ansan, securing the agency would certainly represent a key development. It would redefine the city's governance systems, cement its role as a leader in shaping national migration policies, and solidify its position as South Korea's model city for multicultural integration. Beyond the immediate benefits of job creation and investment, the agency's presence would further enhance Ansan's reputation and influence on both national and international stages.

In late 2024, Mayor Lee unveiled the *Urban Basic Plan for a 2040 Ansan* (*2040nyeon-ansan-dosigibonggyehoeg*), replacing the outdated 2020 plan. This new framework, summarized by the slogan *Ansan as a Rainbow of Diversity* (written in English in its original formulation), articulates a

bold vision of a *Young, Global, Multicultural, Economically Vibrant, and Safe City* poised to shape the future.

Damunhwa represents one of the central aspects of this vision, reframed as a defining feature of Ansan's identity. The city's diverse foreign population is celebrated not only for their contributions to the local community but also as key drivers of its development and global appeal. Lee's commitment to positioning Ansan as the *City of Damunhwa* was further demonstrated during his participation in the 2024 Asia-Europe Summit on Intercultural Cities in Hamamatsu, where he reaffirmed Ansan's leadership in diversity governance by signing the *Hamamatsu Declaration* (Section 14.13, pp. 444-445). This further solidified Ansan's role as a champion of inclusion on both the national and international stage.

18.11

The Governance System of the *City of Damunhwa*

In the same way I explored the structure and dynamics of the *City of Interculturalitat* in Barcelona (Sections 10.13-10.15) and the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei* in Hamamatsu (Sections 14.12-14.14), the following sections of this chapter examine the key dimensions of governance in what can be called Ansan's *City of Damunhwa*. This analysis begins by outlining the governance structure underpinning Ansan's approach to cultural heterogeneity, moves on to explore its conceptual framework, and concludes with an assessment of the successes and challenges of the city's efforts, as seen through the perspectives of its stakeholders.

Unlike Barcelona and Hamamatsu, Ansan lacks a specific comprehensive normative or regulatory framework to guide its policies and practices concerning cultural heterogeneity. Nevertheless, a system of governance has progressively consolidated, whose origins can be traced back to the establishment of the Multicultural Village in Wongok-dong. While not formalized into a single overarching framework, Ansan's efforts to promote *damunhwa* are organized around four key priorities:

- a) *Building infrastructures and services for foreign residents and multicultural families*: Ansan has taken significant steps to establish itself as a foreigner-friendly city, beginning with its

designation as a multicultural special zone and the creation of the Multicultural Village in Wongok-dong. Policies aimed at recognizing the civil rights and representation of foreign residents include advocacy programs and opportunities for participation in local policymaking. This institutional commitment ensures that foreign residents' voices are integrated into the city's administration and development.

- b) *Promoting human rights*: Ansan has worked closely with the National Human Rights Commission and Gyeonggi Province to strengthen frameworks that protect and promote the rights of foreign residents. A notable outcome of this collaboration is the establishment of support networks and monitoring groups that identify and address human rights issues promptly. The city has also created facilities that offer free medical care, ensuring that foreign residents, regardless of their circumstances, have access to essential health services.
- c) *Supporting foreign residents' settlement and integration*: Recognizing the challenges faced by newcomers, Ansan provides accessible Korean language education and ensures that key administrative and civic information is translated into multiple languages. Cultural and sports activities – such as guided tours, taekwondo, badminton, etc. – are regularly organized to foster connections between foreign residents and the local community. Specific initiatives also target multicultural families, offering home-visit education, employment assistance, family counseling, and academic support for children, helping these families adapt and thrive in their new environment.
- d) *Celebrating cultural heterogeneity as an integral part of the city's identity*: The city promotes the organizations of events and programs celebrating foreign cultural expressions. Festivals such as World People's Day and multicultural fairs showcase the rich tapestry of cultures represented in the city. Educational initiatives highlighting foreign residents' languages and traditions aim to cultivate curiosity, mutual respect, and understanding among Korean residents, encouraging a more inclusive and harmonious community.

Many of the initiatives within these four areas of action are concentrated within the geographical bounds of Ansan's Multicultural Village and are primarily overseen by the Intercultural (*damunhwa*) Support Headquarters. This administrative body serves as the backbone of the *City of Damunhwa's* governance system, connecting political leaders, the local administration, civil society organizations, and foreign residents. The governance structure revolves around the expertise of six specialized teams operating under the Headquarters' two main divisions: the Intercultural Policy Division and the Intercultural Support Division.

Within the Intercultural Policy Division, responsibilities are organized as follows:

- **Intercultural Policy Team:** This team coordinates Ansan's participation in the National Council of Multicultural Cities, organizes multicultural citizenship awards, and fosters collaboration through public-private councils. It also oversees key facilities like the World Culture Experience Center and the Multicultural Immigrants Plus Center.
- **Human Rights Team:** Focused on protecting the rights of foreign residents, this team operates consultation centers and human rights committees while running specialized programs for migrant women who are victims of violence. It also provides emergency support for those in need.
- **Multicultural Special Zone Support Team:** Dedicated to enhancing infrastructure within multicultural zones, this team oversees the development of shopping centers and parks and supports employment initiatives, including facilitating job placements for foreign cooks.

The Intercultural Support Division takes a hands-on approach to community programs and services:

- **Intercultural Welfare Team:** This team manages essential facilities such as the Multicultural Family Support Center, Global Multicultural Center, and Global Youth Center. It provides Korean language education for marriage immigrants and learning support for children.
- **Global Culture Team:** Through events like International Day, multicultural festivals, and cross-cultural programs, this team fosters cultural exchange and community participation. It also supports residents with physical education classes and cultural experiences.
- **Intercultural Education Team:** Focused on education, this team runs cultural diversity training and programs such as the Immigrant Early Adaptation Program, helping newcomers integrate more easily into Korean society.

In addition to coordinating these teams, the Intercultural Support Headquarters operates several key facilities that deliver direct services to foreign residents. These include:

The Multicultural Immigrants Plus Center, which offers consultations on daily life, immigration processes, and medical issues, while providing services such as visa issuance certificates and employment permits. The Intercultural Small Library, housing over 13,500 books from 24 countries, creating a welcoming space where residents can read in their native languages and engage with one another. The Consultation Support Center for Foreign Residents, which provides multilingual assistance in 15 languages, covering daily life, legal support, and healthcare services. The Health Branch Office, offering free healthcare to both foreign and local residents. The Multicultural Village Special Zone Media Center, which promotes cultural understanding through media education, content

creation, and community-building initiatives. The World Culture Experience Hall, a vibrant space that showcases permanent exhibitions of artifacts, instruments, and traditional costumes from around the world. It also organizes interactive experiences such as costume-wearing, cultural games, tours, and lectures for schools and community groups.

The Intercultural Support Headquarters also operate several facilities aimed at directly offering various services to foreign residents. These includes:

- The Multicultural Immigrants Plus Center, which offers consultations on daily life, immigration processes, and medical issues, while providing services such as visa issuance certificates and employment permits.
- The Intercultural Small Library, housing over 13,500 books from 24 countries, creating a welcoming space where residents can read in their native languages and engage with one another.
- The Consultation Support Center for Foreign Residents, which provides multilingual assistance in 15 languages, covering daily life, legal support, and healthcare services.
- The Health Branch Office, offering free healthcare to both foreign and local residents.
- The Multicultural Village Special Zone Media Center, which promotes cultural understanding through media education, content creation, and community-building initiatives.
- The World Culture Experience Hall, a vibrant space that showcases permanent exhibitions of artifacts, instruments, and traditional costumes from around the world. It also organizes interactive experiences such as costume-wearing, cultural games, tours, and lectures for schools and community groups.

The implementation of these initiatives relies heavily on partnerships with civil society organizations and volunteer groups. Many of these groups include foreign residents who contribute either through organized participation or voluntary efforts. Korean-led organizations, particularly those with religious affiliations, also continue to play a significant role in supporting these programs.

While the Intercultural Support Headquarters focuses broadly on foreign residents, two additional key actors provide specialized support for specific cultural minority groups: the Ansan Multicultural Family Support Center, which assists marriage migrants and their families; and the Goryeoin Culture Center, dedicated to promoting the social inclusion of the Goryeoin community.

The Ansan Multicultural Family Support Center, established in 2008 under the national *Multicultural Family Support Act* (Section 16.4, p. 493), is operated by the Ansan Women's Christian Youth Association (YWCA) on commission from Ansan's local government. Dedicated to fostering personal growth, cultural understanding, and a sense of belonging, the center tailors its wide-ranging

programs to meet the unique needs of marriage migrants and their families. Its initiatives span education, social integration, and advocacy, organized around four key areas of focus:

- a) *Empowering families and promoting equality* The center's family education programs are designed to strengthen family bonds and equip participants with tools to thrive in Korean society. Through courses on communication, role fulfillment, and relationship-building, families gain practical skills for daily life. Children benefit from career exploration programs and guidance on school admissions, while spouses learn to navigate life together with understanding and support. Gender equality is a central focus, with programs that encourage awareness of gender roles and promote trust and mutual respect within families. By fostering balance and harmony, these initiatives build strong foundations for lasting relationships. In addition, the center offers human rights education tailored to multicultural families, raising awareness of legal systems and promoting respect for diversity through sensitivity training and multicultural understanding workshops.
- b) *Promoting social integration*: To support participants in becoming active, engaged members of society, the center offers a variety of social integration programs. Workshops on job hunting, financial literacy, and volunteering teach participants their rights and responsibilities while forging connections with employment agencies to create meaningful opportunities. Korean language education plays a vital role in helping marriage migrants and children adapt to life in Korea. Free classes provide participants with the language skills needed for daily interactions and social engagement. For children, tailored language development programs focus on grammar, conversation, and pronunciation, ensuring they gain confidence in communication. Interpretation and translation services further ease the transition by bridging language gaps and helping migrants navigate cultural and practical challenges in everyday life.
- c) *Comprehensive support and advocacy*: The center offers compassionate counseling services to address interpersonal challenges such as marital conflicts, parent-child issues, and generational differences. Individual, couple, and family sessions provide guidance to help families overcome emotional hurdles and build healthier relationships. For families facing more complex challenges, the case management program delivers tailored support, including crisis intervention for domestic violence, assistance with divorce proceedings, and help securing employment and financial stability. These services empower families to achieve resilience and independence. Public awareness campaigns complement these efforts by dispelling prejudice, fostering understanding, and strengthening social inclusion within the wider community.
- d) *Cultivating global competencies*: The Bilingual Family Environment Project supports families with young children, encouraging bilingual communication in both Korean and their native

languages. By fostering linguistic diversity, the program helps children build a strong cultural identity while preparing them to engage globally. Initiatives like Multicultural Family Exchange and Communication Spaces celebrate diversity and promote community connections. These programs provide opportunities for families to interact, share experiences, and build lasting ties, creating a more inclusive and culturally vibrant society. To further support children, the Social Inclusion Safety Network focuses on emotional well-being and academic success, offering study assistance, career counseling, and resources to help children reach their full potential.

The center extends its reach through collaborations with key organizations, creating opportunities for skill-building and personal growth. Programs include:

- **Café With:** Run by the Hendon Welfare Foundation, this initiative trains marriage migrants in baking, café management, and entrepreneurial skills.
- **Marriage Immigrant Assistance Program:** Supported by the Korea Gas Corporation, this program enhances digital literacy and career readiness through IT training.
- **Child Growth Support Project:** Sponsored by Shinhan Bank, this project offers creative activities, psychological support, and Korean language resources to nurture children's development.

The Goryeoin Cultural Center, established in 2016 and operated by Neomeo Corporation since 2017 under commission from Ansan's local government, stands as a cornerstone of support and cultural preservation for Ansan's Goryeoin community. Situated in the heart of *Ttaegol Village*, a Goryeoin enclave nestled in the neighborhood of Seonbu-dong – which borders Wongok-dong to the north – the center holds a strategic and symbolic presence. The area's close proximity to the Siheung and Banwol Industrial Complexes has drawn Goryeoin workers to settle there over time, gradually shaping the neighborhood with their ethnocultural imprint. Russian-language signage, specialized shops, and services tailored to the Goryeoin reflect their integral presence in the local landscape. Within this context, the Goryeoin Cultural Center has emerged as a vital hub for fostering inclusion, empowerment, and social integration.

At the heart of the center's work is education, which serves as a bridge for Goryeoin families to navigate and connect with South Korean society. Korean language classes are offered to both children and adults, providing essential tools for effective communication and daily life. For adolescents, after-school programs enrich their learning experience beyond the classroom, offering creative

opportunities in art, music, and physical education while connecting them to cultural activities that deepen their sense of belonging and pride in their heritage.

The center also offers practical support services to address the immediate needs of the Goryeoin community. Consultation and interpretation services are readily available to assist with issues surrounding employment, wages, housing, and legal matters. More than a resource for individual challenges, the center cultivates a sense of community through events and activities that bring residents together, fostering bonds and celebrating shared traditions.

A particular highlight of the Goryeoin Cultural Center is its Exhibition Hall, a space dedicated to preserving and sharing the history and resilience of the Goryeoin people. Here, visitors can explore powerful narratives of migration and learn about the Goryeoin independence activists whose courage and sacrifice shaped the community's legacy. Complementing the exhibition, guided tours of Ttaegol Village provide an immersive experience, weaving together stories of cultural identity and resilience.

Beyond the institutional efforts of Ansan's key actors – the Intercultural Support Headquarters, the Multicultural Family Support Center, and the Goryeoin Cultural Center – numerous civil society organizations play a pivotal role in promoting the social inclusion and rights of foreign residents. Many of these groups trace their roots back to the Borderless Village movement, while others include religious-based initiatives and networks led by foreigners themselves.

Table 8 summarizes the results of this analysis, offering a visual representation of the governance system of the City of *Tabunka Kyōsei*.




Table 8. Visual synthesis of the City of Damunhwa’s governance system, outlining the various scales of governance – including their respective roles and the mechanisms shaping their engagement through a multiscale lens. The focus then narrows to the municipal level, detailing the core principles that underpin the City of Damunhwa and mapping the ecosystem of actors involved in its governance, together with their specific roles.

Framing *Damunhwa* in Ansan?

In Ansan, as in the rest of South Korea, the concept of *damunhwa* initially emerged as a framework championed by civil society actors to advance the principles of equality and human rights for foreign residents. In Ansan, these efforts took shape through the Borderless Village movement, a coalition of pro-migrant organizations that articulated a vision of *damunhwa* rooted in three core pillars: *human rights*, *sharing*, and *community* (Section 18.4). The movement pursued 13 strategic goals focused on securing civil, political, and social rights for foreigners.

However, as we discussed, the leadership role of the Borderless Village movement in managing cultural heterogeneity was gradually eclipsed by Ansan's local government. This shift occurred with the establishment of the Intercultural Support Headquarters (originally the Foreign Workers Division) and the development of the Multicultural Village plans. The local administration assumed control of the *City of Damunhwa* and began to reshape its vision, establishing the current system of governance. The focus moved away from the protection of human rights and the promotion of social inclusion, emphasizing instead the celebration of cultural diversity as a strategic asset. This new vision highlighted the concentration of foreign residents as a means to promote social development, enhance the city's brand, and attract tourism, positioning Ansan as a creative, multicultural, and, ultimately, global city.

Over the years, *damunhwa* has consolidated as a central theme in Ansan's city visions and strategic plans, culminating in its most recent iteration under Mayor Min-geun Lee: *Ansan as a Rainbow of Diversity: A Young, Global, Multicultural [Damunhwa], Economically Vibrant, and Safe City* (Section 18.10, 540). Yet, unlike Barcelona's *interculturalitat* or Hamamatsu's *tabunka kyōsei*, both of which are backed by strategic master plans that articulate their meaning and role within broader urban policies, *damunhwa* in Ansan remains ambiguous and undefined. Despite its prominence in political rhetoric, the local government has yet to articulate a clear conceptual framework or present a comprehensive plan for its implementation. Even the latest *Urban Basic Plan for a 2040 Ansan*, which explicitly places *damunhwa* at its core, lacks a dedicated section defining the concept or presenting a unified strategy. Instead, scattered references to specific initiatives aimed at promoting the inclusion of foreign residents are the closest approximation to a strategic approach.

Compounding this ambiguity is the tension between Ansan's identity as a *City of Damunhwa* and its aspirations to become a *Global City*. Mayor Lee has increasingly emphasized that Ansan must move "beyond being a City of Damunhwa" and evolve into a global metropolis akin to New York (Section 18.10, p. 540). While this rhetoric highlights lofty ambitions, it risks undermining the value of *damunhwa* by relegating it to a transitional phase – a steppingstone toward a larger, cosmopolitan ideal.

This conceptual vagueness is also mirrored in the shifting terminology used to translate *damunhwa* into English. Initially, as in Hamamatsu, Ansan adopted *multicultural* as its preferred translation. However, following its entry into the Intercultural Cities Network (ICC) in 2020 as South Korea's first intercultural city, *intercultural* has increasingly been favored. Yet this linguistic shift reflects no substantive change in governance frameworks or practical initiatives. Instead, it appears driven by strategic motivations, aimed at appealing to an international audience as part of city branding and diplomatic efforts.

An analysis of the discourses and practices surrounding *damunhwa* reveals further nuances. While the local government tends to frame *damunhwa* in terms of cultural diversity as an asset – promoting it through tourism and cultural branding – the initiatives of those who implement *damunhwa*-related programs tell a different story. These actors prioritize equity of opportunity and access to rights for marginalized groups, shifting the focus from diversity as spectacle to diversity as social justice. While festivals, such as the celebrated Ansan Street Festival, highlight cultural heterogeneity and encourage cultural exchange, these events remain secondary to the day-to-day implementation of *damunhwa*-related initiatives, focused on the core priorities of education, employment, and social inclusion.

Considered from a global perspective, Ansan's approach to *damunhwa* aligns with narratives of diversity advantage and integration, yet it diverges from the more expansive framework of diversity governance. Like Hamamatsu's *tabunka kyōsei*, Ansan's *damunhwa* is not based on a conceptualization of cultural heterogeneity as an inherent characteristic of social life that transcends traditional markers like nationality or ethnicity. Instead, policies and initiatives are primarily directed toward foreign residents, reinforcing a narrower focus.

Where Ansan distinguishes itself from other cities, such as Hamamatsu, is in its more explicit adoption of an intersectional lens – particularly in its focus on gender. A significant emphasis is placed on the experiences of marriage migrants, with programs that empower migrant women through education, employment assistance, and advocacy. These efforts, deeply rooted in ideals of gender equality, are often driven by Korean feminist organizations and advocacy groups, showcasing a progressive, equity-driven approach to cultural heterogeneity.

Despite these efforts, the *City of Damunhwa* struggles to maintain a coherent identity and unified governance model. The various policies and initiatives are fragmented, and pursued by different actors with disparate visions and agendas. Without a foundational framework to tie them together, *damunhwa* remains a collection of disjointed efforts rather than an integrated, purposeful strategy for managing cultural heterogeneity.

Looking ahead, a potential turning point may be on the horizon. If Ansan is selected as the home of South Korea's new Immigration Agency, this could spark a redefinition of *damunhwa*'s structural and ideological foundations. Such a development would offer an opportunity to clarify its relationship with the city's global ambitions while addressing the ambiguities and fragmentation that currently hinder its governance. For Ansan, this moment holds the potential to transform *damunhwa* from a loosely defined aspiration into a clear and actionable vision – one that genuinely balances cultural diversity, inclusion, and global competitiveness.

18.13

Entering the *City of Damunhwa*: Successes and Challenges

During my fieldwork in Ansan, I had the privilege of engaging with a wide range of institutional and civil society representatives and participating in numerous *damunhwa*-related initiatives. These activities, organized by key stakeholders in Ansan's governance system, offered a valuable lens through which to assess the city's approach to cultural heterogeneity. Drawing on my previous fieldwork in Barcelona and Hamamatsu, I sought to identify the successes and challenges that define Ansan's *damunhwa* efforts.

Institutional actors, particularly those closely connected to the Intercultural Support Headquarters, unsurprisingly praised the *local government's active engagement* in addressing foreign residents' needs. The city's *commitment to innovation and experimentation* was frequently highlighted as a hallmark of its approach. Unlike many municipalities, Ansan has officially embraced a narrative incorporating cultural heterogeneity into its local identity and pioneering inclusive policies aimed at empowering foreign residents as full citizens and active community members.

One notable achievement highlighted by stakeholders is Ansan's *substantial allocation of resources and personnel* to manage migration and cultural diversity, which has enabled the city to

institutionalize robust practices for supporting and empowering foreign residents. Additionally, the development plans for the Multicultural Village have been praised for integrating the needs and perspectives of foreign residents directly into *urban planning and revitalization efforts*. This approach is particularly evident in Wongok-dong, where the city's commitment to inclusivity has shaped the neighborhood's transformation, ensuring that urban development addresses the unique challenges faced by its diverse community.

Another success lies in Ansan's extensive and diverse network of collaborators. The city works closely with a wide range of stakeholders, including academic researchers from Hanyang University, policy experts, educators, and civil society organizations – many of which are led by foreign residents themselves. This vibrant network not only amplifies the city's capacity for innovation but also ensures a dynamic civil society that actively responds to municipal incentives, often driving institutional action through lobbying and advocacy.

Despite these achievements, institutional actors also identified significant challenges facing the *City of Damunhwa*. Chief among them is the persistent scarcity of resources. While Ansan's investments in *damunhwa* governance surpass those of many other municipalities, the available economic and human resources remain *insufficient* to meet the growing demands of its strategic agenda. This shortfall has been exacerbated by the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which intensified the workload for many actors without a corresponding increase in funding or staffing.

The Intercultural Support Headquarters, for instance, has experienced a noticeable mismatch between its responsibilities and available personnel. After an initial period of expansion from 2007 to 2016 – growing from 17 to 24 staff members – the pace of growth stagnated, with only two additional hires over the last eight years. This lack of staff hampers the headquarters' ability to effectively address the increasingly complex challenges of cultural heterogeneity.

Resource constraints have also fostered competition among stakeholders, particularly civil society organizations, which are often the primary implementers of *damunhwa*-related initiatives. This competition undermines collaboration, reducing the potential for synergistic interventions. Additionally, this dynamic has reinforced a fragmentation of practices, with many initiatives operating in silos, disconnected from one another.

Another critical challenge lies in the *geographic concentration* of *damunhwa*-related activities within Wongok-dong and Ttaegol Village. While this focus has facilitated targeted interventions and strengthened community engagement in these neighborhoods, it has also created a form of spatial segregation. These areas risk becoming pluralist enclaves – ghettos of *damunhwa* – that remain isolated from the broader civic life of Ansan. This segregation limits opportunities for meaningful

interaction between foreign residents and the wider Korean population, hindering the goal of genuine integration.

The perspective of civil society actors in Ansan also underscores *the fragmentation of interventions* and the *absence of a cohesive strategy* in the city's approach to cultural heterogeneity. From their viewpoint, Ansan's claim to be *number one for damunhwa* is viewed more as a slogan reflecting the city's high concentration of foreign residents rather than evidence of a well-structured governance system. Many civil society actors downplay the creativity and innovation attributed to Ansan's practices, instead pointing to more efficient models in other cities that are difficult to replicate locally due to *limited economic resources*.

At the same time, civil society representatives acknowledge the city's relative strength in providing a *diverse array of services and institutional mechanisms* aimed at addressing the immediate needs of foreign residents. They particularly credit the *dynamic activism of civil society* and the *resilience of volunteers* for creating an effective system to manage emergencies and the early phases of foreign residents' settlement. However, they criticize the system for *lacking a long-term vision* and being overly focused on addressing crises as they arise through a reactive welfare model.

A key challenge for civil society actors lies in their *economic dependence* on government funding, which restricts their autonomy and binds their initiatives to the priorities of the local administration. This contrasts with Barcelona, where civil society representatives felt aligned with the local government's inclusive agenda and believed they had advocacy channels to influence the *City of Interculturalitat*. In Ansan, however, civil society stakeholders feel the local government prioritizes economic development and the *entrepreneurial city model over an inclusive city vision*. Issues related to the empowerment and rights of minorities often take a backseat to economic maneuvers and operations. Moreover, although communication channels, such as councils providing reports and recommendations, exist between civil society and the administration, many stakeholders express frustration at their limited influence over government decisions. They see the governance system as *predominantly top-down*, both economically and politically, which they identify as one of the *City of Damunhwa's* fundamental flaws.

Integrating stakeholders' perspective with field observations, Ansan's main successes in managing cultural heterogeneity can be attributed to its establishment as a *foreigner-friendly* city and its development of an *organic and dynamic system* capable of *addressing emergencies* related to its foreign population. This dynamism hints at significant potential for growth, particularly in fostering greater involvement of foreign residents in local governance. However, Ansan must develop a clear and unified framework for cultural heterogeneity. Such a framework is essential to systematically address emerging issues, promote synergy and cooperation among stakeholders, and ensure the

sustainability of its institutional efforts. Without this, the system risks being shaped by ambiguity and driven by opaque or purely economic interests.

Furthermore, currently, cultural heterogeneity in Ansan is primarily *limited to foreign residents*, with a specific focus on marriage migrants and Goryeoin. While these efforts intersect with issues of class and gender, they remain notably silent on sexual orientation. This omission is partly due to the influence of anti-LGBTQ+ *religious organizations*, which play a prominent role in Ansan's governance of *damunhwa*. This dominance poses a significant challenge, as it risks narrowing the scope of inclusion to doctrinal boundaries. Moreover, it blurs the line between assistance and proselytizing, potentially exploiting the vulnerabilities of minority groups to serve religious or ideological agendas.

This conflation of inclusion with religious militancy threatens the integrity of empowerment efforts, as it may prioritize expanding the influence of specific political or religious groups over the genuine integration and well-being of marginalized individuals. To address this, Ansan must strive for a broader, mainstreamed, intersectional vision of inclusion that is free from sectarian interests and rooted in universal principles of equity and human rights. Only then can the city fulfill its potential as a model for inclusive governance and cultural heterogeneity.

The following table (Table 9) systematizes the findings of my fieldwork, highlighting the main perceived successes and challenges of the governance system of the City of *Damunhwa*. These findings are presented from the perspectives of government officials and civil society actors and are further enriched with my own critical insights.

THEME	INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS' PERSPECTIVE	CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS' PERSPECTIVE	ADDITIONAL CRITICAL INSIGHTS
Long-Term Sustainability	- Success: Institutional commitment to addressing foreign residents' needs through novel policies and the Intercultural Support Headquarters. - Success: Willingness to incorporate cultural heterogeneity into the city's local identity and empower foreign residents as active community members. - Success: Innovative development plans in Wongok-dong.	- Success: Institutional commitment to supporting foreign residents through diverse, responsive initiatives, particularly in the early stages of settlement or crisis. - Challenge: Some see the city's claim to be "number one" for <i>damunhwa</i> as more slogan than substance, critiquing a lack of deeper, coherent strategy.	- Success: Government-led commitment and innovation contributes to a reputation of "foreign-friendly" city. - Challenge: Some initiatives are <i>ad hoc</i> rather than part of a cohesive system. - Challenge: Sustainability concerns emerge when interventions focus mostly on emergencies or short-term outcomes without deeper structural planning.
Networking and Collaboration	- Success: Partnerships with academic researchers, policy experts, educators, and CSOs (many led by foreign residents). - Success: This wide network is viewed as a driver of dynamic, innovative practices.	- Success: City's openness to collaboration. - Challenge: Competition for limited funding sometimes hinders genuine partnerships. - Challenge: Certain stakeholders feel overshadowed by larger or more connected groups, reducing collaborative potential.	- Opportunity: Strong network potential. - Challenge: Uncoordinated funding streams and top-down agendas, leading to parallel or duplicate efforts. - Challenge: Civil society effectively lobbies and advocates in some cases but lacks unified strategic platforms to fully maximize collaborative impact.
Resources	- Success: Comparatively larger budget and dedicated staff for <i>damunhwa</i> governance than in many other municipalities. - Challenge: Increasing financial and human resources are crucial to institutionalizing robust practices for foreign resident support in the long-term.	- Success: Ansan's resource investment surpasses other cities. - Challenges: Fundings are still insufficient to meet growing demand. - Challenge: Resource competition leads to fragmented services and fosters rivalry among organizations.	- Challenge: Despite relatively high investments, staff and funding remain too limited for the ambitious <i>damunhwa</i> agenda – exacerbated by COVID-19 demands. - Challenge: Competition for funds fuels siloed interventions, undermining synergy among stakeholders.
Multicultural Enclaves	- Success: Officials view focused interventions in Wongok-dong and Ttaeol Village as effective models for strengthening community engagement. - Success: They emphasize transformation of these neighborhoods in line with foreign residents' needs.	- Challenge: Wongok-dong and Ttaeol Village create physical and social isolation from the rest of Ansan, limiting meaningful interaction with the broader Korean population, and, thus, hindering integration.	- Success: Intensive development in Wongok-dong produces highly visible "diverse" spaces, where foreigners are welcome. - Challenge: The development of multicultural enclaves risks marginalizing foreign residents to specific zones, reinforcing segregation and prejudices.
Responsiveness	- Success: Ansan's system responded flexibly to crisis (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) and evolving circumstances. - Success: Short-term interventions were critical to handling urgent needs.	- Success: Swift action enabling to address crises. - Challenge: Lack of a cohesive long-term vision. - Challenge: The local government's approach is primarily welfare-oriented and crisis-driven rather than proactive or strategic.	- Success: Capability to promptly and innovatively address urgent issues. - Challenge: Lack of a strategic roadmap for consistent, forward-looking interventions.
Drivers of Diversity Governance	- Success: Some officials praise that Ansan's primary focus still remains on economic development and entrepreneurial positioning, which contributes to legitimize diversity governance	- Challenge: The local government prioritizes economic growth over minority empowerment, sidelining rights-based agendas.	- Challenge: A market-driven model can overshadow deeper equity goals, reducing policy to an instrument for labor management rather than genuine intercultural integration.

Centralization	- Success: Commitment of the local government to providing funding mechanisms that enable local NGOs and community groups to implement <i>damunhwa</i> projects. - Success: Top-down funding as necessary to coordinate and oversee consistent service standards.	- Challenge: Dependency on city grants constrains their freedom to advocate or experiment, as initiatives must align with the administration's economic or political priorities. - Challenge: Communication channels exist but yield limited influence; reports and recommendations often go unheeded.	- Challenge: Top-Down Structure: Government holds financial reins, limiting grassroots autonomy and creative potential. - Challenge: Funding competition discourages cooperation, perpetuating fragmentation and inhibiting a more cohesive, inclusive governance system.
Practices	- Success: Promptly addressing needs of key foreign populations (e.g., marriage migrants, ethnic Koreans from post-Soviet states). - Challenge: Cite constraints on expanding scope to additional minority categories due to limited resources and political considerations.	- Challenge: Narrow focus of <i>damunhwa</i>, excluding other marginalized groups (e.g., LGBTQ+ communities, other non-Korean ethnic minorities). - Challenge: Selective approach lacks an intersectional perspective on cultural heterogeneity.	- Challenge: The system largely overlooks broader diversity concerns (sexual orientation, disability, etc.) - Challenge: Emphasizing only a few recognized groups may perpetuate gaps in representation and inclusion for other minorities.
Religious Organizations	- Success: Effective partnerships with faith-based groups for volunteer work and social support, particularly in the context of crises. - Challenge: Risks of overreach.	- Challenge: Some civil society actors worry that conservative religious organizations exert disproportionate influence, shaping inclusivity narratives around doctrine. - Challenge: Concerns that vulnerable populations may be coerced into religious environments or activities in exchange for assistance.	- Challenge: Faith-based activism can blur the line between genuine support and proselytizing, especially where government oversight is weak. - Challenge: Faith-based activism may curtail or contradict universal, human-rights-based principles of cultural inclusion, especially if religious ideals clash with minority identities (e.g., LGBTQ+).
Overall Outlook	- Success: Ansan's identity as a foreigner-friendly city. - Challenge: The governance system lacks an overarching strategic blueprint. - Challenge: Resource/staff shortfalls limit cohesive coordination.	- Challenge: Lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework to avoid patchwork of initiatives. - Challenge: Many projects remain isolated, driven by immediate need or economic logic rather than a shared vision.	- Challenge: Without a unifying framework, the governance model is shaped by ad hoc priorities, influential stakeholders, and reactive measures. - Opportunity: A more transparent and intersectional strategy could unify diverse actors around long-term objectives, fostering synergy and ensuring sustainability.

***Table 9.** Structured synthesis of the fieldwork findings, distinguishing the key themes that emerged from the interviews and outlining the perceived successes, challenges, and opportunities of the City of Tabunka Kyōsei's governance system from the perspectives of both government officials and civil society actors. These insights are further enriched by my critical reflections and observations, offering a comprehensive view of the system's dynamics.*

Conclusion

This fourth section of the dissertation examines how cultural heterogeneity rose to prominence in South Korea's public and political discourse, while also tracing how various strategies emerged to address the complexities of a diversifying society. The discussion takes place against a backdrop of evolving national identity, the beginnings of modern international migration, and the gradual establishment of democracy and the consolidation of a decentralized system of governance.

Initially, South Korea's nation-building project – which gained a renewed momentum following the catastrophic division of the Korean Peninsula after the end of World War II – rested firmly on the notion of ethnocultural homogeneity as the foundation for unity and cohesion. Yet when authoritarian rule ended in the late 1980s, this homogeneity-based narrative began to loosen. Democratization opened new avenues for decentralization policies and amplified the voices of civil society actors, notably those speaking for minority groups. Around the same time, South Korea also emerged as a magnet for international migrants, although governmental attitudes framed these arrivals predominantly as short-term guest workers, limiting their rights and excluding them from many social services.

This restrictive stance did not go unchallenged. Migrant activism soon intertwined with wider civil and human rights movements, drawing on support from NGOs, religious organizations, and labor unions. Over time, these movements coalesced around the concept of *damunhwa* (multiculture), which called for pluralistic ideals of equality and social inclusion. While *damunhwa* initially took shape at the grassroots level, it gradually found its way into formal national policies, fostering more inclusive measures on immigration and integration. In recent years, the acceptance of cultural heterogeneity has continued to grow, establishing it as an integral pillar of South Korea's contemporary identity and propelling cities into a more decisive role. As local governance became increasingly robust, municipalities began functioning as crucial intermediaries, balancing national directives with local concerns and community-based advocacy.

Our discussion began by examining the genesis of political identity and state formation on the Korean Peninsula. Centuries of strife and unification attempts set the stage for the eventual emergence of modern governance structures. The establishment of the Goryeo kingdom in the 10th century consolidated, for the first time, the notion of a unified cultural and political realm. The subsequent Joseon kingdom not only continued this centralizing trajectory but also established a Confucian moral and administrative framework that included a rigid social hierarchy. In parallel, the monarchy imposed protective isolationist policies aimed at shielding Joseon from outside interference.

Despite these internal efforts at cohesion, Joseon eventually fell to Japanese colonial expansion in 1910, triggering two major upheavals: an era of repressive colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, which galvanized a nationalism grounded in cultural unity; and, eventually, the post-1945 partition of the peninsula into a communist North and a capitalist South, with each polity claiming to embody *true* Korea.

In the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the first, authoritarian governments – led by Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan – held sway until a wave of pro-democracy activism in the late 1980s established the Sixth Republic. While this democratization process opened space for civil society to advance political reforms and promote social pluralism, the traditional emphasis on ethnic homogeneity and a strongly centralized state structure remained influential. Still, the governance system underwent notable transformations towards a *local turn* where municipalities and grassroots organizations became increasingly involved in decision-making, gaining channels to push for institutional change in ways previously unimaginable.

Building on this historical and political context, I turned to consider the challenges of minority recognition and equality in South Korea, examining several groups whose struggles for rights tested the entrenched myth of cultural uniformity. Ethnic Koreans returning from abroad – notably, *Joseon-jok* from China, *Goryeoin* from former Soviet territories, and Korean Americans – occupy a complex status. Although they share ancestral links to the peninsula, many find themselves subject to various forms of discrimination and exclusion, unable to fully integrate into the societal mainstream. A peculiar case of ethnic-Korean returnees is represented North Korean defectors (Talbukja), who acquire South Korean citizenship on arrival, frequently confront cultural and linguistic obstacles, as well as lingering suspicion from locals.

Meanwhile, non-ethnic-Korean migrants form another substantial minority. Among them, marriage migrants represent a distinctive phenomenon in South Korea, as a growing number of foreign women from China or Southeast Asia has been settling in rural areas as a result of demographic imbalances caused by low birthrates and a scarcity of marriageable women in the South Korean countryside. These women grapple with patriarchal family structures, linguistic hurdles, and social isolation, and their children are often subjected to discrimination in school environments that fail to accommodate students from diverse cultural backgrounds.

Non-ethnic-Korean migrant workers recruited through guest-worker programs – which began with the Industrial Trainee System and evolved into the Employment Permit System – have also been facing serious issues in their settlement in the country. Recruited to fill labor shortages in low- or semi-skilled sectors, they are usually relegated to precarious legal statuses, substandard labor conditions, and limited job security. Yet, as South Korea's economic development progressed, these

workers became central to the South Korean economy, even as the society at large struggled to reconcile their presence with longstanding notions of ethnic purity.

Starting in the 1990s, democratization began to intersect more substantially with globalization – a trend actively promoted by the government under the *seggyehwa* (globalization) slogan – and the country experienced sustained labor-market pressures. An energized civil society that included pro-migrant, human rights, and feminist groups leveraged these conditions to demand stronger labor protections and broader social rights for foreign nationals. Authorities initially responded haphazardly, producing *ad hoc* measures that mostly prioritized economic concerns over cohesive multicultural principles.

With the turn of the millennium, the concept of *damunhwa* started gaining momentum as a unifying narrative, gathering scattered discourses and practices with a broader ideological framework. By 2008, the national government had formally integrated *damunhwa* into its migrant integration policies through the *Multicultural Family Support Act*, which catered primarily to marriage migrants and signaled at least a rhetorical shift toward the recognition of cultural heterogeneity as part of the present and future of the country.

Yet tensions persisted. Grassroots coalitions often viewed *damunhwa* as an appeal for genuine equality and a call to dismantle longstanding myths of homogeneity. By contrast, many government-led interpretations of *damunhwa* seemed entangled with global branding and tourist-driven portrayals of South Korea as a modern, multicultural destination. Although this new framework set the stage for reforms such as the *Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners* (2007) and various local ordinances, the absence of a consistent conceptual foundation left room for superficial initiatives that emphasized festivals or media-friendly events rather than more substantive, long-term change.

Within this broader context, I focused on the case of Ansan, a city that exemplifies how local politics can either foster or co-opt the governance of cultural heterogeneity. Originally founded in the 1970s-1980s through a government-led industrial decentralization campaign, Ansan was expected to function merely as a reservoir of labor for the Banwol and Sihwa Industrial Complexes. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, profound socioeconomic and demographic transformation led to an extraordinary influx of foreign laborers, which reshaped Ansan into a hub of cultural heterogeneity and inclusive practices, revealing the potential for new, pluralistic narratives to emerge.

Wongok-dong, a neighborhood that became home to many of these newcomers, has been standing out for its early and spontaneous experiments in integration and social inclusion. In this district, foreign workers joined forces with Korean activists and religious groups to form grassroots networks, culminating in the *Borderless Village* movement. These local coalitions tackled labor exploitation, xenophobia, and the social challenges of a rapidly diversifying population, while also advocating for

more inclusive political and institutional policies. Rather than relying on top-down directives, the movement sought to build a collaborative and equitable community through bottom-up activism.

Before long, the local government – spurred by a nationwide enthusiasm for *damunhwa* – recognized that Ansan’s large migrant population could be reframed as an asset. Once seen as a problem that tarnished the city’s image, the same demographic profile now seemed well suited to branding Ansan as a cosmopolitan and globally appealing destination. Moved by this entrepreneurial drive, city leaders designated Wongok-dong a *Multicultural Village Special Zone*. Through this initiative, they unveiled a suite of top-down programs aimed at reimagining the neighborhood’s public spaces, sponsoring cultural festivities, and enhancing multilingual services. Yet this official intervention also had a less positive effect: grassroots NGOs that had championed social equity and human rights for years were effectively sidelined in favor of high-profile tourism, diplomatic outreach, and place marketing agendas.

Under successive mayors, the city’s *damunhwa* strategies continued to expand, aiming at consolidating Ansan’s image as a pioneer of governance of cultural heterogeneity and a laboratory of inclusion and cohesion both nationally and internationally. Notably, the city fostered the establishment of the National Council of Multicultural Cities in 2012, and started actively participating in international platforms focusing on migration and diversity, eventually joining the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities Network in 2020. These developments garnered broader recognition for Ansan’s supposed leadership in promoting diversity and provided institutional backing for various pro-migrant services.

Nevertheless, unlike Barcelona’s *interculturalitat* or Hamamatsu’s *tabunka kyōsei*, Ansan still lacks an overarching master plan for *damunhwa*. Many NGOs rely on government subsidies, resources remain unevenly allocated, and entrepreneurial concerns often overshadow deeper social justice imperatives. As a result, the city struggles to preserve the original grassroots ethos, while there is a lingering fear that *damunhwa* policies remain narrowly focused on foreign nationals, neglecting crucial considerations such as sexual orientation and social class.

The possibility of Ansan hosting a forthcoming national Immigration Agency underscores both the city’s significance and the broader political dynamics shaping South Korea’s approach to cultural heterogeneity. Yet, while there are few doubts that the establishment of this agency will further galvanize the enthusiasm for *damunhwa* and open new paths and opportunities for social inclusion and solidarity practices, it is also accentuating the gap between rhetorical commitment to diversity and the realities of local governance. Instead of cooperating for accelerating its realization, Ansan and many other South Korean cities are competing for further enhancing their status as *diversity hubs*, highlights the entrepreneurial strain running through *damunhwa* policies, in which local pride and

national politics align or collide in pursuit of economic and branding gains. Even if Ansan prevails in this contest, the challenge remains to address dimensions of discrimination currently overlooked in the institutional efforts related to *damunhwa* – including, for instance, LGBTQ+ rights –, and to sustain meaningful civic engagement so that the vision of inclusion moves beyond mere window dressing.

In conclusion, this fourth part captures, how also South Korea, is in the midst of a transformative process. The once-dominant narrative of ethnic uniformity is being recalibrated by new discourses shaped by democracy, globalization, and proactive local governance. Although the central government still holds formidable sway – able to reshape social and political landscapes at will – municipalities like Ansan are carving out a role as potential champions of inclusivity, albeit with persistent contradictions. Even as official interventions risk marginalizing grassroots activism, they have laid the groundwork for dynamic, adaptive frameworks capable of acknowledging and uplifting minority communities.

Ultimately, South Korea's efforts to reconcile its tradition of ethnonational unity with the evolving forces of globalization and cultural pluralism remain very much a work in progress. The rise of *damunhwa*, at both the grassroots and governmental levels, reveals a society brimming with civic creativity and resilience. It likewise testifies to the flexibility of state actors, who, however slowly, are adapting to calls for expanded recognition and equity from a wide array of minority groups.

DISCUSSION

I

Modeling the Rise of Diversity: *Homogeneity* and *Heterogeneity* as Paradigms

1

Framing Ideational Revolutions: The Concept of *Paradigm Shift*

The words *sunset* and *sunrise* are so familiar in everyday speech that we may never paused to consider that they reflect an older cosmological view – one in which the sun travels around the Earth rather than the other way around. Today, we use these terms without any particular physical or religious implications. Yet, when they originally entered into use in the English language between the 14th and 15th centuries, they reflected what was considered a self-evident *fact*: namely, that the sun orbited the Earth in a divinely ordered cosmos where everything had its place and purpose, with Earth itself firmly at the heart of creation.

Despite several shortcomings in predictions which were often patched up through *ad hoc* solutions, the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian system stood firm for centuries, until Nicolaus Copernicus published his *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* in 1543. His heliocentric theory shattered geocentrism, ushering in what became known as the *Copernican revolution*. This was far more than a mere refinement of existing knowledge: it opened the door to a fundamental shift in how humanity understood its position in the cosmos.

The transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric system would later become the quintessential case of what Thomas Kuhn famously conceptualized as a *paradigm shift* in his seminal *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). Kuhn argued that scientists operate within *paradigms* – cohesive systems of theories, practices, and norms – that dictate how research is conducted, which questions are acceptable, and how findings are to be interpreted. Such paradigms are more than sets of beliefs: they constitute worldviews that shape both subject matter and meaning.

Against traditional views that science advances as a steady, linear accumulation of facts, Kuhn proposed a model in which it evolves through periods he called *normal science*, punctuated by revolutionary intervals. During the periods of normal science, scientists build knowledge within a particular paradigm by solving puzzles the paradigm itself defines. Eventually, however, this status quo is disturbed by *anomalies* – observations or problems the reigning paradigm cannot adequately explain. While a few anomalies can be dismissed or sidelined, as they pile up without satisfactory resolution, confidence in the existing paradigm erodes. Eventually, this leads to a generalized crisis, paving the way for a new paradigm that addresses the shortcomings of its predecessor. Once this new paradigm takes hold, it realigns both research activities and the scientific community’s worldview.

Kuhn’s model faced various criticisms from philosophers, historians, and scientists (see, for example, Crombie, 1994; Shapin, 1996; Dear, 2001; for an extensive overview, see Bird, 2022). Some pointed to the vagueness of the term *paradigm*, questioning its clarity for studying scientific change. Others argued that Kuhn oversimplified the process, given that science rarely follows such neat, dramatic shifts – beyond the Copernican revolution, tangible examples that conform neatly to Kuhn’s framework can be hard to find. Additional critiques targeted what they saw as Kuhn’s disproportionate focus on social and psychological factors at the expense of empirical evidence and logical reasoning, or as neglecting political, economic, and cultural forces that also shape scientific progress. Finally, Kuhn’s original notion of *incommensurability* – whereby competing paradigms cannot be directly compared using common reference points – provoked further debate, since people who hold opposing worldviews often can and do compare their positions. Kuhn himself later softened his stance on strict incommensurability.

Kuhn’s ideas have proven to be a rich source of insight well beyond the physical sciences and have been particularly influential in the context of social sciences. Notably, Kuhn’s concept of the scientific paradigm was adopted by Peter Hall and reframed in terms of *policy paradigm*, to shed light on how institutions undergo profound shifts, underscoring the powerful influence of *systems of ideas* on policymaking.

In his seminal work *Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State* (1993), Peter Hall set out to explain policy change by examining macroeconomic policymaking in Britain between 1970 and 1989. He distinguished three *orders* of transformation, each tied to shifts in policy targets, strategies, and goals. First-order changes involve small, incremental variations of targets and strategies, typically emerging from accumulated experience and new knowledge. Although the strategies may be refined, the overarching goals of policy remain essentially the same. Second-order changes occur when dissatisfaction with past results triggers substantial modifications to policy strategies. Here, targets may also shift, but goals still hold firm. Finally, third-order changes radically reconfigure all three elements, reshaping not just strategies and targets but also the fundamental hierarchy of goals. As a prime example of this third-order shift, Hall cites Britain's transition from Keynesian to monetarist macroeconomic policies.

Drawing on Thomas Kuhn's analytical framework, Hall proposed to frame third-order policy changes in terms of paradigm shifts, aligning the policymaking process with Kuhn's vision of how scientific progress unfolds. Just as scientists, in Kuhn's model, address scientific puzzles within a prevailing scientific paradigm, Hall suggests that policymakers tackle social problems within a given policy paradigm. First- and second-order changes mirror Kuhn's notion of *normal science*, where incremental gains come from trial-and-error learning. Yet, as in science "a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies, namely by developments that are not fully comprehensible, even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm" (Hall, 1993, p. 280). When developments that do not fit the existing framework pile up and cannot be resolved by small adjustments, the system enters a revolutionary phase, leading to a new policy paradigm.

Hall's work soon became a basic reference for scholars interested in the mechanics of policy change, giving rise to a huge literature (e.g., Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006; Kay, 2007; Howlett & Cashore, 2009; Carson et al., 2009; Carstensen, 2011; Skogstad, 2011; Berman, 2013; for an extensive review, see Hogan & Howlett, 2015). In particular, Hall's analysis significantly contributed to refocusing scholarly attention on the key role ideas play in shaping policy (e.g., Berman, 1998; Walsh, 2000; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004; Blyth, 2013; Baumgartner, 2013; 2014; Hogan & Howlett, 2015). Crucially, Hall highlighted the importance of structural factors beyond state authority in driving radical policy change.

Nevertheless, as with Kuhn's original theory, Hall's model was subject to various criticisms. One chief complaint is that it relies too heavily on punctuated, equilibrium-style shifts to account for policy transformation (Lieberman, 2002; Béland, 2007; Kay, 2007; Cashore & Howlett, 2009; Seabrooke, 2009; Orenstein, 2013; Wilder & Howlett, 2014). Critics have also argued that Hall's

approach paints ideas as overly static or monolithic and underestimates the influence of individual agency (Berman, 2013; Campbell, 2004; Widmaier et al., 2007; Wood, 2015). Some further argued that Hall's approach too readily assumes that policymakers internalize the paradigm uncritically (Schmidt, 2008; Jacobs, 2009; Carstensen, 2011).

In response to these criticisms, some scholars engaged in revising Hall's original framework, introducing more sophisticated models. First, a renewed focus was put on the investigation of the mechanisms through which ideational changes occur, particularly emphasizing the role of contingent factors, particularly *exogenous shocks*, in fostering opportunities for new paradigms to consolidate (e.g., Greener, 2001; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004). In addition, it is now widely acknowledged that paradigm shifts often unfold more gradually than Hall originally anticipated, and the emergence of a new paradigm need not entirely eclipse its predecessor (Coleman et al., 1996; Greener, 2001; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004; Kay, 2011; Wilder, 2015a). Indeed, partial acceptance is a common outcome, with older elements persisting due to institutional or authoritative resistance (Oliver & Pemberton, 2004, pp. 427, 435).

Such developments revived debate around Kuhn's own concept of incommensurability, which Hall's work seemed to inherit. Recognizing that multiple policy paradigms can coexist within a single political system led many scholars to question whether *paradigm* remains an effective analytical tool. This sparked renewed interest in understanding what a policy paradigm actually is and how it operates.

As John Hogan and Michael Howlett (2015) emphasized, even after nearly two decades of scholarly use, the idea of a policy paradigm was still insufficiently theorized. Its elusive nature, combined with confusion about the relationship between its ideational and *material* dimensions (Daigneault, 2015, p. 47), left key causal mechanisms unclear (Blyth, 1997). This ambiguity often caused researchers to overlook the role of agency, including institutional structures and realpolitik factors such as electoral incentives and coalition-building, both in the creation and entrenchment of policy paradigms and during paradigm shifts. Moreover, a limited number of empirical studies compounded these issues. Yet after reviewing these challenges, Hogan, Howlett, and their collaborators convincingly argued that the concept of policy paradigm still offers significant insights into broader social transformations, calling for a more nuanced, empirically grounded understanding of how paradigms take shape, persist, and occasionally give way to new ones.

Paradigms and the Study of Governance of Cultural Heterogeneity

Following the authors mentioned, I also contend that once paradigms are clearly defined and their theoretical foundations fully recognized, they become powerful analytical frameworks for capturing and interpreting ideational shifts. In particular, the concepts of *paradigm* and *paradigm shift* are well-suited to illuminating how collective identities and social cohesion are reconfigured as societies enter the era of diversity.

This is not an entirely new approach. Several contemporary scholars (e.g., Abdallah-Pretceille, 2006; Zapata-Barrero, 2017; 2018; Modood, 2018; Kastoryano, 2018) have already employed the concept of paradigm to describe this transition. In most cases, there is broad agreement that discourses, policies, and practices rooted in the ideal of homogeneity constitute a distinct paradigm. However, many authors introduce paradigms chiefly within the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism debate, using the concept to describe a shift from a *multiculturalism paradigm* to an *interculturalism paradigm*.

While I agree that the concept of paradigm can indeed help to frame and describe the revolutionary transformation in how cultural heterogeneity is addressed, I do not find it productive to treat multiculturalism and interculturalism as separate paradigms. On the contrary, such a distinction makes the concept of paradigm quite ambiguous and risks depriving it of analytical power.

In fact, there is a deep, clear distinction between homogeneity-based approaches and those based on cultural pluralism – a distinction that can justifiably be described in paradigmatic terms. By contrast, the difference between *multiculturalism* and *interculturalism* – variously characterized in the interculturalism-vs.-multiculturalism debate – is analytically less stark. Whether labeled in terms of *multiculturalism* or *interculturalism*, all these approaches share the foundational principle of cultural pluralism and have evolved dynamically over time. From the extensive theoretical and empirical analysis carried out in this dissertation, what emerges is not so much an alleged paradigmatic transition from *multiculturalism* to *interculturalism* – these are, in reality, two among many labels for approaches rooted in cultural pluralism, each shaped by its geographic, historical, sociocultural, and academic context.

Instead, *all* cultural-pluralist approaches have, in fact, undergone a transition tied to the emergence of what we have described as the *framework of diversity governance*. Such a shift has been driven by various structural factors and transformations at the social, political, and economic levels, as well as

in scholarly discourse (Chapter 3). The framework of diversity governance has contributed to deeply reshaping how both *multiculturalist* and *interculturalist* perspectives conceptualize cultural heterogeneity. In particular, three fundamental principles have gained broad acceptance:

- 1) Reconceiving cultural heterogeneity in terms of diversity, resisting the urge to essentialize cultural traits and expanding beyond the traditional markers of nationality and ethnicity to include intersecting identities – such as gender, sexual orientation, age, and social class – while underscoring that identities are socially constructed and continually renegotiated.
- 2) Elevating the role of integration, grounded in interaction and *positive contact*.
- 3) Recognizing cultural heterogeneity as a potential asset for socioeconomic development, captured by the so-called narrative of diversity advantage.

Alongside these developments, the rise of diversity governance has also paralleled the ascent of cities as key players in multiscale governance and, in particular, in shaping migration and diversity policy.

Under this complex transition, approaches framed in terms of *multiculturalism* or *interculturalism* – as well as those termed *tabunka kyōsei* or *damunhwa* (often rendered differently in English, first as *multiculturalism* and now more commonly as *interculturalism*) – have all evolved significantly. Proponents of interculturalism typically emphasize the centrality of interaction and positive contact for diversity governance. Yet, contrary to what some interculturalists assume, this emphasis, while sometimes less central, is not absent in the writings of scholars who identify as multiculturalists and criticize interculturalism. Consequently, I argue that although the concepts of paradigm and paradigm shift can indeed capture the move from homogeneity-based societies to new frameworks of social life anchored in cultural pluralism, the term paradigm should not be casually assigned to every distinct approach.

Rather, *paradigm* becomes a useful analytical category when adopted for highlighting genuinely different mindsets. This more careful use of the concept sharpens our focus on the forces and dynamics driving major transitions and allows for a more precise understanding of how the new paradigm grounded in cultural pluralism continues to evolve. It also clarifies how these changes intersect with the cultural turn in the social sciences, with ongoing empirical research on cultural change and integration, with the growing importance of cities in multiscale governance, and with the emergence of a *diversity advantage* narrative within neoliberal contexts.

Before examining these developments in greater detail, it is important to define *paradigm* clearly. Building on Pierre-Marc Daigneault's (Daigneault, 2015, p. 49) convincing formulation, I define a paradigm in the following way: a set of coherent cognitive and normative ideas, shared intersubjectively by members of a given community, concerning the nature of reality, principles of

social justice, the proper role of the state, the issues requiring public intervention, the goals to be pursued, and the means deemed appropriate for achieving those goals.

My interpretation closely follows Daigneault's discussion (Daigneault, 2015, p. 49-51). Two features in particular are key to understanding paradigms. First, at the ontological level, paradigms consist solely of ideas – values, beliefs, principles, assumptions – that serve *cognitive*, *normative*, and *operational* functions: more specifically, they help individuals interpret their environment, offer moral guidance, and outline practical strategies for action. Second, what distinguishes a paradigm from a mere collection of ideas is the *internal coherence* of these elements, that is a basic level of compatibility and consistency (Daigneault, 2015, p. 51; see also Princen & t'Hart, 2014).

However, unlike Daigneault, I do not believe such coherence must rest exclusively on what he calls “objective logical principles” (Daigneault, 2015, p. 51). Drawing on the arguments of other scholars (e.g., Campbell & Pedersen, 2014; Wilder, 2015a; 2015b; Carstensen, 2015), I argue that a paradigm's coherence arises from the *perceived* consistency among those who share its constituent ideas. Crucially, this view avoids the problematic thesis of incommensurability between paradigms. While paradigms may embody substantially different worldviews, there remains scope for full commensurability or what some authors call “relative commensurability” (e.g., Wilder, 2015a; 2015b; Daigneault, 2015). Consequently, my definition accommodates models describing *gradual* paradigm shifts, recognizing the possibility that different paradigms can, at time, coexist.

With this analytical framework in mind, the evolution of approaches to cultural heterogeneity – when seen through the lens of earlier chapters – reveals how cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, and the newer framework of diversity governance fit within a larger, sweeping transition from what might be called a traditional paradigm of *Homogeneity* to a new paradigm of *Heterogeneity* (I use capital letters to emphasize that these terms represent paradigms). This transition is not a sudden switch but rather a gradual process, during which elements of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity overlap, often sparking tensions and conflicts. Moreover, neither Homogeneity nor Heterogeneity is a static framework; both continue to evolve in response to social and conceptual transformations.

In the sections that follow, I revisit the discussion from Chapters 2 and 3, which examined how homogeneity emerged and consolidated as an ideal for social cohesion and collective identity within political units, and how the ideal of cultural pluralism later developed, paving the way for the rise of multiculturalism and, more recently, the theoretical framework of diversity governance. I also return to the findings and analyses presented in Parts II, III, and IV, demonstrating how similar drivers and mechanisms undergird both the establishment of the Homogeneity paradigm and its subsequent crisis, as well as the emergence of Heterogeneity as a new paradigm for governing cultural heterogeneity and cohesion.

Homogeneity as a Paradigm

Throughout history, the foundation of social cohesion within political units was traditionally framed within the paradigm of Homogeneity. Nation-building processes were historically grounded in the assumption that social cohesion depended on cultural uniformity. Cognitively, cohesion and the collective identity of the political unit was framed in terms of shared cultural attributes: language, religion, customs, norms, and even racial traits such as perceived common ancestry. This understanding depicted political entities and social systems as unified, homogeneous structures. Under this outlook, cultural heterogeneity was seen as a direct threat to unity, reinforcing an *us versus them* dynamic that normatively legitimized efforts by a dominant group to preserve and defend its own cultural uniformity. Operationally, such efforts took shape in exclusionary measures that ranged from segregation and forced assimilation to, in extreme cases, the violent eradication of minorities. Far from being incidental, this marginalization was woven into the system, ensuring the continued power of hegemonic groups.

Before the 17th century, the concepts of *homogeneity* and *heterogeneity* had yet to be clearly articulated, so the markers used to distinguish between *in-groups* and *out-groups* varied widely from one context to another. Over time, however, the Homogeneity paradigm gradually solidified and gained more prominence, evolving in tandem with the rise of nationalism. In the context of the emergence of the modern concept of nation-state at least since the establishment of the Westphalian system, homogeneity came to be defined ever more explicitly in terms of *race* and *ethnicity*, linking the ideal of a shared ancestry with cultural similarities.

From the 18th century onward, the rise of racial and cultural studies – especially the various forms of *scientific racism* – substantially shaped how homogeneity was specified. Theories of race also contained strong normative components, ostensibly justifying pseudoscientific distinctions between superior and inferior peoples and underscoring the supposed importance of racial or ethnic purity. These ideas provided further justification for discriminatory hierarchies and harsh practices intended to marginalize or forcibly assimilate minority groups, or, when this was not possible – usually as a

result of a combination between the resilience of minority and the representation of minority as unassimilable, such as when difference were framed as fixed and unchangeable, for instance when homogeneity was tied to the ideal of racial purity, connected to common ancestry instead than on specific behaviors, believes, and customs – eliminate them.

Historically, the ideal of homogeneity was under near-constant strain due to the frequent coexistence of diverse cultural groups – an inevitable result of migrations and conquests that have shaped most human societies. As the paradigm of Homogeneity solidified, this tension was a constant source of potential *anomalies*, since everyday life often accommodated multicultural arrangements, albeit typically marked by unequal power relations between majorities and minorities.

These anomalies began to accumulate, at least from the late 19th century onward, in response to three pivotal transformations – two at the sociopolitical and socioeconomic levels, and one at the *ideational* level. The first two reflected massive political and economic upheavals that reshaped societies globally in the wake of intensified globalization, democratization, and technological progress. Specifically, they involved (1) the increasing significance of *international migration* in the socioeconomic fabric of developed countries, and (2) a growing *right consciousness*, supported by the development of both national and, later on, international legal frameworks designed to protect and promote human rights.

These two shifts emerged from long historical processes. European colonial expansion beginning in the 15th century marked a critical juncture, fostering extensive global networks in which people and information moved with unprecedented speed. Technological and administrative breakthroughs spurred by the Industrial Revolution transformed socioeconomic and demographic conditions in an expanding number of states, leading to rising demands for migrant labor – often recruited from colonized or otherwise disadvantaged regions – while advances in transportation enabled this migration at extraordinary scales.

Simultaneously, Enlightenment ideals and constitutionalist principles spread, galvanized by watershed events such as the adoption of the United States Constitution (1787) and the French Revolution (1789). Over time, these currents nurtured widespread demands for basic rights, social justice, and democratic institutions, giving minorities new avenues to challenge entrenched power hierarchies and resist the harshest outcomes of race-based theories.

Although the wave of democratization and burgeoning rights consciousness was overshadowed by the horrific toll of two World Wars and the rise of fascist regimes, the end of World War II triggered a turning point. A new global order took shape, propelled by international organizations committed to protecting human rights, starting with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948.

This development accelerated the erosion of rigid social hierarchies, undercutting the authority of dominant groups over minorities. International institutions, in tandem with the political mobilization of minority communities, undermined the normative underpinnings of racial theories and eroded many long-standing mechanisms used to suppress cultural diversity. Although racism survived in various forms at the societal level, it became increasingly discredited in official discourse, prompting more equitable channels for negotiating tensions between majority and minority cultures.

Alongside these momentous sociopolitical and socioeconomic changes, a major ideational transformation took place in the 20th century which also significantly impacted the paradigm of Homogeneity: the *cultural turn*, which positioned the notion of *culture* as a key frame for collective identities. This shift disrupted earlier conceptualization of homogeneity solely in terms of race and ethnicity, progressively redefined homogeneity in terms of *culture* – inherently referring to more fluid and dynamic identity marker – thereby reducing the emphasis on allegedly fixed, biological markers of group identity.

As an effect of these profound transformations, anomalies within the Homogeneity paradigm continued to accumulate. Widespread migration and the renewed assertion of native cultural minority groups, now equipped with firmer legal rights and channels for advocacy, made societies ever more heterogeneous according to the traditional Homogeneity paradigm. The decline of the old paradigm's mechanisms for enforcing uniformity brought about a growing need for new ways to safeguard collective unity. Under the cultural turn, homogeneity no longer hinged on supposedly *objective* biological markers such as race, but rather on the more flexible idea of cultural identity.

For some decades, sociological theories of assimilation provided an *ad hoc* solution for preserving Homogeneity, holding out hope that cultural differences would gradually vanish – either spontaneously or with state support – over generational turnover. Yet, as evidence steadily revealed that spontaneous assimilation was neither immediate nor guaranteed, signs of a global transition toward a new paradigm were already taking shape.

The paradigm of Heterogeneity started consolidating in the second half 20th century as an alternative to Homogeneity in shaping contemporary societies. Recognizing cultural heterogeneity as an unavoidable component of social life in a globalized world, Heterogeneity advanced the normative idea that cultural heterogeneity is a positive value for liberal, democratic societies and a crucial element in upholding human rights. Operationally, this translated into affirmative-action policies that began circulating in developed nations from the 1960s onward, and which were increasingly described in *multicultural* (and sometimes *intercultural*) terms by the 1970s.

During its early development, the paradigm of Heterogeneity drew on a definition of *culture* which still reflected traces of determinism from previous frameworks based on race and ethnicity. Cultural identities were mainly framed in terms of nationality and ethnicity, leaning on essentialist and *groupist* assumptions, highlighting group-level characteristics. In practice, the definition of cultural identities relied on the voices a handful of self-appointed leaders or activists to represent entire cultural groups, inadvertently simplifying the fluidity and complexity of cultural identities and reducing it to a limited range of perspectives. In this context, operationally, the paradigm of Heterogeneity consisted of, on the one side, efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion – typically through formal recognition of minority identities (e.g., linguistic, religious, and customary practices), incorporation into institutions such as schools and workplaces, and better access to public services; on the other side, events intended to celebrate cultural heterogeneity such as *multicultural festivals*, often criticized as superficial celebration of stereotyped cultural traits.

Although Heterogeneity progressively emerged as the dominant paradigm for handling cultural heterogeneity, the shift from Homogeneity to Heterogeneity was gradual rather than abrupt, and greatly influenced by context-specific factors. In many settings, societal structures shaped by the Heterogeneity paradigm coexisted with older structures rooted in Homogeneity, sometimes producing what might be called an *ideational schizophrenia* in discourses and practices, often manifested and reinforced in the social polarization between pro- and anti-Heterogeneity movements.

From its beginnings, Heterogeneity itself continued to evolve, shaped once again by broad socioeconomic and sociopolitical changes as well as ideational shifts. One turning point was the global economic upheaval sparked by the 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent spread of neoliberalism. With growing emphasis on market-driven policies and a diminished role for national governments, decision-making power shifted toward local authorities, business elites, and other nonstate actors. This led to a progressive local turn in governance, with competencies previously prerogatives of national governments now acquired by local governments, a turn which greatly reinforced a push towards decentralization and intertwined with further advances in democratization. Yet, market-driven approaches also reinforced competition, and individualism, which, in turn, weakened

collectivist ideals and exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities, fostering a resurgence of class power and the rise of neoconservatism.

Within this broader context, several factors, in particular, had a significant impact on the paradigm of Heterogeneity, progressively determining its transformation and evolution. First, the local turn in governance led to a shift of the attention of cultural heterogeneity particularly to the local level with local actors and local administration progressively recognized as the key stakeholders in management of cultural heterogeneity. Second, the rise in individualism – supported by new democratic channels for personal expression – refocused attention on *culture* as a fluid, ever-evolving concept centered on individual experiences rather than fixed group identities. This shift expanded the cognitive dimension of Heterogeneity, opening doors for major changes in its normative and operational components.

Chief among these changes was the growing emphasis on *integration*, framed in terms of ties of cooperation and trust among diverse group and as the key to achieving cohesion in heterogeneous societies. Integration particularly emerged as central in the paradigm of Heterogeneity in the context of a particularly increasing exacerbated tension between majority and minorities resulting from several factors. Heightened democratization gave minorities stronger platforms for political mobilization, while the inequalities fueled by neoliberalism intensified tensions. Incidents of social unrest and media-amplified prejudice reinforced the notion that durable social cohesion demanded more than superficial tolerance. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exemplified how single events could dramatically stoke fears of “cultural extremism,” heightening Islamophobic sentiment in particular.

Meanwhile, neoconservative ideologies revived nationalist discourses centered on ethnocultural uniformity as the bedrock of social stability. These narratives, propelled by xenophobia and rigid group boundaries, converged with the rise of right-wing populism (Moffitt, 2016). Ongoing refugee crises in the 2010s further polarized debate, forcing communities to confront questions of humanitarian responsibility and cultural integration.

Against this backdrop, the value of integration was increasingly enshrined in the paradigm of Heterogeneity at both the normative and operational levels. More than an abstract goal for national communities, integration was seen as a tangible objective to be achieved within local contexts. This perspective reframed citizenship as a substantive instead of a formal category, highlighting the importance of equal rights and responsibilities within day-to-day community life rather than mere formal status. Consequently, local administrations devoted growing attention to policies fostering social inclusion, improving access to services for minority groups, and promoting positive contact among diverse populations.

Additionally, a shift in the business sector played a critical role: cultural heterogeneity came to be viewed as an asset for innovation, creativity, and ethical branding. Market-driven and entrepreneurial approaches to governance facilitated the diffusion of this narrative from the business sector to public administrations and government institutions, reframing cultural heterogeneity as an opportunity for tourism, economic growth, and city branding. This *diversity advantage* narrative thus strengthened Heterogeneity's cognitive and normative foundations, framing heterogeneity as a social and economic benefit for public institutions, private enterprises, and local communities.

Taken together, these developments continue to shape the paradigm of Heterogeneity, now increasingly articulated in terms of a framework of *diversity governance*. This framework influences how cultural heterogeneity is defined, how it is justified on normative grounds, and how it is operationally promoted in diverse societies. As my analysis of three distinct geographical contexts shows, the transition from Homogeneity to Heterogeneity – while neither uniform nor linear – reflects a deep, ongoing transformation in the way communities conceptualize, organize, and adapt to cultural difference.

6

From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity in Spain and the EU

In the European context, we considered in detail the case of Spain. Historically, the Iberian Peninsula was never truly monolithic, but rather encompassed diverse peoples, languages, and customs. The Visigothic Kingdom (5th-8th centuries) set some first tenuous basis for a unified identity under a fledgling Catholic monarchy, but subsequent centuries saw a complex interplay of faiths and rulers. Al-Andalus, established after the Muslim conquest of 711, presided over most of the peninsula, while Christian-ruled kingdoms (Castile, Aragon, Portugal, and others) formed a dynamic patchwork of political units in the northern territories. Medieval chronicles often spoke of *las Españas* in the plural, underscoring a multifaced political reality in which *Spain* referred less to a single political entity and more to a geographical or cultural construction.

As the *Reconquista* proceeded between the 9th and 15th centuries, Christian elites introduced the shared ideal of a Catholic Hispania. Even though competing Christian polities remained fragmented,

their rulers invoked Catholicism as a linchpin of *Spanishness*, laying a groundwork for the later melding of religious orthodoxy and national unity. A pivotal moment in this unifying process came in the late 15th century with the dynastic union of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, famously known as the Catholic Monarchs. Although their crowns kept distinct laws and administrations, this marriage brought most of the Iberian Peninsula under a single family, fortifying a sense of *Spanish* cohesion under Catholic influence.

The 1492 conquest of Granada, last stronghold of Muslim rule, ended the Reconquista and solidified Spain as a singular Catholic realm seemingly triumphant over religious and cultural variation – a sentiment soon magnified by swift colonial growth in the Americas. During this period, the persecution of Jews and Muslims, culminating in forced conversions or expulsions, epitomized an urgent push toward religious uniformity and, in turn, a strengthening of the homogeneity ideal.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Habsburg monarchs (Charles V, Philip II, and others) oversaw a vast global empire. While local privileges persisted in Aragon, Catalonia, the Basque territories, and Navarre, Castile increasingly served as the axis of imperial power. This imbalance fostered a centralized monarchy that often brushed over internal diversity, insisting that all Hispanic domains (including colonies) formed a grand Catholic empire where loyalty to Crown and Church was paramount. Although some regions, like Catalonia, tried to preserve their own institutions, the monarchy generally pursued greater central control, encouraging the impression that Spain operated under a single Catholic monarchy.

After the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the Bourbon dynasty introduced sweeping reforms, abolishing centuries-old regional privileges in much of the former Crown of Aragon. This newly consolidated administration highlighted an image of Spain as one state and reinforced the monarchy's legitimacy through a nationalist narrative. It also meant renewed efforts to expel or subjugate groups seen as *outsiders*, as in the 1749 Great Round-up of Spanish Roma, symbolizing the state's firm commitment to the Homogeneity paradigm.

Even as a rising liberal movement produced constitutions (1812, 1837, 1869) that recognized individual rights and national sovereignty, these texts also tended to treat Spain as one uniform nation. While some regions (e.g., the Basque Country, Catalonia) demanded broader autonomy, liberal centralism prevailed, and even short-lived experiments with federal republicanism (notably in 1873) reverted swiftly to a constitutional monarchy. Constitutional references to *la nación española* reaffirmed the conventional unitary narrative, and only limited regional autonomy was permitted.

All of this took a stark turn under the Franco regime from 1939 to 1975, which forcefully harnessed modern mechanisms to bolster the idea of one unified, Catholic, Castilian-based Spain. Franco's suppression of minority languages like Catalan and Basque, as well as his oppression of regional

cultures, aimed to erase any heterogeneous identities. National Catholicism, rooted in the claim of a single Spanish ethnicity, heritage, and language, became an instrument of unrelenting centralized rule and the final apex of the paradigm of Homogeneity.

After Franco's death, Spain underwent a profound transformation that led to the crisis of its traditional rhetoric of homogeneity, paving the way for the consolidation of Heterogeneity. While the notion of Spain as a culturally uniform nation initially persisted in official discourse, the 1978 Constitution marked a seismic shift with its embrace of political pluralism in its very first article. Alongside political pluralism, the Constitution reorganized the country's territorial framework by establishing autonomous communities and recognizing *historical nationalities* like Catalonia and the Basque Country a degree of self-governance that dismantled Franco's centralized model. At the same time, democracy opened new paths for minority voices – non-Catholic religious communities and the Roma in particular – who, for the first time in decades, gained the legal space to organize and demand recognition.

Spain's entry into the European Economic Community in 1986 intensified this trend, fueling increased mobility and migration. Accompanying the international and global scope of Spanish economy, foreign workers from Latin America, North Africa, and Eastern Europe started arriving in growing numbers. Cities across the country became sites of rapid multicultural growth, challenging older assumptions of a uniform cultural identity and spurring new demands for equality and civil rights.

Initially, the national government focused on controlling borders, leaving the question of integration to local authorities. The new decentralized framework empowered municipalities and autonomous communities to adopt their own measures acknowledging cultural heterogeneity. Without a national integration blueprint in the 1980s and 1990s, regions like Catalonia pioneered early programs in integration and *interculturality*, effectively charting a bottom-up path that eventually shaped national policies.

Over time, Spanish legislation began highlighting immigrants' and minorities' rights. In 2000, Spain passed one of the EU's more progressive immigration laws (the *2000/4 Organic Law*), reaffirming the constitutional equality of immigrants and extending essential rights in health, labor, and education. An evolving lexicon of *integration*, *interculturality*, and *diversity advantage* progressively then took root in strategic frameworks such as the two versions of the *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración* (PECI) running from 2007 to 2014.

Yet even as more inclusive policies emerged, competing impulses survived, mirroring political shifts between conservative and progressive governments. Some reforms championed immigrant rights and fostered minority religious communities and Roma inclusion, while others criminalized

unauthorized migration or limited healthcare for those without legal status. Nevertheless, a widespread consensus on Heterogeneity continued to solidify, with both the left and right retaining the language of integration.

In the last two decades, Spain's understanding of cultural heterogeneity has expanded beyond conventional notions of nationality or ethnicity. Laws and strategic plans now also address the needs of other marginalized communities, including people with disabilities and LGTBI individuals. Influenced by EU directives, Spain's latest approaches – such as the 2024 *Marco Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inclusión* – take an intersectional view, recognizing how overlapping identities can drive discrimination or inclusion.

Aligning with the broader European discourse, Spanish policy has progressively emphasized *intercultural* engagement at the local level and the importance of substantive citizenship over mere coexistence. Through active participation, dialogue, and reciprocal adaptation, Spain has moved beyond traditional assimilation or straightforward multiculturalism, instead embracing the Heterogeneity paradigm that conceives diversity as both an advantage and an evolving civic responsibility.

In conclusion, Spain's case highlights a gradual yet meaningful transition from the Homogeneity paradigm toward Heterogeneity shaped by democratization, growing regional power, and civil society mobilization amid rising international migration. While conflicts over autonomy and immigration continue, pointing to the lasting influence of the old paradigm, Spain's political and social debates increasingly turn to Heterogeneity, which has become embedded not just in policy but in the public's sense of collective possibility.

Spain's ongoing consolidation of Heterogeneity ultimately mirrors the broader path that the EU as a whole has taken as its member states have been increasingly grappling with cultural heterogeneity between the 20th and 21st century. Early on, the European Community did not formally oversee cultural matters, but as the European integration project advanced – particularly following the 1973 economic crisis and Europe's growing need for a cohesive social foundation beyond mere economic growth – cultural issues drew increasing attention from European institutions. While efforts to promote a symbolic common European identity gained momentum, these institutions also increasingly embraced Heterogeneity – framed in terms of *diversity* – as a bedrock principle of European cohesion and social life.

Starting in the 1990s, with the formal creation of the European Union, the spotlight turned specifically to minority rights, beginning with migrants and gradually extending to all groups vulnerable to discrimination. By the turn of the millennium, with large-scale initiatives such as the Lisbon Strategy driving Europe's economic renewal, the EU adopted a *diversity advantage* narrative,

positing that cultural heterogeneity sparks creativity. From 2008 onward, the Heterogeneity paradigm took deeper root in EU policies and discourses, exemplified by the *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* and the Intercultural Cities Programme, launched under the Council of Europe and the European Commission, which together established a European framework of diversity governance.

Even so, the shift toward Heterogeneity was neither uniform nor free of conflict. Right-wing populist and nationalist currents reemerged, fueled by economic upheavals, refugee crises, and anxieties over perceived *erosion* of national and cultural identities. Yet their backlash only underscored Heterogeneity's growing sway, as numerous social and political forces rallied to safeguard inclusivity, upholding the established consensus that diversity is both an asset and a basic human right.

Europe's experience thus highlights a transition where, while Homogeneity endures in certain political rhetoric and policy approaches, Heterogeneity, committed to promoting diverse yet cohesive societies – particularly by emphasizing local-level integration – has become the prevailing current. Although tensions remain, the larger trajectory suggests that Heterogeneity has firmly embedded itself in European institutions, laws, and public consciousness, reshaping the ways states, municipalities, and citizens perceive and cultivate social life.

7

From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity in Japan

Japan's process of nation-building was also closely tied to an emphasis on homogeneity. Early unifications of the Japanese peoples began in the 3rd century CE, when numerous clans on the main islands were gradually brought under Yamato hegemony, laying the foundations of a shared political and cultural identity. Even as regional pluralism endured and exchanges with China and Korea introduced writing, technologies, and Buddhism, the imperial court evolved toward increasing centralization.

With the unification of Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate, the Homogeneity paradigm started emerging with the establishment of a rigid social hierarchy of samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants that fixed individuals to hereditary classes, limiting internal mobility and entrenching

unitary norms. The *sakoku* (locked country) policy almost entirely cut off foreign contact and forbade Japanese from leaving, intensifying the sense of a distinct cultural nation and contributing to shaping early collective images of *Japaniseness*.

When the Meiji Restoration overthrew the Tokugawa regime in 1868, it seized upon imperial mythologies to solidify a modern nation-state, drawing on Western industrial, military, and administrative models but merging them with a unifying national narrative. Emphasizing the emperor's divine ancestry, the Meiji government cultivated the idea of Japan as a single family united under the imperial rule (*kazoku kokka*). Through State Shinto, the Meiji regime further cemented a standardized sense of Japaneseness that de-emphasized local identities in favor of a collective bond with the emperor.

Determined to forge a cohesive society, leaders promoted a standardized *kokugo* (national language) based on Tōkyō's dialect. Educational reforms and administrative reorganizations such as the Great Meiji Consolidation restructured local governance, subduing feudal legacies and reinforcing the impression of a singular, centralized nation. Ideals like *fukoku kyōhei* (enrich the country, strengthen the military) helped modernize and militarize Japan, culminating in successful campaigns against China and Russia and leading to colonial endeavors in Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere. These undertakings, modeled on Western imperial practices, underscored the notion of Japan's supposedly superior *race*.

In the early 20th century, fervent nationalism and militarism converged, conjuring an image of an ethnically unified Japan poised for imperial expansion. Brief democratic openings during the Taishō era did not weaken entrenched beliefs in racial and cultural uniformity. By the 1920s and 1930s, right-wing ultranationalism had harnessed the myth of ethnic oneness to fuel authoritarian governance, military conquest, and a war economy. Japan's defeat in World War II ended its imperial aspirations, but the preceding centuries of Tokugawa isolation, Meiji centralization, and modern militarism had firmly embedded the paradigm of Homogeneity in the national discourses and structures.

In the postwar era, Japan underwent another wave of nation-building that once again enshrined ethnocultural homogeneity at the core of domestic discourse and foreign self-presentation. Although the prewar and wartime periods had seen a multiethnic empire, the postwar narrative consistently downplayed that complexity. Influential texts grouped under the *Nihonjinron* (theories of the Japanese) genre, published from the 1970s onward, further promoted themes of Japanese distinctiveness and cultural unity. Originally stemming from 19th-century Western race theories that entered Japan in the Meiji period, these ideas were now reframed as timeless truths, suggesting the archipelago had always been culturally uniform rather than historically shaped by diverse peoples, languages, and traditions.

This postwar homogeneity myths served multiple functions. In an era of rapid economic growth and reshaped global relations, they provided a sense of collective pride and stability, casting the previous notion of a multiethnic empire as an aberration. Yet the insistence on a single language and ethnicity obscured real diversity, particularly among groups such as the Ainu, Okinawans, Burakumin, Zainichi Koreans, and Hāfu children of mixed parentage. The homogeneity narrative effectively muted them, deeming them anomalies in a society presumed to be uniform and forcing them either to assimilate or remain on the margins. By branding minority identities as either irrelevant or threatening, the myth of homogeneity impeded true public recognition of Japan's internal diversity and the ongoing discrimination faced by many communities.

However, Japan's long-standing emphasis on cultural homogeneity progressively collided with a rapidly changing landscape shaped by democratic reforms, gradual decentralization, and the onset of international migration. Minority activists, supported by scholars, civil society, and often local officials, started challenging the mono-ethnic narrative, pointing to Japan's historical complexities and the injustices endured by marginalized groups. As democratic institutions solidified and human-rights perspectives took hold, external scrutiny provided an additional lever that minorities could strategically deploy to press their case – a strategy known as *gaiatsu*. Together with local grassroots movements, these forces exposed the myth of a uniform Japan and created space for more diversified visions.

By the 1980s, pressures from overlooked communities, in tandem with global economic shifts, shone a spotlight on the contradictions of monocultural rhetoric. Campaigns for minority rights underscored the gap between official ideals of uniformity and the lived reality of a diverse population across the archipelago. Meanwhile, local governments – often with progressive leanings – began experimenting with more inclusive policies. Notably, from the 1960s and 1970s onward, forward-thinking municipalities like Ōsaka and Kawasaki adopted measures supporting Zainichi Koreans, Burakumin, and other underrepresented groups, launching initiatives from bilingual education to anti-discrimination ordinances and comprehensive welfare services.

At the same time, Japan's policy of *kokusaika* (internationalization) provided some first pathways – however modest – to help local authorities cope with the incoming presence of foreign newcomers as well as long-established minorities. Though *kokusaika* never explicitly promoted cultural pluralism, it brought global connectivity into sharper focus, letting municipalities address linguistic diversity and foster cross-cultural engagement.

The 1990 revision of the Immigration Law, which gradually transformed Japan into a destination country for many foreign workers, further heightened these challenges. Despite initial attempts to limit newcomers to short-term *guestworkers*, the realities of labor shortages and growing migrant

communities made it clear that migration would be woven into Japan's economic fabric. The arrival of these workers, and their eventual settlement, introduced new minority categories that demanded rights, resources, and a place within Japanese society.

A key turning point came with the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, which hit the area of Kōbe and Ōsaka, home to large foreign populations who had typically been invisible in public policy. Amid the chaotic relief effort, foreign residents suddenly became critical actors and recipients of aid. Their struggles with language barriers and limited access to information spurred civic networks to adopt a new rhetoric of inclusion: *tabunka kyōsei*. Activists, volunteers, and local officials rallied around this notion, envisioning a Japan where cultural differences would be recognized as integral rather than disruptive. This ideal inspired municipal action: an increasing number of cities opened Centers for *Tabunka Kyōsei* to provide multilingual assistance, promote cultural awareness, and include foreign residents in policy discussions. Through collaboration among municipalities, non-profit organizations, and minority groups, local leaders developed a growing set of best practices for diversity governance.

The momentum from these local efforts, combined with international pressures and advocacy from business leaders seeking a more open labor market, ultimately led the central government to adopt *tabunka kyōsei* at a national level. In 2005-2006, Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications issued guidelines meant to promote inclusion. While the plan's aspiration of coexistence on an equal footing represented a stark break from earlier monotone visions, it drew mixed reactions. Progressives criticized it for its assimilationist approach, focusing more on promoting learning of Japanese rather than addressing institutional biases or deep-seated inequality, whereas conservatives feared diversity threatened the notion of a unified national identity. Funding shortfalls also confined many of these programs to ambitious promises rather than concrete transformations.

Despite ongoing tensions, *tabunka kyōsei* has helped erode the postwar myth of homogeneity, popularizing the idea that diversity is integral to Japan's identity today and in the future. High-profile moments – such as Hāfu or naturalized citizens making waves in beauty pageants – highlighted shifting public perceptions of *Japaneseness*. Meanwhile, local governments refined multilingual education, civic engagement, and cross-cultural initiatives, fueling a collective shift toward acknowledging heterogeneity.

Though remnants of the Homogeneity paradigm endure – visible in right-wing opposition and lingering pressures on minorities to assimilate into the Japanese mainstream – the overall arc suggests that Japan has grown more aware of its cultural heterogeneity. Grassroots activism, municipal innovation, and revised national dialogue around *tabunka kyōsei* have converged to widen the scope

of who *belongs*, offering minority and immigrant communities new ways to establish themselves within Japan's evolving social fabric.

8

From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity in South Korea

In ancient times, the Korean Peninsula consisted of diverse tribal polities that eventually coalesced into powerful kingdom – Ancient Joseon until the 2nd century BCE, then Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla in the early centuries CE. Though often in conflict, they gradually forged a sense of shared origins and cultural traits, paving the way for a pan-peninsular ideal and a first phase of political and ethno-cultural unity. The legend of King Dangun – mythic founder of Ancient Joseon – provided a story of divine descent that rulers later invoked to establish a continuous, sacred lineage.

In 918, a new political unit was established, known as the Goryeo kingdom, often credited with representing the first real unification of the peninsula. Although not yet defined by modern nationalism, Goryeo contributed to the consolidation of a notion of a culturally and politically integrated peninsula, laying the foundations for the emergence of a unitary political and cultural identity, despite ongoing rebellions and conflicts.

In 1392, when General Yi Seong-gye overthrew the last Goryeo monarchs, he claimed the Mandate of Heaven and linked his new Joseon dynasty to those ancient, storied origins. Over five centuries, Neo-Confucian doctrine permeated Joseon society, fostering a centralized administration and a rigid social hierarchy under a Confucian moral and political framework. This was complemented by isolationist policies, attempting to ward off external influences. While Joseon was forced into a tributary position to China, it strove to prevent interferences in its internal affairs and, in particular, to defend its borders from Western and Japanese interests. All these efforts helped reinforcing a sense of distinct *Koreanness*, where loyalty to one Confucian monarch was equated with loyalty to a single ethnic and moral community.

Yet this unity was ruptured when Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Under colonial rule, the Japanese regime pushed modernization and abolished certain class distinctions, even as it carried out forced assimilation that provoked a surge of anticolonial sentiment and the rise of a nationalist movement.

This movement adopted Joseon's historical narratives to affirm the ideal of a unified, homogenous *Korean people (minjok)*, distinct from their Japanese rulers. Many Korean intellectuals embraced the *minjok* ideology, portraying Koreans as one people tracing their ancestry back to Dangun.

The abrupt division into North and South Korea in 1948 shattered centuries of unity but further solidified the homogeneity narrative: each government claimed legitimacy over the peninsula, each insisting that all Koreans shared the same race and culture. In South Korea, from 1953 to 1987, a series of authoritarian leaders – Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan – cemented a state-driven nationalism that underscored ethnic unity and an unbroken cultural tradition. In particular, under Park's long regime characterized by top-down modernization, official propaganda celebrated ethnic unity and a shared destiny to achieve rapid economic growth, continuing the pattern of linking state legitimacy to homogeneous cultural belonging.

Despite repressive rule, popular uprisings such as the April Revolution of 1960 and the mass protests of 1987 paved the way for broader recognition of social and political minorities, opening the first cracks in the Homogeneity paradigm. As civil society gained momentum, growing social and political pluralism began contradicting the simplistic *mono-ethnic*, *mono-culture* ideal. Ultimately, the establishment of a democratic Sixth Republic (from 1987 onward) made room for expanded discussions of rights and representation, setting the stage also for questioning old ideas of uniformity.

From the late 1980s onward, as South Korea rose to global economic prominence in what came to be called the *Miracle on the Han River*, labor shortages prompted a wave of incoming foreign workers in the 1990s. Korea had long defined itself as a nation of emigrants, yet now had to grapple with the realities of immigration. This shift confronted the enduring myth of a homogeneous society and made it clear that migration had become a lasting feature of the country's economic and social landscape.

At first, South Korea tried to hold onto the Homogeneity paradigm by deeming migrants as temporary guests – particularly through the Industrial Trainee System, which excluded them from full labor rights. Yet this arrangement proved unsustainable, given the country's labor demands, demographic shifts, and dwindling rural populations. Flows of marriage migrants, visa overstayers, and long-term migrant workers kept growing, leading to the inescapable realization that non-ethnic Koreans would inevitably settle and become part of South Korean society.

Early migrant activism in the 1990s joined forces with broader movements for workers' rights and democracy, emphasizing universal labor, civil, and human rights rather than overt appeals to cultural diversity. Faith-based organizations, labor unions, feminist groups, and pro-democracy NGOs converged, pressing for the recognition of basic protections for foreign residents – a demand powerfully underscored, for instance, by the 1994 protest at Myeongdong Cathedral, followed in 1995

by the notable Supreme Court decision extending labor protections to all foreign workers. These developments punctured the notion of a uniform society.

As democratization, globalization, and grassroots mobilization gathered pace, the government had to adjust its assimilation-oriented approach, originally aimed at inducting migrants (particularly marriage migrants) into Korean language and culture programs. Persistent criticism, political rethinking, and the realization that many migrants were here to stay prompted a more inclusive policy shift, often couched in the emerging concept of *damunhwa*. Initially coined as a translation for Western *multiculturalism*, *damunhwa* was progressively popularized by activists pushing for equal rights and the formal acknowledgment of cultural heterogeneity in South Korea.

Although central authorities continued to dominate policymaking through the 1990s, growing decentralization gave local governments more scope – especially in smaller cities coping with declining populations. Without a centralized integration framework, these municipalities developed practical strategies for supporting migrant workers, offering language assistance, and fostering cultural awareness. Projects like intercultural festivals, consultative committees, and migrant resource centers sprouted, echoing similar bottom-up initiatives seen in parts of Europe.

With the introduction of the *Multicultural Family Support Act* in 2008, the South Korean state formally endorsed *damunhwa*. These earliest efforts centered mostly on marriage migrants and reflected either assimilationist practices or celebrations of diversity that critics found shallow. But under mounting pressure from NGOs and local administrations, the government broadened its interpretation of *damunhwa*, applying it to all migrants and linking cultural pluralism to human rights and social inclusion. Over time, official discourse increasingly portrayed cultural heterogeneity as an asset rather than a risk to national cohesion.

Even with such progress, the old narrative of Korean ethnic purity remains compelling in current politics and public debates. Local governments have become more daring in pursuing inclusive policies based on *damunhwa*, while the central government's stance fluctuates with each administration's priorities. Democratic backslides, narrow policy definitions, and incomplete decentralization all pose ongoing challenges. Still, South Korea's post-authoritarian environment now accommodates far richer discussions about diversity: migrant communities have grown more organized, public opinion has grown more open to Heterogeneity, and official integration frameworks have begun addressing discrimination and the need for genuine inclusion.

As *damunhwa* evolves, it moves beyond superficial celebrations of cultural heterogeneity, embedding deeper recognition of minority rights, cultural autonomy, and broader social participation into the nation's policies and civic life. The very idea of *Korean identity* is gradually expanding to

embrace a more plural, diverse, and ever-shifting society – a telling sign that the once-unquestioned myth of uniformity is steadily yielding to a heterogeneous future.

II

The Diffusion of Heterogeneity and the Consolidation of Diversity Governance

1

Homophily and Homogeneity

Looking up to the sky, it may happen to see vast flocks of birds twisting and swirling in shape-shifting clouds – an astonishing form of behavior known as *murmuration*, which captured people’s attention and imagination since time immemorial. While scientists usually explain this phenomenon as a strategy for reducing predation risk (King & Sumpter, 2012), there have been people who, with less scientific rigor and more poetic sensibility, found in the impressive spectacle of birds flocking an analogy with a typical human behavior: that is, the tendency of individuals to interact and associate those similar to themselves. The English proverb “birds of a feather flock together” is commonly adopted by social scientists to illustrate this inclination, known as *homophily*, that is, literally, the *love of sameness*.

Technically, homophily is defined as the principle whereby network ties form at a higher rate between people sharing certain similarities. There seems to be something almost intuitive about this idea, which resonates through countless proverbs and idiomatic expressions across widely different times and cultural traditions. Long before the English proverb about bird flocks, the ancient Greek adage “A jackdaw is always close to a jackdaw” (*aei koloiòs parà koloiôi hizáneì*) and the old Chinese maxim “Similar things group together” (*wù yǐ lèi jù*) conveyed the same idea. Friendship, in particular, was often explained through notions of likeness, as evident in a variety of sources ranging from Plato’s *Lysis* (Ly. 213d–215e) and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN 8.1, 1155a32–b 13) to the Chinese *Book of Songs* (see Waley, 1996, Ode 17, 119, 164, 165) – notably the very Chinese character

for *friend* (朋, *péng*) visually signifies, precisely, two matching cowrie shells or a flock of birds flying in unison (Lambert, 2022, p. 10).

The *scientific* interest in homophily first gained momentum in the early 20th century through studies on group formation (e.g., Bott, 1928; Wellman, 1929; Hubbard, 1929; Ellis, 1936). The term homophily, as commonly used today, traces back to Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton's influential 1954 work on friendship networks in two American towns (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). Their study inaugurated decades of research investigating homophilous patterns in the constitution and consolidation of network ties (for extensive reviews, see McPherson et al. 2001; Kossinets & Watts 2009; Ertug et al. 2022).

Traditionally, scholars distinguish between *status homophily* and *value homophily* (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). Status homophily involves individuals bonding over similarities in informal, formal, or ascribed status. While the shape of this pattern is greatly influenced by context-specific factors, in order of salience, the following dimensions were identified as relevant in this sense: (a) race and ethnicity, (b) age, (c) religion, (d) education, (e) occupation, (f) gender, and (g) behavioral patterns, such as achievement or delinquency (for a review of the literature concerning each of these aspects, see McPherson et al., 2001). Instead, value homophily concerns similarities in values, attitudes, and beliefs, such as political orientations (Verbrugge, 1977; 1983; Jussim & Osgood, 1989; Knoke, 1990; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). At the intersection of these dimensions lies *culture*, with cultural commonalities usually considered the key predictors of homophilous behaviors (e.g., Mark, 1998; Lizardo, 2006; Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010).

There still is no consensus on the ultimate reasons behind homophily. Some researchers argue that homophilous interactions streamline communication and the evaluation of others' behaviors (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Werner & Parmelee, 1979; Hamm, 2000), while others emphasize how it fosters trust and solidarity (see Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Mollica et al., 2003) or reduces the costs associated with maintaining ties (see Felmlee et al., 1990; Leenders, 1996). Despite ongoing debates over its precise catalysts, homophily remains one of the most robust empirical regularities in human social life. It has been documented not only in friendship networks (e.g., Kandel, 1978; Mark, 1998; Lizardo, 2006; Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010; Smirnov & Thurner, 2016; Laursen, 2017), consistent with ancient intuitions, but also in collaborative networks aimed at achieving shared or compatible goals (McPherson et al., 2001; Dahlander & McFarland, 2013; Wang et al., 2023).

Crucially, homophily is linked to the creation and maintenance of ingroup/outgroup boundaries, serving as a fundamental mechanism of social cohesion. Numerous studies reveal how this sharpening of ingroup identities can lead to the exclusion of outgroups and foster prejudice or xenophobia

(Allport, 1954; Austin & Worchel, 1979; Turner et al., 1987; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Appadurai, 2006; Mackie et al., 2008; Currarini et al., 2009; DiMaggio & Garip, 2012).

Although cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity are more ideational constructs than empirical realities, they nevertheless influence how social spaces are organized. Homophily helps explain why notions of cultural homogeneity often come to be viewed as the bedrock of social cohesion, whereas cultural heterogeneity tends to be perceived as potentially disruptive.

2

The Diffusion of Heterogeneity

Although homophilic tendencies within social groups may help us view the Homogeneity paradigm as a seemingly natural *convergence* characterizing human social life, such logic does not apply to the rise of Heterogeneity. The paradigm of Heterogeneity emerged through broader forces of democratization, globalization, and technological innovation, transmitted via the networks and interactions of diverse political and social contexts. Intensified migration and a universal rights awareness – particularly after World War II, with the growing role of international organizations – proved instrumental in exposing the limitations of the Homogeneity paradigm and opening the door to the Heterogeneity alternative.

By its very nature, migration acts as a channel for diffusion, and it is now widely acknowledged that international migration shapes developed nations at a structural level. The worldwide spread of human-rights principles, fueled by the expanding political influence of international organizations, has likewise been thoroughly documented (e.g., Greenhil, 2010; 2015; Kim, 2013). Set against this global backdrop, my research intended to offer new insights into how the Heterogeneity paradigm gains traction and who acted, in particular, as change agents, driving forward its diffusion.

In all three major geographical contexts examined, local actors led the charge, representing the real pioneers, whose grassroots initiatives influenced discourses later embraced by higher governance levels. These primary innovators fall into two main groups. The first is represented by *minority activists*, usually belonging to minority-led movements. We discussed many examples of minority movements and struggles for recognition in each of the three geographical contexts considered. The

second group of primary innovators is represented by *solidarity actors in civil society* – often faith-based institutions or NGOs championing human-rights causes – who serve as mediators with the broader community, assisting minority voices in refining effective rhetorical strategies and finding the best channels to press for change.

A secondary yet equally crucial set of change agents are those who lend cognitive and normative legitimacy to these budding practices. Although journalists and other media figures play a part, the most influential contributors are academics and experts, who supply civil society's goals with scholarly authority, grounding them in data and systematic analysis. Such legitimacy is a powerful catalyst for wider diffusion and entrenchment of Heterogeneity's frames and practices. The important role of the think tank Comedia's researchers (Section 7.9), along with figures like Carlos Giménez (Section 10.8, p. 280), Keizo Yamazaki (Section 14.10, pp. 431-432), or Han-up Jang (Section 18.8, p. 535), demonstrates how academics and experts can be central actors in propelling Heterogeneity's narratives into mainstream discourse.

The diffusion proceeded through informal networks and nongovernmental organizations, eventually reaching government institutions. Local governments typically engaged first, due to their accountability to immediate realities and their openness to community-driven demands. From these municipalities, the impact radiated to wider tiers of governance, weaving Heterogeneity more firmly into public discourse and institutional structures.

Heterogeneity's principles become visibly entrenched when they find their way into institutional policies and practices, appearing prominently in public discourse among political leaders and officials across different levels of government. Once again, local actors – particularly municipal administrations – have taken the lead as both *pioneers* and *early adopters*. Because they are closest to local conditions, they can quickly perceive and respond to on-the-ground challenges. In addition, they also tend to be highly motivated in engaging with cultural heterogeneity – issues related to this theme, after all, influence local welfare, public opinion, electoral outcomes, and social cohesion.

Local governments proved especially receptive to frameworks and narratives that reduce polarization, maintain order, and address the inherent complexities of cultural diversity. The active engagement of city mayors – whether motivated by personal beliefs or political affiliations – has represented a key element in making sure that Heterogeneity's innovations and practices became formalized policies. Sometimes, municipalities introduced measures in direct response to tensions that already exist in their specific local contexts; other times, they did so proactively, aiming to forestall the kinds of conflicts and issues they have observed developing elsewhere.

As cultural heterogeneity – especially when linked to migration – is inherently a transnational phenomenon, it brings to the fore a broad array of actors at multiple governance levels, facilitating

the diffusion of common frames and practices. The national context, where shared languages, legal frameworks, and cultural norms streamline communication, is usually the first context for diffusion beyond specific municipalities. Ultimately, municipal innovation in diversity governance not only shapes local realities but also resonates nationally, helping embed Heterogeneity in broader policy discourse and institutional structures.

Formal and informal intercity networks serve as critical channels for this diffusion, particularly those devoted to issues of migration and cultural diversity, such as Spain's RECI (Section 10.10, p. 286), Japan's Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents (Section 14.9, p. 427), and South Korea's National Council of Multicultural Cities (Section 18.8, p. 537). These platforms enable municipal leaders not only to share promising practices and exchange practical knowledge, but also – and more importantly – to unite in pursuit of regulatory and financial support from their national governments to address shared challenges, including managing cultural heterogeneity. By presenting a united front and adopting consistent frames and narratives, cities enhance their lobbying power vis-à-vis higher authorities.

International platforms like the ICC Network also play a pivotal role in the diffusion process, although municipalities often engage with these networks instrumentally and strategically, primarily to influence policy discussions in their home countries (or, in Europe's case, at the regional level). In this broader arena, international organizations also intervene, supporting and encouraging networks where local and regional actors convene within their broader strategic agendas focusing on human rights and other strategic policy goals – recently, in particular, those emphasizing sustainability, such as the Sustainable Development Goals. These global incentives and pressures can act directly on individual states or empower local actors to lobby from below.

Although the successful adoption of Heterogeneity's frames by local governments ultimately depends on civil society's skillful engagement with elected officials – above all, the mayor – long-term stability in governing cultural heterogeneity ultimately hinges on professional administrators capable of creating sustainable partnerships with civil society, practitioners, and experts (including private-sector consultants and mediation specialists, as was the case in Barcelona). While political sponsorship remains crucial in ensuring that governance systems for cultural diversity endure, once local administrations establish robust frameworks and agencies, those structures tend to persist even after substantial ideological shifts – a sign of both growing acceptance of Heterogeneity at the national level and the inherent stability of administrative institutions. On-the-ground implementation also benefits from continuity in administrative staff: frequent staff turnover risks to erode the personal connections and contextual knowledge crucial for refining local policies over time.

As local governments grapple with emerging issues, they often seek backing or guidance from higher levels of governance. In all the contexts examined, policy frames grounded on Heterogeneity rose from the municipal to the national level, mainly bolstered by (a) mayors leveraging party ties or municipal coalitions, (b) civil society groups that forged relationships with lawmakers at the national scale, and (c) business elites, mostly interested in employing migrant labor.

In conclusion, the Heterogeneity paradigm emerges chiefly from local contexts – particularly from the civil society – and then grows, permeating broader governance scales. With international organizations now embracing Heterogeneity, its current diffusion typically follows a dual path: bottom-up from localities and top-down from the international arena.

This dynamic underscores not only the significant capacity of local actors to spearhead transformative paradigm shifts – bringing about genuine change in contemporary governance – but also the pivotal role of cities and municipalities as crossroads where civil society, policymakers, and economic and cultural institutions converge. Yet nation-states still remain indispensable in the larger transnational governance of cultural heterogeneity; indeed, they represent the official interlocutors for both local and international stakeholders.

Experts and academics play a decisive part in shaping and validating these emerging Heterogeneity's narratives and policies. By offering data-driven, predictive insights – a necessity within today's market-oriented and entrepreneurial administrative frameworks – these specialists help establish Heterogeneity's ideas as credible and facilitate their diffusion, both within national arenas and across international networks.

A final noteworthy observation concerns what, exactly, circulates as Heterogeneity spreads. In most cases, it is the overarching discourses and policy frames that traverse local, national, and sometimes international boundaries. Instead, the actual governance systems remain mostly shaped by local specificities. Indeed, because every city's model arises from local configurations – reflecting interactions between majority and minority communities, political power dynamics, varying stakeholder capabilities, and each municipality's standing in a multi-tiered governance ecosystem – most actual policies and practices remain deeply rooted in local realities. Nonetheless, once Heterogeneity takes hold at higher levels of governance, certain local innovations can begin to diffuse. This diffusion is, however, usually selective and reconfigured so as to adapt circulating frames and policies to the specific social and institutional contexts.

In many instances, the national scale emerges as the primary context for diffusion. Indeed, Heterogeneity-related frames, issues, and structures of governance typically align most closely within shared linguistic, legal, and cultural contexts. Accordingly, it is more likely that one city's innovation will inspire neighboring municipalities within the same national context. Japan's spread of Centers

for *Tabunka Kyōsei* (Section 13.4, p. 390), originating in Ōsaka, exemplifies a bottom-up diffusion path, while South Korea's Multicultural Family Centers (Section 16.4, p. 493), which owe their expansion to national legislation and growing Heterogeneity-based discourses, illustrate a top-down route. In each scenario, the *neighborhood effect* (Section 4.3, p. 96) frequently can be observed in the diffusion process, with communities that share strong connections – whether geographic, cultural, or political – adopting Heterogeneity-based approaches in succession.

At the international scale, broader discourses such as *interculturalism* are often championed by transnational networks and organizations, yet the dissemination of fully intact policies or governance models is comparatively rare. Even in the European context – where intercity collaboration is robust – local innovations seldom circulate wholesale. Barcelona's Anti-rumor Strategy (Section 10.10, p. 287), for example, is widely known and occasional attempts have been made to export it in places as far as Japan, but what tends to diffuse is more the conceptual framing and methodology rather than the entire institutional architecture. Often, this circulating Anti-rumor Strategy remains a grassroots tool piloted by NGOs or activist groups, rather than an officially adopted municipal policy.

Overall, these comparative insights reinforce the notion that the Heterogeneity paradigm is more likely to spread in the form of discourses, principles, and guidelines for action, while the actual creation or retooling of governance systems remains contingent on the interplay of local conditions. Even so, when Heterogeneity gains traction at regional, national, or international levels, local innovations can indeed travel, offering a valuable repertory of ideas and tested methods for other municipalities – and potentially spurring further refinements across different local contexts.

3

Mechanisms of Diffusion

Diffusion research on policy frames and the practices that stem from them pinpoints four main mechanisms driving the dissemination of ideas: (a) *learning*, (b) *competition*, (c) *coercion*, and (d) *emulation*. Because our interest lies not in examining the spread of one particular policy or practice for governing cultural heterogeneity but rather in the broader diffusion of the Heterogeneity paradigm itself, all four mechanisms may see coming into play, depending on the specific context and focus of

analysis. That said, analyzing and comparing patterns of diffusion across different governance scales reveals certain dominant patterns in the mechanisms that underpin the adoption of Heterogeneity.

One key element is that Heterogeneity diffuses in two distinct modes. First is an *ideological approach*, driven by normative commitments to social justice, equality, and human rights. This attitude typically leads to social and welfare-based initiatives designed to foster inclusion, participation, and mutual recognition of cultural diversity – treating social cohesion as an end in itself. Second is an *entrepreneurial approach*, guided by material considerations: cultural heterogeneity becomes important primarily as a means to achieve economic or political goals.

These two approaches do not remain neatly distinct in practice. They may readily coexist in the trajectory of Heterogeneity's diffusion, and actors themselves often move between them over time. Still, a general distinction is worth outlining.

The ideological approach is most common among civil society actors, especially minority activists and solidarity groups (both religious and secular), as well as researchers and experts. It also characterizes many non-political government actors – such as administrative officials and coordinators in charge of implementing local policies – who often focus on sustaining human rights values and broad social inclusion. In particular, such ideologically grounded efforts tend to predominate in the early emergence and expansion of Heterogeneity's frameworks, when grassroots organizations are the principal initiators of new practices. Moreover, collective action by local governments – especially cooperation through city networks aiming to scale up the governance of cultural heterogeneity – tends to reflect a similarly ideological lens.

When we look at how the ideological strand of Heterogeneity spreads, the most prominent mechanism is *learning*, which is exemplified by evidence-based policy adoption, where new information updates beliefs about the potential success of a given approach. As this mechanism unfolds, the adoption of Heterogeneity is bolstered by a growing belief in its normative legitimacy, whether grounded in ethical imperatives or in the civic value placed on diversity itself.

The entrepreneurial approach typically emerges once practices of inclusion and cultural diversity become institutionalized, especially among political figures and business elites. Here, Heterogeneity is often instrumentalized to achieve economic objectives, particularly through the promotion of a city's brand nationally and internationally as a cosmopolitan, appealing, and welcoming destination for workers, talent, investments, and tourists. It also serves political goals, such as minimizing conflict, lowering polarization, maintaining stable governance, and expanding a city's sphere of influence at both national and global levels. In this sense, city diplomacy strategies and membership in national or international city networks function not only as channels for elevating Heterogeneity-based policy frames but also as effective methods to bolster a city's public image in influential arenas.

State actors, for their part, frequently adopt an entrepreneurial approach to Heterogeneity, responding to pressures from both below (through civil society groups, local governments, and political elites) and above (via international organizations). In all three geographic contexts under consideration, this interplay of bottom-up and top-down pressures has nudged national policymakers to incorporate the Heterogeneity paradigm into their discourses and policies.

Under the entrepreneurial lens, as concerns municipalities, the diffusion mechanism of *competition* takes the center stage, which involves, precisely, governments strategically adopting policies to attract people, businesses, and investments. Instead, the diffusion of Heterogeneity in national politics rather reflects mechanisms of *coercion*, arising when dominant governments or international bodies exert direct or indirect pressure to encourage adoption, and *emulation*, whereby adoption occurs in response to symbolic or normative imperatives, where policymakers follow widely accepted standards to enhance legitimacy or prestige.

In practice, the ideological and entrepreneurial approaches to Heterogeneity can overlap, reinforce each other, or clash. Ideological commitments to human rights, equality, and inclusion often give way to entrepreneurial calculations – particularly in times of economic or political instability – requiring these ideals to be justified in instrumental terms. Over time, many institutions have settled on a hybrid narrative in which equality, integration, and rights coexist with the notion of a diversity advantage. Still, the actual realization of this hybrid model can be fraught with tension: as administrations become more market-oriented and entrepreneurial, they always risk sidelining normative ideals in favor of economic expediency. These tensions reflect divergent interests among civil society, government institutions, and different scales of governance, producing a sometimes fragmented, unstable policymaking landscape. In these conditions, Heterogeneity often faces sustained backlash.

Conversely, ideological approaches also prove hard to sustain unless they have the logistical and political support to anchor them firmly in practice. Cities like Hamamatsu or Ansan illustrate how reliance on volunteers and goodwill alone can limit the long-term impact of ambitious Heterogeneity-based visions.

Ultimately, the hope is that, even amid friction between Heterogeneity and embedded Homogeneity-based narratives, its principles will become woven into the daily workings of government, so that justice, inclusion, and equality are treated not as optional add-ons but as standard elements of local and national administration. Yet the journey remains far from complete, impeded by powerful voices that oppose or dilute minority rights. Reconciling ideological aspirations with entrepreneurial demands remains a crucial challenge in the ongoing consolidation of Heterogeneity.

Comparing the Local Systems of Governance of Cultural Heterogeneity

Although the particular ways in which local governance systems related to cultural heterogeneity take shape are profoundly influenced by context-specific conditions and factors, examining emblematic models that have gained both national and international recognition for their innovation and best practices offers a particularly revealing vantage point. The cases that we have been analyzing in depth in this dissertation – Barcelona’s *City of Interculturalitat*, Hamamatsu’s *City of Tabunka Kyōsei*, and Ansan’s *City of Damunhwa* – each chart a meaningful course toward long-term governance frameworks that address the realities of diverse populations.

While these approaches are firmly rooted in distinct historical, institutional, and sociopolitical settings, they also allow us to explore points of convergence and divergence in how local governments conceptualize and manage cultural heterogeneity. They thus serve not only as potential starting points for future, more focused research – be it on a national scale or on specific facets of local governance from a transnational perspective – but also as illustrations of how mid-sized and large urban centers worldwide are grappling with shifts from older ideals of Homogeneity to the newer paradigm of Heterogeneity.

More precisely, a comparison of these three cases sheds light, first of all, on varied ways municipalities in very different geographical and cultural contexts – Spain, Japan, and South Korea – have progressively embraced the paradigm of Heterogeneity, aiming to promote social inclusion and cohesion while moving away from an overarching or inherited notion of homogeneity. Each city’s evolution also shows how cities themselves act as hubs and nodal points that transmit common cognitive, normative, and operational frameworks across multiple layers of governance, both nationally and internationally, and can become drivers of innovative policy diffusion. At the same time, however, the core mechanisms and particular features of the governance structures that sustain this process differ sharply, shaped in large part by local activism, historical legacies, and the pressures or incentives coming from higher scales of governance.

Barcelona’s governance system stands out for its substantial degree of formal planning and institutional coordination. Over the past decade, it has produced two successive *Interculturality Plans*, each set to last a full ten years. These plans offer explicit policy roadmaps that guide resource

allocation, thereby consolidating stable, long-lasting governance structures. The small Barcelona Intercultural Action team, housed in the municipal Area of Social Rights, Culture, Education, and Life Cycles and overseen by a Commissioner, supervises strategic direction, while the day-to-day work is largely carried out by consultancies, such as QSL Serveis Culturals or Spora Sinergies. In parallel, civil society organizations bring these plans to life through concrete implementation in local settings.

Although the city devotes an interdepartmental focus to *interculturalitat*, its approach is further integrated transversally across all four municipal areas which constitute the local government, each embedding Heterogeneity-based measures into its regular responsibilities. The city's comparatively substantial budgetary commitments and elaborate master plans have created an environment where these measures are genuinely sustainable over time.

Central to Barcelona's notion of *interculturalitat* is a broad, flexible concept of cultural heterogeneity – *diversitat* –, which encompasses not just ethnicity and nationality but also many other identity markers perceived as salient to define minority groups, such as religion, gender, language, and ability. Formally, the city's official discourse connects this inclusive view to three foundational ideals: ensuring equality of rights for all, recognizing the resource-like value of heterogeneity, and fostering positive interactions that strengthen social cohesion. Under this comprehensive framework, cultural heterogeneity is woven into daily governance – from education reforms to gender mainstreaming – extending well beyond narrower discussions of migration.

Thanks to its comprehensive and clearly framing of the cognitive, normative, and operational dimensions of the paradigm of Heterogeneity, a certain balance can be found in Barcelona between the ideological approach that mainly characterizes civil society actors and the entrepreneurial approach characteristic of powerful business and political elites. This balance has been maintained, in particular, by the advocacy power and organizational dynamism of civil society, which has been effectively counterbalancing the weight of entrepreneurial interests.

In Hamamatsu, the system of governance of the *City of Tabunka Kyōsei* is grounded on the three official *Visions* published during the past decade. Formally, coordination rests with the city's International Affairs Division (*kokusai-ka*), but a substantial share of planning and practical coordination is shouldered by the Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communication and Exchange (HICE). Through HICE, Hamamatsu offers a platform for core *tabunka kyōsei* programs that link city departments with civil society organizations and volunteers. In parallel, also Hamamatsu follows an integrative logic of transversalization of Heterogeneity across the local administration: eleven of its fifteen municipal departments integrate foreign residents' needs into their respective mandates, ensuring that *tabunka kyōsei* principles infuse a wide range of city policies and services.

Despite the structured interplay of institutional and civil society actors and the presence of formal policy documents, the city's notion of *tabunka kyōsei* remains strongly tied to foreign residents. While the city occasionally highlights *creativity* and *integration*, it continues to interpret cultural heterogeneity in terms of ethnicity or nationality. Early official texts employed the term *multicultural* to translate *tabunka kyōsei*; after joining the Intercultural Cities Network, Hamamatsu shifted to *intercultural* as the preferred term. Yet, in practice, this linguistic shift has not brought new breadth to *tabunka kyōsei*; the system continues to focus on matters of migration and foreign residents' settlement in local society. Thus, cultural heterogeneity is still framed less as an intrinsic characteristic of everyday civic life and more as an external feature to be integrated due to its potential benefit for the local community.

Ultimately, Hamamatsu's governance structure stands on a relatively centralized and top-down dynamics, heavily influenced by mayoral leadership. The mayor mediates between powerful business elites – often drawn to *tabunka kyōsei*'s economic benefits – and civil society organizations, which tend to uphold a more ideological emphasis on equality and inclusion. In this situation, an entrepreneurial approach to cultural heterogeneity often prevails, with civil society often struggling to sustain its programs unless it can demonstrate how they serve business or broader economic and/or political interests.

In Ansan, the system of governance of the *City of Damunhwa* emerged from loosely connected grassroots efforts that eventually coalesced around the *Multicultural Village* project in Wongok-dong. More precisely, the city government gradually incorporated spontaneous, community-driven practices into a more institutional governance system, relying especially on its Intercultural (*damunhwa*) Support Headquarters. This body – currently organized into two major divisions and multiple specialized teams – oversees initiatives ranging from foreigner-friendly infrastructure to basic human rights and settlement support.

In contrast to Barcelona's and even Hamamatsu's more systematic approaches, Ansan lacks any overarching normative guidelines or consistent master plan for managing cultural heterogeneity. Instead, multiple policies, programs, and specialized civil society organizations exist simultaneously, often producing a somewhat irregular, fragmented governance landscape. While this arrangement allows for considerable and sustainable coverage of foreign residents' issues, the absence of a single unifying framework means the city's approach to *damunhwa* is not thoroughly integrated in the city vision and strategic agenda. Notably, Ansan's leaders have never officially defined *damunhwa* in the manner Barcelona has done with *interculturalitat* or Hamamatsu with *tabunka kyōsei*. Municipal rhetoric frequently links *damunhwa* to efforts to make the city more global and cosmopolitan, rather than viewing it as a principle that could be extended to non-migrant groups or other identities.

Originally, *damunhwa* in Ansan was shaped by grassroots advocates prioritizing human rights and safeguarding vulnerable migrants – a primarily ideological impetus. Gradually, however, municipal authorities recognized the economic and cultural potential of incorporating foreign communities into the local fabric. This dual emphasis on social justice and economic opportunities has yielded some conceptual ambiguity, particularly when the city’s entrepreneurial impulses diverge from civil society’s more value-driven goals.

The interplay of civil society, city officials, and private interests in Ansan thus remains somewhat tense and polarized. On one hand, civil society initiatives have taken root and achieved relative stability within the city’s institutional ecosystem; on the other, these citizen-led efforts often lack the policy protections or formal guarantees that would ensure deeper or longer-term change. Municipal leaders tend to invest in *damunhwa* programs insofar as they advance strategic, often utilitarian objectives. For activists demanding broader, more consistently enforced policy frameworks, this approach can lead to frustration – particularly if they seek robust participation channels or more explicit commitments to minority rights. Consequently, the *City of Damunhwa* in Ansan stands out for its mix of dynamic, well-intentioned projects and a more *ad hoc* governance model, representing an organic amalgam that has both propelled *damunhwa* forward and highlighted the need for a clearer, more cohesive framework.

Taken together, the experiences of Barcelona, Hamamatsu, and Ansan highlight some paradigmatic examples of how local governance systems around the world are grappling with cultural heterogeneity in unique ways, shaped by local histories, politics, and socioeconomic realities. Taken together, they confirm the indispensable role that local governments, specialized agencies, consultancies, and robust civil society networks play in grounding ambitious Heterogeneity-based visions in actual community practices. They further indicate how truly embedding Heterogeneity in municipal governance depends on strategic resource allocation, continuity, and a willingness on the part of political leaders to let inclusive values pervade the city’s operations. Indeed, while local-level policy is frequently at the forefront of adopting Heterogeneity-based frameworks, rhetorical commitment alone is no guarantee of success. Instead, these frameworks must be solidified by dedicated budgets, durable alliances between municipal authorities and civil society, and stable governance structures that can endure changes in political administration or economic pressures.

Furthermore, this comparative analysis points to several avenues for future inquiry. First, researchers might benefit from probing more deeply the interplay of cognitive, normative, and operational components of Heterogeneity in cities’ efforts to manage cultural diversity. Second, analyzing the extent to which each city integrates these local governance structures into broader municipal frameworks can illuminate challenges and successes in balancing ideological and business-

oriented interests. Finally, expanding cross-national comparisons to other locations could help scholars and practitioners trace global trends in how the Heterogeneity paradigm continues to spread and consolidate – analyzing how it resonates and readapts across multiple layers of governance and within diverse cultural settings.

III

Homogeneity and Culture in the Era of Diversity

1

The World's Last Homogeneous People

In the northern edge of the Indian Ocean, between India and Myanmar, lies the Andaman archipelago: a cluster of 572 islands forming the eastern boundary of the Bay of Bengal. Because of its strategic location along ancient trade routes and its role as a natural frontier protecting Indian territories from eastern incursions, the Andaman Islands have drawn notice since antiquity. They already featured in one of the earliest known maps, drawn in the 1st century CE by the Greek-Roman scholar Ptolemy, who described the islands – albeit vaguely and rather sensationallly – as a “land of cannibals” (Ahmed, 2011).

Over the centuries, while the islands continued to be mentioned, the knowledge of their inhabitants and customs remained poorly understood and often distorted, especially in European accounts. More than a millennium after Ptolemy, the Venetian Marco Polo mentioned the Andamans in his famous travelogue, *The Million*, swearing that the islanders had “heads like dogs, and teeth and eyes like dogs” ([Polo] VI, 63).

Moving closer to modern times, there is still an island in the archipelago – North Sentinel Island – about which we know virtually nothing. While the claims of canine-headed people or cannibals have been finally abandoned, North Sentinel Island has recently garnered worldwide attention as home to what is frequently dubbed “the most isolated tribe in the world” (Papathanasiou, 2023). Indeed, the island’s inhabitants, known as the Sentinelese, are resolute in their refusal of contact with outsiders, having consistently shown hostility to any initiatives undertaken to establish dialogue. For that reason, they often appear in lists of the world’s few remaining *uncontacted peoples* – human groups living

without direct incorporation into external political or governmental structures. According to current estimates, there may be around 100 such communities across the globe, totaling about 10,000 individuals (Holmes, 2013).

In recent centuries, the Sentinelese appear to have remained untouched by immigration and external influences. Although details about their social organization are almost entirely unknown, it is not far-fetched to speculate that North Sentinel Island might be one of the last examples of a *homogeneous* people in the contemporary era of diversity.

Until the early 20th century, many human groups could have been defined as homogeneous. In that context, homogeneity was typically framed in terms of allegedly objective racial or ethnic traits grounded in concepts of bloodlines or age-old customs. Tied to nationalist endeavors, this mindset deemed homogeneity both a factual condition and a normative ideal essential for social cohesion. Yet as the 20th century progressed, the presumed absolutes of *race* and *ethnicity* unraveled, increasingly seen as social constructs rather than *scientific* truths.

In the mid-20th century, the concept of *culture* gained prominence, especially with the rise of the so-called *cultural turn* (Section 2.2). Culture came to frame collective identities not as fixed biological phenomena but as mutable social constructs. Initially, this cultural lens still bore traces of determinism, envisaging culture as singular, stable *essences* characteristic of a people or a society. Yet, from the 1970s onward, critical perspectives, such as those from postmodern and constructivist theories, began depicting culture as fluid, diverse, and open to ongoing reinterpretation. Language, beliefs, rituals, and symbols were all recognized as subject to continuous reinterpretation and transformation.

Within this newer, more critical perspective, culture no longer functioned as a substitute for traditional notions of race or ethnicity. Instead, it emerged as a flexible amalgam of multiple, constantly shifting practices, norms, and identities shaped by interaction. Individuals often navigate numerous cultural affiliations simultaneously – gender, class, religion, language, family background, professional identity, and so on – revealing the vibrant complexity of actual social life. Over the past fifty years, forces such as mass migration, instant communication technologies, urbanization, and expanding commercial networks have only reinforced this view. They have fostered an unprecedented capacity for people to renegotiate their identities, intertwining local communities in broader webs of global connectivity. As a result, cultural heterogeneity, often framed in terms of *diversity*, has increasingly been recast not as an exception but as a normal, integral facet of social life.

From this vantage point, homogeneity appears nothing more than a constructed illusion. Any group – however seemingly uniform – commonly exhibits a kaleidoscope of internal differences in outlook, power, and personal trajectories. The notion that large political units might be homogenous has not

only lost descriptive power; it has also been subject to critiques rooted in normative and moral grounds, as efforts to mold a population into a single identity often lead to exclusionary or oppressive policies. Reflecting these shifts, the modern paradigm of Heterogeneity – which acknowledges cultural heterogeneity as intrinsic to social existence – has begun to supplant the earlier ideal of homogeneity.

If the concept of a *homogeneous people* lives on anywhere at all, it would presumably look like a community that has successfully repelled the machinery of globalization and contemporary integration – keeping at bay influence from large-scale political and corporate structures and preventing exposure to the mass communications that can spread ideas and erode old boundaries. In other words: the uncontacted groups, such as the Sentinelese. One might conjecture that the small population of the Sentinelese (somewhere between 50 and 200 individuals) would display minimal internal differences or find its own localized ways of containing or reconciling them. Crucially, they have no need to grapple with the external influences that, almost everywhere else, typically challenge a group's uniformity.

In a stark contrast with nearly every other community worldwide – where people, goods, and ideas circulate with increasing speed – the Sentinelese stand out as one of the last few populations on Earth insulated from the emergent frames and modes of the era of diversity. So long as they keep repelling contact, they may be regarded as the utopia of the long-dominant, traditional homogeneous paradigm. From an external perspective, shaped by the cultural turn and its recent critical developments, the case of North Sentinel Island underscores an evocative lesson: the global tide of cultural heterogeneity is not merely a rhetorical flourish; it's an almost inevitable outgrowth of contemporary migration flows, multiscalar governance, and the exchange of knowledge. Only a community that remains unambiguously closed off from these processes can give shape to the longstanding myth of a homogeneous identity. To everyone else, connected in myriad ways – willingly or not – to the dynamic transformations of our world, homogeneity stands revealed as a fleeting construct, overshadowed by the reshaping logic of Heterogeneity.

Throughout this dissertation, the notion of *culture* – broadly understood as the collective patterns of meaning and practice guiding social groups – has served as a key analytical lens for discussing homogeneity and heterogeneity in social contexts. Yet, as we have seen, this concept is neither fixed nor simple, but has been dynamically evolving over time, accompanying the developments of the cultural turn.

From the outset, we did not attempt to pin down a strict definition of culture; instead, we observed how actors in different localities use the term with varied emphases – some linking it closely to nationality or ethnicity, others stretching it to encompass gender, age, religion, or any significant identity marker. Now, in light of these diverse uses and our research findings, we can pose a vital question: What is the role of culture in this contemporary era of diversity, shaped so deeply by critical insights into culture’s fluid, ever-evolving nature?

The category of culture has long been tied to both collective and individual identities, and it has been referred to as a key framework for understanding how people frame their behaviors, social norms, and everyday practices. Scholars over the last century have debated how precisely culture should be defined, under what conditions it forms, and how it is maintained or transformed (e.g., Znaniecki, 1919; Eliot, 1949; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; Barth, 1969; Geertz, 1973; Ferraro, 1990; Williams, 1997; Benhabib, 2002; Chase, 2006; Hammersley, 2019). Early in the so-called cultural turn (Section 2.2), academic discussions often envisioned cultures as coherent, relatively stable bodies of tradition and norms – something tied and properly defining particular societies or ethnic groups. However, these accounts frequently inclined toward essentialism and groupism, casting individual’s cultural affiliations as almost fixed attributes.

Over the past few decades, in response to academic criticism and the realities of globalization, mass migration, and technology-driven change, scholars have increasingly emphasized the dynamic nature of culture. Rather than a set of enduring traditions, culture is seen as continuously generated and recreated through human interaction, informed by shifts in power, historical processes, and the blending or collision of diverse identity markers. Postmodern thinkers, especially those influenced by post-structuralism, vehemently rejected the notion that culture could be anchored in any single, stable core, instead emphasizing ambiguity, hybridity, and perpetual reinvention.

A compelling contemporary way to conceptualize culture – avoiding the pitfalls of essentialism – is found in the account proposed by Philip Chase, grounded in the notion of *emergence* (Chase, 2006). Emergence is a key concept across natural and social sciences, highlighting how complex phenomena arise from interactions among simpler elements. The classic phrase, “The whole is greater than the

sum of its parts,” conveys how emergent structures exhibit properties irreducible to their individual elements.

Framing culture as an emergent phenomenon implies that this should not be reduced merely to a collated set of individual ideational constructs or practices. Rather, it *emerges* at a collective level through shared norms, meanings, and symbolic codes that shape how people act and interpret their worlds. This collective dimension – the web of intersubjective meanings – gives culture a reality beyond its substantiation at the individual level. Yet it remains inherently fluid and changeable: new meanings can be invented, old ones revised or recontextualized, and the ensemble of beliefs or practices can evolve under shifting social conditions.

A crucial facet of culture is its *ideational* component – that is, its dimension of socially shared meanings ultimately grounded in forms of symbolic coding, including both *cognitive* and *normative* elements. Cognitively, culture offers frameworks for interpreting the world; normatively, it outlines rules, ethical valuations, or ideals that guide how individuals ought to behave. We might refer to this as an *ideational system of social meanings*. Such systems help providing individuals a standing to deal with general questions such as: Why do we do things the way we do? Which actions or beliefs feel obligatory, virtuous, or taboo?

When these social meanings cluster into a coherent (or at least loosely consistent) worldview, they become powerful guides to behavior. They provide reasons for individuals to act in certain ways and, at the same time, they help people make sense of their own actions and identities. In this sense, we can distinguish *culturally salient* behavior from other emergent patterns of social behaviors. For instance, a specific dance gains cultural salience not just because it is a patterned set of steps, but because it is embedded in social meanings, perhaps evoking cultural history, belonging, or ritual significance: if we strip away that symbolic layer, the physical movements alone do not carry the same cultural weight.

Because culture is grounded on an ideational system of social meanings – always shaped, transmitted, or reinterpreted by human interactions – it is inherently dynamic. As people enter new contexts, encounter novel circumstances, or merge with other groups, they *invent* new meanings or rework old ones – a process which includes what Roy Wagner famously described as the *invention of culture* (Wagner, 1975).

Of course, not all ideational systems connected to social meanings can be considered culturally salient. Three additional attributes seem necessary to mark out cultural ideational systems: specifically, such systems a) enjoy some forms of *institutionalization*, b) represent essential frameworks for the *definition of individuals' identities* as members of a social context, and c) are *potentially all-encompassing worldviews*.

More precisely, first, cultural systems tend to exhibit a degree of *institutional or structural embedding*, ensuring that they endure across time. Whether via formal education, religious institutions, or everyday socialization, these systems reproduce themselves in a stable form, though open to gradual transformation.

Second, cultural systems typically serve as foundational contexts for identity – both in terms of self-identification and hetero-identification. They outline who belongs to a certain social group, how membership is recognized, and how in-group solidarity contrasts with out-group difference. This identity dimension underscores culture's role in forging collective belonging.

Finally, cultural ideational systems *potentially* represent all-encompassing worldviews. More specifically, they provide cognitive and normative frameworks through which all aspects of life relevant to individuals can be connected with a meaning that is part of the system. Potentially, their meanings can address all moral or existential questions, mundane routines, or highly specialized functions. When novel situations arise – ones not pre-encoded in the existing cultural system – participants often invent, adapt, or import new meanings to fill the gap.

In conclusion, in today's increasingly interlinked world – the *era of diversity*, where intercultural contact, technology-driven exchange, migration, and multiscalar governance structures define social life – culture emerges as a fluid network of institutional supports, shared identities, and the continuous production of new social meanings. Cultures are neither a static monolith nor a random assortment of customs. They are *emergent, institutionally undergirded, identity-shaping, and potentially all-encompassing system of social meanings* that individuals continually negotiate and update. Individuals increasingly carry multiple cultural memberships, forging hybrid identities that reflect new forms of belonging. Meanwhile, institutions that used to try to freeze or codify a particular version of culture often find their authority weakened as people gain broader, more flexible and diverse cultural repertoires.

The conceptualization of culture as an emergent phenomenon that I endorse can be further clarified and enriched by bringing it into dialogue with Pierre Bourdieu's influential analytical framework, which centers on the concept of *habitus*. When taken together, Bourdieu's perspective on habitus and the account of culture we presented offer a dynamic understanding of how cultural identities and practices are formed, maintained, and transformed by social actors.

Bourdieu famously defined habitus as “a subjective but not individual system of internalised structures, schemes of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same group or class,” constituting a “precondition for all objectification and apperception” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 86). Later, he further characterized it as a “structuring structure, which organises practices and the perception of practices” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 170). Finally, habitus was connected to the concept of *disposition*, intended as the ways of viewing and living in the world: “the habitus, as a system of dispositions to a certain practice, is an objective basis for regular modes of behaviour, and thus for the regularity of modes of practice, and if practices can be predicted...this is because the effect of the habitus is that agents who are equipped with it will behave in a certain way in certain circumstances” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 77). Crucially, while habitus involves an ideational component – a set of internal attitudes and perceptions – it is profoundly “embodied” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 77) in practical activities: specific modes of “standing, speaking, walking” and, ultimately, “feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 70).

Two interconnected elements of habitus are especially relevant for our discussion:

- Habitus does not *determine* individual behavior: While habitus equips individuals with “an acquired system of generative schemes” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 55), leading them to reproduce established patterns that fit into an internalized worldview, it does not completely dictate their actions. Individuals retain the freedom to deviate from habitual structures, generating new ways of acting and thinking. In other words, although habitus provides a structured repertoire of likely or *natural* responses, actors remain capable of creativity and reinvention.
- Habitus can *evolve* through practice: Although a habitus emerges from history, tradition, and socialization, it remains flexible enough to adapt when confronted with new socioeconomic or technological conditions (see also Harker, 1984; 1990). In other words, the fact that habitus represents a product of early socialization which is somehow *imposed* upon individuals during socialization is not incompatible with the fact that it is also continually modified by individuals' experience of the outside world (DiMaggio, 1979). This is how profound cultural or structural changes occur. Through a dynamic interplay between social conditions and personal experience, individuals can creatively *invent* new ways of thinking or acting – resonating with Wagner's concept of *the invention of culture*, Bourdieu refers to habitus as an

“art of inventing” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 55). Yet this inventive power has limits: behaviors or beliefs devoid of any normative or cognitive support within an existing habitus may be *unconceivable*.

When culture is treated as an emergent phenomenon – arising from individuals’ actions connected to shared social meanings – Bourdieu’s habitus illuminates how such emergent processes can solidify into relatively stable, though not immovable, social structures. Specifically, culture can be seen as an ideational system that shapes and is shaped by individuals who share its worldview and dispositions. If habitus highlights the internalization of these meanings – covertly orienting dispositions and practices – then the emergent perspective on culture highlights how, in return, collective processes of interaction and meaning-making yield something larger than any single actor’s perspective. The two frameworks reinforce each other in both directions:

- From individual to collective: Emergent culture emphasizes that individuals, by building on shared social meanings, bring about collective patterns. Habitus explains how these shared meanings become engrained and habitual in people’s embodied knowledge.
- From collective to individual: Habitus, rooted in historical social conditions, shows how cultural patterns give rise to predictable yet adaptable ways of acting. The emergent perspective clarifies that this system is not static, but continually shaped and reshaped through ongoing interactions and new inventions.

A potential pitfall with structural accounts of culture such as the one we are discussing is conflating *culture* with the *social* as a whole. Without clarifying definitions, one might fall into *monist perspectives* that either reduce all social structures to culture (e.g., Znaniecki, 1919; Ferraro, 1990) or dismiss culture as merely another label for social structures (e.g., Phillips 2007). Both extremes overlook the specificity that cultural frameworks bring to social life, such as binding collective identities and normative orientations that transcend purely utilitarian or formal rules.

Maintaining a distinction between *cultural* and *non-cultural* social structures can thus be fruitful. Not all shared ideational systems – such as short-lived games or narrow workplace procedures – rise to the significance of culture. By contrast, robust cultural structures (e.g., national cultures, religious traditions, or even certain corporate contexts) fulfill deeper roles in shaping identities and entire worldviews. They exert what might be called *axiomatic* influence on how members interpret reality and on their feelings of belonging.

Recent social-scientific frameworks support a *social and cultural duality perspective*, whereby cultural and non-cultural social components are treated as analytically distinct yet interwoven (Mohr

& Duquenne, 1997; Breiger, 2000; Mische & Pattison, 2000; Fuhse, 2009; Godart & White, 2010; Basov & Brennecke, 2017; Lee & Martin, 2018). From these perspectives, the differentiation between the two categories of social structures ultimately lies in the characteristics distinguishing cultural ideational systems mentioned in the previous section. In other words, non-cultural ideational systems are those lacking one or more of the essential elements characterizing cultural ideational systems – that is, (a) having institutional supports, (b) underpinning shared identities, and (c) offering potentially all-encompassing worldviews.

Yet, at the same time, the boundary between culture and other social structures remains inevitably porous. More precisely, as ideational systems are inherently dynamic and can be radically transformed in the interaction between individuals, the distinction between culture and other social structures is not fixed and, consequently, not clear-cut. Accordingly, on the one side, a non-cultural ideational system may potentially become a cultural one, with the social structure connected to progressively expanding. For instance, a narrow work ideology can grow into a more pervasive corporate culture which becomes an authentic potentially all-inclusive worldviews characterized by the company's own unique values and norms – in Japan, this phenomenon, conceptualized in terms of *kigyō bunka* (literally meaning *corporate culture*) is often perceived as quite common. On the other side, similarly, a cultural system can lose some of its identity-defining and worldview-encompassing aspects over time, morphing into narrower social structures.

Crucially, in the contemporary era of diversity, individuals often partake in multiple cultural systems – for instance, through ethnicity, religion, language, professional roles, or transnational memberships – leading to hybrid or *creolized* identities. Where normative and cognitive incompatibilities between different ideational systems arise, actors may create new meanings to reconcile them. Yet, people do not necessarily merge these cultural logics seamlessly; they may switch codes or beliefs situationally, much like employing different languages in different settings. Cultural systems can coexist within a single group or person, fostering internal complexity and dynamism, further underscoring that no single culture is monolithic or static.

A final relevant implication of conceiving culture in this structural-emergent sense is that it does not hinge on whether a society or group explicitly frames to its worldview(s) or framework(s) of reference in terms of *culture*. The phenomenon exists wherever institutionalized, identity-defining, and potentially all-encompassing ideational systems take shape, even if participants never deploy the term culture in describing themselves. This leaning toward *realism* underscores that culture can emerge as a social structure, functionally distinctive in shaping meaning, identity, and practice, irrespective of how it is labeled by insiders or outsiders.

Research and Culture in the Era of Diversity

The concept of *culture* seems here to stay, retaining a central position in both scholarly inquiry and everyday discourse, and continuing to serve as a banner for identity-based claims by which individuals and groups seek recognition for their social position or rights. Yet, at the same time, this concept remains a source of persistent and increasing tensions because of its fuzziness, fluidity, and negotiable nature, open to reinterpretation, reflecting the contemporary era's rapid social, technological, and demographic transformations.

The ambiguity of *culture* underlines structural frictions within contemporary understandings, including the complex interplay between the collective and the individual, between particularistic claims and universalistic frameworks, and between the malleability of social meanings and the impulse to anchor these meanings as defining markers of identity. Culture thus appears simultaneously as a foundation for group belonging and as a field of constant reinvention. Alongside these normative and ideological forces, culture is also harnessed for economic or political ends, prompting the strategic production and reworking of cultural expressions and symbols to serve specific agendas.

Despite the controversies that entangle the notion of culture, it appears fated to remain woven into how societies imagine themselves. The dilemmas revolve around the fact that multiple social institutions continue reproducing well-established cultural patterns, while at the same time a variety of actors – individuals, grassroots organizations, private institutions – are increasingly challenging these patterns or renegotiating them in practice. This dual process, in which official cultural norms persist yet also evolve or fragment under new pressures, effectively encapsulates the current era of diversity: social meanings shift, and so do the contexts in which they are deployed.

Even though culture offers an essential category for describing group identities and social dynamics, there is a real danger that using this single term could obfuscate the complex multiplicity of social life. Moreover, the cultural lens can become divisive, as many political and economic stakeholders appropriate it to demarcate and categorize social differences, while certain academic traditions point out the oversimplifications or biases embedded within such usages.

In this dissertation, culture remains a fundamental analytical construct, primarily referenced in terms of *cultural heterogeneity* to conceptualize relations among diverse social groups. Yet the approach pursued has been to deconstruct common definitions of otherness, investigating how specific historical forces have shaped them, how institutions and civil society have codified or contested them over time, and how our present era of diversity took shape. This research underscored that boundaries and meanings associated with cultural difference do not materialize out of the blue; rather, they crystallize from protracted, dynamic processes whose contours keep shifting over time.

No inquiry can provide the final word on these evolving phenomena. Instead, the aim is to propose a framework for scrutinizing local complexities – how cooperation or confrontation unfolds on the ground, how stakeholders interact and negotiate identities, and how localized processes connect to broader, multiscale, governance systems and extended historical trajectories. From this vantage point, one can observe which frames, policies, and practices proliferate or falter, where they meet resistance, and how they contribute (or fail to contribute) to social cohesion.

One major conclusion is that academic research continues to play an influential role in shaping the frames through which societies understand cultural difference. Scholars devise concepts, categories, and narratives that can filter into public debates or inform policy. Consequently, reflexivity remains vital: researchers need to remain alert to the risk that their conceptual tools might perpetuate archaic or biased notions of culture, reinforcing unhelpful boundaries or stereotypes.

Specifically, work prone to *methodological nationalism* can encourage the illusion that culture is indissolubly aligned with national borders, thereby neglecting local or cross-border cultural nuances. Conversely, those who invoke the language of *culture* and *diversity* without a throughout criticism risk reaffirming simplistic or politicized frames that simplify the complexity of social practices.

If the concept of culture is more precarious and troubled than ever, one path forward is to scrutinize how social relations take shape concretely – focusing on patterns of homophily and on how such patterns are continually created, maintained, or recast. This demands a renewed interest in local contexts and transnational connections, accompanied by a comprehensive historical perspective. Above all, it calls for a balanced stance that distinguishes between the normative dimension (which can, for instance, inspire progressive agendas or identity politics) and a scholarly approach committed to tracing and explaining the fluid evolution of social life.

Some guiding principles – approaches this dissertation has tried to adhere to – may foster nuanced, context-aware exploration of diversity and culture:

- *In-depth contextualization*: Investigating how diverse stakeholders – city governments, grassroots movements, business interests – frame cultural heterogeneity in specific locales,

recognizing that these local frames interact with regional, national, and international discourses.

- *Historical continuity and changes*: Showing how current cultural self-definitions or disputes emerge from longer trajectories, ensuring that normative categories like *majority* and *minority* do not appear out of nowhere.
- *Interdisciplinarity*: Combining sociological, anthropological, historical, and political insights to map how cultural meanings are codified, institutionalized, or destabilized by new practices.
- *Critical self-reflection*: Acknowledging that scholarly framings, while purporting to be descriptive, also influence the terms of public debate. Researchers must examine how their analytical frameworks might shape or distort the ways communities perceive themselves.
- *Multiscalarity*: Understanding that local settings operate within broader migratory flows, global labor markets, and transnational cultural exchanges – phenomena that constantly reshape cultural identities.

In sum, as we await what might one day become a *post-cultural turn* where the category of *culture* may be overcome, scholarship on social ecosystems in the era of diversity can profit from more precise, historically grounded, context-sensitive approaches, remaining attentive to the conceptual and political liabilities of the term *culture*. The ongoing tensions within cultural discourse are far from rhetorical: they reverberate through how societies choose to articulate their collective identities, how they allocate resources, and how they contend with difference and affinity in an ever more networked world.

Far from rendering *culture* obsolete, these uncertainties and contradictions underscore why it remains fertile ground for debate, reinterpretation, and fresh empirical work. When we combine a grounded, case-based methodology with a broad, historical, and transnational outlook, we can begin to see culture not as a static category but as a living, evolving process – an ongoing negotiation of identity, meaning, and belonging that demands rigorous scholarship, critical reflexivity, and sensitivity to the everyday realities that shape how people live together.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation set out to investigate how contemporary societies navigate and shape what we have been calling the *era of diversity*, marked by the rise of new frameworks grounded on cultural pluralism for managing cultural heterogeneity. To this aim, it traced how the traditional paradigm of Homogeneity has gradually receded, giving way to new discourses, policies, and social practices that embrace diversity as a fundamental – even *advantageous* – feature of modern social life. Guided by both conceptual and empirical inquiries, the dissertation intended to offer a multiscale, transdisciplinary perspective on these changing notions, examining how various actors – from grassroots movements and civil society organizations, to municipalities, national governments, and international bodies – invent, engage with, and contribute diffusing evolving frameworks of governance of cultural heterogeneity.

At the outset, we framed the scope and potential of this research, situating it against a backdrop of globalization, increasing transnational exchanges, and intensifying debates on migration, cultural heterogeneity, and societal cohesion. Although cultural heterogeneity is not a new phenomenon, the profound socioeconomic, political, and ideational transformations of the last decades have led to the emergence and diffusion of new frames, perspectives, and concepts, progressively taking shape around the ideals of diversity and cultural pluralisms. These shifts have critical implications for how political leaders, community activists, and scholars craft solutions to the tension between universalist ideals of rights, equality, and cohesion, on one hand, and the messy reality of particularistic claims, difference, and complex identity negotiations, on the other.

In the first part of the dissertation, we devoted considerable effort to clarifying definitions, theories, and methodological tools for the research. This theoretical and conceptual scaffolding set up the rest of the study's chapters. Building on a meta-analysis of existing scholarship in disciplines ranging from sociology and political science to anthropology, history, and network studies, we argued that the growing emphasis on diversity emerges from a confluence of forces: the post–World War II rise of human-rights discourses, the expansion of democratic ideals that privilege inclusiveness, the neoliberal turn that reconfigured welfare and governance structures, and the local turn that has empowered municipalities to serve as innovative policy labs. Crucially, the introduction also foregrounded the role of city networks, which have become increasingly prominent in circulating ideas about migration, cultural inclusivity, and intercultural or multicultural frameworks.

Then, we proceeded to delineate the conceptual architecture of the dissertation, explaining how traditional notions of *race*, *ethnicity*, and, finally, *culture*, have emerged, evolved, and, in many cases, lost ground to more dynamic, inclusive, and fluid views of identity and belonging. In particular, the study showed that *culture*, itself, is a historically contingent analytical category which was reframed over decades of academic debate, challenged by critiques from postmodern, constructivist, and transnational scholars who exposed the pitfalls of essentialism and groupism of previous perspectives. Out of this ferment emerged alternative approaches to cultural heterogeneity, including the current frameworks labelled as *multiculturalism*, *interculturalism*, and the broader rubric of *diversity governance*.

Against this theoretical backdrop, we introduced the core methodological framework of the research: a revised policy diffusion theory, combined with a multiscale analysis that locates local governments – especially in urban centers – at the crossroads of top-down institutional pressures and bottom-up community activism. Part I then concluded by presenting the rationale for choosing three focal cities – Barcelona (Spain), Hamamatsu (Japan), and Ansan (South Korea) – as case studies capturing contrasting socio-historical contexts, each with distinctive demographic shifts, governance legacies, and discursive traditions around cultural heterogeneity.

The second part of the dissertation focused on the European Union context, zooming in on Spain and, eventually, on Barcelona as a local manifestation of intercultural policy. Drawing on historical analysis, Part II showed how the EU initially focused on economic integration, with cultural matters occupying a secondary position. Over time, however, especially following multiple enlargements, rising immigration, and the need to promote social cohesion in a more diverse Europe, cultural policy moved to the foreground. Initiatives such as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008) and the Intercultural Cities Programme cast interculturality as a guiding principle for addressing difference. This was conceptualized as moving *beyond multiculturalism*, in the sense that, rather than merely celebrating differences, communities should actively cultivate sustained dialogue, interaction, and mutual adaptation among various groups.

Concurrently, Spain's own historical trajectory – from Francoist centralization to democratic decentralization – exemplifying how localities approached new waves of migration in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. By the time Spain joined the EU, many of its municipalities, led by activist civil society groups, were already beginning developing incipient frameworks for inclusion of cultural minorities. While the issues related to cultural heterogeneity became more urgent – both because of rising immigration and the reemergence of historically entrenched regional differences –, several Spanish cities turned to the narrative of diversity advantage, seeking not merely to tolerate difference but to capitalize on it, in both social and economic terms.

Barcelona emerged as an exemplary case, aligning closely with these European discourses but also feeding them. Historically, Barcelona was marked by strong civic traditions, municipal autonomy, and a legacy of progressive urban planning that combined welfare-oriented policies with entrepreneurial city branding. In implementing its two versions of the ten-year *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat* (Barcelona Interculturality Plan), the city strove to integrate normative ideals of equality and respect with more pragmatic imperatives of city competitiveness, tourism, and global branding. The analysis emphasized the interplay of public-private partnerships, professional consultancies, grassroots activist groups, and EU-level endorsements. This interplay produced a governance model that not only facilitated acceptance of diversity as a normal feature of urban life but also recast it as a lever for economic and cultural dynamism. Part II's discussion concluded that Barcelona, actively engaged with European institutions, exemplified a local government's capacity to *export* best practices and conceptual frames to other municipalities through city networks, thereby illustrating diffusion's real-world impact.

Shifting to East Asia, Part III interrogated Japan's path to acknowledging what in the Japanese public discourse is called precisely as the *Era of Diversity*. Traditionally, Japan has maintained a strong myth of homogeneity, promoted already since pre-modern time under the Tokugawa regime. This myth consolidated during the efforts of modern nation-building under the centralist Meiji government and, even more, in the establishment of the new democratic Japan after World War II. Under this narrative, the archipelago as culturally cohesive and relatively free of cultural heterogeneity. In reality, of course, groups such as the Ainu, Okinawans, Burakumin, Zainichi Koreans, and more recently, immigrant workers from Brazil, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries, have consistently challenged such narratives. While the pre-war and wartime governments suppressed these minority voices, and the postwar political environment remained dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party's unitary discourses, democratization and decentralization have progressively enabled municipalities and civil society activists to innovate in policies that recognize cultural difference.

It was at this point that, gradually, the concept of *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural coexistence) surfaced. Rooted in grassroots activism – especially after the 1995 Hanshin earthquake exposed how foreign communities were dramatically marginalized in disaster situations – *tabunka kyōsei* gradually acquired official sanction. Over time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications created broad guidelines for local governments, though seldom accompanied by robust funding or legislative tools. This gap left many municipalities to adapt *tabunka kyōsei* on their own terms, forging a variety of local approaches that sometimes melded normative objectives of anti-discrimination with entrepreneurial imperatives, from city branding to industrial development.

In this environment, Hamamatsu stands out as a municipality that steadily embraced both *tabunka kyōsei* ideal and brand. Through a series of successive visions and plans, Hamamatsu devised policies for integrating foreign residents – particularly the large Brazilian Nikkeijin population drawn by the city’s manufacturing sector – while also presenting itself as a *creative city* that harnesses cultural heterogeneity as an asset for economic development. The in-depth exploration of Hamamatsu underscored the roles played by mayoral leadership, business elites, civil society organizations, and private consultants, mirroring in many respects the public-private synergy identified in Barcelona’s intercultural governance. Despite these parallels, Hamamatsu’s approach remains more narrowly targeted at foreign laborers, thereby limiting the recognition of other identity markers (e.g., LGBTQ+ or persons with disabilities) that might also animate the concept of diversity. The analysis highlighted that, for many local actors, *tabunka kyōsei* is as much a pragmatic tool for sustaining economic growth in an era of labor shortages as it is an ideological commitment to equality and inclusiveness.

Finally, Part IV turned to South Korea, examining how the strong national ideal of ethnic unity – rooted in resistance to Japanese colonialism and Cold War divisions, and consolidated under authoritarian rule – began to fracture under the combined pressures of democratization, globalization, and labor-market demands. As in Japan, immigration soared in the 1990s and 2000s, with guest-worker programs and marriage migration fueling a growing recognition that the country was no longer culturally homogeneous, if it ever truly had been. This rethinking gave rise to the concept of *damunhwa* (multiculture). Driven by grassroots movements, religious organizations, local NGOs, and eventually national ministries, *damunhwa* policies offered partial legal protections, welfare provisions, and integration assistance for migrant populations, particularly marriage migrants and laborers in industrial zones.

The city of Ansan represents the paradigmatic case of a South Korean city committed to being at the forefront of *damunhwa* discourses and practices. Ansan’s story as a *City of Damunhwa* began in large part with grassroots activism and local volunteer networks in neighborhoods like Wongok-dong, where foreign workers had congregated. Over time, however, municipal authorities – alert to new possibilities for city branding – began interested in capitalizing on the foreign presence both for promoting tourism and a new image of Ansan as a cosmopolitan and global city. Soon, the local administration took charge of the *damunhwa*-related initiatives in Wongok-dong, within the framework of the *Multicultural Village* project. While this municipal endorsement yielded expanded support for migrants, the research also pointed to tensions: local NGOs sometimes felt overshadowed by the city’s entrepreneurial push, which risked commodifying cultural difference as a tourism draw or a brand asset, rather than delving into deeper questions of social justice. Thus, the normative and

entrepreneurial dimensions of diversity governance coexisted in a fraught relationship, shaping day-to-day realities for migrant communities.

Bringing the case studies and theoretical insights together, the research findings and discussion underscored several major themes. First, the tension between *ideational* and *entrepreneurial* approaches is ever-present in municipal approaches to diversity. Whether we label them *intercultural*, *multicultural*, *tabunka kyōsei*, or *damunhwa*, these frameworks oscillate between ethical commitments – equality, anti-discrimination, recognition – and pragmatic objectives – city branding, labor-market advantages, and global competitiveness. This tension is not necessarily an impasse: as shown in Barcelona, synergy can be found whereby robust anti-discrimination measures enhance the city’s attractiveness, or in Hamamatsu, where inclusive policies can help local industries thrive. However, our cross-case comparison highlights that whenever resources tighten or political climates shift, there is a risk that the entrepreneurial dimension will overshadow normative goals, potentially undermining the deeper transformations needed for lasting social inclusion.

Second, the research confirmed that local governments are crucial catalysts in shaping how cultural diversity is interpreted and institutionalized. While national legislation or international conventions provide overarching norms, it is often at the municipal level that discourses become operationalized into policies, pilot projects, or networks of stakeholders. Indeed, cities function both as *implementers* and *innovators*. Implementing higher-level mandates, they adapt them to local conditions. But they also innovate through municipal-led programs, eventually influencing national or international standards. This dynamic, documented in all three broad geographical contexts – Europe, Japan, and South Korea – validates the decision to adopt a multiscalar perspective that recognizes the agency of subnational actors as well as the broader structural constraints they navigate.

Third, the concept of policy diffusion is invaluable for understanding why local initiatives sometimes converge on similar frames of diversity advantage, equality, and integration despite distinct cultural backgrounds and political lineages. All three of the dissertation’s case studies participated in international city networks or alliances, drawing on each other’s successes and solutions. Barcelona, for instance, was an influential pioneer in the Intercultural Cities Programme, with its approaches circulating globally. Hamamatsu collaborated with other Japanese municipalities and eventually joined the same Intercultural Cities Network, bridging what might otherwise seem like very different policy spheres. Ansan, in turn, leveraged national and global recognition to assert itself as a model city, forging alliances and exchanging best practices with both domestic and foreign municipalities. By detailing these cross-border connections, the dissertation not only demonstrates how frameworks such as interculturalism can *travel* worldwide, but also reveals the negotiation processes that occur when local contexts re-interpret externally derived ideas.

Fourth, the study illuminated how discourses of *diversity* differ significantly from older group-bound ideologies framed under a less dynamic conceptualization of culture. Rather than assuming that differences fade with time or remain neatly siloed in ethnic enclaves, many local-level policies now emphasize ongoing, dynamic engagement: intercultural contact, co-creation of cultural activities, collaborative public decision-making. Yet the analysis also signaled the persistent limitations of these new frameworks, including the narrow targeting of certain groups (e.g., migrant laborers or marriage migrants), the overshadowing of invisible minorities (such as LGBT+ individuals, second- or third-generation immigrants, or disabled citizens), and the enduring presence of xenophobia or populist backlash. Hence, while the shift from the paradigm of Homogeneity to that of Heterogeneity is substantial, it remains incomplete, prone to strategic cooptation, and vulnerable to political rollback.

Fifth, the findings spotlight the role of scholars and research institutions as *change agents* in their own right. Throughout each case, the dissertation tracked how academic research – whether from local universities, think tanks, or international consortia – legitimized certain policies or vocabularies. For instance, in the European context, Comedia’s studies formed a bedrock for the Intercultural Cities approach, shaping how municipal leaders framed and measured *intercultural* achievements. In Japan, progressive intellectuals allied with local governments to interpret *tabunka kyōsei* in ways that stressed equality and active participation, and in South Korea, academics contributed to a narrative that recognized the limitations of older assimilation models, often introducing more critical or global insights into official discourse. This dynamic underscores the broader point that ideas do not spread spontaneously; they require carriers – sometimes scholars themselves – and nodes of transmission, which can include academic conferences, co-authored articles, or global think tanks.

With these common threads identified, the dissertation’s findings also highlight the subtle differences among the European, Japanese, and Korean experiences. Europe, and specifically the EU environment in which Barcelona is a key player, has a longer tradition of codified protections for minority rights, as well as supranational institutions that actively promote intercultural dialogue. This can expedite local-level transformations, but also constrains them within standardized EU frameworks. Japan, by contrast, has advanced *tabunka kyōsei* in a more piecemeal and municipal-driven way, reflecting the country’s relatively centralized yet historically corporatist governance approach, complicated by changing labor markets and local activism. Meanwhile, South Korea has shown even more abrupt leaps toward acknowledging diversity, catalyzed by democratization’s synergy with new immigration patterns. Yet as the dissertation’s exploration of Ansan makes clear, these leaps often remain fragile, because the deeply ingrained myth of ethnic unity can reemerge when political winds shift or when resources become scarce.

In pulling together these nuanced discussions, the dissertation points to several broader theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, it challenges the neat dichotomies that sometimes appear in academic debates – East vs. West, normative vs. entrepreneurial, top-down vs. bottom-up – by illustrating a reality that is more hybrid and fluid. Policies seldom arise purely from moral or purely from profit-oriented reasoning. Instead, localities fashion *hybrid discourses* that permit them to meet moral imperatives of inclusion while also pursuing pragmatic city-branding strategies. This carries important implication for how we may judge the *success* or *authenticity* of diversity policies. A local government may embed entrepreneurial motives in a normative framework without necessarily betraying inclusive ideals. Conversely, a policy proclaiming lofty rights-based ideals may fail to gain traction if it overlooks practical concerns, like job creation, city image, or global competition. The research findings thus reveals these tensions as inherent to modern governance rather than as irreconcilable contradictions, inviting to find viable path for balancing them.

Practically, the study underscores the importance of transnational learning and ongoing dialogue among policymakers, activists, and citizens in different regions. If diversity governance is indeed traveling across borders – through city networks, academic research, NGO activism, or intergovernmental organizations – then it is crucial to pay attention to the cultural, institutional, and political translations that occur at local levels. A policy that works in Barcelona cannot be replicated to Hamamatsu; it must be adapted to local laws, cultural norms, and social priorities. Similarly, Ansan's strategies for bridging activism and entrepreneurial branding can inform other cities in both Asia and Europe, but only if they grasp the complex interplay of local civil society, national agendas, and historical discourses of ethnic unity. Identifying these patterns and clarifying how adaptation and appropriation take place is arguably one of the dissertation's key contributions.

An additional insight pertains to the role of language and the translinguistic dimension. As seen throughout the four parts of the dissertation, only by acknowledging multiple linguistic structures – like Spanish, Catalan, Japanese, Korean – can one effectively appreciate how local actors interpret and shape cultural heterogeneity in their specific sociopolitical contexts. In this sense, the research opens the door to more nuanced cross-cultural dialogues and suggests that any truly global conversation on cultural heterogeneity must incorporate conceptual vocabularies from multiple languages and traditions. The East Asian experiences of *tabunka kyōsei* and *damunhwa* are not merely localized derivatives of Western frames and discourses; rather, they have generated their own discursive and policy innovations that can enrich the global repertoire of diversity governance.

Furthermore, the research highlights the crucial significance of both descriptive and normative scholarship. On one level, it offers a descriptive account of how city networks, national reforms, and local activism converge to produce new frameworks. On another level, it delves into the normative

debates about the meaning of inclusion, the obligations of majority and minority groups, and the rights-based imperatives that shape cultural policy. The analysis also points to the possibility that these normative debates can be manipulated – used strategically by political elites to secure moral legitimacy or by activists to press for structural changes. By revealing these uses and potential misuses of normative discourse, the dissertation fosters a more critical awareness of how arguments revolving around *diversity* might be weaponized for narrow ends or, conversely, harnessed for promoting minority inclusion and recognition.

Finally, the research also suggests a direction for policy and activism. By documenting how local communities and policymakers have creatively balanced normative commitments with economic imperatives, it gives concrete examples for other municipalities grappling with the challenges of diversity. For instance, the synergy of public-private partnerships in Barcelona’s intercultural model might spur other cities to forge alliances between cultural NGOs, entrepreneurial consultancies, and municipal authorities, with a well-defined system of accountability and resource-sharing. Meanwhile, the bottom-up impetus seen in Ansan could inspire civic groups elsewhere to leverage local activism to push municipal governments toward more radical inclusivity, even if that activism eventually faces co-optation or partial assimilation into tourism campaigns. Indeed, the dissertation’s critical lens ensures that we recognize co-optation not as a total failure but as a process that can yield partial gains, as well as new dynamics between state actors and NGOs.

Ultimately, this dissertation affirms the notion that cultural heterogeneity is neither ephemeral nor marginal: it has become central to how modern polities understand social identity, rights, and governance. If the old ideal of homogeneity once provided a sense of national unity, the emerging lens of diversity asks how to harness difference as both a social resource and a moral imperative. The three case studies confirm that success in building cohesive, equitable societies under conditions of diversity depends on forging robust alliances among local governments, civil society, private sectors, and transnational organizations. No single stakeholder or level of government can comprehensively address the complexities of multicultural co-existence. Instead, it requires an interplay of actors with different motivations, capabilities, and normative commitments, negotiating their roles while forging a shared language of diversity. The dissertation shows that this interplay is rarely neat or conflict-free but is often generative, spawning new policy solutions, discursive frameworks, and political identities.

It is important to underline the various limitations of the present work, and the open questions that it leaves unresolved, which could become the subject for future research. First, while the comparative approach spanning Europe, Japan, and South Korea is enlightening, future research might expand further to contexts such as Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East. This would test the generalizability of its core arguments and highlight still other models of local governance in the face

of cultural heterogeneity. Second, within each case study – Barcelona, Hamamatsu, Ansan – there remains a variety of sublocal settings (e.g., particular districts, neighborhoods, or social institutions) that might exhibit different patterns of policy adoption and resistance. The dissertation acknowledges these internal diversities but inevitably cannot explore each in exhaustive detail. Furthermore, while focusing on various policies and practices of governance of cultural heterogeneity, in this dissertation we did not delve in the concrete effects of these strategies, that is, their effective results and successes/failures. Another question pertains to how new global crises – like the COVID-19 pandemic or climate-related displacements – will stress-test the emerging diversity governance paradigms. While this dissertation raises the possibility that crises often exacerbate xenophobia or strain municipal budgets, it does not systematically track these developments.

In concluding, this research highlights – so to say – a *world in flux*, where populist backlashes, globalization's uneven economic rewards, accelerated migration flows, environmental crises, and new technological infrastructures (e.g., digital platforms, big data) will continue to shape the structures of community life, the forms of social cohesion, and the construction and renegotiation of collective identities.

We hope that the work completed here may contribute to our understanding of these transformations through the findings concerning how diversity became a dominant lens for interpreting cultural heterogeneity, how frames of diversity governance spread across national borders through policy diffusion, and how governments have been translating them into policies and practices, reconciling ethical imperatives with pragmatic considerations.

From a scholarly perspective, we have been arguing that future research should adopt flexible, multilingual, and transdisciplinary frameworks, bridging disciplinary barriers and national boundaries. Moreover, we have been underlining how academics themselves, by providing analytical constructs or policy blueprints, serve as key *change agents* who shape the discourses that become global norms.

We hope that this analysis may be of interest also for practitioners – policy officials, NGO leaders, educators – who can get information about the shortcoming of essentialism, the vulnerabilities of purely rhetorical inclusivity, and the virtues of forging strong institutional partnerships that combine public, private, and community resources.

On a broader social level, the study offers both a hopeful yet critical view: hopeful insofar as local actors continually innovate more equitable forms of coexistence; critical insofar as we must remain vigilant to the structural inequalities and commodifying impulses that can dilute or distort the transformative potential of diversity.

Moving forward, the final intention is that this work may inform more reflexive, context-sensitive, and ethically grounded approaches to cultural heterogeneity. In providing an in-depth comparative look at how multiple contexts have engaged with diversity governance, this dissertation calls for rigorous analyses and a reservoir of strategies for inclusive policymaking. It likewise underscores the continuing interplay of local agency and transnational linkages, emphasizing that an era of diversity is not simply *arrived at* but is actively co-constructed by actors who, whether intentionally or not, shape the meaning, scope, and potential of cultural difference in the modern world. Diversity, far from an end-state, is an evolving, negotiated process, whose success depends on the capacity of societies to embrace reflexivity, dialogue, adaptability, and indeed, the recognition of heterogeneity not as a threat but an intrinsic element of our contemporary communities – dynamica and fluid, but always, potentially, cohesive.

Appendix

List of Interviews Directly Quoted in the Text

Interview A. Sanahuja, Ramon. *In-person interview with the author*. January 20, 2022.

Interview B. De Torres, Dani. *In-person interview with the author*. February 10, 2022.

Interview C. Japanese city official participating in the Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents (name withheld at the interviewee's request). *In-person interview with the author*. June 14, 2022.

Interview D. Japanese activist from a pro-migrant civil society organization working in Ōsaka (name withheld at the interviewee's request). *In-person interview with the author*. June 16, 2022.

Interview E. Japanese city official from Hamamatsu (name withheld at the interviewee's request) *In-person interview with the author*. July 11, 2022.

Interview F. Japanese activist from a pro-migrant civil society organization working in Hamamatsu (name withheld at the interviewee's request). *In-person interview with the author*. July 12, 2022.

Interview G. Nikkeijin living in Hamamatsu (name withheld at the interviewee's request). *In-person interview with the author*. July 12, 2022.

Interview H. Suzuki, Yasutomo. *Question asked at the conference ““Tabunkakyōsei toshi Hamamatsu” - 16-nenkan no torikumi o furikaeru” (Hamamatsu, a multicultural city - Looking back on 16 years of efforts)*. April 20, 2023.

Interview I. Staff of Ansan's Intercultural Support Division (name withheld at the interviewee's request). *In-person interview with the author*, April 27, 2023.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdallah-Pretceille, M. (2006). Interculturalism as a Paradigm for Thinking about Diversity. *Intercultural Education*, 17(5), pp. 475-483.

Abélès, M. (2000). Virtual Europe. In I. Bellier, & T. M. Wilson (Eds.), *An Anthropology of the European Union. Building, Imagining, and Experiencing the New Europe* (pp. 31-52). Berg.

Abelmann, N., & Kim, H. (2004). A Failed Attempt at Transnational Marriage: Maternal Citizenship in a Globalizing South Korea. In N. Constable (Ed.), *Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia* (pp. 101-123). University of Pennsylvania Press.

Abrams, P. (1978). Towns and Economic Growth: Some Theories and Problems. In P. Abrams, & E. A. Wrigl (Eds.), *Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology* (pp. 9-33). Cambridge University Press.

Acuto, M. & Rayner, S. (2016). City Networks: Breaking Gridlocks or Forging (New) Lock-ins? *International Affairs*, 92, pp. 1147-1166.

Addicott, A. C. (2017). The Rise and Fall of the Zaibatsu: Japan's Industrial and Economic Modernization. *Global Tides*, 11(5).

Adonnino, P. (1985). *Report to the European Council*. European Council. Retrieved April 20, 2023, from <https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/historical/en/4659>.

Adorno, T., & Horkheimer, M. [1944] (2001). *The Culture Industry*. Routledge.

Agrawal, D. R., & Foremny, D. (2018). Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms. *CESifo Working Paper*, 7027.

Ahmed, Z. (2011, September 26). Strategic Importance: A Historical Perspective. *The Light of Andamans*. Retrieved February, 2023, from <http://lightofandamans.blogspot.com/2011/09/strategic-importance-historical.html>.

Aiden, H. (2011). Creating the 'Multicultural Coexistence' Society: Central and Local Government Policies Towards Foreign Residents in Japan. *Social Science Japan Journal*, 14(2), pp. 213-231.

Ainu Policy Promotion Headquarters. (n.d.). Ainu seisaku no gaiyō. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ainusuishin/policy.html>.

Aldrich, D. (2011). The Power of People: Social Capital's Role in Recovery from the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, *Natural Hazards*. 56(3), pp. 595-611.

Ansan City, n.d., yeogdaeansansijang. Retrieved June 20, 2024, from https://www.ansan.go.kr/www/common/cntnts/selectContents.do?cntnts_id=C0001091.

- Appadurai, A. (2006). *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*. Duke University Press.
- Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (Eds.). (1979). *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Brooks/Cole.
- Avenell, Simon. (2006). "Regional Egoism as the Public Good: Residents' Movements in Japan during the 1960s and 1970s. *Japan Forum*, 18(1), pp. 89-113.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona. (1997). *Un Plan Municipal para la Interculturalidad*. Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona. (2002). *Plan Municipal de Inmigración de Barcelona*. Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona. (2008). *Plan de Trabajo Inmigración 2008-2011*. Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona. (2010). *Barcelona Interculturality Plan*. Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Ajuntament de Barcelona. (2021). *Barcelona Interculturality Plan 2021-2030*. Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Alba, R., & Nee, V. (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration. *International Migration Review*, 31, pp. 826-874.
- Alba, R., & Nee, V. (2003). *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Harvard University Press.
- Alcoff, L. M., & Mendieta, E., *Identities: Race, Class, Gender, and Nationality*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Aleo, P. (2016). *Chicago, Illinois - The First 100 Years 1833-1933*, Aleo Publishing.
- Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2000). *After Multiculturalism*. Foreign Policy Centre.
- Allemann-Ghionda, C. (2008). *Intercultural Education in Schools*. European Parliament.
- Allen, M. D., Pettus, C., & Haider-Markel, D. P. (2004). Making the National Local: Specifying the Conditions for National Government Influence on State Policymaking. *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 4(3), pp. 318-344.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Addison-Wesley.
- Amelina, A., Nergiz, D., Faist, T., & Glick Schiller, N. (2012). *Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Research Methodologies for Cross-Border Studies*. Routledge.
- Amin, A. (2002). Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diversity. *Environment and Planning A*, 34(6), pp. 959-980.
- Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (2007). Cultural-Economy and Cities. *Progress in Human Geography*, 31(2), pp. 143-161.

- Anderson, B. (2016). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso.
- Anheier, H., & Leat, D. (2002). *From Charity to Creativity: Philanthropic Foundations in the 21st Century*. Comedia / Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust.
- Aoyama, Y. (2009). Entrepreneurship and Regional Culture: The Case of Hamamatsu and Kyoto, Japan. *Regional Studies*, 43(3), pp. 495-512.
- Aparicio, F. M. (2017). “La Reconstrucción de la Nación”. Homogeneización Cultural Y Nacionalización de Masas en la España Franquista (1936 -1959). *Historia y Política*, 38, pp. 23-56.
- Apple, M. (1996). *Cultural Politics and Education*. Open University Press.
- Appel-Meulenbroek, R., & Danivska, V. (2022). *A Handbook of Management Theories and Models for Office Environments and Services*. Routledge.
- Armstrong, N. (2001). Who’s Afraid of the Cultural Turn? *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 12(1), pp. 17-49.
- Appiah, A. (2005). *The Ethics of Identity*. Princeton University Press.
- Aramburu, M., & Zegrí, M. (1994) Un programa a favor de la convivencia intercultural en Ciutat Vella de Barcelona. In Recasens J. (Ed.), *VVAA Extranjeros en el paraíso*. Virus.
- Arian, A., & Barnes, S. H. (1974). The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability. *The Journal of Politics*, 36(3), pp. 592-614.
- Arian A., & Barnes S. H. (1974). The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability. *The Journal of Politics*, 36(3), pp. 592–614.
- Arima, S. (2017). *Gekijō-gata popurizumu no tanjō*. Minerva.
- Ashcroft, R. T., & Bevir, M. (2017). Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain: Policy, Law and Theory. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 21(1), pp. 1-21.
- Ashworth, G. J., & Voogd, H. (1990). *Selling the City: Marketing Approaches in Public Sector Urban Planning*. Belhaven Press.
- Bhabha, H. K. (1994). *The Location of Culture*. Routledge.
- Bachmann-Medick, D. (2016). *Cultural Turns: New Orientations in the Study of Culture*. Translated by A. Blauhut. De Gruyter.
- Bagguley, P., & Hussain, Y. (2008). *Riotous Citizens Ethnic Conflict in Multicultural Britain*. Routledge.
- Baker, P. E. (1934). Negro-White Adjustment in America. *The Journal of Negro Education*, 3(2), pp. 194-204.

- Balibrea, M. P. (2001). Urbanism, Culture and the Post-Industrial City: Challenging the “Barcelona Model. *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies*, 2(2), pp. 187-210.
- Bantekas I., & Oette, L. (2013). *International Human Rights Law and Practice*. Cambridge University Press.
- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2013). Is There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index. *Comparative European Politics*, 11(5), pp. 577-598.
- Barak, M. E. M. (2022). *Managing Diversity: Toward a Globally Inclusive Workplace*. Sage Publications.
- Barber, B. R. (2013). *If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities*. Yale University Press.
- Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (Eds.). (2006). *Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective*. The MIT Press.
- Barkan, E. (1995). Race, Religion, and Nationality in American Society: A Model of Ethnicity – From Contact to Assimilationism. *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 14, pp. 38-101.
- Barnett, C. (2004). A Critique of the Cultural Turn. In, J. S. Duncan, N. C. Johnson, & R. H. Schein (Eds.), *A Companion to Cultural Geography* (pp. 38-48). Blackwell.
- Barney, J. B. & Clark, D. N. (2007). *Resource-Based Theory Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantages*. Oxford University Press.
- Barrett, B. (2005). *Ecological Modernisation and Japan*. Routledge.
- Barry, B. (2001). *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism*. Harvard University Press.
- Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Little, Brown and Co.
- Basov, N., & Brennecke, J. (2017). Duality Beyond Dyads: Multiplex Patterning of Social Ties and Cultural Meanings. In P. Groenewegen, J. Ferguson, C. Moser, J. W. Mohr, & S. P. Borgatti (Eds.). *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* (pp. 87–112). Emerald.
- Bassnett, S., & Lefevere, A. (1990). *Translation, History and Culture*. UNKNO.
- Bauder, H. (2017). Sanctuary Cities: Policies and Practices in International Perspective. *International Migration*, 55(2), 174-187.
- Baudrillard, J. (1998). *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*. Sage.
- Baumgartner, F. (2013). Ideas and Policy Change. *Governance*, 26(2), pp. 239-258.
- Baumgartner, F. (2014). Ideas, Paradigms, and Confusions. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(3), pp. 475-480.

- Baycan-Levent, T. (2010). Diversity and Creativity as Seedbeds for Urban and Regional Dynamics. *European Planning Studies*, 18(4), pp. 565-594.
- Baycan-Levent T., Gülümser Akgün, A. A., & Kundak S. (2010). Success Conditions for Urban Networks: Eurocities and Sister Cities. *European Planning Studies*, 18(8), pp. 1187-1206.
- Bearce, D. H., & Bondanella, S. (2007). Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence. *International Organization*, 61, pp. 703-733.
- Beck, U. (2002). The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies. *Theory, Culture, and Society*, 19(1-2), pp. 17-44.
- Beech, M. (2005). *The Political Philosophy of New Labour*. I.B. Tauris.
- Befu, H. (2001). *Hegemony and Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron*. Trans Pacific Press.
- Béland, D. (2007). Ideas and Institutional Change in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and Policy Drift. *Social Science Quarterly*, 88(1), pp. 20-38.
- Belfiore, E. (2004). Auditing Culture: The Subsidised Cultural Sector in the New Public Management. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 10, pp. 183-202.
- Bell, D. (1976). *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. Basic Books.
- Benet-Martínez, V., & Haritatos, J. (2005). Bicultural Identity Integration (BII): Components and Psychosocial Antecedents. *Journal of Personality*, 73(4), pp. 1015-1050.
- Benhabib, S. (2002). *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton University Press.
- Bennett, D. (1998). *Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity*. Routledge.
- Bennett, A. 2008. Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, & D. Collier (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (pp. 702-721), Oxford University Press.
- Benson, D., & Jordan, A. (2011). What Have We Learned from Policy Transfer Research? Dolowitz and Marsh Revisited. *Political Studies Review*, 9(3), pp. 366-378.
- Benz, A., & Eberlein, B. (1999). The Europeanization of Regional Policies: Patterns of Multi-Level Governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(2), pp. 329-348.
- Berardo, R., Fischer, M., & Hamilton, M. (2020). Collaborative Governance and the Challenges of Network-Based Research. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 50(8), pp. 898-913.
- Berg, M. L., & Nowicka, M. (2019). *Studying Diversity, Migration and Urban Multiculture: Convivial Tools for Research and Practice*. UCL Press.

- Berman, S. (1998). *The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe*. Harvard University Press.
- Berman, S. (2013). Ideational Theorizing in the Social Sciences since “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State.” *Governance*, 26(2), pp. 217-237.
- Bermúdez, K., Crespo, R., Sanahuja, R., & Astudillo, C. (2018). Building Intercultural Policies and Practices in the City of Barcelona. In White, B. (Ed.), *Intercultural Cities: Policy and Practice for a New Era* (pp. 103-144). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bernecker, W. L. (1998). Monarchy and Democracy: The Political Role of King Juan Carlos in the Spanish Transición. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33(1), pp. 65-84.
- Berry, J. W. (1980). Acculturation as Varieties of Adaptation. In A. Padilla (Ed.), *Acculturation, Theory, Models and Some New Findings* (9-25), Westview Press.
- Berry, J. W. (2019). *Acculturation: A Personal Journey across Cultures*. Cambridge University Press.
- Berry, J. W., & Sam, D. L. (2006). *The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology*. Cambridge University Press.
- Besalú i Costa, X. (2008). Llengua, educació i immigració: el simposi de Girona. *Revista Catalana de Pedagogia*, 6, pp. 161-176.
- Bidet, E. (2009). Social Capital and Work Integration of Migrants: The Case of North Korean Defectors in South Korea. *Asian Perspective*, 33(2), pp. 151-179.
- Biebricher, T. (2018). *The Political Theory of Neoliberalism*. Stanford University Press.
- Binder, J., Zagefka, H., Brown, R., Funke, F., Kessler, T., Mummendey, A., Maquil, A., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J.-P. (2009). Does Contact Reduce Prejudice or Does Prejudice Reduce Contact? A Longitudinal Test of the Contact Hypothesis among Majority and Minority Groups in Three European Countries. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(4), pp. 843–856.
- Bird, A. (2022). Thomas Kuhn. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thomas-kuhn/>.
- Bissoondath, N. (1994). *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*. Penguin Canada.
- Bix, H. P. (1989). *Peasant Protest in Japan, 1590–1884*. Yale University Press.
- Blakeley, G. (2005). Local Governance and Local Democracy: The Barcelona Model. *Local Government Studies*, 31(2), pp. 149-165.
- Blanco, I. (2009a). Gobernanza Urbana y Políticas de Regeneración: El caso de Barcelona. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, 20, pp. 125-146.
- Blanco, I. (2009b). Does a ‘Barcelona Model’ Really Exist? Periods, Territories, and Actors in the Process of Urban Transformation. *Local Government Studies*, 35(3), pp. 355-369.

- Blanco, I. (2015). Cities between Democratic Network Governance and Neoliberalism: A Regime-Theoretical Analysis of Collaboration in Barcelona. *Cities*, 44, pp. 123-130.
- Blanco, I., Gomà, R., & Subirats, J. (2018). El nuevo municipalismo: derecho a la ciudad y comunes urbanos. *Gestión y Analisis de Políticas Públicas*, 20, 14-28.
- Blatter, J., Portmann, L., & Rausis, F. (2021). Theorizing Policy Diffusion: From a Patchy Set of Mechanisms to a Paradigmatic Typology. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 29(6), pp. 805–825.
- Blau, P., & Duncan, O. D. (1967). *The American Occupational Structure*. Wiley.
- Bloomfield, J., & Bianchini, F. (2004). *Planning for the Intercultural City*. Comedia.
- Blumenbach, J. F. [1787] (1820). *Institutiones Physiologicae*. Translated by J. Elliotson. Burgess & Hill.
- Blyth, M. (1997). Moving the Political Middle: Redefining the Boundaries of State Action. *The Political Quarterly*, 68(3), pp. 217–314.
- Blyth, M. (2013). Paradigms and Paradox: The Politics of Economic Ideas in Two Moments of Crisis. *Governance*, 26(2), pp. 197-215.
- Bodnár, J. (2019). Comparing in Global Times: Between Extension and Incorporation. *Critical Historical Studies*, 6(1), pp. 1-32.
- Bommes, M., & Geddes, A. (Eds.). (2000). *Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State*. Routledge.
- Boix, C. (2011). Democracy, Development, and the International System. *American Political Science Review*, 105, 809-828.
- Bondy, C. (2010). Understanding Buraku Inequality. *Contemporary Japan*, 22(1), pp. 104-109.
- Borja, J. (1995). Barcelona: un modelo de transformación urbana, 1980–1995. *Programa de Gestion Urbana*. Quito.
- Bortz, A. (1998). Brazilians that Were Victims of Discrimination in Japan. Retrieved June 23, 2024, from <http://www.debito.org/bortzdiscrimreport.html>.
- Bott, H. (1928). Observation of Play Activities in a Nursery School. *Genetic Psychology, Monographs*, 4, pp. 44-88.
- Bouchard, G. (2012). *L'interculturalisme*. Boréal.
- Bouchard, G., & Scott, H. (2015). *Interculturalism: A View from Quebec*. University of Toronto Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice (Vol. 16)*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Harvard University Press.

- Bourdieu, P. (1990a). *In Other Words: Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology*. Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990b). *The Logic of Practice*. Polity Press.
- Bradley, A., Hall, T., & Harrison, M. (2002). Selling Cities: Promoting New Images for Meetings Tourism. *Cities*, 19(1), pp. 61-70.
- Braithwaite, J., & Drahos, P. (2000). *Global Business Regulation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bran, F., Bodislav, D. A., & Rădulescu, C. V. (2019). European Multi-Level Governance. *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, 8(5), pp. 66-74.
- Braun, D., & Gilardi, F. (2006) Taking 'Galton's Problem' Seriously. Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 18(3), pp. 298-322.
- Braun, D., Gilardi, F., Füglistner, K., & Luyet, S. (2007). Ex Pluribus Unum: Integrating the Different Strands of Policy Diffusion Theory. In K. Holzinger, H. Jörgens, C. Knill (Eds.). *Transfer, Diffusion und Konvergenz von Politiken* (pp. 39-55). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Breiger, R. L. (2000). A Tool Kit for Practice Theory. *Poetics*, 27, (91-115).
- Brenner, N. (1999). Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies. *Theory and Society*, 28, pp. 39-78.
- Brenner, N. (2001). The Limits to Scale? Methodological Reflections on Scalar Structuration. *Progress in Human Geography* 25, pp. 591-614.
- Brenner, N. (2004). Urban Governance and the Production of New State Spaces in Western Europe, 1960–2000. *Review of International Political Economy*, 11(3), pp. 447-488.
- Brenner, N. (2009). A Thousand Leaves: Notes on the Geographies of Uneven Spatial Development. In R. Keil, & R. Mahon (Eds.) *Leviathan Undone? Towards a Political Economy of Scale* (pp. 27-50). University of British Columbia Press.
- Brenner, N. (2011). The Urban Question and the Scale Question: Some Conceptual Clarifications. In N. Glick Schiller and A. Çağlar (Eds.), *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants* (pp. 23-41), Cornell University Press.
- Brenner, N. (2019). *New Urban Spaces: Urban Theory and the Scale Question*. Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing Neoliberalism”. *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 349-379.
- Broadbent, J. (1989) The Technopolis Strategy versus Deindustrialization: High-Tech Development Sites in Japan. In M. P. Smith (Ed.), *Pacific Rim Cities in the World Economy* (pp. 231-253) Transaction.
- Broadbent, J. (2002). Japan’s Environmental Regime: The Political Dynamics of Change. In U. Desai (Ed.), *Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries* (pp. 295-356). The MIT Press.

- Brooks, D. (2006, April 27). The Death of Multiculturalism. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/27/opinion/the-death-of-multiculturalism.html>.
- Brooks, R. (2012). Cultural Diversity: It's All About the Mainstream. *The Monist*, 95(1), pp. 17-32.
- Brophy, I. N. (1945). The Luxury of Anti-Negro Prejudice. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 9, pp. 456-466.
- Brubaker, W. R. (Ed.). (1989). *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*. University Press of America.
- Brubaker, W. R. (1998). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Harvard University Press.
- Bruquetas-Callejo, M. Garcés-Mascareñas, B., Morén-Alegret, R., Penninx, R., & Ruiz-Vieytez, E. (2008). Immigration And Integration Policymaking in Spain. *IMISCOE Working Paper*, 1. Retrieved March 24, 2023, from https://webs.uab.cat/migracions/wp-content/uploads/sites/534/2024/09/BRUQUETAS-CALLEJO-M_.pdf.
- Bukh, A. (2012). Ainu Identity and Japan's Identity: The Struggle for Subjectivity. *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, 28, pp. 35-53.
- Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, 12. *Declaration on European Identity*. Retrieved March 10, 2024, from https://ct.observatoireplurilinguisme.eu/images/International/Identité_européenne/Déclaration_Copenhague_1973_en.pdf.
- Bullivant, B. (1981). *The Pluralist Dilemma in Education: Six Case Studies*. Allen and Unwin.
- Busch, P.-O., & Jörgens, H. (2005). International Patterns of Environmental Policy Change and Convergence. *Environmental Policies and Convergence*, 15(2), pp. 80-101.
- Cabinet Office. (2019). Ninshō shinsei jurisū. Retrieved May 23, 2023, from].]. <https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/about/toukei-info/ninshou-zyuri>.
- Çağlar, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2011). Locality and Globality: Building a Comparative Analytical Framework in Migration and Urban Studies. In A. Çağlar, & N. Glick Schiller, *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants* (pp. 60-84), Cornell University Press.
- Çağlar, A., & Glick-Schiller, N. (2018). *Migrants and City-Making Dispossession, Displacement, and Urban Regeneration*. Duke University Press.
- Çağlar, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2021). Relational Multiscalar Analysis: A Comparative Approach to Migrants within City-Making Processes. *Geographical Review*, 111(2), pp. 206-232.
- Calder, K. E. (1988). *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949–1986*. Princeton University Press.
- Campbell, J. L. (2004). *Institutional Change and Globalization*. Princeton University Press.

- Campbell, J. L., & Pedersen, O. K. (2014). *The National Origins of Policy Ideas: Knowledge Regimes in the United States, France, Germany, and Denmark*. Princeton University Press.
- Cantle, T. (2001). *Community Cohesion*. Home Office.
- Cantle, T. (2012). *Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Capello, R. (2000). The City Network Paradigm: Measuring Urban Network Externalities. *Urban Studies*, 37(11), pp. 1925-1945.
- Caponio, T., Scholten, P., & Zapata-Barrero, R. (Eds.). (2019). *The Routledge handbook of the governance of migration and diversity in cities*. Routledge.
- Caprio, M. E. (2009). *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945*. University of Washington Press.
- Carlson, M. M., & Reed, S. R. (2018). *Political Corruption and Scandals in Japan*. Cornell University Press.
- Carson, M., Burns, T. R., & Calvo, D. (Eds.). (2009). *Paradigms in Public Policy: Theory and Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the EU*. Peter Lang GmbH.
- Carstensen, M. B. (2011). Paradigm Man vs. the Bricoleur: Bricolage as an Alternative Vision of Agency in Ideational Change. *European Political Science Review*, 3(1), pp. 147-167.
- Carstensen, M. B. (2015). Bringing Ideational Power into the Paradigm Approach: Critical Perspectives on Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice. In J. Hogan, & M. Howlett (Eds.), *Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice: Discourses, Ideas and Anomalies in Public Policy Dynamics* (pp. 43-60). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cary, W. L. (1974). Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware. *The Yale Law Journal*, 83(4), pp. 663-705.
- Carrasco, B., Rahemtulla, H. A., & Rohdewohld, R. (Eds.). (2022). *Decentralization, Local Governance, and Localizing the Sustainable Development Goals in Asia and the Pacific*. Routledge.
- Casanova, J., & Gil-Andrés, C. (2014). *Twentieth-Century Spain: A History*. Cambridge University Press.
- Casellas, A. (2006). Las limitaciones del “Modelo Barcelona”: Una lectura desde Urban Regime Analysis. *Documents d'Anàlisi Geogràfica*, 48, pp. 61-81.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The Rise of the Network Society*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Castells, M. & Hall, P. (1994). *Technopoles of the World: The Making of Twenty-First-Century Industrial Complexes*. Routledge.
- Castles, S. (1986). The Guest-Worker in Western Europe - An Obituary. 20(4), pp. 761-778.
- Castles, S. (1997). Multicultural Citizenship: The Australian Experience. In V. Bader (Ed.), *Citizenship and exclusion* (pp. 113-138). St. Manin Press.

- Castles, S. (1999). Citizenship and the Other in the Age of Migration. In A. Davidson, & K. Weekley (Eds.), *Globalization and Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific* (pp. 27-48). St. Martin's Press.
- Cebolla Boado, H., & González Ferrer, A. (2013). *Inmigración. ¿Integración sin modelo?* Alianza.
- Chan, R. K. H. (2006). Participatory Welfare in South Korea: Meaning and Issues. (CAPS Working Paper Series No.174). Retrieved May 23, 2024, from https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1008&context=caps_wp.
- Chaney, D. (1994). *The Cultural Turn: Scene-Setting Essays on Contemporary Cultural History*. Routledge.
- Chang, K. S. (2010). *South Korea under Compressed Modernity*, Routledge.
- Chapman, D. (2004). The Third Way and Beyond: Zainichi Korean Identity and the Politics of Belonging. *Japanese Studies*, 24(1), pp. 29-44.
- Chapman, D. (2007). *Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity*. Routledge.
- Charbonneau, L., & Maruyama, H. (2019). A Critique on the New Ainu Policy: How Japan's Politics of Recognition Fails to Fulfill the Ainu's Indigenous Rights. *FOCUS*, 96.
- Charnock, G., Purcell, T., & Ribera-Fumaz, R. (2012) ; Indignate!: The 2011 Popular Protests and the Limits to Democracy in Spain. *Capital & Class* 36, 1, pp. 3-11.
- Chase, P. G. (2006). *The Emergence of Culture: The Evolution of a Uniquely Human Way of Life*. Springer.
- Chen, S. X., Benet-Martínez, V., & Bond, M. H. (2008). Bicultural Identity, Bilingualism, and Psychological Adjustment in Multicultural Societies: Immigration-Based and Globalization-Based Acculturation. *Personality*, 76(4), pp. 803-838
- Cheon, S.-T. (2008). *Haek ihu en t'onghap Nam-Puk ōnō*. Taehan kyoyuk munhwa sinmun ch'ulp'anbu.
- Cheshire, P. C., & Hay, D. G. (1989). *Urban Problems in Western Europe*. Routledge.
- Chiavacci, D., & Obinger, J. (2018). Towards a New Protest Cycle in Contemporary Japan? Resurgence of Social Movements and Confrontational Political Activism in Historical Perspective. In D. Chiavacci, & J. Obinger, *Social Movements and Political Activism in Contemporary Japan: Re-emerging from Invisibility*. Routledge.
- Cho, H.-Y. (2000). The History of Korean NGOs: Fact and Prospect. In D. Kim et al., *What is NGOs?* (pp. 127-156). Arche.
- Cho, S. (2015). "Being Okinawan" Within and Beyond the Ethnic Boundary: The Process of Identity Formation in an Okinawan Cultural Activist Group in Osaka. Social Movements and the Production of Knowledge: Body, Practice and Society in East Asia. *Senri Ethnological Studies*, 91. Retrieved May 14, 2023, from https://minpaku.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2353/files/SES91_10.pdf.

- Choi, S. Y., Choi, H., & Park, W. S. (2009). Affordable Housing and Local Governance in South Korea: A Fair Share Approach. *International Journal of Urban Sciences*, 13(2), pp. 103-117.
- Chorev, N. (2012). Changing Global Norms through Reactive Diffusion: The Case of Intellectual Property Protection of AIDS Drugs. *American Sociological Review*, 77(5), pp. 831–853.
- Christiano, T., & Sameer, B. Democracy. (2022) In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/>.
- Chun, K. M., Balls Organista, P., & Marín, G. (Eds.). (2003). *Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement, and Applied Research*. American Psychological Association.
- Clarke, J., Bainton, D., Lendvai, N., & Stubbs, P. (2015). *Making Policy Move: Towards a Politics of Translation and Assemblage*. Policy Press.
- Claude, I. (1955). *National Minorities: An International Problem*. Harvard University Press.
- Claude, V. (1989). Sanitary Engineering as a Path to Townplanning: The Singular Role of the Association the *Association Générale des Hygiénistes et Techniciens Municipaux* in France and the French-speaking Countries, 1900–1920. *Planning Perspectives*, 4(2), pp. 153-166.
- Clayton, J. (2020). Multiculturalism. *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, 9, pp. 211-219.
- Coatsworth, J. D., Maldonado-Molina, M. M., Pantin, H., & Szapocznik, J. (2005). A Person-Centered and Ecological Investigation of Acculturation Strategies in Hispanic Immigrant Youth. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 33(2), pp. 157-174.
- Cochrane, A. (2004). Modernisation, Managerialism and the Culture Wars: Reshaping the Local Welfare State in England. *Local Government Studies*, 30, pp. 481-496.
- Cole, A., & John, P. (2001). *Local Governance in England and France*. Routledge.
- Coleman, D. L. (1996). Individualizing Justice through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma. *Columbia Law Review*, 96(5), pp. 1093-1167.
- Coleman, S., & Von Hellermann, P. (2011). *Multi-Sited Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods*. Routledge.
- Coleman, W., Skogstad, G., & Atkinson, M. (1996). Paradigm Shifts and Policy Networks: Cumulative Change in Agriculture. *Journal of Public Policy*, 16(3), pp. 273–302.
- Collier, D., Brady, H. E. & Seawright, J. (2010). Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology. In H. E. Brady and D. Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry* (pp. 161-199), Rowman & Littlefield.
- Collier, D., Mahoney, J., & Seawright, J. (2004). Claiming Too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias. In H. E. Brady and D. Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (pp. 85-102). Rowman & Littlefield.

Colomer, L., & Pérez, A. P. (2024). City Governance, Participatory Democracy, and Cultural Heritage in Barcelona, 1986–2022. *The Historic Environment: Policy & Practice*. Retrieved March 23, 2023, from <https://niku.brage.unit.no/niku-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/3123094/ColomerPastor2024-CityGovernanceParticipatory.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

Comedia. (1991). *Making the Most of Glasgow's Cultural Assets: The Creative City and Its Cultural Economy*. Report to Glasgow District Council.

Congreso de los deputatos. (2022). Retrieved March 12, 2024, from <https://blog.congreso.es/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/timeline-La-universalizacion-del-sufragio.pdf>.

Connolly, K. (2010, 17 October). Angela Merkel Declares Death of German Multiculturalism. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-germany-multiculturalism-failures>.

Considine, M., & Giguère, S. (Eds.). (2008). *The Theory and Practice of Local Governance and Economic Development*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Cornelius, W. A. (1994). *Japan's Internationalization: The Politics of Internal and External Change*. Cornell University Press.

Cornelius, W. A., & Tsuda, T. (Eds.). (2004). *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*. Stanford Univ Press.

Corriente, F. (2008). *Coptic Loanwords of Egyptian Arabic in Comparison with the Parallel Case of Romance Loanwords in Andalusí Arabic, with the True Egyptian Etymon of Al-Andalus*. Federico University of Saragossa.

Coté, J. F. (2007). Comparing the Culture of Cities. In J. Sloan (Ed.), *Urban Enigmas: Montreal, Toronto, and the Problem of Comparing Cities* (pp. 52-93). McGill-Queen's University Press.

Coulthard, G. (2007). Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the 'Politics of Recognition' in Canada. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 6(4), pp. 437-60.

Council of Cities with High Concentrations of Foreign Residents. (2002). Gaikokujinshū jūtoshi Tōkyō kaigi ni okeru 14 toshi kyōdō apīru. Retrieved April 20, 2024, from <https://www.shujutoshi.jp/siryo/pdf/2002110714city.pdf>.

Council of Europe. (1975). *European Charter of the Architectural Heritage*. Council of Europe Publishing. Retrieved June 20, 2023, from <https://www.icomos.org/en/resources/charters-and-texts/179-articles-en-francais/ressources/charters-and-standards/170-european-charter-of-the-architectural-heritage>.

Council of Europe. (2000). *Declaration on Cultural Diversity*. Committee of Ministers on 7 December 2000 at the 733rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. Retrieved March 23, 2023. <https://rm.coe.int/16804bfc0b>.

Council of Europe. (2005a). *Warsaw Summit Action Plan*. (CM(2005)80 final 17 May 2005). Council of Europe.

- Council of Europe. (2005b). *Intercultural Dialogue: The Way Ahead*. (DGIV/DC-FARO (2005) 8 final). Council of Europe.
- Council of Europe. (2008). White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. "Living Together As Equals in Dignity". Retrieved September 10, 2022, from https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf.
- Council of Europe. (2013). *Intercultural City Step-by-Step*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council of Europe. (2013). *Intercultural Cities – Annual report 2013*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council of Europe. (2018). *Intercultural Cities – Annual report 2018*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Council of Local Authorities for International Relations. (2017). *2016 Local Government in Japan*. Council of Local Authorities for International Relations. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from http://www.clair.or.jp/j/forum/pub/docs/jichi-en_1.pdf.
- Cox, T. H. (1993). *Cultural Diversity in Organizations: Theory, Research, and Practice*. Berrett-Koehler.
- Cox, T. H., & Blake, S. (1991). Managing Cultural Diversity: Implications for Organizational Competitiveness. 5(3), pp. 45-56.
- Crafts, N. F. R. (1995). The Golden Age of Economic Growth in Western Europe, 1950-1973. *The Economic History Review*, 48(3), pp. 429-447.
- Creative Cities Network Japan. (n.d.). Sōzō toshi to wa? Retrieved April 23, 2024, from <https://ccn-j.net/creative-city/#:~:text=>.
- Cremer, R., Gounder, R., & Ramasamy, B. (1996). Guidelines for New Zealand-Asia Sister City Relationships: Economic Rationale for an Integrated Approach. Department of Economics, Massey University.
- Cremer, R. D., Bruin, A., & Dupuis, A. (2001). International Sister-Cities, Bridging the Global-Local Divide. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 60(1), pp. 377-401.
- Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 1, pp. 139-167.
- Crombie, A. C. (1994). *Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition*. Duckworth.
- Cullen, L. (2017). The Nagasaki Trade of the Tokugawa Era: Archives, Statistics, and Management. *Japan Review*, 31, pp. 69-104.
- Cunchillos, J.-L., & Zamora, J.-A. (1997). *Gramática fenicia elemental*. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.
- Curchin, L. (1991). *Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation*. Routledge.

- Curchin, L. (2003). *The Romanization of Central Spain: Complexity, Diversity and Change in a Provincial Hinterland*. Routledge.
- Curran-Vigier, C. (2008). *From Multiculturalism to Global Values: How New Labour Set the Agenda*, *Observatoire de la société britannique*, 5.
- Currarini, S., Jackson, M. O., & Pin, P. (2009) An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation. *Econometrica*, 77, 1003-1045.
- Dahlander, L., & McFarland, D. A. (2013). Ties that Last: Tie Formation and Persistence in Research Collaborations over Time. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58(1), pp. 69-110.
- Dahlen, T. (1997). *Among the Interculturalists: An Emergent Profession and its Packaging of Knowledge*. Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology.
- Daigneault, P. M. (2015). Can You Recognize a Paradigm When You See One? Defining and Measuring Paradigm Shift. In J. Hogan, & M. Howlett (Eds.), *Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice: Discourses, Ideas and Anomalies in Public Policy Dynamics* (pp. 43-60). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dahlen, T. (1997). *Among the Interculturalists: An Emergent Profession and its Packaging of Knowledge*. Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology.
- Dale, P. (1986). *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*. St. Martin's Press.
- Dalle Mulle, E., Rodogno, D., & Bieling, M. (2023). *Sovereignty, Nationalism, and the Quest for Homogeneity in Interwar Europe*. Bloomsbury.
- David, E. J. R. (Ed.). (2014). *Internalized Oppression: The Psychology of Marginalized Groups*. Springer.
- Davies, J. (2004). The Foundation as a Political Actor: The Case of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. *The Political Quarterly*, 75(3). pp. 275-284.
- Davies, J. S. (2011). *Challenging Governance Theory: From Networks to Hegemony*. Policy Press.
- Davis, J. W. (2012). A Critical View of Global Governance. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 18(2), pp. 272-286.
- Day, R. J. F. (2000). *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity*. University of Toronto Press.
- Day, S. (2018). The Surprising Longevity of Kawasaki's Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents: An Institutional Account. *Social Science Japan Journal*, 21(1), pp. 27-43.
- De Graauw, E. (2014). Municipal ID Cards for Undocumented Immigrants: Local Bureaucratic Membership in a Federal System. *Politics & Society*. 42(3), pp. 309-330.
- De Losada, A. F., & Abdullah, H. (Eds.). (2019). *Rethinking the Ecosystem of International City Networks: Challenges and Opportunities*. Fundación CIDOB.

- De Mauro, T. (2006). Governance. In *Dizionario di parole del futuro*, Laterza. Retrieved January 20, 2023.
- Dear, P. (2001). *Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and Its Ambitions, 1500–1700*. Princeton University Press.
- Degen, M., & García, M. (2012). The Transformation of the ‘Barcelona Model’: An Analysis of Culture, Urban Regeneration and Governance. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 36(5), pp. 1022-1038.
- Del Biaggio, C., Rossetto, T., & Boria E. (2019). Mapping Local Resistance to Anti-Immigration National Law: A Carto-Essay. *Journal of Research and Didactics in Geography*, 1, pp. 89-98.
- Delanty, G. (2003). *Community*. Routledge.
- Delgado, M. (2007). *La ciudad mentirosa: Fraude y miseria del "Modelo Barcelona"*. Los Libros de la Catarata.
- Della Porta, D. (Ed.). (2009). *Democracy in Social Movements*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Delors, J. (1985). Address to the opening of the European Parliament 12 March 1985. Commission programme for 1985. *Debates of the European Parliament*, OJ 2, 324.
- Deutsch, M., & Collins, M. E. (1951). *Interracial Housing; A Psychological Evaluation of a Social Experiment*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. Macmillan Publishing.
- DiMaggio, P. (1979). Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. by Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron and Richard Nice: Outline of a Theory of Practice. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(6), pp. 1460-1474.
- DiMaggio, P., & Garip, F. (2012). Network effects and social inequality. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38, pp. 93-118.
- Dinnie, K. (2011). *City Branding Theory and Cases*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dixon, A. R., & Telles, E. E. (2017). Skin Color and Colorism: Global Research, Concepts, and Measurement. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 43, pp. 405-424.
- Dobbin, F., & Kalev, A. (2016). Why Diversity Programs Fail: And What Works Better. *Harvard Business Review*, 94, pp. 52-60.
- Doel, M., & Hubbard, P. (2002). Taking World Cities Literally: Marketing the City in a Global Space of Flows. *Cities*, 6(3), pp. 351-368.
- Dogliani, P. (2002). 'European Municipalism in the First Half of the Twentieth Century: The Socialist Network. *Contemporary European History*, 11, pp. 573-596.

- Dolowitz, D., & Marsh, D. (1996). Who Learns What from Whom? A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature. *Political Studies*, 44(2), pp. 343-357.
- Dolowitz, D. P., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer In Contemporary Policy-making. *Governance*, 13(1), pp. 5-24.
- Domingo, A. (2014). *Catalunya al mirall de la immigració. L'Avenç*.
- Donald, S. H., Kofman, E., & Kevin, C. (2009). *Branding Cities Cosmopolitanism, Parochialism, and Social Change*. Routledge.
- Dooley, T. (2018). Half Japanese: Japanese Children of Visibly Mixed Ethnic and Cultural Heritage. Independently Published.
- Douglass, M. (1988). The Transnationalization of Urbanization in Japan. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 12(3), pp. 425-454.
- Douglass, M., & Roberts, G. S. (2000). *Japan and Global Migration Foreign: Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society*. Routledge.
- Douglas, J. W., Raudla, R., & Hartley, R. E. (2015). Shifting Constellations of Actors and Their Influence on Policy Diffusion: A Study of the Diffusion of Drug Courts. *Policy Studies Journal*, 43(4), pp. 484-511.
- Dovidio, J. F., Glick, P., & Rudman, L. A., 2005, *On the Nature of Prejudice Fifty Years after Allport*, Blackwell.
- Dower, J. W. (1999). *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Drezner, D. W. (2001). Globalization and Policy Convergence. *International Studies Review*, 3(1), pp. 53-78.
- Dryzek, J. S. (2013). *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*. Oxford University Press.
- Drury, H. B., [1915] (2008). *Scientific Management: A History And Criticism* (1915). Kessinger Publishing.
- Du Gay, P., & Pryke, M. (2002). Cultural Economy: An Introduction. In P. du Gay, & M. Pryke, (Eds.), *Cultural Economy: Cultural Analysis and Commercial Life* (pp. 1-19). London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage.
- Duménil, G., & Lévy, D. (2004). *Capital Resurgent. Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution*. Harvard University Press.
- Durkheim, E. [1893] (2014). *The Division of Labour in Society*. Translated by S. Lukes. Free Press.
- Durkheim, E. [1897] (1951). *Suicide, a Study in Sociology*. Translated by J. A. Spaulding, & G. Simpson. Routledge.

- Durkheim, E. [1912] (2008). *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Translated by C. Cosman, & M. S. Cladis. Oxford University Press.
- Durocher, R. (2013). Quiet Revolution, Retrieved February 13, 2023, from <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quiet-revolution>.
- Edwards, S. (2023). *The Chile Project: The Story of the Chicago Boys and the Downfall of Neoliberalism*, Princeton University Press.
- Eisenberg, A., & J. Spinner-Halev (Eds.). (2005). *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights, and Diversity*. Cambridge University Press.
- Eizaguirre, S., Pradel-Miquel, M., & García, M. (2017). Citizenship Practices and Democratic Governance: 'Barcelona en Comú' as an Urban Citizenship Confluence Promoting a New Policy Agenda. *Citizenship Studies*, 21(4), pp. 425-439.
- Elias, A., & Mansouri, F. (2020). A Systematic Review of Studies on Interculturalism and Intercultural Dialogue. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 41(4), pp. 490–523.
- Eliot, T. S. (1949). *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*. Harcourt.
- Ely, R. J., & Thomas, D. A. (2020). Getting Serious about Diversity. *Harvard Business Review*, 98, pp. 114-122.
- Endoh, T. (2009). *Exporting Japan Politics of Emigration to Latin America*. University of Illinois Press.
- Engels, D. (2012). Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on Rights Consciousness. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 19 (2, 2), pp. 423-455.
- Ertug, G., Brennecke, J., Kovács B., & Zou, T. (2022). What Does Homophily Do? A Review of the Consequences of Homophily. *Academy of Management Annals*, 16: 1.
- Espai en Blanc. (2004). *La otra cara del fo'rum de les cultures*, Edicions Bellaterra.
- Espuche, A. G., Guardia, M., Monclús, F. J., & Oyón, J. L. (1991). Modernization and Urban Beautification: The 1888 Barcelona World's Fair. *Planning Perspectives*, 6(2), pp. 139-159.
- European Commission. (2002). *EU Response to the 11 September: European Commission Action*. MEMO/02/122. European Commission. Retrieved January 10, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_02_122.
- European Commission. (2008). Intercultural Cities. Retrieved March 22, 2023, from https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/integration-practice/intercultural-cities_en.
- European Council. (2000). *Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000: Presidency Conclusions*. Retrieved February 17, 2023, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm.
- European Council. (2003a). *Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention*. Directorate General IV: Education, Culture and Heritage, Youth and Sport. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from <http://www.ericarts-institute.org/web/files/131/en/OpatijaDeclaration.pdf>.

- European Council. (2003b). *Athens Declaration*. Council of Europe. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20884/informal-european-council-athens-declaration-16-april-2003.pdf>.
- Evans, M., & Davies, J. (1999). Understanding Policy Transfer: A Multi-level, Multi-disciplinary Perspective. *Public Administration*, 77(2), pp. 361-385.
- Ewen, S., & Hebbert, M. (2007). European Cities in a Networked World during the Long 20th Century. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 25(3), pp. 327-340.
- Ewers, M. C. (2007). Migrants, Markets and Multinationals: Competition among World Cities for the Highly Skilled. *GeoJournal*, 68, pp. 119-130.
- Falguera, X. C., & Serra, M. S. (2021). Immigrant Integration Policies in Catalonia (1993-2017): Political Frames. *Migraciones* 52, pp. 221-247.
- Falleti, T. G. (2005). A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), pp. 327-346.
- Falzon, M.-A. (Ed.). 2009. *Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research*. Ashgate.
- Feldman, G. (2011). If Ethnography Is More Than Participant-Observation, Then Relations Are More Than Connections: The Case for Nonlocal Ethnography in a World of Apparatuses. *Anthropological Theory*, 11, pp. 375-395.
- Felmlee, D., Sprecher, S., & Bassin, E. 1990. The Dissolution of Intimate Relationships: A Hazard Model. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 53, pp. 13-30.
- Fernández, A. I. A. (2018). De Cristianos Viejos, Judíos y Otras Historias Old Christians, Jews and Other Stories. *Hidalguía*, 378, pp. 393-468.
- Ferraro, G. P. (1990). *The Cultural Dimension of International Business*. Taylor & Francis.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford University Press.
- Finlayson, J. G., & Rees, D. H. (2023). Jürgen Habermas. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved March 21, 2023, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/>.
- Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*, 52(4), pp. 887-917.
- Fifield, A. (2015, June 20). This Journalist Didn't Just Interview North Korean Defectors, He followed Them on Their Escape. *The Washington Post*, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/20/this-journalist-didnt-just-interview-north-korean-defectors-he-followed-them-on-their-escape/>.
- Fish, R. A. (2009). Mixed-blood, Japanese: A Reconsideration of Race and Purity in Japan. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (pp. 108-139). Routledge.

- Fish, S. (1997). Boutique Multiculturalism, or Why Liberals Are Incapable of Thinking about Hate Speech. *Critical Inquiry*, 23(2), pp. 378-395.
- Florida, R. (2002). *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life*. Basic Books.
- Florida, R. (2003). *Cities and the Creative Class*. Routledge.
- Florida, R., Mellander, C., & Stolarick, K. (2008). Inside the Black Box of Regional Development: Human Capital, the Creative Class and Tolerance. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 8, pp. 615– 649.
- Forrest, A. (1994). A New Start for Cultural Action in the Euro- pean Community. Genesis and Implications of Article 128 of the Treaty on European Union. *Cultural Policy*. 1(2), pp. 11-20.
- Fraser, N. (1997). *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition*. Routledge.
- Fraser, N. (2009). *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World*. Columbia University Press.
- Freire, P. (1970). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Seabury Press.
- French, H. W. (1999, November 15). Japan's Cultural Bias Against Foreigners Comes Under Attack. *New York Times*. Retrieved May 20, 2024, from <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/111599japan-discrimination.html>.
- Friedmann, J. (1986). *The World City Hypothesis*. Wiley.
- Fudesaka, H., & Miyazaki, M. (2010). *Nihonkyōsantō vs. Buraku kaihō dōmei-hitsu*. Ningen shuppan.
- Fuhse, J. (2009). The Meaning Structure of Social Networks. *Sociological theory*, 27, pp. 51-73.
- Fujii, S. (2009). *Heisei 21-nendo kokudo seisaku kankei kenkyū shien jigyō kenkyū seika hōkoku-sho*. Retrieved March 11, 2023, from <https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000218338.pdf>.
- Fujiki, K. (2013). The Scholarly Gaze toward Okinawa Eiga: Notes on the Academic Discourse. *Cinema Studies*, 8, pp. 38-57.
- Fulcher, J. (1988). The Bureaucratization of the State and the Rise of Japan. *The British Journal of Sociology*. 39(2), pp. 228-254.
- Fuller, C., & Geddes, M. (2008). Urban Governance Under Neoliberalism: New Labour and the Restructuring of State-Space. *Antipode*, 40(2), pp. 252-282.
- Furri, F. (2017). Villes-refuge, villes rebelles et néo-municipalisme. *Plein droit*, 115(4), pp. 3-6.
- Gagnon, A.-G. (2000). Canada: Unity and Diversity. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53(1), pp. 12-26.
- Galbally, F. (1978). *Migrant Services and Programs: Report of the Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants*. Australian Government Publishing Service.

- Gans, G. (1973). Introduction. In N. Sandberg, *Ethnic Identity and Assimilation: The Polish Community*. Praeger.
- Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2011). Dimensió administrativa: Estudi exploratori sobre les polítiques locals en matèria d'immigració a Catalunya. In R. Zapata-Barrero, & B. Garcés-Mascareñas (Eds.). *Immigració a Catalunya: Una perspectiva municipal*. ACM.
- Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2012). *Labour Migration in Malaysia and Spain: Markets, Citizenship and Rights*. Amsterdam University Press.
- García, B. (2004). Cultural policy and urban regeneration in Western European cities: Lessons from experience, prospects for the future. *Local Economy*, 19(4), pp. 312-326
- García-Chueca, E. (2019). City Diplomacy in the Postmodern Era: Networks Flourish, Territories Wither? In A. F. De Losada, & H. Abdullah (Eds.), *Rethinking the Ecosystem of International City Networks: Challenges and Opportunities* (pp. 103-109). Fundación CIDOB.
- García-Sanjuán, A. (2017). Al-Andalus. Etymology and Name. Political History. In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (pp. 19-20), Brill.
- Garrard, J., & Mikahilova, E. (2018). *Twin Cities Urban Communities, Borders and Relationships over Time*. Routledge.
- Gascón, R, M. (2002). Hispano, héroe epónimo de Hispania. *Gallaecia*, 21, pp. 345-370.
- Gaspari, O. (2002). Cities against States? Hopes, Dreams and Shortcomings of the European Municipal Movement, 1900-1960. *Contemporary European History*, 11, pp. 597-622.
- Geddes, M. (2005). Neoliberalism and Local Governance: Cross-National Perspectives and Speculations. *Policy Studies*, 26(3-4), pp. 359-377.
- Geddes, M. (2006). Partnership and the Limits to Local Governance in England: Institutional Analysis and Neoliberalism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. 30(1), pp. 76-97.
- Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press.
- Generalitat de Catalunya. (2001). *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració 2001-2004*. Generalitat de Catalunya. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from <http://83.61.4.50/Biblioteca/recursos/ficheros/BMI20070000014/Pla.pdf>.
- Generalitat de Catalunya. (2005). *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració 2005-2008*. Generalitat de Catalunya. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://ibdigital.uib.es/greenstone/collect/portal_social/import/gencat/gencat0142.pdf.
- Generalitat de Catalunya. (2009). *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració 2009-2012*. Generalitat de Catalunya. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2010-07/doc1_15066_149757763.pdf.

- Generalitat de Catalunya. (2016). *Pla de ciutadania i de les migracions: Horitzó 2016*. Generalitat de Catalunya. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://ibdigital.uib.es/greenstone/sites/localsite/collect/portal_social/index/assoc/gencat03/33.dir/gencat0333.pdf.
- George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press.
- Giddens, A. (1998). *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Polity Press.
- Gilardi, F., & Wasserfallen, F. (2019). The Politics of Policy Diffusion. *European Journal of Political Research*, 58(4), pp. 1245-1256.
- Gilroy, P. (1993). *Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures*. Serpent's Tail.
- Gilroy, P. (2004) *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* Routledge.
- Gitlin, T. (1995). After the Failed Faiths: Beyond Individualism, Marxism, and Multiculturalism. *World Policy Journal*, 12(1), pp. 61-68.
- Giménez, C. R. (2003). *Pluralismo, Multiculturalismo e Interculturalidad*. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Retrieved January 19, 2022, from <https://red.pucp.edu.pe/ridei/wp-content/uploads/biblioteca/100416.pdf>.
- Giménez, C. R. (2010). *El interculturalismo: Propuesta conceptual y aplicaciones prácticas*. Ikuspegi. Observatorio Vasco de Inmigración.
- Glazer, N. (1975). *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy*. Basic Books.
- Glazer, N. (1997). *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*. Harvard University Press.
- Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. P. (1963). *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*. MIT Press.
- Glick Schiller, N. (2012). A Comparative Relative Perspective on the Relationships between Migrants and Cities. *Urban Geography*, 33(6), pp. 879-903.
- Glick Schiller, N. (2015). Explanatory Frameworks in Transnational Migration Studies: The Missing Multi-Scalar Global Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 8(13), pp. 2275-2282.
- Gluck, C. (1985). *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Vol. 1)*. Princeton University Press.
- Godart, F., & White, H. (2010). Switchings under Uncertainty: The Coming and Becoming of Meanings. *Poetics*, 38, pp. 567-586.
- Godefroy, N. (2019). La minorité aïnoue dans le Japon moderne et contemporain. D'«anciens indigènes», de nouveau(x) autochtones (1869–2019). *Ebisu*, 56, pp. 255–287.
- Goffman, E. [1963] (1990). *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Penguin Books.

- Gold, J. R., & Ward, S. V. (Eds.). (1994). *Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions*. Wiley.
- Goldberg, D. T. (2004). The Space of Multiculturalism. *OpenDemocracy*. Retrieved March 30, 2023, from https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/article_2097jsp/.
- Gómez Alfaro, A. (n.d.). The Historical Presence of Gypsies in Spain. *VidasGitanas Lungo Drom*. Retrieved October 20, 2023, from https://www.accioncultural.es/virtuales/vidasgitanas/pdf_eng/vidas_git_art1_historia_eng.pdf.
- González, R., Sirlopú, D., & Kessler, T. (2010). Prejudice among Peruvians and Chileans as a Function of Identity, Intergroup Contact, Acculturation Preferences, and Intergroup Emotions. *Journal of Social Issues*, 66, pp. 803-824.
- González, R. S. (2004). Al-andalus: Una reinterpretación histórica sobre la etimología del término. *Nouvelle revue d'onomastique*, 43-44, pp. 223-227.
- González, S. (2011). Bilbao and Barcelona 'In Motion'. How Urban Regeneration 'Models' Travel and Mutate in the Global Flows of Policy Tourism. *Urban Studies*, 48(7), pp. 1397-1418.
- González Ferrer, A., & Cebolla Boado, H. (2008). *La inmigración en España (2000-2007). De la gestión de flujos a la integración de los inmigrantes*. Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Mº de la Presidencia.
- Gordon, A. (2003). *A Modern History of Japan from Tokugawa Times to the Present*. Oxford University Press.
- Gordon, M. M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. Oxford University Press.
- Graham, E. R., Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2013). The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(3), pp. 673-701.
- Grassby, A. J. A. (1973). *Multi-cultural Society for the Future Canberra*. Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Gray, J. S., & Thompson, A. H. (1953). The Ethnic Prejudices of White and Negro College Students. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 48, pp- 311-313.
- Green, D. (2013). Local Foreign Suffrage in Kawasaki City the Changing State of Voting Rights in Japan. *EJCJS*, 13(1). Retrieved April 20, 2023, from <https://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/ejcs/vol13/iss1/green.html>.
- Green, D. (2021). Charting Tabunka Kyōsei: An Assessment of Municipal-Level “Multicultural Coexistence” and Immigrant Integration Efforts in Japan. *Journal of Asian Sociology*, 50(2), pp. 401-429.
- Green, L. (1994). Internal Minorities and Their Rights. In J. Baker (Ed.), *Group Rights* (pp. 101-117). University of Toronto Press.

- Greener, I. (2001). Social Learning and Macroeconomic Policy in Britain. *Journal of Public Policy*, 21(02), 133-152.
- Greenhill, B. (2010). The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54, pp. 127-145.
- Greenhill, B. (2015). *Transmitting Rights: International Organizations and the Diffusion of Human Rights Practices*. Oxford University Press.
- Greenhill, B., Mosley, L., & Prakash, A. (2009). Trade-based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002. *American Political Science Review*, 103(4), pp. 669–690.
- Grillo, R. (2017). *Interculturalism and the Politics of Dialogue*. Independently published.
- Grinter, R. (1990). Developing an Antiracist National Curriculum: Constraints and New Directions. In P. Pumfrey, & G. Verma (Eds.), *Race Relations and Urban Education* (pp. 199–213). Falmer Press.
- Grütter, J., & Meyer, B. (2014). Intergroup Friendship and Children's Intentions for Social Exclusion in Integrative Classrooms: The Moderating Role of Teachers' Diversity Beliefs. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 44(7), pp. 481-494.
- Grzymala-Busse, A. (2011). Time Will Tell? Temporality and the Analysis of Causal Mechanisms and Processes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(9), pp. 1267-1297.
- Gurowitz, A. (1999). Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State. *World Politics*, 51(3), pp. 413-445.
- Gurowitz, A. (2006). The Diffusion of International Norms: Why Identity Matters. *International Politics*, 43, pp. 305–341.
- Haas, E. B. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1992). Further Reflections on the Public Sphere. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (pp. 421–461). MIT Press.
- Hacker, P. M. S. (2013). The Linguistic Turn in Analytic Philosophy. In M. Beaney (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford University Press.
- Hardacre, H. (1989) *Shinto and the State, 1868-1988*. Princeton University Press.
- Hägerstrand, T. (1967). *Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process*. University of Chicago Press.
- Haggard, S., & Noland, M. (2007). *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform*. Columbia University Press.
- Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain. *Comparative Politics*, 25(3), pp. 275-296.
- Hall, S. (1992). New Ethnicities. In J. Donald & A. Rattansi (Eds.), *'Race', Culture and Difference*. Sage.

Hall, T. & Hubbard, P. (Eds.). (1998). *The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime and Representation*. John Wiley & Sons.

Hamamatsu Chamber of Commerce. (2000). *Hamamatsu no sangyo gaiyo*. Hamamatsu Chamber of Commerce.

Hamamatsu City. (2001). *Hamamatsu Declaration*. Hamamatsu City. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from <https://www.debito.org/hamamatsusengen.html>.

Hamamatsu City. (2012). *Hamamatsu Declaration*. Hamamatsu City. Retrieved April 10, 2023, from <https://www.jpf.go.jp/e/project/intel/archive/information/1309/09-01.html>.

Hamamatsu City. (2013). *Hamamatsu Intercultural City Vision*. Hamamatsu City. Retrieved February 12, 2022, from https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/documents/17293/iccvision_en.pdf.

Hamamatsu City. (2018). *The 2nd Hamamatsu Intercultural City Vision*. Hamamatsu City. Retrieved February 12, 2022, from <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/documents/17293/iccvision-eng.pdf>.

Hamamatsu City. (2023). *The 3rd Hamamatsu Intercultural City Vision*. Hamamatsu City. Retrieved February 12, 2022, from https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/documents/17293/eigo_616_marked.pdf.

Hamamatsu City. (2019). Hamamatsu Voluntary Local Review Report: “Hamamatsu, a creative city built on civil collaboration, shining into the future”. Hamamatsu City. Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.iges.or.jp/sites/default/files/inline-files/Hamamatsu.pdf>.

Hamamatsu City. (2021). 3 Koto-gyō-sho ko no kekka wa, kojīn keiei no nōringyōka-tō o nozoku, zenkoku subete no jigyōsho oyobi kigyō o taishō to shite chōsa shita monodesu. 1 Sangyō daibunrui-betsu no jigyōshosū, jūgyōshasū no suii (min'ei). Retrieved May 23, 2023, from https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/documents/3767/3-1_jigyousyosujyuugyosyasu_sangyo.pdf.

Hamamatsu City. (2022). Dai 1-shō Hamamatsu-shi no rekishi-teki fūchi keisei no haikai. Retrieved April 20, 2023, from https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/documents/133742/03dai1shou_1.pdf.

Hamamatsu City. (2023a). Ongaku no machi-dzukuri no ayumi. Retrieved January 22, 2024, from <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/bunka/intro/mc/ayumi.html>.

Hamamatsu City. (2023b). Ongaku bunka yūkō toshi kōryū no suishin. Retrieved January 22, 2024, from <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/bunka/intro/mc/yuukou.html>.

Hamamatsu City. (2024a). Hamamatsu-shi sōgō keikaku. Retrieved May 23, 2024, from <https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/kikaku/totalplan2015/index.html>.

Hamamatsu City. (2024b). *Hamamatsu Declaration*. Hamamatsu City.

Hammersley, M. (2019). *The Concept of Culture: A History and Reappraisal*. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Hannerz, U. (1992). *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Organization of Meaning*. Columbia University Press.
- Hannerz, U. (2003). Being There . . . and There . . . and There! Reflections on Multi- Sited Ethnography. *Ethnography* 4(2), pp. 201-216.
- Hankivsky, O. (2005). Gender vs. Diversity Mainstreaming: A Preliminary Examination of the Role and Transformative Potential of Feminist Theory. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 38(4), pp. 977-1001.
- Harker, R. K. (1984). On Reproduction, Habitus and Education. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 5(2), pp. 117-127.
- Harker, R. K. (1990). *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Harris, M. G. (1939). The International Union and Goodwill. *Local Government Administration: An International Quarterly Review*, 5, pp. 159-160.
- Hart, G. (2002). Geography and Development: Development/s beyond Neoliberalism? Power, Culture, Political Economy. *Progress in Human Geography* 26(6), 812-822.
- Hart, G. (2016). Relational Comparison Revisited: Marxist Postcolonial Geographies in Practice. *Progress in Human Geography*, 42(3), pp. 371-394.
- Harvey, D. (1989). From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human Geography*, 71(1), pp. 3-17.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Hatanaka, T. (2004). *Mibun, sabetsu, aidentiti*, Kamogawa Shuppan.
- Hawkins, P. (1991). The Spiritual Dimension of the Learning Organisation. *Management Education and Development*. 22(3), pp. 172-187.
- Hayek, F. A. (1944). *The Road to Serfdom*. University of Chicago Press.
- Hays, J. C. (2003). Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies. *World Politics*, 56(1), pp. 79-113.
- Hein, C. (2003). Change and Continuity in Postwar Urban Japan, In C. Hein, J. Diefendorf, & Y. Ishida (Eds.), *Rebuilding Urban Japan after 1945*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hein, C. & Pelletier, P. (2006). *Cities, Autonomy, and Decentralization in Japan*. Routledge.
- Hepburn, E., & Zapata-Barrero, R. (Eds.). (2014). *The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States: Governance and Political Parties*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hero, R., & R., Preuhs. (2006). Multiculturalism and Welfare Policies in the USA: A State-Level Comparative Analysis. In K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State* (pp. 121-151). Oxford University Press.

- Herrero de Miñón, M. (1996). Europe's Non-Existent Body Politic. In M. Herrero de Miñón, & G. Leicester (Eds.), *Europe: A Time for Pragmatism, European Policy Forum*, 1-5.
- Hietala, M. (1987). *Services and Urbanization at the Turn of the Century: The Diffusion of Innovations*. SHS, Helsinki.
- Hietala, M. (1993). La diffusion des innovations: Helsinki 1875–1917. *Genèses*, 10, pp. 74-89.
- Hietala, M. (2003). Transfer of German and Scandinavian Administrative Knowledge: Examples from Helsinki and the Association of Finnish Cities, 1870–1939. *Yearbook of European Administrative History*, 15, pp. 109-130.
- Hijino, K. V. L. (2017). *Local Politics and National Policy: Multi-level Conflicts in Japan and Beyond*. Routledge.
- Hijino, K. V. L. (2022). Local Government in Japan. In R. J. Pekkanen, & S. Pekkanen, *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Higashi, H. (1995). The Technopolis in Japan: Its Past and its Future. *Industry and Higher Education*, 9(6), pp. 357-364.
- Hiyama, T. (1904). *Taigai Nihon Rekishi*. Bunkaidō
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. J., & Ranger, T. (1992). *The Invention of Tradition*. Canto.
- Hodson, G., Costello, K., & Macinnis, C. C. (2013). Is Intergroup Contact Beneficial Among Intolerant People? Exploring Individual Differences in the Benefits of Contact on Attitudes. In Hodson, G., & Hewstone, M., *Advances in Intergroup Contact* (pp. 49-80). Psychology Press.
- Hodson, G., Dube, B., & Choma, B. L. (2015). Can (Elaborated) Imagined Contact Interventions Reduce Prejudice among Those Higher in Intergroup Disgust Sensitivity (ITG-DS)? *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 45(3), pp. 123-131.
- Hodson, G., & Hewstone, M. (Eds.). (2013). *Advances in Intergroup Contact*. Psychology Press.
- Hoefle, S. W. (2006). Eliminating Scale and Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg? *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31, pp. 238-243.
- Hogan, J., & Howlett, M. (Eds.). (2015). *Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice: Discourses, Ideas and Anomalies in Public Policy Dynamics*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoggart, R. [1957] (1998). *The Uses of Literacy*. Routledge.
- Holmes, B. (2013, August 22). How Many Uncontacted Tribes are Left in the World? *NewScientist*. Retrieved February 20, 2023, from <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24090-how-many-uncontacted-tribes-are-left-in-the-world/>.

- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Horowitz, E. L. (1936). The Development of Attitude toward the Negro. *Archives of Psychology (Columbia University)*, 194, 47.
- Horowitz, M. C. (2010). *The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Hosein, R. H. (1992). *Distorted: A View of Canadian Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework*. *Centre for Constitutional Studies*, 30(2), pp. 597-624.
- Houston, V. H. (2017). Rising Sun, Rising Soul: On Mixed Race Asian Identity that Includes Blackness. In J. L. Rondilla, R. P. Guevarra, & P. Spickard (Eds.), *Red and Yellow, Black and Brown: Decentering Whiteness in Mixed Race Studies* (pp. 21-32), Rutgers University Press.
- Howell, D. L. (2012). Urbanization, Trade, and Merchants. In K. Friday (Ed.), *Japan Emerging: Premodern History to 1850* (pp. 356-365). Routledge.
- Howlett, M., & Cashore, B. (2009). The Dependent Variable Problem in the Study of Policy Change: Understanding Policy Change as a Methodological Problem. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 11(1), pp. 33-46.
- Howkins, J. (2001). *The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas*. Penguin.
- Huang, Y., & Dan, A. (2017, June 23). "Barbarians" in Ancient Civilizations. [Workshop]. Institute d'Études Avancées de Paris, from <https://www.paris-iea.fr/en/videos-list/barbarians-in-ancient-civilizations-10932>.
- Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague J. (1995). *Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Hudson, R. (2004). Conceptualizing Economies and their Geographies: Spaces, Flows and Circuits. *Progress in Human Geography*, 28(4), pp. 447-471.
- Hughes, R. (1993). *Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America*. Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster.
- Hübshmanová, M. (2003). Roma – Sub Ethnic Groups. *Rombase*. Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz. Retrieved October 12, 2023, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20221211164439/http://rombase.uni-graz.at/cgi-bin/artframe.pl?src=data%2Fethn%2Ftopics%2Fnames.en.xml>.
- Hynes, M. (2021). *The Social, Cultural and Environmental Costs of Hyper-Connectivity: Sleeping Through the Revolution*. Emerald Publishing Limited.

- ICUB. (2006). *Nous accents 2006. Pla Estrategic del Sector Cultural de Barcelona*. Ajuntament de Barcelona.
- Ikawa, H. (2008). 15 Years of Decentralization Reform in Japan. Council of Local Authorities for International Relations: Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance. pp. 28-29. Retrieved March 12, 2022, from https://www.clair.or.jp/j/forum/honyaku/hikaku/pdf/up-to-date_en4.pdf.
- Ikegami, S. (1998). Hamamatsu shinai no koei jutaku niokeru gaikokujinn kyojuusha kyuzo no jittai to sono haikai. *Tokubetsu kenkyu hokokusho (Heisei 9, 10 nendo)*. Shizuoka-kenritsu Daigaku Hamamatsu Tanki Daigaku-bu.
- Ikegami, S. (2001). *Burajirujin to kokusai-ka suru chiiki shakai - kyojū kyō Iku iryō -*. Akashi Shoten.
- Ikegami, S. (2016). Hamamatsuichi to kigyō daigaku shimin ni yoru gaikoku hito jūmin ukeire no ikisatsu to kadai. *Shakai seisaku*, 8, pp. 57-68.
- Ikegami, S., & Kinpara, T. (1997). Seikatsusha to shiten no Burajirujin to Hamamatsu-shi ni okeru kokyo Saabisu. *Seikatsusha toshite no nyu kamaa to chiki shakai. Hamamatsu-shi ni okeru kokyo saabisu wo megutte*. Shizuoka-kenritsu Daigaku.
- Illas, E. (2012). *Thinking Barcelona: Ideologies of a Global City*. Liverpool University Press.
- Ing. (2024). Europe's Most Talked About Cities 2024. Retrieved September 16, 2024, from <https://www.ing-media.com/insights/europes-most-talked-about-cities-report-2024#:~:text=Paris%20has%20topped%20London%20to,city%20jumped%2021%25%20from%202022>.
- Inglis, C. (1996). *Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity*. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
- Intercultural Cities Network. (2022). *Barcelona: Intercultural City Index Analysis*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Intercultural Cities Network. (2020). *Ansan: Intercultural City Index Analysis*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Ishida, E. (1974). *Japanese Culture: A Study of Origins and Characteristics*. University of Tokyo Press.
- Iriye, A., Goedde P., & Hitchcock, W. (2012) *The Human Rights Revolution: An International History*. Oxford University Press.
- Isin, E. F., & Turner, B. S. (2007). Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda for Citizenship Studies. *Citizenship Studies*, 11(1), pp. 5-17.
- Jacobs, A. (2009). How Do Ideas Matter? Mental Models and Attention in German Pension Politics. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(2), pp. 252-279.
- Jacobson, D. (1997). *Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship*. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Jacobson, S. (2011). Interpreting Municipal Celebrations of Nation and Empire: The Barcelona Universal Exhibition of 1888. In W. Whyte, & O. Zimmer (Eds), *Nationalism and the Reshaping of Urban Communities in Europe, 1848–1914*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jacoby, W. (2000). *Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany*. Cornell University Press.
- Jahoda, G. (1956). Assessment of Abstract Behavior in a Non-Western Culture. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 53(2), pp. 237-243.
- James, M., & Burgos, A. (2020). Race. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved April 17, 2023, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/race/>.
- James, W. [1909] (1977). *A Pluralistic Universe*. Harvard University Press.
- Jameson, F. (1998). *The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983- 1998*. Verso.
- Janne, H. (2002). *For a Community Policy on Education*. European Communities Commission.
- Jansen, H. (2001). *The Construction of an Urban Past: Narrative and System in Urban History*. Berg.
- Jarillo, J. C. (1993). *Strategic Networks: Creating the Borderless Organization*. Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Jenson, J., & Saint-Martin, D. (2006). Building Blocks for a New Social Architecture: The LEGO Paradigm of an Active Society. *Policy & Politics*, 34(3), pp. 429-451.
- Jeong, S. Y., & Kong, D. S. (2016). Ansansi damunhwajeongchaeg geobeoneonseuui gujo byeonhwa yeongu. *Hyeondaesahoewa haengjeong*, 26(2), pp. 29-62. Retrieved March 23, 2024, from <https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002119310>.
- Jessop, B. (1997). The Entrepreneurial City: Re-Imaging Localities, Redesigning Economic Governance, or Restructuring Capital? In N. Jewson, & S. Macgregor (Eds.), *Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions*. Routledge.
- Jessop, B. (1998). The Narrative of Enterprise and the Enterprise of Narrative: Place Marketing and the Entrepreneurial City. In T. Hall, & P. Hubbard (Eds.), *The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime and Representation*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Jessop, B., & Sum, N. (2000). An Entrepreneurial City in Action: Hong Kong's Emerging Strategies in and for (Inter)Urban Competition. *Urban Studies*, 37(12), pp. 2287-2313.
- Jessop, B., & Sum, N. (2001). Pre-Disciplinary and Post-Disciplinary Perspectives. *New Political Economy*, 6(1), pp. 89-101.
- Jia, W. (2005). The Deweyan Pragmatism: Its Implications for the Study of Intercultural Communication. *Intercultural Communication Studies*, XIV(1), pp. 100-106.
- John, P. (2001). *Local Governance in Western Europe*. Sage.

- Johnson, C. (1996). *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Jones, M., Jones, R., & Woods, M. (Eds.). (2004). *An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place, and Politics*. Routledge.
- Jónsson, M. (2007). *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain in 1609–1614*. Cambridge University Press & Assessment.
- Joo, S. (2001). *Dispute on Civil Society and NGO: Major Concepts, Models, and Theories*, Hanyang University Press
- Joppke, C. (Ed.). (1998). *Challenge to the Nation-State Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. Oxford University Press.
- Joppke, C. (2004). The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2), pp. 237-257.
- Joppke, C. (2017). *Is Multiculturalism Dead? Crisis and Persistence in the Constitutional State*. Polity Press.
- Jozuka, E., & Jones, V. (2020, September 23). Japan's Hafu Stars Are Celebrated. But Some Mixed-Race People Say They Feel Like Foreigners in Their Own Country. *CNN*. Retrieved December 20, 2023, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/22/asia/japan-mixed-roots-hafu-dst-hnk-intl/index.html>.
- Juha, J. (1996). *Manchuria: An Ethnic History. Ethnic Studies of Northeast Asia*. The Fino-Ugrian Society.
- Julier, G. (1996). Barcelona Design, Catalonia's Political Economy, and the New Spain, 1980-1986. *Journal of Design History*, 9(2), pp. 117-127.
- Julier, G. (2005). Urban designscapes and the production of aesthetic content. *Urban Studies*, 42, pp. 869-887.
- Jun, E. (2014). Tolerance, Tamunhwa, and the Creating of the New Citizens. In J. Lie (Ed.), *Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea* (pp. 79-94). Institute of East Asian Studies.
- Jung-Eun Oh, Dong Kwan Kang, Julia Jiwon Shin, Sang-lim Lee, Seung Bok Lee, Kiseon Chung. 2011. Migration Profile of the Republic of Korea. IOM MRTC Research Report Series, No. 2011-01. IOM Migration Research and Training Centre. Goyang-si, Republic of Korea.
- Junker, T. (2019). Blumenbach's Theory of Human Races and the Natural Unity of Humankind. In N. Rupke, & G. Lauer (Eds.). *Johann Friedrich Blumenbach - Race and Natural History, 1750–1850* (pp. 96-112). Routledge.
- Jussim, L., & Osgood, D. W. (1989). Influence and Similiarity among Friends: An Intergative Model Applied to Incarcerated Adolescents. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52, pp. 98-112.
- Kahn, H. E. (Ed.). (2014). *Framing the Global: Entry Points for Research*. Indiana University Press.

- Kang, H. J. (2020). Multicultural Policy of Ansan City: The Case of Ansan Multicultural Village Special Zone. *MRTC Issue Brief*, 11.
- Kaiho Shimbun, (1995, May 8). No. 1718. Kaiho Shuppansha.
- Kallen, H. M. (1924). *Culture and Democracy in the United States*. Boni and Liveright.
- Kamikawa, T. (2016). Tokyo ni Buraku sabetsu wa nai? *Synodos Academic Journalism*. Retrieved November 23, 2023, from <https://synodos.jp/society/18160>.
- Kandel, D. B. (1978). Homophily, Selection, and Socialization in Adolescent Friendships. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(2), pp. 427-436.
- Karch, A. (2006). National Intervention and the Diffusion of Policy Innovations. *American Politics Quarterly*, 34(4), pp. 403-426.
- Karch, A. (2007). *Democratic Laboratories: Policy Diffusion among the American States*. University of Michigan Press.
- Kashiwazaki, C. (2003). Local Government and Resident Foreigners: A Changing Relationship. In S. Furukawa, & T. Menju (Eds.). *Japan's Road to Pluralism: Transforming Local Communities in the Global Era* (pp. 63-88). Japan Center for International Exchange.
- Kashiwazaki, C. (2016). Multicultural Discourse and Policies in Japan: An Assessment of Tabunka Kyosei. *The Gakushuin Journal of International Studies*, 3. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from https://glim-re.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=3376&file_id=22&file_no=1.
- Kastoryano, R. (2018). Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Redefining Nationhood and Solidarity. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 6(17).
- Kato, C. (2008). “joron “tabunkakyōsei” e no dōtei to shinjiyūshugi no jidai. In K. Choi, & C. Kato, *nihon ni okeru tabunkakyōsei to wa nani ka – zainichi no keiken kara* (pp. 11-31). Shinyosha.
- Katz, E., Levin, M. L., & Hamilton, H. (1963). Traditions of Research on the Diffusion of Innovation. *American Sociological Review*, 28(2), pp. 237–252.
- Kavaratzis, M. (2007) City Marketing: The Past, the Present and Some Unresolved Issues. *Geography Compass*, 1(3), pp. 695-712.
- Kawakatsu, H. (1991). *Nihon Bunmei to Kindai Seiyd*, NHK Books.
- Kay, A. (2007). Tense Layering and Synthetic Policy Paradigms: The Politics of Health Insurance in Australia. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 42(4), pp. 579-491.
- Kay, A. (2011). UK Monetary Policy Change during the Financial Crisis: Paradigms, Spillovers, and Goal Co-ordination. *Journal of Public Policy*, 31(2), pp. 143-161.
- Kearns, G., & Philo, C. (Eds.). (1993). *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present*. Pergamon Press.
- Kee, T. S. (2015). Foreign Workers' Policies and Issues in South Korea. *The University of Sydney*, 13.

- Keene, D., Nagy, B., & Szende, K. (2009). *Segregation – Integration – Assimilation Religious and Ethnic Groups in the Medieval Towns of Central and Eastern Europe*. Routledge.
- Kersting, N., Caulfield, J., Nickson, R. A., Olowu, D., & Wollmann H. (Eds.). (2009). *Local Governance Reform in Global Perspective*, VS Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften.
- Kerwin, L. (2009). *Cultural Diversity: Issues, Challenges and Perspectives*. Nova Science Publishers.
- Kida, S. [1916] (1980). Ezo No Junpuku To Ōu No Takushoku. In Hara, S. (Ed.), *Rekishi Chiri Gakkai*. Heibonsha.
- King, A. J., & Sumpter, D. J. (2012). Murmurations. *Current Biology*, 21;22(4), pp. 112-114.
- Kikuzato, Y. (2009). Ryūkyū /Okinawa minzoku to senjūken. *Inpakushon*, 167: 88.
- Kim, D. (2013). International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions. *International Organization*, 67(3), pp. 505-539.
- Kim, D. J. (1999, August 15). *Let Open a New Millennium of Hope and Prosperity*. Speech on the 54th Anniversary of National Liberation. Retrieved March 23, 2024, from https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1308782.
- Kim, H., & Kim, K. (2023). North Korean Refugee Students' Strategy of School Engagement and Its Impact on Identity in South Korea: "Aspiration Towards an Inter-Korean Identity through a Process of Being One of Them." *Multicultural Education Review*, 15(4), pp. 288-309.
- Kim, H., Oh, H. G., & Lee, S. J. (2017). Determining the Quality of Life of Marriage Migrant Women in Korea. *Korean Journal of Policy Studies*, 32(3), pp. 83-104.
- Kim, H.-J. (2009). Immigration Challenges and 'Multicultural' Responses: The State, the Dominant Ethnicity, and Immigrants in South Korea. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin. ProQuest/UMi. UMi Publication no. 3384154.
- Kim, H. S. (1998). *Ghimhaesung moksa (hankukoekukinnodongjajiwonsentuh daepyo) – geudeulegye. jinjeong pilyohan gun doni ahnin bokgeumipnida*
- Kim, I. S. (2000). Local Governance in Northeast Asia: Tasks and Prospects. *International Review of Public Administration*, 5(2), pp. 115-127.
- Kim, J. (2003). Insurgency and Advocacy: Unauthorized Foreign Workers and Civil Society in South Korea. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 12(3), pp. 237–269.
- Kim, J. (2012). *A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict*. Indiana University Press.
- Kim, J. H. (2024, May 20). imingeun ansansijang, ansansi milae 10nyeon bijeon balpyo *Kgnews*, Retrieved June 20, 2024, from <https://www.kgnews.co.kr/news/article.html?no=793486>.

- Kim, J. K. (2005). State, civil society and international norms: Expanding the political and labor rights of foreigners in South Korea. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 14(4), pp. 383–418.
- Kim, J. K. (2020). *Organized Labor and Civil Society for Multiculturalism: A Solidarity Success Story from South Korea*. Emerald Publishing.
- Kim, J. K., & Fu, M. (2008). International Women in South Korea's Sex Industry: A New Commodity Frontier. *Asian Survey*, 48(3), pp. 492–513.
- Kim J. Y., Oh, S., & Nam, S. I. (2016). Prevalence and Trends in Domestic Violence in South Korea: Findings from National Surveys. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 31(8), pp. 1554-1576.
- Kim, M. (2014). Can the Union of Patriarchy and Multiculturalism Work? Family Dynamics in Filipina-Korean Rural Households. In J. Lie (Ed.), *Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea* (pp. 277-298). Institute of East Asian Studies.
- Kim, P. S. (2000). Administrative Reform in the Korean Central Government. *Public Performance and Management Review*, 24(2), pp. 145-160.
- Kim, P. S. (2006). Local Governance and Civil Society in Korea: Toward Participatory and Better Governance. Retrieved March 23, 2024, from https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000336609.pdf.
- Kim, P. S., & Moon, M. J. (2003). NGOs as Incubator of Participatory Democracy in South Korea: Political, Voluntary, and Policy Participation. *International Journal of Public Administration*. 26(5), pp. 549-567.
- Kim, S. (2010). Collaborative Governance in South Korea: Citizen Participation in Policy Making and Welfare Service Provision. *Asian Perspective*, 34(3), pp. 165-190.
- Kim, S., & Han, C. (2015). Administrative reform in South Korea: New Public Management and the Bureaucracy. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 81(4), pp. 694-712.
- Kim, T. (1999) Aidentiti poritikusu o koete: zainichi chosenjin no esunishiti. Sekai shisōsha.
- Kim, T. M. (1988). Zainichi chosenjin no daisan michi. In J. Iinuma (Ed.), *Zainichi kankoku cho ōsenjin: sono nihon ni okeru sonzaikachi* (pp. 21-86). Kaifusha.
- Kim, Y. (2007). *Tabunka kyōsei kyōiku to aidentiti*. Akashi shoten.
- Kim, Y. (1976). *Cultural Policy in the Republic of Korea*. UNESCO.
- Kinnunen, J. (1996). Gabriel Tarde as a Founding Father of Innovation Diffusion Research. *Acta Sociologica*, 39(4), pp. 431-442.
- Klijn, E. H. (2008). Governance and Governance Networks in Europe: An Assessment of Ten Years of Research on the Theme. *Public Management Review*, 10(4), pp. 505–525.
- Knill, C. (2005). Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12(5), pp. 764-774.

- Knoke, D. (1990). Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction. *Social Forces*, 68, pp. 1041-1063.
- Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Language Education for Migrant Workers and their Social Integration in Japan. *Global Migration Research Paper*, 8.
- Koeth, E. (2010). Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent Debates in Australia and Overseas. *Research Paper*, 6. Australian Parliamentary Library.
- Komai, E. (2021). The Ainu and Indigenous Politics in Japan: Negotiating Agency, Institutional Stability, and Change. *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*, 7(1), pp. 1-24.
- Komai, H. (1992). Are Foreign Trainees in Japan Disguised Cheap Labourers? In *Migration World*, 20(1), pp. 13-17.
- Komeito. (2007). Daihyō shitsumon. Retrieved May 25, 2023, from <https://www.komei.or.jp/km/kuroda-yutaka/2007/06/>.
- Komine, A. (2014). When Migrants Became Denizens: Understanding Japan as a Reactive Immigration Country. *Contemporary Japan*, 26(2), pp. 197-222.
- Kondo, A. (2002). The Development of Immigration Policy in Japan. *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 11(4), pp. 415-36.
- Kondo, A. (Ed.). (2011). *Tabunka kyōsei seisaku eno apurochi*. Akashi shoten.
- Kong, G. (2014) damunhwagajeong janyeoui gyoyug bogji jiwon jeongchaeg-e gwanhan yeongu.
- Köllen, T. (2019). Diversity Management: A Critical Review and Agenda for the Future. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 30(3), pp. 259-272.
- Koo, J.-W. (2024). ansansi, 5dae hyeogsingwaje tonghan 'dosi beulaendeu' hwaglib. *Gyeonggi Ilbo*. Retrieved June 23, 2024, from <https://www.kyeonggi.com/article/20240218580085>.
- Koopmans, R. (2013). Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Contested Field in Cross-National Comparison. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 39, pp. 147–169.
- Korea Research Institute for Workers' Human Rights and Justice. (1995). Policies and Protective Measures Concerning Foreign Workers in Asia and Europe. International seminar on Policy and Protection for Migrant Workers in Asia and Europe, organized jointly by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Korea. Research Institute for Workers' Human Rights and Justice.
- Kossinets, G., & Watts, D. J. (2009). Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social Network. *American Journal of Sociology*, 115(2), pp. 405-450.
- Kotler, P., Asplund, C., Rein, I., & Haider, D. (1999). *Marketing Places Europe: Attracting Investments, Industries, Residents and Visitors to European Cities, Communities, Regions and Nations*. Financial Times, Prentice Hall.

- Kramer, B. M. (1950). *Residential Contact as a Determinant of Attitudes towards Negroes*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Harvard College Library.
- Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. *Papers. Peabody Museum of Archaeology & Ethnology*, 47(1), pp. viii-223.
- Kübler, D., & Piliutyte, J. (2007). Intergovernmental Relations and International Urban Strategies: Constraints and Opportunities in Multilevel Polities. *Environment and Planning C*, 25(3), pp. 357-373.
- Kuhlmann, J., González de Reufels, D., Schlichte, K., & Nullmeier, F. (2020). How Social Policy Travels: A Refined Model of Diffusion. *Global Social Policy*, 20(1), pp. 80-96.
- Kühne, O. E. (2012). Research Report: Historical Amnesia and the “Neo-Imperial Gaze” in the Okinawa Boom. *Contemporary Japan*, 24(2), pp. 213-241.
- Kuhnle, S. (2004). Productive Welfare in Korea: Moving Towards a European Welfare State Type? In N. Gilbert (Ed.), *Modernizing the Korean Welfare State: Towards the Productive Welfare Model*. Routledge.
- Kukathas, C. (1995). Are There Any Cultural Rights? *Political Theory*, 20, pp. 105-139.
- Kukathas, C. (2003). *The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom*. Oxford University Press.
- Kumra, S., & Manfredi, S. (2012). *Managing Equality and Diversity: Theory and Practice*. University Press.
- Kundnani, A. (2002). The Death of Multi-Culturalism. *Race & Class*, 43(4), pp. 67-72.
- Kunitake, K. (1934). *Kume Hakushi Kujūnen Kaikoroku*, 2.
- Kuper, A. (2000). *Culture: The Anthropologists' Account*. Harvard University Press.
- Kwon, H. (2020). byeonhwahaneun damunhwa geobeoneonseu: ansan damunhwama-eul teugguleul salyelo. *hangugjiyeogjiliahgojeji*, 26(2), pp. 159-171.
- Kwon On, O. (2011). *hangug-ui damunhwa gong-gan: uli sahoe damunhwa ijumindeul-ui salm-ui gong-gan-eul chaj-aseo*. hyeon-amsa.
- Kymlicka, W. (1989). *Liberalism, Community, and Culture*. Oxford University Press (1989)
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford University Press
- Kymlicka, W. (2007). The Global Diffusion of Multiculturalism: Trends, Causes, Consequences. In S. Tierneyq (Ed.), *Accommodating Cultural Diversity* (pp. 17-33). Routledge.
- Kymlicka, W. (2010). The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies. *International Social Science Journal*, 61(199), pp. 97-112.

- Kymlicka, W. (2016). Defending Diversity in an Era of Populism: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism Compared. In N. Meer, T. Modood, & R. Zapata-Barrero (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines* (pp. 158-177). Edinburgh University Press.
- Kyōto City. (2015) *Jinken ni kansuru shimin ishiki chōsa hōkokusho*. Kyōtoshi Bunkashiminkyoku Shiminseikatsubu Jinkenbunka Suishinka.
- Lacroix, T. (2021). Migration-Related City Networks: A Global Overview. *Local Government Studies*, 48(6), pp. 1027-1047.
- Lacroix, T., Furri, F., & Hombert, L. (2020). Migration and Municipal Militancy in the Mediterranean. *EuroMedMig Working Paper Series*. Barcelona: GRITIM- UPF. Retrieved February 20, 2023, from <https://repositori-api.upf.edu/api/core/bitstreams/13cef455-e7fc-49eb-ab09-353d5ecdffbb/content>.
- Laden, A. S., & Owen, D. (Eds.). (2007). *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lafont, C. (1999). *The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy*. Translated by J. Medina. MIT Press.
- Lai, B. B. (1990). *The Romance of Culture in an Urban Civilization: Robert E. Park on Race and Ethnic Relations in Cities*. Routledge.
- Lam, J. K.-C. (2000). Shortage of Highly Skilled Workers in Hong Kong and Policy Responses. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 1(4), pp. 405-425.
- Lambert, A. (2022). Friendship in the Confucian Tradition. In D. Jeske (Ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Friendship*. Routledge.
- Landry, C. (2000). *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators*. Earthscan.
- Landry, C., & Bianchini, F. (1995). *The Creative City*. Demos.
- Lane, J. E. (2000). *New Public Management: An Introduction*. Routledge.
- Lankov, A. Bitter Taste of Paradise: North Korean Refugees in South Korea. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 6(1), pp. 105-137.
- Larson, E., Johnson, Z., & Murphy, M. (2008). Emerging Indigenous Governance: Ainu Rights at the Intersection of Global Norms and Domestic Institutions. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 33, pp. 53-82.
- Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1994). *Economies of Signs and Space*. Sage.
- Laursen, B. (2017). Making and Keeping friends: The Importance of Being Similar. *Child Development Perspectives*, 11(4), pp. 282-289.
- Lautard, E. H., & Loree, D. J. (1984). Ethnic Stratification in Canada, 1931-1971. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 9(3), pp. 333-344.
- Lawson, S. (2006). *Culture and Context in World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Lazarsfeld P. F., & Merton R. K. (1954). Friendship as a Social Process: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis. In M. Berger, *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (pp. 18-66). Van Nostrand.
- Ledger, R. (2018). *Neoliberal Thought and Thatcherism: 'A Transition from Here to There?'* Routledge.
- Lee, C. S. (1963). *The Politics of Korea Nationalism*. University of California Press.
- Lee, C. S. (2017). Narratives of 'Mixed Race' Youth in South Korea: Racial Order and In-Betweenness". *Asian Ethnicity*, 18(4), pp. 522–542.
- Lee, J.-E. (2013). geundaedosiui sooedoen salamdeul-sosujawa ingwon-ui sahoesa. *Institute for East Asian Studies*, 10, pp. 140-142.
- Lee, M., & Martin, J. L. (2018). Doorway to the Dharma of Duality. *Poetics*, 68, pp. 18-30.
- Lee, R., Lee, S. M., Hong, M., & Oh, I. (2022). Assessing Mental Illness Risk Among North Korean Refugees and Immigrants Resettled in South Korea. *JAMA Netw Open*, 5(10).
- Lee, S.-Y. (2013). oegug-in miljibjiyeog-ui jiyeog gongdongche hwalseonghwa bang-an. *hangugjibanghaengjeong-yeonguwon yeongubogoseo*.
- Lee, S.-J., & Arrington, C. (2008). The Politics of NGOs and Democratic Governance in South Korea and Japan. *Pacific Focus*, 23(1), 75-96.
- Lee, Y. J. G., Jun J. Y., Lee, Y. J., et al. (2016) Insomnia in North Korean Refugees: Association with Depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms. *Psychiatry Investig*, 13(1), pp. 67-73.
- Lefebvre, H. (1996). *Writing on Cities*. Blackwell Publishers.
- Leitner, H., & Sheppard, E. (2002). "The City Is Dead, Long Live the Net": Harnessing European Interurban Networks for a Neoliberal Agenda. In N. Brenner, & N. Theodore (Eds.), *Spaces of Neoliberalism* (pp. 148-171). Blackwell.
- Leenders, R. T. A. J. (1996). Evolution of Friendship and Best Friendship Choices. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 21, pp. 133-148.
- London, B., & Bae, G. (2023, December 15). South Korea to See Population Plummet to 1970s Levels, Government Says. *CNN*. Retrieved January 13, 2024, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/15/asia/south-korea-to-see-population-plummet-intl-hnk/index.html>.
- Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (2008). More Benetton than Barricades? The Politics of Diversity in Europe. In A. Lentin, & G. Titley, *The Politics of Diversity in Europe* (pp. 9-28). Council of Europe Publishing.
- Lesser, J. (1999). *Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil*. Duke University Press.

- Levi-Faur, D. (2012). From “Big Government” to “Big Governance?”. In D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (pp. 3-18), Oxford University Press.
- Lewallen, A. E. (2008). Indigenous at Last! Ainu Grassroots Organizing and the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir. *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 6..
- Liargovas, P., & Papageorgiou, C. (2024). *The European Integration*, 2. Springer.
- Lie, J. (2001). *Multiethnic Japan*. Harvard University Press.
- Lie, J. (Ed.). (2014). *Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South Korea*. Institute of East Asian Studies.
- Lieberman, E. S. (2001). Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of Periodization Strategies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34, pp. 1011-1035.
- Lim, S. (2022). *South Korean Popular Culture in the Global Context*. Routledge.
- Lindberg, L. N. (1963). *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*. Stanford University Press.
- Link, A. N., & Yeong Yang, U. (2018). On the Growth of Korean tTchnoparks. *International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal*, 14, pp. 405-410.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53, pp. 69-105.
- Lizardo, O. (2006). How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks. *American Sociological Review*, 71, pp. 778-807.
- Llorens, T. (2006). Los municipios como ámbito institucional de inclusión. In C. Simó Noguera, & F. Torres Pérez (Ed.), *La participación social de los inmigrantes en el ámbito local* (pp. 83-90). Editorial Tirant lo Blanch.
- Logan, J. R., & Molotch H. L. (2007). *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. University of California Press.
- Lorbiecki, A., & Jack, G. (2000). Critical Turns in the Evolution of Diversity Management. *British Journal of Management*, 11(3), S17-S31.
- Love, S. (2021). Multicultural Policy since 2010: A Quick Guide. Research Paper Series. Australian Parliamentary Library.
- Lovett, F. (2009). Domination and Distributive Justice. *Journal of Politics*, 71, pp. 817-830.
- Lovett, F. (2010). Cultural Accommodation and Domination. *Political Theory*, 38(2), pp. 243–267.
- Lowndes, V., & Pratchett, L. (2012). Local Governance under the Coalition Government: Austerity, Localism and the ‘Big Society’, *Local Government Studies*, 38(1), pp. 21-40.

- Lubeck, P., & Walton, J. (1979). Urban Class Conflict in Africa and Latin America: Comparative Analyses from a World Systems Perspective. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 3(1-3), pp. 3-28.
- Luna-Garcia, A. (2008). Just Another Coffee! Milking the Barcelona Model, Marketing a Global Image, and the Resistance of Local Identities. In Anne M. C., & K. Hetherington. *Consuming the Entrepreneurial City: Image, Memory, Spectacle* (pp. 143-160). Routledge.
- Lustig, D.B. (1997) Of Kwanzaa, Cinco de Mayo, and Whispering: The Need for Intercultural Education. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 28(4), pp. 574-592.
- Lynn, L. E. JR. (2012). The Many Faces of Governance: Adaptation? Transformation? Both? Neither? In D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (pp. 49-64), Oxford University Press.
- Mackie, D. M., Maimier, A. T., & Smith, E. R. (2009). Intergroup Emotions Theory. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination* (pp. 285-307). Psychology Press.
- Maebayashi, S. (2016). Saigai to nihonjin no seishin-sei. *Gendai shakai kenkyū*, 2, pp. 61-75.
- Maggetti, M., & Gilardi, F. (2016). Problems (and Solutions) in the Measurement of Policy Diffusion Mechanisms. *Journal of Public Policy*, 36(1), pp. 87-107.
- Mahoney, J. (2010). After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research. *World Politics*, 62(1), pp. 120-147.
- Majoor, S. (2011). Framing Large-Scale Projects: Barcelona Forum and the Challenge of Balancing Local and Global Needs. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 31(2), pp. 143-156.
- Mansouri, F., & Modood, T. (2020). The Complementarity of Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Theory Backed by Australian Evidence. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 44(16), pp. 1-20.
- Marcus, G. E. (1986). Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System. In J. Clifford and G. Marcus (Eds.), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (pp. 165-293). University of California Press.
- Muramatsu, M. (1988). *Chihō bunken kaikaku*. Tōkyō Daigaku Suppankai.
- Marinetto, M. (2003). Who Wants to be an Active Citizen?: The Politics and Practice of Community Involvement. *Sociology*, 37(1), pp. 103-120.
- Mark, N. (1998). Birds of a Feather Sing Together. *Social Forces*, 77, pp. 453-485.
- Marsh, D. (2008). Understanding British Government: Analysing Competing Models. 10(2), pp. 251-268.
- Marsh, D., & Sharman, J.C. (2009). Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer. *Policy Studies*, 30(3), pp. 269-288.
- Marshall, A. J. (2005). Europeanisation at the Urban Level: Local Actors, Institutions and the Dynamics of Multi-Level Interaction. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12(4), pp. 668-686.

- Marshall, T. (2000). Urban Planning and Governance: Is there a Barcelona Model? *International Planning Studies*, 5(3), pp. 299-319.
- Marshall, T. (2004). *Transforming Barcelona: The Renewal of a European Metropolis*. Routledge.
- Marshall, T. H. (1950). *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*. Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, I. (2001). Dawn of the Living Wage: The Diffusion of a Redistributive Municipal Policy. *Urban Affairs Review*, 36(4), pp. 470–496.
- Martin, P., & Miller, M. (1980), Guest Workers: Lessons from Western Europe, *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 33, pp. 315-330.
- Maruyama, M. (2016). *Heiseinodaigappei' no seiji shakai-gaku' -kokka no risukēringu to chiiki shakai*. Ochanomizu shobō.
- Mascarell, F. (2005). *La cultura en la era de la incertidumbre*. Roca Editorial.
- Massey, D. B. (2005). *For Space*. Sage.
- Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1985). Spatial Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome. *American Sociological Review*, 50(1), pp. 94-106.
- Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. *Population and Development Review*, 19(3), pp. 431-466.
- Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1994). An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case. *Population and Development Review*, 20(4), pp. 699-751.
- Masterson, D., & Funada-Classen, S. (2004). *The Japanese in Latin America*. University of Illinois Press.
- Masuda, Y. (1967). *Junsui Bunka no Jdken, Nihon Bunka wa Shdgeki ni dd Taetaka*, Kodansha.
- Masumi, T. (2009). Nihonkoku kenpō to buraku mondai. In K. Tomonaga, & T. Watanabe (Eds.), *Burakushi kenkyū kara no hasshin*, vol. 3 (pp. 20-21). Kaihō Shuppansha.
- Matherly, C. (2020). Psychological Distancing Toward North Korean Refugees Under Republic of Korea–Style Unification: Recommendations and Ways Forward. *North Korean Review*, 16(2), pp. 75–92.
- Matsui, T. (2013). *Language and Marketing: A Social History of the "Healing Boom" in Japan*. Sekigakusha.
- Matsuzawa, Y. (2016). *Jiyū-minken Undō: Demokurashii no Yume to Zassetsu*. Iwanami Shinsho.
- McCann, E. (2016). Governing Urbanism: Urban Governance Studies 1.0, 2.0 and Beyond. *Urban Studies*, 54(2), pp. 311-563.

- McCarthy, C., and Crichlow, W. (Eds). (1993). *'Race', Identity and Representation in Education*. Routledge.
- McConnell, D. L. (2000). *Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program*. University of California Press.
- McCormack, G., & Field, N. (1996). *The Construction State: The Pathology of the Doken Kokka*. Routledge.
- McCormack, N. (2018). Affirmative Action Policies Under the Postwar Japanese Constitution: On The Effects Of The Dōwa Special Measures Policy. *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 16(5). Retrieved June 12, 2023, from <https://apjjf.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/article-1498.pdf>.
- McDermott, R. (2001). The Psychological Ideas of Amos Tversky and Their Relevance for Political Science. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(1), pp. 5-33.
- McDonogh, G. (1986). *Good Families of Barcelona: A Social History of Power in the Industrial Era*. Princeton University Press.
- McDonogh, G., & Martinez-Rigol, S. (2018). *Barcelona*. Polity.
- McKesson, J. A. (1952). The Schuman Plan. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(1), pp. 18-35.
- McFarlane, C., & Robinson. J. (2012). Introduction: Experiments in Comparative Urbanism. *Urban Geography*, 33(6), pp. 765-773.
- McGrath, J., & Bates, B. (2013). *The Little Book of Big Management Theories: ... and How to Use Them*. Pearson Business.
- McGrogan, D. (2010). A Shift in Japan's Stance on Indigenous Rights, and Its Implications. *International Journal of Minority and Group Rights*, 17, pp. 355-373.
- McGuigan, J. (2009). *Cool Capitalism*. Pluto Press.
- McMichael, P. (1990). Incorporating Comparison within a World-Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method. *American Sociological Review*, 55(3), p. 385.
- McNamara, K. (2002). Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation. *West European Politics*, 25(1), pp. 47-76.
- McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, pp. 415-444.
- McVeigh, B. (2003). *Nationalisms of Japan: Managing and Mystifying Identity*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Mechtild, R. (2018). *Foreword*. UNESCO.
- Medical Network. (2002). Workshop for Foreign Worker Medical Network. Yonsei University.

- Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2011). How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism? *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 33(2): pp. 175–196.
- Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2016). Interculturalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship. In N. Meer, T. Modood, & R. Zapata-Barrero (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines* (pp. 27-52). Edinburgh University Press.
- Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2019). Accentuating Multicultural Britishness: An Open or Closed Activity? In R. T. Ashcroft, & M. Bevir (Eds.), *Multiculturalism in the British Commonwealth: Comparative Perspectives on Theory and Practice* (pp. 46-64). University of California Press.
- Meller, H. (2001). *European Cities 1890-1930s: History, Culture and the Built Environment*. Wiley.
- Menjívar, C. (2000). *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America*. University of California Press.
- Meseguer, C. (2004). What Role for Learning? The Diffusion of Privatisation in OECD and Latin American Countries. *Journal of Public Policy*, 24(3), pp. 299–325.
- Meseguer, C. (2005). Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 598(1), pp. 67–82.
- Meyer, J. W., Ramirez, F. O. & Nuhoglu, Y. (1992). World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870–1980. *Sociology of Education*, 65(2), pp. 128-149.
- Meyer, C. F., & Rhoades, E. K. (2006). Multiculturalism: Beyond Food, Festival, Folklore, and Fashion. *Kappa Delta Pi Record*, 42(2), 82–87.
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83, pp. 340–363.
- Michalski, W., Miller, R., & Stevens, B. (2001). Governance in the 21st Century: Power in the Global Knowledge Economy and Society. In *Governance in the 21st Century* (7-26). OECD.
- Miller, D. (2006). Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Theoretical Reflections. In K. Banting, & W. Kymlicka (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State* (pp. 322-338). Oxford University Press.
- Milward, H. B., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Governing the Hollow State. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10(2), pp. 359–379.
- Minami, D. (2019). Lost in Translation: Problematizing the Localization of Transnational Activism. *European Journal of International Relations*, 25(2), pp. 511-537.
- Minister of Internal Affairs and Communication. (2006). *Chiiki ni okeru tabunkakyōsei suishin puran ni tsuite*. Minister of Internal Affairs and Communication.
- Mirga-Kruszelnicka, A. (n.d.). *A History of the Roma Associative Movement in Spain*. Roma Civil Rights Movement. Retrieved October 12, 2023, from <https://www.romarchive.eu/en/roma-civil-rights-movement/history-roma-associative-movement-spain/>.

- Mische, A., & Pattison, P. (2000). Composing a Civic Arena: Publics, Projects, and Social Settings. *Poetics*, 27, pp. 163-194.
- Modood, T. (2008). Is Multiculturalism Dead? *Public Policy Research*, 15(2), pp. 84-88.
- Modood, T. (2018). Interculturalism: Not a New Policy Paradigm. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 6(22).
- Modood, T. & May, S. (2001). Multiculturalism and Education in Britain: An Internally Contested Debate. *International Journal of Educational Research*, 35(3), pp. 305-317.
- Moffitt, B. (2016). *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford University Press.
- Mohr, J. W., & Duquenne, V. (1997). The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888–1917. *Theory and society*, 26, pp. 305-356.
- Molins, M. J. V. (2021). Al-Andalus y sus etimologías. In M. P. del Rosal, H. V. Bravo, & D. M. Rosales, *Los Fernández de Córdoba: nobleza, hegemonía y fama. Segundo congreso: homenaje a Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada* (pp. 823-840).
- Mollica, K. A., Gary, B., & Trevino, L. K. (2003). Racial Homophily and Its Persistence in Newcomers' Social Networks. *Organization Science*, 14, pp. 123-136.
- Moon, C. I., & Lim, S. H. (2003). Weaving Through Paradoxes: Democratization, Globalization, Environmental Politics in South Korea. *East Asian Review*, 15(2), pp.43-70.
- Moore, J., & Rodger, R. (2007). Who Really Ran the Cities? Municipal Knowledge and Policy Networks in British Local Government, 1832–1914. In R. Roth, & R. Beachy, *Who Ran the Cities? City Elites and Urban Power Structures in Europe and North America, 1750–1940*. Routledge.
- Morange, M. & Fol, S. (2014). City, Neoliberalisation and Justice. *Justice Spatiale/Spatial Justice*, 6, pp. 1-29.
- Morató, R. A. (2008) La emergencia de una capital cultural Europea. In M. García, & M. Degen (Eds.), *La metaciudad: Barcelona. Transformación de una metrópolis*. Anthropos.
- Morén-Alegret, R. (2008). Immigrants and Immigration Policy-Making. The Case of Spain. Country Report. *Migration Research Group (GRM)*. Retrieved November 13, 2023, from https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2008-08/doc1_1457_306003501.pdf.
- Mori Foundation. (2024). *Global Power City Index 2024*. Retrieved October 4, 2024, from <https://mori-m-foundation.or.jp/english/ius2/gpci2/index.shtml>.
- Morikawa, H. (1992). *Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise Groups in Japan*. University of Tokyo Press.
- Morris-Suzuki, T. (1997). *Re-inventing Japan: Time Space Nation*. Routledge.
- Morris-Suzuki, T. (2002). *Hihanteki sōzō-ryoku no tame ni — gurōbaru-ka jidai no Nihon*. Heibonsha.

- Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. (1995). *Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending*. Routledge.
- Mossberger, K. (2000). *The Politics of Ideas and the Spread of Enterprise Zones*. University Press.
- Müller, U., Wagner, A., & Kunz, P. (2011). *Correlation Analysis between the Intercultural Cities Index and Other Data*, Council of Europe Publishing.
- Mullard, C. (1982). Multiracial Education in Britain: From Assimilation to Cultural Pluralism. In J. Tierney (Ed.), *Race, Migration and Schooling* (pp. 120-33), Holt.
- Mullard, C. (1984). *Antiracist Education*. National Association for Multi-Racial Education.
- Munck, R. (2008). Globalisation, Governance and Migration: An Introduction. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(7), pp. 1227-1246.
- Muramatsu, M. (1988). Mineika, kisei kanwa to saikisei no kōzō: Denki tsushin seisaku no henka. *Leviathan*, 2, pp. 118-135.
- Murphy-Shigematsu, S. (2000). Identities of Multiethnic People in Japan. In M. Douglass, & G. S. Roberts (Eds.), *Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society* (pp. 196-216). Routledge.
- Murphy-Shigematsu, S. (2001). Multiethnic Lives and Monoethnic Myths: American-Japanese Amerasians in Japan. In T. Williams-Léon, & C. L. Nakashima (Ed.), *The Sum of Our Parts: Mixed Heritage Asian Americans* (pp. 207-216). Temple University Press.
- Mussen, P. H. (1950), Some Personality and Social Factors Related to Changes in Children's Attitudes toward Negroes. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 45(3), p. 423.
- Nakamura, A. (2005). "We are all 'Residents of Japan'": The Construction of Common Identity and the Success of the Anti-fingerprinting Movement. *Japanstudien*, 16(1), pp. 145-165.
- Nakamura, T. (1983). *Economic Growth in Prewar Japan*. Yale University Press.
- Narumi, M. (1994). *Chihō bunken no shisō: Jichitaikaikaku no kijuku to tenbō*. Gakuyo Shobo.
- National Council of Multicultural Cities. (2020). *Covenant of the National Council of Multicultural Cities*. National Council of Multicultural Cities.
- National Land Agency. (1992). *chihō toshi no sekai-ka senryaku*. Ōkurashō insatsu-kyoku.
- Navarro, J. M., Pascual Saüc, J., & Rojas, A. (2002) Los planes de acogida e integración intercultural: un instrumento para la planificación participada de políticas locales de inmigración. *Migraciones*, 11, pp. 297-317.
- Navarro, V. (Ed.). (2007). *Neoliberalism, Globalization and Inequalities: Consequences for Health and Quality of Life*. Baywood Publishing Company.

- Neal, Z. P. (2013). *The Connected City: How Networks Are Shaping the Modern Metropolis*. Routledge.
- Neal, S., Bennett, K., Cochrane, A., & Mohan, G. (2013). Living Multiculture: Understanding the New Spatial and Social Relations of Ethnicity and Multiculture in England. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 31, pp. 308-323.
- Neal, S., Bennett, K., Cochrane, A., & Mohan, G. (2018). *Lived Experiences of Multiculture: The New Social and Spatial Relations of Diversity*. Routledge.
- Neidert, L., & Farley, R. (1985). Assimilation in the United States: An Analysis of Ethnic and Generation Differences in Status and Achievement. *American Sociological Review*, 50, pp. 840-850.
- Nelsen, B., & Stubb A. (Eds.). (1998). *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Newcomb, T. M., & Hartley, E. L. (Eds.). (1947). *Readings in Social Psychology*. Holt.
- Newmark, A. J. (2002). An Integrated Approach to Policy Transfer and Diffusion. *Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization*, 19(2), pp. 151-178.
- Niessen, J. (2000). *Diversity and Cohesion: New Challenges for the Integration of Immigrants and Minorities*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Niiya, B. (1993). *Japanese American History: An A-To-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present*. Facts on File.
- Nijman, J. (2007). Introduction: Comparative Urbanism. *Urban Geography* 28(1), pp. 1-6.
- Niimura, T. (2018). Decentralization Reform in Japan – Ambitions to Create Real Local Self-Governments and the Framework of the Constitution. *Seikei hōgaku*, 89, pp. 95-108.
- Nishihara, J. (2014). Heisei no dai gappei no kenshō sōkatsu to chiri-gaku' ichi kōiki jichitai no tanjō to san-tsu no chōsha no hōshiki kara ichi. jinbun chiri gakkai. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/hgeog/2014/0/2014_16/_article/-char/ja/.
- Nishihara, J., & Fujii, S. (2018). Governance and government of an enlarged municipality after municipal amalgamation : Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan. *Shizuokadaigaku jōhōgakukenyūka*. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from <https://shizuoka.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10531/files/180718005.pdf>.
- Nishiyama, H. (2023). Decolonial Encounter with Neo-Nationalism: The Politics of Indigeneity and Land Rights Struggles in Okinawa. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 48(2), pp. 231-450.
- Noel, D. L. (1968). A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic Stratification. *Social Problems*, 16(2), pp. 157-172.
- Nowicka, M., & Vertovec, S. (2014). Comparing Convivialities: Dreams and Realities of Living-with-Difference. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 17(4), pp. 341-356.

- O'Donoghue, S. (2024, May 2). 'Remain Vigilant': Europe's Most Heavily Pickpocketed Tourist Spots Revealed. *Euronews*. <https://www.euronews.com/travel/2024/05/02/remain-vigilant-europes-most-heavily-pickpocketed-tourist-spots-revealed>.
- Oates, W. E. (2001). Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting Perspectives. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 31, pp. 133-145.
- Odijie, M. (2018). The Fear of 'Yellow Peril' and the Emergence of European Federalist Movement. *The International History Review*, 40(2), pp. 358-375.
- OECD. (2021). *OECD Skills Strategy Implementation Guidance for Korea: Strengthening the Governance of Adult Learning*, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing. Retrieved March 20, 2023, from OECD (2021), OECD Skills Strategy Implementation Guidance for Korea: Strengthening the Governance of Adult Learning, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/f19a4560-en>.
- Okamoto, M. (2011). *Nihon Hito Naibu No Minzoku Ishiki To Gainen No Konran*. Shakai Gakubu Kiyō, 19(2), pp. 77-98.
- Okamoto, M. (2015). Ribēn de mínzú rèntóng cóng `chūyún mínzú'ànlì kàn duōyuán mínzú guójiā guān de jiàngòu. *Mínzú xuéjiè*, 36, pp. 145-182.
- Ogawa, A. (2009). *The Failure of Civil Society? The Third Sector and the State in Contemporary Japan*. Routledge.
- Ogawa, A. (2020). Japanese NPOs and the State Re-examined: Reflections 18 Years On. In D. Chiavacci, J. Obinger, & S. Grano (Eds.), *Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and Contention in Post-High Growth* (pp.219-238), Amsterdam University Press.
- Oguma, E. (2002). *A Genealogy of Japanese Self-Images*. Trans Pacific Press.
- Oh, (n.d.). *Gyeong-gidomemoli*. Retrieved March 23, 2023, from <https://memory.library.kr/files/original/1198851d9eald2464f22de0783c8c711.pdf>.
- Oh, D.-S. (1995). High-Technology and Regional Development Policy: An Evaluation of Korea's Technopolis Programme. *Habitat International*, 19, pp. 251-267.
- Oh, G. S. (2007). What Kind of Multiculturalism? In Oh et al. (Eds.), *Multiculturalism in South Korea: A Critical Review* (pp. 25-44). Hanwool.
- Oh, J.-E., Kang, D. K., Shin, J. J., Lee, S.-L., Lee, S. B., & Chung, K. (2011). Migration Profile of the Republic of Korea. *IOM MRTC Research Report Series*, 1. IOM Migration Research and Training Centre.
- Oh, K.-S. (2010a). nuguleul wihan damunhwajuuiinga? ansanjiyeog ijumin jiwon hwaldong-e daehan bipanjeog geomto. *minjusahoewa jeongchaeg-yeongu*, 17, pp. 190-222.
- Oh, K.-S. (2010b). damunhwa jungsimdosi'ui isang-gwa hyeonsil: ansansi wongogdong-ui gyeongheom. *gugto*, 342, pp. 39-45.

- Oh, K.-S., & Jeong, G.-H. (2006). ansansi wongogdong 'guggyeong eobsneun ma-eul' peulojegteu: myeoch gaji jaengjeomdeul. *hangugjiyeogji lihaghoeji*, 12(1), pp. 72-93.
- Oikawa, T. (2021). *Sengonihon no 'kakushin' seiryoku'- teikō to suibō no seiji-shi*. Mineruva-shobō.
- Okada, I. (2016). *Kakushin jichitai: nekkyō to zasetsu ni nani wo manabuka*. Chuokoronsha.
- Okin, S. (1999). *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* Princeton University Press.
- Okuda, H., & Murai, S. (2008). *Dōwa gyōsei ga kichinto waku Q&A*. Kaihō Shuppansha.
- Oliver, M. J., & Pemberton, H. (2004). Learning and Change in 20th-Century British Economic Policy. *Governance*, 17(3), 415-441.
- Olowu, D., & Wunsch, J. S. (2004). *Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Oomen, B. (2019). Decoupling and Teaming Up: The Rise and Proliferation of Transnational Municipal Networks in the Field of Migration. *International Migration Review*, 54(3), pp. 913-939.
- Orenstein, M. A. (2008). *Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform*. Princeton University Press.
- Orenstein, M. (2013). Pension Privatization: Evolution of a Paradigm. *Governance*, 26(2), pp. 259-281.
- Otsuka, M. (1986). *Chiho toshi kogyo no chiiki kozo*. Kokon shoin.
- Oxford English Dictionary. (2023) Diversity. Retrieved September 20, 2023, from https://www.oed.com/dictionary/diversity_n?tab=meaning_and_use.
- Ozgen, C. (2021). The Economics of Diversity: Innovation, Productivity and the Labour Market. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 35(4), pp. 1168-1216.
- Paddison, R. (1993). City Marketing, Image Reconstruction, and Urban Regeneration. *Urban Studies*, 30(2), pp. 339-350.
- Padilla, A. (Ed.). (1980). *Acculturation, Theory, Models and Some New Findings*, Westview Press.
- Pajares, M. Las políticas locales en el ámbito de la inmigración. In E. Aja, & J. Arango (Eds) *Veinte años de inmigración en España. Perspectivas Jurídicas y Sociológicas (1985-2004)* (pp. 369-394). Fundación CIDOB.
- Palley, T. (2021). *Neoliberalism and the Road to Inequality and Stagnation*, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Palumbo, A., & Bellamy, R. (2017). *From Government to Governance*. Routledge.
- Papathanasiou, K. (2023, March 24). North Sentinel Island: Home to the Most Isolated Tribe in the World. *Vale Magazine*. Retrieved April 20, 2023, from <https://thevalomagazine.com/2023/03/24/north-sentinel-island-home-to-the-most-isolated-tribe-in-the-world/>.

- Parekh, B. C. (2000). *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*. Runnymede Trust Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain.
- Parini, I. (2012). Censorship of Anime in Italian Distribution. *Journal des traducteurs*, 57(2), pp. 325-337.
- Park, B.-G., & Jeong, G.-H. (2004). segyehwawa ij-eobeolim-ui jeongchi: ansansi wongogdong-ui oegug-in nodongja geaju jiyeog-e daehan yeongu. *Hangugjiyeogjihaghoeji*, 10(4), pp. 800-823.
- Park, C.-E. (2002). *guggyeong eobsneun ma-eulgwa damunhwa gongdongche*. ansan-oegug-innodongjasenteo.
- Park, C.-E. (2007). bagcheon-eung. (2007). hangugjeog damunhwa undong-ui silcheon: ansan guggyeong-eobsneun ma-eul undong-eul jungsim-eulo. *hangugsahoeahaghoe gitaganhaengmul*, pp. 181-217.
- Park, G.-S. (2022). *Development and Globalization in South Korea: From Financial Crisis to K-Pop*. Korea University Press.
- Park, M. (2009). *Kungmin, inmin, simin*. Soхва.
- Park, R. E. (1950). *Race and Culture*. The Free Press.
- Park, R. E., & Burgess, E.W. [1921] (1969). *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. University of Chicago Press.
- Park, S., Lee, Y., Jang, H., & Jo, M. (2017). Violence Victimization in Korean Adolescents: Risk Factors and Psychological Problems. *International Journal of Environmental Research*. Public Health 19, 14(5), 541.
- Park, S. O., & Markusen, A. (1995). Generalizing New Industrial Districts: A Theoretical Agenda and an Application from a Non-Western Economy. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 27(1), pp. 81-104.
- Park, S. W. (2010). Yokdae jeongbuui ijujeongchek byunhwawa minganui daeung. In *President Lee Myung-bak Government's Immigration Policy, Is It Acceptable? Policy Discussion*. National Human Rights Commission of Korea.
- Parkinson, M., & Harding, A. (1995) European Cities Toward 2000: Entrepreneurialism, Competition and Social Exclusion. In M. Rhodes (Ed.), *The Regions and the New Europe: Patterns in Core and Periphery Development* (pp. 53-77). Manchester University Press.
- Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social System*. Free Press.
- Parsons, T. (1967). *The Structure of Social Action*. Free Press.
- Pascual, J. (2008). Cultural Policies, Human Development and Development Innovation: Or Why We Need an Agenda 21 for Culture. *UNESCO Observatory Multi-Disciplinary Research in the Arts E-Journal*, 1(2), pp. 9-25.

- Pastrana-Huguet, J., Casado Claro, M.-F., Gavari-Stark, E. (2022). Japan's Culture of Prevention: How Bosai Culture Combines Cultural Heritage with State-of-the-Art Disaster Risk Management Systems. *Sustainability*, 14(21), 13742.
- Payne, S. G. (1971). Catalan and Basque Nationalism. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 6(1), pp. 15-33.
- Payne, S. G. (2011). *Spain: A Unique History*. University of Wisconsin Press.
- Payre, R. (2010). The Importance of Being Connected. City Networks and Urban Government: Lyon and Eurocities (1990–2005). *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 34(2), pp. 260-280.
- Peck, J., Theodore, N., & Brenner, N., (2009). Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, Moments, Mutation, *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 29(1), pp. 49-66.
- Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing Space. *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 380-404.
- Pedroni, M. (2013). *From Production to Consumption: The Cultural Industry of Fashion*. Interdisciplinary Press.
- Pekkanen, R. (2004). Social Capital without Advocacy. In M. Alagappa (Ed.), *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia*. Stanford University Press.
- Pekkanen, R. (2006). *Japan's Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates*. Stanford University Press.
- Pempel, T. J. (1990). *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. Cornell University Press.
- Pekkanen, R. J., Tsujinaka, Y., & Yamamoto, H., (2014). *Neighborhood Associations and Governance in Japan*. Routledge.
- Peña-López, I. (2019). *Convirtiendo participación en soberanía: el caso de decidim.barcelona. Barcelona*. Huygens Editorial.
- Peña-López, I. (2017). *Decidim.barcelona, Spain. Case Study*. IT for Change.
- Pentassuglia, G. (2003). *Minorities in International Law: An Introductory Study*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Pérez, J. (2007). *History of a Tragedy: The Expulsion of the Jews from Spain*. University of Illinois Press.
- Perez Takagi, L., & Nishikura, M. (2013). *Hafu: The Mixed-Race Experience in Japan*. Documentary. Distribber.
- Perotti, A. (1994). *The Case for Intercultural Education*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Peruzzi Castellani, B. (2023a). The European Ideal of an Inclusive City: Interculturalism and “Good Social Practices” in Barcelona. *Social Inclusion*, 11(3), pp. 150-161.

- Peruzzi Castellani, B. (2023b). From Disaster Solidarity to “Multicultural Conviviality”: Risks and Opportunities for Migrants in Japan after the Great Hanshin Earthquake. *Partecipazione e Conflitto*, 16(3), pp. 531-545.
- Peters, B. G. (2012). Governance as Political Theory. In D. Levi-Faur, D. (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Governance* (pp. 19-32), Oxford University Press.
- Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public Administration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 8, pp. 223-243.
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup Contact Theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, pp. 65-85.
- Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90, pp. 751-783.
- Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2008). How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-Analytic Tests of Three Mediators. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 38, pp. 922-934.
- Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2011). *When Groups Meet: The Dynamics of Intergroup Contact*. Psychology Press.
- Pharr, S. J. (2003). Conclusion: Targeting by an Activist State: Japan as a Civil Society Model. In F. J. Schwartz, & S. J. Pharr (Eds.), *The State of Civil Society in Japan* (pp. 316-336), Cambridge University Press.
- Phillips, A. (2007). *Multiculturalism without Culture*. Princeton University Press.
- Pi-Suñyer, C. V. (2010). *The Transition to a Decentralized Political System in Spain*. Forum of Federations.
- Pinyol-Jiménez, G., & Caraballo, S. (2018). *Immigration and Integration Management in Spain*. Friederich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved February 25, 2023, from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/madrid/17649.pdf>.
- Pinyol-Jiménez, G., & Caraballo, S. (2023). Management Of Immigration, Asylum, and Integration in Spain. *Labour and Social Justice*. Retrieved March 23, 2023, from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/madrid/20614.pdf>.
- Piper, N. (1998). *Racism. Nationalism and Citizenship: Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany*. Ashgate.
- Pisarevskaya, A., & Scholten, P. (2022). Cities of Migration. In P. Scholten (Ed.). *Introduction to Migration Studies*. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer.
- Pitts, D. (2009). Diversity Management, Job Satisfaction, and Performance: Evidence from U.S. Federal Agencies. *Public Administration Review*, 69(2), pp. 328-338.
- Piyada, C. (2021). Cheap and Dispensable: Foreign Labor in Japan via the Technical Intern Training Program. *Jsn Journal*, 11(1), pp. 33-49.

- Polillo, S., & Guillén, M. F. (2005). Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(6), pp. 1764–1802.
- Porcher, L. (1986). *Projet n. 7 du CDCC: L'éducation et le développement culturel des migrants. Rapport final du groupe de travail*. Conseil de l'Europe.
- Porter, J. (1965). *The Vertical Mosaic*, Toronto University Press.
- Portes, A., & Sensenbrenner, J. (1993). Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, pp. 1320-1350.
- Porter, J. (1975). Ethnic Pluralism in Canadian Perspective. In N. Glazer, & D. Moynihan (Eds.), *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (pp. 267-304), Harvard University Press.
- Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2001). *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. University of California Press.
- Portes, A., & Zhou, M. (1993). The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 530, pp. 74-96.
- Prakash, A., & Potoski, M. (2006). Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2), pp. 350–364.
- Prasad, P., Konrad, A., & Pringle, J. (2006). Examining the Contours of Workplace Diversity: Concepts, Contexts and Challenges. In, A. M., Konrad, P. Prasad, & J. K. Pringle (Eds.), *Handbook of Workplace Diversity*. Sage.
- Prebisch, R. (1971). *Change and Development: Latin America's Great Task*. Praeger Publishers.
- Prewitt, K. (2002). Does Ethno-Racial Classification Have a Future in Policymaking? *Public Affairs Report*, 44(1), pp. 16-19.
- Princen, S., & t'Hart, P. (2014). Putting Policy Paradigms in Their Place. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(3), 470-474.
- Proulx-Chénard, S. (2021). Interculturalism. Retrieved September 20, 2023, from <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/interculturalisme>.
- Purificación Ubric Rabaneda (PUR). (2011). ¿Cuándo llegaron los primeros judíos a España? *Clío: Revista de historia*, 120, pp. 26-33. Retrieved January 19, 2024, from https://www.ugr.es/~pubric/files/Clío-cuando_llegaron_judios_España.pdf.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Touchstone Books/Simon & Schuster.
- Putnam, R. D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(2), pp. 137-174.
- Ramasamy, B., & Cremer, R. (1998). Cities, Commerce and Culture: The Economic Role of International Sister-City Relationships between New Zealand and Asia. *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, 3(3), pp. 446-461.

- Ramírez, C. S. (2020). *Assimilation: An Alternative History*. University of California Press.
- Rasmus, J. (2020). *The Scourge of Neoliberalism: US Economic Policy from Reagan to Trump*. Clarity Press.
- Rath, J. (Ed.). (2007). *Tourism, Ethnic Diversity and the City*. Routledge.
- Ravitch, D. (1992). Diversity in Education. *Dialogue*, 95, pp. 39-47.
- Rawls, J. (1999). *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*. Harvard University Press
- Ray, L. J., & Sayer, A. (1999). *Culture and economy after the Cultural Turn*. Sage.
- Reed, S. R. (1986). *Japanese Prefectures and Policymaking*. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Regulski, J. (1988). *Decentralization and Local Government Danish-Polish Comparative Study*. Routledge.
- Reimann, K. D. (2010). *The Rise of Japanese NGOs: Activism from Above*. Routledge.
- Reischauer, E. O. (1988). *The Japanese Today*. Charles Tuttle.
- Resende-Santos, J. (2007). *Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army*. Cambridge University Press.
- Resonance. (2024). Best Cities. Retrieved September 27, 2024, from <https://www.worldsbestcities.com/rankings/worlds-best-cities/>.
- Reus-Smit, C. (2018). *On Cultural Diversity International Theory in a World of Difference*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rhee, J. (2022). Korean Technoparks: An Evolving Integrated Business Platform. In D.-S. Oh, F. Y. Phillips, & A. V. Mohan (Eds.), *Smart City 2.0: Strategies and Innovations for City Development*. World Scientific Publishing.
- Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997). *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Open University Press.
- Richard, O. C., Barnett, T., Dwyer, S., & Chadwick, K. (2004). Cultural Diversity in Management, Firm Performance, and the Moderating Role of Entrepreneurial Orientation Dimensions. *Academy of Management Journal*, 47(2), pp. 255–266.
- Risse, T. (2013). Governance under Limited Sovereignty. In M. Finnermore, & J. Goldstein (Eds.), *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World* (pp. 78-104). Oxford University Press.
- Rius, J., & Sánchez-Befando, M. V. (2015). Modelo Barcelona y política cultural: usos y abusos de la cultura por parte de un modelo emprendedor de desarrollo local. *EURE* 41(122).
- Rius-Ulldemolins, J., Hernández i Martí, G.-M, & Torres, F. (2015): Urban Development and Cultural Policy “White Elephants”: Barcelona and Valencia, *European Planning Studies*.

- Rix, A. G. (1975). Tokyo's Governor Minobe and Progressive Local Politics in Japan Alan G. Rix 1975
- Robinson, J. (2011). Comparisons: Colonial or Cosmopolitan? *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*. 32(2), 125-140.
- Robinson, J., (2014). Introduction to a Virtual Issue on Comparative Urbanism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*.
- Robinson, J. (2015). Comparative Urbanism: New Geographies and Cultures of Theorizing the Urban. Debates & Developments. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 40(1), pp. 187-199.
- Rocher, F., Labelle, M., Field, A.-M., & Icar, J.-C. (2007). *Le concept d'interculturalisme en contexte québécois: Généalogie d'un néologisme*, Memoir presented to the Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accommodement reliées aux différences culturelles, Retrieved February 13, 2022, from <https://www.mce.gouv.qc.ca/publications/CCPARDC/rapport-3-rocher-francois.pdf>.
- Rodger, R. (Ed.). (1993). *European Urban History*. Leicester University Press.
- Rodríguez-Piñero y Bravo-Ferrer, M. (2010). La nueva legislación de extranjería e inmigración. *Diario La Ley*, 7423.
- Rogers, E. M. (1962). *Diffusion of Innovations*. (First Edition). Free Press.
- Rogers, E. M. (1983). *Diffusion of Innovations*. (Third Edition). Free Press.
- Rogers, E. M. (1995). *Diffusion of Innovations*. (Fourth Edition). Free Press.
- Rogers, E. M. (2003). *Diffusion of Innovations*. (Fifth Edition). Simon & Schuster.
- Rojek, C., & Turner, B. (2000). Decorative Sociology: Towards a Critique of the Cultural Turn. *The Sociological Review*, 48(4), pp. 629-648.
- Rondinelli, D. A., & Cheema, G.S. (1983) Implementing Decentralization Policies. An Introduction, In G.S. Cheema, & D.A. Rondinelli (Eds.), *Decentralization and Development. Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (pp. 9-34). Sage.
- Roquet, P. (2009). Ambient Literature and the Aesthetics of Calm: Mood Regulation in Contemporary Japanese Fiction. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 35(1), pp. 87-111.
- Rorty, R. M. (1967). *Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method*. University of Chicago Press.
- Rorty, R., 1999, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America*, Harvard University Press.
- Rose R. (1991). What is Lesson-Drawing? *Journal of Public Policy*, 11(1), pp. 3-30.
- Rose, R. (1993). *Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy*. Chatham House.

- Rose, N. (1996). The Death of the Social? Re-Figuring the Territory of Government. *Economy and Society*, 25(3), pp. 327-356.
- Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. (1965) *Preliminary Report*. Queen's Printer.
- Rubicondo, K. (2016). *Quantitative Comparability Study of the ICC Index and the Quality of Life Data*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Ruipérez, M. G. (2012). El empadronamiento municipal en españa: evolución legislativa y tipología documenta. *Documenta & Instrumenta*, 10, pp. 45-86.
- Russell, B. (2019). Beyond the Local Trap: New Municipalism and the Rise of the Fearless Cities. *Antipode*, 51(3), pp. 989-1010.
- Russell, J. G. (2009). The Other Other: The Black Presence in the Japanese Experience. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity*. Routledge.
- Rutgers, L. V., & Bradbury, S. (2006). The Diaspora, c. 235–638. In S. T. Katz (Ed.), *The Late Roman-Rabbinic Period. The Cambridge History of Judaism. Vol. 4*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ryu, W., Chon, Y., & Lee, H. (2024). Posttraumatic Growth and Psychopathological Symptoms as Predictors in the Integration of North Korean Adolescent Refugees: Latent Profile Analysis. *Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy*, 16(Suppl 2).
- Saenger, G., & Gilbert, E. (1950). Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales Personnel. *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, 4, pp. 57-76.
- Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books.
- Saito, J., & Yamada, K. (2011). Local Government in Japan. In A. Gaunder (Ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics* (pp. 119-130). Routledge.
- Saitō, N. (2014). Buraku shusshinsha to kekkon sabetsu. *Synodos Academic Journalism*. Retrieved December 10, 2023, from <https://synodos.jp/opinion/society/10900/>.
- Sakitani, M. (2008). *Dīenuē de tadoru nihonjin 10 man-nen no tabi: Tayōna hito gengo bunka wa dokokarakitano ka? Shōwadō*.
- Sakitani, M. (2009). *Shin nihonjin no kigen — shinwa kara dīenuē kagaku e*. Benseishuppan.
- Salzborn, S. (2021). Ethnicity, Homogeneity, Nation: A Relationship of Tension. *Theoria*. 68(167), pp. 66-81.
- Sandberg, N. (1973). *Ethnic Identity and Assimilation: The Polish Community*. Praeger.
- Santirso, M. (2012). *España en la Europa liberal (1830-1870)*, Editorial Ariel.
- Sartori, G. (2002). *Pluralismo, Multiculturalismo e Estranei*. Rizzoli.
- Sasaki, M. (2001). *Sōzō toshi e no chōsen: Sangyō to bunka no ikidzuku machi e*. Iwanamishoten.

- Sase, M. (1982). Tekunoporis Oitachi no Ki. *Sangyo Ritchi*, 21(9): 6-11.
- Sassen, S. (2001). *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2004). *Cities in a World Economy*. Pine Forge.
- Sassen, S. (Ed.). (2013). *Deciphering the Global: Its Scales, Spaces, and Subjects*. Routledge.
- Sato, K. (2009). The Representation and Role of Mixed-Race ‘Haafu’ Models in Contemporary Japanese Female Fashion Magazines. In K. Suzuki, & D. A. Von Vacano (Eds.), *Reconsidering “Race” as a Transnational Construction in Global Japan*. Oxford University Press.
- Satoh, S. (2019). Evolution and Methodology of Japanese Machizukuri for the Improvement of Living Environments. *Japan Architectural Review*, 2(2), pp. 127-142.
- Saunier, P.-Y. (2001). Sketches from the Urban Internationale, 1910-50: Voluntary Associations, International Institutions and US Philanthropic Foundations. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25, pp. 380-403.
- Saunier P.-Y., & Payre, R. (2000). Municipalités de tous pays, unissez vous! L'Union Internationale des Villes ou l'internationale municipale (1913-1940). *Amministrare*, 30, pp. 217-239.
- Saxenian, A. (2000). Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs. *UC San Diego Working Papers*. Retrieved March 15, 2023, from <https://escholarship.org/content/qt88x6505q/qt88x6505q.pdf>.
- Saxenian, A. (2002). Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant High-Growth Entrepreneurs. *Economic Development Quarterly*, 16(1), pp. 20-31.
- Saunier, P.-Y. (2002). Taking Up the Bet on Connections: A Municipal Contribution. *Contemporary European History*, 11, pp. 507-528.
- Saxer, C. J. (2024). Globalization as a Policy: Initiation and Implementation of the Segyehwa Policy in South Korea, 1993–2003. *Research in Globalization* (8).
- Sayer, A. (2001). For a Critical Cultural Political Economy. *Antipode*, 33(4), pp. 687-708.
- Savage, R. L. (1985). Diffusion Research Traditions and the Spread of Policy Innovations in a Federal System. *Publius*, 15(4), pp. 1-27.
- Schachner, M. K., Brenick, A., Noack, P., Van De Vijver, A. J. R., & Heizmann, B. (2015). Structural and Normative Conditions for Interethnic Friendships in Multiethnic Classrooms. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 47, pp. 1-12.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2008). EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(6), pp. 916-937.
- Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(4), pp. 661–679.

- Schlesinger, A. (1991). The Disuniting of America: What We All Stand to Lose if Multicultural Education Takes the Wrong Approach. *American Educator*, 15, pp. 14-33.
- Schlesinger, A. (1992). *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*. W.W. Norton and Co.
- Schlesinger, J. M. (1998). Shadow Shoguns: The Origins and Crisis of Japan, Inc. *The Washington Quarterly*, 21(2), pp. 135-148.
- Schmid, A., & Götze, R. (2009). Cross-National Policy Learning in Health System Reform: The Case of Diagnosis Related Groups. *International Social Security Review*, 62(4), pp. 21-40.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2008). Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, pp. 303-326.
- Schmiz, A. (2017). Staging a 'Chinatown' in Berlin: The Role of City Branding in the Urban Governance of Ethnic Diversity. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 24(3), pp. 290-303.
- Schnegg, M. (2014). Anthropology and Comparison: Methodological Challenges and Tentative Solutions. *Zeitschrift Für Ethnologie*, 139(1), pp. 55-72.
- Schön, A. M. (2024). *Nations before the Nation-State Between City-State and Empire from Antiquity to the Present*. Cambridge University Press.
- Schön, D. A. (1971) Beyond the Stable State: Public and Private Learning in a Changing Society. Maurice Temple Smith.
- Schwartz, S. J., & Unger, J. B. (2017). Acculturation and Health: State of the Field and Recommended Directions. In S. J. Schwartz & J. B. Unger (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Acculturation and Health* (pp. 1-14). Oxford University Press.
- Schwartz, S. J., Unger, J. B., Zamboanga, B. L., & Szapocznik, J. (2010). Rethinking the Concept of Acculturation: Implications for Theory and Research. *American Psychologist*, 65(4), pp. 237-251.
- Schweitzer, R., Galvany, N., Jiménez, J. R., & Garcés Mascareñas, B. (2022). *Immigrant Integration in Small and Medium-Sized Towns and Rural Areas: Local Policies and Policymaking Relations in Spain*. Country Report. CIDOB.
- Scott, J. (1992). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity. *The MIT Press*, 61(1), pp. 12-19.
- Seabrooke, L. (2009). Everyday Legitimacy and Institutional Change. In A. Gofas & C. Hay (Eds.), *The Role of Ideas in Political Analysis: A Portrait of Contemporary Debates* (pp. 167-186). Routledge.
- Secchi, L. (2010). Entrepreneurship and Participation in Public Management Reforms at the Local Level. *Local Government Studies*, 36(4), pp. 511-527.
- Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración. (2006). *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2006-2009*. Retrieved March 30, 2023, from http://web2.famp.es/famp/programas/seminarios_cursos_jornadas/ARENA/PECI.pdf.

Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración. (2011). *Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2011-2014*. Retrieved March 30, 2023, from <https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2018-12/PECI-2011-2014.pdf>

Segovia, C., & Hervé, J. (2022). The Creative City Approach: Origins, Construction and Prospects in a Scenario of Transition. *City, Territory and Architecture*, 9(29).

Seo, M.-W. (2009). *damunhwaui jeongchijeog jang-e gwanhan yeongu: ansansileul jungsim-eulo. Bigyomunhwayeongu*. 15(2), pp. 79-114.

Seo, S. (2023). Why the media gets it wrong when it comes to North Korea: Cases of ‘dead’ North Koreans in the Kim Jong-un era. *Journalism*, 24(9), 1899-1918

Seol, D.-H., & Skrentny, J. D. (2004). South Korea: Importing Undocumented Workers. In W. A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. L. Martin, & J. F. Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective* (pp. 481-516). Stanford University Press.

Seth, M. J. (2010). *A History of Korea - From Antiquity to the Present*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Shachar, A. (2000). On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability. *Political Theory*, 28, pp. 64-89.

Shapin, S. (1996). *The Scientific Revolution*. University of Chicago Press.

Shibuichi, D. (2016). The Struggle Against Hate Groups in Japan: The Invisible Civil Society, Leftist Elites and Anti-Racism Groups. *Social Science Japan Journal*, 19(1), pp. 71-83.

Shibutani, T., & Kwan, K. (1965). *Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Shimoda, H. (2010). Tongues-Tied: The Making of a “National Language” and the Discovery of Dialects in Meiji Japan. *The American Historical Review*, 115(3), pp. 714-731.

Shin, Y.-K. (2013). *damunhwajiwondanche-ui hyeongseong-gwajeong-gwa yeoghalbyeonhwa: ansansi wongogdong-eul salyelo. seouldaehaggyo daehag-won seogsa hag-winnonmun*.

Shinoda, K. (2007). *Nihonjin ni natta sosen-tachi — dīenuē kara kaimei suru sono tagenteki kōzō. Nipponhōsōshuppanyōkai*.

Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2006). Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), pp. 825-843.

Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2008). The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion. *American Journal of Political Science*. 52(4), pp. 840–857.

Shipper, A. (2018). Activism for Harmony? Immigrant Rights’ Activism and Xenophobic Activism. In D. Chiavacci, & J. Obinger, *Social Movements and Political Activism in Contemporary Japan: Re-emerging from Invisibility*. Routledge.

Shin, G.-W. (2006). *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea*. Stanford University Press.

- Shizuoka Shimbun. (1991). *Shizuoka ken rekishi jinbutsu jiten*. Shizuoka Shimbun Publishing Bureau.
- Shore, C. (1996). Transcending the Nation-State? The European Commission and the (Re)- Discovery of Europe. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 9, pp. 471-494
- Shore, C. (2000). *Building Europe. The Cultural Politics of European Integration*. Routledge.
- Shore, C. (2006). “In Uno Plures”(?) EU Cultural Policy and the Governance of Europe, *Cultural Analysis*, 5, pp. 7-26.
- Shorten, A. (2010). *Multiculturalism: The Political Theory of Diversity Today*. Polity.
- Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. Cambridge University Press
- Siddle, R. (1996). *Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan*. Routledge.
- Siddle R (2002) An Epoch-Making Event? The 1997 Ainu Cultural Promotion Act and its Impact. *Japan Forum*, 14, pp. 405-423.
- Simmel, G. [1904] (1957). Fashion. *American Journal of Sociology*, 62(6), pp. 541-558.
- Simmons, B.A. (2009). *Mobilizing for Human Rights*. Cambridge University Press.
- Simmons, B.A., Dobbin, F., & Garrett, G. (2006). Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism. *International Organization*. 60, pp. 781–810.
- Simmons, B.A., & Elkins, Z. (2004). The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *American Political Science Review*, 98(1), pp. 171-189.
- Simón, C. S. (2018). *Simbología e identidad nacional durante el franquismo del medio siglo*. Conference: Retos y oportunidades de la investigación educativa.
- Simons, S. (1901). Social Assimilation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1, pp. 790-822.
- Sims, V. F., & Patrick, J. R. (1936). Attitude toward the Negro of Northern and Southern College Students. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 7, pp. 192-204.
- Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya. (2014). Fòrum Universal de les Cultures Barcelona 2004, Sa Resolució 9/Ix Del Parlament. Sindicatura de Comptes de Catalunya. Retrieved 12 April, 2023, from <https://static1.ara.cat/ara/public/content/file/original/2014/0717/19/informe-11-2014-de-la-sindicatura-de-comptes-sobre-forum-universal-de-les-cultures-barcelona-2004-sa-81ed6fa.pdf>.
- Song, S. (2010). Multiculturalism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved January 10, 2022, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/>.
- Song, S.-W, Lee S.-Y., & Kim, N.-K. (2011). jibangjachidanche-ui oegug-ingeonloja jiwon hyeonhwang-gwa munjejeom-e gwanhan yeongu. *diaseupola yeongu*, 5(2), pp. 29-62.
- Skelcher, C. (2010). Fishing in Muddy Waters: Principals, Agents, and Democratic Governance in Europe. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20, pp. 161-175.

- Skey, M., & Antonsich, M. (2017). *Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Skogstad, G. (Ed.). (2011). *Policy Paradigms, Transnationalism, and Domestic Politics*. University of Toronto Press.
- Skover, D., & Testy, K. Y. (2002). LesBiGay Identity as Commodity. *California Law Review*, 90, pp. 223-255.
- Skrentny, J. D. (2002). *The Minority Rights Revolution*. Harvard University Press.
- Sleap, F., Sener, O., & Weller P. (Eds.) 2013. *Dialogue Theories*. Dialogue Society.
- Smirnov, I., & Thurner, S. (2017). Formation of Homophily in Academic Performance: Students Change Their Friends rather than Performance. *PLoS ONE*, 12(8).
- Smith, A. D. (1986). *Ethnic Origins of Nations*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Smith, A. D. (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Wiley.
- Smith, H. (1999). The Failure of Korea Inc. *Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform*, 6(2), pp. 153-166.
- Smith, N. (1995). Remaking Scale: Competition and Cooperation in Pre-National and Postnational Europe. In H. Eskelinen and F. Snickars (Eds.), *Competitive European Peripheries* (pp. 59-74), Springer.
- Sōmushōtōkeikyoku. (2023). Jinkō suikei. Retrieved February 10, 2024, from <https://www.stat.go.jp/data/jinsui/pdf/202309.pdf>.
- Sørensen, A. (1998). Theoretical Mechanisms and the Empirical Study of Social Processes. P. Hedstrom, & R. Swedberg (Eds.), *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2007). *Theories of Democratic Network Governance*. Palgrave Macmillan
- Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2011). Enhancing Collaborative Innovation in the Public Sector. *Administration & Society*, 43, pp. 842-868.
- Springer, S., Birch, K., & MacLeavy, J. (Eds.). (2016). *Handbook of Neoliberalism*. Routledge.
- Starke, P. (2013). Qualitative Methods for the Study of Policy Diffusion: Challenges and Available Solutions. *Policy Studies Journal*, 41(4), 561-582.
- Stasavage, D. (2020). *The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today*. Princeton University Press.

- Stefanek, E., Strohmeier, D., & Van de Schoot, R. (2015). Individual and Classroom Predictors of Same-Cultural Friendship Preferences in Multicultural Schools. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 39(3), pp. 255–265.
- Steger, M. B., & Roy, R. K. (2010). *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Steiner, K., Krauss, E. S., & Flanagan S. E. (Eds.). (1980). *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan*. Princeton University Press.
- Stevens, G. (2008) Subject, Object and Active Participant: The Ainu, Law, and Legal Mobilization. *Indigenous Law Journal*, 7(1).
- Stevens, G. (2014). The Ainu, Law, and Legal Mobilization, 1984–2009. In M. J. Hudson, A. E. Lewallen, & M. K. Watson (Eds). *Beyond Ainu Studies: Changing Academic and Public Perspectives* (pp. 200-222). University of Hawaii Press.
- Stockwin, J. A. A. (1999). *Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as Theory: Five Propositions. *International Social Science Journal*, 155, pp. 17-18.
- Stokke, C., & Lybæk, L. (2016). Combining Intercultural Dialogue and Critical Multiculturalism. *Ethnicities*, 18(1), pp. 70-85.
- Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., Devinney, L. C., Star, S. A., & Williams, R. M., Jr. (1949). *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life. (Studies in Social Psychology in World War II)*. Princeton University Press.
- Strack, R, Kovács-Ondrejko, O., Baier, J., Kotsis, A., Antebi, P., & Kavanagh, K. (2021). *Decoding the Digital Talent Challenge*, BCG, from <https://web-assets.bcg.com/0e/10/1449287142cbb241410b269a97f9/bcg-decoding-the-digital-talent-challenge-nov-2021-r.pdf>.
- Stråth, B. (2002). A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4), pp. 387-401.
- Sugimoto, Y. (1999). Making Sense of Nihonjinron. *Thesis Eleven*, 57(1), pp. iii-136.
- Sumner, W. G. (1906). *Folkways*. Ginn.
- Sun, Y. (2011). Intercultural Communication and Global Democracy: A Deweyan Perspective. *Intercultural Communication Studies*, XX(1), pp. 17-26.
- Sunahara, Y. (2011). *Chihō seifu no minshu shugi: Zaigen shigen no seiyaku to chihō seifu no seisaku sentaku*. Yuhikaku.
- Sutcliffe, A. (1983). In Search of the Urban Variable: Britain in the Later Nineteenth Century. In D. Fraser, & A. Sutcliffe (Eds.), *The Pursuit of Urban History* (pp. 234-263). Edward Arnold.

- Sutherland, E. H. (1950). The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws. *American Journal of Sociology*, 56(2), pp. 142-148.
- Suzuki, E. (2013). shinsai ga ro wa ni shita ijū-sha-tachi no gen i zai ma – “tomonikiiru” to wa? *Higashinihon Daishinsai to Mainoriti*, 1, pp. 10-18.
- Suzuki, M. (2021). *Education of Children with Diverse Backgrounds*. Japan & Council of Europe 25 Years. Webinar on Intercultural Cities in the Asia-Pacific Session 1. Retrieved April 20, 2023, from <https://www.strasbourg.fr.emb-japan.go.jp/files/100173017.pdf>
- Swyngedouw, E. (2004). Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? Networks, Territories, and Rescaling. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17(1), pp. 25-48.
- Swyngedouw, E. (2005). Governance, Innovation, and the Citizen: The Janus Face of Governance-beyond-the-State. *Urban Studies*, 42(11), pp. 1991-2006.
- Syrett, S., & Sepulveda, L. (2011). Realising the Diversity Dividend: Population Diversity and Urban Economic Development. *Environment and Planning*, 43, pp. 487-504.
- Syrett, S. & Sepulveda, L. (2012) Urban Governance and Economic Development in the Diverse City. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 19(3), pp. 238-253.
- Szapocznik, J., Kurtines, W. M., & Fernandez, T. (1980). La participacion y la adaptacion bi-cultural en la juventud Hispano-Americana. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 4(3-4), pp. 353-365.
- Tadmor, C. T., Tetlock, P. E., & Peng, K. (2009). Acculturation Strategies and Integrative Complexity: The Cognitive Implications of Biculturalism. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 40(1), pp. 105-139.
- Takaya, S. (2022). *Tabunka Kyosei no Jikkenshitu – Osaka kara kangaeru*. Seikyusha.
- Takenaka, A. (2004). The Japanese in Peru: History of Immigration, Settlement, and Racialization. *Latin American Perspectives*, 31(3), pp. 77-98.
- Takeuchi, A. (1996). Kougyou Chiiki no Hendou. Taimeidou.
- Takezawa, Y. (2009). jo tabunkakyōsei no genjō to kadai. *Bunka Jinrui-gaku*, 74(1), pp. 86-95.
- Talbani, A. (1993). Intercultural Education and Minorities: Policy Initiatives in Quebec. *McGill Journal of Education*, 28(3), pp. 407-419.
- Tanba, S. (2014). *Burakumondai kaiketsu e no riron-teki kiseki*. Burakumondai Kenkyūjo
- Tarde, G. [1890] (1903). *The Laws of Imitation*. Translated by E. C. Parsons. Henry Holt And Company.
- Tarumoto, H. (2018). The Limits of Local Citizenship Policies in Japan. In T. Lacroix, & A. Desille, (Eds.), *International Migrations and Local Governance. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship*. Palgrave Macmillan,

- Tatsuno, S. M. (1986). *The Technopolis Strategy: Japan, High Technology, and the Control of the Twenty-first Century*. Prentice Hall.
- Tatsuno, S. M. (1988) Building a Japanese Technostate: MITFs Technopolis Program. In R. W. Smilor, G. Kozmetsky, & D. V. Gibson (Eds), *Creating the Technopolis: Linking Technology, Commercialization and Economic Development* (pp. 3-21). Ballinger Publishing Company.
- Taylor, A. J. (2002). Governance. In G. Blakeley, & V. Bryson (Eds), *Contemporary Political Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (pp. 35-53). Pluto Press.
- Taylor, C. [1992] (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (pp. 25-73). Princeton University Press
- Taylor, C. (1995). *Philosophical Arguments*, Harvard University Press.
- Tegtmeyer Pak, K. (2000). Foreigners Are Local Citizens Too: Local Governments Respond to International Migration in Japan. In M. Douglass, & G. S. Roberts (Eds.), *Japan and Global Migration Foreign: Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society* (pp. 246-275). Routledge.
- Terazawa, M. (1990). Nihon shakai no heisasei to bunka. In Gyōzaisei Sōgō Kenkyūsho (Ed.), *Gaikokujin rōdōsha no jinken* (pp. 63-68). Ētsuki Shoten.
- Terrón, A. (2010). L'Immigration et la construction des politiques d'intégration en Espagne. In Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité Nationale et du Développement Solidaire, *Identités nationales, identité européenne. Symposium*. Conseil supérieur du Notariat.
- Thomas, W. I., Park, R. E., & Miller, H. [1921] (1971). *Old World Traits Transplanted*. Patterson Smith.
- Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. *Journal of Political Economy*, 64(5), 416-424.
- Tilly, C. (1984). *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Tokuhashi, I. (2016). Intākaruchuraru shiti no saizensen – Baruserona no torikumi kara – 'kōen repōto. My Eyes Tokyo. Retrieved May 20, 2024, from <https://www.myeyestokyo.jp/52167>.
- Triviño-Salazar, J. C., & Climent-Ferrando, V. (2024). Including Immigrant Voices in Local Mechanisms of Citizen Participation? Insights from the Crucial Case of Barcelona. *Governance*, 38(1).
- Troyna, B. (Ed.). (1987). *Racial Inequality in Education*. Tavistock.
- Troyna, B. (1993). *Racism and Education*. Open University Press.
- Trullén, J. (2001). El projecte Barcelona. Ciutat del coneixement des de l'economia. Barcelona Metròpolis Mediterrània, 1, pp. 16-25.
- Tsuboi, H. (2019). *Zai seichō no jidai (sengonihon wo yomikaeru)*. Ringawa shoten,

- Tsuda, T. (1999). The Permanence of “Temporary” Migration: The “Structural Embeddedness” of Japanese-Brazilian Immigrant Workers in Japan. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 58, pp. 687-722.
- Tsuda, T. (2003). *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective*. Columbia University Press.
- Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Basil Blackwell.
- Turner, R. N., West, K., & Christie, Z. (2013). Outgroup Trust, Intergroup Anxiety, and Outgroup Attitude as Mediators of the Effect of Imagined Intergroup Contact on Intergroup Behavioral Tendencies. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 43(Suppl 2), E196–E205.
- Tusell, J. (2007). *La transición a la democracia (España, 1975–1982)*. Espasa-Calpe.
- Tylor, E. B. (1871). *Primitive Culture*. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from <https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.42334/page/n15/mode/2up>.
- Tylor, E. B. (1889). On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions; Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent. *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 18, pp. 245-272.
- Uebel, T. (2024). Vienna Circle. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved November 13, 2024, from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/vienna-circle/>.
- Uemura H., Kimura M., & Shiobara Y. (Eds). (2013). *Shimin no Gaiko: Senju Minzoku to Ayunda 30 Nen*. Hosei University Press.
- Ueyama, S. (1990). *Nihon bunmeishi no kôshô: juyô to sôzô no kiseki*, Kadokawa Shoten.
- Upadhyay, V. S., & Pandey, G. (1993). *History of Anthropological Thought*. Concept Publishing.
- UNESCO. (2001). *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*. UNESCO. Retrieved September 10, 2022, from <https://www.unesco.org/en/legal-affairs/unesco-universal-declaration-cultural-diversity>.
- Vallvé, J. (1986). *La división territorial de la España musulmana*. Instituto de Filología.
- Van den Berg, L., Braun, E., & Van Winden, W. (2001). Growth Clusters in European Cities: An Integral Approach. *Urban Studies* 38(1), pp. 185-205.
- Van der Brug, W., D’Amato, G., Berkhout, J., & Ruedin, D. (2015). *The Politicisation of Migration*. Routledge.
- Van Evera, S. (1997). *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Cornell University Press.
- Van Parijs, P. (Ed.). (2004). *Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity*, De Boeck.
- Varsanyi, M. W. (2006). Interrogating “Urban Citizenship” Vis-À-Vis Undocumented Migration. *Citizenship Studies*, 10(2), pp. 229-249.

- Vasishth, A. (1997). A Model Minority: The Chinese Community in Japan. In M. Weiner (Ed.), *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (pp. 108-139). Routledge.
- Vaisey, S., & Lizardo, O. (2010). Can Cultural Worldviews Influence Network Composition? *Social Forces*, 88, pp. 1595-1618.
- Verbrugge, L. M. (1977). The Structure of Adult Friendship Choices. *Social Forces*, 56, pp. 576-597.
- Verbrugge, L. M. (1983). A Research Note on Adult Friendship Contact: A Dyadic Perspective. *Social Forces*, 62, pp. 78-83.
- Vertovec, S. (1998). Multimulticulturalisms. In M. Martiniello (Ed.), *Multicultural Policies and the State* (pp. 25-38). European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations.
- Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and Its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(6), pp. 1024-1054.
- Vertovec, S. (2012). 'Diversity' and the Social Imaginary. *European Journal of Sociology*, 53(3), pp. 287-312.
- Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (2010). *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. Routledge.
- Vezzale, L., & Stathi, S. (2017). *Intergroup Contact Theory. Recent Developments and Future Directions*. Routledge.
- Vilches, J. (2001). *Progreso y libertad. El Partido Progresista en la revolución liberal española*. Alianza,
- Vincent, M. M. (2015). Ungodly Citizens: Protestants in National-Catholic Spain, 1939-53. *European History Quarterly*, 45(1).
- Vion, A. (2002). Europe from the Bottom Up: Town Twinning in France during the Cold War. *Contemporary European History*, 11, 623-640.
- Vogel, D. (1997). Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(4), pp. 556-571.
- Vogel, E. F. (1979). *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*. Harvard University Press.
- Volden, C. (2002). The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits? *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(2), pp. 352-363.
- Vosse, W. (2000). The Emergence of a Civil Society in Japan. *Contemporary Japan*, 11(1), pp. 31-53.
- Vox. (2023). *Cuida Barcelona, cuida lo tuyo*. Vox., Retrieved January 21, 2024, from <https://img.beteve.cat/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/programa-vox-elecciones-municipals-2023-barcelona-130523.pdf>.

- Vreeland, J. R. (2003). *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wagner, R. (1975). *The Invention of Culture*. University of Chicago Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. Academic Press.
- Waldron, J. (1995). Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative. In W. Kymlicka (Ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp- 93-119). Oxford University Press.
- Waley, A. (Transl.) (1996). *The Book of Songs*. Grove Press.
- Walker, J. L. (1969). The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States. *The American Political Science Review*, 63(3), pp. 880-899.
- Walker, J. L. (1973). Problems in Research on Diffusion of Policy Innovations. *American Political Science Review*, 67(4), pp. 1186-1191.
- Wallach, O. (2023, November 3). Charted: The Number of North Korean Defectors (1998-2023). *Visual Capitalist*. Retrieved May 30, 2024, from https://www.visualcapitalist.com/north-korean-defectors-escape-routes/#google_vignette.
- Walsh, J. I. (2000). When Do Ideas Matter? Explaining the Successes and Failures of Thatcherite Ideas. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33, pp. 483-516.
- Wang, B.-L. C. (1977). Governmental Intervention in Ethnic Stratification: Effects on the Distribution of Students among Fields of Study. *Comparative Education Review*, 1(21), pp. 110-123.
- Wang, Y. S., Lee, C. J., West, J. D., Bergstrom, C.T, & Erosheva, E. A. (2023). Gender-Based Homophily in Collaborations across a Heterogeneous Scholarly Landscape. *PLoS One*, 5;18(4).
- Ward, K. (2010). Towards a Relational Comparative Approach to the Study of Cities. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34, pp. 471-487.
- Ward, S. V. (1998). *Selling Places: The Marketing and Promotion of Towns and Cities 1850-2000*. E and FN Spon.
- Ward S. V. (2000). Re-Examining the International Diffusion of Planning. In R Freestone (Ed.), *Urban Planning in a Changing World* (pp. 40-60). Spon.
- Ware, C. F. (1940). *The Cultural Approach to History*. American Historical Association.
- Warner, W. L., & Srole, L. (1945). *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*. Yale University Press.
- Wataru, K. (2000). Kikan inin jimu seido no haishi no seiji katei. *Konan Hogaku*, 40(3/4), pp. 473-526.
- Waters, M. C. (1999). *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities*. Russell Sage Foundation.

- Waters, M. C., Tran, V. C., Kasinitz, P., & Mollenkopf, J. H. (2010). Segmented Assimilation Revisited: Types of Acculturation and Socioeconomic Mobility in Young Adulthood. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(7), pp. 1168-1193.
- Watson, G. (1947). *Action for Unity*. Harper.
- Wayland, S. V. (1997). Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 5(1), 33-58.
- Weber, M. (1958). *The City*. Translated by D. Martindale, & G. Neuwirth. Free Press.
- Webster, T. (2007). Translation, Bortz v. Suzuki, Judgment of October 12, 1999, Hamamatsu Branch, Shizuoka District Court, 16 *Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J.* 631. Retrieved May 23, 2024, from <https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol16/iss3/4/>.
- Weiner, M. (2009). *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity*. Routledge.
- Weiner, M. & Hanami, T. (Eds.). (1998). *Temporary Workers or Future Citizens? Japanese and U.S. Migration Policies*. New York University Press.
- Weinreich, P. (2009). 'Enculturation', not 'Acculturation': Conceptualising and Assessing Identity Processes in Migrant Communities. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 33(2), pp. 124-139.
- Welch, S., & Thompson, K. (1980). The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 24(4), pp. 715-726.
- Wellman, B. (1929). The School Child's Choice of Companions. *Journal of Education Research*, 14, pp. 126-132.
- Werner, C., & Parmelee, P. (1979). Similarity of Activity Preferences among Friends: Those Who Play Together Stay Together. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 42(1), 62-66.
- Weyland, K. (Ed.). (2004). *Learning From Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform*. Johns Hopkins University Press
- Weyland, K. (2005). Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform. *World Politics*, 57(2), pp. 262-295.
- Weyland, K. (2006). Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Weyland, K. (2008). Bounded Rationality in Latin-American Pension Reform. In. S. J. Kay and T. Sinha (Eds.), *Lessons from Pension Reform in the Americas* (pp. 185–211). Oxford University Press.
- Weyland, K. (2009). The Diffusion of Revolution: “1848” in Europe and Latin America. *International Organization*, 63(3), 391-423.
- Weyland, K. (2010). The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830–1940. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(8–9), 1148-1176.

- White, B. W. (2022). City-Based Inclusion Networks in a Post-Multicultural World: The Intercultural Cities Programme of the Council of Europe. *Local Government Studies*, 48(6), pp. 1070-1090
- White House. (2013, May 7). *Remarks by President Obama and President Park of South Korea in a Joint Press Conference*. Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved May 12, 2023, from <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/07/remarks-president-obama-and-president-park-south-korea-joint-press-confe>.
- White, J. W. (1995). *Ikki: Social Conflict and Political Protest in Early Modern Japan*. Cornell University Press.
- Widmaier, W. W., Blyth, M., & Seabrooke, L. (2007). Exogenous Shocks or Endogenous Constructions? The Meanings of Wars and Crises. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(4), 747-759.
- Wilder, M. (2015a). Ideas beyond Paradigms: Relative Commensurability and the Case of Canadian Trade-Industrial Policy, 1975–1995. *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp. 1004-1021.
- Wilder, M. (2015b). What Is a Policy Paradigm? Overcoming Epistemological Hurdles in Cross-Disciplinary Conceptual Adaptation. In J. Hogan, & M. Howlett (Eds.), *Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice: Discourses, Ideas and Anomalies in Public Policy Dynamics* (pp. 19-42). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wilder, M., & Howlett, M. (2014). The Politics of Policy Anomalies: Bricolage and the Hermeneutics of Paradigms. *Critical Policy Studies*, 8(2), pp. 183-202.
- Williams, R. (1947). *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*. Social Science Research Council.
- Williams R. (1958). *Culture and Society*. Doubleday & Company.
- Williams, R. (1997). *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, E. O. (1979). Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 22, pp. 233–261.
- Wilner, D. M., Walkley, R. P., & Cook, S. W. (1952). Residential Proximity and Intergroup Relations in Public Housing Projects. *Journal of Social Issues*, 8, pp. 45-69.
- Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks*, 2(4), pp. 301-34.
- Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2003). Methodological Nationalism and the Study of Migration: Beyond Nation-State Building. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), pp. 576-610.
- Wise, A., & Velayutham, S. (Eds.). (2009). *Everyday Multiculturalism*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wolf, M. (2006). Rigid Designation and Anaphoric Theories of Reference. *Philosophical Studies*, 130(2), pp. 351-375.
- Womack, P. (2011). *Dialogue*. Routledge.

- Wood, M. (2015). Puzzling and Powering in Policy Paradigm Shifts: Politicization, Depoliticization and Social Learning. *Critical Policy Studies*, 9(1), pp. 2-21.
- Wood, P. (2004). *The Intercultural City: A Reader*. Comedia.
- Wood, P. (2009). *Intercultural Cities: Towards a Model for Intercultural Integration*. Council of Europe Publishing.
- Wood, P., & Landry, C. (2008). *The Intercultural City Planning for Diversity Advantage*. Routledge.
- Work, R. (2002). Overview of Decentralisation Worldwide: A Stepping Stone to Improved Governance and Human Development. In *Second International Conference on Decentralization*. Manila, Philippines.
<http://biblioteca.unmsm.edu.pe/redlieds/recursos/archivos/gestionestado/overview-decentralisation-worldwide-paper.pdf>.
- Wu, F. (2003). The (Post-)Socialist Entrepreneurial City as a State Project: Shanghai's Reglobalisation in Question. *Urban studies*, 40(9), pp. 1673-1698.
- Xie, Y., & Greenman, E. (2011). The Social Context of Assimilation: Testing Implications of Segmented Assimilation Theory. *Social Science Research*, 40(40), pp. 965-984.
- Yamagishi, A., & Sato, Y. (2022). *Measuring Discrimination in Spatial Equilibrium: 100 Years of Japan's Invisible Race*. CIRJE-F- 1188.
- Yamaguchi, T. (1985). National Policies and Urban Systems: The Japanese Experience. Retrieved April 5, 2023, from https://repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=36413&file_id=19&file_no=1.
- Yamamoto, T. (1999). Emergence of Japan's Civil Society and Its Future Challenges. In T. Yamamoto (Ed.), *Deciding the Public Good: Governance and Civil Society in Japan*. Japan Center for International Exchange.
- Yamamura, E. (2013). Natural Disasters and Participation in Volunteer Activities: A Case Study of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*. 84(1), pp. 103-117.
- Yamanaka, K. (1993). New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in Japan. *Pacific Affairs*. 66(1), pp. 72-90.
- Yamanaka, K. (1996). Return Migration of Japanese-Brazilians to Japan: The Nikkeijin as Ethnic Minority and Political Construct. *Diaspora*, 5(1), pp. 65-97.
- Yamanaka, K. (1997). Return Migration of Japanese Brazilian Women: Household Strategies and Search for the "Homeland." In R. Krulfeld & D. Baxter (Eds.), *Beyond Boundaries, Selected Papers on Refugees and Immigrants, Volume 5* (pp. 11-34). American Anthropological Association.
- Yamanaka, K. (2000). I Will Go Home, but wWhen?: Labor Migration and Circular Diaspora Formation by Japanese Brazilians in Japan. In M. Douglass, & G. R. Roberts (Eds.), *Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society* (pp. 123-152). Routledge.

- Yamanaka, K. (2003). A Breakthrough for Ethnic Minority Rights in Japan: Ana Bortz's Courageous Challenge. In M. Morokvasic, U. Erel, & K. Shinozaki (Eds.), *Crossing Borders and Shifting Boundaries. Schriftenreihe der Internationalen Frauenuniversität »Technik und Kultur«* (pp. 231-259), vol 10. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Yamanaka, K. (2012). Immigration, Policies, and Civil Society in Hamamatsu, Central Japan. In D. W. Haines, K. Yamanaka, S. Yamashita (Eds.), *Wind Over Water: Migration in an East Asian Context* (pp. 92-105). Berghahn.
- Yamashiro, J. H. (2017). *Redefining Japaneseness: Japanese Americans in the Ancestral Homeland*. Rutgers University Press.
- Yamashita, K. T. (2001). *Circle K Cycles*. Coffee House Press.
- Yamashita, J. (2003). Influence of Jean Gottmann's thought on national development plans in Japan. *Ekistics*, 70(422/423), pp. 358-365.
- Yang, Y., & Konrad, A. M. (2011). Understanding Diversity Management Practices: Implications of Institutional Theory and Resource-Based Theory. *Group & Organization Management*, 36(1), pp. 6-38.
- Yee, S., & Morin, J.-Y. (2009). *Multiculturalism and International Law*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Yeoh, B. S. A. (2005). The Global Cultural City? Spatial Imagineering and Politics in the (Multi)Cultural Marketplaces of South-east Asia. *Urban Studies*, 42(5/6), pp. 945-958.
- Yeon, J. (2012). Korean Dialects: A General Survey. In N. Tranter (Ed.), *The Languages of Japan and Korea* (pp. 168-185). Routledge.
- Yokomichi, K. (2006) *The Development of Municipal Mergers in Japan*. Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) / The Institute for Comparative Studies in Local Governance (COSLOG). Retrieved March 15, 2023, from https://www.clair.or.jp/j/forum/honyaku/hikaku/pdf/up-to-date_en1.pdf.
- Yomiuri Shimbun. (2024, March 15). Japan Cabinet Proposes Change to Foreign Trainee Program to Address Labor Crunch; Expects to Attract 820,000 over 5 Years. *The Japan News*, Retrieved May 23, 2024, from <https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20240315-174872/>.
- Yorifusa, I. (2006). Local initiatives and the decentralization of planning power in Japan. In C. Hein, & P. Pelletier, *Cities, Autonomy, and Decentralization in Japan* (pp. 25-54). Routledge.
- Yoshida, S. (1999). Rethinking the Public Interest in Japan: Civil Society in the Making. in T. Yamamoto (Ed.), *Deciding the Public Good: Governance and Civil Society in Japan*. Japan Center for International Exchange.
- Yoshino, K. (1992). *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*. Routledge.
- Young, I. M. (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton University Press.
- Zaltman, G., Duncan, R. & Holbeck, J. (1973) *Innovation and Organizations*. Wiley.

- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2015). *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2016). Intercultural Governance Index: An Exploratory Study on Spanish Cities. *Mondi Migranti*, 2, pp. 149-178.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2017a). Interculturalism in the Post-multicultural Debate: A Defence. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 5, 14.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2017b). Intercultural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in Barcelona: Mainstreaming Comprehensive Approach. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 83(2), pp. 247-266.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2018). Rejoinder: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Alongside but Separate. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 6, 20.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2019). *Intercultural Citizenship in the Post-Multicultural Era*. Sage.
- Zapata-Barrero, R., Caponio, T., & Scholten, P. (2017). Theorizing the 'Local Turn' in a Multi-Level Governance Framework of Analysis: A Case Study in Immigrant Policies. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 83(2), pp. 241-246.
- Zelinsky, W. (1991). The Twinning of the World: Sister Cities in Geographic and Historical Perspective. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 81(1), pp. 1-31.
- Zgajewski, T., & Hajjar, K. (2005). The Lisbon Strategy: Which Failure? Whose Failure? And Why? *Egmont Papers*, 6.
- Zhou, M., & Bankston, C. (1998). *Growing Up American: How Vietnamese Children Adapt to Life in the United States*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Zhou, M., & Kim, S. S. (2006). *Community Forces, Social Capital, and Educational Achievement: The Case of Supplementary Education in the Chinese and Korean Immigrant Communities*. *Harvard Educational Review*, 76(1), pp. 1-29.
- Znaniecki, F. [1919] (2008). *Cultural Reality*. Kessinger Publishing.