Europeanisation and social movements: The case of the Stop TTIP campaign

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Introduction

We want to prevent employment, social, environmental, privacy and consumer standards from being lowered and public services (such as water) and cultural assets from being deregulated in non-transparent negotiations. The ECI supports an alternative trade and investment policy in the EU. (lawsuit of the Stop TTIP Coalition, https://stop-ttip.org/lawsuit-ecj/)

Since 2013, the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership) agreement has been one of the most controversial policies discussed at the European Union (EU) level (Morin et al. 2015). Formally, the negotiations, which are aimed at facilitating trade between the United States and the EU, started in July 2013 after a two-year period when 'the EU Trade Commissioner and the US Trade Representative looked into the various initiatives that could benefit job creation, economic growth, international competitiveness and the development of high international standards in various areas' (European Commission 2016: 1). Since 2014, the Stop TTIP Coalition (a movement of more than 500 European organisations) has become increasingly vocal and organised a petition aimed at blocking the negotiations conducted by the European Commission and theEUmember states via the European Council. Over 3.2million signatures have been collected for a European Citizens' Initiative (ECI).[1] Although the petition was rejected by the Commission in September 2014 as falling outside the scope of the ECI Regulation, the Stop TTIP Coalition has continued to collect signatures and initiated a lawsuit submitted to the European Court of Justice. The TTIP agreement is considered by the Stop TTIP Coalition to 'pose a threat to democracy, the rule of law, the environment, health, public services as well as consumer and labour rights'.[2] Furthermore, between 2014 and 2016 and together with the Stop TTIP Coalition, several other organisations have mobilised against the TTIP, conducting a number of initiatives both at the national and EU level in order to influence European institutions (e.g., the European Parliament, EP). For example, in May 2016, Greenpeace Netherlands unveiled a number of documents connected to TTIP,[3] generating a strong reaction on the part of EU governments. Currently, the TTIP has come to a dead end (the European Court of Justice ruling was issued on May 2017, with a verdict favourable to the protesters), mostly due to the multilevel campaign orchestered by the Stop TTIP campaign.

We consider TTIP to be a very promising case study for analysing social movements' Europeanisation and their capacity to mobilise referring to European issues, targets and identities. From a research standpoint, although valuable contributions on the Europeanisation of social movements have been produced since the mid-1990s (e.g., Della Porta & Caiani 2009; Imig & Tarrow 2000;Marks & McAdam 1996; Koopmans & Statham 2010; Rucht 2002; Tarrow 1994), finding moderate numbers of Europeanised protests and actors, they are, however, quite outdated. More recent works on global waves of contention (e.g., Della Porta & Mattoni 2014; Kousis 2014) tend to overlook specific processes of Europeanisation. Recent studies have been limited to austerity measures (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015), where the TTIP is studied more from a trade union (Dierckx 2015; Leiren & Parks 2014) or international relations perspective (Morin et al. 2015). Over the past few years, though, the economic crisis has increased the significance of the EU as one of the 'key crisis actors' for contention (Bourne&Chatzopoulou 2015: 35).The TTIP, similarly to other recent European civil society campaigns such as ACTA (the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) and the Bolkestein Directive (Della Porta & Parks 2015, 2016), allows us to provide an additional piece of empirical research to the issue of citizens' participation in European politics.

In this article we test the Europeanisation hypothesis, according to which, due to increasing competencies at EU level, there should be an 'upscaling' of protest where the EU becomes a central target of collective action in terms of a significant level of mobilisation and focus for the creation of actors' identities. The TTIP seems to be a crucial test case since it concerns a policy area (i.e., foreign trade) that falls under the exclusive competence of the EU and where political opportunities for civil society actors are 'closed' insofar as negotiations are kept 'secret', discussed mainly within the European Council and, on a very technical issue, it is difficult to mobilise a large public (see Dierckx 2015). So why and how has this movement become 'Europeanised'?

Our analysis builds on an original comparative dataset that includes supranational actors (i.e., anti-TTIP organisations at the EU level) and national actors from six EU

countries (Austria,Germany, Italy, Spain,Great Britain and France).We use various sources to investigate the degree and forms of social movements' Europeanisation. A protest event analysis and semi-structured interviews in Brussels with key representatives of the movements and policymakers have allowed us to observe the evolution of various indicators of the Europeanisation of social movement organisations (SMOs) against TTIP, linking them to opportunities and resources.This, as stated in the conclusion, will not only disconfirm the traditional low representation of these types of actors in current European politics, but will indicate instead strong signs of (differentiated) paths of Europeanisation from below. Not only do the paths of Europeanisation vary from country to country, but they are influenced by the interplay between the political opportunities at the EU and the domestic levels.

Europeanisation and social movements: The analytical framework

In this articlewe investigate the degree and forms of social movements'Europeanisation.We argue that Europeanisation occurs when movements: (1) develop European organisations and/or transnational contacts with groups in other countries (i.e., 'European actors'); (2) contest authorities beyond the state (i.e., 'European targets'); and (3) mobilise around European issues and/or organise their protest with a European 'scope', giving birth to 'European events' staged in Brussels or in more European countries simultaneously (see also Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). We adopt the concept of 'Europeanisation' to refer not only to 'the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance' (Risse et al. 2001: 3), but also to the impact of these structures at the domestic level in influencing the ways in which collective actors make their demands visible in the public sphere. We address the 'processual' aspects of Europeanisation by analysing the reciprocal influences between European and national structures to indicate a research design that develops from 'an analysis of the system of interactions (actors, resources, problems, etc.) at the domestic level', and raise the question of 'whether the EU affects this system of interaction and if so in what way' (Radaelli & Franchino 2004: 948; Saurugger 2006).We study whether 'Europanisation from below' (e.g., Della Porta & Caiani 2009) is taking place in response to top-down Europeanisation, as in the case of the TTIP.

Starting from the scholarship mentioned above – and helpfully distinguishing between 'non-Europeanised' grassroots collective action, which does not addressEUissues at all,and various forms of Europeanised social movement actions – this study, in order to empirically investigate the degree of anti-TTIPmovement Europeanisation, will look at 'how much' the dimensions of SMO collective action (actors, target, level of mobilisation) vary in terms of 'scope' (national versus European).[4]

However, as has been suggested (Ladrech 1994), while the re-orientation of domestic organisational logics is a feature of Europeanisation, the homogenisation or harmonisation of domestic practices across Europe is not a realistic expectation. Instead, pre-existing domestic structures and internal developments are likely to have an important mediating effect. In this regard, we also look at the ways through which this is done – notably by exploring[5] the forms of Europeanisation and their repertoire of action (i.e., consensual versus conflictual). More specifically, if Europeanisation produces multilevel governance (Marks & McAdam 1996), then collective action should adapt to intervening in and influencing the multiple territorial layers of decision making (Mazey & Richardson 2002; Tilly 1978) in order not only to communicate with the various territorial levels of government, but also to develop strategies of 'crossed influence'.A typology of the different forms of Europeanisation of social movement mobilisation (Balme & Chabanet 2002; Della Porta & Caiani 2009; Imig & Tarrow 2000, 2001) can be built by combining the territorial scope of the protester with the target. In a fully supranational polity, all important claims should be made by European political parties, interest groups, social movements and other collective actors targeting the European institutions ('supranationalisation'). However, national mobilisations may Europeanise as well. This could, for instance, occur when European actors exercise transnational pressure by intervening in national contexts, criticising national policies or propagating European integration.

A third path to the Europeanisation of collective action is domestication, where the EU or its policies are either the source or the indirect target of protest by domestic actors but the direct target remains the nation-state. Domestication can be considered to be proof of the dominant position of the nation-state, but it can also be seen as a stimulus for innovation in the organisational structure and the frames of the protests.

Finally, a form of externalisation is present if and when the mobilisations of national

actors target theEUdirectly.We will analyse ‘how’the Europeanisation of social movements develop using this typology.

Turning to the explanatory level, we refer to classical categories of social movement studies (e.g., Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998) in order to analyse the degree and forms of Europeanisation of SMOs and NGOs against the TTIP. European integration has raised concerns about its effect on the distribution of power among different actors, and in particular the role of civil society. Some scholars are optimistic, stressing the capacity of the traditional actors of democracies such as political parties and interest groups to adapt to the EU, organising at this level and taking advantage of it.On the other hand, scholars looking in particular at social movements and protest have been more sceptical that actors equipped with scarce material resources (finance, professionalisation, etc.) may be able to build transnational organisations or stage mobilisations at the EU level, stressing that protest directly targeting the EU is scant (Giugni & Passy 2002; Imig 2004; Rucht 2002). Similar results also emerged from studies focusing on the European claim-making of civil society (Koopmans & Statham 2010). Moreover, works analysing more in-depth the activities of SMOs around European institutions have emphasised that the structure of the EU interest groups is dominated by business organisations (Beyers 2002; Greenwood 2007; Saurugger 2006).More recent analyses of the anti-austerity waves of protest in Europe have stressed the lack of transnational coordination, as well as the difficulty on the part of the challengers in framing the mobilisation in European terms (e.g.,Mathers 2016).Nevertheless, it has been observed that the degree of involvement of social movements in European politics varies by different dimensions of Europeanisation and by country (Della Porta&Caiani 2009; for the cognitive dimension of social movements’ Europeanisation and the role played in it by the mobilisation of expertise by strategic actors at the EU level, see Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Monforte 2014); that it has been particularly strong during European Council summits; and that they are willing to cooperate with – not dismantle – EU institutions (Della Porta & Parks 2015). Finally, it has been noted that, above all, organisations that adapt to the rules of the game toward the European institutions (i.e., to a consensual style, rather than protest) obtain some routine access to supranational organisations (see Rootes 2002).

Against this background, this article investigates more specific hypotheses regarding the interaction between the EU and social movements. Research on social movements has related strategic choices to the available political opportunities (i.e., POS) – namely the set of opportunities and constraints that are offered by the institutional structure of the political systems in which these groups operate (Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1994). POS refers to the degree of ‘closure/openness’ of a political system to the claims raised by the protesters – either in terms of long-lasting institutional features of a regime (e.g., electoral system, degree of centralization) or of more ‘dynamics’ (e.g., political opportunities, the configuration of power between allies and opponents). To a certain extent, movement organisations adapt to the public decision-making structure, mobilising when and where access channels open up (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978). While ‘open’ opportunities encourage mobilisation, the lack (or closing) of these opportunities often translates into scarce mobilisation or even the escalation of more disruptive actions (i.e., a ‘curvilinear relation’).

Beyond political opportunities, some scholars suggest the integration of the notions of ‘cultural’ and ‘discursive’ opportunities (i.e., COS and DOS, respectively) which determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be ‘“legitimate” by the audience’ (Kriesi 2004: 72). In this respect, the opportunities for movements to mobilise can be characterised in terms of more inclusive or exclusive cultural and discursive contexts *vis-à-vis* the challengers (e.g., the political culture and discourses on a specific topic of the elites or the way authorities manage collective action).[6]

From this perspective, and referring to mobilisation against the TTIP, we can observe that the political and cultural/discursive opportunities available for the challengers are not so favourable (i.e., ‘open’) at the EU level (see Table A in the Online Appendix) and this may have a negative impact on their degree of Europeanisation (*H1a*). In addition, when focusing on action strategies (i.e., forms of Europeanisation) the policy style influences the collective action form: European governance is more open to conventional lobbying than to contentious actions (Marks & McAdam 1999: 103–104; see also Tilly 1978; Saurugger 2006). Thus, at the EU level we expect to find more frequent use of insider strategies by anti-TTIP social movements, conforming to the institutional preferences for dealing with ‘polite’ lobbyists rather than protest (*H2a*).[7] At the same time, closed POS might lead to a

radicalisation of protest.

Strategic choices must also take into account the available resources (McCarthy & Zald 1996). The capacity to organise at the European level is linked to the characteristics of specific actors and their capacity to mobilise material and symbolic resources (Della Porta& Caiani 2009). The availability of material resources (e.g., size, degree of professionalisation) has been said to explain the larger capacity of business interest groups to intervene at the EU level, whereas their absence has been considered to be responsible for the weakness of public interest groups and social movements such as environmentalists in European politics (Balme & Chabanet 2002; Giugni & Passy 2002; Rootes 2002). If this holds true, we should expect (*H3a*) that those actors more equipped with organisational resources, as well as being lobby-oriented (e.g., interest groups), will 'Europeanise' more in terms of the development of European organisations, targets and actions than informal, fragmented and protest-oriented movement organisations. According to what has been suggested by research on the Europeanisation of SMOs (e.g., see Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Lahusen [c_] 2004; Monforte 2014), we may also assume that we would find differences in the levels of Europeanisation of different types of SMOs.

Beyond the above-mentioned hypotheses, other considerations lead us to expect a more significant degree of Europeanisation of movements and contention.First, since the political opportunity approach stresses the need for social movements to address the territorial levels where decisions are taken (Tarrow 1989), we should expect attempts to develop multilevel strategies in order to reduce the costs of European protest campaigns (Della Porta & Tarrow 2005). Referring to the concept of 'multilevel opportunity structures', which underlines the effectiveness for social movements of exploiting political opportunities at multiple territorial levels (Della Porta et al. 2009; Della Porta & Parks 2016; Parks 2015), we argue that although the EU political opportunities do not appear favourable for the TTIP challengers (see Table A in the Online Appendix), we have to specify our hypotheses crossnationally. In particular, following the POS approach, and combining the context opportunities concerning the TTIP, at both the national and European levels, we hypothesise that social movements are more motivated to addressing the European level when they have less leverage at home (*H1b*) in an attempt to trigger 'boomerang' effects (Keck & Sikkink 1998). For example, concerning environmental NGOs in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Poloni-Staudinger (2008) stresses on the basis of a content analysis of news wires that changes in domestic elite alliances and electoral cleavages help to explain why groups choose to target activity at the supranational level. When the domestic opportunity structure is closed, supranational activity becomes more likely – and, to the contrary, the opening of the domestic political opportunity structure decreases supranational activity among groups.More specifically,we can expect that in countries where the political and discursive opportunities for the challengers of the TTIP are unfavourable (i.e., 'closed'), social movements will be more Europe-oriented either in terms of degree (i.e., EU as actor, level of mobilisation and target) or of paths of Europeanisation (i.e., developing an externalisation of protest). Vice versa, in countries where there is a more 'open' context of opportunities (i.e., POS/DOS), they may be more focused domestically for their mobilisation, either in terms of degree or path of Europeanisation (i.e., developing a domestication of European protest, targeting domestic institution and organising at the national level). (For more details on our operationalisation of POS/DOS, see Table A in the Online Appendix.) As for 'discursive opportunities', it has been demonstrated, for instance, that the discourse of national political elites exerts a strong influence on the mobilisation of collective actors, opening up or, alternatively, posing constraints on them (Koopmans & Statham 2010).

Second, as social movement scholars have observed (Tilly 1978), opportunities vary across time by opening or closing during one campaign. Likewise, we hypothesise (*H1c*) a growth in/decrease of Europeanisation of anti-TTIP social movements in terms of target, actors and events over time as the European institutional opportunities, common to our six countries, open or close over time.

Finally, beyond material resources, cognitive resources (Geddes & Guiraudon 2004) and cultural traditions play an important role in facilitating or hampering the development of transnational strategies. For instance, policy analysis studies underline that expertise is a decisive factor favouring the presence of civil society in EU policy making (Rodekamp 2013), and movement scholars have shown that social movements as 'newer, resource-poor [c_]

organisations that tend to reject conventional politics' easily develop transnational identities and actions (Della Porta & Mosca 2009: 783). From this point of view, SMOs could be expected (*H3b*) to be more motivated to develop supranational networks, identities and actions than, for instance, political parties or trade unions, which are traditionally more deeply rooted in the nation-states (Marks & McAdam 1996; Larsson 2014). To be sure, studies focusing on interest groups and the European system of governance (Beyers & Kerremans 2011) have also found that the groups' material resources explain to a lesser extent their access to the EU than do their relations with domestic parties and overall domestic embeddedness. In our study, we will pay a particular attention to the relational resources of the anti-TTIP movement.

Methods and data

Two primary methods are used for the empirical analysis. To measure the degree and paths (i.e., forms) of Europeanisation of the organisations against TTIP, we conducted a protest event analysis (PEA) between 2014 (when the issue became fully visible on the EU policy agenda) and May 2016 in six European countries and at the EU level making a total of 784 events coded.Following a longstanding tradition in social movement research (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978), and despite its limitations (McCarthy & Zald 1996; Mueller 1997), we use PEA because it allows the quantification of many protest properties, such as frequency, timing and duration, location and claims (Koopmans & Rucht 2002). In order to retrieve relevant information on the the anti-TTIP protest in Europe, we rely on a combination of sources: national quality newspapers scanned for relevant articles using keywords such as 'TTIP & protest' and 'TTIP & mobilisation' on the Lexis Nexis database[8]; online information portals such as Euronews and Eurobserver; and the 'news sections' of the Stop TTIP websites in the six countries – namely, specific sections where 'news' from other newspapers or press agencies are reported.[9] We use a formalised codebook. Our unit of analysis – the 'protest event' – consists of the following elements or variables for coding: an actor who initiates the protest event; the form of action; the target at which the action is directed; an object actor whose interests are affected by the event; and the substantive content of the event that states what is to be done (issue). In order to measure the level of 'Europeanisation' of each of these dimensions we add the variable 'scope', ranging from local to national, crossnational and European/supranational. Only the categories 'supranational' and 'EU' are considered to be measuring 'Europeanised' actors, events and targets.

Cautiously,and with many interpretative caveats, our protest events allow for controlling, if not the 'real' amount and forms of the protest, at least the associations between specific characteristics of protest repertoires as well as general trends. Furthermore, triangulation with other sources is used to improve our interpretation of the PEAdata. Indeed, in a second part of the study, aware of the critiques to the 'structuralist bias' of the POS approaches (Diani & McAdam 2003), we integrate the PEA with 12 semi-structured interviews with key representatives of movement organisations and policy makers (see Table B in the Online Appendix). For the selection of interviewees, we follow a positional method and the so-called 'snowball' technique (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). Finally, an in-depth analysis of documents (policy reports, statistical databases, Eurobarometer) concerning the TTIP agreement and the mobilisation at EU and domestic levels allows us to reconstruct its political and cultural context. (For further details about our methods, see Table C in the Online Appendix.)

Figure 1. Trends in the mobilisation against TTIP in Europe, by country (2014–2016) (absolute values). Notes: N = 784, semesters are shown. Abbreviations: IT (Italy), ES (Spain), FR (France), UK (United Kingdom), De (Germany),AT (Austria), EU (EU level).

As for the country cases selection, the first criterion is to compare those countries represented by the highest number of Stop TTIP campaign members out of the total number of 522 organisations of the Coalition in order to have a 'critical mass' of protest events to analyse. This set of countries was chosen because it provides for sufficient variation along the dimensions we considered potentially relevant for European mobilisation (see Table A in the Online Appendix).

Multilevel political opportunities and Europeanisation

The mobilisation intensity around European issues

A first indicator of Europeanisation of social movements is their mobilisation intensity around European issues – that is, how much do SMOs take part in public debates and actions concerning European politics such as the TTIP? Our protest event data confirm that the Stop TTIP mobilisation is a significant and increasing phenomenon in the period under analysis (see Figure 1). A total of 784 TTIP-related actions initiated by movements,

NGOs, interest groups and various actors has been identified: respectively, 172 in Germany, 129 in Austria, 122 in Italy, 90 in Spain, 94 in France, 87 in the Unite Kingdom and 90 at the European level. Furthermore, considerable variations across the six countries can be observed, with stable or increasing levels of mobilisation against TTIP in the majority of our countries.

Out of the 784 total protest events, 228 were organised in 2014, 467 in 2015 and 89 within the first four months of 2016, for a hyphotetical total according to a linear projection of 270 events in 2016. The events conducted at the EU level were 32 in 2014

(14 per cent of the annual total), 48 in 2015 (10 per cent) and 10 in 2016 (11 per cent), totalling 83 events (11 per cent of the codified cases). Overall, for all the countries, the peak of mobilisation on the TTIP issue occurred between the second semester of 2014 and the first semester of 2015, with some very small variations. More specifically, in Spain (but the same holds true for the EU level), the intensity of mobilisation remained stable over time. France is the only country where it decreases.Whereas, in Germany, already very high at the beginning of our analysis, the intensity of mobilisation against the TTIP sharply increased from 2014 to 2016, as it did in Austria, the United Kingdom and Italy – albeit not linearly.[10]

As well as the number of actions, an additional relevant aspect of the intensity of mobilisation is the number of participants. According to our protest event data, the size of events organised against the TTIP in the period of our analysis is high, with 796,299 participants in the first semester of 2014 and 1,331,069 in the second. There were 148,649 protesters in the first six months of 2015 and 3,277,768 in the second, with 226,940 in the first four months of 2016. In all countries, half of the events (50 per cent) involved a high number of participants (on median, 300), confirming that this European issue was highly 'participated' in by civil society.

The data on the intensity of mobilisation can be explained via the POS framework when looking at the changing political opportunities at the EU level.Our findings appear to be in line with the apparent opening of the decision-making process since the protest reached its peak (similarly in most of our countries) when it seemed that the EP could have supported the positions of the Stop TTIP movement. Actually, in April 2014, the EP postponed the vote on the TTIP to July 2015, creating 'momentum' for social movements' hopes and mobilisation. This, as has been noticed (see Bouza García & Villar 2012; Greenwood 2012), indeed set a favourable 'context' for the protest, opening the (perception of) room for new players in Brussels, although the 2014 ECI was immediately rejected by the Commission. When in July 2015 the EP passed a resolution substantially in favour of the agreement, the only possible opening of the opportunity structure at the EU level was definitively closed. However, after the end of 2015, the mobilisation of civil society against the TTIP continued, assuming more expressive (and cognitive) forms than protest, as exemplified by the words of a 'Friends of the Earth' representative:

> [T]he European institutions became even more closed to our requests over time, and the 'wikileaks' simply showed how we were right in denouncing the lack of transparency which characterised the decision-making – although our concerns had not been previously considered. Even the European Parliament, within which initially we did have some supporters and potential allies, was not very open to our ideas. (Interview 9)

European actors, targets and events

Asecond step in assessing the degree of Europeanisation of the anti-TTIP social movements is to examine to what extent the collective actors protest, who are their targets and whether their events have a European scope[11] (Figure 2). These indicators allow us to investigate the 'salience' of the integration process in the everyday life of citizens (i.e., whether the

Figure 2. Percentage of protest events with EU Scope (EU actor, EU target, EU event), by country.
Notes: Target scope (N = 685); actor scope and issue scope (N = 691). Cramer's V between scope of the target and country = 0.34***; between scope of the actor and country = 0.26***; between scope of the event and country = 0.19***. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

nation-state remains the primary focus of their political action and identities) or, on the contrary, actors increasingly frame their protest within a European dimension.

When looking at the scope of the protesters against TTIP, in all countries, 'European' actors account for a moderate proportion of events: 4.5 per cent on average, from 3.9 per

cent of European claimants inAustria to 10 per cent in Spain and theUnited Kingdom, with Germany in-between at 5.8 per cent.The level rises to 7 per cent if we add the crossnational actors initiating anti-TTIP events (i.e., those mobilising simultaneously in two or more European countries). Indeed, overall, national actors are still the main initiators of TTIP protests in, respectively, 72 and 20 per cent of cases.

Looking at the scope of the target of protest, in all countries, although national and subnational institutions are still important targets in 37 per cent of cases, the role of European ones is relevant, accounting for more than a third of events. In a cross-country perspective, this picture varies from 70 per cent of European targets in the Italian and Spanish anti-TTIP protests, to 30 per cent in France, to 15 per cent in Germany and 8 per cent in the United Kingdom. The high proportion of European-level targets of the TTIP mobilisation is particularly relevant, especially when compared to previous research (Della Porta & Caiani 2007; Koopmans & Statham 2010).

Finally, another important indicator of the Europeanisation of social movements is the level of mobilisation (i.e., the scope of the event), which is in principle independent from the scope of the subject actor and/or target, referring instead to the the capacity of creating 'European' initiatives. In the protests of the countries under study, about 10 per cent of all

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events are organised at the EU level, as against 83 per cent at the domestic level.Once again the European reference remains less important in the events organised by the German and British organisations, whereas it is more prominent in the Spanish and Italian cases, with France in-between.

The national differences in the Europeanisation of mobilisation against TTIP that emerged from our data can be partly explained by the POS at the domestic level. More specifically, the Austrian political and discursive opportunities seem to be particularly open for the TTIP challengers both at the institutional level, with left parties and unions supportive of them, and at the non-institutional level, with 70 per cent of Austrians against the TTIP versus an EU average of 32 per cent. Furthermore, there is transparency and institutional discussions with respect to the TTIP. For example, the Head of the Austrian government spoke out against some parts of the agreement (i.e., the Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ISDS) and there are growing concerns across the parties in parliament, with parliamentary appeals and a TTIP presentation before the EP as of 22 February 2016. Finally, the protesters seem to have 'allies' among economic actors, with small and mediumsized enterprises publicly taking a position against TTIP (Interview withAustrian campaign representative, 15 August 2015).

Similarly, in Germany, the political opportunities for mobilisation against TTIP appears to be very open: the movement can rely on 'allies in power' like the Social Democrats and the unions and other economic categories such as small businesses[12] as well as the main institutions (i.e., the government, parliament,MEPs, judiciary).[13] As explained by the representative of one German organisation, 'the opportunities were fairly open since several political parties, interest groups and trade unions have been particularly receptive to the demands of the movements' (Interview 3). Furthermore, the media are increasingly critical of the TTIP,and there is huge and increasing societal awareness and consensus in the country against the agreement (59 per cent of Germans; European Commission 2015).

To the contrary, in the case of France the political opportunities configuration is not so clear since, on the one hand, and from a non-institutional standpoint, the Socialist government has clearly spoken against TTIP more recently on 3 May 2016, whereas, on the other hand, the local authorities have been supportive of the protest initiatives from the beginning. For example, on the party level, although the French Socialists and several MEPs stand against the TTIP, the right-wing parties have also tried to capitalise on the discontent of the people using the 'TTIP' issue. Furthermore, according to the Stop TTIP coordinator, the 'multilevel' institutional opportunities for the protest have been ambivalent, with local authorities more open than the national government to the request of the protesters, but clearly less powerful in terms of decision making (Interview 2). At the societal level, the opportunities for protest against the TTIP seem moderately favourable, with only 34 per cent of French citizens against the agreement (European Commission 2015).

In Italy and Spain, both the political and discursive opportunities for anti-TTIP protest appear more closed, as explained by the Italian representatives of the campaign: '[T]he chances of being heard by the national institutions have always been very low. The only way to be considered is to mobilise widely at the European level' (Interview 5). In Italy, as in other countries, although local authorities in several dozen municipalities and

some important regions took action against the TTIP, the government is one of the main supporters of TTIP negotiations in the EU, as confirmed by several public statements of the Economic Minister.[14] Moreover, trade unions have an unclear and divided position on the TTIP and only 26 per cent of Italians are against it (European Commission 2015).According to the representatives of the movement in Italy, this is also due 'to the "silence"or misleading communication on the issue by the media' (Interview 1).

Similarly, in Spain, the movement against TTIP had to face a 'closed' opportunities structure created by the majority of political parties including PP, PSOE, UPyD y CiU that have approved the treaty (e.g., the vote of the PSOE on this in May 2015) and scarce information on the topic by traditional media. Public support of the movement is moderate, with the ECI signatures quorum only at 17 per cent in the country, and only 20 per cent of the Spanish people are against the agreement (European Commission 2015).According to Spanish Stop TTIP representatives in a document dated 15 July 2015, this was also due 'to the complicity of mass media that have not provided to citizens accurate information on the topic'.

Finally, in the United Kingdom, the political and (especially) discursive opportunities are slightly open for the movement. This is due to a configuration of power that sees the independentist parties (e.g., the Scottish National Party) as well as the national opposition and local authorities mobilising against the TTIP, and, more generally, a significant debate around the topic with information kept alive by several government committees and reports. Societal awareness is also high, although surprisingly only 23 per cent of the population is against the TTIP (European Commission 2015), with artists, celebrities and intellectuals taking openly critical positions.

To summarise our assessment of the political and discursive opportunities considered together in the six countries (see Table A in the Online Appendix for further operationalisation details): Germany is 'very open';Austria is 'open'; France and the United Kingdom are 'slightly open''; and Italy and Spain are 'closed'.

In line with our research hypotheses concerning the multilevel nature of political opportunities, the crossnational analysis reveals that the Europeanisation of social movements is influenced by the general political and discursive opportunities in their own country. They tend to 'Europeanise' more, especially in terms of EU targets and events, where the domestic opportunities are closed, whereas in those countries such as Austria, Germany and partly the United Kingdom where the political and discursive opportunities are more open *vis-à-vis* the challengers, they 'Europeanise' to a lesser extent. In fact, the most numerous and larger events are in countries characterised by an open opportunity structure (i.e.,Austria and Germany), whereas in the others that are characterised by more unfavourable political and discursive opportunities, the protest events are less numerous. The Italian exception, where we found high levels of TTIP mobilisation in spite of an unfavourable political and societal context, can be explained by the interplay between the national and the EU contexts.

Time: The enduring Europeanisation from below

Regarding diacronichal trends (not shown), our data point to an enduring adaptation among non-institutional actors to the shift in competences to the supranational level. Europeanlevel targets, actors and events of the anti-TTIP social movements have indeed been

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Table 1. Forms of Europeanisation of the anti-TTIP movement (percentages): All actors (N = 772)

Target scope

National EU

Actor Scope National (a) Domestication (b) Externalisation

55.3 27.2

EU (c) Transnational pressure (d) Supranationalisation

2.6 14.9

By country: ES (69 per cent) and IT (74 per cent)=+externalisation

AT (89 %),UK (84 %), DE (80 %)=+domestication

By actor type: Smos (not coalition) (66.2 per cent) and interest groups (67 per cent)=+domestic.

Smos as coalition (39.9 per cent)=+externalisation

Parties (24.7 per cent)=+supranationalisation (but not interest groups, 7.8 per cent)

Notes: Based on all events concerning the TTIP. Cells show percentages calculated on the total (N = 772). Cramer's V between scope of the actor and scope of the target = 0.40***; for all actors (N = 772); 0.52*** for both political parties (N = 73) and social movements (N = 231); 0.35*** for interest groups (N = 115) and 0.36*** for the TTIP as whole coalition (N = 348). Cramer's V between scope of the actor and scope of the target = ES and IT 0.7*, FR0.10*, UK0.28*, DE 0.41***, AT 0.31***. Legend: '+'means = mainly. $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$.

increasing, although not in a linear fashion. In particular, EU targets and events tend to increase across time. In particular, events with an EU scope have more than doubled from 14 per cent in 2014 to 38 per cent in 2015 (and 18 per cent in the first four months of 2016). Events with EU targets remain stable, from a very high 43 per cent at the beginning of 2014 to 40 per cent in the first four months of 2016. Although the mobilisation by 'European' movements that was very high at the beginning of the campaign at 28 per cent of cases in the first semester of 2014 tends to decrease towards the end of the period analysed, events organised by 'crossnational' (interpreted as an intermediate category of 'horizontal' Europeanisation) movement actors are initially absent, but increase to reach 5 per cent in 2016.

Forms of Europeanisation

This growing 'Europeanisation from below' follows a peculiar pattern. Applying our typology of forms of Europeanisation to our data (Table 1),[15] we observe that, overall, the Europeanisation of protest mainly assumes the forms of domestication (55.3 per cent),[16] followed by externalisation (27.2 per cent) where national actors exert pressure on European targets to have more leverage at home in a context that they perceive as 'closed' to their requests. Supranational dynamics are also relevant at 14.9 per cent, but transnational pressure applies only to 2.6 per cent of cases.[17]

A comparison across countries points to important differences in the forms of Europeanisation: Italy and Spain are characterised by externalisation (in 74 and 69 per cent of cases, respectively) as it is more typical of 'closed' contexts (see alsoKeck&Sikking 1998).[c]_

Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom show instead primarily forms of domestication (89, 84 and 80 per cent, respectively), which could be linked to weakeness but also to a strategic choice within a political domestic context that is perceived as 'open' by civil society (for the Austrian case, see the TTIP Coalition document dated 15 July 2015). As fas as supranationalisation is concerned, withEUactors that targetEUinstitutions directly,we see it particularly present in events in Spain and France (in 7–9 per cent of cases), whereas forms of Europeanisation via transnational pressure aremore frequent in France (5.5 per cent) and the United Kingdom (6.9 per cent). In sum, the role of the interplay between domestic and European opportunities in shaping collective mobilisation is confirmed when looking at the different paths of Europeanisation: externalisation is mainly present in those countries (e.g. Italy and Spain) where the national context is closed. On the contrary, in those countries where the 'opportunities' are more open and the national institutions are considered to be a more trustworthy 'connection' to Brussels (e.g.,Austria,theUnitedKingdom and Germany), domestication is the preferred form of Europeanisation.

Consensual or conflictual Europeanisation?

Beyond the end of 'permissive consensus' towards Europe, scholars talk about a 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 39), referring to a politicisation of the process of integration as being increasingly critical.Therefore,another relevant dimension to investigate in terms of the forms of Europeanisation of movements is the degree of conflict in the process of Europeanisation. Do anti-TTIP social movements moderate their repertoire of action when they address the European level?

According to our data, movement organisations tend to use mainly demonstrative (i.e., protest) actions in about 50 per cent of events and conventional actions (i.e., contacting/lobbying, consultation/cooperation, action toward courts, etc.) in 20.9 per cent of cases.[18] Moreover, 12 per cent of the events take the form of media-related actions and 7 per cent are online actions such as publication of online articles, petitions and donations; 9 per cent of the events are expressive actions aimed at activating citizens on the TTIP issue with cultural and symbolic events such as 'rising social awareness with conferences, talks, lectures, training sessions, articles, radio and TV programs' (Spanish representative of the Stop TTIP Coalition in a document dated 15 July 2015).[19] Finally, only 1 per cent of the events are confrontational actions.However, when looking at how the action strategies change at the EUlevel in terms of whether the protester or the event has a 'European' scope (Figure 3),[20] we see that, as hypothesised, the EU decision-making style seems to influence the repertoire. The TTIP social movement tends to use strategies traditionally considered common to interest groups such as lobbying instead of protest.

More specifically, on the one hand, conventional actions such as lobbying increase to a third (31 per cent) when the mobilisation occurs at the EU level, becoming the most important form of action[21];on the other hand,demonstrative actions such as protests sharply decrease to 25 per cent. Indeed, as underlined by the representatives of the Stop TTIP

movements in Germany, their main strategy is ‘taking to the streets – showing that it’s not cliques, but real people behind big numbers’ (Stop TTIP Coalition document dated 15 July 2015).[22] Differently from other research findings (e.g., Della Porta & Caiani 2009), mediarelated actions are not very frequent at the EU level (6.5 per cent), whereas online activities

Figure 3. Action strategies of the anti TTIP movement in EU-level versus non-EU level events (percentages).
Notes: Event scope national (N = 626), event scope European (N = 154), total (N = 780). Cramer’s V between scope of the event (EU versus national) and type of action = 0.40***. Same relation, by country Cramer’sV=0.22*** for event scope national;=0.26** for event scopeEU. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

are (22 per cent).[23] Surprisingly, confrontational actions are used more at the EU level than at the national level (around 6 versus 0.2 per cent of cases, respectively), confirming that with ‘closed’ opportunities, mobilisation is more difficult, but when it occurs it is more radical (curvilinear relationship).

These findings on the moderation of the action repertoire at the EU level may be better interpreted by turning to the qualitative data of our interviews. Indeed, several civil society organisations stress that they mainly use knowledge and the spreading of information (i.e., ‘mobilise cognitive resources’, in our terms) at the European level, whereas political resources (as citizens’direct mobilisation) are used mainly at the national level (Interviews 1, 3,7 and 10). In fact, the various anti-TTIP actors interviewed are fully aware of the multilevel nature of the campaign, as explained, for example, by the representative of the EU-level organisation ‘Transport & Environment’ who notes that her group was ‘responsible for the organisation of lobbying at the EU level, whereas the affiliated national organisations organise protest events and marches at the national or even subnational level on their own’ (Interview 8). Similarly, theEuropean Consumer Organisation (BEUC) representative explains that the type of work done in Brussels ‘is mainly lobbying, whereas other forms of action are left to national or local organisations’ (Interview 6) and the Friends of the Earth group not only stresses a division of labour between the national and the EU levels, but also emphasises the more favourable context for protest at the domestic one:

> [A]t the national level we leave the job to other members of the Stop TTIP Coalition and to our national sister organisations [whose] work is more effective, due to mass

Figure 4. Share of protest events with EU scope (actor, event and target), by actor type (percentages).
Notes: EU actor (N = 776); EU event (N = 773); EU target (N = 767). Cramer’s V between the type of group and the scope of the actor = 0.27***; and the scope of the event = 0.16***; and the scope of the target = 0.25***. N total (100 per cent) for political parties (75), environmental movements (77), consumer organisations (29), civil right organisations (41), GJM/anti-corruption/anti-multinational organisations (90), Think tank & cultural (34), unions (44), other economic interest groups (32), TTIP coalition as a whole (354). This latter category includes the coalition either at the national, European or local level. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

> support. In Brussels we focus more on the diffusion of information … relationships with EP members. (Interview 9)

Organisational characteristics and Europeanisation

Do SMOs and collective actors richer in resourses have greater access to the EU level? The hypothesis according to which Europeanisation is facilitated by the availability of organisational resources (material and symbolic) is here tested by comparing the mobilisation of different types of actors in the anti-TTIP campaign. Beyond similar political opportunities, we see from our data that the Europeanisation of the different groups that compose the anti-TTIP movement varies. First of all (data available from the authors upon request),with regard to the intensity of the mobilisation, the prominent actor is represented by the Stop TTIP Coalition as a whole (mobilising in 46 per cent of all cases). Political parties and environmentalist groups come second (both accounting for 10 per cent of protest events).Trade unions follow with 5.7 per cent, together with civil right movements,economic groups (e.g., farmers) and think tanks.More specifically (see Figure 4), when looking at the development of European actors – namely at the scope of the actor who initiates the protest as European – political parties and movement organisations belonging to the previous Global Justice Movement (GJM) account for a large proportion at 20–30 per cent.We find very few unions organised at the EU level, as well as think thanks and economic interest groups (8–9 per cent), whereas environmental and consumerist movements, as well as the

TTIP Coalition as a ‘whole’, stay in a median position with 13–15 per cent of events by EUlevel actors belonging to these categories.

In terms ofEuropeanisation as level of mobilisation (i.e.,EUscope of the event), political

parties and groups belonging to the GJM movement stand out, with both accounting for about 25–27 per cent of cases. They are followed by environmental organisations and the Stop TTIP Coalition as a 'whole', which initiates events with an 'EU scope' in 19 per cent of cases.All of the other actors, trade unions included, are well below these figures. Finally, when looking at events addressing EU targets: trade unions, together with the Stop TTIP Coalition as a whole and political parties, are prominent,havingEUtargets in 42–52 per cent of their cases. These are followed by environmentalists and GJM groups, with, respectively, 27 and 37 per cent of EU target events. Third, we find think tanks and other professionaleconomic categories, who address EU institutions in 14–15 per cent of cases.

To conclude, our findings show that: (a) as expect, it is not only traditionally stronger organisations like political parties that 'Europeanise', but also actors less endowed with material resources such as the GJM, at least in terms of European targets; and (b) if there are still some thresholds for weaker organisations to mobilise on European politics, as the modest results of SMOs on all three dimensions of Europeanisation demonstrate, relational resources matter for European mobilisation. In fact, when the movements mobilise as a coalition ('TTIP Coalition as a whole'), they perform 'better' in terms of Europeanisation on all the indicators, evidently compensating for the lack of material resources.[24] This finding is reinforced by the data in Table 1 about the different paths of Europeanisation of the mobilisation, which shows that domestication is more significant for social movements and interest groups in 67 per cent of cases versus 45–59 per cent of all other actors. However, when SMOs act in 'coalition', externalisation is more frequent in 40 per cent of cases versus 20 per cent for political parties, 23 per cent for interest groups and 12 per cent for social movements acting alone.[25] Our findings on the strong European activism of theGJMsuggest the importance of the heritage of previous protest resources can be 'eventful' (Jasper & Goodwin 2011), providing collective actors with identities, overlapping membership and networks useful for the action.

Furthermore, SMOs and NGOs, beyond national coordination have started to build transnational ties and coordinating bodies: our data (see Figure 5) indicate that these organisations share a tendency to coordinate their actions transnationally and to address (thanks to these networks) European institutions.[26] With reference to the total number of events (N = 784), in 54.7 per cent of them the actors mobilise on their own, in 32.4 per cent they mobilise with another national actor and in 12.9 per cent they mobilise in coordination with an actor from another country (i.e., crossnational) or internationally (e.g., an international federation). Most importantly, we see that the more supranationally 'networked' they are, the more the anti-TTIP social movements 'Europeanise' in terms of being able to organise events with an EU scope or to address the European institutions.

In fact, it emerges from the interviews that a multilevel structure is present in several SMOs: 'activating unexpected allies' is the strategy underlined by the representatives of the TTIP protest in Germany (TTIP Coalition document dated 15 July 2015). In addition, as explained by the French representative of the protest campaign: '[W]e have tried to work also at the EU level but we usually do it together with the other Stop TTIP campaign representatives' (Interview 2). Similarly, the representative of the European coordination

[c]

Figure 5. Organising for targeting the EU: Transnational targets and events by SMOs and NGOs with and without 'networks'.

Notes:Cramer'sVbetween national or cross-national/international ties andEUscope of the event=0.38***; and EU scope of the target = 0.27***. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

unit stresses that 'the bulk of the organisation has been done coordinating domestic effort' (Interview 3) and another European NGO representative states that their main activity during the Stop TTIP campaign has been their involvement 'in an institutional setting, the TTIP Advisory Body [a coordination body] which allowed us to express our concerns vis-àvis EU institutions' (Interview 6).[27]

Put more broadly, our data confirm that European campaigns tend to consolidate European networks of activitists (Della Porta et al. 2009). This relevant degree of transnational embeddedness may be related to the weak institutionalisation of supranational movement actors, which pushes national movement organisations to be directly involved in multilevel pressures. In sum, coordinating, either at the national or European level, does matter for the Europeanisation of collective action.

Conclusion

European integration multiplies both restrictions and opportunities for social movements, serving as an impetus to increase their range of intervention in order to overcome the

former and exploit the latter. However, the question remains: Is the EU, as well as other supranational institutions, accountable to pressures from below? In this study we have addressed this question by looking at the Europeanisation of movements and NGOs mobilising against the TTIP.We can summarise our findings as follows. First, our data show that the POS still matter and it documents a strong SMO *adaptation in terms of multilevel governance*. The Stop TTIP movement is playing a 'double-level' game (Putnam 1988) since EU institutions are a growing target, together with national governments. Compared

to previous studies on the Europeanisation of political mobilisation that found a certain general degree of Europeanisation (Della Porta&Caiani 2009;Koopmans &Statham 2010; Seidendorf 2003) and that were also accompained by some caveats, our data indicate that, at least when looking at the protest campaign against TTIP, there is a *significant* degree of Europeanisation of social movement actors. We found this in terms of: (1) intensity of mobilisation around a genuine European(ised) and even technical policy; (2) development of European actors through the transnational networking of domestic organisations; and (3) level of mobilisation and repertoire of action fully adapted to multilevel governance. The *Europeanisation of social movements is not a limited phenomenon* (for similar findings, see Balme & Chabanet 2008; Monforte 2014; Ruzza 2014;Uba & Uggla 2011).

Second, we found that this process has specific characteristics, including *differential Europeanisation*, which can be better understood by taking into account the *multilevel opportunity structure* exploited by the movement. In this regard, our work adds another piece of empirical research to support the intuition of those social movement scholars who are aware of the importance of the national context and the necessity to take into account the multilevel opportunity structure in the analysis of (Europeanised) social movements and which also act as 'rooted cosmopolitans' (Tarrow 2005). Indeed, in line with the POS hypothesis, the political opportunities of TTIP policy making at the EU level influence the Europeanisation of social movements in that they are higher when the opportunities are perceived as open and lower when they are closed. However, there is great variation across countries in this respect,which can only be explained by the interplay of theEUand national political opportunities.Our data stress that social movements 'Europeanise'more, especially in terms of targets and level of the mobilisation, when the opportunities are 'closed' at the national level (i.e., Italy and Spain), whereas in the other countries (mostly Austria, Germany, but also France and United Kingdom) with a more favourable context, the main targets and scope of the mobilisation are domestic. The specific multilevel opportunities for configuration also influences the paths of 'Europeanisation' of collective actors, which tend to recur as *externalisation* when they do not have much leverage at home (as in the cases of closed political opportunities in Italy and Spain), whereas *domestication* is the most frequent path for movements facing a more open context of national opportunities (Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom). Also, international relations research has pointed at the recent increase in the externalisation of protest toward international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) as the main strategy of transnationalisation of civil society groups when states censor or repress them (see, among others, Della Porta & Parks 2015). More empirical and comparative studies are needed on different policy issues and types of movements to further elaborate the hypotheses on the link between the two (or more) levels. More specifically, while literature on political opportunity in the EU is generally rare (Della Porta & Parks 2015), our study is theoretically in line with those scholarswho stress that adaptation to theEUlevel is crucial (Della Porta et al.2009;Lahusen 1999: 202), and it offers an empirical contribution to the research stressing that *a variable model of political opportunity structure* is preferable in order to account for interacting opportunities at multiple levels (Bieler 2005; Della Porta & Caiani 2007; Lahusen 2004; Sikkink 2005).

Third, in line with our hypothesis according to which decision-making style influences strategies of action (e.g., Marks & McAdam 1999; Tilly 1978), we find *more lobbying*

than protest at the EU level also with respect to social movements.[28] In fact, as expected, we find that, overall, conventional actions are more frequent at the EU level, whereas demonstrative strategies are usedmore at the national and local levels.This finding indirectly supports those who consider that professionalisation of the NGOs at the EU level has the

potential to improve representativeness (Saurugger 2006). Furthermore, online actions are becoming increasingly relevant in terms of the repertoire of action at the EU level, as an effect presumably of the enlargement of citizens' repertoire of political participation and of growing interest in transnational issues (Della Porta et al. 2009).

Finally, in line with recent literature comparing the Europeanisation of different types of SMOs, we argue that, beyond material resources, *relational resources* also play an important role in the transnationalisation of civil society organisations (see also Monforte 2014; Ruzza 2004). More specifically, we have shown that it is *not only economic resourcerich organisations* (such as political parties or unions) that are capable of targeting EU institutions and staging EU protests; social movement organisations, especially when they coordinate their action, are also capable of doing so.[29] By exploiting networks, movements can increase their effectiveness in multilevel arenas through resource and knowledge exchange with other movements and INGOs (Rucht 2004). In this, our findings emphasise the role of cognitive resources, such as the building of new collective identities through framing and the mobilisation of expertise, to access EU institutions (Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Lahusen 2004; Monforte 2014).

In sum, Europeanisation 'from below' is increasingly becoming a reality: The European public space is fully acknowledged as a relevant one – not substituting the national level, but complementing it.From our research (as inACTA,see Parks 2015), it seems that SMOs have definitively come of age in their multilevel capacities, and – if not adequately considered – they may possibly soon be an increasing challenge to EU institutions in other policy areas.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web-site:

Table A. Political and Cultural/Discursive opportunity structures for the TTIP mobilisation at the EU and national level (our six countries)

Table B. Interviews

Table C.Methodological specifications

Notes

1. The European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) is an EU procedure, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, aimed at enabling 'EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies' (see http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome). It allows one million EU citizens, who are nationals of at least a quarter of the member states, to call directly on the European Commssion to propose a legal act.
2. https://stop-ttip.org
3. www.ttip-leaks.org
4. The notion of 'scope of the actor' initiating the protest and of the 'target' towards which the protest is directed refers to the organisational extension of the organisation and/or institution (e.g., a protest against the European Commission has a 'European scope of the target'). The notion of the 'scope of the event/action' refers instead to the scope of the mobilisation – namely, to the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive mobilisation of the event. Further details about our measurements are discussed later in this article.
5. Only for 'Europeanised' protests – namely protests with EU actors, events and targets.
6. Among the various operationalisations of political opportunities (see Meyer (2004) for a detailed literature review of the concept),we look at the dimensions of the context illustrated inOnlineAppendix A, which combines both institutional features and discursive factors of the TTIP, POS and COS/DOS, both at the EU and national levels.
7. However, some criticise this perspective showing that not all social movements involved at the EU level of politics have been transformed into fragmented fields of individual interest groups and lobbies (e.g., Lahusen 2004).
8. One (left-wing) per country (since it has been shown by the literature on PEA that doubling the newspapers does not increase significantly the number of events found; Koopmans & Rucht 2002): *La Repubblica* for Italy,*El Pais* for Spain and analogous ones,according to LexisNexis availability.However, mainstream newspapers did not provide us with many protest events.
9. This mix of sources allowed us: (1) to bypass the media blackout on the TTIP issue present in some of the

mainstream media in our six countries, and (2) to balance the possible biases introduced by using also the news sections of the SMO and NGO websites. In addition, redundant articles have been eliminated and intercoders' reliability tests and online discussions of difficult cases have been carried out.
10. The number of protest events passed fromfive in Italy at the beginning of 2014 to 16 in 2016,with a peak of 54 events in the first semester of 2015; from five to nine in the United Kingdom in the same period, with a peak of 44 events in the second semester of 2015; from eight to 13 in Austria, with a peak of 72 events in the first semester of 2015; and from 20 to 27 in Germany, with a peak of 50 events in the first semester of 2015. In Spain, the overall amount of events remained stable from five in 2014 to six in 2016, with a peak of events in the central years of our analysis. The same holds true for events organised at the EU level: ten in 2014 and 2016, respectively, with a peak of 22–25 events in the central years.
11. As mentioned, the 'scope' of the actor organising the protest event and the scope of the addressee refer to the organisational extension of the organisation and/or institution (e.g., Italian government, European Commission). In our coding scheme the categories for the scope of the actor/target vary from 'local' (city/district or regional) to 'crossnational/multilateral' ('involving actors from two or more countries'), to supranational (i.e., 'European'). The notion of the 'scope' of the mobilisation refers to the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive mobilisation of the event. For instance, if an article mentions an anti-TTIP event organised in Brussels or simultaneously in more than one of our selected European countries, the scope of this protest event is 'European'.
12. For example, the German Trade Union Federation as well as the 'Chambres of commerce' joined the anti-TTIP Coalition from the very beginning (Stop TTIP Coalition document dated 15 July 2015).
13. For example, the German parliament established a 'petition committee' on TTIP.
14. Among others, in *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 30May 2016.
15. For the typology and related analyses, we considered relying on Imig and Tarrow's (2001) criteria where all events related to the anti-TTIP mobilisation since they, by default, involve claims 'launched in response to the EU policies and institutions'. To obtain the four types of Europeanisation, we crossed

the scope of the protester (national versus European) and the scope of the target (national versus European). In order to measure the level 'Europeanisation' of each of these dimensions we added the variable 'scope', ranging from local, to national, crossnational and European/supranational. Only the categories 'supranational/EU' have been considered as measuring 'Europeanised' actors, events and targets.
16. An example of domestication is the lobbying done by anti-TTIPmovements in Spain on political parties with the aim of introducing the TTIP issue into their programmes, as was the case of the German coalition 'TTIP unfairhandelbar', which submitted a petition to theGerman parliament with over 68,000 signatures.
17. An example of 'transnational pressure' is the event called 'Municipalities against TTIP', which was celebrated in Madrid with the participation of European local government representatives and political parties.
18. In order to classify the repertoires of action, we distinguished six main social movement action strategies (Tarrow 1989): *Conventional actions* associated with conventional politics and the institutional arena (e.g., related to electoral campaigns); *media-related actions*, such as organising press conferences, distributing releases,paying for advertisements and giving interviews/letters to newspapers; *demonstrative actions*, which are legal actions aimed at mobilising large numbers of people (e.g., street demonstrations – legal and nonviolent – rallies, petitions); *expressive actions*, such as initiatives whose aim is more to unite the militants rather than display the movement's strength; *confrontational actions*, which are also nonviolent but aimed at disrupting official policies or institutions and therefore usually illegal (e.g., blockades, occupations); and *online actions* (e.g., mail bombing).
19. Examples of *expressive* actions are the case of the Trojan horse brought by the TTIP protestors around many European cities or the 'TransatlanticResistance Journey against TTIP' organised by the European Greens in June 2015 in Madrid.
20. The Cramer V between scope of the actor (national versus EU) and type of action is 0.27***; between scope of the event (national versus EU) and type of action it is 0.40***. Because of space constraints, Figure 3 shows only the data obtained from selecting 'EU scope events' as the basis of the analysis. However, the same trends (data available from the authors upon request) emerge also when we select events with 'European actors' as the basis for analysis:*conventional* actions are 20 per cent at the national level versus 26 per cent at the EU level; and *demonstrative* actions (i.e., protest) are 54 per cent at the national level versus 14 per cent at the EU level.
21. This change of repertoire of action holds true both for countries characterised by a more consensual 'movimentistic' tradition, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, and for those with a more 'protest culture'.Cramer V between event scope and type of action, disaggregated per country is 0.22** for event scope national and 0.26** for event scope EU.
22. For example, on 18 April 2015, more than 50 Spanish cities participated in the Global Day of action against TTIP. Similarly, during an SPD election campaign event in Hamburg, 120 German citizens organised a flashmob against TTIP and CETA.
23. An example of online action at the EU level is when the Stop TTIP UK movement emailed 150 European candidates before the 2014 EU elections to ask their position on TTIP.
24. To this we can add that not only do 'relational resources' matter, but also they seem to interact with the POS of a country. In those countries where the POS is more closed (as in Italy or partly in France), this is compensated by the high coordination capacity of civil society actors in addressing the European

level (disaggregated data, not shown).
25. Focusing on events made by political parties, supranationalisation is the dominant form of Europeanisation, representing about 25 per cent of cases.
26. To measure the level of 'transnational embeddedness', we coded whether the event was organised by one actor alone or in coordination with another actor, national organisations or organisations abroad as well as international organisations. The indicators compare the percentage of protests with EU targets and EU events organised by single versus 'networked' actors.
27. We can observe a higher degree of transnational embeddedness among Spanish and German social movement actors and a lower level for the Italian and French, with the English and Austrian ones inbetween (Cramer V 0.49***). Transnational contacts do not seem typical of the most institutionalised

and resourceful movement traditions, but are all the more relevant for the more contentious southern movements.
28. Although when protests emerge at the EU level, they are disruptive, according, as expected, to a curvilinear relationship between (closed) context and radicalness of collective action.
29. Although the focus of this study on the Europeanisation of social movements is mainly on the POS approach, for further research purposes the history of the SMOsat the national level (which goes beyond the scope of this article) also should be considered. In fact, the SMOs composing the anti-TTIP Coalition display different experiences of protest and networking, and theymobilise in contexts in which this issue has different levels of salience. All these dimensions play a role in the process of the Europeanisation of social movements, particularly with respect to relational resources.

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