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A bourgeois story? The class basis of Catalan independentism

ABSTRACT: *In Catalonia and beyond, the recent upheaval of secessionist mobilisations has challenged not only extant territorial frameworks and integration processes but also our understandings around nationalism and its social bases of support. Upper-class and bourgeois sectors of the population have been traditionally considered as overrepresented within the Catalan nationalist constituency. Our data on the social background of supporters instead indicate an interclass constituency behind the 'procés' that unfolded under the post-2007 Great Recession. As the movement for Catalan self-determination and independence became a mass phenomenon, it broadened the traditional constituency of Catalan nationalism and encompassed large sectors of the population, including the working classes. Looking at the intersection of positions on nation and class, we suggest that cross-class alliances were crucial in accounting for the surge of support for independence that we have observed in Catalonia since 2010.*

On September 11th, 2012, roughly 20 per cent of the Catalan population gathered to voice their collective desire for secession in the largest (at the time) pro-independence demonstration in democratic Spain. Exactly two years later, under the slogan 'Now is the time, united for the new country', about two million protesters lined the streets of Barcelona in alternate colourful rows resonant of the *senyera* (Catalan flag). Wearing the commemorative red and yellow T-shirts to form a huge 'V' for 'vote', they demanded a fully binding referendum on independence.

These events were major turning points during a cycle of contention that evolved around the *procés* towards independence launched by institutional and civil society actors, which has been taking place in Catalonia over the last few years and persists today. Marking a striking turn in the history of the Catalan nationalist movement, many people went beyond the promotion of the nation's linguistic and cultural identity and advocacy for further autonomy. Instead, many Catalans embrace outright independence, challenging Spain's constitutional arrangement in place since 1978 and the very processes of European integration (Boylan 2016: 761-2; Closa 2017).

Catalan nationalism having developed in one of the richest areas in Spain, scholars and media commentators alike have often underscored its bourgeois basis— and bias (Balcells 1996; McRoberts 2001; Guibernau 2004; Miley 2007; Crameri 2015; Senserrich 2018).[1] However, there is also no doubt that independentism gained momentum during the financial crisis and ensuing social crisis, which hit Catalonia as hard as it did other Spanish regions, its quantitative increase

[1] See https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/a-peculiar-bourgeois-nationalism-brings-spain-to-the-brink-1.3260767; https://www.wsj.com/articles/middle-class-catalans-not-workers-drive-push-for-independence-1507714203.

also triggering qualitative changes.[2] Building upon this literature and drawing on an original dataset from a 2015 post-electoral survey, in this article we explore the individual characteristics and socio-economic composition of the pro-independence milieus.

Social movement studies have rarely addressed the class bases of contentious politics. In the scarce research that is available, a main assumption is that while in 'old' social movements labour unions and blue-collar workers asked for a more equal redistribution of resources, new middle classes (especially social-cultural specialists) mobilised in 'new' social movements around cultural issues and post-materialist values (Inglehart & Catterberg 2002). Scholars have already noted that nationalist tides of contention, while having a distinctive identity-essentialist component, tend to become one of several mobilisational vectors that sometimes diverge but often intersect with other streams of mobilisation, including economic and employment issues (Beissinger 2002: 75-6). What is more, besides claiming for self-determination and authority over a specified territory (Hechter 2000), ethno-nationalist movements tend to change in extraordinary times, and then to sediment in normal times (Beissinger 2002). Focusing upon the Catalan case, we suggest that in a recession-driven context with high levels of dissent organised against austerity policies, there has not only been an increase in support for independentism, but also a change in the social composition of the supporters of the Catalan *procés*.

Catalan nationalism has a long history, over which both its discourse and its social basis have changed. As testified by the very name of the main Catalan party (founded in 1931, before the Francoist dictatorship), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, the Republican Left of Catalonia), even if not a workers' party, Catalan nationalism has bridged claims for independence with those for social justice. The fascist regime brutally repressed the Catalanist movement, in general, and ERC in particular. Under a state of war lasting from 1936 to 1948 and under Franco's dictatorial regime, 4,000 people were executed (including many in public) by 1953, and 130,000-150,000 were missing in Catalonia at the end of the civil war (Guibernau 2004: 46).

As with other nationalist minority movements (Smith 1991), the networks that organised much of the strategic resistance against Francoism – those that contributed to developing a Catalanist identity and promoting indigenous language and culture – consisted of relatively well-off, highly educated, cultural elites. However, in the shadow of the post-2007 Great Recession, inequality has deepened, levels of unemployment have risen, many people's material resources have declined, and middle classes have impoverished in many places, including Catalonia. Following the financial crises and austerity programs, the social pact between low- and moderate-income classes that enabled the building of the welfare state seems to have collapsed (della Porta et al. 2017: 50). In contrast with the traditional narrative of Catalan nationalism as middle class, we shall contend throughout that the recent upsurge of support for independence in Catalonia has been based upon the mobilisation of individuals from various social classes.

Our study seeks to nuance claims for a positive associaton between socioeconomic class and support for nationalism (in Catalonia). We argue such claims too often rely on weak empirical evidence, namely 1) measure of support for independence relies on deficient proxies, such as voting recalls: if we want to measure support for independence and self-determination, we need more fine-grained, direct measurements of these variables; 2) conclusions are often drawn from correlation-based type of analyses— but the size of the effect is very small, and it often vanishes when we control for alternative explanations; 3) in statistical terms, cultural and identity-related

[2] Even if support for independence prdellaoved resilient to economic recovery (Bel et al.2019).

variables are better predictors of support for independence, to the detriment of economic and class indicators. Even though the upper-middle classes might tend to support the *procés* to a greater extent, we cannot make sense of the peak of mobilisation and mass embracement of pro-independence stances without taking into account the ability of the pro-independence *avant garde* and movement actors to articulate frames that appealed to broad sectors of the society, including the working classes and deprived milieus.In the next section we will review the evolution of support for independence in Catalonia. Then, the nexus between economic factors and secessionism will be examined and the data used will be introduced. Zooming into the Catalan case, we will subsequently shed light on the role of social class as a determinant of support for independence. In the conclusion, we will summarise the main findings of this article and signal some avenues for further inquiry.

Catalan independence and (historical) time in context

The movement for Catalan independence has recently challenged the so-called 1978 regime, based upon a pacted transition, and the 1978 Spanish constitutional framework with its compromise on an ambivalent autonomous solution. In particular, Article 2 states that 'the Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards, and recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that make it up and solidarity between all of them' (Guibernau 2013: 375). While ERC remained initially weak, the post-Franco history of Catalan politics has long been imprinted by the nationalist project of Jordi Pujol, leader of Convergència i Unió (CiU) since the first democratic election in 1980 and until the mid-2000s. CiU was a centre-right and moderate nationalist coalition made up of the centre-liberal Convergència Democrática de Catalunya (CDC) and the conservative Unió Democrática de Catalunya (UDC). By seeking to increase Catalan autonomy within the extant constitutional framework of the Spanish state, CiU managed to appeal to a broad constituency across the left-right divide (Elias 2015). In fact, 'within the Catalan political space, CiU positioned itself exclusively on the territorial dimension, as a Catalanist party with a strong nation-building pedigree that could be trusted to govern in Catalonia's interests' (Elias 2015: 85). The salience of peripheral nationalism has left its footprint on the understanding of left and right: contrary to the left, the right has been widely considered in Catalonia as the opponent of regional devolution (Dinas 2012). However, CiU lost power in 2003 to a coalition of leftist forces with federalist preferences, led by the social-democratic Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC, the Catalan branch of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español). In a situation of increasing political uncertainty (and related electoral volatility) between 2000 and 2004, the PSC launched a proposal to reform the Statute of Autonomy (Catalonia's basic law) in order to open a dialogue with the pro-independence ERC (then in the opposition) and challenge CiU (in government and supporting the Partido Popular, PP).

With the PSOE in power at the state level since 2004 (although it had rejected a Basque proposal for greater autonomy), the Catalan government exploited a window of opportunity for further autonomy, launching a public debate on the reform. Approved by the Catalan Corts in 2005, the proposed statute (which defined Catalonia as a 'nation') was however rejected by the Partido Popular and also triggered internal tensions within the PSOE. New negotiations brought about a revamped agreement between the PSOE and CiU. Adopted by the Parliament (with the opposition of the ERC) and ratified by referendum in June 2006 (73 per cent voted 'yes', with less than 50

per cent participation), the new statute was not enacted, given appeals on the grounds of unconstitutionality by the PP and other autonomous communities.

Confirming the importance of constitutional process in revitalizing ethnotationalist movements (della Porta et al. 2017), the process of reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, from 2003 to 2010, is 'widely regarded as providing a favourable context for a public discussion of Catalonia's relationship to Spain and for the Catalan secessionist movement to gain' momentum (Muñoz & Guinjoan 2013: 49). Between 2006 and 2010, the incoming decision of the Constitutional Court on the new statute of autonomy has been constructed 'from below' as a prospectively framed event that shows the impossibility of a negotiated solution, presenting an urgency for action (Basta 2017). In June 2010, the Constitutional Court nullified several provisions with reference to the Catalan status and language as well as the devolution of some economic and political competencies (for a summary, see Burg 2015). Popular outrage at this decision was key to massive street demonstrations calling for the recognition of the Catalan nation and contributed to trigger a major boost in support for independence, which had been rather marginal and marginalised in Catalonia (Dowling 2014), as were the openly secessionist parties before 2010-12 (Basta 2017). As Figure 1 shows, support for an independent Catalan state slowly increased from 13.6 per cent in June 2005 to 19.4 per cent in February 2010, then jumping to 48.5 per cent by November 2013.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Besides the 2010 march, there was a wave of pro-independence mobilisation in Catalonia throughout the 2009-2015 period. Importantly, pressure from the streets through mass mobilisations was present— especially in the form of street protests during the 2012-2015 *diadas* (National Day of Catalonia) launched by civil society organisations such as Òmnium Cultural and Assemblea Nacional Catalana (della Porta et al. 2017). Apart from these grand-scale events, the collective performances of pro-independence activism have also included international publicity campaigns, performances, and local grassroots and dissemination activities (Crameri 2015: 104-5). Preceded by more than 500 municipal-level non-binding consultations on independence in 2009-2011 (Muñoz & Guinjoan 2013), about 2.3 million people symbolically cast their votes in a massive unofficial voting performance led by extra-institutional actors— and the collaboration of the Generalitat— on 9 November 2014. While "cultural elites" are clearly overrepresented amongst the independentist avantgarde and civil society organisations (Crameri 2015), one major feature of the *procés* is that it transcended the traditional boundaries of Catalan nationalist parties— also targeting and mobilising working-class Castilian speakers through, e.g., through newly created organisations such as Súmate (Aramburu 2018).

Moreover, protest events often have a transformative impact on the very movement that carry them out (della Porta 2017a),. Iin the Catalan case, the cycle of protest contributed to broadening the basis of support of the movement and reformulating its core claims (della Porta et al. 2019). Indeed, mass mobilisation also contributed to triggering 'a process of polarisation that pushed the traditionally moderate Catalan nationalist parties to an increasingly radical stance, as claims moved from autonomy to independence' (della Porta et al. 2017: 160). In addition to unconventional forms of political participation,, electoral competition dynamics, especially the repositioning of moderate parties, are key to account for the shift between accommodation and contestation (Rico & Liñeira 2014; Barrio & Rodríguez-Teruel 2017). Together with opportunities and incentives offered by a loose institutional framework, party elites' more radical position on the national

identity cleavage can foster polarizing strategies (Barrio & Rodríguez-Teruel 2017; Colomer 2017). Specifically, CiU abandoned its once nationalist pragmatic positions and embraced more openly pro-independence stances. In November 2010, CiU won about 40 per cent of the vote in the regional election. However, the 2012 election 'produced a parliament heavily polarised on the territorial issue, with traditionally minor parties gaining ground over mainstream formations' (Rico & Liñeira 2014: 257-8). Despite its poor electoral results, CiU managed to remain in government thanks to a majority in favour of self-determination, which stuck to its commitment to hold a referendum on independence against the firm opposition of the main state-wide parties (Rico & Liñeira 2014). In January 2013, the Catalan Generalitat adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty, which recognised Catalonia as a sovereign political subject. Although the Constitutional Court ruled this symbolic declaration unconstitutional, it signalled the political will to hold a referendum in the near future and represented a major clash between Catalan and Spanish institutions (Orriols & Rodón 2015).

According to della Porta et al. (2017: 39-68), the level of Catalan popular unrest results to a large extent from a combination of three root contextual causes, as three intertwined (socioeconomic, political, and territorial) crises spiralled. On the one hand, the Great Recession, addressed through austerity policies (with increasing inequality, rampant unemployment, stagnating salaries for the middle classes, reduced social mobility prospects, as well as cuts in public spending and social benefits) added on narratives related to mid- and long-term socioeconomic grievances (e.g. on the conditions of the transport infrastructure, low central State investment, and 'fiscal despoliation'), which were contested from the streets during a cycle of anti-austerity protest in Catalonia and the whole of Spain (Portos 2017). In light of the 2008 world financial crisis, the huge private debt that led to the collapse of the housing bubble, the subsequent collapse of mass consumption, and the dramatic increase in the public deficit and unemployment rocketing above a quarter of the country's workforce, Spain was forced to request a €100 billion loan from the European Union in order to inject capital into its badly damaged banking sector in June 2012.

The situation was nearly as dramatic in Catalonia, which saw unemployment skyrocket from 7.5 to 23.6 per cent between 2006 and 2011, while the Catalan contribution to Spain's GDP decline from 25.6 per cent in 1979 to 19 per cent by 2010 (Dowling 2014). Additionally, the regional executive faced severe liquidity problems amidst growing tension between regional and central authorities; by the summer of 2012, the Generalitat asked the central government for financial resources, implemented restriction on public spending, and curtailed welfare provisions. In fact, 'CiU's government—elected in November 2010—was the first regional executive to implement a systematic agenda of cuts in public expenditure, including severe cutbacks and welfare retrenchment, and stood out as a champion of austerity measures that will be later introduced elsewhere (Rico & Liñeira 2014: 260; del Pino and Ramos 2018). This happened in a context in which, the EU mandated limits on deficits and debts, which were then constitutionalized. In this process, the Spanish government had reduced regional economic autonomy (Colino 2013), in turn feeding pro-secession narratives about economic grievances—some authors have already noted a revival of centralism and conservatism in Spain in the 2000s (e.g. Guibernau 2004)—, which has paralleled regionalist movements' shifting priorities 'from language to money' (Toubeau & Massetti 2013). As in other cases of tensions between rich and poor regions throughout Europe, in Catalonia inter-regional transfers and re-distribution were challenged, leading to sustained inter-territorial conflict, status anxiety, and generalised discontent (Colomer 2017; Dowling 2014; Henderson et al. 2013).

At the same time, a political crisis unfolded across various countries— not only but mostly in the European periphery (della Porta 2015). In Spain, this crisis consisted of different dimensions, including the falling legitimacy of established political parties, social democracy, and corruption scandals.[3] On top of (and at the same time infiltrating) the socioeconomic and political impasses, a territorial crisis and appeals for self-government also came into play in the Catalan case (della Porta et al. 2017: 66). If globalisation had created a division between 'winners' and 'losers', with an emerging integration–demarcation cleavage (Hutter 2014; Kriesi et al. 2008), old cleavages have been remobilised. In addition to a return to the class cleavage, centre-periphery cleavages were also reinvigorated (della Porta 2015; della Porta et al. 2017). In part as a response to the process of increasing convergence and the inability of international institutions to cope with the Great Recession and its consequences, discourses attached to national sovereignty resonated with a large portion of citizens. As Michael Keating noted,

> 'Reactions to the effects of the global market are often territorial, as the disjuncture between the global rationality of the multinational corporation and the spatial rationality of the local community is felt. So what may be a rational market strategy of plant closure from the overall perspective of the firm is felt locally as a loss of jobs and income not only for the affected workers but for the entire community. Hence the prevalence of local struggles against plant closures, with class and sectoral conflicts assuming a territorial form. More generally, social solidarity may be assuming a territorial form with the decline of class attachments and the institutions that sustained them' (2001a: 27).

Although new cleavages can emerge and restructure political conflict, we will contend that the old cleavages still matter for contentious politics in general, and disputes over independence in particular. We will next delve deeper into the class basis of territorial conflicts.

Is it the economy? The social bases of support for independence

The role of social classes for nationalist support has long been a contentious matter in the social sciences (Connor 1994; Smith 1998). Some authors argue that social class is subordinated to the nation as a source of identity and political development, thus economic factors will not be relevant predictors in explaining ethno-national conflict (Connor 1994, 2001). However, most accounts concede that material conditions and social class configurations are crucial to understand nationalist support across a wide array of cases (e.g. Gourevitch 1979; Gellner 1983; Coakley 1992; Beissinger 2002; Keating 2001b, 2014).

The association between increasing inequality and nationalist struggle can flow in two different, alternative directions. First, a 'bourgeois' approach puts its finger on the grievances related to exploitation fuelled by state policies that drag resources— be that in a direct (e.g. territorial transfers) or indirect way (e.g. welfare)— from the wealthy and hard-working region to send them to other poorer and self-indulgent regions (Harvie 1994; Massetti & Schakel 2016: 867). The

[3] Several scandals affected the credibility of Mariano Rajoy's government and the ruling Partido Popular, such as the publication in 2013 of the handwritten account ledgers by former party treasurer Luís Bárcenas (supposedly associated with black money). Importantly, the conservative Catalan nationalist Convergència Democràtica has been plagued by a string of scandals too, including Jordi Pujol's confession of tax evasion and money laundering via secret Swiss and Andorran bank accounts (Miley 2016).

arrangement of the state's taxation and spending regime might be holding the growth of the territorial sub-unit down, as the richer sub-unit is subsidising poorer parts of the state rather than retaining its own wealth (Horowitz 1981; Sorens 2005). While these approaches suggest a positive association between economic affluence and nationalism, this relationship can flow in an opposing way. Some scholars argue that the uneven economic development of certain regions at the expense of others is a by-product of state choices that have not transferred enough direct (investments) or indirect (welfare) resources to limit the output differential or to close the development gap, even giving rise to 'internal colonialism' dynamics (Hechter 1975; Massetti & Schakel 2016: 867). With inequality between the core and periphery increasing, likelihood of developing a peripheral nationalist movement increases, especially when the cultural gap core-periphery is greater (Hechter 1975). As uneven economic development may be associated with the rise of nationalisms, shared territorial interests will come about as the capitalist system unfolds, creating poor and rich places (Keating 2014). The effect of wealth on nationalism might be moderated (or mediated) by a number of variables, including integration in international economy and at the supranational level (Meadwell & Martin 1996; Gourevitch 1979). Specifically, several contributions understand nationalism as the result of particular class interests, whether this be an emerging bourgeoisie, a frustrated middle class, or a working class experiencing both class and ethnic discrimination (Keating 2014: 323; Coakley 1992; Díez Medrano 1995; Gellner 1983). Recent studies have shown how (economic) issues become territorialised, stressing the need to distinguish between inter-regional and intra-regional solidarity: not only regional politics are characterized by inter-regional competition, but intra-regional politics intensify through regional governments and devolution, putting groups under strain as they compete for resources and policy gains under continuous processes of rescaling (Keating 2013, 2017; Jessop et al. 2008).

Addressing the Catalan case, Montserrat Guibernau (2004: 63) contends that, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, middle classes and the bourgeoisie critical of Francoism were the main actors that exercised cultural resistance in the private arena (see also Balcells 1996; Keating 2001b; McRoberts 2001; Miley 2007). Research on nationalist movements has pointed in general at the role of intellectual and political elites in developing nationalist discourses, for which supporters are then mobilised in different social strata. As Kathryn Crameri notes,

> 'the study of Catalan nationalism has been no different, painting it as primarily a bourgeois phenomenon that has depended on the intellectual elites at times when Catalonia had no autonomous government of its own, and on the political elites since the reestablishment of the Catalan parliament in 1980' (2015: 106).

To a great extent, the political project of Pujol's Catalanism was founded on satisfying the needs of a broadly defined middle class, which were to be articulated within the Catalan autonomy (Dowling 2014; Balcells 1996). However, the role social class has played in the recent peak of support for secession in Catalonia is more disputed. As some authors emphasise, 'it has been the conversion of the Catalan middle classes to support independence rather than "pragmatic Catalanism" that has turned what was hitherto a minor component of Catalan nationalism into a mass secession movement' (Crameri 2015: 118). Contending with this view, Steven Burg (2015) argues that economic assessments and grievances, family income, and unemployment had generally no significant influence on preference for independence and voting for secessionist parties. In accounting for support for secession, he stresses the role of Catalan identity, rather than personal material and economic grievances (Burg 2015; Rodón & Guinjoan 2018). Thus 'mobilization for independence in Catalonia is best understood as an example of the politics of

recognition, rather than simply a struggle for material interests' (ibid., 290). Also, research noted that the effect of Catalan identity on support for secession interacts with contextual features: when having pro-secession contacts among proximate networks, pro-independence attitudes increase dramatically among dual-identity individuals (Rodón & Guinjoan 2018).

To be sure, the relationship between class and national identities is clearly a complex one, as they are neither overlapping nor mere substitutes for one another. While aiming at protecting Catalan identity, CDC, the larger centre-liberal counterpart within the enduring CiU coalition through the 1980s until the early 2000s, has explicitly recognised and deliberately tried to encompass 'the growing internal plurality' of the Catalan nation (Guibernau 2004: 129). Catalonia is often portrayed as a paradigmatic case of civic nationalism (Balcells 1996; Conversi 1997: Keating 2001b), which is meant to rely more on a common project than on ethnic features. However, some scholars have emphasised the overwhelming 'ethnic' component among the social bases of support for the Catalan nationalist movement, and the salience of the ethno-linguistic divide (Miley 2007; Moreno 2013). Self-identification as Catalan is strongly associated with identity aspects, especially place of birth and language practices (Miley 2007; Álvarez-Gálvez et al. 2017; Miley and Garvía 2019), with a steadily growth of predominant and exclusive Catalan identities ('more Catalan than Spanish' and 'only Catalan') have steadily grown from 24% in 1979 to beyond 40% in 2010s during the last decade, while predominant and exclusive Spanish identities ('more Spanish than Catalan' and 'only Spanish') have halved to around 15% of the population (Serrano 2013: 527-8).

When it comes to pro-independence attitudes, they range from 32.5 per cent among those whose maximum educational level completed is primary education, to 51.4 per cent for those with a university degree. Additionally, support for independence goes from 19.2 per cent for migrants— i.e. born outside Catalonia— to 24.8 per cent among those with (two) migrant parents, 46.4 per cent with mixed parents, and 63.5 per cent with both Catalan parents (Serrano 2013: 530). Although socioeconomic class seems to have some impact on independence (39 per cent for those self-perceived as lower classes and 45 per cent for middle and upper classes), further statistical analyses show that while use of the vernacular language is correlated with Catalan support for independence, class, habitat, and education are not (ibid.). In fact, it has been noted that:

> 'the thesis of an alleged middle-class, highly educated, non-urban character of nationalist attitudes is not supported by the results… these approaches, usually linked to the ethnocultural reproduction hypothesis, are not supported either as origins become significant and positively correlated only with those individuals with both parents born in Catalonia. This would suggest that being socialized under a Catalan-orientated environment— combining the ethnocultural reproduction and nation-building socialization— have a positive influence in shaping attitudes towards independence, but for individuals not socialized under this framework the results do not show the opposite effect on attitudes towards independence. When socio-political cleavages— identity, ideology and nationalist vote— are included in the model the three variables have significant effects on independence' (Serrano 2013: 538).

Although cultural-identity variables are indeed important in explaining Catalan support for secessionism, expectations and positions regarding the economic consequences of secession are also important predictors— yet these economic expectations are in part a rationalisation of prior preferences; they are filtered by national identity; and they have a higher relevance for people with weaker party cues (Muñoz & Tormos 2015). In addition to the appeal to welfare and fiscal

autonomy, Serrano (2013) finds that anticipated benefits of secession and perceptions of the economic costs of maintaining the status quo are key motivations for independence among Catalans— even after controlling by identity. Delving deeper into this line of reasoning, Griffiths and collaborators argue that 'the increase in support for independence in Catalonia is based on the dire economic circumstances affecting Spain, so keeping the status quo is no longer attractive for the Catalan government and a large proportion of the Catalan population' (2015: 44).

In short, while identity certainly plays an important role as a predictor of support for independence, the role of class and economic grievances is more disputed. Challenging elite-centred approaches, we point at the inter-classist basis of support of the movement for independence in Catalonia. As the *procés* became a mass phenomenon, it built broad cross-cutting alliances across different groups of the population, including deprived sectors. In order to account for the boost in support for Catalan independence in the shadow of the Great Recession, we have to consider that the bases of independentism have gone beyond an ethnic constituency (descent, language, cultural-centric frames of reference). The social base of the movement is complex, neither merely moved by frustrated intellectuals nor the making of any exclusive social class, but rather encompassed several heterogeneous groups.

While upper-middle classes and Catalan-speaking people might still be keener to support independence these days, support for independence increased across working classes. As the Catalan case reflects, secessionist tendencies represent conjunctural developments of the crisis as citizens adapt to but also resist different characteristics of short-term capitalist development through the reterritorialisation of politics. We are not the first to develop this association between inter-class alliances and secessionism: as minority nationalism spreads, there is a move towards cross-class bases. In fact, Keating (2014) noticed that ethno-nationalist issues divide along class as nationalist leaders try to build cross-class support. For instance, the Scottish National Party extended its social base from the working class plus petite bourgeoisie dominant at the origins to an all-class coalition (Keating 2014). This has been the case, we contend, also in Catalonia during the *procés* and under a recession-ridden scenario, which is key to account for the peak of independentism.

Indeed, the *procés* is neither merely nor mostly a bourgeois phenomenon, rather involving broad cross-class alliances such as those observed in other movements such as the Global Justice Movement or anti-austerity protests. The development of neoliberal policies in fact transforms the relations between the economy and the state, having an impact on the social basis of conflicts and contentious politics. Given the increasing relevance of conflicts over socio-economic issues (Hutter 2014), capitalism's restructuring leads to the mobilisation of a wide array of social groups in various ways, including anti-austerity mass protest (della Porta 2015) and, we contend throughout, the renewed upsurge of mobilisations around self-determination and secession. As noted in some previous research,

> 'While some research indicated that the social bases of left-wing protest had shifted from the working-class labour movement to the new middle classes, anti-austerity protests brought attention back to the mobilization of those who suffered the most from neoliberal globalization. [… Some] social groups have lost much from the neoliberal turn on social and civil rights. Public employees and retired individuals, once considered among the best-protected social groups, have seen their rights continuously reduced. To a greater or lesser extent, precarious conditions, including loss of fundamental rights such as healthcare, housing and education, are at the core of anti-austerity protests… Sometimes called the

> 'multitude' or the 'precariat', those protesting against austerity represented new coalitions of various classes and social groups that perceived themselves as the losers in neoliberal development and its subsequent crisis' (della Porta 2017b: 460).

The development of left-wing and redistributive frames for mobilisation around the secession issue has been key for the mobilization of many citizens from different social groups, which help account for the increase in support for pro-independence positions. The austerity and recession-dominated context was in fact crucial in the rise, spread, and resonance of frames around redistribution, equality and social justice. Additionally, with the broadened social and political bases of support for independence, in Catalonia the democratic-emancipatory and social justice frames that emphasised collective dignity, popular empowerment, deliberation, participatory democracy, etc. have prevailed over traditional nationalist components in order to expand the movement basis (della Porta et al. 2017: 34). Building upon long-standing feelings of institutional unfairness (associated with economic strain, mistreatment, and insufficient funding for autonomy), the pro-independence (especially left-wing) milieus have put forward alternative, socially just visions of an independent Catalonia. These narratives developed in a general climate of political dealignment and mass dissent following the cycle of anti-austerity protest in Spain (including the 2011 15M/indignados mobilisations). As Andrew Dowling (2014) highlights, in the period after 2003, in a context of multiple crises, Catalan independence became the catch-all solution: the *procés* 'narrative appealed to ever expanding sectors of the population, being the only Catalan political discourse that had not been discredited and being sufficiently amorphous to have projected onto it a range of aspirations … the apparent failures of federalism and autonomy has given the signifier "independence" cross-party appeal and has come to represent the solution to a range of political ailments at a time of political, social and economic crisis'.

Data

In order to shed light on the social bases of independentism, we use the post-electoral survey carried out by the Political Research unit at the University of Santiago de Compostela after the 2015 regional election in Catalonia (N=1,400; Rivera Otero et al. 2017).[4] Together with sociodemographic information and political attitudes of the respondent, this dataset includes a battery of questions on nationalism, voting spells, support for the right to self-determination, and positioning towards independence.

In order to measure the dependent variable, we use three different indicators that are supposed to be interrelated but arguably measure different dimensions of support for independence. Overcoming a major longstanding limitation of most available survey data on Catalonia, we can rely on information about direct preferences towards independence, self-determination and voting recalls. First, a dummy variable captures whether or not the respondent supports 'the independence *procés* that the Government led by Artur Mas launched'. Second, we consider whether or not the respondent is in favour of self-determination—that is, whether Catalonia should have a vote to

[4] The target sample of the 'Estudio Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas en Cataluña 2015' consists of Catalans over 18 years old. The fieldwork was conducted between 16 November 2015 and 23 December 2015 (the Catalan election took place on 27 September 2015). Following a proportional allocation, quotas by sex, age, and province were used (margin of error ±2.62%). The questionnaire was administered by interviewers via telephone using the CATI software. See Rivera Otero et al. (2017: 11-12).

decide upon its eventual secession from the Spanish state. We use as a proxy their support for delivering 'a referendum on independence to decide upon the Catalan independence', which is measured though a yes/no item. Third, we capture retrospective voting spells in the 2015 regional election through a 7-category variable.[5] The level of correlation between support for self-determination and the other variables is only moderate (.39 > Pearson's r < .46).[6]

The independent variable is social class belonging. Indicators of self-declared class belonging encounter a major problem: despite widespread feelings of relative loss of social status, the sense of belonging to the middle classes is still high, at least in Spain (Alonso et al. 2017). Class is thus better measured through more objective indicators. Seminal studies on social structure for political participation measure class through the education proxy (Barnes et al. 1979). Although educational level is arguably useful, we also look at two more direct (yet somehow interrelated) indicators, such as income at the household level and job status. Both the maximum educational level attained (primary, secondary, university degree) and the average net revenue of the household consist of three categories (low, defined as 1,200€ or less; medium, ranging between 1,201€ and 3,000€; and high, 3,001€ or more). Job status is a multinomial variable including the following categories: working, student, retired/pensioner, and unemployed.[7] From a descriptive standpoint, we perform simple statistical analyses throughout, including cross-tabulations. Also, bivariate and multivariate regression analyses are in the Appendix. We report the descriptive statistics of both the dependent and independent variables used in our analyses in Table 1, as well as the (language, identity, ideology and province-level) controls.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The *procés*: an interclassist basis of support for independence

Following the 2017 Catalan election, media commentators and other observers noted that voting for pro-independence parties increased dramatically in blue-collar areas with a high proportion of Spanish-speaking inhabitants (Sánchez & Puente 2017). In comparison with 2015, support for pro-independence grew the most where it was smaller, while it decreased in the municipalities that have traditionally been keener to support nationalism.

This trend has been developing for some time. As the previously described data from the 2015 post-electoral barometer indicate, the level of support for self-determination is relatively homogeneous across social backgrounds. Even though the better-off sectors of the population seem

[5] Alternatively, we grouped the vote for pro-independence forces (Junts pel Sí and Candidatura d'Unitat Popular) vs. no openly pro- independence parties (centre-right liberal Ciudadanos [Cs], conservative Partido Popular [PP], socialdemocratic PSC/PSOE, left-wing coalition Catalunya Sí Que es Pot [CSQP], conservative regionalist Unió) in a dummy variable—however, the level of correlation with support for the dummy of support for the independence *procés* is very high (Pearson's r= .90). The categories null/ blank/ non voted/ voted for other minority parties are recoded as missing.

[6] Note support for the independence procés is highly correlated with other proxies of independence, including preferred form of state and the Linz-Moreno question on national and regional identity are highly intercorrelated (Pearson's *r* > .70)— see Holesch (2016).

[7] As the level of correlation between education and income is only moderate (Pearson's r= .43), rather than merging them in a common indicator, we keep them separate throughout.

more likely to support the referendum on independence, level of support among working milieus is also high (Figure 2). While 85.3 per cent of employed people support the referendum device to decide upon eventual secession, this figure reaches (a certainly not low) 76.5 per cent for unemployed respondents. Support for the referendum is clearly majoritarian among people with medium and high levels of income (83.3 and 81.8 per cent), but also among those with a lower income (72 per cent). Similar figures can be observed for education: support for self-determination increases from 73.7 to 82.2 and 85.5 per cent, as the maximum attained level of education moves from primary to secondary and university degree. Unsurprisingly, relative to self-determination attitudes, support for the independence process is smaller among all groups of population. While secessionist positions are prevalent among working population (67.3 per cent), a relevant 49.9 per cent of unemployed people declares its support as well. Pro-independence attitudes prevail among highly educated and people with a higher income (67.2 and 67.5 per cent), and, while significantly lower, they are still widespread among the less educated and those with the lowest income— that is, household average net revenue of 1,200€ per month or less— at 45.6 and 38.9 per cent, respectively.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The descriptive statistics reported throughout suggest that education, income, and job status variables may have a positive effect on support for self-determination and independence. Middle-class professionals are clearly overrepresented amidst those who support both options. In other words, more resourceful people will be more likely to show positive attitudes towards self-determination and independence, and mobilise for them. The positive association between class and secessionism-related variables would not only be consistent with prior evidence zoomed into the Catalan case (e.g. Serrano 2013; Burg 2015)—even if not in other cases, as e.g. in Scotland--and also meet some expectations in the political mobilisation literature, which shows that the educated sectors of the middle class are most likely to engage in political activities in general, including protest performances of new left actors such as the anti-racist and the global justice movements (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001; Norris et al. 2005).

Note, however, the goodness of fit of the bivariate regressions in the Appendix is very small (Adjusted R-squared < 0.03; Tables A1-A2-A3, Appendix). This could suggest that class-related attributes have an irrelevant explanatory power. In fact, as soon as we incorporate the identity-cultural predictors in the multivariate regressions, the effect of social position is clearly absorbed and concealed by national identity, increasing the Adjusted R-squared coefficients dramatically (Tables A4-A5-A6, Appendix). We should not rush to misleading conclusions, though: the fact that coefficients for social conditions do not appear to be significant in multi-variate regressions does not entail class is irrelevant in accounting for support for independence and self-determination in Catalonia.

On the one hand, it could reflect the inter-class nature of other cleavages. While the lower presence of independentist preferences in the lower classes is certainly influenced by the predominantly non-Catalan origins in them (Díez Medrano 1995; Miley 2007; Llaneras 2017), the class cleavage— with its left-right expression— also intersects the centre-periphery cleavage in a party system in which nationalist positions are expressed by different parties with different social bases. According to our results, 53.4 per cent of unemployed, 43.8 per cent among those with lower

income, and 48.8 per cent of those who completed only primary education voted for pro-independence parties in 2015 (JxSi or CUP)[8]— see Figure 3.[9] In contrast, the joint vote share of PP and Cs is 25.5, 29, and 28.4 per cent for these same three groups. Pro-independence electoral forces are not an exclusive option of the best-off sectors of the population, and embracing the territorial status quo (or more centralist positions) is not the prevalent option among the most deprived people. Yet, these figures change dramatically depending upon the ideological self-placement of lower-class individuals. While JxSi or CUP were the electoral choices for 62.7 per cent of the unemployed, 55.8 per cent with the lowest income, and 55.7 per cent of the less educated left-wing individuals in total, these values mark a dramatic contrast for right-wing respondents within the worst-off sectors of the population (these parties gathered 34.3, 30.3, and 42.6 per cent of support within this subset, respectively).

Notwithstanding the complex historical relationship between territorial-based identity politics and the left (Hobsbawm 1996), in the Catalan case we find that support for independence varies dramatically depending on ideological self-placement (see Miley and Garvía 2019; Dinas 2012).[10] While declared support for the *procés* for left-leaning lower-class respondents is above 60 per cent (specifically, 67.9 per cent among the left-wing unemployed, 61.1 per cent for those left-wing individuals with the lowest incomes, and 62.3 per cent for the less educated on the left), it falls below 40 per cent among right-wing deprived individuals (these figures range from 31.5, to 29.7 and 39 per cent for the least well-off, unemployed, and less educated sectors of the population, respectively). These results suggest that support for independence is substantial among all the lower-class groups, being particularly high among left-wing respondents.[11] It goes in line with some recent empirical evidence, revealing that individuals with a strong regional attachment assume a more progressive stance on the left–right axis— regardless of their positions on the cultural and economic issues (Galais and Serrano 2019).

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

[8] CUP stands for Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy), "a radical left-wing and pro-independence party consisting of autonomous local-level assemblies", which gained 10 MPs in the 2015 Catalan election (della Porta et al. 2017: 185). The CiU coalition, consisted of the conservative Unió and the centre-liberal Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), splitted amid polarisation over independence and corruption scandals. The main pro-independence parties (ERC and CDC), along with major civil society organisations such as the Assemblea Nacional Catalana and Òmnium Cultural, put forward a joint list (Junts pel Sí, JxSí) that won the 2015 Catalan election, securing 62 seats.

[9] As families of non-Catalan origin are more likely to develop Spanish-centric cultural frames of reference (Miley 2007; Fernández-i-Marín 2010), we can take language as a proxy for origin. As expected, support for pro-independence parties is particularly high among Catalan-speaking working classes, amounting to at least 80% among people who speak only or mostly Catalan and are unemployed, have completed only low levels of education, or live in a household with a low income level, respectively.

[10] Initially measured through a 0-10 scale (Rivera et al. 2017), ideological self-placement is recoded into a three-category variable (left, centre, right).

[11] Note, however, that there is not a significant and robust interactive effect between social class and left-right self-placement in the model specifications in Tables 5-7 (Appendix).

In order to further detect underlying associations and patterns in our data, we performed Multiple Correspondence Analyses with the supporters of the independence *procés* and self-determination sub-samples. The plots in Figure 5 display the origin axes; the axes contrast level of income, education and professional status among the Catalan independentist constituency and among the supporters of the referendum, respectively.[12] On the (upper) right of this axes we find the independence supporters who are poorly educated and, on the left, we find their opposites (i.e. those reporting higher educational levels). The axes are also shaped by household income and professional status. Similar to levels of education, on the right side we find unemployed people and low-income recipients, while those who are working/students and report higher income levels are on the left. Those with intermediate educational and income levels tend to be in the lower centre, and retired people/pensioners are on the lower centre(-right). This suggests four things: first, a contrast between high and low levels of education is a key line of division in the pro-independence constituency; second, income and professional status follow the same lines; third, level of education also overlaps with the division by socioeconomic conditions. Typically, pro-independence milieus who are students/ under employment have high education and income, whereas the reverse holds true for those who are unemployed, poorly educated and have low income levels. Lastly, the MCA shows very similar results for the pro-independence and for self-determination actors— except for some categories of job status (especially being a student), which does not cluster with the other upper class indicators. In sum, our results suggest there is (also) a relevant, clearly distinguishable presence of lower class, deprived milieus both among the Catalan independentist and for self-determination constituencies.

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Conclusion

Catalan nationalism has been defined (and often stigmatised) as a nationalism of the rich—not only developing in a well-to-do region, but also supported by the bourgeoisie. Our analysis of the social characteristics of the individuals supporting independentism helps us nuance such statements. We try to go beyond the usual stock-in-trade: studies that emphasise the positive effect between class and support for nationalism are too often based on weak correlations, misspecified models, poor proxy measurements and small substantive significance. Rather, in Catalan nationalism as in other minority nationalisms, we argue that the centre-periphery cleavage runs across social classes, with different discourses around the meanings of the nation and its association with class and redistributive issues. Further research is needed in order to ascertain the potentially moderating relationships between different cleavages and the whether and how class attributes interact with political attitudes and emotions in triggering support— and mobilisation— for secession.

In addition to developing new empirical evidence, this paper adds to the recent efforts to bring capitalism back into the analysis of contentious politics (e.g. della Porta 2015, 2017b; Barker et al.

[12] We choose the default specification, so coordinates are returned in standard normalization (i.e. singular values divided by the square root of the mass). The first two dimensions of the MCA with the Burt matrix and adjustments explains at least 95.6% of the total inertia among the Catalan independentists (and 94.6% among the referendum supporters).

2014). While nearly 50 percent of all states have been confronted by ethno-national movements in the last decades (Connor 1994, 2001), little systematic evidence has explored the social bases of the national quests (some exceptions notwithstanding, e.g. Álvarez Pereira et al. 2018; Massetti & Schakel 2016; Burg 2015; Muñoz & Tormos 2015; Sorens 2005). We contend that the concern for the class base of political conflict should expand beyond the anti-austerity protest domain to encompass popular mobilisations in a wide array of arenas, including the recent upsurges of secessionist movements that unfolded under meagre economic circumstances. In particular, the economic, social, and political crises that have hit Catalonia, as well as other regions in Spain and beyond, may have triggered not only an upsurge in the independentist positions but also a transformation of the very characteristics of Catalan nationalism. Beissinger (2002) observed during the breakdown of the Soviet Union that nationalist visions and structures can change quickly in unsettled times. As we had noted in some previous work (della Porta et al. 2017), referendums 'from below' can work as a watershed, transforming existing actors and visions. In Catalonia— and in Scotland— the revival (and new forms) of minority nationalist mobilisations emerged, to some extent, to resist the financial crisis and its social consequences (ibid.).

Some experts have interpreted the processes of reterritorialisation of politics and upsurges of secessionist movements, including the *procés* for independence in Catalonia, as a means to promote a left-wing agenda with a great revolutionary-emancipatory potential led by the working classes. If we look at the social basis of supporters and promoters of Catalan independence, however, different classes seem to be mobilised by different visions of independentism. If this is true, critics of the *procés* (especially on the left) should not downplay the importance of the support for independence among the lower classes, and its implications in terms of empowerment and politicisation of their constituencies. The mobilisations for independence has a diverse base of support, with different visions of the nation intersecting different class configurations. Moreover, accounting for the independentist boost in Catalonia, one cannot ignore the broad cross-class alliances built among different sectors of the population, including the lower classes and deprived sectors of the population, mobilised in part thanks to left-wing pro-redistributive frames promoted and develop during the *procés* for independence. The massive mobilizations against austerity have made social claims salient also within the Catalanist arenas, where the bridging of claims of independence and social justice, not new, was however strengthened. The refusal by the Spanish government to allow for a referendum has then contributed to the convergence of a broad social and ideological spectrum in opposing what was perceived as deeply injust. Importantly, the events of the last ten years have produced a transformation in Catalan nationalism, with a shift in the identities and the attitudes towards the territorial status that no degree of repression by Spanish nationalists seems likely to reverse.

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

FIGURE 1: Preferred status for Catalonia in relation to Spain. Data source: Baròmetre d'Opinió Política (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, Generalitat de Catalunya). Own elaboration. Source: della Porta et al. (2019).



FIGURE 2: Support for the independence 'procés' *and referendum by job status (upper left, N= 1,202; Cramér's V= 0.1635***[13] and upper right, N= 1,250; Cramér's V= 0.1248***), by level of income (centre left, N= 748; Cramér's V= 0.2113*** and centre right, N=771; Cramér's V=*

[13] Cramér's V is a measure of co-variation between two nominal variables (0=no association, 1=full association). The asterisks indicate the probability that the results in the sampled population reflect those in the real population.

*0.1201**), and by education (lower left, N= 1,202; Cramér's V= 0.1685*** and lower right, N= 1,249; Cramér's V= 0.1161***). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).*



*FIGURE 3: Party voted in 2015 by job status (in percentage; N= 1,111; Cramér's V= 0.1511***), income (N= 707; Cramér's V= 0.1531**), and educational level (N= 1,110; Cramér's V= 0.1692***). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).*



FIGURE 4: Multiple Correspondence Analysis coordination plots. Class variables (income, education and job status) for supporters of the independence 'procés' and the referendum for self-determination (left and right, respectively). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Support procés	1204	.60	.49	0	1
Support referendum	1252	.82	.39	0	1
Party					
I_Ciudadanos	1113	.15	.36	0	1
I_PSC/PSOE	1113	.11	.31	0	1
I_Partido Popular	1113	.04	.21	0	1
I_CUP	1113	.09	.29	0	1
I_CSQP	1113	.07	.25	0	1
I_Unió	1113	.01	.12	0	1
Job status					
I_Student	1302	.05	.23	0	1
I_Retired/pensioner	1302	.18	.38	0	1
I_Unemployed	1302	.27	.44	0	1
Income	805	1.92	.63	1	3
Education	1301	2.22	.78	1	3
Language					
I_Only/more Spanish	1303	.18	.38	0	1
I_Equal	1303	.33	.47	0	1
Identity					
I_Only Spanish	1290	.06	.23	0	1
I_More Spanish	1290	.05	.21	0	1
I_Equal	1290	.34	.47	0	1
I_More Catalan	1290	.29	.45	0	1
Ideology					
I_Centre	1142	.25	.43	0	1
I_Right-wing	1142	.28	.38	0	1
Province					
I_Girona	1304	.21	.41	0	1
I_Lleida	1304	.21	.41	0	1
I_Tarragona	1304	.21	.41	0	1

TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics of the independence-related and class variables, as well as controls. Baseline categories of multinomial variables: 'Junts pel Sí' (party), 'worker' (job status), 'only/more Catalan' (language), 'only Catalan' (identity), 'left-wing' (ideology), 'Barcelona' (province). Source: Estudio Postelectoral Elecciones Autonómicas en Cataluña 2015 (Rivera et al. 2017).

Appendix

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3											
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Job status (ref.: unemployed)																
I_Worker	.73***	.14	.58**	.17	-.22	.21	-.44	.24	-1.89***	.38	1.29**	.39	-.09	.29	-1.09	.59
I_Student	.50	.28	1.17**	.45	.32	.40	.10	.46	-14.63*	1.05	2.19***	.50	-.19	.65	-.24	1.09
I_Retired/pensioner	.12	.18	.02	.21	.32	.26	.20	.29	-.74	.40	1.30**	.45	.14	.37	-.35	.70
Constant	-.01	.11	1.18***	.13	-1.22***	.17	-1.45***	.19	-1.57***	.20	-2.92***	.36	-2.01***	.24	-3.06***	.39
Pseudo R2	.02		.02		.02											
N	1202		1250		1111											

TABLE A1: Bivariate regressions. Model 1: logit regression (DV: support procés). Model 2: logit regression (DV: support referendum). Model 3: multinomial logit regression (DV: party voted; reference category: 'JxSi'; other categories are as follows: 'Ciudadanos', 'PSC/PSOE', 'Partido Popular', 'CUP', 'CSQP', 'Unió'). IV: job status (ref. category: 'unemployed'). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3											
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Income (ref.: lower)																
I_Medium	.92***	.18	.67**	.20	-.54*	.26	-.94**	.28	-1.08**	.38	.41	.39	-.33	.36	-.01	.81
I_High	1.18***	.25	.56*	.28	-.69	.35	-1.29**	.44	-2.71*	1.05	.37	.47	-.00	.43	-.69	1.24
Constant	-.45**	.15	.92***	.16	-.66**	.22	-.76**	.22	-1.42***	.29	-1.93***	.36	-1.56***	.31	-3.43***	.72
Pseudo R2	.03		.01		.02											
N	748		771		707											

TABLE A2: Bivariate regressions. Model 1: logit regression (DV: support procés). Model 2: logit regression (DV: support referendum). Model 3: multinomial logit regression (DV: party voted; reference category: 'JxSi'; other categories are as follows: 'Ciudadanos', 'PSC/PSOE', 'Partido Popular', 'CUP', 'CSQP', 'Unió'). IV: level of income (ref. category: 'low income'). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3											
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Education (ref.: primary)																
I_Secondary	.54**	.16	.50**	.19	-.19	.23	-.60*	.26	-1.19**	.36	1.34**	.49	.37	.36	.34	.85
I_University	.89***	.15	.74***	.18	-.56*	.23	-.97***	.25	-1.58***	.36	1.55**	.48	.04	.36	.54	.79
Constant	-.18	.12	1.03***	.14	-.94***	.18	-1.02***	.19	-1.50***	.23	-3.07***	.46	-2.20***	.30	-3.99***	.71
Pseudo R2	.02		.01		.02											
N	1202		1249		1110											

TABLE A3: Bivariate regressions. Model 1: logit regression (DV: support procés). Model 2: logit regression (DV: support referendum). Model 3: multinomial logit regression (DV: party voted; reference category: 'JxSi'; other categories are as follows: 'Ciudadanos', 'PSC/PSOE', 'Partido Popular', 'CUP', 'CSQP', 'Unió'). IV: maximum level of education attained (ref. category: 'primary education'). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3											
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Job status (ref.: unemployed)																
I_Worker	.20	.24	.08	.22	.31	.34	-.11	.34	-1.49**	.54	1.25**	.42	-.06	.36	-.73	.64
I_Student	.06	.47	.88	.49	.63	.63	.20	.66	-17.77	2576.23	2.05***	.54	-.43	.77	-.12	1.16
I_Retired/pensioner	.15	.31	.05	.27	.46	.44	.11	.43	-.72	.67	1.36**	.48	-.11	.47	-.50	.87
Language(ref.: only/more Catalan)																
I_Only/more Spanish	-1.90***	.36	-.56	.29	2.97***	.53	2.66***	.54	3.95***	.88	1.54*	.62	2.36***	.57	1.70	.98
I_Equal	-.63**	.23	.23	.25	1.01**	.34	.99**	.34	1.64*	.67	.50	.27	1.09**	.37	.27	.64
Identity (ref.: only Catalan)																
I_Only Spanish	-6.39***	.95	-2.56***	.46	20.08	1266.56	20.37	1447.84	3.27*	1.42	-16.89	5711.99	3.91**	1.23	.32	19086.04
I_More Spanish	-7.31***	1.26	-2.27***	.48	36.87	3926.45	37.54	3988.62	20.10	3716.56	-.23	8300.28	20.94	3716.56	16.67	26409.03
I_Equal	-5.60***	.73	-1.62***	.32	19.31	1266.56	19.66	1447.84	3.46**	1.11	.12	.38	4.07***	.76	19.86	3817.07
I_More Catalan	-3.22***	.73	-.39	.34	16.62	1266.56	17.27	1447.84	-.73	1.51	-.29	.27	2.23**	.77	18.20	3817.07
Ideology (ref.: left-wing)																
I_Centre	-.80**	.24	-.28	.22	.79*	.34	-.54	.33	.65	.96	-1.26**	.39	-1.31**	.40	.31	.70
I_Right-wing	-1.04***	.27	-.88***	.23	1.80***	.40	-1.68**	.61	4.23***	.85	-2.82**	1.02	-19.16	3462.16	1.35	.69
Province (ref.: Barcelona)																
I_Girona	-.16	.29	.32	.26	-.04	.41	.19	.40	.31	.65	-.40	.32	-1.37**	.47	.67	.71
I_Lleida	-.27	.29	.53	.27	-.08	.40	.35	.38	-.46	.67	-.32	.33	-1.51**	.50	-.61	.91
I_Tarragona	-.26	.29	.33	.26	.11	.40	-.10	.43	-.54	.69	-.22	.35	-.93*	.45	-.33	.89
Constant	5.61***	.77	2.76***	.36	-21.05	1266.56	-20.33	1447.84	-7.32***	1.43	-2.43***	.46	-4.11***	.80	-22.14	3817.07
Pseudo R2	.54		.20		.37											
N	1050		1088		981											

TABLE A4: Multivariate regressions. Model 1: logit regression (DV: support procés). Model 2: logit regression (DV: support referendum). Model 3: multinomial logit regression (DV: party voted; reference category: 'JxSi'; other categories are as follows: 'Ciudadanos', 'PSC/PSOE', 'Partido Popular', 'CUP', 'CSQP', 'Unió'). IV: job status (ref. category: 'unemployed'). Controls: prevalent language spoken (3 categories; reference category: 'only Catalan'/ 'more Catalan than Spanish'), national identity (5 categories; reference category: 'only Catalan'), ideological self-placement (0-10 scale recoded into 3 categories; reference category: 'left-wing'), province (4 categories; reference category: 'Barcelona'). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3											
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Income (ref.: low)																
I_Medium	.46	.31	.10	.28	-.07	.44	-.32	.44	-.62	.61	.16	.47	-.52	.46	-.18	.91
I_High	.07	.42	-.34	.37	.67	.61	.39	.63	-1.48	1.21	.25	.55	.88	.60	-.24	1.36
Language(ref.: only/more Catalan)																
I_Only/more Spanish	-2.08***	.42	-.76*	.37	3.25***	.63	2.78***	.63	3.21**	1.04	1.22	.71	2.30**	.68	2.40*	1.14
I_Equal	-1.01**	.29	-.26	.31	1.55**	.47	1.19**	.45	1.72*	.83	.63	.32	1.57**	.46	-.16	.91
Identity (ref.: only Catalan)																
I_Only Spanish	-5.52***	.98	-2.09***	.58	19.58	1493.42	19.86	1719.67	3.04*	1.54	-16.58	7195.45	3.97*	1.63	-1.39	27683.16
I_More Spanish	-6.52***	1.27	-2.42***	.59	36.78	4316.11	37.07	4399.51	19.56	4049.5	-.18	8699.63	21.72	4049.5	16.08	20667.72
I_Equal	-5.06***	.74	-1.59***	.41	19.09	1493.42	19.74	1719.67	2.62*	1.17	.10	.45	4.68***	1.07	18.77	3765.29
I_More Catalan	-2.86***	.75	-.28	.46	16.28	1493.42	17.15	1719.67	-.18	1.54	-.28	.34	3.00**	1.07	18.22	3765.29
Ideology (ref.: left-wing)																
I_Centre	-.52	.30	-.31	.29	.63	.43	-.04	.41	-15.59	2013.02	-1.77**	.54	-1.25**	.41	.12	.98
I_Right-wing	-.78*	.34	-1.28***	.29	1.12*	.49	-1.31*	.65	3.35***	.85	-2.45*	1.03	-18.97	3221.00	1.46	.84
Province (ref.: Barcelona)																
I_Girona	-.43	.38	-.04	.35	.06	.57	.67	.54	-.59	.96	-.20	.38	-.97	.62	1.60	.94
I_Lleida	-.49	.41	.35	.41	.07	.60	1.06*	.52	-.35	.97	-.30	.43	-1.04	.63	-16.74	4781.52
I_Tarragona	-.41	.34	-.10	.32	.47	.47	.14	.52	-.50	.82	-.16	.41	-1.17	.61	.50	1.05
Constant	5.15***	.82	3.32***	.49	-20.89	1493.42	-20.72	1719.67	-6.15***	1.53	-1.37**	.52	-4.88***	1.16	-22.25	3765.29
Pseudo R2	.51		.21		.37											
N	637		653		605											

TABLE A5: Multivariate regressions. Model 1: logit regression (DV: support procés). Model 2: logit regression (DV: support referendum). Model 3: multinomial logit regression (DV: party voted; reference category: 'JxSi'; other categories are as follows: 'Ciudadanos', 'PSC/PSOE', 'Partido Popular', 'CUP', 'CSQP', 'Unió'). IV: level of income (ref. category: 'low income'). Controls: prevalent language spoken (3 categories; reference category: 'only Catalan'/ 'more Catalan than Spanish'), national identity (5 categories; reference category: 'only Catalan'), ideological self-placement (0-10 scale recoded into 3 categories; reference category: 'left-wing'), province (4 categories; reference category: 'Barcelona'). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3											
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Education (ref.: primary)																
I_Secondary	-.39	.29	.16	.24	.86*	.40	-.16	.39	.06	.55	1.19*	.56	.34	.46	.89	.89
I_University	-.32	.28	.07	.24	.68	.39	-.37	.38	-.28	.55	1.32*	.54	.03	.45	.82	.86
Language(ref.: only/more Catalan)																
I_Only/more Spanish	-1.94***	.36	-.55	.29	3.04***	.53	2.57***	.54	3.71***	.83	1.68**	.61	2.32***	.58	1.78	.98
I_Equal	-.62**	.23	.21	.25	1.03**	.34	.98**	.34	1.59*	.63	.58*	.27	1.09**	.37	.30	.64
Identity (ref.: only Catalan)																
I_Only Spanish	-6.51***	.95	-2.56***	.46	19.84	1117.32	20.06	1262.11	4.10**	1.39	-16.58	5610.97	3.87**	1.23	.54	16927.18
I_More Spanish	-7.36***	1.26	-2.27***	.48	36.29	3383.62	36.97	3434.15	20.43	3.82	-.45	7424.55	20.59	3193.82	16.54	23749.01
I_Equal	-5.64***	.73	-1.62***	.32	19.05	1117.32	19.37	1262.11	3.66**	1.10	.10	.37	4.05***	.76	19.63	3339.06
I_More Catalan	-3.23***	.73	-.40	.34	16.29	1117.32	17.01	1262.11	-.19	1.48	-.35	.26	2.23**	.76	17.98	3339.06
Ideology (ref.: left-wing)																
I_Centre	-.84***	.24	-.30	.22	.87*	.35	-.59	.34	.68	.96	-1.18**	.40	-1.25**	.41	.46	.71
I_Right-wing	-1.11***	.27	-.87***	.23	1.89***	.40	-1.71**	.61	4.17***	.82	-2.65**	1.02	-18.97	3221.00	1.53*	.70
Province (ref.: Barcelona)																
I_Girona	-.19	.29	.30	.26	.03	.40	.13	.40	.33	.62	-.30	.31	-1.29**	.47	.67	.71
I_Lleida	-.27	.29	.48	.27	-.17	.40	.34	.38	-.20	.64	-.26	.33	-1.50**	.50	-.53	.91
I_Tarragona	-.28	.29	.30	.26	.08	.40	-.12	.43	-.52	.66	-.14	.34	-.90*	.45	-.25	.89
Constant	6.08***	.79	2.79***	.38	-21.16	1117.32	-19.81	1262.11	-8.20***	1.47	-2.52***	.59	-4.33***	.86	-23.13	3339.06
Pseudo R2	.54		.19		.36											
N	1050		1087		980											

TABLE A6: Multivariate regressions. Model 1: logit regression (DV: support procés). Model 2: logit regression (DV: support referendum). Model 3: multinomial logit regression (DV: party voted; reference category: 'JxSi'; other categories are as follows: 'Ciudadanos', 'PSC/PSOE', 'Partido Popular', 'CUP', 'CSQP', 'Unió'). IV: maximum level of education attained (ref. category: 'primary education'). Controls: prevalent language spoken (3 categories; reference category: 'only Catalan'/ 'more Catalan than Spanish'), national identity (5 categories; reference category: 'only Catalan'), ideological self-placement (0-10 scale recoded into 3 categories; reference category: 'left-wing'), province (4 categories; reference category: 'Barcelona'). Source: Rivera et al.'s survey (2017).

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