This study investigates whether and to what extent political factors drive disagreement within the allegedly consensual monetary committee of the European Central Bank. Absent voting data, the article assesses disagreement based on the semantic distance between the policy positions publicly articulated by the European Central Bank President and the central banks of Eurozone member states. The empirical analysis shows that the disagreement articulated by national central bankers is affected by the ideological inclinations of the governments of the countries they represent. Our findings thus suggest that central bankers’ position-taking is shaped not only by economic conditions but also by domestic political considerations. This result challenges the European Central Bank’s projected image of itself as an institution whose members are impermeable to domestic political pressures as a way to defend the independence of the institution to which they belong.

Does politics drive conflict in central banks’ committees? Lifting the veil on the European Central Bank consensus

Moschella, Manuela
;
2020

Abstract

This study investigates whether and to what extent political factors drive disagreement within the allegedly consensual monetary committee of the European Central Bank. Absent voting data, the article assesses disagreement based on the semantic distance between the policy positions publicly articulated by the European Central Bank President and the central banks of Eurozone member states. The empirical analysis shows that the disagreement articulated by national central bankers is affected by the ideological inclinations of the governments of the countries they represent. Our findings thus suggest that central bankers’ position-taking is shaped not only by economic conditions but also by domestic political considerations. This result challenges the European Central Bank’s projected image of itself as an institution whose members are impermeable to domestic political pressures as a way to defend the independence of the institution to which they belong.
2020
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
Central banking; committee decision-making; conflict; European Central Bank; text analysis
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Descrizione: Accesso Aperto MIUR - Nome del programma: SIR bando 2014 - Acronimo del progetto: UNCENTRAL - Numero di contratto: RBSI14KCWY - Data di pubblicazione del fascicolo: giugno 2020 (pubblicazione online del paper: 02.12.2019) - Scheda di progetto con tutti i soggetti che hanno concorso alla realizzazione del paper: Manuela Moschella, Nicola Martocchia Diodati
Tipologia: Accepted version (post-print)
Licenza: Creative Commons
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11384/83090
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