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“The Oriental Reception of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* I: Textual Witnesses and Lexical Choices”

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1 – Rhetorical lexicon in the Oriental Aristotelian tradition

1.1 – Introduction: Object and Goals of this Contribution

The object of my PhD thesis is the Arabic reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and I try to approach it by observing the lexical choices operated by the authors that participated in this tradition. Throughout the ages, this treatise was never read in isolation: in the Latin Middle Ages, where it was not directly available, it was known through the references present in Cicero's *De Inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, and by this mean it found its place, together with grammar and dialectic, in the *trivium*, the first grade of intellectual formation of scholars. In Late Antiquity, when the text of the *Rhetoric* was still accessible, it was usually interpreted either in relationship with Aristotle's ethical writing, or as a part of his *Organon*. Some centuries after the composition of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, it was the Alexandrian philosophical school, which has established Aristotle's exemplar role for later thinkers, that also established rhetoric and poetry as permanent parts of Peripatetic logic, so that they were transferred to Islamic philosophy attached to this context.

In my contribution, on one side I deal with the Arabic reception of the *Rhetoric* and with the vocabulary choices operated in this field (part 1). On the other side, I study the Latin posterity of this Arabic reception, focusing mainly on the translation technique that characterizes the Arabic-Latin text of the *Rhetoric* penned by Hermannus Alemannus (part 2).

Like many classical literary and philosophical works in the Islamic and in the Christian world, the *Organon* had a wide-ranging and pervasive impact on later cultural activity. The very fact of being part of the school corpus that shaped generations of Greek, Arabic, and, at a later stage, Latin intellectuals produced a remarkable fidelity to the study and actualization of Aristotle's writings throughout the centuries and a recurrent need to establish one's own position both in relation to scholastic tradition and in relation to the author that originated it.

The successive lexical choices operated by the philosophers that placed themselves in Aristotle's wake offer a crystallized image of these positions. If technical lexicon is a field in which Aristotelian authors, interested in continuity with their scholarly tradition, doubtlessly had every reason to be conservative, the structure of the *Organon* and the history of the Greek-Arabic translation process produced a wide range of possible lexical variations. The structural argument rests on the fact that each discipline discussed in Aristotle's *Organon* is directly analyzed in a dedicated treatise but also frequently placed in relationship with cognate disciplines in the remaining *Organon* sections, and that each section was translated separately, while the historical argument consists in the observation that the translation movement made Aristotelian rhetoric accessible for Arabic readers in multiple versions, produced in different occasions and conditions.

By closely observing the lexical shape taken by a few technical concepts selected from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* I in the surviving Arabic translations of the *Organon* and in the philosophical reflection of Islamic philosophers like Fārābī, Avicenna, and, whenever possible, Averroes, I try to untangle which terminological evolutions were dictated by an aspiration towards continuity with Aristotelian Scholasticism, which by the desire to produce a lexical system more coherent than that occasioned by the translation process, and which by the material limitations imposed by the material conditions of the witnesses of the relevant texts.

The concepts on which I chose to reflect were *syllogism*, *demonstration*, *enthymeme*, *induction*, *example*, *sign*, *probable*, and *generally recognized*, (named συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις, ἐνθύμημα, ἐπαγωγή, παράδειγμα, τεκμήριον and σημείον, εἰκός, and ἔνδοξον by Aristotle), beginning with the terms that, like syllogism and demonstration, are common to rhetoric and deductive reasoning, then move to enthymeme, their properly rhetorical counterpart, to terms belonging to inductive reasoning, like induction and example, to the terms for enthymematic premises, i.e. the necessary or non-necessary sign, the probable, and the generally recognized.

The last group of expressions is very characteristic of rhetoric, but does not pertain exclusively to this art.

Clearly, these expressions and their Arabic equivalents do not appear with equal frequency in the rhetorical texts that compose my corpus, and expressions that appear less frequently in the context of this art are less exposed to interesting innovations, unless some unforeseeable accident in the Greek-Arabic translation process dictated otherwise. Indeed, this was the case with the exceptional equivalence established in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* between Aristotle's word for example (παράδειγμα) and what was to become the Arabic Peripatetic standard term for demonstration, or *burhān*. Therefore, the first five sections of chapter 1.4, discussing syllogism, demonstration, enthymeme, induction, and example, are rather short and descriptive, and their main contribution to my investigation on the reception of rhetorical vocabulary consists in portraying the effects of lexical standardization on subjects that, however philosophical momentous, were not at the center of the reflection that was developed in the rhetorical texts I examined. On the contrary, sections 1.4.6-1.4.9 are much longer and investigative, because the sign, the probable, and the generally recognized were at the center of many genuinely rhetorical debates, like the quest for the *proprium* of rhetoric, which in turn had repercussions on the many occasions in which syllogistic premises were classified in non-rhetorical sections of logic. Because of this, such terms occur very frequently, and each thinker's strategy on whether to name them according to scholastic tradition, adherence with the text of the Arabic translations, or internal coherence is often called into question and modified.

Doubtlessly, it would have been possible to focus on other terms that are just as relevant for the global architecture of rhetorical lexicon, like *ethos*, *pathos*, and *objection* (ἦθος, πάθος, and ἔνστασις), but I preferred to focus on concepts that are mainly developed in the first book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The reasons beyond this selection are that the concentration of my Aristotelian source texts made it easier to point out similarities, differences and interactions in how different thinkers developed them, and that it is in its first book that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* has

the more points of intersections with other logical disciplines, allowing me to reflect on how rhetorical lexicon was received in the *Organon* tradition as a whole. Since this perspective turned out to be very instructive on how different strands of Peripatetic lexicon were known and integrated, I do not regret my choice, although it did deprive my work from the possibility of exploring other philosophically relevant rhetorical terms.

Following the same line of thought beyond the Islamic Peripatetic school and expanding my analysis to the Latin reception of the Oriental tradition of the *Rhetoric* would not be possible, because, shortly after Hermannus Alemannus' Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle's text, William of Moerbeke's Greek-Latin translation began to circulate widely as well, making it very hard to discuss the lexical choices of those Latin philosophers who developed an interest in rhetoric by comparing them to their sources.

Therefore, in order to include in my reflection at least Hermannus' version itself, that is not plagued by this flaw, in my thesis I investigate both this translator's practice and his statements concerning his own work in order to discuss his method when dealing with Aristotle's text and with the two Avicennian excerpts that he deemed fit to quote. Finally, my thesis includes an analysis of the possible relationships between Hermannus' source text and the known witnesses of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Hiṭā'ah* on the basis of a few available critical passages.

1.2 – Methodology

1.2.1 – A Corpus for the Investigation of Rhetorical Lexicon in the Islamic Peripatetic School

In the following pages, I will dress a list of the texts I employed for my analysis on the vocabulary of Islamic Peripatetic rhetoric. Of course, this list is far from being exhaustive of all the texts that are historically relevant, even if we limit our reflection to those that are available in a modern edition: the only authors taken into account are Fārābī, Avicenna, and, in a less systematic way, Averroes and Ibn Riḍwān. An important Avicennian text like *Iḥṣān al-ʿUlūm* was left out of

this investigation, because its specificities and peculiarities face to face with other Avicennian works, which can often be labelled as *summae* as far as their literary genre is concerned, made lexical comparisons hazardous.¹ Future research will surely supply occasions for studying this and others key texts in the development of Peripatetic thought from the same point of view that I tried to develop in this contribution, and which already allows us to take into account a large variety of sources, ranging from Aristotle's *Organon*, to its Arabic translations, to their Islamic philosophical reception.

Let us now move to the brief presentation of the relevant witnesses. **Ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346** manuscript is the only codex in our possession containing a continuous Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. On the first pages, some marginal notes copied from the antigraph inform us that the editor of the text, the philosopher Ibn al-Samḥ, assembled it by comparing two Arabic copies and a Syriac one. Another note at the end of the document seems to imply that this translation was already being read by 731. It is difficult to choose whether to accept such an early date, but even if we elect not to, our translation must be very ancient. A 13th century Arabic-Latin version of the same text is our second relevant witness. The Greek-Arabic translation has been edited twice, first by 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī² and finally by Malcolm C. Lyons.³

Ms. *Parisinus Arabus 2346* does not only preserve the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* but also the rest of the *Organon*: actually, the pages containing *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* were only sewn to the codex as an afterthought, and, up to that moment, ms. *Parisinus Arabus 2346* only contained a translation of Porphiry's *Isagoge* and of Aristotle's *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and three versions of his *Sophistical Refutations*.

¹ A very useful reflection of some elements of Avicenna's rhetorical lexicon in this text can be found in M. Aouad, *Les prémisses rhétoriques* (Ps Büttgen, S. Diebler, M. Rashad (ed.), *Théories de la phrase et de la proposition de Platon à Averroès*, Rue d'Ulm 1999).

² Aristotle, *Rhetorica in versione arabica vetusta*, A. Badawī (ed.), Cairo, 1951.

³ Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, M.C. Lyons (ed.), Cambridge, 1982.

Like the translation of the *Rhetoric*, the Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics* deserves special attention, since the recapitulation of rhetorical means of persuasion offered in II.27 seems to have played an important role in the understanding of many concepts that were key to this art. The only medieval translation of this work that is available to the contemporary reader is that attested by ms. *Parisinus Arabus 2346*, together with ms. *T o p k a p i S a 8362*, although, as it is the case for the *Rhetoric*, we know of the existence of at least one lost Arabic version from bibliographical sources. According to Francis E. Peters and to Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist*,⁴ the author of the Arabic edition of the *Prior Analytics* that is available to us was named Theodorus (/

), Arabicized as Taḍāri in the Paris manuscript. The latter also makes reference to a *naql q a d ānd* to one by Ibn al-Biṭriq, who died around 835. Moreover, the *Fihrist* again testifies that Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn and Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh produced further translations. Finally, a rich Syriac translation and commentary tradition is attested both by Ibn al-Nadīm and by the marginalia of the Paris manuscripts.⁵

All the *Organon* sections but *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* have been published by F. Ğabr and by A. Badawī,⁶ while the *Poetics* is available thanks to D.S. Margoliouth's and J. Tkatsch's editions.⁷

As far as Avicenna's texts are concerned, my main focus will be on the rhetorical section of the *Book the Cure*, that is to say *K i t āb al-ḥiḍā b al-ḥiḍā*. This section is further divided into four treatises, the first two devoted to the content of Aristotle's first Book, and the following two to Aristotle's Second and Third Books. On some occasions, especially in the later sections, Avicenna follows the order of Aristotle's subject matter, but he rewords each passage rather freely. In other contexts,

⁴ See Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249,6, G. Flügel (ed.)

⁵ My main window on the Syriac tradition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and on its lexical developments has been J.W. Watt (ed.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac. Barhebraeus, Butyrum Sapientiae, Book of Rhetoric*, Leiden, 2005.

⁶ F. Ğabr, *Al-naṣ ḡ-l-k ā m-īndntīq Aristū* Beirut, Dār al-fikr al-lubnānī, 1999 and A. Badawī, *Mantiq Aristū* Beirut 1980.

⁷ D. S. Margoliouth, *al-K a l ā m-š i ā l-l ū ḡ ā l-awwālyn Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristotelem*, Nutt, London 1887, pp. 1-76, and J. Tkatsch, *Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles und die Grundlage der Kritik des griechischen Textes*, voll. I-II, Wien und Leipzig, 1928-1932

mainly located in the first two books, the order in which different subjects are discussed varies widely between Aristotle's and Avicenna's texts. *K i t āḥḩā b* has been edited by M.S. Sālim,⁸ whom I usually follow.

Only one more Avicennian *summa* containing a section explicitly devoted to rhetoric has reached us, namely *al-ḩikma al-'A rḩīyya*.⁹ In this very early work, which covers all the main areas of Aristotelian theoretical philosophy, the subject of rhetoric is dealt with in two chapters. However, since the logical concepts that we are going to discuss in this chapter are briefly discussed in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* as well, all Avicenna's *summae* that contain a section devoted to *Q i ymā* must be taken into account. Therefore, besides the logical section of *K i t āḩī f ā l*, I will often quote Avicenna's '*U y ū ḩikma*,¹⁰ *K i t āḩī d ā ḩiyat*,¹¹ *Naḩā*,¹² for which I have employed A. Badawī's, M. 'Abduh's, and M.T. Dāniš-Pažūh's editions.

For the sake of comparison, I will also make reference to Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric* and to his *Middle Commentary on the Qiyā*.¹³ The first text has been edited by M. Aouad,¹⁴ and it follows the whole of Aristotle's treatise, both by analysing it and by rewording it in a more or less literal way. This treatise, completed by 1175, was preceded by a short commentary on the same subject, composed during Averroes' youth.¹⁵

Finally, in order to understand Avicenna's relationship to the lexicon displayed by the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, we have to consider the rhetorical production of his

⁸ Avicenne (Ibn Sīnā), *Al-š i ḩa ḩogique, VIII, Rhétorique (Al-ḩaḩā b*, M.S. Sālim (ed.), Cairo, 1954.

⁹ Avicenne (Ibn Sīnā), *K i t āḩī ḩ anlū ' -ḩikma al-' A rḩīyya*, M. Šāliḩ (ed.), Beirut, 2007.

¹⁰ Avicenna, '*U y ū ḩikma*, A. Badawī (ed.), Beirut, 1980.

¹¹ Avicenne, *K i t āḩī d ā ḩiyat*, M. 'Abduh (ed.), Le Caire, 1974.

¹² Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), *Al-Naḩā t -aḩḩ ar qḩr af-ḩā l ḩī*, M.T. Dāniš-Pažūh (ed.), Tehran, 1985.

¹³ Ibn Rušd, *Talḩiḩ K i t āḩī yimā*, Talḩiḩ mantiq Aristū, Ć. Ćihāmī (ed.), Beirut 1992.

¹⁴ Averroès (Ibn Rušd), *Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique*, M. Aouad (eds), B o l l . , Paris, 2002.

¹⁵ Averroes, *Short Commentary on the Rhetoric*, ed. Ch. E. Butterworth, in *A v e r r o e s ' S h o r t C o m m e n t a r i " T o p i c s , " " R h e t o r i c " State University of New York Press, Albany 1978 , "*

identifying the occurrences of the Greek terms by means of Lyons' Greek-Arabic glossary for the *Rhetoric* and of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* for other parts of the *Organon*.²⁵ at least at a general level, in most cases, these Greek terms are used in the technical sense that is proper to logic, but I tried to point out the cases in which it is not so. Whenever available, the information gathered by J. Lameer on the logical vocabulary of the Arabic *Organon* was also very useful.²⁶ Subsequently, I tried to retrace the equivalents of the Greek expressions in each of their occurrences having as my reference Ğabr's and Lyon's editions of the *Organon* Arabic versions, as witnessed mainly by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346.²⁷ The occurrences of Greek words and of their Arabic translations in the *Rhetoric* are readily available thanks to the glossary in Lyons' edition. For all other texts, different equivalents of the selected Aristotelian terms, be them from one or more versions of the same work by the Stagirite, are listed in my contribution with their occurrences. For the term ἀπόδειξις I have not been able to produce a full census, but I hope to be able to do so in the future.

What I tried to track in Fārābī's, Avicenna's and Averroes' texts is the use of these Arabic terms, whenever connected with a meaning that is close enough to Aristotle's understanding of συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις, ἐνθύμημα, ἐπαγωγή, παράδειγμα, τεκμήριον and σημείον, εἰκός, and ἔνδοξον to grant plausibility to a form of conceptual continuity between Aristotle and Islamic Philosophers' production. Such continuity does indeed take place even if Fārābī's, Avicenna's, and Averroes's texts are not translations but commentaries and reworkings of the Aristotelian corpus, so that word-by-word correspondence should not be taken for granted.

²⁵ It is possible, though not likely, that, in the future, the consultation of works like A. Wartelle, *Lexique de la 'Rhetorique' d'Aristote*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1982, or H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, Berlin, 1870 (reprinted by Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960) will yield further occurrences of ἔνδοξον that had not been listed in Lyons' glossary, which does not aim at exhaustiveness. Still, the relevance of this term in the context of Aristotelian *Rhetoric* makes it improbable that Lyons would have left out any of the passages in which it does appear, especially if, in that case, our term was employed in its technical sense.

²⁶ See J. Lameer, *Al-F ā r ā b ī a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n S y l l o g i s m o s*, Leiden/New York/Köln, Brill 1994.

²⁷ See F. Ğabr, *Al-naṣ ḡl-k ā m-īndīq Aristū* yoll I-II, Beirut 1999, and M.C. Lyons, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica: The Arabic Version*, voll. I-II, Pembroke Arabic Texts 1982.

For the sake of clarity, I usually talk about the relevant terms in Greek (e.g. ἔνδοξον) or in Arabic (e.g. *maḥm ū d* , *ḥmaqš bhūūl*) whenever I am discussing the verbal data pertaining Aristotle's, Fārābī's, Avicenna's, Averroes' and the translators' texts. Whenever I try to trace the philosophical concept behind these terms in each author, I use English translations that aim to cover both Greek and Arabic expressions (e.g. *generally accepted*, English translation of ἔνδοξον and of most of its Arabic equivalents).

Ideally, in order to discuss the lexical expression of the *generally accepted* in any given author, we should perform a global conceptual review of his production, and observe in each case the terms employed to name and describe it. However, the bulk of the available material would force us to investigate, at best, one single text at a time, depriving us of the means to investigate wider trends and to abstract from the specific properties that characterize the production of each philosophical work. Therefore, I will proceed by inventorying the Arabic terms employed by Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes that coincide with the terms employed in the Arabic versions of the *Organon* in order to translate Aristotle's own technical expressions. The weakness of this approach resides in the fact that nothing compelled Islamic Philosophers to name and discuss specific Aristotelian contents exactly in the same terms chosen by Aristotle, and nothing forced Aristotle to be strictly consistent in his choice of words. Therefore, I tried to look at my data with the consciousness that their completeness is not granted. However, trust in their representativeness is justified by Peripatetic thinkers' global understanding of the conceptual coherence that characterizes the Aristotelian philosophical system and by the persuasion that, even if they often did mean to achieve a free reshaping of this system that would be in adequacy with the cultural context of their own philosophical activity, they chose to do so by the active appropriation of the fundamental elements of Alexandrian Peripatetic thought.

Although the permanence between the Aristotelian and the Peripatetic links among terms and concepts is only fully granted for Arabic translations, and not for Islamic commentaries, I do believe in the possibility of a fruitful interaction between my target on one side, i.e. the study of

the lexical form of rhetorical concepts in Aristotle and in Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes, and my means on the other one, i.e. the observation of Greek and Arabic terms employed by these authors. My optimism rests upon the technical quality of the expressions I analyze, for, in authors as committed to participating innovatively in Peripatetic philosophical tradition and to acclimating it to the Islamic cultural context as Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes, it is reasonable to assume an aspiration towards coherence with literary forms and technical language of the preceding Aristotelian scholastic tradition. On this reflection I ground my belief, if not in total identity, at least in global conceptual and terminological continuity between Aristotle and Islamic Peripatetic thinkers as far as the characterizing elements of each philosophical discipline are concerned.

In order to locate the occurrences of the aforementioned terms in the Arabic philosophers' production, I did not dispose of an instrument as inclusive and effective as the *TLG* for Aristotle's writings. Therefore, although sometimes a thorough examination of all materials was beyond my reach, I availed myself of a variety of means in order to make as extensive as possible the list of passages in which these words appear. In more detail, I managed to check the text of Fārābī's *K i t āb al-Hiṭā b* and of the rhetorical parts from Ibn Riḍwān's *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences* in their integrity, while other works were investigated on the basis of indexes, whenever their editors had produced them. This tool was mainly available for Hermannus' *Didascalia*, Latin translation of Fārābī's *Š ū ḥ al-Hiṭā b* and, at a lesser level of development and detail, for Fārābī's *R i s ā l a f ī m ā y a n b a ğ ī -falsafa, y u q a M a q ā l a fī ī n ā q ṣ ā w t al-im ū l n h k t ā l n i ī m, i -ā d ā l b , -Q a i k y ā s ā , b Q i k y ā s ā g b ā r l a , l K i t ā b l u r d ā l ā ḥ al-Q i y ā s* had recourse to the indexes of each publication for Averroes' texts as well. I enriched the findings deriving from these sources with the systematic use of Alon

and Abed's *Al-Fārābī's Philosophy* which provides Fārābī's own definitions of technical philosophical terms.²⁸

In Avicenna's case, I could avail myself of the corpus provided by the software *Writings of Avicenna*,²⁹ which allowed me to run a full search in the relevant texts for the Arabic equivalents of Aristotle's terms that had emerged from the comparison between the Greek text and its Arabic versions.

On the basis of the collected data, I tried to draw some conclusions on the evolving interaction between later authors' theoretical positions and their relationship to different authorities in shaping their lexical choices. My understanding of the main tenets of Fārābī's and Averroes' rhetorical thought was shaped by Aouad's seminal analysis on the foundations of rhetoric according to Fārābī³⁰ and on his edition of Averroes' *Middle Commentary on Rhetoric*. My ground reference for Avicennian philosophy was D. Gutas' diachronic reconstruction of Avicenna's philosophical journey in his work on the evolving relationship between this thinker and the Aristotelian tradition.³¹

Any attempt to trace an evolution in an ancient author, be it lexical or otherwise, presupposes at least a provisional reconstruction of the chronology underlying the production of this writer. My Farabian chronology is derived from the aforementioned paper, and is therefore based upon the four main phases recognized by Aouad in the changing ways in which our philosopher characterizes rhetorical methods of persuasion: from a distinction based on truth value, to one based on their material composition – although at this stage no kind of premise was identified as exclusively rhetorical – to the identification of rhetorical premises with accepted

²⁸ A. Ilai and Sh. Abed, *Al-Fārābī's Philosophy*, vol. II, Cambridge University Press 2002.

²⁹ *Writings of Avicenna*, by the Computer Research Center for Islamic Science, Teheran 2014.

³⁰ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconstruite*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 133-180.

³¹ D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014 (2nd ed.)

propositions and the opinions shared by the listeners, to the rearrangement of the rhetoric around the notion of immediate and shared point of view.³² This differentiation produces a relative chronology to which I adhere throughout my exposition. If discussing the evolution of rhetorical lexicon on the basis of a chronology derived from the development of Fārābī's rhetorical thought could be tainted with the suspicion of circular argumentation, the similar chronological results reached by Heinrichs on a different basis should suffice to reassure us.³³

Concerning Avicenna, my understanding of the chronology of his texts has again been shaped by Gutas' reconstruction, which articulates the philosopher's evolution on the basis of his relationship with Peripatetic tradition, highlighting an early period (until 1013, in which *al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyyā* was redacted), a transition period (1013-1014, marked by the composition of *The Provenance and Destination* and *The State of the Human Soul*), a middle period (1023-1027, in which *Ki t āHbi d ā ly a*, *-Š i k f i t ā t n t r o d u c t i o n l* by Ğuzġānī, and *K i t ā N a ğ ā* were penned), the period of eastern philosophy (1027-1030, in which Avicenna composed *The Easterns* and the prologue to *K i t ā š l i*), and a later period (1030-1037, characterized by the writing of *al-I š ā r ā t wa-l-t a n*).³⁴

If these chronological frames offer us a bedrock for an historical reflection on the Islamic philosophers' lexical choices, this reflection will in turn allow us to further enrich and nuance the understanding of the general trends that shaped the evolution of Fārābī's and Avicenna's thought, especially insofar as this evolution was dictated by the relationship they voluntarily established with tradition.

This line of research will shed light both on authorial choices on Fārābī's and Avicenna's part that were based on an actual textual relationship with Aristotelian writings – in the forms

³² See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 174-175.

³³ Heinrichs builds a relative chronology of Fārābī's logical writings based upon the presence or absence of the two concepts *muḥā k ā t i m i t a t i o n*, and *taḥy ī* (of production of imagination) in W. Heinrichs, *Die antike Verknüpfung von Phantasia und Dichtung bei den Arabern*, in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 128 (1978), pp. 252-298.

³⁴ D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 145.

through which they were available to Islamic Medieval readers – and on the fact that the similarity in terminology between any Arabic Peripatetic text and a given Aristotelian Greek-Arabic translation should sometimes be understood as the effect of their belonging to a shared lexical and scholarly tradition in the wider sense, and not exclusively as a clue towards a direct textual relationship between the two works.

1.3 – Lexical Difficulties Posed by the Arabic Translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Ibn al-Nadīm’s *Fihrist* testifies that, throughout the centuries, many more translations of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* were available that are now lost.³⁵ However, not even the main text of *Parisinus Arabus 2346*, the only one to survive antiquity, shows lexical uniformity. Probably the most salient feature of the rhetorical lexicon in this Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* is that the translator does not recognize some key Greek words as proper technical terms. Therefore, he does not provide them with a uniform translation, as we see in the case of Greek σημεῖον variously translated as *r ā ṣ rāsm*, and *d a l, ānd*, vice versa, in the case of *d a l* translating at the same time σημεῖον, παράδειγμα, and τεκμήριον. Later on, these terms will normally be translated as *d a-l ā l āiṭā d*, and *d a l*. The same happens with terms like ἀπόδειξις and παράδειγμα, both translated, among other solutions, as *burhā n*. Moreover, some of the translator’s lexical choices, being at odds with the Peripatetic usage that became common later on, had far-reaching consequences for Arabic philosophers’ selection of words. This is the case, for example, of the Greek παράδειγμα translated with *b u r*, a philosophical term that normally means *demonstration*, and of the Greek ἐνθύμημα translated with *t a f* instead of the standard *da m.ī r*

³⁵ See Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 250,1-3, ed. G. Flügel.

³⁶ The deficiencies of the Arabic translation in terms of lexical choices should not however be overstated, for similar problems occurred in other Aristotelian texts as well: see for example the non-standard translation of σημεῖον with *rasm* in *Poetics* chapp. 3 and 26 1462b4 1448a35 by the much later Abū Bišr Mattā, and Taḍārī’s version of *Prior Analytics* II.23 68b9-14, where the expression οἱ ῥητορικοὶ (συλλογισμοί) is translated as *al-m a qīṣālyḥutabiyya wa-l-fiqhiyya wa-m a ṣ w a, rhétorycal, judicial and deliberative syllogisms* (see *K i t ā b al-āid qāwānīn* II 23 pp. 399). I do not wish to draw attention to the fact that in this case rhetoric has been replaced by its three genders - in all likelihood by means

Renate Würsch adds to her very useful translation of the first book from Avicenna's *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b* an in-depth discussion of various lexical problems. This discussion analyses the Arabic translator's usage of *d a l ā l ā* as well, focusing on their relationship with Aristotle's τεκμήριον and σημείον. In more detail, Würsch puts forward the following table to represent Greek terminology and its translation:³⁷

<i>Renate Würsch</i>	<i>Aristoteles</i>	<i>Arabische Übersetzung</i>
Notwendige Zeichen	τ ε κ μ ή ρ	dalīl
Zeichen schlechthin	σ η μ ε ῖ ο	
(Nicht-notwendige) Zeichen/Indiz		σ η μ ε ῖ ο

According to Würsch, Aristotle distinguishes between *sign itself* and *non-necessary sign* on one side, and *necessary sign* on the other side, calling the first σημείον and the second τεκμήριον,³⁸ while the Arabic translation would conflate *sign itself* and *necessary sign* (under the term *dalī*), therefore making the term *‘a l ā* specific to the *non-necessary sign*. This reconstruction, however, seems entirely based on passages like the translation of *Rhet. I.2, 1357b1-5*, in which only the word *d a l ā* is used to cover both σημείον and τεκμήριον, and it does not take into account the fact that

of a gloss absorbed by the main text – but rather to the terms employed to transpose the adjectives *epidictic*, *judicial* and *deliberative*. In the Peripatetic context, later on, *epidictic* would have been translated as *taṭbī t* (for which a reference to *m u n ā*, *foalār fīght*) rather than with *ḥutabiyy*, and *judicial* with a reference to *tašā ḡ* rather than with *f i .* As explained by M. Aouad, the translator oriented his choices towards the Islamic environment rather than towards the Aristotelian content of his text, a fact that had meaningful consequences for the reception of *Prior Analytics II.23*. See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ’ A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é s p a r F ā* *immédiat et commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 172.

37. See also R. Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik. Ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*, Berlin, K. Schwarz 1991, p. 52-57, and J. J. Lameer, *Al-F ā r ā b ī a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n Theory and Islamic Practice*, Leiden / New York / Köln, Brill 1994, pp. 234-239 for a detailed reconstruction and analysis of the translation of this passage from the *Prior Analytics*.

38 See *Rhet. I.2, 1357b1-5*: τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν.

the Arabic translation offers the two options *d a l* (*Rhet.* I.2, 1357b4, 6, 8, 16, 22 and I.3, 1359a7) and *‘alāma* (*Rhet.* II.25, 1402b.14, 19; 1403a10, 14 and II.2, 1417b37) for τεκμήριον as well. Moreover, σημείον, besides being translated by *d a l/ā l* (*Rhet.* I.2, 1357a32; 1357b1, 7; I.9, 1367a31, 33; II.2, 1379b16) and *‘alāma* (*Rhet.* I.9, 1366b27, 28, 29; 1367b27; and II.2, 1379a33) — as we would expect according to Würsch’s descriptions — is also translated by the word *rasm* (*Rhet.* I.15, 1357b 10, 12, 13, 16, 21; I.3, 1358b29 and 1359a8), which in Avicenna’s time meant *descriptive definition*. Not to mention that the Arabic *da l āl* also appears as a possible equivalent for παράδειγμα (*Rhet.* I.15, 1377a6 and I.9, 1368a29). Therefore, the situation described by Würsch does not globally fit the data that we can gather from Lyons’ edition of the Arabic translation. The following example may suffice to illustrate how Würsch’s table is far from representing a global picture of the translation of σημείον and τεκμήριον within the Arabic *Rhetoric*:

Rhet. II.25, 1402b13-23: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν, εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημείον, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ... τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου [ἢ] τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἔάν τε ὄν ἔάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων ...

Since enthymemes can be formulated on four bases, and these four bases are the following: probability, example, necessary sign, and sign: the enthymemes that are based upon things which commonly occur or seem to occur derive from necessary and always existing derive from necessary signs, those that are based on what is general and particular derive from signs ...

In this passage, the Arabic translator always substitutes the word *‘alāma* for τεκμήριον (and the word *rasm* for σημείον), with the result that when the enthymemes that derive from necessary signs are discussed, the reader is confronted with the phrase *wa-min-h ā m ā ḥ a k ū n id ī r ā r i ḥ y i a y t a i*, *ἔκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων* between them there are those which are based on necessity, and they are those that are based on the *‘alā m ā* On the subject of σημείον and τεκμήριον, the lexical

relationship between Aristotle's Greek text and its Arabic version is better described as chaotic than as misleading, for apparently the translator did not understand these words as technical terms, and did not put much effort into finding a systematic translation for them.

On the other hand, a more uniform approach appears in Taḍārī's Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, in which σημεῖον is translated as 'a l ā, while τεκμήριον is transliterated as t a q m a. According to Würsch, it is this translation (or a similar one) that allows Avicenna to reach a tidier solution in his *Kitāb al-Qiyāṣ*.³⁹ It suggests that it could as well have played a role in helping Arabic readers to make sense of the rhetorical lexicon. The only proper counterargument is the fact that the chapters of the *Prior Analytics* that deal with rhetorical subjects are rather few, so that the impression of lexical uniformity they give may well depend on a lack of room for variety.

Moreover, we should not forget that a certain degree of lexical diversity existed even concerning the translations of σημεῖον and τεκμήριον in the *Prior Analytics* context, although not in the body of Taḍārī's translation. In II.27 70b1-6, while Aristotle presents two options for the precise use of the terms σημεῖον and τεκμήριον, the main text of ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 univocally states that we should call 'a l ā what derives from the extremes, and t a q m a what derives from the middle term.³⁹ This falls easily in line with what I stated about Taḍārī's translation in the previous paragraph, but a marginal note reports that he found, stated in Yaḥyā's Syriac writing, that what derives from the extremes should be called t a q m a and what derives from the middle term should be called 'a l ā, to the contrary of Taḍārī's translation. Now, the signs deriving from the middle term are those that can be demonstrative.

It is therefore clear that, if a rather uniform terminology was finally established later on, this was because medieval authors could reach consensus with each other, and not because any clear path had been traced by the corpus of Greek-Arabic Aristotelian translations.

³⁹ See *Kitāb al-Qiyāṣ* I, p. 410,4-8 ed. Ğabr.

Finally, I think that Würsch's description better reflects what we find in Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb*, since there we see at the same time:

(1) σημεῖον in the sense of non-necessary sign « translated » as *‘a l ā m a*

Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba I.6, 44,6: *A n d a s f a r a s t h e c l u e / ‘ a l ā m a*
that the predicate belongs to it by necessity while it does not belong by necessity to the subject, or
that it belongs by necessity to the subject while the predicate does not belong to it by necessity.

along the same lines as

Aristotle, Rhetoric I 2, 1357b1-7: τ ὠ δ ὁ ἡ μ ε τί φ ω ἔ ν ο ν ὅ τ ἔ ω χ σ ῶ φ τ ὠ π α ἴ ῥ θ κ α σ τ ὁ ν
τ π ρ ὀ ἄ θ ὁ . . . ἄ τ ο ο ὡ δ ὁ ψ ῖ ἑ ἄ ν ν α γ κ α ε ἰ κ μ ῖ τ ρ ῶ δ ῖ μ ο ἰ ῶ ν ν α γ κ ἄ ν ἰ ὡ σ ο ν κ ἔ μ ὁ ἄ ν
κ α π ἄ ἡ ὄ ν ι α φ . ἄ ρ ἄ ψ μ ἄ ἄ ἰ ἄ λ ἑ γ ἔ ἄ ῥ ν γ ἰ ν σ τ ἄ ἰ λ ο γ δ ἰ ἰ σ ὄ ρ α τ ἰ ὅ ε σ κ . μ ἴ ρ ὁ ἰ ο ν
τ ο ἰ ο τ ὠ ἄ π ο σ η μ ε ε ἰ ἰ σ ω τ ν ἰ ν

Among signs, one is in the same relationship as the individual things towards general things
... Of these, the necessary one is the necessary sign/τ ε κ μ ῖ ἡ while the non-necessary one does not
have a name as far as the difference is concerned. I call necessary those from which syllogisms
derive: this is why this among signs is called necessary sign/τ ε κ μ ῖ ρ ἰ ο ν

(2) τεκμήριον in the sense of necessary sign « translated » as *d a l ī l*

Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba I.6, 44,8: *And indeed, if the predicate belonged by necessity to it and it*
belonged by necessity to the subject, it would be

Therefore, it would take the shape of the first figure, which could be read together with the same passage as above, that is to say:

effective type of *ʿalā*. Secondly, I am unsatisfied because, with the exception of *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* a 1.6, 43,12, whenever the term *dalī* appears alone, it is not clear whether it is a rhetorical term, or if it is rather to be understood, in a less technical sense, as the mere *trace* of something else. In any case, if we are to assume that the equivalent of the σημεῖον ἀνώνυμον in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* is *dalī*, this could be due to a tradition line similar to that which is attested by the marginal notes to the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346. The relevant note concerns the translation of *Prior Analytics*, II.27, 70b1-6:

Kitāb al-Anālūṭiqā al-ūlā II.27, p. 410, 4-7, ed. Ğabr: And what of these ʿalā mā t i s r called ʿalā iā that which derives from the extreme (terms). And as far as that which derives from the middle term is concerned the first figure is the most laudable and the most trustworthy of the

The author of the note to this passage found, in a Syriac writing by Yaḥyā, a statement attesting that what of these *ʿalā* is rightfully called *ʿalāma* is that which derives from the middle term. And as far as that which derives from the extreme terms is concerned, it is called *taqmaryūn*. Which is, as noted by the scribe, the opposite of what appears in the main text. In the context of the *Prior Analytics*, the word for sign in general (σημεῖον) is clearly *ʿalāma*,⁴³ so that the note by Yaḥyā could be read as stating that sign in general (*ʿalā*) and necessary sign (here – and only here – *ʿalā*) should have the same name, in opposition with non-necessary sign (here – and only here – *taqmad*). Arabic terms are different, but in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* like we have the same word for sign in general and necessary sign (*dalā*) and a different expression for non-necessary sign (*ʿalā*). *ma*

1.4 – How Each Concept is Lexicalized by Each Author

⁴² The relevant Arabic text is:

⁴³ See *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb al-ūlā*, p. 408,8-409,1 ed. Ğabr:

In the following table, you will find a prospect of the terms chosen in order express the concepts *demonstration, syllogism, enthymeme, induction, example, sign, probable* and *generally recognized* by the Greek-Arabic translators, Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes. The table does not aim for exhaustiveness, but rather for helpfulness in guiding the reader through the next chapter, allowing him to preserve a global perspective when so many questions of detail are broached. Let us begin by discussing how each Aristotelian concept is lexicalized by each author; the conclusions that will follow will also focus on what we can learn by observing each author's lexical choices as a whole, i.e. by reading the table column by column.

Table of the technical terms employed by the Greek-Arabic translators, Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes. The occurrences cited merely serve an illustrative purpose and should not be assumed to be exhaustive.

		Aristotle	Arabic translation	Ar. transl. An. Pr.	Ar. transl. An. Pr. mg.	Farabi	Avicenna	Averroes
1	syllogism	συλλογισμός	salğasa	qiyās (e.g. 405.3)		qiyās (e.g. 69.9)	qiyās	qiyās
2	deduction, demonstration	ἀπόδειξις	burhān	burhān (e.g. 180.1)		burhān (e.g. 55.9-17)	burhān	burhān (2.21.6, 2.24.1-6-11, 2.25.8, 3.1.13, 3.2.2, 3.17.14)
			taṭbīt					
			taṭabbut					
			tabayyun	istihṛāğ				
				silūğismūs (e.g. 180.3)				
3	enthymeme	ἐνθύμημα	tafkīr	antūmīmā		(qiyās fiqhiyy) in Farabi's <i>K i t</i> <i>al-Q i y ā s</i> <i>ḍa m ī r ĩ n</i> <i>Riḍwān</i> <i>ḍa m /muḍmar</i>	ḍamīr	ḍamīr
				(qiyās ḥaṭabiyy, fiqhiyy, mašwariyy) 399.5-6 ⁴⁴			tafkīr (antūmīmā) <i>K i t ā b</i> <i>Q i y ā s</i> 74.8	

⁴⁴ The translated term in Aristotle (*Prior Analytics* II.23, 68b11) is ῥητορικὸς συλλογισμὸς rather than ἐνθύμημα.

		Aristotle	Arabic translation	Ar. transl. An. Pr.	Ar. transl. An. Pr. mg.	Farabi	Avicenna	Averroes		
				(iḍmār) ⁴⁵		in <i>K i t ā b</i> (ḍamīr ḥiṭabiyy wa- <i>Ḥiṭā b</i> (10,10-18 ed. Langhade) <i>anṭū m ī im ā</i> <i>Š ḍ al-Q i y ā s</i>	(ḍamīr ḥiṭabiyy wa- fiḥiyy ...) <i>K i t ā b i y a</i> 555.5			
4	induction	ἐπαγωγή	i‘tibār	istiqrā’ (e.g. 402.7, 403.1)	Īfāgūgā (e.g. 403.2)	istiqrā’ (e.g. 69.9)	istiqrā’	istiqrā’		
			(ifāgūgā)					i‘tibār (e.g. 1.2.25-26)		
5	example/analogy	παράδειγμα	burhān	miṭāl (401.1, 402.14)		tamṭil	tamṭil/ <i>esemplificazione</i> miṭāl/ <i>esempio</i>	miṭāl		
			dalāla					i‘tibār (e.g. 37,9)	burhān (3.14.3, 3.17.2-4-8, 3.16.21)	
			taṭbīt aw waṣf					burhān (e.g. 36,1 and 191,18)		
			na‘t at-taṭbīt aw al- waṣf						Imān (399,12)	
6	sign	σημείον	rāsīm	‘alāma		dalīla	‘alāma (e.g. 111,4)	‘alāma (e.g. 1.2.33-34)		
			rasm					‘alāma	rasm, rāsīm (e.g. 192,2,18)	
			dalāla						dalīl	
			dalīl					taqmaryūn	dalīl	dalīl (e.g. 1.2.28-29-33)
			‘alāma							
	evidence	τεκμήριον	dalāla	taqmaryūn	‘alāma	dalīl (see 111,3)	dalīl	dalīl (e.g.		

⁴⁵ The term *iḍmār* does not appear in the translation of the *Prior Analytics* but rather in the beginning of *Posterior Analytics* I.1, 71b10 (see *K i t ā b al-āḥād qūāṭā na il lyl*, p. 26,2 ed. Ğabr).

		Aristotle	Arabic translation	Ar. transl. An. Pr.	Ar. transl. An. Pr. mg.	Farabi	Avicenna	Averroes	
7			ʿalāma				taḡmūrīdun (<i>Kitā b - a</i> <i>Q i y57ϯ,3</i>)	1.2.33)	
8	probable	εἰκός (57a32.34.36, b21, 59a8, 67b31, 71a13, 76a18.20.21.22, 92b25, 93a6.7, 00a7.8.12, 02a9.11.12.13.14.17.19, 02a20.22.23.27, b14.16.21.24.26.27.29, 02b30.32.34, 03a1.7)	ṣīdīq (17.24)	ayqūs (408.1-3)	ra'y	ayqūs in <i>Š dī al-Q i y(pp. 550-551)</i>	ṣādiq	maḥmūdāt (See 1.2.8/57a32-36 and 2.25.8/ 02b14-16) maḥmūd	
			ṣādiq (12.26, 13.2.4.5)				ra'y (in <i>K i t ā N l a ḡ ā l t</i>		
			muṣaddaq (157.16)				e.g. 108,11)		
			waḡaba (166.3.5.11, 169.8)	muqaddama maḥmūda (70a9/408.7)		mu'aṭarāt aw maḥmūdāt (e.g. 109,11)			
			wāḡib (157.21, 166.2.5.13.20)	maḥmūdāt, maḥmūd (probabilis in <i>Didascalia</i> , 156.10)		wāḡib (191,17-12,3)			
ḥaqq (47.11)	maḥmūd (in <i>Philosophy for 'A r dūā</i> and <i>Kitā b - a Š i) f ā ' ḥ</i>								
9	generally admitted	ἐνδοξος (55a17, 56b34, 57a10.13, 68a21.24, 02a33)	maḥmūd (<i>Rhet.</i> 55a17, 56b34, 57a10.13, 68a21.24)	maḥmūd (e.g. 62a13, 70a4/408.2, 70a8/408.4, 70b5/410.6.)					
			zanūn (<i>Rhet.</i> 02a33)	ra'y maḥmūd ⁴⁶ (24b2/182.9, 62a18/367.12)					
			ra'y				mašhūr, maẓnūn, maqbūl	mašhūr , maẓnūn, maqbūl	mašhūr, maẓnūn, maqbūl

⁴⁶ This expression translates the Greek τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου (*Prior Analytics* 24b2-3).

1.4.1 – Syllogism (συλλογισμός)

In the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, besides *salğasa*, only other transliterations of the Greek words are employed, namely *silğimūs*, *silū ġnia*, *sulū ġ i sandūnsu s a*. As reported by Lameer, the term *qiyās* (and its plural forms *qiyā s ānd m a q ā*, that finally became the standard option, is common in Taḍārī's *Prior Analytics* as attested by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, with sporadic occurrences of *sulū ġ i s silū ġ i sandū ġā m i*⁴⁷ Conversely, ms. Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 mainly transliterates the Greek συλλογισμός, occasionally adding the term *qiyās* to the transliteration.⁴⁸ Moreover, the Istanbul copy of Taḍārī's version translates συλλογισμός with the Arabic *miqyās* at least once, in *Prior Analytics* I.23 40b20.⁴⁹

Lameer lists the terms that mean syllogism in Fārābī's logical texts as well. Head of the list is, foreseeably, the word *q i ywāt* the plural forms *q i y ānd ān t a q ā* while other options surface sporadically: *s ū l ū ġ i n* *Man q ā l a f š ū n ā q ā* *āwtā-l-miū h i l-tā n*⁵⁰ possibly *m i q j n ā* *al-Q i y ā* *ānd*, startlingly, *d a l n k l i t ā Q b i y ā* the incipit of this text, Fārābī

⁴⁷ See J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogism* (Leiden / New York / Köln, Brill 1994, pp. 42-43. Lameer refers the reader to examples in *Prior Analytics* I.1, 24a12/180.3 for *sulūğismūs* (with *al-qiyās* and *al-ğāmi'a* above the line in ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, and the gloss *ay al-qiyās* in the main text of ms. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362) and 24a26/182.4 for *siluğismūs* (spelt *silūğismūs* in ms. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 and with *qiyās* above the line in ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346).

⁴⁸ This statement by Lameer should not be understood too strictly, for the very opposite situation does sometimes take place. See for example the Arabic title of *Prior Analytics* I.23, where we twice find *al-silū ġ i ā* in ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, while in ms. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 Ğabr testifies the reading *al-m a q i ā* On the other hand, the Arabic translation of Aristotle's text employs *al-m a q i ā* See Kit ā b A n n ā l l q ū ā l l i ā

⁴⁹ Interestingly, Lameer points out that in the same passage I.23 40b20/261.4 ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 glosses its translation *q i ywāt* the rarer *m i q y ā s* suggesting that ms. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 could have been perused by Ibn Suwār while preparing the *Organon* edition attested by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346. See J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogism* (Leiden / New York / Köln, Brill 1994, pp. 42-43. *e o r y a n d*

⁵⁰ See J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogism* (Leiden / New York / Köln, Brill 1994, p. 42.

⁵¹ The uncertainty concerning *m i q y ā s* derives from the fact that, although this is the reading printed by Daniš-pažuh, it is not attested by one witness of the text, ms. Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Mağlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, Ṭabāṭabā'ī 949, which reads the plural form *m a q ā* On the subject, see J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogism* (Leiden / New York / Köln, Brill 1994, p. 42 n. 1, and Fārābī, *Š d h al-Q i y ā* *Al-manṭi q i y-l-f ā tr, ā l b ū* vol. II p. 357,13, ed. M.T. Daniš-pažuh.

states the intention of listing the forms of speech that are used to confirm or discard what is unknown in speculative arts, and of explaining how they can be coordinated. Then he writes that these forms of speech are *q i y*, *āris* *syllagisms*, but that they are also called *d a l ā* *signs* by some people.⁵² According to Lameer, the people who would call *d a l wāhāt* normally goes under the name of *q i y āre* *māuslim* theologians. More accurately, they would only call so a subgroup of them, i.e. those falling under the category of *i s t i-lā āhli d b ā* *conclusion on the basis of the evidence for what is not perceptible*, a way of proving God's existence by observing the sublunary world.⁵³ Fārābī formulates the plan of analysing *q i y ān* *ā t i-lā āhli d b ā* *jointly both in the incipit of Kitāb al-Qiyās* and *Kitāb al-Ḥikm*.⁵⁴

1.4.2 – Deduction/Demonstration (ἀπόδειξις)

Many different terms are used in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* to cover the Greek ἀπόδειξις (*b u r*, *ḥaḥb nī* *tatābbut*, *tabayyun*), but none of them is extraneous to later Peripatetic tradition. The main obstacle for the global understanding of Aristotle's text consisted in the fact the word *b u r* *was* employed by the translator to express the meaning of the unrelated παράδειγμα as well. Avicenna uses the verb *istahr a* (*to deduct*) as well (e.g. in 32,16 and 33,4), together with the forms *tatb ī* *tatābbut*, and *tabayyun* but, up to now, I have not found the infinitive form *istihr ā ḡ*

Concerning Averroes, according to Aouad's index, the passages in which this author employs *b u r* *in* the *deduction/demonstration* sense are the following: 2.21.6; 2.24.1; 2.24.6; 2.24.11; 2.25.8; 3.1.13; 3.2.2 and 3.17.14. In 3.2.2, Averroes intends *b u r* *as* a discipline, and there is no correspondence for this occurrence of the word in the Greek text. For 3.17.14, Aouad suggests in his glossary that this occurrence of *b u r* *concerns* *l a d e m o n s t r a t i o n e c o n f o n d a*. This is in keeping with the lexical usage of section 3.17 as a whole.

⁵² See Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Qiyās*, p. 1,1-3, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* *ʿFi ān* *ḥaḥb* *II*.

⁵³ See J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogism* (Leiden/New York/Köln, Brill, 1994), pp. 204-205.

⁵⁴ See J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogism* (Leiden/New York/Köln, Brill, 1994), p. 43, and Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Qiyās al-Ṣāḡ*, p. 68,13, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* *ʿinda l-Fārābī*, vol. II.

relevant to point out in this context that, according to Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist*,⁵⁹ Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh also produced an Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, although no surviving copy of this work is known to date.

Fārābī

As far as the enthymeme is concerned, we are able to assess that, in his *Long Commentary* to the *Rhetoric*, Fārābī employed the word *ḍam ī* that later became standard, for it is used by Ibn Riḍwān in many passages of his *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences* which are exactly mirrored by Hermannus' *Didascalía*, a translation of Fārābī's *Long Commentary*.⁶⁰ Moreover, at pp. 154-155 of his article *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote* M. Aouad explains how in his *Kitāb al-Hikma* Fārābī defines the *ḍam ī* on the basis of the immediately shared point of view, which the *ḍam ī* entails because of the suppression of one of its premises. This is a separate process from the abridgement of dialectical or demonstrative syllogisms, which is not the cause of their acceptance. Finally, when interpreting *Prior Analytics* II.27 in his *Šarḥ al-Qiyāsa*,⁶² Fārābī uses the transliteration *anṭū m ī* he found in Taḍārī's translation.

Avicenna

The authority of the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was not strong enough to convince Avicenna of the opportunity of including a translation of ἐνθύμημα, in *Uyūn al-Hikma* and in *al-Hikma al-ʿArḍiyya*, two youthful *summae* that contain a section explicitly devoted to the art of

enough to confirm that the original text did include *idm ā* rather than *anṭū m ī*, as printed by Badawī. Badawī's reconstruction might be based on Aristotle's Greek text rather than on the Arabic witnesses.

⁵⁸ See *Kitāb al-Hikma*, 17 ed. Ḡabr, translating *Topics VIII.14* 164a6.

⁵⁹ See Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 250,1-3, G. Flügel (ed.)

⁶⁰ For a partial edition of Ibn Riḍwān's text and for its meaning for the reconstruction of Fārābī's work, see M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalía d'Alpharabi*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 133-180. M. Aouad also discusses the bibliographical and manuscript evidence for believing that a *Long Commentary* to the *Rhetoric* by Fārābī actually existed, and is represented by Ibn Riḍwān's quotes and by Hermannus' translation in the *Didascalía*.

⁶¹ M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2 (1992), pp. 154-155.

⁶² See Fārābī, *Šarḥ al-Qiyāsa*, p. 551, ed. M.T. Daniš-pažuh.

rhetoric.⁶³ On the other hand, both works use the term *ḍamīr*, absent from the Arabic *Rhetoric* but close to the solution found in Abū Biṣr Mattā's translation of the *Posterior Analytics* and in Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh's translation of *Topics VIII*.⁶⁴

Let us begin our discussion by considering the following passage, in which the premises of enthymeme are examined:

Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdhiyyā*, p. 91,14-15 (ed. Ṣāliḥ): *And it has already been said that the enthymeme (ḍamīr) is primarily divided in two parts: the one that derives from the probable things, and the second from signs, then the signs [are of] two sorts: the necessary signs and the one that derives from the most likely thing.*⁶⁵

Conceptually, this runs parallel to the following passage from *K i t āḤḥā b*, where we read about *t a f k ā r ā ḍa m ā ḥ i d r t ḥ e r i v*

***K i t āḤḥā b*, p. 43,10-13:** *And not all the t a f k ā r ā ḍa m ā ḥ i d r t ḥ e r i v premises that are probable (as their opposite), but sometimes they derive from necessary premises and sometimes from premises that are true in most cases.*

*And the enthymemes that belong to both groups are sometimes built upon true premises/ṣā d i -qḥāttis to say, the premises that are truly commonly praised – and sometimes they are built upon signs.*⁶⁶

If in *K i t āḤḥā b* this kind of context normally triggers the use of *t a f k ā r ā ḍa m ā ḥ i d r t ḥ e r i v* (as we will see), this is not the case in other Avicennian works and in other sections of *K i t āḤḥā b*. Since *K i t āḤḥā b*

⁶³ The one mention of *ḍamīr* that we encounter in *ʿU y ū Ḥikma* is not located in the chapter devoted to the direct discussion of rhetorical syllogisms, that reflects the position of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the *Alexandrian Organon*, but in the review of modes of argument that mirrors the equivalent list placed at the end of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. In the latter passage, coherently with our expectations, the *ḍamīr* is introduced as a syllogism in which only the minor premise is stated. See Avicenna, *ʿU y ū Ḥikma, al-Manti q i ḥ i ḥ*, 10, 4-13, and 11,1-2, ed. A. Badawī.

⁶⁴ On the Arabic translations of ἐνθύμημα in Aristotle's *Organon*, see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Enthymeme in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 34-35.

⁶⁵ This is the relevant Arabic text:

⁶⁶ This is the relevant Arabic text:

Š ā' fhad adherence to the Aristotelian thought between its stated goals, and probing for Aristotelian lexicon as a longstanding unstated interest, while in other writings Avicenna took a markedly different stance, the distinctive translation history of different parts of Aristotle's *Organon* had an impact on the rhetorical vocabulary of each of them.

Another *summa* dating back to Avicenna's youth which does allot a chapter and some less formal sections to the discussion of rhetoric does not mention the enthymeme concept at all, neither by the name of *ḍa m īn* or by that of *t a f*. This is the case of *K i t āHbi d ālyā*, which, discusses rhetorical subjects twice in I.4, the chapter devoted to the analysis of the matter covered in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, and in I.7, the chapter that reviews, in extremely synthetic terms, the matter covered in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The first rhetorical insert in *K i t āHbi d ālyā* covers the review of modes of argument found in *Prior Analytics*, but after discussing *i s t a p d ā ' tamtī* - which translate Aristotle's εἰσαγωγή and παράδειγμα - he curiously omits to mention the enthymeme, i.e. the deductive equivalent of *tamtī*.⁶⁷ It is hard to say whether this is due to an authoritative choice on Avicenna's part, or to some accident in the manuscript transmission of *K i t āHbi d ālyā*, which, up to 'Abduh's edition, is only known to us thanks to two manuscripts.⁶⁸ The second occasion in which *K i t āHbi d ālyā* discusses rhetorical subjects immediately follows the previous one, since in the same chapter Avicenna discusses the premises that do not derive from further syllogizing, including rhetorical premises (*m a q b ānḍ māzn ū ḥ, āccepted and presumed premises*).⁶⁹ However, in this text, unlike in *U y ū ḥikma* and in *K i t āNajā*, the link between each kind of premises and the art in which they are employed is not established immediately but in the subsequent discussion of individual arts, which occupies *K i t āHbi d ālyā*

⁶⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t āHbi d ālyā*, 114,4, ed. 'Abduh.

⁶⁸ The sources employed by 'Abduh are ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2475 and ms. Istanbul Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 4894. Although Mahdavi states that ms. Istanbul Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 4894 does not contain Avicenna's *K i t āHbi d ālyā* rather the text bearing the same title composed by Aṭīr-ad-Dīn al-Abharī, the fact that 'Abduh used and currently quoted from this manuscript in his edition must mean that it did contain Avicenna's text. See Avicenna, *K i t āHbi d ālyā*, , pp. 118q ed. 'Abduh and Y. Mahdavi, *Fehrest-e nošḥa ḥ-yā moša n n a f b i ā e t S i n ā (B i b l i o g r, Tehran, Bank Mellat / University of Tehran, 1954, p. 254).*

⁶⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t āHbi d ālyā*, 116-119, ed. 'Abduh.

1.5-9. Therefore, the fact that *ḍa m* is not mentioned in this section is not surprising. Finally, the *ḍa m* and its technical characterization do not surface in the brief chapter exclusively allotted to the art of rhetoric, which briefly covers its usefulness, the ends of its three genders, and its premises (*mazn ū naādtm a q b, ōrlpās* *med and accepted premises*, together with what is similar to *m a š* *ḥoī* *commonly known*, but does not identify with it when properly examined).⁷⁰ Knowing that Aristotle went to great lengths in order to stress the centrality of the enthymeme for the proper development of rhetoric,⁷¹ its complete disappearance from *K i t Ḥ b d ā* is remarkable, the avowed concision of the text notwithstanding. The question is not merely terminological, so as to be explained on the grounds of the literary and sometimes allusive style embraced by Avicenna in this text, which was composed while he was incarcerated in the castle of Fardaḡān in 1023 A.D.⁷² After all, if terms like *tamṭī* and *i s t* were not too technical for the style and tone of *K i t Ḥ b d ā* why would *t a f a k d ā r m* be condemned as overly specialized jargon in the same context?⁷³ Indeed, the enthymeme is not broached as a subject at all, not even under a metaphorical denomination. A possible reason for this omission could derive from a strong understanding of the term *ḡā w ā*, *ḥoī* *chosen* by Avicenna in his global introduction to *K i t ā b a l Ḥ i d ā* in order to express its literary genre. If this was not necessarily the case in Avicenna's time, in the early days of Arabic Peripatetic philosophy, the expression *ḡā w ā* had been used to denote introductions to Galenic thought and to logic that were remarkably brief. The condensed form of the exposition, coupled with the desire to offer for all syllogistic arts presentations that are uniform in structure, covering for each of them the questions usually broached by Alexandrian *prolegomena*, encouraged the desertion of the enthymeme. This rhetorical concept

⁷⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t Ḥ b d ā* 126, ed. 'Abduh.

⁷¹ See e.g. *Rhet.* I.1 1355a3-19.

⁷² See W.E. Gohlman, *T h e l i f e* SUNY Press 1974, pp. 58-60. *ā* ,

⁷³ For the use of *tamṭī* and *i s t* immediately before the passage where, on the basis of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, we would expect Avicenna to mention the enthymeme, see Avicenna, *K i t Ḥ b d ā* 111-114, ed. 'Abduh.

had been very prominent in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but it did not easily find its place in a harshly summarized version of Peripatetic *prolegomena*.

Although in the rest of his work Avicenna prefers the term *ḍa m ī* for the concept *enthymeme* and, in general, *t a firk* outside the standard Peripatetic vocabulary, in his *K i t ā b a l Š i f e* doesn't only employ both expressions, but, while explaining the difference between *ḍa m ī* and *t a firk* *K i r t ā b a l*, p. 36,2-4, he also presents both as equally valid technical terms, without referencing any of them to the Arabic translation, and, secondly, he employs *t a firk* in other, unrelated passages, like 43,10, 56,10, 167,7-8, 179,5-7, and 191,16.

Let us consider how Avicenna articulates the meanings of *ḍa m ā* and *t a firk*:

Avicenna, *K i t ā b a l*, p. 36,2-4 *Sālim*: *I n i t s o b j e c t , t h e t ḍa m ī r / e n t h y m e m e , b o t h v i e w i o f r o o t a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e m i d d l e t e r m , i t i s a p o i n t t a f k ī r a s f a r a s i n i t a m i d d l e t e r m t h a t p r e m i s e i s a b s e n t i t i s a ḍa m ī r / e n t h y m e m e ḍa m ā σ / t e m a t h y t n a f n k ī r a r a e n i n t h e o b j e c t .*⁷⁴

T a f a k d i ḍa m ā are the same kind of argument, but in the first case attention is focused on the type of middle term from which this argument arises, while in the second case on the fact that a premise is omitted.

Since *t a firk* is the equivalent for the Greek ἐνθύμημα employed in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Avicenna confers it the more strictly Aristotelian meaning of ἐνθύμημα, for in the Stagirite's work the ἐνθύμημα is always described in terms of its effectiveness and of the recognized character of its premises, without stating that they should be hidden. The latter is a Peripatetic interpretation, and Avicenna suitably reserves for the word *ḍa m ī* the proper *enthymeme* translation within the Arabic Peripatetic school – the meaning that was more relevant to this context.

⁷⁴ This is the relevant Arabic text:

Any time that in *K i t āḥibā bā* Avicenna employs the word *t a f a k* explicit reference to the kind of premises and middle terms from which enthymemes derive is involved, as in I.3, p. 21,3-8, I.6, p. 43,10-14, II.1, 56,6-10, and III.8, 191,17-192,5. Whenever enthymemes are exclusively presented under the angle of the omission of a premise, however, it is the term *ḍa m* that is preferred, as in I.6, p. 36,13-37,2.

Even if *K i t āḥibā* does not delve into the enthymeme as a subject, it does state that their major premise is hidden (IX.21 p. 555.7 and IX.24 p. 574.12-13). The word *t a f a k* never appears, but the translation of ἐνθύμημα that was used in the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* probably does, if the word *ī ū m ā* at *K i t āḥibā* IX.24, 574,2 is to be emended to *anṭū m ī*, as in the ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442.

While Avicenna's *K i t ā-Ṣ i f h ā d* been characterized by an especially intense engagement with Aristotle's thought and lexicon, the author's stance in *K i t āNba ḡ* is very different. Whereas Avicenna's descriptions of enthymeme in his *K i t āḥibā bā* often mention the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms can derive – and in that case the philosopher often indulges in the expression *t a f a k* rather than *ḍa m* to name enthymemes – *K i t āNba ḡ* offers a definition of rhetorical syllogism that does not even mention the kind of the premises on which it is built but only the fact that they are omitted:

Avicenna, *K i t āNba ḡ* p. 108,4-10 *Dāniš-Pažūh*: *Section on the ḍa m ī r ḍa m ṭī h r e i s syllogism of which the major premise is concealed, either for its visibility and its superfluity – like what brings the habit in a circle from the centre to the key circumference, and every couple of lines a premise has been dropped – or for the hiding of the mendacity of the major (premise), if the universal (premise) declares it – like the speech of the rhetor adversary, therefore he is treacherous, ”*

person that makes an address (makes be it) understood in what his speech is contradictory with it, and it would not be conceded.⁷⁵

Enthymematic premises can be omitted according to Aristotle as well, but for the Greek philosopher this is by no means part of the definition of enthymeme.⁷⁶

Premises for different kind of syllogisms are discussed later on in Avicenna's *K i t ā b a l N a ḡ*⁷⁷ but they are not explicitly attributed to individual logical arts. Since in this text the premises of enthymeme are never the direct object of the philosopher's enquiry, the fact that he always named the enthymeme *ḍamīr* is coherent with what we have stated about *ḍa m ā n d t a f k ī r* in Avicenna's *K i t ā b f ā l'*.

Averroes

Unsurprisingly, Averroes' lexical choices in his *Talḥiṣ k i t ā b i y a n f* conform strictly to the contemporary standard, and no mention is made of *antū m ī*, the transliteration of ἐνθύμημα, enthymeme, found in Taḍāri's translation of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* II.27.⁷⁸ The term used in order to name enthymemes is invariably *ḍa m ī*. However, an interesting move on Averroes' part was that of substituting the statement that the *ʿa l m ā* sign, cannot be identified with the *a y q ū s* transliteration of εἰκόζ, with the statement that it cannot be identified with the *ḍa m ī r*, enthymeme.⁷⁹ Since the immediate follow-up in Taḍāri's *Prior Analytics* II.27 made it clear that *a y q ū s* is synonym of *muqaddama maḥm ū d a*, commonly and the next lines in Averroes' *i s e* specified that in his text the *ḍa m ī* derived from *muqaddamā maḥm ū d* I think that this shift implied Averroes' conviction that, like *ḍa m ī* does, the term *ʿa l ā m ā t* (and *d s a i l*, necessarily

⁷⁵ The relevant Arabic text is:

⁷⁶ See, for example, *Rhet. I.1* 1355a6-8, or *Rhet. I.2* 1356b3-17.

⁷⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b f ā l*, pp. 112-122, ed. M.T. Daniš-pažuh.

⁷⁸ See Averroes, *Talḥiṣ k i t ā b i y a n f*, pp. 275-276, ed. Butterworth, 1983.

⁷⁹ See *K i t ā b f ā l q ū ā l i y a n f*, p. 408,1, ed. Ğabr, and Averroes, *Talḥiṣ k i t ā b i y a n f*, pp. 275-276, ed. Butterworth.

signs) should only – or preferentially – refer to a kind of syllogism, rather than to a kind of premise, like εἰκός or *muqaddama maḥm ū* would have done.

1.4.4 – Induction (ἐπαγωγή)

Arabic Translations of the Organon

In the Arabic *Rhetoric*, Aristotle's term ἐπαγωγή is usually translated as *i ḥ t i b ā r*, *a s p e c t*, an anomalous solution with which Peripatetic philosophers had to come to terms.⁸⁰ observed by Lameer,⁸¹ who had leisure to observe the copy of the *Prior Analytics* translation in ms. Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362, the two surviving witnesses of the Arabic *Organon* diverge on how they translate Aristotle's term ἐπαγωγή. When translating *Prior Analytics* II.23,⁸² on three occasions ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 replaces ἐπαγωγή with *i s t* the term that will become the standard choice for naming *induction*, while ms. Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 has the transliteration *a b ā ḡ* twice, while *i s t* only appears on one occasion.⁸³ In *Prior Analytics* II.25 too,⁸⁴ the Arabic text of ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 employs the term *i s t i q r ā* but in *i n d u c t i o n* this case its Greek equivalent is ἀπαγωγή, *reduction*, on which all Aristotelian manuscripts agree.⁸⁵ On the other hand, ms. Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 always translates ἀπαγωγή/ἐπαγωγή with the transliteration *a b ā ḡ* almost all other cases, Taḍāri translates the term ἐπαγωγή in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* with the word *i s t* and Čabr's edition does not

⁸⁰ See S.M. Afnān, *W ā ḡ a h nyāim afha l s a f ī f ā r s i ḥ a r a b ī* (*A B e i ḥ D a r l e l e M a s h r q h i c a l* I 1969.

⁸¹ See J. Lameer, *A l - F ā r ā b ī a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n ḥ a b ṭ* (*L e i d e n / N e w Y o r k / K ö l n*, B e r l e e k T h e s e 1994, p. 8.

⁸² See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II.23 68b15-19 and *K i t ā b ḥ a ḡ ḡ a ḡ ḡ* I 112B, p. 399.8-12 ed. Čabr.

⁸³ In the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 copy of the *Prior Analytics*, the transliteration *a b ā ḡ* only appear as a marginal note to *i s t* in the incipit of *Prior Analytics* II.25. See *K i t ā b ḥ a ḡ ḡ a ḡ ḡ* I 112B, pp. 403.1 ed. Čabr.

⁸⁴ See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II.25 69a20-35 and *K i t ā b ḥ a ḡ ḡ a ḡ ḡ* I 112B, pp. 403.1-404.6 ed. Čabr.

⁸⁵ The same mistake appears thrice in II.25, once in 68b20, once in 68b27, and once in 68b35, but this could perfectly well be due to the fact that part of this passages was emended on the basis of each other. The occurrence of the Greek letter *alpha* as a mistake for the letter *epsilon* is more suggestive of minuscule than of uncial writing, for, in the former case, both letters have a small and rounded shape, but the similarity between the oral form of ἐπαγωγή and ἀπαγωγή is strong enough to explain the substitution.

mention any variant reading, neither in the Paris nor in the Istanbul manuscript.⁸⁶ The only exception concerns *Prior Analytics* I.25, where ἐπαγωγή occurs in 42a3 and in 42a23 and is translated by the infinitive *i l t, giatlperāng*.⁸⁷

I s t is the equivalent chosen for ἐπαγωγή in other parts of the *Organon* as well: by Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn in the *Categories*,⁸⁸ by Abū Bišr Mattā in the *Posterior Analytics*,⁸⁹ by Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī and Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh in the *Topics*,⁹⁰ by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī and by ‘Īsā Ibn Zur‘a in their respective translations of the *Sophistical Refutations*.⁹¹

Fārābī

Lameer observes that Fārābī,⁹² when commenting upon Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* II.23⁹³ and II.25⁹⁴ in his *Š dī al-Q i y nāwār* employs the transliteration *abā ġ ūtġ ūalk* about induction (ἐπαγωγή in Greek), and concludes from this evidence that he did not find such a term in his Arabic copy of Aristotle. If we take into account Fārābī’s behavior in his *Š dī al-Q i y cān* concerning

⁸⁶ In his *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle employs the term ἐπαγωγή in I.25 42a2, 42a23, II.21 67a23, II.23 68b14, 68b15, 68b18, 68b29, 68b32, 68b33, 68b37, II.24 69a16. It is translated as *i l t, giatlperāng*, in I.25 42a2/268,7 and in 42a23/270,2, as *bi-l-hass* in II.21 67a23/393,13, and as *i s t* in II.23 68b14/399,7, 68b15/399,8, 68b18/399,10, 68b29/400,6, 68b32/400,10, 68b33/400,10, 68b37/400,13, II.24 69a16/402,7. See *K i t ā bn āid qūāū l, aīl* Ğabr.

⁸⁷ See *K i t ā bn āid qūāū l, aīl*, pp. 268,7 and 270,2 ed. Ğabr.

⁸⁸ The one occurrence on ἐπαγωγή in Aristotle’s *Categories* takes place in chapter 11, 13b37, translated as *i s t āt p. r ā* 86,1. See *K i t āi bġ ūqāū: Ğabr*.

⁸⁹ In his *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle names ἐπαγωγή in I.1 71a6/425,6, 71a10/426,2, I.3 72b29/437,4, I.13 78a34/475,3, I.18 81a40/495,2, 81b1/495,3, 81b2/495,4, 81b3/495,6, 81b8/495,9, II.3 90b14/556,6, II.19 100b4/618,17. It is always translated as *i s t Seq K i ā t’ ā bn āid qūāū m il, ydy* Ğabr.

⁹⁰ In Aristotle’s *Topics*, ἐπαγωγή is named in I.8 103b3, I.12, 105a11, 105a13, 105a16, I.14 105b27, I.18 108b10, II.5 11b38, 112a5, II.8 113b17, 113b29, II.10 115a5, IV.2 122a19, IV.3 123b7, VIII.1 155b21, 155b34, 155b36, 156a1, 156b14, 157a7, VIII.2 157a20, VIII.8 160a38, and it is always translated with *i s t boḥinḥōōks* I-VII, translated by Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī, and in book VIII, translated by Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh. See *K i t ā lū b, ādq* Ğabr.

⁹¹ In Aristotle’s *Sophistical Refutations* we find the term ἐπαγωγή in chap. 4 165b28 and in chap. 15 174a37. Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī translates it as *i s t āt p. 925,4* (mirroring 165b28) and at p. 1052,7 (mirroring 174a37). ‘Īsā Ibn Zur‘a translates it as *i s t āt p. 926,13* (mirroring 165b28). At p. 1052,7, mirroring 175a37, ‘Īsā Ibn Zur‘a does not translate it explicitly. The *n a q l sēms doīōmit* it at p. 928,1-5 (mirroring 165b28) and seems to translate it as *faḥ ḥ r , āt l o r y* , p. 1054,5 (mirroring 174a37). See *K i t ā lū b, ādq* Ğabr.

⁹² See J. Lameer, *Al-F ā r ā b ī tādīān Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice*, Leiden / New York / Köln, Brill 1994, p. 8.

⁹³ See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II.23 68b15-19.

⁹⁴ See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II.25 69b20, 69b27, and 69b35.

the translations of the Greek term εἰκός, Lameer's assumption that he would have quoted the transliteration *abā ġ ūi* if it had been available to him seems quite justified. It also seems reasonable to conclude that Fārābī's *Prior Analytics* text must have been globally closer to that exemplified by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, where *abā ġ ūi* appears as a marginal gloss, than to that of ms. Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362, where this transliteration appears in *Prior Analytics* II.23 and II.25.

Avicenna

When Avicenna discusses *induction*, he usually chooses the standard term *i s t* employed by Taḍārī in the Greek-Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics*, ignoring the transliteration *a b ā ġ ūi* which is sometimes used in the same translation. An explicit definition of *i s t* (*induction*) is offered by Avicenna in *K i t āNba ġaānt*

*On induction: Induction is a judgement about a universal due to the existence of that judgement in the particulars that fall under that universal, either all of them – and this is the complete induction – or most of them – the and this is the commonly known induction (mašhūr) – as if someone predicated the major term of the middle term because of the existence of the major in the minor. An example of it is that every long-lived animal has little gall, because every long-lived animal is like a human being, or a horse, or a bull, and human beings, horses and bulls have little gall. And it is their habit not to remember it in this order, but they confine themselves to what is like the minor or what is like the minor.*⁹⁵

Indeed, nothing is there that could remind the reader of the odd translation *ἐπαγωγή* as *i s t* in *ba r* the Arabic *Rhetoric*. Yet, in the rhetorical section of Avicenna's *K i t āšbi ftā*'s curious expression does resurface, although in *K i t āHā b* its meaning seems to have shifted, so that it can be used in the same paragraph as *i s t*. D.L. Black⁹⁶ translates it as *example*. This

⁹⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t āNba ġaānt*, -if sīta pp 106-107, ed. Dāniš-Pažūh.

⁹⁶ D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Leiden / New York Brill 1990, p. 174 in *Med*

identity rests on the fact that in *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ*⁹⁷ Avicenna contrasts the couples *q i ḡlā n i r* (the deductive foundations of dialectic and rhetoric) and *i s t -tanṭīl* (their inductive counterparts), mirroring the parallels that we find in the Arabic *Rhetoric* I.2 1356a35-1356b5 between the couples *tafkī -s a l* and *buahā ri ʿ t* with *ḍurhā* reemployed as a translation of the Greek παράδειγμα (*example*). From this fact we understand that Avicenna understood that the translator's *i ʿ t* was close to the more common *i s t*.⁹⁸ Still, in the same *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ*,⁹⁹ Avicenna openly states that an *i ʿ t* is indeed a *tanṭīl*, i.e. an *example*, and uses *i ʿ t* together with *i s t*, *induction*, stating that in dialectic and in science the syllogism is stronger than *i ʿ t i b ā r* and *i s t*, while in rhetoric *i ʿ t* is stronger than the enthymeme, showing that Avicenna, who saw fit to contrast *i ʿ t* and enthymeme, did not understand the first as an investigative method, but rather as a specific rhetorical tool, making us suspect the two terms than *i ʿ t* and *bi ā s r t*, *i q r ā* semantically close as the they might be, cannot be synonymous.¹⁰⁰

We thus begin to see how, in his *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ*, Avicenna usually tried to integrate the odd expressions that derived from the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric* by finding for them a semantic nuance that could separate them from the more standard expressions of the original Aristotelian concept.

Averroes

in order to refer to induction, alongside the standard *i s t*, Averroes sporadically employs the word *i ʿ t* as well. The use of the latter term seems to be more than the mere citation of the Arabic translation, in which *i ʿ t* is the most common equivalent for the Greek ἐπαγωγή. In the *Middle Commentary*, *i ʿ t* only occurs twice, in 1.2.25 and 1.2.26, but in both cases it appears without explanations, leading us to think that Averroes expected his reader to automatically

⁹⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ* p. 36,5, ed. Sālim.

⁹⁸ See also Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik. Ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*, Berlin, K. Schwarz 1991, p. 204-205, n. 110.

⁹⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ* pp. 35.14-36.1, ed. Sālim.

¹⁰⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ* pp. 37,9, ed. Sālim.

recognise *i* ^ḥ *t* as *al-sayān* synonym for *i* ^ḥ *s* *t*. It is true that in 1.2.25 the coupling *al-q i y ā-l-i* ^ḥ *wa* *b ā r* twice preceded by the coupling *al-q i y ā-l-i s w ā* (with *ā ° t* of course employed with reference to rhetoric and not to dialectic), which could have helped the reader to correctly link the word *i* ^ḥ *t* to the *induction* concept. Moreover, nothing like the phenomenon described above introduces the appearance of *i* ^ḥ *t* in 1.2.26, so that we must assume that Averroes' readers could recognize and understand that word regardless of context. It is hard to pinpoint why Averroes would choose to employ this word in 1.2.25-26 and nowhere else, especially since in 1.2.26 he is massively reworking Aristotle's lines 1357a18-21,¹⁰¹ in which *ἐπαγωγή/i* ^ḥ *t* itself is not named at all.

1.4.5 – Example (παράδειγμα)

Arabic Translations of the *Organon*

In the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the translation of παράδειγμα seems quite haphazard as well, since it occasionally involves the expressions *taṭb ī t ṣfi*, *confirmation and description*, and *d a l ā l* -also used for σημείον and τεκμήριον – but most of the time it employs *burhā n* - also used for ἀπόδειξις, *demonstration*.¹⁰² Lexical uniformity within the Arabic *Rhetoric* itself is not the only problem, since, in due time, the equivalence between *burhā n* and ἀπόδειξις, *demonstration*, became standard for Peripatetic philosophers. Moreover, in the other parts of the *Organon* in which the term παράδειγμα appears, it is invariably translated as *miṭāl*, *example*. This is

¹⁰¹ See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, ed. Lyons, pp. 12.11-17.

¹⁰² Since in this case Lyons' glossary is not exhaustive, below I will list the occurrences of παράδειγμα in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* together with their translation. Παράδειγμα is translated as *b u r* *h ā n* in 1.2.1356b3-5-7-12-15-24/9.20-23-24 and 10.7-10-19, 1357a14-15/12.6-8, 1357b26-30-34/14.3-7-11, II.18 1392a2/129.27, II.20 1393a25-26-27-28/134.2-4-6, 1394a9-17/136.12-21, II.23 1399a8/153.20, II.25 1402b14-18/167.25 and 168.4, III.16 1417a13-19/213.12 and 214.11, and III.17 1418a1-3/216.20-22. The word παράδειγμα also appears in I.5 1360b7 and I.9 1366a32, where it is translated as *taṭb ī t ṣfi* *confirmation or description*, in I.15 1377a6, where it is translated as *d a l ā l* and in I.9 1366a29, where we find *al-d a l ā l-lā ut r hwā*. See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, M.C. Lyons (ed.), Cambridge, 1982.

the case in *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics* and in *Topics*.¹⁰³ The same equivalence seems to hold for the *Poetics*,¹⁰⁴ although in this work Aristotle does not use παράδειγμα in its technical logical sense.

It is apparent that, for later readers, the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* lent itself to various misunderstandings. If such misunderstandings did not occur, this is in all likelihood due to the fact the Islamic philosophers' appreciation of Peripatetic rhetorical thought was shaped by a variety of written texts and scholarly traditions that far exceeded what we know of the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Fārābī

Fārābī's solution to the difficulties posed by the Arabic translations is pretty straightforward, since he exclusively seems to employ *miṭāl* (only in his *Kitāb al-Qiyās* and *tamṭī*, the second form infinitive from the same root. This is in contrast with the choice operated by Avicenna and Averroes later on, since they alternated between the more common option *miṭā karḥī* and *burhān* the "philological" solution. It seems reasonable to assume that the *tamṭī /miṭāl* approach was chosen by Fārābī after comparison with the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, where II.24, devoted to the analysis of παράδειγμα in the Greek original, makes use of the term *miṭāl*.

We should also remember that, as underlined by Lameer, Fārābī's approach to rhetorical lexicon was considerably influenced by his understanding of the enthymeme as *qiyās* This *qiyās*

¹⁰³ In his *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle names παράδειγμα in II.24 68b38/401,1, 69a13/402,5, where it is translated by Taḍārī as *miṭāl*, in the *Posterior Analytics*, παράδειγμα appears in I.1 71a10/426,1, where Abū Bišr Mattā translates it as *miṭāl*. In the *Topics*, Aristotle speaks makes reference to παράδειγμα in I.14 105b28/659,13, VI.14 151b20/836,1, and VIII.1 157a14-15/857,18-19: in all this cases, παράδειγμα is translated by as *miṭāl*, whether the translator be Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī as in books I and VI, or Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh as in book VIII. See *Kitāb al-Qiyās* and *Kitāb al-Burhān*.

¹⁰⁴ The occurrences of παράδειγμα in Aristotle's *Poetics* are the following: chap. 15 1454a28, 1454b14, chap. 22 1458a20, and chap. 25 1461b13. Abū Bišr Mattā translates it as *miṭāl*, in chap. 15 p. 38,15, p. 40,12, chap. 22 p. 59,8, and in chap. 25 p. 73,2. Aristotle uses the word παράδειγμα in chap. 24 1460a25 and in chap. 25 1460b26, but this section is not translated in Abū Bišr Mattā's Arabic version of the *Poetics*.

entrained the research of a balance between the legal Islamic understanding of *q i yānā* *miṭā l* and their Aristotelian meaning, which, on occasion, pushed Fārābī towards describing the *miṭā l* both as concept synonymical with *q i yānā* as one of its types.¹⁰⁵

Finally, unlike what happens for other terms, as far as the concept expressed by παράδειγμα is concerned, we are able to assess that also in his *Long Commentary* to the *Rhetoric* Fārābī employed the word *miṭā*, for it is used by Ibn Riḍwān in many passages of his *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences* which are perfectly mirrored by Hermannus' *Didascalía*, a translation of Fārābī's *Long Commentary*.¹⁰⁶ This would be very relevant, for the *Long Commentary*, because of the constraints of its literary gender, would have been the proper place to reflect on the lexical specificities of the Arabic *Rhetoric*: the fact that Fārābī chose not to do so should be seen as a reflect of his own scholarly interests.¹⁰⁷ However, the state of our documentation on the *Long Commentary* to the *Rhetoric*, mainly depending on Ibn Riḍwān's selection of quotes, does not allow us to conclude that Fārābī avoided a certain term. We cannot be entirely sure that the *Long Commentary* to the *Rhetoric* did not employ the anomalous equivalence παράδειγμα/*b u r h n ā* sporadic and isolated form, as is the case of the appearance of *w ā ḡā* as equivalent of εἰκός in the *Long Commentary* to the *Prior Analytics*. What we can state with adequate certainty is that, while Fārābī referred to *w ā ḡā* in the sense of *probable* in other

¹⁰⁵ See J. Lameer, *Al-F ā r ā b ī a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n S y l l e b e r g* (New York/ Köln, Brill, 1994), pp. 252-254.

¹⁰⁶ For an edition of the rhetorical sections from Ibn Riḍwān's text and for its meaning for the reconstruction of Fārābī's work, see M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍw ā n e t l a D i d a s c a l i a i n R h e t o r i c A l p h a r a b i i*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 133-180.

¹⁰⁷ We do not need to worry overmuch on the possibility that Fārābī had as a source other Arabic translations on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, for Aouad demonstrated Fārābī's dependence on a text close to the Paris *Organon* translation as far as *K i t ā b h n ā* is concerned. See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ' A r i s t o t e l e* *εἰκός*, *concept de point de vue immédiat et commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 158-161.

works as well,¹⁰⁸ if we cannot discard the hypothesis that he used the equivalence παράδειγμα/*burhā* in the Long Commentary to the *Rhetoric*, he never did it elsewhere.

Avicenna

As Fārābī had done before him in *K i t al-Ḥikma b,da* in the rhetorical section of his *al-Ḥikma al-ʿA r dīyā*,¹¹⁰ Avicenna discussed *tamtī lor*, *exemplification*, as a kind of persuasive argument, together with enthymeme. The gist of Aristotle’s parallel passage is that exemplification (παράδειγμα) and enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα) are the form that dialectical induction and syllogism take in rhetoric.¹¹¹ Avicenna’s text surely reflects this element, but the philosopher also tries to deepen the reader’s understanding of the role of *tamtī* by introducing *q i yasā* possible synonym of this term, not at all in its logical acceptation, but rather in its juridical sense. Still, *qiyā* is never used as a synonym of *tamtī* alone and without explanation, because that would have provoked an unavoidable confusion with *qiyā* used in its normal sense of *syllogism*.

Avicenna’s addition of the term *i t al-Ḥikma b,da* to the group *mitā*, *ltamtī* and *burhā* needs some explanation: this word, which does not appear in A.-M. Goichon’s lexicon, usually means *aspect*, *point of view* (like in *K i t al-Ḥikma b,da*), while in Averroes’ *Middle Commentary* (in 1.2.25 and 1.2.26) and in the *R tū r īt mā* means *inductive reasoning*. In Avicenna’s context, D.L. Black translates it with *example*. For the value of *inductive reasoning*, which we find in *R tū r ī shā* refers to Soheil M. Afnān, *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*.¹¹² R. Würsch translates it with *Analogieschluss* (or *conclusion by analogy*) as well, basing her choice upon I.6, 35.14-36.1. In this passage, we read

¹⁰⁸ See Fārābī, *K i t al-Ḥikma b,da* 109,11, Langhade (éd.), in *Al-Fārābī, K i t al-Ḥikma b,da* Langhade (éd.), and *al-Fārābī, Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971. On the understanding of this passage, see the subsection of the present work that is devoted to *the Probable in Fārābī ’ s K i t ā b al-Ḥikma b,da*, pp. 77-82

¹⁰⁹ Fārābī, *K i t al-Ḥikma b,da* 163,11, Langhade (éd.). On the relationship between this idea in Fārābī and in Avicenna, see D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 275.

¹¹⁰ See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿ A dīyā*, p. 90,9-14, M. Šāliḥ (ed.)

¹¹¹ See Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1356a34-b27.

¹¹² See D.L. Black, *L o g i c a n d A r i s t o t l e ’ s R h e t o r i c*, Leiden / New-York / Boston, 1990, p. 174.

lakinna al-da mī r a h u w a -h m ā q k̄ ḡ-iā ‘s ta imbi ānr tahtī ml āu enthat da am īs that from which syllogism (q i ḡ) derives, while a paragon (tamṭī) is that from which an i ḡ t. The ā r word i ḡ t appears in Avicenna’s text in the non-technical sense of *point of view* and *observation* as well, but its meaning seems to be *example* throughout the whole of *K i t Ḥiḥā b wa* at least.

The role of i ḡ t can be explored further by looking at I.6, 36,5, where the two couples, da m ī- ḡ i ḡ (the deductive foundations of dialectics and rhetoric) and tamṭī ḡ istiqrā (their inductive counterparts) mirror the pairs that we find in *R ṭū r ī* 1356a35-1356b5, that is to say tafkīr (ένθυμήμα) – salḡasa (συλλογισμός) and b u r (παράδειγμα) – i ḡ t (ἐπιλογὴ). From this comparison, we learn that the role that in the *R ṭū r ī* is played by i ḡ t is handed over to istiqrā in Avicenna, while the role of b u r is played by tamṭī. Therefore, if i ḡ t is equivalent to tamṭī, i ḡ t should mean something else, like *example* (παράδειγμα in Aristotle).¹¹³ Line I.6, 37,9 definitely rules out the possibility of Avicenna giving to i ḡ t exactly the same value it has in *R ṭū r ī* because it couples it with istiqrā (induction), in such a way that the two terms must have two different meanings.

The word b u r in the sense of *example* – with explicit reference to the Arabic translation – appears in *K i t Ḥiḥā b wa*, 36,1. I inserted it in the table without parentheses because it also appears – in the same sense and without any reference to the Arabic version – in *K i t Ḥiḥā b aal* 1167,9-12 and 191.17-192.3, where it mirrors Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 02b14 and its Arabic translation in 167.24-25.

Averroes

The blanket use of b u r to cover both the Greek term παράδειγμα and ἀπόδειξις in the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric* is a prime example of how such discrepancies between Greek and Arabic could provoke some confusion in Aristotle’s readers, not so much as to the general delimitation of these two concepts – for it emerged rather clearly from their more

¹¹³See R. Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik: ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*, K. Schwarz, Berlin, 1991, p. 204-205, n. 110.

straightforward translation in other parts of Aristotle's *Organon* – but rather as to the pertinent meaning of *b u r* in different contexts.

Although Averroes regularly employed the words *miṭā* and *tamṭī* in order to refer to the example as a form of reasoning, the fact that he was aware of the equivalence established in the Arabic *Rhetoric* between *b u r* (normally meaning *demonstration*) and παράδειγμα, *example*, can be established by looking at the passages in which he explicitly employed *b u r* in this sense: 3.14.3, 3.17.2 (*bi-l-b u r h ā n-l-miṭā*), 3.17.4 (*bi-it-tamṭī l -huwā alladī y u ḥua Aristū i flbui b u r h ā dī h-ḥi in*), 3.17.8 (*bi-l-b u r h ā in m m.ā m q a dhukā ā-miṭā*), 3.17.14 (*al-qawl al-miṭā l* is mentioned in the preceding line), and 3.16.21.¹¹⁴

As the short quotes within parentheses show, in 3.17.2, 3.17.4, and 3.17.8 Averroes himself clarifies that by writing *b u r* he means *miṭā* while in 3.14.3 I understand the occurrence of the term *b u r* to mean *example* not only because its Greek antecedent is the word παράδειγμα (1414b27) but also because the quote used by Averroes to show how the goal of a speech is already determined and mastered in its preamble is indeed an example. It seems worth to notice that in 3.17.2, 3.17.4, and 3.17.14 Averroes thinks of examples even if in all these cases the term *b u r h ā n* found in the Arabic version (in 216.1, 216.12, and 217.25) did not stand for παράδειγμα but rather for ἀπόδειξις in its weaker acceptation of *showing, proof* (see 1417b23-24, 1417b33, and 1418a27).

The last Averroistic occurrence of *b u r* as *example* (3.16.21) is especially remarkable, since in that case Averroes himself introduces this concept, by stating that the *b u r* is *example*, is the only space for narration in deliberative rhetoric, even if in *Rhet. II.16* 14017b15-20 Aristotle does not discuss example, but only states that in deliberative rhetoric narration will be limited to past events, if it is to be present at all.

¹¹⁴ In other cases, we find *miṭā* in passages where the Arabic translation does not name *b u r* explicitly, but which Averroes probably understood to refer to the example for contextual reasons. See, for example, *Rhet. I.2* 1358a1-2 and its exegesis in Averroes, *Commentaire moÿen*, 12.36, p. 24, and the ḥadīth explained in M. Aouad, *istote* M. Rashed, *L' exégèse de l' oīle : archéologie sur quelques commentaires grecs, arabes et byzantins. Deuxième partie*, in *Medioevo* 25, 1999, p. 604.

Ambiguities in the opposite sense were also possible: for example, in a key passage for the understanding of the role of examples in rhetoric like *Rhet.* II.25 1402b13-23, Aristotle states that enthymemes derive either from probable things, or from examples, signs, or proofs. The Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* has *burhān* as a translation of example (παράδειγμα), and in 2.25.8 Averroes seems to understand this term as a reference to demonstration in its technical sense, for he states that the kind of enthymeme which is called *burhān* first figure syllogism deriving from signs (‘*al ā*), *maḥd* owns its name to its necessity (*id ī r ā*).¹¹⁵ Normally, examples are neither syllogistic nor necessary.

As observed by Aouad and Rashed,¹¹⁶ Averroes’ interpretation of the typology of enthymemes diverges from Avicenna’s precisely in this respect. In *Kitāb al-Burhān*,¹¹⁷ Avicenna describes the enthymemes deriving from *al-burhān* going from particulars to a universal judgement, which is precisely what examples do.

We should however keep in mind that this disagreement between Avicenna and Averroes (with Fārābī as a possible predecessor of Averroes, for Avicenna’s wording alerts us to the fact that he was writing those lines with a polemical attitude towards some older author)¹¹⁸ was doctrinal rather than lexical, for both authors were conscious of the double meaning of *burhān* in the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

However, in *Rhet.* I.2, the chapter that played the most prominent role in the Arabic reception of Aristotle’s treatise,¹¹⁹ the relationship between examples and enthymemes is presented under a very different light: rather than being portrayed as premises from which

¹¹⁵ See Averroès (Ibn Rušd), *Commentaire moyen*, vol. II, p. 259, ed. M. Aouad, *La Rhétorique d’Aristote*.

¹¹⁶ See M. Aouad, M. Rashed, *L’explication de la Rhétorique d’Aristote : recherches byzantines. Première partie*, in *Medioevo* 23, 1997, pp. 161-163.

¹¹⁷ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Burhān*, pp. 191, 17-192, 5, ed. Sālīm.

¹¹⁸ See again M. Aouad, M. Rashed, *L’explication de la Rhétorique d’Aristote : recherches byzantines. Première partie*, in *Medioevo* 23, 1997, pp. 161-163. The authors develop their discussion from the phrase *hādhā yuḡābu al-ḥādī*, *this is how this passage should be understood*, that concludes Avicenna’s presentation of the four sources of enthymemes in *Kitāb al-Burhān*, p. 192, 4-5, ed. Sālīm.

¹¹⁹ On this subject, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d’Aristote par Fārābī*, *Érôtologie*, point de vue immédiat et commun, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 134-143.

enthymemes can be built, examples are presented on par with enthymemes. Indeed, enthymemes and examples are said to be the only two independently existing forms of rhetorical argumentation: *everyone produces persuasion through demonstration by stating either examples or enthymemes, and nothing else besides this* (*Rhet.* I.2 1356b2-3). The Arabic translation of this passage, which, as expected, adopts *burhān* to render παραδείγματα, is quite straightforward. It is therefore not surprising that Averroes thought it proper to suggest a different understanding for the *b u r hān* that in *Rhet.* I.2 is presented, alongside with the enthymeme, as an independent mean of persuasion, and for the *b u r hān* in *Rhet.* II.25 is portrayed as one of the four types of premises from which an enthymeme can derive. It is also understandable that, of the two homonymical meanings held by *b u r hān* in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, *example* and *demonstration*, example was the one reserved for I.2 1356b2-3, which is a passage containing a general statement about the status of the main tools of persuasion and taken from a chapter deemed fundamental for the understanding of rhetoric.¹²⁰ In such a context, example was easily perceived as the more central and technical meaning of *b u r hān*.

Moreover, and at a different level, Averroes' interpretation of *b u r hān* in the sense of demonstration might have been due to the desire to offer a systematized version of the doctrine of signs and of enthymemes deriving from signs, so as to make it symmetrical with that of the three syllogistic figures, absent from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* II.25 (1402b13-23), but introduced in the parallel passages of *Prior Analytics* II.27 (70a11-24).¹²¹

¹²⁰ By this statement, I do not mean to say that in *Rhetoric* I.2 Averroes always understands *b u r hān* to mean example. Indeed, just a few lines below Averroes understands it as a translation of ἀπόδειξις, *demonstration*, when discussing the difference between demonstration and syllogism in I.2.17 of his *Middle Commentary* to the *Rhetoric*, while in I.2 1356b 10-17 Aristotle focused on the difference between syllogism and example. If ever the status of chapter I.2 in the reception of the *Rhetoric* played a role in shaping Averroes understanding of whether *b u r hān* meant example or demonstration, it was only insofar as the divergent statements of I.2 1356b2-3 and II.25 1403b13-23 could have been interpreted contrastively.

¹²¹ Averroes probably found further incitement for understanding Aristotle's passage in II.25 in this way in the fact that Aristotle's discussion of the sources of enthymemes in I.2 was unsatisfactory in as far as it verbally associated third and first figure syllogisms, while the criterion stated by Aristotle for doing so would rather link first figure syllogism to second figure syllogism, for both first and second syllogisms have a middle term that is more universal

The homonymical translation of παράδειγμα and ἀπόδειξις in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* surely allowed Averroes to interpret *Rhetoric* II.25 1402b13-23 in a direction that prompted him to present his favoured taxonomy of signs, but it surely did not force him or his predecessors to concoct it, nor did it prevent Averroes from understanding that both example and demonstration played a discrete but relevant role in Aristotle's conceptualization of rhetoric.

On the other hand, Averroes always used *tamṭī ḍr miṭā* to name examples in his *Talḥīs k i t ḍ b y āw*¹²² which is not surprising, since the translation *miṭāl* is systematically employed in Taḍārī's version of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*.

1.4.6 and 1.4.7 – Sign (τεκμήριον and σημεῖον)

The Sign in the Arabic Translations of the *Organon*

As we have already seen,¹²³ the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric* did not offer much help towards understanding the distinction between the Aristotelian concepts of σημεῖον and τεκμήριον either. The Greek σημεῖον is sometimes translated as *r ā soi rasm* (thirteen times), as *d a l, ḍālīl* (five times), and as *‘alāma* (nineteen times), while τεκμήριον becomes either *d a l (ḍālīl)* (six times) or *‘alāma* (six times). It is interesting to point out that, while the use of *rasm* and *‘alāma* for σημεῖον is uniformly spread throughout the book, the use of *d a l / ḍālīl*¹²⁴ for σημεῖον extends to *Rhet.* I.9 and II.2 but also to *Rhet.* I.2, where *d a l iḥ* likewise employed to translate τεκμήριον. On the other hand, whenever *‘alāma* is used to represent τεκμήριον (mainly in *Rhet.* II.25), σημεῖον was

than the subject of the conclusion. On this subject, see W.M.A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I, a Commentary*, New York, Fordham University Press 1980, pp. 66-68. Fārābī and Averroes shifted the focus of this classification from establishing whether or not the middle term is more universal than the subject of the conclusion to comparing middle terms both to major and to minor terms, evaluating whether they are more general more particular than any of them.

¹²² See, for example, Averroes, *Talḥīs k i t ḍ b y āw* pp. 275-276, ed. Butterworth, 1983.

¹²³ See the section of this chapter devoted to *L e x i c a l D i f f i c u l t i e s P o s e d b y t h e A r* 21-28.

¹²⁴ Actually, the use of *dālīl* is much more common than that of *d a l ā* translation of σημεῖον: *d a l* only appears twice, in 45.16, translation of *Rhet.* I.9 1367a31, and in 105.19, translation of *Rhet.* II.6 1384b19. Moreover, on one occasion, τεκμήρια is translated with *d a l* the plural form of *d a l* that I did not try to distinguish between the forms *dālīl* and *d a l* in this analysis.

translated as *rasm*, so that a distinction between the two concepts could have been traced by the reader.

Term in Aristotle's <i>Rhetoric</i>	Σημεῖον	Τεκμήριον
Chapter by chapter translations in the Arabic <i>Rhetoric</i>	I.2 <i>dalla</i> (3 occurrences), <i>rasm</i> (5 occ.)	I.2 <i>dalāla</i> (5 occ.)
	I.3 <i>rasm</i> (2 occ.)	I.3 <i>d a l ī l</i>
	I.5 <i>rasm</i> , ^c <i>a l a m a</i>	
	I.9 <i>d a l ī l</i> , ^c <i>al d (ā o h cā) l a</i>	
	II.2 <i>d a (l 2 ōcd.)</i> , ^c <i>a l ā m a</i>	
	II.3-5 ^c <i>a l (ā o n c a)</i>	
	II.6 <i>d a l</i> , ^c <i>ā d la (ō o n c a)</i> , <i>d a l f'all ā v</i>	
	II.7-24 ^c <i>a l (ā o n c a)</i>	
	II.25 <i>rasm</i> (4 occ.)	
	III.2 ^c <i>a l rāsm a</i> ,	
	III.10 ^c <i>a l ā m a</i>	
Total occurrences of each translation	<i>D a l</i> 4 occ., <i>dalla</i> 3 occ., <i>d a l 2 ōcd. a</i> <i>rasm</i> 13 occ., ^c <i>a l ā n c a</i>	<i>dalīl</i> 1 occ., <i>dalāla</i> 5 occ., <i>'alāma</i> 5 occ.

The Arabic word *d a l* appears as a translation of παράδειγμα, *example*,¹²⁵ too.

¹²⁵ In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle uses the term σημεῖον, sign, in chapter I.2 1357a32, 1357b1, 1357b7, 1357b10, 1357b12, 1357b13, 1357b15, 1357b19, 1357b21, chap. I.3 1358b29, 1359a8, chap. I.5 1361a28, 1361a38, chap. I.9 1366b27-29, 1367a29, 1367a31, 1367b27, 1367b33, chap. II.2 1379a33, 1379b16, 1379b19, 1379b35, chap. II.3 1380a16, chap. II.4 1381a7, chap. II.5 1382a30, 1383a6, chap. II.6 1383b30, 1383b33, 1384a2, 1384a4, 1384a7, 1384b18, 1384b19, chap. II.7 1385b7, chap. II.8 1386b1, II.21 1395a6, chap. II.24 1401b9, chap. II.25 1402b14, 1403a2, 1403a4, chap. III.2 1404b2, 1404b33, 1405a32, chap. III.10 1411b19.

The author of the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* selects *d a* (or a related word) as a translation in *Rhet.* I.2 12.26/1357a32, 1357b1/13.6, 1357b7/13.10, I.9 1367a31/45.16, 1367b33/47.14, II.2 1379b16/88.2, 1379b35/88.24, II.6 1384b19/105.19. He selects *'a l ā* (or a related word) in *Rhet.* I.5 1361a38/25.17, I.9 1366b27/44.4, 1366b28/44.4, 1366b29/44.5, 1367b27/47.6, II.2 1379a33/87.2, II.3 1380a16/89.23, II.4 1381a7/92.22, II.5 1382a30/97.12, 1383a6/99.19, II.6 1383b30/102.18, 1383b33/102.22, 1384a2/103.2, 1384a4/103.4, 1384a7/103.6, II.7 1385b7/108.18, II.8 1386b1/111.21, II.21 1395a6/139.15, II.24 1401b9/164.4, III.2 1404b33/176.14, and III.10 1411b19/202.15. He selects *rasm* in *Rhet.* I.2

Ishāq's translation of *De Interpretatione* systematically has *dalīl* for σημεῖον,¹²⁶ and so do Abū Bišr Mattā's versions of the *Posterior Analytics* and of the *Poetics* most of the time,¹²⁷ while Taḏārī's Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics* and the *naql qadīm* of the *Sophistical Refutations* always offer 'a l ā for σημεῖον.¹²⁸ Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's and 'Īsā Ibn Zur'a's translations of the *Sophistical Refutations*

1357b10/13.13, 1357b12/13.13, 1357b13/13.15, 1357b16/13.18, 1357b19/13.21, 1357b21/13.25, I.3 1358b29/17.7, 1359a8/17.24, I.5 1361a28/25.7, II.25 1402b14/167.25, 1403a2/169.9 1403a4/169.11, III.2 1404b2/174.24. In 1384b18/105.18 he chooses the juxtaposition *al-' a l ā m-d ā l*, while σημεῖον is not translated in I.2 1357b15/13.17-18, I.9 1367a29/45.15, II.2 1379b19/88.3-7, III.2 1405a32/178.16.

On the other hand, Aristotle uses τεκμήριον in chap. I.2 1357b4, 1357b6, 1357b8, 1357b16, 1357b22, chap. I.3 1359a7, chap. II.25 1402b14, 1402b19, 1403a10, 1403a14, and chap. III.17 1417b37. The Arabic version of τεκμήριον is *dalāla* in *Rhet.* I.2 1357b4/13.7, 1357b6/13.10, 1357b8/13.12, 1357b16/13.18, 1357b22/13.25, and I.3 1359a7/17.22, while it is 'a l ā in *Rhet.* II.25 1402b14/167.25, 1402b19/168.5, 1403a10/169.19, 1403a14/169.22, and III.17 1417b37/216.18.

¹²⁶ In his *De Interpretatione*, Aristotle names σημεῖον on the following occasions: chap. 1 16a6, 16a16, chap. 3 16b7, 16b10, 16b22. It is translated with the verb *dalla*, or *to signal*, in all places but chap. 3 16b7 and 16b10, where *d a l ī l , s i g n* is found instead. For *dalla* see pp. 104,4, 105,4, 112,1, and for *d a l ī l* of *K i t ā b B ā r e d . F . Ğ a b r . m ī n i y ā s*

¹²⁷ In the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle makes use of the term σημεῖον in I.4 73a32, I.6 74b18, 75a33, I.10 76b5, I.28 87b1-3, II.1 89b27, and II.17 99a3. In I.10 76b5 σημεῖον means *point* in the geometrical acceptance, so that Abū Bišr Mattā translates it with *nuqta* (see *K i t ā b Ā b i ḥ q ā d ū ā ā n a i l y . 4637* ed. F. Ğabr). In all other cases, the meaning of σημεῖον is *sign*, and it is generally translated with the word *d a* (see *Ķ i t ā b Ā b i ḥ q ā d ū ā ā n a i l y . 442,4, 451,2, 454,14, 533,7, and 550,4* ed. F. Ğabr). On three occasions, I.6 75a33, I.28 87b1 and II.27 89b27, σημεῖον is translated with the term 'a l ā *but*, the former case the reading preferred by Ğabr is only supported by ms. Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362, while ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 has *d a š e e Ķ i . t ā b i ḥ q ā d ū ā ā n a i l y . 454,14, 533,5, and 611,4.*

In the *Poetics*, Aristotle names σημεῖον at chap. 3 1448a35, chap. 4 1448b9, 1449a25, chap. 6 1450a35, I.13 1453a17, 1453a26, chap. 16 1454b21, 1455a20, chap. 17 1455a26, chap. 18 1456a15, chap. 22 1459a7, chap. 24 1460a17, chap. 26, 1462a6, 1462b4. Abū Bišr Mattā translates it with *d a ḥ* in chap. 4 (see pp. 7,12, and 11,16), chap. 6 (see p. 17,9), chap. 13 (see pp. 31,20 and 32,23), chap. 17 (see p. 44,6), chap. 18 (see p. 48,16), and chap. 22 (see p. 63,14). At chap. 24 1460a17 σημεῖον has no translation in the Arabic version, as in chap. 16 1455a20, where Kassel suggests that the shorter text could be the original. In chap. 16 (p. 41,2) and 26 (see p. 76,14) σημεῖον is translated with 'a l ā *while*, in chapp. 3 (p. 6,15) and 26 (p. 75,10) it is translated with *r u s* [rasm] form of *rasm*, or *trace*, a not very common solution also adopted in the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*. On the fact that in chap. 3 p. 6,15 Abū Bišr Mattā doubly translates Aristotle's σημεῖον in 1448a35, see L. Tarán, D. Gutas, *Aristotle, Poetics. Edition Maior of the Greek Text, with Historical Introductions and Philological Commentaries*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2012, p. 321 n.10. For the references to the Arabic text, see *al-K a l ā m - š i ḥ ā - l - ā l - w a l y m A n a l e c t a O r i e n t a l i a a d P o e t i c a m A r i s t o t e l e m*, edited by D. S. Margoliouth, ed. Nutt, London 1887.

¹²⁸ In Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* the term σημεῖον appears twice in I.36 48b32, once in 48b33, in I.38 49a36, II.26 69b37, and in II.27 70a3, 70a6, 70a9, 70a10, 70a11, 70a24, 70a38, 70b1, 70b4, 70b12, 70b13, 70b15, 70b18, 70b22, 70b23, 70b24, 70b27, 70b28, 70b31, and 70b38. In *K i t ā b Ā b i ḥ q ā d ū ā ā n a i l y . 4637* pp. 304,16, 304,17, I.38 p. 308,6, II.26 p. 407,36, and II.27 p. 408,1, 408,4, p. 409,1 (twice), 409,13, and 411,2, 411,3, 411,4, 411,7, 411,8, 411,9, 411,10, 411,12, (twice), 411,15 (twice), and 412,3 ed. Ğabr, Taḏārī invariably translates it with 'a l ā *but*, the alternative term *d a l ā p* appears in the margin of ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, in a note relative to II.27 70a16/408,4.

have both *ʿa l ā* and *dalīl* instead.¹²⁹ Even if on most occasions the Arabic translation of the *Poetics* translates σημεῖον with *dalīl*, an equivalence with *rasm*, like in the *Rhetoric*, appears sporadically.¹³⁰ The Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics* also has the transliteration *t a q m* for τεκμήριον.¹³¹

Its brevity notwithstanding, the importance of *Prior Analytics* II.27 in shaping the Arabic reception of rhetorical matters in the *Organon* means that Taḍāri's choices probably played an important role in selecting the Arabic terms for *sign* and *necessary sign* on which a consensus was reached later on. However, I would like to point out that a certain degree of lexical variety existed even concerning the translations of σημεῖον and τεκμήριον in the *Prior Analytics* context, although not in the body of Taḍāri's translation.

In *Prior Analytics* II.27 70b1-6, Aristotle presents two options for the precise use of the terms σημεῖον and τεκμήριον: we should either distinguish signs according to syllogistic figures, and call τεκμήριον the middle term, or call *signs* (σημεῖα) the arguments deriving from the extremes of a syllogism, and *evidence* (τεκμήρια) the arguments deriving from middle terms.

On the other hand, the translation of this passage in the main text of ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 univocally states that we should call *ʿa l ā* what derives from the extremes, and *t a q m a r y ū n* what derives from the middle term.¹³² This falls easily in line with what stated above about Taḍāri's lexical choices, but a marginal note declares that its author could read, in Yaḥyā's Syriac writing, that what derives from the extremes is to be called *t a q m* and what derives from the middle term is to be called *ʿa l ā*, unlike in Taḍāri's translation. Now, the signs deriving from the

In his *Sophistical Refutations* Aristotle names σημεῖον in chap. 5 167b9 and in chap. 33 182b22, and on both occasions the *naql qadīm* offers the translation *ʿa l ā*. See chap. 5 p. 950,6, and 33, p. 1177,13, *K i t s ā ḥ f i q ed.* Ćabr.

¹²⁹ As specified at the previous note, in Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* the term σημεῖον appears in chapp. 5 167b9 and 33 182b22. In chap. 5 167b9 it is translated with *ʿa l ā* both by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī and by ʿIsā Ibn Zurʿa, while in chap. 33 182b22 Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī uses the term *d a ā* and ʿIsā Ibn Zurʿa uses the verb *dalla*. See chap. 5 pp. 947,4 and 948,9, and chap. 33, pp. 1180,4 and 1182,4, *K i t s ā ḥ f i q ed.* Ćabr.

¹³⁰ On *rasm* as a translation for σημεῖον in Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, see the present subsection at pp.55-56, nn. 125 and 127.

¹³¹ In Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* the word τεκμήριον appears in II.27 70b2, and its translation as *t a q m* is found in *K i t s ā ḥ f i q ed.* p. 410,6, ed. Ćabr.

¹³² See *K i t s ā ḥ f i q ed.* p. 410,4-8, ed. Ćabr.

middle term are those that can be demonstrative, and the idea that the *dure sign* (τὰ ἀνάγκη ῥητῶν) should not derive from them is implausible.¹³³

Given the lexical asymmetries and difformity of every single streak of the *Organon* transmission chain, the establishing of consensus on Arabic terminology for *sign* and *necessary sign* could not have been the straightforward product of a specific translation or of the translations of one specific Aristotelian work, but must rather have been the result of collective global reflection on a vast corpus of different traditions.

The Sign in Fārābī

Fārābī employs the term *‘alāma* for the signs that, being in the second or third figure, are not sure (σημεῖον ἀνώνυμον or just σημεῖον in the Greek *Rhetoric*), while *d al is* reserved for the first figure *necessary signs*, which are called τεκμήρια in Greek.¹³⁴

On at least one occasion, the term *‘al ā is* also used in a global sense, inclusive of necessary and non-necessary signs, in the same way in which Aristotle often intends σημεῖον, for, when discussing the species of enthymemes in his *K i t ā Ḥilāḥā b al Fārābī* lists *preferred or commonly praised* (ἄδρα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδοξασίμων) (wsā ḡ (i) *and signs* (‘al ā) *ḥā t*. Now, here wā ḡ i *abdā ‘al ā* reflect Aristotle’s use of εἰκότα and σημεῖα as sources of enthymemes in *Rhetoric* I.2 1357a32. Just a few lines after Fārābī’s source passage, Aristotle will explain that, of the aforementioned σημεῖα, or *signs*, some are sure and can be called τεκμήρια, while others, being unsure, can be referred to as σημεῖα ἀνώνυμα. This observation, coupled with the fact that in the following pages¹³⁶ Fārābī will explicitly discuss together the *‘alāma* and the

¹³³ I think that the following note on ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, made available by Ğabr’s edition, should be understood in the same light. It states that the glossator translated the following statement from the Syriac: *in the second and third figures the middle terms are called extremes*. Even if it is far from being a conclusive explanation, it was probably a rationalization of the heterodox statement found in the previous Syriac note, namely that the evidence derives from the extremes and the sign from the middle term. The second statement would circumscribe this odd proposal to second and third figure syllogisms, which are, in any case, inconclusive.

¹³⁴ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥilāḥā b al Fārābī*, 111,7-113,14, ed. Langhade.

¹³⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥilāḥā b al Fārābī*, 109,11-12, ed. Langhade.

¹³⁶ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥilāḥā b al Fārābī*, 111,3-6, ed. Langhade.

d al-āsiya species of the enthymeme that, on account of their existence, make the existence of something else necessary, implies that when listing such species in *K i t al-Hibā b al-Fārābī* 109,11-12, by the word *‘alāmā Fārābī* was referring to both sure and unsure signs.

In adherence to the wording of the Arabic version of Aristotle’s text, when Fārābī comments upon *Prior Analytics* II.27 in his *Š dh al-Q i y al-‘al-Q i y*¹³⁷ the term that he chooses for referring to all kind of signs and to build an opposition with *maḥm ū d al-akbār* / *as* a possible source for enthymemes is again *‘alāma*. We do not know which terms would have been employed by Fārābī in order to name necessary and unnecessary signs separately, discussed by Aristotle in II.27 70b1-6, for our witnesses of his commentary to the *Prior Analytics* stops abruptly at II.27 70a23. However, if his behaviour as far as enthymeme is concerned can be regarded as a hint, he would have offered both *d al-āsiya* the standard term, and *t a q m a* the transliteration preserved by Taḍārī’s translation.

Unsurprisingly, in order to refer to signs in general, in *K i t al-Hibā b al-Fārābī* makes use of the periphrasis *al-d al-āsiya* as well.¹³⁸

Both in his *K i t al-Hibā b al-Fārābī*¹³⁹ and in his *Š dh al-Q i y al-‘al-Q i y*¹⁴⁰ while commenting upon *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a3-23, Fārābī makes a very explicit point of the fact that, in different contexts, the term *‘al ā*, mirroring σημεῖον, or *sign*, in Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* II.27, can refer to a premise (*muqaddama*), as in the Aristotelian passage he is discussing, to a syllogism (*qiyā*) or to a middle term (*hadd*). This strengthens Aouad and Rashed’s supposition that, when in *K i t al-Hibā b al-Fārābī* states that *d al-āsiya* and *‘alāma* are said primarily of middle terms but also of premises and of whole syllogisms, he does so in order to clarify an ambiguity existing both in *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a3-b6

¹³⁷ See Fārābī, *Š dh al-Q i y al-‘al-Q i y* *al-manti q i y al-‘al-Q i y*, vol. II p. 550,23-553,11, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

¹³⁸ See, for example, Fārābī, *K i t al-Hibā b al-Fārābī*, 111,3, and 115,7 ed. Langhade. See also the title found in ms. Bratislava, University Library, TE 41 and printed by Langhade in p. 111,7, *al-‘al āsiya* *al-āsiya* *al-āsiya* .

¹³⁹ See Fārābī, *K i t al-Hibā b al-Fārābī*, 115,7-117,20, ed. Langhade.

¹⁴⁰ See Fārābī, *Š dh al-Q i y al-‘al-Q i y* *al-manti q i y al-‘al-Q i y*, vol. II p. 553,5 ff. ed. Daniš-pažuh.

and in *Rhet.* I.2 1357 a22-b25, where σημείον and τεκμήριον could refer interchangeably to middle terms, premises or syllogisms.¹⁴¹

I would like to point out another facet of Fārābī's discussion of signs that could be better understood if seen in the light of Aristotle's textual obscurities: in *K i t ʿĪtibā b al* when discussing proof and sign,¹⁴² the extensive distinction drawn by Fārābī between three types of signs according to whether their middle term is more specific or more general than both their subject and their predicate seems rather superfluous to the economy of Fārābī's text. It is innovative in relation to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and at most loosely based on the distinction of signs according to syllogistic figures offered by Aristotle in *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a10-23.

Its role becomes much clearer if we consider attentively what Aristotle states in *Rhetoric* I.2:

Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I.2, 1357b10-20: *Among signs, (1) one is in the same relationship as the particulars to the universals, as if someone said that there is a sign of the fact that wise people are just, for Socrates was both wise and just. This is indeed a sign, but it can be refuted, even if what is said is true, for it cannot be arranged in a syllogism.*

¹⁴¹ See M. Aouad, M. Rashed, *L' exégèse R h é t o r i q u e d' Aristote : recherches byzantines. Première partie*, in *Medioevo* 23, 1997, p. 74. At p. 74 n. 54, Aouad and Rashed refer to the fact that in *K i t ʿĪtibā b al ʿĪtibā b*, pp. 115,13-117,12 Fārābī discusses the relationship of concomitance that can take place between *d a* and *l m a d* (together with relationships of anteriority and posteriority, already discussed in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*), while in p. 117,13-14 ed. Langhade, Fārābī mentions fire and smoke as examples of *d a*. Although the Arabic philosopher does not signal it, these points are not to be found in Aristotle (nor in his Arabic translation) but seem to derive from John Philoponus' commentary on *Prior Analytics*.

On the basis of Ğabr's recent edition of the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, we also know that the glossator of ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 chose to add in the margin of the page containing *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a3-b6 a note quoting a "comment" discussing the chronological relationship between a sign and what it signals, and citing fire and smoke as examples of signs. If we cannot make much more of such a finding, it surely reinforces Aouad and Rashed's impression that Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a3-b6 and *Rhet.* I.2 1357 a22-b25 where "co-interpreted" by Fārābī in his *K i t ʿĪtibā b al*, also on the basis of Philoponus' commentary to the *Prior Analytics*, and that the content and wording of *K i t ʿĪtibā b al* can be better understood in the light of the questions left open by both Aristotelian texts.

¹⁴² See Fārābī, *K i t ʿĪtibā b al* 111,7-113,14, J. Langhade (ed.)

(2) *The other one is necessary, as if someone said that there is a sign of the fact that someone is ill, for he is running a fever, or that someone has given birth, for she has milk in her breasts. Among signs, only the latter is a proof (τ ε κ μ) for it is the only one that cannot be refuted, on the condition that it is true.*

(3) *That which is in the same relationship as the universals to the particulars is as if someone said that there is a sign of the fact that someone is running a fever, for he is gasping. This too can be refuted, even if it is true, for even someone who is not running a fever can gasp.*

According to Aristotle, a sign and the thing it signifies can be in the same relationship as the particular towards the universal, or they can be in the same relationship as the universal towards the particular. Three examples complement this statement. The first two ostensibly refer to the first case (in which the sign and the signate are in the same relationship as the particular towards the universal), while the last example illustrates the second case (in which the sign and the signate are in the same relationship as the universal and the particular).

While the first and third example seem to fill their role rather uncontroversially, the second example raises some doubts. Aristotle seems to mean that, together with the first one, this example should illustrate the situation in which the sign and the signate are in the same relationship as the particular towards the universal. When Aristotle writes that someone's fever is a sign of the fact that he is ill, he must have in mind a syllogism close to the following: people running a fever are ill, a given individual runs a fever, this individual must therefore be ill. As explained by Grimaldi in his commentary,¹⁴³ in this syllogism "ill people" includes "people running a fever", and "people running a fever" includes our individual, and it is on this grounds that the fever is a valid middle term for a first figure syllogism, that leads to an irrefutable conclusion. This fits well with Aristotle's argument, who, without making it explicit, is also offering an example of sign for every syllogistic figure. Still, irrespective of Aristotle's previous

¹⁴³ See W.M.A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I, a Commentary*, New York, Fordham University Press 1980, pp. 66-68.

statement, here the sign – i.e. the middle term – and the signate are not in the relationship of the particular to the universal but in that of the universal to the particular.

This links the second example to the third one (a second figure sign) rather than to the first one (a third figure sign), for both “people running a fever” and “gasping people” are universals, while “this person,” who is ill, and “this person,” who is running a fever, are particulars.

The incongruence between Aristotle’s description of this example and its actual characteristics must have left its ancient readers as perplexed as ourselves: trying to establish a twofold classification of the three syllogistical figures of signs on the basis of the universality and particularity relationship between the sign (or middle term) and the signate bore unsatisfactory results. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* left the first figure sign midway between the signs that are in the same relationship as the particulars to the universals (an attribution based on the philosopher’s own statement) and the signs that are in the same relationship as the universals to the particulars (on the basis of the direct observation of the fact that the middle term of the proposed example, “people running a fever,” is more universal the subject of its conclusion, who is a given individual.)

In order to exit this aporia, Fārābī (followed by Averroes later on)¹⁴⁴ decided to shift from Aristotle’s twofold classification to a threefold classification, possibly influenced by the classification of signs offered in *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a10-23, which is openly centered on syllogistic figures. In order to do so, he abandoned particularity and universality of sign and signate as a classification criterion and selected a new one instead, based on whether the middle term of each sign should be regarded as more specific or more general than both the subject and the predicate of the conclusion.

¹⁴⁴ See Averroes, *Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote*, t. 2, pp. 22-23, ed. Aouad.

Consequently, in his *K i t āḥḥā b'āḥḥā*¹⁴⁵ Fārābī listed three different types of sign: that in which the middle term is more general than its predicate and its subject, that in which the middle term is more particular than its predicate and its subject, and that in which the middle term is more general than its subject and more particular than its predicate (or equal to it). The first two types, formed in the second and third figure respectively, are called *‘alāmā*, while the third one is never called a *‘alāmā* but rather a *dalīl* for, it is demonstrative and formed in the first figure.¹⁴⁶

F ā r ā b ī -Ḥ ā Ḥ ā b'ā Ḥ ā 113,8, ed. Langhade: There are two kind of signs. The first of them is the sign in which the common term is more general than the predicate and the subject together, and the second is the sign in which the common term is more specific than the predicate and the subject together. That in which the middle term is more general than the extremes is structured in the second figure and it can

And concerning the second kind of sign, namely that in which the middle term is more specific than the extremes, it is in v

And concerning the kind that is more general than the subject and more pecific than the predicate, or equal to it, that is a real proof, because its structure is syllogistic, and it is also a syllogism concerning that of which it is made proof.

I believe that this system of classification, not Aristotelian in its origin, was concocted in order to rephrase *Rhetoric* I.2 1357b10-20 in such a way to cover the same philosophical grounds – the classification of signs according to the relationship between their middle terms and their extremes – without raising the same interpretative difficulties. In the meanwhile, Fārābī did not let the occasion to enrich his presentation of signs with their classification by syllogistic figures offered in *Prior Analytics* II.27 go to waste.

¹⁴⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t āḥḥā b'āḥḥā*, pp. 111,7-113,8, J. Langhade (ed.)

¹⁴⁶ The distinction of signs (σημεία) and proofs (τεκμήρια) on the basis of syllogistic figures is also put forward by Aristotle in *Prior Analytics* II.27 70b1-6.

The Sign in Avicenna

Let us now discuss Avicenna's situation in more detail. Following his longstanding goal to account for the lexical peculiarities of the Arabic translation, alongside *d a* and *alāma*, in *K i t āb al* Avicenna employs the term *rasm* as well, as in III.8, 192,2 and III.8, 192,18. This approach is not specific to the rhetorical section of *K i t āb al*, since he quotes peculiarities of the translation lexicon in other logic sections of the same work. See for example *K i t āb al*, where at I.3, 24,8¹⁴⁷ we find *al-dā'i* ('~~the~~ widespread propositions) rather than *al-mahmūd* (~~the~~ commonly praised propositions) or *al-ma š h* (~~the~~ commonly known propositions) to cover the concept of ἔνδοξον, as in the first two books of Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī's translation of Aristotle's *Topics*,¹⁴⁸ and *K i t ā b a l* *Q i y* where the transliteration *ṭa ġ m ū r* for the Greek term τεκμήριον is mentioned and correctly interpreted as the surest kind of *alāma* in *K i t ā b a l* 24, 575,3. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, a similar transliteration (*t a q m d*) appears in the Parisinus Arabus 2346 version of the *Organon* as a translation of τεκμήριον.

A.M. Goichon's glossary has an entry for *d a*,¹⁴⁹ which is however not specifically concerned with the rhetorical usage of the term. Still, some elements stir the interest of the readers of *Kit ā b al* as well. Firstly, at point 1, devoted to the most common meaning of *d a*, *l ī l* the author translates it with *argumentation* and *demonstration*, citing as source the *A q s ā l ā h* *al- a q l* Moreover, while discussing more specific meanings of *dal*, Goichon states that it can refer to a first form truncated syllogism (*q i y d ā n s r*) as well, i.e. syllogisms in which the middle term is not openly stated. What is the difference between this case (taken from *K i t ā b a l* *Nağā*) and the case of *ḍa m ī f k*, described in I.6, 36,1-5 as a syllogism lacking a premise or examining a middle term that only thought requires? Let's consider the *K i t ā b a l* *Nağā* passage.

Avicenna, *K i t ā b al* 109,6-11 *Dāniš-Pažūh*: *T h e d a l ī l i n -l i k e h i s p*
syllogism whose middle term is one thing that, if it belongs to the minor term, is always followed by

¹⁴⁷ A similar occurrence is in Avicenna's *K i t ā b al*, 191,15.

¹⁴⁸ See *K i t ā b al*, 162, ed. Čabr.

¹⁴⁹ See A.-M. Goichon, *L e x i q u e d e l a l a n g u e p* Desclée de Brouwer, 1939, 148. *d ' I b n S ī n ā*

than the end terms – so that, if it declared its two premises, it would be of the third figure, like your

s p e e c h “ T h e b r a v e a ¹⁵³ v e a s t y b r a n m e i c a ¹⁵⁴ n l d t b y e r c a n u r s i e c o

The comparison of the passages from *K i t ā N b a ġ* ~~and~~ concern *d a larīd l'ā l ā m a* respectively, show us that Avicenna understood *d a ħ s ā* first figure (necessary) syllogism, and the second as a second or third figure (non-necessary) sign, in line with the Arabic Peripatetic correspondence between *d a ħ n d* τεκμήριον on one side and *‘a l ā* ἀνασημειῖον on the other side. Avicenna follows the same scheme in the *Q i y ā* ¹⁵⁵ and in the *H i t ā b* sections ¹⁵⁶ from *K i t ā b ā l Š i*, ~~fa~~ although in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* the enthymeme is not discussed in terms of syllogistic figures. Because of the obvious parallelism with *Prior Analytics* II.27, the *Anonimi in Rhetoricam* scholia illustrates Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* I.2, 1357b10-21 with the aid of syllogistic figures as well. ¹⁵⁷

The sign in Aristotle and in Avicenna: term, premise or syllogism?

Let us now discuss the respective usage of *d a ħ n d* *‘a l ā* in Avicenna’s works and in his sources. As already stated, in *K i t ā N b a ġ* ~~and~~ *l a l s* is defined either as a first figure truncated syllogism, or as its middle term, while Aristotle’s understanding of this term in his *Prior Analytics* is as follows:

***Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a6-9:** σ η μ ε δ ἰ β ο ω λ ε ε ἴ τ ν α ρ ὁ τ ἀ α π ο ι δ ε ἢ ἀ κ ν τ α γ κ ἡ ρ ἰ α ἰ α
ε ἵ ν δ ο ο ξ ἣ ο ἄ ρ ρ ν τ ἔ σ σ ζ ἠ ο ἣ ε ν ο μ ῆ ρ ὁ α τ ἔ ὕ ρ σ ο τ ν ε γ ρ ἔ ο γ ω ἄ ρ ἄ , γ ρ μ ο ἄ σ τ η ο μ ε ἵ ὁ ν
ε ἵ σ π α γ ὕ ε γ ο ἣ ε ἵ ν ν α ι

¹⁵³ Avicenna could be referring to *al-Ḥa ġ ġi āb ġn* (861-314a/c.), administrator and military leader for the Omayyad caliphs.

¹⁵⁴ The relevant Arabic text is:

¹⁵⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b ā l Š i*, pp. 574,2-575,13.

¹⁵⁶ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b ā l Š i*, pp. 43,10-45,7.

¹⁵⁷ Without going as far as an explicit reference to syllogistic figures, even Aristotle’s Arabic translation enriches the exemplification of this passage along the same lines (see *R ḥ* I.2, p. 13.16-24).

The sign is regarded as demonstrative premise, either necessary or generally recognized: for that which when it exists a thing is, or which when it has happened, before or after, a thing has happened, this is a sign of a thing happening or being

The fact that Avicenna calls the *dalīl* that is to say a syllogism, is hard to explain, since Aristotle seems to σημεῖον (and τεκμήριον) as a *premise* or πρότασις. We would rather expect to read that, since a *dalīl* is a *qiyās*, it is made up by the proper type of *muqaddamāt*, for example by *dalā'il / signs*.

This would fit with Aristotle's statements about enthymemes both in the *Prior Analytics* and in the *Rhetoric*.¹⁵⁸ For example, let us have a look at the following short passage from the *Analytics*:

Aristoteles, Prior Analytics II.27, 70a10-14: Ἐν θύμῳ ἔμμεσα ὅτι ἄλλο γέ τίς ἐστὶ κούτ' ὡς
σημεῖον, εἰ ἴσῳ ἄρα σὶ ἡ μὲν ὡς ἄλλο ἐπὶ πάντων ἢ ἐνὶ ἐσώπρῳ ὅτι ἄνασδι ὄξος

An enthymeme is a syllogism deriving from probabilities and signs, but probability and sign are not the same thing, for the probability is a

The only Arabic translation of the *Prior Analytics* that we can still read does not show any shift in the direction of Avicenna's text for what concerns the status of the *dalīl* as a *premise* rather than as a syllogism:

Kitāb al-ādalīl I 16, 2d7c, a b p m : d 4 c o s 8 , f a r a s ' a l ā m a
is a demonstrative premise, either necessary or generally recognized, because that which with its existence the thing exists, or that which with its being or of the being of the thing.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ See *Rhet.* II.25, 1402b13-20.

¹⁵⁹ This is the relevant Arabic text:

We should not let the presence of the term *‘a l ā* instead of *dalīl* mislead us, for, as we have already established together, in the *Prior Analytics* II.27 it stands for σημεῖον in its widest sense, which includes both the *necessary* and the *non-necessary sign*.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, Avicenna would probably name it *dalī* rather than *‘a l ā*, which makes it a suitable comparison for our *K i t ā b a l N a ḡpās* passage.

In the *Qiyā* section of his *K i t ā b a l N a ḡpās*, Avicenna confronts this very lines:

A v i c e n n a Q, i y ā K i s t ā B K 15 (ed): And in this place it is customary to name *dalī l* that which is made of two premises, the multitude sees and affirms, and an argument and a *dalī l* are taken not in it is a *dalī l* for another of its parts, like smoke itself made up of the two parts is a *dalī l*. Sometimes it concerns a concerns a thing in the present, sometimes it happens in general, and sometimes it happens usually, like when they say that envious people are hated and that benefactors are loved. Both these premises are a *dalī l*, *dalī l r* can be taken from both of them. should be made into a *‘a l ā* and *dalī l*, or that the benefit and this speech itself should be a *dalī*, that is to say, something that is followed, accepted, recognized, and employed. And indeed, this is what is meant by *dalī l* in ¹⁶¹his place.

Avicenna seems to maintain that Aristotle’s statement according to which a *‘a l ā* is *naa muqaddama* (or πρότασις, *premise*) does not threaten the understanding of *dalī* and *‘a l ā* as a

¹⁶⁰ This solution is not limited to our Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics*, for *‘a l ā* stands for σημεῖον in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* I.6 75a33 and II.17 99a3 (translated at pp. 454.14 and 611.6 of Ğabr’s edition of the *Arabic Organon* respectively, although in the first case Ğabr prints the reading *bi-l-‘a l*, while iBādawī and the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 prefer *bi-l-‘a l ā*. Finally, *‘a l ā* translates σημεῖον in all the extant Arabic versions of the *Sophistical Refutations* 167b9 (see pp. 815.2, 816.14, and 818.10 of Bādawī’s edition).

¹⁶¹ This is the relevant Arabic text:

syllogisms, but rather that, in this passage (*fī ādā -mawḍi*),¹⁶² Aristotle is disallowing the habit of naming *dalī* the middle term of a syllogism of the *dalī*-type. This position is probably not endorsed by Avicenna himself, both because of his *K i t āNba ḡ* definition of the *dalī*¹⁶³ and because of the use he makes of the word *dalī* throughout his *K i t āHibā b.* Avicenna implies a distinction between *ḍamīr* on one side and *dalī* and *‘a l ā* on the other in *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā* as well, where he talks about *ḍamā* that are taken from *maḥm ū ād t* , and *‘d l ā ā*.¹⁶⁴ Avicenna’s point of departure in analysing the incipit of *Prior Analytics* II.27 may have been the fact that, more precisely, Aristotle’s translation calls the *‘a l ā* *andemonstrative premise*, or *muqaddama burhā n i .y y a*

Throughout Avicenna’s work, a *dalī* or a *‘a l ā* may be either a middle term (*hadd*) or a syllogism (*qiyā*) and, whenever Aristotle’s influence is most felt, a premise (*muqaddama*) as well.¹⁶⁶

Avicenna: are there ḍamā’ir that are neither dalā’il nor ‘alāmāt?

After reflecting upon the passages on *d a ,l‘aīllā* and *ḍa m*¹⁶⁷ from *K i t āNba ḡ* the reader could wonder if *ḍa m* should be seen as co-extensive with the couple *dal -fa ll ā* rather than as something that derives from them. I think that this is indeed the case within *K i t ā b a l N a ḡ* and probably within *K i t ā b i y a* well.

¹⁶² Often this syllogism is called *dalīl* itself, while often it is the middle term that is called with this (word)

(Avicenna, *K i t āNba ḡ* 109, 6-11 ed. Dāniš-Pažūh).

¹⁶³ See for example *K i t āHibā b.*, p. 44,4, where birth itself (*al-w i l*) is said to be the *d a* of the lack of virginity of the mother.

¹⁶⁴ Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā*, p. 91,7-9, ed. Šāliḥ.

¹⁶⁵ See *K i t ā b i y a*, p. 408,5 ed. Ḡabr: , Aristotle’s original text in *Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a6-7 read σημείον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἢ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος.

¹⁶⁶ See for example *K i t ā b i y a*.

¹⁶⁷ For *d a* and *‘d l ā* see above in this section, for *ḍa m* see section 1.3 of this text, titled *Lexical Difficulties Posed by the Arabic Translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric*

I would like to draw attention on the quick reference to rhetorical subjects made by Avicenna at the beginning of *K i t ā Q b i y ā l s* IX-2, p. 555,6-11 (which elaborates upon the incipit of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* II.23)¹⁶⁸

Avicenna, K i t ā Q b i y ā l s I X-8: And w i t h . i n 5 t 5 h , e 6 d a m ā ' i r t h e c a l l e d d a l ā ' i w e a r e g o i n g t o m e n t i o n k n o w t h a t r h e t o r i c a l a r g u m e n t s a r e e i t h e r d a m ā ' i r i n a r e w h i t t e d - h a n d i f t h e y w e r e n o t r e s t r a i n e d , t h e y w o u l d m i s e r v e r e v e r t t o o n e o f t h e s y l l o g i s t i c f i g u r e s - o r e x a m p l e s t h a t a r e p r e s u m e d

Here, the couple *d a l ā ' i* and *ī a l l ā ' i* seem to exhaust the space of enthymemes, which are described exclusively as syllogisms with a hidden major premise.

In *K i t ā Q b i y ā l s* IX-24 Avicenna also states that the *d a l ā ' i* built on a major premise that is recognized and a minor premise that is individual is called enthymeme (*antū m ī*)¹⁷⁰ and that a *ī a l ā ' i* is a *d a m ā ' i* in which the major and the minor terms are united by a *ī a l ā ' i*¹⁷¹

Finally, Avicenna explicitly states that anything that is not a *d a m ā ' i* cannot be a *d a l ā ' i* or a *ī a l ā ' i*:

*Avicenna, K i t ā Q b i y ā l s I X-13: A f t e r t h e 5 t h p a r t 2 d a l ā ' i a n d p r e m i s e i s h i d d e n (u d h) , w h i l e i f i t i s n o t s o t h e y b e c o m e a s y l l o g i s m .*¹⁷²

This is a far cry from Aristotle's original statement, in the parallel passage from the *Prior Analytics*:

Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II.27, 70a24-25: Ἐὰ μὲν ὁ ἄνω ἡμίλιος ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ἰσοῦν γίνομαι ὁ ἄνω ἡμίλιος ἔστι τὸ ἐπὶ ἁπλοῦς ἡμίλιος ἰσοῦν

¹⁶⁸ See Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II.23 68b8-14.

¹⁶⁹ The relevant Arabic text is:

¹⁷⁰ To the word *ī n ū* printed in Zāyid's edition I prefer the reading of the ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 (which could well be an emendation based on the knowledge of the Arabic translation of the *Prior Analytics*, or maybe of the Greek word ἐνθύμημα itself). See Avicenna, *K i t ā Q b i y ā l s*, pp.573,4-574,2, ed. S. Zāyid.

¹⁷¹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā Q b i y ā l s*, pp.573,4-574,2-3.

¹⁷² This is the relevant passage in Arabic:

If only one premise is spoken, there is just a sign, but, if the other one is added, there is a syllogism.

Aristotle is merely underlining that a σημεῖον is a premise (as in *Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a6-7) which could build an enthymematic syllogism together with another premise. The idea that, by saying “only one premise” something would be actively omitted was originally inserted by the Arabic translator,¹⁷³ which amplified the Aristotelian ἐὰν μὲν οὖν ἡ μία λεχθῆι πρότασις (if only one premise is spoken) to obtain the phrase and if one premise is spoken and the other one is suppressed.¹⁷⁴ Avicenna prefers the technical verb *aḍmara* (to omit enthymematically) to the translator’s *akbata* (to suppress), thus implying the idea that *d a l aḥd^ḥ ia ll ā m ā* is definition *ḍa m ā* as well.

What is most, within the boundaries of *K i t āb al-ḥikm* there is no reference to *ḍa m ā* deriving from anything but *d a l aḥd^ḥ ia ll ā m ā* to be contrasted with Aristotle statement in *Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a10 that enthymemes are syllogisms from probabilities (εἰκότα) or signs (σημεῖα).

A global comparison between the incipit of Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* II.27 and its parallel passage in Avicenna’s *K i t āb al-ḥikm* is very instructive: while in the *Prior Analytics* probability (εἰκότος or *a y ḍ i ā* a generally recognized premise (πρότασις ἔνδοξος, *muqaddama maḥm ū ḍ*, the sign (σημεῖον or *ʿa l ā*) is a demonstrative premise (πρότασις ἀποδεικτική, *muqaddama b u r h ā*), neither necessary or recognized (ἢ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος, *immā ḍ i ḥ r ā r i-ḥiyyā* w a *maḥm ū ḍ*, and the enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, *antū m ī*) derives from both probabilities and signs, in *K i t āb al-ḥikm* the sign (*d a l aḥd^ḥ ia ll ā m ā*) which is also called an *antū m ī*, derives from a recognized premise (*muqaddama maḥm ū ḍ*) and an individual premise (ḥ *ḥiyya*). Since all *d a l aḥd^ḥ ia ll ā m ā* t have the characterizing qualities of the *ḍa m ā*, and all *ḍa m ā* are either *d a l aḥd^ḥ ia ll ā m ā*, the term

¹⁷³ See *K i t āb al-ḥikm* *ḍi ḥ r ā r i-ḥiyya*, p. 409,24-25 ed. Ğabr.

¹⁷⁴ Ğabr’s text reads , but I prefer , as in Badawī’s edition and in ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346.

ḍa m means nothing more than the sum of *d a l* and *ʿa l l ā*, which might be why it does not receive an independent discussion in the *K i t ā b* context.¹⁷⁵

The *K i t ā b* landscape is very different, for the author clearly asserts the derivation of *ḍa m ā* from both *d a l* and probabilities – called either *ṣā d i*¹⁷⁶ or *ḡ ṭ*¹⁷⁷ as in the Arabic version of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. A statement to the same effect, although without the mention of *ṣā d i*, appears in *al-Ḥikma al-ʿ Adhiyyā*,¹⁷⁸ where it is stated that *ḍa m ā* derive either from *d a l ā ʿ i l* or from recognised premises (*maḥm ū d*). On the other hand, the role of *d a l* and *l ā* as a syllogisms is not clearly expressed in Avicenna’s rhetorical writings.¹⁷⁹

1.4.8 – Probable (εἰκός)

The Probable in the Arabic Translations of the *Organon*

Concerning the meaning of Aristotle’s εἰκός, or *probable*, *probability*, its proximity with ἔνδοξον, or *generally admitted*, the next term on our list of rhetorical concepts, is evident even to the superficial reader. The relationship between these terms has been studied by W.M.A. Grimaldi and by J. Sprute, the latter pointing out how a subjective and doxastic quality is present in εἰκός as well, since this concept cannot be reduced to what happens most of the time, but it also refers to what is known to happen most of the time.¹⁸⁰ Yet, I believe that, although εἰκός and ἔνδοξον could both refer to the same kind of statements that support enthymemes, Aristotle did not employ them in a fully synonymic way, but that he did intentionally use the opposition between

¹⁷⁵ This also implies that R. Würsch’s question on why Avicenna uses *d a l* rather than *ʿa l ā* in order to say *sign in general* would lose much of its interest if asked in analytical context, for here this concept is probably best expressed by the word *ḍa m*. See R. Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik: ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*, Berlin, K. Schwarz, 1991, p. 208, n. 124

¹⁷⁶ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b* p. 43,10-13. In this passage, before stating that enthymemes derive from *d a l* and *l ā* *ṣā d i*, Avicenna classifies rhetorical premises according to their level of certitude as well.

¹⁷⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b*, p. 191,17 and ff., ed. Sālim.

¹⁷⁸ Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿ Adhiyyā*, pp. 91,1-4 and 91,14-15, ed. Šāliḥ.

¹⁷⁹ On this subject, see the previous section.

¹⁸⁰ See W.M.A. Grimaldi, *S e m e i o n , T e k m e r i o n a*, in *American Journal of Philology* Vol. 101.4 (1980) and J. Sprute, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1982, pp. 74-75.

these two terms in order to characterize ἔνδοξον in a rather subjective direction (close to Sprute's ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δοκοῦντα, or the things that, on most occasions, are known by opinion) and εἰκός is a more objective one (rather in line with Sprute's reference to ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὄντα, or *the things that are on most occasions*). Objectively close as the two terms εἰκός and ἔνδοξον may be, it is still interesting to reflect on whether translators and later philosophers recognized and valorized the subtle distinction that separates them.

On the other hand, as far as the translation of Aristotle's εἰκός, or *probable, probability*, is concerned, it is again interesting to point out how the Arabic version of *Prior Analytics* both transliterates it as *a y q̄ ānā* and substitutes it with the translation of its Aristotelian definition, πρότασις ἔνδοξος, or *muqaddama maḥm ū d commonly praised premise*.¹⁸² Although the choice of offering a transliteration of the Greek word points to the fact that Taḍāri recognized εἰκός as a technical term, by adopting the expression *muqaddama maḥm ū d* as its equivalent the translator added to this concept a subjective connotation that is absent from Aristotle's term. The expression *maḥm ū d* which literally means *praised*, implies the idea of personal or social appreciation, rather than that of objective likelihood inherent in εἰκός. This semantic shift, coupled with the homonymy thus introduced between εἰκός and ἔνδοξον, proved to have far-reaching consequences on the conceptualization of rhetoric in the Islamic Peripatetic school.¹⁸³

On the other hand, the translation of the *Rhetoric* offers again many equivalents, which probably implies that the translator did not understand the term εἰκός in a technical sense, as it happened in the case of other concepts that we have already discussed. Moreover, most of the solutions adopted in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* originate from the roots of the verbs *ṣadaqa*

¹⁸¹ See *K i t ā b āl q̄ ānā* I.27, p. 408,4, ed. Ğabr.

¹⁸² See *K i t ā b āl q̄ ānā* I.27, p. 408,8, ed. Ğabr.

¹⁸³ On the lexical shift towards subjectivity implicit in the translation of εἰκός with maḥmūd, see M. Aouad, M. Rashed, *L ' e x é g è s e d e l a R h é t o r i q u e s o m m e n t a d e ū r s A g r e c s , a s a l t e s e t b y z a n t i n s . D e u x i è m e h e r c h p a r t i e*, in *Medioevo* 25, 1999, pp. 591-595.

(to tell the truth), *ḥaqqā* (to be right) and *wā ḡ* (to be necessary), a fact that seemed bound to obfuscate the link between εἰκός and possibility.¹⁸⁴

However, the many equivalents of εἰκός found in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* notwithstanding, it is *maḥm ū* that will become standard within Peripatetic tradition. Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes will on occasion recur to the anomalous solutions witnessed by the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but this is by no means the regular case. It is on account of their anomalous character that we will look at such cases with keen interest.

Finally, it is relevant to point out that *maḥm ū* (for *muqaddama maḥm ū*) does not only translate or mirror εἰκός but also the Aristotelian ἔνδοξον, *generally admitted*.¹⁸⁵ Therefore, whenever in later authors standard Peripatetic lexicon is adhered to, it is not always clear whether mentions of *maḥm ū* are references to εἰκός or to ἔνδοξον, and if these two terms were discrete in the mind of Arabic readers at all, especially since their meaning and range of usage were from the beginning quite close.

The Probable in Fārābī

The Probable in Fārābī Šaṣḥ al-Ḥiṭāba

Unluckily, we cannot verify whether the employment of *wā ḡ* and *maḥm ū* for referring to the probable and the generally recognized respectively (i.e. the Greek εἰκός and ἔνδοξον) actually took place in Fārābī's *Long Commentary* on the *Rhetoric*, for its original lexical constitution can only be established for the passages that have been cited by Ibn Riḍwān in his *Book of what, taken from*

¹⁸⁴ Within the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle names εἰκός in chap. I.2, namely in 1357a32-36, 1357b21, and in chapp. I.3 1359a8, I.9 1367b31, I.11 1371a13, I.15 1376a18-22, I.19 1392b25 and 1393a7, II.23 1400a7-8, 1400a12, II.24 1402a9-14, 1402a17-23, 1402a27, and II.25 1402b14-16, 1402b21, 1402b24, 1402b26-34, 1403a7. The author of the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* selects *ṣā d* (or a related word) in *Rhet.* I.2-3 p. 13.2, 13.4, 13.25, *ḥaqq* in chap. I.9 p. 47,11, *aḥr* (for μάλλον εἰκός) in I.11 p. 58.11, *m u ṣ ā* in I.15 p. 76.10-12, 76.14, he omits a specific translation for εἰκός in I.19 p. 132.15 and 133.6-7, and he selects *wā ḡ* in II.23 p. 157.16-17, p. 157.21 (here μὴ εἰκός forms an endyadis with ἄπιστον, and ἄπιστον is translated as *lam yakun muṣaddiqan*), II.24 p. 166.1-3, p. 166.5, p. 166.8, p. 166.13, and II.25 p. 168.15-16, p. 168.18, p. 168.20.

¹⁸⁵ On the translations of ἔνδοξον in the Arabic versions of the *Organon*, see paragraph of this subsection devoted to *The Probable in The Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 71-73.

logic, is employed in arts and sciences. This is mainly the case for textual sections concerning non discursive means of persuasion, so that no equivalent for εἰκός or ἔνδοξον occurs in them.¹⁸⁶

The Probable in Fārābī Šaḥ al-Qiyās

While interpreting *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a10 in his *Šaḥ al-Qiyās*,¹⁸⁷ whenever relevant, Fārābī cites a ḡ i b ā ṭ maḥma ū d, ~~which~~ the transliteration of εἰκός he found in Taḍārī's translation,¹⁸⁸ but when the choice of words is his own he usually prefers the expression *maḥm ū d* or *muqaddama maḥm ū d*.¹⁸⁹

A remarkable exception does however occur in *Šaḥ al-Qiyās* p. 551,10, where Fārābī states that there are two kinds of enthymemes, those that are called *al-mū ḡ i b ā ṭ maḥma ū d*, ~~which~~ necessary and commonly praised things,¹⁹⁰ and those that are called *al-ḡ a l ā ṭ ma ṣigns*.¹⁹¹ This distinction clearly follows the Greek expression ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων, *from probable things or signs* (*Prior Analytics* II.27 70a10), in such a way that – as in Taḍārī's translation – *ḡ a l ā ṭ ma ṣigns* mirrors the Greek term σημεῖα, *signs*, while the hendiadys *al-mū ḡ i b ā ṭ maḥma ū d* ~~which~~ reflect the term εἰκότα, *probable things*.

¹⁸⁶ For a discussion of how Ibn Riḍwān's textual quotes can be identified by the word-by-word parallel between the *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences* and the Latin translation of Fārābī's *Long Commentary* by Hermannus Alemannus (known as *Didascalica in Rhetoricam Aristotelis*), and for an edition of Ibn Riḍwān's passages themselves, see M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalica in Rhetoricā* in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 133-180. Moreover, any hope of gleaning some insight on the subject of Fārābī's lexical choices on the subject of the probable and of the generally recognized from Hermannus Alemannus' translation of Fārābī's *Long Commentary* on the *Rhetoric* is cut short by the fact that the terms ἔνδοξον ed εἰκός do not appear in *Rhet. I.1* 1354a1-4, the part of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* that is commented upon in the surviving section of the *Didascalica*.

¹⁸⁷ See Fārābī, *Šaḥ al-Qiyās* *As-manṭi q i y-l-ḡ ā ṭ r, ṣoḷb II* p. 550,23-553,11, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

¹⁸⁸ See *K i t ā b al-ḡ a l ā ṭ ma ṣigns*, p. 408,4-6, ed. Ğabr.

¹⁸⁹ See Fārābī, *Šaḥ al-Qiyās* *As-manṭi q i y-l-ḡ ā ṭ r, ṣoḷb II* p. 551,5, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

¹⁹⁰ The perusal of *Šaḥ al-Qiyās* p. 551,21-23 disposes of possible residual doubts on the meaning of *mū ḡ i b ā ṭ ma ṣigns*, which could hypothetically be the plural of *mū ḡ a ṭ ma ṣigns*, *affirmative sentence*. However, still in the frame of his analysis of *Prior Analytics* II.27, Fārābī explains that while a *ḡ a l ā ṭ ma ṣigns* always affirmative (*mū ḡ a ṭ ma ṣigns*), *maḥm ū d* is either affirmative (*mū ḡ a ṭ ma ṣigns*) or negative (*sā l ḡ*), and *mū ḡ i b ā ṭ ma ṣigns* is explicitly synonymous with *maḥm ū d*. See Fārābī, *Šaḥ al-Qiyās* *As-manṭi q i y-l-ḡ ā ṭ r, ṣoḷb II* p. 551,21-23, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

¹⁹¹ Even if in other contexts the most generic expression employed to refer to signs was *ḡ a l ā ṭ ma ṣigns*, where Fārābī employs *ḡ a l ā ṭ ma ṣigns* as a general term, referring both to necessary and non-necessary signs (as σημεῖον did in Aristotle) because such is the usage in Taḍārī's translation of the *Prior Analytics*. See *K i t ā b al-ḡ a l ā ṭ ma ṣigns*, p. 408, ed. Ğabr.

The presence of the participle *m ū ġ*, *necessary* – roughly synonymous with *w ā ġ* – is very noteworthy, for no offspring of the root *w a ġ* ever translates εἰκός in Taḍāri’s version of the *Prior Analytics*. Nothing of the sort appears in the marginalia of ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 either. The lexicon provided by Lyons for the Arabic version of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* only mentions *m ū ġ i b* as a translation of the Greek participle κατασκευάζων, *confirming*,¹⁹² but *w ā ġ* together with *haqq* and *ṣā d*, is one of the most common equivalents of εἰκός in the Arabic *Rhetoric*.

This circumstance implies that, even if for Fārābī the standard term for referring to *probable* was usually *maḥm ū d*, *comprehension was aware of the fact* that, in some contexts, the same concept could be expressed by words like *m ū ġ* or *w ā ġ necessary*, and that this equivalence was well established enough to overcome the apparent incongruence between the literal meaning of *m ū ġ* or *w ā ġ* and the general sense of the logical passages in which it was used, apparently more in line with the employment of *maḥm ū d*.

Since we do not know of other translations of the *Prior Analytics* besides Taḍāri’s work,¹⁹³ the awareness of the functional synonymy between *w ā ġ* and *maḥm ū d* could either be due to the circulation of further scholia to the aforementioned Aristotelian texts, or to a direct comparative analysis of the Arabic texts of the *Rhetoric* and of the *Prior Analytics* operated by Fārābī himself.

However, Fārābī does not merely present *m ū ġ* and *w ā ġ* as near-synonyms of *maḥm ū d*. He also elaborates upon the different nuances of their meaning, which is a common reflex of Arabic Peripatetic philosophers when faced with the lexical vagaries of the Arabic *Corpus Aristotelicum* or of their Arabic commentators.

The premises called *w ā ġ* are qualified as being true for the most part (*‘a l -āktar*) and as relating to the future (*f ī-mustaqbal*), while other premises are explicitly said to be exempt

¹⁹² See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, vol. II, p. 79, M.C. Lyons (ed.), Cambridge, 1982.

¹⁹³ See F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus, the Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Brill, Leiden, 1968, pp. 14-16.

from the qualification of being true “for the most part” and are said to refer either to the present or to the past.

Fārābī (Qiyās al-ṣāḥih -20, ed. Dā 5n-Ḥ B Ḥ Ḥ) he [i.e. Aristotle] related that, within rhetoric premises, the necessary premise (al-muqaddama al-wāḡiba) is a commonly known premise (muqaddama mašhūra) taken from what, in the future, is or is not for the most part (‘alā al-aktar), and by these two things he meant the possible things (al-mumkina) that do not exist now, and that for the most part will be or will not be existing, ” in this he does not pose the condition posed as a condition in that which is capable of not being, and this is why the condition for the most part ” is posed in it .

In *Ki t al-Ḥiṭā b* when Fārābī makes the same distinction between rhetorical premises that are unconditional (‘a l-ḥlāq wa-ġ a y r) and premises for which the condition (š a) of being for the most part (‘a l āaktan) is posed,¹⁹⁴ the latter are given no specific name, while it is the former that are called *maḥm ū d ā t* .

Fārābī (Ḥiṭā b al-Ḥiṭā b, ed. Langhade: 0 and those among them [i.e. the species] in which it is found something that is or is not in the future for the most part, and it appears clearly that , when they are chosen as major premises (maẓn ū na) . Concerning (maḥm ū d ā t) in which it is assumed that something does or does not befall to something else absolutely and without condition, they are taken as indeterminate and universal.

Implicitly, the comparison between these passages from *Š ḍ al-Qiyā* and from *Ki t al-Ḥiṭā b* outlines a subtle distinctive connotation of *maḥm ū d ā t* and *w ā ḡ* which is just sufficiently marked to account for the existence of two separate terms but not deep enough to undermine the fact that both *maḥm ū d ā t* and *w ā ḡ* can refer synonymically to the concept called εἰκός by Aristotle.

¹⁹⁴ See Fārābī, *Ki t al-Ḥiṭā b*, p. 109.13-17, J. Langhade (ed.)

While it has already been observed that *Prior Analytics* II.27 played an important role in resolving the difficulties of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and of its translation,¹⁹⁵ the presence of the term *m ā ḡ* in Fārābī's *Š ḏ ḥ al-Q i yw* would also imply the use of *Rhetoric* to round off the reader's understanding of the *Prior Analytics*, thus drawing our attention to the global way in which Aristotle's corpus, and especially his *Organon*, was viewed and used in the Arabic Peripatetic school. This is all the more to the point since nothing, in our *Prior Analytics* passage, called for further explanation, in so far as the expressions *maḥm ū ḏr muqaddama maḥm ū d* were concerned.

The Probable in Fārābī Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba

As in *Š ḏ ḥ al-Qiyā siḥ* his *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, while listing the species included within rhetorical premises, Fārābī employs the word *w ā ḡ* together, with *m u ḥ a ā t maḥm ū d ā b t ā d f i ḥ i l y i l* and *ʿ a l ā m b ā ā d - i f ā i - l y ḡ i l ā* based on what we have stated about Fārābī's *Š ḏ ḥ al-Qiyā* we could expect *w ā ḡ* to have a meaning close to or identical with that of *maḥm ū d*. However, the syntax of this passage seems to bind *w ā ḡ* imbrā strictly to *ʿ a l ā* rather than to *maḥm ū d*.¹⁹⁶ t

F ā r ā b ī ; Ḥ i ḥ ḥ b u ā - 12, ad. Langhade And between species there are preferred propositions (*m u ' a ḥ a r ā t*) or propositions secondly necessities (*w ā ḡ i b ā t*) and signs (*ʿ a l ā*)

This appears to mean that Fārābī individuates three elements in rhetorical species: (1) *maḥm ū d ā t*, commonly, synonymous with *m u ḥ a ā t m a ḥ m ū d ā b t ā d f i ḥ i l y i l*, (2) *w ā ḡ i b ā t*, and (3) *ʿ a e l s ā s m i ā t t*. However, this understanding of Fārābī's passage raises some questions.

¹⁹⁵ See M. Aouad, M. Rashed, *L ' e x é g è s e d e l a R h é t o r i q u e d ' A r i s t o t e : r e c o l l e c t i o n d e t r a d u c t i o n s b y z a n t i n s*. Deuxième partie, in *Medioevo* 25, 1999, pp. 593-595.

¹⁹⁶ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i ḥ ā b*, pp. 109, 11, Langhade (éd.), in *Al-Fārābī, K i t ā b al-Ḥ i ḥ ā b*, Langhade (éd.), and al-Fārābī, *Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, ed. M. Grignaschi, in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971.

Firstly, Fārābī's Aristotelian reference is probably *Rhet.* I.2 1357a32, where we read that enthymemes derive from probabilities (εἰκότα) and from signs (σημεία): we would therefore expect a list organised in two points, rather than in three. Secondly, as seen in the previous paragraph, in *Šiḥ al-Qiyā* terms like *maḥm ū d a n* (or *mūāḡḡār*)¹⁹⁷ are synonymous and refer to Aristotle's εἰκός, *probability*, so that they could hardly constitute two separate items on a list, at least without a conspicuous and explicit justification that is absent from Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*. Thirdly, in the following lines, Fārābī discusses extensively *maḥm ū d a n* (association with *d a l*)¹⁹⁷ but not *w ā ḡ i* suggesting that this term plays an ancillary role to either *maḥm ū d a n* or *ḥ a l ā*. Moreover, if we chose to understand *w ā ḡ i* and *ḥ a l ā* as two discrete concepts, it would be syntactically hard to see how *f i b ā d - i ḥ a m i ḥ*, *a t*¹⁹⁸ *f i r s t* could simultaneously refer to both of them. However, at the same time, not qualifying one of the species of rhetoric with the expression *f i b ā d - i ḥ a m i ḥ* would seem in contrast with the philosophical goals of Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*.¹⁹⁹ Finally, the adverb *t ā n i y y a n*,²⁰⁰ *s e c o n d* presupposes that this list is organized around two polarities, and that *w ā ḡ i* must therefore form a block either with *maḥm ū d a n* or with *ḥ a l ā m ā t*.

Maybe, rather than *and secondly necessities* (*wa-w ā ḡ i ḥ a m i ḥ*) Sālim's and Langhade's editions,²⁰¹ we could read *o r n e c e s s i t y* at p. 109,11 (with the amended reading),²⁰²

¹⁹⁷ For *maḥm ū d a n* see Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭāba*, p. 109,15-111,2, J. Langhade (ed.), for *ḥ a l ā m ā t* see Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭāba*, pp. 111,3 ff., J. Langhade (ed.)

¹⁹⁸ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭāba*, p. 109,12, J. Langhade (ed.)

¹⁹⁹ On the role of *f i b ā d - i ḥ a m i ḥ* as the proprium of rhetoric in Fārābī see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *Arabic Science and Concept Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 133-180.

²⁰⁰ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭāba*, p. 109,12, J. Langhade (ed.)

²⁰¹ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭāba*, p. 54,15-16, M.S. Sālim (ed.), and Al-Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭāba*, p. 109,11-12, Langhade (ed.), in Al-Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭāba*, Langhade (éd.), and al-Fārābī, *Didascaliam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971. Langhade's apparatus states that, while ms. Bratislava University Library, TE 41 has the adopted text, the ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 812 reads *m a ḡ i* instead of *maḥm ū d a n*, but since the verb *ḡamada*, to freeze, is intransitive, this is probably to be understood as a lapsus calami.

Fārābī would be stating that premises which are species can be either (1) probabilities (named either *mu'ata r*, *ārt maḥm ū d*, *ārtw ā ḡ*) or (2) signs (*ʿa l ā*), close parallel to Aristotle's statements in *Rhet. I.2 1357a32 τὰ δὲ ἐνθυμήματα ἔξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων* (*enthymemes derive either from probabilities and from signs*) or in *Prior Analytics II.27 70a10 ἐνθύμημα δὲ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ἔξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων* (*an enthymeme is a syllogism deriving either from probabilities or from signs*).²⁰³ This understanding would also be coherent with Fārābī's synonymic use of *ay q ū s* *maḥm ū d* and *m ū ḡ* in the commentary to Aristotle's *Prior Analytics II.27* from his *Š dī al-Qiyā s* for in that context, as discussed above, all these terms reflect the Greek εἰκός.²⁰⁴ The expectation of finding two groups of rhetorical species, inspired by the adverb *tā n i y y a n*, at the end of *n d l y* the phrase, would be satisfied, as would the expectation of finding all the elements of the list (or none of them) discussed in the following pages.

However, even if we accepted the emendation of *wa-w ā ḡ i* into *aw-w ā ḡ i* the expression *fī b ā d-i ā*, at first sight, would still be attributed to only two out of the four terms cited in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* to illustrate the rhetorical species, namely to *maḥm ū d* and *ʿa l ā* to the exclusion of *w ā ḡ i* assumedly synonyms of *maḥm ū d*. Therefore, I would rather discard this hypothesis, for one of the main philosophical tenets of Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* is that rhetorical arguments can emerge from different kinds of premises, as long as they are, formally and materially, effective at first sight.

²⁰² It is acceptable to suggest emendations to the text shared by ms. Bratislava University Library, TE 41 and ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 812 (the two witnesses of Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* known to and used by J. Langhade to prepare his edition of the text) on account of the similarity that the editor recognizes between them, although he does not state whether this closeness is positively due to transmission mistakes, which would imply sure kinship between the two copies. He does however rule out direct filiation between ms. Bratislava University Library, TE 41 and ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 812, or vice versa, for both manuscripts have incontrovertible lacunae that are not shared by the other. See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 8-9, J. Langhade (ed.)

²⁰³ The lexicon of the Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics* passage is similar to that selected by Fārābī in his *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, for εἰκότα is translated as *m u q a d d ḥ i m ū d a i a d* σημεῖα is translated as *ʿa l ā*, while in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* we find *šā d i a d d ā t a l*. A similar parallel passage is *Rhet. II.25 1402b14*, where the sources of enthymemes are given as *probability* (εἰκός), *example, evidence* (τεκμήριον), and *sign* (σημεῖον), while the Arabic translation has *wāḡib* for εἰκός, *ʿa l ā* for τεκμήριον, and *rasm* for σημεῖον.

²⁰⁴ Cfr Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i y i ā* *Ad-manṭi q i y-l-f ā t r*, vol. II p. 550,23-551,23, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

Without modifying the traditional text, we could view it in the following light: while in *K i t āQbi y* probably on the impulse of the Arabic translation of *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a1-10, Fārābī did not seem to draw a distinction between what Aristotle calls εἰκότα and what he calls ἔνδοξα, here, when commenting upon the *Rhetoric*, he did separate them. He also situated them at a different analytical levels, for, while *w ā ḡ i εἰκότα* ~~was~~ contraposed to *‘a l ā m ā ḡ i*, and both taken together constitute (2) the second degree understanding of what are the species of rhetorical premises, its first degree understanding is (1) *maḥm ū d ʿā t d /o* (synonymous with *m u ḡ a r*) Aristotle’s passage on σημεία and εἰκότα as the source of enthymemes in *Rhet.* I.2 1357a32 would therefore be quoted, but, unlike in our previous reconstruction, the couple *w ā ḡ i b ā t* and *‘a l ā* ~~was~~ taken as a whole, would constitute a single point in the list of rhetoric species. If we accepted this option, we would be dealing with a list of three elements, organized in two groups. Coherently with Fārābī’s doctrinal goal, both understandings of rhetorical species would be said to be effective *f ī b r ā d ’ i y ’ , i d* and, coherently with the presence of the adverb *t ā n i y y a n*, secondly, the exposition would be organized in two points. If this were the right understanding, in his commentary to the *Rhetoric*, Fārābī would indeed closely reproduce the lexical options of the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* itself, rather than those of the Arabic *Prior Analytics*, which, unsurprisingly, were adhered to in his *K i t āQbi y* with the only addition from the Arabic *Rhetoric* of *m ū ḡ a s* as a further translation of εἰκότος, synonymic with *maḥm ū d*. As an example of the coincidence of the lexical choices operated in *K i t āHā b* ~~was~~ in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, note that, in the latter text, *maḥm ū d* is by far the most common translation of ἔνδοξον,²⁰⁵ and *w ā ḡ i b* only appears as a translation of εἰκότος (although εἰκότος itself has many other equivalents).²⁰⁶

Nevertheless, this explanation remains unsatisfactory for two main reasons: firstly, while in the following pages the (1) *maḥm ū d ʿā t d /o* ~~was~~ indeed be discussed,²⁰⁷ and so would be the

²⁰⁵ With only one exception, for in *Rhet.* II.25, 14002a33 ἔνδοξα is translated as *zu n* (presumptions). See the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon* pp. 93-96.

²⁰⁶ See the section of this chapter devoted to the *The Probable in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 71-73.

²⁰⁷ See Fārābī, *K i t āHā b*, pp. 109,15-111,2, J. Langhade (ed.)

(2b) *‘a l ā /σημεία*,²⁰⁸ we would receive no further explanation on the (2a) *w ā ḡ /εἰκότα*. However, as a separate item on the emended list, we should expect an individual analysis of (2a) *w ā ḡ /εἰκότα* to take place, even if in *K i t ā-Ḥiṭā b a*.l 54,15-16 (2a) and (2b) were listed together, in opposition with (1). Secondly, in the Aristotelian pages that run parallel to our passage, the εἰκός, the *probable*, is discussed, albeit cursorily and not in relationship with the species of rhetoric, while the ἐνδοξον, the *generally recognized*, is not.²⁰⁹ It seems unlikely that Fārābī would have inserted a reference to an Aristotelian concept extraneous to the textual section on which he was working without contextually offering any further clarification.

A last-ditch solution to our problem could be to understand *wa-w ā ḡ i b ā t* , *commonly* gloss, redacted with the intention of offering a scholarly synonym of *maḥm ū d ā t* , *commonly propositions*, since both terms were known as translations of Aristotle’s εἰκός. Later on, this gloss would have been inserted in Fārābī’s text by mistake. The meaning in the original wording, devoid of *wa-w ā ḡ i b ā t*, summed up as follow: within the realm of rhetoric, species are (1) commonly praised propositions, *maḥm ū d εἰκότα* / *α* (synonymous with *m u ḥ a a* and glossed as *w ā ḡ i b ā t*), and (2) signs, *‘a l ā /σημεία*.

At the price of this small expunction, we would have an argument that is effectively structured on two levels, as the adverb *tā n i y y a n* , *led us to expect*, parallel with Aristotle’s *Rhet. I.2 1357a32*. Both items receive further attention in the following lines,²¹⁰ and both are qualified as *fī b ā d-i ā ḡ i y l* , *which is in keeping with* Fārābī’s argumentation in his *K i t ā-Ḥiṭā b a*. On the other hand, in this light, it is not at all surprising that the qualifier *fī b ā d-i ā* , *at first sight*, does not apply to the gloss *wa-w ā ḡ i b ā t* .

²⁰⁸ In this case, the terms employed are *‘a l ā* and *alā* See Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, pp. 111,3 ff., J. Langhade (ed.).

²⁰⁹ On the identification of the parallel passages in Fārābī’s *K i t ā-Ḥiṭā b a* and in Aristotle’s *Rhet. I.2* see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ’ A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r t é s v u e i m m é d i a t e F a r ā b ī*, *l’Annuaire de la Faculté des Sciences et de la Philosophie*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 136-142.

²¹⁰ Cfr Fārābī, *K i t ā-Ḥiṭā b a*, pp. 109,15-111,3, J. Langhade (ed.) for *maḥm ū d* and Fārābī, *K i t ā-Ḥiṭā b a*, pp. 111,3 ff., J. Langhade (ed.) for *‘a l ā* In the latter case, the terms employed are actually *‘a l ā* and *alā*.

The author of the gloss could have known of the occasional equivalence between *w ā ġ i b* and *maḥm ū* (as alternative translations of εἰκόζ) either thanks to a parallel acquaintance with the Arabic texts of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Posterior Analytics* – for in the *Rhetoric* εἰκόζ is sometimes translated as *w ā ġ i b* and in the *Posterior Analytics* it is translated as *maḥm ū*²¹¹ – or, more immediately, thanks to his familiarity with Fārābī's exegesis to Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* II.27 in his *Š di al-Q i y*²¹³. Another possible source for this piece of information is Avicenna's *al-Ḥikma al-'A r dīyā*, where, in the section *F ī m a ' ā tū ī i k ā b ta d jū - h u k l ū f m ā - ḥ i t ā w l a w e*, we find a statement concerning the fact that the species which can constitute the material parts of enthymemes are either *a š y ā ġ i b a w a maḥm ū d a , n e c e s s a r y a n (εἰκότα), c o m m o n l y d a l ā ' i l , , n e c e s s a r y s i g n s*. Both Avicenna's and Fārābī's passages are reworkings of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* I.2 1357a31-b5,²¹⁴ and their similarity in content would have been conspicuous for any advised reader and potential commentator.

The Probable in Fārābī: General Remarks

Regardless of the hypothetical reflections presented above, the possible equivalence between *maḥm ū d*, and εἰκόζ was clearly already in place before Avicenna's time, since it is attested

²¹¹ Indeed, εἰκόζ is translated as *w ā ġ i b* in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, but not in *Rhet.* I.2 1357a32, the passage on which Fārābī is working here, where εἰκόζ is translated as *š ā d i q*. It appears mainly at in *Rhet.* II.23-25. See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, vol. I, p. 11,26, M.C. Lyons (ed.), Cambridge, 1982, Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, vol. IV, p. 50, M.C. Lyons (ed.), Cambridge, 1982, and the section devoted to the Arabic Translations of the *Organon* in the present section of this text, devoted to the probable (εἰκόζ).

²¹² See *K i t ā b n ā d d ū ā l i d ā w*, p. 408,1-7, ed. Ḡabr.

²¹³ See Fārābī, *Š di al-Q i y i n al-manti q i y-l-F ā t r , v o l . I* pp. 550,23-553,11, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

²¹⁴ With the only difference that, while in *al-Ḥikma al-'A r dīyā* Avicenna, like Aristotle, listed *necessary and commonly praised things* (εἰκότα), *necessary signs* (*d a l ā t e k m i r i a*), and *non-necessary signs* (*' a l ā s h m e i a*), here Fārābī covers all kind of signs with the expression *' a l ā t*. This is possibly due to Fārābī's preference for a more concise formulation, to the fact that Aristotle himself, when first presenting the sources of enthymemes in *Rhet.* I.2 1357a31-32 only lists *probable things* (εἰκότα) and *signs* (σημεία), while pointing out, a few lines below, that said signs can be either necessary (τεκμήριον) or non-necessary (σημείον ἀνώνηνον). On the translation of σημείον with *' a l ā t* rather than with *d a*, which in the Arabic Peripatetic school usually refers both to necessary sign (τεκμήριον in Greek) and to the unqualified sign (σημείον in Greek) see Taḍāri's Arabic version of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* II.27, and, in the present work, the paragraphs on *The Sign in the Arabic Translations of the Organon* p. 53, and on the *Lexical Difficulties Posed by the Arabic Translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric*

in Fārābī's *Šiḥ al-Qiyāma* either in Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* itself, or in the mind of his learned readers that glossed it later on.

What is more, whether in his *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* Fārābī referred to the εἰκός as *maḥm ū d*, *w ā ḡ i b* or –synonymically – as both, by his time the difficulties posed by the chaotic state of affairs in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, where εἰκός was translated indiscriminately as *ṣā d*, *iḥṣāq* or *w ā ḡ hāḍ* had been overcome satisfactorily, with no weakening of the subjective undertone of Aristotle's εἰκός taking place.

It is interesting to note that this fairly adequate solution, extended to the rhetoric domain, was apparently reached on the basis of the single occurrence of *muqaddama maḥm ū d* as an equivalent of the Greek εἰκός in the translation of the *Prior Analytics*, for nothing I could detect in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* could have suggested that all these terms referred to the same concept. This underscores the potential pitfalls of contenting us with comparing one single Arabic Peripatetic text with one single Aristotelian source in Arabic, even when the relationship between these philosophical works is beyond doubt, as M. Aouad established for Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* and the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* witnessed by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346.²¹⁵

What of the other obstacle posed by the Arabic versions of the *Organon* to the understanding of the meaning attributed by Aristotle to εἰκός, *probable*, namely the disappearance of its objective connotation in its translation as *maḥm ū d*, *c o m m o i n l y p* Taḏāri's *Prior Analytics* II.27?²¹⁶ This is no marginal subject, for it is at the price of this semantic shift that the potential misunderstandings implicit in the multiple and chaotic translations of εἰκός in the Arabic *Rhetoric* (as *ṣā d*, *w ā ḡ hāḍ* and more)²¹⁷ were avoided.

²¹⁵ On the subject, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par une vue immédiate et commune*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 158-161.

²¹⁶ See M. Aouad, M. Rashed, *L'exégèse de la Rhétorique d'Aristote : r* byzantins. Deuxième partie, in *Medioevo* 25, 1999, p. 595.

²¹⁷ The different translations of εἰκός found in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* are summed up in the section of the present chapter devoted to *The Probable in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 71-73.

Another problematic side effect of adopting Taḍāri's *maḥm ū* as a translation of εἰκός was that it produced a homonymy between the two terms εἰκός, *probable*, and ἔνδοξον, *generally recognized*, which in the Arabic Peripatetic school could legitimately have turned into a conceptual merger.

The translation of the Aristoteian term as *maḥm ū* notwithstanding, some cues to the objective nature of εἰκός Aristotle were still available to Fārābī:²¹⁸ firstly, in *Prior Analytics* II.27 the εἰκός is described as what is known to be (or not to be) in a certain way for the most part (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ), and Taḍāri's version renders it quite recognizably as *al-k ā ' i-ġna ywkaā 'a l ā* *what is or is not for the most part*. Secondly, the various translations of εἰκός adopted in the Arabic *Rhetoric* were, if misleading, generally free of subjective connotations.

Surely the subjective quality of the expression *maḥm ū* did not mean that the objective relationship between rhetoric premises and the truth remained entirely in the shadow. Actually, the classification of logical disciplines according to the truth value of their premises developed in Late Antiquity meant that Islamic philosophers had to deal with this question rather forthrightly.²¹⁹

While discussing the premises of syllogisms (and therefore of enthymemes) in his *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, Fārābī states that they can be entirely true, entirely false, or partially true and false. The latter group divides further into premises the largest part of which is false, premises that are equally true and false, and premises the largest part of which is true (*m āšidqu-h ā* *ḥā ḥā ḥā z ā ' i* *h ḥ*²²⁰ On this basis, rhetoric premises as a whole (namely *maḥm ū* *d, ā* *r probabilities*, and *signs*, or *‘a l ā*) *mā* would not have been characterized by their relationship with truth, e.g. by the fact of

²¹⁸ On the objective quality of the εἰκός in Aristotle (as opposed to Plato and other ancient philosophers), see W.M.A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I, a Commentary*, Fordham University Press 1980, p. 63, where the author is discussing Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1357a3.

²¹⁹ See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Brill 1990, pp. 17-49, *o e t i c s*

²²⁰ See Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, pp. 87, 12-15, Langhade (éd.), in Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, Langhade (éd.), and al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971.

being true for the most part. However, nothing forbade to specify in this direction a subgroup of rhetoric premises, like *maḥm ū d aḥm*.

Indeed, I would venture to say that this is what is achieved when Fārābī discusses *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a3-10 in his *Š ḡ al-Qiyā s* Here *m ūji b āre* named without reference to its near-synonym *maḥm ū d āre* and the expression *al-k ā ḡ i-ḡna ywā ā ḡ ā ḡ n-aktār*, *whatās or is hot for the most part*, is employed to clarify the meaning of *m ūji b āre*.²²¹ More specifically, Fārābī states: *and he [i.e. Aristotle] related that, within rhetoric premises, the necessary premise (al-muqaddama al-wāḡiba) is a commonly known premise (muqaddama mašhūra) taken from what, in the future, is or is not for the most part (‘alā al-aktār), and by these two things he meant the possible things (al-mumkina) that do not exist now, and that for the most part will be or will not be.*²²²

The objective sense of εἰκός is hinted at by the expression *for the most part*, while its subjective sense is referred to with the adjective *ma š h ū r*, *common* ~~although~~ the latter expression is also rephrased as *mumkin*, *possible*, which is its objective equivalent.

Note that similar acknowledgements to this “secondary,” more objective, acceptance of the εἰκός concept, embodied by its translation *w ā ḡ āre* present elsewhere in Fārābī and in the Islamic Peripatetic tradition, for we find them in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*,²²³ in Avicenna’s *al-Ḥikma al-‘A rḡīyā*²²⁴ and *K i t ā ḡ b āre*²²⁵ in Averroes *Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric*.²²⁶

The Probable in Avicenna

As we did for Fārābī, we could state that, on most occasions and when it does appear, for Avicenna the εἰκός concept is covered by the term *maḥm ū d aḥm*. However, there are some interesting exceptions, which we shall discuss below.

²²¹ See Fārābī, *Š ḡ al-Q i y i ā A -m a ṡ t i q i y -l-ḡ ā r*, *v o l I I*, pp. 550,23-552,2, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

²²² See Fārābī, *Š ḡ al-Q i y i ā A -m a ṡ t i q i y -l-ḡ ā r*, *v o l I I*, p. 551,16-18, ed. Daniš-pažuh. On this passage, see also the paragraph devoted to *The P r o b a b l e* *al-Q ū ḡ ū ḡ* in the present chapter of this work, p. 73-76.

²²³ See Fārābī, *K i t ā ḡ ḡ ā b āre*, 109,11-12, Langhade (ed.)

²²⁴ See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-‘ A r ḡ i y ā*, p. 91,1-4, M. Šāliḡ (ed.)

²²⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t ā ḡ ḡ ā b āre*, pp. 191,17-192,2, ed. Sālim.

²²⁶ See Averroès (Ibn Rušd), *C o m m e n t a i r e m o y e n* 2ḡ5.819, M. Aḡ ḡ ā (ed.) *o r i q u e d ’ A r i s t o t*

In his youthful work *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, Avicenna sometimes opts for the more “Peripatetic” and less “Aristotelian” solution by employing the standard term *maḥm ū* whenever he wants to refer to εἰκός, but on one occasion he prefers the formulation *a š y ājība wa maḥm ū d a f ī b ā d r a* “things that are necessary and commonly praised at first sight”, as a synonym of *maḥm ū d*²²⁷. It is

²²⁷ A very helpful English translation of this text was provided by L. E. Ezzaher in his book *Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle's Rhetoric: The Commentaries of al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes*, Southern Illinois University Press 2015, pp. 54-71. Its usefulness notwithstanding, there are some tenets implicit in Ezzaher's translation that I cannot entirely share, and that are worth listing here, for they have philosophical implications.

Firstly, at §2 of his excerpt, Ezzaher assumes that the pronoun *wa-hiya* in Sāliḥ's text referred to rhetoric, *al-ḥitā b, a* while it clearly points to dialectics, *al-ǧ a d f o r* it is said that this art has necessary syllogisms as object and truly commonly praised premises as matter, which is an apt description of dialectics (see Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, p. 87,5-8 ed. M. Šāliḥ, and *Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, p. 54,11. The same holds true for Ezzaher's §4, see Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, p. 87,13 ed. M. Šāliḥ, and L. E. Ezzaher in his book *Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle's Rhetoric: The Commentaries of al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes*, Southern Illinois University Press 2015, p. 54, 19).

Moreover, at § 24 of Ezzaher's version, concerning the name of the example in rhetorical thought and in other fields, I would not translate *f u q a h ā n ā s ō m s ā h o l a r s t o d a y*, but rather as *our jurists today*, for it was not in the wider scholarly field that the rhetorical and philosophical example (*al-tamṭī*) was called analogy (or *q i y ā m* synonym of philosophical syllogism), but only in the legal domain, technically understood. Likewise, the Rawāfiḍ and the Dāwdid, cited contextually, are meant as legal traditions in the proper sense, and it is in law (*fiqh*), not in theology, as printed by Ezzaher, that they reject the use of analogy, or *q i y ā n* their own wording (see Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, p. 90,9-11, ed. M. Šāliḥ, and L. E. Ezzaher in his book *Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle's Rhetoric: The Commentaries of al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes*, Southern Illinois University Press 2015, p. 57,30-32).

Finally, at § 30 of his excerpt, Ezzaher translates the passage of *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya* that I will discuss in this chapter. Avicenna states that the rules allowing us to produce syllogisms on any matter are either *m a w ā d ā* places, or they are *a n w ā d ā* not think that Ezzaher is entitled to translate *a n w ā d ā* particulars, as he does, for Avicenna's *m a w ā d ā* and *a n w ā d ā* for Aristotle's τόποι and εἶδη respectively, and should therefore be translated as *places and species* (see Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, p. 91,1-2, ed. M. Šāliḥ, and L. E. Ezzaher in his book *Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle's Rhetoric: The Commentaries of al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes*, Southern Illinois University Press 2015, p. 58,21). In all these cases, Šāliḥ's edition follows ms. Uppsala Orientalis Vetus 70, codex unicus for *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, without any alteration.

On the other hand, when discussing the principles of rhetoric in Aristotle's predecessors, Ezzaher's translation (*they did not lay down logical principles for oratory; they laid down only general principles* correctly presupposes the Arabic *lam yaḍa ʿ ū ḥ i t ā f ā a t ḥ ā n m a n ṭ a q i y y a n b a l w a ḍ ʿ a n ʿ ā m a s i n* in the text of the 13th century ms. Uppsala Orientalis Vetus 70, rather than *w a ḍ ʿ a n ʿ i l, s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s*, printed by Šāliḥ. The reading ʿ *n ā m i y y a n* does not pose any conceptual problem. The information on the content of ms. Istanbul Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 4894 provided by the PhiBor project website allows as to establish that, contrary to what stated by Anawati, this codex did not include a partial copy of *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, for at folio 39 v the text of Avicenna's *B ā b B u a r l h ā n m ū n g i* proceeds uninterrupted. Therefore, the Uppsala manuscript is indeed codex unicus for *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍiyya*, and I assume that Sāliḥ's edition, followed by Ezzaher, also read ʿ *n ā m i y y a n*. See D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill

interesting to point out that in this passage of the section *Fī mā' ā tū rī k' ā b ta ā l bā g' ā t fī hu k ū m al-ḥiṭāwā a*, *On the material aspect of enthymemes*, Avicenna is discussing the material aspect of enthymemes, namely their premises, as Fārābī had already done in his *K i t al-ḥiṭā bā*.²²⁸ Avicenna states that rules allowing us to produce syllogisms on any matter, are either *mā wā' c*, (mirroring the Greek τόποι) – and as such they do not lead to the discovery of the parts of rhetorical syllogisms²³⁰ – or they are *ā n w ā' c*, *species* (mirroring the Greek εἶδη), which constitute themselves the material parts of syllogisms. Said *ā n w ā' c*, can be either *sa, l ā' i l*, (τεκμήρια), *signs* or *ā y ā n ā t g, n s n o n n e c e s s a r y* (σημεία), or *ā š y wā g' i b ā w a w m a ḥ m ū d a*, *necessary signs* (εἰκότα) *only* *p r a*

It is when discussing the same subject that Langhade's edition of Fārābī's *K i t al-ḥiṭā bā* employs the term *wā g' i b ā* in order to refer to εἰκότα,²³¹ which might have played a role in Avicenna's choice to showcase the uncommon equivalence between *wā g' i b* and εἰκότος in the passage we analyzed above. However, it is also envisageable (and probably more likely) that the

2014, pp. 87-88, and G.C. Anawati, *Le manuscrit Nour Osmaniyye 4894*, in *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales du Caire*, vol. 3 (1956), p. 382, C.J. Tornberg *Codices Arabici, Persici et Turcici Bibliothecae Regiae Universitatis Upsaliensis*, Lund, Berling 1849, p. 242, and the PhiBor page devoted to Avicenna's *I l ā h m a y u s c r i p t s*, <https://www.avicennaproject.eu/#/manuscripts/list>.

²²⁸ See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-' Aḍiyyā*, p. 91,2-4, ed. M. Šālih.

²²⁹ Of course, in this case both Avicenna and Fārābī are following in Aristotle's footsteps, since they both rework Aristotle's *Rhetoric* I – and Fārābī, more specifically, *Rhetoric* I.2 – as an expression of the essence of rhetoric. However, the understanding of probable things (εἰκότα), signs (σημεία) and necessary signs (τεκμήρια) as the species (εἶδη) of rhetoric in an interpretation that goes beyond Aristotle's text. In the *Rhetoric* (I.2 1358a27-35) species are merely described as premises proper to each individual rhetorical gender, in opposition to topics, which are common to all rhetorical genders, and to other disciplines as well. No link is made between species and premises such as probable things and necessary or non-necessary signs.

²³⁰ This is not the case in Fārābī's *K i t al-ḥiṭā bā*, where *mā wā' c*, *like the species*, are described as premises. See Fārābī's *K i t al-ḥiṭā bā* 107,13, J. Langhade (ed.)

²³¹ See Fārābī, *K i t al-ḥiṭā bā* 109,11-12, J. Langhade (ed.), in *Al-Fārābī, K i t al-ḥiṭā bā* Langhade (éd.), and al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la réthorique*, Beyrouth, 1971.

clause *wa-wāğibā* was inserted in the margin of Fārābī's *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma* and the suggestion of Avicenna's parallel texts.²³²

On the other hand, in *al-Ḥikma al-'Aḍiyyā* neither the term *šā d īna* nor any term deriving from the root *ḥ-q-q* appear as equivalents of Aristotle's εἰκός, although this had often been the case in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*. This could be explained with the relative shortness of *al-Ḥikma al-'Aḍiyyā* in comparison with Aristotle's text, but, assuming that Avicenna chose to showcase a little known synonym of *maḥm ū ih* in order to share with his readers a harder to get-by piece of erudition, or in order to stress his belonging to the Peripatetic school of thought, the fact that he picked *wāğib* over *šā d īna* should not go unremarked.

Both terms had little to share with the etymological sense of εἰκός, and even less with the normal philosophical employment of *maḥm ū ih*. What is worse, by Avicenna's time, both terms had a clearly defined technical meaning, *wāğib* as *necessary* and *šā d īna* as *true*. However, both words had comparable grounding for not being neglected as possible synonyms of *maḥm ū ih* since their employment in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* is far from being sporadic. Only, since the translator uses the equivalence εἰκός/*šā d īna* mainly in *Rhetoric I* and the equivalence εἰκός/*w ā ġ i b* mainly in *Rhetoric II-III*, we could have imagined that Avicenna would have selected *šā d īna* as a synonym of *maḥm ū ih* for his *al-Ḥikma al-'Aḍiyyā*, which is mostly focused on the subjects discussed by Aristotle in *Rhetoric I*. After all, this is what we see happening in Avicenna's *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma* from his *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma* although none of them is the normal term for the probable, Avicenna occasionally mentions *šā d īna* in that sense in his first book and *w ā ġ i b* in his third book, roughly equivalent to Aristotle's *Rhetoric II*. It is not very likely that Avicenna reached the solution we find in *al-Ḥikma al-'Aḍiyyā* by means of a different translation of Aristotle's text, for his *K i t ā b al-*

²³² To the already mentioned *al-Ḥikma al-'Aḍiyyā* p. 91,2-4, M. Šāliḥ (ed.), we could add Avicenna's *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma*, p. 191,17 from his *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma* for this passage, see the following section of the present text, discussing *The Probable in Avicenna's 'Ni af 'ās'* *K i t ā b al-*

Ḥiṭā b makes it amply clear that, later in his life, he was at leisure to consult in detail a text very close to the translation of the *Paris Organon*.

Whatever the reason behind the fact that *ṣā d* does not appear in *al-Ḥikma al-‘Adīyyā* in the sense of *probable*, the presence of *w ā ġinī* in this acceptance is indicative of the interest shown by Avicenna in this youthful text for the vocabulary of the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. This fits well with D. Gutas’ observation about how the frequent recourse to transliteration of Greek titles and technical terms, the laudatory and explicit references to older Peripatetic authors, and global doctrinal closeness with Peripatetic tenets make of *al-Ḥikma al-‘Adīyyā* a work in which Avicenna’s desire to be recognized as part of the Aristotelian tradition is preponderant.²³³

The Probable *Kitāb al-Ṣifā’ Avicenna’s*

Passages like *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b dād*, 43,12²³⁴ show how Avicenna was aware of the fact that the expression *ṣā d i* (*qr ā r u e p r e m i s e s*) should be understood as εἰκότα, since he glosses it with the expression *premises that are really recognized* (*al-ḥa q ī q i-maḥm ā d*). The same holds true for cases in which Avicenna employs *w ġib* in order to refer to εἰκός, as we can see from *K i t ā b a l Ḥiṭā b* 1.8, 191,17, where it is stated that *enthymemes* (*al-t a f*) derive either from *necessary premises* (*al-w ġi b/εἰκότα*), from *examples* (*al-burhā n*) or from *evidence* (*al-d a*) or from a *clue* (*al-r u s ū a w l d ā*). The translator’s *al-w ġi b/εἰκότα* is immediately glossed by *al-ā r ā a l maḥm ū d* that is to say *the commonly praised opinions* or *the maxims*. It is interesting to point out that the singular expression *r a ’ ḥ m ū n d a e s* already appear in the Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics* (I.1, 24b12 and 182.9), but also that there it stands for ἔνδοξον rather than for εἰκός.

Therefore, as far as the terms εἰκός and ἔνδοξον are concerned, Avicenna’s *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b a a l*, together with *al-Ḥikma al-‘Adīyyā*, gives us the most faithful image of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, since

²³³ See D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, pp. 292-293

²³⁴ For this passage, see section 1.3 of this contribution, titled *Lexical Difficulties Posed by the Arabic Translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric*, pp. 21-28

the confusion provoked in other commentaries by substituting both terms with *maḥm ū* does not take place, while the integrity of the εἰκός concept is preserved by pointing out on occasion that both *ṣā d ānḥ w ḡib* actually have the same meaning.

Avicenna does so by specializing the use of *maḥm ū* so, that, as observed by Aouad,²³⁵ in *K i t Ḥiḇā b iḥ* only refers to the material side of rhetorical argumentation, namely to premises. Although this choice probably emerges from Avicenna's desire to reproduce the structure of Aristotle's lexicon, it does not imply that, in *K i t Ḥiḇā b aḥm ū ḥas* and the same meaning as Aristotle's εἰκός on account of being its equivalent, nor that, in this text, the relationship between *maḥm ū* as a translation of εἰκός and the various translations of ἔνδοξον is similar to the relationship existing between Aristotle's εἰκός and ἔνδοξον themselves. Yet, it is probably because the existence of two discrete concepts in Aristotle's text was still recognizable for Arabic philosophers that, in his *K i t Ḥiḇā b aḥm ū*, Avicenna chose to reserve the term *maḥm ū* for certain usages and to reserve expressions like *m a ṣ h ū r* ,, and *m a z a ḥ ū* for the remaining usages of ἔνδοξον. This is a further mark of Avicenna's interest for Aristotle's text in the logic section of *K i t āṣ bi f w ā ḥ*, implies attention to textual detail and a desire to explain it rather than philosophical adherence.

Still, the systematic use of *maḥm ū* as an equivalent of εἰκός leaves us with the question whether Islamic Peripatetic philosopher – with the partial exception of Avicenna – actually recognized εἰκός and ἔνδοξον as separate concepts, since both are translated in the same way (*maḥm ū*) within Taḍāri's version of the *Prior Analytics*, and since εἰκός is exploded into three different roots in the Arabic *Rhetoric*.

²³⁵ See M. Aouad, *Définition du concept de loué selon le point de vue immédiat*, in A. Hasnawi, A. Elamrani-Jamal, M. Aouad, R. Rashed (edd.) *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque*, Leuven-Paris, Peeters-Institut du monde arabe 1997, p. 425-427.

The Probable The Cream of Wisdom Hebraeus'

Let us now spend a few tentative words on the Syriac equivalents of Aristotle's εἰκός, *probable*, in the rhetoric section of Bar Hebraeus' *The Cream of Wisdom*, a 13th Century philosophical summa closely tied with Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā*.²³⁶ These considerations were made possible by the publication of the rhetoric section of the *The Cream of Wisdom* in Watt's edition, inclusive of translation, commentary and glossaries.

Watt's glossaries are Greek-Syriac, Greek-Arabic, and Syriac-Arabic at the same time, by virtue of comparing Aristotle's text, the rhetoric section of Bar Hebraeus' *The Cream of Wisdom* and the rhetoric section of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā* namely his *Kitāb al-Hibā* and the aforementioned glossaries, Watt lists some derivatives of the Syriac root z-d-q as equivalents of Aristotle's εἰκός, or *probable*.²³⁷ From this root emanates a rich variety of words that concern the concepts of justice and obligation.

The Arabic word *ṣādīq*, etymologically related to the aforementioned z-d-q, sporadically appears as an equivalent of εἰκός in the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 version of the *Rhetoric* as well, but the meaning of all the Syriac terms listed in Watt's glossaries is closer to that of *wāḡib*, another occasional translation of εἰκός in the Arabic *Rhetoric* and in later Arabic Peripatetic philosophers.

Still, although Avicenna employed *ṣādīq* in the sense of *probable* much more frequently than other authors, and he had extensive influence on Bar Hebraeus' *The Cream of Wisdom*, I would rather discharge the idea that in choosing *ṣādīq* as his usual expression for *probable* Bar Hebraeus was citing *Kitāb al-Šifā* first, although more present in Avicenna than in Fārābī and in Averroes, and especially so in *Kitāb al-Hibā*, it is by no means his only equivalent for Aristotle's εἰκός, nor the one he employs the most often. *Maḥmūd*, or *commissary*, a commoner *ṣādīq*,

²³⁶ On the relationship between Bar Hebraeus' *The Cream of Wisdom* and Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā* see J.W. Watt (ed.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac*. Barhebraeus, *Butyrum Sapientiae*, Book of Rhetoric, pp. 3-34, Leiden, 2005.

²³⁷ See J.W. Watt (ed.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac*. Barhebraeus, *Butyrum Sapientiae*, Book of Rhetoric, 6.7.2-3, pp. 234-237, Leiden, 2005.

choice, and so is *wā ḡ i b*, albeit by a such thinner margin. More relevantly, while *ṣā d i q* only appears in *K i t Ḥiṭā b* and, to a lesser extent, *wā ḡ* have currency in other Avicennian works too. Finally, Bar Hebraeus's use of a derivative of *z-d-q* whenever Avicenna discussed the εἰκός concept in the parallel passage from *K i t Ḥiṭā b* is not systematic. For example, when proposing a typology of enthymemes on the basis of their premises in *K i t ā b a l Ḥiṭā b*, Avicenna names *ṣā d i q ā t*, and later glosses this term with the expression *maḥm ū d ḡ i q i y y a*, truly *co* which surely was more readily understandable to the contemporary reader.²³⁸ In the parallel passage from the *Rhetoric* (1.2 1357a30-33), Aristotle discussed εἰκότα, *probable things*, translated as *ṣā d i q* in the Arabic version of the *Organon*, stating that enthymemes can derive either from them, or from ἔνδοξα, *generally recognized things*. However, although in this case the term *ṣā d* was quite prominent in Avicenna's text, we do not find it in *Book of Rhetoric* 1.7.1 from *The Cream of Wisdom*, where the same concepts are reworded by Bar Hebraeus. In *The Cream of Wisdom*, the selected expression is, in Watt's translation, *truly praised premises* (a term deriving from the root *z-d-q*), clearly closer to Avicenna's gloss *maḥm ū d ḡ i q i y y a* than to the original *ṣā d i q ā t*.

Either Bar Hebraeus did not find *ṣā d i q* in the parallel passage of the Syriac translation that he had at his disposal according to Watt,²³⁹ or he felt that his readers would benefit more from the straightforward gloss to *ṣā d i q* offered by Avicenna than from this surprising and possibly obsolete Aristotelian expression itself, although it was cited by Avicenna and preserved by the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*.

What we can gather from the rhetorical section of *The Cream of Wisdom* is that the root *z-d-q* derivatives were recognized as acceptable Syriac expressions referring to Aristotle's εἰκός, or

²³⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t Ḥiṭā b* p. 43,12, ed. Sālim.

²³⁹ See J.W. Watt (ed.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac*. Barhebraeus, *Butyrum Sapientiae*, *Book of Rhetoric*, pp. 6-9, Leiden, 2005.

probable. As it is apparent from the rhetorical section of *The Cream of Wisdom* 6.7.2,²⁴⁰ in which its author lists *obligatories, examples, signs, and indications* as the sources of enthymemes (following Avicenna's *K i t al-Hibā b al-B*), derivatives of the Syriac root z-d-q could be used by Bar Hebraeus in passages where the Arabic translator and Avicenna had preferred *w ā ḡtā šā d ānd maḥm ū als* an equivalent of Aristotle's εἰκόσ, leaving us with the impression that rhetoric *w ā ḡāndbā d i q* were synonymous in the mind of the 13th Century reader.²⁴¹

It is tempting to hypothesise that the Arabic *w ā ḡ ōr mecēs(ary)* and *šā d ioḡtrue(ḡ)* were loanwords from Syriac, both mirroring a derivative of z-d-q, *w ā ḡr* tracing its meaning and *šā d i q* its form.²⁴² Still, the data of which we dispose is not strong enough to reach a definitive conclusion on this subject.

The Probable in Averroes

In a way, Averroes' behaviour keeps the middle ground between his predecessors, since he systematically uses *maḥm ū ih* order to express the concept of εἰκόσ, like Fārābī does, but he also employs *maḥm ū als* an equivalent of ἔνδοξον, which we find in Avicenna but not in Fārābī.

In his *Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric*, Averroes' attention to the ancient terminology for εἰκόσ follows the same pattern as Fārābī's and the young Avicenna's did: he usually prefers to name the εἰκόσ concept *maḥm ū ā* solution deriving from Taḏāri's version of the *Prior Analytics* rather than from the *Rhetoric*, and he ignores most of the lexical vagaries found in the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric* itself,²⁴³ including *šā d i w* which Avicenna had inserted and commented upon in *K i t al-Hibā b al-B* in his *K i t al-B i f.6ā*²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ See J.W. Watt (ed.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac. Barhebraeus, Butyrum Sapientiae*, Book of Rhetoric, 6.7.2, p. 234, Leiden, 2005.

²⁴¹ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Hibā b al-B*.8, p. 191,17, ed. Sālim, and See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, p. 167,24, ed. Lyons.

²⁴² On Syriac loanwords in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, see Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, vol. II, p. viii, M.C. Lyons (ed.), Cambridge, 1982, and U. Vagelpohl, *A r i s s Rhetoridinthe East*, Leiden, Brill 2008, pp. 54-66.

²⁴³ See *A v e r r o è s (I b n R u š d) , C o m m e n t a i r e d e M. A o u a d (e d) , v o l I I I , C o m m e n t a i r e d u a R h é t o r i q* commentaire, p. 52.

²⁴⁴ See Avicenna *K i t al-Hibā b al-B* p. 43,12, ed. Sālim.

In *Talḥiṣ k i t -Q b y lā l k t o o*, while covering the same conceptual ground as Aristotle in his *Prior Analytics* II.27, Averroes does not employ the term *w ā ḡ (m o b ṣ ā d) j b u t*, whenever the εἰκός concept is intended, he selects the term *maḥm ū* ²⁴⁵.

1.4.9 – Generally Recognized (ἔνδοξον)

The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the *Organon*

In the Arabic *Rhetoric* the term ἔνδοξον is translated as either *maḥm ū* (*commonly praised*) or, on one single instance (*Rhet.* II.25, 1402a33), as *z u n ū* (*presumptions*), while the Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics* – by Taḍāri – boasts the options *maḥm ū* and *r a ' ḥ m ū* ²⁴⁶ and that of the *Posterior Analytics* – by Abū Biṣr Mattā²⁴⁷ – uses either *m a q* (*accepted*) or *m a š* (*commonly known*).²⁴⁸ As pointed out by M. Aouad, the term *m a q* already had a meaningful history of religious and juridical use.²⁴⁹

We find a much wider variety of solutions in the Arabic *Topics*, both on account of the frequent occurrence of the word ἔνδοξον in the Greek original, and of the complex translation

²⁴⁵ See Averroes, *Talḥiṣ k i t -Q b y lā l k t o o* pp. 275–276, ed. Butterworth, 1983.

²⁴⁶ See the following *Prior Analytics* passages: I.1 24b12/182,9; II.11 62a13/367,14, 62a18/367,18; II.27 70a4/408,5, 70a7/408,7, 70b4/410,6.

²⁴⁷ F.E. Peters points out that, according to the colophon of this work in the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, the redactor Ibn Suwār used an apograph of copies of Abū Biṣr Mattā's translation penned by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī and 'Īsā Ibn Zur'a, who mainly employ *maš h ā s* an equivalent for ἔνδοξον. See F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus, the Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Brill, Leiden, 1968, p. 18.

²⁴⁸ In Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* ἔνδοξον occurs thrice: at I.6 74b22, 74b24, and I.19 81b20. In 74b24 it is translated as *m a q* ^{h i ā} 74b22 the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 has *m a š* ^{h (Badawī's preferred reading)} in the main text and *m a q* ^{b (preferred by Ğabr)} above the line. In 81b20 the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 reading is *m a š* ^{h ū q} ^{l a ū l m a} (chosen by both Badawī and Ğabr), while ms. Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 reads *m a š* ^{h ū q} ^{š a h c ā u t d} possibly be a mistaken insertion inspired by the presence of the phrase 'a l ṭ a ā r ī - r q a ' a ṣ a h f a w lines above (in 497,1 ed. Ğabr, where it translates κατὰ δόξαν in *Posterior Analytics* 81b18), or it could maybe derive from Ibn Suwār's perusal of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's and 'Īsā Ibn Zur'a's versions.

²⁴⁹ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ' A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é e s u e i m m é d i a t e f ā r ā b i , commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 169 n. 66. More specifically, it is reported that, in ḥadīth tradition, maqbūl is used to refer to a tradition that satisfies requirements and that is either saḥīḥ, correct, or ḥasan, beautiful.

The juridical acceptation of *m a q* did not disappear completely from the usage of Arabic Philosophers: for example, we find it used in this sense in *K i t -Q b y l ā l k t o o*, where Avicenna describes as *m a q* a certain type of contract. On this subject, see Avicenna, *K i t -Q b y l ā l k t o o* p. 123,13, ed. Sālim.

history of this text, which, as established by Ğabr²⁵⁰ on the basis of Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist*²⁵¹ and of the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 marginalia, is the work of two different scholars, Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī for books I-VII, from a Greek text, and Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh for book VIII on the basis of Iṣḥāq's Syriac version. As already stated, the *Fihrist* reports that Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh authored an Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as well.²⁵² A few exceptions notwithstanding, within the *Topics* the translation for ἔνδοξον is *dā ḥ i ḥ*, *in books I-II*²⁵³ *and in books III-IV* and in VIII.5-8,²⁵⁴ and *maḥm ū ih* book VIII.11-14.²⁵⁵ The option *m a q* appears in some interlinear notes from ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346. The different solution adopted in books I-II and III-VII, all translated by Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī, is probably due to the revision underwent by books I-II on the basis of a manuscript translated from the Greek and of a text that was itself in Greek.²⁵⁶ The presence of both *m a ṣ* *and maḥm ū ih* Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh's book VIII is harder to explain: maybe this is due to collation or to an attempt to standardize the lexicon of the *Topics* by someone acting on a text that already comprised both Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī's and Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh's translations.

The case of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* is no less complex, for the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 offers us three different versions for each chapter. Two of these translations are by

²⁵⁰ See *K i t ā l ū b*, p. 142, ed. Ğabr.

²⁵¹ See Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249,15-25, G. Flügel (ed.)

²⁵² See Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 250,1-6, G. Flügel (ed.)

²⁵³ Passages from the *Topics* in which ἔνδοξον is translated as *dā ḥ i ḥ*: I.1 100a20/635,5, 100a30/635,13, 100b21/636,4, 100b23-27/636,7-10, 101a10/637,2, 101a13/637,4; I.2 101b1/637,14, I.10 104a8/651,8, 104a13-17/651,11-652,2, 104a17/651,15, 104a21/652,3, 104a22/652,4, 104a23/652,4, 104a28/652,8, I.14 105b2/658,6, 105b4/658,7, 105b18/659,4, I.18 108b13/670,12, II.5 112a5/684,11.

²⁵⁴ Passages from the *Topics* in which ἔνδοξον is translated as *m a ṣ*: III.6 119a38/718,8, 119b16/719,3, IV.3 123b20/735,3, VIII.5 159b1/869,2, 159b2/869,2, 159b4/869,2, 159b5/869,3, 159b8/869,5, 159b12/869,6, 159b13/869,6, 159b14/869,8, 159b16/869,16, 159b20/870,1, 159b22/870,3, 159b23/870,4, 159b24/870,6, 159b25/870,6, VIII.6 159b37/871,3, 159b38/871,3, 160a9/871,14, 160a13/872,5, VIII.8 160b1/874,7.

²⁵⁵ Passages from the *Topics* in which ἔνδοξον is translated as *maḥm ū ih*: III.5 159a39/869,2, VIII.11 161b28/881,1, 161b35/881,7, 161b37/881,10, 162a3/881,14, 162a7/881,18, 162b2/883,6, 162b27/884,13, 163b20/888,13.

²⁵⁶ Information on this revision is provided by the colophon to book II of *K i t ā l ū b*, p. 700.15-701.8 ed. Ğabr for the text, and F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus, the Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Brill, Leiden, 1968, pp. 20-23, for a translation.

Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī and ‘Īsā ibn Zur‘a, the first also cited in the notice from Ibn al-Nadīm’s *Fihrist*, the second ignored in it.²⁵⁷ The third text, an ancient translation (*n a q l*),²⁵⁸ is attributed to Ibn Nā‘ima by the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346 itself and to Ibrāhīm ibn Bakūš al-Aššārī by Ibn al-Nadīm. In the latter case to Ibrāhīm ibn Bakūš al-Aššārī would have acted on the basis of Ibn Nā‘ima’s Syriac translation.²⁵⁹ ‘Īsā Ibn Zur‘a’s translation for ἔνδοξον is *m a š*,²⁶⁰ while Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī employs mainly *m a š*,²⁶¹ on a couple of occasions, *r a*, *point of view*.²⁶¹ Finally, the *n a q l q a d ī* offers both *maḥm ū* and words derived from the root of the verb *ḡanna*, to *presume*.²⁶²

Since the information presented in the previous paragraph is very dense, but its ready availability to the reader is key for the easy understanding of the following pages, I sum it up in tabular form.

Table1: translations of the term in the Arabic versions of the books

		maḥmūd	maqḅūl	mašhūr	dā‘i‘	ra’y	ḡanna
Rhetoric (<i>n a q l</i>) <i>q a d ī m</i>		X					X
Prior Analytics (Taḡārī)		X					
Posterior Analytics (Abū Bišr Mattā)			X	X			
Topics	I-II, Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī, Greek revision				X		
	III-VII, Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī			X			

²⁵⁷ See Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249,26-29, ed. G. Flügel.

²⁵⁸ This is how F. Ğabr prefers to name it, without resolving the ambiguity between the hypothesis on its authorship, either by Ibrāhīm ibn Bakūš or by Ibn Nā‘ima. See *K i t ā b ū ḡ a b r*, 899-901, ed. Ğabr.

²⁵⁹ See F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus, the Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Brill, Leiden, 1968, pp. 23-26.

²⁶⁰ Passages from the *Sophistical Refutations* in which ‘Īsā ibn Zur‘a translated ἔνδοξον as *m a š*: I.165b4/920,6, 165b7/920,9; I.9 169a36/992,15; I.17 175a31/1068,2 175a33/1068,3; I.27 181a16/1153,4; I.33 182b38/1185,10, 183a1/1185,13; I.34 183a38/1191,4, 183b5/1191,10, and, above the line, I.33 183a1/1183,19.

²⁶¹ Passages from the *Sophistical Refutations* in which Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī translated ἔνδοξον as *m a š*: I.165b4/918,6, I.9 170a40/991,6, I.27 181a16/1151,3, 183a1/1183,19, I.34 183a38/1189,10, and, above the line, I.33 182b38/1183,17 and 183a1/1183,19. Passages in which Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī translated ἔνδοξον as *r a*: I.17 175a31/1070,2, 175a33/1070,3, I.33; 182b38/1183,17, 183a1/1183,19.

²⁶² Passages from the *Sophistical Refutations* in which the *n a q l* translated ἔνδοξον as *maḥm ū*: I.2 165b4/921,9, 165b7/922,3; I.9 170a40/994,6, I.33 182b38/1183,14. Passages in which the *n a q l* translated ἔνδοξον with words derived from the root of the verb *ḡanna*: *bi-l-ḡann* in I.17 175a31/1070,1 and 175a33/1070,2; *māzn ū* in I.27 181a16/1154,11, and *min al-ḡn ūn*: I.34 183a38/1192,18 and 183b6/1193,6.

	VIII.5-8, Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh			X			
	VIII.11-14, Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh	X					
	ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, marginal notes		X				
Sophistical Refutations	<i>n a q l q a d ī n</i>	X					X
	Yahyā ibn ‘Adī			X		X	
	‘Īsā ibn Zur‘a			X			

The Generally Recognized in Fārābī

As it was made clear by Aouad in his article on *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d’ Aristote reconsidérés*, the discussion of Fārābī’s choices concerning the multiple Arabic equivalents of ἔνδοξον must necessarily take into account the philosophical problem of the individuation of premises that are proper to rhetoric as an art.²⁶³ This is why in the following pages I will try to build a parallel presentation of the development of this philosopher’s understanding of what constitutes the *proprium* of rhetoric (mainly on the basis of Aouad’s reconstruction) and of his lexicalization of the ἔνδοξον concept.

The Generally Recognized in Fārābī’s Classifications of Logical Arts

In Fārābī’s *Riṣāla fī al-falāfiya* and *Maqāla fī al-‘aql* find no reference to *endoxa* as premises, for in these works premises are associated with different syllogistic arts on the basis of their truth value, so that rhetoric is characterized by premises that are equally true and false.²⁶⁴ As explained by Black,²⁶⁵ this approach had developed in the Alexandrian commentary tradition, on the impulse of the systemic inclusion of *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* in the Aristotelian *Organon*.

²⁶³ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d’ Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī, commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992.

²⁶⁴ See *Riṣāla fī al-falāfiya* in *Alfarabi’s Philosophy*, ed. F. Dieterici, Brill 1892, p. 57 and p. 87, and A.J. Arberry, *Fārābī’s C*, in *Rivista di Studi Orientali* 17, 1937-1939, p. 268 and p. 274.

²⁶⁵ See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics*, Brill 1990, pp. 17-53, and M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d’ Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī, ou* in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 174.

The Generally Recognized in Fārābī *Šaḥ al-Ḥiṭāba*

As outlined by Aouad, a pivotal role in the development of Fārābī's rhetorical thought was played by his *Šaḥ al-Ḥiṭāba*.²⁶⁶ Disappointingly, we can only investigate this text by proxy, thanks to Ibn Riḍwān's *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences* and to Hermannus Alemannus' partial translation.²⁶⁶ It is at this chronological point, when he first approached Aristotle's *Rhetoric* individually, that Fārābī's reflection focused on the lack of premises that are distinctive of rhetoric, for what is said by Aristotle to be the proper basis for enthymemes pertains, strictly speaking, to other arts. In the *Rhetoric*, this is the case of εἰκότα, *probable things*, which, according to Fārābī, actually belong to dialectics, and of σημεῖα, *signs*, which belong to demonstration.²⁶⁷

Let us now move on to the empirical observation of Fārābī's choice of words concerning the *generally recognized*, and, for lack of direct witnesses of his Arabic text, let us do so by considering Hermannus Alemannus' translation of *Šaḥ al-Qiyās* in his *Didascalía*.

Probabilis is by far the term most commonly employed in order to refer to rhetorical premises, in the same sense as Aristotle's ἔνδοξος. Although in his critical edition of the *Didascalía* Grignaschi does not spell out the reasoning behind the following statement,²⁶⁸ his identification of the Latin *probabilis* with Fārābī's use of *maḥm ū* is probably correct.

²⁶⁶ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 163-165. Hermannus Alemannus' translation is edited as *Didascalía* in Fārābī, *Ki-Ḥaṭāba*, ed. J. Langhade, and Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, ed. M. Grignaschi, in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971.

²⁶⁷ For tracing this development, Aouad singles out §10 of Hermannus Alemannus' *Didascalía*. See Fārābī, *Ki-Ḥaṭāba*, ed. J. Langhade, and al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971, pp. 165-166. Aristotle's ideas on this subject are expressed, for example, in *Rhet.* I.2, 57a29-33, where he states that εἰκότα correspond to possible propositions and σημεῖα correspond to necessarily true propositions. However, Aristotle does not make any explicit link between εἰκότα and dialectics, and in his *Topics* he does not seem to use the term εἰκότος in a technical sense.

²⁶⁸ See Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, index des mots, p. 256, ed. M. Grignaschi, in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971.

Inconveniently, we cannot disprove or confirm this claim by means of comparison with Ibn Riḍwān's *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences*, for only its passages for which a word-by-word correspondence with Hermannus' text can be established should be assumed to be quotes from Fārābī's *Šarḥ al-Ḥiṭā b* and such passages do not discuss *endoxa*.²⁶⁹

Grignaschi's reconstruction of *maḥm ū ds* as the antecedent of Hermannus' *probabilis* does however stand to reason, for *maḥm ū ds* overwhelmingly the most common translation for Aristotle's ἔνδοξον in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, to which Fārābī's *Šarḥ al-Ḥiṭā b* is devoted. I base my conviction that Grignaschi's identification between Hermannus Alemannus' *probabilis* and Fārābī's *maḥm ū ds* right upon the analysis of Hermannus' Arabico-Latin version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where a direct comparison between Arabic original and Latin translation can be established thanks to the survival of both texts. Since Hermannus' text is still mainly unpublished, my enquiry was conducted by looking at *Rhetoric* I.1-8 in its two existing witnesses, ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, and ms. Toledo, Biblioteca Capitulare, 47.15.²⁷⁰ This selection constitutes a sample that is rather extensive but by no means exhaustive, so that conclusions derived from it aim to be forceful and persuasive rather than entirely final.

In *Rhet.* I.1 1355a17 Aristotle is discussing how knowledge of syllogistic rules is also conducive to the mastery of enthymemes, as the capacities to recognize what is true and what is

²⁶⁹ M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), and M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii (suite)*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 8 (1998), pp. 131-160. However, *endoxa*, i.e. dialectical and rhetorical premises, are discussed in passages from Ibn Riḍwān's text that are devoid of direct correspondence in Hermannus' translation. In these passages, *endoxa* are called *muqaddamāt dā'i'a* (widespread premises) in dialectical context, and *muqaddamāt mā'i'a* (satisfying premises) in rhetorical context. On this subject, and on why I do not think that these expressions reflect Fārābī's lexicon, see the subsection on *Ibn Riḍwān as a Witness*, pps 125-129. *Fārābī's Lexicon*

²⁷⁰ A very useful glossary for Hermannus Alemannus' translations of chosen Averroistic passages inserted in his Arabico-Latin translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* has been published in F. Woerther, *Les citations du Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d'Aristote par Averroès*, in *Mélanges de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain*, vol. 63 (2010-2011), pp. 356-358. However, due to Hermannus' selection of citations, none of the terms used by Fārābī to name the premises of rhetorical syllogisms appears in Woerther's publication.

likely belong to the same person. In the Arabic translation of this passage from the *Rhetoric*, we read:

K i t ā r b i ṭ ā l r i q ā , e d I L y o n s , C o m m o n l y p r a i s e d p r o p o s i t i o n s (a l - m a ḥ m ū d ā t)
*enter the science of truth as far as they resemble it.*²⁷¹

Hermannus Alemannus' translation of this passage is worded in the following way, with a clear correspondence between the Arabic *al-maḥm ū d ā r* *commonly praised propositions*, and the Latin *probabilia*:

Hermannus Alemannus, Rhethorica, ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 67rb25: Probabilia autem ingrediuntur scientiam veri ex hoc quod assimilatur ei

The existence of an equivalence between *maḥm ū* and *probabilis* is further testified by the Arabic translator's and Hermannus' versions of Aristotle's *Rhet.* I.2 1356b34²⁷² and 1357a10-13.²⁷³ We can even rest assured that this solution was not employed by Hermannus exclusively when dealing with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, for the term *probabilis* is used to echo *maḥm ū* in the excerpt

²⁷¹ As observed by Lyons in his commentary to the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle's Greek expression στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν is not translated into Arabic. See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, M.C. Lyons (ed.), p. 231, Cambridge, 1982.

²⁷² The Arabic version of *Rhet.* I.2 1356b34 is as follows: and it is not part of the description of rhetoric that it observes the commonly praised propositions (*al-maḥm ū d ā*) according to each person, like Sūqrāṭis or ʿĪfyās, but the commonly praised (*al-maḥm ū*) in its relation to dialectics. On the other hand, this is how Hermannus Alemannus translates this passage: *et neque pertinent rethorice quod ipsa recipiat vel consideret probabilia secundum unumquemquem hominum ut Socratem aut Kalliam, sed probabile secundum quod est artis topice*. See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, p. 11,6-8, ed. Lyons for the Greek-Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, and ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 69va11 for its translation by Hermannus.

²⁷³ This is the text of the Greek-Arabic version of I.2 1357a10-13: and they require syllogism because they are not commonly praised... And concerning what is not persuasive, it is that of which it is not agreed that it is or that it is commonly praised. Hermannus Alemannus translates this passage in the following way: *ut in his que non sunt sillogistica et sunt indigentia sillogismo per hoc quod ipsa non sunt probabilia... Quod autem non est persuasivum est illud de quo nescimus quod sit aut quod sit probabile*. See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, p. 11.22-12,5, ed. Lyons for the Arabic text, and ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 69vb9-16 for its Latin counterpart.

from Avicenna's *K i t ā-Hibā b* with which the Latin translator replaced *Rhet.* III.2-4, 1405a31-1407a18.²⁷⁴

The prominent role of *maḥm ū d / p r o b a b i l i a* in Hermannus Alemannus' *Didascalía* we can find proof that Fārābī's *K i t ā-Hibā b* contained occurrences of other translations of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον as well.

In *Didascalía* § 54, Fārābī epitomizes the contents of *Rhet.* II.22 1395b35-a5 by stating that, in the third *pars* of the fourth *differentia*, Aristotle summarily discusses enthymemes and the fact that they can only derive from *well known, acceptable and probable premises*, a peculiarity they share with dialectical syllogisms.

*Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis, § 54, pp. 246,15-247,5, ed. Grignaschi.*²⁷⁵ IN TERTIA PARTE sermo est in enthymematibus summatis; et qualiter utendum est eis, et que est differentia inter ea et sillogismos topicos sive dyalecticos. Et ex quibus fiunt enthymemata et quod non componuntur nisi ex notoriis et receptibilibus {et probabilibus} et quoniam per hoc communicant sillogismis dyalecticis seu disputativis. DEINDE declarat {hic} qualiter accipiuntur notoria et probabilia in enthymematibus * et quoniam usitantur in enthymemstibus * secundum aliam dispositionem * quam in syllogismis disputativis * et declarat per quam dispositionem usitantur probabilia in enthymematibus.

In the apparatus to this passage, Grignaschi reconstructs the antecedents *m a ḥ m ū d* for Hermannus Alemannus' *n o t o r i a* for his *r e c e p t i b i l i a*, and *maḥm ū d* for *probabilia*.

²⁷⁴ This is the relevant Avicennian text: elegant, well known and commonly praised expressions, and sometimes they are used in known discussions. Hermannus Alemannus' translation is as follows: rationes subtiles probabiles et interdum usitantur in notoriis sermonibus. See Avicenna, *K i t ā-Hibā b*, 206,13-14, ed. Sālim for the Arabic text, and ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 128ra17-130rb28 for Hermannus' Latin translation.

²⁷⁵ In Grignaschi's edition of the *Didascalía*, text included between curly brackets whenever it is found in ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16097, but not in *Declaratio Compendiosa*, an edition of Hermannus Alemannus' text printed in Venice in 1481. Vice versa, text inserted between asterisks is found in *Declaratio Compendiosa*, but it is absent from ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16097. See Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, ed. Grignaschi (éd.), Table des abréviations, p. 148.

Once more, although the concision of the critical apparatus did not allow Grignaschi to debate his statement, I think it stands verified. We have already discussed the relationship between Hermannus Alemannus' *probabilis* and the Arabic term *maḥm ū dn* in the previous paragraph, and similar arguments can be made for the correspondence of *notorius* with *m a š h ū r* , and of *receptibilis* with *m a q b ū l* .

Notorius and *receptibilis* do not appear in Hermannus Alemannus' Arabico-Latin translation of *Rhetoric* I.1-8, and, whenever *m a š h ū r* and *m a q b ū l* are found elsewhere in the Greek Arabic version of Aristotle's text, their sense is not technical. Nonetheless, it may be interesting to point out that the expression *al-m a š h ū r-him, afamoussa for their deeds*,²⁷⁶ employed in the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhet.* I.15 1375b29, was translated by Hermannus Alemannus as *famosos in rebus*,²⁷⁷ while the term *m a q b ū l* translates Aristotle's ὁμολογούμενος in the Arabic version of *Rhet.* I.15 1376a27, was rephrased in Latin as *receptum*.²⁷⁹ A further occurrence of *m a q b ū l* in the Arabic translation was not translated in Latin at all,²⁸⁰ for Hermannus abridged to a few words the epitome offered by Aristotle in 1390a24-27 of the contents of *Rhet.* II.12-13, where the character of young and old people is discussed.²⁸¹

There is no occurrence of *notorius* and *receptibilis* either in Hermannus' quotations from Averroes' *Middle Commentary to the Rhetoric* and in his first quote from Avicenna's *K i t āb al-ḥikmah*, but both terms are employed, to reflect the Arabic *m a š h ū r* and *m a q b ū l* respectively, in the excerpt from Avicenna's *K i t āb al-ḥikmah* I.1 with which the Latin translator substituted *Rhet.* III.2-4, 1405a31-1407a18.

²⁷⁶ See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, p. 75,4, ed. Lyons. In this passage, the translator rendered Aristotle's adjective φανερός.

²⁷⁷ See ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673 72vb7.

²⁷⁸ See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, p. 76,21, ed. Lyons.

²⁷⁹ See ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673 93rb2.

²⁸⁰ See Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, p. 125,4, ed. Lyons.

²⁸¹ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 111ra13-14.

In Avicenna's and Hermannus parallel passages, we are faced with three occurrences of *ma š* (كأش *K i t ašībā baw* 1 p. 210.10/ folio 129va 16 in the Paris manuscript, p. 210.12/ folio 129va 20, and p. 211.3/folio 129vb3), and three occurrences of *notorius* (in ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 128rb5-6/ *K i t ašībā baw* 1, p. 206.13-14, in 129va 16/p. 210.10, and in 129va 20/p. 210.12), partially overlapping with each other. Let us now examine them one by one.

When in *K i t ašībā baw* 1 Avicenna writes about *elegant, well known* (ma^crūfa) and *commonly praised* (maḥm ū d a) e²⁸² he is specifying under which conditions figurative expressions can be used successfully in rhetorical speech. Hermannus translates this phrase as *rationes subtiles notorie probabiles*,²⁸³ thus substituting *notorius* for *ma c*, and *probabilis* for *maḥm ū d*, as already discussed above. A few pages later,²⁸⁴ while listing the three kinds of expressions that should be avoided on account of their coldness, Avicenna discusses metaphors that, albeit already in use, are not very effective because they bring to mind something else. In the case of wine, sometimes called *reddish*, and of milk and water, sometimes referred at as *the two white things*, the problem originates in the fact that this turn of phrase is not well known. The Avicennian expression is on both occasions *haytu l ā myā š kh ū n a n*, where *t h* and *o n i s* n o both occasions Hermannus Alemannus translates it as *non divulgata et nota existentie hac denominatione*.²⁸⁵ When adding that what is very commonly known in popular language is not effective in rhetorical speech either, Avicenna writes *wa-l ā m ā k ā n a ma š h ū r a n ḡ* *very commonly known*,²⁸⁶ and its Latin translation is *nisi fuerint notoria valde vulgata apud linguas hominum*.²⁸⁷ The last instance of *ma š* appearing in the excerpt from *K i t ašībā baw* 1 is to be found in the discussion of how poetic expressions as well are misplaced in rhetoric, for they

²⁸² See Avicenna, *K i t ašībā baw* 1, p. 206.13-14, ed. Sālim.

²⁸³ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 128rb5-6.

²⁸⁴ See Avicenna, *K i t ašībā baw* 1, p. 210.10-12, ed. Sālim.

²⁸⁵ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 129va16-17.

²⁸⁶ See Avicenna, *K i t ašībā baw* 1, p. 210.12, ed. Sālim.

²⁸⁷ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 129va20.

provoke wonder rather than persuasion. Hermannus Alemannus translates Avicenna's phrase *l a y s a h u ḥabi l-lafzi l-mā š ḥi ās aum mofuerit dictio talis usitata et famosa.*²⁸⁹

Therefore, although in *K i t āḤiḥā b ḥāḥ* p. 206.13 Hermannus employs the adjective *notorius* to translate *m a ḥ r ū f* rather than *ḥāḥ m a ḥ ḥāḥ*, and in *K i t āḤiḥā b ḥāḥ* p. 211.3 he substitutes *m a ḥ ḥwīḥ* for the double translation *usitatus et famosus*, rather than with *notorius*, Grignaschi's assumption that *notoriis* in *Didascalía* § 54 should be regarded as a translation of the term *m a ḥ ḥi ā* Fārābī's lost *Ḥi ḥāḥ* stands verified by Hermannus Alemannus' choices for *K i t āḤiḥā b ḥāḥ* p. 210.10 and 210.12.

Proof of the equivalence between *receptibilis* and *m a ḥ ḥāḥ* is harder to come by, but in *K i t ā b ḥāḥ* p. 210,6, when introducing the third type of expressions that should be avoided due to their coldness, Avicenna states that some of them are too heavy not on account of their innate strangeness but because their deformity diverts them from being accepted: *li-anna-h ā ḥāḥ r a f a ḥ h a y-h ā t ḥāḥ*. Hermannus Alemannus' translation for this phrase was *propter hoc quod eius forma et habitudo irreceptibilis*,²⁹⁰ which – unsurprisingly – shows the same parallel use of the Arabic root *q-b-l* and of the Latin root *recipio* that Grignaschi hypothesized in *Didascalía* § 54.

Finally, the persuasiveness of Grignaschi's reconstruction of the Farabian antecedents of Hermannus' *notoriis*, *receptibilibus* and *probabilibus* as *m a ḥ ḥāḥ*, and *ḥāḥ ḥi ḥi ā* due to the coherence of Fārābī listing together all the terms deriving from the Arabic *Organon* that he was currently using to name the premises of enthymemes.²⁹¹

²⁸⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t āḤiḥā b ḥāḥ*, p. 211.3, ed. Sālim.

²⁸⁹ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 129vb3.

²⁹⁰ See ms. Paris, BNF, Latin 16673 129va3.

²⁹¹ It is also worthwhile to mention that in *Rhet.* II.22 1395 a35-b06, the passage pointed out by Grignaschi as the Aristotelian source for *Didascalía* § 54, the word ἔνδοξον itself does not appear, even if the subject under discussion is indeed the premises from which enthymemes can derive: ὥστ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὀρισμένων λεκτέον, οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὐς ἀποδέχονται, καὶ τοῦτο διότι οὕτως φαίνεται δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, so that not all opinions are proper ground for speech, but rather some definite ones, like those of the persons who judge, or those that the people accept, and this is so because in such a way it seems clear to everyone or to most people. Moreover, conclusions should not be derived only from necessary premises, but also from premises that are true in most cases. Nonetheless, in the Arabic translation of these

Didascalía § 54 is not the only passage from the Latin translation of Fārābī's *Šiḥ al-Ḥitāb* where rhetorical premises are named. In *Didascalía* § 10 we find them described as *probabiles*, *notorie*, *famose*:

Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis, § 10, p. 165,6-166,1, ed. Grignaschi: Oportet enim ut sumamus fidem ex ipsis altero duorum modorum: aut secundum quod sunt probabiles, notorie, famose; aut secundum quod sunt sensibiles.

In *Didascalía* § 10 as well, Grignaschi's apparatus proposes Arabic equivalents for the technical terms translated by Hermannus, and it suggests *maḥm ū* for *probabilis*, for *notorie*, and *ma š h ū r a*, for *famose*. The reasoning behind the identification between *probabiles* and *maḥm ū* has already been exposed in the paragraphs above, and in this

lines, many terms relevant to the generally recognized do surface, like the verbs *qabala*, *zanna*, and *r a ' ā*: *And it is h*** from everything that people presume (yazannūnahu) and think (yarawnahu), but rather from determinate known things (min uḥd ū d a m a ' r ū f a)*, *either for the judgment (yaqbilūna mjnhuud) or for this should happen from what has already been clearly observed to be so entirely or for the most part (for the Arabic text, see Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, vol. I, p. 125,4, ed. Lyons).*

According to Badawī's edition of the Arabic *Rhetoric*, this passage includes the word *maḥm ū* as well, meaning *commonly praised*, while Lyons prefers to print *maḥd ū* instead. The two options are phonetically and graphically very close. Lyons's choice is closer to the Aristotelian ἐκ τῶν ὀρισμένων, *from some definite (opinions)*, which makes no reference to the fact that opinions on which rhetorical argumentation should be built must be well known. Still, the innovative reference to known premises is undeniably present in the Arabic translation by means of the participle *ma ' r ū f a*, meaning precisely *known*, and placed side by side with *maḥm ū d a ḥd ū* in such a way that they closely resemble a double translation. *Probabilis* is not attested unanimously by all Hermannus' witnesses: according to Grignaschi's apparatus, it is found in ms. ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16097, but it is absent from the *Declaratio Compendiosa*, namely the print edition of the *Didascalía* that was printed in Venice in 1481. Still, the Latin translation remains a strong argument in favour of Badawī's choice, for in order to support Lyons's solution, the *Declaratio Compendiosa* should comprise a translation of *maḥd ū* rather than a mere omission.

If Grignaschi's identification of *Rhet. II.22 1395 a35-b06* as the source passage of *Didascalía* § 54 is correct, the presence of the adjective *probabilis* in Hermannus' text could also be suggestive of *maḥm ū* having been present in Aristotle's text, since *probabilis* arguably mirrors *maḥm ū* elsewhere in Hermannus' translation work.

Moreover, we should also consider that Grignaschi could not read the Arabic *Rhetoric* in Lyons's edition. On the basis of Badawī's text alone, the presence of *maḥm ū* probably seemed uncontroversial to him, so that it could well have had a bearing on his conviction that *Didascalía* § 54 was indeed inspired by *Rhet. II.22*.

In conclusion, if Lyons' understanding of ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, informed by the Greek text of the *Rhetoric*, is probably correct, and the edition of the Arabic *Rhetoric* should read *min uḥd ū d a m a ' r ū f a*, *from definite things*, it is also likely that Fārābī and Hermannus were faced with the variant reading *min uḥd ū d a m a ' r ū f a*, *from things that are commonly praised and well known*.

case, Grignaschi offers some explanations of why he thinks that *notorie* should be identified with *š ā ḥ i ḥ* and *famose* with *m a š h ū r a*, but he points out that Fārābī employed both *š ā* and *m a š h i ḥ* in the paragraph devoted to the example (*al-tamtī*,²⁹²) when stating that for enthymeme and example the end of the premises must be to convince from a point of view immediately common to everyone (*fī -r ḥ -sy ā b -š l qā*); and *m a š h i ḥ* in the section discussing the material side of rhetorical argumentation.²⁹³

These observations, however, are only relevant to the fact that the adjectives *š ā* and *m a š h i ḥ* actually belong to Fārābī's lexicon, but do not build a specific relationship between them and Hermannus' *notorius* and *famosus*, the empirical evidence from which this reflection originated, nor account in any way for the concomitance of three near synonyms like *probabiles*, *notorie* and *famose* in the *Didascalía*. Indeed, Grignaschi does not cite any Farabian passage in which *š ā* and *m a š h i ḥ* (not to mention *maḥm ū*) do occur.

Furthermore, while we can reasonably assume that Fārābī and Hermannus were coherent with themselves in their lexical choices throughout one single text, the conclusions Grignaschi reached in *Didascalía* § 10 are in contrast with those he reached in *Didascalía* § 54: in the former case he states that the Latin adjective *notorius* represents the Arabic *š ā* while in the latter he affirms that it represents the Arabic *m a š h i ḥ*. Consequently, he also declares that *m a š h i ḥ* is represented by *famosus* in the first case, and by *notorius* in the second one.

Finally, I think that the information on Hermannus' translation practice I provided when discussing *Didascalía* § 54 encourages us to agree more with Grignaschi's understanding of that passage than with his interpretation of *Didascalía* § 10, for the Arabico-Latin version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* – which constitutes a large enough sample to examine and understand Hermannus Alemannus' skills and preferences as a translator – never uses *notorius* as an equivalent of *š ā ḥ i ḥ* or *public*.

²⁹² See Fārābī, *K i t āb al-Hibā*, p. 165,2, and p. 85,13-14, ed. Langhade.

²⁹³ See Fārābī, *K i t āb al-Hibā*, p. 105,15-107,11, ed. Langhade.

The hypothesis I tend to favour is that in *Didascalía* § 10 the phrase *notorie famose* should be taken globally as a double translation of one single Farabian term, most likely *m a š dī*. My persuasion is based on the observation that *notorius* translates *m a š linū* two out of the three occurrences of this Arabic term in Hermannus' Latin translation of Avicenna's *K i t ā l-Ḥiṭā b al-Ḥiṭā*, and *famosus* does so in the remaining one. Moreover, in all cases the Latin equivalent of *m a š hū r* is a double translation: *divulgata et nota* (*K i t ā l-Ḥiṭā b al-Ḥiṭā* p. 210.10),²⁹⁴ *notoria valde vulgata* (*K i t ā l-Ḥiṭā b al-Ḥiṭā* p. 210.12),²⁹⁵ and *usitata et famosa* (*K i t ā l-Ḥiṭā b al-Ḥiṭā* p. 211.3).²⁹⁶ This choice was possibly the result of Hermannus not feeling that he altogether understood the meaning of *m a š hū r* technical rhetorical term.

On a different note, we should not focus overmuch on *Didascalía* § 10 and § 45. Interesting as they might be, these sections are not representative of the lexical landscape of Fārābī's *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b al-Ḥiṭā* as a whole or of its Latin translation, for in the rest of this work the only prominent equivalent for Aristotle's ἐνδοξον, or *generally recognized*, is *probabilia/maḥm ū d ā t*. *Probabilia* is employed, for example, in *Didascalía* § 3 and § 4, while discriminating between the syllogistic and the non-syllogistic kind of assent that is almost sure in the first case,²⁹⁷ and while discussing how persuasion deriving from witnesses differs from persuasion based upon *probabilia/maḥm ū d ā t* in the second one.²⁹⁸ In the latter paragraph, we also find the expression *res ... famosa pro* *divulgata*, which mixes references to the ἐνδοξος equivalents *probabilis/maḥm ū d* and *famosus/m a š hū r* but this does not change the fact *probabilis*, with four occurrences is by far the most common option in Fārābī and Hermannus' *Didascalía*.

Since *receptibilis* (probably mirroring *m a q bā*) and *famosus* and *notorius* (probably mirroring *m a š hū r*) to be understood as quasi synonyms of *probabilis/maḥm ū d* at least in the context in

²⁹⁴ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 129va16-17.

²⁹⁵ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 129va20.

²⁹⁶ See ms. Paris, BNF, latin 16673 129vb3.

²⁹⁷ See Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis* §3, p. 156.10, ed. Grignaschi.

²⁹⁸ See Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis* §4, pp. 157.8, 158.1, 158.5, 158.6, and 158.9, ed. Grignaschi.

which they appear – it is likely that Fārābī chose to occasionally insert them in his discussion of *Rhetoric* in order to honour the rhetorical thought and lexicon preserved in different parts of the *Organon*, like Abū Bišr Mattā’s version of the *Posterior Analytics*, Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s version of the *Topics*, ‘Isā Ibn Zur‘a’s and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s versions of the *Sophistical Refutations*. Nonetheless, he chose to refer to rhetorical premises with the term *probabilia/maḥm ū d ān tal* likelihood because this is the ἔνδοξον translation most commonly found in the Greek-Arabic *Rhetoric*. In *Š d r al-Ḥiṭā b* the first work expressly devoted by Fārābī to the textual and philosophical analysis of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, such a fact could hardly fail to leave a mark.

The Generally Recognized in Fārābī ’ s C o m m e n t a r i e s on the Posterior and Posterior Analytics, and to the Topics

From a Classification of Premises Based on Truth Values to a Classification Based on Assent

After the completion of his works centered on the classifications of logic arts, the *R i s ā l a f ī y a n b a ḡ ī a n y u q a d f a l s a f a r a n d* the *M a b ḡ ā l a t a f ṣ ḥ ā n l ā q ṣ a i w t ā m ū l l n b k l i m i t ā ḡ* Fārābī abandoned the schema that classified syllogistic arts on the grounds of the truth values associated with their premises and conclusions, in such a way that rhetoric was characterized by premises that are equally true and false. Subsequently, Fārābī elaborated an inchoative classification of logical arts on the basis of the kind of assent (or *taṣd ī*) they produce,²⁹⁹ systematized and reworked by Avicenna later on.³⁰⁰

Specific Terms for Rhetorical and Dialectical Premises

In other Farabian works – like *K i t ā b i y k ā i l s t ā b i y ā ṣ ḡ k ā i l t ā b u r d a n ā l K i t ā b a l ḡ a d* – rhetorical and dialectical premises do therefore get directly analyzed, and in his *K i t ā b a l B u r* they are called *m a ḡ b ā n d n ā t ṣ h* respectively:

²⁹⁹ See D.L. Black, *L o g i c a n d A r i s t o t l e ’ s i n P h i l o s o p h y*, Brill 1990, pp. 102-103. *o e t i c s i n M*

³⁰⁰ See D.L. Black, *L o g i c a n d A r i s t o t l e ’ s R h e t o*, Brill 1990, pp. 95-96. *o e t i c s i n M*

Fārābī -B u K h ū ā b-21,3³⁰¹ E a h a r ū d:1 t h e a c q u i e s c e n c e (al-*nafs*) is the assent for that against which an objection can be perceived and to which it is possible to be opposed. And the acquiescence of the soul can also be preferred in regard to the strength or weakness of its objection. The assent that is close to certitude (al-*y a q ī n*) alectical assent (al- *d i t a ṣ ḍ ġ ī a q d a a l l i y y*) , w h i l e t h e a c q u i e s c e n c e - o f t a ṣ ḍ b ī a q l ā a ğ l i y y) .

And the things thanks to which assent that is close to certitude is granted are either commonly known propositions (al-*m a ṣ h ū r ā t*) a n d t h e i r l i k e , o r s y l l o g i s m s c o m p o s e d o f c o m m o n l y k n o w n p r o p o s i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y o n t h e g r o u n d s o f t h e i n d u c t i o n o f t h a t i n w h i c h t h e e x h a u s t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t h a t h a v e b e e n e x a m i n e d i s n o t k n o w n w i t h c e r t i t u d e . A n d t h e t h i n g s o n w h i c h t h e r e i s a c q u i e s c e n c e o f t h e s o u l a r e e i t h e r t h e a c c e p t e d p r e m i s e s (a l - m a q b ū l ā t) , o r t h a t w h i c h i s a s y l l o g i s m c o m p o s e d o f p r e m i s e s a n d s o m e t i m e s t h i s h a p p e n s i s e s f r o m o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t w e h a v e l i s t e d w h e r e w e h a v e e x p l a i n e d e l o q u e n t a l l o c u t i o n s (a l - m u ḥ ā ṭ a b ā t a l - b a l ā ḡ i y y a) .

The reference to rhetoric by the term *b a l*, which applies more properly to literary eloquence, is interesting but unambiguous: it clearly points to what is called *ḥiṭā b* elsewhere in Fārābī.

When listing the premises that inspire rhetoric acquiescence (*s u k ū n al-*nafs**)³⁰² Fārābī does still refer to possible premises (*m u q a d d a m ā*); i.e. to a modal classification, but only as a second tier integration to *al-m a q b*, accepted premises. Both *al-m a q b* and *al-m a ṣ h ū r ā t* reflect t

³⁰¹ The relevant Arabic text is: .

³⁰² Rather than *taṣḍīq*, assent. On the subject of *sukūn al-*nafs**, see D.L. Black, *L o g i c a n d A r i s t o t l e ' s R e a s o n i n g i n M e d i e v a l A r a b i c P h i l o s o p h y*, Brill 1990, p. 77.

ἐνδόξοις. While its resemblance with Fārābī's definition of *m a ṣ h i* is the closest, the definition of *m a q b i* is modeled on this source as well.

Fārābī's List of First Premises

We could be tempted to ascribe this selection to the fact that *m a q b i* and *m a ṣ h i* are the two translations of ἐνδόξοις attested in the Arabic version of the *Posterior Analytics*, the Aristotelian text that was reworked in Fārābī's *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* would rather discard this view on two grounds. Firstly, the presence of *m a q b i* in Parisinus Arabus 2346, main source for Ğabr's edition of the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, could be due to a revision or to other forms of collation, for out of three occurrences of ἐνδόξοις, we only find it above the word *m a ṣ h i* in I.19 81b22, and alongside it in I.19 81b20. Secondly, the use of *m a ṣ h i* in the sense of dialectical ἐνδόξοις and of *m a q b i* in the sense of rhetoric ἐνδόξοις is common to *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* and many more Farabian texts, like *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* 305, *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* 306, *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* 307, and to the *Fuṣū l fī ḥamsa fuṣū l* 18. On all these occasions, Fārābī is reflecting upon the source for our assent both to *m a q b i* and *m a ṣ h i*, which like *maḥs ū s* sensible premises, and *m a ṣ h i* i n t

³⁰⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* pp. 18-19, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq ʿ-ʿFi ān r d i l ā n* I, in which premises that are not known thanks to syllogism are listed as *al-m a ṣ h i*, *al-m a ṣ h i t ū ṣ a l ā m t a ṣ h i*, and *al-m a q b i*. Moreover, in Fārābī, *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* pp. 154-64, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq ʿ-ʿFi ān r d i l ā n* I, where juridical (i.e. rhetorical) syllogisms are discussed, rhetorical premises are always called *al-m a q b i*.

³⁰⁶ See Fārābī, *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* 306, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq ʿ-ʿFi ān r d i l ā n* I, where premises the knowledge of which is not due to syllogism are listed as *m u q a d d a ḥ s n ā*, *ḥ a ṣ ṣ a*, and *m a q b i*. Türkler's edition adds to the text a reference to intellective premises that is in the apparatus of al-ʿAḡam's text. See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, Brill 1990, p. 95 n. 126, and M. Türkler, *Farabînin bazı mantik eserleri*, in *Revue de la Faculté de Langues*, 1958, vol. XVI, pp. 165-286.

³⁰⁷ See Fārābī, *K i t āb u r d i l ā n* pp. 17-18, 19, 6-20, 20, and 29-30, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq ʿ-ʿFi ān r d i l ā n* I, for the list of premises that are not known through syllogism.

³⁰⁸ See Fārābī, *Fuṣū l fī ḥamsa fuṣū l* 18, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq ʿ-ʿFi ān r d i l ā n* I, for a list of premises that do not derive from syllogism.

premises,³⁰⁹ are not ascertained by syllogism themselves. While *ma'āqib* became the main source of scientific demonstration and, as discussed above, *ma'shāh* were associated with dialectics and *maqāb* with rhetoric, *maḥsūsoḥ* sensible premises, were not assigned to a specific art, even if they were widely discussed.³¹⁰

Black speculates that the absence of a disciplinary association for sensible premises is due to the fact that, according to Fārābī, demonstration, dialectics, and sophistry only engage with universal problems, while sensible premises are always particular.³¹¹ Still, since Fārābī remained convinced that experience does produce scientific knowledge, Black assumes that, in his opinion, sensible premises could on occasion pertain to the aforementioned logical arts, on condition of being understood, in that context, as universal rather than particular. Black's reasoning seems to the point. An interesting passage corroborates this view: in the chapter of his *Ki tāḥḥal* which discusses the premises of dialectics (*qaḍāyā*), Fārābī states that *sensible premises are not used as principles in dialectics because their subjects are particulars, except in the induction for the verification of universal premises that have sensible particulars as their subjects, and they do not belong with sensible premises, but they are part of commonly known premises.*³¹² Actually, I think that this passage by Fārābī should incite us to see Black's reconstruction rather as fact than as a hypothesis.

The Four Premises that Are First: An Origin for Fārābī's Doctrine

The idea that only four kind of primary premises exist and that they are intelligible or scientific (*'ilmiyya* or *yāqā'i*) sensible (*maḥsūsoḥ*), commonly known (*ma'shāh*) and accepted premises

³⁰⁹ *Ma'āqib*, intelligible premises, are actually called *yāqā'i* in *Ki tāḥḥal* (see Fārābī, *Ki tāḥḥal*, 18, M. Faḥrī, (ed.), *al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fārābī*, vol. IV) and in *Ki tāḥḥal* (see e.g. Fārābī, *Ki tāḥḥal*, 7-12, R. al-Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fārābī*, vol. III). This is discussed in D.L. Black, *Logic and Arabic Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Brill 1990, pp. 95-96.

³¹⁰ On the subject of *maḥsūsoḥ* sensible premises, see D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric in Arabic Philosophy*, Brill 1990, p. 96 n. 128. On the relationship between endoxastic premises and *σημεία* as sensible premises in Fārābī, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par de vue immédiat et commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 171.

³¹¹ See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, pp. 6 n. 28.

³¹² See Fārābī, *Ki tāḥḥal*, 17-20, 22, R. al-Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fārābī*.

(*m a q b* is *quātē*) widespread in Fārābī's work, and it is sometimes paired with coupling of different kinds of premises with specific arts. Such a statement, that must have been of some relevance to Fārābī, is not to be found in the same form throughout Aristotle's *Organon*. The question of the origin of this doctrine is not without interest, for it is from its inchoative Farabian formulation that later thinkers, including Avicenna, developed a system both inclusive in terms of kinds of premises and of logical arts it concerned, and heavy in terms of philosophical consequences it implied.³¹³

G a l e n ' s F o u r K i n d s o f P r e m i s e s

Although such a classification of argumentative premises is absent from Aristotle's *Organon*, Rescher cursorily points out that a similar one regularly surfaces in Galen's *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*. In this work, Galen frequently makes reference to epistemological principles while championing Hippocrates's and Plato's view on the collocation of the *hegemonikon*, or the governing part of the soul.³¹⁴

We know that this book did have an Arabic reception because it is quoted by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq in his letter on the Syriac and Arabic translations of Galen's books. Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq states that, by the end of the 9th Century, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* had been translated into Syriac twice, by his contemporary Ayyūb ar-Ruhāwī al-Abraṣ and by himself, on the latter occasion with the addition of an apologetic appendix, while Ḥunayn's cousin and associate Ḥubayš translated it

³¹³ On the subject, see D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, pp. 65-97. *P o e t i c*

³¹⁴ See N. Rescher, *Al-Fārābī's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics*, University of Pittsburgh Press 1963, p. 41. Rescher merely hinted that Fārābī's classification of known premises has a far antecedent in Aristotle's *Topics*, mediated either by Galen or by the Stoics. However, the only grounding he offers for his statements is a reference to a contribution by I. Müller's, who names neither the Stoics nor Fārābī, and mainly focuses on the reconstruction of Galen's thought in his lost *Περὶ ἀποδείξεως*. He does indeed establish a parallel between the aforementioned Farabian concept and Aristotle's *Organon*, but, whatever appearances may suggest, this parallel concerns *Sophistical Refutations* 165a38-165b12 rather than *Topics*. See I. Müller, *Über Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis*, in *Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, vol. XX (1897), pp. 405-478.

into Arabic.³¹⁵ This translation was known to Fārābī, who quotes “the last chapter” of *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* in order to highlight Galen’s use of deprecation of his adversary’s origins in order to support his arguments on an entirely unrelated subject.³¹⁶

Besides offering a list of premises, on occasion,³¹⁷ Galen even specifies that each kind of them had been discussed by “the ancients” in a specific work: with the possible exception of those concerning rhetoric,³¹⁸ all the mentioned works belong to Aristotle’s *Organon*, so that we are not surprised by the shift affecting Fārābī’s texts, where premises are assigned to the arts that correspond to each of their types, rather than to the *Organon* books in which they are analyzed.

So, according to Galen, what are the types of premises, called λήμματα, that we employ? Since his *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* is not a systematic work on logic, it does not offer a specific treatment of our subject, and we will have to compose with one of the many occurrences in which he makes reference to his epistemological framework in order to discard psychological doctrines that diverge from Plato’s and Hippocrates’s views. For example, when accusing Zeno and Chrysippus of being immethodical even in their use of premises that are not demonstrative, Galen proceeds as follows:

³¹⁵ See Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, *Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, pp. 21-22, ed. Bergsträsser, in *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. XVII, 2, Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft 1925.

³¹⁶ See Fārābī, *Κ i τ ἄιδῃ βαρφ*, 71,14-73,2, ed. Langhade. In Fārābī’s text the reference to the title of Galen’s work is explicit, but De Lacy points out that the statement ascribed to Galen by Fārābī does not appear anywhere in the surviving Greek text of *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*. De Lacy speculates that Fārābī’s words could be a reference to the tenth book of this work, mentioned by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq and by Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī in his *al-Ḥā w ī f ī l-Ṭibb*, but ignored by Galen himself in his *De libris propriis*, a work listing his authentic publications, where it is stated that *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* consists of nine books. De Lacy’s hypothesis is that could have Galen added a tenth book to his text after the writing of *De Libris propriis*. See Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, pp. 44-45, ed. Ph. De Lacy, Al-Rāzī, *al-Ḥā w ī f ī l-Ṭibb*, vol. I p. 14,10-12, ed. Ismā’īl, and Galen, *De Libris propriis*, in *Scripta minora*, vol. II, p. 122.18, ed. I Müller.

³¹⁷ See Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* II.3, p. 112,3-7, ed. Ph. De Lacy.

³¹⁸ All the titles cited by Galen are plural, which is standard for Σοφιστικοὶ ἐλέγχοι, Τοπικά, and Δεύτερα ἀναλυτικά, but less so for the *Rhetoric*, apparently called here αἱ ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι. In his commentary, De Lacy speculates that, in this case, Galen could be meaning works by other Peripatetic authors who had worked on the same subject, like Teophrastus, Demetrius of Phalerum and Heracleides Ponticus. The other possibility is that Galen was quoting the ancient rhetorical textbooks (τέχναι ῥητορικαί) sometimes reviewed by Aristotle in his own work. See Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* II.3, p. 626, ed. Ph. De Lacy.

Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* II.3, pp. 110,21-112,2. ed. de Lacy: For they (i.e. Zeno and Chrysippus) do not know that scientific premises (ἐπιστημονικά) refer back to the essence of the matter under investigation and have it as their guide. All others are external. Some are used by the dialecticians for practicing playing the midwife, leading him to some discovery, and raising questions in his mind; all of this, if you wish, you may call dialectical (διαλεκτικά), gymnastic and topical (κἀγυμναστικά καὶ κἀτοπικά), for I am not concerned about the names: but try to distinguish them from scientific premises. Others are even more remote than these and are constructed chiefly from generally accepted and every-day examples and from certain inductions of the same sort or from witnesses. These you may call, if you wish, plausible or rhetorical (πιθανὰ καὶ ῥητορικά), for I do not care what name you give them, but you must try to learn their nature. Sophistical premises (σοφιστικά) depart even further from the essence of the matter under investigation.

Galen calls ἐπιστημονικά the properly scientific premises, those suitable for establishing the collocation of the *hegemonikon*, and remarks that they must derive from the very essence of the problem under investigation. Premises that do not derive from the very essence of the problem can be dialectical (διαλεκτικά, γυμναστικά or τοπικά λήμματα in Greek), rhetorical (πιθανά or ῥητορικά λήμματα), or sophistical (σοφιστικά λήμματα).³¹⁹

Sophistical Premises

The parallelism between this list and the classification of premises advocated by Fārābī is far from perfect, for the latter philosopher never mentions sophistical premises in this context, while dialectical and rhetorical premises are mentioned in both cases. Reasonable grounds for the Farabian omission could be offered by the fact that, as much for the Arabic philosopher as for Aristotle, sophistical reasoning does not have any kind of premises that is specific to it, for it employs ἔνδοξα, in common with dialectics and rhetoric. Another factor at play could be Fārābī's

³¹⁹ See also Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* II.3, p. 110,1-6, Ph. De Lacy (ed.)

choice of stressing the primary character of the premises he lists, since he insists that they are known without making use of further premises.

Sensible Premises

A further problem with the identification of Galen as Fārābī's source is that, if Fārābī's intelligible premises, or *m u q a d d a m ā* could easily be identified with Galen's ἐπιστημονικὰ λήμματα, Fārābī's sensible premises, or *m u q a d d a ḥ s n ā* do not immediately correspond to any of Galen's λήμματα types. However, it could be defended that, when Galen discusses scientific premises, he is referring both to premises that we know intellectually, and to premises that we know through sense perception. We get a hint in this direction when Galen discusses the premises on which the discussion of the collocation of the *hegemonikon* should be based: if the first premise to be considered is the definition of *hegemonikon*, the second is to be sought in dissections, which are undoubtedly a sensorial experience.³²⁰ Accordingly, I think it would be more proper to view the presence of *m u q a d d a ḥ s n ā* as *sensible premises*, as an analysis of Galen's ἐπιστημονικὰ λήμματα into *m u q a d d a m ā*, or *intelligible (scientific) premises*, and *m u q a d d a ḥ s n ā*, or *sensible (scientific) premises* preferred by Fārābī. Moreover, as discussed above, *sensible premises*, which are never assigned to any specific logic discipline and which in general concern particulars, can at times be principles of scientific, dialectical or sophistical reasoning, as long as, in that context, they can be understood as universal.

Furthermore, Fārābī's classification of premises, although recurrent in his work and common to *Ḥamsa Fuṣū* ³²¹ *K i t ā Ḥ b a* ³²² *K i t ā Q b i y ā* ³²³ and *K i t ā Q b i y ā* ³²⁴ is not

³²⁰ See Galen, *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* II.3, pp. 110,28-112,6, Ph. De Lacy (ed.)

³²¹ Fārābī, *Fuṣū l t a š t a m i l u ḍ ḡ f u l ū l ḡ ḥ a m ā* 'a in-š *f a ā s ū ḡ l ū f m ā n ṭ i q i w a - h ū y a ḥ a m s a f u ṣ ū*, lp. 64,12-15, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq ʿinda l-Fārābī*, vol. I.

³²² See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥ b a* pp.17-20, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ- Fi ā n r ḍ w ā l* I.11

³²³ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Q b i y ā* ḡ ḡ, p. 75,5, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ- Fi ā n r ḍ w ā l* I.11

³²⁴ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Q b i y ā* pp.18,15-19,6, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ- Fi ā n r ḍ w ā l* I.11

entirely constant. In some occasions, like in *K i t ā b al-Mantiq*³²⁵ the list is first exposed in its standard form, and later synthesized to three elements. This restructuring is explained by a statement to the effect that distinguishing between dialectical and intelligible premises is not pertinent in the framework of *jadal*. Given the shifting form this doctrine takes in Fārābī, I would not regard the differences existing between his statements about the four primary premises and those supported by Galen on the four kinds of λήμματα as relevant enough to discard the hypothesis that the first derive from the second, or at least from a related tradition.

³²⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Mantiq* 1B,6-15, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* ‘*Fi ānri dīn al-‘Ilm* A list of first premises in three points – *maḥs ū s a , and amqab š ih kūrīn* that also be found in *K i t ā b al-Mantiq* 7B,5, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* ‘*Fi ānri dīn al-‘Ilm* Its editors disagree on this subject. R. al-‘Aḡam’s 1987 edition prints the tripartite list, but M. Türker’s 1958 edition printed a fourfold list of premises, naming *m u q a d dnahsn ū t a , m a š q ḥ a ū d l m a , , q ū l a*. The differences between the two texts are minutely spread throughout the passage and resurface whenever reference is made to the number of primary premises, so that, in all likelihood, whichever of the two versions is wrong, it does not owe its existence to one or more mechanic copying mistakes. At the root of the editors’ divergence, there is the preliminary preference accorded by each editor to a single manuscript: Türker to ms. Ankara, Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Kütüphanesi, Ismail Saib I 183, and R. al-‘Aḡam to Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Emanet Hazinesi 1730. The presence of ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1349 in Türker’s apparatus, in this case always in agreement with the Ankara manuscript, does not imply that the editor’s choice was determined by mechanical elimination of the Emanet Hazinesi manuscript, for Türker states in her preface that ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1349 was probably copied from ms. Ankara, Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Kütüphanesi, Ismail Saib I 183. D. Black states that the catalogue in four points espoused by Türker is to be preferred on the grounds that Fārābī seems to indicate that his list is complete, and other Farabian works clearly have lists composed of four elements. Although it would be possible to share this way of thinking, which also presupposes to imagine that ms. Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Emanet Hazinesi 1730 derives from an ancestor in which the reference to intelligible premises was lost because of a copying mistake and in which the frequent statements about the number of premises indexed in the passage was later rectified in order to restore internal coherence, I think that Black’s reasoning neglects the fact that in *K i t ā b al-Mantiq* 7B,5, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* ‘*Fi ānri dīn al-‘Ilm* do indeed find an explanation of why the standard list composed of sensible, accepted, commonly known, and intelligible premises can on occasion be resumed to a shorter one. Fārābī announces that he is going to do so in the beginning of his discussion of dialectics on the grounds that, in these circumstances, the distinction between intelligible and commonly known premises is not relevant. Can we compare the context of *K i t ā b al-Mantiq* 7B,5, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* ‘*Fi ānri dīn al-‘Ilm* that of *K i t ā b al-Mantiq* 7B,5, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* ‘*Fi ānri dīn al-‘Ilm* in this respect? In any case, if the list with *maḥs ū s a , and amqab š ih kūrīn* is indeed the original text, the genesis of the erroneous list would be easy to explain as the product of collation with one of the texts reporting the much more prevalent fourfold list.

See M. Türker, *Farabînin bazı mantik eserleri*, in *Revue de la Faculté de Langues, d’Histoire et de Géographie*, vol. XVI, pp. 174 and 250, and Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Mantiq* 7B,5, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* ‘*Fi ānri dīn al-‘Ilm*. See also D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, pp. 94 n. 10 and 126, and Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Mantiq* 1B,6-22, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq* ‘*Fi ānri dīn al-‘Ilm*

An Antecedent Sophistical Refutations? to the 's

If we accept a link between Galen's and Fārābī's analysis of premises, the problem of the source for Galen's classification gains new interest. Although Rescher was likely right in pointing out a form of continuity between *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* and *K i t ā Q b i y ā Š b s ğ I a a n h*, less optimistic about Müller and Rescher's claim that Galen's classification could itself go back to Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*.³²⁶ Their second chapter is devoted to listing the genres of arguments that can be used in oral discussion:

Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 2, 165a38-165b12: Ἐσ δ ἡ ὠν τ ῶ δ ι α λ ἔ γ ἔ ρ ῶ κ α ι τ ἔ τ τ γ ἄ ρ ῶ δ ῶ δ α σ κ α δ ῶ ι α λ ε ἰ κ π α ἰ ε κ ι ο ρ ἰ α κ α ἔ ἰ ρ κ ω ἔ π ι δ κ ω ὄ κ μ ἔ δ ν ἔ κ ο ἰ τ ῶ ω ἰ κ ε ἄ ρ ω χ ν ἄ κ ἄ σ μ ω θ ἡ μ κ α ὀ ῥ ἔ κ τ ῶ ν ο ἄ π ο κ ρ ι ν δ ο ο μ ξ ἔ ὦ ν ο υ σ υ λ λ ο γ ι (ξ ὄ γ μ ἄ ε μ ν ι ο σ ι τ ε τ ὠ φ α ι ω θ ἄ) γ ὄ ν α λ ε ἔ τ ω ἰ ἔ κ κ ω ὠ ἔ ν δ ὄ ξ ω ν σ υ λ λ ο γ ἄ σ τ ι κ ῶ ἄ π ὠ ε ε ι π ρ ρ α κ ὄ ὀ ἰ ἔ κ τ ῶ ὄ κ ο ὄ π ῶ ἄ ω π ν ο κ ρ ι κ α μ ἔ ν ω ἄ ν α γ κ ε α ἰ ἰ δ ὠ ἔ ν ῶ φ ρ ι ο σ π ο ἰ ἔ χ ι ε μ ἔ ν π ω σ τ ὄ ἡ μ ρ ἡ ὄ ν ἄ , ἔ ν ὠ ρ ἔ ἔ τ ἄ) ρ ο ἰ ς ἔ ρ ι σ ὄ τ ω ἔ ο κ τ ῶ φ α ι ν ο μ ἔ ἔ ν δ ὠ ἔ ν ῶ ὄ ῥ ῶ ν ν τ ὠ , ἔ σ υ λ λ ο γ ἡ φ α ι κ ὄ μ ε ν ο σ υ λ λ ο γ ι σ τ ι κ ο ἰ

Of arguments used in discussion there are four classes: didactic, dialectical, examinational, and contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are those that deduce from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer (for the learner must be convinced); dialectical arguments are those that deduce from reputable premises, to the contradictory of a given thesis; examinational arguments are those that deduce from premises which are accepted by the answerer and which anyone who claims to possess knowledge of the subject is bound to know (in what manner, has been explained elsewhere); contentious arguments

³²⁶ Both Müller and Rescher refer to *Sophistical Refutations* as *Topics IX*. See N. Rescher, *Al-F ā r ā b ī ' s S h o r t C o m m e n t a r y o n t h e P r i o r A n a l y t i c s*, University of Pittsburgh Press 1963, p. 41 and I. Müller, *Über Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis*, in *Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, vol. XX (1897), pp. 405-478.

are those that deduce or appear to deduce to a conclusion from premises that appear to be reputable but are not so.

Could Aristotle's list of kinds of argument for discussion, consisting in didactic, dialectical, examinational, and contentious arguments, really be the source for Galen's classification of kinds of λήμματα, consisting in scientific, dialectical, rhetorical and sophistical premises? Dialectical arguments are present in both lists, and Galen might well have had didactic arguments in mind when discussing ἐπιστημονικά λήμματα, for, at the end of *Soph. Ref. 2*, Aristotle mentions the fact that a full discussion of demonstrative arguments (τὰ ἀποδεικτικά) is available in the *Analytics*, establishing a clear correspondence between demonstrative and didactic arguments. Also the difference between disputative (ἐριστικά) and sophistical (σοφιστικά) arguments is merely lexical.

However, rhetorical premises, included in Galen's list, are nowhere to be found in Aristotle's classification, and it is next to impossible to put them in any relationship with examinational arguments (πειραστικά), the only remaining element in Aristotle's list. Examinational arguments are discussed by Aristotle in *Top. VIII.5* 159a25-38 as well, and this passage clarifies that they amount to a distinctively dialectical practice,³²⁷ as does the end of *Soph. Ref. 2*,³²⁸ where Aristotle, offering a bibliographic note for *Soph. Ref. 2* 165a38-165b12, states that demonstrative arguments have been discussed in the *Analytics*, contentious arguments will be discussed in the following pages, and dialectical and examinational arguments – taken collectively – have been discussed elsewhere, for example in *Top. VIII.5* 159a25-38.

After all, *Soph. Ref. 2* 165a38-165b12, Müller and Rescher's favourite excerpt, is not the only Aristotelian passage in which different kinds of logical premises are listed and contrasted: the same happens, for example, in *Prior Analytics* I.1 24a22-25 and in *Top. I.1* 100a29, where the

³²⁷ On this subject, see R. Smith, *Aristotle, Topics. Books I and VIII, with Excerpts from Related Texts*, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1997, pp. 128-130.

³²⁸ See *Soph. Ref. 2* 165b9-12.

classification is shrunk to two elements, demonstrative and dialectical premises.³²⁹ Rather than chasing a specific chapter of the *Organon* that would have been at the origin of Galen's classification of λήμματα, it would probably be wiser to observe, together with R. Smith in his commentary to *Topics* I and VIII,³³⁰ that the situations involving argument in the *Topics* (and in the *Organon*) are five: demonstration, rhetorical argument, sophistic argument, dialectical argument oriented towards practice and inquiry, and dialectical argument oriented towards examination. The last two elements of the list are not systematically separated, for, to once again quote R. Smith, inquiry and examination are but two different functions that can be served by dialectical argument. It comes therefore as no surprise that Galen chose to shape his classification of premises in *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* having as a model the whole of Aristotle's *Organon* rather than one single passage, and it is also understandable that he did not preserve the distinction between dialectical and examinational arguments, present in *Soph. Ref.* 2 165a38-165b12, but far from being constantly implemented in the *Organon* as a whole.³³¹

We do not have to imagine Galen's relationship to his Aristotelian sources as necessarily direct and textual: a contemporary thinker like Albinus espoused the same organization of syllogistic premises as Galen,³³² and this schema must have been widespread enough to reach Boethius some centuries later.³³³ In this perspective, I think it would be easier to view the list of premises presented by Galen in his *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, and that may well be at the origin of Fārābī's list in his commentaries on the *Analytics* and on the *Topics*, as a loose product of

³²⁹ See also *Top.* I.10 104a7 and *Top.* I.14 105a36.

³³⁰ See R. Smith, *Aristotle, Topics. Books I and VIII, with Excerpts from Related Texts*, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1997, p. 128.

³³¹ This is what P. Moraux means when he states that Aristotle often contrasts rhetorical arguments with apodictic, dialectic, and disputative premises: not that he ever produced a single fourfold classification of premises belonging to these arts, but that, on disparate occasions, he compared rhetoric premises to premises belonging to each other art separately. See P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes* Éditions universitaires de Louvain 1951, p. 178. *Aristo*

³³² See Albinus, *Epitome doctrinae Platonicae sive Διαδοχικά*, ed. Louis. On the subject, see P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes* des Éditions universitaires de Louvain 1951, p. 179.

³³³ See Boethius, *De Topicis Differentiis*, 1181 C, ed. Nikitas. On the subject, see S. Ebbesen, *Commentators and commentaries on Aristotle's*, vol. 3, Brill 1985, pp. 102-103. *Elenchii*

its time and climate, rather than as a specific elaboration upon *Soph. Ref.* 2 165a38-165b12 or any other single Aristotelian passage.

Selecting a Name for Rhetorical and Dialectical Premises from the Peripatetic Tradition

If at this stage of his reflection Fārābī selected *ma š lanā* and *ma q ba* as equivalents of ἔνδοξον, it is reasonably not because he wanted to reflect the lexical facies of the Arabic version of the *Analytics*, or of any specific Aristotelian text, but rather because he chose the two translations most common in his environment and specialized them so that each could characterize a given logical art. Indeed, Abū Bišr Mattā and Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī, the translators who had the closest biographical ties with Fārābī, mainly employ *ma q ba* and *ma š lanā* respectively.³³⁴

Fārābī’s Use of Further Peripatetic Translations of ἔνδοξον

As it is apparent from other works, Fārābī was aware of the existence of further equivalents of these terms, but, probably since they were more peripheral in the lexical choices of his contemporaries, he employed them as synonyms or qualifiers of the main terms he had chosen, as in the case of *dā i* or in a different and subordinated role, as in the case of *maḥm ū* and *zann*.³³⁶ In some of the Farabian texts we just mentioned, therefore, other translations of the term

ἔνδοξον surface: for example, in *Fuṣū l t a š t a m i l u d ḡ r a l ā l ḡ h a i m n i a r ḡ a i r n i r f i c ā u r t ā y d*

³³⁴ The other term employed by Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī to translate ἔνδοξον, could also have been used by Fārābī to coin the expression *f i b-rā* which played a very prominent role in his later rhetorical thought. On this subject, see the section on *The Generally Recognized in F ā r ā b ī* - *Ḥitā* in this chapter, p. 134-153.

³³⁵ The term *dā i*, translates ἔνδοξον in Abū ‘Utmān al-Dimašqī’s version of *Topics* I-II, which had been revised on Greek sources. On this subject, see the following pages of this section.

³³⁶ For example, in Fārābī’s *K i t ā b* both *maḥm ū* and *māzn ūān* are subordinated to *maš ū r ā ḡ m ū* as far as they are one of the species of *maš ū r ā ḡ m ū* and *māzn ūān* as far as they are the residual section of the *maš ū r ā ḡ m ū* that is exclusively supported by *zann*, unlike other commonly known premises, which can have grounding elsewhere as well (e.g. in sense, *al-ḥiss*). See Fārābī, *K i t ā b*, pp. 87,8-9 and 105,10-11, ed. Langhade. Moreover, in Fārābī’s *Š ḡ ḡ al-Qiyā* the *māzn ūān* are the kind of premises that is distinctive of rhetoric, and in his *K i t ā b* the word *maḥm ū* builds – together with *mustankar* – a polarity within the realm of what is *maš ū r*. On these subjects, see the sections of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in F ā r ā b ī* - *Ḥitā* pp. 130-133, to *The Generally Recognized in F ā r ā b ī* - *Ḥitā* pp. 184-185, and, for *K i t ā b* - *Ḥitā* following pages of the current section.

š u r ~~ā~~ ³³⁷ n ā f^ḥmāntiqiwa-hīya ḥamsa fuṣū l ³³⁷ and in *K i t āḤbī y āḤs g*,³³⁸ whenever dialectical *al-m a š h āḥ* are introduced and defined, the word *dā* , *widespread*, is also used to describe them, mirroring its employment in Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s books I-II of *K i t āḤbī y āḤs g* derived on multiple Greek sources.³³⁹ This was a rather foreseeable choice, for *dā* is one of the few equivalents of ἐνδοξόν that only appears in dialectical context, and is never found in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*. It is however interesting to point out that, unlike Avicenna later on,³⁴⁰ Fārābī never seems to use *dā* as the primary term to refer to the concept of dialectical ἐνδοξόν, but only as a tool to explain what is meant by it.

Another point that should be spared some attention is that, in Fārābī, the technical term *dā* does not appear in *K i t āḤbdal*, as we might have expected based on the fact that we originally found this term in Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s translation of books I-II of Aristotle’s *Topics*. This underscores the importance of sometimes understanding the similarity in terminology between an Arabic Peripatetic text and any Aristotelian Greek-Arabic translation as the effect of their belonging to a shared lexical and scholarly tradition in the wider sense, and not exclusively as a clue towards a direct textual relationship between the two works.

In both the *Ḥamsa Fuṣū l* and in *K i t āḤbī y āḤs g* the Farabian works that explain *al-m a š h āḥ* with the adjective *dā* , *al-m a q b āḥ* described as the premises that are accepted because they are certified by a person who is *murtaḍin*, *satisfying*. As far as I know, this term does not appear in any Aristotelian translation as an equivalent of ἐνδοξόν. The word *murtaḍin* is also used in the same way in Fārābī’s *K i t āḤbī y āḤs*

³³⁷ Fārābī, *Fuṣū l t a š t a m i l u l ḥ i ā m ā n a i n - š f a ḥ ḥ i l u l i m ā n t i q i w a - h i y a ḥ a m s a f u ṣ ū l* p., 65,1-2, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Maṅṭiq ‘inda l-Fārābī*, vol. I

³³⁸ Fārābī, *K i t āḤbī y āḤs g*, p. 75,6-9, R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Maṅṭiq ‘Fi ān r d v a l l I I . l*

³³⁹ On this subject, see the paragraph devoted to the Arabic translations at the very beginning of the present section on the generally recognized (ἐνδοξόν).

³⁴⁰ See the section of this paragraph devoted to *The Generally Recognized in Avicenna*, pp. 161-243.

³⁴¹ Fārābī, *K i t āḤbī y āḤs*, p. 18,17-18,18 R. al-‘Aḡam (ed.), *al-Maṅṭiq ‘Fi ān r d v a l l I I . l*

In *K i t āb al-ḥikma* the term *dā'irah*, does not surface, but dialectical premises are described as *muḥarrāḥ*, preferred.³⁴² *Muḥarrāḥ* appears at least twice in *K i t āb al-ḥikma* as well, once in the chapter devoted to dialectical premises (*Qaḍā'iyah*) and once in that devoted to the utility and the importance of dialectics (*Munafā'iyah*). In the chapter on the premises of dialectics,³⁴³ Fārābī states that *al-maṣḥūrāt*, the common compass knowledge, comprises two polarities: what is preferred and praised (*muḥarrāḥ* and *maḥmūd*) versus what is rejected and refused (*muṭarraḥ* and *mustankar*). Fārābī specifies that, as far as *al-maṣḥūrāt*, the common compass knowledge, is concerned, *al-muḥarrāḥ* and *al-maḥmūd*, what and what is praised, are opposed to *al-muṭarraḥ* and *al-mustankar*, what is rejected and what is refused, like what is true (*ṣādiq*) is opposed to what is false (*ḡālib*) as far as scientific premises are concerned.

In Fārābī's *K i t āb al-ḥikma*, and *maḥmūd* are placed again in the same subordination relationship when discussing dialectical premises in the chapter on dialectics and the other sciences (*Al-ḡā'iyah*). It is worth noting that, both in the chapter on the utility and importance of dialectics and in that on its relationship with other sciences, two translations of ἔνδοξον, *maṣḥūrāt* and *maḥmūd*, synonyms in the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Topics*, are hierarchized by Fārābī in such a way that *maṣḥūrāt* has a wider sense than *maḥmūd* something which will also take place in his *K i t āb al-ḥikma*.³⁴⁵

However, while in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* the coexistence of *maṣḥūrāt* and *maḥmūd* could reasonably be ascribed to the fact that the latter was an equivalent of εἰκός rather than of ἔνδοξον (as in Taḍārī's translation of *Prior Analytics* II.27), I am not sure that this line of thought would be pertinent in *K i t āb al-ḥikma* when using the word *maḥmūd* in this text, Fārābī is not directly naming the premises of a logical art (be it rhetoric, dialectics or sophistry), but rather

³⁴² This happens, for example, in the same passage immediately following the previous one: see Fārābī, *K i t āb al-ḥikma* p. 19,1-2, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq* q. ʿ-*Fi ān-rḍā'iyah* 111.

³⁴³ See Fārābī, *K i t āb al-ḥikma* p. 20,1-4, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq* q. ʿ-*Fi ān-rḍā'iyah* 111.

³⁴⁴ See Fārābī, *K i t āb al-ḥikma* p. 21-29,3, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭiq* q. ʿ-*Fi ān-rḍā'iyah* 111.

³⁴⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t āb al-Ḥiṭāba*, pp. 107,13-109,10, ed. Langhade, and, in the present text, the sections devoted to *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī 'āb al-Ḥiṭāba* and to *The Probable in Fārābī 'āb al-Ḥiṭāba*, at pp. 134-153 and pp. 76-82.

proposing a contraposition between *m u ʔaranaḥm ū d* (*p r e f e r r e d* and *maḥm ū d* *m m o n* *wa-mustankar* (*rejected and reprehensible*).³⁴⁶ The first couple of adjectives is subsequently identified with *m a š ha* and the second couple is identified with *š a noī* *rēpulsive*. This contraposition is proper to dialectics, and mirrors that implicit between the Greek terms ἔνδοξον and ἄτοπος.³⁴⁷ Therefore, we must reach the conclusion that, in *K i t aḡ la d maḥm ū* deflects the meaning of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον rather than that of εἰκός.

In the light of the translation history of Aristotle's *Organon* in Arabic, the identification between *maḥm ū* and ἔνδοξον is not necessarily surprising, for *maḥm ū* translates both ἔνδοξον and εἰκός in Tadāri's *Prior Analytics*.³⁴⁸ On the other hand, the ebbing of *maḥm ū* between these two meanings could seem at odds with the fact that a conceptual distinction between *generally recognized* (ἔνδοξον) and *probable* (εἰκός) can sometimes be traced in the Arabic Peripatetic school as well, especially in passages that somewhat reflect the otherwise neglected objective sense of Aristotle's εἰκός, *probable*, by using its translation *w ā ḡ i b*

Slightly incongruous as it might seem, the conclusion that Fārābī did use *maḥm ū* both in the sense of *generally recognized* (as Aristotle's ἔνδοξον) and of *probable* (as Aristotle's εἰκός) is based on empirical evidence, and it becomes less surprising if we take into account the fact that,

³⁴⁶ See Fārābī, *K i t aḡ la d maḥm ū*, 1-2, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manti q ʿFi ān r d a b*. Further occurrence of *m u ʔara* from *K i t aḡ la d maḥm ū* place in the chapter discussing the utility and the importance of dialectics, where Fārābī states that human beings start by learning commonly known opinions (*al-ʔ a r -m ā š h*) that are preferred at first sight (*f ī b -r ā d i y ʔara*) by the whole group, accepted opinions (*al-ʔ a r -m ā d q b*), and sensible opinions (*al-ʔ a r -m ā ḡ s ū*). See Fārābī, *K i t aḡ la d maḥm ū*, 13-14, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manti q ʿFi ān r d a b*. Since in this case *m u ʔara* appears alongside *al-ʔ a r -m ā d š h* for a list in three points naming the first things human beings learn, together with *al-ʔ a r -m ā d q b* and *al-maḥs ū* and these things are dialectical, rhetorical and scientific premises respectively, it is likely that in its previous *K i t aḡ la d maḥm ū* occurrence the term *m u ʔara* was a straightforward synonym of *maḥm ū d*.

³⁴⁷ For the equivalence between *š a* and ἄτοπος, see Soheil M. Afnān, *W ā ḡ a h ʾ -y n i ā m f a b i l u s , D a r f e l i M a s h r e q* 1969.

³⁴⁸ On the subject, see the sections of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96, and the *Probable in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 71-73.

³⁴⁹ The most notable occurrences of this acceptance of *w ā ḡ i b* Fārābī are found in *Š d i al-Q i y i ā Al-manti q i y -l y ā t l i F ā r , v o l I I*, pp. 550,23-552,2, ed. Daniš-pažuh, and in *K i t aḡ la d maḥm ū*, pp. 109,11-12, ed. Langhade. On this subject, see the section of this chapter titled *T h e P r o b a b l e i n p p . 8 2 + 8 5 ū b i : G e n e r a l R e m a r k s*,

although the objective sense of Aristotle's *probable*, εἰκός, did not entirely disappear in Arabic, it was mainly covered by the its rare translation *w ā ḡ*. Moreover, this kind of situations should build into our general understanding of the fact that Fārābī, although interested in the systematic analysis and classification of Peripatetic rhetoric lexicon, did by no means produce a uniform lexical system himself.

Ibn Riḍwān as a Witness to Fārābī's Lexicon

As explained above, we find an echo of Fārābī's use of *dā* ' and *murtadīn* in Ibn Riḍwān's *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences*. As discussed by Aouad,³⁵⁰ the latter work was developed in close relationship with Fārābī's *Long Commentary on the Rhetoric*. This textual closeness extends to the presence of literal quotes from Fārābī's *Long Commentary* in Ibn Riḍwān's book, but this is not the case of the passage that concerns us here because it mentions both *muqadda mā t*, or *widespread premises*, and *muqadda mā t*, or *satisfying premises*:

I b n ā r ḥ , Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences, § XXI, ed.

Aouad: The assent deriving from syllogistic speech is made necessary by the same premises that compose it. And the premises of rhetoric syllogism are of four genders: s e n s i b l e p r e m i s e i n t e l l i g i b l e - t h e s e e x i s t i n r h e t o r i c s o a s t o p r o d u c e s u r e a s s e n t , and because of this, as far as they are concerned, there is no difference between the person who demonstrates and the rhetorician - a n d t h e o t h e r t w o g e n d e r s a r e w i d e s a t i s f y i n g p r e m i s e s (m u q a d d a m ā t m u r t a ḍ ā) .
people following every legal system have satisfying premises that are different from those of the others. And the most effective of them in producing assent and the most deserving that their law be

³⁵⁰ For an analysis of the evidence for believing that a *Long Commentary* to the *Rhetoric* by Fārābī actually existed, and of the relationship between Ibn Riḍwān's text and Fārābī's work, see M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 133-180.

the true one are the people who are able to deal with the sensible and the intelligible.³⁵¹

When listing the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms can be derived, Ibn Riḍwān names *maḥs ū s* (or *sensible premises*), *ma'q ū l i ā n t t e l l i g i b l e p d ā e' m i c i f s a e s ()*, *widespread premises*), and *m u q a d d a m d ā* (or *satisfying premises*). On the philosophical level, this is an interesting statement, for in Fārābī's works an analogous list (with *m a ṣ h* instead of *d ā* and *m a q* instead of *m u r t a d i n*) is normally offered as the catalogue of the premises that do not derive from further syllogizing, sometimes with reference to the different syllogistic arts to which each type of premise is devoted.³⁵² In the Farabian texts we examined above, while multiple types of premises can be used in rhetoric, the only premises that are proper to this art are *al-m a q b*, *the accepted premises*, which are called *m u q a d d a m d ā* or *satisfying premises*, in Ibn Riḍwān. The inclusion of demonstration in the realm of enthymeme and rhetoric – spelled out in the text cited above – is indeed Ibn Riḍwān's main philosophical departure from Fārābī's rhetorical doctrine, and, as extensively explained by Aouad, one of the elements that better illustrates his attitude towards his main source, spacing from literal quotes of lengthy Farabian passages to the development of ideas incompatible, and possibly polemical, with Fārābī's tenets.³⁵³

Let's now examine Ibn Riḍwān's work on the lexical plane. In this area, too, Ibn Riḍwān moves a step further than Fārābī by directly naming dialectical and rhetorical premises

³⁵¹ The relevant Arabic text is: " . . . " . . . " . . . "

³⁵² This is the case in Fārābī, *K i t ā b u d d i a l a r* 19,17-20 and 20,1-5, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ- Fi ā n r d ā l b* 111, and in Fārābī, *K i t ā b u r d i a l a r* 19, M. Faḥrī (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ- Fi ā n r d ā l b* 111.

³⁵³ On the subject, see M. Aouad, La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii, § XXI in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 214-216, and M. Aouad, La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii (suite), in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 8 (1998), pp. 131-160.

*m u q a d d ā i ' m ā d t m u q a d d a m ā*³⁵⁴ rather than just making use of these adjectives to describe this kind of premises. As far as the employment of *d ā* ' is concerned, he was corroborated by Avicenna's lexical choices, for he did often use *d ā* ' to directly refer to ἔνδοξα, sporadically in his *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma al-ʿ Adhiyyā* and in *K i t ā b al-Nağā*.³⁵⁵ On the other hand, I know of no precedent for the appearance of *murtaḍin* as the immediate qualifier of rhetorical premises, nor of the direct attribution of *murtaḍin* to premises, rather than to people who certify them. According to Ibn Riḍwān's passage, moreover, *m u q a d d a m ā* tare synonymous with *m u q a d d a m ā*, but rather make up a subgroup of them, for while *m u q a d d a m ā* are different to different nations, according to their specific legal system, it is only those *m u q a d d a m ā* that belong to the people worthiest of inducing assent and of being taken as a model that are also *m a q b ū*³⁵⁶. Therefore, according to Ibn Riḍwān, premises that qualify as *m a q b ā* are also in conformity with *al-maḥs ū s* , the sensible, and *al-m a ' q ū l* , the intelligible .

Since on other accounts Ibn Riḍwān's rhetorical lexicon can help us reconstruct Fārābī's word choice in his *Long Commentary to the Rhetoric*,³⁵⁷ we might wonder whether this can happen in

³⁵⁴ The rhetorical section of Ibn Riḍwān's *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences* has been edited by Aouad in his article on the same subject. For the passage on *m u q a d d ā i ' m ā d t m u q a d d a m ā* see M m u r t a Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍw ā n e t l a D i d a s c a l i a i n Ṛ h e t o r i c* in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 195-196.

³⁵⁵ On this subject, see the following paragraph of this chapter, entirely devoted to the terms employed by Avicenna for the ἔνδοξον concept.

³⁵⁶ In a way, this presentation of *murtaḍā* brings them a step closer to *m a ṣ h* (called *m u q a d d ā i ' m ā d t* in Riḍwān's text) as they are presented by Fārābī elsewhere, when he states that what is *m a ṣ h* information may not be so for another nation, which explains the obscurity of Aristotle's dialectical arguments. The reference to the juridical system seems rather specific to *murtaḍā* and *m a q b ū* see Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Manṭi q* 'Fi ā n r ḍ ā l

³⁵⁷ This is the case for the terms *miṭā l* , e a n d a n m , e n t h y m e m e , as explained in the sections of the present chapter devoted to *The Enthymeme* (1.4.3, pp. 34-42) and to *The Example* (1.4.5, pp. 46-54). Both words appear in Ibn Riḍwān's literal quotes from Fārābī's lost *Long Commentary on Rhetoric*, identified by Aouad on the basis of the correspondence between Ibn Riḍwān's text and Hermannus Halemannus' *Didascalica*, a Latin translation of the *Long Commentary*. See M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍw ā n e t l a D i d a s c a l i a i n Ṛ h e t o r i c* in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 163-245.

the present case as well, even if here there is no word by word correspondence between Ibn Riḍwān's text and that of the Latin translation of the *Long Commentary*.

Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the possible implications of assigning Ibn Riḍwān's lexicon to Fārābī's *Long Commentary on Rhetoric*. This attribution would question some of the conclusions we reached while previously discussing the *Long Commentary*: for example, if the term *dā'irah* 'spread, wisdom' was already part of Fārābī's lexicon when he wrote the *Long Commentary*, Grignaschi's assumption that Hermannus' *probabilis* emerged as the translation of the Arabic term *maḥmūḍ*, rather than of any other word of the *ἔνδοξον* semantic area, becomes less straightforward, and the same holds true for the identification established between *maqābil* and *receptibilis*, which could as easily reflect the Arabic *murtaḍin*.³⁵⁸

On the basis of his global study of Ibn Riḍwān's book, Aouad observes that, whenever the presence of a direct quote from Fārābī cannot be ascertained, the two texts do not always show philosophical conformity.³⁵⁹ What is more, the theoretical divergences between Fārābī's and Ibn Riḍwān's works mainly concentrate in the latter's rhetorical chapters, and the passage we are considering is itself very polemical, for it helps assert how rhetoric is the most general of the syllogistic arts on the grounds that it employs all kind of premises and produces all kinds of assent.³⁶⁰ Moreover, we can reasonably expect Fārābī to be closer to the lexicon of the Arabic *Organon* translations in his *Long Commentary to the Rhetoric* than in other texts, less devoted to the literal analysis of Aristotelian writings. If this statement has no implications on whether or not Fārābī is likely to have immediately named dialectical premises "*muqālad dā'irah*" in this *Long Commentary* (for the Arabic translation of the *Topics* does the same), in the same context, the use

³⁵⁸ On the equivalence between *probabilis* and *maḥmūḍ* and between *receptibilis* and *murtaḍin*, see the paragraph devoted to the *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī's 'sh al-Ḥitāb* in this contribution, p. 104.

³⁵⁹ See M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alpharabii*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 212-245 and M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alpharabii (suite)*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 8 (1998), pp. 131-160.

³⁶⁰ On this specific subject, see M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍwān et la Didascalie in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alpharabii*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997), pp. 214-217.

of “*m u q a d dnurtadā*” the name rhetorical premises would be surprising, for the term *murtadīn* as a translation of Aristotle’s ἐνδοξον does not even appear in the Arabic translations of the *Organon* that we do know. If Ibn Riḍwān’s attitude towards Fārābī’s lexicon can be expected to dovetail with his attitude towards his thought – ranging from acceptance, to adaptation, to opposition – we should probably assume that the innovative use of *dā* and *murtadīn* we encountered in Ibn Riḍwān, *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences*, § XXI, was introduced by Ibn Riḍwān himself rather than by Fārābī.

The Generally Recognized in Fārābī Šaḥ al-Qiyās

A further step in Fārābī’s elaboration of a theory for what is proper to rhetoric was achieved in his *Šaḥ al-Qiyās*, was inspired by the analysis of *Prior Analytics* II.23 68b9-14.³⁶¹

Fārābī read this text in Taḍārī’s Arabic version, where the expression οἱ ῥητορικοὶ (συλλογισμοί), which are said to take the same forms as dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms, is expanded to *al-ma qisā al-ḥutabiyya wa-l-fiqhiyya wa-ma š wa, r r h e t o r i c a l j u r i d i c a l a n d d e l i b e r a t i v e s y l l o g i s m s* (see *K i t ā b n ā ḥ d q u ā - ū l* II.23 p. 399,4-5). Regardless of how this translation came to be,³⁶² Fārābī was confronted with a curious statement: this passage apparently places *juridical and deliberative syllogisms* at the same level as rhetorical syllogisms, while in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* the judicial and the deliberative, together with the epideictic, are the three genders of rhetoric. Moreover, the following pages from the *Prior Analytics* only discuss rhetorical syllogisms, with no reference to juridical and deliberative syllogisms at all, nor to the genders of rhetoric.

³⁶¹ See Fārābī, *Šaḥ al-Qiyās* *al-manṭi qiyāsiyya*, vol. II pp. 510,23-513,14, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

³⁶² On the genesis of the text in Taḍārī’s version, see R. Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik. Ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*, Berlin, K. Schwarz 1991, p. 52-57, M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d’Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, in *Arabic or Islamic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 172, and J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Arabic Rhetoric*, in *Arabic and Islamic Syllogistic Practice*, Leiden / New York / Köln, Brill 1994, pp. 234-239.

Since in the parallel passage of *Š dī al-Q i y* 1123s from *Kitā b -Q ā l-ġ* Fārābī's discussion focuses systematically on *maq b ūl āccepted premises*, we can reliably state that, at this chronological point, Fārābī already understood the incipit of *Prior Analytics* II.23 to exclusively refer to rhetoric. However, in the context of *Š dī al-Q i y* Fārābī was predisposed to give more weight to the wording of his Aristotelian source text, and to search it for specific philosophical positions. Therefore, he gave a particular meaning to each of the expressions used in *Prior Analytics* II.23 68b10, rooted in the kind of premises from which rhetorical, juridical, and deliberative syllogisms are taken, but he also maintained that explaining each kind separately would have been superfluous. Indeed, the study of rhetorical syllogism should suffice, together with the consciousness that the person dealing with *maq b ūl āccepted premises* will not make use of all the possibilities of rhetoric.³⁶⁴

In this context, the premises of deliberative syllogisms are said to be *al-mumkina al-šā d i q a* , or *possible true premises*, while those of rhetoric syllogisms are called *al-mazn ū ninda l-š ā m ior' ī n* , *the premises that are presumed by the audience*, thus employing a translation of *ἐνδοξον* which appears once in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, but only surfaces frequently in the *na q l q a d ī* of the *Sophistical Refutations*.

It is worth pointing out that, while in Fārābī's *K i t ā b l u r d h l ā m u q a d d a m m ā t m u n* *possible premises*, were juxtaposed to the *maq b ū l ā t* , *as possible sources of mis e*

³⁶³ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b l u r d h l ā m u q a d d a m m ā t m u n* 154,4-64,15, R. al-ʿAğam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ-ġi ā n r d h l ā m u q a d d a m m ā t m u n* II.1. This passage was also reproduced at the end of witnesses of *Kitā b -Q ā l-ġ* Fārābī, *K i t ā b l u r d h l ā m u q a d d a m m ā t m u n* 93, R. al-ʿAğam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ-ġi ā n r d h l ā m u q a d d a m m ā t m u n* II.1.

³⁶⁴ As explained by Aouad, Fārābī chose to interpret Aristotle's *maq b ū l āccepted premises* , *de d s t h e r a t i v e* syllogisms produced by the person endowed with practical reason (*al-m u t a*) *when reflecting on a point of view*. Such syllogisms are taken from possible true premises and concern individuals, while *maq b ū l āccepted premises*, *juridical syllogisms*, derive from the points of view of legislators. Aouad points out that, although the expression *ā r ā d i ʿ w ā a l sunan*, or *the points of view of legislators*, is to be understood as synonymous with the term *al-m a q b ū l āccepted premises* in Fārābī's *Kitā b al-Q i y* *Kitā b -Q ā l-ġ* the latter word does not appear in this *Š dī al-Q i y* passage. See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ' A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é s p a r F ā r ā b ī*, *Arabico u l e c Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 170.

syllogisms inducing rhetorical assent,³⁶⁵ here *al-mumkina al-šā d i qā possible true premises*, are only a subset of the premises that are *māzn ū n a -š ā m il ā ī n l , p r e m i s e s t h a t* audience. Indeed, the latter group includes some false premises, which a person endowed with practical reason would not employ.

Therefore, on the one hand, in *Š dī al-Q i y Fārābī* ameliorates his understanding of the *proprium* of rhetoric, while, on the other hand, he changes his lexical selection for discussing its premises: the term *m a q b ū l* , which was the standard option for naming rhetorical *endoxa* in earlier works, disappears, and in its place we find *māzn ū n , p* in the commentary to *Prior Analytics* II.23,³⁶⁶ where rhetorical syllogisms are discussed.

On the other hand, rhetorical premises seem to be described as *maḥm ū d* in the commentary to *Prior Analytics* II.27,³⁶⁷ closely mirroring the Arabic translation of the same passage. It should be remembered that the concepts of εἰκός, *probable*, and ἔνδοξον, *generally recognized*, are partially confused in Taḍārī's translation, probably because of Aristotle's statement that a probable thing is an endoxastic premise (τὸ μὲν εἰκός ἐστὶ πρότασις ἔνδοξος, *Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a3-4). As it seems, in *Prior Analytics* II.27 70a10 this clause pushed either the translator, or an early glossator of the translation, to substitute the Greek ἐξ εἰκότων, *from probable things*, with the Arabic *m i n m u q q dī m ā d n ā , t f n a o m c o m m o*, instead of using the d p r transliteration *a y q ā* in II.27 70a2 and 70a5.

It is therefore questionable, on a case by case basis, if Arabic philosophers were actually able to reciprocally demarcate *commonly praised* and *probable things* (ἔνδοξα and εἰκότα) on the basis of this sole passage. It is also likely that in his *Š dī al-Q i y Fārābī* could not – or would not – do so, for, while commenting upon *Prior Analytics* II.27, he made a synonymic hendiadys of the words *al-mū ḡ i d n ā al-maḥm ū d*, *the necessary* and *the commonly praised things*. As discussed in

³⁶⁵ See above in this section and Fārābī, *K i t ā b l u r d o ā* 7n21,3, M. Faḥrī, (ed.), *al-Manti q 'Fi ān r d ā b* IV

³⁶⁶ See the already mentioned passage, Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i y i ā A d - m a n ṭ i q i y - l - f ā t r*, vol. II, pp. 510,23-513,14, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

³⁶⁷ See Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i y i ā A d - m a n ṭ i q i y - l - f ā t r*, vol. II, pp. 550,23-553,11, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

the section of this chapter devoted to the Arabic reception of the Greek term εἰκός,³⁶⁸ the participle *mū ḡ* is to be understood as a reference to the vocabulary witnessed by the Arabic *Rhetoric*, where εἰκός is frequently translated by derivatives of the verb *wā ḡ a b a*, *t o A s b e n* explained beforehand,³⁶⁹ Fārābī did on occasion refine the meanings of *mū ḡ i b / awdām ḡ h i m ū d* so that the first term reflected the objective acceptance of Aristotle's εἰκός, or *probable*, and the second one its subjective acceptance. However, neither of these nuances entirely covers the meaning of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον, or *generally recognized*.³⁷⁰

Therefore, the only prominent expression for rhetoric *endoxa* in Fārābī's *Š dī al-Q i yisā s* the term *mazn ū*, *presumed*, thus mirroring the centrality that the idea of *zann*, *presumptive opinion*, had in Fārābī's search for the *proprium* of the rhetoric at that stage.³⁷¹

The word *m a š h w i c h*, sometimes translates ἔνδοξον in the Greek-Arabic versions of Aristotle's *Organon*, does however appear in the *Š dī al-Q i yisā s* commentary to *Prior Analytics* II.27. When discussing Aristotle's statement that an *a y qisā* a commonly praised premise (*muqaddama maḥm ū d* on what is – or is not – most of the time,³⁷² Fārābī explains that, between rhetoric premises, *al-muqaddama al-w ā ḡ*, *it h b n e c e s s a r y p r e m i s e* (i.e. εἰκός) is a *muqadda m a m q ḡ h ū r a* *commonly known premise*, taken from the things that are in the future most of the time. This employment of *m a š h i s ā* further clue to the fact that, on the basis of the Arabic translation of *Prior Analytics* II.27, Fārābī did not draw a distinction between probabilities and *endoxa* – for the expression *muqaddama maḥm ū d* translation of πρότασις ἔνδοξος, is commuted into *muqaddama w ā ḡ i a b d e a r* reference to εἰκός – although he did establish an autonomous subtle differentiation between the near synonyms *w ā ḡ a n d m a ḥ m ū d* elsewhere. Finally, the presence of

³⁶⁸ See the section of this chapter devoted to *T h e P r o b a b l e a l - Q i y i s ā s* of the present text.

³⁶⁹ See the sections devoted to *T h e P r o b a b l e a l - Q i y i s ā s* of this text. *Š a r*

³⁷⁰ On the nuances that distinguish Aristotle's ἔνδοξον and εἰκός, see W.M.A. Grimaldi, *Semeion, Tekmerion and eikos in Aristotle*, in *American Journal of Philology*, vol. 101.4 (1980) and J. Sprute, *Die Enthymentheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1982, pp. 74-75.

³⁷¹ On this subject, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par vue immédiat et commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 170-171.

³⁷² Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i yisā s Ad-manti q i y l f ā t r*, vol. 11 p. 551, 16-18, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

ma š halā or shows that, since the expression *al-muqaddamā t -ḥuṭbiyya* must mean *rhetoric premises* in the technical sense,³⁷³ in *Š ḍi al-Q i ytlāc* term *ma š h ū r* , *c o m m* also *bey k n o* applied to rhetoric, although in earlier works it was exclusively devoted to dialectical premises.

The Generally Recognized in Fārābī *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*

Although not cardinal to Fārābī's quest for what is distinctive of rhetoric anymore, some usages of the already mentioned *ἔνδοξον* translations resurface in his *K i t ḥiṭā b .aa l*

For example, while introducing the idea that enthymemes can be syllogisms either truly or apparently, Fārābī recapitulates the general distinctions of syllogism, thus stating that its premises can be classified both as *necessary* (*ḍa r ū r* , *i p o s s i b l e* (*ḥumkina*), or *indeterminate* (*muṭlaqa*), as *k n o w n a c c o r d i n g t ḍ i b - y a ṭ i l ḥ p r e s u m e d* (*maẓn ū ḥi ṭā b a ḥ l ū m* *sensible* (*maḥs ū sanā*) as, *entirely true* (*ṣā d i ḍ i k a l l*), *b n i t i r e l ḍ i b a ḥ i - l e k u l l*) or *partially true* and *f ḍ i b i l e ḥ i - l e ḡ u* (*z k ṣ ū d i w ḍ i ḡ u ḥ*)³⁷⁴. The distinction into *sure*, *presumed*, and *sensible premises* reflects that found in *Ḥamsa fuṣū lin*, *K i t ḥiṭā b*, *K i t ḥiṭā b*, *K i t ḥiṭā b* *ṣa ḡ* to the same effect.³⁷⁵ However, this passage is not central to Fārābī's reflection on the specificities of rhetoric.

The final evolution in Fārābī's appraisal of the *proprium* of rhetoric took place in his *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b* probably on the impulse of the unsolved limits of his understanding of this question in *Š ḍi al-Q i ytlāc* detailed by Aouad, describing the *proprium* of rhetoric as those premises that are *maẓn ū n a ḥ i ṭā b a ḥ l ū m* *presumed by the audience*, was a solution that left unanalyzed the relationship between what is *maẓn ū n ḥ i ṭā b a ḥ l ū m* and *ἠθορμειῖα* which, together with the εἰκότα,

³⁷³ Cfr Fārābī, *Š ḍi al-Q i ytlāc* *ad-manti q i ytlāc*, vol. I p. 512,1, ed. Daniš-pažuh, where there is a contraposition between *q i y ā - m ā t a ḥ i ṭā b a ḥ l ū m* and *ḍ i b i l e ḥ i - l e ḡ u ḥ*, which belong to deliberation and rhetoric respectively. Therefore, the adjective *ḥuṭbiyy* must refer to the art of rhetoric in its technical sense, and not, generically, to the activity of speaking in front of an audience.

³⁷⁴ See Fārābī, *K i t ḥiṭā b .aa l* 7,8-9, ed. Langhade. A less direct reference this classification of syllogistic premises, discussing primary premises, is to be found in Fārābī, *K i t ḥiṭā b .aa l* 105,10-11, ed. Langhade.

³⁷⁵ See the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī's Analytics, and to the Topics*, pp. 107-128.

constitute the material source of enthymemes according to Aristotle.³⁷⁶ Moreover, the scope of the *mazn ū n*, *p* was wider than that of rhetoric, for it included what is indeed *mazn ū* but not *m u q* *persuasive*.

As a response to this difficulties, Fārābī transitioned from discussing the *proprium* of rhetoric in terms of specific premises to describing it as the fact of being true or persuasive *f ī b ā d -r ā d l -m ū š t a r a k*, *f r o m t h e p o i n t*³⁷⁷ This last insight had the merit of being specific to rhetoric both materially and formally, and it was either a Farabian innovation, or a concept derived from *fiqh*, or maybe from Greco-Roman rhetoric, Ancient commentaries to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or to other parts of his *Organon*, most likely *Topics* or *Prior Analytics* II.23-27.³⁷⁸

However, although in *K i t ā b al-Hikma* rhetorical premises do not bear the brunt of distinguishing rhetoric from other logical arts anymore, this text does devote them a specific

³⁷⁶ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 171. It could also be useful to point out that in the Arabic translations of the *Organon* that we know textually (i.e. those preserved by the sylloge in ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346) the terms used for referring to premises deriving from sensible experience, on which demonstrative science can be built, and those used for sensible rhetorical premises can always be told apart easily. The former are called *maḥs ū s ā t*, *sensible premises*, a term that always reflects the Greek αἰσθητόν, *perceptible, sensible*, or its cognate, while the latter are mainly called *d a l o ā 'ā l i ā*, translations of the Greek word σμητέον. I listed the different translation of σμητέον within the Arabic *Organon* in more detail in the paragraph of this subsection devoted to *The Sign in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, p. 53. In the Arabic translations of Aristotle's *Organon*, the word *maḥs ū s* appears in *K i t ā b al-Anāḥil qū'ā l* pp. 275,21 and 275,26, I.38 p. 307,11, II.21 pp. 393,6 and 394,8 ed. Ğabr, invariably as a translation of αἰσθητόν (see *Prior Analytics* I.27 43a27 and 43a33, I.38 49a25, II.21 67a14 and 67b1), in *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma* pp. 693,19 and 693,21, IV.4, twice at p. 740,16 and once at p. 740,17, V.3 pp. 763,17, 764,2, 764,4 ed. Ğabr, always translating αἰσθητόν (see *Topics* II.8 114a23 and 114a25, IV.4 125a29, 125a30, and 125a31, V.3 131b23, 131b31, and 131b34), and in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Poetics* chap. 9, p. 20,2 (See *al-Kalām-šarḥ al-ḥikma l-awwalīya* in *Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristotelem*, edited by D. S. Margoliouth, ed. Nutt, London 1887). In this case, the translated word is the Greek adjective ἀναίσθητος, appearing in *Poetics* chap. 9 1450b39.

³⁷⁷ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 174.

³⁷⁸ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 176-177.

section.³⁷⁹ They are discussed under the name of *ma š h ū r ā t*, *known propositions*, as Fārābī had already opted to do in his *Š dī al-Q i y*. This choice had been a departure from the usage of his commentaries to Aristotle's *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, which reserved the adjective *ma š h ū r*, *commonly known*, for dialectical premises, and the adjective *ma q b ū l*, *for rhetoric premises*. This solution was made possible by the fact that Fārābī's new criterion to attribute premises to rhetoric or to dialectical was not inherent to whether they were *ma š h ū r ā t* but to whether they were *ma š h ū r ā t* or *ma q b ū l ā t* and should therefore be used rhetorically, or *ma š h ū r ā t* or *ma q b ū l ā t*, and should accordingly be used dialectically. *Ma š h ū r ā t* could even be used in sophistry, insofar as they were *ma š h ū r ā t* or *ma q b ū l ā t*.³⁸⁰

Unlike the term *mazn ū n*, *proof* and its cognates – the words *ma q b ū l*, *and concept* *ma q b ū l ā t*, *and* *ma q b ū l ā t*, *and* *ma q b ū l ā t* *don't even appear in the very inclusive list of premises that can be used to produce enthymemes. If this list could be so comprehensive, it was because the identity of rhetoric did not rest on the type of its premises any longer, but on whether its effectiveness was immediate and shared, or not.*³⁸¹ Shifting the onus of identifying rhetoric away from its premises allowed Fārābī to restore the integrity of the *ἔνδοξον* concept, which in Aristotle was not proper to either rhetoric or dialectics, but pertinent to both arts. Moreover, it showed how a person of Fārābī's education was in a position to recognize that the multitude of translations offered for *ἔνδοξον* in the Arabic versions of all *Organon* sections were actually synonymous,³⁸² the merger between the translations of *εἰκός* and *ἔνδοξον* notwithstanding.

³⁷⁹ See Fārābī, *K i t ā m a n t i q*, *al-Ḥatā b*, pp. 52,6-53,2, M.S. Sālim (ed.), or Al-Fārābī, *K i t ā m a n t i q*, 105,6-107,11, Langhade (ed.), in Al-Fārābī, *K i t ā m a n t i q*, Langhade (éd.), and al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971.

³⁸⁰ See Fārābī, *K i t ā m a n t i q*, 105,15-107,11 J. Langhade (ed.). Fārābī offers a similar distinction between dialectical and sophistical – but not rhetorical – premises in his *K i t ā m a n t i q*. See Fārābī, *K i t ā m a n t i q*, 16,13-17, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Maṅt i q* – *Fi ā n r a ḥ ā l*. For an explanation of the meaning of the expression *f ā h i z a n a l m a š h ū r ā t*, attributed to sophistical premises in that context, see D.L. Black, *L o g i c a n d A n d P o e t i c s i n M e d i e v a l R h e t o r i c*, *Arabic Philosophy*, Brill 1990, p. 96 n. 129.

³⁸¹ See Fārābī, *K i t ā m a n t i q*, 105,15 ff., ed. J. Langhade.

³⁸² For the different translations of *ἔνδοξον* in the Arabic *Organon* (*maḥm ū t i n R h e t o r i c*, *Topics VIII.11-14* and in the *naql q a d* of the *Sophistical Refutations*, the verb *zanna* and its derivatives in the *n a q l* of the *Sophistical Refutations* and

Finally, it is worth pointing out that, while discussing rhetorical species and places in *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*,³⁸³ Fārābī seems to arrange hierarchically many of the terms available as translations of ἔνδοξον in the Arabic versions of the *Organon*, like we have seen him doing in his *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*. Fārābī's analysis runs as follows: firstly, the *m a š h fū ī r ā b-rā al-cān* can be either places or species. Species themselves can be understood, firstly, as *maḥm ū d ā b ā df ī r 'a*, commonly praised propositions (or the synonymous *m u ṭ a ā t , p r e f e*), or, secondarily, as *ḥ a ṭ ā t d o i n 's al-r a*, signs at first sight.³⁸⁴ Finally, as particulars of their subjects, *maḥm ū d ā t , c o m m o n l y p r e m i s e s*, can have either sensible and natural items (*maḥs ū s aṭ a b w ā*), or voluntary items (*i r ā ḍ*). Those of them that have sensible items as the particulars of their subjects are corroborated by sense (*ḥ a s s*), while other premises (here called *m a š h r ā* rather than *maḥm ū d*), which are supported by their renown (*š u r ā*) only, are presumed premises (*muqaddamā maẓn ū*) h a They can be confused with sure premises (*y a q ī*) only by accident.

Both *maḥm ū d* and *maẓn ū ā n* are subordinated to *maš ḥ r ā* the *maḥm ū d i ā* as far as they are one of the species of *maš ḥ r ā* and the *maẓn ū ā n* the term employed in *Š a ḥ al-Qiyā* to refer the *proprium* of rhetoric – in as far as they are the residual section of the *maš ḥ r ā* that is exclusively supported by *ẓ a n n*, unlike other commonly known premises, which can have grounding elsewhere as well (e.g. in sense, *al-ḥ i s s*). A similar phenomenon had taken place in Fārābī's *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*, where *m a š h ā* and *maḥm ū d* both translations of ἔνδοξον in the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Topics*, had already been hierarchized by Fārābī in such a way that *m a š h ū r ā* had a wider sense than *maḥm ū d*.³⁸⁵

sporadically in the *R h e t o r i c* in the *Posterior Analytics*, *m a š h* in the *Posterior Analytics*, in *Topics* III-IV and VIII.5-8, and in Yahyā ibn 'Adī's *Sophistical Refutations*, and *d ā ' i n i* *Topics* I-II) see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

³⁸³ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 55,3-55,2, M.S. Sālim (ed.), or Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 107,12-109,15, Langhade (ed.), in Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*, Langhade (éd.), and Fārābī, *Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971.

³⁸⁴ For a more detailed discussion of this Farabian passage, see the paragraph of this work devoted to *The Probable in Fārābī ' s Ḥ i ṭ ā b*, pp. 76-82.

³⁸⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 10,1-5, R. al-'Aḡam (ed.), *al-Manti q ' -Fi ā n r ā* I III

We have witnessed the evolution of Fārābī's rhetorical lexicon concerning the *generally recognized* at a granular level. By looking at more general trends, we can gather an appreciation of the interplay between his evolving philosophical views, his relationship to philosophical authorities and his choice of words.

The inchoative stages of Fārābī's reflection on this subject were set outside the realm of rhetoric proper, for they took place within the *Ri s āmlā a y fa īn yb ā ḡ ā d dā ma q-a b l a falsafa* and the *Ma q ā l a f šī n ā ʿā l - l - mī u k h t - d n i n*, namely works devoted to the classification of Logical arts. In this context, following the lead of Aristotle's Alexandrian commentators, Fārābī applied to the Aristotelian *Organon*, inclusive of *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, the schema according to which each art is characterized by the specific kind of premises it employs.³⁸⁶ These premises are classed and bestowed on syllogistic arts according to their truth value, so that rhetoric is characterized by premises that are as much true as they are false (*wa-l-šā d i ḡ l - m u b ā w - k ā y a l - h i t ā b i*).³⁸⁷ Since this arrangement of logic knowledge antecedes known Farabian interactions with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, it is not surprising that, although this art is discussed, the vocabulary chosen to name its premises is exclusively determined by relationships established between other logic arts and rhetoric. Goals like the individuation of a *proprium* for rhetoric that is coherent with Aristotle's text and thought on this subject, or the reuse of terms denoting philosophical concepts that were proper to rhetoric within the translations of given parts of the *Organon* lay entirely outside his horizon.

³⁸⁶ See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, pp. 47-51; and M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, ou in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 174.

³⁸⁷ See *Ri s ā l b ā š r l n i ā l f ā r ā b ī f ī m ā y a n b e f ā s ā f a* in *Alfarabi's Philosophy*, ed. M. Aouad, *Abhandlungen*, F. Dieterici (ed.), Brill 1892, p. 57 and p. 87, and A.J. Arberry, *Fārābī's poetry*, in *Rivista di Studi Orientali* 17, 1937-1939, p. 268 and p. 274.

From the composition of his *Š ḍi al-Ḥiṭā b* onwards, Fārābī's focus shifted remarkably, and fell heavily on elucidating the question of the *proprium* of rhetoric, or the establishment of what sets rhetoric apart from other syllogistic arts.³⁸⁸

Š ḍi al-Ḥiṭā b is a work expressly devoted to the philosophical and textual analysis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: therefore, Fārābī anticipated to recognize the distinctive trait of this art in the premises that are specific to rhetoric as presented in Aristotle's text, but, as pointed out by Aouad,³⁸⁹ these expectations were not met. Fārābī's problem lay in the fact that, in the Greek *Organon*, what is said by Aristotle to be the proper basis for rhetorical syllogisms is shared with other arts. In the *Rhetoric*, this is the case of εἰκότα, *probable things*, which also pertain to dialectics, and of σημεῖα, *signs*, which pertain to demonstration.³⁹⁰

The absence of a satisfying *proprium* for rhetoric is the problem posed, but not solved, in Fārābī's *Š ḍi al-Ḥiṭā b*. Still, it entrained a novel kind of interest in rhetorical premises and for the Aristotelian vocabulary best suited to name them. Because of this, and also because of the foreseeable attention allotted to the wording of Aristotle's text in a work belonging to the commentary genre (*š ḍi*); a few Arabic words that reflect the Greek ἔνδοξα surface. As stated in the previous sections of this chapter,³⁹¹ these words can be reliably pinpointed on the basis of Hermannus' Latin witness, and they are, firstly and foremost, *maḥm ū d* *ḥ* commonly praised

³⁸⁸ We have no direct Arabic witness of Fārābī's *Š ḍi al-Ḥiṭā b*, and we can only study it thanks to two indirect sources, the *Didascalía*, a 13th Century Arabico-Latin translation of Fārābī's text by Hermannus Alemannus, and Ibn Riḍwān's *Book of what, taken from logic, is employed in arts and sciences*, an 11th Century treaty that has Fārābī's logical works – and especially his *Š ḍi al-Ḥiṭā b* – as his main sources. On why I do not think that Ibn Riḍwān's work can be used like a source for establishing Fārābī's vocabulary as far as the generally recognized is concerned and on the reconstruction of the *Š ḍi al-Ḥiṭā b* expressions for what is generally recognized on the basis of Hermannus' Latin translation, see the subsections of this chapter devoted to *Ibn Riḍwān* and to *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī's Š ḍi al-Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 125-129 and 97-107.

³⁸⁹ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 163 and ff. For tracing this development, Aouad singles out §10 of Hermannus Alemannus' *Didascalía*.

³⁹⁰ See Fārābī, *Kiṭāb al-Ḥiṭā b*, Langhade (éd.), and Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971, pp. 165-166 and Aristotle, *Rhet.* I.2, 57a29-33, where he explains how εἰκότα correspond to possible propositions and σημεῖα to necessarily true propositions.

³⁹¹ See the subsection of this chapter devoted to the *Generally Recognized in Fārābī's*

propositions, and, far less systematically, *ma š h ū r ā t*, *commonly accepted premises*.

This implies a rather eclectic approach to lexical choice on Fārābī’s part, both because these three terms appear as translations of Aristotle’s ἔνδοξος in the Arabic versions of different parts of the *Organon*, and because their usage is entirely synonymic and devoid of specialization. Like Aristotle before him, in this context Fārābī does not draw any lexical distinction between dialectical and rhetoric ἔνδοξον.

Although the provenance of these terms had no impact on their semantic value, the frequency with which these words appeared in Fārābī’s *Š ḏi al-Ḥiṭā b* seems to be directly influenced by the Aristotelian source from which they derive. Indeed, *maḥm ū ḏor*, *commonly praised*, is the commonest equivalent of Aristotle’s ἔνδοξον, or *generally recognized*, in the Arabic *Rhetoric*,³⁹² while *ma q* *ḥāṭṭā* *h a š* *ḥiṭā* *accepted* and *commonly known*, mainly derive from Abū Bišr Mattā’s *Prior Analytics*.³⁹³ This is highly suggestive of Fārābī’s preference for translations sanctioned by their usage in the Arabic version of the part of the *Organon* upon which he was commenting, at least in the context of a *š ḏi r*

My conclusion on the reasons behind Fārābī’s predilection for *maḥm ū ḏor* over all other ἔνδοξον translations in his *Š ḏi al-Ḥiṭā b* is strengthened by the observation that this solution did

³⁹² The Arabic *maḥm ū ḏor* translates Aristotle’s ἔνδοξον in Taḏārī’s *Prior Analytics* as well, which is not without bearing on the subject we are discussing, for *Prior Analytics* II.27 played a key passage in shaping the reception of Aristotle’s enthymeme theory in Arabic philosophy. Still, I prefer to leave Taḏārī’s text outside this discussion because it was prone to produce confusion on the respective delimitation of the ἔνδοξον and of the εἰκόσ concepts, since the Arabic *maḥm ū ḏor* mirrored both.

³⁹³ The Arabic term *ma q* *ḥāṭṭā* *h a š* *ḥiṭā* *accepted* is the equivalent of ἔνδοξον in ‘Īsā Ibn Zur‘a’s and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s translations of *Sophistical Refutations*, in Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s *Topics* III-IV, and in Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh’s *Topics* VIII.5-8, too (unless the latter solution was systematically introduced by collation on the basis of Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s books: on the subject, see the subsection of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96).

On the other hand, the term *ma q* *ḥāṭṭā* appears in some interlinear notes to the Arabic version of the *Topics* (both in Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s and in the Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh’s sections) in ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346.

not prove durable. The balance reached in this work between his new, extensive interest in rhetorical premises – that pushed Fārābī to include in his text a large sample of the relevant Greek-Arabic translations – and his fidelity to the vocabulary employed in the Arabic *Rhetoric* – the stated object of his commentary activity, could only suffice to delimitate the problem of the *proprium* of rhetoric, and was by constitution inadequate to its solution.

This is the reason why in a variety of later works, ranging from *K i t āḡ l a d t a ḡ l i , t ā b a l Q i y ā s , -Q K y ā ṣ ā ḡ i ā n d , K i t ā B b u r d i F ā r ā b ī*, specializes the terms *m a ṣ h ū r ā t* dialectical premises and *m a q b ū l ā t* rhetorical premises. Like we discussed above, *m a ṣ h ū r ā t* and *m a q b ū l ā t* appeared as translations of Aristotle's ἐνδοξον in the Arabic versions of *Prior Analytics* and *Topics*, the works upon which Fārābī was commenting in this case, but his main reason for choosing *m a ṣ h ū r ā t* and *m a q b ū l ā t* as technical terms for the generally recognized in dialectics and in rhetoric was in all likelihood that of endowing rhetoric with a – however provisional – *proprium*, and only at a secondary level the inherent interest of the vocabulary of the works he was discussing.

The development of specific terms for rhetoric and dialectical premises fitted well with Fārābī's new system of classification for logical arts, that was rooted in the kind of assent (or *taṣdīq*) produced by each of them, rather than in the truth value of the premises specific to each art in previous classifications.³⁹⁴

In *K i t ā ḡ l a d t a ḡ l i , t ā ḡ l i y ā l s , -Q i K y ā ṣ ā ḡ i ā n d , K i t ā B b u r d i F ā r ā b ī*, and *m a q b ū l ā t* are the proper denominations of premises for rhetoric and dialectic, but they are not the only terms derived from the Arabic translations of the *Organon*, for the participle *dāʿi* is widespread, taken from Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī's version of *Topics* I-II, appears in *K i t ā ḡ l i y ā l s a l*

³⁹⁴ See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, pp. 71-78. Still, in his case *K i t ā B b u r d i F ā r ā b ī* incidentally mentioned muqaddammāt mumkina (possible premises) alongside maqbūlāt (accepted premises) as available grounds for building the acquiescence of the soul, (*s u k ū n a f s*), the kind of assent that belongs to rhetoric. See Fārābī, *K i t ā B b u r d i F ā r ā b ī* 20, 17-21, 3, ed. Fahrī.

Şa ğ³⁹⁵ and in *Fuṣū l t a š t a m i l u l a f a l ū l ħ i a m ā n ' a i n - š f a ā s ū l u f m ā n t i q i l* wa-hiya ḥamsa fuṣū l³⁹⁶ .

However, in *K i t ā Q b i y ā* Şa ğ i d ā l³⁹⁷, always plays an ancillary role to *m a š h F ū r r* example, while discussing the grounding of premises that do not derive from further syllogizing, Fārābī names dialectical premises *m a š h ā s n s ū a l*, but he also employs *d ā ' i n i* order to qualify them as the premises that are widespread in the people. In a parallel way, *m a q b ā r d s ā i d* to have been accepted by a satisfactory (*murtaḍin*) group or individual, and *maḥs ū s o ā s e n s i b l e* premises, are said to have been accepted thanks to the witness of sense (*al-ḥiss*).

Another term taken from the Arabic versions of the *Organon* that does have a place in Fārābī's vocabulary at this stage, in *K i t ā Ğ b a d i s u l l a ḥ m ū d* , c o m m o n w h i c h h a d b e e n a s i s e d , observed above, the most common equivalent of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον, generally recognized, both in the Arabic *Rhetoric* and in Taḍārī's *Prior Analytics*. Therefore, all the Arabic equivalents of ἔνδοξον available in the Arabic versions of the *Organon* - except the derivatives of the root *z-n-n*³⁹⁷ - were present in Fārābī's texts dating from this phase.

Still, as in the case of *d ā '* , *maḥm ū* does not appear as a synonym of *m a š h b ū t* rather as part of a polarity that describes *m a š h* itself in Fārābī's *K i t ā Ğ b a d i s u l l a ḥ m ū d* participles *mustankar* (*reprehensible*) and *muṭ a ṭ a ḥ* (*rejected*) are opposed to *m u ṭ a ṭ a ḥ* and *maḥm ū*.³⁹⁸

When composing his *K i t ā Ğ b a d i s u l l a ḥ m ū d* , -Q i k y ā ṣ ā ḡ b ā n d a k l i t ā b a l B u r h ā n Fārābī adhered systematically to the lexical choices that were functional to his philosophical goal: specializing *al-m a q b ā s t h ā* only premises that belong to rhetoric and to rhetoric only, so that they could themselves contribute to the characterization of this art.

³⁹⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Q b i y ā* Şa ğ i d ā l, p. 75.7-8, R. al-ʿAğam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ- Fi ā n r d ā l* I E l

³⁹⁶ See Fārābī, *Fuṣū l t a š t a m i l u l a f a l ū l ħ i a m ā n ' a i n - š f a ā s ū l u f m ā n t i q i w a - h i y a ḥ a m s a f u ṣ ū l* , l p. 65,1, R. al-ʿAğam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ i n d a l - F ā r ā b ī*, vol. I.

³⁹⁷ Aristotle's ἔνδοξον is translated by *zanna*, to think, and by its derivatives in the *n a q l o f t h e d o p h i s t i c a l R e f u t a t i o n s* and, on one occasion, in the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. On this subject, see the subsection of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

³⁹⁸ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ğ b a d i s u l l a ḥ m ū d*, 2, R. al-ʿAğam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q ʿ- Fi ā n r d ā l* I E l

This behaviour did not prevent him from feeling a keen interest in the Arabic Peripatetic vocabulary that was left out of the project described above, pushing him to work on establishing what could be the meaning and function of words like *dā'irah maḥmūl* if they could not be synonymic with *maqbul*

The developments entrained by Fārābī's reflections during the elaboration of his *Šiḥ al-Qiyās* based on the analysis of *Prior Analytics* II.23 68b9-14 in its Arabic form, produced a distinction between the possible true premises, proper to deliberative syllogisms, and premises that are presumed by the audience, belonging to rhetoric syllogisms.³⁹⁹ This was not without bearings on the philosopher's lexical choices.

On the one hand, from the commentary to *Prior Analytics* II.23, we learn that, at this stage, Fārābī abandoned the term *maqbul* in favour of *maznūn* *al-maznūna* 'inda l-sāmi' nī the premises that are presumed by the audience, previously attested mainly in the *nāqil* of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* and, marginally, in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*.⁴⁰⁰ We can thus state that, the transition from *maqbul* to *māzūn* notwithstanding, specialization remained Fārābī's preferred choice as far as the denomination of rhetorical premises was concerned.

On the other hand, the miscellaneous tendency to make use of multiple quasi-synonymic translations of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον, or *generally recognized*, manifested itself in the commentary to *Prior Analytics* II.27,⁴⁰¹ with the simultaneous presence of the terms *al-mūjibā maḥmūd*, *āat* referred to a concept roughly equivalent with Aristotle's εἰκός in its more objective acceptance, and *mašhūh* used to explain and clarify the expression *al-muqaddama al-wājibā*, i.e. equivalent of *al-muqaddama al-maḥmūl* itself. Tellingly, in this very passage, in which *al-muqaddama al-wājibā* (or *al-maḥmūl* is described as a commonly known premiss from what,

³⁹⁹ See Fārābī, *Šiḥ al-Qiyās* *Ad-manṭi qiyāsiyyah*, vol. II pp. 512,4, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁴⁰⁰ On the Arabic translations of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον see the subsection of the present chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

⁴⁰¹ See Fārābī, *Šiḥ al-Qiyās* *Ad-manṭi qiyāsiyyah*, vol. II p. 551,16-18, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

the future, is or is not for the most part, *al-muqaddama al-w ā ġ* is also said to be from rhetorical premises (*min al-muqaddamā t -ḥuṭṭāliyya*), showing that Fārābī's coherence in always reserving the word *m a š h ū* for dialectical premises and *m a q ḥ ū* (an unambiguous synonym of this term) for rhetorical premises only extended to contexts in which rhetoric and dialectical premises could be opposed directly.

The coexistence of these two tendencies, one towards lexical specialization and univocity, and one towards the miscellaneous reuse of vocabulary elements deriving from different traditions, was arbitrated by the resolution to confine lexical eclecticism to the description and illustration of rhetorical terms, while uniformity remained the rule for their denomination, at least within the boundaries of one single work.

The philosophical background of *K i t āb al-Ḥiṭā b* was as full of implications for lexical development as that of *Š aḥ al-Ḥiṭā b* had been.

In this work, the onus of constituting the proprium of rhetoric had shifted from rhetorical premises to the fact of being persuasive at first sight (*f ī b-nā a*), both for the material and for the formal elements of rhetorical reasoning.⁴⁰² Disencumbered from this burden, rhetorical premises were now free to reflect Fārābī's interest for lexical uniformity or for the vagaries of the vocabulary of the Arabic *Organon* as well as he deemed fit.

Fārābī opted for a complete absence of lexical distinction as far as the denomination of premises were concerned: indeed, dialectical, rhetorical and sophistical premises are indiscriminately called *m a š h ū* (*truly commonly known premises*), even when they appear side by side. The latter fact is not problematic, because when dialectical, rhetorical and sophistical premises are discussed together or contrastively, dialectical premises are specified as *m a š h ū-brāqī qā ī*, *truly commonly known*, rhetorical premises are specified as *m a š h ū-br ā a d irf'ā ī* (*truly commonly known*).

⁴⁰² On this subject, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par vue immédiat et commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, p. 158-161.

known at first sight, and sophistical premises are specified as *ma š h ū r* *ʔā h i* *ʔr ā* apparently commonly known.⁴⁰³

Let us remark in passing that the expression *ma š h ū r* *ʔā h i* *ʔr ā* in order to refer to dialectical premises, holds a reference to the fact that *ma š h ū r* , *c o m m o n l y k n o w n* properly referred to dialectical premises, while terms like *ma q b ū r* *m ā z n ū n* (accepted or presumed premises) were in use for rhetorical premises. As a throwback to the old state of things, even in *K i t ā b* *ʔHā b* only dialectical premises are verily called commonly known, or commonly known *f i* *h a* *q i* *q a*

Alongside Fārābī's choice to lexically blend in just one term dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical premises – while preserving their semantic distinction by other means – in *K i t ā b* *ʔHā b* Fārābī's interest in the multiple synonyms of Aristotle's *ἔνδοξον* available in the Arabic versions of the *Organon* was still very lively, and it was still conducive to the insertion of most of these words in the lexical system of his works. Synonymity was avoided by modifying and specifying the meaning of these terms in order to enable their subordination to *ma š h ū r* the word that had been selected as the main expression for the *generally recognized*. While in other texts the aforementioned subordination was obtained by relegating the divergent term to the role of explanation or qualification of *ma š h ū r* the main term for *generally recognized*, in *K i t ā b* *ʔHā b* all expressions like *ma ḥ m ū d ā t* and *ma ḥ m ū n ā t* were used to refer to different subsets of the *ma š h ū r* or *ā t* . example, when discussing the species of the commonly known premises,⁴⁰⁴ Fārābī explains that some *ma š h ū r* are *ʔā t ā* equivalent of Aristotle's *σημεία*, *signs*, and some are *ma ḥ m ū d ā t* , equivalent of Aristotle's *εἰκότα*, or *probabilities*.⁴⁰⁵ This articulation was also coherent with the fact that in the parallel passage from *Rhetoric* I.2 the Arabic translation for *εἰκότα* is *ma ḥ m ū d* , elsewhere an equivalent of *ἔνδοξον*, but immediately afterwards we find a statement to the effect

⁴⁰³ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b* *ʔHā b* 105,15-107,11, ed. Langhade.

⁴⁰⁴ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b* *ʔHā b* 109,11-111,2, ed. Langhade.

⁴⁰⁵ For Aristotle's use of *σημεία* and *εἰκότα*, see *Rhetoric* I.2 1358a27-35.

that the subjects of some *maḥm ū d āret* sensible (*maḥs ū*) and some are voluntary (*i ḍiyā*). Of the *maḥm ū d āret* that have sensible subjects, those that are confirmed by sense stand verified, while those that only have their renown (*š u ḥ*) to support them are mere presumed premises, or *mazn ū n*. Nothing in Aristotle's parallel text could amount to a nudge towards the representation of *mazn ū n* as a subgroup of *maḥm ū d āret* itself, a subgroup of *ma ṣ h ū n* in this case, we are directly witnessing the effects of Fārābī's will to integrate most Aristotelian vocabulary as transmitted by his different sources into the lexicon of his own treaties, and of his consciousness that this goal made necessary the specialization of each of these terms, particularly those that did not occupy a central role in Fārābī's newly established lexical system.⁴⁰⁶

Fārābī's interest in rhetorical Peripatetic vocabulary found its boundaries in philosophical acquisitions that had crystallized in a specific lexical form that the philosopher was not willing to question, not even after the characterization of rhetoric ceased to depend on its premises. This is the case of the concept of *ẓann*, *opinion*, which had been the pivot of the reorganization of rhetoric operated in Fārābī's *Š ḍi al-Q i y ān* and to which the expression *al-maznūna* 'inda l-sāmi' nī *the premises that are presumed by the audience*, was related.⁴⁰⁷ In *Š ḍi al-Q i y ān* the term *maznūnā* had replaced *ma q b ās* the standard term to name rhetorical premises, and, although in *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b* the role of rhetorical premises changed drastically, this shift was not reversed.

This statement can be verified on multiple occasions. For example, when explaining how enthymemes can be syllogisms either apparently or in truth, in *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b* Fārābī outlines the general distinctions of syllogism and states that its premises can be classified as as *known*

⁴⁰⁶ Another meaningful product of this Farabian tendency can be recognized in the very extensive list of premises that can be used as premises of enthymemes, on condition of being *ma ṣ h ū r a -r fa ī' -m ḥ b ṣ ā ḍ l ū ṭ a ḥ l* (*common praised premises from the point of view that is immediate and shared*), for this list includes both *possible premises* and *presumed premises* and (*mazn ū n*). See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 107-11, ed. Langhade.

⁴⁰⁷ On this subject, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, *vue immédiat et commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992. pp. 169-172.

a c c o r d i n g t o s ú n i d -y a q ā n i l e p r e s u m e d (n i a z n ā) , l a r i s e m s i b l e (r h a h s ū š a)
 The distinction into *sure*, *presumed*, and *sensible premises* also appears in *Ḥamsa fuṣū lin, K i t ā b a l*
Ġadal, K i t ā Q b i y ā n d s i n K i t ā Q b i y ā š l s ġ ā n d in all these occasions Fārābī preferred the
 term *m a q b ū l* (this was not the case in *Š a h al-Qiyā š*⁴⁰⁹ The same happens in the lengthy list of
 premises that can on occasion be employed as premises of enthymemes, on condition of being
m a š h ū r a -r f y ā l -m b ā d i ā r a k l (c o m m o n f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w t h a t i t i m p e d i a t e m i s e s
and shared), for this list includes m u q a d d a z m ā n a m (a p r e s u m e d e n d m p q a d n d a m ā s
m a q b ū l a (a c c e p t e d p r e m i s e s)

Evolving Philosophical Views, Relationship to Philosophical Authorities, and Lexical Selection in Fārābī's Rhetorical Thought

Lexical Choices and Philosophical Evolutions

What conclusions can we then draw concerning the interaction between the development of Fārābī's philosophical positions and his relationship to different philosophical authorities in shaping his lexical choices?

The philosophical element of this question has been largely covered by Aouad's analysis in his contribution on the foundations of rhetoric according to Fārābī.⁴¹¹ From the characterization of each art in the *Organon* according to its specific premises, assigned to every one of them according to their truth value, which can be found in *R i s ā l ā y f ā n b u q a d d ā m a q ā b l a*

⁴⁰⁸ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥ d ā b ā l* 87,8-9, ed. Langhade. A less direct reference this classification of syllogistic premises, discussing primary premises, is to be found in Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥ d ā b ā l* 105,10-11, ed. Langhade.

⁴⁰⁹ See the section of this chapter devoted to *T h e G e n e r a l l y R e c o g n i z e d i n F ā r ā b ī ' s A n a l y t i c s , a n d t o t h e T o p i c s*, pp. 107-128.

⁴¹⁰ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥ d ā b ā l* 107,5-11, ed. Langhade.

⁴¹¹ See M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ' A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é s p a r F ā r ā b ī , c o m m u n*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992.

t a ' a *ḥfalsafa* and in *Maqāla fī n-āqāṣ al-ilm ū l-h b l-tā n*⁴¹² Fārābī progressed to focusing on the problem of the *proprium* of rhetoric, already described in *Š ḍ al-Ḥiṭā b* and actively tackled in *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b* ill t ā Q b i y ā l s , -Q i K y i ā ḡ b i a r l a , l -B k i r t ā Ḥ i ḥ a l ; Q a i l y ā s , and *K i t ā Ḥ i ḥ a l* b . While in the last text Fārābī identified the *proprium* of rhetoric with persuasion at first sight, in all the former works he had been expecting to trace it in a kind of premises that would be specific to this art.

This progression had the foreseeable considerable impact on the vocabulary chosen by Fārābī to name rhetorical premises: in the *R i s ā l ā a y f ā ī n y b u a ḡ ā d d a n m a q -ḥfalsafa* a t a ' the expression *ṣā d i ḡ l - m u ṣ ḡ ā w ā* , (p r e m i s e s) t h a t i s e x c l u s i v e l y s m u c h determined by relationships existing between syllogistic arts, inclusive of rhetoric, and truth. In this lexical choice, no influence whatsoever is exerted by Aristotelian vocabulary in its Arabic forms, be it from the *Rhetoric* or from other sections of the *Organon*.

The search for a *proprium* for rhetoric grounded both in Aristotle's text and in his thought on this subject inevitably brought his lexicon for rhetorical premises to the forefront, since, for an extended period, Fārābī worked under the assumption that such a *proprium* must consist in the premises of each syllogistic art. This entailed the presentation of a variety of translations of Aristotle's ἐνδοξον in Fārābī's following works, still miscellaneous and unsystematic in his *Š ḍ al-Ḥiṭā b* where *maḥm ū d* overrides *maqāb* and *ānta š h* for its frequency but not for its function, and in forms hierarchized according to different criteria in most logic short treatises and in *Š ḍ al-Q i y ā* . This standard term for rhetorical premises was exclusively established as *maqāb* in the first case, and as *māzn ū n* in the second.

Finally, in *K i t ā Ḥ i ḥ a l* b the pressure to select a single and univocal term to name rhetorical premises was no more, since rhetorical premises were no longer expected to

⁴¹² See *R i s ā l ā a y f ā ī n y b u a ḡ ā d d a n m a q -ḥfalsafa* in *Alfarabiy Philosophische maqāb l a t a ' Abhandlungen*, ed. F. Dieterici, Brill 1892, p. 57 and p. 87, and A.J. Arberry, *F ā r ā b ī ' s C , i n Rivista di Studi f P o e t r j Orientali* 17, 1937-1939, p. 268 and p. 274.

instantiate the *proprium* of rhetoric: this function had been given over to the immediate quality of rhetorical persuasion, that is effective *f ī b-ā q* (from *thāimmediate point of view*). Free from compulsion on this specific point, Fārābī chose terminological – rather than lexical – adherence to Aristotle’s vocabulary by collectively naming rhetorical, dialectical and sophistical premises *m a š h* thus reflecting Aristotle’s indiscriminate use of *ἔνδοξον* in these three arts.

Still, Fārābī’s *m a š h* could be qualified as *m a š h fū rā ad ir y*, *m a š h fū rā ad ī q a*, *a n*, *m a š h ū r zā h i f q a t* whenever a specific reference to either rhetorical, dialectical, or sophistical premises was required.⁴¹³

Fārābī’s Choice of Literary Genres and his Relationship to Philosophical Authorities

Another pertinent lens for observing Fārābī’s lexical choices is that of his varying relationship to philosophical authorities, and, subordinately, of the literary genre of his works.

As fittingly observed by Gutas,⁴¹⁴ in the 10th Century, when Logic finally acquired massive relevance for the Baghdad readership, it entered a stage almost entirely free of formal institutions for the teaching and transmission of the newly born Arabic discipline, and very few constraints and expectations were imposed on the literary form Fārābī would choose for his texts. This makes a stark contrast with the comprehensively influential role of scholarly institutions in the elaboration and preservation of clearly defined and systematically enforced philosophical genres that characterized logical research and teaching in Syriac and Latin Medieval settings. If Fārābī was not obliged by external forces to comply with the canons of specific logical literary genres, since such genres did not yet exist in the expectations of his Arabic public, his choice to adhere throughout his works to traits of preexisting, Alexandrian logical genres, is all the more interesting, for it equates to a deliberate declaration of belonging to a certain tradition. In fact, the Syriac tradition came short of transmitting to the Arabs *not only the*

⁴¹³ See Fārābī, *K i t H d ā b a f*. 105,15-107,11, ed. Langhade.

⁴¹⁴ See D. Gutas, *Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works*, in Ch. Burnett (ed.) *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, London, The Warburg Institute, 1993, pp. 29-76.

matter of Greek scholarship, but its forms as well, as assumed by Rescher,⁴¹⁵ but, given Fārābī's background as Yūḥannā Ibn Ḥaylān's and Abū Bišr Mattā's pupil, it could not fail to make such forms known to early Islamic philosophers, subsequently leaving them free to dispose of this heredity along the patterns that they judged more fitting to their own aims.

Rhetoric in the Ġawāmi': Continuity with the Lexicon of Aristotle's *Organon*

Amongst the Farabian texts that are relevant for our discussion of rhetorical vocabulary, the most represented literary genres are that of the *šarḥ*, a lengthy commentary that can focus as much on the conceptual content of the source text as on its letter,⁴¹⁶ and of the *ġawāmi'*,⁴¹⁷ synoptic summary or, on occasion, literal abstract of texts belonging to the Alexandrian school curriculum. As the title declares, *Šarḥ al-Ḥiṭā* and *Šarḥ al-Qiyās* belong to the *šarḥ* genre. On the other hand, *Kiṭāb al-Riḥla*, *Qiyās al-Kātib*, *Qiyās al-Ḥiṭā* and *Kiṭāb al-Ḥiṭā* can be considered as *ġawāmi'* together with *al-Fuṣūl al-ḥamsa*, which acts as a preface to all of the above in ms. Bratislava, University Library, TE 41. The role of *Kiṭāb al-Qiyās* is somewhat similar to that of *ġawāmi'* but its reference public is that of the Islamic theologians rather than that of the young scholars of philosophy. This is evident from its alternative title, *Muḥtasar al-šaḡīr ma fi ṭiḥāṭ al-ṭarīqat al-kawātib* *Small Abridgement on Logic in the Manner of the Theologians*.

Outside Fārābī's production, the expression *ġawāmi'* was mainly used for summaries of medical works. In reference to Fārābī, however, *ġawāmi'* is actually the term chosen by Ibn al-Nadīm in order to name the philosopher's global endeavor to abridge the whole of Aristotle's *Organon*, the product of which we can still read, mainly thanks to mss. Bratislava, University Library, TE 41 and ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 812. In the formulation

⁴¹⁵ See N. Rescher, *Al-Fārābī's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Analytica*, University of Pittsburgh Press 1963, p. 23.

⁴¹⁶ On the general meaning of the term *šarḥ*, see D. Gutas, *Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works*, in Ch. Burnett (ed.) *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, London, The Warburg Institute, 1993, pp. 33-35.

⁴¹⁷ On the meaning of the expression *ġawāmi'* in the general context, see D. Gutas, *Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works*, in Ch. Burnett (ed.) *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, London, The Warburg Institute, 1993, pp. 37-38.

offered by ms. Bratislava, University Library, TE 41, this ambitious enterprise contained at least one section for each art of the Alexandrian *Organon*.

Authorities other than Ibn al-Nadīm – like the copyist of the Bratislava manuscript itself, Averroes, and the copyist of his Andalusian predecessor Ibn Bāǧǧa’s commentary on Fārābī’s collection of logical texts – referred to this work and its parts with terms less heavy in implications than *ǧa w ā*. Indeed, all the aforementioned witnesses opted for the very open-ended expression *k i t ā b*. The title adopted for the whole sylloge from the 13th Century on, *at-Ta m ā n i -Maḥṣūḥ* or *at-Ta m ā n i y a -Maḥṣūḥ*, the *Eight (Books) on Logic*, does not offer any further information on the literary genre in which later Arabic readers situated this text.

Nonetheless, Ibn al-Nadīm’s distinctive lexical choice in naming Fārābī’s abridgement of the nine parts of the *Organon* with the term *ǧa w ā* manifestly connoted as belonging to the Alexandrian scholastic heritage, must mean that in the 10th Century this specific work could be seen in continuity with the Peripatetic tradition in which Fārābī had been schooled. In fact, Gutas argues that his logical *ǧa w ā* was composed with the key goal of incorporating Peripatetic logic into Islamic sciences, an objective of paramount importance, for Aristotelian logic was viewed as the embodiment of Greek scientific methodology itself. Its acceptance was therefore preliminary to the stable introduction of Greek science in the Arabo-Islamic world.⁴¹⁸ If this objective is especially underlined in the alternative title of *K i t ā b al-ǧāwāmi‘*, also known as *Muḥṣar al-ša ḡ ī r m a f n ī t i ḥ a r ī ‘ q a u l i ā l a k a* with an explicit reference to the distinctly Islamic practice of *k a l ī m*, be enlarged to all the Bratislava *Organon* texts.

However, if Fārābī’s *ǧa w ā* had the insertion of Peripatetic philosophy in the Arabic intellectual word as their goal, they did not have any Peripatetic Scholastic literary genre as their means: as Aouad’s reconstruction of the rhetorical and philosophical thought developed in *K i t ā b*

⁴¹⁸ On the meaning of the expression *ǧawāmi‘* in the general context, see D. Gutas, *Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works*, in Ch. Burnett (ed.) *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, London, The Warburg Institute, 1993, p. 50.

al-Ḥiṭāb has amply shown, the texts belonging to Fārābī's reworking of the *Organon* are neither verbatim abstracts nor abridgements, for they involve both considerable reorganization of Aristotelian materials and – through the process of reorientation of multiple Aristotelian passages described in detail by Aouad – the development of new and independent claims, together with the arguments that support them.⁴¹⁹ The innovative structure and content of *Kiṭāb al-Ḥiṭāb* as compared with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is remarkable, regardless of what the term *ḡawāmi'* may suggest beyond the fact that these Farabian works constituted a brief introduction to Aristotelian logic.

In the case of Fārābī's *ḡawāmi'* continuity with ancient texts can be established on the lexical plane, keeping as a reference Aristotle's *Organon* as a whole. This is exemplified by the fact that *maqāb*, the main term chosen in most texts in order to name rhetorical premises, probably came from outside rhetorical tradition, i.e. from Abū Biṣr Mattā's translation of the *Posterior Analytics*.⁴²⁰ A further sign that all the Farabian texts which can be described as *ḡawāmi'* had within their scope the whole *Organon* and were not limited to the Aristotelian work they were commenting upon in each case, is the keen interest they show in wider Peripatetic vocabulary. While the role of *maqāb* as the standard term for rhetorical premises and that of *mašḥūrāt* dialectical premises was undisputed, many of its Arabic synonyms prevalent in different *Organon* sections were reoriented towards a meaning similar to that of *maqāb* and *mašḥūrāt*, distinguishable from it, so that they could be included in the *ḡawāmi'* without producing synonymy.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹ For the manner in which Fārābī centers the whole discussion of rhetoric on the principles of this art, namely the matter covered by Aristotle's *Rhetoric* I.2, and for how Fārābī's pervasive activity of reorientation on specific Aristotelian passages results into the identification of said principles with the novel concept of point of view that is immediate and shared, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés* point de vue immédiat et commun, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 134-143.

⁴²⁰ See the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

⁴²¹ This is the case of the terms *dā'ir*, *widéspread*, taken from Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī's version of *Topics* I-II, which appears in *Kiṭāb al-Ḥiṭāb* *al-Fuṣūl al-ḥamša*, and *maḥmūd*, *commonly praised*, the most usual equivalent of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον, *generally recognized*, both in the *Arabic Rhetoric* and in Taḏārī's *Prior Analytics*. Both *dā'ir* and

An especially interesting example is that of *K i t āḥḥā bāḥ*; in this case rhetorical lexicon was exposed to the influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* both because Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is inherently pertinent whenever rhetorical subjects are discussed and because in *K i t āḥḥā bāḥ* *Rhetoric* was the stated object of the commentary activity. These two parallel forces notwithstanding, *K i t āḥḥā bāḥ* often in lexical discontinuity with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, to the advantage of terms deriving from the wider *Organon* tradition, in accordance with other Farabian texts that can be classed as *ḡa w ā .m* For example, in *K i t āḥḥā bāḥ* dialectical, rhetorical and sophistic premises are indiscriminately called *m a š h īw r cām* commonly known premises,⁴²² and, whenever it is necessary to specify a premise as rhetorical, dialectical or sophistic, this is done adverbially.⁴²³ Yet, the key term *m a š h īw r* appears in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, while it is indeed found in other parts of the *Organon*.⁴²⁴ Of course, in *K i t āḥḥā bāḥ* expressions already present in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, like *maḥm ū d ān* and *māzn ū n dō n*, on occasion appear, but, in order for them to be included in *this text*, their meaning had to be specified, and it was subordinated to that of *m a š h īw r*.⁴²⁵ The lexicon of *K i t āḥḥā bāḥ* is therefore an especially poignant expression of Fārābī's will to integrate every one of his *ḡa w ā* in the perspective of the whole *Organon*, and not exclusively of the Aristotelian text he was discussing in each case.

maḥm ū d ān play an ancillary role to *m a š h īw r*, the standard term for the dialectical ἔνδοξον in Fārābī's texts that can be classed as *ḡa w ā .m*

⁴²² On the subject, see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 184d in Fārābī, 153.

⁴²³ It is interesting to point out that, although the choice of *m a š h īw r* for rhetorical premises is an example of lexical discontinuity with the Arabic *Rhetoric*, it enabled adherence with Aristotle's use of one single word for rhetorical, sophistic and dialectical premises, called ἔνδοξα through his *Organon*. A prerequisite for considering this adherence worth of attention is to believe that the lexical convergence of rhetorical, sophistic and dialectical premises in Aristotle was perceivable in the Arabic translations of the *Organon*. This is indeed possible, for, the variety of competing translations notwithstanding, the equivalence between ἔνδοξον and terms like *maḥm ū d ān* extended to certain Arabic versions of *Rhetoric*, *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, and beyond.

⁴²⁴ See the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

⁴²⁵ Fārābī's interest in rhetorical Peripatetic vocabulary found its boundaries in philosophical acquisitions that had crystallized in a specific lexical form that the philosopher was not willing to question, not even after the characterization of rhetoric ceased to depend on its premises. For example, in *Š dī al-Q i* the term *māzn ū n dō n* replaced *m a q b ā* as the standard term to name rhetorical premises, and this shift was never reversed, although in *K i t āḥḥā bāḥ* the role of rhetorical premises changed drastically.

Shorter Works: a Vocabulary Shaped by Alexandrian Prolegomena

The model of shorter works that maintain that each art is characterized by the specific kind of premises it employs and by their truth value, like *Maqāla fī nāqā' al-ʿaivā' al-ḥikmīya* to Alexandrian prolegomena than to specific books of Aristotle's *Organon* itself. The same holds true for the *Risāla fī mā yānba ġī'an* described by Gutas as *nothing more than a transcript or adaptation of an Arabic study of the Alexandrian Prolegomena to the study of Aristotle*.⁴²⁶ For example, it is clear that expressions used in these texts to describe rhetorical premises – like *al-ṣādīq al-muḥāwāḍir* *premises that are as much true as they are false* – do not owe anything to the rhetorical and dialectical lexicon deployed in the Arabic translations of the nine sections of the Alexandrian *Organon*.⁴²⁷

However, the area in which the lexical continuity of these Farabian works with Alexandrian prolegomena is more evident is the conceptual rather than the verbal domain, partly because of the brevity of the relevant Farabian texts, and partly because we do not have specific Arabic translations to which we can compare them. On the limited data of which we dispose, we would be inclined to say that, in these texts, the vocabulary chosen to name rhetorical premises is exclusively determined by relationships established between other logic arts and rhetoric.

The *Šurūḥ* emphasis on the Lexicon of Aristotle's Rhetoric

Finally, continuity with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* specifically, and not merely with Aristotle's *Organon* at large, was sought for in *Šarḥ al-Ḥitāb* and in *Šarḥ al-Qiyās*, *Šurūḥ* were texts expressly devoted to the philosophical and textual analysis of an individual Aristotelian work. This preferential relationship was not intended to entirely exclude the rest of the *Organon* from

⁴²⁶ See D. Gutas, *Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works*, in Ch. Burnett (ed.) *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, London, The Warburg Institute, 1993, p. 48 n. 93.

⁴²⁷ See *Risāla fī mā yānba ġī'an* *al-falsafa*, in *Alfarabī's Philosophy* *al-maḥāḍir* *Abhandlungen*, F. Dieterici (ed.), Brill 1892, p. 57 and p. 87, and A.J. Arberry, *Farābī's C*, in *Rivista di Studi Orientali* 17, 1937-1939, p. 268 and p. 274.

Fārābī's perspective: in *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* this is evident from the sporadic employment of terms like *ma q b ū l ā t* (*a c c and m a ṣ h ī p r ō t o ṣ ṭ i b i n i t i o n s*) to name rhetorical premises,⁴²⁸ while the firm orientation of the same commentary towards Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is testified by the overwhelming quantitative prevalence of the occurrence of *maḥm ū d ā t* (*c o m m o n l y p r a i s e d p r o p o s i t i o n s*) in the same role.

As far as the selection of rhetorical lexicon is concerned, the case of *Š dī al-Q i yā* is related to that of *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* by its literary genre, and to *K i t ā b l u r d i l ā n , -Q i y ā* by the fact that its main subject is not Aristotelian rhetoric, but another syllogistic art. Witness to the closeness in matter of *Š dī al-Q i yā* is the fact that the new standard term for rhetorical *endoxa*, or *maẓn ū ṇ* was previously attested mainly in the *naql qad ī* of Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* and only marginally in the Arabic *Rhetoric*.⁴²⁹ Concerning the Arabic equivalent of the Greek term εἰκός, *Š dī al-Q i yā* employs simultaneously the terms *al-mū ḡ i b ā maḥm ū d*, *al-maḥm ū d* necessary and commonly praised things,⁴³⁰ referred to a concept roughly equivalent with Aristotle's εἰκός in its more objective acceptance, and *ma ṣ h ū r*, or *commonly known*, used to explain and clarify the expression *al-muqaddama al-w ā ḡ*. Within the limits imposed on our knowledge by the available documentation, *mū ḡ ō r w ā ḡ* was previously employed in the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, while *ma ṣ h* appears in Abū Bišr Mattā's translation of the *Posterior Analytics* and in Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī's and Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh's translations of *Topics* III-IV and VIII, confirming at once the global opening of *Š dī al-Q i y ā* towards the *Organon* at large and its special attention for the lexicon of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

As far as Fārābī's attitude towards authorities and literary genres is concerned, his closeness to the lexicon of the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* plays a different role in *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* and in *Š dī al-Q i yā*: in the first case, it confirms the dedication of the *Š dī* to the

⁴²⁸ See *Didascaliam in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, § 54, pp. 246,15-247,5, ed. Grignaschi, and the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

⁴²⁹ See the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

⁴³⁰ See Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i yā*, *Al-manṭi q i yā*, vol. I, p. 551,21-23, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

elucidation and absorption of a specific Aristotelian text, while in the second case it challenges this very expectation by favouring the lexicon not of *Prior Analytics*, the stated object of commentary for *Š dī al-Q i y bā* of another art of the *Organon*. What prevails here is the attention for Aristotelian verbal expression in general, which surely finds its rightful place in the commentary genre.

By means of conclusion, we can state that literary genres do play a quite direct influence on Fārābī's relationship to his philosophical authorities: his lexical choices concerning rhetorical terms show conceptual continuity with Peripatetic tradition for *R i s ānlā a y fa in yuqaddāma a n q a b l a t falsafa and FouMmai q āll a fši n āqšāwt dīm ū l'n b l t d n lē* lexical continuity with Aristotle's *Organon* for Fārābī's *ǧa w ā maḥmūd* lexical continuity with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for Fārābī's *š u h r. ū*

Fārābī's Philosophical Goals in Rhetoric and the *Organon* Vocabulary: Lexical Strategies

I would like to finish this excursus with an exposition of the strategies employed by Fārābī in order to harmonise the different goals that inspired his lexical choices. Fārābī could not have foregone the employment of some strategy of this kind, for the goals that had bearing over his vocabulary were not only variegated, but also potentially divergent in terms of their lexical results.

With the exception of Fārābī's proemial, shorter texts like *R i s ā n h ā y ā n b a ḡ ī y u q a d d a m a q falsafa and M a a q āall al u fši n āqšāwt dīm ū l'n b l t d n lē* which are characterized by a form of global autonomy from the rhetorical lexicon of Aristotle's *Organon*, all Farabian works did pursue a strategy of integration of different strands of Peripatetic lexicon.

In the case of *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* the first Farabian work to be confronted with the problem of the *proprium* of rhetoric and with the relevant lexicon, integration of different terms employed in Arabic translations of the *Organon* for rhetorical premises was reached on a miscellaneous basis. We are forced to reach this conclusion because the expressions *maḥmūd ā t (c o m m o n l y*

propositions) also present in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, *ma q b ū l ā t* (also found in Abū o p o s Bišr Mattā's translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, and *ma š h* (commonly known propositions) again found in Abū Bišr Mattā's translation of the *Posterior Analytics* and in the Arabic *Topics*, cannot be explained in terms other than those of random synonymic alternation.⁴³¹ This observation is not contradicted by the numerical prevalence of the occurrences of *maḥm ū d* over those of *ma q b ū l ā t* and *ma š h*, for this prevalence has no semantic underpinnings, and it is probably justified by a form of generic preference awarded to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in a work avowedly devoted to its elucidation.

In later works, Fārābī's approach to rhetorical lexicon became markedly more sophisticated, for a separate treatment was reserved for traditional terms that had been selected to be the standard reference expression for rhetorical premises, and for terms that used to be their synonyms in different translations of the Arabic *Organon*, but were finally not chosen to fulfil this role. Although he discarded them for usage in their original meaning, Fārābī chose not to relinquish them entirely, and undertook to find a new place for them.

As far as what we could call main vocabulary for rhetorical premises was concerned, i.e. the terms *ma q b* in the *ḡa w ā* and *maḥm ū n i ā š ḥ* al-Q i y Fārābī's strategy was one of regularization by selection. This is to say that, of the many translations of ἔνδοξα employed in the corpus of the Arabic versions of the *Organon*, one was chosen as the only term for rhetoric premises to the detriment of all others, thus giving issue to a situation in which the same concept was systematically named with the same word, a condition that was far from being realized before, as much in the Arabic versions of Aristotle as in *Š ḥ al-Ḥiṭā b a*.

⁴³¹ On the presence of the terms *maḥm ū d*, *ma q b ā n l ā t š h*, see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96. On the vocabulary for rhetorical premises in Fārābī's *Š ḥ al-Ḥiṭā b* see the section on *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī's Š ḥ al-Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 98-108. The observations presented above concerning the denomination of rhetorical premises address the whole of *Š ḥ al-Ḥiṭā b* which we know by means of its Latin translation in Hermannus Alemannus' *Didascalica*, but more specifically *Didascalica* § 10, published in al-Fārābī, *Didascalica in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971, pp. 165-166.

In the same works, i.e. the *ǧa w ā marid* ^Š *ḏi ral-Q i y* the strategy chosen for the harmonization of subsidiary vocabulary was radically different. No exclusive choice was operated, as if Fārābī was desirous to include in his own texts all strands of Peripatetic lexical tradition. However, at this stage, Fārābī did not envisage the miscellaneous coexistence of near-synonyms any more, not even for terms that clearly had a subordinate role in relationship to expressions like *ma q b* and *māzn ū n* which had been explicitly selected as the standard expressions for the main concept to which all these words used to refer in Arabic versions of Aristotle, namely rhetorical premises. Therefore, Fārābī was compelled to shape an acceptance of the wider *ἔνδοξον* concept that was proper to each of these terms.

As a first and preliminary move, *ma š h* were made clearly distinguishable from *ma q b* and *māzn ū n* by consecrating them to dialectical premises in all the texts under discussion.⁴³²

On this basis, Fārābī worked on finding for each of the remaining terms a role that was ancillary to that of *ma q b* (*māzn ū n*) and *ma š h* at the same time, in order to be able to employ them as synonyms or qualifiers of the main terms he had chosen – as in the case of *dā* – i or in a different and subordinated role – as in the case of *maḥm ū* and *w ā ḡ*. Accordingly, in *al-Fuṣū l -Ḥamsa* and in *K i t ā b al-Q i y ā s al-Šaḡīr*, *dā* is sometimes used to explain or qualify the term *ma š h* but never to substitute it,⁴³³ while in *K i t ā b al-Q i y ā s al-Šaḡīr* the word *maḥm ū* builds – in opposition with *mustankar* – a polarity within the realm of what is *ma š h*,⁴³⁴ and, in Fārābī's *Š ḏi ral-Q i y* the meanings of *mū ḡ i b* / *andānāḡim b* are occasion refined so that the first term reflects the objective acceptance of Aristotle's *εἰκός*, or *probable*, and the second one its

⁴³² On the subject, see the paragraph of this chapter devoted to Specific Terms for Rhetorical and Dialectical Premises, part of the section on The Generally Recognized in Fārābī's to the Prior and Posterior Analytics, and to the Topics. Farabian statements on this topic can be found, for example, in Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Burhān*, pp. 20,17-21,3, ed. Faḥrī.

⁴³³ See Fārābī, *Fuṣū l al-Ḥamsa* in *al-Fārābī*, vol. I, and Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Qiyās al-Šaḡīr*, p. 75,6-9, R. al-^cAḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fārābī*, vol. II.

⁴³⁴ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b al-Q i y ā s al-Šaḡīr*, 1-4, R. al-^cAḡam (ed.), *al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fārābī*, vol. II.

subjective acceptance. This distinctive connotation is just marked enough to account for the existence of two separate terms, but never deep enough to undermine the capacity of *maḥm ū d* and *w ā ḡtō* refer synonymically to the concept called εἰκός by Aristotle.

In Fārābī's *K i t āḥbā b a* terms are switched between *m a ṣ h ū* which becomes the main expression for rhetorical premises – and *m a q b, īwīl nāẓn ū n iā ṣ ḡ ḡ al-Q i y-ā* which are demoted to the place of subsidiary terms. Fārābī's strategy, however, does not change: main vocabulary is established and regularized by selection from the pool of solutions offered by the Arabic versions of the *Organon*, while subsidiary vocabulary is integrated by ancillary specialization in different directions of terms left out from the selection of main vocabulary. The permanence of the global frame notwithstanding, some small divergences from Fārābī's approach in his *ḡa w ā* and in *ṣ ḡ ḡ al-Q i y* do surface in his *K i t āḥbā b a*. First, the selection of *m a ṣ h ū* as the standard term to designate rhetorical premises was not only done to the detriment of translations of ἔνδοξον prevalent in various *Organon* sections, like *maḥm ū d*, *ḡanāẓb ū* but it also involved the extension of the meaning of the term *m a ṣ h ū* to include, besides rhetorical premises, dialectical and sophistical premises as well.⁴³⁵ This change brought *K i t āḥbā b a* into alignment with Aristotle's usage of ἔνδοξον, which extended to dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical examples, but it was innovative in comparison with the composite vocabulary of the Arabic versions of the *Organon*.

Secondly, translations of ἔνδοξον that had not been selected as standard terms for rhetorical premises in *K i t āḥbā b a* were included in Fārābī's work as usual, but not as synonymic explanations of the main term or as references to a specific facet of the ἔνδοξον concept. Rather, they were used to name a given subset of rhetorical premises: for example, in the presentation of genres and species of rhetorical premises, *maḥm ū d ā t*, *c o m m o n l y* premises, (alongside *ʿa l ā, ḡānā*) are described as a species of *m a ṣ h ū ḡ ḡ al-Q i y* the *a l* premises that can produce enthymemes at large; further on, *maḥm ū d ā* is divided into premises

⁴³⁵ See Fārābī, *K i t āḥbā b a*, pp. 105,15-107,11 J. Langhade (ed.).

that have sensible items as the particulars of their subjects – and are therefore corroborated by sense (*ḥass*) – and *muqaddamā maẓn ū npraesumed premises*, which are only supported by their renown.⁴³⁶

By means of conclusions, we can retain that, whenever Fārābī had philosophical reasons to address the question of rhetorical premises, he was receptive to the varied lexicon bequeathed to him and to his contemporaries by the translation history of the Arabic *Organon* in its entirety. At first, in his *Šiḥ al-Ḥiṭā b*, a specific hierarchy was imposed on this vocabulary, producing a heterogeneous and miscellaneous synonymy between the terms *maq b, ūml aš th, ūandā t maḥm ū d*, translated as *receptibilia, famosa* or *notoria*, and *probabilia* by Hermannus Alemannus in his *Didascalía*.⁴³⁷ This situation was not to last, for the further development of Fārābī's conception of what constitutes the *proprium* of *Rhetoric* (in the *ǧa w ā nīd fī Šiḥ al-Q i y*)⁴³⁸ and its final distinction from rhetorical premises themselves (in *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b*)⁴³⁹ incited the philosopher to structure his lexicon hierarchically, reserving the fuller meaning of *ἔνδοξον* for one main Arabic term, and developing different semantic nuances in order to characterize and distinguish complementary terms. This strategy, that allowed Fārābī to promote and demote expressions like *maq b, ūml aš th, and maẓn ū n* from the main to the complementary tier whenever required by the theoretical developments of his reflection, was also susceptible to integrate a maximum of

⁴³⁶ See Fārābī, *Kitā b -Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 107,12-109,15, Langhade (ed.), in *Al-Fārābī, K i t ā Ḥiṭā b*, Langhade (éd.), and al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971. For a more detailed discussion of this Farabian passage, see the section on *the Probable in Fārābī ' s Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 76-82.

⁴³⁷ See *Didascalía* § 10, in al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971, pp. 165-166

⁴³⁸ See for example Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b* 20,17-21,3, ed. Fahrī, and Fārābī, *Šiḥ al-Q i y* *Al-manti q i yly ā t l i F ā r*, vol. II pp. 510,23-513,14, ed. Daniš-pažuh. On the subject of the development of the conception of the *proprium* of *Rhetoric* in Fārābī, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ' A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é s p a r d e v u e i m m é d i a t e t c o m m u n*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992.

⁴³⁹ See Fārābī, *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b*, pp. 105,15-107,11 J. Langhade (ed.).

logical terms of Peripatetic ancestry into Islamic scholarly thought, thus fulfilling one of Fārābī's main objectives in composing his Aristotelian commentaries.

The Generally Recognized in Avicenna

The Generally Recognized in Avicenna's al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyya

The only work composed by Avicenna in his early period (*ante* AD 1013)⁴⁴⁰ that encompassed a global discussion of rhetorical subjects was *al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyya*. Its composition, at the request of Abū al-Ḥasan, a prosodist from Buḥārā, marked a turning point in the history of Islamic and Peripatetic philosophy, for this work was the first example of philosophical *summa* in the posterity of Greek thought. Texts belonging to this literary genre – destined to a massive and long-lasting development in the following centuries – were intended as unitary and systematic discussions of all parts of Aristotelian philosophy.

In the rhetorical chapter of *al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyya*, the vocabulary employed in the Arabic translations of the *Organon* and in Fārābī's rhetorical works appears in a drastically simplified version.⁴⁴¹ In this text, the only equivalent of Aristotle's rhetorical ἔνδοξον is the term *maḥm ū d*, *commonly praised*, which also appears in the same role in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*.

While in the Arabic *Rhetoric* the term *w ā ḡ i b* is one of the possible translations of the Aristotelian term εἰκός, in Taḍārī's version of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, εἰκός is again translated as *maḥm ū d* therefore, whenever it mirrors εἰκός rather than ἔνδοξον, *maḥm ū d* can be accompanied by the expression *w ā ḡ i b*, . Whenever it mirrors εἰκός rather than ἔνδοξον, *maḥm ū d* can be accompanied by the expression *w ā ḡ i b* necessary, for, while in the Arabic *Rhetoric* the term *w ā ḡ i b* is one of the possible translations of the Aristotelian term εἰκός, in Taḍārī's version of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, εἰκός is again translated as *maḥm ū d* other terms that used to translate Aristotle's

⁴⁴⁰ For the chronology of Avicenna's works, see D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 145.

⁴⁴¹ See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyya*, pp. 90-92, ed. M. Šāliḥ.

ἔνδοξον elsewhere in Peripatetic tradition, like *m a q l a n ā m a z n ū*, do not appear in *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā* at all.

Still in the rhetorical section of *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā*, Avicenna states that the *tamtī l*, example, can be grounded either in truth (*f ī ḥ a q ḍ*), in the widespread view (*al-ra’y al-dā’*), in an apparent, unexamined view (*zā h al-ra’y al-ġayr al-mu ‘ t*), or in homonymy (*ištirā k -isra*).⁴⁴² We can state confidently that the second and third point refer to dialectics and sophistry respectively because in the dialectical section of *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā* dialectical premises are systematically called *al-dā’ i* or *dialectical premises*.⁴⁴³ Of all the translations produced by the *Arabic Organon* translation, the option chosen by Avicenna for naming the dialectical premises in *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā* is overwhelmingly *al-dā’ i* with the very occasional presence of the expression *m a š h o* to qualify it.⁴⁴⁴

Again, in the generalization of the employ of *dā’ i* we can witness an intense push towards lexical simplification, possibly caused by the fact that this work, albeit not especially short and remarkably focused on rhetoric, dialectics and poetry,⁴⁴⁵ does include a wide range of subjects for its length. Still, the choice of *dā’ i* as the main equivalent for ἔνδοξον was unprecedented in Avicenna’s epoch and remained unusual afterwards. I do not know how to justify this finding myself, for, in the Arabic versions of the *Organon* books, the equivalence between ἔνδοξον and *dā’ i* is not especially common, although its occurrences clearly situate it in the field of dialectics. Indeed, it only appears in *Topics I-II*, translated by Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī from a Greek text, and further revised on the basis of multiple Greek sources. The revision set these treatises apart from *Topics II-VII*, that did not benefit from it, and from *Topics VIII*, translated by Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh from Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Syriac version. Indeed, in Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s unrevised books and in Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh’s section, *m a š h a m ā ḥ m ū* are always preferred to *dā’ i*.

⁴⁴² See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā*, p. 90,5-8, ed. M. Šālih

⁴⁴³ See, for example, Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā*, pp. 47-49, ed. M. Šālih

⁴⁴⁴ See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā*, p. 48.1-3, ed. M. Šālih

⁴⁴⁵ See D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 93.

It is interesting to point out that Avicenna selected his two ἔνδοξα equivalents for *al-Ḥikma al-‘Aḍiyyā* from the two polar opposites of the *Organon* translation history: *maḥm ū d* , chosen by Avicenna to name rhetorical premises, is mainly attested in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, a *n a q l* in the translation of *Sophistical Refutations* by Ibn Nā‘ima (fl. AD 830), and in Tādārī’s undated version of *Prior Analytics*.⁴⁴⁶ On the other hand, *dā* ḥ Avicenna’s option for dialectical premises, is only found in the version of *Topics* I-II by Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī (fl. 915), and is likely due to the revision of these two books on a further Greek source.⁴⁴⁷ Therefore, while the equivalence between ἔνδοξον and *maḥm ū d* is characteristic of the first phase of the Baghdad translation movement, the equivalence between ἔνδοξον and *dā* ḥ only appears in its third phase.⁴⁴⁸

The idea that Avicenna might have derived the generalization of *dā* ḥ from some lost translation that had this term as the only equivalent of ἔνδοξον is conceivable but not very likely, for, although in his *Kitāb al-Š i ḥeādīd* use *dā* ḥ in order to name the generally recognized, he only did so in *Kitāb al-Ġ a dī*, mirroring Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s revised books I-II. Avicenna’s preference for *dā* ḥ in *al-Ḥikma al-‘Aḍiyyā* could possibly be explained with the philosopher’s

⁴⁴⁶ *Maḥm ū d* also competes with *m a ṣ* in the translation of *Topics* VIII authored by Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh, an older contemporary of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (AD 893- AD 974). This translation derived from Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Syriac version of the *Topics*. Since the presence of *m a ṣ* concerns *Topics* VIII.1-10, while that of *maḥm ū d* is strictly limited to *Topics* VIII.11-14, it is tempting to think that one of the two terms was inserted by collation with other sources by means of an unachieved revision. In this case, we could assume that *maḥm ū d* was the most ancient solution, established up to Ḥunayn’s school, later partially converted to *m a ṣ* in order to align the text to the vocabulary that had become current by Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh’s time. Of course, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that Ibrāhīm himself was still entirely satisfied by the equivalence between *maḥm ū d* and ἔνδοξον, and that the switch towards *m a ṣ* did not take place until some later scholar, making use of Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s and Ibrāhīm’s partial translations of the *Topics* as a whole, tried to even out its vocabulary. However, the contraposition of two consistent lexical blocks, that of *m a ṣ* in *Topics* VIII.1-10 and that of *maḥm ū d* in *Topics* VIII.11-14, cannot be explained on the basis of mere occasional collation: it presupposes a revision plan that, albeit unachieved, was global in its intentions.

On this subject, see the section of the present chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, p. 93-96.

⁴⁴⁷ Concerning this revision, see again the section of the present chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, p. 93-96.

⁴⁴⁸ On the chronology of the Baghdad translation movement and on its division in three consecutive phases, see F.E. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs. The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam*, New York University Press 1968, pp. 59-61.

desire for an expression that would clearly separate dialectical premises from rhetorical ones, for, of all the translations of ἔνδοξον available in the Arabic *Organon*, *dā`is* is the only term that is never employed both in rhetoric and in dialectics, but belongs to the latter exclusively. A chronological argument, suggesting that, by Avicenna's time, the vocabulary supported by Abū ʿUṭmān al-Dimašqī in his scholarly revision had gained the upper hand should be refuted on the ground that this does not seem to be the case in Fārābī's texts and in Avicenna's other works.

Finally, the chronological distance between the attestations of *maḥm ū dand dā`is* translations of ἔνδοξον should give us pause. D. Gutas was on-target in recognizing that, especially when dealing with Peripatetic logic, Avicenna's contemporaries were faced with many difficulties, arising from the language of the translated Greek philosophical texts, which forced them to deal simultaneously with the interplay of coincidence and divergence between logical concepts and the terms used to designate them and with the coexistence of three discrete levels of Arabic vocabulary: native (and sometimes literal) usage, the usage of the Islamic disciplines, and the usage of the Greek-Arabic translations.⁴⁴⁹ Gutas also pointed out that the language of the *Organon* was further complexified, in the eyes of its readers, by the fact that the lexicon of the Greek-Arabic translations was not uniform, but "falling into three distinct periods with their corresponding variations." The case of *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā*, in which terms deriving from discrete periods of the translation movement are used to represent different acceptations of the same Greek term, alerts us to the fact that, by Avicenna's time, the existence of three different groups of translations, characterized by their specific lexical *facies*, may not have been perceptible anymore, although the lexical variety they had produced did not cease to be an obstacle for the readers of the *Organon*. It would be interesting to know whether this was already true in Fārābī's time, who died in AD 950 and whose lifetime largely overlapped with the production of the most recent Greek-Arabic translations.

⁴⁴⁹ See D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, pp. 268-269.

The Generally Rhetorically Accepted in Avicenna's

During his youth, Avicenna composed one further very concise *summa*, titled 'U y ū Ḥikma. As it was the case with *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdhiyyā*, this text included a logic, a physical, and a metaphysical section, and its logic section encompasses a global exposition of the premises that belong to each syllogistic art.

In it we find the statement that rhetorical syllogism can derive, on an equal basis, from accepted premises (*m u q a d d a m ā t*), presumed premises (*m u q a d d a z m ā ḥ*) and certain type of commonly known premises (*m u q a d d n a ṣ ḥ ā*).⁴⁵⁰

The example offered for *m u q a d d a m ā t* makes it clear that here Avicenna understood this kind of premises as aphoristic statements from respected authorities, that are accepted by the public on account of the reliability of their sources.⁴⁵¹ On the other hand, as far as rhetoric is concerned, *m u q a d d n a ṣ ḥ ā* were qualified as *m a ṣ ḥ f ū r ā ad-i ā*, or commonly known at first sight, establishing an implicit connection with Fārābī's reflection on the role of persuasion at first sight in characterizing rhetoric, developed in his *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭā*.⁴⁵² The reference to the fact that rhetorical commonly known premises are such at first sight (*f ā d-i ā*) should be understood in relationship with the unconditional employment of commonly known premises that is made in the section on dialectical premises from 'U y ū Ḥikma, which is referred to with the expression *f ā d-i ā w a l s i n n a* beginning of what is being heard.⁴⁵³ What commonly known premises (*m u q a d d n a ṣ ḥ ā*) share in their rhetorical and dialectical

⁴⁵⁰ See Avicenna, 'U y ū Ḥikma, *al-Manṭi q i p. ʔ3ā*, ed. A. Badawī.

⁴⁵¹ Avicenna points out that, if the enthymeme "this wine is cooked, drinking cooked wine is licit, therefore it is licit to drink this wine" is persuasive, it is not because its major premise is a proof or a commonly known statement, but because it is received from the 8th Century *i m ābū Ḥanifa*. See Avicenna, 'U y ū Ḥikma, *al-Manṭi q i p. ʔ3ā*, ed. A. Badawī.

⁴⁵² On this subject, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par vue immédiat et commun*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992.

⁴⁵³ See Avicenna, 'U y ū Ḥikma, *al-Manṭi q i p. ʔ3ā*, ed. A. Badawī.

conception, is that they are not employed insofar as they are true (*ḥa q ḥ*) – *qa* a condition that can be verified or not – but only insofar as they are *m a š h*⁴⁵⁴ *r a* .

What is the profile of the ‘*U y ū ḥikma*’ vocabulary in comparison with the lexical traditions developed in the Arabic versions of the *Organon*? The most common Arabic translation of *ἔνδοξον* in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, *maḥmū* (‘or commonly praised’), does not appear in ‘*U y ū ḥikma*’ at all. The term *m a š h* *thā*trdoes instead appear in ‘*U y ū ḥikma*’, translates Aristotle’s *ἔνδοξον* in Abū Bišr Mattā’s version of the *Posterior Analytics*, in Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s and Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh’s versions of the *Topics*, and in Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī and ‘Īsā Ibn Zur‘a’s versions of *Sophistical Refutations*. *Maqbū lis* mainly found in Abū Bišr Mattā’s *Posterior Analytics*, together with the already cited *m a š h* *māzn ū* the other equivalent of *ἔνδοξον* that appears in ‘*U y ū ḥikma*’, does not have an immediate antecedent in the Arabic *Organon*, but expressions deriving from the same root sporadically translate *ἔνδοξον* in the Arabic *Rhetoric* and more regularly in the *naql q a d* of *Sophistical Refutations*.⁴⁵⁵ Globally observed, the terms chosen in ‘*U y ū ḥikma*’ in order to name rhetorical premises do not seem to have been picked on the basis of their appearance in a specific section of the Arabic *Organon*, but on the basis of a sort of pre-selection operated by the antecedent philosophical tradition, and notably by Fārābī in his *ḡa w ā* and in his *Š ḍ al-Q i y ā s* . Fārābī’s *Kitā b -Ḥiṭā lb*, the only one of his *ḡa w ā* that is expressly devoted to rhetoric, reserves the term *m a š h* for rhetorical and dialectical premises, while the rest of his *ḡa w ā* and his *Š ḍ al-Q i y ā s* prefer the terms *maqbul ā* and *māzn ū* antrespectively for rhetorical premises. However, we do not need to view Avicenna’s lexical choices as a mirror image of Fārābī’s options, but rather as the sedimentation of a collective selection process that had been shared by a large group of scholars and translators working between the 9th and the 10th Centuries: Fārābī himself,

⁴⁵⁴ For the rhetorical characterization of commonly known premises, see Avicenna, ‘*U y ū ḥikma*, *lal-Manti q i p. y ā t* , 13.10, ed. A. Badawī, for their dialectical characterization see Avicenna, ‘*U y ū ḥikma*, *lal-Manti q i p. 27-8*, ed. A. Badawī.

⁴⁵⁵ On *māzn ū* as a translation of the Greek term *ἔνδοξον*, see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

but also older members of the same school like Abū Bišr Mattā and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, people who acted in Baghdad in the same chronological frame, like Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī, and mere contemporary like Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh.

Avicenna definitely made a sustained effort in order to offer a brief characterization of all three types of rhetorical premises (*m a q b māzṅnāū nand m a š h*), so that they could be told apart clearly from each other. However, no attempt was made to pinpoint one kind of premises that would identify rhetorical syllogisms alone, as Fārābī had done in his *Š ḏ al-Ḥiṭā b im ḥis Š ḏ r al-Q i yarād* in most of his *ḡa w ā*.⁴⁵⁶ Indeed, in ‘*U y ū Ḥikma* Avicenna was working in the wake of Fārābī’s *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b awl*, which, unlike the rest of his *ḡa w ā* recognized the *proprium* of rhetoric not in its premises, but in its persuasiveness at first sight: this is why in ‘*U y ū Ḥikma*, too, the individuation of one specific kind of premises as characteristic of rhetoric would have been superfluous.

Furthermore, Avicenna’s reflection did not go in the direction of hierarchizing the kinds of premises that belong to rhetoric, like Fārābī had done in his *ḡa w ā* and in his *Š ḏ al-Q i y ā s* and as Avicenna had done in his *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḥiyā*. Indeed, if Avicenna in his ‘*U y ū Ḥikma* and Fārābī in his *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b awl* could refer to rhetoric and dialectical premises by the same term (*muqaddamā t n a š h*), their treatment of the vocabulary they selected for rhetorical premises was not the same. The terms they employed, *m a q b māzṅnā ū* and *m a š h arā* identical, but, while in *K i t ā Ḥiṭā b awl* Fārābī clearly selected *m a š h* as the standard term for naming rhetorical premises, relegating *m a q b* and *māzṅnā ū* to a subordinate role, in ‘*U y ū Ḥikma* Avicenna placed the three kind of dialectical premises on equal footing, although, avowedly, his presentation of *m a š h* is more extensive than those of *m a q b* and *māzṅnā ū n ā t*.

⁴⁵⁶ On Fārābī’s use of different Greek-Arabic translations of ἐνδοξον in his later works, see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Rhetorical in Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, and to the Topics*, pp. 107-128, *The Generally Rhetorical in Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, and to the Topics*, pp. 130-133, and *The Generally Rhetorical in Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics*, pp. 132-136. in *Fārābī’s Kitāb al-*

The establishment of a hierarchy between different terms that can refer to dialectical and rhetorical premises had been a trait of Fārābī's rhetorical works from early on. His last text that did not include it was his *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* at least as far as we can understand on the basis of its Latin translation by Hermannus Alemannus.⁴⁵⁷ Yet, a relevant difference between Fārābī's *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* and Avicenna's *ʿU y ū Ḥikma* alerts us to the weight that the intercurrent developments in Fārābī's thought must have had on Avicenna's lexical choices: while in Fārābī's *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* the terms used to name rhetorical premises seem to be interchangeable and are never defined individually, Avicenna associates a distinctive meaning to each of them.

Avicenna's divergence from Fārābī on the coordination or subordination to each other of different kinds of rhetorical premises is probably partially explained by the fact that Fārābī's references to rhetorical premises were usually inserted into fourfold classifications of logical premises that are first (*ma ʿ q, ūmlḥā ū ṣ m̄ t š ht, ū andī ma q b ū andī* logical arts (demonstration, dialectics and rhetoric)).⁴⁵⁸ The classification of premises offered by Avicenna in his *ʿU y ū Ḥikma* is much more extensive, including sophistic and poetic premises,⁴⁵⁹ and systematically offers different kinds of premises for each syllogistic art. This phenomenon is due to Avicenna's elaboration of a new conception of the relationship between the different parts of Aristotle's *Organon*, that had finally shifted from the identification of each art on the basis of its characterizing premises to its identification on the basis of the kind of assent produced by each of them.⁴⁶⁰ In this new context, establishing a hierarchy between the different kinds of premises employed in rhetoric must have seemed superfluous.

⁴⁵⁷ On the subject of the equivalence between Arabic and Latin terminology in Fārābī's *Didascalia*, see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Rhetorical Premises in Fārābī's Š ar*

⁴⁵⁸ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b* pp. 18-19, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manti q ʿ-Ḥiṭā b*.

⁴⁵⁹ See Avicenna, *ʿU y ū Ḥikma*, *al-Manti q i p.* 23 and p. 13.14, ed. A. Badawī.

⁴⁶⁰ See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, pp. 6-10. Actually, in Black's account of Avicenna's classifications of premises ignores the relevant texts both in *ʿU y ū Ḥikma* and in *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b* taking into account only Avicenna's *K i t ā b* and his *I š ā r-Ḥ a n*. However, I believe in the importance of including *ʿU y ū Ḥikma* in our reflection, at least on account of its early position in Avicenna's chronology.

The Generally Rhetorized in Avicenna's

Avicenna produced many more *summae* in his middle period (from AD 1023 to AD 1027).⁴⁶¹ Therefore, a larger number of his texts dating from this epoch do encompass a rhetorical section.

The logical section of *Ki t ĀḤbi d ĀḤ* (AD 1023), titled *Al-B ā b-A wā l-Manfiqī* is organized in nine chapters: each of them is devoted to the presentation of one of the arts that are part of the Alexandrian *Organon*.⁴⁶² In this text, the premises of dialectics and rhetoric are briefly discussed, firstly, in the detailed list of premises that can be ultimate sources of syllogisms, since they do not derive from syllogisms themselves. This list concludes *Ki t ĀḤbi d ĀḤ* and therefore the general discussion of syllogism that mirrors Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*.⁴⁶³ Secondly, dialectical and rhetoric premises are examined in the short chapters devoted to dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms respectively, namely in *Ki t ĀḤbi d ĀḤ* I.7.⁴⁶⁴

In all the relevant passages, Avicenna's vocabulary for rhetorical premises is consistent with that of his *U y ū Ḥikma*: no example is offered to present in detail accepted premises (*al-m a q b*) but their acceptance is said to rest on trust (*an al-tiqā*).⁴⁶⁵ Although this is not stated explicitly, such trust must be oriented towards some kind of authoritative figure, the element that had been highlighted by Avicenna in *U y ū Ḥikma*.⁴⁶⁶ Presumed premises (*al-maẓn ū n*) are only described as uncertain, and the example offered for this kind of premises is similar to that

⁴⁶¹ On the periodization of Avicenna's writings, I used as my main reference D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 145.

⁴⁶² In this text, like in many more Avicennian works, the association of arts and premises is precise and explicit, although it does not take place in the list of premises itself, but rather in the following chapters, devoted to a syllogistic art each. Although Black only seems to ascribe this trait to the presentation of premises offered by *al-I š ā r ā t wa-l-T a n b ī* actually, is a further element denoting the homogeneity in Avicenna's approach to the premises of syllogism in his *U y ū Ḥi k a n a*, *-ḤKī i dt āyba* , *š i l p k i ā t t ā n ā j ā* and his *al-I š ā r-lā t t a n w ā h ā t* , homogeneity aptly remarked by Black on other accounts. See D.L. Black, *Logic and Poetics in the Rhetoric of Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Brill 1990, p. 97.

⁴⁶³ See Avicenna, *Ki t ĀḤbi d ĀḤ* 19,1-5, ed. 'Abduh.

⁴⁶⁴ See Avicenna, *Ki t ĀḤbi d ĀḤ* 25, ed. 'Abduh for dialectics, and Avicenna, *Ki t ĀḤbi d ĀḤ* 26, ed. 'Abduh for rhetoric.

⁴⁶⁵ See Avicenna, *Ki t ĀḤbi d ĀḤ* 19,1, ed. 'Abduh.

⁴⁶⁶ See Avicenna, *U y ū Ḥikma*, *al-Manṭi q i p. 33* ed., A. Badawī.

proposed in *‘U y ū Ḥikma*: *he who walks in arms is a fighter* in the first case, *he who squints at night is a burglar* in the second.⁴⁶⁷ The presentation of rhetorical commonly known premises (*al-m a š h*) *ū r ā t* in *Kitā b -H ā l d ī* is the closest to its parallel passage in *‘U y ū Ḥikma*: the same example is used in both passages (stating that a brother should be helped even if he is unfair), and in both cases it is specified that such premises are only assumed to be commonly known in a provisional way (*ilā l-t a ‘ a* *or until further investigation*, in *K i t ā H b i d ā l f ā ā d-i ā*, *or at first sight*, in *‘U y ū n al-Ḥikma*).⁴⁶⁸ Further investigation could change their status from well-known to repulsive (*š a*) *ī ‘* this time in the dialectical acceptance, but would not mobilize the notions of true and false, since they are not relevant for the effectiveness of dialectical and rhetorical premises.

Therefore, the relationship between the vocabulary employed to discuss rhetorical and dialectical premises in *K i t ā H b i d ā l f ā ā d-i ā* and the vocabulary employed in the Arabic translations of the *Organon* is the same relationship that exists between the lexicon of *‘U y ū Ḥikma* and of the Arabic *Organon*. Indeed, when composing *K i t ā H b i d ā l f ā ā d-i ā*, the terms preferred by Avicenna for naming rhetorical premises were still those collectively selected by scholars and translators working in Baghdad between the 9th and the 10th Centuries, including Fārābī in his later works.⁴⁶⁹

Avicenna also remained faithful to the attitude he had displayed in his *‘U y ū Ḥikma* as far as the distinctive presentation of different rhetorical premises (*m a q ḥ īndžnā ū n* and *m a š h*) *ū r ā t* was concerned, since, both in *‘U y ū Ḥikma* and *K i t ā H b i d ā l f ā ā d-i ā* premises are characterized well enough to allow the reader to tell them apart from each other. Avicenna’s desire to attribute a clearly distinguishable meaning to each term was not to be taken for granted, since the Greek word designing all these kinds of premises in Aristotle’s *Organon* was invariably

⁴⁶⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t ā H b i d ā l f ā ā d-i ā* 19,2-3, ed. ‘Abduh, and Avicenna, *‘U y ū Ḥikma*, *al-Manṭi q i* p. 37-8 ed. A. Badawī.

⁴⁶⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t ā H b i d ā l f ā ā d-i ā* 19,8-9, ed. ‘Abduh, and Avicenna, *‘U y ū Ḥikma*, *al-Manṭi q i* p. 38-11, ed. A. Badawī.

⁴⁶⁹ On the relationship between Avicenna’s early rhetorical vocabulary and Fārābī’s lexicon in his *ġa w ā* and in his *Š ā l-Q i s s e* the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in Avicenna’s ‘U y ū Ḥikma*, pp. 164-168.

ἐνδοξον, and in Fārābī's early works, like his *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b*, different translations of ἐνδοξον are used in a synonymic way.

In Avicenna's *U y ū ḥikma* and *K i t āḤbi d ā* however, the author's effort towards clarifying the exact meaning of *m a q ḥ, ūmāz nū ā*, and *m a š h ā* did not reach the point of selecting one kind of premises that would identify rhetorical syllogisms alone, as Fārābī had done in *Š dī al-Q i yā* in most of his *ḡa w ā* in Fārābī's texts, this choice was propped up by the fact that the terms that sufficed to identify rhetorical premises were also used to name the *proprium* of rhetoric.⁴⁷⁰

In *U y ū ḥikma* and in *K i t āḤbi d ā* Avicenna also chose not to establish a hierarchy between the terms that he used to name rhetorical premises, like Fārābī had done in his *ḡa w ā m i* and in his *Š dī al-Q i y* where some translations of ἐνδοξον have a more general meaning than others.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁷⁰ The main term by which Fārābī refers to rhetorical premises is *m a q ḥ* in most of his *ḡa w ā* (see e.g. Fārābī, *K i t āḤbi d ā* I, pp. 20,17-21,3, ed. Faḥrī), *māz n ū n i* in *Š dī al-Q i y ā* (see Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i y ā* I, pp. 510,23-513,14, ed. Daniš-pažuh), and *m a š h ā* in *h i s ā k t i t āḤbi b a a l* (see Fārābī, *K i t āḤbi b a a l* pp. 105,6-107,11, ed. Langhade). I discussed Fārābī's choices in the section of this chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī's contemporary* *Generally Recognized in Fārābī's contemporary* (at pp. 107-128, pp. Fārābī' 130-133, and pp. 134-153 respectively).

⁴⁷¹ For example, while in Fārābī's *Š dī al-Q i y* the general term for rhetorical premises is *māz n ū n* other Arabic translations of Aristotle's ἐνδοξον are used to refer to more specific concepts. Such is the case of *wā ḡ i b ā t*, *n e c e s s* and *māḥm ū d*, *ā r* commonly praised propositions, which in *Prior Analytics* II.27 take up the role of Aristotle's εἰκός, a term that Arabic readers were not able to separate completely from ἐνδοξον because of the *alea* of the *Organon* translation process. Moreover, Fārābī employs the term *m a š h ā* to clarify the meaning of *wā ḡ*, that was bound to surprise the public when used in the uncommon acceptance of endoxastic premise. The same process takes place in Fārābī's *Ḥamsa fuṣū* the text premised to his *ḡa w ā* in *K i t āḤbi y āḡ*. In these texts, whenever dialectical premises, called *m a š h ā* are introduced and defined, the word *dā*, *w i d e s p r e a d*, is also used to describe them, mirroring its employment as a translation of ἐνδοξον in Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī's books I-II of *K i t āḤbi b āḡ*, in Fārābī's *K i t āḤbi b āḡ* the general term for dialectical, rhetorical and sophistical premises is *m a š h ā*, and the expressions *māz n ū n* and *m a q ḥ* refer to subgroups of rhetorical premises. For the vocabulary of *Š dī al-Q i y* see, Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i y ā* I, pp. 551,16-18, ed. Daniš-pažuh, for that of *Ḥamsa fuṣū* see Fārābī, *Fuṣū l t a š t a m i l ā l ḡ i ā m ā n ' a m - š* *f a ḡ s ū ḡ i ā - m ā n t i q i w a - h i y a ḡ h a m s a f u ṣ ū*, lp. 65,1-2, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q - Fi ān r d ā l I* for that of *K i t āḤbi y āḡ* see Fārābī, *K i t āḤbi y āḡ*, pp. 75,6-9, R. al-ʿAḡam (ed.), *al-Manṭi q - Fi ān r d ā l II*, and for that of *K i t āḤbi b āḡ* see Fārābī, *K i t āḤbi b āḡ* pp. 107,12-109,15, ed. Langhade.

Why was Avicenna's approach so different from Fārābī's? The development of Avicenna's *taṣdīq* doctrine probably played a part in it, since it allowed Avicenna to include in his classification of the sources of syllogisms a much larger array of premises than Fārābī had done in his fourfold classification. The *taṣdīq* doctrine also implied a new understanding of the relationship between the parts of the *Organon*. These relationships were no longer oriented by the identification of each art on the basis of its characterizing premises, but rather by its identification on the basis of the kind of assent it produced.⁴⁷² In this light, hierarchizing the different kinds of premises employed in rhetoric might have seemed less relevant.

The place of Sophistics, Rhetoric, and Poetics in Avicenna's *Ki t āḤbī d āly a*

There is one further fact that catches the attention of the reader interested in the denomination of endoxastic premises in *Ki t āḤbī d āly a*. While the order in which logical disciplines are discussed by Avicenna in his *summae* usually reproduced the ninefold articulation of the Alexandrian *Organon*, starting with Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and ending with *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*, *Ki t āḤbī d āly a* stands out because, although it reflects the same division, it alters the order in which logical disciplines are discussed, postponing sophistic so as to make it the last section of logic. No direct and explicit explanation is offered for this shift, but it must rest upon a global analysis of the role of rhetoric, poetics and sophistic in the *Organon*.

In his *Ki t āḤbī d āly a* edition, M. 'Abduh highlights the fact that in this treaty the discussion of sophistic is wider than that of dialectics, rhetoric, and poetics.⁴⁷³ He also establishes a link between the latter observation and the omission of these three disciplines in *Ki t āḤbī d āly a*, where a reference to *Ki t āḤbī d āly a* stands in their place.⁴⁷⁴ Its inherent interest notwithstanding, 'Abduh did not discuss the problem of the order of the *Organon* sections in itself, but the sketch of

⁴⁷² See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, app. 46-101. Poetics in M

⁴⁷³ See Avicenna, *Ki t āḤbī d āly a*, 128, n. 1, ed. 'Abduh.

⁴⁷⁴ See Avicenna, *Ki t āḤbī d āly a*, pp. 184.5-185.2 ed. Daniš-pažuh.

an answer to this implicit question could be drawn on the basis of the *K i t ā-Na ġ* passage he cites, which constitutes the final paragraph of the logical section of that *summa*. As much as the specificity of individual Avicennian works should always be respected and the risk of projecting traits that are justified by the aims and by the context of a given treatise on any other text by the same author should never be underestimated, I think that, in this case, searching for an explanation to the innovative order we encountered in *K i t ā-Hi d* in the pages of *K i t ā b a l N a ġ* is not out of place. The reason for my conclusion is that, although *K i t ā-Na ġ* is also marked by the lack of an individual discussion of dialectics, rhetoric and poetics, which are all analyzed in *K i t ā-Hi d* instead, the place from which the text quoted by ‘Abduh’ is taken, namely the end of the logical section of each *summa*, is one of outstanding relevance. Therefore, the fact that in both cases Avicenna chose to finish his logical *fann* with sophistic must have a shared ground, left unstated in *K i t ā-Hi d* but explained in *K i t ā-Na ġ*, in the latter case Avicenna’s deviation from the Alexandrian *Organon* tradition went beyond the reorganization of the order in which logical disciplines are discussed, and reached the point of skipping three of them altogether. In that passage Avicenna states that by then, i.e. by the end of the sophistic section of *K i t ā-Na ġ* had accomplished the fourfold goal of presenting the method that gives access to demonstrative syllogism (*al-q i y ā s u r ā h*) to true definition (*al-hadd al-ḥa q*), and the method that prevents the formation of misconceptions on both accounts. Thus, in a few words Avicenna drew an outline of the content of the third *ġuz*’ of the logical section of *K i t ā-Na ġ* which systematically discusses demonstrative assent, demonstrative conceptualization – referred to with the expressions *demonstrative syllogism* and *true definition* respectively – and the obstacles that could thwart these processes, again, concerning both syllogisms and definitions. All the aspects of sophistic that do not directly concern these processes are explicitly excluded from discussion in *K i t ā-Na ġ*. Avicenna’s statement to this effect at the beginning of the chapter titled *On the Statements of the Sophists*.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t ā-Na ġ*, p. 175.2 ed. Daniš-pažuh. In this case I prefer to follow the reading reported by Daniš-

By his own admission,⁴⁷⁶ Avicenna did not exclude dialectics, rhetoric and poetics from discussion in *K i t āNba ġlā* because they objectively lacked interest, or because they had been somehow evicted from the realm of logic: besides explicitly saying so, he names dialectical, rhetorical and poetic premises in the list of syllogistic premises that do not derive from further syllogizing placed at the conclusion of the second *ġuz'* from the logical section of this text (devoted to the general discussion of the *qiyās*).⁴⁷⁷ Moreover, brevity in exposition of the knowledge that anyone must possess in order to be part of the philosophical élite was one of the *desiderata* of the friends who had asked Avicenna to compose *K i t āNba ġlā*,⁴⁷⁸ in the passage under discussion, the philosopher refers any reader desirous of further detail on the neglected disciplines to his *K i t āšbi ftā* showing that he did not regard his previous direct engagement with these disciplines as outdated, but rather as less relevant in the context of his *K i t āNba ġlā* as less pertinent to its specific goals.

On one hand, when Avicenna wrote *K i t āHā d* he could not yet avail himself of his *K i t āšbi ftā* as a standard reference for specific bibliographical question that he did not see fit to include in any of his later works. In order to offer a global reading of logic, he was therefore forced to produce a discussion of all the *Organon* disciplines, brief and perfunctory as these discussions might be. On the other hand, in *K i t āHā d* he had already committed to centering his global reorganization of *manṭiq* on the concepts of conceptualization and assent, of which demonstration was the main output, and dialectics, rhetoric and poetics a subordinate – however organic – byproduct. Sophistic, being characterized by erroneous conceptualization or erroneous assent could be opposed to all other disciplines, and could therefore find its rightful place at the

pažuh for ms. *rm*, as suggested by A. Ahmed in his translation of the text. See A. Ahmed, *Avicenna's Deliver* Oxford University Press 2011, p. 140, n. 72.

⁴⁷⁶ Avicenna writes, *verbatim*, *wa-i n k ā hl āūt ' lā* although there is definitely benefit in this (i.e. in mentioning things beyond demonstration and sophistic). See Avicenna, *K i t āNba ġlā* 184.9, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁴⁷⁷ Avicenna discusses dialectical premises in the chapter *F īdā l* (see Avicenna *K i t āNba ġlā*, pp. 118-120, ed. Daniš-pažuh), rhetorical premises in the chapters *F īm al q b ān* and *F āf-tažh ū n* (pp. 115 and 120-121) and poetic premises in the chapter *F īmulā y y* (p. 121).

⁴⁷⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t āNba ġlā*, pp. 1,7-8, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

end of the discussion of all forms of conceptualization and assent that Avicenna regarded as legitimate, while in its traditional collocation, between dialectics and rhetoric, it would have unduly split the homogeneous group made up by demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric and poetics. Within this group, the subordinate status of dialectics, rhetoric and poetics, that do not yield the benefit of sure knowledge, made the pertinence and the extent of their discussion dependent on the context of different Avicennian *summae*: from maximal in *K i t ʿāḥḥ* which also retained the Alexandrian order for the disciplines of the *Organon*, to average in *K i t ʿĤb d ā* which the opposition between sophistic and the other four arts centered on assent is introduced, to minimal in *K i t āNba ġ ā* which a mere acknowledgement of the value of dialectics, rhetoric, and poetics and a reference to *K i t ʿāḥḥ* suffice.

If the case of the order in which syllogistic disciplines are presented in *K i t ʿĤb d ā ly a* , *K i t ʿāḥḥ* , and *K i t āNba ġ ā* illustrates the global process that brought Avicenna from viewing himself as a disciple of Aristotle and a member of the Peripatetic school to assuming the role of reformer and fulfiller of the kind of *taʿlīm* that Aristotle had initiated, it should also warn us against understanding this process as a continuous and monotonic motion, for the introduction of a distinctive deviation from an Alexandrian pattern as deeply-rooted and sanctioned as the order of the *Organon* parts could be abandoned in a following work, while the existence of that very work later enabled Avicenna to entirely reorganize the exposition of logic around his preferred concepts.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁹ This caution would be even more pressing if we were to entirely accept Gutas' understanding of Ğūzġānī's statement in Avicenna's biography on the fact the philosopher copied in the logical section of *K i t āNba ġ ā* the text of *al-Muḥtaṣar al-Aṣġar -Mfīnīq*, which he had composed in Ğūrġān around 1013-14 AD. Gutas seems to imply that, on the grounds of Ğūzġānī's declaration, we can be sure that Avicenna produced no new material for the compilation. Since Avicenna largely drew on his older works for the physical and metaphysical sections of *K i t āNba ġ ā*, this is a likely conclusion, but certainty escapes us, for Ğūzġānī's statement is written from the point of view of *al-Muḥtaṣar al-Aṣġar -Mfīnīq*, that was entirely included in *K i t āNba ġ ā* and not from the point of view of the logical section of *K i t āNba ġ ā* that may or may not been entirely taken from *al-Muḥtaṣar al-Aṣġar -Mfīnīq*. See W.E. Gohlman, *The life of Ibn Sīnā* ŞUNY Press 1974, pp. 74,9-76,1, and D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 112.

Kitāb al-Šifā': Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba

In *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* both the root of the verb *ḥamada* and that of the verb *ẓanna* – already present in the Arabic translation or the *Rhetoric* – are employed by Avicenna, alongside the root of the verb *š a h*, in order to produce the words *maḥm ū*, *dn a š ha* and *maẓn ū*. Even *dā* ' absent from the Arabic *Rhetoric*, does sometimes appear, although not as often as other terms. These words can all be understood, with different nuances, as synonyms of Aristotle's *ἔνδοξον*.

The concept behind Aristotle's *ἔνδοξον* played a role in all of Avicenna's *summae*, since *ἔνδοξα* constituted the premises of both dialectic and rhetorical premises, and, on account of the function of premises in identifying logical disciplines, Avicenna systematically discussed this subject in the works that he devoted to the study of philosophy in its entirety.

In this context, the lexicon of *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* submitted at the same time to the constraints imposed on it by its rhetorical focus and by the goals pursued at a general level in *Kitāb al-Šifā'*: these factors were favourable to the surfacing of a surplus of attention for the technical terms employed for rhetorical concepts in this text.

Mašhūr in Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*

The term *mašhūr*, or *commonly known*, does not appear in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. On the other hand, it is well attested in the Arabic versions of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations* as a translation of Aristotle's *ἔνδοξον*, which had received other equivalents in the *Rhetoric*.⁴⁸⁰ It comes therefore as no surprise that, in Fārābī's *ġa w ā* the adjective *mašhūr* belongs firmly to the dialectical field and is used to name dialectical

⁴⁸⁰ On this subject, see the paragraph of the present text devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

premises, contrasting with *maq b l, āccepted*, the participle that plays the same role for rhetoric.⁴⁸¹ However, the distribution of the translations of ἔνδοξον in the Arabic *Organon* is not reflected as clearly in other works, like in Fārābī's *K i t āḥibā b al-here dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical premises are all called mašhūrā tor; commonly known premises*, and are identified thanks to the specifications *f īha d ī oq tauly*, *f ī b-ā al ör yāt firsta slght*, and *f īzā hl i-qat*, of *im appearance only*, respectively.⁴⁸² Avicenna's position in works other than *K i t ā-Šb i fisā d* sometimes intermediate between those held by Fārābī in his *ġa w ā and* in his *K i t āḥibā b al*: example, in *U y ū ḥikma* and in *K i t āḥi d ā* devoted specific sections to the discussion of *maq b āu tl* and *maznū ā t* (accepted and supposed premises) as rhetorical premises, and to *mašhūrā tas* dialectical premises, but he also quoted what is described as *mašhūr f ī b-ā al ās ā* source of rhetorical reasoning.⁴⁸³

In the light of this shifting background, how did Avicenna employ the term *mašhūr* in the rhetorical section of his *K i t ā-Šb i fisā d*? Although the occurrences of *mašhūr* are not always to be understood in a technical sense,⁴⁸⁴ it is remarkable that, as observed by M. Aouad, they were never employed in reference to rhetorical proceedings.⁴⁸⁵ Conversely, this expression appears frequently enough in *K i t āḥibā b al* to allow the reader to state positively that its sense roughly mirrors that of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον in its dialectical acceptation.⁴⁸⁶ This is especially explicit in the

⁴⁸¹ See the paragraphs of this text devoted to *T h e G e n e r a l l y R e c o g n i z e d i n F ā r ā b ī ' s A n a l y t i c s , a n d t o t h e T o p i c s*, pp. 107-128, and to *T h e G e n e r a l l y R e c o g n i z e d i n F ā r ā b ī ' s R h e t o r i c*, pp. 132-136.

⁴⁸² See Fārābī, *K i t āḥibā b al*, pp. 105,15-107,11 J. Langhade (ed.).

⁴⁸³ See Avicenna, *U y ū ḥikma* p. 13, ed. Badawī, and Avicenna, *K i t āḥi d ā* pp. 115-120 ed. 'Abduh.

⁴⁸⁴ The occurrences of *m a š h ū r* in Avicenna's *K i t āḥibā b al* that are not to be understood in technical rhetorical sense of this term are the following. In IV.1 p. 202,14, 205,6, 210,10, 210,12, 211,3, and IV.4 p. 236,3 ed. Sālīm, its meaning is stylistic, usually with reference to the fact that an expression is well-known. On the other hand, in I.3 p. 15,14, II.9 p. 123,7, III.4 p. 148,7, 150,8, IV.4 p. 240,1 ed. Sālīm, *m a š h ū r* is used in the context of juridical discussions, also on account of the fact that dialectic (and therefore dialectical terminology) were part of Islamic legal culture.

⁴⁸⁵ See M. Aouad, *Définition du concept de loué selon le point de vue immédiat*, in A. Hasnawi, A. Elamrani-Jamal, M. Aouad, R. Rashed (edd.) *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque*, Leuven / Paris, Peeters / Institut du monde arabe 1997, p. 411 n. 8.

⁴⁸⁶ The occurrences of *m a š h ū r* in Avicenna's *K i t āḥibā b al* I.1 p. 6,5, I.4 p. 26,3, II.2 p. 67,4, II.4 p. 91,5, II.9 p. 123,7, III.7 p. 176,8, 176,9, 177,11, and 177,16, ed. Sālīm.

first occurrence of *ma š hirū* in this text, in *K i t āḤiḫā b āl*, where Avicenna, after having contextualized rhetoric within the *Organon* and after having exposed its definition and usefulness, contrasted it with the usefulness of dialectic. By pursuing this outline, Avicenna was following in Aristotle's footsteps, who centered the incipit of his *Rhetoric* on the relationship between this art and dialectic.⁴⁸⁷ Possibly inspired by the last lines of *Rhet. I.1*, which deal with the distinction between the sophist and the dialectician on one side and the orator who favours real means of persuasion and the orator who favours apparent means of persuasion on the other one, Avicenna devoted the conclusion of *K i t āḤiḫā b āl* to illustrating the respective role of dialectic, rhetoric and sophistic by means of a Koranic quote. Citing the sūrah of the Bee,⁴⁸⁸ he pointed out that God ordered the faithful to invite to the Way of the Lord with wisdom (*bi-l-ḥikmati*) and beautiful preaching, and to discuss with other people (*wa-ğ a ḍuim*) with the best arguments (*bi-a l l a t ī h i a ḥsanu*). Avicenna established a correspondence between wisdom and demonstration (*b u r*) ḥ ā n reserved for a capable élite, between beautiful preaching and rhetoric (*ḥiṭā b*), for those who are incapable of demonstration, and between the best arguments that should be used in discussion (already denominated *ğadal*, or *dialectic*, in the *Koran*) and *al-m a š h ū-maḥnt ū dā* the commonly known and praised premises. Therefore, in this passage the link between commonly praised premises and dialectic is not only explicit, but also peculiarly relevant, because dialectic is contrasted with rhetoric, clarifying that, in this text, the domain of *ma š h* does not extend over both arts like it did in Fārābī's *K i t āḤiḫā b āl*

The form taken by the relationship between rhetorical and dialectical premises in *K i t ā b ā l Ḥiṭā b* is directly explored by Avicenna in III.7, a chapter aptly titled *On the Difference Between Dialectical and Rhetorical Premises and on Giving Species that are Useful for Assents with their Types*. Avicenna begins by characterizing dialectical premises as always commonly known (*m a š h*), *ū r a*

⁴⁸⁷ See *Rhet. I.1* 1354a1-6.

⁴⁸⁸ See *Kor. XVI.125*.

although they may not find place in popular opinion (*ẓann li-l-ǧ u m ḥ*).⁴⁸⁹ Dialectical premises may also be remote from the conclusion they produce without losing in effectiveness. On the other hand, rhetorical syllogisms have as their premises the opinions of the people (*ẓu n ū n a l ḡ u m ḥ ārr*) commonly praised premises (*u m ū r ḥm ū d, ā*)⁴⁹⁰ which encompass statements sometimes excluded from truly commonly known premises (*al-m a š h ū-ḥā āqtī ḡ*).⁴⁹¹ Moreover, rhetorical premises must be close to the conclusions they produce in order to be effective.⁴⁹¹

This situation, in which dialectical reasoning rests upon commonly known premises (*m a š h ū ānd ārr*) rhetorical syllogisms upon popular opinion (*ẓu n ū ḡ u m ḥ*)⁴⁹² etymologically close to *māẓn ū ḡ*, *presumed*, one of the terms that characterize rhetoric in this – and many others – texts), is nuanced in the following pages. Here, Avicenna states that an orator can be ultimately persuasive even if what he says is not very well known, and does therefore probably not belong to popular opinion (*ẓann*), provided that it is indeed *m a š h ū ā* commonly known. Normally, the fact of being commonly known would entitle a statement to be the source of dialectical, rather the rhetorical, reasoning. Yet, if these commonly known premises are close to their conclusions, like they should be in rhetoric, illustrating their result can suffice to make them rhetorically persuasive.⁴⁹²

In Avicenna's *K i t āb al-ḥikā b al-ḥikā* we never find the phrase *mašhūr f ī b-ā d tawmān* *only l known at first sight*, that had been central both to Fārābī's *K i t āb al-ḥikā b al-ḥikā* and to Avicenna's *U y ū n a l*

⁴⁸⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t āb al-ḥikā b al-ḥikā*, p. 176,7-8 ed. Sālim.

⁴⁹⁰ The expression *m i n u ḥm ū ū d an, a f r o m c o m m ū s* employed in *K i t āb al-ḥikā b al-ḥikā*, p. 177,16 ed. Sālim., while *ẓann li-l-ǧ u m ḥ* appears in *K i t āb al-ḥikā b al-ḥikā*, p. 176,7 ed. Sālim.

⁴⁹¹ The closeness and remoteness of premises and conclusions in dialectic and rhetoric respectively is discussed in See Avicenna, *K i t āb al-ḥikā b al-ḥikā*, p. 176,5 and p. 176,8 ed. Sālim. Similar statements can be found in Aristotle's *Rhet.* II.22, 1395b25-31, translated in Arabic in the Version of the *Organon* offered by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, p. 142,18-143,2 ed. Lyons.

⁴⁹² See Avicenna, *K i t āb al-ḥikā b al-ḥikā*, p. 177,10 ed. Sālim.

Hikma and *K i t ā* *Hibī d ā* ⁴⁹³ Rather, we encounter synonymic expressions which, instead of applying the qualification *f ī b-rā al-tō mašhūr*, apply it to terms that are normally attributed to rhetoric in the context of *K i t ā* *Hīṭā b al-ḥikma* *zann, opinion*, or *maḥm ū d*, *c o m m o n l y* ⁴⁹⁴ Interestingly enough, phrases like *mašhūr* or *mašhūrā f ī b-rā al-āreḥ* ⁴⁹⁵ Indeed used in Avicenna's *K i t ā* *Š i f i n ā* *ḥikma* to name and describe rhetorical means of persuasion, but only outside *K i t ā* *b al-Hīṭā b* *for*: example, we find it in *K i t ā* *Q l i y ā*, in *K i t ā* *Ḥ l u r d ā* and in *K i t ā* *S a f a ṭ a a l* II.3. ⁴⁹⁵ This detail shows that Avicenna's desire to lexically separate the rhetorical and dialectical notions of *generally recognized* was specific to the textual aspect of *K i t ā* *Hīṭā b* as it expressed and illustrated Avicenna's relationship with the Aristotelian corpus, and that he did not attach much theoretical weight to it. Rather, it probably served the purpose of stressing the fact that the many *kutub* of which *K i t ā* *Š i f i n ā* *ḥikma* composed, besides offering an intellectual presentation of science, also entertain an active relationship with one Aristotelian text that is specific to each of them, and that clarifying the formal and textual *facies* of these source texts taken individually was part of the goals of each *K i t ā* *Š i f i n ā* *ḥikma*. Accordingly, outside the boundaries of his *K i t ā* *b al-Hīṭā b* Avicenna was not as interested in the niceties of Aristotelian rhetorical lexicon, and did not find it worthwhile to reproduce it, giving way either to the lexicon of other Aristotelian texts as it could be known thanks to the Arabic tradition of the *Organon*, or to a vocabulary more suitable to the systematic presentation of science in all its branches. The relative shortness of

⁴⁹³ Actually, in *K i t ā* *Ḥ l u r d ā* will meet the expression *dā 'f i i ' b-rā al-ḥikma*, *a w i d e s* *instead of* *mašhūr* *if r i s t* *b ā d -r ā ' ḡ l c o m m o n l y* but this divergence is not relevant for the present discussion, for in Avicenna both *dā '* and *ma š h ū r* reserved to the notion of accepted on a collective and customary base within the dialectical domain.

⁴⁹⁴ See the expressions *maḥm ū d ā-ḥasab b ū d -r ā* in *K i t ā* *Hīṭā b* p. 21,8, *zann al-sā m f l i ā d -r ā* in *K i t ā* *Hīṭā b* p. 26,6, *maḥm ū d fālītā d -r ā* in *K i t ā* *Hīṭā b* p. 40,3, *bi-ḥasab al-zann wa b ā d -r ā* in *K i t ā* *b al-Hīṭā b* I.1, p. 46,1, and again *maḥm ū d fālītā d -r ā* in *K i t ā* *Hīṭā b* p. 174,5, ed. Sālim.

⁴⁹⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t ā* *Q l i y ā* p. 5,1 and IX.4, p. 452,16 ed. Madkūr, *K i t ā* *Ḥ l u r d ā* p. 66,1 and 67,10, and *K i t ā* *b al-Safṣaṭa* II.3 p. 84, X, ed. Sālim. I discuss Avicenna's use of *ma š h ū r* in the non-rhetorical parts of the logic of his *K i t ā* *b al-Š i f i n ā* in the subsection of the present chapter titled *Ma š h ū r i n t h e L o g i c a l*, p. 206.

other Avicennian works like ‘U y ū ḥikma, *al-Ḥikma al-‘Adhiyyā*, *Kitāb al-Ḥibā* and *Kitāb al-Nağ* together with their specific goals, made this distinction either hard to attain, or irrelevant.

The absence of the phrase *mašhūr fī bāda* from Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Ḥibā* notwithstanding, chapters like III.7 let us gather that Avicenna’s understanding of rhetorical premises in *Kitāb al-Ḥibā* was not far from his appraisal of the same subject in ‘U y ū ḥikma, in *Kitāb al-Ḥibā*, later on, in his *Kitāb al-Nağ* rhetorical premises are described as *maqūla* and as *maznūna*, (accepted and presumed), dialectical premises are called *mašhūrā* (commonly known premises), but, under specific conditions, some *mašhūrā* can be used successfully to induce rhetorical persuasion.

Dā’i in Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Ḥibā*

The term *dā’i*, borrowed from the Arabic version of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, can be found in the Arabic translation of *Topics I-II*, penned by Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī and revised on multiple Greek sources. Therefore, it entered the Islamic Peripatetic tradition with a strong dialectical connotation, playing a minor and descriptive role in Fārābī’s *Ḥamsa Fuṣū*, in his *Kitāb al-Nağ* and in his *Kitāb al-Ḥibā*.⁴⁹⁶ However, *dā’i* gained in importance in Avicenna’s *al-Ḥikma al-‘Adhiyya*, where it was substantivized as *dā’i*, widespread premises, and became the main term for naming dialectical premises.⁴⁹⁷ Although in later *summae* like ‘U y ū ḥikma and *Kitāb al-Ḥibā* Avicenna systematically preferred the expression *mašhūrā* (commonly known premises) to *dā’i* (widespread premises), he reverted to the latter expression in order to name dialectical premises in his *Kitāb al-Nağ*. In this text, the premises and proceedings that are described as *dā’i* *maḥm ū d fī bāda*, widespread at first sight, can even be used in order to provoke rhetorical

⁴⁹⁶ For a discussion of the usage of *dā’i* by Fārābī, see the subsections of this chapter devoted to *Fārābī’s Use of Peripatetic Translations of ἔνδοξον* from the section on *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī’s Posterior Analytics, and to the Topics*, pp. 107-128, and to *The Generally Recognized in Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Nağ*, pp. 137-153.

⁴⁹⁷ I discuss Avicenna’s use of *dā’i* in *al-Ḥikma al-‘Adhiyya* in the subsection devoted to *The Generally Recognized in Avicenna’s al-Ḥikma al-‘Adhiyya*, pp. 159-163.

persuasion.⁴⁹⁸ Considering this landscape, we could wonder whether, besides being well attested in the dialectical section of Avicenna's *K i t āb f i t*, the term *dā 'i* is also present in its rhetorical section, be it in reference to dialectical or to rhetorical premises, for example by means of a locution like *dā 'i bā d i f' a d ā* *widespread at first sight*.

The answer to this question is negative, with the small exception of a single occurrence of *dā 'i* in *K i t āb f i t* 116. In this chapter, Avicenna discusses the species and the sources of assent that are common to all rhetorical genres. One of the sources of assent discussed by Avicenna are maxims, that can derive from popular agreement concerning law and tradition, and yet maxims may not reflect *al-dā 'i mātkaqa*, *absolute widespread premises*.⁴⁹⁹ While popular agreement, law and tradition are all sources for rhetorical premises, *dā 'i i a f e, ā s t* we know, dialectical premises.

The nearly complete isolation of this occurrence of *dā 'i* in *K i t āb f i t* can be explained, firstly, with the obvious fact that its history in the Greek-Arabic translations of the *Organon* destined it to be only ever employed in reference with dialectical premises, less central than rhetorical premises to the subject of *K i t āb f i t*. Secondly, the exceedingly rare presence of *dā 'i* in *K i t āb f i t* can be explained by observing that this word did not belong to the core of standard Peripatetic lexicon, and, if Avicenna did sometimes adopt it, it was only in reference to the vocabulary of the specific text in which *dā 'i* did appear, i.e. the Arabic version of the *Topics*. Such a reference was only likely to take place in the dialectical section of *K i t āb f i t ā l*

Maqbūl in Avicenna's *K i t āb f i t ā l*

⁴⁹⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t āb f i t ā l* 120,3-7, ed. Daniš-pažuh. I discuss Avicenna's employment of *dā 'i* or *widespread*, in *K i t āb f i t ā l* the subsection of the present text devoted to *The Generally R Kitāb al-Nağāt*, pp. d i n A 227-237.

⁴⁹⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t āb f i t ā l*, p. 173,15 ed. Sālim.

After being sometimes present in the Arabic versions of the *Organon* – but not of the *Rhetoric* – as a translation of ἔνδοξον, *maqbul*, or *accepted*, played a major role in the denomination of rhetorical premises both in Fārābī and in Avicenna’s early works. As we shall see, *maqbul* is largely attested in the rhetorical section of his *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* well, but with a different, and somewhat diminished, purpose.⁵⁰⁰

Like we shall see concerning the term *maznūn*, or *presumed*, the expression *maqbul* is mainly attested in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* III.6-8, which rework Aristotle’s *Rhet.* II.24-26 and therefore review rhetorical argumentative tools. More to the point, it is in these chapters that *maqbul* appears in its technical and properly rhetorical sense, while in other contexts its use is much wider and looser. For example, in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* II.2, when Avicenna analyzes the non-discursive means that dispose the listeners to being persuaded, he states that these devices can concern the speaker, the speech or the listeners. Then he specifies that the effect produced by these means on the speaker is that of making him *maqbul* as far as his speech is concerned.⁵⁰¹ Clearly, in this case *maqbul* cannot be understood in its technical sense, which is proper to rhetoric as an art, for this acceptance, easily applicable to speech, could hardly be applied to the speaker, who is a person and not a statement. Rather, we could translate it as *well received*, *appreciated*.

Other passages in which *maqbul* does not appear in its technical sense are located in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* IV, a book that, like Aristotle’s *Rhet.* III, often discusses questions of style: in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* IV.2 we can read that some forms of apology employed by poets should be avoided since they are *mustaqbul*, *undiscoverable* and *unacceptable*, while in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* IV.4 Avicenna points out that the narration employed by the defender should be attractive and well received (*latī fān*).⁵⁰² In both cases, although rhetorical speech may be the subject discussed by

⁵⁰⁰ The occurrences of *maqbul* in Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* are found in I.2 p. 10,12, 10,15, II.2 p. 71,6, II.9 p. 123,13, III.6 p. 170,15, 171,11-12, p. 174,2, III.8 p. 187,9, 190,8, IV.2 p. 218,16, and IV.4 p. 242,15.

⁵⁰¹ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* II.2 p. 10,12-15 ed. Sālim.

⁵⁰² See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* IV.2 p. 218,16 and *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* IV.4 p. 242,15, ed. Sālim.

Avicenna, *maq* does not qualify this speech as persuasive, and its sense is not logical or rhetorical, but rather literary.

On other occasions, Avicenna uses the term *maqbul* in a sense that, albeit not technically rhetorical, departs from the colloquial acceptance of this word as *accepted* or *appreciated*. This is the case of the usages of *maqbul* that are linked to the juridical background, which used to overwhelmingly characterize this term before its adoption as a translation of ἔνδοξον in the Arabic versions of the *Organon*.⁵⁰³ A relevant example is offered in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba* II.9, in which Avicenna discusses the assents that are based upon non-technical grounds, namely laws, witnesses, the contract, torture, and trust.⁵⁰⁴ Avicenna offers a more detailed analysis of all the aforementioned sources of persuasion in the following pages. When he assesses contracts, he also takes into account their possible rebuttals, which can be found in religious law, in civil law, be it domestic or foreign, or in other contracts. Contracts can be opposed either on the basis of other contracts previously sealed, or on the basis of other contracts sealed afterwards. In the latter case, Avicenna suggests to argue that, since a pact concluded afterwards can only have been reached in opposition with the previous one, the first pact, although originally accepted (*maqbulan*), must have been nullified by the pact that replaced it.⁵⁰⁵ I believe we can agree that the sense in which the first contract was originally accepted is not rhetorical, as no reference whatsoever is made to persuasion, but rather concerns the fact that the pact had been ratified by both contracting parties alike.

In other cases, the meaning of *maqbul* was closer to what its use in Avicenna's previous works would have suggested, and it entailed a clear reference to rhetorical persuasiveness. In

⁵⁰³ On the juridical background of the term *maqbul*, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote* recopie par Fārābī, ou le concept d'Arabic Science and Philosophy, vol. 2, 1992, p.169 in *Medieval Islamic Philosophy*

⁵⁰⁴ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, pp. 117,10 and ff., ed. Sālim.

⁵⁰⁵ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, p. 123,13 ed. Sālim.

K i t āḤḥāba dīl, devoted to the analysis of the deliberation concerning particular things, Avicenna begins by discussing the parts of wellbeing and then moves to the investigation of what is good and what is useful. In this context, he broaches evils that are useful insofar as they preserve from further evils, and he states that it is accepted (*maqbūlan*) by the people that anything which prevented an evil actually produced a kind of good.⁵⁰⁶ The reference to the people (*al-ḡumhū*) makes it reasonable to believe that the acceptance of this statement is of a rhetorical nature.

However, it is in the final chapters of *K i t āḤḥāba dīl* that *maqbūl* is systematically employed in its technical sense of *commonly accepted*, and therefore capable of inspiring rhetorical persuasion. For example, in *K i t āḤḥāba dīl* 6, Avicenna discusses some elements that are common to all rhetorical genres, beginning with species (possible and impossible, existing and non-existing, magnification and lessening) and ending with the means that can produce assent, namely example and enthymeme. A special case of enthymeme that is analysed at length in this chapter is that of the maxim, or *raʿy*, to which more than half of the chapter is allotted. When discussing the propositional character of *raʿy*, Avicenna explains how, although enthymemes that have maxims as their premises also have propositions of the same kind as their conclusions, these conclusive maxims can only serve as premises of a further persuasive enthymeme inasmuch as those maxims that had been used as premises of the first enthymeme are cited as well.⁵⁰⁷ Avicenna justifies this fact by observing that the maxims derived from the first enthymeme – and that should serve as premises for the derivative enthymeme – are not accepted (*maqbū l*) in themselves, but – it can be guessed – only on account of the maxims that act as their premises in the syllogisms from which they derive. It is these original maxims that are accepted in themselves instead. The fact that the persuasiveness of an enthymeme should depend on the

⁵⁰⁶ See Avicenna, *K i t āḤḥā b dīl*, p. 71,6 ed. Sālim.

⁵⁰⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t āḤḥā b dīl*, p. 170,15 ed. Sālim.

characterization of its premises as *maqbul* suffice to show that, in this context, this term is employed in its technical and rhetorical acceptation.

A few lines later, when comparing dialectic and rhetoric on the subject of maxims, Avicenna explains that rhetorical maxims should be taken either from those that are accepted (*maqbul*) by everyone, or from those that are accepted by an imām, or from those that seem accepted concerning changeable things, while what is presumed concerning eternal things belongs to dialectic.⁵⁰⁸

The last appearance of *maqbul* in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 116 concerns examples that can be employed as maxims, that is to say *the examples that are accepted and common insofar as they are universal judgements* (*al-amṭāl al-maqbūl as āli r a -h ā lak lā ān* ⁵⁰⁹ *dk*), ⁵⁰⁹ the stipulation that these examples do not need to be truly commonly praised (*maḥmūd al-ḥabqī*), but need to be commonly praised at first sight (*maḥmūd ā t frīa*) ⁵¹⁰ clarifies that the accepted quality of the aforementioned examples is mentioned by Avicenna in order to illustrate their belonging to the field of rhetoric.

The title of *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 118, *On slanted enthymemes that are accepted* (*al-maqbūla*) *in rhetoric, on those of them that are disregarded and sophistical, and on the types of objection*, is relevant to our discussion as well.⁵¹⁰ In this phrase, it would seem that it is the characteristic of being accepted that qualifies slanted enthymemes as rhetorical, while in its absence they would be sophistical: therefore, in the current passage as well, *maqbul* appears in its technical acceptation by helping to induce rhetorical persuasion.

Still in *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 118, Avicenna states that the examples deriving from attributes are presumed syllogisms,⁵¹¹ while, in the next paragraph, we read that some form of

⁵⁰⁸ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 116, p. 171,11-12 ed. Sālim.

⁵⁰⁹ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 116, p. 174,2 ed. Sālim

⁵¹⁰ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 118, p. 187,9 ed. Sālim

⁵¹¹ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 118, p. 190,3 ed. Sālim. Avicenna clarify elsewhere (*Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāb* 116, p. 36,2-4) that both the term *tafaṭṭ* and the term *dam* refer to rhetorical syllogism, but the expression *tafaṭṭ* stresses the role of the

The function of *maqḅū* in *K i t āšib f i s ā* is drastically diminished in comparison with its extension in other works. It is never substantivized and employed in order to name rhetorical premises; yet, its link to the art of rhetoric remains univocal, so that stating that something is *maqḅū* immediately provokes its recognition as rhetorical rather than dialectical or sophistical. Did this happen on account of Avicenna's desire to closely align the lexicon of *K i t āšib f i s ā* with that of the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, known to him in a form close enough to the text witnessed by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346? If this statement cannot receive final validation, it remains a viable hypothesis.

The only other Avicennian text I examined in which *maqḅū* do not make an appearance as rhetorical premises is *al-Ḥikma al-' Aḍiyyā*. However, in this case, *maqḅū* is not even employed in the descriptive role in which we find it in *K i t āšib f i s ā*; this is probably due to the reduced dimensions of *al-Ḥikma al-' Aḍiyyā*, that did not allow Avicenna's conservative attitude towards lexicon to show, an attitude that consisted in finding a new function for terms that had been substituted by others in their previously common acceptance.

Maznūn in Avicenna's *K i t āšib f i s ā*

Like we observed concerning *maqḅūl* and its cognates, terms derived from the root *z-n-n* are well represented in the rhetorical section of Avicenna's *K i t āšib f i s ā*. Unlike *maqḅū* expression derived from *z-n-n* does even appear as a translation of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but the passage in which this happens is completely isolated.⁵¹⁵ If we focus on the occurrences of the participle *maznūn*, presumed, we do of course encounter many passages in which this term is used rather in a general than in a technical sense.⁵¹⁶ For example, when in *K i t āšib f i s ā* Avicenna discusses how rhetorical and dialectical syllogisms belong to the same art, we find the

⁵¹⁵ See *Rhet.* II.25, 1402a33.

⁵¹⁶ Within the perimeter of Avicenna's *K i t āšib f i s ā*, cases in which the term *maznūn* is used in its general acceptance of *supposed* rather than in its technical rhetorical sense are the following: *K i t āšib f i s ā* pp. 21,6, II.5 p. 99,6, III.2 pp. 137,7 and 139,1, III.4 p. 151,1, and III.6 p. 173,7.

following statement: *concerning the tafkīr, you have learned that it is part of a syllogism, and if this syllogism were completed, it would be assumed (maznūnan) that it is a dialectic syllogism.*⁵¹⁷ Clearly, in this case, the attribution of the participle *maznūn* to the complete syllogism does not presuppose that the conclusion that this syllogism is indeed dialectic was reached on the basis of rhetorical premises or by means of rhetorical reasoning. In this context, the meaning of *maznūn* is not technical, but rather close to the standard Arabic usage, which equates it with *assumed* in its broadest sense.

Still, *maznūn*, which already had its place as one of the key denominations of rhetorical premises in other Avicennian and Farabian texts, does not desert this role in the rhetorical section of *K i t āḥib fī ḥikm*. Indeed, on most occasions, Avicenna employs the term *maznūn* in order to label as rhetorical some argumentative statement or proceeding.⁵¹⁸ A prime example of this tendency is *K i t āḥib fī ḥikm* III.8, the chapter in which the word *maznūn* is employed most frequently by far. For example, when discussing slanted enthymemes and whether or not they belong to rhetoric, Avicenna discusses enthymemes whose slanting rests on their syllogistic form, and he asserts that in this case verbal argumentation cannot certify any necessity, not even a kind of necessity that is merely presumed (*luzū m a maznūnan*), so that the production of persuasion rests rather on the speaker than on the speech.⁵¹⁹

A few lines later, Avicenna states that belittling or magnifying the actions which are attributed to someone is a kind of *presumed argument* (or *al-iḥt i ʿāḥib fī ḥikm*), by which he means that it is a legitimate tool of rhetorical argumentation.⁵²⁰

When the typology of slanted enthymemes reaches the discussion of slanted enthymemes based on signs, Avicenna states that this kind of syllogism is indeed only presumed (*maznūn*)

⁵¹⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t āḥib fī ḥikm* p. 21,6-7, ed. Sālim.

⁵¹⁸ Unless I am mistaken, *K i t āḥib fī ḥikm* passages in which Avicenna employs the term *maznūn* in an acceptance that is technically rhetorical are: *K i t āḥib fī ḥikm* p. 14, II.1 p. 58,5, III.7 p. 181,1, III.8 pp. 188,1, 188,13, 189,1, 189,5, 190,3, 190,8, 190,9, 191,3, 193,6, and IV.1, p. 199,15.

⁵¹⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t āḥib fī ḥikm* pp. 187,11-188,2 ed. Sālim.

⁵²⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t āḥib fī ḥikm*, p. 188,9-13 ed. Sālim.

because it is a second form syllogism from two affirmative premises, and immediately afterwards he clarifies that Aristotle as well meant that this kind of slanted enthymeme is a presumed enthymeme, or *tafkīr maznūn*, rather than a true enthymeme, or *tafkīr ḥa q ḥ*.⁵²¹ In this case, albeit the meaning of *maznūn* clearly belongs to the field of rhetoric, it does not distinguish a rhetorical kind of *tafkīr* from a different, logical, kind of *tafkīr*, for the term *tafkīr* itself always entails an explicit reference to rhetoric.

In the same chapter, Avicenna also states that the examples deriving from attributes are presumed syllogisms,⁵²² while, in the next paragraph, we read that some form of misunderstanding is essential to the effectiveness of examples deriving from syllogisms, and that the way in which this misunderstanding is dealt with makes them either rhetoric or syllogistic proceedings. In his context, Avicenna states that, if sophistic things were presumed and accepted (*maznūna maq bla*), then they would be rhetoric, and that in rhetoric it is not reprehensible to use presumed enthymemes by taking in an absolute sense what is not actually stated in an absolute sense.⁵²³ This occurrence of *maznūn* is especially relevant, for, together with *maq bl,ūt* clearly plays the role of discriminating between sophistic and rhetorical arguments: sophistic arguments that are also presumed and accepted (*maznūna maq bla*) are indeed rhetoric on account of this very qualification.

Finally, Avicenna states that the information that he has proposed concerning the presumed species (*al-anwā ' -maʿnīl ū h*) which are effective against both contraries is enough to equip the reader of *K i t ḥibā b* on the subject of contradictions.⁵²⁴

⁵²¹ See Avicenna, *K i t ḥibā b*, p. 189,1-5 ed. Sālim.

⁵²² See Avicenna, *K i t ḥibā b*, p. 190,3 ed. Sālim. Avicenna clarify elsewhere (*K i t ḥibā b*, p. 36,2-4) that both the term *t a f* and the term *ḍa m* refer to rhetorical syllogism, but the expression *t a f* stresses the role of the middle term, while the expression *ḍa m* underlines the fact in rhetorical syllogism one of the premises can be hidden. *T a f* is the translation of Aristotle's ἐνθύμημα that we find in the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric* found in ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, while *ḍa m*, although less attested in the Arabic versions of the *Organon*, was established as the standard term for rhetorical syllogism in Avicenna's time.

⁵²³ See Avicenna, *K i t ḥibā b*, p. 190,8-9 ed. Sālim.

⁵²⁴ See Avicenna, *K i t ḥibā b*, p. 191,3 ed. Sālim.

After the conclusion of the presentation of slanted enthymemes, the second part of *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b III.8* is spent discussing the sources from which enthymemes in general can derive,⁵²⁵ namely necessary things or generally admitted views (*al-w ā ḡ i wa-lāyīti al-a r ā-maḥmaūlā*), examples (called *al-burhānāt* in this context), necessary signs (*al-d a*) and non-necessary signs (*al-rusūm*).⁵²⁶ The aforementioned sources for enthymemes are analysed in more detail in the following lines, with a systematic focus on the means of contradicting them. When the discussion turns to examples, Avicenna makes two points: that examples can only be contradicted effectively by means of other examples, and that a specific kind of examples – namely those that do not rest on the examination of one single case, but of many or all the particular cases that are relevant to one universal statement concerning one genus⁵²⁷ – can be either accepted, or contradicted in two different ways.⁵²⁸ The first strategy consists in undermining the pertinence of the example for the conclusion that the orator wants to reach, while the second strategy works by showing that the assent to the exemplar statement had not been granted on rhetorical grounds, and that, therefore, such statement was not persuasive.

All along chapter III.8, the participle *mazn ū nis* regularly employed in order to characterize syllogisms, premises, and argumentative proceedings as rhetorical, and this happens frequently for the occurrences of *mazn ū nis* that take place outside the boundaries of *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b III.8* as well.⁵²⁹ Moreover, as we have already observed, it is sometimes the case that the

⁵²⁵ In this case, Avicenna refers to rhetorical enthymemes by the term *taf kaṭṭar thān da mā* which is very pertinent, for if we consider the distinction between these expressions as it is described in *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b III.8*, p. 36,2-4, we can observe that, while both *taf kaṭṭar thān da mā* refer to rhetoric syllogism, the first one stresses the fact that it is characterized by a certain kind of middle terms, while the second one refers to the condensed form of enthymemes.

⁵²⁶ On this subject, see Avicenna, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b III.8*, p. 191,17-192,2 ed. Sālim.

⁵²⁷ On this type of induction, see *Rhet.* I.2, 1357b25 ff.

⁵²⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b III.8*, p. 193,6 ed. Sālim.

⁵²⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b III.8*, p. 1,4, II.1 p. 58,5, III.7 p. 181,1, IV.1 p. 199,15 ed. Sālim.

aforementioned argumentative proceedings are said to be rhetorical precisely on account of the fact that they have also been qualified with the attribute *mazn ū*⁵³⁰.

Does the role played by *mazn ū* in characterizing logical tools as rhetorical extend to the denomination of rhetorical premises, which did constitute the *proprium* of rhetoric in many of Fārābī's texts?

Two passages from the first book of *K i t āḥḥā b* could be understood in this sense, although it is not entirely clear whether they actually refer to rhetorical premises.

In *K i t āḥḥā b*, after discussing the usefulness of rhetoric and the place of opposites in rhetoric and dialectic, Avicenna takes on the place of real and apparent persuasion, arguing that they both belong to rhetoric, while apparent dialectic loses its status as such to become sophistic. In this context, Avicenna makes the fundamental point that, like the real dialectical syllogism is mirrored by a kind of syllogism that is dialectical by analogy only, in rhetorical speech we find both what is persuasive because it is itself taken from the presumed things that are used in rhetoric (*min al-mazn ū n ā-t u s a t l a ' a-ḥiṭāf bī*⁵³¹) and what is not, by itself, persuasive, but is assimilated (*m u š a*) on account of its name, appearance, or on other grounds already presented in *K i t ā-Safsataa*. Indeed, the expression *min al-mazn ū n ā-t a l m u s m a a l ' a-ḥiṭāf bī* could be understood to refer to syllogisms that derive from a kind of premises called *mazn ū n ā* presumed premises, but the preposition *min* could be partitive with no less likelihood than it could mark the origin of these syllogisms. In this case, Avicenna's phrase should be translated as *what is persuasive because it is one of the presumed things that are used in rhetoric*, which would not alter the global meaning of our passage. The analogy involving the contraposition between real and apparent rhetorical persuasion on the one hand and the

⁵³⁰ I think that clear examples of this case can be found in Avicenna, *K i t āḥḥā b*, p. 1,4, II.1 p. 58,5, III.8 p. 190,8, and IV.1 p. 199,15 ed. Sālim.

⁵³¹ See Avicenna, *K i t āḥḥā b*, p. 25,15 ed. Sālim.

contraposition between real dialectical syllogism and assimilated dialectical syllogism on the other hand makes the partitive understanding of *min al-maẓn ū nna* more likely, since no reference to premises is made for dialectical argumentations.

K i t aḥḥā b aḥ begins with the discussion of the last kind of enthymeme, grounded on premises that are as likely as their contraries, while the previous eight kinds had already been examined in *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ*.⁵³² Avicenna explains that, although both a statement and its contrary can be reached on the basis of this kind of premises, no assent can be reached on the basis of premises that, besides being equally probable, are also equally presumed (*m u t a s ā-w i n f a ḥ ḥ a n n*), because in that case our intellect would not incline towards any of the possible conclusions. When the premises from which enthymemes derive are equally probable, they also need to be true for the most part (*aḥḥā*), and therefore presumed (*maẓn ū n fa-inna-h u m ā l a m t a k u n ḥ a ḥ ḥ a n n*), *l a m y a k b a t t a t a n*, or *anid ihdaed, here, as long as they are not mostly true and presumed premises, there will be no inclination of the soul at all*. In this case, the fact that the qualification *maẓn ū n* is attributed to rhetorical premises is beyond doubt, since the discussion bears precisely on the nature of the premises of the ninth kind of enthymeme. Still, even here, *maẓn ū n* is not substantivized in order to refer to rhetorical premises alone and on its own merits. Rather, its role is to characterize the expression *aḥḥā* in terms of the understanding of rhetorical premises that Fārābī and Avicenna had developed on the basis of the concepts of *ḥ a n n*, *opinion*, and of persuasion that acts at first sight (*f i b ā d ḥ i ḥ*). Thus, Avicenna layered the opinion-centered view of rhetoric born in Fārābī's *Š a ḥ ḥ a l - Q i y o s* over the rather objective interpretation of Aristotle's εἰκός and ἔνδοξον that emerges from *Prior Analytics* II.27,⁵³³ where εἰκός is glossed with the phrases πρότασις ἔνδοξος, *generally accepted proposition*, and ὁ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἴσασιν οὕτω γινόμενον ἢ μὴ γινόμενον ἢ ὄν ἢ μὴ ὄν, *what men know to happen or not*

⁵³² See Avicenna, *K i t aḥḥā b aḥ* | p. 45,11-46,2 ed. Sālim.

⁵³³ See *Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a4.

to happen, to be or not to be, for the most part such and such.⁵³⁴ The expression used in order to convey the sense of the Greek ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, or *for the most part*, was already *‘a l -ākṭar* in the Arabic version of the *Organon* attested by ms. *Parisinus Arabus 2346*.⁵³⁵

As a global appraisal of Avicenna’s employment of *mazn ū* within the rhetorical section of his *K i t āṣbi fitāis* undeniable that, although this term did still belong to the specifically rhetoric vocabulary, and that, as such, it sufficed in order to characterize a concept or a statement as rhetorical, it had lost the central place that it held in this context in works like *‘U y ū n al-Ḥikma* and *K i t āḤbi d āḥy d* that it would occupy again in *K i t āNajā taw*. Here, together with the cognates of *m a q līt ūds* the standard expression for naming rhetorical premises. If the brevity of *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḥyā* did not constitute an obstacle to the establishing a conclusive comparison, it would be tempting to place side by side this text and Avicenna’s *K i t āḤā b āal*, since in both cases expressions like *m a q l ānd māzn ū* are neglected, while *maḥm ū* is the only term left in order to refer to rhetorical premises.

Maḥmūd in Avicenna’s *K i t āḤbi t ā l b a*

The place of *maḥm ū* *for commonly praised*, as the main translation for ἔνδοξον in the Arabic versions of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Prior Analytics* established it as a prime candidate for a major role in the vocabulary of *K i t āḤā b āal* this is all the more true on account of the disposition, proper to each section in the logical part of *K i t āṣbi fitāis* integrate at some level most of the technical lexicon that characterized the corresponding section of the Alexandrian *Organon*.

However, *maḥm ū* had also been used as a translation of ἔνδοξον in texts where ἔνδοξα mainly represented the source of dialectical syllogisms, such as Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh’s *Topics VIII* (alongside the translation of ἔνδοξον as *m a š hoū* *commonly known*) and the *n a q l āf a d ī m*

⁵³⁴ On the subject of Fārābī’s understanding of *zann* as one the concepts that structure rhetorical thought, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ’ A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é s v u e i n m é d i a t e F c o m m u n i , b i , o u* in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 170-171.

⁵³⁵ See *K i t ā l ā b n ā l q ā l l i i i 27*, p. 408,5 ed. Jaber.

Sophistical Refutations (together with some cognates of the verb *zanna*, to presume).⁵³⁶ In itself, this is in keeping with Aristotle's use of ἔνδοξον both in rhetoric and in dialectic, but it did harbour potential sources of confusion for Arabic readers, who did not find this equivalence systematically respected in the translations of the *Organon*, and who did at times assume that every syllogistic art had to be characterized by a specific type of premises. Yet, the background element that requires the most consideration and that played the largest role in shaping the meaning of *maḥm ū* within Avicenna's *K i t ā-Hikma* is the fact that *maḥm ū* had also been used to translate the term εἰκός, or *probable*, in *Prior Analytics*, while in the *Arabic Rhetoric* εἰκός had been translated as *wā ḡ* (*inebessary*), *ḥaqq* (*right*), *ṣā d* (*itrupe*) or their cognates.⁵³⁷

The status of *maḥm ū* already had an important place in *al-Hikma al-' Aḍiyyā*, where it was the only ἔνδοξον translation retained by Avicenna of the many terms already employed by Fārābī in his rhetorical writings (*m a q , b m ū a l š h a m ū d r d ā*), and it also appeared in passages in which Aristotle discussed εἰκός. However, it did not appear in this sense in later Avicennian texts like *U y ū ḥ i k m a* and *K i t ā-Hikma* and it will appear as a translation of ἔνδοξον in *K i t ā-Najāt* .l
Conversely, in the rhetorical section of *K i t ā-Hikma* , is prominent and reminiscent of that played by *maḥm ū* in *al-Hikma al-' Aḍiyyā*.

Of the many occurrences of *maḥm ū* in *K i t ā-Hikma* most can be understood as technical terms.⁵³⁹ As observed by Aouad, there is in this text an acceptance of *maḥm ū* that

⁵³⁶ For more detail on the Arabic equivalents of ἔνδοξον, see the paragraph of this text devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

⁵³⁷ For more detail on how εἰκός was translated into Arabic, see the paragraph of the present text devoted to *The Probable in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 71-73.

⁵³⁸ Passages of *K i t ā-Hikma* in which *maḥm ū* is used in order to refer to moral and religious obligations: I.3 p. 16.2, II.1 p. 59,15, 62,12, II.4, p. 84,5, III.4, p. 86,3, p. 92,13, III.4, p. 154,15, and IV.4, p. 242,15-16.

⁵³⁹ In *K i t ā-Hikma* , the only occurrence of *maḥm ū* that seems clearly non-technical to me is located in IV.1, p. 206,13, in which it is said that figurative expressions that can be used in rhetoric need to be gentle, recognized (*m a ū ḥ* and well-known (*maḥm ū ḡ*). Here, *maḥm ū* is more or less a synonym of the neighbouring *m a ū ḥ*.

refers to moral and religious obligations, and that is especially relevant for epideictic rhetoric.⁵⁴⁰ When *maḥm ū* is used in this sense, it is often coupled with its contrary, *maḍm ū* *noḥ*, *blamable*. For example, in *K i t ʿAḥbā b ʿAb* Avicenna explains how the orator is sometimes supposed to discuss the existence or the non-existence of something, and sometimes to evaluate it on the basis of the aims of the relevant rhetorical genre, namely justice and injustice for judicial rhetoric, usefulness and harmfulness for deliberative rhetoric, praise and blame for epideictic rhetoric. In the case of epideictic discussion, while some things are known to be virtues, on other occasions it is incumbent on the orator to ascertain whether something is praiseworthy or blamable (*maḥm ū d* or *maḍm ū n*)

As foreseeable, *maḥm ū* is more commonly used in this acceptance in *K i t ʿAḥbā b ʿAb*, the chapter devoted by Avicenna to epideictic rhetoric, but it also appears elsewhere.

However, the use of *maḥm ū* that is most relevant for the global analysis of Avicenna's rhetorical lexicon is its acceptance as *commonly praised* (and therefore accepted as true) in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. Indeed, this understanding of *maḥm ū* simultaneously reflects the coexistence of a dialectical and of a rhetorical meaning for ἔνδοξον in Avicenna's lexicon, Aristotle's use of ἔνδοξον both as a dialectical and as a rhetorical term, and the choice operated by Fārābī's in his *K i t ʿAḥbā b ʿAb* where sophistical, rhetorical and dialectical premises are all called *m a š h ū* *oḥ* *commonly known propositions*, and they can be told apart thanks to the attributes that accompany them whenever relevant: *m a š h fū l-r ā d-ir ʿa* (*or* *premises that are commonly known at first sight*) for rhetorical premises, *m a š h fū-halaq ī* (*or* *truly commonly known premises*) for dialectical premises, and *m a š h ū-zā ah i-faṭ* (*or* *premises that are truly commonly known in appearance only*) for sophistical premises.⁵⁴¹ Avicenna instituted a similar distinction

⁵⁴⁰ See M. Aouad, *Définition du concept de loué selon le point de vue immédiat*, in A. Hasnawi, A. Elamrani-Jamal, M. Aouad, R. Rashed (edd.) *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque*, Leuven / Paris, Peeters / Institut du monde arabe 1997, p. 426.

⁵⁴¹ See Fārābī, *K i t ʿAḥbā b ʿAb*, 105,15-107,11, ed. Langhade.

between what is *maḥm ū dī -ḥal q ī aq d* and what is *maḥm ū dī b ā d ir ʿa ʿ* namely *truly commonly praised* and *commonly praised at first sight*. While the first expression – or a synonymic phrase – characterizes premises that are accepted in dialectic, the second one characterizes premises that are accepted in rhetoric.⁵⁴² Although this classification concerns the material side of rhetorical and dialectical argumentation, Avicenna also outlines their separation on the formal level, by stating that the logician can use *maḥm ū dī* employing the conditions of Logic, while the rhetorician can do so by following customary habits.⁵⁴³

As a witness to the ambivalence of this expression in Avicenna's *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d*, even if an explicit lexical distinction between *maḥm ū d ā s* dialectical and as rhetorical premises could be drawn in the terms exposed above, the word *maḥm ū d ā n* also appear in both dialectical and rhetorical contexts without any further specification.⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴² What is dialectically and what is rhetorically accepted are named *maḥm ū d ā -ḥa q fī ā q d* and *maḥm ū d ā t f r i a ʿ b i ā y d i ʿ* in Avicenna's *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 39,10-40,3, III.6 p. 174,3-5, *maḥm ū d ā d ā t f o r m i a ḥ m ū d ā t -ḡ ū m ḥ a n d r a l* *maḥm ū d ā t t ā ʿ* respectively in *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 40,8-12, *maḥm ū d ā q ī q a r d* and *maḥm ū d ā n n i y y* (or very similar expressions) in I.2 p. 7,11-12, I.3 p. 21,7-12, I.6, p. 40,12-13, 41,1-6, 42,2-8, 43,12-16, *m ā z u y n a* *maḥm ū d ā n d* *maḥm ū d ā q q* in *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 2,11-12, ed. Sālim.

⁵⁴³ See Avicenna, *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 42,8-9, ed. Sālim.

⁵⁴⁴ By means of example, *maḥm ū d ī* is used in order to refer to dialectical arguments in opposition with rhetorical ones in Avicenna, *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 6,5, ed. Sālim, where dialectical arguments are called *al-m a ṣ ḥ ū -ma ḥ m ū d ā n a l* order to contrast them with demonstrative and rhetorical ones. In this case, the substantivized participle *m a ṣ ḥ a ṣ* is enough to express the dialectical nature of these assertions. In the same way, in the general context of the discussion of *al-maḥm ū d ā -ḥa q ā q o r* (*truly commonly praised premises*), (immediately followed by the discussion of *al-maḥm ū d ā -m a z n ā* (*presumably commonly praised premises*)), when describing how scientists and dialecticians approach them, Avicenna did not feel the need to constantly qualify them as dialectical, and preferred the bare *maḥm ū d ā n* order to name them. See Avicenna, *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 41,13-42,1, ed. Sālim.

On the other hand, in the rhetorical section of *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* can also be employed in reference to rhetorical arguments (rather than dialectical ones) without any further specification. Such is the case when, while discussing the sources of assent that are common to all rhetorical genres, Avicenna states that *al-r a ḥ -ī n a ḥ m ū d ā*, *or the commonly praised maxim*, belongs to the discussion of the enthymeme (see Avicenna, *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 167,8, ed. Sālim), and when he states that rhetorical speech does not always need to rest on *al-m a ṣ ḥ ū r ḡ ō r* (*very commonly known premises*), but can also be based on *u m ū -ma ḥ m ū d ā n* (*commonly praised things*), provided that they are accepted (*ī d ā q ū*). Since *al-m a ṣ ḥ ū r ḡ ō r* is an explicit reference to dialectical arguments, *u m ū -ma ḥ m ū d ā n* unspecified as it is, must refer by contrast to rhetorical premises, an implicit reference made easier by the fact that it takes place in the section of *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* is globally devoted to rhetoric. (see Avicenna, *K i t ʿĪtibā b ā d* p. 177,16, ed. Sālim)

Finally in its dialectical acceptance, *maḥm ū* should be used in order to characterize the principles of sciences and arts that are not entirely established by demonstration, like ethics and rhetoric itself.⁵⁴⁵

A relevant fact that can be pointed out concerning *maḥm ū* *ḍr*, commonly praised, is that, unlike *maq b ā* and *ma š h* (accepted and commonly known), in Avicenna's *K i t ā* *ḥibā b* this participle is sometimes substantivized in order to name rhetorical premises.⁵⁴⁶ This could be due to the fact that in *K i t ā* *ḥibā b* in *al-Ḥikma al-' Aḍīyā* at an earlier stage,⁵⁴⁷ the sense of *maḥm ū* was more influenced than in other cases by the use that had been made of *maḥm ū* as a translation of Aristotle's εἰκός, or *probable*, in the *Rhetoric* and in *Prior Analytics*, and it is εἰκότα that, together with σημεία, are said by Aristotle to be the source of rhetorical syllogisms.⁵⁴⁸ Otherwise, it could be due to the preference, proper to the logical section of Avicenna's *K i t ā* *al-Ši f fār* the very terminology that was witnessed by the Greek-Arabic translations of the relevant *Organon* section. The role of the equivalence between *maḥm ū* and εἰκός is showcased by the passage in *K i t ā* *ḥibā b* in which Avicenna discusses enthymemes according to their premises, stating that enthymemes deriving from premises that are necessary or mostly true (rather than from premises that are equally possible) rest either on signs (*al-d a l*) *ār* or true

⁵⁴⁵ As far as ethics is concerned, we can see this take place in *K i t ā* *ḥibā b* p. 79,7, ed. Sālīm, where Avicenna states that there is less truth in ethics than in geometry because ethics rests on commonly praised premises (*al-maḥm ū d*), while something similar happens for rhetoric in *K i t ā* *ḥibā b* p. 39,3-7, ed. Sālīm, where Avicenna argues that the discrimination between what is commonly praised for individuals and for a group of people is itself only a commonly praised statement, and therefore not sound enough to be part of the grounding basis of the art of rhetoric. Apparently, its foundation should be epistemologically sounder.

⁵⁴⁶ Some passages in which the fact that Avicenna is using the term *maḥm ū d* in order to name rhetorical premises are Avicenna, *K i t ā* *ḥibā b* p. 43,12-16, I.6 p.45,1, II.1 p.56,8, and III.8 p. 191,17, ed. Sālīm.

⁵⁴⁷ For a discussion of *maḥm ū d* in *al-Ḥikma al-' Aḍīyā*, see the subsections of the present text devoted to *The Probable in Avicenna's al-Ḥikma al-' Aḍīyā* and *The Generally Rhetorical al-' Aḍīyā* respectively, pp. 85-88 and 159-163.

⁵⁴⁸ See e.g. *Rhet.* I.2, 1357a32 and *Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a10.

premises (*al-ṣā d i*), identified with *truly commonly praised premises* (*al-maḥm ū d al-ḥa q iyya*).⁵⁴⁹ Now, this passage mirrors Aristotle's *Rhet.* I.2 1357a32, in which we read that enthymemes derive from probabilities (εἰκότα) and from signs (σημεία). If commonly praised things (mirroring Aristotle's probabilities) are, together with signs, that from which enthymemes can derive, it is not surprising that Avicenna understood them as premises. The term used to substitute εἰκότα in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* is *ṣā d i*, thus making the connection between *Rhet.* I.2 and *K i t al-ḥibā b al* even more explicit.

M. Aouad offers an account of the double meaning of *maḥm ū d* that conjugates its moral and religious acceptance with its epistemological one.⁵⁵⁰ He begins by observing a discrepancy internal to Avicenna's *K i t al-ḥibā b al* in which, as we have seen, it is said that enthymemes can derive either from signs (*d a l*) or from *maḥm ū d* thus, making *maḥm ū d* the premises of a subset of rhetorical syllogisms,⁵⁵¹ while, elsewhere in the same chapter,⁵⁵² Avicenna describes as *maḥm ū d* all the forms of reasoning that are conducive to persuasion (*i q n*). This amounts to stating that all kinds of rhetorical reasoning can be described as *maḥm ū d* which is in contrast with what observed above about the fact that *maḥm ū d* is only characteristic of a subset of rhetorical syllogisms in *K i t al-ḥibā b al*.

Aouad solves this asymmetry of Avicenna's rhetorical lexicon by interpreting, on one side, the commonly praised premises from which enthymemes can derive as moral and religious statements. He supports this claim convincingly and exhaustively by pointing out the moral nature of the examples chosen to illustrate the premises of enthymemes that are not signs, and

⁵⁴⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t al-ḥibā b al* p. 43,12-16, ed. Sālim. I discuss this passage in more detail in the subsection of this text devoted to *The probable i-ḥitā b al*, 175-200 in *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de Damas*.

⁵⁵⁰ See M. Aouad, *Définition du concept de loué selon le point de vue immédiat*, in A. Hasnawi, A. Elamrani-Jamal, M. Aouad, R. Rashed (edd.) *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque*, Leuven / Paris, Peeters / Institut du monde arabe 1997, p. 425-427.

⁵⁵¹ See Avicenna, *K i t al-ḥibā b al* p. 43,10-14, ed. Sālim.

⁵⁵² See Avicenna, *K i t al-ḥibā b al* p. 39,1-3, ed. Sālim.

by pointing out that, when Avicenna offers another and more detailed classification of the possible sources of enthymemes,⁵⁵³ he glosses the term *maḥm ū* with expressions like *w ā ḡānd b r a*, which can also mean *compulsory* and *moral maxim* respectively.

On the other side, Aouad explains that, when the characteristic of being *maḥm ū* is applied to all forms of rhetorical reasoning, its meaning must be different, and must amount to the fact of being praised on account of being presumed true. The fact of being presumed true is the logical starting point of rhetorical arguments, be it said of moral obligations or of facts of any sort. Therefore, the second sense of *maḥm ū* includes the first, making their coexistence by far less problematic.

On a different note, Aouad aptly points out that, while the usage of *maḥm ū* that was standard in Avicenna's time extended both to the matter and to the form of juridical arguments, in *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-ḥikma* the term *maḥm ū* is only referred to their matter, that is to say to the premises of rhetorical syllogisms: actually, it is one of their most common denominations. On the other hand, while the form of rhetorical arguments is indeed discussed in *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-ḥikma*, it is usually referred to by other expressions.⁵⁵⁴ A key for explaining why Avicenna reserved the term *maḥm ū* for the premises of rhetoric, to the detriment of its formal aspect, and to the exclusion of terms like *m a q* and *maḥm ū* could again be found in the fact that, in the rhetorical section of *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-ḥikma* *Š i fāsā* already in Avicenna's *al-Ḥikma al-ʿ Adhiyyā*, the use of the term *maḥm ū* was much more influenced by its role as a translation of Aristotle's εἰκόσ, or *probable*, than as translation of ἔνδοξον, or *generally accepted*. While both Greek terms are translated as *maḥm ū* in different Arabic version of Aristotle's *Organon*, ἔνδοξον is a qualification of persuasiveness that can be readily applied both to the material and to the formal side of an argument, but the meaning of

⁵⁵³ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-ḥikma* p. 191,17-192,17, ed. Sālim.

⁵⁵⁴ Aouad points out the expression *al-r u s ū r m u ā a d l o r* *customary habits*, found in *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-ḥikma* p. 42,9, ed. Sālim.

εἰκόσ, a rough generalization based on experience (also called a moral universal)⁵⁵⁵ is more strictly centered around the role of what it marks as a premise.

By means of conclusion, we could state that in *K i t ā Š b i f t ā e* 'term *maḥm ū*, d exceptionally specialized so as to exclusively refer to the material side of rhetorical premises – to the detriment of their formal side – is more properly understood as the heir of Aristotle's εἰκόσ than of his term ἔνδοξον. By this I do not mean that the Avicennian *maḥm ū* and the Aristotelian εἰκόσ have precisely the same meaning, but rather that Avicenna's concept was elaborated, at least partially, out of desire to give a philosophically satisfying account of all the textual elements of Aristotle's logical texts, including normally neglected expressions like εἰκόσ, variously recast as *maḥm ū d ā, d ō r ā ğ i b*.

Kitāb al-Šifā': al-Mantiq outside Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba

Mašhūr in the Logical Section of Avicenna's *K i t ā Š b i f ā l*

Like in many Avicennian texts, in *K i t ā Š b i f ā l* term *ma š h ō r ā* commonly known, is the ἔνδοξον translation most commonly employed in order to refer to what is generally recognized as an appropriate basis for dialectical speech, be it within or without the rhetorical section of the treatise.⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵⁵ See W.M.A. Grimaldi, *S e m e i o n , T e k m e r i R h e t o r i c , r i n d A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f P h i l o l o g y* vol. 101.4, o t l e ' s 1980, pp. 383-398.

⁵⁵⁶ Partial list of the occurrences of *m a ḥ ū m* in the logical section of *K i t ā Š b i f ā l* in which the sense of this term is arguably dialectical: *K i t ā Š b i f ā l* pp. 4,17, I.6 pp. 51,10-13, 52,2, III.3 p. 157,5, III.4 p. 164,12, IV.4 p. 206,11-12, IV.5 pp. 217,5, 221,18, IV.6 pp. 225,19, 226,8, V.3 p. 258,13, V.5 pp. 286,7-9, 286,14, VIII.1 pp. 395,8, 396,7-8, VIII.3 p. 390,6, IX.4 p. 447,16-18, 448,12, 453,9-10, 453,11-18, 454,2-8, 454,18, IX.9 p. 491,6, IX.11 p. 506,10, IX.12 pp. 507,11, 507,15, IX.18 p. 537,7, IX.21 p. 557,17, ed. Madkūr.

K i t ā Š b i f ā l pp. 55,6, 55,7, 55,10, 55,12, 56,4, 56,6, I.4 pp. 66,2, 66,3, 66,5-6, 67,5, 67,10-11, 67,15-16, I.11 p. 106,8, I.12 pp. 116,12, 116,14-15, II.5 p. 151,2, 151,4, II.6 p. 156,17, III.1 pp. 191,18, 192,7, 192,10, III.2 p. 197,16, 199,14, III.5 p. 225,1, 225,3, 225,7, 225,9, III.6 p. 237,6, IV.3 p. 280,11, 280,13-14, ed. 'Afiḥi.

K i t ā Š b i f ā l pp. 10,3, 10,6, 10,12 11,16, 13,1, I.2 pp. 19,9, 19,12, 19,15, 20,3, I.3 p. 26,1, I.4 pp. 34,8, 34,11, 35,2, 36,1-5, 37,5-8, 37,12-13, 37,15, 39,2, 39,4, 40,4, 40,15-16, 41,1, I.5 pp. 43,8-11, 44,8, 44,9, 44,13-14, 45,9, 45,11, 45,13, 46,1-2, 46,6-7, 47,7, 47,9, 51,6, 51,13, I.8 pp. 72,11, 72,12, 73,8, 73,9 73,11, 74,4, 74,9, 74,11, 75,10-12, 76,3, 76,14, 77,2, 77,4, 77,6, 77,15,

In the same vein, in *K i t ā-Hiḫā b* the expression *m a š h ū r* never referred to rhetorical arguments, not even as part of the phrase *m a š h ū r al-f ū* or *bi-ḥiḫā* 'known at first sight', that had been used to designate rhetorical premises in earlier works like *U y ū ḥikma* and *K i t ā b al-H i d ā*. In this respect, Avicenna's practice in *K i t ā-Hiḫā b* goes beyond D.L. Black's observation, based upon *U y ū ḥikma*, *K i t āš bi f i d ā l-l i š ā r-lā t t a n w a* concerning the fact that *m a š h ū r* and *maḥm ū d* are more narrowly linked with dialectic than with rhetoric. Indeed, in *K i t ā-Hiḫā b* the word *m a š h ū r* is created as so specifically dialectical that it is never employed to name rhetorical premises in the section of *K i t āš bi f i d ā l-l i š ā r-lā t t a n w a* devoted to rhetoric, not even when accompanied by the clause *f i d ā l-l i š ā r-lā t t a n w a* current in other Avicennian works: it is *maḥm ū d* that substitutes for it in this context.⁵⁵⁷

Let us now try to discuss analytically whether this paradigm holds unchanged in other sections of *K i t āš bi f i d ā l-l i š ā r-lā t t a n w a*. This choice depended on the rhetorical context in which it was operated. Indeed, as we will see, normal expressions to name what is accepted on rhetorical grounds were *m a q ū l* and *ḥaṣn ū* in all parts of logic outside *K i t ā-Hiḫā b*, especially in *K i t ā b al-Ġ a d ā* and the standard use of *m a š h ū r* was rather in reference with dialectical argumentations and premises. However, although the sense of *m a š h ū r* is mainly dialectical in all the sections of *al-Mantiq* outside *K i t ā-Hiḫā b*,⁵⁵⁸ the formulation *m a š h ū r al-f ū* which had been characteristic of previous, more compendious discussions of rhetoric, does occasionally resurface in other sections of *K i t āš bi f i d ā l-l i š ā r-lā t t a n w a*, *B u k r i h i ḫ ā b t ā-Safsāṭa l*

79,16, I.9 pp. 82,1, 82,7, I.10 pp. 96,16, 96,18, 97,2-4, 97,15, 97,17, 98,1, II.2 pp. 115,11-18, 116,1-10, 121,16-17, 122,1, II.3 pp. 131,15, 132,3, 133,8, 134,2, 168,17, 186,14, II.4 pp. 136,13, 136,19, 138,14, II.6 pp. 152,13-15, 156,9, 157,9, 158,6, 159,16, 162,4, 163,4, III.1 pp. 165,11, 166,1, 169, 170,18, 171,1, III.2 pp. 178,4-8, 180,17, III.3 pp. 187,19, 188,17, III.4 pp. 193,6, 201,19, 203,4, 203,13, 203,15, 196,6, IV.1 p. 221,4, IV.3 p. 232,5, VII.3 pp. 320,12, 321,4, 321,6-13, 322,3-7, 323,13-15, 324, 326,10-14, 329,16, VII.4 pp. 333,2, 336,6, ed. al-Ahwānī.

K i t ā-Safsāṭa l pp. 5,14, 7,3, 7,12, I.5 p. 35,14, II.1 pp. 57,7, 59,16, 61,5, II.2 pp. 63,8-12, 64,5-8, 65,6-14, 66,3, 66,9-12, II.3 pp. 74,8, 76,10-13, 78,14, 76,10, 81,3, II.4 p. 94,7, II.6 pp. 110,7, 111,1, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁵⁷ D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Brill 1990, pp. 143 n. 150 et seq. in *Method*

⁵⁵⁸ For the normal, dialectical use of *m a š h ū r* in part of *K i t āš bi f i d ā l-l i š ā r-lā t t a n w a* is neither *K i t ā-Hiḫā b* nor *K i t āš bi f i d ā l-l i š ā r-lā t t a n w a*, see Avicenna, *K i t ā b u r d i ḥ ā* pp. 151 and 225, where the term *m a š h ū r* refers to dialectical premises in opposition with *ṣā d*, referred to demonstrative premises, and to *m a b ā d ḥ ā*, referred to rhetorical premises.

Let us firstly examine the case in *K i t āQbi yIā*,⁵⁵⁹ where Avicenna opens the fourth section of *al-Manṭiq* by concisely reminding the reader of the content of the previous section, and by stating that the goals of logic are, primarily, the knowledge of syllogisms – especially demonstrative ones – and, secondly, the knowledge of those kinds of syllogisms that are not demonstrative, but rather dialectical, sophistical, rhetorical or poetical, all of which are described in terms of their specific usefulness. Then the philosopher states that, since the science that investigates a more general object should always precede the science investigating a more specific one, he will begin by discussing syllogism in general, postponing the analysis of the specific forms of syllogism – demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, rhetorical, or poetic – which are mainly distinguished on material grounds. The latter statement notwithstanding, before moving on with the general discussion of syllogism, Avicenna points out that we should reject the association between necessary premises and demonstration, premises that are mostly possible and dialectic, premises that are equally true and false and rhetoric, premises that are minimally possible and sophistry, impossible premises and poetics. Instead of this manner of organizing logical disciplines, which used to have currency in the Peripatetic reflection on the *Organon*, we should recognize that the premises that are proper to each discipline may vary in terms of their truth value and still be acceptable premises of that same discipline, and that dialectical premises must be characterized by the fact of being well-known and approved (*al-š u h r a -taslī*) in a l
sophistical premises by their resemblance with first and well-known premises, poetical premises by the fact of being imaginative, and rhetorical premises by the fact of being – as I warned – presumed and well-known at first sight (*mazn ū m a š h fū b r ā ad -ī ā*).⁵⁵⁹ In this passage, the presence of the term *mazn ū* could lead us to think that Avicenna understood *m a š h fū b r ā ad -ī ā* a l
r ā as its mere synonym, but this cannot be the case, for, in texts like *K i t āHbi d ā* the a , premises called *m a q b ū d z n ā ū t n a ū d t m a š h ū r ā t i l* were presented side by side and u b each was exemplified with a different choice of propositions, thus showing that they had

⁵⁵⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t āQbi yIā*, p. 5,1-3, ed. Madkūr.

different acceptations.⁵⁶⁰ Rather, an explanation for the presence of the expression *m a š ħi ħā rd i ḥ al-r* in these lines of *K i t ā Q b i yā*, sporadic as it may be, could reside in the fact that this passage, like the occurrences of the expression *m a š ħi ħā rd i ḥ* in shorter Avicennian *summae*, is devoted to a global taxonomy of logical premises. When presented in the context of a global classification of the sources of syllogistic arguments, different kinds of premises may or may not be linked to the logical art that they characterize, but this fact can be overshadowed by their distinction on the basis of how each of them is assented to. The expression *m a š ħi ħā rd i ḥ al-r* had the advantage of containing both an explicit reference to the shared social basis that supports the acceptance of dialectical and rhetorical premises, i.e. the participle *m a š ħaūdra* reference to the specific trait of rhetorical premises, that tells them apart from dialectical ones, namely the fact of being commonly known *f b ā d i ḥ*, at first sight. This duality, absent from expressions like *m a q b ā n d ā n ū n wās* in all likelihood propitious to the insertion of rhetorical premises in a general classification of syllogistic premises.

In order to further illustrate this point, let us observe that in ‘*U y ū ħikma*, *K i t ā b al-Ĥid ā* and *K i t ā Nağā t*, the variety of logical premises is discussed within the section devoted to *Q i yā* although not at its beginning, like in *K i t ā Q b i yā*, but rather at its end, outside the boundaries of the rough correspondence between the succession of subjects that characterizes Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s exposition in *Prior Analytics* and in the Islamic philosopher’s shorter *summae*.⁵⁶¹ More in keeping with Aristotle’s text, in Avicenna’s *K i t ā b al-Q i yā* discussion of the variety of syllogistic premises, located in its first chapter, is presented as incidental, and this section of *K i t ā b i f nās* with the discussion of rhetorical means of persuasion, like in *Prior Analytics* II.27.

⁵⁶⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t ā Ĥ b d ā*, p. 119, ed. ‘Abduh.

⁵⁶¹ See Avicenna, ‘*U y ū ħikma*, p. 15, ed. Badawī, *K i t ā Ĥ b d ā*, p. 120, ed. ‘Abduh, and Avicenna, *K i t ā Nağā t f ā wā l*, p. 129, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

In *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣ*, the last book of this treatise, Avicenna reviews the means by which the syllogistic premises belonging to a specific art are obtained, but, although the title of *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣ* depicts the subject of this chapter in very broad terms (*On the Acquisition of Premises and the Attainment of Syllogisms on Each Subject*),⁵⁶² only the attainment of demonstrative and dialectical premises is properly discussed. Avicenna justifies this choice by stating that rhetoric and poetics are of less consequence because they do not investigate universal things, while sophistry, regardless of its universal focus, is reprehensible.⁵⁶³ This is why in *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣ* the reference to the opposition between *ma š h al-ḥaq bān* and *ma š lf ḥā d ir ḡ* is tangential to the main discussion, and it is only meant to offer a term of comparison for the opposition between statements that are *ḍar ū-ḥaq bān* or *ḍar ū-š ubhir a , n e c*⁵⁶⁴ *ḥā s a r y* in this case Avicenna could not have had recourse to expressions like *māzn ū noān ma q b im* or *ḍar ū-ḥaq bān* to name rhetorical premises, because he needed a phrase that could exemplify how the same truth value or epistemological status could characterize a statement on two independent levels: the level of truth (*al-ḥaq bān*) and another level, linked either to the social appraisal of truth (*al-š u ḥ*) or to the immediate appearance of truth (*f ḥ ā d ir ḡ*). This forced Avicenna to punctually select the term *ma š ḥ* in order to name both dialectical and rhetorical premises, both because the ambiguous position of this expression between two different logical arts lent itself to the analysis of their relationship, and because it already contained an etymological reference to *al-š u ḥ* so that it could be nuanced by specifying that the statement to which it referred possessed *al-š u ḥ* truth, or that the belonging of this quality to this statement was accepted at first sight, regardless of what further reflection would produce.

Like in *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣ*, in *Kitāb al-Ḥikm* the rhetorical use of *ma š ḥ* within the boundaries of the staple expression *ma š lf ḥā d ir ḡ*, appears in the context of a general

⁵⁶² See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣ*, sp. 446,1.

⁵⁶³ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣ*, sp. 454,13-20.

⁵⁶⁴ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣ*, sp. 452,16.

discussion of syllogistic premises. In the present case, the analysis of this subject is much more systematic than it had been in the professedly cursory reference in the short digression of *K i t ā b al-Q i y ā*, and it is articulate enough to show that the premises called *m a š h f ū r ā d ir y ā l - a l ġ a y m u t a d* besides being, on one level, premises that do not derive from further syllogizing in their own right, are also to be seen as a type of *m a z n ū*⁵⁶⁵ thus rejoining Avicenna's current rhetorical vocabulary. The coexistence of the expressions *m a z n ū* and *m a š h ū r f b ā d ir ā y* is regulated by pinning down the meaning of a traditional expression for a philosophical concept that had not been selected by the Peripatetic heirs of this tradition (like *m a š h ū* what is rhetorically accepted) by limiting it to a section of what was included in the original concept (Aristotle's ἐνδοξον). We have seen the same method employed, for example, in Fārābī's delimitation of what is *m a h m ū* as a subgroup of what is *m a š h ū*⁵⁶⁶

Finally, in his *K i t ā b s a t a a l l 3*, Avicenna does sporadically use the expression *a l - m u t a š a - t n ū k ā f i b ā d ir y ā* in order to refer to sophisticated premises that derive their effectiveness from their resemblance with what is persuasive in the rhetorical acceptance.⁵⁶⁷

By means of conclusion, I think we can agree that, although this was on no account a steadfast rule, in the sections of *K i t ā b i f h ā* do not have rhetoric as their main subject, Avicenna preferred to describe rhetorical arguments and premises with the expressions *m a q b ū l* and *m a z n ū* yet, whenever the context called for focusing on the relationship between different logical arts and their characteristic premises or on the global classification of existing kinds of syllogistic premises, Avicenna had recourse to the expression *m a š h f ū r ā d ir y ā* as well. This choice was probably inspired by the fact that the phrase *m a š h f ū r ā d ir y ā*, being more analytical than the terms *m a q b ū l* and *m a z n ū*, could offer both a direct presentation of what the philosopher regarded as the specific trait of rhetorical premises, i.e. the fact of being accepted at

⁵⁶⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b l i r d i 4* pp. 66,16-17 and 67,15, ed. 'Afifī.

⁵⁶⁶ See Fārābī, *K i t ā b d i 1*, 1-4, R. al-'Aḡam (ed.), *a l - M a n t i q ' - F i ā n r d i 1*

⁵⁶⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b s a t a a l l 3*, p. 74,10, ed. al-Ahwānī.

first sight, and a reference to the social grounding that supported this kind of acceptance, shared by rhetoric and dialectic. The expression *m a š ḥi lū ā d-ir* thus constituted an excellent basis for the contrastive insertion of rhetorical premises in a classification of all kinds of syllogistic premises, like those that we find in *K i t ābū b ā l q ā* and in *K i t ābū r dī ā* and elsewhere in Avicenna's production beyond *K i t ā b ā l*

Ḍā'ī' in the Logical Section of Avicenna's *K i t ā b ā l*

Within the boundaries of Avicenna's *K i t ā b ā l*, what is generally recognized can also occasionally be called *Ḍā'ī'*, , equivalent for *ἔνδοξον* in books I-II of *K i t ābū b ā l q ā* translated by Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī from the Greek and emended on the basis of another Greek based translation and of a further Greek copy. The term *Ḍā'ī'* appears in the book I of *K i t ā b ā l Ḡadal*, sometimes together with the more common terms *maḥm ū*⁵⁶⁸ and *m a š ḥ ā*⁵⁶⁹ and sometimes alone, but with the same meaning.⁵⁷⁰

Although in the Arabic translation of the *Topics* we also find a lone occurrence of *Ḍā'ī'* in II.5,⁵⁷¹ this roughly reflects the lexical landscape we found in the Arabic *Organon*, for Avicenna massively reorganized the structure of Aristotle's *Topics* II-III, conflating them into *K i t ā b ā l Ḡadal* II, so that Avicenna's text is divided in seven treatises and Aristotle's text in eight. Avicenna occasionally employs the term *Ḍā'ī'* in other sections of *K i t ā b ā l Ḡadal*: he does so twice in *K i t ābū r dī ā* and on one occurrence in *K i t ābū r dī ā* itself. In both *K i t ābū r dī ā*, there is a clear motive for using this word in the given context, for the author is discussing either

⁵⁶⁸ On this subject, see Avicenna, *K i t ā b ā l Ḡadal* I, p. 31,13; I.4, p. 38,15; I.9, p. 81,15, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁶⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b ā l Ḡadal* I, p. 24,8; I.4, 37,16; I.5 p. 51,6, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁷⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b ā l Ḡadal* I, p. 21,5; I.8, p. 72,15, 74,7, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁷¹ See *Topics* II.5 112a5 and *K i t ābū b ā l q ā* 684,11 ed. Jaber.

⁵⁷² See Avicenna, *K i t ābū r dī ā*, p. 166,8 – where Avicenna states that the principles of first philosophy are demonstrative and sure premises, the principles of dialectic are widespread and commonly known premises (*al-muqaddamāt-i-tamāhīl*) and the principles of sophistry resemble widespread or certain premises – and IV.3, p. 280,13, where Avicenna explains that he does not rule out that the definition of one of two opposites could be better known than the definition of the other opposite, within the boundaries of the syllogism that concerns the commonly known and the widespread (*bi-l-qiyāsa š ḥi lū ā l-i-āliyya*)

K i t al-Ġadal or dialectic as a subject. The same holds true for *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma*, p. 173,15, where Avicenna is discussing rhetorical maxims, explaining how they can concern persuasions shared on the basis of laws and customs (*li-s u n n a t i n*). Said persuasions are unlike simple widespread propositions (*al-dā ' i ' mātlaqa*), are grounded in time and space. The employ of a term that stands for ἔνδοξον but that does not appear in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is due to the fact that here the rhetorical approach to ἔνδοξα is contraposed to that which is proper to dialectic.⁵⁷³

Although I illustrated how the term *dā ' i ' mātlaqa* appears in *K i t al-Ġadal* because this is the translation of ἔνδοξον almost invariably employed in *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma* let me stress that *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ġadal* I offers many more terms that stand for ἔνδοξον, like *maḥm ū d*, *ma' aqšb al-ḥikma* or *mazn ū*. My point is more precisely that, in the *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma* context, Avicenna chose to include the nonstandard term *dā ' i ' mātlaqa* into the range of words regularly employed to discuss ἔνδοξα on account of the lexical landscape of the Aristotelian translations he had at his disposal. This is why, with very few and easily explainable exceptions, he never used this nonstandard solution unless his Aristotelian sources did as well.

Outside *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma*, the term *dā ' i ' mātlaqa* is to be found in *al-Ḥikma al-' Adīyā*⁵⁷⁴ and in *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma* as well.⁵⁷⁵

Maqbūl in the Logical Section of Avicenna's *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma*

In Avicenna's *Kitā b al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma* use of *maqbul*, accepted, one of the translations of ἔνδοξον in Abū Bišr Mattā's version of the *Posterior Analytics* and in the *marginalia* to the *Topics* preserved by ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, is well attested outside its rhetorical section too, although, unsurprisingly, it isn't always technical. Indeed, *maqbul* is often employed on the basis of its etymology and in a

⁵⁷³ On the subject, see Avicenna, *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma*, p. 171,10 ff, ed. Sālim.

⁵⁷⁴ See *al-r a ' - ḡā ' i ' mātlaqa* in Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-' Adīyā*, p. 90,3, M. Šāliḥ (ed.)

⁵⁷⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Ḥibā b al-Ḥikma*, p. 118,10 ff., ed. Daniš-pažuh, in which an entire paragraph is devoted to the substantive derived from *dā ' i ' mātlaqa* in order to refer to premises, *al-dā ' i ' ā t*

dialogical context, as a reference to a position that has been accepted by someone participating in a discussion.⁵⁷⁶ The same happens on many occasions in many *Organon* sections, but more commonly in *Kitāb al-Ġāda* and in *Kitāb al-Safsāṭa*, in which debate clearly played a more central role to Avicenna's reflection than in *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣa* or *Kitāb al-Ḥikma*.

Interestingly, and probably still in relationship with its etymological sense, the term *maqbul* could even be used in order to designate dialectical premises, although in cases that are usually less clear-cut than those in which *maṣḥūb* is used. The surprising element of this choice consists of course in the fact that, in previous works, *maqbul* was usually employed to characterize rhetorical premises, often in opposition with *maṣḥūb* specialized for dialectical premises. The relevant cases are not many, but they are frequent enough to be hard to dismiss as irrelevant to the meaning of *maqbul*. For example, in *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣa* *maqbul* is used as a direct synonym of *maṣḥūb* when discussing either-or propositions, called *munfaṣila* (separative) by Avicenna. When Avicenna questions whether separative propositions that have universal antecedents and consequents can be true, he reaches the conclusion that they can because, between other reasons, the truth of prepositions can sometimes depend on a commonly accepted opinion rather than on a true statement. While on most occasions, in this context like elsewhere, Avicenna names commonly accepted opinions *maṣḥūb* when he exemplifies the case of separative propositions that have universal subjects which are regarded as true on the basis of accepted opinions, our philosopher states that the idea according to which either God or man is

⁵⁷⁶ The situation in which these occurrences of *maqbul* appear usually offers ample proof of its non-technical acceptance: this is for example the case of *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣa*, where Avicenna discusses categorical syllogisms and states that, if, like him, Galen refused to draw a distinction between first and fourth figure syllogisms, he did not do so on the same grounds that Avicenna himself supported, but rather because he regarded such a practice as not natural and not widely accepted (*jayr taḥiṣṣiyya* – here the sense of *maqbul* is rather doxographic than logical, exactly like the sense of the adjective *taḥiṣṣiyya* is rather doxographic than physical. See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣa* II.4 p. 107,12).

⁵⁷⁷ The meaning of *maqbul* is said to be non-technical in one of its six occurrences from *Kitāb al-Qiṣṣa* (II.4 p. 107,12), and in one of its seven occurrences of *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* (p. 92) and, on the other hand, in seven of its eleven occurrences from *Kitāb al-Safsāṭa* (I.8 p. 73,11, II.3 p. 125,5, 130,15, II.4 p. 135,14 and 141,10, III.3 p. 190,8, and VII.2 p. 313,12) and in both its occurrences from *Kitāb al-Safsāṭa* (I.5 p. 81,5 and in II.4 p. 94,5).

the origin of all movement is both *m a š* *ḥanūd m a q* (commonly known and accepted) for those who believe that there is only one actor.⁵⁷⁸ The almost constant preference accorded to the employment of *m a š* *ḥanūd* to the fact that, in this passage, the sporadic use of *m a q* does not add a rhetorical nuance to the characterization of the premises upon which separative propositions are validated, but is entirely synonymic with *m a š* *ḥ ū r*

Another case in which the use of *m a q* is quite clearly dialectical takes place in *K i t ā b a l B u r ḥ*, where Avicenna rebuffs the accusation of having spuriously derived a definition from the definition of its contrary in *K i t ā b a l* *ḥanūd* on the grounds that dialectic does not involve the establishing and the invalidation of truths, but rests on the adversary's acceptance of a premise or on well-known opinion (*al-ra'y al-m a š ḥ*). In a demonstrative context the definition of one of two contraries could not be better known than the definition of the other contrary, the definition of one of two contraries can indeed be better known than the definition of the other one from a dialectical point of view, namely from the point of view of what is commonly known and widespread (*bi-l-qiyās ilā -m la š ḥ ū r l-ḥanūd*). Similarly, states Avicenna, many premises can be evident or accepted (*maqbū l* *ḥanūd*) from the point of view of renown (*š u ḥ*).⁵⁷⁹ Clearly, in an argument organized around the opposition between demonstration and dialectic, and on the fact that a given kind of argument is not acceptable in the first, but useful in the second, the premises that are described as accepted (*maqbū l* *ḥanūd*) from the point of view of renown are to be identified as dialectical premises, and not as a sudden reference to rhetorical ones.⁵⁸⁰ Interestingly, the dialectical acceptance of *maqbū l* surfaces in *K i t ā b a l* *ḥanūd* Well, where, in I.10, *mašhūr* and *maqbū l* are used synonymically,⁵⁸¹ and in II.2, in a list of *topoi* for confirmation and invalidation that arches over II.1-2. In this context, the synonymy of *mašhūr* and *maqbū l* is granted by the fact

⁵⁷⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b a l* *ḥanūd*, p. 286,9, ed. Madkūr.

⁵⁷⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b a l* *ḥanūd*, p. 280,16, ed. 'Afīfī.

⁵⁸⁰ Another passage in which Avicenna employs *m a q* in order to refer to dialectical premises is *K i t ā b a l* *ḥanūd* p. 530,5.

⁵⁸¹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b a l* *ḥanūd*, p. 98,1, ed. al-Ahwānī.

that this hendiadys is analyzed in characteristically dialectical terms as what is accepted and believed by people at large, and is certified as being, indeed, what is *mašhū* in itself.⁵⁸²

However, most occurrences of *maqbū lare* to be understood in the standard rhetorical sense of *accepted as a premise of rhetorical reasoning on account of the authority of an influential individual or of a few eminent people*. For example, in *K i t āBbu r dī.4*, accepted premises (*al-maqbū l āre*) cited in Avicenna's general classification of first premises, without an explicit reference to rhetoric, but with the definition that characterizes it in other contexts: *al-maqbū l ā t* are the premises that are accepted because of the authority of one or more people.⁵⁸³ The preeminence of the rhetorical understanding of *maqbū l* over the developments exposed above is attested by the fact that, elsewhere, *maqbū l* and *mašhū r* can be contrasted in the context of a global opposition between different logical arts, like in *K i t al-Ḍbu r h.5*, where Avicenna states that demonstration cannot be developed satisfactorily on the basis of true (*ṣā d ī*), accepted (*maqbū l*) or well-known statements (*mašhū r*), but must be grounded on necessary premises (*da r ū r*).⁵⁸⁴ The same general observation holds true for *K i t Ḍbu r dī.15*, where well-known and accepted premises (*al-mašhū r* and *al-maqbū l*), which are always analyzed in their primary form in scientific discussion, but not in dialectic, are cited in the wake of an explicit reference to rhetoricians, who reason on the basis of opinion (*ʿa l āzan*), and to dialecticians, who reason on the basis of well-known opinion (*ʿa l ār a-ḥayā š*).⁵⁸⁵ Besides *K i t Ḍbu r dī lā n*, *Q i Kytiā*, *s ā, b a l* offers some clear examples of the rhetorical employment of *maqbū l* grouped around the discussion of non-deductive arguments that Avicenna develops in IX.21-24, in parallel with Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* II.23-27.⁵⁸⁶ Finally, at least one case in which *maqbū l* is arguably used in a similar sense is located in *K i t āḠba dī.1*, where Avicenna explains that rhetoric, although

⁵⁸² See Avicenna, *K i t Ḍbu r dī.2*, pp. 115,16, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁸³ See Avicenna, *K i t Ḍbu r dī.4*, pp. 66,7-8, ed. ʿAfifī.

⁵⁸⁴ See Avicenna, *K i t Ḍbu r dī.15*, pp. 151,1-8, ed. ʿAfifī. The term *maqbū l* is used in a partially similar acceptance in *K i t Ḍbu r dī.14*, pp. 111, 17 and 113,7, ed. ʿAfifī.

⁵⁸⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t Ḍbu r dī.15*, p. 225,3, ed. ʿAfifī.

⁵⁸⁶ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Ḍbu r IX.21*, p. 556,9, IX.24, p. 573,12, and p. 574,10 ed. Madkūr.

organized according to the rules of what is accepted and commonly praised (*maqḅū maḥmū*) like dialectic, should not be confused with it, for rhetoric deals with particular issues.⁵⁸⁷

If the presence of the non-technical acceptance of *maqḅū* is not surprising, we could be puzzled by the simultaneous presence of a dialectical and rhetorical meaning of the same term in the same text, but this difficulty can be softened by reflecting on the fact that terms that name logical premises appear in Avicenna under two distinct lights: that of the link between the arts of the *Organon* and specific premises, and that of the classification of logical premises according to the way in which they elicit assent. While the first point of view is always pertinent within the context of a given art – for example when Avicenna is discussing rhetoric and rhetorical premises in his *Ki t ḥibā b a w* whenever a certain type of premises is evoked without the boundaries of texts explicitly devoted to the logical art to which these premises belong, the second point of view can very well prevail. Therefore, whenever rhetorical premises, like *m a q ḅ ā r ē n ā m e d* in a properly rhetorical context, they cumulate their role as premises that are assented to because they are endorsed by authoritative people and their role as premises that are typically associated with this art. On the other hand, when they appear in passages that are not centered around rhetoric, as is usually the case in other sections of *K i t ḥ ḥ ḥ K i t ā b a l Q i y K ā i s t ḥ b u r d a r ḥ K i t ḥ ḥ ḥ* reference to the specific link between each art and its premises is overshadowed by the characterization of *m a q ḅ ā s* propositions that base their acceptance on the ascendancy of their supporters. Potentially, the latter approach lends itself to the employment of *m a q ḅ* in different logical arts.

A parallel for how the understanding of *m a q ḅ* and *n ā z n ū n i s ā s* sometimes grounded in their role as the premises that characterize rhetoric and sometimes in the way in which said premises evoke someone's assent can be found in the comparison between different global Avicennian presentations of syllogistic premises. In some Avicennian works, like *U y ū n a l*

⁵⁸⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t ḥ ḥ ḥ*, 17,9, ed. al-Ahwānī.

Hikma,⁵⁸⁸ *K i t āHbi d ā l-l-ā š h ā r-l-ā t n* by⁵⁸⁹ such comparisons include systematic or at least frequent references to the arts of the *Organon* to which each kind of premises is normally linked, while in other cases, like *K i t āN lā ġ ā*⁵⁹⁰ premises are only classed according to internal criteria, such as the way in which they inspire assent in each listener. In consonance with the variable understanding of *m a q b ānd māzn ū n* sometimes used with reference to the art to which these premises belong, and sometimes to the basis on which they provoke our assent, the classification of syllogistic premises that we find in *K i t āš bi f*⁵⁹¹ occupies the middle ground, since only poetry, demonstration and sophistry are named, while premises typical of all syllogistic arts are mentioned.

Maznūn in the Logical Section of Avicenna's *K i t āš bi f ā l*

In the non-rhetorical sections of *K i t āš bi f māzihū*, nor presumed, is probably the term most consistently linked with rhetoric from those derived from the translation of ἔνδοξον, as it is within the context of *K i t āH lā b dāike maq b ūt lca* can be substantivized in order to refer to rhetorical premises themselves or it can be used in order to counterpose rhetoric with another logical art, be it dialectic or poetics. This is the case, for example, in *K i t āB lū r d.4q*⁵⁹² where Avicenna inserts the substantivized form *al-mazn ū n* *ōrt presumed premises*, in the list of syllogistic premises that do not derive from further syllogizing,⁵⁹³ and in *K i t āš bi 1*,⁵⁹⁴ where Avicenna compares rhetoric and poetics by stating that, if they share a civic function in deliberative, disputative and epideictic speeches, yet rhetoric reaches its goals availing itself of assent and poetry of imagination.⁵⁹⁴ Moreover, while poetical narrations cannot be enumerated,

⁵⁸⁸ See Avicenna, *U y ū Hikma* pp. 10-14, ed. Badawī.

⁵⁸⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t āH b d ā l-l-ā* pp. 116-119, ed. 'Abduh.

⁵⁹⁰ See Avicenna, *al-I š h ā r-l-ā t n* *l-l-ā* pp. 341-363 and IX.1 pp. 460-465 ed. Duniyā, also discussed in D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Leiden / New York, Brill 1990, pp. 96-98. n *Medieval*

⁵⁹¹ See Avicenna, *K i t āN lā ġ ā* pp. 113-123, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁵⁹² See Avicenna, *K i t āB lū r d.4q* pp. 63-67 ed. 'Afifi.

⁵⁹³ See Avicenna, *K i t āB lū r d.4q* pp. 66,16, ed. 'Afifi.

⁵⁹⁴ See Avicenna, *K i t āš bi 1*, pp. 25,8, ed. Badawī.

we can enumerate presumed assents (*al-taṣḍīqā t -maẓn ū*) which here are a metonymical expression for rhetorical proceedings.

However, if the rhetorical use of *maẓn ū* is by far the prevailing option,⁵⁹⁵ it is far from being the only one. Indeed, a less technical use of *maẓn ū* to be understood as that which is approved by *ẓann*, or *opinion*, without reference to any specific syllogistic art, often in the context of a broad opposition between opinion and knowledge, emerges throughout the logical section of *K i talāḥ lā*. A case in point is *K i talāḥ lā dVā*,⁵⁹⁶ where Avicenna offers the statement “science is an opinion (*ẓann*) that does not change,” as an example of fallacy, for opinion cannot be said of science, and remarks that it is as problematic as stating “science is an opinion characterized by the fact of being known scientifically, or by the fact of being presumed (*maẓn ū*).”⁵⁹⁷

The above-mentioned use of *maẓn ū* as grounded on opinion (*ẓann*) does not directly emerge from the technical acceptance of rhetorical *endoxon*, but its homonymy with this concept is not especially problematic. Another employment of this expression is more puzzling: indeed, *maẓn ū* can also be used as an expression referred to the dialectical *endoxon*, in contexts which are clearly characterized as dialectical and which are entirely free from references to rhetoric. This is sometimes the case in *K i talāḥ Safsaṭa*, where, in II.3, Avicenna states that, in sophistic dealings, the goal to be pursued is the defeat of the adversary, and that this is easier by means of what is commonly known and presumed (*al-m a ṣ h ū-l-maẓn ū*) than by means of what is true (*al-ḥaqq*).⁵⁹⁸ A similar occurrence of *maẓn ū* in an openly sophistic sense takes place in *K i talāḥ Safsaṭa* II.1, where Avicenna states that sophists share with dialecticians and demonstrative thinkers a certain lack of interest for homonymy. Indeed, sophists only differ from dialecticians

⁵⁹⁵ For the unsurprising rhetorical acceptance of *maẓn ū* see Avicenna, *K i t al-bi yā* pp. 5,1 and 8.6, III.5 p. 177,13, IX.21 pp. 555,8 and 556,10, IX.24 p. 574,3-10, ed. Madkūr, and *K i t al-bi dā*, p. 10,5-12, and II.3 p. 132,12, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁹⁶ See Avicenna, *K i t al-bi dVā* p. 272,11, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁹⁷ See also Avicenna, *K i t al-bi yā* p. 176,13, ed. Madkūr, *K i t al-bi r dVā*, p. 259,6-7, ed. ‘Afifī, *K i t al-bi Safsaṭa l* II.5, p. 107,13, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁵⁹⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t al-bi Safsaṭa l* I.3, p. 76,10-14, ed. al-Ahwānī.

and demonstrative thinkers in that the syllogism they employ is *mazn ū*⁵⁹⁹. This acceptance is not strictly linked with the reflection on sophistry: we find it in *K i tal-ġ lā dV* III.4, where Avicenna, discussing syllogisms that are used for exercise and therefore based on two opposites, explains that such syllogisms would be fallacious if employed with the pretense of yielding the truth, while a presumed conclusion (*n a t ī ġnā*) derive from a true premise (*ḥaqq*) and a presumed premise (*mazn ū*), from two presumed premises, or from an originally repulsive premise (*š a*) that has been accepted and a presumed premise. The contrapositions, at different levels, between *mazn ū* and *ḥaqq* and between *mazn ū* and *š a* highlight the dialectical acceptance of *mazn ū*.⁶⁰⁰

The last, and most remarkable, occurrence of *mazn ū* with a clear link to dialectic occurs in *K i tal-Burhān* III.2, where mathematics and dialectic are compared on the syllogistic figures they employ, the first in the case of mathematics and a variety of forms, including the second, in the case of dialectic.⁶⁰¹ The characterization of dialectic is enlarged to include its material side and the miscellaneous employment of true and presumed premises, which are referred to with the expression *al-ḥa q ī q l-īmaznwān*

If the use of *mazn ū* in *K i tal-ḥa q l-īmaznwān* can in part be explained thanks to the presence of *mazn ū* and other derivatives of the root *z-n-n* as translations of *ἔνδοξον* in the *n a q l oḡ a d ī m* Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*,⁶⁰² and in *Kitā l-ġ a dV* its relative anomaly is mitigated by the simultaneous occurrence of the more standard expression *al-m a š* (*commonly known*) when this concept is named for the first time in the context of that paragraph, its use in *K i tal-Burhān* III.2 is harder to explain. Since it is very hard to imagine that, in this case, the choice to employ *mazn ū* rather than *m a š* was dictated by any desire for lexical nuance, it is probably better to interpret

⁵⁹⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t al-ḥa q l-īmaznwān* I.1, p. 56,4, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁶⁰⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t al-ġ lā dV* III.4, p. 331,16, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁶⁰¹ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Burhān* III.2, p. 198,11 ed. 'Afifī.

⁶⁰² On the translations of *ἔνδοξον* in the Arabic versions of the *Sophistical Refutations*, see the section of the present chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96.

commonly known premises from which dialectical reasoning is built. Although Avicenna names dialectical premises as a whole *al-ma šāh*, for the various types of well-known premises that he spells out, he mainly prefers the doublet *mā h ma awša h ḥim ū*, that which is well-known and commonly praised. The items listed in these lines are what is well-known in general according to people, what is well-known and commonly praised according to philosophers and scientists, what is most known and commonly praised according to most scientists, and what is well-known and commonly praised according to virtuous people.⁶⁰⁶

However, the mainly dialectical use of *maḥm ū* in the logical sections of *Kitāb al-Š i fāt* are not explicitly devoted to rhetoric seems to depend more on the context in which this term occurs than on its semantic value itself: when Avicenna openly and concisely discussed rhetoric in *Kitāb al-Q i yā* following Aristotle's example in *Prior Analytics* II.23-27, *maḥm ū* is referred to rhetorical premises as freely and as directly as it had been referred to dialectical ones elsewhere, alone⁶⁰⁷ or accompanied by rhetorically nuanced terms like *ma q anūmah ū*⁶⁰⁸. Indeed, this could happen because the lexical value of *maḥm ū* still covered what is common to the material basis of dialectical and rhetorical reasoning, as it will come to light thanks to the perusal of *Kitāb al-Ğadal* I.2, where it is stated that dialectic and rhetoric are united by their usefulness in pushing adversaries towards a conclusion and by their accepted and commonly praised method (*bi-ṭarīq in ma q b ū ḥim ūnd*), but they are differentiated by the fact that rhetoric deals with particulars.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁶ Besides the already mentioned *K i t ā f s ā t ā d . 2*, p. 9,14 and *K i t ā l d ā*, p. 43,8-11, other cases in which *maḥm ū* appears in its dialectical acceptance in the non-rhetorical sections of the logic of *K i t ā b f r ā k i t ā b a l B u r h ā n*, p. 166,14, ed. 'Afifī, *K i t ā b y l ā*, p. 51,10-12, IX.16 p. 533,3-4, IX.23 p. 571,17, ed. Madkūr, *K i t ā l d ā l l*, I.3 p. 31,13, I.4 pp. 38,16, 40,7, I.5 p. 43,8, I.8 p. 74,9-17, I.9 p. 81,15, I.10 p. 97,15, II.2 p. 116,10, VII.1 p. 303,4, VII.3 pp. 320,9, 321,1-2, 323,13, and 329,1, VII.4 p. 333,6, ed. al-Ahwānī, *K i t ā f s ā t ā d . 1* p. 5,14, I.2 p. 9,14, and II.2 p. 64,8-10, ed. al-Ahwānī.

⁶⁰⁷ See the phrase *muqaddama maḥm ū* commonly praised premise, used to describe the major premise of a *d ā b r i l necessary sign*. Avicenna, *K i t ā b y l ā*, p. 557,5-6, and IX.24, p. 573,5, ed. Madkūr.

⁶⁰⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b y l ā*, pp. 573,12 and 574,3, ed. Madkūr.

⁶⁰⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā l d ā*, p. 17,9, ed. al-Ahwānī. An analogous use of *maḥm ū* takes place in *K i t ā l d ā*, p. 14,10, ed. al-Ahwānī.

A similar acceptance of *maḥm ū* clearly allowed for its seamless employment as much when referring to rhetorical premises than when referring to dialectical ones.

Finally, besides being sometimes used non-technically and, on most cases occurring in the logical part of *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma*, *ḥikmā* logical value, *maḥm ū* does sometimes appear in its ethical sense of *praised*, in opposition with its antonym *madm ū* *not blamed*. These occurrences are usually easy to tell apart from those pertaining to doxastic premises.⁶¹⁰

The Generally Recognized in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifā': General Remarks

Since the length of Avicenna's *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma* and the role played by the generally recognized in Avicenna's conceptualization of rhetoric and dialectic made this chapter especially cumbersome for the reader, in the following pages I will summarize the discussion of Avicenna's usage of the translations of ἔνδοξον that emerged from the Arabic *Organon*, and outline the main conclusions that we can reach on this basis concerning Avicenna's attitude towards technical lexicon in *K i t ā b al-Š i f ā ' al-Ḥ i k m ā* general and in *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i k m ā* particular.

Let us begin by reviewing Avicenna's usage of *mašhūr*, or *commonly known*. In the rhetorical section of *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i k m ā* philosopher systematizes the dialectical acceptance of this term, which had appeared quite casually on account of having been the translation of ἔνδοξον in many dialectical contexts, while it was usually rendered as *maḥm ū* in the Arabic version of the Rhetoric. Some of Fārābī's works, like most of his *ḡa w ā '*, *ma* serve for *mašhūr* a space that is as solidly dialectic as that which it occupied in the Arabic arguments, while in other texts, like Fārābī's *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i k m ā* meaningful semantic innovation takes place, and *mašhūr* is be said of dialectical, sophistry, and rhetoric alike, differentiating these disciplines and their tools by means of adjective expressions that are specific to each of them. In his early works, like *U y ū ḥ i k m ā*

⁶¹⁰ For the ethical acceptance of *maḥm ū* in the non-rhetorical sections of the logical part of *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i k m ā*, Avicenna, *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i k m ā* p. 187,6-11 (*nafs al-quwwa muḥt ā r ḥ m ū m*), *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i k m ā* p. 258,2-8 (*al-faḍī l a m a l a k a maḥm ū*), and *K i t ā b al-Ḥ i k m ā* p. 61,15 (*al-aḥl ā ḡ n a ḥ m ū ḍ . a*

and *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma* Avicenna mainly discussed *mašhūrā* *tor*, commonly known premises, as the basis of dialectical reasoning, but he did insert the analysis of what is *mašhūr f ī b-ā d ī y , a d o m m o* known at first sight, in his presentation of rhetorical premises.

In comparison with these works, the solution adopted in the rhetorical section of *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma* is one of radical closeness with the vocabulary of the Greek-Arabic translation of Aristotle's text, for in both texts *mašhūr* is never employed in a rhetorical sense, not even in the fixed and elsewhere very common expression *mašhūr f ī b-ā d* which gets modified in order to rid it of *mašhūr* , producing forms like *maḥm ū d f ī b-ā d*. The comparison with other philosophical texts, where the expression *mašhūr f ī b-ā d* was as widespread as it was formally uniform, hints to the deliberateness of Avicenna's choice in abandoning *mašhūr* as a term whose rhetorical credentials were not supported by the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, and, implicitly, to the meaningful role played by the Arabic *Rhetoric* in the establishment of the lexicon of the rhetorical section of Avicenna's *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma* .

Therefore, its occasional non-technical usage notwithstanding, the common employment of *mašhūr* in *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma* is close to that of Aristotle's ἐνδοξον in its rhetorical acceptance. This did not prevent Avicenna from maintaining that rhetorical conclusion can be reached on the basis of premises that are *mašhūra* in *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma*.⁶¹¹ In this case, the special proximity that he tried to establish with Aristotelian sources in *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma* is lexical rather than conceptual.

Let us remember that the expression *mašhūrā f ī b-ā d* is indeed employed in *K i t ā b a l Š i f rānā* for naming rhetorical premises, but only outside *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma*, whenever the context called for focusing on the relationship between different logical arts and their characteristic premises or on the global classification of existing kinds of syllogistic premises. This choice was probably inspired by the fact that the phrase *m a š h ū r ā d ī y*, being more analytical than *m a q ā n ā l m a z n ū* the terms normally used to qualify rhetorical proceedings, could offer both a direct

⁶¹¹ See Avicenna, *K i t Āḥīd al-Ḥikma*, p. 176,7-8 ed. Sālim.

presentation of what the philosopher regarded as the specific trait of rhetorical premises, i.e. the fact of being accepted at first sight, and a reference to the social grounding that supported this kind of acceptance, shared by rhetoric and dialectic. The expression *ma š h b ā d ir ʿa* thusly constituted an excellent basis for the contrastive insertion of rhetorical premises in a classification of all kinds of syllogistic premises.

Still, the observation that, in the logic of *K i t ā š bi f* well-established expression *ma š h b ā d ir ʿa* used in its standard form in non-rhetorical sections, but was systematically modified in *K i t ā b* should steer us towards examining the lexical distinction between rhetorical and dialectical premises in an intertextual perspective, rather than in a theoretical one: in *K i t ā b* lexical continuity with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is pursued in order to implicitly portrait Avicenna's relationship with the Aristotelian corpus, which persisted regardless of the different opinions that the two authors entertained on specific conceptual points. Indeed, this can be seen as a further effect of the double allegiance of *K i t ā b* to the intellectual presentation of science in all its parts, and to the exposition and explanation of the content and form of Avicenna's books. This point of view allows us to explain why, in other *K i t ā b* sections, Avicenna spoke of rhetorical subjects in terms less close to those of the Arabic *Rhetoric*, for, in each section of *al-Manṭiq*, the relevant lexical antecedent was the parallel book from Aristotle's *Organon*, translated on a different occasion and with a different vocabulary. On a few occasions located in *K i t ā b* for example, the use of *ma š h b ā d ir ʿa* be rhetoric, for in that text nothing pushes Avicenna towards proximity with the lexicon of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but we do sometimes find the term *dā ʿ* widespread, as a synonym of dialectical *ma š h b ā d ir ʿa* account of the fact this expression is found in the parallel passages of Aristotle's *Topics*. The relative shortness of other Avicennian works like *U y ū ḥ ikmā*, *K i t ā b* *H i d ā y ā t*, *K i t ā b* together with their specific goals, made the distinction in the reception of the technical lexicon that was proper to different *Organon* parts either hard to attain, or irrelevant.

As I mentioned above, in the logical but non-rhetorical sections of Avicenna's *K i t ā š bi*, *fi mā* is generally recognized can also occasionally be called *dā ' i ' c*, *al-dā'irah*, the equivalent of *ἐνδοξόν* in books I-II of *A r i s t o t*. The term *dā ' i ' c* appears in book I of *K i t ā š bi*, sometimes together with the more common terms *maḥm ū* and *ma š ḥ a ū* sometimes alone but with the same meaning. This roughly reflects the lexical landscape we found in the Arabic *Organon*, if we take into account the different internal organization of Aristotle's and Avicenna's books.

Avicenna occasionally employs the term *dā ' i ' c* in other sections of *K i t ā š bi* as well: he does so twice in *K i t ā š bi* (I.11.7 and IV.3) and, on one single occasion, in *K i t ā š bi* itself (in III.7). In the *K i t ā š bi* context, Avicenna chose to include the nonstandard term *dā ' i ' c* into the range of words regularly employed to discuss *ἐνδοξόν* on account of the lexical landscape of the Aristotelian translations he had at his disposal. This is why, with very few and easily explainable exceptions, he never used this non-standard solution unless his Aristotelian sources did as well.

Although in previous and later Avicennian works the expression *dā ' i ' c* had been prominent enough to entirely replace *ma š ḥ a ū* the expression for the commonly accepted basis of dialectical reasoning (in *al-Ḥikma al- ' A ḍ iyyā*) and even to generate the phrase *dā ' i ' c i b ā d i f r ' a*, *al-dā'irah* widespread at first sight, in order to name rhetorical premises (in *K i t ā š bi*), *dā ' i ' c* does barely appear in *K i t ā š bi*. Even if the absence of a term can hardly be proof of anything, this is easily compatible with the interpretation of Avicenna lexical choices in the logical section of *K i t ā š bi* that I am suggesting, namely that in each book of this work the philosopher was moved by the desire to interpret and reflect as closely as possible the Aristotelian vocabulary of the relevant *Organon* parts, in the form in which they were available to him thanks to the Greek-Arabic translations.

Let us now go back to Avicenna's use of *mazn ū* and *maqbaū*, ~~both~~ *presumed* and *accepted*. Their many occurrences in which their meaning is not technical notwithstanding, in the sections of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā'ī* ~~other~~ than his *Kitāb al-Hitāba*, the employment of these terms is mainly rhetorical, not just in the sense that their occurrences in this acceptance are more copious than those in which they appear in other senses, but also insomuch as *mazn ū* and *maqbaū* be used as adjectives to characterize something in a rhetorical sense, or they can sometimes be substantivized in order to refer directly to rhetorical premises.

Surprisingly, be it on the basis of the abovementioned wider acceptations, or, in the case of *mazn ū*, because of its historically verified equivalence with Aristotle's ἐνδοξον in dialectical sense, attested by the *naql* of the *Sophistical Refutations*, Avicenna does sporadically use *maqbaū* and *mazn ū* in dialectical sense too, although not in contexts in which dialectic is opposed to rhetoric, but rather to demonstration or sophistry. The acclimation of *mazn ū* and *maqbaū* to clearly dialectical contexts is sometimes facilitated by the establishment of the synonymic hendiadys *mazn ū n maqbaū*, ~~how~~ often *mazn ū n maqbaū l*.

A further line of thought that could explain why *maqbaū* and *mazn ū* could appear both with a rhetorical and with a dialectical meaning in the same text consists in observing how, in Avicenna's writings, the terms by which logical premises are named appear under two different lights: on the one hand, when *maqbaū* and *mazn ū* are mentioned in rhetorical context, they often cumulate their characterization as premises that are assented to on account of authoritative people's endorsement and their characterization as premises that are typically associated with the art of rhetoric. On the other hand, when *maqbaū* and *mazn ū* are named in non-rhetorical context, as it is often the case in sections of *Kitāb al-Šifā'ī* ~~other~~ than *Kitāb al-Hitāba*, the reference to the link between each art and its premises plays second fiddle to the characterization of *maqbaū* and *mazn ū* according to the specific way in which these premises provoke assent in the listener. Indeed, this acceptance of the terms *maqbaū* and *mazn ū* is compatible with their occasional use in a sense that is not strictly rhetorical, but rather dialectic

is not possible to positively validate this supposition, it remains a likely and potentially meaningful explanation.

Another Avicennian text I examined in which *maqḅū ḏ* and *maznūn ā* do not appear as rhetorical premises is *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Adīyyā*. Indeed, in this case, *maqḅū* and *maznūn* are not even used adjectivally, as they are in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma al-‘ Adīyyā*, or to a similar aspiration towards continuity with Aristotle’s lexicon, since in both cases *maḥm ū* is the main term used for naming rhetorical premises.

Finally, let us review Avicenna’s use of *maḥm ū*, or *commonly praised*. Apart from a few passages in which this participle appears in its ethical sense and in other acceptations that are not technical, in the non-rhetorical treatises of the logical section of *Kitāb al-Š i* this term is mainly referred to the proper basis for dialectical proceedings, as a synonym of *ma š h ū r* (*commonly spread*) (*widespread*).

However, the predominance of the dialectical use of *maḥm ū* over its rhetorical acceptance seems to depend more on the context in which this term occurs than on its semantic value itself: in Avicenna’s discussion of rhetoric in *Kitāb al-Q i* mirroring Aristotle’s example in *Prior Analytics* II.23-27, *maḥm ū* can be directly referred to rhetorical premises in the same manner in which it had been referred to dialectical premises in other contexts, be it alone or together with openly rhetorical terms like *ma q ḅ nū m ā z n ū n*.

This shows that the meaning of *maḥm ū* still included what was common to the material basis of dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. My statement is supported, for example, by *Kitāb al-Ġadal* I.2, where we can read that rhetoric and dialectic are united by their effectiveness in pushing adversaries towards a conclusion and by their accepted and commonly praised method

(*bi-ṭa r ī ṣ a q i b ū ḥim ū n d*), *but* they are differentiated by the focus on particulars that characterizes rhetoric.⁶¹⁵

How did Avicenna use *maḥm ū* within *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā*, a rhetorical section of *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā*? In the Arabic versions of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Prior Analytics*, the place of *maḥm ū*, commonly *praised*, as the principal equivalent of ἔνδοξον, implied that it was going to be an important element of the lexicon of *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā*, especially since, in these texts, Aristotle had employed ἔνδοξον in clearly rhetorical contexts. However, *maḥm ū* had also been used as an equivalent of ἔνδοξον in the dialectical sections of the *Organon*, such as in Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh's *Topics VIII* and in the *na q l* of *Sophistical Refutations*. Adherent to Aristotle's use of ἔνδοξον as this situation might have been, it was fraught with potential difficulties for Islamic philosophers, who often based their logical speculation on the idea that syllogistic arts should be characterized by their specific premises. Still, the detail of the *Organon* translations that had the most influence on the meaning of *maḥm ū* in Avicenna's *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā* was the fact that, in *Prior Analytics* II.27, *maḥm ū* was used to translate Aristotle's ἔνδοξον and εἰκός at the same time, while in the *Rhetoric* εἰκός had been translated as *wā ḡ* (*necessary*), *ḥaqq* (*right*), or *ṣā d* (*true*). Both in *al-Ḥikma al-'A rḍiyya* and in *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā*, this mix of solutions was dealt with in the same way, by employing *maḥm ū* in contexts in which Aristotle had used both ἔνδοξον and εἰκός, in *al-Ḥikma al-'A rḍiyya* to the detriment of all other Arabic translations of ἔνδοξον. The coincidence is interesting, because in other Avicennian texts, like *U y ū ḥikma* and *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā*, *K i t al-Riḥā*, *al-Naḡā* *tw* do not witness it.

In *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā* most occurrences of *maḥm ū* can be understood as technical terms. A rather common acceptance of *maḥm ū*, especially in epideictic contexts, refers to moral and religious obligations, but by far the most relevant use of *maḥm ū* for the global picture of Avicenna's rhetorical vocabulary is the acceptance of *commonly praised*, and therefore accepted as

⁶¹⁵ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā*, 17,9, ed. al-Ahwānī. A similar use of *maḥm ū* takes place in *K i t al-Ḥikma b al-Riḥā*, 14,10, ed. al-Ahwānī.

true, present both in dialectical and in rhetorical discourse. The antecedents of this way of employing the term *maḥm ū* are to be found in the coexistence of a dialectical and of a rhetorical understanding of ἐνδοξόν in Aristotle's lexicon, and in the solution adopted in Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Hiṭāb*, in which sophistical, rhetorical and dialectical premises are all called *ma š h* but can be told apart thanks to the attributes that specify them. Similar attributes are used by Avicenna as well, who referred to what is commonly praised in dialectics with the expression *maḥm ū d - fl ha q ī* and to what is commonly praised in rhetoric by the expression *maḥm ū fl b ā d - r ā i.ā* by , truly commonly praised and commonly praised at first sight.

What is more, in Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Hiṭāb* the participle *maḥm ū* like *maq b ā* and *ma š his* sometimes substantivized in order to name rhetorical premises, either because of the influence exerted by the Greek term εἰκός on Avicenna's *maḥm ū* in *Kitāb al-Hiṭāb* like in *al-Ḥikma al-' Adīyyā*, and it is εἰκότα that, with σημεία, are regarded by Aristotle as the source of rhetorical syllogisms,⁶¹⁶ or because of the preference shown by Avicenna in the logical section of *Kitāb al-Šifā* for the vocabulary that had been witnessed by the Greek-Arabic translations of the relevant *Organon* section.

Finally, as observed by M. Aouad, in Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Hiṭāb* the expression *maḥm ū d* , normally referred as much to the formal than to the material side of rhetorical discourse, is specialized for the discussion of its material side, and in particular of its premises. A key for the interpretation of this shift can be found that, in *Kitāb al-Hiṭāb* as in *al-Ḥikma al-' Adīyyā*, the term *maḥm ū* is as much the heir of the Greek word εἰκός as it is the equivalent of Aristotle's ἐνδοξόν. In this context, the concept beyond Avicenna's expression *maḥm ū* was in part elaborated in the intent of giving a philosophically satisfying account of as much as possible of the *Organon* vocabulary, up to often neglected expressions such as εἰκός, which had become hard to grasp on account of its multiple Arabic translations, *maḥm ū d ā*, *d ā* and *w ā ḡ*. Such an approach fits well with Avicenna's global attitude in *Kitāb al-Šifā* and, I could venture to say, in the whole logical

⁶¹⁶ See e.g. *Rhet.* I.2, 1357a32 and *Prior Analytics* II.27, 70a10.

section of *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* because of the closer than usual relationship that he entertains in this text with Aristotle's vocabulary, Avicenna is especially ready to include it, explain it, and find the specific lexical nuances that could allow different translations of the same Greek term to avoid homonymy and to coexist in a meaningful way.

The comparison between Avicenna's lexical choices that pertain to the generally recognized within *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* and in other logical sections of *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* highlights the philosopher's desire to adhere as closely as possible to the image of Aristotelian technical vocabulary of each *Organon* section that was offered to him by the available Arabic translations. Indeed, as far as translations of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον are concerned, if coherence and systematization had been sought in shorter Avicennian works, in *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* a pattern emerges, according to which the more standard terms are employed in other sections of the logic, while, in *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* itself, many expressions that were present in the Arabic *Organon*, but had not found general acceptance in the Islamic Peripatetic school, are restored and given a role. See, for example, how the term *mašhūr*, commonly known, usually referred to the kind of generally recognized on which dialectical reasoning is based and absent from the Arabic *Rhetoric*, appears in the key rhetorical expression *mašhūr fī b-ā* in many sections of *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* but never in *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* where innovative locutions such as *maḥm ū fī b-ā* are created to replace it, or how the terms *maẓn ū* and *ma q* found in the Arabic *Rhetoric* but only in the *na q l* of the *Sophistical Refutations* (*maẓn ū*) and in the Arabic *Posterior Analytics* (*ma q*) became the most common expressions for rhetorical premises in Farabian and early Avicennian texts, but are seldom, if ever, used in this acceptance in *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* while they remain common in this sense in other logical sections of *Kitāb al-Šiḥā*. Another case in point is that, in *Kitāb al-Šiḥā*, Avicenna names *maḥm ū ā* both rhetorical and dialectical premises, thus staying close to Aristotle's use of ἔνδοξον and to the Arabic translator's way of transposing this word. Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Šiḥā* had a common term for rhetorical and dialectical premises, but *ma š* the participle chosen for that

role in this context, does not appear in the Arabic *Rhetoric*. Fārābī, who, in other texts had reserved *ma š lfoū* the characterization of dialectical premises, selected it either because he preferred lexical simplification and coherence over adherence to the vocabulary of his textual sources, or, possibly, because he found it in one of the translations of the *Rhetoric* that did exist but which we cannot read any more.

Hopefully, further studies will point out whether a similar process also took place with the technical lexicon that characterizes other sections of Aristotle's *Organon* and the corresponding book of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Š i f ā ' .* *Wā* could be tempted to suggest that it is so by pointing out the case of the term *dā ' i ' ,* translation of *ἐνδοξόν* in *Topics* I-II, systematically employed to name the generally accepted in *al-Ḥikma al- ' Adīyā* and in *K i t ā b al-Nağā* but not in *Kitāb al-Š i f ā ' ,* where it is only found in *Kitāb al-Ğadal* I, the book that covers the same subject-matter as Aristotle's *Topics* I-II.

The Generally Recognized in Avicenna's

As we have already seen while discussing *K i t ā b al-Ğadal* Avicenna's *K i t ā b al-Nağā* composed immediately after *K i t ā b al-Š i f ā ' (*in 1026-1027 A.D.), was a *summa* characterized by heavy dependence on previously redacted Avicennian texts,⁶¹⁸ and by an avowed aspiration to conciseness that expressed itself rather at the conceptual than at the verbal level. Indeed, *K i t ā b al-Nağā* is not remarkable for its brevity – especially in comparison with works like *U y ū n a l Ḥikma* and *K i t ā b al-Ğadal*, like *K i t ā b al-Nağā* belonged to the genre of *summae* – but it does honour the request by Avicenna's friends that was at its origin, namely that of selectively presenting only the knowledge that it is necessary to possess in order to belong to the philosophical élite.

⁶¹⁷ On this subject, see the section of the present chapter devoted to *The Generally Recognized in al-Ḥikma al- ' Adīyā*, pp. 168-175.

⁶¹⁸ See D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 116.

With this goal in mind, Avicenna judged that he could spare the hurried reader an explicit and direct discussion of dialectics, rhetoric and poetics, of the kind that is usually found in the sections of his *summae* that mirror the presentation of said disciplines in the Aristotelian *Organon*. This is why *K i t ā-Nağā* does not contain any independent chapter devoted to rhetoric, but exhorts the reader interested in further detail on this subject to turn to *K i t āš bi*.⁶¹⁹ Still, Avicenna did not deem himself exempted from the duty to present the tools of rhetoric when reworking the list of logical argumentative means offered by Aristotle in his *Prior Analytics*, and to include dialectical, rhetorical, and poetic statements in the list of first premises that he inserted in the same context. From this we can deduce that, if Avicenna did not regard the ability to practice rhetoric as an indispensable trait of the philosopher, he did regard the understanding of the rightful place of rhetoric in the wider domain of logical arts as a component of philosophical knowledge that could not be foregone. Therefore, although in this work the link between the tools of rhetorical argument and the art to which they belong is usually not explicit, *K i t ā-Nağā ta l* contains a fair amount of rhetorical vocabulary.

Of all the words found in the Greek-Arabic translation to designate the εἰδοξον concept, only *dā ' i widaš* (spread premises) , *ma* (accepted premises) and *mazn ū n ā t* (presumed) refer to syllogistic premises in *K i t ā-Nağā*, and are therefore discussed in specific paragraphs.⁶²⁰ All these sections belong to an elaborated list of judgements to which assent is immediately granted, and which are therefore fit for employment as syllogistic premises.⁶²¹ Similar lists figured in most Avicennian *summae*, from *U y ū Hikma* and *K i t ā-Hi d ādyka*, *t āš bi* and *I š ā r-ā n bā* developing and generalizing the typology of four kinds of syllogistic premises

⁶¹⁹ See Avicenna *K i t ā-Nağā*, t,pl 174-175 ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶²⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t ā-Nağā*, t,pl. 120,8 ff., ed. Daniš-pažuh for *al-mazn ū n ā n* and Avicenna, *K i t ā-Nağā*, t,pl. 115,6 ff., ed. Daniš-pažuh for *al-ma q b. ū l ā t*

⁶²¹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā-Nağā*, t,pl 112,6-123,3 ed. Daniš-pažuh.

that do not derive from further syllogizing already systematically present in Fārābī's accounts of logic.⁶²²

Avicenna states of *ma q b ū l ā t*, that they are accepted on account of someone's personal authority, like when a piece of legislation is accepted because of the credit enjoyed by the *i m ā m* who supports it.⁶²³ The choice of the example clarifies that the leverage of the authority which certifies accepted premises is not assessed individually by each listener, but collectively by the community to which the orator belongs and to which he addresses his speech, like in the case of *ma š h* (commonly known premises) and *maḥm ū d* (praised premises) in other contexts.⁶²⁴

Mazn ū n constituted, together with *ma q b*, the standard core of the expressions chosen to name rhetorical premises in many Avicennian works, as it had also been the case in Fārābī's *Š d r al-Q i ya ū d s n*, his *ḡa w ā* (with the exception of *K i t ā H i b ā b a a l*

Their description in this work is similar to that offered by Avicenna in *K i t ā H i b ā b a a l* and in *U y ū H i k m a*, and it is focalized on the uncertainty of the assent that is granted to them.⁶²⁵ In this case, however, Avicenna delves further in the characterization of *mazn ū n* stating that propositions only belong to this group inasmuch as the uncertainty of their assent is produced by the fact that the possibility of the opposite of the proposition also occurs to the mind. This allows Avicenna to clarify the relationship between *mazn ū n* and dialectical premises, called *dā ' i h e r e ā t* and *ma š h* in most Avicennian texts: if it were not for the simultaneous occurrence to the mind of assent to the presumed proposition and to its opposite, and if the acceptance of these premises

⁶²² On the possible sources of Fārābī's fourfold list of syllogistic premises, see the subsection devoted to *G a l e n ' s F o u r K i n d s o f P r e m i s e s*, within the section *T h e G e n e r a l l y R e c o g n i z e d i n F ā r ā b ī ' s c o m m o n a n d t o t h e T o p i c s*, pp. 107-128.

⁶²³ See Avicenna, *K i t ā H i b ā b a a l*, p. 115, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶²⁴ On why *ma q b ā r e s ū t* in relation to a community and not to isolated individuals, see D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Brill 1990, p. 142.

⁶²⁵ See Avicenna, *Kitā b -Nağd al-ḡa w ā n*, pp. 120-121, ed. Daniš-pažuh, Avicenna, *U y ū H i k m a*, *lāl-Maṅṭi q i* p. 37-8 ed. A. Badawī, and Avicenna, *K i t ā H i b ā b a a l*, pp. 19, 2-3, ed. 'Abduh.

were just not firm enough, they could not be told apart from premises that are widespread at first sight (*bi-ḥasab al-mašḥwā-huwa al-dā' i'c frīa*).⁶²⁶ *bi-sūnā in' Kii t lānba ḡ* there is no independent discussion of commonly known - or widespread - propositions at first sight, in this case Avicenna's exposition of syllogistic premises is organized differently than in *'Uyū Hikma l* and in *Kii t al-ḥudūd*, in all texts the philosopher maintains that *al-dā' i'c -f ā can bād i' i* source of rhetorical syllogisms alongside with presumed and accepted premises.

In *Kii t al-ḥudūd* the term *dā' i'c* plays a central role in dialectical lexicon, for the words *mašḥū r* and *maḥmūd ā* not directly employed here to refer to syllogistic premises, while *dā' i'c ā t*, *widespread premises*, are analyzed in detail, receiving the same general characterization that is proper to *mašḥū r* in Avicennian texts.

The substitution of *mašḥū r* with *dā' i'c* is systematic enough to encompass what seems to be rhetorical premises:

Avicenna, Kitāb al-Ma'ādī. As for: widespread premises (al-dā' i'c ā t) that are common to all, without exception, they are good (opinions (ārā')) that are accepted when people agree, and if they were examined, they would be like your brother when he acts unfairly and when he is treated unfairly, the same thing that is widespread in relation to each listener, but its effect is different for each individual.

The reference to the fact that these premises are praised at first sight (*al-maḥmūd ā f ī b ā al-r ā*) is transparent, for it involves the expression *f ī b ā d* that encapsulated Fārābī's understanding of the *proprium* of rhetoric in his later works,⁶²⁷ and that was also part of the

⁶²⁶ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-ḥudūd* - *ḥudūd* 121,2-3, ed. Daniš-pažuh. On this subject, see also D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle in Medieval Arab Philosophy*, Brill 1990, p. 145 n.21.

⁶²⁷ See for example al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-ḥudūd* 105,15-107,11 J. Langhade (ed.).

characterization of this art in Avicenna's other *summae*.⁶²⁸ Even the example which illustrates the concept, that of the brother which should be helped even if he is unfair, is the same that exemplifies rhetorical premises in *K i t al-Ḥabīb d al-Ḥikma*.⁶²⁹

Discussing rhetorical premises under a denomination like *dā'irah*, which only appears in the Arabic version of the *Topics* as a term for dialectical premises and had never been linked to rhetoric in any previous work by Fārābī or Avicenna, might look like a deliberate innovation. This choice could possibly be explained on account of the fact that in *K i t al-Ḥabīb* the premises that do not derive from further syllogizing are not explicitly linked to specific logical arts, like it had been the case in other Avicennian *summae*, and also on account of the fact that neither dialectics nor rhetoric are discussed independently.⁶³⁰ Unsurprisingly, the extension of the meaning of *dā'irah* to include rhetorical premises is pursued by its specification with terms that, unlike *dā'irah*, uncontestably belong to rhetorical tradition, either in its Peripatetic formulation (like the adjective *maḥmūḍ* translation of ἔνδοξον in the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Prior Analytics*, adopted by Avicenna as the main term for rhetorical premises in *al-Ḥikma al-Ḥiyyā*),⁶³¹ or in its Farabian development (like *f i b-tā al-ḥayāṭi* first sight, the concept

⁶²⁸ In *al-Ḥikma al-Ḥiyyā* we find the expression *al-ḥayāṭi* which Avicenna discusses, alongside with accepted and presumed premises, rhetorical premises that are commonly known *f i b-tā al-ḥayāṭi* as *al-ḥayāṭi* while, in *K i t al-Ḥabīb* the same premises are called commonly known *i l-tā al-ḥayāṭi* as *al-ḥayāṭi* further investigation, an expression that appears in the passage from *K i t al-Ḥabīb* devoted to *widespread premises that are praised at first sight* and examined above. See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-Ḥiyyā*, p. 91,3, Ṣāliḥ (ed.), *U y ū Ḥikma*, *al-Manti q i p. 33*, ed. A. Badawī, *K i t al-Ḥabīb*, *al-Manti q i p. 126,4*, ed. Ḥ. Abduh, and *K i t al-Ḥabīb*, 40,3.

⁶²⁹ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Ḥabīb*, 19,8-9, ed. Ḥ. Abduh, and Avicenna, *U y ū Ḥikma*, *al-Manti q i p. 33-34*, ed. A. Badawī.

⁶³⁰ See Avicenna, *K i t al-Ḥabīb*, 122-123, ed. Daniš-pažuh for Avicenna's justification of this omission.

⁶³¹ On the use of *maḥmūḍ* as an equivalent of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον in the Arabic versions of *Rhetoric* and *Prior Analytics*, see the section of this text devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, pp. 93-96. On its role in *al-Ḥikma al-Ḥiyyā* see the pages of the present section that discuss *The Generally Recognized in Avicenna's al-Ḥikma al-Ḥiyyā*, pp. 159-163.

elaborated by Fārābī in order to encapsulate the *proprium* of rhetoric in his *K i t ā-Hikma* and later adopted by Avicenna in *‘U y ū Hikma* and in the rhetorical section of his *K i t ā-‘Ulūm*⁶³²

Curious as it might be, Avicenna’s choice to substitute *dā’* for *ma š* (the term that we find in *‘U y ū Hikma* and in *K i t ā-Hikma*) does not seem to reflect a conceptual innovation, for the expressions *dā’* (*‘ilm ū ad nfaī -r la āndī*) and *ma š* (*‘ilm ū ad nfaī -r la āndī*) in both cases appear alongside other rhetorical premises called *maqab* and *maẓn ūānt* look perfectly synonymous, and the list of premises offered by *K i t ā-Hikma* and *K i t ā-‘Ulūm* characterize the three groups of propositions in the same terms: *maqab* are accepted thanks to the personal authority of their sources, *maẓn ūānt* merely produce an opinion, and rhetorical *dā’* are such only until they undergo verification.

In *K i t ā-Hikma* the adjective *ma š* frequently appears in opposition to expressions deriving from the root *ḥ-q-q*, for Avicenna organizes his discussion of many logical subjects on the contraposition between a faulty but commonplace opinion and his – correct – understanding of what actually are things like the privative proposition, the conversion of the absolutes, or the mixture of premises in a given syllogistic figure.⁶³³ Clearly, this is not the dialectical or rhetorical usage of the word *ma š* for it merely describes a widespread opinion, which is understood to be wrong because it is systematically contrasted with the truth. As clearly argued by D.L. Black, within the scope of the enlarged Alexandrian *Organon*, the dialectical use of *ma š* does not imply falsity at all.⁶³⁴

⁶³² On Fārābī’s elaboration of the *f ī brā adī* concept, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d’ Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī*, ou *l’Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992. On de v u e Avicenna’s employment of Fārābī’s expression, see the paragraphs of this text devoted to *The Generally Recognized in Avicenna-Hikma*, p. 164-168, and to *The Generally Recognized in Avicenna-‘Ulūm*, pp. 173-201.

⁶³³ See Avicenna, *K i t ā-‘Ulūm*, pp. 29,3 ff. for the privative proposition, p. 45,1 ff. for the conversion of the absolutes, and pp. 66,2-79,6 ed. Daniš-pažuh for the mixture of premises in a given syllogistic figure.

⁶³⁴ See D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics*, Brill 1990, pp. 140-141 and 144. *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992.

In *K i t aḥḡā* there are only four occurrences of *m a š hāt* that could seem to fall outside this framework, and I would like to briefly discuss them in order to ascertain whether this is finally the case, and whether or not, in *K i t aḥḡā* the word *m a š hāt* can be a substitute for *ἐνδοξον* on its own merits.

Avicenna's text encompasses a *faṣl fī sī t*,⁶³⁵ in which an *i s t i q r ās* contrasted *h ū r* with an *i s t i q r ā* the ground is that, although they both derive a judgement on a universal proposition by observing the presence of the predicate in the particulars belonging to that universal proposition, the *i s t i q r ās* does so by examining all such particulars, while the *i s t i q r ā* *m a š hāt* limits itself to the exam of some particulars.

How should we understand the phrase *i s t i q r ā*? We might entertain the idea that it refers to a specifically dialectical or rhetorical type of induction, but, since only the presence of word *m a š hāt* seems to go in this direction, I would rather view the *i s t i q r ās* as a popular *h ū r* form of induction, or as what is popularly understood as induction. In the latter case, the contraposition between *i s t i q r ā* and *i s t i q r ās* would still be very close to the passages in which *m a š hāt* is opposed to *ḥaqq*.

In Avicenna's *Faṣl fī dā'ir*⁶³⁶ the adjective *m a š hāt* like *maḥm ū d*, is used to define *al-dā'ir ā t* themselves, by saying that they are *commonly known and praised* (*m a š hāt* *ḥāḥmaū d* *premisses or opinions*, to which assent must be granted on account of the evidence given by either everyone, or most people, or all the scholars, or most of them, or the best of them, provided that the crowd does not oppose them. In this case, the terms *m a š hāt* *maḥm ū d* are clearly used in their dialectical (and potentially rhetorical) sense, but their presence is strictly dependent on their role in defining *al-dā'ir ā t*. The technical term in this context is *al-dā'ir ā t* itself.

In *K i t aḥḡā*, *faṣl fī lūā hy-ijā'at* *al-i a-ḡaw dāl āḥatij* Avicenna offers a list of mistakes that can occur in definition. One of them is the definition of an object by making

⁶³⁵ See Avicenna *K i t aḥḡā ta ṣl fī sī t*, p. 406, 14, ed. Daniš-pažuh

⁶³⁶ See Avicenna, *K i t aḥḡā ta ṣl fī dā'ir* p. 118, 11, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

reference to a second object, that can in turn be defined only on the basis of the first. Three examples follow: that of the sun defined as the star rising in the morning – when the definition of morning cannot help but refer to the sun – the definition of quantity as the susceptibility to being equal or unequal to something else – when the definition of equality rests upon that of quantity – and the definition of quality as the susceptibility to being similar or not similar. – when the definition of similarity rests upon that of quality. In the process, at *K i t āNabğā* 1174,62, the above mentioned definition of quantity is described as a *commonly known definition* (*al-tahd ī d a l m a š h -kammīyyāti*). Since our *commonly known definition* admittedly appears in a list of mistakes, I think we can safely state that this occurrence of *m a š h* is parallel to an unstated “true definition.” This case is similar to the previously discussed passages in which *m a š h* was opposed to *haqq*, and does not therefore contradict the observation that, on its own merits, *m a š h* does not embody a dialectical (or rhetorical) concept in Avicenna’s *K i t āNabğā .ta l*

Finally, in *K i t āNabğā ,Fasl -rfafsi l-n lāq*,⁶³⁷ p. 331,5, the adjective *m a š h* appears one last time, well outside the logical section of this text. Avicenna is discussing the faculties of the rational soul, namely the active faculty and the knowing faculty, thus somehow establishing a psychological counterpart to his discussion of syllogistic premises that do not derive from further syllogizing in the logical section of the same work.⁶³⁸ The active faculty is said to have a relationship with the instinctive animal faculty, with the imaginative (*mutahayyil*) and imaginary (*wahmiyy*) animal faculty, and with itself. The latter relationship consists in the fact that *the widespread and commonly known opinions* (*al-ārā ’ -dā a’ li -m a š h*) are produced between the active faculty and the theoretical intellect (*al-‘aql al-nazā r*). Here the word *m a š h* is again used in its technical dialectical sense, both because there is an explicit reference to the *Book of logic* (*K i t āNabğā*)⁶³⁹ and because the expression *al-ārā ’ -dā a’ li -m a š h* is followed by an

⁶³⁷ See Avicenna, *K i t āNabğā ,Fasl -rfafsi l-n lāq*, p. 331,5 ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶³⁸ See Avicenna, *K i t āNabğā*, pp. 113-123, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶³⁹ Avicenna, *K i t āNabğā ,Fasl -rfafsi l-n lāq*, p. 331,5 ed. Daniš-pažuh.

example of *widespread and commonly known opinion* which often occurs with *ma š hūts* technical understanding,⁶⁴⁰ or with the synonymous understanding of *dā* ,⁶⁴¹ namely that *injustice is ugly*. However, if in the psychological section of *K i t ā Nağā* the adjective *ma š ka* be used in its dialectical sense, it is again on account of its association with the term *dā* , in a clear reference to the *Faṣl -dā* of the same work.⁶⁴²

Examining the data I just exposed, we can observe that, in the sporadic passages of *K i t ā b al-Nağā* in which *ma š* appears in its dialectical sense (in *Faṣl -dā* and *Faṣl -rafāsi al-l n āq*),⁶⁴³ it does so because it is placed in the immediate proximity of *dā* . As we shall see, the same statement holds true for the expression *maḥm ū* and a similar mechanism had been in place in Fārābī's later rhetorical works, which reached a high degree of lexical complexity by selecting a small number of main technical terms derived from the Arabic translations of the *Organon*, and complementing it with secondary vocabulary with very similar meaning from the same sources. This process did not result into homonymy between main vocabulary and secondary because the latter had been either subordinated to the former, or specialized in a new direction.⁶⁴⁴

It is *dā* that in *K i t ā Nağā* stands for the Greek term *ἔνδοξον* in dialectical context, while *maḥm ū* and, to a lesser extent, *ma q* belong to the properly rhetoric field. In a parallel way, *ma š* and *maḥm ū* only ever play their ancillary role in relationship with *dā* , and never with *maḥm ū* and *ma q*, which is entirely understandable for *ma š* but not quite as expected for *maḥm ū* since this term had been devoted to rhetorical premises rather than to dialectical premises in Avicennian works like *al-Ḥikma al- Aḥiyā*.

⁶⁴⁰ See for example Avicenna, *K i t ā Hilā* p. 116,6, ed. 'Abdhu, and Avicenna, *K i t ā B lu r dī* p. 66,1.

⁶⁴¹ See Avicenna, *K i t ā Nağā ta ṣl -dā* p. 118,12, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶⁴² See Avicenna, *K i t ā Nağā ,aṣl F-dā* p. 118,10 ff., ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶⁴³ See Avicenna, *K i t ā b al-N a ḡ Faṣl fī l-dā* 'i'āt and *Faṣl fī l-nafsi l-nāṭiq* pp. 118,11 and 311,5, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶⁴⁴ On Fārābī's binary approach to the miscellaneous lexicon of the Arabic *Organon*, see the section of this chapter devoted to *F ā r ā b ī ' s P h i l o s o p h i c O r g a n o n V o c a b u l a r y : L e x i c a b S t r a t e g i e s*, pp. 156-161.

The uniformity of Avicenna's employment of *dā'iri* order to refer to *ἐνδοξον* within *K i t ā b al-Nağā* shows that the philosopher had adopted the Farabian model according to which, confronted with the lexical variety offered by the Greek-Arabic translations, our author tends to select one single term for each logical concept in his shorter *summae*, while he strives to partially reflect the lexical intricacies of the Arabic Aristotelian texts available to him in his *K i t ā b al-Nağā*, a work both bulkier and avowedly more Peripatetic than Avicenna's other texts. However, let us also observe that Avicenna's lexical choices outside *K i t ā b al-Nağā* were not uniform within each text, do not seem to be intertextually standardized: for example, *ἐνδοξον* in the dialectical sense is called *dā'iri* in *K i t ā b al-Nağā* in *al-Hikma al-ʿAḥyā* – like in the first two books of Aristotle's *Topics* in ms. *Parisinus Arabus 2346*⁶⁴⁵ – while in *U y ū Hikma* and in *K i t ā b al-Nağā* we find the much more common *ma š h ū r*.

As already stated, in *K i t ā b al-Nağā* the term *ma ḥ m ū d*, faces a fate similar to that of *ma š h ū r*, commonly known: they are rarely substantivized, but they sometimes appear as attributes of *dā'iri*, widespread, the expression that characterizes dialectical premises in *K i t ā b al-Nağā*.

Both terms had had a much more prominent role in previous Avicennian works, but, unlike *ma š h ū m ū* all underwent a semantic specialization. *Ma ḥ m ū* had been a translation of Aristotle's *ἐνδοξον* in the *na q l* of *Sophistical Refutations*, in Taḍārī's version of *Prior Analytics*, and in Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh's version of *Topics VIII*, but it had also been one of the most common translations of Aristotle's *ἐνδοξον* in the surviving Arabic version of *Rhetoric*. Possibly finding this move easier because *K i t ā b al-Nağā* do not encompass any explicit discussion of dialectics, rhetoric and poetics, Avicenna completely neglected the rhetorical side of the expression *ma ḥ m ū* whenever the subject under discussion was a proper equivalent of the Greek

⁶⁴⁵ Translated by Abū ʿUṭmān al-Dimašqī and further revised on Greek and Greek-Arabic sources. See the section of the present text devoted to *The Generally Recognized in the Arabic Translations of the Organon*, p. 93-96.

ἐνδοξον, like in the already mentioned *Faṣl fī māḥmū* where both *maḥmū* and *mašhūr* are employed to describe dialectical premises, called here *dāʾ* of *wāds* spread propositions.⁶⁴⁶

On the other hand, *muqaddama maḥmū* is the description given of the maxim in *Faṣl fī l-rāʾiyya*, passage that mirrors the rhetorical section of *Prior Analytics* II.27, but, in this case, *maḥmū* is probably to be understood as the counterpart of εἰκός, *probable*, rather than of ἐνδοξον, *generally recognized*.⁶⁴⁷

The Generally Recognized in Avicenna: General Remarks

Al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā, one of Avicenna's earliest work containing references to the rhetorical concepts that I investigated, offers a very concise list of terms in order to name the generally recognized, for we mainly find *dāʾ* (*widespread*) for what is generally recognized in dialectic and *maḥmū* (*common*) for what is generally recognized in rhetoric. The only other surfacing expression that had been used to translate Aristotle's ἐνδοξον is *mašhūr* (*commonly known*),⁶⁴⁸ but always as a qualifier of *dāʾ*. This setup is both far from the vocabulary chosen by Fārābī, who differentiated the dialectical from the rhetorical ἐνδοξον by calling the first *mašhūr* and the second *maqbūrah* and close to the Arabic versions of Aristotle's texts that Avicenna was probably using in order to read the *Rhetoric* and the *Topics*. Indeed, in the Arabic *Rhetoric*, the generally recognized is almost exclusively called *maḥmū* while in Abū ʿUṭmān al-Dimašqī's revised version of *Topics* I-II we find *dāʾ* like in *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā*.

⁶⁴⁶ See Avicenna, *Kiṭāb al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā*, p. 118, 11, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

⁶⁴⁷ Although both ἐνδοξον and εἰκός appear in *Prior Analytics* II.27, it is εἰκός, transliterated as *ayqūṣ* Ṭadāri, that it glossed as *ra māḥmū*. On the usage of *ra māḥmū* in the sense of *probable* in Avicenna's *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā*, see the section of this chapter devoted to *The Probable in Avicenna* *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā*, pp. 86-89.

⁶⁴⁸ See Avicenna, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā*, p. 48.1-3, ed. M. Šāliḥ.

Most of the rhetorical lexicon found in *‘U y ū ḥikma* and in *K i t āḥbi d ās* located in global expositions of the premises that belong to each syllogistic art, in which Avicenna listed rhetorical premises as *m u q a d d a m ā* (accepted premises), *m u q a d d a z m ū* (presumed premises), and *m u q a d d n a ṣ ḥ* (commonly known premises).⁶⁴⁹ The ratio behind the selection of these terms could not be more different than the one behind the same process in *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḥiyā*. None of the expressions used to name rhetorical premises and the generally recognized in *‘U y ū n al-Ḥikma* and in *K i t āḥbi d ās* found in the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, although they do appear in the translations of other *Organon* sections. Rather, their use seems to have been sanctioned by the habits of other Islamic Peripatetic philosophers such as Fārābī, who, in his *ḡa w ā ḥad* employed all of these words. By citing Fārābī, I do not want to suggest that, in this case, Avicenna’s lexical choices were made under his direct influence, but rather that in *‘U y ū n al-Ḥikma* and *K i t āḥbi d ās* the selection of rhetorical terminology was geared towards internal coherence and contemporary trends, to the detriment of fidelity to any Arabic Aristotelian lexical model. More precisely, when composing *‘U y ū ḥikma* and *K i t āḥbi d ās* the terms chose by Avicenna for naming rhetorical premises were still those collectively selected by scholars and translators working in Baghdad between the 9th and the 10th Centuries. This group surely included Fārābī at the stage in which he composed his later works, but was by no means limited to him. Indeed, the structure of the vocabulary that derives from ἔνδοξον in Fārābī’s *ḡa w ā ḥad* and in Avicenna’s *‘U y ū ḥikma* and *K i t āḥbi d ās* is very different: since Avicenna did not view rhetorical premises as the *proprium* of rhetoric any more, he did not try find one term that would apply to all of them, like *m a q ḥ* in Fārābī’s *ḡa w ā ḥad* and *ḥaẓn ū* in his *Š ḥ al-Q i ym*. Moreover, while Avicenna’s three kinds of rhetorical premises in *‘U y ū ḥikma* and *K i t āḥbi d ās* are on equal footing, Fārābī tended to establish hierarchies within the terms that he derived from the *Organon* translations, selecting one of them as the principal expression for referring to what is generally recognized and accepted as the proper basis for rhetorical or dialectical discussion, and

⁶⁴⁹ See Avicenna, *‘U y ū ḥikma*, *al-Manṭi q i ḡ. 3* ed. A. Badawī.

only using the rest of the traditional vocabulary in order to gloss, explain or qualify the main term.

Why was Avicenna's approach so unlike Fārābī's? Probably, the appearance of Avicenna's *taṣdīq* doctrine probably played a role, since it allowed Avicenna to include in his classification of the sources of syllogisms a much larger array of premises than Fārābī could do in his fourfold classification. The *taṣdīq* doctrine also implied a new understanding of the relationship between the *Organon* sections. Said relationships were no longer oriented by the identification of each art on the basis of its characterizing premises, but rather by its identification on the basis of the kind of assent it produced. From this point of view, hierarchizing the different kinds of premises employed in rhetoric might have seemed less necessary.

Actually, in comparing *al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyyā* on one side and *Uyūn al-Ḥikma* and *Kitāb al-Ḥidāya* on the other, we already see at play two divergent tendencies that will remain active in later Avicennian works: one, characteristic of *al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyyā*, pushing towards the valorization and the interpretation of Aristotelian lexicon as it was known by means of the Arabic translations, and one, represented in *Uyūn al-Ḥikma* and in *Kitāb al-Ḥidāya*, oriented towards the selection of the terms most propitious to the systematic exposition of knowledge, be it rhetorical or otherwise. These tendencies did not represent successive chronological stages, but were rather the expression of Avicenna's permanent centers of interest, so that, from work to work, Avicenna could drift between them, and even give in to both at the same time, like we will see when discussing his *Kitāb al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyyā*.

In Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Ḥikma al-'Adhiyyā* comparison between Avicenna's lexical choices that pertain to the generally recognized within *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* and in other logical sections of the logic stresses the philosopher's intention to closely adhere to the portrait of Aristotelian technical vocabulary of each *Organon* section that was offered by the available Greek-Arabic translations. Indeed, concerning translations of Aristotle's ἔνδοξον, if coherence and lexical systematization had been

sought in many shorter Avicennian works, in his *Kitāb al-Šifā* a new pattern appears, establishing that standard terms are used in other logical sections, but in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* itself, many expressions that were present in the Arabic *Organon*, but had not found general acceptance in Islamic philosophy, are finally given a place. See, for example, how the term *mašhūr*, commonly known, usually referred to the dialectical *generally recognized* and absent from the Arabic *Rhetoric*, appears in the key rhetorical expression *mašhūr fī b-rā al-ḥikma* in many sections of *Kitāb al-Šifā* but not in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* and, indeed, in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* innovative phrases such as *maḥm ū fī b-rā al-ḥikma* are created in order to replace *mašhūr fī b-rā al-ḥikma*, and the terms *mazn ū* and *maqal* absent from the Arabic *Rhetoric* but present in the *Naqal* of *Sophrastean Refutations* (*mazn ū*) and in the Arabic *Posterior Analytics* (*maqal*) became the most widespread expressions for rhetorical premises in Farabian and early Avicennian texts, but were seldom, if ever, used with this meaning in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* while they remain common in this sense in other logical parts of *Kitāb al-Šifā*. Another relevant observation is that, in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma*, Avicenna calls *maḥm ū al-ḥikma* rhetorical and dialectical premises alike, thus staying close to Aristotle's use of *ἔνδοξον* and to the Arabic translator's way of giving an equivalent to this word. Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* had the same term for rhetorical and dialectical premises, but *mašhūr*, the participle selected for this role in that context, did not appear in the Arabic *Rhetoric*. Fārābī, who, in other texts had reserved *mašhūr* for the characterization of dialectical premises, chose it either because in this case he preferred lexical simplification over adherence to the vocabulary of his sources, or, maybe, because he found it in one of the translations of the *Rhetoric* that we cannot read any more.

Although this suggestion still needs further verification, I am inclined to think that this lexical relationship between one section of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā* and its counterpart in Aristotle's *Organon* was not specific to the rhetoric. A clue in this sense is offered by the use of the term *dā'i*, equivalent of *ἔνδοξον* in *Topics* I-II, systematically employed to name the generally accepted in *al-Ḥikma al-Adīyā* and in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* but not in *Kitāb al-Šifā* where it only appears in *Kitāb al-Ġadal* I, the book that covers the same subject-matter as Aristotle's *Topics*

I-II. The oscillation between *dā'* and other equivalent of ἔνδοξον in *Kitāb al-Šifā'* reflects the similar situation that we have witnessed concerning rhetorical lexicon, faithful to the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric* in *Kitāb al-Šifā'* and standardized according to contemporary principles in other logical sections of *Kitāb al-Šifā'*.

Finally, in *Kitāb al-Nağāt*, that was composed on a request by Avicenna's friends to have a text containing only what it is necessary to know in order to be part of the philosophical élite, Avicenna does not deal with rhetoric systematically, but only when offering overviews of syllogistic premises and of deductive argumentative tools, in parallel with Aristotle's discussion in *Prior Analytics* II.23-27. The landscape that emerges from these passages includes the use of *dā'* in order to name dialectical premises, and of *maḥmū* and *maš'* in order to qualify them. *Maqab* and *nāẓnūnā* are used, described and defined like in *Uyūn al-Ḥikma* and *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* in reference to rhetorical premises, together with the phrase *al-dā' al-maḥmū dā' fī ḥikma*,⁶⁵⁰ which mirrors the expression *maš' fī ḥikma* elsewhere. Therefore, in *Kitāb al-Nağāt*, like we have observed in many Farabian texts, almost all the technical vocabulary found in the Arabic *Organon* in order to refer to the *generally recognized* is present, but not all terms are on the same footing. Some, like *dā'* and *maqab*, and *naẓnūnā* are main options that can be used to name dialectical and rhetorical premises, while others, like *maš'* and *maḥmū* are only used for explanation and description in the dialectical field. For some of them, like *maḥmū* that in the Arabic *Organon* appeared as much in rhetorical than in dialectical sense, this implied a process of specialization. This attitude, already present in Farabian works, allowed Avicenna to conjugate his two already mentioned tendencies in dealing with the technical vocabulary of *Rhetoric*, and possibly of logic in general: the tendency to include and explain Aristotle's lexicon known through the Arabic translations of the *Organon* (as in *al-Ḥikma al-Ḥaqīqīya*), and the tendency that resulted in the production of an homogeneous vocabulary, functional to the systematic exposition of knowledge

⁶⁵⁰ See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* 120,3-7, ed. Daniš-pažuh.

(as in *Uyū ḥikma* and in *Kitāb al-Ḥikma* according to my reconstruction, the same tendencies had been articulated in *Kitāb al-Šifā* thanks to the double standard honoured by Avicenna towards technical vocabulary: exegetical inclusion of terminology derived from the Greek-Arabic translation of each *Organon* text in the matching section of *Kitāb al-Šifā* and, reconstruction of a simpler and more contemporary philosophical vocabulary for each discipline whenever said discipline is discussed elsewhere in the logical section of *Kitāb al-Šifā* .

As we have seen, both approaches are alive at different chronological stages in Avicenna's philosophical journey, and describing his more Aristotelian streak as a juvenile character is not entirely satisfactory. In addition to rooting him in the Peripatetic tradition and validating him as its main heir, as D. Gutas explained so well,⁶⁵¹ it also had a permanent appeal for him, which can be usefully described as Avicenna's philological attitude. This attitude coexisted diachronically with Avicenna's more systematic and, in a sense, more traditional approach, which, overlooking the relationship with Aristotle's works as discrete textual entities, pushed him towards the production of the best possible exposition of scientific knowledge, making use of a thoroughly contemporary terminology. This terminology incorporated the lexical selection process that the Islamic Peripatetic school had operated on Aristotle's technical vocabulary as it had emerged from the translation movement.

1.5 – The Role of the Greek-Arabic Translations of Other Sections of the *Organon* in the Understanding of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

We have seen above how the vocabulary of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* in their Arabic version did help Avicenna's understanding in quite a few situations,⁶⁵² since it was far closer to the Peripatetic standard than the lexicon on the Arabic *Rhetoric* was.

⁶⁵¹ See D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Leiden, Brill 2014, pp. 289-293

⁶⁵² See the section of the present contribution titled *Lexical Difficulties Posed by the Rhetoric*, pp. 21-28.

It is interesting to reflect on the role of the *Prior Analytics* translation as far as Fārābī is concerned as well. Aouad and Langhade disagree about the plan of his *K i t āḥḥā b* and the fact that Aouad does not regard the text as unachieved, while for Langhade it is *le debut du K. al-Ḥaṭāba* (ou *K. fī l-Ḥaṭāba*) *décrit par les fahāris comme un long commentaire de 20 tomes* (FHL 23). Aouad sees the book we have as a coherent whole organized in two parts, one concerned with the definition of rhetoric and one concerned with its procedures.

For Aouad, the fact that Fārābī lists twelve rhetorical procedures, but only analyses enthymeme and example is unproblematic, since he states in 81.5-83.5 that only enthymeme and example are necessary to the coherence of rhetoric as a discipline. Another possible explanation for this state of things resides in the availability of the short account of rhetorical matters proposed in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, which only describes rhetorical deductive and inductive tools, leaving absolutely no room for ethical and non-technical proofs. More ambitiously, it could also be worthwhile to reflect on whether Fārābī's restructuring of the *Rhetoric* around the second chapter of its first treatise could be due to the fact that almost all the rhetorical sections of the *Prior Analytics* have a close parallel with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* I.2.

The Place of the Arabic Translation of the *Prior Analytics* in Avicenna's Understanding of Aristotle's Vocabulary

In the only Arabic version of the *Prior Analytics* that has reached us (thanks to the manuscripts *Parisinus Arabus* 2346 and Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmad III 3362 from Istanbul)⁶⁵³ the word that translates σημεῖον is the Arabic *ʿa l ā*, and only in the page margin there are traces of the better known lexicon.

Another very interesting side of the translation of the *Prior Analytics* are the abundance of γράφεται which surround it, which often refer explicitly to a Syriac source. A testimony of the interest and relevance of the Syriac tradition, and of how it can sometimes be related to ancient

⁶⁵³ See J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogism* (Leiden/New York/Köln, Brill) 1994, p. 334.

Greek commentators, is to be found in one of these marginal notes, which focuses on the chronological relationship between a sign and the thing for which it stands for. It reads as follows:

Marginal note in the ms. Paris Ar. 2346, Kitāb al-Ḍalīl ḡabr, p. 408 n.

7: In red: and (there is) another comment. I copy it, and which it is a sign/dalīla like the shaking of the rubbing of the nose that signals nosebleed is from the sick person, or it is together with the thing that has the 'alāma/clue, like the smoke that has the bond, like the ash, for it signals existing fire.⁶⁵⁴

Now, the Aristotelian passage to which this note makes reference is *Prior Analytics* II.27, or the chapter devoted to enthymeme. By itself, this note would not attract any more interest than the other annotations that occupy the margins of ms. *Parisinus Arabus* 2346. It does not offer variant readings or philological background, and it does not really enlighten us on Aristotle's philosophical positions. It merely applies chronological taxonomy to the relationship between the 'alāma/σημεῖον and the thing or event to which it hints.

However, reading this note together with the following Philoponian passage will put us in the position to value it in a different perspective:

Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria*, XIII p. 481,9-12 Busse: τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον εἰς δύο διαιρεῖται, εἰς εἰκὸς καὶ τεκμήριον. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον τριχῶς νοοῦμεν· ἢ γὰρ ἔστιν ὄντος τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ἅμα τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ σημεῖον, ὡς τὸ 'καπνὸς εἰ ἔστι, πῦρ ἔστιν'· ἢ μετὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ σημεῖον, οἷον τὸ τέφραν εἶναι σημαίνει ὅτι πῦρ ἤδη γέγονεν· ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, πρῶτον δὲ τὸ σημεῖον, ὡς τὸ γάλα ἔχειν τὴν μετὰ δύο ἡμέρας μέλλουσαν τίκτειν.

⁶⁵⁴ The relevant Arabic text is: , , .

, , , , .

The sign is divided in two, the probable and the evidence. We understand the sign in three ways: either it takes place while the fact is fire, ” or the sign is after the fact, l the fact takes place later and the sign first, like the fact of having milk (is a sign) of the woman who is going to give birth within two days.

Not only is the same chronological taxonomy put to the same purpose here, but two of the examples employed correspond exactly in the Greek and in the Arabic text as well, namely the one involving fire and smoke, and the one involving fire and ash. The example illustrating the relationship between a clue and a fact that is going to occur in the future is the shaking of the lip for “vomiting” rather than the presence of milk in a woman’s breast for “birth,” but these two options are not wide apart, since they both derive from the bodily/medical sphere. It should be noted that none of the examples in the Arabic text do appear anywhere in Aristotle’s writings, nor in any other coeval text. Only the Philoponian passage concerning the pregnant woman finds parallels in the text of the Greek *Rhetoric* (See 1357b15-16), where the sign of proximity of birth is milk production alone, while the Arabic translation adds a reference to quickened respiration and the *Scholia Anonymi* to pallor.⁶⁵⁵

The only parallel that I could find for the examples employing smoke and ash is again Peripatetic, but younger and possibly derivative of Philoponus. It is taken from one of the surviving series of *scholia* to the *Rhetoric*, ascribed to a certain Stephanus and date to the 12th Century by Conley and Ross, since it quotes the *Suda* lexicon and it originates from Anna Comnena’s 1118 project aimed at producing a commentary for all the Aristotelian texts that

⁶⁵⁵ See *Anonimi in Rhetoricam*, XXI p. 5,17-18 Rabe. Still, I wish to point out that in the *scholia* the presence of two gynecologic examples is justified by the fact that they make reference to different syllogistic forms. “This woman has milk, therefore she has given birth, for all lactating women have given birth” is a syllogism in the first form (and therefore necessary), while “this woman is pale, therefore she has given birth, for all women who have just given birth are pale” is a syllogism in the second form (and therefore not necessary). A similar reasoning seems to underlie the insertion in the Arabic translation.

scholastic tradition had not already endowed with one. This passage concerns syllogisms in the second form.

Stephanus, *In Rhetoricam*, XXI p. 266 Rabe: [1357b19] Λυτὸν γὰρ καὶ καὶ τοῦτο κἄν ἀληθὲς ἦ· κἄν γὰρ ἀληθὲς ἦ τὸ “οὗτος πυρέττει ὁ νῦν ὀρώμενός μοι πνευστιῶν”, ἀλλὰ λύσιμος ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅτι ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι ἀπὸ καταφατικῶν τῶν δύο προτάσεων καταφατικὸν συνήγαγες.

Ἰστέον καὶ ἐπὶ τινῶν πῆ μὲν τὰ σημεῖα προηγοῦνται ὧν εἰσι σημεῖα, οἷον ἡ ἴρις τοῦ ὑετοῦ, ὃ καὶ πολλάκις καὶ διαψεύδεται (φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ ἴρις, ὑετὸς δὲ οὐ γίνεται), πῆ δὲ τὸ οὐ σημεῖον προηγείται, ὡς τὸ πῦρ τῆς τέφρας. πῆ δὲ ἅμα τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ σημειωτόν, ὃ καὶ κυρίως τεκμήριον, οἷον ἅμα πῦρ καὶ καπνός· ἐὰν οὖν εἴπῃς, ὅτι σημεῖον τοῦ εἶναι ἐνταῦθα πῦρ τὸ εἶναι ἐνταῦθα τέφραν, ψεῦδος· ἐστὶ γὰρ τέφρα ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἐνταῦθα πῦρ, ἀλλ’ εἰκὸς ἦν μετενηχῆθαι ἀλλαχόθεν ἐνταῦθα τὴν τέφραν.

Besides the further elaboration on the heuristic role of enthymemes, Stephanus’ text too offers a fully systematic exemplification of the chronological taxonomy for signs. The commentator also seems to attribute heuristic value to the chronological taxonomy itself, specifying that only the signs which are contemporary with the signified thing are τεκμήρια, i.e. first form syllogisms.

Again, the case chosen for the sign of a fact that will take place in the future is a source of variation: here it is the rainbow that alerts us of the coming storm – rather than heralding its conclusion, as we would be inclined to expect. Still, the “πῦρ and τέφρα” and the “πῦρ and καπνός” examples precisely mirror what we find in the *Parisinus Arabus 2346* and in Philoponus’ text.

Although the other option cannot be excluded, Philoponus has a stronger likelihood than the Arabic tradition of having been Stephanus’ source, for it surely was available to Byzantine readers, and for ancient commentaries were one of his main references.⁶⁵⁶ However, if we keep in mind that, in Anna Comnena’s age, the Greek tradition did not mainly link Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*

⁶⁵⁶ See T.M. Conley, *Aristotle's Rhetoric in Byzantium*, in *Rhetorica* VIII.1, 1990.

with his logical writings, but rather with his political treatises, the idea that a short observation could have transmigrated from a commentary on the *Prior Analytics* to a commentary on the *Rhetoric* seems more likely within the Arabic world. Should we accept this reconstruction of the Byzantine reception of the *Rhetoric* without any reservation?

Still, the most interesting question arising from the note in Parisinus Arabus 2346 is how Philoponus' text could reach the Arabic glossator. Although the whole of the Greek commentary is generally assumed to be authentic, Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist* states that, as it is often the case with the *Prior Analytics*, Philoponus' work was only translated into Arabic up to the discussion of *al-š k ʿdmaliyya*, the predicative figures.⁶⁵⁷ This would leave out of Philoponus' text most of its second book. Although it is very hard to establish the worth of Ibn al-Nadīm's remark as far as the Greek commentary is concerned, this probably means that only its first book was translated into Arabic and available during the 10th Century.

Accordingly, what should we think of the Paris manuscript note? Either it entered the margin of the *Prior Analytics* in a still Greek-speaking (or maybe Syriac-speaking) community, it was translated as such and subsequently faithfully copied always in the same place, or it testifies that more Alexandrian texts were translated into Arabic and – directly or indirectly – available to the editor of the Paris *Organon*.⁶⁵⁸ The fact that these texts would not have been known by Ibn al-Nadīm is by no means an unsurmountable obstacle.

⁶⁵⁷ B. Dodge (using Flügel's text *al-ǧumliyyah*) understands universal syllogisms or composite syllogisms, see *The Fihrist of al-Nadim: A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, p. 600. Also see Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249,6-10, ed. G. Flügel.

⁶⁵⁸ Specific interest in the chapters of the *Prior Analytics* that discuss rhetorical argumentative devices is shown by the Syriac glossator of ms. *Istanbul Ayasofya 2442*, where the Arabic terms for *enthymeme*, *opposition*, *sign*, and *necessary sign* are all translated and transliterated in Syriac and Greek, besides being glossed by other Arabic expressions as well. I came into contact with this manuscript through the PhiBor project (ERC AdvGr, www.avicennaproject.eu), and what I state here on this subject is a provisional result of the research pursued in that domain.

1.6 – Conclusion: Avicenna’s and Fārābī's Philological Leanings in Dealing with the Arabic Text of the Rhetoric

As a conclusion of my analysis of the rhetorical lexicon in Fārābī and in Avicenna, I believe I can state that its main results are two. Concerning Fārābī,⁶⁵⁹ I have pointed out how, whenever he had philosophical reasons to discuss the problem of rhetorical premises, he was shown interest in the rich vocabulary produced by the translation history of the Arabic *Organon*. Firstly, in *Š dī al-Ḥiṭā b* the terms *m a q b*, *ḡ l a ṣ ḥ*, *ḡ* and *ḡ n d*, *ḡ* were probably used as synonyms.⁶⁶⁰ Later developments in Fārābī’s understanding of what constitutes the *proprium* of *Rhetoric* (in the *ḡ a w ā* and in *Š dī al-Qi y*)⁶⁶¹ and its separation from rhetorical premises themselves (in *K i t ā b a l Ḥiṭā b*)⁶⁶² motivated the philosopher to structure his lexicon hierarchically, reserving the fuller meaning of ἔνδοξον for one main Arabic term, and developing different semantic nuances in order to characterize complementary terms. This strategy, that allowed Fārābī to promote and demote expressions like *m a q b*, *ḡ l a ṣ ḥ*, *ḡ* and *ḡ n d* from the main to the complementary tier whenever required by the theoretical developments of his reflection, was also susceptible to integrate a maximum of logical terms of Peripatetic ancestry into Islamic scholarly thought, thus fulfilling one of Fārābī’s main objectives in composing his Aristotelian commentaries.⁶⁶³

Concerning Avicenna, after observing similar phenomena, I would like to stress how his interest in the nuances of Aristotelian lexical nuances, if not equally present in all his texts, was not a youthful trait, to which succeeded indifference for Avicenna’s wording.

⁶⁵⁹ See the subsection of this text titled *Fārābī ’ s P h i l o s o p h i c a l G l o s s a r y: L e x i c a l R h e t o r i c S t r a t e g i e s*, pp. 156 ff.

⁶⁶⁰ See *Didascalía* § 10, in al-Fārābī, *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis*, M. Grignaschi (éd.), in *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971, pp. 165-166

⁶⁶¹ See for example Fārābī, *K i t ā b l i r ḡ l a ṣ ḥ* 20,17-21,3, ed. Fahrī, and Fārābī, *Š dī al-Q i y* *Al-manti q i y l y ā t l i F ā r*, *ḡ l b* II pp. 510,23-513,14, ed. Daniš-pažuh. On the subject of the development of the conception of the *proprium* of *Rhetoric* in Fārābī, see M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ’ A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é s p a r d e v u e i m m é d i a t e t c o m m u n*, in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992.

⁶⁶² See Fārābī, *K i t ā b Ḥiṭā b* 105,15-107,11 J. Langhade (ed.).

⁶⁶³ See D. Gutas, *Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works*, in Ch. Burnett (ed.) *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, London, The Warburg Institute, 1993.

One of the most remarkable aspects of Avicenna's relationship to rhetorical lexicon is his interest in the letter of what he regarded as Aristotle's text. As a general rule, Avicenna conformed to the rhetorical terms which had become standard within the Peripatetic tradition rather than to the often odd solutions of the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Still, this is more the case in works like *K i t āḤlā ḡtāh* in *K i t āḤlā*, where standard lexicon is still the norm, but terms taken from the Arabic translation are sometimes showcased and glossed over by Avicenna.

The same attitude can occasionally be observed in Fārābī's and Averroes' works as well. For example, Fārābī normally employs the standard term *ḍa m īn* in order to refer to enthymemes, but in his *K i t āḤbi yāh* also showcases the expression *qiyā s*, taken from the Arabic translation of the *Prior Analytics*. In the same way, Averroes systematically uses the word *istiqrā* for the logical procedure of induction, but on occasion he also employs the less common *i't i b ā r* with the only goal, as far as I can tell, of mirroring its appearance in the Arabic translation, alongside *ī ḡ ā*, transliteration of the Greek ἐπαγωγή.

Still, this happens much more frequently in Avicenna's *K i t āḤlā*, for which I will only mention a few examples: firstly, the coexistence of the standard *ḍa m ān* and of the rarer *t a f f o r ī r* ἐνθύμημα, and, secondly, the appearance of the really outlandish translation *burhā n* (which normally means *deduction, demonstration*) for the Greek παράδειγμα (*example*), together with the more common expressions *tamtī* and *miṭāl*. Moreover, we have already pointed out that Avicenna occasionally makes reference to the rhetorical sign, called σημεῖον by Aristotle, by means of the expression *r u s ū ḥ a w ā* instead of the plain *ʿa l ā m* can only explain this choice with Avicenna's desire of giving a posterity to the sporadic translation of σημεῖον with *rāsim* and *rasm* in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*. Finally, let us recall how, in *K i t āḤlā*, Avicenna did sometimes refer to what is *probable* with the expressions *ṣā d ān* and *w ā ḡ* which had both appeared as translations of Aristotle's εἰκός in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*. Elsewhere,

Avicenna mainly favoured the more standard solution *maḥm ū*. The case of *al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā*, in which *w ā ġ* – but not *šā d i* – is used like in *K i t ʿā lā*, constitutes a relevant exception.⁶⁶⁴

Alongside Avicenna’s preface to *K i t ʿā lā*, from which he states that in this work he will mainly try to give a satisfactory account of Peripatetic thought rather than of his own philosophy, I think that this conservative and sometimes explicative attitude towards the lexicon of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is one of the reasons why we – rightfully – understand *K i t ʿā lā* as a text still very attentive to its relationship with the Aristotelian corpus. Rather than a peculiarity of his youthful years, for Avicenna this was a diachronical center of interest, which however did not prevent our philosopher from believing that his task was not limited to the explanation of Aristotle, but rather expanded the integration of all strands of Peripatetic textual and conceptual tradition in his systematic exposition of perfected knowledge, so that, also on account of having effectively integrated Aristotelian thought and vocabulary, *K i t ʿā lā* could substitute it. The technical terminology of rhetoric is just one of the many fields in which we can see the interaction between Avicenna’s tendency towards a philological attitude towards Aristotle’s text and a systematic attitude towards the search for philosophical truth.

⁶⁶⁴ See the section devoted to *The Generally Recognized in al-Ḥikma al-‘ Aḍiyyā* at pp. 86-89 of the present text.

2 – Hermannus Alemannus’s Arabic-Latin translation

In the following pages, I discuss the interplay between Hermannus’ translation of Aristotle and his citations from Avicenna, looking both at Hermannus’ own statements and at his practice. After a brief introduction about what we know about the material and intellectual context of Hermannus’ work and a few words about the witnesses of his translation of the *Rhetoric* (chapters 2.3 and 2.4), I wish to focus firstly on the various degree of literality Hermannus employs when he deals with his different authors (chapters 2.5 and 2.6), and secondly on the principles that guide him in deciding which source to select in different contexts (chapter 2.7). Finally, I will add some thoughts on the genetic relations between Hermannus’ Avicennian source and the *Book of the Cure* manuscripts and I will try to gauge whether Hermannus’ version could be used to improve the Arabic editions of the *Rhetoric* and of the *Book of the Cure*, and whether this might tell us anything about their early transmission (section 2.8).

2.3 – Hermannus Alemannus and his Literary Activity

2.3.1 – Hermannus’ life and work

Hermannus Alemannus was active as a scholar during the 13th Century, within the territories of the Crown of Castile.⁶⁶⁵ He was probably bishop of Astorga (in León) from 1266 to 1270 – the year of his death – and he is mainly known for having translated from Arabic to Latin Aristotele’s works concerned with poetry, rhetoric, and ethics, along with Arabic commentaries about the

⁶⁶⁵ On Hermannus’ biography, see G.H. Luquet, *Hermannus Alemannus* (León, 1901), pp. 407-422.

same subjects.⁶⁶⁶ He began translating Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on *Poetics* spurred by the Bishop of Toledo and by the chancellor of the King of Castile. After achieving this work by 1256, with the goal of making all the sections of the Alexandrian *Organon* available to the Latin public, Hermannus Alemannus undertook to prepare a Latin version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* from Arabic, again for the crown of Castile. In this context, he also translated some short sections of Fārābī's *K i t āb al-Hikmah*, *Book of the Rhetoric*, and of Averroes' *Middle Commentary*⁶⁶⁷ on the *Rhetoric*, together with two excerpts from the rhetoric section of Avicenna's *K i t āb al-Ṣifā*, *Book of the Cure* (II.2 73,7-75,15 and IV.1 206,8-212,16 of Sālim's edition),⁶⁶⁸ in order to substitute or explain difficult sections of Aristotle's text.⁶⁶⁹ Since the quotes from other sources are finalized to explaining Aristotle's text and not to the divulgation of those texts as such, Hermannus' attitude is sometimes rather paraphrastic when dealing with them.

2.3.2 – Hermannus' translation in the context of the Latin reception of the Rhetoric

The 13th Century marked a turning point in the reception of the *Rhetoric* in the Western World. Until the 12th Century, Aristotle's text, still unavailable in Latin, was mainly known through texts like Cicero's *De Inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which inevitably bestowed a Ciceronian slant on it.⁶⁷⁰ This fitted well with the assumption that rhetoric, together with grammar and

⁶⁶⁶ Actually, the version of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is ascribed to this translator on stylistic ground: see A. Akasoy and A. Fidora, *Hermannus Alemannus und die alia translatio der Nikomachischen Ethik*, in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 44 (2002), and D.N. Hasse, *Latin Averroes Translations of the First Half of the Thirteenth Century*, Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 2010.

⁶⁶⁷ We glean this piece of information from Hermannus' prologues to his rhetorical and poetical translation, both available in W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus* in *Viatrolog* 2, 1970, pp. 227-250. Translation s

⁶⁶⁸ M.S. Sālim, *Ibn Sīnā infā*, 'Allogi-Hikmah', Imprimerie Nationale, 1954. que (Al

⁶⁶⁹ The nature of these difficulties is discussed in W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus* in *Viatrolog* 2, vol. 2, 1970, in F. Woerther, *Les citations du Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique arabo-latine de la Rhétorique* in *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences et des Lettres de Paris* 1969, 2010, pp. 323-359, and in G. Celli, *Some Observations about Hermannus Alemannus' Citations of Avicenna's Book of the Rhetoric*, in *Oriens* vol. 40.2 (2012), pp. 477-513.

⁶⁷⁰ Cicero's rhetorical thought did absorb many Aristotelian leads, so much so that Cicero is one of the first ancient sources for large textual quotes from the *Rhetoric*. However, although Aristotle's role as source for basic rhetorical tenets like the three genres distinction was known (See Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* 3.4), until the 12th Century, the

dialectic, belonged to the *trivium*, and had therefore a set role in the education of scholars. This assumption was however called in question both by further reflection on the partition of sciences on the basis of different Late Antique distinctions,⁶⁷¹ and by the translation, during the first half of the 12th Century, of Arabic works on the same subjects like Fārābī's *De scientiis* by Gerard of Cremona. The position of rhetorics in Arabic partitions of sciences rested on the inclusion of the Aristotelian treatise, together with Poetics, in the 6th Century Alexandrian *Organon*.⁶⁷² This created a tension between the authoritative Ciceronian picture, which portrayed rhetorics as akin to politics and ethics, and the no less authoritative Peripatetic tradition, within which rhetoric was a part of logic. As highlighted by G. Dahan,⁶⁷³ it was this tension that made a Latin version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* into a major *desideratum* for people like Roger Bacon and Hermannus Alemannus, who discussed this subject in Paris, shortly before the middle of the 13th Century.⁶⁷⁴

The first Greek-Latin translation of the *Rhetoric*, called *Vetus*, actually goes back to the beginning of the 13th Century. Its author is unknown and its diffusion was minimal.⁶⁷⁵ Around

readers' attentions was mainly caught in solving intestine problems of Cicero's elaboration on rhetoric, such as the armonization between the three rhetorical genres and the constitutiones system, which is characterized differently in the *De Inventione* and in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. On the subject, see T.M. Conley, *Aristotle's Rhetoric in Byzantium*, in *Rhetorica* VIII.1, 1990, pp. 43-44.

⁶⁷¹ These are the opposition between theoretical and practical knowledge (which is actually Aristotelian), the distinction of speculative sciences into physics, mathematics and theology, and the stoic tripartition between physics, moral and logic. On the interplay between these options and the position of rhetorics, see G. Dahan, *L'entrée de la Rhétorique d'Aristote dans le*, in H. Rosier-Catach, G. Dahan (ed.), *La Rhétorique 240 et 127 d'Arīstōtēiōns et comme siècle*. Paris: Vrin, 1998, pp. 67-69.

⁶⁷² On the subject, see D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Leiden, Brill, 1990.

⁶⁷³ G. Dahan, *L'entrée de la Rhétorique d'Aristote dans le*, in H. Rosier-Catach, G. Dahan (ed.), *La Rhétorique 240 et 127 d'Arīstōtēiōns et comme siècle*. Paris: Vrin, 1998, pp. 65-66.

⁶⁷⁴ On Bacon's perception of the central role of Aristotle's still untranslated *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, see R. Bacon, *Opus Maius* III, p. 71, ed. Bridges. On the meeting between Bacon and Hermannus, see R. Bacon, *Moralis Philosophia* VI, p. 276, 19-28.

⁶⁷⁵ C. Marmo does not hesitate about dating this translation, but B. Schneider, editor of the Greek-Latin translations of the *Rhetoric*, specifies that it is to be understood as a *terminus ante quem*, resting upon the presumed copy date of its most ancient witness, the ms. Toletanus latinus 47.15. The latter goes back to the middle of the 13th Century. However, the many difficulties met by the anonymous translator and his frequent employment of transliterated Greek words (especially for technical terms) lead Schneider to believe that this translation was more ancient, and

1256 and 1269 respectively, Hermannus Alemannus' Arabic-Latin *Rhetoric* and William Moerbeke's Greek-Latin *Rhetoric* are finally published.⁶⁷⁶ According to B. Schneider, the Arabic-Latin had a very scant diffusion,⁶⁷⁷ as suggested by the fact that it only survives in two copies. However, C. Marmo⁶⁷⁸ has pointed out how Giles of Rome, when composing in Paris the first Latin commentary on the *Rhetoric* (1272-1273) based upon Moerbeke's version, made use of Hermannus' Arabic-Latin translation and of the anonymous Greek-Latin *Vetus* in order to overcome the brachylogy and the obscure examples of Aristotle's text. Beside Giles, Hermannus' text was also read by Thomas Aquinas and Jean de Jandun.⁶⁷⁹

In the first half of the Century, the new climate and the new translations pave the way for further discussion of other Aristotelian rhetorical subjects, this time mediated by the fourth book of Boethius' *De topicis differentiis*. A prime example is the analysis of the relationship between rhetorics ad dialectics, which was especially relevant in the light of the growing importance of logic in contemporary philosophical thought. Nonetheless, in the 13th and 14th Centuries, the idea that rhetorics are better understood in relationship with ethics and politics remained on the whole more popular.

In the 14th Century, Moerbeke's translation and Giles of Rome's commentary will turn Aristotle's text into a new classic of rhetorical education, while the Ciceronian perspective, which links rhetoric with ethics and politics rather than with dialectics, will ultimately prevail. In this context, the interest of commentators will shift to the role played by the character (ἦθος) of the

possibly earlier than the 13th Century. See Aristotle, *Rhetorica: Translatio anonyma et Guillelmi*, ed. B. Schneider, Leiden, Brill 1978, p. XIII.

⁶⁷⁶ The date for Moerbeke's translation is again to be understood as a *terminus ante quem*, grounded on the quotes from the Latin *Rhetoric* in the *Quaestio disputata de malo* (circa 1269-1270), in the *Summa Theologiae Ia Ilae* (circa 1271) in the *Summa Theologiae Ila Ilae* (around 1272) by Thoma Aquinas. On this subject, see Aristotle, *Rhetorica: Translatio anonyma et Guillelmi*, ed. B. Schneider, Leiden, Brill 1978, p. XXVIII.

⁶⁷⁷ Cfr Aristotle, *Rhetorica: Translatio anonyma et Guillelmi*, ed. B. Schneider, Leiden, Brill 1978, p. X.

⁶⁷⁸ C. Marmo, *L' utilizzazione della Rhetorica nei commenti di Egidio Romano (1272-1273)*, in *La Rhétorique d' Aristote: traditions et*, G. Dahan, ed. R. Rosier-Catach (edd.), Paris 1998, p. 153-163.

⁶⁷⁹ E. Beltran, *Les questions de Jean de Jandun sur l' éthique à Paris*, in *La Rhétorique d' Aristote. Traditions et*, G. Dahan, ed. R. Rosier-Catach (edd.), Paris 1998, pp. 153-163.

speaker and by the passion (πάθος) of the public. Aristotle himself regarded them as πίστεις ἔντεχνοι (e.g. in 1356a1-4), and they were better suited than enthymematic theory to the prevailing ethic and political reading of the *Rhetoric*. Commentators were especially interested in the fairness of using *sermons passionales* in rhetorical practice.⁶⁸⁰

2.4 – The Witnesses of Hermannus' Rhetoric

We know about Hermannus' yet unedited translation thanks to three manuscripts,⁶⁸¹ namely ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, ms. Toledo, Biblioteca Capitulare, 47.15, and ms. Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. Plut. 90 Sup. 64, even if the latter copy only contains the citations from Averroes, to the exclusion of quotes from Fārābī and Avicenna, and of Aristotle's text itself. In Aegidius Romanus' commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which mainly relies on Moerbeke's Greek-Latin translation,⁶⁸² there are short quotes from Hermannus' text as well, mainly drawn from the part of the translation regarding Aristotle rather than from his commentators cited by the translator.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ The idea that rhetorics and dialectics are somehow interrelated will not be lost entirely. An interesting example of this is George of Trebizonde, who began his career as a rhetorician within the boundaries of byzantine hermogenian and Latin Ciceronian elaboration, but after translating Aristotle's *Rhetoric* from Greek between 1442 (in Florence) and 1446 (in Rome) went on to produce a handbook of Aristotelian dialectic and logic on scholastic sources, intended for the use of humanists and orators. See J. Monfasani, *George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic*, Leiden, Brill, 1976.

⁶⁸¹ For this text some editorial *specimina* that forego a recensio are nonetheless available. The translator's prologue, together with the incipit and explicit of the translation, are present in G. Lacombe, A.L. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, E. Franceschini, L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles latinus: codices*, Cambridge, University Press, 1955, 1.211 and ff., while 1355a20-1355b25, 1377b16-1378a31, and 1403b6-1404a11 are printed in the edition of *Rhetorica Vetus* and of Moerbeke's version (B. Schneider, *Rhetorica: Translatio anonyma et Guillelmi*, Leiden, Brill 1978.)

⁶⁸² The first Greek-Latin translation of the *Rhetoric*, from an unknown author and rarely copied, goes back to the beginning of the 13th Century, while the much more famous version by William of Moerbeke is dated 1269. According to R. Kassel's stemmatic reconstruction, the anonymous version rests entirely within the γ branch, while Moerbeke's text derives both from γ and from Δ. Cfr. Aristotle, *Aristotelis ars rhetorica*, R. Kassel. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1976, and G. Dahan, *L'entrée de la Rhétorique d'Aristote en France*, in R. Cailly, G. Dahan (eds.), *La Rhétorique d'Aristote en France*, Paris: Klincksieck, 1998, pp. 165-86.

⁶⁸³ Cfr. C. Marmo, *Retorica e poetica*, in L. Bianchi (ed.), *La filosofia nelle Università. Secoli XIII e XIV*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia 1997.

Ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673: Parchment codex dating to the 13th Century. It was penned in gothic letters by two different copyists – the first active up to 61r and the second from 65r – and it consists of 172 folia divided in two columns each. It contains no corrections, but sporadic glosses appear in the section that contains Hermannus’ *Rhetoric*. This text – mistakenly named *Averroes in Rhetoricam* by *Aristoteles Latinus* – covers folia 65r-147r. The manuscript also preserves *Rhetorica Vetus* (ff. 1r-61r), a list of Greek words found in this text (f. 61v), and Averroes’ *Middle Commentary* on the *Poetics*, again translated by Hermannus. On the verso of the last folio we can read: *Explicit Deo gratias anno Domini millesimo ducentesimo quinquagesimo sexto, septimo decimo die Marcii, apud Toletum, urbem nobilem. Aristoteles Latinus* refers this statement to the translation of the commentary on the *Poetics* rather than to the copying of the codex, which goes back to the 13th Century, as stated above.⁶⁸⁴

Ms. Toledo, Biblioteca Capitulare, 47.15: Parchment codex dating to the 13th Century, made up of 160 folia followed by two blank ones. It is a very large manuscript, its pages are organized on three columns and two different copyists penned sections ff. 1r-146v and ff. 147r-160. There are no marginal notes and the upper third of each page is hard to read because it was damaged by humidity. The translation of the *Rhetoric* covers folia 36r-53r, but many more texts are included in the codex. They vary in subject, but they are all philosophical in nature. Quite a few of them share the characteristics of being Aristotelian, translated from Arabic, or devoted to rhetoric subjects. The *Rhetorica Vetus* occupies folia 25r-35v.⁶⁸⁵

Ms. Florence, Biblioteca medicea laurenziana, Gadd. Plut. 90 Sup. 64:⁶⁸⁶ Paper codex going back to the end of the 15th Century, in Italian humanistic hand, made up of 106 folia preceded by 5 blank folia. Two copyists have been working on it. In the margins and in the interline there are

⁶⁸⁴ Cfr G. Lacombe, A.L. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, E. Franceschini, L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles latinus: codices*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1955, I.706.

⁶⁸⁵ Cfr G. Lacombe, A.L. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, E. Franceschini, L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles latinus: codices*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955, II.1243.

⁶⁸⁶ On this witness, see W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus*, in *Vidua* vol. 2, 1970, caudl B. *Trans* Schneider, *Rhetorica: Translatio anonyma et Guillelmi*, Leiden, Brill 1978.

glossae and *scholia* inserted by a hand slightly younger than the copyists'. It does not contain the whole of Hermannus' translation of the *Rhetoric*, but only quotes from Averroes taken from chapters I.1-5, which cover folia 105r-106v. The manuscript also preserves the Latin version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* prepared between 1442 and 1446 by George of Trebizond (ff. 1r-97r)⁶⁸⁷ and *summaria* for the three books of the *Rhetoric* (97r-104v)⁶⁸⁸

Aegidius Romanus' commentary on the *Rhetoric* is still unedited, but the edition printed in Venice in 1515 is easily available thanks to a reprint.⁶⁸⁹ However, this witness is not – strictly speaking – pertinent to our task, since, at the best of my knowledge, Aegidius' quotes from Hermannus' translation are always taken from the text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* translated into Latin, and never from the philosophical quotes that are added from Averroes, Fārābī, and Avicenna.

When discussing Hermannus' text, I act on the presumption that the Paris and the Toledo manuscripts shared a common ancestor, for there are passages where the text that they both

⁶⁸⁷ On the composition of this translation, see J. Monfasani, *George of Trebizond: a Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic*, Leiden, Brill, 1976, p. 55, where it is said that, though achieved in Rome, this work was probably begun in Florence. On its witnesses, see J. Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezuntiana: texts, documents and bibliographies of George of Trebizond*, Binghamton, N.Y., Center for medieval and early Renaissance studies, the Renaissance society of America 1984, pp. 698-701. The presence of George's translation of the *Rhetoric* together with Hermannus' Averroistic *excerpta* seems to be unique on the basis of the description of George's *codices* offered by Monfasani. George also prepared a set of *scholia* on Aristotle's text (printed in J. Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezuntiana: texts, documents and bibliographies of George of Trebizond*, Binghamton, N.Y., Center for medieval and early Renaissance studies, the Renaissance society of America 1984, pp. 465-472), but, at first glance, they seem to have no contentistic relation with Averroes' commentary. A possible path for further speculation is that, according to Monfasani, while most Trapezuntian witnesses are located in Italy, a cohesive group of manuscripts preserved in Spain were copied for Spaniards in Rome, and are characterized, in Monfasani's own words, by a "strongly Aristotelian flavor." See J. Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezuntiana: texts, documents and bibliographies of George of Trebizond*, Binghamton, N.Y., Center for medieval and early Renaissance studies, the Renaissance society of America 1984, p. XVII.

⁶⁸⁸ Cfr G. Lacombe, A.L. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, E. Franceschini, L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles latinus: codices*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955, II.2343.

⁶⁸⁹ Aegidius Romanus, *Commentaria in Rhetoricam Aristotelis*, Venice 1515, Unverändert Nachdruck, Minerva G.M.B.H., Frankfurt 1968. A regional list of Giles' manuscripts is in F. Del Punta, C. Luna, B. Faes De Mottoni, *Aegidii Romani opera omnia, Catalogo dei manoscritti*, in *Corpus philosophorum medii aevi*, Firenze, Olschki 1993.

preserve cannot be right.⁶⁹⁰ Moreover, both witnesses are characterized by individual mistakes, so that none of them can be viewed as *eliminandus* in the reconstruction of the text. I am incapable of making reliable assumptions on the stemmatic position of Aegidius' commentary vis-à-vis Hermannus' translation, but, as explained above, this is not a relevant factor when discussing Avicennian quotes in Hermannus' *Rhetoric*. On these premises, whenever I quote Hermannus translation of Aristotle's and Avicenna's *Rhetoric*, I make use of the text that I personally assembled by collating its witnesses. I wish to highlight that this version of the Latin text is, by all points of view, provisional: my goal is simply to provide the reader with a meaningful text and some information about what readings our witnesses offer. For reference purpose, I always quote page and line number of the Paris manuscript. Whenever I adopt a reading from the Toledo manuscript, I specify it.

2.5 - Hermannus' statements on his own translations

As shown by Boggess,⁶⁹¹ there is evidence for three translations by Hermannus related to the last two books of the Arabic *Organon*:⁶⁹² one derived from Al-Fārābī's works on the *Rhetoric* - which include a *divisio textus* and explanatory material - one from Averroes' commentary on the *Poetics*, and one - with which I am concerned here - mainly from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* itself.

⁶⁹⁰ See for example the case of *decentia* (to be emended in *decentiam*) and of *significatum* (possibly to be emended in *dictio*) at paragraph 2.8.4 of this work, and of *munus* and *munusculum* (to be emended in *minus* and *minusculum* respectively) at paragraph 2.8.6.

⁶⁹¹ See W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus' Rhetorical Translations*, in *Viator*, vol. 2 (1970).

⁶⁹² Evidence for the translation of the *Rhetoric* comes from manuscripts sources only, while evidence for Averroes' *Middle Commentary* to the *Poetics* and al-Fārābī's commentary on the *Rhetoric* is based upon manuscript texts and a 1481 printed edition from Venice.

In their manuscript copies, each work is coupled with a foreword by the translator.⁶⁹³

While the short prologue to Al-Fārābī's text focuses exclusively on the content of the book and its usefulness, the introductions to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and to Averroes' *Poetics* give us some insight concerning Hermannus' intentions.

2.5.1 - Citations from Arabic commentators

To begin with, introducing the *Rhetoric*, Hermannus states that he envisages the translations of this treatise and of the *Poetics* as a global project whose goal is to make the last unexplored sections of the *Organon* available to Latin readers.⁶⁹⁴ The wording also implies that Hermannus'

⁶⁹³ The prologue to Fārābī's text can be found in W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus in Viatu Rhetoric* vol. 2, 1970, and the prologue to Averroes' *Poetics* in G. Lacombe, A.L. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, E. Franceschini, L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles latinus: codices*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955, I.212-213, while the prologue to the Aristotelian *Rhetoric* is in both sources.

⁶⁹⁴ Parts of Aristotle's *Organon* started being available for Latin readers in Late Antiquity. An overview of its translation history can be gleaned from the introductions to the *Aristoteles Latinus* volumes: by Hermannus' time, the *Isagoge* had been translated thrice, once by Marius Victorinus in the 4th Century, once by Boethius (c. 475-526), and once by an unknown author, identified with Gilbertus Porreta (who died in 1154) from the 13th Century onwards. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello disagrees with this attribution, and dates the text to the beginning of the 12th Century. For the *Topics*, two recensions were produced by Boethius and one by an anonymous 12th Century scholar. The *Sophistical Refutations* were translated by Boethius and by James of Venice towards the half of the 12th Century, while the Latin version of the *On Interpretation* was also provided by Boethius. We know of two ancient Latin versions of the *Categories*, one by Boethius and one by an anonymous author, which is known thanks to an edition based at the same time on this translation and on the former one. On stylistic grounds, the author of the anonymous text cannot be identified with Marius Victorinus; in any case, he acted before the end of the 9th Century. A 4th Century Latin paraphrasis of Aristotle's text was also edited by Alcuin in 780 or 790, erroneously attributed to Augustine and widely circulated. The *Prior Analytics* were translated in Late Antiquity by Boethius as well, and again around the half of the 12th Century by a scholar whom Lorenzo Minio-Paluello identified on stylistic grounds with the translator of the *Topics* and possibly with James of Venice. The translation history of the *Posterior Analytics* is more complex, for, albeit Boethius declares that he translated them, we do not dispose of further proof for this statement. James of Venice produced what is known as the *Vulgata* translation, while another version completed before 1153 survives in only one exemplar, on which the name *Ioannis* seems to appear. Finally, the *Posterior Analytics* were also translated by Gerard of Cremona (who was born around 1114 and died around 1187). However, the questions of which of the aforementioned texts were within Hermannus' reach remains entirely unexplored. William of Moerbeke (born between 1215 and 1235 and dead around 1286) was active in the same time span as Hermannus, and we could speculate whether the latter

original plan was to translate Aristotle's *Poetics* rather than Averroes' commentary. At the same time, in 65rb4-8 Hermannus complains about the complexity of his task:

Nec miretur quisquam vel indi/gnetur [5] de difficultate vel quasi rudita/te translationis, nam multo difficilius/ et rudius ex greco in arabicum est transla/ta.

Further on, at lines 65rb25-65va22, Hermannus dwells on the possible consequences of such difficulties:

[25] Veniam igitur concedant qui forsitan non/ immerito poterunt hunc meum laborem de/ imperfectione redarguere ...

... sed potest, quoquomodo/ his⁶⁹⁵ habitis per paulativa⁶⁹⁶ incrementa, finis/ tandem desiderate perfectionis facilius/ impertiri, quemadmodum contingit in/ libro Nichomachie quem latini E/thicam [10] Aristotilis appellant. Nam et hunc/ prout potui in latinum verti eloquium/ ex arabico. Et postmodum reve/rendus pater magister Robertus, grossi ca/pitis, sed subtilis intellectus, Linkonien/sis [15] episcopus, ex primo fonte unde ema/naverat, greco videlicet, ipsum est com/pletius interpretatus et grecorum commen/tis proprias annectens notulas commen/tatus.

Sic, si totius scientie largitori/ [20] placuerit, contingere poterit in his opus/culis primordialiter a nobis, etsi debi/liter, elaboratis ...

Hermannus wishes that those who will be offended by the roughness of his translation will accept it as a provisional tool, until someone else will provide a better one from the Greek original.

knew the Latin translation of the *On Interpretation* provided by the former. Cfr G. Lacombe, A.L. Birkenmajer, M. Dulong, E. Franceschini, L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles latinus: codices*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955.

⁶⁹⁵ The word *his* is missing from the Paris manuscript, but it is in the Toledo manuscript.

⁶⁹⁶ Both the Toledo and the Paris manuscripts read *paulatina*, but the adjective *paulatinus* does not appear in any lexicographical corpus I could check. Even if the Spanish adjective *paulatino-na* does mean *gradual*, I would rather settle for the emendation *paulativa*, from the adjective *paulativus*, listed by Du Cange. The lexicographer quotes the *De gratiis et virtutibus beatae et gloriosae semper V. Mariae*, a treatise by Engelbert of Admont, who was born in Styria some decades after Hermannus. See *Aristoteles latinus: codices*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1955), I.211-212.

However, he also describes the already available work by Robertus Grosseteste as a compound of a Greek-based translation and commentaries taken from Greek authors. Boggess⁶⁹⁷ argues that it is in this very respect that the word *sic* likens Robertus' and Hermannus' versions, so that the translator's words should be taken to mean *complete interpretatus et arabum commentis proprias annectens notulas commentatus sum*. This statement would be backed up by the fact that our text is indeed often interrupted by explanatory citations from Al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes, all of whom are named in the translator's prologue. Nevertheless, since the main subject of the passage is the provisional character of faulty translations, which will subsequently be replaced by better ones, rather than the necessity of supplementing them with commentaries, I do not believe that *sic* can be interpreted in the sense wished by Boggess. The word *primordialiter* in the following line also suggests that what the author is now interested in is the possibility that at a later stage someone will be able to produce a better translation of the *Rhetoric*, thanks to access to Greek sources.

Accordingly, I must come to the conclusion that in this foreword Hermannus does not announce his intention of adding passages from Arabic commentators to the Latin translation, even if this is definitely what the readers will see him doing later on.

However, Hermannus does write explicitly about making use of Arabic commentators when introducing the first Avicennian citation, since in 77ra20-22, after stating that Aristotle's

⁶⁹⁷ See W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus, sin'Viator* vol. 2, 1970, p. 247. *Translations*

text is here incomprehensible, he states that he will add to this passage something from the *Book of the Cure: post ipsum ad eius elucidationem textum Avicenne ex libro suo Asschiphe subiungere usque ad finem capituli*. On the other hand, Averroes' citations are briefly, though systematically, introduced by the bare name of the commentator, sometimes preceded by the verb *dixit*.⁶⁹⁸ The same device - namely the insertion of the *inquit translator* phrase - holds for Hermannus' editorial insertions occurring within Aristotle's text.

Quotes from Al-Fārābī's are usually brief, but those from Avicenna and Averroes are full-fledged citations, which, even if not always literal,⁶⁹⁹ run from a few lines to some pages in length.

Averroes' citations by far outnumber those of Avicenna: Boggess counted thirteen of the former and only two of the latter.⁷⁰⁰ Avicenna's citations are however longer than those from Averroes. Boggess' systematical census of the Averroistic passages stops at 76rb, but Woerther's contribution on Hermannus and Averroes will show that there actually are no more sections from

⁶⁹⁸ The only exception to this rule is the citation from Averroes which appears in 77r of the Paris manuscript and in 38va of the Toledo manuscript, wrongly attributed to Avicenna.

⁶⁹⁹ On Hermannus' non-literal approach to Averroes' texts, see F. Woerther, *Les citations du Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d'Aristote par Averroès dans le manuscrit de la Bibliothèque de Saint-Joseph*, *Vol. 63* (2010-2011): *é Saint*

⁷⁰⁰ The first of these citations, discussed in this work, deals with what men regard as good and with the proper rewards for good and bad actions. It is added to the end of Aristotle's chapter I.6. The second citation, beginning in 128ra of the Paris manuscript, analyzes metaphors, periphrasis, diminutives, stylistic coldness, and comparisons. Unlike the previous case, here the Aristotelian text for III.2-4 is completely substituted by Avicenna's words. On the subject, see the table in section 5 of this chapter.

the *Middle Commentary* in our text,⁷⁰¹ even if some citations from al-Fārābī will follow and both the Avicennian passages are still to come. This assumption is backed by the fact that the collection of Averroistic excerpts in ms. *Laur. Plut. 90 Sup. 64* ends here as well.

Finally, Boggess also remarks upon the presence of explicitly highlighted insertions by the translator in which Hermannus states that he is going to omit a section of Aristotle's work, either because of the difficulty of the passage in the Arabic text, or because of the obscurity of the Greek examples used in it.⁷⁰²

2.5.2 - Literal and paraphrastic translation in Hermannus' statements

In the prologue to the *Rhetoric*, Hermannus informs us **(a)** that he began working on the translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* because of a request from John, bishop of Burgos, and from the king of Castile; **(b)** that these treatises are significant inasmuch as they complete the *Organon*, like stated by the Arabic commentators; **(c)** that Cicero's and Horace's works are no substitutes for the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, since they do not deal with logic but rather with politics and grammar; **(d)** that while translating the Aristotelian treatises he was confronted with many difficulties - namely the obscurity of the Arabic version, the unfamiliar Greek examples it contains, and the scarcity of Arabic scholars prepared to deal with this text; **(e)** that he hopes the readers will forgive the shortcomings of his work until someone will be able to produce a better

⁷⁰¹As I said above, the one exception to this rule is the marginal note on page 77r, which is coupled with a longer Avicennian citation and mistakenly attributed to Avicenna. See F. Woerther, *Les citations du Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d'Aristote dans la traduction arabe de Hermannus*, in *Revue de Philologie Classique*, t. 83 (2010-2011), p. 131-132.

⁷⁰²See W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, t. 2, 1970, p. 243, and see sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4.

version with the aid of Greek sources; and **(f)** that in his translation he will not elaborate upon articulations for the text of the *Rhetoric*, because that has already been done by Al-Fārābī, whose *glosa* Hermannus translated.⁷⁰³ He therefore encourages the readers to add such articulations as notes in the margins of their own manuscript, using his al-Fārābī translation as a source.

Hermannus does not openly discuss the method applied in his translation, nor does he state whether his approach to Aristotle's text is going to be literal or paraphrastic. The readers are indeed told that they should not be put off by the *difficultate vel quasi ruditate translationis* (65rb5), and that the following pages are *quod intelligere et excipere potuimus de translatione que pervenit ad nos horum voluminum Aristotilis* (65rb18-21), but one is left to wonder if the defects of the translation here referred to consist in discrepancies between the Arabic and the Latin texts or rather in its dissatisfactory linguistic form and its apparent lack of internal coherence. The wording *difficultate vel quasi ruditate* is rather suggestive of the second option, for, if the translator had decided to depart from his source text, what would be the point of letting the product remain unpolished? The second phrase could be interpreted in the same direction, since it states that Hermannus' understanding of the Arabic *Rhetoric* is imperfect, not that he tried to improve upon it through paraphrastic resources. Still, none of these arguments is decisive.

On the other hand, Hermannus does make an open statement about his method in 77ra15-22, while introducing the first Avicennian citation: this is also the passage in which Hermannus

⁷⁰³ An edition of this text, the *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotilis*, is being prepared by Prof. Aouad and Dr. Woerther at the Paris CNRS.

refers explicitly to the fact that he is going to quote an Arabic commentator. Please note that in this case the Avicennian citation is meant to clarify Aristotle's text rather than to substitute for it, like the other Avicennian citation and the Averroistic passages do.

[15] *Dixit translator. In hoc passu inveni/mus textum Aristotelis vel ita corruptum, vel decurtatum,/ vel forte in se obscurum quod sententiam plane/ intelligibilem ex eo elicere non potuimus./ Unde visum fuit verbum ex verbo transferre et/ [20] post ipsum ad eius elucidationem textum Avi/scenne ex libro suo Asschiphe subiun/gere usque ad finem capituli.*

It is a well known fact that the expression *verbum ex verbo transferre* goes back to Cicero's treatise *De optimo genere oratorum*, where, in V.14, the author discusses the method he adopted in rendering Aeschines' and Demosthenes' orations:

nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator, sententiis isdem et earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis. In quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed genus omne verborum vimque servavi.

As a counterpart to Cicero's position, the reader could look at Boethius' statements about his own translation at p. 135.5-8 of the *Isagoge*:

Secundus hic arreptae expositionis labor nostrae seriem translationis expedit, in qua quidem uereor ne subierim fidi interpretis culpam, cum uerbum uerbo expressum comparatumque reddiderim. Cuius incepti ratio est quod in his scriptis in quibus rerum cognitio quaeritur, non luculentae orationis lepos, sed incorrupta ueritas exprimenda est.

If this is the framework in which Hermannus' words are to be taken, then the opposition established is between literal, stylistically rough translations and translations which are more refined, but less literal. Hermannus' reference to the *difficultate vel quasi ruditare translationis* in his prologue would hint to the fact that his Latin version manages the difficulties of the Arabic text by sacrificing elegance and clarity to literality.

The statement in 77ra19 about wanting to translate the ensuing lines *verbum ex verbo* should not be read in opposition to Hermannus' usual behaviour, but rather as a signal that the customary standard will be adhered to more strictly.

2.6 - Literal and paraphrastic translation in Hermannus' practice

Hermannus' statements about his activity need now to be verified in the light of his practice.

Preliminarily, it should be noted that while translating the first five chapters of Aristotle's treatise, Hermannus consistently renders his source text rather literally, even retaining some expressions which are linguistically awkward in Latin, such as *fa-lam yataḥallaṣū i ḏa'ā y a h ā ḡ u z*, (*they* do not reach the point of devoting⁷⁰⁴ a part to it [i.e. of the art of discourse], p. 1.16, ed. Lyons), translated as *non contingunt ad hoc, ut partem eius ponerent* (66ra19),⁷⁰⁵ or *an y a n b a ḡ ī yulaḥ ḥṣa . ḏā -tathīḥiā* 2.6-7, whose idiomatical Latin translation would have been something

⁷⁰⁴ The verb *yaḏa'ū* can be translated as *composing* as well, but here I chose *devoting* because it seems closer to the understanding of the text held by Hermannus; however, I believe that the other option would be more appropriate to the Arabic translation itself, since its Greek source is probably the incidental *ὡς εἰπεῖν*, wrongly taken to be a completive of the principal verb. It should also be noted that the Arabic text as it is cannot do, since we would expect to see *an* between the preposition *i* *lanā* the verb *yaḏa'ū*.

⁷⁰⁵ Here I follow the Toledo manuscript reading (36rb39-40) rather than *non contingunt ad hoc partem eius ponerent* in the Paris manuscript (66ra19).

like *that it is advisable to declare ... this way*,⁷⁰⁶ but which contains an internal accusative, so that Hermannus' very literal rendering is *quoniam determinandus sit hac determinatione* (66rb9-10).

There are also situations in which it is difficult to establish the relationship between Arabic phrases and their Latin rendering, as is the case with some slightly paraphrastic solutions, such as *al-fā ḥ* (*the examiner*, 2.11), rendered as *scrutatoris vel inquisitoris vel oboratoris* (66rb1-2). Either it is a case of triple translation, in which different options are given for one and the same word, or it shows the insertion in the Latin text of some marginal glosses.⁷⁰⁷ Another example is *r u 'ayd taṭabbut* (*exam and confirmation* 3.1), rendered as *firmitudinem consilii* and *profunditatem investigationis* respectively (66va11-12): this might indeed be a genuine case of paraphrase, since these Latin equivalents are derived from the meaning of the Arabic words taken jointly. However, no instance of non-literal translation goes beyond the borders of a single word or phrase, so that it is usually possible to point out exactly which Arabic expression is translated by each Latin one.⁷⁰⁸ Hermannus never tries to reorganize his text at a broader level, so that it can be stated

⁷⁰⁶ In translating *lah ḥṣa* as a rightful equivalent of ἀποφύω (*to declare*, in 1354a22 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*) rather than as *to epitomize*, I follow the position expressed in D. Gutas, *Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works*, in Ch. Burnett (ed.) *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, London, The Warburg Institute, p. 39 n. 41.

⁷⁰⁷ While *scrutator* and *inquisitor* both reflect the meaning of *f ḥṣ* in the same way, *oborator* seems to have been selected because of another meaning of the verb *faḥaṣa*, namely *to speak*. This makes it more likely that the alternative between *oborator* and the other solution goes back to the translator himself, while the alternative between *scrutator* and *inquisitor* might derive from Latin glosses.

⁷⁰⁸ The following cases are even less relevant: *fa-yaṣd u q ḥ* (*and they tell the truth*, 1.8), whose Latin equivalent is given as *et aliquantulum intendunt quod intendunt* (66rb8), maybe because in his Arabic text Hermannus found or read *y a q s ḥ d ū n a wa-l-ʿ u l* (*the scholars*, 1.14), translated as *communiter* (66ra16), possibly on account of the confusion between the roots ʿ-l-m and ʿ-m-m; and *wa-h u w a m* (*and it is acknowledged*, 2.13), translated as *deinde satis est* (66rb21), where it is easy to attribute the absence of *notum* to some accident within the Latin tradition.

with some confidence that his intention is to offer a literal version of Aristotle.⁷⁰⁹

In the following section I will examine the methods applied by the translator in 77ra15-78va19, where we find the Aristotelian passage Hermannus claims not to understand, the Avicennian citation announced in the translator's insertion, and an Averroistic citation wrongly ascribed to Avicenna.

2.6.1 - Literal translation of Aristotle

It is now possible to check Hermannus' statement that he is going to translate Aristotle's text literally (*verbum ex verbo transferre*) against his own practice. An overall look at the Latin translation and at *Rhetoric* 1363a16-1363b4, in which the list of goods which occupies I.6 is completed, will show us that no large scale transposition takes place, nor any extensive addition or omission. The following lines (77rb14-22) strengthen the idea that Hermannus' approach to Aristotle is indeed literal:

(d) Deinde non faciunt ea que reputantur defectiva etsi sint modica, secundum minus electionis cum exilitate suarum actionum, eo quod ipsa etiam sunt possibilia secundum similitudinem eorum que fiunt faciliter; (e) nisi quod modicum factum eorum invenitur aut totaliter aut plurimum aut assimilativum aut defectivum, cum his que exhilarant amicos et contristant inimicos;

The parallel text in Aristotle's Arabic translation is to be found at 32.8-13:

⁷⁰⁹ In this light, I would not regard double or loose translations of single words as proper examples of paraphrase: rather, I am thinking of the insertion of passages that have no correspondence in the original and of cases of reshaping of the text like those we encounter in section 2.6.2 (second strategy).

(d) Moreover, [those things] which are regarded as faulty are not destined to be completed, even when their completions are small, [achieved] less deliberately and easily, because they, too, are possible under the same conditions of those things that happen with ease. (e) However, their easy completion can be achieved either fully or for the most part, about similar things or about faulty things, like those that please friends and damage enemies.

As he admitted a few lines above, Hermannus does not have a clear idea of the meaning of this passage, but it is easy to trace each comma of the Latin text back to its source in the Arabic original.⁷¹⁰ I also believe that the same degree of literalness can be found in the remaining passages (b), (c), and (f-g-h), even if in these cases some misunderstandings on the translator's part, or maybe some mistakes within the Arabic and Latin manuscript tradition, make the picture less straightforward.

To begin with, in (b), at lines 77rb5-6, the following words are to be read: *eo quod reduplicatio vehemens inducit molestiam in prolixitate temporis*, which should be a translation for 32.2-3 of the Arabic *Rhetoric*, where there is *li-anna l-ša ʿ ʿ š a a d ī ḥ d d a d u y i l - ḥ u z n ṭ ū l - f ā ṣ ḥ ā n i* (because what is very difficult is defined as pain with regard to the duration of time). There does not seem to be any semantic relationship between *what is difficult* and *reduplicatio*, whereas the Arabic adjective *š a ḍ cān* actually be translated as *vehemens*. However, rather than interpreting this divergence between Arabic and Latin as a deliberate intervention on Hermannus' part, I would argue that the text read by the translator was *ḍ a ʿ d i p l i c i t y*, and not *š a ʿ d i f f i c u l t y*, since the words are graphically close. Besides, in 78ra6 and in 78ra10 one finds *ḍ a ʿ t r a n s l a t e d* as *duplicitas* and one learns why this, rather than *debilitas*, is the best solution.⁷¹¹

⁷¹⁰ The same could be said about (a), (i), and (j-k-l).

⁷¹¹ See subsection 2.6.2.

The problematic spot in **(c)** is located in 77rb11, where the words *in his que sunt ex habundanti* are to be read. This should match the Arabic *wa-āḥirihunna min faḍlin* (and the last of these things in terms of excellence, 32.6). Even if *ex habundanti* can very well be interpreted as a translation of *min faḍlin* (since *faḍl* means both *excellence* and *excess*) for what concerns the absence of *and the last of this things* in the Latin text, I think that a suitable solution would be to assume that it also was missing in Hermannus' Arabic text. Otherwise, *āḥiri* might have been the only missing word in Hermannus' exemplar, or it might have been overlooked by the translator himself.

Finally, the last difficulty is located in 77rb24-25, i.e. section **(g)**.

(f) *et miratur de ipsis quando fecerint ea secundum quod sunt in apparatu et experientia. Illi autem (g) qui nihil nolunt de malo penitus sunt (h) quorum factum reputatur exiguum in correctione et exhortatione ...*

The previous lines should reflect the Arabic text of 32.13-15:

(f) *and we are surprised at them whenever they make them [i.e. these things] according to what there is in it [i.e. in this situation] in terms of preparation and exercise, and [we are surprised] at that (h) whose completion may look easy [15] with regard to emendation and exhortation ...*

The sentence *qui nihil nolunt de malo* in **(g)** seems to have been added by Hermannus *ex novo*, since there is nothing to explain it within the Arabic text. However, it must be admitted that the syntax of the Arabic here is elliptical, and no translation of **(f-h)** is possible without supplementing a main clause (like *qui nihil nolunt de malo* in Hermannus, or *we are surprised* in my

English version) introducing the sentence here translated as *at that whose completion may look easy for what concerns emendation and exhortation*.⁷¹²

Since Hermannus constantly endeavours to keep his Latin translation close to its Arabic source, it appears that his work on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* deserves a critical and reliable edition, which could then be compared to the Greek-Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*. This comparison would provide a good basis to ameliorate the Arabic text, which in turn is a relevant witness for the Greek original of the Arabic *Rhetoric*. This path of research looks promising if one takes into account the fact that, on one hand, we only have one direct witness of the Arabic *Rhetoric* - namely the ms. *Parisinus Arabus 2346* - and that none of the editors⁷¹³ of the Arabic version use Hermannus systematically, and that, on the other hand, the Latin version seems to be based upon an edition of the Arabic text which does not fully overlap with that in ms. *Parisinus Arabus 2346*, since Hermannus' translation does not include chapters 15, 16 and 17 of Aristotle's second book.⁷¹⁴

2.6.2 - Paraphrastic translation of Avicenna

As I shall show, Hermannus usually approaches Avicenna's text much more freely than his behaviour towards Aristotle would lead us to expect. The translator's goal in dealing with the Arabic philosopher seems to be restricted to the mere elucidation of the text of the Greek

⁷¹² A handy solution is to refer back at that whose completion etc. to and we are surprised at them, in **(f)**. It seems that Hermannus mistakenly thought that *at that whose completion may look easy for what concerns emendation and exhortation* was to be taken as a sentence on its own, thus being forced to provide **(g)** in the same capacity in which I have inserted [we are surprised] in my translation from Arabic. Therefore, even if the phrase *qui nihil nolunt de malo* rests on false assumption, it is not to be taken as an insertion or as paraphrastic, but rather as an explanation which was indispensable to make the text intelligible.

⁷¹³ See Aristotle, *Rhetorica in versione arabica vetusta*, ed. 'A. Badawī, (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣriya, 1959).

⁷¹⁴ See Averroes, *Commentaire moyen*, vol. I (*Introduction générale*), 9, and F. Woerther, *Le rôle des traductions dans les traditions textuelles : les versions arabe et arabo-latine de la Rhetorique*, in *Actes du colloque de la Sorbonne*, éd. D. Smith (Paris: Vrin, Textes et Traditions, forthcoming).

Rhetoric, so that in some passages the Avicennian treatise ends up being paraphrased or possibly “emended,” while in other cases it is still translated in a more or less literal fashion.

Paraphrastic activity concerning Avicenna in Hermannus’ text is mainly of two types, since it either consists of explicative insertions in the translated text (first strategy), or of a global rephrasing of an unclear or otherwise unsatisfactory passage (second strategy).

First strategy: Concerning the first option, it will appear that this method is also employed in the translation of Aristotelian passages. Within the Avicennian passages themselves, no markers introduce the sections inserted by the translator, as it can be observed 78ra9-12:

(18) *Etiam intellexerunt quidam eorum pro debilitate duplicitatem, hoc est frequentiam. Et intellectus fuit horum quod, cum aliquid frequenter fit, gravat,⁷¹⁵ quamvis ante hoc fuerit leve.*

(19) *Causa huius diversi intellectus fuit quod per eosdem characteres in arabico scribitur debilitas et duplicitas.*

(20) *Et exemplum eius in quo nos sumus est quod ducit assensum hominis pro voluntate sua in beneficencia ...*

In this passage the reader finds first a doxological statement to the effect that someone has mistaken *duplicitas* (د ا in Arabic) for *debilitas* (د i in Arabic) and secondly the reason behind this blunder, namely the homography of our two words in unvowelized Arabic script. Let us then compare this brief passage to its Avicennian counterpart:

⁷¹⁵ This should translate the Arabic verb *ammala* (74,7), but it seems likely that Hermannus selected this word in opposition to the following *leve*, which actually mirrors the Arabic *sahlan* (74,7) rather well. The reading *gravat* is to be found in the Paris manuscript (78ra8), while the Toledo manuscript has *generat* (38vb41).

(18) *And some of them mistook “feebleness” meaning is that, whenever anything redoubles, it bores, even if before it used to be simple.*

(20) *And an example - inasmuch as we deal with it - is what causes man towards his preference for benevolence...*

Here there is no trace of what the Latin version tells us about the reason for the confusion between *d a* and *d i*. Since it would have been superfluous to inform an Arabic reader that the very words he is reading are composed by the same alphabetical characters, it is quite safe to infer that paragraph (19) does not stem from some marginal note in Hermannus’ codex or further away in the Arabic manuscript tradition. On the other hand, such an observation obviously requires knowledge of the Arabic language and possibly access to an Arabic text of Avicenna’s treatise: there is therefore no reason to suppose it to be a note left by some Latin scholar after the translator had completed his activity. The only option left, then, is to read (19) as a paraphrastic comment introduced by the translator himself, even if it is not marked as such.⁷¹⁶ The same could be argued for 77vb10-14, or paragraph (14), which has no parallel in 74,15-⁷¹⁷ or for 129ra26-b2, which does not correspond to 209.9-10 in Avicenna’s text.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁶ The same conclusion concerning the source for the mistake of those criticized by Avicenna is reached by Aouad and Rashed in M. Aouad and M. Rashed, *L’exemple de la Rhétorique*, *Annuaire Méditerranéen* (1997), 124-127. *istote*,

⁷¹⁷ This addition to Avicenna’s text provides the reader with an example of what could be regarded as an adequate or an inadequate reward coming from an orator. One of the reasons to believe that these lines were not inserted by a later Latin scribe is that in them we find the rather uncommon expression *citra posse*, meaning before reaching the (highest) possible level, which also appears in 78ra25 (*citra meritum*).

⁷¹⁸ The goal of this insertion is to enlighten the Latin reader about the expression *dictiones frigidae*.

Similar cases of paraphrastic activity occurring within the Aristotelian text differ inasmuch as the explanatory insertions are usually highlighted by short phrases such as *inquit interpretes* in 67va18:

[67va5] *Rethorica autem utilis/ est et proficiens eo quod veracia secundum iustum*⁷¹⁹
me/liora sunt suis contrariis. Quando etenim non/ fuerint iudicia constituta secundum quod oportet
*vin/cuntur*⁷²⁰ *ab his rebus necessario et istud est res/ [10] que meretur redargutionem et*
inrepatio/nem.

Avenrosdi: *Rethorica duas/ habet utilitates, quarum una est quod in/stigat cives ad*
*operationes nobiles./ Homines enim naturaliter*⁷²¹ *proni sunt ad contrarium o/perationum [15]*
iustitie: quando igitur non reti/nentur per sermones rethoricos vin/cunt eos illicita desideria et
operantur/ contraria operibus iusticie.

Inquit/ interpretes: *Idem veritates rerum operan/darum [20] pertinentium iusticie sequende*
sunt et/ respuende falsitates desideriorum illi/citorum. Et ad has veritates conatur/ rethorica et ad
*redargutiones et/ increpationes*⁷²² *[25] propter opposita.*

According to Hermannus, the Aristotelian passage he is dealing with focuses on the utility of rhetoric, which prompts him to insert Averroes' words on the same subject. As soon as the citation ends, the reader would expect him to revert to Aristotle's text, since this is how he usually behaves. However, before doing so with *Deinde eo quod aliquis*, he adds a short statement of his own (*Idem veritates rerum* etc.) in order to clarify the relevance of the insertion from Averroes.

⁷¹⁹ *Secundum iustum* in the Toledo manuscript: the Paris manuscript has *iustis*.

⁷²⁰ The Toledo manuscript reads *vinceretur*.

⁷²¹ The word *naturaliter* appears both in the Paris and in the Florence manuscript, but it is missing from the Toledo manuscript.

⁷²² Actually, the Paris manuscript reads *et ad redargutiones et increpationes et redargutiones et increpationes*.

The shift from translation to comment is clearly pointed out by the *inquit interpretes* phrase.

The absence of an explicit indication that (14), (19) and 129ra26-b2 - all occurring within an Avicennian quotation - are Hermannus' insertions and not translations from some source text should probably alert us to the fact that Hermannus conceived his relationship with Avicenna's text in rather different terms than that with Aristotle's text.

Second strategy: As explained above, Hermannus' interventions on Avicenna's text can also take the shape of an overall rephrasing of a passage which is unclear in its original form or which, as it is, does not help the translator in making Aristotle's intentions easier to understand. In this respect, let us have a look at 77va11-27:

(1) *Inquit Avicenna: Deinde de bonis utilibus sive conferentibus est beneficentia vel retributio. (2) Etenim in se ipso bonum et conferens in bono altero est commendatio et mentio facta in bonum et dilectio.*

(3) *Et nobilior beneficentia est illa que exhibetur nobilioribus, tuendo ipsos contra malignos eorum inimicorum sive facto sive verbo, (4) quemadmodum fecit Homerus poeta quando statuit duos honorabiles, (5) scilicet Menelaum regem Athenarum et Achillem fortem, (7) et ex eorum opposito posuit alios duos, scilicet Paridem et Helenam (9) inimicos ipsorum, et illos erexit in signaculum et quasi titulum laudis, inimicos vero in signum vituperii et depressionis [Paridem scilicet filium regis Troie et Helenam.]*

The source passage in Avicenna is 73,7-12:

(1) Besides, among useful goods there are benevolence and reward. (2) Indeed, it is useful in itself, while fame, good reputation, and fondness are useful in another good.

(3) And the best aspect of benevolence is benevolence towards the best people, with help for them against their base enemies - either practical help or verbal help - (4) like what [Ummidius] Homer] the poet did when he chose two excellent people, (5) namely Tāwdrūs king of Athens] and Hīlānī [i.e. Helen] his daughter and he raised them as a target for praise and applause. (7) And in front of them he raised their enemy Iskandar [i.e. Alexander], son of the king of Barbar, (8) who was their enemy and therefore handled them roughly with blame and scorn.

The first divergence to be witnessed between our two texts is located in (5). Some equivalence is established between Tāwdrūs king of Athens and father of Helen on one side, and Menelaus *regem Athenarum* on the other one, although we do know that the Homeric Menelaus was king of Sparta and not of Athens. The reason for this far-fetched correspondence is that Hermannus was probably clueless about the identity of Tāwdrūs. In his index to the Avicennian treatise, Sālim identifies him with Θησεύς, king and founding hero of Athens. Although Sālim does not state his motives, his solution is probably grounded on the fact that here Avicenna's source is *Rhetoric* 1363a16-1363b4, or, more specifically, 1363a16-19, where it is written that another good thing is *that which someone of the wise or good men or women has preferred, as Athena did with Odysseus, Theseus with Helen, the goddesses with Alexander, and Homer with Achilles* (ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οἷον Ὀδυσσεύα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἑλένην Θησεύς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλεῖα Ὅμηρος). In Avicenna's text Tāwdrūs is the only available equivalent for the Greek Theseus and it also occurs conveniently close to Helen and to Athens (which parallels Aristotle's goddess Athena). However, Sālim has overlooked the fact that, in the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, the name Theseus does not occur at all, since in 31.18-19 it is written as *Homer chose Odysseus the Athenian, Helen, Alexander, and Achilles*. In Aristotle's, text

the name Theseus appears twice more, in II.23 1397b27 and in II.23 1399a3, and in both cases its Arabic transliteration is *Tīsiyūs*.⁷²³ I will return to the subject of Avicenna's intentions in writing *Tāwdrūs* in 7.2, but it is easy to see how Hermannus could not have taken it to refer to Theseus. He probably had as much trouble in identifying him as we do nowadays. This is possibly the reason why he chose to substitute him with the well-known Menelaus, whose relationship with Helen, Achilles, and Alexander is at least clear, neglecting the fact that he was not king of Athens. However, he did not neglect the fact that he never was Helen's father: therefore, the phrase *his daughter* is omitted and the reference to Helen is displaced from (5) to (7), while (6) does not even appear in the Latin text.

The Latin text for (7), besides including a reference to Helen, is interesting inasmuch as it does not leave the name *Alexander* unaltered, but substitutes it with the form *Paridem*, which is less ambiguous in referring to the Homeric hero. This is especially worth mentioning, since in 77ra27 the same word, namely *al-Iskandar*, occurring in 31.18 of the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, is simply transliterated as *Alexander*.

Moreover, in (7) Avicenna describes Alexander as *son of the king of Barbar*, while no such specification is given in the Latin text. The phrase however seems to reappear in (9), where we learn about *Paridem scilicet filium regis Troie*. The possible substitution of *Troie* for *Barbar* is discussed in 2.6.2.

Paragraphs (6) and (8) have no immediate Latin parallel, but they seem to be conflated in (9), even if in (6) Avicenna's hendiadys *praise and applause* is translated by the single term *laudis* and *signaculum et quasi titulum* is a double translation for *target*. Moreover, Hermannus seems to have mistaken Homer as the subject of *to handle roughly*, while Avicenna intended it to be Alexander/Paris. If the correspondence between (6)-(8) and (9) holds, the phrase *Paridem scilicet*

⁷²³ Interestingly enough, Hermannus introduced considerable alterations in his version of these passages (at 118r and 119v of the Paris manuscript), probably in order to bypass cumbersome examples that would have been unclear for his readers. Therefore, no equivalent of the Arabic *Tī s i cān* was found there. I cannot locate parallels for the passages on Theseus in Avicenna either.

filium regis Troie and *Helenam* - almost identical to *scilicet Paridem et Helenam* in (7) - should then be regarded as a gloss.

Still, the most interesting change undergone by Avicenna's text is the removal of Helen from (5) and her insertion in (7) alongside with Alexander, so that in Hermannus' section (5) there are two objects of praise - namely Menelaus and Achilles - and in (7) there are two objects of blame - namely Paris and Helen, while in Avicenna's account there were three praiseworthy people - that is Tāwdrūs, Helen and Achilles - and only Alexander was to be blamed.

The general result is that in Hermannus' account a neat parallel between two positive characters and two negative ones appears, while Avicenna's original was asymmetrical and somewhat surprising, in as much as the source of praise and blame was first Homer and later on Paris. The shift on Hermannus' part might have been triggered from the fact that in (4) Avicenna introduces a dual object for Homer's choice of *two excellent people* to commend (*f ḍālayni* in 73.10), adding Achilles, the third target of appraisal, as the object of a further verb (*wa-aḥt ā in* 73.10), and it could have been facilitated by the fact that Helen is an ambiguous character, which could be deemed worthy both of praise and of despise. However, the convergence of all changes occurring in Hermannus' paraphrase towards a tidier and more foreseeable text should lead us to think that this was the translator's goal as well.

Furthermore, the parallel between two equivalent groups of people, one to be praised and one to be blamed, is easy to retrace in the very citation from Averroes' *Middle Commentary* that Hermannus adds to this passage from Avicenna:⁷²⁴

Inimicum vero et sibi pertinentes deprimit et mala que potuerit exaggregat erga ipsum, prout accidit Homero po/ete cum grecis et inimicis eorum. Grecos enim et magnates eorum et qui ex

⁷²⁴ Averroes' Latin text occupies lines 38va16-38 of the Toledo manuscript and the second note on the left margin of 77r of the Paris manuscript. The parallel Arabic text is in 1.6.18-19 of the *Middle Commentary*.

parte ipsorum erant magnificavit laudibus/ et extulit carminibus durabilibus in sempiternum, alios vero, scilicet ipsorum adversarios, submersit vituperiis que nulla umquam/ [15] absterget⁷²⁵ oblivio in facto proelii quod olim habitum est inter ipsos.

Since Averroes is by far Hermannus' most cited source, there is some ground to believe that it is the basis for the translator's slant on the Avicennian passage cited above. It makes even more sense to think so given that here Averroes does a better job at overcoming the difficulties of the Arabic translation than does Avicenna, as pointed out by Aouad while listing the points of convergence between the two philosophers' commentaries on the *Rhetoric*.⁷²⁶

Whenever considering a translation made upon a manuscript text and describing its method, it should be taken into account the fact that any divergence between said version and the source text as it is known from print editions can rest either upon the translator's intervention, or upon some variant reading that he found in his manuscript copy. However, here the second option is not really open for us, since the insertion described for Hermannus' first strategy requires knowledge of the Arabic language and attention to the Latin public at the same time, while the example I presented for the second strategy shows so much coherent reorganization of the text that it would be very hard to trace it back to the accidents of manuscript transmission.

⁷²⁵ In 38va32 the Toledo manuscript shows absterget, while The Paris manuscript uses abtergeret (at line 15 of the marginal note offering Averroes' text).

⁷²⁶ See Averroes, *Commentaire moyensote. Édition critique du texte arabe et traduction française*, ed. M. Aouad, (Paris: Vrin 2002), vol. I (Introduction générale), 34-36.

2.6.3 - Literal treatment of Avicenna

Other translations of Avicennian passages do however receive a much more literal treatment, a good example being 77vb22-78ra5:

(16) *Nam quod queritur vel expectatur in beneficentia est ut perveniatur ad supremum possibilitatis et quod indulgetur in maleficentia est quod procedit a necessitate et a defectu possibilitatis. (17) Quod ergo deficit a possibili in beneficentia est ex impotentia, quod autem pertransit necessitatem in maleficentia est ex proposito. Et quando perdurat molestatio molestantis et intenditur debilitas et metus donec pertranseat horam necessitatis,⁷²⁷ adducit discordiam procul dubio.*

Its Avicennian parallel text is to be found at 74,2-6:

(16) [74,2] *Because what is expected in terms of benevolence is the realization of possibility, while what is forgiven in terms of harm is what comes from necessity or lack of possibility. (17) Hence that which is less than what is possible in terms of benevolence is a deficiency, while that which is more than what is necessary in terms of harm is an intention. And whenever [5] submission to misfortunes is prolonged and feebleness and fright are reinforced, so that he exceeds the instant of necessity with harshness, aversion is surely triggered.*

The differences between the two texts are not very relevant. In (16) there is indeed an example of double translation - namely *queritur vel expectatur* for *al-m u t a w* (what is expected) - whereas the translation of *b u l ū ġm k* (the realization of possibility) as *ad supremum possibilitatis* is somewhat interpretative. Moreover, in the same section the manuscripts show the verb *indigetur*, is needed, which does not translate the participle *al-m adū*, what is forgiven. The Latin text should however be emended to read *indulgetur*, which is graphically close to *indigetur*, and which fits with the meaning of the following lines.

⁷²⁷ The words *et intenditur debilitas et metus donec pertranseat horam necessitatis*, which can be found in the Paris manuscript, are missing in the Toledo manuscript (38vb39).

Further, in (17) the expression *molestatio molestantis* is to be found, which looks like an Arabic-sounding etymological figure of speech⁷²⁸ and which should stand for *al-id^c nāli-l-miḥani*, *submission to misfortunes*, but which does not represent its Arabic counterpart very well. Lastly, nothing in the Latin text corresponds to the Arabic words *bi-ḡ-ḡ a f wāth hiarshness*, though the short phrase could simply have been overlooked by the translator. Still, this possible intervention on the text on Hermannus' part is not plausible, since it is both isolated and apparently not designed to improve the sense of the passage in any way.

On the other hand, some expressions are translated very literally, as is the case with *defectu possibilitatis* in (16), which verbally reflects Arabic *wa a z i ,nakk w f possibility*, but is rather awkward as a Latin expression, while something like *impossibilitate* would be more straightforward. A similar example from (17) is *quod ergo deficit a possibili* for *fa-mā q a ṣ u- r a c a mumkini*, *that which is less than what is possible*.

2.7 – Hermannus and Avicenna

In Hermannus' version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the translations from Fārābī,⁷²⁹ Avicenna and Averroes are not finalized at divulging said sources for their own sake, but rather at explaining Aristotle's text. Accordingly, Hermannus' attitude is slightly more paraphrastic when dealing with them than when dealing with Aristotle himself. More specifically, in the first chapters of the first book of the *Rhetoric* Hermannus uses Averroes as a source of commentary notes for complex Aristotelian passages. In the later, more example-intensive books, it is Avicenna that will be employed, once to explain a difficult Aristotelian section, and once to substitute for Aristotle's text altogether. It is Hermannus himself that describes examples and foreign words in Aristotle's

⁷²⁸ *Molestatio molestantis* seems to be a literal rendering of an expression like *al-id^c nāli-l-mud^caniyy*, whose normal translation would be *molestatio alicuius*.

⁷²⁹ On quotes from Fārābī, see F. Woerther, *Les traces du Fārābī dans le commentaire de Hermannus sur la Rhétorique d'Aristote*, *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, vol. 54 (2012), pp. 137-154.

Latin text as the main reason for which he was forced to enlist Avicenna's aid.⁷³⁰ This approach seems quite sensible, if we consider the fact that Averroes' work on the *Rhetoric* is indeed structured as a commentary, aimed at making Aristotle's text easier to grasp, and that it is divided into Aristotelian *lemmata* and their explanation, while Avicenna's treatise, as a part of *K i t ā b i f i s ḥ i t*, as a self-sufficient text. On the other hand, as a reworking of the original, it was perfectly capable of substituting for it: after all, this is what actually happened in the Arabic philosophical tradition after Avicenna's death.⁷³¹

On four occasions, Hermannus also informs the reader that he is going to omit an especially troubling passage, as a last-resort tool to cope with the difficulties of the Greek-Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.⁷³²

The following table sums up Hermannus' citations from Averroes and Avicenna, together with Hermannus' omissions. I also note which Greek passages are commented upon, and – between brackets – which passages are intentionally left without translation. For immediate reference purpose, I quote the pages and lines of the Paris manuscript for Hermannus' version, Bekker's numbers for Aristotle's Greek text, Sālim's edition for Avicenna, and Aouad's edition for Averroes' *Middle Commentary*.⁷³³

Aristotle, <i>Ars Rhetorica</i> I		
65vb17-66ra3	I.1, 1354a1-4	Ave. MCR, 1.1.1 (p. 1.6-14), and 1.1.2 (p. 2.4-5, and 2.7-8)
66vb15-67ra4	I.1, 1354b22-28	Ave. MCR, 1.1.9 (p. 5.10-22)
67rb28-67va3	I.1, 1355a18-20	Ave. MCR, 1.1.13 (pp. 8.8 and

⁷³⁰ This statement is made just before his second Avicennian quote, at 128ra11-16 of the Paris manuscript: *in hoc passu tot inciderunt exempla extranea et greca (grata PT) vocabula quod nullum nobis consilium fuit prosequendi textum Aristotilis. Unde coacti fuimus (fuerimus P) sequi illud quod Avicenna de hoc passu excerpterat et posuerat in libro suo Aschiphe.*

⁷³¹ Hermannus himself addresses his activity as a translator of the *Rhetoric* and its commentaries in two cases. See G. Celli, *Some Observations about Hermannus Alemannus' Citations of Avicenna's Book of the Rhetoric*, in *Oriens* vol. 40.2 (2012), pp. 478-483.

⁷³² These passages too have been pointed out by W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus in Viatu Rhetorico* vol. 2, 1970, p. 240.

⁷³³ See *Averroes. Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d'Aristote. Édition* Aouad (ed.), Paris: Vrin, 2002.

		8.11-13)
67va11-18	I.1, 1355a20-24	Ave. MCR, 1.1.14 (p. 8.14-16)
67vb11-13	I.1, 1355a29-32	Ave. MCR, 1.1.17 (p. 9.12-13)
72rb21-72va8	I.4, 1359b2-18	Ave. MCR, 1.4.4 (pp. 32.23-33.11)
72vb7-10	I.4, 1359b23-29	Ave. MCR, 1.4.6 (p. 34.10-11)
75rb (marginal note)	I.5, 1361b27-34	Ave. MCR, 1.5.24 (p. 46.10)
75rb (marginal note)	I.5, 1361b27-34	Ave. MCR, 1.5.24 (p. 46.9)
75rb20-75va4	I.5, 1361b39-1362a12	Ave. MCR, 1.5.26 (pp. 46.19-47.3)
75vb8-18	I.5, 1362a12-14	Ave. MCR, 1.5.27-28 (p. 47.15-19)
76rb7-12	I.6, 1362a29-31	Ave. MCR, 1.6.6 (p. 49.16-18)
76rb27-28	I.6, 1362b5-1362b10	Ave. MCR, 1.6.9 (p. 50.5-6)
77va11-78va19 77va (marginal note)	I.6, 1363a17-1363b4	Avi. KH, II.2 (pp. 73,7-75,15)⁷³⁴ Ave. ⁷³⁵ MCR,1.6.18-19 (pp. 53,6-54,5)
92vb12-18,	(I.15, 1375b33-1376a8)	xxx
Aristotle, <i>Ars Rhetorica</i> III		
128ra17-130rb28	(III.2-4, 1405a31-1407a18)	Avi. KH, IV.1 (pp. 206,8-212,16)⁷³⁶
134va24-28,	(III.9, 1410a9-1410a20)	xxx
135va24-b7	(III.10, 1411a4-1411b10)	xxx
143ra18-20	(III.16, 1417a13-1417a16)	xxx

We can see at a glance that, although quotes from Averroes are much more frequent (and grouped in *Rhetoric* I), the Avicennian citations are much longer, so that, on the whole, Hermannus translated much more Avicenna than Averroes. The extension of the Latin text available to us for Avicenna's *K i t āḥḥā b aḥḥā* gives some ground to the hope of establishing genetic relationships between Hermannus' source and the Arabic manuscripts of this treatise. The first Avicennian citation refers to *Rhet.* I.6 but is located in *K i t āḥḥā b aḥḥā*, for in the

⁷³⁴ See paragraphs 2.7.2, 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 of the present work.

⁷³⁵ As Boggess points out, the manuscripts mistakenly state that this passage is taken from Avicenna as well.

⁷³⁶ See paragraphs 2.7.3, 2.8.3, 2.8.4, 2.8.5, 2.8.6, and 2.8.7 of the present contribution.

Arabic commentary Aristotle's first book is divided into two separate treatises, the first one devoted to the general principles of rhetoric, and the second one to the three rhetorical genres, judiciary, deliberative and encomiastic. Likewise, the second Avicennian citation stands for a section of IV.1, but mirrors Aristotle III.2-4, where stylistically appropriate words are discussed. I will analyze some textual peculiarities of the first quote from Avicenna (Ari. *Ars Rhetorica*, I.6, 1363a17-1363b4/ Avi. *K i t āḥḥā b,at*12, pp. 73,7-75,15) at paragraphs 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 of this contribution, while the second Avicennian quote (Ari. *Ars Rhetorica*, III.2-4, 1405a31-1407a18/ Avi. *K i t āḥḥā b,at*1, pp. 206,8-212,16) will be examined at paragraphs 2.8.3, 2.8.4, 2.8.5, 2.8.6, and 2.8.7.

2.7.1 – Occasions and reasons for Hermannus' citations from Avicenna

In order to tackle the question of when and why Hermannus employs Avicenna's adaptation of the *Rhetoric*, it is useful to review the evidence presented by Boggess about sections of the text that are not translations from the Arabic *Rhetoric*. Boggess starts by making a list of the passages taken from Averroes that appear between the beginning of the treatise and folio 76rb.⁷³⁷ Boggess' detailed analysis of the first insertion (65vb17-66ra3, mirroring Averroes' 1.1.1 and the first lines of 1.1.2) allows us to extend to Averroes our observations about Hermannus' paraphrastic attitude towards Avicenna's text, since it shows that three sections of the Averroistic passage were ignored, as it was the case with Avicenna.⁷³⁸ One more trace of Hermannus' approach to Averroes' text is to be found in 77ra, where the wrongly attributed citation occurs. At lines 12-13 of the marginal note in which the quotation of the *Middle Commentary* appears, the following words can be read: *inimicum vero et sibi pertinentes deprimit et mala que potuerit ex aggregat erga ipsum, prout accidit Homero po/ete cum grecis et inimicis eorum*. To begin with, the correspondence between the first line and its source is not completely straightforward, since Averroes says *y a f ' a l u*

⁷³⁷ See W.F. Boggess, *H e r m a n n u s A l e m a n n u s i n ' V i a t a d h o l e 2, 1070, p p c 240-242. T r a n s l a t i o n s*

⁷³⁸ According to Aouad's edition, the neglected parts are *iḍ kānat hātāni ṣ- ṣinā'atāni* (1.1.1,2-3), *wa-lakin min ḡihati ... wa-hiya ṣinā'atu l-manṭiqi* (1.1.1,9-13), and *wa-muntahyan minhā ilā miqdārin mā ... bi-hāḍihi ṣ-ṣinā'ati* (2.1.1,2-4).

bi-^c a d u ~~ad~~ w ii-ik nas ~~ad~~ na ur r-bā-aṣdiw q̄ ā ḥaiyrā, namely and that man does what is bad to an enemy and what is good to a friend. Moreover, in Aouad's edition nothing could explain the presence of *poete*, the Latin attribute for Homer. However, the phrase *Ū m ī r -ā ṣ ī fs* ~~to be~~ found in the previous paragraph (1.16.17).

Boggess also lists the passages taken from Avicenna: one (77va11-78va19) is the text I will discuss in 2.7.2, while the other (128ra17-130rb28) concerns figurative speech and is discussed in 2.7.3. The few lines added by Hermannus to both citations testify that his aim was quite different in each case: at 77ra15-22 the translator states that the Arabic text is so hard to understand that he is forced to transpose it word by word and to add Avicenna's text *ad eius elucidationem*, while in 128ra11-16 one reads:

in hoc passu tot inciderunt exempla extranea et grata⁷³⁹ vocabula quod nullum nobis consilium fuit prosequendi textum Aristotilis. Unde coacti fuerimus⁷⁴⁰ sequi illud quod Avicenna de hoc passu excerpserat et posuerat in libro suo Aschiphe.

Accordingly, in this case Avicenna's text is not used as a commentary, in order to enlighten a difficult passage, but rather as a substitute for Aristotle, a section of whose text (1405a31-1407a18) is not translated.

As Boggess points out, there are four more occasions in which Hermannus apologizes for omitting a part of the original *Rhetoric*, always on account of the obscurity of the Greek

⁷³⁹ It is hard to understand how *grata* should be translated, but the best solution would probably be pleasant, to be understood as refined and therefore hard to understand. However, another option seems easier: namely, *grata* could be a mistake for *greca*, which is graphically close. Both our witnesses read *grata*, but *greca* fits with what the translator states in his prologue, in 65rb4-13: *Nec miretur quisquam vel indi/gnetur de difficultate vel quasi rudita/te translationis, nam multo difficilium/ et rudius ex greco in arabicum est transla/ta. Ita quod Alfarabius, qui primus conatus/ est ex rethorica aliquem intellectum/ glosando elicere, multa exempla greca/ propter ipsorum obscuritatem pertransiens dere/linquit et propter eandem causam multa du/bie exposuit.* Both in the prologue and while introducing his second quotation from Avicenna, Hermannus cites both the low quality of the Arabic text and the Greek words present in it as the main difficulties in dealing with the *Rhetoric*.

⁷⁴⁰ Boggess seems to be right in preferring *fui*mus, which is in the Toledo manuscript.

examples.⁷⁴¹ It might be worth noting that both the reason for the insertion of the first Avicennian passage - namely the damaged state and the intrinsic difficulty of the text - and that for the insertion of the second Avicennian passage - that is, the strange examples - are already named in Hermannus' prologue.⁷⁴²

The overall picture shows us Hermannus using Averroes as a source for explanatory notes in the first chapters of the *Rhetoric* and skipping some passages, or substituting them with Avicenna, in the later, more example-intensive books. As can be evinced from the prologue and from Boggess' contribution, al-Fārābī also provided both some interesting readings and a general framework for the translation.

This approach seems quite sensible, if one looks at the fact that Averroes' work on the *Rhetoric* is explicitly structured as a commentary, aimed at making Aristotle's text easier to grasp, and is divided into Aristotelian entries and their explanation, while Avicenna's treatise, as a part of the *Book of the Cure*, looks like as a self-sufficient text. As a reworking of the original, it can very well substitute it, as it actually happens in the Arabic philosophical tradition after Avicenna.

Therefore, the first quotation from the *Book of Cure* seems to be somehow exceptional, since it encompasses a citation from Avicenna, one from Averroes, and the original Aristotelian text. It might be that Aristotle's text was not omitted because in this case Hermannus had no problem with his examples, but rather with the general sense of the passage, since this is what he states while introducing the citation. Besides, this could serve as a motive for the insertion of the

⁷⁴¹ The passages named by Boggess are 92vb12-18, 134va24-28, 135va24-b7, and 143ra18-20: see W.F. Boggess, *Hermannus Alemannus in Viatore*, vol. 2, 1970, p. 243a l. *Translations*

⁷⁴² See, for example, 65rb6-8 (*multo difficilius et ruidius ex greco in arabico est translata*) and 65rb10-13 (*Alfarabius ... multa exempla greca propter ipsorum obscuritatem pertransiet derelinquit et propter eadem causam multa dubie exposuit*).

note from Averroes. Still, by looking at the subjects addressed concomitantly by Avicenna and Averroes, it emerges that the only relevant passages are those about Homer as someone who knew how to remunerate both friends and enemies through the rhetorical devices of praise and blame. On the one hand, this passage seems to deserve particular attention inasmuch as it offers a specifically rhetorical way in which gratitude should be expressed. On the other hand, Hermannus must have found the Homeric example both puzzling and interesting, so that Averroes' passage, which gives little information about historical details, did not seem enough to clarify, it and Avicenna's words had to be added. The idea that in his first citation from the *Book of the Cure* Hermannus was chiefly concerned with Avicenna's words about Homer is strengthened by the fact that, as shown in 2.6.2, these are the lines on which the translator acts most intrusively.

2.7.2 – Hermannus' First Avicennian Quote

The first quote from *K i t ā ḥ lī* (fl. 73,7-75,15 of Sālim's edition) encompasses a citation from Avicenna, one from Averroes, and some introductory words by Hermannus himself. Unlike what happens for the second Avicennian quote (*K i t ā ḥ lī* t, fl. 206,8-212,16), here Aristotle's text was not omitted, possibly because in this case Hermannus had no problem with its examples, but rather with the general sense of the passage. This is what he states while introducing the citation:

Ms. Paris, BNF Latin 77ra15-22:

Dixit translator: *In hoc passu invenimus textum Aristotelis vel ita corruptum, vel decurtatum, vel forte in se obscurum quod sententiam plane intelligibilem ex eo elicere non*

*potuimus. Unde visum fuit verbum ex verbo transferre et post ipsum ad eius elucidationem textum
Avi/scenne ex libro suo Asschiphe subiungere usque ad finem capituli.*

Hermannus is stating that the Arabic text is so hard to understand that he is forced to transpose it word by word and to add Avicenna's text *ad eius elucidationem*. This could also serve as a motive for the contemporary insertion of the note from Averroes, which is not announced by Hermannus.⁷⁴³

Rhet. I.6 is part of Aristotle's discussion of deliberative rhetoric. At the beginning of I.4 (in 1359a30-b1), Aristotle establishes that the topics worth discussing in terms of deliberative rhetoric concern good and bad things whose obtainment depends on our behavior. Chapter four then analyzes those good and bad things that are of a political nature (1359b2-1360b3), while chapter five discusses happiness and its parts, as they are the goal of deliberation (1360b4-1362a14). Finally, chapter six examines the goal of deliberation in terms of goodness and usefulness, for this is the reference point employed by deliberating people (1362a18-20). Single good things on which there is general agreement are then treated (1362b10-28). For good things that are not universally recognized, some individuation criteria are suggested: for example, that

⁷⁴³Still, if we consider the subjects addressed concomitantly by Avicenna and Averroes, we find out that the only relevant passages are those about Homer as someone who knew how to remunerate both friends and enemies through the rhetorical devices of praise and blame. On the one hand, this passage seems to deserve particular attention inasmuch as it offers a specifically rhetorical way in which gratitude should be expressed. On the other hand, Hermannus must have found the Homeric example both puzzling and interesting, so that Averroes' passage, which gives little information about historical details, did not seem to him enough to clarify it and Avicenna's words had to be added. The idea that in his first citation from *K i t o b f e r m a n n u s* Hermannus was chiefly concerned with Avicenna's words about Homer is strengthened by the fact that these are the lines on which the translator acts most intrusively. I discuss this subject in more detail in G. Celli, *Some Observations about Hermannus Alemannus' Citations of Avicenna's Book of the Rhetoric*, in *Oriens* vol. 40.2 (2012), where I also offer a provisional text of Hermannus translation of the Aristotelian, Avicennian and Averroistic passage.

which is the opposite of a bad thing, or the opposite of what is desired by our enemies, are often a good thing (1362b29-37). The passage that reportedly stumps Hermannus explains that good things are often those that are appreciated by valuable people, those that take place in a preferred way, those easily obtained, and those desired by each one (1363a17-b4).

The structure of *K i t āhī t ā.2b* resembles that of *Rhet.* I.6 inasmuch as its first section (pp. 64,11-69,14 in Sālim's edition) is devoted to good things that are recognized by everyone, while its second section (pp. 69,15-75,14 in Sālim's edition) analyzes more subjective criteria. However, the Avicennian and Averroistic passages quoted by Hermannus focus strongly on rewards for benevolent and malicious acts, which are not addressed at all in Aristotle's text.⁷⁴⁴ The citation from Avicenna runs to the end of his chapter II.2, while the quote from Averroes is much shorter (1.6.18-19 or pp. 53,6-54,5 in Aouad's edition) and strictly focused on benevolence and its reward. The narrow scope of the citation from Averroes leads me to think that the passage that Hermannus could not understand actually was 1363a16-24, in which it is stated that subjective criteria for recognizing a good are the fact that it is appreciated by valuable people and that it is easy to obtain.

2.7.3 – Hermannus' Second Avicennian Quote

The second Avicennian citation, beginning in 128ra of the Paris manuscript, analyzes metaphors, periphrasis, diminutives, stylistic coldness, and comparisons. Unlike the previous case, here the

⁷⁴⁴ As J. Watt explains, this is probably due to the translation of τιμωρία (1363a26) as *m u k ā*, "fræquital, reward" (p. 32.5 ed. Lyons). See J.W. Watt (ed.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac. Barhebraeus, Butyrum Sapientiae, Book of Rhetoric*, 6.7.2, p. 234, Leiden-New York, 2005, 2.3.7-8, p. 308.

Aristotelian text for III.2-4 is completely substituted by Avicenna's words. In this case as well, Hermannus introduces quotation with some explanatory phrases:

Ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 128ra11-16: *In hoc passu tot inciderunt exempla extranea et greca (grata PT) vocabula quod nullum nobis consilium fuit prosequendi textum Aristotilis. Unde coacti fuimus (fuerimus P) sequi illud quod Avicenna de hoc passu excerpterat et posuerat in libro suo Aschiphe.*

Hermannus cannot translate Aristotle's Arabic version because of the many examples and Greek words it contained.⁷⁴⁵ This is also the main difficulty Arabic commentators faced in dealing with the *Rhetoric*,⁷⁴⁶ and the reason put forward by the translator for omitting the four Aristotelian passages listed in my table.⁷⁴⁷ Hence, omission could be regarded as Hermannus' default solution for passages made unclear by the many references to Greek culture. However, while all the sections listed in my table were tolerably short and their absence did not prevent the global understanding of Aristotle's text, the problematic passage outlined in 128ra11-16 covers as much as three chapters of the *Rhetoric*. By merely leaving it out of the Arabic-Latin translation, therefore, Hermannus would have faced a structural problem, for the whole Aristotelian discussion of the stylistic choice of words would have been missing. Hence the extraordinary

⁷⁴⁵ The anonymous Arabic translator's approach to this kind of difficulties is discussed in U. Vagelpohl, *Aristotle's Rhetoric in the East*, Leiden, Brill, 2008, p. 206.

⁷⁴⁶ Hermannus states it in his prologue to the translation of the *Rhetoric*: ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 65rb4-13: *Nec miretur quisquam vel indignetur de difficultate vel quasi ruditate translationis, nam multo difficilius et rudius ex greco in arabicum est translata. Ita quod Alfarabius, qui primus conatus est ex rethorica aliquem intellectum glosando elicere, multa exempla greca propter ipsorum obscuritatem pertransiens derelinquit et propter eandem causam multa dubie exposuit et, ut Avicenna et Avenrosd estimant, propter hanc etiam causam glosam usque ad finem negotii non perduxit.*

⁷⁴⁷ Here are Hermannus' explanations for his Aristotelian omissions. Ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 92vb12-18: *Dixit translator: circa hunc locum plures scribebantur testes et exempla suorum testimoniorum que propter errorem antiquum scriptorum ita confusa fuerunt in omnibus exemplaribus quod non poterat haberi consilium ad ea transferendum. Ideoque fuerunt relictas, 134va24-28: Sermo translatoris: Plura talia exempla ad idem facientia quia grecam sapiebant sententiam non multum usitatum latinis dimissa sunt et subsequitur quasi conclusio auctoris. 135va24-b7: Inquit translator: Hic plura exempla dicte rationis confirmativa dimisit Ibiniscena in suo Aschiphe et Avenrosd in sua determinativa expositione huius libri quia penitus grecam sententiam protendebant nec videbatur eis quam magnam habebant utilitatem in arabico eloquio. Hac quoque de causa ego dimisi ipsa. Qui autem magnum habebant auditorium per ipsa volentes in latino via procedere rethoricandi? 143ra18-20: Et inducat probationem ad hoc exemplum notum in greco quemadmodum processit talis in causa contra talem.*

decision of substituting it with a commentator's text. It will not be hard to see why Hermannus sought an explanation for Aristotle's examples in Avicenna's *K i t ā* rather than in Averroes' *Middle Commentary* if we follow S. Stroumsa's discussion of the indifference shown by Averroes for Greek examples, literary references, and technical terminology in his writings on rhetoric and poetics, which very much differs from Avicenna's systematic attempt to offer an Arabic explicative equivalent for most of them.⁷⁴⁸

If citations from commentators and omissions of troubling Aristotelian passages are the tools employed by Hermannus when dealing with the Arabic translation of the *Rhetoric*, we still don't know how he intervenes on Avicenna's text. The second Avicennian quote, being the longest, provides the best basis for answering this question. I suggest that his activity revolves around three main axes, namely paraphrasis, explicative insertions, and substitution of Arabic *realia* with concepts either more familiar to the Latin reader, or more coherent with the sometimes fictitious Greek background in which Hermannus wanted to anchor his translation of logics. Since I have already extensively discussed the first two cases elsewhere,⁷⁴⁹ I will sum them up very briefly, while I will describe the third strategy in more detail.

Paraphrastic activity takes the form of an overall rephrasing of a passage which is unclear in its original form or which, as it is, does not help the translator in making Aristotle's intentions easier to understand. On the other hand, explicative insertions are also employed for the translation of Aristotelian passages, but, while in that case they are effectively and explicitly marked by means of *rubricae* like *dixit interpres*, within the Avicennian passages themselves no title introduces the sections inserted by the translator. This reinforces the conclusion that

⁷⁴⁸ See S. Stroumsa, *Avicenna's Philosophical Stories: Aristotle's Poetics Reinterpreted*, in *Arabica* XXXIX, 1992.

⁷⁴⁹ G. Celli, *Some Observations about Hermannus Alemannus' Citations of Avicenna's Book of the Rhetoric*, in *Oriens* vol. 40.2 (2012), pp. 487-492.

Hermannus viewed his relationship with Avicenna’s text in rather different terms than that with Aristotle’s text.

An example of substitution of Arabic *realia* with Greek *realia* is to be found in Hermannus’ second Avicennian quote. Faced with the staggering list of culture specific examples that illustrate *Rhet.* III.2-4, the translator resorts to the omission of a section of Aristotle’s text, and to its replacement with Avicenna’s parallel passage (IV.1 206,8-212,16 of Sālim’s edition). Here, Hermannus is faced with a discussion of diminutive and augmentative substantives, like *duhayb/‘iqyā* r(a little bit of gold/pure gold, 209,5-6) and *tuwayb/hi* l (á little gown/a formal gown, 209,6-7).

K i t ~~Ab~~ t ā l b a , -8, ed. Vā. l i i , m : 2 0 9 , 5

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Likewise for the augmentative and diminutive enunciation. And w
 b i t o f g o l d ” a n d “ a l i t t l e g o w n , ” t h e v e r y
 “ p u r e g o l d , ” o r w h e ~~But~~ w h e r n e o v n e e r s o a n y e s s “ a f y o s r m “ a b l i
 a n d b i “ t a ” o r - “ a n d i t n e a m s a h e r e d u c t i o n i o f t h e b i t - i n t h i s c a s e t h e m e a n i n g i s v e r y
 different.

Ms. Paris, BNF Latin 16673, 129ra15-24: [15] *Et hac via procedit usus dictionis amplificative et diminutive. Cum enim dicitur verbi gratia aurulum [diminutivum de auro] aut vestiolum [diminutivum de veste], diminuitur unum et idem significatum [20] quod amplificatur dicendo aurum eurizon aut vestimentum polimeton, [idem exametum]. Verum quando dicitur vulpes aut vulpecula, et quando dicitur minus aut minusculum diversificatur per hoc significatum diversitate non modica.*

We can see that the diminutives are translated by means of the standard Latin diminutive suffix *-ulus, -a, -um* as *aurulum* and *vestiolum*. The augmentatives could have been effectively

rendered with periphrastic Latin expressions, as we would do when translating them in English, but Hermannus chose to translate them with Greek loanwords instead, namely *eurizon* and *polimeton*.⁷⁵⁰ Du Cange lists the expression *polymitus* in his glossary, that is *polymita vestis, multis variisque coloris filis et liciis contexta et variegata*. The term seems to be inspired by Greek and Du Cange reports that some glossae link it to ποικιλτική and πολυμιταρική. *Eurizon* is an alchemical term, which refers to a very pure kind of gold, or possibly to a kind of gold which has not been produced through alchemical means. Mandosio,⁷⁵¹ discussing the presence of this word in the late 15th Century author Jeroni Torella, states that it might be a neologism deriving from the Greek adjectives εὐρίζος (*with good roots*) or ὄβρυζος (*very pure, said of gold*). The derivation of the Latin *obryzum* from either of these Greek expressions is uncontroversial. However, if Hermannus was already using this term, it cannot be seen as a 15th Century neologism; moreover, it should be noted that in the Middle Ages the Greek pronunciation of ὄβρυζος and εὐρίζος differed only for the first vowels, which had a very similar shape in minuscule writing, and that the two terms are also equated in the *Alphita*, a lexicon of botanical and medical *glossae* that originated in 11th Century Salerno.⁷⁵² Finally, since E. Trapp's *Lexikon zur Byzantinischer Gräzität*⁷⁵³ also lists the adjective εὐρίζος and translates it as *rein, pur (vom Gold)* there is really no reason to worry about the relationship between *eurizon* and εὐρίζος, since our Latin word surely stems from the adjective with *u*, whether it was linked to ὄβρυζος or not. The choice of translating the Arabic augmentatives *‘iqyā* and *ḥi l irī* such a way is not only due to the lack of a proper augmentative

⁷⁵⁰ Both the Toledo and the Paris manuscripts bear the additional text *idem exametum*, which, in all likelihood, originated as a gloss. *Exametum* is probably a Greek loanword too, glossed by Du Cange as *pannus holosericus, Graecis recentioribus ἐξ ἄ μ ι* See C. Du Cange, P. Carpentier e L. Henschel, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, Niort, L. Favre 1883-1887.

⁷⁵¹ See Jean-Marc Mandosio, *La création verbale dans l'alchimie* in *Bulletin Du Cange: Archivum M o y e n Â g e , latinitatis medii aevi* 63, 2005, p. 138.

⁷⁵² See J.L.G. Mowat, *Alphita, a medico-botanical glossary from the Bodleian manuscript, Selden B. 35, vol. II, in Anecdota Oxoniensia*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1887, p. 127.

⁷⁵³ See E. Trapp, *Lexikon zur byzantinischen Gräzität*, Verl. der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 2005.

suffix in the Latin language, but also to Hermannus's desire to provide an Hellenising veneer to his Aristotelian translations, even when they are actually translations from Arabic. This is also confirmed by the fact that these and other loanwords appear in the Latin version with the Greek neutral suffix *-ov*, which is sometimes quite preposterous. This is the case of the meters *agamenon* and *effron*, which never existed in Greek literature, and which – but for the suffix – are plausible looking transliterations of the Avicenna's *afā* and *afman*,⁷⁵⁴ since the final *yā* of *afā* could easily have been misread as a *rā* and the *fān* 'afman could easily have been misread as a *gayn*. Although it is not clear how Avicenna's *afman* originated from the expression *διθύραμβοι/ditū ā mūb* of Aristotle's Greek-Arabic translation, the permanence of *ἔπη/afā* in the text of *K i t āḥbi ḥ:āḥma* leads us to assume that, in Avicenna's eyes, *afman* is to be regarded as a Greek loanword as well.

2.8 – Hermannus and the other Textual Witnesses of Avicenna's *K i t āḥbi ḥ:āḥma* Critical Passages

The goal of this section is to find out at which degree the textual relationship between the Arabic and the Latin witnesses of Avicenna's rhetorical work can be established and described, since better knowledge of the links between Hermannus' Arabic source and other Avicennian Arabic manuscripts would be, at the same time, very useful in editorial terms and extremely informative as far as the history of our text is concerned. These questions will be dealt with directly in subsection 2.8.8 and in section 2.9 of this chapter.

In the following pages, I will discuss some textual problems suggesting that Hermannus' text is in some relationship with ms. Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 (*Ob*), which, according to its colophons, was produced in Shiraz between 1481 and 1491. In fact, although both Hermannus and *Ob* have individual mistakes, they do share a variety of errors.

Ob (and sometimes Hermannus) also shares mistakes with *Sh* and *S*, two very ancient Istanbul witnesses of the whole *K i t āḥbi ḥ:āḥma* was copied before 1481, but probably much

⁷⁵⁴ About the transliteration and translation for the names of Greek meters, see paragraph 6.7 of this text.

earlier, and is best known for the so-called “Avicennian signature,”⁷⁵⁵ while S was penned by Amīr al-Dīn Māniyūl between Marāġa and Ḥarbūt from 1273 to 1276.⁷⁵⁶

After presenting the evidence concerning common readings in Hermannus and other witnesses, in this section I will therefore briefly discuss the nature of his relationship with the much more recent *Ob*, without discarding the role that collation could have played in the establishment of this link.

2.8.1 – Omission of *bi-l-ġ a f* “with harshness”, in Hermannus’ translation

The second chapter of the second book from *K i t ā Ḥ ḥ ā b ā* is devoted to the deliberation on things that are particular rather than general. The section preserved by Hermannus’ first Avicennian quote, that is to say II.2 73,7-75,15, discusses what is good, what is useful, and their parts. The passage quoted below introduces an example of ingratitude (opposed to gratitude, which is a good).

Hermannus

Avicenna 74,3-6 ed. Sālim

*Quod ergo deficit a possibili in beneficentia
est ex impotentia, quod autem pertransit
necessitatem in maleficientia est ex proposito.*

, 2 1
3.
7 6 5 4
9 8

*Et quando perdurat molestatio molestantis
et intenditur debilitas et metus donec pertranseat
horam necessitatis,¹ adducit discordiam procul
dubio.*

1 et intenditur... necessitatis] om. T

1] om. Oa habet Oa sl. 2]

⁷⁵⁵ On this subject, see G. C. Anawati, *Essai de bibliographie avicennienne*, Cairo, Dār Al-Ma‘ārif 1950, pp. 73-74, and Appendix B in A. Bertolacci, *Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Ḥayāt* (The Manuscripts Preserved in Turkey and Their Significance)*, in J. Jabbour (ed.) *Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph*, vol. 67, 2017-2018, and the bibliography quoted therein.

⁷⁵⁶ More information on this manuscript is gathered in G. Celli, *The Ms. Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442: A 13th Century Copy of the *K. al-Šifā’* with *Syri**, in J. Jabbour (ed.) *Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph* 67, 2017-2018.

add. ShOSCbSfESqSrObLVi 3]
 EGVi, *om.* Ob 4] Sh E SrG
mg. 5] LaObOa 6] SSr 7
] *om.* LaOa 8] Ob 9]
 SVh

Avicenna: *Hence that which is less than what is possible in terms of benevolence is a [self-]imposed deficiency, while that which is more than what is necessary in terms of harm is an [evil] intention.*

And whenever submission to misfortune is prolonged and feebleness and fright are reinforced, so that one exceeds the instant of necessity with harshness, aversion is surely triggered.

This passage is full of textual and interpretative difficulties, but I will only bring up what is – or could be – relevant for establishing relationships between Hermannus and the Arabic manuscript tradition.

Firstly, the Avicennian text underlying the Latin *in beneficentia* seems to have been similar to Sālim’s text, also attested by *Vh, Si, La, K, Ch, Oa* and *Cm* (*f īiḥs ā, ḥinī* terms of benevolence,” II.2 74,4) rather than that of *Sh, O, S, Cb, Sf, E, Sq, Sr, Ob, Va, L, Vi*, which read *f īiḥs ā nī-l-muḥḍinī* (“in terms of benevolence towards the benefactor”). However, in this case it is hard to make a clear-cut statement about which was the original Avicennian option and which was the innovative one, capable of proving the relationship between two witnesses. Accordingly, this observation cannot be used to investigate the history of the manuscript tradition. Secondly, the translator’s text did not share the omission of *qaṣd* with ms *Ob*.

Moreover, the source text for this translation *molestatio molestantis* cannot be either *al-id^c nāli-l-miḥan* (“submission to misfortunes,” II.2 74,5), which we find in most witnesses, or *al-id^c nāli-l-muḥayyar* (“submission to the person who has the choice”) as in mss. *E* and *Va*, or *al-id^c nāli-l-muḥḍini* (“submission to the benefactor”) as in *Sr* and *L*. Maybe we could assume that

Hermannus' Arabic source read *ihz ā nmulhzih*, "the affliction of he who afflicts," since in II.2 74,1 *wa-l yāhẓ u n u -hi*'s translated by *sine molestia*.

Finally, the Latin text offers no equivalent for the Arabic *bi-l-ğ a f* "with harshness," 74,5). If it is due to a misreading like that occurring in *Ob*, which has *m ā -h bā* instead, this would mean that Hermannus' Arabic source and *Ob* have a common mistake, and therefore that they share at least one ancestor.

2.8.2 – Confusion between *b ā* ("domain") and *b ā* ("mind, attention"): Possible Traces of Collation

In *K i t ā* *ḥā b*, II 75,3-11, Avicenna discusses non-pecuniary ways of rewarding someone. Let's concentrate on the conclusion of this discussion, which is again included in Hermannus' first Avicennian quote.

Hermannus

Avicenna 75,7-11 ed. Sālim

Omnis enim homo delectatur in aliquo et ammiratur de aliquo, quod sibi placet, a proprio ei, aut per naturam suam aut per assuetudinem aut per experientiam ipsius. Multa enim delectant et placent propter experientiam, que, si non esset experientia, non delectarent nec placerent.

Et huius quoque capituli seu intentionis sunt directio exhortativa et consultiva fidelitas: sunt enim beneficentia et retributio quedam.

Et est quidem beneficentia et¹ eius retributiva responsio artificiosa et delectabilis valde

.
¹ ,
,
,
³.
²
6 5 4
. ,

*cum sit in hora necessitatis et requisitionis sue; imo
eximia est et honorabilis.*

1 et] om. T

1] OSf 2] Ob 3] om. EObVi, Vh 4
] Oa, La 5] SiLaOa 6
] Ob

Avicenna: *And everyone enjoys something and admires something that is fit for him. And if (this were) about what one is prepared for and used to, then, for what concerns preparation, one would have found pleasant and would have admired something that one would not enjoy or admire if it were not for that.*

And in this domain (there are) guidance and good advice as well: indeed, this is some kind of benevolence and reward. And at the arrival of the good deed and of the reward when they are needed and wished for there is a pleasant occasion, but sizeable and valuable as well.

Hermannus' translation for Avicenna's *m i n dā hb dā* (ln 75,9) is *huius quoque capituli seu intentionis*. Unsurprisingly, double translations are not uncommon in the Latin version of the *Rhetoric*, so that we cannot exclude that the expression *capituli seu intentionis* was indeed based on the single word *al-b ā*. However, whereas the semantic link between *al-b ā* and *capitulum* is quite straightforward, this is not the case for *al-b ā* and *intentio*, since elsewhere the latter translates words like *ma'n ā* and *qaṣd*.⁷⁵⁷ It is therefore worth observing that the manuscript *Ob* does not read *al-b ā* but *al-b ā* ("mind, attention"), which – although graphically very similar to the original reading – actually comes much closer to Hermannus' *intention* in terms of meaning. Accordingly, rather than a double translation, *capituli seu intentionis* could be the product of the insertion in the main text of a word that had been copied in the margin because of collation with a witness that shared the reading we find in *Ob*. The opposite process, i.e. the insertion by collation of the reading *al-b ā* in a witness that, like *Ob*, testified *al-b ā* is also a possibility, and maybe an even more likely one, for the phrase with *al-b ā* is not very clear, and could have pushed a

⁷⁵⁷ On the subject, see the discussion at paragraph 2.8.4, concerning the words *aḥass*, *aḥsan* and *decentiam*.

conscientious reader to compare his copy of the text with other sources. The events I described most probably happened within the process of transmission of the Arabic manuscripts, or, at most, contextually with Hermannus' translation activity, for later contact with different streams of Arabic tradition could hardly have occurred.

Ultimately, the Latin rendition of *al-b ā i h* 75,9 is another hint of a possible relationship between Hermannus' Arabic source and *Ob*, but also a warning that this relationship could well be due to contamination rather than to genealogy.

2.8.3 – *K a -fiuā* (“it has been enough for him”) and *k i f* (“sufficiency”)

At the beginning of Hermannus' second quote from Avicenna (*K i t ā h ā b, dM.1* 206,8-212,16) we find a discussion of “borrowed” (Arabic verb *ista'ara* 216,10) expressions, which is followed by some suggestions on how to avoid explicitly referencing shameful subjects, for in rhetoric pointing at them by gesture rather than naming them is not an acceptable solution. Finally, Avicenna argues that antiphrastic references could be satisfactory for listeners. For example, in order to blame someone, it could be beneficial to state that integrity is better than depravation, building an opposition between integrity and depravation, or even that “more integrity is better,” thus leaving the opposition implicit.

Hermannus

Avicenna 207,14-16 ed. Sālim

*Et fortassis coordinabit oppositum opposito
secundum prepollentiam et dignitatem¹ prout
dictum est in predictis² exemplis, et fortassis non
faciet mentionem eius quod diversum est, sed
solummodo hoc quod melius et nobilius est proponet
et sufficiens erit hoc in illo processu.*

,¹
,² .
,³ ,

1 **dignitatem]** ut *add.T* 2 **predictis]**
premissis P

1] *add. Ob* 2] *om. Ob* 3]
ShSVhSi ESqObViL

Avicenna: *And often the opposite of what is most proper and most apt is mentioned, like what was mentioned in the two examples. And often that different thing has not been mentioned, but only what is most proper and most apt [has been], and this has been enough for him [i.e. the listener] on this very question.*

The phrase *, this has been enough for him on this very question.* printed by Sālim and attested – between others – by the manuscripts *O, Cb* and *Sf*, appears in a different form in the witnesses *Sh, S, Vh, Si, E, Sq, Ob, Vi,* and *Vh*. In the latter group, we find the infinitive *k i f ā y a* (“sufficiency”) instead of the perfect *k a* followed by the personal pronoun *-hu*, which stands for the rhetor’s audience. *K i f ā y a* seems to me a simplification of *k a -fīuā* for the second case implies a more complex syntactical structure that could easily have been ignored by an absent-minded copyist.

Although Hermannus’ translation *et sufficiens erit hoc in illo processu* is characterized by a participle (*sufficiens*) rather than by an infinitive, the absence of any reference to who exactly will be satisfied hints to the fact that the Arabic source of the Latin translation read an infinitive like *k i f ā y a* without personal attached pronoun – rather than a perfect like *k a -fīuā*. Although the words *ki f ā y a* and *k a -fīuā* have a very similar *rasm* – so that this mistake is potentially polygenetic – the fact that *Sh, S, Vh, Si, E, Sq, Ob, Vi, Vh,* and Hermannus share a wrong reading does lend some weight to the hypothesis that they could be related.

2.8.4 – *A ḥ a* (“viler”), *a ḥ s* (“better”) and *decentiam*

In the course of the same chapter – and still within Hermannus’ second quote form *K i t ḥ b ā b a a l* – Avicenna also discusses which elements are relevant for the effectiveness of metaphorical expressions (*K i t ḥ b ā b a a l* 1, 208,5-209,9), namely whether they spotlight nobler or viler aspects of what is described. Introduced for metaphors, this mechanism is extended to already existing expressions in the following terms:

Dictio enim que presentat rem honoratioris¹ intentionis decentior existit. Significatum quippe ex significati relatione² decentiam³ nanciscitur,⁴ quamvis per unamquamque dictionum proprie sumptarum non intendatur nisi veritas unius significati, prout dici potest de mulo quoniam est de genere equorum non connotando equam que ipsum genuit. Hoc quippe competentius videbitur quam si dicatur quod sit de genere asinorum non connotando asinum

1	honoratioris]	honorationis	T	2	1]	Obs	2	...]	om.	Sh	3]
relatione]	om.	T	3	decentiam]	decentia	TP	4	ShOSCbsfVh	Ob	4]			
nanciscitur]	nanciscitur	T	nanciscitur	P	ShOSCbsfESqObVhVi	Si	Y	5]					

LaCm

Avicenna: *Indeed, the enunciation that happens to something insofar as it has a nobler meaning is more beautiful than the enunciation that happens to the thing insofar as it has a viler meaning, even if both of these were oriented towards just one meaning, like the fact of saying of the mule that it is offspring of a horse from something that is not a horse. And this is surely of a donkey from something that is not a donk*

Hermannus' text is somewhat problematic. Provisionally, I would translate it as follows: "namely, the enunciation which exhibits something that is more honorable is more respected. By all means, a meaning obtains respectability thanks to (its) relationship with the thing that is meant, although through any of the enunciations, if strictly understood, nothing else is meant but the truth of just one meaning." Please note that with the expressions "meaning" and "thing that is meant" I render the same Latin word, repeated twice in the same phrase (*significatum*,

apparent equivalent of the Arabic *lafz*, and *significati*, equivalent of *maʿnā*. This is why the meaning of the expression *significatum quippe ex significati relatione decentiam nanciscitur* is not clear at all. *Significatum* is often an equivalent for *maʿnā*⁷⁵⁸ while *significatio* translates both *maʿnā* and *dalla/dal* (twice and four times respectively). However, in no other passage from Avicenna does Hermannus translate *lafz* with *significatum*. Actually, *lafz* is almost always translated with *dictio*, as here in the first line of the text.⁷⁵⁹

I am therefore quite skeptical on the fact that in 208,11 the word *significatum* in our passage actually translates Avicenna's *lafz* in 208,11. The problem is, of course, the second occurrence of this term, since, if it bears the same meaning of the first occurrence, it makes the phrase virtually senseless. If, on the other hand, it bears a different meaning, it could signify the thing that is meant (the "reference", opposed to the "meaning", in Kripkean terminology like in the rendering of Hermannus' passage offered above), which would give intelligibility to the phrase and, in a way, also a certain correspondence with Avicenna's original text. Still, this seems quite far-fetched, for, by giving to the same word two different values in such a short space, Hermannus would have been asking of his reader a really needless interpretative effort. The odds that he would do so in the only occasion in which *lafz* is translated as *significatum* are quite low.

To explain the riddle, if we assume the strict coincidence between first and second occurrence of *significatum*, we could assume that Hermannus Arabic text was somehow different from that of the other witnesses, offering something like *fa-inna l-maʿnā al qaaht min haytu maʿnā ā ḥṣaun*, but what seems most likely to me is that the mistake took place within the Latin manuscript tradition, and that, despite the agreement of the Toledo and the Paris manuscript on the reading *significatum*, the original text was ... *intentionis (maʿnā) decentior existit*.

⁷⁵⁸ Hermannus does sometimes translate *maʿnā* with *intentio*: see, for example, *K i t Ḥiḥā b Ḥl* 206,13 (*rationes seu intentiones*), 207,8 (*rerum intentiones*), and 210,9 (*intentionem*), although in this text *intentio* can also stand for *qaṣd* (like in *K i t Ḥiḥā b Ḥl*, 206,9).

⁷⁵⁹ See for example *K i t Ḥiḥā b Ḥl* 209,14. Only once *lafz* is translated with a verbal periphrasis (*fa-idā sakata ʿan-hu lafzan*, and if he does not refer to it with a verbal expression, 208,8-9, translated as *quando ... non sermocinando*).

dictio (lafz) quippe ex significati relatione decentiam nanciscitur. Later on, the alternative (or double) translation *significatum* (or *seu significatum*) for *maʿn ā* would have been inserted above *intentionis*. Finally, a copyist took it for a correction of *dictio*, so that it entered the text instead of it. After all, double translations are very common in Hermannus text, as we have seen in the case of *rationes seu intentiones* for *maʿn ā* at 206,13, cited in note.

Agreement on the textual history of Hermannus' text, however, is not a prerequisite for the genealogical point I am going to make.

It seems reasonable to me to understand the correspondence between Hermannus' *dictio enim que presentat rem honoratioris intentionis decentior existit. Significatum quippe ex significati relatione decentiam nanciscitur* and Avicenna's

as quite analytical. *Dictio enim que presentat rem honoratioris intentionis decentior existit* mirrors *... ,* while *Significatum quippe ex significati relatione decentiam nanciscitur* mirrors *...*

Otherwise, we could see both *dictio enim que presentat rem honoratioris intentionis decentior existit* and *significatum quippe ex significati relatione decentiam nanciscitur* as a global, double translation of *... ,* since this is a tool often deployed by Hermannus. I would rather discard this option, for the expressions *d i c t i o e n i m q u e p r e s e n t a t r e m h o n o r a t i o r i s i n t e n t i o n i s d e c e n t i o r e x i s t i t* and *s i g n i f i c a t u m q u i p p e e x s i g n i f i c a t i r e l a t i o n e d e c e n t i a m n a n c i s c i t u r* are not synonymous (a precondition for viewing them as a double translation), and for it would leave the second term of comparison

without an explicit equivalent, probably on the ground that it could be extrapolated from the first term of comparison.

If my analytical understanding of Hermannus' translation is correct, then *rem honoratioris intentionis* stands for *maʿn ā a*, *decentior* stands for *aḥsan*, and the presence of the substantive *decentiam* in the Latin text shows that its Arabic source must have read

("that happens to the thing insofar as it has a better meaning"), as in *Sh, O, S, Cb, Sf,* and *L,* rather than ("that happens to the thing insofar as it has a

viler meaning”) as in Sālim’s edition (208,12-13). The sense of the Avicennian paragraph requires a reading that could be semantically opposed to the comparative *akram* (“nobler,” 208,12), so that we can state with some confidence that Sālim’s choice *aḥass* was right, and that all the witnesses in favor of the innovative text *aḥsan* share a common ancestor, namely *Sh*, *O*, *S*, *Cb*, *Sf*, *L*, Hermannus’ Arabic source, and *Ob*, whose text is *wa-aḥsan*.

A possible side effect of the loss of the opposition between *akram* and *aḥass* is that a subset of witnesses, i.e. *S* and *Ob*, also reads *alzam*, *more necessary*, instead of *akram*, while *Sh*, that often agrees with *S* and *Ob*, has a lacuna that goes from the first to the second . Therefore, if we think that Hermannus’ source was related to the group *Sh*, *S*, *Ob*, we must also assume that these three manuscripts had a further common ancestor that was not shared by Hermannus’ source.

2.8.5 – Identification of Mutanabbī as a poet

In *K i t āḤḥā bāw* 1 209,3-4, part of Hermannus’ second quote, Avicenna is still discussing metaphorical expressions, and reworking Aristotle’s stance that metaphors can be taken from better or worse species within the same gender.⁷⁶⁰ One of the many examples of this offered in our text is a poetry verse:

Hermannus	Avicenna 209,3-4
<i>Et istud propiniquum est ei quod dixit poeta</i>	¹ :
<i>Abultibi:</i>	
« O f i l i K e r u s t i ,	⁴ , ³ , ²
<i>d i c a m , o s e m i v i d e n s .</i>	
	1] add. CbSf, add. ObCm 2] OcSf 3] ObL 4] Ob

⁷⁶⁰ See Aristotle, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, W.D. Ross (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press 1959, 1405a15-16.

Avicenna: *And this is similar to what Abū al-Ṭayyib said: “Oh blind person, and, if he is proud, oh half-s e e i n g p e r s o n . ”*

In his translation, Hermannus points out Abū al-Ṭayyib’s (or Mutanabbī’s) identity as a poet, which is implicit in the Arabic text, partially because for Avicenna’s readers this identity was very well known, and partially because the fact that the following quote was a verse is apparent from its meter.

How did Hermannus himself come to the conclusion that he was dealing with a poetry text? Was his grasp of Arabic culture deep enough to include basic information about Abū al-Ṭayyib and his poetic activity? Abū al-Ṭayyib’s fame notwithstanding, I do not think so. To begin with, his name is wrongly transliterated as *Abultibi*, which makes it unlikely that Hermannus was familiar with this historical personality. Moreover, the translator does not seem very interested in literary and poetical subjects as such, as we can see that other poetic examples are left untranslated (see e.g. Avicenna’s *K i t ā b al-Ḥikāma*, p. 210,4). If not from his personal culture, could Hermannus derive consciousness of Abū al-Ṭayyib’s role as a poet from the immediate context? Actually, the word *š i* (“poetry”) is sometimes cited in the previous pages, for poetry texts are the readiest source of examples for metaphors. However, although Hermannus could have been aware of the fact that poetry was somehow linked to Avicenna’s subject thanks to these appearances of the word *poetry* itself, this does not explain why he recognized and marked this as a verse, while he neglected other poetic lines (see again *K i t ā b al-Ḥikāma*, p. 210,4). What exactly could have alerted him to the fact that these words constituted a poetic text? Expecting Hermannus to recognize the metrical structure seems somewhat too optimistic.

Accordingly, the most likely source for our piece of information seems to have been his own Arabic manuscript, that probably had an indication similar to what we find in *Ob* and *Cm*. These witnesses insert the word *š i*, “poetry,” immediately after the name Abū al-Ṭayyib. It seems like a title mistakenly inserted in the Arabic text, for it has no syntactic links to the rest

of the phrase: this is probably also the reason why Hermannus feels free to translate it with *poeta* rather than with *poetria*. Therefore, the Arabic source of the Latin translation and the manuscripts *Ob* and *Cm* would share an innovative reading (and a likely sign of kinship), if it were not that the insertion of a title in the text could have happened multiple times in the Arabic tradition.

2.8.6 – Plural or Dual Number

This passage refers again to Hermannus’ second Avicennian quote. In the first chapter of the fourth book, *K i t ā-Ḥitā b a* Avicenna discusses the respective efficacy of altered, tropic expressions and standard, non-tropic expressions, like, for example, *red* as opposed to *beet red*. After discussing the evocative value of freshly minted and already established metaphors, he focuses on the effect of augmentative and diminutive nouns.

Hermannus

Avicenna 209,7-9 ed. Sālim

*Verum quando dicitur vulpes aut vulpecula,
et quando dicitur minus¹ aut minusculum²
diversificatur per hoc significatum diversitate non
modica. Oportet ergo in pluribus locis ut caveantur
superfluitates utreque.*

: , : ¹, : , :
· , ,
· ²

1 minus] *munus* PT *pc.* **2 minusculum]**

1] ShVi **2]**

minusculum PT

ShOSVhCbSf SqSrOb(a.c.)KOaViCm

Avicenna: *But whenever one says “bbiigt” f ooxr” “and its“mlailt l
means the reduction of the bit - in this case the meaning is very different. In most cases, the excesses should
be globally avoided.*

The eye-catching difference between the likely text of Hermannus’ Arabic source and Sālim’s edition is the use of the explicitly dual adjective *utreque* to specify the substantive *superfluitates*, while in Arabic text the name is in the plural form *al-i ftār.tā* from the apparatus I

provided, it can also be seen that the dual option *al-i fṭār nā* appears in a pretty large group of Avicennian witnesses, so that we could be tempted to assume that Hermannus' ancestor was related to this sizeable (and ancient) group of manuscripts, because they happen to share a reading which also seems to be – crucially – wrong. However, it is not clear whether by printing the plural *Sālim* actually made the best choice. There is an obvious sense in which it can be said that the excesses that should be avoided here are two, for, while in the parallel passage Aristotle only discusses diminutives,⁷⁶¹ in Avicenna augmentative and diminutive expressions are being discussed together. Moreover, the dual number, by clarifying which opposite excesses should be avoided, enables us to give a perspicuous translation of *ǧā nāin* as *at the same time*. Compared with “in most cases, both excesses should be avoided at the same time,” an expression like “in most cases, the excesses should be globally avoided” (or, in R. Würsch's translation *In den meisten Fällen muss man sich vor Übertreibungen insgesamt hüten*)⁷⁶² could seem rather redundant. Moreover, the case for *al-i fṭār nā* strengthened by the presence of a dual in the mirroring Aristotelian passage, both in Greek and in Arabic. Aristotle's text in 1405b34 is εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀνφοῖν τὸ μέτριον, “however, in both cases care should be taken to preserve moderation,” where the pronoun ἀνφοῖν probably refers to καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν (“that which is good and that which is bad,” 1405b30), both of which can be belittled by diminutives. The Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* in Lyons's edition⁷⁶³ translates 1405b34 as follows:

(“and we should beware here and aim at frugality in both things at the same time”). Badawi prints *al-umūr* instead of *al-amrayn*, probably because of a different optical reading of the ms. Parisinus Arabus 2346, but the Greek original ἀνφοῖν makes Lyons's solution more likely.⁷⁶⁴ Finally, the dual number appears in the rhetorical section of Bar Hebraeus' *The Cream of Wisdom*, a

⁷⁶¹ See Aristotle, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, University Press 1959, 1405b29-34.

⁷⁶² See R. Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik. Ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*, Berlin, K. Schwarz 1991, p. 114.

⁷⁶³ Aristotle, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica: The Arabic Version*, M.C. Lyons, (ed.), Cambridge, Pembroke Arabic Texts, 1982.

⁷⁶⁴ See Aristotle, *Rhetorica in versione arabica vetusta*. ḤA. Badawī (ed.), Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya, 1951.

Syriac summa that, as far as our subject is concerned, has Avicenna's *K i t āHlā b* and the Greek-Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as its main sources.⁷⁶⁵

If then *al-i fṭār tīā* is an easy trivialization of *al-i fṭār nā* the fact that the latter, correct, reading is shared by Hermannus and a long list of Arabic witnesses does not tell us anything about the relationship of the source of the Latin translation and Avicenna's Arabic manuscripts. On the other hand, we can probably assume that the witnesses that erroneously read *al-i fṭār tā* were somehow related,⁷⁶⁶ although allowances must be made for the possibility of a plural genesis of the mistake and for the effects of contamination. We see contamination in act in *Ob*, where the original reading *al-i fṭār nā* was substituted with *al-i fṭār.tā*

2.8.7 – *Yurā d uhi* (“through which one aims at”)

In *K i t āHlā b* there is a long section devoted to the four species of “cold enunciations” (*al-lz fal-ā r*, 208, 10-212,8 ed. Sālim, parallel to III.2 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*), like periphrastic expressions, foreign words, uncommon and tropic expressions, and whether or not they are appropriate in rhetoric and poetic contexts. The longest description is allotted to the third species of stylistically cold enunciations, whose frigidity does not derive from the fact that they are long, composite or metaphorical, but from the fact that their understanding is not immediate. At the same time, Avicenna broaches the subject of the relationship between these expressions and meter, which was already discussed in Aristotle's text in 1406b1-4. Aristotle uses the words *διθυραμβοποιούς, ἐποποιούς* and *ἰαμβεῖσις*, which, mirrored by the Arabic transliteration of Greek words *dītū ā mūh afā*, and *a y āū* were bound to be an obstacle for Hermannus. While Averroes overlooks them all, Avicenna does give a transliteration for all of them (based of course upon the Arabic version) explaining how the first two are to be used as well (in 211,13, 212,1 e 212,3).

⁷⁶⁵ See J.W. Watt (ed.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac. Barhebraeus, Butyrum Sapientiae, Book of Rhetoric*, 6.7.2, p. 234, Leiden-New York, 2005, 7.2.6, p. 247.

⁷⁶⁶ The relevant witnesses are *Si, Dm, E, La, Da, Va, L, Gp*, and *Ob* (p.c.).

It is in this context that we find the following passage, which is relevant not so much for its content, but rather for the way in which Arabic manuscripts witness it and for the translation offered by Hermannus.

Hermannus

Avicenna 211,15-212,1 ed. Sālim

*Dictio vero extranea pertinet metro
nominato “effron,” e
inducendum pavorem seu terrorem in legibus et
constitutionibus rerum¹ publicarum, ad incitandum
mentes hominum ut insistant rebus honestis et
fugiant a contrariis ...*

¹ “ ”
... ³ , ²

1 rerum] om. P

1] ShSob 2] ShSob 3]

ESqVi

Avicenna: *And as far as what is abstruse is concerned
Indeed, it is a meter through which one aims at making something scary in administrative things and laws,
so that people will be submissive or fearful.*

Instead of the relative clause *yur ā-ḥi* (“through which it is aimed at ...,” or “through which one aims at...”), in the manuscripts *Sh*, *S* and *Ob* we find , a likely *vox nihili*. Whether this innovation is based on the mere alteration of the *rasm* or rather on a meaningful and graphically similar expression like *li-a d* (which would give rise to the translation “a meter for the lowest [possible level of] fear”), this mistake is hardly reversible or polygenetic, so that *Sh*, *S*, and *Ob* must share a common ancestor. The very fact that is a meaningless expression also rules out the possibility of its presence being due to contamination, while this could easily be the case for its absence from other witnesses eventually related to *Sh*, *S*, and *Ob*, for this unintelligible word could easily have prompted a zealous copyist (or reader) to check other sources and restore the correct reading. If Hermannus’ Arabic source was indeed linked to the common ancestor of

Sh, *S*, and *Ob*, this is possibly the reason why it offered the correct reading *y u r ā* ~~hi~~, which *i* Hermannus correctly substitutes with words cognate of *induco* (*ad introducendum* and *inductio*) at p. 211,2 of Sālim's edition as well. Of course, the possibility that Hermannus' translation conveys the right reading independently from mss. *Sh*, *S*, and *Ob* remains open.

2.8.8 – Hermannus and the other Textual Witnesses of Avicenna's *K i t āb i t : a l - b i t ā* General Statements

Hermannus' text does share a few innovative readings with *Ob*, for some of which, however, collation could have played a role. This is the case of *capituli seu intentionis/al-b ā* (discussed in paragraph 2.8.2) and *poeta/š i* (discussed in paragraph 2.8.5). Other mistakes are potentially polygenetic, like in the case of *k i f / s ū f f i c i a n s* (see paragraph 2.8.3). Nonetheless, in other situations, confusing forces like collation and polygenesis of errors are a less likely explanation, as for the omission of *bi-l-ğ a f a t ā* (paragraph 2.8.1), for *aḥsan/decentiam* (paragraph 2.8.4), and for *al-ifraṭā / s u p e r f l u i t a t e s u t r e q u e* (paragraph 2.8.6).

Ob also shares innovative readings with the much older *Sh* and *S*, so that this triplet is surely interrelated (see, for example, paragraphs 2.8.4 and 2.8.7). Since it is not clear whether all the mistakes shared by *Sh*, *S*, and *Ob* are in Hermannus' Arabic source as well, we must assume that either the relationship between Hermannus and *Ob* does not extend to *Sh* and *S*, or that these mistakes were present in Hermannus' Arabic source as well, but they have been «hidden» by the translation process. In the first hypothesis, it would be more reasonable to ascribe the similarity between *Ob* and the Latin version to collation. On the other hand, if the second hypothesis is true, and with the large dose of caution made mandatory by the brevity of Hermannus' Avicennian excerpts, the relationship between *Sh*, *S*, *Ob*, and the Latin translation could also be genealogical.

2.9 – Hermannus as a witness for Avicenna

The question of how and whether Hermannus' translation could help us in establishing Avicenna's text is harder to answer. Even if we had a stemma and a reliable text of the Latin *Rhetoric*, we would still have to face the fact that various passages of Avicenna's treatise are

paraphrased rather than translated, and that even those sections which actually are translated are treated less literally than Aristotle's text. However, since the passages translated from the *Book of the Cure* are not too long, it seems possible to analyze them satisfactorily in order to distinguish the paraphrastic sections from the literal ones, so that the latter can receive more weight as full-fledged witnesses. Moreover, a more precise understanding of Hermannus' goals in quoting and rephrasing Arabic commentators could enable us to better use the Latin text as a secondary witness, in the way commentaries are normally employed in order to establish the wording of the text commented upon. This does of course mean that any information extracted from Hermannus' work should be examined and utilized with as much caution as possible.

In the following section I examine a passage in which a solution to textual problems could actually come from the Latin translation (2.9.1) and cases in which the latter has only a lesser role (2.9.2).

2.9.1 – *Aut per naturam suam*

In *K i t* *ā* *ḥ* *ḥ* *ā* *b* *ā* 75,4-9 Avicenna discusses non-monetary rewards, such as happiness for friends and unhappiness for enemies. Then it is stated that everyone admires and is impressed by something that fits him. Finally, in 75,8-9 Avicenna seems to say that, if this happened on the ground of custom and habit, people would admire things by which they would be unimpressed unless they had grown used to them.

(28) *And everyone enjoys something and admires something that is fit for him, since preparation occasionally makes something pleasant and admirable, in such a way that, if it were not for it, one would not enjoy or admire it.*⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶⁷ The Arabic text for this section (75,7-9) is the following: *fa-kullun yaltad d bi-š a y ' -y a t aw'a a ġ ġ a b u m i n š a yaḥuṣ uḥu. Wa-i m m āha b ā b i m ā -t i a ' d t a ā d r a -h n a d -d r i a t h q i d , t u l a d f i t t u š a y -t' u ' n a ġ w ġ i b u m i n h l ā h ā l d a d i h i w g -l u ā l t t a u ' a ġ ġ a b m i n h u*

However, the text printed by Sālim and translated above is unlikely to be the original one, since the period in 75,8 begins with the expression *wa-i m m ā* which cannot be interpreted as a coordinative conjunction, because for that the reading *wa-i m m ā* would be required. Nor can *i m m ā* really be taken as I did in my translation, because if *i m m ā* actually were the composition of *in* and *m ā* it would have to be followed by a verbal phrase.

A possible and rather inexpensive solution would be to ignore Sālim's punctuation and relate the *wa-i m m ā ḥa ḥ ā b* of line 8 with *bi-ḥa ḥ ā s a b* of line 6 so that the translation of the passage at lines 5-9 would be *and unlike those things, either about what happens to him in accordance with observation concerning him ... - and everyone enjoys something and admires something that is fit for him - or about what preparation occasionally makes pleasant and admirable...* However, in order to accept this hypothesis, it would be preferable to see the conjunction *i m m ā* before the *bi-ḥa ḥ ā s a b i m ā* expression at line 6.

Otherwise, we might emendate *wa-i m m ā* in *wa-i m m ā*, introducing a disjunction instead of a conjunction, or we could opt for *wa-a m m ā ḥa ḥ ā b i m ā - t i a ' d t a ā r d r a a ḥ b u a w f ā i n n a* ..., where the initial *amma* would be answered by the *fā* in *fā-inna*.

Yet, Hermannus' text suggests another solution, since in 78rb28-va6 it reads

(28) *Omnis enim homo delectatur in aliquo et ammiratur de aliquo quod sibi placet a proprio ei, aut per naturam suam aut per assuetudinem aut per experientiam ipsius. Multa enim delectant et placent propter experientiam que si non esset experientia non delectarent nec placerent.*

The Latin *aut per naturam suam* does not have any parallel within the Arabic text and *aut per assuetudinem aut per experientiam ipsius*, translation of *wa-i m m ā ḥa ḥ ā b i m ā - i ' t ā a t a d a r r* (literally, about what one is prepared for and used to), is annexed to the previous and not to the following sentence. If this were a faithful image of its source, the Arabic text would be

fa-kullun yaltad *al-bi-š a y ' -y at aw ' a a ğ ğ a b luṣ unhi un, š iḥasabi fiṭratihijwaa i m m ā b i*
ḥa s a b i m ā -t ia ' d ta ā r d, and everyone enjoys something and admires something that is proper
for him, either about his own nature, or about what one is prepared for and used to. I suggest the use of
the word fiṭra because it also appears in 75,8, where it is translated by the same Latin equivalent
natura (78rb29),⁷⁶⁸ but, in order to solve the problem with the Avicennian text outlined above, any
Arabic word of the same meaning would be satisfactory.

The insertion of *about his nature* would have the advantage of fixing Avicenna's text on the basis of one of its witnesses, namely the Latin translation. Moreover, in this light the reading of the Arabic manuscripts can easily be explained as the product of a jump from same to same, that is to say from *i m m ā i m m ā*. Adding *natura* to the list of reasons to like something also helps us to understand the words *multa enim delectant et placent propter experientiam que si non esset experientia non delectarent nec placerent* in 78va5-6, because now there is an opposition between a situation in which only nature influences us and a situation in which it acts alongside with habit.

On the other hand, a mistake between *aw* and *wa* or *imma* and *amma* would be easy to explain as well. Besides, while translating Avicenna, Hermannus does something add short sections without announcing them,⁷⁶⁹ so that we should not be overly surprised by the fact that Hermannus' *aut per naturam suam* has no parallel in the Arabic text. Still, this addition would have an - however small - doctrinal relevance, which is not the case with any of the examples discussed in the previous sections. It could also be said that *natura* might stem from the already named 78rb28 passage, which says *prout appropriatur ei eorum secundum suam naturam*, but since their nature is not set against any kind of experience, that would have to be traced back to a

⁷⁶⁸ The Arabic *fiṭra* is also translated as *natura* in Avicenna's *Philosophia Prima*, while *al-ḥ a q m a f t ū a i s l* translated by *naturalis intellectus* in *De generatione et corruptione*. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima vel scientia divina*, ed. Simone Van Riet, Gérard Verbeke, (Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill 1977-1983), *lexiques*, and Avicenna, *Liber tertium naturalium de generatione et corruptione*, ed. S. Van Riet, G. Verbeke, Louvain-Leiden, Peeters-Brill 1987.

⁷⁶⁹ See section 2.4.

mechanical mistake, which does not seem very likely. Not only does the tripartition *natura/assuetudo/experientia* not appear in 75,8/78rb28, but it also is not to be found in the previous chapters of the Aristotelian treatise. Even the somewhat similar passage from the very beginning of the *Rhetoric*, *and some people do these things* (i.e. rhetoric and dialectic) *without a plan, while other people do them through familiarity stemming from habit* (οἱ μὲν εἰκῆ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἔξεως), is translated by Hermannus as *quidam ergo vulgarium faciunt hec inperspecte, alii vero ex assuetudine et habitu stabilito* (66ra9-10). The only word this Latin passage shares with 78va2 is *assuetudine*.

One last objection that could be raised is that the emendation based on Hermannus' text would make Avicennas' *ἰσῦς* (*assuetudo*) and *tadarrub* (*experientia*) synonymous, but, from what can be gleaned from the Arabic-Latin lexica to Avicenna's works, none of these couples of terms is very common or very technical, so that it does not seem impossible that they could be used to mean the same thing.

In conclusion, I think that in a passage such as (28), which does not otherwise seem to engage in paraphrase, Hermannus is a trusty enough witness to actually consider ameliorating the Arabic text on his basis.

2.9.2 - Other problems

As pointed out in section 2.6, in *K i t Ḥibā b al-ḥikm* p. 73.7-13 Avicenna discusses benevolence, of which the best kind is benevolence towards the best sort of people. Avicenna cites Homer as an example of the best kind of verbal benevolence, since on the one side he praises the king of Athens, Helen, and Achilles - all excellent people and Homer's friends - and on the other side he contrasts them to Alexander, their enemy, who in turn blamed and insulted them. This amounts to dealing properly with enemies and friends. More precisely, in 73,11-12 he speaks of

(7) ... Alexander, son of the king of Barbar, (8) who was their enemy and therefore handled them roughly with blame and scorn

In section 2.6, where the whole passage is discussed, I came to the conclusion that the translation of this paragraph is remarkably paraphrastic. Moreover, the phrase *Iskandar bin malikin barbarin*, *Alexander, son of the king of Barbar*, seems to have two Latin renderings: a synthetic one in (7), that is *scilicet Paridem* (77va23), and one in paragraph (9), which has no parallel in the Arabic text, that is *Paridem scilicet filium regis Troie* (77va27). In these two loci Paris is always coupled with Helen, as already discussed in section 2.6. Before discussing Avicenna's text, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the attributes *son of the king of Barbar* and *filium regis Troie*.

Actually, the superfluous repetition of the content *that is to say, Paris and Helen* in (7) and (9) and the awkward syntactical position of the second *Paridem scilicet filium regis Troie et Helenam* must bring the reader to believe that one of the *scilicet* clauses, and the second one with more likelihood, is not Hermannus translation, but a later gloss, which was meant to clarify the expression *inimicos*, but which was mistakenly inserted in the main text. If *Paridem scilicet filium regis Troie et Helenam* is a gloss, then Hermannus did not translate Avicenna's *son of the king of Barbar* at all. The closeness between *son of the king of Barbar* and *filium regis Troie*, which is both semantic and formal, could make us doubt that the Latin text actually bears no relation to the Arabic one, but it must be admitted that to any Latin reader *filium regis Troie* would be a perfectly natural attribute to gloss the name Paris, so that its presence does not need any further explanation.

Going back to the Arabic textual problems, something needs to be said about the Arabic *Barbar* (). Avicenna's manuscripts do not agree about this reading: the printed reading appears in *Cb*, *Sh*, *Cm*, *Cd*, *L*, and *La*, while *Dm* has *barmar* and *Oa* has *b ū b* *ṣālim*'s reading is the only one that makes any sense at all, but the other options could point at some difficulty within the Arabic manuscript transmission.

The exact meaning of *malik barbar* is also not so easy to pin down.⁷⁷⁰ Ullmann⁷⁷¹ lists *al-barbar* as a possible translation for βάρβαρος, while GaLex⁷⁷² provides *al-barbar* as a rendering for both οἱ βάρβαροι and βαρβαρικός and *al-umum wa-b a r ā ab ā* as a translation for βάρβαροι. Avicenna's *Iskandar bin malikin barbarin* could then be taken to mean *Alexander, son of a foreign king*, a description which would exactly suit Paris son of Priam, quite at home in the group of Homeric characters. In view of the fact that Hermannus actually took this passage to refer to Paris, if he did find the word *barbar* in his source, he must have understood it as foreign. However, since the only lexicographical evidence for this value is to be found in Greek-Arabic translations, it is far from certain whether Avicenna could have employed *barbar* in that sense. Surely he did not find it in the Arabic version of the *Rhetoric*, where βάρβαρος in 1410a15 is translated as *i ḡ n aab* ١٩٧١١ and τὰ βαρβαρικὰ in 1361a36 is omitted at 25.14.⁷⁷³ Still, it looks like all the possible interpretations for *Iskandar bin malikin barbarin* force us to come to terms with some difficulty.

In this light, by taking Hermannus *Paridem scilicet filium regis Troie* as a translation rather than as a gloss, one could think that Hermannus decided to improve upon his source text,

⁷⁷⁰ Kazimirski does not list *barbar* as an adjective and translates *al-barbar* as the Berbers, while Wehr and Traini offer the adjective *barbariyy*, again rendered as Berber, and Lane as well translates the substantive *barbar* as the Berbers, even if he does point out that the word is in an etymological relationship with the Greek βάρβαροι. Still, it is hard to understand who this *Alexander son of a Berber king* could be or, more to the point, why a Berber should have been inserted in a list of Homeric characters at all.

⁷⁷¹ See Manfred Ullmann, *Wörterbuch zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhunderts*, (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2002).

⁷⁷² See Gerhard Endress and Dimitri Gutas, *A Greek and Arabic lexicon (GALex): materials for a dictionary of the mediaeval translations from Greek into Arabic*, (Leiden: Brill, 1992).

⁷⁷³ Averroes' *Middle Commentary* to the Aristotelian treatise does contain the word *al-barbar*, namely in 2.4.27, where the interpreted Greek passage is 1382a4-7, a section of the second book in which Aristotle distinguishes between anger, which always targets individuals, and hate, which can have groups as an object as well. Averroes suggests *al-barbar* as an example of hated group: nevertheless, Aouad cautions that here *al-barbar* does not designate nonspecific strangers, but rather the Berber people as a whole, with reference to the thirteenth century Iberian demography. Then again, Avicenna did not live in thirteenth century Andalusia, so maybe his usage of *barbar* is closer to what we find in Greek-Arabic translations than to any reference to a specific historic population. See Averroes, *Commentaire moyen*, vol. III (*Commentaire du Commentaire*), 248-249.

specifying that Alexander was Trojan and not a generic stranger. This would fit well with the paraphrastic nature of our section, as is the substitution of the name Paris for the synonymous but more generic Alexander.

Another option worth considering would be that Hermannus did actually translate the text he found in his manuscript, but that this text was not *Iskandar bin malikin barbarin* (

). Rather, it might have been *I s k a n d a r b i*, where *ā t ū (k ā)* would be a y ā somewhat odd transliteration for the toponym Troy, whose modern standard version is the French loanword *Ti r w.*⁷⁷⁴ In itself, emending Avicenna's text to mean *Alexander, son of the king of Troy* should be possible on a merely semantic basis, but I think that, without the support of the Latin version, the chances of Troy being known to Avicenna as *T r u*, rather than as some transliteration of Ilium, are quite small.

As a conclusion, the relevant question for this passage are (i) whether Hermannus phrase *filium regis Troie* is to be read as an easy gloss or as a literal translation of the Arabic text, and (ii) whether it is closer to Avicenna's linguistic usage to employ the word *barbar* in order to mean foreign or rather to employ the transliteration *Truyā* to refer to Troy. At the present stage of research, I do not believe that these questions can receive satisfactory answers, and surely not on account of Hermannus' translation.

⁷⁷⁴ What we would expect as a transliteration of Τροία is something like *Itr ū* or *Ti r ū* with long vowels, with emphatic *ṭ* and with no more than a single consonant at its beginning. Still, Vagelpohl's observations about transliteration standards in the Arabic *Rhetoric* and in other early Greek-Arabic translations show us that at this stage a form like *T r u* would not have been unconceivable: examples are given for the initial consonant cluster, since the name Πλάτων can be transliterated as *A f ṭ ū mā* *F ṭ ū ā* and as *Flatū n* and for unemphatic *t* instead of *ṭ*, since the name Τρύλεφος can be transliterated as *T ī l . ā*. This, however, is not enough to grant us that the transliteration *T r u y ā* would have been possible for Avicenna, who surely did not find it in his translation of Aristotle, who in the *Rhetoric* does not use the word Τροία at all. See Uwe Vagelpohl, *A r i s t o t l e ' s R h e t o r i c i n t h e E a s t*, Leiden, Brill 2008, pp. 150-159.

Transliteration options for Greek names available to Avicenna and Hermannus paraphrastic approach to Arabic commentators are relevant elements in the discussion of the identity of Tāwḍrūs at 73,10 of Avicenna's text as well, although in this case the source of the solution I suggest is not Hermannus himself.

Theodore is the Greek name which comes closest to our Tāwḍrūs; as we know, however, no Theodore is involved in the war for Troy or is related to Helen. Besides, it should be noted that different manuscripts have different readings for this passage: in mss. *Sh*, *O*, *Cb*, and *Dm* there is the reading chosen by Sālim, in *Sq*, *Ob*, and *Cd* we find *T ā w ḍ VaμLṣ* and *Vi* read *M ā w ḍ, Ḥi u s* testifies *T ā w ḍ* while *Oa*, *La*, and *Cm* seem to read *t ā ḍ and Ṣ* seems to read *T ā d ū r ū s*

Since the mention of *Helen his daughter* follows immediately, it is possible that here Avicenna is actually referring to Tyndareus, father to Helen, Clytemnestra and the Dioscuri. Catalogues of alternate names for prominent writers such as Theodor Abū-Qurra report him both as Tāwḍrūs and as Tandūrus,⁷⁷⁵ which comes quite close to a transliteration of Tyndareus.⁷⁷⁶ Besides, there aren't many reasons why this character should have been well known to Arabic readers: therefore, it is not unconceivable that his name could not be told apart from Theodor.

⁷⁷⁵ See for example the on-line thesaurus of the Consortium of the European Research Libraries, which lists the ways in which various place and people names appeared in European press between 1450 and 1830. Cf. *Consortium of the European Research Library*, <http://thesaurus.cerl.org/record/cnp00405030>, accessed on 02/12/2021, 2012.

⁷⁷⁶ Varying spellings for the same name can be found in Ibn an-Nadīm's *Fihrist* as well: Flügel's edition has *T a y ā d ū r s* (12.4, 14.20, 303.16-18), *T a y ā ḍ* (24.5; 249.6), *T a y ū ḍ* (269r5) *T a y a ḍ* (42.17) *T a ḍ ā* (244.9) and *T a ḍ r u s* (244.11). In the translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* we only find two occasions in which the rendering of the Greek θεόδωρος is still extant: in 106.9 (i.e. 1400b16) we read *T ā d ū*, while in 176.3 (i.e. 1404b22) we find *T ā w a d . ū r ū s*

Unfortunately, the Greek name Τυνδάρεωϛ does not appear in Ullmann's *Wörterbuch zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhunderts*,⁷⁷⁷ nor in the Greek-Arabic index of the GaLex first volume. Kraemer's article on Homer's Arabic reception doesn't give us any clue in this direction either⁷⁷⁸ and in Aouad and Rashed's list of sources for references to ancient exegetic activity on the *Rhetoric* (in Greek or in Arabic) there is no author likely to have shown much interest for this sort of erudite detail.⁷⁷⁹

Otherwise, one might imagine some paleographical mistake leading from a regular transliteration of Τυνδάρεωϛ such as *T i nūd* to what is to be found in the manuscripts; the only problem with this interpretation is that in our Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* there is no reference to the original Theseus or to any relation of Helen that could be mistaken for Tyndareus.

So, either one assumes that Avicenna could access another translation of the *Rhetoric*, in which Theseus - or maybe even Tyndareus - was named,⁷⁸⁰ or one takes *Tāwdrūs* to somehow go back to *Undūsūs al-A t i*, who is mentioned in 31.18 of Lyons's edition.

2.9.3 - Conclusions

Accepting any reading from the Latin translation over the testimony of the Arabic manuscripts for Avicenna's text implies the assumption that all the Arabic witnesses share a

⁷⁷⁷ See Ullmann, *Wörterbuch zu den griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungen des 9. Jahrhunderts*, Wiesbaden, Harassowitz 2002

⁷⁷⁸ Jörg Kraemer, *Arabische Homerverse*, in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. 106 (1956). As M. Aouad has kindly suggested, a fruitful line of enquiry on this problem could entail going through the Arabic historians most concerned with Greek subjects looking for references to the mythological Tyndareus.

⁷⁷⁹ See M. Aouad, M. Rashed, *L ' e x é g è s e d e l ' B r e m i e r e p a r t i e , a n n e e 1 1 0 0 (1 1 0 0)*, vol. 23 (1997). *i s t o t e .*

⁷⁸⁰ We do not have the text of any other translation, but we know of their existence through Ibn an-Nadīm's catalogue; all the relevant information about them is to be found in Aouad, "La *Rhétorique*", and in F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus: The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, (Leiden: Brill, 1968).

common ancestor which, on the other hand, does not belong to the group of Hermannus' predecessors. This holds true for the problem discussed in section 2.9.1, since all the Arabic codices show the very same text. The only other possibility is to regard all the Arabic readings as polygenetic errors: actually, at least the omission of the Arabic equivalent of *aut per naturam suam* is potentially polygenetic, as it would be the result of a jump from like to like, namely from *i m m ā* to *i m m*. Still, the idea that the same mistake was repeated in every single case does not sound very likely. The possibility that, while all the Arabic manuscripts are related to each other, the Latin translation stands alone surely needs further corroboration in order to become fully acceptable, but it is less unlikely than it does appear at first sight, since the most ancient witnesses of Hermannus are coeval with the most ancient dated Arabic manuscripts for the logical part of *K i t āš bi*, from what can be gained from the list of witnesses for the *I l ā h i y ā t* produced by the PhiBor project.⁷⁸¹ Hermannus' witnesses also seem to be slightly older than all of the manuscripts used by Sālim.⁷⁸²

Further research will maybe offer us the answer to these questions: on this subject, we can hope in meaningful development both on account of the analysis of the Arabic manuscripts of Avicenna's *K i t āš bi* that is taking place in the framework of the PhiBor project and of its edition of the *I l ā h i y ā t* and on account of the edition of Hermannus' *Rhetoric*, which is the last stages of its elaboration thanks to the work of F. Woerther and M. Aouad. The publication of these works is sure to permanently change our perspective when reflecting on Hermannus as a witness of Avicenna's *K i t āš bi*.

⁷⁸¹ Manuscripts of the *Logic* that, as the Paris and Toledo manuscripts, go back to the 13th Century are *O* (1267), *S* (1272), *Cb* (1285, used by Sālim as well), *Sf* (693H/1293), and *Si* (1297). See A. Bertolacci, *On the Manuscripts of the I l ā h i y ā t o f - Š ā*, in A. Akasoy (ed.), *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber*, Leiden, Brill 2008, pp. 59-76 and the PhiBor project web page, <http://www.avicennaproject.eu/index.php?id=61>.

⁷⁸² See Avicenna, *al-Š i f - Mantiq, Al-Hikā b*, ed. M.S. Sālim, Cairo, al-Idāra l-‘amma li-l-ṭaqāfa 1954, pp. 24-30 and G. Anawati, *Avicenna: la Métaphysique* (Paris, Vrin 1978), pp. 18-20. *du S h i f a*

⁷⁸³ See *Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations*, ERC Advanced Grant 339621, under the direction of A. Bertolacci. Information concerning this project is available at <https://www.avicennaproject.eu>

List of Manuscript Sigla Employed in this Chapter:

1. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damat Ibrahim Paşa 822 (12th-13th C.) **(Sh)**
2. Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 (666H/1267-8) **(O)**
3. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 (671-674H/1273-1276) **(S)**
4. Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 (677H/1278) **(Vh)**
5. Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar 331 *huşûsiyya*, 2415 Beḥîṭ (684H/1285) **(Cb)**
6. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (693H/1293) **(Sf)**
7. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damat Ibrahim Paşa 823 (697H/1297-8) **(Si)**
8. Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262 (9th/15th C.) **(Va)**
9. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damat Ibrahim Paşa 824 (824H/1421) **(Dm)**
10. Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Mağlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 135 (Ša^cbān 871H/March 1467) **(E)**
11. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748 (879H/1474) **(Sq)**
12. Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek 1445, Golius 84 (881H/1476) **(La)**
13. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cami 770 (888H/1483) **(Sr)**
14. Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 (886H/1481-897H/1491) **(Ob)**
15. Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek 1444, Golius 4 (before 10th/16th C.) **(L)**
16. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 894 falsafa (10th-11th/16th-17th C.) **(Cd)**
17. Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708 (10th/16th C.) **(Oa)**
18. Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1326 (10th/16th C.) **(Gp)**
19. Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 3983 (1002H/1593) **(Da)**
20. Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmed III 3445 (11th/17th C.) **(Vi)**
21. London, British Museum Or. 7500 (11th/17th C.) **(Cm)**

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4 - Résumé substantiel de la thèse en français

4.1 – Introduction : Objet et buts de cette contribution

L'objet de ma thèse de doctorat est la réception arabe de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote, que j'essaie d'aborder en observant les choix lexicaux opérés par les auteurs qui ont participé de la tradition péripatéticienne. A travers les âges, ce traité n'a jamais été lu isolément : au Moyen Âge latin, où il n'était pas directement accessible, il était connu à travers les références présentes dans le *De Inventione* et la *Rhetorica ad Herennium* de Cicéron, et par ce moyen il a trouvé sa place, avec la grammaire et la dialectique, dans le *trivium*, le premier degré de la formation intellectuelle des savants. Dans l'Antiquité tardive, lorsque le texte de la *Rhétorique* était encore accessible, il était généralement interprété soit en relation avec l'écriture éthique d'Aristote, soit comme faisant partie de son *Organon*. Quelques siècles après la composition du *Corpus Aristotelicum*, c'est l'école philosophique d'Alexandrie, laquelle a établi le rôle exemplaire d'Aristote pour les penseurs ultérieurs, qui a également établi la rhétorique et la poésie comme parties permanentes de la logique péripatéticienne, de sorte qu'elles ont été transférées à la philosophie islamique attachées à ce contexte.

Dans ma contribution, d'un côté j'aborde la réception arabe de la *Rhétorique* et les choix de vocabulaire opérés dans ce domaine (chapitre 1 de ce texte). D'un autre côté, j'étudie la postérité latine de cette réception arabe, en me concentrant principalement sur la technique de traduction qui caractérise la version arabo-latine de la *Rhétorique* rédigée par Hermann (chapitre 2 de ce texte).

4.2 – Le lexique rhétorique dans l'école islamique péripatéticienne

Comme de nombreuses œuvres littéraires et philosophiques classiques dans le monde islamique et dans le monde chrétien, l'*Organon* a eu des répercussions étendues et généralisées sur l'activité culturelle ultérieure. Le fait même que les écrits d'Aristote faisaient partie du corpus scolaire qui

a façonné des générations d'intellectuels grecs, arabes et latins a produit dans la postérité une fidélité remarquable à l'étude et à l'actualisation de ces ouvrages à travers les siècles, jointe au besoin récurrent d'établir sa propre position à la fois par rapport à la tradition scolastique et par rapport à l'auteur qui en est à l'origine.

Les choix lexicaux successifs opérés par les philosophes qui se sont placés dans le sillage d'Aristote offrent une image cristallisée de ces positions. Si le lexique technique est un domaine dans lequel les auteurs aristotéliens, soucieux de la continuité avec leur tradition savante, avaient sans doute toutes les raisons d'être conservateurs, la structure de l'*Organon* et l'histoire du processus de traduction gréco-arabe ont produit une pluralité de variations lexicales possibles. Les sources d'innovation structurelles consistent dans le fait que chaque discipline discutée dans l'*Organon* d'Aristote est aussi bien directement analysée dans le traité qui lui est dédié, que fréquemment mise en relation avec ses disciplines jumelles dans les autres sections de l'*Organon*, et que chacune de ces sections a été traduite séparément des autres. Par contre, la source d'innovation historique consiste dans l'observation que le mouvement de traduction a rendu la *Rhétorique* aristotélienne accessible aux lecteurs arabes dans de multiples versions, produites dans différentes occasions et conditions.

En observant de près la forme lexicale prise par quelques concepts techniques choisis dans la *Rhétorique* I d'Aristote (*sylogisme, démonstration, enthymème, induction, exemple, signe, probable et généralement reconnu*) dans les traductions arabes survivantes de l'*Organon* et dans la réflexion philosophique de philosophes islamiques comme Fārābī, Avicenne et, chaque fois que possible, Averroès, j'essaie de démêler lesquelles évolutions terminologiques ont été dictées par une aspiration à la continuité avec la scolastique aristotélienne, lesquelles par le désir de produire un système lexical plus cohérent que celui occasionné par le processus de traduction, et lesquelles par les limitations matérielles imposées par les conditions des témoins des textes pertinents.

Il serait impossible de poursuivre ce discours jusqu'à la réception latine de la tradition orientale de la Rhétorique, car, peu après la parution de la traduction arabo-latine du texte Aristotélicien rédigé par Hermann, la traduction gréco-latine par Guillaume de Moerbeke du même texte a commencé à circuler largement. Cela rend difficile d'analyser les choix des philosophes latins qui se sont intéressés à la rhétorique et de les comparer à leurs sources.

Pour pouvoir au moins inclure dans ma réflexion la traduction d'Hermann elle-même, exempte de cette problématique, je traite de la méthode du traducteur vis-à-vis d'Aristote et des extraits avicenniens qu'il cite. Je poursuis cette analyse sur la base de la pratique d'Hermann et des déclarations dont il parsème ses écrits. Enfin, ma thèse comprend une analyse des relations qu'on pourrait tracer entre le texte source d'Hermann et les témoins connus du *K i t āḥḥā baal* d'Avicenne, sur la base des passages critiques qui sont disponibles.

4.3 – Méthodologie suivie

4.3.1 – Un corpus pour l'investigation du lexique rhétorique dans l'école islamique péripatéticienne

Dans les pages suivantes, je dresserai une liste des textes que j'ai employés pour mon analyse sur le vocabulaire de la rhétorique péripatéticienne islamique. Bien entendu, cette liste est loin d'être exhaustive de tous les textes historiquement pertinents, même si nous limitons notre réflexion à ceux qui sont disponibles dans une édition moderne : les seuls auteurs pris en compte sont Fārābī, Avicenne, et, d'une manière moins systématique, Averroès et Ibn Riḍwān. Un texte avicennien important comme *al-I š ā r āḥḥā baal* également été exclu de cette enquête, car ses spécificités et particularités face à d'autres œuvres avicenniennes rendaient les comparaisons lexicales hasardeuses.⁷⁸⁴ Les recherches futures fourniront sûrement des occasions d'étudier ce

⁷⁸⁴ Une réflexion très utile sur certains éléments du lexique rhétorique d'Avicenne dans ce texte se trouve dans M. Aouad, *Les prémisses rhétoriques*, dans P. Büttgen, S. Diebler, M. Rasheed (éd.) *Théorèmes de la 'Avicenne phrase et de la proposition de Platon à Averroès*, Rue d'Ulm 1999.

texte et d'autres textes clés dans l'histoire de la pensée péripatéticienne du même point de vue que j'ai essayé de développer dans cette contribution, et qui nous permet déjà de prendre en compte une grande variété de sources, allant de l'*Organon* d'Aristote, à ses traductions arabes, à leur réception dans la philosophie islamique.

Passons maintenant à une brève présentation des témoins concernés. Le manuscrit *Parisinus arabus 2346* est le seul codex en notre possession contenant une traduction arabe continue de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote. Sur les premières pages, quelques notes marginales copiées de son antigraphe nous informent que l'éditeur du texte, le philosophe Ibn al-Samḥ, l'a assemblé en comparant deux exemplaires arabes et un exemplaire syriaque. Une autre note à la fin du document semble impliquer que cette traduction était déjà lue vers 731. Il est difficile d'accepter une date aussi précoce, mais même si nous choisissons de ne pas le faire, notre traduction doit être très ancienne. Une version arabo-latine du XIII^e siècle du même texte est notre deuxième témoin pertinent. La traduction grec-arabe a été éditée deux fois, d'abord par 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī⁷⁸⁵ et enfin par Malcolm C. Lyons.⁷⁸⁶

Le manuscrit *Parisinus arabus 2346* ne conserve pas seulement la version arabe de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote mais aussi le reste de l'*Organon* : en fait, les pages contenant la *Rhétorique* et la *Poétique* n'ont pas été cousues au codex qu'après coup, et, jusqu'à ce moment, le manuscrit *Parisinus arabus 2346* ne contenait qu'une traduction de l'*Isagogè* de Porphyre et des ouvrages aristotéliens *Catégories*, *De l'interprétation*, *Premiers Analytiques*, *Analytiques postérieurs*, *Topiques* et *Réfutations sophistiques* (le dernier ouvrage en trois versions).

Comme la traduction de la *Rhétorique*, la version arabe des *Premiers Analytiques* mérite une attention particulière, puisque la récapitulation des moyens rhétoriques de persuasion proposés en II.27 semble avoir joué un rôle important dans la compréhension de nombreux concepts qui

⁷⁸⁵ Aristote, *Rhetorica in versione arabica vetusta*, A. Badawī (ed.), Cairo, 1951.

⁷⁸⁶ Aristote, *Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, M.C. Lyons (ed.), Cambridge, 1982.

jouent un rôle central dans cet art. La seule traduction arabe médiévale de cet ouvrage qui soit disponible pour le lecteur contemporain est celle attestée par le manuscrit *Parisinus arabus 2346*, avec le manuscrit *T o p k a p i S a r a c o*. Cela n'empêche que, comme c'est le cas pour la *Rhétorique*, nous sommes au courant de l'existence d'au moins une version arabe perdue à partir de sources bibliographiques. Selon Francis E. Peters et le *Fihrist* d'Ibn al-Nadīm,⁷⁸⁷ l'auteur de l'édition arabe des *Premiers Analytiques* dont nous disposons s'appelait Théodore (Θεόδωρος), arabisé en Taḏāri dans le manuscrit de Paris. Ce dernier fait également référence à un *naq l q d e s P r e m i e r s A n a l y t i q u e s* et à une version d'Ibn al-Biṭrīq, décédé vers 835. De plus, le *Fihrist* témoigne à nouveau qu'Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn et Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh ont produit des traductions à leur tour. Enfin, une riche tradition syriaque de traductions et commentaires est attestée à la fois par Ibn al-Nadīm et par les marginalia des manuscrits parisiens.⁷⁸⁸

Toutes les sections de l'*Organon* sauf celles de la *Rhétorique* et de la *Poétique* ont été publiées par F. Ğabr et par A. Badawī,⁷⁸⁹ tandis que la *Poétique* est disponible grâce aux éditions de D.S. Margoliouth et J. Tkatsch.⁷⁹⁰

En ce qui concerne les textes d'Avicenne, je me suis concentrée principalement sur la partie rhétorique du *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma*, c'est-à-dire *K i t ā b al-Ḥikma*. Cette section est à son tour divisée en quatre traités, les deux premiers consacrés au contenu du premier livre d'Aristote et les deux suivants aux deuxième et troisième livres d'Aristote. À certaines occasions, en particulier dans les deux derniers traités, Avicenne suit l'ordre dans lequel Aristote déroule ses arguments, mais il reformule chaque passage assez librement. Dans d'autres contextes, situés principalement dans

⁷⁸⁷ Voir Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249,6, G. Flügel (ed.)

⁷⁸⁸ Ma fenêtre principale sur la tradition syriaque de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote et sur ses développements lexicaux a été J.W. Watt (éd.), *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac. Barhebraeus, Butyrum Sapientiae, Book of Rhetoric*, Leiden, 2005.

⁷⁸⁹ F. Ğabr, *Al-naṣ ḡ-l-k ā m-īndntiq Aristū* Beirut, Dār al-fikr al-lubnānī, 1999 et A. Badawī, *Mantiq Aristū* Beirut 1980.

⁷⁹⁰ D. S. Margoliouth, *al-K a l ā m-š i ḡ-l-n ā ḡ ā l-awwal* dans *Ahalecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristotelem*, Nutt, London 1887, pp. 1-76, et J. Tkatsch, *Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles und die Grundlage der Kritik des griechischen Textes*, voll. I-II, Wien und Leipzig, 1928-1932

les deux premiers livres, l'ordre dans lequel les différents sujets sont abordés varie considérablement entre les textes d'Aristote et d'Avicenne. *K i t āḥḥā b* a été édité par M.S. Sālim,⁷⁹¹ que je suis habituellement.

Une seule autre *summa* avicennienne contenant une section explicitement consacrée à la rhétorique nous est parvenue, à savoir *al-Ḥikma al-'A rḍīyya*.⁷⁹² Dans ce tout premier ouvrage, qui couvre tous les domaines principaux de la philosophie aristotélicienne, le sujet de la rhétorique est traité en deux chapitres. Cependant, étant donné que les concepts logiques que nous allons discuter dans ce chapitre sont également brièvement discutés dans les *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote, toutes les *summae* d'Avicenne qui contiennent une section consacrée aux *Qiyā* doivent être prises en compte. Par conséquent, outre la section logique de *K i t āḥḥā b*, j'en ferai souvent les *'U y ū ḥikma*,⁷⁹³ *K i t āḥḥā b d āḥḥā b*,⁷⁹⁴ et *al-Nağā t*⁷⁹⁵ d'Avicenne, pour lesquels j'ai employé les éditions de A. Badawī's, M. 'Abduh's, et M.T. Dāniš-Pažūh.

Par souci de comparaison, je ferai également référence au *Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique* d'Averroès et à son *Commentaire moyen au Q i y*⁷⁹⁶. Le premier texte a été édité par M. Aouad⁷⁹⁷ et il couvre tout le traité d'Aristote, à la fois en l'analysant et en le reformulant de manière plus ou moins littérale. Ce traité, achevé vers 1175, fut précédé d'un court commentaire sur le même sujet, composé pendant la jeunesse d'Averroès.⁷⁹⁸

⁷⁹¹ Avicenne (*I b n Sī-nā* in *Ḥikma*, VIII, *Rhétorique* (*Al-ḥaṭā b*), M.S. Sālim (ed.), Cairo, 1954.

⁷⁹² Avicenne (*I b n Sī-nā* in *Ḥikma*, VIII, *Rhétorique* (*Al-ḥaṭā b*), M.S. Sālim (ed.), Cairo, 1954.

⁷⁹³ Avicenne, *'U y ū ḥikma*, A. Badawī (ed.), Beirut, 1980.

⁷⁹⁴ Avicenne, *K i t āḥḥā b d āḥḥā b*, M. 'Abduh (ed.), Le Caire, 1974.

⁷⁹⁵ Avicenne, *Al-Nağā t -ahğ an r qḥr af-ḍā l ḥ*, M.T. Dāniš-Pažūh (ed.), Tehran, 1985.

⁷⁹⁶ Ibn Rušd, *Talḥiṣ K i t āḥḥā b d āḥḥā b*, M. Aouad (ed.), Beirut, 1992.

⁷⁹⁷ Averroès (Ibn Rušd), *C o m m e n t a i r e m o y e n*, M. Aouad (ed.), Paris, 2002.

⁷⁹⁸ Averroès, *Short Commentary on the Rhetoric*, Ch. E. Butterworth, in *A v e r r o è s ' S h o r t C o m m e n t a r i e " R h e t o r i c "* State University of New York Press, Albany 1977.

Enfin, pour comprendre la relation d'Avicenne avec le lexique affiché par la traduction arabe de la *Rhétorique*, il faut aussi considérer la production rhétorique de son prédécesseur Fārābī, que j'ai examinée en me concentrant sur son *K i t ʿĤdā bāʿalla Didascalia* d'Hermann, et les sections rhétoriques du *Livre sur ce qui est utilisé, de la logique, dans les sciences et les arts*⁸⁰⁰ d'Ibn Riḍwān, puisque ces deux textes peuvent partiellement pallier la perte du *Š ḍi al-Ḥaṭā b de Fārābī*. J'ai également étudié les *ḡa w ā* de Fārābī sur la logique, à savoir les *R i s ā l a f ī m ā y y u q a d d a m a q falsafa*,⁸⁰¹ *M t u q ā h h l i f ṣ i m ā q ʿa w t ʿā l i m ū l n h l t d n i t ʿi i t ʿ b a l ḡadal*,⁸⁰³ *K i t ʿQ b i y ʿā l s i , t ʿQ b i y ʿā l s ḡ ʿā k r i l i , t ʿB l u r d i l ā n d Ṣ ḍ i al-Q i y ʿ*⁸⁰⁷ Je n'ai pas pu inclure dans mon étude des textes comme *K i t ʿT ḥ l i t ʿA l k i n a a l M u ḡal d e Fārābī*, malgré leur intérêt potentiel. J'espère que, dans de futures recherches, il sera possible de les étudier dans le même cadre conceptuel qui sous-tend mes réflexions dans cette contribution.

Toutes les informations que j'ai extraites de ces sources sont exposées par ordre chronologique. Un tableau global donne un aperçu des préférences lexicales manifestées par les différents auteurs péripatéticiens arabes qui ont écrit sur la rhétorique.

4.3.2 – La procédure analytique sous-jacente à cette enquête

⁷⁹⁹ Al-Fārābī, *K i t ʿĤdā bāʿalla* Langhade (éd.) dans *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique*, Beyrouth, 1971 et M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍw ā n Dādascalla in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii*, § XXI in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 7 (1997).

⁸⁰⁰ M. Aouad, *La doctrine Rhétorique de Ibn Riḍw ā n Dādascalla in Rhetoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii* (suite), in *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 8 (1998), pp. 131-160.

⁸⁰¹ Fārābī, *R i s ā l b ā ṣ r l n i l f ā r ā b ī f ī m ā y a n b falsafa*, in *Al f y ā u q ā d d d m a P ḍ i ā ḷ l o ṣ o Abhandlungen*, F. Dieterici (ed.), Brill 1892.

⁸⁰² Fārābī, *M a q ā l a ṣ i i n ā q ʿa w t ʿā l i m ū l n h l t d n i t ʿi i t ʿ b a l ḡadal* *Al n i s s - Š f i ʿ a h a , B a d a w ī*, Cairo, 1953, pp. 149-158.

⁸⁰³ Fārābī, *K i t ʿT ḥ l i t ʿA l k i n a a l M u ḡal d e Fārābī*, vol. III.

⁸⁰⁴ Fārābī, *K i t ʿQ b i y ʿā l s ḡ ʿā k r i l i*, Aḡam (ed.), al-Mantiq ʿinda l-Fārābī, vol. II.

⁸⁰⁵ Fārābī, *K i t ʿQ b i y ʿā l s ḡ ʿā k r i l i*, Aḡam (ed.), al-Mantiq ʿinda l-Fārābī, vol. II.

⁸⁰⁶ Fārābī, *K i t ʿB l u r d i l ā n d Ṣ ḍ i al-Q i y ʿ*, al-Mantiq ʿinda l-Fārābī, vol. IV.

⁸⁰⁷ Fārābī, *Š ḍ i al-Q i y ʿ*, M.T. Daniš-pažuh, Al-mantiqiyyāt li-l-Fārābī, vol. II.

La première étape de mon analyse, à savoir obtenir une liste des différentes traductions de συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις, ἐνθύμημα, ἐπαγωγή, παράδειγμα, τεκμήριον et σημείον, εἰκός et ἔνδοξος employées dans les versions arabes des multiples textes composant l'*Organon* d'Aristote, a été réalisée en identifiant les occurrences des termes grecs au moyen du glossaire gréco-arabe de Lyon pour la *Rhétorique* et du *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* pour les autres parties de l'*Organon*.⁸⁰⁸ dans la plupart des cas, ces termes grecs sont employés dans le sens technique propre à la logique, mais, où cela n'est pas le cas, j'ai essayé de le signaler. Par la suite, j'ai essayé de retracer les équivalents des expressions grecques dans chacune de leurs occurrences, en utilisant comme référence les éditions de Ğabr et de Lyon des versions arabes de l'*Organon*, lesquels, répétons-le, suivent principalement le manuscrit *Parisinus arabus 2346*.⁸⁰⁹ Les occurrences des mots grecs et de leurs traductions arabes dans la *Rhétorique* sont facilement accessibles grâce au glossaire de l'édition de Lyon. Pour tous les autres textes, les différents équivalents des termes aristotéliens choisis, issus aussi bien d'une que de plusieurs versions du même ouvrage du Stagirite, sont répertoriés dans mon texte avec leurs occurrences.

Ce que j'ai essayé de repérer dans les textes de Fārābī, d'Avicenne et d'Averroès, c'est l'utilisation de ces termes arabes, chaque fois qu'ils sont liés à un sens assez proche de la notion aristotélienne de συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις, ἐνθύμημα, ἐπαγωγή, παράδειγμα, τεκμήριον et σημείον, εἰκός et ἔνδοξος pour accorder de la plausibilité à une forme de continuité conceptuelle entre la production d'Aristote et celle des philosophes islamiques. Une telle continuité peut bien avoir lieu, même si les textes de Fārābī, d'Avicenne et d'Averroès ne sont pas des traductions,

⁸⁰⁸ Il est possible, mais peu probable, qu'à l'avenir, la consultation d'ouvrages comme A. Wartelle, *Lexique de la 'Rhétorique' d'Aristote*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1982, or H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, Berlin, 1870 (reprinted by Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960) donnera d'autres occurrences de ἔνδοξον qui n'avaient pas été répertoriées dans le glossaire de Lyon, qui ne vise pas l'exhaustivité. Pourtant, la pertinence de ce terme dans le contexte de la rhétorique aristotélienne rend improbable que Lyon ait omis l'un des passages dans lesquels il apparaît, surtout si, dans ce cas, notre terme était employé dans son sens technique.

⁸⁰⁹ Voir F. Ğabr, *Al-naṣ ʿal-k ā m-ʾindntiq Aristū* voll I-II, Beirut 1999, et M.C. Lyons, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica: The Arabic Version*, voll. I-II, Pembroke Arabic Texts 1982.

mais plutôt des commentaires et des remaniements du corpus aristotélicien, de sorte que la correspondance mot à mot ne doit pas être tenue pour acquise.

Par souci de clarté, je parle généralement des termes pertinents en grec (par exemple ἔνδοξον) ou en arabe (par exemple *maḥm ū d* , *m a q b aṭcl*) chaque fois que j'essaie de retracer le concept philosophique derrière ces termes chez chaque auteur, j'utilise des traductions en anglais qui visent à couvrir à la fois les expressions grecques et arabes (par exemple *generally accepted*, à savoir *généralement accepté*, traduction anglaise de ἔνδοξον et de la plupart de ses équivalents arabes).

Idéalement, pour discuter des formes lexicales prises par le concept de *generally accepted* chez un auteur donné, il faudrait faire une revue conceptuelle globale de sa production, et observer les termes employés pour nommer et décrire ce concept dans chaque cas. Cependant, la masse du matériel disponible nous obligerait à enquêter, au mieux, un seul texte à la fois, nous privant des moyens de réfléchir sur des tendances plus larges et de faire abstraction des propriétés spécifiques qui caractérisent la production de chaque œuvre philosophique. Par conséquent, je procéderai par l'inventaire des termes arabes employés par Fārābī, Avicenne et Averroès qui coïncident avec les termes employés dans les versions arabes de l'*Organon* afin de traduire les propres expressions techniques d'Aristote. La faiblesse de cette approche réside dans le fait que rien n'obligeait les philosophes islamiques à nommer et à discuter des contenus aristotéliciens spécifiques exactement dans les mêmes termes choisis par Aristote, et rien n'obligeait Aristote à être strictement cohérent dans son choix de mots. Par conséquent, j'ai essayé de regarder mes données avec la conscience que leur exhaustivité n'est pas acquise. Cependant, la confiance en leur représentativité est justifiée par le fait que les penseurs péripatéticiens semblent reconnaître de façon globale la cohérence conceptuelle qui caractérise le système philosophique aristotélicien et par le constat que, même s'ils visaient souvent une libre refonte de ce système qui serait en adéquation avec le contexte culturel de leur propre

activité philosophique, ils ont choisi de le faire par l'appropriation active des éléments fondamentaux de la pensée péripatéticienne alexandrine.

Bien que, en se déplaçant du milieu aristotélicien à celui péripatéticien, la permanence des liens entre termes et concepts ne soit entièrement sûre que pour les traductions, et non pas pour les commentaires, je crois en la possibilité d'une interaction fructueuse entre ma cible, c'est-à-dire l'étude de la forme lexicale de certains concepts rhétoriques chez Aristote et chez Fārābī, Avicenne et Averroès, et mes moyens, c'est-à-dire l'observation des termes grecs et arabes employés par ces auteurs. Mon optimisme repose sur la qualité technique des expressions que j'analyse, car, chez des auteurs engagés à participer de manière innovante à la tradition philosophique péripatéticienne et à l'acclimater au contexte culturel islamique comme Fārābī, Avicenne et Averroès, il est raisonnable d'assumer une aspiration de cohérence avec les formes littéraires et le langage technique de la tradition scolastique aristotélicienne précédente. Sur cette réflexion je fonde ma croyance, sinon en une identité totale, du moins en une continuité conceptuelle et terminologique globale entre Aristote et les penseurs péripatéticiens islamiques en ce qui concerne les éléments caractéristiques de chaque discipline philosophique.

Afin de localiser les occurrences des termes susmentionnés dans la production des philosophes arabes, je ne disposais pas d'un instrument aussi inclusif et efficace que le *TLG* pour les écrits d'Aristote. Par conséquent, même si parfois un examen approfondi de tous les matériaux était hors de ma portée, j'ai utilisé divers moyens afin d'étendre autant que possible la liste des passages dans lesquels ces mots apparaissent. Plus en détail, j'ai réussi à vérifier le texte du *K i t ā ḥdā b al-Fārābī* et des parties rhétoriques du *Livre sur ce qui est utilisé, de la logique, dans les sciences et les arts* d'Ibn Riḍwān dans leur intégrité, tandis que d'autres travaux ont été étudiés sur la base des index qui avaient été produits par leurs éditeurs. Cet outil était principalement disponible pour la *Didascalia* d'Hermann, traduction latine du *Š ḥ al-Ḥaṭā b de Fārābī*, et, à un moindre niveau de développement et de détail, pour la *R i s ā l a f ī m ā y a n b a ḡ ī t a ḥ a ḥ l a ḥ l i a t-ḥ u ḥ ṣ ai l-ḥ m i i m, i l ḥ ā d ā b , -Q i ḥ y ā s ā , b-Q i ḥ y ā s ā ḡ b i a r l a , l- K i t ā*

Bur h ā t pour Š dī al-Q i ydā Fārābī. J'ai également eu recours aux index de chaque publication pour les textes d'Averroès. J'ai enrichi les découvertes provenant de ces sources avec l'utilisation systématique de *Al-F ā r ā b ī ' s P h i l o s o p h y* d'Alon etpAbed, qui fournissent les définitions des termes philosophiques de Fārābī proposées par le philosophe même.⁸¹⁰

Dans le cas d'Avicenne, j'ai pu me prévaloir du corpus fourni par le logiciel *Writings of Avicenna* édité par le *Computer Research Center for Islamic Science* in Teheran,⁸¹¹ ce qui m'a permis d'effectuer une recherche complète pour les équivalents arabes des termes d'Aristote qui avaient émergé de la comparaison entre le texte grec et ses versions arabes des ouvrages pertinents.

Sur la base des données recueillies, j'ai essayé de tirer quelques conclusions sur l'interaction évolutive entre les positions théoriques des auteurs plus récents et leur relation avec différentes autorités dans la formation de leurs choix lexicaux. Ma compréhension des principes de la pensée rhétorique de Fārābī et d'Averroès a été façonnée par l'analyse séminale d'Aouad sur les fondements de la rhétorique selon Fārābī⁸¹² et sur son édition du *Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique* d'Averroès. Ma référence fondamentale pour la philosophie avicennienne était la reconstruction diachronique par D. Gutas du voyage philosophique d'Avicenne dans son travail sur l'évolution de la relation entre ce penseur et la tradition aristotélicienne.⁸¹³

Toute tentative de retracer une évolution chez un auteur ancien, qu'elle soit lexicale ou autre, suppose au moins une reconstitution provisoire de la chronologie sous-jacente à la production de cet écrivain. Ma chronologie farabienne est dérivée de l'article susmentionné, et est donc basée sur les quatre phases principales reconnues par Aouad dans l'œuvre du philosophe. Elles sont liées aux façons utilisées par Fārābī pour caractériser les méthodes de la

⁸¹⁰ A. Ilaï et Sh. Abed, *Al-Fārābī ' s P h i l o s o p h y*, vol. I-II, Cambridge, University Press 2002.

⁸¹¹ Voir *Writings of Avicenna*, par le *Computer Research Center for Islamic Science*, Teheran 2014.

⁸¹² Voir M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d ' A r i s t o t e r e c o n s i d é r é s p a r F ā r ā b ī et commun*, dans *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol 2, 1992, pp. 133-180.

⁸¹³ D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014 (2nd ed.)

persuasion rhétorique : d'une distinction basée sur la valeur de vérité, à une distinction basée sur leur composition matérielle (bien qu'à ce stade aucune sorte de prémisse n'ait été identifiée comme exclusivement rhétorique), à l'identification des prémisses rhétoriques avec les propositions acceptées et les opinions communs aux auditeurs, au réarrangement de la rhétorique autour de la notion de point de vue immédiat et commun.⁸¹⁴ Cette différenciation produit une chronologie relative à laquelle j'adhère tout au long de mon exposé. Si discuter de l'évolution du lexique rhétorique sur la base d'une chronologie dérivée du développement de la pensée rhétorique de Fārābī pouvait être entaché du soupçon de raisonnement circulaire, les résultats chronologiques similaires atteints par Heinrichs sur une base différente devraient suffire à nous rassurer.⁸¹⁵

En ce qui concerne Avicenne, ma compréhension de la chronologie de ses textes a encore été façonnée par la reconstruction de Gutas, qui articule l'évolution du philosophe à partir de son rapport à la tradition péripatéticienne, en mettant en évidence une période ancienne (jusqu'en 1013, date de rédaction d'*al-Ḥikma al-ʿAdīyyā*), une période de transition (1013-1014), une période intermédiaire (1023-1027, dans laquelle *K i t āḤī d āḤly a ʿš bi*, *Ḥāḥī* Introduction par Ğuzġānī, et *K i t āḤā ḡāḥī* écrits), la période de la philosophie orientale (1027-1030, dans laquelle Avicenne a composé *al-Ma š r i ʿti ly* prologue de *K i t āš bi*) et une période ultérieure (1030-1037, caractérisée par l'écriture de *al-I š ā r-lā ta n wāḥī*⁸¹⁶ *h ā t*

Si ces cadres chronologiques nous offrent un socle pour une réflexion historique sur les choix lexicaux des philosophes islamiques, cette réflexion nous permettra à son tour d'enrichir et de mieux nuancer la compréhension des tendances générales qui ont façonné l'évolution de la

⁸¹⁴ Voir M. Aouad, *Les fondements de la Rhétorique d' Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī et commun*, dans *Arabic Science and Philosophy*, vol. 2, 1992, pp. 174-175.

⁸¹⁵ Heinrichs construit une chronologie relative des écrits logiques de Fārābī basée sur la présence ou l'absence des deux concepts *muḥā k* (imitation), et *taḥy ī* (ou fabrication de l'imaginaire) dans W. Heinrichs, *Die antike Verknüpfung von Phantasia und Dichtung bei den Arabern*, in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 128 (1978), pp. 252-298.

⁸¹⁶ D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Brill 2014, p. 145.

pensée de Fārābī et d'Avicenne, notamment dans la mesure où cette évolution a été dictée par le rapport qu'ils ont choisi d'établir avec la tradition péripatéticienne.

Cet axe de recherche éclairera à la fois certains choix faits par Fārābī et Avicenne, fondés sur des relations textuelles réelles avec les écrits aristotéliens – dans les formes sous lesquelles ils étaient accessibles aux lecteurs islamiques médiévaux – et le fait que la similitude terminologique entre tout texte péripatéticien arabe et une traduction aristotélienne gréco-arabe donnée doit parfois être comprise comme l'effet de leur appartenance à une tradition lexicale et savante partagée au sens large, et non pas exclusivement comme un indice d'une relation textuelle directe entre les deux œuvres.

4.4 – Le rôle des traductions gréco-arabes d'autres sections de l'*Organon* dans la compréhension de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote

Le lexique des *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote dans sa version arabe a aidé Avicenne dans plusieurs situations, parce qu'il se trouve à être plus proche au standard péripatéticien que le lexique de la traduction de la *Rhétorique*.

Il est intéressant de réfléchir sur le rôle de la traduction des *Premiers Analytiques* en ce qui concerne également Fārābī. Aouad et Langhade sont en désaccord sur le plan de son *K i t ā b al-Ḥaṭā b*, en tant qu'Aouad considère le texte comme achevé dans son état actuel, alors que selon Langhade il ne s'agit que du début du *K. al-Ḥaṭā b a* (*Ḥaṭā b Ka*) *f d é c l r i t p a r l e s* long commentaire de 20 tomes (FHL 23). Aouad considère le livre que nous avons comme un tout cohérent organisé en deux parties, l'une consacrée à la définition de la rhétorique et l'autre à ses procédures.

Pour Aouad, le fait que Fārābī énumère douze procédés rhétoriques, mais n'analyse que l'enthymème et l'exemple, n'est pas problématique, puisqu'il affirme en 81.5-83.5 que seuls l'enthymème et l'exemple sont nécessaires à la cohérence de la rhétorique en tant que discipline. Une autre explication possible de cet état de choses réside dans la disponibilité du bref exposé des

matières rhétoriques proposé dans les Analyses antérieures d'Aristote, qui ne décrit que des outils rhétoriques déductifs et inductifs, ne laissant aucune place aux preuves éthiques et non techniques. De manière plus ambitieuse, il pourrait également valoir la peine de se demander si la restructuration de la Rhétorique opérée par Fārābī autour du deuxième chapitre de son premier traité pourrait être due au fait que presque toutes les sections rhétoriques des *Premiers Analytiques* ont un passage parallèle en *Rhétorique* I.2 d'Aristote.

4.4.1 - La place de la traduction arabe des *Premiers Analytiques* dans la compréhension avicennienne du lexique d'Aristote

Dans la seule version arabe des *Premiers Analytiques* qui nous est parvenue (grâce aux manuscrits *Parisinus arabus* 2346 et *T o p k a p i S a r a* d'Istanbul)⁸¹⁷ le mot qui traduit οὐδὲν est l'arabe *ʿa l ā*, on *signe*, et ce n'est que dans la marge de la page qu'il y a traces du lexique qui est plus connu.

Un autre côté très intéressant de la traduction des *Premiers Analytiques* est l'abondance de γράφεται qui l'entourent, qui font souvent référence à une source syriaque. Un témoignage de l'intérêt et de la pertinence de la tradition syriaque, et de la façon dont elle peut parfois être rattachée aux commentateurs grecs antiques, se trouve dans l'une de ces notes marginales, qui met l'accent sur la relation chronologique entre un signe et la chose qu'il représente. L'extrait est le suivant :

Note en marge du manuscrit *Parisinus arabus* 2346, *K i t ā b i ḡā b r*,
p. 408 n. 7: *I n r e d : a n d (t h e r e i s) a n o t h e r c o m m e
p r e c e d e s t h a t f o r w h i c h i t i s i l l n e s s e s , a n d i t s i g n a l s d a l ī l
v o m i t i n g , a n d l i k e t h e r u b b i n g o f t h e n o s e t h a t s i g n a l s n o s e b l e e d i s f r o m t h e s i c k p e r s o n , o r i t i s*

⁸¹⁷ Voir J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristoteahd Islamic Practice*, Leiden/ New York/ Köln, Brill, 1994, p. 334.

*t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e t h i n g t h a t h a s t h e ' a l ā n
lags behind that which has the bond, like the ash, for it signals existing fire.*⁸¹⁸

Or, le passage aristotélicien auquel cette note fait référence est *Premiers Analytiques* II.27, c'est-à-dire le chapitre consacré à l'enthymème. À elle seule, cette note ne susciterait pas plus d'intérêt que les autres annotations qui occupent les marges du manuscrit *Parisinus arabus* 2346. Elle n'offre pas de variantes de lectures ou d'arrière-plan philologique, et elle ne nous éclaire pas vraiment sur les positions philosophiques d'Aristote. Elle applique simplement une taxonomie chronologique à la relation entre le *a l ā/σημείον* et la chose ou l'événement auquel il fait allusion.

Cependant, la lecture de cette note avec le passage de Philopon ci-dessous nous mettra en position de l'évaluer dans une perspective différente :

Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Analytica Priora commentaria*, XIII p. 481,9-12 Busse: τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον εἰς δύο διαιρεῖται, εἰς εἰκὸς καὶ τεκμήριον. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον τριχῶς νοοῦμεν· ἢ γὰρ ἔστιν ὄντος τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ἅμα τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ σημεῖον, ὡς τὸ 'καπνὸς εἰ ἔστι, πῦρ ἔστιν'· ἢ μετὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ σημεῖον, οἷον τὸ τέφραν εἶναι σημαίνει ὅτι πῦρ ἤδη γέγονεν· ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, πρῶτον δὲ τὸ σημεῖον, ὡς τὸ γάλα ἔχειν τὴν μετὰ δύο ἡμέρας μέλλουσαν τίκτειν.

*The sign is divided in two, the probable and the evidence. We understand the sign in three ways : either it takes place while the fact is fire , " or the sign is after has taken place, or the fact takes place later and the sign first, like the fact of having milk (is a sign) of the woman who is going to give birth within two days.*⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁸ Le texte arabe pertinent est :

La traduction anglaise est la mienne.

⁸¹⁹ La traduction anglaise est toujours la mienne.

Non seulement la même taxonomie chronologique est utilisée ici pour le même but, mais deux des exemples employés correspondent exactement dans le texte grec et dans le texte arabe, à savoir celui impliquant le feu et la fumée, et celui impliquant le feu et la cendre. L'exemple illustrant la relation entre un indice et un fait qui va se produire dans le futur est le tremblement des lèvres pour « le vomissement » plutôt que la présence de lait dans le sein d'une femme pour « la naissance », mais ces deux options ne sont pas très éloignées, puisqu'elles relèvent tous deux de la sphère corporelle/médicale. Il convient de noter qu'aucun des exemples du texte arabe n'apparaît dans les écrits d'Aristote, ni dans aucun autre texte contemporain. Seul le passage de Philopon concernant la femme enceinte trouve des parallèles dans le texte de la *Rhétorique* grecque (voir 1357b15-16), où le signe de proximité de la naissance est la seule production de lait, tandis que la traduction arabe ajoute une référence à la respiration accélérée et la *Scholia Anonymi* à la pâleur.⁸²⁰

Le seul parallèle que j'ai pu trouver pour les exemples employant la fumée et la cendre est encore péripatéticien, mais plus récent et peut-être dérivé de Philopon. Il est tiré d'une des séries de scholies à la *Rhétorique* qui ont survécu, attribuée à un certain Stephanus et datée du XII^e siècle par Conley et Ross, puisqu'elle cite le lexique *Suda* et qu'elle trouve sa place dans le projet mené par Anne Comnène depuis 1118 visant à produire un commentaire pour tous les textes aristotéliens qui en étaient encore dépourvus. Ce passage concerne les syllogismes de la seconde forme.

Stephanus, In *Rhetoricam*, XXI p. 266 Rabe: [1357b19] Λυτὸν γὰρ καὶ καὶ τοῦτο κᾶν ἀληθὲς ἦ· κᾶν γὰρ ἀληθὲς ἦ τὸ “οὗτος πυρέττει ὁ νῦν ὀρώμενός μοι πνευστιῶν”, ἀλλὰ

⁸²⁰ Voir *Anonimi in Rhetoricam*, XXI p. 5,17-18 Rabe. Je tiens cependant à signaler que dans les scholies la présence de deux exemples gynécologiques se justifie par le fait qu'ils font référence à des formes syllogistiques différentes. « Cette femme a du lait, donc elle a accouché, car toutes les femmes allaitantes ont accouché » est un syllogisme de la première forme (et donc nécessaire), tandis que « cette femme est pâle, donc elle a accouché, pour toutes les femmes qui viennent d'accoucher sont pâles » est un syllogisme de la deuxième forme (et donc pas nécessaire). Un raisonnement similaire semble sous-tendre leur insertion dans la traduction arabe.

λύσιμος ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅτι ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι ἀπὸ καταφατικῶν τῶν δύο προτάσεων καταφατικὸν συνήγαγες.

Ἰστέον καὶ ἐπὶ τινῶν πῆ μὲν τὰ σημεία προηγοῦνται ὧν εἰσι σημεία, οἷον ἡ ἴρις τοῦ ὑετοῦ, ὃ καὶ πολλάκις καὶ διαψεύδεται (φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ ἴρις, ὑετὸς δὲ οὐ γίνεται), πῆ δὲ τὸ οὐ σημεῖον προηγεῖται, ὡς τὸ πῦρ τῆς τέφρας. πῆ δὲ ἅμα τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ σημειωτόν, ὃ καὶ κυρίως τεκμήριον, οἷον ἅμα πῦρ καὶ καπνός· ἐὰν οὖν εἴπῃς, ὅτι σημεῖον τοῦ εἶναι ἐνταῦθα πῦρ τὸ εἶναι ἐνταῦθα τέφραν, ψεῦδος· ἐστὶ γὰρ τέφρα ἐν τίνι τόπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἐνταῦθα πῦρ, ἀλλ'εἰκὸς ἦν μετενηνέχθαι ἀλλαχόθεν ἐνταῦθα τὴν τέφραν.

Outre l'élaboration plus approfondie du rôle heuristique des enthymèmes, le texte de Stephanus offre également une exemplification entièrement systématisée de la taxonomie chronologique des signes. Le commentateur semble aussi attribuer une valeur heuristique à la taxonomie chronologique elle-même, en précisant que seuls les signes contemporains de la chose signifiée sont τεκμήρια, c'est-à-dire des syllogismes de première forme.

Encore une fois, le cas choisi pour le signe d'un fait qui aura lieu dans le futur peut varier : ici c'est l'arc-en-ciel qui nous alerte de la tempête à venir – plutôt que d'annoncer sa conclusion, comme on serait enclin à s'y attendre. Pourtant, les exemples « πῦρ et τέφρα » et « πῦρ et καπνός » reflètent précisément ce que nous trouvons dans le manuscrit *Parisinus arabus 2346* et dans le texte de Philopon.

Bien que l'autre option ne puisse être exclue, Philopon a une plus grande probabilité que la tradition arabe d'avoir été la source de Stephanus, parce que il était sûrement disponible pour les lecteurs byzantins et parce que les commentaires anciens étaient l'une des principales références pour ce scholiaste.⁸²¹ Cependant, si l'on garde à l'esprit qu'à l'époque d'Anne Comnène la tradition grecque ne liait pas la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote principalement à ses écrits logiques, mais plutôt à ses traités politiques, l'idée qu'une brève observation aurait pu transmigrer d'un commentaire aux *Premiers Analytiques* à un commentaire à la *Rhétorique* semble plus probable dans

⁸²¹ Voir T.M. Conley, *Aristotle's Rhetoric in Byzantium*, in *Rhetorica* VIII.1, 1990.

le monde arabe. Faut-il se fier sans réserve à cette reconstruction de l'histoire de la fortune de la *Rhétorique* à Byzance ?

Pourtant, la question la plus intéressante qui découle de la note dans *Parisinus arabus 2346* est de savoir comment le texte de Philopon a pu atteindre le glossateur arabe. Bien que l'ensemble du commentaire grec soit généralement supposé authentique, le *Fihrist* d'Ibn al-Nadīm déclare que, comme c'est souvent le cas avec les *Premiers Analytiques*, l'œuvre de Philopon n'a été traduite en arabe que jusqu'à la discussion des *figures prédicatives*, *al-a š k al-maliyyal*.⁸²² Cela prive le texte de Philopon de la plus grande partie de son deuxième livre. Bien qu'il soit très difficile d'établir le poids de la remarque d'Ibn al-Nadīm en ce qui concerne le commentaire grec, cela signifie probablement que seul son premier livre a été traduit en arabe et était disponible au X^e siècle.

Que penser donc de la note du manuscrit de Paris ? Soit elle est entrée en marge des *Premiers Analytiques* dans une communauté encore de langue grecque (ou peut-être de langue syriaque), elle a été traduite sans altération et par la suite copiée fidèlement toujours au même endroit, soit elle témoigne que plus de textes alexandrins ont été traduits en arabe et que – directement ou indirectement – ils étaient à la disposition de l'éditeur de l'*Organon* de Paris.⁸²³ Le fait que ces textes n'auraient pas été connus d'Ibn al-Nadīm n'est en aucun cas un obstacle insurmontable.

4.5 – Les penchants philologiques d'Avicenne face au texte arabe de la *Rhétorique*

⁸²² B. Dodge (en utilisant le texte de Flügel *al-ğ u m l*) entend syllogismes universels ou syllogismes composites, voir *The Fihrist of al-Nadim: A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, p. 600. Voir aussi Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249,6-10, ed. G. Flügel.

⁸²³ Le glossateur syriaque du manuscrit *Istanbul Ayasofya 2442* montre un intérêt particulier pour les chapitres des *Premiers Analytiques* qui traitent des dispositifs argumentatifs rhétoriques, où les termes arabes pour *enthymème*, *opposition*, *signe* et *signe nécessaire* sont tous traduits et translittérés en syriaque et en grec, en plus d'être également traduits par d'autres expressions arabes. Je suis entrée en contact avec ce manuscrit à travers le projet PhiBor (ERC AdvGr, www.avicennaproject.eu).

Un des aspects le plus marquants du rapport d'Avicenne au lexique rhétorique est son intérêt pour l'aspect littérale de ce qui, pour lui, tenait la place du texte d'Aristote.

En règle générale, Avicenne s'est conformé aux termes rhétoriques qui étaient devenus la norme dans la tradition péripatéticienne plutôt qu'aux solutions souvent étranges de la version arabe de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote. Pourtant, cela est plutôt le cas dans des ouvrages comme *K i t ā b al-N a ḡqū* et dans *K i t ā ṣ ḥ bī*, où le lexique standard est toujours la norme, mais les termes tirés de la traduction arabe sont parfois présentés et glosés par Avicenne.

La même attitude peut parfois être observée dans les œuvres de Fārābī et d'Averroès. Par exemple, Fārābī emploie normalement le terme standard *ḍa m* pour désigner les enthymèmes, mais dans son *K i t ā b al-Yūḡyūn* il présente également l'expression *q i y ā ṣ* tirée de la traduction arabe des *Premiers Analytiques*. De la même façon, Averroès utilise systématiquement le mot *i s t i q r ā* pour la procédure logique d'induction, mais à l'occasion il emploie aussi le moins courant *i ḥ t, i b ā r* dans le seul but, à ma connaissance, de rappeler son apparition dans la traduction arabe, aux côtés de *ī f ā*, translittération du grec ἐπαγωγή.

Pourtant, ce phénomène se vérifie beaucoup plus fréquemment dans le *K i t ā ṣ ḥ bī f ā l* d'Avicenne, pour lequel je ne mentionnerai que peu d'exemples : en premier lieu, la coexistence de l'expression ordinaire *ḍa m* et du plus rare *t a f* pour nommer l'enthymème, et, en second lieu, l'apparition de la traduction vraiment excentrique *b u r ḥ* (qui signifie normalement *déduction, démonstration*) pour le concept d'exemple (dit en grec παράδειγμα), aux côtés des formes *tamī* et *miṭā*, plus courants. De plus, nous allons remarquer que le signe rhétorique, appelé σημεῖον par Aristote, est occasionnellement nommé *r u s ū -m a l w ā m* d'Avicenne, qui se borne ailleurs au plus simple *ʿa l ā*. Je ne saurais expliquer ce choix qu'avec le désir de donner une postérité à la traduction occasionnelle de σημεῖον avec *r ā seti rasm* dans la version arabe de la *Rhétorique*. Rappelons enfin comment, dans *K i t ā ṣ ḥ bī*, Avicenne se réfère parfois à ce qui est probable avec les expressions *ṣ ā d* et *q v ā ḡ* les deux employées comme traductions de l'εἰκός aristotélicien dans la *Rhétorique* arabe. Ailleurs, Avicenne a principalement favorisé l'option

maḥm ū, plus standard. Le cas d'*al-Ḥikma al-ʿAḍīyyā*, où *w ā ġ-i* n'est pas *ṣā d i* est utilisé comme dans *K i t ā ṣ bi*, constitue une exception intéressante.

A côté de la préface d'Avicenne à *K i t ā ṣ bi*, dans laquelle il déclare que dans cet ouvrage il essaiera de rendre compte de la pensée péripatéticienne plus encore que de sa propre philosophie, j'estime que cette attitude conservatrice et parfois explicative envers le lexique de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote devrait figurer parmi les raisons pour lesquelles nous regardons *K i t ā b al-Ḥiṭā b* comme partiellement relevant du genre du commentaire.

4.6 – La traduction arabo-latine d'Hermann

Dans ma thèse, je discute aussi de l'interaction entre la traduction d'Aristote par Hermann et ses citations d'Avicenne, en examinant à la fois la pratique d'Hermann et ses déclarations à ce sujet. Après une courte introduction sur ce que l'on sait du contexte matériel et intellectuel de l'œuvre d'Hermann et quelques mots sur les témoins de sa traduction de la *Rhétorique* (sections 2.3 et 2.4), je m'attarde d'abord sur les divers degrés de littéralité employés par Hermann lorsqu'il traite avec ses auteurs de référence (sections 2.5 et 2.6), et d'autre part sur les principes qui le guident dans le choix de la source à sélectionner dans différents contextes (section 2.7). En outre, j'ajoute quelques réflexions sur les relations génétiques entre la source avicennienne d'Hermann et les manuscrits du *K i t ā ṣ bi* et j'essaie d'évaluer si la version d'Hermann pourrait être utilisée pour améliorer les éditions arabes de la *Rhétorique* et du *K i t ā ṣ bi*, et si cela peut nous apprendre quelque chose sur leur transmission précoce (section 2.8).

Quelles sont les conclusions d'ordre générale qu'on est en droit de tirer de ma démarche au sujet de la relation entre la source arabe des passages avicenniens cités par Hermann et les autres témoins du *K i t ā ṣ bi* ? ce qui concerne le texte d'Avicenne, accepter une lecture de la traduction latine contre le témoignage des manuscrits arabes implique l'hypothèse que tous les témoins arabes partagent un ancêtre commun qui, d'autre part, ne fait pas partie des

prédécesseurs d'Hermann. Cela est le cas pour le problème discuté dans la section 2.9.1 de ma thèse, puisqu'en *K i t āḥbā* 75,4-9 tous les codex arabes ont le même texte. En effet, ils manquent d'un équivalent de la phrase *aut per naturam suam*, qu'on retrouve en Hermann. La seule possibilité qui reste pour garder le texte d'Hermann, qui me semble préférable, est de considérer toutes les lectures arabes comme des erreurs polygénétiques : en réalité, au moins l'omission de l'équivalent arabe de la phrase *aut per naturam suam* est potentiellement polygénétique, car elle résulterait d'un saut du même au même, à savoir de *i m m ā i m m ā*. Pourtant, l'hypothèse que la même erreur aurait été répétée dans chaque cas ne semble pas très probable. La possibilité que, bien que tous les manuscrits arabes soient liés les uns aux autres, la traduction latine soit indépendante de tous devrait être corroborée par des données ultérieures pour pouvoir être accepté, mais elle n'est pas à rejeter à première vue, puisque les témoins les plus anciens de Hermann sont contemporains des plus anciens manuscrits arabes datés pour la partie logique du *K i t āḥbā*, fauḥ moins pour ce que l'on peut tirer de la liste des témoins de l'*I l ā h p r o d u c t ā* par le projet PhiBor.⁸²⁴ Les témoins d'Hermann semblent également être légèrement plus anciens que tous les manuscrits utilisés par Sālim dans son édition.⁸²⁵ Les études à venir vont peut-être nous apporter des données probantes dans un sens ou dans l'autre : en ce sens, on peut espérer beaucoup aussi bien du travail sur les manuscrits arabes du *K i t āḥbā* qui se poursuit dans le cadre de l'élaboration de l'édition critique de l'*I l ā h*, en préparation au sein du projet PhiBor,⁸²⁶ que de l'édition de la *Rhétorique* d'Hermann, elle aussi en train d'être préparée par les soins de F. Woerther et M. Aouad.

⁸²⁴ Les manuscrits de la Logique qui, comme les manuscrits de Paris et de Tolède, remontent au XIII^e siècle sont O (1267), S (1272), Cb (1285, également utilisé par Sālim), Sf (693H/1293), et Si (1297). Voir A. Bertolacci, *On the Manuscripts of the Ḥikmah*, in *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages*, a l Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber, Leiden, Brill 2008 et la page web du projet PhiBor, <http://www.avicennaproject.eu/index.php?id=61>.

⁸²⁵ Voir M.S. Sālim, *Ibn Sīnā's Ḥikmah*, pp. 24-30 et G. Anawati, *Avicenne : la Métaphysique* (Paris, Vrin 1978); que d u pp. 18-20.

⁸²⁶ Voir *Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations*, ERC Advanced Grant 339621, sous la direction d'A. Bertolacci. Les informations qui concernent ce projet sont disponible sur sa page en ligne <https://www.avicennaproject.eu>.