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Version last revised: 18.10.2019

Sevgi Doğan

Reading Hegel on Women and Laughing Hegel against or with Women/Other?

Abstract: I am going to deal with the problem of the individual in terms of Hegel's sexism. In paragraph § 166 in the *Philosophy of Right* (PR, pp. 144–145), it can be observed how Hegel discriminates between men and women. Such discrimination shows us what Hegel means by the concept of the individual. The only individual who can realize himself in his theory of freedom is man. The woman realizes herself and exists only in the family. Hegel states, "In the family the wife has her full substantive place, and in the feeling of family piety realizes her ethical disposition". Hegel contradicts himself here. On the one hand, he claims that the true realization of the individual is possible only in ethical life within the state; because only in the state, through the right laws, can the individual actualize their freedom. He continues to claim that it is true that individuals cannot complete their existence without the unity of the objective and the subjective. Nevertheless, he limits the woman to just the family, which seems a contradiction of his political and philosophical project. Through the examination of Hegel's view of women in society, I will demonstrate how Hegel failed to realize his political project for the existence of the individual in the *Philosophy of Right* and *Phenomenology of Spirit*: Is Hegel's philosophy with or against women/other? The woman as the other is necessary for his philosophical project.

1 Introduction

Hegel's approach to women and gender damages his political project and his idea of universalism. The first question concerns what Hegel's philosophical and political project means, and the second question concerns what sort of role woman or the "other" plays in this project. I believe that Hegel's limitation of women with the family, that is with the private life, jeopardizes his theory of the state in particular and his theory in general (Elshtain 1993, pp. 170–181). Without doubt, Hegel is a defender of the patriarchal nature of society, although at the risk of his philosophical and political project. Hegel aims to reveal the complete realization of Spirit. For Hegel, Spirit is understood as human identity, self-consciousness through others, through history of humanity and the self-consciousness of the world around ourselves. Without ignoring Hegel's limited and patriarchal perspectives to women, I believe that we cannot simply refuse He-

gel's philosophical conceptions. However, considering their deficiencies we can utilize his theory in order to resolve the social and political problem. For this reason, in this study, the usage and critique of Hegel's philosophy will work together. The main concern is to reveal the deficiency of his political project through his approach to the problem of the individual human being.

In the *Lectures on Philosophy of Right* given between 1818 and 1831, Hegel emphasizes that the end is the particular individual and every individual must be provided for (Pöggeler 1995). Hegel insists on the existence of the individual maybe more than liberal tradition. For the liberal tradition, the individual is the owner who protests against the intrusions of political power in its inviolable private sphere. For Losurdo, in these lectures, Hegel refers to the individual who is the member of the plebian class who invokes the intervention of political power in the sphere of the economy to guarantee its sustenance (Losurdo 2011, p. 199). Hegel in these lectures insistently emphasizes the liberty and right of individuals, but these individuals basically are not women but only men. What is reality or truth for Hegel? Remo Bodei defines it as follows:

The truth does not live in the inner homine, but in the act of unceasingly connecting with the world, with the outside, of measuring oneself with the harshness of reality and then returning in itself enriched, imbued with the world, enlarged by comparison (Bodei 1981, pp. 8–9).

From Bodei's definition we can say that the truth exists outside; that is, the truth is an outsider but not only an outsider; it is also an insider in the sense that after a relationship with the outsider, it returns to its inner world in order to achieve this truth. The truth is based on the relationship between two individuals, the relationship between one and other, and the process of recognition and *Bildung*.

Philip J. Kain claims that "quite clearly, the *PR* holds a more conservative view of women than does the *PS*" (Kain 2002, p. 166). But a detailed analysis of both texts demonstrates that Hegel's position about women does not change from *Phenomenology of Spirit (PS)* to *Philosophy of Right (PR)*. Regarding Hegel's supposed project, I follow Alison Stone's claim which emphasizes that in so far as Hegel talks about the participation of all citizens in every sphere of modern society from family to the state, women would also participate in family, ethical life and the state (Stone 2012, pp. 145–146). Hegel, actually at least on the theoretical level, allows us to think that women as other or as a slave can achieve self-consciousness.

In this paper, the discussion, in particular, is based on the Self-Other relationship or distinction. In the *PS*, the section called "The Ethical Order" begins with a reference to Sophocles' *Antigone*. Who are women for Hegel? Are they con-

sidered as slaves? These are questions that many feminine philosophers have tried to answer, rejecting the idea that Hegel considers the woman as a slave.¹ Seyla Benhabib claims that for Hegel “women are not individuals, at least, not in the measure and to the same extent as men are” (Benhabib 1992, p. 247). Women are not able to struggle for spiritual development and diremption (*Entzweiung*).

2 The “nature” of the individual

The individual and universal are fundamental features of Hegel’s theory; we can find the relationship between these two in his examination on nature. Hegel clearly speaks of the deficiencies of the individual in the *Philosophy of Nature* (*PhN*). His entire philosophy is based on the annihilation or negation of these deficiencies through the *social ontology* of these individuals. This negation means to obtain the universal. In the *PhN*, Hegel demonstrates the relationship between the individual and the universal through the concept or notion of genus and individual or subject. For Hegel,

the genus constitutes the concrete substance of the subject, and is in implicit and simple unity with its singularity. As the universal is basic division, however, it may proceed from this its self-diremption as a unity which has being-for-self, and so posit itself within existence as subjective universality (*PhN*, § 367, p. 170).

For Hegel, “the sex-relationship [...] has the universal Notion as the essence of the individuals” (*PhN*, § 366, p. 170). Hegel mentions two processes of genus: 1) it can proceed from its self-diremption and 2) it can put itself as a subjective universality. This is the process of the universal or genus. And genus tries to link up with itself. According to Hegel, in this process, there are two negations: 1) “the negation of the merely internal universality of genus”; 2) the negation of “the merely immediate singularity in which living being still belongs to nature” (*PhN*, § 367, pp. 170–171). The universal as the genus realizes itself in the individual and it gains its free existence and its universality in the individual. Without the individual, in this regard, the free existence of genus as universality is not possible (*PhN*, § 367 Addition, p. 171). The genus is identical with the individual in an immediate manner; but the individual, for Hegel, is still distinct from genus because of its singular subjectivity. Its particularity differentiates individual from universal (*PhN*, § 369, pp. 175–176).

¹ For example, Patricia J. Mills, Shari Neller Starrett, Sara J. MacDonald, Heidi M. Ravven.

Before everything else, for Hegel, the sex-relationship is based on a need or it begins with a need because “individual as a single being is not adequate to immanent genus” (*PhN*, § 368, p. 172); here we can find the *social ontology* of Hegel and also the basic character of genus. The individual as universal being or genus being needs another individual for its existence. This is deficiency of the individual. As Hegel writes, the genus exists in the individual and it is opposed to the “inadequacy of its single actuality” (*PhN*, § 368 Addition, p. 174); for this reason, it integrates itself with the other through its urge. By this mediation, therefore, the genus can bring other genera into existence because it links itself with another and creates new generation. In the case of human beings, Hegel talks about the unity of male and female, material and spiritual elements (Arthur 2004, p. 30). The new formations are composed of both sides: “The female certainly contains the material element, while the male contains the subjectivity” (*PhN*, § 368 Addition, p. 175).

3 The divine and human law: Woman in the family

In the *PS* and in the *PR*, Hegel refers to Sophocles’ play *Antigone* by claiming that familial ethical life is the place where the woman has unique responsibility. Hegel’s interpretation of *Antigone* is generally at the center of feminist critique of Hegel. My question concerns how we can relate the woman question or Hegel’s approach to women to his political project. I try to refer to the concept of “totality” or “universal”, which is problematic since this universal lacks the particular element because of his approach to woman. Patricia J. Mills writes that:

The family represents life and the polis represents the risk of life. The conflict between these two spheres is inescapable and unalterable. Man cannot renounce the family since he cannot renounce the particularity of his existence nor can he renounce the universality of his action in and for the *polis* (Mills 1986, p. 132).

While in *Antigone*, there is a woman who dares to interfere in political life, in Hegel’s interpretation of *Antigone*, there is no such thing. In the *History of Philosophy (HPh)*, Hegel refers to *Antigone* as the “noblest of figures that ever appeared on the earth” (*HPh*, p. 441). In *Lectures on Aesthetics (LA)*, Hegel appreciates *Antigone* and writes that “*Antigone* seems to me to be the most magnificent and satisfying work of art of this kind” (*LA1*, p. 1218). In the *PR*, *Antigone* represents the family’s ethical feature and virtue. She expounds on this virtue as the law of woman and law of nature. The law of woman represents the subjective

feature and the realm of feeling; it is the law of the inward life (*PR*, p. 144). While we consider the principle of Hegel's project, we can immediately observe the concepts of totality and universality, or more precisely the reconciliation of the individual and universal. However, particularly in the *PR*, we can easily notice a one-sided aspect: Hegel ignores the individual for the sake of the universal or universality. The unity of opposites, such as the unity of the individual and universal, the unity of woman and man, the unity of feeling and reason, are the central category of dialectics. Is it really so in Hegel's dialectic? If the ethical life is based on the universal and if we are talking about the transcendence of the ethical realm from its subjectivity into universality, then the entire community must be transcended into universality in order to attain complete realization.

The simple substance of Spirit (which is consciousness) divides itself into a human and divine law. According to Hegel, the contradiction between the divine law and human law is both ethical and tragic (*PR*, § 166, p. 144). The family is governed by the divine law and it embraces three relationships: 1) husband and wife; 2) parents and children; 3) brothers and sisters. Among these relationships, that of husband and wife constitutes a mutual recognition (*PS*, § 456, p. 273). In other words, "one consciousness immediately recognizes itself in other" (*PS*, § 456, p. 273). However, this self-recognition is not ethical because it is natural, which means that it is the image of Spirit and its representation, and not actual Spirit itself. Here there occurs an idea of "otherness". According to Hegel, the relationship realizes itself in other, for example in the child. But it has not its actual existence in itself. This other exists through this relationship. Hegel at the end concludes that women are naturally ethical beings. For Hegel, women are concerned with the universal because their relationship is not based on feeling but on the universal (*PS*, § 457, p. 274).

Hegel defines the relationship between husband and wife as a natural relation. They have a reciprocal relationship and duty towards one another. While the brother can leave the immediate and natural element of ethical life of the family and thereby can obtain and create the ethical life which is conscious of itself as well as actual, the sister or wife remains in the family as the head of household and as a guardian of the divine law. When the brother leaves the divine law, he passes over to human law (*PS*, § 459, p. 275). "The individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individuality, finds it in the Family, and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his nation" (*PS*, § 461, pp. 276–277). The brother is considered as a mediating link between family and civil society. Divine law is the law of family, whereas human law is above and superior to the divine law and the law of the nation or ethical life. But still human law "derives [*geht aus*] in its living process from the divine" (*PS*, § 460, p. 276). Men can realize themselves ethically in their

actions as ethical beings, and they realize themselves within the people as a whole; whereas women can realize themselves through their actions as universal ethical beings in the family. In the private sphere, in the family, women are considered as universal beings. But what about her individuality?

4 The woman as the individual

In the *PS* (§ 596), Hegel writes that the fate and truth of the ethical world is to be Spirit. To be Spirit means to pass away in the *individual* itself. Hegel continues to say that the individual or legal person gains its Substance and fulfillment outside of that world; that is, outside of the ethical world. To Hegel, the abstraction of the person is annihilated by “the movement of the world of culture and faith”, by “the completed alienation” and by “the ultimate abstraction” (*PS*, § 596, p. 364).

The definition of family in the ethical sphere is “an immediate consciousness of itself” and “a natural ethical community” (*PS*, § 450, p. 268). It is a moment of the ethical sphere. “The family, as the unconscious, still inner Notion (of the ethical order), stands opposed to its actual, self-conscious existence” (*PS*, § 450, p. 268). It is an “immediate being of the ethical order” (*PS*, § 450, p. 268). For Hegel, this moment, or immediate being of the ethical order, stands against that ethical order. It is an ethical being but an immediate ethical being. Although the family is immediately determined as an ethical being, for Hegel, the family can be an ethical entity in so far as it is not a natural relationship of family members, because the ethical principle must be a universal. In the *PR*, Hegel defines woman’s destiny with the family; and her family piety constitutes her “ethical frame of mind”, or her “ethical disposition”, and in some sense her universality (*PR*, § 166, p. 144). *Antigone* is an example of this family piety and virtue.

In this part of the *PS*, we can observe the strict separation between the private and public life. This separation is particularly clear in Hegel’s division between the member of a family and a citizen. In this regard, he writes that

the deed [...], which embraces the entire existence of blood-relation, does not concern the citizen, for he does not belong to the Family, nor the individual who is to become a citizen and will cease to count as this particular individual (*PS*, § 451, pp. 269–270).

The individual is a real individual only in so far as he becomes (because for Hegel there would not be “she”) the citizen. He is actual and substantial when he is a citizen. To be a citizen is to be freed from the sensuous and there-

fore to be universal. If he is still an individual, it means that he is not a citizen and he still belongs to family. Still belonging to family refers to being only an “unreal impotent shadow” (*PS*, § 451, p. 270). Women are not considered as individuals. For Hegel, the individuals are only some particular elements through which the universal and Spirit becomes itself.

5 Woman and *Bildung*

How is it possible to utilize Hegel’s dialectical theory and his theory of recognition for the woman question? For Benhabib, Hegel, in different parts of *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (*LPH*), refers to women as not naturally but culturally and socially defined (Benhabib 1996, p. 30). In this regard, these passages indicate Hegel’s “awareness of the cultural, historical and social variations in family and sexual relations” (Benhabib 1996, p. 30).

In *LPH*, Hegel criticizes the abstract equality of modern times. For him, equality in civil life is almost impossible because of “the individual distinctions of sex and age” (*LPH*, p. 163). Hegel states that if there is equality for all citizens in the government, the women and children will be excluded from this sort of equality. Not practically but theoretically, Hegel’s conception of recognition and otherness leads the individual woman to realize herself in society, not only in the family. Hegel’s ideal state theory presupposes the unification of the individuals and universals in ethical life. Individuals can realize themselves just in the state as citizens. Through the *Bildung*, the individuals actualize and emancipate themselves from their immediate, immature, and natural conditions.

Hegel’s idea of the culture/education or *Bildung*² can be used to analyze women’s condition in society. For Hegel, through alienation, the self-conscious being can arrive at the highest form of consciousness and awareness to feel at home (“Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung”, which begins with § 484, *PS*, p. 294). Not just against Hegel but with Hegel we try to understand and figure out the way for the emancipation of women.

² In Hegel’s usage, the concepts of *Kultur* and *Bildung* are quite different from each other. *Kultur* is not employed by Hegel very often but it refers to the spiritual and artistic activities of a people; these activities can include art, science, and other intellectual forms. He rarely uses the term which means one who is educated and who is not educated. *Bildung* is used by Hegel very often. *Bildung* refers to formation, education. To understand what *Bildung* means we can look easily to its root, which is *bilden*, referring to producing, making, creating, shaping, forming, setting up; also, educating and instructing.

Hegel defines culture or human culture as a product of human being. Through culture “the individual acquires standing [*Gelten*] and actuality” (*PS*, § 489, p. 298). Just as the individual is a sort of moment for the Substance, so human “culture [*Bildung*] [...] is the essential moment of Substance itself” (*PS*, § 490, p. 299). In this culture, through action and activities, the individual arrives at the actual world.

In the chapter “Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung”, Hegel discusses the ethical world and its subjects who belong to family and civil society, and to the state. These subjects are both ethical and have legal status, like the citizen. These modern individuals, for Hegel, are also divided against themselves; that is, they are self-alienated.³ Hegel utilizes the concept of self-alienated subject or self-alienation itself in order to theorize the culture (*PS*, § 486, pp. 295–296).

In paragraph § 489 of *PS*, Hegel claims that the individual acquires actuality and objective validity through alienation in the culture (*PS*, § 489, p. 298). The concrete actuality is the process of culture. The individuals are alienated from their natural substance and being. Alienation signifies that the individuals externalize themselves in the culture. This cultural process is a mediating process. Alienation and externalization are two important elements for the existence and actualization of the individuals. This externalization and alienation are considered as means of the transition of the

[mere] *thought-form of substance* into actuality, and, conversely, of the *specific individuality* into *essentiality*. This individuality moulds itself by culture into what it intrinsically is, and only by so doing is it an intrinsic being that has an actual existence (*PS*, § 489, p. 298).

Hegel continues to write that “the measure of its culture is the measure of its actuality and power”. The cultural process by which the individuals are shaped leads also to the development of the individual as universal, as objective essence. It leads to the development of the actual world (*PS*, § 490, pp. 298–299).

According to Hegel, in the Greek *polis*, there was not a civil society to act as a mediator between the family and the government. This civil society exists in the modern bourgeois society. Luce Irigaray, in *Speculum of the Other Woman*, defines Hegel’s understanding of woman who cannot develop, who does not have self-consciousness, self-transcendence (but has self-immanence), history, subjectivity, and individuation (Ravven 1996, p. 249). Women are simply universal but only in the family. In Hegel’s philosophy or his dialectical method there is

³ Hegel’s conception of self-alienated refers to the active subject which is different from the Cartesian one. His idea about alienating oneself derives from Kant and Fichte’s understanding of subject.

the possibility also for the woman, in order to gain self-transcendence, self-consciousness, to be a historical subject and belong to subjectivity.

In the *PR*, although Hegel believes that women can be educated, they are not capable of some activities which “demand a universal faculty” and “their minds are not adapted to the higher sciences, philosophy, or certain of the arts” (*PR*, § 166 Addition, p. 144). This signifies that they are not capable of abstracting or theorizing but they are made more for practical activities. Hegel reduces women not only into the family but also into feeling, arbitrary inclinations, and opinions, which are considered by Hegel threatening features for government and society – that is, for the ethical realm – due to the fact that women are not able to govern and “act according to the dictates of universality” (*PR*, § 166 Addition, p. 144). While womanhood acts according to the feelings, manhood operates “through the stress of thought and much specialized effort” (*PR*, § 166 Addition, p. 145). While there is no place for womanhood to transcend itself, manhood can transcend itself into self. This transcendence is actualized by the culture, by the demand of the universality. Hegel presents us a means for the emancipation of women on the theoretical level, which is “transcendence” or “transcending oneself into universality”.

6 Phenomenological emancipation: Either Hegel with woman (other) or woman with Hegel

The basic principle of Hegel’s phenomenology is “transcendence”. The realization and self-consciousness of the individual is possible or can be considered as actual only when transcending itself into self.

The self knows itself as actual only as a transcended self. Therefore, it is not constituted by the unity of consciousness of itself and the object; on the contrary, the object is, for the self, its negative (*PS*, § 491, p. 299).

This transcendence can be read as a means to interpret the woman question. It is not enough to confront the woman question as an actual problem. The emancipation of woman “is not constituted by the unity of consciousness of itself and the object” (*PS*, § 491, p. 299), which refers to the object of the problem. The self should “know itself as actual as a transcended self” (*PS*, § 491, p. 299). It has to be alienated from the actuality that she has confronted. This transcendence is possible only through the molding and developing of the self. It is the process of alienation from alienation: “The alienation will alienate itself, and the whole will, through this alienation, return into its Notion” (*PS*, § 491, p. 300).

In fact, Hegel disproves himself by his phenomenological expressions. His contradiction can be found in his discourses on work and enjoyment in the *PS*. Work and enjoyment are two elements which relate individuals with the external world. Hegel regards work and enjoyment as the universal constituents or factors because “each in his own enjoyment provides enjoyment for all, just as in working for himself he is at the same time working for all and all are working for him” (*PS*, § 494, p. 302). The existence of an individual is in itself universal. The existence of the individual woman who works at home or in the family according to Hegel’s phenomenological explanation is universal. But without doubt Hegel regards this aspect as ethical law of family or universal virtue of woman in the family. The woman as slave or other stands against the husband. Their relationship is based on a dialectical contradiction, which carries them to the universal ethical realm. “It [self-consciousness] finds that it is outside of itself and belongs to another, finds its personality as such dependent on the contingent personality of another” (*PS*, § 517, p. 313). Husband and wife are “others” for each other. For Hegel, other “appears as something *negative* of self-consciousness” (*PS*, § 552, p. 336).

If “the family is the first and vital educator of the citizen” (Ravven 1996, p. 237) and if the transformation and self-transcendence/self-transformation is possible or begins with the family through education, then the parents are educators of the citizen. Here we find the potential for women’s self-transcendence and self-transformation. My question is whether in his theory of ethical life, the family or the women in the family, he talks esoterically and clandestinely about the fact that women can transcend and transform the family substance. The unity of man and woman “constitutes the active middle term of the whole and the element which sunders itself into these extremes of divine and human law” (*PS*, § 463, p. 278). While both man and woman are capable of transforming oneself into other, into universal, woman’s transformation remains in the private sphere; in such a way, they can preserve and bring forth the other. The reciprocal relationship between man and woman leads the man to transcend himself into the ethical sphere and self-consciousness, into actuality, into human law; but this relationship does not allow woman such a transcendence. This is the point that Hegel could not surpass.

7 Conclusion

The woman, in general, is determined by feeling while man is defined by reason. Still Hegel continues to remain in contradiction and therefore is deprived of unity of objectivity and subjectivity. There is a contradiction in Hegel’s theory

of freedom because when we consider his theory at a general level, to attain freedom is to be in interaction in ethical life, which contains not only the family but also civic community and the state. As said above, “totality” is the fundamental principle of Hegel’s ontological and phenomenological theory; this totality cannot exclude two spheres from each other, family from ethical life, but they represent the Spirit as a whole. In point of fact, to gain freedom is to interconnect with others through labor and to participate in politics through corporations, associations, societies, or guilds. However, women do not have such a possibility. Therefore, the real member of the ethical life or ethical system is only the man, not woman (Doğan 2018, p. 70). Only man becomes a citizen and therefore an individual to attain the universal. Totality is not realized by excluding others, but with others this totality as Spirit is actualized.

Hegel’s approach to slavery and enslavement can also help us to understand his attitude and idea about gender and women generally. Hegel, in the *PR*, defines a slave as one who “knows not his essence, his infinitude, his freedom; he does not know himself in his essence, and not to know himself is not to think himself” (*PR*, p. 42). Through this passage, we can say that slave and slavery is not something natural, but it is something that you have when you do not possess a self-consciousness. In this regard, I disagree with Inwood who claims that for Hegel slavery is natural. Here, the key word for slavery is “free” or freedom.⁴ “Slave’s will does not know itself as free, and is thus a will-less will” (*PR*, p. 45). Other important terms are recognition and thus *Bildung* or a process of *Bildung* through which the individuals emancipate themselves from slavery. In the sense of slavery and slave, we can claim that Hegel considers women as slaves but not by nature because they are not free and self-conscious beings. Slavery is not a permanent feature but it is a social and historical category. *Bildung* enables women to obtain their self-consciousness and to be recognized by others. *Bildung* and self-emancipation lead women to be free.

It is not important whether in an Aristotelian sense the slave is natural or not but whether it is deficient in rationality (Inwood 2010, p. XXVI). For Hegel (here I

⁴ According to Inwood, “Slavery, he [Hegel] thinks, is natural”. But I disagree because Hegel is against the Aristotelian understanding of natural slavery (Inwood 2010, p. XXVI). There is a similar view of woman in the philosophy of Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel in the sense that they commonly believe that there is a natural and unrefutable difference between female and male (Padia 1994, p. 27). Aristotle talks about the inferiority of the woman in his *Generation of Animals* in which he separates male from female. Aristotle writes that women are infertile males even though they reproduce. Men are men because of their particular ability, but women are women because of their particular inability (766a30–31) (Aristotle 1943, pp. 391–393).

think he is Hobbesian) it does not matter whether or not there are natural slaves, what matters is that there is an enslaver. The human being tends to enslave the other. But according to Hegel, as we know from the *PR*, slavery is not a right thing. His departure point is not the naturalness of slavery.

Our natural condition is oppression – oppression by nature, by our rulers, by our community, even by the gods. Freedom has to be striven for, and religion is, in Hegel’s view, the central arena in which the battle is fought. The outcome of the battle is the liberation granted us by Lutheran Christianity (Inwood 2010, p. XXVI).

Hegel’s conception of slavery, in this regard, is not a “permanent feature of any social order” (Smith 1992, p. 99) but it is a historical category. As it is a historical category, slavery is something which can be overcome or annihilated. Not only recognizing other women but also other men paves the way for the emancipation of the individual woman in community. Revolution, therefore, is necessary. When in the *PhH*, Hegel talks about the revolution in Europe and in the American continent, he does not refuse or reject the revolutions; on the contrary, he glorifies them because they exist or happen in order to realize freedom, and freedom from slavery.

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