

# Reading Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā'* in the Ottoman World

## The Circulation of the Work Within the School of As'ad al-Yānyawī\*

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As'ad Ibn 'Alī Ibn 'Uṭmān al-Yānyawī (Yanyalı Esad Efendi, d. 1143/1730<sup>1</sup>) was one of the most interesting intellectual figures of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, under the reign of Ahmed III. In spite of the interest aroused by his intellectual activity, still much is left to know about his philosophical production. Born in Ioannina (the Ottoman Yanya), in north-western Greece, he started his education under the guide of Mehmed Efendi, Mufti of Yanya, and of İbrahim Efendi, before moving to Constantinople in 1098/1686, where he was appointed as a professor in 1111/1699. He took part in the translation project that started under the patronage of the Grand Vizier Damad İbrâhim Paşa of Nevşehir: his main interest was with the Arabic translations of philosophical and scientific texts, and in 1721 he was commissioned to provide a new translation of Aristotle's works.<sup>2</sup> At that stage of

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<sup>1</sup> Al-Yānyawī's death is dated to 1134/1722 in GUTAS Dimitri (1998), *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture – The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbasid Society (2<sup>nd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>/8<sup>th</sup>-10<sup>th</sup> centuries)*, Routledge, London/ New York, p. 175. Al-Yānyawī was, however, still alive in 1725, when he was appointed as judge of Galata; for al-Yānyawī's biography, see ASLAN Adnan (2006), "As'ad Afandi of Yanya," in LEAMAN Oliver (ed.), *The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic philosophy*, vol. I: A-I, Bloomsbury, London/ New Delhi/ New York/ Sydney, p. 39-40; see also ŞAHİN Naim (2005), "Türk Mantıkçıları," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1/ 17, p. 343-354 (esp. p. 349-350).

<sup>2</sup> On Al-Yānyawī's activity as a translator, see: KAYA Mahmut (1992), "Some Findings on Translations Made in the Eighteenth Century from Greek and Es'ad Efendi's Translation of the Physics," in İHSANOĞLU Ekmeleddin (ed.), *Transfer of Modern Science & Technology to the Muslim World*, IRCICA, Istanbul,

his career, As‘ad al-Yānyawī showed a deep interest in the Aristotelian philosophy and its reception: as I shall argue in the present paper, the breadth of his interests also encompassed Avicenna’s most complete philosophical *summa* concerning the Aristotelian philosophy, namely the *Kitāb al-Šifā’*.

The manuscript tradition of this work, that counts up to more than two hundred manuscripts, is still a matter of investigation.<sup>3</sup> A first systematic inquiry into the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Šifā’* is now being conducted within the framework of the ERC Project: “*PhiBor* - Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations and Intellectual Endeavours: Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics (*Ilāhiyyāt* of *Kitāb al-Šifā’*) of Avicenna (*Ibn Sīnā*),” directed by Amos Bertolacci.<sup>4</sup> According to the provisional results of this survey, at least three manuscripts of Avicenna’s *summa* circulated or were even produced in the school of As‘ad al-Yānyawī, namely a copy of the section on natural philosophy of Avicenna’s *Šifā’*, which preserves an ownership note of As‘ad al-Yānyawī,<sup>5</sup> but whose date of copy and copyist are unknown, and two manuscripts containing the section of logic of Avicenna’s *Šifā’*, arguably copied in this school.

The present inquiry will focus on the two eighteenth-century manuscripts preserving the section of logic (*ğumlat al-mantiq*) of Avicenna’s *Šifā’*, namely mss. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 and Atıf Efendi 1565.<sup>6</sup> Both manuscripts reveal some new evidence of al-Yānyawī’s intellectual activity in the period in which he was professor in the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anşārī in Constantinople. In what follows, I will argue that they preserve several *marginalia* quoting some as

p. 385-391; ÖZERVARLI M. Sait (2011), “Yanyalı Esad Efendi’s Works on Philosophical Texts as Part of the Ottoman Translation Movement in the Early Eighteenth Century,” in SCHMIDT-HABERKAMP Barbara (ed.), *Europa und die Türkei im 18. Jahrhundert/Europe and Turkey in the 18. century*, V&R University Press, Bonn University Press, Göttingen, p. 457-472; KÜÇÜK B. Harun (2013), “Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Eighteenth Century: Esad of Ioannina and Greek Aristotelianism at the Ottoman Court,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 41, p. 125-158. See also GUTAS Dimitri (2000), “Translations from Greek and Syriac” s.v. “Tardjama,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, ed. BEARMAN P., BIANQUIS T., BOSWORTH C.E. et al., Brill, Leiden/ New York, vol. X, p. 225-9, esp. p. 228.

<sup>3</sup> As a preliminary step towards the more recent systematic inquiry into the manuscript tradition of this work, see BERTOLACCI Amos (2008), “On the Manuscripts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Šifā’*,” in AKASOY Anna and RAVEN Wim (eds.), *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages – Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation*, in *Honour of Hans Daiber*, Brill, Leiden/ Boston, p. 59-75.

<sup>4</sup> Of great importance for this survey is the collaboration with the ERC Project: “*PhiC* – Philosophy in Context: Arabic and Syriac Manuscripts in the Mediterranean,” directed by Maroun Aouad.

<sup>5</sup> Ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 796; the first folio preserves an ownership note by As‘ad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn ‘Uṭmān al-Yānyawī, and the manuscript has plenty of marginal notes signed by As‘ad. On these marginal notes, see *infra*, §1.1.2.

<sup>6</sup> Both mentioned among the manuscripts containing the logic of Avicenna’s *Šifā’* in GUTAS Dimitri (2014), *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition – Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works*, Second Revised and Enlarged Edition, Brill, Leiden/ Boston, p. 421.

of yet unedited translations by As'ad al-Yānyawī, and even some interesting and yet unstudied notes of his own on Avicenna's text (section I). Then, I shall argue that both manuscripts derive from the same exemplar, namely a manuscript that must have circulated within As'ad al-Yānyawī's school and that must have preserved some *marginalia* to Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā'* that are also preserved in three thirteenth-century manuscripts ascribed to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210)<sup>7</sup> (section II).

## I. THE LOGIC OF AVICENNA'S *ŠIFĀ'* WITHIN AS'AD AL-YĀNYAWĪ'S SCHOOL

### I.1. Ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 [= ms. P]

#### I.1.1. A General Presentation of the Manuscript

Manuscript Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 [henceforth: ms. P]<sup>8</sup> (end of the copy: *yawm al-ḥamīs 29 Ğumādā al-āḥira* 1134/ Thursday, 16<sup>th</sup> of April 1722) contains only the section on logic of Avicenna's *Šifā'*. According to the information provided in the colophon (T1), the manuscript was copied in the *madrassa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople by Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī, under the request of As'ad Ibn 'Alī Ibn 'Uṭmān al-Yānyawī himself.

T1. Ms. P, Colophon, fol. 426r:

قد وقع الفراغ من تنميقة بعون المعين وحسن توفيقه عن يد العبد النحيف الضعيف المحتاج إلى  
رحمة ربه اللطيف، الراجي عفوه يوم يؤخذ بالنواصي محمد بن أحمد الأسكوبي ساكناً في مدرسة  
أبي أيوب الأنصاري وقت الظهر في يوم الخميس التاسع والعشرين من شهر جمادى الآخرة في سنة  
أربع وثلثين ومائة وألف؛ رحم الله امرءاً نظر في هذا المكتوب ودعا لكاتبه ولباعث كتابته المعروف  
بأسعد بن علي بن عثمان البنيوي سلمه الله ولجميع المؤمنين والمؤمنات. والحمد لله ونعم المعين  
والصلوة والسلام على محمد سيد العالمين.

The end of its [*scil.* the book's] composition has come with the help of the Helper, and the excellence of its result [has been attained] by the hand of the weak, frail servant, in need of the mercy of his Lord the Kind, hoping for His forgiveness

<sup>7</sup> An edition of these marginal notes and a reconstruction of their manuscript tradition is provided in DI VINCENZO Silvia (2018), "Early Exegetical Practice on Avicenna's *Šifā'*: Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Marginalia* to Logic," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 28/1, p. 31-66.

<sup>8</sup> A description of the manuscript is provided in the catalogue: DUGHAYM M. al-Sayyid (2010), *Fihris al-maḥtūṭāt al-'arabiya wa-al-turkiya wa-al-fārisiyya fī al-Maktaba al-Sulaymānīyya*, Saqīfāt al-Šafā' al-'Ilmiyya, Ġidda, p. 556-558.

the day he will be seized by the forelocks<sup>9</sup>, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskübī, staying in the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī at midday on Thursday, day 29 of the month of Ğumādā al-āḥira in the year 1134 [= 16<sup>th</sup> April 1722]; may God give mercy on the man who looks at this text and prays for its copyist and for him who encouraged its copy, known as As‘ad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn ‘Uṭmān al-Yānyawī, may God protect him and all the men and the women having faith in Him. The praise belongs to God, and may the grace of the Helper, His blessing and His peace be on Muḥammad, Lord of the world.

Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskübī was one of As‘ad al-Yānyawī’s students active in the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī,<sup>10</sup> where As‘ad al-Yānyawī was professor at the time ms. P was copied. This piece of information regarding al-Yānyawī’s biography is provided by the colophon of his translation and reworking of the *Compendiosa Logica in Usum Scholarium*<sup>11</sup> by Ioannes Cottunius (d. 1658), preserved in mss. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2568 and Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi, 2655,<sup>12</sup> which was reportedly accomplished the day 21 of Ğumādā al-āḥira 1134 (i.e. April 8<sup>th</sup>, 1722, just eight days before the end of the copy of ms. P) when As‘ad al-Yānyawī was professor in the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Qur‘ān* 55:41: “The guilty will be known by their distinguishing marks and will be seized by the forelocks (*fa-yu ḥaḍu bi-l-nawāṣī*) and the feet.” It is a humility statement on the copyist’s part, who portrays himself as guilty.

<sup>10</sup> Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskübī is also the copyist of ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 812 (preserving al-Fārābī’s summaries of Aristotle’s logic), copied in the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī just a year before the copy of ms. P (in the month Ğumādā al-āḥira of the year 1133 H/1721). In the colophon of the manuscript, the copyist explicitly mentions As‘ad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn ‘Uṭmān al-Yānyawī as his professor (*ustād*). I owe this piece of information to Teymour Morel, who worked on ms. Hamidiye 812 within the *PhiC* Project; GUTAS, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, p. 175 mentions an Aḥmad al-Uskübī as the copyist of ms. Hamidiye 812 and Al-Yānyawī’s student, relying on TÜRKER Mubahat (1963), “Fārābī’nin “*Şerā’it ul-yakīn*”i,” *Araştırma* 1, p. 151-152, 173-174.

<sup>11</sup> COTTUNIUS Ioannes (1669), *Compendiosa logica in usum scholarium*, Ex Typograph. Matthaei Bolzetta de Cadornis, Padova.

<sup>12</sup> The translation bears the following title: *al-Şarḥ al-anwar fī al-manṭiq*. According to the catalogue, ŞEŞEN Ramazan (1997), *Muhtārāt min al-maḥṭūṭāt al-‘arabiyya al-nādīra fī maktabāt Turkiyyā*, Waqf al-Abḥāt li-al-tārīḥ wa-al-funūn wa-al-ṭaqāfa al-islāmīya, Istanbul, p. 296, the two manuscripts preserve Al-Yānyawī’s translation of Aristotle’s logical works, but on ms. Ayasofya 2568 see ÖZERVARLI, “Yanyalı Esad Efendi’s works,” p. 464. The work is also described by ASLAN, “As‘ad Afandi of Yanya” (p. 39) and by ÖZERVARLI, “Yanyalı Esad Efendi’s works,” p. 464, who both mention this work under the title *Tarḡamat Şarḥ al-anwar* and claim that, more than being just a literal translation of the Aristotelian logical corpus, it contains an Arabic translation of a summary and commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* by Ioannes Cottunius.

<sup>13</sup> For the text of this colophon, see ŞEŞEN, *Muhtārāt min al-maḥṭūṭāt*, p. 296.

### ***1.1.2. As'ad al-Yānyawī's (autograph?) Marginalia to the Logic of Avicenna's Šifā'***

Ms. P is a witness of special relevance to the study of al-Yānyawī's reception of Avicenna's *Šifā'*: in fact, it preserves several marginal notes ascribed to As'ad al-Yānyawī himself that went almost unnoticed so far and that deserve more consideration. Each note is ascribed to al-Yānyawī by the signature "As'ad" at the end of the text. At first glance, it is clear that these notes contain very specific remarks of philosophical interest concerning Avicenna's text. As a first example, I shall present below (T2) two marginal notes ascribed to As'ad al-Yānyawī which comment on *Kitāb al-Madḥal* I 4.<sup>14</sup>

**T2.** IBN SĪNĀ, *al-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Madḥal* I 4, p. 22.7-12 Cairo ed. and al-Yānyawī's marginal notes in ms. P (fol. 5r):

#### **The main text:**

وكذلك صناعة المنطق، فإنها ليست تنظر في مفردات هذه الأمور من حيث هي على أحد نحوي الوجود الذي في الأعيان والذي في الأذهان، ولا أيضا في ماهيات الأشياء من حيث هي ماهيات، بل من حيث<sup>(١)</sup> هي محمولات وموضوعات وكليات وجزئيات وغير ذلك مما إنما يعرض لهذه المعاني من جهة ما قلناه فيما سلف<sup>(٢)</sup>.

[The case of] the discipline of logic is analogous, since it doesn't inquire into the simple ones among these things inasmuch as they are in one of the two ways of existence, [i.e.] the one that is in the individuals and the one that is in the minds, nor [does it inquire into] the things' quiddities inasmuch as they are quiddities, but rather<sup>(1)</sup> inasmuch as they are predicates and subjects [of predication], universals and particulars and other [things] among what only occurs to these notions under the respect that we said in what preceded<sup>(2)</sup>.

#### **The marginal notes:**

(١) فيه إشارة إلى أنّ موضوعه هي المعقولات الثانية، كما سيصرّح به فيما بعد؛ وقد صرّح به في أوائل الإلهيات. أسعد

(1) There is in it an indication of the fact that its [i.e. logic's] subject are the secondary intelligibles, as it will be explained in what follows; it has also been explained in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*.<sup>15</sup> As'ad.

(٢) أي في الفصل الثاني؛ قال فيه: «بل من حيث ينفع في إدراك أحوال ذينك الوجودين». أسعد

<sup>14</sup> Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḥal* is quoted from the following edition: IBN SĪNĀ (1952), *al-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, 1. *al-Madḥal*, ed. MADKŪR Ibrāhīm, QANAWĀTĪ Georges Š., AL-ḤUDAYRĪ Maḥmūd and AL-AHWĀNĪ Fu'ād, al-Maṭba'a al-amīriyya, Cairo (henceforth: Cairo ed.).

<sup>15</sup> See IBN SĪNĀ (1960), *al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* I 2, ed. MŪSĀ Yūsuf M., DUNYĀ Sulaymān and ZĀYID Sa'īd, Cairo, al-Hay'a al-'amma li-šū'un al-maṭābi' al-amīriyya, p. 10, 17 – 11, 2.

(2) I.e. in the second chapter [i.e. *Kitāb al-Madḥal* I.2]; he [scil. Avicenna] said in it: “but rather inasmuch as it is useful for the acquisition of the states of those two [kinds of] existence” [a *verbatim* quotation of *Kitāb al-Madḥal* I 2, p. 15, 18-19 Cairo ed.]. As‘ad.

(1) In the case of the first marginal note, As‘ad al-Yānyawī identifies an allusion Avicenna made to the subject of logic (namely the secondary intelligibles), which is not explicitly spelled out in the passage at stake. Therefore, As‘ad al-Yānyawī makes it explicit in his marginal note and also recalls another passage of Avicenna’s *Šifā’* in which the subject of logic is dealt with, namely the beginning of the section on *Metaphysics*, which very likely refers to *Kitāb al-Ilāhiyyāt* I 2, p. 10,17-11,2.<sup>16</sup>

(2) The second marginal note on the passage aims at clarifying Avicenna’s vague reference to something he stated in “what preceded”. As‘ad al-Yānyawī interprets the reference as a hint to *Kitāb al-Madḥal* I 2, p. 15,18-19 Cairo ed., which he quotes *verbatim*: the portion quoted is part of Avicenna’s statement that logic is a theoretical inquiry concerning the things inasmuch as it is useful for the acquisition of the two kinds of existence, namely the existence in the external reality and that in the mind.

The two examples discussed so far show the exegetical purpose of al-Yānyawī’s *marginalia*. Some other marginal notes in the same handwriting end with the clause “*li-nāmiqihī As‘ad*” or “*li-nāmiqihī al-faqīr As‘ad*” (“[The note] belongs to the one who wrote it, the poor As‘ad”), which seemingly points to the fact that not only As‘ad al-Yānyawī is the author of these glosses, but that he himself must have written them in the margins of ms. P.<sup>17</sup> A transcription of the marginal note on fol. 13v is provided below (T3) by way of example:

**T3.** Ms. P, fol. 13v:

قوله «والثاني إنه الذي» إلى آخره ليس الثاني هو ما ذكره فقط، بل الثاني على ما خرجه صاحب الكليات، أعني پورفوريوس، وغيره من الشراح هو الذي يوضع تحت الجنس ويقال عليه الجنس فيما هو؛ وإنما نقصه لنقصان فهمه بالمأخذ. لنامقه الفقير أسعد عفي عنه.

<sup>16</sup> IBN SĪNĀ, *al-Šifā’*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* I 2, p. 10,17-11,2: “The subject matter of logic, as you have known, was the secondary intelligible ideas (*al-ma‘ānī al-ma‘qūla al-‘āniyya*) that depend on the primary intelligible ideas (*allatī tastanidu ilā al-ma‘ānī al-ma‘qūlati al-‘ulā*) with respect to the manner (*kayfiyya*) by which one arrives through them from what is known to what is unknown (*yutawaṣṣalu bihā min ma‘lūmin ilā maḡhūlin*) —not [however] with respect to their being intelligible[s], having [that] intellectual existence that either is not at all attached to matter or attached to noncorporeal matter,” tr. in MARMURA Michael E. (tr.) (2005), *Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing*. A parallel English-Arabic text, Brigham Young University Press, Provo (Utah), p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> I would incline to think that the notes are autographs by As‘ad al-Yānyawī, rather than that someone else copied them in ms. P, because of the presence of the humility formula *al-faqīr* (“the poor”), which points to the fact that As‘ad al-Yānyawī is describing himself in such a way. On the use of similar humility statements, see GACEK Adam (2009), *Arabic Manuscripts – A Vademecum for Readers*, Brill, Leiden/ Boston, p. 239-240.

His statement “and the second [definition] states that it is the one that...” up to the end: the second [definition] does not consist in what he mentioned only, on the contrary, the second [definition], in the way in which the Master of the Universals, i.e. Porphyry, and the other commentators produced it, is that “it is that which is subsumed under the genus and of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’”; he [scil. Avicenna] failed [to correctly mention] it only because he failed in understanding the source [of the passage]. [The note] belongs to the one who wrote it, the poor As'ad, may [God] forgive him.

The note comments on *Kitāb al-Madḥal* I 11, p. 60, 14-15 Cairo ed., where Avicenna mentions the second of Porphyry's definitions of the species as “that of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’” (*aḥaduhumā qawluhum [...] wa-al-tānī innahu allaḏī yuqālu ‘alayhi al-ḡins min tarīqi mā huwa*). As'ad al-Yānyawī raises an objection against the way in which Avicenna reports Porphyry's definitions of the species, claiming that the second definition provided by Porphyry actually states that the species is “that which is under the genus and of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’”. Al-Yānyawī's objection is grounded in a different interpretation of Porphyry's text (*Isag.*, 4, 9-11 Busse),<sup>18</sup> which is slightly ambiguous. In fact, there are two possibilities to understand the passage: it could be read (a) as if Porphyry were presenting two definitions of the species, namely one claiming that the species is what is under the genus and the other claiming that it is that of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’,<sup>19</sup> or (b) as if the two statements were parts of one and the same definition, claiming that the species is that which is under the genus and of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’.<sup>20</sup> Reading (a) is Avicenna's way of understanding the passage, whereas reading (b) is al-Yānyawī's. The difference between the two readings depends on the way the conjunction “and” (καί) is interpreted, namely on whether it is taken as a conjunction between two different definitions (a) or as a conjunction between two halves of the same definition (b) of the species.

The note in T3 provides us with an interesting insight into al-Yānyawī's attitude towards the text he comments. A general feature of his exegesis seems to be a careful study of Avicenna's work along with an attentive reading of the Greek text it

<sup>18</sup> PORPHYRIUS (1887), *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. BUSSE Adolf, (CAG IV.1) Reimer, Berlin, p. 4.9-11: ἀποδιδόασιν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὕτως· εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ ταττόμενον ὑπὸ τὸ γένος καὶ οὐ τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ κατηγορεῖται.

<sup>19</sup> According to this reading, the passage could be translated as in BARNES Jonathan (tr.) (2003), *Porphyry, Introduction*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 5: “Now they present species thus: a species is what is ordered under a genus; and: that of which a genus is predicated in answer to ‘What is it?’”

<sup>20</sup> In this case, the passage could be translated thus, modifying Barnes' translation: “Now they present species thus: a species is that which is ordered under a genus and of which a genus is predicated in answer to ‘What is it?’”

comments.<sup>21</sup> As far as his attitude towards the author of the text he comments is concerned, clearly he doesn't refrain from criticism when his interpretation diverges with respect to Avicenna's<sup>22</sup>.

To sum up, this brief overview of the *marginalia* preserved in ms. P provides us with a clue about As'ad al-Yānyawī's study of Avicenna's logic. However, the presence of al-Yānyawī's most probably autograph marginal notes in ms. P is not an isolated phenomenon: several marginal notes in the same handwriting and signed in an identical manner ("As'ad") are to be found also in the margins of the aforementioned witness of the natural section of Avicenna's *Šifā'* owned by As'ad al-Yānyawī, i.e. ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 796. I would suggest that both ms. P and ms. Hamidiye 796 were annotated by As'ad al-Yānyawī himself. Hence, one should expect a systematic survey of al-Yānyawī's notes in both manuscripts to reveal many relevant details concerning al-Yānyawī's reading of Avicenna's text.

## 1.2. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565 [= ms. A]

### 1.2.1. A General Presentation of the Manuscript

Manuscript Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565 [henceforth: ms. A] is a witness of the first half of the logic of Avicenna's *Šifā'* (more precisely, the first five *funūn*, namely *al-Madḥal*, *al-Maḥlāt*, *al-'Ibāra*, *al-Qiyās* and *al-Burhān*). Although neither the date nor the place of copy are stated in the colophon, it is nonetheless possible to contextualize the manuscript within the same *milieu* as ms. P.

The main text was copied in ms. A by several scribes, who also alternated in copying the great number of *marginalia* preserved in the manuscript. It is possible to date approximately at least one of the several handwritings alternating in the copy of the text (for the sake of simplicity, hand1):<sup>23</sup> in fact, hand1 is also the author of a number of notes copied on some folios that were added to the manuscript at a second stage, and some of these notes reproduce excerpts of a commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* translated by As'ad al-Yānyawī, together with the date 29 Šafar

<sup>21</sup> This peculiar attention to the original text is consistent with the fact that As'ad al-Yānyawī produced Arabic translations of Porphyry's *Isagoge* and of other parts of Aristotle's logic, fragments of which are preserved in the margins of ms. A; on this point, cf. *infra*, §1.2.2.

<sup>22</sup> As'ad al-Yānyawī is classified among the "anti-Avicennist Peripatetics," in GUTAS Dimitri (2002), "The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 – ca. 1350," in JANSSENS Jules and DE SMET Daniel (eds.), *Avicenna and his Heritage – Acts of the international colloquium, Leuven-Louvain-la-Neuve, September 8-September 11, 1999*, Leuven University Press, Leuven, p. 81-97 (esp. p. 97).

<sup>23</sup> It is the handwriting that copied, for instance, the text from fol. 101r to fol. 103v.



1135 /December 9<sup>th</sup>, 1722.<sup>24</sup> If this date corresponds, as I think, to the date in which the note was copied in the added folio,<sup>25</sup> then it can be argued that hand I was actively working on ms. A on the 9<sup>th</sup> of December 1722. What is more, these notes, as well as other *marginalia* in the manuscript, refer to As'ad al-Yānyawī as a “professor”: in fact, the notes reportedly quote some excerpts of the works of “our professor, the philosopher As'ad” (*li-ustāḍīnā al-faylasūf As'ad*), or even simply “the professor” (*al-ustād*). Arguably, hand I as well as the other handwritings of ms. A belong to some anonymous students of As'ad al-Yānyawī, and should definitely be contextualized in the framework of his school.

Moreover, another handwriting (that I shall name hand2), copying, e.g., the beginning of *Kitāb al-Burhān* on fol. 221v, could belong to a well-known disciple of As'ad al-Yānyawī: in fact, it is a *nasta'liq* that highly resembles that of Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī, copyist of ms. P. If the identification of hand2 with Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī holds, this piece of evidence is consistent with the estimated dating of hand I (which was active around the year 1722 and is, therefore, contemporary with hand2, which copied ms. P in the same year), and both elements suggest that ms. A was copied in the same *milieu* and more or less at the same time as ms. P, i.e. in the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople around the year 1722.

### ***1.2.2. Ms. A as a Witness for al-Yānyawī's Translations***

As already stated, ms. A was heavily annotated by several students of As'ad al-Yānyawī. Generally speaking, the notes quote many excerpts of translations ascribed to al-Yānyawī himself. More specifically, it is possible to identify in ms. A excerpts of al-Yānyawī's translations of:

- A) The Aristotelian logical corpus:
  - i. Porphyry's *Isagoge*;
  - ii. Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*;
- B) Commentaries:
  - iii. A commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*;
  - iv. A commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*;
  - v. A commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*.

<sup>24</sup> On the identification of this translation, see *infra*, §1.2.2.

<sup>25</sup> On this point, see *infra* §1.2.2.

(A) The Aristotelian Logical Corpus

Ms. A preserves several marginalia quoting As‘ad al-Yānyawī’s translations of portions of the Aristotelian logical corpus.<sup>26</sup> During the present inquiry, it was possible to identify with certainty several excerpts of a translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (i) and at least a fragment of a translation of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* (ii); in what follows, I shall provide a brief presentation of both cases.

(i) Al-Yānyawī’s Translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*

In the margins of Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Madḥal* there are several *marginalia* quoting “As‘ad’s translation of Porphyry” (e.g. fol. 20v: *tarḡamat As‘ad li-Pūrfuriyūs*): at a closer inspection, these *marginalia* appear to be excerpts of an Arabic translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* reportedly accomplished by As‘ad al-Yānyawī. As an example, I will transcribe below the marginal annotation preserved on fol. 24r, which is the quotation of an excerpt of As‘ad al-Yānyawī’s translation of a passage of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* concerning the shared features and the differences between the *differentia specifica* and the common accident (Porph. *Isag.* 19,17-20,10 Busse).

**T4.** A fragment of As‘ad al-Yānyawī’s translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge***Porph., *Isag.* 19,17-20,10 Busse**

Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.

Διαφορᾶ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότη κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι, κοινὸν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ προσεῖναι· τὸ τε γὰρ δίπουν ἀεὶ πρόσεστι πᾶσι κόραξι τὸ τε μέλαν ὁμοίως.

Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων διαφορᾶς καὶ συμβεβηκότος.

**Ms. A, margin of fol. 24r**

الرأس الثامن فيما يشترك فيه الفصل والعرض العام.

يشتركان في المقولية على الكثرة ويشترك الفصل مع العرض العام اللزم في كونهما موجودين في الكل ودائما، فإنّ ذا القدمين يوجد دائما في الإنسان، وكذلك الأسود يوجد في كل غراب دائما.

<sup>26</sup> Here I mean by “Aristotelian logical corpus” the entire set of logical works studied in the scholastic curriculum since Late Antiquity, including also a non-Aristotelian work like Porphyry’s *Isagoge*.

Διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἢ μὲν διαφορὰ περιέχει, οὐ περιέχεται δέ· περιέχει γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τρόπον μὲν τινα περιέχει τῷ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι, τρόπον δὲ τινα περιέχεται τῷ μὴ ἐνὸς συμβεβηκότος εἶναι δεκτικά τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων. καὶ ἢ μὲν διαφορὰ ἀνεπίτατος καὶ ἀνάветος, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐπιδέχεται. καὶ ἀμιγῆς μὲν αἰ ἐναντία διαφοραί, μιγείη δ' ἂν τὰ ἐναντία συμβεβηκότα.<sup>27</sup>

ويفترقان بأنَّ الفصل أعمّ من النوع وليس أخصّ منه فإنَّ الناطق يعمّ الملك والإنسان؛ والعرض العامّ هو أعمّ من جهة لوجوده في الكثير وأخصّ من جهة أخرى، لأنّ موضوعاته لا يقبل عرضا واحدا فقط، بل أعراضا كثيرة؛ وبأنّ الفصل لا يقبل الشدّة والضعف والعرض العامّ يقبلهما؛ وبأنّ الفصول المتقابلة لا يمكن أن تختلط وقد يمكن ذلك للأعراض العامّة.  
ترجمة أسعد.

The Arabic translation is clearly different from the one produced in the 'Abbasid period by Abū 'Uṭmān al-Dimašqī (d. after 302 H/914), which is preserved in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe 2346<sup>28</sup> and quoted in the *lemmata* of Ibn al-Ṭayyib's commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*.<sup>29</sup> Al-Yānyawī's translation is less literal and more inclined to provide an interpretative rendering, in order to attain a clearer understanding of the text. As an instance, the clause *fa-inna al-nāṭiq ya 'ummu al-malak wa-al-insān* ("for 'rational' encompasses [both] the angel and the man") is actually an interpretative rendering of the Greek *περιέχει γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον* ("rational contains man"),<sup>30</sup> where there is no explicit mention of the angel. It is, however, true that Porphyry considers 'rational' as a *differentia specifica* characterizing both the species of 'man' and that of the 'divine entity',<sup>31</sup> and the use

<sup>27</sup> "Common to differences and accidents is the fact that they are said of several items. Common in relation to inseparable accidents is the fact that they are present always and to every case: biped is always present to all ravens, and so similarly is black. They differ because differences contain and are not contained (rational contains man), whereas accidents in a way contain in so far as they are in several items, and in a way are contained in that their subjects are receptive not of one accident but of several. Differences are unaugmentable and undiminishable, whereas accidents admit the more and the less. Contrary differences do not mix whereas contrary accidents will mix," tr. BARNES, *Porphyry, Introduction*, p. 17-18.

<sup>28</sup> Edited in BADAŪĪ 'Abd al-Rahmān (1952), *Manṭiq Aristū*, 3 vol., Maṭba'at Dār al-Kutub al-miṣriyya, Cairo, vol. III. The translation preserved in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe 2346 seemingly coincides with the one preserved in ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana & 105 sup., edited by BAFFIONI Carmela (2011), "The Arabic Version of Porphyry's *Isagoge* in the Ambrosiana Library," *Studi Filosofici* 34, p. 37-72; see also BAFFIONI Carmela (2012), "Il manoscritto ambrosiano arabo & 105 sup. e la trasmissione delle opere di logica greca in arabo," *Studia graeco-arabica* 2, p. 245-254.

<sup>29</sup> IBN AL-ṬAYYIB Abū al-Faraġ (1975), *Tafsīr Kitāb Isāgūgī li-Furfūriyūs*, ed. GYEKYE Kwame, Dar al-Mašriq, Beirut.

<sup>30</sup> Tr. BARNES, *Porphyry, Introduction*, p. 17.

<sup>31</sup> See PORPHYRIUS, *Porphyrii Isagoge*, p. 11.21-12.1: "They also present them thus: a difference is that by which each type of thing differs. For man and horse do not differ in virtue of their genus —both we and the

of the Greek περιέχει (“contains”) in this context points to the fact that the *differentia specifica* ‘rational’ has a greater extension of predication than the species ‘man’, since it is also predicated of the species ‘angel’. The translation by al-Dimašqī, on the other hand, rendered the same clause in a much more literal way: *wa-dālika anna al-nāṭiq yaḥwī al-insān* (“and this because ‘rational’ includes ‘man’”).<sup>32</sup>

This marginal note, as well as the others quoting excerpts of al-Yānyawī’s translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, is obviously not an annotation directly composed in the margins of the manuscript. On the contrary, it seemingly reproduces a portion of a work already structured into chapters, as it is clear from the indication opening the marginal note, which points to the fact that the content of the note is part of an *eighth chapter*.

The presence of this fragment in ms. A is extremely interesting: in fact, it should be identified as a quotation of an as of yet unstudied work by As‘ad al-Yānyawī, namely a recently discovered Latin into Arabic translation of the Aristotelian logical corpus preserved in ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, H. Hüsnü Paşa 1238.<sup>33</sup> The entire series of marginal notes in ms. A, quoting al-Yānyawī’s translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* could be considered as an additional relevant witness for this newly discovered work.

#### (ii) Al-Yānyawī’s Translation of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*

A marginal note in ms. A, fol. 241r, which ends with the clause “*min tarğamat al-ustād li-al-ta‘līm al-awwal*” (“[taken] from the professor’s translation of the First Teaching [i.e. Aristotle]”), preserves an excerpt of al-Yānyawī’s translation of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* (T5).

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non-rational items are mortal animals. But when rational is added it sets us apart from them. And both we and gods (θεοί) are rational. But when mortal is added it sets us apart from them,” tr. BARNES, *Porphyry, Introduction*, p. 11. More precisely, Porphyry speaks of ‘divine entities’ (θεοί), but the later commentators often spoke of ‘angels’; see AMMONIUS (1891), *In Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces*, ed. BUSSE Adolf, (CAG IV.3) Reimer, Berlin, p. 70.13-20.

<sup>32</sup> BADAWĪ, *Manṭiq Aristū*, vol. III, p. 1064.

<sup>33</sup> According to As‘ad al-Yānyawī’s own statements in the incipit, the work consists in a translation realized on the basis of an unspecified Latin source. On the discovery of this work in ms. H. Hüsnü Paşa 1238, see MOREL Teymour and GENEQUAND Charles, “Al-Yānyawī’s Account of Porphyry” in the present volume. I wish to thank the two authors of the paper for sharing with me some information concerning the manuscript and the work itself, and particularly I wish to thank Teymour Morel for helping me to compare the excerpts of the translation with the content of ms. H. Hüsnü Paşa 1238.

**T5.** A fragment of al-Yānyawī's translation of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*

**Arist., *An. Post.*, I 4, 73a 34-b4.**

**Ms. A, margin of fol. 241r**

Καθ' αὐτὰ δ' ὅσα ὑπάρχει τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν, οἷον τριγώνῳ γραμμὴ καὶ γραμμῇ στιγμή (ἢ γὰρ οὐσία αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ λέγοντι τί ἐστίν ἐνυπάρχει), καὶ ὅσοις τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχουσι τῷ τί ἐστὶ δηλοῦντι, οἷον τὸ εὐθὺ ὑπάρχει γραμμῇ καὶ τὸ περιφερές, καὶ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμῶ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἑτερόμηκες· καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τί ἐστὶ λέγοντι ἔνθα μὲν γραμμῇ ἔνθα δ' ἀριθμός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ τοιαῦθ' ἐκάστοις καθ' αὐτὰ λέγω [...].<sup>34</sup>

وأسمي بالذات الأشياء التي توجد في الماهية، كما أنّ الخط يوجد بالذات في المثلث والنقطة في الخط، فإنّ ماهيتهما تكون منهما، ويوجدان في القول الشارح للماهية، والأشياء التي تحمل على الأشياء التي توجد في القول الشارح لماهية تلك الأشياء كما أنّ الاستقامة والانحناء توجدان بالذات في الخط، والفرد والزوج في العدد، والأول والمركب والمربع والمسطح فيه؛ ويوجد موضوعها في تعريف كل واحد منها فيهما الخط وفيها العدد. وكذلك أسمى بالذات كل شيء يكون كذلك. من ترجمة الأستاذ للتعليم الأول

The passage is a translation of Aristotle's definition of the senses of *per se* (καθ' αὐτὸ) in *Posterior Analytics* I 4, reportedly accomplished by As'ad al-Yānyawī, and copied in ms. A by one of his students, who designates him as a professor. This fragment as well has to be identified as a part of the aforementioned Latin into Arabic translation by As'ad al-Yānyawī preserved in ms. H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238.<sup>35</sup>

**(B) Commentaries Translated by Al-Yānyawī**

Ms. A also preserves some excerpts of As'ad al-Yānyawī's translations of a series of commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus. In particular, it is possible to identify quotations of his translations of commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and Aristotle's *Physics*. In what follows, I will provide a sketchy presentation of some of these quotations found in the margins of ms. A.

<sup>34</sup> "I describe one thing as 'belonging *per se*' to another (i) if it is an element in the essential nature of the other, as, e.g., a line belongs to a triangle and a point to a line (for the line or point is a constituent of the being of the triangle or line, and is an element in the formula which describes its essence); (ii) if it is an attribute the formula of whose essence includes the subject to which the attribute itself belongs. E.g., 'straight' and 'curved' belong to 'line', 'odd' and 'even,' 'prime' and 'compound,' 'square' and 'oblong' belong to number; and the formula of the essence of each one of these includes line or number respectively. Similarly in all other cases I describe all terms of either of the kinds just described as belonging *per se* to their several subjects," TREDENNICK Hugh (tr.) (1966), *Aristotle, Posterior Analytics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)/London, p. 43-45.

<sup>35</sup> I wish to thank Teymour Morel for the help he provided in the identification of this fragment too.

(iii) A Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*

As to As'ad al-Yānyawī's translation of a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, a fragment of it is quoted in a marginal note on fol. 25v, which ends with the clause: *min tarğamat al-ustād sallamahu Allāh li-šarḥ Risālat Pūrfuriyūs* (“[Taken] from the Professor's, may God protect him, translation of a commentary on Porphyry's treatise”). The passage is quoted in correspondence with the beginning of the *Kitāb al-Maqūlāt*; it states that the study of Porphyry's *Isagoge* (mentioned both in the fragment and at the end of it as *Risālat Pūrfuriyūs*) must precede the study of Aristotle's logic because of the use of the knowledge of the universals before the knowledge of the categories.

The fragment is, actually, a quotation from al-Yānyawī's *al-Šarḥ al-anwar fī al-mantiq*,<sup>36</sup> namely his translation of Ioannes Cottunius' commentary on the first four books of Aristotle's *Organon* and on Porphyry's *Isagoge* (the already mentioned *Compendiosa logica in usum scholarium*) (see T6). Such an identification also provides us with a *terminus post quem* for the copy of this quotation in the margins of ms. A, namely the date in which al-Yānyawī completed his translation of Cottunius' *Compendiosa logica* (21 of Ğumādā al-āḥira 1134/ 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1722).<sup>37</sup>

T6. Fol. 25v, incipit of the fragment

**Ioannes Cottunius, *Compendiosa logica in usum scholarium*, p. 68**

**Ms. A, fol. 25v**

*Primo rectissime ait [scil. Porphyry], speculationem Praedicabilium esse necessariam ad notitiam Praedicamentorum. Nam Praedicamentum nihil aliud est, quam coordinatio Praedicabilium, in qua superiora genera per differentias distribuuntur in suas species, ut infra patebit [...].*<sup>38</sup>

اعلم أنّ معرفة الكليات ضروري لفهم المقولات، فإنّ المقولات ليست إلا ترتيب الكليات يبين فيه أنّ الأجناس العالية تنقسم إلى أقسامه بالفصول، كما سيظهر فيما بعد [...].

<sup>36</sup> This title is already mentioned among As'ad al-Yānyawī's works in TAHIR Mehmed B. (1914-1923), *Ösmanlı Müellifleri*, 3 vol., Matbaa-i Amire, Istanbul, vol. I, p. 235. For the manuscripts that preserve the work, see ÖZERVARLI, “Yanyalı Esad Efendi's works,” p. 464 n. 24.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *supra* §I.1.1.

<sup>38</sup> “Know that the knowledge of the predicables is necessary in order to understand the categories, since a category is nothing but an arrangement of predicables in which the summa genera are divided into their species by the differentiae specificaе, as it will be clarified in what follows [...].” Noteworthy, the Arabic translation renders the Latin “*praedicabilia*” by *kullīyyāt* (“universals”), very likely to avoid a confusion with “*praedicamenta*,” rendered as *maqūlāt*.

Besides the fragment whose incipit is reproduced in T6, ms. A preserves several other excerpts of the translation of the commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*: there are, for instance, three fragments commenting upon Porphyry's classification of *differētia specifica* on fol. 16v that are taken from a not better specified "commentary on Porphyry" (*šarḥ Pūrfuriyūs*), whose translation is not explicitly ascribed to As'ad al-Yānyawī, but that are part of the same work.

(iv) A Commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*

A folio added between fol. 243v and fol. 244r quotes two long excerpts of As'ad al-Yānyawī's translation of a commentary on Aristotle, which is arguably a commentary on *Posterior Analytics*. In fact, the first of the two quotations comments upon the notion of the predication "of all" (κατὰ παντός),<sup>39</sup> whereas the other comments upon the universal (καθόλου) predication as a predication "of all" and "per se".<sup>40</sup> One of the two excerpts ends with the clause *min tarğamat al-ustād li-šarḥ al-Ta'lim al-Awwal* ("[taken] from the Professor's translation of a commentary on the First Teaching [i.e. Aristotle]"), whereas the other simply ends with the clause *min tarğamat al-ustād sallamahu Allāh*. These fragments are presented, respectively, as the second and the fourth sections of a chapter (*al-qism al-tānī* and *al-qism al-rābi' li-hādā al-faṣl*) of the work they quote. At a closer inspection, they actually correspond to the *secunda pars* and *quarta capituli pars* at p. 267 and p. 274 of Ioannes Cottunius' *Compendiosa logica in usum scholarium*. Both excerpts in ms. A report the date of 29 Šafar 1135 (= December 8<sup>th</sup>, 1722), written in red ink at the end of the quotation. Since it doesn't correspond with the date of composition of al-Yānyawī's translation of the *Compendiosa logica*, the date must refer to the time at which this quotation was inserted in ms. A, namely eight months after the end of al-Yānyawī's translation.

(v) A Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*

The recto of the folio inserted between fol. 236v and 237r quotes al-Yānyawī's translation of a commentary on Aristotle, introduced by the clause: *qāla al-ustād al-faylasūf sallamahu Allāh ta'ālā fī tarğamatihi li-šarḥ al-Ta'lim al-Awwal*. Although it is not specified, this excerpt is seemingly another portion of the aforementioned translation of a commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* (iv), dealing with the

<sup>39</sup> See ARISTOTLE, *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, I 4, 73a28-34 (ed. Ross David W., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, I 4, 73b25-74a2.

principles of the demonstrative syllogism. The verso of the same folio, on the other hand, quotes al-Yānyawī's translation of a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, introduced by the clause: *qāla al-ustād al-faylasūf sallamahu Allāh ta'ālā fī tarġamatihī li-šarḥ ṭabī'iyāt al-Ta'līm al-Awwal*. This marginal quotation is actually an excerpt of al-Yānyawī's *al-Ta'līm al-tālīt*,<sup>41</sup> namely his translation of Ioannes Cottunius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*.<sup>42</sup> Although al-Yānyawī's *al-Ta'līm al-tālīt* is still unedited, the identification of this fragment of the Arabic translation is possible by comparing it with the Latin text of Cottunius' commentary (see T7).

**T7. Identification of the translation of Ioannes Cottunius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics***

**Ioannes Cottunius, *Commentarii lucidissimi in octo libros Aristotelis De physico auditu* (p. 93, § VI)**

**Ms. A, verso of the folio inserted between fol. 236v and 237r**

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*Perpend. 3 circa tex. 9 quod θέσις, positio, inter alia significat etiam inopinabilem quandam opinionem, et quae suam ipsa secum praeseferat improbabilitatem, prolatam tamen ab aliquo praeclaro, ac celebrato Philosopho. Qua de re audi Philosophum in primo Topic. cap. 1 θέσις, positio, inquit, est existimatio extranea alicuius eorum, quorum in Philosophia illustris est et pervagata fama, veluti non posse contradici, ut placet Antistheni, vel moveri omnia, ut est sententia Heracliti, vel unum*

*esse omnia, quemadmodum ait Melissus.*

[...].<sup>43</sup>

قال الأستاذ الفيلسوف سلمه الله تعالى في ترجمته لشرح طبيعيات التعليم الأول:

ويستفاد من هذا المبيّن التاسع أنّ لفظ تَسِسُ أيّ الوضع يدلّ على رأي ظاهر الفساد وصادر عن حكم مشهور معتبر عن غفلة. ولتعرّف هذا الشيء اسمع ما قال المصنّف في الفصل الأوّل في أوّل الجدل إنّ تَسِسُ أيّ الوضع هو ظنّ خارجي لأحد الحكماء من المعروفين المشهورين في الفلسفة، مثل ما قال أمستسيوس [sic] لا يمكن أن يقال قول مناقض لقول، أو كما قال هراقلطوس إنّ جميع الأشياء تتبدّل.

أو كما قال ملوس إنّ جميع الأشياء واحد [...].

<sup>41</sup> For a description of the work and a list of the manuscripts preserving it, see ÖZERVARLI, "Yanyalı Esad Efendi's works," p. 464.

<sup>42</sup> COTTUNIUS Ioannes (1648), *Commentarii lucidissimi in octo libros Aristotelis De physico auditu*, Impensis Pauli Frambotti, Venice.

<sup>43</sup> "Thirdly it can be considered, with regard to text 9, that θέσις, i.e. 'thesis', among other [notions], also means a certain inconceivable opinion, which shows it itself its own improbability, but which is asserted by a well-known and admired philosopher. About this subject, I've learned from the Philosopher [i.e.



The excerpt quoted in ms. A is a fragment of al-Yānyawī's translation of a passage of Ioannes Cottunius' commentary, which comments on the use of the word θέσις in Aristotle, *Phys.* I 2, 185a 5-7,<sup>44</sup> by recalling the Aristotelian explanation of the term in *Top.* I 1, 104b 19-22. Interestingly, the Arabic translation offers both a transliteration of the Greek term mentioned by Cottunius (*tasis*) and an Arabic translation of it (*wad'*), corresponding to the Latin rendering provided by Cottunius (*positio*). The Arabic translation quoted in the excerpt seems to be a quite faithful rendering of the original Latin text.

The discovery of these excerpts of As'ad al-Yānyawī's translations in ms. A is of the utmost interest for the study of his activity as a translator. The commentaries quoted in these *marginalia* (B) are excerpts of two already known —though still unedited— translations by As'ad al-Yānyawī. More specifically, the excerpts (iii-iv) are quotations of al-Yānyawī's *al-Šarḥ al-anwar fī al-manṭiq*, and the excerpt (v) is a quotation of al-Yānyawī's *al-Ta'lim al-tāliṭ*. A study of these excerpts preserved in ms. A could offer an interesting perspective on the circulation and reception of his works within his school.

The study of the *marginalia* in ms. A can also provide a brand-new contribution to the knowledge of his production. In support of this claim, I shall mention the discovery of the excerpts quoting al-Yānyawī's translations of Porphyry's *Isagoge* (i) and of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* (ii). In fact, this is worth of the utmost interest, since all these excerpts turned out to be quotations from a unique work, the newly discovered and still unedited translation of Aristotle's logical corpus preserved in ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238. In the prospect of providing a critical edition of the work preserved in ms. H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238, ms. A could be an additional witness to take into account, given the great number of quotations preserved in there and given that the quotations were copied by some direct disciples of the author, very likely under his supervision, which makes ms. A a valuable witness for the text.

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Aristotle] in the first [book] of the *Topics*, chap. 1 [104b19-22]: “θέσις, i.e. ‘thesis’,” he says, “is a strange opinion held by someone of those who are famous and who are widely known in the domain of philosophy, like ‘contradiction is impossible,’ as Antisthenes claims, or ‘everything changes,’ as it is claimed by Heraclitus, or ‘all the things are one,’ as Melissus says”[...].”

<sup>44</sup> “So to enquire whether being is this sort of unity is no different from addressing any other thesis (gr. θέσις) of the kind which is advanced just for the sake of argument —the Heraclitean thesis, for instance, or the idea that being is a single person, or such a thesis as that Being is one man,” tr. WATERFIELD Robin (tr.) (1996), *Aristotle, Physics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford/ New York, p. 10.

## II. MSS. P AND A WITHIN THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF AVICENNA'S *ŠIFĀ'*

### II.1. Mss. P and A as Witnesses of the "Razian Branch" of Avicenna's *Šifā'*

As it has been shown so far, mss. P and A are precious sources for the study of As'ad al-Yānyawī's exegetical activity. In what follows, I will argue that they are also relevant witnesses of an earlier exegetical activity concerning Avicenna's *Šifā'*.

Both manuscripts preserve a set of anonymous *marginalia* that are also preserved in three thirteenth-century manuscripts of Avicenna's *Šifā'* which are stemmatically related to mss. P and A,<sup>45</sup> and in a later undated manuscript (ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 910) which is not stemmatically related to the others, but on the margins of which a second handwriting imported the *marginalia* by collation. Interestingly, this latter manuscript preserves, at the end of each of the marginal notes, a certificate of transmission ascribing them to the theologian and philosopher Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).<sup>46</sup>

Generally speaking, these *marginalia* denote a scholastic exegetical activity. In fact, the marginal notes to the *Šifā'* ascribed to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī are evidently meant to be a tool to facilitate the understanding of the main text, though without being a commentary in the same sense in which, for instance, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Šarḥ al-Išārāt* is. A clear evidence of the difference between the two kinds of exegeses is the fact that the author of the marginal notes abstains from any sort of verification (*tahqīq*) and criticism of Avicenna's statements,<sup>47</sup> confining himself to a plain and didactic clarification of the text, contrary to what happens in the commentary on Avicenna's *Išārāt*.

As a case study, I shall mention two *marginalia*, which are a plain paraphrase of *K. al-Madḥal* I 5 (p. 30,18-32,3), concerning the relationship of the notion of "essential" (*dātī*) to the notion of "signifying the quiddity" (*dāll 'alā al-māhiyya*).

<sup>45</sup> Namely ms. Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi, 2710 (dat. 25 Rabī' al-Awwal 666 – 25 Šawwāl 666/ December 21<sup>st</sup> 1267 – July 15<sup>th</sup> 1268); ms. Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḥīt 331 falsafa (*ḥuṣūsiyya*), 44988 ('*umūmiyya*) (dat. 7<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> century); ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (dat. 693/1293-4). On these manuscripts and their relation to mss. P and A, see Di Vincenzo, "Early Exegetical Practice on Avicenna's *Šifā'*."

<sup>46</sup> The certificate of transmission is introduced by the clause *min ḥaṭṭ* ("from the copy/from the writing of..."), or *nuqila min ḥaṭṭ* ("it was copied from the copy/writing of..."); see Di Vincenzo, "Early Exegetical Practice on Avicenna's *Šifā'*."

<sup>47</sup> On the features of the practice of *tahqīq*, see Wisnovky Robert (2013), "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the *Išārāt*," *Oriens* 41, p. 349-378, esp. p. 354-357.

Avicenna's claim, in this regard, is that the notion of "essential" is more general than the notion of "signifying the quiddity," for the first one can be comprehensive of the latter. Avicenna aims at demonstrating, against the doubts raised by some philosophers, that what signifies the quiddity can be enumerated among the essentials, although "essential" is not simply equivalent to "signifying the quiddity," but is rather a notion with a broader extension.

In order to do so, he proceeds with a diaretical argument: (1) first of all (*K. al-Madḥal* I 5, p. 30,18-31,16), he rules out the possibility that what signifies the quiddity of a species (for instance, "man") can be essential in relation to the species' quiddity itself, since it would be equivalent to state that "man" is essential to "man," which is absurd. A second possibility (2) is that what signifies the quiddity signifies an individual's quiddity: employing the example of man (*insān*) in relation to individual (*šaḥṣ*), Avicenna tries to prove (*K. al-Madḥal* I 5, p. 31, 6-14) that "man" is essential to individuals. In such a case, then, "man" should either be essential (2.1) because it is essential to the individuals' quiddity (which is, again, "man," but this case must be rejected for the same reasons the hypothesis that "man" could be essential for itself was rejected) or (2.2) because it is a part of the complex of features that make them individuals, which could entail that the accidental features characterizing the individual would be essential as well, but this would be an awkward and undesired conclusion. To avoid such a conclusion, Avicenna provides in the subsequent passage (*K. al-Madḥal* I 5, p. 31,17-32,3) a definition of "essential" that prevents the inclusion of the accidental features of the individual among its essential characteristics. The two *marginalia* on the *Šifā'* are just a summary and a paraphrase of this argument in *K. al-Madḥal* I 5, p. 31,6-14, without any further comment.

Interestingly enough, the study of this passage of the *Šifā'* served Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī when he commented upon a parallel passage of the *Išārāt* (p. 204-5 ed. Dunyā).<sup>48</sup> In that passage, Avicenna deals with the same matter, stating that the species signifies the quiddity of its individuals and is, at the same time, essential for them, though without discussing it in detail. It is quite evident that al-Rāzī must have had in mind the passage from *K. al-Madḥal* I 5 when commenting on the passage of the *Išārāt*, for he recalls exactly the aforementioned argument. Moreover, when al-Rāzī reports (*Šarḥ al-Išārāt*, p. 62, 3-13) Avicenna's definition of the "essential" as *the universal notion whose remotion from its subject causes the remotion of the subject itself*, he is evidently referring to the immediately-following passage in *K. al-Madḥal* I 5 (p. 31,17-32,3).

<sup>48</sup> IBN SĪNĀ (1960), *al-Išārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt ma'a Šarḥ Našr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī*, ed. DUNYĀ Sulaymān, Dār al-Ma'ārif, Cairo.

Noteworthy, Avicenna's argument, which is reported in a neutral way in the *marginalia* on the *Šifā'*, is sharply criticized in the *Šarḥ al-Išārāt*,<sup>49</sup> where al-Rāzī claims that one thing, in relation to something else, cannot be, at one and the same time, essential and signifying the quiddity. For instance, (1) humanity represents, in relation to humanity, the totality of its quiddity, though without being essential to it, because of the impossibility for anything to be in relation to itself. Then, (2) humanity can also be in relation to its particulars, but in this case, it doesn't represent their quiddity in its totality. In fact, the quiddity of an individual is made by both shared and distinctive properties, whereas humanity is only the shared feature, being, therefore, just a part of the individual's quiddity. Hence, humanity does not actually signify the quiddity of the things it is essential for, which allows al-Rāzī to draw the conclusion that, if humanity, for instance, represents the complete quiddity of something (*tamām māhiyyatihi*), it isn't, however, essential for that something; if, on the contrary, humanity is not the entire quiddity of something, but rather a part of it, then it is essential for it, but it doesn't signify its quiddity.<sup>50</sup> Hence the impossibility for something of being, at the same time, both signifying the quiddity and essential for the same thing, which contrasts Avicenna's claim of *K. al-Madḥal* I 5 that "essential" is a more general notion that can encompass the more specific notion of "signifying the quiddity."<sup>51</sup> Al-Rāzī's objection to Avicenna basically exploits the same

<sup>49</sup> AL-RĀZĪ Faḥr al-Dīn (1964), *Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt*, ed. NAJAFZADEH Ali Reza, Anjuman-i Āthār va Mafākhir-i Farhangī, Tehran, p. 63.3-12: "My own verification [of the subject] (*al-tahqīq*) is that it is not so, because "man" is essential for "man" either [(i)] in relation to the extent that is shared (*al-qadr al-muštarak*) among the individuals, [i.e.] humanity, so that the idea becomes that "man" is essential for "man". Or [(ii)] it is essential in relation to the particulars that are under it, but the quiddity of that particular doesn't arise from the humanity that is something abstract by which there is sharing, but it arises from it and from that by means of which there is differentiation (*al-imtiyāz*) from what is shared in humanity. If it is so, then, humanity is not the complete quiddity (*tamām al-māhiyya*) of that particular, but rather a part (*ḡuz*) of that quiddity. The result is that it is impossible for humanity to be essential for [the things] for which humanity represents the complete quiddity, in virtue of the impossibility for anything to be related to itself. [On the contrary,] humanity is not signifying the quiddity, in relation to that for which humanity is not the complete quiddity. Therefore, it is impossible for the same one thing in relation to the same one thing to be essential and, at the same time, to signify [its] quiddity."

<sup>50</sup> The same argument is provided in AL-RĀZĪ Faḥr al-Dīn (2002-2003), *Manṭiq al-Mulaḥḥaṣ*, ed. QARĀMALIKĪ Farāmarz A. and AŞĠARĪNIZHĀD Ādīna, Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-i Imām Šādiq, Tehran, p. 38.6-10: "It is impossible to call what signifies the quiddity "essential," because the essential is [(i)] either essential for itself, but this is absurd, since the essential is related to the essence and it is impossible for anything to be in relation to itself; or [(ii)] [it is essential] for something else, but this is vain, because that with respect of which it is essential is, inescapably, composed by it and by something else, hence it [i.e. the essential feature] is [just] one of its parts, so that it doesn't signify its quiddity, because one of the parts of the composite doesn't signify the complete quiddity (*tamām al-māhiyya*)."

<sup>51</sup> In *Manṭiq al-Mulaḥḥaṣ*, p. 44, 2-15, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī describes five definitions of "essential" provided by philosophers. Avicenna's definition of "essential" presented in *K. al-Madḥal* I 5 seems to match with the position held by the third group of philosophers, defining the "essential" as "what cannot be removed from the quiddity". In the same passage, al-Rāzī explicitly endorses the position of the fifth group of

diairetical scheme employed in Avicenna's argument, though with a completely different assumption concerning the quiddity of the individual. In fact, Avicenna made it coincide with the specific quiddity, to which other features that are proper to each individual occur.<sup>52</sup> In al-Rāzī's own view, on the other hand, the individual's quiddity as a whole is composed by a shared factor (*al-qadr al-muštarak*), which is common to all the individuals of the same species (i.e. the specific quiddity), and a distinguishing factor (*al-qadr al-mumayyiz*) that allows the distinction of an individual from the others (i.e. the proper distinguishing features of each individual).<sup>53</sup> As a consequence, the essential constituents of the individual form are, actually, a part of its quiddity (the shared one), rather than the whole of it. This kind of analysis is quite peculiar of al-Rāzī's thought, and was later rejected by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in his own commentary on Avicenna's *Išārāt*, where he basically reassessed Avicenna's view on the subject.<sup>54</sup>

To sum up, supposing that al-Rāzī is the author of the *marginalia* to the *Šifā'*, the comparison between the *marginalia* on *K. al-Madḥal* and the commentary on the *Išārāt* showed that, even if he didn't agree with Avicenna's claim in *K. al-Madḥal* I 5, in his *marginalia* he confined himself to a plain paraphrase of the passage.

Given the apparently "impersonal" style of these *marginalia*, it is difficult to tell with certainty on a philosophical basis whether the authorial ascription preserved in the manuscript tradition is reliable or not.

As to their possible dating, these *marginalia* are copied in the thirteenth-century manuscripts in the same handwriting that is responsible for the copy of the main text, which means that they were copied, together with the main text, from an earlier antigraph. Hence, it can be concluded that this corpus of *marginalia* is, at least, surely earlier than the second half of the thirteenth century (given that the earliest of the three manuscripts dates to 666/1267-8). An ascription to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, therefore, cannot be easily ruled out, neither on a philosophical basis nor on a chronological one. However it might be, the discovery of this set of *marginalia* is worthy of attention, because it provides a clue to the existence of an early exegetical

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philosophers, claiming that the "essential" is "what is a part of the quiddity (*ḡuz' al-māhiyya*)," which excludes what signifies the entire quiddity of something from the essential features.

<sup>52</sup> Avicenna (*K. al-Madḥal* I 5, p. 29.2-13 Cairo ed.) clearly identifies the quiddity of an individual with that of the species (the example is that of the individual man, whose quiddity is determined by his humanity).

<sup>53</sup> On these two "factors" and their role in the definition, see also IBRAHIM Bilal (2013), "Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Ibn al-Hayṭam and Aristotelian Science: Essentialism versus Phenomenalism in Post-Classical Islamic Thought," *Oriens* 41, p. 379-431.

<sup>54</sup> In fact, al-Ṭūsī's commentary on the same passage of Avicenna's *Išārāt* (see IBN SĪNĀ, *al-Išārāt wa-al-Tanbīhāt*, ed. DUNYĀ, p. 205 n. 9) is a defence of Avicenna's claim that the specific nature, such as "humanity," does signify the quiddity of an individual, since it is *the entire quiddity of that individual (wa-tilka al-ṭabī' atu innamā hiya tamāmu māhiyyati tilka al-ašḥāsi)*.

practice concerning Avicenna's *Šifā'*, in spite of an apparently poor production of commentaries on the text between the eleventh and the sixteenth century.<sup>55</sup> Mss. P and A, which both preserve these *marginalia*, well represent the transmission of a thirteenth-century cultural heritage up to the eighteenth century.

## II.2. THE EXEMPLAR OF MSS. P AND A

Besides having been produced within the same scholastic *milieu*, mss. P and A also derive from the same exemplar (that I shall name, for the sake of simplicity, ms. δ).<sup>56</sup> In what follows, I shall try to argue for this claim on two different bases: (i) on the basis of Lachmann's criterion of the presence of shared mistakes in the text of both witnesses; (ii) on the basis of the presence in both witnesses of the aforementioned set of *marginalia* ascribed to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, copied together with the main text and affected, on their turn, by shared mistakes.

(i) As to the first criterion, that is to determine a stemmatic relation between the two manuscripts, both manuscripts share the same accidental omission affecting the text of *K. al- 'Ibāra* II 2, p. 93, 9-11<sup>57</sup> (the underlined clause in T8).

**T8.** IBN SĪNĀ, *al-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al- 'Ibāra*, II.2, p. 93.9-11 and the omission shared by mss. P and A

فإن لم يعتبر ذلك كانت السوالب تلزم الموجبات، لأنَّ السوالب تصدق على ما هو معدوم من  
الموضوعات ولا يمتنع.

So that, if this is not taken into account, the negative statements necessarily follow the affirmative ones, since the negative statements give assent to the subjects that do not exist without being impossible.

(ii) As to the second criterion, in the margins of the same folio both mss. P and A preserve one of the *marginalia* ascribed to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, commenting on a slightly preceding passage (*K. al- 'Ibāra* II 2, p. 93, 2). What is more, in both manuscripts the clause accidentally omitted in *K. al- 'Ibāra* II 2, p. 93, 9-11 is integrated in the margin, but it is wrongly included as a part of the marginal note commenting on *K. al- 'Ibāra* II 2, p. 93, 2 (see T9).

<sup>55</sup> On this point, see WISNOVSKY Robert (2013), "Avicenna's Islamic reception," in ADAMSON Peter (ed.), *Interpreting Avicenna*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 190-213, esp. p. 194.

<sup>56</sup> The two manuscripts are seemingly not derived from each other, for each of them has mistakes that are not shared with the other.

<sup>57</sup> Quoted from the edition: IBN SĪNĀ (1970), *al-Šifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, 3. *al- 'Ibāra*, ed. MADKŪR Ibrāhīm and AL-ḤUDAYRĪ Maḥmūd, al-Hay'a al-miṣriyya al- 'amma li-al-kitāb, Cairo.

T9. A shared mistake in a marginal note in mss. P and A

**The marginal note as it is preserved in the other manuscripts**

أي بعد أن يكون الموضوع الذي هو الإنسان موجودا غير معدوم.

**The marginal note in mss. P and A**

أي بعد أن يكون الموضوع الذي هو الإنسان موجودا غير معدوم لأنَّ السوالب تصدق على ما هو معدوم من الموضوعات\*.

“I.e. provided the fact that the subject that is the man is existent [and] not non-existent.”<sup>58</sup>

\* The underlined part exactly corresponds to the clause omitted in mss. P and A in *K. al-'Ibāra* II 2, p. 93, 9-11.

As to the genesis of this phenomenon, it can be supposed that the addition of the omitted portion of text in the margin of an ancestor of mss. P and A was mistaken for a part of the marginal note written slightly above it, and therefore included in the marginal note in the copies derived from it. It is possible to figure out that this peculiar mistake was already there in the common antigraph of the two manuscripts (ms. δ): in fact, the presence of the same graphic confusion in both mss. P and A suggests that the two manuscripts are accurate reproductions of ms. δ.

To sum up, on the basis of both the aforementioned criteria (i) and (ii), it can be argued that mss. P and A are copies of the same exemplar. The results provided by the analysis of the stemmatic relations between the two manuscripts are consistent with the data of the historical reconstruction conducted so far: the two manuscripts were copied in the same context (i.e. within the school of As'ad al-Yānyawī) and from the same copy (i.e. ms. δ). Arguably, ms. δ was a manuscript that preserved at least the section on logic of Avicenna's *Šifā'* and descended, in its turn, from a copy related to the three aforementioned thirteenth-century manuscripts. These manuscripts altogether form a branch of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Šifā'* that could be named “Razian branch,” since it is characterized by the presence of a set of exegetical marginal notes ascribed to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, that were evidently transmitted at least up to the eighteenth century.

<sup>58</sup> The purpose of this marginal note is to clarify, with regard to *K. al-'Ibāra* II 2, p. 93, 2: “... provided the aforementioned condition (*ba'd al-šarḥ al-madkūr*),” what is the “aforementioned condition” to which Avicenna refers.

## CONCLUSIONS

As the present inquiry tried to show, a careful study of mss. P and A is able to provide new insights into the intellectual activity within the circle of As‘ad al-Yānyawī, and even some new textual evidence of As‘ad al-Yānyawī’s own production concerning the Aristotelian logic. In addition to that, both manuscripts revealed themselves as precious witnesses of a stratified exegetical activity on Avicenna’s *Šifā’*, collecting several philosophical *marginalia* produced between the thirteenth and the eighteenth century. In sum, it can be stated that mss. P and A are outstanding witnesses attesting a continuity of the exegetical tradition concerning Avicenna’s *Šifā’* between the period which was defined as the “golden age of Arabic philosophy” (1000-1350 ca.)<sup>59</sup> and that moment of cultural vibrancy for the Ottoman history that is represented by the beginning of the eighteenth century. One should expect a more systematic study of this sort of *marginalia* to be able to cast a new light on the exegetical activity concerning Avicenna’s *Šifā’* throughout the centuries.

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<sup>59</sup> GUTAS, “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 – ca. 1350,” p. 81-97.