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**A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION ON THE PROBLEM OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN HEGEL AND MARX'S PHILOSOPHY**

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RIASSUNTO

UN'INDAGINE CRITICA SUL PROBLEMA DELL'INDIVIDUO NELLA FILOSOFIA DI HEGEL E MARX

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Qual è il posto dell'individuo nella filosofia di Hegel e Marx? Sulla base di questa domanda la tesi presenterà una ricerca approfondita che riguarda l'esistenza etimologica, epistemologica, storica, ontologica, politica ed economica dell'individuo. L'argomento di fondo è stato sviluppato intorno a un'indagine sull'esistenza politica dell'individuo. In effetti, è impossibile considerare l'esistenza dell'individuo al di fuori dei casi succitati. Tramite la determinazione di Hegel e Marx a proposito degli individui e del loro modo di generare la loro esistenza nel campo della politica, si pone necessariamente la seguente domanda: è possibile parlare dell'esistenza dell'individuo nello Stato moderno? Da un lato, Hegel è conosciuto come un filosofo che più di altri parla dell'individuo e comprende gli individui nel suo pensiero; dall'altro, la filosofia sociale di Marx è stata definita come incentrata sulla società ed è stato proposto che non esiste un posto per l'individuo nella sua filosofia. In altri termini, secondo quest'idea, Marx non aveva accennato al tema dell'individuo e si occupava solo delle questioni relative alla comunità, e il progetto politico di Hegel è filosoficamente e talvolta politicamente l'espressione più apprezzata dell'individuo nella sfera politica. Tuttavia, uno degli obiettivi principali di questa tesi è di confutare questo punto di vista. In altre parole, nella tesi saranno presentate le seguenti domande fondamentali: in primo luogo, quando Hegel parla dell'individuo quanto riesce veramente a mettere gli individui nella sfera politica? E' riuscito a realizzare il suo progetto fondato sulla teoria politica, che è stata presentata come incentrata sull'individuo? In secondo luogo, Marx ha veramente ignorato l'individuo? Di conseguenza, il principale argomento di questa tesi è che nella *Filosofia del Diritto* Hegel confuta se stesso, benchè secondo il pensatore l'individuo esista nella sfera politica e realizzi la sua libertà nello Stato; inoltre, contrariamente agli argomenti secondo cui Marx non avrebbe affrontato il problema dell'individuo, nei suoi primi scritti egli ne conduce un'analisi e illustra che l'individuo non è libero come accennato nel contesto della critica economica e politica. In altre parole, l'individuo non è escluso dagli scritti di Marx e perciò egli lo spiega attraverso l'analisi ontologica, politica ed economica. Partendo da questo punto di vista, possiamo concludere che l'affermazione paradossale secondo cui l'individuo esiste nello Stato o nella sfera politica non è altro che un'illusione.

Parole-chiave: individuo, Universale, Stato, Hegel, Marx, Aristotele, relazione, ragione, autocoscienza, sentimento, lavoro, capitalismo, agente politico, illusione, astratto, cosa, immaginario, libertà.

ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION ON THE PROBLEM OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN HEGEL AND MARX'S PHILOSOPHY

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What is the place of the individual in Hegel and Marx's philosophy? Within the scope of this question, the thesis will present an extensive investigation into the etymological, epistemological, historical, ontological, political and economic existence of the individual. Basically, the main subject is formulated around an examination regarding the political existence of the individual. As matter of fact, it is impossible to consider the existence of the individual outside of these above-mentioned cases. By way of the deliberations of these two philosophers about individuals and how these individuals generate their existence in the political sphere, the following question necessarily emerges: is it possible to speak of the existence of the individual in the modern state? While Hegel is known as a philosopher who talks about the individual and includes the individual in his philosophy more than others; Marx's social philosophy has often been defined as society-centered and it has been proposed that there is not any place for the individual in his philosophy. According to this view, Marx did not touch on the issue of the individual and dealt only with issues relating to community while, philosophically and sometimes politically, Hegel's political project is the most successful expression of the individual in the political sphere. However, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to refute this standpoint. To this end, this thesis raises two fundamental questions. First; when Hegel speaks of the individual, how much room in the political sphere does he really give to the individuals? Is his project of developing a political theory, which is allegedly individual-centered, successfully realized? Secondly, did Marx really ignore the individual? Accordingly, the main claim of this thesis is that although Hegel asserts that the individual exists in the political sphere and achieves their freedom within the state, in my view, within *Philosophy of Right* Hegel disproves himself; however, contrary to arguments claiming that Marx did not address the problem of the individual, within the context of his early writings, Marx presents an analysis of the individual and demonstrates by way of an economic and political criticism that the individual is not free as claimed. Starting from this point of view, we can conclude that the claim paradoxically stating that the individual exists in the state or in the political sphere is no more than illusion.

Keywords: Individual, universal, state, society, Hegel, Marx, Aristotle, relation, reason, self-consciousness, feeling, labor, capitalism, political agent, illusion, abstract, thing, imaginary, freedom.

ÖZET

BİREYİN HEGEL VE MARX FELSEFELERİNDEKİ YERİNE DAİR ELEŞTİREL BİR İNCELEME

Doğan, Sevgi

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Bireyin Hegel ve Marx felsefelerindeki yeri nedir? Bu temel soru çerçevesinde şekillenecek olan tez, bireyin etimolojik, epistemolojik, tarihsel, ontolojik, siyasal ve ekonomik varoluşuna dair derin bir araştırmayı sunacaktır. Esasında temel sorunsal bireyin siyasal varoluşuna dair bir sorgulama etrafında şekillenecektir. Doğruyu söylemek gerekirse, bireyin bu varoluşunu az önce bahsedilen durumlardan ayrı düşünmek imkânsızdır. Bu iki filozofun bireye ve onun siyasal alanda kendini nasıl var edebildiğine dair saptamaları üzerinden “bireyin modern devletteki yerinden bahsetmek olanaklı mıdır” sorusu ister istemez ortaya çıkacaktır. Bir yanda Hegel, bireyden en çok bahseden ve felsefesinde de bireye en çok yer veren filozoflardan biri olarak bilinirken, diğer yandan Marx’ın sosyal felsefesi toplum merkezli olarak tanımlı bırakılmış ve bireyin onun felsefesinde yeri olmadığı görüşü ortaya atılmıştır. Yani bu anlayışa göre Marx birey meselesine değinmemiş ve sadece topluma dair meselelerle uğraşmış; Hegel’in siyasal projesi ise felsefi olarak ve bazen politik olarak bireyin politik alandaki en başarılı anlatımı olmuştur. Ancak bu tezin temel amaçlarından biri de bu kanıyı çürütmek olacaktır. Bu amaçla iki temel soru ortaya atılacaktır; (1) Hegel bahsedildiği gibi bireyden söz ederken onu gerçekten siyasal arenaya ne kadar sokar; birey merkezli görünen siyasal teorisine dair projesini başarıyla gerçekleştirmiş midir? (2) Marx bireyi gerçekten görmezden mi gelmiştir? Dolayısıyla, bu tezin asıl savı, Hegel, her ne kadar bireyi siyasal alanda var ettiğini ve bireyin özgürlüğünü devlette kazandığını iddia etse de, *Hukuk Felsefesi* içerisinde kendi kendini çürütmektedir; Marx ise öne sürülen görüşlerin aksine genç dönemine ait çalışmalarında bireyin bir analizini sunmakta ve bireyin bahsedildiği gibi özgür olmadığını bizlere ekonomik ve siyasal eleştiri etrafında göstermektedir. Yani birey Marx’ın felsefesinden dışlanmış değildir, Marx’ın ontolojik, siyasal ve ekonomik analizleri bunu göstermektedir. Buradan yola çıkarak şu sonuca varabiliriz, paradoksal olarak bireye devlette ya da siyasal alanda önemli bir yer verdiğini öne süren siyasi kuramlar bize illüzyondan başka bir şey sunmamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birey, evrensel, devlet, toplum, Hegel, Marx, Aristoteles, ilişki, akıl, öz-bilinç, duygu, emek, kapitalizm, siyasal özne (aktör), illüzyon, soyut, şey, hayali, özgürlük.

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...To my Father and my Mother...

To Gezi Resisters!

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Is it possible to speak of the individual in the modern state? Whether one answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to this question, other more fundamental questions arise: if ‘yes,’ then ‘how is it possible?’ If ‘no,’ then ‘why is it not possible?’ These questions, in turn, lead to one further question, and the central question of this research project: ‘why is the individual *speechless* in the modern (capitalist) state—a state which, paradoxically, assumes that the individual and their freedom are ensured and advanced by capitalism, and which derives its own existence from the freedom of the individual?’ The central concept of the thesis, the individual as an existing subject, pertains to these questions.

Coming from a country that has a substantial history, connects two continents (Asia and Europe), and has thereby hosted many different cultures, religions, and ethnic groups, many of which still continue to coexist on the same territory leads me to reflect on *diversity*, hence *similarity* and *dissimilarity*, *homogeneity* and *heterogeneity*, *the individual and the universal*. The struggle between two different ethnic groups—Turkish and Kurdish—which has continued for decades and continues to exist at the present time induces me to question the meaning of freedom, individual rights, particularly, the right to a voice in political life, and the existence of the individual in the modern state. In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel points out that “man must be accounted a universal being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, or Italian, but because he is a man.”¹ Prompted by this statement and a concern with regard to the exclusion of the individual from political life, I aim to examine the concept of the individual with a special focus on its relation to the modern state. It is the starting point of this present thesis. I begin with feeling, with heart. I begin not with pure reason. I begin with insights, which are mine.

The fundamental question is how it is possible to retain dissimilarity within similarity, heterogeneity within homogeneity. This chief question is related to the problem of the relation between the individual and the universal. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that the individual as a being

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, § 209, p.109

different from their fellows, that is, as dissimilar, can exist in a condition of homogeneity or in a condition that relies on similarity. The essential and more difficult question to respond to is how it is possible to combine these two—homogeneity and heterogeneity—as one unity, like the individual and the universal in one composition. In fact, this is a question that underlies many philosophical problems. The political and economic realization of the individual, the conflict between general and private interest, are also related to this problem.

It is my conviction that nowadays we need to analyze, criticize and thus to *re-identify*, and *re-define* all concepts, without exception, in relation to Marx's own definitions. We need to re-identify and redefine all concepts because the capitalist system changes every day, maybe every hour, and thus continuously transforms itself without our awareness. As their bases and reference points thus keep changing, all our concepts need constant revision and analysis. Further, as we will also see throughout the present work, all these concepts from the simplest to the more complicated (from our basic feeling of “love” to the concept of “capital”, “money”, “market”, “nature”, “society”, etc., as well as the concept of “individual”) are abstract, so to speak; they are not concrete because of the fact that all these concepts have lost their proper relationships and reference points. For this reason, we have to search out their true relationships. The task is to reconsider what the truth is! In order to achieve this, we have to demonstrate that the appearance, which we supposed to be the truth, is not real. With these remarks, I am trying to indicate the possibility of an interpretation of the concept of the individual through Marx's critical method.²

It is important to note that, even though socialist circles specifically emphasize the importance of the economy in Marx's analyses, Marx also ascribes great importance to the workers' struggle in the political sphere. In other words, the existence of the individual should be sought for in the sphere of politics as well as economics. It is a great mistake, when talking about economy, to forget the importance of politics. As a matter of fact, the distinction between the sphere of politics and that of economics is a modern distinction and one that Marx criticizes in his early writings such as *On the Jewish Question*. The modern state leaves people alone and abandons them to their fate. In modern society, the individual does not find themselves as a person, the way they did in former societies, through and within the common spirit of society, but along with the development of division of labor, they find themselves within their objectified relation to divided labor. However, this self-discovery is a lonely discovery that the person has to do by themselves.

Such a discovery, that is, the self-realization and self-discovery of the individual, is not treated by philosophy only; it is the subject of contemporary literature as well. In *Marx's Theory of Alienation*,

² This paragraph was presented at Telos in Europe: The L'Aquila Conference, held on September 7-9, 2012, in L'Aquila, Italy.

István Mészáros points out that the problem of individual freedom has received greater attention by philosophers from the seventeenth century onwards;³ to this should be added the concern of contemporary literature with the exploration of the individual as well, especially in relation to the concept of alienation. Furthermore, it is not only philosophy and literature that are interested in individual existence and individual freedom; psychology as a new *so-called* human science has also come to the fore during the nineteenth century. As Collin Morris states in his book *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, the exploration of the individual in Western literature can be found in the form of biographies and autobiographies as well as novels. In this respect, Morris also differentiates Greek tragedy from Western tragedy. Greek tragedy was a drama of circumstances while Western tragedy is a drama of person or character.⁴

The argument of this dissertation is inspired by the actual problem of the individual in the modern state. The thesis claims that although the individual, with its economic, social and political rights, is presented as one of the founding blocks of the modern political institution, the individual does not exist—or is not considered—as a *political agent*. It exists only as *consumer* both *for* himself and *for* another (*capitalist*) and as a *producer for another (capitalist)* but not as a *creator for* himself. Marx talks about the production and consumption dialectic in relation to this matter in the “Introduction” to *Grundrisse* (1858, published 1939). In an effort to show how this dialectic reveals the difference between Marx’s and Hegel’s philosophical perspectives on individual existence, a detailed survey of some of Marx’s well-known, early writings is presented here.⁵

Secondly, this thesis shows the view that Marx does not discuss the concept of the individual as Hegel does to be mistaken. Both Hegel and Marx address the issue of the individual albeit in different manners. In this respect, I do not accept the prevalent view that Marx does not address the problem of the individual. On the other hand, Marx’s treatment of the individual is not identical with Hegel’s approach. The analysis and survey of Hegel’s philosophy shall demonstrate that while Hegel attempts to unify the individual with the universal and find the unification of the individual and the state in political action, strictly speaking, the individuals are step by step reduced to an instrument and excluded from the political sphere. In other words, Hegel’s attempt fails, as we will see through the second and third chapters.

³ István Mészáros, *Marx’s Theory of Alienation*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1970, p. 255

⁴ For further information look: Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1972, p.4

⁵ This paragraph was presented at Telos in Europe: The L’Aquila Conference, held on September 7-9, 2012, in L’Aquila, Italy.

Both Hegel and Marx give importance to *self-determination* as an essential aspect of the existence of the individual in political life. This is significant for the modern comprehension of the individual since the concept of the individual in modern times is only an illusion, which dictates or conceals *existence-without-self-consciousness*. Moreover, the individual does not exist in society only as a person and as a social, moral, or ethical entity, or in the economic sphere as an economic entity. As Hegel and Marx articulate in different places within their works, the individual also actualizes themselves as a political (animal) agent—an idea which originates from Aristotle, who defined the human being as a political-being. For this reason, the third claim of this dissertation is that the individual becomes the real individual when they are able to take their voice back as a political agent. This framework leads us to brood over the term “human agent.”

If and when every single individual could represent themselves, representatives would be *needless*. In my view, it is forgotten that the human being is not just a species being, or a universal being, or a social being subsisting in a community, but they are at the same time a *human agent*. What does it mean to call the human being an “agent”? The etymological analysis of the word ‘agent’ indicates its origin coming from Latin *agens*, present participle of *agere* which means “to drive, lead, conduct, manage, perform, and do.”⁶ Put differently, the term ‘agent’ refers to an actor, factor, or functionary; that is, it implies a person, or an individual, or an entity that has capacity to choose, act and carry out their choices in the world. Shortly, the individual as a human agent always means “a subject in action.”

It should be questioned why the individual is not considered as having the capability of acting and making decisions by their choices in the modern period. There is not any decision made by the individuals in any sphere, either political or economic, which constitutes society, but it is common to talk about individuals as decision-makers within a *concealed abstraction*. This problem is related to “freedom” itself. To proclaim that the individuals are free, that they are thereby able to do what they prefer or intend to do without damaging society or *others with whom they are interrelated*, implies that the individual has the right to demand change and challenge the problems in a community. Therefore the concept of the individual should be materialized—embodied—in concrete, definitive, determinable, visible actions or states.

In the modern period, the concept of the individual could be linked to the term ‘*crisis*.’ The crisis between the individual and others—whether they be states, or other single individuals—arises from lack of freedom which is *strictly* related to economy and politics. The freedom that the modern world or, to put it clearly, the capitalist system, proclaims that you have does not actually exist in the practical sense but only theoretically. This freedom is much like that of the *Stoics*’. As Hegel states in

⁶ [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_\(grammar\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent_(grammar))

the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we can speak of two different types of freedom: (1) freedom resting on thought and (2) living freedom. In light of this distinction, capitalism must be defined as a *stoical system*.

An adequate examination of the crisis of the individual and its lack of freedom in the modern period requires some deeper and more systematic questions to be answered. One of these questions is how the concept of the individual developed. The other is the relation of the existence of the individual to politics.

To address the first question, I will first examine the historical development of the concept of the individual. I begin by taking a glance at the history of primitive societies. Morris highlights the identity that an individual finds through a people or a community in primitive societies. “In primitive societies the training of the child is usually directed to his learning the traditions of the tribe, so that he may find his identity, not in anything peculiar to himself, but in the common mind of his people.”⁷

The identity and the existence of the primitive human being are dependent on the existence of its community and the common mind of the people in that community. Primitive human being finds their identity through integration with the tradition and the common mind of the people. Colin Morris finds similarity between primitive societies and some Eastern societies. However, he separates Eastern societies from the Western comprehension of the individual.⁸

The Eastern tradition excludes the individuality or the individual in the Western sense from their belief and community because the Eastern tradition believes that they come into existence in another form after their death. The more interesting thing in the Eastern and Asiatic tradition is that each person is a sort of manifestation of life within themselves. For this reason, they are not separated from life and other human beings and they manifest the common experience of humanity. In the Western tradition, on the other hand, the individual does not express the common mind of the people. Individuals in the Western world are separated not only from life itself but also from other human beings and from their community. They relate to community only because of their basic needs, not for tradition, culture or a common spirit.

The Asiatic and Eastern tradition is also appraised in terms of personality, for example, by Ernst Cassirer in his work called the *Myth of the State*, in which he considers the Eastern religions—Confucianism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism—as impersonal. Cassirer also asserts that in primitive societies, the individuals identified themselves “with the life of community and with the life of

⁷ Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1972, p.1.

⁸ *Ibid*, Morris, *The Discovery.*, p.2

nature.”⁹ However, this was not the same in Greek philosophy. Philosophy in Ancient Greece was based on ‘logos’ and self-knowledge of the individual. The Sophists’ understanding of the human being as having a central position in the world played an important role in considering the human being as an individual. Nevertheless, the individual was not conceived as isolated from its society either. “The soul of the individual is bound up with the social nature; we cannot separate the one from the other. Private and public life are interdependent. If the latter is wicked and corrupt, the former cannot develop and cannot reach its end.”¹⁰ In this sense, the primitive consideration of the human being within community continues to exist in Greek philosophy but with more emphasis on the existence of the individual.

Therefore, in Chapter II, I will also pay close attention to identifying the specific use of the term in Greek philosophy, particularly in some of Aristotle’s works such as *Metaphysics*, *Categories* and *Politics*. Then I will shortly analyze the concept of the individual in the medieval period.

Having described the development of the concept of the individual in the history of philosophy, I will move on to my other question concerning the relation of the existence of the individual to politics. To give a systematic account of the major aspects of the problem of the individual in the modern political state, in Chapter III, I will examine the concept of the individual in the philosophy of Hegel. I focus on Hegel for two reasons. First, I believe that Hegel provides a most systematic framework in which the existence of the individual can be examined in relation to the universal as well as in relation to politics, society, and economy. Secondly, a comprehension of Hegel’s understanding of the individual is necessary for a discussion of Marx’s position on the subject. It is commonly held that the individual is a fundamental feature of the modern political state while it is not the main concern of Marx’s philosophy. In contrast, I will argue that the individual does not exist in the modern political sphere and this is one of Marx’s main criticisms of the modern state. It is generally believed that it is difficult to find the discussion of the individual explicitly in Marx’s philosophy. To counter these arguments, one must take a closer look at Marx’s critique of Hegel. Therefore, Chapter IV is devoted to Marx’s critique of Hegel. While Hegel speaks of the concept of the individual more than Marx does, Marx’s critique of Hegel reveals that he is motivated by a similar concern with the individual and aims at strengthening the existence of the individual in relation to politics, society and economy.

Prima facie, it seems that Hegel was much more aware of the problem of the existence of the individual in society and in particular in the state. On that account, I would like to focus on that problem in the context of Hegel’s approach to the subject-matter. To this end, in Chapter III, I will examine and analyze the concept of the individual through a close analysis of some of his texts. I will

⁹ Ernst Cassirer, *Myth of the State*, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1946, p.45

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Cassirer, *Myth of the State*, p. 73

particularly focus on the *Philosophy of Right* in an attempt to explore the relation of the individual to the state and other human beings in society. I will also emphasize the relation of the individual to the terms ‘reason’ and ‘feeling’ in his *Philosophy of History*. In addition, the *Encyclopedia* and *Science of Logic* are used as the main reference sources for the comprehension of some of his philosophical concepts.

Hegel’s attempt while forming his theory of the state is similar to Plato’s in that they both try to describe an ideal state. According to Hegel, Plato could not achieve this without harming free individuality (personality). Hegel makes an effort to discover the reconciliation of free personality with the “ethical world” (the highest stage of which is the State). In many of his books like the *Philosophy of History* as well as the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel relates freedom to thought. Human beings are the only free beings because they alone are conscious of their act of thinking. Consciousness, therefore, produces or creates freedom. Due to consciousness, the individual recognizes themselves as a unique being pertaining to the universal. The individual thus finds their ultimate realization, that is, their realization with the universal, within the state, as completeness.

It should be pointed out that there is not any possibility to experience ‘*pure freedom*’, that is, freedom *in itself*. Of course, it is possible to discuss it theoretically, but practically it is difficult to comprehend. It could be said that we intuitively know and experience pure freedom. But according to Hegel, this is empty freedom. Put in another way, it is almost impossible to experience pure freedom while the individual is surrounded by various deployments and manifestations of power, as Foucault asserts. Accordingly, while the term freedom is discussed, the individual should be considered as a finite or limited being, not merely in the biological sense but also in the sociological sense.

In that respect, Hegel is right to differentiate *negative* freedom from *positive* freedom. He cites this distinction in *The Philosophy of Right*. Negative freedom is that “we have the limitless infinitude of absolute abstraction, or universality, the pure thought of itself.”¹¹ Here, the will refuses all determination; it abstracts itself from all contents and definitions.¹²

As Hegel affirms, even though the concept of negative freedom is put forward as if it is intended to be experienced equally and universally, it is meant to remain in thinking only because any positive determination would limit it. Therefore, negative freedom relates to *inner being*, nothing more. However, positive freedom characterizes the reconciliation and unity of universality and particularity in individuality.

¹¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans: S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Mineola, New York, 2005, §5, p. xxxi

¹² *Ibid*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §5: Note, p. xxxii

A close analysis of Hegel's texts regarding the concept of the individual enables us to clarify two points. First, it enables us to answer our question about whether the individual exists as a political agent in Hegel's philosophy. Second, it enables us to clarify the comprehension and identify the existence of the individual in the modern world. In the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel claims that he explains the existing state (present state) but while he explains the existing state, he theorizes and idealizes it. He defends the modern state by way of idealizing it. In this manner, we can progress to the existence of the individual in Marx's philosophy, which will be examined in our fourth chapter.

The fourth chapter on Marx is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will introduce the concept of the individual within the framework of the ontological existence of the individual in Marx's early writings such as *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. Marx approaches the individual as a person by underlining the concept of 'alienation.' He describes the individual as alienated from their product, from the labor process, from their society, species and thus alien to themselves. In his book *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx argues that "Hegel hypostatizes abstractions and then reinterprets the world as the realization of those hypostases."¹³

In an effort to grasp the method of Marx and to comprehend his critique I will also deal with the texts of Feuerbach since they have had significant influence on Marx. Marx expresses his admiration of Feuerbach in one of his letters to Feuerbach as follows: "your *Philosophie der Zukunft*, and your *Wesen des Glaubens*, in spite of their small size, are certainly of greater weight than the whole contemporary German literature put together."¹⁴ In his letter to Hegel¹⁵, Feuerbach presents his critique of Hegel's idea of the universal by asserting the significance of the sensuous and the apparent. He says: "I am aware that the ideas engendered or awakened in me by you and expressed in your philosophy do not obtain on high in the universal sphere, beyond the sensuous and the apparent, but continue to act in me creatively." This claim denotes the materialistic aspects of Feuerbach. In this context, Feuerbach strictly criticizes the understanding of the latest philosophy talking about the spirit, world spirit, or the spirit of world history. This spirit resides in activities as beyond these activities. It is the kingdom of idea or thought. Here it is clear that Feuerbach is opposed to Hegel's idealism. In addition to this point, Feuerbach also speaks of his understanding of humanity. He says, "it is a question of overthrowing from its throne the ego, the self in general, which, especially since the

¹³ Andy Denis, *Organism in the early Marx: Marx and Hegel on the State as an Organism*, Version:3, October 2006

¹⁴ Marx to Ludwig Feuerbach, in Bruckberg, Paris, August 11, 1844

¹⁵ Letter to Hegel, Ludwig Feuerbach 22 November 1828

beginning of Christianity, had dominated the world, which has conceived itself as the only spirit to exist.”¹⁶

In the second part, the political existence of the individual will be taken up. This second part is divided into two sections. The first section of the second part is focused on Marx’s article called *On the Jewish Question* [1843]. In this article, Marx discusses the reality of the political state concerning its relationship to the existence of the individual and civil society.

The second section of the second part is on another early writing of Marx, namely, *the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. In *the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx makes the same criticism of hypostatization against Hegel’s understanding of the state. In this section, I also focus directly on the *Philosophy of Right* in order to clarify and explore Marx’s critiques. Marx points out that Hegel’s state is an abstraction and the individual in this abstract state is regarded as a means in order to realize the universal. Because of this abstraction, Hegel severs the state from the community thereby granting the highest level to the state. Accordingly, it seems that there is a hierarchy in Hegel’s theory of the state, and as a result, Marx argues that there is a separation between the individual, the community and the state.

Marx demonstrates another side of this problem in light of economy, which is difficult to find in Hegel’s philosophy, even in the *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel tries to demonstrate that the state is this unity of the particular and the universal. It is difficult to consider a state, particularly as the compromise of the individual and the universal, without the individual. Hegel repeatedly and insistently argues that the individual materializes their complete existence within and through a national community and their participation or activity in political life. For Hegel, civil society is not adequate in order to actualize the complete spirit development of human being. On the other hand, without Marx it is difficult to understand why the existence of the individual is problematic in the modern political state. In other words, without an examination that takes into account economic perspectives, it is not possible to comprehend adequately what alienates and separates the individual from political participation. In short, while Hegel talks about the ontological existence of the individual in a philosophical context, Marx emphasizes its ontological existence from an economic perspective. For this reason, both philosophers will be our *pathfinders* in searching for the answers to our questions.

The method that I use throughout the dissertation is to analyze the texts of Marx and those of Hegel almost paragraph by paragraph. When we take a glance at every chapter, it seems that every chapter

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach’s letter to Hegel

has its independence. On the one hand, every chapter is independent in itself; on the other hand, all chapters are interrelated.

For both Hegel and Marx, the question is how it is possible for the individual to ‘*feel at home*.’ The conflicts between the individual and society have always been treated as the subject matter of political philosophy. It is still a considerably up-to-date question. As Sean Sayers says, modern society is characterized with the concept of the individual. This is a good reason to research this concept through Marx and Hegel whose philosophies are still close to our times.

The reason why these philosophers are preferable is that their different—idealist and materialist—perspectives yield certain and explicit responses to our questions. No later thinkers, even though they think and talk about this problem, could come up with an adequate suggestion like them. For example, Foucault or post-Marxists such as Mouffe and Laclau engage in analyses of the subject and of subjectivity and discuss the determination of discourses in social relations. Actually, the issue of which they speak is the subject with multiple identities determined within society. In this respect, according to Mouffe, the subjectivity of one person is not determined only by his condition in the relations of production. Every social agent is the focus of many subject positions.¹⁷ For example, as a woman, I can be both a worker and a very religious Muslim, or both a very religious Muslim housewife and a worker, or in addition to being a religious housewife, mother, and worker—I could identify myself as a Turkish Muslim and ethnic Kurd. The multiple subject state of every individual corresponds both to different social relations in which the individual is embedded and to the discourses that constitute these relations.¹⁸

This somewhat nebulous condition arose from the chaos after the Second World War. The situation of heterogeneity is homogenized by making one of the subject identities more apparent, depending on the circumstances. For example, I take my place among one of these very identities, for instance, in the feminist sphere as a woman, or in the ecological movement as an environmentalist, or with my fellow Muslims in a religious community. Post-Marxists believe that these multiple struggles lead the democratic struggle to become more widespread and stronger.

In this respect, against the idea of classical Marxism that reduces the subject to just a single determination, namely, to their class, Mouffe, a post-Marxist, emphasizes the condition of the multiple subject and its multiple struggles. Instead of class antagonism, she points out the democracy of aggressive pluralism in which all struggles are co-involved. However, the problem emerges at the

¹⁷ Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy”, translated by Stanley Gray, in *the Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited and with introduction by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1988, p.90

¹⁸ *Ibid*, Mouffe, pp. 89-102

point of taking part in as struggle. These struggles separate from one another by the acceptance of different identities. This is in reality to the advantage of capitalism in recognizing its enemy very well and thus it strengthens its struggle against its enemy.

The main question is that, even if modern states claim that every individual is guaranteed the right to free speech (namely, a voice in the political arena through different political means such as democracy), is it really still possible for the individual to realize its existence in modern political forms by means of its own self-respect? Through modern constitutions, their institutions, and through the rights of the individual in the modern understanding, is it possible to speak of the existence of the individual? In other words, does the constitutional citizenship sustain the existence of the individual in and for itself, or does it in fact negate the existence of the individual? The individual in modern society finds himself in a virtual prison. He can do anything he wants but not really with his self-determination.

CHAPTER II

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE *INDIVIDUAL*

In this second chapter, I would like to demonstrate the concept of the individual by means of an analysis of its etymology and research into the historical background of the concept. For this aim, I shall concentrate on its lexical meaning and then I will deal with the comprehension of the individual, in particular, in ancient Greek. To this end, I focus on Aristotle's approach to the concept of the individual. I then proceed with a short analysis of the medieval period. Even if the ancient thinkers did not explicitly concentrate on the problem of the individual, it seems to me that they did not completely subsume, as is usually believed, the existence of the individual under the universal or the political state either. In the first place, they considered or discussed the good life for human beings and tried to define and analyze the best political structure in light of this perspective. Their fundamental object was the good life. Of course, Plato's discussion of justice and right in the first book of the *Republic*, for example, is far from being individualistic. However, in my view, when Ancient Greeks discuss the best political structure for human beings, they do not ignore the existence of the individual. They sought for the best political structure because it provided the best life for human beings; they did not consider the political structure above and beyond the individual. This was the case for both Plato and Aristotle. It can be said that the ancient Greek world tries to find the balance between the well-being of the individual and the common good.

2.1. Etymological and lexical analysis

In his book *Myth of the State*, Ernest Cassirer says that before trying to understand how a myth *works* one must know what it *is*.¹⁹ Starting from this point of view, we shall begin with an etymological examination of the term 'individual.' First I shall present its lexical meaning. Extant dictionary definitions direct us to the concept of the particular as opposed to the universal. For example, the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* identifies this term with the concept of the particular. It

¹⁹ Ernest Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, A Doubleday Anchor Book, 1955, p.2

expresses that one of the distinctive features of particulars is that they cannot be at more than one place at a time whereas

“universals are capable of being wholly present in more than one place at a given time...Since a particular is not instantiated by another thing, it is sometimes said to exist ‘in itself’, whereas universals exist ‘in’ something else. For this reason, the term ‘particular’ is related to the term ‘substance’ which is traditionally used to mean something capable of independent existence.”²⁰

It was Aristotle who most famously conveyed the common sense intuition that substance must be “a particular *this*” because particulars can exist in themselves whereas the universal is always predicated of something.²¹

The *Latin dictionary of Lewis*²² and *Oxford Latin Dictionary of Glare*, on the other hand, define the notion of the individual by focusing on its “atomic” character:

Latin Dictionary: “*in-dividuus*, [in-*divido*] I) not divided, indivisible (class): arbores, with stems not branched. *Individuum*: an atom, indivisible particle. II) Inseparable, not separated (post. Aug.)”

Oxford Dictionary: “*individuus*~a~um[in+dividvvs] I) incapable of being divided, indivisible.~um: corpus (principium) an atom (in the atomic theory of Democritus); ~um: alone. II) That cannot be parted, inseparable. III) Not divided or forked; not shared. Equal, impartial.”

As we see, the term is composed of “in” and “dividual” (divided, shared). In Latin (as in English) “in”, gives the negative meaning to a concept.

The Oxford Dictionary defines the word as:

“(LL. *Individualis*; L. *individuus*, indivisible, inseparable; *in-* priv., and *dividuus*, divisible, from *dividere*, to divide.)²³ adj. 1. One in substance or essence; forming a divisible entity; indivisible. 2. That cannot be separated; inseparable. 3. a. Existing as a separate indivisible entity; numerically one, single. b. Single, as

²⁰ *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, general editor: Edward Craig, Routledge: London and New York, 1998, (235-238)

²¹ In the *Categories* Aristotle explains the universal as a predication of something. He writes that “(1^b12-15) man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; so animal will be predicated of the individual man also—for the individual man is both a man and an animal.” It might be said that universal, for example, animal or man as species, is predicated of the individual man. (Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, translated with notes and Glossary by J. L. Ackrill, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1975, p.4)

²² Charlton T. Lewis; Charles Short [1879], *A Latin Dictionary; Founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin dictionary* (Trustees of Tufts University, Oxford)

²³ *Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language*, second edition, the World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York, 1963, p.932

distinct from others of the same kind; particular, special. c. Expressing self-identity: Identical, self-same, very same. 4. Distinguished from others by attributes of its own; marked by a peculiar and striking character.”²⁴

The definitions above give the meanings of ‘individual’ as an adjective. As a noun, on the other hand, ‘individual’ means;

“1. a single being, or things of any kind; a single group when taken as a unit. 2. a person.”²⁵ “1. Inseparable things. 2. a. A single object or thing, or a group of things forming a single complex idea, and regarded as a unit; a single member of a natural class, collective group, or number. b. *Logic* and *Metaph.* An object which is determined by properties peculiar to itself and cannot be subdivided into others of the same kind; *spec.* in *Logic*: An object included in a species, as a species is in a genus. 3. a. A single human being, as posed to Society, the Family, etc. b. Without any notion of contrast or relation to a class or group: A human being, a person.”²⁶

In Latin, ‘individual’ is called ‘*individuus*’ which means ‘indivisible.’ In common language, it indicates an indivisible, independent being with its proper form. As we see, the Latin word ‘*individuus*’ has the same meaning as particulars which could have their own properties distinguished from those of other particulars. Etymologically, the term has the same meaning as ‘*atomo*’ and the term ‘*individuus*’ is distinguished from ‘individual’ (lat. *Individuum*) that is the non-divided, the unique or the one. In his article “The Individuals in Aristotle,” Micheal Frede explains that there is a difference between the two terms because while the term “individual” can be a property, *atomo* cannot. For example, one can said “individual animal” or “individual person”, but this is not the case for *atomo*. Micheal Frede gives an explanation regarding Aristotle’s statement in *Categories* (1^b6-7).²⁷

²⁴ *The Oxford English Dictionary*, second edition, prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, Volume VII, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989, p. 879

²⁵ *Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language*, second edition, the World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York, 1963, pp.932-933

²⁶ *The Oxford English Dictionary*, second edition, prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, Volume VII, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989, pp. 879-880.

²⁷ “(1^b3-4) some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the individual man or individual horse—for nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject.” (Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, translated with notes and Glossary by J. L. Ackrill, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1975, p.4) Here Aristotle emphasizes the differentiation between the universal and the particular. While the particular does not make up complete whole, universal makes up the complete whole, or one species corresponds to complete whole. (Ammonius, *On Aristotle’s Categories*, translated by S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews, Cornell University Press, 1991, p-39) “(1^b6-7) Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not

Aristotle explains the term ‘individual’ as “that which is one in number.” If there is more than one thing, then we can speak of them as one species or kind.

As we see from this description of the concept of the individual, it refers to ‘inseparable things,’ ‘a single being or human being,’ ‘a person,’ ‘a single member of a natural class,’ etc. For our purpose, which is to analyze the individual human being as a member of a political society, this means that the individual is unique and a single person. Here a question naturally follows: what makes this individual single or unique? I will argue that what makes one single individual different from other individuals is a *relation* but this relation is not only with the family, society and culture in which the individuals are embedded, but also with themselves in their self-realization, or self-affirmation by way of embodying themselves in their works such as craft, philosophy, art, and so on. Also what differentiates one particular individual from other particular individuals are the “feelings” or “sensations”, “desires”, “inclinations”, etc., that they have.

The third description of the concept of the individual refers to ‘a single human being as opposed to Society, the Family.’²⁸ In this context, the purpose of this study is to make an analysis of the individual as “a single human being as opposed to society, family” and the state. In other words, we will present the individual as a person, as a concrete human being.

In the German dictionary concerning philosophical concepts, *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe*, the term ‘individual’ is defined at three levels: the metaphysical individual (*Metaphysische Individuen*), the empirical individual (*Empirisches Individuum*) and lastly the human individual (*die Menschlichen Individuen*). In its metaphysical sense, the individual is a being, which, in itself, has a separate existence as a being distinct from another. The empirical individual is determined as independent (self-employed), spatial, temporal, causal, oneness (unity, *Einheit*). The human individual is in constant interaction with the population (*die Gesamtheit*) from which the individuals first differentiate themselves. According to this sociological definition, the individual (especially the “great” individuals) emerge by way of reacting to their society. In other words, the individual is not older than society (*Gesellschaft*), the individual is formed only in society. Nevertheless, the individual has an initial core that is not socially but psychologically and metaphysically conditioned.²⁹

said of any, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject—the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject.” (Aristotle, *Categories*, trans: J. L. Ackrill p. 4)

²⁸ *The Oxford English Dictionary*, second edition, prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, Volume VII, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989, pp. 879-880.

²⁹ *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe*, Historisch-Quellenmäßig, edited by Dr. Rudolf Eisler, Berlin, 1910, p.568

Having surveyed various dictionary definitions, the first aim of this chapter is to analyze how the concept of the individual comes to exist. For example, the treatment of the term ‘individual’ in Ancient Greece is different from its treatment in western European understanding. In Ancient Greece, the *polis* or city-state is considered prior to the individual. Besides, in primitive societies and tribes, it is not unusual to talk about a “common mind”³⁰ so that the person can find their identity through their society or community, that is, through this common mind. However, in medieval times, the existence of the individual acquires importance because of the religious belief, Christianity. In this context, the western man is defined within ‘inwardness.’ Self-awareness becomes a basic concept.³¹ In *Tribe, State and Community: Contemporary Government and Justice*, Charlotte Waterlow exposes this development from tribal communities to the modern state with its constitution and government. Waterlow states that modern civilization is based on “the idea of the importance of the individual as a unique creative person.” Then she adds, “this idea is not, of course, in itself new. It has been embodied in all the great religions, and affirmed by many saints and sages.” Waterlow claims that the new thing in this idea is that the individual finds its expression in social and political institutions. It signifies that within modern society and through modern civilization, the individual obtains importance and significance as “a unique creative person.”³² However, in my view, it remains “particular” because of the fact that it obtains its political significance in political institutions. In other words, *it is institutionalized*. The existence of the individual simply depends on social and political institutions.

2.2. A Historical Overview of the concept of the *individual*

2.2.1. The concept of the individual in Greeks

It is quite easy to say that the origin of the word ‘individual’ is a Greek word. *In-dividuum* in Greek tradition does mean “*atomo*” [“ἄ-τομος”—*átomos* (from α-, “un”- + τέμνω - *temno*, “to cut”)]. This word is used in the sense of ‘individual’ or ‘individual thing.’ As mentioned above, the term, in this sense, is firstly introduced by Aristotle in *Categories*.³³ Therefore it signifies something un-divided and one in itself.³⁴ In Greek philosophy, the concept that comes nearest to the meaning of the individual can be found firstly in Democritus’ philosophy in regard to the term ‘*atom*.’ The word ‘individual’ was close to terms such as *individuum*, *individualis*, and *singularis* which were related or

³⁰ Charlotte Waterlow, *Tribe, State and Community: Contemporary Government and Justice*, Methuen & Co Ltd., 1967, pp.1-2

³¹ For the further explanation the book by Charlotte Waterlow, *Tribe, State and Community: Contemporary Government and Justice*, can be considered as an elaborated work concerning the development of the modern political state.

³² Charlotte Waterlow, *Tribe, State and Community*, 1967, p.4

³³ Michael Frede, ‘Individuals in Aristotle’, in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.50

³⁴ *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, centro di studi filosofici di gallarate, istituto per la collaborazione cultural, venezia-roma.

belonged to *logical relations* rather than the concept of human or human relations.³⁵ However, logic is not as divorced from human relations as is often supposed. Research concerning logic aims to represent the use of categories in humans' experiences. For example, the relation between the universal and the particular arises because of the need for explaining and understanding the relation of the individual object with a more general class. "A central problem of medieval philosophy was the relation of the individual object (*unum singulare*) with the general or universal class to which it belonged, and humanity was often taken as a test case in this argument."³⁶

In Plato's ontology, the individual does not hold any value because it cannot be an object of science. For Plato, the individual is inferior to the idea or the universal. On the other hand, Aristotle ontologically considers the individual as the primary substance. Also for him, the term 'individual' signifies something indivisible.

Research into how the individual was treated or what the place of the individual in the Greek world is reveals that it had the distinguishing feature embedded in Greek culture which gave some "rights" (such as free communication and the criticism of some issues) to the individual citizen "long before the notion of democracy had been conceived."³⁷

In Greek history, the individual began making their appearance through expressing themselves in art, in poetry and in thought. In the fifth and sixth centuries B.C, there began to appear individuals who were concerned about expressing their originality and individuality through their products. The originality signifies that, for example, the sculptor had an idea that was unknown and never expressed before. "The individuality was not usually that of the subject, in the sense of producing the recognizable appearance of some individual, real or imaginary; it was that of themselves as creators."³⁸ These individuals wanted to be recognized as the creator of their products. "One sign of this is their wish to have their statues recognized as having been produced by no one else."³⁹ To this end, they began to inscribe their statues with their own name instead of the dedicatee of the statues.

The Athenian Greeks also began demanding the right to democratic participation in the political affairs of the state and claiming responsibility for their participation. In late sixth century Athens, democracy had placated itself in Athens life. The basic understanding of Greek democracy was based on the idea

³⁵ Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1972, p.64 (In this book, Colin Morris examined the concept of the individuality by way of literary, historical and theological, as well as artistic sources. In so doing, Morris elaborates and discovers the individual in terms of its spiritual and intellectual dynamic in the twelfth century.)

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual.*, p.64

³⁷ Anthony M. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment*, JM Dent & Sons Ltd, London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1980, 160-161

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece.*, p.181

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece.*, p.181

of 'isonomia' (equal right for all). Cleisthenes of Athens (570-508) who was the statesman regarded as the founder of democracy in Athens based all his reforms on the idea of 'isonomia.' However, it is important to notice that in Greece, not every individual participated in politics. Some Greeks directly participated in politics while others more or less consciously followed the political issue that had been presented to them.⁴⁰

In *Individual and Community: the rise of the polis 800-500 B.C.*, Chester Starr describes the individuals as agents who have the ability to make historical change. In this period, the Greeks created their great political achievement: the *city-state* or *polis*. The city-states were independent cities. They controlled a limited amount of territory surrounding the state. This period in which the city-states developed is called the Archaic Period. During this time, these city-states were in close interaction with each other and thus they certainly learned political organization from one another. However, each state developed their culture and political organization differently, therefore uniquely. Each state had independence.

City-states firstly started as monarchies. At the beginning, they were ruled by the hereditary king, or *basileus*. In the Homeric world, the leader was called *basileus* which is properly defined as "chieftain", instead of its modern definition as "king." The Greeks, however, were tired of the kings and most of them were overthrown in eighth century B.C. The new alternative political thought took the place of monarchies, that is, that of the *basileus*. One of them, and the most common one, was *oligarchy* which signified 'the rule of a few.' Oligarchy was most often the rule of the wealthy citizens of the city-states. This kind of government by the wealthy is called *timocracy* ("in which the degree of public participation depended not on ancestry but on the basis of wealth, measured in terms of agricultural produce."⁴¹) The tyrants overthrew most of the oligarchic governments and a few kings. The tyrants in Greece were usually destroyed because of dissatisfaction or crisis. They tried to maintain their powers by military force or by fear. In the *sixth* century, the Greek city-states had two alternatives for a new political experience. The tyrannies still existed but oligarchical political system began to appear in the Greek city-states. Some of the oligarchies were replaced by a new political system called *democracy*. This was the second alternative in these experiments.

The meaning of 'democracy' is 'rule by the *demos* (people).' But it must be borne in mind that democracy in city-states and democracy in the modern time are completely different. In Ancient city-states, 'rule by the *demos* (people)' meant the government was really ruled by people, or more accurately, by the free male citizens of city-states. Not all the people took place in the government.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* p.200

⁴¹ Chester G. Starr, *Individual and community: the rise of the polis 800-500 B.C.*, New York-Oxford University Press, 1986, p.79

Slaves, women, and foreigners were excluded. Thus, in some respects, democracy was similar to oligarchy. All this explanation given by Chester Starr in *Individual and Community: the rise of the polis 800-500 B.C.*, is defined in detail in Aristotle's *Politics*. Almost the entire book deals with the form of the political state and its constitution, their foundation, their transformation into one another, and so on.

Starr writes that in this period there was conflict between the demands of the individual for his honor and glory and the needs of community. In 500 B.C., every community of city-states had arrived at the concept of a political unity with the aim of a *common end*. Therefore, every individual could feel that they realized their rights through their own acts. That is to say, they felt significant through this political government by virtue of their own rights.

Modern anthropologists claim that earliest communities, or put another way, the earliest organization of people were tribes that were based on egalitarian economy. In egalitarian economy, the tribes had simple tools to produce primary goods in order to consume. In the tribal society, the tribesman supplied the resources. The task of the chiefs was to succor the local people in the case of necessity. However, according to some anthropologists, the task of the chief in collecting and redistributing resources is limited. Therefore, they ““find the primary role of the chief is to process information and manage interaction between communities.’ In either case the power of a chieftain rests not on formal rules but on *personality*, and ultimately on his *utility* to his followers.”⁴²

Similarly, in Greek city-states, as explained in the *Iliad*, there were assemblies and councils, in which people met and discussed the war or another problem. The power of the *basileus* rested on his personality, so to speak, personal loyalty and persuasive abilities. His power did not depend on rules. His abilities and his personal loyalty determined his power.

In the Greek city-state every free individual, if this individual is not god or a hunted animal, as Aristotle says, must live inside a political community. In other words, from Aristotle's description of man as a “political animal,” it is easy to see that the individual in Ancient Greece exists as a political agent.

The emergence of the city-state or polis served to strengthen communal unity. Its emergence can be placed initially in the eighth century. The task of the ancient state was determined “as maintaining the favor of the gods for the community, defending against foreign enemies, and maintaining internal security.”⁴³ Chester Starr points out that in the 18th century after Christ the duties of the state in Europe was more or less defined as it was in the ancient states. But religion was not privileged; it was

⁴² *Ibid.*, Starr, *Individual and community.*, p.18 (Italics are mine)

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Starr, *Individual and community.*, p.40

considered not as the primary duty of the state but the last one. The primary duty of the state in eighth century B.C. was to support religion to ensure the political unity of the community. For example, festivals were one major way to bring the community close together at the early sanctuaries, such as the meeting for the worship of Apollo.

The emergence of cities and the spread of the coinage sped up the development in Greek economy. Due to these developments, the intellectual perspectives on the political arena were affected. They began to think to make their laws to reorganize the *polis*. Thus, they could solve the problems of the cities by virtue of this law instead of the command of the Olympian deities. Chester Starr states that, after 600 B.C. in particular, primarily the Ionian philosophers started to consider and interpret the world as being governed by natural laws. In other words, they began to abandon belief in the arbitrary rule of the Olympian deities in order to think on the natural law. Thanks to their efforts and aims, political and ethical guidance was given to the *poleis*. These philosophers could participate in political life because they were of aristocratic origin. Therefore, according to Chester Starr, the development of rational analysis has taken place, partly owing to conscious political activity.⁴⁴

In 500 B.C. the organs of the government in the *polis* could be determined by its magistrate—elected for one year—, a council of elder citizens and an assembly of all citizens. In the polis, political power was in the hands of the people who possessed the rural lands. But even though commercial elements were not limited, they were ignored in public policies and not allowed to dominate the political life.

The system of government in Greece enabled the citizens to have true voice in the political arena. They could shape the policy with their own rights. They were not passive auditors of the *basileis*. On the other hand, many rural residents were too busy with their farming to attend the assembly and they were also distant to the place for the assembly. For this reason, they could not always come to attend the meeting. However, their decisions were very important because they could lead to war or the death of somebody. It can clearly be seen how far removed from the Greek who could directly participate in social and political life the modern voters who merely choose their representatives are. The Greeks were far more political than we are. On the other hand, a Greek politician Pericles claimed that not all citizens were interested in public affairs and therefore he said that they did not fulfill their fundamental duties.

By 500, the *polis* had attained a perfected form through its development in the arts, economy, and politics which developed in conscious unity. It is Sophocles in his work, *Antigone*, who gave a clear explanation of the conflict between the authoritarian requirements of the government, so to speak, the strict *Polis* and the religious responsibilities of the individual.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Starr, *Individual and community.*, p.73

In Ancient Greece, each individual was not only interested in his own affairs but also in the affairs of the state. However, according to Hegel, the Greeks did not arrive at the highest political constitution because they did not possess the idea of the *autonomous individual*. There is not a sharp distinction between the individual and social good in Ancient Greece. According to Hegel, in the city state of the Greece, “[t]he citizens are still unconscious of particular interests and therefore of a corrupting element.”⁴⁵ In this respect, Hegel claims that Greek society was unconscious of the differences between the good of the individual and the good of the polis.

Summarizing this part of our investigation, we can say that, the appearance of the concept of the individual takes quite a long time. In my view, the appearance depends particularly on the separation between society and the state or the governmental system. In pre-modern societies, there was not an explicit and strong distinction between society and the state. In primitive societies, human beings were united “by common beliefs” or a “common mind.” In Ancient Greece, Aristotle considers the *polis*, or the city-state as the natural unity of society. (I should note that, in my opinion, when Aristotle began from the *polis*, he did not consider the *polis* as having supreme worth, as, for instance, Hegel did.) Classical Western political thought, on the other hand, began with the existence of the individual or individual rights. As Colin Morris says in his book, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, Western “political thought has been deeply influenced by individualistic assumptions.”⁴⁶ However, Colin Morris points out that the weakness of the sense of individuality is not observed only in these primitive societies. Ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophy also devoted less attention to the meaning of individuality. They did not have any concept similar to our concept ‘person’ but they had many words expressing community of being.⁴⁷

Furthermore, Colin Morris argues that the lack of interest in the individual in the Eastern and Asiatic tradition had to do with belief in reincarnation. The doctrine of reincarnation belongs to the Eastern tradition, and according to this belief, each person will be reborn in another form. For their tradition each person is the manifestation of life within themselves.⁴⁸ For this reason, individuality in the Western sense was excluded from the Eastern and Asiatic tradition of thought.

One area in which the concept of the individual begins to receive attention in the ancient Greek tradition is in logic, as we shall examine in Aristotle. In this respect, it can be said that the importance of the concept of the individual increases with Aristotle’s works. In the following section, we will examine two of these works, namely, *Metaphysics and Categories*.

⁴⁵ Nicholas White, *Individual and conflict in Greek ethics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 39

⁴⁶ Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1972, p.2

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual.*, p. 2

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual.*, p. 2

2.2.1.1. The idea of the individual in philosophy of Aristotle:

In Aristotelian doctrine, the individual is understood as primary substance so that ontologically it is prior to secondary substances such as species and genus (*Gattung*) whereas in Platonic doctrine, the universal has ontological priority and therefore the individual comes after the universal.

For Aristotle, as for Plato, the meaning of term 'individual' corresponds to what is in-divisible as well. Aristotle speaks of the individual in his works such as *Categories*, *Topics* and *Metaphysics*. But the term 'individual' is not used in all the books of the *Metaphysics*. It appears in the *Metaphysic Beta* (B), X (*Iota* (I)) and XI (*Kappa* (K)).

2.2.1.1.1. Categories

In the *Categories*, Aristotle speaks of ten categories that forms of speech can fall under to describe or affirm something that is true or false. Without any combination of these ten categories, none of these things can be said to be true or false (for example, 'man', 'white', 'runs'). (1) Substance: man or horse, (2) quantity: four-foot, five foot, (3) quality: white, grammatical, (4) relation: double, half, large, master, (5) Place (where): in the Lyceum, in the market-place, (6) time (when): yesterday, last-year, (7) position (being in a position): is-lying, is-sitting, (8) State (condition, of having): has-shoes-on, has-armor-on, (9) action (of doing): cutting, burning, (10) affection (of being-affected): being-cut, being-burned, that is, affection means to receive some changes from some other objects.

Aristotle speaks of substance as the ontological correlate of the subject in grammar. He claims that some things are fit to occupy the subject position in a sentence, and some things cannot be the subject but are *predicated of* subjects.

In the *Categories*, Aristotle describes what a substance is. He says that a substance is neither 'in a subject' nor 'said of a subject', like the individual man or the individual horse (*Categories*, 2^aII). Therefore, he says that the individual man or the individual horse is substance. Put differently, a substance is something independent.

In this context, he distinguishes the particular substance that is primary substance from the universal, which is secondary substance. Primary substance is numerically one and hence it is individual. For that reason, it is a certain 'this.' On the other hand, secondary substance is not a certain 'this' for "man and animal are said of many things."⁴⁹ To put it another way, secondary substance is predicated of things. For instance, when we say 'Socrates is a man', here we are talking about two substances; one of them is Socrates and another is man as a species being. In that sentence, while 'Socrates' implies the individual, 'man' refers to universality or generality. Aristotle says that the genus and species are not primary substances but rather they are secondary substances because if the primary substance

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, 1975, p.9

(*prôtai ousiai*) does not exist, secondary substance cannot exist either. Regarding secondary substances, Aristotle says that they are not in a subject but they are predicated of the subject or said of a subject as a subject. For example, “man” is not in the individual man but “man” is said of the individual man as subject. It is the same for “animal”; that is, “animal” is not in the individual man, but it is said of the individual man as a subject. Species is something general; but it is not a property. When we say ‘Socrates is ill’, for example, then we are talking about a property which is illness. In this context, we can say that in the *Categories*, Aristotle does not mention the individual as an empirical being. He treats it in logical sense.

In addition, Aristotle claims that the notions of the individual and the particular do not just apply to objects; these two notions can also apply to properties. Similarly, the general is not restricted to apply only to objects but also properties can be general. For example, man is said of a particular man. The genus (animal) is said of the species (man).⁵⁰ This is the same also for the non-substance categories such as the quality; for example, the genus (color) is said of the species (white). Accordingly, the genus and species are said of the particulars (white). The man that can be classified as species is predicated of the individual man.

In short, in *Categories*, Aristotle makes several important distinctions. Firstly, he says that there are *objects* and *properties* of objects. In addition, he makes a distinction between the general and the particular, universals and individuals. These cut across each other, into individual objects, individual properties, general properties and general objects (*Categories*, 2). For example, the individual white is in a subject, but it is not said of a subject, because Aristotle claims that individual properties are not said of other subjects but they can exist in a subject.

Aristotle says that primary substances are the subjects of everything belonging to the other nine categories and they are predicated of these substances or they are in these primary substances. As a result, the individuals in the *Categories* have a very significant ontological role stated in terms of substance. The individuals are primary substance. Concrete objects are primary substances. For example, Socrates is a primary substance whereas human being is a secondary substance as genus. If particular or individual man exists, then general man or the species man exists as well. However, in the *Categories*, even if they are secondary, they are still called “substance” by Aristotle. Later in

⁵⁰ And as the secondary substance Aristotle claims that species is more substance than the genus because it is closer to the primary substance. The other reason why the species is more substance than the genus is because the genus is more universal than the species.

Metaphysics Zeta 13, Aristotle refuses the universals—genus and species—as proper candidates for substance because substance *must* be or *is* peculiar to a thing but universals belong to many things.⁵¹

2.2.1.1.2. Individual in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

In *Metaphysics* book III (*Beta*) Aristotle asks, “whether the first principles are universals or like the individual things.”⁵² He claims that ‘non universal is substance.’ According to Aristotle, particular things have independent existence but universal things do not independently exist. This argument is against Plato because according to Plato, universals have independent existence. On the other hand, Aristotle affirms Plato’s view that the individual is not the object of science, that only the general and universal can be its object.⁵³

Aristotle also questions whether there is more than one science of all substance or just one science for all substance. In *Metaphysics* Book X (*Lota*) as well as Book III (*Beta*), he criticizes those philosophers who think that the substance of all things is unity or being. Pythagoreans and later Plato maintain that unity itself is a sort of substance. In addition, some others claim that the One is Love (like Empedocles), or Air (like Anaximenes), or the Indeterminate (Anaximander). Aristotle refuses all of these ideas. Here Aristotle also claims that the universal cannot be a substance.⁵⁴

Similarly, in Book XI, Aristotle again states that substance is not universal but rather it is the particular and separable thing.⁵⁵ Aristotle does not believe that the conception of ideas exists independently from the particulars. Aristotle mentions a correlation between the particular and the

⁵¹ “For, first, the substance of a thing is peculiar to it, in that it does not belong to anything else; but a universal is common to many things, for it is precisely what is of a nature to belong to many things that is called a universal.” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics Books Z and H*, translated with a commentary by David Bostock, Clarendon press-oxford, 1994, p24)

⁵² Aristotle, *Metaphysics Vol.I Books I-IX*, with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick, London, William Heinemann Ltd., Harvard Univ. Press, 1968, p. 103

⁵³ Aristotle, “Metaphysics: Book XI (Kappa)”, in *Aristotle Metaphysics X-XIV, Oeconomica Magna Moralia*, with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick, London William Heinemann Ltd., Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 57

⁵⁴ “Now if no universal can be a substance (as we have stated in our discussion of substance and being), and being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of one thing existing alongside the many (since it is common to them), but only as a predicate, then clearly neither can unity be a substance; because being and unity are the most universal of predicates. Therefore genera are not certain entities and substances separate from other things; and unity cannot be a genus, for the same reasons that being and substance cannot.” (Aristotle, *Methaphysics vol.2 Books X-XIV*, with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick, *Oeconomica and Magna Moralia* with an English translation by Cyril Armstrong, London; Cambridge; Mass. : W. Heinemann, Harvard Univ. Press, 1969, p.13)

⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Methaphysics vol.2 Books X-XIV*, with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick, *Oeconomica and Magna Moralia* with an English translation by Cyril Armstrong, London; Cambridge; Mass. : W. Heinemann, Harvard Univ. Press, 1969, p.63

universal.⁵⁶ In *Beta* (III) he defines the individual as being “numerically one.”⁵⁷ As in the *Categories*, Aristotle speaks of the individual not only in the case of objects but also in the case of properties.

In conclusion, we can say that substance has two main close meanings; one of them is that substance cannot be predicated of anything else, that is, having independence; secondly, substance signifies the individual and separate existence.⁵⁸ As we observed from his writings such as *Categories* and *Metaphysics*, one might say that the concept of individual in *Categories* is taken into account logically and related to the concept of the universal. Moreover, in *Categories* the individual is examined in relation to the categories and in terms of its place in the categories. However, in some ways even if in *Metaphysics* the individual is also treated with regard to logic, it seems that the discussion of the individual in *Metaphysics* is more ontological.

In my opinion, this distinction between the individual and the universal also informs his political writing. Because in his political writing, the individual was considered as political agent without whom the political structure could not be actualized.

In the *Politics* (Book VII, section I), Aristotle argues that the main aim is not the political structure *per se* but the political form which is appropriate to the good life. Therefore, the aim is not the universal in itself but the universal that is good for particulars. Accordingly, the best constitution determines good life for the citizens. In other words, in my view, the good life of the individuals or particulars is the main concern of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the existence of the individual being outside of a political community is not possible because what makes the individual being a human being is his typical character of being a political animal. The political community exists with the existence of individual being and through their participation in the political affairs.

2.2.1.1.3. The Individual in Aristotle’s *Politics*

As we know, the ancient Greeks did not deal with the concept of the individual as a person or subject like the moderns; their primary interest was always in the universal. Even though, Aristotle did not speak much of the individual in the *Politics* (but rather he talked about the political forms and their constitutions, that is, common good or common welfare), I would like to mention how Aristotle considers the existence of the individual. In other words, I shall demonstrate how Aristotle related politics to human being.

Aristotle treats the term *Politiké* as a science, science of human affairs or the art of the common life. According to him, *Politiké* is the study of human being’s happiness or their good. Aristotle called

⁵⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics vol.1 Books I-IX*, with an English translation by Hugh Tredennick, London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1968, p. 117

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Book V, pp.239-241

human being “by nature a political animal.” This political animal can obtain and develop their capacities through and within a community or society. Therefore, the *Politiké* tries to discover in what sort of life human being can be happy and then by which form of government and what kinds of institutions the life of human being is secured. The first question is treated in *Nicomachean Ethics*. The *Politics* is occupied with the second question, that is, the constitution of the state.⁵⁹ In the first book of *Politics* Aristotle claims that the state is a community, which is called political. Aristotle enters into further detail in order to elaborate the state and its components by an analytical method. For this purpose, he aims at examining the state and its foundational elements by separating it into fractions. Aristotle explains the unification or the cooperation of ruler and ruled as necessary like the biological unification of man and female by nature. The aim of this unification of the ruler and subject is security. The villages come together and create the state composed of ruler and its subjects. “The partnership finally composed of several villages is the city-state; it has at last attained the limit of virtually complete self-sufficiency, and thus, while it comes into existence for the sake of life, it exists for the good life.”⁶⁰

The last form of the community is the city-state composed of several villages as we already briefly mentioned above. The aim of this new form of society is the good life. Aristotle attempts to elaborate the form of society and the state from a biological standpoint. For this reason, he claims that at the end, the development and the final form of the city-state are natural. In other words, it develops by nature.⁶¹

Just as villages existed by nature, so did the city-state. As can be observed, for Aristotle, the nature of anything is its *telos*, that is, its final form. Thus, Aristotle claims, “from these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal.”⁶² It seems to me that Aristotle does not separate the activity of human being from their nature. In other words, every activity of human being for him is natural or belongs to nature. Thus, the evolution of city-state or human being is also natural. Human being in this sense is by nature a political animal because for Aristotle, to be political means to occupy oneself with human affairs and human life and human’s happiness, and then to search by what mode of government or the state human being’s life is secured. “Thus also the city-state is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually.”⁶³ In other words, the state in nature is prior to the individual. The reason why the state is the creation of nature is because the individuals cannot be self-sufficient on their own. As we see, in contrast to the modern

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *Politics*, with an English translation by H. Rackham, Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. xii-xiii

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 8 (First Book, second chapter)

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, p.9

⁶² *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 9 (First Book, second chapter)

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, p.11

claim regarding the individual, here the individual is defined as a non-self-sufficing being. The individual is a part of the whole and according to Aristotle the whole takes precedence over the parts.⁶⁴

According to Aristotle, human being has a social instinct by nature. If someone does not need anybody or any society because this subject is a self-sufficient being, for Aristotle, it is impossible, and it signifies that this subject must be a beast or god; for to be a human being is to be dependent upon other human beings and their relations. Just as a part of the individual which is separated from the whole individual cannot be sufficient for itself, so this individual is in the same relation with the whole as its parts are with it. For this reason, according to Aristotle, there is a natural social instinct that leads individuals to come together.⁶⁵

For Aristotle, human beings were slave or free also by nature.⁶⁶ The problem of Aristotle is that he considers everything by nature. For example, according to him, by nature some would govern and some would be governed; because they are separated as such when they were born. In this context, it seems to me that Aristotle ignores the relations among human beings which are created by them and which produce the human being and recreates their relationships with others.

It seems to me that the modern problem of the individual is well-captured by this definition of Aristotle's. In the modern period, the individuals are slaves because they sell not only their body but their minds as well. Therefore, they belong to another human being like a slave. The only difference is that the slaves in ancient time did not possess anything, not even their bodies, whereas in modern time the modern slaves have permission to sell themselves (their labor force) for money. However, the result of this is that many individuals in modern society do not have a property in their own person or in their production.

Indeed Aristotle was clearly aware of the problem of politics; because he believes that human being is a real human being so long as they participate in politics. In this context, he points out that "when there are a number of persons without political honors and in poverty, the city then is bound to be full of enemies."⁶⁷ Accordingly, Aristotle considers the participation in politics as necessary element of the political community.

Hegel discusses harmony between the individual and the community in Aristotle as well. A detailed investigation under a separate chapter would may be demonstrate us the difference between Aristotle

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, pp.11-13

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, pp.11-13

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, p.19

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 225

and Hegel concerning their political view; however it is not our task to compare these great philosophers which could be the subject of another thesis.

2.2.2. The Individual in the *Middle Ages*

It is very difficult to find an understanding of the individual in primitive societies. In primitive societies or tribes, the children were trained according to tradition so that they could find their identity in the common mind of these societies (that is to say, that of their people), but not in something peculiar to themselves.⁶⁸ In this respect, it may rightly be said that the rise of the concept of the individual rests on self-awareness that, to a certain extent, requires one to be estranged from society and its tradition. Therefore, the individual being could find its identity only as long as it progresses to its own inner being. In this context, the rise of the individual takes place with Christianity.

In *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, Walter Ullmann states that extraordinarily little attention was given to the problem of the individual in the Middle Ages. In the middle ages, there was always a king or a pope whom the individual obeyed. “In a rough sense one may well say that for the larger part of the Middle Ages it was the individual as a subject that dominated the scene, while in the later Middle Ages and in the modern period the subject was gradually supplanted by the citizen.”⁶⁹ However, Ullmann observes, medieval writings do not give sufficient attention to the question of subjection. “Although medieval writings do not delve explicitly into the standing of the individual, they nevertheless have a great deal to say illicitly on his rights and functions, and so on.”⁷⁰ Ullmann questions why the individual was a subject but not a citizen in the greater part of the Middle Ages. He claims that research on medieval politology has not yet recognized the difference between the individual as a *subject* and as a *citizen*.

It is very easy to discover the understanding or existence of the individual in western political thought. In the medieval West, the individual had high value. According to Aristotle, the polis, or city—the natural unity of the community—is prior to the individual. However, in the philosophy of contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau the individual as a person, and their rights has priority to any form of society.

In *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, Colin Morris characterizes the western man with the concept ‘self-awareness’ or ‘inwardness.’ While Plato in the *Republic* and Aristotle in the *Politics*

⁶⁸ Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1972, p.1.

⁶⁹ Walter Ullmann, *The individual and society in the middle ages*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1966, p. 5

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Ullmann, *The individual and society in the middle ages* p. ix

argue that the individual is not a self-sufficient being, according to the modern period, the individual as agent exists as a self-sufficient being.

Self-knowledge is the most important theme in the 11th and 12th centuries. Why is self-knowledge the important theme of the middle ages? For self-knowledge is a kind of path to arrive at God. This is seen particularly in the monastic or eremitical tradition. The idea of the individual had a high value in the understanding of Christianity. In this respect, this religion is defined to be an 'interior' religion. The interests of the individual and the relations of the individual with others on the basis of the understanding of humanity are basic themes of Christianity. "Once there was a growth in learning and a deeper understanding of the Bible, the Fathers, and the classics, all the pre-conditions for a major discovery of the individual would be present."⁷¹ The basic understanding of Christianity is that God became man for the salvation of human being. It is a kind of affirmation of human dignity because it means that God is in the human being. Moreover, the central belief or principle of Christianity is that "a man must love others as he loves himself."⁷²

"Self-assertion', 'self-expression', 'self-realization', 'self-fulfillment': these words were never, or scarcely ever, used before the nineteenth century; they are all new words compared with others which also mark man's preoccupation with himself, such as 'self-love', 'self-command', 'self-sufficiency', and 'self-assurance'.⁷³

These words arose and became widespread after the French Revolution. Among these words, Plamenatz chose two of them; 'self-assertion' and 'self-realization.' Plamenatz makes a distinction between these two terms. He relates 'self-assertion' to the individual and 'self-realization' and other close terms such as 'self-development', 'self-fulfillment' and 'self-creativity' to the species as well as the individual. Self-assertion has a meaning close to "self-expression" and sometimes to "self-affirmation." Self-creativity is related to the species rather than the individual. It is linked with the term "progress"; for it refers to the human potentialities realized by progress.⁷⁴ Self-assertion means that someone wants to be recognized by others for what he wills, desires, how he acts, etc.⁷⁵

In this sense, 'the self' is an important term for the idea of the individual. The discovery and rise of the individual depend not only on the epistemological discovery of the importance of self-awareness and self-knowledge of human beings. It should be born in mind that Christianity has a great role in this discovery. For self-knowledge of man or self-discovery of man, that is to say, all these expressions

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual.*, p.37

⁷² *Ibid.*, Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual.*, p.11

⁷³ John Plamenatz, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p. 324

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Plamenatz, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man*, p. 324

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Plamenatz, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man*, p. 325

signify that knowing God, discovering or arriving at God is possible through one's interior discovery or knowledge.

While on the one side, the problem of the 'self' regarding freedom, in terms of self-determination, self-sufficiency, self-realization, and self-affirmation, is read as a significant point to attain freedom; on the other side, it separates the individual from others due to that self-turning into its inner itself. As we shall see later in this dissertation, Marx criticizes Hegel in a similar way for a similar reason. Modern society and the State act as if they are prioritizing the existence of the individual, however, they damage and ignore its existence and isolate the individuals from their species being and their products by way of alienation. In Hobsbawm's words, the "process of the emancipation of man from his original nature conditions of production is one of human *individualization*."⁷⁶ Marx also says, in *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formation*, that "man is only individualized (*vereinzelt sich*) through the process of history. He appears originally as a generic (species) being, tribal being, herd animal."⁷⁷ Here what Marx wants to say is that human being exists first as a tribal being and then through a historical process or progress, human being becomes an individual being. As Marcello Musto says, "in reality, the isolated individual did not exist before the capitalist epoch."⁷⁸ This statement of Musto is pretty much engaged in the problem of the individual's place in the modern State. The question is: how is it possible to sustain the existence of the individual without damaging or ignoring its being?

The examination of Greek philosophy and the medieval period illustrates that unlike primitive and eastern societies, ancient Greek philosophy emphasizes the individual more than society. Of course it is not very much obvious in Greek philosophy but they did this by stressing "self", for instance self-knowledge even if this emphasis is not as explicit as it is with the moderns. Nevertheless, this individual always existed within society unlike modern society.

⁷⁶ E.J. Hobsbawm, "Introduction", in *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, Karl Marx, tran: Jack Cohen, International Publishers, New York, 1965, p.14

⁷⁷ Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, with an introduction by E.J. Hobsbawm, tran: Jack Cohen, International Publishers, New York, 1965, p.96

⁷⁸ *Karl Marx's Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy 150 years later*, edited by Marcello Musto, Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy, London and New York, 2008, p.4

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

“[Slavery] is found in a world
where a *wrong* is still a *right*.”⁷⁹

3.1. Introduction

The argument of this thesis leads us to examine Hegel's approach to the concept of the individual because of two reasons:

1) Firstly, the argument of this study researches how Marx apprehends the individual, particularly through his early writings, and Marx's early writings direct us to Hegel's concepts. The thesis will state that both philosophers approach the problem in different manners but they also have some similarities. For example, “Hegel wants as much liberty as possible, and so does Marx. Hegel wants as little authority as is absolutely necessary, and so does Marx. And both want the maximum development of the individual.”⁸⁰

2) Secondly, regarding the first reason, the thesis claims that even though Hegel seems to give priority to the existence of the individual, its existence remains still as a means. For example, in his well-known works the *Philosophy of History* and the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel argues that ancient Greeks do not attach priority to the individual as much as the universal. However, Hegel considers the individual as a concrete person as “one of the principles of the civic community.”⁸¹ According to Hegel, the Greeks failed to notice the importance of the individual within the universal. However, Hegel's comprehension of the significance of the individual is also misguided. The whole purpose of his philosophy is to grasp the individual and the universal within one another without damaging either of them. However, while we read the *Philosophy of History*, we encounter some reflections of a

⁷⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §57, p.15 (italics are mine)

⁸⁰ Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, translated from the German edition of Johannes Hoffmeister by H. B. Nisbet, introduction by Duncan Forbes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p. xxxv

⁸¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §182, p.96

division between the individual and the universal: the division between feeling and reason. This division is the starting point of the individual-universal problem.

In his work *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, Hartmann claims that “Hegel degrades the individual to the level of a mere tool in the hands of the idea, and thinks that for the individual’s weal or woe philosophy has no concern.”⁸² From Hartmann’s statement, we shall attempt to demonstrate how Hegel manifests the individual as a tool in his philosophy. In the same book, Hartmann states that “Hegel demands that the individual should be sacrificed to the teleology of the absolute idea.”⁸³

Hegel explains the development of the individual or human being who tries to find and seek their place in society or in the world in a philosophical, systematical, and historical context. Hegel, in this regard, speaks of a historical progress that is the *process* of self-creativity and self-discovery. Especially, from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* we are acquainted with this progress. It is the progress of the spirit (*Geist*) but it is the development of the individual or human being through nature, history, and society towards the universal.

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel aims to justify the philosophical point of view, which starts from ordinary, non-philosophical consciousness, which is called ‘natural consciousnesses.’ This development progresses from abstract and universal categories to their concrete realization (*Bildung*) in history and the embodiment of human achievements in art, religion, and philosophy. In the *Phenomenology*, we can discern how the *Geist* progresses and in the *Philosophy of Right* we can observe how this development passes through family, society and finally reaches universality with the state. In these works, we see how Hegel gives a systematical explanation of his philosophy. It seems to me that the *Phenomenology* is more abstract than the *Philosophy of Right* and is the most difficult work to understand. On the other hand, according to me, the *Phenomenology* (maybe this can be said for the other works of Hegel) is a kind of provision for the *Philosophy of Right*. The reason why I think that they are a kind of provision is that I consider the *Phenomenology* as the expression of universality. Of course, the *Phenomenology* also describes universality, particularity and individuality and their progress together, but the *Philosophy of Right* gives more concrete descriptions about practice even though there are also some abstractions in this work. Here I should remark that every work of Hegel has its own systematic development as I have tried to shortly above define for the *Phenomenology*.

⁸² Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, 10th ed., Preface, p. 10, quotation from “Hegel’s Conception of Freedom” by S. W. Dyde, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Nov., 1894), pp. 655-671 .

⁸³ Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, 10th ed., Preface, p. 10, quotation from “Hegel’s Conception of Freedom” by S. W. Dyde, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Nov., 1894), p. 655

Starting from the above-mentioned two reasons, under this chapter the thesis analyzes the concept of the individual through the *Philosophy of Right* and *Philosophy of History*. Besides, the *Phenomenology* and other works of Hegel will also be referred to wherever relevant and whenever required in order to comprehend and clarify his understanding of the individual. No doubt, our theme will be discussed in terms of modern society; because the concept of the individual is the product of modern times. For this reason, the concept of the individual shall be analyzed in detail through the concept of civil society and the state, which were presented in the *Philosophy of Right*. Therefore, the main argument is going to be argued in the Subjective and Objective Spirit; Hegel dealt with these two different spheres in greater depth in the *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel was the first person who developed the concept of civil society and separated the state from civil society, family and thus from the individuals. According to Hegel, the sphere of civil society is a characteristic of the modern state; because in medieval society and in earlier times, the state was not situated over and beyond civil society. In the former society, if you were a member of a noble family or smallholder, your position and your profession in the political state or system were defined by your property, which you had because of your birth-right.⁸⁴

3.1.1. A brief explanation of his works

I need to confess that at each time I read Hegel's works I feel that I am deeply influenced by his philosophy. It seems to me the reason is that his writing is mystical and piquant. By keeping this in mind, I would like to continue with a brief introduction of his works. In *Reason and Revolution*, Marcuse presents the development of Hegel's thought in five different stages:

- 1) From 1790 to 1800, he concentrates on the religious foundation for philosophy, explained in the collected papers of this period, the *Theologische Jugendschriften*.
- 2) Between 1800 and 1801, he showed his interests in philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Schelling through their critiques. His main works from this period are *Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie* (1801), *Glauben und Wissen* (1802) and his other articles in *Kritische Journal der Philosophie* (1802-1803).
- 3) From 1801 to 1806, *Jenenser system*: the period indicates the earliest form of his complete system. "This period is documented by the *Jenenser Logik und Metaphysik*, *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, and *the System der Sittlichkeit*."⁸⁵ Marcuse observes that, in *Jenenser system* Hegel did not apply the idea of the social contract to the state. In his later work, the system

⁸⁴ Andy Blunden, *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*,
form <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/cyc.htm>, 8th January 2000

⁸⁵ Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960, p. 29

changed and therefore the idea of the state as an objective whole, which is separated from society, takes the place of the idea of the social contract. In other words, the main point of Hegel's philosophy is the state separated from society.⁸⁶

- 4) In 1807, the *Phenomenology of Mind* was published.
- 5) "The period of the final system, which was outlined as early as 1808-11 in the *Philosophische Propädeutik*, but was not consummated until 1817. To this period belong the works that make up the bulk of Hegel's writing: *The Science of Logic* (1811-16), the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817, 1827, and 1830), *the Philosophy of Right* (1821), and the various Berlin lectures on the Philosophy of History, the History of Philosophy, Esthetic, and Religion."⁸⁷

In the earlier writings of Hegel, as Marcuse said, there is no exaltation of state as there is in his later writings but rather Hegel criticizes the state with the critique of contract theory.

In the period of foundation of Hegel's philosophy, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling's philosophies furnished the intellectual ambience of Germany. The second period of his philosophical development, that is, the period between 1800 and 1802 was under the influence of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Metaphysik der Sitten* published in 1799. Kant distinguished reason (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*). However, Hegel criticized these concepts in terms of his dialectical method and gave them new meanings. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel says that "the understating is thought, the pure 'I' as such."⁸⁸ He also argued that consciousness is able to "attain to rational knowledge" by way of ordinary understanding [*Verstand*].⁸⁹ Reason is thus defined as a process of reflection (*PS*, §21). Besides, in the *Science of Logic* (in the first "Preface"), Hegel explains that the understanding determines whereas reason undoes this determination which is fixed and determined by the understanding.⁹⁰ In this point, on the one side, Hegel defines reason as dialectical as well as negative because reason resolves the determinations of the understanding "into nothing." On the other side, for him, reason is positive because reason "generates the universal and comprehends the particular therein."⁹¹

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution.*, p.173

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution.*, p. 29

⁸⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, "Phenomenology of Spirit", in *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, §13, p. 51

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, "Phenomenology of Spirit", in *The Hegel Reader*, §13, p. 51

⁹⁰ "Der Verstand bestimmt und hält die Bestimmungen fest; die Vernunft ist negativ und dialektisch, weil sie die Bestimmungen des Verstands in nichts auflöst; sie ist positiv, weil sie das Allgemeine erzeugt und das Besondere darin begreift." (Hegel, *Wissenschaft Der Logik*, source:

<http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich>)

⁹¹ Hegel, *Science of Logic*, source:

3.1.2. About the method: discovery or exposition?

In *Hegel: A Re-interpretation*, Kaufmann expresses that Hegel's philosophy is estimated in distinct senses such as a "system" and as "dialectic" by two different groups; that is, the left and the right Hegelians. While the right Hegelians consider Hegel's philosophy as a system, the left or young Hegelians conceive of his philosophy as dialectic. Kaufmann's argument in this book (*Hegel: A Re-Interpretation*) is intended to show that Hegel's dialectic is not a method like Marx and his followers thought.⁹² Kaufmann claims that "Hegel's dialectic is at most a method of exposition; it is not a method of discovery."⁹³

It is erroneous to interpret Hegel's dialectic as just a method of exposition but not a method of discovery because in the *Phenomenology* Hegel reveals the whole process of spirit as an exposition and then as a discovery. In this respect, his dialectical method demonstrates that every stage or phase must cancel, preserve, and transcend itself. In every stage, there is exposition of spirit and through this exposition the spirit discovers itself. For this reason both processes, that is, exposition and discovery are together. If we ignore that Hegel's dialectic contains discovery, we could not say that the spirit accomplishes self-consciousness.

Kaufmann strictly points out that Hegel's dialectic is not based on the three stages including thesis, antithesis and synthesis with regard to every philosophical theme he takes up. Kaufmann emphasizes this point for Hegel's philosophy of history as well. He expresses that Hegel concentrates on the idea of history in three stages: in the first stage, there is only one person, ruler, who is free. This stage is represented by the ancient orient. In the second stage, i.e., classical antiquity, there are some who are free but still there are also slaves. The third stage is the modern world where every person is free. However, in my thesis I would like to discuss how the modern world conceals the slavery of human beings by claiming that "man as man is free."⁹⁴ The modern state recognizes human beings as free beings, but in practice, under the capitalist mode of production and within its law, all human beings—except the minority of capitalists—are in fact slaves. However, whether the capitalists are indeed free or not is also another question, because according to a certain reading and application of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, neither the capitalists nor the proletariat are free.

After these introductory remarks, I would like to begin with the analysis of Hegel's concept of the individual through his texts.

<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlprefac.htm>, parag. §9

⁹² Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Re-Interpretation*, Doubleday Anchor Book: New York, 1966, p. 286

⁹³ *Ibid.*, Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Re-Interpretation*, p. 162

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Re-interpretation*, p. 249

3.2. The Textual Analysis of the Concept of the Individual

Hegel considers individuality in relation with universality. In the *Hegel Dictionary*, Inwood explains the term ‘individual’ in relation with the other two terms ‘particular’ and ‘universal.’ It can be interpreted that as we have seen in previous chapter, Hegel follows Aristotle who examines the individual and universal as being related each other. He clarifies the etymology of the term as follows;

“(a) *Einzeln* (‘singular, single, individual, isolated’, etc.) comes from *ein* (‘one’ and ‘a’). This generates *das Einzelne* (‘the individual (thing)’), *der Einzelne* (‘the individual (man, person)’), (*die*) *Einzelheit* (‘singularity’, etc., and also ‘particular point, detail’) and *vereinzeln*, *Vereinzelnung* (‘to isolate, individualize’, ‘isolating, individualization’). (b) The Latin *individuum* (‘the indivisible’, a translation of the Greek *atomon*) gave rise, in the sixteenth century, to (*das*) *Individuum* (‘(the) individual’) and *individual*, and, in the eighteenth via French, to *individuell* and *Individualität*. These words carry a stronger suggestion of human individuality and individualism than *einzeln*, etc. But the common expression for ‘the individual’ in the sense of ‘person’ is *der Einzelne*, not *das Individuum*.”⁹⁵

Inwood points out that Hegel usually uses the term *einzeln* in contrast to *allgemein* and *besonder*. But he adds that the terms *Individuum* and *Individualität* are often used by Hegel particularly for the human individual or individuality. In this respect, Inwood asserts, “the ‘world historical individual’ is *das Individuum*, not *der Einzelne*.”⁹⁶

Hegel tried to use his native language even though he had a command of Latin language. For this reason, Hegel usually prefers to use the concept in German but sometimes he uses the Latin words as we mentioned above. In this context, in this dissertation we are going to focus on the term individual as human individual, in the sense of person.

In Hegel’s day the terms namely, the universal, particular and individual, were used in two main senses in logic:

“1. the distinction between ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ corresponds in part to that between the generic (or ‘determinable’) and the specific (or ‘determinate’). A universal (concept, etc.) is a concept that applies to, or a characteristic that inheres in all entities of a given type: e.g. ‘coloured’. A particular applies to only some of these entities: e.g. ‘red’. (‘universal’ and

⁹⁵ M.J. Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, Blackwell Publishers, 1992, p. 302

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, p. 302

‘particular’ are here relative terms: what is, from one point of view, particular, i.e. specification of a universal, is, from another, a universal, i.e. a general term that can be specified into particulars.) *an individual is a single entity: e.g. Socrates.*

2. The terms also apply to types of judgment: a universal judgment concerns all entities of a given type: e.g. ‘All men are wise’. (Hegel often refers to this type of universality as ‘allness’, *Allheit*.) A particular judgment concerns some of the entities of a given type: e.g. ‘Some men are wise’. An individual judgment concerns an individual: e.g. ‘Socrates is wise’. The individual judgment was seen by Kant (*CPR*, A71, B96) and other logicians as similar to the universal judgment, in that the predicate applies to the whole of the subject (e.g. Socrates), not just to a part of it, as in the particular judgment. (This, together with the fact that individuality represents unity, in contrast to the ‘sundering’ of particularity, accounts in part for *Hegel’s view that individuality is a restoration of universality on a higher level.*)⁹⁷

Universal represents itself in the individuals. In the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* (§181), Hegel indicates that the universal makes itself an individual by means of particularization. In this regard, Hegel defines the actual thing as an individual “which by means of particularity rises to universality and makes itself identical with itself (*Enc.*, §181).”⁹⁸

Hegel rejects the idea of making a separation between the universal and the individual and giving priority to the universal as Plato did. According to Plato, as is well-known, “forms, universal, ideas are prior to individuals.”⁹⁹ On the other hand, as Inwood points out, Hegel emphasizes that universal and individual are in an equal position.¹⁰⁰ In other words, Hegel tries to give a status to the individual, which is equal with the universal. Inwood states that Hegel rejects the claim that the universal, particular and individual are logically, ontologically and epistemologically different from each other; because as we know, the universal, in contrast to the more traditional conceptions of it, is concrete, which develops itself by way of the particular and individuals. Therefore, the universal maintains its

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, p. 303

⁹⁸ “§181 Alles ist *Begriff*, und sein Dasein ist der Unterschied der Momente desselben, so daß seine *allgemeine* Natur durch die *Besonderheit* sich äußerliche Realität gibt und hierdurch und als negative Reflexion-in-sich sich zum *Einzelnen* macht. – Oder umgekehrt, das Wirkliche ist ein *Einzelnes*, das durch die *Besonderheit* sich in die *Allgemeinheit* erhebt und sich identisch mit sich macht.” Source: <http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Enzyklop%C3%A4die+der+philosophischen+Wissenschaften+im+Grundrisse>

⁹⁹ M.J. Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, Blackwell Publishers, 1992, p. 303

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, p. 303

existence in the particular and in the individual. The process of universal thought, is that this universal thought, as Inwood pointed out, “particularizes itself into specific thoughts” and at the end of the process this universal thought which has particularized itself into specific thoughts, “returns to the unity of the absolute Idea.”¹⁰¹

However, in my view, even though there is interaction and interrelation between the universal and the individual in Hegel’s philosophy, the universal still has more priority than the individuals. According to Hegel, the individuals have particular differences but they are nevertheless subordinated to what they have in common. For example, for Hegel, they are not distinguished in terms of Reason. In the Introduction to *Philosophy of Right* Hegel stresses the particularity and universality as follows; “A man, who acts perversely, exhibits particularity. The rational is the highway on which everyone travels, and no one is specially marked (*PR*, § 15).” Here, Hegel maintains that the individuals can be differentiated from each other in terms of their particular acts but they are not differentiated in respect of reason. There are specific thoughts, but they are finally resolved into the universal. One might say that Hegel seems to focus on the individual like Aristotle but in reality, he sneakingly and subtly gives priority to the universal whereas Aristotle considers the individual as primary substance and universal as secondary substance; in so doing he emphasizes the universal to be predicated of the individual in contrast to Hegel.

3.2.1. Conceptual analysis of the individual in the *Encyclopedia*

In the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel begins with the universal. In the paragraph § 20, he explains how the individual and particular are derived from the universal. The individual and the universal intermingle and mutually complete each other.¹⁰²

Hegel relates thought to language: what is the expression of thought in language must be universal. Accordingly, he makes a distinction between “the particular individual” and “the individual in language.” As I understand, this particular individual does not refer to the universal because it is particular and it has a special character, which distinguishes it. On the other hand and at the same time, Hegel gives a universal meaning to ‘I’, ‘the individual’, ‘this individual’, ‘here’ and ‘now.’ Hegel tries to forge this kind of logical relation between the individual and the universal not in the practical or concrete area,¹⁰³ but by staying within language, thought or abstract thinking. He already says that ‘I’ means the single self of me, which is different from other selves. There is a sensation or feeling with

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary*, p. 304

¹⁰² G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I: The Science of Logic, ‘Preliminary Notions’, § 20. We can observe the same assertions in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, under the part on “Consciousness: Sense-certainty,” (§90-§110) in which the argument proceeds around the universal and particular in terms of ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘this.’

¹⁰³ In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel tries to make this connection, namely, a relation between the individual and universal in the sense of objective spirit through which stage the individual and universal reconciles in the state.

this 'I'. After saying "language expresses nothing but universality," he says that it is not possible to express feeling and sensation in language so they are not important and they are "untrue." In this context, I cannot say that I agree with Hegel, because it is possible through "feeling or sensation" to go far from ourselves and from other individuals and to find ourselves-realization or affirmation. On the other hand, Hegel seems to imply that it is possible to gain self-realization and self-affirmation only through "thought."

On the one side, Hegel wants to combine or reconcile the individual and the universal. He claims that he rejects the separation between the individual and the universal and does not give any priority to the universal. On the other side, he omits (neglects) "sensation" or "feeling" that makes the individual itself. However, "sensation" or "feeling" relates the universal with the individual. If Hegel says "feeling or sensation far from being the highest truth is the most unimportant and untrue,"¹⁰⁴ it means, for me, that Hegel still wants to remain in the abstract realm or merely in thought. However, this thought must be in relation with feeling. I do not try to reduce everything to the material aspects. However, what seems to me disingenuous in his philosophy is that Hegel begins with an important and great aim, which is desirable—reconciliation of the individual and the universal—but he is still in the level of abstraction and he is therefore in contradiction. Hegel is right when he mentions that 'I' implies both the universal and the individual in language. Thus, we can inevitably find some relationship between the individual and the universal in this context. Still we have a question that has not been answered. In other words, does it mean that Hegel reconciles the individual and the universal? Is this explanation of Hegel enough for us to understand him and his aim?

In the *Encyclopedia*, in the *Phenomenology*, and in the *Philosophy of Right* as well, we can encounter the ontological, epistemological, and logical relation between the terms such as individual, universal and particular. For Hegel, the universal develops itself into the particular and into the individual. Here it can be interpreted that the whole does not make sense without the particular and the individual. In that respect, Hegel does not think that they are strictly different in an ontological, epistemological, or logical sense. In the following quotation from the *Encyclopedia*, we can see how Hegel forges the ontological, logical, and epistemological relations among these terms. In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel explains the notion of individuality in three moments: universality, particularity, and individuality.

“§ 163 The Notion as Notion contains the three following ‘moments’ or functional parts. (1) The first is Universality—meaning that it is in free equality with itself in its specific character. (2) The second is Particularity—

¹⁰⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I: The Science of Logic, 'Preliminary Notions', § 20

that is, the specific character, in which the universal continues serenely equal to itself. (3) The third is Individuality—meaning the reflection-into-itself of the specific characters of universality and particularity; which negative self-unity has complete and original determinateness, without any loss to its self-identity or universality.”¹⁰⁵

After this passage, in fact Hegel explains why he thinks that the individual is equal to the universal. Hegel depicts that “the universal in its true and comprehensive meaning is a thought.”¹⁰⁶ According to Hegel, the thought gained its full recognition with Christianity (*Enc.*, §163); because Hegel states that the Greeks did not comprehend God and the human being “in their true universality. The gods of the Greeks were only particular powers of the mind.”¹⁰⁷ The universal and thought is equal according to Hegel’s logic. With Christianity, the universal and the individual are reconciled in God and in Jesus Christ. Moreover, with Christianity, reason, or thought is associated with God itself. Therefore, Christianity is the representation of reason in the world. The realization of this religion in the world is very much philosophical when we bear Hegel’s philosophy in mind.

As a matter of fact, when we take a glance at Marx’s statement about idealism in one of his letters to his father, we can understand what Hegel means when stating that Greeks did not comprehend God in its true universality, which had to be united with thought (reason); and which excluded individuality or particularity. In this letter, Marx wrote, “from the idealism which, by the way, I had compared and nourished with the idealism of Kant and Fichte, I arrived at the point of seeking the idea in reality itself. If previously the gods had dwelt above the earth, now they became its centre.”¹⁰⁸ It seems to me that what Marx would say by the statement claiming that he “arrived at the point of seeking the idea in reality itself” is nothing more than Hegel’s philosophy. With reason and with thought, gods dwelt in the earth and became the center of the earth. In other words, with Jesus Christ, God dwelt in the earth; therefore, anthropocentric insight became possible. Thus, the infiniteness and absoluteness of God is unified with human beings’ hope of immortality and limitlessness. In this regard, Hegel himself says, “man as man was not then recognised to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights... Only in Christendom is man respected as man, in his infinitude and universality.”¹⁰⁹ Reason and thought are two significant faculties through, which human being is defined as infinitude and universality.

¹⁰⁵ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I: The Science of Logic, Section III: The Doctrine of Notion, ‘The Subjective Notion’, § 163

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Encyclopedia*, § 163

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Encyclopedia*, § 163

¹⁰⁸ Karl Marx, “Discovering Hegel (Marx to his father),” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1978, p.7

¹⁰⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I: The Science of Logic, Section III: The Doctrine of Notion, ‘The Subjective Notion’, § 163

In Christianity, the difference between human being and God is sneakily wiped out. However, how is the figure of God reshaped in human beings? The answer is; first by giving the property or the concept of infinitude to reason; and secondly by denying truth to feeling.

Therefore, philosophy attempts to prove God through reason and gives a chance to human beings to discover everything by way of themselves, that is, by way of their reason. In this context, God finds its actuality in the individual who is Jesus Christ.

Hegel further explains the relation between actuality and individual in paragraph §181 where he again points out that “the actual thing is an individual.” Why is it so important to say that the “individual and actual are the same things”? Because if the individual is actual, it means that actuality is determinate and concrete. When the particular, which is concrete and determined, is reconciled with the universal, it becomes individual. In other words, the individual is the particular that knows itself to be grounded in the universal.

“... Similarly the individual must be understood to be a subject or substratum, which involves the genus and species in itself and possesses a substantial existence.”¹¹⁰ Here the individual is qualified as “a subject or substratum” which is “the genus and species in itself” so the individual as the subject or substratum includes the universal in itself. For example, I am a particular individual or a single entity as a being, Sevgi. I am particular as being a member of a culture or nationality. Also, I am universal as belonging to the human species. What I want to say with this example is the fact that I am a particular being in my family as having some special features—personality—which make me different from other members of family and I am also a particular being with a family which has some special characteristics that are different from other families; I have a particular religion, culture, relationship with others and so on. I am also universal because I am a human being and my rationality is grounded in universality. And insofar as I am aware of both my particularity and its relation to and basis in universality, I am an individual. The individual is defined by Hegel as a self-conscious being.

In the same passage, Hegel describes the individual as *a person* as follows: “what the slave is without, is the recognition that he is a person: and the principle of personality is universality. The master looks upon his slave not as a person, but as a selfless thing. The slave is not himself reckoned an ‘I’ — his ‘I’ is his master (§ 163).”¹¹¹

Hegel thus draws attention to the relation between the concepts of ‘recognition’ and the ‘individual.’ In the *Phenomenology*, he explains how it is possible to be an individual (individual human being) or a person only by way of being recognized by something external, that is, by another person or other

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Encyclopedia*, § 164

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Encyclopedia*, § 163

individuals. In particular, in the chapter “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness Lordship and Bondage,” he gives a broad explanation concerning this dialectical relation. He describes a war between the lord and the bondsman; because they *desire* to be *recognized* on the part of the other. At the end of the war, the bondsman recognizes the other as his lord. Here “they are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.”¹¹² On the other hand, Hegel mentions the ideal recognition, which is a mutual, reciprocal recognition. For Hegel, the one-side of recognition is not enough because it is only ideal by way of the reciprocal and mutual relation, by both sides of selves. From this passage, it can be said that there is only one-side for recognition. In this recognition, at first, it appears at only the lord is a person because only the lord succeeded in being recognized by the other one. However, even though he is not dependent on something else, the lord only “appears” independent *prima facie*. As we know, Hegel’s philosophy always progresses by transcending previous phases. In this context, Hegel explains that the freedom of the lord is not real freedom. On the other hand, the freedom of bondsman is closer to achieving freedom. This is due, not only to his/her recognition of the lord, but also to labour or work. In the *Phenomenology*, as well as in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel explains that the individuals realize themselves through work or labour.¹¹³ The reason why labor is important for the individual’s self-realization is that the individuals see their own reflection in their products. They objectify themselves in their products.

Another important concept, which is especially mentioned in the *Phenomenology*, is the concept of *desire*. The concept of desire and recognition complete each other by being mediated through labor. The product of labor is also invested with the desire to be recognized by other individuals. This means that the individual and their product of labor do not remain *in itself* but become *for itself* after being recognized; in other words, after a relationship with others.¹¹⁴

¹¹² G. W. F. Hegel, “The Phenomenology of Spirit”, §185, from *The Hegel Reader*, edited by Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998, p. 95

¹¹³ “Labour... is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the thing. The negative relation to the object passes into the *form* of the object, into something that is permanent and remains; because it is just for the labourer that the object has independence. This negative mediating agency, the activity giving shape and form, is at the same time the individual existence, the pure self-existence of that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externalized and passes into condition of permanence.” G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, § 195, trans: J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1967, p. 238

¹¹⁴ Bernstein defines the significance of these concepts such as *an sich* and *für sich* as follows; “The *an sich* is always undeveloped and self-identical; because self-identical it is self-contained and not dependent on anything outside itself. The *für sich* involves a developmental process of externalization whereby the self-containedness of the other is overcome and it becomes for another, and in that sense dependent on another.” (J.M. Bernstein, ‘From self-consciousness to community: act and recognition in the master-slave relationship’, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.18)

The individual as a self-conscious being exists not only *an sich* but also *für sich*. Individuals externalize themselves by way of desire and therefore enter into relations to others. The individuals' desire and will are not just natural desire or will like the desire for eating or drinking; human desire is linked to knowledge of the desired thing, that is, consciousness of the desired thing. The knowledge or consciousness of desire or will leads the individuals to relate to other individuals and society. The concept of desire is thus accompanied by knowledge and carries the individual to the level of self-consciousness. This relation of the individuals to society is explained by Hegel in terms of duty and right relation.

3.2.1.1. The realization of the individual: duty-right dialectic:

In the third part of the *Encyclopedia*, "The Philosophy of Spirit," Hegel talks about external circumstances as the objective aspect in which the spirit realizes itself. Therefore, here it is spoken of finitude, the external appearances. Within this objective world, the particularized will finds itself among differences. These circumstances and differences present themselves to consciousness as needs.¹¹⁵ When Hegel speaks of the Will, he refers to the practical aspects of Spirit. In this context, the Spirit's needs are not only epistemic but practical.

According to Hegel, liberty belongs to thought and to the universal. The form of liberty is self-referential—i.e. its aim is itself;—its content is determined by 'right.' It therefore has its content in the form of universality. With this character of universality, the content of freedom is the law. Hegel thus relates liberty to right or justice (*Enc.* §486). The form of individual freedom is moulded by universal form of liberty, that is, *law*. Therefore, according to Hegel, the "reality" is the law in which free will realizes its existence. "This 'reality', in general, where free will has *existence*, is the Law (Right)—the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juristic law, but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom."¹¹⁶ The individual freedom or liberty in general, is instituted by an authoritative power. The existence of the individual is thus rendered dependent on law.

Hegel speaks of the development of free will through three stages, which demonstrate his dialectical approach and summarize the structure and development of his *Philosophy of Right*; and which we can see outlined in the following paragraph:

"The free will is:

(A) Itself at first immediate, and hence as a single being- the *person*: the existence which the person gives to its liberty is *property*. The *Right as Right* (law) is *formal, abstract right*.

¹¹⁵ Hegel, *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Part III: The Philosophy of Spirit, Section Two: Objective Spirit § 483

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 486

(B) When the will is reflected into self, so as to have its existence inside it, and to be thus at the same time characterized as a *particular*, it is the right of the *subjective will, morality* of the individual conscience.

(C) When the free will is the substantial will, made actual in the subject and conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity - it is the ethics of actual life in family, civil society, and State.”¹¹⁷

The first phase is immediate, that is, the person. The person actualizes its freedom in the external sphere by way of property. However, for Hegel property does not only satisfy natural needs; it gives the possibility to the person to objectify its existence and supersede “the subjective phase of personality (*PR*, §41).” In other words, freedom, or a person, gives itself reality in sensible materials, objects, or external things. In this first phase of freedom defined as property, the right is abstract right.

In paragraph § 488, Hegel makes a clear distinction between ‘the person’ and ‘the individual’; while the mind in its immediacy of self-secured liberty is the individual, the person is one who knows this individuality within absolute free will. This absolute free will is described as an inner freedom. For this reason, in itself, it is abstract and empty and “has its particularity and fulfillment not yet on its own part, but on an external thing.”¹¹⁸ The person realizes itself through the possession, which is external to it. I give the predicate of “mine” to this possession, that is, my personal will. Possession is defined as property and this property is characterized as a means and thus the existence of the personality as an end.

The person is more abstract, that is, *in itself* than the individual; every individual is of course also a person but when we make mention of the individuals, we speak of the individuals associated with others. For this reason, in my judgment, Hegel uses the term, ‘person’ in the first section, Abstract Right; and in the Ethical Life, he uses the term, individual in relation to family, society, and the state.

According to Hegel, the ‘subjective will’ can realize its existence only in conditions of freedom which are defined as duties. Hegel adds, “what is a right is also a duty, and what a duty is, is also a *right*.”¹¹⁹ This statement is the certain indication of the modern state. More clearly, it is a demonstration of the structure of modern society. Besides, in my view this statement of Hegel displays the possible relation of the individuals to the state or politics. Hegel emphasizes, “in the phenomenal range right and duty are correlate, at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else.”¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 487

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 488

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 486

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 486

When Hegel speaks of the right-duty dialectic, he gives the example of the rights and duties of the members of the family. For example, the father of the family has duties to protect and educate the children while the children have the duty to obey their father. In this respect, “the rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them.”¹²¹ Likewise, just as the individuals as the members of the state have rights in the state, so they have some duties to realize.

According to Hegel, the right and duty relation organizes the relation of the state to the individuals. From my standpoint, duty-right relation is basic for the existence of modern state; because it is another sort of contract that relies on interaction or interconnection between two sides. Law formalizes this contract (duty-right relation). It does not matter whether this mutual recognition between the state and the individuals based on the duty-right relation is actualized rightly but this recognition is important and fundamental for the modern state dependent on law. “All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals...he who has no rights has no duties and vice versa.”¹²² From this statement, it can be said that the State and society exist for the sake of the individuals’ interests. The state, society, and the individuals are in a mutual relationship like the reciprocal relationship between duty and rights. In my view however, in reality, while individuals perform their duties, the state does not carry out its duties in the same way.

In the second phase, the person reflects on itself.¹²³ Duty is in the sense of morality in me as subjective will. In this sense, there are two things different from each other, on the one hand, it is the duty as a subjective disposition or will in me, or inward, and on the other hand, this duty must be morally actualized. In other words, there is inward purpose and the realization or actualization of this purpose.

In paragraph §502, Hegel talks about the distinction between the law (right) and the subjective will. Subjective will is abstract and empty as long as it does not actualize itself in the external sphere and thus rise to the universal. Law is related to society. If there are not any laws, in a society there would be revenge as a form of punishment which is the act of a subjective will (*PR*, §102 *Addition*). This subjective will or personal will corresponds to direct right or abstract right that is particular. Therefore subjective will exists independently and can be in opposition to universal will (*PR* §104).

The realization of subjective will is possible in the sphere of morality.¹²⁴ The reality of right first demonstrates itself in the subjective will or personal will. Then this subjective will moves (progresses) from the abstract right to the phase of morality in which subjective will refers to itself, that is, it is its own object. Therefore this phase is called the phase of self-determining of subject which “constitutes

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 486

¹²² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 486

¹²³ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 486

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 502

the principle of morality (*PR*, §104).” Then Hegel points out the ambiguity of the natural right or law of nature by questioning whether this natural right existed readily in nature or this right is governed by the nature of things.

“The phrase ‘Law of Nature’, or Natural Right, in use for the philosophy of law involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing ready-formed in nature, or right as governed by the nature of things, i.e. by the notion. The former used to be the common meaning, accompanied with the fiction of a *state of nature*, in which the law of nature should hold sway; whereas the social and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights... The law of nature — strictly so called — is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the reign of force, and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. The social state, on the other hand, is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what is to be restricted and sacrificed is just the willfulness and violence of the state of nature.”¹²⁵

In this paragraph, Hegel criticizes social contract theorists for their understanding of the state of nature. The idea of ‘law of nature’ (or ‘natural right’) is in essence based on the statement claiming that society is a battleground (*Kampfplatz*). The first understanding is related to the state of nature, in which every individual is considered to be equal. However, in the state of nature, every individual has infinite right and for this reason their infinite rights need to be curtailed for the common good.

Hegel criticizes the contract theorists because the state of nature is not an ethical state. It is an animal state, in which the individuals fight against one another. That is, it is a state, in which all is against all. According to Hegel, in this state, men do not have rights and duties. For this reason, in society they do not have the natural rights which society could respect. The problem of the modern state in this respect is that the state does not consider itself as having the duty to satisfy the desires of every individual but rather the individual acts as a means that has to work for the state. Even though, as Hegel claimed, there is a reciprocal (mutual) relationship between these two, the individual and the state, all of this is only in theory because in practice there is not any mutuality between these two. While the individual realizes their duties, they cannot take their rights from the state.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 502

At the end of the paragraph, Hegel points out that it is just the social state in which rights are actualized and realized. Under the subtitle of “Morality,” Hegel claims, “the free individual, who, in mere law, counts only as a person, is now characterized as subject...”¹²⁶

After morality, Hegel passes on to the ethics in which the subjective and objective spirit find their completeness, that is, their true being. In the last phase, ethical life, family and civil society are integrated into the State as the universal entity. The duty and the actualization of duty combine in the ethical life or in social ethics that is their truth, that is, their absolute unity.¹²⁷

3.2.2. Ontological and moral aspects of the individual in the *Philosophy of Right*

The aim of Hegel in the *Philosophy of Right* is to reconcile Nature and Spirit. In this context, I would like to discuss the role of the individual as a person in this reconciliation. In my view, his work was a systematic explanation of a theory of the state. Hegel constructed or re-defined new concepts such as state, law, right and duty in order to found a state theory. In this respect, “Hegel sees the state as ‘an independent and autonomous power’ in which ‘the individuals are mere moments,’ as ‘the march of God in the world.’ He thought this to be the very essence of the state, but, in reality, he was only describing the historical type of state that corresponded to civil society.”¹²⁸ From this quotation, it seems that the individual exists not *in itself* and *for itself* but it exists *for another*. This ‘another’ is the state. However, this theory of the state is based on the concept of freedom. Especially when we thoroughly examine the “Introduction,” we see that Hegel talks particularly about freedom as well as will. Without the existence of right, neither freedom nor will truly exist. Therefore, in my view, the theory of law corresponds to a theory of freedom. Under this subtitle, the problem of the individual is subsumed under two topics; 1) the relation between the individual and freedom; 2) ethical life and the individual.

3.2.2.1. The relation between the individual and freedom

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel points out that the individual can be differentiated from the animal in terms of *will* and *thought*; because animal has no will and for this reason, its action depends on its instinct. In this regard, the individuals cannot use their theoretical faculty without will; because according to Hegel, “in thinking we are active.”¹²⁹ In this context, Hegel asserts that the theoretical and practical faculties are inseparable. “In every activity, whether of thought or will, both these

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 503

¹²⁷ “In social ethics these two parts have reached their truth, their absolute unity; although even right and duty return to one another and combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity.” (*Ibid.*, Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 486)

¹²⁸ Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960, p.215

¹²⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §4, pp. xxx-xxxii

elements are found.”¹³⁰ In animals, there is no theoretical faculty. According to Hegel, the nature of will and freedom can be shown within the whole. In this respect, we are going to analyze this whole in an effort to understand the nature of will and freedom, which can be shown in Hegel’s theory of right.

Hartmann explains that the assumptions of *Philosophy of Right* result from the *Logic*. The *Philosophy of Right* starts with the abstract right and *ab initio*, demonstrates the representation of his logic. The reason is that from the family to the state, it proceeds with logical assumptions, or logical premises. In this context, for instance, the family is the manifestation of immediate unity of plural spirit; society appears as reflective unity (by the element of Understanding); and finally the state establishes the unity of particular and universal, that is, it refers to what is “for itself” (reason, self-comprehending).¹³¹

In the sphere of abstract right, the individuals firstly exist in themselves. For this reason, the individuals are persons and the will of the individuals is merely abstract and potential. So long as the individuals do not embody themselves in the external world, they cannot actualize their true freedom. For this reason, Hegel writes, “a person must give to his freedom an external sphere, in order that he may reach the completeness implied in the idea.”¹³² According to Hegel, embodiment is made possible through property, which is external. In this regard, property does not merely satisfy our needs but also make it possible for us to supersede the subjective phase of personality and replace it with the objective phase (§41 Addition). Hegel states, “a person has right to direct his will upon any object, as his real and positive end.”¹³³ Thanks to property, the individuals realize their freedom in the external sphere, that is, in an object. In this context, Hegel points out that in possession the individuals become rational. This first realization of freedom in the external object is not a completed one but Hegel adds that it is the only realization of the abstract personality relating itself to its object.

3.2.2.1.1. Property and the existence of the individual

The *Philosophy of Right*, as we said previously, speaks of property, which gives personality to a person. In Hegel’s own words, “...property...is the existence [*Dasein*] of personality.” My will takes visible existence through property. In other words, property is the outward symbol of personality. Hegel proclaims that human beings have not just appetites or desire but also will and thus if they are a person and act rationally they need to possess a thing. Before anything else, the person becomes rational through possession. Property is the embodiment of my will (§46 Addition).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §4, p. xxxi

¹³¹ Klaus Hartmann, “Towards a systematic Reading of Philosophy of Right”, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.117

¹³² G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §41, p. 4

¹³³ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. Dyde, §44, p. 6

Man also looks at another person as property in which he can find his personality and his will. Here what I mean with the concept of property is not merely a material entity. Property is more than a material thing; it has also a spiritual value.

However, it does not make too big a difference whether one speaks of property in the material sense or the spiritual sense because, either way, property is just a means. It is nothing more than an instrument in order to exist humanly. In this respect, in the *Philosophy of Right*, in paragraph §40, he states that “a person, in distinguishing himself from himself, relates himself to another person, and indeed it is only as owners of property that the two have existence [*Dasein*] for each other.” When the subject relates to another subject, this relationship takes place through possession, or by virtue of property. In this respect, only through self-consciousness, that is, by means of becoming conscious of themselves, do the individual take their own possession. It signifies that to possess is to be self-conscious of one’s own being and other-being!

By means of property, the object comes into the individuals’ possession. This object becomes meaningful because indeed the object does not have any end in itself; for this reason, thanks to the will of this person the object acquires a soul and meaning (§44). In paragraph §43, Hegel differentiates the inward property of spirit or the inner spiritual side of a person from external objects. This inward property is defined as mental endowments such as talents and knowledge. They are also the possession, that is, of the free mind. This free mind gives external existence to these mental endowments. In other words, free mind directs its inward property upon objects. Therefore, the objects become ours.

Every individual has the will to direct this will to an object. Every individual is free to make something an object of their will; because they have the right to direct their will upon an object. In property, my will takes a visible existence. So long as my will becomes objective in property, property takes the character of private property (§46). I am a person so long as I will something, or I want to possess something. I have to desire something in order to externalize myself. However, it is not enough to claim and represent that something is mine. The second step must be realization of this will, which is based on the concept of recognition. I possess an object as long as my will exists in this object. If I take possession of it, it means that “the embodiment of my will then be recognized by others as mine.” (§51) To take something over into possession signifies that the property you have is recognized by others and for this reason your personality is recognized in the same way. This recognition is only possible by relationships. A relationship means recognizing the existence of others or being conscious of others.

There is a difference between the animal and human being in terms of recognition. When a pair of animals copulates, the unity of their species is based on feeling but in this relation, there is not any

mutual recognition at the conceptual level. Hegel displays that this conceptual level is achieved only between human individuals.¹³⁴ Through this relation, which exists also between the child and parents relationship in the family, human beings reciprocally know each other. Therefore, for each individual, the matter is to discover their truth, that is to say, it is discovery of what the truth of their existence is. Real cultural communication begins in the ambient of family. Hegel calls it *Bildung*.¹³⁵

When we experience our dependence on basic needs, such as hunger and thirst, which keep recurring, then we try to satisfy these needs. For doing this, we begin to labor in order to produce something which supports these needs all the time. As a result, we have something in our *possession*.¹³⁶ Taking possession or having property leads the individual to meet with their opposition, which is an object outside themselves.¹³⁷ The individual becomes a rational being for the first time with possession because property replaces the subjectivity of personality; the individuals *objectify* themselves. Therefore, from their pure or merely abstract determination the individuals move into concrete freedom. However, it is important to note and Hegel reminds us that this realization of freedom in the external sphere of possession or property, that is, in an external thing, is not complete.

At the stage of abstract right, individuals are merely natural beings. They do not yet have a true conception of themselves. Paragraph § 57 talks about the individuals' possession of themselves

¹³⁴ H.S. Harris, "Hegel's System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation," in G. W. F. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4)*, edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1979, p.29

¹³⁵ "*Bildung*, as Hegel understands it is the reciprocal communication of rational agents." (H.S. Harris, "Hegel's System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation," in G. W. F. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4)*, edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1979, p.30)

¹³⁶ Hegel describes possession as having external power over something. And taking a possession or the possession of property on the one hand is the satisfaction of wants and needs as a means but on the other hand Hegel says that "it is really the first embodiment of freedom and an independent end (§45, *Note*)." In other words, first of all, the possession of property appears as a means to satisfy the wants and needs, but indeed it is the first actualization of freedom.

¹³⁷ In the *Philosophy of Right*, in the first section, namely, "Abstract Right", Hegel speaks of man as an implicit and abstract being, which does not yet encounter with his opposition or any object. In this regard he says, in addition of paragraph §34, "if I say, 'I am free,' the I, here, is still implicit and has no real opposed to it." Of course it means that this first stage is immature, indefinite, and hence very abstract. But in the same addition of paragraph Hegel points out that only "from the standpoint of morality as contrasted to abstract right there is opposition, because there I am a particular will, while the good, though within me, is the universal." It means that at that stage, in terms of morality, the will contains in both the particular and universal. In this manner, the will is definite. But what happens when the will becomes definite? Hegel replies this question as follows in the same paragraph; "but when this lack of definiteness is set in opposition to the definite, it becomes itself something definite. In other words, abstract identity becomes the distinguishing feature of the will, and the will thereby becomes an individual will or person." What Hegel here intends to say is that the definition refers to the concrete identity and to the concrete will; through this definite and concrete will the individual exists as a person. (G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, translated by S.W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc.: Mineola, New York, 2005, §34 Addition , p.1)

through self-consciousness. As Hegel says, “the circumstance that I, as free will, am an object [*gegenständlich*] to myself in what I possess and only become an actual will by this means constitutes the genuine and rightful element in possession, the determination of property.”¹³⁸ However, Hegel writes that “only through the education of his body and mind, mainly by his becoming conscious of himself as free does he take possession of himself, become his own property and stand in opposition to others.”¹³⁹

In the modern period, the individuals are not educated so as to enable them to “take possession of themselves” or to acquire an understanding of freedom in the sense that Hegel describes. They are rather indoctrinated so that they internalize capitalist ideology and serve the capitalist. In this respect, the individuals can be defined as a means for the satisfaction of capitalists. In paragraph § 59, Hegel says that the individuals use objects as a means for the satisfaction of their wants; in the case of the modern period, the individuals are used as objects which corresponds to a means. The object (commodity) becomes the fundamental principle, which is alienated from the existence of the individuals. The individuals are considered merely as consumers, and, qua labor-power, as themselves commodities, that is, as a means. In the same paragraph, Hegel claims, “when the object and I come together, one of the two must lose its qualities, if we are to become identical.”¹⁴⁰ Since the individual is the living being and the object is merely a natural thing, the object is consumed and the individual preserves themselves. However, in modern capitalist society, the individuals and object come together and it is the individuals that lose their qualities. They are reduced and transformed into a simple means.

There is a strong and rigorous relation between the individuals and property. Property as an external thing does not exist in itself but in its relation to the individuals. According to one aspect of property, it also exists by means of its relations to other external things (§71). These relations could be both necessary and accidental. However, as we already learned, property also is the manifestation of will, for this reason, the existence of property for other’s existence means that property exists for the will of another. The relationship of the will to another will is the true ground because this is the ground on which freedom realizes itself.

Here the contract is mediation between two wills. Therefore, contract is not the means through which I hold property by means of relating my subjective will to an object; it is the means by which I hold property by virtue of another individual’s will.¹⁴¹ However, contract still remains in the sphere of

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, edit. by Wood, trans. by Nisbet, §45, pp.76-77

¹³⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, § 57, p. 13

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §59 *Addition*, p.15

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §71, p.23

abstract right; that is, it is still subjective because it is nothing more than arbitrary caprice. Contract constitutes general right; but its inner universality is merely generality and this generality relies on the caprice of particular wills. Hegel states that in this external manifestation of right, when right is opposed to its intrinsic universality, then it is a mere semblance, or seeming reality, which corresponds to wrong. In this context, Hegel defines ‘wrong’ as “the mere outer appearance of essence, giving itself forth as independent.”¹⁴² In sphere of abstract right under wrong, neither right in general nor personal right is respected by the parties making the contract. Wrong is not a creation of evil but it results from the absence of law. In this respect, we can observe from the following quotation the importance and significance of right. “Hence everything turns on the point that in crime it is not the production of evil but the injury of right as right, which must be set aside and overcome.”¹⁴³ In the aforementioned paragraph, Hegel lays emphasis on right, which is essential for the existence of freedom of the individuals. Once right is injured, wrong is inevitable.

In the sphere of abstract right, the will makes its existence possible in an external object. However, in the next step, this will comes back to itself and becomes its own object. This is the sphere of morality, in which the will becomes self-referring of will, that is, it becomes subjectivity. Morality is defined as the self-determining subject (*PR*, §104).¹⁴⁴

In the sphere of morality, the will is not in itself but rather it is for itself because it turns over against itself. Here the individuals pass into being subjects; that is, they are no longer mere person. However, Hegel argues that the real completion of the concrete identity of the good and the subjective will, which arises in morality, takes place in the ethical system. The ethical sphere or ethical order is not the subjective form of the will. In this context, Hegel claims, “neither right nor morality can exist independently, but must have the ethical as its pillar and support. In right is wanting the element of subjectivity, and in morality is wanting the objective, so that neither by itself has any actuality.”¹⁴⁵ The ethical system is considered as necessary element because to Hegel’s system, while the sphere of abstract right is lacking in subjectivity, morality is deprived of objectivity.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §83 *Addition*, p. 30

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 99 *Note*, p. 36

¹⁴⁴ Let me quote from Hegel who summarizes all phase of the will through which the conception of freedom progresses. This development begins with abstract phase of the will to the phase of the self-determining subject, which is morality. “Thus property being an external object, we have in it the phase of the abstract “mine;” in exchange we have the common “mine,” the “mine” brought into existence by two wills; in wrong the will which belongs to the province of right, the will in its abstract, direct, and intrinsic existence, is made contingent by means of the particular will which is itself contingent. In morality this whole phase of will is so far transcended that its contingency is turned back into itself and made one with itself, and thus becomes a self-referring, infinite contingency of the will, or in a word subjectivity.” (*Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 104 *Note*, p. 41)

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 141 *Addition*, p.75

According to Ritter, in Hegel's philosophy, the concept of freedom corresponds to justice. In other words,

“Hegel's theory of justice is more radically a theory of freedom than any other. What immediately sets Hegel's philosophy of right apart is that it is devoted to establishing and determining justice as freedom, not by postulating freedom as the prior principle of justice, but by developing the structures of justice themselves as the constitutive reality of freedom.”¹⁴⁶

For this reason, he begins from abstract right and moves to the realization of the individuals in the political state. What differentiates Hegel's understanding of freedom from liberal theory is that Hegel's theory does not develop through any predetermined concept of freedom. In liberal theory, there is a predetermined notion of freedom and this notion is considered as a principle, which determines and legitimates “the various relations of right.”¹⁴⁷ In Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, ‘abstract right’ is the same with the traditional term of ‘natural right’¹⁴⁸, which, as we have seen, Hegel criticizes. Hegel mentions this point in his *Encyclopaedia* in paragraph §502 quoted above of which we have already spoken. In this paragraph, he talks about the state of nature and natural rights, which is *ready-made* or *ready-given* in nature. However, in Hegel, justice as freedom is not a prior principle but justice provides the development of the structures of freedom. That is, justice is “the constitutive reality of freedom.”¹⁴⁹ Freedom is constituted by justice but not as a principle. Through justice, through right the individual realizes their freedom in the state. In other words, freedom or right is not naturally given.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Joachim Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, translated with an Introduction by Richard Dien Winfield, The Mit Press, 1982, p.2

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Winfield, p.3

¹⁴⁸ Seyla Binhabib, “Obligation, Contract and Exchange”, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.160

¹⁴⁹ Joachim Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, translated with an Introduction by Richard Dien Winfield, The Mit Press, 1982, p.2

¹⁵⁰ Quite similar claim can be found in the *Philosophy of Right* in paragraph §49 in which speaks of “equality.” Hegel says that in personality it is possible to say that all persons are equal which is according to Hegel an empty tautology; since a person as abstract being is not yet considered within differentiated attribute and is not separated from others. For Hegel, equality depends not only on the accident of natural nature but also relies upon difference of mind and character. In this regard, Hegel writes, “sometimes the demand is made for equality in the division of the soil of the earth, and even of other kinds of wealth. Such a claim is superficial, because differences of wealth are due not only to the accidents of external nature but also to infinite variety and difference of mind and character. In short, the quality of an individual's possessions depends upon his reason.” (*PR*, § 49 Note, p. 9, trans: Dyde) That is to say, equality is determined by interaction and interconnection with others, such as other subjects or nature. Hegel in the addition of the same paragraph states that all individuals are equal but only as a person, that is to say, “only with reference to the source of possession;” because “everyone must have property.” For him, this sort of quality is the only one that we can consider as equality.

In the Translator's Introduction to *Hegel and French Revolution*, Richard Winfield speaks of Hegel's three basic theses on freedom. The first thesis is based on the relation between freedom and justice; in other words, freedom is defined as a sole substance and content of justice. Freedom is presented as the structure of justice and justice as a realization of freedom. The second understanding of Hegel's freedom is related to a structure of interconnection and interaction between the individuals. Therefore, "freedom is neither a faculty given by nature, nor a capacity of the self, but a structure of interaction between individuals wherein the self-determination of each is constitutively related to that of others through mutual recognition and respect."¹⁵¹ In this regard, the concept of 'mutual recognition' is significant to comprehend what freedom in terms of Hegel's philosophy is; because freedom is determined by this inter-subjective structure. In this inter-subjective structure, the individuals objectify their self-determination through their relation to others. In this reciprocal relation, "each will autonomously determines itself in accord with the realization of others."¹⁵² Thirdly, "the interaction of freedom is not a single interrelationship."¹⁵³ However, it refers to a system of right. This system of right consists of "all practical relations as determination of freedom."¹⁵⁴ This freedom is linked to distinct structures or spheres of interaction such as the sphere of person, property, morality, civil society, the family, and the state.

Since the treatment of the topic of freedom and justice in the *Philosophy of Right* moves back and forth between and pays equal attention to the subjective and objective aspects of the issue, the concept of relation, especially, reciprocal relation is *essential* to it. The content of the structure of this interaction involves particular rights, duties or institutional forms, which are explained in this masterpiece.

Hegel presents the mutual relation between freedom and right first in relation to property. In his essay called "Person and Property: On Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*; Paragraphs 34-81," Ritter claims that in Hegel's philosophy, the liberation of the individual depends on work. This approach is in contrast to the contract theorists' who state that human beings lived in freedom in the state of nature because, according to Hegel, this sort of state ignores that human beings are free *in actu*.¹⁵⁵ In paragraph § 194 (in *Note*), Hegel points out that "in this view no account is taken of the freedom which lies in work."¹⁵⁶ In the same *Note*, Hegel links the freedom of human beings to their emancipation from the power of

¹⁵¹ Joachim Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, translated with an Introduction by Richard Dien Winfield, The Mit Press, 1982, p.5

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Winfield, p.5

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Winfield, p.6

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Winfield, p.6

¹⁵⁵ (in reality) *Ibid.*, Ritter, "Person and Property: On Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*; Paragraphs 34-81", trans. by Winfield, p.136

¹⁵⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §194 (*Note*), p.103

nature through practical action. According to Hegel, the state of nature is a state of slavery (§194, *Note*); because it remains in mere nature, natural want and its direct satisfaction. However, true freedom is “nowhere to be found except in the return of spirit and thought itself, a process by which it distinguishes itself from the natural and turns back upon it.”¹⁵⁷

Freedom is related to labor as well as to justice or right through which the individuals realize themselves in society and in the political state. Therefore, property and right elevate the freedom of the individuals to the universal principle, which is to be found in the political state. In the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel makes an analogy between the concept and its existence and the body-soul dialectic. Just as the soul and the body are distinct and still united so the concept and its existence have two sides; distinct and united. And Hegel says that if these two, namely, the body and the soul or the concept and its existence do not correspond, they are defective. In this context, Hegel contends that the unity of the concept and its existence, of body and soul is not “a mere harmony of the two, but their complete interpenetration.”¹⁵⁸ To Hegel, this unity is Idea.” The idea of right must correspond to the idea of freedom through its embodiment.¹⁵⁹ Freedom is not possible without idea of right and its actualization.

The *Philosophy of Right* begins with subjective spirit and proceeds with objective spirit. However, it seems to me that the critique of Marx on the section of the State, can also be applied to the rest of the book, i.e., the first section on abstract right. In the *Critique*, Marx criticizes Hegel’s theory of the state or law on the ground that the predicate becomes the subject or vice versa. For instance in the first section on the abstract right, when Hegel talks about the personality, he considers the personality as a subject, which is indeed a predicate. Instead of referring to person, he mentions its predicate, that is, personality. He says, “personality implies, in general, a capacity to possess rights, and constitutes the conception and abstract basis of abstract right.”¹⁶⁰ Here, it should be the person, who has capacity to possess right but what Hegel does is to consider the predicate as a subject. For this reason, *ab initio*, Hegel explicitly remains within abstraction.

In the “Introduction” of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel criticizes Kant’s doctrine of right and Rousseau’s definition of right. Kant claims that in order to attain a universal law the basic idea is to limit freedom and caprice of the individuals in accordance with the universal law. By the limitation of freedom and caprice of the individuals, every individual’s principle of action would be brought in accordance with a universal law. In Kant’s doctrine of right, Hegel finds both the negative and positive

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §194 (*Note*), p.103

¹⁵⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, § 1 *Addition*, p. xxiii

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 1 *Addition*, p. xxiii

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 36, p.2

side. That is to say, 'limitation' is the negative side but 'universal law' or so-called "law of reason" is the positive side of Kant's theory. Kant and Rousseau consider not absolute and rational will as the basic principle but they focus on "the will and spirit of the particular individual in their peculiar caprice."¹⁶¹ For this reason, according to them, the truth relies on the individual's will but not on reason or rationality.

From this standpoint, that is, from the analysis of the concept of freedom in relation to the individuals, now we are going on to examine the existence of the individuals and their freedom in ethical life.

3.2.2.2. The ethical life and the individual

Hegel divides his study into three parts; (1) Abstract Right, (2) Morality, (3) Ethics. In the ethical system or order, the objective and abstract form of right and the subjective form of morality are reconciled. The form of the ethical order is universality. What grounds the individuals is their social relations and the social order in which they live. Hegel affirms that the development of the individuals is possible only in a good state; in that in this good state the individuals receive their rights.

A detailed examination of the ethical system will lead to the following results: 1) Existence of the individuals is actualized through duty. 2) Ethical reality depends on the individuals who remove their private will and conscience, which are their self-assertion and antagonism (*PR*, §152). 3) In the ethical system, the individuals have rights on the account that they can subjectively and freely determine themselves. These individuals are not independent because they "belong to the ethical and social fabric."¹⁶²

My argument will be that Hegel's philosophy proceeds by subject-predicate inversion as Marx and Feuerbach state. He conceives the ethical system as a subject and absolute, that is, everlasting, while the individuals are predicates and a matter of indifference to the objective ethical order.¹⁶³

In the "Preface," Hegel expresses the goal of his work as "an attempt to conceive of and present the state as in itself rational."¹⁶⁴ Here Hegel declares, "the rational is real and the real one is rational." This rationality realizes itself in the external world with the activity of the individuals and culminates in the state. "The rational is synonymous with the idea, because in realizing itself it passes into external existence. It thus appears in an endless wealth of forms, figures and phenomena."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 29, p. xlvi

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §153, p.81

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 145 Addition, p.77

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, p. xx.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, "Preface", *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, p. xix

What leads the individuals to be free is duty. Counter to the general perception of duty, which is determined as the limitation of freedom, Hegel claims that “the individual finds in duty liberation.”¹⁶⁶ By way of duty, the individual or subject encounters objective realization. Duty frees the individuals from their subjective and particular inclination and impulse. Also for Hegel, duty abolishes indefinite subjectivity of the individual by way of a realization of its action objectively. The point is that duty with relation to right correlates the individuals to universal spirit.¹⁶⁷ “Right and duty coincide in the identity of the universal and the particular wills. By virtue of the ethical fabric man has rights, so far as he has duties, and duties so far as he has rights.”¹⁶⁸ And the individual’s rights are protected by the state. The unity of right and duty as Hegel explains in the *Philosophy of Right* is “one of the most important features of states;” the actualization of freedom and the ethical whole correspond to the state. And the state is conceived as being on a par with God.

“§ 258 Addition—...The state is the march of God in the world; its ground or cause is the power of reason realizing itself as will. When thinking of the idea of the state, we must not have in our mind any particular state, or particular institution, but must rather contemplate the idea, this actual God, by itself.”¹⁶⁹

All in all, this passage explains to us that particular persons or individuals are only means. They are only phases in the realization of the purpose of the state. Also the individual’s awareness of the essence of the state is not the point. The point is that the essence of the state, the realization of the state, can be present without this awareness. The point is that the individual is the means for this realization.

As we see, the real purpose of Hegel is to attain rationality in the form of phenomena, by way of the objectification of the state in the existence of the individual or external world. In this regard, the state is the unity of the subjective spirit¹⁷⁰ and the objective spirit.¹⁷¹ The subjective spirit includes the different opinions and actions of individuals, and the objective spirit refers to the body of laws.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §149 p. 78 (italic is mine)

¹⁶⁷ “...mind or spirit is not something individual, but the unity of individual and universal.” (*Ibid.*, *PR.* §156) And this spirit for Hegel refers of course to the state. “The state is the spirit, which abides in the world and there realizes itself consciously.” (*Ibid.*, *PR.* §258)

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §155 p. 81

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §258 p. 136

¹⁷⁰ Hegel in his works such as the *Encyclopaedia* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* explains the development of Spirit in three stages: Subjective, objective (the *Philosophy of Right* is its broad explanation of the objective spirit) and absolute spirit. Subjective spirit is not yet as consciousness of itself. It is in this stage is in itself (*an sich*) but not for itself (*fur sich*). Here “spirit stands opposed to a natural world in which it does not as yet see anything akin itself” (Hegel: A Re-Examination, J. N. Findlay, London.1958). Spirit is also in bondage to what it stands to opposed.

¹⁷¹ In the objective spirit, spirit develops itself through the laws, morality and ethics. Here spirit is in the interrelation with the other spirit. It can be said that spirit is here for itself.

Objective spirit implies the spirit of a social group. This social group objectifies its spirit in its customs, laws and institutions (Right). The individual character and the individual consciousness are permeated by this objective spirit. When the contradiction between the objective and subjective spirit becomes a single unity then they attain the absolute spirit, which is the expression of freedom.

For Hegel, the ethical system, which includes the family, civil society and the state, is the only possible place where the individual can achieve self-realization, self-determination, self-consciousness and become free.¹⁷²

Under the title of “Ethics,” Hegel discusses the economic, legal and social institutions. He holds that these economic, legal and social relations can be observed in ‘civil society.’ He especially develops his materialistic elements or premises in the paragraphs between 182 and 208. In these paragraphs, he deals with the system of needs. Richard Winfield explains the division between the state and civil society in Hegel’s “ethical life” as follows;

“Hegel demarcates civil society from the state by having the economy, social interest groups, and the public administrations of civil law and welfare all fall within civil society as necessary components of social freedom, while making the independent concern of self-government the specific activity and *raison d’être* of the state. On this basis, Hegel gives an entirely new mandate to public life.”¹⁷³

For Hegel the liberation of the individual is made possible through civil society, which enables individuals to relate to each other. The individual determines himself in this ethical system. In society, wherein there is a relationship with other individuals, the individual is able to be recognized. This recognition is possible not only by way of the relationship to other individuals but also by the institutions, law and the state, which give the universal character to the individual.

As the project of Hegel is to realize the unity of the universal and the individual, he does not give an atomistic character to the individual. He says, “individuals in the civic community are private persons, who pursue their own interests.”¹⁷⁴ However, then, he adds, “the particular person is essentially connected with others. Hence each establishes and satisfies themselves by means of others, and so

¹⁷² G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §142 p. 76.

¹⁷³ Joachim Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, translated with an Introduction by Richard Dien Winfield, The Mit Press, 1982, p.18

¹⁷⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §187 p. 99

must call in the assistance of the form of universality.”¹⁷⁵ What is the meaning of “the form of universality?” It seems to me, for Hegel, it means to behave as being aware of others’ needs and inclinations.

The individual satisfies its needs and inclinations with being in relation to other individuals in civic community in ethical life. Ethical substance is the family (“as ‘immediate’ or natural mind”¹⁷⁶), civil society (“the ‘relative’ totality of the ‘relative’ relations of the individuals as independent persons to one another in a formal universality”¹⁷⁷) and the political constitution (“the self-conscious substance, as the mind developed to an organic actuality,”¹⁷⁸) that is, the state. The realization of the ethical idea appears in the state because the ethical spirit includes the spirit of family and civil society. As Hegel argues in what follows, the state finds its direct existence in the ethical custom and its indirect existence in the self-consciousness of the individual. Now here we have to understand what Hegel means by “direct and unreflected existence” (in ethical custom) and “indirect and reflected existence” (in self-consciousness of the individual). Here the reason why the existence of the state in self-consciousness is indirect is because the state realizes itself by way of the law or duty in the individual. In this sense, there is mediation between the state and the individual. On the other hand, the existence of the state in ethical custom is direct because the law and the institutions exist directly in ethical custom or reveal themselves directly in ethical life. The state finds its existence in its knowledge and activity.¹⁷⁹

In short, Hegel explains that the state has its reality in the particular self-consciousness and through this particular, it raises to the universal which is its highest end.¹⁸⁰ Thus, the highest duty of the individual is to be a member of the state. For Hegel the individual by way of his duty and right is in relation with the state. With these duties as we explained shortly above the individual gains his actuality and self-affirmation or self-recognition. “Consequently,” says Hegel, “individuals can attain their ends only in so far as they themselves determine their knowing, willing, and acting in a universal way and make themselves links in this chain of social connection.”¹⁸¹ The ends of the individuals are to attain the highest purpose, which is the universal.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §182 p. 96

¹⁷⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part III: The Philosophy of Spirit, Section 2: Objective Spirit, §517

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Encyclopedia*, §517

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Encyclopedia*, §517

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §257 p. 132

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §258 p. 133

¹⁸¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, from the internet side:

<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/prindex.htm>. This translation seems much more understandable than the other translation.

“§ 145 *Addition*.—Since the phases of the ethical system are conception of freedom, they are the substance or universal essence of individual. In the relation to it, individuals are merely accidental. Whether the individual exists or not is a matter of indifference to the objective ethical order, which alone is steadfast. It is the power by which the life of individuals is ruled. It has been represented by notion as eternal justice, or as deities who are absolute, in contrast with whom the striving of individuals is an empty game, like the tossing of the sea.”¹⁸²

In the passage above, while Hegel tells us that the phases of the ethical system are freedom for the individual and this freedom refers to universality for the individual, he also says that the objective ethical order, which is steady, is indifferent to the existence of the individual. He claims that the objective ethical order is the power that rules the individual’s life. However, here we have to ask who the ruler is or who/what rules the individual’s life? If the ethical order is the power that rules the individual’s life, who creates the law in order to rule the life of the individual? Who constitutes it, if the individual does not constitute the law or the rule? Here Hegel makes an abstraction from the individual and gives the priority to absolute, universal law. Marx’s critique of religion also addresses this question:

“the basis of irreligious criticism is: *Man makes religion*, religion does not make man. In other words, religion is the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man, who either has not yet found himself or has already lost himself again. But *man* is no abstract being, squatting outside the world. Man is *the world of the man*, the state, society. This state, this society produce religion, *a perverted world consciousness*, because they are *a perverted world*.”¹⁸³

Here Marx claims that the real creator of the state, society and etc., is the individual man. However, the quotation of Hegel says that the individual is not the creator but they are the subjects who are ruled by the law of Absolute. As Marx tells us, the individuals are not abstract; on the contrary, they are reality and they exist in reality.

3.2.2.3. Civil society and the state

The definition of the individual in civil society is that they are private persons who pursue their own interests. These individuals as concrete persons are determined as “a totality of wants and a mixture of

¹⁸² G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §145 p. 77

¹⁸³ Karl Marx, *Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, from the book: *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, edited with an introduction by Lewis S. Feuer, Collins: London, Glasgow, 1969, p. 303

necessity and caprice.”¹⁸⁴ Due to these wants or needs, these particular individuals are necessarily related to others. By means of others, they satisfy their needs. Each individual establishes themselves in the sphere of difference. On the one hand, civil society is the realm of difference; on the other hand, it is intermediate element between the family and the state (*PR*, §182 Addition). Hegel states that civil community is the production of the modern world. Because every individual follows their interests in such a society, they are an end to themselves and all other individuals are nothing for them. Of course, Hegel indicates that every individual has to come into relation with others in order to realize their ends. It seems that Hegel tries to say that every one considers others as a means or instrument. But what is the reason? Why does the individual treat each other merely as a means in such society? At this point, Hegel does not yet touch upon the reason, whose answer should be found in the capitalist mode of production and its relations. In capitalist system, it is not the needs or material things that are considered as an instrument but the individuals themselves are regarded as a means. What I observed in Hegel’s political theory is that the individuals are reduced to mere things.

Hegel states that the civil community is a system, but a system of mutual dependence, which “interweaves the subsistence, happiness, and rights of the individual with the subsistence, happiness, and the right of all.”¹⁸⁵ Due to this system of mutual dependence the happiness, subsistence, and rights of one individual are in the same way the rights and happiness of others. On the one hand, Hegel indicates that everyone is an end in themselves; and therefore in order to attain their end, for each particular subject, other subjects are an instrument. The question is; if I consider each particular person as a means, how does my particular end or purpose become universal? It is quite inconsistent. Hegel tries to find the answer in the system of needs in civil community.

Hegel characterizes civil community under three elements: 1) the system of needs which contains the satisfaction of one particular individual and others through the work of this particular individual and others’ work; therefore they satisfy the needs of each other. 2) “The actualization of general freedom;” for instance, “the protection of property by the administration of justice.”¹⁸⁶ 3) The element of police and the corporation through which the particular interest becomes universal or common interest.

3.2.2.3.1. The system of wants

The particular will is at the outset opposed to the universal will and in this phase, it is subjective need. The objectification, that is, the satisfaction of this subjective want is possible in two ways. Firstly, this subjective want gets objectivity through external objects, which belong to the product of others’ will

¹⁸⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §182, p. 96

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §183, p. 97

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 188, p. 101

and needs and which are the property of other individuals. Secondly, this satisfaction and objectification is realized through labor (labor is mediation between subject and object).

Hegel defines the individual in civil society as *der Bürger (bourgeois)*, that is, the burgher.¹⁸⁷ These burghers are social because they are interdependent. Hegel contends that the individual is the product of its social conditions. Because the individuals produce the means for each other's satisfaction, their way of life is not independent but it is formed by their social surroundings.¹⁸⁸ Hegel calls this "the social moment" or "social element." In the system of needs, Hegel points out that this social moment gives a determinant form to the mode of the satisfaction of the needs including the acquisition of the means. Moreover, this social moment contains the demand of equality with others.

Hegel also states that the demand for equality and "the desire of each person to be unique become real sources of the multiplication and extension of wants."¹⁸⁹ In my view, this sort of explanation belongs to the definition of capitalism; because if somebody desires equality with others or demands to be particular or unique, it does not create a fruitful multiplication and extension of wants but it creates mere *competition*. Hegel, instead of asking the main reason of inequality for satisfaction of needs, assertively admits that inequality promotes and proves to be *fruitful source* of reproduction and extension of needs. However, today we know (and maybe Hegel should have seen) that the reproduction and extension of needs in this mode of production is far from being healthy and fruitful.¹⁹⁰

The way to produce and reproduce the means and needs for satisfaction is *labor*. Let me cite from Hegel's very literal statement: "human sweat and toil win for men the means for satisfying their wants."¹⁹¹ However, Hegel also mentions the alienation of labor due to the specialization of production which results from division of labor; because the means and wants are specified. By virtue of division of labor, labor becomes simplified. According to Hegel, this process is positive because through the abstraction of the individual's skill (i.e., abstraction of labor) the amount of production becomes greater. In this multiplication and extension of needs and means, and the ways of production, the infinitely complex movements of exchange and reciprocal production come together owing to their universality. This diversity and complexity of mutual production and exchange as well as the range of

¹⁸⁷ §190 Note: "Im Rechte ist der Gegenstand die *Person*, im moralischen Standpunkt das *Subjekt*, in der Familie das *Familienglied*, in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft überhaupt der *Bürger* (als *bourgeois*) – hier auf dem Standpunkte der Bedürfnisse (vgl. § 123 Anm.) ist es das Konkretum der *Vorstellung*, das man *Mensch* nennt; es ist also erst hier und auch eigentlich nur hier vom *Menschen* in diesem Sinne die Rede."

¹⁸⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §195, pp.103-4

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §193, p.103

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §193, p.103

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §196 *Addition*, p.104

means which is used for this production and exchange trigger the appearance of some general system within which they are differentiated: “particular systems of wants, means, and labour, ways and methods of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical training.”¹⁹² It is this system that creates class distinction because in this way the individuals are assigned to classes or estates. These classes are 1) immediate class (agricultural class); 2) the reflecting class or formal class (industrial or business class); 3) the universal class (the class of civil servants).

The definite and real actualization of the individuals is determined by the activities and the skills, which make them the member of one of these classes. For example, while Hegel refers to the first immediate and substantial class (i.e. the agricultural class) as being inclined to subjection, he considers the second formal and reflecting class (the industrial class) as being inclined to freedom. The reason for his claim is because of the type of reflection and labor involved in these different estates through which the individuals materialize their freedom. Accordingly, the real universal existence of the individuals appears in one of the definite classes to which they belong.

In civil society, my abstract right or intrinsic right becomes law. For example, in civil society, “property [...] depends upon contract, and, in general, upon those formalities, which furnish legal proof of possession.”¹⁹³ In civil society, right is the only settled element of the relation of wants. However, according to Hegel, this right is restricted and only about the protection of property. For Hegel here individuals are still in the sphere of particularity. Civil society in its abstract universality supplies a vital and important environment for the existence of the individuals but it is incomplete for human development. In civil society, the individuals act or actualize their private, subjective opinions and therefore they find their private or personal happiness in such society. In other words, civil society is the sphere of needs but this sphere is the result of the pursuit of selfish ends. But the project of Hegel is to extend such particularity to universality. Hegel indicates universality as necessity, which finds its realization in right. Justice, laws, and right all are important and necessary in civil society.

In this regard, Hegel states that “the realization of this relative unity over the whole range of particularity is the function of the police, and within a limited but concrete totality constitutes the corporation.”¹⁹⁴ The corporation as a national community enables the individual to get involved in the affairs of state. “Hence only by belonging to a national community and taking part in its political life does a man fully realize himself.”¹⁹⁵ The corporation is one of the ethical principles, which combines

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §201, p. 105

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §217, p.115

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 229 Addition, p. 122

¹⁹⁵ Z. A. Pelczynski, “Nation, civil society, state: Hegelian sources of the Marxian non-theory of nationality”, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 265

the individual and universal. Particularly, the industrial or business class belongs to the corporation. The corporation, which is grounded upon civic community, supplies the universality to the individuals, which the modern state does not always give the individuals. Thus, family is the first basis of and corporation is the second ethical ground of the state.

3.2.2.3.2. The state and the individual

Hartmann claims that the Hegelian state is different from the state in other theories such as that of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and many others “who wish to explain the genetic question of how the atomic individuals in the state of nature establish a state. Hegel on the other hand is interested in what the state is, regardless of how it arose.”¹⁹⁶ Under this subtitle, I do not deal with the state in Hegel’s theory in too much detail because I shall elaborate the elements of Hegel’s state in the last component of the thesis in interaction with Marx’s critique of it.

“The fundamental presupposition of the *Republic* and ancient Greek political life generally (Hegel argues) was absolute priority of the community over the individual.”¹⁹⁷ That’s why Hegel in the *Philosophy of Right* claims that *Republic* was a very successful political book but still it missed the concept of the individual in the political area. In this sense, the ancient Greek always sees the individual as a political animal by nature. According to the ancient Greek, he was a son of his city, he never thought of himself as separate from this city and his community, as an independent individual “facing other similar individuals in an atomistic state of nature or some rather loosely structured society which they had voluntarily established. A Greek citizen was so wholly immersed in the politics and ethos of this city that he cared little for himself.”¹⁹⁸ Accordingly, the Greek citizen did not act according to his private interest but “the traditional ideals of his city which he accepted without questioning.”¹⁹⁹ Here Pelczynski claims, “he was merely an instrument, a member of an organism, which acted through him in pursuit of its own universal needs.”²⁰⁰ For Hegel, what is lacking in ancient Greek is ‘subjectivity’ or ‘subjective freedom.’ Here Pelczynski rightly says that for this development a cultural and social revolution was needed, which happened only after the rise of the Christianity, at least for Western culture. It was through these developments that subjective freedom was recognized and admitted.

As I have claimed before, in the modern political state, the individual pretends to be the fundamental element of the political state and of society itself whereas the reality indicates that the individual is just

¹⁹⁶ Klaus Hartmann, “Towards a systematic Reading of Philosophy of Right”, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.120

¹⁹⁷ Z. A. Pelczynski, ‘Political community and individual freedom’ in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.57

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Pelczynski, ‘Political community and individual freedom’ in *The State and Civil Society*, p.57

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Pelczynski, ‘Political community and individual freedom’ in *The State and Civil Society*, p.57

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Pelczynski, ‘Political community and individual freedom’ in *The State and Civil Society*, p.57

a means. The difference between the Greek's approach to the problem and the approach of the modern political state is that in Greek society there was consideration of the universal and thus the community in which the individual lived. However, in the modern political state, neither the individual nor the community is taken into account. In modern capitalist society, the state is over and beyond the individuals as a basic and necessary institution. The state gets this power from the bourgeoisie, the law and institutions, which it has created and enacted. In other words, in modern political society, it is not the individual but a particular class, which claims to represent the individual (the bourgeoisie) and its self-institutionalization in the state that is absolute.

Pelczynski claims that Marx takes the term '*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*' ('bourgeois society') from Hegel. However, he makes a deep critique of Hegel concerning the separation between civil society and the state. It ('*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*') is the description of modern life, so to speak, it implies the contrast between 'civil' and 'political.' For Hegel, there are two different spheres: the 'public sphere', that is, '*der Staat*' and the private sphere, that is, '*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.' Hegel's observation of this separation becomes an important discovery for the social theory of Marx. Marx rejects Hegel's endorsement of this separation and the primacy of the state in social and historical life. He gives priority to ethical life in which the family and civil society are contained. On the other hand, Hegel does not believe that individualism "could express itself safely" in civil society "without harming the community." Subjectivity and particularity as two similar elements of individualism are considered by Hegel "as enemies of ethical and political life."²⁰¹

In short, Hegel does not consider civil society to be sufficient for the complete actualization of the individuals. Only the state enables individuals to be legitimately recognized.

3.2.3. *Philosophy of History*

Marcuse claims that the *Logic* of Hegel explains "the structure of reason" while *the Philosophy of History* demonstrates "the historical content of reason."²⁰²

Throughout history, philosophy makes an effort to separate feeling from reason or vice versa. One of them is always sacrificed on behalf of the other. It seems to me that one of the reasons for this effort is to abstain from *pain*, which is a feeling. Then it should not be mistaken to claim that all history is *abstention from pain*. At least we have evidence for this claim throughout history in general and in the philosophy of history in particular, in which there are many determinations, definitions and attempts in

²⁰¹ Z.A Pelczynski, 'The significance of Hegel's separation of the State and Civil Society' in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.3

²⁰² Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960, p.224

an effort to set up a system as an indication of this *abstention from pain*. Amongst great philosophers, Kant in particular strives to preclude feelings (that is, our passions, desires, inclinations, fears, angst and so forth) from his philosophy. According to Kant, these feelings depend on subjectivity and are therefore not authoritative. Nor are they reliable since they mislead reason. It should not be difficult to understand why Kant tries to abstain from feelings. They are the nightmare of reason; they are the enemy of reason as refractory carcinomas. In the simplest term, we could state that it is not only to save reason from subjectivity that Kant tries to fend feelings off. Another significant and sharp reason for this abstention is to *escape from pain*.²⁰³

One of the main aims of building up a system is to reconcile the universal and the particular, and by extension, reason and feeling. The reason why there is an endeavor for the reconciliation of these two different faculties is due to their constant conflict. The separation between two different worlds such as feeling-reason, individual-universal, state-society, etc., all seem to be a result of this fundamental conflict. Eventually the result is the superiority or predomination of one of them over the other. It could be argued that 18th and 19th century philosophy, which had begun with Descartes in the 17th century, seeks to reconcile feeling with reason through an attempt to set up a system. However, since a system is based on the *presupposition* and *necessity* of reason or a rational perspective, these philosophies gave the priority to reason and based their entire philosophy upon reason. Kant is an important example according to whose philosophy reason has priority.

Something else is often overlooked: that this attempt to combine reason with feeling does not take place only in private life but also in political and social life. Wherever there is a community, one of the most important aims should be the integration of feeling with reason.

3.2.3.1. Feeling and Reason

Starting from this point of view, under this subtitle, the relation of the individual and their feelings with reason will be analyzed. The distinction between reason and feeling became almost obvious by the enlightenment tradition. Here it might be difficult to characterize briefly the enlightenment attitude but it can be said that the enlightenment dedicated itself to human reason, science, and education in an attempt to achieve the best society of free human beings.²⁰⁴ To this end, they tried to emancipate reason from traditional bonds, custom, and faith. The enlightenment tradition established their values such as “liberty,” “equality” on the authority of two fulcrums: one of them is reason and the other is Nature, which was “viewed as an autonomous, harmonious, and self-regulating mechanism of material bodies connected by mathematically definable causal relationships.”²⁰⁵ Reason was considered not

²⁰³ Some claims here were presented in Karaburun Conference between 6-9 2012 in Izmir, Turkey

²⁰⁴ Robert Anchor, *The Enlightenment Tradition*, Harper&Row, Publishers, 1967, p.ix

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Anchor, *The Enlightenment Tradition*, pp.x-xi

“merely as a tool but as a substantive attribute of humanity.”²⁰⁶ In the ideal society of the enlightenment, the individuals were governed by reason. Accordingly, the idea that the individual is just a rational being began to dominate not only philosophy but politics and society. This approach leads the individual to be separated in two different realms: on the one side, there is the individual combined with feelings and on the other side, the individual is related to reason.

The failure of Hegel is that he also ends up giving much priority to the universal on behalf of reason. As a result, the division continues to exist despite Hegel’s efforts to unify the two different sides. In this context, Peperzak clearly exposes the paradox of feeling. For on the one hand Hegel in the *Philosophy of History* puts forth that feeling is the immediate form of the individual (the life) and thus truths can be known through feeling. On the other hand, he emphasizes that feeling cannot be the criterion because it is not able to differentiate truth from falsehood. Hegel suggests that only intellect and reason can distinguish truth from falsehood and judge the truth of what is given by feeling.

Briefly, feeling has not any ability to control and judge the truth. It is only reason and intellect that is able to dispose of uncontrollable and unconscious elements.²⁰⁷ However, when the intellect and reason are seen as the certain criterion of truth, absolute thinking does not allow seeing or observing the possibility of falsehood resulting from the intellect and reason. Yet, even though intellect and reason are not immediate processes like feeling, they also always have the possibility of creating or making mistakes.

Kaufmann, in his work *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*, stresses that even if Hegel’s philosophy is based on reason, it does not mean that Hegel ignores the emotions and passions. On the contrary, as Kaufmann refers, in his students’ lecture notes, Hegel states: “thus we must say quite generally that *nothing great* in the world has been accomplished *without passion*.”²⁰⁸

It is clear that Hegel does not keep passion outside world history and his philosophy. However, the problem is that passion does not have as much importance as reason. Emotions, passions, or feelings are all means for reason to realize itself in world history. Kaufmann points out that Kant in his work *Anthropologie* (1798, §71) sets the passions in contrast to pure practical reason and speaks of them as incurable and leading to many evils. Kaufmann claims that Hegel’s attitude towards passions is not so far from Kant’s approach to passions.

According to Hegel, the self-awareness (the intuition) of the single individual is the starting point of their awareness of ethical life. This single individual becomes aware of ethical life by controlling their

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Anchor, *The Enlightenment Tradition*, p.x

²⁰⁷ Adriaan Th. Peperzak, *Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p.48

²⁰⁸ Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Re-interpretation*, Doubleday Anchor Book: New York, 1966, pp.4-5

natural environment. Therefore, their first existence is their direct relation with nature. That is to say, before the individual exists or emerges as a free agent, they encounter the necessities of their nature. In this regard, Harris says, “the whole concept of man as a free rational agent is first presented to each of us in the shape of the natural world in which we exist.”²⁰⁹ In this stage, we become a free agent; before becoming a free agent, we must know what it means to be rational and for knowing that we must first discover what we need for our natural active organism. Secondly, we must find “what is possible for us as a natural organism and what the natural consequences of different possible patterns of behavior are.”²¹⁰ We discover all these outside, that is, within the world, with others, in relation to others.

“The first stage of ‘Natural ethics’ is what Hegel calls ‘feeling.’ This is the simplest most primitive form of intuition.”²¹¹ This concept, namely, feeling, embraces the external world, that is, the natural environment. Therefore, we subsume nature under ‘feeling.’ We do so by acting on nature. “Thus work or labor will be the crucial moment of this stage.”²¹² However, work or labor is also the negation of our feeling; because with work feeling is transformed. Labor or work makes feeling practical. Your feeling contains ‘desire’ or ‘wants’ and then you need to satisfy them; in an attempt to satisfy this ‘desire’ or ‘want’ you need a means which is ‘work’ or ‘labor.’

The contrast between need and its satisfaction enables feeling to become practical or to be actualized.²¹³ When you desire something, it means that you are conscious of your need. Therefore, desire involves the activity of imagination. Harris gives an example of a baby to explain this point. A baby does not have any imaginative awareness; for this reason, it does not desire. Its need is only basic existence.

We thus see that feeling becomes conscious within practice. And for its practical realization there must be desire which is the departure point of labor. To act is to desire. To labor is to desire. Without desiring anything you could not begin to work or approach your need or want. This means that desire is the starting point of consciousness. If you desire something, it means you have something in your mind, and you have knowledge about your desire or will. In other words, desire implicitly contains the concept as well as intuition and thus the universal.

²⁰⁹ H.S. Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” in G. W. F. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4)*, edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1979, p. 20

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” p. 20

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” p. 22

²¹² *Ibid.*, Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” p. 23

²¹³ *Ibid.*, Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” p. 23

In the first stage of natural ethics, Hegel deals with feeling “as a living process of the singular individual.”²¹⁴ The second stage of natural ethics is related to thought, i.e., it is sort of an abstract conceptual stage. The second stage is examined from the point of view of thinking consciousness. Therefore, this second stage can be defined as the subsumption of intuition under concept. It is about the conceptualization of labor and possession. In contrast to the first stage which is real and finite, this second stage is infinite and ideal. Accordingly, the first stage is about feeling, this second stage is about thought. “But both stages are ‘formal,’ for both are concerned with the conditions that must be satisfied if the singular human organism is to reach maturity”²¹⁵ as opposed to the actual concept which would be actual self-realization.

Family takes its place in this first stage for the structure of family is natural. The second stage is connected to social relations outside the family. “But in both stages we are dealing with man as a *possibility*.”²¹⁶ In the first stage, the concern is about the real nature as abstract possibility while in the second stage we deal with the ideal side as an abstract possibility.

In the *System of Ethical Life*,²¹⁷ Hegel presents his recurring theme of recognition in terms of the relation between concept and intuition. He explains the process of recognition in three stages: the first stage is the stage of the subsumption of concept under intuition. First the individual is perceived by another individual as “the owner of all his possessions and of rights generally.”²¹⁸ This means that to be an individual perceived by others is to have rights and to own things. However, this stage has a formal character; it remains very universal and general. No one is interested in what sort of capacities one has, for instance. It means that one is recognized by others but one is still “in itself.”

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” p.36

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” p.36

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” p.36

²¹⁷ Harris explains that Hegel’s *System of Ethical Life* is one of his earliest manuscripts, which was uncompleted among his Jena’s papers, and the editors titled it *System der Sittlichkeit (System of Ethical Life)*. Hegel wrote it in the winter of 1802 or the spring of 1803. According to Harris, these manuscripts can help to understand his later mature works such as *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Philosophy of Right*; because according to Harris, one can meet the basic concepts of Hegel in these mature works in his *System of Ethical Life*, that is, in these manuscripts. I believe that these manuscripts also help us to comprehend the *Philosophy of History* and relation between feeling and reason.

²¹⁸ H.S. Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” in G. W. F. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4)*, edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1979, p.39

Hegel claims, “intuition and emotion, [...], are both unreflecting forms of consciousness.”²¹⁹ He objects to the common view that God can be conceived and presented by or “is present only to our immediate consciousness or intuition.” He writes:

“we must insist in reply to such arguments that man is a thinking being, for it is thought which distinguishes him from the animals. He behaves as a thinking being even when he is himself unaware of it. When God reveals himself to man, he reveals himself essentially through man’s rational faculties; if he revealed himself essentially through the emotions, this would imply that he regarded man as no better than the animals, who do not possess the power of reflection—yet we do not attribute religion to the animals.”²²⁰

Admittedly, Hegel says something very right and important because it implies that one has to reflect on what opinion one accepts before making a commitment. However, it seems that Hegel heavily emphasizes reason and hence misses the importance of intuition and emotion. He continues to prove the difference between feeling and reason. It seems that Hegel does not ignore the importance of feeling through which all spiritual things, all products, and object of thought etc. can be recognized and realized.

“God is the eternal being in and for himself; and the universal in and for itself is an object of thought, not of feeling. It is true that all spiritual things, all date of the consciousness, all products and objects of thought—and above all religion and morality—must also come to us through the medium of feeling, and indeed primarily through this medium.”²²¹

It seems to me that Hegel’s whole attempt is to rationalize the existence of God and in this effort to realize God through human reason, feelings are eliminated or set aside. The universal as well as God in and for itself is not the object of feelings but of thought. In the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel reveals the movement and realization of Spirit in world history starting with feeling and going through different cultures, history, and individual nations towards the states in which the individuals actualize themselves. In this sense, his method is historical and empirical. But Hegel defines the process of world history as a rational process because it is governed by reason. The world history is a scene where the Spirit reveals and finds itself. In other words, the history is disclosure of thought. In this

²¹⁹ Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, translated from the German edition of Johannes Hoffmeister by H. B. Nisbet, introduction by Duncan Forbes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p.39

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.*, trans. by Nisbet, p.39

²²¹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.*, trans. by Nisbet, p.39

sense, his method is deductive and logical as well as rational. Hegel claims that the philosophy of history is the application of thought to history.

“Feeling, however, is not the source from which they [all products and objects of thought, religion and morality] are derived, but only the form which they assume in man; and it is the basest form they can assume, a form which man shares in common with the animals. All substantial things must be able to assume the form of emotion, yet they can also assume a higher and worthier form. But to insist on translating all morality and truth and every spiritual substance into feeling, and to endeavor to preserve them in this form is tantamount to saying that their proper form is in the animal one—although the latter is in fact incapable of comprehending their spiritual content. Feeling is the lowest form which any such content can assume, for its presence in feeling can only be minimal.”²²²

Hegel claims that every spiritual thing first comes to exist through feeling. But feeling is not the source of the spiritual things. Feeling is just an instrument or a means through which the spirit realizes itself. He adds that feeling is only a form that the spirit takes. In one of his early fragments, Hegel makes an analogy between reason and love. He thought that reason is analogous to love because from his dialectical perspective both go out and lose themselves in another and finally find themselves.²²³ However, Hegel still thinks that what makes an individual a human being and differentiates them from animal is reason but not their feeling.²²⁴

Hegel puts feeling in the same position as animal feeling. In other words, feeling is common to both human beings and animals. Therefore, it is only reason that separates human being from the animal. However, the problem is Hegel does not consider the full importance of feeling as a relation among individual beings. It is feeling, which is more social than reason. Reason and feeling reveal different aspects of both the particular and relational dimensions of the individual and cannot replace or be subsumed under one another. It is also not a valid argument to place reason above feeling by claiming that animals also have feelings but not reason. Definitely, the animal also enters into connection with other animals. However, it is not on the same level with that of human being. Besides, not all human

²²² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.*, trans. by Nisbet, p.39

²²³ See H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, p. 143, and elsewhere.

²²⁴ Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, translated from the German edition of Johannes Hoffmeister by H. B. Nisbet, introduction by Duncan Forbes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p.49

feelings are held in common with animals (for example “hatred”, or “love”) because animals are innocent like a child but human beings are guilty.²²⁵

The animal cannot love anybody or hate somebody but human being has human feelings. In other words, some of human feelings are not instinctive. An animal never loves another animal but it only acts according to its nature or instinct. In my view human beings relate their feeling and reason when they love or hate. In other words, unlike animals’, human interaction through feelings seems mediated.

Hegel argues, “the individual may well be treated unjustly; but this is a matter of indifference to world history, which uses individuals only as instruments to further its own progress.”²²⁶ The problem of the individual is linked to the perception of the individual as an instrument.

3.3. Conclusion

In the conclusion of this chapter, I am going to shortly deal with the problem of the individual also in terms of Hegel’s gender discrimination, as I believe that Hegel’s approach to the difference between man and woman will help us clarify the subject-matter. Particularly in paragraph §166 it can be observed how Hegel discriminates between men and women. Such discrimination shows us what Hegel gets at or means with the concept of the individual. In my view, the only individual, who can realize themselves in Hegel’s theory of freedom is man. According to Hegel, in the family, there are active and passive sides. In such a relation, the husband exhibits power and mastery, while the woman indicates the passive and subjective side. While the woman belongs to the inner world, the man materializes his existence in the outer world. Hegel writes as follows; “the husband has his real essential life in the state, the sciences, and the like, in battle and in struggle with the outer world and with himself.”²²⁷ The husband has possibility to act in the outer world and therefore to find his essential life in the state. This is *one side* of the possibility of the realization of himself, which is objective or corresponds to the universal part. “Only by effort does he, out of his disruption of himself, reach self-sufficing concord. A peaceful sense of this concord, and an ethical existence, which is intuitive and subjective, he finds in the family.”²²⁸ This is the *second side* of his realization, that is, the family, which is subjective. In short, there are two possibilities or two essentialities that man actualizes: 1) the state, as a universal and objective element of his realization; 2) the family, as a subjective and intuitive element. However, let us take a glance at the approach towards the woman. The woman realizes herself and exists only in the family. In this context, Hegel states, “in family the

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.*, trans. by Nisbet, (additions from the winter semester of 1826-7) p.217

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.*, trans. by Nisbet, p.65

²²⁷ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by S. W. Dyde, Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, New York, 2005, §166, p.87

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §166, p.87

wife has her full substantive place, and in the feeling of the family piety realizes her ethical disposition.”²²⁹ In my view, Hegel contradicts himself. On the one hand, he claims that the true realization of the individual is possible only in ethical life within the state; because only in the state, through the right laws can the individual actualize their freedom. On the other hand, he continues to claim that it is true that the individuals cannot complete their existence without the unity of the objective and the subjective. Nevertheless, he limits the woman just with the family, which seems to me a contradiction.

“§166 Addition—Women can, of course, be educated, but *their minds are not adapted to* the higher sciences, philosophy, or certain of the arts. These demand a universal faculty. Women may have happy inspirations, taste, elegance, but they have *not ideal*. The difference between man and woman is the same as that between animal and plant. The animal corresponds more closely to the character of the man, the plant to that of the woman. In woman there is a more peaceful unfolding of nature, a process, whose principle is the less clearly determined unity of feeling. If women were to control the government, the state would be in danger, for they do not act according to the dictates of universality, but are influenced by accidental inclinations and opinions.”²³⁰

The woman is in general determined with feeling while man is defined with reason. Still Hegel continues to remain in contradiction and therefore is deprived of unity of objectivity and subjectivity. In my view, there is a contradiction of Hegel’s theory of freedom because while we generally consider his theory, to attain freedom is to be in interaction in ethical life, which contains not only family but also civic community and the state. In point of fact, to gain freedom is to interconnect with others through labor and to participate in politics through corporations, associations, societies, or guilds. However, women do not have such a possibility. Therefore, the real member of the ethical life or ethical system is only the man, not woman.

Richard Kroner states that “the *Philosophy of Right* was, as Hegel guessed, not only his own last work, it was the last classical work of German philosophy.”²³¹ Richard Kroner explains the reason for Hegel’s inability to solve the problem of the reconciliation of opposites by his philosophy of history. According to him, there is a deeper reason for this inability, that is, “Hegel wanted to transform faith

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §166, p.87

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, §166, p.87 (italics are mine)

²³¹ Richard Kroner, “God, Notion, and Individual in the Philosophy of Hegel”, (1941 December) *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal*, Volume II, and September 1941-June 1942, edited by Marvin Farber, p.194

into knowledge, religion into thought. He never fully realized what a huge gap separates revelation and reason, prophecy and philosophy, inspiration and argumentation, or in other words, God and man.”²³² As Kroner stated, Hegel does not grasp that one of these is not *real*, in the sense of not being experienced. You can experience man, but not God; you can experience philosophy but not prophecy, or inspiration, etc. They are all abstract and empty without experience. Of course, you cannot experience God but you only talk about it through your faith, which is outside of knowledge in the world. In my view this transformation of Hegel’s, that is the transformation of faith into knowledge, leads Hegel to transform subject into object, or object into subject. Feuerbach particularly speaks of this sort of inversion and in this regard criticizes Hegel. This critique will be given in the fourth chapter of the thesis on Marx in detail. For example, he presents the state as absolute subject and the individuals as absolute object. In this regard, Richard Kroner, like Feuerbach, underlines that Hegel’s philosophy is in the last analysis theology.²³³ Richard Kroner claims that philosophy, which is also theology, affirms faith through the logical thought and metaphysical speculation.

According to Kroner, Hegel’s political theory is the complete agreement between the will of the individual and that of the state. In Hegel’s philosophy of right, the individual is taken into account in the ideal state by way of legislation. In this context, Richard Kroner separates the state doctrine of Hegel from that of Plato’s republic and Aristotle’s polity, as Hegel himself also did, and which we have already pointed out. “The individual has more scope in Hegel’s ideal state than he has in Plato’s republic or in Aristotle’s best polity.”²³⁴ But I do not agree that Hegel managed to realize the unity of the individual will of the citizens and the universal will of the state; because in this process of unification the individual is step by step excluded from the state although Hegel asserts that the state is the only element within which the individual actualizes their true freedom. This point will be discussed in detail in the last section of the thesis.

Inwood²³⁵ claims that Hegel thought of society, or the laws and institutions which constitute society, as substance whereas the members of society are conceived as its accidents (*PhR*, §156 and *Addition*). However, according to Inwood, the individual existed because the human beings began to look into themselves. The person began to find their right not through social norms, laws or institutions but through their inner state. In the Greek period, an emphasis on the individual was not so common as it is nowadays, but some men, like Socrates, began to search the way for the right through themselves. Inwood says that in the Greek time, the individual followed their own interests but Hegel thought that they pursued these interests through the accepted laws or rules. For example, Antigone, who wanted to

²³² *Ibid.*, Kroner, “God, Notion, and Individual in the Philosophy of Hegel”, p.195

²³³ *Ibid.*, Kroner, “God, Notion, and Individual in the Philosophy of Hegel”, p.191

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, Kroner, “God, Notion, and Individual in the Philosophy of Hegel”, p.197

²³⁵ M.J. Inwood, “Hegel, Plato and Greek ‘Sittlichkeit’”, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z.A.Pelczynski, Cambridge University press, 1984

bury her brother's corpse, was acting according to her family norms and King Creon, as opposed to this, was acting in accordance with the norms of public, civil life. This conflict between the family norms and public norms marred the harmony of Greek life. Further, men like Socrates began to look into themselves in accordance with their right and not with social norms or institutions. In this respect, he distanced himself from the institutions and social norms in which there were accepted values. It means that there was the tendency to self-awareness. According to Hegel, this is the starting point for a self-knowing and a genuine freedom (*PhR*, §279R).

The comprehension of the concept of the individual in the Hegelian sense is constructed on the transition from the abstract idea of the individual to the concrete idea of the individual through historical progress.²³⁶ The individuals living in community materialize "their private and public rights to freedom in the social institutions (*PhR*, §264)."²³⁷ These social institutions need to be unified into a structure founded on rational principles.

Shortly, Hegel speaks of a twofold human nature: that is, its mind consists of (1) the feature of particularity and its will; (2) the character of universality (§120). Individuals actualize their rights through these two aspects. In other words, they have to integrate their private personality and universality. Hegel claims that through the family and civil society individuals obtain their rights directly, that is, their private personality, and the second one, that is, universality, they acquire indirectly.²³⁸ While the corporation leads individuals to attain an activity or an occupation directed to a universal end, the individual in social institutions implicitly arrives at the universal through the particular interests.

Shortly individuals find their private and public rights in the state. Firstly, they acquire their private rights in the family and civil society; secondly, they obtain their public rights in two different ways: (1) the individuals actualize their particular interests in the social institutions. (2) Individual attains self-consciousness through these institutions and in so far as they directly as well as actively interrelate to these institutions, they can have the possibility to get an occupation and activity which directs them to the universal end. (§264)

²³⁶ "As a philosophical method, dialectic is, then, that reconstruction of an object of knowledge which merely lays bare whatever implicit assumptions it contains. Inasmuch as this method also determines the presentation of a philosophical work, dialectic is also a mode of presentation." K.-H. Ilting, "The Dialectic of civil society", *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.307

²³⁷ K.-H. Ilting, "Hegel's concept of the State and Marx's Early critique", *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.101

²³⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §120

Hegel will argue that self-consciousness is the fundamental concept for the existence of the individual. According to Bernstein, Hegel is a modern philosopher because he makes self-consciousness the basis of the individual and self-consciousness is foundational for the modern period.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MARX'S PHILOSOPHY

4.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD

When Marx was in the gymnasium at the period of his strong belief in Christianity, he wrote an article about the task of mankind, in which he claimed that “history regards as great men only those who have ennobled themselves by working for the common good.”²³⁹ It appears that Marx had already known what his position in history would be on behalf of the common good. In the last paragraph of the same article, he continues to write that in life every individual chooses their positions in an attempt to work for humanity. The choice should not be a burden to the person who has already decided to dedicate and sacrifice his life through his chosen position. It is a sacrifice not merely for man’s own self but for all others.²⁴⁰

Accordingly, when we take Marx’s historical significance, position and effectiveness into consideration, it is a great task and claim to deal with Marx’s texts, which have been already studied and continue to be studied within the prodigious literature on Marx. Being conscious of this difficulty of well-comprehending his works, under this subtitle, I will concentrate on the problem of the individual especially in his early texts. In this context, I will focus firstly on the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844) in which he speaks of the concept of labor and alienation from an economic perspective; secondly *On the Jewish Question* (1843), in which Marx focuses on political emancipation and human emancipation; thirdly, his *Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State* (1843) in relation to Hegel’s conceptualization of the individual in the modern state; fourthly the *Holy Family* (1845), the *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847), and the *German Ideology* (1845-46, published 1932) where the concepts of the historical and dialectical materialism are treated at greater length.

²³⁹ Karl Marx, “Thoughts of a Young Man on Choosing a Profession”, in *The Unknown Karl Marx: documents concerning Karl Marx*, edited with an introduction by Robert Payne, University of London Press Ltd: London, 1972, p.53

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Thoughts of a Young Man on Choosing a Profession”, p.53

In short, the aim of this chapter is to examine Marx's approach to the problem of the individual through a research into each of his early works.

We must always keep in mind that in all his works Marx takes all sociological, economic and political problems in a certain historical context and this historical approach gives him a perspective which leads him to make certain predictions concerning the future. It is my intention here to analyze the problem of the individual in the modern state in light of Marx's farsightedness. The problem of the individual, which emerges in the 17th century, is still the great political problem of contemporary society, which claims that individual freedom is the basic political principle. However, the existing political system is available for people and is dependent on the government *of* people but it does not permit the people *to* govern; it is not governed *by* the people. It merely pretends that people govern the political state.

The individual will be considered as the single individual as distinct from the species-being which was particularly highlighted by Marx. Or, speaking in terms of logic, we will distinguish the individual from the universal. It can be easily observed that Marx does not treat the problem of the individual in the same way that, for instance, Hegel did. In other words, he does not take up the subject systematically as regards its ontological, logical, political and ethical dimensions. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental question for Marx. He tries to answer in which way or through which political manner society can attain such a high level of "freedom" and "equality" so as to embrace every single being—individual—in this planet as a *social being* under the same sun and stars. In this respect, through his texts, the individual will be elaborated in terms of the concepts of freedom, alienation, labor (specifically in relation to capital), species-being, society and finally, the state. For Marx, as we will see, the problem is not only associated with the political existence of the individual in the modern state but it is directly interconnected with economy. That is what differentiates Marx from Hegel because Hegel in particular concentrates on the ontological existence of the individual and society. However, the economical part is missing in his philosophy. In addition, in Marx's early writings we mostly encounter a humanistic perspective regarding the existence of the human being, which bears the influence of Feuerbach. The following section (i.e., in 4.4.3 the analysis of *the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, under 4.4.3.2.1.1 the Influence of Feuerbach) will also touch on the influence of Feuerbach on Marx and Marx's critiques in relation to Feuerbach's philosophy.

In one of his very early writings during his last semester at the gymnasium, Marx, as we have already mentioned, wrote an essay titled "Thoughts of a young Man on Choosing a Profession" in which he speaks about the task of man during his life. Here Marx makes a differentiation between the human being and the animal in terms of their struggles with nature. "Nature has given to the animals alone a sphere of activity in which they may move and quietly accomplish without ever striving to go beyond

it or even suspecting there is another sphere.”²⁴¹ However, at this point Marx does not yet compare human beings and animals in terms of their social being. He will arrive at the point of defining the human being as a social being in his later works such as in the *Manuscripts of 1844*.

In the *Grundrisse*, Marx says the individuals are “the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society,²⁴² on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century.”²⁴³ Political economists such as Ricardo and Smith considered this individual as an ideal being. According to Marx, they conceive of this individual not as a historical result but rather as a departure point of history.²⁴⁴

Marx says, “economists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labor, credit, money, etc., as fixed, immutable, eternal categories.” And he continues; “economists explain how production takes place in the above-mentioned relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement which gave them birth.” As we point out, for the economists, the historical movement of production does not exist. What happens when they ignore this historical movement? It means that the production is conceived only in terms of the category of logic.²⁴⁵ Marx in the *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847) criticizes classical economists’ ahistorical and abstract approach to economic categories such as money, commodity, capital, division of labor, etc. To Marx, these categories exist by means of their relations with each other, in a specific context of social changes and conditions at a certain period.

In this chapter, the problem of the individual will be examined under two parts and accordingly through the following arguments:

1) From an *ontological perspective (with an economic dimension)*: First, the individual must be analyzed in the context of the notion of “relation.” In this regard, the thesis claims that the individual is separated from his social relations and reduced into market relations. As Herbert Marcuse had already argued in his article “The Obsolescence of Marxism,” this means that the individual is

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Thoughts of a Young Man on Choosing a Profession”, p.49

²⁴² In the *On the Jewish Question*, Marx points out that civil society dissolved into independent individuals. These individuals are related to the political state and society by law whereas in old society (in the estates and guilds) they were related by privilege.

²⁴³ Karl Marx, “The Grundrisse”, in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1978, p. 222

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, “The Grundrisse”, in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 222

²⁴⁵ “But the moment we cease to pursue the historical movement of production relations, of which the categories are but the theoretical expression, the moment we want to see in these categories no more than ideas, spontaneous thoughts, independent of real relations, we are forced to attribute the origin of these thoughts to the movement of pure reason.” (Marx, *the Poverty of Philosophy*, 1847, www.marxists.org)

“governed by marketability.”²⁴⁶ The relationship between every individual and their relationship with institutions such as the state is dependent on and governed by exchange value. Marx argues this issue in his well-known work, *Grundrisse* by way of an analysis of the producer-consumer dialectic. Marx already begins to discover these ideas, albeit in less elaborate form in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Therefore, the *Manuscripts* can guide us in elaborating this concept of “relation.” The problem of the individual in the *Manuscripts of 1844* is analyzed and treated in terms of the following aspects: (a) the relationship of the individual to the object; (b) the relationship between the individual and society; (c) the fundamental relationship of the individual to labor. (Within the scope of this relationship, Marx explains how the individuals become estranged beings as regards their estranged labor.)

From this point of view, the thesis will trace the cause of the reduction of the individual to a “self-conscious being” in Hegel’s dialectic, which Marx’s criticizes, to the individual’s loss of *relationships*.

Hegel refers to the individual as a self-conscious being and sees history as the development of self-consciousness. According to Hegel, the individual in this context is a rational being. However, for Marx the individual is not just a rational or self-conscious being but the individuals exist through their activity and thus they are conscious of their activity. To put it in another way, the individual has already been defined as mere self-conscious being or merely a rational being. In addition, the existence of the individual is conceived as a separated being, a single being, a being separated from others, etc. by definition. Then, “self-consciousness” is added to this definition. However, self-conscious being is not considered as a being aware of the real, sensuous, external world through the senses. As a consequence, the individual remains an abstract being within his loss of relations. Now in this point it is important to say that the individual as it is conceived by this present ideology is an *imaginary-being*.²⁴⁷ Because of this imaginary conception defined in abstraction from its relations, the individual is forced to established imaginary relations to the external, sensuous world. Therefore, the only relations left to the individuals are their relations to their own imaginations.

2) *Political perspective*: Depending upon the first argument, this second argument will demonstrate that the claim that the individual is a *political being*, paradoxically, separates the individual from their political activity. Here Marx demonstrates that the individual is a real individual as long as they realize themselves within politics. However, political emancipation is not the only way or the full development of emancipation. Marx particularly makes this point in *On the Jewish Question*. Therefore, true emancipation or complete emancipation is human emancipation, which we shall focus

²⁴⁶ Herbert Marcus, “The Obsolescence of Marxism”, in the *Marx and the Western World*, edited by Nicholas Lobkowitz, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1967, p.409

²⁴⁷ I do not mean that individuals are unreal, delusive or phantasmal being but on the contrary, the individual must be very much real because the capitalist system requires their reality and their very livingness.

on in the fourth part of this chapter. As Michele Ciliberto claims, after the 19th century the idea based on the politicization of society or the politicization of every individual becomes dominant, therefore the individual is considered in this context, namely participation in politics.²⁴⁸ It seems to be that it is just an illusion, just a *handy method* of the system in order to manipulate every individual as a passive and agreeable person into the resent system.

Indeed the basis of the present political system is to *depoliticize* every individual. In this regard, Marx in *the Poverty of Philosophy* explains that the emancipation of the working class takes place by means of the necessity of the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, which must also take a political character. However, the political state as a subject ensures and *legitimizes* its existence through *law*.

Under the political perspective, the relationship of the individual to the state is going to be analyzed through Marx's writings such as *On the Jewish Question* (1843) and *the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1843). In this context, the state will be defined as "an instrument of coercion in the service of ruling, exploiting class" as Althusser (in *For Marx*) claimed.²⁴⁹

It is the most important and fundamental question how the system succeeds in manipulating the individual while there is such great exploitation, oppression in question. The answer was given by Marcuse in his article called "The Obsolescence of Marxism," in which he emphasizes the changes in advanced countries, which blocks the transition from capitalism to socialism. He argues that this transition is blocked "not by violent suppression or by terroristic modes of government but by a rather comfortable and scientific coordination and administration."²⁵⁰ Accordingly, for Marcuse, due to the changes in the system, the transition from capitalism to socialism is severed both ideologically and practically. Marcuse states that the system has undergone significant changes through scientific coordination and administration and the form of the state has evolved into a structure called the "social state." By re-defining its tasks so as to include the satisfaction of certain basic needs and demands of society such as health and education, the social state successfully conceals the inherent conflict in capitalism. Although Marcuse suggests that it is difficult to meet with resistance and a revolutionary movement against the present system of exploitation in advanced countries with such developed technologies, administration and well-done social coordination, he misses an important point. When an economic crisis takes place, the first thing that the state does is to withdraw such rights (e.g. health care and education). Therefore, it can be claimed that during the crisis period, the conflict springs out

²⁴⁸ Michele Ciliberto, "Cultura e Ideologia", from a conference: International Summer School di Filosofia e Politica: I fondamenti culturali della democrazia, Luiss Guido Carli: Libera Università Internazionale Degli Studi Sociali, 5-8 March 2011

²⁴⁹ Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, translated by Ben Brewster, the Penguin Press, 1969, p. 110

²⁵⁰ Herbert Marcuse, "The Obsolescence of Marxism", in the *Marx and the Western World*, edited by Nicholas Lobkowicz, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1967, p.411

again. In advanced countries under this kind of the structure of the state, the individual under the label of “the liberal individual within their right for political speech” in reality does not have any political activity that is realized by them. Thus, the actual political crisis begins to be realized and discovered through the economic crisis.

In order to see this point, we must again look at Marx’s texts and take his concepts, particularly the concept of “relation.” Nowadays within globalization it is difficult and likely impossible to propound that there is not any resistance in advanced countries. It is because the relationship of one advanced country to the under-developing country exists not only by economic interdependence but also by scientific and technological development. For this reason, we can say without hesitation that one advanced country *strictly* and *heavily* relates to another developing country. In particular, migration relates developed countries to developing countries. People from developing countries come to developed countries for work or for better living conditions. Through migration, they also bring their problems from their home country. Although immigrants possibly live in better conditions when compared with the conditions in their own country, they are still not equal with the citizens of the developed country. Such problems create resistance even in advanced countries. For this reason, a problem in a developing country leads to another problem in advanced countries, which possibly reveals the resistance against the problems of the present system.

I should like to draw attention to the fashionable view that Marx is not concerned with the problem of the individual and focuses on society only.²⁵¹ The general opinion with respect to Marx’s approach to the existing human individual is that Marx puts this problem on the side because he believes that the problem of the individual will be resolved within communist society, after the revolution. If it is so, now we have to seek for the cause of this understanding, which is usually related to the 19th century.²⁵² It would appear that the reason why it is thought that Marx does not touch on the existing human individual is due to two aspects. 1) First of all, it is because of a general expectation that his philosophy must be in parallel with Hegel’s philosophy or in line with Hegel’s approach to the individual, which is considered as a unique, comprehensive, and clearly elaborated one in every respect. This expectation seems to me to be mistaken. 2) Secondly, in general Marx concentrates his attention on society within the framework of the economy. However, as we will see in his early

²⁵¹ George L. Kline, in his article, namely, “Some Critical Comments on Marx’s Philosophy”, especially emphasizes this argument and claims that Marx’s philosophy simply society-centered. “But the society-centeredness defended by Marx is to give way to genuine man-centeredness in the historical future.” (in the *Marx and the Western World*, edited by Nicholas Lobkowitz, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1967, p.420)

²⁵² “In realtà, prima di questa epoca (XVIII secolo), l’individuo isolato, caratteristico dell’epoca capitalistica, semplicemente non esisteva.” (Marcello Musto, “Commento storico critico”, in *Introduzione alla critica dell’economia politica* by Karl Marx, a cura di Marcello Musto, traduzione di Giorgio Backhaus, Quodlibet, 2010, p.75)

writings, for example, in the *Manuscripts of 1844*, in his critiques of political economy (as well as his critiques of Hegelian dialectic) Marx speaks of the individual.

It is true that Marx pays great attention to society. However, this does not imply that Marx did not say anything regarding the individual being. Contrarily, in his early writings, for example, while he speaks of labor and its form of alienated labour, he refers to the existing human individual. Moreover, in the *Grundrisse*, when he talks about the producer-consumer dialectic, he again points to individuals who are reduced to just the consumer and the producer but they are *not* the consumer and the producer for themselves. In other words, the individuals produce for the owner of private property²⁵³ and they even consume for the same owner of private property. Accordingly the consumer and producer exist for *another-being*, namely for the capitalist. For this reason, these individuals are alienated from their products. It goes without saying that the individual as such is nothing more than an instrument. The more you are *isolated-individual* the more you are consumer and producer for *other-individual*. Here I would like to emphasize that the isolated-individual and imagined-individual are equal or almost identical. As long as the individuals do not meet with reality, they can just imagine this reality. It means that they are isolated from this reality and for this reason; they live only with its image. The reality that the individuals think to be truth is only illusion. In this unreal and illusionary world, the individuals exist only as imaginary beings or entities.

“Maximilien Rubel has said that Marx could not respect the freedom and dignity of the individual because at the present (procommunist) stage of history “there are no individual.” Marx not only refused to ascribe to existing human individuals any intrinsic value, inviolable rights or inherent dignity but he also explicitly repudiated all “so-called human rights” as expression of a bourgeois ideology that was egoistic and antisocial; furthermore he insisted that intrinsic value will accrue only to the unalienated, creative individuals of the communist future. Until that time individuals have only historically instrumental value: those who work to bring about a communist society are to be respected as persons; those who refuse or fail to do so are to be treated as mere obstacles on the path of historical progress.”²⁵⁴

According to this Marxian interpretation, there are two different aspects concerning the relationship between the society and the individual. The first approach considers the individual as an instrument in an attempt to realize the ideal society. The second approach advocates that the basic aim is freedom

²⁵³ Private property is the exclusion of others from use of an object. In this context, private property is right of an individual or some groups. Capital or means of production refers to private property.

²⁵⁴ George L. Kline, “Some Critical Comments on Marx’s Philosophy”, in the *Marx and the Western World*, edited by Nicholas Lobkowitz, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1967, pp.420-1

and independence of the individual from society. For this reason, society is just an instrument. The former is the society-centered view whereas latter is the individual-centered view.

From Kline's interpretation referred to above, we understand that Marx completely refuted the existence of the individual and left this problem until after the communist revolution because until that time the individual is just an instrument in an attempt to materialize the communist society. It is right that Marx refused to determine the individual with "any intrinsic value, inviolable rights or inherent dignity."²⁵⁵ He refused these kinds of determinations because these expressions exclude changes and make the individual absolute and abstract. Moreover, it means that the individual is determined by something outside them. Then the individual depends on another thing for their existence. Attributing intrinsic value or inherent dignity to the individuals implies that the individual is pre-determined. However, the individuals are never determined inherently but they are determined by their relations with society, with nature, with the elements of society, with family, with each other etc.

In my judgment, if it is really the case that Marx left the problem of the individual to the communist phase or to the specific future, it is time to reveal what the individual would be if Marx should like to say something regarding this problem. Nevertheless if it is not so, we must unfold this problem through his writings. It is my intention in this thesis to insist that Marx speaks of the individual both in his early and later writings. However, I do not intend to enter here into a detailed analysis of his later works. Our attention shall be given to his early writings.

The common belief is that Marx does not speak of the individual in the ontological sense. If we take a glance at the literature on Marx, it is difficult to find a comprehensive research on the problem of the individual. For example one of the studies of Keith Graham, called *Karl Marx: Our Contemporary: social theory for a post-Leninist world*, devoted only two pages to an explanation of individuals in Marx. Here he argues, correctly, that the individual is considered in relation to the full scope of social relationships. Graham claims that "for Marx, individuals are relatively powerless: 'the "power of the

²⁵⁵ Goerge L. Kline, "Some Critical Comments on Marx's Philosophy", in the *Marx and the Western World*, edited by Nicholas Lobkowitz, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1967, pp.420-1 (Marx most particularly speaks of "inviolable rights" in *On Jewish Question*. In this writing, he criticizes the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* and later constitutions in 18th century. Through these rights for example, the privilege of faith, that is, particular religion is recognized under the name of *liberty*. In this context, Marx asserts that liberty determined as a right of man "is not founded upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man from man." ("On Jewish Question", *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1978, p.42) To put it another way, the system first separates man from man depending upon faith and property, and then the system confers rights and implements these rights)

individual” very much depends on whether others combine their power with his.”²⁵⁶ Therefore, Graham asserts that Marx’s ontology is based on collectivities.²⁵⁷

One of the fundamental reasons for the view that Marx did not concern himself with the problem of the individual is because his early writings were published after his later writings. Accordingly, the Marxists concentrated on the problem of society in terms of politics and economy through his later writings. Another reason, no less important, is that Marx criticized the fiction of the individual in civil society. Marx saw and was aware of the separation between society and the individual between civil and political life; he also realized that civil society was characterized by an emphasis on the individual. In other words, the individual was separated from society and its political life and then put into the center of society (which was an illusion). This is the reason why Marx particularly emphasizes the existence of society. Without emancipation of society, without eliminating this separation, the individuals cannot be emancipated. The emancipation of society and that of individual are interrelated. In this regard, it might be said that Marx did not forget the existence of the individual but aimed at revealing and exposing the illusion of the existence of the individual in civil society and the political state. It is the basic and fundamental purpose of the thesis to claim that it is *misleading* and a *delusion* to assume that Marx did not speak of the existence of the individual being.

Until Marx, philosophers and thinkers have considered the individual as an abstract being or entity. Thus here the method will be to disclose this abstraction and to demonstrate the true individual being in the same way as Marx does in the *Manuscripts of 1844*—i.e., through a criticism of political economy. Under this chapter, the true individual being will be analyzed in terms of its true relationship to society, politics, other individuals and economy.

In short, even if it is claimed that Marx did not directly address the problem of the individual in this research the target is to reveal how the individual proceeds on the path which labor takes. In other words, I see an ontological and procedural similarity between the individual and labor. Particularly in the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx clarifies estranged labor in this context. Just as an object is alien to its producers (workers) and thus becomes independent through the labor process, so the process that the individual undergoes is the same as that which the object undergoes. For this reason, the existence of the individual is strongly related to estranged labor or to the concept of alienation.

4.2. A GLANCE AT THE YOUNG MARX

To begin with, I would say that I do not accept the fashionable view that there is a clear difference between the early and later Marx: (1) Marx as philosopher in his early writings; (2) Marx as an

²⁵⁶ Keith Graham, *Karl Marx: Our Contemporary: social theory for a post-Leninist world*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1992, p.23

²⁵⁷ Ibid., Graham, *Karl Marx: Our Contemporary: social theory for a post-Leninist world*, p. 32

economist and a sociologist in his later works as well. One of the followers of this view is Iring Fetscher, who defines young Marx as a philosopher.²⁵⁸ I strongly believe that Marx himself would object to that kind of separation. Marx was as much a philosopher in his later works as he was in his early writings. Are we to believe that he left his philosophical standpoint in his later years? I do not think so!

Admittedly, there are some fundamental differences between Marx's early and later writings. Nevertheless, these differences are not so great as to yield the sharp division between two parts of Marx's intellectual life. In this regard, I agree with the determination of Joseph O'Malley and Maximilien Rubel who claim that the whole of Marx's writings and his development were "organic." It means there are not any division periods but there is an organic development in his intellectual development. Marx's early and mature works are thus unified his social and political theory. It is also important to note that Marx did not reject his early writings in his later writings.²⁵⁹

The reason why there is that kind of belief is because Marx formulates his later works largely from an economic standpoint. However, this does not imply that Marx left his philosophical concern on these problems behind, even on economic issues. In this context, in the "Introduction" to *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (1857-58)*, Hobsbawm criticizes those who refer to Marx as an economist or sociologist or historian; because for Hobsbawm this distinction is misleading and opposed to Marx's method. According to Hobsbawm, this sort of differentiation is mechanical. In this regard Hobsbawm refuses this academic distinction of Marx because the bourgeois academic economists and sociologists "draw a sharp line between the static and dynamic analysis, hoping to transform the one into the other by injecting some 'dynamising' element into the static system...But this is not Marx's way."²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸ Iring Fetscher, "The Young and the Old Marx", in *the Marx and the Western World*, edited by Nicholas Lobkowitz, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, London, 1967, p. 19

Eugene Kamenka in his book, namely, *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism*, talks about the same argument, which Fetscher embeds Marx's early writing just into philosophical perspectives and basis. Kamenka claims that Marx in his mature writings did not concentrate on ethical and philosophical questions. But I have to object to this claim due to the fact that in *Das Kapital* Marx criticizes particularly the system of capital and elaborates the attitudes of capital towards people. No doubt, it is an ethical formulation of capital. Marx demonstrates how capital forms its ethic system through economy, through market system, through money system. Kamenka presents Marx's early writings in which we find the key for his ethical views.

²⁵⁹ "There appears to be no basis for the view that the young and the old Marx represent two distinct periods in which his doctrinal principles, his theoretical and practical concerns and his intellectual positions were radically opposed. His own major posthumously published writings—among them especially the *Critique* and his preliminary draft of *Das Kapital*—provide the textual evidence against such a view." (Joseph O'Malley, "Introduction", in *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, by Karl Marx, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, edited with an Introduction and Notes by Joseph O'Malley, Cambridge at the University Press, 1970, p.xv)

²⁶⁰ Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, trans: Jack Cohen, with Introduction by Eric J. Hobsbawm, International Publishers: New York, 1965, p. 16-17

4.2.1. The atmosphere of the period²⁶¹

The period in which Marx and Engels lived witnessed two important events: the industrial revolution in England and the French Revolution. This period, that is, 19th century led Marx and Engels to become conscious of the social problems of their times. The years 1830 and 1831 were revolution years. In 1830 in France occurred the July revolution. It spread from the east to the west of Europe. It was the reason of the Polish rebellion. At the end of the 18th century, the industrial revolution arrived at its summit and in the 1830s it ended. The term 'industrial revolution' belonged to Engels. It was related to the period of transition.

Marx's father, Heinrich Marx read extensively the 18th century French Enlightenment literature, so the ideas of French thinkers were discussed in their home. Therefore, Marx began to become interested not only in French writers such as Diderot and Voltaire, but also in English philosophers such as John Locke who claimed that philosophical ideas or thoughts were not innate but determined by experience derived from sense perception. Locke was against the Cartesian thought that we are born with innate ideas. In other words, the mind is a tabula rasa. The French materialists also adopted similar views. Marx was influenced by these philosophical views.

Marx stayed in Bonn for just one year, and then went to the University of Berlin. In Berlin, he joined the Young Hegelians. Marx met with Engels for the first time in the Young Hegelian group. However, it was not through the Young Hegelians in Berlin that Marx became friends with Engels. In 1842, Engels had published a pamphlet, which criticized the philosophy of Friedrich Schelling with his shrewd ideas. About this time, Friedrich Schilling was invited by the Prussian government to Berlin in order to submit his philosophy against the Hegelian system, which sought to reconcile the Bible with science. In 1842, Marx and Engels came together at the same newspaper.

Engels and Marx were raised in different families and were under different influences. While Marx was influenced by the French materialists, Engels was under the influence of the religious environment. For this reason, Marx did not touch upon problems of religion as much as Engels did. However, at the end both philosophers arrived at the same results.

4.2.2. Marx's early writings

Between 1843 and 1844 Marx wrote: *Zur Judenfrage (The Jewish Question)*, *Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung (the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right:*

²⁶¹ David Riazanov, *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: An Introduction to Their Lives and Works*, translation to Turkish: Ragıp Zarakolu, Belge Yayınları, 1990

Introduction) (published in *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*²⁶² in 1844), *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right)* (published 1927), and *Die Ökonomisch-philosophischen Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts)* (published 1932, were unpublished during his life time). When Marx wrote these works, he was little more than twenty-five years old. In addition to these works, *Deutsche Ideologie (The German Ideology)* as another early writing of Marx was written in 1845-46 but the complete text was not published until 1932 and *Heilige Familie (The Holy Family)* containing a critique of the Young Hegelians was first printed in 1845. Then in 1847, Marx wrote a critique of Proudhon (*the Poverty of Philosophy*). In 1848 appeared the *Communist Manifesto*. In 1902, Mehring published some of Marx's early writings but the more important works of Marx remain unknown until 1927.

After the publication of Proudhon's *Philosophy of Poverty*, Marx began to work in order to criticize it and wrote his short book, *the Poverty of Philosophy* in 1847. In this short book, he not only criticized Proudhon's work but also manifested his communist ideas. *The Poverty of Philosophy* was his first attempt to define the important phases of the development of the capitalist mode of production.

The *Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* was all published from German text as a first edition in Berlin from Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Part I, Volume 3, in 1932. It is a pity that his early writings were almost unknown until Karl Korsch's and George Lukács' publications in 1932. In fact, a close friend of Marx and Engels, Wilhelm Liebknecht, had suggested publishing some early works of them but they immediately refused this proposal, which they thought to be an unnecessary and useless attempt. Instead, Marx proposed republishing some quite lengthy portions from *Das Kapital (Capital)*.

4.2.2.1. The importance of early writings with regard to the whole development of Marx

After the Second World War (and, in particular, after the 60's) there was much discussion in the academic field regarding the ethical and the ontological existence of the individual. While these discussions are interpreted as the crisis of Marxism, basically it might be defined as a crisis that arose due to the fact that Marx's early writings were not read sufficiently and correctly. Lucio Colletti gives this response to the so-called "crisis of Marxism." One of the reasons for this, in turn, is the insistence of separating Marx's works into different *independent* spheres. Separating his philosophy in two different fields is one thing; and saying that these different fields are independent and there is not any continuity among them is another. While early Marx structures his thoughts on the basis of political

²⁶² *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* was a German and French Annals. It was published in Paris in February, 1844. The language of annals was German. Marx and Ruge were the editor of annals. But they published only one double issue of the journal.

and philosophical analyses—this does not mean that there is not any economic analysis in early Marx—; later works of Marx involve the economic critique of capitalism and the construction of a new society.

“The importance, the validity, of the early writings can be judged only from the point of view of fully developed Marxism.”²⁶³ In this regard, Colletti emphasizes that the whole generation of Marxism did not know anything concerning the early writings of Marx. Therefore, it led them to understand later Marx incompletely. In this context, Colletti asserts that the first generation tried to comprehend Marx through *Capital* owing to unknown young Marx. According to Colletti, for this reason this first generation overlooked his philosophical perspectives.²⁶⁴ After the publication of Marx’s early writings, the interest on Marx developed due to the fact that these writings are based on his philosophical perspectives more than his economic approach. In particular, this interest resulted from Marx’s critique of Feuerbach, Young Hegelians and Hegel himself. However the publication of his early writings not only leads to an interest in his works but also it makes way for an interest in the — forgotten—philosophy of Hegel and the Young Hegelians which Marx largely discussed in his early writings.²⁶⁵

Similarly, Lucio Colletti draws attention to the point that early Marx was taken into account because of his consideration and critiques of Hegel’s philosophy in which existentialism found its origin. In this respect, Colletti explains that, particularly in France after the Second World War, Existentialist and Catholic thinkers were interested in Marx’s early writings more than Marxists themselves while Marxists had already abandoned these early writings. Shortly, according to Colletti, Marx did not receive a recompense for his early writings as philosophical works (apart from the interest of Italian Marxist Galvano della Volpe, (1895-1968)).²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Dirk J. Struik, “Introduction”, in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* by Karl Marx, trans., by Martin Milligan, International Publishers, New York, 1964, p.49

²⁶⁴ Lucio Colletti, “Introduction”, *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, Penguin Books, 1975, p.8

²⁶⁵ Struik, “Introduction”, in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* by Karl Marx, trans., by Milligan, p.48

²⁶⁶ Lucio Colletti, “Introduction”, in *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, Penguin Books, 1975

In this introduction Colletti, especially, talks about the relationship between the writings of Engels and those of Marx. Colletti points at the influence and significance of Engel’s writings on Marx. Colletti emphasizes that due to these unknown Marx’s early writings, the first generation of Marxism (second international) could not know because of which philosophical and practical reasons that Marx disengaged with Hegel and Feuerbach and therefore he inclines to the analysis of modern capitalist society. In this point this Marxist generation grasps Marx through Engels’ writings such as *Anti-Dühring* (1878), *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) and *Ludwing Feuerbach* (1888). All these works of Engels appeared after the death of Marx in 1883. For example in many places Kautsky, from his generation (among Plekhanov, Bernstein, Heinrich Cunow and the others), mentions that they comprehended *Capital* through *Anti-Dühring*. Also Colletti indicates that

Dirk Struik states that after 1847 Marx was interested in economic and political subjects and thus he neglected the personal and ethical side of the individual. It is the crucial question to research whether Marx in his later works neglects one side of individual man as regards their personal and ethical life. On the other hand, it seems that Marx concentrated on the individual from other points of view such as economic and political emancipation. For example in *Capital*, instead of the concept of alienation, there occurs a new essential concept, namely, *fetishism of commodities*. Later Marx mostly concentrated on history, class struggle, and economy. In this sense, Dirk Struik rightly expresses that in his later works his early Hegelian-based terms such as “alienation” almost disappear; but “together with many other Hegelian words which had outlived their usefulness for Marx and Engels, such as exteriorization and objectivation, it [alienation] is still used very effectively as late as the third volume of *Capital*.”²⁶⁷ It is one of the proofs for the fact that Marx is still a philosopher in his later writings without forsaking his philosophical concepts and therefore philosophical perspectives.

As a consequence, in post-World-War II period, as part of the early works of Marx, the existential problems of the individual or the subject were discussed, for example existentialists, or post-Marxists talking about multiple subjectivity. As a result, the individual was analyzed in the light of both Hegel and Marx’s philosophies. Thus, neither the philosophy of Hegel nor that of Marx has been completely negated, and, as Colletti mentioned many times, it is important to criticize and re-read Marx’s early writings in light of his fully developed works to understand the political problems of today.

In light of the foregoing findings, I would like to seek the response of some questions, which I intended to raise and which had been already posed by Dirk Struik: “Did Marx lose interest in the personal value of man? Did he lose sight of the individual in the masses?”²⁶⁸ It seems to me that these questions imply that Struik believes that through his early writings Marx argues and speaks of the individual and their relation to society and to the state, namely their relation to political life.

It seems that just as Marx’s early writings are concentrated on the problem of the individual through philosophical perspectives as well as economic aspects, so are his later works. What make these early

later observation of Ryazanov claiming that almost the second half of seventies younger generation knew Marx’s method through Engels (p.9). As a consequence, Colletti observes that this Marxist generation read Marx through Engels’ writings. In other words, Engels’ works were a kind of theoretical sources in order to understand the philosophical problems of Marx’s later works during the period of Second International. Furthermore, in this introduction, Colletti gives clear explanation on philosophical differences between Engels and Marx regarding Young Hegelians and Hegel’s philosophy. For example, the paths of Engels and Marx to arrive at the theoretical communism were different. While Engels realized his transition to this theoretical communism from the field of political economy, instead of the critique of Hegel and old speculative philosophy, Marx took the way including the philosophical critique of Hegelianism.

²⁶⁷ Dirk J. Struik, “Introduction”, in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* by Karl Marx, trans., by Milligan, 1964, p.55

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Struik, “Introduction”, in *The Manuscripts of 1844* by Karl Marx, trans., by Martin Milligan, 1964, p.55

works unclear as regards the problem of the individual is that these early writings were presumably firstly interested in the critique of Hegel's philosophy, which reflected on the individual and secondly the philosophical treatment of the problem of the individual is not direct but formulated around the concept of alienation and estrangement.

In his early works, Marx dealt very seriously with political problems through Hegel's standpoint. Hegel tried to find the right path for the participation of the individual in the political sphere in modern society. In the Hegelian approach, family and civil society cannot realize a political constitution for their own interests because there is already a state from which the family and civil society are derived. In current states, the voice of the family and civil society do not exist because there is a state which makes all decisions including the determination of people's desires and will.

4.3. THE ONTOLOGICAL EXISTENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

This second part of the chapter will concentrate on ontological problems in relation to the economic analysis of Marx in particular in the *Manuscripts of 1844*. After his research about the work of Hegel on the state and the system of society and law, Marx attains the conclusion that the basis of civil society must be sought in political economy because political economy is not just a study on economy but it is a study of economy in relation to law, custom, government; moreover it presents the relations of economic terms such as buying, selling, producing, and distribution of national income and wealth to government and to law. After the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, namely the critique of the state, Marx reaches the conclusion that the basic explanation of the state passes through civil society, which is the sphere of the individual's economic activity.

Marx explained the reason why he decided to engage with economy, particularly political economy, in his preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Before 1844 and particularly during 1843 Marx focused on politics as well as economics. Marx clearly understood that political relations and its forms could not be comprehended well without elaborating what its real elements are and what their functions are in civil society. Politics by itself does not provide an adequate explanation for political and economic questions. It is the economic relations, so to speak, material relations, that reveal true relations of man to not only politics but also other types of relationship in which he is included.

Marx was an editor of the *Reinische Zeitung* in the years between 1842 and 1843. He wrote and published an introduction to the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in Paris in 1844. In 1842-43, he became interested in economic problems and in 1843, he started to criticize Hegel's philosophy of law. In the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx emphasized that his interest in economy was prompted by the themes that he

was occupied with in the *Rheinische Zeitung*.²⁶⁹ After his re-examination of Hegel's study, Marx arrived at the conclusion that

“neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term ‘civil society’; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy.”²⁷⁰

Political economy is a basic element of civil society. Marx displays that “legal relations” and “forms of state” which structure society and the members of this society such as the individuals can be comprehended only through the critique of political economy. These legal relations are the relations of production, selling, buying, and distribution of national income and wealth; that is to say, these relations are the expression of the economic structure of society. In this context, political economy reveals these relations between economy and politics.

To Marx economic formation through history took its shape as progressive development in “Asiatic, ancient, feudal,” and finally “modern bourgeois modes of production.”²⁷¹ These modes of production are the economic formation of society. For Marx, economic relations, that is the relations of production are the basis of the legal and political superstructure. Therefore, they are real foundation of society.

4.3.1. The structure and superstructure

In the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx defines the structure and superstructure of society. The economic foundation or the economic conditions of production is

²⁶⁹ *Rheinische Zeitung* is a daily radical newspaper. It was published years between 1842 and 1843 in Cologne. Marx was the editor of this newspaper. In this newspaper Marx occupied with economic questions such as “the proceeding of the *Rhenish Landtag* on thefts of wood and parceling of landed property, the official polemic which Herr von Schaper, the *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province, opened against the *Rheinische Zeitung* on the conditions of the Moselle peasantry, and finally debates on free trade and protective tariffs...” (Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”, in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1978, p.3)

²⁷⁰ Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”, in *Early Writings: Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, Penguin Books, 1975, p. 425

²⁷¹ Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in *Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 1978, p, 5

considered as the structure of society whereas “the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophical forms,”²⁷² namely ideological forms, are determined as the superstructure.

Marx speaks of changes resulting from economic transformation leading to the entire transformation of the superstructure. In this regard, Marx made a distinction between the material transformation, namely, economic transformation, and the ideological forms, which embrace legal, political, religious, philosophical forms.

After the development of social productive forces, the social order is destroyed: “new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.”²⁷³ The progress of society as economic development results in transformation by means of the transformation of the social forces of production. The transformation of society before anything else is possible with the development of productive forces, which has already existed in the society. With the improvement of the productive forces, social order will disappear. The old society contains new and higher relations of production and the material conditions of these relations within itself. The transformation of economic conditions of production is influenced by natural science, which transforms nature for production through discovering new technology and new forms of production. In addition to natural sciences, ideological forms influence this transformation.

Marx never considers the separation between the ideological structure and economic structure of society. In fact, the ideological structure (involving legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic forms of society) is determined by the mode of production, that is, the economic condition of production. The contradictory and complicated structure of superstructure reflects the whole relations of social production. However, here Marx emphasizes that for the examination of this transformation, the transformation of economic conditions of production must be distinguished from the ideological transformation because Marx says, “this consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production.”²⁷⁴ The understanding and analysis of this transformation is possible by means of considering the conflicts between the social forces of production and relation of production, that is, with the material contradiction of life. The conflict between the ideological structures is elaborated by the conflict between the social forces of production and the relation of production.

²⁷² Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1978, p.5

²⁷³ Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in *Early Writings: Marx*, intro. by Lucio Colletti, p. 426

²⁷⁴ Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859)”, in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, edited by Lewis S. Feuer, Fontana Classics of History and Thought, 1969, p.85

Marx demonstrates that human beings become conscious of this conflict through/within the ideological structures. However, it does not mean that men become always conscious of this conflict within the ideological forms. But it is possible to become conscious of this conflict and fight the conflict out through ideological structures such as the political, or aesthetic or philosophical forms. The new world order corresponds to/is required new formed ideology. This ideology is reformed in accordance with social relations of production.

The structure and superstructure do not only determine society; the existence of the individuals is also affected by these structures of society. The material structure of society or the economic relations, the relations of production, determine the will and the force of the individuals. The relations of production determine the individual as a producer (*producing being*) while the political and legal superstructures determine the individual as a citizen or as a *legal being*. Marx summarizes his guiding principle for his studies and these material relationships as follows;

“In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.”²⁷⁵

In this passage, Marx defines the legal and political structure as the superstructure of society, which is determined by the relations of production. The economic structure is the fundamental or key provision for the superstructure of society. In other words, the material structure of society or the mode of production in material life generally determines the process of social, political and intellectual development of life. As a result, consciousness does not define the existence of individuals but adversely, it is their social conditions that determine their consciousness. Regarding this point, Althusser claims that the conditions and forms of this consciousness are examined through true historical study.²⁷⁶

Althusser affirms that for Hegel material life, that is, the concrete history of people is determined by the dialectic of consciousness—so to speak, by consciousness of people and their ideology—whereas according to Marx, the material conditions of human beings express the history of people but the

²⁷⁵ Karl Marx, ‘Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, in *Early Writings: Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, Penguin Books, 1975, p. 425

²⁷⁶ Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, translated by Ben Brewster, the Penguin Press, 1969, p. 105

consciousness of man is not the expression of history.²⁷⁷ Consciousness and ideology are no more than the appearance of material life.²⁷⁸ According to Althusser, what constitutes the consciousness of people is religion, philosophy, which is embodied in the state. As we already mentioned, there are two societies in Hegel's philosophy: civil society (the society of needs) and political society (the state). For Marx, the state as political ideology is determined by civil society as the sphere of economy. In other words, in Hegel the essence of the economy is political ideology while in Marx the essence of the political ideology altogether is the economy.

Althusser argues that the forms of superstructure (namely "the State, the dominant ideology, religion, politically organized movements, and so on"²⁷⁹) reflect the conflict between capital and labor. Althusser expresses that the relation and contradiction between capital and labor is not simple, as Marx and Engels also claim in many places of their works. Concrete historical conditions and forms in which this conflict exists always give it originality, that is to say, every concrete historical condition and form has its specificity. Althusser employs the conception of superstructure in order to explain and clarify this originality or specificity. To Althusser, these forms of superstructure are state, dominant ideology, religion, organized political movements, so on and so forth.²⁸⁰

In *For Marx*, Althusser claims that Marx does not only turn the concepts and terms of Hegel upside down but also replaces old concepts with new ones. Moreover, Marx gives them new content. In this regard, Althusser points out that not only the terms but also the relations of these terms change.²⁸¹ To Althusser, these new terms are gathered under two groups: on the one hand structure and on the other hand superstructure. In this respect, he speaks of the structure and superstructure as "the separation conditions." Of course, Marx never makes such a definite distinction and categorization between the structure and superstructure. Rather Marx says that the relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, which determines a legal and political superstructure. "The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general."²⁸² In Marx, the superstructure is embodied in the structure of society. On the other side, Althusser argues "*the relative autonomy of the superstructure and their specific effectivity.*"²⁸³ He uses this separation of autonomous

²⁷⁷ The same difference between Hegel and Marx is made for their understanding of the state. In Hegel, the state is truth of civil society. Civil society, in which the state realizes itself, is not more than an appearance (phenomenon) of the state through 'reason'. According to Althusser, one must shed light on Marx in order to dispose of Hegel's shadow or one must shed Marxist light on Hegel.

²⁷⁸ Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. by Ben Brewster, p.107

²⁷⁹ Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. by Ben Brewster, p. 106

²⁸⁰ Karl Marx, 'Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', in *Early Writings: Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, Penguin Books,1975, p. 425

²⁸¹ Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, translated by Ben Brewster, the Penguin Press, 1969, p. 111

²⁸² *Ibid.*, Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. by Ben Brewster, p. 111

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. by Ben Brewster, p. 111

spheres to develop his conception of overdetermination. Althusser contrasts his conception of overdetermination with the idea of contradiction in Hegelian dialectic, which is inherited and adapted in Marx's theory of the development of the productive forces through their inner contradiction. Both in Marx and in Hegel, "contradiction" does not only affect the structure of society but is also affected by it. In other words, "contradiction" is "determining, but also determined in one and the same movement, and determined by the various levels and instances of the social formation it animates."²⁸⁴ However, Althusser argues that his conception of overdetermination implies something more than this mutual determination. In the Hegelian dialectic, for instance, there is a core (Spirit) of the whole development. The term "overdetermination", on the other hand, is used to elaborate multiple forces, multiple centers. This is what Althusser is trying to point out when he speaks of the autonomy of separate spheres. He thus attempts to rescue Marx's philosophy from the reductionist understanding of economy.

Althusser mentions the letter of Engels to Bloch—in which Engels talks about the materialistic conception of history—as a significant evidence in order to disprove economic reductionism. According to Althusser, in this letter, Engels does not just speak of the strong influence of the economy over the forms of superstructure but also of how these forms of superstructure have their proper effects as independent beings.²⁸⁵

Engels emphasizes that the economic condition is the basic one but not the only determining one because to Engels, various elements of the superstructure determine the course of the historical struggles as well, and it is important to pay attention to Engels' use of verb like 'preponderate' which is used in order to underline the domination of the superstructure in many cases. It means that the elements of superstructure have their proper influence in the course of historical struggles, but it does not mean that they are completely separate from the economic element as Althusser claims. Engels claims that

“[t]here is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible), the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary.”²⁸⁶

Then Engels explains strong influence of economy in determining the course of history:

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. by Ben Brewster, p. 101

²⁸⁵ Letter from Engels to J. Bloch in Königsberg, 21 September 1890, *Historical Materialism* (Marx, Engels, Lenin), p. 294 – 296.

²⁸⁶ Letter from Engels to J. Bloch

“We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions. Among these the economic ones are ultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc., and indeed even the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one.”²⁸⁷

I do not agree with the claim, which states that the superstructures have their autonomy. According to Althusser, Marx resolves the identity of the political and the economic and, through the relative autonomy of the superstructure, he breaks “with the Hegelian principle of explanation by consciousness of self (ideology).”²⁸⁸ For example, according to overdetermination, religion as an autonomous sphere could determine a society and its political forms, which have a strong influence over society. That is, according to religious norms, the education, the institution of the state are organized and the new laws are enacted according to these religious norms. In my view, there is mutual relationship between the structure and superstructure. The new structure always re-forms the old one through the superstructure of new society and this structure for itself constitutes the new superstructure like a new ideology to maintain its possibility of survival as well. In short, Marx does not reject the influence of the superstructures on the development of history and historical struggle; however he does not assert these structures and superstructure as separate and autonomous conditions either.

4.3.2. The analysis of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*

In the Preface of the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx declares two reasons why he intends to write and concentrate on a new research with a different theme from the *Critique*.²⁸⁹ 1) Firstly, in the *Critique*, he introduced a critique of political philosophy within the scope of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. He expresses that the argument of the *Critique* is merely based on speculative philosophy and therefore in this work the subjects were intermingled.²⁹⁰ Marx thought it was unsuitable to combine the critique of speculative philosophy with the critique of law and politics. He believed that “the intermingling of criticism...hampers the development of the argument and renders comprehension difficult.”²⁹¹ 2) Secondly, for Marx, “the wealth and diversity of the subjects to be treated, could have been compressed into *one* work only in a purely aphoristic style” which would be arbitrary systemization. Therefore, he decided to separate different subjects such as ethics, politics, law, and concentrate on them in “distinct, independent pamphlets” and then to show the interrelationship of these separate

²⁸⁷ Letter from Engels to J. Bloch

²⁸⁸ Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. by Ben Brewster, p. 111

²⁸⁹ Karl Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in 1844.

²⁹⁰ Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,” in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1978, p.67

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.67

parts. Accordingly, “for this reason it will be found that the interconnection between political economy and the state, law, ethics, civil life, etc., is touched on in the present work only to the extent to which political economy itself *ex professo* touches on these subjects.”²⁹²

However, Marx could not completely realize his final goal, in the sense of the critique of ethics and politics. Therefore, the manuscripts generally focused on the critique of political economy and speculative Hegelian philosophy more than politics and ethics.²⁹³ Even though Marx did not explicitly claim that he criticized political economy through the critique of Hegelian philosophy, we could interpret that he was struggling to demonstrate that political economy, like Hegel’s system, remained in abstraction. Therefore, Marx’s critique of the classical political economists is similar to his critique of Hegel’s philosophy. In this context, Marx found a strong relationship between the standpoint of classical political economy and Hegel’s logic. Just as the Hegelian explanation is based on consciousness of the self, that is, abstract thought, so the classical political economy does not explain the concepts of political economy in relation to their material and historical conditions.

The fundamental themes of these manuscripts are critique of political economy, the notion of the proletarian revolution, future of communism and some philosophical concepts derived from Feuerbach and Hegel such as “alienation,” “labour,” “alienated-labour,” the essence of man. Manuscripts substantially dealt with three main problems; “labor,” “alienation,” and “humanistic socialism.”²⁹⁴ In my judgment, the whole book (all three manuscripts), tries to reveal (deals with) the *concealed* relationship between private property and labor.

After criticizing the relationship between society and the individual from an economic and philosophical perspective, Marx reaches the conclusion that the individuals are separated from the external world and their relationship with others (namely, with other individuals or society and with nature). What does this separation mean for Marx? It signifies that the individuals lose their proper existence as human beings (species being). Then this brings us to another question: what does “loss of the proper existence of the individual” mean? It corresponds to the individual existing as a simple

²⁹² *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.67

²⁹³ Mario Dal Pra, *La Dialettica in Marx: Dagli scritti giovanili all’«Introduzione alla critica dell’economia politica»*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1965, pp.149-242

²⁹⁴ “I Manoscritti presentano sostanzialmente tre gruppi di problemi, dai quali risulta la concezione dell’uomo e del ‘mondo dell’uomo’ che il Marxismo svilupperà. I problemi che il realismo umanistico di Marx affronta sono: a) l’alienazione, b) il lavoro e c) l’umanismo socialista.” (Enrique González Pedrero, Istituto Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, *Annali*, Anno settimo, 1964/65, Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, p. 195)

object²⁹⁵ (commodity) and furthermore, that this individual exists as a means or an instrument for the political and economic realization of the system.

These manuscripts are written from a historical perspective. In this respect, the history of our species particularly under the modern economic system, can be seen as a process of alienation of the individuals from their products, from the process of their products and finally from their species being. In this historical process communism is the final stage which man can/must reach through overthrowing private property and wage-labor, by means of a proletarian revolution.

Regarding the *Manuscripts of 1844* the problem of the individual will be researched in terms of two aspects:

- 1) The relation of the individual with the object—property, nature, labor.
- 2) The relation of the individual with society and with other individuals.

The manuscripts are composed of three manuscripts. In the first manuscript, the topics include wage, capital and ground rent. In this context, the first manuscript basically claims that classical political economists do not understand the nature of labor; because they consider labor as a “thing” which lacks material and historical relations. By doing so, they fail to notice the relationship of labor to man.

Here I would like to elaborate what Marx understands with the concept “thing.” Marx particularly emphasizes that the concepts of political economy such as “money,” “capital,” “labor,” “production,” “distribution,” “consumption,” etc., cannot be evaluated like a simple thing. For a “thing” in itself does not explain anything. If you estimate anything to be a “thing,” it means that you treat it as if it always existed without its material and historical relations. For example, to introduce capital as if it had always existed means to concentrate only on the matter (content) and draw the attention away from the essential formal determination (form); because capital is not only determined by matter but it is determined also by some certain forms (i.e., mode of production), that is, the forces of production and the relations of production. It is the same for the individuals because the individual is not only a definite concept but it is the *total social relations*. In this sense, the individual exists in a certain historical context.

In capitalist economy, the result of considering the individual to be a thing is to reduce the individual into an object of consumption; that is, to comprehend them within the form of needs. Indeed, this is true of any concept, object or subject in capitalist economy.

²⁹⁵ What I mean with the statement “simple object (commodity)” is that the object exists within its relations of production and distribution. In other words, this object exists only in order to be produced and consumed. The object can be sold and bought.

Rent of land and alienated-labor are other basic themes in the first manuscript. In the second manuscript, Marx explains the conflict between capital and labor, as well as the relationship between land property and capital. Finally, in the last manuscript Marx criticizes Hegel's *Phenomenology* and division of labor. More specifically, Marx criticizes the speculative nature of Hegel's philosophy, and accuses Hegel of converting religion into thought. In addition, in the last manuscript Marx talks about communism and annulment of private property.

Marx aims at starting with the critique of political economy through displaying its abstraction and exposing political economy as a discipline, which does not comprehend its true essence. For this reason, he criticizes political economy by touching on its relationship with law, ethics, civil life, etc. In addition to the points made on the shortcomings of political economy, Marx attacks the manner of present criticism about the critique of Hegelianism.²⁹⁶ In the Preface of *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx refers to Feuerbach's criticism, which according to him is the only positive and real achievement, in order to point out that all other criticisms such as those against theologians and political economists are not profound and true criticisms.

Let us take a look at the manuscripts. The first manuscript begins with wages of labor. In this context, Marx focuses on political economy and its understanding of labor. Labor is important for and is the basis of the existence of the individual. However, while it is the basis of the liberty of the individuals and a condition of their existence, in its estranged form, labor turns into a destructive element.

4.3.2.1. First Manuscript

The workers cannot overcome their existing conditions because of two reasons: 1) the first reason is division of labour because if there is division of labor, the individuals as workers cannot direct their productivity to other channels. 2) The second reason is due to their state of being subordinate to capitalists. The reason for this subordination is the fact that the capitalists possess the means of production as their private property. Therefore, "the worker has to struggle not only for his physical means of subsistence; he has to struggle to get work, i.e., the possibility, the means, to perform his activity."²⁹⁷ As a result, the workers are subjected to the capitalists not only in terms of private property (of which they are deprived), but also in terms of all the decisions concerning their wages, the price of the products that they produce, the time that they need to work, etc.

Because of these two reasons, the individuals suffer two times. The relationship based on the subordination of the worker is laden with many contradictions. The results of the relation between the

²⁹⁶ Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1978, p.68

²⁹⁷ Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, translated by Martin Mulligan, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, from the marxists.org, p. 4

capitalist and the worker sometimes make it appear to be mutual, while at other times, the relation is revealed to be completely asymmetrical. More clearly, as long as the capitalist gains, the relation is asymmetrical; the worker does not gain as the capitalist does. However, if the capitalist loses, correlatively the worker will necessarily also lose. Let me quote from Marx: “the worker need not necessarily gain when the capitalist does, but he necessarily loses when the latter loses.”²⁹⁸ Thus (1) when the wealth of society decreases, the working class suffers. (2) If the wealth of society increases, under this situation the demand for labor increases due to the competition between the capitalists. It seems to be a better situation for workers. However, the worker is still at a disadvantage because this situation leads the workers to overwork. They demand to earn more and therefore they have to sacrifice their time and lose their freedom.

Within political economy, labor is considered a commodity. Thus, when there is an increase of commodity such as goods and services to the market, the wage begins to decline. If the wage of labor rises, it is because the demand for labor as a commodity increases, but if, on the contrary, the wage is decreased, it is because the supply of labor increases. Thus not only is there an antagonism between the workers and the capitalist, there is also competition amongst the workers.

Under the subtitle “profit of capital”, the first manuscript examines the nature of capital. Private property is the basis of capital. The law, that is positive law, is passed in order to maintain the existence of private property and capital. What does a person obtain with capital? The response of this question is the power but it is not a causal power, it is *purchasing power*. In other words, it is the power to purchase labor-power and other means of production. This power means the power to dominate over labor and the products of this labor. The capitalist individuals possess this power because of capital but not because of their personal qualities.²⁹⁹ Thus, the capitalist individual is identified with capital whereas the working individual is identified with labor. Only the individuals’ labor power is visible for the profit and self-interest of the capitalist individual but not for the individuals themselves, not for their humanity. One might argue that these two distinct individuals are differently alienated from each other. Similarly, they do not see each other as human beings; because on the one hand there is capital on the other hand there is labor power. These particular individuals relate each other over their interests.

In this context, with the reference of Adam Smith, Marx states that capital is labor in a certain quantity, which is stored up and stocked. Then Smith points out that “funds, or stock, is any accumulation of products of the soil or of manufacture. Stock is called capital only when it yields to its

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.3

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.11

owner a revenue or profit.”³⁰⁰ Accordingly, capital is directly related to profit. In capitalism, both production and consumption are engaged in to obtain profit. In this context, Ricardo defines a nation as a producing shop and man as a machine not only for producing but also for consuming. According to Ricardo, “human life is a kind of capital; economic laws blindly rule the world. For Ricardo, men are nothing, the product everything.”³⁰¹ This situation is constitutive of what the individual has become at the current period. Later Marx makes a similar point on the consumer and production dialectic in his *Grundrisse*. Herein Marx clearly and obviously clarifies the situation of the individual within their economic position in the present system. The individual is not *real*, and not a *true* individual. In other words, they are nothing more than machine parts for the other capitalist individual.

Marx evaluates land as private property to be a commodity but not to be a thing. I suppose that at this point it is necessary as well as useful to clarify the difference between a “commodity” and a “thing.” A commodity is not similar to a “thing.” It is not as simple as thing. A thing means can be understood *in itself*. You do not need to go deep to comprehend what it is. However, a commodity signifies a relationship with something or somebody, it is not defined as merely independent. As a result, the commodity is comprehended in certain context and in a certain historical process. This brings us to the next point.

4.3.2.1.1. Estranged Labor³⁰²

Colletti, in this crucial work, observes that Marx had already understood estranged labor as wage-labor in the *Manuscripts of 1844*. As Marx mentions in *Grundrisse*, in the first glance the sale and purchase of labor power seem to be equivalent but it is indeed a separation of labor from property. For this reason, labor becomes alien to its subject.

Colletti claims that when Marx talks about human nature in the *Manuscripts of 1844* he does not mention human nature as “a ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of the sort found in natural-right philosophy but as a *series of relationships*.”³⁰³ These relationships are the relations of production, the relations with labor, with other individuals, namely, all *social relations*.

According to Marx, political economy failed to explain the premises —such as capital, labor, wages, their relationships to each other, and rent of land—of all those conditions that cause “alienation.”³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p. 11

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p. 18

³⁰² “Die entfremdete Arbeit” (Karl Marx, *Texte zu Methode und Praxis II: Pariser Manuskripte 1844*, Rowohlt, 1966, p.50)

³⁰³ Lucio Colletti, “Introduction”, in *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, Penguin Books, 1975, p.52

³⁰⁴ Marx uses *Entäusserung* as alienation and *Entfremdung* as estrangement but they are interchangeable and almost have the same meaning. Thus alienation and estrangement are used in the same meaning. Alienation or estrangement (*Entäusserung* and *Entfremdung*) is different from externalization in the philosophy of Hegel. In

Under these circumstances, the term alienation does not have positive meaning for Marx as it did for Hegel. Without doubt, Marx admits the positive side of objectification.³⁰⁵ Objectification is more positive than alienation. Objectification is the realization of labor in the product. Labor is materialized in an object. "Labor's realization is its objectification."³⁰⁶ Individuals reach and carry out their existence by the process of objectification. In this context, under the capitalist economic circumstances, the loss of object is the loss of reality and the loss of the realization of the individuals.³⁰⁷ Hence, at this point objectification appears not as a realization of the existence of the individual but as loss of object, which denotes the loss of the individual.

Accordingly, estrangement or alienation signifies the loss of object. Furthermore, the object or the product of labor becomes an alien thing to its producer, and becomes an independent external existence. As a result, the individual worker becomes also alien to their product. Consequently, we can basically claim that while alienation has a negative meaning, objectification has a more positive sense. However, under the capitalist form of production, objectification is bound to result in alienation.

In explaining the real and essential connection between capital and labor, land and labour, wages and capital, etc., Marx reaches the following results:

1. It does not mean that the more the workers produce the better their situation becomes. On the contrary, they become poorer.
2. Labor does not just produce only commodities but also creates itself as commodity for the capitalist. As the worker serves to create labor as a commodity, so the worker creates himself as a commodity as well.
3. The worker as commodity becomes cheaper when they produce more commodities.
4. The value of the worker as commodity decreases as the value of the world of objects as commodities increases.³⁰⁸

Because of these reasons listed above under the four items, the worker is faced with *alienation*. However it is not a simple alienation of worker from the product; it is the separation of labor from its real relations to man. At the end there is just one form of alienation, which is related to and includes

Marx alienation and objectification are related but still distinct. In Marx's understanding, objectification corresponds to Hegel's concept of externalization. (John Plamenatz, *Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, P. 115; Plamenatz's work gives a broad perspective of Marx's aspect of man. In this study, he criticizes Marx to be obscure and to misunderstand Hegel. In addition, he lays emphasis on the rigid ties between these two great philosophers.)

³⁰⁵ In German it is correspondent with *Vergegenständlichung*, that is, in English objectification, embodiment.

³⁰⁶ Karl Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company: New York, London, 1978, p.71

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.71-72

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.71

other forms of alienation mentioned above; “alienation or estrangement of man,”³⁰⁹ that is, “estrangement of the individual.” The individuals can be alienated without becoming estranged from their labor, in the sense that the individual can be alienated from society or other individuals even within their direct relation to labor. It is possible that the individuals still become estranged from themselves and society due to the fact that the individuals cannot get involved in politics. Let me put it more clearly, if the participation of the individual in politics is somehow blocked, then the individuals are still alien to the society in which they live.

Now we will move on to our next discussion: *the forms of estrangement*.

4.3.2.1.1.1. Alienation of labor from its product

In alienation of labor from its product, the product no longer belongs to its producers. It becomes an independent being. Of course, in such a society (or in every kind of society) the product inevitably becomes independent or alien to its producer. Let me give an example. For instance, as a painter an individual can produce a painting, his/her art and then s/he has to sell it in order to meet his/her human needs, or maybe s/he exchanges with something that s/he needs. It is a necessary result for providing the essential needs. After selling their painting, they become alien to their product but this alienation is positive due to the fact that they have already materialized (actualized) their existence through their production process. The product that the individuals produce is not considered as a commodity because this product corresponds to its producer. The individual does not find anything alien to himself within his product. Initially the individuals create their object for themselves but then for another in order to support their life.

In fact, the product produced by worker is the objectification of labor. Workers, indeed, actualize themselves in the object they produce. This object is the materialization of labor. In this context, labor is also re-creation of human being. However, under these economic conditions (capitalist mode of production), the objectification and realization of their labor in an object or in a product appear as a loss of their reality, that is, loss of their objects. For this reason, this creation or production is no longer the re-creation of workers and the *way of finding* themselves but it is the loss of object and thus the loss of the worker’s proper and essential existence.³¹⁰

Why does the product of labor become more powerful than the worker? What does it mean for the individual? Marx makes an analogy with religion in this context. He says that the more the individuals give to God, the more they lose themselves. It is the same for the loss of object of labor, which does not anymore belong to the worker. The workers or the individuals realize their labor in the object with

³⁰⁹ In my view Marx uses term “man” in order to refer humankind or human being in general, that is, it means “species being.”

³¹⁰ Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Tucker, p.71

all their effort but in the end, it is a *one-sided* process. “For on this premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the alien objective world becomes which he creates over-against himself, the poorer he himself—his inner world—becomes, the less belongs to him as his own.”³¹¹

For the individuals, it means that they lose something from their inner world, which makes them poorer in front of the alien objective world. The more the individuals lose their inner world, the less they reveal and realize their true reality. The individuals put their life into the object but if the object does not belong to them, life is not anymore their life but on the contrary, this life belongs to the object, which is not owned by the same individuals. Therefore, the individuals are not the result of the product of their labor because the individuals remain without object, that is, without their realization. Therefore, *possession* (property) is important but it is the *possession of labor* and the *possession of product* or object of labor. Because this possession leads the individual to embody or objectify his/her labor in the object which is his/her reality. In this alienation, 1) the labor of the worker becomes object and 2) the labor becomes an independent, outside entity and something alien to the worker. What does it mean then? It means that 1) the individual also becomes an object, not a subject (agent); and 2) the individual becomes an independent entity in the negative sense in that becomes an *isolated* being.

Labor becomes as “an object, an external existence” to the worker but it does not mean only the alienation of worker from his labor but it signifies also that labor becomes independent from the worker. Labor is not his labor anymore. It belongs to another individual who benefits from this labor whenever or however s/he wants. In addition to this alienation, labor becomes a commodity. Labor is evaluated according to some amount of money, that is, as a wage.

Marx also pays attention to nature without which the individual cannot do anything and cannot live. Human being produces through nature and within nature. Nature provides humankind with two things: 1) the external sensuous world in which the individuals fulfill their human activity or labor. And for this activity nature offers them (a) the matter or object over which they can work and (b) provide the means through which the individuals produce or give the form to the object. That is, nature provides the means of labor; it provides labor with the object on which labor operates, because without object, labor cannot exist. 2) Nature provides the individuals with the means of life, that is, the physical subsistence of the individuals.³¹²

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.72

³¹² *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.72-3

In short, the workers 1) lose their labor through loss of product that they produce; 2) they lose their object through which they realize themselves; 3) they are deprived of not only the objects, which are necessary for their life but also the object through which they produce.³¹³

Political economy does not disclose this alienation “inherent in the nature of labor” because political economy thinks labor just through its positive results. In other words, political economy takes labor into consideration only when it produces value. In addition, political economy pays attention to labor if it ceases to be the specific power of human being and turns into an activity yielding a profit. For Marx, on the other hand, the essence of the labour is to be a specific activity of mankind, the spark of personality, and the objectification of this personality.

4.3.2.1.1.2. Alienation of labor from the activity of production

The question of the relation of labor to its product is closely connected to the relationship of the worker to their activity of production. In Marx’s words, “the estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the *act of production*—within the *producing activity*, itself.”³¹⁴ Simply if the worker were not alienated from this process, s/he would not become alien to its result, that is, the product of his/her labor in the same way. In capitalism, this activity does not belong to the worker. Therefore, the worker never feels happy during production. This activity is “activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker’s *own* physical and mental energy, his personal life or what is life other than activity—as an activity which is turned against him, neither depends on nor belongs to him.”³¹⁵

Since, as we will see in next section, Marx believes that labor is the nature of human beings, alienation of labor from the activity of production implies alienation of human beings from their own nature. Thus, from this second type of alienation, the third aspect of alienation appears. The individual as a species being becomes alienated from his/her species being.

4.3.2.1.1.3. Alienation of species being [*Gattungswesen*]

Before touching on alienation of species being I would like to speak of the concept of the species being or Marx’s views on human nature and some interpretations regarding this subject.

4.3.2.1.1.3.1. The individual as species being [the question of human nature in Marx’s early writings]

It is necessary to discuss the concept of human nature, or species being in that the argument of this thesis is about the individual. In fact, in the *Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy* (1842), Feuerbach demonstrates that the problem of the essence lies behind the idea, which argues that

³¹³ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.72

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.73

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 75

the essence of something lies outside of this thing. For example, Feuerbach observes that the Hegelian approach regards the essence of human beings as outside of human beings but not in human beings themselves. From my standpoint, Marx's treatment of human essence or human nature proceeds with Feuerbach's view.

The question of human nature in Marx is one of the most debated topics among Marxists. Norman Geras argues that there are many claims about human nature among Marxists, "whose truth is not obvious, but controversial."³¹⁶ On the one hand, some claim that Marx rejects human nature because according to them this sort of acceptance is conservative and reactionary; on the other hand, some contend that there is an idea of human nature in Marx's philosophy. "At least since Aristotle, philosophers have defined human beings as rational animals. By this, of course, they mean to say that the specific feature that differentiates humans from other animals is their rationality. In this sense, we can call the human essence our species-character or being."³¹⁷ In my view, Marx did not reject or hesitate to speak of human nature or human essence but when he talked about the concept of human nature, he did not make mention of a fixed, constant human essence. However, of course, Marx did not explicitly refer to human nature as Feuerbach did.

In my view, the question of human nature in Marx, or generally in philosophy, might be related to the question of the relation between theory and practice, as well as the materialist and idealist approaches. Marx did not consider the concept outside of its material and historical development. In Marx, the concept of human nature is conceived in terms of its movement, i.e., its particular, historical, material movement. Hegel and later Feuerbach, for example, regard the concept of human essence as self-conscious being whereas in the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx argues that human being is an *acting being*. Human nature is based on the concept of "relations." These relations are social relations, the relations of production.

Norman Geras presents a wide analysis of that concept in his work, *Marx and Human Nature* in which he argues that Marx somehow speaks of human nature. He particularly emphasizes the *Theses on Feuerbach* because, according to Geras, the sixth thesis shows that Marx did not reject the idea of a human nature. Another thinker who makes mention of Marx's approach to human nature is Erich Fromm. While Geras put particular emphasis on *Theses on Feuerbach*, especially the sixth thesis; in his work *Marx's Concept of Man*, Fromm focused on the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*.

³¹⁶ Norman Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, Verso editions, 1983, p.104

³¹⁷ Thomas E. Wartenberg, "'Species-Being' and 'Human Nature' in Marx", *Human Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1982), pp. 77-95 Published by: Springer, p. 77

“Marx—like everyone else—did reject certain ideas of human nature; but he also regarded as some being true. It is important to discriminate the sort that he rejected from the sort that he did not.”³¹⁸ In this regard, it is necessary to reveal what Marx refused and what he acknowledged about the idea of human essence. According to Norman Geras, Marx’s early writings are separated from his later writings (his development after 1845) not because of his rejection of the idea of human nature.³¹⁹ For Geras, in his later writings, Marx emphasizes on the idea of human nature. Geras begins his analysis with a classification of the customary understanding of human nature in two groups. The first understanding claims that human nature is a constant and universal entity. “This typically what is involved in claims that human nature rules out the possibility of socialism, lasting human harmony, direct democracy, and what have you.”³²⁰ The second understanding refers to the changes, which depend on different times and places. In other words, this understanding indicates, “human nature is different in different times or places or according to the influence of different circumstances. The idea here is of a historically changing, socio-culturally specific entity.”³²¹

Geras differentiates the expression of ‘human nature’ from ‘the nature of man.’ In this respect, ‘human nature’ is used to express a constant entity, that is, “the set of all (relatively) permanent and general human characteristics.”³²² However, he uses ‘the nature of man’ in its broader sense, namely, it means “the all-round character of human beings in some given context.”³²³ As we see, the first usage (human nature) indicates an unchangeable entity, while in the second there is variability and instability in the nature of man.

Regarding the sixth thesis³²⁴ on Feuerbach, in Geras’ view, Marx did not object to Feuerbach who conceives of human being as an internal, species, natural entity. However, what Marx thought about Feuerbach’s mistake is that Feuerbach considers human *only* in terms of those features. “Das Wesen kann daher *nur*³²⁵ als “Gattung”, als innere, stumme, die vielen Individuen *natürlich* verbindende

³¹⁸ Norman Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, Verso editions, 1983, p. 15

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, p. 19

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, p. 23

³²¹ *Ibid.*, Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, p. 23

³²² *Ibid.*, Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, p. 24

³²³ *Ibid.*, Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, p. 24

³²⁴ “VI. Feuerbach löst das religiöse Wesen in das *menschliche* Wesen auf. Aber das menschliche Wesen ist kein dem einzelnen Individuum inwohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner Wirklichkeit ist es das ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.

Feuerbach, der auf die Kritik dieses wirklichen Wesens nicht eingeht, ist daher gezwungen:

1. von dem geschichtlichen Verlauf zu abstrahieren und das religiöse Gemüt für sich zu fixieren, und ein abstrakt - *isoliert* - menschliches Individuum vorauszusetzen;

2. Das Wesen kann daher nur als “Gattung”, als innere, stumme, die vielen Individuen *natürlich* verbindende Allgemeinheit gefaßt werden.” Source: http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me03/me03_005.htm

³²⁵ *Italic is mine.*

Allgemeinheit gefaßt werden.” In other words, Geras argues that Marx criticizes Feuerbach for conceiving of the human being through a one-sided perspective.³²⁶

In *From Hegel to Marx*, under the subtitle ‘Marx and Feuerbach,’ Sidney Hook examines the theses on Feuerbach, and states that Feuerbach defines human essence through “the biological facts of interdependence and reproduction.”³²⁷ However, Marx explains this reality through social relations. Feuerbach considers human essence only as “genus” but Marx refuses to reduce human essence only to biology. “If one must speak of the ‘essence of man,’ one must find it in man’s civilisation, material and ideal, and not in biology.”³²⁸

Like Geras, Emile Bottigelli believes that there is the idea of human nature in Marx. According to Bottigelli, Marx confines himself to the approach of Feuerbach concerning human nature.³²⁹ For Bottigelli, in the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx tries to determine this human essence. But nevertheless, Bottigelli states that Marx did not give any clear or obvious definition referring to human essence. It means that in Marx’s writings, the idea of a human nature is not as obvious as it is in Feuerbach. Although Marx did not define human essence, according to Bottigelli, one might derive this definition from the entire work, that is, the *Manuscripts of 1844*. Bottigelli states that in Marx, there is not any *a priori* defined human nature or human essence.³³⁰ In this respect, Bottigelli argues that Marx admitted the idea of Hegel: human beings create or produce themselves; and it is the originality of Marx because human beings who create themselves only produce their own truth. Like Bottigelli, Althusser, asserts that human nature does not exist as something that is determined for once and never changes throughout history. And like Bottigelli, Althusser defines human nature through its historical and dialectical process in Marx. In other words, according to these thinkers, human nature is a product of history.

In *the Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx considers human nature or what he calls, ‘species being’ in terms of labor, that is, human activity. As Erich Fromm put it, “what Marx means by ‘species-character’ is the essence of man; it is that which is universally human, and which is realized in the process of history by man through his productive activity.”³³¹ Marx did not differentiate the existence of the individuals’ life from their species-life. The character of the individuals’ species being is to be social being. “Man’s individual and species-life are not different, however much – and this is inevitable – the mode of

³²⁶ Norman Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend*, Verso editions, 1983, p. 31

³²⁷ *ibid.*, Hook, *From Hegel to Marx.*, p.298

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, Hook, *From Hegel to Marx.*, p.298

³²⁹ E. Bottigelli, “Introduction”, in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 by Karl Marx*, translation to Turkish: Kenan Somer, Sol Yayınları, 1993, p. 56

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, Bottigelli, “Introduction”, in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 57

³³¹ Erich Fromm, *Marx’s Concept of Man*, Frederick Ungar Publishing: New York., 1961, from: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/fromm/works/1961/man/index.htm>

existence of the individual is a more particular or more general mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular or more general individual life.”³³²

In the *Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx speaks of the alienation of the individual from their species being, that is, from their essence. The fundamental question is here what this essence is. To respond to this main question we should consider the following quotation.

“... [I]n the first place labor, *life-activity, productive life* itself, appears to man merely as a *means* of satisfying a need—the need to maintain the physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species—its species character—is contained in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character. Life itself appears only as *a means to life*.”³³³

In other words, all of this alienation or estrangement of man and his production and the process of this alienation would not be possible if the labor of the worker, his activity, and thus his production did not belong to others.

Estranged labor leads the worker to become an alien to his/her species being. What does “species being” mean? To be a species being means that man “can apprehend in thought not only his own individual self, but also his own species-character, his own essential nature.”³³⁴ Productive activity as a character of human species being differentiates humankind from the animals because the feature of this species being is its “free, conscious activity” which the animal does not possess. The animal just has its life activity, which is identical with itself. The animal cannot distinguish itself from its life activity because it has not any free conscious activity. However, human individuals can distinguish themselves from their life activity because they do not possess only life activity but consciousness. Because of this consciousness, the individual makes life its object. In Marx’s words; “man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity.”³³⁵ And he continues; “man is species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but also because he treats himself as the

³³² Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, translated by Martin Mulligan, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, from the marxists.org, p.45

³³³ Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, pp. 75-76

³³⁴ Joseph O’Malley, “Introduction,” in *Critique.*, by Karl Marx, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, Cambridge at the University Press, 1970, p. xli. I found this interpretation of O’Malley very Hegelian, so to speak, from perspective of Hegel’s logic. Put it differently, to say that man is species being signifies that species-being refers to and includes both individual self and universal character of human species, that is, the true essence of human nature.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 76

actual, living species; because he treats himself as a *universal* and therefore a free being.”³³⁶ The character of man’s species being is its universal feature. Man considers himself to be a free and universal being. The individuals make life the object of their consciousness and for this reason, their activity is free activity.

Shortly, what makes man different from animal is related to the difference between *immediacy* and *mediation*. The animal has an immediate relation with nature but on the other hand, human beings can separate themselves from their object and their relation with nature; therefore the relation of the individual becomes a mediate form. For instance, this relation appears as mediate form because of the means of production. When the individual has a mediate connection with nature through their own labor (not estranged), this individual is free to conduct their own life activity. This individual is free to relate to nature. However due to estranged labor, the human being in capitalism is not free at all, and thus reduced into mere life-activity. Their life-activity is a simple means for their existence. Here the term “freedom” does not mean being able to do whatever one wants and desires to do. Rather to be free indicates that the individuals have a *direct* relation to their object and their labor. Accordingly, to be free is to possess the object that the individuals produce and to relate with their object and labor regarding production and consumption.

To sum up, the differences between the animal and human being are as follows;

- 1) While the animal has an immediate relationship with nature over its immediate needs, the individuals form both immediate and mediate relation with nature.
- 2) The individuals’ life-activity is free and conscious activity.
- 3) The animal “produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally.”³³⁷
- 4) While the man produces the whole nature, the animal produces just itself, that is, for surviving.
- 5) The man produces and forms something in accord with “the laws of beauty.”

The essence of man (human being) is to be a species being.³³⁸ Species of human being is a social being and to be a social being is to be in relations with the world outside (nature), with the production

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 75

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.76

³³⁸“Species nature” (and, earlier, “species being”)—*Gattungswesen*; “man’s essential nature”—*menschlichen Wesen*.” (Karl Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company: New York, London, 1978, p.77) “Man is a species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but—and this is only another way of expressing it—but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being.” (Marx, p. 75) Here the definition of species or genus is the same with the Hegelian description. In *Encyclopaedia of The Philosophical Sciences* (§177) Hegel defines species (*die Gattung*) as universal. According to Hegel, the universal contain the individual and particular. “Similarly the individual must be understood to be a subject or substratum, which involves the genus and species in itself and possesses a substantial existence” (Logic §164). From this quotation we can see that Marx is very much

process, and with other individuals. What makes human individual a species being is that they transform the objective world, namely they produce universally. In this context, Marx says that the aim of working or producing is the actualization, objectification, and materialization of the species life of human beings. Humans as species being not only create themselves intellectually, that is, in consciousness; but they create actively in reality. However with estranged labor not only nature, the life activity, the individual, and the product (object) are alienated but also the individuals are estranged from their species being. Therefore, “estranged labor estranges the species from man.”³³⁹ For the individual loses their human character, and loses the relation of belonging to their species. In other words, as Marx argues, the object of labor is to objectify the species life of human being; if the individuals are estranged from their labor, they cannot objectify their species being. The life of the species is the productive life but if labor, life activity, and productive life appear only as an instrument to satisfy the needs, the life of species is no longer a productive life. Therefore, with estranged labor, the individual as a species being becomes a means to mere continuance of existence and becomes alien to themselves.

Because the worker is alien to their species being, in the same way they are alien to the other individuals. “In fact, the proposition that man’s species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature.”³⁴⁰ It is clear that each activity of the individuals, as well as each relation of the individuals to themselves is realized through the relationship with others.

Thus, alienation means that the individual lacks knowledge of others and themselves. The reason is that the individual never meets with other individuals through their labor or their product of labor; because the relation of the individuals is mediated through their estranged product and labor. The recognition of their labor and the product of their labor by other individuals is a sort of the confirmation of the individuals’ existence. Thus, alienation is closely connected with the term *recognition*.

Marx expresses over and over again that the relationship of the individuals to themselves become a real and objective relation only with other individuals. Therefore, the individuals are the total relationship. Just as the worker realizes his labor within the relationship to nature and other man, so he practically estranges from his labor, its process, its production and his real essence within the same relationship.

Hegelian. To say that the individual is species being means that the individual recognizes the universal in themselves and rises above their subjectivity.

³³⁹ Karl Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.75

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.77

Respectively we get the following results, which arise from estranged labor;

- 1) The workers are estranged from nature and themselves within their relationships. These relations are not simple and ordinary relations. It is the relationship of the worker to the other individual. In his/her relationship to other individuals, the individual places him/herself and his/her relation to nature as well.
- 2) Without this relationship, neither realization nor fulfillment of the individual (the worker) nor estrangement of the worker is possible.
- 3) Through this relationship with others, the self-estrangement of the worker is manifested in the practical world. The whole phenomenon concerning estrangement of the worker is practical. Praxis contains negative and positive activity of man. On the one side the individuals can actualize themselves through their practical activity, that is, through their creation; on the other side, their practical activity leads them to become alien in their proper relationship, so to speak, in the relation of their production. Just as a priest is a mediator of religious estrangement of the individuals, so money in the same way is another practical mediator of the alienation of human beings.
- 4) Due to estranged labor, the individuals create a relationship of the production of their labor and of their labor activity as a power over themselves. They thus create a hostile relationship with the other individual.
- 5) Simply it can be said that the individuals who produce in estrangement lose their proper relationships! In other words, the loss of his relationship is the loss of his own essence.³⁴¹

The loss of relationship is the loss of recognition, which makes the individual a real and true individual. The true individual is a species being. In other words, the individuals are the representations of species of human being in their own particular existence. The individuals sometimes are recognized through their immediate existence or immediate relation; sometimes through a mediator, for instance, through object, labor, or product, or through their relationship of production. In this context, recognition is in some way the evidence and confirmation of the existence of the individuals. Under alienation, the objects produced by the individuals are considered only for consumption but these objects are not conceived as a means for the recognition of the existence of the individuals. This *un-recognized* situation is the result of alienated labor.

In this regard, the emancipation of human beings and the overcoming of alienation will be possible through the abolishment of private property, when human beings possess their own labor activity and manage their own labor force. Human beings will thus retake their productive life, which is for Marx the life of the species.

³⁴¹ Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.78

The estranged labor results in the *capitalist* and *private property*. “*Private property* is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of *alienated labor*, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.”³⁴² In fact, estranged labor is first drawn from private property as a result. In other words, estranged labor is obtained through “the movement of private property.” However, at the end of the analysis of estranged labor, Marx explains that “though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labor, it is rather its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual confusion.”³⁴³ The man possessing private property as a result of estranged labor dominates over the whole relationship of producer—worker. It is the point, the essence of private property that classical political economy is not able to disclose.

In addition to private property, the wage form is the result of estranged labor as well. “Wages are a direct consequence of estranged labor, and estranged labor is the direct cause of private property.”³⁴⁴ In other words, my estranged labor creates wages. And private property dispossesses me of my labor which becomes estranged labor. That is, private property takes my livelihood away. From this point of view, private property is not considered as a separate thing from the individuals, or outside of them. Labor is identical with the individuals and private property is a result of their activity, their estrangement of labor.

In short, Marx began with a fact of political economy, which is the alienation of the workers and their production. From this departure point, he arrived at the concept “estranged labor.” By means of the analysis of this concept, Marx revealed the deprivation and weakness of political economy, which did not consider labor and its production as estranged fact. Marx draws attention to alienation as an activity and alienation as a fact (case). On the one hand, for the individual alienation is an activity; that is, everything appears as *activity of alienation* but on the other hand, for non-producing person everything appears as *a state of alienation*.

4.3.2.2. Second Manuscript

In the second manuscript, Marx concentrates on capital and labor, in particular, the relationship of capital to the workers. It is clear that the individual exists only as capital and only when s/he serves for capital. In other words, the individuals do not exist if they suffer from poverty, if they steal, or if they commit an illegal act. In these cases, the worker exists only due to stealing, breaking the law, etc., in front of judge or laws. Just as Marx says for workers, so the individual is considered as a *specter* (*invisible*) in politics. Within this relationship of capital to the individual, the individual is reduced to a commodity, and s/he appears and exists just insofar as s/he is considered as capital. “Splitting of labor

³⁴² *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.79

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.79

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.80

into labor itself and the wages of labor. The worker himself a capital, a commodity.”³⁴⁵ From this point of view, Marx continues to discuss the essence of the relationship between private property and labor in his third manuscript.

4.3.2.3. Third Manuscript: The essence of private property and labor

In the third manuscript, Marx focuses on private property and labor concerning their relationship through the critiques of political economists such as Ricardo and Smith. Marx begins his manuscript by demonstrating that the essence of private property is labor. He acknowledges that the principle of political economy is labor as Adam Smith and other economists recognized; but this new political economy, to which Marx re-defines and gives the right form, no longer considers private property as “a mere condition external to man.”³⁴⁶ Marx indicates that political economy is on the one hand a product of the movement of private property, that is, the product of the modern industry; on the other hand, it has to be regarded “as a force which has quickened and glorified the energy and development of *modern industry* and made it a power in the realm of *consciousness*.”³⁴⁷

What is the reason of the antithesis between the individual, society, and politics? The answer is very obvious for Marx: the antithesis of *labor* and *capital*. The conflict between the individual, society, and politics remains in contradiction as long as “it is not comprehended as the antithesis of *labor* and *capital*”³⁴⁸.³⁴⁹ This antithesis must be grasped “in its active connection, its internal relation.”³⁵⁰

In order to comprehend the antithesis of the individual and society it is required to take the individual into account not as a single being and as an abstract existence but it is necessary to grasp this contradiction with the relation of the individual to capital and labor. To be sure, the antithesis of the individual and society is associated with the conflict between capital and labor. Capital is to possess power over labor and the products of that labor; the power of capitalists is the purchasing power of their capital. The capitalists with this power purchase labor. Accordingly, “capital is store-up labor.”³⁵¹ Labor belongs to the individuals; for this reason if there is a conflict between capital and labor, there is

³⁴⁵ Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, translated by Martin Mulligan, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, from the marxists.org, p.39

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.40

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.40

³⁴⁸ Here we should answer the question: “what does capital mean for Marx?” therefore, we can understand the relationship between labor and capital. In the *Manuscripts of 1844* under the subtitle “Capital”, Marx asserts, “Capital is thus the governing power over labor and its products. The capitalist possesses this power, not on account of his personal or human qualities, but inasmuch as he is an owner of capital. His power is the purchasing power of his capital, which nothing can withstand.” Then he asks what capital is and answers, “capital is stored-up labor.” (Karl Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, translated by Martin Mulligan, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967, from the marxists.org, p.11)

³⁴⁹ Karl Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 81

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 81

³⁵¹ Karl Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.11

also contradiction between the individuals and capital. Capital purchases labor of the individuals in order to make profit. The individuals sell their labor to the capitalist in order to maintain their life.

Then how is it possible to annihilate this contradiction between the individual and society? As mentioned above, Marx claims that the emancipation from the conflict between capital and labor is possible through a revolutionary movement, which leads private property to be abolished. Annihilation of private property is the key point to end up the antithesis of capital and labor. Well, what happens when it is abolished?

Firstly, Marx states that with the negation of private property, the individuals not just properly produce themselves but also they produce their object and the other individual.³⁵² Secondly, the abolition of private property is basically emancipation from the results of alienation. In turn, the individuals can objectify themselves in their product without being alien to their object. Accordingly, the point of departure and the result of the movement are the material of labor and the individual as a subject. The whole movement has a social character.

“Likewise, however, both the material of labor and man as the subject, are the point of departure as well as the result of the movement (and precisely in this fact, that they must constitute the *point of departure*, lies the historical *necessity* of private property). Thus the *social* character is the general character of the whole movement: *just as* society itself produces *man as man*, so is society *produced* by him. Activity and consumption, both in their content and in their *mode of existence*, are *social*: *social* activity and *social* consumption; the *human* essence of nature first exists only for *social* man; for only then does nature exist for him as a *bond* with *man*—as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for him—as the life-element of human world; only here does nature exist as the *foundation* of his own *human* existence. Only here has what is to him his *natural* existence become his *human* existence, and nature become man for him. Thus *society* is the consummated oneness in substance of man and nature—the true resurrection of nature—the consistent naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfilment.”³⁵³

Basically, if the individuals lose this social character, they lose all the features which make them human beings. Accordingly, it is necessary to give back the social character of the individuals through annihilation of the claim that they could create alone and consume alone. The individual is a

³⁵² Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 85

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.85

complement of social relations. As a result, the individual is the *relation in itself*. In this regard, the individual is the relation *for itself* as well as in itself. These social relations therefore reveal the extent to which society creates the individual and the extent to which the individual creates society. In other words, production does not belong only to society because the individuals also produce society. Therefore, it goes without saying that from the paragraph above, Marx refutes the argument which claims that Marx's philosophy is society-centered.

Thereupon, it goes without saying that the relationship between the individual and society is not one-sided but mutual. It is very important to draw attention to this point because here Marx demonstrates that society and the individual are not two separate and independent beings. Instead, they are interlocked. From this point, we can draw the conclusion that Marx explicitly argues that there is a human world, which is neither society-centered nor individual-centered. Because there is such a strong relationship between society and the individual, there is mutual alienation in the human (external) world in terms of both the individual and society.³⁵⁴

In society the individuals' natural existence becomes their human existence because only in society do they meet with their species being and gain the character of human existence. Even if social activity and social consumption in their proper features are based on communal activity and consumption, social activity and social consumption are definitely not only "in the form of some directly communal activity and directly consumption." When the scientist engages in scientific activity seldom in communal interaction with others, it could be seen as direct activity. However, even so, the individual as a scientist is social not only because s/he gets the material of her/his activity such as language as a social product from society but also because her/his own existence is social activity. Therefore the consciousness of the individual as social being, her/his general consciousness, is not "an abreaction from *real* life" but it is "only the *theoretical* shape of that of which the *living* shape is the real community, the social fabric."³⁵⁵ As a consequence, Marx expresses that man's activity of his general consciousness is his theoretical existence as social being which is shaped through his relation with society. From this point of view, Marx puts the emphasis on the relation between society and the individual. In other words, he abstains from establishing society as an abstract form opposite to the individual.

³⁵⁴ "Il flusso che l'emancipazione apre va appunto dalla società all'individuo, come dall'individuo alla società, sicché l'individuo è sociale sia quanto all'origine, sia quanto al risultato; né l'attività sociale dell'individuo ha bisogno di qualche forma particolare per essere tale; basta che essa sia semplicemente attività «umana» per essere social, cioè per trarre dalla società il suo materiale e per conferire ad essa il proprio risultato." (Mario Dal Pra, *La Dialettica in Marx: Dagli scritti giovanili all'«Introduzione alla critica dell'economia politica»*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1965, p.207)

³⁵⁵ Karl Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 86

Life in its general sense is a creation of the individual's activity with other individuals. For this reason, even if their particular life is sometimes not direct communal life, it is always a manifestation of social life; and their social life is at the same time their species-life. Thus, the individual life and species-life are identical. Man from her/his consciousness of species affirms that s/he is a social being. Due to this generality or universality in the sense of species-life, in her/his thought man confirms her/his real existence. In this context, Marx confirms the existence of the individual with his/her particularity. What makes man the individual being is his particularity, his particular being. However, just as s/he is particular being so s/he is totality. S/he is the totality of her/his social activity and s/he is totality of her/his subjective existence of thought. In this respect, Marx highlights that thinking and being are different but "at the same time they are in unity with each other"³⁵⁶

In the objective world, the individuals do not confirm themselves only in thought; they affirm themselves through all their physical essential powers. With their essential powers (*Wesenkräfte*) they orient themselves to the objective world. Their orientation to the object and their appropriation of that object refer to their whole human relation to the world. It is seen that it is not simple appropriation of the object; it is manifestation of their humanity or their social and human activity. Hence, just as their human relations to the world (that is, their way of acting through their essential powers) are not just, one-dimensional so their relation to the object does not mean merely possessing or appropriation of that object.³⁵⁷

Concerning the concept of possession of an object and manifestation of the human world through this possession of the object, private property emerges as a main gospel in this regard. Accordingly the question is: what does private property do to man? Due to the private property, all the powers of the individual being in their direct social form are replaced by or reduced to only the relation of possessing or having. It signifies that man is reduced to this abstract property in an effort to "yield his inner wealth to outer world."³⁵⁸

Positive transcendence of private property leads man to orient and relate to the object or thing just as an object or thing. This relation of thing to itself and to man is an objective human relation because of man as a social being. For this reason, the object is not more than the object with its relation to man. It denotes that the object does not have any power over its producers. Let me quote one more sentence from Marx; "in practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself to the human being humanly."³⁵⁹ In capitalist mode of production, this relation is not human due to the fact that the object relates to man as a powerful thing over him/her; because human character as a subject

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 86

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 87

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 87

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 87

is given to the object. The relation is significant not because of man as species being (human being) but because the object has taken upon itself human characteristic. In respect thereof, there is an inverted relationship; this inverted relation is between the subject and the predicate. This inversion expresses also the main problem of the individual; that is, the inversion between the individual and politics and economy. It is necessary to reverse this inverted relationship between aim and means.

At this point, we have to mention another side of the object, namely, in terms of the subject and his capacity. It seems all things depend on object or are considered through objective perspective. At this very point, Marx focuses on the subjective capacity. He emphasizes that an object is related to the essential power of man. If this essential power is not confirmed by or corresponded with the object, this subjective capacity has no sense for that object. It goes without saying that Marx defines this subjective capacity or the essential power of man in social or humanized senses. An object takes its form by way of the subjective capacity or the essential power of the individuals. The manifestation of this essential power is the humanization of the object. As long as the subjective capacity of the individuals does not actualize itself in an object, this capacity or essential power remains abstract; or under this condition, this essential power of the individuals would be only potential power. Marx argues that all the human senses or faculties develop and take shape through “a labor of the entire history of the world down to the present.”³⁶⁰ As a result, Marx relates these senses to the social conditions of man. For example a person who is about to die because of famine definitely does not consider the food in its human form, but the food for this starving man exists just in its abstract form; that is, the food serves merely to get him out that hell hole. In this sense, there is not any difference between man and animal, which tries to survive.

4.3.2.3.1. The reality of division of labor and its estranged form

Having discussed various types of alienation, under this subtitle; we will examine its root cause: *division of labor* in its negative form. Marx points out Say’s remark that “division of labor is a convenient, useful means—a skillful deployment of human powers for social wealth; but it reduces the ability of each person taken individually.”³⁶¹ Thusly we see another reason creating alienation of the individuals concerning their labor activity: division of labor.

In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels claim, “division of labor and property are identical expressions.”³⁶² In other words, while in division of labor the same thing is expressed according to activity, in property this same thing is affirmed according to product of the activity. And property is

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 89

³⁶¹ Karl Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.58

³⁶² Marx and Engels, *German Ideology: including Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*, Prometheus Books: New York, 1998, p.52

“the power of disposing of the labor-power of others.”³⁶³ That is, property is enjoyment of the labor-power of others.

Concerning division of labor, Adam Smith begins with a simple abstraction. He claims that division of labor emerges due to the activity of exchange and trade. Firstly, Smith differentiates the animal from man; the animal can survive independently whereas man has to live with others in order to meet their human requirements. Therefore, man needs to interact with others. However, man interacts with others not only for their needs but also for others’ requirements. Adam Smith, basically, claims that man turns towards the personal interests of others. If man can convince others of the usefulness of the products that he produces for their requirements, it would be the best condition for that man. Thus, man starts to make productive activity his main purpose due to his interests and their propensity to trade and exchange. From this point of view, Adam Smith indicates that man tends towards others’ advantages or interests rather than their humanity.

As a result, the exchange or trucking leads to division of labor. Furthermore, division of labor is not a result but it is a reason. More clearly, the different natural talents among man are not the reason leading to division of labor but it is because of division of labor that there are many different natural talents existing among men. This claim of Smith is obviously not more than reducing man to an abstract position. It reduces man and his natural human talent to the market, exchange and trucking activity by division labor. As is seen, man, basically, is equal with commodity because division of labor, as Adam Smith argues, is not for the realization of humanity as a whole but for the advantages or interests of men. The reason for exchange is based on egoism, not humanity. Eventually, division of labor exists not for man but for capital.

In my view while Adam Smith considers division of labor, which “bestows on labor infinite productive capacity,”³⁶⁴ he excludes the manifestation of the individuals as species being or the humanization of their labor; he considers only the productive capacity of labor. The exclusion of the individuals’ realization in the process of production is the result of alienated individuals in existing capitalist society.

What causes division of labor to expand is the extent of the market or the extent of the power of exchanging. It depends on the size of the market because if the market is small, nobody wants to dedicate himself to just one employment because man cannot find sufficient demand for his product

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, p.52

³⁶⁴ Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.58

and exchange of his product with another similar product. Adam Smith adds, “the accumulation of capital mounts with division of labor, and vice versa.”³⁶⁵

In the *Grundrisse*, Marx argues that understanding division of labor is essential to understanding capitalism. When he speaks of the method of political economy, he points out how it is false to begin with the population which for him is abstraction; because the population is composed of classes; but in the same way these classes are also empty as long as they are not understood through their elements such as wage labor, capital, etc. Capital and wage labor, in turn, cannot be grasped without exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. which are the presuppositions of the wage labor and capital.³⁶⁶

As Marx asserts, without presuppositions of capital such as *division of labor, price, wage, labor, money, etc.*, it is difficult to comprehend what capital is as well as what society is; in the same way, without dealing with these concepts of political economy it is difficult to grasp what the individual is in present society. For this reason, let us take a look at the money-man relationship as another cause for alienation of the individual.

4.3.2.3.2. The Money relation: *imaginary-individual*

What is the influence of money on the existence of the individual?

“The difference between effective demand based on money and ineffective demand based on my need, my passion, my wish, etc., is the difference between *being* and *thinking*, between the imagined which *exists* merely within me and the imagined as it is for me outside me as a real object.”³⁶⁷

Money transforms the individual into an image and imagination. As long as money is the primary tool for meeting one’s needs, the majority of individuals can only imagine satisfying their real demands and requirements. Their talent or capacity relies on money to be realized. That’s why the imaginary individual replaces the real and social individual. Everything, which is supposed to be actualized, remains unreal, in thinking and imaginary. Therefore, without money, demand or desire remains always without object, as just a simple image. In relation to money, we encounter a new definition of the individual; this individual is “the individual who possesses only fantasies”; that is, the individual is the imaginary-individual as well as the isolated individual. As Marx says capitalist has power over

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p.57

“Die Akkumulation der Kapitalien steigt mit der Teilung der Arbeit und wechselseitig.” (Karl Marx, *Texte zu Methode und Praxis II: Pariser Manuskripte 1844*, Rowohlt, 1966, p.99)

³⁶⁶ Marx, “The Grundrisse,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company: New York, London, 1978, p.237

³⁶⁷ Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.104

labor because of capital; in the same way, the capitalists possess power over the individuals due to money.

It is the power of money that helps man to be recognized as an individual. Moreover, money gives occasion to the individuals to realize themselves in the object, or in their production. It is money that enables the individuals to transform their real demand, requirements, image, and wish into reality. Money exists as such a power to materialize an image into reality. In addition to that, however, money also transforms reality into image. Furthermore, it is money that leads the real object, real requirements, needs etc., to be only image and thinking. All these effects of money transform the real individual into an abstract being, so that the “real essential power of man and nature” become an abstraction.³⁶⁸ Shortly, money separates the individuals from species being and from others. If you have money, you are in a relation to other individuals. If you do not have money, you are isolated from others. Therefore, money, which was only a mediator, becomes a power over the individuals. As Marx says in the *Manuscripts of 1844*, money is “*the general distorting of individualities.*”³⁶⁹ It “transforms fidelity into infidelity, love into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, servant into master, master into servant, idiocy into intelligence, and intelligence into idiocy.”³⁷⁰

4.3.2.3.3. The critique of Hegel’s dialectic and a general critique of his philosophy

Until now, we have been dealing with the problem of the individual in terms of the individual’s relationship with the external, sensuous world (particularly through the relationship of their labor to the external world). Under this subtitle, the purpose is to reveal the problem within their inner property, which is their *self-consciousness*. To this end, the concept of the individual in relation to self-consciousness will be examined through Marx’s critique of Hegel.

Marx attempts to criticize partly the Hegelian dialectic, especially in the context of *Phenomenology* and *Logic*, and partly his philosophy as a whole, in an attempt to understand and justify the points mentioned above. What differentiates Marx’s materialism from Hegelian idealism or the idealist aspect of dialectic is the way to relate the idea to reality. Hegel presents reality, the material world as a manifestation of the Idea, which is described as the primary reality. Reality corresponds to the idea exhibiting itself and we get this idea from the outside, that is, from the external world, from outside of us. It means that the world exists for the sake of knowledge. Therefore, Marx responds to Hegel’s idealism with Shakespeare’s question:

“Who can hold a fire in his hand

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.105

³⁶⁹ Marx, *Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. by Mulligan, from the marxists.org, p. 61

³⁷⁰ Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.105

By thinking of the frosty Caucasus?
Or cloy the hungry pangs of appetite
By bare imagination of a feast?³⁷¹

Furthermore, in this part of the manuscript, Marx aims at presenting the relation of the Hegelian dialectic to “the modern critical movement”³⁷² or the modern critics (of that period) such as Strauss and Bruno Bauer. Marx criticizes the modern German critical movement for overlooking the vital question regarding their relation to Hegelian dialectic. The modern Germans criticism is powerfully concerned with the past and its subject-matter. In this respect, the modern critics such as Strauss and Bruno Bauer still remain within Hegelian dialectic even though they criticize this dialectic. According to Marx, it is only Feuerbach who discovers the truth of Hegel’s philosophy and hence demonstrates a serious and critical approach to Hegelian dialectic.

What does Feuerbach achieve with the true critique of the Hegelian dialectic?

- 1) Feuerbach argues that philosophy is no more than religion which is expressed by thinking and which has taken the form of thought. In addition, he indicates that religion is another form of estrangement of man.
- 2) Feuerbach establishes “*true materialism*” and “*real science*” by way of making “the social relationship of man to man the basic principle of the theory.”³⁷³
- 3) Lastly, Feuerbach opposes the negation of the negation; because negation of negation according to Feuerbach is the affirmation of theology or the transcendent because theology, the transcendent, etc., is first denied and then affirmed through the method of negation of negation.

Feuerbach summarizes Hegelian dialectic as follows;

Feuerbach explains that Hegel’s departure point (1) is the absolute, so the abstraction. In Hegelian terminology, Hegel sets out from the Infinite, the universal, that is, from the “estrangement of Substance.” Hegelian philosophy begins from religion and theology. (2) Then Hegel abolishes the infinite in order to set up “the actual, sensuous, real, finite, particular.”³⁷⁴ It means that Hegel annuls philosophy, religion and theology. (3) In the third stage, Hegel again establishes the infinite, that is, annulling the positive signifies the re-establishment of religion and theology.

Marx states that from the point of view of negation of negation Hegel could not find the real movement of history but what he found is “the *abstract, logical, speculative expression*.”³⁷⁵ Moreover,

³⁷¹ William Shakespeare, “The Tragedy of King Richard the Second”, quotation from: J. Middleton Murry, John Macmurray, N. A. Holdaway, G. D. H. Cole, *Marxism*, Chapman & Hall Ltd. London, 1935, p.32

³⁷² Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 106

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 108

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 108

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 108

he could not illustrate the real origin of man's history. For this reason, this process of history is the process of the abstract movement of religion and theology, more clearly, the historical process of thought but not the real history of man.

4.3.2.3.3.1. Marx emphasizes two errors of Hegel

(1) The first error takes place in the *Phänomenologie*, in which Hegel treats entities such as wealth, state-power, etc., in their abstract form, as a thought. However, he does not consider these entities as facts that have to be in a relationship with man. In this regard, the whole history of the process of alienation and then the whole process of annihilation of this alienation is the process of production and re-production of abstract—logical, speculative—thought. In this context, the whole process of alienation and the negation of this alienation could be defined as the process of opposition; that is, “the opposition of *in itself* and *for itself*, of *consciousness* and *self-consciousness*, of *subject* and *object*—that is to say, it is the opposition, within thought itself, between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness.”³⁷⁶ Marx argues that in Hegel's philosophy the appropriation of the powers of man firstly takes place in pure thought, in consciousness, which is abstraction. Man appropriates these objects as thoughts.

(2) Secondly, Hegel vindicates all expressions of man in the external, objective, sensuous human world (such as wealth, religion, etc.) through thoughts. All these things such as wealth, state-power, religion, sense of man, etc., become spiritual entities because it is mind which is “the *true* essence of man, and the true form of mind is thinking mind, the logical, speculative mind.”³⁷⁷

4.3.2.3.3.2. The achievement of Hegel's dialectic

It goes without saying that Marx appreciates Hegel's dialectic and he mentions the positive aspects of his dialectic concerning the realm of alienation as follows: In the first place, *annulling* is one of these positive aspects of Hegelian dialectic. The annulment of estrangement equals the appropriation of the objective essence. Man gains his real essence through the annulment of estrangement within the estranged objective world. On the other hand, Marx finds this annulment of alienation abstract and formal because Hegel posits man as mere consciousness or self-consciousness. The annulment of estrangement therefore is an empty abstraction of negation of negation.

Secondly, Hegel shows in his speculative logic that “the definite concepts, the universal fixed thought-forms in their independence vis-à-vis nature and mind are a necessary result of the general estrangement of the human being and therefore also of a human thought”³⁷⁸ In Hegel's speculative logic there are definite concepts, universal thought-forms as opposed to nature and minds. These fixed

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, 1978, p.110

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.111

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.122

universal thought-forms are independent from nature and mind. However, Hegel demonstrates them as moments of the process of abstraction and thus brings these thought-forms and determinate concepts close together. Marx claims that in this way abstraction in fact abandons itself since this abstraction has already grasped itself as abstraction. As a consequence, it arrives at its contrary entity, at *nature*. From this framework, Marx concludes that “the entire logic is the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in itself; that the Absolute Idea is nothing in itself; that only *Nature* is something.”³⁷⁹

Marx highlights that Hegel places man and nature in fixed mental shapes, that is, in abstract thoughts. All these fixed mental forms are subjects of the first negation—the estrangement of human thought—and after that they are exposed to negation of this negation which means the annulment or transcendence of alienation of human thought. However, still, according to Marx, this negation of negation remains to be a restoration of these fixed mental forms, namely, the abstract thoughts “in their estrangement.” “To him, therefore, the whole of nature merely repeats the logical abstractions in a sensuous, external form.”³⁸⁰ In so doing, he reduces nature to “the *form of Idea’s other-being*.”³⁸¹

4.3.2.3.3. The approach of Engels to Hegel

In his review of “A Contribution to the Critique of Political economy,” Engels explains that, in some fields of sciences, Germany proved itself to be better than others, but just in one science it was difficult to find the name of a German, that is, in political economy because in Germany the theoretical conditions of political economy had not fully developed. Political economy is the theoretical analysis of bourgeois society and in this regard political economy presupposes the conditions of developed bourgeois society but these conditions did not exist in Germany. In this context, Engels in his review for Marx’s work, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” emphasizes the material conditions of life through which all social and political relations can be understood.³⁸²

Engels asserts that the work of Marx aims at a consistent survey of the bourgeois mode of production and its laws. But it is not just an investigation of this mode of production; it also is a critique of all economy of which bourgeois political economists are only defenders and commentators. According to Engels, after the death of Hegel, nobody undertakes to examine and develop a science with its internal links like him. Engels claims that in this period there were two predominant philosophies; on one side

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.122

“Die ganze Logik ist also der Beweis, dass das abstrakte Denken für sich nichts ist, dass die absolute Idee für sich nichts ist, dass erst die *Natur* etwas ist.” (Karl Marx, *Texte zu Methode und Praxis II: Pariser Manuskripte 1844*, Rowohlt, 1966, p.125)

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.124

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.125

³⁸² Review by Frederick Engels, Karl Marx: “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”, *Karl Marx: Critique of Political Economy*, <http://www.marxists.org>

there was completely abstract, speculative Hegelian dialectic and on the other side Wolff's metaphysical philosophy, to which the bourgeois economists held on. However, "the second method has been theoretically demolished by Kant and particularly Hegel."³⁸³ Hegelian method in its essence was idealist and it was certainly not to be applied in this form. Engels says, "the main point in this case was the elaboration of a world outlook that was more materialist than any previous one."³⁸⁴ Hegelian method began with pure thought but "the starting point was to be inexorable facts."³⁸⁵ Engels found this method applicable but according to him, it was to be criticized, not to be overthrown. Because the Hegelian school did not apply this dialectical method rightly, it began to be forgotten. "Hence, it was first of all essential to carry through a thorough critique of the Hegelian method."³⁸⁶ Engels thinks that the importance and uniqueness of Hegelian philosophy comes from his historical perspective. To Engels, "he was the first to try to demonstrate that there is an evolution, an intrinsic coherence in history."³⁸⁷ This view of history provides a serious contribution to the philosophy of Marx.

Marx drew the Hegelian dialectic out of its idealist framework. Therefore, with the right understanding of this dialectic method, it is time to criticize political economy in two different manners: in terms of history or in terms of logic. On the other hand, according to Engels, the most suitable way was the logical method.³⁸⁸

4.3.2.3.3.4. Self-consciousness: an alien form of (to) the individual

Just as Hegel treats entities and objects as thought-entities, so the subject is considered as an abstract form. The subject is conceived as consciousness or self-consciousness, abstracted from the conditions, which form this self-consciousness. It seems that, so long as man appears as a totality of thought, consciousness and self-consciousness are independent entities. This abstract character given to the individual leads man to be abstracted and thus estranged from the real sensuous world. In this regards Marx defines Hegel's standpoint as one-sidedness.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, Review by Engels, Karl Marx: "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy"
<http://www.marxists.org>

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Review by Engels, Karl Marx: "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy"
<http://www.marxists.org>

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Review by Engels, Karl Marx: "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy"
<http://www.marxists.org>

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Review by Engels, Karl Marx: "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy"
<http://www.marxists.org>

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Review by Engels, Karl Marx: "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy"
<http://www.marxists.org>

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Review by Engels, Karl Marx: "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy"
<http://www.marxists.org>

According to Marx, the significant things in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, are as follows; (1) he defines "the self-genesis of man as a process;" (2) he grasps "objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation;" (3) also he comprehends the essence of labor and objective man; (4) Hegel conceives the objective man as a result of this process of labor as objectification and alienation.

However although Hegel comprehends the essence of man as labor, as objectification and transcendence of alienation, Marx sees his position as similar to that of the political economists' because, like the approach of political economy, Hegel also comprehends the essence of man as labor, but as political economy he grasps it in its abstraction. In this context, "labor is man's *coming-to-be for himself* within *alienation*, or as *alienated* man."³⁸⁹ Hegel recognizes objectification and transcendence of alienation through labor as a process of self-realization of man. On the other hand, although Hegel grasps labor as essential to man, labor is only a process in order to arrive at self-consciousness as the essence of man. Self-consciousness is the essence of man. In this respect, Marx emphasizes that Hegel conceives labor as abstractly *mental* labor.

Marx speaks of the real, corporeal individual as a directly natural being in two respects: 1) on the one hand, the individual is equipped and endowed with objective essential powers, natural, material powers. In this sense, this individual acts naturally for his/her needs. 2) On the other hand, s/he is, like other beings such as animal and plants, a limited being and for this reason, s/he suffers. It means that the object that s/he needs remains outside her/him. It is therefore a dependent object.³⁹⁰

The relation of the individuals to objects is clearly essential and necessary. For this reason, the individuals cannot be conceived outside objects. The individuals always need the nature or object outside them. We are natural beings because we have a nature outside us. To be an objective being is to have an object outside oneself. "An unobjective being is *nullity*—an *un-being*."³⁹¹ On this matter Marx has the same standpoint with Feuerbach who in the *Philosophy of the Future* claims that only the sensuous beings require objects outside themselves in order to exist; for example to breathe they need air, to drink they need water, etc., but they do not need anything, at least directly, for the act of thinking. A breathing-being needs air, something outside itself but thinking-beings are related to themselves, to self-being. In other words, they are an object of their own-self.

³⁸⁹ Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.112

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.115

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, "Manuscripts of 1844," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.116

4.3.2.3.3.5. The individual as a suffering-being

With the reduction of the individual into merely self-consciousness and thinking-being, it is forgotten that the individual is a suffering-being. Suffering-being implies that the individual is not alone. In other words, the individual is a totality of human relations, relations to other individual, to nature, to objects, to society, etc. We can say that one of the problems of the individual is the fact that the individual is not seen as suffering-being. However “to be sensuous is to suffer.”³⁹² Because the individuals possess an object and besides they become an object of others, the individual is a suffering being. The individual is sensuous being which makes them a suffering being. To have relation with object is an indication of the existence of the individual; for first to have an object implies that the individual has a relationship. Secondly, to have relation with an object is the only concrete form in which I can experience and actualize myself. Without relationship, the individual could not have any object and could not be an object for others.

From this perspective, we arrive at two defining elements of a relationship: 1) there must be at least two subjects (or individuals) or one subject and one object; 2) feeling. What I try to indicate is that even if relationship is based either on hatred or on love; either bestial feeling or sensuous, in all cases the relation is dependent on feeling; for man is a sensuous being. In addition to man’s suffering character, he is a passionate being in relation with his object. Here Marx is all of one mind about passion with Hegel who considers passion as man’s essential force towards and over the object.

The individual means simply and directly, self-conscious being but this statement is nothing more than words. With this remark, I am trying to indicate that although the essence of the individual is defined as self-consciousness, it is an illusion because of the fact that it is not desired that the individual is self-consciousness or awareness of what’s happening.

4.3.2.3.3.6. The individual as knowing being

In addition to having a natural existence, man “is natural *human* being” which signifies that “he is a being for himself. Therefore he is a *species being*, and has to confirm and manifest himself as such both in his being and in his knowing.”³⁹³

Marx argues that in Hegelian dialectic the relation of the individual to the object is based on the act of knowing. Therefore, the object has not any objectivity outside knowing. Similarly, knowing is the sole objective relation of consciousness. But then in this process there is another moment. Consciousness objectifies itself in other-being and then annuls and supersedes this objectification; lastly resumes

³⁹² *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.116 “*Sinnlich sein ist leidend sein.*”

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.116

itself in its other-being. Hegel believes that, in this way, consciousness is “*at home in its other-being as such.*”³⁹⁴ Here Marx finds two illusions of speculation. In the first place, “consciousness (knowing as knowing, thinking as thinking) pretends to be directly the *other* of itself—to be the world of sense, the real world, life—thought over-reaching itself in thought (Feuerbach).”³⁹⁵ Secondly, the process of the supersession of the spiritual world and then resuming it in self-consciousness, like the negation of religion and then affirmation and re-recognition of religion, implies that self-conscious man confirms and re-establishes it.

At the end of this moment, self-consciousness pretends that it is in the other of itself (in its other-being) at home. It means that it is again at home in religion after the process of negation and supersession of religion. Even though consciousness annihilated and superseded the “spiritual world,” self-consciousness still is a sort of confirmation of this alienated world through the re-establishment of it. One might say that Hegel’s philosophy is pure thinking through experiences. The same abstraction appears in a being-thinking inversion as in the subject-predicate inversion. The subject-predicate inversion is a great indication of the problem of the individual. In Hegel, the subject appears as a result at the end of the process during which the spirit realizes itself through world history. In the modern state, the individual is considered as a subject but through the dialectical process, it is realized that the individual is just a means or an instrument. On the other hand, the state, private property,³⁹⁶ or simply capital, in this regard, profit is the end and appears as a subject.

In short, alienation appears;

Firstly (1) in the fact that (a) man’s means of life belongs to an other, and (b) therefore it is impossible for him to fulfill his desires; and secondly (2) in the fact that (a) man’s activity becomes something other than itself under these circumstances (capitalist conditions), and (b) “all is under the sway of *inhuman* power.”³⁹⁷ In which kind of society does the individual live? With reference to political economists, this society is *civil society*.³⁹⁸ What kind of society is this civil society? In this civil society, every individual exists as a means for others. Moreover, the individual in this civil society is either a worker or a capitalist.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.118

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.118

³⁹⁶ “That the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of *private property*—in that of the economy, to be precise—is easy to see.” (Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 84)

³⁹⁷ Marx, “Manuscripts of 1844,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 100

³⁹⁸ “Die *Gesellschaft*—wie sie für den Nationalökonomem erscheint—ist die *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, worin jedes Individuum ein Ganzes von Bedürfnissen ist und es nur für anderen, wie der andere nur für es da ist, insofern sie sich wechsel seitig zum Mittel werden.” (Karl Marx, *Texte zu Methode und Praxis II: Pariser Manuskripte 1844*, Rowohlt, 1966, p.97)

4.4. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE POLITICAL STATE

4.4.1. Introduction

The fourth part of this chapter will deal with the problem of the individual through their relationship to politics. In this respect, the main and fundamental writings of Marx, which are going to be analyzed are *Zur Judenfrage (On the Jewish Question)* (1844) and *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right)*. While the former was published in 1844, the latter written in 1843, remained unpublished during Marx's lifetime.

In the third part of this chapter, we tried to analyze the problem of the individual in terms of the ontological existence of the individual in relation with the economic aspect. In this context, we see that the individual, as regards their existence in society, is unreal and an illusion because the individual is deprived of their real relationship to the real external sensuous world. Because the individual is alien to their existence, in the sense of their relationship to themselves (here to their product of labor, its process, and labor itself), to other individual, generally to their species being, and finally to society, the individual is also alien to politics. In short, it can be said that as the individual's existence does not belong to the individual, they are alien to all their relationships.

On the one hand, the individual in its lexical definition means, "single, independent being." On the other hand, as we see through the third part, this is not the case because the individual, even in itself, is not independent. It is merely said that the individual must be or should be independent. But the reality is that the individual completely and inevitably depends on their relationships with the external sensuous world, that is, the world outside the individual.

With respect to politics, the individual has not any right to guide their political existence. However, the modern state claims that the individual governs themselves through their political decisions. But it is just *appearance*. It is just what we see but what is the *reality* behind this appearance? The abstract form in which the relationship of the individual to the political state exists separates the individual from their reality. Just as there is a subject-predicate inversion concerning the thought-subject relation, so here there is the subject-predicate reversion regarding the relationship between the individual and the state. What does this reversion mean for the individual's existence? The answer to this question is strongly related to the means-end inversion, which is similar to the subject-predication inversion. It means that the individual in reality is not an independent being but it is an instrument for the existence of the political state. Whereas the political state is the end, the individual is just a means in order to realize the existence of the political state. It signifies that the state is considered as a creature of the individual but it is not the individual who creates the political state for the organization of society as a means. It should be reminded that the state should be just an instrument for the interests of human beings. Once we recognize the state as a means, then we realize that the political state is not an

absolute being. For Hegel as well as for capitalism, on the other hand, the political state appears as absolute being.

I realize that my claim that the state appears as an absolute being may sound controversial since capitalist ideology itself would never acknowledge that it grants the state such a status. But I argue that the political state appears as absolute being in capitalism in that it has absolute power, both in its use of force and its alliance with capital. It does not recognize any power that can overtake it.

In *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel had already argued that not *all* individuals could participate in decision-making processes and deliberations concerning the common affairs of the state; for this would be an atomistic attitude, which automatically collapses in the sphere of the state. The state is not an atomistic state but an organism. However, Hegel demonstrates the normal as abnormal. What I am trying to say is that, to Hegel, the representation of all individuals on the universal interests of the state by virtue of their own decisions is irrational. In this regard, for Hegel, what is true and rational is irrational and absolutely false. Let me quote from Hegel: “It is held that all should share individually in the counsels and decisions regarding the general affairs of state. The reason assigned is that all are members of the state, its affairs are the affairs of all, and for the transaction of these affairs all with their knowledge and will have a right to be present.”³⁹⁹ However, it goes without saying that, to Hegel, this common belief is an empty and abstract claim whereas it is the true political form of every individual. Moreover, for Hegel, to be a member of the state is nothing more than an abstraction.

In this point, we should ask; what is abstraction and what is it to be a member of the state? Or more generally, what is Hegel’s determination and ideal form of the state? Indeed the answer of these questions will be given more clearly in section 4.4.3 of this chapter which is concentrated on the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* but shortly one might say that, theoretically for Hegel, to be member of the state signifies simply to have rights and in the same manner to have duties. It may seem that, in Hegel’s mind, there is an ancient Greek form of government, which was not representative. However when we examine his masterpiece *Philosophy of Right*, more closely, we will discover that Hegel’s political form is quite opposed to that of ancient Greek. In Hegel’s political sphere, the individuals are deliberately excluded from politics. For this reason, in Hegel, to be a member of the state is an illusion.

I would like to re-emphasize that the ‘individual,’ which was created by modernism, that is to say, which was the symbol of the so-called modern period, was just an illusion. In this sense, the Ego as a concept is a creation of the modern times. By underscoring the existence of the individual, the aim is to isolate the subject into its lonely life. Furthermore, in so doing, the individual is separated from its

³⁹⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, § 308, p.183

relations to others, its relation to social life, to politics, etc. It creates a great problem not only for the individual itself but also for the others, for society because the ‘individual’ thus loses their respect for others. They forget how to live with others as being aware of or being conscious of the existence of others. This is related with the greatest illusion the ‘individual’ lives in that enables them to recognize only themselves. The concept of the ‘individual’ was defined as a bourgeois conception by Marx.⁴⁰⁰ Like other concepts of modern society and classical political economy, the emphasis on the individual overlooks their *relations*, namely *social relations*. It is necessary to find the concrete reality of the individual, which is their social existence.

As John Macmurray claimed in his book *Marxism*, “to be rid of our illusions is surely the first condition of discovering the truth.”⁴⁰¹ What is the truth⁴⁰²? It is the aim of realism, which aims to fight

⁴⁰⁰ “You must, therefore, confess that by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property.” (Marx and Engels, “Manifesto of Communist Party”, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p. 486)

⁴⁰¹ J. Middleton Murry, John Macmurray, N. A. Holdaway, G. D. H. Cole, *Marxism*, p.52

⁴⁰² It is not our task to elaborate the concept of truth but I believe that it would be useful to explain it in moderation. Truth: “The adjective *wahr* (‘true’) is cognate with the Latin *verus* (‘true’, etc.) and originally meant ‘trustworthy, reliable’. (The English ‘true’ is cognate with the German *treu*, ‘faithful, loyal, dependable, reliable’.) From this come the noun (*die*) *Wahrheit* (‘truth’) and the adjectival noun *das Wahre* (‘the truth, that which is true’)... *Wahr* is close to *richtig*, which is cognate with *Recht* (Right), ‘right’, and the Latin *rectus* (‘straight, correct’, etc.), and originally meant ‘straight’. It now means ‘correct’, but overlaps ‘real’ and ‘quite’, as in ‘a real (quite a) success, fool, etc.’

Wahr and *Wahrheit*, like ‘true’ and ‘truth’, apply not only to beliefs, statements, etc., but also to things, as in ‘a true artist’, a ‘true friend’, etc.” According to Plato, truth or true can be applied to things. In the *Republic*, he points out that the supreme Form like the sun illuminates the earthly objects, that is, this Form “supplies truth to what is known”. However, according to Aristotle, truth cannot be applied to things. He excluded truth from things and for him, truth can be found in judgments. Michael Wood claims that in eighteenth century, truth is considered in relation to the laws of thought. “A true proposition must conform to the laws of thought, especially the law of Contradiction.” Wood claims that Hegel rejects Aristotelian truth, which applied to judgment but Hegel thinks that judgment can be *richtig* rather than *wahr*. Wood argues that Hegel “applies *wahr* and *Wahrheit* primarily to concepts and to things. But he tends to believe that only God or the Absolute is strictly true.” If something is called to be true, it means that it is in fully in accord with its concept. Wood says, “nothing can be strictly true except the Whole.” In other words, only the whole can be true. In addition to this, for Hegel, if something is not self-contradictory, it means that it is true. Although Hegel thought that only the absolute, God, the idea, etc., is true, in his philosophy, “Hegel often refers to a concept, a Form of Consciousness, a level of nature or a historical stage as the *Wahrheit* of one or more of its predecessors in the conceptual hierarchy or historical process, even if it is not the final stage, not, that is, the ‘absolute truth’”. (*A Hegel Dictionary*, Michael Wood, Blackwell Philosophers Dictionary, 1992, pp.298-300)

“In the writings of Marx and Engels (α) ‘truth’ normally means ‘correspondence with reality’, while (β) the criterion for evaluating truth-claims normally is, or involves, human practice; i.e. Marx and Engels subscribe to a classical (Aristotelian) concept, and a practicist criterion of truth.” (*A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, edited by Tom Bottomore, Blackwell Publisher, 1991, p.550) I would like to use the concept of truth much more Marxian sense, which corresponds to “reality.” In my view, truth is related to the gap between the appearance and reality. If there is identical there is truth, but if not, there is illusion. It seems to me that truth in Hegelian sense which corresponds to the concepts is also close my understanding of truth. In this regard, the concepts or things are not in contradiction with themselves. There must not be self-contradiction in order to speak of truth.

against illusions. The political illusion in society is the belief that the individual has free choice not only in the political area but also in the economic base and in order to get rid of this illusion we are forced to find or seek the truth. It is the contention of this thesis that the truth in question must be manifested and analyzed through the concepts of Marx. Thus, to begin with, it must be found in the capitalist mode of production. The problem of the individual is based on the question whether we are aware of the relation between what we think and what we do. The traditional form of consciousness ignores this sort of relation. This relation is the relation of theory to praxis. If theory disengages with praxis, or praxis breaks with theory, in the former theory becomes mere thought and abstract; in the latter praxis exists without logic, or consciousness.⁴⁰³

The main research will be to explore the nature of political power. For this reason, we should pay attention to the difference between *political consciousness* and the *nature of political power or the political state*. Marx clearly explains his approach to this question, especially in an article, which was written against Ruge (who wrote an article in July in *Vorwärts*⁴⁰⁴). Ruge in his article after the Silesian revolt⁴⁰⁵ in the summer of 1844 claims that without *political consciousness* in Germany and a *social reform* that would originate from political revolution, “no social revolt could succeed in Germany.”⁴⁰⁶ Marx pointed out particularly the nature of political power, namely, the nature of the political state. To Marx, the problem did not spring from the form of the political state or political programme but from its origin, or its essence.

For Marx, the state and the political organization of the state are not different things; they are the same. In accordance with this view, Marx refers to the Prussian government and says that “the *state* will never discover the source of social evils in the ‘state and the organization of society,’ as the Prussian expects of his King.”⁴⁰⁷ “Even the radical and revolutionary politicians look for the causes

⁴⁰³“The Marxism attack upon idealism is fundamentally an attack upon our traditional form of consciousness which consists in being unaware of the real relation between what we think and what we do, and in a conscious inability, which rationalizes an instinctive refusal, to bring the two into explicit relation.” J. Middleton Murry, John Macmurray, N. A. Holdaway, G. D. H. Cole, *Marxism*, pp.47-48

⁴⁰⁴ It was a biweekly German socialist newspaper published in Paris from January to December 1844. That newspaper was considered the most radical journal in Europe. It was edited by Karl Ludwig Bernays. Heinrich Heine, Georg Herwegh, Mikhail Bakunin and Arnold Ruge had contributed to the journal. Besides Friedrich Engels, Georg Weerth and Georg Weber collaborated with the newspaper. Marx had particular contribution to edit it especially summer of 1844 who wrote in the journal. Like Marx many others joined to the *Vorwärts* when *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* was closed. It was closed in January of 1845. In this journal, Marx criticized Ruge’s idea who calls the state reform. Marx broke with Ruge by this article.

⁴⁰⁵ Sileans weavers’ revolt of 1844 was the first major independent worker’s uprising in Germany taking place from 4 June to 6 June. The Sileans weavers were subjected to exploitation by both the capitalists and landlords. They were confronted with the sharp cut of their wages by the manufacturing entrepreneurs.

⁴⁰⁶ David McLellan, *Marx before Marx*, Harper & Row Publishers: New York and Evanston, 1970, p.158

⁴⁰⁷ Karl Marx, “Critical Notes on ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform’”, *Vorwärts!*, No.63, August 7 1844, from www.marxists.org

of evil not in the nature of the state but in a specific form of the state which they would like to replace with another form of the state.”⁴⁰⁸ Marx finds a great fault in this sort of understanding. He indicates that the organisation of society is the state itself. The state finds the social evils in the administration and “hence the cure is sought in administrative measures. Why? Because the *administration* is the *organizing* agency of the state.”⁴⁰⁹ The form is changed but the content remains always the same. The main problem is to be able to seek what its essence is.

Within the frame of those questions given above we seek the reality and appearance of the state throughout the works mentioned above. The fundamental reason why these particular writings are chosen to discuss the problem of the individual is because Marx manifests his attitude towards the state and the relationship of the individual to the political state, and generally to politics, in these works. Another reason, not less important, is that particularly in *On the Jewish Question*, Marx speaks of the individual being as an “*illusory phenomenon*”⁴¹⁰ in the political state. In other words, the argument of the thesis is as follows; *nowadays the individual as a single being in society is an imaginary being* and his relation with the political state is illusory and thus *the individual in this sense is an illusory being*. Within the framework of this argument, Marx’s determination in this writing is as follows: Due to the dualism of the individual’s life, namely the dualism of life of civil society and life of politics, and more importantly the dualism of private individual life and species-life, the individual is not able to realize what the truth is, the individual is not able to realize himself either in his individual life or in his species-life. The reason is that both the life of civil society and political life are unreal, illusory and therefore the individual is an imaginary and illusory being as well. This point will be investigated in detail throughout this part.

Now let us take a look at the text of *On the Jewish Question*.

4.4.2. The Analysis of the “On the Jewish Question” (1844)

Marx wrote this work at end of 1843 and published this article first in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. He divided it into two parts; (1) the first part contained the criticism of politics which concluded that the emancipation of the individual would come to an end by means of abolishing the division between “man as egoistic being in ‘civil society’ and man as abstract citizen in the state.”⁴¹¹ Therefore, in this first part, he comments not only on the ‘Christian state’ but also on the ‘state as such’ which most emphatically must be underscored. (2) In the second part, Marx expounded the problem in terms of economy, that is, the criticism of economy or commerce which, to Marx, was linked to ‘Judism.’

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Critical Notes on ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform’”, *Vorwärts!*, from www.marxists.org

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “Critical Notes on ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform’”, *Vorwärts!*, from www.marxists.org

⁴¹⁰ Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.34

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.26

Within the scope of these two determinations in this writing, Marx criticizes Bruno Bauer concerning his work called, *Die Judenfrage* [1843], in which Bauer speaks of his sympathy for the *political emancipation* in Germany. Marx argues against Bauer's idea that found the emancipation of the Jewish people through a critique of the Christian state instead of the 'state as such.' Bauer suggests, "the Jew should renounce Judaism, and in general that man should renounce religion, in order to be emancipated as a citizen."⁴¹² In this respect, Bauer believes that political emancipation of religion within the state is annihilation of all religion. Therefore, through the abolition of religion in the state the individual would be emancipated as a citizen. In other words, to be a true citizen is possible through the "political abolition of religion." Thus according to Bauer, a state with religion is not a true or even an actual state.

In this sense, in this critique of Bauer's ideas, Marx also propounds his theory of the state. He grounds his analysis of the Jewish problem on two basic problems: 1) political emancipation; 2) human emancipation. To Bauer the emancipation of the Jewish people is possible by virtue of the secularization of the state. Accordingly, for Bauer man liberates himself from the restriction of religion in a political way, that is, with the medium of the state. Marx comments that Bauer considers only one aspect of the state. This aspect, which Bauer could not fully formulate, is the nature of the state and "the nature of political emancipation."⁴¹³

Here, Marx discusses this problem by giving the example of North America, since North America is supposedly secular. Thus in these free states, the question of religion becomes a secular question by losing its theological dimension and becomes linked to the form of the state. To Marx, if the state has a political attitude to religion or religious man in general, and ceases to hold a theological attitude towards religion, the criticism of the relation of religion to the political state becomes the criticism of the political state.⁴¹⁴

As soon as the state loses its theological form, it becomes possible to discuss the question politically. Even though it is claimed that the state is indifferent toward any kind of religion and achieves a fully political emancipation, there is still a defect due to the existence of religion in civil society. For this reason, this defect must be seen to be a deficiency of the *state* itself. The question is thus transposed to the relation of *political emancipation* to *human emancipation*. "The question of the *relation between political emancipation and religion* becomes for us a question of the *relation between political emancipation and human emancipation*."⁴¹⁵ In this point, Marx expresses two things: 1) the criticism of the secular state. The criticism is the criticism of "religious failings of the political state by

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.29

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.30

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, pp.30-31

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.31

criticizing the political state in its secular form;”⁴¹⁶ 2) the contradictions in human terms; such as between the state and a particular religion or religion in general, between the state and “particular *secular elements*”, and finally between “the state and its general *presuppositions*.”⁴¹⁷ In a word, it is the criticism of the *nature of the state*.

What are the particular elements of the state? Marx explains them, in the following paragraphs, as we will see. For example, one of these elements is *private property*.

In this context, Marx expresses that political emancipation does not provide complete emancipation from religion and it is not the right form of human emancipation. The state might be emancipated from religions such as Judaism or Christianity and religion in general. In so doing, the state becomes indifferent to any kind of religion. However, “to be *politically* emancipated from religion is not to be finally and completely emancipated from religion, because political emancipation is not the final and absolute form of *human* emancipation.”⁴¹⁸ Therefore, it should be said that political emancipation is basically the emancipation of the state. The state liberates itself from religion but this does not signify that the individual liberates themselves from religion. Let me express it clearly in Marx’s own words; “a state may be a *free state* without man himself being a *free man*.”⁴¹⁹ Obviously, it is also the political problem of nowadays. The state exists *liberally* and over and above the individuals; *it is indifferent to the liberation of man*.

Political emancipation does not lead to human emancipation. For example, the state emancipates itself from religion although the immense majority is still religious in their private lives. On many other similar points, the individuals liberate themselves only through the state or through a political way. According to this determination, the state provides the freedom of the individual which has no sense in nowadays’ political state. The state is for the individual the political way of liberation. It goes without saying that for Marx this is a “*devious way*.” To Marx, “the state is the intermediary between man and human liberty.”⁴²⁰

Let us turn our attention the elements of political state Marx mentioned above.

4.4.2.1. The existence of the individual as *illusory phenomenon* and the *imaginary being*

It is claimed that the political state and civil society are interrelated, but the relation between the political state and civil society is illusory because the state governs civil society without really

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.31

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.32

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.32

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.32

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.32

touching the problem of civil society. Moreover, the state leaves the solution of some problems to civil organizations without any support. Actually, it is the task of the state to solve such problems. The state stays on top of civil society; it is not embedded into civil society. In the same way, the member of civil society, that is, the individual is not embedded into the political state. The problem of the individual is situated in this type of relationship (or lack thereof) of the individual and civil society to the political state or generally to politics.

“The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth.”⁴²¹ The relationship between the political state and civil society remains spiritual because the state puts itself in opposition to civil society like the opposition of heaven to earth. We are never sure about the existence of heaven but we continue to believe in heaven as a perfect place for human beings. Moreover, we always image heaven as opposed to the earth, just as we image the state as opposed to civil society. The state appears as if it is *unattainable, disconnected* to civil society, and *unknown* like heaven. The state stands always over civil society as superior to all members of society.

In the state, the individual is considered as ‘a species being’; but Marx criticizes the concept of the individual at this point “as the imaginary member of an imaginary sovereignty.” “In the state, where the individual is considered to be a species-being,⁴²² they are divested of their real individual life and filled with an unreal universality.”⁴²³ In the state, where according to Hegel the individual arrives at the universal level, the individual actually does not exist as a political being. The individual exists only physically. The individual is separated from their real human being so that they cannot realize their immediate reality; thus the individual is put into the state where they basically lose their real being and become a universal being (species being). However, this universal being as citizen remains all too abstract.

4.4.2.2. The elements of the political state

In the modern political state, the individual finds themselves in contradiction with the political state and with other individuals as members of civil society. This conflict relates to the division between *civil society* and the *political state*. This division, in turn, is about the relation between the political state and its presuppositions. As Marx remarks, these presuppositions of the political state are 1) *material elements* such as private property—the *means of production*—and 2) *spiritual elements* such as culture and religion. The elements of the political state as Marx argued are in the first place private

⁴²¹ Marx, “On the Jewish Questions,” *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, p.220

⁴²² Marx considers species being as human species. Differently from Feuerbach who emphasizes mostly on “consciousness” Marx contends that man is “species being,” that is, in the sense of Marx, social being when man lives and acts with other in accordance with his nature. Therefore, “species being” implies universality.

⁴²³ Marx, “On the Jewish Questions,” *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, p.220

property as a material element, then education and occupation; in addition to these, culture and religion are spiritual elements. One might methodologically separate and call them as structure and superstructure as post-Marxists already did.

In the secular state, the conflict resolves into the division between civil society and the secular political state. Through the spiritual elements such as culture, tradition or religion the state manipulates the individuals in order to avoid the contradictions or conflicts with society. The state applies religious principles or cultural sentiment (i.e., national feelings) in an effort to manage the individuals and to sustain social order. Religion commends the individual to obey authority, proclaiming that all authority comes from God. Therefore, the state's authority in the same way is related to God. In democracy as a political system or in a secular state, although there is not any privileged religion in the state, the political emancipation from religion as Marx showed still does not abolish or destroy religion. In other words, religion continues to exist in civil society as private creed.

Private property is another element of the political state. Marx relates the reason why the political state and civil society are separated to the emergence of private property. In the *German Ideology*, Marx clarifies the reason. To Marx, the state has become an independent and separate entity from civil society when property cast off all communal institution and became private property. The separation is the result of the emancipation of private property from community.⁴²⁴ Therefore, Marx defines this state as a form of organization, which the owners of private property necessarily adopt to mutually assure their interests and their ownership of private property.

Marx explains the relationship of the political state to property in the *German Ideology* (1845-46) under the subtitle called "the relation of the state and law to property." Here Marx gives a short historical background of this relation of the state to property. "The first form of property is tribal property [*Stammeigentum*]."⁴²⁵ Tribal property was not the developed stage of production. Here the hunting, fishing, cattle-raising or agriculture is for tribal people the main means to live. Many tribes come together in a city and thus the second form of property, which is the communal and state property, appears. Then feudal or estate property is defined as the third form of property. In short, tribal property passed through various stages such as "feudal landed property, corporative movable property, capital invested in manufacture"⁴²⁶ and arrived at modern capital. Modern capital is "determined by big industry and universal competition, i.e. pure private property, which has cast off all semblance of a communal institution and has shut out the State from any influence on the

⁴²⁴ K. Marx and F. Engels, *German Ideology: including Theses on Feuerbach and to the Critique of Political Economy*, Prometheus Books, 1998, p.99

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.38

⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.99

development of property.”⁴²⁷ How did owners of private property purchase the state? Marx explains as follows;

“To this modern private property corresponds the modern State, which, purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it, as reflected in the rise and fall of State funds on the stock exchange.”⁴²⁸

Therefore, the distinct character of private property is that; 1) this property does not any more belong to the communal institution (*Gemeinwesen*); 2) correspondingly, the state has no influence on the development of the property. These two features are the character of modern private property. Just as tribal property had corresponded to the ancient state so this modern private property corresponds to the modern state.

Material elements such as private property are preconditions of the modern state because the state is nothing more than a form of organization ensuring the private property of the bourgeois for internal and external purposes. The owner of private property through taxation gradually seizes the modern state. In this respect, Marx argues, “the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests.”⁴²⁹ Here one might ask, regarding political emancipation, what happens when the individuals strive to liberate themselves from religion and even from private property. Of course political conflict would occur. The state pretends to liberate itself from private property only in the same way as it destroys religion, namely, by trying to repress “its own prerequisites—civil society and its elements—and to establish itself as the genuine and harmonious species-life of man.”⁴³⁰ For example, it tries to repress private property “by confiscation or by progressive taxation.” However, Marx asserts that the way the state seeks to stifle its preconditions is force or violence. “Thus the political drama ends necessarily with the restoration of religion, of private property, of all the elements of civil society, just as war ends with the conclusion of peace.”⁴³¹

The state proclaims that people without distinctions based on birth, social rank, education or occupation are equal. Distinctions based on birth, social rank, education or occupation are not supposed to be distinctions that count before the law. They are not distinctions that are politically recognized. However, the state does not abolish private property; because it legally recognizes the

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.99

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.99

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.99

⁴³⁰ Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.36

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.36

existence of private property. The state annihilates these distinctions in its own way just as it permits private property to exist in its own way.⁴³²

Accordingly, at this point Bauer did not pay attention to the relationship of the political state to its presuppositions. Furthermore, because of not being based on the relation between the political state and its presupposition, Bauer did not touch on the contradiction between “*general interest* and *private interest*”, the secular “schism between *political state* and *civil society*” which leads Bauer to remain deeply Hegelian. What Bauer intends to do is to displace religion from the state to civil society through political emancipation which is indeed the separation of the individual into *public person* and *private person*.⁴³³ However, this division does not mean that political emancipation abolishes “man’s real religiosity.”⁴³⁴ Accordingly, political emancipation demonstrates that religion changes its place in the state with civil society. Thereby the individual in their private life is *religious* and in their public life is a secular *citizen*.

What Marx tries to say is that the fundamental and essential reason of the religious problem could not be found within religious or theological criticism. However, the problem must be researched into the relationship itself, that is, the relationship of the political state to the presuppositions of its existence. It is a crucial observation that religion is one of presuppositions of the political state as a spiritual element. Inevitably, this observation leads one to question how these elements affect the relationship of the individual not just with politics and religion but also with other individuals. The material and spiritual preconditions—namely, private property, culture, tradition, religion, etc.—determine the whole of the relationships of the individual. These elements, whether they are material or spiritual, are *apparatus* for the state to exist and maintain its existence. In this writing, Marx did not use the word ‘apparatus’ to define these elements as means or instruments of the political state for its own existence; the expression is Althusser’s. However, although Marx did not say explicitly that these elements are apparatus, it seems to me that when speaking of “the elements of the state” Marx implicitly refers to the instruments of the political state.

Marx finds that political emancipation is a great development but on the other hand, the final form of human emancipation is not political emancipation. With political emancipation, the state can emancipate itself from restrictions, such as religion, without emancipating the individuals; the state can be a free state without freedom of the individuals. By political emancipation, religion is expelled from political life into private life. It is not anymore in public law but in private law. “It [Religion] is

⁴³² Marx, “On the Jewish Questions,” *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton, Penguin Books, 1975, p.219 (it seems to me this translation is more comprehensible).

⁴³³ Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.35

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.35

no longer the essence of community, but the essence of differentiation.”⁴³⁵ What does Marx mean by “essence of differentiation”? He wants to point out that by expelling religion from “the sphere of public law,” the differentiation between the public and private life, between political community and civil society become sharper and more obvious. It is obvious because religion is not completely abolished by the political emancipation. However, if religion was the essence or spirit of the state before, now it is the spirit of civil society, the essence of private life. Basically, the division which from the very beginning has already existed became more obvious and sharper by political emancipation because now the political sphere and private sphere are separated. Accordingly, religion is an “expression of the fact that man is *separated* from the *community*, from himself and from other men.”⁴³⁶

In short, political emancipation is not final human emancipation. Marx defines it as an illusory form of emancipation. Owing to this illusory form, the individual becomes an illusory phenomenon. This illusion is based on the form of the political state.

Nowadays in society, there is only one existence of the individual, that is, the private individual; for the community is not a political community; for this reason, the individual is not a communal being. If there is not any political activity in species-life, there is not any political being or the individual or political species in this society.

4.4.2.3. The loss of the political relationship

4.4.2.3.1. The reality of the political state and its relationship with the individual

What is the reality of the political state? Strictly speaking, we have already above in some degree questioned the truth of the political state. Marx reminds us that the political state is an egoistic body, which appears as a subject. It seems that the state has a body and character because it is only worried about its own existence. It can do anything in order to sustain its proper existence. Therefore, the state is not interested in the *general interest*, which in fact should be its proper concern. The political state is interested in *particular* or *private interest*. From this point, it might be said that the political state has a particular or individual character as a subject. On the other hand, the political state acts as if its existence was for the general interests.

Marx talks about the members of the state as religious persons. Why are members of the political state defined as religious? For a religious individual always remains between two different spheres such as between heaven and earth, the real sensuous external world. For this reason, the individual as a

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.35

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.35

member of the political state falls into “the dualism between individual life and species-life, between the life of civil society and political life.”⁴³⁷ Just as the religious individual treats heavenly life as if it were its true life, so the individual treats political life “as if it were his true life.” The religious individual relates themselves to the religious order (or God) by isolating and alienating themselves from the real world and other individuals. Religion is the separation of “man from man” because every individual is considered (particularly in Christianity) “a sovereign being, a supreme being.”⁴³⁸ Similarly, the individuals take the character of a supreme being by way of law, that is, their supreme condition is their legal status. Thus, Marx draws an analogy between being political (in and through the modern state) and being religious. “They are religious...in the sense that religion is here the spirit of civil society, and expresses the separation and withdrawal of man from man.”⁴³⁹

In this point, it is important to pay attention to the relationship between the state and the individual. In other words, such a question immediately appears; what does the individual mean in the eye of the political state? This individual is considered as

“a sovereign being, a supreme being; but it is uneducated unsocial man, man just as he is in his fortuitous existence, man as he has been corrupted, lost to himself, alienated, subjected to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements, by the whole organization of our society—in short man who is not yet a *real* species-being.”⁴⁴⁰

It is also the reality of democracy. In other words, in democracy man is characterized as sovereign man, independent and supreme man within his alienated, unreal and unsocial existence. Is it democracy? Or is it simply an illusory form of democracy? Obviously, it is illusory. It is the claim of Christianity saying that every individual supreme⁴⁴¹ which thus leads the individual to become a sovereign being in his political life. Just as the individual does not guide himself in religion, so the sovereignty of the individual is nothing more than an appearance.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.39

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.39

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.39

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.39

⁴⁴¹ It begins with the embodiment or objectification of Absolute, Supreme Being of God into man, namely, into Christ. Therefore, sanctity is fallen into the earth from the Olympus. It is without doubt unreal and for this reasons the reflection and the influence of this Christian understanding inevitably is found in *public* and *private* of man.

4.4.2.3.2. The reality of the rights of human beings and the relation of rights to the individual

Bauer expresses that man has to sacrifice his privileged interest, for example in the sense of “privilege of faith,” for the general interest. In this respect, Marx begins to question what kind of rights Bauer talks about. Bauer speaks of the rights of man; to a certain degree, these rights of man include political rights.

It goes without saying that the individual can acquire these political rights only in and through the community. To have these rights means the individual can participate in political life, namely, in the state, and life of the community. “They fall in the category of political liberty, of civil rights.”⁴⁴² In this respect, Marx demonstrates that there are two rights in question: 1) the *rights of man*; 2) the *rights of the citizen*. The rights of the citizen are those rights one has by virtue of belonging to a certain political state. The rights of man are human rights that every person supposedly has simply by virtue of being human regardless of which political community they belong to. Marx argues that the North Americans and the French discover these rights of man; for example, *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* talks about liberty.

Marx criticizes the constitution law⁴⁴³ (such as *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*) as regards the rights of man. He defines these rights as the rights of egoistic man. In this sense, these constitutions did not create the rights of man beyond the private interests and private desires of man. This means that man is still separated from community as a member of society, as an individual being.

Marx asks what the difference between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen is. Furthermore he asks who the man different from the citizen is. Then he responds that this man is the member of civil society. Another question Marx asks is why they called these rights “the rights of man.” Marx explains this fact by the relationship of the political state to civil society and “by the nature of political emancipation.”⁴⁴⁴ In the first place, Marx says that these rights of man are simply the rights of the members of civil society. As a result, these rights are rights of unreal man, which is completely alien to both the life of the community and political life. As a result the difference between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen is related to the nature of political emancipation which separates the individuals as public (or citizen) and private person.

According to constitution, in 1793 (*Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*), the rights of man include equality, security and property. Moreover, in this context, it defines liberty as a power to

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.41

⁴⁴³ Marx emphasizes on the constitutions concerning rights of man through *Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, in the years; 1791, 1793, 1795, *Constitution of Pennsylvania*, and *Constitution of New Hampshire*.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.42

do everything without damaging other man's rights. However the question is how this liberty is realized, where this liberty exists. Due to the separation of man from his political life and thus from other men, this liberty as a right of man is found in the separation of man from man, not the relationship of man to man. Then how does liberty as a right of man realize itself? It goes without saying that it is private property. Private property is the practical form of liberty. It is through and with private property that the individual enjoys life and realizes his will and inclinations. These achievements and enjoyment take place independently from society and without relation to others. It takes place in the egoistic interests of the individual. "It is the right of self-interest."⁴⁴⁵ The liberty of the individual as a right of man to do everything without destroying other's rights and the private property as the practical application of these rights are the basis of civil society. In this society under these rights of man, every individual considers other individual as a person that limits his right. In other words, the individual does not see in the other individual his realization. Other man is just a limitation of his rights. Herewith equality, liberty, security and property are the basis and character of civil society, which were founded by the constitutions. If one mentions equality, liberty and security, it is because of private property but not because of the existence of the individual. It is liberty of free marketing; it is equality of selling and buying commodity; it is security of private property. Here security is about the concept of the police in civil society. Indeed security is a sort of guarantee for egoism of civil society. In this regard the existence of civil society is based on preserving each member regarding their rights and property, and in addition to this, civil society meets their demands and expectations. For this reason, "the only bond which holds them together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property and their egoistic persons."⁴⁴⁶

4.4.2.3.3. The existence of the individual in the old and new form of society

Marx discusses political emancipation as the dissolution of old society into a political system (*Saatswesen*) but this political system, which rests on the sovereignty of man, is estranged from people.

The old society was *feudalism*. In this form of society, political life had a directly political character. The elements of civil life such as family, property, and occupation took the form of elements of political life such as lordships, caste, and guilds. The relation of the individual to the state was determined as a whole through these forms. In this respect, there was an organic link between that realm of life where production took place and political life.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.42

⁴⁴⁶ Marx, "On the Jewish Questions," *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, 1975, p.230

In this society (feudalism), property and labor were separated from the body of the state and were made “*distinct societies within society.*”⁴⁴⁷ Moreover, the individual was separated from the body of the state because the individuals existed in the political elements, which we have already mentioned in the previous paragraph. Labor and property were related to different societies such as corporations, guilds, etc. With the existence of new civil society, labor and property become dependent on the political state itself. In feudalism,

“they [the vital functions and conditions of civil society] excluded the individual from the body of the state, and transformed the *particular* relation which existed between his corporation and the state into a general relation between the individual and social life, just as they transformed his specific civil activity and situation into a general activity and situation.”⁴⁴⁸

In the old form of the state, even though the individuals were excluded from the political state, they were still related to politics through their particular relations with corporation or guilds. Of course, in this organization, the state existed for “the private affair of a ruler and his servants.”⁴⁴⁹ In other words, the state was necessarily the state of private affair of a ruler and his servants. Therefore, the revolution that established a new society overthrew the estates, corporations, guilds and privileges. According to Marx, it signifies that this “political revolution *abolished the political character of civil society.*”⁴⁵⁰ For civil society was reduced to single individuals. According Marx, with this political revolution, 1) state affairs became the affairs of the people; 2) the political state became “a matter of general concern.” For this reason, this revolution destroyed estates, corporations, guilds, and privileges through which the individuals related to the state. These organizations indeed related the people to community life; but when they were shattered by this political revolution, the people were separated from community life.

Marx particularly speaks of the period following the political revolution from feudalism into revolution of civil society in which the individuals are separated from community life, from his relationship with the state as a whole. Thereby this new society relies merely on the individual being. The relationship of the individual to the state as a whole is not in question. Marx repeats the basic elements of civil society: 1) on the one hand, *individuals*; 2) on the other hand, *material* (such as property) and *cultural* elements (such as religion) (Marx also calls it spiritual elements). For instance, the individuals are formed and determined in society through property and religion in that private property determines your status or the class to which you belong, and in the same way, religion

⁴⁴⁷ Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, London, 1978, p.44

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, pp.44-45

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, p.45

⁴⁵⁰ Marx, “On the Jewish Questions”, *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, 1975, p.232

presents your culture as well as your life style. In this society, man is free to do anything. The contents of both societies, feudal society and civil society, are the same but the forms of these societies are changed. “Hence man was not freed from religion—he received freedom of religion. He was not freed from property—he received freedom of property. He was nor freed from the egoism of trade—he received the freedom to engage in trade.”⁴⁵¹

In civil society, man as an individual being is the foundation of this society and the presupposition of political life, which is a dilemma. It is a dilemma because on the one hand the individual is a presupposition and foundation of this new society and political state; on the other hand, the individuals exist without their self-activity or without acting both in civil society and in the political state. The relation of “means and end” is inverted. In this political life, the recognition of the individual is possible within the rights of man; this law regulates the relations of the individual. In this type of society and political community, man is no longer *political*-man. The individual dissolved into “independent” individuals but the adjective “independent” in front of the “individuals” is indeed nonsense and meaningless because in fact, there is no individual who is independent. Every individual depends on something; firstly, they depend on nature in an effort to survive in the world; for their basic needs and for producing and re-producing these needs and transforming nature they depend on tools. They depend on other individuals at least to meet other basic needs. They depend on their mothers in order to exist. Therefore, we are socially dependent on something. In my view, the word “independent” does not signify that the individuals are able to do everything by themselves, which is the assumption of modern society, but rather “independent” must be comprehended by the word “separated”, “isolated,” or “single” individual.

The relationship of the individuals to the state is realized through the *law*. In this respect, the individuals are legal individuals because the law regulates the relations of “independent” individuals.

This is why Marx remarks that political emancipation is not the full emancipation of man. This emancipation splits man into two parts; one is the reduction of man to the member of civil society as egoistic individual, *independent* individual; second is the reduction of man to a citizen and to a moral person in the political sense. Marx states that the political revolution transforms civil society into its elements without criticizing or without changing the elements of civil society; namely without revolutionizing the elements of civil society; such as private property and religion as we already explained.⁴⁵²

Let us take a look the paragraph given below in which Marx explains the completion of human emancipation;

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, “On the Jewish Questions”, *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, 1975, p.233

⁴⁵² Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, 1978, p.46

“Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an individual man has become a *species-being* in his empirical life, his individual work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognized and organized his *forces propres* (*own forces*) as *social forces* so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of *political* force, only then will human emancipation be completed.”⁴⁵³

From this quotation, the Hegelian influence can be observed which distinguished the moral person as a political person, namely, in terms of citizenship, and the individual as the egoistic one. Then how is human emancipation achieved? When is man emancipated completely? Firstly 1) man has to abolish their character as abstract citizen. It means that man must be a citizen by their direct relationship with politics and society. 2) Secondly, man has to become a *species being* in their life as a whole, in their works, in their relationship with others, with society, with politics and with nature. To become a species being points out that man is a real human within their humanistic activity in empirical life. Thirdly 3) man has to recognize their powers not as an egoistic one but as a social force and thus man can organize their force not just for themselves but also for others as social powers. Therefore, this social power cannot be separated from man in the form of political power. In other words, when the individual recognizes their power not as an egoistic power but as a social power, this social power in the form of political power could not be separated from themselves.

The reason why political emancipation fails to achieve real emancipation is because civil society which political emancipation seeks to overcome is a society of egoism and of practical need. In this context we can say that the principle of civil society; in the first place 1) is based on the existence individual (the character of this individual is to be egoistic, isolated, separated, imaginary and to have illusory relationship to the political state. Besides, a supreme character is given to the individual); 2) the law is the principle for the existence of the individual in the form of citizenship. Marx maintains that this “supreme condition of man is his *legal* status, his relationship to laws which are valid for him, not because they are the laws of his own will and nature, but because they are dominant and any infraction of them will be *avenged*.”⁴⁵⁴ Although the principle of civil society is the laws which organize the relations between each individual, these laws do not result from the own will and nature of the individual; they are enforced on the individuals by a certain class. Whenever the individual endangers these laws and thus the political state, the individual will be punished.

Accordingly, it seems to me the world which is based on the *separation* (division between civil society and political state) is more *theoretical* than before. The foundation of new society brought with itself

⁴⁵³ Marx, “On the Jewish Questions,” *Early Writings of Marx*, introduced by Lucio Colletti, 1975, p. 234

⁴⁵⁴ Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question”, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, 1978, p.51

not only the separation of political life and private life but also a sharp distinction between theory and practice. One of the examples for this theorization is the organization, determination, and restriction of the individual's activity through laws, which are not the result of the will of the individual. Due to the theorization, the individual is separated from the political state and is reduced to the theorized and institutionalized individual, which is no longer a practical phenomenon. It is said that the individual is politicized in our present century but indeed, they are not. For these above-mentioned reasons, the individual is an imaginary and illusory phenomenon.

Summarizing this part of our investigation, we can say that Marx never reduces the existence of the individual just into self-conscious being. Of course, Marx accepts that man is differentiated from animal according to their consciousness. However, Marx especially underlines the importance of activity. In this sense, the individual is consciousness of their activity. Man is a being dependent on their activity. Being active refers to being in relationship with something or somebody outside oneself. For this reason, man is a social being, through which he realizes their true and human activity. With all this in mind, we can daringly say that the gap between the political state and the individual lies behind the separation between the individual as self-conscious being and the individual as active being. Less praxis more theorization! It is the principle and slogan of the current capitalist system (*neo-liberalism*)⁴⁵⁵

4.4.3. The Analysis of the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right

4.4.3.1. A brief historical background of the Critique

It is said that *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right)* is the most difficult among Marx's early writings. The difficulty results from both the works of Marx and Hegel together. If you target to penetrate fully into Marx's *Critique* in order to achieve a comprehensive and analytical reading, you must penetrate into Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* as well.

⁴⁵⁵ David Harvey defines neo-liberalism in his book, namely *A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism*. He says that neoliberal state emphasizes particularly the individual liberty and freedom stemming from classical liberalism. Therefore, these neo-liberal states basically say that "we give you the individual freedom and liberty" so that you have to forget social justice. Therefore, neo-liberal idea related to social movements, which occurred in 1960s. These movements are about two things: 1) individual liberty and freedom, free speech movement; the individual liberation from state control; 2) social justice. According to Harvey, it happened in the last thirty years. In this regard according to Harvey, neoliberalism is not an accident; it is a political project, which almost began in 1970s. Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and others created an ideological movement around neo-liberalism in 1947. It was called neo-liberalism because it took seriously liberal principles of freedom and liberty in 18th century. But nevertheless, during the 1950s and 1960s although these ideological thinkers of neo-liberalism wrote lots of articles and did lots of things to disseminate their ideas, nobody took them serious. Besides policy did not take them seriously because the policy was dominated by Keynesianism; it was strong in policy. However, Harvey emphasizes that in 1970s Keynesianism based on state intervention did not work anymore. Accordingly, in mid-1970s Margaret Thatcher was the person who implemented this neo-liberal project. The fundamental idea of neo-liberalism is that liberty and freedom of the individual can be granted and guaranteed just by free trade, free market system and strong system of private property rights.

Marx left this work without date as well as title, and the *Critique* was not published during Marx's lifetime. This manuscript was published in 1927. After this incomplete manuscript, at the same year, Marx wrote the contribution to the *Critique* and it was published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in 1844.

The writings of the Young Marx are generally considered to be *criticism*. In one of his letters to Ruge (September 1843) Marx claims that criticism has to concern itself with “the theoretical existence of man, in other words to make religion, science, etc.”⁴⁵⁶ He emphasizes that, in Germany, religion and politics became the predominant concern so that he wanted to deal with these questions through the method of criticism. Marx's main criticism concerns the gap between the ideal mission of the state and the way it actually functions alongside civil society. In this respect, Marx argues, “it [state] everywhere comes into contradiction between its ideal mission and its real preconditions.”⁴⁵⁷ Immediately after this determination he says that merely “out of this conflict of the political state with itself, therefore, one can develop social truth.”⁴⁵⁸ Thus, Marx sets out by the critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*). It is Hegel's major writing on political theory, which was published in 1821. Hegel used this work for his lectures in political philosophy.⁴⁵⁹

In his work, Marx criticizes Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* paragraph by paragraph, that is, from 261 to 313. However, the first four pages of the manuscript are missing. Marx deals with the internal constitution, including the crown, the executive and legislature. Marx projected to write a critique of Hegel's political philosophy for over a year. He spoke of his project with his friend, Arnold Ruge through a letter (written in 5 March 1842). Marx found Hegel's political system or his constitutional monarchy contradictory. And he aimed at writing the critique of Hegel's natural law and his political system and accordingly he mentioned that he would discuss and be against Hegel's constitutional monarchy.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁶ Karl Marx, “For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing” (letter from Marx to Ruge, September, 1843), in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, 1978, p.13

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, Letter from Marx to Ruge, September, 1843, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, 1978, p.14

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, Letter from Marx to Ruge, September, 1843, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, 1978, p.14

⁴⁵⁹ Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, edited with an Introduction and Notes by Joseph O'Malley, Cambridge at the University Press, 1970 (I prefer to call *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'* in its short version as *Critique*.)

⁴⁶⁰ The letter from Marx to Arnold Ruge (5 March 1842), in *Marx Engels Collected Works Vol 1*, International Publishers, 1975, translated by Clemens Dutt, pp. 382-383 (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1842/letters/42_03_05.htm)

In the Introduction of the English translation to the *Critique*, O'Malley writes that Marx never submitted his article on Hegel's political philosophy because of the fact that at that period he had not enough time to concentrate himself on his projected essay. He lacked time due to his journalism. For example, at that period, there was Prussian censorship and in the February of 1842 Marx was busy writing a criticism about it.

To O'Malley, another reason for Marx's failure to write the *Critique* "may have been due to his lack of a methodology suitable for a systematic criticism of Hegel's political philosophy." Consequently, Marx began to criticize Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* paragraph by paragraph but he could not create an essay. He planned to revise his manuscripts in order to publish after finishing them. For this reason at the same time he also wrote an essay as an introduction to the *Critique*, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung" which he submitted (February 1844) to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*.

O'Malley claims, "as it turned out, a key element in the methodology employed by Marx in the *Critique* was provided by an essay by Feuerbach which first appeared, of all places, in Ruge's *Anekdoten*."⁴⁶¹ For this reason, this second short essay ("Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung") focused on the significance and importance of the criticism of Ludwig Feuerbach on speculative philosophy and theology.

At that period, Marx was exiled from Germany and he went to Paris with his wife where he published the "introduction" to the *Critique*. However he did not revise his manuscripts because of the fact that he found the work to be too complex and hybrid. However, Marx lays stress on the importance and significance of this work for "the development of his thought."⁴⁶² As Colletti contended, the *Critique* was not only a starting point as a critique of philosophy of law and did not just transform this critique into the critique of the state but it is much more complicated and sophisticated than *Philosophy of Right* itself.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶¹ Joseph O'Malley, "Introduction," in *Critique*, by Karl Marx, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, edited with an Introduction and Notes by Joseph O'Malley, Cambridge at the University Press, 1970, p. x

⁴⁶² O'Malley, "Introduction," in *Critique*, by Karl Marx, p.xi "After his death in March 1883 the manuscript remained undiscovered among his papers until 1922, when David Rjazanov, who was then attempting to establish the contents of the full Marx-Engels *Nachlass*, found it in the Berlin archives of the German Socialist-Democratic Party. It was then published for the first time, edited by Rjazanov, in the first volume of MEGA (1927)." p. xi

⁴⁶³ Lucio Colletti, "Marx e Hegel", in *Il Marxismo e Hegel*, Editori Laterza: Roma, Bari, 1973, p. 112 [According to Colletti, Marx began the *Critique* like the critique of philosophy and then he penetrates the object of that philosophy. In other words, it is no longer the issue of Hegel talking about society but it directly speaks of society itself. It means Marx left behind Hegel's approach to society and thus started to approach to the condition

4.4.3.2. The purpose of the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* and his criticism

Actually, Marx speaks of the true essence of the *Critique* more clearly in his essay, which was written after the *Critique*, namely, *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Here, he argues that the task of history is to reestablish the truth of this real world “once the other-world of truth has vanished.” Especially, it is the task of philosophy that has to unmask the self-alienation of human being once it relieved itself of its sacred, mystical form. In so doing, “the critique of heaven is transformed into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, the critique of theology into the critique of politics.”⁴⁶⁴ At the beginning of the article, Marx expresses that the critique of religion, by which every critique is firstly started, is completed.

It should be reminded that Marx does not directly focus on the *Philosophy of Right* in terms of its content but he attacks the content of Hegel's political state through its form. It is also worth noting that Marx interprets the *Philosophy of Right* as a manifestation of the modern states. The first aim we have already mentioned above is the criticism of Hegel's constitutional monarchy. In this regard, Marx proposed to make an evaluation of Hegel's political philosophy and to arrive at the critique of existing political institutions. In the “Preface” to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* published in 1859, Marx explained that the conclusion he arrived at after his critique of Hegel's political system was that legal relations and the political forms of the states could not be sought and comprehended by themselves or by “the so-called general development of the human mind.”⁴⁶⁵ Instead of these, they could be comprehended by investigating their material conditions. As Marx alluded, Hegel defined the material conditions of life in “civil society.” Hegel took the concept of “civil society” from the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century. However, it is important to note that Hegel's concept of civil society is an important advancement on the concept as it has been handled in the social contract tradition. According to contract theorists, the purpose of the state is to secure and to regulate social relations among citizens. Hegel like Aristotle argues that the state is not a sphere of regulations to facilitate social and economic or commercial relations in an attempt to prevent injustice among the citizens. Civil society is the sphere of needs including this sort of regulations.⁴⁶⁶ Allen

of the present society as O'Malley indicated. And lastly says Colletti, the *Critique* is not only about the issue of society; that is, not only theory but also practice. (p.112)]

⁴⁶⁴ Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,” in *Critique.*, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, edited with an Introduction and Notes by Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.132

⁴⁶⁵ Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” (Marx on the History of His Opinions) in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Robert C. Tucker, 1978, p.4

⁴⁶⁶ Inwood, M. J., *A Hegel Dictionary*, Blackwell Publishers, 1992, pp. 53-54

Wood states that Hegel is the first philosopher who separates ‘civil society,’ which is considered as the realm of economy, from family and the state. Hegel’s ‘civil society’ is a type of social organization.⁴⁶⁷

Richard Winfield claims that many interpreters assert that Hegel follows classical political economists such as Stuart, Smith and Ricardo who considered economy within civil society. However, Winfield argues that these interpreters ignored that the classical political economists did not distinguish civil society from an independent political sphere, “but from a ‘civil government’ devoted to the same civil rights, deriving from liberty, which are supposedly operative in the market place.”⁴⁶⁸ For this reason, the economy of such civil society of the political economist “can be called a ‘political’ economy insofar as the ends ascribed to politics are ultimately indistinguishable from those of society.”⁴⁶⁹ And the essence of civil society could be comprehended through political economy.

Hegel differed from Marx in that he attributed a more significant role to the state as the realm where the individual can exist in synthesis with the universal. In this regard, the individual being was reduced to an institutional being, which means that the individuals can exist and realize themselves only through their institutional (legal) relationships. By the 17th century the individual was considered as a political being, however, this is only the appearance on the surface. While the basic characteristic of the modern period is allegedly the politicization of the individual, the reality is quite the opposite.

As a result, Marx’s interest in political issues during the period when he was editor of the *Reinische Zeitung* indicated that the aim of Marx in criticizing Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* was to reveal the relationship of the existing political system to the economy of society. In this regard, it could be said that, during 1842 and the early period of 1843, the first form of his social criticism appeared through his journalism. In this period, he wrote about the censorship in the *Anekdoten*. Moreover, he wrote many articles on social and political questions in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. In this daily newspaper, the approach of Marx to social and political questions is determined by his convictions about social reform. Marx approaches social reform as a way, which could be achieved through the education of the public. Marx particularly believed in the necessary education of regime, “about the shortcoming of the existing socio-political order by appealing to a philosophical understanding of the nature and purpose of political society.”⁴⁷⁰ In this respect, there are two determinations of Marx’s criticism: 1)

⁴⁶⁷ Allen W. Wood, “Hegel and Marxism,” *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, edited by Frederick C. Beiser, 1996, p.421

⁴⁶⁸ Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Richard Dien Winfield, 1982, p. 19

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution.*, trans. by Winfield, 1982, p. 20

⁴⁷⁰ O’Malley, “Introduction,” in *Critique.*, by Karl Marx, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. xvi

social philosophy appealing to the regime was the theoretical aspect of criticism; and 2) public education was the practical aspect “through the medium of the popular press.”⁴⁷¹

However, Marx left this conviction or this program of social reform due to two reasons: 1) because of “the official reaction in the form of censorship.”⁴⁷² Because of this effective censorship, he saw that public education alone could not result in social reform. Therefore, he arrived at the necessity of social and political organization. 2) Marx realized the power of economic interests. In this regard, he saw that an understanding of economic factors in political society was essential to succeed in attaining the common good and the aim of criticism. As a result, Marx realized that two things—the philosophical understanding of society and economic factors of political society— could achieve the true understanding of society and give an adequate theoretical basis of criticism.⁴⁷³

O’Malley reveals that the discovery of Marx regarding his theoretical shortcomings in regard to the economic aspect of political society was the end of the first phase of his intellectual development. To O’Malley, these determinations regarding the shortcomings of his theoretical basis for social criticism led Marx to establish the second phase of his intellectual development, which for O’Malley was the decisive phase. He identifies this decisive phase with the period between 1843 and 1846.

Let me summarize how O’Malley characterizes the early writings of Marx in three periods; 1) the first effort at political organization; 2) Marx aims at achieving the knowledge firstly in political theory, secondly in history, and then lastly in political economy. This knowledge in different fields is necessary for his effective social criticism and its theoretical basis; 3) during the third period Marx for the first time met with the industrial proletariat. He saw the industrial proletariat as the material force in society, which could bring about a social revolution. As a result, his views on social transformation become more radical. Education, rather than being a goal in its own sake, became an instrument that served to demonstrate to the people who are economically, socially and politically dispossessed their real interests in society and the significant role they will assume for the transformation of and revolution in society. In other words, Marx considers education as part of his criticism for “the economically, socially and politically dispossessed.”⁴⁷⁴

Consequently, in early 1843, by means of his experiences in political journalism, Marx reached two results: 1) “the existing socio-political order was far short of—indeed, in some respect it was the

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, O’Malley, “Introduction,” in *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. xvi

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, O’Malley, “Introduction,” in *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.xvi

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, O’Malley, “Introduction,” in *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. xvi

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, O’Malley, “Introduction”, in *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. xvi, “Workers’ organizations would be the means both for education and for the achievement and exercise of political power aimed at the radical transformation of the existing economic, social and political order.”

antithesis of—a rational state⁴⁷⁵; 2) the reform concerning the existing social-political order could not be completed “without a clearer understanding of the operation of economic forces within it.”⁴⁷⁶

In relation to these two results, O'Malley emphasizes the influences of Eduard Gans and Karl von Savigny on Marx's intellectual development. Marx attended the lectures of law from both thinkers. The lectures of Gans provided him the *rational critical analysis of legislative institutions* and producers. On the other hand, the lectures from Savigny provided him with a *historical method of the analysis of social and political institutions*. Although Marx criticizes the 'Historical School of Law' in which Savigny is involved, he adopted his method, which explained the existing institution by taking account of their historical genesis. According to O'Malley, Marx firstly applied this “historic-genetic technique” to his writing, the *Critique*.

4.4.3.2.1. The method used in the *Critique*

O'Malley states that Marx fundamentally puts to use three critical techniques in the *Critique*.

- 1) The critical approach of Feuerbach to speculative philosophy, particularly, Hegel's philosophy. In other words, Marx takes this method from Feuerbach⁴⁷⁷ as a “transformative method of criticizing”⁴⁷⁸ the speculative aspect of Hegel's philosophy. The Feuerbachian method helps Marx reveal the nature of Hegel's speculative philosophy, which according to Marx is “a mystical and pantheistic view of reality.” Therefore, through this method, the mystical form of Hegel's philosophy and his approach to the existing political state (order) would be uncovered. In this regard, Marx uses Feuerbach's method of subject-predicate inversion to uncover the true relationship between the individual man and society, between society and the political state.⁴⁷⁹

In 1865, in one of his letters to his friend Schweitzer, Marx expresses what he sees to be the negative and positive aspects of Feuerbach's thought:

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, O'Malley, “Introduction”, in *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p. xxvi

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, O'Malley, “Introduction”, in *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p. xxvi

⁴⁷⁷ To O'Malley two important Feuerbach's works affected Marx's intellectual development: 1) *Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity)* published in 1841; for O'Malley more importantly, 2) “Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie” (“Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy”) submitted to Ruge's *Anekdoten*. The first work of Feuerbach was important for Marx because of the fact that Marx took the *subject-predicate* inversion. In Feuerbach this conversion is the conversion of God and man. Put it more clearly, God is not anymore subject but it is now a predicate. Instead of God, man is subject, not predicate like before. Marx read second work before he had begun to write the *Critique*. In this writing, Feuerbach clarified his critical technique of subject-predicate inversion, which was employed in the *Essence of Christianity*. Moreover, Feuerbach explained the general method of criticism of speculative philosophy, especially philosophy of Hegel. (Joseph O'Malley, “Introduction”, in *Critique.*, by Karl Marx, p. xxix)

⁴⁷⁸ O'Malley, “Introduction”, in *Critique.*, by Karl Marx, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p. xxvii

⁴⁷⁹ Marx, *Critique.*, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley 1970, p.40

“Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is certainly poor. Nevertheless he was epoch-making *after* Hegel because he laid *stress* on certain points which were disagreeable to the Christian consciousness but important for the progress of criticism, points which Hegel had left in mystic *clair-obscur* [*semi-obscurity*].”⁴⁸⁰

- 2) The analysis and exposition of Hegel’s text paragraph by paragraph. Through the analysis and explication of the text, Marx exposes the internal contradictions in Hegel’s account of the existing political society and order.
- 3) The historic-genetic technique by von Savigny as a systematic method of criticism. By the historical genesis, through a historical research about the genesis of the modern political state, Marx tried to point out certain contradictions. In this context, Marx focuses on three historical developments: 1) “the evolution of political institutions”; 2) the separation between civil society and the political state (civil and political life) which is the characteristic of modern society;⁴⁸¹ 3) “the relationship between private property and the political state.”⁴⁸²
- 4) A fourth critical technique, in addition to O’Malley’s categorization of the method that Marx employed might be, as mentioned in Althusser’s work, *Pour Marx*, a polemical approach to the questions. In this regard, in the *Critique*, Marx approaches Hegel’s political philosophy

⁴⁸⁰ Marx’s letter to Schweitzer, (24 January 1865, London) “On Proudhon”, first published in *Der Social-Demokrat*, No. 16, February 1, 1865.

⁴⁸¹ The separation between civil society and political state is more specifically observed in the idea of social contract. Aristotle stated that people were not equal inborn so that some of them were born as slaves and some of them were born to govern the others, which afterwards was claimed by Hobbes as well. However according to Rousseau, every individual is born free but they are in chains everywhere. Most importantly, he puts emphasis on the individual who exists necessarily in a community. In this regard, he argues that every individual is born free but they forgo their freedom for the sake of utility. The basis of all legitimate authority among every individual could be only contracts because no man has natural authority over another man and strength does not create any right. Rousseau emphasizes that if a series of man obligated to a single individual man, here there is not any people and leader but rather a master and his slaves. In this context, it is not an *association* but it is just an *aggregation*. A series of man comes together in order to overcome the obstacles and preserve themselves. In this regard, Rousseau introduces the problem as follows; “ ‘Find a form of association which will defend and protect, with the whole of its joint strength, the person and property of each associate, and under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.’ This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract gives the answer (pp.55-6).” Therefore, every individual dedicates himself to society (or association) with all his right; because when every individual devotes himself completely to community, the condition becomes the same for all people. For this reason, when the condition is the same for every individual, it does not make sense to turn this condition against other people for his interest. As a result, “*each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and we as a body receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole* (p.55).” The union of all other persons forms the public person; at one time, it was called city and now it is called *republic* or *body public*. (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, translated by Christopher Betts, Oxford University Press, 1994)

⁴⁸² O’Malley, “Introduction”, in *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. xxxix

through a polemic against him.

Now let us take a glance at Feuerbach's philosophy in order to grasp and see better, what Marx takes from him and what he refuses or criticizes. Without considering some basic works of Feuerbach, it might be difficult to comprehend Marx's writings such as *On the Jewish Question* or *the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Moreover as Althusser claimed, the early writings of Marx with Feuerbach's philosophy allow "historical reading" of the whole Marx's writings.

According to Althusser, until 1845 Marx did not abandon Feuerbach's approach to philosophical problems. In this sense, *The German Ideology* was Marx's first work in which he criticizes and begins to break off his relation with Feuerbach's philosophy.⁴⁸³

However, in my conviction, Marx, before *The German Ideology*, had already begun to criticize Feuerbach's philosophy by taking the shortcomings of his criticism of speculative philosophy into consideration. In one of his letters to Ruge,⁴⁸⁴ Marx says, "Feuerbach's aphorisms seem to me incorrect only in one respect, that he refers too much to nature and too little to politics. That, however, is the only alliance by which present-day philosophy can become truth." In this letter, Marx discusses the significance and importance of emphasis on the sphere of politics. For his conviction, philosophy becomes true through alliance with the sphere of politics.

4.4.3.2.1.1. The influence of Feuerbach

Feuerbach studied under Hegel in 1804 in Berlin. Marx characterizes Feuerbach "as a frivolous mocker, and Bauer as a man of wholly uncritical mind."⁴⁸⁵ Some of Feuerbach's texts and articles are *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy* (1839); *The Essence of Christianity* (1841); *The Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy* (1842); *The Principle of the Philosophy of Future* (1843); the preface to the second edition of *the Essence of Christianity* (1843); and the *Essence of Religion* in 1851. All these texts and articles could not be examined under this subtitle but regarding the argument, *The Essence of Christianity*, *The Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy* and *The Principle of the Philosophy of Future* will be taken into account.

⁴⁸³ "Naturally, Marx's themes go beyond Feuerbach's immediate preoccupations, but the theoretical schemata and problematic are the same. To use his own expression, Marx did not really 'settle accounts' with this problematic until 1845. The *German Ideology* is the first work indicating a conscious and definitive rupture with Feuerbach's philosophy and his influence." Louis Althusser, Part One Feuerbach's 'Philosophical Manifestoes', *La Nouvelle Critique*, December 1960 (first published in 1965 as *Pour Marx* by François Maspero, S.A., Paris. In English in 1969 by Allen Lane, The Penguin Press)

⁴⁸⁴ Letter from Marx to Ruge (13 March 1843), in *Marx Engels Collected Works* Vol. 1 (pp. 398-399), International Publishers (1975), (first published journal *Documente des Socialismus*, Bd I, 1902), translated by Clemens Dutt

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Letter from Marx to Ruge (13 March 1843), in *Marx Engels Collected Works* Vol. 1 (pp. 398-399), (1975)

The comprehension of Feuerbach's man as social being is not richer than Hegel's, as Marx and Engels affirmed. The difference between Hegel and Feuerbach is that Hegel's explanation of his philosophy is not as simple and clear as Feuerbach's. Even though Marx thought that Feuerbach's philosophy was extremely poor when compared with Hegel's, he still found Feuerbach very important due to leading the progress of criticism.⁴⁸⁶

The problem of the individual's freedom, put differently, the problem of the existence of the individual as free man, is the problem of essence of the man. In this point, the problem of the individual must be examined by underlining the essence of the human being in terms of Feuerbach's philosophy. Feuerbach's works on the essence of man are based on a critique of the religious perspective.

4.4.3.2.1.1.1. “The Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy”

This article was the continuation of the *Essence of Christianity*, which will be discussed below. In the *Provisional Theses*, we see Feuerbach's critique of speculative philosophy by establishing the relationship between religion or theology and Hegel's philosophy. In other words, Feuerbach applied his critical method to speculative philosophy in relation to religion. In this point both Feuerbach and Marx believed that Hegel's concept of the Absolute was essentially theological and referred to the religious concept of God as ordinarily called by human beings. It might be said that the principle of Feuerbach's method concerning the critique of Hegel's speculative philosophy is based on a comparison of theological approaches to human being and to nature with Hegel's approach. In this respect, Hegelian speculative philosophy is identified with theology.

Feuerbach began criticizing and attacking speculative philosophy as theology in the *Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy*. According to Feuerbach, speculative philosophy transfers divine being into the external sensuous world. Feuerbach considers Spinoza “the originator of speculative philosophy, Schelling its restorer, Hegel its perfecter.”⁴⁸⁷

According to Feuerbach, the similarity between theology and Hegel's speculative philosophy is as follows:

⁴⁸⁶ Marx talks about this issue—comparison of Hegel and Feuerbach—in his letter to J. B. Schweitzer “on Proudhon” (24 January 1865). Also in the *German Ideology* Marx and Engels uttered the lack of Feuerbach on the idea of man which according them is still ‘abstract’, not ‘really existing active man.’ Marx and Engels here criticized Feuerbach because of the fact that he considers the relationship between man just as emotional relations such as love or friendship. He ignores social relations.

⁴⁸⁷ Ludwig Feuerbach, “Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy (1842),” in *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*, L.S. Stepelevich (ed.), 1983, Cambridge University Press, p. 156

- 1) Just as theology transfers the essence of human being into something outside human being, so Hegel's *Logic* transfers the thought, the thinking of human being as if it was outside human being.
- 2) Just as theology represents everything in accordance with the divine essence in heaven and in earth, that is, in abstract form and in concrete form (in nature), so Hegel's philosophy demonstrates everything twice just as theology. In other words, Hegelian philosophy indicates everything firstly in logical form, that is, "as an object of the logic and then again as an object of the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit."⁴⁸⁸ In this context, what must be done is to make the predicate into the subject and the subject into predicate.
- 3) Theology separates and alienates human beings from their essence and then re-identifies "the alienated essence with the human being, so Hegel multiplies and splits up the simple, self-identical essence of nature and the human-being in order, then, to mediate forcibly what was forcibly separated."⁴⁸⁹ The reason why Hegel's philosophy is based on a mediate process and lacks immediate unity is because of his method, his *Logic*, which contains negation and negation of negation (*Aufheben*).

Feuerbach finds Hegel's philosophy abstract. He emphasizes the revelation or realization of the absolute spirit in art, in religion and in philosophy according to Hegel. However, he underlines the importance and function of human feelings and intuition, which could not be separated from art, religion, and philosophy. By speculative philosophy, the absolute spirit was differentiated from human essence and demonstrated to be of another sort. The entire system of Hegel's philosophy depends on the abstraction; owing to this abstraction, his philosophy is an expression of human-being estranged from its essence. It is important to define what the term "abstract" means. "'To abstract' means to suppose the *essence* of nature *outside nature*, the *essence* of the human being *outside the human being*, the *essence* of thinking *outside the act of thinking*." And he continues "Hegelian philosophy lacks *immediate unity, immediate certainty, immediate truth*."⁴⁹⁰

Like Hegel, according to Feuerbach, the essence of human beings, or what differentiates them from animals, is their consciousness ("in the sense of the feeling of self, in the sense of the ability to distinguish one sensuous object from another, to perceive—even judge—external things according to definite sensuous characteristics emanating from them, consciousness in this sense cannot be denied of

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, "Provisional Theses (1842)," in *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*, 1983, p. 158

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, "Provisional Theses (1842)," in *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*, 1983, p. 158

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, "Provisional Theses (1842)", in *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*, 1983, p. 159

the animal”⁴⁹¹) like thought or speech as species features. This consciousness is their species (in the *Essence of Christianity*, species is defined by Feuerbach as *the mode of being*) character. Feuerbach relates consciousness to knowledge of which animals are deprived. Through consciousness, human beings are able to produce science. According to Feuerbach, science is the consciousness of species because the object of science is species, the natural needs of human beings. The important thing concerning consciousness of human beings or the character of species (humanity proper) is to be aware of the infinity of consciousness. However, in this point what differentiates Feuerbach from Hegel is that Feuerbach does not consider only consciousness as the distinctive feature of the species but he regards human beings as reason, will, and heart. Their human essence is not separated from matter, from their sensation, feeling which make human beings concrete entities. For this reason, Feuerbach speaks of alienation of human beings from their truly human essence. The act of abstraction leads human beings to be separated from their true essence.⁴⁹²

Feuerbach discusses that Hegel’s speculative philosophy begins with absolute spirit, with God. However, Feuerbach thinks that there is a subject-predicate inversion involved in this starting point. It means that Hegel considers God as a subject and, nature and human beings are regarded as its predicates. In this respect, God has a personality and individuality that creates and exists independently while nature and human beings are dependent entities and thus subordinate to God.

In this sense, Feuerbach states that philosophy begins with the actual, real world, from the finite and the determined things. It is the infinite or absolute spirit that is derived from the finite and therefore absolute spirit is the predicate, not the subject. In other words, just as there is no quality in thought without determinate qualities, there is no infinite being without the determined, finite, actual world.⁴⁹³

To Feuerbach, there is a dialectical and mutual relationship between the subject and the predicate. Feuerbach relates the predicates as the principal existence for the subject because the subject relates with reality and certainty only by way of its predicates. In the *Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy*, Feuerbach argues that all predicates such as wisdom, love, power, even infinity etc. exist first with human beings. The existence of human beings, their reality and certainty depends on the reality and certainty of man’s human predicates. Similarly, the reality of the individual depends on

⁴⁹¹ Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, (Introduction: §1 The Being of Man in General), translated by George Eliot, Harper Torchbooks: New York, Evanston, and London, 1957

⁴⁹² “To a complete man belongs the power of thought, the power of will, and the power of heart. The power of thought is the light of knowledge, the power of will is the energy of character, the power of heart is love. Reason, love, and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love, and will.” (Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, (Introduction: §1 The Being of Man in General), trans. by George Eliot, 1957)

⁴⁹³ “The task is not to suppose the finite in the infinite but rather the infinite in the finite. [...] The beginning of philosophy is the finite, the determined, the actual. The infinite cannot even be thought *without* the finite.” (Feuerbach *Provisional Theses*, from <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/sefd0/tx/pt.htm>)

the reality of the human being as a species. For example, thought and speech as the properties of human species belongs to the essential character of the human individual.

After the publication of this article, Marx wrote Ruge a letter in which he expressed his enthusiasm for Feuerbach. The only thing, with which Marx was not satisfied, was that Feuerbach put too much emphasis on nature and too little on politics. According to Marx, contemporary philosophy became a truth by means of politics. It goes without saying that Marx was indebted to Feuerbach for his reversal of Hegel's dialectic. In the *Critique*, the strong influence of Feuerbach's method can be observed. Besides the reversal method of Feuerbach, Marx had Feuerbach to thank for some of the terms he used in the *Critique* such as 'mystification'; for Marx, the philosophy of Hegel contains "a systematic 'mystification'."⁴⁹⁴ The term 'mystification' signified that something was deprived of its own independent nature because this independent nature was transformed into an imaginary entity. However, Feuerbach is deprived of a social and historical perspective, which could be found in Marx. In other words, Marx transformed Feuerbach's criticism into a social and historical criticism. In sum, Feuerbach and Marx both thought that Hegel inverted the correct relationship between subjects and predicates.

4.4.3.2.1.1.2. *The Essence of Christianity*

Although Feuerbach's masterpiece, the *Essence of Christianity*, did not make a great impression on Marx as it did on Ruge, it is still important to read it because it discusses emancipation from Christianity or religion.

In this basic work, through a research on the essence of religion or theology in general and the essence of Christianity in particular, Feuerbach concentrates on *the essence of man*. In the preface of the *Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach firstly distinguished his philosophy from the philosophies of his time as well as philosophies prior to his time. In this regard, he aims at presenting the principle of a new philosophy in this work. This new philosophy clarifies what philosophy was and what philosophy must be. Simply he says that this research for uncovering philosophy is based not on the Understanding itself as Kant's philosophy is, or on the Absolute as Hegel's is, but on an understanding of man himself. To Feuerbach, hitherto philosophy lacks "the real, complete nature of man."⁴⁹⁵ In other words, it remains always in abstract form and therefore in this philosophy the essence of man is conceptual being.

⁴⁹⁴ David McLellan describes this term as follows; "this term...meant to deprive something of its own independent nature by making this nature into a mere emanation of an imaginary entity." It implies that something loses its true nature by transforming into an imaginary entity, unreal being. (David McLellan, *Marx before Marx*, Harper & Row, Publishers: New York and Evanston, 1970, pp. 108-9)

⁴⁹⁵ Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. xxxiv-v

In this respect, the principle of Feuerbach's philosophy is reality, so to speak, real being, not thought, but the external sensuous world, not directly and immediately thought, but matter and senses. This means that thought is created "from the *opposite* of thought, from Matter, from existence, from the senses; it has relation to its object first through the senses, i.e., passively, before being defined in thought."⁴⁹⁶ This is also one of the basic assertions of Marx who points out in *Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* that it is man who creates thought but it is not thought which creates man. In this respect, Feuerbach targets "to discover" and "unveil existence"⁴⁹⁷ rather than "invent" it. He aims at seeing this existence correctly.

4.4.3.2.1.1.2.1. The essence of human beings

Feuerbach tries to analyze the distinction between animals and human beings in terms of consciousness. As we shall see, it is this demarcation, which differentiates Marx from Feuerbach. For Marx, man is not just a conscious being but particularly a social being. It might be said that Feuerbach is more Hegelian concerning the approach to the essence of man insofar as he remains more abstract.

As Marx emphasized in his letter to Ruge, Feuerbach laid stress on nature, i.e, the nature of mankind, or the species. However, Feuerbach's approach to consciousness, nature and species-being involves a certain understanding of science which Marx later criticized. According to Feuerbach, "Science is the cognizance of species. In practical life we have to do with individuals; in science, with species."⁴⁹⁸ In other words, practical life deals with the individual while science copes with the universal.

Feuerbach distinguishes human beings from animals in terms of inner and outer life. What Feuerbach says here is that while man has two lives, animal has just one simple life. It means that man has an inner and an outer life while the animal has only one life of inner within outer. "The inner life of man is the life which has relation to his species, to his general, as distinguished from his individual, nature."⁴⁹⁹ Thus, it might be said that Feuerbach, like Hegel, refers to the differences between the individual and the universal as well as the intrinsic connection of the individual to the universal. The universal corresponds to the species being. In the end, it can be said that Feuerbach remains Hegelian in certain important respects although he aimed to criticize Hegel's speculative philosophy.

It is by way of this consciousness that the individual being's awareness of his limits makes itself manifest. Therefore, with his consciousness he feels and recognizes himself as a limited being. The individual human being exists within the consciousness of the limitation or awareness of finitude. It is the characteristic of the individual being. However, this consciousness of finitude is not only based on

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. xxxiv-v

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. xxxvi

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 2

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 2

the awareness of natural limitation but it also relies on social life, in other words, being a social animal.

Feuerbach took the concept of consciousness from Hegel. He constitutes consciousness as the essential difference between man and animal. Man is distinguished from animal in terms of consciousness in so far as man makes his species or “his mode of being” the object of his thought. Feuerbach, as Hegel already did, related consciousness to knowledge.

In addition to consciousness as a feature of the human being, feeling is another important term in Feuerbach’s philosophy; because feeling is an inward power inside us and by means of feeling, you arrive at God. In this respect, there is a strict relationship between love and God. Feuerbach was aware of the loss of feelings like Love because of the fact that modern philosophy very much emphasizes reason. Feuerbach mentions the combination of the individual and the universal through love, which, according to him, holds the opposite sides together, that is, reconciles the perfect and imperfect. Let me quote from Feuerbach himself;

“The law condemns; the heart has compassion even on the sinner. The law affirms me only as an abstract being,—love, as a real being. Love gives me the consciousness that I am a man; the law only the consciousness that I am a sinner, that I am worthless. The law holds man in bondage; love makes him free. Love is the middle term, the substantial bond, the principle of reconciliation between the perfect and the imperfect, the sinless and sinful being, the universal and the individual, the divine and the human. Love is God himself, and apart from it there is no God. Love makes man God and God man...Love is materialism; immaterial love is a chimaera.”⁵⁰⁰

Most importantly, Feuerbach lays stress on love as something material. It means that love is not abstract. I found the emphasis on love important and significant for some reasons. Firstly, when separated from his feelings, the individual is reduced to the rational being. Therefore, secondly, the individual is separated from his nature, which is based on being sensuous as well as rational. This separation results in a miscomprehension of human nature; strictly speaking man exists both with reason and feeling.

Feuerbach turned Hegel’s speculative philosophy upside down. Feuerbach, by explaining the essence of Christianity, explains also the essence of Hegel’s philosophy: *it is a sort of description of Hegel’s philosophy*. What I am trying to say is that while Feuerbach represents the essence of Christianity, he therefore demonstrates its similarity with and its relation to Hegel’s philosophy. In one of his

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 47-48

arguments, Feuerbach states, “in religion man separates himself from himself, but only to return always to the same point from which he set out. Man negates himself, but only posits himself again, and that in a glorified form: he negates this life, but only, in the end, to posit it again in the future life.”⁵⁰¹ The similarity between the way Feuerbach describes Christianity and Hegel’s philosophy is obvious. As a matter of fact, Hegel himself said that his philosophy was a representation of Christianity in thought. Feuerbach notes that both are forms of alienation in the sense that the individual separates himself from himself and from the world in order to return to himself as self-consciousness of himself and to the present world in which he exists. As a result, according to Feuerbach, it goes without saying that the whole of Hegel’s philosophy is based on the essence of the Christianity.

All belief in God or in the absolute refers to human beings themselves, the essential needs of human beings. Human beings create this belief for their own sake.⁵⁰² Feuerbach characterizes the essence of Christians as being opposite to Nature, but at the same time, Christianity sanctifies the essence of man. In other words, the world is temporary according to this belief “but man, nay, the individual, personal man, is eternal.”⁵⁰³ The ancient world was fascinated with the cosmos, but the modern world (or Christian world) discovered man and the individual (personal man); according to Feuerbach, the result is “the Christians despised the world.”⁵⁰⁴ While the ancients ignored the existence of the individual, the Christians were indifferent towards the world and species.⁵⁰⁵

The Christians have immediate unity and relation with the species. They defined the individual immediately with the universal being. However, the ancients differentiated the individual from Nature. It means that the intermediate process was left out by the Christians. Instead of the intermediate process, they found themselves in immediate relation with universal Being. “They immediately identified the individual with the universal being.”⁵⁰⁶ It goes without saying that what takes place here is merely a blessing of the essence of man, but it is at the same time a destruction of the relationship of man to Nature, to society, and to other individuals. It is the point where this significant connection with nature, society, and most importantly with the other individual being begins to get lost. Feuerbach underlines the difference between the Christians and heathens, in the sense that while “the heathens believed in a providence for the individual only through his relation to the race, through law, through the order of the world, and thus only in a mediate, natural, and not miraculous providence,”⁵⁰⁷ the

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.182

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 106

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, pp.150-1

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, pp.150-1

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.152

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.152

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.152

Christians omitted this sort of relation and rejected the intermediate process. Therefore, they gave too much importance to the single individual.⁵⁰⁸

For the Christian, the individual and universality united in the existence of God, for God is individuality and universality. There is not any difference between the species and the individual because in Christian religion the species is conceived as an individual. There is an immediate unity between the universal and individual.⁵⁰⁹

For Christianity, reason is just a part of man but for the ancient Greeks reason was immortal and the essence of man. The Christians think that the individual is immortal and divine. The individual was immortal for the Christians because of Christ through and in whose body God demonstrates itself. Christ is immediate identity of God and the species. That's why the individual was significant and immortal. Reason was immortal for the ancients as well, and they also concerned themselves with the relation of the individual to reason (but not as only a part of man like the Christians did). Christ is the ideal expression of humanity. Put differently, God is not only for us but he is in itself.

It is important to put particular emphasis on the Christian perspective on the individual in an attempt to comprehend the modern consideration of the individual. Feuerbach states, "separation from the world, from matter, from the life of the species, is therefore the essential aim of Christianity."⁵¹⁰ It is similar to what Marx called "*alienation*." However, the difference between Feuerbach and Marx concerning the approach to the problem of the individual is based on their attitude towards nature. Feuerbach puts particular emphasis just on nature and in this regard on the essence of man or religion and theology whereas Marx argues the historical, political, and economic situation of mankind. However, it should be underscored that Marx owed to Feuerbach "the idea of separation of relationship of man to nature," etc.

In short, to Feuerbach the essence of the individual rests on the concept of self-consciousness alongside feeling. In my view, Feuerbach considers self-consciousness as the essence of human being because it leads to awareness of God and it is feeling because feeling provides immediate relationship

⁵⁰⁸ "It is true that the heathen philosophers also, as Plato, Socrates, the Stoics, believed that the divine providence extended not merely to the general, but also to the particular, the individual; but they identified providence with Nature, law, necessity." (*Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.152 footnote)

⁵⁰⁹ "With the Christians God is nothing else than the immediate unity of species and individuality, of the universal and individual being. God is the idea of the species as an individual—the idea or essence of the species, which as a species, as universal being, as the totality of all perfections, of all attributes or realities, freed from all the limits which exist in the consciousness and feeling of the individual, is at the same time again and individual, personal being. *Ipse suum esse est*. Essence and existence are in God identical; which means nothing else than that he is the idea, the essence of the species, conceived immediately as an existence, an individual." (*Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.153)

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 161

between the individual and God or the spiritual. The materialistic view point of Feuerbach says that without my existence God does not exist, that is, if I do not believe in God, it does not exist in my consciousness and in my belief. It signifies that “thus he exists only in so far as he is felt, thought, believed in.”⁵¹¹ However, does Feuerbach’s materialistic viewpoint sever the dialectic relation between the individual and universal that is found in Hegel? In what follows, it will be shown that this relation between the universal and the individual is still maintained not only in Feuerbach’s but also in Marx’s thought.

4.4.3.2.1.1.2.2. The individual, reason, and feeling

According to Feuerbach, “the individuality is the self-conditioning, the self-limitation of the species.”⁵¹² The individual is a limited and temporal being whereas the species is eternal. In other words, individuality is the limitation of universality. In this context, feeling refers to the individual while reason is identical with idea of the universal; because feeling is more particular than reason. In the same way, feeling is more concrete than reason, which is more suited to abstraction. However, according to Feuerbach, there should not be a rigid separation between feeling and reason. Additionally “feeling makes God a man, but for the same reason it makes man a God.”⁵¹³ Feuerbach did not transform the individual into reason only. To put it more clearly, the individual is not the self-conscious being or rational being but they are a being who possesses feeling. In this regard, Feuerbach claims that feeling puts you in touch with material things. Therefore, you can feel your existence. That’s why he states that thinking is the negation of my existence and thus my individuality; because by thinking you leave out the external sensuous world and you remain in yourself. For this reason, it is not Descartes’ cogito that leads you to exist but it is feeling giving you a proper existence. “Reason is the self-consciousness of the species, as such; feeling is the self-consciousness of individuality... Cogito, ergo sum? No! Sentio, ergo sum...reason is the annihilation of personality.”⁵¹⁴

Feeling and reason are two different features of man with their different functions. To put too much emphasis on one of these entities results in the rejection or negation of the other. It is a failure of the modern world to lay more stress on reason than on feeling. As a result, feeling is despised by reason. Feuerbach says, “the man without feeling has no home, no private hearth. Feeling, the heart, is the domestic life; the reason is the *res publica* of man. Reason is the truth of Nature, the hearth is the truth of man. To speak popularly, reason is the God of Nature, the heart the God of man.”⁵¹⁵ By losing feeling, man loses his proper home. Therefore, man remains without home and without heart.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 200

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.281

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 281

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p. 285

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.285

From the whole of his views that are mentioned above, it can be concluded that Feuerbach's philosophy is based on feeling and sense perception, which are more particular, concrete and belong to the individual being. This is what makes his philosophy materialistic. Manfred H. Vogel, in his introduction to Feuerbach's *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*⁵¹⁶, indicates his formulation of philosophy based on "sense perception as the primary source of cognition. Feuerbach turns to sense perception because of his conviction that true reality resides in the concrete, particular, individual being."⁵¹⁷ Therefore, Feuerbach is against the idea that the universal is the central point of reality. According to him, the universal is not as concrete as the individual, but rather the universal is just a concept, not reality itself. In this sense, Feuerbach claims, "the particular belongs to being, and the general belongs to thought."⁵¹⁸

It seems to me that one of the best ways to understand Hegel's speculative philosophy is to comprehend Feuerbach's philosophy because of his differentiation between feeling and reason. To Feuerbach feeling is the basic character of religion and faith. However, as Feuerbach also argued, Hegel considered feeling as the lowest form of human beings. For this reason, says Feuerbach, feeling for Hegel is not good enough and satisfactory for religion. "Of course, religion as a spiritual content, as a content of consciousness, may find expression in feeling, but it is poor expression. In feeling, man is not distinguished from the animal. Expression in feeling leads to subjectivity and hence to complete arbitrariness."⁵¹⁹ That's why Hegel concentrates on reason as the truth and reality of theology as well as philosophy, politics, society, etc. In contrast to Hegel, Feuerbach puts particular emphasis on feeling, which is more concrete and represents *genuine* truth.

Regarding this point, it seems to me that it is difficult to find a special emphasis or statement on reason and feeling separately or together with the consideration of their relation to each other in Marx's proper works. However, Marx indicates the difference between theory and praxis, which seems to me in some way similar to the separation of or relation between reason and feeling.

Shortly, Marx dealt with Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* through Feuerbach's criticism (to which Marx adds a social and historical dimension), in particular by means of his method of *subject-predicate*

⁵¹⁶ In *Principles of the Philosophy of Future*, Feuerbach declared that the philosophy of future had to leave behind Hegelian philosophy. In this context Feuerbach attempted to criticize the entire metaphysical tradition of philosophy; this metaphysical tradition of philosophy was based on Hegel's philosophy. In addition to *Principles*, also in *Theses* Feuerbach attempted to expose that philosophy in general and particularly Hegel's philosophy involved religious forms. But they concealed this form of religion. In the *Principles*, Feuerbach described new philosophy with some terms such as empiricism, naturalism, realism, anthropologism, and humanism; the terms such humanism are applied by Marx in his early writings such as in the *Critique*.

⁵¹⁷ Manfred H. Vogel, "Introduction" to *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, by Feuerbach, translated with an introduction by Manfred H. Vogel, the Library of Liberal Arts, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, p.ix

⁵¹⁸ Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, trans. by Vogel, 1966, p. 43

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, trans. by Vogel, 1966, p. xxxiv

inversion, and with his terms such as “*mystification*.” In addition, through the analysis of Feuerbach’s basic works we realize that Marx’s materialistic approach comes from Feuerbach’s. His approach to the existence and essence of the individual enlightens us that it is possible to analyze the individual in relation with reason and feeling, maybe in Marxian in relation with theory and praxis. After this stage what Marx would do is to analyze and criticize the individual in terms of theory and praxis through the historical, materialistic (for example, economical) and social relations. With consciousness of this knowledge let me continue to the *Critique*.

4.4.3.2.2. Back to the *Critique*: the content and form of the *Critique*

O’Malley states that Marx’s main objection to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* is grounded on the distinction between form and content. In this context, according to him, Marx criticized the manner of Hegel’s speculative philosophy or the way of Hegel’s consideration of political questions or political society. Therefore, O’Malley says, “it is the philosophical form, not the empirical content of *The Philosophy of Right*, which is under attack.”⁵²⁰ In this context, it means that Marx is mainly concerned with Hegel’s *logic*. Hegel’s way of considering things in *The Logic* presents the particular empirical existent as established by the Idea or Absolute. While O’Malley is right to emphasize Marx’s critique of the philosophical form of the *Logic*, it should be noted that Marx charges Hegel not only with the philosophical form but also with empirical content. In my estimation, Marx deeply criticizes Hegel’s political system by taking consideration of both the form and the content of *The Philosophy of Right*.

The *Philosophy of Right* is divided into three parts: 1) Abstract Right (§§34-104); 2) Morality (§§105-141); 3) Ethical Observance (§§142-360) which is separated in three sections, namely, the family, the civic community (civil society), and lastly, the state. The third section of the State is divided into three sub-sections; constitutional law, international law and world history. Constitutional law is separated into two parts: the state constitution including three sub-titles (the prince, the executive and the legislature), and foreign polity. Marx contextualizes and elaborates the section on the State containing the sub-section called the state constitution (the prince, the executive and the legislature). It seems that Marx aimed at addressing the political problem around the political state of Hegel through the third section of the *Philosophy of Right*, namely, the State which begins with paragraph §257. However, the *Critique* begins with paragraph § 261 and ends with paragraph §313. Some pages are missing.

As we already argued, Marx began to be interested in politics in that period (1843-44) through his journalism. Here in the *Critique* Marx intended to approach the existing political state and political problems and thus elaborate his thoughts by examining Hegel’s theory of the state.

⁵²⁰ O’Malley, “Introduction”, in *Critique*., trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. xxxiii

4.4.3.3. Departure from Hegel

Let me shortly handle the third section of the State in the *Philosophy of Right*, the paragraphs that Marx intended to treat in the *Critique* but which are missing. The third section of *Philosophy of Right* begins with paragraph §257.

Paragraph §257:

The state is the actualization of the ethical idea or ethical spirit, which refers to the reconciliation of the particular and the universal, or of the individual and the universal. The ethical idea is the reality of reason, which means that the realization and actualization of family and civil society are completed in the state. Here Hegel considers the state as a subject, which knows itself, manifests itself, thinks itself and implements what it knows. It is pure will. Ethical custom is the manifestation of “the direct and unreflected” (or *immediate*) existence of the state while the state finds its *mediate* existence (“indirect and reflected existence”) “in the self-consciousness of the individual and in his knowledge and actuality.”⁵²¹ Hegel in the ‘Note’ discusses the rational character of the state while emphasizing that *ethical life is governed by feeling*. As a result, the main claim in this paragraph is based on the differences between *reason* and *feeling*. While reason is the feature of the state, feeling is the character of ethical life, namely, family (*love* is the point in question among the members of family) and civil society.

Paragraph §258:

Under this paragraph, Hegel especially characterizes the possible realization of the state through the existence of the individual, through his self-consciousness; it means that the state which is defined as absolutely rational and therefore universal embodies and materializes itself in the particular. The end of the state is to unite the particular with itself. With and through this unity the highest form of freedom is actualized and as a result of this ultimate end, namely unity, the highest duty of the individuals is “to be a member of the state.”

Hegel especially differentiated the state from civil society by objecting to the misleading view that the duty or specific end of the state is to assure and protect property and personal freedom. This approach leads to the misunderstanding that the ultimate end of the unity of the state is the interests of private individuals. However, the relation of the individual to the state is not based on the interests of the individuals or security and protection of their personal interests or personal freedom. Then what is the relationship based on? According to Hegel, the individual attains their truth, objectivity and ethical life by way of being a member of the state, which is the objective spirit. Basically, in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel claims that the fundamental feature of the individual is to will to be in union. This union carries the individual into universal, collective life. In other words in the state objective freedom

⁵²¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, p. 132

(freedom of the general substantive will or freedom of universal) and subjective freedom (“the freedom of the individual knowledge and will”, that is, freedom of every individual seeking their particular ends) are united (*PR*, §258).

It goes without saying that Hegel left unanswered the questions about the origin of the state and its institutions which according to him are the subject matter of history whereas the subject matter of the *Philosophy of Right* is the Idea of the state.

Even though Hegel does not see the state as an other-worldly entity and describes its self-actualization in the concrete world, he also sees the state as a kind of manifestation of God. Let me cite directly from Hegel; “The state is the march of God in the world, and its ground or cause is the power of reason realizing itself as will.”⁵²² On the other hand, Hegel says, “the state is not a work of art. It is in the world, in the sphere of caprice, accident and error. Evil behavior can doubtless disfigure it in many respects.”⁵²³ There seems to be a contradiction on the part of Hegel in that he describes the state both as “disfigure[d...] many respects” and “the march of God,” which corresponds to reason and the absolute. However, it is the mutual and dialectical relationship of the universal to the individual and that of abstract to concrete.

Paragraph §260: *constitutional law*

Hegel states that the modern state gives freedom to the individual. This freedom is what Hegel calls “concrete freedom.” Its realization in and by the state takes place as follows: 1) on the one hand the individual materializes his personal individuality and his personal interest through the development and recognition of their rights within family and civil society (the sphere of the needs) and 2) on the other hand, the individual passes over these interests and rights in accord with the interest of the universal. Moreover, the individual recognizes and knows the universal as his own substantive spirit by his own knowledge and will, that is, by his self-consciousness.⁵²⁴

The modern state is actualization of subjective and objective freedom. Without particularity and individuality there is not any universality and vice versa. Besides, it is the union of the individual and universal interest and will. The state needs to be very aware of the knowledge and will of the particularity and individuality in order to develop itself, and without the universal and particular elements, the state could not truly exist and organize itself. In other words, true organization of the state is possible through the unity of the particular with the universal. As we see, all these explanations remain abstract and continue to exist in their abstract forms. In fact, Hegel foretells that “the

⁵²² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, p.136

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, pp.136-137

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, in *Addition*, p.138

philosophical investigation deals with only the inner side of all this, the thought of conception.”⁵²⁵ It is the aim of Hegel to investigate the essence of the state philosophically. Or it ought to (should) be said that it is a vindication of the essence of theology in a philosophical manner; and it is verification of this theology through an introduction of the essence of the state.

4.4.3.4. Comeback to Marx

4.4.3.4.1. The nature of human society and its relationship to the individual man

From paragraph §261 to paragraph § 263 Hegel speaks of the relationship of the state to family and civil society. Along with paragraph § 263 Hegel begins to transfer this relationship into the institutions (or the state) which “comprise in detail the constitution, that is, the developed and actualized rationality.”⁵²⁶

The *Critique* begins with paragraph §261 of *Philosophy of Right*. In this paragraph, Hegel talks about the relationship of the spheres of private interests, family and civic community to the state. In that relationship, the state is defined as an independent entity, external necessity, and the highest authority, which the spheres of private interests, family, and civic community are dependent. The power of the state is predicated on the unity of its own universal end and aim “with the particular interests of individuals.”⁵²⁷ The question is here as follows; how does this relationship between the state and the individuals materialize? The answer lies in the dialectical relation between duty and right.⁵²⁸ The problem and conflict between the state and individuals lie in that relationship of right to duty or vice versa.

Hegel explicates the dependence and subordination of the sphere of interests, of family and of civic community to the state by emphasizing Montesquieu’s famous work called *L’Esprit des Loix*. Montesquieu expounds the specific character of the law, in particular, the law regarding the right of person, the character to be dependent on the state itself. In addition to that, Montesquieu grasps that the parts could be comprehended only within a relationship to the whole.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, in *Note*, p.133

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, in *Note*, p.141 §265. Family is defined as sphere of sensibility whereas civil society is determined by irritability. Hegel expounds these spheres as independent entity by referring the nerve system. Both systems at the end are based on feeling. These two spheres build up their own form or system, and also they are “lower orders of animals” in contrast to the rationality of the state which is an organized whole. However, Hegel once more again argues that the existence of the state is materialized in so far as these two spheres, so to speak, family and civil society “are developed within it.” Only in this case the state is “a living unity.” “The laws which govern these two are the institutions of the rational...”(p. 141, §263 *Addition*)

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, p.139 (§ 261)

⁵²⁸ Hegel explains the relationship of the duty to the right in modern state in the sphere of the ethical system in the paragraph § 155. Let me quote from Hegel; “Right and duty coincide in the identity of the universal and the particular wills. By virtue of the ethical fabric man has rights, so far as he has duties, and duties so far as he has rights.” (*Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, p. 81)

Marx lays stress on the character of the state as “external necessity” and speaks of the dependence and subordination of family and civic community to the state. In this regard, Marx reminds us to ask; “what does ‘to be external necessity’ imply?” Here Marx finds contradiction because on the one hand, Hegel claims that family and civil society could find their immanent end in the state, that is, within their relation to the state but on the other hand, their dependence is defined under the relationship of “external necessity.” Another reason for this contradiction is that “to be external necessity” refers to the separation between the state and the sphere of private rights and private welfare (the sphere of family and civil society). For the state is not considered as an entity integrated with these spheres. In this context Marx says that ‘external necessity’ implies that in case of the fact that the laws and interests of the state is in conflict with these of family and civil society, in front of the state, family and civil society have to obey the will and interest of the state. Let me summarize this relationship of the state to family and civil society, which constitutes the conflict in question;

- 1) The state is conceived of as an external necessity and higher authority,
- 2) In relation to the state, family and civil society are subordinate and dependent,
- 3) However, Hegel characterizes the state as the immanent end of family and civil society while the state is external necessity,
- 4) The laws regarding the rights of person depend on the state and they can be modified by the state,
- 5) In reality, the existence of family and civil society is the presupposition of the state.

Paragraph §262

Hegel speaks of the actual Idea and explicates the actualization of this actual Idea. The actual Idea is “mind as infinite and actual.”⁵²⁹ First actual Idea divides itself into ideal spheres such as family and civil society as its finite and material existence. The reason for this separation is to return to its ideality and therefore to become infinite and actual mind for itself. The actual Idea allocates its material and finite actuality to these two spheres. It does this in such a way that this allocation or the function allocated to each individual appears as though it was occasioned by “circumstances, caprice, and private choice”⁵³⁰ of the individual. It goes without saying that family and civil society are components of the state and therefore the material (actuality) of the state.

Marx picks up on two peculiar aspects of the material actualization of Idea (mind as infinite and actual). Here Feuerbach’s criticism may be observed, namely, *subject-predicate inversion*.

- 1) The spheres of family and civil society are grasped as spheres of the concept of the state, but they are considered especially as finite phases of the state. In this regard, the state divides

⁵²⁹ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.7

⁵³⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, p.140

itself into two spheres: family and civil society. On the one hand family and civil society as “ordinary empirical existences” do not have their “own mind [*Geist*]” but “rather an alien mind” as their law, “while on the other hand the actual Idea does not have an actuality which is developed out of itself, but rather has ordinary empirical existence as its existence [*Dasein*].”⁵³¹ Here according to Marx, the inversion of subject and predicate appears. The actual Idea is presented as a subject. Speculative philosophy reverses the status of family and civil society which are in reality the more active entities. But a passive character is given to them and thus speculative philosophy reduces family and civil society into the predicate while the status of the subject is given to the actual Idea. As a result, the real subjects are made unreal and “take on the different meaning of objective moments of the Idea.”⁵³²

- 2) The material of the state is allocated to the individuals through “circumstance, caprice, and personal choice of station in life” but Hegel does not claim that they are real and necessary things. On the contrary, circumstance, caprice, and personal choice are found irrational. They are presented as “a result and product of the Idea.”⁵³³

As a result, Marx finds particularly the mystery of the *Philosophy of Right* and generally the mystery of Hegelian philosophy in this paragraph (§262). Along with paragraph §263, Hegel focuses on the passage from family and civil society into the state through institutions. According to Hegel, the transition of the spheres of family and of civil society into the state is a result of necessity because these two spheres (of family and civil society) have the character of spirit or universality in themselves. Because of this reason, he argues that the transition of these spheres into the state is considered as a rational power in the form of necessity. In this point, the power of the rational demonstrates itself within institutions. However, Marx observes that this transition of family and civil society into the state is not because of the natural result of these spheres or the essence of the state and specific essence of family or civil society but the reason is more abstract. For Marx, this transition is derived from the “universal relation of necessity and freedom.”⁵³⁴ In this context, Marx indicates that this sort of transition exists also in the *Logic*, when Hegel talks about the transition from the sphere of Essence to the sphere of Concept, and in other sections of *Logic* as well.⁵³⁵ From this point of view, it might be said that the transition is derived from abstraction rather than empirical existences. For this reason, Marx properly emphasizes that Hegel always inverts the subject and predicate relationship. Let me put it in Marx’s own sentences; “the important thing is that Hegel at all times makes the Idea

⁵³¹ Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p.8

⁵³² *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p.8

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p.8

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 10

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 10

the subject and makes the proper and actual subject, like ‘political sentiment,’ the predicate. But the development proceeds at all times on the side of the predicate.”⁵³⁶

It seems to me that in addition to the subject-predicate inversion, there is another important problem which arises out of paragraph §268. The problem is based on the relationship of reason to feeling. The paragraph says that feelings such as political dispositions like patriotism results from the state’s institutions, which are the actuality of reason. In this regard, this political sentiment must be nothing more than a product of institutions of the state. Feeling is merely defined in accordance with reason. In other words, feeling is reduced to reason. The aim is to save all personal opinion, feeling, sentiment etc., by transferring them into reason. However, reason always lies in the state, in its institution, and in its constitution. Accordingly it signifies that feeling is reduced to and defined by the state and its institutions.

4.4.3.4.2. The state as organism

Marx finds the analogy between the state and an organism to be a great discovery. However, he sees a problem in the way of manifesting this discovery. For this reason, Marx regards this analogy as “pure tautology.”⁵³⁷ The organism metaphor suggests that the state has various powers with their corresponding different functions and tasks. Besides, the state or the Idea develops into its differences, which correspond to the organism. Different organs with their corresponding functions and affairs constitute various powers of the state. The Idea or the state as universal consistently produces or creates itself through these various powers. The organism in this sense is the development of the state or the idea to its differences. Hegel states that, at the end, the universal maintains its proper identity throughout the process because the universal produces itself in a *necessary* way. This necessity is because of the fact that these various powers are characterized by the “nature of the concept.”⁵³⁸ However, according to Marx, it is very strange to find that the universal still keeps its identity at the end of the whole process because its self-creation is its own presupposition. In this point, it might be said that to say that it is itself the presupposition of its own creation is both a tautology and a contradiction. For at the beginning Hegel claims that the universal continually produces and therefore completes itself through these various powers of the state or organism but then at the end he states that the universal maintains its proper identity during the process. Then we should ask; why is then there a process if nothing changes? The beginning of the process and the end of the process are the same. It makes it both tautological and contradictory.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 11

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 11

⁵³⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Wood, p. 290 § 269

Shortly, the various powers of the state or Idea have specific characteristics due to the external reason or an alien reason but not “by reason of their own nature.”⁵³⁹ They realize themselves “by the nature of the concept,”⁵⁴⁰ which is merely abstract.

Paragraph § 270:

In paragraph § 270, Hegel speaks of the character of the state in three forms: 1) the state aims at universal interest by including and therefore preserving particular interests within universal interest; 2) the substantiality of the state or its abstract reality (actuality of the state) is the necessity of the state because this substantiality is divided into various spheres of the state’s activity and these distinctions of state-activity correspond to different moments of the conception of the state; 3) as a result the substantial existence of the state, “when thoroughly permeated by education, is the spirit which knows and wills itself.”⁵⁴¹ Mind or spirit is the substantiality of the state, which knows and wills itself.

In this context, Marx notes and reveals some findings concerning this paragraph: 1) Marx puts forth these concepts (defining the specific character of the state such as abstract actuality, necessity, substantiality) as “the categories of abstract logic.”⁵⁴² These categories are presented as subjects. It goes without saying that Marx very much concentrates on the form or the way of Hegel’s presentation. For this reason, Marx especially argues that Hegel’s way of explanation stands on logic or abstract form. 2) The substantiality becomes spirit or mind by the way of *passing through the form of education*. Here on the one hand the educated spirit or mind is said to be substantiality, on the other hand substantiality is the educated spirit or mind. It signifies that “mind becomes the predicate of its predicate.”⁵⁴³ 3) Marx stresses that because Hegel’s departure point is the Idea as subject and real being, the actual subject and very real being continue to exist as “the final predicate of the abstract predicate.”⁵⁴⁴ Because of this abstraction, the state is mystified.⁵⁴⁵

The end of the state and its various powers are determined by and depend not on their own existence but on another alien reason or substance. 4) Because of all these abstract configuration and logical determinations, Marx rightly claims that Hegel is not interested in the philosophy of right but what he presents us is merely logic. For this reason, Marx especially indicates that the content-form relationship in Hegel is confused. For the concrete content or determination and explanation of the *Philosophy of Right* are manifested as formal. Therefore, its formal explanation or determination takes place of concrete content or actual determination. Here again Marx indicates the sort of inversion

⁵³⁹ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 15

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 15

⁵⁴¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 270, p.144

⁵⁴² Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 17

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 17

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 17

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, edit. by O’Malley, 1970, p. 17

between the content and form. In other words, Hegel dissolves all political realities into abstract thought. In this point, the logic is not used as a means in order to reveal the nature of the state but rather the nature of the state becomes an instrument to prove the logic.

The differentiation of the organism of the state into various powers is embodied by the nature of the concept. Hegel speaks of three functions of the state; legislative, executive, and lastly, the function of the prince instead of the generally accepted judicial function (*PR*, § 272 *Addition*). Here Hegel depicts that the judicial function of the state is “not the third element of the conception (*PR*, § 272 *Addition*).” In logical sense, “the legislative corresponds to universality and the executive to particularity...The individuality uniting the other two lies beyond these spheres.”⁵⁴⁶

This sort of political state is the production of the modern world. The main character of the modern world is to be based on freedom of subjectivity as Hegel discussed in the ‘Addition’ to the same paragraph. In respect to this, the constitution of a political state keeps itself from being one-sided by way of including the principle of free subjectivity and by corresponding to reason. What keeps the state together is not a sentiment like honor as Montesquieu⁵⁴⁷ claimed; it is duty that keeps the state together. For this reason, according to Hegel, the old forms of political state, which are classified into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, are not yet completely mature. However, Marx does not focus on this determination of Hegel. As O’Malley mentioned in his introduction of the *Critique*, here it could be said again that Marx concentrates on the critique of the form rather than on the content. In this respect, he criticizes much more the form of determination rather than the content determining the nature and characteristics of the political state, that is, the actual determination of the state.

Another paragraph, namely, the *Addition* of paragraph § 275, confirms the finding of Marx stating that Hegel’s interest lies in logic, or form rather than the nature of the state, i.e., content. In that addition, Hegel explains the reason to begin with the function of the prince or “the factor of individuality” under the logical form. Let me put it more clearly, the prince as being also the factor of individuality brings three phases of the state together within itself and thus in the prince these three phases are related to each other. Hegel clarifies this point by giving a logical explanation; “the I is at once the most individual and the most universal.”⁵⁴⁸ In so doing, Hegel simply reduces the universality of the

⁵⁴⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 272, *Addition*, p.157

⁵⁴⁷ According to Montesquieu, the principle of democracy is virtue. Accordingly, democracy relies on sentiment. It goes without saying that Hegel refuses this idea, and instead of sentiment he puts the reason in order to keep the state together. Basically, he says that the virtue of rulers is not enough while society grows and is civilized. In this respect Hegel utters that “not mere sentiment, but the form of rational law is required, if the whole is to be able to keep itself together, and give to the developed powers of particularity the right to expand positively as well as negatively.” (Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 273, *Note*, p.159)

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 275, *Addition*, p.161

constitution and the laws, and counsel into the prince. The departure point and the ultimate or final decision, or the self-determination, is the prince.

On this matter, Marx deals with the content more than before. According to Marx, what Hegel wants to do is to make the prince and the sovereignty of the state the basal principle of the universality of the constitution and the laws corresponds to the prince. While Hegel above talks about the inter-relationship of three phases, he on the other hand emphasizes the prince as a final decision or self-determination. The basal character of the political state is unity of its elements. In this unity, the elements of the state with their different functions are dissolved as well as preserved. Hegel elaborates the universal character of the relationship of the individual functionary to the state within one of the organs of the state in paragraph §277; here Hegel mentions that this relationship does not rest on “the strength of their immediate personality” but rather “on the strength of their universal and objective qualities.” This kind of relationship appears in an external way and for this reason, “the functions and powers of the state cannot be private property.”⁵⁴⁹

Marx’s basic criticism of Hegel in paragraph § 279 is again related to the subject-predicate inversion. Hegel directly does not state the empirical fact but puts them into a metaphysical statement. For example, instead of saying that “the will of the monarch is the final decision,” Hegel says that “the final decision of the will is the monarch. The first statement is empirical, the second twists the empirical fact into a metaphysical axiom.”⁵⁵⁰ Once again, Hegel speaks of the nature of the state in an abstract way to point out monarchy as the best form of political system. For this reason, he continues to remain obscure, unclear, and abstract. “...the dignity of the monarch is represented as something derivative not only in its form but also in its essential character. But the conception of the monarch is not derivative, but purely self-originated.”⁵⁵¹ Here the concept becomes the subject as independent and *self-originated*.

4.4.3.4.2.1. Monarchy and democracy as political forms

It seems to me that with paragraph §279 Marx really began to be interested in the content of the *Philosophy of Right* by differentiating monarchy from democracy.

Hegel in this paragraph (§279) elaborates the differences between the sovereignty of the prince (monarch) and the people. The true form of sovereignty for Hegel is the sovereignty of the monarch; his argument is that without the prince or monarch and apart from the articulation of the whole, which

⁵⁴⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, quoted from the *Critique.*, by Karl Marx, translated by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, Cambridge at the University Press, 1970, p. 21

⁵⁵⁰ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. 25

⁵⁵¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 279, *Note*, p.164

is “necessarily and directly associated with him, the people is a formless mass.”⁵⁵² For that reason, neither democracy nor republic as sovereignty of people is the right form of sovereignty for Hegel. However, Hegel again makes the monarch the subject and the people the predicate whereas the people are both the departure point and the result, and therefore the reason of the political system.

In respect thereof, Marx defends democracy against monarchy. Marx differentiates democracy from monarchy in some ways: 1) Democracy as sovereignty of the people is the truth of monarchy because without the people monarchy could not exist. 2) For that reason, “monarchy is necessarily democracy in contradiction with itself, whereas the monarchial moment is no contradiction within democracy.” Monarchy is in contradiction with itself because it needs the people to maintain its existence, and since the political form that rests upon the sovereignty of the people is democracy, an element of democracy is necessarily involved in monarchy. On the other hand, monarchy is based on the sovereignty of the individual person, which excludes the people or the sovereignty of people. 3) In democracy all moments have the same significance and each of these moments is nothing more than “a moment of the whole Demos”⁵⁵³; whereas in monarchy, one part (the monarch) is more significant than others and thus this one determines and modifies the whole of the constitution. 4) In democracy, it is the people, who make the constitution and therefore the constitution is the constitution of the people; on the other hand, in monarchy it is the monarch who determines the constitution. 5) While the departure point of democracy is man and thus the state is the *objectified* man, monarchy begins with the state and therefore man (the monarch) is the *subjectified* state. In other words, in democracy man objectifies himself in the state without losing his subjective character, whereas in monarchy the state is subjectified and represented in one man.⁵⁵⁴

According to Marx, democracy is not only a form of the political state but it is also the essence of every other sort of political constitution. Democracy socializes and politicizes man.⁵⁵⁵ He says, “democracy is *human existence*, while in the other political forms man has only *legal existence*. That is the fundamental difference of democracy.”⁵⁵⁶ In other words, the existence of man is the principle of democracy, his real existence is fundamental but in other forms of political constitutions man is determined by its law, so man has legal existence. In other forms, man is abstract being which makes him *dependent on legality*. Most importantly, the *self-determination of the people* is the principle and basic character of democracy. In contrast to Hegel, Marx delineates the true unity of particular and

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 279, *Note*, p.164

⁵⁵³ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. 29

⁵⁵⁴ “Hegel proceeds from the state and makes man into the subjectified state; democracy starts with man and makes the state objectified man. Just as it is not religion that creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the constitution that creates the people but the people which creates the constitution.” (Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.30)

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.30

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.30

universal in democracy. Again, in contrast to Hegel, Marx emphasizes that there is no separation between the formal and material principle in democracy. It means that the material form of the state corresponds to its formal principle because the unity of particular and universal is realized completely in democracy. For example, in monarchy or in the republic, as Marx mentioned, the formal principle or the political man is separated from the material principle of the state, namely, from the people, or from “the unpolitical, private man.”⁵⁵⁷ Therefore, this political individual is given a particular and separate existence.

From the discussion above, it is clearly observed that the individual man in Hegel’s state is separated from politics, and becomes just *unpolitical* and *private* individual. Besides, the individual has only legal existence. Law and constitution define the individual. However, he could not define law or constitution. He is not the final decision maker. It is important to underscore the individual as a loser, in the sense that the individual has *lost* his political participation and his *political existence*. Therefore, he becomes *unpolitical* man and separated from his universality. The individual is confined to particularity. However it is important to highlight the statement of democracy, or present democracy (which is not *true democracy* in the Marxian sense) asserting that the individual man is politicized. More clearly, the claim of present democracy is that the modern individual is directly related to politics, which is an illusion. The present democratic state restricts the right of people and gives more freedom and right to its representatives. It is the basic character of the modern political state. By ‘the modern state’ I mean the representative democracy of liberal constitutional states but not direct democracy.

4.4.3.4.2.2. Modern times and the state: *how is it?*

There is a statement among people who call the political state “*Fatherly State*.” In the sense of the state, the word “Fatherly” is used to represent the power of the state as similar to the omnipotence of God.

“The most intimate epithet of God in prayer is the word ‘Father;’ the most intimate, because in it man is in relation to the absolute nature as to his own; the word ‘Father is the expression of the closest, the most intense identity—the expression in which lies the pledge that my wishes will be fulfilled, the guarantee of my salvation.”⁵⁵⁸

From these expressions, it is inevitable to claim that the political state is considered as God, which protects and gives you a “guarantee” for your existence in the sensuous world. In other words, it is the representation of God in a limited and temporal world. Another reason for calling the state ‘fatherly

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.30

⁵⁵⁸ Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, 1957, p.125

state' is the given character of father who protects the members of family and supplies them with their needs. There is no state, which can avoid and be abstracted from an ascription of this sort of duty to it.

In this context, Marx defines modern times as the time of abstraction. Let me quote from Marx; "the abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product."⁵⁵⁹ This determination clearly explains the problem of the individual in the modern state and in the modern times. As Marx demonstrated in this quotation, not only does the state become the abstract state but also the private life of the individual takes an abstract form. As we saw, in the *On The Jewish Question*, Marx speaks of the individual as *imaginary* and *illusory*. At least in the Middle Ages, says Marx, there was political man; besides every private sphere was characterized by a political form; the political sphere was integrated into and with the private sphere. In this regard, the political life in the Middle Ages was identical with the popular life. However, it was not perfect, in the sense that even though the political state and popular life were intertwined and man was a political man, he was not a free man. However, in modern times man is *both unfree* and *unpolitical*; he has an abstract character in this abstract private life.⁵⁶⁰

In paragraph §280, Hegel describes the elements of the political state. In the first element, the monarch or prince is separated from all other content. This monarch or prince as absolute head of the state is a specific individual. This specific individual is monarch by way of nature, by immediate form, that is, by birth. This is one of the distinctive features of monarchy. However, as Marx discussed, to say that a man is a ruler by birth turns the status of the monarch into nothing more than a metaphysical palaver. In this point, Marx finds Hegel again in contradiction with himself, in the sense that while he mentions the rational character of the state, he then claims that the monarch is the dignity of the state by way of natural birth, which is certainly non-rational. "The body of the monarch determines his dignity. Thus at the highest point of the state bare *Physis* rather than reason would be the determining factor. Birth would determine the quality of the monarch as it determines the quality of cattle."⁵⁶¹ For Marx the problem is that, Hegel, throughout the whole *Philosophy of Right*, insists upon describing the irrational as if it is rational, trying to demonstrate its rationality. Accordingly, Hegel absolutely underlines that the irrational is rational.

In addition to the separation of the monarch from all content, the monarch or the prince also represents the actual unity of the state. In paragraph §281, Hegel explicates this unity of the monarch as the real unity of the state in two steps. The first is the autonomy (or self-determination) of the will and the

⁵⁵⁹ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p. 32

⁵⁶⁰ According to David McLellan, Marx's approaches to different forms of sovereignty by historical analysis are similar with Hegel's attitude in *Philosophy of History*. (*Marx before Marxism*, p. 113)

⁵⁶¹ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, 1970, p.33

second is the existence of this will. In other words, the existence of the monarch and the autonomy of his will is what guarantees and preserves the unity of the state. The existence of the monarch thus saves the state from being reduced to the sphere of particularity and being dissolved. The birth of monarch by nature is described as birthright; so to speak “right of birth and right of inheritance constitute the basis of legitimacy, not as regards positive right merely, but likewise in the idea.”⁵⁶² Hegel thinks that the right of birth and right of inheritance would prevent factious contests and quarrels.

Hegel goes further and criticizes the idea, which claims that the monarch has to provide for the interests and concern of the people and therefore the people must be allowed to choose the person who would be responsible and provide for their interests. For that reason, he claims that the type of monarchy that rests upon election is the worst type of institution. In elective monarchy, the power of the state is dragged down into the interest of particularity or private (particular) wills; the specific faculties of the political state are converted into personal property.

In paragraphs §283 and §284, Hegel passes to the second element of the political state, namely the *executive*, which corresponds to *particularity*. And in the next paragraph (§285), he mentions the third element of the power of the sovereign, that is, the *legislative*, corresponding to *universality*. The element of particularity is also the element of determinate content and in the second element, this particularity or determinate content is subsumed under the universal. This particularity becomes the highest council and the individuals who comprise it. This council and the individuals “present to the monarch for his decision the content of the affairs, as they arise, and of the legal cases which necessarily spring out of actual wants.”⁵⁶³ The individuals who are responsible for the affairs of the state have direct contact with the monarch. Because these decisions are objective, only they are capable of contributing to decision-making apart from the capricious will of the monarch. In this regard, only these rules, these councils, and these individuals can be accountable. Nevertheless, the monarch as the ultimate subjectivity of decision-making is beyond all responsibility for the acts of the government. He can choose and dismiss the individuals in the highest council with his unrestricted arbitrary will. As a result, all power including particularity and universality (executive and legislative) ultimately depends on the monarch.

The third element of the power of princely function corresponding to universality is involved in the consciousness of the monarch as subjectivity and appears in the laws and the political constitution as objectivity. The power of “the princely function presupposes these other elements, just as much as

⁵⁶² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 281, *Note*, p.167

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 283, p.170

they presuppose it.”⁵⁶⁴ Regarding this third element, namely the legislative element, Marx highlights that Hegel is not aware that with this third legislative element he annihilates the other two elements or vice versa. In this respect, Marx finds Hegel to be in contradiction because of the fact that he claims that the power of the monarch presupposes the other two elements; in that case, the princely function is established not by natural birth or birthright but by other elements. In other words, the power of the sovereign is determined by the legislative and executive elements.

On one side, there are empirical entities, reality, and the empirical individual, that is, the real individual with his sensuous existence; on the other side, there are thought, the imagination of these empirical entities, that is to say the imaginary individual, idea and abstract Substance, and abstract state, etc. In this context, what Hegel does is to prove that the ultimate actuality of the state is empirical man, the real sensuous individual; besides, he presents the essence of the individual acting as an imaginary individual rather than acting in their real, human existence. These are the results of the inversion of subject into object and object into subject. Let me summarize what we want to say or more correctly, what Marx tries to say: the first reason for the subject-object inversion is due to the fact that Hegel aims at manifesting the realization and embodiment of the Idea or the abstract Substance through human activity, through the external sensuous world. Secondly Hegel sees the acts of the individual not as their act in their actual, human existence but as an act of an *imaginary* individual. Consequently, according to Marx, in this way the whole philosophy of Hegel creates an “impression of something mystical and profound.”⁵⁶⁵

Even if it is said that Hegel puts emphasis on the individual, it is misleading because in Hegel the individual is not the real individual. In other words, the individual in Hegel is more abstract than universal. In his philosophy, the individual appears for the sake of the manifestation of idea. Gradually, Hegel relates every individual to the state through estates, corporation, and bureaucracy. However, as we will see, the individual still remains a separate entity in abstraction from the political state. It seems to me that the institutionalization of the individual through the legal form and other institutions are clearly introduced by Hegel. It appears that Hegel puts much emphasis on the politization of the individual through organizations or communities but indeed, after an elaborate reading of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, it would be realized that it is a demonstration of a politically disempowered individual.

4.4.3.4.3. The spirit of the corporation

After his comments on Hegel’s hereditary monarchy, Marx starts dealing with the executive power. The relation of civil society to the political state is possible by means of corporations and bureaucracy.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 285, p.170

⁵⁶⁵ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.39

In relation to §287 where Hegel speaks of the specific character of each of the elements and their distinctions, Marx contends that Hegel originally establishes a correlation between the executive, the police, and the judiciary. The common interests for all are located in civil society and managed or administrated by Corporations, trades, and professions. They are responsible for protecting and preserving private property and the interests of these particular spheres so that their authority depends on the confidence of associates and professional equals. On the other hand, these particular spheres (the sphere of private interests) must be subordinated to the interest of the state. Therefore, the universal interest of the state and the law of the state must be secured and preserved in the sphere of private rights, and these rights must be brought back to the universal interest. To realize these aims and tasks requires delegates of executive power, that is, a) executive civil servants, b) the higher college of advisers. These two bodies organize and work together in groups. They converge in the higher heads that are close to and have direct contact with the monarch. Posts such as those in Corporations are generally filled by popular election of the interested parties and confirmation of appointment by a higher authority.⁵⁶⁶

There are a few reasons for this particular and necessary organization. First, according to Hegel, civil society is the arena of the battle and the contest taking place between the individuals, that is to say, the private interest of the individual against other private interests. Second, it is a sphere of contest between the private interest and collective interest. In addition to these two, the private interest of the individual and the collective interest together are against the interest of the state, its order and its higher standpoint. For this reason, the higher authority must necessarily organize and administer this sphere. Here the corporation assumes an important position. “At the same time the corporation mind, engendered when the particular spheres gain their title to rights, is now inwardly converted into the mind of the state, since it finds in the state the means of maintaining its particular ends.”⁵⁶⁷ Therefore, the passage from civil society or the sphere of private interest to the higher authority is realized through the corporations. Hegel expresses the significant task of the corporation as leading the particular to relate with the universal. The corporations organize and regulate the private interests. “Since the spirit of the corporation contains directly the riveting of the particular to the universal, it exhibits the depth and strength of the state as it exists in sentiment.”⁵⁶⁸ Bureaucracy as the power of mediation leads the corporation and every individual to connect with the state. For Hegel, bureaucracy means “a body of higher civil servants who were recruited by competition from the middle class.”⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 288, p.171

⁵⁶⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §289, in the “*Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*”, by Marx, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, pp.41-42

⁵⁶⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 289, p.172

⁵⁶⁹ David McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism*, 1970, p. 116

4.4.3.4.4. The organization of the business of the executive

The business of the executive is also based on division of labor (§290); it is divided into different branches and every branch has to be governed through a separate center of administration and their own authority or special officials. The activity of these various branches come together again both when these activities connect to civil society from above, and when they converge in the highest level of executive within a general oversight. Shortly, these activities converge again in (1) relating civil society and (2) in the supreme executive within a concrete overview. The functions of the executive is actualized and carried out by individuals. There is not any natural and immediate relationship between the individual and his office. In other words, the individuals are not appointed to the office as officers by birth or by their natural personality; for this reason, their assignment requires objective criteria such as evidence of ability and knowledge. This examination or proof “guarantees to the state what it needs, and, as it is the sole condition, makes it possible for any citizen to devote himself to the universal class.”⁵⁷⁰

However, in the next paragraph, Hegel runs into a contradiction because of the fact that the assignment of an officer among other individuals requires the subjective side. While he says that the business of choosing the officers is carried out by objective nature and elements such as the proof of ability and knowledge, in paragraph §292, he indicates the subjective side of this appointment (by the monarch). The reason is the possible application of many candidates.

The person who is appointed to his official vocation by the decision of the monarch maintains his position on the condition that he actualizes his duties. The officer finds the satisfaction of his needs as well as the realization of his official vocation in civil or public service. The officer sacrifices his subjective inclination, ends and private interest on the behalf of public service. However, he finds all his satisfaction by fulfilling his duties. Therefore, here, the unity of private interest and universal interest as the principle, conception and internal stability of the state lies in the fulfillment of duties.

⁵⁷⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 291, p.173 (It appears to me that here to explain what Hegel means and refers when he mentions the class is necessary. The class is not simply a collection of the individuals with their some certain common features. Harris expresses that “it is a complex of institutions or of objectified patterns of thought and action...Hegel’s account of the classes must therefore include an account of how they meet the needs and perform the functions which are *not* their specific social function.” For instance, slaves are not involved in any class. They are not a class because they do not have any structural relations in order to relate each other as slaves but they belong to a family or a master. Therefore, they related to society through that family or that master. Accordingly, the classes are supposed to have the structural relations. Because of these structural relations, every class is defined as being organic. Each class refers to the organic whole. From Harris’ explanation of Hegel’s account every classes must have common certain approach to how encounter the needs and how to reach to these needs, that is, through which functions. Briefly, a class has something in common in terms of obtaining the needs and performing its function. (H.S. Harris, “Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: An Interpretation,” in *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4)*, by G. W. F. Hegel, edited and translated by H.S. Harris and T. M. Knox, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1979, p. 68)

The public servants and the members of the executive “constitute the main part of the middle class, in which are found the educated intelligence and the consciousness of right of the mass of a people.”⁵⁷¹ The control of this middle class or the control of civil servants and the members of the executive are carried out by both corporation-rights from below and the operation of the institution of the sovereignty from above. In other words, these two prevent the civil servants and members of the executive from using their intelligence, skills, and education as a means for their arbitrary will, despotism and tyranny. This middle class with their skill, education, and intelligence is fundamental for the existence of the state. Hegel thinks that the state without middle class would be “at a law stage of development.” For its future, the state has to form its middle class, which could be possible in an organization, “by the legalization of particular circles, which are relatively independent, and by a force of officials, whose willfulness has no power over these legalized circles.”⁵⁷²

Instead of being concerned with the education of the whole of society, Hegel underscores the importance of education of the middle class. Here empirical facts are ignored once again.

4.4.3.4.4.1. Bureaucracy

The bureaucratic form of the state further substantiates the argument of my thesis. Due to bureaucracy, the rift between civil society and the state grows and the direct relationship of the individual to the political state and to politics is prevented. Bureaucracy is considered as the highest form and end of the state because it mediates between the state and the individuals. In other words, it is identical with the state, which should be just mediation and a service for the people. However, it remains as a form without content, and for this reason, this mediation leads the individual to become alienated from the political state. The individuals do not conceive the political state as a part of themselves; and do not perceive themselves as part of the political state.

While Marx criticizes and describes the relationship of the state to its institutions, he emphasizes that the contradiction between civil society and the state could not be annihilated via bureaucracy; on the contrary, it is fixed.

As we have already seen, Hegel separated civil society from the state, the particular interests from universal interest. In this point, Marx underlines that Hegel establishes bureaucracy on this separation between civil society and the state. However, it is a formal organization, in the sense that Hegel did not give any content to bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is the formalism of the state. The existence of bureaucracy depends on the corporations in which bureaucracy materializes itself. Corporations consist in elements of civil society; and they are the bureaucracy of civil society. Conversely,

⁵⁷¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005., § 297, p.175

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 297, *Addition*, pp.175-76

according to Marx, “the bureaucracy is the corporation of the state”⁵⁷³ in that it is a control mechanism on behalf of the state. Just as the bureaucracy and corporations fight against each other “in order to create their own room,”⁵⁷⁴ so also they regard each other as necessary to maintain their own existence. Bureaucracy is defined by Marx as an illusion of the state.

The relationship of the particulars, (public servants or members of corporations) to the highest level of the state with regard to knowledge and understanding is an illusion. They entrust each other for the comprehension of the state’s problems. At the end, there is no answer! At the end, there is also conflict with regard to knowledge due to the hierarchical structure of the state.

The protection and security of the state and its legality against civil society is actualized through the executive power, i.e. civil servants; for only they represent the state against civil society, which is the sphere of private property.⁵⁷⁵

According to Marx, the division between the civil society and the state, and thus the separation of the individual and the state are not transformed but on the contrary, fixed. Now there is a great gap between two spheres via bureaucracy, which complicates the relationship of the individuals to the state. Therefore, it goes without saying that “modern times” is the time of legality *against* but *not of* society and the individuals. *More* legality, *less* liberty! The result is a state alien to civil society and the state becomes a subject having independence without any relationship with other spheres.

It is worth noting that the sphere of the state with its institutions, the executive civil servants, and executive office holders as well as deputies, is just the arena of these members of the state, of course, against civil society. Therefore, this sort of state is not the state of every citizen or individuals, but, as Hegel in many places demonstrated,⁵⁷⁶ it is the state of some.

4.4.3.4.5. The legislature

The legislative element is connected with the laws as well as the internal affairs of the state. Besides, the legislature is a part of the constitution. The legislature is based on and thus presupposes the constitution. The constitution, in turn, does not create itself by itself so that it also presupposes the legislature or laws. As Hegel states, the constitution progresses through “the improvement of the laws and the progressive character of the universal affairs of government.”⁵⁷⁷ In other words, while the constitution remains outside of the activity of the legislature, it nevertheless progresses as long as the

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.45

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.46

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.49

⁵⁷⁶ For example when he says that the middle class containing in public servants, members of the executive, etc., as educated and good-skilled is based of the state, it means that there are classes as well as there are some differences between every individuals in regard to these classes.

⁵⁷⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 298, p.176

legislature makes further evolution. What sort of problem or conflict does Marx find in the paragraph focusing on the legislative moment? According to Marx, there is a circle here. To put it more clearly, on the one hand, the power of the constitution comes from the legislature. The legislature contains the constitution as well as extending beyond it. On the other hand, the legislature is “subsumed under the constitution.”⁵⁷⁸

Hegel puts the constitution outside the sphere of the legislature but nonetheless, not directly but indirectly, the legislature modifies and thus intervenes in the constitution.

In paragraph §299, in the Remark, Hegel gives more details about the difference between the subject-matter of legislation and that of the administrative and executive functions. The content of the legislature is laws whereas the subject-matter of the latter is the particular and its way of fulfillment. The business of the legislature in relation to the private individuals is determined in two aspects: 1) the provision that the state enables the individual to benefit; 2) the services that the individuals must do for the state. The first division is composed of the laws concerning private rights in general, and the rights of societies and corporations. For the latter, Hegel claims that the services that must be performed by the individuals have to be reduced to money, with the exception of military services. To Hegel, money is a universal symbol of the real value of goods and services. The universal value of the tasks and services are evaluated by money, which seems to refer to taxes. In this way, the services that must be performed by the individuals can be legally determined. In Addition, Hegel also claims that these two aspects of the constitution explains “the rights and services of the individuals (§299 *Addition*).”

After the explanation of legislative power, Hegel embarks on its relation to the ‘many’ or ‘the mass.’ This relation is materialized by the Estates.

4.4.3.4.5.1. The relationship of ‘many’ (mass, rabble) to the state

In the legislative power, there are two effective elements mentioned above, namely, the element of the *monarch* and that of the *executive*. The last element of the legislature is *different classes* or the *Estates*.⁵⁷⁹ What is the function of the Estates or classes? They bring the public affairs (general concern) into existence not only in itself but also for itself. In other words, they bring into existence “the element of subjective formal freedom, the public consciousness, or the empirical universality of

⁵⁷⁸ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.55

⁵⁷⁹ “In the legislative function in its totality are active both the monarchical element and the executive. The monarchical gives the final decision, and the executive element advises. The executive element has concrete knowledge and oversight of the whole in its many sides and in the actual principles firmly rooted in them. It has also acquaintance with the wants of the offices of state. In the legislature are at least represented different classes or estates.” (Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 300, p.178)

the views and thoughts of the many.”⁵⁸⁰ The estates represent the many to the state. Here Marx especially emphasizes that the respective attitude of Hegel to the spirit of the state (*dem Staatsgeist*) is transformed when he meets its real empirical form, namely, the ‘Many’ and therefore he disdains this spirit. According to Hegel, the ‘Many’ is not as respectable as the spirit of the state. Hegel is not concerned too much with the actual existence of the spirit of the state because he supposed that he has already sufficiently demonstrated the actualization of the spirit of the state, which is an illusion. Marx manifestly proclaims that Hegel, in the face of empirical fact, closes his eyes and thus ignores the existent reality.

Marx again affirms that Hegel inverses public affairs or general concern into a subject. In this regard, it might be said that Hegel always ignores the subjects, who actualize themselves in public affairs. However, Hegel opts for public affairs as subject instead of saying that the subject embodies himself in public affairs. Moreover, Marx interprets the Estates as “the political illusion of civil society.”⁵⁸¹ Likewise, public affairs are not the general concern of civil society. In this point, Marx pays his attention to Hegel’s differentiations in regard to the ‘being-in-itself’ [*Ansichsein*] and ‘being-for-itself’ [*Fürsichsein*] of the general concern. For the ‘being-in-itself’ of public affairs is formal and belongs to the business of the executive with its formal being. At the end, while the public affairs actualize its ‘being-in-itself’ as ‘being-for-itself’, these affairs are not empirical, but only formal. Let me put it differently in Marx’s own words; “public affairs is complete without being the actual affairs of the people. The actual affairs of the people have been established without the activity of the people.” In this regard, Marx continues; “the estates are the illusory existence of the affairs of the state as being an affair of the people.”⁵⁸²

Hegel does not pay attention to the facts and empirical reality relating to the public or people as much as he did for the spirit of the state. In the Remark of the paragraph we are talking about (§301), Hegel manifests his concern for the people by disdaining their decisions, opinions, and thoughts. On this matter, Hegel presents the general belief, which says that the summoning of the Estates to the process of the enactment of the laws is necessary and useful, and calls it an error. According to Hegel, the reason that people believe this general claim for two reasons: 1) the people or the deputies of the people know well what will be the best for their own interests; 2) the best will which actualizes or objectifies this interest is undoubtedly their own will.

Interestingly but not surprisingly Hegel speaks of the people as follows;

⁵⁸⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 301, p.178

⁵⁸¹ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p. 62

⁵⁸² Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.62

“§301 *Note*: but it is rather true that the people, in so far as this term signifies a special part of the citizens, does not know what it wills. To know that we will, and further what the absolute will, namely reason, wills, is the fruit of deep knowledge and insight, and is therefore not the property of the people.”⁵⁸³

Might it be really true that people do not know what they will? To say that people as mass or as the ‘Many’ do not know what they decide and will is to say that there is no individual being able to make decisions. Obviously, it is an ignorance and annihilation of the existence of the individual in the sphere of politics, or the state. If you wonder what the reason should be, Hegel immediately accounts for his claim. And therefore, self-assuredly Hegel propounds that to know what we will and also to know what reason wills rests upon *deep knowledge*. It goes without saying that the people do not have that deep fruitful knowledge. Instead of talking about how this knowledge could be the property of the people Hegel speaks of the *absolutely incapability* of knowing what we will. Hegel directly and immediately rejects the possibility of possessing this type of deep knowledge. Furthermore, as it can be seen further along the paragraph, Hegel puts in effort to prove how the Estates are unnecessary!⁵⁸⁴

Hegel demonstrates the needlessness of the Estates by way of manifesting 1) the knowledge and 2) skills of highest civil servants, who necessarily have deeper and more comprehensive ability for the affairs, organization, and requirements of the state; these civil servants are familiar to the business of the state and they have wider and better skills for the business of the government. For these reasons, they could do their best without requiring the classes or the Estates. In other words, the Estates are *superfluous*. As we see, in this Remark Hegel demonstrates the Estates as having an *illusory* and a *formal* being. The Estates do not contribute something significant to the state and to its business.

Further along in the paragraph, Hegel mentions the following points concerning the positive side of the Estates. The real achievement of the Estates, according to Hegel, is that their deputies are able to inspect the behaviors and work of the civil servants, which are less visible to the chief functionaries. In addition to this, the deputies of the Estates have concrete insights into specific needs and defects. What is the effect of this sort of contribution?⁵⁸⁵

The remarkable contribution of the Estates or the deputies of the Estate is to compel the public officers to produce and apply their best work and insights. As a result, the Estates have effects only on the officers. However, this effect is just formal; that is to say, it has not concrete reality. Again Hegel points out that the idea saying that the Estates have the will of the universal interest is nothing more

⁵⁸³ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 301, *Note*, p.178

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 301, *Note*, p.179

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 301, *Note*, p.179

than the idea of the *rabble* (mass). He presents the following objection in regard to the universal will of the Estates: "...the classes, since they originate in individuality, the private standpoint and particular interests, are apt to pursue these things at the expense of the universal interest; while the other elements of the state, being already at the point of view of the state, are devoted to universal ends."⁵⁸⁶

The explanations given above are the reasons for the refutation of the universal will of the Estates. The Estates represent the particular and private standpoint so that they follow not the universal but the particular interests. On the other hand, the state's elements always pursue the universal interests and universal ends; moreover, *ab initio*, the elements of the state adopt the point of view of the state. Here there is an unanswered question: *how is the participation of the people in the political state possible?*

Marx is very much aware of Hegel's standpoint on the Estates. In this regard, Marx, who always emphasizes the importance and significance of the relationship between content and form, argues that Hegel needs the Estates for his logic.⁵⁸⁷

In other words, Hegel's concern with the Estates is for show. He needs them because the Estates constitute the concrete part of the logical structure. Accordingly, Marx proclaims, "a form without content must be formless." What does it mean? It signifies that the state as a form without the people (as a content of the state) is/must be formless.

Hegel is conscious of the importance of content, concrete experiences. Put differently, the public affairs exist as being-in-itself but according to Hegel's logic, it should exist also as being-for-itself. The being-for-itself of the public affairs are actualized as an empirical universal in the Estates. However, the problem is that it is formal, not concrete. At the end, according to Hegel, the Estates are superfluous. These concrete and superfluous Estates cannot be ignored and annihilated by Hegel because he needs them, so to speak, he needs the more concrete and external sensuous world, but nonetheless he interprets them as *uneducated, inferior* to the *abstract*, to the *idea* and thus disdains them.

Marx expresses that just as the bureaucrats are the deputies of the state in civil society so the Estates are the deputies of civil society in the state. At the end of the mentioned paragraph (§301, *Addition*) Hegel speaks of the relationship of the state to the Estates; and we can observe that Hegel presents the Estate as a means through which the state enters the particular consciousness of the people and therefore, in this way, the people begin to participate in the state itself.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 301, *Note*, p.179

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.64; "Hegel's true interest is not the philosophy of right but logic." p.18

In paragraph §302, Hegel treats the Estates as instruments whereas in the previous paragraph he mentioned them as an unimportant element. Here the Estates are defined as the organ of mediation. Through the mediation of the Estates, the state reaches the people. This means that the Estates constitute the mediation with the organized executive. For this reason, according to their functions, they represent both the universal interest and particular interest. Further along in the paragraph we read the following points which surprisingly make us wonder if Hegel changes his idea about the Estates and therefore about the *rabble*.⁵⁸⁸

Here Hegel says that the Estates enable the individuals to be organized in their opinion and will in the face of the state. Shortly, with the mediation of the Estates the individuals are not anymore contra the state. Again, in the Remark, the logic of Hegel begins to operate. The consideration of the Estates is important because of the totality of the organism. For this reason, this consideration and the contribution of the Estates remain again formal. In the Addition, Hegel makes his last notice about this mediation as necessary and says, “the constitution is essentially a system of mediation.”⁵⁸⁹ For him, if in a country there are only the prince and the people without any organs, or elements such as the executive or the Estates, there will be despotism; because they are deprived of the mediation; that is to say, the state fails to function as an organism, which has a relation to its parts. With this view of the state as an organism, the common bias claiming that the Estates are opposed to the state, particularly to the executive, is prevented. However, when the Estates or assembly of the Estates are considered within the totality, that is, as part of an organic system, these realize their existence through the function of mediation. The opposition between the Estates or assembly of the Estates and the state thus becomes mere appearance. However, Hegel draws his attention to the dangerous case; that is to say, if this appearance of the opposition between the state and the Estates precipitates to the substantive opposition, namely, real opposition, then it indicates that the state is in the process of decay. It seems to me this finding is important because it signifies that the existence of the state depends on the Estates. Furthermore, the existence of the state depends on the true relationship of the state to the Estates. Without this relationship as an organic system, the state necessarily would fall into decay. However, Hegel addresses this issue as if it is unimportant. Interestingly, immediately after this sentence about the decay of the state, Hegel claims that this antagonism is not that sort of antagonism, which might potentially lead to the corruption of the state.⁵⁹⁰

This antagonism does not disturb and is not dangerous for the state because of the fact that the objects or the matter of the Estates are not related to the basic issues of the political state but rather they are “more special and indifferent.” In this regard, even if this sort of opposition is against the state,

⁵⁸⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 302, p.180

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 302, p.180

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 302, *Note*, p.180

eventually, it remains only a passion to satisfy subjective interests. As a result, Hegel does not interpret this opposition as a dangerous case. Nevertheless, the question is: in what kind of situation does the state collapse? If this opposition or antagonism does not lead to the decay of the state, what does?

Let us summarize what Hegel explains to us through the statements of Marx:

- 1) The state is defined as an organism,
- 2) The state and the executive are considered to be identical,
- 3) The nation is “broken up into particulars (people and associations)”⁵⁹¹; thus, they are separated from the state and the executive.
- 4) The Estates take part between the state and these particulars. Therefore, the Estates are defined as being a mediating organ. “They are a middle term.”⁵⁹² In this context, it can be said that the Estates provide the unity of the state and civil society. Through the Estates, the private interests of the corporations, individuals, and society unite with the universal interest, that is, with the state. The Estates prevent the state from being an unorganized aggregate or a mass. Regarding the monarch, the Estates also prevent the activity of the monarch from being extreme, like turning into despotism.⁵⁹³

According to Marx, in Hegel’s political scheme, the Estates emerge and exist as the imagined nation and this imagined nation becomes a particular power but is separated from the actual nation. It means that the contradiction between the nation or the Estates and the executive or the state disappear or is annihilated because of the fact that the actual nation is transformed into an imagined and illusionary nation. Here again the real relationship of the state to civil society is *transmuted* into *image*, *phantasy* or *illusion*.

In paragraph §303, Hegel defines the people as an unofficial class, more precisely, the class of people. While the universal class, the class of civil servants possesses the universal immediately in its self-determination “as the end of its essential activity,”⁵⁹⁴ the unofficial class or private individual “attains political significance and efficiency”⁵⁹⁵ within the Estates, which is the representation of the legislative power. As we already mentioned, through the Estates, private individuals appear not as a mere aggregate or mass because they already belong to a class. In the Estates, the class composed of private individuals and defined as the unofficial class is divided into different sub-classes; that is to say, 1) agriculture class, 2) industrial (business) class, 3) universal class of civil servants (*PR* §§ 202-205).

⁵⁹¹ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.67

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.69

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.70

⁵⁹⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 303, p.181

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 303, p.181

Marx importantly demonstrates that the unofficial class is also an *unpolitical* class. It is significant to emphasize the relationship of the people to politics. The Estates enable the unofficial or unpolitical people to reach the universal or attain access to the political state, which makes them political. Through these two classes (agricultural and business classes) in the Estates, the private individual or every class find its political significance. In so doing, Hegel gives political significance to the private sphere. It seems that Hegel did not want to separate the private sphere of the individual, or the sphere of private property and private individual, (that is, the family as well as civil society) from the state and thus politics. In this regard, Hegel believes that the direct participation of the individual in the political state is actualized through this separation into two classes in the Estate and through the assembly of the Estates. Therefore, as Marx demonstrated, the class difference (agriculture and industrial or business class) in civil society appears to be political differences for Hegel. In relation to the assembly of the Estates, in the Remark Hegel demonstrates the superfluity of the election and direct participation of the individuals in politics.

As we see, in spite of all his negative comments on the Estates, eventually it seems that Hegel indeed remains always in a circle. Hegel is always in contradiction with himself, probably because he is very much aware of the fact that without this unofficial class the state does not make any sense or have any significance. However, his first starting point, which is universal and his fear of falling into the particular from the universal and remaining there prevents him from overcoming this problem. The reason and explanation of his fear can be observed in the same paragraph (§303, remark). Hegel speaks of the widespread view, which believes that “since the private class is in the legislature exalted to participation in the universal business, it must appear in the form of individuals, be it that representatives are chosen for this purpose, or that every person shall exercise a voice.” However, according to Hegel, this sort of idea or belief exists neither in family nor in civil community, in which every individual manifests themselves as a member of a universal because this approach represents an abstract atomic view.

What does Hegel not like? He is against the common belief that if the unofficial class is able to participate in state affairs through the legislature, then this participation must be “in the form of individuals.” In other words, it would mean that either the individual would choose his representative or every single individual would give his voice to the affair of legislature by directly voting. It goes without saying that for Hegel this sort of form is atomistic and abstract. This atomistic aspect is already abolished in the sphere of family and civil society because in family and civil society the individual emerges as a member of a universal group. “As to the state, it is essentially an organization, whose members are independent spheres, and in it no phase shall show itself as an unorganized

multitude.”⁵⁹⁶ Regarding this determination of Hegel about this prevalent idea, Marx proclaims that the direct participation of people in the state or political participation by means of elections (voting) is “a necessary idea of the people’s development.”⁵⁹⁷ Therefore, whereas this way of political participation is, according to Hegel, an atomistic and an unorganized form, for Marx it is a representation of the development of a people and thus it leads a people to progress.

It is very interesting to read and realize that the mass or the aggregate of individuals scares Hegel so much. For him, the mass or rabble is an unorganized collective and an atomistic group. “The many, as individuals, whom we are prone to call the people, are indeed a collective whole, but merely as a multitude or formless mass, whose movement and action would be elemental, void of reason, violent, and terrible.”⁵⁹⁸ He says that, in civil society, this unorganized mass can exist as collective beings through organized groups, such as family or corporations. However, as soon as the individuals begin to participate in politics by choosing their representative or through every single individual voting to declare their opinion concerning state affairs, these collective groups will separate into the aggregate of individuals. Moreover, this sort of understanding divides civil society from the state as well. However, Marx finds all contradictions of Hegel’s political philosophy through these explanations, which is nothing more than the expression of the modern society. Consequently, the political Estates represent the separation between the state and civil society. In other words, they are “the factual expression of the actual relationship of the state and civil society,”⁵⁹⁹ resulted in their separation. It seems that Hegel, without noticing, describes modern society (capitalist society) with its class contradiction. Hegel never defines modern society as a contradictory society. No doubt, he was aware of this conflict between classes but he never refers to this contradiction with regard to economy but he judges this conflict in terms of politics.

4.4.3.4.5.2. The possibility of the rise of civil society to the universal

Marx points out that when Hegel claims that civil society is the sphere of the private interest, it means that civil society is versus the political sphere or the political state. Then to say that civil society is politicized through the Estates signifies that Hegel adds a new character to civil society because within the Estates as an element of legislative power, civil society obtains the political efficacy and political significance of which it was at the beginning deprived. Within these Estates, civil society acquires a particular political function.

Hegel does not consider the unofficial classes or civil society as having a universal character whereas the class of civil servants is necessarily universal in virtue of its determination. Civil society can

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 303, *Note*, p.181

⁵⁹⁷ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.79

⁵⁹⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 303, *Note*, p.181

⁵⁹⁹ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.76

acquire “the political significance and efficacy” only in the case that civil society ceases to be the sphere of private interests or “renounce itself as what it already is, as unofficial class.”⁶⁰⁰

4.4.3.4.5.2.1. The separation of the individual into two existences

How does the universal law appear in the individual? When the legislative element becomes a representation of the separation between the state and civil society, how does it affect the individual? As we have already amply discussed, Marx says that, as a result of the separation between the civil society and the political state, “the citizen of the state and the member of civil society are also separated.”⁶⁰¹ Just as civil society separates itself from its private character or it must renounce itself as unofficial class in order to acquire political significance, so the individual must renounce his private interest and himself as a member of civil society in order to obtain political efficacy and in order to be politicized. In consequence, there are two individuals; 1) the individual as *a member of civil society* and 2) the individual as *citizen of the state*. The individual as a *citizen* finds himself in or meets two different organizations.

The actual individual lives in two organizations, bureaucratic organization and social organization. Bureaucratic organization is the external and formal determination of the executive power. Moreover, the bureaucratic organization does not have any influence on the individual and their activity. In the social organization, the individual does not touch upon the state because he is considered to be outside of the state as a private man. For this reason, neither the individual nor civil society has any influence on the political state.⁶⁰² Let me compare them in the following way:

- 1) The bureaucracy is the organization of the state. The individual contributes the material to this political organization. “The latter [the social] is a civil organization whose material is not the state.”⁶⁰³
- 2) In the bureaucratic organization, the state is in *formal opposition* to the individual whereas in the social organization the individual finds himself in *material opposition* to the state.

Then what should the individual do in order to acquire political significance and efficacy? Just as civil society has to renounce itself as unofficial class in order to acquire political significance, so the individual must leave behind his private character, his civil activity, and therefore the civil organizations. Marx explains as follows; “thus, in order to behave as actual citizen of the state, to acquire political significance and efficacy, he must abandon his civil actuality, abstract from it, and retire from this entire organization into the individuality.”⁶⁰⁴ *Individuality* is the only way for the

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.77

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.77

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.77

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.77

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.78

individual to become a state-citizen, but to become a political citizen the individual has to separate themselves from civil society and its organizations and thus abandon their civil or private activity. As a result, the individual becomes bare individuality; more precisely, the individual is reduced to pure, bare individuality. This is another particular characteristic of modern society; the individual in modern society exists as a separated and isolated being.⁶⁰⁵

The existence of the individual in the political sphere is possible only by way of his refutation and abandoning of civil organizations or communities. From this point of view it seems that the existence of the individual as a citizen depends on their isolation and abstraction from their actual existence. Therefore, ironically, to be an individual citizen means to be isolated from one's society. In this point, Marx emphasizes, "his [the individual's] existence as citizen is an existence lying outside the realm of his communal existence, and is hence purely individual."⁶⁰⁶ In consequence, there is only a pure isolated individual in question. After abandoning their civil activity and accepting an existence as individual outside the realm of civil society, the individual finds their first communal body in the legislature, that is, within the legislative power. In this political organization (in the legislature) the individual exists as a political being.

Consequently, we can say that the individual as a member of civil society and the individual as a citizen are in opposition.⁶⁰⁷

Just as the Estates mediate between civil society and the state, so the individual as citizen might be defined as a mediating entity between the private individual and the political state. Marx claims that the individual as a member of civil society must abandon civil society to obtain political efficacy and therefore in so doing only individuals "acquire significance as man. In other words, his character as a member of the state, as a social being, appears to be his human character."⁶⁰⁸ Accordingly, if you are a member of the state and if you play a role as a political man, it appears to be your human character. The reason why the individual must leave behind their class and civil society is because in so doing they achieve being a participant of the state. In other words, the class or civil society, to which the individual belongs, stands between the individual and the political state. Therefore, when the individual renounces this class, they also abolish the mediating element needed to achieve the universal.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.78

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.78

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.78

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.81

4.4.3.4.5.2.2. Marx's critique of the Estates and representative systems

Hegel generates a society in which political classes are transformed into social classes. In this state what unites “the various states within the state”⁶⁰⁹ is bureaucracy. Accordingly, Marx says that civil society is defined and therefore remains within bureaucracy in which civil society and the political state become identical. Civil society as unofficial class stands against the state. Within civil society, the classes are a mass. As their structure is based on arbitrary will, their development is not organizational. What is the difference between former societies and the society, which Hegel has described? Marx expresses this difference as what leads to the separation between the individual and their class. The individual is not a communal being [*ein Gemeinwesen*]⁶¹⁰ anymore. The relationship of the class to the individual is ruptured and class becomes an external determination to the individual. “Class distinction is no longer one of need and of labor as independent bodies.”⁶¹¹ In Hegel's society, the distinction between classes becomes superficial and formal. The distinct groups within civil society do not remain unchangeable. These differences, which classes undergo, appear to be changing with an arbitrary principle.⁶¹²

The class of the individuals is sometimes determined by their labor or by chance. Therefore, the type of labor and chance determine which class the individual belongs to and whether they remain in that class. The class becomes an “external determination of the individual.” The reason for this external determination is because the individuals do not find their identities in their labor which determines their class. The individuals have no dealings with their real substantial activity. Moreover, the class does not anymore relate to the individual as an objective communal being, which is continually in relation to the individual. In other words, the individual does not relate themselves to their actual activity and actual class anymore. The individual is separated from their human character by the division between the state and civil society. They acquire the human character only when they are a member of the state.

In paragraph §304, Hegel mentions the antagonism between the executive (as the power of crown) and legislative (constituted by the Estates). Hegel indicates that the relationship between the executive of the state and the legislature constituted by Estates in civil society is characterized by both *hostility* and *harmony*. For this reason, Hegel seeks a new element to construct “both the impossibility of hostility and the actuality of harmonization.”⁶¹³ What is this element for Hegel? It goes without saying that this element no longer belongs to the Estates. “For him, such an element would be the freedom of decision

⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.80

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.81

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.80

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.81

⁶¹³ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.92

and thought in face of the sovereign will and the executive.”⁶¹⁴ More correctly, it is the element belonging to the will of the crown and the executive will. Even if the legislature constitutes the organized and total political state, legislature as an element of the political state is still the sphere of the contradictions within the state. Hegel, as we mentioned before, constructs these Estates from the corporations as an abstract political form of civil society. Moreover, these Estates are considered as opposed to the universal, that is, to the state.

Hegel first constitutes the Estates as a political element of civil society within the state, which is derived from the corporations; and then he determines them as opposed to the state because of the fact that the Estates contain distinct classes of civil society. This is not consistent because the Estates are reduced back to distinct classes, and thus the private individual.⁶¹⁵

Hegel tries to have the agricultural class mediate between the state and civil society. It means that the agricultural class has a higher political task than the other Estates or classes. We find the explanation regarding this transformation of the task between the Estates and agriculture class in paragraph §305. For this paragraph, the agricultural class is the only mediating class between the Estates and the state. Hegel conceives of the agriculture class necessary for mediation. According to Hegel, the agriculture class is more independent than the other Estates. The reason why Hegel separates the agricultural class from the other Estates is because the agriculture class is similar with the princely function. The similarity is certain rights they have by birth such as ownership of land. Hegel claims, “as its basis it has family life, and as regards subsistence it has the possession of soil. As regards its particularity it has a will, which rest upon itself, and, in common with the princely function, it bears the mark of nature.”⁶¹⁶

The agriculture class, according to Hegel, depends only on itself. Therefore, Hegel disintegrates and dissolves the Estates by virtue of giving priority and particularity to the agriculture class.

What Marx conceives of Hegel’s agriculture class is “the empowered agriculture class, aristocratic landed property.”⁶¹⁷ This type of (landed) private property as Marx already manifested is 1) independent from state capital, or the wealth of the state, that is, the universal wealth of the political state; 2) independent from “the need of society or the social capital, from favor from the mob.”⁶¹⁸ The agricultural class is defined as an independent class whose wealth is independent and separated from the state’s wealth. Thus “in the sharpest terms,” as Marx says, “the opposition, as Hegel develops it, is

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.92

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.94

⁶¹⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 305, p.182

⁶¹⁷ Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.96

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique.*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.98

the opposition of private property and capital.”⁶¹⁹ This means that the agricultural class acquires political significance and position due to its wealth; wealth secures political import. Inevitably, it might be said that political significance and political activity are possible only if you have wealth.

Hegel never says that private property is the fundamental basis for the political constitution and therefore for the political state, but Marx’s interpretation reveals private property to be the principle of the political constitution and thus the highest political orientation is directly related to private property. Marx elaborates how private property is the essence of the political state; he argues that private property supports the constitution and also it is the constitution itself. Private property gives the political state to its independence. The existence of the political state in a way rests on private property.⁶²⁰

Accordingly, what Hegel did is “instead of making private property a civil quality, Hegel makes political citizenship, existence, and sentiment a quality of private property.”⁶²¹

Generally, Hegel creates the illusion that the Estates can take place in politics as an element of the executive and can therefore be an element of the political state. Then he abandons this determination and decides that the only executive who can govern the state is the monarch. While Hegel previously claimed that civil society could obtain its ethical life through corporations, he later transforms the appearance of civil society as well as the executive. He does this by excluding the Estates as the legislative element of civil society from mediating between civil society and the political state because wealth becomes the center of the executive power. And wealth in the corporations is unreliable because of “the uncertainty of trade, the desire for gain, and the fluctuations of property.”⁶²²

4.4.3.4.5.2.3. *The member of the state or the member of the group: the problem of the participation of the rabble in the universal concerns of the state*

In paragraph §308, Hegel returns to the question of the participation of all individuals. In this regard, in civil society, one might say that Hegel mentions two different groups, or he separates the Estates in two groups; “a fluctuating element and an immutable element (landed property).”⁶²³ It seems that this fluctuating element corresponds to the business class, which is the second element of the Estates. To Marx, Hegel makes “a new distinction within civil society and the Estates: the distinction between a

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.98

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.107

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.111

⁶²² Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 306, p.182

⁶²³ Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.112

fluctuating element and an immutable element (landed property)”⁶²⁴ (which has already mentioned by Hegel in the paragraph §§305-306).

The fluctuating element of the Estates or the second element of the Estates is represented by deputies (by “election and selection of deputies”⁶²⁵) while the immutable element (landed property) does not need deputies. This first element of the Estates can act by themselves but not through deputies like the second element of the Estates.

Hegel gives two reasons for the deputies: the first reason is external reason; that is to say, because of the great number of the membership; the second reason is essential reason, i.e., because of its determination and its activity. It signifies that the character of the Estates does not contain the political occupation and political activity; because as Marx says, their particular activity and occupation are alien to the political occupation and activity. However, according to Hegel, this participation or the election of the deputies does not emerge individually and in atomistic manner because every individual is already a member of the corporation, communities, or societies. Through these corporations, societies and communities they systematically organize and select deputies. For this reason, they do not split into atomistic individuals. “These various circles receive in this way political unity.”⁶²⁶

The spheres of civil society such as Corporations or associations find their universal existence in the sphere of the political state through the law. However, Marx discusses that the political right as the right of Corporations or association, etc., is in contradiction with the political right as the right of the state and citizenship; because the political right should not be the right of particular existence like the right of Corporations.

Hegel enters a new contradiction in paragraph §314 because first of all, he says that the Estates take political part in the legislative power. Now he claims that they are only accessory (“addition”). In this regard, the determination of the Estates does not contain in achieving the optimum result in the deliberation and decision on the affairs of the state; because the role of the Estates is merely an addition.⁶²⁷ Here the question is if they do not have any effective impact on the business of the state, why do they take part in the political constitution as deputies or representatives? It seems that they are only ornamental plants or fishes within the political state! Hegel describes the main role and task of the Estates as follows; “their distinctive trait is that, as they represent the members of the civic community who have no share in the government, it is through their co-operating knowledge, counsel,

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.112

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Critique*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’Malley, 1970, p.112

⁶²⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 308, p.183

⁶²⁷ “Rather do they form merely an addition (§301).” Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, §314, p.251

and judgment that the element of formal freedom attains its right.”⁶²⁸ The members of the civil society find their representation in the government through the assembly of the Estates; because these members of the civil society do not have any share with the government, or the political state. Here beyond all question there is strict distinction and separation between civil society and its members and the political state. Hegel proves this strict division with his expression in this paragraph (§314). In this paragraph, we can more clearly see the ambiguities and conflicts of Hegel. It seems that he differentiates *formal freedom* and concrete freedom. What does formal freedom mean? It appears to me that formal freedom means that the individual does not have any direct relation with freedom. Here the individual as a member of civil society does not have direct relation with the political state but through the Estates, which represent this member of civil society in the government. Accordingly, it might be said that formal freedom does not correspond to an immediate relation of the individual but mediate relation is its basis. The function of the Estates is to ensure formal freedom of the members of civil society. How do the Estates realize that? This formal freedom “attains its right” in relation to the members of civil society, through the Estates’ participation in government’s knowledge, in the deliberations and decisions of the government on the affairs of the state.

The public opinion attains some results through acquiring this knowledge coming from the government by means of the Estates. 1) The public attains true thought and insights concerning the condition and the concept of the state and the affairs of the state. 2) This knowledge enables it to judge rationally with regard to the business of the state. 3) Furthermore in this way the public opinion gets informed about and learns to esteem the management, talents, virtues, and skills of the public officers. However, what does it ensure to the public opinion, if they do not have any effective voice over them? Therefore, this explanation remains an empty aggregation of words! Then Hegel says by virtue of this publicity civil servants find an opportunity to develop their abilities, their talents, and therefore the public opinion is a platform for them to show themselves and attain high honor.

However, in paragraphs § 316 and § 317, Hegel begins to disprove his first claim with regard to public opinion. Hegel describes public opinion as formal subjective freedom associated with the phenomenon of collectivity. That is, “formal subjective freedom, implying that individuals as such should have and express their own judgment, opinion, and advice concerning affairs of state, makes its appearance in that aggregate which is called public opinion.”⁶²⁹ The public opinion is described as an unorganized way through which the individuals express their opinion and judgments. Obviously, for Hegel, the public opinion is not trustable.

⁶²⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, § 314, p.186

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005 § 316, p.187

4.4.3.5. The conclusion

With a deep research and analysis of Marx's own works, particularly the works in which he speaks of the state, society, and man in detail, we realize and find that Marx is indeed interested in the problem of the individual. In the *Critique*, through an elaborated and extensive investigation, Marx shows the relationship of the individual to the state and civil society. The state is the modern state and therefore the individual is the modern individual, a product of the modern times, as we have already many times declared. Accordingly, Marx *discovers* the problem of the individual in the modern political state within the construction of the political state.

Then what is the conclusion, which has reached fruition? It is about the structure of the state itself, which is given to us by Hegel. If you look at the structure of the political state, from the top down or vice versa, you will realize how it is hierarchical. This hierarchy is reinforced by the bureaucratic structure of the state. Here are some results:

- 1) The relationship between right and duty is defective, resulting from a contradiction between the professed mutual relation and the actual asymmetry between them.
- 2) The modern state is overestimated and sublimated (exalted). The state is considered as powerful as God. Because of this exaltation, its bureaucrat is perceived to have unlimited will and power.
- 3) According to my view, the modern individual can be characterized as an institutionalized and politicized being ("politicized" in relation to Hegel's political project). What I mean with "institutionalized" is to have a legal existence.
- 4) Bureaucracy as a mediator or a means leads the individual to become alienated from the political state. Therefore, the political state is alien for all individuals. Just as it is not a part of the individual, the individual is not a part of the political state. This alienation is reflected in our observation that the individual is in fact considered and conceived as a means only.
- 5) Step by step, Hegel severs the relationship of the people, or in his own words, "the rabble" to the state. In other words, the people are practically pushed outside the political state.
- 6) The individuals, as Marx pointed out, find themselves in a two-fold organization: a) the bureaucratic organization, which does not touch the individual and society; b) the social organization of civil society, which does not touch the state.
- 7) Lastly, the individual is not a social individual but an isolated individual, decreed to be a "citizen."

What is the place of the individual as a human being in such a structure? Actually, Marx's answer is very simple; first, the modern state is based on the existence of the individual but this individual is not the individual, which we have been told it was: a free political agent. Rather, this individual is

separated from its communal being, and for this reason *isolated*, and therefore *alienated*. In this way, the individual is reduced to an *imaginary, illusory* being.

The Philosophy of Right is nothing more than a sort of presentation and thus manifestation of the modern political state. Even though some may argue that the Prussian State, which Hegel seems to be describing and defending is old-fashioned compared to other European models, Marx's analysis reveals that it exhibits the distinctive features of the modern political state. It is properly the modern political state itself. It elucidates clearly and precisely what civil society and the individual *ought to be* in the political state. Marx's aim is to remove mystical elements from philosophy and to put it in the service of history to reveal the human self-alienation that has developed in and through it. For his end, Marx unmasks the existing political situation which does not correspond to social and economic reality but which is thought to be true and real existence. He tries to demonstrate that the actuality, which you thought to be real, is an illusion. That is to say, Marx wants to indicate that you are separated from your true relations and therefore you are reduced to a lonely individual. Actually, Marx himself argues the problem of modern times as the problem of politics. Let me quote from Marx; "the relationship of industry, of the world of wealth in general, to the political world is a major problem of modern times." As he illustrates in the rest of the previous sentence, these problems are the problems of human beings: "the moment modern political and social actuality is subjected to criticism, [...], criticism focuses on genuine human problems..."⁶³⁰

One might say that Marx's critique of Hegel's political theory and generally the critique of existing political state is based on one concept or one adjective which defines the real or true existence of the political theory of Hegel and the true determination of existing political state. The theory of Hegel and the existing political state are "*fictitious*" or "*imaginary*" as opposed to actual, real! I regard this expression as important and significant; because modern political theory generally and Hegel's political theorization particularly tries to demonstrate that the existing political state is/should be the state which is real and actual; which exists in itself and for itself; in which all individuals have civil rights to actualize their political goals, and tasks. However, what Marx shows us is that the truth and actual existence of the state is quite different from the way it is presented by these theories. The two expressions "*fictitious*" and "*imaginary*" indicate that the state is in a relationship of dependence upon another existence or sphere.

According to Marx, the state in Hegel is an abstraction; the family and civil society are prior to and more fundamental than the state. In this respect, Marx discusses the relation of the individual or the people to the state so as to defend democracy over monarchy. Marx also criticizes the 'political state'

⁶³⁰ Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'", in the *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, trans. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley, 1970, p.134

and ‘constitution.’ Marx’s view on political life is that he believes in immediate or direct democracy—that’s why he attacks the Hegelian understanding of bureaucracy. As Pelczynski points out, Marx “rejects the fact of a highly institutionalized form of government, based on fixed legal and constitutional relations, in favor of an ideal of political life in which people participate directly and spontaneously.”⁶³¹

In “Hegel’s Concept of The State and Marx’s Early Critique,” Ilting explains Marx’s interpretation of Hegel as follows; “Hegel sought to comprehend the state as an object which existed independently of individuals living in a state community and credited these individuals themselves with only a dependent existence.”⁶³² This is the Marxian approach to Hegel’s state. Ilting, in his article, tries to show how Marx misunderstands Hegel and to justify how Hegel presents the concept or idea of the state to “recognition of the right (*Recht*) of the citizens in order to take part in political decisions within the state.”⁶³³ Ilting confirmed Hegel’s idea of the state as a concrete entity, which actualizes itself through the particular will.

According to Ilting, under the influence of Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx almost avoids appreciating Hegel’s intentions. In addition, for Ilting, Marx does not understand Hegel’s “train of thought”⁶³⁴ and the important parts of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel understands the state both as the ‘immanent end’ of the private sphere of life and as an ‘external necessity’ to the individual—here the state exists to limit to the private interests of the individual. However, in this point Marx is right to criticize Hegel for this ‘unresolved antinomy’⁶³⁵ because without the individual interests and without individual desires, inclinations, Hegel could not materialize the fulfillment of the real state. In addition, here there is a problem concerning the *means and ends* that is parallel to the *subject-predicate* problem, which Feuerbach discussed and Marx indicated as well. While the state is an ‘external necessity’ for individual interests and also an ‘immanent end of the private sphere of life’, which restricts the private will and interests, the individual is also considered as a means in order to materialize the fulfillment of the state.

Ilting criticizes Marx for overlooking Hegel’s consideration about the relation between the duties and rights in the state because Ilting argues that Hegel in §261 “makes civil rights the foundation of all

⁶³¹ Z. A. Pelczynski, “Nation, civil society, state: Hegelian sources of the Marxian non-theory of nationality”, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.269

⁶³² K.-H. Ilting, “Hegel’s concept of the State and Marx’s Early critique”, in *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.93

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, Ilting, “Hegel’s concept of the State and Marx’s Early critique”, in *The State and Civil Society*, edit. by Z. A. Pelczynski, 1984, p.95

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, Ilting, “Hegel’s concept of the State and Marx’s Early critique”, p.104

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, Ilting, “Hegel’s concept of the State and Marx’s Early critique”, p.105

duties in the state, and then, in the Remark, presents the fulfillment of the duties of a subject as a condition for the preservation of civil right.”⁶³⁶ For this reason, Ilting asserts that Marx, without making any comments, ignores the idea of Hegel that “the duties of a citizen in the state must correspond exactly to his rights...”⁶³⁷

Another critique of Ilting to Marx is that Marx misconstrues Hegel’s exposition of his philosophy through just interpreting paragraph §262. Ilting says that “whereas Hegel wishes to show how the rights to freedom of the members of civil society expand to become rights of participation in social institutions (§§262-4), Marx simply fixes on the metaphysical tone of Hegel’s style.”⁶³⁸ Ilting emphasizes that the state for Hegel comes to exist through the activity of its citizens. However, as I believe I have demonstrated through my analysis, these citizens are not active beings in Hegel’s state.

The difference between Marx’s approach to the individual being and the attitude of Hegel is that step by step Hegel excludes the relationship of the people, or in his own words, “the rabble” to the political state. People remain outside of the political state. The rabble must be only governed. It is the best solution that the modern political state can come up with. Accordingly, society is not a political society. Strictly speaking, it is no longer a society or community; because as Rousseau expounds in his masterpiece, *The Social Contract*; there is a difference between an *association* (community) and an *aggregate*.⁶³⁹

4.5. THE CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL THROUGH SOME OF MARX’S WRITINGS

In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels wrote that the premises of the materialistic conception of history are “the real individuals (*die wirklich Individuen*), their activity and their material condition of their life both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity.”⁶⁴⁰ These premises are the real foundations of their conception. Regarding these premises, the individuals are real individuals if they are recognized through their activity and their material conditions. In this last section, I would like to concentrate on the problem of the individual in terms of the *German Ideology* and the *Holy Family* in which Marx demonstrates the materialist conception of history. In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels differentiate the individuals from animals concerning the first historical

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, Ilting, “Hegel’s concept of the State and Marx’s Early critique”, p.105

⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*, Ilting, “Hegel’s concept of the State and Marx’s Early critique”, p.105

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, Ilting, “Hegel’s concept of the State and Marx’s Early critique”, p.106

⁶³⁹ Let me quote from Rousseau; “If a series of men, in succession, are made to submit to one other man, all I can see in them is a master with his slaves, however many of them there may be; I cannot see a people and its leader. It could be said to be an aggregation, but it is not an association; there is no public good, no body politic.” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, translated by Christopher Betts, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.53)

⁶⁴⁰ Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.37

act, which is not that they think but that they *create* their *means of subsistence*. In other words, creation or production is the first historical act of human beings. Through the production of their means of subsistence, human beings create their *material conditions*.

In relation to these two main works, in this chapter of the dissertation I will roughly criticize the liberal view of the existence of the individual. The liberal view is the main reason for the problem of the individual in modern society and the modern political state because the liberal account approaches the individual as an atomistic being, which is the basis of liberal society. According to this account, as we know, the atomistic individual and free market are the fundamental elements of liberal society. Individuals pursue their interests in the free market on their own. This kind of free market is in accord with human needs and human nature. Because of the free market system, individuals in such a society exist as competing beings. As Sean Sayers states, “under the impact of the market, society has been dissolved into a mass of separate individuals, each pursuing their own independent interests.”⁶⁴¹ David Harvey in *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* points out the fundamental proposal of the neo-liberal approach as follows;

“The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as ‘the central values of civilization.’ In so doing, they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideals. These values, they held, were threatened not only by fascism, dictatorships, and communism, but by all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgments for those of individuals free to choose.”⁶⁴²

In modern society, the individual is a creation of the free market, that is, a creation of economic system of market. In such a society as Marx and Engels discussed in the *German Ideology*, the individuals must exist independently and they relate to each other by way of exchange. In former societies, the bond that held the individuals together was family, earth or clan. In the same work, Marx and Engels claim that the individuals depend on each other because of division of labor.

In the conclusion, we arrive at the point of a certain determination of the concept of the individual as well as that of society; that is, the individual is a social and thus political being *within all their relations*. Correspondingly, society is not an aggregation of the individuals; it is *the whole web of relationship*. The modern capitalist world is based on the separation and aggregation of individuals in a way that excludes the relationship of each individual to each other. The liberal account needs this conception of ‘society’ as “an aggregate of individuals” to create the illusion of self-sufficient

⁶⁴¹Sean Sayers, “Individual and Society in Marx and Hegel: Beyond the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism”, *Science & Society*, Vol. 71, No. 1, (January 2007), (84–102), p. 87

⁶⁴²David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neo-liberalism*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 5

individuals who do not need to relate to others except for exchange. Because they act only on behalf of their own interests, they can abstain from any responsibility towards other individuals.

Modern society thus destroys all social ties and relations.⁶⁴³ In this way, individuals can compete freely in the free market. The basic point in the free market is that “individuals seem to be free and independent agents; their social interconnection appears to be external and accidental to them.”⁶⁴⁴ As Sean Sayers illustrates, “social relations among people are transformed into economic relations among things — relations that operate in an alien way, independently of us.”⁶⁴⁵ In other words, the only reasons that bring individuals together are economic needs.

Marx and Engels in the *German Ideology* assert that “work” or “labor” is “the only connection which still links them with the productive forces and with their own existence.”⁶⁴⁶ But in my view “work” does not only connect the individuals with the productive forces and with their own existence; nowadays work is also the only way to have intercourse with other individuals. However, there is a difference between “work” as the activity engaged in producing material life (needs) and “work” as self-activity or self-manifestation. In the earlier periods, as Marx asserts in the *German Ideology*, the production of material life and self-activity were conceived separately and the production of material life was conceived as “a subordinate mode of self-activity.” However, today, the conception of work as “the production of material life” has displaced the other conception. Marx contends that material life has become the only end and the activity of production of material life, that is, “work as self-activity” has become a means to that end.⁶⁴⁷

Then the question is how Marx describes the individual in such a society. In the *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels touch on two facts, which Marx did not deal with in *On the Jewish Question*: 1) the relation of productive forces⁶⁴⁸ to the individuals; 2) the relation of the individual to the productive forces. 1) The productive forces (or forces of production) appear as if they are in a world independent of the individuals because they do not belong to the individuals unless the individual is an owner of private property. The productive forces thus attain an independent and separate being that is indifferent

⁶⁴³ Sean Sayers, “Individual and Society in Marx and Hegel,” *Science & Society*, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2007, p. 90

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Sayers, “Individual and Society in Marx and Hegel,” *Science & Society*, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2007, p. 91

⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Sayers, “Individual and Society in Marx and Hegel,” *Science & Society*, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2007, p.96

⁶⁴⁶ Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.96

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.96

⁶⁴⁸ *Productive force* or *forces of production* refers to the material means of production (non-human labor power) (such as factories, machinery, raw materials, etc.) together with human labor power. In other words, Marx uses the term “forces of production” or “productive force” to point at “a broad range of factors involved in the process of production.” These “productive forces” includes “tools and machines such as ploughs and steam engines, factories and workshops, raw materials, roads and canals, knowledge and skills, and even classes directly involved in production, such as the working class in capitalist society.” (*Historical Dictionary of Marxism*, Walker David and Daniel Gray, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2007, p. 106)

to the intercourse of the individuals. Marx claims that in earlier times the productive forces had never taken on an indifferent form to the individuals to such an extent.⁶⁴⁹ Marx also proves that, in earlier periods, the intercourse of the individuals was more limited. So, while the interdependence of individuals is much more full-fledged in capitalist societies, because of the alienation of the individuals from the productive forces, this relationship of interdependence remains uprooted and misconceived.

2) The individuals are separated from these productive forces and hence they are divorced from “their real life-content.” The result is that the individuals become *abstract* individuals. In short, the individual divorced from productive forces is an abstract individual and enters into relation with other individuals only as abstract individuals.⁶⁵⁰ Therefore they “stand against these productive forces”⁶⁵¹ which are alienated from them as something that needs to be re-appropriated.

The problem of the individual is strongly related firstly to the productive forces, work—labor. The problem of the individual is secondly related to necessity. What I mean by the concept of necessity is that the individuals in the modern capitalist world exist only for living or for their existence. *Thirdly, the problem of the individual is linked to identity.* The individuals in modern society do not have any identity. By ‘identity’, I do not mean something like national, ethnic, or religious identity, which is given by the state, but the identity through which the individual finds their personality. This identity is linked to being able to make decisions concerning one’s life and having the capacity to carry out these decisions. In other words, identity is linked to self-creation. This is why in the *German Ideology* Marx and Engels say, “what the individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.”⁶⁵² In this respect, what the individuals are depends on what they produce, how they produce, namely, the mode of production.

Another important point concerning individuality in Marx’s theory is its relation to what is social. It is often argued that Marx’s political theory emphasizes what is social to the exclusion of an adequate consideration of individuality. For example, in *Grundrisse*, Marx points out, “society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relation within which these individuals stand.”⁶⁵³ In my view, to say that “society does not consist of individuals” does not mean that Marx did not consider or pay attention to the problem of the individuals. Marx does not direct his attention to the individual in abstraction, but in relation to “the sum of interrelations [...] within which these

⁶⁴⁹ Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, pp. 54-57 (also, p.38, 45, 49)

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.96

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.96

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.37

⁶⁵³ Karl Marx, “The Grundrisse”, in *the Marx-Engels Reader*, edit. by Tucker, 1978, p. 247

individuals stand,” but his purpose in doing so is actually to understand the individual, which cannot be done without its relation to society. What is individual is also social.

In the *German Ideology*, where Marx and Engels criticize Feuerbach’s materialism, they also criticize his standpoint on the individuals. Feuerbach conceives the individuals as “an object of the senses.”⁶⁵⁴ However, Feuerbach does not comprehend the individuals in terms of their “sensuous activity.” In other words, Feuerbach conceives the individual only theoretically and not within their social conditions and their existing condition of life. Furthermore, Feuerbach excludes history from his analysis of the individuals and society. According to Marx, insofar as Feuerbach concentrates only on the individuals or human being without considering their social connections and their existing condition of life, the individuals of Feuerbach remain mere abstractions. In addition, Feuerbach recognizes the individuals only emotionally. For Marx, Feuerbach recognizes love and friendship as the only “human relations.” In other words, Feuerbach does not criticize the present conditions of life. Regarding this point, Marx and Engels claim that “in large-scale industry and competition the whole mass of conditions of existence, limitations, biases of individuals, are fused together into the two simplest forms: private property and labor.”⁶⁵⁵ This relationship of the existence of the individuals to private property and labor is what Feuerbach overlooked. For this reason, “he [Feuerbach] never manages to conceive the sensuous world as the total living sensuous activity of the individuals composing it.”⁶⁵⁶

As Marx and Engels already pointed out in *the Holy Family*, the problem of the individual is related to Hegelian philosophy or German idealism, which teaches that the real individuals are self-conscious beings.

In the *Holy Family* under the subtitle called “Mystery of Speculative Construction”, Marx clarifies the mystery of Hegel’s philosophy, particularly, his logic. Marx explains that Hegel expresses the process of absolute subject as the process of thought where the perception of an object is reflected through the limited sensory perception and imagination of philosophers. Then Hegel presents the real thing within speculative presentation. For this reason, the reader cannot differentiate the real from the speculative reasoning.⁶⁵⁷

To see the individual only as a self-conscious being means to exclude them as *active subjects*. Furthermore, this viewpoint ignores the material conditions in which the individuals exist.

⁶⁵⁴ Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998., p.46

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.94

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 1998, p.47

⁶⁵⁷ Karl Marx and Engels, *Holy Family and Critique of Critical Critique*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1956, p. 82

In *the Holy Family*, Marx claims that in the modern world every individual is both a *slave* and *member* of a *community*. However, the enslavement in bourgeois society ostensibly takes the form of maximal liberty. In this context, Marx's description of the individual is as follows;

“In the modern world each one is at the same time a member of slavery and of the public commonwealth. Precisely the slavery of civil society is in appearance the greatest freedom because it is in appearance the perfect independence of the individual. Indeed, the individual considers as his own freedom the movement, no longer curbed or fettered by a common tie or by man, the movement of his alienated life elements, like property, industry, religion, etc.; in reality, this is the perfection of his slavery and his inhumanity. Right has here taken the place of privilege.”⁶⁵⁸

Just as old society was a society based on privileges, so the modern society is a society of rights. By saying that “right has here taken the place of privilege,”⁶⁵⁹ Marx tries to indicate that so-called “rights” are still either disguised privileges or empty legal words. Liberal ideology presents these rights as if the individuals could materialize their existence through them. This ideology turns individuals into abstract legal persons.

Marx defines the individuals in civil society as egoistic. They are pushed to being egoistic because in civil society the individuals are considered as independent beings like atoms. In *the Holy Family*, Marx points out that the members of civil society cannot be likened to atoms; because “the atom has no needs, it is self-sufficient; the world outside it is absolute vacuum, i.e., it is contentless, senseless, meaningless, just because the atom has all its fullness in itself.”⁶⁶⁰ Individuals cannot be conceived like atoms because they are not independent from other individuals; rather they necessarily depend on the existence of other individuals. Marx asserts that the individuals in civil society live in pure appearance.⁶⁶¹

Therefore we can say that the reality of the individuals exist outside themselves. The sensuous world, and the existence of others remind individuals that they are not independent beings but rather that the reality of their existence is this dependence itself. The individuals depend on the other individuals because of natural necessity and interests. This necessity is natural because individuals exist within relations; to be in relationships is their nature. *Necessity* is their *natural property*.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Karl Marx and Engels, *Holy Family and Critique of Critical Critique*, 1956, p.157

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Karl Marx and Engels, *Holy Family and Critique of Critical Critique*, 1956, p.157

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Karl Marx and Engels, *Holy Family and Critique of Critical Critique*, 1956, p.162

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Karl Marx and Engels, *Holy Family and Critique of Critical Critique*, 1956, p.162

In this regard, *Marx criticizes Hegel's theory of the state, which claims that the state ties the individuals together.*⁶⁶² To Marx, it is not the state that holds the individuals together but natural necessity. In modern capitalist societies, this natural interdependence manifests itself in civil society where their interests twist the individuals together. In modern society, the individuals in civil society are seen as atoms, but as Marx argued, they are atoms just in imagination. Here the contradiction of the individuals in the modern society or in civil society is that the individuals imagine that they exist independently.

⁶⁶² *Ibid.*, Karl Marx and Engels, *Holy Family and Critique of Critical Critique*, 1956, p.163

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

“[Marxism] is not merely an economic or historical theory, but a universal outlook on the world, more universal than Hegelianism, since it appeals not only to the head, but also to the hand and the heart of mankind.”⁶⁶³

In order to realize the goal of this thesis and clarify the argument, I have undertaken an uneasy journey. The difficulty results from the philosophers presented here as well as the actuality of the problem. The main question of the argument is whether the individual exists as a political and social agent in the modern state and political society.

I began with the etymological and historical background of the concept of the individual through an analysis of the concept in itself and then through its historical development from the Ancient Greek to the Medieval period. The reason why I focus on the ancient and middle ages is to comprehend the development of the concept. Generally, the concept of the individual is correlated with Christianity. With the symbolization of Christianity in a subject or a person, that is, Jesus Christ, the existence of the individual is held to be of utmost importance. The individual who was not able to attain the infinite now becomes the embodiment of infinitude. Therefore, Christianity had a decisive role in the excogitation of the individual. In my view, the reason why the individual as a concept did not appear in Ancient Greece, or was not considered in the same way as it is today, is that the infinite, absolute, or divine things were considered to be outside this world. In Ancient Greece, some are free but according to Ritter, it is Christianity, which contends that the human being is free. In the Greek city-state, the free individual as the citizen has political freedom in participating in the decisions of the state. Hegel adopts this idea of political participation from Aristotle.

In capitalist society, the individuals are not free because they depend upon other beings as slaves. For both Aristotle and Hegel, freedom is related to politics. According to Aristotle, free individuals are

⁶⁶³ Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, edit. with an Introduction by Drik J.Struik, trans. by Martin Milligan, 1964, p. 48-49

necessarily related to or participate in political life for the individual is defined as a political animal. “For him, therefore, freedom as a political form of justice also contains the purpose of the political order; it must make possible the freedom of selfhood for every individual; he ought to live in the city as himself and be able to achieve his human determination.”⁶⁶⁴

In the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel states that the question of the individual was introduced into Western philosophy by Socrates and Christianity. But according to him, only in the modern period has this concept been developed. Within Christian belief, which endowed the individuals with divineness and a privileged status, the individual comes to the fore as a distinctive component of the modern world. Therefore, in the modern world, the separation between the other world (the kingdom to come) and the human world disappears. Thus, the individual-centered world was created.

After the analysis of the concept of the individual in terms of its historical development, I have put particular and excessive emphasis on the philosophies of Hegel and Marx for the ontological and economic analysis of the concept. In the second chapter on Hegel, I have concentrated particularly on the concept of the individual in relation to their political existence. For this aim, the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Philosophy of History* have guided us. In the chapter on Marx, I have dealt with the ontological, economic, and political existence of the individual in two parts. In the first part, Marx’s masterpiece, that is, the *Manuscripts of 1844*, has directed us to an ontological and economic view point on the individual. For a discussion of the political existence of the individual, the particular emphasis in the second part has been on *On Jewish Question* and the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*.

The question is why the individual or the subject is not free. This is linked the concept of “relation.” One might say that the entire social philosophy of Hegel rests on the concept of “relation.” And if there is a relation, it indicates that there is dependence. However, in Hegel, this dependence is not given in a negative sense. Rather it is the way or the form through which the single individual becomes independent, and accordingly, appears as self-awareness of themselves and the other—this other might be a human being or it might be the external world in the sense of nature, and object outside of subject, etc. I believe that whereas Hegel discovers and thus makes explicit the importance of relation, Marx underlines the form of relation as such and thus explicates how the individual loses this human relation. The relationship of the individual to the individual and the relationship of the individual to nature, etc. is the main point of concern for Marx as well as Hegel. However, Marx focuses more on the existence of the individual as a problem in the modern world, especially in his early writings such as the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* and *On the Jewish Question*.

⁶⁶⁴ Ritter, *Hegel and French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Winfield, 1982, p. 49

Actually, the mature Marx could also have been discussed under this topic; however, I had to give up that purpose in that it would be very difficult to focus on a detailed research on both the young and the mature Marx at the same time. With this in mind, I have dealt with the young Marx only, which has already been an exhaustive and challenging mission in itself. Simply the mature Marx would be another research project, but here in this conclusion, I briefly touch on *Grundrisse* and *Capital* in an attempt to summarize the modern concept of the individual in terms of Marx.

The modern world described by Marx is founded on separation. While Hegel is also very much aware of the separation between human beings and themselves as well as nature and searches for a unification of this separation or opposition, he nevertheless separates the individual from themselves, and from society, etc. This separation began with the French Revolution through which two processes of separation developed: 1) on the one hand, civil society was separated into independent individuals, as bearers of private interest; 2) on the other hand, the political sphere had more autonomy in respect to civil society.⁶⁶⁵ So, while the individual obtained their independence from civil society as private persons on the one hand, on the other hand the existence of the individual or the freedom of the individual was restricted by virtue of legal constructs. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* makes explicit this separation and restriction.

I believe that the aim of Hegel regarding the realization of this separation, especially in the *Philosophy of Right*, is to determine and to clarify what exactly these spheres are. However, in every step of the *Philosophy of Right* we are confronted with inevitable conflicts. While Hegel tries to overcome these contradictions, he runs into other contradictions. His solution is always to unify these different spheres such as the political sphere and the private sphere, that is, civil society. This unification is based on "recognition." However, at the end, we are notably brought face to face with the exclusion of the individual from the political sphere. Thus, we notice that the so-called "recognition" is not reciprocal but *one-sided*.

In Hegel, the freedom of the individuals depends upon a return to their own existence. That is to say, to be free is to be self-reflexive; their existence depends upon themselves. For Hegel, if the individual remains dependent upon something else, it implies that the individual's process of self-realization is not completed. In other words, for the individual to be free, their existence must, in the end, be self-contained. For this reason, both in the *Phenomenology* and in the *Philosophy of Right*, after its long journey, (self-) consciousness or spirit turns back over to itself to be truly free and self-contained. Freedom is the self-realization and self-dependency of human being.

⁶⁶⁵ Luca Basso, "Marx: Quale Libertà", *Quaderni Materialisti: Marx lo Spettro bussa ancora*, vol 7/8, Edizioni Ghibli, 2010, p. 71

I argue in this dissertation that the existence of the individual remains very problematic in the philosophy of Hegel. On the one hand, Hegel would say that the individual exists. On the other hand, the existence of the individual is not independent from the Absolute. On the one hand, he states that without the individual, that is, without the individual's experiences, it is impossible to realize the universal. These individual experiences, which are components of life, are essential to the development of Hegel's Spirit.⁶⁶⁶ Self-consciousness cannot manifest itself without life. The *Philosophy of History* also discusses the significance of the individual and their inclinations and feelings. They are the efficient or influential subjects of world-spirit. On the other hand, Hegel still continues to see these individuals as a means to the universal, so to speak, a means of attaining the absolute. In short, in Hegel's philosophy the existence of the individuals as agents of the world-spirit is in an uncertain and doubtful condition.

Hegel identifies the individuals with private interests, inclinations, and passions. For this reason, the individual is but only an instrument in an attempt to materialize the universal. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presents not only the individuals but also the state itself, laws and duties as phases to arrive at the highest sphere (§ 279). In the paragraph in which Hegel speaks of religion, he expresses that this highest point is the divine will realizing itself in the state. In this respect, Hegel points out, "the state is divine will as a present spirit, which unfolds itself in the actual shape of organized world."⁶⁶⁷ On the one hand, the state is divine will itself; on the other hand, the state is a means through which the divine will demonstrates itself.

By means of a profound investigation regarding the problem of the individual in Hegel's writings, I come to the conclusion that the existence of the individual in Hegel is associated with the definition of the concept of the individual. According to this definition, the individual is merely a self-conscious being, which is separated from their material representation. In the introduction to the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel explains that the Spirit makes itself felt in the individuals firstly and particularly through feeling and passion. In this respect, Hegel states, "we may affirm absolutely that *nothing great in the World* has been accomplished without *passion*."⁶⁶⁸ However, although these spiritual things emerge through feeling and passion, Hegel especially asserts that feeling and passion are not the core of these spiritual things. In other words, they are only forms, which are supposed to be in human beings. The better explanation of the dichotomy between reason and passion is given by George

⁶⁶⁶ "The recognition of the essentiality of life to self-consciousness is the core of Hegel's argument" J.M. Bernstein, 'From self-consciousness to community: act and recognition in the master-slave relationship', *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*, edited by Z. A. Pelczynski, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.18

⁶⁶⁷ Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans.by Dyde, 2005, § 279, p. 145

⁶⁶⁸ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, with prefaces by Charles Hegel, trans. J. Sibree, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001, p.37

Amstrong Kelly recalling “Hume’s striking dictum that ‘reason is the slave of the passions’ and the consequent attempt of German idealism to restore the primacy of reason by enlarging its content.”⁶⁶⁹ While Hegel attempts to arrive at a unification of this dichotomy, I believe that he still retains it.

Besides, according to Hegel, feeling is a property we have in common with animals. It is not feeling that separates the human beings from animals but reason or self-consciousness.⁶⁷⁰ Hegel does not consider feeling or passion as a human relation. I believe that this is an oversight on Hegel’s part. It goes without saying that the animal also makes relationship with other animals but instinctively. However, human beings get in touch with other human beings in a more complicated way that is mediated by the relationship between feeling and reason. Only when reason, which animals do not have, enters into relation with feeling, do human beings become truly human beings. We must keep in mind that the individuals are not pure reason as they are not pure feeling or passion either. Regarding this point, in the introduction to *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, Richard Kroner explains the relationship between reason and the individual in relation to Kant’s idea. As is well-known, Kant claims that “man as a moral agent is autonomous, that it is his own practical reason which dictates the moral law: man is—or rather ought to be—his own master.”⁶⁷¹ According to Richard Kroner, this leads to a difficulty because when the individual is thus divided against themselves, they are “not really free but [...] half-free and half-slave. At best, he is his own slave, enslaved by his master, reason.”⁶⁷² On the contrary, Hegel tries to overcome this division and reconcile reason with the external world even though he fails.

Let us explain Hegel’s approach to the problem of the individual in relation to feeling and passion through a letter from Marx to Feuerbach.⁶⁷³ In this aforesaid letter, Marx criticizes the character of the *Literatur-Zeitung* that Bauer monthly published (1843-1844). Marx claims that Bauer transforms “criticism” into a transcendental being. It is a transcendental being because they regarded “consciousness or self-consciousness as the only human quality. Love, for example, is rejected, because the loved one is only an ‘object’. Down with the object.” In this letter, Marx mentions the feeling of love which Feuerbach also stresses in his works as something that is absent in modern philosophy. In his critique to Bauer, Marx emphasizes the significance of feeling and passion. Bauer and his followers look down on feeling and passion; the only human quality for them is consciousness or self-consciousness as was the case with Hegel.

⁶⁶⁹ George Amstrong Kelly, “Notes on Hegel’s ‘lordship and bondage,’ in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, volume III (Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Logic*), London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004, p.171

⁶⁷⁰ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §4 Addition, §42 Addition, §47 Note, §56 Addition, §190, §211.

⁶⁷¹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, translated by T.M. Knox with an introduction, and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner, Harper Torchbook, 1961, p.11

⁶⁷² Ibid., Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, 1961, p.11

⁶⁷³ Letter from Marx to Ludwing Feuerbach, in Bruckberg, Paris, August 11, 1844

What Bauer and his followers in fact reject is the object of feeling and passion. This amounts to the rejection of what is concrete, that is, the object. In the same matter, Marx remarks, “this criticism thus regards itself as the only active element in history. It is confronted by the whole of humanity as a *mass*, an inert mass, which has value only as the antithesis of intellect. It is therefore regarded as the greatest crime if the critic displays *feeling* or *passion*.” The same criticism can be made to Hegel’s approach to feeling and passion. In Hegel, feeling and passion are important, but still they are deficient in arriving at the truth. They are secondary while consciousness, or self-consciousness, or better still reason, is the essence of his philosophy. It is the essence of spirit; it is the essence of history. Not surprisingly, Hegel has the same approach to the mass, which has value only as the antithesis of intellect.

In this point, the question comes in sight *ipso facto*: does the individual exist in the philosophy of Hegel? If the response is ‘yes,’ how does it realize its existence? Hegel considers freedom not just as something inherent but also something practical. In other words, the problem, which Hegel wants to overcome, is not only theoretical but also practical. However while Hegel aimed to resolve this problem, still he remains in the abstract, more theoretical area. Nevertheless, at this point, labor or work emerges as a concept through which the individuals actualize or objectify themselves in society and which Hegel and Marx have in common. Marx claims that “the person objectifies himself in production; the thing subjectifies itself in the person.”⁶⁷⁴ Here Marx is very close to the Hegelian sense of labor—production.⁶⁷⁵ According to both philosophers, labor or work is the fundamental and significant element for the realization of the individual as a *determined* and *self-consciousness* subject. Of course for Hegel it is just a stage, because the complete actualization—fulfillment—is only possible through and within the state.

In the *Philosophy of Right*, as we have seen, the individual is defined as a spiritual being, which contains two opposed characteristics. One of them is conscious and willing individuality and the second is the universality which knows and wills the substantive reality (§264). Due to this twofold character, according to Hegel, they can obtain their rights only in so far as they act as both private persons and as persons willing substantive reality. In the same paragraph, Hegel points out that the individuals obtain their rights directly in the family and indirectly in civil society. Through these two institutions, the particular interests of the individuals implicitly point to the universal. The individuals obtain their rights indirectly by way of social institutions or in the corporation. The corporation

⁶⁷⁴ Marx, Karl, *Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*, Penguin Books, translated with a Foreword by Martin Nicolaus, 1973, p. 89

⁶⁷⁵ Labor and production as different concepts in terms of different context, just for this case they are considered to have similar meaning which lead an individual to be aware of their existence.

provides the individuals with occupation and activity and thus the individuals realize their universality in civil society by way of corporations.

As we know, Hegel divides the political state into three spheres: 1) the legislative; 2) the executive (government); 3) the monarch (the function of the prince). In the legislative function, Hegel mentions three elements but only two elements are active. These elements are the monarchical element and executive (government) element. The last element is the estates or different classes. On the one hand in paragraph §300, Hegel talks about the estates as the last moment of the legislative function; on the other hand in the next paragraph (§301), Hegel completely eliminates the estates. The function of the estates brings the public affairs into existence. According to Hegel, the estates do not need to work on the laws; because for Hegel, this sort of idea results from the claim, which believes that the deputies of people or people themselves must know what is best for their interests. But actually for Hegel, the people does not know what is best for themselves, that is, they do not know what they will; because Hegel asserts that to know what to will and to know what reason or absolute wills is the result of profound knowledge and comprehension, insight but people do not belong these sort of properties (§301 Note). Therefore, the individuals as a member of the estates exclude from political decision because “the highest state officials have necessarily deeper and more comprehensive insight into the workings and needs of the state, and also greater skill and wider practical experience.”⁶⁷⁶ Accordingly, the individuals or strictly speaking people are not necessary because without them these highest officials are able to actualize the best result.

In paragraph §308 we can observe the same treatment towards the second section of the estates. This part of the general class element comprises the “fluctuating side” of civil society (§308). This element takes part in politics through deputies because of its numerous memberships. However, when society appoints these deputies, they come together not as an aggregate of atoms but they act through their societies, corporations, associations. Therefore, these societies, communities, and corporations can connect with politics through these deputies. However, in paragraph §314, Hegel claims that the estates or classes do not have maximum efficiency for deliberation and decision-making about the affairs of the state while in the previous paragraph stating that they participate in politics through deputies. Therefore, once again Hegel ignores and excludes people from participating in politics and the affairs of the state. The purpose or the task of the estates is to inform people about decisions which are taken by the highest civil officials. Hegel talks about the estates or deputies only because he wants people to be informed about the political decisions, deliberations, that is, about the affairs of the state but at the same time, he rejects their effective participation in the affairs of the state and also finds their decision inefficient.

⁶⁷⁶ Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Dyde, 2005, §301 note, p.179

Knox and many others strive to demonstrate that Hegel never considers the individual as an instrument.⁶⁷⁷ However, in the *Philosophy of Right*, particularly when we read the part on the State, in the first place, we observe that Hegel attempts to combine the individual and the universal (unification of the individual and the state) through organizations such as corporations and estates but then step by step the participation of every individual in politics is ignored. Shortly, the individuals are ignored and Hegel's state theory remains abstract and formal.

Marx proves that the individuals were much more integrated with society before modern society. In this sense, the social roles were on a large scale constant and determined according to their roles in the social order. In such societies before the modern period, individuals were confined within certain determinations such as being feudal lords, serfs, landlords, etc. Accordingly, within modern society and the development of the free market, the individuals were no longer defined as lords, landlords, serfs or slaves; they began to be characterized as free, independent beings and thus free agents.

The core of capitalism is the renewal of itself with a new technological revolution or discovery, a new economical reformation, or ideological and cultural theorizations. It keeps itself alive forever. However, one thing never changes: the contradiction between capital and labor. The form of suppression changes but the content never changes. Marx emphasizes, "the modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonism. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, and new forms of struggle in place of the old ones."⁶⁷⁸ The character of bourgeois period, according to Marx, is that class antagonism has polarized in two great classes: proletariat and bourgeois.

It seems that Marx does not use the term 'individual' as often as does Hegel; instead of the term 'individual' as an atom of a society, Marx prefers to speak of the individual within the concept of class. Here, the following question emerges: is the individual who is taken into account in terms of class sacrificed on behalf of society? The answer to this question, as we saw through a detailed examination of Marx's works, is that Marx never left out a consideration of (and attention to) the individual. Rather, he always dealt with the existence of and the place of the individual in the capitalist mode of production through the analysis of labor (especially in his early writings) and through the relation of the individual to the labor-market (particularly in his later writings such as in *Grundrisse* and *Capital*).

⁶⁷⁷ For further information about Knox's explanation on this point look: T. M. Knox, 'Hegel and Prussianism', in *Hegel's Political Philosophy*, edited by Walter Kaufmann, Atherton Press: New York, 1970

⁶⁷⁸ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, edited by Lewis S. Feuer, Fontana Library, 1969, p.49

Grundrisse, stands between the *Manifesto* [1848] and *Capital I* [1867]. This work was inspired by the 1857 economic crisis, which stimulated him to summarize and write his works on economy. The original force or effect, which stimulated him to reveal this work was the revolutions of 1848-50 (or, strictly speaking, the defeat of these revolutions).⁶⁷⁹ Marx claims that when bourgeois society is considered, the ultimate phase of the process of social production emerges always as the society itself, that is, as the human beings themselves within their social relations. The subjects of this production process are the individuals, but they are the individuals in mutual relations.⁶⁸⁰ In *Capital* Marx goes further and finally claims that the relationships between the individuals are reduced to the relationship between commodities. Compared to Hegel's metaphysical discussion of the individual, Marx's discussion is far less grandiose: in *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, Marx speaks of the individual almost entirely in terms of their relations in the market place.

In the *Grundrisse*, Marx speaks of the individual as *produced—created*—and as “*producing in society*”⁶⁸¹ in relation to a society within free competition. In this society, the individual is defined as an independent being. According to Marx, this conception originated in the seventeenth century and progressed in the eighteenth century with the social contract theory of Rousseau, which gave the individual an independent and autonomous character. Marx describes the situation of the individual in this society as follows: “In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate.”⁶⁸² Marx says that with the deep analysis of the individual in history, that is, by going back into history it could be seen that “the producing individual” emerges as a dependent being, that is,

“as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan [*Stamm*]; then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the clans. Only in the eighteenth century, in ‘civil society’, do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity.”⁶⁸³

Marx emphasizes in this paragraph that the individual in eighteenth century society, called civil society, engages in social relations (including institutions) for his private aims. It is important to notice that Marx says that this “social connectedness confront the individual as mere means.” What does it mean? Marx continues to define this society or the epoch in which the isolated individual exists within

⁶⁷⁹ Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, Foreword and Translation: Martin Nicolaus, Penguin Books, 1973, p.8

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus, 1973, p. 712

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*, *Ibid.*, Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus, 1973, p.83

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*, Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus, 1973, p.83

⁶⁸³ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus, 1973, p.84

“the most developed social relations.” Can it be interpreted that here the individual is a mere means within the realization of social relations? Here social relations are the purpose in front of the individual.

Marx agrees with the Aristotelian claim, which says that human being is “a political animal” and not just a social animal. “The human being is in the most literal sense a political animal, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.”⁶⁸⁴ This determination is a criticism of the relationship between the individual and ‘civil society’ in which, according to Marx, the individual is isolated. The capitalist society leads to the repeated reproduction of the human being as an isolated individual.⁶⁸⁵

In this point, Marx argues that the individual cannot exist without its economic independence from capitalist society. He talks about economic freedom for the existence of the individual but he does not speak of the problem as Hegel does. In this respect, the argument of the thesis was discussed in terms of the theoretical and practical approaches. Hegel tries to represent the problem of the individual both in theoretical and practical framework. Instead, Marx presents its practical aspects.

In Marx, the individual is taken away from their abstract position in Hegel’s philosophy and examined in their indirect relation to one another as subjects of the production process. In other words, the individual is analyzed first through their relation to their labor and to the process of labor; then, through their relation with the product which they produce at the end of the process, and finally through their mediate relation with another individual. In this context, Marx mentions the concept of ‘fetishism,’ which signifies that the relationships between human beings are reduced to relationships between commodities.

From Marx’s definition of production and its relationship with the individual and consumption, it can be perceived how Hegel’s influence appears in Marx’s understanding. Marx points out that “the individual produces an object and, by consuming it, returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-reproducing individual. Consumption thus appears as a moment of production.”⁶⁸⁶ Hegel also states that the individuals realize themselves by producing. In their production, they perceive their real existence; the individuals come back to themselves at the end of the production by recognizing themselves in the object, which they have produced. However, it should be reminded that there is a difference between these two perspectives on production, in the sense that Hegel does not speak of the consumption, which for Marx creates not only production but also a manner of consumption and a

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus, 1973, p.84

⁶⁸⁵ István Mészáros, *Marx’s Theory of Alienation*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London, 1970, p.269

⁶⁸⁶ Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. by Martin Nicolaus, 1973, p. 94

means of production and consumption. This means that for Marx the process of self-realization is not consummated in the mind, but is rooted in material life.

As we already mentioned in previous chapters on Marx, Marx criticizes the classical political economists for beginning with the isolated individual. In contrast, the starting point of Marx is the social individual, the individual determined by society, and therefore, by the given conditions of production. Therefore, in Marx's thought, the individual is not isolated and abstracted from everything but rather evaluated as "socially" determined. In other words, the individuals are wholly composed of "relations." Because of these relations, the individuals are not simple "things" in themselves but they are determined by these relationships.

It goes without saying that Hegel never ignores the existence of the individual in relation to the universal. Nevertheless, in the end, the individual exist for itself. It seems to me, however, that the individual in modern capitalist society does not exist for itself but only for another-self. This is the cause of the ambiguity in Hegel's convoluted system: on the one hand, it takes note of the individual's relation to the universal; on the other hand, it tries to account for a distorted fact as if it is rational: the fact that the individual is reduced to a simple "thing" in modern capitalist society.

What I deduce through a deep reading of the *Manuscripts of 1844* is that the loss of the relation of the individual to the external, social world means that the individual loses their existence. The idealization of the existence of the individual is a "fantasy." In the *Manuscripts*, Marx points out that the individuals create society and in the same manner, society creates the individuals. Marx did not reduce his standpoint to one that is either society-centered or individual-centered. Marx clearly observed that there is a rigorous relationship between society and the individuals, which is reciprocal.

Marx reveals the concept of the individual as socially determined through the comprehension of Hegel. Accordingly, through a detailed analysis and an extensive reading of Hegel and Marx, we can observe that Marx did not ignore the existence of the individual in his writings. Marx does not take the individual as the departure point but his analysis in fact aims at explaining the possibility of the existence of the individual *as* an individual. The reason why he doesn't take the individual as the departure point is methodological; it is because the individual does not stand in isolation from the web of relations they are embedded in. However, this does not mean that he is not concerned with creating the social and economic conditions in which the individual can actually exist *as* an individual. In other words, the individual is not lost in Marx's writings just because Marx considers the individual as a result but not a departure point; on the contrary, the individual is considered as an end in itself. Marx did not fall into the error that Hegel did, for in Hegel, the individual is conceived just as a stage or phase, and therefore is reduced to a means.

After the examination of Hegel and Marx's philosophy through historical, etymological, and ontological analyses, in my view the fundamental problem of the individual is *depolitization*. In other words, the individuals do not exist as free political agents in modern society even though, paradoxically, the modern political state claims that the individuals are free with respect to participation in politics. Hegel's political philosophy, that is, his absolute state theory, is unable to function as a correction of this depolitization process. This error of Hegel is linked to the content and form relation. The form of society changes but the content (class relations) continues to exist as Marx and Engels affirmed in the *Communist Manifesto*.

As we saw in the third chapter, Marx explains the reasons and the results of this depolitization, which turns the individuals into isolated and imaginary beings, in his early writings such as the *Manuscripts 1844*, *On the Jewish Question*, and the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. However it should be noted that, even though Marx emphasizes the importance of economic relations, he did not ignore the political side of the issue. In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme (Kritik des Gothaer Programms)*⁶⁸⁷ [1875], he says that without political freedom the economic freedom of workers did not realize. The social problems are not separate from the political problems. For this reason, the problem needs to be solved within a democratic state.

Consequently, having explored both Marx's and Hegel's works, we see that one needs to consider the existence of the individual in two ways: immediately or mediately. It is very difficult to speak of the immediate existence of the individual given the historical background of social and economic relations that have made such existence inconceivable. The individual is sometimes mediately recognized. In other words, the individual can be recognized by means of an object they have produced. In this case, recognition can serve to verify the individual's existence. But in capitalist society, the things the individuals produce or create are only considered as expendable objects. Thus, they do not come remotely close to being recognized. The loss of relationship, which was discussed under the heading of alienation in section 4.3.2.1.1 (Estranged Labor), means that the recognition, which would make the individual a true and real individual, gets lost. The objects remain while the individuals lose their

⁶⁸⁷ This work of Marx was written against the programme taking place in Gotha and which addressed to the followers of Lassalle. Two German socialist parties come together to unity and make party programme. They did not carry out the programme, which Marx suggested. However, Marx was against the programme. In this critique, Marx explained the communist society and the task of the state during the revolution process. The Marxist programme proclaims that the German social democrat labor party aims to establish a people state. In this programme Marx also declares the tasks of a membership of the German social democrat labor party. The social and political conditions are unequal so that whole memberships of the party had to struggle against these conditions. The aim of the class struggle targets to eliminate every kind of class dominant. The capitalist mode of production results in the slavery for the proletariat. Social democracy abolishes the nowadays wage system, that is, the mode of production. Therefore, social democracy organizes the work on the basis of cooperative. By this way, it aims to give the whole workers' products which they performed.

relationship with their objects. The individuals are conceived only as a producer for another. And the objects are not considered as an object or means for recognition so that the individuals are not recognized.

After all these profound investigations, I suppose that we answer our main question, “is it possible to speak of the individual in modern state?” In fact, the answer is quite obvious: the modern state pretends that the individuals act as a main protagonist of political state; it pretends that it recognizes the existence of the individual. The existence of the individual is not possible because they are recognized just as an instrument for the sake of political state. Here the methodological separation between the structure and superstructure comes into play. Superstructure as a means plays its role to manipulate every individual; to conceal the defect of economic structure. For this reason the conflict between the individual and the present political state must be found in the increasingly growing conflict between labor and capital which leads the basic separation and alienation we already mentioned through the whole discussion of thesis’ argument although some post-Marxist claim emphasizes on the superstructure and democratic development.

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