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**MARSILIUS OF INGHEN AND THE THEORIES OF  
*CONSEQUENTIAE*  
WITH A PROVISIONAL EDITION OF MARSILIUS' TREATISE ON *CONSEQUENTIAE***

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.... philosophers' convictions about the eternity of problems or conceptions were as baseless as a young girl's conviction that this year's hats are the only ones that could ever have been worn by a sane woman.  
- R. G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, Oxford 1939, p. 65

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...no one knows exactly what a logical consequence is.  
- H.B. Curry, *A Theory of Formal Deducibility*, Notre Dame 1957, p. 1

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## 0. Introduction

From a contemporary point of view, many logicians and philosophers of logic would hesitate to take medieval theories of *consequentiae* as theories of logical consequence in a "proper" sense. Nowadays, more often than not, *logical* is taken to mean *formal* (in some sense); medieval theories of *consequentiae* deal also (if not mainly) with material consequences, whose validity - both from a contemporary perspective and from the point of view of some medieval theories - depends on the meaning of their categorematic terms. If we take *consequence* narrowly, these logicians and philosophers of logic would probably be right: in this sense, most medieval theories appear to be more about some sort of linguistic entailment than about consequence. The same contemporary logicians or philosophers of logic would also dismiss Medieval Logic as having little or nothing to do with Logic at all - and they would be joined in this assessment by many historians of Medieval logic itself. However, the concept of (logical) consequence or Logic itself are neither unequivocally defined nor as eternal and immutable as some might like to believe: they have a history which could turn out to be relevant or possibly even enlightening for our own conceptions and endeavours.

Therefore, I am going to argue that this kind of dismissive assessment might not be completely correct: on the contrary, it appears to often be short-sighted or sometimes patently wrong. I will make my point by examining some interesting features of a logical text from the second half of the XIV century: the treatise on *Consequentiae* by Marsilius of Inghen, of which I am giving a semi-critical edition.

Cameron outlines four possible approaches to the study of the history of Medieval logic: "rational reconstruction", "historical reconstruction", "history of applied logic", and "social

history of logic".<sup>1</sup> Each of these types assumes its own privileged point of view, pursues its particular goals, and asks its specific questions. It is very rare to find historiographical works taking exclusively one of these approaches; and ideally, a historiographical study of Medieval logic should aim for a balance between the four: it should go for both historical accuracy and philosophical interest at the same time. Far from reaching this historiographical ideal, in the present work I am attempting to offer a presentation as *tout court* as possible of Marsilius of Inghen's theory of *consequentiae*: I will take up methods and questions from all four of Cameron's approaches and I will try to offer some answers.

In contributing a first edition of an influential text as Marsilius' *Consequentiae*, along with its contextualisation and a philosophical analysis of some of its central features, I am pursuing both historical and philosophical aims. From the historiographical point of view, I am making new materials available to a wider readership - materials that were previously available only in manuscript form. By presenting a detailed reconstruction of Marsilius' life and works within their institutional and cultural context, I am suggesting also a more precise approximation for the dating of Marsilius' *Consequentiae*. Furthermore, I am adding a tile to the complex and still incomplete mosaic of XIV century discussions on the subject and giving some elements to call for a partial reassessment of the split between Parisian and English traditions; a need for such a reassessment emerges also from a conceptual analysis even of some of the most exemplificative texts belonging to either tradition. This tile may be a small one, but it is still important in order to offer a better picture of these theories and - more broadly - of some significant developments in logic in the second half of the XIV century.

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<sup>1</sup> Cameron [2011]

From the philosophical point of view, by working on the specifics of a case study and on its context, I am touching upon some general questions about what counts (or should count) as Logic, the relation of Logic to its own history, and about what it means to logically follow.

In Chapter I, I am presenting a detailed analysis of Marsilius' life and career as a professional philosopher and as a fairly typical - although successful - University master in the second half of the XIV century. Because of its typicality, Marsilius' life offers an interesting example of how late medieval philosophers worked within their institutional contexts. Furthermore, a more detailed analysis of Marsilius' life could shed light on some questions of interest for the history of late medieval philosophy and of logic, including Marsilius' possible involvement with the "Buridanian circle" (if there were such a thing), an approximate dating of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* and even on the split between Parisian and English traditions and their relation to each other. I am also offering a brief analysis of Marsilius' personal library, bequeathed to the University of Heidelberg upon his death.

Chapter II is an introduction to the edition of Marsilius' *Consequentiae*, which follows the same chapter.

In preparing the present edition, the complexity of the manuscript tradition and the palaeographical difficulties entailed a long editorial work and some substantial editorial choices. In order to justify those choices I am introducing the structure of the treatise and its manuscript tradition. In the manuscripts' circulation of Marsilius' works on the *logica modernorum*, there are some features of interest emerging from such analysis: for example, they are often copied within anthologies of logical texts belonging mostly to the English tradition. I am situating the *Consequentiae* within the tradition of Marsilius' other works in the *logica modernorum* and I am analysing the relations among these treatises, broaching the



question of their relative order of composition and if they were conceived as a unitary or at least continuous project. I was able to distinguish two main blocks of text: on the one side, a "core block", more unitary both in content and circulation, and including the treatises edited by Bos, all dealing with supposition and closely related theories; on the other side, a second less unitary block, grouping together Marsilius' treatises on *Consequentiae*, *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia*. Furthermore, I am proposing a tentative dating of the *Consequentiae* with some supporting philological, textual and doctrinal arguments: I suggest that the late 1360s are a probable date of composition.

Finally, I am presenting the choices adopted for the establishment of the edition of the text in the selection of the basis manuscripts, about the preferred *lectio*, and the orthography and syntax.

In Chapter III, I have two principal aims. First, I am rejecting the common historiographical thesis that sees Medieval Logic as logic only in a (partially) equivocal sense. Second, I am assessing medieval theories of *consequentiae* in their historical development and conceptual framework, in order to tackle the question if they are theories of consequences at all and, therefore, to have a frame of reference for an analysis of Marsilius' theory (chap. 4). I am presenting a general overview of the profile of medieval logic and of its study. Starting from a minimal definition of logic as "what logicians do", in the first place I am examining who medieval logicians are, in which institutional and cultural contexts they operate (especially in the later Middle ages), and how they define themselves and their practices; I am briefly analysing these practices against the ways medieval logicians define them. I am then outlining and evaluating some common takes and issues in the historiography of Medieval Logic. I am arguing that Medieval Logic is logic in an unequivocal sense, that it does not require any extrinsic unifying notion, and - by discussing some methodological questions - that the study

of Medieval Logic qua logic is philosophically relevant also from our contemporary point of view. Finally I am giving a partial historical introduction to the XIV century debate(s) on *consequentiae*, touching upon some of the issues which are going to be the main focus in my analysis of Marsilius' theory. In particular, in examining the most common classification of XIV century theories of *consequentiae*, I am paying particular attention to the split between a Parisian tradition and an English tradition on the subject, highlighting their main features. I am arguing that the general classification is at least partially inadequate and that several authors, including Marsilius, for some aspects do not fit well within the usual parameters characterising either the Parisian or the English approach, but rather that their theories are hybrids of both.

My analysis of Marsilius' theory of *consequentiae* is developed in Chapter IV, in which I focus on Marsilius' definition of *consequentia* and on some aspects of its articulation throughout Book I. I begin with an analysis of Marsilius' *definitio* or *descriptio quod sit* of *consequentia* and of its parts, to show that Marsilius' conception of *consequentia* is twofold: (1) *consequentia* is an *oratio* which expresses some entailment relation between existing sentences; (2) this relation is the *habitus necessaria* of the following or *illatio* and it is what constitutes the very core of Marsilius' notion of *consequentia*. I am then analysing Marsilius' overview of several accounts of validity. In particular I am concentrating on those which he deems satisfactory accounts and on some aspects of their articulation, in a comparison with John Buridan's and Albert of Saxony's analogous discussions. Finally, I am focusing on Marsilius' take on the relation between *consequentiae* and *propositiones hypotheticae conditionales*. Even if Marsilius rightfully belongs to the Parisian tradition, this analysis shows some relevant differences with Buridan and Albert, most evidently about their very conceptions of what a *consequentia* is and

about its divisions. Overall, while Albert and Marsilius embrace some major Buridianian theses, these authors do not present a uniform front even on some central issues.

In Chapter V, I am taking a case study from Book II and examining Marsilius' analysis of the expositions of sentences containing *incipit* and *desinit*. Late Medieval discussions about *incipit* and *desinit* are an interesting and complex meeting point of physical, ontological and logical questions and concerns. I am not overlooking these issues, because they play a major role in justifying an author's choice in matters primarily concerning the logical analysis of sentences containing these terms. Therefore, even if I am focusing on the technicalities of Marsilius' treatment of the *expositio* of sentences of this type, I am contextualising it within the more general framework of these debates. In the split between logical and physical approaches, Marsilius' theory shows some hybrid features, but - as I am going to argue - it inclines towards the logical end of the spectrum.

## 1. Chapter I: Marsilius of Inghen: Life and Works

«Λεκτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνδρῶν»  
Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* I, 21

### 1.1 *Life*<sup>2</sup>

#### 1.1.0 *Introduction*

There are philosophers whose lives appear to be intrinsically interesting: this might be due to the personal charisma of some of these characters, to some unusual event happening to them or to many other factors - particularly with the help of time, a few not completely reliable sources, and tradition. The preference for emblematic figures or the partisan approach of some old historiographical ways have played their part as well. In any case, some philosophers' lives offer more colourful anecdotes and have a pinch of adventure or a brush of romanticism. Peter Abelard's love story with Heloise and its tragic conclusion still ring a bell with the general public. William of Ockham is said to have escaped from Avignon at night on stolen horses (which is probably false). We know very little of John Buridan's life, but François Villon's verses on his supposed execution "thrown in a sack into the Seine" by order of the Queen of France contributed to build up a legend. Marsilius of Inghen is not legend material. The only poems written about him are encomiastic exercises assigned to Heidelberg schoolboys to commemorate the founding rector of the local University shortly after his passing.<sup>3</sup>

Marsilius' life is neither particularly adventurous nor romantic: he was never condemned for holding unorthodox positions; he was a very well respected master for most of his life; he seems to have entertained very good relations with popes and potentates; and when his

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<sup>2</sup> To date, the most extensive biography of Marsilius is still Ritter [1921]; see also Bos [1983], Braakhuis - Hoenen [1992a], and Courtenay [1992]. Bos [1983, 6-9] gives an analysis of the previous literature on Marsilius' life and works. I will engage with the relevant secondary literature where available, therefore mostly for the pivotal moments in Marsilius' life; however my principal aim is to give a presentation and extensive analysis of the primary sources instead than a bibliographical compilation.

<sup>3</sup> See Vimpfelingius [1499]

personal positions were in conflict with the line held by his University, he abandoned Paris quietly and went to found a new university elsewhere. However, this does not diminish the importance of Marsilius' philosophy and its influence: he is one of the most original and philosophically sharp nominalists in the second half of the XIV century; and the *via marsiliana* (Marsilius' way of conceiving, presenting and defending nominalism) ended up being very successful in many central and eastern European universities well into Early Modernity.

Furthermore, Marsilius' life offers an interesting insight into the academic life and intellectual relations in Paris and then in Heidelberg in the second half of the XIV century, and the portrait of a successful (however not too atypical) medieval master.

I will therefore present a picture as complete as possible, examining all the known documentation concerning Marsilius. Such an account of Marsilius' mostly academic life gives us at least a partial insight into the circumstances of his intellectual life. I will proceed first with an overview of Marsilius' early life (I.1.1). I will then give an extensive analysis of his time in Paris as a student, a young master and finally as a renowned philosopher, with particular attention to Marsilius' administrative and diplomatic commitments. In this section I will also touch upon some issues of more general interest, as for example Marsilius' possible involvement with the "Buridanian circle" (if there were such a thing), and I will point out some clues for a tentative dating of the *Consequentiae* (I.1.2).<sup>4</sup> I will then examine what we know of Marsilius' time as an envoy at the papal curia just on the verge of the Great Schism, and of his "missing years" after he left Paris and before he reappeared in Heidelberg as the founding rector (I.1.3). After an overview of Marsilius' last years in Heidelberg (I.1.4) and having drawn some conclusions (I.1.5), I will at last offer a brief analysis of Marsilius' personal library, devised to the University of Heidelberg after his death (I.1.6).

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<sup>4</sup> A more extensive argument for a tentative dating of the *Consequentiae* and a paleographical analysis will follow in Chapter II.

### 1.1.1 *Early life*

We do not have any direct contemporary documents on Marsilius of Inghen's early life, but we have a good margin for reconstruction from later sources.

Both his date and place of birth have been matters of scholarly debates.

Marsilius was probably born around 1340. We might reach a better approximation if we take Nicholas Prowin's *Oratio Funerbris* to be a reliable source:<sup>5</sup> indeed, according to Prowin, Marsilius became *magister artium* before he turned twenty, which was unusually early and hence worth mentioning.<sup>6</sup> Since Marsilius - as far as we know - began to teach in Paris by the end of September 1362,<sup>7</sup> assuming that he did not complete his studies long before that, then he was not born before 1342 or 1343.

Ritter argued for a higher age, because (a) already in 1363 Marsilius occupies a prominent position in Paris;<sup>8</sup> (b) he is mentioned as a *senior* of the *natio Anglicana* in 1376; (c) if he were born in 1342 or later, Marsilius' would have been an early death.<sup>9</sup>

I do not think that Ritter's reasons are conclusive: (a) it is not unheard of for a young and ambitious master to have a rapidly progressing career,<sup>10</sup> since it is the "Parisian system" itself to allow only *magistri artium*, mostly young masters, to elect the rector and hold that office.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, (b) by 1376, especially if he "stayed in the arts", Marsilius would indeed be a *senior* among the other *magistri*. Furthermore, (c) since at the time of his death Marsilius seems to have still been quite actively involved in the academic life, and had just completed his lectures

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<sup>5</sup> Prowin's *Oratio Funerbris* was printed in 1499 in Vimpfelingius [1499, 38 and ff.]. I could not find any manuscripts.

<sup>6</sup> Vimpfelingius [1499, 42]: "ante vicesimum etatis sue annum magisterium in artibus acquiescit". Usually, "a student of arts was not allowed to obtain the *inceptio* (the final stage to the Master's degree) before the age of 21" (Bos [1983,7]).

<sup>7</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 272]. See I.1.2

<sup>8</sup> See I.1.2

<sup>9</sup> Ritter [1921, 7] is widely followed: for example, recently Hoenen, Santos Noya, and Schulze have dated Marsilius' birth between 1335 and 1340 (Marsilius de Inghen [2000, Einleitung, 1]); Bos used to set Marsilius' date of birth around 1340 (Bos [1983, 7]), but later on he seemed to have moved it up to 1330 (Bos [1997]). See also: Hoenen [1993a, 7-11] and [2013]; Longeway [1999, 537], Markowski [1985], Wielgus [1993].

<sup>10</sup> On masters' careers in medieval universities see Verger [2002, 148-151].

<sup>11</sup> On Marsilius' own defence of the "Parisian way" see I.1.4. Among the many studies on the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris, see in particular Olga Weijers [1994-2012] (in particular [2005] contains a study about Marsilius) and [2011].

on the *Sentences* and hence obtained his doctorate in Theology, it is likely that he did not die an old man: if we take Prowin seriously, 54 or 53 years is indeed a plausible age.

As for Marsilius' place of birth, he was probably born in Nijmegen or nearby:<sup>12</sup> he is referred to as 'Marcilius de Inghen de Novimagio Coloniensis diocesis' in the *Rotulus* of the *Natio Anglicana* in Paris,<sup>13</sup> and as 'Mercilius de Novimagio' in the *Proctor's Book*.<sup>14</sup> It has been noted that these are indeed reliable sources, since they are likely based on a statement by Marsilius himself and therefore should hold more weight than the *Oratio Funebris*,<sup>15</sup> where it is stated that Marsilius belonged to the neighbouring diocese of Utrecht.<sup>16</sup> On such basis, some scholars have claimed that Marsilius was a native of Inghen (also spelled Ingen) instead.<sup>17</sup> Since Inghen is only about 25 km from Nijmegen, it is possible that our sources refer to the nearest major city: this would not be unusual, even if it is just as common for students to refer to their villages as a place of origin even if these are at a significantly shorter distance from the closer major city - like e.g. Groesbeek, that appears in the *Chartularium* and is only 5 kilometers from Nijmegen.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, Braakhuis and Hoenen argue that 'de Inghen' was used commonly as a surname in that area and occurs frequently in the books of the universities of Cologne and Heidelberg during Marsilius'.<sup>19</sup> According to Braakhuis and Hoenen, taking 'de Inghen' as a family name would make more sense of what would otherwise be a strangely redundant

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<sup>12</sup> Toepke [1893, 607], Ritter [1921, 7], Bos [1983, 7]. On the topic, see Braakhuis - Hoenen [1992a]

<sup>13</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 91]

<sup>14</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 289]

<sup>15</sup> Vimpfelingius [1499]

<sup>16</sup> Braakhuis - Hoenen [1992a, 4]. Among those who rely on the *Oratio Funebris*: Toepke [1893], Ritter [1921]

<sup>17</sup> E.g.: Thorbeke [1886,9], Markowski [1985, 136], Pattin [1988, 305]

<sup>18</sup> I thank professor Hoenen for his note on this matter.

<sup>19</sup> See Braakhuis - Hoenen [1992a, 3-4], Doorninck [1903, 138, 147, 158, 168, 177], Toepke [1893, 882], Ritter [1921, 7]. In particular, Braakhuis - Hoenen [1992a, 3] argue that: "no de Inghen's were recorded in Inghen itself". However I do not think this fact proves in any way that someone called 'de Inghen' was not from Inghen: even if in the second quarter of the XIVth century 'de Inghen' has developed in a family name, its geographic origin is quite clear: it is not unlikely that there are not many people identifying themselves as 'from Inghen' in Inghen itself. It should also be noted that "Inghen" means something like "meadow" and is not just the name of a particular place but it appears as an ending in several toponyms as well: Wageningen, Groningen, Persingen. I thank professor Hoenen for this last remark.

reference in the *Rotulus* (“de Inghen de Novimagio”) and of the “Marsilius de Novamagio” in the *Proctor's Book* – that would otherwise simply be wrong. However, as Sara Uckelman notices, inherited family names developed very late in the Low Countries and only became common when Louis Napoleon imposed their use. Agreeing with Uckelman, I am inclined to interpret the apparently redundant “de Inghen de Novimagio” as a literal descriptive, clarifying that the ‘Ingen’ Marsilius comes from is the one near Nijmegen - rather than e.g. the omonymous village in France.<sup>20</sup> Since it is still common to refer to the closest city to someone's village of origin when explaining where somebody is from, the entry in the *Proctor's Book* could still be explained as an approximation.

### 1.1.2 Paris

The first known mention of Marsilius of Inghen in an official document is the entry in the *Rotulus* of the *Natio Anglicana* at the University of Paris for 27 September 1362: “dominus Marcellus de Inghen” inceptis under *magister* William Buser of Heusden<sup>21</sup> and is “hired” along with five other masters.<sup>22</sup>

Considering Marsilius' provenience, the framework of his philosophy, and how quickly his career progressed, it is reasonable to assume that he had received his higher education in Paris and was already well known among his colleagues.

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<sup>20</sup> I am deeply grateful to Dr. Uckelman for her annotations.

<sup>21</sup> On Buser see Kneepkens [1982] and [1993]

<sup>22</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 272-3]: “Sub mag. Wilhelmo Buser, 27 die Septemb.: Item inceptit dominus Nicolaus de Prutia, cujus bursa 8 sol., franco valente 18 sol. Item inceptit dominus Marcellus de Inghen, cujus bursa 8 sol. Item inceptit dominus Theodoricus de Oy, cujus bursa 8 sol. Item inceptit dominus Willehelmus de Wic, cujus bursa 8 sol. Item inceptit dominus Johannes Holtman, cujus bursa 8 sol., et supplicavit nationi quod caperet pignora ad mensem, quod concessum fuit. Item inceptit dominus Symon de Beverwic, cuius bursa 8 sol. [...] Item anno, die, ut supra, omnes magistri pro tunc presentes nationis Anglicane pransi fuerunt *in ymagine Nostre Domine*, in quo prandio 7 magistri, scilicet mag. Nicolaus de Prucia, mag. Marcellus de Inghen, mag. Theodoricus de Oy, mag. Wilhelmus de Wic, mag. Johannes Holtan, mag. Symon de Beverwic, mag. Johannes de Suecia, quilibet pro suo introitu solvit unum florenum, et residuum, scilicet 25 sol., solvit receptor ex parte nationis.” See also Thijssen [2004]



The main historiographical question concerning the first years of Marsilius' career in Paris is the one about his alleged relationship with Buridan: was Marsilius a pupil of Buridan's? Scholars are divided on the subject.<sup>23</sup>

There are some occurrences of Marsilius referring to Buridan as *magister meus*,<sup>24</sup> but this is not a title that Marsilius reserves only for the Picard master<sup>25</sup> and, as it has been noted, it is often an honorific epithet (akin to our "my esteemed colleague")<sup>26</sup> not implying any institutional intellectual filiation.<sup>27</sup>

Buridan is certainly one Marsilius' main references through all of his logical and philosophical works; is his influence due exclusively to his written works or were they personally acquainted?

They belonged to different *nationes* (respectively *Picardiae* or *Picardica* and *Anglicana*), and most of the teaching and academic activities happened in one's nation. The university of Paris at the time was largely constituted of quite autonomous entities (colleges, convents, national schools, etc.), but there was a certain amount of institutional flexibility and permeability among such institutes. According to the 1290 statute, any student of the faculty of Arts could attend the lectures of masters outside of his nation.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, it is verisimilar that a

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<sup>23</sup> For example: according to Ritter [1921 I,11] Marsilius was a pupil of Buridan's; Kneepkens [1982, 159] and Braakhuis - Hoenen [1992a, 7] consider a personal relationship between the two unlikely. A more cautious intermediate position is taken by Courtenay [2004a] and Thijssen [2004]

<sup>24</sup> Marsilius de Inghen, *Quaestiones super libros De generatione et corruptione*, ed. Venice 1501, fol. 106va: "Et quia hec opinio mihi probabilis apparet, nescio si passionatus ex opinione magistri mei magistri Johanni Buridani qui eam posuit, ideo eam in suis partibus persuadere propono et eam immediate declarare intendo..." See also: Thijssen [2004, 23]

<sup>25</sup> *Magister meus*, for example, is also the Cistercian James of Eltville, who however might have been Marsilius' teacher when he was studying Theology in Paris. See: Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super quattuor libros Sententiarum*, Strasbourg 1501 (repr. Frankfurt/Main 1966), f. 475va: "magister meus bone memorie, magister Jacobus de Erbacko". See also: Courtenay [2004a, 11], [2000a] [1992, 39]. Certainly *magister meus* is a courtesy title for colleagues working together in Heidelberg in the attribution to Marsilius' peers Heilmann of Wununberg and John Holzsaedel (explicitly "a fellow *sententiarium* with Marsilius" - Courtenay [1992,40]). See: Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super quattuor libros sententiarum*, (ed. Santos Noya, vol. 1, 6): "quandoque corollarie arguam cum reverendis magistris meis et patribus: Magistro Heilmanno Wunnenbergher baccalario formati huius almae universitatis et decano Nuhusensi et domino Johanne de Domo Sancti Wilhelmi baccalario actu legente".

<sup>26</sup> Courtenay [1992, 43]

<sup>27</sup> Courtenay [2004], [1992, esp. 41-49], [1987a, ch. 6], [1987b]; Thijssen [2004]; Braakhuis - Hoenen [1992a, 7]. Pelster [1944, 84] erroneously takes "magister meus" seriously.

<sup>28</sup> Courtenay [2004a]; Tanaka [1990]; Toulouse [1939]

student, even being under a master in his own nation, could seek the advice and tutoring of another master from a different nation - especially a popular one whose interests were close to his own.<sup>29</sup>

Even if most of the intellectual influence for a student in Paris probably happened through reading, auditing, and personal interactions outside of the institutional mentorship relations,<sup>30</sup> it is entirely possible that Buridan and Marsilius crossed paths in the late '50s. It is generally presumed that Buridan was dead by 1361,<sup>31</sup> one year before Marsilius' *inceptio*. By 1362, students or young masters who had not prepared for their *determinatio* or had their *inceptio* in Paris had to pay an additional fee to their Nation. Since we do not have any records of Marsilius paying this tax, it is possible that he was in Paris already in the early 1360's or late 1350's; certainly Buridan was still alive and well in 1358.

There is a documented episode involving Buridan between 1356 and 1358 that might be of some interest because of the parties involved. In 1356 a dispute erupted between the Picard and British nations concerning a student, John Mast, who, having determined with the *natio Anglicana* to which he belonged, petitioned to incept with the *natio Picardie*.<sup>32</sup> Themon Judeus, *magister artium* with the British nation and notoriously (along with Albert of Saxony, Nicole Oresme, and Marsilius of Inghen) part of the first generation of Buridianian philosophers, refused his approval.<sup>33</sup> The controversy was not settled until the end of 1358. A

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<sup>29</sup> There are also some extremely rare cases of supervising masters from outside the student's nation; see: Courtenay [2004a]; Tanaka [1990]

<sup>30</sup> Courtenay [2004a]

<sup>31</sup> By 1361 one of Buridan's benefits is devolved to someone else. On Buridan's life and works see: Zupko [2003, xi], [2014], [1998, 131-32]; Michael [1985]; Faral [1950]; Flüeler [1999]; Sobol [1984, x-xx]; Klima [2009, 3]; Courtenay [1999] and [2004a].

<sup>32</sup> On the controversy see Boyce [1937]; on Buridan's, Themon's and Albert's involvement specifically see Thijssen [2004, 26-27].

<sup>33</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 206]: "Item 19<sup>a</sup> die ejusdem mensis facta erat congregacio apud Sanctum Julianum pauperum super quodam bacalario, nomine Johannis Mast, Leodiensis dyoc., qui dum incipere volebat et transiisset cum bedellis nacionis Pycardie per vicum Straminis ad petendum licenciam a magistris facultatis artium, ut morum est, si inceptio sua in dicta facultate eis placeret, respondit magister Themo Judeus nacionis Anglicane, quod non, eo quod alias determinans fuit in sua nacione, et super hoc orta fuisset lis inter magistros nacionis Pycardie et nacionis Anglicane predictarum, ex eo quod quelibet nacio eum dicebat pertinere ad suam nacionem, et super hoc discussum fuisset in facultate predicta, quod nec magis se tenere debet ad unam nacionem quam ad aliam . . ."

general assembly had already convened in the beginning of June 1357 and decided to exclude the proctors (i.e. the heads of the nations) of the English and Picard nations from being part of the committee that would arbitrate the dispute.<sup>34</sup> In July, John Buridan is sent to submit a *rotulus* with the arguments of the *natio Picardie* to the *natio Anglicana* and to argue the Picard case before the committee.<sup>35</sup> The two nations resume the negotiations in July 1258<sup>36</sup> and the representatives reach an agreement on 12 July.<sup>37</sup> Among the witnesses deemed trustworthy who sign the settlement (specially chosen and summoned for the occasion),<sup>38</sup> we find both John Buridan and Albert of Saxony.<sup>39</sup> The day after, the masters from both nations meet to celebrate the happy resolution of the controversy at a local tavern. William Buser is there (he helps with the part of the bill that the nations funding does not cover), Albert of Saxony is there too (and he apparently has to borrow money from John Mast), and presumably so is Buridan - being one of the witnesses.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 212]: "Item secundo die Junii in congregacione generali apud Sanctum Maturinum optentum fuit, ut procuratores nacionum Picardie et Anglie non sederent cum deputatis Universitatis in causa mota inter duas illas naciones super quibusdam terris et personis."

<sup>35</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 212]: "Item facta congregacione deputatorum in causa inter nos et Picardos die II mensis Julii et sedentibus eis pro tribunali apud Sanctum Maturinum, Magister Johannes Buridan, ex approbatione procuratoris Picardorum predictis iudicibus per modum *intendit* seu memorie optulit quemdam rotulum, cuius copia nobis dabatur petentibus..."

<sup>36</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 233]: "Item 12<sup>a</sup> die Julii facta congregacione generali apud Sanctum Maturinum, suplicaverunt nacio Piccardorum et nacio nostra, scilicet Anglicana, quatenus Universitas compositionem ipsorum contentam in instrumento ibidem lecto approbaret, et instrumentum sigillo Universitatis sigillaret, quod fuit concorditer concessum. Forma autem instrumenti et compositionis inferius annotabitur. [...] Factum et sententiatum per iudices per dictas naciones ad hoc electos, videlicet magistros Guillelmum de Alckines, Robertum de Racourt, Henricum de Olmen ex parte nacionis Picardorum; ex parte vero Anglicorum magistros Allardum de Lunne, Geraerdum dictum de Wilde, et Johannem Wilhelmi, qui tanquam tractatores super controversia finium predictarum nacionum tractaverunt et sententiaverunt..."

<sup>37</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 235]: "Anno Domini M<sup>o</sup> CCG<sup>o</sup> quinquagesimo octavo, die duodecima mensis Julii, indictione undecima, pontificatus sanctissimi in Christo patris ac domini nostri domini Innocentii divina providentia pape sexti anno sexto."

<sup>38</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 235]

<sup>39</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 235]: "Quos modum et formam limitum, terminorum, finium ac distinctionum supradictos ipse naciones prefate plenius avizate et deliberate laudaverunt et approbaverunt, et perpetuo ratos et firmos habere voluerunt et tenere promiserunt. Presentibus ad hoc venerabilibus et discretis viris dominis et magistris Ingeranno de Freneyo, Christiano de Sancto Audemaro in theologia; Henrico de Ruppaleto, Herberto de Sarcellis in decretis; Johanne dicto Mercurel, Gervasio Christiani in medicina; Johanne Buridan, Nycolao de Suessione, Roberto Godefridi, Alberto de Saxonia in artibus, et pluribus aliis fide dignis testibus ad premissa vocatis specialiter et rogatis."

<sup>40</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 235-6]: "Item die sequenti, secundum quod ordinatum fuit, magistri dictarum nationum pecuniam depositam et sequestram occasione dicte controversie consumpserunt in taberna *ad grangiam*, ubi consumpte fuerunt 18 libre, scuto valente 30 solidos, de quibus nacio Picardorum solvit 2 scuta cum dimidio, et natio nostra etiam tantum; residuum fuit pecunia sequestrata, videlicet 2 floreni quos habuit

That both Buridan and Albert (and Marsilius' master) were at an official inter-national dinner certainly does not prove the existence of a "Buridanian school"; but it proves at least that they were personally acquainted - and it would be unrealistic to think that human nature and academic relations changed so much that there was no networking and talking shop at such occasions. Furthermore, that both Buridan and Albert were handpicked, with the approval of their nations, as particularly trustworthy witnesses to oversee the conclusion of a lengthy and difficult negotiation, could support the thesis of their good standing with their respective nations and of a closer personal and intellectual relation between them, transcending the institutional boundaries.

This does not prove any direct personal acquaintance between John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen, but in my opinion it supports the sussistence of a personal and professional (as well as professional) network, transversal to the national divisions, to which Marsilius is very likely connected. Staying within the institutional boundaries, Marsilius must have personally known Themon Judeus and Albert of Saxony within his own nation. Both Themon and Albert are still in Paris in 1361 when Marsilius is probably preparing for his *determinatio* and *inceptio*: Albert succeeds Themon as *procurator* and serves his term before leaving for Vienna,<sup>41</sup> where he is among the founding members of the new University (1364).<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, it is highly improbable that later on Marsilius did not cross paths with Oresme - who was a master of Theology when Marsilius was a student in the same Faculty.<sup>43</sup>

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magister Johannes de Calore de magistro Willelmo Buser; item 2 scuta, que habuit receptor noster de eodem; item 1 muto quem habuit magister Albertus de Saxonia de [Johanne dicto] Mast; idem 1 muto quem concesserunt Picardi etiam de [Johanne dicto] Mast."

<sup>41</sup> Thijssen [2004, 21]; Courtenay - Goddard [2004, 5]

<sup>42</sup> Biard [2015]

<sup>43</sup> Courtenay [2000a, 12 and 19]

If Buridan had an actual "school", it did not leave any documentary trace, but this does not mean that he did not gather an informal group of pupils and colleagues around himself, attracted by his fame and sharing a common "intellectual physiognomy".<sup>44</sup>

From a comparison between the development of some of Buridan's theories and his first class', we have enough evidence of a "small intellectual network"<sup>45</sup> conducting a closer philosophical dialogue, sharing a philosophical approach, a conceptual framework, and many fundamental positions, but also diverging on important specific theoretical issues.<sup>46</sup>

If such a group ever existed,<sup>47</sup> we have enough historical and theoretical reasons to believe that Marsilius of Inghen matured in its intellectual environment and was a part of it, at least for a short time before its dissolution.

In November 1362, Marsilius is among the masters who, as customary, petition to the pope for ecclesiastic benefits or other forms of funding.<sup>48</sup> At this point, Marsilius was not a student of Theology yet and it is unlikely that his request was accepted.

At some point in 1363, Marsilius becomes *magister regens*.<sup>49</sup> He seems to be quite active in the political and administrative life of his nation: in June 1363 he is already *subprocurator*<sup>50</sup> and he is unanimously elected acting proctor relieving John Scalpi, until Scalpi returns from his

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<sup>44</sup> Maier [1949,3]

<sup>45</sup> Thijssen [2004, 42]

<sup>46</sup> I think this has been convincingly argued for the case of the relationship between Albert of Saxony and Buridan on the *impetus* doctrine and the identity of substance and quantity by Thijssen [2004]. We are still in need of systematic analogous studies for Marsilius of Inghen, Themon Judeus, Nicole Oresme.

<sup>47</sup> On Buridan's "school" (or lack of thereof) see Thijssen [2000], [2004] and [2009]

<sup>48</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, Rotulus facultatis artium Parisiensium ad Urbanum V missus, 82-92:91]: "23/XI/1362 ... premiare dignetur sanctitas vestra misericordia plena eisdem iuxta petitionum suarum infrascriptarum continencias de beneficiis ecclesiasticis seu aliis graciis specialibus misericorditer providendo, cum acceptacione... Magistro Marcilio de Inghen de Novimagio, Coloniens. dioc. [de can. eccl. S. Severini Colon.]"

<sup>49</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 285]: "Urbanus V Marsilio de Inghen, mag. in art., qui ut asserit rector Universitatis Paris. in artibus extitit, et in eisdem artibus per sex annos continue rexit [...]. 1369 Maii 29, apud Montemflasconem".

<sup>50</sup> Du Boulay [1665-1673, IV, 376]: "Anno eodem [1363] die 25 Junij M. Marcellius de Inghen Nouimagiensis Philosophiae Professor substitutus est M. Ioanni Scalpi in Subprocuratorem Nationis Anglicanae..."; Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 285]: "Item facta congregacione nacionis apud Sanctum Julianum 26 die mensis Junii, supplicavit magister Johannes Scalpi tunc temporis procurator nacionis quatenus nacio concederet sibi pecuniam sibi debita procuratorie sue per vacaciones et quod ipse usque ad reditum suum de Flandria substitueret procuratorem (qui quidem subprocurator nuncupabatur magister Marcilius de Inghen) usque ad reditum. Et concessa fuit supplicacio".

holiday.<sup>51</sup> Less than a year since his *inceptio*, Marsilius takes on the highest office in the nation: the procurator or proctor is to the nation what the rector is to the university.<sup>52</sup> Scalpi is back in August but he has to leave again for Rome,<sup>53</sup> hence Marsilius does not step down until the end of the mandate (probably in the end of September or the beginning of October),<sup>54</sup> but in the meantime he is duly compensated for his trouble.<sup>55</sup>

A few months later, in February and March 1364, we find Marsilius engaged in teaching and supervising the *determinantes'* examinations side by side with his old master.<sup>56</sup> In April, Theodoric Distel resigns from his office as *receptor* (bursar); his request for picking a substitute is denied by the nation: a new regular election is held instead and Marsilius is elected to be in office until 24 February 1365.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 286]: "Anno Domini 1363°, 26 die mensis Junii, facta congregacione nacionis apud Sanctum Julianum pauperem, magister Joannes Scalpi supplicavit nacioni ut possit usque ad reditum suum de Flandria substituere procuratorem. Concessa fuit sua supplicacio, dummodo tamen talem substitueret qui, si ipse non rediret, maneret procurator per vacaciones. Et substitutus est unanimitate consensu magistrorum magister Mercilius de Inghen, in cujus procuracione acta sunt hec que sequuntur."

<sup>52</sup> The four *procuratores* had also been charged with the election of the rector, but by Marsilius' time the electors are four regent masters named specifically for the occasion.

<sup>53</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 286]: "Item facta congregacione apud Sanctum Julianum pauperum 15° kal. Augusti reversus fuit magister Johannes Scalpi predictus, qui supplicavit nacioni, cum ipse ut asseruit nunc habere agere in curia Romana, quatenus nacio ab ipso et loco ipsius vellet capere substitutum procuratorem usque ad reditum suum, et substitutus erat Mercilius predictus usque ad reditum suum, ita tamen quod si redierit infra vacaciones, quod procurator sit quemadmodum fuit prius, et concessa erat supplicacio."

<sup>54</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 290]: "Anno Domini 1363 in die ... facta congregacione nacionis Anglicane ad Sanctum Julianum pauperem, electus fuit in procuratorem magister Albertus de Bavaria."

<sup>55</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 289]: "Item anno Domini 1363, mensis Augusti 13 die, mag. Johannes Neve de Gelria et mag. Marcilius de Inghen de Novymagio ex integrali consensu magistrorum nacionis Anglicane tunc Parisius existentium solvebant quilibet 13 solidos VI denarios pro beyanyo eorum de prima procuratoria ipsorum, in platea de Cythara in *hospicio duorum cignororum*."

<sup>56</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 292-4]: "Item facta congregacione apud Sanctum Julianum nacionis, electi fuerunt concorditer secundum modum consuetum in examinadores determinancium magister Wilhelmus Buser, Magister Johannes de Saxonia et Magister Mercilius de Novimagio, V Kal. Februarii [...]. Item die XVI kal. Martii determinavit dominus Johannes Arnoldi de Novimagio, Colonien. dioc. sub magistro Mercelio de Inghen, cuius bursa IX solidi. [...] Item, eadem die determinavit dominus Martinus Tienych de Aquis Leodiens. dyoc. sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cuius bursa IX solidi. Satisfecit bedellis et nacioni, posuit literam officialis et fidejussorem, prout nacio sibi concessit. Et satisfecit receptori in procuratorio magistri Theodorici de Oy."

<sup>57</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 298-9]: "Item electus fuit receptorem usque ad festum Mathie magister Marchelius [sic] Inghen, et juravit sub expensis receptoris antiqui. [...] Anno Domini millesimo trecesimo sexagesimo quarto, indictione secunda, mensis Aprilis die sexta, hora primarum [...p]rimo resignavit magister Theodericus Distel de Unna officium receptoris nacionis predictae, cupiens alium substituere, quod negatum fuerat, sed erat ab omnibus noviter electus magister Marcilius de Inghen in exercendum officium predictum usque ad festum Mathie proximo futurum."

In the beginning of 1365 Marsilius is charged again with examining the *licentiandi*<sup>58</sup> and with an increasing number of students determining under him.<sup>59</sup> In July, Marsilius' name comes up again in the University records. He is, with Buser and many masters from all faculties and all nations, at an extraordinary general assembly, addressing a matter of "extreme urgency": some layman had abusively planted some grains in the masters' garden; an eviction order was issued immediately and promptly executed.<sup>60</sup> Order and leisure spaces were re-established the same day.

In March 1366 Marsilius is once again elected *procurator* of the *natio Anglicana*;<sup>61</sup> in October 1367, he becomes rector of the University of Paris for the first time.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 307]: "[13/1/1365] Item in eadem procuracione facta congregacione nacionis apud sanctum Julianum pauperem ad eligendum officarios, electus fuit in examinatore[m] licenciandorum apud Sanctam Genofevam [sic] magister Marcellus de Inghen."

<sup>59</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 308-10]: "Item in eadem determinavit dominus Johannes Colc dyoc. Colonien. sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa X solidi. Item determinavit dominus Heynricus Heynrici dyoc. Colonien. sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa X solidi. Item determinavit dominus Arnoldus dictus Neve dyoc. Colonien. sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa X solidi. Item determinavit dominus Ghiselbertus Groensbeec dyoc. Colonien. sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa X solidi. [...] Item determinavit dominus Heynricus Culemborch sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa nichil. [...] Item determinavit dominus Jordanus Wanghe de Clivis sub magistro Mercilio dei Inghen, qui posuit literam officialis, quod solveret, antequam caperet alios gradus, cujus bursa X solidi. [...] Item determinavit dominus Nycolaus de Crucinaco sub magistro Marcilio, cuius bursa V solidi, qui posuit literam officialis usque ad festum Remigii."

<sup>60</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 135]: "Anno Domini 1365, die tertia mensis Julii, magistro Johanne de Dyodona, Belvae. dyoc, tunc temporis rectore Universitatis existente, fuit deliberatum in congregacione generali magistrorum regentium et non regentium ad hoc specialiter et per juramentum vocatorum apud Sanctum Maturinum celebrata, quod quoddam bladum, quod fuerat a quodam laico in villa Sancti Germani commorante seminatam, penitus colligeretur seu extirparetur, quod eodem die fuit executum, scilicet in quadam portione prati clericorum, presentibus venerabilibus et discretis viris dominis et magistris, predicto rectore, magistro Roberto de Corbeia, magistro Johanne de Sancto Medardo, magistro Johanne de Corbolio carmelita, [Johanne de Cystercio] priore Sancti Bernardi, magistro Amando fratrum Minorum, cum multis aliis tam secularibus quam religiosis doctoribus in theologia; item in decretis magistro Johanne de Fresneio cum multis aliis; item in medicina magistro Petro Lupi, magistro Johanne de Lovanio et magistro Walrando cum multis aliis; item in artibus quatuor procuratoribus, magistro Dyonisio Flatonis, magistro Odardo Bileti, magistro Nicolao de Suesione, magistro Johanne de Crello, magistro Nicolao le Faulurdier, magistro Nicolao Jonglet, magistro Johanne Bouchim, magistro Thoma Durandi, magistro Thoma Mielle, magistro Michaele Wistomi, magistro Marsillio [de Inghen] et magistro Guillelmo Buserii cum valde multis magistris omnium nationum et scolaribus omnium facultatum."

<sup>61</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 160]: "Anno Domini 1366, die 24 mensis Martii, videlicet in profesto Annunciationis beate Virginis Marie, facta congregacione facultatis more solito apud S. Julianum Pauperem ad eligendum novum rectorem per venerabilem et discretum virum magistrum Johannem de Trelon, fuit electus in rectorem Universitatis Parisiensis magister Johannes de Dunghen de Brabantia Leodiensis dyocesis, qui valde invite onera rectorie acceptavit. Et fuerunt intrantes magister Guillelmus de Marchia, magister Clemens Calati, magister Thomas Durandi et magister Marcilius de Ynghen."

<sup>62</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 166]: "Anno Domini 1367, mensis Octobris die xj, electus fuit concorditer in rectorem Universitatis Paris. magister Marcilius de Inghen nullo intralium reclamante, in qua rectoria plurimos habuit labores et expensas".

According to Bos, most of Marsilius' philosophical works (and the logical ones in particular) have probably been composed up to this point, i.e. between 1362 and 1367, before Marsilius takes over more demanding administrative and representative duties.<sup>63</sup> However, there are a few reasons to doubt that Bos' assessment is correct. For example, the list of even only Marsilius' surviving philosophical works is quite extensive; in the coming years he will have mostly teaching duties for months (an occupation quite conducive to the production of academic texts - such as commentaries on Aristotle's works commonly found in the Universities curricula, and short treatises on logical or philosophical subjects); furthermore, in several cases, Marsilius seems to have written more than one commentary on the same text.<sup>64</sup> Although further studies are still needed before reaching a definite reliable dating of most of Marsilius' writings (but for his commentary on the *Sentences*), it seems unlikely that all or even most of them were composed over a five-year timespan.

At some point in 1366, Marsilius must have enrolled in Theology: when he finally obtains a canonicate in the spring 1369, the document mentions that he has been studying theology for three years.<sup>65</sup> At a normal pace, Marsilius would have completed the mandatory five years of study by 1371; then he would have read cursorily two books of the Bible and finally commented upon the *Sentences*.<sup>66</sup> But Marsilius does not complete his degree in Paris: he will only in Heidelberg - shortly before his death. Ritter assumes that, because of his many academic and administrative commitments, Marsilius was not seriously engaged in his theological studies while in Paris and that his real theological formation began in Heidelberg. However, even if Marsilius' career is particularly brilliant or even exceptional, it is not unusual for students in theology to still keep a regency in the arts, and hence have to deal with

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<sup>63</sup> Bos [1983, 8]

<sup>64</sup> For a list of Marsilius' known surviving works see I.2

<sup>65</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 188]: "Urbanus V Marsilio de Inghen, mag. in art., «qui ut asserit rector Universitatis Paris. in artibus exitit, et in eisdem artibus per sex annos continue rexit, et qui s. theol. a tribus annis citra scholaris fuit », canonicatum eccl. Monasteriens. confert. Dat. apud Moilemflasconem iiii kal. Junii, anno septimo. « Litterarum scientia ». 1369 Maii 29, apud Montemflasconem". See Ritter [1921, 38-40].

<sup>66</sup> Courtenay [1992, 45], [2000a]



the related commitments. Ritter's thesis seems to be at least partially shaped by wanting to make Marsilius a proper representative of German (and particularly Heidelbergian) theology.<sup>67</sup> As remarked by Courtenay, it is undeniable that Marsilius' *Sentences* commentary, as we have it, was composed and read in Heidelberg. However much of its content either matches Marsilius' philosophical works, probably from the Parisian period, or "appears somewhat frozen in time" (as far as contemporary references go) to 1370s.<sup>68</sup> Therefore it is quite likely that the materials assembled later were collected around that time. As Courtenay suggested, it is probable that Marsilius' theological studies were delayed by his prolonged absences from Paris on diplomatic missions.<sup>69</sup> By the time the Great Schism began, Marsilius was probably close to completion, but he was absent when the University of Paris took a stand for Clement VII under the pressure of the King of France. With the political situation deteriorating, Marsilius – supporter of Urban VI – probably never went back to Paris and had to complete his degree later on in Heidelberg.

As a philosopher Marsilius was certainly well known and also widely read in the faculty of theology,<sup>70</sup> but we do not know much about his time as a young theologian in Paris.

As far as we know, he was not associated with any college,<sup>71</sup> although he might have had closer contacts with the Cistercian convent and access to their library. James of Eltville, who Marsilius remembers in his *Sentences* as "magister meus bonae memoriae", was a Cistercian and a master of Theology in Paris around the time Marsilius was there;<sup>72</sup> furthermore, along with James, Marsilius shows a predilection for Cistercians and Augustinian authors as his acknowledged sources in theology. This is a mere conjecture, but it would help to account for Marsilius' apparent closeness (sometimes in terms of theoretical affinity, sometimes of

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<sup>67</sup> Courtenay [1992, 41-47]

<sup>68</sup> Courtenay [1992, 47-53], [2000a, 11]; Hoenen [1993b]

<sup>69</sup> Courtenay [2000a, 7]

<sup>70</sup> Courtenay [1992, 57-51]

<sup>71</sup> Courtenay [2004, 14]

<sup>72</sup> See Courtenay [2004, 11]

conceptual awareness, or even of textual correspondence)<sup>73</sup> to some of the on-going developments in English logic, since the Cistercian library held one the largest collection of English logical and philosophical texts in Paris at the time.<sup>74</sup>

At the end of his rectorship, in the second half of 1368 Marsilius is back to teaching (and presumably writing).<sup>75</sup> In December, he is chosen as the *natio Anglicana* representative to be sent with the roster to the pope: the assignment is prestigious, quite the career opportunity, and furthermore it will pay rather handsomely.<sup>76</sup> Marsilius will not have to leave before the end of March 1369.<sup>77</sup> In the meantime, Marsilius keeps teaching and has more and more

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<sup>73</sup> For example, Marsilius rejects that the *consequentia ut nunc* is a *consequentia* at all [*Consequentiae* I, 2, <3> ]; this position is common in the "English" logical tradition on the theory of consequences. See Chapter IV. See for example Bertagna [2008, 362] and [1994, 533]. Furthermore, the second book of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* deals with *consequentiae* involving sentences containing *exponibiles* terms and their "exposed" versions - topic which is typically treated in treatises on *Exponibiles*. This structure is not common in the XIV cent. "Parisian" or "Continental" tradition on *consequentiae*, but it occurs in some treatises in the English tradition, e.g. in Richard Ferrybridge or Paul of Venice. See Bertagna [1994, 538]. See Chapter II.

<sup>74</sup> On the Cistercian library, see: Courtenay [2004]. On the circulation of English manuscripts in Paris see also Genest - Vignaux [1988].

<sup>75</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 312-314]: "Item VI die mensis ejusdem [Junii 1368] licenciatus sub magistro Marsilio solvit bursas sue licencie dominus Johannes de Venlo, cujus taxa IX solidi. [...] In artibus inceperunt: [...] Item dominus Johannes de Venlo, cujus bursa exoluta prius est dicta sub magistro Marcilyo. Item dominus Gotfridus de Tijla, sub dicto magistro Marsilyo, cujus bursa VIII solidi de qua eciam caucione fidejussoria et litera mediante satisfecit. [...] Item in crastino crastine diey sancti Johannis Baptiste dominus Geraerdus dictus Wilde licenciatus fuit sub magistro Marsylio, qui satisfecit pro bursis sue licencie IX solidos caucione fidejussoria et literam domini officialis. Item idem incepit sub dicto magistro Marsilio in vigilia sancti Petri Apostoli de carcere, satisfaccione obligatoria jam data. [...] Item 3 die mensis Julii licenciati fuerunt domini Hugo de Delf. Item Wolbrandus Cesar, Bartholomaeus Wil[helm]y, Alfarodus de A, sub magistro Marsilio, quorum satisfactio dicta per literas jam ad archam impositas. Item in crastino Divisionis Appostolorum magister Marsilius exolvit pecuniam pro qua se obligaverat pro domino Johanne de Ledenberk". Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 320]: "Item pro distributionibus magistrorum in festo Katerine in missa exposuit receptor XXXVI solidos. Item incepit dominus Johannes Haghen sub magistro Marcilio, cujus bursa VI solidi; posuit literam officialis ut supra in aliis actibus (*sic*) usque ad duos annos."

<sup>76</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 321]: "Item XIII die mensis Decembris facta congregacione nacionis apud Sanctum Maturinum ad eligendum nuncium, per quem rotulus nacionis Anglicane esset mittendus ad curiam Romanam, et fuit electus magister Marcilius de Inghen in nuncium unanimiter nullo contradicente. Item in eadem congregacione fuit deliberatum quod ex parte officii sui esset recepturus C et LX francos per istum modum, quod de quolibet magistro presente die predicto, scilicet XIII die mensis Decembris, Parisius existente in rotulo ponendo reciperet duos francos, et de quolibet superveniente post dictum jam prescriptum reciperet III francos, et residuum summe jam taxate reciperet de prompta pecunia nacionis, et hoc si nacio residuum summe taxate in prompto haberet, antequam exierit villam cum rotulo; quod si non in prompto plenariam summam habuerit nacio predicta, tunc predictus magister Marcilius defectu pecunie nacionis prompte carebit, quosque nacio complementum illius pecunie defectus prescripti habuerit. Et ex illo complemento defectum pecunie debite sibi recipiet, et natio ex eodem sibi satisfaciet." Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 328]: "[8/III/1369] Item octava die mensis Marcii facta congregacione nacionis in primis Sancti Jacobi apud Sanctum Maturinum [...] Summa data nuncio, magistro scilicet Mersilio, a receptore secundum quod idem receptor computavit in computo sequenti: XL franci, II solidi."

<sup>77</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 187]: "[16/XII/1368 - 24/III/1369] Nec fuerunt aliqui nuncii nisi quatuor magistri de quatuor nationibus in facultate artium et bedellus. [...] n. 10] Nuntius ex parte nat. Anglic. erat Marsilius de Inghen, qui Martii 19 in taberna pro suo Bene valetate duos francos solvit (vid. Auctar. Charlul., I), qui tamen solum

students.<sup>78</sup> In February 1379, when the *procurator* in office, Henry Langhal, has to submit a request to the nation, Marsilius acts as proctor for the deliberation.<sup>79</sup> By mid-March the last financial issues concerning the *rotulus* are being settled.<sup>80</sup> On 19 March Marsilius petitions the nation to receive a one franc reimbursement once he is back, like the other national envoys; his request is granted.<sup>81</sup> That same night the *natio* meets at the tavern "'At the Castle', between the two bridges", for a farewell dinner and for luck Marsilius buys a round out of his

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post Martii 31 ad curiam profectus est." Courtenay [2000a, 9] ignores the last remark, assuming that by the end of March Marsilius was already on his way to Italy. See also: Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 329-331].

<sup>78</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 324]: "Item incepit dominus Herdwicus sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VII solidi. [...] Item incepit dominus Alfardus de Aa sub magistro Mersilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VII solidi". Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 326-328]: "Primo determinavit domicellus Baldwinus de Bronchorst sub magistro Mersilio de Inghen, cujus bursa XI solidi. Item determinavit domicellus Reynoldus de Vianne sub eodem magistro Mersilio, cujus bursa VIII sol. posuit pignora. [...] Item determinavit dominus Henricus de Tremonia sub magistro Mersilio, cujus bursa nichil, quia juravit statutum paupertatis. [...] Item dominus Henricus Sesarii determinavit sub magistro Mersilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VII solidi. [...] Item determinavit dominus Johannes de Duren sub magistro Mersilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VIII solidi; posuit pignora. Item determinavit dominus Jacobus de Aquis sub magistro Mersilio, cujus bursa VIII solidi; posuit pignora. [...] Item determinavit dominus Hermannus de Colberch sub magistro Mersilio de cujus bursa III solidi; solvit francum cum III solidis, pro residuo pignora. Item subdeterminavit dominus Johannes Zinninghe sub magistro Mersilio de Inghen, cujus bursa IIII solidi, posuit pignora". Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 330]: "Item licentiati fuerunt domicelli Johannes et Baldewinus de Bronchorst sub magistro Marcelio de Inghen, quorum bursa XI solidi. [...] Item licentiatus fuit domicellus Reynaldus de Vianen sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa IX soldi". Furthermore, around the same time, Marsilius appears again in the *Liber procuratoris* because, when a colleague gets sick, Marsilius asks the nation to cover for his expenses. Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 324]: "Item eisdem die [25/I/1369], hora et loco facta congregacione nacionis ad supplicandum et ordinandum de pecunia nacionis, supplicavit magister Mercilius pro Johanne nostro bedello, cum per aliqua tempora infirmus fuisset et adhuc infirmaretur et plures expensas habuisset, ut nacio sibi pie in aliquo subveniret, cui dati fuerunt duo franci".

<sup>79</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 325-326]: "[17/II/1369] Item in iam dictam congregacionem supplicavit magister Henricus Langhals, pro tunc procurator nacionis, cum ispe esset obligatus magistro Arnesto de Wulven existenti receptori IIII francos et XV solidos, ut nacio tantam pecuniam velit defalcare receptori in proximo computo de summa, quam debet nacioni, et idem magister Henricus maneat debitor nacionis secundum formam statuti supradicti. Qua supplicacione facta dictus magister Henricus exivit congregacionem, magistro Mersilio de Inghen tenente locum procuratoris ad deliberandum super dicta supplicacione. Facta deliberacione et eodem magistro Henrico revocato responsum sibi fuit per dictum magistrum Mersilium, supplicacionem suam fore concessum."

<sup>80</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 329]: "[14/III/1369] Item eadem die in completoriis facta congregacione nacionis apud Sanctum Maturinum ad audiendum computum inrotulorum, computaverunt domini inrotulatores, quod receperunt ab inrotulandis nonaginta sex francos, qui soluti erant pro tunc magistro Mercilio de Inghen, nuncio ituro cum rotulo ad curiam, exceptis tribus francis, pro quibus magister Petrus de Leydis supplicavit pro dilacione."

<sup>81</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 329-330]: "[29/III/1369] Item XIX die dicti mensis Marci facta congregacione nacionis Anglicane apud Sanctum Maturinum post sermonem, supplicavit magister Mercilius nuncius iturus cum rotulo ad curiam Romanam, ut ipse in reditu suo a quolibet utiliter signato, videlicet ubi peteret vel ubi daret reformacionem suam, haberet unum francum, secundum quod nunciis aliarum nacionum est concessum, cujus supplicacio erat concessa." Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 341]: "[7/IX/1369] Item 7 die mensis Septembris facta congregacione nacionis apud Sanctos Cosmam et Damianum super eciam modo exigendi francum a quolibet utiliter signato, scilicet sicut principaliter petivit, vel sicut petivit reformari vel melius ad usum nuncii nacionis in curia pro rotulo, scilicet magistri Mercilii de Inghen, cum hoc alias ante ejus recessum ad sui supplicacionem per nacionem concorditer erat ordinatum: deliberatum fuit et eciam ad supplicacionem magistri Arnoldi Neve concessum quod ipse tamquam procurator constitutus ex parte antedicti magistri una cum bedello monere deberet singulos tales, ut satisfacerent, et contra rebelles procedere, scilicet vocando coram nacione vel alio iudice, coram quo nacio vellet dictum magistrum Arnoldum juvare quantum licite posset."

own pocket.<sup>82</sup> After having overseen a student's *licentia* on 31 March,<sup>83</sup> Marsilius must have left for the curia around the beginning of April.<sup>84</sup>

It was going to be a long journey: Urban V had (temporarily) moved back to Rome in October 1367 - and he was going to be there until September 1370, when he returned to Avignon. As noted by Courtenay, it is the first time that the University delegation has to undertake the longer and more demanding journey to Italy for the *rotulus*.<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, the mission of the representative bringing the *rotulus* could usually be quite prolonged because it was their task to check that there were no mistakes and reduplications among the requests.<sup>86</sup> Given that Marsilius' absence was most likely going to be extended, he had entrusted the *scholae* assigned to him for the year to Arnold Neven - although in May the nation reassigns the office to Jordan de Clivis.<sup>87</sup> Marsilius is certainly not back by 25 April to sponsor a *licentia*, as it is written instead in the *Liber procuratoris*: that sponsorship was certainly done *in absentia*.<sup>88</sup> Marsilius will be away from Paris for about two years, probably well into the spring of 1371. When Marsilius reaches the pontifical court in April 1369, he probably has occasion to meet the emperor Charles IV, who is still in Rome; but his most profitable networking and most meaningful relationship is certainly the one Marsilius maintains with Urban V himself. Indeed, in some letters and documents, Urban V refers to Marsilius as his own *familiaris*,<sup>89</sup> which means - as Courtenay noted - that:

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<sup>82</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 330]: "Item eadem die nacio intravit tabernam *ad castellum* infra duos pontes, ubi consumpsit VI libras, de quibus dictus magister Mercilius solvit ii francos pro suo *bene valete*; residuum solvit receptor".

<sup>83</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 331]: "[31/III/1370] Item ultima die mensis Marcii [...] licentiatus fuit dominus Johannes de Dūeren sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VIII s.". Courtenay [2000a] believes that Marsilius sponsored this *licentia in absentia*.

<sup>84</sup> Courtenay [2000a, 9] disagrees and assumes that Marsilius had left shortly after 19 March.

<sup>85</sup> Courtenay [2000a, 7]

<sup>86</sup> Courtenay [2000a]

<sup>87</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 337]: "[7/V/1370] Item VII die mensis Magii facta congregacione nacionis apud Sanctum Maturinum in nonis Nostre Domine super scolis VII arcium, adjudicavit eas nacio magistro Jordano, non obstante quod magister Marcilius cui concesse erant per nacionem eas magistro Arnolde Neven concesserat et ipsum ad legendum in eis pro ipso instituerat, sicut preposuit ex parte sua".

<sup>88</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 335]: "Item XXV die mensis Aprilis [...] fuit licentiatus dominus Hermannus Lullenisse sub magistro Mercilio, cujus bursa IIII solidi, et solvit".

<sup>89</sup> See Courtenay [2000a, 8]

he belonged to an inner circle of those, outside the papal staff, who had access to the pope.<sup>90</sup>

Such *familiaritas* could indeed make quite the difference in a career. Was it a result of Marsilius' mission? Or was Marsilius already acquainted with the Pope, maybe from when the latter was still William de Grimoard and used to be a celebrated master of canon law? We do not know.

Overall things seem to go quite well for Marsilius in Rome and then in Avignon.

By the end of May 1369, Marsilius, who has been student of theology for some time now and master regent for six years, becomes canon in Münster, but without prebend.<sup>91</sup> However by the end of June 1369 Marsilius has managed to exchange his expectations in Münster with an appointment near Cologne, bringing a canonical prebend.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, in July 1369, Marsilius receives an invitation and a *licentia docendi* at the faculty of arts in Montpellier with the same power as a regent master - basically as a "visiting professor" for the autumn and winter terms 1369-1370.<sup>93</sup> From this evidence, the amount of detailed surviving paperwork concerning this matter (the invitation, the visiting masters' rights and obligations, their pay and the timely acquittance of said stipend),<sup>94</sup> and considering Marsilius' prolonged absence from Paris,<sup>95</sup> in my opinion we have more than enough reason to believe that he accepted the appointment.<sup>96</sup>

In one of the examples in his *Consequentiae* Marsilius mentions Montpellier, but not Paris;<sup>97</sup> it is not compelling evidence, but it might be enough to speculate that the text (at least in the

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<sup>90</sup> Courtenay [2000a, 10]

<sup>91</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 188], [LC n° 25057]

<sup>92</sup> [LC n° 23344], dating 30 June 1369; see also Courtenay [2000a, 7]

<sup>93</sup> Guiraud [1891, 216-217]; Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 92n]

<sup>94</sup> For example: Guiraud [1891, 218-220]; [LC, n° 23835, 24152, 24153, 24154, 24155, 24156, 24715, 24716, 24717, 24718, 24719]

<sup>95</sup> Marsilius is certainly still fulfilling his duties as a nuntius in September 1369. See Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 341]

<sup>96</sup> On this I agree with Courtenay [2000a, 7-9]

<sup>97</sup> The mention of Montpellier is constant in all the manuscript I could examine.

version that was transmitted and that I am presenting) was composed or revised for his lectures in Montpellier, between 1369-1370.

It does not look like Marsilius went back to Paris after teaching for two terms in Montpellier (autumn 1369 - winter 1369/1370). There is only one minor mention of him in the *Liber* of the English nation in March 1370, about a *determinatio* that was probably sponsored *in absentia*:<sup>98</sup> Marsilius is still absent and exercising his duties as the nation *missus* in August 1370, since the nation decides to write to him once again for a matter concerning the *rotulus*.<sup>99</sup>

Marsilius seems to have stayed away from Paris also for most of the 1370-1371 academic year: we know that six (unlisted) masters of the Anglican nation have been absent for an extended period of time in January 1371<sup>100</sup> and Marsilius' name does not appear in the University documents until the beginning of May 1371. Overall, Marsilius' whereabouts between August 1370 and May 1371 are unknown: as a *familiaris* of Urban V it is possible that Marsilius remained with the papal court at least until the pope's death in December 1370.<sup>101</sup> He might have stayed under Gregory XI, completing his duties as *nuncius*,<sup>102</sup> or he might have been travelling for a few months thereafter.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 351]: "Item subdeterminarunt: dominus Olavus de Zwecia loco domini Johannis Hoon de Harlem sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa IIII solidi [...]"

<sup>99</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 359-360]: "Item facta fuit congregacio nacionis Anglicane apud Sanctum Maturinum ad supplicandum et pro facto nacionis, ubi fuit deliberatum quod factum nacionis maneret in suspenso usque ad recessum domini episcopi Glascuensis. In qua supplicavit magister Henricus Kemp, quod imponeretur in rotulo tamquam presens, et concessa fuit supplicacio per modum supradictum. Item facta fuit congregacio nacionis 3<sup>a</sup> dominica mensis Augusti [= 18/VIII/1370] apud Sanctum Maturinum super facto nacionis, et deliberatum fuit quod scriberetur magistro Marcilio ad hoc ut expediret factum."

<sup>100</sup> E.g. Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 362]: "[13/I/1371] ... quod sex magistri absentes possent imponi rotulo nacionis".

<sup>101</sup> 19/XII/1370

<sup>102</sup> Gregory XI is elected on 30/XII/1370. Marsilius happened to be *nuncius* under Gregory probably twice: at the beginning of his papacy in 1370-71 and before his death. In 1379 Marsilius puts forward a request for a refund relative to a mission in Avignon under Gregory XI that might refer either to 1371 or, more likely, to 1377-78. See: Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 570]: "[21/II/1379] Et supplicavit magister Hugo de Hervorst ex parte magistri Mercilii de Inghen, quod cum nacio sibi adhuc teneretur XX francos de legacione alias facta in Avinionem tempore Gregorii pape XI, et nunc nacio recepisset XXIII francos ab Universitate, quod nacio vellet sibi satisfacere de illis XX francis. Cujus supplicacio fuit concessa, dum tamen daretur quitancia sufficiens nacioni, sic quod nacio maneret indempnis."

<sup>103</sup> Courtenay [2000a, 10]

On 5 May 1371, Marsilius is probably on his way back when the nation decides to regroup on a later date to drink to his health.<sup>104</sup> He is certainly back on the 14th of the same month, when he addresses the nation for letters on the behalf of a certain Reynaldus.<sup>105</sup> On the same day, the *natio* goes to the tavern "'ad ymaginem beate virginis' in vico Sutorum" to have those drinks.<sup>106</sup>

Now that he is back things get once again quite busy for Marsilius.<sup>107</sup> In June 1371 he is elected rector of the University of Paris for the second time.<sup>108</sup> He will be in office until 16 December 1371.<sup>109</sup> Among other things, as a rector, along with three other deputies, he has to examine some new statutory articles for the *natio Anglicana*.<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, in November 1371, towards the end of Marsilius' mandate, his nation names him and Gerard of Kalkar to provide<sup>111</sup> for the holiday of Saint Edmund.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 397]: "[5/V/1371] Primo eodem die in dicta congregacione deliberavit concorditer, quod sibi placeret ire ad tabernam et propinare magistro Mercilio de Ynghen".

<sup>105</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 397-398]: "Item anno Domini quo supra, facta congregacione nacionis Anglicane 14<sup>a</sup> die mensis Maii immediate post sermonem apud Cordigeros ad supplicandum, supplicavit primo magister Mercilius de Inghen nomine cujusdem bachillarii, Reynaldi nomine, quatenus nacio sibi concederet literas testimoniales de hoc, quod alias per annum studisset in facultate arcium et bachillariatum optinuit in eadem facultatem, cujus supplicatio fuit concessa".

<sup>106</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 398]: "Item 2<sup>o</sup> propositum erat, cum alias concorditer deliberatum fu[er]it per magistros nacionis, quod vellet de pecunia nacionis propinare magistro Mercilio, cum alias legatus cum rotulo nacionis tempore recessus sui nacioni propinasset, quatenus protunc nacio iret ad tabernam sibi propinando. Super quo concorditer omnes magistri presentes consencierunt, licet aliqui tamen dicebant quod in alia congregacione preterita illud non poterat efficaciter deliberari, cum nacio non fuisset vocata ad ordinandum de pecuniis suis, ut ipsi dicebant. Omnibus tamen ad hoc concorditer consencientibus ivit nacio ad tabernam *ad ymaginem beate virgini* in vico Sutorum, ubi consumpsit 2<sup>os</sup> francos cum 4<sup>or</sup> solidis, quos receptor solvit".

<sup>107</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 399-401]: "Item licentiatus est dominus Johannes Boisville sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa 7 sol. Satisfecit receptori. [...] Item incepit dominus Johannes Boysville sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cuius bursa 7 solidi. Juravit et satisfecit receptori".

<sup>108</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 200]: "1371, Junii 24, Parisiis. Item anno Domini 1371, in festo beati Johannis Baptiste, electus fuit in rectorem idem magister Marcilius [de Inghen] nullo intrancium reclamante, et sic iterato habuit labores et expensas, licet non tot et tantas".

<sup>109</sup> Du Boulay [1665-1673, IV, 436]: "Die vero 16 Decemb. eidem Marcilio successor successus est...".

<sup>110</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 402-403]: "Item facta congregacione nacionis Anglicane anno quo supra, die XI<sup>a</sup> Septembris, apud Sanctum Maturinum ad statuendum de scolis et ad supplicandum, deliberatum erat quod tales articuli, qui statui deberent, deberent dari quatuor deputatis, scilicet domino rectori et domino magistro Ade et magistro Henrico Lanchals et magistro etc. ...".

<sup>111</sup> The "procuratores" is used here in a less technical sense, as a synonym for "provisores"; see following note and also Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 435].

<sup>112</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 405]: "Item in die sabbati ante festum sancti Edmondi fuit facta congregacio nacionis ad ordinandum de pecunia nacionis et de festo Edmondi et ad supplicandum et ad eligendum procuratores pro festo. Electi fuerunt Mercilius de Inghen et ego ipse Gerardus prescriptus in procuratores pro festo".

In January 1372, Marsilius is among the masters charged with examining the students determinating.<sup>113</sup>

When in the beginning of March 1372 the nation is reorganising its finances and collecting its debts, Marsilius is chosen to revise the soliciting letter, along with the proctor, the bursar and Gerard of Hoynghe. <sup>114</sup> In the meantime, Marsilius keeps up with his ordinary teaching duties, but things seem to have slowed down, since in March he supervises the *licentia* and *inceptio* of only one pupil - and one with no scholarship at that.<sup>115</sup> Courtenay conjectures that in this period Marsilius was probably completing his initial theological training and preparing to become a bachelor in Theology, since he seems to be less active as a teacher and an administrator between 1372<sup>116</sup> and 1373.<sup>117</sup>

Around the same time, Marsilius ends up on the front line in a matter concerning one of the common articles attached to the University *rotulus* to be sent to the Pope. The events are both recorded in the *Liber procuratoris nationis Anglicane* and in the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*.<sup>118</sup> The English nation disapproves of one of the articles; six deputies (and our Marsilius is among them) are named to raise the issue in the general assembly of the

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<sup>113</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 408]: "[13/I/1372] Item in 3<sup>o</sup> per tres magistros antiquiores de nacione electi fuerunt in examinadores determinancium et jurati magister Marsilius de Ingham [sic], magister Hermannus de Bodtenburc et magister Jordanus de Clyvis".

<sup>114</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 410]: "[6/III/1372] Item super ordinacione debiti nacionis, deliberavit quod debitores monerentur et citarentur. Item super supplicacione magistri Edmari deputavit nacio magistrum Mercilium, magistrum Gerardum de Hoynghe et procuratorem et receptorem, qui corrigerent literam ejus pro honore nacionis, ut melius potuerint, antequam sigillaretur".

<sup>115</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 411]: "[9/III/1372] Primo licenciatus est Johannes Hollinc de Tremonia sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa nichil. [...] [19/III/1372] Item inceptit Johannes Hollinc de Tremonia sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa nichil".

<sup>116</sup> According to Courtenay the period of Marsilius' decreased activity is between 1371-1373; I believe that the lower limit has to be brought up to 1372: we have seen that Marsilius was presumably away from Paris until the spring 1371, but his engagements on record for the following months are not fewer than the average of his "busier" periods. See following note

<sup>117</sup> Courtenay [2000a, 10 n. 29]

<sup>118</sup> Respectively: Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 411] and [1894b, 203-206]. One of the documents referring to the facts in March must have the wrong date, probably the *Liber procuratoris*: according to the *Liber* the meeting of the English nation naming the masters to bring up the issue in the general assembly is on 19 March, but the general assembly when the English masters (who are said to have been regularly elected by their nation) address the issue is on 17 March.



University.<sup>119</sup> In the assembly, Marsilius is the one taking the floor, addressing the issue in the name of his nation - and he repeatedly addresses the notary to witness and record everything. Marsilius asks the assembly to remove or revise the article under discussion.<sup>120</sup> The rector remits the decision on how to proceed to the consultation of the masters and doctors in attendance.<sup>121</sup> One nation sides with the *natio Anglicana*; two against.<sup>122</sup> Master Peter Lupi, for the faculty of Medicine, votes for sending the articles as they are.<sup>123</sup> The dean of the faculty of Law, Lambert de Flore Sicco, recommends hearing the reasons of the English

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<sup>119</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 411]: "Item facta congregacione nacionis Anglicane 19<sup>a</sup> die mensis Marcii ad deputandum et supplicandum ad Sanctum Julianum, deputati erant sex magistri, magister Gherardus de Harderwiic, magister Bertoldus canonicus Sancti Salvatoris, magister Henricus Lanchals, magister Adam de Catwiic, magister Mercilius de Inghen et magister Jordanus de Clivis, et cum istis procurator pro tempore, ad informandum deputatos facultatis theologie super quodam articulo contento et sigillato in rotulo quodam pape Gregorio mittendo, delendo vel corrigendo, si predicti magistri predictos doctores sufficientibus rationibus ad hoc adductis informarent. Qui articulus erat in forma quod ordo rotuli servaretur, quod supplicare esset in perpetuum prejudicium nacionis Anglicane."

<sup>120</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 203-204]: "1372, Martii 17. Parisiis. In nomine Domini, amen. Noverint universi presens publicum instrumentum inspecturi, quod anno ejusdem millesimo trecentesimo septuagesimo primo, secundum usum ecclesie Gallicane, die decima septima mensis Martii, pontificatus sanctissimi in Christo patris ac domini nostri domini Gregorii divina providencia pape undecimi anno secundo, apud Sanctum Maturinum Parisius, venerabilibus et circumspicis viris doctoribus et magistris Parisius actu regentibus, videlicet in theologie, decretorum, medicine, et arcium facultatibus, ad congregacionem generalem, prout moris est, ibidem celebrandam, ex jussu venerabilis et circumspicis viri, magistri Mathei de Hersino, tunc rectoris Universitatis Parisiensis, convocatis sufficienter et congregatis, proposuit dictus rector utrum expediret mittere quosdam articulos sigillatos dicto domino nostro summo pontifici; deinde proposuit idem rector ultimum articulum esse super supplicacionibus et injuriis. Quibus propositis, surrexit venerabilis et discretus vir magister Marcellius de Inghen, magister in artibus, una cum pluribus magistris nacionis Anglicane, et nomine ipsius nacionis proponendo supplicavit et requisivit in plena congregacione, quatinus predicti articuli ad dictum dominum nostrum summum pontificem, prout erant sive sunt scripti, non mitterentur, specialiter quoad illum articulum continentem, quod in omnibus ordo rotuli observetur in concurrenciis magistrorum, si qui concurrant; offerens Universitati predicte eam sufficienter informare, quod ille articulus, videlicet "quod in omnibus, etc." est contra Deum et justiciam et in maximum sue nacionis prejudicium et gravamen. Ad quod ostendendum peccit, in mei publici notarii et testium subscriptorum presencia, idem magister Marcellius nomine nacionis predicte, sibi dari deputatos ab Universitate predicta, et qui nacionem suam predictam in suis rationibus et motivis haberent audire, et Universitati predicte refferre, ut per eam predicte nacioni breve fieret justicie complementum.

Qui quidem magister Marcellius, nomine et tanquam procurator sue nacionis prefate, ad hoc, ut asserebat, legitime constitutus, in mei publici notarii et dictorum subscriptorum testium presencia, protestatus fuit de appellando, nomine procuratorio predicto, in casu (*sic*) quo in suis rationibus non audiretur, et ad eas ostendendas rationabiliter non admitteretur, vel alias quoquo modo nacio sua predicta gravaretur."

<sup>121</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 204]: "Quibus sic actis, dictus rector, in dictorum doctorum et magistrorum deliberacione posuit et eisdem precepit, quod deliberarent super hiis que in eorum deliberacione posuerat, maxime super illis articulis."

<sup>122</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 204]: "Et postmodum dictis facultatibus et quatuor nacionibus, videlicet nacione Gallicana, nacione Picardorum, nacione Normannorum et nacione Anglicana, ut consuetum est, ad partem sustractis, et habita deliberacione inter ipsas, et postea ad deliberaciones suas reddendas iterato congregatis, deliberavit dictus rector, nomine facultatis arcium, primo per hunc modum: videlicet, quod due naciones deliberabant simpliciter, quod mitterentur dicti articuli sicut erant et sunt scripti et sigillati; et alie due naciones deliberabant et deliberaverunt, quod non mitterentur sicut sunt; sed ille articulus, dicte nacioni Anglicane prejudiciabilis, totaliter deponeretur."

<sup>123</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 204]: "Insuper magister Petrus Lupi, nomine facultatis medicine, deliberavit simpliciter, quod mitterentur dicti articuli prout sunt sigillati et ordinati."

nation against that article, while sending the others without further delay.<sup>124</sup> Also Nicholas of Leigné, for the faculty of Theology, votes for hearing the reasons of the English nation and recommends three theologians for the hearing: Simon Frenon for the French nation, Nicole Oresme for the Norman, and Peter Brevis for the Picard.<sup>125</sup> Marsilius insists for everything to be put on record.<sup>126</sup> Apparently the assembly decides to hear the reasons of the *natio Anglicana*, and for that purpose the matter is again on the table in another meeting in the beginning of May. The same notary is back and the rector requests Peter Brevis, theologian from the Picard nation, to be there to bear witness. Marsilius seems to be once again the English nation's spokesman; his position is steadfast: the article in question is "illegal and against divine law as well."<sup>127</sup> The rest of the meeting almost looks like a reenactment of the previous one: the four nations are once again evenly split, the Faculty of Medicine insists for keeping the article as it is and sending the *rotulus*; the Faculty of Law votes for dropping the incriminated article and sending the rest, followed by the Faculty of Theology.<sup>128</sup> Marsilius' motion seems to have passed.

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<sup>124</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 204]: "Tercio, magister Lambertus de Flore Sicco, decanus facultatis decretistarum, nomine facultatis sue deliberavit per hunc modum: primo, quod dicta natio Anglicana in suis rationibus audiretur quoad articulum illum, quem sibi dicit esse prejudiciabilem; secundo deliberavit, quod alii articuli sine ulteriori dilacione ad curiam transmitterentur."

<sup>125</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 204]: "Quarto loco deliberavit magister Nicholas de Laingniis, nomine facultatis sacre theologie, quod dicta natio Anglicana in suis rationibus audiretur; et ad illas audiendas deputavit venerabiles viros magistrum Symonem Freron de nacione Gallicana, magistrum Nicholaum Oresme nacionis Normannorum, et magistrum Petrum Brevis nacionis Picardorum, sacre theologie professores: et postquam esset audita dicta natio, tunc fieret de articulis secundum quod dicte Universitati videretur expedire. Et finaliter deliberavit idem magister Nicholas de Laingniis, nomine quo supra, quod littere regie super quatuor milibus florenorum ex nunc sine ulteriori dilacione ad curiam transmittantur."

<sup>126</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 204-5]: "De et super quibus omnibus et singulis, dictus magister Marcellus, nomine quo supra, peciit a me notario publico, in dictorum hic subscriptorum testium presencia, sibi fieri atque tradi publicum instrumentum, sive publica instrumenta, unum, duo, sive plura, dum et quando sibi et nationi sue predicte fuerit oportunum. Acta fuerunt hec Parisius, anno, die, indictione, mense, pontificatu et loco quibus supra, hora terciarum vel circiter, presentibus ad hoc venerabilibus et discretis viris, magistris Jacobo Juvenis, Guillermo Carnificis, Thoma Mielle, magistris in artibus, et pluribus aliis doctoribus vel magistris, testibus ad premissa vocatis specialiter et rogatis. Et ego Guerinus de Bochahou, clericus Briocensis, publicus apostolica et imperiali auctoritate notarius, etc."

<sup>127</sup> Neither the *Liber procuratoris nationis anglicanae* and the records of the general assemblies in the *Chartularium* mention what this article is about.

<sup>128</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 205-206]: "1372, Maii 3, Parisiis. In nomine Domini, amen. Noverint universi presens publicum instrumentum inspecturi, quod anno ab Incarnacione ejusdem millesimo trecentesimo septuagesimo secundo, die tercia mensis Maii, indictione decima, pontificatus sanctissimi in Christo patris ac domini nostri domini Gregorii divina providencia pape undecimi anno secundo, in congregacione generali magistrorum regencium Universitatis Parisiensis apud Sanctum Maturinum dicta die, ut moris est, celebrata, ex

From the *Liber Procuratoris*, it looks like before September 1372 Marsilius had been reading in the schools of his *natio*.<sup>129</sup> Marsilius was not at the meeting held in the beginning of the month to deliberate about the schools; hence, on 21 September, he asks the nation to assign back to him the regency of some of the *scholae* of which he had already been in charge, at least for the winter term.<sup>130</sup> In February 1373, Marsilius, along with Jordan de Clivis and Gerard of

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jussu venerabilis et circumscripti viri magistri Petri de Hersino, dicte Universitatis tunc rectoris, ibidem convocatorum et congregatorum ad deliberandum super quibusdam articulis, in eorum deliberacionibus per dictum rectorem positus, nec non, et ad audiendum relacionem deputatorum alias datorum per Universitatem antedictam ad audiendum rationes quasdam, per procuratorem et magistros de nacione Anglicana sibi propositas et in scriptis traditas, de et super quodam articulo in rotulo Universitatis predicte ad curiam destinando inserto, quem dicta nacio Anglicana alias sibi esse prejudicia[bi]lem asseruit, et contra juris tam divini quam humani tenorem, super quo etiam dicta nacio Anglicana deputatos sibi dari cum instancia requisivit: in mei publici notarii et testium subscriptorum presencia, retulit venerabilis et circumscriptus vir magister Petrus Brevis, sacre theologie doctor, nacionis Picardie, ad hoc requisitus per rectorem antedictum, quod convocatis Universitatis predicte deputatis super premissis articulis, auditis propositis per illos de dicta Anglicana nacione, videbatur majori parti deputatorum predictorum, quod articuli, sicut essent sigiliati, non essent mittendi, donec super hiis per dictam Universitatem esset maturius deliberatum; nichilominus alii ex nunc, ne negocium dicte Universitatis pateretur dispendium, mitterentur dicti articuli indilate. Super quo, quid esset agendum, una cum aliis articulis, super quibus Universitas predicta pro tunc vocata fuit, in dicte Universitatis deliberacione per rectorem antedictum propositis habitaque singularum facultatum et nacionum deliberacione ad partem, ac demum eisdem pro audiendo deliberaciones congregatis, deliberavit rector predictus, nomine facultatis arcium in hunc modum: videlicet, quod due nationes volebant quod articuli, sicut sunt sigillati et ordinati, mitterentur, non obstantibus propositis per procuratorem nacionis Anglicane predicte et deliberacione dictorum deputatorum; et alie due nationes volebant eciam dictos articulos ad curiam transmitti, preter illum de quo est contencio; et de illo plenius et maturius deliberari volebant. Postmodum vero deliberavit magister Thomas de Sancto Petro, nomine facultatis medicine, quia ex eo quod dictus dominus rector posuerat in deliberacionem, non retractando deliberata, sufficebatur dicte facultati alias per ipsam deliberata; ita quod volebat et deliberabat dictos articulos, prout sunt, ad curiam transmitti, non obstantibus quibuscumque objectionibus sive allegacionibus ex parte predicte nacionis Anglicane. Insuper tercio loco, magister Lambertus de Flore Sicco, decanus facultatis decretorum, nomine sue facultatis, deliberavit per hunc modum, quod dictus articulus de quo est sermo, dimitteretur, et alii cicius quam bono modo fieri posset ad curiam destinarentur. Quarto et ultimo loco, magister Petrus Brevis, nomine facultatis theologorum, deliberavit in hunc modum, quod sicut deputatis videbatur expediens, super articulo sive articulis, nacionem Anglicanam predictam tangente vel tangentibus, fieri deberet et observari; videlicet quod alii articuli quam cicius poterit transmitterentur, et iste vero articulus, donec plenius per Universitatem memoratam esset deliberatum, an expediret vel non, dimitteretur. De et super quibus omnibus et singulis magister Marcellus de Inghen, nomine dicte nacionis Anglicane, peciit a me notario publico infrascripto sibi fieri publicum instrumentum. Acta fuerunt hec Parisius sub anno, die, mense, indictione et pontificatu predictis, hora terciarum, vel circiter, presentibus ad hec venerabilibus et circumscriptis viris magistris Johanne de Bornasello, priore de Carnoto, decretorum doctore, Matheo de Hersino, Johanne Le Dos, Guillermo Le Dos, Johanne de Marsonno, magistris in artibus, ac pluribus aliis doctoribus et magistris, testibus ad premissa vocatis specialiter et rogatis. Et ego Guerinus de Bochahou, clericus Briocensis, publicus, etc."

<sup>129</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 414-415]: "Item XII die mensis Septembris facta congregacione nacionis hora prime post sermonem apud Sanctum Maturinum super ordinacione scolarum pro regentibus et rector[ibus] in ordinario instanti, - et quia V erant instantes pro scolis, qui se promiserant lecturos, et V sunt scole spectantes ad nacionem, - deliberatum fuit quod quilibet haberet unam scolam, manentibus actu regentibus in scolis quas iam haberent. Supplicavit tamen magister Thomas de Clivis, quod in casu, quo ipse haberet plures audientes quam magister Wilhelmus Wadenoye, quod tunc ipse magister Wilhelmus permutaret scolas, in quibus legerat magister Marcilius."

<sup>130</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 415]: "[21/IX/1372] Item magister Marcilius de Inghen, quia nuper in disposicione scolarum non fuit presens, supplicavit nacioni quatenus provideretur sibi de scolis, quia

Kalkar, is once again elected to examine the *determinantes*;<sup>131</sup> a few days later, he takes the mandatory oath required for that job.<sup>132</sup> We know from the *Chartularium* that Marsilius is elected to represent his nation when the Picard John of Beke becomes rector, at the end of March 1373.<sup>133</sup> Marsilius' name does not come up again in the *Liber procuratoris* until June, when he is named once again proctor. On the following Tuesday, the new *procurator* - with the "leisure funding" coming with his office - takes all the masters to lunch.<sup>134</sup> Marsilius is in office till the end of August, when John of Prisolwalch relieves him.<sup>135</sup> In the meantime, two English masters in a row had been elected to the office of rector, and both of them had refused the appointment; we only have a mention of this fact in the *Liber of the natio Anglicana* and no further documentation, so we do not know who these masters are.<sup>136</sup> Even if we wanted to allow ourselves to speculate, we do not have any further information that could support the hypothesis of Marsilius being among them. All we could say is that Marsilius has a talent for dealing with bureaucratic matters and situations requiring a diplomatic touch, and such talent is amply acknowledged by his colleagues, as his numerous appointments to several positions

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intenderet regere et continuare regenciam eciam ipse; proposuit quod fuit in possessione quarundam scolarum, in quibus hyeme proximo preterita rexerat. Et sic significavit eis regenciam futuram."

<sup>131</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 419]: "Item facta congregacione nacionis in Sancto Maturino die 6<sup>a</sup> mensis Februarii ad eligendum examinatorum determinancium et bachalariorum licenciandorum in Sancta Genevefa, electi fuerunt in examinadores determinancium magistri Mercilius de Inghen, Jordanus de Clivis et Gherardus de Calker."

<sup>132</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 420]: "[10/II/1373] Item facta congregacione nacionis ad audiendum juramenta examinatorum determinancium, juravit magister Mercilius de Inghen et Gerardus de Calker prescriptus in nacione; sed nacio procuratori dedit potestatem audiendi juramentum tercii examinatoris, scilicet magistri Jordani, pro se propter absenciam ejus in illa congregacione."

<sup>133</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 212]: "1373, Martii 24, Parisiis. Anno Domini 1372, die xxiiij mensis Martii, electus est in rectorem Universitatis Parisiensis magister Johannes de Beke, Brabantinus, Leodiensis dyocesis; et fuerunt intrantes Lambertus de Marchia, Jacobus Juvenis, Thomas Mielle et Marcilius de Inghen, Gallicane, Picardie, Normannie et Anglicane nationum."

<sup>134</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 426-427]: "[2/VI/1373] Item eodem [die] tunc electus fuit in procuratorem nacionis predictae magister Marcellus de Inghen nullo penitus reclamante. In cujus procuratoria acta sunt hec que sequuntur. Primo deliberavit nacio quod die martis sequente fieret prandium, ad quod omnes magistri vocarentur et perpotarentur bejany nacionis; ad quod prandium idem magister Marcellus electus in procuratorem dedit 22 solidos sibi racione officii a nacione debitos, quod exercere deberet per vacaciones. [...] Item inceperunt eodem die sub eodem magistro Marcelio de Inghen: Meynardus Rodolfi de Tyla, licenciatus in 4a [audicione] Sancte Ge[novefe] licet prius tempore, cujus bursa V solidi; Wolterus de Züelen licenciatus in 3a [audicione] Nostre Domine, licet posterius in tempore, cujus bursa V solidi."

<sup>135</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 428]

<sup>136</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 428]: "Notandum quod in vigilia beati Johannis hujus anni electi erant successive in rectores, scilicet duo de nacione nostra, qui non consencientes se excusaverunt, et tercius qui Gallicus erat, scilicet magister Wilhelmus de Trecis, acceptavit."

show. The common practice in Paris is to elect rector a young master, less likely to have many other commitments and preoccupations and whose career would benefit from being in office. The common practice, I said, but not a binding rule - as long as the elected master is an *artista*: Buridan held his second rectorship twelve years after the first,<sup>137</sup> and by then he was one of the most influential thinkers in Paris. In 1373, then, Marsilius was an eligible candidate among many others, but also likely to refuse the appointment - especially if he was devoting more time to his own research and studies, as Bos suggested. This is, however, mere speculation. When in September 1373 the English proctor is summoned to appear before the provost of Paris, Marsilius is one of the two deputies chosen to go with him.<sup>138</sup> In the same month, it is once again that time of the year when the *natio* has to reorganise its *scholae*. Both Marsilius and Thomas of Clivis step up to take charge of the new advanced ones. Most of the other masters suggest to draw lots to solve the impasse, with the constraint that the winner would allow his colleague a fair share of the teaching and of the revenue; both Marsilius and Thomas agree. Luck favours Thomas.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Buridan was rector in 1328 and 1340.

<sup>138</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 428]: "Item die XII<sup>a</sup> mensis Septembris facta congregacione nacionis super quadam citacione, qua citatus fuit peremptorie procurator nacionis nomine nacionis ad comparendum coram preposito Parisiensi [Hugone Aubriot] die martis proxime tunc sequenti [13/09/1373] hora primarum, deliberatum fuit concorditer quod haberet deputatos, quos vocaret per juramentum eorum ad comparendum in predicta hora cum procuratore coram preposito adpetendam causam illius citacionis. Et deputati fuerunt magister Marcilius de Inghen et magister Johannes Luczellenborch."

<sup>139</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 430]: "Item facta congregacione nacionis per juramentum die XVI<sup>a</sup> mensis Septembris in primis apud Sanctum Maturinum ad ordinandum de scolis pro magistris regere volentibus a principio magni ordinarii usque ad finem illius anni, a principio magni ordinarii proxime affuturi incepti octo fuerunt magistri pro scolis instantes, scilicet magister Marcilius de Inghen, magister Thomas de Clivis, magister Jordanus de Clyvis, magister Walterus Ghyselberti, magister Gherardus de Kalkar, magister Wylhelmus Wadenow, magister Walterus de Delf, magister Hugo de Hervast. Magister Marcilius instetit pro scolis nostris novis superioribus, et pro eisdem instetit magister Thomas de Clyvis. [...] Major pars nacionis, scilicet secundum pluralitatem vocum, magistrum Marcilium et magistrum Thomam missit ad sortem, cui sors daret, ille eas optinere deberet, exhortando tamen illum qui eas optineret, ut alium juvaret quantum posset pro aliis scolis sibi convenientibus aquirendis. Et placuit ambobus. Qui sortem mittentes in presencia nacionis, magister Thomas de Clivis eas sorte optinuit."

In December 1373, Marsilius is chosen as one of the *inrotulatores* (those who write down the masters' *supplicationes* and make sure that they pay their dues) for the *rotulus* to be sent to the curia.<sup>140</sup>

In January 1374, the *natio Anglicana* is involved in another controversy about another garden;<sup>141</sup> once again, Marsilius has to exercise his diplomatic touch<sup>142</sup> and the matter goes on well into February.<sup>143</sup> In the meantime, Marsilius is once again charged with supervising the *determinantes'* examinations.<sup>144</sup> In March 1374, he and Jordan de Clivis are entrusted with putting "in decent form" a recommendation letter for one of the other masters.<sup>145</sup> When there is an issue with the proctor of Sainte Geneviève about the selling or merging of some of the schools belonging to the English Nation, Marsilius is the one who is sent to consult a lawyer with whom he was acquainted.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 435]: "[7/12/1373] ... cum fuit ad eligendum nuncium et inrotulatores. Electus fuit in nuncium a[b] ampliori parte magistrorum tunc presencium magister Hermannus de Bottenbroec; et electi fuerunt in inrotulatores reverendi magistri magister Wilhelmus Scotus, Marcilius de Inghen et magister Jordanus de Clivis."

<sup>141</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 438-444]

<sup>142</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 440]: "[17/I/1374] Item facta congregacione [...] super [...] qualiter ulterius esset procedendum super quodam jardino situato in vico Serpentis spectante ad provinciam Suecie. Et fuit relatum de verbo ad verbum, prout supra ex alio latere continetur. Quibus relatis et auditis deliberatum fuit, quod cedulae protunc oblate in nacione portarentur per deputatos ad aliquem expertum, qui contenta in dictis cedulis in bona et debita forma, tamen sub expensis dicte provincie, redigeret, et quod ulterius procurator et deputati ordinarent sicut eis videretur expedire ad honorem ecclesie Upsalensis. Et deputati fuerunt magister G[uillelmus] Scotus, magister Mercilius, magister Johannes Langhals, Jordanus de Clivis, magister Henricus de Thenis. Et hoc de isto."

<sup>143</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 442-443]: "Item die hunc sequente, videlicet XIII Fe[bruarii], iverunt procurator, mag. Mercilius, mag. Henricus de Thenis, receptor nacionis protunc, una cum bedello nacionis ad magistrum Adolfum de Praellis, pro tunc in Castileto repertum, dantes sibi unum francum per bedellum a magistro Petro de Luca latum et receptum, procuratore quodam substituto ecclesie Upsalensis provincie Suecie, sibi supplicantes quatinus vellet cedulam sibi porrectam perlegere, videndo utrum per tales obligaciones et alia ut supra. Ipse respondens dixit, unum de nobis sequenti die reversurum et cedulam reperiendam correctam reportaturum".

<sup>144</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 440]: "[17/I/1374] Secundus articulus fuit ad eligendum examinatores determinancium et bachalariorum licenciandorum in Sancta Genefefa [sic]. Electi fuerunt examinatores determinancium magister Mercilius, magister Jordanus, magister Thomas de Clivis." Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 443-444]: "[15/II/1374] Item in eadem congregacione recepta fuerunt a nacione juramenta examinatorum determinancium, videlicet magistri Mercilii de Inghen, magistri Thome de Clivis, et magistri Jordani de Clivis. [...] Item determinavit dominus Johannes Coc sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa V solidi et IIII denarii. Item determinavit dominus Johannes Gout sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa V solidi et IIII denarii. Item determinavit dominus Ricoldus Milde sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa V solidi et IIII denarii.

<sup>145</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 447-448]: "[14/III/1374] Item in eadem congregacione supplicavit magister Gherardus Kemyn per deputatos literam testimonialem sibi alias a nacione concessam confecturos et in forma decenti posituros; et erant sibi dati deputati una cum procuratore magister Mercilius de Inghen et magister Jordanus de Clivis."

<sup>146</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 448]: "[14/III/1374]: "Item in eadem congregacione fuit propositum, procuratorem seu collectorem monasterii Sancte Genovefe velle citare procuratorem et receptorem nacionis nostre pro mortizando seu vendendo scolas magnas et novas Almannorum in cono vici Straminis versus

Despite others having applied for the office, at the end of March 1374, Marsilius is once again elected to represent the nation for the election of the new *rector*.<sup>147</sup> Between April and June a few students undergo their *licentia* or *inceptio* under Marsilius.<sup>148</sup> We know that at this point Marsilius owes some books to the nation (we do not know which ones): as an emolument for his teaching in the schools, the nation writes off his debt on a couple of those volumes.<sup>149</sup> In September 1374, Marsilius is unanimously elected proctor.<sup>150</sup> At the end of the same month, it is once again the time to organise the nation *scholae* for the new academic year. Marsilius must be an incredibly renowned and popular master: we know that he has so many students that they cannot fit in his classrooms and he has to beg his colleagues to let him use their spaces.<sup>151</sup> In 1374, the English nation is planning grand celebrations for the holiday of St. Edmund; Marsilius is once again again charged with the planning.<sup>152</sup>

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Secanam sitas, quia domini dicti monasterii racione juris, quod habebant in fundo seu in area dictarum scolarum, nacionem nostram ad unum premissorum faciendum compellere nitebantur. Et consuluerunt protunc magistri, quod magister Mercilius de Inghen adiret unum advocatum, cujus haberet noticiam, querens ab eo attente, utrum racione dicti juris in tali casu nacionem ad unum illorum faciendum compellere possent, et quod postea videretur quid faciendum."

<sup>147</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 450]: "Item facta tertia vice congregacione nacionis XXIII<sup>a</sup> die Marcii hora primarum apud Sanctum Julianum in electione rectoris super eodem immediate prenarrato, ordinatum et deliberatum fuit penitus secundum quod prius. Et fuit in eadem congregacione electus in intrantem pro electione rectoris magister Mercilius de Inghen. Aliqui alii supplicaverunt, verumptamen nil obtinuerunt, etc. [...]"

<sup>148</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 450]: "[4/IV/1374] Item licenciatus est dominus Johannes Gout sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa V solldi, IIII denarii. Posuit pignora." Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 451]: "[7/IV/1374] Item eodem die licentiatus erat dominus Johannes Coc, sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa V solidi et IIII denarii." Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 454]: "[13/V/1374] ... incepit et magistrus erat dominus Johannes Choc sub magistro Mercilio, cujus bursa V solidi, III denarii, pro quibus posuit pignora receptori, que postea redemit." Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 455]: "[3/VI/1374] Demum die sabbati sequente inceperunt domini Johannes Gout et Ricoldus Milde sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, quorum utriusque bursa V solidi et IIII denarii."

<sup>149</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 453-454]: "[5/V/1374] Item facta congregacione nacionis V die mensis Maii apud Sanctum Maturinum ad audiendum computum receptoris et ad eligendum procuratorem, computavit dominus receptor, et solutis XXX solidis pro scolis nostris novis, et IIII francis pro scolis in quibus magister Marcilius illo anno legebat, pro anno illo et soluto sibi emolumento suo sibi debito racione officii anno tunc currente, scilicet II libr., mansit nacioni obligatus in VIII libris, IIII albis minus, et fuit comptus ab omnibus approbatus."

<sup>150</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 458]: "[23/IX/1374] Anno quo supra et die, facta congregacione nacionis ad audiendum computum receptoris, et ad eligendum procuratorem, electus fuit concorditer in procuratorem magister M[arcelius] de Inghen, nullo penitus reclamante."

<sup>151</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 459]: "[29/IX/1374] Item facta congregacione nacionis Anglicane ipso die Michaelis hora prime in Sancto Maturino regencium et non regencium per juramentum ad ordinandum de scolis, deliberatum fuit concorditer quod quilibet regencium pro tunc inciperet in scolis, in quibus consuevit legere, et magister Marcilius de Inghen inciperet in scolis magistri Wilhelmi de Wadenoy, vel in aliis ubi vellet, dummodo poneret, ibi alium nacionis predicte. Et si contingeret, quod dictus magister Marcilius tot haberet scolares, quod commode non possent sedere in scolis dictis sibi deputatis, et aliquis aliorum, in cujus scolis scolares dicti Marcilii commode intrare possent, ita modicos haberet scolares, quod commode intrare possent in scolas

In January 1375, Marsilius, Jordan de Clivis and Gerard Kalkar are appointed examiners for the *determinantes*.<sup>153</sup> Through 1375 Marsilius supervises several students<sup>154</sup> and seems to be doing quite well financially: in March, when it is time to collect the money due for the envoy to send to Avignon, Marsilius is among the masters who loan some money to the nation.<sup>155</sup>

In May 1375, a certain Wynandus from Sweden asks for the help of the nation in an ongoing lawsuit that is going before the rector; the *natio* appoints Marsilius and Lyphardus of Dattlen to ascertain if Wynandus' claim is a just cause.<sup>156</sup>

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Wadenoy: tunc magister Marcilius de Inghen sepe dictus supplicaret illi habenti paucos scolares, ut sibi suas scolas concedere dignaretur, et alter, quicumque esset, suam supplicationem concederet."

<sup>152</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 460]: "Item facta congregacione nacionis XIII<sup>a</sup> die Novembris in Sancto Maturino ad providendum de nuncio pro rotulo, et ad ordinandum et disponendum de festo sancti Eadmundi, videlicet quantum ad sollempnitates faciendas in ecclesia et in officiis divinis ipso die ejusdem sancti et quantum ad prandium faciendum pro magistris nacionis, ut si prandium fieri deberet provideretur concorditer de modo faciendi ipsum, et darentur sive deputarentur aliqui magistri ad procurandum oportuna. Et erat concorditer conclusum ut fieret condecens sollempnitas in ecclesia in divinis officiis, et ut haberentur alieni cantores sub expensis nacionis. Ulterius tandem concorditer concludebatur, quod fieret prandium honestum pro magistris nacionis volentibus interesse, ita tamen, quod quilibet eorum daret antea V solidos parisiens. et nacio solveret residuum. Et deputabantur ad procurandum magister Henricus de Thenis receptor tanquam ex officio, et magistri Marsilius de Inghen et Thomas de Harlem."

<sup>153</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 462]: "[10/I/1375] Item X<sup>a</sup> die mensis Januarii facta congregacione nacionis in Sancto Maturino ad eligendum examinatores determinancium et bacalariorum licenciandorum in Sancta Genovefa, electi fuerunt in examinatores determinancium magistri Marcilius de Ynghen, Jordanus de Clivis et Gherardus Calker."

<sup>154</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 464-465]: "[11/III/1375] Item determinavit dominus Theodericus Baec sub magistro Marcilio, cujus bursa IIII solidi. Satisfecit. [...] Item Bernardus Luttic sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VI solidi, VI denarii. [...] Item dominus Johannes de Kempen sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VI solidi, VI denarii. Satisfecit in pignoribus." [Denifle - Chatelain 1894a, 471]: "[14/5/1375] Item XIII<sup>a</sup> die ejusdem mensis, que erat dies lune, incepit dominus Bernardus Luttic sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VI solidi et VI denarii. Item eodem die dominus Paulus Johannis incepit sub eodem magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VI solidi." Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 475]: "[26/VI/1375] Item die sequenti incepit dominus Theodericus de Hesewiic sub magistro Marcilio de Inghen, cujus bursa VII sol."

<sup>155</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 465]: "[23/III/1375] Eadem hora in nacione nostra de pecunia tradenda bedello communi, scilicet XV francos, mutuavit dominus receptor nationi tres francos, mag. Marsilius de Inghen III francos, mag. Limphardus de Dattlen 1 francum, inag. Thomas de Clivis II fr., mag. Jordanus de Clivis tres fr., mag. Gherardus de Kalker III fr., quia extunc nacio pecuniam non habuit, et predictis magistris de prima pecunia levanda solvere promisit."

<sup>156</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 471-472]: "[16/V/1375] Ite XVI<sup>a</sup> die ejusdem mensis, que erat dies mercurii, facta congregacione nacionis in terciis ad Sanctum Maturinum ad supplicandum, supplicavit dominus quidam, nomine Wynandus, prepositus ecclesie Aboensis, quatenus cum esset coram domino rectore quedam lis inter ipsum una cum quibusdam suis sociis de provincia Swecie, et magistrum Johannem de Gortenbeke, doctorem decretorum ex alia parte super administracione quorundam domum dicte provincie, et ipse dictus dominus Winandus esset per dominum episcopum Lincopensem, ad cujus disposicionem pertinent ille domus, procurator constitutus ad intromittendum se de amministracione dictarum domorum, prout asseruit se, si opus esset, doctorum literis et instrumentis; quo non obstante prefatus magister Johannes se intromitteret de illarum domuum disposicione, allegans se substitutum a quodam alias ante promocionem moderni episcopi dicti in procuratorem constituto; cum tamen et predecessor illius episcopi obiisset, et modernus episcopus procuracionem factam a suo predecessore illi, a quo idem magister Johannes erat substitutus, publice revocasset, prout idem dominus Wynandus asseruit se docturum, si opus esset, velle sibi assistere nacio in prosequendo suam causam, ut opinaret justicie complementum, attento quod dictus magister Johannes quereretur pro posse in curia domini



In September 1375, Marsilius is once again elected proctor.<sup>157</sup> For the new academic year, the five senior regent masters are confirmed in the schools in which they were already teaching; Marsilius is one of them.<sup>158</sup> In February 1376, we find Marsilius among the examiners for the *determinantes*.<sup>159</sup> A few weeks later, he is called along with some other senior masters to testify on a financial issue: Michael of Prussia, who owes a sum of money to the nation, has been claiming that his debt had been written off by a previous proctor. Marsilius, Adam of Catwyc, Jordan of Clivis and Gerard of Kalkar all agree that that is not the case and that Michael should be paying.<sup>160</sup> This minor incident confirms that Marsilius has been continuously very involved in the bureaucratic life of the nation: maybe he has a penchant for administrative matters and he does not have a short memory.<sup>161</sup>

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reitoris evasiones et dilaciones fraudulentas. Et deliberavit nacio concorditer, quod dicto domino Winando deputarentur ex parte nacionis magistri Mercilius de Inghen et Lyphardus de Dattilen, quos ei nacio deputavit, ut informarentur ipsi, an ipse dominus Wynandus sepefatus erga dictum [sic] magistrum Johannem pretenderet et haberet causam justam; qui si taliter esse reperirent, assistere deberent dicto domino Wynando in curia domini reitoris nomine nacionis."

<sup>157</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 477]: "[24/IX/1375] Item facta congregacione nacionis 24<sup>a</sup> die mensis ejusdem apud Sanctum Julianum pauperem ad audiendum computum receptoris et ad eligendum procuratorem, de consensu omnium magistrorum fuit computus dilatus usque ad proximam procuracionem, et electus in procuratorem magister Marcellus de Inghen."

<sup>158</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 477]: "[30/IX/1375] Primo ultima die Septembris sequente facta congregacionem nacionis apud Sanctum Maturynum ad ordinandum de scolis, ordinatum fuit quod quinque seniores retinerent scolas in quibus essent. Ceteri vero si qui essent providerent sibi expensis nacionis, dum tamen fideliter continuarent lecturam."

<sup>159</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 481]: "[11/II/1376] ... electi fuerunt in examinadores determinancium magistri Marcellus de Inghen, Jordanus de Clivis et Gerardus de Kalker".

<sup>160</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 482-483]: "[27/II/1376] .... Cum itaque hec proposuisset procurator, requirens magistros tunc presentes ut deliberarent qualiter esset ulterius procedendum super istis, deliberatum fuit saltem a majori parte nacionis quod vocarentur aliqui ex senioribus de nacione, quibus melius constaret istud factum, et specialiter magistri Adam de Catwyc, Marcellus de Inghen, Jordanus de Clivis et Gerardus de Kalker, ut illi audirentur, et secundum quod illi dicerent, ulterius procederetur. Et quia, ut dicebatur, magister Marcellus ante adventum procuratoris dixerat aliquibus magistris nacionis quod bene recordaretur, quod idem magister Michael semel supplicavit pro remissione illius pecunie, et tunc sua supplicacio fuit interempta, dixerunt plures ymmo major pars nacionis, quod auditis magistris prenomatis requiretur illa pecunia ab eo, nisi doceret se interim satisfacisse nacioni. Item eadem penultima die Februarii hora nonarum Nostre Domine vel quasi, vocatis per juramentum ad Sanctum Maturinum magistris Adam de Catwyc, Marcilio de Inghen, Jordano de Clivis, Gerardo de Kalker et Waltero de Delf receptore, procurator quesivit ab eis tunc presentibus quid eis constaret de illa pecunia suprascripta. Et dixerunt concorditer quod bene scirent eum debere nacioni V francos aut circiter; ymmo dicebant aliqui eorum, se bene recordari de hoc quod ipse supplicaverat nacioni pro remissione illius pecunie, sed sua supplicacio fuit interempta, et interim non satisfacit."

<sup>161</sup> Checking Marsilius' involvement in the administration of the Nation against the other senior masters', as resulting from the *Chartularium* and the *Liber procuratoris* in particular, Marsilius is as active as his most involved colleagues and he tends to be the frontman in dealing with the most delicate issues involving the *natio Anglicana*.

When, in March 1376, some scheduling problem arises about the *determinatio* of a Thuringian student, Jacob of Berka, and the nation names two masters to examine him, they also call Marsilius, because they "require his assistance".<sup>162</sup> A few days later, on 9 March, another procedural issue comes up: several students belonging to the *natio Anglicana* had sustained their *determinatio* elsewhere and therefore, according to the statute in effect, they could not be admitted to the examinations in Sainte Geneviève. The nation delegates the proctor Hugo of Hervorst and Marsilius to go before the rector and require a meeting of the Arts faculty for the following day.<sup>163</sup> On 10 March, Marsilius brings the request before the assembly; the Gallicans are against, the Picards in favour, the Normans first want to make sure that the request is "sensible" and compatible with the faculty statutes. After a brief examination they too concede and the meeting is adjourned.<sup>164</sup> The following day Marsilius, standing for his nation, addresses the assembly again: he presents many reasons from the faculty statutes and

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<sup>162</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 486]: "[4/III/1376] Sed de tercio quod proponebat magister Johannes de Berka, requirebat nacio ipsum et eciam dictum Jacobum ut se submitterent quibusdam magistris ipsis deputandis per nacionem ad concordandum eos; quod ipsis placuit. Et fuerunt eis assignati procurator, scilicet magister Hugo de Hervorst, et magister Johannes Priswalch alias de Saxonia, et magister Mercilius de Inghen in caso, quo dicti duo magistri ejus assistencia indigerent". Around the same time, Marsilius is supervising several *determinationes* - Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 486-488]: "Item Wilhelmus Danielis sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa IIII solidi. Solvit rectori et juravit procuratori. [...] Item Mertinus Giisberti. Item Petrus Jacobus de Catwiic sub magistro Mercelio de Inghen, cujus bursa V solidi et VIII denarii. Posuerunt pignora et juraverunt procuratori. Item Petrus Bartholomeus de Aemsterdam sub eodem magistro Mercelio, cujus bursa V solidi et VIII denarii. Solvit rectori et juravit procuratori. [...] Item Theodericus Jacobi de Alcmaria sub magistro Mercelio de Inghen, cujus bursa IIII solidi. Posuit pignora et juravit procuratori."

<sup>163</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 488-489]: "[9/III/1376] Item IX<sup>a</sup> die Marcii facta congregacione nacionis regencium et non regencium per juramentum post sermonem apud Predicadores ad habendum concilium, et ad supplicandum, propositum fuit quomodo in magnum prejudicium nacionis esset, quod temptatores in examine Sancte Genovefe quosdam nolebant temptare, qui erant de nacione nostra, eo quod licet determinassent in artibus in alia Universitate, non tamen determinaverant Parisius, cum tamen iidem temptatores nullum haberent ad contrarium juramentum. [...] Et deliberavit nacio: primo quod essent deputandi aliqui magistri nacionis, et deputabantur procurator, scilicet magister Hugo de Hervorst, et magister Mercelius de Inghen, qui haberent requirere dominum rectorem, ut sequenti die faceret congregacionem facultatis arcium [...]. Et postea procurator et magister Mercelius accesserunt dominum rectorem sicut ipsis fuit injunctum per nacionem, et quia periculum erat in mora, eo quod temptamen Sancte Genovefe cito claudendum foret, requirebant ipsi rectorem, quod ipse faceret congregacionem facultatis in septima hora."

<sup>164</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 489]: "[10/III/1376] Insuper sequenti die, que erat dies X<sup>a</sup> Marcii [...], primo magister Mercelius de Inghen nomine nacionis ex certis motivis per ipsum tactis supplicavit facultati, quatinus injungeret temptatoribus examinibus Sancte Genovefe, ut ipsi admittant ad temptamen eos qui alibi determinaverunt, dum tamen jurent juranda, solutis etiam solvendis. Que supplicacio interempta fuit per nacionem Gallicanam; sed fuit concessa a nacione Pycardie. Sed dicebat nacio Normannie quod vellent ut darentur deputati, habentes inquirere an illa supplicacio esset racionabilis et statutis facultatis compossibilis; quo inquisito ipsi concederent illam supplicacionem. Et tunc procurator prout sibi injunctum fuit a nacione, appellavit nomine nacionis ab interempcione facta per nacionem Gallicanam de illa supplicacione ad facultatem; supplicans eciam aliis nacionibus, ut dispensarent cum domino rectore ut sequenti die possent facere aliam congregacionem facultatis per juramentum, quia periculum erat in mora."

the established custom in favour of the Anglicans' request, counteracting point by point the Gallicans' arguments. At the end of the day, the motion is approved.<sup>165</sup>

Marsilius is by now a senior master, well respected and very popular, hence it is quite normal that he is consulted about delicate matters and that he keeps reappearing in positions of responsibility. Nevertheless, a pattern is clear: much more frequently than his colleagues in the same position, Marsilius is actively involved in most legal matters;<sup>166</sup> and he ends up being spokesman of his nation before the rest of the University in several delicate occasions. We do not know if he had any formal juridical training, but undoubtedly Marsilius shows comfort and competence in arguing the cases of the day.

Around the end of March 1376, Marsilius is chosen as the representative of the Anglican nation for the election of the *rector* - and his colleague Gerard of Kalkar is elected to the office.<sup>167</sup> We know from an entry in the *Liber Procuratoris* dated 7 April 1376, that Marsilius had been loaning money to the nation and in particular to other masters in need, since Herman of Bottenbruec repays him.<sup>168</sup> We do not have any record of any extraordinary administrative commitments for Marsilius over the winter and spring terms; however apparently none of the *licentiati* in the April session is under his supervision.<sup>169</sup> This might be either a gap in our documentation or a sign of Marsilius taking some time to follow his own

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<sup>165</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 489-490]: "[11/III/1376] Item die sequenti, que erat XI<sup>a</sup> Marcii, facta congregacione nacionis per juramentum regencium et non regencium hora primarum apud Sanctum Julianum ad reiterandum requestam nacionis faciendam facultati arcium pro hiis qui non determinaverant Parisius, quod ipsi existentes in secundo anno solutis solvendis pro determinantibus reputentur, et ad temptamen Sancte Genovefe admittantur: tunc magister Mercilius de Inghen nomine nacionis, adductis multis motivis ex statutis facultatis et ex consuetudinibus, dissolvendo eciam motiva allegata per nacionem Gallicanam, propter que eandem requestam sive supplicacionem ipsa interemit die precedenti, requisivit facultatem et supplicavit eidem, prout supra scriptum est. Et deliberando dicebat nacio Gallicana se admittere hujusmodi supplicacionem gracie ista vice, addito tamen quod expediret, quod alias fieret una congregacio ad maturius deliberandum super isto negocio et ad statuendum quod tales de cetero non admitterentur. Nacio vero Pycardorum simpliciter admisit supplicacionem et requestam nacionis nostre; sed nacio Normannie conformabat se nacioni Gallicane et admisit gracie supplicacionem nostram."

<sup>166</sup> This is quite evident from the records in the *Liber procuratoris nationis Anglicanae* and in the *Chartularium* for the periods of Marsilius' confirmed presence in Paris.

<sup>167</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 491]: "[24/III/1376] Ulterius electus fuit pro intrante ad eligendum rectorem magister Mercelius de Inghen, et postea electus fuit in rectorem Universitatis concorditer ab omnibus intrantibus magister Gerardus de Kalker."

<sup>168</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 491]: "[7/IV/1376] ... computatis etiam tribus francis solutis magistro Mercelio de Inghen ex parte magistri Hermanni de Bottenbruec...."

<sup>169</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 495]

research and possibly work on his theological studies, which are quite delayed. Anyway, through the spring of 1376, Marsilius seems to have maintained his financial stability and good relations with his colleagues. In May 1376, for the dinner in honour of the new masters, Marsilius and William of Waldenoy keep a seat and promise to cover for one of them, Paul of Gelre, who had claimed some financial difficulties. When Paul fails to show up, Marsilius and William set his bill anyway and also that of several other masters.<sup>170</sup>

When it is once again time to start preparing the *rotulus* for the Pope, Marsilius is chosen to be the Anglican envoy for the second time.<sup>171</sup>

At the end of September 1376, while the nation is organising the schools for the new academic year, we find that Marsilius has been spending some money in the schools during his previous mandate - money that he will have to return personally if he does not deliver the results requested by the University.<sup>172</sup> In February 1377, Marsilius is busy with the *determinationes*,<sup>173</sup> but he seems to spend the rest of the spring organising his forthcoming

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<sup>170</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 497]: "[18/V/1376] Propterea deliberatum fuit concorditer in nacione illos magistros novos perpotare. Et intravit nacio tabernam in prandi nuncupatam *duo gladii*, sitam juxta parvum pontem, in qua nacio consumpsit xxxviii solidos, de quibus solvit magister Henricus Tuve 1 francum pro jocundo introitu, et magister Mercilius de Inghen et magister Guillelmus de Wadenoy promiserunt hospiti pro uno francko ex parte magistri Pauli de Gelria, qui dixit se venturum ad prandium, ut multi magistrorum in eodem retulerunt. Sed quia presens non fuit, ideo ad manus predictorum duorum fidejussorum, scilicet magistri Mercilii et Wilhelmi, promiserunt ulterius eos tenere indempnes magistri Henricus de Roshem, Hector Vilt de Huessen, Johannes Wolgast de Saxonia et Henricus Tuve." See also: Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 498-499].

<sup>171</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 502-503]: "[6/IX/1376] Item VI<sup>a</sup> die Septembris congregacione nacionis facta ad Sanctum Maturinum ad ordinandum pecuniam nuncio ex parte nacionis, fuit concorditer deliberando conclusum quod nuncio nacionis, videlicet magister Marsilio, darentur de pecunia nacionis xxv aut xxx franci, ita tamen quod si nacionem contingeret solvere pecuniam per dictum nuncium pro facto Universitatis exponendam, quod ex tunc ipse nuncius tenebitur in hujusmodi facto per ipsum exponenda fideliter computare, et sibi super hujusmodi expositis fideliter computatis a nacione satisfiet; si autem pecunia pro ipso et aliis Universitatis nunciis per contribucionem capitum colligetur, ex tunc debet habere tantum quantum alterius nacionis facultatis arcium nuncius habebit, videlicet C francos."

<sup>172</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 503-504]: "[30/IX/1376] Item facta congregacione nacionis Anglicane per juramentum ultima die mensis Septembris, que fuit dies sancti Jeronimi, in primis Nostre Domine apud Sanctum Maturinum in domo capitulari ad ordinandum de scolis et avizandam quandam literam obligatoriam, in qua nacio prefata obligaretur magistro Mercilio de Inghen ad restitutionem pecunie, quam consumet in legacione sua, in casu in quo non fieret contribucio capitalis per Universitatem ordinata. [...] Pro litera predicta dati erant deputati magister Ricoldus de Trajecto, magister Jordanus de Clivis, magister Gherardus Pillich, magister Gerardus Kalker et magister Hugho de Hervorst, quod ipsi ordinarent literam obligatoriam pro profectu magistri Mercilii et nacionis." And Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 507-508].

<sup>173</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 511-513]: "[10/II/1377] Item electi fuerunt in examinadores determinancium magistri Mercilius, Jordanus [de Clivis], Gerardus Kalkar. [...] [III/1377] Item determinavit dominus Nicolaus de Lutzenburch sub magistro Mercilio de Inghen, cujus bursa xvi denarii. Posuit pignus. [...] Item determinavit dominus Henricus Lovenscheide sub magistro Mercil[i]o de Inghen, cujus bursa VI solidi."

trip: once again, this mission is expected to be longer than usual, because in January Gregory XI had decided to return to Rome, and hence the envoy from Paris would have to stop both at Avignon and Rome.<sup>174</sup> In May 1377, Marsilius seems to be aware of the Pope's poor health and he urges the Nation to prepare the *rotulus* in such a way that it could also be used in case Gregory died while Marsilius was already at the Roman curia.<sup>175</sup>

As far as we know, Marsilius will never return to Paris from his mission.

### 1.1.3 *At the Pontifical Court and the Missing Years*

Marsilius leaves for Avignon probably in June 1377: he is certainly there in July, and we know from the *Liber Procuratoris* that he has been writing steadily to keep the nation informed.<sup>176</sup>

The pontifical court is not moving to Rome immediately and Marsilius ends up staying: in

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<sup>174</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 516-517]: "[19/IV/1377] Primus fuit ad deliberandum seu refundendum magistro Mersilio, nuncio alias ad curiam Romanam pro nacione, pecuniam pro legacione per nacionem sibi promissam, dummodo tamen fieret contribucio in Universitate. Qua facta et pecunia aliqua collecta et singulis facultatibus et nacionibus distributa, receptaque die precedenti summa L francorum per receptorem nacionis nostre proportionaliter divisione pecuniarum tunc existencium facta nacioni nostre pertinente, narravit dictus magister Mercilius circa hoc contractum alias inter nacionem et ipsum nuncium, et petivit ex quo sibi deberentur de illis L francis receptis per receptorem XLI vel circiter (quomodo et qualiter tantum de dicta summa sibi dicebat de jure competere, dimitto causa brevitatis quia esset nimis prolixum), quod sibi dicti XLI fr. deliberarentur, quia pecuniam mutuavit et quia iturus esset indilate ad curiam. Ultra supplicavit quatenus nacio faceret sibi tantam gratiam, quod illos IX francos ultra recipere posset, et consequenter illos L francos totaliter, et eos expectare vellet de contribucione ultra fienda, quia iturus est ad partes longinquas, et nacio melius expectare posset quam ipse. Super quo articulo deliberatum fuit una cum supplicacione dicti Marsilii concorditer ab omnibus, quod dictus magister Mersilius reciperet dictos L francos totaliter; multi tamen dixerunt, qui minorem partem secuntur, quod XLI franci, quos petebat de jure, non debebantur sibi de ista summa de jure, sed solum XX vel XXI franci sibi debebantur. Tamen omnes concorditer, sive de jure sibi competere, sive non, favorabiliter sibi concesserunt. [...]. 3um articulus fuit ad ordinandum de pecunia nacionis. Ordinatum fuit primo de pecunia data magistro Mersilio, de qua prius...."

<sup>175</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 519]: "[5/V/1377] Item 2° supplicavit magister Mersilius de Inghen, cum esset iturus ad curiam Romanam ex parte seu pro factis Universitatis et pro communi utilitate, quatinus si contigerit ipso existente in curia, etc., rotulum fieri seu papam mori, quod eidem rotulo tanquam presens et in loco suo possit imponi. Cujus supplicacio fuit reputata racionabilis et concessa."

<sup>176</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 523]: "[4/VII/1377] Item facta congregacione Universitatis, facultatis et nacionis apud Sanctum Matulinum ad audiendum literam missam per magistrum Mercilium, nuncium universitatis, et audita fuit. [...] [26/VII/1377] Item facta congregacione nacionis apud Sanctum Matulinum ad audiendum nova per magistrum Mercilium, tunc Avinione existentem, lecte fuerunt littere misse per eundem. [...] [7/VIII/1377] Item facta congregacione apud Sanctum Matulinum die VII mensis Augusti pro rescribendo magistro Mersilio responsum et alia supra primitus scripta per eundem, dati fuerunt deputati ad ordinandum idem magistri Jordanus de Clivis et Hugo de Hervorst."

November he is still in Avignon<sup>177</sup> and the following spring he is still serving as a representative of the University when the nation is preparing the new *rotulus*.<sup>178</sup> However, whatever Marsilius' mission was supposed to be originally, it probably ended up going beyond the usual duties relative to the *rotulus*. In the meantime, Gregory XI had passed away on 27 March 1378 near Rome and in April the Archbishop of Bari Bartolomeo Prignano was elected pope with the name of Urban VI. Almost immediately Prignano's election is controversial and it is a cause of discontent particularly among the French cardinals. We are on the threshold of the Western Schism: things will precipitate within a few months.

On 10 June 1378, Marsilius appears in the *Liber* as supervising Henry Ludenschede's *determinatio*,<sup>179</sup> but he is certainly still with the curia near Rome on 12 June:<sup>180</sup> we can agree with the editors that it is either a mistake in the text for "Johannes"<sup>181</sup> or that Marsilius is once again counted as present *in absentia*.<sup>182</sup>

On 27 June 1378, Marsilius is in Tivoli with Urban VI, writing to the rector and the masters of the University of Paris.<sup>183</sup> The news he is sending is dire: a group of cardinals opposing the pope have retired to Anagni, they have armed men and violent skirmishes have already occurred. We know that Marsilius has been writing repeatedly, asking for instructions on how to proceed; once again he is insisting for an answer. Furthermore, he fears for his own safety: he has been asking and asks again for new letters, since the ones he has from the bishop of Senlis hold little or no weight. "The Church - in my opinion - has not been in such danger of a

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<sup>177</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 529]: "[23/XI/1377] Item XXIII<sup>a</sup> die Novembris facta fuit congregacio Universitatis ad Sanctum Matulinum super quatuor articulis. Primiis erut ad audiendum literas missas de Avinione, que fuerunt lecte, et satis fuit concordatum ut rescriberetur ex superhabundanti."

<sup>178</sup> For example, Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 540]

<sup>179</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 558]: "[10/VI/1378] Item determinavit dominus Heinricus Ludenschede sub magistro Marsilio de Inghen, cujus bursa sex solidi cum dimidio."

<sup>180</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 558]: "[12/VI/1378] Super primo fuerat concorditer deliberatum, quod esset scribendum magistro Heinrico de Thenis et magistro Marsilio, protunc existentibus in curia, quatenus hoc factum velint sollicitare et meliori modo quo possent elaborare; et si laboribus seu quovis alio modo expensas facerent, nacio refunderet, nec haberet pro ingrato si pro ea contingeret eos occupari."

<sup>181</sup> A "Johannes de Inghen" is active in Paris around that time. He is likely to be about fifteen years younger than Marsilius since he obtains his *licentia* in June 1370 (see Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 358]). He was certainly still active in Paris in April 1378 - See Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 544].

<sup>182</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 557-558, n. 2]

<sup>183</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 553-555]; Du Boulay [1665-1673, IV, 466]

schism in a hundred years",<sup>184</sup> Marsilius writes. He will be proven right soon: on 20 September 1378, with the support of Charles V of France, the French cardinals gather in Frondi and elect pope Robert of Geneva, who takes the name of Clement VII. He will eventually move back to Avignon.<sup>185</sup>

At first, despite Charles' pressures, the University of Paris choses to stay neutral: apparently, at least in January 1379, they cannot reach an unanimous agreement among all nations and faculties;<sup>186</sup> therefore, for now,

Relinquimus ipsos disputationibus eorum et interim quescamus.<sup>187</sup>

However, the stall does not last for long. Already in February 1379, there is a discussion to establish if the *rotulus* should be sent to Clement VII.<sup>188</sup> On 21 May 1379, once again Charles V invites the University to support Clement as the true pope,<sup>189</sup> but it looks like before then the Gallican nation and the faculty of Medicine were already getting organised to send a common *rotulus* to Clement instead of Urban.<sup>190</sup> The day after the reiterated invitation from the king, a general assembly of the entire University convenes *apud Sanctum Maturinum* to deliberate on the matter.<sup>191</sup> While the faculties of Medicine and Law immediately pronounce in favour of Clement, the faculty of Theology asks for more time to have *majorem deliberationem*, and the faculty of Arts is divided: two nations are in favour, two request to adjourn the meeting.<sup>192</sup> When the assembly reconvene two days later, the faculty of Theology gives its approval but the artists have not found a common line: the Gallicans recognise Clement VII as the only true

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<sup>184</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 554]: " ... ecclesia Dei, videre meo, non in centum annis in tanto fuit scismatis periculo..."

<sup>185</sup> The scholarly literature on the Great Western Schism is extensive; for a recent introduction to the historical, social and cultural context see Rollo-Koster - Izbicki [2009]. A classic reference on the universities in relation to the Schism is Swanson [1979]

<sup>186</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 561]: "... in ista materia maxime ardua faciat consentire omnes facultates et nationes, ne una quidem, si fieri potest, dissentiente."

<sup>187</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 561]

<sup>188</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 563]

<sup>189</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 564]

<sup>190</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 563]

<sup>191</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 565-572]

<sup>192</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 566]

pope, the Normans are ready to follow the royal injunction,<sup>193</sup> but the Picard and Anglican nations are opposed, maintaining that the University should stay neutral.<sup>194</sup> With three faculties out of four agreeing, as of 24 May 1379 the University of Paris supports Clement VII.<sup>195</sup> The consensus is not, and will not be, unanimous. The Anglican nation seems particularly resilient in harbouring a diffuse dissent: most masters seem cautiously to be pro neutrality; some (like Hugo of Hervorst) seem pragmatically indifferent;<sup>196</sup> those who support Clement are quite tepid about it; others (like Gerard of Kalkar) speak openly in favour of Urban VI.<sup>197</sup> The general line of the *natio Anglicana* between the end of 1379 and 1382 is overall not favourable to Clement, to the point that the University will have to entrust the key to the common sigil of the nation to a Scotsman - since Scotland is flanking Clement.<sup>198</sup> There is disagreement also among the ranks of the theologians.<sup>199</sup> Some supporters of Urban VI are fired by the University, like the chancellor of Sainte Geneviève Judocus Ghisilius<sup>200</sup> - in this case despite the stern opposition of the English nation, flanked also by the Picards and the Normans.<sup>201</sup>

We know from a letter by John of Jenzenstein, archbishop of Prague and chancellor to King Wenceslaus of Bohemia, dating September 1381, that several Parisian masters supporting Urban VI had abandoned Paris and were hoping to transfer to the University of Prague - or to

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<sup>193</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 569]: "Item magistri nationis Normanorum deliberaverunt quod reputabant dominum nostrum regem Francie et prelatos sui regni in hoc esse bene informatos, idcirco sufficebat eis quod ipsi haberent fidem dicti domini nostri regis in hoc et suorum prelatorum."

<sup>194</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 569]: "Item magistri nationum Picardie et Anglie deliberaverunt concorditer quod propter certas rationes loco et tempore proponendas et explicandas dicta Universitas non debebat recedere a deliberatione alias habita, scilicet a neutralitate et indifferentia."

<sup>195</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 570-571]

<sup>196</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 571]

<sup>197</sup> In 1379 Gerard of Kalkar had been chosen as the nation envoy to bring the *rotulus* to Clement VII; he refused the appointment. Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 579]

<sup>198</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 586 n° 1644], referring to year 1381.

<sup>199</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 585, n° 1643] reports a letter dating 26 October 1381 by Clement VII to the faculty of Theology about the "sinister rumors" he has been hearing about the position of the faculty and exhorting the masters to stay loyal to him.

<sup>200</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 586], referring to December 1381 - 25 April 1382.

<sup>201</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 586]; Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 304-310]; Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 618-620]



other Northern and Eastern Universities.<sup>202</sup> For example, this is probably the case also for Gerard of Kalkar, who will go to Vienna, and Marsilius, who will end up in Heidelberg in 1386. We can see already from the lists in the *Liber procuratoris* that the English nation undergoes a veritable turnover among its ranks in 1382.<sup>203</sup> Around 1381, the University policy concerning the dispute between the two popes has been getting more and more repressive of those masters refusing to align themselves to the official position: accusations of heresy start to rise against those supporting Urban VI<sup>204</sup> - and it is probably still fresh in everybody's memory how easily such talk used to lead to the stake through most of the century. It stands to reason that most masters in favour of Urban VI would prefer to move to more friendly *studia* by 1382.

But what about Marsilius in the meantime? We had left him in Tivoli with Urban VI around the end of June 1378, when he had just sent a quite agitated letter to the University asking for instructions on how to proceed in the rapidly deteriorating situation concerning the pope. We do not know what the University replied, neither do we know when - or even if - Marsilius went back to Paris. Marsilius is not mentioned in the new assignments of the schools of the Nation in September 1378. The only other mention in the Parisian surviving documents is an entry in the *Liber procuratoris* dating 21 February 1379: since Marsilius is absent, Hugo of Hervorst requests on Marsilius' behalf his due for his mission to Avignon under Gregory XI.<sup>205</sup> From this date on, there is no trace of Marsilius in Paris. We do not know if he had returned to Paris at some point between July 1378 and the winter of 1379 and then left again, or if he had never come back. What we do know is Marsilius' personal position on the Schism: we have a

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<sup>202</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 584-585]

<sup>203</sup> On the consequences of the Western Schism on medieval universities see e.g. Nardi [1992, in particular 100-102]

<sup>204</sup> For example: Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 583 n° 1639]

<sup>205</sup> Denifle - Chatelain [1894a, 570]: "[21/II/1379] Et supplicavit magister Hugo de Hervorst ex parte magistri Mercilii de Inghen, quod cum nacio sibi adhuc teneretur XX francos de legacione alias facta in Avinionem tempore Gregorii pape XI, et nunc nacio recepisset XXIII francos ab Universitate, quod nacio vellet sibi satisfacere de illis XX francis. Cujus supplicacio fuit concessa, dum tamen daretur quitancia sufficiens nacioni, sic quod nacio maneret indempnis."

surviving letter from quite some time later (the *terminus a quo* is the Spring of 1390), where Marsilius, who has been in Heidelberg for years at the time, lists several reasons why the late Urban VI was the true pope, and so is his successor Boniface XI.<sup>206</sup> Considering the situation in Paris in the late 1370s and the timing of his disappearance from the Parisian academic life, it would seem more probable that this letter expresses Marsilius' consolidated conviction instead of a position of convenience - held while in a country supporting the pope in Rome and as a master in a newborn University approved by the Urban VI.

Did then Marsilius abandon Paris in 1378 or 1379 for his political and ecclesiological convictions, foreseeing the line the University was about to take? We do not know, nor do we have much information about his whereabouts between then and 1386. For all the information we have, he might have retired for some time to his parish of Saint Andrews of Cologne.<sup>207</sup> Ritter believes that there are traces of Marsilius in Prague and possibly at the monastery of Eberbach, but his hypothesis is not supported;<sup>208</sup> completely unfounded is Amann's conviction that Marsilius came back to Paris.<sup>209</sup>

All we can say with some degree of certainty is that in 1382, at some point after Easter and before Pentecost, the city of Nijmegen provides an opulent dinner in honour of "master Marsilius of Inghen".<sup>210</sup> Since the title of "master" lacks any of the qualifications that would have likely been there, were it referring to anything else than an intellectual or professor, I see little reason to doubt that it is indeed our Marsilius.

What is Marsilius doing in Nijmegen? It does not look like he is a longterm resident (or at least that he will be after 1382), since his name does not appear again in the *Accounts* book of the city, but we have no way of knowing if he has been in town for some time by the spring 1382.

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<sup>206</sup> The edition of this text, with a historical introduction, is in Ritter [1921, 196-204]

<sup>207</sup> This is not unlikely at all, and Marsilius might have indeed been there for some time, since in a document dated 1386, Marsilius refers to himself not only as "canonicus" but also "thesaurarius ecclesie Sancti Andree Coloniensis". See: [AUH I, 1, nr. 72, p. 146]

<sup>208</sup> Ritter [1936, 57]

<sup>209</sup> Amann [1928]

<sup>210</sup> *Rekeningen der stad Nijmegen 1382-1543* [I, 1910, 28]: "magistro Marcelio de Inghen de 4 quartalibus vini 2 libre 13 sol. 4 d." See also: Braakuis - Hoenen [1992, 5]

Was he merely visiting his place of origin or maybe any family he might have had there? Or was he on a diplomatic mission on behalf of the pope or the emperor? It is indeed possible: Nijmegen belongs to Duchy of Guelders, under the Holy Roman Empire, and therefore is siding with Urban VI. Around the same time of the banquet for Marsilius, Nijmegen is entertaining two more guests, treated to similar dinners: a certain John of Brabant, attendant to the king of France;<sup>211</sup> and James of Apeltarm, judge in Deventer.<sup>212</sup> Marsilius, John or James were in Nijmegen at the same time, but we do not know if they were there to meet with each other.

On the one hand, on the basis of his last known whereabouts and his personal connections, it is possible that since his "disappearance" in 1379 Marsilius had been travelling in the service of the pope or the emperor. On the other hand, such possibility does not preclude that Marsilius could have kept teaching in one or more schools or universities during the years between Paris and Heidelberg. For example, Maier argued that Marsilius had been teaching in Pavia and held him responsible (along with Blasius of Parma) for the diffusion of the English and Buridanian philosophical novelties in northern Italy.<sup>213</sup> Her hypothesis is grounded on two considerations. In the first place, Maier observes that in his '90s letter on the legitimacy of Urban V's papacy, Marsilius shows a detailed knowledge of the Italian events during the time about which he is writing. In the second place, Maier's main point is based on a passage in Giovanni Marliani's *Tractatus de reactione* (1448), where Marliani is referring to one of Marsilius' commentaries on the *De generatione et corruptione* and he calls Marsilius "Marsilius noster". Among the several authoritative philosophers quoted or mentioned through the

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<sup>211</sup> *Rekeningen der stad Nijmegen 1382-1543* [I, 1910, 28]: "Johanni de Brabanti, famulo regis Francie, de 4 quartalibus vini 2 libre."

<sup>212</sup> *Rekeningen der stad Nijmegen 1382-1543* [I, 1910, 28]: "Jacobus de Apeltarem, judici in Davantria..."

<sup>213</sup> Maier [1964a]

treatise, according to Maier the "noster" appears to be used only for Marsilius, and she infers that he must have been teaching in Pavia at some point.<sup>214</sup>

However, Maier's principal argument is inconclusive, as it has been argued by Courtenay:<sup>215</sup> the "noster" is more likely an honorific title not to be taken literally, especially after such a long time since Marsilius' supposed visit. Nevertheless, as Maier's "noster" point is feeble, Courtenay's rejection might be rushed and Maier's first reference to Marsilius' '90s letter might be at least partially on track. The letter shows for sure that Marsilius is not in Paris after 1379, since his account of the events transpiring there in the following years is partial and not in the right order. However, it is true that the letter reports vividly some Italian events, in particular some episodes involving Urban VI or, for example, an observation by Barnabo Visconti, lord of Milan.<sup>216</sup> It is probable then that Marsilius spent some further time after his mission with Urban VI and travelling on his behalf, and it is furthermore possible that he interacted with the lord of Milan. Pavia was in Milan territory; did Marsilius teach there then? We cannot say, but as his name does not appear in the registry of the University of Pavia, nor in the one in Padua,<sup>217</sup> this is little more than speculation: we do not have any evidence of Marsilius' presence in an Italian or continental University before 1386. However, it is possible that Marsilius kept busy during those seven years: his theological degree, left unaccomplished when he left Paris, seemingly did not progress much during that time, since it was completed only in 1396.

#### 1.1.4 *Heidelberg*<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> Maier [1964a, in particular 218-220]

<sup>215</sup> Courtenay [1992, 44]

<sup>216</sup> Ritter [1921, 202-203]

<sup>217</sup> I thank dr. Paolo Rosso for his help with the Padua and Pavia archives.

<sup>218</sup> On Marsilius' fundamental role in Heidelberg my main references here are Miethke [2008] and [1992]; Courtenay [1992]; Ritter [1921]; Pelster [1944].

Whatever Marsilius was doing in the years he was "missing", his fame as a philosopher did not wither - which makes it more likely than not that he was lecturing somewhere. If he was travelling on the Roman pope's behalf, in whose good graces apparently he would always be, he probably met Rupert I, Count Palatine and Duke of Bavaria, and his co-rulers Rupert II and Rupert III, at some point before 1385 - and (seemingly) made an impression.

We do not know who first conceived and planned the foundation of the University of Heidelberg:<sup>219</sup> it could have been the Count's own idea or from his court; it could also have been a papal solicitation; or it could have come from a third party entirely. However, quite early on, Marsilius is officially called in by Rupert - on a princely stipend - as a member of his Council to act as "founding rector" and to organise the Faculty of Arts in particular (*pro dicti studii incohacione in facultatem artium operam daret efficacem*). Quite probably since that very moment, the University of Heidelberg becomes Marsilius' pet project.<sup>220</sup>

The request bearing Rupert's name for the foundation of a new *studium generale* in Heidelberg (in all the faculties and modeled on Paris)<sup>221</sup> is presented to Urban VI on 23 October 1385 and approved on the same day. In the following years, Marsilius will be the principal supporter of the initial spirit and, despite the divergences among his colleagues, he will try to keep the University of Heidelberg organised in a way analogous to Paris - starting, for example, with the exclusive eligibility of the rector among the artists.

Marsilius gives his own laconic account of the founding of the University to make sure that the statutes (and the good regime they insure) are not violated out of ignorance and stay binding for all present and future masters.<sup>222</sup> However, even if Marsilius' strong wording is in line with

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<sup>219</sup> Miethke [1992, 15]: "Aber wer sich da im fürstlichen Rat mit welchen Argumenten für das Unternehmen einsetzte, wer sich mit welchen Argumenten dagegen stemmte, was letztlich für den Fürsten den Ausschlag gab und auf welche Kräfte er sich stützen konnte, all das ist uns völlig unbekannt".

<sup>220</sup> Winkelmann [1886, I, nr. 3, 4-5]. For Marsilius' own account of the foundation of the University of Heidelberg see AUH I, 1, nr. 72. See also Miethke [1992, 13-14].

<sup>221</sup> AUH I, 1, nr. 72, 16-18

<sup>222</sup> AUH I, 1, nr. 72, 4-10: "ut modus incepcionis dicti studii universis posteris innotescat utque statuta, que incepta et acta sunt pro eius bono regimine et ad que tenenda constringuntur et constringentur magistris

the standard rhetoric of founding statutes, in the following years he will show an honest commitment and a great investment in the project as it is: those rhetorical statements in Marsilius' account could possibly reveal his insightful awareness of the project's fragility.

After Urban VI's approval, and once all the required paperwork is ready and the due payments deposited, on 24 June 1386 Rupert presents the official concession letters to his council. The following Thursday the council gathers again to start planning the details concerning the new university and it is then that Marsilius of Inghen is officially brought on the project and welcomed on the council itself - in Marsilius' own words, "on a large pay".<sup>223</sup> Was Marsilius in Heidelberg and promoting the project already before then? In the very beginning of his report, Marsilius states that he is writing down the events as he saw them or heard about them; so his own account does not give any information about it.

Since *tres faciunt collegium*, i.e. at least three masters are required, the theologian Reginald of Aulne, from Paris, and the *magister artium* and *baccalarius in sacra pagina* Heilmann Wunnenberg, from Prague, follow shortly after Marsilius to lay the foundation of the Faculty of Theology. On Marsilius' insistence, Rupert has finally completed the privilege letters for the studium by 1 October 1386; Marsilius, acting as rector, has them preserved in the university *arca*, that he himself commissioned and purchased for the common use of the university. On 18 October, Reginald celebrates a solemn mass, with the attendance of Marsilius, Heilmann and all the scholars and students, for the foundation of the *studium*. The day after, Marsilius starts lecturing *in loycam*, Reginald on the *Epistle to Titus* and Heilmann on Aristotle's *Physics*. A few weeks later more masters begin to arrive, mostly from Prague. By 17 November 1386, Dietmar Swerthe has joined the ranks of the Heidelberg faculty of arts, but the *magistri artium* are still very few, therefore they decide to let also the theologian Reginald vote for the election of the rector, even if - according to the Parisian way - only artists can normally vote and be

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presenter pariter et futuri, in quaque facultate fuerint magistrati, insuper et scolares .... ne forte per ignoranciam eorum aliquis ipsis vel alicui ex eis contravenire presumat..."

<sup>223</sup> AUH I,1, nr. 72, 25-35

elected. Marsilius specifies in his report that it was an exceptional occasion that does not constitute a precedent. Marsilius is chosen unanimously as the first rector of the University of Heidelberg.<sup>224</sup> The following day, Marsilius goes to persuade Rupert of the necessity of procuring the proper sigils for the university and the rector, and then he commissions them.<sup>225</sup>

At this point, there is still much work to be done on the statutes, to actually give the newborn university full-fledged regulations beyond the programmatic intentions of being "like Paris" (that will not last). Marsilius records faithfully all the progress.

Already by the end of January 1387, Marsilius has to deal with the first internal dissents and attacks on the spirit of the statutes: on 31 January a newly arrived theologian from Prague, Conrad of Soltau, in his oath refused to subscribe to the article that the rector had to be a master of arts.<sup>226</sup> We do not know the details of how the situation evolves: Marsilius tells us only that there have been "many altercations and several changes of opinion" by 16 March 1387, when a general assembly gathers to discuss the issue once again, but this time it reaches an agreement in favour of keeping the statutes as they are.<sup>227</sup> This particular entry in Marsilius' *Rector-book* is important because, in addition to the authoritative point threatening excommunication for those who go against the statutes, it contains a "social" argument in favour of the Parisian way:

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<sup>224</sup> AUH I,1, nr. 73

<sup>225</sup> AUH I,1, nr. 74

<sup>226</sup> AUH I,1, nr. 81: "[31/I/1387] Insuper ultimo die januarii iuravit venerabilis vir magister Conradus de Soltau doctor sacre theologie modo expresso hoc excepto, quod super statuto domini nostri duci, quo tenebatur, quod semper rector deberet esse magister in artibus et non doctor in alia facultate, dixit se velle plenius deliberare, super quod pluries exstitit disceptatum".

<sup>227</sup> AUH I,1, nr.84

dictum statutum ... parvorum scholarium in promocionem et expedicionem esset...  
quodque grave foret scholaribus parvis qualibet de causa magistrum sacre theologie vel  
alterius facultatis doctorem forte maioribus inpeditum in sui auxilium invocare.<sup>228</sup>

The issue clearly had risen from two opposite ways of conceiving the office of rector: in Prague, the *rector* is an honorific role of prestige, assigned to already affirmed masters; in Paris, it is an office entrusted to the young masters in arts, who have more time to attend to the administrative tasks, to promote their career and help them financially. Since at this point the only two masters from Paris were still the theologian Reginald of Aulne and Marsilius himself, Marsilius might be stating his own position.<sup>229</sup> This passage is certainly in the same egalitarian spirit animating the article of the statutes regulating the internal ordering of the *rotulus*, as reported by Marsilius, according to which the nobility or high status of any of the masters is irrelevant.<sup>230</sup>

After having finally reached an agreement on the rectorship, Marsilius' first official mandate concludes a few days later, on 24 March 1387, and Heilmann Wunnenberg is elected to relieve him.<sup>231</sup> However, this victory of Marsilius' will not last, not even through his lifetime: in 1393 the statutes will be modified to allow the election of the rector among all the masters of the University, and the point will be further expanded in 1395.<sup>232</sup>

Partially due to the shortage of artists in those early years, between 1386 and 1393, Marsilius will hold the office of rector eight times and he will have to deal with his share of troubles.

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<sup>228</sup> AUH I,1, nr.84, 7-14

<sup>229</sup> Also Miethke [1992, 24-25] believes so.

<sup>230</sup> AUH 1,1, nr. 85: "... Advertendum est quod in premissis non est facta mencio de nobilibus an magnos status habentibus in studio nostro. Nam voluit universitas quod in singulorum rotulorum ordinacione super inscripcione talium facta congregacione universitatis iuxta genus, statum quem tenent in studio, morem ac scienciam, in quantum velint inrotulari iuxta decretum universitatis inscriberentur."

<sup>231</sup> AUH I,1, nr. 86

<sup>232</sup> Winkelmann [1886, I, nr. 31, 55] and AUH I, 2, nr. 161.



In December 1387, at the very beginning of Marsilius' second rectorship,<sup>233</sup> an issue has risen with a group of six Parisian masters: they had gathered in an exclusive meeting to privately read some letter sent from Paris, and had therefore stirred the distrust and the hostility of many of their colleagues. The incident is solved quickly with a questioning and a formal admonition by the University and the injunction to reconfirm an oath of alligiance to Heidelberg,<sup>234</sup> but it shows that the internal divisions among the masters run deep. The official line of the University, or at least Marsilius', is in support of the Roman pope; this is repeatedly made clear on several occasions. Following the incident with the six Parisian masters, all Heidelberg masters are forbidden to hold titles from the University of Paris.<sup>235</sup> When Urban VI passes away in October 1389, Boniface IX succeeds him on 9 November 1389 and the Schism continues.<sup>236</sup> The University of Heidelberg stays firm in its Roman Obedience and sends a new supplication to the new pope, this time brought by both Conrad of Soultau and Marsilius of Inghen.<sup>237</sup> Futhermore, Marsilius is once again the rector when in October 1390 the Palatine Count is entertaining envoys from the King of France: the University of Heidelberg fears that they are there to convince the Count to join the anti-pope and, in order to stop him from doing anything harmful to Boniface IX's cause, Marsilius is to intervene accompanied by some representatives.<sup>238</sup>

However, the most dangerous ordeal that the fledgling University of Heidelberg has to undergo in those first uncertain years does not seem to be related to the Schism, although some internal divisions among the masters might have played a major role. In November 1388, the rector Berthold Suderdick abandons the University of Heidelberg for Cologne while still in office; he takes with himself the masters Hartlevus de Marca and Theodoric de

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<sup>233</sup> AUH I,1, nr. 96, referring to 16/12/1387

<sup>234</sup> AUH I,1, nr. 99, referring to 16/12/1387

<sup>235</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 102

<sup>236</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 11

<sup>237</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 11 and 60; AUH I, 2 446; see also Miethke [1992, 34]

<sup>238</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 123

*Monasterio* and most of the students, to the point that only a few are left. Marsilius has to step in, take over the office of rector, and navigate his university through the crisis.<sup>239</sup>

As it had often happened in his time in Paris, Marsilius is usually the one who gets called upon to deal with delicate situations. For example, when in September 1397 Conrad of Soltau is illegally arrested *a quibusdam laicis*, Marsilius is sent along with the rector to appeal for their colleague and he becomes actively engaged for quite some time to ensure Conrad's release.<sup>240</sup>

As he does also in several other occasions, Marsilius will also loan a quite significant sum of money to help the University cover for the expenses relative to Conrad's liberation.<sup>241</sup>

With his eight rectorships by 1393, Marsilius has already been in office more than any of his colleagues;<sup>242</sup> his role has been undoubtedly essential for establishing and shaping a proper *studium* in Heidelberg. After 1393, after the change in the statutes allowing for the election of the rector among the masters of all faculties, Marsilius is probably busy with the completion of his theological studies: he will be rector only once more, in 1396 - and he will die in office. In June 1393, Marsilius appears in the official lists as a bachelor of theology<sup>243</sup> and, by the end of 1394, as a *baccalarius formatus*.<sup>244</sup> Therefore, also in consideration of some internal references of the text, it is highly probable that Marsilius read the *Sentences* between 1392 and 1394 – in any case not before 1392.<sup>245</sup>

As far as we know, Marsilius must have completed his theological studies at some point between June 1395 (he is still *baccalarius formatus* on the 17th)<sup>246</sup> and 23 June 1396;<sup>247</sup> we

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<sup>239</sup> Töpke [1884-1893 I, 34]: "Item citra medium rectorie recedente rectore propter epidemiam et guerras et una secum magistris Hertlevo de Marka et Theodorico de Monasterio et fere simul omnibus scolaribus, paucis in comparatione demptis, substitutus fuit magister Marsilius de Inghen....". See also Miethke [1992, 32-33]

<sup>240</sup> AUH 1,1 nr. 168 • 170-171 • 173 • 176 • 178 • 181-182 • 185-190 • 192 • 195

<sup>241</sup> AUH 1,1 nr. 204

<sup>242</sup> See Miethke [1992, 27]

<sup>243</sup> AUH I, 1 nr. 160 referring to 15 June 1393.

<sup>244</sup> For example, AUH I,2 nr. 180, referring to 1 November 1394; nr. 185, referring to 26-29 December 1394; and nr. 187, referring to 29 December 1394.

<sup>245</sup> See Courtenay [1992, 39]

<sup>246</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 202

know that he is the first theologian to obtain his degree in Heidelberg.<sup>248</sup> In August 1395, Marsilius petitions for having exclusive use of the house he has been inhabiting and his request is granted.<sup>249</sup> Marsilius' request might be a sign of a slowdown in his teaching activity, probably to focus on his studies since, when he is elected rector for the ninth time on 23 June 1396, Marsilius has obtained the title of *doctor theologie*.<sup>250</sup> Marsilius is fulfilling regularly his duties of rector through July<sup>251</sup> and his death on 20 August 1396 seems to be quite sudden and unexpected. Marsilius is buried *apud Sanctum Petrum in choro ante altarem magnum*,<sup>252</sup> respectfully mourned by his colleagues and the whole *studium*.<sup>253</sup>

### 1.1.5 Conclusion

Overall, Marsilius of Inghen was a professional philosopher and academic. His life lacks the excitement of Ockham's or the legendary mystery of Buridan's, but it is a life of solid professional achievements as a master, an administrator and a rector, as well as of philosophical speculation. Furthermore, Marsilius' life is documented well enough that for the most part we have a fairly good idea of how his career progressed and of some of his everyday commitments among teaching, meetings and examinations.

Even if it is probable that Marsilius was intimate with a Pope or two, and shook hands with emperors, dukes, and various sorts of potentates, his relationships of major interest for the history of philosophy are others. It is possible that he came in direct contact with John Buridan; probably he was at least personally acquainted with his fellow Anglican masters Albert of Saxony and Themon Judeus, and later on with the Norman theologian Nicole

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<sup>247</sup> Ritter [1921, 40]; Pelster [1944, 85]; and Courtenay [1992, in particular 40]. On Marsilius as a theologian see in particular Courtenay [1992] and [2001].

<sup>248</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 454

<sup>249</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 207

<sup>250</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 211

<sup>251</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 212-216

<sup>252</sup> AUH I,1 nr. 217

<sup>253</sup> See Prowin's *Oratio Funerbris* in Vimpfelingius [1499, 38 and ff.]; AUH I,1 nr. 217 • 219 • 220

Oresme. The existence of a sort of "Buridanian circle", to which he may have belonged, at least intellectually, is not unlikely.

Furthermore, we have an extensive list of students that determined or incepted under Marsilius' supervision: further studies could give us a better measure of Marsilius' direct influence of the following generation and hence of the development of nominalist positions in the late XIV century. Moreover, through many years in Paris Marsilius' name was repeatedly associated with some of his colleagues': Jordan de Clivis, Gerard of Kalkar, Adam of Catwijn, Hugo of Hervost, just to mention a few. Awareness of such personal connections and further studies could bring a more complete and better understanding of the evolution and interaction of philosophical positions, of the ways and contexts of circulation and access to ideas, and of the intellectual climate in Paris in the third quarter of the XIV century.

#### 1.1.6 *Epilogue: A Useful Inheritance*

Marsilius' legacy is of enormous historical importance: the University of Heidelberg is probably the most tangible remnant of his talent for and life-work in diplomacy and administration. The historical resonance of his philosophy is long and deep, as testified by the diffusion of the so called *via marsiliana*, especially through central and eastern European Universities, in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modernity.<sup>254</sup> The relevance of Marsilius' philosophy and the breadth of its influence have been only partially studied and there is much still to be done. However Marsilius left also another inheritance, a material one, to the University of Heidelberg: his library.<sup>255</sup> On such an inheritance I would like to spend only a few words.

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<sup>254</sup> For an outline of Marsilius' influence see Hoenen [2013]; on the reception of Marsilius' philosophy and works see also Bos [2000]; Wojtczak [2000]; Walz [2000].

<sup>255</sup> On Marsilius' library see in particular Walz [1993a] and Hoenen - Ernzt [2014, 10]. See also: Töpke [1884-1893, 678-85], Maier [1942, 200-201].

Not long after his death, Marsilius' books were entrusted to the University library at the *collegium artistarum*.<sup>256</sup> the list of those acquisitions, still preserved among the university documents,<sup>257</sup> gives us a very good idea of most of the books in Marsilius' possession in his Heidelberg years. Such data obviously probably does not exhaust Marsilius' library (he could have left some of his book to others), his readings, and the intellectual influences on his thought, but it allows us at least a partial and possibly helpful insight on what he was working on and kept close at hand later on in his life.

In the Heidelberg "Marsilius Collection" catalogue, presumably compiled in 1396 not long after Marsilius' death, we find:

- a) more than 70 theological titles;<sup>258</sup>
- b) 11 juridical entries;<sup>259</sup>
- c) 34 items catalogued as of ethical subject,<sup>260</sup> including titles such as Plato's *Timaeus* with Calcidius' commentary,<sup>261</sup> Isidor of Seville's *Ethimologiae*,<sup>262</sup> Cicero's *De inventione* and *De oratore*,<sup>263</sup> and possibly the *Rhetoric ad Herennium*,<sup>264</sup>
- d) merely 6 entries on metaphysical matters, including Buridan's *Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, Thomas Aquinas' *Super XII libros Metaphysicae*, and a volume containing Averroes' commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, *De de anima* and the *De coelo*;<sup>265</sup>
- e) 42 titles on natural philosophy;<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> AUH I, 1 nr. 222

<sup>257</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 454 • 457-459 • 462-463 • 466-467

<sup>258</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 454

<sup>259</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 457

<sup>260</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 459

<sup>261</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 459, entry (191)

<sup>262</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 459, entry (194)

<sup>263</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 459, entry (196)

<sup>264</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 459: "(209) Item (500) librum Hergetti in papiro". Furthermore, in AUH I,2 nr. 459, in entry 205, it is listed also Peter of Alvernia's *De Coelo*, but simply because copied in the same codex containing a text on Macrobius' commentary to Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*.

<sup>265</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 463

<sup>266</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 462

- f) a few (6) medical items, which is to be expected in the library of somebody working in natural philosophy and might have served as sources for Marsilius' questions on the *De generatione et corruptione* or some other project of his in natural philosophy;<sup>267</sup>
- g) 19 entries on logic;<sup>268</sup>
- h) 11 titles classified as on grammar.<sup>269</sup>

We do not know if the internal thematic divisions in the collections were established arbitrarily by the master librarian, or if they mirrored Marsilius' own arrangement of his library.

What can we learn from this list? The preponderant number of theological entries is easily explainable since Marsilius must have been working for the completion of his degree in theology in his Heidelberg years. A few juridical books are not unusual in the library of a man of Marsilius' position; certainly they complement well some inclinations Marsilius has shown and point in the direction of a more than possible interest on his part. The scarce number of metaphysical texts, which includes well established reference works like Thomas' and the

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<sup>267</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 458: "(180) Primo (459) artem commentatam in pergameno. (181) Item (460) decem libros Rasis in pergameno [ar-Rasi, *Ad Almanosrem libri decem*]. (182) Item (461) dietas universales et particulares et urinas Ysaac in pergameno [Isaac ben Salomon Israeli]. (183) Item (462) lilium medicine bonum in pergameno [Bernard of Gordon, *Lilium medicinae*]. (184) Item (464) liberum [sic] Galieni ad Glauconem in pergameno [Galen, *Ad Glauconem de medendi methodo*]. (185) Item (465) aliquos alios libellos et sexternos in medicina parvi valoris."

<sup>268</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 466: "(335) Primo (582) logica Alberti in papiro. (336) Item (583) antiquas questiones super predicamenta in pergameno. (337) Item (584) Thomas super posteriorum in pergameno. (338) Item (585) expositio super librum thopicorum in pergameno. (339) Item (586) commentum cum questionibus super libro priorum in pergameno. (340) Item scripta super (587) veterem artem, (588) librum divisionum et (589) librum thopicorum Boecii in pergameno. (341) Item (590) textus loyce Aristotelis de quo legere consuevit. (342) Item (591) questiones elencorum in papiro. (343) Item (592) antiquum textum loyce in pergameno. (344) Item (593) loyca vetus Alberti Magni in pergameno. (345) Item (594) Egidium super elencorum in pergameno. (346) Item (595) commentum Boecii super predicamenta Aristotelis in pergameno. (347) Item (596) questiones magistri Rudolphi Britoni super libro posteriorum in pergameno. (348) Item (597) scripta et questiones thopicorum et elencorum in papiro parvi valoris. (349) Item (598) questiones posteriorum in papiro, quas ipse legit. (350) Item (599) scriptum super Porphirium et peryarmonias [sic] in paupiro. (351) Item (600) questiones super veterem artem, quas ipse legit, in papiro. (352) Item (601) questiones ipsius super priorum in papiro."

<sup>269</sup> AUH I,2 nr. 467: "(353) Primo (602) secundum Prisciani Minoris. (354) Item (603) recepta ex 2<sup>o</sup> eiusdem. (355) Item (604) poetriam novam et syonima. (356) Item (605) unum librum cum multis vocabulis. (357) Item (606) diversos tractatos de arte metrificandi et rigmatizandi. (358) Item (607) quendam librum metricum. (359) Item (608) hystoriam Alexandri. (360) Item (609) poetriam novam. (361) Item (610) unum tractatum grammaticalem. (362) Item (611) Lucanum. (363) Item (612) reportata et dicta super Priscianum et super flores."

usual Buridan, strengthens the hypothesis of an earlier dating of Marsilius' *Quaestiones super librum metaphysicorum*. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Marsilius had been working and lecturing on ethical subjects at some point in Heidelberg and on at least some of his many works in natural philosophy.<sup>270</sup> Undoubtedly the number of natural philosophy titles in Marsilius' library and the number of works he produced in this field leaves little doubt that it is one of his major interests. The same is true of logic, even if logical (and grammatical) texts in Marsilius' Heidelberg library are not predominant.

#### Logical Works in Marsilius' Library

Author/Attribution	Title / Description	Material
Albert [of Saxony] <sup>271</sup>	[Perutilis] Logica	paper
Albert the Great	<i>loyca vetus</i> [= Super Porphirium?, Super Praedicamenta?, Super De Interpretatione?, Super librum de sex principibus? ]	parchment
Aristoteles	<i>textus loyce A. de quo legere consuevit</i>	--
Boethius	<i>super artem veterem</i>	parchment
Boethius	Liber divisionum	parchment
Boethius	<i>librum thopicorum</i> [= De topicis differentiis?]	parchment
Boethius	Super Praedicamenta	parchment
Giles of Rome	Super librum elenchorum	parchment
Radulphus Brito	Quaestiones super librum posteriorum	parchment
Thomas Aquinas	Quaestiones super librum posteriorum	parchment
--	<i>antiquas questiones super predicamenta</i>	parchment
--	<i>antiquum textum loyce</i>	parchment

<sup>270</sup> In addition to Marsilius' known or preserved works, the presence of several titles in his collection on the movement of the heart could induce us to suppose that Marsilius might have composed (or at least worked upon) an autonomous treatise *De motu cordis*.

<sup>271</sup> The editor of AUH takes the entry to be Albert the Great's. I believe it to be a mistake: there is another entry containing mentioning a *logica vetus* explicitly by Albert the Great (presumably his commentaries on Porphyry, the *Categories*, the *De interpretatione*, and possibly on the *Liber sex principiorum*) in more valuable parchment. The other known logical works by Albert the Great, on both *Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations*, would have been more likely titled *loyca nova* or have individual titles. The simply *loyca* in paper attributed simply to Albert is more likely Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis logica*.

--	<i>exposicio super librum thopicorum</i>	parchment
-- / Marsilius of Inghen?	<i>commentum cum questionibus super libro priorum</i>	parchment
-- / Marsilius of Inghen?	<i>questiones elencorum</i>	paper
-- / Marsilius of Inghen?	<i>scripta et questiones thopicorum et elencorum ... parvi valoris</i>	paper
Marsilius of Inghen	Questiones super librum posteriorum	paper
-- / Marsilius of Inghen?	<i>scriptum super Porphirium et peryarmonias [= Peri hermeneias]</i>	paper
Marsilius of Inghen	<i>quaestiones super artem veterem</i>	paper
Marsilius of Inghen	Quaestiones super librum priorum	paper

It is likely that most of Marsilius' logical works have been composed at an earlier date, especially his treatises in the so-called *logica modernorum*.<sup>272</sup> This could be supported also by the lack of any of these works by Marsilius in this collection and the presence only of (presumably) Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis Logica* out of the *summae* and the treatises in the same genre. Most of the volumes in this group are expensive parchment codices, objects of value in their own right, some are even "antiques". Several among these are commentaries on the *logica vetus*. This is not enough to conclude that Marsilius' *Quaestiones in artem veterem* (a paper copy of which is in the list too) have been composed or revised in Heidelberg, but it could bring some support to this kind of hypothesis. Certainly, according to the compiler of the catalogue, Marsilius had at least lectured on this text at some point in Heidelberg. On the same uncertain ground, we tentatively put forward a similar hypothesis for Marsilius' *Quaestiones* on the *First* and *Second Analytics*, of which too we find paper copies in the same list: on the *Quaestiones super librum posteriorum* we have once again the librarian's note stating that Marsilius had read those questions.

One of the items in the same collection appears to be a miscellany of "writings and questions" on the *Topics* and the *Sophistical refutations*, "of little value", on paper, that could be a folder of

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<sup>272</sup> See Chapter II



working notes by Marsilius. This is a wild guess, but it could have some grounding since several of the other volumes in Marsilius' library are indeed on topical matters or on the *Sophistical refutations*, which shows at least an active interest on his part on the subject. On the one hand, among Marsilius' logical works are usually listed also some *Questiones super librum Elenchorum* - and we cannot exclude that the *quaestiones elenchorum* mentioned in the catalogue are indeed Marsilius'. On the other hand, we might wonder if at some point Marsilius was putting together some notes on the *Topics*, either for an independent work or for some of his other projects. Sadly, we do not have enough data to move beyond the realm of mere conjecture.

Overall, the Heidelberg collection catalogue allows only for little more than speculation. A point of interest of this catalogue lays in what is not there: with the exception of (presumably) Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis Logica*, Marsilius' library lacks most of the evident logical sources of his works already studied to some degree. This absence could be irrelevant, since Marsilius could have donated some of his books to third parties. But let us assume for the argument's sake that this absence is meaningful and that Marsilius does not have many technical logical works beforehand in his last few years: such lack would still not be surprising because of the earlier dating of Marsilius' *logica modernorum* treatises, but it would not prove a shift in Marsilius' interests or positions. However much work is still needed on both the unedited parts of the *logica modernorum* and on most of Marsilius' other logical works.

## 1.2 Works<sup>273</sup>

Despite having led a life full of institutional engagements, Marsilius of Inghen seems to be a prolific author who is credited with a considerable number of works. In some cases the

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<sup>273</sup> A good, even if dated, overview of Marsilius' works is in Bos [1983, 11-16]. An extensive list and analysis of Marsilius' works is in Markowski [1988] and [1992]; see also Hoenen [1989] and [1990].

attribution is dubious or unclear. Until such attributions are confirmed or refuted by further inquiries, we are going to report here a list of the major titles usually attributed to Marsilius.

i. Logic and Grammar

- a) Abbreviationes veteris et nove logice
- b) Expositio super veterem logicam
- c) Questiones veteris artis
- d) Questiones super Prothirium
- e) Quaestiones super *Peri hermeneias*
- f) Questiones super librum Priorum
- g) Questiones super librum Posteriorum
- h) Questiones super librum Elenchorum
- i) *Logica modernorum treatises*: Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones, Consequentiae, Obligationes, Insolubilia.
- j) Sophisma: "Homo est bos"
- k) att.: Questiones super secunda parte Doctrinalis moderne<sup>274</sup>

ii. Natural Philosophy<sup>275</sup>

- a) Abbreviationes super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> The attribution to Marsilius is doubtful at least: according to a later marginal addition in the only known manuscript containing this text, the *Questiones* are attributed to a certain "master Simon". See Weijers [2005]. The *Doctrinale* is a handbook of latin grammar and arithmetics in leonine verses composed by Alexander de Villadei around 1200. The text is edited in Reichling [1893].

<sup>275</sup> Lists of Marsilius' works usually add also a *Quaestio utrum qualitas suscipit magis et minus*; however some very convincing arguments against its authenticity and a plausible reconstruction of the origin of this misattribution have been put forward by Bakker [2000, 121-123] and Kaluza [1995, 197, n. 1]

<sup>276</sup> I take Marsilius' *Abbreviationes*, available also in an early modern edition [Venice 1521] to be authentic until proven otherwise: from what I could see, the content is compatible with Marsilius' philosophical positions; furthermore a text of *accurtata Marsilii super physicorum* is in the library of Conrad of Worms, Marsilius' colleague in Heidelberg - See AUH I,2 nr. 461. On the limits and problems of the early modern edition see also

- b) att. *Questiones libri Physicorum*<sup>277</sup>
- c) *Abbreviata super De celo et mundo*
- d) *Questiones in librum De celo et mundo*
- e) *Questiones breves super librum de generatione et corruptione*
- f) *Questiones super librum De generatione et corruptione secundum ultimam lecturam*
- g) *Quaestiones libri De Anima*
- h) *Expositio Parvorum naturalium*
- i) *Questiones Parvorum naturalium*
- l) *Tractatus de spera*<sup>278</sup>

### iii. Metaphysics

- a) *Questiones super librum Metaphysicorum*

### iv. Ethics

- a) *Questiones in librum Ethicorum*
- b) *Lectura Oeconomicorum et Politicorum*<sup>279</sup>
- c) *Questiones XIII in Rhetoricam Aristotelis*<sup>280</sup>

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Maier [1951, 279]. It is very probably not Marsilius' the text circulating as *Questiones subtilissime Johannis (sic) Marcilii Inguen super octo libros phisicorum secundum nominalium viam*, incorporated in Wadding's edition of John Duns Scotus' works (Lyon, 1639).

<sup>277</sup> The attribution of this text to Marsilius' is doubtful; this work is usually considered a "pseudo Marsilius". See Weijers [2005]

<sup>278</sup> Not mentioned in Weijers [2005]

<sup>279</sup> Weijers [2005] considers this work to be a pseudo.

<sup>280</sup> The insertion of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* among moral works was quite common in the Middle Ages, as argued already by Murphy [1969] and [1981]. However, a more nuanced assesment would be more appropriate - see for exampe Briggs [2007]. Roughly, the insertion of *Rhetoric* (and *Poetics*) among either logical or ethical matters depends on each author's take on how the *Organon* should be defined: either in an "extended" way (e.g. as Thomas Aquinas did) or in a "narrow" way. In the last quarter of the XIV century in the *curricula* of most central European Universities, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is considered as a moral text and in the same way it is listed in the XIV century catalogue of the Heidelberg University Library that I examined in I.I.4. At the current state of the research, Marsilius' relevant works on the subject are still unedited and therefore it would be inappropriate to determine his own position on the issue. Hence, I am following the general medieval trend and the Heidelberg

d) Morales diverse<sup>281</sup>

v. Theology

a) Questiones super quatuor libros Sententiarum<sup>282</sup>

b) Lectura in Mattheum <sup>283</sup>

c) Principium super Danielelem cum aliis diversis

d) Scriptum super Danielelem

vi. On University and Church Politics

a) Letter from Tibure, 27/VII/1378<sup>284</sup>

b) Rationes cur Urbano Pontifici electo adherendum<sup>285</sup>

Most of these works are not available or only partially available in a modern edition.<sup>286</sup>

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catalogue and I am counting Marsilius' *Quaestiones in Rhetoricam* among his ethical works. According to Weijers [2005] it is only a single question.

<sup>281</sup> This work appears in several catalogues and listst under the attribution to Marsilius of Inghen; it could probably be a collection of annotation of ethical subject, but it is still to be studied. See Weijers [2005]

<sup>282</sup> Arghentinae 1501, reprint 1966 Frankfurt/Main.

<sup>283</sup> Partially edited in Berndt [1985]. Of this text we have Marsilius' autograph - see Miethke [1986b]

<sup>284</sup> Edited in Denifle - Chatelain [1894b, 553-555]

<sup>285</sup> Edited in Ritter [1921, 196-204]

<sup>286</sup> For the references to Marsilius' edited, partially edited works and works available in an early modern edition see the Bibliography in the present work.

## 2. Chapter II: Introduction to the Edition of Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae*

He is only human, and that's an impediment to editing a classic.  
- T. Stoppard, *The Invention of Love*, Act I, Grove Press: New York, 1998, p. 33

### 2.0 Introduction

In preparing the following edition of Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae*, the complexity of the manuscript tradition and the palaeographical difficulties entailed a long editorial work and some substantial editorial choices (II.4). In order to justify those choices I will introduce Marsilius' treatise (II.1) and I will offer a profile of the known manuscripts (II.2). I am then going to situate the *Consequentiae* within the tradition of Marsilius' other *logica modernorum* works (II.3) and to propose a tentative dating (II.3.3).

### 2.1 On the Structure of the Treatise

Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae* is divided in two books clearly conceived as continuous parts of a unitary project - as shown by several internal references to the other *pars*<sup>287</sup> and confirmed by the manuscript tradition.<sup>288</sup>

The first book is on *consequentia* in general and, as it is quite common in the genre, it is structured in three macro-sections respectively, on the definition of *consequentia*, its subdivisions, and the rules controlling it.

After a short introduction, Marsilius deals with the matter of the definition of what a *consequentia* is and what the notion of *consequentia* is supposed to capture.

Once Marsilius has chosen a preferred account of *consequentia*, after an extensive examination, he distinguishes between formal and material *consequentiae* and offers a further subdivision: respectively, syllogistically and non-syllogistically formal *consequentia* on the

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<sup>287</sup> E.g. in *Consequentiae* II.1.2.<2>-<3> [W f. 127rv; Y f. 103r; M f. 50r ]

<sup>288</sup> See the following paragraphs in the present chapter - II.2-3.

one hand, and simply material *consequentia* on the other hand; he rejects the admissibility of a material *consequentia* "as-of-now".

The third section of the first book presents a systematic series of rules, meticulously proven and usually accompanied by examples,<sup>289</sup> divided as follows:

- general rules applying to any *consequentia* whatsoever:
  - general rules applying to most but not all *consequentiae*;
- special rules for formal non syllogistic *consequentiae*;
- conversion rules:
  - rules for conversions of non amplified *de inesse* sentences (*de recto* and *de obliquo*);
  - special rules for conversions of sentences *de obliquo* and with amplified terms;
  - conversions of modal propositions:
    - *De sensu composito*;
    - *De sensu diviso*;
- Rules for material consequences.

The second book deals with *consequentiae* between types of sentences containing some kind of non-explicit logical complication and their "analysed" versions; this kind of logical relation is called *expositio*, i.e. "exposition". What kind of logical relations this *expositio* actually turns out to be is quite controversial - both for the medieval authors and the contemporary interpreters.<sup>290</sup> In any case, *exponibiles* are the subject of a specific "genre" in the *logica modernorum*, that comes to be codified in the XIV century. The second book of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* presents the same subdivisions usually found in these treatises on *exponibiles*:

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<sup>289</sup> This approach is in line with the "Continental" tradition; on the other hand the "English" tradition tends to merely list the rules without giving long proofs, many examples or detailed theoretical justifications. For an effective outline of the main features of both logical traditions see Bertagna [2008, 630-633]

<sup>290</sup> For an excellent outline of the issues see Spade [2000]

- on exceptive sentences (e.g. "every man besides Socrates runs");
- on exclusive sentences (e.g. "only an animal is a man");
- on reduplicative sentences (e.g. "I like Socrates inasmuch as he was good to me");
- on sentences *de incipit* (e.g. "Socrates begins to run", "Socrates begins to be white");
- on sentences *de desinit* (e.g. "Socrates ceases to run", "Socrates ceases to be white");
- on sentences *de differt* (e.g. "Socrates is different from a donkey");
- On 'infinite' - taken categorically or syncategorically;
- on comparatives (e.g. "Socrates is stronger than Plato");
- on superlatives (e.g. "Socrates is the strongest");
- on universal signs collectively taken (e.g. "all the Apostles are twelve");
- On the sign '*totus*' (entire/ whole/all together; e.g. "Socrates as a whole is a man")
- On '*ita*' and '*sicut*' ('as ... as'; e.g. "Socrates is as white as Plato").

Each chapter in the second book is divided in two sections: the first one giving an analysis of the kind of exponible sentence discussed in that chapter, its subspecies and how to expose them; and the second one stating the specific rules for inferences involving that type of exponible sentence. Such a detailed analysis of *exponibiles* is not common in *consequentiae* treatises, especially in those belonging to the Continental tradition (e.g. Buridan's *in primis*). However, it is not unique to Marsilius' work: some discussions of *expositiones* or inferences involving *exponibiles* are included both (*in nuce*) in some older treatises and (sometimes more systematically) in some contemporary ones focusing on *consequentiae* especially within the English tradition - as, for example, in Richard Billingham's *De consequentiis*<sup>291</sup> or, later, in the section *De conditionali et rationali* in Paul of Venice's *Logica*.<sup>292</sup>

Overall, some features of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* (e.g. the omission of any extended discussion on categorical or modal syllogistics in the first book and the inclusion of *exponibiles*

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<sup>291</sup> Richard Billingham [2003] deals with some cases of *exponibiles*, such as *exclusivae* and *exceptivae*.

<sup>292</sup> Paulus Venetus [1990] counts the kind of inference holding "ab exposita ad alteram suarum exponentium" among his *modi simplices arguendi*. See Bertagna [1994, 538]

as part of the theory of *consequentiae* properly speaking) are not commonly found in contemporary treatises on *consequentiae* or in Marsilius' conceptually closest sources and most obvious references - namely, Buridan's *Tractatus de consequentiis* and Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis logica* IV.

## 2.2 The Manuscripts of Marsilius' *Consequentiae*

There are 15 confirmed manuscripts containing complete or partial versions of Marsilius' *Consequentiae*, of which a brief overview follows.

[1] BASEL, *Universitätsbibliothek*, F VI 62<sup>293</sup> [ff. 57r-115r and 253ra-262vb] (= B)

Origin: Ulm, Heidelberg. Previously: Dominikanerkonvent Basel. Material: paper. Date: second quarter of the XV century, but the *Consequentiae* dates 1436.

The manuscript contains Book I, Book II, and what looks like a second partial version of Book I. Most of the codex has been copied by Albrecht Löffler, owner of the volume, when he was in Ulm. The codex contains, among other texts, also Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*, *Restrictiones*, *Alienationes*. At the end of his transcription of the *Suppositiones*, Albrecht notes that the treatise was composed in Paris;<sup>294</sup> he does not do as much for any of the other treatises.

Furthermore, the codex contains also some *Quaestiones parvorum logicalium* (*Q. de suppositionibus*, *Q. de ampliationibus*, *Q. de appellationibus*, *De septem regulis appellationibus*, *Notata de restrictionibus et alienationibus*) dubiously attributed to Marsilius of Inghen, just preceding the mutilated version of the *Consequentiae*.

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<sup>293</sup> Lohr [1994, 112-114]; Markowski [1988, 67-78].

<sup>294</sup> Lohr [1994, 112]: "Excipiunt Suppositiones terminorum magistri Marsilii Parisii compilatae..."



Book I - incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis *tenebo* Dei iuvamine *istum modum procedendi*..." - Excipit: "Excipit prima pars consequenciarum reverendi Magsitri Marsilij anno domini 1436 3<sup>o</sup> nonas Iunij ante horam quartam postmeridiam. Johannes de Constantia. (?)".

Book II - incipit: "Circa secundam partem consequenciarum vi. Circa secundam partem consequenciarum videndum est de consequenciis ab exponentibus ad expositas...". Excipit: "Et sic de expositionibus ly ita et sic sufficiant et sic est finis consequenciarum de expositione propositionum reuerendi. Excipit 2<sup>a</sup> pars consequenciarum reuerendi magistri Marsilij scripta per me Alberchtum Loeffler tunc temporis Ulme sub anno domini 1436 pridie ydus Iunij indicionum 14<sup>o</sup>."

Alternate Book I (253ra-262vb) - incipit: "Utrum diffinico consequencie sit bona qua dicitur consequencia est oracio habens antecedens et consequens et notam illacionis principales partes sui. Et arguitur primo quod non, nam illa oracio est consequencia..." - Excipit: "... patet Socrates est asinus tenet consequencia in."

[2] ERFURT, *Universitäts und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha*, Ampolonianum Q 277<sup>295</sup>

[ff. 26r-71v] (= E)

Origin: Heidelberg (?). Material: pigskin cover. Date: 1421 (f. 25v and 71v). The manuscript contains Book I and Book II (incomplete) and among the other texts also Marsilius' *Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes et Restrictiones*.

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis *tenebo* Dei adiutorio *istum modum*." Excipit: "ita et suis consequenciis et ex consequenti de ultimo capitulo principali dicta sufficiant et sic est finis consequenciarum reverendi magistri Marsilii de Inghen scripti et finiti per me Fridericum Arenbawr de Onolspach in vigilia s. nativitati Christi AD MCCCCXXI."

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<sup>295</sup> See Bos [1983, 22]; Schum [1887, 519-520]; Markowski [1971, 364]

[3] ERFURT, *Universitäts und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha*, Ampolonianum Q 280<sup>296</sup>

[ff.152r- 178v] (= F)

Origin: Erfurt (?). Material: thick pigskin cover. Date: first half of the XV century. The manuscript contains Book I and Book II, preceded by Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes* and *Appellationes*.

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis tenebo Dei adiutorio istum modum." Excipit: "possimus venire ad ipsum qui - seculor. Excipit<sup>2a</sup> pars consequentiarum a reverendo magistro Marcilio de Ynghen peritissimo pie memorie per manus Tilmani Wal de Tulpeto."

[4] KLAGENFURT, *Universitätsbibliothek*, pap. 103<sup>297</sup> [ff.30v-80r] (= Kl)

Origin: Germany - Ulm; Italy - Brescia. Material: paper. Date: XV sec: 1423 for part of the manuscript; the *Consequentiae* dates 1438. The manuscript contains Book I and Book II, following Marsilius' *Suppositiones* (1423), *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*, *Restrictiones et Alienationes*, all under the common title of *Parva Logicalia*.

Excipit: "dicta sufficiant per dei auxilium ... nec non omnium sanctorum. Excipit textus parvorum logicalium reverendi magistri Marsilii de Inghen anno domini 1438 nona die maii in Brixia sub magistro L.B. hora duodecima. "

[5] KRAKOW, Biblioteka Jagiellońska 2602 (DD XII 60)<sup>298</sup> [ff.28v-70r] (= Kr)

Origin: Germany?. Material: paper. Date: XV century. The manuscript contains Book I and Book II, Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes* preceding the *Consequentiae*, and the *Obligationes* following it.

Incipit: "Tractatus de consequentiis tenebo etc." Excipit: "Sed si conceditur hoc solum est et ad istum quod deus non est bonus quam diabolus et hoc de 11<sup>o</sup> capitulo dicta et per consequens

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<sup>296</sup> See Bos [1983, 22]; Schum [1887, 519-520]; Markowski [1971, 364]

<sup>297</sup> Bos [1983, 23]; Menhardt [1927 I, 142]

<sup>298</sup> Bos [1983, 23]; Wiśłocki [1877-81]; Markowski [1971, 331]

de *lectio dubia* tota parte consequentia est sicut breviter dicta pro quo ille sint vivit rignat<sup>299</sup>  
mens humana sollicite *lectio dubia* benedictus etc...."

[6] MUNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, C.L.M. 4385 (Aug. S. Ulr. 85)<sup>300</sup> [61r- 88r] (= N<sub>1</sub>)

Origin: Vienna?. Material: paper. Date: 1382 for part of the codex; 1423 for the *Consequentiae*.  
According to Bos, the manuscript contains both Book I and Book II, preceded by Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes* and *Appellationes* (all dating 1382). The same codex contains also a commentary on William of Sutton's *Consequentiae*; several XIV century logical texts on the properties of terms (by Hugo Kym, Johannes Lebendorfer, Thomas Manlevelt, among others); a commentary on Manlevelt; and an anonymous commentary on Richard Billingham's *De probationibus terminorum*.<sup>301</sup>

[7] MUNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, C.L.M. 7658 (ind. 258)<sup>302</sup> [ff. 256v- 267v] (= N<sub>2</sub>)

Origin: ?. Material: paper. Date: 1429 (f. 231v). The manuscript contains part of the *Consequentiae*, preceded by Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, part of the *Appellationes* and *Restrictiones et Alienationes*.

[8] MUNICH, *Bayerische Staatsbibliothek*, C.L.M. 7709 (Ind. 309)<sup>303</sup> [ff.25v-71r] (= M)

Origin: ?. Material: paper. Date: 1412 (f. 61r). The manuscript contains both Book I and Book II, along with Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*, *Restrictiones et Alienationes*, preceding the *Consequentiae*; and part of the *Insolubilia* following it.

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<sup>299</sup> pro - rignat] probably error for: "pro quo ille sine fine vivit et regnat".

<sup>300</sup> Bos [1983, 23]; Halm [1871, 156]; Markowski [1971, 364]

<sup>301</sup> Bos [2009]

<sup>302</sup> Bos [1983, 24]; Halm [1873, 182]; Lacombe [1939, 729]; Markowski [1971, 364]

<sup>303</sup> Bos [1983, 24]; Halm [1873, 189]; Markowski [1971, 354]

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis tenebo Dei iuvante istum modum procedendi." Excipit: "Haec de expositionibus ly sicut et ita sufficiant dicta de consequentiis Deo gratias benedicimus domino alleluia."

[9] TRIER, *Stadtbibliothek* 1039/1277<sup>304</sup> [ff. 300v-331v] (= T)

Origin: Germany; previously at St. Matthias' Abbey Library. Material: paper; leather bound wooden cover. Date: 1436 (f. 331v). The manuscript contains only Book I, preceded by Marsilius' *Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, and Restrictiones et Alienationes*.

Excipit: "fit finis primi libri consequentiarum reverendi magistri Marsilii de Inghen 1436."

[10] UPPSALA, *Universitetsbiblioteket* C640<sup>305</sup> [ff. 1r-12r and ff. 23r-31v] (= U)

Origin: Prague. Material: paper. Date: 1388. The manuscript contains part of Book I and part of Book II, however separated by Marsilius' *Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, and Restrictiones et Alienationes*; Book II is followed by Marsilius' *Obligationes*.<sup>306</sup>

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequenciis tenebo dei adiutorio istum modum procedendi..." -

Excipit: "quod deus non est minus bonus quam dyabolus haec de capitulo 11<sup>o</sup> et per consequens de tota parte secunda consequentiarum sicut breviter dicta pro quo sit qui sine fine vivit et regnat deus benedictus."

[11] CITTÀ DEL VATICANO, *Biblioteca Vaticana*, Vat. Lat. 3065<sup>307</sup> [ff. 83v-93v] (= V)

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<sup>304</sup> Bos [1983, 24]; Kristeller [1965, 205]; Becker [1911, 124-125]

<sup>305</sup> Andersson-Schmitt - Hallberg - Hedlund [1993, 190-191]; Bos [1983, 25]

<sup>306</sup> It is not Marsilius' *Insolubilia* as Bos [1983, 25] writes and not Pierre d'Ailly's *Obligationes* as the tentative attribution by Andersson-Schmitt - Hallberg - Hedlund [1993, 191]. The incipit and excipit of this treatise correspond to those of Marsilius' *Obligationes* as in ms. Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, V.P.L. 5162, ff. 140r-171r. Andersson-Schmitt's mistake is however based on the mistaken attribution of Marsilius' *Obligationes* to Pierre d'Ailly (*Tractatus de arte obligandi*) in an early modern printed edition (Paris 1489).

<sup>307</sup> This manuscript has come to the attention of several scholars because of the other logical treatises in it; about Marsilius' *Consequentiae* see: Bos [1983, 25]; Maierù [1970, 312]. A systematic study of the codex in its entirety is direly needed and could prove very useful to understand the relationships between the so called "English" and

Origin: Italy?. Date: 1400-1404. The manuscript, out of Marsilius' treatises, contains only Book I of the *Consequentiae*,<sup>308</sup> however it transmits also an ample collection of logical texts mostly from the English tradition, including among other things: Ralph Strode's *Consequentiae*;<sup>309</sup> Richard Ferrybridge's *Consequentiae*;<sup>310</sup> Peter of Candia's *Consequentiae*;<sup>311</sup> the first *particula* of Burley's *De puritate*;<sup>312</sup> William Buser's treatise on *Obligaciones*;<sup>313</sup> Richard Billingham's *Conclusiones*;<sup>314</sup> and a treatise on *Insolubilia* ascribed to Bradwardine.<sup>315</sup>

Incipit: "Dei adiutorio istum modum procedendi de consequentiis tenebo quia primo..." -  
Excipit: "Et haec de consequentiarum materialium regulis sub correctione melius dicentium dicta sufficiant etc. excipit tractatus consequentiarum composito a venerabili artium doctore Marsilio de Inghen... etc.".

[12] CITTÀ DEL VATICANO, *Biblioteca Vaticana*, Vat. Lat. 3072<sup>316</sup> [ff. 89v-119r , 119v and 200r] (= V<sub>2</sub>)

Origin?. Date: XV. Book I and Book II of the *Consequetiae* follow Marsilius' treatises on *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes* and *Appellationes*; they are added in another hand in folios having an autonomous parallel numeration (ff. 119v; 200r). F. 119v is an addition on *consequentiae*, in a third hand and barely legible; f. 200r is an *errata corrige* for the main *Consequentiae* text, written in a very clear hand.

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis tenebo dei adiutorio in factu modo procedendi." -  
Excipit (119r): "quod deus non est maius bonus quam dyabolus et hoc <de> expositionibus

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"Continental" logical traditions and the circulation of logical texts in Italy between the end of the XIV and the beginning of the XV century.

<sup>308</sup> Bos [1983, 25] incorrectly takes it to contain Book I and Book II.

<sup>309</sup> Vatican Library online catalogue - URL: <http://www.mss.vatlib.it/gui/console?service=shortDetail&id=79578>

<sup>310</sup> Del Punta [1982,55]

<sup>311</sup> Bertagna [2008]

<sup>312</sup> Green-Pedersen [1980, 110]

<sup>313</sup> Kneepkens [1980, 148•153•155•157•164-165]; Ashworth [1994, 124-128•133]

<sup>314</sup> De Rijk [1976, 137]

<sup>315</sup> Kristeller [1967, 316]; Pinborg [1981, 27•37-38• 40]

<sup>316</sup> Bos [1983, 25]

ipsarum sicut et ita et suis consequentiis et ex consequenti de ultimo capitulo principali dicta sufficient etc. est finis magistri Mercilii de Inghen tam prima quam secunda pars -- -- deo gratias."

[13] WIEN, *Dominikanerkonvent* 51/273<sup>317</sup> [ff. 84r-137v] (= D)

Origin: Vienna? Date: XV - 1449 (f. 117v); 1437 (f. 137v). The manuscript contains Book I (1449) and an older copy of Book II (1437), along with Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*, another treatise on *Consequentiae*, some annotations, excerpts from Peter of Spain and Paul of Venice.

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis tenebo istum modum procedendi deo adiuvante."

[14] WIEN, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, V.P.L. 5162 [ff. 102r-140r]<sup>318</sup> (= W)

Origin: Germany; previously at the Benediktinerkloster St. Michael (748-1791)[Lunael. q. 39].

Material: paper. Date: 1401 and second quarter of the XV century; the section including Marsilius' *Consequentiae* dates 1401. The manuscript contains: Book I and Book II, Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*, *Restrictiones et Alienationes*, *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia*; partial double copies of the *Suppositiones* and *Ampliationes* in another hand; and several other logical fragments and anonymous treatises.

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis dei tenebo adiutorio istum modum procedendi." -

Excipit: "quod deus non est minus bonus quam diabolus tamen non debet negari in praesentia loicorum eo quod male sonat haec de exponentibus sicut et ita et suis consequentiis et consequenter de ultimo capitulo principali dicta sufficient et sic est finis consequentiarum

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<sup>317</sup> Bos [1983, 25]; Czeike [1952]

<sup>318</sup> Bos [1983, 25]; see also the online catalogue of the Austrian National Library - URL: [http://alep.h.onb.ac.at/F/S3S4DPCT26DG6AXX5Y9QHFL2TEYXLS2ATR1SUPB64UJ3IPXYVG-06814?func=direct&local\\_base=ONB06&doc\\_number=000162768](http://alep.h.onb.ac.at/F/S3S4DPCT26DG6AXX5Y9QHFL2TEYXLS2ATR1SUPB64UJ3IPXYVG-06814?func=direct&local_base=ONB06&doc_number=000162768)

magistri Marsilii de Inghen pro quo laudetur Deus noster Jesus Christus sine fine in saecula saeculorum amen Deo gratias excipit textus consequentiarum magistri Marsilii et secuntur nunc consequenter obligatoria eiusdem."

[15] WIEN, *Österreichische Nationalbibliothek.*, V.P.L. 5199<sup>319</sup> [ff. 68r-121r] (= Y)

Origin: Vienna, previously at Vienna Old University Library. Material: paper. Date: second quarter of the XV century. Among other things, the manuscript contains Book I and Book II, along with Marsilius' treatises on *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*, *Restrictiones et alienationes*.

Incipit: "Tractaturus de consequentiis Deo adiuvente tenebo istum modum procedendi quod primo..." - Excipit: "quod deus non est minus bonus quam diabolus et haec de expositionibus ipsorum sicut et ita et suis consequentiis sufficiant et per consequens de ultimo capitulo principali istius libri dicta sufficiant et sic est finis presentis tractatus magistri Marsilio de Inghen *lectio dubia* precum mihi *lectio dubia* breviavi hoc ubi nihil datur nisi haberi *lectio dubia* dantibus."

None of these copies is an autograph.

#### Chronological synopsis of the manuscripts containing Marsilius' *Consequentiae*

Ms.	Date	Origin	Supp.	Ampl.	App.	Rest.-Al.	Cons.	Oblig.	Insol.
<b>U</b>	1388	Prague	f. 13r- 16r	f. 16r- 19r	f. 19r- 23r	--	<b>I:</b> f. 1r- 12r; <b>II:</b> f. 23r-31v	f. 32r- 61r	--
<b>W</b>	Cons.	Germany?	f. 72r-	f. 85r-	f. 93r-	f. 101r-	<b>I-II:</b> f.	f. 140r-	(part.) f.

<sup>319</sup> Bos [1983, 26]; see also the online catalogue of the Austrian National library - URL: [http://aleph.onb.ac.at/F/S3S4DPCT26DG6AXX5Y9QHFL2TEYXLS2ATR1SUPB64UJ3IPXYVG-07649?func=find-acc&acc\\_sequence=000842911](http://aleph.onb.ac.at/F/S3S4DPCT26DG6AXX5Y9QHFL2TEYXLS2ATR1SUPB64UJ3IPXYVG-07649?func=find-acc&acc_sequence=000842911)

	1401; second quarter XV cent.		85r; f. 209r- 212v	f. 93v; 212v	100v	101v; f. 101v- 102r	102r- 140r	171r	171v- 174v
<b>V</b>	1400- 1404	Italy?	--	--	--	--	<b>I:</b> f. 83va- 94ra	--	--
<b>M</b>	1412	?	f. 1r-10r	f. 10r- 17r	f. 17r- 24r	f. 25r- 25v	<b>I-II:</b> f. 25r-61v	--	(part.) f. 63r-70v
<b>E</b>	1421	Heidelberg?	f. 1r-8v	f. 8v-16r	f. 16r- 24r	f. 24r- 25r; f. 25r-25v	<b>I-II:</b> 26r- 71v	--	--
<b>N<sub>1</sub></b>	1382; <i>Cons.</i> 1423	Vienna?	f. 45r- 51r [1382]	f. 51r- 55r [1382]	f. 55r- 60r [1382]	--	<b>I-II?:</b> f. 61r-88r [1423]	--	--
<b>N<sub>2</sub></b>	1429	?	f. 221r- 231v	f. 233v- 246r	(part.) f. 246r- 254v	(part.) f. 255r- 255v	(part.) <b>I?:</b> 256v- 267v	--	--
<b>T</b>	1436	Germany	f. 250r- 272r	f. 273r- 283v	f. 285v- 296r	f. 297v- 299r	<b>I:</b> f- 300v- 331v	--	--
<b>B</b>	<i>Cons.</i> 1436; second quarter XV cent.	Ulm; Heidelberg	f. 1v-22v	f. 24r- 25r (note) and f. 26r-37r	f. 37v (note) and f. 38v-52r	f. 53r- 34v	<b>I-II:</b> 57r- 115r; (partial second copy) f. 253ra- 262vb	--	--
<b>D</b>	1437 <b>[II]</b> ; 1449 <b>[I]</b>	Vienna?	f. 44r- 48v	f. 48v- 69v	f. 69v- 83r	--	<b>I-II:</b> f. 84r-137v	--	--
<b>KI</b>	1423; <i>Cons.</i> 1438	Germany - Ulm; Italy - Brescia	f. 2r-13r [1423]	f. 13v- 22r [1438]	f. 22r- 30r [1438]	f. 30r- 30v [1438]	<b>I-II:</b> 30v- 80r [1438]	--	--
<b>F</b>	First half	Erfurt?	f. 132r-	f. 141r-	f. 147r-		<b>I-II?:</b>		



	XV cent.		140v	146v	162r	--	162r- 178v	--	--
<u>Y</u>	Second quarter XV cent.	Vienna	f. 37r- 48r	f. 48r- 56r	f. 56r- 66v	f. 66v- 67v	<b>I-II:</b> f. 68r-82r and 84v- 121r	--	--
Kr	XV	Germany?	f. 2r-13r; (part.) 160v	f. 13r- 19r	f. 19r- 28r	--	<b>I-II:</b> f. 28v-70r	f. 70r- 101v	--
V <sub>2</sub>	XV	?	f. 75ra- 80ra	f. 80ra- 84ra	f. 84ra- 88ra	--	<b>I-II:</b> f. 89v- 119r; [119v]; 200r	--	--

### 2.3 The *Consequentiae* and the Other *logica modernorum* Treatises

Most of Marsilius' known treatises on the *logica modernorum* are grouped by the early modern commentator Conrad Pschlacher under the title of *Parva logicalia* (little logical matters) and presented in this order: *Suppositiones*, *Appellationes*, *Ampliationes*, *Restrictiones*, *Alienationes*, *Consequentiae*.<sup>320</sup> The text is strongly abbreviated and of little or no use for an edition. Marsilius' other *logica modernorum* treatises on *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* are omitted in this and in the other printed early modern edition I know of.<sup>321</sup> Egbert Bos gave a

<sup>320</sup> Pschlacher's edition and commentary have been published twice, in 1512 and 1516 respectively, with very few variations: (a) *Compendarius parvorum logicalium liber continens perutiles Petri Hispani tractatus priores sex et clarissimi philosophi Marsilii dialectices documenta cum utilissimis commentariis per virum preclarum Chonradum Pschlacher*, Vienna 1512; (b) *Parvorum logicalium liber succinto epitomatis compendio continens perutiles argutissimi dialectici Petri Hispani tractatus priores sex et clarissimi philosophi Marsilii logices documenta cum utilissimis commentariis per virum preclarum Chonradum Pschlacher*, Vienna 1516.

<sup>321</sup> *Textus dialectices Marsilii de suppositionibus, ampliationibus, appellationibus, restrictionibus, alienationibus et duabus consequentiarum partibus pro communi omnium utilitate noviter abbreviatus*, Krakow 15..?. Furthermore, Ritter [1921, 193] and Bos [1983, 26], among the others, also list a 1792 edition of only Marsilius' *Suppositiones* (*Suppositiones prodierunt sub nomine Marsilii Parisiensis*), but I was unable to obtain a copy of the volume. Moreover, Marsilius' *Obligationes* is printed under Peter of Ailly's name as *Tractatus de arte obligandi* (Paris 1489).

critical edition of the *Treatises on the Properties of Terms* (as his volume is aptly titled), including the works up to the *Alienationes*.<sup>322</sup> I am presenting here an edition of the *Consequentiae*.

Were these treatises conceived as separate works or as a continuous project with some degree of unity - of the kind that might be shared by a series of lectures, or the notes for the same class?

It is probable that later on Marsilius lectured on these treatises in succession, for example possibly for the first class he taught *in loycam* at the University of Heidelberg in 1386.<sup>323</sup> However this is not of any import for a hypothesis concerning the original project (or projects) behind the treatises or their actual composition. We might find more clues looking at the manuscript tradition and at the internal references among these works.

**Table of the Manuscripts containing Marsilius' *logica modernorum* treatises**

Ms.	Date	Sup.	Ampl.	App.	Rest./Al.	Cons. I	Cons. II	Obl.	Ins.
1) Erfurt, Ampl. Q. 326	End XIV	x							
2) Pistoia, Archivio Capitolare, 61	End XIV	x							
3) Vienna, Osterr. Nazion. 4698	End XIV	x							
4) Sion, Bibl. cant. du Valais, 73	XV	x							
5) Kremsmünster, Bibl. Cremifanensis, C 81	XIV-XV			x					
6) Workław, Bibl. Un. IV Q 6	1423				x				
7) Krakow, Bibl. Jag. 2054	1428				x				
8) V	1400-1404					x			
9) Krakow, Bibl. Jag., 2116	?								x

<sup>322</sup> Unterkircher – Horninger – Lackner [1981]; Bos [1983]

<sup>323</sup> See I.I.4

Ms.	Date	Sup.	Ampl.	App.	Rest./Al.	Cons. I	Cons. II	Obl.	Ins.
10) Vat., Pal. Lat. 995	1457							x	x
11) Erfurt, Ampl. Q 30	End XIV	x	x	x					
12) Erfurt, Ampl. Q 283	1450	x	x	x					
13) Turin, Bibl. Naz. 1009 [III G 12] (Pasini lat. 449) [a]	1406	abbr.	abbr.	abbr.					
14) N <sub>1</sub>	1382;1423	x	x	x		x 1423	? 1423		
15) Turin, Turin, Bibl. Naz. 1009 [III G 12] (Pasini lat. 449) [b]	1406	x	x	x	x				
16) Göttingen, Univ., Lün. 66	1414	x	x	x	x <sup>324</sup>				
17) Prague, Metr. Kap., 1388	Beginning XV	x	x	x	x				
18) Krakow, Bibl. Jag., 1906	1446	x	x	x	x				
19) Cologne, Erzdiozesanbibliothek 57	XV	x	x	x	x				
20) F	First half XV	x	x	x		x	x		
21) V <sub>2</sub>	XV	x	x	x		x other hand	x other hand		
22) D	1437-1449	x	x	x		x 1449	x 1437		
23) Kr	XV	x	x	x		x	X		
24) E	1421	x	x	x	x	x	X		
25) N <sub>2</sub>	1429	x	x	x	x	part	Part		
26) T	1436	x	x	x	x	x			
27) Kl	1423; 1436	x 1423	x	x	x	x	X		
28) B	1436; second quarter XV	x	x	x	x	x 1436	X 1436		

<sup>324</sup> There are two version of this treatise in this manuscript; the second one cannot be attributed to Marsilius' - see: Bos [1983, 230 and 234-237]

Ms.	Date	Sup.	Ampl.	App.	Rest./Al.	Cons. I	Cons. II	Obl.	Ins.
29) Y	XV	x	x	x	x	x	X		
30) U	1388	x	x	x		x f. 1r- 12r	X f. 23r- 31r	x	
31) M	1412	x	x	x	x	x	X		part
32) W	1401	x	x	x	x	x	X	x	part

Overall, the general background picture emerging from the manuscript tradition and its analysis yields a bipartition within Marsilius' treatises: on the one hand, a "core" initial block on the properties of terms (*Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes*), quite compact [II.3.1]; and on the other hand, a second group on other logical subjects (*Consequentiae, Obligationes, Insolubilia*), added to the initial treatises but less cohesive in the circulation [II.3.3]. The *Restrictiones et alienationes*, relegated to an extrinsic position by this kind of division, seems to be a sort of appendix to the last version of the treatises on the properties of terms [II.3.2].

### 2.3.1 *The Manuscript Circulation and the Initial Core Block (Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes)*

In Bos' critical edition of the *Treatises on the Properties of Terms*, the opening lines of the *Ampliationes, Appellationes* and *Restrictiones et alienationes* show (in my opinion correctly) a continuity of these treatises among themselves and with the *Suppositiones*.<sup>325</sup>

The manuscript tradition seems to confirm a higher degree of unity among these treatises, in particular among the first three in the standard order. Only one relatively ancient codex (XIV-

<sup>325</sup> Bos [1983, 98]: "Dictum de suppositionibus dicendum est de ampliationibus." Bos [1983, 128]: "Dicto de ampliationibus dicendum est de appellationibus." Bos [1983, 160]: "Postquam determinatum est de appellationibus, restat nunc determinare de restrictionibus et de alienatione termini a sua suppositione."

XV c.) contains a single copy of the *Appellationes* [n. 5 in the table above] and two codices, both dating from the 1420s, have the *Restrictiones et alienationes* alone [n. 6-7]. The treatise on *Ampliationes* always circulates with the *Suppositiones* and with the *Appellationes* [n. 11-13], sometimes with the addition of the *Restrictiones et alienationes* [n. 15-19], or the *Consequentiae* [n. 20-23], or both [n. 24-29]. One of the oldest manuscripts, U [n. 30, 1388, Prague], has the *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*, both books of the *Consequentiae* and the *Obligationes*, however it omits the *Restrictiones et alienationes*. U is a particularly interesting codex, both because it is a fairly ancient copy (put together still during Marsilius' lifetime) and because of its pagination: it opens with Book II of the *Consequentiae* (f. 1r-12r), followed by the *Suppositiones* (f. 13r-16r), *Ampliationes* (f. 16r-19r), *Appellationes* (f. 19r-23r), then Book I (f. 23r-31v), and the *Obligationes* (f. 32r-61r). This manuscript requires further studies, but it seems unlikely that its peculiar internal ordering is the result of the incorrect binding of unbound *peciae*: the blank page between Book II and the *Suppositiones* (f. 13v) would lead us to think instead that the latter was copied first and the other treatises followed. Another fairly good manuscript, M [n. 31, 1412], contains all the treatises up to the *Consequentiae* in the standard order, with the addition of a part of the *Insolubilia*. The only manuscript containing all the *logica modernorum* works is W [n. 32, 1401, Germany?].

The general picture we get from the manuscript circulation is then of a more constant block including the *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes* and *Appellationes*, with the recurring addition of the *Restrictiones et alienationes* and/or of the *Consequentiae* - and sometimes of the *Obligationes* and/or *Insolubilia*. In particular the later addition of the *Consequentiae* to a pre-existing copy containing at least the *Suppositiones-Ampliationes-Appellationes* block is evident in N<sub>1</sub> [n. 14], V<sub>2</sub> [n. 21] and B [n. 28].<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> B also contains the *Restrictiones et alienationes*.

However, Marsilius' *Suppositiones* shows also a consistent autonomous circulation. On the one hand, four manuscripts [n. 1-4] contain only Marsilius' *Suppositiones*; of these, three are from the late XIV century [n. 1-3] - and at least in some cases they are collections of logical works belonging to the English tradition [e.g. n. 2].<sup>327</sup> On the other hand, in at least another case [KL, n. 27] the other treatises on the terms and the *Consequentiae* were added several years later to a pre-existing copy of the *Suppositiones*.

This kind of circulation is paralleled by the presence of at least three principal versions (without counting the abbreviated one)<sup>328</sup> of the treatises on the properties of terms, individuated by Bos:<sup>329</sup> the textual and conceptual differences are more evident and consistent in the *Suppositiones* and basically negligible in the other treatises. Textually, Version I is generally more concise than Version III: it has fewer examples, it omits at least three extended passages present in Version III, and its opening passage is different and shorter.<sup>330</sup> Conceptually, the main theoretical difference between Version I and Version III concerns the supposition of (grammatically) relative terms. For example, Version I embraces Buridan's position on two issues: on the verification of the term taking the relative (i.e. the antecedent to that relative); and on the effect of universalization or of the negation (e.g. by means of terms like *onmis* and *nullus*) on the supposition of relative terms.<sup>331</sup> Version III shows a marked shift from Buridan's position to a theory closer to Albert of Saxony's.<sup>332</sup> For example, in Version I Marsilius' holds that a negation or a universalising syncategorematic term applying to the relative term does not change the supposition of this relative, since the

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<sup>327</sup> Ms. Pistoia, *Archivio Capitolare*, 61 contains, among other things: Marsilius' *Suppositiones* [f. 1r-4r], possibly partial; Ralph Strode's *Consequentiae* [f. 5r-13v]; Johannes Venator Anglicus' *De terminis et propositionibus* [f. 15ra-75ra]; Walter Burley's *De primo et ultimo instanti* [f. 78rb-80rb]; Richard Billingham's *Speculum puerorum sive De probationibus propositionum* [f. 83ra-88rb]; William Heytesbury's *Regulae consequentiarum* [f. 88va-89vb] and his *Sophismata asinina* [f. 90ra-92va]; Peter of Candia's *Epistula de obligationibus* [f. 92va-b].

<sup>328</sup> See n. 13 in the table above.

<sup>329</sup> Bos [1983, esp. 35-41]

<sup>330</sup> Bos [1983, 36-37]

<sup>331</sup> On Buridan's treatment of relative terms, the most recent and complete study is Mary Sirridge's forthcoming contribution in the *Acts of the XX European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics* (Cambridge 2014).

<sup>332</sup> Bos [1983, 35 and 208]; for Marsilius' relevant alternative passages see Bos [1983, 72-80] (Version I) and Bos [1983, 86-96] (Version III).

relative suppositis only for that of which its antecedent is verified in the main clause. In Version II, Marsilius holds that we can speak of verification also for the relative term itself and not only for its antecedent, therefore a negation or a universalizing syncategorematic applying to the relative term does change its supposition compared to the supposition of its antecedent in the main clause. Textually Version II is in between Version I and Version III; conceptually it is in line with Version III.<sup>333</sup>

Version I is preserved in two manuscripts [n. 11 and N<sub>1</sub>, n. 14], both from the end of the XIV century and containing also the *Ampliationes* and the *Appellationes*.<sup>334</sup> Version II is transmitted by two manuscripts: a late XIV century one [n. 2], transmitting only the *Suppositiones* in a collection of "English" logical work; and V<sub>2</sub>, [n. 21], assembled at some point during the XV century and containing the first three treatises with the successive addition of the *Consequentiae* in another hand. All the other non abbreviated codices, including the ones transmitting only Marsilius' *Suppositiones*, contain Version III.

As Bos argued,<sup>335</sup> it is very likely that the three version are different stages of elaboration of the *Suppositiones* and that Version I was the first to be composed, then followed by Version II and III - for the textual and conceptual reasons exposed. On the basis of the dating of N<sub>1</sub> and U (the oldest witnesses respectively of Version I and Version III), Bos indicates 1382 as the *terminus ante quem* for Version I and 1388 for Version III; the *terminus post quem* is Marsilius' *inceptio* in 1362.<sup>336</sup>

At least Version I of the *Suppositiones* was almost certainly composed at some point during Marsilius' Parisian period, probably quite early and closely followed by the *Ampliationes* and *Appellationes*, since these three treatises appear together in the two manuscripts containing Version I. As of now it is hard to achieve a more precise dating, but further light on the matter

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<sup>333</sup> Bos [1983, 35-40]

<sup>334</sup> As we have seen, N<sub>1</sub> contains also the *Consequentiae*, added in 1423.

<sup>335</sup> Bos [1983, 35 and 38]

<sup>336</sup> Bos [1983, 38]

might be shed in the future by the on-going edition project of Marsilius' philosophical works.<sup>337</sup>

The situation is similar for Version II and Version III. Since the manuscript circulation of Version I is limited to only two specimens, we might guess that an updated edition of the *Suppositiones* became available soon. After "releasing" Version I Marsilius must have reconsidered his positions on the properties of grammatically relative terms (namely on their supposition) and made his corrections to the *Suppositiones*. The corrections in Version II are mainly conceptual. Since also Version II has a scarce circulation, we might hypothesise that it takes shape primarily for lecture purposes and, probably not much later, gets developed and systemised in Version III in a second moment. Bos tentatively concludes that Version II and III belong to the Heidelberg period (after 1386) and he presents two points in support of his thesis.<sup>338</sup> On the one hand, (a) in the Version III passage on the supposition of relative terms,

Marsilius speaks of his masters of the University of Paris, about the Paris school; besides an opponent of Marsilius contrasts the views of the Paris school with those of Marsilius<sup>339</sup>

- the point being that this would not occur in the text if Marsilius were still in Paris.

On the other hand, (b) in many manuscripts transmitting Version III, one might find words of German origin - Bos' example is *marcha*.<sup>340</sup>

However, neither point seems particularly strong nor conclusive. As for (a), the passage under consideration is only in Version III. If this is actually a "revised" version meant for wider circulation, it is likely that the general etiquette of "Parisian" refers to a commonly shared philosophical position in Paris and is intended to be recognisable by a more extended public. Nevertheless this does not exclude in principle Marsilius' institutional affiliation with the

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<sup>337</sup> Paul Bakker and Hanna Wojtczak are preparing editions of Marsilius' *Parva Naturalia*, *Questions on the Posterior Analytics*, *Questions on De caelo*, and of his *Abbreviatio of the Physics*, to be released in the next few years.

<sup>338</sup> Bos [1983, 38-39]

<sup>339</sup> Bos [1983, 38]

<sup>340</sup> Bos [1983, 39]



University of Paris. Furthermore, in the text Marsilius refers explicitly to Version I and marks his own detachment from the philosophical position commonly shared among his masters:

Sed diceret aliquis: 'Tu in *Suppositionibus* [= Version I] tuis dixisti oppositum.' Secundo diceret aliquis: 'Communiter scola Parisiensis dicit oppositum.'

Ad primam respondeo quod protunc dixi sicut magistri mei de universitate Parisiensi, nec ad modum loquendi ita precise adverti sicut postea feci. Nec reputo inconveniens, si autem prius dicta nunc in melius mutavi.

Ad secundum dico quod scola Parisiensis nec aliud vult nisi quod precise supponit relativum identitatis pro illis pro quibus propositio in qua ponitur suum antecedens, verificatur....<sup>341</sup>

The opponent's second argument ("this is not the way it is done in Paris!") would make much more sense as a polemical point if Marsilius were still in Paris - and also the emphasis in the *responsio* on Marsilius' own Parisian education would be still justified. Moreover, Marsilius talks here of the "manifesto" of the Parisian school in the present tense (*vult*), which would probably be incorrect by the time he is in Heidelberg - especially after the exodus (particularly evident in the English nation) of Marsilius' masters and colleagues in the wake of the Western Schism.<sup>342</sup> Marsilius' estrangement from the "Parisian school" looks primarily intellectual, a parting from the Parisian way, but not necessarily institutional.

As for Bos' point (b), most of the Version III manuscripts are of German origin and it would not be unlikely that the presence of German words is due to the copyists' choice of more common and familiar terms - especially for words referring to currency. Moreover, the use of *marcha/marcae* is standard in examples about dialectical inferences like the one it appears in also in Marsilius' text (*velle esse in luto pro centum marcis*), independently from the geographical origin of the text.<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> Bos [1983, 88•90]; Bos' translation [1983, 89•91]: "But someone might say: 'In your Treatise on suppositions you have asserted the opposite'. Secondly, someone might argue: 'Generally the school of Paris says the opposite'. To the first doubt, I answer that, the, I spoke like my teachers of the University of Paris, and I did not pay attention to the general usage of language as accurately as I have been doing since. And I do not think it improper to change what I have said before for something better. To the second doubt, I say that the school of Paris does not have in mind something other than that a relative of identity suppositis exactly for those things concerning which the proposition, in which its antecedent occurs, is verified."

<sup>342</sup> See I.1.3

<sup>343</sup> See Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.3.5 <7>: "... 'velle esse in luto pro centum marcis' non est pars in modo ad 'velle esse in luto', quia isto modo marcae diminuunt a voluntate simpliciter." There is nothing unusual

However, my arguments are not conclusive either and the revisions in Version II/III could have well been completed away from Paris - either in Heidelberg or in Montpellier, or maybe even during Marsilius' "missing years". It is likely that Marsilius read his Version II/III of the treatises on the properties of terms and the *Consequentiae*, *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* during his inaugural course of lectures *in loycam* in Heidelberg in 1386. Nevertheless, even if this were the case, it would not prove that Version II/III were reworked for that occasion or shortly before: the limited manuscript circulation of Version I could be pointing into a different direction. Furthermore, Marsilius played a paramount role in the founding and establishment of the University of Heidelberg - a role that likely took effort and much of his time.<sup>344</sup> Therefore, if he actually read his *logica modernorum* during the first term of activity of the new-born university, it would seem more likely that he revisited some of his already refined "greatest hits" not requiring any additional work.

If we wanted to put Marsilius away from Paris for the writing of Version III, another viable candidate could even be Montpellier, where he was "visiting professor" between the autumn of 1369 and the winter of 1369-1370.<sup>345</sup> The position in Montpellier was quite prestigious, warranting a course of lectures living up to the growing reputation of a young Master whose career has already taken off. However, it was a temporary position: not enough to ensure Marsilius' institutional detachment from his *alma mater*, but still removed from Paris. Hence it allowed a balance between belonging and estrangement - which would justify an intermediate reading of the passage from Version III of the *Suppositiones* discussed above. Furthermore, at this point Marsilius has enough notoriety to openly embrace a theory contrary to the one commonly embraced by his masters at his home institution. Lastly, since

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here, neither in the use of *marcae* nor in the example per se. A more anomalous case would be in Albert of Saxony, who - in the analogous passage of his *Perutilis logica* (IV.21) - seems to be ready to roll in mud for a significantly smaller amount of money: "Quia non sequitur: "Vellem esse in luto pro decem marcis, ergo vellem esse in luto". I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen for his annotation.

<sup>344</sup> See Chapter I.1.4

<sup>345</sup> See Chapter I.1.2

there are some hints in the *Consequentiae* supporting that it was composed (or at least reworked) for the Montpellier lectures,<sup>346</sup> such dating would put Version III in a closer chronological proximity and conceptual continuity to Marsilius' *Consequentiae* and possibly to the second group of his *logica modernorum* treatises including the *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia*.

### 2.3.2 An Appendix? (Restrictiones et alienationes)

It is probable that at some point around the redaction of Versions II/III Marsilius completes also his *Restrictiones et alienationes*. This treatise is very short and it either circulates alone [n. 6-7] or in some of the manuscripts containing Version III [n. 15-19; n. 24-32];<sup>347</sup> it does not seem to be part of this tighter block, even if, like the other treatises, it deals with a subject matter pertaining the supposition of terms. Conceptually, Bos noted that there are some differences of content between the *Restrictiones* and the previous treatises: in particular, here Marsilius appeals to the notion of *status* (absent in the previous treatises) to give a definition of *restrictio*.<sup>348</sup> Since *restrictio* is the inverse property to *ampliatio*,<sup>349</sup> this passage implies a redefinition of *ampliatio* in terms of *status*, but such redefinition is not developed. If there is a conceptual shift in the *Restrictiones et alienationes*, this is not articulated, it does not seem to have any major logical consequences, and it might be in play for reasons of brevity. Overall, because of this kind of minor anomaly in its content, its shortness, and its non-constant presence only in some of the manuscripts of Version III, this treatise is most likely a sort of appendix added to the main body of the treatises on the terms - probably around the time of the elaboration of the last version.

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<sup>346</sup> See II.3.3

<sup>347</sup> In some cases, it is not Marsilius' treatises to be added to the previous one's. On this, see Bos [1983, 230-232]

<sup>348</sup> Bos [1983, 38]. For the relevant passages see Bos [1983, 160-163]

<sup>349</sup> Bos [1983, 160]: "Restrictio enim et ampliatio sunt opposita; que habent esse circa idem."

### 2.3.3 *The Second Block (Consequentiae, Obligationes, Insolubilia) and a Tentative Dating of the Consequentiae*

Generally, we have a quite plausible and coherent picture of the manuscript tradition and of the connections among Marsilius' first four treatises, telling us a believable story of their development - even if the details concerning the dating of these works are tentative and non-conclusive.

As for the second group of treatises, we should probably use the term "block" with some caution or merely as a handy tag: these treatises seem to lack the textual unity of the "core" group, as it is reflected also in the manuscript circulation; the only apparent *trait d'union* among them are the (quite loose) conceptual and historical connections among their subject matters. Whereas in the core block the incipits of the treatises following the *Suppositiones* show a smooth flowing of one section into the other, in this second group the incipits (in most manuscripts: *tractaturus de...*) tend to mark the beginning of individual treatises instead of the progressive parts of a more unitary project.<sup>350</sup>

Then, for an overall assessment of the treatises in the second block, let us examine three indicators: the internal references, the correlations among the respective subject matters of the works under consideration, and their circulation in the surviving manuscript tradition.

In the body of Marsilius' *Consequentiae*, the only explicit reference to another one of his *logica modernorum* treatises is a mention of the *Ampliationes* at the end of Book I.<sup>351</sup> In Book II, in the chapter on the *expositio* of sentences *de incipit*, Marsilius talks briefly about the "time of

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<sup>350</sup> The *Consequentiae*, *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* do not consistently circulate together; when they do, the copists occasionally insert a note on the following or preceding treatise in their editorial ending or opening notes. See for example W.

<sup>351</sup> Y f. 101v; M f. 49r; V f. 95ra; W f. 126r.

the obligation”, but makes no reference to his own *Obligationes*.<sup>352</sup> In the working transcription of the *Obligationes* that I could consult, based on a single manuscript,<sup>353</sup> I could not find an explicit reference to any of Marsilius' other logical works. In the *Insolubilia*, on the other hand, there are at least two references to the *Obligationes*,<sup>354</sup> but none to the *Consequentiae* or to the other treatises on the properties of terms - as far as I could see.<sup>355</sup> In the core block and in the *Restrictiones et alienationes* there is no reference to any of the treatises of the second group. Overall, an overview of the internal references shows a split within this group, with the *Consequentiae* on the one side and the *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* on the other. On the one hand, such difference between the *Consequentiae* and the other two treatises is also at least partially confirmed by their uneven circulation in the manuscript tradition. On the other hand, the closer connection between the *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* is to be expected, because of the quite well known conceptual and historical links between *obligationes* and the development of *insolubilia* within obligational contexts.<sup>356</sup>

Admittedly, if a degree of unity - however loose - is to be found among the three treatises of the second group, it is in the affinity of their subject matter. We might say that all of them are primarily concerned with validity in several inferential contexts. The *Consequentiae* deals with the definition, the kinds and the rules of valid logical inference/consequence/entailment. The *Obligationes* is concerned with the preservation of logical coherence and inferential validity within the obligational framework - in the *Obligationes Parisienses*, an earlier text,<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>352</sup> *Consequentiae* II, 3, 1 [W 131r-v; Y 109r; M 53v]: " ... in tempore obligationis obligationis patet quia omnis actus respondentis et opponens imaginatur esse pro eodem tempore adequate."

<sup>353</sup> I thank Bert Bos for his transcription of Marsilius' *Obligationes* as transmitted in W.

<sup>354</sup> M f. 64v: "Et si dicatur quod talem casum admissisti in *Obligationibus* quia dicis hanc esse impossibilem, respondeo quod in *Obligationibus* admissi hanc propositionem...."; M f. 66r: "Modo non oportet talem consequentiam valere ut dictum est in capitulo secundo obligationum".

<sup>355</sup> I thank Bert Bos for his working transcription of Marsilius' *Insolubilia* as transmitted in M and W. Further studies are required on this text and I plan to prepare a critical edition in the future.

<sup>356</sup> See for example Spade - Read [2013]; Spade - Yrjönsuuri [2014]; Yrjönsuuri [2015]; Stump [1980]; Martin [2001]; Pironnet [2001].

<sup>357</sup> For the edition of the *Obligationes Parisienses* see De Rijk [1975]

the *obligatio* is even explicitly defined as *scientia de consequentiis*.<sup>358</sup> The *Insolubilia* is focused on the analysis and the resolution of many kinds of paradoxical cases, including semantic and inferential paradoxes.<sup>359</sup>

While it is appealing to take the main concern with the validity of inferential relations as the specific difference of the second block, one might object that this distinction is too broad: any logic qua logic - they might argue - is fundamentally concerned with the issue of validity and therefore such primary concern with validity itself would not be a good candidate to define a specific group of logical treatises. Furthermore, in many medieval treatises on *suppositio*, the theories of personal supposition yield the doctrine of distribution, with the descent (*descensus*) to and the ascent (*ascensus*) from singulars<sup>360</sup> - which have to do, in a preeminent way, with the validity of inferences.<sup>361</sup> However, this kind of objection seems to be at least ill posed. It is true that validity and inference (in the general meaning of reaching a conclusion from a set of premises in a "reliable" way) are at the very core of what we commonly understand to be (a) logic. Nevertheless, it is also true that validity and inference are the main object of analysis in *consequentiae* and (at least in a major sense) in *obligationes*, and are essential for the analysis and resolution of *insolubilia*. However, this is not the case in the treatises on the properties of terms. In these treatises on the properties of terms - be it supposition or ampliation, or any of the others - the immediate end is a preliminary analysis of said properties of the terms and their workings, but obviously granting logical validity still stands as the ultimate aim.

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<sup>358</sup> See for example Spade - Yrjönsuuri [2014] and in particular Yrjönsuuri [2015] for an analysis of the relationship among *obligationes*, the *consequentia* relation and conditionals.

<sup>359</sup> See for example Spade [1973], [1975], [1982b], [1987], [1988]; Priest - Routley [1982]; Martin [1988]; and in particular Read's study on self reference and validity as in Read [2001] - revised version of Read [1982].

<sup>360</sup> Very roughly, theories of descent and ascent basically concern the acceptability of some inferences from or to universal or particular affirmative or negative propositions, to or from a conjunction or disjunction of singular propositions whose singular terms are picked by the respective common terms in the universal or particular proposition. The literature on supposition theory and distribution theory is extensive; see for example: Spade [1988a] and [2002]; Ashworth [2013]; Matthews [1997]; Parsons [2008].

<sup>361</sup> See for example Karger [1993].

Overall, the conceptual and historical ties among *consequentiae*, *obligationes* and *insolubilia* are probably the best criterion of delimitation of the second group of treatises.

As for the manuscript tradition, in the circulation the second group of treatises does not show the same kind of cohesion of the core block. Once again we stumble upon the same split we found in the internal references between the *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* on one side and the *Consequentiae* on the other.

On the one hand, the *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* are preserved only in a handful of codices: the *Insolubilia* appears alone in one manuscript [n. 9] and the *Obligationes* in none. Both treatises, but none of the other Marsilius' *logica modernorum* works, are together in another codex from the late 1450'. U [n. 30, 1388] contains the *Obligationes*, along with the core block and the *Consequentiae*. M [n. 31, 1412] has part of the *Insolubilia* following all the other treatises but the *Obligationes*. W [n. 31, 1401] transmits them both along with all Marsilius' other treatises. All the manuscripts containing the *Obligationes* and the *Insolubilia* along with some other part of Marsilius' *logica modernorum* are specimens of Version III. Neither the *Obligationes* nor the *Insolubilia* circulates exclusively with the *Consequentiae* in any of the manuscripts that I know of.

On the other hand, the *Consequentiae* seems to have a different kind of circulation. The treatise is clearly conceived as unitary and its two parts tend to be transmitted together: there is no instance of Book II circulating alone;<sup>362</sup> Book I is not followed by Book II only in a couple of manuscripts (V [n. 8]; T [n.26]; and possibly N<sub>1</sub> [n. 14]); and sometimes the transmission of both parts is partial (N<sub>2</sub> [n. 25]). Overall the *Consequentiae* does not have an extensive individual circulation: it appears by itself only in V [n. 8] (only Book I), a collection of logical works predominantly belonging to the "English" tradition, containing a number of treatises

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<sup>362</sup> However, as we have seen, Book II was copied first in U [n. 30], and all the other treatises followed in the standard order; and in D Book II is older (1437) than Book I (1449).

on *consequentiae* and dating between 1400-1401.<sup>363</sup> In all the other manuscripts, Marsilius' *Consequentiae* is associated with the core block (N<sub>1</sub> [n. 14]; F [n. 20]; V<sub>2</sub> [n. 21]; D [n. 22]; Kr [n. 23]; U [n. 30]) or with the core block and the *Restrictiones et alienationes* (E [n. 24]; N<sub>2</sub> [n. 25]; T [n. 26]; Kl [n. 27]; B [n. 28]; Y [n. 29]; M [n. 31]; W [n. 32]), sometimes followed by the *Obligationes* (U [n. 30]), or the *Insolubilia* (M [n. 31]), or both (W [n. 32]).

We find a copy of the *Consequentiae* in one of the manuscripts containing Version I (N<sub>1</sub> [n. 14]) and in the only codex transmitting Version II (V<sub>2</sub> [n. 21]), but there is no doubt that the text is in both cases a later addition.<sup>364</sup> With the exception of V, in all the other manuscripts the *Consequentiae* accompanies Version III. So far, I was able to identify only one version of the text of the *Consequentiae* and of the *Obligationes*, but this result could be non-definitive. As of now, I could only access two partial copies of the *Insolubilia* (as in M and W), which are insufficient to reach any reliable conclusion on the possible existence of more than one version.

In my opinion, in the manuscript tradition we have enough clues pointing in the direction of a composition at least of the *Consequentiae* around the time of Version III or shortly after - although a more precise dating is hard to achieve. On the basis of the codices and following Bos,<sup>365</sup> we could pick 1388 as *terminus ante quem*, since the oldest copy of the text is transmitted in U. The *Consequentiae* is certainly composed after (one of the versions of) the *Ampliationes*, because of the explicit mention at the end of Book I; therefore we can say that the *Consequentiae*, in the form we have it, certainly does not precede at least the first version of the "core block" on the properties of the terms. Another possible clue, even if not a particularly solid one, could be the only toponym present in the treatise: in none of the

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<sup>363</sup> See above II.2 [11]

<sup>364</sup> The *Consequentiae* seems to have been added also in one of the manuscripts of Version III in a different hand (B [n. 28]).

<sup>365</sup> Bos [1983, 38]



passages or examples in the *Consequentiae* Marsilius refers to Paris or Heidelberg, but there is only a single mention of Montpellier, in the chapter on propositions *de desinit* in Book II, recurring in all the manuscripts consulted for the present edition.<sup>366</sup> If we were to take this mention as a possible reference to the place of composition of the text, we might tentatively suppose that the *Consequentiae* was completed, or at least revised, around the time of Marsilius' sojourn in Montpellier during the autumn and winter terms 1369-1370.

As for the dating of the *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* (even for a merely relative one), the situation appears to be different and more complicated. As I have already mentioned, the *Insolubilia* follows the *Obligationes*, however their collocation in the chronology of the other *logica modernorum* treatises or of the second block is uncertain. The lack of references to any of the other treatises and the close similarity to William Buser's *Obligationes*<sup>367</sup> could lead us to think that Marsilius' treatise on obligations belongs to an earlier phase of Marsilius' career. However, the lack of mention of either the *Obligationes* or the *Insolubilia* in any of the treatises on the properties of the terms or the *Consequentiae* (even in passages in which such references would have been thematically appropriate) would weigh in favour of a later composition. In this case, also the feeble support of geographical references is of little or no help: as far as I could see, there are no geographical references in the *Insolubilia* and far too many in the *Obligationes* - as typical of many common examples in this genre of treatises. Among the many mentions of Paris and Rome through the entire treatise, there is also one of Cologne<sup>368</sup> (Marsilius' diocese of origin) and a long passage on Montpellier and Avignon<sup>369</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> *Consequentiae*, II, 5: "...similiter quod villa Monti Pessolani nunc incipit esse, quod est falsum..." [W 133v-134r; Y 112rv; M56r].

<sup>367</sup> Strobino [2009-2010, 16]

<sup>368</sup> *Obligationes*, W f. 146r: "'ego sum Colonie' est de facto falso quare impossibile secundum quid et si vadam illuc postquam ibidem fui, erit vera proportionaliter ista: 'ego non fui Colonie' - est iam de facto vera et ex consequentia necessaria secundum quid et postquam ibidem fuero erit falsa."

<sup>369</sup> "Ammone" in the text - *Obligationes*, W f. 159r-160r: "Aliud exemplum: denotatis propositionibus similibus sit tale: pono tibi existenti in Monte Pessolano: 'tu es in Monte Pessolano.' Si negas, negas verum et impertinens. Eodem modo arguitur si dubitas et quod sit vera motum est, et quod sit impertinens patet, quia non sequitur 'tu es in monte Pessolano,' ut notim est ex corrolariis capituli secundi, Si concedis, arguitur sic: tu concedis falsum et impertinens, probatum est ante, et quod ipsa sit falsa probatur, quia ipsa est similis huic tu es in Ammone."

that do not have an exact match in Buser's work.<sup>370</sup> However, if the isolated mention of Montpellier could be a weak clue in the *Consequentiae* along with multiple and consistent indications of a composition successive the mid 1360s, it seems to be insufficient in the different context of the *Obligationes*.

## 2.4 The Establishment of the Present Edition

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Propositum non constat quod non potest esse similis illi nisi in falsitate cum idem non potest esse in diversis locis, ergo quod est falsa. Item concessa ea proponitur tibi ista: 'tu es in Ammone.' Si negas vel dubitas, concedis unum falsum et negas vel dubitas reliquum ergo male. Consequentia tenet per communem regulam dicentem quod negato uno similem debet negari et reliquum et consesso uno debet concedi et reliquum. Si concedis, concedis falsum et impertinens, ergo male. Antecedens patet, quia falsa est, ut notum est, et quod sit impertinens patet, quia non sequitur 'tu es in Monte Pessolano et tu es in Ammone sunt falsa et tu es in monte Pessolano, ergo tu es in Ammone,' sicut non sequitur 'Deus est et homo est asinus convertuntur et tesu est ergo homo est asinus,' quia antecedens est simpliciter possibile et consequens impossibile. Et intelligitur propositiones esse similes eas similes intrinsece, ut ambe sunt vere vel in falsitate quod ambe sunt false. Ad illud respondetur ab aloquibus premittendo /f. 159v/ tamquam pro secunda regula regula generali observanda in positione propositionum similibus, quia quandoque posuit aliquas propositiones esse similes, que non possunt esse similes nisi in falsitate, tunc qua+m+cumque istarum praeposita primo loco est neganda quia falsa ex posito. Secunda tegula quod quando ponuntur aliquae propositiones esse similes que non possunt esse similes nisi in veritate, tunc quecumque primo loco est proposita est concedenda quia ex posito sequitur ipsam esse veram. Ex quibus multas regulas speciales concludunt de quibus hic propter brevitatem obtinetur. Hiis premissis respondetur ad sophisma admittendo positum et negando istam propositam 'tu es in monte Pessolano' iuxta regulam primam, quia due propositiones predictae non possunt esse similes nisi in falsitate, ut dictum est in arguendo, et ideo negant earum propositam. Sed ex dictis patet in primo istius responsionis, nam ista: 'tu es in monte Pessolano' est impertinens et extra concederetur, ergo debes eam infra concedere. Ex alio, nam esto quid regule hic starent adhuc suppositum eorum esset falsum, sc. quod dicte propositiones non possunt esse similes nisi in falsitate, nam per novam impositionem non excludunt. Ideo aliter +negatur+ respondetur admissio posito concedendo hanc propositam 'tu es in monte Pessolano,' quia vera et impertinens et cum dicitur concedis falsum et non sequens respondetur quod ipsa sit falsa, et quando dicitur quod ipsa sit falsa et impertinens quare debet negari et cum probatur negatur quod non possunt esse similes nisi in falsitate, ymo possunt esse similes in veritate per novam impositionem, ut notum est. Ad secundum concessa ea, cum proponitur 'tu es in Ammone', ista negatur quia impertinens est et extra negatur et quando dicitur tu negas unum similem /160r/ et concedis reliquum, si sit infra tempus, ista conceditur tamquam sequens ex consequente ista tu male respondes sicut si nunc extra tempus fuerit. Negatur quod fuerunt similes et si dicatur ponatur ipsas esse similes sic +sicut+ significande sicut nun significant, tunc concedunt quidam hanc sicut prius 'tu es in monte Pessolano' et quando eis arguitur tu concedis falsum et impertinens ergo male. Negant consequentiam nisi addatur tu concedis impertinens quod extra negares. Istud non videtur michi sufficere, quia quidquid sit de ultima consequentia non apparet, quod male concedunt istam 'tu es in monte Pessolano,' nam oppositum sequitur expresse ex posito, nam sequitur iste sunt similes sic significando, sicut nunc significant, ergo ambe sunt falsae sicut et igitur concedunt et sequitur secundo iste sunt +similes+ false et ista 'tu es in monte Pessolano' significat te precise esse in monte Pessolano quam habent concedere eo quod excluderunt novam impositionem, ergo tu non es in monte Pessolano, quare male sunt hec concessa tu es in monte Pessolano. Ideo exclusa nova impositione admitto positum scilicet quod similes sic significando et negando istam 'tu es in monte Pessolano,' et cum dicitur tu negas verum et impertinens, nego quod licet non sequitur quod iste sunt similes, ergo tu non es in monte Pessolano. Bene tamen sequitur: iste sunt similes et significant sicut in communi ydiomate cum hoc significabant, ergo tu es in Monte Pessolano, ut deductum est vel omnes simul in diversis locis, ut ratio ante facta concludit et sic patet quod nulle ipsarum dummodo cum semper impositione tali simul addatur significando precise, sicut tantum hoc instans obligationis significant."

<sup>370</sup> For the edition of Buser's work see Pozzi [1990]. See also Kneepkens [1993] and [1982].

The lack of an autograph copy of Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae*, the complexity of the manuscript tradition and the palaeographical difficulties entailed a long editorial work and some substantial editorial choices.

The present edition of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* is provisional and it is based on four manuscripts: V, W, Y, M. V has been chosen as the basis manuscript for Book I, with a complete collation of W and Y and spot-check for M; W is the basis for Book II (omitted in V), with a complete collation of M and Y. For the difficult passages through the entire treatise, some of the other manuscripts have also been consulted - especially E and F.<sup>371</sup>

The critical apparatus gives all the variants for the basis manuscripts and the alternative readings for the difficult passages. Following an approach common in the editions of medieval Latin logical texts, among the alternative readings I have preferred neither the *lectio difficilior* nor the *lectio faciliior*, but the *lectio ad sensum*, i.e. the version that most convincingly preserved logical coherency and the required sense.

In order to make the text more accessible to a larger readership of non-medievalists, the language has generally been normalised to Classical Latin for the orthography (e.g. "consequentiae" instead of "consequencie") and for most lexical variations (e.g. "nihil" for the medieval "nichil"). However, some medieval lexical peculiarities typical of logical texts have been deliberately preserved - e.g. "Sortes" has not been normalised to "Socrates".<sup>372</sup>

The medieval syntax has been maintained through the text without any significant variations; the classical *consecutio temporum* or the use of modal attraction is accepted only on manuscript basis.

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<sup>371</sup> Some of the other manuscripts consulted were not very helpful - like for example Kr, that transmits a very corrupted version of the text and is barely legible.

<sup>372</sup> "Sortes" is the most common of many variations presumably on "Socrates" in medieval texts; the word does not carry any sign of abbreviation. The history of "Sortes" and his relationship to "Socrates" could be the subject of a very interesting paper that - as far as I know - has yet to be written.

In some cases of unusual verbal construction, the preferred reading has usually been chosen on the grounds of the manuscript agreement, the clarity of the intended meaning, and the "technicality" and consistency of the use. The major example of this kind of editorial choice concerns the construction of "antecedit" in Book I.3.1, in the fourth of the general rules holding for all *consequentiae*.<sup>373</sup> In classical Latin *antecedo*, *-is*, *antecessi*, *antecessum*, *antecedere* means "to precede", "to go before of", "to go in front of", and is a transitive verb.

The fourth of the general rules states:

in omni consequentia bona, quidquid antecedit *ad* antecedens etiam antecedit *ad*  
consequens,

which means - translating as verbatim as possible:

in every good consequence, anything that *antecedit* to the antecedent also *antecedit* to the  
consequent.

In most manuscripts, the *antecedit* in this passage is constructed intransitively, with *ad* and the accusative of *antecedens* or of *consequens*. I take this use to be both technical and preferable for reasons of stylistic clarity. The use is technical in the sense that the relation signified by the verb is not of mere precedence but of "being the antecedent of": in this context, the unusual grammatical construction is not surprising since it is in line with the trend of regimentation of Latin in medieval logical texts. A desire for clarity could also play a role, since *antecedens* (and *consequens*) is a neutral name and therefore its accusative and nominative forms are identical: in a transitive construction, it might not be clear if *antecedens* is the subject or the object term. *Antecedit* in construction with *antecedens* or *consequens* is recurring through the rest of the text justifying the rule, but the construction is not constant in all the manuscripts and alternates between transitive and intransitive. In my collation, the

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<sup>373</sup> [M 35v; Y 79v-80r; V 88rb-va; W 110v]

intransitive construction has always been preferred, even when the *ad* is omitted in most manuscripts.

Given the complexity of the manuscript tradition transmitting Marsilius' *logica modernorum* treatises, at this point I will not give a *stemma codicum* of the *Consequentiae*. Bos deemed the endeavour to be impossible and useless for the treatises on the properties of the terms - also because of the four different circulating versions.<sup>374</sup> The tradition of the *Consequentiae* is unavoidably connected to the other treatises', so it does not look like the task is going to be much easier - even if we were to confirm the existence of only one version of our text. Overall, giving a *stemma codicum* for the *Consequentiae* tradition does not look like a completely impossible task; furthermore, if successful, it would yield relevant results also about the transmission of Marsilius' other *logica modernorum* treatises. However, it does look like the length and difficulty of such a venture would be beyond the scope of the present work and overcome its own utility. The transmission of medieval logical texts tend to constitute a veritable "living tradition", even more so than the one of philosophical texts: often a copyist would transcribe *ad sensum*, reformulate or omit examples, annotate the main text, and so on. On the one hand, this makes it harder and harder to attain a reliable genealogy of the different manuscripts; on the other hand, each and everyone of the copies represents a text actually in use at some point in time. We do not have an autograph of the *Consequentiae* that could testify the *intentio auctoris*, but from a careful collation of a number of relatively ancient, complete and readable manuscripts, and by trying primarily to preserve the sense, we managed to obtain a version of the text that looks reasonably reliable and coherent. As of now, this seems to be an achievement more than sufficient to give us an insight into Marsilius of Inghen's logic and into the development of theories of *consequentiae* in the late XIV century. A more

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<sup>374</sup> Bos [1983, 39]

complete edition will be perfected in the future by a more extensive comparison and collation of the great majority of the manuscripts - however even that text will probably be only marginally closer to the author's intention.

In the meantime, we have some hints pointing at the relationships among some of the manuscripts - e.g., from their respective excipits, it is clear that Kr is somehow related to U, either by dependence or a common ancestor. However, we do not have such clear and unambiguous markers for our four basis manuscripts. M, V, W, Y were chosen because they were relatively old copies and for their accessibility, their readability and for the quality of the text transmitted. One has to begin somewhere and V happened to be the starting manuscript: since it was highly readable and the text was overall coherent, it served as basis for Book I. W constitutes the basis for Book II: it was almost a foregone choice since W is the only codex containing all of Marsilius' *logica modernorum*. Even if not as legible as the other manuscripts, Y was extremely useful, in particular for some of the difficult passages in both books, as were M and E. Neither the recurring significant errors nor the alternative readings are consistent enough to paint any definitive picture of the relationships among our manuscripts. However, from an analysis of the variants, the general impression is of a closer tie between M and W. M transmits a couple of passages absent from the other manuscripts - e.g. several lines of explanation of rule 12 around the end of I.3.2. V is an interesting manuscript: its Latin is generally more refined, more grammatically consistent and more "classical" than the language shared by the other manuscripts; and its syntax shows more elegant constructions. V's copyist is probably copying from two or more manuscripts: for example at f. 88ra, the copyist is transcribing twice the same rule, once calling *bona* the *consequentia*, i.e. "good" or "valid", the other time calling it *necessaria*, i.e. "necessary".<sup>375</sup> The two formulations of the rule are

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<sup>375</sup> V 88ra: "Sexta regula est haec: Omnis consequentia cuius antecedens est una copulativa composita ex partibus contradicentibus principalibus est bona. Probatur quia eius antecedens est impossibile ergo consequentia est bona ut tractum est ex prima regula ubi dicitur quod ad impossibilem sequitur quilibet <sic>. Septima regula est haec: Omnis consequentia cuius antecedens est una copulativa composita ex partibus

logically equivalent in Marsilius' theory, the phrasing of the two passages shows only minimal variations, and the same redundancy is absent from any of the other manuscripts examined till now. Nevertheless, even if minimal, the variations in the two versions prevent us from thinking that it was a mechanical mistake. The best explanation would seem to be a deliberate choice of the copyist working from at least two different sources. Our copyist might have been at odds with two different versions of the text, since *bona* or *necessaria* tend to be conceptually important words. Furthermore, one might say that there is a small conceptual space between a *consequentia bona* and a *consequentia necessaria*; if we accept a *consequentia bona* that is not tout-court *necessaria*, e.g. for example a *consequentia* valid only *ut nunc* (as-of-now), then that gap might become a veritable difference. Now, this is not the case for Marsilius' theory, since for him the *consequentia* is the necessity of the inference - and the *consequentia ut nunc* is not a *consequentia* at all.<sup>376</sup> However, in V we find also several treatises on *Consequentiae* holding different positions (namely, accepting *consequentiae ut nunc*) that are in our copyist's hand. It is possible that our fellow was quite bewildered by the theory itself. While facing two different versions of the text, he might have assumed that he was in front of two different rules and that each of his sources had missed one - or, puzzled by the variation, he might have simply decided to copy both.<sup>377</sup> Overall, the V's copyist seems to be a smart one or at the very least an educated one - which could make V less reliable. Therefore, when in disagreement, the other versions have usually been preferred to V, unless either the text in V showed more coherency and made more sense than the others, or for stylistic reasons in case of equivalence.

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contradicientibus est necessaria. Probat: eius antecedens est impossibile ergo consequentia est necessaria et bona. Consequentia tenet per primam regulam. Antecedens patet quia omnis copulativa est impossibilis quae componitur ex partibus contradicientibus." V differs from the other manuscripts also in numbering the rules: this is the sixth of the general rules that apply to most but not all *consequentiae*; M, W, Y keep numbering them in continuity with the previous general rules applying to all consequences, thus all the other manuscripts count the rule in question as the tenth.

<sup>376</sup> On the notion of consequence, the necessity of the inference and Marsilius' theory, see Chapter IV.

<sup>377</sup> Obviously, V might be copying mechanically from a single manuscript, but in that case the same scenario would apply to V's source.

## The Edition

### *Signs and Abbreviations*

<>	addition of the editor
—	illegible passage
+ +	deleted in the manuscript
[ ]	in the text, mark an expression that should be deleted
<i>add.</i>	addit - addition that has not been included in the collation
<i>om.</i>	omisit - omission
<i>add. sup./ s.lin/ sl.</i>	written above the line of the text
<i>add. marg.</i>	written in the margin
<i>vel forsān</i>	"or maybe"; conceivably; guess of the editor
<i>lectio dubia</i>	"doubtful reading"
<i>ante</i>	before
<i>post</i>	after

In the the text, "non" with the addition of ":" (i.e. "non:") has used to mark the occurrence of clearly propositional negations.



<Prima pars consequentiarum>

Tractaturus<sup>379</sup> de consequentiis, Deo adiuvante, istum modum procedendi tenebo:<sup>380</sup> primo ponam consequentiae<sup>381</sup> definitionem necnon eius<sup>382</sup> divisionem cum hoc definitiones aliorum<sup>383</sup> terminorum<sup>384</sup> subdividendo.<sup>385</sup> Secundo ponam aliquas breves regulas<sup>386</sup> consequentiarum<sup>387</sup> cum notabilibus illis<sup>388</sup> regulis deservientibus,<sup>389</sup> supplicans omnibus audientibus ut<sup>390</sup> si quae minus bene dicta reperiant,<sup>391</sup> me habeant<sup>392</sup> excusatum; si<sup>393</sup> aliqua bene,<sup>394</sup> non mihi sed Deo gratiarum referant<sup>395</sup> actiones.

I. 1 <De definitione consequentiae>

<1> Quantum ad primum, sciendum<sup>396</sup> quod quamvis consequentia a diversis diversimodi definiatur, tamen [V 83vb] iudicio melius dicentium salvo<sup>397</sup> ita definiatur:<sup>398</sup>

Consequentia est<sup>399</sup> oratio habens antecedens et consequens et notam illationis consequentis ex antecedente tanquam<sup>400</sup> principales partes sui, ut haec oratio: 'Homo currit, ergo animal currit'.

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<sup>a</sup> V=Vat. lat. 3065, f. 83v-93r; W=Vienna 5162, f. 102r-140r; Y= Vienna 5199, f. 68r-121r; M=Munich 7709, 25v-61r; E = Erfurt Amp. Q 277, 26r-71v; F= Erfurt Amp. Q 280, 152r- 178v. V, W and Y transcribed for the first part. Spot checks for M, E, F. M, W and Y transcribed for the second part. Spot checks for E.

<sup>379</sup> *om.* V

<sup>380</sup> *add.* quia V, *add.* quod MY | tractaturus - tenebo] Tractaturus de consequentiis Dei tenebo auditorio istum modum procedendi W; tractaturus de consequentiis tenebo Dei iuvante istum modum procedendi M; Dei adiutorio istum modum procedendi de consequentiis tenebo V; tractaturus de consequentiis deo adiuvante tenebo istum modum procedendi Y

<sup>381</sup> *corr. mg. ex.: communem vel forsan: conclusionem* V

<sup>382</sup> *om.* W

<sup>383</sup> diversorum MW

<sup>384</sup> membrorum W

<sup>385</sup> subiungendo MW

<sup>386</sup> *ante* breves

<sup>387</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>388</sup> istis M

<sup>389</sup> servientibus V

<sup>390</sup> *om.* M

<sup>391</sup> dixero M | quae minus - reperiant] quae minus bene dixero V

<sup>392</sup> me habeant] habeant me W

<sup>393</sup> *add.* autem M

<sup>394</sup> bona W, *lectio dubia* M

<sup>395</sup> retribuunt M, dent W

<sup>396</sup> notandum M

<sup>397</sup> *add.* dico quod M

<sup>398</sup> ita definiatur] sic definitur M

Antecedens huius propositionis vel orationis <sup>401</sup> est <sup>402</sup> |M 26r| haec propositio: 'homo currit'; consequens eius<sup>403</sup> oratio<sup>404</sup> 'animal currit'; et nota illationis consequentis ex antecedente est haec<sup>405</sup> conuinctio 'ergo' vel 'igitur'.<sup>406</sup> |W102v|

Antecedens est propositio ex qua per notam illationis seu<sup>407</sup> consequentiae infertur consequens,<sup>408</sup> ut in oratione prius posita haec propositio 'homo currit' dicitur<sup>409</sup> antecedens.<sup>410</sup> Consequens vero<sup>411</sup> est propositio quae per notam consequentiae infertur<sup>412</sup> ex alia, scilicet<sup>413</sup> antecedente, ut in oratione |Y68v| prius posita haec propositio<sup>414</sup> 'animal currit' dicitur<sup>415</sup> consequens. Et<sup>416</sup> nota illationis<sup>417</sup> consequentis ex antecedente est haec<sup>418</sup> coniunctio 'ergo', vel 'igitur',<sup>419</sup> vel aliqua<sup>420</sup> alia eam includens vel ei<sup>421</sup> aequivalens. Unde generaliter coniunctio significans habitudinem sequelae necessariam unius propositionis<sup>422</sup> ad aliam dicitur nota illationis. Unde apparet<sup>423</sup> quod haec coniunctio 'si' est<sup>424</sup> nota illationis, quia ipsa<sup>425</sup> faciens<sup>426</sup> propositionem<sup>427</sup> conditionalem<sup>428</sup> significat habitudinem sequelae unius propositionis ad aliam.<sup>429</sup> Similiter<sup>430</sup> est de ista coniunctione 'quia' et de omnibus<sup>431</sup> aliis<sup>432</sup> si sint praedictis<sup>433</sup> aequivalentes.<sup>434</sup>

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<sup>399</sup> *add.* antecedens et consequens sive Y

<sup>400</sup> *om.* V

<sup>401</sup> propositionis vel orationis] consequentiae W

<sup>402</sup> antecedens - est] cuius orationis est/ antecedens M

<sup>403</sup> *om.* W, haec M

<sup>404</sup> *om.* V, propositio M

<sup>405</sup> in M

<sup>406</sup> vel igitur] *om.* MV

<sup>407</sup> *om.* V, vel M

<sup>408</sup> consequentia M

<sup>409</sup> est M

<sup>410</sup> dicitur antecedens] *om.* W

<sup>411</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>412</sup> *ante* per notam M

<sup>413</sup> utputa V

<sup>414</sup> oratio M

<sup>415</sup> est MV

<sup>416</sup> sed MV

<sup>417</sup> *om.* M

<sup>418</sup> in M

<sup>419</sup> vel igitur] *om.* VY

<sup>420</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>421</sup> sibi M

<sup>422</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>423</sup> oportet Y

<sup>424</sup> sit M

<sup>425</sup> *add.* est MY

<sup>426</sup> facit W

<sup>427</sup> *om.* W

<sup>428</sup> *add.* et MW

<sup>429</sup> *add.* sequi V

<Instantiae et dubitationes>

Sed<sup>435</sup> circa<sup>436</sup> praedicta<sup>437</sup> statim oriuntur<sup>438</sup> dubitationes et instantiae.<sup>439</sup>

<1> Primo aliquis diceret<sup>440</sup> quod dictae<sup>441</sup> descriptiones antecedentis et consequentis sint<sup>442</sup> diminute<sup>443</sup> positae.<sup>444</sup>

<1.1.1> Probaretur<sup>445</sup> sic:<sup>446</sup> illae<sup>447</sup> definitiones<sup>448</sup> sunt malae quae sunt circulares; sed<sup>449</sup> istae<sup>450</sup> definitiones<sup>451</sup> sunt huiusmodi; igitur sequitur quod istae<sup>452</sup> definitiones<sup>453</sup> sunt malae.<sup>454</sup> Maior<sup>455</sup> patet,<sup>456</sup> quia si dicerem<sup>457</sup> quod 'a est illud cuius est b et - e converso-<sup>458</sup> b est id<sup>459</sup> quod<sup>460</sup> est ipsius<sup>461</sup> a' male definirem.<sup>462</sup>

Minor patet quia dicitur quod antecedens sit<sup>463</sup> propositio ex qua per notam consequentiae infertur consequens, et<sup>464</sup> definiendo consequens dicitur:<sup>465</sup> 'consequens<sup>466</sup> est propositio quae per notam

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<sup>430</sup> sicut M

<sup>431</sup> *om.* V

<sup>432</sup> talibus W

<sup>433</sup> *om.* W

<sup>434</sup> aequivalentibus W

<sup>435</sup> *add.* tunc V

<sup>436</sup> contra W, *add.* duo Y

<sup>437</sup> dicta MW

<sup>438</sup> *add.* quaedam Y

<sup>439</sup> dubitationes et instantiae] instantiae et dubitationes V, *add.* et W

<sup>440</sup> dubitaret M

<sup>441</sup> illae M

<sup>442</sup> sunt MW

<sup>443</sup> *add.* et malae Y

<sup>444</sup> *om.* M, *add.* et W

<sup>445</sup> probatur W probarer Y

<sup>446</sup> *add.* nam W

<sup>447</sup> istae MW

<sup>448</sup> descriptiones Y

<sup>449</sup> *om.* M

<sup>450</sup> illae MV

<sup>451</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>452</sup> dictae W

<sup>453</sup> descriptiones W

<sup>454</sup> sequitur - malae] etc. MV

<sup>455</sup> *add.* rationis MY

<sup>456</sup> nota est de se W, est nota M

<sup>457</sup> definirem Y

<sup>458</sup> *add.* quod MY

<sup>459</sup> illud M

<sup>460</sup> cuius M, *add.* d\_\_ Y

<sup>461</sup> *om.* M

<sup>462</sup> quia si - definirem] nota est de se W

<sup>463</sup> est M

<sup>464</sup> sic etiam M, *add.* in W

consequentiae infertur ex antecedente', et sic consequens describitur<sup>467</sup> per antecedens et antecedens per consequens. Hoc autem est circulariter describere, igitur<sup>468</sup> etc.<sup>469</sup>

<1.1.2> Et<sup>470</sup> confirmatur<sup>471</sup> idem<sup>472</sup> ex alio:<sup>473</sup> illae definitiones non sunt bonae,<sup>474</sup> quae non notificant definita;<sup>475</sup> sed istae<sup>476</sup> sunt huiusmodi; ergo<sup>477</sup> non sunt bonae.<sup>478</sup> Maior<sup>479</sup> patet ex eo<sup>480</sup> quod<sup>481</sup> de<sup>482</sup> proprietate<sup>483</sup> [Y 69r] bonae definitionis<sup>484</sup> est notificare definitum. Minor<sup>485</sup> scilicet quod illae<sup>486</sup> non notificant<sup>487</sup> definita,<sup>488</sup> patet.<sup>489</sup> Declaratur,<sup>490</sup> quia<sup>491</sup> ponatur quod aliquis sit qui nesciat<sup>492</sup> quid sit antecedens nec etiam<sup>493</sup> sciat<sup>494</sup> quid est<sup>495</sup> consequens - quod<sup>496</sup> est valde<sup>497</sup> possibile. Et dicatur ei<sup>498</sup> quod antecedens est propositio ex qua per notam consequentiae<sup>499</sup> infertur consequens, et<sup>500</sup> sic<sup>501</sup>

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<sup>465</sup> *add.* etiam M

<sup>466</sup> quod M

<sup>467</sup> definitur W

<sup>468</sup> ergo M

<sup>469</sup> igitur etc.] *om.* W

<sup>470</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>471</sup> *add.* illud MV

<sup>472</sup> *om.* W

<sup>473</sup> *add.* quia | ex alio] alio modo V

<sup>474</sup> verae Y

<sup>475</sup> definitum MW

<sup>476</sup> illae *vel forsitan* istae V, illae M

<sup>477</sup> igitur *add.* istae M

<sup>478</sup> non sunt bonae] *om.* W, etcetera M, non sunt verae Y

<sup>479</sup> *add.* rationis Y

<sup>480</sup> ex eo] *om.* M

<sup>481</sup> quia MW

<sup>482</sup> *om.* M

<sup>483</sup> ex - proprietate] ex hoc quia descriptio Y

<sup>484</sup> proprietate bonae definitionis] definitionis bonae proprietate M

<sup>485</sup> *add.* autem V

<sup>486</sup> ista W

<sup>487</sup> notificat W

<sup>488</sup> definitum W

<sup>489</sup> *om.* MW | scilicet - patet] quod istae non notificant definitum Y

<sup>490</sup> *om.* V

<sup>491</sup> et MV

<sup>492</sup> non sciat M

<sup>493</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>494</sup> nec etiam sciat] *vel* M

<sup>495</sup> sit MW | nesciat - sciat quid est] ut scit antecedens non quod sit Y

<sup>496</sup> hoc M

<sup>497</sup> *om.* V

<sup>498</sup> ille M

<sup>499</sup> *om.* V

<sup>500</sup> *om.* M

<sup>501</sup> statim MWY

ille<sup>502</sup> |M 26v| non<sup>503</sup> statim<sup>504</sup> per istam<sup>505</sup> definitionem intelligeret<sup>506</sup> quid sit<sup>507</sup> antecedens,<sup>508</sup> et  
causa<sup>509</sup> quare<sup>510</sup> non intelligeret<sup>511</sup> eam<sup>512</sup> est<sup>513</sup> quia ignorat quid sit<sup>514</sup> consequens.

Et si illi sic dicatur ut possit scire quid est antecedens, quaerat quid est<sup>515</sup> consequens,<sup>516</sup> et<sup>517</sup> dicatur  
sibi<sup>518</sup> quod consequens<sup>519</sup> est propositio quae per notam consequentiae<sup>520</sup> infertur ex alia, scilicet<sup>521</sup>  
|V 84<sup>ra</sup>| ex antecedente. Iterum<sup>522</sup> per istam<sup>523</sup> definitionem non intelligit<sup>524</sup> quid sit<sup>525</sup> consequens,  
cum non sciet<sup>526</sup> quid sit<sup>527</sup> dicere<sup>528</sup> propositio quae infertur ex antecedente; ergo<sup>529</sup> apparet quod  
illae<sup>530</sup> definitiones<sup>531</sup> non notificant definita,<sup>532</sup> quod fuit<sup>533</sup> declarandum.<sup>534</sup>

<1.2> Secundo arguitur:<sup>535</sup> communiter alii aliter definierunt<sup>536</sup> consequentiam<sup>537</sup>|W 103r| cum<sup>538</sup>  
unius definibilis<sup>539</sup> unica<sup>540</sup> debeat<sup>541</sup> esse<sup>542</sup> definitio (ut trahitur ex dictis<sup>543</sup> Philosophi septimo<sup>544</sup>

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<sup>502</sup> iste MW

<sup>503</sup> *post* definitionem W

<sup>504</sup> *om.* W

<sup>505</sup> illam V

<sup>506</sup> et sic - inteligeret] statim ille / per istam definitionem non intelligit M

<sup>507</sup> est MV | sic - quid est] secundo per illam definitionem non intelligit quod sit Y

<sup>508</sup> *add.* vel quid est consequens M

<sup>509</sup> *add.* est WM

<sup>510</sup> quia MWY

<sup>511</sup> intelligit MVY

<sup>512</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>513</sup> *om.* MV, causa Y

<sup>514</sup> est V

<sup>515</sup> et si - quaerat quid est] quaerat in *vel fors*an igitur iste cui sit dicitur quid sit antecedens et quid sit Y

<sup>516</sup> et si - consequens] quare ergo iste cui sic dicitur quid est consequens ut possit scire quid sit antecedens W,  
quaerat ergo ille cui sic dicitur ut possit scire quid sit antecedens et quid sit consequens M

<sup>517</sup> *add.* si M

<sup>518</sup> sic Y

<sup>519</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>520</sup> per notam consequentiae] *om.* MVY

<sup>521</sup> ex alia scilicet] *om.* M

<sup>522</sup> tunc MW

<sup>523</sup> illam M

<sup>524</sup> intelligit V

<sup>525</sup> est V

<sup>526</sup> sciat W, nescit M

<sup>527</sup> est VY

<sup>528</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>529</sup> igitur W

<sup>530</sup> istae MW

<sup>531</sup> *om.* M

<sup>532</sup> definitum MW

<sup>533</sup> erat M

<sup>534</sup> probandum V

<sup>535</sup> *om.* M, nam VWY

<sup>536</sup> definiunt MW

<sup>537</sup> *add.* quare VW, *add.* et Y

<sup>538</sup> *om.* M

<sup>539</sup> definitum M

*Metaphisicae*:<sup>i</sup> nam definitio datur per partem essentialem<sup>545</sup> rei et principaliter<sup>546</sup> formalem; constat enim<sup>547</sup> quod unius rei sola<sup>548</sup> est una forma essentialis),<sup>549</sup> quare videtur<sup>550</sup> dictam definitionem non esse bonam.

<2> Secundo<sup>551</sup> aliquis<sup>552</sup> dubitaret<sup>553</sup> utrum consequentia<sup>554</sup> mala sit consequentia vel non.<sup>555</sup>

<2.1> Et arguitur primo ex definitione quod sit,<sup>556</sup> quia<sup>557</sup> in consequentia mala est antecedens et<sup>558</sup> consequens et nota illationis, igitur<sup>559</sup> sequitur quod<sup>560</sup> consequentia mala est consequentia.<sup>561</sup> Consequentia tenet<sup>562</sup> per definitionem datam. Antecedens patet<sup>563</sup> de illa:<sup>564</sup> 'homo currit, ergo<sup>565</sup> asinus currit', in qua ly homo currit dicitur antecedens, et<sup>566</sup> ly asinus currit dicitur consequens, et ly ergo dicitur<sup>567</sup> nota illationis.

<2.2> Secundo arguitur ad idem<sup>568</sup> ex communi fama,<sup>569</sup> nam<sup>570</sup> communiter dicitur quando<sup>571</sup> aliqua<sup>572</sup> |Y 69v| consequentia proponitur<sup>573</sup> quam negat respondens<sup>574</sup> vel quod illa non valet<sup>575</sup> vel

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<sup>540</sup> solum una M, solum Y, *post esse* W

<sup>541</sup> debet V, deberet M

<sup>542</sup> una MY

<sup>543</sup> dicto VY

<sup>544</sup> primo Y

<sup>i</sup> Aristot., *Metaph.*, 3.3.998; cf. Aquinas, *In Metaph.*, 3.3.430

<sup>545</sup> *ante partem* M

<sup>546</sup> *id maxime* Y

<sup>547</sup> *autem* WY | *constat enim*] confirmatur ergo V

<sup>548</sup> solum MW

<sup>549</sup> *om.* MW, *add.* et ergo solum una definitio Y

<sup>550</sup> sequitur W, *add.* per M

<sup>551</sup> tertio MVY

<sup>552</sup> *post* dubitaret M

<sup>553</sup> dubitatur ab alia parte W

<sup>554</sup> *post* mala M

<sup>555</sup> *vel non*] *om.* MW

<sup>556</sup> *sic* MW

<sup>557</sup> *om.* M

<sup>558</sup> *alibi vel forsitan* animal Y

<sup>559</sup> ergo M

<sup>560</sup> igitur sequitur quod] ergo V | *add.* scitur quod Y

<sup>561</sup> *add.* ista W

<sup>562</sup> patet W, videtur patere Y, videtur tenere M

<sup>563</sup> probatur W

<sup>564</sup> ista Y

<sup>565</sup> et igitur Y

<sup>566</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>567</sup> est M | ergo dicitur] ita est Y

<sup>568</sup> arguitur ad idem] probatur id idem M, probatur idem W, probatur id Y

<sup>569</sup> *vel forsitan* forma V

quod illa est mala.<sup>576</sup> Et in hoc quod dicitur quod<sup>577</sup> est<sup>578</sup> consequentia mala, innuitur quod<sup>579</sup> sit<sup>580</sup> consequentia.

<2.3> Tertio: nam si<sup>581</sup> <non> sic,<sup>582</sup> sequeretur<sup>583</sup> quod esset<sup>584</sup> aliqua<sup>585</sup> propositio<sup>586</sup> quae<sup>587</sup> nec esset<sup>588</sup> categorica nec hypothetica. Consequens est inconueniens et contra Philosophum<sup>589</sup> primo *Peri hermeneias* et contra Petrum Hispanum expresse<sup>590</sup> in *Summulis* suis.<sup>591</sup>

Probatur consequentia<sup>592</sup> capiendo conditionalem falsam, ut 'si deus est, baculus stat in angulo', quae<sup>593</sup> vel est conditionalis, vel non.<sup>594</sup> Si est conditionalis, sequitur<sup>595</sup> quod est consequentia, cum<sup>596</sup> ly si, ut dictum<sup>597</sup> est, sit<sup>598</sup> nota consequentiae vel<sup>599</sup> illationis;<sup>600</sup> [M 27<sup>r</sup>] et est<sup>601</sup> mala,<sup>602</sup> ut<sup>603</sup> notum est; ergo<sup>604</sup> consequentia mala est consequentia, quod est<sup>605</sup> propositum. Si autem dicatur quod non

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<sup>570</sup> quia Y

<sup>571</sup> quod M, *add.* alicui Y

<sup>572</sup> *om.* W

<sup>573</sup> *om.* W, proponatur Y

<sup>574</sup> negat respondens] negant respondentes W

<sup>575</sup> vel quod illa non valet] *om.* YW, quae non est bona M

<sup>576</sup> vel quod illa est mala] *om.* M, vel quae non est bona consequentia quod talis consequentia est mala W

<sup>577</sup> *om.* V | et in hoc quod dicitur quod] quod talis M

<sup>578</sup> *post* consequentia MW

<sup>579</sup> hoc quod - quod] innuitur quod consequentia mala Y

<sup>580</sup> est MW

<sup>581</sup> nam si] unde Y

<sup>582</sup> modo *add.* tunc W

<sup>583</sup> sequitur MV, patet Y

<sup>584</sup> est VY, *post* propositio Y

<sup>585</sup> *ante* est W

<sup>586</sup> esset aliqua propositio] aliqua propositio esset M

<sup>587</sup> *om.* M

<sup>588</sup> *om.* M, est V

<sup>589</sup> Aristotelem Y

<sup>590</sup> *om.* W

<sup>591</sup> in *Summulis* suis] *om.* MVY | *add.* et MVY

<sup>592</sup> *ante* consequentia M

<sup>593</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>594</sup> *add.* est conditionalis MY

<sup>595</sup> patet Y

<sup>596</sup> nam W

<sup>597</sup> praedictum Y

<sup>598</sup> est W

<sup>599</sup> et V | consequentiae vel] seu consequentiae *post* illationis M

<sup>600</sup> vel illationis] *om.* W

<sup>601</sup> *om.* W

<sup>602</sup> male W | *add.* consequentia Y

<sup>603</sup> prout W

<sup>604</sup> igitur M

<sup>605</sup> *add.* ad W

sit<sup>606</sup> conditionalis, et<sup>607</sup> manifestum est<sup>608</sup> quod non sit<sup>609</sup> alterius speciei<sup>610</sup> propositionis<sup>611</sup> hypotheticae quam conditionalis,<sup>612</sup> ergo non est<sup>613</sup> propositio hypothetica nec categorica,<sup>614</sup> prout notum est;<sup>615</sup> quod tamen sit<sup>616</sup> propositio satis notum est de se.<sup>617</sup>

Ex quibus<sup>618</sup> sequitur statim<sup>619</sup> quod aliqua est propositio<sup>620</sup> quae<sup>621</sup> nec est<sup>622</sup> categorica nec hypothetica, quod fuit probandum.

In oppositum arguitur:<sup>623</sup>

Omnis<sup>624</sup> consequentia est argumentatio, sed<sup>625</sup> nulla<sup>626</sup> consequentia<sup>627</sup> mala est argumentatio, ergo<sup>628</sup> nulla consequentia mala est consequentia. Discursus est bonus, quia in secundo modo secundae figurae.<sup>629</sup> Antecedens pro prima parte patet, quia omnis consequentia tenetur<sup>630</sup> sub aliqua specie<sup>631</sup> argumentationis. Pro secunda parte<sup>632</sup> manifestum<sup>633</sup> est quia in consequentia mala non est debita probatio<sup>634</sup> consequentis ex antecedente quod tamen requiritur ad argumentationem esse bonam,<sup>635</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> est MY

<sup>607</sup> *om.* M

<sup>608</sup> *ante* manifestum M

<sup>609</sup> est M, est *add.* alicuius W

<sup>610</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>611</sup> *om.* V, *post* hypotheticae Y

<sup>612</sup> quam conditionalis] *om.* MW

<sup>613</sup> ergo non est] et sic nec erit M

<sup>614</sup> hypothetica nec categorica] categorica nec hypothetica M

<sup>615</sup> prout notum est] *om.* M, quod fuit probandum W

<sup>616</sup> est V

<sup>617</sup> quod tamen - se] *om.* W | satis - se] est notum M

<sup>618</sup> quo M

<sup>619</sup> *ante* sequitur M

<sup>620</sup> *ante* est M

<sup>621</sup> nec categorica prout - est propositio quae] *om.* W

<sup>622</sup> erit W

<sup>623</sup> *add.* quod M

<sup>624</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>625</sup> et M

<sup>626</sup> ibi Y

<sup>627</sup> argumentatio M

<sup>628</sup> ita Y

<sup>629</sup> quia - figurae] *om.* V | *add.* et VY

<sup>630</sup> est V, continetur Y, *add.* et ponitur W

<sup>631</sup> parte M

<sup>632</sup> *add.* patet Y

<sup>633</sup> *post* est MV

<sup>634</sup> proportio MV

<sup>635</sup> esse bonam] proprie dictam MW



nec e converso<sup>636</sup> in<sup>637</sup> consequentia<sup>638</sup> mala est<sup>639</sup> necessaria illatio; ista<sup>640</sup> tamen<sup>641</sup> requiritur ad omnem argumentationem,<sup>642</sup> quocumque modo etiam<sup>643</sup> |V 84<sup>rb</sup>| acciperetur<sup>644</sup> argumentatio.

Et confirmatur hoc<sup>645</sup> communi |W 103<sup>v</sup>| opinione modernorum, dicentium consequentiam malam non esse consequentiam, cui concordat |Y 70<sup>r</sup>| ratio quia<sup>646</sup> sicut similitudinarie<sup>647</sup> homo pictus<sup>648</sup> hoc nomine 'homo' significatur,<sup>649</sup> non<sup>650</sup> tamen est homo; ita<sup>651</sup> videtur consequentiam malam similitudinarie<sup>652</sup> nomine consequentiae significari,<sup>653</sup> non tamen esse consequentiam; igitur<sup>654</sup> videtur quod consequentia mala non sit<sup>655</sup> consequentia.<sup>656</sup>

<3> Alia<sup>657</sup> dubitatio<sup>658</sup> est<sup>659</sup> quia,<sup>660</sup> nihil dictum est in praedictis definitionibus<sup>661</sup> de consequentia bona quomodo<sup>662</sup> ipsa<sup>663</sup> debeat definiri.<sup>664</sup>

<Ad instantias>

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<sup>636</sup> e converso] etiam MW

<sup>637</sup> om. Y, add. ista M

<sup>638</sup> post mala Y

<sup>639</sup> post e converso VY

<sup>640</sup> illa V, quae M

<sup>641</sup> quae ad minus W

<sup>642</sup> add. *Id* ad unius Y

<sup>643</sup> om. M

<sup>644</sup> accipitur post argumentatio W

<sup>645</sup> vel fors haec V, om. MW

<sup>646</sup> om. V

<sup>647</sup> similitudine Y

<sup>648</sup> depictus M

<sup>649</sup> add. et M

<sup>650</sup> post tamen M

<sup>651</sup> igitur VY

<sup>652</sup> similitudine Y

<sup>653</sup> consequentiam malam - significari] similitudinarie malam consequentiam significari hoc nomine consequentia W

<sup>654</sup> ergo M

<sup>655</sup> est M

<sup>656</sup> non tamen - consequentia] om. W

<sup>657</sup> Quarta V, secunda M

<sup>658</sup> quarta dubitatio] tertium dubium W

<sup>659</sup> ant. dubitatio Y, om. MW

<sup>660</sup> quod Y

<sup>661</sup> om. Y |

<sup>662</sup> qualiter V

<sup>663</sup> om. M

<sup>664</sup> in praedictis - bona] de consequentia bona in definitionibus praedictis W, de consequentia bona in dictis definitionibus M

<1> Ad primam harum<sup>665</sup> instantiarum<sup>666</sup> respondeo<sup>667</sup> quod dictae definitiones<sup>668</sup> sunt probabiliter positae et sunt probabiles, nec rationes contra eas adductae concludunt.<sup>669</sup>

<1.1.1> Ad primam,<sup>670</sup> quando<sup>671</sup> dicitur: 'istae definitiones non sunt bonae<sup>672</sup> quae<sup>673</sup> sunt circulares', nego<sup>674</sup> illam;<sup>675</sup> et huius<sup>676</sup> causa<sup>677</sup> est<sup>678</sup> quia in terminis relativis,<sup>679</sup> quemadmodum sunt isti<sup>680</sup> termini<sup>681</sup> 'antecedens' et 'consequens', non est<sup>682</sup> aliquid<sup>683</sup> inconueniens<sup>684</sup> definire<sup>685</sup> terminos<sup>686</sup> circulariter, ut 'pater' definitur<sup>687</sup> 'quod sit<sup>688</sup> res habens<sup>689</sup> filium' et 'filius' definitur<sup>690</sup> e converso 'quod sit<sup>691</sup> res habens patrem'.<sup>692</sup>

Et Porphyrius, definiens genus, dicit [M 27v] quod<sup>693</sup> "genus est terminus qui<sup>694</sup> praedicatur de speciebus"; et<sup>695</sup> definiens speciem<sup>696</sup> dicit quod 'species<sup>697</sup> est de qua praedicatur genus'. Et in littera

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<sup>665</sup> istarum MY , *add.* dubitationum seu W

<sup>666</sup> dubitationum M

<sup>667</sup> dico W

<sup>668</sup> descriptiones W

<sup>669</sup> rationes - concludunt] concludunt contra eas rationes adductae W, igitur concludunt quae contra rationes adductae Y, etiam concludunt contra eas rationes adductae M

<sup>670</sup> *add.* rationem W

<sup>671</sup> *post.* dicitur Y

<sup>672</sup> non sunt bonae] sunt malae WY

<sup>673</sup> qui W

<sup>674</sup> negatur V

<sup>675</sup> istam Y

<sup>676</sup> *om.* M

<sup>677</sup> *ante* huius WY

<sup>678</sup> *add.* haec V

<sup>679</sup> illis V

<sup>680</sup> illi M

<sup>681</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>682</sup> non est] *om.* M

<sup>683</sup> *om.* W

<sup>684</sup> *add.* aliquid W

<sup>685</sup> definiri W

<sup>686</sup> *om.* W

<sup>687</sup> *add.* sic M

<sup>688</sup> definitur quod sit] est W | quod sit] pater est M

<sup>689</sup> *post* filium Y

<sup>690</sup> *om.* Y | filius definitur] *om.* M

<sup>691</sup> est Y

<sup>692</sup> et filius - patrem] et e contra filius est res habens patrem W

<sup>693</sup> et M] dicit quod] sic definit W

<sup>694</sup> terminus qui] quod W

<sup>695</sup> tunc Y

<sup>696</sup> *add.* sic W

<sup>697</sup> *om.* W

confitetur quod<sup>698</sup> 'genus' et 'species' sunt termini relativi,<sup>699</sup> necesse<sup>700</sup> est ergo<sup>701</sup> in utrorumque<sup>702</sup> rationibus<sup>703</sup> utrisque terminis<sup>704</sup> uti.

Quod autem 'antecedens' et 'consequens' sint termini relativi manifestum est,<sup>705</sup> quia antecedens est ad aliquid antecedens, et consequens est<sup>706</sup> ad aliquid<sup>707</sup> consequens. Modo tales termini<sup>708</sup> sunt<sup>709</sup> de praedicamento ad aliquid, quia <sup>710</sup> de se <sup>711</sup> ipsis <sup>712</sup> cum <sup>713</sup> addito 'ad aliquid' essentialiter praedicantur,<sup>714</sup> ut patet per secundam<sup>715</sup> definitionem ipsorum 'ad aliquid' per Aristotelem<sup>716</sup> in *Praedicamentis*<sup>717</sup> 'ad aliquid'<sup>718</sup> positam.<sup>719</sup>

Ad probationem Aristotelis,<sup>720</sup> quando dicitur:<sup>721</sup> "si definiendo 'a' dicerem quod 'a'<sup>722</sup> esset ipsius<sup>723</sup> 'b', et e converso<sup>724</sup> quod<sup>725</sup> 'b' esset<sup>726</sup> ipsius 'a', male definirem";<sup>727</sup> b negatur illud si termini<sup>728</sup> essent relativi, sicut iam declaratum est. Sed verum est si<sup>729</sup> esset |Y 70v| alii termini non<sup>730</sup> deberent sic<sup>731</sup> definiri.

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<sup>698</sup> quia Y

<sup>699</sup> sunt termini relativi] autem r.s. Y

<sup>700</sup> necessarium W

<sup>701</sup> om. VY

<sup>702</sup> utrumque Y

<sup>703</sup> rationes W

<sup>704</sup> om. VY

<sup>705</sup> manifestum est] patet V

<sup>706</sup> om. Y

<sup>707</sup> aliquod Y

<sup>708</sup> post sunt Y

<sup>709</sup> sint V

<sup>710</sup> add. sunt Y, sic W

<sup>711</sup> om. Y

<sup>712</sup> add. ad hoc Y

<sup>713</sup> add. ad hoc W

<sup>714</sup> ante essentialiter W, praedicabiles V

<sup>715</sup> om. V, eandem Y

<sup>716</sup> Philosophum WY

<sup>717</sup> praedicamento W

<sup>718</sup> om. V

<sup>719</sup> om. Y

<sup>720</sup> maioris W, *lectio dubia* Y

<sup>721</sup> quando dicitur] dicit quod Y

<sup>722</sup> om. V

<sup>723</sup> illius *vel forsan* terminus

<sup>724</sup> e converso] om. Y

<sup>725</sup> post b Y, om. V

<sup>726</sup> est VY, add. *cuius* VW

<sup>727</sup> male definirem] om. V

<sup>b</sup> quando dicitur - ipsius a] quando dicitur si definiendo 'a' dicerem quod esset cuius est 'b', et e converso 'b' est cuius est ipsius 'a' V | quando dicitur quod si definiendo 'a' dicerem quod 'a' est ipsius 'b' et e converso quod 'b' esset ipsius 'a' W | quando dicit quod si defininendo 'a' dicerem quod est illius 'b' et 'b' quod est ipsius 'a' Y

<sup>728</sup> om. Y

<sup>729</sup> add. non essent termini relativi sed W

<1.1.2> Ad confirmationem quando dicitur: "illae<sup>732</sup> definitiones non sunt bonae quae non notificant definita",<sup>733</sup> concedo<sup>734</sup> istam<sup>735</sup> - intelligenti<sup>736</sup> ex communi modo loquendi quid nomina significant. Nam estimo<sup>737</sup> quod ista definitio 'homo est animal rationale'<sup>738</sup> intellecto quod<sup>739</sup> sit optima, tamen si<sup>740</sup> uni<sup>741</sup> layco proponeretur, ei<sup>742</sup> non<sup>743</sup> notificaret<sup>744</sup> definitum, vel uni alteri non intelligenti quod<sup>745</sup> hoc nomen 'animal' significaret.<sup>746</sup>

Et ad minorem, quando dicitur quod "istae<sup>747</sup> definitiones non notificant definita",<sup>748</sup> hoc nego,<sup>749</sup> dummodo intelligitur ex communi modo [W 104<sup>r</sup>] loquendi quid nominis.<sup>750</sup> Nam si ego vel aliquis iuvenis<sup>751</sup> scirem<sup>752</sup> vel sciret<sup>753</sup> quod iste terminus 'antecedens' significaret talem propositionem 'homo currit' in hac totali<sup>754</sup> oratione 'homo currit, ergo animal currit' et quod iste terminus 'consequens' significat ista 'animal currit'<sup>755</sup> in eadem oratione, et<sup>756</sup> tunc nobis<sup>757</sup> diceretur quod consequens esset<sup>758</sup> propositio quae per notam consequentiae<sup>759</sup> infertur<sup>760</sup> ex<sup>761</sup> antecedente, ista definitio sibi<sup>762</sup> optime notificaret<sup>763</sup> definitum. Et hoc sufficit.<sup>764</sup>

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<sup>730</sup> *add. recto* Y

<sup>731</sup> *ita* V

<sup>732</sup> *istae* WY

<sup>733</sup> *definitum* WY

<sup>734</sup> *dicitur concedendo* V

<sup>735</sup> *illam* V

<sup>736</sup> *om. V, intelligit Y, praecognito M*

<sup>737</sup> *esto* MW

<sup>738</sup> *add. mortale* M

<sup>739</sup> *intellecto quod] om. MWY*

<sup>740</sup> *om. M | tamen si] quamvis idem praedicatur cuius W, quorum praedicatorum Y*

<sup>741</sup> *om. V*

<sup>742</sup> *proponeretur ei] om. WY*

<sup>743</sup> *om. W*

<sup>744</sup> *notificat* Y

<sup>745</sup> *quid* MW

<sup>746</sup> *significet W, significat Y*

<sup>747</sup> *illae* V

<sup>748</sup> *definitum* WY

<sup>749</sup> *add. et hoc M | hoc nego] nego istam W*

<sup>750</sup> *add. significant* M

<sup>751</sup> *iuniores vel forsant intelligens W*

<sup>752</sup> *dicerem* M

<sup>753</sup> *vel sciret] om. W, vel scirem M*

<sup>754</sup> *om. V, totale Y*

<sup>755</sup> *quod iste - corrit] om. WY*

<sup>756</sup> *quod iste terminus consequens - oratione et] om. M*

<sup>757</sup> *sibi* MY

<sup>758</sup> *est* WY

<sup>759</sup> *illationis* Y

<sup>760</sup> *post antecedente* W

Ad probationem minoris, quando dicitur: "ponatur<sup>765</sup> |V 84<sup>va</sup>| quod aliquis sit qui ignoret<sup>766</sup> quid sit antecedens et quid sit consequens,<sup>767</sup> ita quod iste ignoret<sup>768</sup> quid nominis",<sup>769</sup> admitto casum. Et dico ultra<sup>770</sup> quod istae<sup>771</sup> definitiones non<sup>772</sup> notificant illi<sup>773</sup> definitum<sup>774</sup> |M 28<sup>r</sup>| qui<sup>775</sup> ignorat<sup>776</sup> quid nominis terminorum, quod tamen<sup>777</sup> oportet eum<sup>778</sup> scire - sicut isti<sup>779</sup> qui ignorant<sup>780</sup> quid significaret iste terminus<sup>781</sup> 'animal',<sup>782</sup> numquam ista<sup>783</sup> definitio<sup>784</sup> 'homo est animal rationale'<sup>785</sup> aliquid<sup>786</sup> notificaret.<sup>787</sup> Oportet enim si definitiones notificare<sup>788</sup> debeant definitum<sup>789</sup> quid nominis praecognoscere.

Sed adhuc aliquis<sup>790</sup> diceret: "tu dicis quod oportet quid nominis<sup>791</sup> ex communi modo<sup>792</sup> loquendi<sup>793</sup> praecognoscere.<sup>794</sup> Et si sic,<sup>795</sup> tunc praesciretur istud quod<sup>796</sup> istae<sup>797</sup> definitiones |Y 71<sup>r</sup>| deberent<sup>798</sup> notificare, cum sint definitiones quid nominis ostendentes quid nomen<sup>799</sup> significat".<sup>800</sup>

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<sup>761</sup> *add.* alia sed ex antecedente Y, *add.* ex alia scilicet M

<sup>762</sup> *om.* W

<sup>763</sup> *ante* sibi MY

<sup>764</sup> *om.* Y | *add.* et V

<sup>765</sup> *om.* M

<sup>766</sup> ignorat W | sit qui ignorat] ignarus et ignoraret Y

<sup>767</sup> et quid sit consequens] *om.* WY

<sup>768</sup> ignorat *post* quid nominis W | iste ignoret] illa ambo ignorans M

<sup>769</sup> quid nominis] *om.* M

<sup>770</sup> ulterius *ante* dico W | dico ultra] quando ultra dicitur Y, tunc ulterius dicitur M

<sup>771</sup> illae MV

<sup>772</sup> *sl.* W

<sup>773</sup> *s. lin. ante* istae V, sibi M

<sup>774</sup> definita V, *add.* ista Y, *add.* concedo M

<sup>775</sup> quia VY

<sup>776</sup> ignorant V, ignorans *add.* nescit Y, ignorans *add.* est M

<sup>777</sup> quod tamen] ut W

<sup>778</sup> *ante* oportet V

<sup>779</sup> iste WY

<sup>780</sup> ignorat W, ignoraret VY

<sup>781</sup> *om.* Y, nomenM

<sup>782</sup> isti - animal] ignorant quid hoc nomen animal significat M

<sup>783</sup> illa V

<sup>784</sup> *om.* W

<sup>785</sup> homo - rationale] animal rationale V, animal rationale mortale MW | *add.* sibi Y

<sup>786</sup> aliud Y

<sup>787</sup> *ante* aliquid V, *add.* +aliquid+ V

<sup>788</sup> oportet - notificare] *om.* M

<sup>789</sup> definita V, *om.* M

<sup>790</sup> *ante* adhuc M

<sup>791</sup> *om.* W

<sup>792</sup> *ante* communi Y

<sup>793</sup> *add.* quid sit antecedens Y

<sup>794</sup> *ante* ex W, *add.* quid nomina significant W

<sup>795</sup> si sic] *om.* Y

<sup>796</sup> istud quod] quid M

<sup>797</sup> illae V

Respondeo<sup>801</sup> quod multi sunt<sup>802</sup> qui bene<sup>803</sup> cognoscunt<sup>804</sup> ex communi<sup>805</sup> usu loquendi quid sit consequens<sup>806</sup> et quae propositio vocatur antecedens, qui tamen nesciunt convertibiliter<sup>807</sup> describere antecedens vel<sup>808</sup> consequens.

Unde si hoc ab eis quaeretur, deliberarent<sup>809</sup> sicut unus<sup>810</sup> puer<sup>811</sup> scit quod<sup>812</sup> virum matris suae<sup>813</sup> vocatur<sup>814</sup> ex usu loquendi 'pater',<sup>815</sup> non<sup>816</sup> tamen sciret<sup>817</sup> convertibiliter<sup>818</sup> describere<sup>819</sup> patrem.<sup>c</sup> Et talem definitionem convertibilem<sup>820</sup> manifestat definitio data.<sup>821</sup>

Per hoc ad confirmationem,<sup>822</sup> quando<sup>823</sup> dicitur quod oportet ex communi modo loquendi praecognosci<sup>824</sup> quid nominis,<sup>825</sup> concedo; et<sup>826</sup> quando<sup>827</sup> dicitur quod<sup>828</sup> tunc<sup>829</sup> praesciretur

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<sup>798</sup> debent Y, *add.* +notificant+ W

<sup>799</sup> nomina W

<sup>800</sup> significant W | nomen significat] per nomen significatur M

<sup>801</sup> respondetur M

<sup>802</sup> sint Y

<sup>803</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>804</sup> sciunt V

<sup>805</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>806</sup> antecedens VWY

<sup>807</sup> *vel fors*an convenienter WY

<sup>808</sup> et M

<sup>809</sup> *add.* se W

<sup>810</sup> *om.* M

<sup>811</sup> *add.* bene V, *add.* vocans M

<sup>812</sup> scit quod] qui MY, *om.* W

<sup>813</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>814</sup> vocat vel vocare debet M, volens vocare debet Y

<sup>815</sup> *post* puer W, Barta *add.* et pater suus Octo V, patrem M

<sup>816</sup> *post* tamen M

<sup>817</sup> sciens W, sciat Y, *ante* tamen M

<sup>818</sup> *ante* scit V

<sup>819</sup> convertibiliter describere] unius unica descriptio illum suum Y

<sup>c</sup> sicut unus - describere patrem] Variants: Sicut unus puer bene scit quod mater matris suae vocatur Barta et 'pater' suus Octo non tamen convertibiliter sciret describere patrem V | sicut unus puer 'pater' vocans virum matris suae ex communi modo loquendi non tamen sciens convertibiliter describere patrem W | sicut puer qui virum matris suae vocat vel vocare debet ex usu loquendi patrem non scit tamen convertibiliter describere patrem M | sicut unus puer qui virum matris volens vocare diceret ex usu loquendi 'pater' non tamen sciat unius unica descriptio illum suum patrem Y

<sup>820</sup> convertibiliter M

<sup>821</sup> et talem - data] *om.* V, et talem descriptionem manifestat definienda Y, talem convertibilem descriptionem manifestat quaedam descriptio W

<sup>822</sup> formam VWY

<sup>823</sup> argumenti V

<sup>824</sup> praecognoscere Y

<sup>825</sup> quid nominis] *ante* praecognoscere MY

<sup>826</sup> quando - et] *om.* W

<sup>827</sup> *add.* tunc M

<sup>828</sup> *om.* W

<sup>829</sup> autem Y, *add.* illud W

quomodo<sup>830</sup> definitiones deberent notificare,<sup>831</sup> nego istud,<sup>832</sup> quia definitiones non solum<sup>833</sup> notificant<sup>834</sup> quid nominis, sed convertibiliter quid nomen significat exprimunt et ostendunt,<sup>835</sup> et hoc non oportet praescire.<sup>836</sup> Quod autem<sup>837</sup> ista<sup>838</sup> sint<sup>839</sup> bene dicta<sup>840</sup> consonatur sive concordatur<sup>841</sup> auctoribus.<sup>842</sup> Patet insipiendo<sup>843</sup> dicta<sup>844</sup> Petri Hispani in principio suarum<sup>845</sup> *Summularum*, in<sup>846</sup> capitulo de propositione, ubi definiens<sup>847</sup> propositionem categoricam<sup>848</sup> totaliter per<sup>849</sup> istum<sup>850</sup> modum procedit.<sup>851</sup> Dicit enim<sup>852</sup> quod propositio<sup>853</sup> est oratio habens subiectum et<sup>854</sup> praedicatum et copulam principales partes sui; et describens<sup>855</sup> subiectum dicit<sup>856</sup> quod ipsum<sup>857</sup> est de quo alterum dicitur, scilicet praedicatum.<sup>858</sup> Et postea describens<sup>859</sup> [W 104v] praedicatum dicit<sup>860</sup> quod ipsum<sup>861</sup> est quod dicitur de alio,<sup>862</sup> scilicet de<sup>863</sup> subiecto. Contra quas definitiones Petri Hispani<sup>864</sup> nec<sup>865</sup> plus nec minus possent<sup>866</sup> fieri instantiae iam factae.<sup>867</sup>

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<sup>830</sup> quod W, id quod M

<sup>831</sup> deberent notificare] notificarent M

<sup>832</sup> illud M

<sup>833</sup> *post* notificant Y

<sup>834</sup> *om.* M

<sup>835</sup> exprimunt et ostendunt] *om.* VWY

<sup>836</sup> praesciri V, scire M

<sup>837</sup> tamen V

<sup>838</sup> illa V

<sup>839</sup> *om.* M

<sup>840</sup> data W, dantur *add.* et M

<sup>841</sup> consonatur - concordatur] et consonantia et concordantia W, consonant seu concordant M | ista - concordatur] dicta haec bene sunt posita quod ipsa consonant auctoribus Y

<sup>842</sup> *add.* hoc Y

<sup>843</sup> insipa V

<sup>844</sup> *vel forsitan* circa V, *om.* M

<sup>845</sup> *om.* MV

<sup>846</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>847</sup> definitiones V

<sup>848</sup> ubi - categorica] quia definitionem propositionis tractam Y | propositionem categoricam] propositionum categoricarum V

<sup>849</sup> *om.* W

<sup>850</sup> unum V

<sup>851</sup> per circulariter Y, procedendi M

<sup>852</sup> dicit enim] dicens V

<sup>853</sup> *om.* V, *s. lin. ante* est W, *add.* categorica V

<sup>854</sup> *om.* W

<sup>855</sup> definiens V

<sup>856</sup> dicens M

<sup>857</sup> quod ipsum] subiectum M

<sup>858</sup> scilicet praedicatum] *om.* Y

<sup>859</sup> describit W, definiens V

<sup>860</sup> dicens W

<sup>861</sup> quod ipsum] praedicatum M

<sup>862</sup> quod dicitur de alio] de quo alio dicitur M

<sup>863</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>864</sup> Petri Hispani] Petrus Hispanus *add.* definiens W

Unde oportet quod ipsae nihil concludunt contra definitiones positas. Et<sup>868</sup> tamen istae<sup>869</sup> eadem [M 28<sup>v</sup>] fieri possunt contra valentes auctores, [Y 71<sup>v</sup>] ut puta contra<sup>870</sup> Porphyrium et Petrum Hispanum. <1.2> Ad secundam rationem,<sup>871</sup> quando dicitur quod communiter alii aliter definiunt consequentiam, conceditur ista,<sup>872</sup> et quando dicitur quod<sup>873</sup> unius definibilis<sup>874</sup> una sola debeat esse definitio, verum est essentialis, sed<sup>875</sup> bene possunt esse plures definitiones quid nominis eiusdem<sup>876</sup> definibilis.<sup>877</sup> Modo<sup>878</sup> iste terminus 'consequentia' non definitur definitione essentialis, cum sit terminus connotativus et accidentalis,<sup>879</sup> sed solum<sup>880</sup> definitione quid nominis. Et ideo<sup>881</sup> non est inconueniens ipsius<sup>882</sup> esse plures<sup>883</sup> definitiones bonas quid nominis. Et ideo licet<sup>884</sup> definitiones aliorum<sup>885</sup> magistrorum de hoc nomine 'consequentia' sint [V 84<sup>vb</sup>] bonae, non tamen<sup>886</sup> sequitur quod praedicta sint<sup>887</sup> mala, sed<sup>888</sup> ista<sup>889</sup> pertinent<sup>890</sup> ad superiorem<sup>891</sup> scientiam, scilicet ad<sup>892</sup> primam philosophiam.<sup>893</sup> Et ideo de hoc nihil plus dicitur<sup>894</sup> ad praesens.

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<sup>865</sup> non VY

<sup>866</sup> possunt *post* fieri Y

<sup>867</sup> *add.* quamvis nihil concluderent etc. V | iam factae] quam factae sunt M

<sup>868</sup> cum M

<sup>869</sup> ipsae *add.* vel sibi similes positae M

<sup>870</sup> sicut M

<sup>871</sup> *om.* M

<sup>872</sup> *om.* M

<sup>873</sup> *om.* M

<sup>874</sup> definitum M

<sup>875</sup> *om.* M

<sup>876</sup> *om.* M

<sup>877</sup> definiti M

<sup>878</sup> nam M

<sup>879</sup> non essentialis M

<sup>880</sup> *add.* definitur W

<sup>881</sup> ita M

<sup>882</sup> eiusdem *ante* bona M

<sup>883</sup> *ante* esse M

<sup>884</sup> *om.* M

<sup>885</sup> auctorum M

<sup>886</sup> *om.* M

<sup>887</sup> sit W, *post* mala M

<sup>888</sup> *om.* M

<sup>889</sup> id M

<sup>890</sup> pertinet MW

<sup>891</sup> maiorem M

<sup>892</sup> *add.* ipsam W

<sup>893</sup> *ante* primam M

<sup>894</sup> plus diceretur] *om.* M



<2> Ad secundam dubitationem, quando quaeritur utrum consequentia mala sit consequentia, respondeo iudicio meo quod<sup>895</sup> non.<sup>896</sup>

Et<sup>897</sup> ratio potest assignari duplex, quia<sup>898</sup> sicut se habet homo pictus ad hominem, ita videtur se habere consequentiam malam ad consequentiam. Sed constat hominem pictum non esse hominem, igitur consequentia mala non est consequentia. Consequentia est nota,<sup>899</sup> et prima pars antecedentis videtur patere ex eo quia sicut similitudinarie homo pictus hoc nomine 'homo' significatur et non proprie,<sup>900</sup> ita videtur de consequentia mala, quae similitudinarie et improprie<sup>901</sup> vocatur<sup>902</sup> hoc nomine 'consequentia'. Quod sic<sup>903</sup> potest persuaderi, quia ad consequentiam proprie dictam requiritur illatio necessaria, modo |Y 72r|<sup>904</sup> in consequentia mala non est illatio necessaria<sup>905</sup> sicut in consequentia bona, ergo solum similitudinarie et ordinarie ad consequentiam bonam consequentiam malam nominatur consequentia.<sup>906</sup> Consequentia nota est de se.<sup>907</sup> Antecedens pro prima parte notum.<sup>908</sup> Non enim esset consequentia nisi esset illatio.<sup>909</sup> Pro secunda parte patet, quia in consequentia mala consequens non infertur ex antecedente sicut in consequentia bona.<sup>910</sup>

Secunda ratio sumitur ex communi modo loquendi, nam communiter<sup>911</sup> |W 105r| quando aliqua mala consequentia<sup>912</sup> proponitur,<sup>913</sup> dicitur<sup>914</sup> |M 29r| quod non sequitur<sup>915</sup> et si non sequitur iuxta communem modum dicendi,<sup>916</sup> tunc<sup>917</sup> non est<sup>918</sup> consequentia. Ergo apparet quod consequentia mala non est consequentia.

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<sup>895</sup> *ante* iudicio VWY

<sup>896</sup> *add.* +minus+ W

<sup>897</sup> *om.* M

<sup>898</sup> duplex quia] dupliciter primo M

<sup>899</sup> *add.* de se W

<sup>900</sup> et non proprie] tamen est homo W

<sup>901</sup> et improprie] in propositione W

<sup>902</sup> *add.* seu nominatur W

<sup>903</sup> aliter W

<sup>904</sup> *add.* modo Y

<sup>905</sup> modo - necessaria] *om.* W

<sup>906</sup> ista W

<sup>907</sup> de se] *om.* M

<sup>908</sup> *add.* est de se M

<sup>909</sup> non enim - illatio] nisi enim esset illatio necessaria non esset consequentia M

<sup>910</sup> *add.* sed secundae *lectio dubia* probationis principalis non est de se sed M

<sup>911</sup> nam communiter] *om.* M

<sup>912</sup> aliqua mala consequentia] consequentia aliqua M

<sup>913</sup> *add.* in qua sequitur consequens M

<sup>914</sup> dicimus M

<sup>915</sup> non sequitur] illa non consequentia M

<sup>916</sup> iuxta - dicendi] ex communem modo loquendi M

<2.1> Ad primam rationem probantem consequentiam malam esse consequentiam,<sup>919</sup> quando dicitur quod in consequentia mala est antecedens et consequens et nota illationis, hoc negatur, quia nihil vocatur proprie<sup>920</sup> consequentia nisi oratio in qua est habitudo necessaria consequentis ex antecedente. Ita nihil vocatur antecedens proprie nisi propositio ex qua<sup>921</sup> per notam illationis infertur consequens necessaria illatione. Ad probationem antecedentis, quando dicitur quod<sup>922</sup> in ista oratione 'homo currit, igitur asinus currit', 'homo currit' est antecedens et 'asinus currit' est consequens, negatur hoc; sicut enim ista oratio non est consequentia,<sup>923</sup> ita nec ista oratio 'asinus currit'<sup>924</sup> est consequens.

<2.2> Ad secundam<sup>925</sup> rationem,<sup>926</sup> quando dicitur quod communis fama habet, quando<sup>927</sup> proponitur<sup>928</sup> consequentia quae non est bona vel quam negant respondentes,<sup>929</sup> quod consequentia est mala,<sup>930</sup> hoc<sup>931</sup> conceditur. Et quando dicitur quod in hoc innuitur quod sit consequentia,<sup>932</sup> hoc<sup>933</sup> negatur, nam respectu huius<sup>934</sup> [Y 72<sup>v</sup>] additur *ly mala et*<sup>935</sup> est dictio<sup>936</sup> *distrahens*<sup>937</sup> a suo principali significato, sicut [V 85<sup>ra</sup>] satis est dictum ante, nam iste terminus 'consequentia' connotat necessariam illationem unius propositionis ex alia. Oppositum huius illationis necessariae connotat 'consequentia

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<sup>917</sup> *add. dicimus quod illa M*

<sup>918</sup> *om. M*

<sup>919</sup> *probantem - esse consequentiam] om. M*

<sup>920</sup> *om. M*

<sup>921</sup> *ex qua] om. W*

<sup>922</sup> *add. +ista+ W*

<sup>923</sup> *add. +nec+ W*

<sup>924</sup> *asinus currit om. W*

<sup>925</sup> *aliam MV*

<sup>926</sup> *om. VW*

<sup>927</sup> *quod VY*

<sup>928</sup> *proposita V*

<sup>929</sup> *habet - respondentes] tenet quod proposita consequentia non est bona respondetur W*

<sup>930</sup> *add. hoc W*

<sup>931</sup> *om. W*

<sup>932</sup> *add. hoc W*

<sup>933</sup> *om. W*

<sup>934</sup> *illius W*

<sup>935</sup> *additur - et] quod est consequentia haec dictio mala seu additio V | nam respectu - et] non iam huius quod est consequentia haec dictio mala est dictio distrahens Y*

<sup>936</sup> *dictum W*

<sup>937</sup> *nam respectu - distrahens] et ratio huius est *ly malum additum ly consequentia est determinatio distrahens* *distrahit enim istum terminum consequentia W**

mala',<sup>938</sup> nam non est aliud dicere consequentiam esse malam quam illationem consequentis ex antecedentem non esse necessariam.

<2.3> Ad tertiam rationem,<sup>939</sup> quando dicitur:<sup>940</sup> "sequitur quod aliqua esset<sup>941</sup> propositio quae nec esset<sup>942</sup> categorica nec hypothetica", negatur ista.<sup>943</sup> Ad probationem,<sup>944</sup> quando dicitur: "capiatur una conditionalis falsa, ut haec: 'si deus est, baculus stat in angulo'", placet mihi; et quando quaeritur<sup>945</sup> utrum sit conditionalis vel non, dico quod est conditionalis capiendo 'conditionalem' large, sed non est conditionalis capiendo 'conditionalem' stricte et proprie. Ad improbationem, quando dicitur "si est conditionalis, tunc est consequentia" verum est si esset<sup>946</sup> [M 29<sup>v</sup>] conditionalis proprie dicta, sed non oportet ita esse si sit conditionalis communiter dicta. Unde proprie non dicitur aliqua propositio conditionalis nisi sit conditionalis vera.

Petrus Hispanus dicens propositionem conditionalem esse unam de sex speciebus propositionis hypotheticae et dividens eam in conditionalem veram et falsam solum intelligit hoc de conditionalibus<sup>947</sup> communiter acceptis,<sup>948</sup> et non oportet omnem talem esse consequentiam.<sup>949</sup>

<3> Ad tertiam<sup>950</sup> | W105<sup>v</sup>| dubitationem quando dicitur:<sup>951</sup> quid sit<sup>952</sup> consequentia bona,<sup>953</sup> solvi potest uno modo ex praedictis. Alio modo dicendum<sup>954</sup> quod est idem quod consequentia, et e converso consequentia<sup>955</sup> idem quod consequentia bona ut<sup>956</sup> tamen ante<sup>957</sup> ostensum fuit.<sup>958</sup>

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<sup>938</sup> *om.* W | oppositum - mala] nulla enim illatio necessaria significatur in consequentia mala etiam ille terminus malum oppositum huius illationis necessariae connotat M

<sup>939</sup> *om.* MVW

<sup>940</sup> *add.* quod V

<sup>941</sup> est V

<sup>942</sup> est V

<sup>943</sup> illud V, illa M

<sup>944</sup> *add.* eius W

<sup>945</sup> petitur W

<sup>946</sup> est W

<sup>947</sup> conditionalis M

<sup>948</sup> accepta M

<sup>949</sup> et non oportet - consequentiam] *om.* M

<sup>950</sup> secundam M

<sup>951</sup> quando dicitur] quae est W, quaeritur M

<sup>952</sup> quid sit] quomodo M

<sup>953</sup> *add.* debeat definiri M

<sup>954</sup> alio modo dicendum] *om.* V

<sup>955</sup> *add.* +bona+ W

<sup>956</sup> et V

Sed secundum istam rationem <sup>959</sup> statim <sup>960</sup> surgit <sup>961</sup> dubitatio, utrum omnis propositio quae praecedit<sup>962</sup> notam illationis, ut<sup>963</sup> 'ergo', sit antecedens, vel aliqua talis |Y 73r| sic<sup>964</sup> et<sup>965</sup> aliqua non. Si dicatur primum, tunc statim sequeretur <sup>966</sup> consequentiam malam habere antecedens et per consequens consequentiam malam esse consequentiam - quod est contra dicta. Si dicatur secundum, tunc statim <sup>967</sup> dubitaretur <sup>968</sup> quando <sup>969</sup> propositio praecedens hunc terminum 'ergo' debeat <sup>970</sup> reputari<sup>971</sup> antecedens et quando<sup>972</sup> non, et quomodo debeat<sup>973</sup> hoc<sup>974</sup> cognosci. Si autem<sup>975</sup> aliquis diceret<sup>976</sup> quod antecedens esset<sup>977</sup> propositio<sup>978</sup> praecedens<sup>979</sup> hunc terminum<sup>980</sup> 'ergo'<sup>981</sup> vel huic<sup>982</sup> coniunctioni<sup>983</sup> aequivalentem;<sup>984</sup> respondetur<sup>985</sup> quod<sup>986</sup> numquam,<sup>987</sup> nisi, minus grosse capiendo<sup>988</sup> 'consequentiam', bonam esse consequentiam<sup>989</sup> notificaret - quia<sup>990</sup> consequentiam bonam describeret per hoc quod est oratio habens antecedens et consequens etc.<sup>991</sup> et describeret antecedens<sup>992</sup> quod est

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<sup>957</sup> certum W

<sup>958</sup> est *add.* quid sit consequentia patet ergo faciliter quid sit consequentia bona V

<sup>959</sup> solutionem M

<sup>960</sup> iterim *post* surgit V

<sup>961</sup> surgeret M

<sup>962</sup> praecederet *add.* hanc V

<sup>963</sup> *om.* V

<sup>964</sup> *om.* W

<sup>965</sup> sic et] *om.* V

<sup>966</sup> sequitur W

<sup>967</sup> *om.* W

<sup>968</sup> dubitatur W

<sup>969</sup> quae W

<sup>970</sup> debet VW

<sup>971</sup> putari V

<sup>972</sup> quae W

<sup>973</sup> debet W

<sup>974</sup> *ante* debeat W

<sup>975</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>976</sup> aliquis diceret] autem dices W, secundo dicatur W

<sup>977</sup> est MW

<sup>978</sup> *add.* in consequentia bona M

<sup>979</sup> quae praecedit W

<sup>980</sup> hunc terminum] hanc notam M

<sup>981</sup> igitur Y, *add.* in consequentia V, in consequentia bona W

<sup>982</sup> huius V

<sup>983</sup> coniunctionem Y

<sup>984</sup> aequivalens *add.* nihil V | huic coniunctioni aequivalentem] conceptum aequivalentem illae M

<sup>985</sup> nihil respondes W

<sup>986</sup> quia MW

<sup>987</sup> quia numquam *om.* V

<sup>988</sup> numquam - capiendo] minus grosse W

<sup>989</sup> esse consequentiam] *om.* VY | bonam esse consequentiam] *om.* M

<sup>990</sup> eo quod M

<sup>991</sup> *om.* W

propositio quae<sup>993</sup> praecedit li<sup>994</sup> ergo in consequentia bona.<sup>995</sup> Et istae<sup>996</sup> notificationes<sup>997</sup> et declarationes<sup>998</sup> essent grossae et circulares, et ut mihi videtur illud non sufficeret.<sup>999</sup>

Et ob hanc causam respondetur ad argumentum seu dubitationem quod aliqua propositio quae praecedit hunc terminum 'ergo' vel aliquam coniunctionem aequivalentem sibi, est antecedens et aliqua non. Et quando [V 85<sup>rb</sup>] petitur quomodo debeat cognosci, quando aliqua<sup>1000</sup> propositio est antecedens et quando<sup>1001</sup> non, dicitur quod hoc debet considerari penes<sup>1002</sup> illationem: si enim illatio fuerit necessaria, tunc talis propositio<sup>1003</sup> est antecedens; si autem illatio non fuerit<sup>1004</sup> necessaria,<sup>1005</sup> tunc talis propositio [M 30<sup>r</sup>] non dicitur antecedens.

<De illatione necessaria>

Sed fortior tunc oritur dubitatio inter omnes, et est<sup>1006</sup> quomodo debeat cognosci quando illatio est necessaria et quando non.<sup>1007</sup> Ad quam multi diversimode tamen respondent; eligatur aliqua pars melius sibi placens.

Credo enim quod non sit<sup>1008</sup> faciliter exprimibile, quando illatio est necessaria, et quando non. Sed tamen unam opinionem eligam quae poterit probabiliter sustineri.

<1> Primo enim<sup>1009</sup> ad illam<sup>1010</sup> dubitationem dicunt aliqui quod tunc<sup>1011</sup> illatio est necessaria quando antecedens,<sup>1012</sup> retenta significatione terminorum, non potest esse verum nisi consequens sit

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<sup>992</sup> *add. sic vel forsitan sit M*

<sup>993</sup> *propositio quae] quod M*

<sup>994</sup> *hanc notam M*

<sup>995</sup> *consequentia bona] ante praecedit M*

<sup>996</sup> *illae add. autem essent M*

<sup>997</sup> *ante grossae M*

<sup>998</sup> *et declarationes] om. M*

<sup>999</sup> *et ut - sufficeret] minus sufficientes M*

<sup>1000</sup> *ista W*

<sup>1001</sup> *add. +dicta+ W*

<sup>1002</sup> *per M*

<sup>1003</sup> *om. M*

<sup>1004</sup> *add. bona vel MW*

<sup>1005</sup> *add. non esset M*

<sup>1006</sup> *add. quod W*

<sup>1007</sup> *add. est necessaria W*

<sup>1008</sup> *est W*

<sup>1009</sup> *ergo W*

<sup>1010</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1011</sup> *om. W*

verum,<sup>1013</sup> supposito quod ipsum<sup>1014</sup> sit. Et isti<sup>1015</sup> possunt moneri a dicto<sup>1016</sup> Petri Hispani in primo<sup>1017</sup> suarum *Summularum* tractatu<sup>1018</sup> [W 106v] capitulo <decimo>septimo<sup>1019</sup> de propositione hypothetica, ubi dicit conditionalem esse veram, cuius antecedens non potest esse [Y 73v] verum sine<sup>1020</sup> consequente. Modo dictum est quod consequentia bona aequivalet<sup>1021</sup> conditionali, et e converso conditionalis vera aequivalet consequentiae bonae, quia<sup>1022</sup> omnis conditionalis vera est consequentia<sup>1023</sup> necessaria. Et ideo pariter<sup>1024</sup> sicut dicitur de conditionali vera, ita<sup>1025</sup> debetur<sup>1026</sup> dicere<sup>1027</sup> de consequentia bona<sup>1028</sup> quia<sup>1029</sup> consequentia bona<sup>1030</sup> est<sup>1031</sup> cuius antecedens non potest esse verum nisi consequens sit verum supposito quod ipsum sit<sup>1032</sup> - eodem modo quod dictum est supra.<sup>1033</sup>

Sed istud dictum non valet; declaratur sic: nam, si sic deberet describi illatio necessaria, tunc sequeretur quod ista<sup>1034</sup> esset bona consequentia: 'omnis propositio est negativa, ergo Deus non est'. Consequens est falsum, et consequentia est<sup>1035</sup> bona, ergo ista descriptio consequentiae bonae seu illationis necessariae non valet.<sup>1036</sup> Ultima consequentia est nota; et quod primae consequentiae

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<sup>1012</sup> *post* terminorum V

<sup>1013</sup> sit verum] *om.* V

<sup>1014</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1015</sup> ista W

<sup>1016</sup> *add.* ex dictione W

<sup>1017</sup> prima parte V

<sup>1018</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1019</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>1020</sup> *om.* M

<sup>1021</sup> *add.* uni W

<sup>1022</sup> conditionalis vera - bonae quia] vel saltem quod unum eorum includit aliud tunc Y | vel saltem unum illorum includit alterum unde M

<sup>1023</sup> *post* necessaria M

<sup>1024</sup> *om.* M

<sup>1025</sup> *om.* Y | vera ita] eodem modo M

<sup>1026</sup> *om.* M, *add. lectio dubia* videre W

<sup>1027</sup> dicitur M | debetur dicere] videtur dicere debere Y

<sup>1028</sup> de consequentia bona] *om.* WY

<sup>1029</sup> del Y, quod W

<sup>1030</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1031</sup> conditionalis vera aequivalet - consequentia bona] *om.* V

<sup>1032</sup> cuius antecedens - ipsum sit] *om.* V, cuius antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente M, quod consequentia bona est eius antecedens et consequens non potest esse verum etc. *post* dictum est Y

<sup>1033</sup> *om.* V, quod consequentia bona est eius antecedens et consequens non potest esse verum etc. Y | eodem - supra] *om.* W

<sup>1034</sup> sequeretur quod ista] haec VY

<sup>1035</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1036</sup> valuit V

consequens sit falsum, patet, quia haec propositio 'omnis propositio est negativa', est mere probabilis,<sup>1037</sup> et ista 'Deus non est' est<sup>1038</sup> impossibilis.

Si autem essent solum tres<sup>1039</sup> propositiones negativae et nullae aliae propositiones,<sup>1040</sup> tunc ita<sup>1041</sup> esset sicut per istam<sup>1042</sup> 'omnis propositio est negativa' significaretur<sup>1043</sup> igitur<sup>1044</sup> ipsa est mere possibilis.<sup>1045</sup> Sed quod ista sit<sup>1046</sup> impossibilis 'Deus non est' non oportet probari; quod autem<sup>1047</sup> consequentia sit bona, demonstratur<sup>1048</sup> faciliter, quia haec propositio 'omnis propositio est negativa' retenta significatione terminorum<sup>1049</sup> non<sup>1050</sup> potest esse vera, nisi<sup>1051</sup> 'Deus non est' [M 30<sup>v</sup>] sit vera.<sup>1052</sup> Ergo illatio est necessaria per definitionem necessariae illationis, et antecedens declaratur quia haec propositio 'omnis propositio est negativa' non potest esse vera. Probatur hoc, quia non est vera quando est, quia tunc est aliqua propositio affirmativa, ergo tunc falsum esset dicere quod omnis propositio est negativa, nec quando ipsa non est, quia quod non est<sup>1053</sup> non est verum. Ergo<sup>1054</sup> non potest esse vera, igitur nullo modo potest esse vera nisi<sup>1055</sup> ista 'Deus non est' sit vera. Sic apparet quod dicta definitio non valeret<sup>1056</sup> salva [V 85<sup>va</sup>] correctione ponentium; ad ipsum<sup>1057</sup> Petrum Hispanum quid sit<sup>1058</sup> dicendum patet in solutionibus.

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<sup>1037</sup> *fortasse* possibilis

<sup>1038</sup> *add.* mere W

<sup>1039</sup> duae M

<sup>1040</sup> negativae - propositiones] verae et negativae W

<sup>1041</sup> sicut M

<sup>1042</sup> *add.* propositionem M

<sup>1043</sup> *ante* omnis M, *add.* et M

<sup>1044</sup> ergo M

<sup>1045</sup> de +praesenti+ possibili M

<sup>1046</sup> est M

<sup>1047</sup> quod autem] sed quod W

<sup>1048</sup> declaratur M

<sup>1049</sup> *add.* eadem M

<sup>1050</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1051</sup> *add.* ista M

<sup>1052</sup> sit vera] *ante* deus M

<sup>1053</sup> quia quod non est] *om.* W

<sup>1054</sup> *add.* ista W

<sup>1055</sup> nullo - nisi] *om.* W

<sup>1056</sup> valui W

<sup>1057</sup> ad ipsum] quid ad W

<sup>1058</sup> *om.* W

<2> Alii dicunt quod consequentia bona et necessaria illatio sit quando ex opposito<sup>1059</sup> consequentis infertur oppositum<sup>1060</sup> antecedentis, ut in ista: 'homo currit, ergo animal currit'. Sequitur enim 'nullum animal currit, igitur nullus homo currit'. Etiam istud patet per Philosophum<sup>1061</sup> in *Primo Priorum*, et<sup>1062</sup> est simpliciter [Y 74r] verum. | W106v|

Sed tamen videtur mihi quod definiendo<sup>1063</sup> sic<sup>1064</sup> sit minus bene posita.<sup>1065</sup> Causa est quia ipsi describunt idem per idem. Dicunt enim consequentiam bonam et<sup>1066</sup> illationem necessariam<sup>1067</sup> esse<sup>1068</sup> ubi ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis, vel ergo<sup>1069</sup> intelligunt de illatione bona<sup>1070</sup> vel illatione<sup>1071</sup> mala. Si dicatur quod<sup>1072</sup> de bona illatione<sup>1073</sup> tunc ita notum esset definitum sicut definitio<sup>1074</sup> et e converso. Nisi enim quis<sup>1075</sup> sciret quid<sup>1076</sup> esset consequentia bona, quomodo ipse scire posset quando esset<sup>1077</sup> necessaria illatio<sup>1078</sup> consequentis ex antecedente? Manifestum est quod nullo modo,<sup>1079</sup> et ratio apparet quia si sic intelligitur quod<sup>1080</sup> illatio bona seu necessaria est ubi<sup>1081</sup> ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis, est vera petitio principii, quia<sup>1082</sup> idem notificatur per idem.<sup>1083</sup> Si autem dicatur quod ipsi<sup>1084</sup> intelligunt<sup>1085</sup> de<sup>1086</sup>

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<sup>1059</sup> *add. lectio dubia* contra W

<sup>1060</sup> *add. ex oppositum alterius scilicet* W

<sup>1061</sup> per Philosophum] *om.* W

<sup>1062</sup> *add. illud dictum* W

<sup>1063</sup> dicendo VWY

<sup>1064</sup> *om.* M

<sup>1065</sup> *diminute dictum*] VWY

<sup>1066</sup> sive M

<sup>1067</sup> et illationem necessariam] *om.* W

<sup>1068</sup> *ante* bonam M

<sup>1069</sup> enim M

<sup>1070</sup> *ante* illatione M

<sup>1071</sup> de M

<sup>1072</sup> dicatur quod] *om.* M

<sup>1073</sup> quod - illationem] secundum W

<sup>1074</sup> notum - definitio] *lectio dubia* unde *lectio dubia* circa est definitio sicut definitum M

<sup>1075</sup> aliquis W, *post* sciret M

<sup>1076</sup> quae M

<sup>1077</sup> quomodo - esset] seu M

<sup>1078</sup> *ante* necessaria M

<sup>1079</sup> *add. cognoscet* M

<sup>1080</sup> et ratio - intelligitur quod] quod bona illatione ex opposito consequentis infertur ex oppositum antecedentis ideo oportet sic dicere M

<sup>1081</sup> qua M

<sup>1082</sup> et W, quod M

<sup>1083</sup> per idem] *ante* notificatur M

<sup>1084</sup> *om.* M

<sup>1085</sup> intelligeretur M

<sup>1086</sup> *add. ipsa* W



illatione mala scilicet ubi<sup>1087</sup> oppositum antecedentis<sup>1088</sup> infertur ex opposito consequentis<sup>1089</sup> illatione mala, tunc sequeretur quod<sup>1090</sup> consequentia bona esset consequentia mala,<sup>1091</sup> quod tamen<sup>1092</sup> nullus dicit.<sup>1093</sup> Et ex isto<sup>1094</sup> patet quod<sup>1095</sup> dictum eorum<sup>1096</sup> non sufficit.<sup>1097</sup>

<3> Alii autem dicunt<sup>1098</sup> quod antecedens bonae consequentiae est propositio praeposita notae illationis vel<sup>1099</sup> sibi apposita<sup>1100</sup> sic se habens ad aliam<sup>1101</sup> quod [M 31r] impossibile est sic esse<sup>1102</sup> qualitercumque est significabile<sup>1103</sup> per eam, stante impositione terminorum, quin<sup>1104</sup> ita sit sicut qualitercumque significatur per consequens.

Et ista<sup>1105</sup> definitio antecedentis videtur esse<sup>1106</sup> magis<sup>1107</sup> exquisita et<sup>1108</sup> elaborata. Tamen salva correctione eam ponentium non sufficit, quia, si<sup>1109</sup> sic, sequeretur quod omnis consequentia mala esset consequentia bona, quod esset<sup>1110</sup> inconueniens.

Probatur consequentia, quia proponatur aliqua consequentia mala,<sup>1111</sup> ut<sup>1112</sup> 'homo currit, ergo asinus currit', et probatur ex ista<sup>1113</sup> definitione quod ista consequentia<sup>1114</sup> sit<sup>1115</sup> bona, quia impossibile

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1087 quod M  
1088 consequentis M  
1089 antecedentis M  
1090 sequeretur quod] *om.* M  
1091 bona - mala] mala esse consequentia bona M  
1092 *om.* M  
1093 diceret M  
1094 et ex isto] unde M  
1095 *add.* illud M  
1096 *add.* salva honestate eorum M  
1097 *add.* pro descriptione illationis necessariae tertium *lectio dubia* sec M  
1098 *add.* sic M  
1099 aut M  
1100 opposita W  
1101 *add.* i.e. ad consequens M  
1102 sic esse] *om.* V  
1103 est significabile] *post* eam V, significatur W  
1104 qui W  
1105 illa V  
1106 *om.* V  
1107 *add.* +exposita+ W  
1108 *om.* V  
1109 *om.* W  
1110 quod esset] hoc est W, hoc autem est V  
1111 *add.* pura V  
1112 illa V, *om.* M  
1113 illa V, *om.* M  
1114 ista consequentia] *om.* MV  
1115 est W

est<sup>1116</sup> qualitercumque est<sup>1117</sup> significabile<sup>1118</sup> per antecedens, stante impositione terminorum, sic esse<sup>1119</sup> quin ita sit sicut est significabile<sup>1120</sup> per consequens, ergo<sup>1121</sup> consequentia est<sup>1122</sup> bona per eos.

Antecedens probatur<sup>1123</sup> quia ista<sup>1124</sup> dictio<sup>1125</sup> 'significabile' [Y 74v] est ampliativa,<sup>1126</sup> et ideo sensus antecedentis<sup>1127</sup> est iste: <sup>1128</sup> 'impossibile est esse<sup>1129</sup> qualitercumque potest significari per<sup>1130</sup> antecedens<sup>1131</sup> etc.',<sup>1132</sup> modo istud manifeste est<sup>1133</sup> verum. Nam ponatur casus quod, stante significatione<sup>1134</sup> huius<sup>1135</sup> termini 'homo' quam iam habet,<sup>1136</sup> addatur sibi significatio 'asini', tunc manifestum est quod adhuc stat<sup>1137</sup> significatio termini quam a natura<sup>1138</sup> | W107r| habuit.<sup>1139</sup> Constat tamen<sup>1140</sup> quod impossibile est sic<sup>1141</sup> esse qualitercumque est significabile per antecedens, quin ita sit sicut significatur per consequens, nam in significatione antecedentis includitur significatio consequentis, et ita posset<sup>1142</sup> declarari<sup>1143</sup> de qualibet alia<sup>1144</sup> consequentia [V 85vb] mala.<sup>1145</sup>

Secundo sequitur<sup>1146</sup> quod haec consequentia esset bona 'omnis homo currit, ergo<sup>1147</sup> Sortes currit'.

Consequens<sup>1148</sup> est inconueniens, quia Sorte mortuo antecedens posset esse verum consequente

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<sup>1116</sup> *add.* ita esse WY

<sup>1117</sup> sit M

<sup>1118</sup> est significabile] significatur W

<sup>1119</sup> sic esse] *om.* Y

<sup>1120</sup> est significabile] significatur MW

<sup>1121</sup> igitur M

<sup>1122</sup> *ante* consequentia M

<sup>1123</sup> approbatur V, declaratur M

<sup>1124</sup> illa V

<sup>1125</sup> *add.* +significatur+ W

<sup>1126</sup> dictio affirmativa W

<sup>1127</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1128</sup> *om.* M

<sup>1129</sup> *om.* MV

<sup>1130</sup> significari per] significare M

<sup>1131</sup> per antecedens] *post* qualitercumque V

<sup>1132</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1133</sup> *ante* manifeste M

<sup>1134</sup> impositione M

<sup>1135</sup> istius W, illius M

<sup>1136</sup> *add.* quod W | quam iam habet] *om.* M

<sup>1137</sup> est W

<sup>1138</sup> a natura] antea W

<sup>1139</sup> habebat W, habeat V

<sup>1140</sup> enim W

<sup>1141</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1142</sup> potest W

<sup>1143</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1144</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1145</sup> declaratur V

<sup>1146</sup> sequeretur VW

existente falso, seu<sup>1149</sup> posset<sup>1150</sup> ita<sup>1151</sup> esse sicut significatur per antecedens<sup>1152</sup> sed tamen<sup>1153</sup> non  
 posset<sup>1154</sup> ita<sup>1155</sup> esse sicut significatur per consequens.<sup>1156</sup> Antecedens<sup>1157</sup> probatur: <sup>1158</sup> nam <sup>1159</sup>  
 ponatur quod Sortes iam sit,<sup>1160</sup> tunc manifestum est quod impossibile est esse<sup>1161</sup> qualitercumque  
 significatur<sup>1162</sup> per istam<sup>1163</sup> 'omnis homo currit', quin ita sit sicut per consequens significatur,<sup>1164</sup> nam  
 hic antecedens<sup>1165</sup> 'omnis<sup>1166</sup> homo currit' significat omnem hominem qui est<sup>1167</sup> currere, et ex  
 consequente<sup>1168</sup> significat<sup>1169</sup> Sortem currere, cum supponatur<sup>1170</sup> Sortem esse hominem qui est,<sup>1171</sup> et  
 ex consequente in <sup>1172</sup> significatione antecedentis includitur significatio consequentis. Et per  
 consequens impossibile est sic esse <sup>1173</sup> qualitercumque significatur per antecedens <sup>1174</sup> stante  
 impositione terminorum<sup>1175</sup> quin ita sit sicut significatur per consequens,<sup>1176</sup> quod fuit probandum.  
 Plures autem<sup>1177</sup> tales rationes<sup>1178</sup> possent<sup>1179</sup> fieri, de quibus gratia<sup>1180</sup> brevitatis supersedeo.<sup>1181</sup>

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1147 igitur M  
 1148 *om.* W  
 1149 antecedens posset - seu] *om.* MV  
 1150 potest *post* ita M  
 1151 *om.* W  
 1152 per antecedens] *om.* W  
 1153 *om.* W, *add.* tunc M  
 1154 potest M  
 1155 *om.* W, *ante* non M  
 1156 *add.* ergo etc. V, *add.* et M  
 1157 *om.* V, *post* probatur M  
 1158 *add.* assumptum V  
 1159 et WY  
 1160 *ante* iam V, *add.* homo M  
 1161 *om.* VWY  
 1162 *post* currit V  
 1163 per istam *add.* propositio] *ante* significatur M  
 1164 *add.* quod autem ita sit V, *add.* quod ita manifestum est M  
 1165 vero M | hic antecedens] haec propositio V  
 1166 hic antecedens omnis] haec oratio W  
 1167 qui est] *om.* W  
 1168 *add.* per illam V  
 1169 significatur *add.* et designatur V  
 1170 quia supponit V | suppositum sit M  
 1171 qui est] *om.* M  
 1172 ex W  
 1173 in significatione - sic esse] *om.* M  
 1174 eam M  
 1175 *add.* non potest esse M  
 1176 *add.* stante impositione terminorum V  
 1177 aliae M  
 1178 *ante* tales M  
 1179 possunt M  
 1180 causa M  
 1181 plures - supersedeo] *om.* V

<4> Sed ista<sup>1182</sup> definitio posset<sup>1183</sup> sic corrigi quod consequentia bona [M 31<sup>v</sup>] est oratio sic se habens quod impossibile est sic esse qualitercumque per antecedens<sup>1184</sup> secundum eius totalem significationem pro nunc significatur sic esse<sup>1185</sup> quin ita sit qualitercumque per consequens significatur secundum eius significatione pro nunc,<sup>1186</sup> et per consequens antecedens esset propositio sic se habens quod impossibile est esse qualitercumque per eam significatur pro nunc secundum eius totalem significationem, quin ita sit qualitercumque pro nunc<sup>1187</sup> per consequens significatur et secundum eius totalem significationem. [Y 75<sup>r</sup>]

Et secundum ista definitionem facile est solvere rationes.

Ad primam enim dicitur quod non valet ista consequentia quia<sup>1188</sup> infertur quod omnis consequentia mala esset<sup>1189</sup> consequentia.

Ad probationem, quando dicitur: "formetur<sup>1190</sup> talis consequentia 'homo currit, ergo asinus currit'" placet mihi; et quando dicitur quod impossibile est qualitercumque est significabile per antecedens stante impositione<sup>1191</sup> terminorum etc.<sup>1192</sup> concedo,<sup>1193</sup> cum hoc tamen stat quod possibile est qualitercumque pro nunc significatur per antecedens secundum eius totalem significationem sic<sup>1194</sup> esse licet non sit sicut per consequens<sup>1195</sup> significatur etc.<sup>1196</sup> Patet hoc, quia per antecedens secundum eius totalem significationem pro nunc significatur [W 107<sup>v</sup>] animal rationale currere, et sic potest esse, licet non esse ita quod asinus curreret, quod tamen per consequens significatur, et ideo non concludit ista ratio contra secundam definitionem.

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<sup>1182</sup> *om. M*

<sup>1183</sup> *ante definitio M*

<sup>1184</sup> *add. positum ante notam illationis W*

<sup>1185</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1186</sup> *post significatur V*

<sup>1187</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1188</sup> *hoc W, qua M*

<sup>1189</sup> *add. bona V*

<sup>1190</sup> *dicitur formetur] formaretur M*

<sup>1191</sup> *primaria significatione V*

<sup>1192</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1193</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1194</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1195</sup> *add. lectio dubia propositionis V*

<sup>1196</sup> *sic - etc.] om. W*

Ad secundam rationem,<sup>1197</sup> quando dicitur: "sequeretur quod haec consequentia esset bona 'omnis homo currit, ergo Sortes currit'", negatur consequentia. Ad probationem: quando dicitur quod<sup>1198</sup> impossibile est qualitercumque per antecedens significatur [V 86<sup>ra</sup>] etc., dicitur quod licet ita esset, tamen manifestum est quod<sup>1199</sup> possibile est quod<sup>1200</sup> qualitercumque per antecedens significatur<sup>1201</sup> penes<sup>1202</sup> eius<sup>1203</sup> totalem significationem sic esse, licet non ita sit<sup>1204</sup> sicut per consequens significatur. Et ratio est quia antecedens secundum eius totalem significationem non significat Sortem currere sed solum significat omnem hominem qui est<sup>1205</sup> currere. Modo manifestum est quod<sup>1206</sup> possibile est omne hominem currere, licet Sortem non currat, ut puta<sup>1207</sup> Sorte mortuo. Et ideo dicta<sup>1208</sup> ratio<sup>1209</sup> nihil<sup>1210</sup> concludit contra<sup>1211</sup> secundam definitionem.

Possibile enim est<sup>1212</sup> qualitercumque pro nunc<sup>1213</sup> secundum<sup>1214</sup> totalem significationem huius propositionis 'omnis homo currit' significatur sic<sup>1215</sup> esse, quamvis<sup>1216</sup> non ita<sup>1217</sup> sit<sup>1218</sup> sicut per hoc consequens 'Sortes currit'<sup>1219</sup> significatur,<sup>1220</sup> sicut statim declaratum<sup>1221</sup> est, et sic apparet quod rationes adductae contra definitionem istam<sup>1222</sup> nihil concludunt.<sup>1223</sup>

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<sup>1197</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1198</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1199</sup> manifestum est quod] adhuc W

<sup>1200</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1201</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1202</sup> secundum V

<sup>1203</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1204</sup> *ante ita V*

<sup>1205</sup> qui est] *om. W*

<sup>1206</sup> *add. +haec+ W*

<sup>1207</sup> *add. ipso V*

<sup>1208</sup> ista M | ideo dicta] *om. V*

<sup>1209</sup> *add. illa V*

<sup>1210</sup> non M

<sup>1211</sup> *add. dictam W*

<sup>1212</sup> *ante enim M, add. esse M*

<sup>1213</sup> *add. et V*

<sup>1214</sup> *add. eius VWY*

<sup>1215</sup> *add. scilicet V, om. M*

<sup>1216</sup> quod W, licet V

<sup>1217</sup> sic M

<sup>1218</sup> *ante ita V*

<sup>1219</sup> Sortes currit] *om. M*

<sup>1220</sup> *add. esse M*

<sup>1221</sup> statim declaratum] dictum W

<sup>1222</sup> secundam iam positam W | definitionem istam] istam secundam definitionem M

<sup>1223</sup> et sic apparet - concludunt] *om. V* [add. contra secundam definitionem possibile est omne *vel forsam* omnium contrarium prout secundum eius totalem significationem huius propositionis omnis homo currit significat sic esse *lectio dubia* posse *lectio dubia* licet non sit ita qualitercumque per hoc consequens Sortes currit significatur sicut statim declaratum est apparet quod rationes adductae contra istam definitionem secundam nihil concludunt Y

Sed adhuc<sup>1224</sup> alii<sup>1225</sup> mirabiliter impugnant<sup>1226</sup> istam<sup>1227</sup> secundam<sup>1228</sup> definitionem,<sup>1229</sup> et hoc<sup>1230</sup> sic, quia dicunt:<sup>1231</sup> "si ipsa<sup>1232</sup> esset bona,<sup>1233</sup> sequeretur<sup>1234</sup> |M 32r| quod<sup>1235</sup> ista<sup>1236</sup> consequentia esset bona: 'homo est et<sup>1237</sup> asinus est,<sup>1238</sup> ergo homo est asinus'". Istud<sup>1239</sup> consequens est simpliciter<sup>1240</sup> falsum. Probant |Y 75v| tamen consequentiam sic:<sup>1241</sup> vel hoc consequens 'homo est asinus' solum significat hominem esse et<sup>1242</sup> asinum esse<sup>1243</sup> vel, ultra ista duo,<sup>1244</sup> significat<sup>1245</sup> hominem<sup>1246</sup> esse asinum.

Si dicatur primum, tunc<sup>1247</sup> habetur<sup>1248</sup> propositum, quia<sup>1249</sup> antecedens et consequens precise<sup>1250</sup> significant idem. Sed<sup>1251</sup> si dicatur secundum, inconueniens est, quia 'hominem esse<sup>1252</sup> asinum'<sup>1253</sup> nihil est nec<sup>1254</sup> potest esse, et per consequens non potest significari.<sup>1255</sup> Consequentia videtur<sup>1256</sup> esse<sup>1257</sup> nota,<sup>1258</sup> et<sup>1259</sup> antecedens ipsi declarant,<sup>1260</sup> quia hominem esse asinum, si esset vel posset

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<sup>1224</sup> sunt V, om. M

<sup>1225</sup> add. qui adhuc V

<sup>1226</sup> repugnant repugnant V

<sup>1227</sup> illam V

<sup>1228</sup> om. W, post secundam M

<sup>1229</sup> alii - definitionem] sunt aliqui qui secundum istam definitionem mirabiliter opinantur W | add. et minus fortiter MV

<sup>1230</sup> om. M

<sup>1231</sup> om. M

<sup>1232</sup> ista M

<sup>1233</sup> add. definitio bonae consequentiae M

<sup>1234</sup> sequitur W

<sup>1235</sup> om. V

<sup>1236</sup> illa V

<sup>1237</sup> om. V

<sup>1238</sup> add. +homo+ V

<sup>1239</sup> om. M, illud V

<sup>1240</sup> manifeste V

<sup>1241</sup> add. quia V, quia M

<sup>1242</sup> om. W

<sup>1243</sup> om. W

<sup>1244</sup> ista duo] illud W, om. V

<sup>1245</sup> significant W

<sup>1246</sup> homo W

<sup>1247</sup> om. M

<sup>1248</sup> habentur V

<sup>1249</sup> add. tunc MV

<sup>1250</sup> om. V, post significant M

<sup>1251</sup> om. MW

<sup>1252</sup> add. ut Y

<sup>1253</sup> add. et M

<sup>1254</sup> nihil est nec] non V, et ut Y

<sup>1255</sup> significare M

<sup>1256</sup> manifestatur Y

<sup>1257</sup> om. V

esse,<sup>1261</sup> nihil<sup>1262</sup> posset<sup>1263</sup> esse aliud<sup>1264</sup> quam homo existens asinus, modo<sup>1265</sup> hoc est simpliciter<sup>1266</sup> impossibile quia<sup>1267</sup> homo<sup>1268</sup> non potest existere asinus; quod autem hominem esse asinum<sup>1269</sup> nihil aliud<sup>1270</sup> posset<sup>1271</sup> esse quam homo existens asinus patet, quia hominem esse<sup>1272</sup> currentem nihil aliud est<sup>1273</sup> quam homo existens currens,<sup>1274</sup> prout isti<sup>1275</sup> alibi <sup>1276</sup> determinate<sup>1277</sup> supponunt.

Tenendo definitionem priorem <sup>1278</sup> quidam respondunt <sup>1279</sup> ad argumentum quando dicitur: 'sequitur<sup>1280</sup> quod ista<sup>1281</sup> consequentia esset bona<sup>1282</sup> 'homo est et asinus est, ergo homo est asinus,' negando consequentiam. Et quando<sup>1283</sup> quaeritur<sup>1284</sup> ab eis, quid significet consequens plus quam antecedens, scilicet utrum solum significet<sup>1285</sup> hominem esse et asinum esse, dicunt quod non, sed significat [W 108r] solum<sup>1286</sup> hominem esse asinum. Et<sup>1287</sup> quando eis<sup>1288</sup> arguitur<sup>1289</sup> contra<sup>1290</sup> quod<sup>1291</sup> hominem esse asinum nihil est nec potest esse,<sup>1292</sup> negant.<sup>1293</sup> Dicunt enim<sup>1294</sup> quod est<sup>1295</sup> significabile complexe.<sup>1296</sup>

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<sup>1258</sup> esse nota] tenere M  
<sup>1259</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>1260</sup> ipsi declarant] quando adducitur sit Y  
<sup>1261</sup> vel posset esse] *om.* W, *add.* vel Y | si - esse] sic est vel potest M  
<sup>1262</sup> non VY  
<sup>1263</sup> potest Y  
<sup>1264</sup> *om.* W, *ante* posset esse M  
<sup>1265</sup> sed W  
<sup>1266</sup> totaliter M  
<sup>1267</sup> cum MW, tunc Y  
<sup>1268</sup> hoc M  
<sup>1269</sup> hominem esse asinum] *om.* V  
<sup>1270</sup> *om.* M | nihil aliud] vel Y  
<sup>1271</sup> potest WY  
<sup>1272</sup> existentem M  
<sup>1273</sup> aliud est] potest esse aliud Y, potest esse M  
<sup>1274</sup> cum - existens currens] homo nihil potest esse nisi quam currens W  
<sup>1275</sup> *add.* per W | illi *post* alibi V  
<sup>1276</sup> *add.* est declaratum VY  
<sup>1277</sup> *om.* VY  
<sup>1278</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>1279</sup> dicunt W  
<sup>1280</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>1281</sup> illa V  
<sup>1282</sup> *add.* omnis W  
<sup>1283</sup> inspiciendo V  
<sup>1284</sup> petitur W  
<sup>1285</sup> significat W  
<sup>1286</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1287</sup> sed Y  
<sup>1288</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1289</sup> eis arguitur] arguitur eis Y  
<sup>1290</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>1291</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>1292</sup> nec potest esse] *om.* MVW

Sed<sup>1297</sup> ista<sup>1298</sup> opinionem<sup>1299</sup> non<sup>1300</sup> credo esse<sup>1301</sup> veram nec sufficere.<sup>1302</sup> Et<sup>1303</sup> ideo ego<sup>1304</sup> aliter<sup>1305</sup> respondeo<sup>1306</sup> ad argumentum,<sup>1307</sup> quando dicitur quod illa<sup>1308</sup> consequentia esset bona 'homo est et asinum est, ergo<sup>1309</sup> homo est asinus',<sup>1310</sup> negatur<sup>1311</sup> consequentia.<sup>1312</sup>

Ad probationem<sup>1313</sup> quando dicitur:<sup>1314</sup> "vel<sup>1315</sup> consequens solum significat asinum esse et hominem esse",<sup>1316</sup> dico<sup>1317</sup> quod non. Immo secundum [V 86<sup>rb</sup>] huius<sup>1318</sup> totalem<sup>1319</sup> significationem nihil istorum<sup>1320</sup> significat<sup>1321</sup> sed significat proprie loquendo<sup>1322</sup> hominem esse asinum. Et quando dicitur<sup>1323</sup> hominem esse asinum nihil esse<sup>1324</sup> nec potest esse, conceditur; et quando infertur<sup>1325</sup> 'ergo<sup>1326</sup> non significatur',<sup>1327</sup> negatur consequentia.<sup>1328</sup> Nam<sup>1329</sup> sufficit [Y 76<sup>r</sup>] quod possit

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<sup>1293</sup> *add. hoc Y, add. et M*

<sup>1294</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>1295</sup> *post significabile Y*

<sup>1296</sup> *complexum W*

<sup>1297</sup> *add. nullam W*

<sup>1298</sup> *illa V, istarum W*

<sup>1299</sup> *opinionum W*

<sup>1300</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1301</sup> *fore W*

<sup>1302</sup> *om. W, sufficientem MY*

<sup>1303</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1304</sup> *om. WY*

<sup>1305</sup> *post respondeo MV*

<sup>1306</sup> *respondetur V*

<sup>1307</sup> *secundum V, add. aliter ad argumentum Y | ad argumentum] uno modo M*

<sup>1308</sup> *ita Y*

<sup>1309</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>1310</sup> *quando - asinus] om. M*

<sup>1311</sup> *negando M*

<sup>1312</sup> *quando dicitur - negatur consequentia] om. W | add. et V, add. praedictam M*

<sup>1313</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1314</sup> *arguitur M*

<sup>1315</sup> *om. M*

<sup>1316</sup> *asinum esse et hominem esse] hominem esse et asinum esse M*

<sup>1317</sup> *dicitur M*

<sup>1318</sup> *om. Y, eius M*

<sup>1319</sup> *talem Y*

<sup>1320</sup> *illorum M, horum V*

<sup>1321</sup> *ante nihil M, ante istorum Y*

<sup>1322</sup> *proprie loquendo] om. VWY*

<sup>1323</sup> *arguitur add. quod M*

<sup>1324</sup> *est M*

<sup>1325</sup> *quando infertur] om. VY*

<sup>1326</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>1327</sup> *ergo non significatur] post consequentia VY*

<sup>1328</sup> *vel consequens - negatur consequentia] quod ista consequentia esset bona 'homo est et asinus est ergo homo est asinus' negatur consequentia ergo non significat W | et quando infertur - negatur consequentia] negatur consequentia quod ergo nihil significat M*

<sup>1329</sup> *haec W*



imaginari.<sup>1330</sup> Non enim oportet significatum<sup>1331</sup> propositionis<sup>1332</sup> esse vel posse esse,<sup>1333</sup> sed sufficit quod<sup>1334</sup> possit<sup>1335</sup> imaginari<sup>1336</sup> esse. Intellectus<sup>1337</sup> enim extendit se<sup>1338</sup> ad imaginabilia.<sup>1339</sup> Quod autem<sup>1340</sup> possit imaginari<sup>1341</sup> 'hominem esse asinum'<sup>1342</sup> patet,<sup>1343</sup> quia<sup>1344</sup> si forma humana cum<sup>1345</sup> forma asinina<sup>1346</sup> [M 32<sup>v</sup>] imaginarentur simul in eadem materia, licet hoc naturaliter loquendo<sup>1347</sup> sit impossibile, tamen<sup>1348</sup> imaginabile est<sup>1349</sup> hominem esse asinum, nam forma humana dat esse hominem et<sup>1350</sup> forma asinina dat esse asinum. Et quemadmodum illud<sup>1351</sup> argumentum solutum est,<sup>1352</sup> ita<sup>1353</sup> possit<sup>1354</sup> solvi quodlibet simile per<sup>1355</sup> modum proportionalem quoniam<sup>1356</sup> multa<sup>1357</sup> alia similia<sup>1358</sup> supra istud fundamentum fundantur.<sup>1359</sup> Et sic<sup>1360</sup> apparet<sup>1361</sup> quomodo<sup>1362</sup> secundum praedictam<sup>1363</sup> consequentiae definitionem<sup>1364</sup> describeretur consequentia bona.<sup>1365</sup>

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<sup>1330</sup> *add.* esse M | quod possit imaginari] quod potest imaginari esse Y, *lectio dubia* imaginatum esse V

<sup>1331</sup> significationem V

<sup>1332</sup> termini MW, *om.* Y

<sup>1333</sup> *add.* semper V

<sup>1334</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1335</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>1336</sup> *add.* +posset+ possibile Y

<sup>1337</sup> intellecto V

<sup>1338</sup> *ante* extendit Y

<sup>1339</sup> *add.* sed M

<sup>1340</sup> *om.* M

<sup>1341</sup> possit imaginari] imaginari potest Y, potest imaginari M

<sup>1342</sup> hominem esse asinum] asinum esse hominem M

<sup>1343</sup> sic videtur peros\_\_\_\_ M

<sup>1344</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1345</sup> et MW

<sup>1346</sup> asini Y

<sup>1347</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1348</sup> tunc VWY

<sup>1349</sup> imaginabile est] imaginarentur VWY, *add.* et sic imaginando videtur imaginari M

<sup>1350</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1351</sup> istud M

<sup>1352</sup> *ante* solutum Y

<sup>1353</sup> et M

<sup>1354</sup> posset W, possibile Y

<sup>1355</sup> secundum M

<sup>1356</sup> quia M

<sup>1357</sup> multi V

<sup>1358</sup> alia similia] *om.* M, reputa esse falsa Y

<sup>1359</sup> fundatur MY

<sup>1360</sup> si M

<sup>1361</sup> *add.* quod Y

<sup>1362</sup> *add.* consequentia mala non est consequentia Y

<sup>1363</sup> primam M, prius dicta V

<sup>1364</sup> consequentiae definitionem] *om.* V, demonstrationem consequentiae M

<sup>1365</sup> et quemadmodum - consequentia bona] *om.* W | describeretur consequentia bona] *om.* Y, describeretur consequentiam veram M

<5> Alia solutio<sup>1366</sup> datur communis quod consequentia bona est consequentia cuius antecedens<sup>1367</sup> sic se habet quod impossibile est qualitercumque<sup>1368</sup> per ipsum<sup>1369</sup> significatur sic esse<sup>1370</sup> secundum eius totalem significationem pro nunc, quin ita sit qualitercumque per consequens<sup>1371</sup> significatur, secundum eius totalem significationem<sup>1372</sup> pro nunc,<sup>1373</sup> per<sup>1374</sup> ipsum<sup>1375</sup> nunc significatur.<sup>1376</sup> Et ista<sup>1377</sup> definitio<sup>1378</sup> consimiliter defendi potest et<sup>1379</sup> declarari<sup>1380</sup> sicut definitio consequentiae<sup>1381</sup> prius<sup>1382</sup> posita et haec de definitione consequentiae,<sup>1383</sup> sufficiant etc.<sup>1384</sup>

Sequitur de divisione consequentiae etc.

## I. 2 <De divisione consequentiae>

Restat nunc<sup>1385</sup> determinare de<sup>1386</sup> divisione<sup>1387</sup> consequentiae.<sup>1388</sup>

<1> Et est prima divisio<sup>1389</sup> consequentiae<sup>1390</sup> in consequentiam formalem et<sup>1391</sup> materialem.<sup>1392</sup>

Consequentia formalis est quae tenet in omnibus terminis et quibuscumque<sup>1393</sup> qualitercumque dispositis,<sup>1394</sup> retenta consimili<sup>1395</sup> forma propositionum.<sup>1396</sup> Exemplum ut<sup>1397</sup> talis<sup>1398</sup> syllogismus:

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<sup>1366</sup> definitio Y  
<sup>1367</sup> *add.* et consequens Y  
<sup>1368</sup> *add.* pro nunc +s+ *vel forsitan* +p+ nunc  
<sup>1369</sup> *add.* antecedens Y  
<sup>1370</sup> sic esse] *om.* W, *ante* quin Y | significatur sic esse] *ante* quin V  
<sup>1371</sup> *add.* eiusdem consequentiae Y  
<sup>1372</sup> secundum - significationem] *post* consequens V  
<sup>1373</sup> pro nunc] *om.* MW  
<sup>1374</sup> prout M  
<sup>1375</sup> eodem Y  
<sup>1376</sup> secundum eius - nunc significatur] *om.* W | per ipsum nunc significatur] *om.* V  
<sup>1377</sup> illa V  
<sup>1378</sup> *add.* potest MW  
<sup>1379</sup> defendi potest et] *om.* MW  
<sup>1380</sup> *add.* patet Y  
<sup>1381</sup> *om.* V, antecedentis Y  
<sup>1382</sup> primam Y  
<sup>1383</sup> dicta Y | *add.* antecedentis et consequentis M | haec - consequentis] et consequenter W  
<sup>1384</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1385</sup> iam V, *add.* dicere et W  
<sup>1386</sup> *add.* ei concedendae V, concedendae Y  
<sup>1387</sup> definitionem *post* consequentiae Y  
<sup>1388</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1389</sup> definitio Y  
<sup>1390</sup> eiusdem M, *add.* scilicet V, *add.* dividitur Y  
<sup>1391</sup> *add.* in consequentia V  
<sup>1392</sup> formalem et materialem] materialem et formalem Y  
<sup>1393</sup> et quibuscumque] *om.* MW, *post* dispositis Y, *lectio dubia* V

'omne quod est<sup>1399</sup> a est b,<sup>1400</sup> omne quod est<sup>1401</sup> c est a, ergo omne quod est<sup>1402</sup> c est b'.<sup>1403</sup> Forma autem consimilis<sup>1404</sup> propositionum est<sup>1405</sup> quando respectu eiusdem copulae propositiones sunt eiusdem qualitatis et quantitatis.<sup>1406</sup> Et<sup>1407</sup> dicitur<sup>1408</sup> notanter<sup>1409</sup> "respectu eiusdem copulae",<sup>1410</sup> quia si copula variatur<sup>1411</sup> - esto quod |Y 76v| maneret<sup>1412</sup> eadem |M 33r| qualitas et quantitas -, non<sup>1413</sup> maneret eadem forma, ut istae<sup>1414</sup> non sint<sup>1415</sup> eiusdem<sup>1416</sup> formae - sicut istae:<sup>1417</sup> 'Sortes potest esse' et 'Sortes est',<sup>1418</sup> sed istae<sup>1419</sup> 'nullus homo est asinus' et 'nullus deus<sup>1420</sup> est diabolus'<sup>1421</sup> sunt<sup>1422</sup> eiusdem formae,<sup>1423</sup> nam<sup>1424</sup> ibi<sup>1425</sup> est eadem quantitas et qualitas et eadem<sup>1426</sup> copula. Unde tria sunt<sup>1427</sup> in propositione se<sup>1428</sup> tenenda<sup>1429</sup> ex parte<sup>1430</sup> |W 108v| formae, puta<sup>1431</sup> ipsa<sup>1432</sup> copula, qualitas et quantitas.

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<sup>1394</sup> variatis V, addisparatis Y

<sup>1395</sup> retenta consimili] consimili retenta V

<sup>1396</sup> om. V

<sup>1397</sup> ante exemplum Y

<sup>1398</sup> om. Y

<sup>1399</sup> quod est] om. W

<sup>1400</sup> add. et Y

<sup>1401</sup> quod est] om. W

<sup>1402</sup> quod est] om. W, add. +b+ Y

<sup>1403</sup> add. et Y

<sup>1404</sup> similis V

<sup>1405</sup> dicitur MY

<sup>1406</sup> sunt eiusdem qualitatis et quantitatis] significant eadem qualitatem et quantitatem M | add. et consimilis situs terminorum W, add. et ordo terminorum M

<sup>1407</sup> om. MY

<sup>1408</sup> dico M

<sup>1409</sup> notabiliter M

<sup>1410</sup> add. propositionis M

<sup>1411</sup> variaretur MW, mutaret Y

<sup>1412</sup> esset V

<sup>1413</sup> add. autem Y

<sup>1414</sup> illae V

<sup>1415</sup> ut istae non sint] necnon W

<sup>1416</sup> lectio dubia V

<sup>1417</sup> om. V

<sup>1418</sup> add. +sor+ V

<sup>1419</sup> illae V

<sup>1420</sup> lapis W

<sup>1421</sup> animal W

<sup>1422</sup> sequitur W

<sup>1423</sup> sunt eiusdem formae] om. VY

<sup>1424</sup> om. MY

<sup>1425</sup> idem W, ubi MY

<sup>1426</sup> om. VY

<sup>1427</sup> om. V

<sup>1428</sup> om. W

<sup>1429</sup> lectio dubia Y, tendet V

<sup>1430</sup> ex parte] post propositione Y

<sup>1431</sup> scilicet Y

Consequentia materialis<sup>1433</sup> dicitur<sup>1434</sup> consequentia bona<sup>1435</sup> quae tenet in quibusdam<sup>1436</sup> terminis gratia certe<sup>1437</sup> significationis terminorum et non in omnibus retenta consimili forma, ut 'homo currit, ergo animal currit', quae<sup>1438</sup> tenet ex<sup>1439</sup> eo quod iste<sup>1440</sup> terminus 'animal' est superior ad istum terminum 'homo', sed non gratia formae, quia non sequitur 'homo<sup>1441</sup> currit, ergo asinus currit',<sup>1442</sup> et tamen ibidem retinetur<sup>1443</sup> consimilis<sup>1444</sup> forma - |V 86<sup>va</sup>| scilicet<sup>1445</sup> eadem qualitas, eadem<sup>1446</sup> quantitas,<sup>1447</sup> et<sup>1448</sup> copula,<sup>1449</sup> et ideo<sup>1450</sup> consequentia materialis nominatur.<sup>1451</sup>

<2> Secunda<sup>1452</sup> divisio est haec:<sup>1453</sup> consequentiarum formalium alia<sup>1454</sup> syllogistica,<sup>1455</sup> alia non syllogistica.<sup>1456</sup>

Consequentia formalis syllogistica<sup>1457</sup> est idem<sup>1458</sup> quod<sup>1459</sup> syllogismus et<sup>1460</sup> hoc capiendo syllogismum<sup>1461</sup> pro integro processu<sup>1462</sup> composito<sup>1463</sup> ex maiore et<sup>1464</sup> minore et conclusione, scilicet

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<sup>1432</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1433</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1434</sup> *est MV*

<sup>1435</sup> consequentia bona] *om. W, bona consequentia Y*

<sup>1436</sup> *add. aliis V*

<sup>1437</sup> *om. VW*

<sup>1438</sup> Consequentia ista *W*

<sup>1439</sup> *add. +quo+ W*

<sup>1440</sup> *ille MV*

<sup>1441</sup> *Sortes M*

<sup>1442</sup> asinus currit] baculus stat in angulo *W*

<sup>1443</sup> *tenetur Y*

<sup>1444</sup> *similis V*

<sup>1445</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>1446</sup> *om. MVY*

<sup>1447</sup> *post scilicet eadem V*

<sup>1448</sup> *om. M*

<sup>1449</sup> *add. et ordo terminorum M*

<sup>1450</sup> *et ideo] ergo W, add. haec Y*

<sup>1451</sup> vocatur *ante* materialis *Y*, *add.* et forte diceretur quod sic nulla esset consequentia formalis quia nulla est quae tenet in omnibus terminis cum nulla fiat in omnibus terminis responderetur quod verba sunt capenda ad intensionem loquentis consequentia enim formalis est quae tenet ex parte formae scilicet sic quod in quibuscumque terminis ipsa fieret retenta illa forma est quae ut valet ista in qua eadem specie non in numero *M*

<sup>1452</sup> *tertia Y*

<sup>1453</sup> *om. Y, add. quod V, ut M*

<sup>1454</sup> *una M, add. est Y*

<sup>1455</sup> *syllogizata W*

<sup>1456</sup> *syllogizata W*

<sup>1457</sup> *syllogizata W*

<sup>1458</sup> *om. M*

<sup>1459</sup> *om. W | idem quod] om. M*

<sup>1460</sup> *eo Y*

<sup>1461</sup> *ante hoc Y*

ex<sup>1465</sup> antecedente et consequente syllogismi. Quomodo autem definiatur<sup>1466</sup> syllogismus satis<sup>1467</sup> notum<sup>1468</sup> est ex *Primo Priorum* circa<sup>1469</sup> principium, quam definitionem etiam<sup>1470</sup> ponit<sup>1471</sup> Petrus Hispanus in *Summulis* suis.

De hac autem consequentia formali<sup>1472</sup> syllogistica<sup>1473</sup> nihil<sup>1474</sup> dicam<sup>1475</sup> in isto tractatu,<sup>1476</sup> supponens Philosopum de huiusmodi consequentia<sup>1477</sup> satis bene determinasse.<sup>1478</sup>

Consequentia autem<sup>1479</sup> formalis<sup>1480</sup> non syllogistica<sup>1481</sup> est omnis bona consequentia<sup>1482</sup> de forma non syllogistica, sicut a copulativa ad alteram eius<sup>1483</sup> partem vel a parte disiunctivae ad totam disiunctivam, de quibus plus dicitur<sup>1484</sup> in sequentibus.<sup>1485</sup>

<3> Tertia divisio |M 33<sup>v</sup>| est de consequentia materiali,<sup>1486</sup> sed propter<sup>1487</sup> huiusmodi membrorum divisionem<sup>1488</sup> et subdivisionem<sup>1489</sup> prolixitatem in tenendam<sup>1490</sup> |Y 77<sup>r</sup>| brevitatem<sup>1491</sup> ipsam derelinquo.

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<sup>1462</sup> integro processu] integrum processum Y

<sup>1463</sup> om. MW

<sup>1464</sup> om. M

<sup>1465</sup> om. M

<sup>1466</sup> definitur W

<sup>1467</sup> post notum est Y

<sup>1468</sup> satis notum] notandum M

<sup>1469</sup> scilicet M

<sup>1470</sup> et Y

<sup>1471</sup> om. M

<sup>1472</sup> om. V

<sup>1473</sup> syllogizata W

<sup>1474</sup> non M

<sup>1475</sup> add. ad praesens V

<sup>1476</sup> ante isto Y, capitulo V

<sup>1477</sup> add. formali syllogistica M

<sup>1478</sup> add. et de alio quia dei gratia de hac unam specialem aggregationem colligere propono V | add. et ex alio quia per dei gratiam de hoc specialem aggregationem colligere propono Y | et ex hoc quia dei gratia de hoc unam specialem congregationem colligere propono M

<sup>1479</sup> om. MV

<sup>1480</sup> ante consequentia M

<sup>1481</sup> syllogizata W

<sup>1482</sup> om. M | bona consequentia] consequentia bona V

<sup>1483</sup> om. M

<sup>1484</sup> ante plus Y

<sup>1485</sup> in sequentibus] postea M

<sup>1486</sup> add. quomodo subdividitur M

<sup>1487</sup> per V

<sup>1488</sup> ante membrorum M

<sup>1489</sup> add. +est sciend+ Y

<sup>1490</sup> in tenenda] vel fors in reverendam Y, lectio dubia gaudens V, devitans W

<sup>1491</sup> om. W

Circa consequentiae <sup>1492</sup> divisionem tamen <sup>1493</sup> est <sup>1494</sup> sciendum <sup>1495</sup> quod quidam dividunt <sup>1496</sup> consequentiam materialem <sup>1497</sup> in consequentiam materialem <sup>1498</sup> simpliciter dictam et <sup>1499</sup> in consequentiam materialem <sup>1500</sup> ut nunc. Consequenter dicunt quod consequentia materialis <sup>1501</sup> simpliciter dicta est<sup>1502</sup> quae simpliciter loquendo est bona et<sup>1503</sup> sic<sup>1504</sup> se habet quod impossibile est ita esse sicut per antecedens significatur<sup>1505</sup> pro nunc<sup>1506</sup> secundum quod prius dicebatur,<sup>1507</sup> nisi ita sit sicut per consequens significatur. Consequentia autem <sup>1508</sup> ut nunc secundum eos est quae simpliciter loquendo non<sup>1509</sup> est bona nec<sup>1510</sup> valet, immo impossibile<sup>1511</sup> est sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur, licet non sit ita<sup>1512</sup> sicut per consequens significatur.<sup>1513</sup> Sed<sup>1514</sup> consequentia ut nunc bona<sup>1515</sup> sic describitur<sup>1516</sup> ex eo quod,<sup>1517</sup> rebus se habentibus ut nunc se habent,<sup>1518</sup> non potest sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur,<sup>1519</sup> quin <sup>1520</sup> ita <sup>1521</sup> sit sicut per consequens significatur.<sup>1522</sup> Exemplum poni potest<sup>1523</sup> ut:<sup>1524</sup> si Sortes sit<sup>1525</sup> albus dicendo<sup>1526</sup> 'Sortes currit, ergo album currit'.<sup>d</sup>

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<sup>1492</sup> quam V

<sup>1493</sup> *om. Y, post sciendum V*

<sup>1494</sup> consequentiae - est] quam M

<sup>1495</sup> videndum M

<sup>1496</sup> dividebant M

<sup>1497</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1498</sup> *om. V, add. et in consequentiam W*

<sup>1499</sup> ut W

<sup>1500</sup> *om. VW*

<sup>1501</sup> et materialis *post dicta W*

<sup>1502</sup> *add. ista W*

<sup>1503</sup> *add. quae W*

<sup>1504</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1505</sup> *om. W, etc. V*

<sup>1506</sup> pro nunc] *om. W, lectio dubia Y, nunc ante significatur M, add. etc. M*

<sup>1507</sup> dictum est V

<sup>1508</sup> *om. M*

<sup>1509</sup> *lectio dubia Y*

<sup>1510</sup> vel Y

<sup>1511</sup> immo impossibile] non possibile Y

<sup>1512</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>1513</sup> secundum quod - consequens significatur] *om. W* | consequentia ut nunc secundum eos - consequens significatur] *om. V*

<sup>1514</sup> et V, *add. dicitur M*

<sup>1515</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1516</sup> sic describitur] dicitur *post sed W, om. MY*

<sup>1517</sup> *add. in W*

<sup>1518</sup> *add. quod WY*

<sup>1519</sup> *ante per W*

<sup>1520</sup> *add. etiam Y, nisi M*

<sup>1521</sup> sic V

<sup>1522</sup> *add. et M*

<sup>1523</sup> poni potest] potest poni Y, *om. W*

Sed<sup>1527</sup> salva reverentia<sup>1528</sup> id<sup>1529</sup> ponentium,<sup>1530</sup> hoc non convenienter ponunt:<sup>1531</sup> nam isti idem dicunt solum<sup>1532</sup> consequentiam<sup>1533</sup> bonam [W 109r] esse<sup>1534</sup> consequentiam<sup>1535</sup> et consequentiam dividunt in materialem et formalem.<sup>1536</sup> Ex quo<sup>1537</sup> sequitur quod omnis consequentia materialis est bona,<sup>1538</sup> cum<sup>1539</sup> omne<sup>1540</sup> divisum praedicatur<sup>1541</sup> universaliter<sup>1542</sup> de quolibet ipsius dividendum.<sup>1543</sup> Arguitur<sup>1544</sup> ergo ex illo<sup>1545</sup> sic: "omnis consequentia materialis est bona, consequentia ut nunc non est bona, ergo<sup>1546</sup> consequentia ut nunc non est consequentia materialis". Discursus est<sup>1547</sup> in Baroco, et<sup>1548</sup> conclusio est<sup>1549</sup> contra divisionem iam<sup>1550</sup> recitatam ab eis.<sup>1551</sup> Maior fuit statim ab eis<sup>1552</sup>

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<sup>1524</sup> *add.* si Sortes est asinus currit tunc sequitur Sortes currit igitur asinus currit vel WM

<sup>1525</sup> est W

<sup>1526</sup> *om.* W, ut sic dicendo Y, et V

<sup>d</sup> pro nunc - currit] Sed dicitur consequentia ut nunc bona ex eo quod in rebus se habentibus ut sic se habent quod non potest sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin ita sit sicut per consequens significatur. Exemplum ut 'si Sortes est asinus, asinus currit' tunc sequitur: 'Sortes currit, igitur asinus currit', vel 'si Sortes est albus, Sortes currit, ergo albus currit' **W** | nunc significatur etc. secundum quod prius dicebatur nisi ita sit sicut per consequens significatur. Consequentia ut nunc secundum eos est quae simpliciter loquendo non est bona nec valet immo impossibile est sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur, licet non sit ita sicut per consequens significatur. Sed dicitur consequentia ut nunc bona ex eo quod rebus se habentibus ut nunc se habent non potest sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur, nisi ita sit sicut per consequens significatur. Et exemplum poni potest ut si Sortes sit albus dicendo Sortes currit ergo albus currit **M** | *lectio dubia* pro nunc secundum quod prius declarabatur nisi ita sit sicut per consequens significatur. Consequentia autem ut nunc secundum eos est quae simpliciter loquendo modo (*vel forsan* non) est bona vel *lectio dubia* videlicet non possibile est sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur. Sed consequentia ut nunc bona ex eo quod rebus se habentibus ut nunc se habent quod non potest esse sic sicut per consequens significatur. Exemplum potest poni ut: 'si Sortes sit albus - ut sic dicendo - Sortes currit, ergo albus currit' **Y** | etc. secundum quod prius dictum est nisi ita sit sicut per consequens significatur. Et consequentia ut nunc describitur ex eo quod rebus se habentibus ut nunc se habent non potest sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur quin sic sit sicut per consequens significatur. Exemplum poni potest ut: 'si Sortes sit albus et Sortes currit ergo albus currit' **V**

<sup>1527</sup> *lectio dubia* Y

<sup>1528</sup> indifferentia Y

<sup>1529</sup> *post* ponentium M, istud *post* ponentium W, *om.* Y

<sup>1530</sup> *add.* in MW, *add.* et V

<sup>1531</sup> *add.* nunc M

<sup>1532</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1533</sup> *add.* *lectio dubia* modo Y

<sup>1534</sup> *ante* bonam W

<sup>1535</sup> simpliciter Y

<sup>1536</sup> materialem et formalem] consequentiam formalem et materialem M

<sup>1537</sup> isto W, hoc Y

<sup>1538</sup> consequentia W

<sup>1539</sup> et V

<sup>1540</sup> *vel forsan* esse M

<sup>1541</sup> praedicaretur Y

<sup>1542</sup> *om.* M

<sup>1543</sup> quolibet ipsius dividendum] suis dividendum V, membris dividendum ipsum MY

<sup>1544</sup> arguitur M

<sup>1545</sup> alio Y, isto W

<sup>1546</sup> igitur M

<sup>1547</sup> tenet M

<sup>1548</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1549</sup> *om.* V | conclusio est] consequens W

<sup>1550</sup> *om.* M

declarata<sup>1553</sup> et minor patet<sup>1554</sup> ex<sup>1555</sup> eorum<sup>1556</sup> definiendo<sup>1557</sup> consequentiam ut nunc. Propter<sup>1558</sup> hanc igitur<sup>1559</sup> causam non divisi consequentiam materiale<sup>1560</sup> in<sup>1561</sup> consequentiam<sup>1562</sup> ut nunc, supponens ex prius<sup>1563</sup> dictis consequentiam ut nunc non esse consequentiam, quae tamen a loicis<sup>1564</sup> vocatur<sup>1565</sup> consequentia ut nunc, [Y 77v] ut<sup>1566</sup> satis patet ex dictis.<sup>1567</sup>

### I.3 <Regulae de consequentiis>

Praeterea est<sup>1568</sup> advertendum<sup>1569</sup> quod ponendo regulas de consequentiis primo pono regulas [V 86<sup>vb</sup>] generales omnium consequentiarum; secundo regulas speciales consequentiarum formalium non syllogisticarum;<sup>1570</sup> tertio diversas<sup>1571</sup> regulas consequentiarum materialium, et<sup>1572</sup> simul notabilia illis regulis deservientia<sup>1573</sup> admittendo.<sup>1574</sup> [M 34r]

#### I.3.1 <Regulae generales consequentiarum>

<1> Post praedicta restat ponere aliquas regulas generales consequentiarum, quarum prima est haec: quod in omni bona consequentia ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis. Non

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<sup>1551</sup> *om. Y, add. et VY*

<sup>1552</sup> *ab eis] om. W, per eos MV, ante statim M*

<sup>1553</sup> *datam Y*

<sup>1554</sup> *est VY*

<sup>1555</sup> *om. V, per W*

<sup>1556</sup> *eos W*

<sup>1557</sup> *patet definiendo] est eorum definitum M*

<sup>1558</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1559</sup> *ergo V, om. M*

<sup>1560</sup> *malam V*

<sup>1561</sup> *et WY*

<sup>1562</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1563</sup> *suis W*

<sup>1564</sup> *tamen a loicis] cum et illata W*

<sup>1565</sup> *post tamen V, add. esse M*

<sup>1566</sup> *sicut V, add. ut Y*

<sup>1567</sup> *lectio dubia V | ut - dictis] prout apparet ex lectio dubia praedictis M*

<sup>1568</sup> *post advertendum W, om. Y*

<sup>1569</sup> *notanudm W*

<sup>1570</sup> *syllogistatarum W*

<sup>1571</sup> *post regulas W*

<sup>1572</sup> *post simul W*

<sup>1573</sup> *deservientibus W*

<sup>1574</sup> *etc. W, om. Y, subiungendo add. etc. etc. etc. M | add. sequitur regulae consequentiarum W*



tamen<sup>1575</sup> oportet e converso, quod ex opposito antecedentis inferatur oppositum consequentis. Et iterum, si ex opposito consequentis inferatur<sup>1576</sup> oppositum antecedentis, tunc consequentia est bona. Pro hac regula declaranda supponitur primum principium omnium evidentissimum quod<sup>1577</sup> contradictoria non possunt simul<sup>1578</sup> stare.<sup>1579</sup> Tunc probatur regula sic: si ex 'a esse'<sup>1580</sup> sequitur 'b esse', tunc vel<sup>1581</sup> ex 'opposito ipsius b esse' sequitur 'oppositum ipsius a esse', vel non. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si non, tunc 'oppositum ipsius b<sup>1582</sup> esse' stat<sup>1583</sup> vel stare<sup>1584</sup> potest cum 'a esse' et cum 'a esse' simul<sup>1585</sup> stat ipsum<sup>1586</sup> 'b esse' per primum suppositum<sup>1587</sup> ergo<sup>1588</sup> 'b esse' et<sup>1589</sup> 'oppositum b esse' possunt simul<sup>1590</sup> stare cum 'a esse'; et ultra sequitur quod contradictio stat simul,<sup>1591</sup> quod est contra suppositum.<sup>1592</sup>

Ista ultima consequentia est nota<sup>1593</sup> ex<sup>1594</sup> prima, scilicet quod si<sup>1595</sup> ex 'opposito ipsius b esse' non sequitur 'oppositum ipsius a esse', tunc 'a esse' potest stare<sup>1596</sup> cum<sup>1597</sup> 'opposito b esse'.<sup>1598</sup> Iterum<sup>1599</sup> patet<sup>1600</sup> per primum<sup>1601</sup> principium, quia cum quolibet<sup>1602</sup> stat alterum contradictorium. Cum ergo<sup>1603</sup> non semper<sup>1604</sup> oporteat cum<sup>1605</sup> 'opposito b esse' stare 'oppositum<sup>1606</sup> |Y 78r| a esse' - cum non

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<sup>1575</sup> non tamen] et non V

<sup>1576</sup> infertur W

<sup>1577</sup> om. V

<sup>1578</sup> post stare V

<sup>1579</sup> add. et V

<sup>1580</sup> om. W

<sup>1581</sup> nihil Y

<sup>1582</sup> a V

<sup>1583</sup> add. cum eo W

<sup>1584</sup> om. W, post potest V

<sup>1585</sup> semper MW, post stat Y

<sup>1586</sup> om. V, cum Y

<sup>1587</sup> ante primum W

<sup>1588</sup> igitur Y

<sup>1589</sup> est W

<sup>1590</sup> semper W

<sup>1591</sup> cum a esse et ultra - simul] om. V

<sup>1592</sup> oppositum b - contra suppositum] om. W

<sup>1593</sup> ante est Y

<sup>1594</sup> et MV, ut W

<sup>1595</sup> om. M

<sup>1596</sup> ante potest V

<sup>1597</sup> add. illius V, ista Y, add. illo M

<sup>1598</sup> oppositio b esse] om. VY, opposito M

<sup>1599</sup> oppositum W, hoc V

<sup>1600</sup> ante iterum VY

<sup>1601</sup> om. M

<sup>1602</sup> add. propositione Y

<sup>1603</sup> igitur Y

<sup>1604</sup> add. +oportet+ V

<sup>1605</sup> ex W

sequatur ad ipsum - sequitur quod eius<sup>1607</sup> contradictorium, scilicet<sup>1608</sup> 'a esse';<sup>1609</sup> tunc quando 'oppositum a esse'<sup>1610</sup> non<sup>1611</sup> potest stare vel non stat cum 'opposito b esse', per<sup>1612</sup> prius<sup>1613</sup> dicta, stabit vel stare poterit autem<sup>1614</sup> |W 109<sup>v</sup>| aliquo<sup>1615</sup> tempore vel<sup>1616</sup> neutra pars contradictionis staret, <sup>1617</sup> quod est impossibile.<sup>e</sup>

Simili modo<sup>1618</sup> declaratur<sup>1619</sup> secunda pars<sup>1620</sup> regulae, scilicet quod<sup>1621</sup> si ex opposito consequentis sequitur <sup>1622</sup> oppositum <sup>1623</sup> antecedentis, tunc <sup>1624</sup> consequentia est bona. Da enim quod consequentia<sup>1625</sup> non valeat<sup>1626</sup> quando dicitur 'c<sup>1627</sup> igitur<sup>1628</sup> d';<sup>1629</sup> et<sup>1630</sup> quod tamen<sup>1631</sup> ex opposito ipsius<sup>1632</sup> d<sup>1633</sup> oppositum ipsius<sup>1634</sup> c sequeretur.<sup>1635</sup> Cum ergo<sup>1636</sup> non sequitur 'c<sup>1637</sup> ergo<sup>1638</sup> d',<sup>1639</sup>

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<sup>1606</sup> *add.* ipsius B

<sup>1607</sup> illius V, ipsius Y

<sup>1608</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1609</sup> cum non sequatur - esse] *om.* V

<sup>1610</sup> tunc - esse] *om.* V

<sup>1611</sup> *post* non Y

<sup>1612</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1613</sup> *add.* +posito+ V

<sup>1614</sup> tunc - autem] tunc quando oppositum a esse non potest stare vel non stat cum oppositum b esse prius dicta stabit ergo vel stare poterit quod cum aliquo opposito W

<sup>1615</sup> *add.* alio Y

<sup>1616</sup> *om.* MWY

<sup>1617</sup> *add.* stare posset vel Y

<sup>e</sup> cum non sequantur ad ipsum - quod est impossibile] cum non sequatur ad ipsum, sequitur quod illius contradictorium scilicet a esse non potest stare vel non stat cum opposito b esse prius +posita+ dicta, vel --- aliquo tempore neutra pars contradictionis staret, quod est impossibile V | tunc quando oppositum a esse non potest stare vel non stat cum oppositum b esse prius dicta stabit ergo vel stare poterit quod cum aliquo opposito aliquo tempore neutra pars contradictionis staret, quod est impossibile W | cum non sequatur ad ipsum, sequitur quod ipsius contradictorium a esse tunc quando oppositum a esse potest non stare vel non stat cum opposito b esse per prius dicta stabit vel stare poterit autem cum *vel forsan* cum aliquo alio tempore neutra pars contradictionis stare posset nec staret quod est impossibile Y | cum non sequatur ad ipsum sequitur quod eius contradictorium, scilicet 'a esse' non stabit cum opposito ipsius 'b esse' prius dicto vel stare poterit cum aliquo opposito +ipsius b esse+ aliquo tempore staret neutra pars contradictionis, quod est impossibile

<sup>1618</sup> simili modo] similiter M

<sup>1619</sup> declararetur W

<sup>1620</sup> *add.* dicta Y

<sup>1621</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1622</sup> infertur V

<sup>1623</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1624</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1625</sup> *post* valet W

<sup>1626</sup> valet VWY

<sup>1627</sup> *add.* est Y | quando dicitur c] *om.* V

<sup>1628</sup> ergo V

<sup>1629</sup> *add.* est Y

<sup>1630</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1631</sup> *om.* Y, cum M

<sup>1632</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1633</sup> *add.* esse Y

oppositum d<sup>1640</sup> potest stare cum ipso<sup>1641</sup> c.<sup>1642</sup> Quia si<sup>1643</sup> d<sup>1644</sup> non sequitur,<sup>1645</sup> tunc d<sup>1646</sup> potest non<sup>1647</sup> stare.<sup>1648</sup> Ponatur ergo quod non stet;<sup>1649</sup> tunc stabit oppositum<sup>1650</sup> eius<sup>1651</sup> - tunc<sup>1652</sup> semper cum qualibet propositione stat<sup>1653</sup> altera pars contradictionis.<sup>1654</sup> Possunt ergo simul stare c et oppositum ipsius<sup>1655</sup> d;<sup>1656</sup> cum<sup>1657</sup> hoc simul infertur oppositum ipsius c, igitur<sup>1658</sup> c<sup>1659</sup> et oppositum ipsius<sup>1660</sup> |M 34<sup>v</sup>| c stant<sup>1661</sup> cum opposito ipsius d. Hoc tamen<sup>1662</sup> est impossibile, quia<sup>1663</sup> contradictoria starent simul, quod est contra suppositum, igitur<sup>1664</sup> secunda<sup>1665</sup> pars regulae fuit vera. <sup>f</sup>

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- <sup>1634</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>1635</sup> sequitur *ante* oppositum ipsius c Y  
<sup>1636</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>1637</sup> *add.* est Y  
<sup>1638</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>1639</sup> *add.* est Y | c igitur - ergo d] *om.* W  
<sup>1640</sup> *om.* W, *add.* esse Y  
<sup>1641</sup> opposito Y  
<sup>1642</sup> *om.* W, *add.* esse Y  
<sup>1643</sup> *add.* ad M  
<sup>1644</sup> *add.* est Y  
<sup>1645</sup> *add.* aliquid c est Y  
<sup>1646</sup> *add.* est Y, *add.* c M  
<sup>1647</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>1648</sup> *add.* cum c est Y, *add.* cum c M  
<sup>1649</sup> staret W, stat *add.* et MY  
<sup>1650</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>1651</sup> ipsius Y | stabit oppositum eius] eius oppositum stabit V  
<sup>1652</sup> *om.* V, cum M  
<sup>1653</sup> stabit M  
<sup>1654</sup> tunc - contradictionis] *om.* Y  
<sup>1655</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1656</sup> b W  
<sup>1657</sup> et MV  
<sup>1658</sup> ergo V  
<sup>1659</sup> igitur c] *om.* W  
<sup>1660</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1661</sup> stat W  
<sup>1662</sup> *om.* V, autem M |hoc tamen] et hoc W  
<sup>1663</sup> *add.* duo M  
<sup>1664</sup> ergo W, ita V  
<sup>1665</sup> prima Y

<sup>f</sup> da enim - vera] Da enim quod consequentia non valet. Quando dicitur c est igitur d est quod ex opposito d esse sequitur ipsius c esse cum igitur non sequitur c est igitur d est, oppositum d esse potest stare cum opposito c esse, quia si d est non sequitur aliquid c est, tunc d est potest stare cum c est ponatur enim quod non stat et tunc stabit oppositum ipsius d est cum c est et oppositum c est cum opposito d est, quod est impossibile, quia tunc contradictorii possunt igitur simul stare, c est et oppositum ipsius c est cum opposito ipsius d est starent simul quod est contra primum *lectio dubia* suppositum *lectio dubia* prius igitur prima pars regulae fuit vera **Y** | Da enim quod consequentia non valet ergo d et quod tamen ex opposito ipsius d oppositum ipsius c sequeretur cum ergo non sequitur c ergo d, oppositum d potest stare cum ipso c, quia si d non sequitur tunc d potest non stare ponatur ergo quod non stet, et tunc eius oppositum stabit semper cum qualibet propositione stat altera pars contradictionis possunt ergo simul stare c et oppositum d, et hoc simul infertur oppositum ipsius c, ergo c et oppositum c stant cum opposito ipsius d. Hoc est impossibile quia nontradictonaria starent simul, quod est contra suppositum **V** | da enim quod non valet consequentia quando dicitur ad oppositum potest stare cum ipso quia si non sequitur tunc d potest non stare ponatur ergo quod non stet, tunc stabit oppositum eius. Tunc semper cum qualibet

Exemplum huius<sup>1666</sup> datur<sup>1667</sup> in terminis significativis, nam<sup>1668</sup> sequitur:<sup>1669</sup> 'homo currit, igitur<sup>1670</sup> animal currit', sic<sup>1671</sup> e converso sequitur:<sup>1672</sup> 'nullum animal currit, igitur nullus homo currit'. Et<sup>1673</sup> dixi in prima parte<sup>1674</sup> regulae quod non oportet e converso<sup>1675</sup> ex opposito antecedentis sequi oppositum consequentis. Patet hoc,<sup>1676</sup> nam haec 'nullus homo currit' quae<sup>1677</sup> est<sup>1678</sup> opposita<sup>1679</sup> antecedentis,<sup>1680</sup> scilicet<sup>1681</sup> 'homo currit',<sup>1682</sup> |V 87<sup>ra</sup>| non infert hanc<sup>1683</sup> 'nullum animal currit' si enim<sup>1684</sup> asinus curreret et nullus homo curreret,<sup>1685</sup> tunc ita esset<sup>1686</sup> sicut<sup>1687</sup> antecedens significat esse<sup>1688</sup> et<sup>1689</sup> non tamen<sup>1690</sup> sicut consequens significat esse.<sup>1691</sup> Et intelligo idem<sup>1692</sup> per oppositum et<sup>1693</sup> contradictorium,<sup>1694</sup> et ita capit Philosophus oppositum<sup>1695</sup> *Primo*<sup>1696</sup> *Priorum* capitulo tertio.<sup>1697</sup>

|Y 78<sup>v</sup>|

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propositione stat altera pars contradictionis. Possunt ergo simul stare c et oppositum ipsius b, cum hoc simul infertur oppositum ipsius c et oppositum ipsius c stat cum opposito ipsius d et hoc est impossibile quia contradictoria starent simul quod est contra suppositum ergo secunda pars regulae fuit vera **W** |

Da enim quod non valeat consequentia, quando dicitur c igitur d et quod cum ex opposito d ipsius c sequeretur. Cum ergo non sequitur c ergo d, oppositum d potest stare cum ipso c quia si ad d c non sequitur tunc d potest non stare cum c. Ponatur ergo quod non stet, et tunc stabit oppositum eius cum semper cum qualibet propositione stabit altera pars contradictionis. Possunt ergo simul stare c et oppositum ipsius d, et hoc simul infertur oppositum ipsius c, igitur c et oppositum ipsius / c stant cum opposito ipsius d. Hoc autem est impossibile, quia duo contradictoria starent simul, quod est contra suppositum igitur secunda pars regulae fuit vera **M**

<sup>1666</sup> istius Y

<sup>1667</sup> habetur V, om. MY

<sup>1668</sup> add. sic Y

<sup>1669</sup> nam sequitur] om. W

<sup>1670</sup> ergo VW

<sup>1671</sup> et W

<sup>1672</sup> om. W

<sup>1673</sup> om. V, sed Y

<sup>1674</sup> add. huius Y

<sup>1675</sup> e converso om. W

<sup>1676</sup> patet hoc] om. Y

<sup>1677</sup> om. MV

<sup>1678</sup> om. V, post opposita M

<sup>1679</sup> oppositum W, add. huic M

<sup>1680</sup> in antecedente W, antecedenti M

<sup>1681</sup> om. MV | quae - scilicet] igitur opposita huic Y

<sup>1682</sup> add. et M

<sup>1683</sup> add. propositionem Y

<sup>1684</sup> omnis V

<sup>1685</sup> currit M

<sup>1686</sup> tunc ita esset] om. V, tunc licet ita esse M

<sup>1687</sup> add. per M

<sup>1688</sup> om. Y

<sup>1689</sup> om. MY

<sup>1690</sup> add. ita esse M

<sup>1691</sup> post tamen Y| non infert - esse ] tunc sicut antecedens significat, est non tamen esset sicut consequens significat W

<sup>1692</sup> hic W

<sup>1693</sup> om. W

Ex hac regula faciliter redditur<sup>1698</sup> causa<sup>1699</sup> quare<sup>1700</sup> syllogismus est bonus<sup>1701</sup> quando ex opposito conclusionis<sup>1702</sup> cum altera praemissarum infertur oppositum alterius praemissae. Nam ex hac<sup>1703</sup> regula<sup>1704</sup> manifestum est,<sup>1705</sup> quod tunc consequentia<sup>1706</sup> est bona quando ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis; et per consequens consequentia est formalis quando ex opposito consequentis formaliter <sup>1707</sup> infertur oppositum antecedentis. <sup>1708</sup> Constat autem <sup>1709</sup> quod antecedens<sup>1710</sup> syllogismi est una<sup>1711</sup> propositio<sup>1712</sup> copulativa et per consequens cuiuscumque partis illius <sup>1713</sup> copulativae <sup>1714</sup> oppositum <sup>1715</sup> inferatur, <sup>1716</sup> oppositum antecedentis inferatur, <sup>1717</sup> cum copulativa <sup>1718</sup> contradicat <sup>1719</sup> disiunctivae de <sup>1720</sup> partibus contradicentibus. Et <sup>1721</sup> ad veritatem disiunctivae<sup>1722</sup> sufficit unius suarum partium veritas;<sup>1723</sup> et ad illationem disiunctivae illatio<sup>1724</sup> unius partis. Quando ergo<sup>1725</sup> ex opposito<sup>1726</sup> conclusionis cum una<sup>1727</sup> praemissarum infertur oppositum alterius praemissae,<sup>1728</sup> signum est quod oppositum consequentis non potest stare cum ambabus

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<sup>1694</sup> contradictionem Y, *lectio dubia* V  
<sup>1695</sup> opposita Y, *om.* W  
<sup>1696</sup> secundo W  
<sup>1697</sup> secundo et sexto Y, *add.* et sexto M  
<sup>1698</sup> *ante* faciliter M  
<sup>1699</sup> ratio Y  
<sup>1700</sup> qualiter W  
<sup>1701</sup> *add.* et W  
<sup>1702</sup> *add.* seu consequentis V  
<sup>1703</sup> *om.* YV  
<sup>1704</sup> regulis V  
<sup>1705</sup> *ante* manifestum MW  
<sup>1706</sup> *ante* consequentia M  
<sup>1707</sup> *om.* V, *post* antecedentis M  
<sup>1708</sup> et per - consequentis] *om.* W  
<sup>1709</sup> etiam M  
<sup>1710</sup> *add.* boni Y  
<sup>1711</sup> *vel fors* bona W  
<sup>1712</sup> *om.* MY, *post* copulativa V  
<sup>1713</sup> ipsius W, *post* copulativae Y, istius M  
<sup>1714</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>1715</sup> *vel fors* omnium W  
<sup>1716</sup> infertur W, *add.* infertur Y  
<sup>1717</sup> infertur WY | oppositum antecedentis inferatur] *om.* V  
<sup>1718</sup> copulativae M  
<sup>1719</sup> contradicit V | copulativa contradicat] eius contradictorium W  
<sup>1720</sup> disiunctivae de] disiunctiva ex M  
<sup>1721</sup> *add.* tamen Y, igitur *add.* cum M  
<sup>1722</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>1723</sup> *ante* unius MV  
<sup>1724</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>1725</sup> igitur W  
<sup>1726</sup> *add.* unius W  
<sup>1727</sup> altera V  
<sup>1728</sup> *add.* quod est falsum et contra suppositum W

partibus copulativae<sup>1729</sup> antecedentis, quia<sup>1730</sup> quando stat cum una,<sup>1731</sup> interimit aliam. Ergo<sup>1732</sup> consequentia fuit bona<sup>1733</sup> formaliter.<sup>1734</sup>

Et per consequens semper est<sup>1735</sup> syllogismus bonus<sup>1736</sup> quando ex opposito consequentis cum altera praemissarum infertur<sup>1737</sup> syllogistice oppositum alterius praemissae.

<2> Aliud<sup>1738</sup> correlarium sequitur ex prima<sup>1739</sup> regula.<sup>1740</sup> Et potest esse regula secunda<sup>1741</sup> haec<sup>1742</sup> [W110r] quod quidquid<sup>1743</sup> in consequentia bona repugnat consequenti,<sup>1744</sup> etiam<sup>1745</sup> repugnat antecedenti. Probatur ex<sup>1746</sup> prima,<sup>1747</sup> quia ex opposito<sup>1748</sup> consequentis<sup>1749</sup> infertur<sup>1750</sup> oppositum antecedentis.<sup>1751</sup> Modo illud<sup>1752</sup> per regulam infert oppositum antecedentis, ergo<sup>1753</sup> sequitur<sup>1754</sup> quod illud<sup>1755</sup> idem repugnat<sup>1756</sup> antecedenti, [M 35r] quod fuit probandum.

Et confirmatur regula<sup>1757</sup> sic: si<sup>1758</sup> aliquid<sup>1759</sup> repugnat<sup>1760</sup> consequenti quod<sup>1761</sup> [Y 79r] non repugnat<sup>1762</sup> antecedenti,<sup>1763</sup> tunc arguitur sic: hoc<sup>1764</sup> repugnat consequenti, igitur<sup>1765</sup> ex eo<sup>1766</sup>

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<sup>1729</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1730</sup> *et W*

<sup>1731</sup> *add. istarum M*

<sup>1732</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>1733</sup> *add. et VWY, add. quia eam Y, add. quia eam et V*

<sup>1734</sup> *add. interimit consequentia prima fuit bona et formalis Y, add. et quando iam formaliter W*

<sup>1735</sup> *post syllogismus V*

<sup>1736</sup> *ante syllogismus Y*

<sup>1737</sup> *sequitur post syllogistice Y*

<sup>1738</sup> *alia add. regula seu V*

<sup>1739</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>1740</sup> *ex prima regula] om. W, ex ista M*

<sup>1741</sup> *ante regula M*

<sup>1742</sup> *et - haec] est V*

<sup>1743</sup> *quod Y*

<sup>1744</sup> *antecedenti Y*

<sup>1745</sup> *om. Y, post repugnat M | repugnat consequenti etiam] om. W*

<sup>1746</sup> *add. regula Y*

<sup>1747</sup> *add. regula M*

<sup>1748</sup> *quod Y*

<sup>1749</sup> *consequentis Y*

<sup>1750</sup> *infert Y | quia ex - infertur] quidquid repugnat consequenti infert V*

<sup>1751</sup> *consequentis Y | add. vel \_\_ oppositum consequentis W, animal et \_\_ oppositum consequentis Y*

<sup>1752</sup> *ex consequenti oppositum Y*

<sup>1753</sup> *igitur Y | illud - ergo] om. V | modo illud - ergo] om. M*

<sup>1754</sup> *infertur M*

<sup>1755</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>1756</sup> *repugnet V*

<sup>1757</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1758</sup> *ita quod V, per adversativum Y*

<sup>1759</sup> *aliud Y*

<sup>1760</sup> *repugnet V*

<sup>1761</sup> *add. tunc Y*

sequitur<sup>1767</sup> oppositum consequentis.<sup>1768</sup> Consequentia tenet, quia alias<sup>1769</sup> non diceretur repugnare consequenti.<sup>1770</sup> Et ultra istud<sup>1771</sup> oppositum consequentis statim infert<sup>1772</sup> oppositum antecedentis per regulam primam.<sup>1773</sup> Et per consequens primum inferens semper stat cum opposito antecedentis, scilicet istud<sup>1774</sup> quod infert<sup>1775</sup> oppositum consequentis<sup>1776</sup> et<sup>1777</sup> illud<sup>1778</sup> idem non repugnat antecedenti, ergo<sup>1779</sup> potest stare cum antecedente et<sup>1780</sup> simul<sup>1781</sup> stat cum opposito eius, quia semper stat cum illo,<sup>1782</sup> ut probatum<sup>1783</sup> est, igitur<sup>1784</sup> oppositum antecedentis<sup>1785</sup> et antecedens<sup>1786</sup> simul<sup>1787</sup> stare possunt<sup>1788</sup> cum isto<sup>1789</sup> quod repugnat consequenti,<sup>1790</sup> quod est contra propositum, scilicet hoc<sup>1791</sup> quod contradictoria<sup>1792</sup> non possunt simul stare.<sup>1793</sup>

Ultima tamen consequentia [V 87<sup>rb</sup>] nota est de se, et prima<sup>1794</sup> tenet ex eo quod<sup>1795</sup> si aliquid<sup>1796</sup> inferat<sup>1797</sup> aliud,<sup>1798</sup> tunc semper illud quod stat cum consequente<sup>1799</sup> stabit cum antecedente,<sup>1800</sup> et

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<sup>1762</sup> repugnet V  
<sup>1763</sup> consequenti Y  
<sup>1764</sup> arguitur sic hoc] scilicet illud Y  
<sup>1765</sup> ergo V  
<sup>1766</sup> ex eo] *om.* V, isto Y  
<sup>1767</sup> infert V  
<sup>1768</sup> antecedentis W  
<sup>1769</sup> alius M  
<sup>1770</sup> *ante* repugnare W, *ante* non diceretur M  
<sup>1771</sup> *om.* Y, illud V  
<sup>1772</sup> infertur WY  
<sup>1773</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1774</sup> id W, quod idem V  
<sup>1775</sup> infertur Y  
<sup>1776</sup> antecedentis W  
<sup>1777</sup> sicut igitur M  
<sup>1778</sup> istud W, id Y  
<sup>1779</sup> *add.* quandoque V  
<sup>1780</sup> *add.* ergo W  
<sup>1781</sup> *vel forsitan* similiter VWY  
<sup>1782</sup> cum illo] *om.* VWY  
<sup>1783</sup> significatum W, argutum M  
<sup>1784</sup> ergo V  
<sup>1785</sup> consequentis M  
<sup>1786</sup> antecedentis M  
<sup>1787</sup> *add.* stant vel V  
<sup>1788</sup> ut probatum - stare possunt] *om.* Y, *ante* scilicet hoc V  
<sup>1789</sup> illo MV  
<sup>1790</sup> antecedenti V  
<sup>1791</sup> *om.* V, id Y  
<sup>1792</sup> contradictorium Y  
<sup>1793</sup> *add.* *lectio dubia* cum veritate Y  
<sup>1794</sup> *add.* consequentia Y  
<sup>1795</sup> ex eo quod] quia W  
<sup>1796</sup> aliqua Y  
<sup>1797</sup> infert Y  
<sup>1798</sup> *om.* W

ideo cum<sup>1801</sup> oppositum<sup>1802</sup> consequentis illatum<sup>1803</sup> inferat et simul stat<sup>1804</sup> cum opposito antecedentis,<sup>1805</sup> sequitur quod repugnat<sup>1806</sup> consequenti inferens istud<sup>1807</sup> oppositum<sup>1808</sup> consequentis secundo<sup>1809</sup> stabit cum opposito antecedentis.<sup>1810</sup> Exemplum huius habetur hic:<sup>1811</sup> si ista<sup>1812</sup> consequentia est<sup>1813</sup> bona<sup>1814</sup> 'homo currit, ergo<sup>1815</sup> animal currit', et huic consequenti 'animal currit'<sup>1816</sup> repugnat haec<sup>1817</sup> 'nullm corpus currit', tunc<sup>1818</sup> eadem repugnat<sup>1819</sup> huic antecedenti 'homo currit'.

<3> Tertia regula est:<sup>1820</sup> quidquid sequitur ad consequens<sup>1821</sup> consequentiae bonae,<sup>1822</sup> istud<sup>1823</sup> sequitur ad antecedens.<sup>1824</sup>

Illud<sup>1825</sup> declaratur sic:<sup>1826</sup> si<sup>1827</sup> consequentia esset<sup>1828</sup> bona 'a est, ergo b est' et ad hoc consequens<sup>1829</sup> 'b est'<sup>1830</sup> sequitur consequens<sup>1831</sup> 'c est',<sup>1832</sup> tunc<sup>1833</sup> ad istud<sup>1834</sup> antecedens<sup>1835</sup> 'a est' sequitur<sup>1836</sup> 'c

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<sup>1799</sup> *add. lectio dubia* secundo Y

<sup>1800</sup> *add.* quo consequens stet cum antecedente Y

<sup>1801</sup> si Y

<sup>1802</sup> *add.* aliud Y

<sup>1803</sup> consequentis illatum] illati consequenti Y

<sup>1804</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1805</sup> consequentis MVW | *add.* exemplum huius habetur hic si ista consequentia esset bona Y

<sup>1806</sup> repugnans Y

<sup>1807</sup> id Y, illud *add.* idem V

<sup>1808</sup> *add. lectio dubia* et sciendum Y

<sup>1809</sup> ergo W

<sup>1810</sup> ultima - antecedentis] *om.* M

<sup>1811</sup> *om.* MV

<sup>1812</sup> illa V

<sup>1813</sup> sit V

<sup>1814</sup> exemplum - bona] *om.* Y

<sup>1815</sup> igitur Y

<sup>1816</sup> animal currit] *om.* Y

<sup>1817</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1818</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1819</sup> *add.* eadem Y

<sup>1820</sup> *om.* Y, *add.* haec V

<sup>1821</sup> *add.* alicuius W

<sup>1822</sup> consequentiae bonae] *om.* V

<sup>1823</sup> illud *add.* idem V

<sup>1824</sup> *add.* illius Y

<sup>1825</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>1826</sup> *add.* quia V

<sup>1827</sup> *add.* illa V

<sup>1828</sup> est Y

<sup>1829</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>1830</sup> esse W

<sup>1831</sup> *om.* Y, *post c est* V

<sup>1832</sup> esse W

<sup>1833</sup> *add.* etiam *vel forsitan* ergo Y



est'. Istud<sup>1837</sup> declaratur sic:<sup>1838</sup> ex opposito ipsius<sup>1839</sup> 'c'<sup>1840</sup> est' ultimi consequentis<sup>1841</sup> sequitur  
oppositum ipsius<sup>1842</sup> 'a est',<sup>1843</sup> igitur<sup>1844</sup> consequentia ista<sup>1845</sup> |Y 79v| 'a est, igitur<sup>1846</sup> c est' est<sup>1847</sup> bona.  
Consequentia tenet<sup>1848</sup> per primam regulam.<sup>1849</sup> Antecedens declaratur, quia cum<sup>1850</sup> sequitur<sup>1851</sup> ad 'a  
est' 'b est', et ad<sup>1852</sup> 'b est' 'c est',<sup>1853</sup> oppositum ipsius 'c est'<sup>1854</sup> infert oppositum ipsius 'a est',<sup>1855</sup> vel  
non. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si dicatur quod<sup>1856</sup> non, sequitur quod<sup>1857</sup> tunc<sup>1858</sup> oppositum<sup>1859</sup> ipsius  
'c est'<sup>1860</sup> cum<sup>1861</sup> illa<sup>1862</sup> 'a est' potest stare.<sup>1863</sup> Consequentia tenet,<sup>1864</sup> quia<sup>1865</sup> non<sup>1866</sup> oportet cum  
opposito ipsius<sup>1867</sup> 'c est'<sup>1868</sup> stare<sup>1869</sup> ipsius 'a est', quia non sequitur ad ipsum. Et tamen oportet  
cum<sup>1870</sup> eodem opposito eodem modo<sup>1871</sup> stare<sup>1872</sup> vel oppositum ipsius 'a est'<sup>1873</sup> |W 110v| vel ipsum

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1834 illud VY

1835 *om. V*

1836 *add. hoc consequens V*

1837 illud Y

1838 illud - sic] *om. V*

1839 illius Y

1840 *om. M*

1841 ultimi consequentis] *om. Y*

1842 istius Y, eius M

1843 a est] *om. V*

1844 ergo V

1845 illa V, *om. M*

1846 ergo V

1847 *add. consequentia MW*

1848 patet Y

1849 *add. et MV*

1850 non Y

1851 *add. aliud Y*

1852 ad a - et ad] a Y

1853 esse Y

1854 esse Y

1855 esse Y

1856 dicatur quod] *om. MV*

1857 sequitur quod] *om. MW*

1858 cum V

1859 opposito VY

1860 esse Y

1861 *om. VY, add. opposito W*

1862 ipsius W, *om. M*

1863 illa a - stare] staret ipsius oppositum a esse modo *lectio dubia* [ad impossibilem Y | *add. illa V, add. ista M* |  
potest stare] *ante cum M*

1864 patet WY

1865 *add. si V*

1866 consequentia - non] et tunc Y

1867 ipso *ante* opposito Y

1868 causam Y

1869 *add. oppositum W*

1870 *add. ipso V*

1871 eodem modo] *om. V*

1872 eodem modo stare] *om. W* | ipsius a - stare] *om. Y*

1873 esse Y

'a<sup>1874</sup> est',<sup>1875</sup> ex eo quod<sup>1876</sup> cum qualibet<sup>1877</sup> propositione stat alterum<sup>1878</sup> contradictorium<sup>1879</sup> et semper stare<sup>1880</sup> oportet alterum.<sup>1881</sup> Sequitur<sup>1882</sup> quod<sup>1883</sup> cum<sup>1884</sup> opposito ipsius<sup>1885</sup> 'c<sup>1886</sup> est' stat 'a est',<sup>1887</sup> sed ex opposito<sup>1888</sup> 'c est'<sup>1889</sup> sequitur<sup>1890</sup> oppositum ipsius 'b est', quia<sup>1891</sup> dictum est 'b est ergo<sup>1892</sup> c est' illam<sup>1893</sup> consequentiam esse bonam ergo oppositum ipsius 'b est'<sup>1894</sup> et 'a est' | M 35v] possunt simul stare,<sup>1895</sup> et<sup>1896</sup> 'a est'<sup>1897</sup> infert<sup>1898</sup> 'b est'<sup>1899</sup> in bona<sup>1900</sup> consequentia, prout iterum est suppositum , ergo<sup>1901</sup> oppositum 'b est'<sup>1902</sup> infert oppositum 'a esse' per secundam regulam praecedentem, ergo 'a esse' et suum oppositum<sup>1903</sup> stabunt<sup>1904</sup> simul<sup>1905</sup> cum opposito ipsius 'b esse'<sup>1906</sup> quod implicat contradictionem.

Exemplum huius regulae patet, quia cum ista<sup>1907</sup> consequentia sit bona 'Sortes currit, ergo<sup>1908</sup> homo currit', et ad hoc consequens<sup>1909</sup> 'homo currit' sequitur<sup>1910</sup> 'risibile currit',

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<sup>1874</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1875</sup> esse Y

<sup>1876</sup> quia Y, *add. semper M* | non oportet - ex eo quod] ex quo ad oppositum ipsius c est non sequitur oppositum eius quod est a est impossibile et quod non stet oppositum ipsius a est cum ponatur c esse igitur stat quod stabit a esse posito opposito ipsius c esse eo quod M

<sup>1877</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1878</sup> altera V

<sup>1879</sup> contradictoriarum V, contradictoriorum M

<sup>1880</sup> *add. a ante semper Y*

<sup>1881</sup> alteram V | et semper - alterum] et ultra M

<sup>1882</sup> *add. tunc V*

<sup>1883</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1884</sup> ex V

<sup>1885</sup> *om. V*

<sup>1886</sup> opposito ipsius c] *om. Y*

<sup>1887</sup> esse M

<sup>1888</sup> *add. ipsius V*

<sup>1889</sup> stat a - c est] *om. W*

<sup>1890</sup> stat Y

<sup>1891</sup> eo quod M

<sup>1892</sup> igitur M

<sup>1893</sup> *om. M*

<sup>1894</sup> quia - b est] *om. W*, igitur a est Y

<sup>1895</sup> possunt simul stare] stant simul V | et a - stare] potest simul stare cum a est M

<sup>1896</sup> sed cum M

<sup>1897</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>1898</sup> *vel forsitan* infertur M

<sup>1899</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>1900</sup> *post* consequentia Y

<sup>1901</sup> vel Y

<sup>1902</sup> esse M

<sup>1903</sup> infert - suum oppositum] et b est Y, similiter W, et b est *add. +stabunt sim+ V*

<sup>1904</sup> stant Y

<sup>1905</sup> *om. W*

<sup>1906</sup> cum opposito b esse] cum a est VY, cum est W

<sup>1907</sup> illa V

<sup>1908</sup> igitur Y

etiam ad hanc 'Sortes currit', quae est primum antecedens, sequitur haec 'risibile currit',<sup>1911</sup> quae<sup>1912</sup> sequitur<sup>1913</sup> ad consequens.<sup>1914</sup> Ergo regula vera.<sup>1915</sup>

<4> Quarta regula est haec: in omni consequentia bona,<sup>1916</sup> quidquid antecedit ad<sup>1917</sup> antecedens<sup>1918</sup> etiam antecedit ad<sup>1919</sup> consequens.

Et significat regula tantum quod, si aliqua<sup>1920</sup> consequentia fuerit<sup>1921</sup> bona, tunc ex quacumque propositione sequitur antecedens istius<sup>1922</sup> consequentiae, ex eadem sequitur consequens illius<sup>1923</sup> consequentiae, ut<sup>1924</sup> 'homo currit, ergo<sup>1925</sup> animal currit'. Consequentia est<sup>1926</sup> bona. Modo<sup>1927</sup> hoc antecedens 'homo currit' sequitur ex ista<sup>1928</sup> 'Sortes currit', igitur<sup>1929</sup> hoc consequens 'animal currit' etiam<sup>1930</sup> sequitur ex eadem.<sup>1931</sup> Sequitur enim 'Sortes currit, igitur<sup>1932</sup> animal currit'. Probatur<sup>1933</sup> ex praecedenti regula, <sup>1934</sup> quia ad propositionem quae antecedit ad <sup>1935</sup> antecedens sequitur antecedens <sup>1936</sup> in bona <sup>1937</sup> consequentia per quid nominis, et cum <sup>1938</sup> ad illud <sup>1939</sup> antecedens

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<sup>1909</sup> ad hoc consequens] sequitur VY

<sup>1910</sup> igitur Y, ergo *add.* animal V

<sup>1911</sup> ed ad hoc consequens - currit] oppositum sequitur ad hanc Sortes currit quae est primum prima risibile currit W | sequitur homo currit ergo animal risibile currit et illa risibile currit sequitur ad hanc homo currit quae est primum antecedens et tamen illa risibile currit V | sequitur homo currit igitur risibile currit et sequitur ad hoc quod homo currit quia est primum antecedens hoc risibile currit Y

<sup>1912</sup> *om.* V

<sup>1913</sup> sequebatur VY

<sup>1914</sup> hanc Sortes currit quod fuit primum antecedens Y | *add.* primum V

<sup>1915</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>1916</sup> *add.* et formali W

<sup>1917</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1918</sup> *add.* hoc Y

<sup>1919</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>1920</sup> ita Y

<sup>1921</sup> sit Y

<sup>1922</sup> illius MV

<sup>1923</sup> istius W

<sup>1924</sup> sicut ex isto Y, *add.* cum haec M

<sup>1925</sup> igitur Y

<sup>1926</sup> *ante* consequentia W

<sup>1927</sup> *om.* Y | consequentia est bona modo] sit bona consequentia et M

<sup>1928</sup> illa V, regula Y

<sup>1929</sup> ergo *add.* et V, etiam M, *add.* animal currit et Y

<sup>1930</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>1931</sup> ex eadem] ad eandem W

<sup>1932</sup> ergo M

<sup>1933</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1934</sup> *add.* +quae+

<sup>1935</sup> *om.* VWY

<sup>1936</sup> *om.* W

<sup>1937</sup> *post* consequentia V

<sup>1938</sup> *add.* hoc W, tamen Y

sequatur<sup>1940</sup> consequens, prout supponitur, sequitur<sup>1941</sup> quod idem consequens sequatur ad istam propositio ad quam antecedens sequebatur<sup>1942</sup> per regulam praece-|Y 80r|-dentem, |V 87<sup>va</sup>| dicentem<sup>1943</sup> quod "quidquid sequitur ad consequens etc."<sup>1944</sup>

Ergo<sup>1945</sup> sequitur<sup>1946</sup> quod<sup>1947</sup> propositio quae antecedit ad<sup>1948</sup> antecedens, antecedit ad<sup>1949</sup> consequens, quod fuit probandum.<sup>1950</sup> Exemplum ponitur<sup>1951</sup> in<sup>1952</sup> terminis,<sup>1953</sup> ut si<sup>1954</sup> 'a est'<sup>1955</sup> est<sup>1956</sup> antecedens ad 'b est'<sup>1957</sup> in bona consequentia; et si c antecedit ad a; tunc a sequitur ad c et ad a sequitur b per propositum. Sequitur ergo per praecedentem regulam quod ad c sequitur b, ergo sequitur quod sicut c antecedit ad a antecedens, sic ipsum antecedit ad b consequens, quod est propositum, ergo regula vera.<sup>1958</sup>

### I.3.2 <Regulae generales non tamen convenientes omnibus consequentiis>

<5|1> Consequenter, videndum est de regulis<sup>1959</sup> quae<sup>1960</sup> vocantur<sup>1961</sup> generales - non tamen conveniunt<sup>1962</sup> omnibus consequentiis - quarum prima est haec (et quinta<sup>1963</sup> in ordine):<sup>1964</sup> quod<sup>1965</sup>

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<sup>1939</sup> istud W

<sup>1940</sup> sequitur MWY

<sup>1941</sup> om. Y

<sup>1942</sup> quod idem - sequebatur] om. VWY

<sup>1943</sup> om. VWY

<sup>1944</sup> om. W, add. et ad propositionem quae antecedit ad antecedens sequitur consequens V, add. item Y

<sup>1945</sup> igitur M

<sup>1946</sup> ergo sequitur] sed W

<sup>1947</sup> sequitur quod] om. VY

<sup>1948</sup> om. WY

<sup>1949</sup> om. Y

<sup>1950</sup> add. etc. M

<sup>1951</sup> om. MV, modo Y

<sup>1952</sup> add. istis M

<sup>1953</sup> in terminis] *lectio dubia* significativis Y

<sup>1954</sup> ut si om. M

<sup>1955</sup> om. M

<sup>1956</sup> esset M

<sup>1957</sup> om. M

<sup>1958</sup> in bona - vera] sequitur propositum per praecedentem regulam quod ad c sequitur b, ergo sequitur quod sicut et antecedit ad antecedens, simul ipsum antecedit ad b consequens, quod fuit probandum etc. W | in bona consequentia si *sic* antecedens c ad a a sequitur ad c et tunc ad a sequitur b propositum sequitur per \_\_ rationem quod ad c sequitur b igitur sequitur quod ad c antecedit ad a antecedit etc. Y | in bona consequentia et si c antecedit ad a tunc a sequitur ad c et quod ad a sequitur b positum sequitur per praecedentem regulam quod ad c sequitur b igitur sequitur sicut c antecedit ad a antecedens ipsum antecedit ad b consequens quod est propositum sequitur nunc restat ponere et M

<sup>1959</sup> consequenter - regulis] tunc restat ponere aliquas alias regulas V | nunc restat ponere aliquas regulas Y

<sup>1960</sup> om. V, add. etiam Y

<sup>1961</sup> om. V

<sup>1962</sup> communiter de W

<sup>1963</sup> add. et W

omnis consequentia cuius antecedens est<sup>1966</sup> simpliciter impossibile, est bona. Ista<sup>1967</sup> probatur<sup>1968</sup> ex descriptione bonae<sup>1969</sup> consequentiae prius posita,<sup>1970</sup> quia<sup>1971</sup> impossibile est qualitercumque pro nunc<sup>1972</sup> significatur<sup>1973</sup> per antecedens secundum eius totalem significationem sic esse,<sup>1974</sup> quin ita<sup>1975</sup> sit sicut significatur per consequens secundum eius totalem significationem, quodcumque sit illud,<sup>1976</sup> |M 36r| ergo<sup>1977</sup> consequentia est bona. Consequentia tenet<sup>1978</sup> per definitionem<sup>1979</sup> bonae<sup>1980</sup> consequentiae.<sup>1981</sup> Et<sup>1982</sup> antecedens patet, quia<sup>1983</sup> cum antecedens<sup>1984</sup> supponitur esse impossibile; impossibile est<sup>1985</sup> sic esse qualitercumque pro nunc<sup>1986</sup> significatur<sup>1987</sup> per ipsum<sup>1988</sup> antecedens<sup>1989</sup> et per consequens impossibile est sic<sup>1990</sup> esse qualitercumque per ipsum significatur<sup>1991</sup> pro nunc, quin ita sit sicut<sup>1992</sup> per quamlibet<sup>1993</sup> aliam<sup>1994</sup> propositionem significatur. Haec regula etiam<sup>1995</sup> aliter<sup>1996</sup> probatur in |W 111r| regulis<sup>1997</sup> generalibus.

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<sup>1964</sup> et quinta in ordine] *om.* M | quarum - ordine] *om.* V  
<sup>1965</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>1966</sup> *post* simpliciter MW  
<sup>1967</sup> illa *post* probatur Y  
<sup>1968</sup> *add.* sic Y  
<sup>1969</sup> *post* consequentiae V  
<sup>1970</sup> positae Y, *ante* prius M  
<sup>1971</sup> quod Y  
<sup>1972</sup> *post* significatur MW  
<sup>1973</sup> significat Y  
<sup>1974</sup> sic esse] quodcumque sit illud VW  
<sup>1975</sup> sic W  
<sup>1976</sup> istud M | secundum - illud] *om.* W | quin - illud] *om.* V  
<sup>1977</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>1978</sup> est Y  
<sup>1979</sup> descriptione V  
<sup>1980</sup> *post* consequentiae V  
<sup>1981</sup> *add.* cum W  
<sup>1982</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>1983</sup> patet quia] *om.* W  
<sup>1984</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>1985</sup> impossibile est] *om.* Y  
<sup>1986</sup> nunc Y  
<sup>1987</sup> *post* ipsum V  
<sup>1988</sup> eam Y  
<sup>1989</sup> *om.* VY  
<sup>1990</sup> *add.* +esse+ V  
<sup>1991</sup> *ante* per W  
<sup>1992</sup> qualitercumque Y  
<sup>1993</sup> quamcumque Y  
<sup>1994</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>1995</sup> *ante* regula V  
<sup>1996</sup> hec - aliter] quae et ratio aliam Y  
<sup>1997</sup> consequentiis Y

<6|2> Sexta<sup>1998</sup> regula est haec: quod omnis consequentia cuius consequens est<sup>1999</sup> simpliciter necessarium, est bona. Et hoc solet dici sub istis<sup>2000</sup> verbis:<sup>2001</sup> "necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet". Probatur in omni tali<sup>2002</sup> consequentia:<sup>2003</sup> ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis, ergo omnis talis consequentia est bona. Consequentia tenet<sup>2004</sup> per primam regulam. Antecedens patet,<sup>2005</sup> quia cum<sup>2006</sup> consequens talis consequentiae sit [Y 80v] necessarium, suum contradictorium est simpliciter<sup>2007</sup> impossibile. Consequentia est nota<sup>2008</sup> de se. Et<sup>2009</sup> tunc<sup>2010</sup> ex isto<sup>2011</sup> sequitur oppositum antecedentis per regulam<sup>2012</sup> praecedentem, quia<sup>2013</sup> quidquid ex eo<sup>2014</sup> infertur, sequitur ad ipsum in consequentia bona.

Exemplum primae regulae:<sup>2015</sup> 'Deus non est, ergo homo est asinus'.

Exemplum secundae regulae:<sup>2016</sup> 'baculus stat in angulo, ergo<sup>2017</sup> causa prima<sup>2018</sup> est'.<sup>2019</sup>

Dixi notanter<sup>2020</sup> in ipsis<sup>2021</sup> regulis<sup>2022</sup> de<sup>2023</sup> impossibili<sup>2024</sup> simpliciter et de<sup>2025</sup> necessario<sup>2026</sup> simpliciter,<sup>2027</sup> quia quidam loici dicunt propositionem de praeterito veram<sup>2028</sup> esse necessariam et

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<sup>1998</sup> secunda V  
<sup>1999</sup> *post* simpliciter W  
<sup>2000</sup> aliis V  
<sup>2001</sup> *add.* quod pure V, *add. lectio dubia* necesse *lectio dubia* quibus Y  
<sup>2002</sup> *add.* est Y  
<sup>2003</sup> *add. lectio dubia* vera Y  
<sup>2004</sup> patet W, probatur Y  
<sup>2005</sup> probatur Y  
<sup>2006</sup> et V  
<sup>2007</sup> *post* impossibile Y  
<sup>2008</sup> *post* se W  
<sup>2009</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>2010</sup> *add.* si sic V  
<sup>2011</sup> illo V  
<sup>2012</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>2013</sup> *vel forsitan* quod W  
<sup>2014</sup> eadem W  
<sup>2015</sup> *add.* ut Y  
<sup>2016</sup> *add.* Deus nunc est ergo W, *add.* ut Y, *add.* +ut+ V  
<sup>2017</sup> et W  
<sup>2018</sup> *ante* causa Y | causa prima] deus V  
<sup>2019</sup> *add.* et V  
<sup>2020</sup> notabiliter Y  
<sup>2021</sup> *om.* W, istis Y  
<sup>2022</sup> *add.* duabus ut Y  
<sup>2023</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>2024</sup> impossibile V | de impossibili] *post* simpliciter W  
<sup>2025</sup> *om.* V

falsam esse impossibile. Si autem<sup>2029</sup> istud<sup>2030</sup> sit verum, tunc adminus manifestum<sup>2031</sup> est quod tales non<sup>2032</sup> sunt necessariae<sup>2033</sup> nec<sup>2034</sup> impossibiles<sup>2035</sup> simpliciter,<sup>2036</sup> quia<sup>2037</sup> non non pro quolibet tempore<sup>2038</sup> sunt necessariae vel impossibiles.<sup>2039</sup> Et ideo locutus sum<sup>2040</sup> de necessario<sup>2041</sup> simpliciter et de impossibile<sup>2042</sup> simpliciter.

<7|3> Septima<sup>2043</sup> regula est haec<sup>2044</sup>: ex antecedente possibili numquam<sup>2045</sup> sequitur consequens mere impossibile. Ista consequentia patet per<sup>2046</sup> Philosophum<sup>2047</sup> *Primo Priorum*. Et faciliter potest<sup>2048</sup> declarari, quia<sup>2049</sup> cum antecedens sit<sup>2050</sup> possibile sic potest fieri<sup>2051</sup> totaliter<sup>2052</sup> sicut<sup>2053</sup> per ipsum pro nunc<sup>2054</sup> significatur. Alias ipsum esset impossibile. Sed tamen<sup>2055</sup> non potest fieri<sup>2056</sup> sicut per<sup>2057</sup> consequens<sup>2058</sup> significatur, [V 87<sup>vb</sup>] cum ipsum<sup>2059</sup> sit simpliciter<sup>2060</sup> impossibile. Igitur<sup>2061</sup> si<sup>2062</sup>

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<sup>2026</sup> necessarium V  
<sup>2027</sup> et de necessario simpliciter] *om.* W  
<sup>2028</sup> *ante* de V  
<sup>2029</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>2030</sup> illud VY  
<sup>2031</sup> adminus manifestum] scitum V  
<sup>2032</sup> nec Y  
<sup>2033</sup> impossibiles *add.* simpliciter Y  
<sup>2034</sup> vel V  
<sup>2035</sup> necessariae Y  
<sup>2036</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>2037</sup> igitur W  
<sup>2038</sup> quolibet tempore] qualibet specie W | *add.* ipsae Y  
<sup>2039</sup> quia - vel impossibiles] *om.* V  
<sup>2040</sup> locutus sum] loquor hic W  
<sup>2041</sup> necessariis V  
<sup>2042</sup> impossibilis V  
<sup>2043</sup> secunda V  
<sup>2044</sup> est haec] *om.* W, *add.* quod V  
<sup>2045</sup> *ante* ex M  
<sup>2046</sup> consequentia patet per] *om.* V, et per M, ratio est Y  
<sup>2047</sup> Philosophi VY  
<sup>2048</sup> possibile est Y  
<sup>2049</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>2050</sup> est V  
<sup>2051</sup> *add.* et W, esse M  
<sup>2052</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>2053</sup> consequentialiter Y, *add.* +sicut+ V  
<sup>2054</sup> nunc Y  
<sup>2055</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>2056</sup> *add.* sic Y  
<sup>2057</sup> *add.* ipsum Y  
<sup>2058</sup> *add.* pro nunc Y  
<sup>2059</sup> consequens M  
<sup>2060</sup> *post* impossibile W  
<sup>2061</sup> ergo MV  
<sup>2062</sup> cum M

antecedens<sup>2063</sup> sit possibile et consequens impossibile, consequentia non est bona.<sup>2064</sup> Consequentia clara est,<sup>2065</sup> et<sup>2066</sup> totum<sup>2067</sup> antecedens notum est<sup>2068</sup> de se. [M 36<sup>v</sup>]

Sed diceret aliquis:<sup>2069</sup> 'omne currens est asinus,<sup>2070</sup> homo est currens,<sup>2071</sup> igitur homo est asinus'.<sup>2072</sup>

Antecedens est possibile et consequens<sup>2073</sup> simpliciter<sup>2074</sup> impossibile, ergo regula fuit falsa.<sup>2075</sup>

Consequentia est nota, et antecedens pro prima parte, scilicet quod ista consequentia est bona,<sup>2076</sup>

patet, quia est discursus in Darii. Sed pro secunda parte,<sup>2077</sup> scilicet quod antecedens sit possibile,

patet,<sup>2078</sup> quia tam<sup>2079</sup> maior quam<sup>2080</sup> minor est possibilis. Quod<sup>2081</sup> autem consequens sit<sup>2082</sup> [Y 81<sup>r</sup>]

impossibile patet de se.

Ad id respondetur: concedo quod ista consequentia non est bona;<sup>2083</sup> et negatur quod<sup>2084</sup> antecedens

sit possibile. Ad probationem, quando dicitur<sup>2085</sup> quod<sup>2086</sup> tam maior quam minor est possibilis,<sup>2087</sup>

hoc<sup>2088</sup> conceditur, et negatur consequentia "ergo<sup>2089</sup> antecedens est possibile". Hoc enim non<sup>2090</sup>

sufficit, sed oportet quod maior esset<sup>2091</sup> minori<sup>2092</sup> compossibilis, sed<sup>2093</sup> sic<sup>2094</sup> non est hic,<sup>2095</sup> nam si

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<sup>2063</sup> *add.* simpliciter M

<sup>2064</sup> est bona] valet V | consequentia non est bona] *ante* si M

<sup>2065</sup> consequentia clara est] *om.* W, consequentia est nota M

<sup>2066</sup> clara est et] *om.* Y

<sup>2067</sup> *om.* MV, *post* antecedens Y

<sup>2068</sup> notum est] patet Y, simpliciter M

<sup>2069</sup> diceret aliquis] *lectio dibia* diceres tu hic M | *add.* bene sequitur. W

<sup>2070</sup> *add.* et MY

<sup>2071</sup> est currens] currit Y

<sup>2072</sup> *add.* et consequentia bona cum Y

<sup>2073</sup> antecedens - consequens] consequens falsum et antecedens W

<sup>2074</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>2075</sup> bona Y

<sup>2076</sup> scilicet - bona] *om.* Y

<sup>2077</sup> *add.* patet M

<sup>2078</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2079</sup> quam M

<sup>2080</sup> tam Y

<sup>2081</sup> tunc Y

<sup>2082</sup> est M

<sup>2083</sup> patet quia - non est bona] *om.* W | Quod - non est bona] autem consequens sit impossibile supponitur ad illud concedo quod ista consequentia est bona V | ergo ista quod sit impossibile supponitur ad idem conceditur *vel forsitan* reveritur quod illa consequentia est bona Y

<sup>2084</sup> *post* antecedens Y

<sup>2085</sup> quando dicitur] conceditur M

<sup>2086</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>2087</sup> est possibilis] sunt possibles M

<sup>2088</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>2089</sup> igitur MY

<sup>2090</sup> enim non] *om.* Y

<sup>2091</sup> et V

<sup>2092</sup> minor sint V

<sup>2093</sup> modo MV



omne currens esset asinus, tunc semper<sup>2096</sup> esset<sup>2097</sup> minor falsa quae dicit quod homo esset<sup>2098</sup> |W  
111v| currens,<sup>2099</sup> nam si homo esset currens,<sup>2100</sup> aliquod currens<sup>2101</sup> non esset<sup>2102</sup> asinus - quod est  
contradictorium maioris -<sup>2103</sup> ergo<sup>2104</sup> antecedens est<sup>2105</sup> una<sup>2106</sup> copulativa<sup>2107</sup> composita ex maiore  
et minore, quarum qualibet est possibilis.<sup>2108</sup> Tamen copulativa est impossibilis, quia maior est  
impossibilis<sup>2109</sup> minore. Quod autem istud<sup>2110</sup> non sit inconveniens, patet de copulativa composita  
ex partibus sibi invicem<sup>2111</sup> contradicentibus, quarum partium<sup>2112</sup> quaelibet<sup>2113</sup> est possibilis, sicut<sup>2114</sup>  
ista:<sup>2115</sup> 'Sortes currit, Sortes non currit'; quaelibet enim pars istius<sup>2116</sup> est possibilis,<sup>2117</sup> saltem quae  
est propositio, sed tamen copulativa est impossibilis, quia prima <sup>2118</sup> copulativae <sup>2119</sup> est  
impossibilis<sup>2120</sup> secundae parti,<sup>2121</sup> quia<sup>2122</sup> partes inter se contradicunt, ut<sup>2123</sup> suppositum est.<sup>2124</sup>  
Corrolarie potest concedi ista consequentia,<sup>2125</sup> quod ex possibilibus copulative<sup>2126</sup> coniunctis<sup>2127</sup> bene  
sequitur impossibile, dum<sup>2128</sup> ista<sup>2129</sup> possibilia sibi invicem sint impossibilia.<sup>2130</sup>

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<sup>2094</sup> sed sic] cum Y  
<sup>2095</sup> om. Y  
<sup>2096</sup> om. W  
<sup>2097</sup> post minor Y  
<sup>2098</sup> est WY  
<sup>2099</sup> esset currens] currit Y | nam si omne - esset currens] om. M  
<sup>2100</sup> add. lectio dubia tunc Y  
<sup>2101</sup> aliquod currens] om. W  
<sup>2102</sup> est VW  
<sup>2103</sup> quod est contradictorium maioris] om. VWY  
<sup>2104</sup> post antecedens V, igitur MY  
<sup>2105</sup> in hanc M | antecedens est] om. Y  
<sup>2106</sup> +eo+ M | est una] ex hac W  
<sup>2107</sup> add. est M  
<sup>2108</sup> add. sed V  
<sup>2109</sup> compossibilis W, impossibilis Y  
<sup>2110</sup> illud VY  
<sup>2111</sup> sibi invicem] om. VY  
<sup>2112</sup> om. VY  
<sup>2113</sup> add. pars Y  
<sup>2114</sup> ut V  
<sup>2115</sup> illa V  
<sup>2116</sup> illius V  
<sup>2117</sup> sicut ista - possibilis] om. Y  
<sup>2118</sup> add. pars Y  
<sup>2119</sup> copulativa W  
<sup>2120</sup> impossibilis Y  
<sup>2121</sup> add. copulativae Y  
<sup>2122</sup> propositio sed - parti quia] possibilis secundae parti quae W  
<sup>2123</sup> om. Y  
<sup>2124</sup> add. unde V  
<sup>2125</sup> ista consequentia] om. V  
<sup>2126</sup> post coniunctis V  
<sup>2127</sup> communiter W  
<sup>2128</sup> dummodo V

<8|4> Octava<sup>2131</sup> regula est haec:<sup>2132</sup> numquam ex vero<sup>2133</sup> sequitur falsum. Probatur, quia cum antecedens sit verum, sic<sup>2134</sup> est sicut per ipsum significatur; et cum consequens sit<sup>2135</sup> falsum, non sic<sup>2136</sup> est sicut per consequens<sup>2137</sup> significatur. Ergo consequentia<sup>2138</sup> ubi<sup>2139</sup> antecedens est verum et consequens<sup>2140</sup> falsum<sup>2141</sup> non est bona consequentia. Tenet consequentia<sup>2142</sup> per bonae consequentiae definitionem.<sup>2143</sup> Antecedens notum est de se.

<9|5> Nona<sup>2144</sup> regula est haec:<sup>2145</sup> si ad aliquam propositionem cum una<sup>2146</sup> necessaria<sup>2147</sup> copulativae<sup>2148</sup> adiuncta sequitur<sup>2149</sup> alia, ista<sup>2150</sup> eadem<sup>2151</sup> sequitur ad eandem propositionem<sup>2152</sup> sine<sup>2153</sup> illa<sup>2154</sup> necessaria sibi<sup>2155</sup> adiuncta. Declaratur, quia vel<sup>2156</sup> consequens quod sequitur est<sup>2157</sup> necessarium, vel non. Et si sic,<sup>2158</sup> [M 37r] tunc<sup>2159</sup> sequitur ad quamlibet propositionem, ut patet<sup>2160</sup> per sextam<sup>2161</sup> regulam. Si<sup>2162</sup> non est<sup>2163</sup> necessaria,<sup>2164</sup> tunc<sup>2165</sup> quaeritur de ista<sup>2166</sup> propositione ex

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2129 illa V  
2130 corrolarie - impossibilia] om. Y  
2131 quarta V  
2132 add. quod Y  
2133 veris V  
2134 om. Y  
2135 est W  
2136 om. W, post est Y  
2137 ipsum V  
2138 om. W  
2139 ibi W | ergo consequentia ubi] in consequentia bona eo Y  
2140 lectio dubia Y  
2141 om. Y  
2142 ante tenet Y  
2143 post per Y  
2144 quinta V  
2145 quod W  
2146 aliqua W  
2147 add. illi V, sibi Y  
2148 om. V  
2149 add. aliqua V  
2150 illa V  
2151 add. alia ista Y  
2152 om. V  
2153 +ita+ W, add. ista Y  
2154 post necessaria WY  
2155 add. +addita+ non W  
2156 om. Y  
2157 quod sequitur est] om. Y  
2158 add. illa M  
2159 vel non - tunc] ergo ipsum Y  
2160 propositionem ut patet] om. Y  
2161 secundam VY

qua cum ista<sup>2167</sup> necessaria inferebatur, utrum ea [Y 81<sup>v</sup>] stante semper stat alia; et si sic,<sup>2168</sup> tunc alia<sup>2169</sup> sequitur ad ipsam.<sup>2170</sup> Ergo<sup>2171</sup> regula est vera.<sup>2172</sup> Vel ipsa<sup>2173</sup> potest stare [V 88<sup>ra</sup>] alia non stante; et hoc est impossibile, quia ea<sup>2174</sup> stante semper stat alia<sup>2175</sup> necessaria, et ex consequenti<sup>2176</sup> cum illa<sup>2177</sup> alia sequitur ad eandem<sup>2178</sup> sumptam cum<sup>2179</sup> alia<sup>2180</sup> necessaria. Sequitur quod alia<sup>2181</sup> semper stat stante<sup>2182</sup> prima propositione ex qua cum ista<sup>2183</sup> necessaria alia<sup>2184</sup> inferebatur. Exemplum huius potest poni hoc:<sup>2185</sup> ut si<sup>2186</sup> sequatur<sup>2187</sup> 'omnis<sup>2188</sup> homo est risibilis, Sortes est homo, ergo<sup>2189</sup> Sortes est risibilis'; ubi<sup>2190</sup> ista<sup>2191</sup> 'Sortes es risibilis' infertur ex illa<sup>2192</sup> 'Sortes est homo',<sup>2193</sup> coassumpta<sup>2194</sup> ista<sup>2195</sup> necessaria 'omnis homo est risibilis', quia manifestum est quod [W 112r] ista stante<sup>2196</sup> 'Sortes est homo' vel semper simul<sup>2197</sup> oportet<sup>2198</sup> stare 'Sortes est risibilis' - et si

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2162 vel YW  
2163 om. V  
2164 necessariam W, *lectio dubia* V, necessarium Y  
2165 et Y, *add. +sequitur+* W  
2166 illa V  
2167 illa V  
2168 et si sic] om. Y  
2169 om. Y  
2170 ista Y | alia - ipsam] ad eam sequebatur alia W  
2171 ideo W, igitur Y  
2172 ideo -vera] quia secunda W  
2173 om. V  
2174 eam *vel forsitan* eam esse Y  
2175 igitur Y  
2176 consequente V  
2177 ista Y  
2178 eam W, illam V  
2179 in W  
2180 ista Y, illa V  
2181 illa V | quod alia] om. Y  
2182 cum W  
2183 illa V  
2184 om. W | ista necessaria alia] *lectio dubia* aliud Y  
2185 hic W  
2186 *add. +ponatur+* W  
2187 sequitur VY  
2188 aliquis Y  
2189 igitur Y  
2190 ibi W  
2191 illa V  
2192 ista Y  
2193 Sortes est homo] om. Y  
2194 qua assumpta W  
2195 illa V, om. Y  
2196 ista stante] illa V, in *lectio dubia* hoc Y  
2197 *post* stare Y | vel semper simul] om. W  
2198 *post* stare V

sic tunc<sup>2199</sup> sequitur ad istam<sup>2200</sup> solam 'Sortes est homo' ista<sup>2201</sup> 'Sortes est risibilis',<sup>2202</sup> quod est<sup>2203</sup> propositum - vel quandoque sine illa<sup>2204</sup> potest<sup>2205</sup> stare.<sup>2206</sup> Et hoc<sup>2207</sup> non, quia manifestum est quod ista<sup>2208</sup> 'Sortes est homo' stante, semper<sup>2209</sup> stat ista<sup>2210</sup> necessaria<sup>2211</sup> 'omnis homo est risibilis', quia illa est necessaria et ex consequenti semper stat cum<sup>2212</sup> qualibet vera et<sup>2213</sup> cum ista<sup>2214</sup> necessaria et ista<sup>2215</sup> 'Sortes est homo' semper stat quod Sortes est risibilis, quia ipsa sequitur ad illam<sup>2216</sup> quod est regula.<sup>2217</sup>

<10|6> <sup>2218</sup>Decima<sup>2219</sup> regula est haec:<sup>2220</sup> omnis consequentia cuius antecedens est propositio<sup>2221</sup> copulativa composita<sup>2222</sup> ex partibus contradicentibus principalibus<sup>2223</sup> est<sup>2224</sup> necessaria. Probatur, quia<sup>2225</sup> eius antecedens est<sup>2226</sup> impossibile, igitur<sup>2227</sup> consequentia est<sup>2228</sup> bona. Consequentia tenet<sup>2229</sup>

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<sup>2199</sup> sic tunc] Sortes currit Y

<sup>2200</sup> illam V

<sup>2201</sup> illa V

<sup>2202</sup> et si - risibilis] *om.* MW

<sup>2203</sup> quod est] oportet esse Y

<sup>2204</sup> sine illa] *om.* WY

<sup>2205</sup> *add.* non WY

<sup>2206</sup> *ante* potest V

<sup>2207</sup> et hoc] ut Y

<sup>2208</sup> illa V

<sup>2209</sup> *add.* hoc quod Y

<sup>2210</sup> illa V, *add.* +Sortes est risibilis+ W

<sup>2211</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2212</sup> in W

<sup>2213</sup> *add.* sic M

<sup>2214</sup> illa V

<sup>2215</sup> necessaria et ista] *om.* V

<sup>2216</sup> quia ipsa - illam] *om.* MW, *add.* ergo sequitur quod etiam semper oportet quod illa 'Sortes est homo' stante stet illa 'Sortes est risibilis' V

<sup>2217</sup> quia illa - regula] quod est ratio Y | *add.* etc. V

<sup>2218</sup> *add.* sexta regula est haec omnis consequentia cuius antecedens est una copulativa composita ex partibus contradicentibus principalibus est bona probatur quia eius antecedens est impossibile ergo consequentia est bona ut tractum est ex prima regula ubi dicitur quod ad impossibilem sequitur *sic* quilibet V

<sup>2219</sup> septima V

<sup>2220</sup> est haec] *om.* W

<sup>2221</sup> una composita M

<sup>2222</sup> componibilis W

<sup>2223</sup> *om.* V, partibus M

<sup>2224</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2225</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2226</sup> *add.* coniunctiva Y

<sup>2227</sup> ergo V

<sup>2228</sup> *om.* MY, *add.* necessaria et V

<sup>2229</sup> est M

per quintam<sup>2230</sup> regulam. Antecedens patet,<sup>2231</sup> quia omnis copulativa est impossibilis<sup>2232</sup> quae componitur ex partibus contradicentibus.<sup>2233</sup>

<11|7> Undecima<sup>2234</sup> regula est haec:<sup>2235</sup> arguendo a propositione<sup>2236</sup> habente solum unam<sup>2237</sup> causam<sup>2238</sup> veritatis ad aliam<sup>2239</sup> habentem illam<sup>2240</sup> eandem<sup>2241</sup> causam<sup>2242</sup> veritatis, et cum hoc aliam vel alias, est bona consequentia.<sup>2243</sup> Exemplum<sup>2244</sup> ut:<sup>2245</sup> "quod fuit homo fuit album, igitur<sup>2246</sup> homo fuit<sup>2247</sup> albus',<sup>2248</sup> nam<sup>2249</sup> antecedens habet solum unam causam veritatis,<sup>2250</sup> scilicet istam:<sup>2251</sup> quod illud<sup>2252</sup> quod fuit<sup>2253</sup> homo fuit album;<sup>2254</sup> sed consequens habet illam<sup>2255</sup> et<sup>2256</sup> cum hac<sup>2257</sup> |M 37v| aliam,<sup>2258</sup> quia ipsum<sup>2259</sup> tantum valet<sup>2260</sup> sicut<sup>2261</sup> quod illud quod fuit homo fuit album, vel istud<sup>2262</sup> quod est homo fuit album.

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2230 istam W, ipsam Y, primam V

2231 probatur W, est M

2232 *post* contradicentibus Y

2233 *add.* repugnantibus Y | quae - contradicentibus] *ante* est impossibilis M

2234 octava V

2235 est haec] talis est W

2236 a propositione] ab oratio Y

2237 solum unam] unam solam V

2238 *add.* sufficientem Y

2239 alia W, alteram Y

2240 *om.* Y

2241 *om.* V

2242 *add.* sufficientem Y

2243 *ante* bona MV

2244 hic *post* ut VY

2245 *om.* M, *add.* hoc VW

2246 ergo MV

2247 oportet V

2248 *add.* q Y

2249 *add.* hic V, hoc Y

2250 habet - veritatis] unam solam causam veritatis habet VY, solum unam causam veritatis habet M

2251 *om.* VY, illam *add.* illud M

2252 *om.* Y

2253 *add.* illud fuit M

2254 fuit album] *om.* M

2255 istam Y, *add.* causam M

2256 *om.* VY

2257 haec V

2258 alia VY

2259 ipsam Y

2260 *ante* tantum Y

2261 scilicet VY

2262 illud V

Probatur regula ex eo<sup>2263</sup> quod<sup>2264</sup> quando<sup>2265</sup> non potest ita<sup>2266</sup> esse sicut pro nunc per antecedens significatur<sup>2267</sup> secundum eius [Y 82<sup>r</sup>] totalem significationem quin ita sit sicut pro nunc<sup>2268</sup> per consequens significatur<sup>2269</sup> secundum eius totalem significationem,<sup>2270</sup> tunc<sup>2271</sup> consequentia est bona. Sed sic est<sup>2272</sup> de omni<sup>2273</sup> tali consequentia, ergo omnis talis consequentia est bona. Consequentia est nota.<sup>2274</sup> Antecedens pro prima parte patet per definitionem bonae consequentiae;<sup>2275</sup> [V 88<sup>rb</sup>] pro secunda parte est notum,<sup>2276</sup> quia antecedens<sup>2277</sup> ex quo solum unam<sup>2278</sup> causam veritatis habet quam etiam<sup>2279</sup> habet consequens,<sup>2280</sup> si ita sit<sup>2281</sup> sicut antecedens<sup>2282</sup> significat, ita<sup>2283</sup> erit sicut consequens significat. Quod fuit probandum. Sed tamen<sup>2284</sup> non oportet e converso affirmative<sup>2285</sup> arguendo, [W 112<sup>v</sup>] quia non sequitur 'album fuit Sortes, ergo quod est album fuit Sortes' - prout de se notum est.<sup>2286</sup>

<12|8> Duodecima<sup>2287</sup> regula est haec:<sup>2288</sup> omnis consequentia cuius antecedens et consequens sunt<sup>2289</sup> de eisdem terminis et totaliter eodem modo supponentibus, non amplius<sup>2290</sup> in una quam in alia acceptis, dummodo fuerunt<sup>2291</sup> eiusdem qualitatis, est bona consequentia.<sup>2292</sup> Probatur regula<sup>2293</sup>

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<sup>2263</sup> ex eo] *om.* Y

<sup>2264</sup> quia WY

<sup>2265</sup> quia V, utrumque M

<sup>2266</sup> *post* esse W

<sup>2267</sup> *ante* quin VY

<sup>2268</sup> pro nunc] *ante* significatur M

<sup>2269</sup> *ante* tunc V

<sup>2270</sup> quin - significationem] etc. Y

<sup>2271</sup> veri M

<sup>2272</sup> *add.* hoc , *add.* hic W

<sup>2273</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2274</sup> *ante* est M | consequentia est nota] *om.* W | omnis - anota] etc. Y

<sup>2275</sup> *add.* sed Y

<sup>2276</sup> *ante* est MW

<sup>2277</sup> *post* quo VY

<sup>2278</sup> solum unam] unam solam VY

<sup>2279</sup> talis W

<sup>2280</sup> *add.* et V

<sup>2281</sup> est Y

<sup>2282</sup> consequens W

<sup>2283</sup> *add.* etiam V

<sup>2284</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2285</sup> *om.* W

<sup>2286</sup> prout de se notum est] *om.* WV

<sup>2287</sup> nona V

<sup>2288</sup> *om.* W

<sup>2289</sup> *add.* totaliter V

<sup>2290</sup> magis ample V

<sup>2291</sup> sit W, sint M

<sup>2292</sup> *om.* W, *ante* bona V

<sup>2293</sup> *om.* W

quia in omni tali consequentia<sup>2294</sup> antecedens includit consequens, immo<sup>2295</sup> aequivalet consequenti, ergo<sup>2296</sup> omnis talis<sup>2297</sup> consequentia est bona.<sup>2298</sup> Consequentia tenet. Et<sup>2299</sup> antecedens declaratur,<sup>2300</sup> quia si non, hoc esset ex eo quod antecedens et consequens non essent de eisdem terminis vel quod<sup>2301</sup> non eodem modo supponerent vel quod magis ample supponerent in una quam in alia. Modo<sup>2302</sup> oppositum omnium<sup>2303</sup> istorum<sup>2304</sup> supponitur in regula, ergo sequitur quod in omni tali consequentia antecedens aequivalet consequenti. Ergo regula<sup>2305</sup> est vera. Quod fuit probandum.

Exemplum huius,<sup>2306</sup> ut 'homo est animal, ergo<sup>2307</sup> animal est homo'.<sup>2308</sup> Termini enim<sup>2309</sup> in untrisque propositionibus<sup>2310</sup> eodem modo supponunt et aequaliter ampliantur et<sup>2311</sup> sunt eiusdem qualitatis,<sup>2312</sup> et<sup>2313</sup> propter hoc<sup>2314</sup> consequentia est bona.<sup>2315</sup> [M 38<sup>r</sup>]

Et haec de generalibus regulis dicta sufficiant.

Sequuntur modo aliae regulae.<sup>2316</sup>

### I. 3. 3 <Aliae regulae speciales consequentiarum formalium non syllogisticarum>

Restat nunc ponere aliquas regulas speciales consequentiarum formalium non syllogisticarum.<sup>2317</sup>

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<sup>2294</sup> *om. VW*

<sup>2295</sup> *ergo V*

<sup>2296</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>2297</sup> *terminis Y*

<sup>2298</sup> *aequivalet - bona] etc. V*

<sup>2299</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>2300</sup> *probatur Y*

<sup>2301</sup> *quia Y*

<sup>2302</sup> *add. quarum Y*

<sup>2303</sup> *om. W*

<sup>2304</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>2305</sup> *ergo sequitur - regula] om. Y*

<sup>2306</sup> *ante exemplum add. ponitur V*

<sup>2307</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>2308</sup> *homo est - est homo] Sortes est homo albus igitur Sortes est albus homo M*

<sup>2309</sup> *termini enim] om. Y*

<sup>2310</sup> *propositione add. lectio dubia autem Y, om. M*

<sup>2311</sup> *add. etiam V, etiam M*

<sup>2312</sup> *om. V | eiusdem qualitatis] eadem W*

<sup>2313</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>2314</sup> *ita M*

<sup>2315</sup> *add. Intelligo regulam ad ab eadem parte copulae lectio dubia signum rimanentibus non erit ultra verba non enim sequitur semper omne animal homo non est prout homo est praedicatum igitur semper homo non est animal prout ly homo est subiectum et tamen termini praecise eodem modo aeque ample stant apparet vel forsane oportet enim si praedicatum supponens confuse tantum vere negatur de subiecto [M 38<sup>r</sup>] stante confuse distributive quod e converso de illo praedicato reducto ad istius ipsum subiectum de eo remaneant confuse et distributive sicut patet in exemplo iam posito M*

<sup>2316</sup> *sequuntur - regulae] om. W, etc. Y | et haec - regulae] etc. V*

<1> Quarum prima est haec: quod<sup>2318</sup> arguendo a tota<sup>2319</sup> copulativa<sup>2320</sup> ad quamlibet<sup>2321</sup> eius partem principalem<sup>2322</sup> est consequentia bona et formalis.

Exemplum |Y 84v| ut:<sup>2323</sup> 'a est et b est, ergo<sup>2324</sup> a est'.<sup>2325</sup> Consequentia est bona.<sup>2326</sup> Probatur regula:<sup>2327</sup> impossibile est qualitercumque per antecedens significatur sic esse quin<sup>2328</sup> ita sit sicut per consequens talis consequentiae significatur.<sup>2329</sup> Et cum haec<sup>2330</sup> tenet in omnibus terminis qualitercumque dispositis, ergo<sup>2331</sup> sequitur quod talis<sup>2332</sup> consequentia est<sup>2333</sup> bona et formalis.<sup>2334</sup> Tenet<sup>2335</sup> consequentia<sup>2336</sup> per definitionem bonae<sup>2337</sup> consequentiae et formalis.<sup>2338</sup> Antecedens declaratur, quia<sup>2339</sup> ad veritatem copulativae requiritur sic esse<sup>2340</sup> qualitercumque per utramque partem principalem<sup>2341</sup> pro nunc<sup>2342</sup> secundum eius totalem significationem significatur.<sup>2343</sup> Modo<sup>2344</sup> non potest ita<sup>2345</sup> esse qualitercumque per utramque<sup>2346</sup> partem principalem<sup>2347</sup> significatur<sup>2348</sup> secundum eius<sup>2349</sup> totalem significationem,<sup>2350</sup> nisi<sup>2351</sup> ita esset sicut per primam<sup>2352</sup> eius partem<sup>2353</sup>

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<sup>2317</sup> syllogizatarum W

<sup>2318</sup> om. Y

<sup>2319</sup> a tota] om. Y

<sup>2320</sup> add. aliqua W, alteram Y

<sup>2321</sup> alteram W

<sup>2322</sup> om. VW

<sup>2323</sup> huius Y

<sup>2324</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2325</sup> add. ista W

<sup>2326</sup> add. et V | consequentia est bona] est bona consequentia M

<sup>2327</sup> om. W, ante probatur V | add. quia W

<sup>2328</sup> consequens Y

<sup>2329</sup> ante talis M | talis consequentiae significatur] significatur si tales consequentiae formentur W

<sup>2330</sup> hoc WY

<sup>2331</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2332</sup> terminis Y

<sup>2333</sup> sit M

<sup>2334</sup> et formalis] om. MV

<sup>2335</sup> lectio dubia est post consequentia Y

<sup>2336</sup> ante tenet M

<sup>2337</sup> post consequentiae Y

<sup>2338</sup> et formalis] om. MV | add. et MW

<sup>2339</sup> patet Y, add. cum M

<sup>2340</sup> sic esse] quod ita sit M

<sup>2341</sup> principaliter V, significatur Y, om. M

<sup>2342</sup> om. M

<sup>2343</sup> ante pro nunc M

<sup>2344</sup> et M

<sup>2345</sup> sic M

<sup>2346</sup> om. V

<sup>2347</sup> om. M

<sup>2348</sup> ante nisi M

<sup>2349</sup> earum M

<sup>2350</sup> modo - significationem] om. WY

<sup>2351</sup> om. Y



secundum eius totalem significationem significatur<sup>2354</sup> et nisi<sup>2355</sup> ita esset<sup>2356</sup> sicut per secundam partem<sup>2357</sup> eius principalem<sup>2358</sup> pro nunc<sup>2359</sup> secundum eius totalem significationem significatur.<sup>2360</sup>

Ergo<sup>2361</sup> regula est simpliciter vera.<sup>2362</sup> Non enim potest<sup>2363</sup> ita<sup>2364</sup> esse<sup>2365</sup> sicut per antecedens<sup>2366</sup> significatur<sup>2367</sup> secundum eius totalem significationem nisi<sup>2368</sup> ita sit sicut per eius<sup>2369</sup> consequens significatur etc..<sup>2370</sup> Quod fuit probandum.<sup>2371</sup> Et etiam<sup>2372</sup> teneat<sup>2373</sup> |W 113r| in omnibus terminis; patet<sup>2374</sup> quia in nullis<sup>2375</sup> reperitur instantia - consimili<sup>2376</sup> forma<sup>2377</sup> in omnibus terminis retenta.<sup>2378g</sup>  
|V 88va|

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<sup>2352</sup> secundam W

<sup>2353</sup> ante eius MV, add. principalem pro nunc W

<sup>2354</sup> add. similiter M

<sup>2355</sup> et nisi] om. Y

<sup>2356</sup> esse M

<sup>2357</sup> om. Y

<sup>2358</sup> lectio dubia Y, ante eius M

<sup>2359</sup> om. M

<sup>2360</sup> et nisi - significatur] om. W

<sup>2361</sup> igitur M

<sup>2362</sup> ergo - vera] sequitur Y

<sup>2363</sup> enim potest] om. Y

<sup>2364</sup> sic M

<sup>2365</sup> ita esse] ista esset Y

<sup>2366</sup> consequens W

<sup>2367</sup> add. sed MW

<sup>2368</sup> quin MV

<sup>2369</sup> om. M

<sup>2370</sup> om. V | nisi ita - significatur etc.] om. W | antecedens - etc.] secundam partem lectio dubia principalem in pro nunc secundum eius totalem significationem significatur regula est vera modo non potest esse sicut per consequens significatur Y

<sup>2371</sup> fuit probandum] est etc. Y

<sup>2372</sup> et etiam] om. Y, quod in V

<sup>2373</sup> tenet Y, est M

<sup>2374</sup> apparet V

<sup>2375</sup> in nullis] nullibi V

<sup>2376</sup> consimilis MW, add. probatur W

<sup>2377</sup> enim W, enim ratio M, non probatur Y

<sup>2378</sup>formaretur W, formatur Y | enim - retenta] non probatur in omnibus terminis formatur Y | consimili - retenta] ratio enim consimilis quod in omnibus formaretur M

§ consimili - retenta] consimili forma retenta V | consimilis probatur enim in omnibus terminis formaretur W | ratio enim consimilis quod in omnibus formaretur M | consimilis non probatur non probatur in omnibus terminis formatur Y

<2> Secunda regula est haec:<sup>2379</sup> ab una parte disiunctivae principali<sup>2380</sup> ad totam disiunctivam est consequentia<sup>2381</sup> bona et formalis. Ut: 'homo currit,<sup>2382</sup> ergo<sup>2383</sup> homo currit vel homo est<sup>2384</sup> asinus'.<sup>2385</sup>

Pro declaratione<sup>2386</sup> regulae<sup>2387</sup> supponitur quod disiunctiva et copulativa<sup>2388</sup> compositae<sup>2389</sup> ex partibus contradicentibus contradicunt, ut istae<sup>2390</sup> contradicunt: <sup>2391</sup> 'Deus est vel<sup>2392</sup> homo est asinus', et<sup>2393</sup> 'nullus<sup>2394</sup> Deus est et nullus<sup>2395</sup> homo est asinus'. Ista<sup>2396</sup> est bona<sup>2397</sup> regula communis<sup>2398</sup> loicorum, et ideo hoc<sup>2399</sup> supponitur. Alibi<sup>2400</sup> declarabitur.<sup>2401</sup> Qua<sup>2402</sup> suppositione praemissa probatur regula<sup>2403</sup> in omni consequentia in qua<sup>2404</sup> arguitur a parte disiunctivae principali<sup>2405</sup> ad<sup>2406</sup> totam disiunctivam est<sup>2407</sup> consequentia<sup>2408</sup> sic se habens<sup>2409</sup> quod ex opposito consequentis formaliter<sup>2410</sup> infertur oppositum antecedentis. Igitur<sup>2411</sup> omnis talis consequentia est bona et<sup>2412</sup> formalis. Consequentia tenet per |Y 85<sup>r</sup>| primam<sup>2413</sup> regulam. Et antecedens declaratur,<sup>2414</sup>

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<sup>2379</sup> *add. quod arguendo Y, add. quod M*

<sup>2380</sup> *om. V, principale Y*

<sup>2381</sup> *post bona MY*

<sup>2382</sup> *add. +vel homo est asinus+ M*

<sup>2383</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>2384</sup> *homo est] om. W*

<sup>2385</sup> *add. currit et W*

<sup>2386</sup> *declarationem add. huius V*

<sup>2387</sup> *om. M*

<sup>2388</sup> *disiunctiva et copulativa] copulativa et disiunctiva MV*

<sup>2389</sup> *composita WY*

<sup>2390</sup> *illae MV | ut istae] et ideo Y*

<sup>2391</sup> *post nullus homo est asinus M*

<sup>2392</sup> *add. nullus V*

<sup>2393</sup> *om. M*

<sup>2394</sup> *et nullus] om. W*

<sup>2395</sup> *om. W*

<sup>2396</sup> *illa V*

<sup>2397</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>2398</sup> *om. M*

<sup>2399</sup> *hic M*

<sup>2400</sup> *add. cum W, add. non Y, add. enum V*

<sup>2401</sup> *declaratur W*

<sup>2402</sup> *quod Y*

<sup>2403</sup> *add. ut Y*

<sup>2404</sup> *in qua] ubi MVY*

<sup>2405</sup> *om. V, ante disiunctivae Y, ante parte M*

<sup>2406</sup> *a Y*

<sup>2407</sup> *add. +bona+ W*

<sup>2408</sup> *est consequentia] om. Y*

<sup>2409</sup> *habet Y*

<sup>2410</sup> *om. M*

<sup>2411</sup> *ergo V*

<sup>2412</sup> *bona et] om. VW*

<sup>2413</sup> *post regulam Y*

nam si<sup>2415</sup> sit ista<sup>2416</sup> consequentia proposita:<sup>2417</sup> 'homo currit, igitur<sup>2418</sup> homo currit vel homo est asinus',<sup>2419</sup> et declaratur<sup>2420</sup> per suppositionem<sup>2421</sup> oppositum consequentis<sup>2422</sup> - scilicet copulativa de partibus contradicentibus, ut<sup>2423</sup> 'nullus homo currit et nullus homo est asinus' -, tunc<sup>2424</sup> sequitur per praecedentem regulam formaliter:<sup>2425</sup> 'ergo<sup>2426</sup> nullus homo currit', quia arguitur<sup>2427</sup> a<sup>2428</sup> copulativa ad<sup>2429</sup> partem principalem.<sup>2430</sup> Ergo<sup>2431</sup> sequitur quod ex<sup>2432</sup> opposito<sup>2433</sup> consequentis sequitur<sup>2434</sup> formaliter oppositum antecedentis. Quod fuit probandum.<sup>2435</sup>

Dico<sup>2436</sup> notanter in praedictis duabus<sup>2437</sup> |M 38<sup>v</sup>| regulis quod<sup>2438</sup> "arguendo a parte principali<sup>2439</sup> ad partem principalem",<sup>2440</sup> quia si non arguitur |E 39<sup>r</sup>| a parte principali ad partem principalem, sed a minus principali ad minus principalem, non haberent regulae veritatem.<sup>2441</sup> Exemplum, ut si argueretur<sup>2442</sup> a<sup>2443</sup> parte minus principali disiunctivae ad totam disiunctivam,<sup>2444</sup> sicut<sup>2445</sup> 'homo est

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<sup>2414</sup> declarabitur M

<sup>2415</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2416</sup> talis Y, haec M

<sup>2417</sup> *post* asinus M

<sup>2418</sup> ergo MV

<sup>2419</sup> homo est asinus] asinus currit W

<sup>2420</sup> detur V

<sup>2421</sup> *add.* quod M

<sup>2422</sup> *om.* V, *add.* stet M

<sup>2423</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2424</sup> et V

<sup>2425</sup> *om.* W

<sup>2426</sup> quod MVY

<sup>2427</sup> *om.* VWY

<sup>2428</sup> *om.* MWY

<sup>2429</sup> a V

<sup>2430</sup> *add.* est consequentia bona et formalis V, *add.* et W

<sup>2431</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2432</sup> quod ex] *om.* W

<sup>2433</sup> oppositum W

<sup>2434</sup> *om.* W, *post* formaliter Y

<sup>2435</sup> *add.* et V

<sup>2436</sup> *post* notanter V

<sup>2437</sup> *ante* praedictis M

<sup>2438</sup> regulis quod] *om.* Y

<sup>2439</sup> principale W, *add. s.l.* \_\_\_\_ M

<sup>2440</sup> *add.* et non a minus principali M

<sup>2441</sup> quia si - veritatem] quia si non arguitur ad partem principalem sed ad minus principalem sed vel si argueretur a parte minus principali et non principali non haberent regulae veritatem W | quia si non arguitur ad partem principalem sed ad minus principalem vel argueretur non a parte principali sed minus principali non haberent regulae veritatem Y | quia si non arguitur a parte principali ad partem principalem sed a minus principali ad minus principalem non haberent regulae veritatem V | quia si argueretur ad partem non principalem sed ad minus principalem vel etiam non a parte principali sed minus principali regulae non habent veritatem M

<sup>2442</sup> dicitur Y, arguitur V

asinus, ergo<sup>2446</sup> homo est asinus et<sup>2447</sup> deus est vel homo<sup>2448</sup> non est asinus',<sup>2449</sup> constat quod consequentia non valeret. Proportionaliter<sup>2450</sup> est<sup>2451</sup> arguendo<sup>2452</sup> a<sup>2453</sup> copulativa ad quamlibet<sup>2454</sup> eius partem principalem.<sup>2455</sup>

<3> Tertia regula est haec:<sup>2456</sup> ab universali ad suam indefinitam est consequentia bona et<sup>2457</sup> formalis. Ut: 'omnis homo est animal, ergo<sup>2458</sup> homo est animal'.

Patet regula, quia numquam reperitur<sup>2459</sup> instantia quin valeret,<sup>2460</sup> et causa<sup>2461</sup> est quia veritas universalis praesupponit veritatem indefinitae.<sup>2462</sup>

<4> Quarta regula est haec: arguendo a tota disiunctiva cum negatione<sup>2463</sup> contradictoria<sup>2464</sup> unius partis principalis<sup>2465</sup> [W 113v] ad alteram<sup>2466</sup> partem,<sup>2467</sup> est consequentia bona<sup>2468</sup> et formalis. Et tenetur hic ly alteram relative.<sup>2469</sup> Exemplum potest poni:<sup>2470</sup> 'homo est asinus vel deus est,<sup>2471</sup> sed nullus homo est asinus, ergo<sup>2472</sup> deus est'.<sup>2473</sup> Probatur regula<sup>2474</sup> sic: omnis talis consequentia tenet<sup>2475</sup>

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<sup>2443</sup> ad V  
<sup>2444</sup> disiunctivae W  
<sup>2445</sup> sic V  
<sup>2446</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>2447</sup> homo est asinus et] *om.* V  
<sup>2448</sup> +plo+ Y  
<sup>2449</sup> animal VY, *add.* sed W  
<sup>2450</sup> similiter V  
<sup>2451</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>2452</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>2453</sup> *add.* tota Y  
<sup>2454</sup> aliquam V, qalteram WY  
<sup>2455</sup> *om.* VY  
<sup>2456</sup> *om.* VY, *add.* arguendo Y  
<sup>2457</sup> bona et] *om.* VW  
<sup>2458</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>2459</sup> patitur Y  
<sup>2460</sup> valeat V, valet Y  
<sup>2461</sup> vera Y  
<sup>2462</sup> indefinitam W  
<sup>2463</sup> destructione E  
<sup>2464</sup> contradictoriam ad *post* principalis W, contradictoriae *post* principalis MY  
<sup>2465</sup> *add.* asserendo eius W  
<sup>2466</sup> aliam V, *add.* eius Y  
<sup>2467</sup> *add.* principaliter Y  
<sup>2468</sup> *ante* consequentia Y  
<sup>2469</sup> *add.* et negativa Y  
<sup>2470</sup> *add.* ut hoc V  
<sup>2471</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>2472</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>2473</sup> *add.* et E

in terminis quibuscumque et qualitercumque<sup>2476</sup> dispositis, ergo<sup>2477</sup> omnis talis<sup>2478</sup> consequentia est bona et formalis.<sup>2479</sup> Consequentia tenet per definitionem<sup>2480</sup> consequentiae<sup>2481</sup> formalis.<sup>2482</sup> Antecedens,<sup>2483</sup> scilicet quod omnis<sup>2484</sup> talis consequentia<sup>2485</sup> teneat in omnibus terminis qualitercumque dispositis, [Y 85<sup>v</sup>] patet, quia ad veritatem disiunctivae<sup>2486</sup> [V 88<sup>vb</sup>] requiritur unam partem esse veram, et ad veritatem copulativae requiritur ambas partes esse veras.<sup>2487</sup> Cum igitur<sup>2488</sup> antecedens sit<sup>2489</sup> una copulativa cuius prima pars est illa<sup>2490</sup> disiunctiva et<sup>2491</sup> secunda pars est<sup>2492</sup> contradictoria unius partis principalis talis disiunctivae, si<sup>2493</sup> copulativa debet esse veram, requiritur<sup>2494</sup> quod pars disiunctivae non negata sit vera.<sup>2495</sup>

Et ex hoc illam<sup>2496</sup> inferendo in omnibus terminis<sup>2497</sup> tenet consequentia. Ergo<sup>2498</sup> regula est simpliciter vera. Consequentia est nota.<sup>2499</sup> Antecedens<sup>2500</sup> quoad<sup>2501</sup> primam<sup>2502</sup> partem patet,<sup>2503</sup> scilicet<sup>2504</sup> quod ad veritatem<sup>2505</sup> copulativae requiritur partem disiunctivae<sup>2506</sup> non negatam<sup>2507</sup> esse veram.

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<sup>2474</sup> *om.* EW

<sup>2475</sup> est Y

<sup>2476</sup> quibuscumque et qualitercumque] qualitercumque et quibuscumque W | terminis - qualitercumque] quibuscumque terminis qualitercumque EV

<sup>2477</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2478</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2479</sup> bona et formalis] formalis et bona W

<sup>2480</sup> *add.* bonae Y

<sup>2481</sup> *add.* et Y

<sup>2482</sup> *add.* sed W, *add.* et V

<sup>2483</sup> *add.* patet Y

<sup>2484</sup> scilicet quod omnis] quia Y

<sup>2485</sup> *om.* EW

<sup>2486</sup> *add.* sufficit et Y

<sup>2487</sup> et ad veritatem - veras] *om.* V

<sup>2488</sup> ergo V

<sup>2489</sup> est WY

<sup>2490</sup> una Y, *add.* copulativa M

<sup>2491</sup> *om.* W

<sup>2492</sup> eius W

<sup>2493</sup> scilicet W, sed *add.* talis Y, *add.* igitur E

<sup>2494</sup> sequitur M

<sup>2495</sup> requiritur - vera] *om.* W

<sup>2496</sup> istam W, *om.* EY

<sup>2497</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2498</sup> igitur Y, *add.* ista E

<sup>2499</sup> consequentia est nota] *om.* V, *add.* et EM

<sup>2500</sup> consequentia Y

<sup>2501</sup> pro M

<sup>2502</sup> illam *post* partem V, *add.* eius E

<sup>2503</sup> *om.* V, stat M

<sup>2504</sup> in M

<sup>2505</sup> partem W

<sup>2506</sup> *om.* V, disiunctivam Y

<sup>2507</sup> negativa Y

Demonstratur,<sup>2508</sup> quia ad veritatem copulativae<sup>2509</sup> requiritur illam<sup>2510</sup> disiunctivam esse veram,<sup>2511</sup> cum sit<sup>2512</sup> eius<sup>2513</sup> altera pars principalis vera,<sup>2514</sup> vel ergo<sup>2515</sup> pro parte negata - et hoc non quia<sup>2516</sup> secunda<sup>2517</sup> pars copulativae esset tunc<sup>2518</sup> falsa [E 39<sup>v</sup>] quia est<sup>2519</sup> contradictoria<sup>2520</sup> illi parti<sup>2521</sup> negatae<sup>2522</sup> - vel<sup>2523</sup> pro parte non negata. Et si sic, habetur<sup>2524</sup> propositum. Sed aliae partes antecedentis<sup>2525</sup> et totus<sup>2526</sup> processus patent<sup>2527</sup> de se.

<5> Quinta regula est haec:<sup>2528</sup> ab interemptione unius<sup>2529</sup> partis principalis<sup>2530</sup> copulativae ad interemptionem<sup>2531</sup> totius copulativae<sup>2532</sup> est consequentia bona et<sup>2533</sup> formalis.<sup>2534</sup> Exemplum ut 'nullus homo currit,<sup>2535</sup> ergo<sup>2536</sup> non: homo currit et deus est'. Patet regula, quia ex opposito consequentis, scilicet a copulativa,<sup>2537</sup> sequitur oppositum antecedentis, quia<sup>2538</sup> qualibet eius pars<sup>2539</sup>

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<sup>2508</sup> declaro V, declaratur M

<sup>2509</sup> eius M

<sup>2510</sup> istam EM

<sup>2511</sup> demonstratur - veram] *om.* Y

<sup>2512</sup> *ante* vera E

<sup>2513</sup> *post* pars V, unius Y

<sup>2514</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>2515</sup> igitur E

<sup>2516</sup> qua WY

<sup>2517</sup> alia M

<sup>2518</sup> *ante* secunda EV, *om.* M

<sup>2519</sup> eius V

<sup>2520</sup> quia est contradictoria] *om.* W

<sup>2521</sup> parte E

<sup>2522</sup> parti negatae] esset vera V, *om.* M | *add.* secunda nam quia tunc secunda pars copulativae esse falsa quia est contradictoria illi Y

<sup>2523</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2524</sup> habeo W

<sup>2525</sup> sed - antecedentis] et sic maior autem W

<sup>2526</sup> totius Y

<sup>2527</sup> patet WY

<sup>2528</sup> *add.* quod W

<sup>2529</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2530</sup> *post* copulativae W

<sup>2531</sup> *add.* +cuius+ W

<sup>2532</sup> *om.* MY, partis *vel fors* propositionis V

<sup>2533</sup> bona et] *om.* V

<sup>2534</sup> *ante* consequentia V

<sup>2535</sup> *add.* +vel+ M

<sup>2536</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2537</sup> scilicet a copulativa] *om.* V

<sup>2538</sup> et M

<sup>2539</sup> *om.* W, *ante* eius V

copulativae sequitur.<sup>2540</sup> Sequitur enim<sup>2541</sup> 'homo currit et deus est, ergo<sup>2542</sup> homo currit' per primam regulam.

Circa<sup>2543</sup> istam<sup>2544</sup> regulam est advertendum quod [M 39r] ad interimendum<sup>2545</sup> copulativam oportet negationem<sup>2546</sup> praeponi<sup>2547</sup> totae copulativae et non in medio,<sup>2548</sup> ut interimendo copulativam, de qua ante fuit sermo, non debet dici 'nullus<sup>2549</sup> homo currit et nullus deus est', sed debet dici:<sup>2550</sup> 'non: homo currit et<sup>2551</sup> deus est'.<sup>2552</sup> Non enim est verius dare contradictionem quam praeponere negationem toti,<sup>2553</sup> ut dicitur in libro *Peri hermeneias*, et ex consequenti interimere<sup>2554</sup> proprie contingit praeponendo<sup>2555</sup> negationem toti.<sup>2556</sup>

Ex<sup>2557</sup> hoc consequenter [W 114r] apparet<sup>2558</sup> quod non oportet negationem<sup>2559</sup> similiter<sup>2560</sup> se<sup>2561</sup> habere<sup>2562</sup> interimendo<sup>2563</sup> copulativam et alteram<sup>2564</sup> eius interimendo<sup>2565</sup> partem.<sup>2566</sup> Nam interimendo istam propositionem<sup>2567</sup> 'homo currit' sufficit dicere<sup>2568</sup> 'nullus homo currit' [Y 86r] vel saltem 'nullus vel nulla homo currit'; sed<sup>2569</sup> interimendo copulativam<sup>2570</sup> negatio 'non'<sup>2571</sup> deberet<sup>2572</sup> sic praeponi,<sup>2573</sup> scilicet: 'non: homo currit<sup>2574</sup> et deus est'.

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<sup>2540</sup> om. W | copulativae sequitur] om. MV

<sup>2541</sup> oppositum - enim] om. Y

<sup>2542</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2543</sup> vel forsitan contra Y

<sup>2544</sup> illam M

<sup>2545</sup> intermittendum W, add. illam V

<sup>2546</sup> negationi V, negativam Y

<sup>2547</sup> praeponere M

<sup>2548</sup> medi Y

<sup>2549</sup> om. W

<sup>2550</sup> debet dici] om. VY

<sup>2551</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2552</sup> sed debet - deus est] om. W

<sup>2553</sup> add. propositioni V

<sup>2554</sup> interimendo MY

<sup>2555</sup> praeponere W

<sup>2556</sup> add. propositioni V, post contingit M

<sup>2557</sup> et V

<sup>2558</sup> habetur V

<sup>2559</sup> add. poni M

<sup>2560</sup> consimiliter VM

<sup>2561</sup> om. Y

<sup>2562</sup> se habere] \_\_\_ V, om. M

<sup>2563</sup> add. +prout homo currit+ V

<sup>2564</sup> om. M

<sup>2565</sup> ante eius M

<sup>2566</sup> et altera - partem] et interimendo eius partem Y

<sup>2567</sup> istam propositionem] partem V | nam interimendo istam propositionem] scilicet M

<sup>2568</sup> sufficit dicere] lectio dubia Y, lectio dubia [sicut dicere V

<sup>2569</sup> similiter M

<sup>2570</sup> et alteram - copulativam] tunc W, add. talis M

<6> Sexta regula est haec:<sup>2575</sup> arguendo a copulativa negativa<sup>2576</sup> ad disiunctivam affirmativam de partibus <sup>2577</sup> contradicentibus partibus copulativae antequam negaretur <sup>2578</sup> est formalis consequentia.<sup>2579</sup>

Probatur sic:<sup>2580</sup> arguendo in eisdem<sup>2581</sup> terminis a propositione ad propositionem<sup>2582</sup> sibi<sup>2583</sup> gratia formae aequivalentem <sup>2584</sup> est consequentia formalis.<sup>2585</sup> Sed consequentia <sup>2586</sup> de qua loquitur regula<sup>2587</sup> est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior<sup>2588</sup> rationis est de se nota.<sup>2589</sup> Minor,<sup>2590</sup> scilicet quod talis copulativa negativa et disiunctiva affirmativa<sup>2591</sup> simpliciter<sup>2592</sup> aequivalent<sup>2593</sup> |V 89<sup>ra</sup>| declaratur, quia ista copulativa negativa 'non: homo currit et deus est',<sup>2594</sup> aequivalet <sup>2595</sup> istae disiunctivae affirmativae<sup>2596</sup> 'nullus homo currit vel nullus deus est' |E 40<sup>r</sup>| formaliter. Probatur, quia<sup>2597</sup> vel<sup>2598</sup> aequivalet <sup>2599</sup> istae <sup>2600</sup> disiunctivae de partibus contradicentibus partibus<sup>2601</sup> copulativae <sup>2602</sup> vel copulativae <sup>2603</sup> de una <sup>2604</sup> parte contradicente et alia <sup>2605</sup> non <sup>2606</sup> contradicente.<sup>2607</sup> Sed nullo <sup>2608</sup>

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<sup>2571</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2572</sup> debet M

<sup>2573</sup> poni V

<sup>2574</sup> sed - currit] *om.* Y

<sup>2575</sup> de terminis W, *add.* quod EV

<sup>2576</sup> +negativa+ negata E

<sup>2577</sup> *om.* E

<sup>2578</sup> negatur *add.* bona et Y, *add.* copulativa W

<sup>2579</sup> ante formalis M | formalis consequentia] consequentia bona et formalis E

<sup>2580</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2581</sup> eiusdem M

<sup>2582</sup> a - propositionem] ante in eisdem E

<sup>2583</sup> saltem M, scilicet W, si Y

<sup>2584</sup> aequivalet Y

<sup>2585</sup> bona Y

<sup>2586</sup> *add.* bona Y

<sup>2587</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>2588</sup> *add.* istius V

<sup>2589</sup> ante de V, *add.* et EM

<sup>2590</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2591</sup> *add.* vel e converso M

<sup>2592</sup> sunt Y, *vel forsā* formaliter M, *om.* E

<sup>2593</sup> aequipollent V, aequivalentes Y

<sup>2594</sup> declaratur - deus est] *om.* WY

<sup>2595</sup> *om.* VWY, aequipollet E

<sup>2596</sup> *om.* EVWY

<sup>2597</sup> *add.* prima Y

<sup>2598</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2599</sup> aequipollent V

<sup>2600</sup> illi EV

<sup>2601</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2602</sup> partibus copulativae] *om.* WY, *add.* vel copulativae de partibus contradicentibus copulativae partibus M

<sup>2603</sup> *om.* EY, copulativa M



modorum<sup>2609</sup> potest dici praeter primum.<sup>2610</sup> Ergo<sup>2611</sup> sequitur<sup>2612</sup> quod<sup>2613</sup> copulativa negativa  
aequivalet<sup>2614</sup> formaliter disiunctivae affirmativae<sup>2615</sup> de partibus contradicentibus partibus<sup>2616</sup>  
copulativae non<sup>2617</sup> negatae.<sup>2618</sup> Consequentia ultima<sup>2619</sup> est<sup>2620</sup> nota.<sup>2621</sup> Prima pars antecedentis  
patet, quia non apparet<sup>2622</sup> plura<sup>2623</sup> quarum<sup>2624</sup> alicui formaliter talis copulativa negativa<sup>2625</sup>  
posset<sup>2626</sup> aequipollere.<sup>2627</sup> Sed<sup>2628</sup> quod<sup>2629</sup> nullo<sup>2630</sup> aliorum modorum<sup>2631</sup> posset<sup>2632</sup> dici<sup>2633</sup>  
declaratur. Primo enim modo<sup>2634</sup> non potest dici quod copulativa negativa<sup>2635</sup> contradicit<sup>2636</sup>  
copulativae de partibus contradicentibus ambabus,<sup>2637</sup> quia statim sequitur quod<sup>2638</sup> contradictoria  
simul<sup>2639</sup> possunt<sup>2640</sup> esse<sup>2641</sup> falsa, ut posito<sup>2642</sup> quod nullus homo currat,<sup>2643</sup> haec esset<sup>2644</sup> falsa:<sup>2645</sup>

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<sup>2604</sup> *post parte EWY*

<sup>2605</sup> *et alia] vel altera Y*

<sup>2606</sup> *negativa V*

<sup>2607</sup> *et - contradicente] om. E*

<sup>2608</sup> *nullum EY*

<sup>2609</sup> *modo M, istorum Y*

<sup>2610</sup> *praeter primum] patet primo modo scilicet W*

<sup>2611</sup> *igitur EY*

<sup>2612</sup> *ergo sequitur] om. W*

<sup>2613</sup> *add. totam Y*

<sup>2614</sup> *aequipollet EV, post formaliter EM*

<sup>2615</sup> *aequivalet - affirmativae] disiunctive aequivalet affirmativae formaliter W | formaliter aequipollet  
disiunctivae affirmativae V | aequivalet formaliter disiunctivae affirmativae Y*

<sup>2616</sup> *istius Y*

<sup>2617</sup> *om. M*

<sup>2618</sup> *mediatae W, negativae M*

<sup>2619</sup> *videtur W*

<sup>2620</sup> *esse W*

<sup>2621</sup> *bona W, add. sed VY, add. et M*

<sup>2622</sup> *apparet W*

<sup>2623</sup> *add. ratione W*

<sup>2624</sup> *quorum M*

<sup>2625</sup> *negata MW*

<sup>2626</sup> *possit V, potest Y*

<sup>2627</sup> *aequivalere Y*

<sup>2628</sup> *seu W*

<sup>2629</sup> *om. W | aequipollere sed quod] om. M*

<sup>2630</sup> *add. modoVW, nulla Y, nullus Y*

<sup>2631</sup> *om. W*

<sup>2632</sup> *possit V*

<sup>2633</sup> *posset dici] similiter M*

<sup>2634</sup> *om. VWY | enim modo] quod E*

<sup>2635</sup> *vel forsā negata V*

<sup>2636</sup> *aequipollet E*

<sup>2637</sup> *ante partibus MV | ante contradicentibus E*

<sup>2638</sup> *om. V, duo E*

<sup>2639</sup> *post esse M*

<sup>2640</sup> *om. EVWY*

<sup>2641</sup> *essent Y*

<sup>2642</sup> *puta W*

<sup>2643</sup> *add. tunc EY*

<sup>2644</sup> *est VY | haec esset ] hoc est W*

'homo currit et<sup>2646</sup> deus est' pro prima parte;<sup>2647</sup> et haec<sup>2648</sup> esset<sup>2649</sup> falsa 'nullus homo currit et nullus deus est'<sup>2650</sup> pro secunda parte. Sic<sup>2651</sup> etiam declaratur<sup>2652</sup> quod non possit<sup>2653</sup> dici quod copulativa<sup>2654</sup> negativa contradicat<sup>2655</sup> copulativae de una parte contradicente<sup>2656</sup> et<sup>2657</sup> de<sup>2658</sup> alia<sup>2659</sup> non,<sup>2660</sup> quia<sup>2661</sup> etiam<sup>2662</sup> sequitur<sup>2663</sup> quod duo<sup>2664</sup> contradictoria essent simul falsa. Si enim sit<sup>2665</sup> prima pars quae debet negari ambae erunt<sup>2666</sup> falsae pro secunda<sup>2667</sup> parte,<sup>2668</sup> ut hic:<sup>2669</sup> 'homo currit<sup>2670</sup> et homo est asinus', 'nullus homo currit<sup>2671</sup> et homo est asinus'. Si sit secunda pars quae debet negari,<sup>2672</sup> tunc<sup>2673</sup> falsae essent<sup>2674</sup> ambae<sup>2675</sup> copulativae<sup>2676</sup> pro prima parte,<sup>2677</sup> ut 'homo est asinus et deus est' |M 39v| et<sup>2678</sup> 'homo est |Y 86v| asinus et nullus deus est' sunt falsae.<sup>2679</sup> Formaliter ergo<sup>2680</sup>

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<sup>2645</sup> *add.* nullus E

<sup>2646</sup> *add.* +nullus+ E

<sup>2647</sup> pro prima parte] *om.* Y

<sup>2648</sup> *add.* etiam M

<sup>2649</sup> est VY

<sup>2650</sup> pro prima - deus est] *om.* W

<sup>2651</sup> *om.* W, *post* etiam E

<sup>2652</sup> *add.* scilicet W | pro secunda - declaratur] prima parte sit haec quod posset dici Y

<sup>2653</sup> posset Y, potest M

<sup>2654</sup> +copulativa+ *add.* contradictoria W

<sup>2655</sup> contradicit V

<sup>2656</sup> negativa EMV

<sup>2657</sup> *add.* et W

<sup>2658</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>2659</sup> *add.* parte Y

<sup>2660</sup> *add.* +quod+ M | et de alia non] *om.* EV

<sup>2661</sup> et tunc W, *add.* sic E

<sup>2662</sup> *om.* MW, *post* sequitur EY

<sup>2663</sup> sequeretur E

<sup>2664</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2665</sup> +sit+ W

<sup>2666</sup> ambae erunt] ambo essent E

<sup>2667</sup> prima E

<sup>2668</sup> *add.* copulativae E

<sup>2669</sup> *om.* E

<sup>2670</sup> est E

<sup>2671</sup> est E

<sup>2672</sup> falsae essent - negari] *om.* W | falsae essent ambae pro secunda parte, ut hic: 'homo currit et homo est asinus', 'nullus homo currit et homo est asinus'. Si sit secunda pars quae debet negari, V] falsa erunt prima parte ut homo currit et homo est asinus est asinus et sit secunda pars quae negativae Y | ambae erunt falsae pro secunda parte ut haec homo currit et homo est asinus nullus homo currit et homo est asinus ambae sunt falsae si enim sit secunda pars quae debet negari M

<sup>2673</sup> talis Y

<sup>2674</sup> *post* tunc V, erunt MY

<sup>2675</sup> aliae Y, *ante* falsae V

<sup>2676</sup> *add.* quae debent negari V | ambae copulativae] *ante* falsae E

<sup>2677</sup> pro prima parte] *om.* V, *add.* etc. M

<sup>2678</sup> *om.* EV, *add.* +nullus+ M, *add.* nullus EWY

<sup>2679</sup> sunt falsae] *om.* EVWY

<sup>2680</sup> *om.* Y

aequivalet<sup>2681</sup> copulativa negativa disiunctivae<sup>2682</sup> affirmativae de partibus contradicentibus partibus<sup>2683</sup> copulativae non negatae.<sup>2684</sup>

<6.1> Ex hac regula<sup>2685</sup> sequitur<sup>2686</sup> corrolarie, quod aliqua consequentia est formalis qua arguitur<sup>2687</sup> a negativa ad affirmativam. Patet corrolarium, quia a copulativa negativa ad disiunctivam affirmativam<sup>2688</sup> <est consequentia bona>.<sup>2689</sup>

<6.2> Secundo sequitur quod copulativa negativa<sup>2690</sup> aequivalet disiunctivae affirmativae,<sup>2691</sup> ut 'non: homo currit et deus est' et<sup>2692</sup> 'nullus |W 114v| homo currit vel nullus deus est', ubi<sup>2693</sup> haec disiunctio<sup>2694</sup> 'vel' non negatur. Et ratio est<sup>2695</sup> quia alias ab una earum<sup>2696</sup> ad alteram<sup>2697</sup> non valeret<sup>2698</sup> consequentia.

<6.3> Tertio sequitur probabiliter<sup>2699</sup> quod propositio<sup>2700</sup> negativa simpliciter aequivalet<sup>2701</sup> affirmativae in hypotheticis.<sup>2702</sup> Patet per probationem regulae, quia copulativa negativa aequivalet<sup>2703</sup> formaliter<sup>2704</sup> disiunctivae affirmativae.

<6.4> Quarto concedi<sup>2705</sup> posset<sup>2706</sup> quod in hypotheticis negativa<sup>2707</sup> propositio esset affirmativa. Declaratur:<sup>2708</sup> talis propositio<sup>2709</sup> copulativa<sup>2710</sup> negativa est propositio<sup>2711</sup> hypothetica, et non est

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<sup>2681</sup> aequipollet V  
<sup>2682</sup> copulativa negativa disiunctivae] copulativae negativa disiunctiva E  
<sup>2683</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>2684</sup> negativae W  
<sup>2685</sup> hac regula] hoc M  
<sup>2686</sup> *post* corrolarie V, habetur Y  
<sup>2687</sup> qua arguitur] *om.* V  
<sup>2688</sup> patet - affirmativam] *om.* M  
<sup>2689</sup> est consequentia bona] *om.* MWVY  
<sup>2690</sup> copulativa negativa] copulatio negata V  
<sup>2691</sup> disiunctivae affirmativae] disiunctioni affirmatae V  
<sup>2692</sup> ergo V  
<sup>2693</sup> quod V  
<sup>2694</sup> coniunctio Y, coniunctio disiunctiva M  
<sup>2695</sup> et ratio est] patet V, *om.* M  
<sup>2696</sup> istarum M  
<sup>2697</sup> ad alteram] *om.* M  
<sup>2698</sup> non valere] *om.* V  
<sup>2699</sup> *add.* implicat contradictionem est affirmativa igitur et affirmatur Y  
<sup>2700</sup> *post* negativa MV  
<sup>2701</sup> aequipollet M] simpliciter aequivalet] aequipollet simpliciter W  
<sup>2702</sup> oppositis V  
<sup>2703</sup> aequipollet W  
<sup>2704</sup> *post* disiunctivae V  
<sup>2705</sup> concedo W  
<sup>2706</sup> *om.* W, possit V

copulativa<sup>2712</sup> - quia requiritur<sup>2713</sup> ad eius veritatem<sup>2714</sup> ambas eius<sup>2715</sup> partes esse veras, quod non est ita,<sup>2716</sup> quia aequivalet<sup>2717</sup> disiunctivae: ad eius<sup>2718</sup> veritatem sufficit alteram<sup>2719</sup> partem esse veram. Ergo<sup>2720</sup> relinquitur quod talis est<sup>2721</sup> disiunctiva quia<sup>2722</sup> non est alterius speciei propositionis<sup>2723</sup> hypotheticis. <sup>2724</sup> Vel <sup>2725</sup> [V 89<sup>rb</sup>] igitur <sup>2726</sup> est disiunctiva affirmativa <sup>2727</sup> (et, si sic, <sup>2728</sup> habetur propositum quia <sup>2729</sup> copulativa negativa <sup>2730</sup> est disiunctiva affirmativa); <sup>2731</sup> vel aequivalet disiunctivae<sup>2732</sup> negativae, et hoc non est<sup>2733</sup> quia disiunctiva negativa aequivalet<sup>2734</sup> copulativae<sup>2735</sup> affirmativae - modo ista<sup>2736</sup> non aequivalet<sup>2737</sup> copulativae<sup>2738</sup>affirmativae.<sup>2739</sup>

<6.5> Quinto notandum est<sup>2740</sup> quod, sicut haec coniunctio 'et' negata<sup>2741</sup> aequivalet<sup>2742</sup> disiunctioni<sup>2743</sup> affirmativae vel etiam aliqua alia sibi <sup>2744</sup> aequivalens, ita haec <sup>2745</sup> coniunctio 'vel' negata <sup>2746</sup>

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<sup>2707</sup> negativis Y

<sup>2708</sup> Ratio est quia *add.* sequitur quod W

<sup>2709</sup> *om.* V | talis propositio] quod M

<sup>2710</sup> *post* negativa Y

<sup>2711</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2712</sup> affirmativa Y

<sup>2713</sup> *post* veritatem VY

<sup>2714</sup> requiritur - veritatem] ad eius veritatem requiritur M

<sup>2715</sup> *post* partes VY

<sup>2716</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2717</sup> *om.* W, aequipollet V

<sup>2718</sup> *post* veritatem W

<sup>2719</sup> *add.* eius Y

<sup>2720</sup> igitur MY

<sup>2721</sup> *om.* W

<sup>2722</sup> quae W, *add.* ipsa nulla Y

<sup>2723</sup> *om.* MVY

<sup>2724</sup> hypothetica M

<sup>2725</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2726</sup> ibi W, ergo V

<sup>2727</sup> *add.* vel disiunctiva Y

<sup>2728</sup> *add.* sit M

<sup>2729</sup> quod M

<sup>2730</sup> copulativa negativa] copulativam negativam V

<sup>2731</sup> et si sic - affirmativa] *om.* W

<sup>2732</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>2733</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>2734</sup> *add.* verum Y, aequipollet M

<sup>2735</sup> negativae - copulative] *om.* V

<sup>2736</sup> istae VWY

<sup>2737</sup> aequivalent VW, aequipollet M

<sup>2738</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2739</sup> *om.* VWY | *add.* Verum est tamen quod volens contrarium sustinere potest dicere quod est speciei copulativae negativae et quod non oportet ad hoc ad veritatem eius requiri ambas partes esse veras quia hoc est dictum et habet locum in copulativa affirmativa et ideo quamvis aequipollet disiunctivae affirmativae necessarie *vel fors* natura rem esse disiunctiva dic sicut \_\_\_\_ neutra pars est demonstratum et quia ignotum est quod \_\_\_\_ est copula M

<sup>2740</sup> notandum est] nota V

<sup>2741</sup> negativa W

aequivalet<sup>2747</sup> copulationi<sup>2748</sup> affirmativae.<sup>2749</sup> Et hoc posset probari ex eodem fundamento, quia alias<sup>2750</sup> sequitur<sup>2751</sup> contradictoria simul<sup>2752</sup> esse falsa. De probatione tamen supersedeo.<sup>2753</sup>

<6.6> Sexto est<sup>2754</sup> notandum quod copulativa vel<sup>2755</sup> disiunctiva<sup>2756</sup> vel aliqua alia ypotetica non dicitur negativa vel affirmativa ex negatione primae partis suae<sup>2757</sup> vel etiam<sup>2758</sup> secundae vel<sup>2759</sup> ambarum, sed ex affirmatione vel negatione<sup>2760</sup> copulae principalis; ut copulativa<sup>2761</sup> affirmativa dicitur quamdiu<sup>2762</sup> haec coniunctio 'et'<sup>2763</sup> non negatur ut haec<sup>2764</sup> 'homo non<sup>2765</sup> currit et equus non est asinus'<sup>2766</sup> est propositio affirmativa, quia haec coniunctio 'et' [Y 87:] non negatur sed<sup>2767</sup> affirmatur. Ita etiam disiunctiva affirmativa dicitur<sup>2768</sup> quando<sup>2769</sup> haec coniunctio 'vel' non negatur,<sup>2770</sup> nam<sup>2771</sup> copula dicitur formalis pars propositionis.<sup>2772</sup> Propter hoc ea affirmata semper dicitur propositio affirmativa, et ea negata<sup>2773</sup> dicitur propositio<sup>2774</sup> negativa, sicut<sup>2775</sup> etiam<sup>2776</sup> est de<sup>2777</sup>

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2742 copulative - aequivalet] *om.* Y  
2743 disiunctivae WY  
2744 ei V  
2745 ita haec] ista Y  
2746 negativa W, negative Y  
2747 *add.* tamen Y, *add.* +dis+ V  
2748 *om.* Y, copulativae W  
2749 affirmatae V  
2750 saltem W  
2751 sequeretur V, *add.* quod W  
2752 *post* esse VY  
2753 tamen supersedeo] tunc supra Y  
2754 *post* notandum W  
2755 *om.* W  
2756 *add.* hypothetica Y  
2757 sui W  
2758 *om.* VY  
2759 etiam secundae vel] *om.* W  
2760 vel negatione] *om.* WY  
2761 coniunctio W  
2762 quam+diu+ ly Y  
2763 *om.* W  
2764 *om.* Y | ut haec] ut sic hic W, et sic sit hic V  
2765 *om.* MW  
2766 equus - asinus] asinus non est equus V  
2767 non negatur sed] *om.* V  
2768 *add.* quod V  
2769 quod W  
2770 affirmatur VY  
2771 *om.* Y  
2772 *add.* et VY  
2773 *add.* semper Y  
2774 *om.* V  
2775 sic Y  
2776 *om.* W  
2777 est de] et in V

propositionibus de inesse, nam haec est affirmativa 'homo est<sup>2778</sup> non asinus',<sup>2779</sup> quia copula affirmatur,<sup>2780</sup> et haec negativa 'homo non est asinus',<sup>2781</sup> quamvis praedicatum non negatur. Ex<sup>2782</sup> copulae enim affirmatione<sup>2783</sup> vel negatione<sup>2784</sup> propositio [E 41r] affirmativa vel negativa est iudicanda.<sup>2785</sup> [W 115r]

<7> Septima regula est haec: arguendo<sup>2786</sup> ab interemptione<sup>2787</sup> [M 40r] disiunctivae ad copulativam de partibus contradicentibus partibus<sup>2788</sup> disiunctivae negativae<sup>2789</sup> antequam<sup>2790</sup> negatur,<sup>2791</sup> est consequentia<sup>2792</sup> formalis, ut<sup>2793</sup> optime sequitur: 'non: homo currit vel homo est animal,<sup>2794</sup> ergo<sup>2795</sup> nullus homo currit et<sup>2796</sup> nullus homo est animal'. Probatur regula,<sup>2797</sup> quia tales formaliter inter<sup>2798</sup> se aequivalent, igitur<sup>2799</sup> etc..<sup>2800</sup> Consequentia tenet.<sup>2801</sup> Antecedens patet,<sup>2802</sup> quia ambae formaliter contradicunt disiunctivae<sup>2803</sup> affirmativae, scilicet huic:<sup>2804</sup> 'homo currit vel homo est animal'. Quod autem ita sit,<sup>2805</sup> patet de disiunctiva negativa, quia non est verius dare<sup>2806</sup> contradictionem<sup>2807</sup> quam praeponere<sup>2808</sup> negationem toti.<sup>2809</sup> Et quod copulativa quae est consequens<sup>2810</sup> illi<sup>2811</sup> disiunctivae

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<sup>2778</sup> *add.* +asinus+ W

<sup>2779</sup> *add.* +est asinus+ W

<sup>2780</sup> quia copula affirmatur] *om.* V

<sup>2781</sup> *post* homo VY

<sup>2782</sup> *add.* parte Y

<sup>2783</sup> affirmativa V

<sup>2784</sup> negativa Y | copulae - negatione] parte enim copulativae affirmativae vel negativae W

<sup>2785</sup> iudicanda W

<sup>2786</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2787</sup> *add.* totius M

<sup>2788</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2789</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2790</sup> quando *add.* consequentia Y

<sup>2791</sup> negaretur Y | antequam negatur] *om.* V

<sup>2792</sup> *add.* bona et Y

<sup>2793</sup> quia M, unde W

<sup>2794</sup> *add.* +ve+ V, *add.* vel Y

<sup>2795</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2796</sup> nullus homo currit et] *om.* Y

<sup>2797</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2798</sup> *om.* V

<sup>2799</sup> ergo V

<sup>2800</sup> talis W, *add.* ista Y

<sup>2801</sup> *add.* et V, sed Y

<sup>2802</sup> probatur W

<sup>2803</sup> *add.* +et+ W

<sup>2804</sup> scilicet huic] ut sic W, ut haec Y

<sup>2805</sup> sequitur V

<sup>2806</sup> *ante* verius Y

<sup>2807</sup> conditionem W

<sup>2808</sup> *vel forsitan* imponere V

contradictat, patet per <sup>2812</sup> regulam communem: <sup>2813</sup> "copulativa et disiunctiva <sup>2814</sup> de partibus contradicentibus contradicunt".<sup>2815</sup>

<8> Octava regula est haec: arguendo<sup>2816</sup> a tota conditionali cum positione antecedentis ad positionem consequentis est consequentia bona et<sup>2817</sup> formalis.<sup>2818</sup>

Exemplum ut sic arguendo:<sup>2819</sup> 'si<sup>2820</sup> homo currit, homo movetur; sed homo currit, ergo<sup>2821</sup> homo movetur'.

Et <sup>2822</sup> probatur regula: talis <sup>2823</sup> consequentia <sup>2824</sup> tenet <sup>2825</sup> in omnibus terminis qualitercumque dispositis<sup>2826</sup> retenta consimili<sup>2827</sup> forma.<sup>2828</sup> Ergo talis consequentia<sup>2829</sup> est<sup>2830</sup> formalis. Consequentia tenet et<sup>2831</sup> antecedens patet,<sup>2832</sup> quia qualitercumque essent termini, si prima pars antecedentis esset<sup>2833</sup> vera, tunc conditionalis esset<sup>2834</sup> necessaria.<sup>2835</sup> Et si cum hoc<sup>2836</sup> secunda pars antecedentis esset<sup>2837</sup> vera, tunc<sup>2838</sup> consequens<sup>2839</sup> eiusdem<sup>2840</sup> conditionalis<sup>2841</sup> etiam est<sup>2842</sup> verum,<sup>2843</sup> cum<sup>2844</sup> ex

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<sup>2809</sup> *add.* propositioni V

<sup>2810</sup> *add.* etiam V

<sup>2811</sup> istius W

<sup>2812</sup> *add.* secundam V

<sup>2813</sup> regulam communem] conclusionem V

<sup>2814</sup> copulativa et disiunctiva] disiunctiva et copulativa W

<sup>2815</sup> ante de Y | *add.* igitur etc. Y

<sup>2816</sup> *add.* +arguendo+ W

<sup>2817</sup> bona et] *om.* W

<sup>2818</sup> ante consequentia W | et formalis] *om.* V

<sup>2819</sup> exemplum - arguendo] nam si V | sic arguendo] *om.* Y

<sup>2820</sup> *om.* W

<sup>2821</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2822</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>2823</sup> +in+ Y

<sup>2824</sup> istaY, ipsa V

<sup>2825</sup> est Y

<sup>2826</sup> ordinatis Y

<sup>2827</sup> eadem Y

<sup>2828</sup> *add.* recte V

<sup>2829</sup> post est V

<sup>2830</sup> ergo - est] est bona consequentia et Y

<sup>2831</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2832</sup> et antecedens patet] *om.* V

<sup>2833</sup> est VW

<sup>2834</sup> est VY

<sup>2835</sup> vera V

<sup>2836</sup> cum hoc] *om.* V

<sup>2837</sup> est WY, sit M

<sup>2838</sup> et Y, *add.* tunc M

<sup>2839</sup> consequentia VY

<sup>2840</sup> *om.* VWY

<sup>2841</sup> *om.* W

vero<sup>2845</sup> non sequitur nisi verum. Igitur<sup>2846</sup> si ita est sicut per antecedens significatur, quicumque<sup>2847</sup> fuerint |V 89<sup>va</sup>| termini,<sup>2848</sup> ita erit sicut per consequens significatur.

Notandum |Y 87<sup>v</sup>| circa regulam<sup>2849</sup> quod sic arguendo solet<sup>2850</sup> vocari<sup>2851</sup> syllogismus hypotheticus . Et fiunt<sup>2852</sup> multi tales in dictis materialibus,<sup>2853</sup> ut patet<sup>2854</sup> primo *Physicorum*, ut:<sup>2855</sup> 'si transmutatio substantialis<sup>2856</sup> est, materia prima<sup>2857</sup> est; sed transmutatio substantialis<sup>2858</sup> est, ergo<sup>2859</sup> materia prima est'. Et proportionaliter multi sunt huiusmodi<sup>2860</sup> syllogismi hypothetici.<sup>2861</sup>

<9> Nona regula est haec: quod ex formaliter impossibili - sicut ex copulativa composita ex partibus contradicentibus - formaliter<sup>2862</sup> sequitur quodlibet consequens.<sup>2863</sup> Per probationem, supponitur quod omnis ista consequentia est formalis in qua ex posito<sup>2864</sup> antecedenti potest deduci suum consequens vel consequentias<sup>2865</sup> intermedias formales nullo extrinseco coassumpto. Patet, quia sic probat Philosophus <in> *Primo Priorum* syllogismos imperfectos esse formales. Ex hoc probatur regula quia ex copulativa composita de partibus contradicentibus sequitur formaliter copulativa cuius prima pars est una disiunctiva composita ex prima parte sua et ex consequente ex ea illata; et secunda pars est secunda pars sui. Sit per probationem haec consequentia copulativa: 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, igitur a est'; sequitur formaliter: 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, igitur Sortes est vel a est et Sortes non

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<sup>2842</sup> om. Y, ante etiam V

<sup>2843</sup> vera VY

<sup>2844</sup> vel forsane tunc Y

<sup>2845</sup> eo W

<sup>2846</sup> ergo V

<sup>2847</sup> add. etiam V

<sup>2848</sup> quicumque - termini] om. W

<sup>2849</sup> circa regulam] om. V

<sup>2850</sup> possibile Y

<sup>2851</sup> add. hoc argumentum +tlc+ Y

<sup>2852</sup> sunt Y

<sup>2853</sup> materiis W, rebus Y

<sup>2854</sup> in V

<sup>2855</sup> om. Y

<sup>2856</sup> vel forsane stabilis W, add. lectio dubia +terminis+ Y

<sup>2857</sup> om. Y

<sup>2858</sup> vel forsane stabilis W

<sup>2859</sup> igitur add. prima Y

<sup>2860</sup> add. modi Y

<sup>2861</sup> add. de quibus non est nunc dicendum M, add. sequitur de conversionibus W, add. etc. etc. etc. Y | et proportionaliter hypothetici] om. V

<sup>2862</sup> add. +contradicentibus+ M

<sup>2863</sup> add. quod ex eo infertur M

<sup>2864</sup> vel forsane primo M

<sup>2865</sup> vel forsane consequentes M



est', quia prima pars copulativae<sup>2866</sup> illatae<sup>2867</sup> sequitur formaliter ad primam partem copulativae inferentis; secunda sequitur formaliter ad secundam, igitur tota copulativa sequitur formaliter ad totam copulativam.

Tenet consequentia. Et prima pars antecedentis patet, quia sequitur formaliter: 'Sortes est, igitur Sortes est vel a est', quia a parte disiunctae ad totam disiunctivam per secundam regula huius capituli. Et secunda pars |M 40<sup>v</sup>| patet, quia eadem pars est secunda pars inferentis et illatae. Modo<sup>2868</sup> in copulativa illata sequitur formaliter consequens illatum ex prima copulativa, quia haec est argumentum<sup>2869</sup> a tota disiunctiva cum contradictorio unius partis, per quartam regulam, sicut: 'Sortes est vel a est, sed Sortes non est, igitur<sup>2870</sup> a est', per quartam regulam praedictam. Ergo de prima ad ultimam est consequentia formalis per supponentem arguendo sic: 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, igitur a est', quod erat probandum. Similiter arguitur in qualibet huiusmodi, igitur etc.<sup>2871</sup>

#### I.3.4 <Regulae de conversionibus>

Restat nunc ponere<sup>2872</sup> regulas<sup>2873</sup> quasdam de conversionibus.

Nam conversio solet dici consequentia formalis iuxta definitionem eius dicentem quod<sup>2874</sup> conversio |E 41<sup>v</sup>| est duarum propositionum categoricarum<sup>2875</sup> utroque termino ordine converso participantium<sup>2876</sup> sic quod ab una ad aliam est<sup>2877</sup> formalis consequentia, quamvis non sint multae talium<sup>2878</sup> consequentiae formales proprissime.

Et primo de propositionibus de inesse de recto<sup>2879</sup> in quibus nullus terminus ampliativus<sup>2880</sup> ponitur.

|W 115 v|

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<sup>2866</sup> *add. lectio dubia* sequens M

<sup>2867</sup> *lectio dubia* M

<sup>2868</sup> *add. lectio dubia* ex M

<sup>2869</sup> *lectio dubia* M

<sup>2870</sup> *add. \_\_\_\_* M

<sup>2871</sup> *nona - igitur etc.] om.* EFVWY

<sup>2872</sup> *restat nunc ponere] post conversionibus* V

<sup>2873</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>2874</sup> *om.* V, aliqua Y

<sup>2875</sup> *add. habitudo* V

<sup>2876</sup> *ante ordine* Y

<sup>2877</sup> *sic quod - est] unius ex alia W, unius ad aliam* Y

<sup>2878</sup> *post consequentiae* V, tales Y

<sup>2879</sup> *add. et in illis M | de recto] et de necessario* V

<sup>2880</sup> *post ponitur* V

#### I.3.4.1 <Regulae de conversionibus propositionum de inesse non ampliatis>

<1> Quarum prima est haec: arguendo ab universali negativa de modo loquendi consueto et ubi non est aliena restrictio a parte subiecti vel a parte praedicati ad universalem negativam de terminis transpositis<sup>2881</sup> praeponendo<sup>2882</sup> praedicato eius hoc additum<sup>2883</sup> 'quod est' est<sup>2884</sup> consequentia<sup>2885</sup> bona, ut: 'nullus homo est antichristus, ergo<sup>2886</sup> nihil<sup>2887</sup> quod est antichristus est homo'; 'nullus homo est asinus, ergo nihil quod est asinus, est homo'. Patet ista<sup>2888</sup> regula, quia<sup>2889</sup> numquam reperitur instantia.

Dico notanter "de modo loquendi consueto", scilicet ubi praedicatum sequitur copulam et non praeponitur, quia si praedicatum copulae praeponeretur regula<sup>2890</sup> non haberet veritatem, quia non sequitur: 'omnis sol<sup>2891</sup> planeta non est, ergo<sup>2892</sup> omnis planeta sol non est'.

Dico etiam<sup>2893</sup> notanter "ubi non est<sup>2894</sup> aliena<sup>2895</sup> restrictio",<sup>2896</sup> quia non sequitur: 'nullus homo est mulier, ergo<sup>2897</sup> nulla mulier est homo', nam propter hoc<sup>2898</sup> quod hoc signum 'nullus' secundum communem opinionem restringit hunc terminum 'homo', scilicet<sup>2899</sup> ad supponendum solum pro masculis,<sup>2900</sup> verum<sup>2901</sup> est antecedens, scilicet<sup>2902</sup> 'nullus homo est mulier', et consequens, quia caret tali restrictione, est falsum,<sup>2903</sup> scilicet haec<sup>2904</sup> 'nulla mulier est homo'.

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<sup>2881</sup> de terminis transpositis] *om. VY*

<sup>2882</sup> praeponibile *Y*

<sup>2883</sup> hoc additum] *om. W*

<sup>2884</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>2885</sup> *post bona V*

<sup>2886</sup> *nam Y*

<sup>2887</sup> *nullus W, lectio dubia Y*

<sup>2888</sup> *illa V*

<sup>2889</sup> *om. V*

<sup>2890</sup> *post haberet V*

<sup>2891</sup> *post est V*

<sup>2892</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>2893</sup> *om. W*

<sup>2894</sup> *add. +aliqua+ V*

<sup>2895</sup> *alia W*

<sup>2896</sup> *add. etc. V*

<sup>2897</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>2898</sup> *add. quia V*

<sup>2899</sup> *om. VY*

<sup>2900</sup> *vel forsitan masculinis W*

<sup>2901</sup> *add. tamen V*

<sup>2902</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>2903</sup> *est falsum] om. Y*

<sup>2904</sup> *hoc WV*

Dico etiam notanter |Y 88r| "praeponendo praedicato<sup>2905</sup> hoc<sup>2906</sup> additum 'quod est'", quia alias<sup>2907</sup> non sequitur,<sup>2908</sup> ubi praedicatum esset<sup>2909</sup> terminus singularis - quia non sequitur 'nullus homo est antichristus, ergo<sup>2910</sup> nullus antichristus est homo', quia consequens non est<sup>2911</sup> propositio eo quod<sup>2912</sup> termino singulari non potest proprie addi<sup>2913</sup> signum<sup>2914</sup> distributivum.<sup>2915</sup> Sed verum est:<sup>2916</sup> ubi praedicatum esset<sup>2917</sup> terminus communis, illud<sup>2918</sup> non oportet<sup>2919</sup> addi.<sup>2920</sup>

<2> Secunda regula est haec: arguendo a particulari affirmativa de praedicato communi capto sine aliquo signo sibi addito,<sup>2921</sup> dummodo<sup>2922</sup> non fiat maior restrictio in una earum<sup>2923</sup> quam alia, |E 42r| ad particularem affirmativam vel indefinitam affirmativam<sup>2924</sup> de terminis transpositis, est bona<sup>2925</sup> consequentia - ut: 'homo est animal, ergo<sup>2926</sup> animal est homo',<sup>2927</sup> 'quoddam animal est currens, ergo<sup>2928</sup> quoddam currens est animal'.

Dico notanter "de praedicato communi", quia si praedicatum esset terminus singularis,<sup>2929</sup> non converteretur |V 89vb| in particularem<sup>2930</sup> vel indefinitam sed in<sup>2931</sup> singularem,<sup>2932</sup> nisi<sup>2933</sup> tunc<sup>2934</sup>

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<sup>2905</sup> *add. eius V*

<sup>2906</sup> *add. totum V*

<sup>2907</sup> nihil W, aliud M

<sup>2908</sup> sequeretur *add. scilicet V*

<sup>2909</sup> est Y

<sup>2910</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2911</sup> non est] *om. W*

<sup>2912</sup> eo quod] quia VY

<sup>2913</sup> potest proprie addi] additur proprie W

<sup>2914</sup> *add. +sed+ W*

<sup>2915</sup> *lectio dubia V*

<sup>2916</sup> esset W, *add. quod V*

<sup>2917</sup> est V

<sup>2918</sup> istud W

<sup>2919</sup> valet W

<sup>2920</sup> *add. etc. V* | ubi - addi] gratia formae nam in terminis divinis est instantia ut non nulla essentia divina generat ergo unum generans est essentia divina cuius antecedens est catholicum et consequens etiam huiusmodi additum utile est propter praedicata sumpta cum signis distributivis sibi additis et etiam propter propositiones de praedicatis singularibus quae aliter nequeat proprie convenienter formari M

<sup>2921</sup> *add. +dicendum+ W, add. dummodo V*

<sup>2922</sup> *add. lectio dubia +c+ vel forsitan +t+ Y*

<sup>2923</sup> illarum V

<sup>2924</sup> vel indefinita affirmativam] *om. W*

<sup>2925</sup> *post consequentia V*

<sup>2926</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2927</sup> *add. et M*

<sup>2928</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2929</sup> *add. tunc Y*

<sup>2930</sup> *add. affirmativam V*

<sup>2931</sup> *om. M*

<sup>2932</sup> singulari Y | sed in singularem] *om. W*

oportet<sup>2935</sup> apponere<sup>2936</sup> praedicato eius hoc additum 'quod est'. Exemplum<sup>2937</sup> ut:<sup>2938</sup> 'homo est Johannes' [M 41r] convertitur in illam:<sup>2939</sup> 'Johannes est homo' (quae est singularis);<sup>2940</sup> vel in<sup>2941</sup> istam:<sup>2942</sup> 'quoddam quod est Johannes, est homo' [W 116r] quae est particularis - sed haec<sup>2943</sup> consequentia fit<sup>2944</sup> apponendo<sup>2945</sup> hoc additum<sup>2946</sup> 'quod est'.<sup>2947</sup>

Dico<sup>2948</sup> notanter "dummodo<sup>2949</sup> non fiat<sup>2950</sup> maior<sup>2951</sup> restrictio in una quam in alia",<sup>2952</sup> quia<sup>2953</sup> si maior fieret<sup>2954</sup> restrictio non valeret consequentia vel saltem non oporteret consequentiam valere. Unde non sequitur: 'quaedam mulier est homo, ergo<sup>2955</sup> quidam homo est mulier'. Nam in prima iste<sup>2956</sup> terminus<sup>2957</sup> 'homo' non restringitur, et ideo<sup>2958</sup> est vera;<sup>2959</sup> sed in secunda restringitur, ergo<sup>2960</sup> ipsa<sup>2961</sup> est falsa: nam in ista<sup>2962</sup> 'quidam homo est mulier', ly 'homo' propter hoc signum 'quidam' masculini generis restringitur ad supponendum solum<sup>2963</sup> pro masculinis. Et ideo sensus est: 'aliquis masculinus est mulier', quod est falsum.<sup>2964</sup>

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<sup>2933</sup> ubi WY, +ubi+ V

<sup>2934</sup> om. M

<sup>2935</sup> om. VY

<sup>2936</sup> apponeretur V, praeponeretur Y

<sup>2937</sup> om. W

<sup>2938</sup> om. Y, add. in illa V

<sup>2939</sup> istam W

<sup>2940</sup> quae est singularis] om. V

<sup>2941</sup> Johannes est - in] om. MW

<sup>2942</sup> illam V

<sup>2943</sup> hoc VWY, add. non W

<sup>2944</sup> consequentia fit] est VVY

<sup>2945</sup> add. quod Y

<sup>2946</sup> hoc additum] addito W

<sup>2947</sup> add. et M

<sup>2948</sup> add. etiam V

<sup>2949</sup> ubi VWY

<sup>2950</sup> est VWY

<sup>2951</sup> aliqua V

<sup>2952</sup> altera W | in una quam in alia] vel etiam maior V

<sup>2953</sup> et W

<sup>2954</sup> ante maior V

<sup>2955</sup> igitur Y

<sup>2956</sup> ille VY

<sup>2957</sup> lectio dubia Y

<sup>2958</sup> add. ipsa V

<sup>2959</sup> et ideo est vera] om. WY

<sup>2960</sup> et ideo VY

<sup>2961</sup> om. V

<sup>2962</sup> illa Y

<sup>2963</sup> post restringitur Y

<sup>2964</sup> nam in ista - falsum] om. V

Dico etiam notanter: "capto sine aliquo signo<sup>2965</sup> sibi addito",<sup>2966</sup> quia si apponeretur<sup>2967</sup> sibi signum universale<sup>2968</sup> forsitan<sup>2969</sup> consequentia<sup>2970</sup> non valeret in particularem<sup>2971</sup> vel indefinita,<sup>2972</sup> nisi praeponeretur<sup>2973</sup> praedicato hoc additum 'quod est', ut<sup>2974</sup> si<sup>2975</sup> diceretur: 'planeta est omnis sol': si<sup>2976</sup> convertitur<sup>2977</sup> in istam<sup>2978</sup> 'omnis sol est planeta', tunc non convertitur<sup>2979</sup> in particularem; et si in istam<sup>2980</sup> 'quoddam quod est omnis sol est planeta', tunc<sup>2981</sup> additur hoc<sup>2982</sup> additum<sup>2983</sup> 'quod est'.<sup>2984</sup>

<3> Tertia regula est haec:<sup>2985</sup> ab universali affirmativa de praedicato communi capto sine aliquo sincategoremate<sup>2986</sup> addito sibi<sup>2987</sup> ad particularem affirmativam de terminis transpositis<sup>2988</sup> ubi non sit maior restrictio in una quam in alia, est bona consequentia.

Ista<sup>2989</sup> regula probatur, quia ex opposito consequentis infertur<sup>2990</sup> oppositum antecedentis. Patet hoc, si arguitur<sup>2991</sup> sic: 'omnis homo [E 42v] est animal, ergo<sup>2992</sup> aliquod animal est homo'. Da [W 116v] oppositum consequentis - 'nullum animal est homo', et sequitur quod 'nullus homo est animal' per

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<sup>2965</sup> *om.* M

<sup>2966</sup> *ante* sibi M

<sup>2967</sup> *post* sibi V

<sup>2968</sup> apponeretur - universale] caperetur tale signum copulae a parte subiecti W

<sup>2969</sup> *add.* quia V

<sup>2970</sup> *om.* W, *post* valeret M

<sup>2971</sup> particularibus Y

<sup>2972</sup> indefinitis Y

<sup>2973</sup> apponetur Y

<sup>2974</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2975</sup> *om.* W

<sup>2976</sup> et Y

<sup>2977</sup> converteretur V

<sup>2978</sup> illam V

<sup>2979</sup> converteretur V

<sup>2980</sup> illam V

<sup>2981</sup> *lectio dubia* etiam Y

<sup>2982</sup> ad W

<sup>2983</sup> signum Y

<sup>2984</sup> *add.* +tertia regula etc.+ W

<sup>2985</sup> *add.* quod V

<sup>2986</sup> signo sincategorematico Y

<sup>2987</sup> *ante* addito Y

<sup>2988</sup> de terminis transpositis] *post* alia V

<sup>2989</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2990</sup> sequatur V, sequitur Y

<sup>2991</sup> argueretur V

<sup>2992</sup> igitur Y

primam regulam et secundam conclusionem<sup>2993</sup> quod est oppositum antecedentis.<sup>2994</sup> Et simili<sup>2995</sup> modo<sup>2996</sup> potest probari<sup>2997</sup> regula praecedens.

Specificationes autem positae<sup>2998</sup> in ista<sup>2999</sup> secunda<sup>3000</sup> ponuntur in ea eisdem<sup>3001</sup> de causis propter<sup>3002</sup> quas ponebatur in regula praecedenti.<sup>3003</sup>

<4> Quarta regula est haec:<sup>3004</sup> arguendo a particulari<sup>3005</sup> negativa de praedicato communi capto sine<sup>3006</sup> aliquo sincategoremate<sup>3007</sup> addito, ad<sup>3008</sup> aliam particularem<sup>3009</sup> negativam de modo loquendi inconsueto<sup>3010</sup> est bona consequentia, sicut sequitur: 'quoddam<sup>3011</sup> animal homo non est,<sup>3012</sup> ergo<sup>3013</sup> aliquis<sup>3014</sup> homo animal non est'. Patet regula, quia<sup>3015</sup> ex opposito<sup>3016</sup> consequentis infertur<sup>3017</sup> oppositum<sup>3018</sup> antecedentis. Sequitur enim<sup>3019</sup> 'omnis homo omne<sup>3020</sup> animal<sup>3021</sup> est, ergo<sup>3022</sup> omne animal est homo'. Et<sup>3023</sup> ex alio<sup>3024</sup> potest idem<sup>3025</sup> probari, quia numquam<sup>3026</sup> reperitur<sup>3027</sup> instantia.

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<sup>2993</sup> et secundam conclusionem] *om.* MW, conclusionem Y

<sup>2994</sup> consequentis VW

<sup>2995</sup> similia Y

<sup>2996</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>2997</sup> *ante* potest Y

<sup>2998</sup> proprietate W, appropriatae M, suppositae Y

<sup>2999</sup> illa V

<sup>3000</sup> *om.* V, regula Y

<sup>3001</sup> eiusdem Y

<sup>3002</sup> de causis propter] \_\_\_\_ (sput?) Y

<sup>3003</sup> regula praecedenti] prima et secunda regulis Y

<sup>3004</sup> *add.* quod MV | est haec] talis est M

<sup>3005</sup> *add.* +affirmativa+ W

<sup>3006</sup> quamvis Y

<sup>3007</sup> *add.* sibi V

<sup>3008</sup> in VW

<sup>3009</sup> *add.* +affirmativa+ W

<sup>3010</sup> consueto MW

<sup>3011</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3012</sup> non est] *ante* homo EV, *add.* +homo+ M

<sup>3013</sup> igitur E

<sup>3014</sup> quiddam M

<sup>3015</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3016</sup> ex opposito] oppositum VY

<sup>3017</sup> sequitur WY, *post* antecedentis Y

<sup>3018</sup> affirmationem Y

<sup>3019</sup> sequitur enim] *om.* Y

<sup>3020</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3021</sup> *add.* *blank space* V

<sup>3022</sup> igitur MY

<sup>3023</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3024</sup> illo W

<sup>3025</sup> illud W, aliter EM, *ante* potest Y, *post* probari E

<sup>3026</sup> nullibi V

<sup>3027</sup> invenitur EM

<5> Quinta regula est haec:<sup>3028</sup> arguendo a particulari negativa<sup>3029</sup> ad particularem negativam de modo loquendi consueto<sup>3030</sup> non valet consequentia; unde non sequitur: 'quoddam animal non<sup>3031</sup> est homo, ergo<sup>3032</sup> quidam homo non est animal'. Patet, quia oppositum consequentis stat cum antecedente. Stant enim iste<sup>3033</sup> simul: 'omnis homo est animal, et<sup>3034</sup> quoddam animal non est homo', ut notum est.<sup>3035</sup>

<6> Sexta regula est haec:<sup>3036</sup> arguendo<sup>3037</sup> a propositione particulari affirmativa vel universali negativam seu particularem affirmativam<sup>3038</sup> de terminis [V 90<sup>ra</sup>] transpositis [M 41<sup>v</sup>] praeponendo subiecto in utraque hoc additum 'quod est' est formalis<sup>3039</sup> consequentia.<sup>3040</sup>

Ista<sup>3041</sup> regula patet<sup>3042</sup> ex eo quia<sup>3043</sup> formaliter<sup>3044</sup> sequitur:<sup>3045</sup> 'nihil quod est homo est mulier, ergo<sup>3046</sup> quod est mulier non est homo vel<sup>3047</sup> nichil quod est mulier [Y 89<sup>r</sup>] est homo';<sup>3048</sup> et sic in<sup>3049</sup> affirmativis: <sup>3050</sup> 'aliquid <sup>3051</sup> quod est homo, est<sup>3052</sup> Sortes; ergo aliquid<sup>3053</sup> quod est Sortes, est homo',<sup>3054</sup> quia nusquam reperitur instantia.

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<sup>3028</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3029</sup> *add. de terminis transpositis Y*

<sup>3030</sup> *de modo loquendi consueto] post consequentia Y*

<sup>3031</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3032</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>3033</sup> *illae V*

<sup>3034</sup> *om. W | quidam - et] om. Y*

<sup>3035</sup> *ut notum est] om. V*

<sup>3036</sup> *add. quod M*

<sup>3037</sup> *add. +a particulari+ E*

<sup>3038</sup> *particulari affirmativa - particularem affirmativam] universali vel particulari affirmativa vel universali negativa ad universalem negativam vel ad particularem affirmativam M] universali affirmativa vel negativa ad universalem negativam particularem affirmativam W] universali negativa vel affirmativa ad universalem negativam vel particularem affirmativam Y] universali affirmativa vel negativa ad universalem negativam ad propositionem universalem negativam vel particularem affirmativam V*

<sup>3039</sup> *bona V*

<sup>3040</sup> *est formalis consequentia] ante praeponendo V*

<sup>3041</sup> *om. V*

<sup>3042</sup> *om. V*

<sup>3043</sup> *quod V*

<sup>3044</sup> *ista - formaliter] om. W*

<sup>3045</sup> *add. +vel+ Y*

<sup>3046</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>3047</sup> *quid est mulier - vel] om. VY*

<sup>3048</sup> *quod est mulier non est homo vel nichil quod est mulier est homo] quod est homo est mulier W*

<sup>3049</sup> *om. VY*

<sup>3050</sup> *affirmativa W, et V*

<sup>3051</sup> *omne Y*

<sup>3052</sup> *add. +lectio dubia de hoc igitur vel quaedam mulier est homo+ Y*

<sup>3053</sup> *aliquid Y*

<sup>3054</sup> *add. probatur Y*

Et ex alio patet,<sup>3055</sup> quia semper<sup>3056</sup> ex opposito consequentis sequitur<sup>3057</sup> oppositum antecedentis, prout faciliter patet diligenter<sup>3058</sup> intuenti.<sup>3059</sup>

#### 1.3.4.2 <Regulae de conversionibus propositionum de obliquo et de propositionibus de terminis ampliatis>

Circa istas regulas positas est notandum <sup>3060</sup> quod omnes haec <sup>3061</sup> intelliguntur <sup>3062</sup> de <sup>3063</sup> propositionibus de inesse, nam de modalibus postea diceretur.<sup>3064</sup> Etiam ista<sup>3065</sup> dicta magis<sup>3066</sup> sunt |E 43r| manifesta de<sup>3067</sup> propositionibus de recto quam in alias<sup>3068</sup> de obliquo, et ideo<sup>3069</sup> tam de illis de obliquo quam de<sup>3070</sup> illis de terminis ampliatis<sup>3071</sup> aequaliter est <sup>3072</sup>dicendum.<sup>3073</sup>

#### <Notanda>

<1> Circa quas primo est notandum,<sup>3074</sup> sicut<sup>3075</sup> alibi declaratum<sup>3076</sup> est,<sup>3077</sup> quod obliquus non potest esse subiectum aut<sup>3078</sup> praedicatum<sup>3079</sup> propositionis<sup>3080</sup> de inesse et de<sup>3081</sup> verbo |W 117r| personali, immo semper<sup>3082</sup> oportet istud<sup>3083</sup> esse<sup>3084</sup> rectum.<sup>3085</sup> Et ex<sup>3086</sup> consequenti advertendum est<sup>3087</sup> ut<sup>3088</sup>

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<sup>3055</sup> *om. VY*

<sup>3056</sup> *post consequentis VY*

<sup>3057</sup> *infertur V*

<sup>3058</sup> *om. WY*

<sup>3059</sup> *intelligenti Y*

<sup>3060</sup> *sciendum Y*

<sup>3061</sup> *illae add. regulae V*

<sup>3062</sup> *intelligitur W*

<sup>3063</sup> *in V*

<sup>3064</sup> *dicatur Y, ante postea V | postea diceretur] om. W*

<sup>3065</sup> *om. V*

<sup>3066</sup> *om. V, post sunt V*

<sup>3067</sup> *in Y*

<sup>3068</sup> *in alias] om. Y*

<sup>3069</sup> *om. V*

<sup>3070</sup> *quam de] sit cum V*

<sup>3071</sup> *add. cetera Y*

<sup>3072</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3073</sup> *vel forsā didicerit Y | de recto quam - dicendum] tam de recto quam de illis de obliquo W*

<sup>3074</sup> *add. quod E*

<sup>3075</sup> *prout VY*

<sup>3076</sup> *derivatum V*

<sup>3077</sup> *sicut - est] post obliquus VY*

<sup>3078</sup> *vel V*

<sup>3079</sup> *subiectum aut praedicatum] praedicatum aut subiectum W*

<sup>3080</sup> *in propositionibus Y*

<sup>3081</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3082</sup> *om. EW*



<obliquus><sup>3089</sup> se tenens ex<sup>3090</sup> parte praedicati consideretur<sup>3091</sup> ut rectus<sup>3092</sup> et<sup>3093</sup> etiam  
<obliquus><sup>3094</sup> se tenens a parte<sup>3095</sup> subiecti ut melius<sup>3096</sup> possit converti.

Alias enim<sup>3097</sup> talis<sup>3098</sup> propositio<sup>3099</sup> non posset<sup>3100</sup> converti.<sup>3101</sup> Et est ratio<sup>3102</sup> quia ignoraret  
quomodo terminus deberet transponi.<sup>3103</sup>

<2> Secundo est<sup>3104</sup> notandum quod in conversione talium propositionum de terminis obliquis<sup>3105</sup>  
et<sup>3106</sup> de terminis<sup>3107</sup> ampliatis principaliter duo sunt<sup>3108</sup> attendenda, ut semper earum fiat  
conversio<sup>3109</sup> bona.<sup>3110</sup>

<2.1>Primum est hoc, ut<sup>3111</sup> non arguatur<sup>3112</sup> a non distributo ad distributum. Et est<sup>3113</sup> causa  
quia<sup>3114</sup> talis consequentia non valeret.<sup>3115</sup> Exemplum:<sup>3116</sup> ut non sequitur 'Sortes differt ab omni

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3083 illud Y  
3084 *add.* +subiectum+ E  
3085 esse rectum] *blank space* V  
3086 *add.* +pnci- V  
3087 *om.* V  
3088 quod E  
3089 *blank space* V, rectus EMWY  
3090 a EW  
3091 consideratur W  
3092 *om.* MVWY  
3093 *om.* Y  
3094 *blank space* V, rectus EMWY  
3095 praedicati - parte] *om.* W  
3096 *add.* +eset+ E  
3097 *add.* *lectio dubia* homo MWY  
3098 totalem W, talem MVY  
3099 *add.* *blank sapce* V, propositionem MWY  
3100 possit Y | non posset] repossit W  
3101 *om.* V, convertere MY  
3102 ideo *ante* est V  
3103 terminus deberet transponi] debetur transponere terminus V  
3104 *om.* W  
3105 terminis obliquis] obliquo Y, .a.quo V  
3106 *om.* V  
3107 de terminis] *om.* W  
3108 *ante* duo V  
3109 *add.* quam sit Y  
3110 ut semper - bona] *om.* V  
3111 quod W  
3112 *add.* ibi W  
3113 *post* causa Y  
3114 quod Y  
3115 valeat Y  
3116 *om.* VY

homine, ergo<sup>3117</sup> omnis homo differt a Sorte', quia in antecedente ly homine<sup>3118</sup> stat determinate propter duo signa distributiva et in consequente ly homo<sup>3119</sup> supponit confuse et distributive, quia est subiectum propositionis universalis<sup>3120</sup> affirmativae.<sup>3121</sup>

<2.2>Secundum est: ne arguatur a magis amplo ad minus amplum sine distributione, nec e converso, cum distributione. Et causa est eadem,<sup>3122</sup> quia non oportet talem<sup>3123</sup> consequentiam valere.<sup>3124</sup>

Exemplum primi,<sup>3125</sup> ut 'homo est mortuus, |Y 89v| ergo<sup>3126</sup> homo qui est est mortuus'.

Non sequitur, quia in prima<sup>3127</sup> ly homo stat ample,<sup>3128</sup> tam pro hiis quae<sup>3129</sup> sunt quam pro hiis quae<sup>3130</sup> fuerunt; et in secunda stat magis restricte,<sup>3131</sup> quia solum stat<sup>3132</sup> pro hiis quae<sup>3133</sup> sunt.

Exemplum secundi, ut 'nullus homo qui<sup>3134</sup> est est<sup>3135</sup> mortuus, ergo nullus homo est mortuus'.

Non sequitur, quia arguitur cum distributione ab<sup>3136</sup> hoc<sup>3137</sup> termino 'homo'<sup>3138</sup> stante<sup>3139</sup> minus ample in una earum quam<sup>3140</sup> in alia, quia in prima<sup>3141</sup> solum stat<sup>3142</sup> pro hiis quae<sup>3143</sup> sunt, ad eundem stantem tam pro hiis |E 43v| quae<sup>3144</sup> sunt quam pro hiis quae fuerunt in alia earum.

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<sup>3117</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3118</sup> homo VWY

<sup>3119</sup> ly homo] *om.* VWY

<sup>3120</sup> quia - universalis] *post* consequente V | ly homo - universalis] non quia est subiectum propositionis universalis affirmativae quod supponit confuse et distributive Y

<sup>3121</sup> *om.* MVW, *add.* et Y

<sup>3122</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3123</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3124</sup> *add.* de forma Y

<sup>3125</sup> exemplum primi] *om.* W

<sup>3126</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3127</sup> in prima] *post* ly homo Y

<sup>3128</sup> ampliative Y

<sup>3129</sup> qui V

<sup>3130</sup> qui V

<sup>3131</sup> magis restricte] minus ample VY

<sup>3132</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>3133</sup> qui V

<sup>3134</sup> quidam Y

<sup>3135</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3136</sup> a V

<sup>3137</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3138</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3139</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3140</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3141</sup> in prima] *om.* V | in alia - quia in prima] *om.* WY

<sup>3142</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>3143</sup> qui V

<sup>3144</sup> qui V

Et istis duobus observatis faciendo in<sup>3145</sup> propositionibus de obliquo<sup>3146</sup> vel de<sup>3147</sup> terminis ampliatis de subiecto praedicatum et econverso semper tenet<sup>3148</sup> consequentia.<sup>3149</sup>

Iuxta hoc convertitur<sup>3150</sup> ista<sup>3151</sup> 'nullus murus [V 90<sup>rb</sup>] est in lapide'<sup>3152</sup> in illam<sup>3153</sup> 'nullum ens in lapide est murus', quia ly ens<sup>3154</sup> a parte praedicati fuit rectus.<sup>3155</sup>

'Asinus est Sortis, igitur<sup>3156</sup> aliquod ens Sortis est asinus'; 'nullum mortuum est homo, ergo<sup>3157</sup> nihil [M 42<sup>r</sup>] quod est<sup>3158</sup> homo est mortuum'; 'album fuit Sortes, ergo<sup>3159</sup> Sortes est vel fuit albus'.

In prima conversione restringendo<sup>3160</sup> hunc terminum 'homo' in convertenti<sup>3161</sup> a parte subiecti ut solum staret<sup>3162</sup> pro hiis quae<sup>3163</sup> sunt, sicut in conversa supponit a parte [W 117v] praedicati.<sup>3164</sup>

In secunda ampliando hunc terminum 'albus' a parte praedicati per copulam ut simul supponat pro hiis quae<sup>3165</sup> sunt et<sup>3166</sup> fuerunt sicut in conversa supponit a parte subiecti.<sup>3167</sup>

### 1.3.4.3 <De conversione propositionum de verbis impersonalibus>

<1> De conversione<sup>3168</sup> impersonalium<sup>3169</sup> sit prima regula haec:<sup>3170</sup> arguendo per<sup>3171</sup> transpositionem terminorum in propositionibus de verbis impersonalibus non valet<sup>3172</sup> consequentia, ut<sup>3173</sup> non

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<sup>3145</sup> de W

<sup>3146</sup> aliquo *add. supra* obliquo V

<sup>3147</sup> *om.* W, in V

<sup>3148</sup> valet Y

<sup>3149</sup> *add.* et Y

<sup>3150</sup> cum dicitur V

<sup>3151</sup> illa V

<sup>3152</sup> *add.* convertitur V

<sup>3153</sup> istam Y | in illam] ergo W

<sup>3154</sup> *add.* sicut se tenens V

<sup>3155</sup> fuit rectus] *om.* V, *post* ens Y, *add.* in prima M

<sup>3156</sup> *om.* WV

<sup>3157</sup> *om.* W, igitur Y

<sup>3158</sup> *add.* +mortuum est+ W

<sup>3159</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3160</sup> restringitur Y

<sup>3161</sup> in convertenti] *om.* VWY

<sup>3162</sup> stet *ante* solum Y

<sup>3163</sup> qui V

<sup>3164</sup> *add.* et V] sicut - praedicati] in conversa a parte [W 117v] praedicati pro hiis quae fuerunt W

<sup>3165</sup> qui V

<sup>3166</sup> vel Y

<sup>3167</sup> *add.* etc. sequitur ergo conversae impersonalium sequitur Y, *add.* etc. V

<sup>3168</sup> *add.* M

<sup>3169</sup> *add.* et Y

<sup>3170</sup> *om.* V, ista Y

<sup>3171</sup> secundum V

<sup>3172</sup> tenet W

sequitur: 'me pudet peccati,<sup>3174</sup> ergo peccatum<sup>3175</sup> pudet mei'.<sup>3176</sup> Nec sequitur: 'animam meam taedet vitae meae, ergo vitam meam taedet<sup>3177</sup> animae meae',<sup>3178</sup> prout de se<sup>3179</sup> notum est. Sed forte peteret quis,<sup>3180</sup> quomodo tunc<sup>3181</sup> tales<sup>3182</sup> [Y 90r] debent<sup>3183</sup> converti.<sup>3184</sup>

Respondeo<sup>3185</sup> quod per<sup>3186</sup> resolutionem<sup>3187</sup> in propositionem<sup>3188</sup> de verbo personali omnino<sup>3189</sup> <sunt> aequivalentes, et per conversionem illarum.<sup>3190</sup>

De prima:<sup>3191</sup> 'me pudet peccati'<sup>3192</sup> resolvitur in istam:<sup>3193</sup> 'ego habeo pudorem de peccato'<sup>3194</sup> et tunc<sup>3195</sup> convertitur:<sup>3196</sup> 'habens pudorem de peccato'<sup>3197</sup> est ego'.<sup>3198</sup> Secunda resolvitur in hanc: 'anima mea habet taedium de vita mea';<sup>3199</sup> et tunc<sup>3200</sup> illa<sup>3201</sup> convertitur<sup>3202</sup> sic:<sup>3203</sup> 'habens taedium de vita mea est anima mea'.<sup>3204</sup>

Et per hanc<sup>3205</sup> conversionem potest sciri<sup>3206</sup> quomodo in aliis<sup>3207</sup> consequentiis<sup>3208</sup> conversio<sup>3209</sup> debet<sup>3210</sup> formari.<sup>3211</sup>

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<sup>3173</sup> exemplum VY

<sup>3174</sup> peccata W

<sup>3175</sup> peccata W

<sup>3176</sup> me W

<sup>3177</sup> *add.* +animam meam+ W

<sup>3178</sup> me pudet - animae meae] animam meam taedet vitae meae igitur vitam meam taedet animae meae nec sequitur me pudet peccati igitur peccatum pudet mei Y

<sup>3179</sup> de se] *post* notum est V

<sup>3180</sup> aliquis V

<sup>3181</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3182</sup> *add.* termini Y

<sup>3183</sup> deberent Y

<sup>3184</sup> *add.* et V

<sup>3185</sup> dico W

<sup>3186</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3187</sup> resolutiones V

<sup>3188</sup> propositione Y, propositiones V

<sup>3189</sup> eis VY

<sup>3190</sup> *add.* exemplum Y

<sup>3191</sup> primo Y

<sup>3192</sup> peccata W | me pudet peccati] me taedet vitae meae Y

<sup>3193</sup> illam V

<sup>3194</sup> peccatis W | ego - peccato] anima mea habet taedium de vita mea Y

<sup>3195</sup> ita Y

<sup>3196</sup> *add.* sic Y | et tunc convertitur] igitur W

<sup>3197</sup> peccatis W

<sup>3198</sup> habens - ego] habens taedium de vita mea est anima mea Y

<sup>3199</sup> anima - vita mea] ego habeo pudorem de peccato Y

<sup>3200</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3201</sup> *om.* W, *post* resolvitur Y

<sup>3202</sup> resolvitur W

<sup>3203</sup> in istam V

<sup>3204</sup> habens - anima mea] habens pudorem de peccato est ego Y

<sup>3205</sup> harum *post* conversionem V

<sup>3206</sup> patere W, *om.* V

#### 1.3.4.4 <De conversionibus propositionum modalium>

<Notanda>

<1> Circa<sup>3212</sup> conversiones modalium est<sup>3213</sup> notandum<sup>3214</sup> quod<sup>3215</sup> quaedam sunt modales de sensu

Modales de sensu composito [E 44r] dicuntur<sup>3218</sup> ubi modus aptus<sup>3219</sup> natus<sup>3220</sup> est<sup>3221</sup> verificari de tota propositione in quantum<sup>3222</sup> propositio subicitur vel<sup>3223</sup> praedicatur. Exemplum ut: 'Sortem currere est possibile', vel 'necesse est hominem esse animal'.<sup>3224</sup>

Dicitur notanter:<sup>3225</sup> "ubi<sup>3226</sup> modus aptus<sup>3227</sup> natus est<sup>3228</sup> verificari de tota propositione in quantum propositio,<sup>3229</sup> quia non omnis modus qui verificatur de tota propositione facit propositionem modalem,<sup>3230</sup> ut haec<sup>3231</sup> non est modalis:<sup>3232</sup> 'homo est albus,<sup>3233</sup> est propositio scripta, vel nigra<sup>3234</sup> vel rubea,' sed solum illi modi<sup>3235</sup> faciunt propositionem modalem qui<sup>3236</sup> verificantur de tota propositione

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<sup>3207</sup> in aliis] huius V

<sup>3208</sup> consequenti V

<sup>3209</sup> conversiones *vel fors* conversiones V | et - conversio] per harum propositionum consequenter potest fieri conversio in aliis huius omni conversionem Y

<sup>3210</sup> potest W, debent V

<sup>3211</sup> *add.* sequitur aliud capitulum etc. etc. etc.

<sup>3212</sup> quantum ad V

<sup>3213</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3214</sup> *add.* primo V

<sup>3215</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3216</sup> aliae VY

<sup>3217</sup> sunt modales] *om.* WY

<sup>3218</sup> dicunt W, sunt V

<sup>3219</sup> natus Y

<sup>3220</sup> *vel fors* nativis V

<sup>3221</sup> *om.* W, *ante* aptus V

<sup>3222</sup> quanto W, *add.* est M

<sup>3223</sup> aut Y, aliqui M

<sup>3224</sup> *add.* \_\_\_ Y, *add.* et M

<sup>3225</sup> notabiliter M

<sup>3226</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3227</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3228</sup> *om.* VWY

<sup>3229</sup> etc. V | subicitur - propositio] *om.* W

<sup>3230</sup> quia - modalem] *om.* M

<sup>3231</sup> hic WY, *add.* omnis W

<sup>3232</sup> non est modalis] *om.* WY

<sup>3233</sup> asinus Y

<sup>3234</sup> in *lectio dubia* nigro Y

<sup>3235</sup> *om.* VWY

<sup>3236</sup> *add.* vere W, qua M

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in quantum propositio,<sup>3237</sup> ita<sup>3238</sup> quod<sup>3239</sup> si non esset haec propositio de qua<sup>3240</sup> verificatur<sup>3241</sup>, non verificaretur de eo, sicut iste<sup>3242</sup> modus 'possibile' non verificatur<sup>3243</sup> de hac propositione 'homo currit', nisi esset propositio. Nihil enim<sup>3244</sup> vocatur<sup>3245</sup> possibile complexe nisi propositio.<sup>3246</sup>

Sed propositio modalis de sensu diviso vocatur<sup>3247</sup> ubi huiusmodi<sup>3248</sup> modus ponitur ad copulam. Exemplum,<sup>3249</sup> ut 'Sortem<sup>3250</sup> possibile est<sup>3251</sup> currere'; 'hominem<sup>3252</sup> contingens est videre',<sup>3253</sup> et sic de aliis,<sup>3254</sup> |Y 90<sup>v</sup>| ubi talis modus<sup>3255</sup> additur copulae.<sup>3256</sup> Nam<sup>3257</sup> ly Sortem in prima est subiectum |W 118r||V 90<sup>va</sup>| et <sup>3258</sup> ly currens <sup>3259</sup> praedicatum, et hoc <sup>3260</sup> totum <sup>3261</sup> 'possibile est esse' <sup>3262</sup> intermedium<sup>3263</sup> est copula. Et ita<sup>3264</sup> patet quod iste<sup>3265</sup> modus ponitur<sup>3266</sup> ad copulam, quia inter subiectum et praedicatum.<sup>3267</sup> Unde idem<sup>3268</sup> est<sup>3269</sup> quando<sup>3270</sup> modus<sup>3271</sup> ponitur inter accusativum et infinitum vel quando modus<sup>3272</sup> ponitur inter suppositum<sup>3273</sup> et appositum.

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3237 *add. + \_\_ + Y*

3238 *nam Y*

3239 *om. M*

3240 *add. nunc V*

3241 *verificaretur M*

3242 *ille V*

3243 *verificaretur MV*

3244 *nam Y*

3245 *vocaretur VWY*

3246 *homo currit - nisi propositio] vel enim notaretur propositio possibile compossibile W | nihil - propositio] om. V*

3247 *est V, videtur Y*

3248 *om. Y*

3249 *om. Y*

3250 *hominem Y*

3251 *ante possibile Y*

3252 *Sortem MW*

3253 *currere V, currere vel videre M*

3254 *de aliis] om. M*

3255 *ante talis Y*

3256 *additur copulae] ponitur ad copulam V*

3257 *add. si MY*

3258 *om. W*

3259 *currere W, currit V, add. est Y*

3260 *add. \_\_ resolvitur M*

3261 *vel forsantantum WY*

3262 *om. esse V, add. stans totum M*

3263 *vel forsantantum interimendum ante possibile V*

3264 *isto W*

3265 *ibi V, om. Y*

3266 *ante modus add. +mo\_+ V*

3267 *subiectum et praedicatum] praedicatum et subiectum V*

3268 *illud MV*

3269 *om. Y*

3270 *quia M*

3271 *om. M*

3272 *quando modus] om. MV*

<2> Secundo circa conversiones modalium<sup>3274</sup> est notandum quantum ad illas de sensu composito, quod ipsae<sup>3275</sup> convertuntur dupliciter.

<2.1>Uno modo quantum ad transpositionem totius<sup>3276</sup> subiecti et totius praedicati, ut ista:<sup>3277</sup> 'Sortem currere est possibile' convertitur in istam: <sup>3278</sup> 'possibile est Sortem currere'. Et de ista <sup>3279</sup> conversionem <sup>3280</sup> nihil plus [M 42<sup>v</sup>] dicam,<sup>3281</sup> quia satis manifestum est <sup>3282</sup> quod istae <sup>3283</sup> propositiones consimiliter convertuntur,<sup>3284</sup> illa<sup>3285</sup> conversione<sup>3286</sup> sicut illae<sup>3287</sup> de inesse,<sup>3288</sup> quia modales de sensu composito vere sunt<sup>3289</sup> de inesse, quia copula earum<sup>3290</sup> non est modificata<sup>3291</sup> ut 'est', nam ista<sup>3292</sup> de simplici inherentia praedicati ad subiectum<sup>3293</sup> - ut<sup>3294</sup> ista:<sup>3295</sup> "Sortes currit" est possibile' vel<sup>3296</sup> 'propositio possibilis'<sup>3297</sup> sicut haec propositio:<sup>3298</sup> "Sortes currit" est propositio nigra<sup>3299</sup> vel<sup>3300</sup> haec:<sup>3301</sup> 'homo est animal'.<sup>3302</sup>

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<sup>3273</sup> subiectum Y

<sup>3274</sup> om. Y

<sup>3275</sup> isate W

<sup>3276</sup> om. E

<sup>3277</sup> illa V, om. E

<sup>3278</sup> illam V

<sup>3279</sup> illa V

<sup>3280</sup> om. E

<sup>3281</sup> dicatur Y

<sup>3282</sup> ante manifestum V

<sup>3283</sup> illae V

<sup>3284</sup> ante consimiliter V

<sup>3285</sup> et eadem W, +illae+ V

<sup>3286</sup> lectio dubia convertuntur V

<sup>3287</sup> aliae M, ista Y

<sup>3288</sup> illa - inesse] om. E

<sup>3289</sup> ante vere VY

<sup>3290</sup> in eis Y

<sup>3291</sup> est modificata] modificatur Y, verificatur V

<sup>3292</sup> add. est Y

<sup>3293</sup> ut est nam - subiectum] ut patet de illa simplici inferentia V | ideo ista est de simplici inherentia W

<sup>3294</sup> cum Y

<sup>3295</sup> illa V

<sup>3296</sup> possibile vel] om. VY

<sup>3297</sup> vel forsam possibile Y, vel forsam possibile ante propositio V | ut est - possibilis] ut patet de illa Sortes currere est propositio modalis nam est de simplici inherentia M

<sup>3298</sup> om. M

<sup>3299</sup> necessaria W

<sup>3300</sup> om. W

<sup>3301</sup> add. propositio Y

<sup>3302</sup> quia copula - animal] Sortes currere est possibile ergo Sortes currere est possibile sicut alia de inesse quia copula in eis non est modificata ut de simplici inherentia Sortes +currere+ currere est propositio possibile Sortes currit est propositio nigra vel homo est animal E

<2.2> Alio modo convertuntur penes transpositionem subiecti et praedicati ipsius dicti, ut<sup>3303</sup> ista:<sup>3304</sup>  
'hominem esse [E 44<sup>v</sup>] animal est necesse, ergo<sup>3305</sup> animal esse hominem est necesse', ubi iste<sup>3306</sup>  
modus 'necesse' nullo modo<sup>3307</sup> variatur, sed solum<sup>3308</sup> sit<sup>3309</sup> transpositio in partibus dicti.<sup>3310</sup>

#### 1.3.4.4.1 <Regulae de conversionibus modalium de sensu composito>

Et de istis<sup>3311</sup> breviter<sup>3312</sup> sunt<sup>3313</sup> ponendae<sup>3314</sup> aliquae regulae notandae.<sup>3315</sup>

Et<sup>3316</sup> nota<sup>3317</sup> quod 'dictum' in propositione modali de sensu composito<sup>3318</sup> vocatur<sup>3319</sup> totum praeter  
modum et<sup>3320</sup> copulam et sincategoremata<sup>3321</sup> sincategorematice retenta,<sup>3322</sup> ut 'omne hominem esse  
animal est necesse'; ibi<sup>3323</sup> hoc totum 'omne homine' et 'animal',<sup>3324</sup> 'dictum' dicitur,<sup>3325</sup> scilicet totum  
praeter modum et copulam.<sup>3326</sup>

<1> Unde<sup>3327</sup> sit<sup>3328</sup> prima<sup>3329</sup> regula haec: arguendo<sup>3330</sup> respectu huius modi 'possibile' vel 'necesse' a  
dicto universali negativo<sup>3331</sup> ad aliud dictum universale negativum de terminis transpositis<sup>3332</sup> [Y 91r]  
est bona consequentia.<sup>3333</sup>

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<sup>3303</sup> eiusdem W  
<sup>3304</sup> illa V  
<sup>3305</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>3306</sup> ubi iste] ibi ille V  
<sup>3307</sup> nullo modo] in nulla VY  
<sup>3308</sup> add. modo V  
<sup>3309</sup> fit V  
<sup>3310</sup> partibus dicti] dictis W  
<sup>3311</sup> illa V, isto W  
<sup>3312</sup> om. MW  
<sup>3313</sup> sint V  
<sup>3314</sup> om. W, post regulae M  
<sup>3315</sup> om. MV  
<sup>3316</sup> etiam Y  
<sup>3317</sup> notandum V | et nota] pro quibus est notandum M  
<sup>3318</sup> de sensu composito] om. W  
<sup>3319</sup> post dictum W, add. illud Y  
<sup>3320</sup> om. M  
<sup>3321</sup> sincategorema M  
<sup>3322</sup> capta Y | sincategorematice retenta] scilicet hoc sigum omne M  
<sup>3323</sup> om. VY  
<sup>3324</sup> add. lectio dubia istud W  
<sup>3325</sup> add. esse ante dictum Y, vocatur ante dictum V  
<sup>3326</sup> ut - copulam] om. M  
<sup>3327</sup> om. V, tunc W  
<sup>3328</sup> post regula V  
<sup>3329</sup> post regula Y  
<sup>3330</sup> add. a sensu composito W



Exemplum ut:<sup>3334</sup> 'nullum hominem currere est possibile, ergo<sup>3335</sup> nullum currens esse hominem est possibile'. Similiter bene sequitur: 'nullum hominem esse asinum est necessarium, ergo<sup>3336</sup> nullum asinum esse hominem est necessarium'.<sup>3337</sup>

Ista regula patet, nam<sup>3338</sup> bene sequitur: 'nullus homo currit,<sup>3339</sup> igitur<sup>3340</sup> nullum currens est homo'. Ergo<sup>3341</sup> cum<sup>3342</sup> ex possibili non<sup>3343</sup> sequitur impossibile, ex possibilitate antecedentis sequitur possibilitas consequentis. Similiter bene sequitur:<sup>3344</sup> 'nullus homo est asinus, ergo nullus asinus est homo'; ergo<sup>3345</sup> cum<sup>3346</sup> [W 118v] ex necessario non sequitur contingens, ex<sup>3347</sup> hoc quod antecedens est necessarium, sequitur consequens esse necessarium. Ergo<sup>3348</sup> regula fuit vera. Consequentia patet.<sup>3349</sup> Et<sup>3350</sup> antecedens,<sup>3351</sup> scilicet<sup>3352</sup> quod tales consequentiae sunt bonae depositis signis,<sup>3353</sup> patet per regulas<sup>3354</sup> conversionum propositionum de inesse.

<2> Secunda regula est haec: arguendo respectu eorundem modorum a dicto universali<sup>3355</sup> affirmativo vel<sup>3356</sup> particulari affirmativo<sup>3357</sup> ad dictum particulare affirmativum de terminis transpositis est consequentia bona,<sup>3358</sup> ut: 'omnem<sup>3359</sup> hominem esse animal est necesse, ergo<sup>3360</sup> aliquid animal esse

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3331 negative Y

3332 +transpositis+ V

3333 ante bona V

3334 om. Y

3335 igitur Y

3336 igitur Y

3337 add. et V

3338 iam W, quia V

3339 add. +igitur+ nullus homo est currens Y

3340 ergo V

3341 igitur Y

3342 tantum W

3343 om. V

3344 similiter bene sequitur] declaratur W

3345 om. W, igitur Y

3346 etc. W

3347 et ad V

3348 igitur Y

3349 tenet Y

3350 om. V

3351 add. probatur Y

3352 om. W

3353 consequentiae - signis] sunt bonae consequentiae depositis signis W, consequentiae depositis signis sunt bonae V

3354 regulam V

3355 om. Y

3356 add. dicto V

3357 om. Y

3358 ante consequentia Y

3359 om. W

3360 igitur Y

hominem est necesse'. Patet<sup>3361</sup> regula, quia nusquam reperitur instantia. Et<sup>3362</sup> sicut praecedens probatur.<sup>3363</sup> Similiter sequitur: 'aliquem hominem esse currentem<sup>3364</sup> est possibile ergo<sup>3365</sup> aliquod currens esse hominem est possibile'.<sup>3366</sup> Probatur<sup>3367</sup> |V 90<sup>vb</sup>| nec plus nec minus sicut praecedens.<sup>3368</sup>

<3> Tertia regula est haec:<sup>3369</sup> arguendo respectu huius modi<sup>3370</sup> 'impossibile' vel 'falsum'<sup>3371</sup> a dicto universali affirmativo vel particulari affirmativo<sup>3372</sup> ad<sup>3373</sup> dictum<sup>3374</sup> particulare affirmativum<sup>3375</sup> de terminis transpositis, non oportet consequentiam valere,<sup>3376</sup> ut non sequitur: 'impossibile est omne<sup>3377</sup> animal<sup>3378</sup> esse hominem,<sup>3379</sup> ergo impossibile est aliquem<sup>3380</sup> hominem |E 45<sup>r</sup>| esse<sup>3381</sup> animal'.<sup>3382</sup> Nec sequitur: 'falsum est omne habens<sup>3383</sup> caput esse<sup>3384</sup> hominem, ergo<sup>3385</sup> falsum est<sup>3386</sup> aliquem<sup>3387</sup> hominem habere caput'.

Et causa<sup>3388</sup> huius<sup>3389</sup> est quia ex impossibili sequitur possibile<sup>3390</sup> et<sup>3391</sup> ex falso<sup>3392</sup> verum, et non e converso.<sup>3393</sup>

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<sup>3361</sup> *add.* ista Y

<sup>3362</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3363</sup> *add.* et V | sicut praecedens probatur] probatur sicut praecedens VY

<sup>3364</sup> esse currentem] currere V

<sup>3365</sup> et Y

<sup>3366</sup> aliquem - hominem est possibile] aliquod currens esse hominem est possibile, ergo aliquem hominem esse currentem est possibile W

<sup>3367</sup> *add.* a dicto universali affirmativo V

<sup>3368</sup> sicut praecedens] \_\_\_ V

<sup>3369</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3370</sup> *add.* +dicti+ modi W

<sup>3371</sup> vel falsum] *om.* W

<sup>3372</sup> a dicto - particulari affirmativo] *om.* MWV

<sup>3373</sup> *add.* aliquid M

<sup>3374</sup> ad dictum] *om.* V

<sup>3375</sup> particulare affirmativum] *om.* MVW

<sup>3376</sup> ante consequentiam W, *add.* exemplum M

<sup>3377</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3378</sup> asinum W

<sup>3379</sup> *add.* +asinum+ W

<sup>3380</sup> *om.* W, omnem V

<sup>3381</sup> *add.* +hominem+ W

<sup>3382</sup> asinum W

<sup>3383</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3384</sup> habere W

<sup>3385</sup> *add.* +impossibile+ W, igitur Y

<sup>3386</sup> *add.* hominem M

<sup>3387</sup> *om.* W, omnem V

<sup>3388</sup> ratio Y

<sup>3389</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3390</sup> *add.* et non e converso M

<sup>3391</sup> quia W, ut Y

<sup>3392</sup> *add.* sequitur Y

<4> Quarta regula est haec:<sup>3394</sup> [M 43<sup>r</sup>] arguendo respectu huius modi<sup>3395</sup> 'verum' a dicto [Y 91<sup>v</sup>] universali affirmativo vel particulari affirmativo<sup>3396</sup> ad dictum particulare<sup>3397</sup> affirmativum, vel a dicto universali negativo ad dictum<sup>3398</sup> universale negativum<sup>3399</sup> de terminis transpositis est bona<sup>3400</sup> consequentia, ut<sup>3401</sup> 'verum est nullum hominem esse equum, ergo<sup>3402</sup> verum est nullum equum esse hominem';<sup>3403</sup> 'verum est hominem currere, ergo<sup>3404</sup> verum est currens<sup>3405</sup> esse hominem'. Patet<sup>3406</sup> regula, quia deposito modo talis<sup>3407</sup> consequentia valet, ut<sup>3408</sup> dictum est in<sup>3409</sup> conversionibus illarum<sup>3410</sup> de inesse. Ergo<sup>3411</sup> addendo antecedenti hunc modum 'verum' etiam<sup>3412</sup> valebit consequentia,<sup>3413</sup> quia si antecedens bonae consequentiae est verum, consequens est verum, quia ex vero non sequitur nisi verum.

Et haec de modalibus compositis dicta<sup>3414</sup> sufficiant.<sup>3415</sup>

#### 1.3.4.4.2.1 <Regulae de conversione propositionum modalium de necessario de sensu diviso>

<1> Quantum ad divisas,<sup>3416</sup> sit prima regula haec:<sup>3417</sup> arguendo a propositione de necessario de sensu diviso universali affirmativa<sup>3418</sup> vel particulari affirmativa<sup>3419</sup> ad aliam de necessario de terminis transpositis<sup>3420</sup> non oportet consequentiam valere.<sup>3421</sup>

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<sup>3393</sup> et non e converso] *om.* VY, ex vero sequitur non nisi verum W

<sup>3394</sup> illa V

<sup>3395</sup> *add.* modi W

<sup>3396</sup> vel particulari affirmativo] *om.* WY

<sup>3397</sup> *ante* dictum W

<sup>3398</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3399</sup> universale negativum] universalem negativam Y

<sup>3400</sup> *post* consequentia VY

<sup>3401</sup> *add.* bene sequitur V

<sup>3402</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3403</sup> *add.* similiter Y

<sup>3404</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3405</sup> currentem W

<sup>3406</sup> *add.* ista Y

<sup>3407</sup> adhuc V

<sup>3408</sup> unde V

<sup>3409</sup> de Y

<sup>3410</sup> istarum W

<sup>3411</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3412</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3413</sup> *add.* \_ Y

<sup>3414</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3415</sup> et haec - sufficiant] *om.* V, *add.* etc. sequitur W

<sup>3416</sup> divisum W

Probatur, quia non sequitur: 'omne lucens in sphaera lunae necesse est esse lunam, ergo<sup>3422</sup> aliquam lunam necesse est esse lucentem [W 119r] in sphaera lunae', quia antecedens est verum - quia omne quod est vel potest esse lucens in sphaera lunae de necessitate est luna -, cum<sup>3423</sup> falsum est quod<sup>3424</sup> lunam<sup>3425</sup> necesse est<sup>3426</sup> esse lucentem in sua sphaera,<sup>3427</sup> quia potest eclipsari et non lucere in ea.<sup>3428</sup> Similiter<sup>3429</sup> non sequitur: 'aliquod lucens necesse est esse lunam, ergo<sup>3430</sup> aliquam lunam necesse est esse lucentem', propter eandem causam. Ergo<sup>3431</sup> regula est<sup>3432</sup> vera.

<2> Secunda regula est: <sup>3433</sup> quaelibet talis propositio <sup>3434</sup> potest converti in particularem affirmativam<sup>3435</sup> de possibili praeponendo eius praedicato<sup>3436</sup> hoc<sup>3437</sup> 'quod est necesse'.

Exemplum huius:<sup>3438</sup> 'omne lucens<sup>3439</sup> in sphaera lunae necesse est esse lunam, ergo<sup>3440</sup> aliquod quod est necesse<sup>3441</sup> esse lunam<sup>3442</sup> potest esse lucens [E 45v] in sphaera lunae'. Similiter haec:<sup>3443</sup> 'aliquod lucens de [Y 92r] necessitate est luna<sup>3444</sup> ergo<sup>3445</sup> aliquod quod<sup>3446</sup> de necessitate est luna<sup>3447</sup> potest

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<sup>3417</sup> illa V  
<sup>3418</sup> *vel forsā* affirmativo W  
<sup>3419</sup> *vel forsā* affirmativo W  
<sup>3420</sup> de terminis transpositis] *om.* V  
<sup>3421</sup> *ante* consequentia Y | *add. lectio dubia* definitio Y  
<sup>3422</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>3423</sup> consequens tamen W, tamen V  
<sup>3424</sup> quia W, +quod+ V  
<sup>3425</sup> *add.* esse lucentem non W, luna Y  
<sup>3426</sup> necesse est] de necessitate V  
<sup>3427</sup> in sua sphaera] *om.* W, in sphaera sua V  
<sup>3428</sup> in ea] ita etiam V  
<sup>3429</sup> simpliciter W  
<sup>3430</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>3431</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>3432</sup> *om.* VY  
<sup>3433</sup> *add.* +quia+ W, *add.* haec arguendo quod Y, *add.* quod M  
<sup>3434</sup> *om.* MY  
<sup>3435</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>3436</sup> subiecto M  
<sup>3437</sup> *add.* additum Y  
<sup>3438</sup> *add.* est V, *add.* ut M  
<sup>3439</sup> *add. lectio dubia* totale M  
<sup>3440</sup> igitur EY  
<sup>3441</sup> *ante* est V, *add.* est Y  
<sup>3442</sup> aliquod - luna] aliqua luna W  
<sup>3443</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>3444</sup> *add.* convertitur sic W | ergo - luna] *om.* M  
<sup>3445</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>3446</sup> *add.* est Y  
<sup>3447</sup> aliquod quod de necessitate est luna] *om.* W

esse lucens'. Probatur regula<sup>3448</sup> per syllogismum expository, demonstrato<sup>3449</sup> lucente<sup>3450</sup> in sphaera lunae<sup>3451</sup> quod<sup>3452</sup> de necessitate est<sup>3453</sup> luna. Arguitur<sup>3454</sup> sic:<sup>3455</sup> 'hoc potest esse lucens in sphaera lunae'. Patet, quia alias<sup>3456</sup> conversa<sup>3457</sup> non esset<sup>3458</sup> vera. Et 'hoc est aliquid quod<sup>3459</sup> de necessitate est luna, ergo<sup>3460</sup> aliquid<sup>3461</sup> quod<sup>3462</sup> de necessitate est luna potest lucere in sphaera lunae'. Similiter probarentur<sup>3463</sup> omnes consimiles.

<3> Tertia regula est haec:<sup>3464</sup> |V 91<sup>ra</sup>| arguendo ab<sup>3465</sup> universali negativa de necessario de modo affirmato et verbo negato ad universalem negativam de necessario<sup>3466</sup> de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia.<sup>3467</sup>

Exemplum ut bene<sup>3468</sup> sequitur:<sup>3469</sup> 'omnis homo de necessitate non est asinus, ergo<sup>3470</sup> omnis asinus de necessitate non est homo'.

Probatur regula,<sup>3471</sup> quia numquam<sup>3472</sup> reperitur instantia. Igitur<sup>3473</sup> regula est<sup>3474</sup> vera. Consequentia tenet, quia ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis ut prius dicebatur.<sup>3475</sup>

Antecedens patet inducendo.<sup>3476</sup>

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<sup>3448</sup> *om. E*

<sup>3449</sup> *lectio dubia V, demonstrando EMY*

<sup>3450</sup> *lucens EY*

<sup>3451</sup> *add. +quia+ W*

<sup>3452</sup> *quae W*

<sup>3453</sup> *add. esse E*

<sup>3454</sup> *dicitur V*

<sup>3455</sup> *om. E*

<sup>3456</sup> *alia MVW*

<sup>3457</sup> *lectio dubia W, conversio EMVY*

<sup>3458</sup> *add. bona vel V*

<sup>3459</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3460</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>3461</sup> *lectio dubia Y*

<sup>3462</sup> *quam Y*

<sup>3463</sup> *probarem W*

<sup>3464</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3465</sup> *a propositione W*

<sup>3466</sup> *de necessario] om. W*

<sup>3467</sup> *ante bona Y*

<sup>3468</sup> *ut bene] om. MW, sicut Y | exemplum ut bene] om. E*

<sup>3469</sup> *add. enim EMW*

<sup>3470</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>3471</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3472</sup> *nusquam V*

<sup>3473</sup> *ergo EMV*

<sup>3474</sup> *om. VY*

<sup>3475</sup> *quia - dicebatur] om. EVWY, post inducendo M*

<4> Quarta regula est haec:<sup>3477</sup> arguendo a propositione<sup>3478</sup> universali negativa de necessario apponendo<sup>3479</sup> negationem modo immediate et non verbo ad universalem negativam de necessario<sup>3480</sup> de terminis transpositis non valet consequentia.<sup>3481</sup>

Ista<sup>3482</sup> regula patet,<sup>3483</sup> quia non sequitur:<sup>3484</sup> 'nullam lunam necesse est esse<sup>3485</sup> lucentem,<sup>3486</sup> ergo<sup>3487</sup> nullum lucens necesse est esse lunam'.<sup>3488</sup> Patet, quia oppositum consequentis stat cum antecedente,<sup>3489</sup> ergo<sup>3490</sup> consequentia non valet. Consequentia patet.<sup>3491</sup> Antecedens patet,<sup>3492</sup> [M 43v] quia istae<sup>3493</sup> stant simul: 'aliquod<sup>3494</sup> lucens de necessitate est luna' et 'omnem<sup>3495</sup> lunam non<sup>3496</sup> necesse est esse lucentem',<sup>3497</sup> quia manifestum est quod aliquid quod<sup>3498</sup> potest esse lucens de necessitate est luna - et cum hoc<sup>3499</sup> stat,<sup>3500</sup> quia<sup>3501</sup> omnem lunam non necesse est lucere.

<5> Quinta regula est haec: arguendo a propositione universali vel particulari [W 119v] de necessario, ubi una negatio<sup>3502</sup> ponitur ad modum et alia ad verbum, ad aliam particularem de necessario, [Y 92r] ubi<sup>3503</sup> consimiliter ponuntur negationes, est consequentia bona.

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<sup>3476</sup> inductione EY, *add.* in singularis W

<sup>3477</sup> illa V

<sup>3478</sup> a propositione] ab M

<sup>3479</sup> postponendo V

<sup>3480</sup> de necessario] *om.* MVW

<sup>3481</sup> *add.* +ergo+ W

<sup>3482</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3483</sup> probat V

<sup>3484</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3485</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3486</sup> esse lucentem] lucere M

<sup>3487</sup> igitur M

<sup>3488</sup> *add.* +consequentia+ W

<sup>3489</sup> stat cum antecedente] non repugnat antecedenti Y

<sup>3490</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3491</sup> *om.* W, est M, *add.* et MV

<sup>3492</sup> scitur V, est M

<sup>3493</sup> illae V

<sup>3494</sup> omne V

<sup>3495</sup> nullam W

<sup>3496</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3497</sup> esse lucentem] lucere MV

<sup>3498</sup> *post* lucens W

<sup>3499</sup> cum hoc] causa huius W

<sup>3500</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3501</sup> quod M

<sup>3502</sup> necessaria V

<sup>3503</sup> *add.* consimiles vel V

Unde<sup>3504</sup> bene sequitur: 'aliquem hominem non necesse est non currere, ergo<sup>3505</sup> aliquid currens non necesse est non esse hominem'. Probatur, quia numquam<sup>3506</sup> reperitur instantia.<sup>3507</sup> Ex alio, quia ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis, ergo<sup>3508</sup> [E 46<sup>r</sup>] consequentia est<sup>3509</sup> bona. Consequentia tenet.<sup>3510</sup> Antecedens probatur,<sup>3511</sup> quia da oppositum:<sup>3512</sup> 'omne currens de necessitate non est homo' sequitur 'ergo<sup>3513</sup> omnis homo de necessitate non est currens'<sup>3514</sup> (per tertiam regulam), quod<sup>3515</sup> est oppositum antecedentis.

Et sic<sup>3516</sup> dictum sit de conversionibus<sup>3517</sup> illarum<sup>3518</sup> de necessario.<sup>3519</sup>

#### I.3.4.4.2.2 <De conversione propositionum de possibili de sensu diviso>

<6|1> Quantum ad divisas<sup>3520</sup> de possibili sit sexta<sup>3521</sup> regula haec:<sup>3522</sup> arguendo a<sup>3523</sup> propositione de possibili universali vel particulari de sensu diviso,<sup>3524</sup> in qua nulla ponitur negatio, ad aliam particularem<sup>3525</sup> de possibili de terminis transpositis, est consequentia bona.

Exemplum,<sup>3526</sup> ut bene sequitur: 'Sortem possibile est currere, ergo<sup>3527</sup> currens possibile est esse<sup>3528</sup> Sortem'. Probatur, quia ex opposito consequentis<sup>3529</sup> sequitur oppositum antecedentis.<sup>3530</sup> Sequitur

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<sup>3504</sup> ut V

<sup>3505</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3506</sup> nullibi V, nusquam W

<sup>3507</sup> add. et Y

<sup>3508</sup> igitur EY

<sup>3509</sup> om. Y

<sup>3510</sup> consequentia tenet] om. V

<sup>3511</sup> patet V

<sup>3512</sup> add. consequentis W

<sup>3513</sup> igitur Y, add. +omne+ V

<sup>3514</sup> add. patet Y

<sup>3515</sup> quae V

<sup>3516</sup> om. Y, sicut V

<sup>3517</sup> conversione VY

<sup>3518</sup> istarum W, illius V

<sup>3519</sup> de necessario] om. W

<sup>3520</sup> istas M, propositiones V

<sup>3521</sup> prima V

<sup>3522</sup> in ordine V

<sup>3523</sup> de Y

<sup>3524</sup> de sensu diviso] divisa W

<sup>3525</sup> om. Y

<sup>3526</sup> om. MY

<sup>3527</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3528</sup> om. Y

<sup>3529</sup> om. V

<sup>3530</sup> om. V

enim:<sup>3531</sup> 'Sortem non possibile est currere,<sup>3532</sup> ergo<sup>3533</sup> Sortem necesse est non currere', et ultra:<sup>3534</sup>  
'ergo<sup>3535</sup> omne<sup>3536</sup> currens de necessitate non est Sortes'.

<7|2> Septima<sup>3537</sup> regula est haec: arguendo a propositione de possibili de modo<sup>3538</sup> affirmato et de<sup>3539</sup>  
verbo negato<sup>3540</sup> ad aliam<sup>3541</sup> de terminis transpositis, non oportet consequentia valere.

Exemplum,<sup>3542</sup> ut non sequitur: 'omnem<sup>3543</sup> lunam<sup>3544</sup> possibile est non lucere, ergo<sup>3545</sup> omne<sup>3546</sup> lucens  
possibile est non esse lunam'. Patet,<sup>3547</sup> quia oppositum consequentis stat<sup>3548</sup> cum antecedente.

Stant<sup>3549</sup> enim<sup>3550</sup> istae<sup>3551</sup> simul: 'omne lunam possibile est non lucere' et 'quoddam lucens [V 91<sup>rb</sup>] de  
necessitate est luna', quia ambe sunt<sup>3552</sup> actu verae.

<8|3> Octava<sup>3553</sup> regula est haec: arguendo<sup>3554</sup> a propositione universali negativa de possibili,  
negationem praeponendo<sup>3555</sup> modo et <non> verbo,<sup>3556</sup> ad aliam<sup>3557</sup> universalem negativam<sup>3558</sup> de  
terminis transpositis, est consequentia bona.<sup>3559</sup>

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3531 nam Y  
3532 esse currentem V  
3533 igitur Y  
3534 et ultra] *om.* W  
3535 *om.* MY  
3536 aliquod V  
3537 secunda V  
3538 *add.* loquendo Y  
3539 *om.* VY  
3540 *add.* de possibili Y  
3541 affirmativam W  
3542 *om.* V  
3543 istas aequivalere Y  
3544 *add.* +im+ W  
3545 igitur Y  
3546 +omne+ W  
3547 *add.* illud VY  
3548 +stat+ Y  
3549 stat WY  
3550 autem Y  
3551 illae V, illud Y  
3552 simul V  
3553 tertia V  
3554 haec arguendo] *om.* V  
3555 *ante* negationem V  
3556 modo et verbo] verbo et modo W  
3557 +affirmativam+ W, *om.* V  
3558 universalem negativam] negativam universalem W  
3559 *ante* consequentia VY



Exemplum,<sup>3560</sup> ut bene sequitur:<sup>3561</sup> 'nullus homo potest esse asinus, ergo nullus asinus potest esse |Y 93r| homo'. Probatur, quia<sup>3562</sup> ex opposito consequentis infertur<sup>3563</sup> oppositum antecedentis. Igitur<sup>3564</sup> consequentia est bona. Consequentia<sup>3565</sup> est<sup>3566</sup> nota.<sup>3567</sup> Antecedens apparet, quia sequitur 'aliquis<sup>3568</sup> asinus potest esse homo, igitur<sup>3569</sup> aliquis<sup>3570</sup> homo potest esse asinus' per sextam<sup>3571</sup> regulam.<sup>3572</sup>

<9|4> Nona<sup>3573</sup> regula est haec:<sup>3574</sup> arguendo a propositione de possibili in qua una negatio ponitur ad verbum<sup>3575</sup> et alia |E 46v| ad modum,<sup>3576</sup> universali vel particulari, ad aliam particularem de terminis transpositis non oportet consequentiam valere.

Exemplum,<sup>3577</sup> ut non sequitur: 'quoddam<sup>3578</sup> lucens non potest non |W 120r| esse luna, ergo<sup>3579</sup> quaedam<sup>3580</sup> luna non potest non esse lucens'. Nam<sup>3581</sup> antecedens est manifeste<sup>3582</sup> verum, consequens<sup>3583</sup> autem simpliciter<sup>3584</sup> falsum. Similiter non sequitur: 'omne lucens in sphaera lunae non<sup>3585</sup> potest non esse luna, igitur<sup>3586</sup> aliqua<sup>3587</sup> luna<sup>3588</sup> non<sup>3589</sup> potest non esse lucens in sphaera

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<sup>3560</sup> *om. V*  
<sup>3561</sup> bene sequitur] *om. V*  
<sup>3562</sup> haec Y  
<sup>3563</sup> sequitur V  
<sup>3564</sup> ergo V  
<sup>3565</sup> *add. +apparet+ W*  
<sup>3566</sup> *om. V*  
<sup>3567</sup> est nota] tenet Y, *add. et W*  
<sup>3568</sup> *om. V*  
<sup>3569</sup> ergo V  
<sup>3570</sup> *om. V*  
<sup>3571</sup> unam V  
<sup>3572</sup> *add. etc. V*  
<sup>3573</sup> quarta V  
<sup>3574</sup> illa V, *add. quod M*  
<sup>3575</sup> modum V  
<sup>3576</sup> dictum V  
<sup>3577</sup> *om. V*  
<sup>3578</sup> quod M  
<sup>3579</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>3580</sup> *add. +potest+ W*  
<sup>3581</sup> quia M  
<sup>3582</sup> *add. lectio dubia simpliciter M*  
<sup>3583</sup> ergo M  
<sup>3584</sup> autem simpliciter] *om. V*  
<sup>3585</sup> *om. W*  
<sup>3586</sup> ergo MV  
<sup>3587</sup> *lectio dubia M*  
<sup>3588</sup> *om. VWY*  
<sup>3589</sup> *om. W*

lunae'. Nam<sup>3590</sup> antecedens est<sup>3591</sup> verum et consequens simpliciter<sup>3592</sup> falsum,<sup>3593</sup> prout satis<sup>3594</sup> potest<sup>3595</sup> patere<sup>3596</sup> ex<sup>3597</sup> illis<sup>3598</sup> de necessario.<sup>3599</sup>

<10|5> Decima<sup>3600</sup> regula est haec: arguendo a propositione universali vel particulari de possibili habente unam<sup>3601</sup> negationem additam modo et aliam<sup>3602</sup> additam<sup>3603</sup> verbo, ad aliam<sup>3604</sup> propositionem<sup>3605</sup> particularem affirmativa<sup>3606</sup> de possibili, ubi nulla negatio ponitur ad modum<sup>3607</sup> vel ad verbum, sed<sup>3608</sup> praepositur<sup>3609</sup> praedicato conversae<sup>3610</sup> a parte subiecti in propositione convertente<sup>3611</sup> hoc totum ens 'quod non potest non<sup>3612</sup> esse', est consequentia bona.<sup>3613</sup>

Exemplum, ut optime sequitur: 'aliquod lucens non potest non esse<sup>3614</sup> luna, igitur<sup>3615</sup> aliquod quod non potest non<sup>3616</sup> esse<sup>3617</sup> luna potest esse lucens'.<sup>3618</sup> Similiter<sup>3619</sup> est<sup>3620</sup> de universali.<sup>3621</sup> Quod autem talis consequentia sit bona patet per syllogismum expository sic arguendo: demonstrato<sup>3622</sup>

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<sup>3590</sup> *om. Y, enim post antecedens V, autem post antecedens M*

<sup>3591</sup> *add. manifeste W*

<sup>3592</sup> *prout M*

<sup>3593</sup> *simpliciter falsum] om. W*

<sup>3594</sup> *add. +patet+ Y | prout satis] om. M*

<sup>3595</sup> *post patere*

<sup>3596</sup> *add. ubi M*

<sup>3597</sup> *sicut de V*

<sup>3598</sup> *istis MW | ex illis] om. Y*

<sup>3599</sup> *add. huic de possibili aequivalens M*

<sup>3600</sup> *quinta V*

<sup>3601</sup> *om. M*

<sup>3602</sup> *add. +hunc+ W*

<sup>3603</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>3604</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3605</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3606</sup> *om. M*

<sup>3607</sup> *add. et Y*

<sup>3608</sup> *et Y*

<sup>3609</sup> *apponitur seu supponitur M*

<sup>3610</sup> *converso Y*

<sup>3611</sup> *convertentis W*

<sup>3612</sup> *om. M*

<sup>3613</sup> *ante consequentia V*

<sup>3614</sup> *add. +lucens+ V*

<sup>3615</sup> *ergo V*

<sup>3616</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>3617</sup> *aliquod quod - esse] om. W*

<sup>3618</sup> *add. +simpliciter+ W, add. et hoc non potest non esse luna V*

<sup>3619</sup> *add. etiam V*

<sup>3620</sup> *om. WY*

<sup>3621</sup> *aliis M*

<sup>3622</sup> *de toto V*

lucente quod non potest non esse luna, hoc potest esse lucens.<sup>3623</sup> Patet ista,<sup>3624</sup> quia alias prima propositio convertenda non esset vera. Ergo<sup>3625</sup> est aliquod<sup>3626</sup> quod non potest non esse luna. Patet iterum per idem, quia<sup>3627</sup> alias propositio convertenda<sup>3628</sup> non esset vera.<sup>3629</sup> Ergo:<sup>3630</sup> 'aliquod quod non potest non esse luna, potest esse lucens'. |Y 93v|

Et <sup>3631</sup> sicut dictum est <sup>3632</sup> de conversione propositionum de possibili, ita dicendum est de conversione<sup>3633</sup> propositionum de contingenti, capiendo contingenti pro<sup>3634</sup> possibili.

#### I.3.4.4.2.3 <De conversione propositionum de impossibili de sensu diviso>

<1> Notandum<sup>3635</sup> quod ex dictis potest patere<sup>3636</sup> quomodo<sup>3637</sup> convertendae sint<sup>3638</sup> propositiones de impossibili.<sup>3639</sup> Ista<sup>3640</sup> enim<sup>3641</sup> quae aequipollent<sup>3642</sup> propositionibus de possibili convertibilibus,<sup>3643</sup> convertuntur<sup>3644</sup> ut<sup>3645</sup> illae<sup>3646</sup> quae<sup>3647</sup> ponuntur in primo et<sup>3648</sup> tertio<sup>3649</sup> ordinibus.<sup>3650</sup> Ista<sup>3651</sup> autem quae aequivalent<sup>3652</sup> propositionibus de possibili non convertibilibus<sup>3653</sup> non convertuntur<sup>3654</sup>

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<sup>3623</sup> *add.* et hoc potest non esse luna ergo V

<sup>3624</sup> illa VY, *add.* propositio V

<sup>3625</sup> et hoc MW

<sup>3626</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>3627</sup> per idem quia] *om.* M

<sup>3628</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3629</sup> ergo - vera] *om.* V

<sup>3630</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3631</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3632</sup> dictum est] patet M

<sup>3633</sup> conversionibus M

<sup>3634</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3635</sup> *add.* tamen est V

<sup>3636</sup> *ante* potest M

<sup>3637</sup> *add.* similiter Y

<sup>3638</sup> sunt W, *om.* Y

<sup>3639</sup> possibili Y

<sup>3640</sup> illae MV

<sup>3641</sup> *vel forsā* non Y

<sup>3642</sup> aequivalent Y

<sup>3643</sup> contingentibus W

<sup>3644</sup> *add.* non W

<sup>3645</sup> *add.* ut illae de possibili ut Y

<sup>3646</sup> isate W

<sup>3647</sup> hic M

<sup>3648</sup> in primo et] *om.* W, *add.* in V

<sup>3649</sup> secundo VW

<sup>3650</sup> ordine V

<sup>3651</sup> illae MV

<sup>3652</sup> quae aequivalent] convertuntur cum M

<sup>3653</sup> convertentibus Y

ut <sup>3655</sup> istae quae ponuntur in <sup>3656</sup> secundo <sup>3657</sup> ordine et etiam istae <sup>3658</sup> quae <sup>3659</sup> ponuntur in quarto, <sup>3660</sup>  
nisi <sup>3661</sup> tunc <sup>3662</sup> modo improprio <sup>3663</sup> propositiones <sup>3664</sup> quarti ordinis convertuntur <sup>3665</sup> secundum  
modum <sup>3666</sup> dictum in regula praecedenti, <sup>3667</sup> ut haec: 'lucens impossibile <sup>3668</sup> est <sup>3669</sup> non <sup>3670</sup> esse  
lunam' <sup>3671</sup> in hanc: 'quod impossibile est non esse lunam <sup>3672</sup> potest esse lucens'.

<2> Secundo notandum est <sup>3673</sup> quod de <sup>3674</sup> aliis modalibus in omnibus <sup>3675</sup> aliis <sup>3676</sup> modis - [V 91<sup>va</sup>]  
ut <sup>3677</sup> istis: <sup>3678</sup> 'scitum', opinatum <sup>3679</sup> 'dubitatum', 'creditum', <sup>3680</sup> etc. <sup>3681</sup> non facio <sup>3682</sup> mentionem, quia  
tales infinitis modis possunt variare <sup>3683</sup> vel saltem <sup>3684</sup> valde <sup>3685</sup> multi, <sup>3686</sup> etiam <sup>3687</sup> quia non est solitum  
de illis <sup>3688</sup> facere <sup>3689</sup> distinctas mentiones, et quia quilibet <sup>3690</sup> istis <sup>3691</sup> bene <sup>3692</sup> cognitis potest <sup>3693</sup>  
faciliter scire <sup>3694</sup> quomodo consequentiae <sup>3695</sup> convertibiles <sup>3696</sup> in talibus <sup>3697</sup> debent formari. <sup>3698</sup>

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<sup>3654</sup> non convertuntur] *om.* M

<sup>3655</sup> istae autem - convertuntur ut] etiam W

<sup>3656</sup> *add.* quarto et W

<sup>3657</sup> *add.* et primo M

<sup>3658</sup> illae V

<sup>3659</sup> ordine - quae] *om.* M

<sup>3660</sup> et etiam - quarto] *om.* W

<sup>3661</sup> secundo ordine nisi] vel W

<sup>3662</sup> *vel forsitan* tales Y | nisi tunc] ubi M

<sup>3663</sup> improprie W

<sup>3664</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3665</sup> convertantur Y

<sup>3666</sup> *lectio dubia oro*<sup>m</sup> M

<sup>3667</sup> \_\_\_ *ante* regula M

<sup>3668</sup> *add.* non W

<sup>3669</sup> et M

<sup>3670</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3671</sup> *add.* convertitur V, luna M

<sup>3672</sup> luna M

<sup>3673</sup> *om.* Y, *ante* notandum V

<sup>3674</sup> in V

<sup>3675</sup> in omnibus] modificatis MV, oppositionis Y

<sup>3676</sup> hiis M

<sup>3677</sup> *add.* in W

<sup>3678</sup> *add.* modis M

<sup>3679</sup> *add.* dictum Y, *om.* W, *post* creditum V

<sup>3680</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3681</sup> de istis W

<sup>3682</sup> facit W

<sup>3683</sup> variari MV, modificare Y

<sup>3684</sup> autem M

<sup>3685</sup> vel W

<sup>3686</sup> *add.* iuxta veritatem modorum facientium dicitur *lectio dubia* satis modales etc. M

<sup>3687</sup> *om.* M

<sup>3688</sup> istis W

<sup>3689</sup> *ante* de illis MY

<sup>3690</sup> quaelibet W

I.3.4.4.2.4 <De conversione propositionum contingenti ad utrumlibet>

<1> Circa propositiones de contingenti ad utrumlibet<sup>3699</sup> est notandum<sup>3700</sup> quod contingens ad utrumlibet a Philosopho *Primo Priorum* definitur.<sup>3701</sup> Sic describitur:<sup>3702</sup> "'contingens' est quo non existente necessario posito<sup>3703</sup> in esse nihil sequitur impossibile, id est<sup>3704</sup> contingens dicitur |W 120v| quod nec est necessarium vel impossibile".

Exemplum ut: 'Sortem contingit<sup>3705</sup> currere', quia Sortem<sup>3706</sup> nec necessarium est currere, nec etiam<sup>3707</sup> impossibile est currere.<sup>3708</sup>

<2> Secundo nota<sup>3709</sup> quod Philosophus<sup>3710</sup> huius modi<sup>3711</sup> |Y 94r| propositiones vocat<sup>3712</sup> converti<sup>3713</sup> in oppositam<sup>3714</sup> qualitatem,<sup>3715</sup> ut illa:<sup>3716</sup> |M 44v| 'Sortem<sup>3717</sup> contingit currere' in istam:<sup>3718</sup> 'Sortem contingit non currere'; non sic intelligendo<sup>3719</sup> quod<sup>3720</sup> propositio vera<sup>3721</sup> affirmativa debet<sup>3722</sup>

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<sup>3691</sup> *om.* W

<sup>3692</sup> *add.* et perfecte M

<sup>3693</sup> bene cognitis potest] istarum bene contingit W

<sup>3694</sup> potest faciliter scire] faciliter scire potest V

<sup>3695</sup> *add.* quae Y

<sup>3696</sup> *lectio dubia* conversiva V, formales M

<sup>3697</sup> illis VY

<sup>3698</sup> *add.* etc. M

<sup>3699</sup> ad utrumlibet] *lectio dubia* V

<sup>3700</sup> sciendum *ante* est V

<sup>3701</sup> demonstrabitur W, solet sic describi Y

<sup>3702</sup> *om.* W | sic describitur] id est Y

<sup>3703</sup> *add.* tamen W

<sup>3704</sup> id est] igitur W, *om.* Y

<sup>3705</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3706</sup> *post* est V

<sup>3707</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3708</sup> est currere] ideo dicitur contingens V

<sup>3709</sup> notandum est V, est notandum M

<sup>3710</sup> *post* propositiones V, *post* vocat M

<sup>3711</sup> huius modi] has W, huius V

<sup>3712</sup> vocatur Y

<sup>3713</sup> *add.* *lectio dubia* graviter Y

<sup>3714</sup> opposito Y

<sup>3715</sup> *add.* +habet+ Y

<sup>3716</sup> ista W, illam M

<sup>3717</sup> *add.* non Y

<sup>3718</sup> illam V

<sup>3719</sup> intelligenda Y

<sup>3720</sup> est Y

<sup>3721</sup> *vel forsitan* vere Y

<sup>3722</sup> debeat Y

converti in veram<sup>3723</sup> negativam sibi oppositam,<sup>3724</sup> sed quod<sup>3725</sup> ista quae habet<sup>3726</sup> affirmativam<sup>3727</sup> figuram debet converti in istam quae habet<sup>3728</sup> negativam.<sup>3729</sup>

Et isto<sup>3730</sup> modo intendit<sup>3731</sup> Philosophus in *Primo*<sup>3732</sup> *Priorum* capitulo<sup>3733</sup> de contingenti.<sup>3734</sup> Et intelligitur sic quod propositio de contingenti<sup>3735</sup> de<sup>3736</sup> sensu diviso<sup>3737</sup> in qua ponitur nulla<sup>3738</sup> negatio, convertitur in unam<sup>3739</sup> aliam<sup>3740</sup> in qua ponitur negatio ad copulam<sup>3741</sup> sive<sup>3742</sup> ad verbum<sup>3743</sup> et non ad modum, ut 'Sortem contingit currere, ergo Sortem contingit non currere'.

<3> Tertio notandum est<sup>3744</sup> quod nulla<sup>3745</sup> propositio<sup>3746</sup> manet de contingenti proprie<sup>3747</sup> ubi<sup>3748</sup> iste<sup>3749</sup> modus 'contingens'<sup>3750</sup> negatur. Et ratio est<sup>3751</sup> quia semper ubi iste<sup>3752</sup> modus 'contingens'<sup>3753</sup> negatur sit<sup>3754</sup> propositio de impossibili vel de<sup>3755</sup> necessario. Exemplum ut: 'hominem<sup>3756</sup> non contingit esse album',<sup>3757</sup> ista<sup>3758</sup> tantum valet sicut:<sup>3759</sup> 'hominem impossibile est<sup>3760</sup> esse album<sup>3761</sup>

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3723 vere V

3724 *add.* generaliter W

3725 per Y

3726 quae habet] qualibet Y

3727 *om.* VW, affirmativa Y

3728 debet - habet] *om.* V

3729 *add.* figura Y

3730 illo V

3731 *met post* Philosophus W, *met dt* Y

3732 libro Y

3733 *add.* primo VY

3734 *add.* et est ultimum primum V

3735 et est - de contingenti] *om.* Y

3736 in W

3737 de sensu diviso] *post* propositio V

3738 *ante* ponitur V, una Y

3739 *om.* V

3740 affirmativam W, alteram V

3741 ad copulam] *om.* Y

3742 *om.* VY

3743 ad verbum] *om.* V

3744 *om.* MY, *ante* notandum V

3745 ista W

3746 *add.* non W

3747 *post* manet M

3748 *add.* ubi W

3749 ille V

3750 contingit W

3751 *ante* ratio W

3752 ille V

3753 contingit W, *om.* Y

3754 fit V, est Y

3755 *om.* Y

3756 *add.* +necessario est+ W

3757 asinum VY

vel<sup>3762</sup> hominem necesse est esse album'.<sup>3763</sup> Et ratio huius est haec,<sup>3764</sup> quia illa:<sup>3765</sup> 'hominem contingit esse album'<sup>3766</sup> valet copulativam talem:<sup>3767</sup> 'homo potest esse albus'<sup>3768</sup> et<sup>3769</sup> homo potest non esse albus.<sup>3770</sup> Et ex hoc,<sup>3771</sup> propositio<sup>3772</sup> ubi iste modus 'contingens'<sup>3773</sup> negatur, valet ista:<sup>3774</sup> 'homo non potest<sup>3775</sup> esse albus'<sup>3776</sup> vel<sup>3777</sup> homo non potest non esse albus',<sup>3778</sup> quia cum una<sup>3779</sup> valet una<sup>3780</sup> copulativa ubi modus affirmatur, alia valebit<sup>3781</sup> disiunctiva, scilicet ubi modus negatur. Ex quo<sup>3782</sup> satis patet quod si aliqua propositio debeat<sup>3783</sup> proprie esse de contingenti, requiritur<sup>3784</sup> quod iste<sup>3785</sup> modus 'contingens'<sup>3786</sup> in ea non negatur. Quia, si negatur, fit<sup>3787</sup> de necessario vel de<sup>3788</sup> impossibili, propter quod <sup>3789</sup> Philosophus *Primo Priorum* solum locutus est de conversione propositionis de contingenti ubi modus affirmatur.

#### 1.3.4.4.2.5 <Regulae de propositionibus de contingenti>

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- <sup>3758</sup> illa V, *om.* YM  
<sup>3759</sup> *om.* W, *add.* illa V, *add.* haec M  
<sup>3760</sup> hominem impossibile est] impossibile est hominem Y  
<sup>3761</sup> asinum VY  
<sup>3762</sup> *add. lectio dubia* omnimodo M  
<sup>3763</sup> asinum VY  
<sup>3764</sup> illa V, *om.* Y  
<sup>3765</sup> haec W  
<sup>3766</sup> asinum VY  
<sup>3767</sup> illam M  
<sup>3768</sup> asinus VY  
<sup>3769</sup> *add. idem* M  
<sup>3770</sup> asinus VY  
<sup>3771</sup> hac Y  
<sup>3772</sup> propositione Y, *om.* VW  
<sup>3773</sup> contingit W  
<sup>3774</sup> illam disiunctivam M  
<sup>3775</sup> non potest] potest non VWY  
<sup>3776</sup> asinus MVY  
<sup>3777</sup> *add. idem* M [homo potest non esse albus vel] *om.* W  
<sup>3778</sup> asinus Y | et ex - albus] *om.* V  
<sup>3779</sup> *om.* Y | cum una] *om.* W  
<sup>3780</sup> *om.* VY  
<sup>3781</sup> valet V  
<sup>3782</sup> hoc V  
<sup>3783</sup> debet *post* proprie W  
<sup>3784</sup> *add. igitur* Y  
<sup>3785</sup> ille Y  
<sup>3786</sup> contingit W  
<sup>3787</sup> significat W  
<sup>3788</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>3789</sup> propter quod] propositio quia Y

<1> Istis<sup>3790</sup> praemissis sit prima regula de propositionibus de contingenti<sup>3791</sup> haec: |Y 94v| propositio de<sup>3792</sup> contingenti non potest converti in terminis proprie.<sup>3793</sup>

Ista<sup>3794</sup> regula declaratur, quia non sequitur: 'omnem<sup>3795</sup> lunam contingit lucere, ergo<sup>3796</sup> aliquod<sup>3797</sup> lucens contingit esse lunam'. Quia antecedens est verum, quia omnis luna potest lucere et potest non lucere, sed<sup>3798</sup> consequens est<sup>3799</sup> falsum, quia nullum lucens contingit esse lunam. Quia si aliquod lucens contingit<sup>3800</sup> esse lunam, hoc vel<sup>3801</sup> esset lucens quod est |V 91vb| vel potest esse luna; et hoc<sup>3802</sup> non, quia illud<sup>3803</sup> de necessitate |W 121r| est luna vel esset<sup>3804</sup> lucens aliud a luna - et hoc<sup>3805</sup> non, quia illud<sup>3806</sup> impossibile est esse lunam.<sup>3807</sup> Ergo<sup>3808</sup> sequitur quod nullum lucens contingit esse lunam.<sup>3809</sup>

Similiter ostenditur<sup>3810</sup> si<sup>3811</sup> propositio proposita<sup>3812</sup> esset negativa,<sup>3813</sup> ut si caperetur ista<sup>3814</sup> 'omnem lunam contingit non lucere', quia ista<sup>3815</sup> aequivalet affirmativae, sicut in sequenti regula dicitur.<sup>3816</sup> Et si diceretur quod Philosophus supponit<sup>3817</sup> tales propositiones<sup>3818</sup> debere<sup>3819</sup> converti<sup>3820</sup> in terminis in<sup>3821</sup> *Primo Priorum* - saltem universalem affirmativam in particularem -,<sup>3822</sup> dicitur<sup>3823</sup> quod<sup>3824</sup> forte

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<sup>3790</sup> illis V

<sup>3791</sup> de propositionibus de contingenti] *om. V, post haec Y*

<sup>3792</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3793</sup> *ante in terminis VY*

<sup>3794</sup> illa V, *om. W*

<sup>3795</sup> unam W

<sup>3796</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3797</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3798</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3799</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3800</sup> contingeret V

<sup>3801</sup> *ante hoc VY*

<sup>3802</sup> *lectio dubia primo Y*

<sup>3803</sup> *post necessitate Y, istud W*

<sup>3804</sup> esse Y, *om. W*

<sup>3805</sup> secundo Y

<sup>3806</sup> istud W

<sup>3807</sup> luna Y

<sup>3808</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3809</sup> luna Y

<sup>3810</sup> arguendo W

<sup>3811</sup> sed Y

<sup>3812</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3813</sup> esset negativa] *om. W*

<sup>3814</sup> *om. WV, haec M*

<sup>3815</sup> illa V, *om. W*

<sup>3816</sup> dicitur M

<sup>3817</sup> supponeret V | quod Philosophus supponit] *om. M*

<sup>3818</sup> *add. de contingenti Y, ante tales M*

<sup>3819</sup> *vel forsā debet Y*

<sup>3820</sup> *post terminis M*

<sup>3821</sup> *om. M*

<sup>3822</sup> *add. \_ M*



est quaedam<sup>3825</sup> alia usitatio terminorum de<sup>3826</sup> talibus propositionibus in graeco<sup>3827</sup> quam<sup>3828</sup> apud nos. Et ideo Philosophus<sup>3829</sup> [E 48<sup>r</sup>] secundum illam<sup>3830</sup> loquebatur, cum hoc<sup>3831</sup> tamen<sup>3832</sup> stat quod secundum modum quem [M 45<sup>r</sup>] nos habemus de eis, ipsae<sup>3833</sup> non convertuntur similiter<sup>3834</sup> sicut ratio<sup>3835</sup> facta videtur determinasse,<sup>3836</sup> vel dicatur<sup>3837</sup> aliter<sup>3838</sup> ad Philosophum secundum quod placet respondententi.<sup>3839</sup>

<2> Secunda regula est haec: quod affirmativae de contingenti<sup>3840</sup> convertuntur in negativas et e converso; vel, secundum quod alii<sup>3841</sup> dicunt, quod<sup>3842</sup> propositiones de contingenti convertuntur<sup>3843</sup> in oppositam qualitatem.

Exemplum regulae, ut:<sup>3844</sup> 'Sortem contingit ridere,<sup>3845</sup> ergo<sup>3846</sup> Sortem contingit non ridere' et e converso: 'Sortem contingit non ridere, igitur<sup>3847</sup> Sortem contingit ridere'.<sup>3848</sup> Probatur consequentia, quia<sup>3849</sup> [Y 95<sup>r</sup>] sequitur: 'Sortem contingit ridere, ergo<sup>3850</sup> Sortem non necesse<sup>3851</sup> est ridere' per definitionem contingentis, cum<sup>3852</sup> contingens sit quod<sup>3853</sup> nec est<sup>3854</sup> necessarium nec impossibile;

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3823 diceretur MW

3824 *add.* hoc dixit quod M

3825 *om.* MY

3826 *in* W

3827 *in graeco*] *post* terminorum M

3828 *add.* \_\_\_W

3829 *post* illam EMV, *post* loquebatur Y

3830 *istam* W, *add.* rationem Y

3831 *cum hoc*] *om.* M

3832 *vel* Y

3833 *om.* Y

3834 *om.* VY

3835 *add.* de se Y

3836 *demonstrasse* V, *om.* Y

3837 *dicat* V

3838 \_\_\_ V

3839 *secundum* - *respondenti*] *ut* sibi videatur melius expediens V

3840 *de contingenti*] *om.* V

3841 *aliqui* Y

3842 *om.* W

3843 *add.* *in hoc* quod affirmativae de contingenti convertuntur W

3844 *add.* *sequitur* V

3845 *add.* +*videre*+ W

3846 *igitur* Y

3847 *ergo* V

3848 *et e converso* - *contingit ridere*] *om.* W

3849 *add.* +*Sortes*+ W

3850 *igitur* Y

3851 *non necesse*] *contingens* V

3852 *enim* W

3853 *sit quod*] *om.* V

et<sup>3855</sup> tunc<sup>3856</sup> ultra: 'Sortem contingit ridere et Sortem non necesse est ridere, ergo<sup>3857</sup> Sortem contingit non ridere'. Consequentia patet<sup>3858</sup> per definitionem contingentis,<sup>3859</sup> quia<sup>3860</sup> sequitur: 'Sortem contingit ridere, ergo<sup>3861</sup> Sortem<sup>3862</sup> nec necesse est<sup>3863</sup> ridere nec impossibile est ridere'.<sup>3864</sup> Ex hoc sequitur quod: 'Sortem contingit non ridere'.<sup>3865</sup> Simili modo sequitur e converso: 'Sortem contingit non<sup>3866</sup> ridere, ergo<sup>3867</sup> Sortem non necesse<sup>3868</sup> est non ridere'; et<sup>3869</sup> ultra: 'ergo<sup>3870</sup> Sortem possibile est ridere'. Et tunc sequitur: 'Sortem contingit non<sup>3871</sup> ridere, et Sortem<sup>3872</sup> possibile est ridere, ergo<sup>3873</sup> Sortem<sup>3874</sup> contingit ridere'. Ergo<sup>3875</sup> oportet quod in propositionibus de sensu diviso de contingenti,<sup>3876</sup> affirmativae convertuntur in negativas, et e converso.<sup>3877</sup> Quod fuit probandum.

Et<sup>3878</sup> haec de consequentiis formalibus non syllogisticis<sup>3879</sup> dicta<sup>3880</sup> sufficient.<sup>3881</sup>

### I.3.5 <Regulae de consequentiis materialibus>

Quantum ad consequentias materiales primo praemittende sunt<sup>3882</sup> diversae regulae<sup>3883</sup> diversis consequentiis materialibus deservientes. |W 121v| Secundo specialiter<sup>3884</sup> ponendae sunt regulae<sup>3885</sup>

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3854 sit V

3855 om. V

3856 om. Y

3857 igitur Y

3858 tenet Y

3859 add. recte W

3860 quod W, et tunc Y

3861 igitur Y

3862 contingit non ridere consequentia - ergo Sortem] om. V | add. non necesse est ridere igitur Sortem Y

3863 ante necesse Y

3864 add. et Y

3865 add. et Y

3866 om. W

3867 igitur Y

3868 add. +non+ W

3869 tunc V

3870 igitur Y

3871 add. +ridere+ Y

3872 om. VW

3873 igitur Y

3874 om. V

3875 igitur Y

3876 add. ad utrumlibet V

3877 om. V

3878 om. Y

3879 syllogizatis W, add. breviter V

3880 add. pro nunc V

3881 add. etc. iterum sequitur de consequentiis materialibus W

quibus arguitur ab exponentibus ad expositam vel e converso, et generaliter de consequentiis quarum antecedentia vel consequentia<sup>3886</sup> diversimode habent<sup>3887</sup> |E 48<sup>v</sup>| exponi.

<1> Quantum ad primum sit prima regula<sup>3888</sup> |V 92<sup>ra</sup>| haec: arguendo<sup>3889</sup> a definitione ad definitum, a descriptione ad descriptum, a nominis interpretatione convertibili<sup>3890</sup> ad<sup>3891</sup> interpretatum<sup>3892</sup> et e converso, terminis<sup>3893</sup> eodem modo supponentibus et personaliter tentis, sine positione<sup>3894</sup> verborum<sup>3895</sup> actum animae interiore significantium,<sup>3896</sup> est bona consequentia.<sup>3897</sup>

Exemplum primi<sup>3898</sup> ut:<sup>3899</sup> 'animal rationale mortale<sup>3900</sup> currit, |Y 95<sup>v</sup>| ergo<sup>3901</sup> homo currit'; exemplum secundi ut:<sup>3902</sup> 'animal risibile<sup>3903</sup> currit, ergo homo currit'. Exemplum tertii<sup>3904</sup> ut:<sup>3905</sup> 'amator sapientiae diligit<sup>3906</sup> philosophiam,<sup>3907</sup> ergo<sup>3908</sup> philosophus diligit<sup>3909</sup> philosophiam',<sup>3910</sup> et e converso<sup>3911</sup> tantum in una quam in alia

in eiusdem<sup>3912</sup> simili modo<sup>3913</sup> possunt poni<sup>3914</sup> exempla aliorum.<sup>3915</sup>

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<sup>3882</sup> *ante praemittendae V*

<sup>3883</sup> *ante diversae V*

<sup>3884</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3885</sup> *add. in W*

<sup>3886</sup> *vel forsitan consequentis W*

<sup>3887</sup> *ante diversimode Y*

<sup>3888</sup> *add. sit V*

<sup>3889</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3890</sup> *add. lectio dubia +cum universali+ V*

<sup>3891</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3892</sup> *interpretatur Y*

<sup>3893</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3894</sup> *postpositione add. +terminorum+ E*

<sup>3895</sup> *verbum M*

<sup>3896</sup> *significantis M, ante actum E | sine - significantium] om. VWY*

<sup>3897</sup> *ante bona Y*

<sup>3898</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3899</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3900</sup> *om. W*

<sup>3901</sup> *igitur EY*

<sup>3902</sup> *exemplum secundi ut] om. WY*

<sup>3903</sup> *rationale MVWY*

<sup>3904</sup> *add. +exemplum+ E*

<sup>3905</sup> *animal rationale currit - tertii ut] om. VWY*

<sup>3906</sup> *dicit V*

<sup>3907</sup> *diligit philosophiam] currit EM*

<sup>3908</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>3909</sup> *dicit V*

<sup>3910</sup> *diligit philosophiam] currit EM*

<sup>3911</sup> *add. tamen E*

<sup>3912</sup> *add. et M | tantum in unam quam in alia] om. VY, in utraque W, in eiusdem M*

<sup>3913</sup> *simili modo] similiter Y*

<sup>3914</sup> *ante possunt W*

Et<sup>3916</sup> dicitur<sup>3917</sup> notanter: "terminis eodem modo supponentibus<sup>3918</sup> et personaliter",<sup>3919</sup> quia si termini non supponerent<sup>3920</sup> eodem modo,<sup>3921</sup> non oporteret consequentiam valere, ut non sequitur:<sup>3922</sup> 'animal rationale mortale<sup>3923</sup> est definitio,<sup>3924</sup> ergo<sup>3925</sup> homo est definitio'.<sup>3926</sup> Et non sequitur: 'animal risibile<sup>3927</sup> currit, ergo<sup>3928</sup> omnis<sup>3929</sup> homo currit'.<sup>3930</sup>

In prima enim definitio supponit<sup>3931</sup> materialiter, ideo<sup>3932</sup> non valet consequentia. Et<sup>3933</sup> in secunda<sup>3934</sup> descriptio supponit determinate et descriptum confuse et<sup>3935</sup> distributive, et propter hoc non valet consequentia.<sup>3936</sup>

Secundo dicitur<sup>3937</sup> notanter:<sup>3938</sup> "a nominis interpretatione<sup>3939</sup> convertibili", quia si<sup>3940</sup> interpretatio non esset<sup>3941</sup> convertibilis, non valeret<sup>3942</sup> consequentia. Ut non<sup>3943</sup> sequitur: 'hoc est laedens pedem, ergo<sup>3944</sup> hoc est lapis', quia potest<sup>3945</sup> esse ferrum.

Dicitur etiam notabiliter: "sine positione<sup>3946</sup> verborum significantium actum animae interiorum", quia eos<sup>3947</sup> ponendo ista consequentia non oportet valere, ut non sequitur: 'hic puer cognoscit hominem,

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<sup>3915</sup> *om. VW, ante exempla M*

<sup>3916</sup> *om. VYE*

<sup>3917</sup> dico EY

<sup>3918</sup> *ante terminis Y*

<sup>3919</sup> et personaliter] *om. EVWY*

<sup>3920</sup> *post modo V*

<sup>3921</sup> *add. scilicet eiusdem supponentibus et personaliter M*

<sup>3922</sup> ut non sequitur] *om. W*

<sup>3923</sup> *om. V*

<sup>3924</sup> *add. hominis W*

<sup>3925</sup> igitur EY

<sup>3926</sup> *add. hominis W, definitum M*

<sup>3927</sup> rationale VY

<sup>3928</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3929</sup> *om. M*

<sup>3930</sup> et non sequitur - homo currit] *om. W*

<sup>3931</sup> quam definitum ambo supponunt M, *add. et V, add. et definitum personaliter E*

<sup>3932</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3933</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>3934</sup> *add. vero M*

<sup>3935</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>3936</sup> et in secunda - consequentia] *om. MW*

<sup>3937</sup> dico V

<sup>3938</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>3939</sup> interpretatio W

<sup>3940</sup> si+t+ M

<sup>3941</sup> esse M

<sup>3942</sup> valet Y

<sup>3943</sup> ut non] non enim W

<sup>3944</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3945</sup> posset Y, forte V

<sup>3946</sup> postpositione M

<sup>3947</sup> *lectio dubia M*

ergo hic puer cognoscit animal rationale mortale', quia<sup>3948</sup> habet conceptum hominis et non animalis rationalis in quod est tale. Et hanc particularem<sup>3949</sup> in postea dictis regulis saltem affirmativis et negativis multis volo habere pro repetita.<sup>3950</sup> |M 45v|

<2> Secunda regula est haec: arguendo a synonymo ad synonymum<sup>3951</sup> est bona consequentia, ut:<sup>3952</sup> 'Marcus currit, ergo Tullius currit'. Et intelligitur regula de<sup>3953</sup> terminis personaliter tentis et eodem modo supponentibus.<sup>3954</sup>

Notandum <sup>3955</sup> est <sup>3956</sup> circa istam <sup>3957</sup> regulam, quod nomina <sup>3958</sup> synonyma dicuntur nomina <sup>3959</sup> convertibilia<sup>3960</sup> eadem ratione et eodem modo<sup>3961</sup> sua significata significantia.<sup>3962</sup> Unde non sunt ista<sup>3963</sup> synonyma: 'homo' et 'risibile', quia licet sint<sup>3964</sup> convertibilia, tamen non significant sua significata eodem modo, sed<sup>3965</sup> ly homo absolute,<sup>3966</sup> ly risibile connotative.

<3> Tertia regula est haec: arguendo a nomine totius personaliter accepto<sup>3967</sup> ad nomen partis<sup>3968</sup> personaliter acceptum - sine qua parte<sup>3969</sup> totum non potest esse - affirmative<sup>3970</sup> respectu huius verbi 'est' secundi adiacentis, est consequentia bona.<sup>3971</sup> Ut<sup>3972</sup> bene sequitur: 'homo est, ergo<sup>3973</sup> cor<sup>3974</sup> est'; 'domus est, ergo<sup>3975</sup> tectum est'.

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<sup>3948</sup> *add.* \_\_\_ M

<sup>3949</sup> *lectio dubia* M

<sup>3950</sup> dicitur etiam notabiliter - repetita] *om.* VWY

<sup>3951</sup> synonymo ad synonymum] a syllogismo ad syllogismum W

<sup>3952</sup> apparet quia bene sequitur V

<sup>3953</sup> *add.* +in+ Y] et intelligitur regula de] *om.* V

<sup>3954</sup> terminis - supponentibus] *post* consequentia V

<sup>3955</sup> nota V

<sup>3956</sup> *om.* WV

<sup>3957</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>3958</sup> non omnia W

<sup>3959</sup> quae sunt Y

<sup>3960</sup> *add.* convertibilia enim W

<sup>3961</sup> eadem - modo] eodem modo et eadem ratione V

<sup>3962</sup> significant W

<sup>3963</sup> illa V

<sup>3964</sup> quia licet sint] prout sunt W

<sup>3965</sup> quia Y

<sup>3966</sup> *blank space* V

<sup>3967</sup> capto V

<sup>3968</sup> *add.* eius Y

<sup>3969</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3970</sup> *add.* et V

<sup>3971</sup> *ante* consequentia V

Dicitur notanter: "respectu huius verbi 'est' |W 122r| secundi<sup>3976</sup> adiacentis", quia respectu<sup>3977</sup> tertii<sup>3978</sup> adiacentis<sup>3979</sup> non valeret, ut non sequitur: 'domus componitur ex<sup>3980</sup> tecto et fundamento, ergo<sup>3981</sup> tectum |Y 96r| componitur ex tecto<sup>3982</sup> et fundamento'. Et est autem<sup>3983</sup> propositio de 'est' secundo adiacente<sup>3984</sup> in qua<sup>3985</sup> nullum<sup>3986</sup> ponitur aliquod<sup>3987</sup> praedicatum<sup>3988</sup> ultra illud<sup>3989</sup> verbum 'est', ut: 'homo est'. Sed<sup>3990</sup> propositio de tertio adiacente est ubi ponitur aliquod praedicatum<sup>3991</sup> ultra hoc verbum 'est', ut: 'homo est<sup>3992</sup> animal'.

Dicitur etiam<sup>3993</sup> notanter: "ad partem<sup>3994</sup> sine qua totum non potest esse", quia arguendo ad alias partes consequentia non valeret, ut non sequitur: 'domus est, ergo fenestra est'.

Dicitur<sup>3995</sup> etiam notanter: "terminis supponentibus personaliter",<sup>3996</sup> quia<sup>3997</sup> terminis supponentibus materialiter<sup>3998</sup> non valeret<sup>3999</sup> consequentia, ut<sup>4000</sup> non<sup>4001</sup> sequitur: 'domus est dictio<sup>4002</sup> disyllaba,<sup>4003</sup> ergo fundamentum est dictio disyllaba'.<sup>4004</sup> Et ne<sup>4005</sup> hanc clausulam<sup>4006</sup> oporteat<sup>4007</sup> resumere, |V 92rv| ipsam<sup>4008</sup> in omnibus postea<sup>4009</sup> dicendis<sup>4010</sup> volo<sup>4011</sup> subintelligi.

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<sup>3972</sup> et W

<sup>3973</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3974</sup> *add.* hominis Y, corpus V

<sup>3975</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3976</sup> secundo Y

<sup>3977</sup> *add.* verbi Y

<sup>3978</sup> *lectio dubia* de Y

<sup>3979</sup> *om.* V

<sup>3980</sup> *add.* pariete V

<sup>3981</sup> igitur Y

<sup>3982</sup> pariete V

<sup>3983</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3984</sup> *add.* ista Y

<sup>3985</sup> in qua] ubi M

<sup>3986</sup> non W

<sup>3987</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>3988</sup> *ante* ponitur Y, *om.* M

<sup>3989</sup> hoc W

<sup>3990</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3991</sup> ponitur aliquod praedicatum] aliud praedicatum ponitur Y, praedicatum ponitur M

<sup>3992</sup> sed - homo est] *om.* W

<sup>3993</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>3994</sup> ad partem] a parte V

<sup>3995</sup> dico V

<sup>3996</sup> *ante* supponentibus V

<sup>3997</sup> *add.* in Y

<sup>3998</sup> *ante* supponentibus V

<sup>3999</sup> valet Y

<sup>4000</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4001</sup> *add.* enim V

<sup>4002</sup> *add.* +disss+ V

<sup>4003</sup> bisyllaba V

<sup>4004</sup> bisyllaba V

<4> Quarta regula est haec: arguendo a nomine partis sine qua<sup>4012</sup> totum non potest esse ad nomen totius negative respectu huius verbi 'est' secundi<sup>4013</sup> adiacentis, est bona consequentia,<sup>4014</sup> et non e converso, ut bene sequitur: 'cor hominis non est, ergo<sup>4015</sup> homo non est'.

Et<sup>4016</sup> ponantur<sup>4017</sup> hic<sup>4018</sup> istae<sup>4019</sup> specificationes<sup>4020</sup> moderantes regulam eadem ratione qua<sup>4021</sup> in praecedenti.

Quod tamen<sup>4022</sup> istae<sup>4023</sup> regulae<sup>4024</sup> non teneant<sup>4025</sup> e converso<sup>4026</sup> patet,<sup>4027</sup> quia non sequitur: 'paries est, ergo<sup>4028</sup> domus est',<sup>4029</sup> nec etiam sequitur:<sup>4030</sup> 'domus non est igitur paries non est'.<sup>4031</sup> Patet de se, ut notum est.<sup>4032</sup>

<5> Quinta regula est haec: arguendo ab inferiori ad superius affirmative<sup>4033</sup> sine distributione est bona consequentia, ut bene sequitur: 'homo currit, ergo<sup>4034</sup> animal currit'.

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<sup>4005</sup> *om. V*

<sup>4006</sup> *add. non V*

<sup>4007</sup> *add. postea W*

<sup>4008</sup> *om. V*

<sup>4009</sup> *add. +dicendam+ W*

<sup>4010</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4011</sup> *add. eam V*

<sup>4012</sup> *sine qua] sic quod Y*

<sup>4013</sup> *secundo Y*

<sup>4014</sup> *ante bona Y*

<sup>4015</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>4016</sup> *add. quo Y*

<sup>4017</sup> *ponuntur WY*

<sup>4018</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4019</sup> *illae V, om. Y*

<sup>4020</sup> *lectio dubia spales Y*

<sup>4021</sup> *add. probatur ut Y*

<sup>4022</sup> *autem VY*

<sup>4023</sup> *illae V*

<sup>4024</sup> *istae regulae] om. Y*

<sup>4025</sup> *tenent WY*

<sup>4026</sup> *add. +affirmative+ W*

<sup>4027</sup> *istae consequentiae Y*

<sup>4028</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>4029</sup> *paries est ergo domus est] om. W*

<sup>4030</sup> *nec etiam sequitur] om. MW*

<sup>4031</sup> *paries non est ergo domus non est] om. M, paries non est ergo domus non est VW*

<sup>4032</sup> *patet - est] prout est de se notum V, prout de se notum est Y*

<sup>4033</sup> *add. et V*

<sup>4034</sup> *igitur Y*

Dicitur<sup>4035</sup> notanter: "affirmative", quia negative non tenet,<sup>4036</sup> ut non sequitur: 'Sortes non currit, ergo<sup>4037</sup> homo non currit'. Quod autem non sequatur<sup>4038</sup> patet, quia si Sortes non esset et omnis homo curreret,<sup>4039</sup> antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum.<sup>4040</sup>

Dicitur etiam<sup>4041</sup> 'sine distributione', quia cum distributione arguendo [Y 96v] non valeret<sup>4042</sup> consequentia,<sup>4043</sup> ut non sequitur: 'omnis homo est risibilis, ergo omne animal est risibile',<sup>4044</sup> propter distributio huius termini 'animal' in consequenti. Similiter non sequitur:<sup>4045</sup> 'omne indi- [M 46r] - viduum huius<sup>4046</sup> speciei<sup>4047</sup> est asinus<sup>4048</sup> (demonstrata<sup>4049</sup> specie asinina), igitur<sup>4050</sup> omne individuum alicuius speciei est asinus',<sup>4051</sup> quia ly alicuius<sup>4052</sup> speciei<sup>4053</sup> supponit confuse et<sup>4054</sup> distributive cum alia parte subiecti, scilicet cum hoc termino 'individuum'.

Nota quod<sup>4055</sup> 'superius'<sup>4056</sup> vocatur terminus significans<sup>4057</sup> omnia ista<sup>4058</sup> quae significat alter<sup>4059</sup> et cum hoc [W 122v] plura<sup>4060</sup> vel ad minus<sup>4061</sup> rationem magis ampla - supposito<sup>4062</sup> tamen<sup>4063</sup> quod

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<sup>4035</sup> dico VY

<sup>4036</sup> valet Y

<sup>4037</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4038</sup> sequitur V | quod - sequatur] om. Y

<sup>4039</sup> add. tunc V

<sup>4040</sup> add. et Y

<sup>4041</sup> add. notanter Y

<sup>4042</sup> valet MVY

<sup>4043</sup> om. M

<sup>4044</sup> omnis homo - risibile] homo non est asinus ergo homo non est animal WV, homo non est asinus igitur homo non est animal Y

<sup>4045</sup> propter - sequitur] antecedens enim est verum et consequens falsum propter omissionem huius particulae non valet haec consequentia V | antecedens est verum et consequens falsum propter *lectio dubia* a divisione huius particulae non sed ista consequentia esset W | antecedens est verum consequens falsum propter omissionem huius particulae sine distributione non valet ista consequentia Y

<sup>4046</sup> istius Y

<sup>4047</sup> add. non VW

<sup>4048</sup> add. *lectio dubia* +quia+ Y

<sup>4049</sup> demonstrando M

<sup>4050</sup> ergo MV

<sup>4051</sup> demonstrata - est asinus] om. W

<sup>4052</sup> asinus Y

<sup>4053</sup> om. V

<sup>4054</sup> om. VY

<sup>4055</sup> add. terminus M

<sup>4056</sup> *lectio dubia* MW, add. ad aliquem terminum Y

<sup>4057</sup> qui significat V

<sup>4058</sup> illa V, alia M | omnia ista] om. W

<sup>4059</sup> alius Y, alia W, add. termino VY

<sup>4060</sup> add. supposita Y

<sup>4061</sup> vel ad minus] etiam admodum W

<sup>4062</sup> suppono V

<sup>4063</sup> cum hoc Y



tales termini significant sua<sup>4064</sup> significata aeque absolute et aeque connotative. Exemplum,<sup>4065</sup> ut iste<sup>4066</sup> terminus<sup>4067</sup> 'animal' est superior<sup>4068</sup> ad istum terminum 'homo',<sup>4069</sup> quia ipse<sup>4070</sup> significat plura quam ipse. Et iste<sup>4071</sup> terminus<sup>4072</sup> 'ad aliquid' est superior<sup>4073</sup> ad istum<sup>4074</sup> terminum 'idem',<sup>4075</sup> quia significat rationem magis<sup>4076</sup> ampla.

<6> Sexta regula est haec: arguendo a superiori<sup>4077</sup> cum distributione<sup>4078</sup> ad inferius negative et<sup>4079</sup> affirmative cum constantia subiecti est bona consequentia,<sup>4080</sup> ut bene<sup>4081</sup> sequitur: 'nullus homo<sup>4082</sup> currit,<sup>4083</sup> igitur<sup>4084</sup> Sortes<sup>4085</sup> non currit'. Similiter sequitur:<sup>4086</sup> 'omnis homo currit, et Sortes est homo,<sup>4087</sup> ergo<sup>4088</sup> Sortes currit.'

Dico notanter<sup>4089</sup> "cum distributione", quia sine distributione non valeret.<sup>4090</sup> Nam<sup>4091</sup> non sequitur: 'animal non currit, ergo<sup>4092</sup> homo non currit'.<sup>4093</sup>

Dicitur <sup>4094</sup> etiam <sup>4095</sup> notanter: <sup>4096</sup> "affirmative cum constantia subiecti", quia sine constantia subiecti<sup>4097</sup> non valeret<sup>4098</sup> consequentia, ut<sup>4099</sup> non sequitur: 'omnis homo currit, ergo<sup>4100</sup> Sortes

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<sup>4064</sup> om. Y

<sup>4065</sup> om. Y

<sup>4066</sup> ille V, *lectio dubia* in cuiusY

<sup>4067</sup> om. Y

<sup>4068</sup> superius Y

<sup>4069</sup> a Y

<sup>4070</sup> om. VY

<sup>4071</sup> ille V, istius Y

<sup>4072</sup> om. Y

<sup>4073</sup> superius Y

<sup>4074</sup> illum V | ad istum] *lectio dubia* aduc Y

<sup>4075</sup> *lectio dubia* a'd ad V

<sup>4076</sup> ergo W

<sup>4077</sup> a superiori] *post* distributione Y

<sup>4078</sup> cum distributione] *post* negative M

<sup>4079</sup> vel Y

<sup>4080</sup> ante bona VY

<sup>4081</sup> om. MWV

<sup>4082</sup> animal E

<sup>4083</sup> add. igitur et Sortes est W

<sup>4084</sup> ergo MV

<sup>4085</sup> homo E

<sup>4086</sup> om. YE

<sup>4087</sup> et Sortes est homo] om. V, Sortes homo WY, et Sortes est M, Sortes est homo E

<sup>4088</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4089</sup> add. in regula Y

<sup>4090</sup> valet MY

<sup>4091</sup> et Y, ut M

<sup>4092</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4093</sup> similiter - non currit] om. W

<sup>4094</sup> dico VY

currit', quia Sorte non existente<sup>4101</sup> antecedens potest<sup>4102</sup> esse<sup>4103</sup> verum consequente existente<sup>4104</sup> falso.<sup>4105</sup>

Et dicitur: "cum<sup>4106</sup> constantia subiecti" quia<sup>4107</sup> in<sup>4108</sup> antecedente assumitur<sup>4109</sup> propositio in qua de subiecto consequentis dicitur esse<sup>4110</sup> secundum adiacens.

<7> Septima regula est haec: arguendo [Y 97<sup>r</sup>] a parte in modo ad suum totum affirmative et<sup>4111</sup> sine distributione est bona consequentia, ut: 'homo albus currit, ergo<sup>4112</sup> homo currit'.

Pro ista<sup>4113</sup> regula est notandum quod "pars in modo" dicitur dictio<sup>4114</sup> determinabilis,<sup>4115</sup> capta cum determinatione non distrahente [V 92<sup>va</sup>] vel<sup>4116</sup> diminuyente<sup>4117</sup> vel ampliante nec extendente seu etiam ab aequivocatione<sup>4118</sup> a casu<sup>4119</sup> restringente.<sup>4120</sup>

Et<sup>4121</sup> dicitur notanter "non diminuyente", quia hoc quod est 'velle esse in luto<sup>4122</sup> pro centum<sup>4123</sup> marcis' non est pars in modo<sup>4124</sup> ad 'velle esse in luto', quia isto modo<sup>4125</sup> marcae<sup>4126</sup> diminuunt a voluntate<sup>4127</sup> simpliciter.

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<sup>4095</sup> *om. W*

<sup>4096</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4097</sup> *om. V*

<sup>4098</sup> *valet M*

<sup>4099</sup> *quia V*

<sup>4100</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>4101</sup> *add. non valeret consequentia quia V*

<sup>4102</sup> *posset V, ante antecedens M*

<sup>4103</sup> *potest esse] est Y*

<sup>4104</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4105</sup> *consequente existente falso] et consequens falsum Y*

<sup>4106</sup> *om. W*

<sup>4107</sup> *quod WY*

<sup>4108</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4109</sup> *assumatur Y*

<sup>4110</sup> *est Y*

<sup>4111</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4112</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>4113</sup> *illa V, om. Y*

<sup>4114</sup> *add. cum W*

<sup>4115</sup> *determinabili W*

<sup>4116</sup> *om. WY*

<sup>4117</sup> *distrahente vel diminuyente] diminuyente vel distrahente VY*

<sup>4118</sup> *ab aequivocatione] lectio dubia M*

<sup>4119</sup> *a casu] lectio dubia M*

<sup>4120</sup> *nec - restringente] om. VWY*

<sup>4121</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4122</sup> *add. cum centum franciis vel Y*

<sup>4123</sup> *coitum V*

<sup>4124</sup> *in modo] om. V*

<sup>4125</sup> *isto modo] centum V*

Secundo<sup>4128</sup> notanter dicitur<sup>4129</sup> "non ampliante", quia 'homo mortuus' non est pars in modo ad hunc<sup>4130</sup> terminum 'homo'.

Tertio<sup>4131</sup> dicitur<sup>4132</sup> etiam<sup>4133</sup> notanter "non distrahente" quia<sup>4134</sup> 'homo pictus' non est pars in modo ad hunc<sup>4135</sup> terminum 'homo'.<sup>4136</sup>

Causa primi<sup>4137</sup> est<sup>4138</sup> quia iste<sup>4139</sup> terminus 'mortuus'<sup>4140</sup> ibi<sup>4141</sup> ampliatur istum terminum homo.<sup>4142</sup>

Causa secundi<sup>4143</sup> est<sup>4144</sup> quia iste<sup>4145</sup> terminus<sup>4146</sup> 'pictus' distrahit a principali significato huius<sup>4147</sup> termini 'homo', quia homo pictus non est homo.

Dicitur quarto etiam "non extendente" quia 'homo si est nihil' non est pars in modo ad hunc terminum 'homo'. Non enim sequitur: 'lapis est homo si est nihil, ergo lapis est homo'.

Quinto dicitur etiam "seu ab aequivocatione<sup>4148</sup> a casu<sup>4149</sup> restringente" quia ly canis non est totum in modo ad hunc terminum 'canis latrabilis' quia ly latrabilis restringit a casu.<sup>4150</sup> Non enim sequitur: 'est canis latrabili, ergo est canis'.<sup>4151</sup>

Et <sup>4152</sup> breviter <sup>4153</sup> dicam: 'pars in modo' <sup>4154</sup> est <sup>4155</sup> quando, determinabili sumpto <sup>4156</sup> cum determinatione, verificatur<sup>4157</sup> istud<sup>4158</sup> determinabile simpliciter<sup>4159</sup> et alias non, [M 46<sup>v</sup>] ut 'homo

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<sup>4126</sup> isto modo marcae] centum franciis Y

<sup>4127</sup> a voluntate] ad voluntatem MWY

<sup>4128</sup> dico Y

<sup>4129</sup> om. Y, ante notanter V

<sup>4130</sup> istum W

<sup>4131</sup> om. VWY

<sup>4132</sup> post notanter M

<sup>4133</sup> om. M

<sup>4134</sup> add. ly V

<sup>4135</sup> istum W

<sup>4136</sup> add. haec W

<sup>4137</sup> om. W, prima V

<sup>4138</sup> add. prior W, om. V

<sup>4139</sup> ille V

<sup>4140</sup> mortuum Y

<sup>4141</sup> om. VM

<sup>4142</sup> istum terminum homo] om. VWY

<sup>4143</sup> ibi W, secunda V

<sup>4144</sup> om. V

<sup>4145</sup> ille V

<sup>4146</sup> add. +homo+ M

<sup>4147</sup> illius M

<sup>4148</sup> ab aequivocatione] *lectio dubia* M

<sup>4149</sup> a casu] *lectio dubia* M

<sup>4150</sup> a casu] *lectio dubia* M

<sup>4151</sup> dicitur quarto - canis] om. VWY

<sup>4152</sup> add. ut MV

<sup>4153</sup> brevius V

albus est homo', ubi<sup>4160</sup> hoc determinabile 'homo'<sup>4161</sup> verificatur de hoc quod est homo albus.<sup>4162</sup>

Specificationes<sup>4163</sup> in ista regula ponuntur eadem<sup>4164</sup> ratione qua<sup>4165</sup> in sexta.<sup>4166</sup>

<8> Octava regula est haec: arguendo a toto in modo sumpto cum distributione ad partem<sup>4167</sup> in modo negative est consequentia bona,<sup>4168</sup> et affirmative cum constantia subiecti.<sup>4169</sup> Ut bene sequitur: 'nullus homo currit, ergo<sup>4170</sup> nullus homo albus currit'; [W 123r] et<sup>4171</sup> sequitur:<sup>4172</sup> 'omnis homo currit et omnis<sup>4173</sup> homo albus est, ergo<sup>4174</sup> omnis<sup>4175</sup> homo albus currit'.<sup>4176</sup>

Specificationes in ista<sup>4177</sup> regula ponuntur eadem ratione qua<sup>4178</sup> in sexta.<sup>4179</sup>

Vocatur autem 'totum in modo' [Y 97v] dictio capta sine addito ut iste terminus 'homo' est totum<sup>4180</sup> in modo respectu huius termini 'homo albus'.<sup>4181</sup>

<9> Nona regula est haec: arguendo ab<sup>4182</sup> adverbio affirmative<sup>4183</sup> supponente<sup>4184</sup> pro omni tempore copulative<sup>4185</sup> ad<sup>4186</sup> adverbium supponens pro aliquo tempore determinate<sup>4187</sup> est bona consequentia.<sup>4188</sup>

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<sup>4154</sup> pars in modo] *om.* V

<sup>4155</sup> *add.* +terminus+ W

<sup>4156</sup> sumptum W

<sup>4157</sup> *add.* +ad+ W

<sup>4158</sup> illud V

<sup>4159</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4160</sup> ibi *add.* enim V, ibi M

<sup>4161</sup> *om.* MW, *add.* +verificabit+ V

<sup>4162</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4163</sup> *add.* autem Y

<sup>4164</sup> ea W

<sup>4165</sup> sicut V

<sup>4166</sup> in sexta] *lectio dubia* et nomina Y, in secunda M

<sup>4167</sup> *add.* +ad+ V, maiorem Y

<sup>4168</sup> *ante* consequentia MV

<sup>4169</sup> et affirmative cum constantia subiecti] *post* negative V

<sup>4170</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4171</sup> *add.* etiam M

<sup>4172</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4173</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4174</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4175</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4176</sup> omnis homo albus currit] albus homo currit W

<sup>4177</sup> illa VY

<sup>4178</sup> sicut et V

<sup>4179</sup> alia *add.* et secunda ratio Y

<sup>4180</sup> *ante* est W

<sup>4181</sup> vocatur - albus] *om.* V

Exemplum, ut<sup>4189</sup> bene sequitur: 'coelum est<sup>4190</sup> omni tempore, ergo<sup>4191</sup> coelum est<sup>4192</sup> aliquo tempore'.

Sic etiam sequitur:<sup>4193</sup> 'coelum est <sup>4194</sup>semper, ergo<sup>4195</sup> coelum est hodie'.

Et dicitur notanter:<sup>4196</sup> "affirmative", quia si dictio supponens copulative<sup>4197</sup> pro omni tempore negaretur,<sup>4198</sup> non valeret consequentia, ut non sequitur: 'Sortes non est semper, ergo<sup>4199</sup> Sortes non est hodie'. Simili modo est, si talis dictio complectens<sup>4200</sup> omne tempus<sup>4201</sup> significaret negative,<sup>4202</sup> sic<sup>4203</sup> enim<sup>4204</sup> sequitur: 'chymaera numquam est, ergo<sup>4205</sup> chymaera non est hodie'.

<10> Decima regula est haec: arguendo a negatione partis in tempore ad negationem totius in tempore, est bona consequentia.<sup>4206</sup>

Ut bene sequitur:<sup>4207</sup> 'antichristus non est<sup>4208</sup> nunc, ergo<sup>4209</sup> antichristus non est semper'.

Vocatur autem 'pars in tempore' dictio supponens<sup>4210</sup> pro aliquo tempore non copulative, ut 'nunc', 'aliquando', 'aliquo tempore' et consimilia.<sup>4211</sup>

Sed 'totum in tempore' vocatur dictio nata supponere copulative<sup>4212</sup> pro quolibet tempore, ut 'numquam' et<sup>4213</sup> 'semper' et consimilia.<sup>4214</sup>

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<sup>4182</sup> cum WY

<sup>4183</sup> post tempore VY

<sup>4184</sup> supposito M

<sup>4185</sup> om. V, affirmative M

<sup>4186</sup> add. aliud Y, cum M

<sup>4187</sup> determinato Y

<sup>4188</sup> ante bona Y

<sup>4189</sup> quia MY

<sup>4190</sup> add. in MY

<sup>4191</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4192</sup> add. in MV

<sup>4193</sup> coelum est omni - etiam sequitur] om. W

<sup>4194</sup> add. +in omni tempore+ W

<sup>4195</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4196</sup> ante dicitur V

<sup>4197</sup> ante negaretur Y, add. et M

<sup>4198</sup> negative W

<sup>4199</sup> igitur Y | Sortes - ergo] om. W

<sup>4200</sup> om. WVY, lectio dubia M

<sup>4201</sup> potest W | omne tempus] pro omni tempore M

<sup>4202</sup> significative V, negaretur M

<sup>4203</sup> sicut V

<sup>4204</sup> om. W

<sup>4205</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4206</sup> ante bona Y

<sup>4207</sup> bene sequitur] om. Y

<sup>4208</sup> add. +ergo+ W

<sup>4209</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4210</sup> om. Y

<sup>4211</sup> similia Y

<11> Undecima regula est haec: arguendo a toto in loco ad suam partem respectu eiusdem<sup>4215</sup> subiecti est bona consequentia.

Exemplum,<sup>4216</sup> ut bene sequitur: 'Sortes est ubique, ergo<sup>4217</sup> Sortes est hic'; 'chymaera<sup>4218</sup> est<sup>4219</sup> nusquam,<sup>4220</sup> ergo chymaera non est hic',<sup>4221</sup> Breviter<sup>4222</sup> tenent consequentiae<sup>4223</sup> a toto<sup>4224</sup> in loco et a parte<sup>4225</sup> in loco sicut consequentiae<sup>4226</sup> a toto in tempore et a parte in tempore.<sup>4227</sup> 'Totum in loco' autem<sup>4228</sup> est<sup>4229</sup> dictio supponens pro omni loco copulative<sup>4230</sup> adverbialiter<sup>4231</sup> vel nomen<sup>4232</sup> ei aequivalens,<sup>4233</sup> [V 92<sup>vb</sup>] ut<sup>4234</sup> 'nusquam', 'ubique'.

'Pars autem in loco'<sup>4235</sup> est<sup>4236</sup> dictio supponens pro aliquo loco<sup>4237</sup> determinate,<sup>4238</sup> ut 'hic' vel 'ibi'.<sup>4239</sup>

<12> Duodecima regula est haec: arguendo [Y 98<sup>r</sup>] a toto copulato ad partem copulati<sup>4240</sup> non oportet consequentiam valere,<sup>4241</sup> sicut non sequitur: 'Sortes et Plato trahunt navem, ergo<sup>4242</sup> Sortes trahit

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<sup>4212</sup> *add.* quia V

<sup>4213</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4214</sup> et consimilia] *om.* W, etc. VY

<sup>4215</sup> alicuius MWY

<sup>4216</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4217</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4218</sup> *add.* non W

<sup>4219</sup> *post* nusquam VY

<sup>4220</sup> ubique W

<sup>4221</sup> *om.* Y, *add.* et V

<sup>4222</sup> *add.* ultra Y, +----+ V

<sup>4223</sup> tenent consequentiae] tenet consequentia V

<sup>4224</sup> parte V

<sup>4225</sup> *add.* a toto V

<sup>4226</sup> consequentia V

<sup>4227</sup> *add.* et ergo W | in tempore] eius V

<sup>4228</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4229</sup> autem est] est autem *ante* totum VY, *add.* est Y

<sup>4230</sup> *add.* et V

<sup>4231</sup> adverbium W

<sup>4232</sup> non W

<sup>4233</sup> vel nomen ei aequivalens] *om.* M

<sup>4234</sup> *add.* +unusquisque+ W

<sup>4235</sup> modo Y

<sup>4236</sup> dicitur V

<sup>4237</sup> +tempore+ *sub* loco V

<sup>4238</sup> determinato Y

<sup>4239</sup> *add.* et illic V

<sup>4240</sup> *add.* totius Y

<sup>4241</sup> oportet consequentiam valere] valet consequentia Y

<sup>4242</sup> igitur Y

navem'.<sup>4243</sup> Etiam non sequitur:<sup>4244</sup> 'Sortes et Plato habent<sup>4245</sup> centum denarios,<sup>4246</sup> ergo Sortes habet centum denarios',<sup>4247</sup> posito casu<sup>4248</sup> quod quilibet eorum<sup>4249</sup> habeat quinquaginta denarios.<sup>4250</sup>

Vocatur autem 'copulatum' plures<sup>4251</sup> termini coniuncti per coniunctionem copulativam, ut: 'Sortes et Plato'.

<13> Tertia decima regula est haec:<sup>4252</sup> arguendo a toto<sup>4253</sup> disiuncto ad partem disiuncti non oportet consequentiam valere,<sup>4254</sup> ut non sequitur: 'homo vel asinus currit, ergo<sup>4255</sup> homo currit'. Posito enim<sup>4256</sup> |W 123v| quod asinus currat<sup>4257</sup> |M 47r| et homo quiescat,<sup>4258</sup> antecedens est verum et consequens<sup>4259</sup> falsum.

<14> Quarta decima regula est haec: arguendo a parte disiuncti ad totum disiunctum<sup>4260</sup> sine distributione<sup>4261</sup> disiuncti<sup>4262</sup> est bona<sup>4263</sup> consequentia. Ut bene sequitur: 'homo currit, ergo homo currit<sup>4264</sup> vel asinus currit', nam oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti. Si enim nec homo nec asinus curreret, tunc nullus<sup>4265</sup> homo curreret.

Et dico notanter "sine distributione" quia cum distributione disiuncti non oportet consequentiam valere, ut non sequitur: 'omne quod est homo est risibile, igitur omne ens quod est homo vel bos est risibile'. Et volens dicere quod in hac 'omne verum vel falsum est verum' totum disiunctum

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<sup>4243</sup> ergo - navem] *om.* W

<sup>4244</sup> etiam non sequitur] *om.* V, et W

<sup>4245</sup> trahunt Y

<sup>4246</sup> centum denarios] decem solidos V

<sup>4247</sup> centum denarios] decem solidos V

<sup>4248</sup> *add.* possibili V

<sup>4249</sup> precise W

<sup>4250</sup> quinquaginta denarios] quinque V, partem Y |*add.* et ideo Y

<sup>4251</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4252</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4253</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4254</sup> *ante* consequentiam Y

<sup>4255</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4256</sup> tamen M

<sup>4257</sup> *vel forsitan* curreret M

<sup>4258</sup> *add.* tunc W

<sup>4259</sup> *add.* est V

<sup>4260</sup> *add.* affirmative M

<sup>4261</sup> *om.* WV

<sup>4262</sup> *om.* MVW

<sup>4263</sup> *post* consequentia W

<sup>4264</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>4265</sup> nec M

distribuatur, debetur<sup>4266</sup> negare hanc consequentiam: 'omne verum est verum igitur omne verum vel falsum est verum', prout notum est.<sup>4267</sup>

<15> Quinta decima regula est haec:<sup>4268</sup> arguendo a nomine causae efficientis respectu huius verbi 'est' secundi adiacentis <sup>4269</sup> ad nomen effectus <sup>4270</sup> respectu huius verbi 'potest esse' <sup>4271</sup> est bona consequentia. Ut bene sequitur: 'domificator est, ergo<sup>4272</sup> domus potest esse'; quando<sup>4273</sup> enim domificator est, tunc iste est<sup>4274</sup> qui<sup>4275</sup> potest facere domum, et ex consequenti<sup>4276</sup> domus potest esse.

<16> Sexta decima regula est haec:<sup>4277</sup> arguendo a nomine causae efficientis<sup>4278</sup> in actu respectu huius verbi 'est' ad nomen effectus<sup>4279</sup> respectu huius verbi 'fit', est bona consequentia. Ut bene sequitur<sup>4280</sup>: 'domificans<sup>4281</sup> est, ergo<sup>4282</sup> domus fit'.

Et intelligitur regula de causa efficienti<sup>4283</sup> particulari et determinata eodem modo quo<sup>4284</sup> effectus est determinatus. Non enim sequitur: 'faciens est, ergo<sup>4285</sup> cultellus<sup>4286</sup> fit'; sed oportet dici:<sup>4287</sup> 'faciens cultellum est, ergo<sup>4288</sup> cultelum fit'.<sup>4289</sup>

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<sup>4266</sup> *lectio dubia* habetur M

<sup>4267</sup> et dico - notum est] *om.* VWY

<sup>4268</sup> est haec] *om.* M

<sup>4269</sup> secundi adiacentis] *om.* VWY

<sup>4270</sup> efficiens W

<sup>4271</sup> *om.* MVW

<sup>4272</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4273</sup> si VY

<sup>4274</sup> *post* domum Y

<sup>4275</sup> est qui] *om.* M

<sup>4276</sup> ex consequenti] *per* consequens V

<sup>4277</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4278</sup> effectus V

<sup>4279</sup> efficiens WY, *add.* tunc W

<sup>4280</sup> bene sequitur] *om.* VWY, *add.* +ut+ M

<sup>4281</sup> domificator W

<sup>4282</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4283</sup> efficiente V

<sup>4284</sup> qui W

<sup>4285</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4286</sup> *add.* +est+ Y

<sup>4287</sup> addi Y

<sup>4288</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4289</sup> sed - fit] *om.* MW



<17> Septima decima regula est haec: arguendo a nomine effectus respectu huius verbi 'est vel fuit' ad nomen causae efficientis<sup>4290</sup> respectu huius verbi 'fuit'<sup>4291</sup> est consequentia bona.<sup>4292</sup> Ut bene sequitur: 'domus est vel fuit, ergo domificator fuit'. Et intelligitur regula arguendo ad nomen<sup>4293</sup> causae efficientis<sup>4294</sup> |Y 98<sup>v</sup>| de necessitate requisitae ad esse<sup>4295</sup> talis effectus.<sup>4296</sup>

<18> Duodevicesima regula est haec: arguendo a nomine causae materialis respectu huius verbi 'est' ad nomen effectus respectu huius verbi 'potest esse',<sup>4297</sup> est bona consequentia. Ut bene sequitur: 'ferrum est, ergo<sup>4298</sup> cultellus potest esse'.<sup>4299</sup>

<19> Undevicesima regula est haec: arguendo a nomine effectus causae materialis respectu huius verbi 'est vel fuit' ad nomen causae respectu eiusdem<sup>4300</sup> verbi,<sup>4301</sup> est bona consequentia. Ut bene sequitur: 'homo est vel fuit, ergo<sup>4302</sup> materia<sup>4303</sup> hominis est vel fuit'; 'panis est vel fuit, ergo farina et aqua sunt vel fuerunt'.<sup>4304</sup>

<20> Vicesima regula est haec: arguendo a nomine causae<sup>4305</sup> finalis respectu huius praedicati 'bonum' vel 'malum' ad nomen effectus de per se<sup>4306</sup> ordinati in<sup>4307</sup> talem finem respectu eiusdem praedicati 'bonum' vel 'malum'<sup>4308</sup> et |V 93<sup>ra</sup>| respectu huius copulae 'est vel fuit', est bona consequentia. Ut bene

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<sup>4290</sup> effectus V

<sup>4291</sup> respectu huius verbi fuit] *om.* W

<sup>4292</sup> *ante* consequentia VY

<sup>4293</sup> ad nomen] a nomine VW

<sup>4294</sup> effectus V

<sup>4295</sup> causam Y

<sup>4296</sup> talis effectus] etc. Y

<sup>4297</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>4298</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4299</sup> fici W, fieri Y

<sup>4300</sup> huius Y

<sup>4301</sup> *add.* est Y

<sup>4302</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4303</sup> forma W

<sup>4304</sup> farina et aqua sunt vel fuerunt] forma panis est vel fuit Y | panis - fuerunt] *om.* MW

<sup>4305</sup> esse Y

<sup>4306</sup> de per se] *om.* V

<sup>4307</sup> ad Y

<sup>4308</sup> bonum vel malum] *om.* V

sequitur: 'homicidium<sup>4309</sup> est malum, ergo<sup>4310</sup> latitatio in antris<sup>4311</sup> propter homicidium est vel fuit mala'.<sup>4312</sup> Et ista<sup>4313</sup> consequentia tenet e converso a nomine effectus ad nomen<sup>4314</sup> causae.

<21> Vicesima prima regula est haec: arguendo a nomine causae<sup>4315</sup> formalis substantialis vel accidentalis cum hoc<sup>4316</sup> addito 'sufficiens ad denominationem sui subiecti'<sup>4317</sup> ad nomen effectus utrobique<sup>4318</sup> respectu huius verbi 'est' secundi adiacentis est bona consequentia. [M 47v] Ut bene sequitur:<sup>4319</sup> 'forma hominis est, ergo homo est'; 'albedo<sup>4320</sup> sufficiens [W 124r] ad denominatione sui<sup>4321</sup> subiecti est, ergo album est'. Et ista<sup>4322</sup> consequentia tenet e converso a nomine effectus ad nomen causae.<sup>4323</sup>

<22> Vicesima altera regula est haec:<sup>4324</sup> arguendo a propositione affirmativa de praedicato infinito de inesse et de praesenti<sup>4325</sup> et<sup>4326</sup> addendo in antecedente 'pro toto tempore praesenti<sup>4327</sup> et<sup>4328</sup> pro qualibet parte eius'<sup>4329</sup> ad propositionem<sup>4330</sup> negativam de praedicato<sup>4331</sup> finito<sup>4332</sup> est bona consequentia. Ut bene<sup>4333</sup> sequitur: 'Sortes pro toto<sup>4334</sup> tempore praesenti et pro<sup>4335</sup> qualibet parte eius<sup>4336</sup> est non albus, ergo Sortes non est albus'.<sup>4337</sup>

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<sup>4309</sup> latrocinium W

<sup>4310</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4311</sup> latitatio in antris] *lectio dubia* privatio rerum vel rapina facta Y

<sup>4312</sup> malum Y

<sup>4313</sup> illa V

<sup>4314</sup> ad nomen] e nomine Y

<sup>4315</sup> esse Y

<sup>4316</sup> aliquo W

<sup>4317</sup> om. W

<sup>4318</sup> *vel forsitan* utroque Y

<sup>4319</sup> bene sequitur] om. W

<sup>4320</sup> homo W

<sup>4321</sup> om. V, *post* subiecti W

<sup>4322</sup> illa V

<sup>4323</sup> esse Y

<sup>4324</sup> om. W

<sup>4325</sup> de inesse et de praesenti] de praesenti de inesse V

<sup>4326</sup> om. VY

<sup>4327</sup> om. V

<sup>4328</sup> vel Y

<sup>4329</sup> *ante* parte Y

<sup>4330</sup> om. V

<sup>4331</sup> *add.* +in+ W

<sup>4332</sup> ad propositionem - finito] *ante* addendo V

<sup>4333</sup> optime V

<sup>4334</sup> quolibet W

Dicitur etiam notanter "de inesse", quia in modalibus non tenet.<sup>4338</sup> Non enim sequitur: 'Sortes potest esse non<sup>4339</sup> albus, ergo<sup>4340</sup> Sortes non<sup>4341</sup> potest esse albus'.

Dicitur etiam<sup>4342</sup> notanter "de<sup>4343</sup> praesenti" quia in propositio<sup>4344</sup> de praeterito et<sup>4345</sup> de futuro non valet.<sup>4346</sup> |Y 99r| Ut<sup>4347</sup> non sequitur: 'Sortes<sup>4348</sup> erit non albus, ergo Sortes non erit albus'. Si enim cras deberet<sup>4349</sup> esse<sup>4350</sup> albus et post cras<sup>4351</sup> niger, tunc antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum. Similiter non sequitur: 'Sortes<sup>4352</sup> fuit non albus, ergo<sup>4353</sup> Sortes non fuit albus'.<sup>4354</sup>

Dicitur<sup>4355</sup> etiam notanter "addendo<sup>4356</sup> in antecedente 'pro toto tempore praesenti<sup>4357</sup> et pro<sup>4358</sup> qualibet parte eius',<sup>4359</sup> quia isto<sup>4360</sup> omissio non valeret consequentia. Si enim Sortes pro prima medietate temporis praesentis sederet et pro secunda<sup>4361</sup> non,<sup>4362</sup> tunc Sortes esset<sup>4363</sup> sedens et<sup>4364</sup> non sedens,<sup>4365</sup> quia esset<sup>4366</sup> in<sup>4367</sup> secunda medietate<sup>4368</sup> temporis praesentis non sedens. Sed<sup>4369</sup>

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<sup>4335</sup> *om. V*  
<sup>4336</sup> *ante eius Y*  
<sup>4337</sup> *add. et VY*  
<sup>4338</sup> *oportet VY*  
<sup>4339</sup> *ante esse W*  
<sup>4340</sup> *igitur Y*  
<sup>4341</sup> *ante albus Y*  
<sup>4342</sup> *et ante dicitur V*  
<sup>4343</sup> *add. +p--+ Y*  
<sup>4344</sup> *om. MWY, supra +alibi+ V*  
<sup>4345</sup> *vel Y, add. in WY*  
<sup>4346</sup> *oportet VY*  
<sup>4347</sup> *unde W*  
<sup>4348</sup> *add. non Y*  
<sup>4349</sup> *cras deberet] lectio dubia totum diceretur Y*  
<sup>4350</sup> *fieri V, om. Y*  
<sup>4351</sup> *ea V, esset Y*  
<sup>4352</sup> *add. Sortes W*  
<sup>4353</sup> *igitur Y, add. +sor+ V*  
<sup>4354</sup> *add. et V*  
<sup>4355</sup> *dico Y*  
<sup>4356</sup> *addo Y*  
<sup>4357</sup> *om. V*  
<sup>4358</sup> *om. VY*  
<sup>4359</sup> *ante parte VY*  
<sup>4360</sup> *illo V*  
<sup>4361</sup> *alia V*  
<sup>4362</sup> *add. sederet Y*  
<sup>4363</sup> *est V*  
<sup>4364</sup> *sedens et] om. MWY*  
<sup>4365</sup> *add. esse non sedens W*  
<sup>4366</sup> *post praesentis VY*  
<sup>4367</sup> *pro Y*  
<sup>4368</sup> *parte Y*  
<sup>4369</sup> *et Y*

tunc<sup>4370</sup> falsum esset dicere quod ipse non esset<sup>4371</sup> sedens, quia adhuc<sup>4372</sup> pro prima<sup>4373</sup> medietate temporis<sup>4374</sup> esset sedens.<sup>4375</sup>

<23> Vicesima tertia regula est: arguendo a propositione affirmativa de praedicato finito ad negativam de praedicato infinito additis <sup>4376</sup> circumstantiis in <sup>4377</sup> praecedenti regula positus est bona consequentia,<sup>4378</sup> ut bene sequitur: 'Sortes pro toto<sup>4379</sup> tempore praesenti et qualibet eius parte est sedens, ergo Sortes non est non sedens'.

<24><sup>4380</sup> Vicesima quarta<sup>4381</sup> regula est haec: arguendo a diversis<sup>4382</sup> praedicatis<sup>4383</sup> ad praedicatum<sup>4384</sup> coniunctum supposito<sup>4385</sup> quod unum ipsorum<sup>4386</sup> non includatur<sup>4387</sup> in reliquo<sup>4388</sup> nec<sup>4389</sup> ambo sint<sup>4390</sup> accidentia<sup>4391</sup> eiusdem tertii, est bona consequentia. Ut bene<sup>4392</sup> sequitur: 'Sortes est homo et Sortes est albus, ergo<sup>4393</sup> Sortes est homo albus'.

Et <sup>4394</sup> dicitur notanter "si <sup>4395</sup> unum non includat <sup>4396</sup> reliquum", <sup>4397</sup> quia si unum includeret <sup>4398</sup> alterum, <sup>4399</sup> non valeret consequentia, quia fieret nugatio,<sup>4400</sup> ut<sup>4401</sup> non sequitur: 'Sortes est homo

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<sup>4370</sup> tamen M  
<sup>4371</sup> est V  
<sup>4372</sup> om. V  
<sup>4373</sup> add. +medietate+ V  
<sup>4374</sup> add. praesentis Y  
<sup>4375</sup> esset sedens] sederet V  
<sup>4376</sup> add. aliis  
<sup>4377</sup> add. prima regula aut V  
<sup>4378</sup> ante bona Y  
<sup>4379</sup> om. Y  
<sup>4380</sup> 25 V  
<sup>4381</sup> vicesima quinta V  
<sup>4382</sup> divisio M  
<sup>4383</sup> ante diversis Y  
<sup>4384</sup> om. V  
<sup>4385</sup> add. ista sit Y  
<sup>4386</sup> diversorum V, suppositorum Y  
<sup>4387</sup> concludatur M  
<sup>4388</sup> alio VY, altero M  
<sup>4389</sup> et W  
<sup>4390</sup> sunt WY  
<sup>4391</sup> actum Y  
<sup>4392</sup> optime V  
<sup>4393</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>4394</sup> om. V  
<sup>4395</sup> quod V, unde Y  
<sup>4396</sup> includit W  
<sup>4397</sup> alium VY | nec - reliquum] om. M

albus et<sup>4402</sup> Sortes<sup>4403</sup> est albus,<sup>4404</sup> igitur<sup>4405</sup> Sortes est <albus> homo albus';<sup>4406</sup> nec sequitur:<sup>4407</sup>

'Sortes est<sup>4408</sup> Sortes et<sup>4409</sup> Sortes est homo, ergo<sup>4410</sup> Sortes est Sortes homo'.

Dicitur etiam notanter<sup>4411</sup> "dummodo talia<sup>4412</sup> non sint<sup>4413</sup> accidentia eiusdem tertii", quia si essent accidentia eiusdem tertii<sup>4414</sup> |W 124v| non valeret consequentia. Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes est albus et Sortes<sup>4415</sup> est musicus, ergo Sortes<sup>4416</sup> est albus musicus", quia<sup>4417</sup> consequens est propositio plures et non propositio una.<sup>4418</sup> Nec<sup>4419</sup> sequitur: 'Sortes est albus et Sortes<sup>4420</sup> est monachus, |Y 99v| ergo<sup>4421</sup> Sortes est albus monachus', quia esto<sup>4422</sup> quod<sup>4423</sup> consequens sit propositio<sup>4424</sup> una, tamen termini<sup>4425</sup> determinatio<sup>4426</sup> variatur, quia in antecedente ly albus<sup>4427</sup> determinat qualitatem Sortis et in consequente determinat qualitatem<sup>4428</sup> vestium seu habitus.<sup>4429</sup>

<25> Vicesima quinta<sup>4430</sup> regula est haec: arguendo a coniunctis<sup>4431</sup> ad divisa,<sup>4432</sup> dummodo unum coniunctorum non includat<sup>4433</sup> oppositum alterius nec ambo<sup>4434</sup> sint<sup>4435</sup> accidentia eiusdem tertii

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<sup>4398</sup> concluderet M

<sup>4399</sup> unum includeret alterum] sic V

<sup>4400</sup> *lectio dubia ymagio* Y

<sup>4401</sup> sicut M

<sup>4402</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4403</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4404</sup> homo VY

<sup>4405</sup> ergo V

<sup>4406</sup> Sortes est homo albus et - albus] *om.* M

<sup>4407</sup> nec sequitur] *om.* M

<sup>4408</sup> *add.* +homo+ M

<sup>4409</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4410</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4411</sup> tertio W, *om.* Y

<sup>4412</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4413</sup> fuerint W

<sup>4414</sup> quia - tertii] *om.* Y | essent - tertii] sic V

<sup>4415</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4416</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4417</sup> et per V

<sup>4418</sup> *om.* VW, *add.* etc. M

<sup>4419</sup> et non V

<sup>4420</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4421</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4422</sup> *add.* seu dato M

<sup>4423</sup> *add.* monachus Y

<sup>4424</sup> *add.* sit M

<sup>4425</sup> *om.* VWY, *add.* in M

<sup>4426</sup> determinatione W, determinato Y

<sup>4427</sup> ly albus] *ante* in antecedente M

<sup>4428</sup> Sortis - qualitatem] *om.* M

<sup>4429</sup> vestium seu habitus] vestitum et habitus W, habitus seu vestis Y

<sup>4430</sup> quarta V

nec<sup>4436</sup> aliquod eorum<sup>4437</sup> sit<sup>4438</sup> ampliatiu[m]<sup>4439</sup>, nec aequivocu[m]<sup>4440</sup> a casu<sup>4441</sup> est consequentia bona.<sup>4442</sup>

Exemplu[m],<sup>4443</sup> ut bene<sup>4444</sup> sequitur: 'Johannes est homo albus, ergo<sup>4445</sup> Johannes<sup>4446</sup> est homo et Johannes est<sup>4447</sup> albus'.

Dicitur<sup>4448</sup> notanter in regula<sup>4449</sup> "dummodo unum eorum non includat<sup>4450</sup> oppositu[m] alterius", quia<sup>4451</sup> ubi<sup>4452</sup> includeret oppositu[m],<sup>4453</sup> consequentia<sup>4454</sup> non valeret. Ut non sequitur: [M 48<sup>r</sup>] 'haec figura<sup>4455</sup> est homo pictus,<sup>4456</sup> ergo<sup>4457</sup> haec figura<sup>4458</sup> est homo'.

Dicitur etiam notanter<sup>4459</sup> [V 93<sup>rb</sup>] "dummodo ambo<sup>4460</sup> non<sup>4461</sup> sint<sup>4462</sup> accidentia eiusdem tertii", quia ubi<sup>4463</sup> ambo essent accidentia eiusdem tertii non oporteret consequentia[m]<sup>4464</sup> valere.<sup>4465</sup> Ut non

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4431 coniunctio W, *add.* praedicatis Y  
4432 divisum W, *add.* praedicata Y  
4433 est W, includit Y  
4434 *om.* W  
4435 sunt W  
4436 neque Y  
4437 ipsorum V  
4438 est Y  
4439 ampliatiu[m] V  
4440 nec aequivocu[m] *om.* VW  
4441 a casu] *lectio dubia* M, *om.* VWY  
4442 *ante* consequentia Y  
4443 *om.* Y  
4444 *om.* M | ut bene] sicut W  
4445 igitur Y  
4446 *add.* +---+ V  
4447 et Johannes est] vel W  
4448 et dico M  
4449 in regula] *om.* V  
4450 includit Y  
4451 *add.* +---+ V  
4452 *vel fors*an uni W  
4453 includeret oppositu[m] sic esse V, *add.* alterius M  
4454 *post* valeret M  
4455 filia M  
4456 *add.* +et+ W  
4457 igitur Y  
4458 filia M  
4459 *add.* +unum+ Y  
4460 *post* sint Y, *om.* M  
4461 *om.* W  
4462 sunt W  
4463 si Y  
4464 *add.* +con+ W  
4465 oportet consequentia[m] valere] valeret consequentia M

sequitur: 'iste<sup>4466</sup> est albus monachus, ergo<sup>4467</sup> iste<sup>4468</sup> est albus'; nec sequitur:<sup>4469</sup> 'iste<sup>4470</sup> est bonus cytharedus,<sup>4471</sup> ergo<sup>4472</sup> iste<sup>4473</sup> est bonus'.<sup>4474</sup>

Dicitur etiam notanter<sup>4475</sup> "ubi neutrum<sup>4476</sup> sit<sup>4477</sup> ampliatus", quia si unus terminorum esset ampliatus, non valeret consequentia<sup>4478</sup> ad aliam.<sup>4479</sup> Ut non sequitur: 'Adam<sup>4480</sup> est homo<sup>4481</sup> mortuus, ergo Adam<sup>4482</sup> est homo'.

Dicitur etiam notanter: "ubi neutrum<sup>4483</sup> est aequivocum a casu",<sup>4484</sup> quia ad aequivocum a casu consequens fieret propositio plures et sic non valeret consequentia. Ut non sequitur:<sup>4485</sup> 'canis latrat ergo est canis'.<sup>4486</sup>

<26> Vicesima sexta regula est haec: arguendo a propositione negativa de praedicato finito in propositionibus de inesse cum constantia subiecti ad affirmativam de praedicato infinito est bona consequentia. Ut bene sequitur:<sup>4487</sup> 'Sortes non est albus et Sortes est, ergo<sup>4488</sup> Sortes est non albus'.

Dicitur notanter "cum constantia subiecti", quia sine ea non oportet<sup>4489</sup> consequentiam valere, ut non sequitur: 'antichristus<sup>4490</sup> non est homo, ergo<sup>4491</sup> antichristus est non homo', quia<sup>4492</sup> antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, prout de se notum est.<sup>4493</sup>

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<sup>4466</sup> ille V

<sup>4467</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4468</sup> ille V

<sup>4469</sup> nec sequitur] *om.* VW

<sup>4470</sup> ille V

<sup>4471</sup> medicus V

<sup>4472</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4473</sup> ille V

<sup>4474</sup> *add.* quia stat quod sit unus ribaldus quatem optime *lectio dubia* sicut medicus V

<sup>4475</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4476</sup> *add.* eorum V

<sup>4477</sup> est MWY

<sup>4478</sup> valeret consequentia] oportet consequentiam valere Y

<sup>4479</sup> alium VY | ad aliam] *om.* W

<sup>4480</sup> antichristus V

<sup>4481</sup> *add.* +est+ M

<sup>4482</sup> antichristus *add.* +antichristus+ V

<sup>4483</sup> *add.* coniunctorum M

<sup>4484</sup> a casu] *lectio dubia* M

<sup>4485</sup> *add.* *blank space* V

<sup>4486</sup> dicitur - canis] *om.* VWY

<sup>4487</sup> *add.* +non+ W

<sup>4488</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4489</sup> oporteret VW

<sup>4490</sup> *add.* antichristus Y

<sup>4491</sup> igitur Y

<27> Vicesima septima regula est haec:<sup>4494</sup> convertendo propositionem<sup>4495</sup> per contrapositionem si sit universalis affirmativa et<sup>4496</sup> ubi<sup>4497</sup> unus terminorum<sup>4498</sup> |Y 100r| infinitatus pro nullo<sup>4499</sup> supponat, non oportet<sup>4500</sup> consequentiam valere.<sup>4501</sup> Ut non sequitur: 'omnis homo est ens, ergo<sup>4502</sup> omne non-ens<sup>4503</sup> est non homo'. Est enim<sup>4504</sup> antecedens<sup>4505</sup> verum et consequens falsum, quia<sup>4506</sup> non-ens non<sup>4507</sup> est - et sic consequens<sup>4508</sup> est propositio affirmativa cuius subiectum pro nullo supponit.<sup>4509</sup> Nota<sup>4510</sup> quod<sup>4511</sup> "conversio per contrapositionem" est<sup>4512</sup> ubi |W 125r| convertitur propositio<sup>4513</sup> in unam<sup>4514</sup> aliam eiusdem qualitatis et quantitatis,<sup>4515</sup> terminis finitis mutatis in terminos infinitos, testante<sup>4516</sup> Petro Hispano in principio<sup>4517</sup> suarum<sup>4518</sup> *Summularum*,<sup>4519</sup> ut<sup>4520</sup> in exemplo prius posito.<sup>4521</sup>

<28> Duodetricesima regula est haec:<sup>4522</sup> convertendo propositionem universalem affirmativam per contrapositionem, dummodo nullus<sup>4523</sup> terminorum<sup>4524</sup> supponat<sup>4525</sup> pro omni existente, est bona

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4492 nam V  
4493 om. Y  
4494 add. arguendo Y  
4495 add. universalem affirmativam Y  
4496 si - et] om. Y  
4497 om. MV  
4498 add. totali *lectio dubia* in exposita Y  
4499 add. *lectio dubia* exponente V  
4500 om. Y  
4501 consequentiam valere] valet consequentia Y  
4502 igitur Y  
4503 add. non Y, add. +non+ M  
4504 ante est M  
4505 est enim antecedens] antecedens +--+ enim est V, nam antecedens est Y  
4506 +quia+ V  
4507 nihil Y  
4508 consequentia M  
4509 et sic - supponit] om. VWY  
4510 notandum V  
4511 nota quod] vocatur enim M  
4512 om. M  
4513 ante convertitur VY  
4514 om. VY  
4515 add. +in+ Y, add. et quoddam etc. M  
4516 teste MV  
4517 primo M  
4518 om. M  
4519 in - summularum] summulis suis Y  
4520 et W  
4521 ut - posito] om. Y  
4522 talis est W



consequentia.<sup>4526</sup> Ut bene sequitur: 'omnis homo est animal, igitur<sup>4527</sup> omne non animal est non homo'.<sup>4528</sup> Notanter dicitur<sup>4529</sup> "dummodo nullus terminorum supponat pro omni existente" quia si<sup>4530</sup> unus terminus<sup>4531</sup> supponeret pro omni existente,<sup>4532</sup> iste<sup>4533</sup> terminus<sup>4534</sup> infinitus<sup>4535</sup> pro nullo supponeret, quia non pro eodem<sup>4536</sup> supponunt<sup>4537</sup> |V 93<sup>va</sup>| terminus finitus et terminus<sup>4538</sup> infinitus.<sup>4539</sup> Et sic<sup>4540</sup> iuxta praecedentem regulam non valeret<sup>4541</sup> consequentia.

<29> Undetricesima regula talis est:<sup>4542</sup> convertendo propositionem negativam subiecto pro nullo<sup>4543</sup> supponente per contrapositionem<sup>4544</sup> non oportet consequentiam valere.

Ut non sequitur: |E 53<sup>r</sup>| 'chymaera non est homo, ergo aliquid<sup>4545</sup> non<sup>4546</sup> homo non est non<sup>4547</sup> chymaera', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Quod antecedens sit verum notum est. Quod consequens sit falsum patet, quia eius contradictorium<sup>4548</sup> est verum, scilicet 'omnis non homo est non chymaera'.

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<sup>4523</sup> unus W  
<sup>4524</sup> *add.* infinitatus pro nullo W  
<sup>4525</sup> *post* existente V  
<sup>4526</sup> *add.* materialis M  
<sup>4527</sup> ergo M  
<sup>4528</sup> ut bene - non homo] etiam V  
<sup>4529</sup> dico *ante* notanter M  
<sup>4530</sup> ubi MV  
<sup>4531</sup> *om.* VWY  
<sup>4532</sup> est bona - supponeret pro omni existente] *om.* W |*add.* talis Y  
<sup>4533</sup> *om.* WVY  
<sup>4534</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>4535</sup> infinitatus M  
<sup>4536</sup> pro eodem] *post* supponunt W  
<sup>4537</sup> supponeret V, supponit WY  
<sup>4538</sup> ipse V, *om.* Y  
<sup>4539</sup> terminus finitus et terminus infinitus] terminus infinitus et terminus finitus M  
<sup>4540</sup> et sic] ut Y  
<sup>4541</sup> valet *post* consequentia Y  
<sup>4542</sup> *add.* arguendo Y  
<sup>4543</sup> *add.* tempore W  
<sup>4544</sup> per contrapositionem] *ante* subiecto V  
<sup>4545</sup> aliud W  
<sup>4546</sup> *add.* +chymaera+ W  
<sup>4547</sup> *add.* +homo+ WY  
<sup>4548</sup> oppositum Y

<30> Tricesima regula<sup>4549</sup> est haec:<sup>4550</sup> arguendo a propositione<sup>4551</sup> particulari<sup>4552</sup> negativa<sup>4553</sup> de subiecto finito,<sup>4554</sup> subiecto<sup>4555</sup> pro aliquo supponente, per contrapositionem<sup>4556</sup> eam convertendo<sup>4557</sup> est bona consequentia. Ut bene<sup>4558</sup> sequitur: 'homo non<sup>4559</sup> est asinus, ergo<sup>4560</sup> aliquis<sup>4561</sup> non<sup>4562</sup> asinus non est non<sup>4563</sup> homo'. Patet regula, quia oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti, ut<sup>4564</sup> ista:<sup>4565</sup> 'omne<sup>4566</sup> non asinus est non homo'.<sup>4567</sup> |M 48v| Sequitur enim: "omnis non asinus est non homo, omnis homo est non asinus, ergo omnis homo est non homo".<sup>4568</sup> Modo<sup>4569</sup> istud<sup>4570</sup> consequens est simpliciter<sup>4571</sup> falsum.<sup>4572</sup> Et istam<sup>4573</sup> regulam et secundam<sup>4574</sup> praecedente<sup>4575</sup> intellexit Petrus Hispanus. Et intelligitur<sup>4576</sup> de<sup>4577</sup> propositionibus<sup>4578</sup> de modo loquendi consueto. Et posui<sup>4579</sup> eas<sup>4580</sup>

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<sup>4549</sup> *add. talis* W

<sup>4550</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>4551</sup> a propositione] *om.* Y

<sup>4552</sup> *om.* VW, particularem Y

<sup>4553</sup> negativam Y

<sup>4554</sup> de subiecto finito] *om.* WVY

<sup>4555</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4556</sup> compositionem W

<sup>4557</sup> per - convertendo] convertendo eam per contrapositionem V

<sup>4558</sup> optime V

<sup>4559</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4560</sup> igitur *add.* +--+ Y

<sup>4561</sup> *om.* W, *lectio dubia* V, *add.* quod Y

<sup>4562</sup> *add.* est non Y

<sup>4563</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4564</sup> puta M

<sup>4565</sup> illa V

<sup>4566</sup> *om.* WVY

<sup>4567</sup> *add.* +ergo omne non+ M

<sup>4568</sup>sequitur enim - consequenti] *om.* W | omnis homo est non asinus ergo omnis homo est non homo V | sequitur enim omnis non asinus est non homo, omnis homo est non asinus, ergo omnis homo est non homo Y | Sequitur enim: "omne non asinus est non homo, ergo omne non asinus non est homo", per regulam vicesima. Et ultra sequitur: 'ergo omnis homo non est non asinus', per conversionem universalis negativae. Et ultra sequitur: 'omnis homo non est non asinus et omnis homo est', quia supposito quod subiectum pro aliquo supponat. 'Ergo omnis homo est asinus' per regulam vicesimam sextam. Et hoc repugnat consequenti. M

<sup>4569</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4570</sup> illud VY

<sup>4571</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4572</sup> modo - falsum] *om.* M

<sup>4573</sup> illam VY

<sup>4574</sup> aliam V

<sup>4575</sup> regulam et secundam praecedentem] et istam W | et secundam praecedentem] *om.* MY

<sup>4576</sup> intelligerentur W, intelliguntur *add.* regulae V

<sup>4577</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4578</sup> propositiones W, praecedentes V

<sup>4579</sup> posuit Y

<sup>4580</sup> illas V

inter<sup>4581</sup> regulas<sup>4582</sup> |Y 100v| consequentiarum materialium, quia esto quod conversionem tangant, tamen non<sup>4583</sup> sunt formales.

<31> Tricesima prima regula est haec:<sup>4584</sup> si fuerint duae contrarietates<sup>4585</sup> sic se habentes quod cuilibet enti mundi conveniat disiunctum<sup>4586</sup> ex qualibet earum, si tunc<sup>4587</sup> pars<sup>4588</sup> unius infertur ex uno<sup>4589</sup> alterius<sup>4590</sup> universaliter,<sup>4591</sup> et e converso,<sup>4592</sup> tunc est<sup>4593</sup> bona consequentia si<sup>4594</sup> reliquum primae infert<sup>4595</sup> reliquum secundae<sup>4596</sup> universaliter,<sup>4597</sup> et e converso.<sup>4598h</sup>

Ut bene sequitur: <sup>4599</sup> 'omne ens mundi <sup>4600</sup> est genitum vel ingenitum, et omne ens est <sup>4601</sup> corruptibile<sup>4602</sup> vel incorruptibile,<sup>4603</sup> et<sup>4604</sup> omne<sup>4605</sup> genitum est corruptibile,<sup>4606</sup> ergo<sup>4607</sup> omne<sup>4608</sup> ingenitum est incorruptibile'.<sup>4609</sup> Patet ista<sup>4610</sup> regula, quia nusquam reperitur instantia; et<sup>4611</sup> ex alio,

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<sup>4581</sup> tres V

<sup>4582</sup> inter regulas] *om.* M

<sup>4583</sup> *ante* tamen V

<sup>4584</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4585</sup> *vel forsā* convertentes W

<sup>4586</sup> conveniat disiunctum] convenient disiunctivae M

<sup>4587</sup> *om.* Y, et una V

<sup>4588</sup> unum MW, oppositum Y

<sup>4589</sup> ex uno] ex opposito Y, in unum MVW

<sup>4590</sup> infertur - alterius] disiuncti verificatur ulter de una parte alterius disiuncti V

<sup>4591</sup> *om.* VW, *vel forsā* ulter Y

<sup>4592</sup> et e converso] *om.* M

<sup>4593</sup> in MVW

<sup>4594</sup> *om.* MVW

<sup>4595</sup> *vel forsā* infertur *add.* in MVW

<sup>4596</sup> secundum W

<sup>4597</sup> in bona - universaliter] altera de altera verificatur V

<sup>4598</sup> tunc - e converso] *om.* Y | et e converso] *om.* M

<sup>h</sup> si tunc - universaliter et e converso] si tunc unum unius infertur in unum alterius et e converso, tunc in bona consequentia reliquum primae infertur in reliquum secundum universaliter et e converso W | si tunc unum unius infertur in unum alterius universaliter, tunc in bona consequentia reliquum primae infertur in reliquum secundae universaliter M | et una pars unius disiuncti verificatur ulter de una parte alterius disiuncti et e converso, tunc altera de altera verificatur, et e converso V | oppositum unius infertur ex opposito alterius et e converso Y

<sup>4599</sup> bene sequitur] *om.* V

<sup>4600</sup> *om.* MV

<sup>4601</sup> et omne ens est] *vel* WY, *om.* EM

<sup>4602</sup> corporale MW

<sup>4603</sup> incorporale MW

<sup>4604</sup> *sed* V, modo Y

<sup>4605</sup> *add.* ens V

<sup>4606</sup> coroprare V

<sup>4607</sup> igitur EY

<sup>4608</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4609</sup> incoroprare V

<sup>4610</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4611</sup> *om.* Y

quia:<sup>4612</sup> sit<sup>4613</sup> quod aliquod<sup>4614</sup> ingenitum non sit <in>corruptibile,<sup>4615</sup> sequitur<sup>4616</sup> - cum<sup>4617</sup> quodlibet ens<sup>4618</sup> sit<sup>4619</sup> corruptibile<sup>4620</sup> vel incorruptibile<sup>4621</sup> - quod ipsum est corruptibile,<sup>4622</sup> et cum omne corruptibile<sup>4623</sup> sit<sup>4624</sup> genitum et<sup>4625</sup> omne incorruptibile ingenitum,<sup>4626</sup> sequitur quod idem est genitum<sup>4627</sup> et<sup>4628</sup> ingenitum, quod<sup>4629</sup> est impossibile.<sup>4630</sup> Haec<sup>4631</sup> est<sup>4632</sup> regula<sup>4633</sup> Philosophi<sup>4634</sup> *Secundo Priorum*.

<32> Trecesima altera regula est haec: arguendo a propositione de necessario<sup>4635</sup>

[W 125v] in qua [E 53v] nulla ponitur negatio de sensu diviso ad propositionem consimilem<sup>4636</sup> de possibili est bona consequentia. Ut bene sequitur: 'Deum necesse est esse, ergo Deum possibile est esse', sed non tenet<sup>4637</sup> e converso.<sup>4638</sup>

<33> Tricesima tertia regula est haec:<sup>4639</sup> arguendo a propositione in qua nulla ponitur negatio de impossibili<sup>4640</sup> de sensu diviso<sup>4641</sup> ad propositionem<sup>4642</sup> de possibili postponendo<sup>4643</sup> negationem modo

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<sup>4612</sup> *add.* da VY

<sup>4613</sup> *om.* V, sit M | quia sit] quod dato E

<sup>4614</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4615</sup> corruptibile MY, incoroprale V | patet ista - incorruptibile] *om.* W

<sup>4616</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4617</sup> *om.* VW, et M, *add.* quod VWY

<sup>4618</sup> *om.* VWY

<sup>4619</sup> *om.* W, est V

<sup>4620</sup> corporale V

<sup>4621</sup> incoroprale V, *add.* sequitur Y

<sup>4622</sup> coroprale V | quod - corruptibile] *om.* M

<sup>4623</sup> coroprale V

<sup>4624</sup> *om.* V, potest Y, est M

<sup>4625</sup> vel V

<sup>4626</sup> incorruptibile ingenitum] genitum est coroprale V, genitum corruptibile Y | et - ingenitum] *om.* M

<sup>4627</sup> *ante* est Y

<sup>4628</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4629</sup> *add.* implicat et per consequens V

<sup>4630</sup> *add.* patet Y, *add.* et M

<sup>4631</sup> ista V

<sup>4632</sup> *ante* Philosophi Y, *post* regula V

<sup>4633</sup> *add.* etiam V, et Y

<sup>4634</sup> *add.* in V, *om.* M

<sup>4635</sup> de necessario] *om.* W, *post* negatio V

<sup>4636</sup> *ante* propositionem Y

<sup>4637</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4638</sup> *add.* arguendo V

<sup>4639</sup> est haec] talis est W

<sup>4640</sup> *add.* et VY

<sup>4641</sup> de sensu diviso] *om.* W

<sup>4642</sup> aliam W

et non verbo est bona<sup>4644</sup> consequentia. Ut bene sequitur: 'chymeram<sup>4645</sup> impossibile est esse, ergo chymeram<sup>4646</sup> possibile est non<sup>4647</sup> esse'.

Istae<sup>4648</sup> duae<sup>4649</sup> regulae patent, quia ex opposito consequentis<sup>4650</sup> cuiuscumque sequitur oppositum antecedentis.

Exemplum de prima,<sup>4651</sup> nam<sup>4652</sup> sequitur: 'omnem deum non possibile est esse, ergo<sup>4653</sup> omnem deum impossibile est<sup>4654</sup> esse', quia ambae sunt in tertio ordine. [Y 101r] Et ultra sequitur:<sup>4655</sup> 'ergo<sup>4656</sup> omnem deum necesse est non esse', quod est oppositum contradictorium primi<sup>4657</sup> antecedentis.<sup>4658</sup>

Exemplum secundae<sup>4659</sup> regulae<sup>4660</sup> [V 93vb] nam da oppositum<sup>4661</sup> consequentis, ut 'Sortem non possibile est non esse', sequitur: 'ergo<sup>4662</sup> Sortem impossibile<sup>4663</sup> est non esse', quia<sup>4664</sup> ambae sunt in quarto ordine et<sup>4665</sup> istae<sup>4666</sup> contrariantur antecedenti.

<34> Trecesima quarta regula est haec:<sup>4667</sup> regulae Petri Hispani,<sup>4668</sup> quas ponit de consequentiis<sup>4669</sup> modalium de sensu composito in prima parte<sup>4670</sup> suarum *Summularum*<sup>4671</sup> non tenent nisi cum

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<sup>4643</sup> apponendo W  
<sup>4644</sup> post consequentia V  
<sup>4645</sup> add. +non+ W  
<sup>4646</sup> add. non W  
<sup>4647</sup> +non+ W  
<sup>4648</sup> illae V  
<sup>4649</sup> om. V  
<sup>4650</sup> add. +sequitur+ W  
<sup>4651</sup> de prima] primi V  
<sup>4652</sup> bene Y  
<sup>4653</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>4654</sup> add. non E  
<sup>4655</sup> om. V  
<sup>4656</sup> om. W, igitur Y  
<sup>4657</sup> primae Y  
<sup>4658</sup> om. V  
<sup>4659</sup> tertiae W, primae M  
<sup>4660</sup> om. W  
<sup>4661</sup> add. +consequentis+ V  
<sup>4662</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>4663</sup> non possibile V  
<sup>4664</sup> quae W  
<sup>4665</sup> quia W  
<sup>4666</sup> ista W, illae V  
<sup>4667</sup> add. +regulas+ W, add. videlicet quod V | est haec] talis est M  
<sup>4668</sup> petrus hispanus post quas ponit Y  
<sup>4669</sup> quas ponit de consequentiis] in ----- V  
<sup>4670</sup> ante parte M  
<sup>4671</sup> suae summulae WY

constantia propositionum<sup>4672</sup> per quibus supponant dicta. Exemplum,<sup>4673</sup> ut non sequitur: 'Sortem non<sup>4674</sup> currere non<sup>4675</sup> est possibile,<sup>4676</sup> ergo Sortem<sup>4677</sup> currere<sup>4678</sup> est possibile',<sup>4679</sup> quia supposito<sup>4680</sup> quod ista propositio<sup>4681</sup> 'Sortem non<sup>4682</sup> currere' non esset<sup>4683</sup> possibile<sup>4684</sup> et<sup>4685</sup> supposito quod ista<sup>4686</sup> propositio 'Sortem<sup>4687</sup> currere'<sup>4688</sup> non<sup>4689</sup> sit<sup>4690</sup> in mundo,<sup>4691i</sup> tunc ita esset sicut per antecedens significatur,<sup>4692</sup> tamen non esset ita<sup>4693</sup> sicut per consequens significatur,<sup>4694</sup> prout<sup>4695</sup> de se<sup>4696</sup> notum est.<sup>4697</sup>

Sed omnes hae<sup>4698</sup> regulae intelligendae sunt cum constantia propositionum<sup>4699</sup> pro quibus supponant dicta, ut 'Sortem currere non est possibile' |M 49r| et ista propositio 'Sortes currere' et sua contradictoria sunt, ergo 'Sortes non currere est necesse' vel ergo 'Sortes non currere est impossibile'.<sup>4700</sup>

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<sup>4672</sup> subiecti EVWY, *add.* exemplum VY

<sup>4673</sup> *om.* E | per - exemplum] *om.* VWY

<sup>4674</sup> +non+ W, *om.* VWY

<sup>4675</sup> *om.* VY

<sup>4676</sup> necesse E

<sup>4677</sup> *add.* non VY

<sup>4678</sup> *add.* non V

<sup>4679</sup> necesse V, non esse currere Y

<sup>4680</sup> posito V

<sup>4681</sup> ista propositio] *om.* VWY

<sup>4682</sup> *om.* EM

<sup>4683</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4684</sup> necesse VW [Sortem - possibile] Sortes non currat Y | ista - possibile] Sortes non esset et etiam E

<sup>4685</sup> ut V, quia M

<sup>4686</sup> illa V

<sup>4687</sup> *add.* non V

<sup>4688</sup> currit VY

<sup>4689</sup> solum E

<sup>4690</sup> non sit] solum esse VY

<sup>4691</sup> Sortem - mundo] nulla propositio esset W

<sup>i</sup> Sortem currere non est possibile - mundo] Sortem +non+ currere non est necesse ergo Sortem currere est possibile quia posito quod nulla propositio esset W | Sortem currere non est possibile ergo Sortem currere est impossibile quia supposito quod Sortem currere non possibile quia supposito quod ista propositio Sortem currere non sit in mundo M | Sorte, currere est possibile ergo Sortem non currere non est necesse quia posito quod Sortem non currere non esset necesse ut supposito quod illa propositio Sortes non currit solum esset in mundo V | Sortem currere est possibile ergo Sortem non currere est non esse currere quia supposito quod Sortem non currat et supposito quod ista propositio Sortem currit solum esset in mundo Y

<sup>4692</sup> *add.* et Y

<sup>4693</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4694</sup> tamen non - significatur] *om.* W

<sup>4695</sup> ut Y

<sup>4696</sup> de se] *om.* MV

<sup>4697</sup> *add.* et isto modo intelligendae sunt regulae de modalibus E

<sup>4698</sup> suae V, istae M

<sup>4699</sup> subiecti EVWY

<sup>4700</sup> pro - impossibile] *om.* VWY

Et<sup>4701</sup> ita etiam<sup>4702</sup> intelligi debent regulae<sup>4703</sup> de modalibus compositis<sup>4704</sup> in prima<sup>4705</sup> parte<sup>4706</sup> de consequentiis formalibus positae.<sup>4707</sup>

<35> Trecesima quinta regula est haec: arguendo a propositione in qua de aliquo affirmatur<sup>4708</sup> unum<sup>4709</sup> contrariorum incomplexorum<sup>4710</sup> ad aliam propositionem in qua de eodem negatur reliquum est bona consequentia. Ut bene sequitur: 'Johannes<sup>4711</sup> est albus, ergo<sup>4712</sup> Johannes<sup>4713</sup> non est niger'. Addi tamen potest in antecedente<sup>4714</sup> hoc totum<sup>4715</sup> 'pro qualibet parte temporis praesentis',<sup>4716</sup> et tunc regula nullam calumpniam<sup>4717</sup> peteretur.<sup>4718</sup> Et intelligitur regula de propositionibus de praesenti et<sup>4719</sup> de recto<sup>4720</sup> et in propositionibus<sup>4721</sup> de inesse, nam<sup>4722</sup> aliquo<sup>4723</sup> istorum<sup>4724</sup> interveniente<sup>4725</sup> non oportet<sup>4726</sup> consequentiam valere. Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes erit<sup>4727</sup> albus, ergo Sortes non erit niger';<sup>4728</sup> nec<sup>4729</sup> sequitur: 'Sortes habebit albedinem,<sup>4730</sup> ergo<sup>4731</sup> Sortes non habebit negritudinem',<sup>4732</sup> nec<sup>4733</sup> sequitur: 'Sortes potest esse albus, ergo non potest esse niger',<sup>4734</sup> prout de

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<sup>4701</sup> *add.* tamen Y

<sup>4702</sup> *om.* VY | ita etiam] ideo non W

<sup>4703</sup> istae W

<sup>4704</sup> de sensu composito V

<sup>4705</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4706</sup> principio W

<sup>4707</sup> et - positae] *om.* M

<sup>4708</sup> de aliquo affirmatur] *post* incomplexorum V

<sup>4709</sup> *add.* +contradictoriorum+ W

<sup>4710</sup> complexorum W

<sup>4711</sup> Sortes Y

<sup>4712</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4713</sup> Sortes Y

<sup>4714</sup> in antecedente] *om.* Y

<sup>4715</sup> *add.* complexum Y

<sup>4716</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>4717</sup> calumpniarum Y

<sup>4718</sup> patitur Y

<sup>4719</sup> *om.* V

<sup>4720</sup> de recto] *blank post* inesse V

<sup>4721</sup> et in propositionibus] *om.* V

<sup>4722</sup> *add.* +oblique+ W

<sup>4723</sup> altero M, aliquae W

<sup>4724</sup> *om.* W, illorum V

<sup>4725</sup> superveniente W

<sup>4726</sup> oporteret V

<sup>4727</sup> est W

<sup>4728</sup> *super* +albus+ V, *add.* ergo Sortes non potest esse niger Y

<sup>4729</sup> ut W

<sup>4730</sup> album Y | habebit albedinem] habet album M

<sup>4731</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4732</sup> nigrum Y | habebit negritudinem] habet nigrum M

<sup>4733</sup> ut W

se notum est.<sup>4735</sup> Modo<sup>4736</sup> verum est quod in modalibus postponendo negationem huic modi 'potest' teneret consequentia.<sup>4737</sup> Ut bene sequitur: 'Sortes potest esse albus, ergo<sup>4738</sup> Sortes [Y 101v] potest non<sup>4739</sup> esse niger.<sup>4740</sup>

<36> Tricesima sexta regula est haec: arguendo ab affirmatione<sup>4741</sup> unius<sup>4742</sup> privative oppositorum<sup>4743</sup> in propositionibus<sup>4744</sup> de praesenti<sup>4745</sup> et de inesse<sup>4746</sup> et de recto<sup>4747</sup> [W 126r] ad negationem alterius de aliquo uno et<sup>4748</sup> eodem<sup>4749</sup> est bona<sup>4750</sup> consequentia. Ut bene<sup>4751</sup> sequitur: 'Sortes est<sup>4752</sup> caecus,<sup>4753</sup> ergo<sup>4754</sup> Sortes<sup>4755</sup> non est videns'.<sup>4756</sup>

<37> Tricesima septima regula est haec: arguendo ab affirmatione unius contradictoriorum<sup>4757</sup> incomplexorum in propositionibus de inesse et<sup>4758</sup> de praesenti et de recto,<sup>4759</sup> ad negationem alterius de aliquo uno et<sup>4760</sup> eodem, est bona consequentia. Ut<sup>4761</sup> bene sequitur: 'Sortes est homo, ergo<sup>4762</sup> Sortes non est non homo'.<sup>4763</sup>

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<sup>4734</sup> nec sequitur Sortes habebit albedinem - niger] et sic de aliis V

<sup>4735</sup> om. VW

<sup>4736</sup> tamen *post* est Y

<sup>4737</sup> om. V

<sup>4738</sup> igitur Y

<sup>4739</sup> *ante* potest Y

<sup>4740</sup> Modo - niger] om. W, *add.* prout de se notum est et verum est tamen quod in modalibus postponendo negationem huic modo potest teneret consequentia ut bene sequitur Sortes potest esse albus ergo Sortes potest esse niger Y

<sup>4741</sup> *vel forsā* affirmative W

<sup>4742</sup> uno W

<sup>4743</sup> *ante* privative M

<sup>4744</sup> propositione W

<sup>4745</sup> prima W

<sup>4746</sup> de praesenti et de inesse] de inesse de praesenti V

<sup>4747</sup> et de recto] om. W, de *blanck* V | *add.* et / de modo loquendi consueto W

<sup>4748</sup> aliquo uno et] om. M

<sup>4749</sup> *add.* et W

<sup>4750</sup> *post* consequentia W

<sup>4751</sup> om. W

<sup>4752</sup> *add.* +homo+ W

<sup>4753</sup> videns W

<sup>4754</sup> *add.* +sequitur+ W

<sup>4755</sup> om. M

<sup>4756</sup> *currens add.* +non homo+ W, *add.* et modaliter eam *vel forsā* causam sicut *lectio dubia post lectio dubia tractatam* M

<sup>4757</sup> om. V

<sup>4758</sup> om. V

<sup>4759</sup> *blank space* V, *add.* et M

<sup>4760</sup> uno et] om. Y | aliquo uno et] om. M

<sup>4761</sup> et M



Et intelliguntur<sup>4764</sup> haec<sup>4765</sup> regulae eodem<sup>4766</sup> modo circumstantionatae sicut est regula vicesima altera<sup>4767</sup> et eisdem de causis<sup>4768</sup> et<sup>4769</sup> simili modo<sup>4770</sup> addendo<sup>4771</sup> in antecedentibus earum 'pro qualibet parte temporis praesentis'. Exemplum, ut: 'Sortes pro qualibet parte temporis praesentis<sup>4772</sup> est videns, ergo<sup>4773</sup> non est caecus'.<sup>4774</sup>

<38> Duodequadragesima regula est haec: arguendo in<sup>4775</sup> terminis<sup>4776</sup> proprissime disparatis<sup>4777</sup> ab affirmatione<sup>4778</sup> unius de aliquo<sup>4779</sup> subiecto<sup>4780</sup> ad negationem alterius est consequentia bona.<sup>4781</sup> Ut bene sequitur: 'Sortes est homo, ergo<sup>4782</sup> Sortes non est asinus'.<sup>4783</sup> Sunt autem<sup>4784</sup> termini [V 94<sup>ra</sup>] 'proprissime disparati' qui nulla via<sup>4785</sup> neque simul, neque successive possunt convenire<sup>4786</sup> eisdem vel<sup>4787</sup> pro eodem<sup>4788</sup> supponere.

<39> Undequadragesima et ultima<sup>4789</sup> regula est haec:<sup>4790</sup> arguendo ab hoc quod non<sup>4791</sup> est<sup>4792</sup> a<sup>4793</sup> parte subiecti<sup>4794</sup> posito,<sup>4795</sup> ad<sup>4796</sup> hoc<sup>4797</sup> quod<sup>4798</sup> est non-ens<sup>4799</sup> respectu verbi<sup>4800</sup> ampliativi,<sup>4801</sup> non

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<sup>4762</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>4763</sup> tricesima septima - non homo] *om.* W  
<sup>4764</sup> intelligitur W  
<sup>4765</sup> isate W  
<sup>4766</sup> in V, isto Y  
<sup>4767</sup> sicut - altera] omnibus W | est - altera] *blank space* V, est ista Y  
<sup>4768</sup> de causis] *om.* W  
<sup>4769</sup> *om.* V  
<sup>4770</sup> simili modo] similiter M  
<sup>4771</sup> *post* earum W  
<sup>4772</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>4773</sup> igitur W  
<sup>4774</sup> *add.* et \_ M  
<sup>4775</sup> a V  
<sup>4776</sup> *add.* proprie W  
<sup>4777</sup> dispositis W  
<sup>4778</sup> *add.* +a negatione+ W  
<sup>4779</sup> alia Y  
<sup>4780</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>4781</sup> *ante* consequentia VY  
<sup>4782</sup> igitur Y  
<sup>4783</sup> *add.* patet W  
<sup>4784</sup> *add.* illi W  
<sup>4785</sup> *lectio dubia* Y  
<sup>4786</sup> *add.* +eodem+ Y  
<sup>4787</sup> eisdem vel] et non W  
<sup>4788</sup> eisdem *add.* solum W  
<sup>4789</sup> et ultima] *om.* WY, *post* haec V  
<sup>4790</sup> est haec] *om.* M  
<sup>4791</sup> *om.* WY  
<sup>4792</sup> *add.* non-est WY, *add.* positum V

oportet<sup>4802</sup> consequentiam valere. Ut non sequitur: 'quod non est<sup>4803</sup> intelligitur, ergo non-ens<sup>4804</sup> intelligitur'. Antecedens enim<sup>4805</sup> est verum<sup>4806</sup> in aliquo casu quia Antichristus<sup>4807</sup> potest intelligi, vel<sup>4808</sup> 'homo qui heri<sup>4809</sup> moriebatur'. Consequens est<sup>4810</sup> falsum<sup>4811</sup> quia<sup>4812</sup> significat quod<sup>4813</sup> aliquid quod nec<sup>4814</sup> est nec<sup>4815</sup> potest esse nec potest<sup>4816</sup> imaginari esse,<sup>4817</sup> intelligitur.<sup>4818</sup> Hoc<sup>4819</sup> est simpliciter falsum. Quod autem ita<sup>4820</sup> significet,<sup>4821</sup> patet, quia isto<sup>4822</sup> modo hoc<sup>4823</sup> verbum 'intelligitur' ampliatur, sicut apparet in<sup>4824</sup> *Ampliationibus*. [Y 102<sup>r</sup>]

Scias autem quod inter regulas consequentiarum materialium aliquas posui regulas consequentiarum formalium propter convenientiam quam habebant cum regulis praecedentibus et sequentibus - sicut regulae vicesima secunda, vicesima tertia,<sup>4825</sup> vicesima sexta et trigesima tertia et<sup>4826</sup> aliae huiusmodi.<sup>4827</sup>

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4793 ex Y  
4794 verbi M  
4795 *add. +addito+ W*  
4796 posito ad] *om. V*  
4797 *om. M*  
4798 *add. +non+ W, add. non M*  
4799 ens M, *add. positum a parte praedicati in convertente V*  
4800 termini W, *lectio dubia idem M*  
4801 intelligitur Y  
4802 debet M  
4803 *add. non W, add. esset Y*  
4804 non-ens] quod non est ens M, quod non est ens non W  
4805 *om. Y*  
4806 *add. et consequens M*  
4807 *om. W*  
4808 ut W  
4809 *om. W*  
4810 *add. tamen Y*  
4811 consequens est falsum] *om. M*  
4812 quod M  
4813 *om. W*  
4814 non WY  
4815 non WY  
4816 *om. W, post imaginari M*  
4817 nec W  
4818 intelligi W, *add. et VY*  
4819 *add. autem W*  
4820 ista W  
4821 significat VY  
4822 illo V  
4823 *om. W, ad V*  
4824 ex Y  
4825 *lectio dubia M*  
4826 *add. si sunt vel forsā sic M*  
4827 scias - huiusmodi] *om. VWY*

Et haec<sup>4828</sup> de consequentiarum formalium et<sup>4829</sup> materialium regulis sub correctione melius dicentium  
dicta<sup>4830</sup> sufficiant.<sup>4831</sup> | M 49v|

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<sup>4828</sup> sic W

<sup>4829</sup> formalium et] *om.* VY

<sup>4830</sup> *om.* W

<sup>4831</sup> dicta sufficiant] *post* regulis Y | *add.* etc. W, *add.* etc. explicit tractatus consequentiarum composito a venerabili artium doctore Marsilio de Inghen... etc. V, *add.* etc. sequitur secunda pars consequentiarum Y | *add.* etc. explicit primus liber consequentiarum etc. M

## <Secunda pars Consequentiarum>

<De consequentiis tenentibus ab exponentibus ad expositam>

<De expositione propositionum>

Circa secundam partem consequentiarum videndum est de consequentiis tenentibus ab exponentibus ad expositam. Et gratia illius<sup>4832</sup> quomodo<sup>4833</sup> omnes propositiones<sup>4834</sup> in logica sunt exponendae.

Et primo<sup>4835</sup> videbitur de exceptivis; secundo de exclusivis; tertio de reduplicativis; quarto de 'incipit' et<sup>4836</sup> quinto 'desinit'; sexto de propositionibus in quibus ponitur hoc verbum<sup>4837</sup> 'differt' vel aliud<sup>4838</sup> ei<sup>4839</sup> aequivalens; <sup>4840</sup> septimo de hoc termino 'infinitem'; octavo de comparativo et superlativo gradibus; <sup>4841</sup> nono de signis universalibus <sup>4842</sup> tentis collective; <sup>4843</sup> decimo de propositionibus in quibus ponitur<sup>4844</sup> ly<sup>4845</sup> 'totus'; undecimo<sup>4846</sup> et<sup>4847</sup> ultimo<sup>4848</sup> de propositionibus in quibus ponitur illa dictio<sup>4849</sup> 'ita' vel li<sup>4850</sup> sicut.<sup>4851</sup> Et secundum hoc erunt in hac parte undecim<sup>4852</sup> capitula,<sup>4853</sup> Deo duce,<sup>4854</sup> breviter<sup>4855</sup> adimplenda.<sup>4856</sup>

### II.1.1 <De exceptivis>

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<sup>4832</sup> istius M

<sup>4833</sup> om. Y

<sup>4834</sup> omnes propositiones] consequentiae M

<sup>4835</sup> om. M

<sup>4836</sup> om. MY

<sup>4837</sup> propositionibus in quibus ponitur hoc verbum] om. Y

<sup>4838</sup> aliquod W

<sup>4839</sup> sibi W

<sup>4840</sup> aequivalenti Y

<sup>4841</sup> om. Y

<sup>4842</sup> ante signis M

<sup>4843</sup> tentis collective] om. Y

<sup>4844</sup> propositionibus in quibus ponitur] om. Y

<sup>4845</sup> om. W

<sup>4846</sup> om. Y

<sup>4847</sup> om. WY

<sup>4848</sup> om. W

<sup>4849</sup> illa dictio] om. W

<sup>4850</sup> vel li] om. Y

<sup>4851</sup> add. \_\_\_ Y

<sup>4852</sup> in hanc parte undecim] enim Y

<sup>4853</sup> undecim capitula] post erunt M

<sup>4854</sup> dante WY

<sup>4855</sup> om. Y

<sup>4856</sup> complenda Y, add. et finienda vel forsan fruenda sequitur de exceptivis M

<1> Circa primum est primo<sup>4857</sup> advertendum quod tres sunt dictiones exceptivae, scilicet<sup>4858</sup> haec:<sup>4859</sup> 'praeter', 'praeterquam' et 'nisi'. Et dicuntur [W 126<sup>v</sup>] 'exceptivae' eo quod in propositionibus positae faciunt propositiones<sup>4860</sup> exceptivas -ut haec: 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit'.

<2> Secundo est notandum<sup>4861</sup> quod dictio exceptiva non debet<sup>4862</sup> proprie excipere<sup>4863</sup> [Y 102<sup>v</sup>] nisi<sup>4864</sup> a toto in quantitate id est<sup>4865</sup> a<sup>4866</sup> termino distributo signo universalis. Unde haec est impropria seu incongrua: 'aliquis<sup>4867</sup> homo praeter Sortem<sup>4868</sup> currit'.

<3> Tertio est<sup>4869</sup> notandum quod descendendo sub<sup>4870</sup> exceptiva mutari debet<sup>4871</sup> dictio exceptiva in<sup>4872</sup> 'aliud<sup>4873</sup> ab hoc' aggregatum<sup>4874</sup> vel in 'alius a'.<sup>4875</sup> Exemplum<sup>4876</sup> ut:<sup>4877</sup> 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit, ergo<sup>4878</sup> iste<sup>4879</sup> homo alius a Sorte currit, et iste homo alius a Sorte currit....'<sup>4880</sup> et sic de singulis.<sup>4881</sup> Et causa est dicta in praecedenti<sup>4882</sup> notabili, quia incongrue et improprie<sup>4883</sup> diceretur:<sup>4884</sup>

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4857 *om.* W

4858 *videlicet* M

4859 *om.* W

4860 *eas* M

4861 *est notandum]* nota W, *notandum est* M

4862 *om.* Y

4863 *excipit* Y

4864 *non* M

4865 *id est]* et Y

4866 *in* W

4867 *om.* Y

4868 *Platonem* W

4869 *om.* W

4870 *add. termino* Y, *add. termino est distributo* W

4871 *ante mutari* M

4872 *add. ly* W

4873 *alius vel alia* W

4874 *ab hoc aggregatum]* *om.* W, *ab* M

4875 *vel - a]* *om.* WY

4876 *om.* W

4877 *om.* Y

4878 *om.* Y

4879 *ille* Y

4880 *et - currit]* *om.* WY

4881 *lectio dubia similis* Y, *aliis* W

4882 *add. regula* M

4883 *et improprie]* *om.* M

4884 *incongrue - diceretur]* *maius congrue dicitur* Y

'iste<sup>4885</sup> homo praeter Sortem currit', eo quod ly praeter nequit accipere<sup>4886</sup> nisi a termino distributo.<sup>4887</sup>

<4> Quarto notandum quod exceptivae iniquadruplici differentia.

Prima in qua nulla ponitur negatio - ut haec:<sup>4888</sup> 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit'.<sup>4889</sup>

Secunda, in qua ponitur negatio post hanc dictionem 'praeter', ut: 'omnis homo praeter Sortem non currit'.

Tertia contradictoria primae, ut: 'non omnis homo praeter Sortem currit'.

Quarta contradictoria secundae, ut: 'non omnis homo praeter Sortem non<sup>4890</sup> currit'.

Et potest reperiri quinta<sup>4891</sup> species,<sup>4892</sup> sed<sup>4893</sup> non est ista<sup>4894</sup> consueta:<sup>4895</sup> ubi subiectum distribuitur<sup>4896</sup> et ly praeter negaretur, ut: 'omnis homo non praeter Sortem currit' vel<sup>4897</sup> 'omnis homo non preter Sortem non currit'.

Et sciendum quod<sup>4898</sup> prima omnium<sup>4899</sup> istarum apud logicos vocatur 'exceptiva affirmativa', secunda vero 'exceptiva negativa'.

<5> Quinto est notandum<sup>4900</sup> quod in qualibet istarum sunt quattuor partes principales:<sup>4901</sup> 'praeter', copulam,<sup>4902</sup> principale<sup>4903</sup> subiectum et praedicatum.<sup>4904</sup> Exemplum ut<sup>4905</sup> in prima<sup>4906</sup> li<sup>4907</sup> homo

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<sup>4885</sup> ille Y

<sup>4886</sup> accipere M

<sup>4887</sup> eo - distributo] *om.* WY

<sup>4888</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>4889</sup> est currens Y

<sup>4890</sup> *add. supra* Y

<sup>4891</sup> alia Y

<sup>4892</sup> *om.* M

<sup>4893</sup> *vel forsā +sed+ Y*

<sup>4894</sup> *om.* W, ita M

<sup>4895</sup> usitata W

<sup>4896</sup> distribueretur M

<sup>4897</sup> omnis homo non - vel] *om.* W

<sup>4898</sup> sciendum quod] *om.* M

<sup>4899</sup> oppositarum Y, *vel forsā* autem M

<sup>4900</sup> est notandum] sciendum W, notandum est Y

<sup>4901</sup> *ante* partes M

<sup>4902</sup> *add. videlicet W, add. scilicet M*

<sup>4903</sup> principalis M

<sup>4904</sup> et praedicatum] *om.* MY

<sup>4905</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>4906</sup> *add. interl.* 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit' W

est <sup>4908</sup> principale subiectum, et principale praedicatum est ly currens. <sup>4909</sup> Tertium <sup>4910</sup> dictio exceptiva, <sup>4911</sup> ut ly <sup>4912</sup> praeter; et quartum <sup>4913</sup> istud <sup>4914</sup> quod excipitur, ut ly Sortes.

<6> Sexto notandum quod exceptiva affirmativa scilicet prima debet exponi [M 50r] per duas exponentes copulativae: prima propositio, in qua praedicatum affirmatur de subiecto principali <sup>4915</sup> sumpto cum alietate excepti universaliter, <sup>4916</sup> ut sit per hoc signum 'aliud, ut: <sup>4917</sup> 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit' exponitur: <sup>4918</sup> 'omnis homo alius a Sorte currit'. Secunda propositio erit propositio <sup>4919</sup> in qua praedicatum principale <sup>4920</sup> negatur <sup>4921</sup> de excepto universaliter si sit terminus communis, et singulariter si sit terminus singularis [Y 103r] - ut: 'Sortes non currit'; vel <sup>4922</sup> 'omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale' <sup>4923</sup> exponitur sic: 'omne animal aliud ab homine est' <sup>4924</sup> irrationale <sup>4925</sup> et nullus homo est irrationalis'. <sup>4926</sup>

Secunda <sup>4927</sup> exponitur sic <sup>4928</sup> per duas exponentes [W 127r] copulativae quarum prima negat praedicatum de dictione a <sup>4929</sup> qua fit exceptio sumpta cum alietate <sup>4930</sup> excepti universaliter; secunda affirmat ipsum praedicatum <sup>4931</sup> de excepto universaliter si sit terminus communi, et <sup>4932</sup> singulariter <sup>4933</sup>

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<sup>4907</sup> om. WY

<sup>4908</sup> om. Y

<sup>4909</sup> et - currens] currit vero est principale praedicatum W, praedicatum ly currit Y

<sup>4910</sup> tertio W

<sup>4911</sup> exceptivans M

<sup>4912</sup> om. W

<sup>4913</sup> quarto W

<sup>4914</sup> illud M

<sup>4915</sup> ante subiecto MY

<sup>4916</sup> post sumpto M

<sup>4917</sup> sit - ut] om. WY

<sup>4918</sup> om. WY

<sup>4919</sup> erit propositio] om. WY

<sup>4920</sup> om. Y, exceptens M

<sup>4921</sup> negaretur M

<sup>4922</sup> add. sit M

<sup>4923</sup> est irrationale] currit M, est *lectio dubia* mortale Y

<sup>4924</sup> om. Y

<sup>4925</sup> est irrationale] currit M

<sup>4926</sup> est irrationalis] currit M

<sup>4927</sup> tertia M, add. vo Y

<sup>4928</sup> om. Y

<sup>4929</sup> ex M

<sup>4930</sup> cum alietate] *lectio dubia* allente M

<sup>4931</sup> ante ipsum M

<sup>4932</sup> om. M

<sup>4933</sup> post singularis W

si sit terminus singularis - ut 'omnis homo praeter Sortem non currit' exponitur sic:<sup>4934</sup> 'omnis homo alius a Sorte non currit et<sup>4935</sup> Sortes currit'; vel haec 'omne animal praeter hominem non est rationale' exponitur<sup>4936</sup> sic: 'omne animal aliud ab homine non est rationale et<sup>4937</sup> omnis homo est rationalis'.

Tertia exponitur<sup>4938</sup> per disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus copulativae per quam prima exponebatur, quia est contradictoria primae - ut 'non omnis homo praeter Sortem currit' exponitur sic:<sup>4939</sup> 'aliquis homo alius a Sorte non currit vel Sortes currit', et eodem modo de qualibet consimili.

Sed <sup>4940</sup> quarta exponitur per disiunctiva de partibus contradicentibus copulativae per quam exponebatur secunda,<sup>4941</sup> quia est eius contradictoria<sup>4942</sup> - ut 'non omnis homo praeter Sortem non<sup>4943</sup> currit' exponitur sic: 'aliquis homo alius a Sorte currit, vel Sortes non currit'.

Quinta vero (et<sup>4944</sup> satis inconsueta)<sup>4945</sup> est ista, in qua ponitur<sup>4946</sup> una<sup>4947</sup> negatio ante dictionem exceptivam,<sup>4948</sup> exponitur<sup>4949</sup> per disiunctivam cuius prima pars<sup>4950</sup> est<sup>4951</sup> contraria,<sup>4952</sup> secunda vero contradictoria,<sup>4953</sup> partibus copulativae per quam prima<sup>4954</sup> exponebatur et proportionaliter ista<sup>4955</sup> in qua duae ponuntur<sup>4956</sup> negationes per talem disiunctivam oppositam copulativae<sup>4957</sup> per quam exponebatur secunda. Exemplum ut<sup>4958</sup> 'omnis homo non praeter Sortem currit' sic exponitur:<sup>4959</sup>

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<sup>4934</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4935</sup> *a M*

<sup>4936</sup> *haec - exponitur] om. M*

<sup>4937</sup> *ergo M*

<sup>4938</sup> *add. sic M*

<sup>4939</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4940</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4941</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4942</sup> *ante eius M*

<sup>4943</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4944</sup> *est M*

<sup>4945</sup> *consueta M*

<sup>4946</sup> *post negatio M*

<sup>4947</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4948</sup> *ante dictionem exceptivam] om. MY*

<sup>4949</sup> *add. sic W*

<sup>4950</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>4951</sup> *add. +contradictoria+ M*

<sup>4952</sup> *add. est M*

<sup>4953</sup> *add. secundae M*

<sup>4954</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4955</sup> *om. W*

<sup>4956</sup> *ante duae M*

<sup>4957</sup> *om. W*

<sup>4958</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4959</sup> *sic exponitur] sit exponenda Y*



'omnis homo alius a Sorte non<sup>4960</sup> currit<sup>4961</sup> vel Sortes non<sup>4962</sup> currit';<sup>4963</sup> et haec 'omnis homo non praeter Sortem non<sup>4964</sup> currit' exponitur: 'omnis homo alius a Sorte currit<sup>4965</sup> vel Sortes non currit'.

## II. 1.2 <Regulae de exceptivis>

<1> Tunc de istis sit prima regula:<sup>4966</sup> a qualibet istarum ad suas exponentes simul<sup>4967</sup> captas vel e converso est consequentia bona<sup>4968</sup> et<sup>4969</sup> formalis. Patet<sup>4970</sup>, quia ibi<sup>4971</sup> arguitur ab aequivalente ad aequivalens.

<2> Secunda regula est<sup>4972</sup> quod<sup>4973</sup> a prima vel secunda exceptiva<sup>4974</sup> ad unam suarum exponentium, quaecumque sit ista,<sup>4975</sup> est bona consequentia. Patet, quia ad istas sequentur<sup>4976</sup> copulative, ergo<sup>4977</sup> quaelibet pars eius<sup>4978</sup> - cum quaelibet<sup>4979</sup> pars<sup>4980</sup> sequitur ad copulativam, ut in prima parte dictum est. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, quia arguitur a parte copulativae ad totam copulativam et talis consequentia<sup>4981</sup> non valet.

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<sup>4960</sup> *add. marg. M, om. Y*

<sup>4961</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4962</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4963</sup> *omnis homo non praeter Sortem currit - currit] om. W*

<sup>4964</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4965</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>4966</sup> *add. ista Y*

<sup>4967</sup> *sic M*

<sup>4968</sup> *ante consequentia MY*

<sup>4969</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4970</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>4971</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>4972</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4973</sup> *ista Y*

<sup>4974</sup> *add. affirmativa Y*

<sup>4975</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4976</sup> *secuntur M, add. +re+ Y*

<sup>4977</sup> *quia - ergo] tales valent copulativas W*

<sup>4978</sup> *copulativae M, om. Y*

<sup>4979</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4980</sup> *parte M*

<sup>4981</sup> *talis consequentia] ista MY*

<3> Tertia regula est haec:<sup>4982</sup> a<sup>4983</sup> tertia,<sup>4984</sup> quarta, et<sup>4985</sup> quinta<sup>4986</sup> exceptiva ad unam exponentium suarum non valet consequentia. Patet, quia tales [W127<sup>v</sup>] valent disiunctivas. Modo a disiunctiva non valet consequentia<sup>4987</sup> ad unam suarum partium,<sup>4988</sup> prout in prima parte patet.

<4> Quarta regula est haec:<sup>4989</sup> ab una exponentium istarum ad expositam est bona consequentia et formalis. Patet, quia aequivalenter<sup>4990</sup> arguitur a parte disiunctivae ad totam - et<sup>4991</sup> cum ipsae valeant<sup>4992</sup> disiunctivas,<sup>4993</sup> [M 50<sup>v</sup>] talis est formalis. Exempla istarum quaerantur<sup>4994</sup> in expositis et exponentibus prius<sup>4995</sup> positis.<sup>4996</sup>

Et haec de exceptivis dicta sufficiant.<sup>4997</sup> Sequitur nunc consequenter<sup>4998</sup> de exclusivis.<sup>4999</sup>

## II.2.1 <De exclusivis>

Quantum ad<sup>5000</sup> secundum<sup>5001</sup> capitulum<sup>5002</sup> sciendum est de exclusivis.<sup>5003</sup>

<1> Circa quas primo nota quod exclusivae dictiones sunt hae: 'tantum',<sup>5004</sup> 'solum', 'tantummodo', 'solummodo'.<sup>5005</sup> Et<sup>5006</sup> dicuntur exclusivae quia faciunt<sup>5007</sup> in propositione positae ipsam<sup>5008</sup> propositionem exclusivam.

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<sup>4982</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4983</sup> *apparet vel forsan a est M*

<sup>4984</sup> *add. vel a M*

<sup>4985</sup> *om. W*

<sup>4986</sup> *et quinta] om. M*

<sup>4987</sup> *patet - consequentia] om. M*

<sup>4988</sup> *lectio dubia M*

<sup>4989</sup> *est haec] om. Y*

<sup>4990</sup> *om. W*

<sup>4991</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>4992</sup> *ipsae valeant] ipsa valeat W*

<sup>4993</sup> *disiunctivam W, add. et MY*

<sup>4994</sup> *quaeratur W, requiruntur M*

<sup>4995</sup> *om. M*

<sup>4996</sup> *et - positis] om. W*

<sup>4997</sup> *dicta sufficiant] et primo capitulo M, in primo capitulo Y*

<sup>4998</sup> *nunc consequenter] capitulum secundum M*

<sup>4999</sup> *add. etc. M | sequitur - exclusivis] om. Y*

<sup>5000</sup> *quantum ad] circa M*

<sup>5001</sup> *secundam W*

<sup>5002</sup> *om. W, articulum Y*

<sup>5003</sup> *sciendum est de exclusivis] om. Y*

<sup>5004</sup> *add. et W*

<sup>5005</sup> *tantummodo solummodo] om. W*

<2> Secundo nota<sup>5009</sup> quod istae<sup>5010</sup> dictiones quandoque adduntur praedicato tantum,<sup>5011</sup> ut 'homo est tantum animal' - et vocatur propositio de excluso praedicato;<sup>5012</sup> quandoque adduntur<sup>5013</sup> subiecto tantum, et tunc faciunt propositionem<sup>5014</sup> de excluso subiecto; quandoque vero praeponuntur totae propositioni<sup>5015</sup> et cadunt<sup>5016</sup> super totam propositionem,<sup>5017</sup> et tunc faciunt propositionem exclusivam.<sup>5018</sup>

<3> Nota tertio quod propositiones de excluso praedicato sic exponuntur: 'homo est tantum |E 56v| animal: homo est |Y 104r| animal et non<sup>5019</sup> aliud quam animal'. Et est propositio cathgorica de copulato extremo exponens<sup>5020</sup> istius.<sup>5021</sup>

<4> Quarto nota quod propositio de excluso subiecto semper est distinguenda eo<sup>5022</sup> quod potest esse<sup>5023</sup> exclusiva vel de excluso subiecto, ut haec:<sup>5024</sup> 'tantum homo est animal'. Si sit<sup>5025</sup> exclusiva est falsa,<sup>5026</sup> sicut<sup>5027</sup> postea patebit<sup>5028</sup> per eius exponentes. Sed si sit<sup>5029</sup> de excluso subiecto, est vera. Et exponitur sic: 'aliquid quod est homo<sup>5030</sup> et nihil aliud quam homo, est animal'. Et est<sup>5031</sup> eius<sup>5032</sup>

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5006 *om. M*

5007 *post positae W*

5008 *om. W*

5009 *om. W*

5010 *haec W*

5011 *solum W*

5012 *ut - praedicato] om. W*

5013 *om. MW*

5014 *faciunt propositionem] vocatur una propositio W*

5015 *quandoque - propositioni] tertio modo ponitur ad totam propositionem W*

5016 *cadit W*

5017 *totam propositionem] ipsam W*

5018 *et - exclusivam] ut tantum homo currit W*

5019 *nihil W*

5020 *ante propositio W*

5021 *om. W*

5022 *add. vel W*

5023 *potest esse] sit W*

5024 *om. W*

5025 *est W*

5026 *vel forsān plura M*

5027 *ut M*

5028 *ante postea W*

5029 *est M*

5030 *om. M*

5031 *post exponens W*

exponens una propositio<sup>5033</sup> cathgorica<sup>5034</sup> de copulato subiecto. Unde consuevit sic syllogizari probando propositionem iam expositam:<sup>5035</sup> 'Sortes est animal et Sortes est tantum homo, ergo<sup>5036</sup> tantum homo est animal'. Quo argumento facto, semper est distinguendum de conclusione modo praedicto, quia<sup>5037</sup> si sit exclusiva, syllogismus non valet - quia plus est praedicatum minoris quam subiectum conclusionis.<sup>5038</sup> Si vero sit de excluso subiecto, syllogismus est bonus et conclusio est vera, et sic<sup>5039</sup> ly tantum est pars subiecti. Verum tamen in tali<sup>5040</sup> expositione cavendum est<sup>5041</sup> aliquod<sup>5042</sup> quantitate,<sup>5043</sup> prout extendit se ad omne existens sive sit unum sive plura, ut:<sup>5044</sup> 'tantum sex sunt bis tria ergo aliquod<sup>5045</sup> quod est tantum sex est bis tria'. Non valet consequentia loquendo de aliqua<sup>5046</sup> propositione de toto,<sup>5047</sup> prout stat pro uno.<sup>5048</sup>

<5> Quinto nota quod dictio exclusiva quandoque additur termino numerali<sup>5049</sup> ut hic 'tantum quinque sunt praedicabilia', 'tantum decem sunt predicamenta'. Et tales habent duplices sensus: uno modo<sup>5050</sup> prout ly tantum exponitur per plura, et sic exponitur per copulativam bimembrem -<sup>5051</sup> sic: 'quinque sunt praedicabilia et non sunt<sup>5052</sup> plura quam quinque praedicabilia'. Opposita autem huius, ut<sup>5053</sup> 'non tantum quinque sunt praedicabilia' exponitur per [W128r||Y 104v] disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus<sup>5054</sup> copulativae, ut 'nulla quinque sunt praedicabilia<sup>5055</sup>, vel plura sunt

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5032 *om. W*

5033 una propositio] *om. W*

5034 *om. M*

5035 positam Y

5036 igitur Y

5037 et W

5038 subiectum conclusionis] *lectio dubia* distributum a parte subiecti maioris Y

5039 *om. Y*

5040 *add. propositione M*

5041 *om. Y*

5042 aliquot M, aliud WY

5043 *lectio dubia MY*

5044 *om. M*

5045 aliquot M

5046 aliquo M

5047 propositione de toto] *lectio dubia* proprie *lectio dubia* dicto M

5048 verum - uno] *om. W*

5049 *om. M, materiali WY*

5050 *om. Y*

5051 *add. ut W*

5052 *post quam quinque W*

5053 *om. Y*

5054 *om. MY*

praedicabilia quam quinque'. Alio modo exponitur per aliud<sup>5056</sup> et de hoc est postea dicendum propter quod quaevis talis est distinguenda.<sup>5057</sup>

<6> Sexto nota quod tres sunt partes exclusivae praeter<sup>5058</sup> copulam principalem,<sup>5059</sup> ut 'tantum animal est homo': praedicatum est ly homo, subiectum ly animal, tertia<sup>5060</sup> dictio exclusiva ut ly tantum.

Et notetur quod<sup>5061</sup> propositio quae remanet<sup>5062</sup> deposita<sup>5063</sup> dictione exclusiva vocatur praeiacens istius<sup>5064</sup> exclusivae ut praeiacens istius<sup>5065</sup> 'tantum animal est homo' <sup>5066</sup> est 'animal est homo'.<sup>5067</sup> |M 51r||E 57r|

<7> Septimo nota quod quadruplices sunt propositiones exclusivae: prima est affirmativa, ut 'tantum animal est homo'; secunda<sup>5068</sup> negativa, ut 'tantum animal non est homo'; tertia<sup>5069</sup> contradictoria primae, ut 'non tantum animal est homo'; quarta<sup>5070</sup> contradictoria secundae, ut 'non tantum animal non est homo'.

<8> Octavo nota quod prima, scilicet affirmativa,<sup>5071</sup> exponitur per copulativam bimembrem cuius prima pars est praeiacens<sup>5072</sup> et secunda pars<sup>5073</sup> universalis negativa, in qua praedicatum negatur de

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<sup>5055</sup> *add.* exponitur per disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus copulativae ut nulla quinque sunt praedicabilia W

<sup>5056</sup> *vel forsitan* aliis M

<sup>5057</sup> dicenda Y | alio - distinguenda] vel prout partes exclusivae preter principalem couplam scilicet praedicatum principale ut animal subiectum principale ut lapis dictio exclusiva ut tantum W

<sup>5058</sup> *lectio dubia* MY

<sup>5059</sup> *add.* praedicatum MY

<sup>5060</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5061</sup> sexto - notetur quod] *om.* W

<sup>5062</sup> manet W

<sup>5063</sup> dempta W, depenta Y, de praeposita M

<sup>5064</sup> huius W

<sup>5065</sup> exclusivae - istius] *om.* W

<sup>5066</sup> *add.* praeiacens W | tantum - homo] tantum homo est animal W

<sup>5067</sup> animal est homo] homo est animal W | *add.* et terminis MY

<sup>5068</sup> *add.* est M

<sup>5069</sup> *add.* est W

<sup>5070</sup> *add.* est W

<sup>5071</sup> scilicet affirmativa] *om.* W

<sup>5072</sup> *add.* eius W

<sup>5073</sup> *om.* MY

subiecto sumpto in ablativo casu<sup>5074</sup> cum hoc<sup>5075</sup> addito 'aliud' - ut 'tantum animal est homo' exponitur sic: 'animal est homo et nihil aliud ab animali est homo'.

Secunda vero exponitur per copulativam bimembrem cuius prima pars est praeiacens et secunda universalis affirmativa<sup>5076</sup> in qua praedicatum affirmatur universaliter<sup>5077</sup> de subiecto sumpto cum hoc<sup>5078</sup> addito 'aliud' - ut 'tantum animal non est homo' exponitur sic:<sup>5079</sup> 'animal non est homo et omne aliud ab animali est homo' vel loco eius ponatur<sup>5080</sup> ista: 'et<sup>5081</sup> nihil aliud ab animali non est homo' et aequipollet<sup>5082</sup> precedenti<sup>5083</sup>.

Tertia exponitur per disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus copulativae per quam prima exponebatur - ut 'non tantum animal [Y 105r] est homo' exponitur sic: 'nullum animal est homo vel aliquid aliud ab animali est homo'.

Sed quarta exponitur per disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus<sup>5084</sup> copulativae per quam exponebatur secunda - ut<sup>5085</sup> haec<sup>5086</sup> 'non tantum animal non est homo' exponitur sic:<sup>5087</sup> 'omne animal est homo vel aliquid aliud ab animali non est homo'. Et hoc<sup>5088</sup> modo patent exponentes omnes<sup>5089</sup> exclusivae.

<9> Nono nota quod raro<sup>5090</sup> invenitur propositio<sup>5091</sup> ubi ly tantum addatur<sup>5092</sup> dictioni<sup>5093</sup> numerali<sup>5094</sup> cum negatione - ut 'tantum decem non sunt homines'. Sed si<sup>5095</sup> quaeratur quomodo tales<sup>5096</sup> debeant

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<sup>5074</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5075</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5076</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5077</sup> *ante affirmatur W*

<sup>5078</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5079</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5080</sup> *ponitur M*

<sup>5081</sup> *vel M*

<sup>5082</sup> *aequivalent W*

<sup>5083</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5084</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5085</sup> *unde W*

<sup>5086</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>5087</sup> *exponitur sic] sic exponitur ante non tantum MY*

<sup>5088</sup> *tali W*

<sup>5089</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5090</sup> *vel forsitan ratio W*

<sup>5091</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5092</sup> *additur W*

<sup>5093</sup> *dictione M*

<sup>5094</sup> *materiali MWY*

<sup>5095</sup> *om. Y*

exponi, dicatur quod<sup>5097</sup> sicut secunda prius posita<sup>5098</sup> mutando 'aliud' in 'plura' et sua contradictoria per disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus<sup>5099</sup> istius copulativae.<sup>5100</sup> |W128v|

## II.2.2 <Regulae de exclusivis>

<1-4> Consequenter de istis dantur quattuor regulae in primo capitulo positae proportionaliter sicut dicebatur in<sup>5101</sup> exceptivis.

<5> Quinta regula est<sup>5102</sup> quod<sup>5103</sup> consequentia est<sup>5104</sup> bona, quando arguitur<sup>5105</sup> ab exclusiva affirmativa vel negativa ad eius<sup>5106</sup> praeiacentem.<sup>5107</sup> Patet<sup>5108</sup> per regulam secundam,<sup>5109</sup> quia praeiacens est una exponentium.

<6> Sexta regula:<sup>5110</sup> |E 57v| ab exclusiva affirmativa ad universalem<sup>5111</sup> de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia et e converso<sup>5112</sup>, sicut sequitur:<sup>5113</sup> 'tantum animal est homo, ergo omnis homo est animal'. Nam da oppositum consequentis 'aliquis homo non est animal' et 'omnis homo est', ergo 'aliquis<sup>5114</sup> homo est aliud ab animali' et ultra<sup>5115</sup> ergo per conversionem<sup>5116</sup> 'aliud ab animali est homo'<sup>5117</sup>, quod est oppositum antecedentis. Eodem modo sequitur: 'omnis homo est animal, ergo tantum animal est homo'.

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<sup>5096</sup> *lectio dubia* Y

<sup>5097</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5098</sup> *exposita* W

<sup>5099</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5100</sup> *contradicentibus - copulativae] ipius copulativae /contradicentibus* W

<sup>5101</sup> *de* W

<sup>5102</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>5103</sup> *quia add. tunc* W

<sup>5104</sup> *ante consequentia* W

<sup>5105</sup> *quando arguitur] om. M, arguendo* Y

<sup>5106</sup> *suam* W

<sup>5107</sup> *ad eius praeiacentem] om. Y*

<sup>5108</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5109</sup> *ante regulam* M

<sup>5110</sup> *add. arguendo* Y

<sup>5111</sup> *add. affirmativam* W

<sup>5112</sup> *et e converso] post transpositis* M

<sup>5113</sup> *sicut sequitur] ut* M

<sup>5114</sup> *omnis* W

<sup>5115</sup> *lectio dubia* M

<sup>5116</sup> *ergo per conversionem] om. W*

<sup>5117</sup> *et - animali] quod est* W

Et haec<sup>5118</sup> de exclusivis.<sup>5119</sup>

### II.3.1 <De reduplicativis>

Consequenter<sup>5120</sup> in tertio capitulo<sup>5121</sup> dicendum est<sup>5122</sup> de reduplicativis.

<1> Sunt autem dictiones reduplicativae haec:<sup>5123</sup> 'inquantum', 'secundum quod', 'prout', 'ea ratione', et eis<sup>5124</sup> consimiles huiusmodi. Et<sup>5125</sup> dicuntur [Y 105v] reduplicativae quia positae in propositione faciunt propositionem reduplicativam.

<2> Secundo nota quod haec dictiones quandoque tenentur reduplicative,<sup>5126</sup> quandoque specificative. Quando<sup>5127</sup> enim<sup>5128</sup> tenentur specificative, tunc non est in eis difficultas in exponendo. Specificant enim rationem secundum quam principale praedicatum<sup>5129</sup> convenit principali subiecto<sup>5130</sup>. Exemplum ut: 'diligio Sortem<sup>5131</sup> inquantum mihi bene fecit', ly inquantum specificat<sup>5132</sup> rationem secundum quam principale praedicatum convenit principali subiecto et<sup>5133</sup> secundum quam dilectio fertur<sup>5134</sup> in Sortem<sup>5135</sup> scilicet beneficentiam.<sup>5136</sup> Et iste modus est valde usitatus, [M 51v] sicut<sup>5137</sup> enim dicimus:<sup>5138</sup> 'aequivocum inquantum aequivocum non est<sup>5139</sup> aequivocum'<sup>5140</sup> secundum eam rationem secundum quam dicitur: 'aequivocum<sup>5141</sup> non est aequivocum'.<sup>5142</sup>

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<sup>5118</sup> sic M

<sup>5119</sup> exceptivis *add.* sufficiant sequitur aliud W, *add.* sequitur tertium capitulum de reduplicativis M

<sup>5120</sup> quantum Y

<sup>5121</sup> in tertio capitulo] ad tertium capitulum Y

<sup>5122</sup> *ante* dicendum Y

<sup>5123</sup> ut W

<sup>5124</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5125</sup> huiusmodi et] *om.* Y

<sup>5126</sup> tenentur reduplicative] reduplicativae dicuntur M, dicuntur reduplicativae Y

<sup>5127</sup> cum Y

<sup>5128</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5129</sup> subiectum W

<sup>5130</sup> praedicato W

<sup>5131</sup> Johannem W

<sup>5132</sup> *add.* mihi W

<sup>5133</sup> secundum quam - subiecto et] *om.* MY

<sup>5134</sup> infertur M

<sup>5135</sup> Johannem W

<sup>5136</sup> scilicet beneficentiam] sicut in benefactorem W

<sup>5137</sup> sic *vel forsitan* sit Y

<sup>5138</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5139</sup> *add.* univocum M



Sed<sup>5143</sup> quantum<sup>5144</sup> tenentur<sup>5145</sup> reduplicative, tunc<sup>5146</sup> habent diversas<sup>5147</sup> exponentes, prout<sup>5148</sup> postea patebit.

<3> Tertio nota quod in propositione reduplicativa dictio reduplicativa debet praecedere copulam et referri ad praedicatum. Unde si sequitur<sup>5149</sup> copulam, Aristoteles *Primo Priorum*<sup>5150</sup> dicit eam<sup>5151</sup> esse<sup>5152</sup> inintelligibilem.<sup>5153</sup> Exemplum debet enim<sup>5154</sup> dici 'homo inquantum rationalis est risibilis'<sup>5155</sup> et non 'homo est risibilis inquantum rationalis'. Notetur tamen<sup>5156</sup> quod Aristoteles non<sup>5157</sup> intendit quod<sup>5158</sup> tales sint<sup>5159</sup> simpliciter <in>intelligibiles<sup>5160</sup>, sed minus proprias eo<sup>5161</sup> quod sunt<sup>5162</sup> magis inconsuetae.<sup>5163</sup> Et<sup>5164</sup> tales<sup>5165</sup> non possunt intelligi bene [W129r] nisi capiantur<sup>5166</sup> in eodem [E 58r] sensu in quo<sup>5167</sup> primae. Vel dico - et magis ad intentionem Aristotelis - quod non sunt intellegibiles in quibus idem terminus reduplicatur super se ipsum intellectione<sup>5168</sup> vera, ut: 'Sortes est risibilis

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<sup>5140</sup> in quantum - aequivocum] *om.* W  
<sup>5141</sup> dicitur aequivocum] est univocum W  
<sup>5142</sup> univocum MY  
<sup>5143</sup> et M  
<sup>5144</sup> consequenter Y  
<sup>5145</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>5146</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>5147</sup> *ante* habent W  
<sup>5148</sup> sicut W  
<sup>5149</sup> sequeretur M  
<sup>5150</sup> primo priorum] *post* eam MY  
<sup>5151</sup> *add.* non MY  
<sup>5152</sup> *lectio dubia* faciliter Y  
<sup>5153</sup> intellegibilem M, intelligi Y  
<sup>5154</sup> *om.* Y, *add.* sic M  
<sup>5155</sup> rationalis Y  
<sup>5156</sup> nam W, *ante* Aristoteles M  
<sup>5157</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>5158</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>5159</sup> esse WY  
<sup>5160</sup> intelligibiles MWY  
<sup>5161</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>5162</sup> sint M  
<sup>5163</sup> magis inconsuetae] minus consuetae W  
<sup>5164</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>5165</sup> sic W  
<sup>5166</sup> bene nisi capiantur] unde / non capiam W  
<sup>5167</sup> *add. lectio dubia* +propositiones+ Y  
<sup>5168</sup> *lectio dubia* M

inquantum risibilis', quia "sive<sup>5169</sup> specificative sive reduplicative teneatur 'inquantum' super<sup>5170</sup> alietatem importat" - quae non est eiusdem<sup>5171</sup> super se ipsum.<sup>5172</sup>

<4> Quarto nota<sup>5173</sup> quod in propositione reduplicativa sunt<sup>5174</sup> quattuor partes. Ut in ista 'homo inquantum rationalis<sup>5175</sup> est risibilis', prima pars est<sup>5176</sup> principale subiectum, ut ly homo; secunda est principale praedicatum, ut ly risibilis; |Y 106r| tertia est<sup>5177</sup> reduplicatio, ut<sup>5178</sup> ly inquantum; quarta est dictio super quam cadit<sup>5179</sup> reduplicatio puta<sup>5180</sup> ly rationalis<sup>5181</sup>.

<5> Quinto nota quod propositiones reduplicativae sunt in quadruplici differentia.<sup>5182</sup> Sunt enim aliquae in quibus nulla ponitur negatio, ut<sup>5183</sup> 'homo inquantum rationalis<sup>5184</sup> est risibilis'. Aliae sunt in quibus ponitur solum una <sup>5185</sup> negatio sequens immediate <sup>5186</sup> dictionem super quam cadit reduplicatio<sup>5187</sup> ante copulam,<sup>5188</sup> ut<sup>5189</sup> 'homo inquantum rationalis non est asinus'.<sup>5190</sup> Aliae sunt in quibus ponitur sola negatio praecedens hanc dictionem 'inquantum', ut 'homo non inquantum rationalis<sup>5191</sup> est risibilis'.<sup>5192</sup> Et aliae sunt in quibus<sup>5193</sup> ponuntur duae negationes, una ad<sup>5194</sup> copulam, alia ad hanc dictionem inquantum,<sup>5195</sup> ut 'non<sup>5196</sup> homo inquantum animal<sup>5197</sup> non est asinus'.<sup>5198j</sup>

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<sup>5169</sup> sue Y

<sup>5170</sup> *vel forsā* propter Y

<sup>5171</sup> *lectio dubia* M

<sup>5172</sup> se ipsum] *lectio dubia* sumptum M | vel dico - se ipsum] *om.* EW

<sup>5173</sup> notetur W

<sup>5174</sup> *post* quattuor W

<sup>5175</sup> animal W

<sup>5176</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5177</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5178</sup> puta Y

<sup>5179</sup> *add.* +r+ Y

<sup>5180</sup> ut W

<sup>5181</sup> animal W, rationale MY

<sup>5182</sup> *ante* quadruplici Y

<sup>5183</sup> *add.* omnis M

<sup>5184</sup> animal WY

<sup>5185</sup> solum una] una W, una sola Y

<sup>5186</sup> sequens immediate] post W

<sup>5187</sup> super - reduplicatio] reduplicativam W

<sup>5188</sup> ante copulam] *om.* M | sequens - copulam] praecedens hanc dictionem inquantum Y

<sup>5189</sup> *add.* omnis M

<sup>5190</sup> risibilis M | homo - asinus] non homo in quantum animal est rationale Y

<sup>5191</sup> animal W

<sup>5192</sup> aliae - risibilis] tertiam propositio reduplicativa est contradictoria primae ut non omnis homo inquantum rationalis est risibilis M, aliae sunt in quibus ponitur una sola negatio post dictionem reduplicativam ad copulam, ut homo in quantum rationalis non est asinus Y

<6> Sexto nota quod in qualibet istarum ly in quantum potest se<sup>5199</sup> tenere ratione causae vel ratione<sup>5200</sup> concomitantiae. Et est<sup>5201</sup> talis differentia:<sup>5202</sup> quod quando teneretur<sup>5203</sup> ratione causae, ultima<sup>5204</sup> exponens dicitur esse causalis; quando vero<sup>5205</sup> ratione ratione concomitantiae,<sup>5206</sup> debet esse conditionalis - sicut<sup>5207</sup> postea patebit.

<7> Septimo nota quod quando ly in quantum tenetur ratione concomitantiae in istis<sup>5208</sup> tunc<sup>5209</sup> prima istarum et sibi consimiles<sup>5210</sup> (ut haec:<sup>5211</sup> 'homo in quantum rationalis est risibilis')<sup>5212</sup> debent exponi per copulativam quadrimembrem.

Prima exponens<sup>5213</sup> est propositio<sup>5214</sup> in qua principale praedicatum dicitur<sup>5215</sup> de principali subiecto ut 'homo est risibilis';<sup>5216</sup> secunda in qua dictio super quam cadit reduplicatio, affirmatur<sup>5217</sup> de

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<sup>5193</sup> et aliae sunt in quibus] alia est in qua W, quarta est M

<sup>5194</sup> una ad] ad unam Y

<sup>5195</sup> ponuntur - in quantum] contradictoria secundae M

<sup>5196</sup> add. omnis M

<sup>5197</sup> rationalis M

<sup>5198</sup> risibilis add. etc. M

j Sunt enim aliquae - asinus] sunt enim aliquae in quibus nulla ponitur negatio, ut 'omnis homo in quantum rationalis est risibilis'. Aliae sunt in quibus ponitur solum una negatio sequens immediate dictionem super quam cadit reduplicatio, ut 'omnis homo in quantum rationalis est risibilis'. Tertiam propositio reduplicativa est contradictoria primae, ut 'non omnis homo in quantum rationalis est risibilis'. Quarta est contradictoria secundae ut 'non omnis homo in quantum rationalis est risibilis' etc. M || sunt enim aliquae in quibus nulla ponitur negatio, ut 'homo in quantum animal est risibilis'. Aliae sunt in quibus ponitur una negatio post dictionem reduplicativam ante copulam, ut 'homo in quantum rationalis est asinus'. Aliae sunt in quibus ponitur sola negatio praecedens hanc dictionem 'in quantum', ut 'homo non in quantum animal est risibilis'. Alia est in qua ponuntur duae negationes una ad copulam, alia ad hanc dictionem in quantum ut 'non homo in quantum animal non est asinus W || sunt enim aliquae in quibus nulla ponitur negatio, ut 'homo in quantum animal est risibilis. Aliae sunt in quibus ponitur una sola negatio praecedens hanc dictionem 'in quantum' ut 'non homo in quantum animal est rationale'. Aliae sunt in quibus ponitur una sola negatio post dictionem reduplicativam ad copulam, ut 'homo in quantum rationalis non est asinus'. Et aliae sunt in quibus ponuntur duae negationes ad unam copulam alia ad hanc dictionem 'in quantum', ut 'non homo in quantum animal non est asinus' Y

<sup>5199</sup> om. Y

<sup>5200</sup> vel ratione] om. Y

<sup>5201</sup> et est] est enim W

<sup>5202</sup> talis differentia] causalis dictio W

<sup>5203</sup> post causae MY

<sup>5204</sup> quarta W

<sup>5205</sup> add. teneretur W

<sup>5206</sup> add. quarta W

<sup>5207</sup> ut MY

<sup>5208</sup> ista W

<sup>5209</sup> prout W

<sup>5210</sup> similes W

<sup>5211</sup> hic M

<sup>5212</sup> rationalis Y | ut - risibilis] om. W

<sup>5213</sup> om. M

principali<sup>5218</sup> subiecto, ut 'homo est rationalis'. Tertia, in qua praedicatum principale dicitur universaliter de dictionem super quam cadit reduplicatio, ut 'omne rationale est risibile'. Quarta propositio<sup>5219</sup> debet esse conditionalis necessaria, in cuius antecedente dictio super quam cadit reduplicatio affirmatur de hoc termino |Y 106<sup>v</sup>| 'aliquid'<sup>5220</sup> et in cuius consequente principale praedicatum dicitur de eodem termino<sup>5221</sup> 'aliquid' sumpto<sup>5222</sup> cum relativo idemptitatis, ut 'si aliquid est rationale, istud aliquid<sup>5223</sup> est risibile'.

Item, secunda<sup>5224</sup> illarum<sup>5225</sup> (ut haec: 'homo inquantum rationalis non est asinus')<sup>5226</sup> exponitur per copulativam quandrimembrem. Prima est<sup>5227</sup> in qua<sup>5228</sup> principale praedicatum negatur<sup>5229</sup> de principali subiecto,<sup>5230</sup> ut 'homo non est asinus'. Secunda in qua |W129<sup>v</sup>| dictio super quam cadit<sup>5231</sup> reduplicatio<sup>5232</sup> affirmatur de principali subiecto, ut 'homo est rationalis'.<sup>5233</sup> Tertia propositio est<sup>5234</sup> in qua principale praedicatum negatur universaliter de dictione super quam cadit reduplicatio,<sup>5235</sup> ut 'nullum rationale est asinus'. Quarta conditionalis necessaria in cuius antecedente dictio super quam cadit<sup>5236</sup> reduplicatio affirmatur de hoc termino 'aliquid', et<sup>5237</sup> in cuius consequente principale praedicatum negatur de eodem sumpto cum relativo idemptitatis, ut 'si aliquid est rationale, istud idem aliquid<sup>5238</sup> non est asinus'.

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5214 est propositio] *om.* W, propositio est M  
5215 dicatur W  
5216 *add.* et W  
5217 praedicatur MY  
5218 +primo+ W  
5219 *om.* MY  
5220 *om.* M  
5221 et in cuius - termino] *add. marg.* M  
5222 assumpto W  
5223 idem M  
5224 tertia MY  
5225 istarum Y  
5226 illarum - asinus] *om.* W  
5227 *om.* Y  
5228 exponitur - qua] *om.* M  
5229 *post* subiecto Y  
5230 *ante* principali W  
5231 *add.* +dictio+ Y  
5232 *add.* +ut nullum rationale est asinus+ M  
5233 risibilis Y  
5234 propositio est] *om.* MY  
5235 reduplicativa dictio W  
5236 *om.* M  
5237 *om.* W  
5238 istud idem aliquid] istud aliquid M, istud idem Y | *add.* est risibile autem M

Item, tertia<sup>5239</sup> earum quae contradicit primae<sup>5240</sup> exponitur per disiunctivam quadrimembrem de<sup>5241</sup> partibus contradicentibus partibus copulativae per quam prima exponebatur, ut 'non homo<sup>5242</sup> inquantum rationalis est risibilis' exponitur sic:<sup>5243</sup> 'nullus homo est risibilis, vel nullus homo est rationalis, vel aliquod rationale non est risibile<sup>5244</sup>, vel non<sup>5245</sup> si aliquid est rationale, istud aliquid est risibile'.

Item quarta etiam<sup>5246</sup> exponitur per disiunctivam quadrumembrem de partibus contradicentibus partibus copulativae per quam secunda<sup>5247</sup> exponebatur, ut 'non<sup>5248</sup> homo inquantum rationalis non est<sup>5249</sup> asinus' exponitur sic: 'omnis homo est asinus, vel nullus homo est rationalis, vel aliquod rationale est asinus, vel non si aliquid<sup>5250</sup> est<sup>5251</sup> rationale, istud aliquid non est asinus'.<sup>5252</sup>

Et sic patent exponentes omnium <sup>5253</sup> reduplicativarum in quantum ly inquantum tenetur reduplicative<sup>5254</sup> ratione concomitantiae.

<8> Octavo nota quod si ly inquantum teneatur reduplicative<sup>5255</sup> ratione causae [Y 107<sup>r</sup>] tunc in<sup>5256</sup> qualibet istarum, primae tres exponentes sunt eadem,<sup>5257</sup> sed quarta debet esse causalis. Unde ubi in <sup>5258</sup> praedictis <sup>5259</sup> ponebatur <sup>5260</sup> conditionalis affirmativa <sup>5261</sup> prout ly inquantum tenetur reduplicative<sup>5262</sup> ratione concomitantiae, ibi quando<sup>5263</sup> ly inquantum tenetur reduplicative<sup>5264</sup> ratione

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5239 secunda MY

5240 earum - primae] *om. W*

5241 ex W

5242 *add. marg. M*

5243 *ante* exponitur M

5244 vel nullus - non est risibile] *om. W*

5245 *om. M*

5246 *om. W, post* exponitur Y

5247 tertia Y

5248 *add. omnis W*

5249 *add. risibilis M*

5250 aliquid Y

5251 *om. M*

5252 vel nullus - non est asinus] *om. W*

5253 *om. W*

5254 *om. W*

5255 *post* causae MY

5256 *om. W*

5257 *add. semper* quae in \_\_\_ Y | istarum - eadem] trium primarum non variatur W

5258 unde ubi in] ut ibi W

5259 *om. W*

5260 *add. ista W*

5261 *om. W, add. +ratione causae+ M*

5262 *om. MY*

causae ponatur<sup>5265</sup> causalis affirmativa. Et ubi ponebatur<sup>5266</sup> isto<sup>5267</sup> modo conditionalis<sup>5268</sup> negativa, debet<sup>5269</sup> |E 59r| isto<sup>5270</sup> modo poni<sup>5271</sup> causalis negativa. Debent<sup>5272</sup> enim causalis et conditionalis<sup>5273</sup> sibi correspondens totaliter corrispondere formaliter.<sup>5274</sup>

<9> Nono nota quod si<sup>5275</sup> in propositionibus reduplicativis in quarum una ly in quantum negatur et in alia affirmatur, subiecta communia conveniunt et<sup>5276</sup> non differunt penes distributum et non distributum,<sup>5277</sup> si<sup>5278</sup> in utraque subiectum forte<sup>5279</sup> distribuatur, ut hic 'omnis homo in quantum<sup>5280</sup> rationalis est risibilis' et hic<sup>5281</sup> 'nullus<sup>5282</sup> homo<sup>5283</sup> in quantum est<sup>5284</sup> rationalis<sup>5285</sup> est risibilis',<sup>5286</sup> tunc duae primae exponentes copulativae |W130r| et disiunctivae non dicuntur esse contradictoriae, sed<sup>5287</sup> contrariae - ut in<sup>5288</sup> copulativa dicitur sic: 'omnis homo est risibilis et omnis homo est rationalis'; in disiunctiva vero<sup>5289</sup> sic, nam:<sup>5290</sup> 'nullus homo est risibilis vel nullus homo est rationalis'.<sup>5291</sup> Vel forte si<sup>5292</sup> in utraque<sup>5293</sup> non distribuatur,<sup>5294</sup> ut hic:<sup>5295</sup> 'homo in quantum<sup>5296</sup>

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5263 ibi quando] in quantum Y, ita ubi

5264 om. M | tenetur reduplicative] om. Y

5265 ponetur M

5266 om. W

5267 illo Y

5268 causalis W

5269 ponetur MY

5270 alio W

5271 om. MY

5272 debet W

5273 causalis et conditionalis] conditionalis et copulativa MY

5274 sibi - formaliter] secundum corrispondentias aequivalere formaliter W, sibi *lectio dubia* corrispondens *lectio dubia* corrispondens totaliter *lectio dubia* corrispondere formaliter M, copulativa sibi corrispondere totaliter *lectio dubia* consimiliter formaliter Y

5275 ubi EMY

5276 conveniunt et] om. MY

5277 add. sicut differunt sed Y, sicut dictum est sed W, add. sicut distribuatur in illis de quibus est exemplificatum EMY, add. sicut dictum est in illis in quibus est exemplificatum sed W

5278 om. WY

5279 ante subiectum W | subiectum forte] ante in utraque M

5280 add. est M

5281 om. WY

5282 omnis EM

5283 add. non M

5284 om. Y

5285 animal Y

5286 et homo - risibilis] om. W, add. et M, add. et nullus homo in quantum rationalis est risibilis E

5287 seu W

5288 add. ista M

5289 om. W

5290 om. M

5291 nullus - rationalis] omne rationale est risibile vel nullus homo est rationalis W | non omne rationale est risibile vel nullus homo est rationalis E

rationalis est risibilis' et<sup>5297</sup> 'homo non in quantum rationalis<sup>5298</sup> est risibilis'<sup>5299</sup>, tunc primae<sup>5300</sup> duae exponentes copulativae et primae duae<sup>5301</sup> exponentes<sup>5302</sup> disiunctivae debent esse subcontrariae - ut si diceretur sic<sup>5303</sup> in copulativa: 'homo est risibilis et homo est rationalis'; in disiunctiva vero<sup>5304</sup> diceretur sic: 'homo<sup>5305</sup> non est rationalis<sup>5306</sup> vel homo non<sup>5307</sup> est risibilis'.<sup>5308</sup> Ultimae<sup>5309</sup> duae<sup>5310</sup> exponentes non variantur<sup>5311</sup> sed eodem modo formantur.<sup>5312</sup> Sed<sup>5313</sup> quando subiectum<sup>5314</sup> differt penes distributum et penes<sup>5315</sup> non distributum vel<sup>5316</sup> est terminus singularis<sup>5317</sup>, tunc omnes partes disiunctivae debent contradicere omnibus partibus copulativae.

Iterum nota regulas de reduplicativis:

<9.1> Prima: subiectum principale reduplicativae in prima et in secunda exponentibus debent eodem modo capi sicut in reduplicativa. Ut si in reduplicativa accipitur determinate etiam in suis<sup>5318</sup> exponentibus debent capi determinate.

<9.2> Secunda regula: quando signum reduplicativum affirmatur et terminus super quem cadit reduplicatio<sup>5319</sup> est terminus communiter<sup>5320</sup> tentus, tunc tertia exponens debet etiam esse universalis.

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5292 *om.* EWY  
5293 *in utraque]* *om.* Y  
5294 *distribuitur* M  
5295 *si* W  
5296 *add.* est M  
5297 *homo - et]* *om.* W  
5298 *add.* non Y  
5299 *homo non - risibilis]* *om.* W | *et - risibilis]* *om.* E  
5300 *om.* EW, *post* duae Y  
5301 *ante* primae Y  
5302 *om.* Y  
5303 *om.* EW  
5304 *om.* M  
5305 *hoc* M  
5306 *rationale* M, *risibilis* Y  
5307 *om.* EWY  
5308 *risibile* M, *rationalis* Y  
5309 *add.* enim M  
5310 *tamen* Y  
5311 *lectio dubia* M  
5312 *sed - formantur]* *om.* W  
5313 *add.* tunc M  
5314 *add.* +dicit+ W  
5315 *om.* MY  
5316 *add.* si terminus Y  
5317 *est terminus singularis]* termini singulariter W  
5318 *lectio dubia* M  
5319 *vel forsā* reduplicativum M

<9.3> Tertia regula: exponendo reduplicativa ratione concomitantiae, etiam quantumque signum reduplicativum esset affirmatum, quarta exponens debet esse conditionalis negativa

<9.4> Quarta regula: omnis terminus qui affirmatur de se immediate in reduplicativis etiam debet de se immediate affirmare in exponentibus in quibus ponitur.

Circa ad hoc est una regula sed est etiam prius in capitulo de exceptivis etc.<sup>5321</sup> |M 52v|

<10> Decimo nota quod praeter praedictas<sup>5322</sup> aliquae sunt de reduplicato subiecto, ut ista: 'aliquid<sup>5323</sup> quod est risibile inquantum<sup>5324</sup> rationale, est homo'. |Y 107v| Et istae includunt<sup>5325</sup> unam reduplicativam, saltem si sunt affirmativae, ut praedicta includit hanc 'aliquid quod<sup>5326</sup> est risibile inquantum<sup>5327</sup> est rationale', et ista exponitur sicut prima de qua fiebat mentio.<sup>5328</sup>

<11> Undecimo nota quod regulae positae de exceptivis etiam<sup>5329</sup> nec plus nec minus ponuntur de istis.<sup>5330</sup>

<12> Duodecimo<sup>5331</sup> nota<sup>5332</sup> regulam specialem, quod a propositione affirmativa de reduplicato subiecto<sup>5333</sup> ad suam reduplicativam est bona consequentia, sicut<sup>5334</sup> sequitur:<sup>5335</sup> |E 59v| 'aliquid<sup>5336</sup> quod est risibile inquantum<sup>5337</sup> rationale est homo, igitur<sup>5338</sup> aliquid<sup>5339</sup> inquantum<sup>5340</sup> rationale est

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<sup>5320</sup> *vel fors*an quantitative M

<sup>5321</sup> iterum nota regulas - etc.] *om.* EWY, *ante* si in utraque subiecto M

<sup>5322</sup> istas Y

<sup>5323</sup> aliquid M

<sup>5324</sup> *add.* est Y

<sup>5325</sup> istae includunt] ista includit M

<sup>5326</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5327</sup> *add.* homo M

<sup>5328</sup> *add.* supra *vel fors*an superius W

<sup>5329</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5330</sup> *add.* et potest sic resolvi hoc est homo et hoc est animal quod est risibile inquantum rationale igitur etc. M

<sup>5331</sup> secundo M

<sup>5332</sup> notandum M, *add.* quod est Y

<sup>5333</sup> *ante* reduplicato Y

<sup>5334</sup> *om.* M, ut Y

<sup>5335</sup> *add.* enim bene M

<sup>5336</sup> aliquid M

<sup>5337</sup> *add.* est M

<sup>5338</sup> ergo Y

<sup>5339</sup> aliquid MY

<sup>5340</sup> *add.* est Y



risibile'. Patet,<sup>5341</sup> quia ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis. Sequitur enim: 'nihil inquantum rationale est risibile, ergo<sup>5342</sup> nullum ens quod est risibile inquantum<sup>5343</sup> rationale est homo'.

<13> Tertia decima<sup>5344</sup> regula: a propositione de reduplicato subiecto<sup>5345</sup> negativa ad suam reduplicativam non oportet consequentiam valere, ut non sequitur 'aliquid quod est chymaera inquantum est antichristus non est homo, ergo<sup>5346</sup> aliquid<sup>5347</sup> est chymaera inquantum<sup>5348</sup> est antichristus'. Et causa est quia antecedens est verum quia <est> una propositio<sup>5349</sup> negativa nihil<sup>5350</sup> ponens, consequens autem multa ponit propter affirmativas in reduplicativas inclusas,<sup>5351</sup> et<sup>5352</sup> ideo est falsum.

Et haec de reduplicativis sufficiant.<sup>5353</sup> [W130v]

#### II.4.1 <De propositionibus de 'incipit' - Prima pars>

Nunc in sequenti<sup>5354</sup> capitulo breviter<sup>5355</sup> determinandum est de 'incipit' et de<sup>5356</sup> exponentibus propositionum in quibus ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit'. [M 53r]

<1> Circa quas primo est<sup>5357</sup> notandum quod propositionum de 'incipit' quaedam<sup>5358</sup> sunt de subiecto discreto substantiali,<sup>5359</sup> aliquae sunt<sup>5360</sup> de subiecto communi aut<sup>5361</sup> etiam de subiecto<sup>5362</sup>

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<sup>5341</sup> probatur M

<sup>5342</sup> igitur M

<sup>5343</sup> *add.* est Y

<sup>5344</sup> tertia decima] secunda Y, duodecima *vel forsitan* secunda M

<sup>5345</sup> *ante* reduplicato Y

<sup>5346</sup> igitur Y

<sup>5347</sup> aliquod Y

<sup>5348</sup> *add.* non M

<sup>5349</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5350</sup> non M

<sup>5351</sup> inclusa M

<sup>5352</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5353</sup> sunt breviter dicta *add.* etcetera sequitur aliud sequitur nunc consequenter quartum capitulum etc. etc. etc.

W

<sup>5354</sup> quarto M

<sup>5355</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5356</sup> *om.* MY

connotativo. Exemplum primi, ut 'Sortes incipit esse'. Exemplum secundi, ut<sup>5363</sup> 'homo<sup>5364</sup> incipit esse'  
aut<sup>5365</sup> 'hoc album<sup>5366</sup> incipit esse',<sup>5367</sup>

<2> Secundo nota quod hoc verbum 'incipit'<sup>5368</sup> potest poni<sup>5369</sup> respectu terminorum permanentium  
singulariter<sup>5370</sup> et<sup>5371</sup> respectu terminorum connotantium successionem aut<sup>5372</sup> explicite<sup>5373</sup> aut<sup>5374</sup>  
implicite.<sup>5375</sup> |Y 108r| Exemplum primi:<sup>5376</sup> 'Sortes incipit esse homo', 'Sortes incipit esse substantia'.  
Exemplum secundi:<sup>5377</sup> 'motus incipit esse', 'Sortes incipit currere'; 'album incipit esse nigrum';  
'nigrum<sup>5378</sup> incipit esse' et consimiles.<sup>5379</sup> Primae duae<sup>5380</sup> earum<sup>5381</sup> significant explicite successionem,  
sed secundae duae<sup>5382</sup> significant implicite: nam si album incipit esse nigrum, hoc est quod<sup>5383</sup> album  
fit<sup>5384</sup> nigrum, ecce successionem;<sup>5385</sup> similiter, si<sup>5386</sup> nigrum incipit esse,<sup>5387</sup> hoc est ex eo<sup>5388</sup> quod<sup>5389</sup>  
nigredo<sup>5390</sup> in aliquo subiecto intenditur, saltem ut in pluribus, vel quia albedo opposita |E 60r|

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<sup>5357</sup> ante primo M

<sup>5358</sup> propositionum - quaedam] aliquae propositiones MY

<sup>5359</sup> speciali W, add. et Y

<sup>5360</sup> autem W

<sup>5361</sup> om. Y

<sup>5362</sup> etiam de subiecto] om. W

<sup>5363</sup> exemplum secundi ut] om. M

<sup>5364</sup> add. sup. aut album W

<sup>5365</sup> et Y, om. M

<sup>5366</sup> allorum W

<sup>5367</sup> aut hoc - esse] om. W

<sup>5368</sup> add. etc. M

<sup>5369</sup> +ex+poni W

<sup>5370</sup> om. M

<sup>5371</sup> om. W, aut M

<sup>5372</sup> et Y, om. W

<sup>5373</sup> implicite VWY

<sup>5374</sup> et Y, vel W

<sup>5375</sup> explicite VWY

<sup>5376</sup> add. ut W

<sup>5377</sup> add. ut M

<sup>5378</sup> album M

<sup>5379</sup> om. M

<sup>5380</sup> duarum W

<sup>5381</sup> istarum W

<sup>5382</sup> om. WY

<sup>5383</sup> quia Y

<sup>5384</sup> sit W

<sup>5385</sup> ecce successionem] successive W

<sup>5386</sup> add. nam M

<sup>5387</sup> add. homo Y

<sup>5388</sup> ex eo] om. MY

<sup>5389</sup> quia Y

<sup>5390</sup> nigretudo W

remitteretur. Et tam ista intentio<sup>5391</sup> quam ista<sup>5392</sup> remissio fit per<sup>5393</sup> successionem. Et propter istud dixi quod dicitur poni respectu terminorum connotantium successionem,<sup>5394</sup> aut<sup>5395</sup> implicite aut<sup>5396</sup> explicite.

<3> Tertio nota<sup>5397</sup> quod quando<sup>5398</sup> ly incipit<sup>5399</sup> ponitur respectu termini singularis, vel<sup>5400</sup> affirmative vel negative ponitur.<sup>5401</sup> Exemplum primi, ut 'Sortes incipit esse'.<sup>5402</sup> Exemplum secundi, ut 'Sortes non incipit esse'.<sup>5403</sup>

<4> Quarto ex hoc<sup>5404</sup> nota quod communiter et sufficienter ponitur per loicos quod quando<sup>5405</sup> ly incipit affirmatur respectu terminorum pure permanentium, ut<sup>5406</sup> in propositione de subiecto singulari<sup>5407</sup> non connotativo,<sup>5408</sup> ut hic: 'Sortes incipit esse homo',<sup>5409</sup> ipsa exponenda est per copulativam bimembrem, cuius prima pars debet esse positio de praesenti, ut 'Sortes nunc est homo'; et<sup>5410</sup> secunda pars debet esse remotio de praeterito, ut 'Sortes<sup>5411</sup> immediate ante hoc non fuit homo'. Sed negativa opposita exponitur per disiunctivam bimembrem<sup>5412</sup> de<sup>5413</sup> partibus contradicentibus

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5391 intentio W, successio M

5392 alia M

5393 facit per] faciunt propter W

5394 Et propter - successionem] om. W

5395 et Y

5396 et Y

5397 ante tertio Y

5398 si add. +si+ W

5399 add. sup. quia W

5400 om. W

5401 post affirmative Y

5402 add. homo W

5403 add. homo W

5404 ex hoc] post nota Y, post quod M, add. quod M

5405 add. +que+ W

5406 om. MY

5407 lectio dubia M

5408 non connotativo] om. W

5409 om. Y

5410 om. MY

5411 om. M

5412 compositam W

5413 ex W

<partibus copulativae>.<sup>5414</sup> Ut 'Sortes non incipit esse homo' exponitur sic: 'Sortes nunc non est homo vel Sortes immediate ante hoc fuit<sup>5415</sup> homo'.

Secundo dicitur quod quando ponitur respectu terminorum successivorum in propositione respectu subiecti singularis [W131r] substantialis, ut 'Sortes incipit currere', exponitur per copulativam bimembrem, cuius prima pars est remotio de praesenti, ut 'Sortes nunc non<sup>5416</sup> currit'; et<sup>5417</sup> secunda est positio<sup>5418</sup> de futuro, ut 'Sortes immediate post hoc curret'. [Y 108v]

Contradictoria vero eiusdem ut<sup>5419</sup> puta<sup>5420</sup> 'Sortes non incipit currere',<sup>5421</sup> in qua respectu talium<sup>5422</sup> terminorum ly incipit negatur,<sup>5423</sup> exponitur per disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus copulativae praedictae, ut 'Sortes non incipit currere' exponitur sic: 'Sortes nunc<sup>5424</sup> currit vel Sortes<sup>5425</sup> immediate post hoc non<sup>5426</sup> curret'.

Ecce modum<sup>5427</sup> usitatum de 'incipit' in exponendo;<sup>5428</sup> et habet<sup>5429</sup> veritatem cum<sup>5430</sup> moderatione quae<sup>5431</sup> est posita - puta<sup>5432</sup> quod subiectum propositionum sic exponendarum sit terminus singularis de praedicamento<sup>5433</sup> substantiae<sup>5434</sup> ut dictum est.<sup>5435</sup>

Sed dubitaret aliquis<sup>5436</sup> [M 53v] quid intelligitur [E 60v] per ly<sup>5437</sup> nunc: utrum<sup>5438</sup> tempus divisibile vel indivisibile.

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<sup>5414</sup> partibus copulativae] *om.* EMWY

<sup>5415</sup> *add.* +non+ W

<sup>5416</sup> *add.* +est+ M

<sup>5417</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5418</sup> *lectio dubia* Y

<sup>5419</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5420</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5421</sup> Sortes - currere] *om.* W

<sup>5422</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5423</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5424</sup> non WY

<sup>5425</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5426</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5427</sup> modo W

<sup>5428</sup> in exponendo] exponendi W

<sup>5429</sup> habent MW

<sup>5430</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5431</sup> quod Y

<sup>5432</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5433</sup> praedicato et W, *lectio dubia* MY

<sup>5434</sup> subiecto W, *lectio dubia* Y

<sup>5435</sup> ut dictum est] *om.* MY

<sup>5436</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5437</sup> per ly] pro Y

<sup>5438</sup> *add.* aliquod M

Ad quod respondeo quod licet aliqui dicant quod debeat intelligi tempus divisibile<sup>5439</sup> per ly<sup>5440</sup> nunc - puta tempus praesens divisibile - et monentur ex eo quod<sup>5441</sup> non est ponendum in tempore aliquod instans indivisibile, sicut supponitur ex dictis Philosophi<sup>5442</sup> sexto *Physicorum*, quoniam<sup>5443</sup> per 'nunc' non debet intelligi instans<sup>5444</sup> indivisibile - et<sup>5445</sup> tamen mihi apparet<sup>5446</sup> quod maior subtilitas est ponendo<sup>5447</sup> ly<sup>5448</sup> nunc pro instanti<sup>5449</sup> indivisibili. Et ita<sup>5450</sup> capit maior pars logicorum:<sup>5451</sup> nam fugere difficultatem<sup>5452</sup> non est subtilitas respondentis,<sup>5453</sup> immo<sup>5454</sup> debet<sup>5455</sup> potius causam<sup>5456</sup> fortiter perquirere<sup>5457</sup> et<sup>5458</sup> dubitationem ostendere<sup>5459</sup> et de aliis<sup>5460</sup> propositis partem eligere veriore<sup>5461</sup>. Modo multae<sup>5462</sup> pulchrae difficultates<sup>5463</sup> sunt imaginandae iuxta<sup>5464</sup> instantia indivisibilia,<sup>5465</sup> per ly nunc demonstrando quae nullae essent, illis<sup>5466</sup> simpliciter negatis, et specialiter quia<sup>5467</sup> Aristoteles in<sup>5468</sup> sexto *Physicorum* ad minus modum loquendi<sup>5469</sup> istum<sup>5470</sup> admittit dicens quod<sup>5471</sup> primum mutatum<sup>5472</sup> esse est<sup>5473</sup> in athomo<sup>5474</sup> i.e.<sup>5475</sup> indivisibili. Negare igitur istum modum

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5439 ad - divisibile] *om.* Y

5440 *om.* W

5441 ex eo quod] adhuc quia Y

5442 *om.* W

5443 *vel fors*an quare W

5444 aliquod Y, tempus W

5445 *om.* M

5446 *ante* mihi M | et - apparet] cum videtur mihi Y

5447 ponenda MY

5448 *om.* MY

5449 *add. sup.* Y

5450 sic M

5451 loicorum MY

5452 definientem W

5453 *add. marg.* M, *add.* \_\_\_\_ M

5454 *om.* Y

5455 debent Y, *om.* W

5456 *ante* potius MY

5457 quirere *add.* fortiter Y

5458 *om.* MY

5459 *add. marg* M, *add. lectio* dubia seu M, *add.* ad eadem Y

5460 de aliis] dubiis Y

5461 maiorem W | partem eligere veriore] eligere veriore<sup>5461</sup> viam M, partem probabiliorem eligere Y

5462 *om.* Y

5463 *vel fors*an definitiones M

5464 *om.* W, *lectio dubia* Y

5465 *add.* et ea W

5466 istis M

5467 *om.* M

5468 *om.* MW

5469 quaerendi W

5470 *ante* modum Y

5471 dicens quod] dicit W

5472 invitatum M

5473 *ante* esse W

loquendi est negare modum Aristotelis<sup>5476</sup>, quod non videtur<sup>5477</sup> probabile. Unde motivum eorum ad contrarium<sup>5478</sup> nihil valet. Dicunt enim quod in tempore non est ponendum vere<sup>5479</sup> aliquod instans<sup>5480</sup> indivisibile. Hoc est bene<sup>5481</sup> verum, tamen<sup>5482</sup> nihil prohibet ea in tempore imaginari et secundum talem imaginationem loqui, quia<sup>5483</sup> Aristoteles, secundum eam<sup>5484</sup> opinionem quam allegant,<sup>5485</sup> ea posuit<sup>5486</sup> vel ea in modo loquendi admittit.<sup>5487</sup> [Y 109<sup>r</sup>] nihil minus est huiusmodi 'nunc',<sup>5488</sup> prout<sup>5489</sup> ex sexto<sup>5490</sup> *Physicorum* apparet. Et<sup>5491</sup> secundo<sup>5492</sup> immo<sup>5493</sup> in tempore obligationis patet quia<sup>5494</sup> omnis actus respondentis et [W131<sup>v</sup>] opponentis<sup>5495</sup> imaginatur esse pro<sup>5496</sup> eodem tempore adequate.<sup>5497</sup> Hoc tamen<sup>5498</sup> est mere<sup>5499</sup> impossibile, nisi secundum imaginationem, sicut in proposito<sup>5500</sup> modo proportionali.<sup>5501</sup>

<5> Quinto nota quod licet huiusmodi modus loicorum<sup>5502</sup> sit moderatus de<sup>5503</sup> exponendo<sup>5504</sup> propositiones de<sup>5505</sup> ly<sup>5506</sup> incipit, sit verus.<sup>5507</sup> Tamen verius<sup>5508</sup> completius<quae>:<sup>5509</sup> omnis<sup>5510</sup>

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- 5474 athomis W  
5475 i.e. om. W, et Y  
5476 igitur - Aristotelis] om. W  
5477 add. esse M  
5478 ad contrarium] om. W  
5479 esse M, om. Y  
5480 ante aliquod M, om. Y, tempus W  
5481 ante est MY  
5482 cum W  
5483 loqui quia] loquitur M  
5484 vel forsā eos MWY  
5485 vel forsā allegavit W, add. fundant M, add. fundari Y  
5486 lectio dubia Y  
5487 ea posuit - admittit] om. W  
5488 nihil - nunc] om. MY  
5489 et sicut patet M  
5490 vel forsā secundo M  
5491 add. +secundum imaginationem+ W  
5492 tertio M, add. imaginamus W  
5493 et - immo] enim in principio physicorum secundi tentus Y  
5494 patet quia] om. WY  
5495 respondentis et opponentis] opponentis et respondentis Y  
5496 in M  
5497 adequato W, add. et M  
5498 add. non W, post est M  
5499 ante est Y  
5500 sicut in proposito] et etc. lectio dubia committo M  
5501 proposito - proportionali] relationem in t\_\_\_ et in proposito est proportionali modo Y  
5502 loicalis M | modus loicorum] om. W  
5503 sit moderatus de] om. M  
5504 exponentibus W  
5505 propositiones de] om. WY  
5506 om. W

propositio de 'incipit'<sup>5511</sup> in qua ly incipit affirmatur de subiecto singulari praedicamenti substantiae ex-|E 61<sup>r</sup>|-ponitur per disiunctivam cuius ambae partes sunt copulativae. Prima<sup>5512</sup> pars<sup>5513</sup> erit igitur<sup>5514</sup> copulativa in cuius prima parte est positio de praesenti, in secunda vero<sup>5515</sup> remotio de praeterito, ut 'Sortes incipit esse homo', prima exponens est:<sup>5516</sup> 'Sortes nunc<sup>5517</sup> est homo et Sortes<sup>5518</sup> immediate ante hoc non fuit homo'. Secunda pars disiunctivae erit copulativa in cuius prima parte<sup>5519</sup> est remotio de praesenti, et in<sup>5520</sup> secunda eiusdem<sup>5521</sup> est<sup>5522</sup> positio de futuro, ut<sup>5523</sup> 'Sortes nunc non est homo et Sortes<sup>5524</sup> immediate<sup>5525</sup> post hoc erit homo'. Et iste modus<sup>5526</sup> est communis, sive ly incipit ponatur<sup>5527</sup> respectu terminorum<sup>5528</sup> rerum permanentium sive rerum<sup>5529</sup> successivarum. |M 54<sup>r</sup>|

Per oppositum,<sup>5530</sup> contradictoria - puta propositio de tali subiecto<sup>5531</sup> in qua ly incipit negatur - exponitur per copulativam cuius ambae partes sunt disiunctivae primis<sup>5532</sup> copulativis<sup>5533</sup> contradicentes, ut 'Sortes non incipit esse homo' exponitur<sup>5534</sup> per duas exponentes disiunctivas,<sup>5535</sup> quarum prima est haec: 'Sortes nunc non est homo vel Sortes immediate ante hoc fuit homo'; secunda est haec:<sup>5536</sup> 'Sortes nunc<sup>5537</sup> est homo<sup>5538</sup> vel Sortes immediate post hoc non<sup>5539</sup> erit homo'. Et iste est

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5507 sit verus] *om.* W

5508 *om.* MVY

5509 completans M, completansquam VW

5510 *om.* W

5511 de incipit] *om.* M

5512 *add.* igitur eius Y

5513 *om.* W

5514 *om.* MY

5515 *om.* M

5516 prima exponens est] exponitur sic M

5517 iam M, non W

5518 *om.* MW

5519 pars M

5520 ipsius W, *om.* M

5521 *add.* pars M

5522 erit M, *om.* Y

5523 *add.* vel Y

5524 *om.* W

5525 *add.* +h+ M

5526 modo W

5527 ponitur M

5528 *om.* MW

5529 *om.* W

5530 *add.* exponitur Y

5531 per - subiecto] et contradictoria istius exponitur per oppositum hoc est M

5532 praemissis W

5533 *add.* +qua+ M

5534 *add.* sic M

5535 ante exponentes M, *om.* Y

5536 *om.* MW, *add.* et Y

5537 non Y

modus<sup>5540</sup> sufficiens exponendi<sup>5541</sup> omnem propositionem de 'incipit' de subiecto singulari  
praedicamenti substantiae, quare de illis nihil plus dicetur. Et non differt a primo nisi quod isti<sup>5542</sup>  
modi quos<sup>5543</sup> ipsi posuerunt disparate<sup>5544</sup> coniugantur copulative vel disiunctive.<sup>5545</sup>

#### II.4.2 <De propositionibus de 'incipit' - Secunda pars>

Nunc |Y 109v| in<sup>5546</sup> secunda parte huius<sup>5547</sup> capituli<sup>5548</sup> videbitur<sup>5549</sup> quomodo exponendae sunt<sup>5550</sup>  
propositiones de 'incipit' in quibus subicitur terminus communis seu<sup>5551</sup> connotativus.<sup>5552</sup>

<1> Circa quas primo nota<sup>5553</sup> quod modus<sup>5554</sup> exponendi<sup>5555</sup> prius dictus<sup>5556</sup> in illis<sup>5557</sup> non sufficit<sup>5558</sup>  
probare vel exponere propositiones in quibus ponitur terminus connotativus aut communis, quia,<sup>5559</sup>  
capto enim<sup>5560</sup> Sorte<sup>5561</sup> centum<sup>5562</sup> annorum,<sup>5563</sup> probatur secundum eum<sup>5564</sup> quod homo<sup>5565</sup> incipit  
esse Sortes, quod tamen<sup>5566</sup> non est verum, cum pro tunc<sup>5567</sup> nihil incipit esse Sortes. Probatur tamen

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5538 est homo] *om.* W

5539 *om.* W

5540 *add.* nunc Y, *ante* est M

5541 exponendo M

5542 illi Y

5543 quod W

5544 disparati W

5545 quare - disiunctive] *om.* M

5546 de Y

5547 istius *post* capituli Y

5548 in - capituli] *om.* M

5549 videndum est M

5550 sint M

5551 *om.* WY, aut M

5552 *om.* Y

5553 notandum M

5554 huiusmodi M

5555 exponentes M

5556 dictae M

5557 in illis] *om.* M

5558 sufficiunt M

5559 probare - quia] *om.* Y, probatio pro eisdem W

5560 *om.* MW

5561 *add.* vel Johanne M

5562 cento M

5563 centum annorum] *add. marg.* M

5564 secundum eum] *om.* MW

5565 hoc Y

5566 *om.* MY

5567 nunc M



consequentia<sup>5568</sup> sic,<sup>5569</sup> quia<sup>5570</sup> 'homo<sup>5571</sup> nunc<sup>5572</sup> est Sortes<sup>5573</sup> et homo immediate ante<sup>5574</sup> hoc non fuit<sup>5575</sup> Sortes (patet secunda exponens,<sup>5576</sup> quia<sup>5577</sup> Plato immediate ante hoc<sup>5578</sup> non |E 61v| fuit<sup>5579</sup> Sortes)<sup>5580</sup> ergo<sup>5581</sup> homo incipit esse Sortes - et sic<sup>5582</sup> constat quod<sup>5583</sup> antecedens est<sup>5584</sup> verum et consequens falsum.<sup>5585</sup>

Similiter |W132r| probatur per<sup>5586</sup> secundum modum<sup>5587</sup> exponendi:<sup>5588</sup> 'homo nunc non<sup>5589</sup> est Sortes et homo immediate post<sup>5590</sup> hoc erit<sup>5591</sup> Sortes'. Patet prima<sup>5592</sup> pars, quia Plato<sup>5593</sup> nunc non est Sortes,<sup>5594</sup> ergo<sup>5595</sup> homo incipit esse Sortes. Patet<sup>5596</sup> igitur quod<sup>5597</sup> in illis de subiectis communibus modus exponendi prius positus non est sufficiens.<sup>5598</sup>

Eodem modo non <sup>5599</sup> valent istae exponentes <sup>5600</sup> si subiectum fuerit terminus discretus et connotativus,<sup>5601</sup> ut 'hoc album incipit esse Sortes', posito casu<sup>5602</sup> quod Sortes ante diu<sup>5603</sup> fuerit<sup>5604</sup>

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<sup>5568</sup> tamen consequentia] *om. W, add. marg. M*

<sup>5569</sup> *add. si autem W, +homo incipit esse+ M*

<sup>5570</sup> *om. W*

<sup>5571</sup> hoc Y

<sup>5572</sup> *om. W, add. +non+ M*

<sup>5573</sup> *add. +quin Plato+ M*

<sup>5574</sup> post M

<sup>5575</sup> non fuit] erit M

<sup>5576</sup> patet secunda exponens] *om. MY*

<sup>5577</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5578</sup> ante hoc] *om. W*

<sup>5579</sup> Plato - fuit] *om. MY*

<sup>5580</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5581</sup> igitur Y

<sup>5582</sup> et sic] unde Y

<sup>5583</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5584</sup> esse Y

<sup>5585</sup> m Y | et sic - falsum] consequentia est bona per *lectio dubia* adversativam et consequens et antecedens verum M

<sup>5586</sup> similiter probatur per] *om. M* | probatur per] probaretur iuxta Y

<sup>5587</sup> secundum modum] secundus modus M

<sup>5588</sup> *add. quia Y*

<sup>5589</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5590</sup> ante M

<sup>5591</sup> non fuit M

<sup>5592</sup> prius *ante* patet M

<sup>5593</sup> Sortes M

<sup>5594</sup> *add. et Plato ante hoc non fuit Sortes M*

<sup>5595</sup> igitur M

<sup>5596</sup> ergo - patet] *lectio dubia* quod est Y

<sup>5597</sup> quia Y

<sup>5598</sup> modus - sufficiens] exponentes prius dictae non sufficiunt M

<sup>5599</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5600</sup> valent istae exponentes] valet ista consequentia Y

<sup>5601</sup> et connotativus] saltem denotativus M

<sup>5602</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5603</sup> ante diu] *om. M*

sed<sup>5605</sup> quod<sup>5606</sup> immediate post hoc erit<sup>5607</sup> albus. Tunc<sup>5608</sup> probatur quod<sup>5609</sup> hoc album incipit esse Sortes, quia hoc album nunc<sup>5610</sup> non est Sortes et hoc album immediate post hoc erit Sortes<sup>5611</sup> per casum, ergo<sup>5612</sup> hoc album incipit esse Sortes. Antecedens<sup>5613</sup> est verum,<sup>5614</sup> sed quod<sup>5615</sup> consequens sit<sup>5616</sup> falsum patet, quia nihil incipit esse Sortes quia quisquis est Sortes vel erit Sortes diu ante hoc fuit Sortes cum Sortes autem diu fuerat ante hoc tempus.<sup>5617</sup> Ergo<sup>5618</sup> patet quod cum<sup>5619</sup> subiectum sit <sup>5620</sup> terminus discretus <sup>5621</sup> et <sup>5622</sup> connotativus <sup>5623</sup> dictus <sup>5624</sup> modus <sup>5625</sup> exponendi non est sufficiens.<sup>5626</sup>

<2> Ex quo<sup>5627</sup> secundo<sup>5628</sup> sequitur quod in talibus superaddere oportet<sup>5629</sup> tertiam exponentem<sup>5630</sup> praeter<sup>5631</sup> duas prius positas. Unde si sit exponenda <per> propositionem<sup>5632</sup> de futuro, ut<sup>5633</sup> 'hoc album<sup>5634</sup> incipit esse Sortes', exponenda est<sup>5635</sup> per copulativam trimembrem. Prima:<sup>5636</sup> 'hoc album

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5604 fuerat Y, *add.* homo ante hoc M

5605 et M

5606 *om.* MY

5607 est Y

5608 autem M

5609 quia M

5610 *om.* M

5611 *add.* +alias+ est verum Y

5612 igitur M

5613 *add.* enim M

5614 ergo - verum] *om.* Y

5615 *om.* Y

5616 est Y

5617 quia - tempus] *om.* W, antecedens est verum quia quidquid est Sortes ante hoc diu fuit M

5618 igitur MY, *post* patet Y

5619 si M, quando Y

5620 fuerit M, fuit Y

5621 *add.* denotativus M

5622 *add.* etiam M

5623 *add.* etc. Y

5624 dicti M, praedictus Y

5625 modi M

5626 est sufficiens] sufficient M

5627 hoc Y

5628 *om.* Y, *post* sequitur M

5629 *ante* superaddere M

5630 *add.* etiam M

5631 *add.* istas M

5632 propositio W

5633 si - ut] *om.* Y

5634 hoc album] homo albus W

5635 *ante* exponenda Y

5636 *add.* ut Y

nunc non est Sortes'; secunda:<sup>5637</sup> 'hoc album immediate post hoc erit Sortes' - quarum<sup>5638</sup> prima dicitur remotio<sup>5639</sup> de praesenti,<sup>5640</sup> secunda vero<sup>5641</sup> positio<sup>5642</sup> de futuro. Et tertia erit remotio presentis a<sup>5643</sup> futuro, scilicet haec:<sup>5644</sup> 'et nihil |M 54v| quod<sup>5645</sup> immediate post hoc erit hoc<sup>5646</sup> album nunc<sup>5647</sup> est Sortes'. Et proportionaliter<sup>5648</sup> dicatur<sup>5649</sup> de omnibus consimilibus.<sup>5650</sup>

Si vero fuerit<sup>5651</sup> exponenda<sup>5652</sup> per<sup>5653</sup> propositionem |Y 110r| de praesenti, ut 'homo incipit esse Sortes', tunc etiam<sup>5654</sup> per copulativam trimembrem esset<sup>5655</sup> exponenda. Prima est<sup>5656</sup> positio de praesenti, ut 'homo nunc<sup>5657</sup> est Sortes'; secunda est<sup>5658</sup> remotio de<sup>5659</sup> praeterito, ut 'homo immediate ante hoc non fuit Sortes'; tertia est negatio praeteriti a praesenti, ut 'nihil quod<sup>5660</sup> nunc est homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes',<sup>5661</sup> 'ergo<sup>5662</sup> |E 62r| homo incipit esse Sortes'.

<3> Tertio sequitur quod negativa de 'incipit' in praedictis<sup>5663</sup> exponenda est per disiunctivam trimembrem de partibus oppositis<sup>5664</sup> partibus copulativae per quam exponebatur<sup>5665</sup> affirmativa, ut<sup>5666</sup> 'homo non<sup>5667</sup> incipit esse Sortes' exponitur sic: 'nullus homo est Sortes vel<sup>5668</sup> homo immediate

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<sup>5637</sup> *add. est haec Y, add. et W*

<sup>5638</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5639</sup> *remotio+nem+ W*

<sup>5640</sup> *add. et Y*

<sup>5641</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5642</sup> *positio+nem+ W*

<sup>5643</sup> *de MW*

<sup>5644</sup> *hoc add. +est+ W | scilicet haec] om. Y*

<sup>5645</sup> *add. quod M*

<sup>5646</sup> *erit hoc] om. W*

<sup>5647</sup> *add. non M*

<sup>5648</sup> *consimiliter M*

<sup>5649</sup> *dicendum est M*

<sup>5650</sup> *similibus Y*

<sup>5651</sup> *fuerint W, om. M*

<sup>5652</sup> *exponendae W, add. sit propositio M*

<sup>5653</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5654</sup> *erit W | tunc etiam] et M*

<sup>5655</sup> *est Y, om. W*

<sup>5656</sup> *prima est] scilicet W*

<sup>5657</sup> *add. non M*

<sup>5658</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>5659</sup> *add. futuro Y*

<sup>5660</sup> *pro W*

<sup>5661</sup> *Sortes tertia - Sortes] om. M*

<sup>5662</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>5663</sup> *in praedictis] om. M*

<sup>5664</sup> *contradictentibus M*

<sup>5665</sup> *add. prima M*

<sup>5666</sup> *add. +non+ W, add. nullus Y*

<sup>5667</sup> *om. Y*

ante hoc fuit Sortes vel aliquid<sup>5669</sup> quod nunc est homo immediate ante hoc fuit<sup>5670</sup> Sortes'.<sup>5671</sup> Eodem modo de qualibet alia consimili<sup>5672</sup> est dicendum.<sup>5673</sup>

Verum est quod quando est subiectum commune de praedicamento substantiae, tunc posset solveri addendo secundae exponenti relativum idemtitatis, ut 'homo nunc est Sortes et idem homo immediate ante hoc non fuit Sortes': illic<sup>5674</sup> sufficiant duae exponentes.<sup>5675</sup>

<4> Quarto<sup>5676</sup> est notandum<sup>5677</sup> quod<sup>5678</sup> diligenter est<sup>5679</sup> advertendum<sup>5680</sup> de istis<sup>5681</sup> terminis communibus quantum<sup>5682</sup> ad partes disiunctivae per quas exponitur<sup>5683</sup> negativa.<sup>5684</sup> Nam si ipsa propositio de incipit<sup>5685</sup> negativa [W132v] fuit affirmativae<sup>5686</sup> de 'incipit' subcontraria, partes disiunctivae et eadem partes copulativae debent esse subcontrariae;<sup>5687</sup> si autem fuerint contrariae, partes disiunctivae et<sup>5688</sup> partes<sup>5689</sup> copulativae erunt contrariae;<sup>5690</sup> si autem<sup>5691</sup> contradictoriae, erunt<sup>5692</sup> partes disiunctivae et<sup>5693</sup> partes<sup>5694</sup> copulativae<sup>5695</sup> contradictoriae. Et ad<sup>5696</sup> hanc regulam bene avertat exponens.

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<sup>5668</sup> *add. omnis Y*

<sup>5669</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5670</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5671</sup> *add. immediate M | vel aliquid - Sortes] om. W*

<sup>5672</sup> *huiusmodi W, ante alia Y*

<sup>5673</sup> *de - dicendum] dicendum est de aliis consimilibus M*

<sup>5674</sup> *lectio dubia Y*

<sup>5675</sup> *verum - exponentes] om. MW*

<sup>5676</sup> *vel forsitan quinto Y*

<sup>5677</sup> *ante est Y, om. M*

<sup>5678</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5679</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5680</sup> *diligenter est advertendum] om. Y*

<sup>5681</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5682</sup> *lectio dubia praedicatum M*

<sup>5683</sup> *exponebatur M, exponuntur W*

<sup>5684</sup> *om. W, ante exponitur M*

<sup>5685</sup> *de incipit] om. W*

<sup>5686</sup> *affirmativa WY*

<sup>5687</sup> *propositio - subcontrariae] fuerit per primam scilicet affirmativam de incipit erunt subcontrariae quia partes disiunctivae debent esse partibus copulativae subcontrariae M | disiunctivae - subcontrariae] debent esse subcontrariae partes copulativae W*

<sup>5688</sup> *erunt add. de W*

<sup>5689</sup> *partibus W*

<sup>5690</sup> *add. sed M*

<sup>5691</sup> *fuerint M*

<sup>5692</sup> *om. M*

<sup>5693</sup> *erunt M*

<sup>5694</sup> *partibus M*

<sup>5695</sup> *erunt contrariae - copulativae] om. W*

<sup>5696</sup> *om. M*

Sed forte<sup>5697</sup> quaereret aliquis nonne sufficeret<sup>5698</sup> in istis<sup>5699</sup> de subiectis communibus absolutis<sup>5700</sup> et<sup>5701</sup> subiectis<sup>5702</sup> connotativis<sup>5703</sup> eas exponi per duas exponentes addendo<sup>5704</sup> relativum idemptitatis. Exemplum, ut exponendo hanc 'homo<sup>5705</sup> incipit esse Sortes' ut:<sup>5706</sup> 'homo<sup>5707</sup> nunc est Sortes, et idem homo<sup>5708</sup> immediate<sup>5709</sup> ante hoc non fuit Sortes'. Respondeo<sup>5710</sup> quod sic in illis<sup>5711</sup> de<sup>5712</sup> terminis communibus absolutis, sed in illis<sup>5713</sup> de<sup>5714</sup> terminis<sup>5715</sup> connotativis<sup>5716</sup> non sufficit,<sup>5717</sup> ut in ista<sup>5718</sup> prius posita:<sup>5719</sup> 'hoc album incipit esse Sortes'. Verum est dicere: 'hoc<sup>5720</sup> album nunc non est Sortes et hoc idem album immediate [Y 110v] post hoc erit Sortes'. Et tamen falsum est dicere quod hoc<sup>5721</sup> album incipit esse Sortes, quia nihil incipit esse Sortes, ut prius fuit<sup>5722</sup> declaratum.<sup>5723</sup>

#### II.4.3 <Regulae de propositionibus de 'incipit'>

Nunc de istis dantur<sup>5724</sup> regulae generales<sup>5725</sup> consimiles regulis positis<sup>5726</sup> in capitulo primo.<sup>5727</sup>

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5697 *om.* M  
5698 sufficit WY  
5699 in istis] *om.* W  
5700 *om.* WM  
5701 quae M, aut W  
5702 subiecta M  
5703 *lectio dubia* connotans M  
5704 *add.* reliquo exponenti W  
5705 hoc album W  
5706 *om.* M, et W  
5707 hoc album W  
5708 album W  
5709 *om.* WY  
5710 respondetur M  
5711 istis M | in illis] nullus W  
5712 *om.* Y  
5713 aliis Y, istis M  
5714 *add.* praesenti W  
5715 *add.* *lectio dubia* subiectum Y | de terminis] *om.* M  
5716 *add.* et ideo Y, *add.* +ut+ M  
5717 sufficeret Y  
5718 regula M  
5719 *add.* scilicet Y  
5720 *om.* Y  
5721 *om.* Y  
5722 fuerat W  
5723 *add.* etc. sequitur modo aliudputa regulae etc. W | ut - declaratum] *om.* M  
5724 dicantur Y, sumantur M  
5725 *om.* WY  
5726 *ante* regulis W  
5727 consimiles - primo] *om.* M

<1> Prima est ista:<sup>5728</sup> quod<sup>5729</sup> arguendo a qualibet istarum<sup>5730</sup> ad suas exponentes est |E 62v| bona consequentia, et e converso.

<2> Secunda regula est illa:<sup>5731</sup> quod<sup>5732</sup> arguendo<sup>5733</sup> ab illis<sup>5734</sup> quae exponuntur copulative<sup>5735</sup> ad unam exponentium<sup>5736</sup> est bona consequentia sed<sup>5737</sup> non e converso.<sup>5738</sup>

<3> Tertia regula: quod<sup>5739</sup> ab illis<sup>5740</sup> quae exponuntur disiunctive<sup>5741</sup> ad unam exponentium<sup>5742</sup> non est consequentia bona.<sup>5743</sup>

<4> Quarta regula: |M 55r| quod<sup>5744</sup> a parte una talium exponentium ad expositas disiunctive est bona consequentia. Exempla autem<sup>5745</sup> quaerantur<sup>5746</sup> in propositionibus<sup>5747</sup> prius positis.

<5> Quinta regula est:<sup>5748</sup> quod<sup>5749</sup> arguendo cum hoc verbo 'incipit' ab inferiori postposito ad superius non valet consequentia,<sup>5750</sup> ut non sequitur: 'iste incipit esse albus, ergo<sup>5751</sup> iste<sup>5752</sup> incipit esse

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5728 prima est ista] *om.* Y | est ista] *om.* M

5729 *om.* W

5730 illarum M

5731 regula est illa] *om.* M | est illa] *om.* Y

5732 *om.* W

5733 *om.* MY

5734 istis M

5735 *add.* ab una exposita Y

5736 componentium W

5737 et W

5738 sed non e converso] *post* exponentium M

5739 *om.* W

5740 istis M

5741 *add.* ab exposita Y

5742 ad unam exponentium] *post* bona W

5743 *ante* consequentia M, *om.* Y

5744 *om.* W

5745 *om.* MW, *blank space* M, *add.* harum regularum W

5746 positarum sicut W

5747 exemplis W

5748 *om.* Y

5749 *om.* W

5750 *post* superius W

5751 igitur M

5752 *om.* MY

coloratus', quia<sup>5753</sup> esto quod homo semper fuisset coloratus tamen hodie<sup>5754</sup> homo potest<sup>5755</sup> incipere esse albus.

<6> Sexta regula: quod<sup>5756</sup> arguendo ab 'incipit' sumpto<sup>5757</sup> cum aliqua determinatione ad ipsum<sup>5758</sup> sumptum<sup>5759</sup> sine tali<sup>5760</sup> determinatione non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur: 'Sortes incipit esse currens, ergo<sup>5761</sup> incipit esse',<sup>5762</sup> 'Sortes incipit equitare equum Platonis, ergo<sup>5763</sup> Sortes incipit equitare'.

<7> Septima regula est haec:<sup>5764</sup> arguendo ab hoc verbo<sup>5765</sup> 'incipit' postposita dictione sumpta cum signo universali ad eandem sumpta<sup>5766</sup> sine illo<sup>5767</sup> signo non oportet consequentiam valere,<sup>5768</sup> ut<sup>5769</sup> non sequitur: 'Sortes incipit scire omnem propositionem, ergo<sup>5770</sup> Sortes incipit scire propositionem', quia<sup>5771</sup> si Sortes<sup>5772</sup> |W133r| sciret<sup>5773</sup> duas<sup>5774</sup> propositiones quas ultra viginti annos scivisset et per casum<sup>5775</sup> omnes aliae propositiones cessarent esse,<sup>5776</sup> tunc<sup>5777</sup> antecedens est<sup>5778</sup> verum et consequens falsum.

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<sup>5753</sup> *vel forsā* quod M

<sup>5754</sup> tamen hodie] prius adhuc W

<sup>5755</sup> possit MY

<sup>5756</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>5757</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5758</sup> *add.* ad ipsum Y

<sup>5759</sup> *om.* Y, *lectio dubia* M

<sup>5760</sup> ista M, *om.* Y

<sup>5761</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5762</sup> Sortes - esse] *om.* W

<sup>5763</sup> igitur MY

<sup>5764</sup> est haec] *om.* MY

<sup>5765</sup> hoc verbo] universali de W

<sup>5766</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5767</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5768</sup> *ante* consequentiam W

<sup>5769</sup> *add.* +s+ M

<sup>5770</sup> igitur MY

<sup>5771</sup> nam W

<sup>5772</sup> *add.* inciperet W

<sup>5773</sup> scire W

<sup>5774</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5775</sup> per casum] pro nunc W

<sup>5776</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5777</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5778</sup> *om.* MY

<8> Octava regula: arguendo cum<sup>5779</sup> 'incipit' a dictione postposita ad<sup>5780</sup> eandem praepositam non oportet consequentiam valere, ut non sequitur: 'Sortes incipit esse albus, ergo<sup>5781</sup> album incipit esse Sortes'. Quia bene<sup>5782</sup> staret quod Sortes inciperet esse albus, quod tamen nihil inciperet esse Sortes, ut si Sortes diu ante vixisset.<sup>5783</sup>

Et haec de incipit dicta sufficiant.<sup>5784</sup> |Y 111r|

## II.5.1 <De propositionibus de 'desinit'>

Nunc<sup>5785</sup> consequenter<sup>5786</sup> in quinto capitulo dicendum<sup>5787</sup> est de propositionibus de 'desinit'. |E 63r|

<1> Circa quas primo notandum<sup>5788</sup> est quomodo exponantur propositiones de 'desinit'. Circa quas sciendum<sup>5789</sup> quod secundum<sup>5790</sup> imaginationem instantium indivisibilium in tempore, secundum quam 'incipit' exponitur,<sup>5791</sup> licet sic differre<sup>5792</sup> expositionem<sup>5793</sup> propositionum<sup>5794</sup> de 'incipit' posito eo respectu nominum<sup>5795</sup> rerum permanentium et nominum rerum<sup>5796</sup> successivarum, eo quod est dari primum instans rei permanentis et non rei successivae et ideo 'incipit' respectu rerum permanentium aliter est exponendum quam respectum rerum successivarum.<sup>5797</sup>

Talis tamen<sup>5798</sup> diversitas non redeat<sup>5799</sup> in propositionibus de 'desinit', quia<sup>5800</sup> nullius<sup>5801</sup> rei substantialis<sup>5802</sup> datur<sup>5803</sup> ultimum instans<sup>5804</sup> sui esse. Et ideo propositio de 'desinit' numquam

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<sup>5779</sup> arguendo cum] ab W

<sup>5780</sup> add. ipsam W

<sup>5781</sup> igitur MY

<sup>5782</sup> om. Y

<sup>5783</sup> ante ante W | quia - vixisset] ut si Sortes diu ante vixisset tunc staret quod Sortes incipit esse albus quod tamen nihil inciperet esse Sortes M

<sup>5784</sup> add. etc. sequitur quintum capitulum etc. etc. etc. W, add. etc. M | et - sufficiant] om. Y

<sup>5785</sup> circa MY

<sup>5786</sup> \_\_\_ MY

<sup>5787</sup> in - dicendum] quinti capituli considerandum MY

<sup>5788</sup> est - notandum] om. MY

<sup>5789</sup> adducendum MY

<sup>5790</sup> om. W

<sup>5791</sup> exposui Y

<sup>5792</sup> vel forsitan differens MWY

<sup>5793</sup> expositio WY

<sup>5794</sup> de propositionibus MY

<sup>5795</sup> om. MW

<sup>5796</sup> permanentium - rerum] om. W, lectio dubia M

<sup>5797</sup> eo quod - successivarum] om. MW

<sup>5798</sup> ante talis Y, cum ante talis M

<sup>5799</sup> accipitur M, acciderit Y

<sup>5800</sup> om. MY

<sup>5801</sup> add. enim MY



exponitur per positionem<sup>5805</sup> de praesenti et remotionem de futuro. De nullo<sup>5806</sup> enim nomine<sup>5807</sup> substantiae<sup>5808</sup> verum est<sup>5809</sup> dicere 'hoc nunc est et hoc immediate post hoc non erit',<sup>5810</sup> quia si<sup>5811</sup> aliquid<sup>5812</sup> nunc est quidquid sit<sup>5813</sup> in praedicamento substantiae, etiam post hoc erit<sup>5814</sup> ex<sup>5815</sup> eo quod non est dari<sup>5816</sup> ultimum instans esse alicuius rei [M 55<sup>v</sup>] substantialis,<sup>5817</sup> ut dictum est. Attende<sup>5818</sup> tamen<sup>5819</sup> quod si extensio ponatur res distincta a substantia extensa, concedo quod instans in quo incipit rarefactio<sup>5820</sup> alicuius rei sit ultimum instans extensionis praecedentis. Et ergo<sup>5821</sup> haec expositio possit habere<sup>5822</sup> locum<sup>5823</sup> sic dicendo: 'haec extensio nunc est et immediate post hoc non erit',<sup>5824</sup> sed hoc non est in substantiis vel qualitatibus resistens<sup>5825</sup> de quibus<sup>5826</sup> communiter loquitur<sup>5827</sup> - sed haec pertinet magis<sup>5828</sup> ad quartum *Physicorum*.<sup>5829</sup>

<2> Secundo ex hoc<sup>5830</sup> nota quod propositiones de 'desinit' de subiecto singulari pure<sup>5831</sup> absolute affirmativae exponuntur per copulativam cuius prima pars est remotio de praesenti, et<sup>5832</sup> secunda

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5802 *om. W*  
5803 *dicitur M*  
5804 *om. W*  
5805 *vel forsā propositionem MW | per positionem] add. marg. M*  
5806 *nulla Y*  
5807 *om. WY*  
5808 *substantia Y, om. W*  
5809 *esset M*  
5810 *vel forsā ex M*  
5811 *om. M*  
5812 *aliquid M*  
5813 *add. hoc Y*  
5814 *om. M*  
5815 *om. Y*  
5816 *om. M*  
5817 *hoc nunc - substantialis] hoc est ultimum esse alicuius rei W*  
5818 *vel forsā attendetur M*  
5819 *om. M*  
5820 *lectio dubia M*  
5821 *add. igitur Y*  
5822 *vel forsā habens M*  
5823 *vel forsā latum M*  
5824 *lectio dubia M*  
5825 *lectio dubia MY*  
5826 *add. \_\_\_\_ M*  
5827 *loquimur M*  
5828 *ante pertinet M*  
5829 *attende - Physicorum] om. W*  
5830 *ex hoc] post quod W*  
5831 *puro M*  
5832 *om. W*

positio de praeterito.<sup>5833</sup> Exemplum, ut 'Sortes desinit esse' exponitur sic: 'Sortes nunc<sup>5834</sup> non est et Sortes immediate ante hoc fuit'. Et similiter in rebus |Y 111v| successivis. Exemplum,<sup>5835</sup> ut:<sup>5836</sup> 'Sortes desinit moveri': 'Sortes nunc<sup>5837</sup> non movetur et Sortes immediate ante hoc movebatur'.<sup>5838</sup>

<3> Ex quo patet tertio<sup>5839</sup> quomodo exponendae sint<sup>5840</sup> propositiones negativae<sup>5841</sup> de 'desinit' de<sup>5842</sup> subiecto consimili,<sup>5843</sup> quia exponuntur per disiunctivam de partibus contradicentibus partibus copulativae per quam exponebatur affirmativa, ut 'Sortes non desinit esse' exponitur sic: 'Sortes nunc<sup>5844</sup> est vel Sortes<sup>5845</sup> immediate ante hoc non fuit'. Et sic patet<sup>5846</sup> quomodo<sup>5847</sup> in talibus exponendae<sup>5848</sup> sint<sup>5849</sup> propositiones de subiecto singulari.

<4> Quarto nota quod dictae exponentes non sufficiunt in propositionibus<sup>5850</sup> de subiecto communi<sup>5851</sup> aut<sup>5852</sup> de subiecto discreto<sup>5853</sup> connotativo.<sup>5854</sup> |E 63v| Patet<sup>5855</sup> primum quia non sequitur: 'homo nunc non est Sortes et homo<sup>5856</sup> immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes ergo<sup>5857</sup> homo desinit esse Sortes'.<sup>5858</sup> Antecedens est<sup>5859</sup> verum<sup>5860</sup> |W133v| supposito quod adhuc Sortes maneret<sup>5861</sup> centum annis, et<sup>5862</sup>

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5833 positio de praeterito] remotio de futuro W

5834 *add.* +est+ M

5835 *om.* MY

5836 *om.* Y

5837 *om.* W

5838 *add.* ex quo M

5839 *om.* W

5840 sunt MW, *ante* exponendae M

5841 *post* desinit W

5842 *om.* M

5843 consimiliter W

5844 *add.* non W

5845 *om.* W

5846 *om.* M

5847 et sic patet quomodo] ut patet ex quo W

5848 *vel forsitan* exponendo M

5849 sunt MW

5850 in propositionibus] *om.* M

5851 *om.* M

5852 et Y

5853 singulari M

5854 *add.* +exponentes non sufficiunt+ M

5855 *add.* prima M

5856 *om.* W

5857 igitur M

5858 *add.* quia M

5859 esset MY

5860 vera M

tunc<sup>5863</sup> consequens est<sup>5864</sup> falsum, quia tunc nihil desinit esse Sortes. Similiter posito<sup>5865</sup> quod Sortes primo nunc<sup>5866</sup> non sit albus, ita quod<sup>5867</sup> usque nunc fuit albus, tunc<sup>5868</sup> verum est dicere de<sup>5869</sup> Sorte: 'hoc album nunc non est Sortes et hoc album immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes, sicut patet per casum. Tamen<sup>5870</sup> non sequitur: 'igitur hoc album<sup>5871</sup> desinit esse Sortes'<sup>5872</sup> quia cum isto casu<sup>5873</sup> possibile est Sortem manere<sup>5874</sup> et tunc nihil desinit esse Sortes.<sup>5875</sup>

<5> Ex quo sequitur quinto<sup>5876</sup> quod in<sup>5877</sup> talibus oportet<sup>5878</sup> addere<sup>5879</sup> tertiam exponentem<sup>5880</sup> dicendo sic: 'hoc album nunc non est Sortes, et hoc album immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes et nihil quod immediate ante hoc fuit hoc<sup>5881</sup> album nunc est Sortes,<sup>5882</sup> ergo<sup>5883</sup> hoc album desinit esse Sortes'. Et<sup>5884</sup> similiter si subiectum<sup>5885</sup> esset<sup>5886</sup> terminus communis.

<6> Unde sequitur sextum notabile [M 56r] quod etiam<sup>5887</sup> contradictoriae<sup>5888</sup> talium<sup>5889</sup> per tres<sup>5890</sup> exponentes disiunctivae sint<sup>5891</sup> exponendae, ut 'hoc<sup>5892</sup> album non desinit esse Sortes' exponitur

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5861 manens M  
5862 adhum - et] homo morietur adhuc W  
5863 om. W  
5864 esset Y  
5865 supposito W  
5866 ante primo W  
5867 add. semper W  
5868 om. MY  
5869 add. lectio dubia d'mo<sup>do</sup> M, add. lectio dubia mrando Y  
5870 unde Y  
5871 lectio dubia casum M  
5872 sicut - Sortes] om. W  
5873 isto casu] secundum casum M | cum isto casu] om. W  
5874 mori W  
5875 om. Y  
5876 om. M  
5877 om. W  
5878 ante in talibus Y  
5879 superaddere MY  
5880 expositam W  
5881 om. Y  
5882 et hoc - Sortes] om. W  
5883 igitur M  
5884 om. Y  
5885 om. MW  
5886 est W  
5887 om. M  
5888 vel forsā contrariae W  
5889 om. W  
5890 per tres] partes Y  
5891 sunt MW

sic:<sup>5893</sup> 'hoc album nunc est Sortes vel<sup>5894</sup> hoc album immediate<sup>5895</sup> [Y 112r] ante hoc non<sup>5896</sup> fuit Sortes vel<sup>5897</sup> aliquid<sup>5898</sup> quod immediate ante hoc fuit hoc<sup>5899</sup> album nunc<sup>5900</sup> est Sortes'. Et advertatur bene<sup>5901</sup> ad partes<sup>5902</sup> oppositas<sup>5903</sup> talium disiunctivarum respectu partium<sup>5904</sup> copulativarum, nam si propositio<sup>5905</sup> de 'desinit' negativa<sup>5906</sup> fuit<sup>5907</sup> affirmativae subcontraria,<sup>5908</sup> partes<sup>5909</sup> disiunctivae debent<sup>5910</sup> partibus copulativae esse<sup>5911</sup> subcontrariae. Et<sup>5912</sup> si autem fuerint contrariae, tunc<sup>5913</sup> erunt partes<sup>5914</sup> partibus copulativae<sup>5915</sup> contrariae. Et si contradictoriae, erunt partes sibi invicem<sup>5916</sup> contradictoriae.<sup>5917</sup>

Si<sup>5918</sup> aliquis quaereret:<sup>5919</sup> estne alius modus exponendi istas propositiones de 'incipit'<sup>5920</sup> et de<sup>5921</sup> 'desinit'<sup>5922</sup> quam iste quem<sup>5923</sup> tu<sup>5924</sup> dixisti in<sup>5925</sup> quarto capitulo<sup>5926</sup> et<sup>5927</sup> quinto?<sup>5928</sup>

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<sup>5892</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5893</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5894</sup> hoc album non desinit - vel] *om.* W

<sup>5895</sup> *add. marg.* M

<sup>5896</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5897</sup> et M

<sup>5898</sup> *add. aliud* W

<sup>5899</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5900</sup> non W

<sup>5901</sup> unde W

<sup>5902</sup> *add. +ex+* W

<sup>5903</sup> compositas W

<sup>5904</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5905</sup> propositiones W

<sup>5906</sup> negativae W

<sup>5907</sup> fuerint *post* affirmativae W

<sup>5908</sup> subcontrariae W

<sup>5909</sup> pars Y

<sup>5910</sup> tunc Y

<sup>5911</sup> essent Y

<sup>5912</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5913</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5914</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5915</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5916</sup> sibi invicem] *lectio dubia* eadem Y

<sup>5917</sup> nam - contradictoriae] nam si propositio de desinit fuit contraria partes disiunctivae *add. marg.* debeant esse+nt+ cibtrariae partibus copulativae et sicut subcontrariae similiter si autem contradictoriae eodem modo M

<sup>5918</sup> sed M

<sup>5919</sup> quaeritur M

<sup>5920</sup> desinit W

<sup>5921</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5922</sup> incipit W, diceret M

<sup>5923</sup> quame iste quem] sicut M

<sup>5924</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5925</sup> *add. \_* Y

<sup>5926</sup> ante quarto Y, + \_\_+ M

Respondeo quod sunt enim<sup>5929</sup> multi qui<sup>5930</sup> propter instantia indivisibilia non esse<sup>5931</sup> in tempore illos<sup>5932</sup> modos<sup>5933</sup> exponendi non admittunt, prout in prima parte<sup>5934</sup> capituli quarti<sup>5935</sup> fuit tractatum. Et isti<sup>5936</sup> habent duplicem modum exponendi secundum duas ipsorum<sup>5937</sup> opiniones. Una opinio<sup>5938</sup> dicit quod ly 'incipit' et 'desinit' |E 64r| similiter<sup>5939</sup> exponendae sint<sup>5940</sup> tam in terminis rerum permanentium quam in terminis rerum successivarum,<sup>5941</sup> quod etiam<sup>5942</sup> alia<sup>5943</sup> opinio concedit. Et sic<sup>5944</sup> exponit prima opinio<sup>5945</sup> 'motus<sup>5946</sup> incipit esse': 'motus nunc<sup>5947</sup> est et motus<sup>5948</sup> immediate ante hoc non fuit'. Et<sup>5949</sup> demonstrant<sup>5950</sup> per ly hoc totum<sup>5951</sup> tempus per quod<sup>5952</sup> ille motus fuit. Similiter dicunt ista 'motus desinit' esse sic exponenda:<sup>5953</sup> 'motus nunc non est et motus<sup>5954</sup> immediate ante hoc fuit'.<sup>5955</sup> Et demonstrant<sup>5956</sup> per ly<sup>5957</sup> hoc totum tempus sequens in quo talis<sup>5958</sup> res fuit. Sic etiam<sup>5959</sup> exponitur propositio de<sup>5960</sup> 'incipit' per positionem de praesenti et<sup>5961</sup>

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5927 vel W

5928 *add.* capitulis M

5929 *om.* W

5930 multi qui] multae quae M

5931 non esse] *om.* W

5932 istos MY

5933 *vel forsitan* modis M

5934 *om.* M, *ante* prima Y

5935 *ante* capituli M

5936 illi Y

5937 quorum M, eorum Y

5938 *om.* Y

5939 simpliciter W

5940 sunt MW

5941 tam - successivarum] tam in rebus successivis quam in rebus permanentium MY

5942 et W

5943 secunda Y, ista M

5944 et sic] *om.* Y

5945 ista Y, sicut iam M

5946 modus W

5947 *add.* non W

5948 *om.* W

5949 *om.* W

5950 demonstratur W, demonstrantur M

5951 *om.* M

5952 hoc M

5953 sic exponenda] motus M

5954 *add.* nunc Y

5955 similiter - fuit] *om.* W

5956 demonstratur W

5957 *om.* M

5958 *om.* MY

5959 ergo W

5960 propositio de] ly MW

5961 *add.* per M

remotionem de praeterito. Et propositio de 'desinit' per remotionem de praesenti et positionem de praeterito.<sup>5962</sup> Et haec expositio est minus bona, quia secundum eam oporteret istam concedere quod Adam primus homo nunc<sup>5963</sup> desinit homo esse; similiter quod villa<sup>5964</sup> Montis<sup>5965</sup> Pessolani [Y 112<sup>v</sup>] nunc incipit esse, [W134<sup>r</sup>], quod est falsum<sup>5966</sup> - et consequentiae patent per exponentes earum subtiliter intuenti.<sup>5967</sup>

Alia opinio dicit aliter<sup>5968</sup> quod ly incipit connotat<sup>5969</sup> 'nuper non fuisse' et ly<sup>5970</sup> desinit<sup>5971</sup> 'nuper fuisse sed<sup>5972</sup> in brevi tempore<sup>5973</sup> praeterito',<sup>5974</sup> et<sup>5975</sup> ideo<sup>5976</sup> exponunt sic<sup>5977</sup> 'motus incipit esse': 'motus<sup>5978</sup> nunc<sup>5979</sup> est et idem motus<sup>5980</sup> nuper<sup>5981</sup> non fuit' - i.e.<sup>5982</sup> in tempore parum<sup>5983</sup> praeterito<sup>5984</sup> tempus praesens breve, quod est<sup>5985</sup> unius horae vel momenti. Et 'motus desinit esse'<sup>5986</sup> exponitur sic:<sup>5987</sup> 'motus nunc non est et idem<sup>5988</sup> motus nuper fuit'. Et haec<sup>5989</sup> opinio satis est<sup>5990</sup> vulgaris: loici<sup>5991</sup> enim rem quae diu non<sup>5992</sup> fuit <et nunc est> dicunt †in tempore† <incipiens> esse. Et<sup>5993</sup> quae ante<sup>5994</sup> hoc<sup>5995</sup> fuit<sup>5996</sup> sic quod non est<sup>5997</sup> diu postquam<sup>5998</sup> fuit et iam<sup>5999</sup> non est, dicunt

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<sup>5962</sup> et propositio - praeterito] *om.* MW

<sup>5963</sup> non M | homo nunc] *om.* W

<sup>5964</sup> villa] in illa W

<sup>5965</sup> mons W

<sup>5966</sup> quod est falsum] quomodo bene servavit W

<sup>5967</sup> et - intuenti] *om.* MY

<sup>5968</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5969</sup> *om.* W, *add.* tempus per M

<sup>5970</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>5971</sup> aliu M

<sup>5972</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5973</sup> *ante* brevi W

<sup>5974</sup> praeteriti W

<sup>5975</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5976</sup> illi M

<sup>5977</sup> ipsi W

<sup>5978</sup> et W

<sup>5979</sup> *add.* non Y

<sup>5980</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5981</sup> *om.* M

<sup>5982</sup> et M

<sup>5983</sup> *lectio dubia* [per non Y

<sup>5984</sup> praeteriti W

<sup>5985</sup> *add.* qua Y

<sup>5986</sup> *add.* motus W

<sup>5987</sup> exponitur sic] *om.* WY

<sup>5988</sup> nisi W

<sup>5989</sup> *add.* +\_\_+ M

<sup>5990</sup> *ante* satis M

<sup>5991</sup> vulgares W

<sup>5992</sup> *ante* diu Y

<sup>5993</sup> *om.* W

<sup>5994</sup> quae ante] enim M

desinens |M 56v| esse.<sup>6000</sup> Quam propter, haec opinio<sup>6001</sup> non<sup>6002</sup> videtur probabilior<sup>6003</sup> praecedentis.<sup>6004</sup>

Credo tamen primam opinionem, scilicet positam<sup>6005</sup> in praecedenti capitulo, esse<sup>6006</sup> magis logicalem et veram. Et<sup>6007</sup> ideo in eam<sup>6008</sup> sto contentus.

Dicat tamen<sup>6009</sup> quis sicut sibi placeat, quia<sup>6010</sup> in quid nominis non<sup>6011</sup> est fortis ratio.<sup>6012</sup>

## II.5.2 <Regulae de propositionibus de 'desinit'>

Nunc consequenter ponuntur<sup>6013</sup> aliquae<sup>6014</sup> regulae |E 64v| consequentiarum propositionum de 'desinit' et sunt totaliter eadem seu<sup>6015</sup> proportionales sicut de 'incipit' ponebantur.<sup>6016</sup>

<1> Prima est quod arguendo<sup>6017</sup> a qualibet de 'desinit' ad suas exponentes est bona consequentia<sup>6018</sup> et e converso.

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<sup>5995</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>5996</sup> ante hoc fuit] autem fuerat W

<sup>5997</sup> sit M

<sup>5998</sup> *lectio dubia* quasi postea M

<sup>5999</sup> *lectio dubia* M

<sup>6000</sup> postquam - esse] post hoc decet desinere

<sup>6001</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6002</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>6003</sup> ante videtur W

<sup>6004</sup> haec - praecedentis] probabile verificatur esse praecedenti W

<sup>6005</sup> posita M | opinionem scilicet positam] suppositionem W

<sup>6006</sup> est M

<sup>6007</sup> et veram et] *om.* Y

<sup>6008</sup> in eam] mea Y, *om.* W

<sup>6009</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6010</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6011</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6012</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6013</sup> dantur W

<sup>6014</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6015</sup> et M, *om.* W

<sup>6016</sup> ante de M, *om.* W

<sup>6017</sup> est quod arguendo] *om.* W, est arguendo Y, quod arguendo M

<sup>6018</sup> post e converso Y

<2> Secunda regula, quod<sup>6019</sup> ab illis quae exponuntur copulative ad unam<sup>6020</sup> eius<sup>6021</sup> exponentium<sup>6022</sup> est bona consequentia, et<sup>6023</sup> non e converso.<sup>6024</sup>

<3> Tertia regula est<sup>6025</sup> quod<sup>6026</sup> ab illis quae exponuntur disiunctive ad unam exponentium<sup>6027</sup> non valet<sup>6028</sup> consequentia.

<4> Quarta regula,<sup>6029</sup> quod arguendo<sup>6030</sup> <in><sup>6031</sup> eisdem<sup>6032</sup> ab una<sup>6033</sup> suarum<sup>6034</sup> exponentium ad expositam est bona consequentia.

<5> Quinta<sup>6035</sup> regula,<sup>6036</sup> quod<sup>6037</sup> cum hoc verbo 'desinit' ab inferiori ad superius postpositum non valet consequentia.<sup>6038</sup> Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes desinit esse albus, igitur Sortes desinit esse coloratus'.<sup>6039</sup>

<6> Sexta<sup>6040</sup> regula est quod<sup>6041</sup> a propositione de 'desinit' sumpta cum aliqua determinatione |Y 113r| ad eandem sine illa determinatione non oportet consequentiam valere.<sup>6042</sup> Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes desinit esse currens ergo Sortes desinit'.<sup>6043</sup>

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<sup>6019</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>6020</sup> ad unam] ab una M

<sup>6021</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6022</sup> expositam M

<sup>6023</sup> sed W

<sup>6024</sup> non econverso] e converso no W

<sup>6025</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>6026</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6027</sup> expositam M [unam exponentium] expositam W

<sup>6028</sup> non valet] est bona W

<sup>6029</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>6030</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6031</sup> ab M

<sup>6032</sup> in eisdem] contra W, *om.* Y

<sup>6033</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6034</sup> *om.* W, suam M

<sup>6035</sup> sexta W

<sup>6036</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6037</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6038</sup> *ante non* W

<sup>6039</sup> ut non sequitur - coloratus] *om.* MW

<sup>6040</sup> quinta W

<sup>6041</sup> est quod] *om.* M

<sup>6042</sup> oportet consequentiam valere] valet consequentia M



<7> Septima regula est haec: <sup>6044</sup> arguendo <sup>6045</sup> a propositio de <sup>6046</sup> 'desinit' postposita <sup>6047</sup> determinatione<sup>6048</sup> sumpta<sup>6049</sup> cum signo universalis ad eandem determinatione<sup>6050</sup> sine tali<sup>6051</sup> signo universalis<sup>6052</sup> non oportet<sup>6053</sup> consequentiam valere.<sup>6054</sup> Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes desinit scire omnem propositionem igitur Sortes desinit scire propositionem'.<sup>6055</sup>

<8> Octava regula est et ultima<sup>6056</sup> quantum ad praesens: arguendo mediante<sup>6057</sup> hoc verbo 'desinit' postposita<sup>6058</sup> dictione ad eandem praepostiam non oportet consequentiam valere. <sup>6059</sup>Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes desinit esse albus, igitur albus desinit esse Sortes'.<sup>6060</sup>  
Et haec de 'desinit dicta sufficiant'.<sup>6061</sup>

## II.6. 1 <De propositionibus de differt>

Consequenter<sup>6062</sup> in sexto capitulo dicendum<sup>6063</sup> est quomodo exponantur<sup>6064</sup> propositiones in quibus ponitur hoc verbum |W134v| 'differt' vel<sup>6065</sup> aliud aequivalens ei.<sup>6066</sup>

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<sup>6043</sup> ut non - ergo Sortes desinit] *om.* MW

<sup>6044</sup> est haec] *om.* MY

<sup>6045</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6046</sup> a propositio de] a W, de M

<sup>6047</sup> *post.* dictione Y

<sup>6048</sup> *ante* postposita Y, dictione MW

<sup>6049</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6050</sup> *om.* W, dictione M

<sup>6051</sup> illo M

<sup>6052</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6053</sup> *add.* talem Y

<sup>6054</sup> oportet consequentiam valere] valet consequentia M

<sup>6055</sup> ut - scire propositionem] *om.* W

<sup>6056</sup> est et ultima] *om.* MY, *add.* ad W

<sup>6057</sup> ab W

<sup>6058</sup> prius posita W

<sup>6059</sup> oportet consequentiam valere] valet consequentia M

<sup>6060</sup> ut - esse Sortes] *om.* MW

<sup>6061</sup> et - sufficiant] *om.* M | *add.* etcetera etcetera etcetera W, *add.* sequitur capitulum sextum etc. M, *add.* nunc consequitur capitulum sextum Y

<sup>6062</sup> unde M, nunc Y

<sup>6063</sup> videndum Y

<sup>6064</sup> exponuntur MW

<sup>6065</sup> aut M

<1> Circa quod<sup>6067</sup> primo est<sup>6068</sup> sciendum<sup>6069</sup> quod ista inter se<sup>6070</sup> convertuntur et sunt quasi<sup>6071</sup> sinonima:<sup>6072</sup> 'differt', 'aliud', 'non-idem',<sup>6073</sup> 'alterum', 'diversum',<sup>6074</sup> et si qua sunt similia.<sup>6075</sup>

Et sicut<sup>6076</sup> exponitur<sup>6077</sup> propositio in qua ponitur unum istorum<sup>6078</sup> ita exponitur quaevis alia<sup>6079</sup> in qua ponitur aliud<sup>6080</sup> ipsorum<sup>6081</sup> ceteris paribus.

<2> Secundo nota<sup>6082</sup> quod omnis<sup>6083</sup> propositio de 'differt' affirmativa<sup>6084</sup> debet exponi<sup>6085</sup> per copulativam<sup>6086</sup> trimembrem. Et erit<sup>6087</sup> prima exponens<sup>6088</sup> positio subiecti<sup>6089</sup> i.e.<sup>6090</sup> propositio affirmativa<sup>6091</sup> in<sup>6092</sup> qua de subiecto propositionis<sup>6093</sup> de 'differt' personaliter capto<sup>6094</sup> affirmatur esse.<sup>6095</sup> Secunda est<sup>6096</sup> positio termini<sup>6097</sup> super quem<sup>6098</sup> cadit hoc<sup>6099</sup> verbum 'differt', i.e.<sup>6100</sup>

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<sup>6066</sup> *ante* aequivalens M

<sup>6067</sup> *vel fors*an quas W

<sup>6068</sup> *ante* primo W

<sup>6069</sup> notandum Y

<sup>6070</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6071</sup> *ante* sunt M

<sup>6072</sup> *add.* scilicet Y

<sup>6073</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6074</sup> *ante* alterum Y

<sup>6075</sup> et - similia] *om.* MY

<sup>6076</sup> *add.* una W

<sup>6077</sup> *ante* ita W, *post* propositio Y

<sup>6078</sup> eorum M | unum istorum] aliquod ipsorum W

<sup>6079</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6080</sup> alterum MY

<sup>6081</sup> eorum M | aliud isporum] aliquod ipsorum M

<sup>6082</sup> est notandum Y

<sup>6083</sup> quaevis M, *om.* W

<sup>6084</sup> *post* propositio W

<sup>6085</sup> debet exponi] exponitur MY

<sup>6086</sup> *add.* affirmativam M

<sup>6087</sup> *post* exponens M

<sup>6088</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6089</sup> positio subiecti] *om.* W

<sup>6090</sup> et M

<sup>6091</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6092</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6093</sup> *lectio dubia* propositionalitas Y, *add.* affirmativa M

<sup>6094</sup> perspnaliter capto] *om.* W

<sup>6095</sup> *om.* MY, *add.* hoc verbum est secundum adiacens Y

<sup>6096</sup> erit M, esset Y

<sup>6097</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6098</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6099</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>6100</sup> *vel fors*an idem M

propositio affirmativa in qua determinatio super quam cadit<sup>6101</sup> |E 65r| ly<sup>6102</sup> 'differt' personaliter capta<sup>6103</sup> affirmetur<sup>6104</sup> esse.<sup>6105</sup> Tertia erit<sup>6106</sup> negatio termini<sup>6107</sup> super quem cadit<sup>6108</sup> ly<sup>6109</sup> differt a subiecto.<sup>6110</sup>

Exemplum: prima exponens<sup>6111</sup> istius<sup>6112</sup> 'Sortes differt ab asino' est<sup>6113</sup> haec: 'Sortes est';<sup>6114</sup> secunda:<sup>6115</sup> 'asinus est';<sup>6116</sup> |Y 113v| tertia est negativa, ut<sup>6117</sup> ista:<sup>6118</sup> 'Sortes non est asinus'.

Unde sequitur hanc esse falsam: 'Sortes differt a chymera', quia secunda<sup>6119</sup> exponens est falsa, scilicet ista:<sup>6120</sup> 'chymera est'.

<3> Tertio nota<sup>6121</sup> quod si in propositionibus<sup>6122</sup> de 'differt' ly differt praecedit<sup>6123</sup> terminum super quem denotatur cadere, sicut |M 57r| in exemplo prius posito, tunc in tertia exponente negatio<sup>6124</sup> etiam debet praeponi eisdem terminis. Sed si non praecedit ly differt istum terminum,<sup>6125</sup> in tertia<sup>6126</sup>

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<sup>6101</sup> *ante* personaliter M

<sup>6102</sup> hoc verbum W

<sup>6103</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6104</sup> affirmatur Y

<sup>6105</sup> et M, *add.* id verbum est secundum adiacens Y

<sup>6106</sup> esset Y

<sup>6107</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>6108</sup> *ante* a subiecto M

<sup>6109</sup> hoc verbum Y

<sup>6110</sup> a subiecto] *om.* W

<sup>6111</sup> prima exponens] primi exponentis M

<sup>6112</sup> *om.* M, huius *add.* scilicet Y

<sup>6113</sup> et M

<sup>6114</sup> *add.* et M

<sup>6115</sup> *add.* haec MY, *add.* et Y

<sup>6116</sup> *add.* et Y

<sup>6117</sup> est negativa ut] *om.* M

<sup>6118</sup> haec MY, *add.* et Y

<sup>6119</sup> una W

<sup>6120</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>6121</sup> est notandum Y

<sup>6122</sup> propositione W

<sup>6123</sup> *add.* istum Y

<sup>6124</sup> expositionem M

<sup>6125</sup> tunc - terminum] *om.* W

<sup>6126</sup> secunda MW

exponente negatio etiam<sup>6127</sup> deberet<sup>6128</sup> eidem<sup>6129</sup> termino postponi<sup>6130</sup> - ut hic<sup>6131</sup> 'Sortes ab homine differt' tertia<sup>6132</sup> exponens est 'Sortes homo<sup>6133</sup> non est'.

<4> Ex quibus<sup>6134</sup> sequitur<sup>6135</sup> quartum notabile<sup>6136</sup> quod propositio negativa de<sup>6137</sup> 'differt' debet exponi per disiunctivam trimembrem de partibus<sup>6138</sup> oppositis partibus copulativae per quam exponebatur<sup>6139</sup> affirmativa, ut ista<sup>6140</sup> 'Sortes non differt ab asino', exponitur sic: 'Sortes non est vel nullus asinus<sup>6141</sup> est vel Sortes est asinus'.

<5> Quinto nota<sup>6142</sup> quod in<sup>6143</sup> capiendo<sup>6144</sup> partes oppositas partibus copulativae,<sup>6145</sup> dum exponitur<sup>6146</sup> negativa de<sup>6147</sup> 'differt'<sup>6148</sup> per disiunctivam,<sup>6149</sup> est<sup>6150</sup> diligenter advertendum utrum ista de differt affirmativa sit<sup>6151</sup> contraria vel<sup>6152</sup> contradictoria vel subcontraria.<sup>6153</sup> Si enim fuit contraria<sup>6154</sup> tunc exponentes<sup>6155</sup> in disiunctiva in quibus ponitur subiectum affirmativae<sup>6156</sup> debet exponentibus<sup>6157</sup> in copulativa<sup>6158</sup> esse contrariae.<sup>6159</sup> Proportionaliter, si fuerint<sup>6160</sup> subcontrariae,

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<sup>6127</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6128</sup> *debet* MY

<sup>6129</sup> *illi* Y, *isti* M

<sup>6130</sup> *praeponi* Y, *add. exemplum* W

<sup>6131</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6132</sup> *secunda* W

<sup>6133</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6134</sup> *dictis* Y

<sup>6135</sup> *add. +\_+ M*

<sup>6136</sup> *ante* quartum M

<sup>6137</sup> *de+b+ W*

<sup>6138</sup> *add. contrarie* W

<sup>6139</sup> *add. copulativa* Y

<sup>6140</sup> *om.* W, *illa* M

<sup>6141</sup> *add. +vel+ W*

<sup>6142</sup> *est notandum* M

<sup>6143</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>6144</sup> *lectio dubia* mutando M

<sup>6145</sup> *partibus copulativae]* *om.* MY

<sup>6146</sup> *dum exponitur]* in exponendo Y

<sup>6147</sup> *add. ly* W

<sup>6148</sup> *de differt]* *om.* Y

<sup>6149</sup> *per disiunctivam]* *partibus copulativae* M, *om.* W

<sup>6150</sup> *post advertendum* W

<sup>6151</sup> *ante affirmativa* MY

<sup>6152</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6153</sup> *add. vel subalterna* MY

<sup>6154</sup> *vel contradictoria- contraria]* *om.* W

<sup>6155</sup> *add. eius* W

<sup>6156</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6157</sup> *ex partibus affirmativae* W

istae de 'differt' erunt exponentes in quibus ponitur subiectum subcontrariae. Et si<sup>6161</sup> contradictoriae, erunt contradictoriae.<sup>6162</sup> Et per hoc<sup>6163</sup> patet quomodo quaelibet<sup>6164</sup> propositio<sup>6165</sup> de differt est exponenda.<sup>6166</sup>

<Regulae de 'differt'>

<6.1-4> Sexto <sup>6167</sup> de consequentiis illarum <sup>6168</sup> ponuntur quattuor regulae et <sup>6169</sup> sunt <sup>6170</sup> proportionaliter positae hic<sup>6171</sup> sicut [W135r] de exceptivis in capitulo primo<sup>6172</sup> sunt<sup>6173</sup> positae.<sup>6174</sup> [E 65v]

<6.5> Et est tunc<sup>6175</sup> quinta regula ista:<sup>6176</sup> arguendo<sup>6177</sup> ab inferiori ad superius respectu termini super quem cadit hoc verbun 'differt' postpositum<sup>6178</sup> non valet consequentia, sicut<sup>6179</sup> non sequitur: 'tu differs ab asino, ergo<sup>6180</sup> differs ab animali'.

<6.6> Sexta regula: arguendo respectu huius verbi 'differt'<sup>6181</sup> capti cum determinatione vel<sup>6182</sup> signo universali ad eandem propositionem de 'differt' sine ista determinatione vel sine signo universali<sup>6183</sup>

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<sup>6158</sup> in copulativa] copulativae Y

<sup>6159</sup> add. et MY

<sup>6160</sup> erunt M

<sup>6161</sup> subcontrariae - et si] om. M

<sup>6162</sup> erunt contradictoriae] *blank space* M | proportionaliter - contradictoriae] si exponibiles affirmativa et negativa contradictoriae tunc exponentes earum debet esse contradictoriae si vero subcontrariae tunc exponente earum debent esse subcontrariae et si exponibiles sint subalternae tunc exponentes debet esse subalternae Y

<sup>6163</sup> et per hoc] et sic M, ex praedictis Y

<sup>6164</sup> om. M

<sup>6165</sup> propositiones Y

<sup>6166</sup> est exponenda] sint exponendae Y

<sup>6167</sup> add. notandum est Y

<sup>6168</sup> earum W, istarum Y

<sup>6169</sup> om. W, add. regulae M

<sup>6170</sup> om. W, post proportionaliter M

<sup>6171</sup> positae hic] om. MW

<sup>6172</sup> ante capitulo M

<sup>6173</sup> om. M, post positae Y

<sup>6174</sup> add. et in aliis capitulis post Y

<sup>6175</sup> est tunc] om. WY

<sup>6176</sup> om. W

<sup>6177</sup> om. M

<sup>6178</sup> *blank space* M

<sup>6179</sup> exemplum ut M

<sup>6180</sup> igitur M

non oportet consequentiam valere,<sup>6184</sup> ut non sequitur: 'tu differs ab homine albo igitur tu differs ab homine',<sup>6185</sup> 'tu differs ab omni homine, ergo tu differs ab homine'.<sup>6186</sup> Et causa istarum est quia ly<sup>6187</sup> differt includit in se<sup>6188</sup> negationem, sicut patet per ea quae dicta sunt.<sup>6189</sup>

Et haec de differt sufficiant. <sup>6190</sup>

## II.7 <De 'infinitem'>

Nunc<sup>6191</sup> in septimo capitulo dicendum est de expositionibus huius termini<sup>6192</sup> 'infinitem'.<sup>6193</sup>

<1> Pro quo nota<sup>6194</sup> quod ly infinitum<sup>6195</sup> quandoque attribuitur magnitudinibus, quandoque numeris, quandoque multitudinibus,<sup>6196</sup> quandoque durationibus, sed solum volo hic de eo loqui<sup>6197</sup> prout attribuitur magnitudinibus et<sup>6198</sup> numeris,<sup>6199</sup> quia prout<sup>6200</sup> exponitur in<sup>6201</sup> istis,<sup>6202</sup> proportionaliter exponitur in aliis<sup>6203</sup> suo modo.

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<sup>6181</sup> huius verbi differt] eiusdem termini W

<sup>6182</sup> sive W

<sup>6183</sup> ad - universali] sive alio W, *om.* M

<sup>6184</sup> oportet consequentiam valere] valet consequentia MY

<sup>6185</sup> tu differs ab homine albo igitur tu differs ab homine] *om.* MW

<sup>6186</sup> tu differs ab omni homine ergo tu differs ab homine] *om.* Y

<sup>6187</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6188</sup> in se] *om.* W

<sup>6189</sup> sicut - sunt] *om.* MY

<sup>6190</sup> et haec de differt sufficiant] et haec de sexto capitulo *add.* etcetera W, sequitur capituli 7 ergo etc. M

<sup>6191</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>6192</sup> expositionibus huius termini] propositionibus in quibus ponitur iste terminus Y

<sup>6193</sup> *add.* et quomodo exponantur Y

<sup>6194</sup> pro quo nota] pro aliquo primo notandum est Y

<sup>6195</sup> ly infinitum] *om.* M

<sup>6196</sup> virtutibus W | quandoque numeris quandoque multitudinibus] *om.* Y

<sup>6197</sup> *post* volo Y

<sup>6198</sup> aut MW

<sup>6199</sup> numero Y

<sup>6200</sup> sicut Y

<sup>6201</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6202</sup> prout - istis] *om.* W, *add.* sicut Y

<sup>6203</sup> *om.* W

<2> Secundo nota <sup>6204</sup> quod, quandoque <sup>6205</sup> 'infinite' <sup>6206</sup> attribuatur magnitudinibus sive <sup>6207</sup> multitudinibus, <sup>6208</sup> potest capi dupliciter: <sup>6209</sup> categorematice vel sincategorematice, <sup>6210</sup> et utroque modo tam in istis <sup>6211</sup> quam in illis <sup>6212</sup> erit <sup>6213</sup> exponendum.

<3> Tertio nota <sup>6214</sup> quod in continuis <sup>6215</sup> sive in <sup>6216</sup> magnitudinibus capiendo 'infinite' categorematice <sup>6217</sup> tantum est dicere 'infinite' quasi <sup>6218</sup> 'extensum' <sup>6219</sup> sine termino, ut <sup>6220</sup> hic: 'magnitudo est infinita', i.e. 'extensa sine termino'. Unde <sup>6221</sup> patet <sup>6222</sup> <quod> <sup>6223</sup> si sic <sup>6224</sup> esset aliquid infinite, oportet quod ipsum secundum omnem dimensionem esset infinite. Si enim secundum unam dimensionem esset infinite, tunc <sup>6225</sup> usque <sup>6226</sup> unam <sup>6227</sup> dimensionem <sup>6228</sup> haberet terminum et <sup>6229</sup> per consequens non <sup>6230</sup> esset <sup>6231</sup> sine termino.

<4> Ex quo patet quarto quomodo <sup>6232</sup> exponi debeat <sup>6233</sup> infinite longum, quod est infinite <sup>6234</sup> secundum quod <sup>6235</sup> consuevit <sup>6236</sup> appellari. Debet enim dici <sup>6237</sup> extensum secundum longitudinem sine

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<sup>6204</sup> est notandum Y

<sup>6205</sup> quando M, si *add.* ly Y

<sup>6206</sup> *add.* sive W

<sup>6207</sup> vel M

<sup>6208</sup> *add.* tunc M

<sup>6209</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6210</sup> categorematice vel sincategorematice] uno modo sincategorematice alio categorematice Y

<sup>6211</sup> illis W

<sup>6212</sup> istis W, aliis M

<sup>6213</sup> est MY

<sup>6214</sup> est notandum Y

<sup>6215</sup> multitudinibus M

<sup>6216</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6217</sup> capiendo 'infinite' categorematice] *om.* MY

<sup>6218</sup> sicut M, in Y

<sup>6219</sup> intesum M

<sup>6220</sup> sicut M

<sup>6221</sup> nunc M

<sup>6222</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6223</sup> *om.* MWY

<sup>6224</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>6225</sup> et Y

<sup>6226</sup> versus W

<sup>6227</sup> nullam MY

<sup>6228</sup> esset infinite si - dimensionem] non M

<sup>6229</sup> *add.* sic M

<sup>6230</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>6231</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6232</sup> quod W

<sup>6233</sup> debet W

<sup>6234</sup> quod est infinite] *om.* Y

termino.<sup>6238</sup> Unde |M 57v| si aliqua linea<sup>6239</sup> esset infinita in longitudine diceretur extensa secundum<sup>6240</sup> longitudinem |E 66r| sine termino.<sup>6241</sup> Proportionaliter describitur<sup>6242</sup> 'infinitum latum' et 'infinitum profundum'.

<5> Quinto nota<sup>6243</sup> quod iste terminus<sup>6244</sup> 'infinitum', captus<sup>6245</sup> sincategorematicè in<sup>6246</sup> magnitudinibus<sup>6247</sup> consuevit sic exponi: 'infinitum'<sup>6248</sup> |Y 114v| id est 'aliquantum<sup>6249</sup> et non tantum quin maius'. Sed haec<sup>6250</sup> expositio videtur insufficiens,<sup>6251</sup> nam secundum<sup>6252</sup> eam oporteret<sup>6253</sup> in aliquo casu concedere<sup>6254</sup> quod aliquod corpus<sup>6255</sup> <in><sup>6256</sup> infinitum augetur<sup>6257</sup> et tamen<sup>6258</sup> numquam attingeret quantitatem bipedalem. Hoc consequens videtur esse<sup>6259</sup> inconueniens. Quare<sup>6260</sup> sequitur quod non sic exponitur.<sup>6261</sup> |W135v| Consequentia ultima tenet.<sup>6262</sup> Et prima declaratur, quia posito quod<sup>6263</sup> 'a' corpori<sup>6264</sup> [bi]pedali<sup>6265</sup> adderetur 'b'<sup>6266</sup> corpus [bi]pedale<sup>6267</sup> per partes

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6235 quid Y  
6236 consueverunt W, post appellari Y  
6237 exponi sic Y  
6238 ex quo - termino] om. M  
6239 lineat Y  
6240 infinita - secundum] qua ad Y  
6241 unde - termino] om. W  
6242 exponitur Y  
6243 notanudm est Y  
6244 iste terminus] om. MY  
6245 captum MY  
6246 et Y  
6247 add. attributum Y  
6248 om. W  
6249 aliquantulum WY  
6250 post expositio M  
6251 videtur insufficiens] non videtur sufficiens M, non videtur sufficere Y  
6252 add. +non+ M  
6253 oportet Y, add. concedi MY  
6254 om. MY  
6255 om. M  
6256 om. EMWY  
6257 augmentaretur MY  
6258 et tamen] tunc M  
6259 om. W  
6260 quia M, qua est Y  
6261 non sic exponitur] expositio non valeret M, expositio non valet Y  
6262 patet MY  
6263 add. +b corpus+ E  
6264 corpore M, om. W  
6265 bipedali MY, om. EW  
6266 bi add. marg. M  
6267 om. M



proportionales consequenter se habentes<sup>6268</sup> ita quod primo adderetur 'a' medietas, secundo secunda<sup>6269</sup> pars proportionalis,<sup>6270</sup> tertio tertia pars<sup>6271</sup> et sic de aliis.<sup>6272</sup> Constat quod in hac<sup>6273</sup> augmentatione<sup>6274</sup> 'a'<sup>6275</sup> numquam<sup>6276</sup> attingeret<sup>6277</sup> quantitatem bipedalem, quia<sup>6278</sup> numquam esset<sup>6279</sup> sibi<sup>6280</sup> 'b' totum additum eo quod numquam a veniret ad ultimam partem proportionalem ipsius b.<sup>6281</sup>

Et<sup>6282</sup> tamen secundum istam<sup>6283</sup> expositionem<sup>6284</sup> <in><sup>6285</sup> infinitum augmentaretur,<sup>6286</sup> quod<sup>6287</sup> patet quia aliquantum<sup>6288</sup> augmentaretur<sup>6289</sup> et<sup>6290</sup> non<sup>6291</sup> tantum quin maius,<sup>6292</sup> cum nusquam totum esset sibi additum eo quod non est advenire<sup>6293</sup> ad ultimam partem<sup>6294</sup> proportionalem,<sup>6295</sup> ergo<sup>6296</sup> in<sup>6297</sup> infinitum augmentatur.<sup>6298</sup> Consequentia tenet<sup>6299</sup> per expositionem.<sup>6300</sup> Antecedens pro prima parte

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<sup>6268</sup> habent M

<sup>6269</sup> om. MY

<sup>6270</sup> om. MWY

<sup>6271</sup> tertio tertia pars] om. MY

<sup>6272</sup> ita - aliis] om. MY

<sup>6273</sup> hoc W

<sup>6274</sup> augmentatio MY, casu W

<sup>6275</sup> om. E

<sup>6276</sup> a numquam] om. W

<sup>6277</sup> attingere W, post bipedalem M

<sup>6278</sup> quod W

<sup>6279</sup> add. ergo W

<sup>6280</sup> om. M

<sup>6281</sup> totum - b] b totum additum eo quod numquam est venire ad ultimam partem proportionum ipsius b W | sequens quod ita quod esset sibi totaliter additum Y | sequens ita quod secundum ei *lectio dubia* totaliter *lectio dubia* additum M

<sup>6282</sup> add. quod W

<sup>6283</sup> illam Y

<sup>6284</sup> exponentem W

<sup>6285</sup> om. MWY

<sup>6286</sup> argumentaretur W, augetur M

<sup>6287</sup> om. MW

<sup>6288</sup> aliquantulum WY

<sup>6289</sup> argumentatur W

<sup>6290</sup> add. tamen M

<sup>6291</sup> add. +tamen+ M

<sup>6292</sup> magis W

<sup>6293</sup> *lectio dubia* Y, devenire M

<sup>6294</sup> parte Y

<sup>6295</sup> cum - proportionalem] om. W

<sup>6296</sup> igitur MY

<sup>6297</sup> om. Y

<sup>6298</sup> om. MW

<sup>6299</sup> patet Y

<sup>6300</sup> exponentem W, add. et Y

patet per casum.<sup>6301</sup> Et<sup>6302</sup> pro<sup>6303</sup> secunda parte<sup>6304</sup> etiam,<sup>6305</sup> quia non tantum augetur<sup>6306</sup> quin  
maius augetur<sup>6307</sup> apposita<sup>6308</sup> nova<sup>6309</sup> parte<sup>6310</sup> proportionali<sup>6311</sup> ipsius<sup>6312</sup> 'b'.<sup>6313</sup>

<6> Iuxta quod notandum est<sup>6314</sup> <sexto><sup>6315</sup> quod<sup>6316</sup> 'infinitem' sincategorematicè sumptum<sup>6317</sup> aliter  
exponit Aristoteles in<sup>6318</sup> tertio *Physicorum*, definiens ipsum sic:<sup>6319</sup> "'infinitem' est cuius quantitatem  
accipientibus <sup>6320</sup> semper restat aliquid <sup>6321</sup> accipere ultra". <sup>6322</sup> Et intelligitur sic: 'infinitem'  
sincategorematicè sumptum<sup>6323</sup> est<sup>6324</sup> quod in quantitate apprehensum ab<sup>6325</sup> anima<sup>6326</sup> numquam  
potest totum<sup>6327</sup> apprehendi, sed semper restat aliquid<sup>6328</sup> ultra, scilicet<sup>6329</sup> maior<sup>6330</sup> quantitas non  
apprehensa ab ipsa<sup>6331</sup> anima.<sup>6332</sup>

Vel aliter<sup>6333</sup> est expositio<sup>6334</sup> communis et melior:<sup>6335</sup> |Y 115r| 'infinitem' est quod<sup>6336</sup> aliquantum<sup>6337</sup>  
est<sup>6338</sup> et quantumlibet maius.<sup>6339</sup> Ut 'infinitem erit ens' exponitur sic: 'aliquantum<sup>6340</sup> erit ens et  
quantumlibet maius<sup>6341</sup> erit<sup>6342</sup> ens'. Et haec est descriptio melior et magis<sup>6343</sup> usitata.<sup>6344</sup>

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<sup>6301</sup> eandem M  
<sup>6302</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6303</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6304</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6305</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6306</sup> augetur W, augmentaretur Y  
<sup>6307</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>6308</sup> *vel forsàn* opposita M  
<sup>6309</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6310</sup> apposita nova parte] apponat negativa W  
<sup>6311</sup> proportionaliter M  
<sup>6312</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6313</sup> ipsius b] *om.* Y  
<sup>6314</sup> notandum est] nota W  
<sup>6315</sup> quarto W, quinto MY  
<sup>6316</sup> *add.* Philosophus W  
<sup>6317</sup> captum *ante* sincategorematicè W  
<sup>6318</sup> Aristoteles in] *om.* W  
<sup>6319</sup> definiens ipsum sic] sic ipsum definiens Y  
<sup>6320</sup> accepta + + bilis est W, incipientibus M  
<sup>6321</sup> restat aliquid] *om.* W  
<sup>6322</sup> *ante* accipere MY  
<sup>6323</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6324</sup> dicitur W  
<sup>6325</sup> in M  
<sup>6326</sup> apprehensum ab anima] ab anima est apprehensum et W  
<sup>6327</sup> tamen *ante* potest W  
<sup>6328</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6329</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6330</sup> magna Y, *om.* M  
<sup>6331</sup> *om.* MY  
<sup>6332</sup> ab ipsa anima] *ante* apprehensa MY  
<sup>6333</sup> altera M, *add.* et Y

Et sic dictum est de expositione infiniti in magnitudinibus.<sup>6345</sup>

<7> Septimo<sup>6346</sup> nota<sup>6347</sup> quod 'infinitum' in multitudinibus<sup>6348</sup> captum categorematice exponitur proportionaliter<sup>6349</sup> sicut in magnitudinibus, sicut<sup>6350</sup> 'infinita<sup>6351</sup> multitudo' i.e.<sup>6352</sup> 'multitudo<sup>6353</sup> non habens terminum' - et sic consuevit regulariter capi.

Si quaeritur<sup>6354</sup> utrum multitudo partium continui<sup>6355</sup> dicatur<sup>6356</sup> hoc modo 'infinitum',<sup>6357</sup> dicatur<sup>6358</sup> quod sic etiam<sup>6359</sup> infinita<sup>6360</sup> in potentia vel in<sup>6361</sup> unitatibus<sup>6362</sup> [M 58r] non discontinuis.<sup>6363</sup> Sed solum<sup>6364</sup> in<sup>6365</sup> actu, id est<sup>6366</sup> in unitatibus<sup>6367</sup> discontinuis,<sup>6368</sup> ipsa<sup>6369</sup> non est multitudo infinita,<sup>6370</sup>

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<sup>6334</sup> *add. magis* M

<sup>6335</sup> *et melior] om. W, add. est* Y

<sup>6336</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6337</sup> *aliquantulum* MWY

<sup>6338</sup> *om. M, ante aliquantum* Y

<sup>6339</sup> *magis* M

<sup>6340</sup> *aliquantulum* MY

<sup>6341</sup> *ut - maius] om. W, ut infinitum et sic ens aliquantulum* M

<sup>6342</sup> *esset* Y

<sup>6343</sup> *melior et magis] om. MY*

<sup>6344</sup> *infinita* W

<sup>6345</sup> *et - magnitudinibus] Et haec sunt dicta quoad expositionem in infiniti magnitudinibus W, et praedicta est de expositione infinitum in magnitudinibus* M

<sup>6346</sup> *sexto* MW

<sup>6347</sup> *notandum est* Y

<sup>6348</sup> *in multitudinibus] om. W*

<sup>6349</sup> *add. pã* M

<sup>6350</sup> *ut* Y

<sup>6351</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6352</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6353</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6354</sup> *quaeras* MY

<sup>6355</sup> *continue* M

<sup>6356</sup> *dicatur* Y, *sit* W

<sup>6357</sup> *infinita* Y

<sup>6358</sup> *videtur* W, *tantum dico* Y

<sup>6359</sup> *om. WY*

<sup>6360</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6361</sup> *vel in] om. Y*

<sup>6362</sup> *multitudinibus* W, *om. Y*

<sup>6363</sup> *non discontinuis] om. MY*

<sup>6364</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6365</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6366</sup> *add. +solum+ W | solum - est] om. M*

<sup>6367</sup> *partibus* Y, *add. secundum actum* M

<sup>6368</sup> *discontinuatis* M

<sup>6369</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6370</sup> *om. W, in istis finitis* M

quia partes eius<sup>6371</sup> non sunt<sup>6372</sup> discontinuae. Et partes eius sunt<sup>6373</sup> principium<sup>6374</sup> multitudinis quia unitas est.<sup>6375</sup>

<8> <Octavo> <sup>6376</sup> nota <sup>6377</sup> quod <sup>6378</sup> 'infinitem' captum sincategorematicè in multitudinibus consuevit<sup>6379</sup> dupliciter exponi.

Uno modo sic:<sup>6380</sup> unum,<sup>6381</sup> duo, tria, mille, centum,<sup>6382</sup> et sic sine termino in continuo sunt infinitae partes. Probatur<sup>6383</sup> quia ibi<sup>6384</sup> sunt duae<sup>6385</sup> partes,<sup>6386</sup> tres, centum, mille<sup>6387</sup> et sic de aliis.<sup>6388</sup>

Alio modo exponitur sic:<sup>6389</sup> 'aliquot<sup>6390</sup> et non tot quin plura'.<sup>6391</sup> Et sic forte probabiliter<sup>6392</sup> potest<sup>6393</sup> negari quod in continuo essent infinitae<sup>6394</sup> partes, quia<sup>6395</sup> licet ibi<sup>6396</sup> sunt<sup>6397</sup> aliquot,<sup>6398</sup> tamen ibi<sup>6399</sup> sunt<sup>6400</sup> tot quod<sup>6401</sup> non sunt<sup>6402</sup> plura eis,<sup>6403</sup> quia istae<sup>6404</sup> medietates continui sunt sicut<sup>6405</sup>

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<sup>6371</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6372</sup> +q+ M  
<sup>6373</sup> et partes eius sunt] sed sic est M, sed est M  
<sup>6374</sup> *add. lectio dubia* isa Y  
<sup>6375</sup> *ante* unitas M | principium - est] qualitatem per unitas Y  
<sup>6376</sup> septimo MWY  
<sup>6377</sup> notandum est *ante* <octavo> Y  
<sup>6378</sup> *add.* in M  
<sup>6379</sup> solet Y  
<sup>6380</sup> *vel forsitan* sit W, sint *add.* sicut M  
<sup>6381</sup> *om.* MY  
<sup>6382</sup> tria mille centum] \_\_\_\_\_ Y  
<sup>6383</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6384</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6385</sup> secundae W  
<sup>6386</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6387</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6388</sup> mille - aliis] etc. M  
<sup>6389</sup> alio - sic] secundo sit W  
<sup>6390</sup> aliquot MY, *add.* sunt M  
<sup>6391</sup> plures MY  
<sup>6392</sup> probatur W, *om.* Y  
<sup>6393</sup> posset M  
<sup>6394</sup> *ante* essent Y  
<sup>6395</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>6396</sup> *om.* WY  
<sup>6397</sup> *om.* W, *lectio dubia* M  
<sup>6398</sup> aliquot MY  
<sup>6399</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6400</sup> *om.* W, sint Y  
<sup>6401</sup> et W  
<sup>6402</sup> *om.* W, sint Y  
<sup>6403</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>6404</sup> sunt *add.* suae W  
<sup>6405</sup> continui sunt sicut] quae W, continuo sunt sicut M, continui sint Y

[W136r] tot quod non<sup>6406</sup> sunt plura eis. Et sic expositum<sup>6407</sup> est 'infinitem' tam in<sup>6408</sup> continuis quam in discontinuis.

<Regulae de 'infinitem'>

<9.1> Nono<sup>6409</sup> nota<sup>6410</sup> quod quantum<sup>6411</sup> ad<sup>6412</sup> regulas generales<sup>6413</sup> consequentiarum de<sup>6414</sup> 'infinitem',<sup>6415</sup> prima regula est<sup>6416</sup> quod<sup>6417</sup> arguendo<sup>6418</sup> ab<sup>6419</sup> existentia<sup>6420</sup> infiniti in magnitudinibus categorematice capti,<sup>6421</sup> sequitur<sup>6422</sup> quaelibet eius partem quae denominatur<sup>6423</sup> - scilicet partes quae aliquotiens sumptae reddunt ipsum totum<sup>6424</sup> - aliquotiens<sup>6425</sup> esse infinitam,<sup>6426</sup> ut sequitur:<sup>6427</sup> 'infinitem est, ergo<sup>6428</sup> [Y 115v] medietas eius<sup>6429</sup> est infinita, et tertia eius est infinita et<sup>6430</sup> sic de aliis.<sup>6431</sup>

<9.2> Secunda regula est:<sup>6432</sup> arguendo<sup>6433</sup> ab<sup>6434</sup> existentia eius<sup>6435</sup> sequitur suam partem non esse minorem toto, ut bene sequitur: 'hoc est infinitum, igitur medietas eius est infinita'; et ultra sequitur:<sup>6436</sup> 'ergo non est<sup>6437</sup> minor toto'.

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<sup>6406</sup> nulla W  
<sup>6407</sup> expositu Y  
<sup>6408</sup> tam in] totius Y  
<sup>6409</sup> octavo MWY  
<sup>6410</sup> notandum est *ante* <nono> Y  
<sup>6411</sup> quod quantum] *om.* M  
<sup>6412</sup> aliquas M  
<sup>6413</sup> quod - generales] *om.* Y  
<sup>6414</sup> consequentiarum de] *om.* M  
<sup>6415</sup> consequentiarum de infinito] de disiuncto W | *add.* et est Y  
<sup>6416</sup> regula est] *om.* MY  
<sup>6417</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6418</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>6419</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6420</sup> existenti W, existentis Y  
<sup>6421</sup> accepto W, sumptum M  
<sup>6422</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6423</sup> nomina W, denotatur M  
<sup>6424</sup> scilicet - totum] *om.* M | denominatur - totum] quota demominatur eodem infinitum Y  
<sup>6425</sup> aliquota W, *lectio dubia* M  
<sup>6426</sup> aliquotiens esse infinitam] *om.* Y  
<sup>6427</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6428</sup> igitur M, *add.* una W  
<sup>6429</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6430</sup> et - et ] *om.* Y  
<sup>6431</sup> et tertia - aliis] *om.* M  
<sup>6432</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6433</sup> *om.* MW

<9.2> Tertia regula: arguendo<sup>6438</sup> ab esse infiniti sincategorematicè capti<sup>6439</sup> ad esse infiniti categorematice<sup>6440</sup> capti<sup>6441</sup> est<sup>6442</sup> bona consequentia, ut<sup>6443</sup> probatur quia<sup>6444</sup> bene sequitur: 'infinitum est hoc lignum,<sup>6445</sup> igitur<sup>6446</sup> hoc lignum est extensum sine termino'; et ultra:<sup>6447</sup> 'ergo<sup>6448</sup> est<sup>6449</sup> infinitum',<sup>6450</sup> capiendo 'infinitum' categorematice. Quod<sup>6451</sup> consequentia ultima<sup>6452</sup> sit bona,<sup>6453</sup> patet quia arguitur a definitione ad<sup>6454</sup> definitum. Quod<sup>6455</sup> prima consequentia<sup>6456</sup> valeat<sup>6457</sup> patet, quia<sup>6458</sup> sequitur: 'infinitum est hoc lignum, igitur<sup>6459</sup> aliquantulum<sup>6460</sup> et quantumlibet<sup>6461</sup> maius est hoc lignum', et ultra sequitur:<sup>6462</sup> 'ergo<sup>6463</sup> est<sup>6464</sup> extensum sine termino'. Nam da<sup>6465</sup> quod<sup>6466</sup> sit undique terminatum, sequitur quod non sit<sup>6467</sup> quantumlibet<sup>6468</sup> maius ad pedalem<sup>6469</sup> quantitatem datam,<sup>6470</sup> prout patet de se.<sup>6471</sup>

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6434 *om.* M  
6435 *add.* non M  
6436 *om.* W  
6437 ergo non est] *om.* M  
6438 *om.* MW  
6439 accepti W  
6440 sincategorematicè W  
6441 accepti W | ad - capti] *om.* Y  
6442 esse M  
6443 *om.* Y  
6444 probatur quia] *om.* M  
6445 *add.* lignum M  
6446 ergo Y  
6447 *om.* W  
6448 igitur M  
6449 *om.* M  
6450 *add.* esse M  
6451 *om.* MW  
6452 ultra W, ante consequentia MY  
6453 sit bona] *om.* MY  
6454 *om.* W  
6455 et M  
6456 *om.* W  
6457 *om.* M  
6458 arguitur - quia] *om.* Y  
6459 *om.* M, ergo Y  
6460 *add.* est hoc lignum M  
6461 quantum M  
6462 *om.* W  
6463 igitur M  
6464 *om.* M  
6465 dat W  
6466 quid M  
6467 est MY  
6468 quantumcumque M  
6469 proportionalem M  
6470 data Y

<9.4> Quarta regula: quod<sup>6472</sup> arguendo<sup>6473</sup> a posse esse 'infiniti'<sup>6474</sup> sincategorematicè capti<sup>6475</sup> non valet consequentia ad posse esse 'infiniti'<sup>6476</sup> categorematicè capti.<sup>6477</sup> Patet, quia<sup>6478</sup> non sequitur: 'infinitam magnitudinem Deus potest facere,<sup>6479</sup> igitur deus potest facere infinitam magnitudinem'<sup>6480</sup> - et hoc capiendò 'infinitum' categorematicè.<sup>6481</sup> Patet<sup>6482</sup> quia antecedens est verum.<sup>6483</sup> 'infinitam<sup>6484</sup> magnitudinem deus potest facere',<sup>6485</sup> quia aliquantam Deus<sup>6486</sup> potest facere et quantumlibet maiorem.<sup>6487</sup> Consequens tamen<sup>6488</sup> est<sup>6489</sup> falsum, quia non potest facere<sup>6490</sup> aliquam<sup>6491</sup> magnitudinem infinitam.<sup>6492</sup>

Haec de infinito quoad expositionem, et consequentias ad praesens<sup>6493</sup> sufficiant.<sup>6494</sup>

## II.8 <De comparativis et superlativis>

Consequenter in octavo capitulo videndum est<sup>6495</sup> de expositione propositionum in quibus ponitur terminus<sup>6496</sup> comparativi vel superlativi gradus. Et primo videbitur<sup>6497</sup> de hiis in quibus ponuntur termini<sup>6498</sup> comparativi<sup>6499</sup> gradus, secundo superlativi.<sup>6500</sup>

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<sup>6471</sup> patet de se] de se Y, sequitur de se patet M

<sup>6472</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6473</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>6474</sup> infinitum Y

<sup>6475</sup> accepti W

<sup>6476</sup> infinitum Y | ad posse esse infiniti] *ante* non valet M

<sup>6477</sup> accepti W | categorematicè capti] *om.* M

<sup>6478</sup> patet quia] ut M

<sup>6479</sup> deus potest facere] *om.* W

<sup>6480</sup> igitur - magnitudinem] *om.* WY

<sup>6481</sup> et - categorematicè] *om.* MY

<sup>6482</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6483</sup> *add.* scilicet quod quod M

<sup>6484</sup> *add.* enim M

<sup>6485</sup> patet - facere] *om.* Y

<sup>6486</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6487</sup> et quantumlibet maiorem] est magnitudinem infinitam W

<sup>6488</sup> autem W, *om.* M

<sup>6489</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6490</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6491</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6492</sup> *add.* et Y

<sup>6493</sup> consequentias ad praesens] ad regulas W

<sup>6494</sup> *add.* etc. sequitur modo aliud W | haec - sufficiant] et sic cetera sequitur textus M

<sup>6495</sup> *ante* videndum Y | videndum est] *om.* W

<sup>6496</sup> *om.* Y

## II.8.1 <De comparativis>

<1.1> Quantum ad primum nota<sup>6501</sup> quod [M 58v] [W136v] 'comparativus' quandoque tenetur<sup>6502</sup> proprie, tunc denotat<sup>6503</sup> res inter quas<sup>6504</sup> fit<sup>6505</sup> comparatio<sup>6506</sup> convenire in<sup>6507</sup> suo significato,<sup>6508</sup> ut fortior in fortitudine, doctior in doctrina.<sup>6509</sup> Ut 'Sortes est fortior[Y 116r] Platone', iste comparativus 'fortior' denotat tam Sorti quam Platoni fortitudinem inesse. Et sic propositiones<sup>6510</sup> in quibus ponuntur<sup>6511</sup> dictiones<sup>6512</sup> comparativi gradus exponuntur per<sup>6513</sup> copulativam trimembrem, ut 'Sortes est fortior Platone' exponitur sic:<sup>6514</sup> 'Sortes est fortis et Plato est fortis et Plato non est ita fortis sicut<sup>6515</sup> Sortes'.

Et<sup>6516</sup> hoc modo haec esset falsa: 'Deus est melius diabolo', eo quod<sup>6517</sup> secunda exponens esset<sup>6518</sup> falsa, scilicet 'diabolus est bonus'. Talia<sup>6519</sup> tamen<sup>6520</sup> in praesentia loicorum non debent<sup>6521</sup> dici<sup>6522</sup> eo quod male sonant<sup>6523</sup> in auribus eorum,<sup>6524</sup> quia talem expositionem<sup>6525</sup> comparativi<sup>6526</sup> non<sup>6527</sup> intelligunt.

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<sup>6497</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6498</sup> \_ Y [terminus - termini] *om.* M

<sup>6499</sup> comparativus M

<sup>6500</sup> de superlativis Y, superlativus gradus W

<sup>6501</sup> est notandum Y

<sup>6502</sup> capitur W

<sup>6503</sup> denotet Y

<sup>6504</sup> inter quas] in quibus W

<sup>6505</sup> est MY

<sup>6506</sup> *add.* cum ipsa M

<sup>6507</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6508</sup> suo significato] eodem Y, subiecto M

<sup>6509</sup> ut fortior - doctrina] *om.* Y

<sup>6510</sup> in propositionibus M

<sup>6511</sup> ponitur W

<sup>6512</sup> nomina M, nomen W

<sup>6513</sup> *add.* propositionem M

<sup>6514</sup> exponitur sic] *om.* M

<sup>6515</sup> ut M

<sup>6516</sup> *add.* sic Y

<sup>6517</sup> eo quod] quia MY

<sup>6518</sup> est M

<sup>6519</sup> talis M

<sup>6520</sup> enim M, autem W

<sup>6521</sup> debet M

<sup>6522</sup> debent dici] sunt dicenda Y

<sup>6523</sup> sonat W, *lectio dubia* M | male sonant] *post* eorum Y

<sup>6524</sup> ipsorum M

<sup>6525</sup> comparationem et W

<sup>6526</sup> comparatum *add.* +male+ W

<sup>6527</sup> *om.* Y



<1.1.1> Unde sequitur primo quod comparativum in se<sup>6528</sup> includit negationem, ut<sup>6529</sup> patet, quia tertia exponens est una<sup>6530</sup> negativa, puta<sup>6531</sup> 'Plato non est<sup>6532</sup> ita fortis<sup>6533</sup> <sicut Sortes>'.<sup>6534</sup>

<1.1.2> Secundo est notandum<sup>6535</sup> terminus<sup>6536</sup> comparativi<sup>6537</sup> gradus<sup>6538</sup> confundit terminum communem sequente<sup>6539</sup> confuse distributive.

<1.1.3> Tertio sequitur quod<sup>6540</sup> haec est falsa: 'Sortes est fortior homine', quia ibi ly homine<sup>6541</sup> supponit confuse distributive per corrolarium secundum,<sup>6542</sup> et si esset vera,<sup>6543</sup> tunc oporteret quod haec esset vera 'Sortes est fortior se', sed hoc est falsum.<sup>6544</sup>

<1.2> Secundo, comparativus<sup>6545</sup> tenetur<sup>6546</sup> improprie<sup>6547</sup> et hoc dupliciter. Aliquando<sup>6548</sup> solum denotat comparativi positivum<sup>6549</sup> verificari<sup>6550</sup> de subiecto respectu<sup>6551</sup> cuius<sup>6552</sup> fit comparatio, ut<sup>6553</sup> hic: 'Deus est melior<sup>6554</sup> diabolo' significat quod Deus sit bonus, non autem quod diabolus sit bonus. Et hoc modo<sup>6555</sup> exponitur per duas exponentes sic:<sup>6556</sup> 'Deus est bonus et diabolus non est<sup>6557</sup> ita bonus

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<sup>6528</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6529</sup> quod MY

<sup>6530</sup> pura *vel fors*an puta W

<sup>6531</sup> *add. scilicet Y, om. W*

<sup>6532</sup> Plato non est] *om. W*

<sup>6533</sup> ita fortis] *om. MW*

<sup>6534</sup> sicut Sortes] *om. MWY*

<sup>6535</sup> secundo est notandum] secundo nota M, ex hoc patet quod W

<sup>6536</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>6537</sup> comparativus MY

<sup>6538</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>6539</sup> *add. se W*

<sup>6540</sup> tertio sequitur quod] et ideo M, et hoc modo Y

<sup>6541</sup> ibi ly homine] homine M, ly homine ibi Y

<sup>6542</sup> per corrolarium secundum] *om. Y*

<sup>6543</sup> et si esset vera] *om. MY*

<sup>6544</sup> tunc - falsum] tunc Sorte esset fortior se ipso quod non dicitur W, et hoc oporteret quod Sortes esset fortior se quod est falsum Y

<sup>6545</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6546</sup> *lectio dubia Y*

<sup>6547</sup> in propositione W

<sup>6548</sup> quandoque W, *add. enim Y*

<sup>6549</sup> comparativi positivum] positivum comparativi M, comparisonem positivi Y

<sup>6550</sup> *lectio dubia M*

<sup>6551</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>6552</sup> de quo Y

<sup>6553</sup> sicut Y

<sup>6554</sup> *ante est W*

<sup>6555</sup> *add. lectio dubia* etiam de comparativo Y

<sup>6556</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6557</sup> diabolus non est] nullus diabolus est MY

sicut deus'.<sup>6558</sup> Et hoc modo<sup>6559</sup> locuntur communiter<sup>6560</sup> vulgares.<sup>6561</sup> Et hiis modis comparativum<sup>6562</sup> preasupponit suum positivum saltem<sup>6563</sup> de subiecto,<sup>6564</sup> sed non de<sup>6565</sup> ambobus inter quae fit<sup>6566</sup> comparatio,<sup>6567</sup> ut [Y 116<sup>v</sup>] dictum est.<sup>6568</sup>

<1.3> Alio modo<sup>6569</sup> tenetur sic,<sup>6570</sup> quod non<sup>6571</sup> denotat<sup>6572</sup> comparativi<sup>6573</sup> positivum de aliquo eorum<sup>6574</sup> inter quae<sup>6575</sup> fit comparatio verificari,<sup>6576</sup> sed solum denotat oppositum positivi verificari cum hac adiunctione 'minus'<sup>6577</sup> de subiecto tamen<sup>6578</sup> non verificatur<sup>6579</sup> de aliquo ad quo est comparatio, ut 'fornicatio<sup>6580</sup> est<sup>6581</sup> melior adulterio' non significat<sup>6582</sup> quod fornicatio sit bona vel<sup>6583</sup> quod<sup>6584</sup> adulterium sit bonum, sed quod fornicatio<sup>6585</sup> sit minus mala<sup>6586</sup> adulterio.<sup>6587</sup> Et iste modus est improprissimus,<sup>6588</sup> et<sup>6589</sup> tamen est [W137<sup>r</sup>] usitatus.<sup>6590</sup> Unde<sup>6591</sup> dicimus: 'equus est rationalior asino', cum<sup>6592</sup> neuter eorum sit rationalis.<sup>6593</sup> Et comparativus<sup>6594</sup> hoc modo<sup>6595</sup> tentus exponitur<sup>6596</sup>

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<sup>6558</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6559</sup> hoc modo] ita Y  
<sup>6560</sup> capiuntur *post* vulgares Y  
<sup>6561</sup> *add.* comparativum Y  
<sup>6562</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6563</sup> scilicet MY  
<sup>6564</sup> *add.* primum non solum de subiecto W  
<sup>6565</sup> sed non de] sed W, non tamen de Y  
<sup>6566</sup> est Y  
<sup>6567</sup> *add.* alio modo uterque est comparativus W  
<sup>6568</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6569</sup> *add.* in M  
<sup>6570</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6571</sup> *om.* M, tantum Y  
<sup>6572</sup> connotat W  
<sup>6573</sup> *post* positivum Y, comparativus MW  
<sup>6574</sup> illorum M  
<sup>6575</sup> quas M  
<sup>6576</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6577</sup> magis M  
<sup>6578</sup> cum quo W  
<sup>6579</sup> de subiecto - verificatur] tamen hoc videtur W  
<sup>6580</sup> fornicator W  
<sup>6581</sup> *post* melior W  
<sup>6582</sup> non significat] modo sic W  
<sup>6583</sup> nec M  
<sup>6584</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6585</sup> *add.* sed M  
<sup>6586</sup> malum W  
<sup>6587</sup> quam adulterium M, quod adulterium Y  
<sup>6588</sup> *add.* modus Y  
<sup>6589</sup> *om.* MY  
<sup>6590</sup> et tamen est usitatus] cum sit inusitatus W  
<sup>6591</sup> ut MY, *add.* sic etiam Y  
<sup>6592</sup> *add.* tamen Y

per copulativam trimembrem<sup>6597</sup> cuius duo<sup>6598</sup> membra capiuntur per<sup>6599</sup> positivum oppositum<sup>6600</sup> posito<sup>6601</sup> comparativo<sup>6602</sup> et tertium per comparatum oppositum.<sup>6603</sup> Ut<sup>6604</sup> 'asinus est rationalior capra' exponitur sic: 'asinus est irrationalis<sup>6605</sup> et capra est irrationalis<sup>6606</sup> et asinus est minus irrationalis<sup>6607</sup> quam capra'.<sup>6608</sup> Et isti non praesupponunt oppositum positivi sed oppositum cum ly minus.<sup>6609</sup>

Unde patet qualiter exponitur comparativus quocumque modo teneatur.<sup>6610</sup> Iste modus<sup>6611</sup> non praesupponit positivum suum sed positivum comparativi sui oppositi<sup>6612</sup> [M 59r] et<sup>6613</sup> includit comparativus, qualitercumque capiatur habet distribuere terminum sequentem in quem transit eius actus.<sup>6614</sup>

<2> Secundo<sup>6615</sup> propter hoc nota<sup>6616</sup> quomodo<sup>6617</sup> exponendae sunt propositiones<sup>6618</sup> negativae in quibus ponitur nomen comparativi gradus.<sup>6619</sup> Exponuntur enim<sup>6620</sup> per disiunctivam de oppositis partibus <sup>6621</sup> ut si de subiectis contradictoriis, exponentes in quibus ponitur subiectum

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<sup>6593</sup> rationale M

<sup>6594</sup> et comparativus] per consequens M

<sup>6595</sup> hoc modo] taliter W

<sup>6596</sup> post trimembrem W

<sup>6597</sup> bimembrem MY

<sup>6598</sup> om. W

<sup>6599</sup> om. Y, opposito M

<sup>6600</sup> om. MY

<sup>6601</sup> posito om. Y, et pro \_\_\_ M

<sup>6602</sup> comparativi M

<sup>6603</sup> et tertium per comparatum oppositum] om. MW

<sup>6604</sup> add. ista Y

<sup>6605</sup> rationalis W

<sup>6606</sup> rationalis W

<sup>6607</sup> rationalis W

<sup>6608</sup> rationalior capra exponitur - capra] om. M

<sup>6609</sup> et - minus] om. MW

<sup>6610</sup> add. cum M

<sup>6611</sup> iste modus] isto tamen modo W

<sup>6612</sup> vel forsitan oppositum M | suum - oppositi] sui positivi W

<sup>6613</sup> om. M

<sup>6614</sup> unde - actus] om. Y | qualitercumque - actus] quocumque modo teneatur negationem confundentem verbum sequentem se in quem transit actus eius confuse distributive W

<sup>6615</sup> tertio Y, iterum M

<sup>6616</sup> ante propter M

<sup>6617</sup> quod M

<sup>6618</sup> om. W

<sup>6619</sup> nomen comparativi gradus] comparativi M | propter - gradus] notandum est quod negativae de comparativo Y

<sup>6620</sup> om. Y

<sup>6621</sup> ante oppositis MY

<disiunctivae><sup>6622</sup> et copulativae, erunt contradictoriae si conradictoriae; erunt contrariae, si contrariae. Si subcontrariae,<sup>6623</sup> erunt <subcontrariae>,<sup>6624</sup> ut dictum est de aliis.<sup>6625</sup>

<3> Tertio nota<sup>6626</sup> quod si<sup>6627</sup> ablativus quem regit comparativus praecederet<sup>6628</sup> ipsum,<sup>6629</sup> tunc non<sup>6630</sup> confunderetur<sup>6631</sup> distributive, et ideo<sup>6632</sup> in tertia<sup>6633</sup> exponente<sup>6634</sup> talis terminus<sup>6635</sup> non debet distribui nec sequi negationem,<sup>6636</sup> ut<sup>6637</sup> 'Sortes<sup>6638</sup> homine est fortior',<sup>6639</sup> exponitur sic: 'Sortes |Y 117r| est fortis et homo est fortis et homo non est ita fortis sicut Sortes'. Semper enim in talibus cavendum est ne terminus non<sup>6640</sup> distributus in exposita distribuatur in exponente.

<Regulae de comparativis>

Propter hoc possunt inferri<sup>6641</sup> aliquae<sup>6642</sup> regulae comparativis.<sup>6643</sup>

<1-4> Et sunt<sup>6644</sup> primae quattuor proportionales regulis positae in primo capitulo de exceptivis.<sup>6645</sup>

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<sup>6622</sup> distributivae W

<sup>6623</sup> subalternae W

<sup>6624</sup> tales Y, subalternae *add.* et W | ut - subcontrariae] si fuit in subiecto contradictoriae M, si sunt de subiectis contradicentis si autem tales de subiecto sunt contrariae exponentes debent esse contrariae et si subcontrariae exponentes debent esse tales Y

<sup>6625</sup> ut - aliis] *om.* Y

<sup>6626</sup> tertio nota] quarto est notandum Y

<sup>6627</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6628</sup> praecedit MY

<sup>6629</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>6630</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6631</sup> confundit MY, *add.* eum M, *add.* confuse W

<sup>6632</sup> *add.* tunc MY

<sup>6633</sup> in tertia] *om.* W | secunda M

<sup>6634</sup> exponens MW

<sup>6635</sup> talis terminus] *om.* MW

<sup>6636</sup> distribui - negationem] esse M, esse universalis W

<sup>6637</sup> *add.* ista Y

<sup>6638</sup> *add.* ab M

<sup>6639</sup> *add.* quae W

<sup>6640</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6641</sup> inferre MY

<sup>6642</sup> aliqua *add.* corrolaria seu W

<sup>6643</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6644</sup> tunc Y

<sup>6645</sup> *add.* et aliis Y

<5> Quinta <sup>6646</sup> regula est: <sup>6647</sup> arguendo <sup>6648</sup> a <sup>6649</sup> comparativo gradu posito ablativo casu <sup>6650</sup> sequente <sup>6651</sup> cum signo universalis aut <sup>6652</sup> aliqua determinatione <sup>6653</sup> ad eundem <sup>6654</sup> sine <sup>6655</sup> ista determinatione aut <sup>6656</sup> isto signo <sup>6657</sup> non oportet consequentiam valere. <sup>6658</sup> Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes est fortior omni homine, ergo <sup>6659</sup> Sortes est fortior homine', quia in <sup>6660</sup> prima propter ista <sup>6661</sup> duo signa distributiva <sup>6662</sup> ly homine stat determinate et immobiliter, <sup>6663</sup> et in secunda deponitur unum signum, igitur <sup>6664</sup> ibi ly homine stat confuse et distributive. <sup>6665</sup>

Nec <sup>6666</sup> sequitur: 'Sortes est |W137v| fortior homine <sup>6667</sup> puro, <sup>6668</sup> ergo <sup>6669</sup> Sortes est fortior homine', <sup>6670</sup> quia arguitur ab inferiori ad superius aequivalenter cum distributione. <sup>6671</sup>

<6> Sexta regula: arguendo cum comparativo <sup>6672</sup> ablativo comparativi <sup>6673</sup> praeopposito <sup>6674</sup> ad eundem comparativum <sup>6675</sup> ablativo postposito <sup>6676</sup> non valet consequentia. Ut non sequitur: 'Sortes homine est fortior, ergo <sup>6677</sup> Sortes <sup>6678</sup> est <sup>6679</sup> fortior homine', et sic de aliis. <sup>6680</sup>

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<sup>6646</sup> *vel forsitan quarta Y*

<sup>6647</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>6648</sup> *add. lectio dubia mediate M*

<sup>6649</sup> *om. M*

<sup>6650</sup> *om. M*

<sup>6651</sup> *posito - sequente] om. Y*

<sup>6652</sup> *signo universalis aut] om. Y*

<sup>6653</sup> *add. praecedenti ablativum Y*

<sup>6654</sup> *eandem propositionem Y*

<sup>6655</sup> *tali Y*

<sup>6656</sup> *vel M*

<sup>6657</sup> *aut isto signo] om. Y*

<sup>6658</sup> *oportet consequentiam valere] valet consequentia MY*

<sup>6659</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>6660</sup> *add. ista W*

<sup>6661</sup> *om. M*

<sup>6662</sup> *propter - distributiva] post immobiliter Y, add. cadentia super eam in quantitate aut stat confuse distributive Y*

<sup>6663</sup> *determinate et immobiliter] immobiliter et determinate M, determinate Y*

<sup>6664</sup> *deponitur - ibi] om. M*

<sup>6665</sup> *et in - distributive] om. Y, add. quia in ea ponitur unum signum M*

<sup>6666</sup> *ut non M*

<sup>6667</sup> *omni M*

<sup>6668</sup> *albo Y*

<sup>6669</sup> *igitur Y*

<sup>6670</sup> *ergo - homine] om. M*

<sup>6671</sup> *cum distributione] et non distributive W | quia - distributione] om. Y*

<sup>6672</sup> *om. M, add. gradu Y*

<sup>6673</sup> *consequentiae W, om. M, lectio dubia Y*

<sup>6674</sup> *apposito M*

<sup>6675</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6676</sup> *ablativo postposito] ablativum postpositum W*

<sup>6677</sup> *igitur M*

Et haec de comparativis.<sup>6681</sup>

## II.8.2 <De superlativis>

<1> Quantum<sup>6682</sup> ad secundum, scilicet<sup>6683</sup> ad expositionem propositionum<sup>6684</sup> in quibus ponuntur nomina<sup>6685</sup> superlativi gradus,<sup>6686</sup> est sciendum primo quod superlativus quandoque<sup>6687</sup> exponitur<sup>6688</sup> affirmative, ut 'Sortes est<sup>6689</sup> fortissimus hominum'<sup>6690</sup> i.e. <sup>6691</sup> 'Sortes <sup>6692</sup> <est> <sup>6693</sup> omni <sup>6694</sup> alio homine<sup>6695</sup> fortior'. Et sic intelligitur auctoritas Philosophi octavo<sup>6696</sup> *Ethicorum* - dicens<sup>6697</sup> quod istud<sup>6698</sup> quod<sup>6699</sup> per superhabundantiam<sup>6700</sup> dicitur, uni soli<sup>6701</sup> convenit.

Alio<sup>6702</sup> modo<sup>6703</sup> exponitur negative<sup>6704</sup> sic:<sup>6705</sup> 'nullus alius est fortior Sorte'. |Y 117v|

Iuxta hoc patet quomodo exponenda sit propositio in qua ponitur nomen<sup>6706</sup> superlativi<sup>6707</sup> gradus, ut hic: 'Sortes est<sup>6708</sup> fortissimus<sup>6709</sup> hominum'.

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<sup>6678</sup> *om. M*

<sup>6679</sup> *add. +homine+ W*

<sup>6680</sup> *et sic de aliis] om. MY*

<sup>6681</sup> *comparativo Y | et haec de comparativis] om. W*

<sup>6682</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6683</sup> *ad secundum scilicet] om. M, add. quod Y*

<sup>6684</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6685</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6686</sup> *add. et MY*

<sup>6687</sup> *ante superlativus W*

<sup>6688</sup> *tenetur M*

<sup>6689</sup> *Sortes est] om. MW*

<sup>6690</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6691</sup> *sic Y*

<sup>6692</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6693</sup> *om. MWY*

<sup>6694</sup> *cum M*

<sup>6695</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6696</sup> *primo Y*

<sup>6697</sup> *om. WY*

<sup>6698</sup> *est Y | quod iste] om. W*

<sup>6699</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6700</sup> *abundantiam W*

<sup>6701</sup> *add. rei W*

<sup>6702</sup> *alia Y*

<sup>6703</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6704</sup> *add. et M*

<sup>6705</sup> *add. Sortes est fortissimus i.e. Y*

<sup>6706</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6707</sup> *superlativus W*

<sup>6708</sup> *add. +ho+ M*

<sup>6709</sup> *add. +quod+ M*

Nam si superlativus teneatur<sup>6710</sup> affirmative, exponitur per copulativam trimembrem, scilicet:<sup>6711</sup> 'Sortes est fortis et<sup>6712</sup> homines sunt fortes et Sortes omni homine alio a se est fortior'.<sup>6713</sup> Sed si tenetur negative, exponitur sic per copulativam trimembrem ut: 'Sortes est fortis et homines sunt fortes et nullus alius homo est fortior<sup>6714</sup> Sorte'.<sup>6715</sup>

Et hoc semper est verum quando genitivus rectus a superlativo ipsum<sup>6716</sup> sequitur, sed<sup>6717</sup> si praecederet ipsum<sup>6718</sup> - ut 'Sortes est hominum fortissimus'<sup>6719</sup> - tunc tertia exponens debet esse affirmativa, scilicet:<sup>6720</sup> 'Sortes aliquorum<sup>6721</sup> hominum quolibet est fortior'; et<sup>6722</sup> negative:<sup>6723</sup> 'aliquorum hominum nullus homo est fortior Sorte'. Et causa<sup>6724</sup> est<sup>6725</sup> quia,<sup>6726</sup> quando ly hominum<sup>6727</sup> praecederet,<sup>6728</sup> tunc non distribuitur;<sup>6729</sup> quando autem sequitur, tunc distribuitur.<sup>6730</sup> [M 59v] Et ideo oportet sic exponi. Quando autem sequitur, tunc distribuitur. Et ideo<sup>6731</sup> convenienter<sup>6732</sup> exponitur sicut dictum est.<sup>6733</sup>

<2> Ex hoc<sup>6734</sup> patet secundo qualiter<sup>6735</sup> exponendae sunt<sup>6736</sup> negativae. Exponuntur<sup>6737</sup> enim per disiunctivam de partibus oppositis<sup>6738</sup> partibus copulativae, et si fuerint propositiones subcontrariae,

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<sup>6710</sup> tenetur M

<sup>6711</sup> sic M

<sup>6712</sup> *add.* omnes Y

<sup>6713</sup> Sortes omni - fortior] nullus alius homo est ita fortis sicut Sortes W | et homines - fortior] cuius alius homo est fortior Sortes M

<sup>6714</sup> *add.* a Y

<sup>6715</sup> Sed - Sorte] *om.* MW

<sup>6716</sup> *post.* sequitur M

<sup>6717</sup> et sic M

<sup>6718</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>6719</sup> ut - fortissimus] *om.* W

<sup>6720</sup> ut MY

<sup>6721</sup> aliorum M

<sup>6722</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6723</sup> *add.* vero et MY

<sup>6724</sup> *add.* istius M

<sup>6725</sup> hominum - est] *om.* Y

<sup>6726</sup> quod Y

<sup>6727</sup> ly hominum] *om.* M

<sup>6728</sup> praecedit Y

<sup>6729</sup> distribuetur *vel forsā* distribueretur W

<sup>6730</sup> quando - distribuitur] *om.* MW

<sup>6731</sup> *add.* tunc M | oportet - ideo] *om.* Y

<sup>6732</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6733</sup> fuit W

<sup>6734</sup> quo MY

<sup>6735</sup> quomodo Y

<sup>6736</sup> *add.* propositiones M

erunt<sup>6739</sup> exponentes in quibus exponuntur<sup>6740</sup> - copulativa et disiunctiva - <sup>6741</sup> subcontrariae. Si<sup>6742</sup> contrariae,<sup>6743</sup> contrariae;<sup>6744</sup> si contradictoriae, contradictoriae.<sup>6745</sup> Exempla patent cuilibet intuenti per se.<sup>6746</sup>

<Regulae de superlativis>

<1-4> Nunc quoad regulas consequentiarum<sup>6747</sup> ponuntur quattuor regulae de hiis<sup>6748</sup> prius positis<sup>6749</sup> sicut<sup>6750</sup> in aliis.<sup>6751</sup>

<5> Et sit<sup>6752</sup> quinta<sup>6753</sup> quod<sup>6754</sup> arguendo<sup>6755</sup> a superlativo ad comparativum terminis<sup>6756</sup> eodem modo retentis non oportet consequentiam valere. Quia non sequitur: 'Sortes est fortissimus hominum, igitur<sup>6757</sup> Sortes<sup>6758</sup> est fortior homine',<sup>6759</sup> quia in prima<sup>6760</sup> ly hominum<sup>6761</sup> distribuitur,<sup>6762</sup> tamen ista distributio<sup>6763</sup> non<sup>6764</sup> impedit<sup>6765</sup> veritatem propositionis.<sup>6766</sup> In secunda distribuitur ly homine, et

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<sup>6737</sup> *post enim M*

<sup>6738</sup> *de partibus oppositis] per oppositas M*

<sup>6739</sup> *add. propositiones Y*

<sup>6740</sup> *ponitur MW, add. subiectum et distribuatur W, add. unde Y*

<sup>6741</sup> *copulativa et disiunctiva] om. W*

<sup>6742</sup> *subcontrariae si] om. Y*

<sup>6743</sup> *add. fuerint M*

<sup>6744</sup> *add. sint et Y*

<sup>6745</sup> *add. sicut prius Y*

<sup>6746</sup> *exempla - se] om. M, etc. sonat qualibet per se Y*

<sup>6747</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6748</sup> *quattuor regulae de hiis] de hiis regulae quattuor Y*

<sup>6749</sup> *positae Y*

<sup>6750</sup> *om. W*

<sup>6751</sup> *hiis Y | de hiis - aliis] prius positae sicut in illis W*

<sup>6752</sup> *om. M, sic Y*

<sup>6753</sup> *prima W*

<sup>6754</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6755</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6756</sup> *vel forsantentus Y*

<sup>6757</sup> *ergo Y*

<sup>6758</sup> *om. MW*

<sup>6759</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>6760</sup> *in prima] post hominum M*

<sup>6761</sup> *add. non M*

<sup>6762</sup> *add. et Y*

<sup>6763</sup> *ista distributio] om. W*

<sup>6764</sup> *tamen non] cum ista distributio W*

<sup>6765</sup> *add. distributionem Y*

<sup>6766</sup> *add. et M*



impedit distributio<sup>6767</sup> veritatem propositionis, sicut<sup>6768</sup> patet volenti<sup>6769</sup> ex-|W138r|ponentes<sup>6770</sup>  
inspicere<sup>6771</sup> de illis.<sup>6772</sup>

<6-7> Sexta et septima<sup>6773</sup> regula sunt<sup>6774</sup> proportionales<sup>6775</sup> sicut fuerunt<sup>6776</sup> de comparativis.<sup>6777</sup>

Et haec de expositione superlativi gradus<sup>6778</sup> sufficient.<sup>6779</sup>

## II.9 <De signis universalibus tentis collective>

Post hoc in nono capitulo considerandum est quomodo exponendae sunt propositiones in quibus  
ponuntur signa universalialia retenta collective.

Et primo<sup>6780</sup> considerandum est<sup>6781</sup> quomodo<sup>6782</sup> exponantur;<sup>6783</sup> secundo eius<sup>6784</sup> quantitates;<sup>6785</sup>  
tertio quomodo et<sup>6786</sup> si<sup>6787</sup> possint fieri universales; quarto quomodo<sup>6788</sup> capiatur in eis  
contradictio;<sup>6789</sup> et ultimo quomodo ex<sup>6790</sup> eis consuevit<sup>6791</sup> syllogizari.

<1> Quantum ad primum,<sup>6792</sup> sciendum est<sup>6793</sup> quod nihil aliud<sup>6794</sup> est dicere 'omnes collective'  
quam<sup>6795</sup> dicere<sup>6796</sup> 'tota collectio' vel<sup>6797</sup> 'maximus numerus'. Ex quo patet quomodo exponenda sit<sup>6798</sup>

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<sup>6767</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6768</sup> *sic* W

<sup>6769</sup> *volentibus* W | *propositionis - volenti*] vi3 vel M

<sup>6770</sup> *add.* accipere W

<sup>6771</sup> *ante* exponentes MY, *add.* earundem W

<sup>6772</sup> *istis* M | *de illis*] *om.* W | *add. lectio dubia* determinatis Y

<sup>6773</sup> *et septima*] *om.* M

<sup>6774</sup> *est* M

<sup>6775</sup> *consimiles* W, *add.* *et affirmativa* M

<sup>6776</sup> *fuerat* M

<sup>6777</sup> *comparativo* MY

<sup>6778</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6779</sup> *etc.* M | *et - sufficient*] *sequitur nunc modo aliud etc.* W

<sup>6780</sup> *primum* W

<sup>6781</sup> *considerandum est*] *considerabitur* Y

<sup>6782</sup> *add.* *quomodo* M

<sup>6783</sup> *exponuntur* M, *exponendae sint* Y

<sup>6784</sup> *cuius* MY

<sup>6785</sup> *add.* *sint vel forsant sunt* M

<sup>6786</sup> *quomodo et*] *om.* M

<sup>6787</sup> *et si*] *om.* W

<sup>6788</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6789</sup> *capiatur in eis contradictio*] *in talibus capiatur contradictio* M, *capiatur contradictio in illis* Y

<sup>6790</sup> *in* W

<sup>6791</sup> *ante* *ex* Y

itsa: 'omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim', capiend<sup>6799</sup> ly omnes collective. Exponitur enim sic: 'maximus numerus apostolorum Dei<sup>6800</sup> est<sup>6801</sup> duodecim'; vel sic:<sup>6802</sup> 'tota collectio apostolorum Dei est<sup>6803</sup> duodecim'. Similiter exponuntur omnes aliae.

<2> Quantum <sup>6804</sup> ad secundum dicendum <sup>6805</sup> est quod quaelibet huiusmodi est indefinita. Probatur, <sup>6806</sup> quia in qualibet tali <sup>6807</sup> subicitur terminus communis sine signo, ergo <sup>6808</sup> est indefinita.<sup>6809</sup> Consequentia tenet, et<sup>6810</sup> antecedens probatur<sup>6811</sup> quia licet<sup>6812</sup> hoc totum<sup>6813</sup> 'omnes apostoli Dei'<sup>6814</sup> non supponit in propositione de praesenti simul<sup>6815</sup> pro pluribus, tamen successive. Unde<sup>6816</sup> potuisset<sup>6817</sup> supponere pro pluribus.<sup>6818</sup> Nam quando Deus non habuit nisi undecim<sup>6819</sup> apostolos, tunc ly omnes apostoli supposuerat pro uno supposito, scilicet pro <sup>6820</sup> undecim. Et postquam habuit duodecim<sup>6821</sup> apostolos, supposuerat<sup>6822</sup> pro alio,<sup>6823</sup> scilicet pro duodecim. Et hoc sufficit ad<sup>6824</sup> hoc quod sit<sup>6825</sup> terminus communis.<sup>6826</sup>

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<sup>6792</sup> *add.* est primo M  
<sup>6793</sup> sciendum est] notandum M  
<sup>6794</sup> *om.* MY  
<sup>6795</sup> nisi M  
<sup>6796</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>6797</sup> aut MY  
<sup>6798</sup> est MY  
<sup>6799</sup> tento Y, *ante* collective MY  
<sup>6800</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6801</sup> *add.* numerus M  
<sup>6802</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6803</sup> *add.* numerus M, *add.* numerus numerus W  
<sup>6804</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6805</sup> sciendum Y  
<sup>6806</sup> *om.* M, probatio Y  
<sup>6807</sup> qualibet tali] ea MY  
<sup>6808</sup> igitur M  
<sup>6809</sup> ergo est indefinita] *om.* Y  
<sup>6810</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6811</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>6812</sup> *add.* ly Y  
<sup>6813</sup> licet - totum] ly W  
<sup>6814</sup> *om.* W, *add.* sunt duodecim M  
<sup>6815</sup> *post* pro pluribus M, *add.* de Y  
<sup>6816</sup> *vel fors*an verum MY, *add.* enim M  
<sup>6817</sup> potuisse M  
<sup>6818</sup> Tamen - pluribus] *om.* W  
<sup>6819</sup> nisi undecim] *lectio dubia* Y  
<sup>6820</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6821</sup> nisi - duodecim] *om.* M  
<sup>6822</sup> supponebat W, supponat M  
<sup>6823</sup> pro alio] per aliquo Y  
<sup>6824</sup> *om.* M

<3> Quantum ad tertium dicitur quod quando<sup>6827</sup> talis<sup>6828</sup> oratio 'omnes apostoli Dei'<sup>6829</sup> non habet nisi unum suppositum, [Y 118<sup>v</sup>] ideo raro additur sibi<sup>6830</sup> signum universale,<sup>6831</sup> et<sup>6832</sup> specialiter<sup>6833</sup> ut<sup>6834</sup> videtur turpis<sup>6835</sup> sonus dicendo:<sup>6836</sup> 'omnes omnes<sup>6837</sup> apostoli Dei sunt duodecim'. Sicut tamen<sup>6838</sup> convenienter<sup>6839</sup> dicitur:<sup>6840</sup> 'omnis sol lucet',<sup>6841</sup> 'omnis deus<sup>6842</sup> est bonus'; sicut<sup>6843</sup> convenienter<sup>6844</sup> dici posset:<sup>6845</sup> 'quilibet omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim' et non<sup>6846</sup> haberet subiectum<sup>6847</sup> nisi unum suppositum<sup>6848</sup> quamvis propositio esset<sup>6849</sup> universalis.

<4> Per hoc patet ad quartum, videlicet<sup>6850</sup> quomodo<sup>6851</sup> debet<sup>6852</sup> contradictio<sup>6853</sup> sumi<sup>6854</sup> in talibus.<sup>6855</sup> Potest enim negatio praeponi<sup>6856</sup> dicendo: 'non omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim';<sup>6857</sup> et ista<sup>6858</sup> valet<sup>6859</sup> tantum quod 'non maximus [M 60<sup>r</sup>] numerus apostolorum est numerus duodecim';<sup>6860</sup>

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6825 *om. W*  
6826 *add. supponat W*  
6827 *om. W*  
6828 *dicitur - talis] de lectio dubia quantiis Y*  
6829 *etc. M, om. Y*  
6830 *id M, om. W*  
6831 *vel forsitan vel M*  
6832 *om. M*  
6833 *lectio dubia M*  
6834 *et sic M, om. W*  
6835 *lectio dubia M*  
6836 *om. MW*  
6837 *om. M*  
6838 *sicut tamen] sicut patet M, etiam sic Y*  
6839 *communiter MW*  
6840 *add. enim M*  
6841 *add. lucet M, add. et Y*  
6842 *add. +sit+ W*  
6843 *similiter M*  
6844 *communiter MW*  
6845 *potest MY, ante dici Y*  
6846 *modo Y*  
6847 *om. W, add. modo Y*  
6848 *nisi unum suppositum] subiectum nisi W*  
6849 *quamvis propositio esset] licet esse MY*  
6850 *scilicet MY*  
6851 *quod modum Y*  
6852 *sumatur MY*  
6853 *contradictoria W*  
6854 *om. MY*  
6855 *istis M*  
6856 *ante negatio M, add. ut M*  
6857 *sunt duodecim] etc. M*  
6858 *om. M*  
6859 *valebit Y*

vel potest sic dici:<sup>6861</sup> 'quilibet omnes apostoli Dei non<sup>6862</sup> sunt duodecim', et sic<sup>6863</sup> habentur contradictoria.

<5> Quantum ad quintum est sciendum<sup>6864</sup> quod si ponamus<sup>6865</sup> instans indivisibile imaginari et respectu huius<sup>6866</sup> [W138v] omnes respicere<sup>6867</sup> locutiones nostras, tunc convenienter potest<sup>6868</sup> syllogizari ex istis sicut ex singularibus eo quod subiectum<sup>6869</sup> solum supponit<sup>6870</sup> pro uno solo<sup>6871</sup> supposito.<sup>6872</sup> Et argueretur:<sup>6873</sup> 'omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim,<sup>6874</sup> Petrus et Paulus cum hiis<sup>6875</sup> aliis sunt omnes<sup>6876</sup> apostoli Dei,<sup>6877</sup> ergo<sup>6878</sup> Petrus et Paulus cum hiis<sup>6879</sup> aliis<sup>6880</sup> sunt duodecim'. Sed si<sup>6881</sup> tempus<sup>6882</sup> praesens vellet<sup>6883</sup> capere<sup>6884</sup> divisibile,<sup>6885</sup> ut<sup>6886</sup> per<sup>6887</sup> horam<sup>6888</sup> unam, argumentatio<sup>6889</sup> huiusmodi<sup>6890</sup> non valeret. Ponatur<sup>6891</sup> enim quod pro<sup>6892</sup> prima medietate<sup>6893</sup> horae omnes apostoli Dei<sup>6894</sup> sunt<sup>6895</sup> duo<sup>6896</sup> et pro<sup>6897</sup> secunda medietate erunt duodecim. Et argueretur sic:

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<sup>6860</sup> et - duoedecim] *om.* W  
<sup>6861</sup> *ante* sic M  
<sup>6862</sup> *add. sup.* Y  
<sup>6863</sup> *om.* WY  
<sup>6864</sup> est sciendum] dicendum est Y  
<sup>6865</sup> ponimus M, ponatur Y  
<sup>6866</sup> illius MY  
<sup>6867</sup> *lectio dubia* Y, *om.* MW  
<sup>6868</sup> possunt W  
<sup>6869</sup> *add. eius* W  
<sup>6870</sup> *ante* solum M  
<sup>6871</sup> uno solo] isto W, uno Y  
<sup>6872</sup> sigificato Y  
<sup>6873</sup> arguitur Y | et argueretur] ut M  
<sup>6874</sup> *add. et* Y  
<sup>6875</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>6876</sup> *om.* M, eidem W  
<sup>6877</sup> *om.* WY  
<sup>6878</sup> igitur M  
<sup>6879</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>6880</sup> *add. +cum+* W  
<sup>6881</sup> *add. quaevis* W  
<sup>6882</sup> *om.* W, *post* vellet M  
<sup>6883</sup> velleM  
<sup>6884</sup> intendere M, *add. et* Y  
<sup>6885</sup> dividere Y  
<sup>6886</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>6887</sup> *om.* W  
<sup>6888</sup> *post* unam MY  
<sup>6889</sup> *post* huiusmodi MY  
<sup>6890</sup> huius M  
<sup>6891</sup> ponitur Y  
<sup>6892</sup> in W  
<sup>6893</sup> parte W  
<sup>6894</sup> *om.* Y

'omnes apostoli Dei sunt duo<sup>6898</sup> et omnes apostoli dei sunt duodecim,<sup>6899</sup> ergo <duo><sup>6900</sup> sunt duodecim'.<sup>6901</sup> Conclusio est falsa<sup>6902</sup> et premissae sunt<sup>6903</sup> verae, ut patet intuiti.<sup>6904</sup> Sed si tunc<sup>6905</sup> argumentatio deberet valere, oportet addi<sup>6906</sup> pronomen<sup>6907</sup> demonstrativum, quod<sup>6908</sup> patet<sup>6909</sup> de hiis<sup>6910</sup> per argumentationem.<sup>6911</sup>

<Regulae de universalis tentis collective>

<1> Quantum ad<sup>6912</sup> consequentias horum<sup>6913</sup> sit prima regula haec<sup>6914</sup> quod<sup>6915</sup> arguendo a termino<sup>6916</sup> stante collective ad suppositum termini<sup>6917</sup> cui signum<sup>6918</sup> additur non oportet consequentiam valere, [Y 119r] ut<sup>6919</sup> non sequitur: 'omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim, igitur<sup>6920</sup> isti,<sup>6921</sup> demonstratis<sup>6922</sup> duobus, sunt duodecim'.

<2> Secunda regula quod convertendo istam<sup>6923</sup> est bona consequentia, ut bene sequitur:<sup>6924</sup> 'omnes apostoli Dei<sup>6925</sup> sunt duodecim, igitur duodecim sunt omnes apostoli Dei'.<sup>6926</sup>

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<sup>6895</sup> erunt W

<sup>6896</sup> *add.* secundo omnes apostoli Dei erunt sunt duo W, duodecim MY

<sup>6897</sup> et - pro] *om.* Y

<sup>6898</sup> pro - duo] *om.* M | medietate - duo] *om.* Y

<sup>6899</sup> undecim MY

<sup>6900</sup> duodecim WY, undecim M

<sup>6901</sup> undecim Y

<sup>6902</sup> *add.* ista Y

<sup>6903</sup> *om.* W, *add.* manifeste Y

<sup>6904</sup> ut patet intuiti] sicut patet per eas et totum patet diligenter intuiti Y, *om.* W

<sup>6905</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6906</sup> *vel forsitan* addere Y

<sup>6907</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6908</sup> hoc Y

<sup>6909</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>6910</sup> de hiis] *blank space* M

<sup>6911</sup> ordinem M | sed - argumentationem] *om.* W

<sup>6912</sup> *add.* +consequens+ W

<sup>6913</sup> istorum M, istas Y

<sup>6914</sup> *om.* WM

<sup>6915</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>6916</sup> signo M | a termino] *om.* Y

<sup>6917</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6918</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>6919</sup> sicut MY

<sup>6920</sup> ergo M

<sup>6921</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6922</sup> *lectio dubia post* duobus M | *demonstratis duobus] post* duodecim *add.* igitur sunt *lectio dubia* undecim Y

<sup>6923</sup> istas *add.* ambas W, *ante* convertendo M

<sup>6924</sup> bene sequitur] *om.* MY

<sup>6925</sup> *om.* Y

<3> Tertia regula<sup>6927</sup> est<sup>6928</sup> quod a qualibet tali ad suam praeiacentem est bona consequentia. Et voco<sup>6929</sup> 'praeiacentem' eam<sup>6930</sup> quae remanet deposito signo. Ut<sup>6931</sup> sequitur: 'omnes apostoli dei sunt duodecim, igitur apostoli Dei sunt duodecim'.<sup>6932</sup>

## II.10 <De signo 'totus'>

Deinceps in decimo capitulo<sup>6933</sup> dicendum est<sup>6934</sup> de expositione propositionum<sup>6935</sup> in quibus ponitur hoc signum 'totus'.<sup>6936</sup>

<1> Circa quas primo nota quod ly<sup>6937</sup> totus quandoque<sup>6938</sup> capiatur<sup>6939</sup> pure<sup>6940</sup> sincategorematicae,<sup>6941</sup> quandoque categorematice,<sup>6942</sup> et quandoque partim categorematice, partim<sup>6943</sup> sincategorematicae.

Si enim<sup>6944</sup> ly<sup>6945</sup> totus capiatur categorematice, tunc valet tantum<sup>6946</sup> sicut hoc complexum 'aliquid<sup>6947</sup> habens partes', et hoc modo valet idem dicere:<sup>6948</sup> 'totus Sortes est homo' et 'aliquid habens partes quod est<sup>6949</sup> Sortes est homo'. Et isto modo<sup>6950</sup> negatur ista: 'totus Sortes est<sup>6951</sup> minor Sorte', quia

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<sup>6926</sup> *add.* hoc de istis sufficere etc. et per consequens de nono capitulo principali Y

<sup>6927</sup> *om.* Y, *add.* regula M

<sup>6928</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>6929</sup> *lectio dubia* [non oportet M

<sup>6930</sup> *om.* M, istam Y

<sup>6931</sup> unde Y

<sup>6932</sup> *add.* etc. MW, *add.* et haec de hiis sufficiant etc. Y

<sup>6933</sup> *ante* decimo Y

<sup>6934</sup> *ante* dicendum Y

<sup>6935</sup> expositione propositionum] propositionibus exponentium Y, expositionibus W

<sup>6936</sup> totum Y

<sup>6937</sup> licet M, *om.* W

<sup>6938</sup> aliquando Y

<sup>6939</sup> tenetur M

<sup>6940</sup> *om.* M, *post* sincategorematicae Y

<sup>6941</sup> categorematice M, *add.* et Y

<sup>6942</sup> sincategorematicae M

<sup>6943</sup> et M

<sup>6944</sup> ergo W

<sup>6945</sup> *om.* WY

<sup>6946</sup> *ante* valet M

<sup>6947</sup> ens W, aliud Y

<sup>6948</sup> valet idem dicere] ista est concedenda M

<sup>6949</sup> quod est] existens W

<sup>6950</sup> valet - modo] *om.* Y

<sup>6951</sup> homo et - Sortes] *om.* M

significat quod 'aliquid<sup>6952</sup> habens<sup>6953</sup> partes quod est<sup>6954</sup> Sortes<sup>6955</sup> sit<sup>6956</sup> minus<sup>6957</sup> Sorte'. Et<sup>6958</sup> per consequens significat<sup>6959</sup> quod idem sit minus<sup>6960</sup> se ipso, quod est falsum.

Si autem 'totus'<sup>6961</sup> capitur pure<sup>6962</sup> sincategorematicè, tunc 'totus'<sup>6963</sup> valet tantum<sup>6964</sup> sicut haec<sup>6965</sup> oratio: 'quaelibet pars'. Et sic idem est<sup>6966</sup> dicere: 'totus Sortes'<sup>6967</sup> et<sup>6968</sup> 'quaelibet pars Sortis.' Et sic<sup>6969</sup> modo<sup>6970</sup> conceditur quod totus sortes sit<sup>6971</sup> minor Sorte quia significat quod quaelibet pars Sortes sit minor Sorte,<sup>6972</sup> quia ly totus<sup>6973</sup> ut sic non<sup>6974</sup> capitur nisi<sup>6975</sup> pro partibus quantitativis,<sup>6976</sup> non autem<sup>6977</sup> pro partibus essentialibus.<sup>6978</sup> Ideo sic haec propositio<sup>6979</sup> est simpliciter<sup>6980</sup> |Y 119v| vera.

<2> Secundo nota quod<sup>6981</sup> hoc modo 'totus'<sup>6982</sup> additum<sup>6983</sup> termino communi |W139r| postposito distribuit aggregatum ex recto et obliquo istius termini,<sup>6984</sup> ut dicendo: 'tota anima' tantum est dicere

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<sup>6952</sup> aliquis W

<sup>6953</sup> quod habet Y

<sup>6954</sup> quod est] existens W

<sup>6955</sup> *add.* quod hoc M

<sup>6956</sup> est W

<sup>6957</sup> minor WY

<sup>6958</sup> sic M, *om.* Y

<sup>6959</sup> interpretatur Y, importat M

<sup>6960</sup> minor WY

<sup>6961</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6962</sup> *om.* M, *ante* capitur Y

<sup>6963</sup> idem Y, *post* valet M

<sup>6964</sup> quantum Y

<sup>6965</sup> ista M

<sup>6966</sup> *ante* idem Y

<sup>6967</sup> *add.* +est+ W

<sup>6968</sup> sicut dicere Y

<sup>6969</sup> ot Y

<sup>6970</sup> non M

<sup>6971</sup> est M

<sup>6972</sup> quia - Sorte] *om.* M

<sup>6973</sup> et sic - totus] est minor Sorte, et quia Sortes W

<sup>6974</sup> ut sic non] non ut sic M, ut non sic W

<sup>6975</sup> nec M

<sup>6976</sup> *lectio dubia* Y, communibus M

<sup>6977</sup> *ante* non Y

<sup>6978</sup> essentialiter W

<sup>6979</sup> *om.* W

<sup>6980</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6981</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6982</sup> totum W

<sup>6983</sup> additur Y

<sup>6984</sup> aggregatum - termini] istud terminum M | obliquo istius termini] et captum ly et *lectio dubia* autem Y

sicut<sup>6985</sup> 'quaelibet pars animae'. Unde<sup>6986</sup> sequitur corrolarie<sup>6987</sup> quod haec est falsa: 'in corde<sup>6988</sup> est tota anima', |M 60v| quia valet tantum<sup>6989</sup> sicut haec: 'in corde<sup>6990</sup> est quaelibet pars animae', quae falsa est ex<sup>6991</sup> eo quod<sup>6992</sup> in nullo<sup>6993</sup> corde<sup>6994</sup> est quaelibet pars animae.<sup>6995</sup> Sed haec est bene<sup>6996</sup> vera: 'tota anima est in corde':<sup>6997</sup> quaelibet enim pars animae est in corde.<sup>6998</sup> Sed secus<sup>6999</sup> esset si<sup>7000</sup> terminus communis<sup>7001</sup> praecederet hoc signum 'totus',<sup>7002</sup> ut<sup>7003</sup> dicendo: 'in corde<sup>7004</sup> est anima tota',<sup>7005</sup> quia tunc propositio esset vera:<sup>7006</sup> 'in corde<sup>7007</sup> est enim<sup>7008</sup> animae quaelibet pars - ut in corde<sup>7009</sup> equi<sup>7010</sup> est animae equi<sup>7011</sup> quaelibet pars.<sup>7012</sup>

Et sic patet expositio huius dictionis<sup>7013</sup> 'totus',<sup>7014</sup> prout ly totus<sup>7015</sup> capitur<sup>7016</sup> categorematicè pure<sup>7017</sup> et<sup>7018</sup> sincategorematicè.

Si autem ly totus capitur<sup>7019</sup> partim categorematicè<sup>7020</sup> et partim sincategorematicè,<sup>7021</sup> tunc exponitur<sup>7022</sup> sic:<sup>7023</sup> 'hoc est istud, et nihil est huius<sup>7024</sup> quin sit hoc'.<sup>7025</sup> Et sic capitur<sup>7026</sup> a

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<sup>6985</sup> tantum - sicut] est anima W, valet tantum sicut Y

<sup>6986</sup> *om.* M

<sup>6987</sup> *ante* sequitur MY

<sup>6988</sup> corpore MW

<sup>6989</sup> *ante* valet MY

<sup>6990</sup> corpore MW

<sup>6991</sup> in W

<sup>6992</sup> quia Y

<sup>6993</sup> uno W

<sup>6994</sup> corpore W | quae - corpore] *om.* M

<sup>6995</sup> est quaelibet pars animae] *om.* MW

<sup>6996</sup> *ante* est M

<sup>6997</sup> corpore M | sed - corde] *om.* W

<sup>6998</sup> corpore MW

<sup>6999</sup> si sic M

<sup>7000</sup> quod M

<sup>7001</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7002</sup> totiens Y

<sup>7003</sup> et M, *om.* W

<sup>7004</sup> corpore MW

<sup>7005</sup> *ante* anima W

<sup>7006</sup> una W

<sup>7007</sup> parte corporis M, corpore W

<sup>7008</sup> *om.* W

<sup>7009</sup> corpore M

<sup>7010</sup> *om.* M

<sup>7011</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7012</sup> ut - pars] *om.* W

<sup>7013</sup> signi M, signus Y

<sup>7014</sup> *om.* W

<sup>7015</sup> ly totus] *om.* M

<sup>7016</sup> tenetur M, teneatur Y

<sup>7017</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>7018</sup> vel M

<sup>7019</sup> *post* partim W



Philosopho<sup>7027</sup> sexto *Physicorum*, dicente quod si punctum sit<sup>7028</sup> in linea, totum punctum tangit totam  
- et intelligitur<sup>7029</sup> sic: <sup>7030</sup> quod punctum tangit punctum<sup>7031</sup> et quod nihil sit<sup>7032</sup> unius<sup>7033</sup> quin  
tangat<sup>7034</sup> reliquum. Sic<sup>7035</sup> consuevimus dicere quod tota anima intellectiva<sup>7036</sup> est in corde,<sup>7037</sup> quod  
inelligimus sic: 'anima <intellectiva><sup>7038</sup> est in <corde>,<sup>7039</sup> et nihil est ipsius<sup>7040</sup> animae intellectivae  
quin sit in corde'.<sup>7041</sup> Ad<sup>7042</sup> alium enim<sup>7043</sup> intellectum<sup>7044</sup> locutio<sup>7045</sup> ista non habet veritatem.  
Patet<sup>7046</sup> ergo<sup>7047</sup> expositio<sup>7048</sup> huius dictionis<sup>7049</sup> 'totus' et propositionum<sup>7050</sup> in quibus contingit ipsum  
poni.

<3> Tertio<sup>7051</sup> nota quod praeter tres<sup>7052</sup> modos<sup>7053</sup> 'totius' invenitur<sup>7054</sup> adhuc<sup>7055</sup> unus modus,<sup>7056</sup>  
sed<sup>7057</sup> de isto nulla<sup>7058</sup> est difficultas.<sup>7059</sup> Et est<sup>7060</sup> quod 'totus' dicatur istud quod non est pars  
alterius.<sup>7061</sup> Sicut<sup>7062</sup> enim consuevit 'totale'<sup>7063</sup> distingui<sup>7064</sup> a<sup>7065</sup> 'partiale'.<sup>7066</sup>

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<sup>7020</sup> sincategorematicae M  
<sup>7021</sup> categorematicae M  
<sup>7022</sup> valet tantum W  
<sup>7023</sup> om. MW  
<sup>7024</sup> huiusmodi W  
<sup>7025</sup> istud M  
<sup>7026</sup> om. MW  
<sup>7027</sup> a Philosopho] Philosophi M  
<sup>7028</sup> est W  
<sup>7029</sup> intenditur M  
<sup>7030</sup> om. Y  
<sup>7031</sup> intelligitur - punctum] om. W  
<sup>7032</sup> est MY  
<sup>7033</sup> istius W  
<sup>7034</sup> tangit Y  
<sup>7035</sup> add. quod M  
<sup>7036</sup> om. Y  
<sup>7037</sup> corpore MW  
<sup>7038</sup> om. W  
<sup>7039</sup> corpore W | quod - <corde>] om. MY  
<sup>7040</sup> om. MY  
<sup>7041</sup> corpore MW  
<sup>7042</sup> om. M  
<sup>7043</sup> om. M  
<sup>7044</sup> add. nam Y  
<sup>7045</sup> post ista Y  
<sup>7046</sup> patent W  
<sup>7047</sup> igitur M, om. Y  
<sup>7048</sup> exponentes W, per exponentes Y  
<sup>7049</sup> nominis MY  
<sup>7050</sup> et propositionum] in omnibus propositionibus M  
<sup>7051</sup> secundo M  
<sup>7052</sup> istos M, om. Y  
<sup>7053</sup> vel forsā maius Y  
<sup>7054</sup> om. Y

Et sic patent exponentes huius dictionis 'totus' qualitercumque captae.<sup>7067</sup>

<Regulae de 'totus'>

<1> Tunc de consequentiis formandis<sup>7068</sup> penes ly totus<sup>7069</sup> sit<sup>7070</sup> prima regula [Y 120r] talis:<sup>7071</sup> quod<sup>7072</sup> capiendo ly totum categorematicè<sup>7073</sup> est bona consequentia<sup>7074</sup> a propositione in qua ponitur ly totum cum aliquo termino ad eandem sine isto termino 'totus'. Patet,<sup>7075</sup> quia bene sequitur:<sup>7076</sup> 'totus Sortes est homo,<sup>7077</sup> ergo<sup>7078</sup> Sortes est homo'.

<2> Secunda regula est haec<sup>7079</sup> quod<sup>7080</sup> capiendo ly totum sincategorematicè a propositione in qua ponitur ly<sup>7081</sup> totus<sup>7082</sup> sincategorematicè<sup>7083</sup> ad eandem dimisso ly totus,<sup>7084</sup> non oportet consequentiam valere,<sup>7085</sup> quia non sequitur: 'totus Sortes est minor Sorte, ergo<sup>7086</sup> Sortes est minor Sorte'. Antecedens est verum, ut<sup>7087</sup> patet<sup>7088</sup> ex dictis, et<sup>7089</sup> consequens est<sup>7090</sup> falsum.<sup>7091</sup>

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<sup>7055</sup> *add. est Y*

<sup>7056</sup> invenitur modus] est alius modus M

<sup>7057</sup> et W

<sup>7058</sup> isto nulla] nullo una Y

<sup>7059</sup> facultas W

<sup>7060</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>7061</sup> *om. M*

<sup>7062</sup> sic W

<sup>7063</sup> totum W

<sup>7064</sup> signum M

<sup>7065</sup> contra MW

<sup>7066</sup> parti Y

<sup>7067</sup> qualitercumque captae] *om. M* | et sic - captae] et sic patet omnis huiusmodi nominis acceptiones Y

<sup>7068</sup> formandas Y

<sup>7069</sup> de - totus] ponendae sunt regulae et M

<sup>7070</sup> est M

<sup>7071</sup> haec M, *om. Y*

<sup>7072</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>7073</sup> *add. tunc M*

<sup>7074</sup> *ante est M, add. arguendo M*

<sup>7075</sup> *om. W*

<sup>7076</sup> *ante bene MY*

<sup>7077</sup> *add. marg. M*

<sup>7078</sup> igitur MY

<sup>7079</sup> est haec] *om. Y*

<sup>7080</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>7081</sup> *add. totum vel M*

<sup>7082</sup> totius Y

<sup>7083</sup> *om. MY*

<sup>7084</sup> totum M

<sup>7085</sup> oportet consequentiam valere] valet consequentia haec oportet valere M

<sup>7086</sup> igitur M

<sup>7087</sup> et M

## II.11 <De 'ita' et 'sicut'>

Ultimo<sup>7092</sup> breviter dicendum est<sup>7093</sup> de expositione<sup>7094</sup> propositionis<sup>7095</sup> in qua ponitur<sup>7096</sup> 'ita'<sup>7097</sup> et<sup>7098</sup> 'sicut'.<sup>7099</sup>

<1> Circa quam<sup>7100</sup> primo<sup>7101</sup> nota [W139<sup>v</sup>] quod ly sicut est adverbium similitudinis et propter<sup>7102</sup> hoc semper denotat convenientiam<sup>7103</sup> istorum inter quos comparatur<sup>7104</sup> in aliqua habitudine,<sup>7105</sup> ut si dicatur: 'Sortes est ita albus sicut Plato', ly ita et ly sicut<sup>7106</sup> denotant<sup>7107</sup> quod tam<sup>7108</sup> Sortes quam<sup>7109</sup> Plato sint<sup>7110</sup> albi<sup>7111</sup> - et sic<sup>7112</sup> teneatur improprie.

<2> Secundo nota quod ly ita et sicut<sup>7113</sup> quandoque<sup>7114</sup> tenentur<sup>7115</sup> stricte et sic denotant<sup>7116</sup> totalem similitudinem; et<sup>7117</sup> sic exponitur<sup>7118</sup> ista:<sup>7119</sup> 'Sortes est ita fortis sicut Plato' per compulativam<sup>7120</sup>

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<sup>7088</sup> *post dictis M, om. Y*

<sup>7089</sup> *quod Y*

<sup>7090</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>7091</sup> *etc. add. et cetera punt \_\_\_ M, add. etc. etc. etc. sequitur etc. W, add. haec de consequentiis formandis penes hoc signum totus sufficit etc. Y*

<sup>7092</sup> *add. et ultimo M, add. considerandum Y, consequenter W*

<sup>7093</sup> *dicendum est] est dicendum post expositione M, om. Y*

<sup>7094</sup> *expositionibus W*

<sup>7095</sup> *propositionum W*

<sup>7096</sup> *propositinis in qua ponitur] de istis terminis M*

<sup>7097</sup> *sicut Y*

<sup>7098</sup> *vel MW*

<sup>7099</sup> *ita Y*

<sup>7100</sup> *quas W*

<sup>7101</sup> *om. Y*

<sup>7102</sup> *add. +s+ Y*

<sup>7103</sup> *similitudinem W*

<sup>7104</sup> *circa - comparatur] dicendum est quas constat M*

<sup>7105</sup> *similitudine W*

<sup>7106</sup> *ly ita et ly sicut] ly sicut et ly ita W, ly sicut Y*

<sup>7107</sup> *add. quod a modo W, denotat Y*

<sup>7108</sup> *add. ly M*

<sup>7109</sup> *add. ly M*

<sup>7110</sup> *sit W, sunt Y*

<sup>7111</sup> *albus W*

<sup>7112</sup> *et sic] nisi W*

<sup>7113</sup> *ita et sicut] sicut et ita M*

<sup>7114</sup> *om. W*

<sup>7115</sup> *tenetur W*

<sup>7116</sup> *denotat W*

<sup>7117</sup> *om. M*

<sup>7118</sup> *exponi M*

<sup>7119</sup> *om. Y*

trimembrem sic: 'Sortes est fortis et Plato est fortis et Sortes non<sup>7121</sup> est minus<sup>7122</sup> fortis nec magis<sup>7123</sup> fortis quam Plato'.<sup>7124</sup> Et opposita per disiunctivam trimembrem<sup>7125</sup> de partibus oppositis, ut: 'Sortes non est ita fortis sicut Plato' exponitur sic: 'Sortes est fortis vel<sup>7126</sup> Plato non est fortis<sup>7127</sup> vel Sortes non est minus<sup>7128</sup> fortis vel magis<sup>7129</sup> fortis quam Plato'.<sup>7130</sup> [M 61r] Et isto modo satis<sup>7131</sup> raro consuevimus uti<sup>7132</sup> in communi loquela.<sup>7133</sup>

<3> Tertio nota quod ly sicut quandoque<sup>7134</sup> capitur<sup>7135</sup> largius.<sup>7136</sup> Et sic denotat similitudinem rerum inter quas fit<sup>7137</sup> comparatio, et quod<sup>7138</sup> habitudo<sup>7139</sup> [Y 120v] in qua fit<sup>7140</sup> comparatio non minus inest<sup>7141</sup> subiecto quam illi ad quod comparatur,<sup>7142</sup> ut 'Sortes est ita fortis sicut Plato' denotat<sup>7143</sup> quod uterque istorum habeat fortitudinem, et<sup>7144</sup> quod Sortes non habeat<sup>7145</sup> fortitudinem minorem<sup>7146</sup> sive

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<sup>7120</sup> unam M  
<sup>7121</sup> nec M  
<sup>7122</sup> magis Y  
<sup>7123</sup> minus Y  
<sup>7124</sup> *add.* sed aequae fortis Y  
<sup>7125</sup> per disiunctivam trimembrem] trimembrem per disiunctivam Y  
<sup>7126</sup> et M  
<sup>7127</sup> Sortes non - foris] *om.* Y  
<sup>7128</sup> magis Y  
<sup>7129</sup> minus Y  
<sup>7130</sup> et opposita - Plato ] *om.* W  
<sup>7131</sup> valde W  
<sup>7132</sup> *add.* +lo+ Y  
<sup>7133</sup> logo Y, *ante* communi MY  
<sup>7134</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>7135</sup> tentur M  
<sup>7136</sup> large W  
<sup>7137</sup> est W  
<sup>7138</sup> si W  
<sup>7139</sup> similitudo Y, *add.* quidem M  
<sup>7140</sup> est W  
<sup>7141</sup> \_\_\_ M  
<sup>7142</sup> opponatur W  
<sup>7143</sup> denotatur M  
<sup>7144</sup> uterque - et] *om.* M  
<sup>7145</sup> *add.* minus M  
<sup>7146</sup> *om.* M, talem Y

maio<sup>7147</sup>rem quam Plato.<sup>7148</sup> Qua<sup>7149</sup> propter hoc<sup>7150</sup> exponitur sic<sup>7151</sup> per copulativam trimembrem:<sup>7152</sup>

'Sortes est fortis, et<sup>7153</sup> Plato est fortis, et<sup>7154</sup> Sortes non est minus fortis quam Plato'.

Et <sup>7155</sup> opposita exponitur per disiunctivam <sup>7156</sup> de <sup>7157</sup> partibus oppositis proportionaliter copulativae,<sup>7158</sup> et iste modus<sup>7159</sup> est satis<sup>7160</sup> usitatus.<sup>7161</sup>

<4> Quarto nota quod secundum multos loicos<sup>7162</sup> ly ita et ly sicut<sup>7163</sup> faciunt terminum communem<sup>7164</sup> sequentem se<sup>7165</sup> stare confuse et<sup>7166</sup> distributive ratione negationis in eis<sup>7167</sup> inclusae. Et secundum istos, quando post<sup>7168</sup> ly sicut poneretur<sup>7169</sup> terminus communis, tertia exponens deberet<sup>7170</sup> esse universalis, ut ista<sup>7171</sup> 'Sortes est ita fortis sicut homo' exponitur sic:<sup>7172</sup> 'Sortes est fortis et homo est fortis et nullus homo est magis<sup>7173</sup> fortis quam Sortes', vel loco istius potest poni haec: 'et<sup>7174</sup> Sortes non est minus fortis<sup>7175</sup> quam homo'. Quod<sup>7176</sup> sive<sup>7177</sup> sit verum<sup>7178</sup> sive falsum<sup>7179</sup> non curo,<sup>7180</sup> quia

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<sup>7147</sup> sive maiorem] *om.* MW

<sup>7148</sup> *add.* habet W

<sup>7149</sup> *om.* M

<sup>7150</sup> *add.* etiam M

<sup>7151</sup> sicut Y, *post* trimembrem MY

<sup>7152</sup> bimembrem W

<sup>7153</sup> *om.* W

<sup>7154</sup> *add.* nullus M

<sup>7155</sup> ex W

<sup>7156</sup> per disiunctivam] *om.* M

<sup>7157</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7158</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>7159</sup> multus Y

<sup>7160</sup> valde W, *om.* Y

<sup>7161</sup> consuetus MY

<sup>7162</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7163</sup> ita et ly sicut] sicut et ly ita MY

<sup>7164</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7165</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>7166</sup> *om.* MW

<sup>7167</sup> in eis] *om.* WY

<sup>7168</sup> *lectio dubia* Y

<sup>7169</sup> postponitur M

<sup>7170</sup> debet M, *om.* Y

<sup>7171</sup> *om.* M, haec Y

<sup>7172</sup> *om.* W

<sup>7173</sup> minus Y

<sup>7174</sup> *om.* W

<sup>7175</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7176</sup> quia W

<sup>7177</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7178</sup> terminum Y

<sup>7179</sup> non Y

<sup>7180</sup> *add.* quod M

stat in modo loquendi de quo quivis<sup>7181</sup> posset<sup>7182</sup> dicere quod<sup>7183</sup> sibi placet. Scis<sup>7184</sup> tamen quod<sup>7185</sup> frequenter in<sup>7186</sup> omni locutione sic<sup>7187</sup> non<sup>7188</sup> utuntur.<sup>7189</sup> Dicimus enim:<sup>7190</sup> 'Sortes est ita fortis sicut alter homo',<sup>7191</sup> nullo<sup>7192</sup> modo tamen<sup>7193</sup> volentes dicere quod nullus<sup>7194</sup> alter homo<sup>7195</sup> sit<sup>7196</sup> fortior Sorte.

<Regulae de 'ita' et 'sicut'>

<1> Sed<sup>7197</sup> tunc<sup>7198</sup> quoad consequentias [W140r] istarum<sup>7199</sup> sit prima regula,<sup>7200</sup> quod<sup>7201</sup> arguendo a propositione affirmativa in qua ponuntur haec<sup>7202</sup> adverbialia<sup>7203</sup> 'sicut' et 'ita'<sup>7204</sup> ad propositionem in qua <sup>7205</sup> ponitur <sup>7206</sup> alterum <sup>7207</sup> comparativorum, <sup>7208</sup> quodcumque <sup>7209</sup> sit istud, <sup>7210</sup> dicitur <sup>7211</sup> habitudo<sup>7212</sup> in qua fit comparatio, est bona consequentia, ut bene sequitur: 'Sortes est ita bonus sicut

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<sup>7181</sup> quo quivis] quovis M, quo quaevis Y

<sup>7182</sup> potest Y, *add.* quaelibet M

<sup>7183</sup> sicut M, quae Y

<sup>7184</sup> voco M, scio Y

<sup>7185</sup> *add.* sic W

<sup>7186</sup> frequenter in] *om.* M

<sup>7187</sup> sicut M, *om.* W

<sup>7188</sup> *om.* M

<sup>7189</sup> utimus Y, utitur *add.* non dicitur M

<sup>7190</sup> *om.* M

<sup>7191</sup> alter homo] alius M

<sup>7192</sup> uno M

<sup>7193</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>7194</sup> *add.* +homo+ W, *om.* M

<sup>7195</sup> *ante* alter M

<sup>7196</sup> est W

<sup>7197</sup> *om.* M

<sup>7198</sup> *om.* W

<sup>7199</sup> harum W

<sup>7200</sup> *add.* talis W

<sup>7201</sup> *om.* Y

<sup>7202</sup> *om.* W

<sup>7203</sup> verbia *add. marg.* ad M

<sup>7204</sup> sicut et ita] ita et sicut M

<sup>7205</sup> *add.* +loi+ W

<sup>7206</sup> *om.* MY

<sup>7207</sup> de altero Y, *om.* M

<sup>7208</sup> *om.* M

<sup>7209</sup> quascumque Y

<sup>7210</sup> illud Y

<sup>7211</sup> sequitur W

<sup>7212</sup> *om.* M

Plato, ergo Sortes est bonus et Plato est bonus' - et<sup>7213</sup> intelligendo<sup>7214</sup> regulam tenendo ly sicut proprie.<sup>7215</sup> Patet<sup>7216</sup> regula<sup>7217</sup> quia arguitur ab exposita<sup>7218</sup> [Y 121<sup>r</sup>] ad exponentem<sup>7219</sup> proportionaliter.

<2-4> Ponantur de hiis<sup>7220</sup> aliae tres<sup>7221</sup> regulae<sup>7222</sup> positae de<sup>7223</sup> exceptivis in capitulo primo.

Sed quaereret aliquis<sup>7224</sup> utrum<sup>7225</sup> haec esset concedenda: 'deus est ita bonus sicut dyabolus'.

Et respondeo quod non capiendo terminos proprie: non debet<sup>7226</sup> tamen<sup>7227</sup> negari in praesentia<sup>7228</sup> loicorum<sup>7229</sup> eo quod opposita male sonat.<sup>7230</sup> Sed si conceditur hoc<sup>7231</sup> solum<sup>7232</sup> est ad illum<sup>7233</sup> intellectum quod deus non est minus bonus quam diabolus.<sup>7234</sup>

Haec de expositionibus<sup>7235</sup> ipsorum<sup>7236</sup> 'sicut' et 'ita' et suis<sup>7237</sup> consequentiis.<sup>7238</sup>

Et consequenter<sup>7239</sup> de ultimo capitulo principali istius libri<sup>7240</sup> dicta sufficiant.<sup>7241</sup>

<Explicit>

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<sup>7213</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>7214</sup> *intendo* M  
<sup>7215</sup> *add.* et Y  
<sup>7216</sup> *post* M  
<sup>7217</sup> *om.* MW  
<sup>7218</sup> *exponente* M  
<sup>7219</sup> *expositam* M  
<sup>7220</sup> *aliis* M  
<sup>7221</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>7222</sup> *add.* sicut M  
<sup>7223</sup> *in* M  
<sup>7224</sup> *quis ante* quaereret M  
<sup>7225</sup> *om.* Y  
<sup>7226</sup> *dicitur* M  
<sup>7227</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>7228</sup> *lectio dubia* M  
<sup>7229</sup> *loicorum* MWY  
<sup>7230</sup> *sonant* M [non debet - sonat] *om.* W  
<sup>7231</sup> *om.* M  
<sup>7232</sup> *post* est W  
<sup>7233</sup> *istum* Y  
<sup>7234</sup> *add.* tamen non debet negari in praesentia loicorum eo quod male sonat W, *add.* et Y  
<sup>7235</sup> *exponentibus* W  
<sup>7236</sup> *ly* M, *om.* W  
<sup>7237</sup> et suis] *sufficiant dicta de* M  
<sup>7238</sup> *add.* *sufficiant* Y  
<sup>7239</sup> *per consequens* Y  
<sup>7240</sup> *istius libri]* *om.* W  
<sup>7241</sup> *dicta sufficiant]* *om.* Y | et - *sufficiant]* *om.* M

Et sic est finis praesentis tractatus<sup>7242</sup> consequentiarum magistri Marsilii de Inghen,<sup>7243</sup> pro quo laudetur Deus noster Jesus Christus sine fine in saecula saeculorum. Amen. Deo gratias.<sup>7244</sup>

Explicit textus consequentiarum magistri Marsilii et sequuntur<sup>7245</sup> nunc consequenter obligatoria eiusdem.<sup>7246</sup>

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<sup>7242</sup> praesentis tractatus] *om.* W

<sup>7243</sup> et sic - Inghen] *om.* M

<sup>7244</sup> pro quo - gratias] *om.* Y, Deo gratias benedicimus domino alleluia M

<sup>7245</sup> secuntur W

<sup>7246</sup> *add.* etcetera W | textus - eiusdem] secunda pars consequentiarum deo gratias in anno domini 1412 in vigilia Johannis Baptistae etc. M, *lectio dubia* precum mihi *lectio dubia* breviavi hoc ubi nihil datur nisi haberi *lectio dubia* dantibus Y



### 3. Chapter III: In the Middle: A Beginner's Guide to Medieval Logic and What to Do with It

Logic is eternal, so it can wait.

- Oliver Heaviside, as quoted in M. Wilson, *Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behavior*, Oxford 2006, 27

#### 3.0 Introduction

When approaching medieval theories of *consequentiae*, either from a philosophical or historical point of view (or ideally from both), inevitably we have to tackle at least two general directing questions looming in the background: a) what is a *consequentia*, what is it supposed to capture? And b) how does it relate to our contemporary notions of following logically? Furthermore when we are considering if and how a *consequentia* is indeed a "consequence", a third underlying question (methodological in nature) comes to our attention: c) what could the study of medieval theories of *consequentiae* add to our understanding of the consequence relation, of inference, of logical entailment? Or vice versa, how do our contemporary preconceptions and technical training on such matters affect our comprehension of medieval theories?

Following this line of inquiry we find ourselves facing some core questions on the nature of logic, its relation to its own history and, deep down, on the forms and aims of human rationality. These issues appear to be deeply entangled and difficult (if not impossible) to separate from each other while preserving their individual identity: what is logic and what can it be? How could studying medieval logic be of interest in this respect?

The less objectionable definition of Logic would probably be "logic is what logicians do": even if it is not particularly informative, it would at least hold together a wide group of theories and

practices - from syllogistics to probabilistic logic, from Turing's machines to *anyapoha* in the Buddhist tradition,<sup>7247</sup> just to mention a few disparate examples.

At least in most cases, how to obtain reliable conclusions in an argument<sup>7248</sup> seems to be at the core of what makes a logic logic. In this sense, in some way logic is "the science of logical consequence". But, on the one hand this brings us back to our original problem of consequences and *consequentiae*. On the other hand, to quote Curry, "nobody knows exactly what a logical consequence is". Firstly, a consequence, its properties, and what it preserves from a set of premises to a conclusion can be defined in many ways in different logical systems. Secondly, the notion of consequence or (more generally) of what it means "to follow" goes historically through several instantiations within several conceptions of logic.

Medieval logical theories could certainly represent an interesting case study for this wider set of philosophical problems.

In this chapter I have two principal aims. Firstly I am going to reject the common historiographical thesis that sees Medieval Logic as Logic only in a partially equivocal sense. Secondly I am going to try to briefly assess medieval theories of *consequentiae*, in their historical development and conceptual framework, in order to tackle the question of if they are theories of consequences at all and therefore, to have a frame of reference for an analysis of Marsilius of Inghen's theory (chap. 4).

Therefore, I am going to offer a general overview of the profile of medieval logic (3.1) and of its study (3.2). I will then proceed with an introduction to and a brief examination of medieval theories of consequences (3.3).

### 3.1 *What is Medieval Logic? Medieval Practitioners and Discussions*

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<sup>7247</sup> However, specifically anyapoha is relevant for theories of inference. See Hayes [1986]. On Buddhist logic see for example the volumes edited by Matial - Evans [1986] and Sadhukhan - Dokhan [1993]. On theories of inference in Indian philosophy see for example Prasad [2002]

<sup>7248</sup> Here I am using "argument" in a sense analogous to "derivation". See Parsons [1996]

On the same line of what we say for logic tout-court, the most obvious answer to the question "what is medieval logic?" would probably be "what medieval logicians do". So far so good, since once again it seems to be fairly correct - or at least it is not obviously wrong. However, if we look more closely, we find that for several aspects our answer is less unproblematic than what we are led to believe by the general case.

Who were medieval logicians? What is it that they were doing and do we understand it as logic (or, sometimes, do we understand it at all)? How did they define "logic"? pertaining to the field of logic, would we identify the same subjects and problems as they did? These are only some of the many possible questions raising around Medieval Logic that do not have an easy or obvious answer and require venturing into some muddy methodological waters. Although by navigating them cautiously, we stumble upon some interesting spots and fascinating eddies, and overall we refine our own sea legs.

Furthermore, it would not be wise to make rushed generalisations, neither synchronically nor diachronically: under the label of "Medieval Logic" we count a large number of authors, texts, and logical-philosophical positions over the span roughly of a thousand years, on three continents, and in very different contexts. It seems quite evident that generalising would likely yield incorrect results or at best would not be very informative. However, by circumscribing a more restricted area of study we might be able to outline a broad picture of what is going on "in logic" in that time and context: this picture would convey some relevant information to clarify our background issues. Therefore, most of my following remarks are referred exclusively to the Latin world and having in mind mostly the XIV century.

Let us begin then with the barest definition *quod sit* of Medieval Logic as "what medieval logicians do": we should ask ourselves who these medieval logicians are and how they define themselves (3.1.1), and what is it that they actually *do*, and how they define it (3.1.2). I will

then continue by outlining and examining some common takes and issues in the historiography on the subject (3.2).

### 3.1.1 *Schoolboys, Philosophers, Logicians, and Laymen*

To properly understand our heroes and enjoy their exploits, we should be aware of their origin story, i.e. of how they came to be what they are, to believe what they believe and to do what they do. Since we are meeting intellectual heroes, in our case this amounts to having a rough idea of how both our medieval logicians were trained and what they were trained to do. We will not need to go into the details of the curricula of the different kinds of grammar and Cathedral school, *studia* and Universities throughout the Middle ages,<sup>7249</sup> to see almost immediately that logic is ubiquitous: *logica/dialectica* constitutes one of the backbones of medieval lower and higher education and of the medieval way of conceiving and producing knowledge.

The partition of disciplines at the basis of education through the Middle Ages (and beyond) between *trivium* and *quadrivium* is codified fairly early: by the late antiquity, some authors (e.g. Martianus Cappella) are developing a distinction already present in the classical world (e.g. in Marcus Terentius Varro), and it gets picked up by the early medieval "encyclopaedists" (e.g. Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville). The list of disciplines grouped under these labels is not always consistent or crystallised, on the contrary it presents some relevant shifts and has a very complex history that - for reasons of space - we cannot examine here. Long story short the most common account through the Middle Ages (and, once again, beyond) groups on the one hand the *scientiae sermocinales* (disciplines that have to do with language) under the *trivium* - usually counting Grammar, Logic (*logica/dialectica*) and Rhetoric - ;<sup>7250</sup> and on the other hand, it collects the the disciplines having somewhat to do with quantity under the

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<sup>7249</sup> See for example de Ridder-Symoens - Rüegg (eds.) [1992]; in particular for our themes see Weijers [1987], [1995], [1996], [2002], [2011] and Maierù [1994]

<sup>7250</sup> On the teaching of the *trivium* between XIII and the first quarter of the XIV century, see Lewry [1994]

*quadrivium* - counting Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy.<sup>7251</sup> This kind of categorisation projects an image of *logica-dialectica* as primarily concerned with language: this seems to be the first conception of logic a medieval student would be exposed to.

Once undergone his basic training in these liberal arts, a student would pursue his philosophical studies - which, in the later Middle Ages means enrolling in a university. At this point, an average student would have acquired some developed competences in Latin grammar and rhetoric and some disputational proficiency. For example, already in the XII century, William Fitzstephen (writing around 1170) describes a group of twelve to fourteen years old boys in a London churchyard disputing

... some in demonstrative rhetoric, others in dialectic. Some 'hurtle enthymemes', others with greater skill employ perfect syllogisms. Boys of different schools strive against one another in verse, or contend concerning the principles of grammar, or the rules concerning past and future. There are others who employ the old art of crossroads in epigrams, rhymes and metre.<sup>7252</sup>

It is likely that teenagers enrolling in an *artes* university programme a century or two later would still have a similar background and comparable abilities - which means, from the looks of it, a solid education in Latin grammar<sup>7253</sup> and rhetoric, and at least some competency in *dialectica*. If in the second half of the XII century the best and brightest students had some level of mastery over syllogisms, it is possible that such skill only became more common with the wider and deeper diffusion of the Aristotelian logical works and the almost obsessive emphasis that the XIII century put on syllogistics.<sup>7254</sup> Therefore a XIII or XIV century freshman would know already a good amount of logical how-to-dos with syllogistic and non-syllogistic inferences, and would have had plenty of practice in logic, especially applied to disputational contexts. Since the basis of the logical practice had already been learned at the lower level of education, then it should probably not be surprising that most of the surviving "academic"

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<sup>7251</sup> See e.g. Maierù [1994]

<sup>7252</sup> Quoted in Murphy [1980, 160]

<sup>7253</sup> The study of grammar is not foregone at the University level - see e.g. Rosier-Catach [2000]

<sup>7254</sup> E.g. Stump [1989, 157-175]; Broadie [1993]; Pinborg [1972],[1984]; Mugnai [2013, ch. II.3]

logical texts from the XIII and in particular the XIV century give us a picture of Medieval Logic as mainly concerned with meta-logical aspects or with philosophical issues about logic, trying to explain and justify not just the hows but also the whys. During his time in the *artes*, our student's logical education would normally involve studying Aristotle's *Organon* - or at least his masters' views about it - and some technical logical topics (*suppositiones, ampliaciones, appellationes, restrictiones, alienationes, consequentiae, obligationes, sophismata, insolubilia, expositiones...*). In those years, he would read also about natural philosophy and physics, metaphysics and ethics; once their final exam was completed (*determinatio*), by the age of twenty-one (at least in XIV century Paris) he could undergo his *inceptio* to obtain his *licentia docendi* and become a *magister artium*. At this point, our freshly appointed master's logical training is over: he is now a professional philosopher and starts lecturing and composing his own works - as far as logic goes, once again, mostly on the *Organon* and the technical subjects that we mentioned, usually grouped under the heading of *logica modernorum*. In medieval universities, logic (and most other philosophical subjects) was normally taught by fairly young masters, freshly out of their *artes* programmes, while they were pursuing more "serious" studies in the higher faculties (Law, Medicine, Theology).<sup>7255</sup> *Senescere in artibus* (to grow old in the faculty of Arts) was generally discouraged, frowned upon, and quite rare even if not outright unheard of - John Buridan is the most well known exception. Most medieval professional logicians were therefore primarily professional philosophers - and they were trying to become a professional something-else.<sup>7256</sup>

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<sup>7255</sup> See Chapter I. This is true in particular for the Parisian system; in some cases, like in most Italian medieval universities, Law and Medicine "could be pursued at the undergraduate level" (Ashworth [1998, 748]), but both programmes (Medicine in particular) included also the standard *artes* curriculum and a solid logical formation. On the teaching of Logic in Bologna see Buzzetti - Ferrarini - Tabarroni (eds.) [1992]; on the relationship between Logic and Medicine in Italian Universities and in Bologna in particular see Agrimi - Crisciani [1992]

<sup>7256</sup> One interesting and still mostly unexplored line of inquiry would be on the intellectual profiles of non-professional logicians outside of late medieval universities, working in different cultural environments, as for example at secular courts, at the curia or in the legal practice- also to explore the impact (if any) of logic on different forms of applied knowledge and in institutional contexts other than the late medieval academia. For some suggestions in this direction see for example Marenbon [2008, 2] and Cameron [2011]

It is not very common for these late medieval authors dwelling in logic to call themselves *loicus* or *dialecticus* or even *philosophus*: it is quite rare for them to call themselves at all. In reference to the author of a text, *loicus* or *dialecticus* appear more often in the opening or ending notes added to a manuscript by the copyist of the day - even if not as often as the more common *magister* or *magister artium/in artibus*. Sometimes we read an "ego, magister..." by the authors themselves, which refers to the institutional role they held but does not give us anything specific on what these fellows were actually *magister* of: even if its usually *magistri artium*, sometimes theologians or members of the other faculties "go back" to writing about logic. Some other times, a scribe would add a "*doctor theologiae*" to his copy of a logical text composed by some author who completed his theological studies only long after the composition of that text.

*Dialecticus* is more common at first, but around the middle of the XII century *logicus/loicus* takes over a good chunk of the scene.

Along with *dialecticus* or the generic *magister (artium)*, *loicus* (or its typographical variant *loycus*) appears both in manuscripts colophons or in texts discussing different logical positions - as an alternative to the generic *aliquis/aliqui/quis* so common in almost the totality of medieval philosophical texts. Especially in later medieval manuscripts, *loicus* seems to gain a disorienting ambiguity, probably due to a combination of phonetic evolutions and copyists' mistakes: quite curiously, *loicus* ends up being used both for *logicus* (m. n. = logician; from the Gr.: λογικός) and for *laicus* (m. n. = layman). Morphologically, *loicus* is an evolution of *logicus*: it looks quite natural because of the soft pronunciation of the sound "g" in the phoneme "gi" - apparently common already in post-Ciceronian Latin -,<sup>7257</sup> that leaves a trace in the semi-consonantal sound "y" explicit in the alternative spelling. The adverbial form *logice* is fairly diffused (but so is also *logicaliter*); *logicus*, *-a*, *-um* as an attribute, meaning "logical", still

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<sup>7257</sup> For a reasoned introduction to linguistic changes, including phonetic and morphological changes and shifts of meaning, see McMahon [1994] and [2000].

appears here and there in late medieval texts, even if the form *logicalis*, -e is much more frequent;<sup>7258</sup> *loicus* though is definitely predominant in the substantive use, referring to "logicians". However, *loicus* is also employed in a looser sense analogous to *litteratus* or *clericus* - which is both something like "clerk"/"cleric" and simply "literate".<sup>7259</sup> We would not have any major problems so far, because - as we have seen - to be literate in the Middle Ages usually meant to have undergone logical training - and in order to access higher university education, usually students had to take some minor vows that formally made them clerics. However, *laicus* comes into play: *laicus* (from the Greek term λαϊκός) is the contrary of *clericus* and means not only an individual outside of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, but also something or somebody popular or illiterate, i.e. a layman. Probably because of the close resemblance between "a" and "o" in many late medieval personal hands, in an outstanding number of manuscripts we often find a very clearly written *loicus/loici* - with round a round fat "o" - referring not to logicians but to laymen. Usually the context helps, since most appeals to the evergreen layman of philosophical examples are often accompanied by a reference to their ignorance or to the "common way of speaking". Nevertheless, some late medieval *loici/logicians* take the *communis modus loquendi* philosophically very seriously - and among them our Marsilius of Inghen *in primis*.<sup>7260</sup>

To sum up, late medieval logicians seem to be first and foremost *magistri artium* operating within the university institutional context, and therefore philosophers because of the way that those contexts were structured. Both their basic education and professional training include a great deal of logic/dialectic, but also of grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy tout-court. They usually refer to themselves as *magistri* and they employ the connotation of "logician" in their technical works mostly in reference to those arguing some specific logical points.

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<sup>7258</sup> The English "logical" comes from *logicalis*, while for example the French or Italian corresponding adjectives are modeled upon the form *logicus* in its attributive use.

<sup>7259</sup> Gualandri [1992]

<sup>7260</sup> In order to unfold the ambiguity between "logicians" and "laymen", in the edition of Marsilius' *Consequentiae*, I opted for expounding the "loic-", ubiquitous in the mss., alternatively as "loic-" or "laic-" according to the context.



### 3.1.2 Medieval Discussions of (Medieval) Logic: A Snapshot

What then was Logic for our late medieval logicians/philosophers? What did they think it was about? There is some partial agreement on the textual corpus that counts as "logical", but not so much about anything else: not on the definition of logic and its scope, its status in relation to philosophy, its internal subdivisions and parts.... There is no uniformity even of its name!

The double diction of *logica/loica* and *dialectica* requires a few words: a short lexicographical overview will take us straight to the heart of the matter.

Among other modern languages, English too preserves a distinction between "logic" and "dialectic". Looking at the relevant lemmas of a dictionary sanctioning the "ordinary" use, we read for example in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (=OED):

#### **Logic**

1. The branch of philosophy that treats the forms of thinking in general, and more especially of inference and scientific method. [...]
2. A system or a particular exposition of logic; a treatise on logic. Also, the science or art of reasoning as applied to some particular department of knowledge or investigation. [...]
3. Logical argumentation; a mode of argumentation viewed as good or bad according to its conformity to logical principles. [...]
4. Of or pertaining to logic.

#### **Dialectic**

(i) sb.

1. The art of critical examination into the truth of an opinion: in earlier English use a synonym of Logic as applied to formal rhetorical reasoning; logical argumentation or disputation. [...]
2. In modern Philosophy: Specifically applied by Kant to the criticism which shows the contradictory character of the principles of science, when they are employed to determine objects beyond the limits of experience (i.e. the soul, the world, God); by Hegel (who denies that such contradictions are ultimately irreconcilable) the term is applied (a) to the process of thought by which such contradictions are seen to merge themselves in a higher truth that comprehends them; and (b) to the world-process, which, being in his view but the thought process in its objective side, develops similarly by a continuous unification of opposites. [...]

(ii) adj.; sb.

A. Of, pertaining to, or of the nature of Logical disputation; argumentative, logical. [...]

B. sb.<sup>2</sup> [The adjective used absolutely]. A dialectic philosopher, one who pursues the dialectic method; a critical inquirer after truth; a logical disputant.

Besides the OED's apparent fondness of German philosophy, here, on the one hand, "dialectic" appears to be used as a synonym of "logic"/"logical", with an emphasis on its dialogical and disputational dimension. On the other hand, "logic" seems to put the accent on inference and to carry a stronger connection to good reasoning and science.

But for some historical outlines or an analysis of different types or branches of logic, the most common Philosophy reference works in English do not add much to the OED lemmas<sup>7261</sup> - when they even define these terms.<sup>7262</sup> However, an usual (and at least partially artificial) distinction employed within philosophical circles sees, on the one hand, "logic" as "the systematic investigation of the relation of consequence - i.e. which conclusions validly follow from a premise or set of premises".<sup>7263</sup> On the other hand, this distinction associates "dialectic" with "a rational multi-agent debate",<sup>7264</sup> usually in a concrete dialogical setting.<sup>7265</sup> Overall, within both the ordinary and the philosophical contemporary uses of "logic" and "dialectic" as quasi-synonyms we can still hear the echoes of the way the semantic fields of *loica* and *dialectica* came to be employed in the in the Later Middle Ages.

Both *logica/loica* and *dialectica* are calques from Greek already incorporated into Classical Latin, which mostly uses them as quasi-synonyms:

(i) *logica/loica* derives from the Greek λόγος<sup>7266</sup> via the mediation of the adjective λογικός, -ή, -όν, that in its most general meanings corresponds to the Latin semantic fields of *oratio/vox/sermo* on the one hand, and of *ratio* on the other - i.e. respectively to "(A) the word or that by which the inward thought is expressed" and to "(B) the inward thought itself".<sup>7267</sup>

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<sup>7261</sup> E.g. the 2006 edition *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Borchert, has a general lemma for "dialectic" (vol. 5), but not one for "logic".

<sup>7262</sup> For example, both a general lemma for "logic" and for "dialectic" are absent in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<sup>7263</sup> Duncombe - Dutilh Novaes [2016, 3].

<sup>7264</sup> Duncombe - Dutilh Novaes [2016, 3].

<sup>7265</sup> See for example Fink [2012] and Duncombe - Dutilh Novaes [2016]

<sup>7266</sup> We also find a proper calque "logos"; the Lemma in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* reads: "logos (-us) -i, m. 1. A story, anecdote, yarn (often pejorative): (nom. pl. as exclaim.) fairy-tales! rubbish! [...] 2. (math.) A principle of relationship between numbers, ratio." [1985, 1041]

<sup>7267</sup> Lemma "λόγος" in *Greek-English Lexicon* [1889<sup>1</sup>; 1952<sup>2</sup>]

In Classical Latin *logica* seems to maintain primarily the acceptation connected to rationality.<sup>7268</sup>

(ii) In Classical Latin *dialectica* appears to be more common than *logica*. The term derives from the Greek adjective διαλεκτικός, -ή, -όν (τέχνη), i.e. "the art of discussion",<sup>7269</sup> which is in turn a form derived from διαλέγομαι, i.e. "to converse with, hold converse with, [...] to discuss, to argue [...]".<sup>7270</sup> In Classical Latin, *dialectica* commonly signifies "the art of reasoning, logic",<sup>7271</sup> however the emphasis on its disputational aspect is frequent.<sup>7272</sup>

As it has been noticed, while the modern English terms "logic" and "dialectic" have a primary substantival use, their Ancient Greek ancestors are primarily and mainly adjectives;<sup>7273</sup> however, their substantive use appears already in Classical Latin and is consolidated in post-Classical Latin - both for the masculine forms, referring to the practitioners, and for the feminine forms, referring to the discipline.<sup>7274</sup>

Both λογική and διαλεκτική have a shifting meaning in ancient philosophy, which has been studied quite extensively.<sup>7275</sup> Long and complicated story made very short: in Antiquity and Late Antiquity the uses of the concurrent traditions differ significantly, pick out different concepts - and our medieval authors have to make sense of this uneven conceptual and lexical patchwork. For example, on the one hand, Plato uses διαλεκτική in two senses: (a) referring to the Socratic dialogical method of philosophical inquiry;<sup>7276</sup> and (b) designating the method of division and collection.<sup>7277</sup> On the other hand, Aristotle's use of λογικός, -ή, -όν is not technical

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<sup>7268</sup> See for example *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* [1956-1979, Vol. 7/2]

<sup>7269</sup> Lemma "διαλεκτική" in *Greek-English Lexicon* [1889<sup>1</sup>; 1952<sup>2</sup>]. See below for more on the τέχνη/art matter.

<sup>7270</sup> Lemma "διαλέγομαι" in *Greek-English Lexicon* [1889<sup>1</sup>; 1952<sup>2</sup>]

<sup>7271</sup> *Oxford Latin Dictionary* [1985, 536]

<sup>7272</sup> See the occurrences in the respective lemmas of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* [1956-1979]

<sup>7273</sup> Duncombe - Dutilh Novaes [2016, 1].

<sup>7274</sup> Alas, as of now I have yet to find an occurrence of the feminine substantive form, either from *logicus*, -a, -um or *dialecticus*, -a, -um referring to a female practitioner. The role (if any) of women in the history of logic is still an unexplored field.

<sup>7275</sup> For an overview see Duncombe - Dutilh Novaes [2016]. See also e.g. Barnes [2007]; Berti [1996]; Fink [2012]; Malink [2015]; Moraux [1968]; Ryle [1968].

<sup>7276</sup> E.g. *Rep.* 534b.

<sup>7277</sup> E.g. *Phaedr.* 266b.

and is close to the Classical Latin main acceptance of *logicus*, *-a*, *-um* - meaning "intellectual" or "rational".<sup>7278</sup> Συλλογιστική has more closely to do with logical deductive reasoning - both formal<sup>7279</sup> and informal -,<sup>7280</sup> although it covers also some wider capacity or method outside of the scope of what we would call "logic".<sup>7281</sup> Aristotle uses διαλεκτική meaning the social epistemic status of premises that are supported by the opinion of the experts or of the majority,<sup>7282</sup> but also the ability to argue in a particular context under some restraints without reaching a contradiction.<sup>7283</sup> Then we have also the Stoics. Seemingly,<sup>7284</sup> the Stoics' λογική is one of the three parts of philosophy (along with physics and ethics),<sup>7285</sup> and it is divided into διαλεκτική and ῥητορική. From the way Sextus Empiricus employs the term in his account of Stoic philosophy, διαλεκτική looks like something very close to our use of "logic".<sup>7286</sup> Probably, the eclectic tendencies common among Hellenistic and Late Ancient authors do not help to clarify the picture. This patchy complex of philosophical influences, along with the ordinary etymological semantic uses, seems to survive in the ordinary acceptance of *loica* and *dialectica* in Latin. Furthermore, even if Classical, Hellenistic and (at least in part) late ancient Latin culture is fundamentally bilingual,<sup>7287</sup> to the constant flux of translations or "stolen words" from Greek to Latin we have to account for the shifts in the meaning and in the uses of these terms that we have already mentioned - e.g. the nominalisation of the Greek adjectives *in primis*. If the Classical use of most philosophical terms is fixed by authors like Cicero and Seneca, at least up to the XII century the standard medieval philosophical (and hence logical)

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<sup>7278</sup> E.g. *Nic. Eth.* 110b

<sup>7279</sup> E.g. *An. Pr.* 24a28

<sup>7280</sup> E.g. *Top.* 100a18-19

<sup>7281</sup> E.g. *Soph. Elenc.* 138a37-8. See: Duncombe - Dutilh Novaes [2016, 2]

<sup>7282</sup> E.g. *Top.* 104a9

<sup>7283</sup> E.g. *Soph. Elenc.* 165b3-4

<sup>7284</sup> The direct Stoic sources, at least for the First and Middle Stoà, are only fragmentary, and for a reconstruction of Stoic doctrines we have to rely on later compilers, mainly Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Book II, and *Adversus Mathematicos*, Book VIII; and Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, Book VII.

<sup>7285</sup> For a philosophically interesting presentation and analysis of Stoic Logic see Mates [1961]. See also e.g. Frede [1974a] and [1974b]; Mignucci [1965]; Bobzien [1993], [1996], [1997], [1999], [2002], [2011]; Brunshwig [1994] and several papers in Brunshwig (ed.) [1978].

<sup>7286</sup> Duncombe - Dutilh Novaes [2016, 2]

<sup>7287</sup> See, for example, Murphy [1980]

lexicon is conveyed by Boethius'<sup>7288</sup> works and by the early Medieval encyclopaedists - e.g. Isidore of Seville and Cassiodorus.

As for the medieval tradition, the use of *dialectica* to designate the discipline is still predominant in Late Antiquity and through the early Middle Ages, and it is pretty much universal through the XI and the beginning of the XII century.<sup>7289</sup> At this point there are some discussions on the equivalence between *dialectica* and *logica*, but though the XII century the two terms come to be used interchangeably and basically as synonyms.<sup>7290</sup> For example Peter Abelard writes a *Dialectica* but also treatises titled *Logica*, he is quite explicit in considering *logica* and *dialectica* one discipline and in using both terms indifferently.<sup>7291</sup>

However, on the one hand, *dialectica* maintains its etymological and conceptual connection to the dialogical and disputational aspect of logic (D1). On the other hand, especially with the reintroduction into the Latin speaking world of most (previously unavailable) Aristotelian works, *dialectica* grows into other two other narrower uses: (D2) the part of logic that deals with probable arguments or with "the kind of reasoning which falls between demonstrative and sophistical reasoning"; and (D3) a synonym for *inventio*, i.e. the part of logic that finds the appropriate materials for arguments - e.g. in a syllogistic context, the middle term or *argumentum*.<sup>7292</sup>

Even in this very short and very coarse history of two words, we find *in nuce* the main interconnected points of disagreement among medieval logicians on the nature, the status, the object of logic:<sup>7293</sup>

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<sup>7288</sup> See e.g. Ebbesen [1990]

<sup>7289</sup> On the history of the technical employment of the two terms in the middle ages see for example Michaud-Quantin [1969]. For an extensive picture of dialectic in the Middle Ages and its role in the development of Medieval Logic see Stump [1989]. See also Maierù [1993].

<sup>7290</sup> Michaud-Quantin [1969]

<sup>7291</sup> Michaud-Quantin [1969]; Petrus Abelardus, *Logica nostrorum* [ed. Geyer, 1933, 506]

<sup>7292</sup> Ashworth [1998, 750]

<sup>7293</sup> The secondary literature on these debates is extensive. I am simply reporting some of the titles in correlation to the following points.

- Is logic a *scientia* or an *ars* (τέχνη)? Which means: is it a body of knowledge or a mere technique? Furthermore, is it an *habitus* that we acquire?
- Is logic *rationalis* or *sermocinalis*? Which means: is logic primarily about language or about the forms of and rules for correct reasoning?<sup>7294</sup>
- Is it a part of philosophy, conformingly to the Stoic tradition as the medieval higher education system seems to assume? Or is a mere instrument (*Organon*), as in Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition - which, of that same system, is the backbone?
- What is the subject of logic (*subiectum logicae*)? Is it second intentions (*intentiones secundae, entia rationis*)? Is it just syllogisms? Or is a "way of knowing" (*modus sciendi*)?

In the Late Middle ages, many positions try to reconcile some if not most of these oppositions. The increasingly more common subdivision between *logica docens* or *secundum quod est scientia* and *logica utens* or *secundum quod est ars* is deeply permeated by this kind of attitude.<sup>7295</sup> *Logica docens* is the doctrinal corpus that is thought in school,<sup>7296</sup> the theoretical aspect of logic and the rules of good reasoning as a mental *habitus*. As such, *logica (docens)* is a science, is eminently *rationalis*, and shows a noticeable emphasis on meta-logic. In this first sense, logic is a part of philosophy. *Logica utens* is "applied" logic, *dialectica* as an art or the practice of correct argumentation, it is the practice resulting in *disputationes* and *questiones*, and grounding and articulating scientific arguments. As such *logica utens* appears to be primarily *sermocinalis*. Logic in this second acceptation is an instrument of philosophy.<sup>7297</sup>

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<sup>7294</sup> This gap between word and thought as the object of logic seems to be filled already by some other theories non specifically formulated in relation to this issue - namely by theories of mental language.

<sup>7295</sup> See Hoenen [2010]; Ashworth [1998]

<sup>7296</sup> Or at least in the universities, since at the lower levels of education students seem to have to undergo first and foremost a practical-dialectical training.

<sup>7297</sup> Some scholars do not seem to consider *logica utens* to be logic at all. For example, Sten Ebbesen writes: "...there was the notion of *logica utens*, but however much you might apply your logic in discussions of theology or physics or ethics, that would not mean that you were doing logic. [...] Qua logician you can only speak the logician metalanguage." [2011, 101] However, I am under the impression that, on the one hand, behind this kind of statement lies a too narrow reading of *logica utens*, that ignores the properly dialectical practices. On the other hand, this kind of position reduces logic exclusively to metalogic, which seems counterintuitive and undesirable

Even when defined in such a way, *logica utens* and *logica docens* are deeply interwoven and hard to pick apart: overall this division is not meant to be absolute, definitive or exhaustive of all the discussions.

On the one hand, the distinction is not exhaustive, but comes to be incorporated in even more general schemes. For example, in some later (XV cent.) discussions,<sup>7298</sup> *logica docens* and *utens* are joined as aspects or articulations of one *logica artificialis*, i.e. as a system of doctrines and practices direct to distinguish what is true from what is false by means of reason (*notitia docens vero a falso per rationem discernere*). In these distinctions, this part of logic is "artificial" in contraposition to *logica naturalis* and *logica usualis*. The former is both the soul itself as having a natural disposition (*promptitudo*) to make distinctions, definitions and arguments, and the "habit of the first principles" (*habitus primorum principiorum*). *Logica usualis* is the *habitus* resulting from the repeated (*usualis*) use of our natural rational and discursive faculties and it does not require any pre-existing "technical" logical competence; we could define it as the minimal rationality of ordinary reasoning, held also by a layman.

On the other hand, the distinction between *logica docens* and *logica utens* appears to be overall a way of looking at the complexity of the field of logic, by putting the emphasis on one aspect or the other. For example, *logica utens* will generate actual syllogisms and offer actual conclusions, either in the dialectical practice of disputation or for the benefit of other sciences; *logica docens* will analyse and regulate how and justify why those syllogisms work, it will formulate a theory of syllogism, ask questions on the nature of the relation between the premises and the conclusion, and (at some point) reconnect syllogistics to a more general

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at least. As for the specifics of Ebbesen's thesis, it looks like it stands upon a passage of Boethius of Dacia's *Modi significandi* q. 18 [Boethius of Dacia 1969, 68f]: "Dialecticus considerat communes intentiones et habitudines locales ex illis causatas, per quas confirmat suas argumentationes, sed ipsas speciales naturas rerum non considerat a quibus causantur illae habitudines locales. Unde si quaeratur a dialectico utrum sit bonum argumentum 'hoc est calidum, ergo non est frigidum', dicit quod sic proper habitudinem contrarii ad contrarium. Tamen antequam talem habitudinem inveniatur, necesse est quod ipse consideret naturas rerum quae per termino significantur et sciat illos esse impossibiles. [...] Sed tamen secundum quod ipse naturas rerum considerat non est dialecticus sed philosophus."

<sup>7298</sup> What follows on these XV century distinctions depends on Hoenen [2010]

theory of inference, etc. ... In other words, *logica docens* and *logica utens* represent two different approaches to the same subject matter, which is the *subiectum logicae* tout-court, whatever that turns out to be.

The discussions on the subject of logic seem to be more intense in the XIII century, especially at the level of a "higher theory about second intentions, ways of knowing or whatnot";<sup>7299</sup> however the standard explicit position, taken by most authors, sees logic as primarily concerned with distinguishing what is true from what is false by means of argumentation and syllogising.<sup>7300</sup> Along with the shift from an almost uncontested predilection for syllogism as the "most proper" and paradigmatic inferential form in favour of *consequentiae* tout court, generally the XIV century seems to also lose at least some of that interest for the question of what logic is supposed to be about, preferring to build and discuss specific doctrines.

However, overall we can agree with Sten Ebbesen: *de facto*

... the *questiones de subiecto logicae* do not help much in delimiting what the field of logic was thought to encompass at the time, nor do the many *divisiones scientiae* with their subdivisions of logic into its parts, because no matter what theoretical stand an author takes you can be sure that each of his parts of logic corresponds to one of the traditional authoritative logic books.<sup>7301</sup>

However, if in the Middle Ages there is a way of delimiting a *disciplina* that is generally agreed upon, it is by means of its textbooks: a discipline is, in the first place, the textual corpus which is its canon.<sup>7302</sup>

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<sup>7299</sup> Ebbesen [2011,105]

<sup>7300</sup> E.g. Lambert of Auxerre, *Logica* [1971, 4-7]: "Logica est scientia discernendi verum a falso per argumentationem [...T]ota intentio logici est ut habeat syllogismum perfectum." Roger Bacon, *Summulae Dialectices*, Prooemium: "Logica vero secundum quod est scientia est habitus discernendi verum a falso per regulas, quibus comprehendimus veritatem locutionis [...]. Subiectum autem eius est argumentatio sive syllogismus, quia omnis argumentatio est syllogismus aut ad syllogismum reducitur..." Radulfus Brito [1981]: "Sed non est vis quocumque modo dicas, quia omnes modi sciendi sunt entia rationis, et inter istos modos sciendi syllogismus est principalior modus sciendi. Et ego dico duo ad quaestionem: primo quod subiectum in logica est ens rationis sive secundae intentiones, subiectum dico commune per praedicationem. Sed subiectum commune per attributionem est syllogismus."

<sup>7301</sup> Ebbesen [2011, 94-95]

<sup>7302</sup> See e.g. Garfagnini [1993]



## Synopsis of the Logical Textual Corpus

Logica Vetus	Logica Nova (Aristotle)																
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aristotle, <i>Categories</i> (transl. Boethii)</li> <li>• Aristotle, <i>Peri Hermeneias</i> (Boethii)</li> <li>• Apuleius, <i>Peri Hermeneias</i> (until XII)</li> <li>• Porphyrius, <i>Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium</i> (trad. Boezio)</li> <li>• Ps. Agostine, <i>Categoriae Decem</i> (III-IV sec.) (until XIII)</li> <li>• Isidore of Sivilia, <i>Etymologiae</i></li> <li>• Martianus Cappella, <i>De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae</i></li> <li>• Cassiodorus, <i>Institutiones</i></li> <li>• Priscianus, <i>Institutiones</i></li> <li>• Galen, <i>Institutio logica</i></li> <li>• Boethius, <i>Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos, De syllogismis categoricis, De syllogismis hypoteticis, De divisione, De differentiis topicis, In Ciceronis Topica commentarium</i></li> <li>• Cicero, <i>Topica</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Analytica Priora</i></li> <li>• <i>Analytica Posteriora</i></li> <li>• <i>Topica</i></li> <li>• <i>Liber Elechorum</i></li> </ul> <p>[ + <i>Rhetorica e Poetica</i>]</p>																
	<p>[<i>Liber Sex Principiorum</i>]</p>																
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="738 622 927 649">Logica Modernorum</th> <th></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>• Sophismata</td> <td>• De consequentiis</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• De signis</td> <td>• De syncategorematicis</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• De suppositione</td> <td>• De insolubilibus</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• De appellatione</td> <td>• De obligationibus</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• De ampliacione et restrictione</td> <td>• De terminis resolubilibus, exponibilibus, officialibus</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• De copulatione</td> <td>• De probatione propositionum</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• De syncategorematicis</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Logica Modernorum		• Sophismata	• De consequentiis	• De signis	• De syncategorematicis	• De suppositione	• De insolubilibus	• De appellatione	• De obligationibus	• De ampliacione et restrictione	• De terminis resolubilibus, exponibilibus, officialibus	• De copulatione	• De probatione propositionum	• De syncategorematicis	
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Briefly: the logical textual corpus in the Middle Ages is notoriously stratified; even if it has a core group of texts, it is not completely crystallised, but some texts get added while others fall out of grace; and it contains several texts that, to our modern eyes, do not seem to have much to do with logic at all. The backbone of the *logica vetus* (Old Logic, i.e. the authoritative logical tradition available up to the XII century) is constituted by Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categoriae* and *De interpretatione*, Cicero's *Topica*, Boethius, but also Martianus Cappella, Isidore of Seville, Cassiodorus, Galen, Piscianus' *Institutiones grammaticae* - with the addition of some other texts like ps. Augustine's *Categoriae decem* and Apuleius' *De interpretatione* that drop out of the canon between the XII and the XIII century. Usually after 1215 the *Liber sex principiorum*, mistakenly attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers,<sup>7303</sup> is added to the *logica vetus*, but

<sup>7303</sup> See Minio-Paluello [1966]; Lewry [1987]. There are some initial medieval discussions on the identity of the anonymous author of the *Liber sex principiorum*, however I am under the impression that the popularity of the

sometimes it is counted among the textbooks of logic in an eccentric position, and some other times it is just omitted from the logical canon. In the XII century, the *logica nova* (New Logic) is the result of the new wave of translations of Aristotle's works, and it includes the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle's *Topics*, and the *Sophistical refutations*. Sometimes, following the Arabic tradition, some eminent authors like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas embrace an "extended" version of the *Organon* and count also Aristotle's *Rhetorics* and *Poetics* in the *logica nova*,<sup>7304</sup> qua properly logical works.<sup>7305</sup> However, the "extended *Organon*" does not seem to have taken a hold into the Latin West: in most XIV century Universities, the *Rhetoric* in particular will be read as a moral text.<sup>7306</sup> The *logica moderna* or *modernorum* (Modern Logic or Logic by the Moderns) is probably the most original medieval contribution to logic and it includes several kinds of treatises on technical topics. Even if the traditional texts of the *logica vetus* and in particular of the *logica nova* keep being commented upon through the later Middle Ages and well into the Early Modernity, at some point in the XIV century the *logica modernorum* appears to reach a privileged status. Namely, some authors (such as John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen) tend to explain away consolidated doctrines of the *logica vetus* and *nova*, by appealing to the tools and conceptual framework of the *logica modernorum*.<sup>7307</sup> Hence, we can say that at least for a group of XIV century

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attribution to Gilbert (among both later medieval authors and modern scholars) is due to the influence of Albert the Great.

<sup>7304</sup> See Lameer [1996]; Ashworth [1998]

<sup>7305</sup> On this subject in the Arabic tradition see Black [1990]; see also for example Elmrani-Jamal - Hugonnard-Roche [1989]; Hugonnard-Roche [1989], [2003], [2004]; Schoeler [2005]; Peters [1968]; Aouad [1989], [2003].

<sup>7306</sup> See Chapter I

<sup>7307</sup> For example, through the XIV century, syllogistics loses its paradigmatic status to become a just a peculiar case of *consequentia* - see e.g. Stump [1989] and, for updated references, also Dutilh-Novaes [2016]. This tendency to "explain away" also concerns general principles commonly assumed, as for example the *dici de omni et de nullo* - see e.g. Buridan, both in his *Tractatus de Consequentibus* and more explicitly in his *Summulae de Dialectica* (5.1.8). Furthermore, whole grounding theories predominant in the traditional approach, such as the doctrine of *loci*, are either voided of conceptual relevance and reduced to peculiar cases of other doctrines and principles in the *logica modernorum*, or almost completely overlooked in favour of an examination of the same matters exclusively in the terms of the *logica modernorum* - see Buridan's *Summulae de Dialectica* 6 (*Tractatus de locis dialecticis*) or Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis Logica* (see Kann [1993]); and Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae* I.3.4 (rules for material consequences) and II (expositions). On the low interest for the theory of *loci* in the XIV cent. see also, e.g., Ebbesen [1993, 26-29]

philosophers, the *logica modernorum*, as an ensemble of technical tools and theories, becomes the true core of late medieval logic.

Overall, the logical textual corpus gives us a fairly reliable and solid map of what usually fell within logic's borders for late medieval authors, even when the authors themselves engage in territorial disputes over the definition and the subject of logic. However, these borders are often uncertain and crossed over, especially those with the neighbouring domains of Grammar<sup>7308</sup> and Metaphysics.<sup>7309</sup> Medieval logicians are very careful to differentiate the *logical* approach from the way of speaking and the interpretations of the grammarians or the matters and questions of interest for the metaphysicians. Even if these disciplines are taking the same objects under consideration, most "border disputes were settled amicably":<sup>7310</sup> under this respect, more than adjoining kingdoms, these disciplines resemble different administrative divisions, partially overlapping. Nevertheless, some of the constructions falling within the territory of Medieval Logic and discussed qua logic by our medieval logicians look puzzling to our modern eye.

### 3.2 *What Do We Make of Medieval Logic? - Or: Much Ado About Nothing*

As we have seen, medieval authors often disagree on how logic and its scope should be defined but, at the end of the day, their contrasts tend to be reconciled in a more general conception of logic that is (mostly) able to keep together the previously contrasting positions. Moreover, the dimension of Medieval Logic as a textual corpus and its contextualisation within the system of medieval education and within the underlying medieval conception of knowledge help us to understand and justify the presence (within its scope) of metaphysical and grammatical matters and of things that look overall extra-logical to us.

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<sup>7308</sup> For a recent overview see e.g. Rosier-Catach [2010]; see also Rosier Catach [2008] and [2009]; Ebbesen [2008]. On the interconnection among grammar, semantics and pragmatics see also Rosier-Catach [1994]

<sup>7309</sup> A recent collection of studies on logic, ontology and language in later medieval philosophy is Bolyard - Keele (eds.) [2013]. Henry [1972], even if dated, still is an interesting reference.

<sup>7310</sup> Ebbesen [2011, 102]

However, there are elements in our picture of Medieval Logic that look like oddities to our modern eye which we struggle to understand. There seems to be a gap between what we take to be logic and what our medieval logicians took to be logic, and this gap could lead us to misinterpretations - either by keeping us from really making sense of what medieval logicians were trying to do or by inducing us to project beyond measure our conception upon theirs. In order to contextualise medieval logical theories and to make sense of them from a philosophically interesting point of view, we should assess the depth and breadth of this gap. Historians of Medieval Logic seem to be at loss regarding both the big picture and some specific doctrines. The problem is not simply the existence of concurrent definitions; nor the fact that in many medieval logic textbooks we find more things than should actually be there even according to those medieval definitions.<sup>7311</sup> More than that, on the one hand - paraphrasing Spade -, for several central doctrines, we cannot fully grasp what is going on nor what medieval logicians thought they were doing.<sup>7312</sup> On the other hand, we seem to lack a good and exhaustive definition of the object of our inquiries.

However, here I aim to argue that these difficulties are not as impairing as we might be led to believe and can be solved with some historiographical work and methodological caution: first, those puzzling doctrines do not seem to be irremediably out of our reach; second, we do not seem to have good enough reasons not to consider Medieval Logic logic in an unequivocal sense.

### 3.2.1 *Spade's Puzzle*

Let us start with "Spade's puzzle".<sup>7313</sup> Our main question here is if, ultimately, it is really such a big deal. From carefully examining the puzzle it would not seem so: more than a dilemma,

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<sup>7311</sup> Cesalli [2010b, 121-126]

<sup>7312</sup> Spade [2000]

<sup>7313</sup> I take the expression from Cesalli [2010a]

the puzzle poses some issues requiring some methodological and historical considerations, but they do not seem insurmountable.

Spade's puzzle is built on some of the main "genres" within the *logica modernorum*: Spade's examples are the doctrines of *obligationes*, *exponibilia*, *probatio propositionum* and *suppositio* - but this is not an exhaustive list. The puzzle goes roughly like this: we have a good picture of what is on the table (texts, debates, mechanics and details of the doctrines under analysis, respective sides taken by several authors, etc.) but we cannot really make sense of it.<sup>7314</sup> On the one hand, the point of these doctrines and debates still escapes us. On the other hand, most of our interpretations fall short both of a good and coherent explanation, and of accounting for some of the anomalies that we would not expect to find in those doctrines and that keep puzzling us. How do we find ourselves in such a tight corner?

From the looks of it, we are dealing with two kinds of issues here. The first issue concerns the objects we are taking under consideration. Firstly, in some cases we do not have a clear and systematic picture of the historical genesis and first developments of these doctrines. Furthermore, these authors either do not bother to make a statement telling us what they are doing and its purpose, or what they are actually doing does not match what they say they are doing!

The second kind of issue stems more from our way of approaching the materials: we might be asking the wrong questions, hence getting unsatisfactory answers;<sup>7315</sup> moreover, we might be framing our interpretations in the wrong way, appealing to concepts that do not fit. A good example, where this second kind of problems seems particularly evident, are many "classical" analyses and formalisations of supposition theory - if only for the amount of literature

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<sup>7314</sup> Spade [2000]: "We do know the important texts, in most cases. We know the mechanics and the details of many of the logical theories and techniques that emerged during this period. We even know of the theoretical disagreements that arose in some of these theories, and we know by and large who lined up on which side of these disagreements. We know in fact quite a lot about the logic of this period. But what we too often don't know is: Just what did they think they were doing?"

<sup>7315</sup> Spade [2010]

devoted to the subject, especially for Ockham's version of the theory.<sup>7316</sup> *Suppositio* looks as a theory split in two:<sup>7317</sup> on the one side, we find something very much like a theory of reference;<sup>7318</sup> on the other side, the doctrine of *ascensio* and *descensio* has commonly been read as a theory of quantification.<sup>7319</sup> Spade's point is that, when we ask ourselves if *suppositio* theory is a theory of quantification, the question itself is problematic: to answer the question we measure *suppositio* against a modern theory of quantification, but which conclusion should we reach when the application of modern logic fails?<sup>7320</sup> We have three options: either most of these authors got something relatively simple like quantification wrong;<sup>7321</sup> or the parts of the doctrine that do not fit the quantification scheme can be explained away;<sup>7322</sup> or we are not dealing with a theory of quantification at all. The third way looks like the most promising one, but it is not straightforward and can lead us in several diverging directions. Some might want to rest their case and embrace some sort of quietism,<sup>7323</sup> like Markosian: our interpretative schemes fall short and they will probably keep falling short; we should consider *suppositio* as a description of linguistic phenomena taken as primitive, we should refrain from explaining by means of other concepts or in the light of different projects.<sup>7324</sup> Others might prefer to explore alternative options: if *suppositio* theory is not a theory of quantification, it might be something else - a viable candidate (if not the only one)<sup>7325</sup> is some sort of theory of inference.<sup>7326</sup> Overall, this last kind of approach seems advantageous because it spares us from assuming that some phenomena that the medieval theories tackle are simply taken as

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<sup>7316</sup> E.g. Boehner [1952]; Moody [1953]; Matthews [1964] and [1973]; Spade [1988a]; Dutilh Novaes [2007]; Karger [1984], Freddoso [1980]; Priest - Read [1977], [1980] and [1981] - just to mention a few.

<sup>7317</sup> See e.g. Matthews [1997]; Spade [1988a]

<sup>7318</sup> See e.g. Parsons [2008]; Dutilh Novaes [2005b] and [2007]

<sup>7319</sup> E.g. Boehner [1952]; Moody [1953]; Matthews [1964] and [1973]; Spade [1988a]

<sup>7320</sup> See also Spade [1976]

<sup>7321</sup> E.g. Priest - Read [1977]

<sup>7322</sup> Spade [1988a, 190-192]

<sup>7323</sup> For an outline of this kind of historiographical attitude see Cameron [2011]

<sup>7324</sup> Markosian [1988, 52]

<sup>7325</sup> E.g. Dutilh Novaes [2007] suggests to read Ockham's theory of supposition as a theory of "algorithmic hermeneutics".

<sup>7326</sup> E.g. Karger [1984], Freddoso [1980, 28]; see also Matthews [1984, 84]

primitive. It also saves us from being bound within the limits of a purely doxographical recognition - and from the tacit presupposition that these medieval theories are incomprehensible or obsolete. *Mutatis mutandis*, reframing and recalibrating our questions would seem the most profitable way to deal both with the pieces of Spade's puzzle and with other perplexing aspects of Medieval Logic.

Overall, as far as Spade's Puzzle goes, it looks like we can deal in philosophically interesting ways with these disconcerting theories, as long as we are ready to undergo some historiographical hands-on work in the field to try to fill our gaps, and to tune our instruments in appropriate ways to the materials we are trying to explain. How do we tune our instruments though? Reflecting on the issues emerging from our understanding of the big picture and how we approach it could be, if not enlightening, at least helpful.

### 3.2.2 *The Big Picture: Against Cesalli's Thesis*

Overall, our idea of the big picture appears to be at best foggy: we can ask questions to the reference textual corpus, our historical data, and a fairly good number of logical commentaries and treatises among the most influential at the time; but we still come up with shifting, partial, and fragmented definitions of what Medieval Logic is and how it should be interpreted. A nice synthesis of the state of the art is offered by Laurent Cesalli:

One could expect that the complex philosophical discipline we call medieval logic has a well-defined identity; in other words, one can legitimately hope that medievalists or at least historians of medieval logic have a clear picture - if not a formal definition - of the object that they are investigating [...]. It is a puzzling fact, however, that there is no consensual answer to the question of the nature of medieval logic, or more precisely, to the question of what exactly medieval logicians were aiming at [...]. We must confess that we still do not know what exactly medieval logic was.<sup>7327</sup>

As Cesalli puts it (in a second paper in the same volume), if interpreters agree on something, it is mostly on two negative answers:<sup>7328</sup> (a) Contemporary Logic, i.e. Logic as we intend it, has

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<sup>7327</sup> Cesalli [2010a, 50]

<sup>7328</sup> Cesalli [2010b]

little to do with Medieval Logic:<sup>7329</sup> (a') we are before a case of equivocation;<sup>7330</sup> and (b) Medieval Logic per se is not an unitary discipline,<sup>7331</sup> therefore (b'') to answer the question "What is Medieval Logic?" we should find an unifying notion<sup>7332</sup> - and here the proposals differentiate.

However, it seems to me that these two answers have some issues that could lead us astray. Therefore, I am going to argue that, on the one hand, Medieval Logic does not seem to be logic in an equivocal sense from its contemporary counterpart (3.2.2.1); and, furthermore, that the quest for an extrinsic "unifying notion" to apply to Medieval Logic is pointless at best (3.2.2.2).

### 3.2.2.1 *On the First Negative Answer - Are Medieval and Contemporary Logic Equivocal?*

As for (a), it is true that if we expect to find in Medieval Logic those blatant features that leap out in Contemporary Logic, such as symbolisation in an explicitly defined mathematical formal language, we might be disappointed. However, this certainly does not mean that we are before a case of equivocation as held in (a'), nor that Medieval Logic has little to do with Contemporary Logic (a) - or even less that the former is "less logic" than the latter.

For starters, from our contemporary point of view, after the so called "mathematical turn" in logic,<sup>7333</sup> we are trained to expect, on the one hand, some features of formality (in which sense it is not obvious).<sup>7334</sup> Generally, we expect to meet things as e.g. algorithmic or mechanical features, indifference to specific objects and permutability of the terms involved, etc.. On the other hand, we are trained to expect, in particular, a fully fledged (mathematical-like) symbolism. We tend to project this familiar image of Logic on other logics that come to our

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<sup>7329</sup> E. g. Uckelman [2009, 4]

<sup>7330</sup> Cesalli [2010b, 117]

<sup>7331</sup> E.g. De Libera - Rosier-Catach [1986, 64-5]

<sup>7332</sup> E.g. Cesalli [2010b]

<sup>7333</sup> Grattan-Guinness [2004] and Sánchez Valencia [2004]; see also Peckhaus [2004] Dutilh Novaes [2007, 280]

<sup>7334</sup> MacFarlane [2000]; Dutilh Novaes [2011]



attention. We are native to this kind of mathematised logic and a measure of prejudice is not only natural, but also probably unavoidable and possibly useful. It is within our natural habitat that we formulate our general philosophical and historical questions about logic: they are generated from and about our daily logical practices, about logical concepts and problems that are familiar to us and formulated in a language in which we are fluent. Furthermore, it is from our own logical background that we at first *recognise* something familiar, *something logical*, within other conceptions, texts, and theories that are contextually and historically distant from us. It is against this background of ours that these phenomena come to catch our interest beyond any antiquarian curiosity or erudite enthusiasm; because of our background, they *matter* to us. However, such familiarity and recognition are a double-edged sword: they could be deceitful and blind us to the very objects that produced them in the first place. If we rely too much on a first impression of recognition, we could start having higher expectations of familiarity: we could begin to wish for e.g. our reassuring mathematical symbols, functions, algebraic structures, etc.. When we do not find our well-known and well-loved trinkets, we could end up either (i) concluding that we are before something that is not Logic at all or is only so in a defective way, or (ii) "making it fit" in inappropriate ways.

#### 3.2.2.1.1 *Is It Not Logic at All?*

In a measure, Cesalli's thesis (a-a') is a fertile ground for the kind of attitude explicit in (i).

It seems to me that (i) is an incorrect conclusion from unfair expectations. If we accept (i), we are carrying on the same kind of attitude Ancient Greeks showed when they met a foreign language they could not understand: they assumed that it was either not a language at all ( $\beta\alpha\rho\beta\alpha\rho$ , a babbling nonsense) or a language only in a defective way. Here be barbarians! If we believe that if it is not our logic (or if it does not look enough like our logic) then it is not logic at all or only logic in a defective way insofar as we recognise something familiarly logical in it,

then we are likely (more or less implicitly) embracing a preconceived idea about logic which is probably wrong - or at least too narrow. This preconception is twofold: (i') Logic is supposed to be eternal, to grasp some deeper and immutable reality of human rationality or of the deeper structure of the world - or god knows which kind of entities that would be its object -; and (i'') what we commonly take to be logic is actually the one and true Logic.

Now, it is possible that Logic, if there is or can be such a thing, deals with some meaningful fact of rationality or with some deep reality of the world - or all possible worlds etc. ... But it looks like we do not really work with this Logic: we work with logics that are different in their aims, in their ranges, in their techniques, in the specifics of their symbolism. Our logic is certainly not unitary: it is fragmented. Our logic is certainly not immutable (nor infallible), but it moves forward by trial and error, it proves bits and pieces, finds better proves, changes its interests and its aims. On top of that, we cannot say *a priori* that our logic is more Logic than any other pale attempt to get where we are: modern logicians and philosophers of logic widely disagree on which of their common practices and systems count as genuinely logical.<sup>7335</sup> We ourselves are not even clear on what makes for a good criterion of logicity!<sup>7336</sup>

But - one might say - our version of logic, symbolic and formal, has some undeniable advantages of practicality, clarity and manipulability, that make it a much better tool than other versions of logic such as Medieval Logic. Furthermore - the same opponent might continue - logic, deep down and however you might want to look at it, is primarily concerned with the consequence relation, i.e. with granting the following of a conclusion from a set of premises. On the one hand - she says -, this seems pretty deep and at the roots of what we call

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<sup>7335</sup> See e.g. Glanzberg [2015]. This kind of assessment does not not necessarily imply holding some strong version of logical pluralism (see e.g. Beall - Restall [2000], [2001], [2006]; Restall [2002]): on the one side, it is merely an ascertainment of a wide range of practices and theories legitimately going under the label of "logic"; on the other side, even defending some version of logical monism (see e.g. Priest [2006], [2008]) does not imply denying the philosophical value of fragments of the history of logic qua logical theories nor some substantial differences in those theories and practices.

<sup>7336</sup> See for example Dutitlh Novaes [2011]; Sher [2008]

rationality; on the other hand, because of its features, our logic seems to be better equipped to treat such relation.

As for the first objection, contemporary formal symbolic logic is indeed an unprecedentedly powerful tool and within it we can do things that were literally unthinkable before the mathematical turn. However, a tool is good or bad in relation to its assigned task. It is true that, within Contemporary Logic, we can envision and fulfil an ever-growing set of tasks, many of which did not (and probably could not) come up within logical frameworks that were not fully formalised and symbolic, such as Medieval Logic. Nevertheless, this does not imply that those other logical frameworks - let us take specifically Medieval Logic - cannot have any peculiar tasks that fall outside the scope of Contemporary Logic and fulfil them just fine. We might discuss if such tasks are logical or logically relevant, but we cannot deny it by moving from the point of view of our own logic and without having a solid and definite criterion of logicity. Furthermore, because Contemporary Logic is "formalized" and symbolic, per its own nature it carries out a high degree of abstraction on the objects it aims to model and grasp. Despite all its practical gains, any operation of abstraction implies an arbitrary choice and the loss of some features that get left out. But in some cases - at least for some matters and under certain constraints -, a less "abstracting" and less "invasive" modelling choice might have its advantages. Moreover, we might be surprised of what we can do within Medieval Logic, of its expressive power,<sup>7337</sup> and of how naturally and effectively it can reformulate and treat some of the themes proper of our own logical framework - e.g. reformulation of Parsons' first order arithmetic in a version of Medieval Logic.<sup>7338</sup>

As for our opponent's second point, we can agree with her statement that logic is primarily concerned with (logical) consequence. The notion of consequence has very much to do with some kind of following, without losses, of a conclusion from a set of premises; and this looks

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<sup>7337</sup> Parsons [2011]

<sup>7338</sup> Parsons [2014, 259-275]

indeed quite important for correct arguing and rationality in some deep sense. However the consequence relation is not defined in an univocal way, neither in medieval logic nor in contemporary logics. To quote Curry, "no one knows exactly what a logical consequence is".<sup>7339</sup> In general, it is not clear how the notion of logical consequence and its validity should be characterised, how narrow or permissive this characterisation should be (especially against other forms of linguistic entailment).<sup>7340</sup> We might say that the way in which the notion of consequence is defined is the main determiner of any specific logical system. However, we do discuss on how we should pick the "right" notion of consequence for our modelling task. On the one hand, which kind "following" we should prefer and what "makes it follow" is as much discussed today as it was in the Middle Ages. On the other hand, we do discuss even of what should be preserved - e.g. truth, degrees of truth, probability, degrees of probability, etc. ...<sup>7341</sup> In summary, nothing in the centrality of the notion of consequence implies that logic has an eternal and immutable core (other than some kind of following) that we grasp better than anyone else before us. Moreover, as for the philosophical and meta-logical discussion on the nature of this logical following, Medieval Logic does not seem to have any evident intrinsic disadvantage against its contemporary counterpart.

Paraphrasing (supposedly) the electrical engineer Oliver Heaviside, if logic is eternal, then it can wait.<sup>7342</sup> In fact, not only would it not have a history, but it could not hope for much of a future either - so what's the rush? Yet, overall it does not look like logic is eternal (at least insofar as it is something we can do): both our lack of good reasons for dismissing Medieval Logic (& co.) as "un-logical" and our very practices in contemporary logic - i.e. the ways *our* logic works and moves forward - point in the opposite direction.

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<sup>7339</sup> Curry [1957, 1]

<sup>7340</sup> See e.g. Caret - Hjortland [2015]; Field [2015]; Glanzberg [2015]; Etchemendy [2008]

<sup>7341</sup> See e.g. Field [2015]

<sup>7342</sup> The quote, as found in Mark Wilson [2006, 27], reads: "Logic is eternal, so it can wait". However Wilson was quoting from his notes and could not locate again the exact source. A similar quote attributed to Heaviside in several other texts reads: "Logic can be patient for it is eternal". See for example Kline [1972, 3] and Tymoczko - Henle [1999, 399]

### 3.2.2.1.2 *Making It Fit*

However, Cesalli's thesis (a-a') could yield another kind of attitude, explicit in (ii): "making it fit". On the one side, if we accept that Medieval Logic has indeed "little to do with Contemporary Logic", we might want to show the actual extent of that "little" and Medieval Logic's failings from a contemporary point of view - and maybe even try to fix them where they go wrong. Also on the other side, if we reject (a-a'), we might ask: if Medieval Logic & co. are indeed as "logical" as we claim they are, why should we not "make them fit"? Should they not fit already? How can we make sense of them if we do not make them fit?

For Medieval Logic, this "fitting" comes down to reformulating some of its fragments into our own logical frameworks; this is often done, in the first place, by formalising.<sup>7343</sup>

There is nothing wrong *per se* with formalising Medieval Logic: on the contrary, it might give us an intelligible insight of what is going on there and of why it should be interesting for us from a contemporary point of view. In a measure, formalisations could be useful to make medieval doctrines accessible and understandable to a modern readership; however, they could also pose a high risk of unhealthy anachronism and misinterpretation. Before undergoing any formalisation of a past logical theory, we should reflect carefully on the import and the purpose of our operations.

What are our aims when we are formalising a given fragment of Medieval Logic? Are we trying to better understand those theories? To make them clearer? To make them more philosophically interesting? (Can these goals be achieved at the same time?) What are we trying to make explicit and preserve? Where do formalisations become more of a hindrance than a useful tool for approaching Medieval Logic? How far does formalising serve our understanding of a medieval theory and how far should that theory have been already

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<sup>7343</sup> E.g. among others Priest - Read [1977], Spade [1978], Bird [1961]; Klima [1993a] and [1993b]; Dutilh Novaes [2007]; Uckelman [2009].

understood in order to adequately formalise it? These are difficult questions and probably the best way to tackle them is "by doing", i.e. by working on making sense of medieval logical theories and figure out what is going on *in fieri* by proceeding cautiously. As a rule of thumb, we should be careful with our formalism, how we go about formalising, by having very clearly in mind what it is exactly that we are formalizing and what gets lost in our formalisation. Overall, by formalising medieval logical theories, we should not aim as much to "making them fit" as to show their structures and workings - or even, to show both how far they already "fit" and what makes them peculiar. In other words, the desirable outcome would be to show the interest of medieval logical theories in their own right and in the light of our own issues and concerns, without anachronistically flattening them upon our logical systems - which would make the comparison historically wrong and philosophically pointless.

In order to do so, in principle we should be very aware, on the one hand, of our source material - which requires some serious historiographical work and contextualisation -; and, on the other hand, of our operations and of their import.

Usually this formalization involves some sort of axiomatisation and symbolisation in addition to a mapping of the concepts of the theory being translated (T1) into the concepts of the theory it is being translated into (T2).<sup>7344</sup> These operations are in some measure invasive and imply some interpretative choices on T1.<sup>7345</sup>

As for axiomatisation, it could bring some advantages of clarity, because all the propositions in T1 have to become either axioms or theorems (or their contradictories are theorems) that are generated from those axioms by means of explicitly stated inference rules. Furthermore, axiomatics seems to be a powerful tool for meta-theoretic analysis, e.g. for distinguishing the

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<sup>7344</sup> See Klenee [1951, 59-68]; see also Dutilh Novaes [2007, 216 ff.]

<sup>7345</sup> What follows is not going to be an extensive analysis of the issues of formalisation, axiomatisation, symbolisation and translation of formal theories, but simply a brief and partial outline of some issues as far as they get involved in some historiographical choices on medieval logic.

theory from the meta-theory or for a comparison between T1 and T2: once the axioms and the rules of T1 and T2 are stated explicitly, the theories are easy to compare.

Nevertheless, formalising a medieval logical theory into an axiomatic one would imply making some precise choices on its structure (e.g. by picking which of its bits are axioms, which ones are theorems, which inference rules are stated explicitly, etc.); but these choices are not obvious and might not adequately mirror the pre-existing articulations of the theory. Overall, if we decide to axiomatise T1, our choice rests on the presupposition that

to axiomatize is to reformulate a theory with its most intuitive and correct formulation, that is, its proper deductive structure.<sup>7346</sup>

Therefore, we are saying that our T1 does not have yet "its most intuitive and correct formulation" and is not shaped in its "proper deductive structure". However, many medieval logical theories come already with their explicit *principia* and *definitiones*, with their *regulae* and their *conclusiones*. Even taking for granted that the structure of these theories is deductive (which is not always a given), it would be very far fetched to assume that their formulation is neither the most intuitive nor the most correct. It could be misleading to rearrange those *principia*, *definitiones*, *regulae* and *conclusiones* into a fully fledged deductive system, to transform them into axioms and theorems - especially if we do not have a clear idea of what those original elements are supposed to be, of their interconnection and their role in the structuring of the theory. We can certainly still reshape our theory in T2 and make it axiomatic, though would it really give us a better understanding of T1? However, if we do have a good idea of what these elements are supposed to be, of their interconnection and their role in the theory, then we do have a fairly good and deep understanding of the theory itself - and therefore what should we be formalising it for? Such formalisation would show us if in T2 we can do at least what T1 does, but would it not be more interesting - and hermeneutically fruitful - to go the other way around?

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<sup>7346</sup> Dutilh Novaes [2007, 238]

Moreover, as we have seen,<sup>7347</sup> most academic medieval logical texts are both eminently meta-logical and entertain complex relations with dialectical contexts. Since the distinction between the object level and the meta-logical level in many medieval logical texts is controversial at least,<sup>7348</sup> making a clean split "from the outside" could yield some misinterpretations. Furthermore, even the choice for axiomatics *per se* could be inappropriate. By axiomatising, we are stating at least a preference on how we should intend logic and its purpose. We might say that, through the XX century, we find two main ways of conceiving logics, their purpose and "how they should be done": as axiomatic theories or as something like a natural deduction system. On the one hand, the idea behind logic as an axiomatic system is that what a logic does is to give a theory of possible worlds: it structures the relations among the statements in the theory (axioms and theorems) and among the entities that are picked by the terms in those statements by means of derivation. On the other hand, natural deduction systems are intended as "a formalism that comes as close as possible to actual reasoning":<sup>7349</sup> foregoing axioms and focusing on inference rules (a natural deduction system can be thought of as just a set of rules),<sup>7350</sup> this kind of proof calculus tries to model the actual reasoning process, mirroring in a way "intuitive and informal reasoning".<sup>7351</sup> By its own nature then, a natural deduction system looks particularly apt to preserve the original main structure of a given T1 and it might turn out to be an interesting and not too invasive tool to tackle "the informal concept of logical deduction".<sup>7352</sup> However, either if we decide to prefer an axiomatic formalisation of our medieval logical theory or if we prefer to read it through the lenses of natural deduction, we are making a precise choice on how T1 should be intended in the first place: its nature, its purpose, how suitable its initial structure is. Ultimately, there is no

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<sup>7347</sup> See 3.1

<sup>7348</sup> See for example van der Lecq [1993] on the issues of applying the modern object language/meta-language distinction to medieval *insolubilia*.

<sup>7349</sup> Gentzen [1934, 176]

<sup>7350</sup> Prawitz [1965, 13]

<sup>7351</sup> Prawitz [1965, 7]

<sup>7352</sup> Prawitz [1965, 7]. I am grateful to Calvin Normore for his observations on axiomatic and natural deduction systems.



guarantee that either of these options might be an adequate analysis of our medieval logical theory - unless we already know how our medieval theory is supposed to be intended, which is (at least partially) what we are trying to figure out. Either way could seem (in a measure) more apt than the other to treat some features of Medieval Logic.<sup>7353</sup> But either way seems to carry heavy over-interpretations that could certainly be anachronistic and blinding if our purpose is to attain a better understanding of our medieval logical theory *per se* and as an interesting term of comparison against our contemporary theories and issues.

At first sight, symbolisation would seem to be less problematic. Symbolisation concerns the language in which the theory is formulated: as it is commonly done, it is the operation of transforming a set of symbols, i.e. ordinary (written) words, into another set of symbols, i.e. special notations - abbreviations, schematic letters/placeholders/variables. Symbolisation differentiates from an innocuous transliteration at least insofar as the artificial language expressed in the special notation usually also carries along a syntactic rearrangement meant to show "more faithfully" the logical form of the language of origin which is being symbolised. Normally, this artificial language can be conceived either as an extension (i.e. special notations and syntax, without altering relevant portions of the starting language), or an improvement (the arriving language has the same properties and expressive power as the starting language, but performs its tasks in a more immediate or clear way), or a radical reformation of the

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<sup>7353</sup> At least in principle, on the one hand, natural deduction systems seem to be particularly fit to treat some aspects of Medieval Logic as *scientia sermocinalis et rationalis*: Medieval Logic and natural deduction system share the same declared intent of dealing primarily with the structures of rational thought in a natural way. Moreover, natural deduction systems have the advantage of not being an invasive tool, which is quite important if our main aim is to obtain a historical understanding of T1: far from giving T1 a new and improved shape, a natural deduction formalisation would show T1's own structure, just in a clearer way. This has already been done quite extensively by scholars. For example, a famous example of Natural Deduction readings in the history of logic is Corcoran [1972] on Aristotle; a further example, as far as it concerns Medieval Logic specifically, is Peter King's [2001] analysis of XIV century *consequentiae* as natural deduction systems. On the other hand, the choice of axiomatic theories and their modelling could have some advantages when it comes down to treating the semantical and ontological concerns within medieval logic, even if they are costly in terms of the reshaping they carry on T1.

starting language.<sup>7354</sup> The pragmatic take on symbolisation into an artificial language (advocated e.g. by Tarski)<sup>7355</sup> stresses the gains in precision and brevity that it offers. This is true at least up to a point, since sometimes we end up having to "sugar" our symbolised theories to make them intelligible, i.e. partially going back to ordinary words.<sup>7356</sup> So far so good: symbolising the language of our T1 could be useful and make it both easier to see T1's structures, articulations and operations, and to do things within it. However, if T1 is a medieval logical theory we should keep some caveats in mind, in the first place both about the starting language of T1 and the way we think about the arriving language (extension, improvement, reformation).

The general context in which we think of symbolisation is that of a translation from an ordinary language to an artificial formal one. As Hansson argued for formalisations in philosophy, this is a form of idealisation in two steps or - we may add - crossing through three stages: from ordinary language (OL - stage1) to a regimented philosophical language (PL - stage2) and from this regimented philosophical language to mathematical or logical language (LL - stage3).<sup>7357</sup> Can Medieval Logical Latin (MLL) fit in this picture?<sup>7358</sup> Not very well. MLL is already a regimentation of Medieval Philosophical Latin (MPL). In turn, MPL, as such, is not at the stage of ordinary language but is a regimentation of (a fragment of) Medieval Latin (ML). Hence, on Hansson's Scale MLL would not be at stage2 but already at some kind of stage3 that however does not look at all like a fully artificial and formalised language. We might even add a further stage and move OD back to a stage-1, since ML itself is not an ordinary language as we commonly intend it. ML is a semi-living (or semi-dead) language: it is learnt on grammars,

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<sup>7354</sup> Stokhof [2007]

<sup>7355</sup> Tarski [1959, 15]. See also Wang [1955, 228]

<sup>7356</sup> See e.g. Hansson [2000] and Wang [1955, 233]

<sup>7357</sup> Hansson [2000, 164]

<sup>7358</sup> MLL is a fictional entity: we have many different and often contrasting instantiations of MLL. Some of my claims are not true for many instances of MLL, but they seem to hold for those XIV century logicians that Parsons calls BOB (Best Of Buridan).

although it still undergoes evolutions in its syntax and semantics via feedback from OD.<sup>7359</sup> MPL is a regimentation of this already partially artificial language: e.g. it brings new technical terms into the vocabulary and restricts the use of some of those terms already in the common use, e.g. by imposing some changes on their semantics. MLL seems to be a higher regimentation on MLL and MPL: we find an expansion of the vocabulary, a further restriction on ML and MPL's uses of some terms, and interventions on the interpretation of the grammatical rules of ML and MPL. For example, in several MLLs we find the use of schematic letters as placeholders; the addition of technical meanings to terms of common use in ML/MPL (e.g. *consequentia*) or a revision of their meaning; technical interpretations of the so called *syncategorematic* terms (e.g. conjunctions, adverbs, adjectives of quantity, etc...); elements that look like special notations and whose use is at least semi-explicitly regimented (e.g. *ly*), etc. Furthermore, there is an explicit and deliberate restriction on the positional flexibility of (Classical) Latin and partially of ML/MPL. For example: negating negation (i.e. propositional negation) or infinite negation (i.e. term negation) of the predicate term are determined by their position before or after the copula;<sup>7360</sup> the supposition of a comparative term (which is a logically relative term) is determined by the term's position before or after the oblique term (in the ablative case) depending from the comparative,<sup>7361</sup> and so on. The distinction between *grammaticaliter* and *logicaliter loquendo*, i.e. between structuring and interpreting the functions of the terms in a sentence according either to grammar or to logic, is widespread. The interventions of MLL on ML/MPL's grammatical rules do not seem to be a full reformation: e.g. generally, a standard of grammatical *congruitas* is kept as a condition of well-formedness. In this sense, MLL constitutes both some sort of extension (it adds rules) and - informally speaking - an improvement (it tries to do things more efficiently and in a less

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<sup>7359</sup> For an overview of the evolution of Latin in the medieval social and cultural context see Calboli [1994] and Stoltz [1994].

<sup>7360</sup> E.g. for an analysis of Buridan's treatment of negations see Klima [2009, 146-147 • 170 • 186]

<sup>7361</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae*, II, 8.1 rule 6; an analogous stance is taken for example by Albert of Saxony in his *Perutilis Logica*.

ambiguous way) of ML/MPL. However, MLL seems to go for a degree of reformation on how to interpret the properties of terms and the relations among the same terms in a sentence, which can go against the grammatical conventions.<sup>7362</sup> For example, *homo est blanca* is not grammatically correct because of the lack of gender agreement between the subject and its predicate term, but it is logically acceptable - and possibly true. At least some branches of Medieval Logic (e.g. *suppositio, ampliatio, restrictio...*), are concerned - among other things - with how to regiment and interpret these properties of the terms in a specifically logical context beyond a grammatical one. For example, even if we take *homo est blanca* as an acceptable and well formed sentence of our MLL, we will also accept *nullus homo est foemina* because the "nullus" restricts the supposition of *homo* to males only.<sup>7363</sup> And yet, at the same time we will reject the *consequentia: nullus homo est foemina ergo nulla foemina est homo*, because the *homo* in the consequent does not fall under this restriction and hence the consequent does not follow.<sup>7364</sup>

Nevertheless, ML is deeply enrooted within ML/MPL. For example, on the one hand, the presence of meaningful terms from ML/MPL, taken significatively in their ordinary meaning, seems to be quite important for the genesis and the articulation of some medieval logical theories (or of fragments of those), because of their use and of the metaphysical presuppositions they carry. This appears to be the case for consequences holding because of relations of meaning among their syncategorematic terms or, in more specific cases, because of a *genus-species* relation.<sup>7365</sup> On the other hand, despite all the levels of regimentation that MLL carries on ML and MPL, in some cases some of our medieval logicians (*BOB in primis*)<sup>7366</sup>

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<sup>7362</sup> This would imply that the set of grammatical rules of ML/MPL is not kept nor discharged in an uniform way in a given MLL - however we could have rules that tell us in which cases we shall keep or drop the grammatical conventions, and such rules could come from bits of medieval logical theories.

<sup>7363</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae*, I.3.4.1

<sup>7364</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae*, I.3.4.1

<sup>7365</sup> These consequences are considered formal in the XIV century "English" tradition (see e.g. Bertagna [1994], [2000], [2008]), but still hold materially for BOB - BOB is Parson's abbreviation for Best-of-Buridan logicians, including Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen among others.

<sup>7366</sup> This attitude is particularly evident in Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen

have no problem at all going back to the *modus communis loquendi*, i.e. the common way of speaking, and take that use not only as relevant for their logical theory, but also as conceptually enlightening and logically adequate.

Furthermore, we should be very careful when attempting a symbolisation of MLL because a further order of complications might come up: in Medieval Logic, MLL seems to be both the object language and the meta-language, i.e. the language of the theory and the language in which the theory is analysed.<sup>7367</sup>

How should we collocate MLL on Hansson's Scale then? Probably somewhere between PL-stage2 and LL-stage3. MLL in its instantiations and MLL's relation to ML (and MPL) are still in need of further studies, so most of these generalisations should be taken tentatively. Therefore, even if this picture is quite helpful, we need to be very cautious with how we might decide to symbolise our MLL. If our aim is to implement our understanding of our medieval logical theory, it looks like we should avoid going for a fully fledged reformation of our MLL: we should probably prefer an extension on MLL. Moreover, despite the most common tendency even in recent studies,<sup>7368</sup> we should resort to appropriate *ad hoc* notations for the specific fragment of MLL we are treating - e.g. in these cases additional abbreviations tend to be very helpful.<sup>7369</sup> This would allow us to keep away some of the follow-ups of symbolisation - such as desemantification, for example -<sup>7370</sup> which might be undesirable in the analysis of some aspects of Medieval Logic. Under these constraints, we might even give fully fledged symbolisations of a MLL fragment in a contemporary formalised language, while remaining historically accurate and resulting in being both enlightening and logically precise (for

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<sup>7367</sup> E.g. Jacobi [1993, xxvi]; van der Lecq [1993]

<sup>7368</sup> E.g. Dutilh Novaes [2007]

<sup>7369</sup> An objection to the use of *ad hoc* notations, as presented by Stephen Read in a private conversation, claims that these notations tend to become too heavy in the effort to mirror the language of the theory of origin, which along with the unfamiliarity of the notation itself, often makes the reformulation less intelligible. However, this degeneration does not necessarily happen, and the advantages of appropriate notations overall seem to outweigh the nuisance of their unfamiliarity.

<sup>7370</sup> See e.g. Dutilh Novaes [2007, 276]

example, I have in mind some of Klima's and Thom's works in this direction).<sup>7371</sup> By doing so, we are looking at a version of our medieval logical theory rewritten in our own terms - and it is perfectly legitimate. However, we might decide not to symbolise away the OD elements in ML, but simply to implement ML with appropriate notations, in order to increase ML's manipulability. The idea behind this approach would be to try to understand our medieval logical theory as from within as possible, or from an "in between" stance. As with the issues emerging with the axiomatisation of medieval logical theories, even in this case, in order to achieve a good understanding and also a clear and philosophically interesting interpretation, the best option would probably be some kind of third way. This third way should be "in the middle" enough to let us begin an interesting conversation between medieval and contemporary logic without losing sight of the peculiarities of each of the conceptions of logic involved and of their specific issues and approaches. One possible approach to reach this stance without falling into anachronistic misinterpretations at the expenses of Medieval Logic would be to try to partially go "the other way around": instead of mapping medieval logical theories into contemporary ones, we could try to test from within what Medieval Logic can do - and we can try to do so by keeping our formalising interventions to a bare minimum.

A version of this kind of project is Terence Parsons's "articulation of Medieval Logic";<sup>7372</sup> this project of *articulation* is different from a standard formalisation. Parsons's articulation is formulated in a version of English supported by the explicit insertion of Latin-like structures and properties, and a mild symbolisation (mostly abbreviations and a limited extension of the vocabulary), which he calls "Linguish". Linguish - or we could equivalently use an extension of MLL (MLL\*) - is a mid-way language modelled on MLL and it seems to be the language of a "bridge theory" that looks much closer to a fragment of medieval logic than anything else. The idea behind Parsons's project goes roughly like this: Let us try to bring out the structures of a

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<sup>7371</sup> e.g. Klima [1991]; Thom [1996] and [2003]

<sup>7372</sup> See in particular Parsons [2014]

fragment of the medieval logical framework - specifically, a fragment of BOB's - with the help of *ad hoc* notations. Then, let us take (almost) only principles and rules of inference that were either explicitly stated by or available to BOB. Let us see how BOB ticks and what we can do within it.

As it turns out, this approach yields two kinds of substantial results. On the one hand, it gives us a very good and natural insight into the technical workings of BOB (or of a given fragment of Medieval Logic), with very little conceptual projections, minimal loss and considerably fewer anachronisms than most standard formalisations. This kind of articulation gives us a way to deepen and test our understanding of the conceptual framework of our medieval theory and to do so with little recourse to extrinsic notions. Here we do not have to drop (almost) any of the conceptual baggage and peculiarities of our medieval theory in order to make it intelligible and to show its results. On the other hand, this articulation shows us some of the things we can do within this version of a fragment of Medieval Logic, not only in terms of the medieval project but also in terms of our own: for example, Parsons shows that we can give a reformulation of Peano's first order arithmetic within medieval logic. This proves that Medieval logic has at least as much expressive power as Peano. Furthermore, by proving central claims of mathematics, it shows that contemporary logic is not the only logic in town and that Medieval Logic is actually logic properly speaking by contemporary standards, in virtue of the same reasons that ground contemporary logic as a form of valid reasoning, and with no need to "make it fit".<sup>7373</sup>

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<sup>7373</sup> Parsons [2014, 269]: "Historically, symbolic logic did not come with a seal of approval on it. Instead, it achieved its present status by providing a system in which it was possible to formulate central claims of mathematics and (less evidently) science, in which the valid derivations correspond to what mathematicians already recognize as valid reasoning. It is possible then that some other system of logic might accomplish the same goal, while being quite different from modern predicate logic. It need only provide for the formulation of central parts of mathematics and science."

Therefore, pace Cesalli, it looks like (a') is not only unsupported but actually wrong and that Medieval Logic is logic in an unequivocal sense.

### 3.2.2.2 *The Search for a Unifying Notion*

After having shown that Medieval Logic is in some sense as much logic as our own, let us consider briefly the second set of concerns shared by many historians of Medieval Logic as expressed in the second part of Cesalli's Thesis: (b) Medieval Logic is not unitary, therefore (b') we have to find a unifying notion.

My impression is that (b) is less problematic than historians often take it to be; and that (b') does not necessarily follow from (b) but is somehow ill put and could end up yielding either trivial or misleading (and misled) answers.

It is undeniable that late Medieval Logic is a fragmented *disciplina*: it is shown by its definitions, its internal classifications, its textual corpus, its subjects and aims. But the same is true of Contemporary Logic.

It is also true that late Medieval Logic has (along with some familiar features making it *logical* in a sense which modern readers would embrace) features and interests which are at least unusual from a certain contemporary perspective - e.g. a predominant interest for semantics; a strong ontological interest; a deep rooting in ML, and a reflection on ordinary reasoning processes and ordinary language "from within" (along with the lack of a clear distinction between logical and meta-logical language); an emphasis on meta-logical and philosophical questions; a centrality of dialectical procedures, etc. ... However, at least some of these features and interests have found their analogues in some recent (and not so recent) developments within our own logical theories (e.g. starting with the great come back of semantics, or within projects like Natural or Informal Logic, etc.) and within disciplines which are bordering to logic strictly speaking but often claim some degree of formality while having



logic at their core - e.g. Formal Linguistics, Argumentation Theory, some branches of and approaches to Philosophy, etc. ...

Should we look for a unifying notion for Medieval Logic then? On the one hand, *logica/loica*, as medieval philosophers used it, seems to be already a general enough label, a unifying notion in itself: to quote Spade, "they called it logic and they got there first!"<sup>7374</sup> Furthermore, *logica* has a broad enough spectrum and sufficient internal articulations to be a good label and (at least in a measure) a good account for the claims of core logicity made by some of our contemporary disciplines. On the other hand, *logica* as medieval authors used it seems to be - both extensionally and intentionally - a better alternative to most of contemporary proposals of unifying notions for Medieval Logic. These either fall short of scoping over all the subjects and features treated in Medieval Logic (e.g. Jacobi's *Argumentationstheorie*);<sup>7375</sup> or they are conceptually "heavy" notions taken from contemporary projects that, because of their conceptual baggage, do not seem to fit and risk to become an ineffective or (worse) a distorting hermeneutical tool - e.g. Cesalli's *Sprachphilosophie*.<sup>7376</sup>

To sum up, the wisest choice would seem to be trusting our medievals to know what they are doing - at least as far as we can throw them -, and keep using *logica* as they did without looking for further unifying notions. At the end of the day, their idea of *logica* (even as some "logic, and ..." or "logic extra large") could turn out to be enlightening for our own projects too.

Overall, it looks like the big picture is not as muddy as it is often presented to be and that we are able to explore quite deeply these medieval theories and the general historical, philosophical and systematic context in which there were formulated. We understand some of these theories less, some more, but it does not seem like we are stuck in place with nowhere to go: trial by trial, we are making progress on several fronts - e.g. in making materials newly

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<sup>7374</sup> Spade [2002, 2]

<sup>7375</sup> Jacobi [1993]

<sup>7376</sup> e.g. Cesalli [2010b]

available, in developing tools and strategies to analyse our medieval theories, and in our general understanding.

### 3.3 *Treatises on Consequentiae in the XIV Century: A Brief Historical Overview*

In order to have the frame of reference for Marsilius' theory, here I am going to offer a brief historical overview to introduce the XIV century debate(s) on *consequentiae*.

As an autonomous genre in the textual corpus of the *logica modernorum*, treatises *de consquentiis* make their appearance in the XIV century, either as texts circulating independently or as books included in wider *summae* of logic.<sup>7377</sup>

Obviously, discussions on what it means "to follow" and what it requires, are not limited to the specific treatises in later medieval times, but are a great deal older - starting at least in Greek ancient philosophy, with Aristotle on the one hand and the Stoics on the other, as it is well known. Without going into the details, I am going to give a brief historical overview before proceeding with a closer introduction to the approaches to *consequentiae* in the XIV century.

If we were to sum it up in a few lines, we could say that the story of the accounts about logical following amounts to the long and complicated tale of the tensions, the interactions, the clashes and the alternations between two ways of conceiving validity and formality. As for validity, on the one side, we have a stronger notion of good following, requiring some connection of meaning between the premises/antecedent and the conclusion/consequent - i.e. requiring that the information in the consequent is contained in the antecedent in some relevant sense. On the other side, we find a weaker notion of validity requiring simply for it not to be the case (often expressed in modal terms) that the antecedent is true and the

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<sup>7377</sup> For a general introduction see e.g. Pozzi [1978]; Schupp [1988]

consequent is false. The question of formality is deeply interconnected with the issue of validity. Roughly, the split goes like this: on the one hand, the following is formal if there is some relation of containment between the antecedent and the consequent - be it ontological, semantic or epistemic. On the other hand, the following is formal if it does not depend on the meaning of the categorematic terms in the antecedent and in the consequent, but on their structure given by their syncategorematic features - i.e. if the consequent follows from the antecedent in all cases when the same propositional *form* is maintained.

Medieval authors reflecting on these matters find themselves in the position of having to interpret - and to reconcile in a more or less coherent picture - disparate ancient and late-ancient materials, which become increasingly available at various stages.<sup>7378</sup> These materials are articulated in different systems of rules (e.g. Ciceronian and Boethian Topics, Aristotelian Topic, Aristotelian categorical and modal syllogistics)<sup>7379</sup> characterising different sorts of "following" in different terms. However, as Normore observes:

Ancient logics were all in some sense relevance logics. They insisted that for an argument to be valid, conditions must be met that guaranteed both that it would be impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false and that there would be connections of various kinds between the premises and the conclusions.<sup>7380</sup>

A common (but controversial)<sup>7381</sup> historiographical interpretation sees the development of medieval theories of *consequentiae* as a shift from accounts of following in topical contexts and topical terms (therefore more or less directly grounded on semantic connections among the meaningful terms) to more general theories of inference not directly grounded on *loci dialectici* - going through the ascent and descent of syllogistics (as presented in the *An. Pr.*) as a paradigmatic case between the second half of the XII and the end of the XIII centuries.<sup>7382</sup>

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<sup>7378</sup> See Chapter 3.1

<sup>7379</sup> See Normore [2014]

<sup>7380</sup> Normore [1993, 448]

<sup>7381</sup> See Green-Pedersen [1984]

<sup>7382</sup> See e.g. Stump [1989]

Boethius (in particular: *De topicis differentiis*, *De hypotheticis syllogismis*, and his commentaries *In De Interpretatione*)<sup>7383</sup> seems to have been the one who set the standard for the discussion up to the XII century.<sup>7384</sup> In the XII century, in the context of the debates among the Parisian philosophical schools, we see a resurgence of the interest in logic and hence in the analysis of logical following. The contributions made by Peter Abelard, Alberic of Paris, Adam of Basham, etc. do not represent only new conceptual developments on the subject, but also an explicit disagreement on how good inferences and true conditionals should be conceived and about what makes for a satisfactory account of logical validity.<sup>7385</sup> Abelard's account of true conditionals tried to reconcile some core features of Aristotelian logic with some intuitions on the behaviour of sentential connectives.<sup>7386</sup> In this account, for a conditional to be true, there has to be a semantic connection between the antecedent and the consequent, somehow analogously to Boethius' conditions for a good *consequentia naturalis*; while the validity of an argument has the same requirement of something like Boethius' *consequentia accidentalis*.<sup>7387</sup> However, as shown by Martin, Alberic of Paris proved Abelard's account to be inconsistent.<sup>7388</sup> At the end of the day, the idea of an equivalency between the conditions for the validity of an argument and those for the truth of a conditional (apparently supported by Adam of Basham) became generally predominant at least until the XIV century,<sup>7389</sup> along with the weaker account of logical following.

From the end of the XII century and through the XIII century, the *logica nova* has been entirely received and assimilated, and most of the genres in the *logica modernorum* are already on the philosophical scene and are being developed. We do not find systematic analyses of

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<sup>7383</sup> See Dod [1982]

<sup>7384</sup> The *Dialectica* previously attributed to Garlandus Compotista (XI cent.) would have been an exception (see Boh [1982, 303-305]), although the text is probably to be attributed to Garlandus of Besançon (early XII cent.) - see Dutilh-Novaes [2016].

<sup>7385</sup> See e.g. Martin [1986] and [1988]; Iwakuma [1993]; Courtenay [1993]; Normore [1987]

<sup>7386</sup> Normore [2015]

<sup>7387</sup> Normore [2015, 357-358]

<sup>7388</sup> Martin [1986]; see also Martin [1988]

<sup>7389</sup> Normore [2015, 358]

*consequentiae* as such, but the subject is addressed by many authors in several contexts - commentaries on Aristotle's *Topica*, *Analytica Priora*, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*; logical compendia; treatises on *Syncategoremata* (in particular in the chapters on *si* and *quin*), *Sophismata*,<sup>7390</sup> *Insolubilia*, *Obligationes*.<sup>7391</sup>

Historians still have to work out the details and there is still much to be done, but overall it is likely that XIV century *consequentiae* - as theories and as a genre of treatises in the *logica modernorum* - stem from a confluence of various sources and influences. It looks like a major role in this sense was played by: Boethius' *De Hypotheticis Syllogismis*; the Ciceronian and Boethian topical tradition and the Aristotelian *Topics*;<sup>7392</sup> Aristotle's *Analytica Priora*; treatises on *Sophismata* and *Syncategoremata*; and, in a measure, by the XII century debates on arguments and conditionals - even if, especially as far as Abelard is concerned, this influence does not seem to be direct.<sup>7393</sup>

XIV century theories of *consequentiae* are not a uniform block: we have a great number of treatises - many penned by anonymous authors and for the most part still unedited -, representative of alternative (and often conflicting) accounts. Their dating is often very uncertain, even for some major works already available in a critical or printed edition. This often brings up some substantial issues in the study of the influences and conceptual relations among several of these theories - for example, as in the case of Pseudo Scotus' and Buridan's treatises. The author of *Quaestiones in Analytica Priora*, commonly referred to as "Pseudo Scotus", is - as far as I know - still unidentified. Wadding (1639) printed these *Questions* in his edition of Duns Scotus' *Opera omnia*, along with another misattributed commentary per *quaestiones* on the *Posterior Analytics*. Both works are certainly not by Scotus and we have good reasons to believe that the Pseudo Scotus of the *Quaestiones in Analytica Priora* and the

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<sup>7390</sup> See e.g. Green-Pedersen [1984]; Schupp [1988]; Yrjönsuuri [2015]

<sup>7391</sup> For a synthetic overview with a bibliography up to date see Dutilh-Novaes [2016]

<sup>7392</sup> Bird [1961]; Stump [1982b] and [1989]. However, a solid and extensive analysis reducing the importance of topical elements in the development of *consequentiae* see Green-Pedersen [1984, particularly ch. E]

<sup>7393</sup> Martin [2004]

Pseudo Scotus of the *Quaestiones in Analytica Posteriora* are not the same Pseudo Scotus. The latter should probably be identified with John of Cornwall, with the support of an explicit attribution in a manuscript (Oxford, Magdalen 250).<sup>7394</sup> However, not only do we not have any reasons to connect the Pseudo Scotus of the *Priora* with John of Cornwall, but it seems likely that this identification should be rejected.<sup>7395</sup> The dating of Pseudo Scotus' *Quaestiones in Analytica Priora* appears to be as uncertain as the identity of their author. As for Buridan, the dating of his *Tractatus de consequentiis* oscillates between the mid-1330s<sup>7396</sup> and the mid-1340s.<sup>7397</sup> It is not clear which relation, if any, Buridan's and Pseudo Scotus' works on *consequentiae* had to each other: on the one hand, there are some strong similarities (e.g. on what counts as a *consequentia formalis*); but, on the other hand, among the definitions of *consequentia bona* criticised by Pseudo Scotus (*Sup. I Priorum*, q. X) we find also one that looks very much like Buridan's. Overall, historians tend to consider the two texts as not directly dependent nor influenced from each other.

Usually, XIV century treatises on *consequentiae* are divided into four groups, according both to chronological and geographical criteria and to predominant conceptual characteristics:<sup>7398</sup>

1. Burley's *De Consequentiis*;<sup>7399</sup> two early anonymous treatises (An.I: ms. London, BL, Royal 12 F XIX, ff. 111ra-112rb, "Consequentia est habitudo inter antecedens et consequens"; An.II: Paris, BN, lat. 16130, ff. 118va-120vb, "In omni consequentia bona quidquid

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<sup>7394</sup> See e.g. Read [2001], [1993, 236-237] and [2015, 4-5]. See also: Bos [1993, 567-569].

<sup>7395</sup> See in particular Read [2001]

<sup>7396</sup> e.g. Hubien [1975]

<sup>7397</sup> e.g. Zupko [2003, 126] and Read [2015, 3-6]

<sup>7398</sup> This kind of subdivision is quite common in studies on medieval theories of *consequentiae*; here I am referring to the latest instantiation of this schema as offered in Dutilh-Novaes [2016]; however, to maintain, even if coarsely, the chronological criterion in my division I am calling 3.a and 3.b her groups [3] and [4], which represent roughly contemporary developments.

<sup>7399</sup> Edited in Green-Pedersen [1980a]. See also d'Ors [1990] and Green-Pedersen [1981]

sequitur...") showing strong similarities with Burley's work, to which they are probably contemporary and from its same surroundings.<sup>7400</sup>

The texts in this group are of English origin and are mostly lists of rules, possibly composed for didactic purposes. They are classified as a "primitive stage", e.g. by Dutilh Novaes:<sup>7401</sup> in this sense, they would be historically relevant witnesses of the dawn of *consequentiae* as an autonomous genre,<sup>7402</sup> but would be of little philosophical interest. However, this assessment seems to be unfair, for at least two reasons. Firstly, "mere" lists of rules are an important part of the backbone of any of these theories: they are fundamental in order to understand what actually is in a theory of *consequentiae*, how the theory is built and how it works - even if, at first, such bare lists appear less philosophically appealing than definitions and meta-arguments on tricky conceptual aspects of a theory. Secondly, this kind of assessment belittles some features of historical and conceptual interest that are present in these texts, even if in an unsystematic and not fully developed way - features which are evident especially in Burley's treatise (e.g. on the distinction between *c. simpliciter* and *ut nunc*) and in An.I. For example, An.I offers an explicit definition (!) of *consequentia* as *habitudo*, which keeps coming back in several authors belonging to the other groups (e.g. Marsilius of Inghen,<sup>7403</sup> Peter of Mantua, etc.) and is conceptually charged also in the light of the following debates - even if it is left unexamined in An.I

2. Burley's *De Puritate* (both in the version of the *Tractatus Brevior* and, in particular, in the one of *Tractatus Longior*);<sup>7404</sup> Ockham's *Summa Logicae* III-3;<sup>7405</sup> some Pseudo Ockham's

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<sup>7400</sup> Both I and II are edited in Green-Pedersen [1980b]. See also Green-Pedersen [1985]

<sup>7401</sup> Dutilh Novaes [2016]

<sup>7402</sup> Green-Pedersen [1980b]

<sup>7403</sup> See Chapter IV

<sup>7404</sup> Edited by Boehner [1955]. See d'Ors [1990]; Richter [1990]. On Burley's treatment of *consequentiae* in the shorter version of the *De Puritate* see Boh [1982]. See also Spade [2000]

<sup>7405</sup> For discussions of Ockham's theory, see among others: Boehner [1958]; Bird [1961]; McCord Adams [1973] and [1987, vol.1, 457-492]; Richter [1990]; Martin [2005]; Crimi [forthcoming].

treatises (e.g. *Elementarium logicae*); the anonymous *Logica ad Rudium*; <sup>7406</sup> the anonymous *Liber consequentiarum*.<sup>7407</sup>

These texts offer general definitions of *consequentia*, expositions or analyses of criteria of validity, and systematic divisions among types of *consequentiae*.<sup>7408</sup> Overall the characterising feature of this group is a tendency to justify or explain the holding of a *consequentia* on the ground of intrinsic or extrinsic middles and to appeal to other notions closely connected to the topical tradition.

3.a The treatises representative of tradition on *consequentiae* commonly identified as "Parisian" or "Continental": Buridan's *Tractatus de Consequentibus*;<sup>7409</sup> Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis Logica* IV;<sup>7410</sup> Marsilius of Inghen's *Consequentiae*; and the Pseudo Scotus' commentary on the *Prior Analytics*.<sup>7411</sup>

These treatises tend to make away with topical notions in their accounts of *consequentiae*, even when they are dealing with *consequentiae materiales* holding in virtue of the relations of meaning among their categorematic terms (e.g. this is particularly evident in Marsilius' treatment of the rules for material *consequentiae* and in his analysis of some kinds of expositions in Book II). As core characterising features, the treatises in this group embrace the weaker notion of validity for their accounts of *consequentiae* in general and they define a *consequentia* as formal if it holds in all terms while maintaining the same form.

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<sup>7406</sup> Edited in de Rijk [1981]

<sup>7407</sup> Edited in Schupp [1988]

<sup>7408</sup> Ochkam seems to have been the first to appeal explicitly to the distinction between formal and material *consequentia* (Martin [2005]). See also Crimi [forthcoming].

<sup>7409</sup> Edited in Hubien [1976]. See e.g. among others Bos [1976]; d'Ors [1993]; Dutilh Novaes [2005], [2007], [2008]; Karger [1993]; King [2001]; Klima [2004]; Read [1993], [2001], [2012]; Johnston [2014]; Normore [2015]. See also: Parsons [2014]; Crimi [forthcoming]

<sup>7410</sup> Edited in Berger [2010]. For a bibliography up to date see Berger [2014]; see also Biard [2015]

<sup>7411</sup> Wadding [1639]; Pozzi [1978]; Yrjönsuuri [2001]. See in particular Read [2001]



3.b The treatises representative of the quite extensive tradition on *consequentiae* commonly identified as "English" or "British"<sup>7412</sup> - including among others the *Logica Oxoniensis*<sup>7413</sup> and works by Robert Fland,<sup>7414</sup> John of Holland,<sup>7415</sup> Richard Billingham,<sup>7416</sup> Richard Levenham,<sup>7417</sup> Ralph Strode.<sup>7418</sup>

Roughly, the texts in this group bring back a requirement of a connection of meaning among its categorematic terms in order for a *consequentia* to be formal. In other words a *consequentia* is formal if the consequent is somehow contained in the antecedent, either in a semantic or in an explicitly epistemic sense - i.e. the understanding of the consequent is contained in the understanding of the antecedent, as e.g. in Ralph Strode.

Chronologically, geographically and (for the most part) conceptually, Marsilius' treatise on *consequentiae* would seem to rightfully belong to the Continental tradition - and it is generally classified as such by historians.<sup>7419</sup> 3.a and 3.b flourish around the same time and represent two quite different and conflicting approaches to *consequentiae*. Therefore, to have a clearer understanding of the relationships of influence among the great number of treatises on the subject between the 1340s and the end of the XIV century (including Marsilius' text), we should take a closer look at some of the main features that seem to be recurring in the majority of the works belonging to either of these traditions.<sup>7420</sup> With some broad

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<sup>7412</sup> See e.g. Ashworth - Spade [1992]; Lewry (ed.) [1985]; Maierù (ed.) [1982]

<sup>7413</sup> See de Rijk [1977]

<sup>7414</sup> Edited in Spade [1976b]. As argued by Read [2016], the author of the *Consequentiae, Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* circulating under Robert Fland's name should be identified with Elandus Dialecticus.

<sup>7415</sup> Bert Bos edited John of Holland's treatises on *Suppositiones, Fallaciae, Obligationes* and *Insolubilia* (John of Holland [1985]). As far as I know, John of Holland's *Consequentiae* is still unedited. See Bos [1985]; see also Dutilh Novaes [2008, 447]

<sup>7416</sup> Edited in Weber [2003]. See also Maierù [1970]; De Rijk [1975b], [1975c], [1976], [1982], [1982b] and [1982c]

<sup>7417</sup> Edited in Spade [1974]

<sup>7418</sup> Edited in Seaton [1973]. See also Ashworth [1993]; Spade [1975, 87-91]

<sup>7419</sup> e.g. Dutilh Novaes [2016]

<sup>7420</sup> I am expanding on an analogous classification of the respective features recurring in 3.a and 3.b made by Bertagna [2000] and [2008].

generalisations, we can summarise some eminent tendencies shared by most authors in either group in the following table:

3.a Parisian Tradition	3.b English Tradition
Syntactic def. of c.; def. of validity with analyses and rejections of alternative positions	Short syntactic def. of c.
Often c. is characterised primarily as <i>propositio hypotetica</i> (plus assertion rules)	Often c. is characterised primarily as <i>illatio</i> (with an emphasis of the mental operation of the inferring) or the <i>habitudo</i> of the following of the consequent from the antecedent
General (and special) rules proven systematically and in a succession of dependence from each other	General and special rules often stated and illustrated with examples, but left unproven; sometimes they are exposed in a succession of dependence
Division of c.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Formalis</i> = holding in all categorematic terms while retaining the same propositional form               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Syllogistica</i></li> <li>▪ <i>Non syllogistica</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>• <i>Materialis</i> = holding because of relations of meaning among the categorematic terms               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>simpliciter</i></li> <li>▪ <i>ut nunc</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Division of c.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Formalis</i> = the (understanding of) the consequent is contained in the (understanding of) the antecedent</li> <li>• <i>Materialis</i> = it is impossible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false - without any connection of meaning among antecedent and consequent               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>Simpliciter</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><u>Epecially later authors usually reject <i>c. ut nunc</i></u></p>
Syllogism is just a particular case of <i>c. formalis</i> but it seems to lose its paradigmatic role	Syllogism is taken as the paradigmatic case of <i>c. formalis</i> - because of the relations of meaning among its terms
C. with a formally impossible antecedent (or a formally necessary consequent) hold formally	C. with a (formally) impossible antecedent (or a - formally - necessary consequent) hold materially

As I said, this repartition of characterising features is based on common tendencies and it is not completely accurate, even if it is a useful navigation chart to broach many XIV century treatises. However, we find at least one puzzling exception among the main texts in the Parisian tradition. Furthermore, if we want to take seriously these features along with the geographical and chronological criteria, we should probably reconsider the division between 3.a and 3.b - which appears to be partially misleading and certainly incomplete.

Our puzzling case in 3.a is indeed Marsilius of Inghen. Marsilius' theory is essentially "Parisian" in some of its core features and in its spirit: Marsilius' account of validity and his account of formality are both Parisian; his treatment of the *ex impossibili/ad necessarium* is very close to Buridan's and to Albert of Saxony's - as it is his own articulation of most of the rules for *consequentiae*.<sup>7421</sup> However, Marsilius seems to move away from the Parisian "standard" account for several aspects of no little importance: for example, where Buridan and Albert of Saxony define a *consequentia* primarily as a *propositio hypotetica* (supplied with assertion rules),<sup>7422</sup> Marsilius characterises a *consequentia* as an *oratio*, an *illatio*, and the *habitudinem sequelae necessariam unius propositionis ad aliam*<sup>7423</sup> - in a way that is more commonly found in the English tradition. Analogously, in line with many authors belonging to 3.b but against Pseudo Scotus, Buridan and Albert of Saxony, Marsilius rejects the *consequentia ut nunc*.<sup>7424</sup> Furthermore, by taking a closer comparative look at Buridan's, Albert's and Marsilius' theories, we can notice that, for some aspects, a shift from the Buridanian account is already present in Albert of Saxony - a shift that appears to be more explicit and systematic in Marsilius.<sup>7425</sup> As Marsilius is, Albert is also a member of the *natio Anglicana* at the University of Paris.<sup>7426</sup> On the one side, historians already observed that in

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<sup>7421</sup> See Chapter 4

<sup>7422</sup> See for example Buridan's *Summulae de Dialectica* 7, 4.5

<sup>7423</sup> See Chapter 4

<sup>7424</sup> This had already been noted by Bos [1976]

<sup>7425</sup> See Chapter 4

<sup>7426</sup> See Chapter 1

several cases masters belonging to this *natio* held philosophical theories often showing a stronger influence of their counterparts from the other side of the Channel than of their Parisian colleagues<sup>7427</sup> - and this seems to be true also for the case of theories of *consequentiae*. There is still much historiographical work to be done to take the measures of this "hybridisation", both in its conceptual depth and extent, and on the role that institutional contexts and the circulation of texts played in its development and diffusion, especially for later authors.<sup>7428</sup> On the other side, also in 3.b we find some logicians, e.g. John of Holland,<sup>7429</sup> who show some characteristics closer to 3.a than to the standard "English" features - even when they are not particularly late authors and their controversial production is to be situated mostly within the Oxonian context.<sup>7430</sup> Overall, even with the data available being only partial, it looks like if we intend the split between "Parisian" and "English" traditions too rigidly, we would not do justice to several major authors usually placed in either group and we would have on our hands a bunch of (especially later) theories of *consequentiae* that appear like anomalies in this classification. Therefore, the split itself should probably undergo some serious reconsiderations. On the one hand, we should pull more historical data on the interactions among masters and the circulation of texts between the main centres of each tradition (Oxford and Paris) and try to see how far the conceptual split can be retained. On the other hand, we should provisionally expand our classification with a 3.c/4 group of texts and theories blatantly showing some hybrid features - with elements characterising 3.a or 3.b. This group, should include authors roughly from Marsilius' generation (3.b) and from the following one (4) and active either in England or on the Continent, with special regard to

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<sup>7427</sup> A well studied case is e.g. Albert of Saxony, especially for what concerns some of his positions in natural philosophy. See e.g. among others Thijssen - Zupko (eds.) [2001]; Thijssen [2004], [2009]. See also Biard [2016] for further references.

<sup>7428</sup> The present edition and analysis of some aspects of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* aim to be also a contribution in this sense.

<sup>7429</sup> See Bos [1985]

<sup>7430</sup> However, we know that John of Holland was teaching in Prague in 1369 and it is therefore possible that he had received Parisian influences while he was on the Continent. In order to get a more conclusive picture, further studies are still needed for a better dating of his already edited works and of the still unedited *Consequentiae* and *Sophismata*.

German and Eastern European Universities and Italy<sup>7431</sup> - e.g. John of Holland, Richard Ferrybridge,<sup>7432</sup> Peter of Candia,<sup>7433</sup> Peter of Mantua,<sup>7434</sup> and so on.

On the basis of the manuscript tradition and of some evident signs of Marsilius' influence in later authors (e.g. Peter of Mantua), it is possible that Marsilius' own theory of *consequentiae*, certainly formulated in the Parisian context, contributes to this process of "hybridisation" and represents an influential turning point.

### 3.4 Conclusion

I gave an unavoidably partial tour of the general context and shape of Late Medieval Latin Logic and of some historiographical issues which come up when considering some specific medieval logical theories and Medieval Logic itself. Furthermore, I gave a partial historical introduction to the XIV century debate(s) on *consequentiae*, touching upon some of the issues that I will examine in presenting Marsilius' theory.

Much more work still needs to be done in filling our historical gaps by making medieval logical texts available; by clarifying the social and intellectual contexts (if any) where logic was practiced and developed outside the universities; and by examining the logical aspects and points of interests of the widespread applications of *logica utens* through medieval philosophy.<sup>7435</sup> The results of these on-going enterprises are going to give us a better idea of several aspects and instantiations of medieval logic and possibly of medieval logic itself. This

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<sup>7431</sup> The diffusion of English logic in Italy has been object of scholarly interest for quite some time - see e.g. Maierù (ed.) [1982]

<sup>7432</sup> See Bertagna [1994] for an analysis of Ferrybrodage's theory of inferences, transcripts of passages from his *Logica* and *Consequentiae* and further bibliographical references. Part of the *Consequentiae* was also edited in Pozzi [1978] and part of the *Logica* in Del Punta [1982]. See also Bertagna [1998]

<sup>7433</sup> Peter of Candia's *Consequentiae* are edited in Bertagna [2008] and S. Brown is preparing an edition of the *Obligationes* - studied already in Pozzi [1991]. On Peter of Candia see also Donati Curuni [1996]; Morissey [2000]; Pozzi [1991]; Schabel [2003].

<sup>7434</sup> R. Strobino is preparing a critical edition of Peter of Mantua's *Logic*; on his theory of *consequentiae* see Strobino [2016]; Bertagna [2000]. See also James [1974]; Strobino [2009/2010]

<sup>7435</sup> These are the main aims of those historiographical approaches that Cameron [2011] calls respectively: "historical reconstruction", "social history of logic", "history of applied logic".

kind of project is not only of historical interest, but has some philosophical relevance from a contemporary perspective- which is explicit in the approaches<sup>7436</sup> I have examined, but not limited to them.

Overall, from this necessarily partial overview, it appears that Medieval Logic is many things, has many shapes and a wide spectrum (including grammatical and ontological elements), is deeply enrooted in philosophy (both in the curriculum and as its part and its instrument); that, in many texts, it puts an emphasis on meta-logical aspects and it entertains a special relationship with (quasi-)ordinary language. Medieval Logic has some distinguishable features of *logicality* and in - a measure - of formality;<sup>7437</sup> it is a logic in an unequivocal sense and it is expressive enough to reformulate some of our own contemporary logical projects.

In the study of sections of Medieval Logic, it is desirable to maintain a balance between the historiographical enterprise in all its declension (historical reconstruction, social history, history of applied logic) and conducted with as much accuracy and fidelity as possible; and a contemporary philosophical point of view and line of questioning. Probably, only with such a balance could we get a proper understanding of what is going on in medieval logical theories and we could come to see them as interesting and possibly enlightening in themselves for our philosophical projects. It does not seem to me that we necessarily need to undergo heavy reformulations or formalisations of medieval logic, i.e. to "multiply the howlers beyond necessity", to make its history as interesting as we can.<sup>7438</sup> In some cases formalisations into contemporary logical languages are useful to see more clearly the structures of a given logical theory or logical argument. But we should take a rain check on extensive translations into contemporary formalisms - at least until the conceptual features of the theory we are formalising are very clear.

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<sup>7436</sup> These approaches are grouped by Cameron [2011] under the label of "rational reconstruction".

<sup>7437</sup> See also Maierù [1994]; Kann [2006]; Thom [2010]; Yrjönsuuri (ed.) [2001]

<sup>7438</sup> Matthews [1973, 20]

Among the familiar features and the many interests of Medieval Logic, we find notions that (*mutatis mutandis*) sound very much like analogues of our own and are the subject of extensive examinations and developed theories. For example, it sounds very much like we inherited "consequence", as a logical word, from *consequentia*. We do not need to believe à la Collingwood that any given concept keeps carrying within itself its previous instantiations,<sup>7439</sup> to think that a study of medieval theories of *consequentiae* could give us some valuable insight on the way(s) in which we intend the following in a logical context. The two main ways of conceiving the validity of *consequentiae* that we have found in the Ancient and Medieval tradition could be put in conversation with contemporary relevantist approaches to consequence and with other permissive or "minimalists"<sup>7440</sup> accounts of logical following. On the one hand, for their peculiar relation to natural language, Medieval theories of *consequentiae* could be useful to better grasp the difference between *logical* consequence and other forms of linguistic entailment.<sup>7441</sup> Most of the XIV century theories of *consequentiae* do embrace the weaker notion of validity of a *consequentia*, often expressed in modal terms, implemented with some (different) restrictions. What the "English" and the "Parisian" approaches mainly disagree about is that which makes for a *formal consequentia*: they go either with some version of a containment criterion, which is a requirement of relevance; or with an idea closer to our own accounts of *formality*. However, in both cases, a *consequentia*

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<sup>7439</sup> E.g. Collingwood [1939, 97-98]: "that the past which an historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is still living in the present. At the time, I expressed this by saying that history is concerned not with 'events' but with 'processes'; that 'processes' are things which do not begin and end but turn into one another; and that if a process P1 turns into a process P2, there is no dividing line at which P1 stops and P2 begins ;P1 never stops, it goes on in the changed form P2 and P2 never begins, it has previously been going on in the earlier form P1. There are in history no beginnings and no endings. History books begin and end, but the events they describe do not.

If P1 has left traces of itself in P2 so that an historian living in P2 can discover by the interpretation of evidence that what is now P2 was once P1, it follows that the 'traces' of P1 in the present are not, so to speak, the corpse of a dead P1, but rather the real P1 itself, living and active though encapsulated within the other form of itself P2. And P2 is not opaque, it is transparent, so that P1 shines through it and their colours combine into one. Therefore, if the symbol P1 stands for a characteristic of a certain historical period and the symbol P2 for the corresponding but different (and therefore contradictory or incompatible) characteristic of its successor, that successor is never characterized by P2 pure and simple, but always by a P2 tinged with a survival of P1." Here Collingwood is talking about processes, but he takes concepts to fundamentally processes.

<sup>7440</sup> In the sense used e.g. in Etchemendy [2008]

<sup>7441</sup> For references see Glanzberg [2015]

could still be valid even if it is not formal, i.e. there would still be a consequential following and our medieval authors consider this sort of following to be enough for theories of *consequentiae* to be a part of Logic. In other words, it looks like the medieval accounts do distinguish between logicality and formality (either intended as something like the permutability of the non-logical constants; or as some feature of relevance). This very fact is interesting from the point of view of the contemporary philosophy of logic. On the other hand, by dealing with the recurring ambiguity among conditionals, derivations and inferences that we find in Medieval accounts of *consequentiae*,<sup>7442</sup> we could walk with Achilles and the Tortoise and have a better insight into notions that we have the formal means to distinguish very neatly, but that overall - at least in classical logic or logics sufficiently close to it - seem to fall back into an interconnection difficult to untangle.<sup>7443</sup>

Therefore, this kind of study - anchored in history as it is - is per se as philosophically interesting as it can be.

Overall, logic seems to be one of those constructs that Ian Hacking calls "human kinds", i.e. "a kind shaped in part by our conception of it", and as such it is subject to a "looping effect": its own changing, by itself, affects the way we think about it, and the way we think about it in turn determines what it is.<sup>7444</sup> Therefore, reflecting on Medieval Logic itself qua logic is per se relevant for the way we do understand logic - in our own context or in general.

In the previous two chapters I have given respectively a historical and institutional contextualisation of Marsilius of Inghen's works (Chapter I) and a study of the textual tradition and a manuscript edition of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* (Chapter II). In the next chapter I will examine some conceptual features of Marsilius' theory of *consequentiae*.

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<sup>7442</sup> See Chapter 4

<sup>7443</sup> Carroll [1895]

<sup>7444</sup> Hacking [1995]



#### 4. Chapter IV: **On Marsilius of Inghen's Definition of *consequentia***

*1st scholar:* How now, sirrah! Where's thy master?

*Wagner:* God in heaven knows!

*2nd Scholar:* Why, dost not thou know?

*Wagner:* Yes, I know; but that follows not.

*1st scholar:* Go to, sirrah! leave your jesting, and tell us  
where he is.

*Wagner:* That follows not by force of argument, which you, being  
licentiates, should stand upon: therefore acknowledge your  
error, and be attentive.

- Christopher Marlowe, *The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus*, Act I, scene 2 -

#### 4.0 Introduction

Marsilius of Inghen devotes the first part of Book I to the definition of *consequentia*, before moving to its divisions and to the presentation and justification of a detailed series of rules - as is customary in this kind of treatise.

Marsilius' definition is articulated in two steps.

First, he introduces a minimal syntactical definition of what a *consequentia* looks like and then he proceeds to justify it. Second, through the examination of several alternative positions, Marsilius arrives to give a definition of how the relation of following between the premises and the conclusion should be interpreted, i.e. he proposes a criterion of validity.

I am going to begin with an examination of Marsilius' *definitio* or *descriptio quod sit* of *consequentia* (4.1): I will contextualise it in comparison especially with Buridan's and Albert of Saxony's analogous passages, and I will examine its parts and their conceptual function to get a better understanding of what Marsilius intends a *consequentia* to be - i.e. an *illatio* or a "necessary habitude of following" of the consequent from the antecedent (4.2). I am then proceeding to analyse Marsilius' overview of several accounts of validity, and in particular of those which he deems satisfactory accounts; I will expose some relevant articulations of Marsilius' preferred accounts, once again in a comparison with Buridan's and Albert's

analogous discussions (4.3). Finally, I am going to focus on Marsilius' take on the relation between *consequentiae* and *propositiones hypotheticae conditionales* (4.4) and I will offer some concluding remarks on his notion of *consequentia* (4.5).

#### 4.1 Marsilius' Definition Quod Sit: Oratio, Propositio - and the Nota Illationis

Marsilius begins by giving a definition *quod sit* ("what is") of *consequentia*; this is a "minimal" definition of *consequentia* as a linguistic and logical entity of some sort, and it is syntactical: it tells us what a *consequentia* looks like, which parts compose it, and how they stay together.

Consequentia est oratio habens antecedens et consequens et notam illationis consequentis ex antecedente tanquam principales partes sui, ut haec oratio: 'Homo currit, ergo animal currit'. Antecedens huius propositionis vel orationis est haec propositio: 'homo currit'; consequens eius oratio 'animal currit'; et nota illationis consequentis ex antecedente est haec conuinctio 'ergo' vel 'igitur'.<sup>7445</sup>

So, taken at face value, for Marsilius a *consequentia* is primarily an *oratio*.

*Oratio* is one of those Latin words with a somehow ambiguous meaning.<sup>7446</sup> both in its Classical and Medieval uses, in its general acceptations it could mean an aggregation of letters - spoken, written or thought - which might or might not be a meaningful word; a collection of words; or a grammatical collection of words. In this sense, "expression" could be wide and neutral enough to make for an adequate translation.

Sometimes an *oratio* as a grammatical collection of words is taken to be meaningful, i.e. something like *propositio* - which in the medieval use is something closer to our "sentence" than to our "proposition". In this sense, the *oratio-propositio* is called *perfecta* when it is grammatically formed by a name and a verb, and - since it is a *propositio* - it is explicitly said

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<sup>7445</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I, 1 <1>: "A *consequentia* is an expression (*oratio*) having an antecedent and a consequent and a note of the illation of the consequent from the antecedent as its principal parts, as for example this expression (*oratio*): "A man runs, therefore an animal runs". The antecedent of this proposition or expression (*oratio*) is this proposition: "a man runs"; [its] consequent this expression (*oratio*): "an animal runs"; and the note of the illation of the consequent from the antecedent is this conjunction "therefore" or "hence"."

<sup>7446</sup> See the relevant lemmas in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* and in Fuchs - Weijers - Gumbert-Hepp [1994]

to be either true or false. Furthermore, *oratio* can also be a speech or an articulated discourse, and, more specifically, it could mean either the style of speaking, eloquence, or a prayer or even an argument - although in a general sense.

What does Marsilius mean by *oratio* here? It seems a fairly important question, because it might amount to asking - among other things - if Marsilius is defining a *consequentia* in the first place as a *propositio*, i.e. if he is taking it to be primarily a conditional sentence - or something very much like a conditional sentence.

We might be tempted to answer affirmatively and say that a *consequentia* is indeed a *propositio*, because of the "huius propositionis vel orationis" specifying the term *antecedens* and referring to the given example of *consequentia* ("homo currit, ergo animal currit"). Furthermore, in this passage, Marsilius uses *oratio* to designate also the *consequens* ("animal currit"), while its counterpart, i.e. the *antecedens* ("homo currit"), is called *propositio*. Then, it would look like Marsilius is taking *oratio* and *propositio* to be interchangeable; therefore a *consequentia*, per se, would be primarily a *propositio* - and, as such, some kind of conditional sentence.

However, I am going to argue that we should prefer a less charged reading of *oratio* in this instance and distinguish it from *propositio*, for textual, inter-textual and conceptual reasons.

A few pages later, Marsilius explicitly makes the distinction between *oratio* and *propositio*:

... *propositio* [*add. categorica V*] est *oratio* habens subiectum et praedicatum et copulam principales partes sui...<sup>7447</sup>

Therefore, every *propositio* is an *oratio*, but not the other way around. In this sense, an *oratio* should be taken merely as some sort of linguistic construct that might or might not be a *propositio*, i.e. it might or might not be properly said to be true or false. This is the sense in

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<sup>7447</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.1 <1.1.2>: "... a [categorical V] sentence is an expression (*oratio*) having a subject and a predicate and a copula as its principal parts..."

which we should interpret Marsilius' use of *oratio* - in particular in defining *consequentia*. Both the *antecedens* and the *consequens* are linguistic constructs, therefore *orationes*. Also, they are grammatically well formed constructs in the Subject-Verb form, which is normally reducible to the Subject-Copula-Predicate form - e.g. respectively: "homo est currens" and "animal est currens". Hence, they are clearly *propositiones* and, as such, they can be either true or false. *Propositio* keeps being the standard term to describe *antecedens* and *consequens* through the rest of Marsilius' analysis. Therefore, overall Marsilius' alternating use of *propositio* and *oratio*, referring to the *antecedens* and the *consequens* of a *consequentia*, seems to be fairly unproblematic.

What should we then make of that "propositionis vel orationis" referring to *consequentia*? The expression is not redundant, since - as we have seen - the two terms are not synonymous: *oratio* has a wider meaning imposing fewer constraints on the entities it picks out. The occurrence of *propositio* seems to be consistently supported by the manuscript tradition, even if not unanimously - but overall the "propositionis vel orationis" appears to be the preferable reading on the basis of the manuscripts' agreement.<sup>7448</sup> Nevertheless, here this "propositionis" remains puzzling. Through Marsilius' analysis, generally *propositio* is not used again to refer directly to the *consequentia* as such, but only to its sentential parts (*antecedens* and *consequens*) or to talk about the conditional sentence (*propositio hypothetica conditionalis*) qua conditional.<sup>7449</sup> However, here *propositio* is used side by side with *oratio* - which was given by itself as the first definition of what a *consequentia* is. We might then be tempted to take this "propositio" seriously and conclude that for Marsilius a *consequentia* is in the first place a hypothetical sentence - very much like a conditional.

However, I believe that this would be an incorrect conclusion for two reasons.

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<sup>7448</sup> V and Y - while seeming largely unrelated - have the same reading witnessing "propositionis vel orationis"; M has only "orationis"; W foregoes the expression in favour of a simple "consequentiae".

<sup>7449</sup> See *Consequentiae* I.1. <2.3> and the relevant response to that issue. See also §4.4

In the first place, in the very beginning Marsilius' definition reads "consequentia est oratio" - and this *oratio* is there in all the manuscripts. Marsilius' choice seems to be quite deliberate. By picking *oratio*, Marsilius is diverging from the treatises in the tradition usually considered to be closer to him,<sup>7450</sup> namely Pseudo Scotus' *Quaestiones Super I Priorum*, John Buridan's *Tractatus de Consequentibus* and Albert of Saxony's *Perutilis Logica* IV. When giving their analogous descriptive definitions, these authors define a *consequentia* primarily as a *propositio hypothetica*.<sup>7451</sup>

This identification of a *consequentia* with a *propositio hypothetica* both reflects a quite common take on the conceptualisation of *consequentiae* and is characterising of the "Buridanian School's" treatment of at least the syntactic definition of *consequentia*.

On the one hand, as far as it reflects a common approach to *consequentiae*, this identification implies a measure of ambiguity between *propositiones hypotheticae (conditionales)* and *consequentiae*, which goes a long way back.<sup>7452</sup> The identification of a *consequentia* with a *propositio hypothetica*, which has a truth value, is not in Boethius, who used *consequentia* to signify different sorts of relations of following: from the looks of it, these relations often are *in res*; such Boethian *consequentia* is expressed by a *propositio hypothetica* but it is not identified

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<sup>7450</sup> See Chapter 3.3 (Group 3.a)

<sup>7451</sup> Pseudo Scotus, *Super I Priorum*, q. X: "Quantum ad secundum, notandum quod consequentia est consequentia est propositio hypothetica, composita ex antecedente et consequente mediante coniunctione conditionali vel rationali....". John Buridan, *Tractatus de consequentiis*, I, 3: "Consequentia autem est propositio hypothetica; constituta enim est ex pluribus propositionibus coniunctis per hanc dictionem 'si' vel per hanc dictionem 'ergo' aut aequivalentem". However, in the *Summulae de Dialectica*, Buridan defines *consequentia* as an *oratio* - see. *SDD* 7.4.5: "Consequentia autem est oratio composita ex antecedente et consequente designans hanc sequi ad illam." Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica*, IV, 1 (De consequentiis): "Consequentia autem est propositio hypothetica composita ex antecedente et consequente et nota consequentiae significans antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens...".

<sup>7452</sup> However, this implication does not go the other way around, meaning that theories having an ambiguous treatment of *propositiones hypotheticae conditionales* and *consequentiae* do not necessarily explicitly define a *consequentia* as a *propositio hypothetica*.

as one.<sup>7453</sup> Nevertheless, this identification seems to appear fairly early - e.g. it can be found in the *Dialectica* usually attributed to Garlandus Compotista (probably early XII century)<sup>7454</sup> - which has some following. The emergence and the persistence of such identification might be both contributing to and reinforced by the ambiguous treatment of consequences and conditionals seemingly shared by several medieval theories.<sup>7455</sup> Roughly, making an educated guess, it would seem to be deep-seated into the use of a logical language that looks a lot like Medieval Latin,<sup>7456</sup> into the emphasis that Medieval Logic puts on meta-logic, and possibly into Medieval Logic's pronounced dialectical features. The smashing victory of Adam of Basham's account of validity (stating the equivalency between the conditions of validity for an argument and the truth conditions of a conditional)<sup>7457</sup> in the XII century debates, might have been just one among the elements encouraging the emergence of such ambiguity.

Be that as it may, the ambiguity seems to persist, going beyond the stated equivalence or reducibility between *propositiones hypotheticae conditionales* and *consequentiae*; often it is neither solved nor systematically addressed in several XIV century theories of consequences - even when these treatises do not explicitly define a *consequentia* as a *propositio hypothetica*. For example, the anonymous treatise *In omni consequentia bona quidquid sequitur* (Ms. Paris, BN, lat. 16130, ff. 118va-120vb<sup>7458</sup> - which I called *An.II*)<sup>7459</sup> speaks casually of "falsam consequentiam".<sup>7460</sup> Analogously does the *Liber consequentiarum*:<sup>7461</sup> even if it devotes a fairly developed rule to the conceptual and logical relations between *consequentia* and

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<sup>7453</sup> See especially *In Peri hermeneias* 2. For an overview and analysis of the uses of "consequentia" in Boethius see e.g. Suto [2012, ch. 5]. See also Martin [2009]

<sup>7454</sup> See Chapter 3.3

<sup>7455</sup> See e.g. Martin [1986] and [1988]; Iwakuma [1993]; Courtenay [1993]; Normore [1987]; see also Chapter 3.3

<sup>7456</sup> See Chapter 3.2.2.1.2

<sup>7457</sup> Normore [2015, 358]; see also Chapter 3.2.2.1.2

<sup>7458</sup> Edited in Green-Pedersen [1980b]

<sup>7459</sup> See Chapter 3.3

<sup>7460</sup> See for example Rule 10: "... sciendum est quod ista regula non valet [...] sed facit falsam consequentiam." See also Rule 33

<sup>7461</sup> ed. Schupp [1988]

*conditionalis*,<sup>7462</sup> a few pages later the *Liber consequentiarum* talks about *consequentia vera* that *tenet*.<sup>7463</sup> So does Walter Burley, who appears to be the core figure and possibly the main influence among these authors: particularly in his *De consequentiis*, where he talks quite freely of *consequentia vera vel bona*, and even of *conditionalis bona* or that *tenet*.<sup>7464</sup> Furthermore, even if he does not explicitly give a syntactic definition of *consequentia* as *propositio hypothetica*, in the longer version of the *De puritate* he gives the rules for *consequentiae* in the section devoted to *propositiones hypotheticae conditionales*.<sup>7465</sup>

Therefore, even when these texts do tackle the issue of the equivalence between *consequentiae* and *propositiones conditionales*, occasionally this ambiguity keeps coming up - mainly through a quite imprecise lexical shifting between truth and validity - and it is not met with any further clarifications. However, as far as I could see, none of these authors explicitly states that *consequentia est propositio hypothetica*.

On the other hand, this sort of syntactic definition explicitly identifying a *consequentia* with a *propositio hypothetica* is to be found almost in all the most prominent authors belonging to the Parisian "School" - with the exception of Marsilius of Inghen. How should we interpret this kind of choice made by Pseudo Scotus, Buridan and Albert of Saxony? Is it some kind of charged theoretical statement, making explicit an issue that was already present also in several (mainly English) treatises on *consequentiae* from the first part of the century? How seriously should we take it? Are they saying that a *consequentia* is no more no less than a

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<sup>7462</sup> *Liber consequentiarum* I, rule <15>, p. 123

<sup>7463</sup> *Liber consequentiarum* III, rule <2>, p. 125: "... tenet consequentia vera...."

<sup>7464</sup> Walter Burley, *De Consequentiis*, ed. in Green-Pedersen [1980a]. See, for example: I rule 2, p. 113: "... haec ergo est vera vel consequentia bona"; or V §68-69, p. 128: "... ad bonitatem condicionalis non plus requiritur nisi si antecedens sit verum consequens erit verum. Et ideo condicionalis erit bona... [Q]uaedam condicionales tenent ut nunc et quaedam simpliciter...". D'Ors [1990] gives an opposite interpretation: according to him, Burley would be very careful not to mix up *consequentiae* and *conditionales*. However, D'Ors' reading fails to account for some textual evidence. Overall, while the distinction is well outlined in Burley, it is not as constant as it is e.g. in Ockham.

<sup>7465</sup> Walter Burley, *De puritate artis logicae Tractatus longior*, Tr. II (*De propositionibus et syllogismis hypotheticis*), pars I (*De propositionibus hypotheticis conditionalibus*), ch. 1, p. 60: "... propositio hypothetica est quae constat ex duabus categoricis vel ex pluribus mediante coniunctione vel adverbio vel aliqua alia parte orationis coniungente illas categoricas ad invicem... In primo capitulo, in quo ponuntur regulae consequentiarum, pono unam divisionem consequentiarum...".

*propositio hypothetica*, and that any differences between a *consequentia* and a *propositio conditionalis* would amount to superficial syntactic features - e.g. the use of *ergo* before the consequent rather than *si* before the antecedent?

These questions deserve some serious consideration, but in answering we should not overestimate the import of the statement under examination. In fact, generally these authors add further specifications or indicators making a *consequentia* into something else than merely a *propositio hypothetica* or at least implying some conceptual distinction - even if such distinction is not always unambiguous. For example, Pseudo Scotus is quite systematic in talking about *consequentia bona*, *bonitas consequentiae* and of a *consequentia* that *valet* or *tenet*, instead of *consequentia vera* or *veritas consequentiae*.<sup>7466</sup> As for Buridan, he talks quite freely of *consequentia vera*,<sup>7467</sup> even if he does use *consequentia bona* or that *valet* as well.<sup>7468</sup> However, Buridan appeals to something like an assertion rule and, by doing so, he can maintain a distinction between a hypothetical conditional/conditional-like sentence and a *consequentia*.<sup>7469</sup> Also Albert of Saxony - just after having defined a *consequentia* as a

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<sup>7466</sup> Pseudo Scotus, *Super I Priorum*, q. X, e.g: "... ista est bona consequentia .... quid requiritur ad bonitatem consequentiae... tunc consequentia est bona et si non, tunc consequentia non valet..."

However, it should be noted that such tendency to talk mostly of *consequentia bona*, that *tenet* or *valet*, is dominant also in those texts I mentioned a few lines above, where the ambiguity between *consequentia* and *conditional* appears more evident. Furthermore - as far as I could see -, also William of Ockham (SL III.3), the *Tractatus Minor* and the *Elementarium Logicae* are fairly consistent in their talk of *bonitas* or *tenere/valere* of a *consequentia*: I could not find any occurrences of *veritas* explicitly and undeniably referred to *consequentiae* in any of these texts.

<sup>7467</sup> E.g. John Buridan, *Tractatus de Consequentibus* I, 3: "... et tunc consequentia dividitur, quia quaedam est vera et quaedam falsa. [...] [E]go in hoc tractatu per hoc nomen 'consequentia' volo intelligere consequentiam veram ..." Also in *SDD* 7.5, where Buridan gives a primary definition of *consequentia* as *oratio*, he goes on saying that it can be true or false - e.g. *SDD* 7.4.5.(5): "Consequentia dividitur, quia quaedam est vera, quaedam falsa..."

<sup>7468</sup> E.g. John Buridan, *Tractatus de Consequentibus* I, 4: "Consequentia 'formalis' vocatur quae in omnibus terminis valet retenta consimilis forma. [...] [E]st cui omnis propositio similis in forma quae formaretur esset bona consequentia..."

<sup>7469</sup> John Buridan, *SDD* 7.4.5: "Alia consequentia est argumentum si antecedens sit notum et notius consequente, quae asserit antecedens et ob hoc infert assertive consequens. In condicionali autem utimur hac coniunctione 'si' et in argumento hac coniunctione 'ergo'. Et docet haec clausula quod in condicionali coniunctio apponitur antecedenti, sive praeposatur antecedens consequenti sive postponatur, ut 'si asinus volat, asinus habet alas' et 'asinus habet alas si asinus uolat', in argumento autem coniunctio apponitur consequenti, ut 'homo est risibilis; ergo animal est risibile'."



*propositio hypothetica* - talks about *consequentia bona* and that *tenet* or *valet*,<sup>7470</sup> and keeps doing so quite consistently, even if not exclusively.<sup>7471</sup> Furthermore, as Buridan does also e.g. in his commentary on the *Physics*,<sup>7472</sup> Albert mentions explicitly (even if not in detail) the issue of the equivalence between *consequentiae* and conditionals - and such discussions would not have reason to be, if *consequentiae* were simply conditionals.<sup>7473</sup>

These specifications and caveats are not always fully developed, but they do help to circumscribe a notion of *consequentia* distinguished from that of conditional or of some other kind of hypothetical proposition, and therefore they might limit the actual weight of the identification of *consequentia* with *propositio hypothetica*. Furthermore, some encouragement to give a preliminary definition of *consequentia* as a *propositio hypothetica* could have come from Buridan's propositional tokenism if taken in combination with a conception of *consequentia* as some kind of inferential operation rather than some consequence-relation among sentences. If a *consequentia* is an inference<sup>7474</sup> that someone makes and if we want to keep propositional tokenism, then not only do the antecedent and the consequent need to be stated but their being inferred from one another does as well, as one uttering. In this framework, it is then easy to take the next step and to offer a first identification between a *consequentia* and the *propositio hypothetica* that is uttered to describe the inference and to make it be there.

But, overall, even if we want to take the Parisians' statement seriously, we should not take it too seriously, because it might amount to just being a throwback to the "old way of speaking" -

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<sup>7470</sup> E.g. Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica*, IV, 1: "... omnis consequentia est bona et nulla consequentia est mala. [...] Talis consequentia non valet. [...] Sed consequentia materialis dicitur, cui non omnis similis in forma esset bona consequentia vel, sicut communiter dicitur, quae non tenet in omnibus terminis..."

<sup>7471</sup> Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica*, IV, 1: "Consequentia talis est falsa."

<sup>7472</sup> John Buridan, *Q. super octo Physicorum libros*, IV, q. 10 [1509, 76vb-77ra]: "... una conditionalis que equivalet uni consequentie..."

The critical edition of Buridan's *Quaestiones on the Physics* is still in progress; only the first two books are currently available - Streijger - Bakker - Thijssen - Sylla (eds.) [2015].

<sup>7473</sup> Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica*, IV, 1. See §4.4

<sup>7474</sup> I am adopting the common distinction between "inference" as some sort of act by a cognitive subject and "consequence" as a relation. See e.g. in Lindström - Palmgren - Westerstål [2012, 819]

or a way of making explicit an issue that is also present in the more recent tradition on *consequentiae*, while dealing with it elsewhere.

Nevertheless, even if - from the theoretical point of view - for these authors this very identification could end up being of little import, the definition itself seems to put the discussion of *consequentiae* on the sentential level in the first place; and this makes things at least "muddier", especially since we are dealing with preliminary descriptions *quod sit* introducing the subject of these theories.

Then, on the one hand, Marsilius' use of *oratio* seems to be a more non-committal choice; on the other hand, it is a choice that - going against the Parisian "style" - looks quite deliberate.

However, it should be noted that Marsilius' *oratio* is not original. For example, even remaining in the Parisian context, in the *Summulae de Dialectica* (7.4.5.<3>), Buridan himself gives the formulation "consequentia est oratio composita..." - but he does so only *en passant* and not consistently. Furthermore, Marsilius' choice of *oratio* is in line with the analogous *quod sit* definitions given in many earlier and contemporary treatises often belonging to the English tradition, which describe a *consequentia* as an *aggregatum* of (or simply as) *antededens*, *consequens* and *nota illationis*.<sup>7475</sup> Moreover, this *quod sit* description of *consequentia* as *oratio*

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<sup>7475</sup> E.g. *Liber consequentiarum* (ed. Schupp [1988]) I, p. 109: "Est autem descriptio consequentiae quod consequentia est antecedens et consequens cum nota consequentiae"; Anonymous, *Consequentiae "Tractaturus..."*, ms. Vat. Pal. Lat. 1049, f. 362: "... consequentia est aggregatum..." (see Green-Pedersen [1985]); William of Osmā, *De consequentiis* I (ed. Schupp [1991]): "Consequentia est quoddam aggregatum..."; Martinus Anglicus (?), *Consequentiae*: "Consequentia est aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente et nota consequentiae." (see: Green-Pedersen [1985]); Richard Billingham, *Tractatus de consequentiis* (ed. Weber 2003) I: "Consequentia est quoddam aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente et nota consequentiae."; William of Sutton, *Consequentiae*: "... est autem consequentia antecedens et consequens cum nota consequentiae." (see Green-Pedersen [1985]); Richard Swineshead, *De consequentiis*: "... consequentia est totum aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente cum nota consequentiae." (see Read [2014, 169]); Richard Levenham, *De consequentiis* (ed. Spade [1974]): "Consequentia est antecedens et consequens ad illud formaliter vel materialiter sequens cum aliqua nota consequentiae"; Anonymous, *De consequentiis* [ms. Florence, Bibl. Nat., Cod. Magl. cl. V 43 (Strozzi 120)]: "...Consequentia est antecedens et consequens cum nota..." (see Federici Vescovini [1960]; Read [2014, 169]); Anonymous, *De consequentiis* (ms. Pistoia, Biblioteca Capitolare, 61, f. 83v-87v - The curator of the Catalogue mistakenly attributes the text to Ralph Strode): "Consequentia est antecedens et consequens..." (see Read [2014,169]). Among later treatises, see also e.g. Peter of Candia, *De consequentiis* (ed. Bertagna [2008]) I: "Consequentia est aggregatum ex antecedente et cosequente cum nota illationis."; Anonymous, *Consequentiae*

has some long echoes among later authors writing on *consequentiae* during the last quarter of the century and into Early Modernity - and this long echo might be partially dependent on Marsilius' influence.<sup>7476</sup>

Secondly, in Marsilius' passage under consideration (*huius propositionis vel orationis*), we should not take that "propositionis" too seriously, because the immediate referent of "huius propositionis vel orationis" is a specific expression: "homo currit, ergo animal currit". The "propositionis" might be taken to apply to the specific example, but not to be necessarily extended to *consequentia* in general.

We can support this "lighter" and more non-committal reading of the passage for the following reasons.

From the linguistic/grammatical/syntactic point of view, a *consequentia* is a construct of antecedent, consequent and note of illation, as stated in the first definition which has been given. However nothing has been said yet about the nature of the *consequentia* itself beyond a description of what it looks like.

After giving this description or definition *quod sit*, Marsilius offers an example, in the form of: "Homo currit, ergo animal currit". This expression (*oratio*) looks like a compound sentence: it is composed by two categorical sentences and a note of illation. Depending on how we interpret its elements - and the note of illation in particular -, the *oratio* in the example might as well be taken to be a *propositio*, and properly so. The antecedent (*homo currit*) and the

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*secundum modum Oxoniae*: "Consequentia est quoddam aggregatum ex antecedente et consequente ad idem consequens cum nota illationis."

<sup>7476</sup> See e.g. Gerardus de Harderwijk (Gerardus Harderwickensis, de Raedt, de Rota m. 1503), *In Parva logicalia*, p. 105: "consequentia... est oratio continens propositiones et denotans sequelam unius earum ad alteram, denotans quidem per signum illativum..."; *idem*, *Summ.* 4 p. 218 A 30: "...consequentia est oratio habens antecedens et consequens et notam illationis illative tentam, ita quod in omni consequentia sunt tria: antecedens, consequens et notam consequentiae sive illationis."; Chrysostomus Javellus, *De Consequentis*, p. 98: "Consequentia est oratio plures continens propositiones coniunctas per notam illationis denotantem sequelam unius ad alteram"; John of Glogovia (end XV cent.), *Exercitium super omnes Tractatus Parvorum Logicalium Petri Hispani Magistri Johannis Glogoviensis* (ed. Goddu [1995]): "Consequentia est oratio habens antecedens et consequens cum nota illationis illative tenta." See also Ashworth [1973]

consequent (*animal currit*) are *propositiones* - and Marsilius tells us as much in their definition *quod sit* immediately following the passage we have been discussing.<sup>7477</sup> Then he spends several lines on the *nota illationis*:

Et nota illationis consequentis ex antecedente est haec coniunctio 'ergo', vel 'igitur', vel aliqua alia eam includens vel ei aequivalens. Unde generaliter coniunctio significans habitudinem sequelae necessariam unius propositionis ad aliam dicitur nota illationis. Unde apparet quod haec coniunctio 'si' est nota illationis, quia ipsa faciens propositionem conditionalem, significat habitudinem sequelae unius propositionis ad aliam. Similiter est de ista coniunctione 'quia' et de omnibus aliis si sint praedictis aequivalentes.<sup>7478</sup>

Since here the *nota illationis* is a conjunction, this particular example "homo currit, ergo animal currit" has the the grammatical and linguistic form of a *propositio*, therefore the occurrence of the term in "huius propositionis seu ortionis" is perfectly justified. However this does not mean that what is true of this particular example holds in general, i.e. we should not rush to conclude that any *consequentia* is *per se* a *propositio* nor that it has to be expressed in propositional form. If we take a *consequentia* to be described primarily by the word *oratio*, then it might as well be in argument form or be intended primarily as an argument, e.g. as a syllogism, while still conforming to the given syntactical definition.

Certainly, someone might make some solid objections on a textual basis. First - she might object - while giving his definition *quod sit* of antecedent, Marsilius says that it is a "propositio" (in the singular form) and does not add that the antecedent might be a set of premises instead of a single conjunctive sentence. Second, the definition *quod sit* of the *nota illationis* describes it as a conjunction acting on categorical sentences in a way that makes them into a compound sentence: if *si* "facit propositionem conditionalem", and *si* is a note of

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<sup>7477</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.1<1>: "Antecedens est propositio ex qua per notam illationis seu consequentiae infertur consequens, ut in oratione prius posita haec propositio 'homo currit' dicitur antecedens. Consequens vero est propositio quae per notam consequentiae infertur ex alia, scilicet antecedente, ut in oratione [Y68v] prius posita haec propositio 'animal currit' dicitur consequens."

<sup>7478</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.1<1>: "And the note of the illation of the consequent from the antecedent is this conjunction 'therefore' (*ergo*), or 'hence' (*igitur*), or another one including it or equivalent to it. Whence, generally the conjunction signifying the relation (*habitudinem*) of the necessary following of one proposition to the other is called note of illation. Whence, it is evident that this conjunction 'if' (*si*) is a note of illation, because - since it makes a proposition a conditional - it signifies the relation of following of one proposition to the other. The same can be said of this conjunction 'because' (*quia*) and of all the others if they are equivalent to the ones already mentioned."

illation, then a *consequentia* would be primarily a *propositio hypothetica* - specifically, a conditional one. This would confirm that a *consequentia* should be conceived first and foremost on the propositional level.

It seems to me that the first objection carries some weight. However, I could offer a twofold answer. On the one hand, here too, it is likely that Marsilius still has the previous example in mind and that he is pointing out the characterising elements of a *consequentia* by explaining the roles played by its relevant parts - starting from that example. Therefore, "propositio" could be there not to mean that the antecedent is always simply the protasis of a conditional sentence nor that it should be defined as such: it could be justified by the fact that - in the example Marsilius used to introduce his explanation - the antecedent is *de facto* just one proposition. In that example, and in analogous cases, the antecedent happens to be the protasis of a conditional sentences, and it can be described as such without such description being an exhaustive nor an adequate definition. This is not a conclusive counter-objection, but it helps to reduce its conceptual import by letting us read it as a not completely precise way of speaking, grounded on the example. On the other hand, the key element in this passage is what the *nota illationis* signifies, i.e. that which makes it a note of illation: the "habitude of necessary following" (*habitus sequelae necessariae*). As Marsilius states repeatedly in the following pages, this *habitus sequelae necessariae* (or *illatio*) is essential to the *consequentia*; also, he adds explicitly: *consequentia est argumentatio*.<sup>7479</sup> Therefore, "si" is a *nota illationis* insofar as it signifies a necessary following of some sort, as also "ergo", "igitur", "quia" and all the other conjunctions and adverbs that are "equivalent to them" (*sibi aequivalentes*) do. But if we stay on the sentential level of the analysis and take the *consequentia* to be primarily and fundamentally a *propositio hypothetica*, it is hard to see how all these conjunctions and adverbs can be *notae illationis* equivalent to each other: for example, a causal sentence (*quia-*

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<sup>7479</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1. 'In oppositum': "Omnis consequentia est argumentatio, [...] omnis consequentia tenetur sub aliqua specie argumentationis."

sentence) is not true under the same conditions that verify a conditional sentence (*si*-sentence); and yet Marsilius tells us that *quia* and *si* are *aequivalentes* in some sense that makes them both notes of illation. This can certainly be a problematic statement, both from the point of view some of our contemporary takes on consequences and if *consequentiae* are taken to be conditionals at their core. It does not help that Marsilius does not say much at all about in which sense an *oratio* containing a *quia* - and therefore having to do with causality/causation - is a *consequentia*. At least at fist sight, his stance might have to do with the ambiguity intrinsic within the common use of words such as *consequentia*, *igitur* and *ergo* etc. both in Classical and Medieval Latin - as well as in their English equivalents - between a causal/explanatory (and sometimes even temporal) meaning and their "broadly truth-preserving" acceptance.<sup>7480</sup> However, this causal meaning can be properly included within theories of *consequentiae*, and it is done in several ways; Marsilius seems to take these *quia*-cases as a subset of material consequences,<sup>7481</sup> i.e. the class of *consequentiae* holding materially in virtue of the meaning of terms signifying causes and their effects. The following of a consequent where for example a term signifies an effect, from an antecedent where a term signifies that effect's cause - or viceversa -, counts for Marsilius as a proper (material) consequence, when the following is actually there. But obviously this does not imply that the cause-effect kind of following exhausts the whole set of materially valid followings. Even if Marsilius does not say so explicitly and he uses "ergo"/"igitur" in his analysis, this particular kind of material following could be adequately expressed by a *quia* as a *nota illationis*. Insofar as they have the same function of picking out some kind of following between antecedent and

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<sup>7480</sup> Normore [2015, 357]; see also the relevant lemmas in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* [1956-1979] and e.g. in the *Lexicon Latinitatis Nederlandicae Medii Aevi* edited by M. Gumbert-Hepp, O. Weijers, J. W. Fuchs [1977- ]

<sup>7481</sup> Marsilius treatment of *consequentia materialis* is certainly peculiar within the Parisian context. Marsilius' subdivision and treatment of material consequences is in the same line of progressive detachment of *consequentiae* from topical accounts and in the same spirit of developing a generalised account that we find in Buridan's or Albert of Saxony. However Marsilius' classification of material consequences shows some important differences from Buridan's or Albert of Saxony's; namely Marsilius does not accept any *consequentia ut nunc*: it is not a consequence. By doing so, he selects only a "strong" group of non-formal connections counting as proper *consequentiae* between antecedent and consequent.

consequent - even if not necessarily the exact same group of "followings" in the exact same way - *quia, ergo, igitur, si*, etc. are *aequivalentes as notae illationis*. However as we do not have any reason to infer that a *consequentia* is per se a causal sentence, analogously - even if *si* (as *ergo* and *igitur*) seems to pick out a greater number of followings than *quia* - why should we infer that a *consequentia, qua consequentia, is a propositio hypothetica conditionalis or rationalis*? All these notes of illation are notes of illation because of the following itself, not because of the grammatical form they bring forth. Being a *consequentia*, then, does not seem to be a matter rooted in the sentential level; a *consequentia* is not a *propositio*: for Marsilius, it is the following (*illatio, habitudo necessaria*) at its core.

This answers also the second objection. It is true that "si" is used as a conditional connective and it makes the compound sentence into a conditional; and it is also true that "si" is defined as a *nota illationis*. However, it does not follow necessarily that a *consequentia* is per se a conditional. This appears to be the case, partially because of what we have mentioned about the "habitude of a necessary following" being the true core of the *quod sit* of Marsilius' notion of *consequentia*. Furthermore, if we interpret Marsilius' *quod sit* descriptions also in the light of the further developments of his theory, we should distinguish between the role of the conjunction on the grammatical/syntactical level of our *oratio*, i.e. what it does to the structure of the *oratio* it is in or how it shapes it; and its semantic/referential function, i.e. what it "means" or what it picks out: the *habitudo sequelae necessariae* or *illatio*.

Grammatically, these *notae illationis* are conjunctions or adverbs, Marsilius says; then, they make two separate grammatical constructs (*orationes*) into a compound one. In the simplest case - appearing in Marsilius' examples - these two separate expressions, joined together by one of these conjunctions, are in the Subject-Copula-Predicate form, which means they are categorical sentences (*propositiones categoriae*). Therefore, the compound expression, resulting from their joining by means of one of these conjunctions, will be an expression

(*oratio*) which is grammatically a compound sentence (*propositio hypothetica*). Then, grammatically, depending on the conjunction involved, the *oratio* could either be a conditional hypothetical sentence (*si*-sentence), a causal one (*quia*-sentence), or a rational one (*ergo/igitur*-sentence).<sup>7482</sup> Semantically/referentially, these *notae illationis* are notes of the illation insofar as they pick out an illation (*illatio*) or a "habitude of necessary following" (*habitus sequelae necessariae*) of the consequent from the antecedent. This following can be of several kinds: e.g. the kind of following between a sentence affirming that the cause is, and a sentence affirming that the effect is (*quia*-following); or the one between "man is an animal" and "man is mortal"; or between "Socrates is white and Socrates is not white" and "the moon is a wheel of blue cheese" (*si*-following, *ergo/igitur*-following), and so on. Moreover, different *notae* could pick out (roughly) the same kind of following in different ways, i.e. they could connote it differently - e.g. *si*, which *facit propositio hypothetica*, marks its hypothetical nature; *ergo* or *igitur* (traditionally labelled as *rationales* conjunctions) make the *propositio* a *propositio rationalis* and emphasises an assertive aspect in a way *si* does not; *quia* puts the stress on a cause/effect kind of following. But overall, a "note of illation" is a note of the illation insofar as it is a mark or a sign pointing at that following.

It looks like Marsilius would then consider inadequate a flat identification between *consequentia* and *propositio hypothetica* in general - or *propositio hypothetica conditionalis* in particular -, and that we should stick to *oratio* rather than to *propositio hypothetica* as the most adequate definition *quod sit* of *consequentia*. Not all *consequentiae* are grammatically *propositiones hypotheticae*; nor all *consequentiae* are grammatically *propositiones*: e.g. a *consequentia syllogistica* is a *consequentia formalis*, but when it is uttered it shows something like this syntactic/grammatical structure: "Sentence1 (=major premise), Sentence2 (=minor premise), ERGO/IGITUR Conclusion". And yet, it is a well formed *consequentia*, even if it is not

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<sup>7482</sup> See e.g. Maierù [1972, 234-6]



a *propositio hypothetica*. Furthermore, if - as Marsilius says - *omnis consequentia est argumentatio* and *omnis consequentia tenetur sub aliqua specie argumentationis*, then the argument form might be a more "immediate" expression of a *consequentia/illatio* than its propositional counterpart.

Overall, Marsilius' definition *quod sit*: "consequentia est oratio", is a good description (*descriptio*) of what a *consequentia* looks like when we are looking at an actual uttered or written *consequentia*. However, it is not a sufficient definition of *consequentia*: it certainly tells us what a *consequentia* looks like, but it does not tell us what it actually is (*illatio/habitus sequentiae necessariae* etc.), nor how to distinguish when the following is there from when it is not (criterion of validity).

In which sense, then, is a *consequentia* an *oratio*?

Marsilius' use of the term *consequentia* seems to be twofold: on the one hand it denotes the linguistic construct described by the *quod sit* definition we have examined, and therefore it is an *oratio*; on the other hand, it is the "habitus" of necessary following lying beneath that *oratio*, the *illatio* itself, which is characterised very much as a consequence or entailment relation.

Then, it looks like the *oratio*, rather than being the underlying *consequentia/illatio*, is its expression, i.e. it is what we read or see when a *consequentia* is uttered. In this sense, the *oratio* - insofar as it is composed by the required parts to be a *consequentia* (i.e. antecedent, consequent and note of illation) - can be equivalently formulated either as a conditional or conditional-like sentence, or in argument form. Therefore, the *oratio* works like a description of the ongoing *consequentia*: it is a sort of "dummy inference"<sup>7483</sup> or more precisely as a "dummy *illatio*", since we still have not said anything about how this *illatio* should be interpreted.

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<sup>7483</sup> See Ryle [1950]

For now, we have seen that at a first description a *consequentia* is an *oratio* composed by and *antecedens* a *consequens* and a note of illation. The *antecedens* is described as "the sentence from which the consequent is inferred by means of a note of illation or of consequence."<sup>7484</sup> The *consequens* is described as "the sentence which is inferred from the other, i.e. from the antecedent, by means of a note of illation."<sup>7485</sup> And the note of illation is a conjunction or an adverb - like "if", "hence", "therefore", "because", or anything in some sense equivalent - signifying the following of consequent from the antecedent.<sup>7486</sup>

It is immediately clear that we are going to face some worries of circularity - and Marsilius realises it too. In the first place, the issue concerns the definitions of *antecedens* and *consequens*: in the section that Marsilius devotes to the exposition of the *instantiae* and *dubitationes* against his *descriptio quod sit*, the first objection contests that these descriptions of *consequentia*, *antecedens* and *consequens* are "diminished" or "insufficient" (*diminute positae*), because they are circular and they do not notify what they are supposed to define.

Marsilius is perfectly ready to accept that his descriptions of *antecedens* and *consequens* are circular, but he refuses to infer that for this reason they are inadequate descriptions.<sup>7487</sup> *Antecedens* and *consequens* are logically relative terms, i.e. they are relational (*ad aliquid*) in the same way in which "father" and "son" or "genus" and "species" are; therefore they can and should be defined relationally, i.e. by each other: circularity between the definitions of two relative terms is acceptable. However, even if they are acceptable, these circular definitions raise another objection: they fail to notify that which they are defining. The objection goes more or less like this: since these two definitions refer to each other, someone who does not

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<sup>7484</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1<1>: "Antecedens est propositio ex qua per notam illationis seu consequentiae infertur consequens."

<sup>7485</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1<1>: "Consequens vero est propositio quae per notam consequentiae infertur ex alia, scilicet antecedente."

<sup>7486</sup> See §1

<sup>7487</sup> See *Consequentiae* I.1 'In oppositum' <1.1.2> and 'Ad instantias' <1.1.1>

already know what an *antecedens* and a *consequens* are (and we might add the *nota illationis* too), will not understand their definition - nor will she understand what they are from their definition.<sup>7488</sup>

Marsilius' answer seems to confirm our reading of his *quod sit* description of *consequentia* and to support our interpretation of the function of the *oratio*. He admits that these descriptions do not notify the defined. But this is not an issue concerning only such definitions: it comes up also with cases like "man is a rational animal" - by hearing "rational animal" a layman would not understand what a man is, nor would someone who does not know what "animal" means.<sup>7489</sup> Moreover, since we are dealing with *quid nominis* matters, Marsilius appeals to the way of understanding the *quid nominis* in the common way of speaking, by means of a "convertible description".<sup>7490</sup> It is true - Marsilius says - that these definitions do not notify the *quid nominis* of a term to those who ignore what that term means: for these definitions to notify, the *quid nominis* needs to be already known. However these definitions also *show* (*ostendentes*) the *quid nominis* and they describe it convertibly. This seems to be the key move:

Respondeo quod multi sunt qui bene cognoscunt ex communi usu loquendi quid sit consequens et quae propositio vocatur antecedens, qui tamen nesciunt convertibiliter describere antecedens vel consequens. Unde si hoc ab eis quaeretur, deliberarent sicut unus puer scit quod virum matris suae vocatur ex usu loquendi 'pater', non tamen sciret convertibiliter describere patrem. Et talem definitionem convertibilem manifestat definitio data. Per hoc ad confirmationem, quando dicitur quod oportet ex communi modo loquendi praecognosci quid nominis, concedo; et quando dicitur quod tunc praesciretur quomodo definitiones deberent notificare, nego istud, quia definitiones non solum notificant quid nominis, sed convertibiliter quid nomen significat exprimunt et ostendunt, et hoc non oportet praescire.<sup>7491</sup>

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<sup>7488</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Instantiae et dubitationes' <1.1.2>

<sup>7489</sup> See *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias' <1.1.2>

<sup>7490</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7491</sup> Ibid.: "I answer that many who know well from the ordinary way of speaking what a consequent is and which sentence is called antecedent, who nevertheless cannot describe convertibly the antecedent or the consequent. Therefore, if they are asked this, they would deliberate as a child knows from the way of speaking that his mother's husband is called 'father', but he could not convertibly describe a father. And such convertible

Therefore, the descriptions Marsilius gave of antecedent and consequent (and of the note of illation) are not to be meant as exhaustive definitions nor as guidelines to "make" a *consequentia* - or to decide if what we have in front of us is a *consequentia*, when we do not already know if what we have in front of us is a *consequentia* or not. We are in a similar position to the child in Marsilius' example: on the one hand, when we have a *consequentia* in front of us, the ordinary way of speaking is enough for us to call it a *consequentia*<sup>7492</sup> and we can adequately describe it; but we cannot do much more than that. On the other hand, it is true that *antecedens*, *consequens* and *nota illationis* are relational concepts and, therefore, they can be inter-defined, but we still do not have any information to recognise when a consequence is there, i.e. when a sentence is actually antecedent to another which is its consequent.

If we stay on the descriptive/sentential level, there is no way out of this circularity among *antecedens*, *consequens* and *nota illationis*. Overall, the *quid sit* description lets us point at a *consequentia* which is there and which we know to be there, like the child can point at his father: the description tells us what a *consequentia* looks like, but it does not tell us what a *consequentia* is - we still do not have anything to *notify* that to us.

Marsilius has a threefold way out of this. The first fold is conceptual: there is something that we recognise when we point at a *consequentia*, i.e. the *illatio* or the *habitus sequelae necessariae consequentis ex antecedentis*. For us to be able to define this *illatio* and to see when it is there and when it is not, we need a semantic account of validity (second fold). Finally,

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definition shows clearly the given definition. For confirmation by this, when they say that it behoves someone to foreknow the *quid nominis* from the ordinary way of speaking, I concede this; and when they say that then it is foreknown in what way the definitions would have to notify, this, I deny, because the definitions do not only notify the *quid nominis*, but they express and show convertibly what the name signifies, and this does not have to be foreknown."

<sup>7492</sup> An interesting question to ask would be how the *usus communis loquendi* shapes the "intuitive" or "pre-theoretical" notion of *consequentia* and how this relates to the logical notion treated by Marsilius theory. For reasons of space, here it is not possible to focus on this interesting aspect, which is certainly worth further examination.

Marsilius offers (and proves) a long list of rules helping us to distinguish several cases, and granting several kinds of following.

Then, to get to the core of Marsilius' account of what a *consequentia* is and to see what a *consequentia* is beyond its first description, we should examine how Marsilius conceives this *illatio* (4.2), how he characterises it i.e. his account of validity (4.3), and how *consequentiae* and *conditionales* are related (4.4).

#### 4.2 On the *illatio*

As we have seen, Marsilius introduces the core issue of what actually is a *consequentia* - beneath the descriptive level - in his *quod sit* description of the *nota illationis*. As it has been defined, the *nota illationis* seems to function on two levels: on the grammatical/syntactic one, and as a sign pointing at the illation or expressing that the *illatio* is there, i.e. it says that the consequent actually follows from the antecedent.

Grammatically/syntactically, the *nota illationis* is put between the antecedent and the consequent or before the antecedent - depending on the grammatical/syntactic construction required by the note employed: e.g. *ergo*, *quia* and *igitur* mark as consequent the sentence on their right; *si* marks as antecedent the sentence on its right. By being there, the *nota illationis* "makes" the *oratio* by connecting antecedent and consequent. As we have said, if we stay on this level, we do not get out of the circularity among the definitions of antecedent, consequent and note of illation, and therefore we still do not know much about what a *consequentia* is: we keep being in the dark about whether the antecedent is actually antecedent to the consequent or whether that *oratio* is actually a *consequentia*. Certainly, one could say that any expression structured conformingly to the given *quod sit* description is a *consequentia*, i.e. that being a

*consequentia* is a syntactical property of several kinds of expressions (conditionals, *quia*-sentences, *ergo/igitur*-sentences, derivations, etc.), where one can individuate an antecedent part, a consequent one and a note connecting them. Then she could distinguish between good (*bonae*) and bad (*malae*) *consequentiae* by giving an account of validity granting the following that is there in a *consequentia bona*. However, Marsilius does not go down this road: his theory cannot be open to accept *consequentiae malae qua consequentiae*.

For Marsilius, the *nota illationis* is not simply the grammatical conjunction (or adverb) joining two separate sentences into a single *oratio*: it also signifies that there is a "necessary 'habitude' of following of one sentence from the other",<sup>7493</sup> i.e. it means that there is an *illatio*. This *illatio* is signified by the *nota* and it is expressed by it. And the *illatio* itself is essential to the *consequentia*. Marsilius specifies that a *consequentia* is a derivation (*argumentatio*) and it holds *sub aliqua specie argumentationis*. The *argumentatio* itself requires a *debita probatio* of the conclusion (*consequens*) from the premises (*antecedens*); but you have a *debita probatio* of the *consequens* from the *antecedens* when there is an *illatio necessaria* between them.<sup>7494</sup> In other words:

... ad consequentiam proprie dictam requiritur illatio necessaria [...]. Non enim esset consequentia nisi esset illatio.<sup>7495</sup>

... nihil vocatur proprie consequentia nisi oratio in qua est habitudo necessaria consequentis ex antecedente.<sup>7496</sup>

...iste terminus 'consequentia' connotat necessariam illationem unius propositionis ex alia.<sup>7497</sup>

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<sup>7493</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1. <1>

<sup>7494</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'In oppositum': "Omnis consequentia est argumentatio [...]. ...debita probatio consequentis ex antecedente [...] requiritur ad argumentationem esse bonam, nec e converso in consequentia mala est necessaria illatio; ista tamen requiritur ad omnem argumentationem, quocumque modo etiam acciperetur argumentatio."

<sup>7495</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <2>: "... for a consequence in a proper sense, a necessary illation is required. [...] It would not be a consequence unless it is an illation."

<sup>7496</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <2.1>: "... nothing is properly called *consequentia* except an expression in which there is a necessary habitudo of the consequent from the antecedent."

<sup>7497</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <2.2>: "... this term *consequentia* connotes the necessary illation of one sentences from another."

At its core, the *consequentia* is defined as the *illatio*, therefore - Marsilius argues - if there is no *illatio*, there is no consequence. This is a conclusion that stems directly from such characterisation and that was already partially implicit in the wording of the *quod sit descriptio* of the *nota illationis*, which has to signify "a necessary habitude of following of one sentence from the other". Even without any further articulations about what makes the *illatio* or *habitudinalis*<sup>7498</sup> be there and be necessary, Marsilius has enough to argue in favour of a position that he considers "the common opinion shared by the moderns": there is no such thing as a *consequentia mala*.<sup>7499</sup> That *mala* is a *dictio abstrahens*, which means that it abstracts or removes the terms it applies to from their ordinary meaning.<sup>7500</sup> We talk about "bad consequence" only improperly and *similitudinariae*, but what we are talking about is not a *consequentia* in the proper sense:<sup>7501</sup> all that we are saying, when loosely using this expression, is that there is no necessary illation, i.e. that one sentence does not follow from the other.<sup>7502</sup> So, also the elements put together in an *oratio* which is a *consequentia mala*, are not in any proper sense *antecedens*, *consequens* and *nota illationis*, because there is no necessary following between antecedent and consequent, and the note cannot pick out an

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<sup>7498</sup> The best translation of "habitudinalis" - in this kind of philosophical context - is "relation". On the philosophical and logical uses of *habitus* and *habitudinalis* in the later middle ages, see Foucher - Roques (eds.) [forthcoming]

<sup>7499</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1, 'In oppositum': "Et confirmatur hoc communi opinione modernorum, dicentium consequentiam malam non esse consequentiam, cui concordat ratio quia sicut similitudinariae homo pictus hoc nomine 'homo' significatur, non tamen est homo; ita videtur consequentiam malam similitudinariae nomine consequentiae significari, non tamen esse consequentiam; igitur videtur quod consequentia mala non sit consequentia."

<sup>7500</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <2.2>: "...nam respectu huius additur ly mala et est dictio distrahens a suo principali significato..."

<sup>7501</sup> e.g. *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <2>: "...quia ad consequentiam proprie dictam requiritur illatio necessaria, modo in consequentia mala non est illatio necessaria sicut in consequentia bona, ergo solum similitudinariae et ordinariae ad consequentiam bonam consequentiam malam nominatur consequentia. Consequentia nota est de se. Antecedens pro prima parte notum. Non enim esset consequentia nisi esset illatio. Pro secunda parte patet, quia in consequentia mala consequens non infertur ex antecedente sicut in consequentia bona. Secunda ratio sumitur ex communi modo loquendi, nam communiter quando aliqua mala consequentia proponitur, dicitur quod non sequitur et si non sequitur iuxta communem modum dicendi, tunc non est consequentia. Ergo apparet quod consequentia mala non est consequentia."

<sup>7502</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <2.2>: "iste terminus 'consequentia' connotat necessariam illationem unius propositionis ex alia. Oppositum huius illationis necessariae connotat 'consequentia mala', nam non est aliud dicere consequentiam esse malam quam illationem consequentis ex antecedente non esse necessariam."

illation which is not there, i.e. the *oratio* does not describe any deeper *consequentia* because there is none.<sup>7503</sup>

By limiting *consequentiae*, properly meant, only to *consequentiae bonae*, Marsilius stands in agreement with Albert of Saxony;<sup>7504</sup> but they both are shifting from Buridan's treatment, at least in his *TC*. Buridan presents two alternative opinions on the matter: on the one side, (a) since a *consequentia* is a *propositio hypothetica*, some authors divide *consequentiae* into true and false;<sup>7505</sup> on the other side, (b) others hold that one should speak only of *consequentia vera*.<sup>7506</sup> Buridan seems to consider the whole discussion quite idle, because what we take the term *consequentia* to signify is a matter of *quid nominis* - and names signify conventionally. Therefore, his choice of dealing only with *consequentia vera* in *TC* is not rooted in a matter of

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<sup>7503</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <3>: "Sed secundum istam rationem statim surgit dubitatio, utrum omnis propositio quae praecedit notam illationis, ut 'ergo', sit antecedens, vel aliqua talis sic et aliqua non. Si dicatur primum, tunc statim sequeretur consequentiam malam habere antecedens et per consequens consequentiam malam esse consequentiam - quod est contra dicta. Si dicatur secundum, tunc statim dubitaretur quando propositio praecedens hunc terminum 'ergo' debeat reputari antecedens et quando non, et quomodo debeat hoc cognosci. Si autem aliquis diceret quod antecedens esset propositio praecedens hunc terminum 'ergo' vel huic coniunctioni aequivalentem; responderetur quod numquam, nisi, minus grosse capiendo 'consequentiam', bonam esse consequentiam notificaret - quia consequentiam bonam describeret per hoc quod est oratio habens antecedens et consequens etc. et describeret antecedens quod est propositio quae praecedit li ergo in consequentia bona. Et istae notificationes et declarationes essent grossae et circulares, et ut mihi videtur illud non sufficeret. Et ob hanc causam responderetur ad argumentum seu dubitationem quod aliqua propositio quae praecedit hunc terminum 'ergo' vel aliquam coniunctionem aequivalentem sibi, est antecedens et aliqua non. Et quando petitur quomodo debeat cognosci, quando aliqua propositio est antecedens et quando non, dicitur quod hoc debet considerari penes illationem: si enim illatio fuerit necessaria, tunc talis propositio est antecedens; si autem illatio non fuerit necessaria, tunc talis propositio non dicitur antecedens."

<sup>7504</sup> Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica* IV, 1, 596-8: "Consequentia autem est propositio hypothetica composita ex antecedente et consequente et nota consequentiae significans antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens. Ex quo sequitur, quod omnis consequentia est bona et nulla est consequentia mala. Patet, nam si aliqua propositio condicionalis est, per quam significatur antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens, et si ita est, tunc est consequentia, si autem significatur per eam antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens, et non est ita, tunc non est consequentia ex eo quod non est composita ex antecedente et consequente, eo quod illud, quod designatur esse antecedens non est antecedens ad illud, ad quod designatur esse antecedens, nec reliquum est consequens ad ipsum. Propter quod dico quod non magis est ibi consequentia "Homo currit, ergo homo disputata" quam hic "Adam vel homo mortuus est homo". Sed diceret: Tamen communiter dicimus quod ista consequentia est mala, et ad hoc sequitur quod ipsa est consequentia et non est bona. Respondemus quod per hoc quando dicimus sic intelligimus hoc non esse consequentiam, quamvis tamen hoc exprimamus improprie per istam orationem "Ista consequentia est mala". Et ad istum intellectum amplius intendo uti istis orationibus "Talis consequentia est mala", "Consequentia talis est falsa", "Talis consequentia non valet", etc."

<sup>7505</sup> Buridan, *TC* I.3.4: "Et aliqui dicunt quod omnis propositio talis hypothetica, scilicet coniungens plures propositiones per "si" vel per "ergo", est una consequentia; et tunc consequentia dividitur, quia quaedam est vera et quaedam falsa."

<sup>7506</sup> Buridan, *TC*, 1.3.5: "Alii dicunt quod si sit falsa non debet dici "consequentia", sed solum si sit vera."



principle, but it looks more like an overtly arbitrary expositional choice.<sup>7507</sup> Furthermore, as we have seen, Buridan identifies *consequentia* with a kind of *propositio hypothetica*, and such identification is at the basis of opinion (a), therefore Buridan should be committed to admit that, if stated, a *consequentia falsa* would be a kind of *consequentia* - even if he is not going to talk about such cases. Albert's position appears to be trickier to be held, because he is committed to both the claim that *consequentia* is (at some level) a *propositio hypothetica* and to the claim that, properly speaking, there is no such thing as a *consequentia mala*. But for Marsilius - who, elsewhere, often appeals to the *quid nominis* nature of logical issues -<sup>7508</sup> the rejection of bad consequences qua consequences seems to be a central claim that goes beyond matters of convention: it is a claim that concerns the very nature of what a *consequentia* is and it does not seem to be arbitrary at all. Independently from the way in which the *illatio* is characterised - i.e. independently from the account of validity which is carried out by some theory - there has to be an *illatio* there, an *habitus* which is necessary. In which sense the habitus is necessary is partially a matter of *quid nominis* and partially depends on someone's chosen account of validity.<sup>7509</sup> This *illatio* or *habitus* seems to be something more like a kind of logical entailment relation among sentences in the language, rather than an inferential operation made by a mind or a hypothetical sentence. The antecedent is an antecedent only as long as the consequent is in a relation of necessary following from it; *mutatis mutandis*, for the consequent. The *nota illationis* marks the presence of this relation between the sentences it connects, but it does not seem to be essential for a *consequentia* to be a consequence, just for it to be expressed by an *oratio*. However, the presence of the *nota illationis* might as well be conventional: by inserting a note of illation between antecedent and consequent, one might

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<sup>7507</sup> Buridan, *TC* I.3.6: " Et de hoc non est disputandum, quia nomina significant ad placitum; et sive sic sive non sic, ego in hoc tractatu per hoc nomen "consequentia" volo intelligere consequentiam veram, et per "antecedens" et "consequens" volo intelligere propositiones quarum una sequitur ad aliam vera seu bona consequentia."

<sup>7508</sup> See e.g. Chapter 5

<sup>7509</sup> However, Marsilius seems to take that necessity in a stronger sense than the one underlying to Buridan's account. See §4.3

just be stating an *oratio* or a *propositio* describing the *consequentia*, but as long as the antecedent and the consequent are stated and they are antecedent and consequent to each other, the *consequentia* is going to be there even if nobody is stating it or if no mind is making the inference.<sup>7510</sup>

Overall, for it to be a consequence, some kind of necessary propositional relation has to hold between an antecedent and a consequent. However, we still do not know when such relation holds, nor how to fully characterise it or to recognise it when it is there.

#### 4.3 Quando illatio est necessaria?

After having characterised a *consequentia* as an *illatio* of the consequent from the antecedent - which looks very much like a relation of propositional entailment - and as the kind of properly constructed *oratio* expressing it, Marsilius still has to face another issue: nothing has been said yet about how one is supposed to know when the *illatio* is *necessaria* and when it is not.<sup>7511</sup> This is the heart of the matter; Marsilius recognises it, as he recognises that the optimal way to define the criterion of validity for *consequentiae* is not *faciliter exprimibile*. Therefore, Marsilius proceeds to list and examine five accounts (which I will call V<sub>1</sub>-V<sub>5</sub>) of the necessity of the illation: they are fundamentally semantic accounts of validity. Marsilius shows that V<sub>1</sub>-V<sub>3</sub> lead to accepting some undesirable consequences; he accepts V<sub>4</sub>-V<sub>5</sub>: V<sub>4</sub> is a revised version of V<sub>3</sub> which is able to answer the *rationes* against V<sub>3</sub>. However, Marsilius presents this choice as only *probabiliter* supported and, since we are talking about *quid nominis* matters, he allows his readers to pick whichever side of the fence they like best.<sup>7512</sup> I am going to briefly

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<sup>7510</sup> As Normore [2015] notes, a theory like Buridan's, instead, is going to have a problem of accounting for inferences that cannot be made by any finite mind.

<sup>7511</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 'Ad instantias et dubitationes' <3>: "Sed fortior tunc oritur dubitatio inter omnes, et est quomodo debeat cognosci quando illatio est necessaria et quando non."

<sup>7512</sup> Ibidem: "Ad quam multi diversimode tamen respondent; eligatur aliqua pars melius sibi placens".

present Marsilius' analysis of the positions he rejects, before going through his arguments for the positions he embraces - *probabiliter*.

Those who support  $V_1$  hold that:

tunc illatio est necessaria quando antecedens, retenta significatione terminorum, non potest esse verum nisi consequens sit verum, supposito quod ipsum sit.<sup>7513</sup>

This looks very much like the basic Parvipontanian modal account of validity, which is quite standard.<sup>7514</sup> Marsilius, however, adds a requirement for the consequent to be uttered, in order to block some issues which would come up if one accepts propositional tokenism - as Marsilius himself does -, e.g. since if the sentence does not exist, it cannot be true.

Before Marsilius, Pseudo Scotus, Buridan and Albert of Saxony had already stressed the inadequacy of versions of this account with different arguments.<sup>7515</sup> In Marsilius' reconstruction, supporters of  $V_1$  are thinking of something like Peter of Spain's treatment of the equivalence between good *consequentiae* and true conditionals:<sup>7516</sup> accepting this equivalence - as, in a way, Marsilius himself does -, they conclude that the account for the truth of a conditional is a good account also for the validity of a consequence.

But this position does not hold. If  $V_1$  were an adequate account of the necessity of the illation, then - Marsilius then argues - this would be a good *consequentia*: " $(\alpha)$  omnis propositio est negativa, ergo  $(\beta)$  Deus non est".

$\alpha$  is a contingent sentence: it is possible that all stated sentences are negative; but  $\alpha$  is not possibly true: by being stated, it brings an affirmative sentence into existence. Therefore the

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<sup>7513</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 De illatione necessaria <1>: "then the illation is necessary when the antecedens - maintained the meaning of the terms - cannot be true unless the consequent is true, assuming that it exists."

<sup>7514</sup> See Chapter 3

<sup>7515</sup> Pseudo Scotus, *Super Pr. An.*, I, q. 10; Buridan, *Tr. Cons.* I. ch. 3, 21-2; Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica* IV,1, 590-2. The accounts rejected by Pseudo Scotus, Buridan and Albert of Saxony are in the same line of  $V_1$  but slightly different.

<sup>7516</sup> *Summulae Logicales* I: Tractatus suppositionum, 17: De veritate ypoteticarum: "Ad veritatem conditionalis exigitur quod antecedens non possit esse verum sine consequenti, ut 'si homo est, animal est'. Unde omnis conditionalis vera est necessaria, et omnis conditionalis falsa est impossibilis. Ad falsitatem eius sufficit quod antecedens possit esse sine consequenti, ut 'si Sortes est, album est'."

antecedent will always be false.  $\beta$  is a paradigmatic case of impossibility in Medieval Logic. Therefore, since  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  cannot be true, the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true, and hence " $\alpha$  ERGO  $\beta$ " is a *consequentia bona* for  $V_1$ .

Why would it be inconvenient to take  $V_1$ 's account and hence accept " $\alpha$  ERGO  $\beta$ "? Marsilius' point is that " $\alpha$  ERGO  $\beta$ " cannot be a good consequence because it derives a false consequent from an *antecedens probabile*. We can highlight the issue by thinking about it in a possible-worlds jargon. There is no possible world where - keeping the same signification of the terms -  $\alpha$  is stated and it is true. However there are possible worlds where  $\alpha$  is not stated and therefore it is still false but the state of things described by  $\alpha$  is verified - i.e. there are for example only negative sentences. But there is no possible world where the consequent would be true or where the situation described by it would be verified. Therefore there are some possible worlds where the situation signified by the antecedent is verified and the one described by the consequent is not.

Overall, Marsilius' argument against  $V_1$  deriving the impossible from the possible but possibly true, contests  $V_1$ 's restriction on the existence of sentences but in combination with  $V_1$ 's lack of accounting for the possible verification of what they signify.

$V_2$  holds that:

consequentia bona et necessaria illatio sit quando ex opposito consequentis infertur  
oppositum antecedentis.<sup>7517</sup>

Marsilius does not deny that the (contradictory) opposite of the antecedent follows from the (contradictory) opposite of the consequent: this is the first of his general rules of *consequentiae*.<sup>7518</sup> This principle, which applies to all good *consequentiae*, derives directly from the Law of Non-Contradiction and from the *illatio* itself: if the consequent follows from

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<sup>7517</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 De illatione necessaria <2>: "a consequence is good and the illatio is necessary when the opposite of the antecedent is inferred from the opposite of the consequent."

<sup>7518</sup> *Consequentiae* I.3.1<1>: "... in omni bona consequentia ex opposito consequentis infertur oppositum antecedentis..."

the antecedent, then the illation has this property. However, this does not explain nor characterises the *consequentia* and it is not a good definition: by explaining the same by the same, i.e. the *illatio* by a feature of the *illatio* itself, it begs the question.<sup>7519</sup> In other words, the issue with  $V_2$  taken as definition is of the same sort as the issue that Angel D'Ors extends to any account of consequence:<sup>7520</sup>  $V_2$  is not a good criterion of validity because it does not give you the *proprium* of a *consequentia*, but only a necessary accident.

$V_3$  offers a definition that goes like this:

... antecedens bonae consequentiae est propositio praeposita notae illationis vel sibi apposita sic se habens ad aliam quod impossibile est sic esse qualitercumque est significabile per eam, stante impositione terminorum, quin ita sit sicut qualitercumque significatur per consequens.<sup>7521</sup>

Marsilius considers this definition to be *magis exquisita et elaborata*, presumably because it does not overlook the matter of the realisability of the signification of the sentences involved - as  $V_1$  did -, analogously to what accounts of a "Buridanian" kind and  $V_{4-5}$  (which are fundamentally Buridanian too) do.<sup>7522</sup> Indeed this account looks quite "Buridanian" in a way, and with good reasons: it is - almost verbatim - Albert of Saxony's account.<sup>7523</sup>

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<sup>7519</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 De illatione necessaria <2>

<sup>7520</sup> D'Ors [1993, 196-7]

<sup>7521</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 De illatione necessaria <3>: "... the antecedent is the sentence put before the note of illation or adjacent to it, so standing to the other that it is impossible for things to be whatever way they are signifiable by it, retaining the imposition of term, without tem being in whatever way they are signified by the consequent."

<sup>7522</sup> As put by Normore [2015, 361]: "... Buridan proposes instead a criterion that runs not on truth but on what Hans Herzberger has called 'correspondence'. He claims that in order for a proposition to be true it must be not only that things are as the proposition claims them to be (correspondence), but that the proposition itself exists (what Herzberger calls 'realizability') and that some further semantic conditions be satisfied. On his account the truth of a conditional and the goodness of a *consequentia* (or since it is also a proposition, its truth) requires not that it be impossible for its antecedent to be true and its consequent false but that it be impossible that things be/have been/will be as the antecedent has it and not be as the consequent has it." See also Herzberger [1973]; Read [2002] and [2008].

<sup>7523</sup> Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica* IV, 1, 592-4: "Ergo aliter dicendum est, quod illa propositio dicitur antecedens ad aliam, quae sic se habet ad eam, quod impossibile est, qualitercumque est significabile per eam stante impositione terminorum, sic esse, quin qualitercumque alia significat, sic sit".

However,  $V_3$  is still not sufficient, because it is too permissive and over-generates: according to Marsilius, "it would follow that every bad consequence is a good consequence."<sup>7524</sup>

If we were to accept  $V_3$ 's definition, we would have to take as a good consequence something like: "homo currit, ergo asinus currit". Marsilius explains it like this: since *significabile* is an "extending" term (*dictio ampliativa*), as such it can expand the signification of *homo* to include also the signification of *asinus*, without removing its normal meaning - and hence still conforming to the requirement of *stante impositione terminorum*. Therefore, for  $V_3$  the consequent would follow, since what it signifies can be included within what the antecedent can signify.

Similarly,  $V_3$  would take as a good consequence something like "omnis homo currit, ergo Socrates currit", even when Socrates is dead, because  $V_3$  allows for unrestricted ampliation.

However,  $V_3$ 's definition can be appropriately modified into definition  $V_4$  (and an almost identical  $V_5$ );<sup>7525</sup>  $V_{4-5}$  would stop these problems from being raised - and it is accepted by Marsilius:

... consequentia bona est oratio sic se habens quod impossibile est sic esse qualitercumque per antecedens secundum eius totalem significationem pro nunc significatur sic esse quin ita sit qualitercumque per consequens significatur secundum eius significationem pro nunc, et per consequens antecedens esset propositio sic se habens quod impossibile est esse qualitercumque per eam significatur pro nunc secundum eius totalem significationem, quin ita sit qualitercumque pro nunc per consequens significatur et secundum eius totalem significationem.<sup>7526</sup>

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<sup>7524</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 De illatione necessaria <3>: "... sequeretur quod omnis consequentia mala esset consequentia bona, quod esset inconveniens."

<sup>7525</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 De illatione necessaria <5>: "Alia solutio datur communis quod consequentia bona est consequentia cuius antecedens sic se habet quod impossibile est qualitercumque per ipsum significatur sic esse secundum eius totalem significationem pro nunc, quin ita sit qualitercumque per consequens significatur, secundum eius totalem significationem pro nunc, per ipsum nunc significatur. Et ista definitio consimiliter defendi potest et declarari sicut definitio consequentiae prius posita et haec de definitione consequentiae, sufficient etc." Since this is all Marsilius says about  $V_5$  and since it looks almost identical and certainly equivalent to  $V_4$ , I am going to omit it from my exposition.

<sup>7526</sup> *Consequentiae* I.1 De illatione necessaria <3>: "... a good consequence is an expression s.t. it is impossible for things to be howsoever they are signified to be by the antecedent in accordance with its total signification *pro nunc* without them being howsoever they are signified by the consequent in accordance with its total

Marsilius'  $V_4$  and (in particular)  $V_5$  are very close to Buridan's<sup>7527</sup> and Pseudo Scotus'<sup>7528</sup> chosen accounts, although particularly in  $V_4$ , Marsilius' formulation shows some differences from Buridan's by making some restrictions more explicit. For example, Marsilius explicitly requires that the signification has to be "total" and "pro nunc".

To block  $V_3$ 's (and Albert of Saxony's) issue with the unchecked expansion of the possible meanings of the antecedent and the consequent, in  $V_4$  Marsilius goes from *significabile* - which is ampliative - to the actual total signification of the *antecedens* and the *consequens* - which does not amplifyate - and with a restriction to *pro nunc*.<sup>7529</sup>

With these restrictions,  $V_4$  can answer the objections undermining  $V_3$ . Furthermore, Marsilius also deals with an updated version of the previous objections. Someone might say that  $V_4$  would have to accept ( $\gamma$ ): "homo est et asinus est, ergo homo est asinus" - where the consequent is *simpliciter falsum* - as a good consequence. These opponents would argue that either (a): the consequent signifies only *hominem esse* and *asinum esse*; or (b): that the consequent signifies *hominem esse*, *asinum esse* and *hominem esse asinum*. If (a), then the *antecedens* and the *consequens* would signify the same. But, if (b) then it would be

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signification *pro nunc*; and, consequently, the antecedent is a sentence s.t. it is impossible for things to be howsoever they are signified *pro nunc* in accordance with its total signification, without them being *pro nunc* howsoever they are signified by the consequent in accordance to its total signification."

<sup>7527</sup> Buridan, *Tr. Cons.* I.3, 22: "Ideo alii aliter diffiniunt, dicentes quod illa propositio est antecedens ad aliam quae sic se habet ad illam quod impossibile est qualitercumque ipsa significat sic esse quin qualitercumque illa alia significat sic sit ipsis simul propositis. Tamen adhuc illa descriptio non est vera de virtute sermonis, quia supponit quod omnis propositio vera ex eo sit vera quia qualitercumque significat ita est, quod prius negatum est. Tamen dictum fuit quod hoc modo loquendi uteremur ad sensum prius datum; ideo sic illam descriptionem concedemus. Immo etiam saepe feste improbatam, quia ipsa in paucis consequentiis habet instantiam. Tamen quocumque modo loquendi uteremur nos intendemus sensum praetactum."

<sup>7528</sup> Pseudo Scotus, *Super Pr. An.* I, q. 10: "Dico igitur, quod ad bonitatem consequentiae requiritur et sufficit ultimus modus, scilicet impossibile est, antecedente and consequente simul formati, quod antecedens sit verum et consequens falsum, excepto uno casu, scilicet ubi significatum consequentis repugnat significationi notae consequentiae sicut coniunctionis quae denotat consequentiam esse....". Pseudo Scotus' formulation seems to be different, since he does not refer explicitly and systematically to the signification of antecedent and consequent. However he does so in his previous arguments and he appeals to the compatibility between the meaning of the consequent and the signification of the *nota consequentiae*, therefore we can assume that this is a difference in the phrasing, but not a deep disagreement in the theory. Where Pseudo Scotus differentiates from Buridan is in the addition of the exception - addition which is not in Buridan's account intended to block some problematic inferences that could be derived by Buridan's account. See e.g. Boh [1982]

<sup>7529</sup> In the light of Marsilius' rejection of material *consequentiae ut nunc* (see *Cons.* I.2), this *pro nunc* should not be equated to *ut nunc* nor translated as "as of now". I take it to mean something like "for the exact time signified by the copula".

inconvenient: since *hominem esse asinum* "is nothing nor it can be anything", according to them it cannot signify either.

Marsilius offers two possible answers in defence of  $V_4$ . The first one - which he rejects - denies that  $(\gamma)$  is a good consequence in  $V_4$  by accepting that the consequent signifies *hominem esse asinum* and denying that this is nothing: rather, it would be a *complexe significabile*.

Marsilius, following the Buridanian rejection of *complexe significabilia*, deems this theory to be false and insufficient, and he offers a second answer which does without it but, interestingly, appeals to *imaginabilia*.<sup>7530</sup> His first step is to reject (a): if (a) were the case, then the antecedent and the consequent would indeed signify the same thing and there would not be any way out of accepting  $(\gamma)$ . Then he makes clear that the total signification of the consequent is but *hominem esse asinum*; against the first counter-objection in favour of  $V_4$ , Marsilius accepts that *hominem esse asinum* is nothing and that it cannot be anything: there is no such thing as a *complexe significabile*. What he rejects is the objector's inference to the conclusion that, then, *homo esse asinum* does not signify. It signifies just fine: for it to signify it is enough that it is imaginable (*possit imaginari*).<sup>7531</sup> For a sentence to have signification this signification does not have to be naturally possible,<sup>7532</sup> because *intellectus extendit se ad imaginabilia*. Therefore, the consequent in  $(\gamma)$  does signify, but it does not signify the same as the antecedent nor from the antecedent's total signification *pro nunc* follows the consequent's total signification *pro nunc*. Therefore the argument against  $V_4$  fails and  $V_4$  (as  $V_5$  as well) stands as Marsilius' account of choice for the necessity of the illation.

As I said, Marsilius' chosen account of validity is fundamentally "Buridanian" in spirit: it runs on a definition of good following that appeals to modal notions as the "standard"

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<sup>7530</sup> See Chapter 5

<sup>7531</sup> In this, Marsilius is going against Buridan on a major feature of signification and of the supposition of empty terms. See among many other occurrences e.g. Buridan *TC* 1.5.4: "Unde has reputo falsas: 'Chimaera est intelligibilis', 'Chimaera est opinabilis', 'Chimaera significatur per hoc nomen 'chimaera'"."

<sup>7532</sup> If it can include logical contradictions is an interesting question that I cannot explore here.



Parvipontanian account did, but it adds some further restrictions - analogous to those imposed by Buridan -, blocking some problematic cases.

As it is the case with Buridan's *TC* - and with Albert's *Perutilis logica* IV -, much of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* "is an articulation of this criterion",<sup>7533</sup> and it is also an articulation that, for some major developments, does not seem to diverge too much from Buridan's and Albert of Saxony's. For example, both Albert and Marsilius should embrace what Normore calls "Buridan's Meta-argument".<sup>7534</sup>

This Meta-argument explicitly supports two claims and it clearly implies a third one:

- (Met<sub>1</sub>): adding a necessary truth to the antecedent does not change the strength of the following, i.e. that the antecedent follows from the antecedent alone;<sup>7535</sup>

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<sup>7533</sup> Normore [2015, 365]

<sup>7534</sup> Normore [2015, 365-7]

<sup>7535</sup> Buridan *TC* I.8.29-31, concl. 6: "Sexta conclusio est: Ad quamcumque propositionem cum aliqua necessaria sibi apposita vel aliquibus necessariis sibi appositis sequitur aliqua conclusio ad eandem propositionem solam sequitur eadem conclusio, sine appositione illius necessariae vel illarum necessariarum. Probatio. Quia sit A propositio ad quam cum multis necessariis sibi appositis sequitur conclusio B; dico quod ad A sequitur B. Quia si B sequatur ad illas necessarias sine A, tunc ipsa est necessaria, ideo sequitur ad quamlibet. Si vero B non sequatur ad illas necessarias sine A, tunc vel A est impossibilis, et sic ad eam sequitur quaelibet, vel A est possibilis. Et tunc vel impossibile est A stante non stare B, et sic adhuc ad A sequitur B, vel possibile est A stante non stare B. Et si hoc ponat adversarius, tunc, quia non potest A stare quin simul stent omnes necessariae, sequitur quod possibile est A stante cum omnibus necessariis non stare B. Ergo B non sequitur ad A cum quibusdam necessariis sibi appositis, quod est contra positum. Et eodem modo dicerem quod: Ad quamcumque propositionem cum multis veris appositis vel cum aliqua vera apposite sequitur aliqua conclusio ad eandem propositionem solam sequitur eadem conclusio consequentia ut nunc, sed non consequentia simplici. Et hoc probaretur proportionaliter sicut conclusio principalis."; Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica* IV, ch. 2, r. 7 p. 614-6: "Septima regula: Si ad A cum aliqua necessaria sibi apposita veli aliquibus necessariis sibi appositis sequitur B, tunc B sequitur ad A solum. Probatur, nam vel B est necessarium vel non est necessarium. Si est necessarium, tunc sequitur ad A solum per secundam regulam, quia necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet. Si autem B non est necessarium, vel ergo A est possibile vel impossibile. Si dicitur quod A sit impossibile, tunc iterum ad A solum sequitur B, sicut sequitur ad A cum necessaria sibi apposita per primam regulam, scilicet 'Ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet'. Si autem dicitur quod A sit possibile, tunc vel stante A impossibile est B non stare vel stante A possibile est B non stare. Si primum, tunc ad A solum sequitur B, sicut sequitur ad A cum aliqua necessaria sibi apposita, per quid nominis antecedentis et consequentis. Si autem dicitur, quod stante A possibile est B non stare, ergo stante A necesse est stare A et necessarium sibi appositum, cum impossibile sit necessarium non stare et cum impossibile sit A stante A non stare. Et per consequens ad A stare seu ad sic esse sicut significatur per A, necesse est sic esse, sicut significatur per A et necessarium sibi appositum. Ergo ad A sequitur A cum necessaria sibi apposita, et cum ad A et necessariam sibi appositam sequatur B per positum, sequitur per primam partem quintae regulae quod ad A solum sequitur B, quod erat probandum. Erat enim prima pars quintae regulae 'Quicquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad antecedens'. Ex ista regula sequitur, quod sicut ad istam 'Sortes est homo' una cum aliqua necessaria sibi apposita sequitur ista "Sortes est animal", ita ad istam solam 'Sortes est homo' sequitur ista 'Sortes est animal'."; Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.3.2 <9|5>: "Nona regula est haec: si ad aliquam propositionem cum una necessaria copulativae adiuncta sequitur alia, ista eadem sequitur ad eandem propositionem sine illa necessaria sibi adiuncta. Declaratur, quia vel consequens quod sequitur est necessarium, vel non. Et si sic, tunc sequitur ad quamlibet propositionem, ut patet per sextam regulam. Si non est necessaria, tunc quaeritur de ista propositionem ex qua cum ista necessaria inferebatur, utrum ea stante semper

- (Met<sub>2</sub>): Anything follows formally from a contradiction;<sup>7536</sup>
- (Met<sub>3</sub>): If one is committed to Met<sub>1-2</sub>, then she is committed also to accept that anything follows from an impossibility with the same strength with which anything follows from a contradiction.

I say that Marsilius and Albert "should" embrace Met because, whereas Buridan presents Met<sub>1-2</sub> next to each other, as a block (between *conclusio* 6 and 7 in *TC* I.8), Albert and Marsilius do not give an analogously unitary presentation, but they reach similar enough conclusions to be bound to accept Met<sub>3</sub>.

In Buridan's, Albert's and Marsilius' versions, the structure of Met<sub>1</sub> is quite similar and runs on the rules *ex impossibili* and *ad necessarium*, which all of them had perviously stated and

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stat alia; et si sic, tunc alia sequitur ad ipsam. Ergo regula est vera. Vel ipsa potest stare alia non stante; et hoc est impossibile, quia ea stante semper stat alia necessaria, et ex consequenti cum illa alia sequitur ad eandem sumptam cum alia necessaria. Sequitur quod alia semper stat stante prima propositione ex qua cum ista necessaria alia inferebatur. Exemplum huius potest poni hoc: ut si sequatur 'omnis homo est risibilis, Sortes est homo, ergo Sortes est risibilis'; ubi ista 'Sortes es risibilis' infertur ex illa 'Sortes est homo', coassumpta ista necessaria 'omnis homo est risibilis', quia manifestum est quod ista stante 'Sortes est homo' vel semper simul oportet stare 'Sortes est risibilis' - et si sic tunc sequitur ad istam solam 'Sortes est homo' ista 'Sortes est risibilis', quod est propositum - vel quandoque sine illa potest stare. Et hoc non, quia manifestum est quod ista 'Sortes est homo' stante, semper stat ista necessaria 'omnis homo est risibilis', quia illa est necessaria et ex consequenti semper stat cum qualibet vera et cum ista necessaria et ista 'Sortes est homo' semper stat quod Sortes est risibilis, quia ipsa sequitur ad illam quod est regula".

<sup>7536</sup> John Buridan, *TC* I.8. concl. 7: "Septima conclusio est: Ad omnem propositionem copulativam ex duabus invicem contradictorius constitutam sequi quamlibet aliam, etiam consequentia formali. Ex dictis statim patet quod ad talem, immo etiam ad omnem implicantem contradictionem, sequitur quaelibet, quia omnis talis est impossibilis. Sed oportet videre quomodo hoc sit consequentia formali. Dico ergo quod ad istam copulativam: 'Omne B est A et quoddam B non est A' sequitur quaelibet, et eodem modo in quibuscumque terminis talis consequentia formetur. Probatio. Pono, gratia exempli, quod sequatur: 'Omne B est A et quoddam B non est A; ergo baculus stat in angulo.' Quia sequitur: 'Omne B est A et quoddam B non est A; ergo omne B est A', quia ad copulativam sequitur quaelibet eius pars. Deinde sequitur: 'Omne B est A; ergo omne B est A vel baculus stat in angulo', quia ad quamlibet sequitur ipsamet sub disiunctione ad quamlibet aliam. Tunc ex ista et secunda parte primi antecedentis arguam sic: 'Omne B est A vel baculus stat in angulo; et quoddam B non est A; ergo baculus stat in angulo'. Et iste syllogismus tenet per locum a divisione, quia duobus positus sub disiunctione si alterum interimatur reliquum concludetur. Ergo, de primo ad ultimum, ex primo antecedente sequebatur dicta conclusio, quia quidquid sequitur ad consequens sequitur ad antecedens. Et propter talem deductionem aliqui crediderunt quod esset consequentia formalis: 'Tantum pater est; ergo baculus stat in angulo'. Sed hoc non est verum, quia in aliis terminis dicta forma nihil valet, ut: 'Tantum deus est; ergo asinus stat in stabulo'. Nec est verum quod illi dicebant. Dicebant enim istas consequentias esse formales: 'Tantum pater est; ergo filius est', et iterum: 'Filius est; ergo non tantum pater est'. Et neutra est formalis, quia instatur in aliis terminis; non enim sequitur: 'Tantum deus est; ergo asinus est', nec sequitur: 'Ens est; ergo non tantum unum est'."

Met<sub>2</sub> is commonly referred to as the Principle of Pseudo-Scotus, and nowadays as Lewis' Argument; it is basically the same argument advanced by Alexander Neckham against Abelard, identified by Martin as "William's Machine". See Martin [1986]; see also Normore [2015, 366]

proven on the basis of their definitions of *consequentia* and their accounts of validity.<sup>7537</sup> If you take the connection between antecedent and consequent to be necessary in  $V_3$ 's or in  $V_4$ 's sense, then any consequent will necessarily follow from an impossible antecedent, because it can never be the case that things are as the antecedent signifies them to be, and hence it is impossible for things to be as the antecedent signifies them to be while they are not as the consequent signifies them to be.

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<sup>7537</sup> John Buridan, *TC* I.8 concl. 1: "Prima conclusio est: Ad omnem propositionem impossibilem omnem aliam sequi et omnem propositionem necessariam ad omnem aliam sequi. Haec conclusio patet per quid nominis antecedentis et consequentis. Quia impossibile est aliquam propositionem impossibilem esse veram, vel etiam qualitercumque ipsa significat ita esse. Ergo impossibile est qualitercumque ipsa significat ita esse non existente qualitercumque quaelibet alia significat. Similiter, omnem <propositionem> necessariam impossibile est non esse qualitercumque ipsa significat. Ergo impossibile est non esse qualitercumque significat existente qualitercumque alia significat. Et est notandum quod de consequentia ut nunc modo proportionali ponenda est conclusio, scilicet quod: Ad omnem propositionem falsam omnis alia sequitur consequentia ut nunc et omnis vera ad omnem aliam sequitur etiam consequentia ut nunc. Quia impossibile est rebus se habentibus ut nunc propositionem quae est vera non esse veram. Ideo nec possibile est ipsam non esse veram qualibet alia existente vera." (see also e.g. *TC* I.4.11); Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis logica* IV.2 r. 1-2, 604-606: "Quantum ad secundum restat ponere regulas circa consequentias simplices, quarum prima est ista: Ad propositionem impossibilem sequitur qualibet alia. Probatur ex quid nominis antecedentis et consequentis posito in primo capitulo, nam aliqua propositione existente impossibili impossibile est sic esse, sicut ipsa significat non existente sic, sicut alia propositio significat. Ergo propositio impossibilis est antecedens ad quamcumque aliam propositionem, et per consequens ad propositionem impossibilem sequitur quaecumque alia, et hoc est, quod communiter solet dici 'Ad impossibilem sequitur quodlibet'. Ideo sequitur 'Homo est asinus, ergo homo currit', nam ex quo antecedens est impossibile, ergo non existente sic, sicut significat consequens, impossibile est si esse, sicut significat antecedens. Secunda regula: Ad quamlibet propositionem sequitur propositio necessaria. Probatur iterum per quid nominis antecedentis et consequentis, nam impossibile est non esse sic, sicut significat propositio necessaria, ergo etiam impossibile est non esse sic, sicut significat propositio necessaria existente sic, sicut significat quaecumque alia. Et per consequens propositio necessaria consequens est ad quamcumque aliam. Ex quo sequitur istam consequentiam esse bonam 'Homo currit, ergo asinus est animal' vel 'Homo currit, ergo deus est', supponendo cum Aristotele, quod haec est necessaria 'Asinus est animal.'; Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* 1.3.2 <5|1>-<6|2>: "Consequenter, videndum est de regulis quae vocantur generales - non tamen conveniunt omnibus consequentiis - quarum prima est haec (et quinta in ordine): quod omnis consequentia cuius antecedens est simpliciter impossibile, est bona. Ista probatur ex descriptione bonae consequentiae prius posita, quia impossibile est qualitercumque pro nunc significatur per antecedens secundum eius totalem significationem sic esse, quin ita sit sicut significatur per consequens secundum eius totalem significationem, quodcumque sit illud, ergo consequentia est bona. Consequentia tenet per definitionem bonae consequentiae. Et antecedens patet, quia cum antecedens supponitur esse impossibile; impossibile est sic esse qualitercumque pro nunc significatur per ipsum antecedens et per consequens impossibile est sic esse qualitercumque per ipsum significatur pro nunc, quin ita sit sicut per quamlibet aliam propositionem significatur. Haec regula etiam aliter probatur in regulis generalibus. Sexta regula est haec: quod omnis consequentia cuius consequens est simpliciter necessarium, est bona. Et hoc solet dici sub istis verbis: "necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet". Probatur in omni tali consequentia: ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis, ergo omnis talis consequentia est bona. Consequentia tenet per primam regulam. Antecedens patet, quia cum consequens talis consequentiae sit necessarium, suum contradictorium est simpliciter impossibile. Consequentia est nota de se. Et tunc ex isto sequitur oppositum antecedentis per regulam praecedentem, quia quidquid ex eo infertur, sequitur ad ipsum in consequentia bona. Exemplum primae regulae: 'Deus non est, ergo homo est asinus'. Exemplum secundae regulae: 'baculus stat in angulo, ergo causa prima est'. Dixi notanter in ipsis regulis de impossibili simpliciter et de necessario simpliciter, quia quidam loici dicunt propositionem de praeterito veram esse necessariam et falsam esse impossibilem. Si autem istud sit verum, tunc adminus manifestum est quod tales non sunt necessariae nec impossibiles simpliciter, quia non non pro quolibet tempore sunt necessariae vel impossibiles. Et ideo locutus sum de necessario simpliciter et de impossibile simpliciter."

Buridan and Albert go on to prove Met<sub>2</sub> immediately after Met<sub>1</sub>.<sup>7538</sup> What Met<sub>2</sub> proves is that from any contradiction anything follows formally, i.e. that from an antecedent constituted by two contradictory sentences taken conjunctively, any consequent follows by a formal *consequentia*. The idea of formal following that is at play here, is - roughly - that of a following holding independently of the meaning of the categorematic terms involved, but in virtue of the formal structure of the *consequentia*; therefore such *consequentia* will hold through any uniform variation of the categorematic terms, insofar as its formal structure - given by all the syncategorematic features - stays the same.<sup>7539</sup> This account of formality is shared by all

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<sup>7538</sup> Buridan, TC I.8 concl. 7 (see above); Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica* IV, 2, r. 8, 616-8: "Octava regula: Quaelibet consequentia talis est formalis 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, ergo baculus stat in angulo'. Probatur, nam sequitur in consequentia formali 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, ergo Sortes est' a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem. Similiter sequitur 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, ergo Sortes non est', iterum a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem. Et ultra sequitur 'Sortes est, ergo Sortes est vel baculus stat in angulo'. Ista consequentia tenet, nam quaelibet propositio infert unam disiunctivam formaliter, cuius ipsa est pars. Et tunc ultra 'Sortes est vel baculus stat in angulo', sed per secundam partem praedictae copulativae Sortes non est, ergo baculus stat in angulo. Ista consequentia tenet, nam a disiunctiva cum destructione unius eius partis ad alteram partem est consequentia formalis, quia omnis propositio sibi similis in forma, si formaretur, esset consequentia bona. Ista regula solet poni sub his verbis 'Ad omnem copulativam ex duabus contradictoriis compositam sequitur quaelibet alia in consequentia formali'."

<sup>7539</sup> See e.g. John Buridan *TC* I.4: "Consequentia 'formalis' vocatur quae in omnibus terminis valet retenta forma consimili. Vel si vis expresse loqui de vi sermonis, consequentia formalis est cui omnis propositio similis in forma quae formaretur esset bona consequentia, ut: 'Quod est A est B; ergo quod est B est A'. Sed consequentia materialis est cui non omnis propositio consimilis in forma <quae formaretur> esset bona consequentia, vel, sicut communiter dicitur, quae non tenet in omnibus terminis forma consimili retenta; verbi gratia: 'Homo currit; ergo animal currit', quia in his terminis non valet: 'Equus ambulat; ergo lignum ambulat'."; Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica* IV.1, 598-602: "Consequentia formalis dicitur illa, cui omnis propositio similis in forma, quae si formaretur, esset bona consequentia, ut hic 'quoddam B est A, ergo quoddam A est B'. [...]Et prout hic loquitur de forma et de materia, per materiam propositionis vel consequentiae intelligitur termini pure categorematici, ut sunt subiecta et praedicata circumscriptis syncategorematicibus sibi appositis, per quae ipsa coniunguntur aut distribuuntur aut ad certum modum suppositionis trahuntur. Sed ad formam dicitur pertinere totum residuum, videlicet copulae tam categoricarum quam hypotheticarum, similiter negationes et signa et ordo dictionum ad invicem et modi significandi pertinentes ad quantitatem propositionis, ut est discretio et communitas etc. Verbi gratia de praedictis, propter diversas copulas modalium et de inesse propositiones modales dicuntur esse alterius formae quam affirmativae, et similiter propropositiones particulares dicuntur esse alterius formae ab universalibus. Et propter communitatem ad discretionem terminorum propositiones singulares dicuntur esse alterius formae a propositionibus indefinitis. Propter diversum autem ordinem istae sunt diversae formae 'Omnis homo est animal' et 'Animal est omnis homo', et similiter istae consequentiae 'Omne B est A, ergo quoddam A est B' et 'Omne B est A, ergo quoddam B est A'. Item propter relationem istae sunt diversae formae 'Homo currit et homo non currit', 'Homo currit et ipse non currit', propter quod secunda ex sua forma est impossibilis, prima vero non."; Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.2 <1>: "Consequentia formalis est quae tenet in omnibus terminis et quibuscumque qualitercumque dispositis, retenta consimili forma propositionum. Exemplum ut talis syllogismus: 'omne quod est a est b, omne quod est c est a, ergo omne quod est c est b'. Forma autem consimilis propositionum est quando respectu eiusdem copulae propositiones sunt eiusdem qualitatis et quantitatis. Et dicitur notanter "respectu eiusdem copulae", quia si copula variatur - esto quod maneret eadem qualitas et quantitas -, non maneret eadem forma, ut istae non sint eiusdem formae - sicut istae: 'Sortes potest esse' et 'Sortes est'; sed ist 'nullus homo est asinus' et 'nullus deus est diabolus' sunt eiusdem formae, nam ibi est eadem quantitas et qualitas et eadem copula. Unde tria sunt in propositione se tenenda ex parte formae, puta ipsa copula, qualitas et quantitas." Marsilius' use of *dispositis* is analogous to the use that later on e.g. Paul of

Parisian authors and it is considered one of the main characterising features of the Continental tradition on *consequentiae* in contrast with the English tradition. For authors belonging to the latter, a *consequentia* is formal iff there is some sort of relation of either semantic or epistemic containment of the consequent within the antecedent, i.e. a formal consequence is grounded on a relation of meaning among the significative terms involved.<sup>7540</sup> Therefore, for them, cases like the following of anything from a contradiction or of a formally necessary truth from anything are only materially valid.

One of the features of Parisian formal consequences, e.g. as Marsilius remarks explicitly, is that the consequent can be derived from the antecedent by means of exclusively formal passages, i.e. a formal consequence can be proven by means of other intermediate formal consequences.<sup>7541</sup> Buridan's, Albert's, and Marsilius' proofs of  $Met_2$  run on formally good inference rules holding from a copulative sentence to any of its parts and from a given sentence to a disjunction of which that sentence constitutes one of the disjuncts.

In his exposition of  $Met_2$ , Marsilius proceeds differently, but in the end his account gets to the same results: in his section on the general rules applying to all kinds of *consequentiae*, after giving his version of  $Met_1$  in Rule 9, in Rule 10 he goes on to claim that any *consequentia* whose antecedent is constituted from two contradictory sentences is a good consequence because its antecedent is impossible, without any claim about its formality yet.<sup>7542</sup> Marsilius' Rule 10 holds simply because of Rules 5 and 6, and on Rule 1 (the Law of Non Contradiction): all Rule 10 is claiming is simply that, since the antecedent is a contradiction, then the

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Venice will make of *ordinatis* to refer to the respective topical relations holding among the categorematic terms; therefore, Marsilius is simply saying that a formal consequence holds independently of any topical relations that might or might not be subsisting among the terms.

<sup>7540</sup> See Chapter 3

<sup>7541</sup> See e.g. Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.3.3 <9>: "... omnis ista consequentia est formalis in qua exposito antecedenti potest deduci suum consequens vel consequentias intermedias formales nullo extrinseco coassumpto."

<sup>7542</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.3.2 <10|6>: "Decima regula est haec: omnis consequentia cuius antecedens est propositio copulativa composita ex partibus contradicentibus principalibus est necessaria. Probatur, quia eius antecedens est impossibile, igitur consequentia est bona. Consequentia tenet per quintam regulam. Antecedens patet, quia omnis copulativa est impossibilis quae componitur ex partibus contradicentibus."

antecedent is impossible, and therefore any consequent follows in a valid following. Yet Rule 10 makes no claim about such following being formal, nor about the following from a formal contradiction having the same strength as a following from a non-formal impossibility (Met<sub>3</sub>). However Marsilius does make the claim that any consequent follows formally from a contradiction, but he does so later on, in his rules for formal *consequentiae* (Rule f9).<sup>7543</sup> Marsilius' proof of Rule f9 runs exactly like Buridan's and Albert's proofs of Met<sub>2</sub>. Its displacement seems to be due only to expositional reasons: Marsilius' *Consequentiae* is structured more as a teaching handbook than Albert's and Buridan's treatises are, and in this kind of exposition it makes more systematic sense to insert Met<sub>2</sub> among the specific rules for formal consequences and after the rules its proof appeals to (Rule f1<sup>7544</sup> and Rule f2<sup>7545</sup>).

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<sup>7543</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.3.3 <9>: "Nona regula est haec: quod ex formaliter impossibili - sicut ex copulativa composita ex partibus contradicentibus - formaliter sequitur quodlibet consequens. Per probationem, supponitur quod omnis ista consequentia est formalis in qua ex posito antecedenti potest deduci suum consequens vel consequentias intermedias formales nullo extrinseco coassumpto. Patet, quia sic probat Philosophus <in> *Primo Priorum* syllogismos imperfectos esse formales. Ex hoc probatur regula quia ex copulativa composita de partibus contradicentibus sequitur formaliter copulativa cuius prima pars est una disiunctiva composita ex prima parte sua et ex consequente ex ea illata; et secunda pars est secunda pars sui. Sit per probationem haec consequentia copulativa: 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, igitur a est'; sequitur formaliter: 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, igitur Sortes est vel a est et Sortes non est', quia prima pars copulativae illatae sequitur formaliter ad primam partem copulativae inferentis; secunda sequitur formaliter ad secundam, igitur tota copulativa sequitur formaliter ad totam copulativam. Tenet consequentia. Et prima pars antecedentis patet, quia sequitur formaliter: 'Sortes est, igitur Sortes est vel a est', quia a parte disiunctae ad totam disiunctivam per secundam regula huius capituli. Et secunda pars patet, quia eadem pars est secunda pars inferentis et illatae. Modo in copulativa illata sequitur formaliter consequens illatum ex prima copulativa, quia haec est argumentum a tota disiunctiva cum contradictorio unius partis, per quartam regulam, sicut: 'Sortes est vel a est, sed Sortes non est, igitur a est', per quartam regulam praedictam. Ergo de prima ad ultimam est consequentia formalis per supponentem arguendo sic: 'Sortes est et Sortes non est, igitur a est', quod erat probandum. Similiter arguitur in qualibet huiusmodi, igitur etc."

<sup>7544</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.3.3 <1>: "... arguendo a tota copulativa ad quamlibet eius partem principalem est consequentia bona et formalis. Exemplum ut 'a est et b est, ergo a est'. Consequentia est bona. Probatur regula: impossibile est qualitercumque per antecedens significatur sic esse quin ita sit sicut per consequens talis consequentiae significatur. Et cum haec tenet in omnibus terminis qualitercumque dispositis, ergo sequitur quod talis consequentia est bona et formalis. Tenet consequentia per definitionem bonae consequentiae et formalis. Antecedens declaratur, quia ad veritatem copulativae requiritur sic esse qualitercumque per utramque partem principalem pro nunc secundum eius totalem significationem significatur. Modo non potest ita esse qualitercumque per utramque partem principalem significatur secundum eius totalem significationem, nisi ita esset sicut per primam eius partem secundum eius totalem significationem significatur et nisi ita esset sicut per secundam partem eius principalem pro nunc secundum eius totalem significationem significatur. Ergo regula est simpliciter vera. Non enim potest ita esse sicut per antecedens significatur secundum eius totalem significationem nisi ita sit sicut per eius consequens significatur etc.. Quod fuit probandum. Et etiam teneat in omnibus terminis; patet quia in nullis reperitur instantia - consimili forma in omnibus terminis retenta."

<sup>7545</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.3.3 <2>: "Secunda regula est haec: ab una parte disiunctivae principali ad totam disiunctivam est consequentia bona et formalis. Ut: 'homo currit, ergo homo currit vel homo est asinus'. Pro declaratione regulae supponitur quod disiunctiva et copulativa compositae ex partibus

In the same conclusion where he proves  $Met_2$ , Buridan then goes on to show that any *consequentia* having an impossible sentence as its antecedent can be reduced to a formally valid *consequentia* by adding to the antecedent a necessary sentence, which will be the contradictory opposite of the impossible premise.<sup>7546</sup> An analogous process can be applied to a *consequentia ut nunc* with a false antecedent (*ex falso*): such *consequentia* can be reduced to a formal one by conjoining the false antecedent and its contradictory opposite, which is a true sentence.<sup>7547</sup> Albert of Saxony offers a similar reduction of simple material consequences to formal ones by means of the addition of a necessary sentence to the antecedent,<sup>7548</sup> and, analogously, a material consequence as of now can be reduced to a formal one by adding a true sentence to the antecedent.<sup>7549</sup> Whereas Buridan and Albert add these specifications about the reducibility of a *consequentia materialis* to a formal one already in their definitions, Marsilius does not; furthermore he does not speak at all about reducing a material consequence to a formal one. But, in Buridan and Albert, such reduction is per se only a tool to show more clearly the validity of a material consequence: it does not add anything to the

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contradicientibus contradicunt, ut istae contradicunt: 'Deus est vel homo est asinus', et 'nullus Deus est et nullus homo est asinus'. Ista est bona regula communis loicorum, et ideo hoc supponitur. Alibi declarabitur. Qua suppositione praemissa probatur regula in omni consequentia in qua arguitur a parte disiunctivae principali ad totam disiunctivam est consequentia sic se habens quod ex opposito consequentis formaliter infertur oppositum antecedentis. Igitur omnis talis consequentia est bona et formalis. Consequentia tenet per primam regulam. Et antecedens declaratur, nam si sit ista consequentia proposita: 'homo currit, igitur homo currit vel homo est asinus', et declaratur per suppositionem oppositum consequentis - scilicet copulativa de partibus contradicientibus, ut 'nullus homo currit et nullus homo est asinus' -, tunc sequitur per praecedentem regulam formaliter: 'ergo nullus homo currit', quia arguitur a copulativa ad partem principalem. Ergo sequitur quod ex opposito consequentis sequitur formaliter oppositum antecedentis. Quod fuit probandum. Dico notanter in praedictis duabus regulis quod "arguendo a parte principali ad partem principalem", quia si non arguitur a parte principali ad partem principalem, sed a minus principali ad minus principalem, non haberent regulae veritatem. Exemplum, ut si argueretur a parte minus principali disiunctivae ad totam disiunctivam, sicut 'homo est asinus, ergo homo est asinus et deus est vel homo non est asinus', constat quod consequentia non valeret. Proportionaliter est arguendo a copulativa ad quamlibet eius partem principalem."

<sup>7546</sup> John Buridan, *TC* I.8 concl. 7: "Item, ex dicta conclusione apparet quomodo omnis consequentia ex antecedente impossibili reducat ad consequentiam formalem per additionem alicuius necessariae. Quia si antecedens est impossibile, suum contradictorium est necessarium, quo sibi addito erit consequentia formalis ad quodlibet, ut dictum est. Ideo manifestum est illud quod aliqui mirantur, scilicet quomodo declaretur haec consequentia: 'Nihil est; ergo asinus currit'. Et ego dico quod <sic> declaratur: quia haec est necessaria 'aliquid est', ex qua cum praecedente sequitur propositum. Et est sicut de hac consequentia: 'Asinus currit; ergo asinus movetur'. Quare enim sequitur? Quia haec est necessaria 'omne currens movetur' (uel saltem haec est necessaria 'Si aliquid currit, omne currens movetur') qua apposita antecedenti consequentia est manifesta et formalis."

<sup>7547</sup> *ibid.*: "Et ita etiam manifestum est quod omnis consequentia ut nunc ex antecedente falso reducit ad consequentiam formalem per additionem alicuius verae, scilicet contradicentis illi antecedenti..."

<sup>7548</sup> e.g. Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis Logica* IV.2.1, 602

<sup>7549</sup> *ibid.*

*consequentia* itself nor to its strength and it derives from the definition of validity as it is shown in Met<sub>1</sub>. Then, Marsilius might not be adding any specifications about such reduction in his definition of *consequentia materialis* simply because it does not add anything to the definition and it is not a definitional matter.

It is evident that, even if they are not stating it explicitly, Albert and Buridan are bound to accept Met<sub>3</sub>. They take the reduction of a non-formal consequence to a formal one, by means of the addition of an appropriately selected premise, as a confirmation of the validity of the first non-formal consequence; analogously, for them Met<sub>3</sub> is a confirmation of the *ex impossibili* (and of the *ex falso* in the *ut nunc* case) by means of a simple proof.<sup>7550</sup> But Met<sub>3</sub> is also mainly an expression of the strength of the following being the same in formally and non-formally good consequences.

Angel d'Ors argues that, in Buridan's proof, Met<sub>1</sub> follows from the *ex impossibili/ad necessarium*: this is explicit in Buridan's argument as well as in Albert's and Marsilius'. D'Ors continues: since they are interdependent claims, Met<sub>1</sub> should then not be used to ground claims about the *ex impossibili/ad necessarium*, because the argument would be circular and beg the question. However, on the one hand our Parisian authors derive the *ex impossibili* independently from Met, but rather from their definitions of validity;<sup>7551</sup> therefore Met is not supposed to be principally a proof of the *ex impossibili*, but simply a more explicit confirmation of the same. On the other hand, it seems to me that Met's main result is a claim about the strength of the following of the consequent from the antecedent; such claim is about the kind of necessity involved in a good *consequentia*: the necessity of a formal following is the same as the necessity of a non-formal one, i.e. we seem to be dealing here with univocal notions of necessity/impossibility and not, as D'Ors believed, with equivocal ones.<sup>7552</sup> As Normore argued, for Buridan this univocal and more basic kind of necessity involved in the

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<sup>7550</sup> See Normore [2015, 367]

<sup>7551</sup> Normore [2015, 367-8] offers a similar version of such independent derivation.

<sup>7552</sup> Normore [2015] argues extensively in this sense.



consequential following seems to be the necessity of the following holding in a material *consequentia ut nunc*.<sup>7553</sup> Albert seems to share this kind of position too, but Marsilius cannot, at least not in these terms: going against Albert and Buridan but lining up with a common tendency in the English tradition, for Marsilius a *consequentia ut nunc* is not a *consequentia* at all.<sup>7554</sup> Marsilius argues that consequences as-of-now "are not strictly speaking good", because

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<sup>7553</sup> See Normore [2015]. On the distinction, internal to material consequences, between *simplex* and *ut nunc* in Buridan, see *TC* I.4: "... consequentiarum materialium quaedam vocantur 'consequentiae simplices', quia simpliciter loquendo sunt consequentiae bonae, cum non sit possibile antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso, vel esse ita etc. Aliae vocantur 'consequentiae ut nunc', quae non sunt simpliciter loquendo bonae, quia possibile est antecedens esse verum sine consequente, sed sunt bonae ut nunc, quia impossibile est rebus omnino se habentibus ut nunc se habent antecedens esse verum sine consequente. Et istis consequentiis utuntur saepe vulgares, ut si dicamus 'Cardinalis Albus est electus in papam' concludemus 'ergo unus magister in theologia est electus in papam' et si dico 'Ego video unum talem hominem', tu concludes 'ergo certe tu vides unum falsum hominem'. Haec autem consequentia reducitur ad formalem per additionem propositionis verae, non tamen necessariae, vel aliquarum verarum, non tamen necessariarum, ut, in exemplis positus, quia Cardinalis Albus est magister in theologia et quia talis homo est unus falsus homo. Illo modo hic est bona consequentia, supposito quod non sunt homines nisi Socrates, Plato, et Robertus: 'Socrates currit, Plato currit et Robertus currit; ergo omnis homo currit', quia perficitur consequentia per hanc veram: Omnis homo est Socrates vel Plato vel Robertus. Et est sciendum quod de hoc modo consequentiarum ut nunc sunt consequentiae promissivae. Verbi gratia, si Plato dicit Socrati: 'Si veneris ad me dabo tibi equum', haec propositio forte est vera consequentia et forte est falsa propositio non consequentia. Quoniam si antecedens est impossibile, scilicet quod Socrates non potest venire ad Platonem, consequentia simpliciter est vera, quia ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet, ut post dicitur. Sed si antecedens est falsum, non tamen impossibile, tunc consequentia est bona ut nunc, quia ad omne falsum sequitur quodlibet consequentia ut nunc, ut post dicitur, dum tamen extendamus nomen consequentiae ut nunc ad consequentias ut tunc, sive de praeterito sive de futuro aut alio quocumque tempore determinato. Si autem antecedens sit verum, scilicet quod Socrates veniet ad Platonem, tunc forte dicitur quod adhuc consequentia est bona, quia per veras sibi appositae potest fieri formalis, scilicet sic: quidquid Plato unit facere in futurum et quod volitione durante poterit facere (et omnibus circumstantiis adhibitis secundum quas illud uniti, et ipso non impedito, ipse illud faciet quando et quomodo vult et poterit illud facere (et hanc propositionem modifies taliter quod sit vera secundum Aristotelem 9 *Metaphysicae*); sed Plato vult dare equum Socrati, qui ad se veniet, quando ad se venerit; ergo Plato debet equum Socrati. Si ergo hae propositiones de voluntate et potestate Platonis sunt verae, ipse Plato dicebat Socrati veram consequentiam ut nunc; sed si non erant verae, tunc Plato dicebat Socrati falsum, et non consequentiam, et si Plato credebatur has propositiones adiunctas vel consimiles non esse veras, ipse mentiebatur Socrati." On the distinction in Albert of Saxony see *Perutilis logica* IV.1, 602: "Alia divisio consequentiarum materialium. Quaedam sunt, quae vocantur consequentiae simpliciter, aliae sunt, quae vocantur consequentiae ut nunc. Consequentiae simpliciter vocantur consequentiae, quae simpliciter loquendo sunt bonae et sic se habent, quod non est possibile sic esse, ut significat antecedens, quin sit sic, ut significat consequens. Consequentiae autem ut nunc vocantur, quae simpliciter loquendo non sunt bonae, quia possibile est sic esse, sicut significat antecedens, sine hoc, quod sit sic, ut significat consequens, sed sunt bonae ut nunc, quia impossibile est rebus omnino se habentibus, ut nunc se habent, sic esse, sicut significat antecedens, quin sit sic, ut significat consequens. Et istis consequentiis vulgariter saepe utimur, verbi gratia, si dicamus 'Sortes currit, ergo magister in artibus currit' supposito, quod Sortes sit magister in artibus, et ista consequentia reducitur ad consequentiam formalem per additionem alicuius propositionis verae, non tamen necessariae, vel aliquarum verarum, non tamen necessariarum, ut 'Sortes currit, Sortes est magister in artibus, ergo magister in artibus currit'. Contra istam consequentiam ut nunc aliqui arguunt volentes nullam esse consequentiam ut nunc, quia aliter, ut dicunt, ex possibili sequeretur impossibile...."

<sup>7554</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.2 <3>: "Consequentia autem ut nunc secundum eos est quae simpliciter loquendo non est bona nec valet, immo impossibile est sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur, licet non sit ita sicut per consequens significatur. Sed consequentia ut nunc bona sic describitur ex eo quod, rebus se habentibus ut nunc se habent, non potest sic esse sicut per antecedens significatur, quin ita sit sicut per consequens significatur. Exemplum poni potest ut: si Sortes sit albus dicendo 'Sortes currit, ergo album currit'. Sed salva reverentia id ponentium, hoc non convenienter ponunt: nam isti idem dicunt solum consequentiam bonam esse

even if as things are now, they cannot be as the antecedent now signifies without them being as the consequent now signifies, it can be otherwise: "it is possible for things to be as the antecedent signifies, without it being so as the consequent signifies". If a material consequence is, by definition, a *consequentia*, and if a *consequentia* is only a good one, then a *consequentia ut nunc* is not a material consequence: it is not a consequence at all. Obviously, since the *ex falso* holds *ut nunc*, from Marsilius' point of view *orationes* which look like *consequentiae*, having a merely false but not impossible antecedent, are not *consequentiae*.<sup>7555</sup> Marsilius' rejection does not seem to be of the same kind of the rejection by the *aliqui* mentioned by Albert: these *aliqui* refuse the *consequentia ut nunc* claiming that otherwise the impossible would follow from the possible. Here, between Marsilius, on the one side, and Buridan and Albert, on the other, we seem to be facing a deeper conceptual disagreement: it looks like a disagreement about what counts as necessary, at least on a sufficient level to warrant the inference; and it is, consequently, a disagreement about the *consequentia* itself. Also Buridan and Albert recognise that, strictly speaking, a *consequentia ut nunc* does not fulfil the requirements of their definitions of validity; however, for them the necessity of the present is enough to justify the inference as of now of a consequent - and this is sufficient to let them count such an inference as a *consequentia*. However, this does not seem to be sufficient for Marsilius: the necessity of the present does not warrant the following of the consequent from the antecedent. On the one hand, a position of this sort - rejecting the

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consequentiam et consequentiam dividunt in materialem et formalem. Ex quo sequitur quod omnis consequentia materialis est bona, cum omne divisum praedicatur universaliter de quolibet ipsius dividendum. Arguitur ergo ex illo sic: 'omnis consequentia materialis est bona, consequentia ut nunc non est bona, ergo consequentia ut nunc non est consequentia materialis'. Discursus est in Baroco, et conclusio est contra divisionem iam recitatam ab eis. Maior fuit statim ab eis declarata et minor patet ex eorum definendo consequentiam ut nunc. Propter hanc igitur causam non divisi consequentiam materialem in consequentiam ut nunc, supponens ex prius dictis consequentiam ut nunc non esse consequentiam, quae tamen a loicis vocatur consequentia ut nunc, ut satis patet ex dictis." See e.g. Ralph Strode, *De Consequentibus* 1.2.06: "Tertia regula probatur: quia si non valet, detur gratia argumenti quod aliquando erit sicut significatur per antecedens quando ita non erit sicut significatur per consequens, et tamen ista consequentia esset bona. Sed contra: tunc ex prima parte sequeretur quod si tunc formaretur ista consequentia solo significando sicut tunc significat, quod tunc non valeret sed esset mala; et sequitur: tunc erit mala significando praecise sicut nunc significat, igitur nunc non est bona, quod est oppositum primae regulae."

<sup>7555</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* 1.3.2 <5|1>-<6|2>

*consequentia ut nunc* - could be grounded on a rejection of the necessity of the present, of the kind that is common among Scotist thinkers: even if things are as they are now, the present is not strictly speaking necessary, i.e. things could be otherwise;<sup>7556</sup> the kind of necessity involved in  $V_{4-5}$  is much stronger for Marsilius. On the other hand, what emerges from this disagreement among Parisians seems to be a different way of conceiving what *consequentiae* are all about. For Buridan and Albert a *consequentia* seems to be first and foremost a stated inference, i.e. an operation of inferring made by a mind connecting a sentence to another by uttering a true *propositio hypothetica*. As both authors underline, in ordinary reasoning we make *consequentiae ut nunc* all the time, and we are entitled to infer the consequent "as of now": the *propositio hypothetica* we utter is true and it is necessarily so insofar as things are as they are now. For Marsilius, a *consequentia* does not seem to be primarily an inference or an operation, but rather some sort of entailment relation subsisting between sentences; the subsistence of this relation is defined by  $V_{4-5}$ : a *consequentia ut nunc* does not fit the criterion given by  $V_{4-5}$ , therefore there is no relation there; an *oratio* in the form of a *consequentia ut nunc* does not have a relation to pick out and so it is not a *consequentia*. Does this mean that Marsilius is ready to discard all the cases of ordinary reasoning in which we commonly use *consequentiae ut nunc*? That would be a heavy price to pay, but Marsilius might have a way out of paying it: nothing in Marsilius' theory forbids the addition of a condition for things to be as they are now to the antecedent. In other words, by building a restriction to the present into the antecedent and the consequent, we would have a strong enough case for a non-as-of-now relation to be there and to conform to  $V_{4-5}$ ; therefore we would have a *consequentia* properly speaking. This would not be an instance of reduction like the one to a formal consequence, which we have seen in Buridan and Albert: here, we have an initial expression that is not a *consequentia*, there is no valid illation to be shown more clearly by making it formal; here, the

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<sup>7556</sup> Much still needs to be done to reach a good understanding of Marsilius' positions, especially in logica and natural philosophy. It remains to be seen if and how far Marsilius could be sharing a Scotist approach of this sort; this is going to be subject of further studies.

rephrasing would make the *consequentia*. This seems to confirm that for Marsilius a *consequentia* is first and foremost an entailment between sentences in a certain relation to each other, that these sentences have to be formulated in such a way that the relation subsists between them, and that a mind is authorised to infer a consequent from an antecedent in virtue of this relation. But the relation would still be there insofar as the sentences exist, apparently even if no mind bothers to make the inference.

If our interpretation of Marsilius is correct, what would it mean for his take on Met?

It seems that Marsilius has all the elements to be committed to a version of Met<sub>3</sub>, because in his theory he explicitly has the *ex impossibili/ad necessarium*, Met<sub>1</sub> and Met<sub>2</sub> - and because of his characterisation of the *illatio* as the very core of a *consequentia*. Met<sub>1</sub> and Met<sub>2</sub> are derived from V<sub>4-5</sub>; therefore, Marsilius is bound to accept Met<sub>3</sub> in virtue of V<sub>4-5</sub>. But, even if in Buridan, Albet and Marsilius the result is the same, it is neither about the same kinds of things nor is its meaning the same. We have seen that for Buridan and Albert the necessity involved in Met<sub>3</sub> is the necessity warranting an inference, while for Marsilius it is the necessity of an entailment relation. Furthermore, whereas for Albert and Buridan the necessity about which Met<sub>3</sub> is, is the necessity of the *consequentia ut nunc*, for Marsilius this univocal and more basic necessity characterising the *illatio* has to be stronger.

#### 4.4 Consequentiae and Conditionals

We have seen that Marsilius' use of *consequentia* is twofold. On the one hand, at its core, a *consequentia* is a relation of following (*illatio, habitudo sequelae necessariae*, etc.) between existing sentences; this relation is necessary in quite a strong sense, stronger than Buridan's or Albert's. On the other hand, *consequentia* is an *oratio* expressing this underlying relation, which is grammatically/syntactically formed as described by the given *quod sit* description. If

there is no necessary following of the consequent from the antecedent, then there is no consequence and that *oratio* is not a *consequentia*: there is no such thing as a *consequentia mala*, only a *consequentia bona* is a *consequentia*.

The *oratio* expressing a *consequentia* can have the syntactic form of a *propositio hypothetica*, and in particular of a *propositio hypothetica conditionalis*, as it emerges in the first definition *quod sit* of the note of illation. The issue of the relationship between consequences and conditionals is introduced since the very beginning of the treatise and it emerges explicitly in the section on *Instantiae and dubitationes* and in Marsilius' own resolutions.

As we have seen, in the history of medieval logic it is common to find some degree of ambiguity between *consequentiae* and *propositiones hypotheticae conditionales*.<sup>7557</sup> Even if there is often a conceptual distinction between the two notions, it is not always neat nor explicitly addressed. However, when such distinction is explicitly addressed, it is usually by stating an equivalence between *consequentiae* and conditionals.

In a measure, such equivalence is accepted also by Marsilius.

In contemporary logic, such equivalence is proven by versions of the Deduction Theorem (DT). DT is a meta-theorem that can be proven in any logic having the *a fortiori* [ $\alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \alpha)$ ], conditional distributivity [ $(\alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \gamma)) \rightarrow ((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \gamma))$ ], and Modus Ponens (MP). One of these systems is, for example, first order classical logic.

DT states that:

If  $\beta$  is a consequence of  $\Gamma \cup \{ \alpha \}$ , where  $\alpha$  is a closed formula, i.e. if  $\Gamma \cup \{ \alpha \} \models \beta$ ; then the implication  $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$  is a consequence of  $\Gamma$ , i.e.  $\Gamma \models \alpha \rightarrow \beta$ . In the particular case where  $\Gamma$  is an empty set, if  $\{ \alpha \} \models \beta$  then  $\models \alpha \rightarrow \beta$ . The converse also holds from MP.

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<sup>7557</sup> See §4.1

With little manipulation on some of Marsilius' rules, it is clear that he can derive a version of DT within his theory, and therefore he could not only be stating the equivalence between *consequentiae* and conditionals, but he could prove it within his theory of *consequentiae*.

Buridan also assumes this equivalence, insofar as a *consequentia* is a *propositio hypothetica* like a conditional plus the assertion of the antecedent, binding also to assert the consequent; in doing so, he does not seem to have any more issues other than possibly the kind of regression brought forth by Lewis Carroll<sup>7558</sup> - and he might have a way of dealing with it within his fundamentally inferential and propositional account of *consequentia*. However, for authors as Albert and Marsilius the equivalence between *consequentiae* and conditionals is going to be a trickier matter: since they assume that only valid consequences are *consequentiae* and that there is no such thing as a *consequentia mala*, they will have some explaining to do in order to account for false conditionals. What are these false sentences equivalent to?

Albert of Saxony does not go deeply into this issue, but he seems to maintain both that the only *consequentia*, strictly speaking, is the *consequentia bona*, and that conditionals as sentences can be true or false: rather than something equivalent to a *consequentia*, he seems to treat a conditional as a description of a *consequentia*, signifying that the antecedent in that *consequentia* is antecedent to its consequent - if things are not so, then the conditional is false.<sup>7559</sup> But even if Albert manages to outflank the obstacle on the front of conditionals properly meant, he is still going to face a similar issue about *consequentiae* themselves, insofar as he defines them as *propositiones hypotheticae*. As far as I know, he does not address the problem at this level.

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<sup>7558</sup> Carroll [1895]

<sup>7559</sup> See e.g. Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis logica* IV.1, 596-8: "... si aliqua propositio condicionalis est, per quam significatur antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens, et si ita est, tunc est consequentia, si autem significatur per eam antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens, et non est ita, tunc non est consequentia ex eo quod non est composita ex antecedente et consequente, eo quod illud, quod designatur esse antecedens non est antecedens ad illud, ad quod designatur esse antecedens, nec reliquum est consequens ad ipsum. Propter quod dico quod non magis est ibi consequentia 'Homo currit, ergo homo disputata' quam hic 'Adam vel homo mortuus est homo'..."

The question about conditionals is brought up also by Marsilius in relation to the rejection of *consequentia mala* and - specifically - among the objections to such rejection. The objector's argument runs on the equivalence between conditionals and *consequentiae*: it assumes that if something is a conditional then it is a *consequentia* (*si est conditionalis est consequentia*), because *si* is a note of illation. Marsilius would agree to that, for the same reasoning, and he indeed will not reject this assumption - at least not radically. The objection goes on: if there were no such thing as a *consequentia mala*, then there would be some sentence - in the form of a false conditional - which is neither a hypothetical sentence nor a categorical one. If it were a hypothetical sentence, then it would be a conditional and therefore a *consequentia*, because it could not be any other kind of hypothetical sentence but a conditional. And it is not a categorical sentence, because it is not in the simple form Subject+Copula+Predicate, required by the syntactic definition of categorical sentences. Nevertheless this sentence would still have to be a sentence and the only two kinds of sentences are hypothetical and categorical.<sup>7560</sup> In his response, Marsilius bites the bullet and goes all the way through with it: he accepts the assumption of the equivalence between *consequentiae* and conditionals, he maintains that only a *consequentia bona* is a *consequentia* and then concludes that a false conditional is not, strictly speaking, a conditional at all. This stance yields a double account of conditionals: on the one side, there is the conditional properly meant, which is equivalent to a *consequentia* insofar as it is a form of the *oratio* expressing it, and therefore it can be only true; on the other

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<sup>7560</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.1 'Instantiae et dubitationes' <2.3>: "Tertio: nam si <non> sic, sequeretur quod esset aliqua propositio quae nec esset categorica nec hypothetica. Consequens est inconueniens et contra Philosophum primo *Peri hermeneias* et contra Petrum Hispanum expresse in *Summulis* suis. Probatur consequentia capiendo conditionalem falsam, ut 'si deus est baculus stat in angulo', quae vel est conditionalis, vel non. Si est conditionalis, sequitur quod est consequentia, cum ly si, ut dictum est, sit nota consequentiae vel llationis; et est mala, ut notum est; ergo consequentia mala est consequentia, quod est propositum. Si autem dicatur quod non sit conditionalis, et manifestum est quod non sit alterius speciei propositionis hypotheticae quam conditionalis, ergo non est propositio hypothetica nec categorica, prout notum est; quod tamen sit propositio satis notum est de se. Ex quibus sequitur statim quod aliqua est propositio quae nec est categorica nec hypothetica, quod fuit probandum."

side, there is a conditional loosely meant, which is said to be true or false.<sup>7561</sup> Authors who wrote about true and false conditionals - Marsilius says -, like Peter of Spain (but he could also add Buridan to the list),<sup>7562</sup> were only talking about conditionals in an improper or loose sense.

At least two observations can be made about this argument.

In the first place, Marsilius introduces it before his analysis of semantic criteria of validity, and this placing is problematic: in absence of a semantic criterion of validity, the argument would beg the question, since we would still lack an appropriate characterisation of when a *consequentia* is valid. Placed as it is, all the argument does is deny the objector's claim because the claim is to be denied. Certainly, such denial is grounded on Marsilius' rejection of *consequentiae malae*, but this is exactly what the disagreement is about. By introducing V<sub>4-5</sub> defining the *consequentia* as a kind of entailment relation, Marsilius' claim is "filled out": the relation is articulated; if antecedent and consequent do not fulfill V<sub>4-5</sub>'s requirements, then they are not antecedent and consequent at all. Furthermore, in virtue of the relevant rules to have a version of DT, Marsilius could support the identification between *consequentiae* and conditionals, and therefore answer properly to his objector. For this reason, I preferred not to follow his order of exposition.

In the second place, we have seen that Marsilius takes up a stronger notion of necessity in his characterisation of the relation of consequence than the one held by Buridan and possibly by

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<sup>7561</sup> Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae* I.1 'Respondeo' <2.3>: "Ad tertiam rationem, quando dicitur: "sequitur quod aliqua esset propositio quae nec esset categorica nec hypothetica", negatur ista. Ad probationem, quando dicitur: 'capiatur una conditionalis falsa, ut haec: 'si deus est, baculus stat in angulo'', placet mihi; et quando quaeritur utrum sit conditionalis vel non, dico quod est conditionalis capiendo 'conditionalem' large, sed non est conditionalis capiendo 'conditionalem' stricte et proprie. Ad improbationem, quando dicitur 'si est conditionalis, tunc est consequentia' verum est si esset conditionalis proprie dicta, sed non oportet ita esse si sit conditionalis communiter dicta. Unde proprie non dicitur aliqua propositio conditionalis nisi sit conditionalis vera.

Petrus Hispanus dicens propositionem conditionalem esse unam de sex speciebus propositionis hypotheticae et dividens eam in conditionalem veram et falsam solum intelligit hoc de conditionalibus communiter acceptis, et non oportet omnem talem esse consequentiam."

<sup>7562</sup> See e.g. Buridan, *SDD* I.7.3: "Condicionalis est illa in qua coniunguntur duae propositiones categoricae per hanc coniunctionem 'si', ut 'si homo est animal est'. Ad veritatem condicionalis exigitur quod antecedens non possit esse verum sine consequente; unde omnis condicionalis vera est una necessaria consequentia. Ad falsitatem eius requiritur quod antecedens possit esse verum sine consequente, ut 'si homo est, homo est albus'."



Albert of Saxony. This choice could have some interesting implications for Marsilius' account of conditionals, which are at least worth mentioning here and should be the subject of further analyses. As we have seen, Marsilius rejects any *consequentia ut nunc* since these expressions do not conform to  $V_{4-5}$  and therefore he does not accept the *ex falso quodlibet*. Therefore, for him a conditional taken *stricte et proprie* should not be a Philonian conditional, otherwise we would have a true conditional with a merely false but not impossible prodasis corresponding to something that is not a *consequentia*. An additional interesting line of inquiry would be to explore the relations between properly taken conditionals and loosely taken conditionals, the role - if any - of the latter in logical and philosophical contexts, and the possible relevance of Marsilius' theory of *imaginabilia* in these logical contexts where the treatment of empty terms is relevant.

#### 4.5 Some closing remarks

We have seen how Marsilius gives a first description *quod sit* of *consequentia* as an *oratio* composed of an *antecedens*, a *consequens* and a *nota illationis*. But, at its core a *consequentia* is a relation of illation or the habitude of necessary following of the consequent from the antecedent. Therefore, *consequentia* as an *oratio* is an expression of this relation of entailment as it is defined by the semantic criterion of validity  $V_{4-5}$  and holding between at least two existing sentences.

The conception of *consequentia* primarily as some sort of sentential relation, emerging from Marsilius' account, puts him apart from John Buridan and Albert of Saxony, who give their accounts primarily in propositional terms (*consequentia est propositio hypothetica*) and seem to conceive a consequence first and foremost as an inferential operation made by a mind. Nevertheless, with his Parisian colleagues, Marsilius shares many pivotal aspects of his articulation of the notion of *consequentia*. For example, they offer the same account of what it

means for a *consequentia* to be formal. Moreover, they all seem to hold something very much like what Normore calls Buridan's Meta-Theorem and its main results: the strength of the following between antecedent and consequent is the same for formal and material consequences.

However, Marsilius shifts away from both Buridan and Albert in denying that a *consequentia ut nunc* is a *consequentia* at all and, therefore, in taking the necessity of a consequence to be of a stronger kind than the as-of-now one on which Buridan's and possibly Albert's theories appear to run.

In summary, Marsilius' *consequentia* could be described as an ordered pair of an *antecedens* and a *consequens* conforming to V<sub>4-5</sub>. And it has to be an ordered pair because by inverting the members either the relation might not hold, or it would be a different relation. This means, as it appears from many of Marsilius' rules and especially in Book II on *expositiones*, that cases like equivalences or relations holding in both directions are really two *consequentiae* rather than one.

Furthermore, since it is the relation holding between the members of this ordered pair that makes them a *consequentia*, then as long as *antecedens* and *consequens* exist - Marsilius is a tokenist - they would be a *consequentia* even if nobody bothers to say so. This means that, on the one hand, the note of illation is a syntactic convention pertaining to the expression of a *consequentia*: it makes the *oratio* describing or pointing at the relation, saying that the relation is there; but the relation would still be there even if the *nota illationis* were not - or if we changed the syntactic conventions for its employment.

And on the other hand, this account implies that there are many consequences that could possibly never be stated, nor known by any finite (or infinite) mind, which can help Marsilius

to get around some of the issues raised within accounts taking *consequentiae* primarily as inferences, like Buridan's.<sup>7563</sup>

Overall then, Marsilius' treatment of the notion of *consequentia* presents a number of very interesting conceptual and technical features, and it seems to be quite unusual and original within his immediate intellectual *milieu*.

## 5. Chapter V: On the Exposition of *incipit* and *desinit* in *Consequentiae* II.4-5

Modo multae pulchrae difficultates sunt imaginandae iuxta instantia indivisibilia...

- Marsilius of Inghen, *Consequentiae*, II.4.1 <4> -

### 5.0 Introduction

Late Medieval discussions about *incipit* and *desinit* are an interesting and complex meeting point of physical, ontological and logical questions and concerns. Even if we are going to focus on Marsilius' treatment of the exposition of *incipit* and *desinit*, these issues should not be completely overlooked. They are many, complex and quite extensively studied,<sup>7564</sup> and go beyond the technicalities of the *expositio*, which often ends up being affected by extra-logical considerations and concerns. Some of these questions and concerns - at the intersection of logic, ontology and natural philosophy - involve, for example: the time continuum; motion; the gradual acquisition or loss of incompatible accidental properties (*latitudo formarum*);<sup>7565</sup> the moment of change and how to circumscribe the interval of existence of an entity (that could be either "successive" or "permanent" in nature); how to assign truth values to sentences

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<sup>7563</sup> See e.g. Normore [2015]

<sup>7564</sup> For an overview see e.g. Strobach [1998]; Nielsen [1982]. See also among others: Kretzmann [1976], [1977]; Goubier - Roques (eds.) [forthcoming]; Spade [1994]; Di Liscia [2008], [2014]; Thijssen [2009]; Murdoch [1979]; Tabarroni [1989]; Trifogli [1993]

<sup>7565</sup> See Kretzmann [1977]

where *incipit* and *desinit* are the main verb - or how to make good inferences with such sentences; and so on.

I am going to focus on Marsilius of Inghen's treatment of expositions of sentences *de incipit* and *de desinit* in *Consequentiae* II.4-5.

There are three principal possible ways of treating *incipit* and *desinit*, depending on which issues are put in the foreground and also determine the way the others are treated. One approach is purely physical or it might be called physical and ontological. The second approach is purely logical, and - in order to analyse a sentence - it should ignore ontological distinctions about the nature of the entities signified by the terms - e.g. *res permanentes* or *res successivae*. The last kind of approach is a hybrid of the previous two.<sup>7566</sup>

As I am using this distinction, I am thinking about these approaches as different ways of looking at the question, and to deal with a subject matter that is conceived differently. Namely, the logical approach is not trying to account for, to explain or to model physical or natural phenomena - as the physical approach does -, but simply to give a semantic analysis of certain kinds of sentences and to account for inferences involving them. The hybrid approach, on the other hand, often seems to keep natural facts in sight while trying to do a bit of both.

I am going to argue that, even if Marsilius' account seems to be of the hybrid kind, it appears to incline towards the logical end of the spectrum.

In order to do so, in the first place I am going to briefly outline part of the framework of the late medieval discussions about *incipit* and *desinit*. Then, I am going to examine structure and content of the chapters devoted to the expositions of *incipit* and *desinit* in *Consequentiae* II,

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<sup>7566</sup> See e.g. Kretzmann [1976]; Spade [1994].

and to present an analytical exposition and a partial reconstruction of the various ways of expounding such sentences analysed by the author.

### 5.1 *Some Notes on the Issues and The Medieval Discussions about Incipit and Desinit*

Even if medieval discussions show developments that are not strictly Aristotelian (or even quite un-Aristotelian sometimes)<sup>7567</sup> they seem to be rooted - as is often the case in medieval philosophy - within matters of Aristotelian exegesis, in particular concerning *Physics* VI and VIII, passages from *De generatione et corruptione* and passages from *Sophistici Elenchi*.<sup>7568</sup>

Several assumptions flow from Aristotle into and through the medieval discussions of *incipit* and *desinit*. With the exception of a few earlier authors,<sup>7569</sup> it is generally accepted that time is a *continuum*, i.e. it is dense and it cannot be split down to indivisible atoms. However, as Aristotle talks about  $\nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ ,<sup>7570</sup> so most late medieval authors talk about *nunc* and *instants*. And, as at least in some passages, the Aristotelian  $\nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu$  is explicitly treated as a  $\sigma\eta\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ , a limiting sign to "mark the spot",<sup>7571</sup> so - especially in the XIV century - instants come to be explicitly defined as *imaginabilia*, convenient fictional analytical tools, without any real existence - this is the kind of treatment that we find e.g. in Marsilius and in Albert of Saxony.<sup>7572</sup>

The physical and metaphysical fact that time cannot be "gappy" is relevant for the issue of beginning and ceasing to be, to have a property, to move: there cannot be any further instant

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<sup>7567</sup> For example, for Aristotle there is no motion at an instant: the very question about if it is possible for an object to be in motion at an instant does not make sense from the point of view of the Aristotelian orthodoxy. However, many medieval authors do not have any problem in asking the question, under the assumption of instants, be they real, *signa* (analogously to Aristotle's use  $\nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu$  as a kind of  $\sigma\eta\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ ) or imaginary entities. For example, John of Holland comes to give an explicit definition of "being in motion at an instant  $t_i$ " iff  $t_i$  falls within a period through which the object is in motion; such a move nowhere to be found in Aristotle. for an analysis of John of Holland's passage see e.g. Strobach [1998, 91-92]

<sup>7568</sup> See e.g. Sorabji [1983], [1979], [1976]; and Strobach [1998]

<sup>7569</sup> Strobach [1998, 261 n. 38]

<sup>7570</sup> e.g. *Phys.* 237a6-7; 233b33-34; 263b9-264a6.

<sup>7571</sup> e.g. *Phys.* 263b9-264a6.

<sup>7572</sup> See for example Hugonnard-Roche [1997], [1991], [1989]. There are however, also in the XIV some notable exceptions: among the authors refusing to run their analyses even by imaginary instants and sticking instead to time intervals, we find also John Buridan, as he does e.g. in his *Sofismata*. See e.g. Uckelman - Johnston [2010]

between the initial state ceasing to be the case and the final state beginning to be the case. Therefore, in an Aristotelian framework, from the physical and the metaphysical point of view, change has to be instantaneous.

When our authors analyse sentences about *incipit* or *desinit*, most of them face a bit of a conundrum. On the one hand, if the Law of Non-Contradiction stands, the last instant of the first state and the first instant of the final state cannot overlap, because then *p* and non-*p* would be true at the same time. On the other hand, if time is a continuum and the Excluded Middle holds true, then the last instant of the initial state being the case must be *immediately* before the first instant of the final state being the case, otherwise there would be at least one instant when it is not the case that *p* or non-*p* is true.<sup>7573</sup>

Therefore, when dealing with this kind of "limit decision problem",<sup>7574</sup> of the four possible ways to go about the analysis of when the moment of change takes place, as they are categorised by Strobach,<sup>7575</sup> most medieval authors seem to prefer an *either/or* approach: at the limiting instant, only one of the two states obtains. For some, as e.g. Burley in his *De primo and ultimo instanti*,<sup>7576</sup> this seems to be also a physical fact - and in Burley's theory it yields some problems.<sup>7577</sup> For some others, as e.g. Peter of Spain in his *Tractatus Syncategorematum*<sup>7578</sup> or Walter Burley himself in the relevant passages of the *De puritate*, this is merely a matter of the analysis but, as such, it does not affect the time continuum: there

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<sup>7573</sup> See Spade [1994, 195]

<sup>7574</sup> The expression is fairly common in the scholarly literature on the subject: see e.g. Nielsen [1982]; Goubier - Roques (eds.) [forthcoming]

<sup>7575</sup> The four options about the limiting instant listed by Strobach [1998, 5] are:

- Either/or: exactly one of the two states obtains and not the other;
- Neither/nor: none of the two states obtains;
- Both-states obtain;
- Either-way: "In a certain respect, the old state still obtains at the limiting instant, in another respect it does not. Moreover, in a certain way the new state already obtains at the limiting instant, but in another way it does not."

<sup>7576</sup> Edited in H. Shapiro - Ch. Shapiro [1965]

<sup>7577</sup> See e.g. Spade [1994]

<sup>7578</sup> Edited in de Rijk [1992]

the last and the first instant respectively of the previous and of the incoming states coincide.<sup>7579</sup>

As we will see, in Marsilius' analysis we might find some hints pointing into the direction of another possible choice.

Be that which it may, both logical expositions of sentences *de incipit* and *de desinit* and physical-metaphysical theories aiming to account for motion, beginning and ceasing, have to make a choice on how to split the time continuum at the moment of change to run their analyses. If we want to keep an *either/or* approach - as most of our medieval logicians do, at least on the logical or on the meta-linguistic level of their analyses -, to use a contemporary jargon, here we have a limit decision problem insofar as we need to assign the instant of change only to one of the relevant adjacent intervals on the continuum: either to the end of the interval occupied by the initial state or to the beginning of the interval occupied by the incoming state, but not to both.

As Paul Vincent Spade noticed, on the basis of purely logical or mathematical considerations, it makes no difference if you decide to assign an internal or an external limit to the incoming state and an external or an internal limit to the initial one, as long as you are consistent in your assignment.<sup>7580</sup> This means that, from a purely logical point of view, i.e. if you are concerned only with analysing some sentences and not with modelling or explaining actual physical phenomena, the limit assignation can be arbitrary, as long as it falls within the constraints that your logic might want to preserve - e.g. non-contradiction. This way of looking at things does not try to capture their nature nor the way in which limits actually work in the world: certainly, nothing forbids classifying entities by applying this analysis, but the analysis itself is not *per se* an analysis of some fact of the world that needs to be explained.

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<sup>7579</sup> See Nielsen [1982]

<sup>7580</sup> Spade [1994, 196]

However, many medieval authors do have in mind some fact of the world needing to be explained and only a few consider analyses *de incipit/de desinit* to be an arbitrary matter, as for example Ockham does:<sup>7581</sup> the great majority of them, even when conducting a logical analysis on sentences containing *incipit* and *desinit*, tend to assign limits on the basis of extra-logical reasons. In the first place, these are ontological considerations: different kinds of *res* get different assignments. But if we are trying to run a logical analysis by ontological considerations and to capture some fact about the nature of things, then the distinction between physical and logical accounts starts to seem feeble: e.g. on the one side, the logical account cannot pick limits arbitrarily anymore; on the other side, there is a logical necessity in the physical impossibility for two limits to be of the same kind.

By developing some Aristotelian considerations on several different cases of first and last instants, the distinction between *res permanens* (permanent thing) and *res successiva* (successive thing) is quite standard in the XIV century discussions on the topic.

A *res permanens* is a thing whose parts exist wholly at a time: a permanent thing is all there at once, so to speak; this is the case of substantial things like a stone or a piece of wood; "Socrates" is a classical example. A *res successiva* is a thing whose different parts exist at different times, as e.g. motion, any process as such, time itself: by their nature, these things cannot be all there at once.<sup>7582</sup> This distinction can be made more fine-grained: for example, according to authors like John of Holland or Walter Burley,<sup>7583</sup> a permanent thing could be instantaneous or durable (i.e. lasting through time); and a durable permanent thing could be in some way dependent on a *res successiva*, for example (but not necessarily) by being involved in a process, as being a certain colour in a process of *intensio/remissio formarum*.

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<sup>7581</sup> *SL* II,19

<sup>7582</sup> E.g. Walter Burley, *De Pur. Tractatus brevior* [1951, 59]: "Res permanentes sunt quarum esse est simul secundum omnes earum partes, ut lapis et lignum. Res successivae sunt, quarum esse non est simul secundum omnes earum partes, sed esse earum consistit in successionem partium, ita quod eis repugnat habere omnes partes simul, cuiusmodi sunt tempus et motus."

<sup>7583</sup> See e.g. Walter Burley, *De Pur. Tractatus brevior*; for an examination of these further distinctions, see Strobach [1998, 95]



Especially for this last kind of cases, it is not always patent what counts as a permanent or a successive thing: for example, "starting to be white" could be considered either as a proper process of the acquisition of the property of being white (and the remission of the incompatible property of being some other colour); or "being white" could also be considered as the result of that process and, as such, as a properly permanent thing.<sup>7584</sup> Therefore, many authors, as e.g. Peter of Spain,<sup>7585</sup> treat "being white" as a permanent thing; for some others, instead, as e.g. for Marsilius of Inghen, terms like "white" smuggle a "hidden succession" into the analysis, because they are taken to be connoting a process.

These distinctions are relevant, because *res permanentes* and *res successivae* are generally subject to different limit assignations. The agreement is not universal and some authors defend different positions in different works - as e.g. Walter Burley in the *De primo et ultimo instanti* and in the *De puritate*.<sup>7586</sup> Such differences could depend on the scope of the theory: the theory could be aiming to be a physical analysis or it could be taking a more logical point of view. From the physical point of view, the theory needs to be able to analyse motion, time, generation/corruption changes, in a more or less loose Aristotelian framework and by taking other factors into account - as e.g. causality.<sup>7587</sup> As we have said, a purely logical approach (like Ockham's in *SL* II,19) would consider both the split between permanent and successive things, and the limit assignation, to be completely conventional. But many theories do not consider neither the split nor the limit assignation to be a pure matter of convention; in principle, these theories show some kind of hybrid approach between the logical and the physical. Even when they are primarily concerned with a logical or metalinguistic analysis, it looks like they still defend some ontological stance and, in some measure, aim to be able to treat the physical side of the problem.

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<sup>7584</sup> See. e.g. Nielsen [1982]

<sup>7585</sup> *Tractatus syncategorematum*

<sup>7586</sup> See e.g. Nielsen [1982]

<sup>7587</sup> Spade [1994] underlines how the particular issue of accounting for instantaneous causation might be fundamental to make sense of some theories, like e.g. Burley's, that seem to carry more problems than benefits.

Even if there is no standard limit assignation, it becomes fairly common to assign extrinsic limits on both ends of successive things and an extrinsic final limit to permanent things.

On the one hand, this kind of assignation is far from being universally accepted, even for the case of *desinit* about which the agreement tends to be more constant. Once again, the best example of an exception is Ockham: in *SL* II,19 he assigns internal limits to the beginning and to the ceasing of both permanent and successive entities - which makes sense, since here he does not seem to consider the distinction between *res permanentes* and *res successivae* to be logically relevant.<sup>7588</sup>

On the other hand, it is quite easy to see how such assignations immediately raise some problems or - better - they make some problems evident, since these or very similar issues could still come up also with different assignations, but under the same kind of approach trying to "keep a foot in both camps" by wanting a hybrid theory maintaining that time is a continuum, isolating an instant rather than an interval of change and holding that only one of the two adjacent incompatible states can be verified at that instant. For example, under the constraints normally assumed and with the most common kind of exposition, you cannot have two adjacent successive things (as e.g. motion and rest would be) on the continuum, nor a successive thing could follow a permanent one - not to mention the issues relative to instantaneous permanent things and oscillatory motion.<sup>7589</sup> Then, it would seem that either time becomes "gappy" after all,<sup>7590</sup> or that you have to opt for another kind of account than the *neither/nor* one, at the possible price of renouncing either Non-Contradiction or the Excluded-Middle, or both.

## 5.2 Structure and Content of *Consequentiae II. 4-5*

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<sup>7588</sup> Nielsen [1982, 35]

<sup>7589</sup> See e.g. Spade [1994]

<sup>7590</sup> The expression is from Spade [1994]

### 5.2.1 Structure

Marsilius' chapter on the exposition of *de incipit* sentences is divided into three main sections: the first (II.4.1) is on the exposition of sentences where the subject is a discrete substantial term - e.g. 'Sortes' -; the second (II.4.2) is on the exposition of sentences where the subject is a common or a connotative term - e.g. respectively 'homo' and 'album' -; the last one (II.4.3) is devoted to the rules granting good inferences among the sentences to be exposed (*exponendae*) and their exponents (*exponentes*). The second chapter on *desinit* is divided into two sections. The first part (II.5.1) is on the exposition of sentences *de desinit* having a discrete subject term and the exposition of sentences with a common or connotative subject - analogously to the way sentences *de incipit* are expounded. The second part (II.5.2) lists the rules governing good inferences from the sentence to be expounded (*exponenda*) to the one expounding it (*exponens*). Neither the rules given in II.4.3 nor the ones in II.5.2 are accompanied by proofs but only by examples, since they hold on the basis of the rules proven either in Book I or in the previous chapters of Book II.

Both II.4.1-2 and II.5.1 offer an overview of different ways of expounding sentences *de incipit* and *de desinit*, mostly by following the structure outlined in the index. However, among the analyses of the most common approaches to expounding sentences *de incipit*, II.4.1<4> includes a discussion about how to interpret "now" (*nunc*), therefore explicitly touching upon the issues of the acceptability of imaginary indivisible instants and of the temporal continuum. Furthermore, in II.5.1<6> Marsilius analyses two additional positions on the exposition of sentences *de incipit* explicitly rejecting the assumption of instants - be they real or imaginary.

### 5.2.2 Distinctions

In the the very beginning of II.4.1, before going through several approaches to the exposition of sentences *de incipit* and *de desinit*, Marsilius introduces some general divisions.

After stating the first division of sentences *de incipit* according to their subject terms (discrete substantial vs. common or connotative subject), Marsilius gives a second - quite standard - distinction: the verb *incipit* could be used either (-a-) with respect to terms signifying permanent things (*res permanentes*) or (-b-) with respect to terms connoting some kind of succession (*res successivae*) - either (-b<sub>1</sub>-) explicitly or (-b<sub>2</sub>-) implicitly.

Marsilius does not articulate -a-, however he gives two examples: "Sortes incipit esse homo" and "Sortes incipit esse substantia;" then, -a- concerns the coming into being of substantial subjects. Even if in the description of -a- Marsilius adds a "singulariter" (*respectu terminorum pure permanentium singulariter*) and both examples given here are about discrete substantial subjects, -a- applies also to common terms picking out substances - e.g. "homo" in "homo incipit esse." These sentences do require a different exposition, but this is due to the supposition of common terms as such, which is an independent matter from the permanent or sequential nature of any of the terms involved in the split -a/b-.<sup>7591</sup>

-b<sub>1</sub>- concerns sentences having a term explicitly denoting a succession, either in subject position or in predicate position; Marsilius gives two examples of explicit succession: "motus incipit esse" and "Sortes incipit currere."

Then, Marsilius explains -b<sub>2</sub>- a bit more extensively than either -a- or -b<sub>1</sub>-: in sentences like "album incipit esse nigrum" or "nigrum incipit esse" a succession is signified implicitly because they mean the *intensio* of a quality (and the *remissio* of another mutually exclusive one) within some subject - which is indeed a kind of succession. Therefore, -b<sub>2</sub>- seems to be "smuggled in" mostly by connotative terms, specifically by terms meaning some property which is acquired or lost by degrees, in a way analogous to speed or movement: this is the problem of the *latitudo formarum*, analysed in the same kind of context by e.g. the Oxford

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<sup>7591</sup> For Marsilius' theory of supposition see his treatises *Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones et alienationes* in Marsilius of Inghen, *Treatises on the Properties of the Terms*.

Calculators.<sup>7592</sup> Contrary to what many other authors do,<sup>7593</sup> Marsilius does not consider *incipit esse album* as the result of a process and therefore as a proper permanent thing.

What can we make of this first distinction introduced by Marsilius? Not much, I fear, since the passage does not offer a very articulated examination and is quite cursory - which is not surprising, since we are in the context of a treatise mainly concerned with analysing valid consequences. Nevertheless, we can make a few observations.

In the first place, Marsilius mentions only a division about the subject terms (discrete substantial vs. common and connotative), which is going to be relevant in the expositions; however this division is rooted in Marsilius' standard theory of supposition: we are not dealing with any exceptions in the behaviour of these terms in sentences *de incipit* or *de desinit*. Furthermore, Marsilius does not even mention the question of the supposition of the predicate term in such sentences, which, for example, was the main object of controversy between Ockham and Bradwardine.<sup>7594</sup>

Secondly, even if Marsilius is speaking here primarily of terms, it is a relevant factor the kind of entities picked out by these terms when the verb *incipit* is used with respect to them. However, this relevance goes only up to a point and it does not warrant any finely-grained ontological distinction, since Marsilius does not even mention physically and metaphysically problematic cases as instantaneous entities.

Moreover, another distinction - which seems fairly common in logical and metalinguistic discussions about *incipit* and *desinit* and which is missing here -<sup>7595</sup> is the one between a composite and divisive interpretation of these sentences.<sup>7596</sup>

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<sup>7592</sup> See Kretzmann [1977]

<sup>7593</sup> e.g. Peter of Spain. See §1

<sup>7594</sup> Ockham, *SL* I, 75 and II,19; Bradwardine, *De incipit et desinit*. See Nielsen [1982] for an analysis - and the edition of Bradwardine's text.

<sup>7595</sup> See e.g. Bradwardine, *De incipit et desinit*

<sup>7596</sup> On this distinction, see Nielsen [1982]

Overall, we can get at least first general impression from these divisions offered by Marsilius. Firstly, these divisions are not detailed and they try to stay as close as possible to the account of supposition offered by Marsilius in his previous treatises.<sup>7597</sup> Secondly, the -a-/-b- distinction introduces ontological elements, but this distinction seems to be there in the first place to allow Marsilius to give an analysis of several ways of expounding sentences *de incipit* and *de desinit* for which the ontological difference is fundamental. It can certainly be argued that this is not the only reason, and that would be true: there are some hybrid features in Marsilius' theory. However, in *Consequentiae* II.4-5, Marsilius' seems mainly concerned to give a logical examination of 'incipit' and 'desinit' to determine the validity of inferences involving these terms. Such examination seems to take into account the possibility of its application to physical and metaphysical problems and appears to be built as a logical tool with this kind of aim in mind. Nevertheless, Marsilius' examination is not an analysis of the problem of assigning limits to the beginning and ceasing of different types of entities. Ultimately - and of II.5 - Marsilius takes a quite noncommittal stance, from a properly logical and meta-linguistic point of view: since we are working on the logical level and on *quid nominis* matters, we can split the hair - or the limit - however we prefer, as long as we are aware that some expositions might have some logical consequences which are pricier or more counterintuitive than others.

### 5.2.3 Expositions

Marsilius' section on the expositions of sentences *de incipit* and *de desinit* is structured as an overview of several (common?) ways of expounding such sentences. Marsilius does not seem to commit to one - until the very end, when he finally states a preference.

I am going to give a schematic overview of the positions presented by Marsilius, roughly following the order adopted in the *Consequentiae*.

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<sup>7597</sup> See *Suppositiones*, *Ampliationes*, *Appellationes*

The form "EXP" will be used to label expositions of sentences *de incipit* with a singular substantial subject term; "EXPD" will be used for expositions *de desinit*. I am going to call the ways of expounding an affirmative sentence "EXP+" and the ways of expounding a negative one "EXP-". "EXP\*" is going to indicate the expositions of sentences having a common or connotative subject term.

Marsilius' analysis is not complete, in the sense that he does not develop or exemplify all the cases; therefore, I am going to use "[...]" when presenting either the structure of an *exponens* or an example that is not explicitly analysed by Marsilius but that can be easily built by analogy.

Let us begin with *incipit* occurring in sentences with a discrete subject.

**EXP1** distinguishes between the exposition of sentences where *incipit* is not used with respect to terms signifying a succession (EXP1a) and the exposition of sentences where it is (EXP1b).

**EXP1a+** expounds the *exponenda* by a two-membered conjunctive sentence where the first member contains a *positio de praesenti* i.e. it states that the subject of the *exponenda* is now whatever the predicate states it to be; and the second member is a *remotio de praeterito* i.e. it states that the subject of the *exponenda immediately before now* was not whatever the predicate states it to be. Therefore, schematically:

EXP1a+ :    *exponenda*    =<sup>exp1a+</sup>    *positio de praesenti* ET *remotio de praeterito*

E.g. "Sortes incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp1a+</sup> "Sortes nunc est homo et Sortes immediate ante hoc non fuit homo"

i.e. it is true that Socrates begins to be a man if Socrates is now a man and Socrates was not a man immediately before now.

**EXP1a-** will expound a negative *exponenda* by a two-membered disjunctive sentence whose parts are the contradictory sentences to the ones expounding the corresponding affirmative

*exponenda*; i.e. its first member will be a *remotio de praesenti*, its second member a *positio de praeterito*. Therefore, we have schematically:

**EXP1a- :**     *exponenda* =<sup>exp1a-</sup> *remotio de praesenti*   VEL   *positio de praeterito*

e.g. "Sortes non incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp1a-</sup> "Sortes nunc non est homo vel Sortes immediate ante hoc fuit homo"

The other expositions follow the same structure, therefore I am going to give only the schematic forms and the examples for the following cases.

**EXP1b+ :**     *exponenda* =<sup>exp1b+</sup> *remotio de praesenti*   ET   *positio de futuro*

e.g. "Sortes incipit currere" =<sup>exp1b+</sup> "Sortes nunc non currit et Sortes immediate post hoc curret"

**EXP1b- :**     *exponenda* =<sup>exp1b-</sup> *positio de praesenti*   VEL   *remotio de futuro*

e.g. "Sortes non incipit currere" =<sup>exp1b-</sup> "Sortes nunc currit vel Sortes immediate post hoc non curret"

**EXP2** gives a unified account of the cases pertaining respectively to EXP1a and EXP1b, in the following way:

**EXP2+ :**     *exponenda* =<sup>exp2+</sup> (*positio de praesenti* ET *remotio de praeterito*) VEL (*remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de futuro*)

e.g. "Sortes incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp2+</sup> "(Sortes nunc est homo et Sortes immediate ante hoc non fuit homo) vel (Sortes nunc non est homo et Sortes immediate post hoc erit homo)"

Under this analysis, "Sortes incipit esse homo" is true iff: either Socrates now is a man and immediately before now he was not a man, or Socrates now is not a man and immediately after now he will be a man. From the rules Marsilius gave in *Consequentiae* I, it is clear that his



use of *vel* is analogous to a non-exclusive disjunction (V). Therefore it would be theoretically possible for "Sortes incipit esse homo" to be true if both "Sortes nunc est homo et Sortes immediate ante hoc non fuit homo" and "Sortes nunc non est homo et Sortes immediate post hoc erit homo" are true. This cannot be the case if you keep Non-Contradiction in your logic, since "Sortes nunc est homo" and "Sortes nunc non est homo" would have to be true at the same time for both members of the disjunction to be true. And Marsilius does keep Non-Contradiction: it is the first principle he offers in *Consequentiae* I and from which he derives all the following rules. However, if you are willing to forego Non-Contradiction and opt for a *Both-states* or an *Either-way* kind of approach to the limit decision problem, in principle EXP2 could be the descriptive tool of choice for your analysis.

In any case, EXP2 allows you to single out the instant of change without making any choice on the segment within which it has to fall.

**EXP2- :**        *exponenda* =<sup>exp2-</sup> (*remotio de praesenti* VEL *positio de praeterito*) ET (*positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de futuro*)

e.g. "Sortes non incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp2-</sup> "(Sortes nunc non est homo vel Sortes immediate ante hoc fuit homo) et (Sortes nunc est homo vel [Sortes] immediate post hoc non erit homo)"

Marsilius calls EXP2 a *modus verus*: apparently the account it yields is a correct one; moreover, it looks also like it is a complete and uniform account of any sentence having a singular non-connotative subject. EXP2 is, for Marsilius, a *modus moderatus*. But in which sense is it "moderate"? Presumably, because it can treat disjunctively the affirmative cases and conjunctively the negative ones - all cases that are treated separately by EXP1a and EXP1b.

However, later on (in II.4.2<1>), Marsilius mentions also a "second way of expounding" sentences covered by EXP1a; I am going to call this *modus exponendi* EXP3(a). This case is not analysed in detail, but the text gives us enough elements to offer a reconstruction of how it should go. We have the output given by EXP3(a) for sentences where *incipit* is not used with respect to terms signifying a succession: it is identical to the one of EXP1b for sentences where *incipit* is used with respect to successive terms. Therefore, schematically:

**[EXP3(a)+] :**            *exponenda* =<sup>exp3(a)+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de futuro*

Since EXP3 is mentioned in the chapter on the exposition of sentences with a common or connotative subject term, Marsilius only gives an example of a case where EXP3(a) fails (*homo incipit esse Sortes*). However, a working example can be easily built by adapting the *expositio* offered in the passage to an appropriate *exponenda*:

[e.g.]: "Sortes incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp3(a)+</sup> "Sortes nunc non est homo et Sortes immediate post hoc erit homo"

**[EXP3(a)-]:**            *exponenda* =<sup>exp3(a)-</sup> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de futuro*

[e.g.]: "Sortes nunc est homo vel Sortes immediate post hoc non erit homo"

We do not have any further indications about EXP3, therefore we cannot say how it would deal with sentences where *incipit* is used with respect to terms signifying a succession, nor if it would differentiate between these sentences and the ones where *incipit* is used with respect to permanent terms - presumably, it would not.

However, on the one hand, for the exposition of permanent terms, we can say that EXP2 covers both accounts given by EXP1a and EXP3(a); on the other hand, by combining *de facto* both the accounts of EXP1, EXP2 seems to offer an analysis that is *per se* indifferent to the permanent or substantial nature of the objects referred to by the terms involved - and yet it allows for an interpretation in a second moment. Even more, it looks like EXP2 has to be

indifferent to the nature of things to be a viable account at all. EXP2 is a "weak" analysis that would yield a necessary condition for something to *incipere* but not a sufficient one if it were trying to capture some fact about *res permanentes* or *successivae*. This would be the case, because EXP2 would not tell you when you have one kind of limit and when you have the other, i.e. it would not tell you which side of the disjunction is the correct one to account for the thing or phenomenon being analysed: it does not capture the fact. However, if we are not trying to capture any objective phenomenon of the world that needs to be explained, but just to give a complete sentential analysis, then EXP2 is viable. Then, EXP2 can be applied to classify systematically external facts or things, but - in a very Buridanian spirit - this is a matter of arbitrary classification that does not depend from any fact of the mater.

All these accounts hold for sentences with discrete substantive subjects, but - as I have mentioned - they fail when the subject is either a common or a connotative term. It is then necessary to add a third member to the *exponens*, according to the way of exposition that is chosen, in order to extend it to include these cases too.

**EXP1a\*+ :**            *exponenda* =<sup>exp1a\*+</sup> *positio de praesenti* ET *remotio de praeterito* ET *remotio praeteriri a praesenti*

e.g. "homo incipit esse Sortes"<sup>7598</sup> =<sup>exp1a\*+</sup> "homo nunc est Sortes et nullus homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes et nihil quod nunc est homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes"

**EXP1a\*- :**            *exponenda* =<sup>exp1a\*-</sup> *remotio de praesenti* VEL *positio de praeterito* VEL *positio praeteriti a praesenti*

e.g. "homo non incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1a\*-</sup> "nullus homo nunc est Sortes vel homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nunc est homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes"

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<sup>7598</sup> Marsilius tends to read indeterminate sentences as particulars; therefore their contradictories usually are negative universal sentences.

Marsilius annotates that, when the subject is a common substantial term, the output of EXP1a\* can be reformulated with a two-membered *exponens* by recurring to identity (*relativum idemptitatis*):

e.g. "homo incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1a\*id+</sup> "homo nunc est Sortes et idem homo immediate ante hoc non fuit Sortes".

**EXP1b\*** is EXP1's way of analysing sentences with a connotative term in subject position; these sentences obviously require a type -b- exposition, since connotative terms smuggle in a hidden succession.

**EXP1b\*+ :** *exponenda* =<sup>exp1b\*+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de futuro* ET *remotio praesentis a futuro*

e.g. "hoc album incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1b\*+</sup> "hoc album nunc non est Sortes et hoc album immediate post hoc erit Sortes et nihil quod immediate post hoc erit album nunc est Sortes"

**[EXP1b\*-]:** *exponenda* =<sup>exp1b\*-</sup> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de futuro* VEL *positio praesentis a futuro*

[e.g.] "hoc album non incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1b\*-</sup> "hoc album nunc est Sortes vel hoc album immediate post hoc erit Sortes vel aliquid quod immediate post hoc erit album nunc est Sortes"

The corresponding extended version of EXP3(a), for sentences with a common subject term and where *incipit* is used with respect to permanent terms, can be built analogously to EXP1b\*. Therefore, we would have:

**[EXP3(a)\*+]** : *exponenda* =<sup>exp3(a)\*+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de futuro* ET *remotio praesentis a futuro*

[e.g.] "homo incipit esse Sortes" =<sub>exp3(a)\*+</sub> "homo nunc non est Sortes et homo immediate post hoc erit Sortes et nihil quod immediate post hoc erit homo nunc est Sortes"

**[EXP3(a)\*-]:** *exponenda* = <sub>exp3(a)\*-</sub> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de futuro* VEL *positio praesentis a futuro*

[e.g.] "homo non incipit esse Sortes" =<sub>exp3(a)\*-</sub> "homo nunc est Sortes vel homo immediate post hoc erit Sortes vel aliquid quod immediate post hoc erit homo nunc est Sortes"

The analysis of **EXP2\*** is omitted by Marsilius, but **EXP2\*+** will reasonably be a disjunction of the *exponentes* of EXP1a\* and EXP1b\*/EXP3\* for the same *exponenda*:

e.g. "Homo incipit esse Sortes" =<sub>exp2\*+</sub> "(homo nunc est Sortes et homo immediate ante hoc non fuit Sortes et nihil quod nunc est homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes) vel (nullus homo nunc est Sortes et homo immediate post hoc erit Sortes et nihil quod immediate post hoc erit homo nunc est Sortes)"

Analogously, **EXP2\*-** will be a conjunction of the *exponentes* of EXP1a-\* and EXP1b-\*/EXP3-\* for the same *exponenda*:

e.g. "homo non incipit esse Sortes" =<sub>exp2\*-</sub> "(nullus homo nunc est Sortes vel homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nunc est homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes) vel (homo nunc est Sortes vel nullus homo immediate post hoc erit Sortes vel aliquid quod immediate post hoc erit homo nunc est Sortes)"

Whereas some expositions of *incipit* distinguish between the exposition of sentences where *incipit* is used with respect to terms signifying permanent things and with respect to terms signifying a succession, this - according to Marsilius - is not the case with *desinit*. When exposing a sentence *de incipit*, we are (often) making an extra-logical choice: we are either saying that the things signified by the subject have a first instant (e.g. EXP1a), which is

commonly accepted for *res permanentes*; or we are saying that the things signified by the subject do not have a first instant (e.g. EXP1b), which is the common way of expounding sentences where *incipit* is used with respect to terms signifying *res successivae*. However it is commonly accepted that no substantial thing has a last instant either; once again, this is due to extra-logical reasons, but here there is no commonly accepted alternative choice, and Marsilius does not offer any - ignoring Ockham's choice of assigning an internal limit to the ceasing of both permanent and successive things,<sup>7599</sup> we cannot say if deliberately or not.

Therefore, we will have EXPD for any sentence with a singular non-connotative subject and EXPD\* for any sentence with a common or connotative subject.

**EXPD+** : *exponenda* =<sup>expd+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de praeterito*

e.g. "Sortes desinit esse" =<sup>expd+</sup> "Sortes nunc non est et Sortes immediate ante hoc fuit"

e.g. "Sortes desinit moveri" =<sup>expd+</sup> "Sortes nunc non movetur et Sortes immediate ante hoc movebatur"

**EXPD-** : *exponenda* =<sup>expd-</sup> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de praeterito*

e.g. "Sortes non desinit esse" =<sup>expd-</sup> "Sortes nunc est vel Sortes immediate ante hoc non fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes non desinit moveri" =<sup>expd-</sup> "Sortes nunc movetur vel Sortes immediate ante hoc non movebatur"

**EXPD+\*** : *exponenda* =<sup>expd\*+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de praeterito* ET *remotio de praesenti a praeterito*.

e.g. "Hoc album desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>expd\*+</sup> "Hoc album nunc non est Sortes et hoc album immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes et nihil quod immediate ante hoc fuit album nunc est Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>expd\*+</sup> "nullus homo nunc est Sortes et homo immediate ante hoc fuit Sortes et nihil quod immediate ante hoc fuit homo nunc est Sortes"

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<sup>7599</sup> SL II,19

**EXPD-\*** : *exponenda* =<sup>expd\*</sup> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de praeterito* VEL *positio praesentis a praeterito*

e.g. "Hoc album non desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>expd\*</sup> "hoc album nunc est Sortes vel hoc album immediate ante hoc non fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod immediate ante hoc fuit hoc album nunc est Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo non desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>expd\*</sup> "homo nunc est Sortes vel homo immediate ante hoc non fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod immediate ante hoc fuit homo nunc est Sortes"

However, Marsilius mentions an exception, that applies to extensions, but "not to substances, nor to the continuing qualities of which we commonly speak."<sup>7600</sup> When we are talking about an extension, it might be desirable to abstract the extension from the extended thing and therefore to treat this abstracted extension as an object independent from the *res extensa*. Therefore, we can take "the instant in which the rarefaction of something begins" to coincide with or "to be the last instant of the preceding extension."

Overall, such abstracted extension seems to be an imaginary entity, of the same sort of instants - accepted within Marsilius' theory as *imaginabilia*.<sup>7601</sup> However, Marsilius does not say much at all about this exception and what he does say is not very clear. To what kind of extensions does this exception apply? What is its purpose? It looks like it might apply to spatial, numerical, or temporal extensions. Especially in the temporal extension case, abstracting the extension occupied by a certain entity on the time continuum and limiting it autonomously could help fix some of the inconsistencies coming up with theories - like

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<sup>7600</sup> *Consequentiae* II.5.1<1>

<sup>7601</sup> In his treatises on the properties of the terms and in some passages of *Consequentiae* I.1 (see Chapter 4.3), Marsilius gives some cursory hints about terms referring to such imaginable things. Once again going against Buridan and in agreement with some suggestions in Albert of Saxony, also contradictory entities as a chimera or predications "homo esse asinum" are *imaginabilia*, they can be imagined and therefore they do not need to be dismissed as absurdities in a logical analysis that allows for such entities. Possibly, as the edition of Marsilius' works moves forward, we will come to have an insight about what he would make of cases as the square circle. Anyway, Marsilius' logical analysis of *imaginabilia* deserves further studies, also in the light of their employment in his writings about natural philosophy and within the context of the physical discussions of his time.

Burley's - that end up making the continuum "gappy" and giving and limiting differently any given permanent thing (internal starting limit) and its duration (which is a *res successiva* and has therefore an external starting limit).<sup>7602</sup> Furthermore, if such an abstracted extension is an *imaginabile*, then, it would seem able to tolerate contradiction at least up to a certain degree, from the few hints about *imaginabilia* that Marsilius gives us in his treatises on supposition and in *Consequentiae* I.1. Therefore, even if Marsilius does not seem to do it explicitly nor systematically, by appealing to *imaginabilia* it would be possible to opt for some account other than the *Either/or* one, and such account could be implemented by a flexible analytical tool as EXP2.

Marsilius gives only a cursory statement:

si extensio ponatur res distincta a substantia extensa, concedo quod instans in quo incipit rarefactio alicuius rei sit ultimum instans extensionis praecedentis. Et ergo haec expositio possit habere locum sic dicendo: 'haec extensio nunc est et immediate post hoc non erit' sed hoc non est in substantiis vel qualitatibus resistens de quibus communiter loquitur...<sup>7603</sup>

But, in the light of several elements of Marsilius' theory, such a statement could have conceptually and logically interesting consequences. The fact that Marsilius rushes to impose a restriction to the applicability of this exception might mean that he is aware of its possible consequences - and that he is not willing to go down that road, at least not here - "sed haec pertinent magis ad quartum *Physicorum*."

According to Marsilius, the expositions examined until now assume (imaginary) indivisible instants. Nevertheless, there are approaches to the exposition *de incipit* and *de desinit* refusing to run the theory by indivisible instants and instead rely on time intervals - however small.

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<sup>7602</sup> See §1 and Spade [1994]

<sup>7603</sup> *Consequentiae* II.5: "... if the extension is taken as a distinct thing from the extended substance, I concede that the instant, in which the rarefaction of something begins, is the last instant of the preceding extension. And therefore this exposition can take place by saying: 'this extension now is and immediately after now it will not be', but this does not apply to substances or the remaining qualities of which we commonly speak."



Marsilius presents two such theories; both of them do not distinguish between the exposition of *incipit* with respect to terms signifying permanent things and terms signifying successive things. I will call them EXP1<sup>ni</sup> and EXP2<sup>ni</sup>.

Whereas, in expositions accepting instants, *nunc* and *immediate* signify a single indivisible instant in time,<sup>7604</sup> EXP1<sup>ni</sup> and EXP2<sup>ni</sup> take them to refer to extended intervals. For EXP1<sup>ni</sup>, *nunc\** and *immediate\** pick out the entire interval of time during which the thing signified by the subject is/is not; therefore, even if the output of EXP1<sup>ni</sup> looks like the output of other expositions accepting instants, its interpretation is radically different. EXP2<sup>ni</sup> shares the same approach, but it restricts the interval of time by specifying "recently" (*nuper*); therefore *incipit* is interpreted as "nuper non fuisse" and *desinit* as "nuper fuisse".

**EXP1<sup>ni+</sup>** : *exponenda* =<sup>exp1ni+</sup> *positio de praesenti* ET *remotio de praeterito*

e.g. "motus incipit esse" =<sup>exp1ni+</sup> "motus nunc\* est et motus immediate\* ante hoc non fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp1ni+</sup> "Sortes nunc\* est homo et Sortes immediate\* ante hoc non fuit homo"

**[EXP1<sup>ni-</sup>]** : *exponenda* =<sup>exp1ni-</sup> *remotio de praesenti* VEL *positio de praeterito*

[e.g.] "motus non incipit esse" =<sup>exp1ni-</sup> "motus nunc\* non est vel motus immediate\* ante hoc fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes non incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp1ni-</sup> "Sortes nunc\* non est homo vel Sortes immediate\* ante hoc fuit homo"

**EXP1D<sup>ni+</sup>**: *exponenda* =<sup>exp1dni+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de praeterito*

[e.g.] "motus desinit esse" =<sup>exp1dni+</sup> "motus nunc\* non est et motus immediate\* ante hoc fuit"

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<sup>7604</sup> On the key role of *immediate* for the accuracy of any of these expositions *de incipit* and *desinit*, see Strobach [1998]

[e.g.] "Sortes desinit esse homo" =<sup>expd1ni+</sup> "Sortes nunc\* non est homo et Sortes immediate\* ante hoc fuit homo"

**[EXP1D<sup>ni-</sup>]**: *exponenda* =<sup>exp1dni-</sup> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de praeterito*

[e.g.] "motus non desinit esse" =<sup>exp1dni-</sup> "motus nunc\* est vel motus immediate\* ante hoc non fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes non desinit esse homo" =<sup>expd1ni-</sup> "Sortes nunc\* est homo vel Sortes immediate\* ante hoc non fuit homo"

**EXP2<sup>ni+</sup>**: *exponenda* =<sup>exp2ni+</sup> *positio de praesenti* ET *remotio de praeterito*

e.g. "motus incipit esse" =<sup>exp2ni+</sup> "motus nunc\* est et idem motus nuper non fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp2ni+</sup> "Sortes nunc\* est homo et Sortes nuper non fuit homo"

**[EXP2<sup>ni-</sup>]**: *exponenda* =<sup>exp2ni-</sup> *remotio de praesenti* VEL *positio de praeterito*

[eg.] "motus non incipit esse" =<sup>exp2ni-</sup> "motus nunc\* non est vel idem motus nuper fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes non incipit esse homo" =<sup>exp2ni-</sup> "Sortes nunc\* non est homo vel Sortes nuper fuit homo"

**EXP2D<sup>ni+</sup>**: *exponenda* =<sup>exp2dni+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de praeterito*

e.g. "motus desinit esse" =<sup>exp2dni+</sup> "motus nunc\* non est et idem motus nuper fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes desinit esse homo" =<sup>exp2dni+</sup> "Sortes nunc\* non est homo et Sortes nuper fuit homo"

**[EXP2D<sup>ni-</sup>]**: *exponenda* =<sup>exp2dni-</sup> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de praeterito*

[e.g.] "motus non desinit esse" =<sup>exp2dni-</sup> "motus nunc\* est vel idem motus nuper non fuit"

[e.g.] "Sortes non desinit esse homo" =<sup>exp2dni-</sup> "Sortes nunc\* est homo vel Sortes nuper non fuit homo".

Marsilius does not offer an analysis of the extended versions neither of EXP<sup>ni</sup> nor of EXPD<sup>ni</sup> for the exposition of sentences with common or connotative subject terms. However, they could be reconstructed on the model of the given cases by adding an appropriate third member to the *exponens* in the way that we have seen. Therefore, schematically:

**[EXP1<sup>ni\*</sup>+ ]:** *exponenda* =<sup>exp1ni+</sup> *positio de praesenti* ET *remotio de praeterito* ET *remotio praeteriti a praesenti*

[e.g.] "hoc album incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1ni\*</sup>+ "hoc album nunc\* est Sortes et hoc album immediate\* ante hoc non fuit Sortes et nihil quod nunc\* est album immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes"

[e.g.] "Homo incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1ni\*</sup>+ "homo nunc\* est Sortes et nullus homo immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes et nihil quod nunc\* est homo immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes"

**[EXP1<sup>ni\*</sup>- ]:** *exponenda* =<sup>exp1ni\*</sup>- *remotio de praesenti* VEL *positio de praeterito* VEL *positio praeteriti a praesenti*

[e.g.] "hoc album non incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1ni\*</sup>- "hoc album nunc\* non est Sortes vel hoc album immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nunc\* est album immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo non incipit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1ni\*</sup>- "nullus homo nunc\* est Sortes vel homo immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nunc\* est homo immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes"

**[EXP1D<sup>ni\*</sup>+]:** *exponenda* =<sup>exp1dni\*</sup>+ *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de praeterito* ET *remotio praesentis a praeterito*

[e.g.] "hoc album desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp1dni\*</sup>+ "hoc album nunc\* non est Sortes et hoc album immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes et nihil quod immediate\* ante hoc fuit album nunc\* est Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo desinit esse Sortes" = $\text{exp1dni}^+$  "nullus homo nunc\* est Sortes et homo immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes et nihil quod immediate\* ante hoc fuit homo nunc\* est Sortes"

**[EXP1D $^{\text{ni}}$ -]**: *exponenda* = $\text{exp1dni}^*$ - *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de praeterito* VEL *positio praesentis a praeterito*

[e.g.] "hoc album non desinit esse Sortes" = $\text{exp1dni}^*$ - "hoc album nunc\* est Sortes vel hoc album immediate\* ante hoc non fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod immediate\* ante hoc fuit album nunc\* est Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo non desinit esse Sortes" = $\text{expd1ni}^*$ - "homo nunc\* est Sortes vel nullus homo immediate\* ante hoc fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod immediate\* ante hoc fuit homo nunc\* est Sortes"

**[EXP2 $^{\text{ni}}$ +]**: *exponenda* = $\text{exp2ni}^+$  *positio de praesenti* ET *remotio de praeterito* ET *remotio praeteriti a praesenti*

[e.g.] "hoc album incipit esse Sortes" = $\text{exp2ni}^+$  "hoc album nunc\* est Sortes et hoc album nuper non fuit Sortes et nihil quod nunc\* est album nuper fuit Socrates"

[e.g.] "Homo incipit esse Sortes" = $\text{exp2ni}^+$  "homo nunc\* est Sortes et nullus homo nuper fuit Sortes et nihil quod nunc\* est homo nuper fuit Socrates"

**[EXP2 $^{\text{ni}}$ -]**: *exponenda* = $\text{exp2ni}^*$ - *remotio de praesenti* VEL *positio de praeterito* VEL *positio praeteriti a praesenti*

[e.g.] "hoc album non incipit esse Sortes" = $\text{exp2ni}^*$ - "hoc album nunc\* non est Sortes vel hoc album nuper fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nunc\* est album nuper fuit Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo non incipit esse Sortes" = $\text{exp1ni}^*$ - "nullus homo nunc\* est Sortes vel homo nuper fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nunc\* est homo nuper fuit Sortes"

**EXP2D<sup>ni+</sup>**: *exponenda* = <sup>exp2dni+</sup> *remotio de praesenti* ET *positio de praeterito* ET *remotio praesentis a praeterito*

[e.g.] "hoc album desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp2dni+</sup> "hoc album nunc\* non est Sortes et hoc album nuper fuit Sortes et nihil quod nuper fuit album nunc\* est Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp2dni+</sup> "nullus homo nunc\* est Sortes et homo nuper fuit Sortes et nihil quod nuper fuit homo nunc\* est Sortes"

**[EXP2D<sup>ni-</sup>**]: *exponenda* = <sup>exp2dni-</sup> *positio de praesenti* VEL *remotio de praeterito* VEL *positio praesentis a praeterito*

[e.g.] "hoc album non desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp2dni-</sup> "hoc album nunc\* est Sortes vel hoc album nuper non fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nuper fuit album nunc\* est Sortes"

[e.g.] "homo non desinit esse Sortes" =<sup>exp2dni-</sup> "homo nunc\* est Sortes vel nullus homo nuper fuit Sortes vel aliquid quod nuper fuit homo nunc\* est Sortes"

In his *Sophismata*, John Buridan himself held an interpretation of *nunc* as an extended interval of time: he bit the bullet and forewent completely the interpretation of *nunc* as an imaginary instant.<sup>7605</sup> However, Marsilius does not seem to follow him on this point. He remarks that these EXP<sup>ni</sup> and EXPD<sup>ni</sup> expositions would have undesirable consequences, making them less viable (*minus bonae*). For example, EXP1D<sup>ni</sup> would concede that Adam *now* ceases to be, since it is true that Adam *now* is not and it is also true that Adam was *immediately\** before now. The same problem arises with *incipit*: EXP1<sup>ni</sup> would concede that the city of Montpellier now begins to be, since it is true that Montpellier now is and it was not *immediately\** before now.

Similar issues also come up with a somehow restricted interval like the one picked out by EXP2<sup>ni</sup>/ EXP2D<sup>ni</sup>. In the first place, they accept both that something that was not for a long time and now is already, is beginning; and conversely that something is ceasing when it has

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<sup>7605</sup> See Spade [1994, 211]. On Buridan's interval temporal logic see S. L. Uckelman - S. Johnston [2010]

not been already for a short time. In the second place, as already shown by Buridan, there is nothing in the theory *per se* limiting how long or how short the interval picked out by *nuper* or *immediate*\* should be - to use a modern jargon, they are sufficiently *fuzzy* concepts. Therefore such a time interval could end up being arbitrarily long, depending on how who is expounding chooses; and EXP2<sup>ni</sup>/ EXP2D<sup>ni</sup> could end up verifying the same undesirable sentences taken as true by EXP1<sup>ni</sup>/ EXP1D<sup>ni</sup>.

### 5.3 Some closing remarks: What about Marsilius' theory?

Overall, partially because of the issues arising from EXP<sup>ni</sup> and EXPD<sup>ni</sup>, Marsilius prefers to accept the use of imaginary instants within his theory, even if they do not exist outside of the abstraction: they are but a *modus loquendi* - and time remains a continuum. This use of instants as a convenient analytical tool falls in line with some other contemporary logical analyses<sup>7606</sup> and with some late XIV century developments in natural philosophy.<sup>7607</sup>

For Marsilius, not only is it more convenient "to speak according to such imagination", but it is also a more philosophically subtle, complex and elegant way,<sup>7608</sup> with the advantage of allowing to elude the counterintuitive interpretations of EXP<sup>ni</sup> and EXPD<sup>ni</sup>.

These issues in EXP<sup>ni</sup> and EXPD<sup>ni</sup> are not dependent on any presupposition on how to interpret the beginning or ceasing of permanent or successive things: the problem is simply that these interval based expositions would verify sentences which, intuitively, should not be true. Therefore, here it seems to be a matter of semantics rather than of ontological or physical concerns.

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<sup>7606</sup> It is furthermore coherent with his treatment of terms signifying *imaginabilia* in his *Treatises on the Properties of the Terms*. See also e.g.: Normore [1976, 288]: "There are a number of advantages to having instants available as indices for the evaluation of sentences. [...] These advantages were compelling enough to encourage even those, like Albert of Saxony, Heytesbury and Marsilius van Inghan, who did not believe in instants, to nonetheless carry on their analysis as though they did."

<sup>7607</sup> See e.g. H. Hugonnard-Roche [1997]

<sup>7608</sup> *Consequentiae* II.4.1<4>

For the diverging expositions of sentences where *incipit* or *desinit* are used with respect to terms signifying *res permanentes* or *successivae*, it is a different story. As Spade noticed, as long you do it consistently, logically and mathematically it makes no difference how you divide the temporal continuum to pick a first or a last instant for the thing or phenomenon of which you are saying that it is beginning or ceasing.<sup>7609</sup> Your choice will depend on how you believe that such thing should properly be described: it is a matter of ontological and physical presuppositions and concerns - and of how you choose to interpret some Aristotelian passages, mostly from *Physics* VI and VIII, *On Generation and Corruption* and the *Sophistical Refutations*.

Does Marsilius share these ontological presuppositions and concerns? For some aspects, his approach does look hybrid rather than purely logical.

This impression emerges, for example, from the fact that, in his logical analysis, Marsilius seems to keep the -a-/-b- division at least to a degree, but also and especially from the lack of an alternative position accepting an intrinsic last instant in the analysis of expositions *de desinit*.

However, an interesting insight could come from the exceptional case of the exposition of sentences *de desinit* about extensions, which warrants further and more detailed studies. Nevertheless, even if for this exceptional case we can work on an abstraction and therefore we can both forego the standard account of *desinit* and have the last instant of the previous extension coincide with the first instant of the successive one, the exception itself might be allowed only on the basis of extra-logical considerations - as it seems to be supported by the fact that it does not apply to terms belonging to other categories.

And yet, Marsilius' hybrid account seems to incline towards the logical end of the spectrum.

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<sup>7609</sup> Spade [1994, 196]

Overall, Marsilius' account seems to be very Buridanian in its spirit, even if not in all its technical choices: it can be applied to classify things or facts, but it does not aim to capture some objective fact of their nature. On the one hand, the account is a matter of logical and linguistic analysis of the behaviour of sentences containing *incipit* and *desinit*; on the other hand, it does not require nor does it try to capture any objective fact of the matter.

Besides, Marsilius seems to think that, ultimately, as long as we stay within logical considerations, you can pick whatever exposition you prefer, since these are matters of *quid nominis*: "Dicat tamen quivis sicut sibi placeat, quia in quid nominis non est fortis ratio."

Such an attitude would seem to indicate a mostly logical approach in the background - or a logical way of looking at the issue.

Furthermore, in II.5.1<6>, at the end of his analysis of the different ways of EXP and EXPD expositions, Marsilius takes a preferred position. In his own words:

Credo tamen primam opinionem, scilicet positam in praecedenti capitulo, esse magis logicalem et veram. Et ideo in eam sto contentus.<sup>7610</sup>

But in II.4 Marsilius listed several opinions, so which one is he referring to? The most likely candidates are EXP1 and EXP2. EXP1 has the features of the most common account and the advantage of being the first opinion presented in the previous chapter; EXP2 is a logically interesting "moderate" and correct way of exposition, according to Marsilius himself.

As of now, I do not think we have sufficient elements to give a definite answer. However, at least the most interesting choice appears to be EXP2, because it is a complete and flexible account. EXP2 is *per se* neutral to ontological presuppositions and it is capable of treating uniformly the analysis of any sentence *de incipit*, independently of the permanent or successive nature of the terms involved, while still allowing you, in a second time, to "choose your own adventure" if you wish to give an interpretation sensitive to the ontology of the

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<sup>7610</sup> *Consequentiae* II.5: "Nevertheless, I believe that the first opinion - i.e. the one given in the previous chapter - is more logical and true. And I am satisfied with it."



things referred to by such terms. Overall then, EXP2 would make for a handy logical tool of analysis.

## 6. Conclusion

In this work I have given a first edition of Marsilius of Inghen's influential treatise on *Consequentiae*, along with a historical and philosophical analysis of the text and of some of its relevant aspects. In doing so, I have tried to make a *tout court* contribution to the study of Medieval logic, by engaging with different types of methods, questions and approaches (as those are outlined e.g. by Cameron).<sup>7611</sup>

From the historical point of view, my aim was to make an important text available to a wider readership and to clarify Marsilius' theory of consequences and the context of the debates within which this theory was formulated; I also intended to shed some light on some more general aspects of the history of Medieval logic itself. From the philosophical point of view, this project touched upon some underlying general questions about: the philosophical relevance and interest of fragments of Medieval logic and of the history Medieval logic itself; the nature and instances of what we count as Logic and the relation of Logic to its own history; the centrality of the notion of "consequence" and some of its articulations in a particular moment of the history of Logic.

The most evident fruit of this study is the semi-critical edition of both books of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* and the outline of several lines of inquiry to be pursued in the future, but there are a number of more particular results to which I would like to draw attention.

In Chapter I, I presented a detailed analysis of Marsilius' life and of his career as a professional philosopher and as a fairly typical - although successful - University master in the second half of the XIV century. Because of its typicality, Marsilius' life offers an interesting example of how

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<sup>7611</sup> Cameron [2011]

late medieval philosophers worked within their institutional contexts. Furthermore, such a detailed analysis of Marsilius' life helps to shed some light on some questions of interest for the history of late medieval philosophy and of logic, including Marsilius' possible involvement with the "Buridanian circle", an approximate dating of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* and even on the split between Parisian and English traditions and their relation to each other.

In Chapter II I gave an introduction to my edition of Marsilius' *Consequentiae*. I outlined the structure of the treatise and its manuscript tradition, highlighting some features of interest in the manuscript circulation of the *Consequentiae* and of Marsilius' other works on the *logica modernorum* - e.g. their frequent association with logical texts belonging mostly to the English tradition. I situated the *Consequentiae* within the tradition of Marsilius' other works in the *logica modernorum*; I analysed the relations among these treatises and supported some hypotheses on their relative order of composition and the structure of Marsilius project. I was able to distinguish two main blocks of text: on the one side, a "core block", more unitary both in content and circulation, and including the treatises edited by Bos, all dealing with supposition and closely related theories; on the other side, a second less unitary block, grouping together Marsilius' treatises on *Consequentiae*, *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia*. Moreover, I proposed a tentative dating of the *Consequentiae* with some supporting philological, textual and doctrinal arguments: I suggest that the late 1360s are a probable date of composition. Finally, I explained the choices adopted for the establishment of the edition of the text in the selection of the basis manuscripts, about the preferred *lectio*, and the orthography and syntax.

In Chapter III, I pursued two principal aims. First, I rejected the common historiographical thesis that sees Medieval Logic as logic only in a (partially) equivocal sense. Second, I assessed

medieval theories of *consequentiae* in their historical development and conceptual framework, in order to have a frame of reference for my analysis of Marsilius' theory. I offered a general overview of the profile of medieval logic and of its study. Starting from a minimal definition of logic as "what logicians do", in the first place, I examined who medieval logicians were, in which institutional and cultural contexts they worked (especially in the later Middle ages), how they defined themselves and their practices. I briefly analysed those practices against the ways medieval logicians defined them. Then I outlined and evaluated some common approaches and issues in the historiography of Medieval Logic. I argued that Medieval Logic is logic in an unequivocal sense and that it does not require any extrinsic unifying notion. Furthermore, I discussed some methodological questions and claimed that the study of Medieval Logic qua logic is philosophically relevant also from our contemporary point of view. Finally I gave a partial historical introduction to the XIV century debate(s) on *consequentiae*. I examined the most common classification of XIV century theories of *consequentiae* and paid particular attention to the split between a Parisian and an English tradition on the subject, highlighting their main features. I argued that the general classification is at least partially inadequate and that several authors, including Marsilius, for some aspects do not fit well within the usual parameters characterising either the Parisian or the English approaches, but rather that their theories are hybrids of both.

In Chapter IV I developed my analysis Marsilius' theory of *consequentiae*. I focused on Marsilius' definition of *consequentia* and on some aspects of its articulation throughout Book I. I started with an analysis of Marsilius' *definitio* or *descriptio quod sit* of *consequentia* and of its parts; I showed that Marsilius' conception of *consequentia* is twofold: (1) *consequentia* is an *oratio* which expresses some entailment relation between existing sentences; (2) this relation is the *habitus necessaria* of the following or *illatio* and it is what constitutes the very core of

Marsilius' notion of *consequentia*. Then I analysed Marsilius' overview of several accounts of validity: I concentrated my attention in particular on those accounts which Marsilius deemed satisfactory, and on some aspects of their articulation, proceeding by making a comparison with John Buridan's and Albert of Saxony's analogous discussions and by highlighting analogies and differences between their approaches. Finally, I focused on Marsilius' take on the relation between *consequentiae* and *propositiones hypotheticae conditionales*. Even if Marsilius rightfully belongs to the Parisian tradition, my analysis showed some relevant differences with Buridan and Albert, most evidently about their very conceptions of what a *consequentia* is and about its divisions. Overall, while Albert and Marsilius' embrace some major Buridanian theses, these authors do not present a uniform front even on some central issues.

In Chapter V, I took a case study from Book II: Marsilius' analysis of the expositions of sentences containing *incipit* and *desinit*. Late Medieval discussions about *incipit* and *desinit* are an interesting and complex meeting point of physical, ontological and logical questions and concerns. Therefore, I gave a short outline of these issues because of their relevance in shaping an author's choice in matters primarily concerning the logical analysis of sentences containing these terms. Even if I focused on the technicalities of Marsilius' treatment of the *expositio* of sentences of this type, I contextualised this treatment within the more general framework of those debates. In the split between logical and physical approaches, Marsilius' theory shows some hybrid features, but - as I argued - it inclines towards the logical end of the spectrum and presents some elements of originality. Overall, Marsilius' account of the exposition of *incipit* and *desinit* is very Buridanian in its spirit: it does not seem to be intended as an explanation aiming to capture some features of the world, but simply as an analytical

tool, that can be used to classify entities - with or without any presuppositions on the nature of such entities - and can be quite flexible.

There are several lines of inquiry still open and to be pursued in future studies. In the first place, the present edition should be expanded with a more complete collation at least of some of the oldest manuscripts - particularly U. Hopefully, we might then be able to offer a better approximation of a *stemma codicum* for the *Consequentiae* and for Marsilius' other works in the *logica modernorum* - and to have therefore a better understanding of their circulation and influence.

Moreover, we have now enough hints to call for a more systematic reconsideration of the split between the Parisian and the English approaches to *consequentiae*; such reconsideration should both undertake a systematic comparison between some key conceptual aspects and should pay close attention to the possible routes of influence - and, for example to the teaching of logic in the *Natio anglicana* in the second half of the XIV century and to its "minor" members.

Marsilius' logical works have been only barely studied: we still lack an edition of his *Obligationes* and *Insolubilia*. Such editorial work would be very helpful - or even essential - for a better understanding of Marsilius' *Consequentiae* too, e.g. in particular to offer a more complete and historically grounded account of Marsilius' conception of the relation between *consequentiae* and conditionals.

Here I could only scratch the surface of Marsilius' theory of *consequentiae*, by choosing to focus on some essential features concerning the definition of *consequentia* and its articulation, and on a philosophically relevant case study like the exposition of sentences *de incipit et de desinit*. Much work is still to be done. For example, we need a more systematic analysis of Marsilius' rules and of his other *expositiones* (by starting with interesting cases, e.g. as the

exposition of relative terms or that of *totus*). We should proceed to make a closer comparison between Marsilius' *Consequentiae* and his *Questions* on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* and *Topics*, as well as between Marsilius' theory and Buridan's and Albert's. Furthermore, the relevance of Marsilius' logical positions should be considered in the light of his pronounced interests in Natural philosophy: such study would be particularly important also to give a better understanding of the developments of "Buridanian" approaches in the late XIV century, both in Logic and Natural philosophy. For example, one interesting starting point, which emerged already in this study, would be Marsilius' account of *imaginabilia*. As I hope to have shown there is very good reason to think that these inquiries will yield historically and philosophically interesting results.

## 7. Appendix: What Achilles said to the Tortoise

Tortoises are notoriously longevous animals; demigods, apparently, can be too. Busy with the Tortoise's puzzle, Achilles had missed his appointment with Paris - he remembered it only when they had reached Paris, at some point in the second half of the XIV century.

Long gone was Achilles' enormous notebook, gone was the pencil too: more than once, they had to purchase papyruses, paper, and parchments, and all sorts of writing materials that had one thing in common: they were too pricey. Yet the Tortoise refused to grant the First Proposition of Euclid, and Achilles was still going through *ifs* and *thens*. Since Logic could not take the Tortoise by the throat, and force it to accept Z, Achilles was beginning to wonder if shoving his latest codex down the Tortoise's throat would be more convincing.

However, around that time, Paris was an interesting place; they agreed to take a break - the Tortoise was still complaining of Achilles' weight - and have a drink or two at a local tavern: *Ad Castrum infra duos pontes*.<sup>7612</sup> The room was full with all kinds of folks and a party of academics - even in the middle ages, academics had the same unmistakable features they would have centuries later - celebrating some joyous occasion or some impressive achievement. They were discussing intricate matters quite close to the conundrum that had been troubling Achilles for more than a millennium. Around the third glass, he began to pay attention; a couple of glasses later, he addressed his companion: "I believe that there is no way out of our problem..."

"There is not, indeed", rejoiced the Tortoise.

"... at least, as we have been formulating it. Follow my reasoning".

"It has all been about following for a long time", remarked the Tortoise.

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<sup>7612</sup> See Chapter I



"I am starting to think that it might have not been *all* about following, not at all. Maybe it was more about inferring."

"I do not see the difference", said the Tortoise.

"Let's reframe our problem, as these fellows are doing", suggested Achilles, while going through his many notes. "We had the First Proposition of Euclid; you granted the first two steps:

(A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other;

(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same.

But I could not get you to accept (Z): The two sides of the triangle are equal to each other, because you don't accept the Hypothetical (C): If A and B are true, Z must be true. And so on, and so on, for more Hypotheticals than I can bother to count after ... how many glasses did I have?"

"I lost count of those too", replied the Tortoise, trying to be helpful.

Achilles shrugged, then pointed at somebody in the middle of the academic looking group:

"Anyway, that chap over there seems to think that it does not matter if you assert A and B or not: Z would follow all the same. A while ago, he was saying that Z follows from A and B if there is some kind of necessary habitude between Z and A, and B, and that your Hypothetical just describes their *consequentia*, but their following would be there even if you don't state it, as long as A, B and Z exist".

"But this does not look like a matter of Logic: it seems more a relation among things, and what they are", objected the Tortoise.

"Not quite so, my dear. It is a relation, sure. But it is a relation among sentences: that bloke did not say anything about the nature of the things those sentences signify. It does not matter: it all depends on how you define this *consequentia bona* among your sentences, but once you have defined it (and you have your sentences, he was quite adamant about that), if the

relation holds than your sentences are *antecedens* and *consequens* to each other - even if you do not express it, even if you do not *infer* it. Your Hypothetical, he says, is just an expression".

"I am not too convinced, yet", said the Tortoise.

"That's fair", concluded Achilles. "But you will admit it's interesting. Innkeeper, another one for my friend too! May I pay you with this book?"

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