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Avicenna, *Book of the Healing, Isagoge*  
(“*Madḥal*”)

Edition of the Arabic text, English translation and  
Commentary

Part I: Introduction

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## AVICENNA'S REWORKING OF PORPHYRY'S *ISAGOGE* IN THE *MADḤAL* OF THE *ŠIFĀ'*: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE PREDICABLES

The *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, “Book of the Introduction”, is the work that opens the logical section of the *Book of the Healing* (*Kitāb al-Šifā'*), and presents Avicenna's more extensive reworking of Porphyry's *Isagoge*. The *Kitāb al-Šifā'* has a peculiar character, due to the circumstances of its composition: the *summa* originated as Avicenna's answer to a request of his fellow scholars, who felt the need of a systematic commentary on the Aristotelian *corpus*<sup>1</sup>. The result does not perfectly match the original request: if the *Šifā'* is by far the work in which Avicenna shows the most his allegiance to previous exegetical tradition, nonetheless it can hardly be considered as a mere scholastic commentary on the Aristotelian *corpus*. Rather, it offers much more than that. More in particular, the section of Logic of which the *Kitāb al-Madḥal* is part preserves the core of Avicenna's own philosophy inside a structure that is remarkably traditional; the result is a constant interplay between traditional and original elements that is the peculiar trait of the *Šifā'*.

Due to the special nature of the entire *summa*, the *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, far from being Avicenna's only reworking of Porphyry's doctrine of the predicables, offers nonetheless a unique standpoint to study Avicenna's own developments of the theory of the predicables. This study can be fruitfully conducted with regard to the *Kitāb al-Madḥal* from a twofold perspective, historical and philosophical at one and the same time. Generally speaking, two interrelated tendencies emerge in Avicenna's elaboration of his doctrine of the predicables: an exegetical one, in the attempt to provide a consistent exegesis of the authorities (in the specific case of the doctrine of the predicables, Porphyry and Aristotle), and a theoretical one, in the effort to define the doctrine of the predicables within a coherent and original philosophical system.

The purpose of the following *General Introduction* is to display the fructuous interaction between traditional and original elements with regard both to the structure (section I) and the contents (sections II-III) of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḥal*. Focusing on the contents, the present *General Introduction* shall attempt to provide a reconstruction of the salient points of Avicenna's doctrine of the predicables whose core is presented in the *Kitāb al-Madḥal* (section III) in the more general framework of Avicenna's original redefinition of the epistemological status of Logic as a science (section II). The reconstruction provided will hopefully succeed in showing the main points of originality of Avicenna's doctrine of the predicables and their roots in Avicenna's dialectic with the exegetical tradition.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. AL-ĞÜZĞĀNĪ, *Introduction*, §1.3 (with the *Commentary* on the paragraph) and AL-ĞÜZĞĀNĪ, *Biography of Avicenna*, p. 54.2-5.

## I. THE STRUCTURE OF *KITĀB AL-MADḤAL*: A BALANCE OF TRADITIONAL AND INNOVATIVE ASPECTS

The *Kitāb al-Madḥal* is structured into two treatises: the first one is devoted to the study of Porphyry's five predicables singularly taken, a comparison among which is introduced in the second one. The first treatise, which encompasses fourteen chapters, may be further divided into two sections, namely an introductory section (chapters 1-8), and the core of Avicenna's exposition of the five universal utterances (chapters 9-14).

More in detail, the introductory section encompassing chapters I.1-8 is composed, on its turn, of two minor sections: the first one (chapters I.1-4) may be defined as "prolegomenic", since it copes with some traditional points that are part of the traditional scheme of the Late Antique prolegomena<sup>2</sup>. The second one (chapters I.5-8) introduces the exposition concerning Porphyry's five predicables: Avicenna starts in chap. I.5 the traditional division of the signifying utterances aimed at attaining the five predicables through a dihairetical process revealing their features. The first step is the division of the signifying utterance into simple and composite: since the inquiry into the simple precedes the inquiry into the composite, Avicenna proceeds dividing the simple utterances into universal and particular. Then, given that no scientific knowledge of particular things can be attained<sup>3</sup>, Avicenna leaves aside the particular utterances and proceeds dividing the universal utterance into the utterances that are univocally predicated and those that are derivatively predicated, stating that philosophers only deal with the univocally predicated ones. At this point, Avicenna does not proceed further in the division of the universal simple utterances that are univocally predicated of their subject, claiming that he has to depart from the "traditional path" (*al-mu'tād min al-ṭuruq*) in order to achieve his goals (*Madḥal* I.5, §4.3).

Notably, this interruption in *Madḥal* I.5 is followed by the beginning of a discussion of the senses in which "essential" and "accidental" are meant, and chapters I.6-7 deal with two traditional ways of defining the "essential" that are both criticized by Avicenna. Finally, in chap. I.8 the division of the simple universal utterance into its five sections is accomplished, and the division of the utterances restarts from the point it stopped in chap. I.5 with the division of the utterances into essential and accidental. Seemingly, Avicenna was unsatisfied with the traditional definitions of "essential" and "accidental", which might be the reason why he stopped the traditional division of the

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<sup>2</sup> More in detail, chap. 1 is an introduction to the whole *Book of the Healing*, whereas chapters 2-4 are meant to be an introduction on the sciences and on logic, with an inquiry into the utility (*manfa'a*) and the subject (*mawḍū'*) of logic. For a study of the traditional schemes of *prolegomena*, cf. MANSFELD 1994.

<sup>3</sup> On the impossibility of defining particulars and having demonstrative knowledge of them, cf. ARIST., *Met.* Z15, 1039b27-1040a7.

utterance in order to redefine the two key concepts and to proceed dividing the utterances by means of the redefined notions, in order to achieve a correct division into five universal simple utterances. In sum, chapters I.6-7 appear to form a sort of ‘Avicennian interpolation’ within a traditional introductory scheme. With the end of chapter I.8 the introductory section ends, and the exposition of the arguments starts to parallel that of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* up to chap. II.3, with the macroscopic exception of chap. I.12, which has no parallel in Porphyry’s text, and shows Avicenna’s acquaintance with the posterior exegetical tradition (see Tab. 1 below). Other exceptions to the parallelism with Porphyry’s *Isagoge* are represented by some excursus in Avicenna’s exposition that are, once again, reminiscent of the later exegetical tradition, and that are exclusively found in *Madḥal* (cf. e.g. *Madḥal* I.9, §2, containing a digression on definition and description absent in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, that was introduced by the Alexandrian exegetical tradition). With regard to this first section, a comparison with the *Mantiq* of the *Mašriqiyyūn* is quite instructive<sup>4</sup>. Observably, the exposition of the predicables as proposed by Porphyry is replaced in the *Mašriqiyyūn* by Avicenna’s own classification of the predicables, based on their being essential, concomitant or accidental with respect to their subjects, and by Aristotle’s own exposition in the *Topics: Mašriqiyyūn, Mantīq*, pp. 52.4-53.12 on the genus is arguably closer to Aristotle’s own classification of the predicables than to Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. It might be argued that, were it not for the close adherence of the *Šifā*’ to the Aristotelian *corpus*, Avicenna would rather not duplicate the dissertation on the universal predicables, and tend to prefer Aristotle’s exposition of the predicables, trying to harmonize it with Porphyry’s.

Chapters 1-3 of the second treatise deal with the analogies and the differences between the five predicables, which is the object of the second section of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (pp. 13.9-22.13). Avicenna contends the necessity of a dissertation on the similarities and the divergences between the five universals (*Madḥal* II.1, §1.1), which might account for the absence of a dissertation of this sort in other Avicennian reworkings of the *Isagoge* (see Tab. 1)<sup>5</sup>. Despite Avicenna’s ungenerous judgement on the use of this second section of Porphyry’s work, the section is interesting for two reasons, namely a historical and a doctrinal one. From the historical standpoint, it preserves some recognizable quotations of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* that allow to infer that, in all likelihood, Avicenna relied on Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī’s translation of the text<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> The *Mašriqiyyūn* appear as a sort of ‘twin-work’ of the *Šifā*’: they are introduced in *Madḥal* I.1, §3.2, where they are characterized in a specular manner as a work way less adherent to the traditional pattern than the *Šifā*’.

<sup>5</sup> Only one feature shared by the five universals mentioned in chap. II.1, §1.2 is also mentioned *Hidāya*, p. 68.3-4 and *Išārāt*, p. 245.1-6, namely that they are all synonymously predicated.

<sup>6</sup> It is the translation preserved in MS BnF ar. 2346 (the so-called “Arabic *Organon*”), the only extant Arabic translation of the text in its entirety. Witnesses of the same Arabic translation are the *lemmata* in the long commentary on the *Isagoge* by Ibn al-Ṭayyib (*Tafsīr Kitāb*

On the doctrinal level, Avicenna's subtle reassessment of the theory of the predicables can be appreciated in this allegedly traditional and superfluous dissertation as well<sup>7</sup>.

The presence of chapter II.4 at the end of the work is quite remarkable. It has no correspondence in Porphyry's work, nor in the subsequent exegetical tradition; moreover, it consists in an exposition that counts not many parallels in other Avicennian works. To my knowledge, the closest parallel is represented by a chapter preserved in at least two manuscripts of the '*Uyūn al-Ḥikma*, where it is added to the section of Logic<sup>8</sup>. The interesting point is that the subject-matter of the chapter, i.e. the compositions between the predicables, might be meant to bridge the gap between the theory of the predicables in *Madḥal* and the theory of demonstration in *Burhān*, since one of the points at stake is determining which predicables can be assumed in the premises of the syllogisms. The presence of this dissertation at the end of *Madḥal* represents almost an *unicum* in Avicenna's production, and contributes to demonstrate how privileged of a perspective this work provides to scholars.

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*Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs*, ed. by K. Gyekye) and the translation preserved in ms. Ambros. &105sup. (edited in BAFFIONI 2011; a study of the manuscript is provided in BAFFIONI 2012). Other Arabic translations of the *Isagoge* are attested, although no longer extant: Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist*, p. 244 reports that Ayyūb Ibn Al-Qāsim Al-Raqqī (d. 840 ca.) translated Porphyry's *Isagoge* from a Syriac translation into Arabic. Another translation from a Syriac version into Arabic might have been that of Ḥunayn Ibn Ishāq: two scholia in MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 149<sup>v</sup> quote fragments of Ḥasan Ibn Suwār's commentary on the *Isagoge*, in which Ibn Suwār compares the Arabic translation of Dimašqī with the Syriac one of Athanasius, which he quotes in the Arabic translation of Ibn Ishāq (see also *Commentary* on I.11, §4.2.1). Moreover, Porphyry's *Isagoge* might have made its first appearance in the Arabic world before all the aforementioned translations with an epitome of logic written by Muhammad Ibn Al-Muqaffā' (d. 815 ca.), whose text is preserved and edited (*Manṭiq Ibn Al-Muqaffā'*, ed. Dānishpazūh, Teheran, 1978). Some bits of quotation from Porphyry's *Isagoge* in *Madḥal* allow to argue for Avicenna's reliance on the translation by Abū 'Utmān al-Dimašqī, since some peculiar mistakes that affect the translation also affect Avicenna's quotations; for an analysis of these cases, see *Commentary* on I.11, §4.2.1; II.1, §2.2; II.2, §2.3; II.3, §5; II.3, §7. The quasi totality of the cases that allow such a reconstruction are in the second treatise: this is due to the fact that the second treatise proceeds by quoting or paraphrasing Porphyry's *lemmata* and commenting on them, so that the number of quotations of the text is higher.

<sup>7</sup> As an example, see the introduction of synonymous predication as a feature shared by the five predicables in *Madḥal* II.1, §1.2; cf. *General Introduction*, §III.3 on the significance of innovation within Avicenna's doctrine of the predicables.

<sup>8</sup> The additional chapter at the end of the Logic of '*Uyūn al-Ḥikma* is only preserved in MSS İstanbul, Ahmet III 3268 and Roma, Vat. ar. 977, according to Badawī's note to the edition, being absent in the other witnesses employed for the edition and in Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's commentary on the '*Uyūn al-Ḥikma*.

Conclusively, a preliminary overview of the structure of the work suggests that a systematic inquiry into *Kitāb al-Madḥal* can provide a privileged insight into doctrines whose exposition has few or no parallels in the rest of Avicenna's production.

**Tab. 1.** *The structure of Avicenna's Madḥal compared to the exegetical tradition and to Avicenna's other main works*

<i>Madḥal</i>	<b>Porph., Isag.</b>	<b>Exegetical tradition</b>	<b>Avicennian parallels<sup>9</sup></b>
I.1	...	...	...
I.2	...	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 11.6-16.20; 23.23-24; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 25.24-34.25; 39.31-33; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim I-IV	<i>Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 5.1-8.14
I.3	...	Cf. AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 23.19-23; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 36.31-38.26; cf. IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim V	<i>Hidāya</i> , p. 64.3-4; <i>Naḡāt, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 7.1-9.8; <i>Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 9.1-10.14; <i>Išārāt</i> , pp. 167.1-178.3
I.4	...	V	<i>Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq</i> , p. 10.15-20; <i>Išārāt</i> , pp. 179.1-186.10
I.5	...	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 60.7-16; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 35.14-36.10; PS.-ELIAS (DAVID), <i>In Isag.</i> , 52.9-29; cf. IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim V	<i>Hidāya</i> , pp. 64.5-65.5; <i>Uyūn al-Ḥikma, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 1.1-2.6; <i>Al-Risāla al-Mūḡaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq</i> (Appendix A, §1-3); <i>Naḡāt, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 9.9-9.8-12.10; <i>Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 11.1-12.13; <i>Išārāt</i> , pp. 191.1-197.16
I.6	...	Cf. AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 33.2-16; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 36.4-19	Cf. <i>Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 12.14-14.14; <i>Išārāt</i> , pp. 199.1-222.9
I.7	...	...	<i>Hidāya</i> , pp. 65.6-66.4; <i>Uyūn al-Ḥikma, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 2.7-10; <i>Al-Risāla al-Mūḡaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq</i> (Appendix A, §4.1; §4.4; §5); <i>Naḡāt, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 12.11-14.6; <i>Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq</i> , pp. 14.15-20.11; <i>Išārāt</i> , p. 187.1-13; pp. 223.1-232.3
I.8	...	Cf. AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 31.14-33.24; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 36.19-30	
I.9	1.17-3.20	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 47.1-69.11; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 50.6-60.19; DAVID, <i>In Isag.</i> , 121.19-142.21;	<i>Hidāya</i> , p. 66.6-7; <i>Uyūn al-Ḥikma, Manṭiq</i> , p. 2.11; <i>Al-Risāla al-Mūḡaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq</i>

<sup>9</sup> The comparison is made systematically with Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Hidāya*, *Kitāb 'Uyūn al-Ḥikma*, *Risāla Mūḡaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq*, *Kitāb al-Naḡāt*, *Mašriqiyyūn* and *Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt*.

		IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-taʿlīm VIII-IX	(Appendix A, §4.2); <i>Nağāt, Mantīq</i> , pp. 14.7-15.5; <i>Işārāt</i> , pp. 233.1-234.4
I.10		AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 69.12-91.21; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 60.20-76.24; DAVID, <i>In Isag.</i> , 142.22-172.20;	<i>Hidāya</i> , p. 66.8-12; <i>ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, Mantīq</i> , p. 2.13; <i>Al-Risāla al-Mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq</i>
I.11	3.21-8.6	IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-taʿlīm X-XIII	(Appendix A, §4.2-3); <i>Nağāt, Mantīq</i> , pp. 15.6-16.1; <i>Işārāt</i> , pp. 233.1-236.15
I.12	...	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 41.10-42.26; 61.20-21; 68.25- 69.11; 90.9-25; 117.15-118.5; cf. <i>In Isag.</i> , 85.26- 86; 119.7-9; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 48.15-30; DAVID, <i>In Isag.</i> , 113.11-29; PS.-ELIAS (DAVID), <i>In Isag.</i> , 68.28-69.21; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-taʿlīm VII	<i>Al-Risāla al-Mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq</i> (Appendix A, §7)
I.13	8.7-12.11	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 91.22-108.19; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 76.25-88.31; DAVID, <i>In Isag.</i> , 172.21-200.7; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-taʿlīm XIV-XV	<i>Hidāya</i> , p. 67.1-3; <i>ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, Mantīq</i> , p. 2.12; <i>Al-Risāla al-Mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq</i> (Appendix A, §4.4); <i>Nağāt, Mantīq</i> , p. 16.2-7; <i>Işārāt</i> , pp. 238.1-240.9
I.14	12.12-22 12.23-13.8	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 108.20-115.2; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 89.1-93.8; DAVID, <i>In Isag.</i> , 200.8-207.36; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-taʿlīm XVI	<i>Hidāya</i> , p. 67.4-7; <i>ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, Mantīq</i> , p. 2.14-15; <i>Al-Risāla al-Mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq</i> (Appendix A, §5); <i>Nağāt, Mantīq</i> , pp. 16.8-17.8; <i>Işārāt</i> , pp. 241.1-244.9
II.1	13.9-21 13.22-14.12 14.13-15.8	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 115.3-119.9; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 93.9-97.5; DAVID, <i>In Isag.</i> , 208.1-214.27; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-taʿlīm XVII	Cf. <i>Hidāya</i> , p. 68.3-4 and <i>Işārāt</i> , p. 245.1-6
II.2	15.9-13 15.14-24 16.1-7 16.8-18 16.19-17.2 17.3-18.9	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 119.20-124.12; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 97.6-100.25; DAVID, <i>In Isag.</i> , 214.28-219.25; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-taʿlīm XVII	...
II.3	18.10-14 18.15-	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 124.13-125.20; ELIAS, <i>In Isag.</i> , 100.26-	...

19.3	102.36 [ <i>deest</i> DAVID]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
19.4-9	[ <i>desunt</i> Ammonius, David]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
19.10-15	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 125.21-22; [ <i>deest</i> DAVID]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
19.16-19	[ <i>desunt</i> Ammonius, David]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
19.20-20.10	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 126.1-10; [ <i>deest</i> DAVID]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
20.11-15	[ <i>desunt</i> Ammonius, David]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
20.16-21.3	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 127.1-4; [ <i>deest</i> DAVID]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
21.4-7	[ <i>desunt</i> Ammonius, David]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
21.8-19	AMMON., <i>In Isag.</i> , 127.5-128.3; [ <i>deest</i> DAVID]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
21.20-22.3	[ <i>desunt</i> Ammonius, David]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII
22.4-13	[ <i>desunt</i> Ammonius, David]; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, <i>Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs</i> , al-ta'lim XVIII

II.4 ... *Uyūn al-Ḥikma, Manṭiq*, pp. 14.7-15.11; cf. also *Al-Risāla al-Mūḡaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq* (Appendix A, §6)

## II. FREEING LOGIC FROM METAPHYSICS?

### II.1. AVICENNA'S PROGRAM: A 'DE-ONTOLOGIZATION' OF LOGIC

In a renowned programmatic statement at the beginning of the work (*Madḥal* I.1, §2), Avicenna underlines his intention to pursue in the *Šifā'* a clear-cut distinction between logical and metaphysical matters<sup>10</sup>. Among the doctrines dealt with in Logic that should be expected to be affected the most by a process of 'de-ontologization' of the discipline there are the doctrine of the categories and that of the universals, which show several points of contact with Metaphysics. Avicenna's original program must have entailed, on the one hand, expelling the doctrine of the categories from Logic to relocate it in Metaphysics and, on the other, maintaining the doctrine of the universals in Logic, where it is assigned a prominent role, though freeing it from metaphysical questions. Observably, such an original program was partly unattended in the *Šifā'*, where the categories are both dealt with in the section of Logic and in that of Metaphysics, despite Avicenna's dissatisfaction with this solution<sup>11</sup>, and the dissertation on the universals in the *Kitāb al-Madḥal* touches several points that pertain to Metaphysics, despite Avicenna's efforts in the direction of the distinction of the logical and the metaphysical grounds<sup>12</sup>. This might be due both to a certain allegiance to the traditional works on the subject in which logical and metaphysical matters were deeply interrelated<sup>13</sup>, and to a real tension in the definition of the reciprocal relations between Logic and Metaphysics<sup>14</sup>. Metaphysics plays in Avicenna's system a foundational role with respect to the subject-matter of the other sciences, and it can be argued that the discipline of Logic is no exception<sup>15</sup>. This implies a certain degree of detachment from Aristotle's view of Logic as an

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<sup>10</sup> The passage is also discussed in BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 272. Quite interestingly, the intrusion of metaphysical subjects in a logical dissertation is also reproached to Plato in Avicenna's reworking of Aristotle's *Elenchi Sophistici* (*Šifā'*, *Safsafa* II.6, p. 114.11-14), where the object of Avicenna's attack is Plato's *Sophist*. It might be worth questioning whether the contamination of Logic with metaphysical subject-matters was perceived by Avicenna as a distinctive mark of Platonic Logic.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Šifā'*, *Maqūlāt* I.1, pp. 4.15-5.11. On Avicenna's attitude towards the dissertation on the categories in the *Šifā'* and in other works, see CAMINADA 2016, p. 197 and n. 7.

<sup>12</sup> See GUTAS 2014, p. 287 and pp. 300-303 (respectively, on the study of the universals and the categories in Metaphysics), BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 300-301 and BERTOLACCI 2011b, p. 37.

<sup>13</sup> The question whether Porphyry intended to separate the logical and the metaphysical levels in his works is a debated one. On the possibility to read in Porphyry's *Isagoge* an attempt at separating Logic from Metaphysics, see EBBESEN 1990 and BARNES 2003; against this possibility, see CHIARADONNA 2016, p. 325, who grounds his objection in the massive presence of ontology in Porphyry's logical works (cf. also CHIARADONNA 2008).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. BERTOLACCI 2011b, esp. pp. 50-51.

<sup>15</sup> BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 272-279; Id. 2011b, p. 29. On the origin of the view of Metaphysics as a founding science and its permeation in the Arabic tradition, see BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 294-300 and Id. 2007, pp. 65-73.

instrument of philosophy, since it entails providing Logic with the epistemological status of a science. This significant part of Avicenna's original contribution to the discipline of Logic can be especially appreciated in the *Kitāb al-Madḥal*: the work contains the kernel of Avicenna's operation, consisting in (i) assessing the amphibious status of the discipline of Logic, which is both an instrument for the other sciences and a science itself (*Madḥal* I.2, §2); (ii) describing its use and function as an instrument for the other disciplines (*Madḥal* I.3); (iii) providing the epistemological status of Logic as a science, also defining its relation to Metaphysics (*Madḥal* I.4). These sections of the work, together with some *loci classici* usually taken into account regarding Avicenna's view on the subject-matter of Logic (*Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2 and *Burhān* II.6-7) and other passages rarely, not to say never, taken into account in this regard (like *Šifā'*, *Qiyās* I.2, *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579-585 and *Ta'liqāt*, pp. 502.4-506.12 Mousavian/167.14-168.25 Badawī)<sup>16</sup>, are employed in what follows in the attempt to reconstruct a more accurate portrait of the epistemological status of Logic and of the precise role that the doctrine of universals at stake in *Madḥal* plays in it.

## II.2. THE STATUS OF LOGIC AS BOTH AN INSTRUMENT AND AN INDEPENDENT DISCIPLINE

The question concerning the status of Logic is raised in *Madḥal* I.2, §2.3. From a purely Aristotelian perspective, Logic is as an *instrument* for the other disciplines<sup>17</sup>; the post-Aristotelian tradition started to acknowledge Logic a status progressively more alike to that of the other sciences, as a result of a harmonizing interpretation of the Peripatetic and the Platonic tradition. The Late Antique commentaries of Ammonius' school account for the existence of a debate concerning the question whether Logic is an instrument or a part of philosophy. Traditionally, this subject was dealt with at the beginning of the commentaries on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*<sup>18</sup>, as in Alexander's and Themistius' commentaries, according to Elias<sup>19</sup>. An exception with respect to this prevalent traditional pattern is represented by Olympiodorus, who dealt

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<sup>16</sup> The ground-breaking article by A. I. Sabra on this subject did acknowledge the importance of an analysis of *Qiyās* I.2 (SABRA 1980, p. 764), though without going through it in greater detail. To my knowledge, neither the *Mubāḥaṭāt* nor the *Ta'liqāt* have been thoroughly examined yet, as far as the subject-matter of Logic is concerned.

<sup>17</sup> The view that Logic is an instrument for the other disciplines was received by the Peripatetic tradition on the basis of passages like ARIST. *Top.* Θ14, 163b9-11; cf. SORABJI 2005, vol. 3, p. 32.

<sup>18</sup> AMMON., *In An. Pr.*, pp. 8.15-11.21; PHILOP., *In Anal. Pr.*, pp. 6.19-9.24; ELIAS, *In Anal. Pr.*, pp. 134.8-137.3.

<sup>19</sup> ELIAS, *In Anal. Pr.*, p. 134.4-7. Alexander dealt with the subject in his commentary on *Prior Analytics* (pp. 1.3-4.29). As to what concerns Themistius, Elias' testimony witnesses the existence of a no-more extant commentary on *Prior Analytics*; cf. the note in the critical apparatus in WESTERINK 1961, p. 134: "*in commentario genuino nunc deperdito*".

with the status of Logic in his commentary on the *Categories*<sup>20</sup>. All the said commentaries of Ammonius' school followed the same pattern in the discussion of the subject, displaying three positions, proceeding to the refutation of some of them and, finally, assessing a solution. The three positions exposed in these commentaries are: (1a) the view ascribed to the Stoics that Logic is a *part* (μέρος) of Philosophy; this position is very close to the second one (1b), consisting in the view that some Platonic philosophers reportedly ascribed to Plato himself, namely that Logic is the worthiest part (τιμιώτατον μέρος) of philosophy. Finally, the third position (2) is the traditional Peripatetic view that Logic is an instrument (ὄργανον) of philosophy. The Stoics' view that Logic is a part of philosophy (1a) is refuted, as well as the ascription of an analogous opinion (1b) to Plato that some Platonics had allegedly supported<sup>21</sup>. The Peripatetic view (2), on the other hand, is neither explicitly endorsed nor refuted, but the final position consists in a reassessment of a 'genuine' Platonic position, consisting in the fact that Logic is both *part* and *instrument* of philosophy at one and the same time<sup>22</sup>. There is evidence that Avicenna's contemporaries of the Peripatetic school of Baǧdād were well acquainted with the Alexandrian dissertation on this subject matter, on which the Arabic dissertations concerning the same problem were modelled: for instance, Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn al-Ṭayyib inserted an identical doxographical dissertation on the status of Logic among the introductory materials of his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*<sup>23</sup>.

Avicenna himself is evidently aware of a similar debate, as shown by his explicit reference at the end of *Madḥal* I.2, §2.3 to 'disputes' (*al-mušāǧarāt*) on the subject, defined as vain and superfluous<sup>24</sup>. In the passage at stake, the subject is briefly

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<sup>20</sup> OLYMPIOD., *In Cat.*, pp. 14.12-18.12.

<sup>21</sup> This position is not effectively Plato's own, and might actually derive from Plot., *Enn.*, I.3.5.8-9, where Plotinus defines Dialectics as τίμιον μέρος of philosophy: cf. HADOT 1990, p. 187. The confusion implies that in the commentaries of Ammonius' school the term διαλεκτική is taken as substantially synonymous of λογική, as in Philoponus' commentary.

<sup>22</sup> HADOT 1990, p. 187 suggests that this might be a position elaborated in the Academic tradition, partly under the influence of Stoicism; ALEXAND., *In Anal. Pr.* p. 2.33ff., for instance, already hints at some of his predecessors that distinguished two aspects of Logic, i.e. its theoretical aspect and its utility for other disciplines, that prelude to the consideration of Logic as both a part and an instrument of philosophy. Philoponus (*In Anal. Pr.*, p. 9.17-20) justifies the ascription of such a view to Plato by claiming that it can be inferred from his dialogues (in the *Phaedo* and in the *Phaedrus*, Logic would be a part of philosophy, whereas in *Parmenides* Logic would be an instrument).

<sup>23</sup> *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāǧūǧī li-Furfūriyūs*, pp. 26.9-27.6; at the end of the passage, Ibn al-Ṭayyib states that, with this dissertation, the introductory sections of the Alexandrians (*al-Iskandariyyūn*) are completed.

<sup>24</sup> Whether Avicenna got acquainted with the debate directly, i.e. through one of the said Late Antique commentaries translated into Arabic, or indirectly, i.e. through the references to those commentaries in his contemporaries' works, can hardly be ascertained.

exposed, and the apparent contradiction is solved by claiming that the two views are only apparently mutually contradictory, since they presuppose two different ways of considering the domain of philosophy. The tension between Logic seen from the perspective of its utility for theoretical and practical sciences and Logic seen as a science in its own right with a full-fledged epistemological foundation, is evident in the *Šifā'* and also thematized in *Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq*, p. 5.12-18, where Logic is said to be one of the fundamental sciences, but is contrasted to the domains of theoretical and practical philosophy because of its instrumental nature, and *ibid.*, p. 8.8-14, where Logic is called 'instrumental science' (*al-ilm al-ālī*). Logic is a science, but its exceptional instrumental character with respect to the other sciences is due to the fact that it provides the principles for acquiring knowledge of the unknown (*ibid.*, pp. 5.19-6.1). An analogous tension, even if less explicitly thematized, is present in Al-Fārābī, according to which Logic is an instrument and, at the same time, a science whose principles are ascertained by Metaphysics: according to this latter aspect, Logic has a status analogous to Natural Science and Mathematics<sup>25</sup>.

The problem is solved by Avicenna at the beginning of the section corresponding to *Prior Analytics* (*Šifā'*, *Qiyās* I.2). The relation between the view that Logic is an instrument and the view that it is a part of philosophy is described as the relation between a more general (*a'amm*) notion – Logic as a part of philosophy – and a more specific one (*aḥaṣṣ*) – Logic as an instrument of philosophy – that are not in mutual contradiction, so that everything is an instrument of science, is also a part of it, but not the reverse (T1).

**T1.** *Šifā'*, *Qiyās* I.2, pp. 10.4-11.9

«[(a)] You have already understood the subject-matter of Logic, and it has become clear to you how the error occurred with regard to this subject; also, you have already learnt in general how Logic is a part of philosophy and how it is an instrument, and that there is no contradiction between those who consider it as a part and those who consider it as an instrument. [(b)] If the subject-matter of Logic is assumed inasmuch as it is one of the existing beings and philosophy includes what is science of the existing beings, no matter how they are, Logic is a part of philosophy that knows the

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, pp. 68.11-69.1 on the instrumental value of the rules of Logic, and pp. 120.10-121.1, on Logic as a science with a specific subject, whose principles are verified in Metaphysics. According to Al-Fārābī, Logic is an instrument when employed in this way in the other parts of the science: cf. *Risāla šudira bihi al-kitāb*, p. 227.23-25. This passage is not in contrast with a more general view of Logic as a science with its own subject-matter and with a definite epistemological status displayed in the *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, since it specifies that Logic is an instrument *when it is employed as an instrument in other sciences*, which by no means entails that it cannot be considered in a different manner when it is not employed in other sciences. I would therefore be more inclined not to represent Fārābī's view on the status of Logic as a purely Aristotelian one, stating the instrumental character of the discipline (for a different interpretation, cf. GERMANN 2008, pp. 9-10).

states of certain beings<sup>26</sup> whose state and nature is to notify how the unknown is acquired through them or how they help in this regard. Insofar as this state is something that belongs properly to some existing beings, or it is an essential accident for them, or [even] something constitutive, this is an inquiry into the existent insofar as it is an existence in a certain state, so that it is one of the sciences. But since, secondarily, this knowledge with regard to this [kind of] being happens to be useful to the knowledge of other items, this knowledge, which is a certain knowledge itself, is an instrument for another knowledge; what is more, its most outstanding purpose is its utility for another knowledge. Thus, the fact that it is knowledge of a part of the existing beings corresponds to the fact that it is a part of philosophy, and, as to the fact that it is a knowledge of a part of the existent beings insofar as it is useful with regard to another knowledge, that utility corresponds to the fact that it is an instrument. [(c)] The fact that Logic is a part is more general than its being an instrument, and it is not a part of the thing for which it is an instrument: in fact, it is not a part of that to which it is an instrument, since that is the sciences that are measured by Logic and weighed by the expression<sup>27</sup>. It is rather a part of science in absolute that embraces all those sciences. The fact of being “Logic” is in virtue of its being an instrument, and in virtue of its being an instrument a more general notion than the instruments can be also predicated of it, as well as “animal” can be predicated of man in virtue of the latter’s being a man, and he is also said to be “living”. The difference between its being a part and its being an instrument is not the difference that is between two notions absolutely different, but between two notions one of which is more specific and the other more general. Everything is an instrument for the sciences in this way is [also] a part of science in absolute, though not the reverse».

Section [a] in T1 quickly recapitulates *Madḥal* I.4, §3 and I.2, §2. Section [b] states that the domain of inquiry of Logic encompasses a certain class of beings, i.e. mental beings, that show how knowledge of the unknown is attained from something previously known. Among the objects studied in Logic there are the predicables that form the non-declarative statements that provide conceptualization (*taṣawwur*) and the declarative statements that provide assent (*taṣḍīq*), which are two fundamental steps in the process of acquisition of knowledge<sup>28</sup>. Considered insofar as it studies the accidents of a certain kind of beings (more specifically, secondary notions), Logic is a science; considered insofar as this study is an essential tool for other sciences because it allows to grant the validity of the process of acquisition of knowledge, Logic is an instrument of philosophy. As an instrument for the other sciences, Logic plays a pivotal role in Avicenna’s epistemology: it is an indispensable tool in the acquisition

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<sup>26</sup> I.e. to mental beings.

<sup>27</sup> The objection that an instrument cannot be a part of that for which it is an instrument, so that Logic cannot be considered at one and the same time both a part and an instrument of philosophy, was already discussed in the Late Antique tradition: cf. PHILOP., *In Anal. Pr.*, pp. 7.23-8.21.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. the classification of the statements that provide conceptualization and assent in *Madḥal* I.3, §2.3.1 and §2.3.2. See also MADKOUR 1934, pp. 54-56.

of knowledge, a process of which human instinct alone is not able to assure the correct achievement<sup>29</sup>. Thus, the purely Peripatetic position of Logic as an instrument is held as valid<sup>30</sup>: the fact itself that Logic is an instrument of the other sciences entails its being a part of philosophy as the specific notion entails the general one (section [c] in T1).

### II.3. LOGIC AS A SCIENCE: ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS

If Logic is admitted being a science, the main challenge Avicenna must face is the definition of its epistemological status based on the criteria enounced in *Burhān* II.6, p. 155.4-10, namely that every science has a subject-matter whose existence is established in a different discipline and of which the science studies the *per se* accidents. Hence, three elements must be individuated to define Logic as a science, namely (a) its subject-matter, (b) the accidents of it that are studied in Logic and (c) the science that founds the existence of the subject-matter.

#### (a) *The subject-matter*

The definition of the subject-matter of Logic (a) had been the object of an intense and long-lasting dispute between logicians and grammarians which involved the fundamental issue of defining the precise boundaries of the subject of each of the two disciplines<sup>31</sup>. The first impulse to the debate was given by the possible overlap of the subjects of Logic and grammar, both apparently dealing with utterances, which was a rather undesired outcome in the framework of the attempt at justifying the epistemological status of both grammar and Logic as autonomous disciplines. Among the different strategies that were employed to distinguish the approaches of the two disciplines to the utterances, the one that had a relatively great fortune within the school of Baǧdād is based on the Late Antique commentaries of the Alexandrian school, where Logic is said to deal with those utterances that are significative and that

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Madḥal* I.3, §3.1-4 and MICHOT 2000, pp. 68\*-88\*.

<sup>30</sup> For other descriptions of Logic as an instrument in Avicenna's works, cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 316-322. In *Qiyās* I.2, p. 11.9-10 Avicenna mentions an excellent among the later philosophers (*fāḍil al-muta'ahḥirīn*) as a supporter of a purely Peripatetic view that Logic is an instrument and not a part of philosophy. The identity of this anonymous philosopher is unknown: see STREET 2001, suggesting a possible identification with Al-Fārābī, and BERTOLACCI 2005b, pp. 500-501. The purely Peripatetic position, considering Logic as an instrument of philosophy, had also a fortune in Late Antique Syriac philosophy; cf. e.g. the case of Paul the Persian (TEIXIDOR 1992, p. 132).

<sup>31</sup> Besides the renowned dispute between Abū Bišr Mattā and Abū Sa'īd Al-Sīrāfī (on which see MAHDĪ 1970, pp. 55-83, ENDRESS 1977, p. 321 and ELAMRANI-JAMAL 1983, pp. 148-163), a treatise *Fī l-farq bayna naḥw al-'Arab wa-l-manṭiq* is ascribed to Al-Kindī's disciple Aḥmad Ibn Al-Ṭayyib Al-Saraḥṣī (cf. ENDRESS 1977, p. 320 and BIESTERFELDT 2012, p. 152).

signify universal items, whereas utterances *tout court* are the object of grammar<sup>32</sup>. This distinction led to the identification of the subject-matter of Logic with the utterances insofar as they are significative of notions, a position well attested in the works composed by the Peripatetic scholars of Baġdād<sup>33</sup>. The same position is also critically addressed by Avicenna in *Madḥal* I.4, §3.1. Avicenna's answer to the problem consists in assuming as the primary subject of Logic notions rather than utterances. Even if Al-Fārābī is occasionally associated in scholarly literature to the position criticised by Avicenna<sup>34</sup>, it might be worth questioning whether he might have rather been a forerunner for Avicenna's radical shift. In fact, the subject-matter of Logic as it is represented in Al-Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 74.10-12 (cf. also Id., *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, p. 18.4-9) is twofold, consisting both in the intelligible notions insofar as they are signified by the utterances (*al-ma'qūlāt min ḥaytu tadullu 'alayhā al-alfāz*) and in the utterances insofar as they signify the intelligible notions (*wa-l-alfāz min ḥaytu hiya dālla 'alā al-ma'qūlāt*)<sup>35</sup>. It should be observed that, within the framework of this substantial mutual correspondence between language and concepts presented in the *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, Al-Fārābī occasionally pushed further this consideration (cf. *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, pp. 25.22-26.3), by claiming that, were it not for the difficulty of an inquiry of this sort, the primary object of research in Logic would be the composition of the concepts (*al-maqṣūd awwalan huwa tarkīb al-ma'qūlāt*). Apparently, the inquiry into the utterances was conceived as functional to make the inquiry into the concepts possible and was grounded in the said mutual correspondence between utterances and concepts. In the light of the passage from his *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, Al-Fārābī's

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<sup>32</sup> ELIAS, *In Isag.*, pp. 35.14-36.3 claims that non-significative utterances are dealt with by the grammarians, whereas the significative ones by the logicians; cf. YAḤYÀ IBN 'ADĪ, *Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna ṣinā'atay al-mantiq al-falsafī wa-l-naḥw al-'arabī*, pp. 182-181 and IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 68.17-19. A different strategy was employed in AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 77.8-15, according to which grammarians occupy themselves with the utterances of the language of a specific community (*umma*), whereas logicians deal with utterances with respect to their universal aspects, shared by the different communities.

<sup>33</sup> Besides YAḤYÀ IBN 'ADĪ, *Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna ṣinā'atay al-mantiq al-falsafī wa-l-naḥw al-'arabī*, pp. 182-181 and IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 68.17-19, cf. also IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb al-Maqūlāt*, p. 8.4-6, stating that the subject of Logic are the simple utterances that signify high genera (*al-alfāz al-basīṭa al-dālla 'alā al-aġnās al-'awāl*).

<sup>34</sup> See, for instance, MANDOSIO 2013, p. 324, mentioning Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 74.10-12.

<sup>35</sup> On this passage, cf. BAKAR 1989, pp. 206-207, who underlines that in the passage at stake Al-Fārābī underlines the fact that Logic mainly deals with intelligible notions. On the same passage, see STREET 2015, §2.1.1, who believes that Al-Fārābī might have ultimately held that Logic deals with secondary notions, but that this passage rather resembles the doctrine rejected by Avicenna; cf. also MANDOSIO 2013, p. 324.

position seems not only far more nuanced than its representation provided in part of the scholarly literature, but even somehow forerunning Avicenna's own developments, and might not be precisely the one critically addressed by Avicenna.

Avicenna operated a radical shift maintaining, however, a substantial mutual correspondence between utterances and notions (*Madḥal* I.4, §3.1: *al-kalām 'alā al-alfāz al-muṭābiqa li-ma 'ānīhā ka-l-kalām 'alā ma 'ānīhā*, “the discussion concerning the utterances corresponding to their notions is like the discussion concerning their notions”) together with the necessity of employing utterances. The utterances are said to be necessary under two main respects: first, because they are indispensable in dialogue and interpersonal communication (*al-muḥāṭaba wa-l-muḥāwara*)<sup>36</sup>. Second, because they are necessarily entailed in the process of discursive thought (*al-rawiyya*), in which the arrangement of the notions in the mind necessarily entails that the corresponding utterances are imagined as well. To sum up, the necessity of the utterances both for exterior and interior locution requires the logician to deal with them as well, but not as a primary subject of his discipline. The passage of *Madḥal* I.4, §3.1 was questioned by an anonymous disciple within Avicenna's circle (possibly Ibn Zayla)<sup>37</sup>, as Avicenna's reply in *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579-585, pp. 193-194 attests. Avicenna's reply recurs to the notion of “primary subject” of a discipline (*al-mawḍū' al-awwalī*) to explain that, although necessary, the inquiry into the utterances does not correspond to the primary subject of Logic, being rather somehow included in it as one of its parts or as entailed by a part of it. In other words, the inquiry into the utterances is not a primary concern (*ṣuḡl awwal*) of the logician, but it is necessary among his secondary concerns<sup>38</sup>. To sum up, Avicenna ended up overturning the traditional view and confining the inquiry into the utterances among the necessary instrumental inquiries of the discipline, aimed at studying its primary subject, i.e. the notions<sup>39</sup>. The discipline

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<sup>36</sup> The same necessity of the utterances was already noticed in the school of Alexandria: cf. ELIAS, *In Isag.*, p. 35.23-26, arguing that, were it not for the necessity of utterances when teaching, then logicians would not deal with utterances.

<sup>37</sup> For the identification of the anonymous questioner with Ibn Zayla, cf. REISMAN 2002, pp. 200-201 and 246-247.

<sup>38</sup> On the notion of ‘primary subject’, its meaning and its Farabian origin, see EICHNER 2010 and QUARTUCCI 2017, pp. 441-467.

<sup>39</sup> SABRA 1980, pp. 763-764 put rather the accent on the relevance accorded to the utterances in this passage, since “the properties constituting the subject matter of logic would be inconceivable without the exercise of a particular function of language”; cf. also STREET 2015, §2.1.2, taking over the same view. Sabra's interpretation is based on *Madḥal* I.4, §3.1, where Avicenna states that “it is impossible, for the reflection, that the notions are ordered without that their utterances are imagined together with them” (Avicenna's hint at an arrangement of the notions in the mind [*turattabu al-ma'ānī*] employs a technical psychological terminology, and should be read in the light of *Šifā'*, *Nafs* V.6, pp. 243.7-244.4; on this passage, see also ADAMSON 2004, pp. 90-91). The phrase can be understood in two different ways, namely either as assessing that utterances are necessarily required in

of Logic must have a subject-matter, which, in a very famous passage of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'*, is said to be given by the secondary intelligible notions, that 'depend on' the primary notions<sup>40</sup>.

(b) The *per se* accidents of the subject-matter

Secondary notions having been assessed as the subject-matter of Logic, what is left to know is what are the accidents and concomitants of this subject-matter specifically studied in Logic (b). A rather interesting passage of Avicenna's *Ta'liqāt* (pp. 502.4-506.12) that, to my knowledge, has not yet got its share of attention might help in individuating more precisely the subject-matter of Logic and the accidents of the subject-matter that are inquired into in Logic<sup>41</sup>. The passage is an explanation (*šarḥ*) of the aforementioned *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17-11.2.

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order to attain the arrangement of notions that constitutes the process of reasoning itself, or as assessing that utterances necessarily accompany the process of arrangement of the notions in the soul, though without causing it. Sabra's interpretation likely stems from the first of the two options: according to this reading, utterances would be the cause itself of the formation of human reasoning in the soul (p. 763: "conceptual modifications are *brought about* by modifications in the utterances"; emphasis of the author). According to the second interpretation, on the other hand, utterances are necessary concomitants of the notions insofar as it is impossible to stress a notion without the aid of the utterances, without being themselves the cause of the process of reasoning. In other words, human reasoning is always necessarily accompanied by the utterances that correspond to the notions, but it does not originate from the operations on the utterances. I would tend to think that the second possibility might account better for what Avicenna states in *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579-585, pp. 193-194, where he claims that the utterances are studied in Logic not as a primary subject, but rather as something that is either a part of the subject or *a necessary concomitant* of a part of its subject (p. 194.17: *lāzim li-mawḍū'ī l-šinā'ati*), which closely resembles the way in which the relation between utterances and notions is described in *Madḥal* I.4, §3.1.

<sup>40</sup> See *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17-11.2 and BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 272-273. On 'secondary notions' and on the possible historical origin of this expression, that is already employed in the works of Al-Fārābī, see SABRA 1980, pp. 753-757.

<sup>41</sup> The congeries of heterogeneous notes ascribed to Avicenna and transmitted under the title of *Ta'liqāt* (= GS12a in GUTAS 2014, p. 427, where it is listed among Avicenna's authentic works) is not a systematic work, and it is quite difficult to rule completely out the possibility that some scholastic material produced in Avicenna's entourage might have been included in the collection next to Avicenna's own materials. JANSSENS 1997, esp. pp. 116-118, suggested a possible production of the notes gathered under the title of *Ta'liqāt* in the context of Avicenna's activity of lecturing: the notes might have been redacted by one or more of his first-generation students during Avicenna's lessons. Be it the result of Avicenna's own elaboration or of the scholarly activity of his entourage, the view represented in the passage of the *Ta'liqāt* does not contradict Avicenna's other scanty and allusive accounts on the subject in his certainly original works and seems worthy of consideration.

**T2.** *Ta'liqāt*, pp. 502.4-503.3:

«The subject-matter of Logic is given by the secondary intelligibles that depend on the primary ones inasmuch as one is led, through them, from what is known to what is unknown<sup>42</sup>: the explanation of this is that the thing has some primary intelligibles, like 'body', 'animal' and the like, and secondary intelligibles that depend on them, namely the fact that these things are universal, particular and individual. The inquiry into the establishment (*itbāt*) of these secondary intelligibles pertains to the science of Metaphysics, and the secondary intelligibles are the subject of the science of Logic not under the respect of their existence in absolute, since the respect of their existence in absolute is established here<sup>43</sup> (and it consists in [establishing] whether they have existence in the individuals or in the soul), but according to another condition, namely that one is led by them from something [previously] known to something unknown. Establishing this condition – namely that you know that the universal can be a genus, a differentia, a species, a proprium or a common accident – pertains [again] to the science of Metaphysics. Once the general universal, the specific universal [and the like] are established in the science of Metaphysics, the universal<sup>44</sup> becomes, according to this condition, subject-matter of the science of Logic; then, the concomitants (*al-lawāzim*) and the essential accidents that occur to the universal after that are established in the science of Logic».

The primary notions are identified with the notions to which secondary notions accrue, like, for instance, the notions of 'animal', 'man' etc. (cf. *Ta'liqāt*, p. 502.4-7)<sup>45</sup>. These are the notions that, when conceptualized in mind, are apt to be universal or particular, a subject or a predicate and so on, so that secondary notions (such as universality, particularity and so on) depend on (*tastanidu ilà*) them in the sense that they accrue to them. Among the examples of concomitants provided in *Ta'liqāt*, p. 506.5-7 (T3 below) there are the fact of being a genus, a species, a differentia and so on, which are, more in particular, concomitants of universality, that is part of the subject-matter of Logic (cf. *infra* S1).

**T3.** *Ta'liqāt*, p. 506.5-7:

«Clarifying the quiddity of the universal (*al-kullī*), the particular (*al-ḡuz'ī*) and the individual (*al-šahṣī*) and that of certain concomitants (*al-lawāzim*) of these items, like generality (*al-ḡinsiyya*), differentiability (*al-faṣliyya*), speciality (*al-naw'iyya*) and their modes, pertains to Logic. Establishing their existence pertains to the First Philosophy<sup>46</sup>».

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<sup>42</sup> The passage is a quote of *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17-11.2.

<sup>43</sup> I.e. in Metaphysics.

<sup>44</sup> Reading *al-kullī* with Mousavian (p. 503.2) instead of *al-kull* as in Badawī's edition (p. 167.23).

<sup>45</sup> This interpretation is also proposed in EL-ROUAYHEB 2012, p. 83; an identification of the primary notions with the categories is proposed in SABRA 1980, pp. 753-755.

<sup>46</sup> I.e. Metaphysics.

The five predicables defined in *Madḥal* are, therefore, among the necessary concomitants (*lawāzim*) of the subject-matter of Logic (more specifically, of universality, to which is necessarily concomitant the fact of being either a genus, or a species, or a differentia, or a proprium or a common accident). In this regard, the post-Avicennian tradition was apparently puzzled by Avicenna's frequent claim that generality, speciality and the like are accidents that occur to primary notions when they are conceptualized (cf. e.g. *Madḥal* I.12, §1.2). If so, then, the assumption that every discipline studies the accidents of its subject and not the subject itself compels to admit that the subject-matter of Logic includes primary notions, of which it studies accidents like 'genus', 'species' etc.<sup>47</sup>. Understanding notions like 'genus', 'species' and so on as concomitants of the subject-matter of Logic, as T3 shows, rather than as its subject-matter itself saves Avicenna's theory of the subject-matter of Logic from similar objections. In Avicenna's perspective, the claim that 'genus', 'species' and the like are accidents of the primary notions in conceptualization would not be denied – on the contrary, it is often stated –, but it should be specified that 'genus', 'species' and the like occur to primary notions only after universality, which is the accident that attach *primarily* to primary notions. The notion of 'animal' can happen to be considered in mind as a genus of 'man' because universality – more specifically the universality that happens to be generality – occurs to it in conceptualization. The possibility itself for universality to be either generality, or speciality and so on is granted by Metaphysics, as stated in T3. Therefore, the notion of 'animal' is considered as universal, then as a genus of 'man', so that it is correct to state, as Avicenna often does, that the fact of being a genus accrues to the primary notion of 'animal' that occurs to it in conceptualization, but it occurs to that notion as a concomitant of its universality<sup>48</sup>.

(c) Metaphysics as a 'founding science' with respect to Logic

T2-3 clarified that the existence of the subject-matter of Logic, as well as the existence of a specific condition allowing the existence of the concomitants and the essential accidents of the subject-matter studied in Logic, are established in

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<sup>47</sup> This is the objection raised by Al-Ḥūnaḡī and endorsed by Al-Kātibī Al-Qazwīnī: cf. EL-ROUAYHEB 2012, pp. 73-74 and STREET 2015, §2.1.3.

<sup>48</sup> Al-Ḥūnaḡī and Al-Kātibī failed to grasp the point of Avicenna's theory concerning the relation between the concomitants of the secondary notions and the primary notions. The subsequent tradition endorsing Avicenna's theory on the subject-matter of Logic made some attempts to figure out this specific aspect. In order to explain it, a part of the following tradition elaborated the view that 'genus', 'species', 'differentia' and so on represent a third level (*al-daraḡa al-tālīta*) of notions that stem by the manipulation of the secondary notions: see, for instance, the cases of Šams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1303) and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d. 1365) presented in EL-ROUAYHEB 2012, pp. 80-81 and pp. 84-87 respectively. Avicenna does not seem to have ever elaborated a theory of third-level notions nor to have ever spoken of third notions.

Metaphysics, which means that Metaphysics is the science that founds the subject-matter of Logic (c)<sup>49</sup>. In what follows, I would suggest that, despite a certain reluctance in the scholarly tradition to read it in this way, *Madḥal* I.4, §3.2 as well might allude to this same relation between Logic and Metaphysics.

In *Madḥal* I.4, §3.2 Avicenna suggests that the supporters of the view that the subject-matter of Logic consists in the significative utterances failed to recognize that the actual subject – namely secondary notions – belongs to a different class of beings, i.e. mental beings<sup>50</sup>. The mistake might have been induced, in Avicenna’s view, by the traditional classification of the sciences based on the ontological classification of their objects, and by the idea that two disciplines cannot share the same kind of objects. According to such a classification, items that exist in the external reality might be the objects of the disciplines of Natural Philosophy and Mathematics, whereas the inquiry into the existence in mind and into how items are conceptualized in it is ascribed to the domain of inquiry of “another discipline or a part of a discipline” (*li-ṣinā ‘atin aw ḡuz’ ṣinā ‘atin*). The interpretation of this clause is delicate and crucial at the same time. A viable possibility is that of understanding that the two occurrences of ‘discipline’ in “another discipline” and “a part of a discipline” refer to one and the same discipline, which is part of a more general one. This led some scholars to identify the discipline at stake with Psychology, which is a part of Natural Philosophy<sup>51</sup>, to which Avicenna would ascribe “the inquiry into the existence that is in the mind and into how conceptualization occurs in the mind” (*al-naẓar fī l-wuḡūdi allaḏī fī l-dihni wa-annahū kayfa yutaṣawwaru fīhi*). Two main problems arise with such an interpretation: first, mental representations that do not correspond to anything in the external reality (i.e. notions like ‘universal’, ‘particular’ and so on), which are said to be the subject-matter of Logic when considered under a certain respect, are explicitly said to be among the objects of Metaphysics in *Ilāhiyyāt* I.4, p. 26.3-5. The passage states that Metaphysics ascertain also how universal natures exist in the individuals and in the soul. If, undeniably, the domain of inquiry of Psychology is related to Logic as far as the presence of the universal notions in the mind is concerned, and the reference to an inquiry into how these items are conceptualized (*wa-annahū kayfa yutaṣawwaru fīhi*) seems to fall within the domain of inquiry of Psychology, nonetheless the inquiry into the mental existence of these notions which is referred to

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<sup>49</sup> Even if *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 14.18-15.8 only mentions Natural Philosophy and Mathematics as instances of sciences that are subordinated to Metaphysics, the same arguably applies to Logic as well, as observed in BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 268 and n. 7. On the relation between Logic and Metaphysics, see BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 272-284 and 300-301.

<sup>50</sup> MADKOUR 1934, pp. 59-60 proposed an identification of these philosophers with the Stoics, then discussed in MANDOSIO 2013, p. 325 and n. 109, who individuates one of Avicenna’s possible sources in the *Tenth Letter* of the *Iḥwān al-Ṣafā’*.

<sup>51</sup> As in MANDOSIO 2013, p. 331.

in the passage at stake (*al-naẓar fī l-wuġūd allaḍī fī l-dihni*) seems to pertain rather to the metaphysical inquiry<sup>52</sup>.

Second, though not less important, in what follows Avicenna claims that the fact that a certain class of beings is the subject-matter of both Logic and this other discipline does not affect the epistemological status of Logic as an autonomous science, since it is possible for a science to share part of the subject-matter of another one, if considered under a certain specific respect. The possibility that two different disciplines share their subject, that is here just alluded to, is discussed in *Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.7, where Avicenna individuates three ways in which two disciplines can share the same subject:

(1) *Burhān* II.7, pp. 163.12-165.2 and 168.12-13: the subject of one discipline can be more general and include the subject of the other discipline as a more specific part of it, as in the case of Natural Science and Medicine. Both Medicine and a part of Natural Science assume human body as a subject, but Medicine studies it under a specific respect, namely its being in a state of illness or health.

(2) *Burhān* II.7, p. 168.13-14: the two disciplines can share just a part of their two subjects, that differ in the rest, as in the case of Medicine and Ethics.

(3) *Burhān* II.7, p. 168.14-15: the two disciplines can share an identical subject, though dealing with it under two different respects, as in the case of Natural Science and Astronomy, that both study celestial bodies.

The relation between Logic and the said “other science” is of type (1): Logic is said to deal with *a part* of the subject of the other science and to consider it *under a different, specific respect*, namely insofar as it is useful to the acquisition of knowledge. This is arguably the same relation as that between Metaphysics and the other sciences: noteworthy, the same example of Natural Philosophy and Medicine is employed in *Ilāhiyyāt*, I.2, pp. 14.18-15.8 to explain the relation between Metaphysics and the other sciences. Metaphysics provides the foundation of the other sciences because it deals with their subject matters from a different point of view and because it deals with some other doctrines that are dealt with improperly in other disciplines<sup>53</sup>; the particular sciences are subordinated to Metaphysics<sup>54</sup>. According to the principles delineated in *Burhān* II.7, an identification of the other discipline with Psychology would entail assuming that Logic is a more specific discipline of Psychology as well as Medicine is more specific than Natural Philosophy, and that Psychology plays a foundational role for Logic. None of the said conditions of relation between Logic and

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<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.4, p. 26.4-5: *wa-kayfa wuġūduhā fī l-nafs*; cf. also *Šifā'*, *Maqūlāt* I.1, p. 5.9-10: *min ġihati kayfiyyati l-wuġūd*.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 265-266.

<sup>54</sup> *Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.7, p. 165.3-7 and 11-16; cf. HASNAWI 2000, pp. 518-519, text 3 and BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 267.

Psychology is elsewhere thematized by Avicenna, as it should be expected if this were the case; on the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that a foundational role with respect to Logic, as well as with respect to the other sciences, is played by Metaphysics.

An alternative interpretation of the passage in *Madḥal* I.4, §3.2 might be understanding the occurrences of ‘discipline’ in the clause “another discipline or a part of a discipline” as referring to two different disciplines, i.e. respectively Metaphysics and Psychology as a part of Natural Science, and to understand the rest of Avicenna’s dissertation as referring exclusively – or, at least, mainly – to Metaphysics. There are several parallels in Avicenna’s Logic for such a joint mention of Metaphysics and Psychology in similar contexts: for instance, in *Madḥal* I.5, §2.2 Avicenna defers the investigation about the existence of universal notions to “a discipline or two”, which are arguably to identify with Metaphysics and Psychology. A more striking parallel is in *Šifā’*, *Maqūlāt* I.1, p. 5.9-10, where Avicenna states that the study of how the categories exist (*min ḡihati kayfiyyati l-wuḡūd*) pertains to Metaphysics, whereas the study of them inasmuch as they are conceptualized in the soul (*min ḡihati taṣawwur al-naḥs lahā*) pertains to “a part of Natural Philosophy that is contiguous to First Philosophy”, i.e. Psychology<sup>55</sup>. To sum up, the discipline Avicenna might have principally in mind in *Madḥal* I.4 is Metaphysics, and only secondarily Psychology insofar as it studies the process of conceptualization.

Consequently, Avicenna’s objection to his adversaries might be understood as follows: the first mistake they made is the bipartition itself of philosophy into sciences that study the domain of external existence and a science that studies the domain of mental existence. Avicenna would not endorse this first bipartition, since both kinds of existence fall within the domain of inquiry of the Metaphysics. The second mistake is that, even if one were to accept the adversaries’ bipartition of the philosophical sciences, they failed to recognize that the items that have a mental existence can be divided into (a) items that are conceptualized from the external reality and (b) items that are in human mind without any correspondence in the external reality, since they are not the result of conceptualization. Both items (a-b) are the object of Metaphysics<sup>56</sup>, which does not imply that they are so exclusively: items of class (b), for instance, arguably include the secondary notions that are the subject of Logic<sup>57</sup>. Avicenna individuates in the risk of an overlap between the subject of Metaphysics and that of Logic the factor that might have dissuaded his adversaries from admitting notions as the subject of Logic. What assures that the subject matter of Metaphysics and that of Logic do not overlap is not only that the subject-matter of Logic does not entirely coincide with that of the other science, but also that the items of type (b) are the subject-matter of Logic under a specific respect, namely insofar as they allow to

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<sup>55</sup> For the identification of this science with Psychology, see also GUTAS 2014, p. 301.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Šifā’*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 12.11-13.9; *Ibid.*, I.4, p. 26.3-5.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Šifā’*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17-11.2 and *Madḥal* I.2, §2.1.

attain knowledge of the unknown on the basis of a previous knowledge, which is not the respect under which these items are among the objects of Metaphysics. Avicenna's insistence on the fact that his adversaries failed to recognize the specific respect (*al-ḡiha*)<sup>58</sup> under which the subject-matter of Logic is exclusively its own subject-matter is due to the relevance that it has in allowing the individuation of a subject-matter specifically pertaining to the logical inquiry and, consequently, the definition of Logic as a science.

Adopting this second interpretation allows to recognize another reference to the foundational role of Metaphysics with respect to Logic in *Madḥal* I.4, §3.3, where Avicenna recalls a general epistemological principle exposed in *Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.6, p. 155.4-10, namely that every science has a subject of which it studies the accidents and states, and that the study of a subject in itself can pertain to a discipline, whereas the study of its accidents pertains to another. As a science, Logic shares with Natural Philosophy, Mathematics and the other sciences the fact that, unlike Metaphysics, they do not study their subjects insofar as they are existent; they rather the *per se* accidents of their subjects, whereas the inquiry into their subjects themselves pertains to Metaphysics<sup>59</sup>.

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Hopefully, the exam conducted so far helped in the attempt at understanding more precisely the main relation that subsists between Logic and its founding science, i.e. Metaphysics, and the secondary relation that subsists between Logic and Psychology, whose inquiries are tangentially related insofar as the items studied in Logic accrue to primary notions in conceptualization and the process itself of conceptualization is explained in Psychology. Also, it hopefully supported a more accurate individuation of the place occupied by the universal predicables, that are the main object of Avicenna's *Madḥal*, within the inquiry pertaining to the discipline of Logic, and which is their relation to the subject-matter of the discipline (cf. the recapitulative scheme S1 below). In what follows, the doctrine of the universals developed in *Madḥal* shall be more considered more in-depth, in the attempt at reaching a better

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<sup>58</sup> MANDOSIO 2013, p. 332 understands this term in a rather different manner: “la *partie* en vue de laquelle elle [*scil.* la Logique] a été instituée”, identified by Mandosio as the section about the Logic of judgement; this interpretation, however, is anchored to the Latin translation of the passage, which relies on an Arabic exemplar that might have been affected by a slight corruption in this point: instead of reading *wa-lā al-ḡiha allatī bihā huwa mawḍū'uhu* (“and not the respect under which it is its [*scil.* the Logic's] subject”), the Arabic exemplar of the Latin translation arguably read: *wa-lā al-ḡiha allatī bihā hiya mawḍū'a* (“and not the respect according to which it [*i.e.* the discipline of Logic] is instituted”; Lat.: *nec partem ad quam instituta est*). Part of the responsibility for the misunderstanding of the passage is taken by the masculine suffix pronoun of *mawḍū'uhu*, that refers to *manṭiq* instead of *šinā'a*, as one could possibly expect.

<sup>59</sup> *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.1-11.2.

understanding of Avicenna's purported de-ontologization of Logic taking as a test-case one of the doctrines that, as it has been assessed in what preceded, belong by full right to the domain of inquiry of Logic.

**S1. The epistemological foundation of Logic as a science**

(b) The **concomitant attributes** (*lawāzim*) of the subject-matter of Logic

(b) Generality, speciality, differentiality, etc. [= the five universal predicables + other accidents: cf. *Ta'liqāt*, p. 506.5-7 ]

↓ *Are necessarily concomitant to*

(a) The **subject-matter** (*mawḍū'*) of Logic

(a) Secondary notions (*al-ma'ānī al-ma'qūla al-tāniyya*) insofar as one attains through them knowledge of the unknown from the known; i.e. universality, particularity, individuality, being a subject of predication or a predicate etc. (cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17-11.2)

↓ *(a) + (b) Accrue to*

Primary notions like, e.g., «body», «animal», which can be universal, particular, individual etc. (cf. *Ta'liqāt*, p. 502.4.7)

(c) **Metaphysics** establishes the mental existence of the subject-matter of Logic, i.e. it finds its subject-matter (cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* I.4, p. 26.3-5: *kayfa wuḡūduhā fī l-nafs*)

**Psychology** studies the process of conceptualization of the notions in the soul (cf. *Maqūlāt* I.1, p. 5.9-10)

### III. AVICENNA'S THEORY OF THE PREDICABLES IN A 'DE-ONTOLOGIZED' LOGIC<sup>60</sup>

#### III.1. WHAT ARE THE FIVE UNIVERSAL PREDICABLES?

To begin with the fundamental question about the nature of the five predicables, according to Avicenna they are relational items that signify the kind of relation that exists between a predicate and its subject of predication<sup>61</sup>. There is no such thing that is said to be a genus, a species and the like in itself (*fī nafsihi*), but everything is such in relation (*bi-l-qiyās*) to something else<sup>62</sup>. One and the same notion can play the role of one of the five predicables with respect to a certain subject and another with respect to a different subject, so that it can be predicated as a genus of a subject A, as a species of a subject B, as a differentia of a subject C and so on<sup>63</sup>. Notions of this kind exclusively have an intellectual existence<sup>64</sup>, and correspond to the genus, species, differentia, proprium and accident that are described as 'logical' in *Madḥal* I.12 and in *Al-Risāla al-Mūğaza fī uṣūl al-mantiq*, §7 (Appendix A). They are accidental with respect to the primary notions to which they accrue in mental existence, being concomitants of universality<sup>65</sup>.

#### III.2.1. MAJOR ISSUES OF THE THEORY OF PREDICABLES

A general classification of the predicables requires a prior definition of essential and accidental predication. The first issue Avicenna deals with in his reassessment of the system of the predicables is indeed that of the exact definition of the essential predication. This is a particularly delicate subject dealt with in *Madḥal*, where it is the object of a long digression that covers chapters I.5-8 and is dealt with again in chap. I.13 and II.1 with regard to the case of the differentia specifica. The predicative status of the differentia specifica has represented one of the major interpretative challenges

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<sup>60</sup> Part of the results exposed in this section were also presented in DI VINCENZO 2015 and Ead. 2016.

<sup>61</sup> For the exact sense of the expression 'relational items' in the context, cf. MALINK 2007, p. 279 and GRANIERI 2016, pp. 1-2.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Madḥal* I.8, §5.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Madḥal* I.8, §5; II.4, §1 and *Al-Risāla al-Mūğaza fī uṣūl al-mantiq*, §6 (Appendix A).

<sup>64</sup> This is a Peripatetic trait of Avicenna's doctrine of universals: universality and its concomitants only accrue to primary notions in conceptualization, which means that universal notions resulting from the combination of primary notions with universality only have a mental existence.

<sup>65</sup> The Late Antique tradition demonstrated the accidentality of notions of this sort by showing how they fall in the so-called 'fallacy of the accident': e.g., if 'animal' is a genus and 'man' is an 'animal', it does not follow that 'man' is a genus too. On the Late Antique interpretation of the 'fallacy of the accident' and on the possibility that it misunderstands Aristotle, see BÄCK 2015, pp. 155-158. On the accidentality of universality and on the presence of this doctrine in the *Quaestio* I 11a by Alexander of Aphrodisias, see *Commentary* on I.12, §1.2.

faced by ancient and modern scholars by Aristotle's *Organon*, due to the compresence in it of at least two apparently diametrically opposite views<sup>66</sup>. Both views stem from Aristotle's attempt to explain the relationship between genus and differentia: (i) the first one, that can be inferred from *Topics* Δ-Z<sup>67</sup> and *Categories* 1-9, states that only the genus can be predicated essentially (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ), whereas the differentia is predicated in the "what sort of thing is it?" (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστὶ); (ii) the second one, conveyed by *Topics* H3-5<sup>68</sup> and *Posterior Analytics*, states that the differentia can be predicated essentially (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ) like the genus. In sum, the question is whether, in Aristotle's opinion, the essential predicates include the differentia or not. The issue is complicated by the need of meeting two main requirements, namely that of properly distinguishing the genus from the differentia, and, on the other side, that of granting the unity of the definition composed by both predicates. These two problems might explain Aristotle's oscillations. The first account (i) of the predicative status of genus and differentia succeeds in distinguishing genus from differentia, providing a clear-cut distinction of their predicative statuses, but is unable to explain adequately the unity of the definition: it does not explain how the definition is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ, if its constitutive parts are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ in the case of the genus, and ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστὶ in the case of the differentia. The second account (ii), on the other hand, is more suitable to secure the unity of the definition as an essential predicate, since it removes the radical difference that the first account establishes among the predicative

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<sup>66</sup> Cf. the "Teoria I" and "Teoria II" individuated in MARIANI 1997, p. 7.

<sup>67</sup> The central books of the *Topics* clarify that the differentia is not predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ; see *Top.* Δ2, 122b16-17: οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ σημαίνει τί ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποῖόν τι, καθάπερ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν. A remarkable passage, however, is *Top.* Δ6, 128a20-29, in which Aristotle mentions some unspecified philosophers (δοκεῖ τισι) who think that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ; *Top.* 128a20-29: «Since someone thinks that also the differentia is predicated of the species in the "what is it?", it is necessary to distinguish genus from differentia by employing the aforementioned elements; first of all, the fact that the genus is predicated of more [items] than the differentia, then the fact that it is more suitable to provide the genus as an answer to "what is it?" than the differentia ("animal", for instance, signifies what a man is more than "capable of walking") and the fact that the differentia always signifies a quality of the genus, whereas the genus does not [signify a quality] of the differentia [...]».

<sup>68</sup> See, for example, *Top.* H3, 153a15-22. The passage argues that, since the definition (ὄρος) is a statement showing the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of the thing, then also the predicates contained in it are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ of the *definiendum*; Aristotle then explicitly affirms that genus and differentia are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ. See also *Top.* H5, 154a24-29. In this latter passage, Aristotle states again that genus and differentia are both predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ κατηγοροῦνται); the context is the statement, in the *incipit* of H5, that it is more difficult to build (κατασκευάζειν) a definition than demolishing it (ἀνασκευάζειν), since it is not simple to infer, either autonomously or by putting questions to the interlocutors, that the parts of the definition are genus and differentia and that they are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ.

statuses of genus and differentia by stating that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ like the genus, but it turns out to be unable to distinguish genus and differentia, at least on the basis of their predicative status<sup>69</sup>. Two different strategies are viable to explain Aristotle's incongruences, the first consisting in ascribing different positions on the same subject to different chronological phases of Aristotle's production (hence, supposing an evolution of Aristotle's view on the subject)<sup>70</sup>, the other consisting in trying to provide a unitary account for both views, arguing that two different senses of "essential predication" might be at stake<sup>71</sup>. Avicenna's strategy, that can be observed at work in *Madḥal* and in other passages of the *Šifā'*, is arguably the second one.

Traditionally, the 'logical question' about the predicative status of the differentia *qua* part of an essential predicate such as the definition had been inextricably entangled to the 'ontological question' about its categorial status *qua* part of a substance<sup>72</sup>. The problem regards especially the differentiae of the substance that, according to the assumption that the parts of a substance are substances (cf. Arist., *Met.* Z13), should be substances, which contradicts Arist. *Cat.* 3a21-22 and 33, where Aristotle explicitly opposes differentiae to substances, therefore assuming that differentiae are not substances.

I shall argue that Avicenna tried to apply the project of freeing Logic from metaphysical subject-matters to his assessment of the theory of the predicables by disentangling the logical and the ontological questions that had previously been dealt with as two deeply interrelated issues. Also, I shall argue that some of the conceptual tools that are fundamental to Avicenna's operation might have been borrowed from Alexander of Aphrodisias' attempt to provide a unitary interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the predicables, although with important refinements.

### III.2.2. THE 'LOGICAL QUESTION': THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING ESSENTIAL PREDICATION

The problem of the predicative status of genus and differentia *qua* parts of the definition was a debated one in the Late Antique reception of Aristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisias dealt with it in his commentary on book A of the *Topics*<sup>73</sup>, in the attempt

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<sup>69</sup> For a description of these two different accounts of differentia provided in the *Organon* as two different stages of the development of Aristotle's thought on differentia, see GRANGER 1984, pp. 11-2.

<sup>70</sup> It is the strategy adopted, for instance, in GRANGER 1984 and MARIANI 1997.

<sup>71</sup> It is the strategy adopted in MORRISON 1993.

<sup>72</sup> The phenomenon is quite frequent in Late Antiquity; on the debate regarding the categorial status of differentiae, see MORRISON 1993, MARIANI 1997 and DE HAAS 1997, pp. 165-250

<sup>73</sup> Another strictly related passage is the one in which Alexander comments upon Aristotle's observation on those who claim that the differentia is predicated in the "what is it?" (*In Top.* p. 365.4-21), a passage that seems to be recalled in a *Quaestio* of Alexander's on the subject matter of differentia specifica that was translated into Arabic (cf. *infra*).

to provide a unitary exegesis of Aristotle's accounts of differentia in the *Categories* and in the *Topics*.

T4. Alexand., *In Top.*, p. 47.14-23<sup>74</sup>:

«The differentia as well is predicated of many items differing in species, but not in the “what is it?” (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν), since otherwise the definition of genus and differentia would be the same; on the contrary, as he [*scil.* Aristotle] says in other passages, the differentia is mostly predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?” (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι μᾶλλον κατηγορεῖται) of those things of which it is predicated as a differentia, since it explains what sort of thing it is. Hence, one must not think that what was said in the *Categories* concerning the fact that differentiae are predicated of a subject (καθ' ὑποκειμένου κατηγοροῦνται) was said with regard to the properly called “differentiae”, on the contrary, it was said of those already assumed together with matter (τῶν ἤδη συνειλημμένων τῆ ὅλη). In fact, everything predicated of a subject is predicated of it in the “what is it?”, but if the differentiae were predicated in the “what is it?” they would be genera rather than differentiae».

The main problem is caused by the fact that, in the *Categories*, the differentia is said to be predicated *of a subject* (καθ' ὑποκειμένου) but – assuming, as Alexander does in T4, that what is predicated καθ' ὑποκειμένου of something is also predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν of that something – this entails a difficulty in distinguishing genus and differentia, since they both would be predicated essentially (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν) of their subjects. On the other hand, in a number of occurrences in the *Topics*, Aristotle states that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστίν. The solution to the problem comes, for Alexander, from the account of the unity of definition provided in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Alexander distinguishes two kinds of differentiae: the differentiae in their proper sense (αἱ κυρίως λεγόμεναι διαφοραί), which are predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?” (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστίν), and the differentiae conjoined to *matter* (αἱ ἤδη συνειλημμένα τῆ ὅλη), which are predicated in the “what is it?” (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν) as parts of the composition of genus and differentia, analogous to a composite of matter and form. Alexander's solution consists in the individuation of two different ways of considering the differentia: Aristotle's account in the *Categories* would refer to the differentia considered as joined to a genus, assimilated to a form considered in its conjunction to matter, whereas Aristotle's account in the *Topics* would reflect the status of the differentia in itself, as predicated ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστίν. Alexander's theory of the twofold consideration of the differentia can be observed in another passage of his commentary on the *Topics* and in a passage of a *Quaestio de differentia specifica* only extant in the Arabic translation by Dimašqī<sup>75</sup>,

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<sup>74</sup> On this passage, cf. RASHED 2007, p. 69 and n. 234.

<sup>75</sup> I refer to Alexander's *Quaestio de differentia specifica* edited in BADAWĪ 1978<sup>2</sup>, n° 34 in GOULET AND AOUAD 1989, p. 137. It is likely a longer version of the *Quaestio* on the same subject edited in DIETRICH 1964 and listed as n° 29 in GOULET AND AOUAD 1989, p. 136 (on the hypothesis that the two texts are two different versions of one and the same work, see VAN ESS 1966, pp. 154-159). The manuscript tradition ascribes the Arabic version to

which shows several points of contact with another passage of his commentary on the *Topics* (T5).

**T5.** Alexander's *Quaestio de differentia* and the commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*

Alexand., *Quaestio de differentia*, p.  
304.17-20

Alexand. *In Top.* p. 365.4-21

«It is possible to think that Aristotle employs the differentiae, in the *Categories*, according to the fact that they are conjoined to a matter (*ma'a māddatin*)

from his claim that they are predicated synonymously (*'alà tarīqi l-tawātu'i*) of the species and of the individuals;

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but if they were predicated synonymously of what is ranged under them, they would be also predicated of the subjects they are predicated of according to the notion of quiddity (*bi-ma'nà l-māhiyyati*), as well as the genera and the species, and as the genus is predicated synonymously of the species, analogously it would [also] be predicated of the differentiae».

«Talking about differentia, he [*i.e.* Aristotle] said “since some people think that also the differentia is predicated in the *what is it?* (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστί) of [its] species” because the differentia assumed as a complex [together with genus] (ὡς συναμότερος λαμβανομένη) is predicated in this manner – but not also the differentia which is separated from the matter of the complex (χωρίς τῆς ὅλης τῆς συναμότερου) –:

he recalled this [differentia] also in the *Categories*, where he said that the individuals and the species receive the definition (τὸν λόγον) of the differentiae [*i.e.* the differentiae are predicated synonymously of them].

[...]

The genus divided by a differentia considered as separated from matter in the substance is not predicated synonymously (συνώνμως κατηγορεῖται) of it, since no other complex of different parts (ὄλον ἀνομοιομερὲς) is predicated in this way of each one of [its] parts and this sort of differentia is a part of what is divided by it, nor it is predicated [in this way] of the species and the individual, for the part is not predicated of the entire (τοῦ ὄλου) either».

In the *Quaestio*, Alexander claims that the differentiae mentioned in Aristotle's *Categories* are considered as conjoined to matter, for Aristotle says that they are predicated synonymously of their subjects (*Cat.* 3b1-2). Otherwise, claiming that the differentiae are predicated synonymously of their subjects would entail claiming that they are predicated according to the quiddities of their subjects, just like the genera, and that genera are synonymously predicated of the differentiae, but this claim would contradict Aristotle's views stressed in the *Topics*<sup>76</sup>. When Alexander speaks of the

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Dimašqī, and preserves some notes ascribed to Abū Bišr Mattà together with Alexander's text. For this passage, see also RASHED 2007, pp. 70-71.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *Top.* Δ2, 122b18, warning against considering a differentia as a species of the genus it divides; the passage is also recalled in Avicenna's *Mašriqiyyūn, Mantīq*, p. 53.4-5.

differentia conjoined to matter he means the differentia when considered not *qua* pure notion, but together with a genus that makes it subsist, although the genus is not a specified one<sup>77</sup>. An instance is a differentia like ‘rational’, contrasted to the pure notion of ‘rationality’, since ‘rational’ can be understood as ‘x provided with rationality’ (‘x’ being a non-specified genus) and can be predicated synonymously of a substantial subject, whereas ‘rationality’ cannot.

Besides trying to harmonize the accounts of Aristotle’s *Categories* and *Topics*, Alexander’s purpose was avoiding a total overlap of the definitions of genus and differentia, which otherwise would coincide. Alexander’s solution provided the subsequent exegetical tradition with a possibility of reading Aristotle in a unitary way, which is arguably the reason for its fortune in Ammonius’ school in Alexandria<sup>78</sup> and in the Peripatetic school of Baḡdād<sup>79</sup>.

I shall argue that Avicenna’s theory of the predicables might preserve the core of Alexander’s solution, although with some important modifications. Alexander’s solution, if employed as the subsequent exegetical tradition did to account for Aristotle’s oscillation in the *Organon* between two different ways in which the differentia is predicated, only partly succeeds in solving the problem raised in the first

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<sup>77</sup> RASHED 2007, p. 69, n. 235.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. ELIAS, *In Isag.*, pp. 56.30-57.11 and PHILOP., *In An. Post.*, p. 400.21-28, raising aporiae based on the problem of explaining how the definition can be said to be predicated of the thing in the “what is it?”, although it is composed by genus and differentia, the latter being predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?”. The answer is offered in both cases by Alexander’s distinction of the differentiae considered without the genus (καθ’ ἑαυτὰς λαμβανόμεναι χωρὶς τοῦ γένους) and predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?”, and the differentiae taken with the genus, thus forming a new species predicated in the “what is it?”; Philoponus rather speaks of “unnamed genera” (γένη ἀνόνομα) to refer to the differentiae as joint to genera.

<sup>79</sup> IBN AL-ṬĀYYĪB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāḡūḡī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 129.5-14 raises an aporia similar to the one recorded in Elias, *In Isag.*, pp. 56.30-57.11. MS BnF ar. 2346 also provides significant evidence that Alexander’s solution was applied to the understanding of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*: the manuscript preserves two anonymous glosses in which two passages of the *Isagoge* are commented upon, specifying the different kinds of predication that the differentia has when it is considered as a predicable in itself and when it is considered as a part of the definition (edited at p. 1062, n. 4 and p. 1090, n. 4 of Dimašqī’s translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*). In particular, the gloss at p. 1062, n. 4 refers to Porphyry’s statement that the description of the genus can adequately distinguish it from the other four predicables, for it distinguishes genus from differentia for the fact that the differentia is not predicated in the “what is it?” as genus is (PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 3.5-20). The gloss specifies that this is so only if the differentia is not considered as a part of the definition, for in that case the differentia is predicated in the “what is it?”. The second gloss comments on Porphyry’s statement that genus and differentia differ for the fact that the genus is predicated in the “what is it?” whereas the differentia is not (PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.2-4), specifying that also the differentia is predicated in the “what is it?” when considered as a part of the definition.

place. In fact, Alexander pays a high price to achieve a unitary account of Aristotle's theory of the differentia, namely the introduction of two different senses in which Aristotle means the term 'differentia' in the same logical context. Moreover, only one of the two senses can be said to be synonymously predicated of substantial subjects, whereas the other is so only in a derivative way. These considerations might have led Avicenna to rule definitely out of the logical framework the 'pure notion' of the differentia, that cannot be truly predicated synonymously of substantial subjects. This can be argued in a passage on the differentia of the *Nağāt* (T6):

**T6.** *Nağāt, Manṭiq*, p. 16.6-7:

«'Rationality' (*al-nuṭq*) is a simple<sup>80</sup> differentia, whereas 'rational' (*al-nāṭiq*) is a composite differentia (*murakkab*), namely the logical differentia».

Avicenna states in T6 that the differentia can either be considered as a "simple differentia" (*al-faṣl al-mufrad*), e.g. rationality (*al-nuṭq*), or as a "logical differentia", e.g. rational (*al-nāṭiq*). This latter differentia is conceived as composite (*murakkab*) because "rational" can be analyzed as *something having rationality* (*ṣay'un lahu nuṭq*). It is worth noticing that Avicenna's distinction shows several points of contact with the one proposed by Alexander: the idea of composition conveyed by the logical differentia can be understood in quite an analogous way to Alexander's idea of a composition with "matter", if by "matter" one is to understand a non-specified genus that the differentia specifies<sup>81</sup>.

Also, the terminological choice of naming the logical differentia 'composite' (*murakkab*) might betray Avicenna's commitment to Alexander's *Quaestio de differentia*, where the *composition* of the differentia with the matter/genus is expressed precisely in terms of *tarkīb*<sup>82</sup> (cf. also *infra* T15). As we shall see after, Avicenna extends Alexander's analysis of the differentia to all the predicables that are predicated in a derivative way of substantial subjects (i.e. to include, besides the differentia, also the proprium and the common accident), and posits it as the pivot of his solution to the question concerning the ontological status of the predicables.

Back to the predicative status of the differentia, if for Avicenna the only differentia that is taken into account in Logic is the 'composite/enmattered' one, on the other hand, the problem of a consistent account of Aristotle's theory of essential predication

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<sup>80</sup> Reading *mufrad* as in p. 48.21-22 of Fakhry's edition instead of *muğarrad*.

<sup>81</sup> This interpretation is compatible with Avicenna's insistence on the point that "rational" should not be understood as equivalent to "animal provided with rationality". As emerges in *Madhyal* II.4, §2.1, the point is a relevant one, in order to avoid redundancies in the definition: if "rational" encompassed the notion of the genus in actuality and were equivalent to "animal provided with rationality", the clause "rational animal" would be equivalent to an ill-formed clause of the sort: "animal animal provided with rationality".

<sup>82</sup> See e.g. p. 306.11-14 in BADAWI 1978<sup>2</sup>.

is still open. It must be explained how the same composite differentia can be said to be predicated both in the “what is it?” and in the “what sort of thing is it?”.

Avicenna’s original answer to the problem consists in the articulation of the essential predication in two different levels, i.e. a predication *in answer to* “*what is it?*” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) that applies specifically to the signification of the quiddity (both shared and specific, so that both genera and species are predicated in this way), and a predication *in the* “*what is it?*” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*), that embraces the predicables that are predicated in answer to “*what is it?*” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) and also includes the differentia insofar as it is a part of the definition. In other terms, the differentia considered as composite participates to some extent of the same predicative status of the genus with which it concurs to the constitution of a species<sup>83</sup>. If the predication in answer to “*what is it?*” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) expresses the relation between a predicate and the subject of which it signifies the quiddity, the predication in the “*what is it?*” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) is a more general notion that includes the first and expresses the relation between a predicate and the subject to which it is essential<sup>84</sup>. It should be remembered that, in Avicenna’s opinion, an essential predicate does not necessarily signify the subject’s quiddity, but can also signify its essential quality and be predicated of it in answer to “*which sort of thing is it?*”, like the differentia<sup>85</sup>.

Avicenna’s elaboration of two levels of the essential predication is meant to face three major problems, namely (i) explaining how the differentia can be said to accede to essential predication in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* though being predicated in the “*what sort of thing is it?*”; (ii) providing an effective distinction of genus and differentia and (iii) providing a unitary account of the divisions of the predicables provided in Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and in Aristotle’s *Topics*. All the three points are presented in a nutshell in T7:

**T7.** *Šifā’*, *Ġadal* I.6, p. 55.10-18

«[(i-ii)] Then, this genus is described by saying that it is predicated of many differing in species in answer to “*what is it?*” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*). And you know that the differentia, in their definitions<sup>86</sup>, does not distinguish itself from the genus in virtue of being predicated of different species, but it [distinguishes itself from the genus] in virtue of [genus] being [predicated] in the “*what is it?*” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*), so that, if it were among the possibilities of the differentia — as it was explained in the

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<sup>83</sup> Something analogous happens with the ontological status of the composite differentia: cf. *infra*.

<sup>84</sup> The notion of ‘essential’ is said to be more general than that of ‘signifying the quiddity’ in *Madḥal* I.7.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *Madḥal* I.5, §6.

<sup>86</sup> *Fī ḥudūdihim*, i.e. in the definitions accepted by a long exegetical tradition encompassing Porphyry, the school of Alexandria and the school of Baḡdād; cf. DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 130-143.

First Teaching<sup>87</sup>, in the context of the science of the *Demonstration* — and<sup>88</sup> the differentia were apt to be [given] in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ġawābi mā huwa*), then [the differentia] would share with the genus this definition. And if the definition of genus was this one in which the differentia enters, then it would not be impossible this, [namely] that the differentia is predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” (*fī ġawābi ayyi šay’in huwa*), as far as it is divisive (*muqassim*), as it is [also] predicated in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ġawābi mā huwa*), as far as it is constitutive (*muqawwim*)<sup>89</sup>. Then, the genus that distinguishes itself from the differentia would distinguish itself from it<sup>90</sup> because the genus is not apt to be said in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” (*fī ġawābi ayyi šay’in huwa*) so that it is [its] primary predication. [(iii)] As to what concerns the genus taken here<sup>91</sup> [into consideration], it is something more common than both things».

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<sup>87</sup> *Al-ta’līm al-awwal: i.e. Aristotle.*

<sup>88</sup> Reading at p. 55.13: *wa-* (with MS Leid. Or. 4) instead of *wa-annahu*. In the apparatus of the Cairo ed. there is a reading *annahu* instead of *wa-annahu* ascribed to one of the Leiden manuscripts; however, as far as I could check, MS Leid. Or. 4 reports *wa* instead of *wa-annahu*, and MS Leid. Or. 84 has *wa-annahu*. There is, probably, a larger corruption of the text, since certain manuscripts (like MS Damad Ibrahim 824, recorded in the apparatus of the Cairo ed.) omit a larger portion of text preceding the *wa-annahu*. On the possibility that the syntax of this passage is affected by a later insertion in the text, cf. DI VINCENZO 2017, p. 55-60.

<sup>89</sup> The problem is, according to Avicenna, a misconception of the differentia: the tradition of Peripatetic commentators seems to be inclined to think that a differentia may be constituted by a divisive one and a constitutive one; an example of divisive differentiae of the animal is provided by the term “rational”, and an example of constitutive differentiae is provided by the terms “animate” and “sensitive”. The constitutive differentiae may be seen, according to the commentators’ view, as predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ because they can be considered already conjoined to matter; they are *divisive differentiae existing in a subject*.

<sup>90</sup> Reading at p. 55.17: *yubāyyinuhu* instead of *bayānuhu*. The reading *bayānuhu* printed in the Cairo edition yields a difficult meaning: we should translate the passage as follows: “and the *explanation of the genus* that distinguishes itself from differentia is in virtue of the fact that it is not apt [...]”. MSS Brit. Mus. Or. 7500 and Leid. Or. 84 both read: مباينة, which does not seem to fit the syntax of our passage if we want to preserve the *bi-annahu* that follows, but in those manuscripts the complete reading is: *mubāyanatan annahu* (considering *mubāyana* as an internal object of *yubāyyinu*, we should then translate: “and the genus that distinguishes itself from differentia in a way that consists in the fact that it is not apt [...]”). The syntax of the passage has some problems with the reading *annahu* as well, so I would suggest that the reading *mubāyana* may have originated from a misunderstanding of a *rasm* that is attested by MS Leid. Or. 4: I found a reading سانه in MS Leid. Or. 4, which is compatible with the reading *yubāyyinuhu*, which would solve both the syntactical problem and the difficulty in the interpretation. The reading *bayānuhu*, perhaps, simply originated from an accidental omission of the first letter of the *rasm* that, in a manuscript without diacritics, would have been identical to the second one.

<sup>91</sup> *Hāhunā*: in the *Topics* and in Avicenna’s *Ġadal*.

*Ġadal* I.6 is devoted to Aristotle's division of the predicables. The exposition starts with the distinction of the essential predicables that Aristotle mentions in the *Topics* (namely, definition and genus), then a portion of the dissertation on the genus is devoted to the problem of the proper distinction between genus and differentia. In T7, Avicenna raises an exegetical difficulty that embraces both points (i) and (ii) at once: in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, the differentia is said to have access to the predication in the "what is it?"; on the other hand, there is the necessity of distinguishing the genus, that is also predicated in the "what is it?", from the differentia. The last clause of the paragraph alludes to Avicenna's unitary interpretation of Porphyry's and Aristotle's classifications of the predicables (iii).

(i) Among the reasons of Avicenna's concern with the essential predication of the differentia there is Aristotle's account of genus and differentia in the *Posterior Analytics*, a subject Avicenna deals with more extensively in the second treatise of *Burhān*<sup>92</sup>.

**T8.** *Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.2, pp. 125.9-126.2 AFIFI; 83.4-14 BADAŪI

«[(a)] It is said "essential" (*dātī*), in a way<sup>93</sup>, everything that is predicated of the thing in the "what is it?" (*min tarīqi mā huwa*), since it enters its definition (*dāhīl fī ḥaddihī*), so that it would be equivalent if you said "essential" (*dātī*) or "predicated in the what is it?" (*maqūl min tarīqi mā huwa*)<sup>94</sup>. This is the thing's genus, its genus' genus, its differentia, its genus' differentia, its definition and every constituent (*muqawwim*) of the thing's essence<sup>95</sup>, like the line for the triangle, and the point for the limited line, since it is a limited line, and so it is said in the First Teaching<sup>96</sup> too. [(b)] Then, before turning to the goal [of this issue], it is necessary for us to ascertain that the differentiae are suitable to enter the answer [to the question] "what is it?" as the genus is (*anna l-fuṣūla ṣāliḥatun fī an takūna dāhīlatan fī ḡawābi mā huwa ṣulūḥa l-ḡinsi*). Already in the First Teaching, each one among genus and differentia was put as belonging to the species as well as the other, as to what concerns its entering the species' quiddity, and as predicated in the "what is it?" (*min tarīqi mā huwa*). [(c)] Then, the last differentia mentioned in genus' definition was posed, and

<sup>92</sup> For a discussion of Avicenna's distinction between the two kinds of predication in the context of *Burhān*, see IBRAHIM 2013a pp. 379-431 and Id. 2013b, pp. 47-59.

<sup>93</sup> *Min ḡihatīn*: Avicenna is now stating a first sense in which the term "essential" is employed, which is also the sense which can be applied in the case of *Madḥal*; how he is going to show, however, the sense in which "essential" must be understood in the *Burhān* is a wider one. After explaining this first sense, Avicenna is going to introduce another sense, saying that the term can be understood *in another way* (*min ḡihatīn uḥrā*).

<sup>94</sup> *Add.* Badawī (p. 73.6): "and this enters its definition"; *om.* MSS Damad Ibrahim 822 and Leid. Or. 4.

<sup>95</sup> Afifi (p. 125.11) and in the margins of MS Baḥīt 331: *li-dāti l-ṣay'i*; Badawī (p. 73.7) and MS Damad Ibrahim 824: *li-wuḡūdi l-ṣay'i*.

<sup>96</sup> *Al-ta'lim al-awwal*: Aristotle; cf. *Anal. Post.*, 73a34-b3.

it<sup>97</sup> consists in the fact that the genus is *predicated in answer to “what is it?”* (*maqūl fī ḡawābi mā huwa*), so that, in virtue of this, a distinction was drawn between genus [on the one hand] and differentia and what is not differentia [on the other]<sup>98</sup>. [(d)] From this, [we must infer that] it is necessary that the predicate in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) be different from the predicate in the “what is it?” (*fī ṭarīqi mā huwa*) and that there be two differences between them, according to what we considered and explained in its place<sup>99</sup>».

The Aristotelian background of this passage is *Anal. Post.* A4, 73a34-b3: Avicenna starts by explaining the first sense of *essential* as *everything that is predicated of the thing in the “what is it?”*, namely everything enters the thing’s definition (section a). In section (b), Avicenna opens a digression in order to assess whether the differentiae are apt to provide an answer to the question “what is it?” just as the genera are. This exegetical problem is allegedly stimulated by Aristotle’s consideration of the differentia as belonging to the species in the same way as the genus and as predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*)<sup>100</sup>. It is also strictly linked to the issue of Avicenna’s redefinition of the notion of *essential* (*dātī*) in *Madḥal*, where he contends the idea that the essential is reducible to what is predicated in answer to “what is it?”<sup>101</sup>, for such an assumption would leave the differentia out of the essential predicates, against Aristotle’s propensity to consider it as essential. *Madḥal* I.7 starts with an inquiry into the meaning of “signifying the quiddity” (*al-dāllu ‘alā l-māhiyyati*): the multitude of the superficial logicians, who maintain that the *essential* is what *signifies the quiddity*, is said not to consider the differentia as signifying the quiddity. Thus, they contradict the principle of the transitivity of equivalence, because they consider the differentia as essential without considering it as signifying the quiddity, even though the essential, according to them, is precisely what signifies the quiddity. Moreover, Avicenna shows that, considering the way in which what signifies the quiddity was commonly understood – according to the idea that what signifies the quiddity is *what signifies the notion by which the thing is what it is* – one should conclude that, since the thing is what it is only in virtue of all its essential attributes, the quiddity of something is signified by its genus and differentia taken together in the definition (*Madḥal* I.7, §2). So, point (b) establishes – against the belief of some superficial logicians – a common feature of genus and differentia, namely the fact that

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<sup>97</sup> I read at p. 125.16: *huwa annahu*, according to the reading I found attested by MSS Leid. Or. 4, Leid. Or. 84, Pococke 121, Damad Ibrahim 822 and Brit. Mus. Or. 7500, instead of *bi-annahu* (printed in Afifi’s edition).

<sup>98</sup> Badawī, p. 73.12/Afifi, p. 125.16: “and what is not differentia”; but cf. MSS Damad Ibrahim 822 and Pococke 121: *wa-ḡayru dālika* (“and the rest/etcetera”).

<sup>99</sup> I assume this to be a reference to *Madḥal* II.1, §3.4.2.

<sup>100</sup> The precise reference of this remark is not evident; however, it is very likely to be a reference to the fact that in the *Posterior Analytics* both genus and differentia are considered as equally essential features of the things.

<sup>101</sup> See e.g. *Madḥal* I.5, §6.2.

both are predicated in the “what is it?” since they both enter into the answer to the question “what is it?” in the same way. The problem that Avicenna must face at this point is the proper distinction between genus and differentia, since he cannot employ the fact of being predicated in the “what is it?” or not as a suitable distinctive feature, as the other logicians did. At point (c), Avicenna states that the feature that characterizes the genus and distinguishes it from the differentia is its being predicated in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*), solving the problem that was posed by stating that both genus and differentia are predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*). So, in order not to confuse genus and differentia, there must necessarily be a difference between the predication in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) and the predication in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*), as Avicenna contends in section (d).

(ii) Avicenna claims, in a passage of *Ġadal* III.1 (T9), that the common opinion (*al-mašhūr*) simply considers the fact of being predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) as sufficient to distinguish genus from differentia:

**T9.** *Šifā'*, *Ġadal* III.1, pp. 171.13-172.1

«So we say: firstly, when the thing that is a differentia is conceived in the common opinion (*fī l-mašhūr*) in its differentiability – not with respect to what we did in defining the predicate in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*), but with respect of the casual meeting with something divided by another thing<sup>102</sup> [in a way that] people do not fail to recognize it as a differentia –, then it is judged that the thing is not a genus, and that it is not predicated in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*), but in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” (*fī ḡawābi ayyi šay'in huwa*)<sup>103</sup>, and that, according to the common opinion, it does not play the role of the genus. If, then, the consideration [of it] is not in this manner, and the other manner is obscure, then the predication in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*), as regards what is predicated in the “what is it?”, is enough to establish that that thing is a genus, because the distinction between the predication in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) and the predication in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) is not among the things that are understood in the common opinion (*al-mašhūr*)».

The portrait Avicenna provides of the “common opinion” is reminiscent of the tradition of commentators who believed that the distinction between the definitory formulae of the genus and differentia is only based on the fact that the genus is predicated in the “what is it?”, whereas the differentia is not. Avicenna’s target is likely to be a long Peripatetic tradition, encompassing Porphyry, the philosophers

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<sup>102</sup> It means: the meeting of a constitutive differentia with the compound formed by the genus and a divisive differentia.

<sup>103</sup> Reading at p. 171.15-16: *wa-annahū laysa maqūlan fī ḡawābi mā huwa, bal fī ḡawābi ayyi šay'in huwa*, according to the text preserved by MSS Leid. Or. 4 and Leid. Or. 84. The Cairo edition, printing *wa-annahū laysa maqūlan fī ḡawābi ayyi šay'in huwa*, has a text that is unintelligible from a logical point of view.

active in Ammonius' school in Alexandria, and the Peripatetic school of Baḡdād. Alexander held that differentia and genus differ only because the differentia is not predicated in the “what is it?” (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ), as he stated in his commentary on the *Topics* trying to account for Aristotle's claim that the differentia is *generical* (γενική)<sup>104</sup>. It is also clear, from the definitions of genus and differentia provided in the *Isagoge*, that Porphyry held a view of this sort: both genus and differentia are *predicated of many items differing in species*, so that there is no difference between the two descriptions of genus and differentia apart from the fact that the genus is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ and the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστὶ. Greek and Arabic commentators on the *Isagoge* followed the same pattern, declaring that the genus is distinct from the differentia by being predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ<sup>105</sup>. Defined in this manner, however, the differentia needed to be distinguished from the common accident: the schools of Alexandria and Baḡdād agreed in including the differentia among the predicables that are “substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) predicated”, together with genus and species, in virtue of its being constitutive of the substance (συμπληρωτικὴ τῆς οὐσίας) of its subjects<sup>106</sup>.

The urge to provide an adequate distinction between genus and differentia is also evident in *Ġadal* III.4, where Avicenna implicitly recalls the distinction between the two kinds of essential predication. In the relevant passage (T10), Avicenna complains about the fact that the common opinion does not allow the differentia to be predicated in the “what is it?” like the genus, stating that this seems to be, on the contrary, a much-disputed idea<sup>107</sup>.

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<sup>104</sup> ALEXAND., *In Top.*, pp. 38.27-39.2.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, pp. 60.13-61.16; ELIAS, *In Isag.*, pp. 57.11-58.4; DAVID, *In Isag.*, p. 141.16-25; PS.-ELIAS (DAVID), *In Isag.*, praxis 31, p. 77.1-3. Ḥasan Ibn Suwār, in a surviving fragment of his commentary, stated that the fact that the genus is predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*) is able to distinguish genus from differentia, proprium, and accident, which are by contrast predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?” (*min ʔarīqi ayyi ʂayʔ in huwa*): cf. Ḥasan Ibn Suwār [Dimašqī's translation, p. 1062, n. 2]; a distinction of this sort is also to be found in IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡi li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 69.9-16: in this latter case, the discussion falls within the introduction to Porphyry's investigation of the description of genus in *Isag.* pp. 2.17-3.20, where Porphyry concludes that the description of genus is neither redundant (περιττὸν) nor defective (ἐλλεῖπον), for it can properly distinguish the genus from the other four predicables.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, pp. 60.13-61.16 and IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr K. Īsāgūḡi li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 129.18-22. In the latter passage, Ibn al-Ṭayyib raises an aporia on the problem of the overlapping in definition of differentia and common accident, asking which is the distinctive feature that enable us to distinguish the differentia from the common accident. The answer is that the differentia is “substantial” for the thing (*ḡawhariyyun li-l-ʂayʔi*), whereas the common accident accidentally belongs to the thing (*daḡīl*).

<sup>107</sup> Avicenna has there in mind ARIST. *Top.* Δ6, 128a20-30, where Aristotle claims that, since some philosophers maintain that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ as well, it is

T10. *Šifā'*, *Ġadal* III.4, pp. 201.16-202.2:

«Another place deals with the distinction between genus and differentia; and the debate on this subject is in a way completed and reaches a good solution only when the common opinion, for instance, does not prevent from considering also the differentia as predicated in the “what is it?”, so that “rational” [could] be, according to the common opinion, suitable to be predicated in the “what is it?” (*fī tarīqi mā huwa*) as “animal” is, since now this is not a commonly spread opinion, but, on the contrary, this is [an idea] sometimes much opposed in the common opinion, since it is also believed that what is [given] in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” (*fī ġawābi ayyi šay'in huwa*) is not [given] in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ġawābi mā huwa*). As to what concerns the truth, its state was already known in another place<sup>108</sup>».

The common opinion rejects the fact that also the differentia is predicated in the “what is it?”. On the other hand, it is clear that Aristotle considers the differentia as a predicable having access to the thing’s essence in *Posterior Analytics*. Again, in the passage above Avicenna argues that the common opinion does not understand the distinction of the two levels of predication that enables him to solve the problem. Avicenna, in fact, reports that, in the common opinion, the differentia is said not to be predicated in the “what is it?”, because what is predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” cannot be predicated in answer to “what is it?”. However, the argument is valid, according to the common opinion, because the locutions *predicated in the “what is it?”* and *predicated in answer to “what is it?”* are considered as interchangeable<sup>109</sup>. Thus, the passage amounts to a declaration of originality on Avicenna’s part.

(iii) Besides preserving the internal consistency of Aristotle’s writings, Avicenna must cope with the problem of the partial inconsistency between the system of predicables described in Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and that of Aristotle’s *Topics*. Two main issues are at stake. The first is that there is no mention of the differentia in the division of the predicables provided in the first book of the *Topics*, whereas Porphyry’s classification of the predicables includes the differentia. In this respect, one of Avicenna’s main concerns is saving Aristotle from the charge of a defective account

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necessary to make a clear distinction between genus and differentia according to other criteria.

<sup>108</sup> The truth Avicenna refers to consists in the distinction between a predication *fī tarīqi mā huwa* and one *fī ġawābi mā huwa*, so that there would be no contradiction in saying that the differentia is predicated in the “what is it?” (*fī tarīqi mā huwa*) but, at the same time, in response to “what sort of thing is it?” (*fī ġawābi ayyi šay'in huwa*).

<sup>109</sup> Dimašqī’s translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* is quite consistent in rendering the Greek ἐν τῷ τί ἐστί by the expression: *min tarīqi mā huwa* and the Greek ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστί by: *min tarīqi ayyi šay'in huwa*. The philosophers of the Peripatetic school of Baġdād tended to paraphrase the renderings *min tarīqi mā huwa* and *min tarīqi ayyi šay'in huwa* of the Arabic translation as perfectly equivalent to the expressions *fī ġawābi mā huwa* and *fī ġawābi ayyi šay'in huwa*: see DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 157-160.

of predicables because of the apparent absence of the differentia. Avicenna argues that the genus mentioned in the *Topics* ought to be considered as a wider notion encompassing both genus and differentia, so that the differentia is encompassed by Aristotle's division of predicables. Avicenna defends the Aristotelian division of predicables by arguing that Aristotle named *genus*, in the *Topics*, whichever part of the notion of the essence. This means that both the genus and the differentia in the Porphyrean sense are included in the division of the predicables, provided that "genus" is understood in this broader sense. For this contention, Avicenna may have in mind what Aristotle claims in *Top.* A4, 101b18-20, in the section preceding the definition of the four predicables, about the fact that the differentia must be considered together with the genus, since it is *generical* (γενική)<sup>110</sup>.

**T11.** *Šifā'*, *Ġadal* I.6, pp. 54.13-55.10:

«Then, inescapably, the predicable is [(i)] constitutive [and] essential, predicated in the "what is it?" (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*) — I am not saying in answer to "what is it?" (*fī ġawābi mā huwa*), since what is predicated in the "what is it?" (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*) is, as you learned [before], more common — or [(ii)] it is not. [(i)] If it is essential, then [(i.a)] it may signify a part of the essence or [(i.b)] signify the truth of the notion of the essence. [(i.b)] If it signifies the truth of the essence, then it is the *definition* (*ḥadd*) or a synonymous name (*ism murādif*), but there is no usefulness in the synonymous name, and it is not really a predicate, so it remains that [the predicable signifying the truth of the essence] is the definition. [(i.a)] And if it is a part signifying a part of the notion of the essence, then all of this is named, in this Book<sup>111</sup>, *genus* (*ġins*), since all of this shares the fact of being predicated of many differing in species in the "what is it?" (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*), like "animal" for the man, and like "sensitive" for the man; "animal" is, indeed, predicated of the man. And if the man is taken alone in the "what is it?", even if it is not [given] in answer to "what is it?", it does not follow, in this Book<sup>112</sup>, a contradiction between genus' differentia and all what we mentioned in the first part<sup>113</sup>, because in this division of this Book [Aristotle] does not distinguish between genus and differentia, and he did not mention what we called in that place<sup>114</sup> "genus" according to the fact that it is something different from differentia but, on the contrary, he took the notion that is common to both [the predicates] and called [it] *genus*. So did the First Master<sup>115</sup>. And, since it is so, the genus that is here defined is more common than [both] the genus and the differentia that were defined there<sup>116</sup>, otherwise [Aristotle's] division would be defective, but this is a false statement. But genus and differentia are,

<sup>110</sup> On the possible meanings of the term in the context, see ZADRO 1974, pp. 318-9, n. 5.

<sup>111</sup> *I.e.* Aristotle's *Topics*.

<sup>112</sup> Again, a reference to Aristotle's *Topics*.

<sup>113</sup> *Al-fann al-awwal: i.e.* Avicenna's *Madḥal*, the first *fann* of the *Kitāb al-Šifā'*.

<sup>114</sup> *Hunāka: i.e.* in Avicenna's commentary upon Porphyry's *Isagoge*, namely in *Madḥal*.

<sup>115</sup> *Al-mu'allim al-awwal: i.e.* Aristotle.

<sup>116</sup> *Hunāka: i.e.* in Porphyry's *Isagoge*.

together, predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*), as you learned<sup>117</sup>, and it is suitable to answer by both when it is asked of something what it is. As to what concerns the fact that the answer is not complete by each one of them, there is no need for me to provide you a further explanation of that, since it already preceded<sup>118</sup>».

Each part of the notion of the essence, then, is named “genus” and is predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*), so that the term “genus” employed in the *Topics* has not to be understood as equivalent to Porphyry’s genus. This passage is strictly related to *Madḥal* II.1, §3.4, where genus and differentia are considered in terms of parts of the thing’s essence and are said to be both predicated in the “what is it?” for this reason<sup>119</sup>.

The second issue at stake is that Aristotle’s definition of the genus as predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ in the *Topics* is rendered in the Arabic translation employed by Avicenna as predicated *min ʔarīqi mā huwa*, i.e. exactly in the same terms that denote the predication of the genus in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, though this very expression apparently conveys two different meanings in the two cases (in the case of Aristotle’s *Topics*, this kind of predication includes the differentia as well, which is not the case in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*). Avicenna faces, therefore, also the problem of interpreting in a consistent way the accounts of differentia provided by Aristotle and by Porphyry: the Porphyrean tradition concluded that the genus is predicated in the “what is it?” whereas the differentia is not, in evident contradiction with Aristotle’s opinion on this subject. Quite evidently, the distinction of two levels of essential predication is, for Avicenna, also the key to solve this problem, since it allows him to distinguish genus and differentia because of their different level of essential predication, and, at the same time, to consider not only the genus, but also the differentia, as an essential predicate.

### III.2.3. THE ‘ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION’: DEFINING THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE PREDICABLES

Alexander’s distinction in T5 represents a fine tool for Avicenna’s distinction of logical and ontological squares, since it introduces the distinction between a ‘pure notion’ that has a certain determined ontological status and its derived notion, which has not a defined ontological status when considered on its own. If considered as ‘enmattered’, i.e. in conjunction with a non-specified bearer, its ontological status is fixed depending on that of the bearer. The question concerning the ontological status of the ‘pure notion’ can be determined in itself; that of the derived, enmattered notion,

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<sup>117</sup> I assume this to be a reference to *Madḥal* II, 1.

<sup>118</sup> In *Madḥal* II.1.

<sup>119</sup> As it is also clear from section (i) of the passage above, Avicenna tacitly assumes the distinction between a predication in answer to “what is it?” and a predication in the “what is it?” he has already drawn in *Madḥal* II.1. For a different view, considering Avicenna’s claim in *Ġadal* that the differentia is predicated *min ʔarīqi mā huwa* as the result of an evolution of Avicenna’s view on this subject, cf. GYEKYE 1979, p. 209.

on the other hand, requires knowledge of the ontological status of the bearer in order to be ascertained<sup>120</sup>. Arguably, the case of the enmattered predicable plays a pivotal role in Avicenna's attempt to strip the ontological question from the logical square, since it shows that the ontological status is not an essential element of the predicable; as T12 shows, it is rather one of its non-essential concomitants (*lāzim*).

**T12.** *Šifā', Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, p. 235.1-8:

«It must be known that the meaning of the statement that the differentiae of substance are a substance and that the differentiae of quality are a quality is that it is concomitant (*yalzamu*) to the differentiae of substance being a substance and that it is concomitant to the differentiae of quality being a quality, [but] not that there exists in the meaning of their quiddities the definition of substance in [the sense] that they are themselves substances, nor that the differentiae of quality include in their quiddities the definition of quality in that they are qualities [in themselves]. [They do not include this] unless we mean by the differentiae of substance, for example, not the differentia predicated univocally (*bi-l-tawātu'i*) of substance, but the differentia predicated of it derivatively (*bi-l-ištiqāqi*) – I mean [for instance] not “rational”, but “rationality”. It would then be as you have learned, and it would be a differentia derivatively, not univocally. [But] true differentia is spoken of univocally»<sup>121</sup>.

Concerning the question whether the logical differentia is a substance or an accident (a quality, for instance), Avicenna's answer is that the differentiae in themselves do not include, in their quiddities, the definitions of substance or quality, and are therefore none of them, properly speaking; the fact of being a substance or a quality, however, is necessarily concomitant (*yalzamu*) to them. In the case of “rational”, for instance, the differentia is, in itself, neither a substance nor a quality (*i.e.* being a substance or a quality is external to its quiddity), but the fact is concomitant to it of being a substance possessing rationality (cf. T13)<sup>122</sup>.

**T13.** *Šifā', Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, p. 235.13-17:

«Thus, the differentia which is spoken of univocally means something having a certain description in an unqualified [sense]. Thereafter, by way of reflection and contemplation, it becomes known that this thing with this certain description must be either a substance or a quality. An example of this is that the rational is something possessing rationality. There is nothing in its being something possessing rationality

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<sup>120</sup> Cf. DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 161-163 and BENEVICH 2017, p. 259.

<sup>121</sup> English translation in MARMURA 2004, p. 179, modified.

<sup>122</sup> The statement that being a substance or an accident is external to the quiddity of the differentia just applies to the logical differentiae: on this point, see also JANSSENS 2013, p. 359. This is the only sense in which “differentia” has to be understood in Logic: cf. *Madḥal* I.13, §6, where Avicenna declares that he is dealing in this work with the “logical” differentia because the other one is predicated of its subjects only in a derivative way.

[that renders it] either a substance or an accident. It is, however, known externally that this thing cannot but be either a substance or a body»<sup>123</sup>.

To sum up, Avicenna holds that the ontological status of the predicable cannot be determined *a priori*, but only when the subject of the predicable is considered together with it. An analogous theory of the non-determinability *a priori* of the ontological status of the predicable seems to be elaborated in Alexander's *Quaestio de differentia*:

**T14.** Alexand., *Quaestio de differentia*, p. 305.6-8:

«It is not known about the differentia 'inanimate' said in itself (*'alà ḥidatihi*) if it is a substance or not, since 'inanimate' can also be in [a category] different from substance, hence it is not a species of substance. If it is associated to substance, [on the other hand], this becomes known and it becomes one of the species [of substance], since the inanimate substance is a species of substance».

Avicenna, as well as Alexander, seems to endorse a homocategorical view concerning the ontological status of the differentia of the substance, claiming that it depends on the category of its genus and species<sup>124</sup>. A problem possibly entailed by the homocategorical view is that of explaining the relation between the differentia and the genus it divides avoiding the undesired conclusion that the genus is predicated essentially of the differentia, which is like a species for it<sup>125</sup>. Among the issues that an analysis of the relation between genus and differentia in terms of a genus-species relation would entail there is assuming the genus as included in the quiddity of the differentia, so that "rational" could be analyzed as equivalent to "animal provided with rationality", including its genus in the definitory statement, instead of "something provided with rationality". One of the undesired outcomes of an equivalence of this sort is that it produces redundancy in the predication: if "rational" is predicated of "animal", the statement "the animal is rational" is equivalent to "the animal is an animal provided with rationality". In order to avoid this difficulty, Avicenna recalls in *Madḥal* II.4, §2.1 and, more extensively, in *Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, pp. 232.10-235.1 a proof that he might have found in Alexander's *Quaestio de differentia* (p. 304.6-16) to demonstrate that, even if the differentia of the substance belongs to the category of substance, the genus cannot be predicated of it as of a species. The proof demonstrates that a differentia cannot be a species of the genus, because, if it were possible, each differentia would need another differentia to divide its genus and constitute it as a species, and the same holds for that second differentia and so on, in a *regressum ad infinitum*. The relation between genus and differentia is explained through the hylomorphic model, comparing the genus to a matter and the differentia to a form. The analogy is actually a delicate one: the notion of the genus/matter is described in *Madḥal* II.4, §2.1 as a concomitant that is not included in the notion of the

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<sup>123</sup> English translation in MARMURA 2004, p. 180.

<sup>124</sup> On the meaning of 'homocategorical' in this context, cf. MORRISON 1993, pp. 161-6.

<sup>125</sup> A conclusion that would contradict ARIST., *Top.* Δ2, 122b18.

differentia/form. The same point is explained in a passage of the *Mašriqiyyūn* with regard to the form, in a context in which the hylomorphic model explains the relation between genus and differentia (T15).

**T15.** *Mašriqiyyūn, Maṭīq*, p. 21.9-17:

«As to what concerns the relation of the rational soul with corporeality, it is in virtue of a certain cause, and the same goes for the relation of the other forms to their matters, regardless to whether they are separable or not, even if the ones happen to exist in the others, but it will appear clear that this is not determined by [their] notion, but rather by [their] existence, and there is a difference between what is determined by the very notion and what is determined by the existence. Similarly, you do not find any form assumed simply (*bi-basāṭatihā*) according to a very notion that determines that the realization of a matter for it should be understood from the form itself, even if it is necessary, outside its notion and the consideration of its existence, that is has a matter that it requires when a certain existence is presupposed, or that is necessary for it from something else. This unless you assume the form that is not simple (*lā basīf*), but inasmuch as it undergoes a composition (*tarkīb*) with matter, so that matter is not concomitant (*lāzima*) to its notion, but is included (*mutaḍammana*) in the notion of both (*fī maḥmūhimā*), but now we are not speaking about similar cases».

The examples of “rational soul” and “corporeality” are examples of what Avicenna would name ‘simple differentia’ and ‘genus’, and not examples of the predicables genus and differentia. T15 affirms that the notion of the genus/matter is necessarily concomitant to that of the simple differentia, because it is not included in its very notion (*maḥmūm*) nor it is determined by it, but is rather determined by the existence (*wuḡūd*) of the simple differentia, i.e. conjoined to a matter to constitute a rational animal. The fact that what is rational is also a body is a necessary concomitant of the fact that, inescapably, what is rational in existence is also a body. This statement, however, works for the ‘simple differentia’ (e.g. ‘rationality’) assimilated to the form, and not for the ‘composite differentia’ that can be predicated synonymously. The last paragraph of T15 states that if the form is assumed as composite to the matter (*min ḥaytu tarkīb ya’riḍu lahā ma’a al-mādda*), then the notion of the matter is *encompassed* in the notion resulting from both matter and form. Avicenna alludes in this case to the fact that what results from the composition of matter and form includes the notion of matter; taking as an example “rational animal”, “animal” is obviously included in the notion of “rational animal”, though it is not included in the notion of “rational” assumed on its own, with respect to which it remains a necessary concomitant<sup>126</sup>.

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<sup>126</sup> As explicitly stated in *Šifā’, Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, pp. 232.16-233.6. On the fact that notion of the genus is related to that of the differentia by necessary concomitance (*iltizām*), see also THOM 2016, pp. 153-154.

To sum up, Alexander's *Quaestio de differentia* seems to provide the kernel of Avicenna's theory of the non-essentiality of the ontological status for the universal predicable. In Alexander's intention, this analysis exclusively applied to the differentia specifica, in the attempt to explain how it is synonymously predicated of substantial subjects. Avicenna, on the other hand, operates an extension of an analogous distinction between simple and composite to all the derivative predicates, to include the proprium and the common accident as well<sup>127</sup>.

In *Madḥal* I.14, §2.2 Avicenna puts emphasis on the distinction between 'accident' meant as an accidental predicable (according to the logical use of the term, henceforth: accident<sub>i</sub>) and 'accident' meant as opposed to substance (according to the metaphysical use of the term, henceforth: accident<sub>o</sub>). The common accident that is dealt with in Logic should not be identified with the 'ontological accident' that is traditionally meant as opposed to substance (accident<sub>o</sub>). The argument, though quite compressed, is a *reductio ad absurdum* showing the distinction between the notion of logical accident (accident<sub>i</sub>) employed to denote a class of predicables and the notion of ontological accident (accident<sub>o</sub>) employed to denote a class of beings. Avicenna assumes two adjectival terms like "eternal" and "created" in relation to the body, and claims that they must be common accidents with respect to it, given that they are neither a genus, nor a species, nor a differentia, nor a proprium for it, thus fulfilling the criteria of the third of Porphyry's definitions of "common accident" (*Isag.* p. 13.4-5), that recalls closely Aristotle's definition of accident in *Top.* A8, 103b17-19. Having assumed that terms like "created" are common accidents, Avicenna proceeds in demonstrating that they are not accident<sub>o</sub> as well. In fact, if we assumed the contrary (i.e. that "created" is an accident<sub>o</sub>), a predication of the sort "the body is created" would have the form of a synonymous (rather than paronymous) predication, since the accident<sub>o</sub> "created" is directly predicated of the subject "body", without being so by means of a derived term. Then, in virtue of the principle of the transitivity of synonymous predication, the following reasoning would be allowed:

Created is an accident<sub>o</sub>;  
The body is created;

∴ The body is an accident<sub>o</sub>.

The conclusion is manifestly absurd, since the body is, from an ontological point of view, a substance and not an accident<sub>o</sub>. Therefore, Avicenna concludes that "created"

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<sup>127</sup> This does not mean that the matter-form composition on which the genus-differentia composition is somehow modelled is compared to a subject-accident composition: the differences between the two kinds of composition are better examined in Avicenna's *Mašriqiyyūn, Maṭīq*, pp. 23.16-24.3. It rather means that the predication of the derivative predicates with respect to substantial subjects is explained on the basis of the distinction of a 'simple/pure' notion from a 'composite' one, which might have emerged first from the analysis of the genus-differentia composition.

is an accident<sub>i</sub> (i.e. is an accidental predicable) without being, at the same time, an accident<sub>o</sub>. Avicenna's argument demonstrates that it is impossible to predicate synonymously the accident<sub>o</sub> of the substance, whereas this is, according to Avicenna's interpretation of synonymous predication, precisely the way in which an accidental predicable is predicated of its subject.

Having proved that, despite the coincidence in the name, the notion of "accident<sub>o</sub>" in opposition to "substance" cannot coincide with that of "accident<sub>i</sub>" employed by Porphyry, Avicenna goes on proving that there is no univocal correspondence between the two notions. In fact, an accident<sub>o</sub> cannot be a substance, but an accident<sub>i</sub> (meant as "accidental") can either be an accident<sub>o</sub> or a substance<sup>128</sup>, and also the opposite notion, namely that of "essential", can either be an accident<sub>o</sub> or a substance. The terms "accidental" and "essential" do not convey any information about the ontological status of the entities qualified by them, that could well be either an accident<sub>o</sub> or a substance. In *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq* (Appendix A, §5), where the point is exemplified with the terms "white" and "whiteness": both "white" (*abyaḍ*) and "whiteness" (*bayāḍ*) are accidentally predicated of their subjects, being both accidents<sub>i</sub> with respect to them, or *common accidents*, to use Porphyry's terminology. They differ, however, in their ontological status, for "whiteness" is an accident<sub>o</sub> (more specifically, a quality), whereas "white" can be a substance, depending on the ontological status of its bearer. The predicate "white", in fact, is equivalent to "something provided with whiteness", so that it signifies the accident<sub>o</sub> considered as inhering in a substance<sup>129</sup>. It can be argued that the distinction between accident<sub>o</sub> and accident<sub>i</sub> was modelled on the distinction between simple and composite differentia<sup>130</sup>:

**T16.** *Şifā', Ğadal* I.7, pp. 70.10-11

«'Accident' can occur to the accident in the way the accident that is one of the five [universals] does, so that the simple of it is an accident in the sense of 'accident' that is opposite to 'substance' [*i.e.* an accident<sub>o</sub>], and the composite of it (*murakkabuhu*) is "something provided with that accident" [*i.e.* an accident<sub>i</sub>].»

Avicenna's interpretation of accidental predicables as the combination of a non-specified subject *x* with the accident that inheres in it allows to conceive accidental universals as predicated *synonymously* of their subjects, so that "white", for instance, is predicated synonymously of "man" *qua* "thing provided with whiteness" and not

<sup>128</sup> Cf. *Nağāt*, p. 17.3-7.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. *Madḥal* I.14, §2.1.

<sup>130</sup> Avicenna might have been supported by a general understanding of the inherence of an accident<sub>o</sub> in a substance as forming a compound suggested in ARIST., *Met.* Z4, 1029b22-23: Aristotle speaks of 'compounds' formed of substances and accidents<sub>o</sub> of the other categories, and the Greek term for 'compounds' (σύνθετα) is rendered in the Arabic translation as *murakkabāt* (AVERROES, *Tafsīr mā ba'd aṭ-ṭabī'at*, vol. 2, p. 790.2).

*qua* whiteness<sup>131</sup>. Extending the analysis that Alexander applied to the differentia to the accidental predicables allows Avicenna to assess the possibility to predicate *all* of the five universal predicables synonymously of their subjects, breaking the equivalence between synonymous and essential predication<sup>132</sup>.

### III.3. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SYSTEM OF PREDICABLES AND ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

As argued in what preceded, Avicenna operated in the theory of the predicables a substantial detachment of the frameworks of predication and ontology, based on the assumption that the way a predicable is said of its subject can be analyzed prescindendo from its ontological status<sup>133</sup>. A question is left to be settled, concerning how Avicenna made the system of the predicables fit with the classification of beings of Aristotle's *Categories*. The answer is provided in *Ġadal* I.7, pp. 69.12-71.15, which explains how each of the predicables can be found in every category. To begin with the genus, a predicate can be a genus only with respect to the subjects that fit within its same category, regardless to which of the ten category it is (*Ġadal* I.7, p. 70.15-16); in other words, the predication of the genus is exclusively an intra-categorical one. The same arguably works for the species. The differentia of the substance is a substance and the differentia of the quality is a quality (*Ġadal* I.7, p. 69.13-14 and *Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, p. 235.1-5), since the ontological status of the predicable differentia depends on that of its bearer, as previously showed. There seems to be, however, a possible exception to the strict homocategoriality of the differentia, since qualities can also be differentiae for another category, though not of substance (*Ġadal* I.7, p. 69.15-16)<sup>134</sup>. Accidental predicables such as common accidents and propria can be either predicated of subjects that fit in their own category or in another category (cf. T17 below); with respect to substantial subjects, their predication is homocategorial in the same way that of the differentia is.

**T17.** *Šifā'*, *Ġadal* I.7, pp. 70.15-71.2:

«The genus in each of these ten [categories] is only a genus with respect to what is in its category; as to what occurs accidentally in it, [on the other hand], it can occur accidentally to what is not in its category, so that the substance occurs accidentally to something else, like 'man' to 'capable of moving', or it can occur to what is in its

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<sup>131</sup> Hence the relevance of Avicenna's insistence in chap. I.14, §1.4 and §2.1 on the difference between accidents such as "whiteness" that are paronymously predicated and the adjectival predicates derived from them, such as "white", that are synonymously predicated of their subjects. On the difference between 'whiteness' and 'white', see also *Šifā'*, *Maqūlāt* II.1, p. 58.1-8.

<sup>132</sup> That, on the contrary, held valid for Alexander: cf. *supra* T4.

<sup>133</sup> Avicenna's operation might be supported by ARIST., *Top.* A9, 103b20-39, stating that what signifies the "what it is" of something (ὁ τὸ τί ἐστὶ σημαίνων) may either signify its substance or its quality or its quantity or any other of its categories.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. ARIST., *Met.* Z13, 1038b23-25, denying that qualities can be parts of substances.

category, like ‘divisible quantity’ occurs to the ‘continuum’ and vice versa. Every category, when found in another one, is found as occurring accidentally to it, whereas the role of the genus is only played by what is found in that [same] category».

Overall, the predications in which the subject and the predicated have a different ontological status – i.e. are a substance and an accident, rather than both substances or both accidents – only produce accidental predications. Using the expression “intra-categorical” broadly to apply to the predication in which the subject and the predicate are both substances or both accidents, and, by converse, “cross-categorical” to apply to the one in which either the subject or the predicate is a substance, when the other is an accident, essential and accidental predications are distinguished because accidental predication can be both intra-categorical and cross-categorical, whereas essential predication is exclusively intra-categorical<sup>135</sup> (cf. Tab. 2).

**Tab. 2.** *Essential and accidental predication in relation to intra-categorical and cross-categorical predication*

		‘Intra-categorical’ (substance of substance; accident of accident)	‘Cross-categorical’ (substance of accident; accident of substance)
<i>Essential predicates</i>	Genus	✓	✗
	Species	✓	✗
	Differentia	✓	✗
<i>Accidental predicates</i>	Proprium	✓	✓
	Accident	✓	✓

Moreover, Avicenna’s distinction of a predicative and an ontological level allows substances and accidents<sub>o</sub> to be both essentially or accidentally predicated, as illustrated in Tab. 3:

**Tab. 3.** *An analysis of Avicenna’s distinction between predicative and ontological level*

	<i>Substance</i>	<i>Accident<sub>o</sub></i>
<i>Essential predication</i>	<b>[a]<sub>syn</sub></b> E.g. the genus of a species with respect to its species within the category of substance (like “animal”	<b>[b]<sub>syn</sub></b> E.g. the genus of an accident with respect to the accident (like “colour” for

<sup>135</sup> The fact that a quality can be a differentia of an item in another accidental category fits in this large sense of intra-categoriality, since both the predicate and the subject are accidents, although not strictly speaking homocategorial. The predication of genus and species, on the other hand, is also intra-categorial in the sense of homocategorial, as T17 shows: the genus and the species of a predicate in the category of quality, for instance, need to fit precisely in the same category of quality.

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	for “man”).	“whiteness”).
<i>Accidental predication</i> [= <i>accident<sub>i</sub></i> ]	[c] <sub>Syn</sub> E.g. the composition ( <i>murakkab</i> ) of the accident and the subject of inherence with respect to the subject of predication (like “white” meant as “white thing” for “Zayd”).	[d] <sub>Par</sub> E.g. the pure accident with respect to a substance (like “whiteness” for “body”).

Cases [a], [b] and [c] are instances of synonymous predications<sup>136</sup>, whereas case [d] is a paronymous predication, since the accident<sub>o</sub> (like “whiteness”) is paronymously predicated of the subjects that do not fit in its same category. Clearly, in the framework of Avicenna’s analysis of predicables synonymous predication has a wider scope than essential predication, as the philosopher himself declared. In fact, synonymous predication rather seems to coincide with intra-categorical predication<sup>137</sup> – which is not necessarily essential, as case [c] and Tab. 3 show –, in opposition to paronymous predication that occurs in case of *cross-categorical* predication (which is only accidental: cf. Tab. 2).

The “accident” Avicenna holds to be pertaining to Logic is, in fact, the accident<sub>i</sub>, namely the accidental predicable, which encompasses both Porphyry’s propria and common accidents. Though also the instances of [d] are instances of accidental predicates and, therefore, instances of accident<sub>i</sub>, the propria and the common accidents dealt with in Logic are only instances of case [c], since they are substances composed with an accident<sub>o</sub> that are accidentally predicated with respect to their subjects.

#### III.4. THE UNIVERSALS AND SYNONYMOUS PREDICATION: SAVING ARISTOTLE’S INFERENCE?

Avicenna silently introduces the synonymous predication among the features shared by all of the five universals (*Madḥal* II.1, §1.2 and *Iṣārāt*, p. 245.1-6), even though this is not at all a quotation from Porphyry, who was far from acknowledging this point<sup>138</sup>. Avicenna’s claim that the five predicables are all predicated synonymously of their subjects rests on the assumption that they fit in the rule of the

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<sup>136</sup> It should be noticed, however, that the way in which case [c] is synonymously predicated is different than the way in which cases [a] and [b] are. What differs is how strictly one should understand the claim that synonymous predication entails providing the subjects with both the *name* and the *definition* of the predicables. In fact “thing provided with whiteness”, rather than being a definition properly speaking, seems more to be a description of the subject.

<sup>137</sup> Cases [a] and [c] are, in fact, instances of substances predicated of other substances, and case [b] is an instance of an accident<sub>o</sub> predicated of another accident<sub>o</sub>.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. PORPH., *In Cat.*, p. 80.4-27.

transitivity of predication (the so-called ‘antepredicamental rule’) stated in Arist., *Cat.*, 1b10-13, according to which what is predicated of them is also predicated of their subjects<sup>139</sup>, which means that they are *synonymously* predicated of their subjects; the same point is made in T18 below:

**T18.** *Šifā’*, *Maqūlāt* I.2, p. 15.10-15 :

«All of the universals – not only the genus, the species and the differentia<sup>140</sup> – are synonymously attributed to their particulars that equally participate of them. And it is not worth anything what was believed concerning the fact that only the genus, the species and the differentia are [the predicables] that are attributed synonymously, to the exclusion of the others [i.e. proprium and common accident]; this because synonymy is not so because the notion is *essential*, but rather because it is *unique* with regard to the notion, without differing. This unicity can be found [both] in what is essential and in what is accidental, like propria and common accidents».

Avicenna legitimizes his claim on the basis of his reading of Aristotle’s *Categories* according to which synonymous predication is not explicitly defined as an *essential* predication, but rather as a kind of predication in which the subjects all share a *unique* notion. In *Šifā’*, *Maqūlāt* I.3, pp. 22.18-23.9, evidently relying on Arist. *Cat.* 1a20-b9, Avicenna states that being predicated as of a subject is the distinctive feature of universals with respect to particulars rather than being a distinction between essential and accidental predicables<sup>141</sup>. Avicenna’s assumption on synonymous predication was far from being universally acknowledged, since the tradition mostly endorsed the view that only the genus, the species and the differentia specifica are synonymously predicated insofar as they are essentially predicated of their subjects<sup>142</sup>.

It seems legitimate to ask what the purpose of Avicenna’s broad interpretation of Aristotle’s predication ‘as of a subject’ is. It can be argued that Avicenna aims at saving propria and common accidents from the so-called ‘fallacy of the accident’, i.e. from breaking the rule of the transitivity of the predication ‘as of a subject’ enunciated in Arist., *Cat.*, 1b10-12. Quite evidently, the antepredicamental rule is strictly connected to Aristotle’s theory of demonstration<sup>143</sup>: if only essential predication fits the antepredicamental rule, then only inferences based on essential predicates are allowed, which contradicts Aristotle’s own allowance for certain accidental predications within demonstration. The *per se* predicates that are assumed in demonstrations according to Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* A4 include both the essential and some of the accidental predicates (respectively, Arist., *APo* A4, 73a35-8

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<sup>139</sup> See ROHR 1978, pp. 379-385; BÄCK 2015, pp. 148-151.

<sup>140</sup> Reading *lā al-ğins wa-l-naw’ wa-l-faṣl waḥduhā* with the manuscripts instead of *illā al-ğins wa-l-naw’ wa-l-faṣl waḥduhā* as in the Cairo edition.

<sup>141</sup> On this passage, cf. CAMINADA 2016.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. BÄCK 2000, p. 229 and n. 6; DI VINCENZO 2016, pp. 173-181.

<sup>143</sup> On the resemblance of the structure reproduced in the antepredicamental rule with that of a Barbara syllogism, see BÄCK 2015, pp. 150-151.

and 73a38-b6)<sup>144</sup>. In his reworking of *APo* A4 in *Burhān* II.2, after recalling Aristotle’s four senses of ‘*per se*’, Avicenna adds a fifth sense of *per se* (T19).

**T19.** *Šifā’*, *Burhān*, II.2, pp. 127.21-128.2:

«It is also said “*per se*” when the accidents inhere to something primarily (*awwaliyyan*). By “primarily” I mean that [the accident] does not occur to something else and, then, occurs to the thing [itself], but [I mean] that there is no intermediate (*lā wāsiṭata*) between the accident and that to which it occurs, so that that to which it occurs is a cause [for us] to state that it inheres in something else (as you say “white body” and “white surface”, for the surface is white *per se*, whereas the body is white because the surface is white)».

Clearly, Avicenna’s fifth sense of ‘*per se*’ equally applies to essential and accidental predicates, provided that they belong primarily to their subjects. In all likelihood, the background of T19 is Arist., *APo* A4, 73b25-74a3, where Aristotle sets three conditions to call a predicate ‘universal’ (καθόλου), namely that it holds of every case (κατὰ παντός), *per se* (καθ’ αὐτὸ) and as such (ἢ αὐτό). These three conditions grant that what holds universally of a subject also holds necessarily if it. To hold of something *per se* and to hold of it as such are said to be equivalent: Aristotle provides the example of the property of having the sum of the internal angles equal to two right angles (henceforth: 2R), that holds of triangles *as triangles*, i.e. not in virtue of any other more general or more specific property of triangles; in other words, 2R holds of triangles *primarily*. Since 2R belongs to triangles, it can be said to belong to some figures, though not universally: in fact, 2R cannot be proved to belong to an arbitrary figure (it does not belong to squares, for instance). Moreover, 2R only belongs primarily to triangles: 2R belongs to the isosceles triangle, for instance, though not primarily: the isosceles has not 2R because it is isosceles, but because it is a triangle. 2R belongs universally to triangles, since it belongs to every triangle (κατὰ παντός), *per se* (καθ’ αὐτὸ) and as such (ἢ αὐτό), i.e. not in virtue of anything else, but in an immediate, primary way, just because it is a triangle. This is arguably the sense of Avicenna’s stating that what holds *per se-5* of something belongs primarily to it, without any intermediate. Interestingly, the example provided by Avicenna for a *per se-5* property in T19 is white with respect to the surface, since white belongs to the surface primarily, not in virtue of any other cause. As a counterexample, Avicenna

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<sup>144</sup> *Per se-1* predicates correspond to the constituents of the definition, i.e. the essential constitutive predicables (genus, differentia, species). As to *per se-2* predicates, they seemingly include propria, which are not essential predicates in the sense of ‘essential’ employed in the *Isagoge* and in the *Topics*. Whether the so-called ‘*per se* accidents’ are, in Aristotle’s mind, to be exclusively identified with *per se-2* features described in *APo* A4 or not, is still a controversial matter. It is generally held that the identification is valid (cf., among others, WEDIN 1973). The traditional identification with *per se-2* features is challenged in TIERNEY 2001a and Id. 2001b, claiming that *per se* accidents might be so both in the sense of *per se-1* and *per se-2* features.

mentions white with respect to body: Avicenna implies that the surface is white primarily, whereas the body is white because its surface is white; hence, the body is not so primarily, but through the mediation of its surface. In terms of predicables, the example provided by Avicenna is that of a common accident, and *per se*-5 properties arguably cover all the predicables, provided that they are assumed with respect to the subjects to which they belong primarily. Aristotle’s definition of the universal in terms of holding of a subject as a whole and *per se* – *per se* being meant as in T19 – might have scaffolded Avicenna’s inclusion of those common accidents that belong primarily and to all of their subjects among *per se* predicates.

Avicenna must have widened the scope of Aristotle’s predication as of a subject to apply it not just to essential predication (in the narrow sense of ‘essential’ that encompasses exclusively the elements of the definition), but to *per se* predication too (in the wide *per se*-5 sense presented in T19, which includes both essential and accidental universal predicates, provided that they belong to the whole subject as such, i.e. primarily)<sup>145</sup>. If so, *per se*-5 predicates should meet the requirements of the antepredicamental rule and not cause the fallacy of the accident. Assuming the example of “white” as a common accident of the surface in T19, the following reasoning can be built:

The surface is white [= something white];  
 Something white is something having a colour which pierces the vision;

∴ The surface is something having a colour which pierces the vision.

As it can be observed, no fallacy occurs, if “white” is analyzed as “a thing x provided with whiteness”, as Avicenna assumes. “White” as a predicate of the surface, though being an accidental predicate, does not break the antepredicamental rule, so that both the name and the definition of “white” are also rightly predicated of its subject, and the surface can be both said to be “white” and “a thing having a colour which pierces the vision”<sup>146</sup>. In Avicenna’s view, then, the fallacy of the accident does not necessarily affect accidental predication.

Avicenna seems to bend Aristotle’s synonymous predication to better adapt to his theory of demonstration in *Posterior Analytics*. Besides providing a consistent exegesis of Aristotle’s theories of predication and of demonstration, Avicenna’s main concern is assuring the possibility to assume some universal accidental predicates in demonstration: if accidental predicates were not considered as predicated synonymously of their subjects, they could hardly be assumed in syllogistic inferences. The result would be that syllogistic premises would be exclusively

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<sup>145</sup> The traditional equivalence established between Aristotle’s predication as of a subject and essential predication is also contended by part of the recent scholarship: cf. for instance BÄCK 2015, pp. 148-151 and CRIVELLI 2017, pp. 540-542.

<sup>146</sup> “Colour which pierces the vision” is Aristotle’s definition of white: cf. *Top.* Γ5, 119a28-31.

composed out of essential constitutive predicates that correspond to Aristotle’s *per se-1* predicates (i.e. genus and differentia). This is a central point of *Burhān* II.2, where Avicenna argues against an unknown commentator that was misled by the use of the term “essential” that Porphyry made in the *Isagoge*, where the term appears to have pretty much the same extension as the term “constitutive”. The unknown commentator supposedly commented upon Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*, for he is blamed for understanding the term “essential” as it is employed in the *Posterior Analytics* in the same, narrower sense in which it is used in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. This misinterpretation led the commentator to produce a series of mistakes in interpreting Aristotle’s demonstrative syllogism that Avicenna lists in T20.

**T20.** *Šifā’*, *Burhān*, II.2, 128.15-129.4:

«We have already become acquainted with the fact that someone abstains from providing an argument on this subject because of his bad understanding, [that consists in the fact that] he believes that the predicates [employed] in the demonstrations are nothing [else] but the constitutive ones (*al-muqawwimāt*), for, since it had become customary for him, in his studying the book of the *Isagoge*, that the constitutive was called<sup>147</sup> “essential” (*dātīyyan*), and [since] there it is not understood, from “essential” anything else but the constitutive, he thought that the “essential” in the *Book of the Demonstration* (*Kitāb al-Burhān*) was this in itself, namely the cause (*al-illa*). [(a<sub>1</sub>)] He said: “not every cause, for the efficient and the final [causes] are not suitable to be assumed as the middle term of a demonstration, but the matter and what is analogous to it (namely, the genus) and the form and what is analogous to it (namely, the differentia)”. [(a<sub>2</sub>)] And [he said] that the terms of the conclusions (*maḥmūlāt al-maṭālib*) are these *in se* as well; and that the major premise is essential only when its term is essential in the sense of “constitutive” for the subject. [(a<sub>3</sub>)] And he said that the middle term is essential for both the extremities in the sense of “constitutive”. [(b)] When he learned the division of the “essential” (*qismat al-dātīyyi*), he did not understand that the essential, in both the kinds employed<sup>148</sup>, is the term (*al-maḥmūl*); on the contrary, he thought that it was what is assumed in the definition (*al-ma’ḥūd fī l-ḥaddi*), so that he believed that the division was in this manner: among the essential [features], there is what is a predicate assumed in its subject’s definition [i.e. a *per se-1* predicate], and a subject assumed in the predicate’s definition [i.e. a *per se-2* predicate], and not that this predicate is essential for the subject, but that the subject [is essential for it].»

Although the identity of this first commentator is unknown, an attempt at a contextualization can be made. The mistakes that Avicenna ascribes to the commentator seem not to be found in any of the Greek Late Antique commentaries on

<sup>147</sup> Reading *bi-an yusammā* with MSS Pococke 121, f. 226<sup>r</sup> and Dāmād 822, f. 88<sup>v</sup> instead of *bi-an yusammū* (ed. ‘Afīfī) or *an summiya* (ed. Badawī).

<sup>148</sup> I think Avicenna is referring, by “in both the kinds employed” (*fī kilā l-qismayni l-musta’malayni*), to *per se-1* and *per se-2* predicates described in ARIST., *APo* A4. He means that, as in the case of *per se-1* predicates, also in the case of *per se-2* the predicate belongs *per se* to the subject, and not the reverse.

*Posterior Analytics*<sup>149</sup>. Secondly, the following passage (T21) informs us that this first commentator must have had followers among the philosophers that Avicenna *has seen* (*ra'aytu*, “I saw”) reproducing the same kind of mistakes (possibly, his contemporaries). Therefore, the first philosopher must have been a somehow influential commentator, likely not a Greek one. Thirdly, the fact that he is said to have commented and interpreted the *Posterior Analytics* offers a *terminus post quem* to collocate chronologically the first commentator, for Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* remained almost unexplored by Arabic philosophers until their first Arabic translation by Abū Bišr Mattā (d. 940 ca.), considered as the scholar of the Peripatetic school of Bagdād<sup>150</sup>. As to what concerns the second point, in T21 Avicenna refers to some philosophers that he saw being misled by the considerations of this unknown first commentator, upon whom they relied for logical matters.

**T21.** *Šifā'*, *Burhān*, II.2, p. 129.5-10:

«I have seen (*wa-qad ra'aytu*) some of those that are related to knowledge (*ba'd al-muntasibīna ilā l-ma'rifati*), among those to whose nature the interpretation of this man was more akin and who relied upon him about logic, being firmly convinced of the complex of that, to the point that the necessity of this pattern forced him to say:

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<sup>149</sup> Only some fragments of Alexander’s commentary on *Posterior Analytics* are extant (edited in MORAUX 1979; on the witnesses of this commentary, see *Ibid.*, pp. 1-8); the only fully extant Late Antique Greek commentaries on the work are Themistius’ paraphrase and Philoponus’ commentary. Then, there are Eustratius’ commentary on *APo B* and two anonymous commentaries (the one on *APo B* and the other on a part of *APo A*); see GOULET 1989, p. 439 and BRUNSCHWIG 1989, pp. 498 -9.

<sup>150</sup> Since similar positions are not preserved, to my knowledge, in any of the extant Greek commentaries on *Posterior Analytics*, the first commentator Avicenna refers to may well be an Arabic source. If this were the case, then a *terminus post quem* should be the Arabic translation of *Posterior Analytics* by Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus; see ENDRESS 2012. This *terminus post quem* can be established based on the peculiar tradition of *Posterior Analytics*, that apparently underwent a sort of interruption: the study of Aristotle’s *Analytics* stopped, in the Syriac schools between V and VIII century, to *APr A7*. Before Mattā’s Arabic translation, a partial Syriac translation of *Posterior Analytics* was produced by Ḥunayn Ibn Ishāq (d. 876), then followed by a complete Syriac translation made by Ishāq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 910). On the basis of the latter Syriac version, Mattā produced his own Arabic version, preserved by MS BnF ar. 2346 (see HUGONNARD-ROCHE 1989, pp. 520-1). Avicenna’s passage could be referring to a philosopher who had studied both Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics*, as Abū Bišr Mattā himself presumably did (the “Arabic *Organon*” MS BnF ar. 2346 preserves some marginal notes to the *Posterior Analytics* that are ascribed to him, Ibn al-Nadīm ascribes to him a commentary on *Posterior Analytics* and Al-Qifṭī, *Ta'rīḥ al-ḥukamā'*, p. 323 lists, among Mattā’s works, a *Tafsīr kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs wa-huwa l-madḥal ilā l-manṭiq*). The second commentator (or group of commentators), on the other hand, should be more or less contemporary to Avicenna (for he says he “saw” them). On the Arabic reception of *Posterior Analytics*, see also MARMURA 1990, pp. 85-103.

[(i)] “every necessary (*darūrī*) [and] inseparable (*ġayru muḥāriqin*) predicate is constitutive (*muqawwim*)” and [to say] that [(ii)] there is not a notion belonging to the proprium that is common to the species as a whole and in every moment, and that [(iii)] proprium is among the [features] whose separation is not impossible, [(iv)] and that the fact that the equilateral triangle has two equivalent angles near [its] base is a differentia, and not a proprium; and [to say] that [(v)] the fact that every triangle has [its] angles equal to two right angles is a differentia, and not a proprium, and that these [features] are constitutive for their subject».

There are two fundamental mistakes that Avicenna reproaches to the first commentator in T20, and the statements ascribed to the second commentator(s) in T21 can be for the most part analyzed as consequences of the first of these two mistakes. First (a), the commentator interprets in the wrong manner the two first senses of *per se* (καθ'αὐτό) enumerated by Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics* A4. More in detail, the first commentator assumes that “essential” can be said just of those features that are constitutive of their subject, in a sense that roughly coincide with the first sense of καθ'αὐτό mentioned in *APo* A4<sup>151</sup>. Therefore, he concludes that also the causes assumed as the middle term in a syllogism must be essential in this sense. Furthermore, he claims that the causes assumed as a middle term must be like the constitutive elements of a definition, i.e. genus and differentia, and should therefore be material and formal causes. Such a conclusion, which is rather problematic<sup>152</sup>, relies on an analogy between genus and matter, on the one hand, and differentia and form, on the other, that can be found in Porphyry's *Isagoge* as well<sup>153</sup>. The second fundamental mistake (b) made by the first commentator consists in a misunderstanding of the second sense of καθ'αὐτό listed in *APo* A4, namely the one encompassing those features whose subjects are included in their definitions<sup>154</sup>. The commentator concludes that the subjects included in their features' definitions can be said to hold *per se* with respect to their features, whereas the Aristotelian passage

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<sup>151</sup> ARIST., *APo* A4, 73a34-37.

<sup>152</sup> The statement arguing that efficient and final causes cannot be taken as the middle term in a syllogism is, in fact, incompatible with ARIST., *APo* B11, where Aristotle provides a demonstration of how the efficient and the final causes can be assumed as the middle term in a syllogism. Note that Themistius (THEM. *In APo*, p. 52.1-4) rightly understood Aristotle's claim that all the four causes can be assumed as the middle term in a syllogism and this statement cannot, therefore, be ascribed to him. As to Philoponus, his commentary on *APo* B11 is not extant.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 11.12-17 and p. 15.6-7. Cf. also AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 57.23-25 and PS.-ELIAS (DAVID), *In Isag.*, p. 56.24-33. This idea has a background in the analogy employed by Aristotle himself in *Met.* Z12, 1038a5-9 to explain the unity of the definition, namely the analogy between genus and a matter out of which differentiae make the forms.

<sup>154</sup> ARIST. *APo* A4, 73a37-b3.

should rather be interpreted the other way around, saying that the features hold *per se* for their subjects<sup>155</sup>.

The first misunderstanding (a) strongly affects the way in which the premises of a syllogism are chosen, and this is most clear from the statements that are ascribed to the second commentator(s) (cf. Tab. 4 below): if only constitutive features essentially and necessarily belong to their subjects, then *propria* are ruled out as possible elements of the syllogism, for they are not constitutive features of a subject. Moreover, *propria* are said to be safely removed from their subjects without causing their corruption, so that all the features that appear not to be removed from their subject without causing it cease to be are erroneously considered as essential in the sense of “constitutive” of their subject<sup>156</sup>. The ultimate consequence of this reasoning is the paradoxical statement that the fact of having the angles equivalent to two right angles (2R), rather than being a *proprium*, is a *differentia specifica* of the triangle. This latter conclusion is ascribed in Avicenna’s *Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abū Sa’d* to Abū l-Qāsim Al-Kirmānī<sup>157</sup>. Speaking of Al-Kirmānī in his letter, Avicenna claims that “he did not master the [notion of] “essential” and he did not collect in mind its conditions<sup>158</sup>”, reporting a discussion he had with him that revealed the problems faced by Al-Kirmānī in forming a valid syllogism<sup>159</sup>. More in detail, the fifth statement (v) reported by Avicenna in T21 and ascribed to some commentator(s), stating that having the angles equivalent to two right angles is a *differentia specifica* of the triangle, for it is a constitutive feature of the triangle, rather than being a property, recalls a passage of the *risāla* to the Vizir Abū Sa’d, where Avicenna reproaches an analogous claim to Al-Kirmānī<sup>160</sup>. Al-Kirmānī is reported in many occasions to struggle in distinguishing essential features from the non-essential necessary concomitants<sup>161</sup>, to the point that

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<sup>155</sup> As far as I know, (b) cannot be ascribed to the Greek commentators: cf. THEM. *In APo* pp. 10.30-11.5 and PHILOP. *In APo* p. 61.1-28.

<sup>156</sup> Against what Avicenna demonstrates in *Madḥal* I.6.

<sup>157</sup> Abū l-Qāsim Al-Kirmānī, the addressee of Avicenna’s criticism, has been identified by Y. Michot with the Abū l-Qāsim Al-Kātib mentioned by Al-Tawḥīdī; cf. REISMAN 2002, p. 166. We are informed from Al-Tawḥīdī (*Kitāb al-Imtā’ wa-l-mu’ānasa*, 1.35) of the fact that Kirmānī wrote a *Ṣafw al-Ṣarḥ li-Īsāgūgī wa-Qāṭīgurīyās*.

<sup>158</sup> *Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abū Sa’d*, p. 17.7.

<sup>159</sup> The discussion between Avicenna and Al-Kirmānī presumably occurred in Hamaḍān, in 405H/1015, which provides us with a *terminus post quem* for the composition of the *risāla*; see MICHOT 2000, pp. 31\*-32\*. The purpose of the *risāla* is that of asking for a judgement of the vizir Abū Sa’d al-Hamaḍānī.

<sup>160</sup> *Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abū Sa’d*, p. 14.10-15 = frg. (v): «He [*scil.* Al-Kirmānī] said that the fact that the triangle has [its] angles equal to two right angles is constitutive (*muqawwim*) for the triangle [...]».

<sup>161</sup> Cf. *Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abū Sa’d*, p. 8.2-9: «Among [all] this, there is his [*i.e.* Al-Kirmānī’s] claim that everything that is impossible not to predicate of a subject in the existence and even in the pure imagination (*bi-l-tawahhum*), is essential (*dātī*) for it [*scil.* the subject]. It is

Avicenna feels the urge for a clarification of the subject<sup>162</sup>. Apparently, Al-Kirmānī held that a predicate can hold necessarily of its subject only if it is a constitutive essential element of its quiddity<sup>163</sup>.

**Tab. 4.** Testimonies of the first and second commentatos in T20 and T1

Frg. 1 <sup>st</sup> commentator	Frg. 2 <sup>nd</sup> commentator	Theory	Possible Identification
(a <sub>1</sub> )	(i)	The mistake comes from taking as “essential” only the very constitutive features of the essence. [= Porphyry’s essential = Aristotle’s <i>per se</i> -1]	
(a <sub>2</sub> )			
(a <sub>3</sub> )			
---	(ii)	If only constitutive features necessarily and essentially belong to their subjects, <i>propria</i> do not belong to their subject in this manner.	
---	(iii)	Then, it follows from (ii) that <i>propria</i> can be removed in imagination from their subjects.	
---	(iv)	Then, (iv) and (v), that evidently contradict (iii), must be taken as constitutive features (i.e. <i>differentiae specificae</i> )	Abū l-Qāsim Al-Kirmānī
---	(v)		
(b)	---	In the case of <i>APo</i> A4, <i>per se</i> is what is taken in the definition. Consequently, <i>per se</i> -2 are the subjects taken in the definition of the predicates.	

To conclude, Avicenna’s major concern might be reassessing the role of accidental predicables within Aristotle’s syllogistic theory against some of his contemporaries, probably linked to the Peripatetic school of Baḡdād, as Abū l-Qāsim Al-Kirmānī

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impossible not to predicate in the existence finitude of every body, therefore it is essential for it [*scil.* the body]. I informed him of the difference between the concomitant accident (*al-‘arīḍ al-lāzīm*) and the essential (*al-dāṭī*), and I urged him to leave aside the existence and to come to the intellect».

<sup>162</sup> *Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abū Sa‘d*, p. 15.5-17.

<sup>163</sup> The necessity of the constitutive elements was likely argued on the basis of the impossibility to separate them from their subject without causing the latter’s corruption, which might explain why Avicenna argues against this criterion in *Madḥal* I.6, §5-6 that some accidental features as well entail by their removal the subject’s corruption. See also THOM 2016, pp. 151-152, rightly observing that, in Avicenna’s view, essential constitutive predicates represent a subclass of the necessary concomitants.

apparently was<sup>164</sup>. In this purpose, Avicenna's extension of the scope of synonymous predication grants the validity of inferences that include accidental predicates that belong *per se* – i.e. primarily and not in virtue of anything else – to all of their subjects. This preserves the possibility of attaining new knowledge, that would be otherwise confined to inferences based on essential predicates, according to a notion of 'essential' that is far narrower than that of '*per se*' proposed in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*<sup>165</sup>.

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<sup>164</sup> On Kirmānī's intellectual upbringing and his connection with the Peripatetic school of Baḡdād, see MICHOT 2000, pp. 18\*-21\*.

<sup>165</sup> The problem with Aristotle's inference is also individuated in BÄCK 2000: more in particular, Avicenna's solution seems to match the second interpretation in BÄCK 2000, pp. 236-237, endorsed by the author himself as a unitary interpretation of Aristotle. On the role of *propria* and inseparable accidents in Aristotle's theory of the syllogism, cf. MALINK 2006, pp. 98-99.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Avicenna's distinction between the ontological and the logical square anticipates several modern exegetical attempts in the same line, encouraged by the perspective of attaining a unitary reading of Aristotle<sup>166</sup>. Besides the great advantage of allowing a consistent vision of Aristotle's theory of predication and of demonstration, this distinction applied to the theory of the predicables allows to reach a considerable result, namely a more precise delineation of the boundaries of Logic as a philosophical discipline. The whole process is achieved, in accordance to Avicenna's programmatic statement in *Madḥal* I.1, §2, by pursuing a 'de-ontologization' of Logic, i.e. by freeing Logic from the intrusion of ontological subjects.

Avicenna's program has here been observed at work by taking as a test-case his theory of the universal predicables. Universal predicables turned out to be fully embraced by the domain of inquiry of Logic, since they are among the concomitant accidents of its subject-matter, i.e. secondary notions. In order to be one of the objects of Avicenna's Logic, however, the theory of the predicables needs to be disentangled from the theory of the categories, which is assessed as pertaining to Metaphysics insofar as it allows a classification of the items according to their ontological status. Consequently, Avicenna devotes a considerable effort to consider the five universal predicables independently from their ontological status, viewed as a non-essential concomitant to them. It is worth considering the hypothesis that the kernel of Avicenna's operation might be found in Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of the 'composite differentia', namely the differentia assumed with a non-specified matter that can be synonymously predicated of substantial subjects. Alexander's theory is based on a 'hylomorphic' understanding of the interaction between genus and differentia assumed as predicables. Even if genus and differentia are not totally assimilated with matter and form in Alexander, the analysis of the differentia as 'composite' with a non-specified matter/genus suggests a rapprochement of the predicable to the form. The analysis conducted so far showed that the same model plays a relevant role in Avicenna's Logic as well. Quite paradoxically, the first step towards Avicenna's achievement of a neat separation of the logical ground from the metaphysical with regard to the doctrine of the predicables is attained by means of a hylomorphic model to explain the interaction between genus and differentia assumed as predicables remotely suggested by Arist., *Met.* Z10. Even if, in Avicenna's program, the logical analysis is meant to be detached from the ontological one, nonetheless it cannot help but reflect it.

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<sup>166</sup> See, for instance, DUERLINGER 1970, p. 197, for a similar interpretation with regard to the ontological status of the differentia specifica in Aristotle, and BÄCK 2000, p. 153-158 and 170-172.

## EDITING AVICENNA'S *KITĀB AL-MADḤAL* – INTRODUCTION TO THE EDITION

### I. THE TRADITION OF AVICENNA'S *MADḤAL*

#### I.1. A GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION

Avicenna's philosophical masterpiece known under the title of *Kitāb al-Šifā'* had a huge diffusion during the centuries and throughout all the Arabic-speaking world; its massive manuscript tradition perfectly witnesses the great importance the whole *summa* was acknowledged. Its opening work, namely Avicenna's reworking of Porphyry's *Isagoge* entitled *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, is no exception. However, a thorough bibliographical survey of the manuscript tradition of this major work, as well as of other works of Avicenna's, is still a *desideratum* in Avicennian studies<sup>167</sup>. The reason of the difficulty – and, at the same time, of the great importance – of such a task lies in the still imperfect catalogation of a part of the public collections, and in the scarce accessibility of private collections.

A bibliographical research of this kind has been recently undertaken for the section of Metaphysics (*Ilāhiyyāt*) of the *Šifā'* within the framework of the ERC Project: “*PhiBor* — Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations and Intellectual Endeavours: Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics (*Ilāhiyyāt* of *Kitāb al-Šifā'*) of Avicenna (*Ibn Sīnā*)” (<http://www.avicennaproject.eu/>), directed by Amos Bertolacci. This survey disclosed the picture of a manuscript tradition of the section of the *Ilāhiyyāt* amounting at more than 200 MSS<sup>168</sup>.

The present introduction represents an attempt at filling this bibliographical gap with regard to the *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, by presenting the provisional results of a still ongoing bibliographical research concerning the manuscript tradition of this work, conducted in collaboration with the *PhiBor* Project. The bibliographical survey took as a starting point the existing inventories of Avicenna's bibliography<sup>169</sup>, supplemented by the data provided in library catalogues; then, the information provided by the inventories was implemented, updated, specified and, if necessary, corrected after the inspection of the manuscripts' reproductions<sup>170</sup>.

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<sup>167</sup> As already remarked in GUTAS 2010, pp. 48-49.

<sup>168</sup> Updated provisional results can be accessed at the following link: <http://www.avicennaproject.eu/index.php?id=31>.

<sup>169</sup> Such as ANAWATI 1950; ANAWATI 1974, pp. 229-262; *GAL*, vol. I + suppl. vol. I; DIRĀYATĪ 2010; DIRĀYATĪ 2011; ERGIN 1937; ERGIN 1956 and MAHDAVĪ 1954. A preliminary account is also offered in ANAWATI 1951.

<sup>170</sup> All the photographic reproductions employed in this work were attained thanks to the generous help of the aforementioned ERC Project: “*PhiBor*” and of the ERC Project: “*PhiC*: Philosophy in Context”, directed by Maroun Aouad.

### *Amount of the Arabic manuscript tradition*

The exact number of extant manuscripts that preserve the section of Logic of Avicenna's *Šifā'* is still unknown. The provisional results of the present research, conducted within the frame of the *PhiBor* Project, estimate around 200 MSS, among which, 119 MSS preserve the first work (*fann*) of the section of Logic, namely the *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, with the possible addition of other 11 MSS preserving, according to catalogues, a not better specified part of the section of Logic that are susceptible of be witnesses of *Kitāb al-Madḥal* as well. A provisional comprehensive enumeration of the witnesses of *Kitāb al-Madḥal* is provided in section I.2 below.

It can be observed that only 14 among the manuscripts of *Madḥal* that resulted from the present inquiry were already listed by C. Brockelmann in *GAL* (vol. I and Supplement); 28 MSS (then 56 MSS in the second edition published in 1956) were in the first list provided by O. Ergin in 1937, and 39 MSS in the bibliography of Anawati in 1950. The highest number of witnesses was reached in Mahdavi's bibliography in 1954, in which 57 MSS of *Madḥal* can be found<sup>171</sup>. From a purely quantitative point of view, it can be safely claimed that the present inquiry has more than doubled the number of witnesses recorded by the Avicennian bibliographies published in the first half of the twentieth century. In what follows, an analysis of the diffusion of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Madḥal*, embracing both the chronological and the geographical aspects, is provided.

### *Geographical spread of the manuscript tradition: areas of preservation and production*

As previously stated, the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Madḥal* amounts to at least 119 manuscripts, to which 11 MSS recorded as preserving a part of the section of Logic could be possibly added. As shown in S1 below, almost half of the 119 safe witnesses of Avicenna's *Madḥal* is preserved in public and private collections of Iran (49 out of 119 MSS, i.e. 41% of the tradition); Iran is, then, followed by Turkey (whose libraries preserve 31 out of 119 MSS, i.e. 26% of the tradition) and India (where 17 out of 119 MSS are preserved, i.e. 14% of the tradition). These three countries are by far the largest repositories of the witnesses of this section of Avicenna's *Šifā'*. MSS are also preserved in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, UK, Ireland, France, Netherlands and Russia.

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<sup>171</sup> A supplement to Mahdavi's bibliography, which gathered the information available in Anawati, Mahdavi and BERTOLACCI 2008, was more recently presented by David C. Reisman at the International Colloquium "The Manuscript Tradition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifā'*: The Current State of Research and Future Prospects", held in 2010 at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, organised by A. Bertolacci. To my knowledge, however, it was unfortunately never published.

Obviously, the places of preservation do not necessarily coincide with the places of production and earliest circulation of the manuscripts; although explicit information concerning the places of copy of the manuscripts is only available in a few cases<sup>172</sup>, it can be argued that centres that played a substantial role in the production and diffusion of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Madḥal* were prevalently in nowadays Iran, Iraq, Turkey and India. Nowadays Iran was arguably an area of vast production and circulation of MSS of Avicenna's *Šifā'*: among the centres that are known to have been involved in this process, Tabrīz (MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823), İsfahān (MS İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206), Šīrāz and Marāğa (on these two centres, cf. *infra*). Ottoman Constantinople (e.g. MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909; see *infra*) and Bağdād (MS İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261) are also attested in the manuscript tradition as places of copy of Avicenna's *Madḥal*; as to the Indian Subcontinent, Kašmīr is explicitly mentioned in a colophon as a place of copy (MS British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, India Office Ar. 1420), but further elements, such as the copyists' names, concur to place the copy of at least two other witnesses in the Subcontinent (namely MSS Rampur, Raza Library, 3478 and 3479, copied respectively by Fadawī Kahīmkarān Wās and 'Izzat 'Alī Gorakhpūrī: both names might refer to the provenance of the copyists from Khem Karan and Gorakhpur, both in Northern India)<sup>173</sup>.

*Chronological extent of the manuscript tradition and modalities of transmission*

One of the main features of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Šifā'* in its entirety, and of *Madḥal* singularly taken as well, is its great chronological extension, covering almost ten centuries: the dating of the extant witnesses ranges from the twelfth<sup>174</sup> to the twentieth century CE<sup>175</sup>, and the existence of copies of the eleventh century is attested in the colophons of their descendants<sup>176</sup>. On the basis of the 86 out of 119 sure witnesses listed in section I.2 of which a dating – either recorded in colophons, or conjecturally reconstructed – is known, some more specific observations

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<sup>172</sup> I.e. when it is recorded in the manuscripts, either in the colophons or in other notes.

<sup>173</sup> For an overview of the manuscript tradition of the *Šifā'* in India, see AHMED 2012.

<sup>174</sup> The earliest extant twelfth-century witness of Avicenna's *Madḥal* known so far is MS Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276, dated 536H/1142.

<sup>175</sup> Copies were produced in the twentieth century as well, like MS Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran, 20266, copied in 1318H/1900-1, and MS Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṭā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 262 *ḥikma wa-falsafa*, copied in 1337H/1918. Finally, a colophon dated 1343H/1924 can be found at the end of MS Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1801.

<sup>176</sup> MS Rampur, Rampur Raza Library 3477, for instance, preserves a colophon at the end of the first treatise of *Madḥal* attesting the existence of an exemplar dated: 6 Dū l-Ḥiġġa 468H/17<sup>th</sup> July 1076; on this manuscript and the witnesses that are possibly related to it, cf. *infra*, section II.5.

on the distribution of the manuscript production along the centuries can be made (cf. S2 below).

As shown in S2 below, there is, expectedly, poor extant evidence of the earliest stages of the tradition: among the manuscripts dating to the VI/XII century, the earliest is MS Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276 (Ka in the present edition), dated 536H/1142; together with the twelfth-century Latin translation, it is the most ancient extant direct witness of Avicenna's *Madḥal*<sup>177</sup>. The thirteenth-century production is quite well attested: several valuable witnesses produced in this period are still extant. The fourteenth century, on the contrary, apparently witnessed a remarkable fall of the manuscript production: only two copies produced in this period are known to be extant, against the nine dating to the preceding century and the twelve of the following century; the historical reasons for such a noticeable regression are yet to be established<sup>178</sup>. The manuscript production of the Logic of the *Šifā'* flourished anew in the centuries following the dramatic restriction registered for the fourteenth century. It is tempting to link the reprise of an intense manuscript production to the general renewed interest in philosophy showed by the ruling elites during the fifteenth century<sup>179</sup>, and it might be worth trying to weigh the role of patronage in giving new impulse to the book production. The highest peak in the manuscript production was reached during the seventeenth century, which mirrors the climate of cultural renaissance that characterized the Safavid period<sup>180</sup>. Afterwards, the manuscript production continued until the first half of the twentieth century, although with progressively decreasing intensity; there is almost no solution of continuity between the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Madḥal* and its first printed version, which is part of the edition of the entire *Šifā'* published in Cairo between 1952 and 1983<sup>181</sup>.

Within the frame of the present research, it was possible to check more in detail the reproductions of 68 MSS. The Logic of the *Šifā'* is variously transmitted in the manuscript tradition, either alone (entire or divided into parts), or together with some

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<sup>177</sup> MAHDAVI 1954 (p. 171) records as a date of copy of MS London, BLOIOC, Or. 1655 the year 576H/1180-1: since, however, it was not possible to inspect the manuscript, it cannot be established whether the date refers to the manuscript itself or was copied from its exemplar.

<sup>178</sup> A similar regression during the VIII/XIV c. is also observed in the manuscript tradition of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'* by A. Bertolacci, who formulates the hypothesis that the Mongol invasion, which caused in 656H/1258 the fall of the capital Baḡdād, one of the most important centres of manuscript production, might have had a huge disruptive impact in the manuscript copy and circulation; see BERTOLACCI 2018 [forthcoming].

<sup>179</sup> Cf. POURJAVADY AND SCHMIDTKE 2015, p. 253.

<sup>180</sup> For the idea of a "Safavid Renaissance", see POURJAVADY AND SCHMIDTKE 2015.

<sup>181</sup> Cf. *infra*, section II.1.

other sections of the summa, or, in larger-format MSS, with the entire *summa*<sup>182</sup>; a classification according to their content of the 68 MSS autoptically checked ordered by dating is provided in S3 below. Apparently, the section of Logic was transmitted in all different possible formats, with no significant variations; supposedly, the publication of the Tehran Lithograph in 1303-5H/1885-7, containing the sections of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics of the *Šifā'*, might account for the twentieth-century tendency to copy the Logic alone, without these two other sections<sup>183</sup>.

*Main cultural centres of copy of K. al-Madḥal: an attempt at a historical reconstruction*

Combining the geographical and chronological data provided by the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Madḥal*, it is possible to attempt at a historical reconstruction of some of the most vibrant cultural hubs involved in the process of transmission of the work.

### **Twelfth/thirteenth-century Baġdād: the earliest stages of transmission**

Nowadays Iraq, and most specifically Baġdād, assumed a crucial role in the manuscript production, after becoming the capital of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate, and maintained its leadership position in the production and preservation of manuscripts at least until the pillage and destruction of the city by the Mongols in 1258. As previously stated, Baġdād is also attested among the centres in which the *Šifā'* was copied and transmitted already at an early stage of the tradition. Besides MS İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261, which, according to the colophon, was copied there in 677H/1278, there is also some interesting evidence of an earlier copy produced in Baġdād in Ğumādā II 503H/1109-10, reportedly the antigraph of MS Najaf, Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Mu'minīn 1096, a copy dating 1091H. This attested MS must have been the exemplar of at least four other MSS that

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<sup>182</sup> For a more detailed classification of the various formats in which the *Šifā'* and its sections were transmitted, see BERTOLACCI [forthcoming].

<sup>183</sup> That the sections included in the Tehran Lithograph were preferably not copied after its publication is demonstrated by cases like that of MS Beirut, Université St. Joseph, Bibliothèque Orientale 373, a modern copy of MS London, BLOIOC, India Office, Ar. 476 (= 1796). The whole set of MSS India Office Ar. 475-477, forming a complete *Šifā'* in three volumes, arrived in Beirut to be copied in 1890, provided by the Swiss Arabist Charles Pierre Henri Rieu (b. Geneva, 1820-d. London, 1902), who worked at the time at the section of Oriental Manuscripts at the British Museum (see CHEIKHO 1925, pp. 122-123). The section of Logic preserved in MS India Office, Ar. 475 (= 1420), and the section of Mathematics preserved in MS India Office, Ar. 477 (= 1811), were entirely copied (respectively, MSS Beirut, BO 372 and 374); the copy of the Natural Philosophy in MS BO 373 from MS Ar. 476, on the contrary, was interrupted at *Samā' Ṭabī'ī* III.6, when the copyist became acquainted with the existence of the Teheran Lithograph, as a note in French at the end of the copy (f. 111<sup>v</sup>) attests (cf. CHEIKHO 1925, p. 123); presumably for the same reason, the Metaphysics was not copied at all.

preserve only the section of Metaphysics of the *Šifā'*, whose colophons record the same dating according to the same formulation<sup>184</sup>.

### **Thirteenth-century Marāġa: the circles of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Bar Hebraeus<sup>185</sup>**

Marāġa was arguably a very lively centre of copy and study of the *Šifā'* during the VII/XIII century. The town witnessed a flourishing philosophical activity gathered around Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's astronomic observatory, founded in 657H/1259 under the patronage of the Īlhānid ruler Hülegü, which represented, using D. Gutas' words, a "cluster of philosophical activity"<sup>186</sup>. Marāġa was also an important centre for Christian thought: one of the most relevant figures in this regard is Bar Hebraeus, maphrian of the Syriac Orthodox Church, historian and philosopher, who was lecturing there in 1272, and remained there until his death in 1286. The copy of MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 (henceforth: MS A), reportedly started in Marāġa in 671H/1273, must be supposedly set within this context<sup>187</sup>.

Within the entourage of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, on the other hand, must be set the production of at least three other MSS, namely MS İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 (henceforth: MS Nk), MS Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Behīt Collection 44988, 331 *falsafa* (henceforth: MS B) and MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (henceforth: MS C). These three thirteenth-century complete copies of the *Šifā'* arguably derive from the same exemplar (MS η in the stemma in section II.4 below), which very likely circulated within the school of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in Marāġa.

According to the information provided by the colophon, MS Nk was copied by 'Abd al-Kāfi b. 'Abd al-Maġīd b. 'Abd Allāh al-Tabrīzī in 666H/1267-8; an *iġāza*<sup>188</sup> reportedly issued by 'Alī b. 'Umar b. 'Alī al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675H/1276) for the copyist of MS Nk and copied on the first folio of MS Nk qualifies the copyist of the

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<sup>184</sup> MSS Iran, Qum, Āyat Allāh 'Allāma Ḥasan Ḥasanzadeh Āmulī Private Collection, no number; Iran, Qum, Kitābhānah-i Masġid-i A'zam, 1391; Iran, Rasht, Kitābhānah-i Millī 37 and Iran, Mashhad, Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍavī, 23783. The attested witness must have surely preserved the Metaphysics of the *Šifā'*, that all the five witnesses preserve; as to other parts, such as the Logic, it is difficult to tell whether it was copied in MS Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Mu'minīn 1096 from the same exemplar or rather from a different one. On this early "edition" of the Metaphysics of the *Šifā'*, see BERTOLACCI 2018 [forthcoming].

<sup>185</sup> A part of the subjects dealt with in this paragraph are the result of a research published in DI VINCENZO 2018.

<sup>186</sup> GUTAS 2002, pp. 95-6.

<sup>187</sup> For a historical reconstruction of the cultural and intellectual milieu in which MS A was produced, see CELLI 2018 [forthcoming].

<sup>188</sup> Cf. GACEK 2009, pp. 216-9.

manuscript as a student (*tilmīd*) of Al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī<sup>189</sup>, who certified that the copyist of MS Nk had read al-Kātibī's *Šarḥ 'aqd al-ğawāhir* before him<sup>190</sup>. The *iğāza* was reportedly issued by al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī for the copyist of MS Nk in the half of Ğumādā I 659H/3<sup>rd</sup> April-2<sup>nd</sup> May 1261, which means that the copyist of MS Nk was a student of al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī when the latter was active, together with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, within the school of Marāğa<sup>191</sup>. As a further evidence for the presence of the copyist of MS Nk in Marāğa at the time he copied MS Nk, an *'Abd al-Kāfī 'Abd al-Mağīd 'Abīd*<sup>192</sup> *Allāh* is also reported to have finished copying MS Esad Efendi 3804 in Marāğa on 5 Ša'bān 665H/1<sup>st</sup> May 1267<sup>193</sup>. An *'Abd al-Kāfī 'Abd al-Mağīd 'Abd Allāh al-Tabrīzī* is also recorded as the copyist of MS İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 3453/16 in 677H/1278, in Bağdād<sup>194</sup>. If the identification of the two copyists with the one of MS Nk holds, then the copyist of MS Nk might have been a scholar active in Marāğa with a main interest in geometry<sup>195</sup>, who moved from Marāğa to Bağdād at a later stage of his career. This latter fact might be related to a specific event of the history of the school of Marāğa, namely the transferral of a large number of scholars from Marāğa to Bağdād that took place in 1274<sup>196</sup>. According to this reconstruction, the copyist of MS Nk is a scholar initially enrolled in the school of Marāğa as a student of al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī who might have joined al-Ṭūsī moving to Bağdād in 1274.

Another note in the first folio of MS Nk, stating that the manuscript preserves some excerpts written by the *'allāma* Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī (d. 710H/1311) read before al-Šīrāzī himself<sup>197</sup>, provides another clue of the connection of this manuscript with the school of Marāğa. The use of the technical expression *maqrū'a* ("read")<sup>198</sup> points to the fact that this note witnesses again the school practice of reading a work in front of

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<sup>189</sup> Quoting the beginning of the page, l. 1: «this Book of extreme clarity was written by (*bi-ḥaṭṭ*) the *'allāma* student (*tilmīd*) of al-Kātibī».

<sup>190</sup> Lines 1-9. The expression: *qara'a 'alayya* («he read to me») has a technical use in similar texts; see, for instance, POURJAVADY AND SCHMIDTKE 2009.

<sup>191</sup> AL-RAHIM 2003, p. 220.

<sup>192</sup> This is the reading printed in ŞEŞEN 1997, p. 76. The palaeographical difference between *'Abd* and *'Abīd* is, however, minimal, and I suspect that the name reported in the catalogue could be the same of the copyist of MS Nk.

<sup>193</sup> See KRAUSE 1936, p. 526, and ŞEŞEN 1997, p. 76.

<sup>194</sup> RASHED 2011, p. 36 and RASHED 2013, p. 428.

<sup>195</sup> He is qualified in the *iğāza* as *sayyid al-muhandisīn* ("master of the geometers") on f. 1<sup>r</sup> in MS Nk.

<sup>196</sup> Al-Ṭūsī's biography reports that al-Ṭūsī himself moved, together with many of his students, from Marāğa to Bağdād shortly before his death; see IBN ŞĀKIR AL-KUTUBĪ, *Fawāṭ al-Wafayāt*, vol. 3, p. 251.

<sup>197</sup> «In the margin some of the excerpts are [written] by the *'allāma* Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī, and this manuscript was read (*maqrū'a*) before the *'allāma* al-Šīrāzī».

<sup>198</sup> On this expression, see GACEK 2009, p. 54.

a teacher in order to get a permission (*iğāza*) to transmit it. The fact that MS Nk was read before Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī, and that some of the *marginalia* of MS Nk are his own, proves that he played an active role in the teaching and transmission of the text. This piece of information is of the utmost interest in order to place MS Nk in its own cultural context: by the time it was copied, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī as well was a student of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī within the school of Marāğa<sup>199</sup>; although he might well have annotated the manuscript later on, his activity on the manuscript is in itself another clue of the connection of the manuscript with al-Ṭūsī's school. MS C as well can be reconducted to the same school tradition, for it is a copy realized in 693H/1293-4 for Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī's personal library<sup>200</sup>. The reconstruction provided so far is further supported by the fact that the copyists of MSS Nk, B and C copied in the margins of these three witnesses also some marginal notes that attest a collation with a manuscript of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; the notes were presumably in their common exemplar η, which is arguably the manuscript that was collated with al-Ṭūsī's<sup>201</sup>.

#### **Fifteenth/sixteenth-century Šīrāz, in the Safavid Iran: the schools of Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Šīrāzī**

The fifteenth-century Šīrāz was the cradle of two major philosophical school, related to the rival figures of Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502-3) and Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī (d. 903H/1497-8)<sup>202</sup>: the first was active in the Madrasat Dār al-Aytām, also known as Madrasa-ye Begom<sup>203</sup>, whereas the descendants of the second pursued their teaching activity within the Madrasa Manšūriyya<sup>204</sup>. Both schools reconstructibly played a role in the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Šifā'* as well.

In the Madrasat Dār al-Aytām, at the time Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī was teaching, a complete copy of the *Šifā'*, MS Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709, was produced: the

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<sup>199</sup> Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī's departure from Marāğa is supposed in his mid-thirties, between 667H/1268 and 672H/1274; see WALBRIDGE 1992, p. 13.

<sup>200</sup> As stated in the note on f. 1<sup>r</sup>: «For the library of the great master, the high *imām*, the greatest, the most perfect, the most excellent and the most learned, the learned ruler of the sages, the most learned of the sons of Adam, Quṭb al-Milla wa-l-Dīn, proof of the Islām and of the Muslims, counsellor of the kings and lords». See also MAHDAVĪ 1954, p. 170. When MS C was copied (1293-4), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī was probably active in Tabrīz; cf. WALBRIDGE 1992, p. 21 and n. 69. Although it is not explicitly stated, there is some possibility that MS C circulated in Tabrīz.

<sup>201</sup> For a transcription and discussion of these notes, see DI VINCENZO 2018.

<sup>202</sup> On Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī and his philosophical disputes with Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, see AMINRAZAVI AND NASR 2008, p. 49, and NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, pp. 23-28.

<sup>203</sup> On Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's activity in the madrasa, see NEWMAN 1996 and AMINRAZAVI AND NASR 2008, pp. 36-38.

<sup>204</sup> Instituted by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī in 883H/1478 and named after his son Ğiyāṭ al-Dīn Manšūr; see NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, pp. 28-29.

madrasa is mentioned in the colophon of the section of Logic, copied on 17 Ğumādā II 886H/22 August 1481 by Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ḥiğāzī al-Ḥanafī.

Two other MSS are, on the other hand, related to the intellectual circle of the Madrasa Manṣūriyya, namely MSS Rampur, Raza Library, Ḥikma 112 [n. 3476]<sup>205</sup> (henceforth: MS Ş) and Khvoy, Kitābhānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247 (henceforth: MS K). MS Ş is a fourteenth-century witness of the *Şifā*<sup>206</sup> that was owned by Şadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī, then passed to his son Ğiyāṭ al-Dīn Manşūr (d. 949H/1542), active in the Madrasa Manṣūriyya<sup>207</sup>, then to this latter's son Şadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ṭānī (d. 962H/1555)<sup>208</sup>, then to the student of Ğiyāṭ al-Dīn Manşūr, Faṭḥ Allāh al-Şīrāzī (d. 997H/1589)<sup>209</sup>, who is the author of the indexes of contents in the manuscript<sup>210</sup>. MS K as well must have been related to the figure of Faṭḥ Allāh Şīrāzī: it was copied in Ramaḍān 986H/November-December 1578 for an 'Abd al-Ḥāliq Ibn Muḥammad Maḥmūd from Gīlān, who was, according to historical sources of the time, a student of Faṭḥ Allāh Şīrāzī<sup>211</sup>. He reportedly studied MS K with Faṭḥ Allāh Şīrāzī, collated it and corrected it; the process of correction of the manuscript ended the month of Şa' bān 988H/September-October 1580<sup>212</sup>. Interestingly, an 'Abd al-Ḥāliq Ğīlānī is also recorded as the copyist of another witness of the *Şifā*, namely MS Qom, Markaz-i Iḥyā'-i Mīrāt-i Islāmī 314, which might, therefore, be an additional MS related to the same intellectual milieu.

### Mughal India

The emerging of an interest for the *Şifā*' among Şī'ī circles in the Indian Subcontinent, especially focused on Logic and Natural Philosophy, must be very likely put in relation to the circulation of Şīrāzī scholars<sup>213</sup>. This claim finds confirmation in the genealogical study of the manuscript tradition, which shows how Indian witnesses of the section of *Madḥal* ultimately derive from copies owned by Şīrāzī scholars. As an instance, the aforementioned MS Ş played a central role in the transmission of the *Şifā*' in the Mughal India: it became part of the library of the Mughal ruler Akbar (reg. 1556-1605AD), presumably after it was brought to India by

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<sup>205</sup> On this manuscript, see also POURJAVADY 2011, p. 23 and n. 144 and RIZVI 2011, p. 11, n. 8.

<sup>206</sup> The colophon at the end of the section of Logic is dated at the beginning of Rabī' I 718H/May 1318.

<sup>207</sup> See NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, p. 36 and POURJAVADY 2011, pp. 24-32.

<sup>208</sup> According to the sources, son Şadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ṭānī was the younger of the two sons of Ğiyāṭ al-Dīn Manşūr; see NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, pp. 37-38.

<sup>209</sup> Faṭḥ Allāh al-Şīrāzī and Muşliḥ al-Dīn Lārī (d. 979H/1571-2) were students of Ğiyāṭ al-Dīn Manşūr in the Madrasa Manṣūriyya; see NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, p. 36.

<sup>210</sup> As reported in a note in Persian on p. 1, upper margin.

<sup>211</sup> SAYYID MUḤAMMAD MA'ŞŪM BAKRĪ, *Tārīḥ-i Sind*, p. 215.

<sup>212</sup> As reported in a note in Persian on p. 506.

<sup>213</sup> As claimed in AHMED 2012, pp. 212-213.

Faḥ Allāh Šīrāzī himself; only after, it was moved to Rampur Library, where it is still preserved. Interestingly, MS S must have been the origin of an Indian branch of the manuscript tradition: according to the result of the collation of the section of *Madḥal*, at least two MSS nowadays preserved in India – and very likely also copied there – derive from MS S, i.e. MS Hyderabad, Osmaniya University Library, acq. 582 (dat. XIII/XIX c.), which preserves a part of the section of Logic, and MS Rampur, Raza Library, 3478 (dat. 1267H/1850-1), which preserves the whole *Šifā'* except for the section of Mathematics, whose section of Logic was copied by a Fadawī Kahīmkan Wās<sup>214</sup>, very likely a copyist of Indian provenance.

### **Eighteenth-century Ottoman Constantinople<sup>215</sup>**

During the first half of the eighteenth century, Constantinople was the scenario of an outstanding cultural vibrancy, a sign of which is the translation project started under the patronage of the Grand Vizier Damad İbrāhim Paşa of Nevşehir, which aimed at providing new Arabic translations of philosophical and scientific texts, known at the time only through the translations accomplished in the 'Abbāsīd period. It is against the background of this cultural renaissance that a vast number of manuscripts circulated and were gathered in the city's libraries: numerous and rich were the collections gathered by Ottoman statesmen and scholars, mostly preserved in the madrasas' libraries.

Part of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna's *Madḥal* developed against this background as well. A first instance is that of Feyzullah Efendi (d. 1115H/1703), Müfti of Constantinople and tutor of the young Muṣṭafā II<sup>216</sup>, whose seal of *waqf* is on the first folio of MS Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206<sup>217</sup> and whose ownership notes can be found in MSS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 770 and 771<sup>218</sup>; a second instance is that of Abū Bakr b. Rustam b. Aḥmad al-Šīrwānī (d. 1135H/1722-3)<sup>219</sup>, who owned, among others, a thirteenth-century copy of the first half of the Logic of the *Šifā'*, MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 207.

Another famous book collectionist of the same period, Walī al-Dīn Ğārullāh, was both involved in the circulation and in the production of copies of the Logic of Avicenna's *Šifā'*. Before acquiring the previously mentioned MS C in 1138H/1725-

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<sup>214</sup> See the colophon on f. 329<sup>r</sup>; the name of the copyist suggests a provenance from Northern India, in Punjab.

<sup>215</sup> A part of the subjects dealt with in this paragraph are the result of a research published in DI VINCENZO [forthcoming].

<sup>216</sup> For further biographical information, see NIZRI 2010.

<sup>217</sup> Dating 1112H/1700-1; the *waqf* in the seal reports that the manuscript bounded to be kept in the *madrasa* instituted by Feyzullah himself. For a reproduction and transcription of the seal, see BAYRAKTAR AND KUT 1984, pp. 101-102.

<sup>218</sup> In both cases, the note is dated 1115H/1703.

<sup>219</sup> See FU'AD SAYYID 2003, pp. 19-22.

1726, Ğārullāh requested, in 1125H/1713, the copy of MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1425<sup>220</sup>, preserving the Logic and the Metaphysics of the *Şifā'*. As far as the section of Logic is concerned, MS Carullah 1425 is seemingly a copy of MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822, which preserves a conclusive note, claiming that the copy was read to Avicenna himself<sup>221</sup>: one could wonder whether this can account for Ğārullāh's interest in asking a copy of it.

One of the most interesting intellectual figures of the first quarter of the eighteenth century also promoted the production of some of the manuscripts of the Logic of the *Şifā'*: As'ad Ibn 'Alī Ibn 'Uṭmān al-Yānyawī (d. 1143 H/1730<sup>222</sup>), also known as Esad Efendi, showed a deep interest in the Aristotelian philosophy and its reception, also taking part to the aforementioned translation project sponsored by the Grand Vizier Damad İbrâhim Paşa<sup>223</sup>. At least one MS of the section of Natural Philosophy of Avicenna's *Şifā'* is known to have been owned by him<sup>224</sup>, and it can be reconstructed that, as a teacher in the *madrassa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anşārī in Constantinople, he gave impulse to the copy of the Logic of the *Şifā'*. MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909, dating 29 Ğumādâ II 1134H/ 16<sup>th</sup> April 1722, was copied under his request by one of his students, namely Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Uskübī<sup>225</sup>. MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565, seemingly copied from the same exemplar as MS Ragıp Paşa 909<sup>226</sup>, results from the work of several scribes, who alternated in the copy. These handwritings also wrote some marginal notes which often quote works or translations by As'ad al-Yānyawī, referring to him as “our professor, the philosopher As'ad” (*li-ustādinā al-faylasūf As'ad*), or even simply “the

<sup>220</sup> As stated in a note on the guard page of the manuscript, presumably in the handwriting of Ğārullāh himself.

<sup>221</sup> Cf. *infra*, section II.2, n° 11.

<sup>222</sup> Born in Ioannina (the Ottoman Yanya), in north-western Greece, Al-Yānyawī moved to Constantinople in 1098H/1686, where he was appointed as a professor in 1111H/1699. A different dating for his death (1134H/1722) is provided in GUTAS 1998, p. 175; Al-Yānyawī was, however, appointed as judge of Galata in 1725 (for al-Yānyawī's biography, see ŞAHİN 2005, pp. 349-350 and ASLAN 2006).

<sup>223</sup> On Al-Yānyawī's activity as a translator, see KAYA 1992, ÖZERVERLI 2011 and KÜÇÜK 2013; see also GUTAS 2000b, p. 228.

<sup>224</sup> MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 796.

<sup>225</sup> Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskübī is also the copyist of MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 812 (a witness of Al-Fārābī's summaries of Aristotle's logic), copied in the *madrassa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anşārī just a year before (Ğumādâ II 1133H/1721); in the colophon, the copyist explicitly mentions As'ad Ibn 'Alī Ibn 'Uṭmān al-Yānyawī as his professor (*ustād*). I owe this piece of information to Teymour Morel, who worked on the manuscript within the *PhiC* Project; GUTAS 1998, p. 175 mentions an Aḥmad al-Uskübī as the copyist of MS Hamidiye 812 and Al-Yānyawī's student, based on TÜRKER 1963, pp. 151-152, 173-174.

<sup>226</sup> Cf. *infra*, section II.5.

professor” (*al-ustād*). One of the several handwritings<sup>227</sup> copied on 29 Šafar 1135H/9<sup>th</sup> December 1722 some excerpts of a commentary on Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* translated by As‘ad al-Yānyawī. Arguably, then, the manuscript was copied by some anonymous students of As‘ad al-Yānyawī, in the same *milieu* and at the same time as MS Ragıp Paşa 909<sup>228</sup>. Both the manuscripts are particularly relevant to the study of Avicenna’s Ottoman reception, because they also attest As‘ad al-Yānyawī’s own notes of commentary on the text, showing sometimes his critical attitude<sup>229</sup>.

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Conclusively, this preliminary study of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s *Šifā’*, with a special focus on *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, allowed to individuate some of the main paths of the transmission of the work, and to trace a brief history of the transmission of the text.

Noteworthy, a pivotal role in the transmission of Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Madḥal* was played by the Twelver-Šī‘ī tradition: many of the most fertile intellectual environments in which the text was copied and studied belonged to this tradition, such as the circle of Našīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in Marāġa, the schools of Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī and Šadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī in Šīrāz, and the intellectual circles in Mughal India in which the text was copied and studied under the impulse of the scholars from Šīrāz. It can be observed how these geographically and chronologically distinct contexts are actually connected the one to the other in a sort of ideal chain of intellectual transmission: the Šīrāzī tradition, both that of the Daštakī family, which gave impulse to the stem of Avicennian studies in the Indian Subcontinent, and that of Ğalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, claimed an intellectual genealogy that ultimately remounted to Avicenna himself, including in the lineage, among others, Našīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī<sup>230</sup>. On the other hand, the lively reception and circulation of the work among the Ottoman statesmen and scholars proves that this ideal Šī‘ī intellectual lineage

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<sup>227</sup> It is the handwriting that copied, for instance, the text from fol. 101<sup>r</sup> to fol. 103<sup>v</sup>.


<sup>228</sup> For a more detailed account of the circulation of the *Šifā’* within Al-Yānyawī’s school, see DI VINCENZO [forthcoming].

<sup>229</sup> See DI VINCENZO [forthcoming].


<sup>230</sup> The chain of transmission of the Daštakī tradition is mentioned by Ğiyāṭ al-Dīn Maṣṣūr in his *Kašf al-Ḥaqā’iq al-Muḥammadiyya*; see AMINRAZAVI AND NASR 2008, pp. 48-50. As to Dawānī, he mentioned at least two different chains of transmission of this sort, one of which, according to Āghā Buzurg al-Ṭīhrānī (*Ṭabaqāt*, vol. 4, pp. 13-14), was mentioned in an *iġāza* issued for ‘Afīf al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Šafawī (see POURJAVADY 2011, p. 5 and n. 30), whereas the other can be found in Dawānī’s *iġāza* to Mu‘ayyadzāde preserved in MS Esad Efendi 3733 (cf. POURJAVADY 2011, p. 6 and n. 32). All these chains of transmission seem to attach themselves to pre-existent chains of transmission linking Avicenna to Našīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (on which, see AL-RAHIM 2003, ENDRESS 2006, pp. 410-415 and WISNOVSKY 2013, pp. 193-199).

should not be considered as the exclusive means of transmission of the work, and that different cultural contexts were actively involved in its tradition.


**S1. Places of preservation of the manuscripts of Avicenna's *Madḥal***



**S2. Manuscripts inspected or recorded in the catalogues of which the dating – even conjectural – is known (i.e. 86 out of 119 MSS)**



**S3. Manuscripts of which autoptic analysis was possible classified by content and dating**



## I.2. A PROVISIONAL LIST OF THE MANUSCRIPTS OF AVICENNA'S *MADḤAL*

### *Legenda:*

(A) = MS recorded in ANAWATI 1950; see also ANAWATI 1951 and ANAWATI 1974, pp. 229-262.

(B) = MS recorded in C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*, voll.I-II, Brill, Leiden, 1943-19492; suppl. voll. I-III, Brill, Leiden 1937-1942 (vol. I, p. 592, suppl. Vol. I, p. 815).

(D) = MS recorded in *Fihristvārah-i Dastnivištā-yi Īrān (Dinā)*, *The Abridged Catalogue of Iran Manuscripts*, ed. M. Dirāyatī, Kitābhānah, Mūzih va Markaz-i Asnād-i Maḡlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, vol. VI, Tehran 1389Hš/2010.

(E<sup>1</sup>) = MS recorded in ERGIN 1937, p. 22.

(E<sup>2</sup>) = MS recorded in ERGIN 1956, pp. 32-33.

(F) = MS recorded in *Fihristgān: nuṣṣah`hā-yi ḥaṭṭī-i Īrān (Fanḥā)*, *Union Catalog of Iranian Manuscripts*, ed. M. Dirāyatī, Sāzmān-i Asnād va Kitābhānah-i Millī-i Ġumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān, vol. XXI, Tehran 1390Hš/2011.

(G<sup>2</sup>) = MS recorded in GUTAS 2014, pp. 420-421.

(M) = MS recorded in MAHDAVĪ 1954.

(S) = MS recorded in FU'ĀD SAYYID 1950.

\* = manuscript's reproduction checked

† = manuscript recorded in the catalogues and now lost

(m) = MS containing *Manṭiq* (section of Logic)

(t) = MS containing *Ṭabī'iyāt* (section of Natural Philosophy)

(r) = MS containing *Riyāḍiyyāt* (section of Mathematics)

(i) = MS containing *Ilāhiyyāt* (section of Metaphysics)

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## PUBLIC LIBRARIES

**Aligarh** (Uttar Pradesh, India) [3 MSS, 1 checked]

- 1) \*Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 110/30 (1071H/1660-1; copyist: Muḡammad Ḥusayn al-Mašhadī) (m, t, r, i) (E<sup>2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 61 n° 4; AHMED 2012, p. 204, n° 19)
- 2) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 160/21 (m) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>, AHMED 2012, p. 205 n° 24)
- 3) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 160/84 (m) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)

**Baġdād** (Iraq) [1 MS lost]

- 4) †Khizānat Qāsim Muḥammad al-Rajab 271 (m)

**Beirut** (Lebanon) [1 MS checked]

- 5) \*Université St. Joseph, Bibliothèque Orientale 372 (1890) (m) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)

**Benares** (India) [2 MSS, 1 checked]

- 6) Ğāmi‘a Ğawadiyya, Bonaras (Benaras) 15 (XI c.) (m)  
7) \*Ğāmi‘a Ğawadiyya, Bonaras (Benaras) 95 (20 Rabī‘ al-Awwal 902H/5<sup>h</sup> December 1496) (m)

**Cairo** (Egypt) [3 MSS, 2 checked]<sup>231</sup>

- 8) \*Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḥīt Collection 44988, 331 *falsafa* (VII/XIII c.) (m, t, r, i) (A, E<sup>2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)<sup>232</sup>  
9) Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṭā’iq al-Qawmiyya, 262 *ḥikma wa-falsafa* (1337H/1918; copyist: Maḥmūd Qāsim) (m, t, i) (A, E<sup>2</sup>, M, S, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 62 n<sup>o</sup> 16)<sup>233</sup>  
10) \*Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṭā’iq al-Qawmiyya, 894 *falsafa* (X-XI/XVI-XVII c., copyist ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Mayr ‘Abd Allāh) (m, t, r, i) [incompl.: *Ilāhiyyāt* I.8-X.5 (pp. 49.5-455.16 of Cairo ed.), on ff. 815<sup>r</sup>-879<sup>v</sup>] (A, E<sup>2</sup>, M, S, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n<sup>o</sup> 19)<sup>234</sup>

**Damascus** (Syria) [1 MS, 0 checked]

- 11) Maktabat al-Asad al-Waṭaniyya, Asad National Library, 7905 (1043H/1634; copyist: Šāliḥ Ibn Šarīf Ḥāmid) (m, t, r, i) (BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n<sup>o</sup> 22)

**Delhi** (India) [1 MS, 0 checked]

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<sup>231</sup> In MS Cairo, Dār al-Kutub wā’ 3078 (Sohag 39 maṭṭiq) the section of Logic starts at *Ġadal* V.5 (p. 284.8 Cairo ed.) onwards; see the incipit in A, p. 73.

<sup>232</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ب.

<sup>233</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ل.

<sup>234</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ا.

12) National Museum 56.9613 (941H/1534)

**Dublin** (Ireland) [1 MS checked]

13) \*Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 3983 (vols. i-ii) (1002H/1593) (m, t, r, i)

**Herat** (Afghanistan) [1 MS, 0 checked]

14) Herat Museum Library (nr. 14 in the 1964 Catalogue, p. 315) (13 Rabīʿ II 898H/10 February 1493; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥayrī al-Anṣārī) (m, t, r, i)

**Hyderabad** (India) [3 MSS, 1 checked]

15) \*Osmaniya University Library, acq. 582 (m\_i-iii.2) (XIII/XIX c.)

16) Osmaniya University Library, 13 (1001H/1592-3)

17) Salar Jung Museum Library, 76 (m, t\_i-iii) (1108H/1696-7) (AHMED 2012, p. 203 n° 14)

**İstanbul** (Turkey) [31 MSS, 30 checked]

18) \*Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ʿUmūmī) 3966 (m, t, r, i) (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 24)

19) \*Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ʿUmūmī) 4288 (m) (E<sup>1</sup>, A)

20) \*Köprülü Halk Kütüphanesi, Fazıl Ahmet Paşa 894 (m, t, i) (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 30)

21) Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 1445 (1132H/1719) (A, M, E<sup>2</sup>)

22) \*Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 1504 (26 Şaʿbān 674H/21 February 1276) (m\_i-iv) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)<sup>235</sup>

23) \*Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206 (Muḥarram 1093H/January-February 1682; copyist: Muḥammad Wālī Ibn Mīr Ḥamat Šāh mawlānā Muḥammad Ibn Waʿī; place: *dār al-şulṭana* Işfahān) (m\_i-iii) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)

24) \*Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708 (m, t, fragment of r, i) (X/XVI c. in A, p. 77) (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 32)<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ۛ.

<sup>236</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum ۞.

- 25) \*Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 (17 Ğumādā II 886H/22 August 1481 [logic]; 897H/1491-2 [mathematics]; 18 Şawwāl 894H/23 September 1489 [metaphysics]; copyists: Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ĥiġāzī al-Ĥanafī, in Dār al-Malik Šīrāz, in the Madrasat Dār al-Aytām [886H]; Aḥmad Ibn ‘Alī [897H]) (m, t, r, i) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 33)
- 26) \*Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 (25 Rabī‘ I-25 Şawwāl 666H/21<sup>st</sup> December 1267-15<sup>th</sup> July 1268, copyist: ‘Abd al-Kāfi Ibn ‘Abd al-Maġīd Ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Tabrīzī) (m, t, r, i) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 34)
- 27) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 207 (Al-‘aşir al-awsat min Dī l-ḥiġġa 680H/30<sup>th</sup> March-8<sup>th</sup> April 1282; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Ğa‘far al-Mālikī al-Baġdādī) (m\_i-iv) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)<sup>237</sup>
- 28) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atif Efendi 1565 (dat. XI/XVII in A, p. 75; possibly before 29 Şafar 1135H/9<sup>th</sup> December 1722; several anonymous copyists) (m\_i-v) (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 29) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 (671H/1273 in Marāġa - 674H/1276 in Ḥarbart; copyist: Amīr al-Dīn Manyūl (m, i, t, r) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 40)
- 30) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (693H/1293-4; copyist: Abū Bakr ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Tabrīzī) (m, t, r, i) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 44)
- 31) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1425 (1125H/1713) (m, i) (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 45)
- 32) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822 (VI-VII/XII-XIII c., but possibly XIV c.) (m, t, r, i) (M) [incompl.: on f. 355r *İlāhiyyāt* X.4 (p. 447.14 of Cairo ed.)-end] (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 46)
- 33) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823 (697H/1297-8; copyist: Şahāb al-Karmīnī; place: *madrassa* of Ūrḥān, in Tabrīz) (m, t, r, i) (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 47)
- 34) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 824 (824H/1421) (m) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)<sup>238</sup>
- 35) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 795 (1066H/1655) (m, t, i) (E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 50)
- 36) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoġlu Ali Paşa 857 (23 Ramadān 1102H/20<sup>th</sup> June 1691) (m, t, r, i) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 51)

<sup>237</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ع.

<sup>238</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: س.

- 37) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550 (1023H/1614) (m, t) (A, M, E<sup>1-2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 54)
- 38) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 (29 Ğumādà II 1134H/ 16<sup>th</sup> April 1722, copyist: Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskübī, under the request of As‘ad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn ‘Uṭmān al-Yānyawī; place: *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī [in Constantinople]) (m) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 39) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 910 (m, t, r, i) (A; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 38)
- 40) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748 (27 Raġab 879H/16<sup>th</sup> December 1474; copyist: Hāšim ‘Alī al-Nāzīr Ra’if [?]) (m, t, i) (A, B, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 55)
- 41) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 770 (18 Rabī‘ II 888H/4<sup>th</sup> June 1483; copyist: Muḥammad b. Maḥbūb b. ‘Abd Allāh) (m, t, r, i) (A, B, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 56)
- 42) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 771 (Rabī‘ I 885H/May-June 1480; copyist of the natural section: ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Manşūr b. Isma‘il) (m\_i-v + t) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 43) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 772 (628H/1231) (m) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)<sup>239</sup>
- 44) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 773 (26 Ša‘bān 1041H/18<sup>th</sup> March 1632; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn ‘Alī al-Talwāḥī [?]) (m\_i-iv) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 45) \*Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi, Turhan Valide Sultan 208 (m) (A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 46) \*Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 (m, t\_i) (10 Rabī‘ I 677H/8<sup>th</sup> August 1278 in Baġdād; copyist: ‘Abdu l-Raḥman, named (*al-mulaqqab*) Sayf al-Abšīḥī [?]) (A, M, E<sup>1-2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 47) \* Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262 (IX/XV c.) (m, t, i) (E<sup>1</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 57)
- 48) \*Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3445 (XI/XVII c. Anawati; likely before XV-XVI c.) (m) (E<sup>1</sup>, A, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 59)

**Kashan** (Iran) [1 MS checked]

- 49) \*Fahrang va Irshad 15 (XI/XVII c.) (m) (D)

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<sup>239</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum  $\zeta$ .

**Khvoy** (Iran) [1 MS checked]

- 50) \*Kitābḥānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247 (m, t, r, i) (Ramaḍān 986H/November-December 1578; patron: ‘Abd al-Ḥāliq Ibn Muḥammad Maḥmūd from Gīlān) (D, F)

**Kolkata** (Calcutta, Bengal, India) [1 MS, 0 checked]<sup>240</sup>

- 51) Asiatic Society of Bengal Library, Ar. 102 (XI/XVII c., from an exemplar of 469H/1076-7) (m, t, r, i) (nr. L 16 in the Catalogue of 1904, p. 82 [L = section on Philosophy]; nr. 1413 in the Catalogue of 1949, vol. II, pp. 146-7) (B, A, M)<sup>241</sup>

**Leiden** (Netherlands) [1 MS checked]<sup>242</sup>

- 52) \*Universiteitsbibliotheek Or. 4 (Golius Collection) (Catalogue CCO, n. 1444) (before X/XVI c.) (m, t, i) (B, A, M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 66 n° 63; BERTOLACCI 2006, Appendix A; WITKAM 2012, pp. 225-233)

**London** (United Kingdom) [5 MSS, 4 checked]

- 53) \*British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, India Office Ar. 1420 (= n° 475 in the catalogue by O. Loth, p. 131) (Kashmir, 1148H/1735-6) (m) (B, M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>; AHMED 2012, p. 205, n° 26)<sup>243</sup>
- 54) \*British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Jones Collection 114 (1046H/1636) [incompl.: *Ilāhiyyāt* III.6-IV.2] (m\_i-ii.5.4, i\_III.6-IV.2, r\_i-ii, iv [after it]) (B<sup>suppl.</sup>, M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>; AHMED 2012, pp. 207-208, n° 28)
- 55) British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or. 1655 (*Catalogus Codicum Manoscriptorum Orientalium qui in Museo Britannico Asservantur. Pars II Codices Arabicos Amplectens*, Londini 1871, p. 745) (m, t\_i-iii, v-viii) (576H in Mahdavi, p. 171) (M, G<sup>2</sup>)

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<sup>240</sup> National Library of India, Buhar Collection VII 284 (XII/XVIII c.) (A, G<sup>2</sup>, BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 62 n° 11, AHMED 2012, p. 201, n° 2) preserves the Logic only from *Qiyās* I.5, p. 39.9 Cairo ed. onwards (incipit in Hidayat Husain and Muqtadir 1923, vol. 2, p. 315).

<sup>241</sup> See AHMED 2012, pp. 201-202, n° 6. If Ahmed is right in identifying Ar. 102 with Bengal 82, then the manuscript might only contain the fourth fann of Logic (*Qiyās*), as in A, p. 70.

<sup>242</sup> MS Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek Or. 84 (Golius Collection) (Catalogue CCO, n. 1445) does not preserve *Madḥal*.

<sup>243</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ۞; in the introduction to the edition (p. 74) and in GUTAS 2014, p. 421, it is erroneously recorded as India Office 4752.

- 56) \*British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or. 7500 (XI/XVII c.) [incompl.: *Ilāhiyyāt* I-IX] (m, t, i) (A, B, E<sup>2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 67 n° 68)<sup>244</sup>
- 57) \*Royal Asiatic Society, Arabic 58 (Rabī' al-Awwal 1082H/July-August 1671; copyist: Faḍl Allāh Ibn Ḥusayn Azbunī [?]) (m, t, r, i)

**Mašhad** (Iran) [4 MSS, 1 checked]<sup>245</sup>

- 58) \*Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 1119 (m) (D, F) (XI/XVII c.)
- 59) Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī I, 3/156 (m) (A, M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 60) Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 490 (XI-XII/XVII-XVIII c.) (m) (D)
- 61) Shaikh 'Ali Haidar 442 (Ša'bān 1006H/March 1598) (m, t) (D)

**Najaf** (Iraq) [1 MS checked]

- 62) \*Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Mu'minīn, 1096 (copyist: 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ibn 'Abd al-Razzāq Riḍawī, 1091H from an exemplar copied in Ğumādā II 503H/January 1110 in Baġdād) (m, i)

**Oxford** (United Kingdom) [2 MSS, 0 checked]

- 63) Bodleian Library, Huntington 13; 111 (m\_I.v-vi.3; vi.4-ix)
- 64) Bodleian Library, Pococke 119 (m\_I.viii.2-ix) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)

**Paris** (France) [1 MS checked]

- 65) \*Bibliothèque nationale, Ar. 6829 (Dū l-ḥiġġa 1054H - Dū l-Qa'da 1055H/January-February 1645 - December-January 1646; copyist: Muḥammad Riḍā Ibn [Marḥūm] Šāh Muḥammad Kūnbānī) (m, i) (A, E<sup>2</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 68 n° 84)

**Patna, Bihar** (India) [2 MSS, 0 checked]

- 66) Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Bankipur) I, 213 (m, i, t, r) (B; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 61 n° 8)

<sup>244</sup> It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ۶.

<sup>245</sup> MSS Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī IV, 3/260 and 3/261 (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>) preserve, according to GUTAS 2014, p. 421, only the fifth *fann* of the section of Logic, i.e. the *Burhān*.

67) Khudā Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Bankipur) vol. XL, 3465 (published catalogue) = HL 4286 (m, t)

**Pešawar** (Pakistan) [1 MS, 0 checked]

68) Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Islāmiyya 1672 (m, t, r, i) (B<sup>suppl.</sup>, A; AHMED 2012, p. 200 and n. 4)

**Rampur** (India) [5 MSS, 3 MSS checked]

69) \*Rampur Raza Library, Hikma 112 [n. 3476] (m, t, i) (718H/1318-9; copyist: Maḥmūd Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kašānī) (B, A; AHMED 2012, p. 202, n° 7; Massani, p. 447, nr. 13)

70) \*Rampur Raza Library, 3477 ε (m, t, r, i) (XII/XVIII c.) Date in Imtiyāz ‘Alī ‘Arshī. *Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in Raza Library Rampur*. Volume IV: Sufism, Holy Scriptures, Logic & Philosophy. Printed for Raza Library Trust. Rampur, U.P. India 1971, pp. 442-443, nr. 3477)

71) \*Rampur Raza Library, 3478 ε (m, t, i) (1267H/1851; copyist: Fadawī Kahīmkanan Wās [Khem Karan in the Catalogue, fol. 329r, end of Logic] and Muḥammad Hāšim [sic in the Catalogue, fol. 634r, end of Natural Philosophy, 7 Ğumādā II 1267H]; see Imtiyāz ‘Alī ‘Arshī. *Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in Raza Library Rampur*. Volume IV: Sufism, Holy Scriptures, Logic & Philosophy. Printed for Raza Library Trust. Rampur, U.P. India 1971, pp. 442-443, nr. 3478)

72) Rampur Raza Library, 3479 (1293/1876, copyist: ‘Izzat ‘Alī Gorakhpūrī) (m, t, r, i) five volumes (+ nr. 3480, 3481, 3482, 3483) - Logic in two parts.

73) Rampur Raza Library, 3484 (XII/XVIII c.) (m)

**Qazvin** (Iran) [1 MS, 0 checked]

74) Khāndān-i Mīr Ḥussaynā-yi Qazvīnī 135 (m\_i, v) (D) (IX-X/XV-XVI c.)

**Qom** (Iran) [7 MSS, 0 checked]

75) Madrasah-i Raḡavīyah Library 52 (23 Ša‘bān 1080H/16<sup>th</sup> January 1670) (D) (m)

76) Mar‘ashī Najafī (Āyat Allāh) Library 3774 (m. i.9-ii?) (D)

77) Mar‘ashī Najafī (Āyat Allāh) Library 5525 (m) (D)

78) Mar‘ashī Najafī (Āyat Allāh) Library 8145 (m) (D)

79) Mar‘ashi 16248 (Catalogue vol. 41, p. 270)

- 80) Marʿashi 16568 (Catalogue vol. 42, p. 101)
- 81) Markaz-i Ihyāʾ-i Mīrāt-i Islāmī 314 (IX/XV c., copyist: ʿAbd al-Ḥāliq Ğīlānī) (m, r, t) (D)

**St. Petersburg** (Russia) [2 MSS, 0 checked]

- 82) Oriental Section of St. Petersburg University Scientific Library, 62 (m + t)
- 83) Oriental Section of St. Petersburg University Scientific Library, 195 (16 Dū l-Qaʿda 1086H/1<sup>st</sup> February 1676; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn Ṭāhir Labkarī [?]) (m\_i-iii)

**Tehran** (Iran) [32 MSS, 18 checked]

- 84) \*Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār (now: Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī) 1438 (20 Muḥarram 1053H/10<sup>th</sup> April 1643; copyist: Muḥammad Muḥsin Ibn Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḥātūn Ābādī) (m, t, r, i) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, D, F, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 70 n° 106)
- 85) \*Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār (now: Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī) 1439 (29 Rabīʿ I 1075H/20<sup>th</sup> October 1664; copyist: Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn Ibn Ḥāġġī Muḥammad Rāzānī) (m, t, r, i) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, D, F, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 70 n° 107)
- 86) \*Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār (now: Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī) 8331 (1055H/1645; copyist: Faḍl Allāh Ibn Ḥusayn Nāyīnī Ilāhī) (m, t, r, i) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, D, F, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 70 n° 108)
- 87) \*Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 135 (Šaʿbān 871H/March 1467; copyist: ʿAlī Ibn Faṭḥ Allāh al-Maʿdānī al-Iṣfahānī) (m, t, i) (B, M, E<sup>2</sup>, D, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 89)
- 88) Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 144/6 (m, i, t, r) (B; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 91)
- 89) \*Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1893 (1097H/1685) (m\_i-v, r\_iv) (D, F)
- 90) \*Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1895 (994H/1586) (m) (D)
- 91) Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1906 (m) (D)
- 92) \*Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1907 (old n. 00431) (XI/XVII c.) (m\_i-iv) (D, F)
- 93) \*Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1908 (old n. 00424) (m\_i-iv incompl.; *Madḥal* starts at I.5) (D, F) (XIII/XIX c.)
- 94) Kitābhānah-i Maġlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, Ṭabāṭabāʾī 889 (m\_i) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)

- 95) Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 1448 (D) (m)
- 96) Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 1449 (m, t) (D)
- 97) Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 6684/2 (XII/XVIII c.) (part of m\_i) (D)
- 98) Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 241 (Šīrāz, 1075H/1664; copyist: Muḥammad Šāliḥ al-Urdistānī) (m, t) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 99) \*Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 243 (collated with a manuscript dat. 536H, presumably MS Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276) (m, t, r, i) (A, M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 102)
- 100) \*Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran, 580 (X/XVI c.) (m, t, r, i) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 103) = 1326 (+ 1327)
- 101) Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran, 4408 (m) (D)
- 102) \*Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran, 1801 (final colophon, different hand: date 1343H = 1924)? (D)
- 103) \*Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran, 7590 (XI/XVII c. [owners' notes of the XII/XVIII c.]; copyist: Muḥammad al-mad'ū bi-Rabī' [= Muḥammad Rabī' Nišābūri: Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī 1776/5 (1016H/1607-8) (?)]) (m\_i-ii+i)
- 104) Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran, 20266 (1318H/1900-1) (m\_i-iv)
- 105) \*Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 1057 (IX/XV c.) (m) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, D, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 106) \*Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276 (First decade of Dū l-Ḥiġġa 536H/ 4<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> July 1142) (m\_i-ii.3) (M, E<sup>2</sup>, D, G<sup>2</sup>)
- 107) Kitābhānah-i Markazī va Markaz-i Asnād-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān Collection 5137 (XI/XVII c.) (m) (D)
- 108) Kitābhānah-i Markazī va Markaz-i Asnād-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān Collection 9103 (Raġab 1133H/ May 1721) (D, F) (m)
- 109) \*Kitābhānah-i Markazī va Markaz-i Asnād-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān Collection 2288 (XIV/XX c.) (m) (D)
- 110) Kitābhānah-i Markazī va Markaz-i Asnād-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān Collection 1448 (m) (D)
- 111) Kitābhānah-i Markazī va Markaz-i Asnād-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān Collection 1449 (m, t) (D)
- 112) \*Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān (Central Library of Tehran University) 6596 (1076H/1665-6; copyist: Sultān Muḥammad Ibn Rafī' al-Dīn Muḥammad Iṣfahānī) (m, t, r\_i-iii-iv-ii, i) (D)

- 113) Kitābhānah-i Markazī va Markaz-i Asnād-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān Collection 6684/2 (XII/XVIII c.) (part of m\_i) (D)
- 114) \*Kitābhānah-i Dāniškāda-i Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 236/1 (XI/XVII c.) (m) (D)
- 115) Kitābhānah-i Dāniškāda-i Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 289 (XII/XVIII c.) (m\_i-ii) (D)
- 116) \*Kitābhānah-i Dāniškāda-i Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 593/1 (XIV/XX c.) (m\_i-iv.I.7) (D)

#### PRIVATE COLLECTIONS

- 117) **Leiden** (Netherlands), E. J. Brill Collection 238 (XI-XII/XVII-XVIII c.) (m)<sup>246</sup>
- 118) **Tehran** (Iran), Hāfiz Farmānfarmā'iyān (1 Dū l-Qa'da 1060-26 Ša'bān 1061H/26<sup>th</sup> October 1650-14<sup>th</sup> August 1651; copyist: Muḥammad Muqīm Ibn Hāḡḡi Pīrnūrs Zubdah) (m, r, i) (D, F)
- 119) **Tehran** (Iran), Asḡar Mahdavī Private Collection 512 (XI/XVII c.) (m) (D)<sup>247</sup>

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#### *Manuscript of uncertain content – Possibly containing Madḡal (11 MSS)*

**Cairo** (Egypt) [1 MS, 0 checked]

- 120) Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṭā'iq al-Qawmiyya falsafa Ṭal'at 342 (1092H/1619-20) (part of m + t\_i-iv) (A, S)

**İstanbul** (Turkey) [1 MS, 0 found: lost?]

- 121) †Türk İslam Eserleri Müzesi, Çoban Mustafā Paşa Kütüphanesi 572 (E<sup>1</sup>, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n<sup>o</sup> 27)

<sup>246</sup> Recorded in the catalogue of the collection KONINGSVELD AND AL-SAMARRAI 1978, p. 137.

<sup>247</sup> Also recorded in the catalogue of the collection ASHK-E SHIRIN [forthcoming]. Another MS of the Asḡar Mahdavī Private Collection is recorded in D as preserving the section of Logic, namely MS 444 (VI-VIII/XII-XIV c.), but it preserves only the fourth *fann* on *Qiyās* (this piece of information is recorded in D and in the forthcoming catalogue of the collection ASHK-E SHIRIN [forthcoming]).

**Mašhad** (Iran) [1 MS, 0 checked]

- 122) ‘Abd al-Majid Maulavi 322 (part of m) (D)

**Mosul** (Iraq) [1 MS, 0 checked]

- 123) University Library 189.16 (uncertain content) (B, A; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 68 n° 80)

**Patna** (Bihar, India) [1 MS, 0 checked]

- 124) Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Bankipur) XXI, 2223 (part of m) (E<sup>2</sup>, M, A, B<sup>suppl.</sup>, G<sup>2</sup>, AHMED 2012, p. 202 n. 10)

**Qom** (Iran) [2 MSS, 0 checked]

- 125) Mar‘ashī Najafī (Āyat Allāh) Library 10186 (VIII/XIV c.) (part of m) (D)  
126) Mahsumié 655 (XIV/XX c.) (part of m) (D)

**Tehran** (Iran) [2 MSS, 0 checked]

- 127) Kitābhānah-i Dāniškāda-i Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 34 (part of m) (D) (XI/XVII c.)  
128) Kitābhānah-i Dāniškāda-i Ilāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 592 (part of m) (D) (XII/XVIII c.)

**Yazd** [1 MS, 0 checked]

- 129) Saduqi 97 (7 Rağab 1211H/6<sup>th</sup> January 1797) (part of m)

**Private collection** [1 MS, 0 checked]

- 130) Tehran (Iran), Muhīt Tabātabā’ī Private Collection

### I.3. THE MEDIEVAL LATIN TRANSLATION

To the Arabic manuscript witnesses, the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work should also be added: it was seemingly the first of a larger project of translations of the *Šifā'* started in Toledo by the Jewish translator Avendauth (Latinisation of Ibn Daud, d. ca. 1180) and the philosopher Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. after 1181)<sup>248</sup>, and mostly circulated under the name of *Logica Avicennae*<sup>249</sup>. The importance of this translation as a witness for Avicenna's text lies in the fact that it reproduces the readings of an Arabic exemplar that, if extant, would be among the earliest witnesses of the work. A critical edition of the text of the Latin translation has been published very recently<sup>250</sup>; unfortunately, the present research could not benefit of this publication, since when the edition of the Arabic text was prepared, the Latin text was only accessible in its thirteen manuscript witnesses<sup>251</sup> and in its sixteenth-century print, which were systematically checked. A list of the witnesses with the sigla employed in the present Introduction is provided in Tab. 3 below.

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<sup>248</sup> On the Toledan translation movement, cf. BURNETT 2011, FIDORA 2011, BERTOLACCI 2011a. On the Latin translations of Avicenna's works, see JANSSENS 2011; on Avendauth and Gundissalinus, see the historical works: D'ALVERNY 1952 and EAD. 1954; ALONSO ALONSO 1943 and ID. 1947; more recently on the subject, see POLLONI 2015 (on the Toledan period of Gundissalinus and his collaboration with Avendauth, cf. esp. pp. 15-20), FREUDENTHAL 2016, and, focusing on Avendauth, HUDRY 2017. Specifically on some features of the Latin translation of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, see also DI VINCENZO 2012.

<sup>249</sup> A few words about the authorship of the translation are required. The translation is accompanied, in part of the manuscript tradition, by an introductory letter by the translator's part, who presents himself as *Avendeuth Israhelita*, which seems to coincide with the *Avendeuth Israelita Philosophus* that collaborated with Dominicus Gundisalvi in the translation of Avicenna's *Nafs* of the *Šifā'*. An authorial ascription to Avendauth can also be found in most manuscripts referring to the translation of *Madḥal* I.12, which had also an independent circulation (MSS UBGROPDWF). Since the manuscripts that preserve the rest of the work without the letter and chap. I.12 do not present any authorial ascription, the translation of most of the work is cautiously considered as anonymous in modern scholarship. A recent contribution by D. N. Hasse ("Twelfth-Century Latin Translations of Arabic Philosophical Texts on the Iberian Peninsula" presented at Villa Vigoni on 27th June 2013), that analyzed the style and language of this translation as well as that of other anonymous ones, revealed a significant compatibility of the *Logica Avicennae* with other translations by Gundissalinus. It is worth considering the possibility that the translation is the result of a team work of Avendauth and Gundissalinus, like the translation of Avicenna's *Nafs* of the *Šifā'*, even if Gundissalinus is not explicitly mentioned as a co-author in the introductory letter.

<sup>250</sup> Avicenne, *Logica*, Texte latin, édition critique par Françoise Hudry, introduction doctrinale par Alain de Libera, Paris : Vrin, 2018.

<sup>251</sup> See also CHEMIN 1981–1983.

Notably, the different parts of Avicenna's *Madḥal* were often transmitted in a disorganic way in the Latin tradition. Apparently, great relevance was acknowledged in the Latin tradition especially to *Madḥal* I.12 on universals: the chapter is the only one that also had an independent circulation from the rest of the work<sup>252</sup>. The Latin translation of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction and Avicenna's Prologue (i.e. *Madḥal* I.1) was, on the contrary, poorly transmitted: it is only preserved in two manuscripts that also preserve a letter by Avendauth, presumably addressed to the archbishop of Toledo<sup>253</sup>. For a classification of the Latin manuscripts according to their content, see below Tab. 4.

With respect to the Arabic text, the Latin translation presents some peculiar features that still require an in-depth study, such as the presence of *double translations* and of *explanatory additions* to the text, presumably by the translator's part.

**Double translations.** The study of medieval Latin translations brought to light the frequent co-occurrence in the manuscript tradition of double, alternative renderings of a single expression; whether the double translations originated in the course of the transmission of the texts, or they can be considered as spurs of the translators' hesitation and oscillation in the choice of renderings, it was a subject of debate in each specific case. S. Van Riet observed the phenomenon with regard to the Latin translations of the section of *Nafs*<sup>254</sup>, *Ilāhiyyāt*<sup>255</sup> and *Samā' Ṭabī'ī*<sup>256</sup> of the *Šifā'*; since in some cases – such as that of the Latin translation of *Nafs* – the alternative variants determined a bipartition of the manuscript tradition, Van Riet initially interpreted the phenomenon as the result of a non-authorial second recension<sup>257</sup>. Subsequently, she conceded that, even if the formation of two distinct recensions is due to the manuscript tradition, both the recensions might derive from a unique exemplar in which the double variants were inserted by the author<sup>258</sup>. J. Janssens

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<sup>252</sup> Cf. DI VINCENZO 2012.

<sup>253</sup> Published on the basis of MS B in BIRKENMAJER 1934, pp. 314-317; on the basis of MS U in D'ALVERNY 1954, p. 32 and, finally, in BERTOLACCI 2002a, pp. 133-134.

<sup>254</sup> Cf. *Avicenna Latinus. Liber De Anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, ed. S. VAN RIET, introd. G. VERBEKE: I–II–III. (Louvain—Leiden, 1972); IV–V. (Louvain—Leiden, 1968) and VAN RIET 1963, pp. 583–626.

<sup>255</sup> Cf. *Avicenna Latinus. Liber De Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina*, ed. S. VAN RIET, introd. G. VERBEKE: I–IV. (Louvain—Leiden, 1977); V–X. (Louvain—Leiden, 1980).

<sup>256</sup> Cf. *Avicenna Latinus. Liber primus naturalium. Tractatus primus: De causis et principiis naturalium*, ed. S. VAN RIET, introd. by G. VERBEKE (Louvain—Leiden, 1992).

<sup>257</sup> VAN RIET 1963, p. 584: “nous appellerons ‘leçons doubles’ les mots, les tournures ou les phrases à propos desquels se produisent les bifurcations. L'existence des leçons doubles ne permet plus de parler de ‘la’ traduction du *De Anima*, sans plus. D'autre part, il n'y a pas deux traductions indépendantes l'une de l'autre, puisqu'un texte commun entoure les leçons doubles. Nous dirons plutôt qu'il y a une traduction sous deux formes différentes.”

<sup>258</sup> Cf. *Avicenna Latinus, Liber primus naturalium. Tractatus primus: De causis et principiis naturalium*, p. 60\*: “il n'est pas contradictoire de poser, au sommet de la tradition

claimed, with regard to the double translations found in the first treatises of Avicenna's *Physica*, that the double variants might have been in the translator's exemplar<sup>259</sup>, and in the same way R. Hissette interpreted the cases of double readings found in the Latin translations of Averroes' middle commentaries on *Isagoge*, *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*<sup>260</sup>.

The phenomenon of the double translations can be observed in the Latin translation of *Madḥal* as well. Some instances, both concerning single Arabic terms and longer passages, are uniformly attested by all the manuscripts (e.g. Tab.1, cases 1-2 and 5), whereas some others are attested in a non-uniform manner by the different manuscripts (e.g. Tab. 1, cases 3-4 and 6).

More in detail, cases 1-2 show some double renderings of a unique Arabic expression separated by “*vel*” (“or”) that are concordantly attested in the manuscript tradition. In both cases, one of the two renderings can be individuated as the one preferably employed by the translator: in case 1, for instance, the usual rendering for terms that derive from the same root as *yuṣār* in other occurrences of the text is *designare*, whereas in case 2 the expression *al-insān al-ṣaḥṣī*, here rendered both as *individuum* and as *homo singularis*, is elsewhere rendered as *homo singularis* (which is also the most literal rendering).

The double translation *variatur vel differt* in case 3 is attested by two manuscripts, whereas the others attest *variatur* only; in two of these witnesses, the alternative *vel differt* is interlinear and marginal. Case 4 is an instance of an oscillation with regard to the rendering of the Arabic *dātī* (“essential”) – rendered both as *substantialis* and as *essentialis* – that can be found in several occurrences of the same term in *Madḥal* I.5<sup>261</sup>. In this case too, the manuscript tradition is divided: MSS VP generally tend to attest *substantialis*, whereas the other manuscripts either preserve both the translations (one as an interlinear variant, as in MS N) or preserve *essentialis*; in a few other occurrences, both the alternative renderings are juxtaposed in the text<sup>262</sup>. Case 4 also

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manuscrite des deux recensions existantes, un ancêtre unique et d'accepter simultanément que les deux recensions se soient formées au cours des ans”.

<sup>259</sup> Cf. JANSSENS 2002, pp. 113–129 and the introduction to *Liber Primus Naturalium—Tractatus Secundus: De motu et de consimilibus*, ed. S. VAN RIET (†), J. JANSSENS, A. ALLARD, introd. G. VERBEKE (Bruxelles: Académie Royale de Belgique, 2006), p. 69\*.

<sup>260</sup> Cf. *Averroes Latinus. Commentum medium super Libro Peri Hermeneias. Translatio Wilhelmo de Luna attribuita*, ed. R. HISSETTE (Louvain, 1996); *Averroes Latinus. Commentum medium super Libro Praedicamentorum Aristotelis. Translatio Wilhelmo de Luna adscripta*, ed. R. HISSETTE (Louvain, 2010) and HISSETTE 2010, pp. 433–455.

<sup>261</sup> Also with regard to the occurrences of *dāt* (“essence”), variably rendered as *substantia* and *essentia*.

<sup>262</sup> As an attempt to explain how the alternative translations originated, it can be speculated that the possible overlap of *substantialis*, which is the privileged rendering for the term *dātī* in

attests the coexistence of *quid est* and *esse rei* as renderings of the Arabic *māhiyya* (“quiddity”): the two alternative translations are preserved separately in some manuscripts and juxtaposed in others<sup>263</sup>.

Case 5 is a case of double translation uniformly attested by the manuscript tradition but concerns an entire passage. It can be argued that the two translations presuppose a slightly different reading of the Arabic text: clause (b) seems to render *al-šay’* (*aliquid* in the Latin) instead of *li-l-šay’*, rendered as *in aliquo* in clause (a)<sup>264</sup>.

Case 5 is not an *unicum*: case 6 shows another case of two different translations of a single Arabic passage, (a) and (b), that are not uniformly attested by all the manuscripts: MSS VPN attest both the translations juxtaposed the one to the other, whereas MSS UBC only preserve (b) and MSS GM only preserve (a). It should be noticed that (a) and (b) surely presuppose a different Arabic text. Translation (b) corresponds to the correct Arabic text (“nor the animate body is a genus for plants, angels and animals”), whereas translation (a) presupposes, perhaps, a reading *li-l-nās* (“for men”) instead of *li-l-nabāt* (“for plants”) and the omission of *al-ḥayawanāt* (“animals”) in the Arabic. It can be suggested that (b) was meant as a correction of (a), which was possibly due to a corruption of the Arabic exemplar of the translator.

**Tab. 1.** Instances of *duplices lectiones* in the Latin translation of *Madḥal*

<p>1. [I.12, §2.1/p. 66.12-13 Cairo ed.]</p>	<p>De qua intelligitur quod praedicetur de multis differentibus specie ad interrogationem factam per quid, ita ut non <u>exprimat vel designet</u><sup>1</sup> aliquid quod sit animal vel aliud aliquid [...].</p>	<p>ومفهومه أنه المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع في جواب ما هو من غير أن يشار إلى شيء</p>
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the rest of the translation, with the translation of the Arabic *ḡawharī* (“substantial”) might have led to oscillate between *substantialis* and *essentialis*.

<sup>263</sup> An objection could perhaps be raised, namely that the manuscripts that preserve the two translations juxtaposed (*quid est esse rei*) might preserve, actually, a single rendering of the term *māhiyya*: *quid est esse rei* is, for instance, Boethius’ translation of the Greek τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in Aristotle’s *Topics*, 153a15ff.; cf. Boeth. transl. Arist. *Topica* (AL V.1), p. 149.17ff. However, it should be noticed that in the rest of the Latin translation of *Madḥal* the Arabic *māhiyya* is systematically rendered as *esse rei* or simply *esse*; *quid est esse rei* is neither elsewhere attested as a rendering of *māhiyya* in the Latin translation of *Madḥal*, nor in the Latin translations of Avicenna’s *Nafs* and *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā’*. More in particular, in the Latin translation of *Nafs*, *māhiyya* is variably rendered as *quid sit*, *essentia* and *substantia* (cf. *Avicenna Latinus, Liber De Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus*, IV-V, p. 264 s.v. *māhiyya* and I-II-III, p. 365 s.v. *māhiyya*). In the Latin translation of *Ilāhiyyāt*, *māhiyya* is translated as *esse*, *essentia*, *quidditas* and *quid est* (cf. *Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina - Lexiques*, p. 122 s.v. *māhiyya*). Arguably, therefore, *quid est* and *esse rei* were conceived as two possible, substantially equivalent, translations of *māhiyya* in the Latin translation of *Madḥal* too.

<sup>264</sup> For a more detailed analysis of this case, see DI VINCENZO 2012, pp. 464-466.

هو حيوان أو غير ذلك

1. exprimat vel designet] exprimat vel designat a.c. R

2. [I.12, §5.4/p. 72.2-3 Cairo ed.]

Ergo cum unitas coniungitur humanitati <...><sup>1</sup>, fit homo singularis vel individuum in quo conveniunt omnia individua.

فإذا اقترنت الوحدة بالإنسانية على الوجه المذكور حدث منها الإنسان الشخصي الذي يشترك فيه كل شخص

1. على الوجه المذكور om. Lat.

3. [I.2, §1.2.2/p. 13.8-9 Cairo ed.]

Et haec autem considerantur secundum hoc quod sunt id quod sunt ipsa, et consideratio earum non variatur vel differt<sup>1</sup> in hoc quod expoliatae sunt.

وهذه فإما أن ينظر إليها من حيث هي فلا يفارق ذلك النظر النظر إليها من حيث هي مجردة

1. variatur vel differt] variatur NMPVG vel differt s.l. N mg. V<sup>2</sup> variatur vel differt BU

4. [I.5, §6.1/pp. 30.18-31.1 Cairo ed.]

Deinde est hic tractandum si oportet ut intentio verbi substantialis/essentialis<sup>1</sup> sit continens intentionem verbi significantis quid est/esse rei<sup>2</sup> sicut commune continet proprium aut non.

ثم هاهنا موضع نظر أنه هل يجب أن يكون معنى اللفظ الذاتي مشتملا على معنى اللفظ الدال على الماهية اشتغال العام على الخاص أو لا يكون

1. verbi substantialis VPN<sup>s.1</sup> : verbi essentialis NMGBUV<sup>2</sup> s.l. || 2. quid est] ras. post quid est V esse rei s.l. V<sup>2</sup>N (quid est exp. N) quid est rei M quid est esse rei GBUP fort. V<sup>a.c.</sup>

5. [I.7, §3.2.4/p. 40.18-20 Cairo ed.]

[a] Cum autem fuerit in aliquo causa propter quam illud fiat alicuius dispositionis quam habet causa, non debet propter hoc ut habeat dispositionem accidentaliter: multa enim sunt huiusmodi. [b] Cum autem fuerit aliquid causa propter quam aliud fit alicuius dispositionis et causa habet illam dispositionem, non ideo debet habere eam accidentaliter: multa enim ex rebus sunt huiusmodi.

وليس إذا كان للشيء علة بها يصير بحال وللعلة تلك الحال يجب أن تكون تلك الحال له بالعرض فكثير من الأشياء بهذه الصفة

6. [I.11, §4.3/p. 64.16 Cairo ed.]

[a] Nec corpus habens animam est genus hominum et angelorum [b] nec corpus habens animam est genus vegetabilium et angelorum et animalium.

ولا الجسم ذو النفس جنسا للنبات والملائكة والحيوانات

**Explanatory additions to the text.** The Latin translation of Avicenna's *Madḥal* also shows some additions to the Arabic text, concordantly attested in the manuscript tradition, that have the purpose of better clarifying some references in Avicenna's text (a couple of instances in Tab. 2 below). Case 1, for instance, makes explicit what the reference of *hoc* ("this") is, namely the conceptualization something from a simple utterance (*ex uno verbo intelligere*); case 2 specifies that the mention of "man" in that specific case refers to the species, rather than to the individual man: the specification is on purpose, since a distinction is introduced, in the passage, between "man" taken as a species and "man" taken as an individual.

**Tab. 2.**

1. [I.4, §1/p. 21.7-12 Cairo ed.]	Intellectus autem saepe habetur ex uno solo verbo. [...]. Cum vero addideris intellectui esse vel non esse, iam addidisti ei alium intellectum, sicut postea declarabitur suo loco. Hoc autem, <i>scilicet ex uno verbo<sup>1</sup> intelligere</i> , in paucis contingit, et praeter hoc in plerisque est diminutum et malum.	وأما التصور فإنه كثيرا ما يقع بمعنى مفرد [...] وإذا قرنت بالمعنى وجودا أو عدما فقد أضفت إليه معنى آخر كما سيتضح لك في موضعه وذلك في قليل من الأشياء ومع ذلك فهو في أكثر الأمر ناقص رديء <sup>265</sup> .
2. [I.12, §5.2.3/p. 71.7-8 Cairo ed.]	Differentia autem quae est inter hominem qui est species et inter individuum hominis, quod est commune non tantum nomine, sed etiam praedicatione de multis, hoc est: dicimus enim quod intellectus de homine <i>qui est species</i> est quod sit animal rationale [...].	والفرق بين الأنسان الذي هو النوع وبين شخص الإنسان الذي يعم لا بالاسم فقط بل بالقول أيضا أن قولنا الإنسان معناه أنه حيوان ناطق [...].

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A preliminary comparative analysis of the Latin translation of Avicenna's *Madḥal* with the Arabic text revealed, besides a generally faithful translation of the Arabic text, some evidence of the translator's technique and of his peculiar attention to the comprehensibility of the text.

<sup>265</sup> The Arabic text here quoted is based on MS G, whose text is affected, as well as the Latin translation, by a dislocation. On the relation between the Latin translation and MS G, see *infra*, section II.3.

Concerning the cases of double translations presented, certainly with regard to the cases concordantly attested in the manuscript tradition, and perhaps also with regard to those attested differently within the different branches of the tradition, I would suggest that the double renderings might be due to a revision of the translation accomplished by the author. The double translations attested concordantly in the manuscripts might have been inserted in the text already in the archetype of the tradition<sup>266</sup>, whereas those that are not uniformly attested might have been interlinear or marginal in the archetype or have been later added to it. Apparently, the double translations are mostly due to an indecision between two equivalent renderings (cases 1-4), but sometimes they seem to be caused by an uncertainty with regard to the exact reading of the Arabic text (as in cases 5-6). Especially cases 5-6 suggest an ascription of the double translation, even when not uniformly attested by all the manuscripts, to the translator himself, since a correction of the translation possibly based on a different Arabic text occurred at a later stage of the manuscript transmission is far from likely. Moreover, these cases might indicate that the translation underwent a process of revision; whether such a revision was accomplished on the basis of more than just one Arabic exemplar, as particularly case 6 seems to suggest, is a possibility that should not be overlooked<sup>267</sup>.

The additions exemplified in Tab.2, that are uniformly attested in all the manuscripts, might either be ascribed to the translator, or to another figure close to him that could interpolate them in the archetype of the tradition<sup>268</sup>. The additions denote a certain effort to achieve a correct understanding of the text, and to provide an understandable translation of it. To attain this goal, the translator – or someone collaborating with him – might have felt the need to interpolate in the text something comparable to an explicative gloss, introduced by *scilicet* (cf. case 1), or further precisions to the text (cf. case 2).

On the basis of the provisional results displayed so far, it can be argued that a further, more systematic analysis of the Latin text compared with the Arabic is

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<sup>266</sup> The existence of an archetype of the tradition is suggested by the presence of mistakes that affect all the manuscripts; as an instance, in correspondence to *Madḥal* I.10, §2.2/p. 57.8 Cairo ed., the Latin manuscripts all attest *haec quinquemembris* as a rendering of *hāḍā l-taḥmīs*, which might result as an archetypal corruption of an original *haec <divisio> quinquemembris*.

<sup>267</sup> Avendauth's letter to the archbishop of Toledo states that Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction is preserved in *several manuscripts (in plerisque codicibus)*: one might wonder whether this quick allusion to a plurality of manuscripts with which Avendauth was allegedly acquainted should be fully trusted as representing another clue of the use of more than one Arabic witness by the translator's part.

<sup>268</sup> A figure that might have been allowed to make such modifications to the translation in the archetype should have been someone quite close to the translator himself, possibly collaborating with him, but there is no positive extant evidence of such a collaboration.

expected to provide a considerable number of additional elements to cast a new light on the technique adopted in the translation of *Madhal*, and also to establish whether the process of translation and, possibly, revision involved more than just one translator.

**Tab. 3.** Witnesses of the Latin translation with the sigla employed (alphabetical order)

<b>B</b>	Bruges, Sted. Openb. Bibl. 510 (XIII-XIV)
<b>C</b>	Cordoba, Bibl. capit. 52 (XIV)
<b>D</b>	Dubrovnik, Dominik. Samostan 63 (36-V-6) (XIII <sup>2</sup> )
<b>F</b>	Paris, BnF lat. 16096 (XIII <sup>2</sup> )
<b>G</b>	Graz, Universitätsbibl., 482 (XIII <sup>ex</sup> )
<b>N</b>	Napoli, Bibl. Nazionale VIII.E.33 (XIII <sup>2</sup> )
<b>M</b>	Oxford, Merton Coll. 282 (XIV <sup>in</sup> )
<b>O</b>	Oxford, Bodl. Libr., Digby 217 (XIII <sup>2</sup> )
<b>P</b>	Paris, BnF lat. 6443 (XIII <sup>ex</sup> )
<b>R</b>	Roma, Bibl. Angelica 242 (C.4.10) (XIII <sup>2</sup> )
<b>V</b>	Vat. lat. 2186 (XIII-XIV c.)
<b>U</b>	Vat. lat. 4428 (XIII <sup>2</sup> )
<b>W</b>	Oxford, Oriel Coll. 7 (XIV)
<b>Ven. 1508</b>	<i>Avicenne Perhypatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendate, Venetiis 1508</i>

**Tab. 4.** Witnesses of the Latin translation classified according to their content

	Avendauth's Letter	Al- Ġūzġānī's Introduction	Avicenna's Prologue ( <i>Madhal</i> I.1)	Chap. I.2-11	*Chap. I.12	Chap. I.13- II.4	*Chap. I.12
<b>V</b>	---	---	---	x	x	x	---
<b>U</b>	x	x	x	x	---	x	x
<b>B</b>	x	x	x	x	---	x	x
<b>C</b>	x (excerpta)	x (excerpta)	x (excerpta)	x (exc.)	---	x (exc.)	x
<b>G</b>	---	---	---	x	---	x	x
<b>Ven. 1508</b>	---	---	---	x	---	x	x
<b>R</b>	---	---	---	---	x	---	---
<b>O</b>	---	---	---	---	x	---	---
<b>F</b>	---	---	---	---	x	---	---
<b>D</b>	---	---	---	---	x	---	---
<b>W</b>	---	---	---	---	x (estr.)	---	---
<b>N</b>	---	---	---	x	---	x	---
<b>P</b>	---	---	---	x	---	x	---
<b>M</b>	---	---	---	x	---	x	---

#### I.4. THE INDIRECT TRADITION: THE ROLE OF AVICENNA'S DISCIPLES

For reasons that are yet to ascertain, the production of textual commentaries on Avicenna's *Šifā'*, contrarily to that on his latest major summa, namely the *Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt*, had a quite late start in the XVI century CE. Before, only three partial commentaries on the *Šifā'* are attested for the five centuries between the XI and the XVI c., namely one by Ibn Zayla (d. 439H/1048)<sup>269</sup> and one by the 'allāma Al-Ḥillī (d. 726H/1325) on the section of Logic<sup>270</sup>, and one by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606H/1210) on the section of Metaphysics<sup>271</sup>. These considerations are not meant to suggest that Avicenna's *Šifā'* was left unstudied until the XVI century: on the contrary, the study of this major work of Avicenna massively supported the exegetical activity concerning Avicenna's *Išārāt*<sup>272</sup>. Moreover, even if textual commentaries in the most proper sense are poorly attested, the *Šifā'* was, since the earliest stages of its transmission, the object of a lively production of other kinds of exegetical materials, such as paraphrases and marginal annotations (*ḥāšiyāt*). This latter textual material, that witnesses the existence of a flourishing teaching and exegetical activity around the work, is progressively emerging along with the proceeding of a thorough study of the manuscript tradition of the work.

##### **Paraphrasing Avicenna's *Madḥal* within the school: Bahmanyār and Lawkarī**

As to what concerns the *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, it is not sure whether the two aforementioned commentaries on the section of Logic included a commentary on this *fann*: the commentary by the 'allāma Al-Ḥillī seemingly concern only the second *fann* about the Categories (*Maqūlāt*)<sup>273</sup>, whereas the relevant manuscript possibly preserving the commentary by Ibn Zayla still needs to be checked<sup>274</sup>. Hence, there is no certainty about the existence of a textual commentary on the first *fann* of the *Šifā'* at the earliest stages of the tradition of the work. The works that can be considered as the closest to a textual commentary are two paraphrases, one by the first-generation

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<sup>269</sup> On Ibn Zayla, See REISMAN 2002, pp. 195-199.

<sup>270</sup> See WISNOVSKY 2013, p. 194. A commentary on the *Šifā'* by Ibn Zayla is also attested by Al-Nayrīzī: see POURJAVADY 2011, p. 113.

<sup>271</sup> To my knowledge, the only source attesting a commentary by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the *Ilāhiyyāt* is ṢALĀH AL-DĪN AL-ṢAFADĪ, *Al-Wāfi bi-l-Wafayāt* IV (ed. A. al-Arnā'ūt, T. Muṣṭafā [2000], p. 180; ed. S. Dederig [1974], p. 256), also quoted in ṢĀLIḤ AL-ZARKĀN 1963, p. 124 as a witness of a probably spurious work ascribed to al-Rāzī. The value of this attestation is quite uncertain, because Al-Ṣafadī reports that Rukn al-Dīn Ibn al-Qawī' (according to the reading printed by al-Zarkān; Ibn al-Qawab' according to the reading of the two editions) believed having seen, in the library of his father, a *Šarḥ Ilāhiyyāt al-Šifā'* ascribed to al-Rāzī, hence his testimony is not a direct one.

<sup>272</sup> See WISNOVSKY 2013, pp. 203-5.

<sup>273</sup> WISNOVSKY 2013, p. 203.

<sup>274</sup> WISNOVSKY 2013, p. 203.

disciple of Avicenna, Bahmanyār<sup>275</sup>, under the title of *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl*, and the other by Abū al-‘Abbās al-Lawkarī (d. ca. 517H/1123<sup>276</sup>), reportedly his disciple<sup>277</sup>, under the title of *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq*. According to the historiographical sources, Lawkarī gave impulse to the diffusion of the study of philosophy in the provinces of Khūrāsān<sup>278</sup>. Although the date reconstructed for his death is uncertain, we know from the oldest manuscript of Avicenna’s *Ta’līqāt* that Lawkarī wrote the *Fihrist* (Index) of *al-Ta’līqāt* in 503H/1109, which leads to contextualise chronologically his activity between the second half of the eleventh and the first half of the XII century CE<sup>279</sup>.

Both works are conceived as *summae* of Avicennian philosophy, and draw their materials from several Avicennian works to combine them in a unitary compilation. Lawkarī’s *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq* is a yet partially-unedited philosophical *summa* that was probably employed as a teaching manual; the section concerning Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, which has a great importance for the study of the textual tradition of Avicenna’s *Madḥal*, of which it preserves several literal quotations, was edited by Ibrāhīm Dībāǧī in 1986<sup>280</sup>. As it was already noticed, Lawkarī’s *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq* shows a twofold access to Avicenna’s texts, both direct and indirect: the work offers *verbatim* quotations both taken directly from Avicenna’s own works and indirectly from the quotations in Bahmanyār’s *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl*<sup>281</sup>.

The present inquiry takes into account these two works by comparing them systematically with the witnesses of the direct tradition. A comparison between the passages of Avicenna’s *Madḥal* with their quotations in Bahmanyār’s and Lawkarī’s

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<sup>275</sup> On Bahmanyār and his relation to Avicenna, see REISMAN 2002, pp. 185-195; JANSSENS 2003 and AL-RAHIM 2009, pp. 9-14.

<sup>276</sup> The date usually reported for Lawkarī’s death, i.e. 517H/1123, was provided by C. Brockelmann (*GAL* I, p. 602) on unknown basis; for the problems of Lawkarī’s chronology, see MARCOTTE 2006.

<sup>277</sup> This piece of information is reported by AL-BAYHAQĪ, *Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, p. 120; there is, however, a chronological problem, since Bahmanyār died in 1066, so that it is difficult to imagine Lawkarī as his student: see JANSSENS 2008.

<sup>278</sup> AL-BAYHAQĪ, *Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, p. 120.11.

<sup>279</sup> See MARCOTTE, 2006, pp. 134-138.

<sup>280</sup> AL-LAWKARĪ, *Bayānu al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimāni al-ṣidq, Logic, Part One*, ed. I. DĪBĀǦĪ, Tehran: Mu’assasa-i Intiṣārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1364h/1986.

<sup>281</sup> As J. Janssens pointed out, “the quotations are so literal that Lawkarī’s text may be used as an independent testimony, besides available manuscripts, for the establishment of the critical edition of the respective works” (JANSSENS 2008, p. 23). However, one should be aware that the section on Logic of Lawkarī’s *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq* is, seemingly, transmitted by a unique manuscript (MS Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dāniṣgāh-i Tihārān 108). The critical edition is, therefore, based on one witness only, and emendations of the text had often to be made by comparing it with the sources of Lawkarī’s quotations in the work (see the introduction to the edition by I. Dībāǧī, pp. 105-108). Our knowledge of the text of the section of Logic of Lawkarī’s work is, therefore, quite limited and imperfect.

works allows to have a clue of the readings preserved in the manuscripts of Avicenna's *Madḥal* that the two authors had at their disposal. Interestingly, the analysis of the variant readings attested in the bits of text quoted both by Bahmanyār and Lawkarī reveals that the two authors might rely on two different manuscript sources (except, of course, when Lawkarī's quotations are based on Bahmanyār's work).

As previously stated, the *Šifā'* was widely employed to expand and comment the *Išārāt*. This claim is also verified in the case of *Madḥal*, several excerpts of which can be found quoted or paraphrased in the early commentaries on the *Išārāt*: instances are the almost literal quotation of a long excerpt of *Madḥal* I.4, §1 in Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Šarḥ al-Išārāt* (p. 11.2-11), and the abridged quotation of *Madḥal* I.11, §1.1 in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Šarḥ al-Išārāt* (p. 266.7-8). Although this part of the early indirect tradition was occasionally taken into account, an in-depth, systematic analysis of it exceeds the scope of the present edition, in which preference was accorded to a systematic survey of the indirect sources that were judged possibly relevant to the constitution of a critical text. The higher textual relevance ascribed to the paraphrases by Bahmanyār and Lawkarī is motivated by the fact that these indirect sources antedate (or are almost coeval to) the most ancient witnesses of the direct tradition of the text, i.e. MS Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276 and the twelfth-century Latin translation, and might eventually provide an insight into the earliest, non-extant manuscripts. Another indirect source systematically taken into account in the present inquiry for analogous reasons is represented by the fragments of the correspondence between Avicenna and Ibn Zayla.

#### **Questioning Avicenna's *Madḥal* within the school: a correspondence between Avicenna and an anonymous disciple (Ibn Zayla?) on the *Išārāt***

Among the earliest source of quotations of Avicenna's *Šifā'*, the *Mubāḥaṭāt*<sup>282</sup> and the *Ta'liqāt* must be reckoned: the two works, that collect heterogeneous materials produced within Avicenna's school, witness the existence of a lively interaction between the members of Avicenna's circle and Avicenna himself, also concerning subjects dealt with in the *Šifā'*. As to the *Kitāb al-Madḥal*, it is especially the *Mubāḥaṭāt* that play the role of the earliest indirect source of the text. In particular, the portions of Avicenna's *Madḥal* that are mentioned, quoted and commented in the *Mubāḥaṭāt* might all be fragments of a larger correspondence between Avicenna and one of his first-generation disciples and colleagues, namely Ibn Zayla<sup>283</sup>. It is generally acknowledged that Ibn Zayla had a special interest for Logic; this claim is usually based on Reisman's individuation of some questions in the complex of the *Mubāḥaṭāt* concerning the section of *Burhān* of the *Šifā'* that might be ascribed to his

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<sup>282</sup> On the tradition of the heterogeneous materials that form this work, see REISMAN 2002.

<sup>283</sup> On the relation that Ibn Zayla presumably had with Avicenna and on his main fields of interest, see AL-RAHIM 2009, pp. 14-16.

correspondence with Avicenna<sup>284</sup>. Besides this, an interest for the classification of sciences is also ascribed to him, based (i) on a reply of Avicenna to him concerning a passage of the classification of the sciences in *Madḥal* I.2<sup>285</sup> (henceforth referred to as “Letter to Ibn Zayla”) and (ii) on a set of questions concerning the scope of inquiry of the discipline of Logic identified by Reisman as a possible part of Avicenna’s correspondence with Ibn Zayla<sup>286</sup>, i.e. questions 579-585, pp. 193-4<sup>287</sup>.

(i) Avicenna’s Letter to Ibn Zayla focuses on a precise passage of *Madḥal* I.2 concerning the division into theoretical and practical sciences (§1.3.2), which was the object of this brief correspondence between Ibn Zayla and Avicenna<sup>288</sup>; although the passage is not quoted *verbatim*, the reference is easily identifiable. The issue raised by Ibn Zayla concerns the legitimacy of the use of the term *nazar* (“theoretical inquiry”) when speaking about practical philosophy; the question is grounded on the more technical use of the adjective *naẓarī* (“theoretical”) as opposed to *ʿamalī* (“practical”) in the division of the sciences.

(ii) The set of questions 579-585 is very interesting: in fact, it concerns a specific passage of *Madḥal* that deals with the role played by the utterances in the study of Logic, i.e. chap. I.4, §3.1. More in detail, question 579 summarizes the question that was asked to Avicenna, and quotes *verbatim* the first two lines of §3.1/p. 22.13-14 Cairo ed., which were the object of a question asked to Avicenna, and questions 580-585 preserve Avicenna’s answer to the question; some bits of literal quotation are also recalled in question 584 in Avicenna’s answer, where the author quotes the passage at stake. The exact context of the question of which *Mubāḥaṭāt* 580-585 preserve Avicenna’s answer is hard to figure out from the only testimony of the *Mubāḥaṭāt*. The question briefly recapitulated in *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579 reports that Avicenna was asked about an inconsistency that was remarked between two statements in *Madḥal* I.4, namely the one claiming that necessity summons us to the study of utterances and the one claiming that the logician is not primarily concerned with the study of utterances. Avicenna himself, in a passage of his answer, warns the questioner against considering the two statements of *Madḥal* I.4 at stake as contradictory (*Mubāḥaṭāt* 584, p. 194.5-6), so that *Mubāḥaṭāt* 580-585 might seem the answer to a question specifically concerning *Madḥal* I.4.

There is, however, the possibility that *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579 is just an *a posteriori* recapitulation inferred from *Mubāḥaṭāt* 584 of the question originally asked to Avicenna. A passage of Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s *Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt* might arguably be a precious witness that helps to reconstruct the original framework of

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<sup>284</sup> REISMAN 2002, p. 289.

<sup>285</sup> The letter edited in REISMAN 2002, p. 284.

<sup>286</sup> REISMAN 2002, pp. 200-201 and pp. 246-247.

<sup>287</sup> See AL-RAHIM 2009, p. 15.

<sup>288</sup> REISMAN 2002, p. 284.

Avicenna's answer. When commenting on *Iṣārāt*, pp. 180.6-181.4, where Avicenna claims that it is necessary, for the logician, to consider the utterances as well (though independently from languages), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī claims that someone (*wāḥid*) wrote to Avicenna, asking about the contradiction between this statement and what Avicenna claimed elsewhere (*fi sār al-kutub*), concerning the fact that the logician is not primarily concerned with the study of utterances (quoting almost literally *Madḥal* I.4). The question quoted by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī directly addresses Avicenna, and is likely to be a literal quotation of the anonymous disciple's question, of which there is no remain in the *Mubāḥaṭāt*. Avicenna's answer is reported by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in a very abridged form, but can be tentatively identified as a paraphrase of one of the core passages of Avicenna's answer, *Mubāḥaṭāt* 282, of which it preserves the distinction between what is primarily an object of inquiry of a discipline (*maqṣūd bi-l-qaṣd al-awwal*) and what is not primarily so, with echoes of the very beginning of the answer (*Mubāḥaṭāt* 280), of which the comparison with the way tools (*ālāt*) are necessary in order to build a house is alluded to (see Tab. 5 below)

If Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī quotes the anonymous disciple's question in the context of his commentary on the exact passage that was the starting point of the question itself, the question is the result of this disciple's study of Avicenna's *Iṣārāt*, compared to the corresponding sections of the *Šifā'* (in the specific case, the section of *Madḥal*)<sup>289</sup>. The very existence of a correspondence between Avicenna and one of his direct disciples about passages of the *Iṣārāt* is quite a remarkable fact, since, apparently, Avicenna did not allow anyone to study the *Iṣārāt* unless under his supervision, and even the copy of the text had to be agreed upon with the author himself. The sole exception was, reportedly, that of Bahmanyār and Ibn Zayla, who presumably had previously studied the text with Avicenna<sup>290</sup>. Hence, even within the frame of a hypothetical identification of this material with a letter on the *Iṣārāt*, the plausibility of Reisman's ascription of *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579-585 to the correspondence between Avicenna and Ibn Zayla is not undermined: since Ibn Zayla was among the few disciples allowed to study the work even independently, the existence of a letter by his part questioning Avicenna on the text can be reasonably explained.

To conclude, if Reisman's identification is plausible, and if the quotation of Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī must be related to that set of questions of the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, then these fragments might provide a clue of the existence of a so-far unknown correspondence between Ibn Zayla and Avicenna on the *Iṣārāt*, in which the section of *Madḥal* of the

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<sup>289</sup> In his answer, Avicenna invites the questioner to examine what he stated in *Madḥal* by referring to it as *that book* (question 583, p. 193.19: *fa-ta'ammul mā qultuhu fi dālīka l-kitāb*): this could fit well within the hypothesis that the question concerned a comparison between two passages in two different Avicennian works.

<sup>290</sup> Cf. REISMAN 2002, p. 196; for Reisman's translation of the passage in which Avicenna sets these restrictive rules for the transmission of the *Iṣārāt*, see *Ibid.*, p. 206.

*Šifā'* was also quoted<sup>291</sup>. A general interest on Ibn Zayla's part for the classification of sciences, together with a larger interest of Ibn Zayla for Logic and a thorough knowledge of Avicenna's works on the subject, seem confirmed. This reconstructed correspondence, even if only fragmentary, represents one of the most ancient – if not the most ancient at all – indirect sources of Avicenna's *Madḥal*.

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<sup>291</sup> The correspondence can perhaps be added to Reisman's list; cf. REISMAN 2002, pp. 287-302.

Tab. 5.

Mubāḥaṭātī, 579-585, pp. 193-4	Fajr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, ŠT, p. 22.3-7
<p>[579] Question on his statement that necessity summons to the inquiry into the utterances, then on his statement: “the logician, insofar as he is a logician, is not primarily concerned with the utterances”, and display that this is an evident contradiction.</p>	<p>وكذب إليه واحد فقال: «إنك ذكرت في سائر الكتب أن المنطقي من حيث هو منطقي ليس له شغل أولي بالألفاظ وذلك مناقض للكلام المذكور ههنا».</p>
<p>[580] In the theoretical and the practical disciplines there can be things aimed at primarily, so that one is necessarily primarily concerned with them, and [only] after with what falls out of the primary object. An example of this is the realization of a house, since it necessarily requires things that falls out of the [main] purpose, such as hiring a workman and acquiring the tools. [...]</p>	<p>فأجاب أنه يجوز أن يكون البحث عن الألفاظ واجبا على المنطقي لكن لا بالقصد الأول فإن الألفاظ إذا كانت جارية بحرى الأدوات والآلات كان لا يستغال بها واجبا ولكن لا يكون ذلك مقصودا بالقصد الأول</p>
<p>[582] As to the mistake, I will show it; as to what concerns the negligence, I can say it, if one wishes. It consists in that, if something is necessary in a discipline, it is not necessary that everything is necessary in the discipline coincides with that thing; on the contrary, the object in a discipline must be a more general notion, [including] that thing and something else, and [that notion] is the primary object [of the discipline] [...]</p>	<p>للضرورة مثل استئجار الأجير واتخاذ آلات. [...] [582] أما السهو فأدل عليه وأما الإغفال فإذا شاء شافئته به وذلك لأنه ليس إذا كان شيئا ضروريا في صناعة وجب أن يكون كل ضرور في الصناعة ذلك الشيء بل يجوز أن يكون المقصود في الصناعة معنى أعم من ذلك الشيء ومن غيره ويكون هو المقصود الأولي [...]</p>

## II. THE EDITION

### II.1. STATE OF THE ART AND PRINCIPLES OF THE EDITION

So far, the only existing edition of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Madḥal* was the one printed in Cairo in 1952 to celebrate Avicenna's millenary, which had the great merit of publishing this work of Avicenna's for the first time<sup>292</sup>. The edition offered a text based on 10 MSS (see Tab. 6 below), whose selection was not based on a critical comparison of the witnesses<sup>293</sup>. The earliest witnesses employed in the Cairo edition are 4 MSS dating to the VIII/XIII century, and the others range from the fifteenth to the twentieth century.

The present edition is not yet a fully critical edition, since it was by no means possible to gather reproductions of all the 119 and possibly more witnesses estimated for *Madḥal*; rather, it is meant to offer a critical text based on a larger number of witnesses than that employed by the Cairo edition, together with an analysis and reconstruction of their stemmatic genealogical relations (in section II.3).

A first innovation with respect to the Cairo edition consists in the number of witnesses employed, which has increased with the present edition. The text provided in the present edition is based on 32 MSS out of the 68 inspected, of which 21 MSS were selected to be systematically collated and 11 were eliminated as *codices descripti* (a detailed description of the witnesses employed is provided in section II.2).

Another major innovation is the inclusion of the Latin translation among the witnesses employed<sup>294</sup>; in order to read the text of the translation, it was necessary to

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<sup>292</sup> IBN SĪNĀ, *al-Šifāʾ, al-Mantiq*, 1. *al-Madḥal*, ed. I. Madkūr, Ğ. Š. Qanawātī, M. Al-Ḥudayrī, F. Al-Ahwānī, Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1952 (henceforth: Cairo edition). On the main features of this edition, see the general introduction to the edition (“Introduction générale” / “*Muqaddimat al-Šifāʾ*”) by I. Madkūr (both in French and Arabic) and BERTOLACCI 2012d. The same edition was, then, reprinted in Tehran in 1983 and in Beirut in 1993. An allegedly new edition by Muḥammad ʿUṭmān was published in 1428H/2008 in Cairo (Maktabat al-ṭaqāfa al-dīniyya); it is, however, just another reprint of the aforementioned edition (see JANSSENS [forthcoming], section ‘A. SHIFĀʾ: EDITIONS’). The text of the Cairo edition is also the one reproduced in Ömer Türker’s translation of the work into Turkish (İbn Sina, *Kitabu’ş-Şifa. Mantik Giriş*, Istanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2006). Tehran lithograph edition, which antedates the Cairo edition of the *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*, does not preserve the section of Logic of the *summa*, of which the Cairo edition is, therefore, the first printed edition at our disposal.

<sup>293</sup> On this point, see the introduction to the edition, pp. (39)-(42), esp. p. (40).

<sup>294</sup> Cairo editors already took in consideration the opportunity of coming back, once an edition of the Latin text was established, to compare it with the Arabic text: cf. the introduction to the Cairo edition, p. (76).

recur to the manuscript witnesses of the text<sup>295</sup>. The possibility itself of employing this translation as a witness for the Arabic text is due to its quite literal rendering of the Arabic wording<sup>296</sup>.

Third, the present edition is based on a hypothetical stemmatic reconstruction of the tradition (cf. sections II.3 and II.4). A note on the stemmatic relations of the other MSS inspected, although not employed in the present edition, is also provided, as a preliminary step towards a future critical edition of the work (section II.5).

Since for practical reasons it was not possible to employ all the 68 MSS for the present edition, it appeared necessary to set the criteria for a selection of the witnesses. The criterion according to which the selection was made results from a combination of the purely genealogical criterion with the chronological one. As a first step, a preliminary collation on portions of text assumed as test-cases was made. After this first step, it was possible to proceed with the *eliminatio codicum descriptorum* and eliminate some witnesses as copies of earlier MSS. Since, however, the number of MSS was still too high, earlier MSS were privileged and picked as representative of their families. More in detail, special attention was paid to keep all the earliest non-*descripti* witnesses, covering the chronological range between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries CE, and almost all the non-*descripti* witnesses dating to the fifteenth century.

As an ancillary criterion for the selection, witnesses that turned out, after the preliminary collation, to be the result of a very pervasive contamination between different branches of the tradition were preferably left aside. It is the case, for instance, of two MSS employed in the Cairo edition, namely MSS London, BLOIOC, Or. 7500 (M) and London, BLOIOC, India Office Ar. 1420 (X), respectively a seventeenth-century copy and an eighteenth-century one. For instance, MS X, the exemplar of MS Beirut, Maktaba Šarqiyya, Université Saint-Joseph 372<sup>297</sup>, turned out to be part of the same family as MSS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi

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<sup>295</sup> The edition printed in Venice in 1508 is not, taken alone, an entirely reliable witness of the text, since it presents, as any other witness of the text, several mistakes and alterations. Digital photographic reproductions of MSS Graz, Universitätsbibl., 482 (<http://143.50.26.142/digbib/handschriften/Ms.0400-0599/Ms.0482/index.html>) and Paris, BnF lat. 6443 (<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9065953r?rk=21459;2>) are available online; my most heartfelt gratitude goes to all the libraries that allowed me to attain photographic reproductions of the other 11 MSS. Particularly, I wish to thank Father Stjepan Krsić for kindly providing me the photographic reproductions of MS Dubrovnik, Dominik. Samostan 63 (36-V-6), and Manuel Nieto Cumplido, archivist of the Cordoba cathedral, for helping me attaining a reproduction of MS Cordoba, Bibl. capit. 52.

<sup>296</sup> On the value of the Latin translations of Avicenna's *Šifā'* as witnesses of the text, cf. GUTAS 2010, pp. 49-50.

<sup>297</sup> It is a modern copy made from MS X in 1890; see before and CHEIKHO 1925, pp. 122-3.

771 and 770 (respectively, Yi and Y in the present edition)<sup>298</sup>, but its ancestor must have been quite heavily contaminated with a manuscript related to MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823 (Di in the present edition); MS X itself, then, bears also evidence of a further collation with a manuscript related to a third family<sup>299</sup>, resulting in some marginal variants in X. The main text preserved in MS X is, therefore, a blend of at least two different families, with also the addition of marginal variants derived from a third family, which is why, after its stemmatic weight was assessed, it was preferably left aside, and preference was accorded to earlier – and less contaminated – witnesses of the same family.

**Tab. 6.** MSS employed in the Cairo edition and in the present edition.

*Legenda:*

✓ = MS systematically employed.

d = *descriptus* of a manuscript systematically employed, and, therefore, eliminated.

[d] = *descriptus* of a manuscript that was not systematically employed in the present edition; in a fully critical edition it would be eliminated.

c = highly contaminated MS.

MSS inspected	Cairo Ed.	Present Ed.
<b>VI/XIIc.</b>		
1) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276 [Ka]		✓
<b>VII/XIIIc.</b>		
2) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 772 [J]	✓	✓
3) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 [Nk]		✓
4) Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Şarīf, Behīt Collection 44988, 331 <i>falsafa</i> [B]	✓	✓
5) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 [A]		✓
6) İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 1504 [E]	✓	✓
7) İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 [T]		✓

<sup>298</sup> With which, besides numerous peculiar textual readings, it also shares the explicit of the first treatise of *Madḥal*. MS X preserves Al-Ğüzğānī's Introduction as well, which is omitted by the manuscripts of the family of YiY; according to the brief colophon at the end of the Introduction copied in MS X, however, which was reportedly already in the exemplar of MS X, it derives from a copy produced in 891H/1486-7 by a Şarīf Ibn 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥusnī.

<sup>299</sup> Represented by at least 5 MSS, i.e. Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1326; Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i 'Ālī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī 1439; Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 1893; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 795 and Rampur, Raza Library, 3477.

8) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Asir Efendi 207 [As]	✓	✓
9) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 [C]		✓
10) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823 [Di]		✓
<b>VIII/XIVc.</b>		
11) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822 [Da]		✓
12) Rampur Raza Library, Hikma 112 (nr. 3476) [Ş]		✓
<b>IX/XVc.</b>		
13) İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262 [To]		✓
14) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 1057 [Te]		✓
15) İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3445 [Ts]		✓
16) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 824 [Dp]	✓	d
17) İstanbul, Köprülü Halk Kütüphanesi, Fazil Ahmet Paşa 894 [F]		[d]
18) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Mağlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 135 [Mi]		✓
19) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748 [Ş]		✓
20) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 771 [Yi]		✓
21) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 770 [Y]		✓
22) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 [No]		✓
23) Benares, Ğāmi'a Ğawadiyya 95 [Bo]		
<b>X/XVIc.</b>		
24) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1326 [former 580] [I]		
25) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708 [N]	✓	✓
26) Khvoy, Kitābhānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247 [K]		
27) Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 1895 [Vo]		
28) Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 3983 (vols. i-ii) [Ch]		
<b>XI/XVIIc.</b>		
29) Cairo, Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṭā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 894 <i>falsafa</i> [D]	✓	
30) Maşhad, Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 1119 [Q]		d
31) London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or. 7500 [M]	✓	c
32) Kashan, Fahrang va Irshad 15 [Fa]		
33) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 1907 [Ma]		
34) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 7590 [V]		
35) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Dānişkāda-i İlāhiyyāt-i Dānişgāh-i Tihrān 236/1 [De]		d
36) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550 [L]		
37) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 773 [Ye]		d
38) London, British Library, Oriental and India Office		d

Collections, Jones Collection 114 [O]	
39) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ‘Ālī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī 1438 [Pa]	
40) Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ar. 6829 [P]	c
41) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ‘Ālī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī 8331 [Si]	
42) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 795 [Ha]	
43) Aligarh, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 110/30 [Al]	
44) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānişgāh-i Tihṙān, Mişkāt 243 [Z]	c
45) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ‘Ālī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī 1439 [T]	
46) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānişgāh-i Tihṙān 6596 [An]	d
47) London, Royal Asiatic Society, Arabic 58 [Lo]	
48) Najaf, Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Mu’minīn, 1096 [Nj]	
49) İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206 [Fe]	
50) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 1893 [Sh]	
51) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa 857 [Ho]	
<b>XII/XVIIIc.</b>	
52) Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 3477 [Rz]	
53) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1425 [S]	d
54) İstanbul, Atif Efendi Kütüphanesi 1565 [At]	
55) İstanbul, Ragıp Paşa Kütüphanesi 909 [Ra]	
56) London, BLOIOC, India Office Ar. 1420 [X]	✓ c
<b>XIII/XIXc.</b>	
57) Beirut, Maktaba Şarqīyya, Université Saint-Joseph 372 [Jo]	[d]
58) Hyderabad, Osmaniya University Library, acq. 582 [Os]	d
59) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 1908 [Na]	
60) Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 3478 [In]	d
<b>XIV/XXc.</b>	
	Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 262 <i>hikma wa-falsafa</i>
61) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī 1801 [W]	[d]
62) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Dānişkāda-i İlāhiyyāt-i Dānişgāh-i Tihṙān 593/1 [Ti]	[d]
63) Kitābhānah-i Markazī va Markaz-i Asnād-i Dānişgāh-i Tihṙān Collection 2288 [Am]	
<b>Unknown dat.</b>	
64) Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Golius Or. 4 [G]	✓
65) İstanbul, Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ‘Umūmī) 3966 [Za]	d
66) İstanbul, Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ‘Umūmī) [Zi]	

### *The Apparatus*

A further innovation introduced by the present edition is the choice of providing an apparatus articulated on more levels. The edition of the Arabic text is accompanied by up to six levels of apparatus at the bottom of the page. Not all the six levels are constantly present, since their presence is contingent, depending on the necessity of conveying a piece of information that can also be absent for certain passages; the first level of apparatus, for instance, is not present for passages that are not affected by material damages or lacunae in the manuscript tradition and of which no quotation is known in the indirect tradition. The only apparatus that is, obviously, continuously present is the critical apparatus of the variants (fourth level). In what follows, the content and disposition of the six apparatuses is described:

1. *First level: information concerning the **presence or absence of the text in both its direct and indirect witnesses***; this part of the apparatus records quotations, close paraphrases in which a bit of the text can be found, and the witnesses that – either because of a material damage affecting the point, or because of a larger lacuna within the text – omit the portion of text concerned.
2. *Second level: **Greek and Arabic possible sources** of the passage*; this section of the apparatus records, approximately in chronological order, ancient Greek and Arabic passages that are likely to be sources for the doctrine of the passage. The passages are quoted by author, title and page and line number in the edition recorded in the bibliography; e.g. PORPH., *Isag.*, p.1.18-2.10; AL-KINDĪ, *Kitāb fī l-Falsafa l-Ūlā*, p. 9.8-9.
3. *Third level: **parallels in the author’s works***; this section of the apparatus aims at putting the passage in relation to other parallel passages in Avicenna’s own work (for the text of *Madḥal*), or in Al-Ġūzġānī’s work (in the only case of Al-Ġūzġānī’s Introduction). Since for the entire *Madḥal* only texts by Avicenna are mentioned in this section of the apparatus, the quotation of the parallel passages does not mention the author. As for the texts of the second level of the apparatus, the editions of the texts mentioned are specified in the bibliography. Mentions of Avicenna’s works are in the form, e.g.: *al-Šifā’*, *al-Qiyās* I.2, p. 10.4.
4. *Fourth level: **critical apparatus of variants***; this section of the apparatus is the one recording the variants of the Arabic manuscript witnesses and those reconstructed on the basis of the Latin translation.
5. *Fifth level: **apparatus of marginalia***; this section of the apparatus records the marginal notes found in the manuscripts, containing both linguistic and philosophical commentaries on the text.

6. *Sixth level: **critical note*** to the apparatus; this discursive note contains the editor's explanations or remarks on critical points of the text that requires a deeper philological analysis.

## II.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPTS EMPLOYED

(1) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276 [siglum: **Ka**]

COPYIST(S): Aḥmad Ibn Habbat Allāh Ibn Aḥmad Ibn al-Kazzāya.

DATE: First decade of Ḍū l-Ḥiġġa 536H/ 4-13 July 1142.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: Part of *Maṭīq* (entire *Madḥal* and part of *Maqūlāt*, up to the third treatise).

WRITING(S): *Nash*, with diacritics and a partial vocalization; black ink both for the main text and the titles.

NOTES: The manuscript was collated with its model (*qūbila bi-aṣlihi*), as referred by a note in the last folio.

REFERENCES: M, D

(2) Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḥīt Collection 44988, 331 *falsafa* [siglum: **B**]

COPYIST(S): One anonymous copyist.

DATE: Unknown; dating: VII/XIII c. (A, p. 70); see also the Introduction to Cairo ed. of *Madḥal*, p. (69).

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: the entire *Šifāʿ*.

WRITING(S): *Nash*, with diacritics and a partial vocalization; black ink in the main text, red ink for titles and geometrical figures. The writing support is paper; it is severely damaged in some parts, especially at the beginning (cf. e.g. f. 18<sup>v</sup>).

NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ٢. The text of the *Šifāʿ* is preceded by a table of contents in a modern handwriting (ff. 1<sup>r</sup>-14<sup>v</sup>), and a guard page with ownership notes. The *funūn* of the *Riyāḍiyyāt* follow a peculiar order (i, iii, iv, ii). The text of the *Šifāʿ* is accompanied by several marginalia copied in the same handwriting as the main text; some are collational variants and corrections (marked as ٢ in the apparatus of the Cairo edition), and some others are notes of commentary, a part of which might be Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's<sup>300</sup>.

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>2</sup>, M; description in the Cairo ed. of *Madḥal*, pp. (68)-(69), *Ḥiṭāba*, pp. 24-25, *Šiʿr*, p. 20, *Mūsīqā*, p. 49, and in Āl Yāsīn's introduction to the edition of *Samāʿ*, p. 25.

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<sup>300</sup> See DI VINCENZO 2018.

(3) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 772 [siglum: **J**]

COPYIST(S): at least two anonymous copyists; within the section of *Madḥal*, the first copied ff. 1<sup>v</sup>-9<sup>v</sup> (up to *Madḥal* I.10, p. 56.14 of the Cairo ed., §2.1.1 of the present edition), and the second, starting at f. 10<sup>r</sup>, completed the copy of the work. Interestingly, the point in which the handwriting of the main text change seemingly corresponds to the point in which also the model from which the manuscript was copied changes, which means that the two copyists were copying two different exemplars.

DATE: aḥir Ša‘bān 628H/June-July 1231.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Manṭiq*.

WRITING(S): Handwriting 1 of the main text (ff. 1<sup>v</sup>-9<sup>v</sup>): *nash*, black ink for the main text, red ink for titles; presence of letter-pointing. Main features: retroflexed final *yā’* (occasionally); *alif* of prolongation with a very distinctive tail descending below the baseline; *lām-alif muḥaqqāqa*. Handwriting 2 of the main text (ff. 10<sup>r</sup>-37<sup>v</sup>): *nash*, black ink for the main text, red ink for titles; smaller than handwriting 1; presence of letter-pointing and partial vocalization; *šadda* and *sukūn* frequently marked. Main features: *nūn* with internal point; no tail of the *alif* of prolongation; *lām-alif warrāqiyya*.

NOTES: The manuscript was employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: **ج**. The manuscript is articulated into quinions. Ownership notes on the first folio by: ‘Abd al-Mu‘min b. Fāḥir [al-Urmawī?]; Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; ‘Abd al-Raḥman b. ‘Alī b. Mu‘ayyad (8 Ša‘bān 901H/1<sup>st</sup> May 1496, in Constantinople)<sup>301</sup>; Muṣṭafā b. ‘Abd al-Dīn Ilyās b. Muḥammad (Dū l-Qa‘da 960H/October-November 1553).

REFERENCES: M; description in the Cairo ed. of *Madḥal*, p. (74).

(4) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 [siglum: **Nk**]

COPYIST(S): ‘Abd al-Kāfī Ibn ‘Abd al-Maḡīd Ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Tabrīzī, qualified as a student (*tilmīd*) of al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī in an *iğāza* reported on the first folio<sup>302</sup>.

DATE: 25 Rabī‘ al-Awwal-25 Šawwāl 666H/21<sup>st</sup> December 1267-15<sup>th</sup> July 1268<sup>303</sup>.

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<sup>301</sup> On Mu‘ayyadzāde ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Efendi (d. 922H/1516) and the role he played in the circulation of a huge number of manuscripts, see POURJAVADY 2014, p. 293; POURJAVADY, SCHMIDTKE 2015, p. 255; PFEIFFER 2015.

<sup>302</sup> See DI VINCENZO 2018 and *infra*.

<sup>303</sup> Dating 660H/1262 in WISNOVSKY 2012a, p. 262.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown; possibly Marāġa<sup>304</sup>.

CONTENT: the entire *Šifā'*.

WRITING(S): *Nash*, black ink; headings in bold and red ink; letter-pointing and very occasional vocalization. Writing support: paper. Quires: senions.

NOTES: The first folio reports a text written in a handwriting different from the copyist's one, copying an *iġāza* reportedly written by 'Alī b. 'Umar b. 'Alī al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675H/1276) for the copyist of the manuscript 'Abd al-Kāfī b. 'Abd al-Maġīd b. 'Abd Allāh al-Tabrīzī, in the first page of a copy of al-Kātibī's *Šarḥ 'aqd al-ġawāhir*, in which Al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī states that al-Tabrīzī read the book before him, getting the permission to transmit it. It preserves several marginalia copied in the same handwriting as the main text, some of which might be ascribed to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī; other *marginalia* written in a different handwriting: according to a note on the first folio, some *marginalia* of the manuscript should be by the hand of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī. The *funūn* of the *Riyāḍiyyāt* follow a peculiar order (i, iii, iv, ii).

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64; WISNOVSKY 2012a, p. 262.

(5) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 [siglum: A]

COPYIST(S): Amīr al-Dīn Manyūl; colophon written by Buḥatnaşar Ibn Šim'un the Physician, from Qal'at al-Rūm [nowadays Hromgla]) [= Nebukadnāzar Ben Shem'un in the last line, in Syriac, of the colophon, fol. 1r]

DATE: 671H/1273-674H/1276

PLACE OF COPY: copy started in Marāġa and terminated in Ḥarbart

CONTENT: the entire *Šifā'*

NOTES: *Madḥal* has a lacuna between chap. I.5 (p. 28.12 Cairo ed.) and chap. I.8 (p. 45.2 Cairo ed.), probably due to a lacuna in the antigraph. The *funūn* of the *Riyāḍiyyāt* follow a peculiar order (i, iii, iv, ii).

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 40; detailed description in CELLI [forthcoming].

(6) İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 1504 [siglum: E]

COPYIST(S): Anonymous.

DATE: 26 Ša'bān 674H/21<sup>st</sup> February 1276.

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<sup>304</sup> For a hypothetical reconstruction of the milieu in which the manuscript circulated, see DI VINCENZO 2018.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: part of *Manṭiq* (*funūn* i-iv).

WRITING(S): *Nash*, black ink both for the main text and the headings; headings in bold.

NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: عا. The text of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction starts abruptly (*wa-qāla Abū 'Ubayd*), without the introductory clause preserved in the other manuscripts.

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1</sup>, M, G<sup>2</sup>; description in the Cairo ed. of *Madḥal*, p. (72).

(7) İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 [siglum: T]

COPYIST(S): 'Abdu l-Raḥman, named (*al-mulaqqab*) Sayf al-Abšīḥī [?] (section of Logic only).

DATE: 10 Rabī' I 677H/8<sup>th</sup> August 1278.

PLACE OF COPY: *Madīnat al-Salām* [i.e. Baġdād].

CONTENT: *Manṭiq* + part of *Ṭabī'iyāt* (*fann* i).

NOTES: *Manṭiq* and *Ṭabī'iyāt* are copied in two different handwritings; the name of one of the copyists is provided in the colophon of *Manṭiq* (f. 339<sup>r</sup>).

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M.

(8) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 207 [siglum: As]

COPYIST(S): Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī Ibn Ğa'far al-Mālikī al-Baġdādī

DATE: Al-'ašir al-awsaṭ min Dī l-ḥiġġa 680H/30<sup>th</sup> March-8<sup>th</sup> April 1282.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: part of *Manṭiq* (*funūn* i-iv).

WRITING(S): *Nash*, black ink, headings rubricated. F. 6<sup>r-v</sup> is in a different paper, and is also copied in a different handwriting; apparently, also the model copied changes for that section (from I.4, §2/p. 22.2 Cairo ed. to I.5, §1.2/p. 25.1 Cairo ed.), so that it can be supposed that the folio was inserted to fill some gap in the manuscript. Quires: quaternions.

NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ع. The text of *Madḥal* presents a lacuna between chap. I.5 (p. 30.15 Cairo ed.) and the end of chap. I.9 (p. 54.3 Cairo ed.) The manuscript is organized in quaternions, and the length of the omission roughly corresponds to that of a quaternion; however, the lacuna does not correspond to a change of quire nor to a change of page in the manuscript, hence it

is probably due to the loss of a quire in its antigraph. On f. 1<sup>r</sup>, there is an ownership note by the Ottoman scholar Abū Bakr b. Rustam b. Aḥmad al-Širwānī (d. 1135H/1722-3).

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; description in the Cairo ed. of *Madḥal*, pp. (71)-(72).

(9) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 [siglum: C]

COPYIST(S): Abū Bakr ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Tabrīzī.

PATRON: Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī.

DATE: 693H/1293-4.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: the entire *Šifā’*.

WRITING(S): *Nash*, black ink.

NOTES: It preserves several marginalia copied in the same handwriting as the main text, some of which might be ascribed to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The *funūn* of the *Riyāḍiyyāt* follow a peculiar order (i, iii, iv, ii).

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 44.

(10) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823  
[siglum: Di]

COPYIST(S): Šahāb al-Karmīnī.

DATE: 697H/1297-8.

PLACE OF COPY: Madrasa of Ūrḥān, in Tabrīz.

CONTENT: the entire *Šifā’*.

WRITING(S): *Ta’līq*, black ink.

NOTES: The manuscript was collated (cf. e.g. in the margin, between *Madḥal* II.2 and II.3: *balāḡat al-muqābala*).

REFERENCES: E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 47; WISNOVSKY 2012a, p. 263.

(11) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822  
[siglum: Da]

COPYIST(S): Anonymous.

DATE: possibly XIVc.; certainly, before 886H/1481; cf. *waqf* of the Sultan Muḥammad Abū l-Faṭḥ Ḥān Ğāzī, i.e. Mehmet II (d. 886H/1481), on the title page and

on f. 1<sup>v</sup>. A date of copy in Rabī' I 426/January-February 1035 occurs in the colophon of the section on Music<sup>305</sup>, but it is very likely to refer to some antigraph of the witness. Dating to the VI-VII c. H in A, p. 73.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Manṭiq* + *Ṭabī'iyāt* + *Riyāḍiyyāt* + a fragment of *Ilāhiyyāt* (f. 355<sup>r</sup>, *Ilāhiyyāt* X.4 (from p. 447.14 Cairo ed. to the end).

WRITING(S): *Nash*, black ink; letter pointing, vocalization, *i'rāb*, *šadda* and *sukūn* marked. Among the main features: *kāf mabsūta*, *lām-alif warrāqiyya*.

NOTES: The final inscription claims that this copy was read in the presence of Avicenna (*qirā'a* and *muqābala* note, allegedly from Avicenna's hand, dated 3 Rağab 422/2<sup>nd</sup> July 1031, occurring at the end of the section on Mathematics, f. 354<sup>v306</sup>); for a detailed exam of these texts and a discussion of their authenticity, see A, pp. 73-74 and BERTOLACCI [forthcoming], Appendix B.

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; BERTOLACCI [forthcoming].

(12) Rampur Raza Library, Hikma 112 (nr. 3476) [siglum: §]

COPYIST(S): Maḥmūd Ibn 'Alī Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 'Alī al-Wīdkalī (i.e. from a village in Qāšān)

DATE: Beginning of Rabī' I 718H/May 1318 (section of Logic).

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Manṭiq* + *Ṭabī'iyāt* + *Ilāhiyyāt*

WRITING(S): Main handwriting: *Nash*, black ink; presence of letter-pointing, absence of vocalization. Among the remarkable features: abusive horizontal ligature between *alif* and *lām*; *lām-alif* both *warrāqiyya* and *muḥaqqāqa*. Secondary writings: S<sup>2</sup> red ink, seemingly the handwriting of the rubricated *faṣl* at chapter beginnings. It adds marginal and interlinear corrections. §<sup>3</sup> *nasta'līq*, black ink, seemingly belonging to the author of the collational note at the end of the section of Logic (cf. 'Notes'); hence, the marginal and interlinear corrections added in this handwriting are presumably the result of the collation accomplished in 845H/1441.

NOTES: The manuscript was owned by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī (d. 903H/1498), and his descendants; a member of his family, Faṭḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī, presumably brought the manuscript to India; it was later lodged in the Mughal royal library, from which it was transferred to Rampur. Faṭḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī is, according to a note in Persian at the

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<sup>305</sup> See Cairo ed., p. 29, and n. 1: cf. apparatus, p. 152, and Anawati, p. 74, where the date of copy is 420.

<sup>306</sup> Transcription in Mahdavi, p. 170, and Anawati, pp. 73-74.

beginning, also the author of the indexes of the manuscript. Logic is called, in the colophon of the section, the “fourth part” (*al-ġuz’ al-rābi’*) of the *Šifā’*, even if it is placed at the beginning. According to the colophon, the antigraph was a faulty manuscript, with several misspellings. The end of the section of Logic preserves a collation note dated 2 Ğumādā II 845H/27 October 1441 (p. 486); reportedly, the manuscript collated was faulty as well, especially in the end of the section, whereas the beginning is considered as correct. The end of the section of Natural Philosophy (p. 771) preserves a collation note dated Muḥarrām 845H/June 1441.

REFERENCES: B, A; AHMED 2012, p. 202, n° 7; Massani, p. 447, nr. 13; POURJAVADY 2011, p. 23 and n. 144; RIZVI 2011, p. 11, n. 8.

(13) İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262  
[siglum: **To**]

COPYIST(S): Unknown.

DATE: IX/XV c. (Dating in Anawati, p. 77).

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Manṭiq + Ṭabī’iyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt*

WRITING(S): *Main handwriting*: *Nasta’līq*, black ink for the main text, headings in red. Letter pointing, partial vocalization. Remarkable features: sometimes *lām mu’allaqa*; *kāf maškūla*; final *hā’ maḥṭūfa*. *Secondary handwriting*: **To**<sup>2</sup> *Nasta’līq*, black ink; it adds some marginal corrections to the text, and possibly coincides with the author of a note in Persian on f. I (stating that the written folia of the manuscript are 317, without considering the blank ones).

NOTES: Ownership statement on f. I of a Muḥammad Sayyid ‘Alī.

REFERENCES: E<sup>1</sup>, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 57.

(14) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 1057 [siglum: **Te**]

COPYIST(S): At least three anonymous copyists: cf. infra ‘Writing(s)’.

DATE: IX/XV c.; before 1071H/1660-1.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Manṭiq*.

WRITING(S): *Nasta’līq*, main text in black ink, headings in black ink and bold, titles of chapters in red ink; at least three different handwritings alternating: most of the text is written by one of the three copyists; in the section of *Madḥal*, ff. 9<sup>F-V</sup> and 18<sup>F-V</sup> are copied in a different handwriting (remarkably, in both cases it is the last folio of a

quire), which also copied the section from the beginning of fifth *fann* (f. 165<sup>r</sup>) up to f. 186<sup>r</sup>. A third handwriting copied ff. 70<sup>r</sup>-77<sup>v</sup>.

NOTES: The manuscript was owned by the ši'īte scholar Abū l-Faḍl Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī (1651-1725)<sup>307</sup>, who is possibly also the author of part of the marginal notes which comments on the text (signed by ب). Another ownership note on the title-page (the name of the owner was erased and is unreadable) is dated 1241H/1825-6, which very likely matches another ownership note after the explicit (f. 325<sup>v</sup>), dated 1241H and in which the name is erased as well. A marginal note of commentary ascribed to Ḥusayn Ardabīlī<sup>308</sup> can be found on f. 173<sup>r</sup>.

REFERENCES: M, E<sup>2</sup>, D.

(15) Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Maḡlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 135 [siglum: **Mi**]

COPYIST(S): 'Alī Ibn Faṭḥ Allāh al-Ma' dānī al-Iṣfahānī al-muštahir bi-Ṣābirī<sup>309</sup>.

DATE: Ša' bān 871H/March-April 1467.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Maṅṭiq* + *Ṭabī'iyāt* + *Ilāhiyyāt*.

WRITING(S): *Nasta'liq*, black ink, headings in gold; letter pointing: present, vocalization: absent. Decorations with vegetal motifs in colours and gold on ff. 1<sup>v</sup>-2<sup>v</sup>. Systematic use of catchwords.

NOTES: The manuscript is a very elegant, decorated copy, without marginal corrections or annotations.

REFERENCES: B, M, E<sup>2</sup>, D, G<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 89.

(16) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748 [siglum: **Ş**]

COPYIST(S): Hāšim 'Alī al-Nāzir Ra'if [?].

DATE: 27 Raḡab 879H/16 December 1474.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

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<sup>307</sup> Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Iṣfahānī (Fāḍil-i Hindī) (d. 1137H/1724-5); in the ownership note in the title-page of the manuscript, he qualifies himself as having been away from his country and from the Arab world during his youth, in the years 1071-1079H/1660-9: this statement might refer to the period of his journeys to India, following his father.

<sup>308</sup> See POURJAVADY 2011, pp. 41-44.

<sup>309</sup> This copyist seemingly coincides with the 'Alī b. Faṭḥ Allāh al-Ma' dānī al-ṣāhīr bi-Ṣābirī that signed the copy of MS Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 5412 in 885H/1480 (a copy of the *Metaphysics* of the *Šifā'*).

CONTENT: *Manṭiq* + *Ṭabī‘iyyāt* + *Ilāhiyyāt*.

WRITING(S): *Main handwriting*: *Nash*, text in black ink, chapter headings in gold; letter pointing, partial vocalization, *šadda* and *sukūn* marked, systematic use of catchwords. Among the main features: *kāf mabsūṭa*. *Secondary handwriting*: Š<sup>2</sup> writes in *nash*, black ink, and is the author of a few marginal corrections made after collation of another witness; cf. ff. 13<sup>v</sup>-14<sup>r</sup>, where corrections end by *nusha*, meaning that the variant was found in another manuscript. Given the readings imported, the witness collated by Š<sup>2</sup> belonged to a different branch of the tradition. The *descriptus* of MS Š, i.e. MS R, seemingly does not receive the corrections made by Š<sup>2</sup>, which might mean that they are posterior to the copy of MS R<sup>310</sup>.

REFERENCES: A, B, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 55.

(17) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 771 [siglum: **Yi**]

COPYIST(S): ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Manṣūr b. Isma‘īl (section of Natural Philosophy only).

DATE: Rabī‘ I 885H/May-June 1480.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: part of *Manṭiq* (*funūn* i-v) + *Ṭabī‘iyyāt*.

WRITING(S): At f. 194<sup>v</sup> a different handwriting starts copying the text (from Natural Philosophy onwards); the section of Logic might have been added or vice versa, and the handwriting is clearly different (likely an Iranian one).

NOTES: *Madḥal* I.4 on the subject of Logic split into two parts. Ownership notes of Sulaymān b. Yūsuf (dat. 1076H) and Feyzullah al-Mufī (dat. 1115H); the latter acquired, in the same year, MS Y as well.

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M.

(18) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 [siglum: **No**]

COPYIST(S): Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ḥiğāzī al-Ḥanafī (section of Logic)<sup>311</sup>; Aḥmad Ibn ‘Alī (section of Mathematics)<sup>312</sup>.

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<sup>310</sup> The date of copy of this manuscript is unknown, but it is surely earlier than the XII/XVIII c.; see *infra*, section II.3.

<sup>311</sup> Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ḥiğāzī al-Ḥanafī is probably not the copyist of the entire section of Logic; the first three *funūn* are written in a handwriting that closely resembles that of Aḥmad Ibn ‘Alī, who signed the colophon of the section of Mathematics.

<sup>312</sup> This Aḥmad Ibn ‘Alī is presumably the same Aḥmad Ibn ‘Alī that signed in 897H/1491-2 the copy of MS Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Mağlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, 5254, which preserves the

DATE: 17 Ğumādà II 886H/22 August 1481 (date of the section of Logic); 897H/1491-2 (section of Mathematics); 18 Šawwāl 894H/14 September 1489 (section of Metaphysics).

PLACE OF COPY: Širāz, Madrasat Dār al-Aytām (section of Logic).

CONTENT: the entire *Šifā'*.

WRITING(S): *Nash* with *ta'liq* features [section of *Madḥal*], black ink; a few headings in the section of *Madḥal* are unwritten (a blank space was left for them, which were presumably meant to be rubricated, as most of them are).

REFERENCES: A, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 33.

(19) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 770 [siglum: Y]

COPYIST(S): Muḥammad Ibn Maḥbūb [?] Ibn 'Abd Allāh.

DATE: 18 Rabī' II 888H/4 June 1483.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: the entire *Šifā'*.

WRITING(S): *Nash*, black ink, rubricated headings; letter pointing: present; vocalization: absent. Marginal and interlinear corrections seemingly in the same handwriting as the main text.

NOTES: The manuscript was collated: there are several collation marks attesting this process for the section of Logic (ff. 93<sup>v</sup>, 105<sup>v</sup>, 120<sup>v</sup> and *passim*; cf. also f. 232<sup>r</sup>, end of the Logic section: *balaġat al-muqābala*, “the collation came [to this point]”). *Madḥal* I.4 is split into two sections, as in MS Yi. The manuscript shows an ownership note by Feyzullah al-Mufī (dat. 1115H), identical to that in MS Yi.

REFERENCES: A, B, E<sup>1-2</sup>, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 56.

(20) Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek Or. 4 (Golius Collection) [siglum: G]

COPYIST(S): Several copyists, at least four<sup>313</sup>; Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥarīr Muḥammad al-Kātib (f. 298<sup>r</sup>, end of Natural Philosophy). *Madḥal* is copied by a unique copyist, who

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Metaphysics of the *Šifā'*, as a comparison of the two handwritings seems to confirm. Moreover, the statement of modesty that accompanies the name of the copyist is in both cases identical: *aqallu l-ḥalīqa bal lā šay' fi l-ḥaqīqa* (“the least of the creatures, nothing in reality”).

<sup>313</sup> Cf. WITKAM 2012, p. 226: «the different copyists must have worked in some sort of coordinated way, and in the same place and at approximately the same time».

copied a huge portion of text between ff. 1<sup>v</sup>-119<sup>v</sup> and other folios of the following sections<sup>314</sup>.

DATE: Considerably earlier than X/XVI c.

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Manṭiq + Ṭabī‘iyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt*.

WRITING(S): old *nash* with *ta‘līq* features; brown-black ink, rubricated headings, often written in a *tuluṭ*-like script<sup>315</sup>.

NOTES: The manuscript shows several collation marks in the margins (*balāḡa*; e.g. ff. 14<sup>v</sup>, 17<sup>r</sup>, 23<sup>r</sup>, 25<sup>r</sup>), and several collation notes in different handwritings<sup>316</sup>. Quires are numbered and are mostly quinions<sup>317</sup>. The name of at least four owners of the manuscript can be read in the ownership notes on f. 1<sup>r</sup>, mainly dating to the tenth/sixteenth century<sup>318</sup>.

REFERENCES: B, A, M, E<sup>2</sup>; BERTOLACCI 2006, Appendix A; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 66 n° 63; WITKAM 2012, pp. 225-233.

(21) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708 [siglum: N]

COPYIST(S): ‘Alī al-Şābirī.

DATE: X/XVI c.<sup>319</sup>

PLACE OF COPY: Unknown.

CONTENT: *Manṭiq + Ṭabī‘iyyāt* + a fragment of *Riyāḍiyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt*.

WRITING(S): *Nash*, text in black ink, chapter headings in red.

NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: Ū.

REFERENCES: E<sup>1-2</sup>, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 32.

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<sup>314</sup> ‘Copyist 1’ in WITKAM 2012, p. 229.

<sup>315</sup> Resuming the detailed description provided by WITKAM 2012, pp. 226-7.

<sup>316</sup> Cf. WITKAM 2012, pp. 231-2.

<sup>317</sup> Cf. WITKAM 2012, p. 230.

<sup>318</sup> The names are listed in WITKAM 2012, p. 228.

<sup>319</sup> Dating in Anawati, p. 77 and Cairo Edition, p. (73).

## II.3. GENEALOGICAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE WITNESSES

### 1. At the origin of the manuscript tradition

In the attempt to provide a genealogical reconstruction of the manuscript tradition, a fundamental preliminary question must be settled, namely whether an archetype of the extant manuscript tradition existed or not, which is tantamount to asking if all the extant manuscript tradition ultimately derive from a unique copy, characterized by peculiar textual innovations and mistakes.

The answer to the question on the existence of an archetype might be a positive one. Textual corruptions shared by all the manuscripts checked can be found: an instance is the erroneous *wa-l-ğins* in *Madḥal* II.3, §6.1 that supposedly replaced an original *wa-l-faṣl* in the archetype<sup>320</sup>. Overall, the manuscript tradition of *Madḥal* apparently does not show a huge number of evident textual corruptions shared by all the manuscripts. In this respect, however, two points should be kept in mind: first, sources contemporary to Avicenna inform us that the *Šifā'* was read within the circle of Avicenna's disciples during its composition and in the presence of the author himself<sup>321</sup>. If an archetype existed and was produced within Avicenna's school, such a practice might have helped to correct major issues in that copy. Second, the manuscript tradition itself shows a tendency to emend major textual issues by conjecture, so that, in some cases, a single family of manuscripts might seem to avoid a mistake that affects the rest of the manuscript tradition and that might have possibly been already in the archetype because someone emended it. Keeping in mind these premises, some interesting evidence of the existence of an archetype and of the nature of the corruptions that affected it might appear at an attentive analysis of the textual tradition of the work.

(1) *Al-Ğūzğānī's Introduction: a chronological puzzle*. The first textual corruption that affects the manuscript tradition in its entirety can be spotted in Al-Ğūzğānī's Introduction. The passage at §I.6, which deals with the composition of the section of Logic, Mathematics and the books on *Plants* and *Animals* of the *Šifā'*, presents some apparently minor syntactic issues and a major chronological problem.

To begin with, the syntax is quite difficult (cf. Tab. 7 below, column 1 and Tab. 8): there is a quite abrupt shift from a plural reference to *hāđihi l-kutub* ("these books"<sup>322</sup>) to a reference to the book of *Ḥayawān* in the clause immediately following (*wa-hāđā fi aḳtar...al-faylasūf*) and then, again, to a reference to the books immediately after (*wa-zāda fihā...ziyādāt*, "he made to them...some additions"): the *fihā* must, in fact,

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<sup>320</sup> See the note to the critical apparatus in the Edition.

<sup>321</sup> AL-ĞŪZĞĀNĪ, *Biography of Ibn Sīnā*, pp. 54-56.

<sup>322</sup> It is doubtful whether this plural can refer to the *Ḥayawān* and the *Nabāt* only or not; the problem is also remarked in GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note s.

refer to the aforementioned books (*kutub*)<sup>323</sup>. Second, the final clause reporting that Avicenna was forty years old cannot possibly adapt to the date when Avicenna composed all these books, especially the *Ḥayawān* and the *Nabāt*<sup>324</sup>. According to the other chronological information concerning Avicenna's life provided by Al-Ġūzġānī both in the Introduction of the *Šifā'* and in the *Biography*, Avicenna should have reached his forties around 410H/1019-20<sup>325</sup>; however, this can hardly be the exact date of composition of the section of Logic, completed afterwards, during Avicenna's stay in Iṣfahān, and, most of all, of *K. al-Nabāt* and the *K. al-Ḥayawān*, composed after all the other sections, in the year in which 'Alā' al-Dawla attacked the city of Šābūr Ḥwāst<sup>326</sup>. This attack might arguably coincide with the one recorded by the historian Ibn Aṭīr in *Al-Kāmil fī l-Tārīḥ* (*sub anno* 417) for the year 417H/1026-7, when Avicenna was more or less 47 years old<sup>327</sup>.

There are three possibilities to explain the odd indication provided in the Introduction of the *Šifā'*: it can be supposed that Al-Ġūzġānī, either (i) by mistake, or (ii) intentionally, provided a very loose chronological indication; or (iii) it can be presumed that an issue occurred in the transmission of the text. I would suggest that (i) and (ii), attributing to Al-Ġūzġānī the responsibility for the wrong chronological indication, are not an entirely satisfying explanation, given that all the other chronological references he made both in this Introduction and in the *Biography* are perfectly consistent and quite precise<sup>328</sup>. In my opinion, then, (iii) seems the most likely way to explain the phenomenon. A viable solution of this problem that was already suggested<sup>329</sup> is thinking of a corruption of the number in the archetype of the tradition; some further elements, however, suggest the possibility of a more pervasive corruption of the passage.

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<sup>323</sup> Cf. GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note t; Gutas' translation "expanded it" actually presupposes a reading: *wa-zāda fīhi*, which, although attested at least in MS S, is arguably the result of an *a posteriori* adjustment of the manuscript due to the difficult syntax

<sup>324</sup> See also GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note 15: "this number is inaccurate" and *Ibid.*, p. 108: "His [Al-Ġūzġānī's] statement that Avicenna was forty when he completed *The Cure*, on the other hand, is clearly either an error of calculation on Jūzġānī's part or possibly due to the erroneous transmission of the number (forty-eight?) in the transmission of the manuscripts".

<sup>325</sup> Considering what is stated in *Biography*, p. 88.4-6, where Al-Ġūzġānī states that Avicenna's date of birth is 370H, and that he died in 428H at the age of 58.

<sup>326</sup> See *Biography*, p. 66.2-4, and below, Tab. 7, column 3.

<sup>327</sup> See also GUTAS 2014, p. 107.

<sup>328</sup> Usually, the indications provided are quite precise: see, for instance, §1.1 of the Introduction (p. 1.16 Cairo ed.), where Al-Ġūzġānī claims that he joined Avicenna when the latter was around 32 years old. This information is also consistent with Al-Ġūzġānī's claim to have served Avicenna for twenty-five years (*Biography*, p. 68.3): considering that he stayed with him until the latter's death, the sum roughly coincides with the 58 years recorded in *Biography*, p. 88.4-6.

<sup>329</sup> GUTAS 2014, p. 108, but also already in GUTAS 1988, p. 105; cf. *supra*.

It should be noticed that in the passage of Al-Ġūzġānī’s Introduction at stake it is unclear to which books Avicenna made the “additions” (*ziyādāt*) mentioned. “Additions” that might coincide with those here mentioned are elsewhere recalled by Avicenna himself regarding his summary of the *Almagest* in the *Šifā’* (*Madḥal* I.1, §4.3/p. 11.7 Cairo ed.: *wa-alḥaqtu bihi min al-ziyādāt ba’da al-farāġ minhu mā waġaba* [...]), and by Al-Ġūzġānī with regard to all the books of the Mathematics of the *Šifā’* in the *Biography* (p. 64.5-7: [...] *wa-awrada fī kull kitāb min al-riyāḍiyyāt ziyādāt* [...]). On the basis of these parallel passages, it would be tempting to suppose that the additions of the Introduction should refer specifically to the books of Mathematics and that, consequently, the clauses concerning the *Ḥayawān* and the *Nabāt* are misplaced. In other words, this would mean supposing that the passage is affected by an erroneous textual transposition, whose solution would be rearranging the presumably corrupted paragraph as in column 2 of Tab. 7 (Arabic text in Tab. 8).

The hypothetical solution proposed above would entail the advantage of restoring a perfect parallelism with *Biography*, pp. 64.5-66.4 by referring the additions specifically to the books of Mathematics; moreover, it would refer the dating in the text only to the section of Mathematics, to which it could well adapt, therefore solving the chronological issue.

Within the frame of this hypothesis, the corruption would consist in the separation and misplacement of section (c) about the composition of the *Ḥayawān* and the *Nabāt*; but how did such a misplacement originate? The phenomenon could be more easily explained by supposing that section (c) was not, at first, part of the text, and that it was rather added in the margin of a copy (presumably, the archetype’s exemplar). When the archetype was copied from this manuscript, then, the marginal addition – very likely meant to be added at the end of paragraph (b) – was erroneously split and the two halves were misplaced within paragraph (b)<sup>330</sup>; the existence of an archetypal copy affected by such a misplacement justifies the spread of the corruption in all the manuscripts.

**Tab. 7**

(1) <i>Introduction</i> , §1.6 – Transmitted text	(2) <i>Introduction</i> , §1.6 – Proposed text	(3) <i>Biography</i> , pp. 64.5-66.4
[a] There, he dedicated himself to the Logic. Since he could dispose of the books, he followed them and proceeded according to the order that the philosophers observed in them, and dealt with the statements of theirs that he refuted; consequently, the Logic grew long and was completed in Iṣfahān.	[a] In Iṣfahān he dedicated himself to finish the <i>Book of the Healing</i> ; so, he completed the Logic	[a] In Iṣfahān he dedicated himself to finish the <i>Book of the Healing</i> ; so, he completed the Logic
[b+c] As to the	[b] As to the	[b] and the <i>Almagest</i> ; he had already

<sup>330</sup> The erroneous division of the marginal addition might have originated because the addition might have been written in two lines of text that were interpreted as two separate additions.

Mathematics, he had precedingly composed them in the form of a summary, and he decided to add them to the *Book of the Healing*. He also composed the [Book of] *Animals* and [that of] *Plants* and completed these books; he followed in most of the *Book of Animals* Aristotle's book, and added something [of his own] in the books with respect to that [*i.e.* Aristotle's book?]; at the time, he was forty years old.

Mathematics, he had precedingly composed them in the form of a summary, and he decided to add them to the *Book of the Healing*; he completed these books by making some additions to them, with respect to that [previous composition]; at the time, he was forty years old.

abridged Euclids, the *Arithmetic* and the *Music*. He introduced in each book of [the section of] Mathematics some additions, of which he considered that the need was compelling. As to the *Almagest*, he introduced ten theorems concerning the parallax, and he introduced at the end of the *Almagest* things of the science of *Astronomy*<sup>1</sup> that were unprecedented. He introduced in [the abridgement of] Euclid <the solution> of some ambiguities<sup>331</sup>; in the *Arithmetic*, some excellent properties [of numbers] and, in *Music*, some questions which the first [philosophers] neglected.

[c] He also composed the [Book of] *Animals* and [that of] *Plants*, and he followed in most of the *Book of Animals* Aristotle's book.

[c] Then, he finished the *Book of the Healing*, with the two books of *Plants* and *Animals* that were [still] lacking, since he composed them the year 'Alā' al-Dawla made an expedition towards Šabūr Ḥwāst, in the way; in the way, he also composed the *Book of the Salvation*.

Tab. 8

(1) Al-Ġūzġānī, <i>Introduction</i> , §1.6 – Transmitted text	(2) Al-Ġūzġānī, <i>Introduction</i> , §1.6 – Proposed text	(3) Al-Ġūzġānī, <i>Biography</i> , pp. 64.5-66.4
[a] وهناك اشتغل بالمنطق وتمكن من الكتب فعرض من ذلك أن حاذها وجري على ترتيب القوم فيها وتكلم على ما استنكره من أقوالهم فطال المنطق وتم بإصفهان.	[a] وهناك اشتغل بالمنطق وتمكن من الكتب فعرض من ذلك أن حاذها وجري على ترتيب القوم فيها وتكلم على ما استنكره من أقوالهم فطال المنطق وتم بإصفهان.	[a] واشتغل بإصفهان بتتيم كتاب الشفاء ففرغ من المنطق
[b] والمجسطي وكان قد اختصر أوقليدس [b] وأما الرياضيات فقد [b+c] وأما الرياضيات فقد كان والأرثماتيقي والموسيقى. وأورد في كل كان عملها على سبيل عملها على سبيل الاختصار في	[b] وأما الرياضيات فقد [b] وأما الرياضيات فقد كان عملها على سبيل عملها على سبيل الاختصار في	[b] والمجسطي وكان قد اختصر أوقليدس [b] وأما الرياضيات فقد [b+c] وأما الرياضيات فقد كان والأرثماتيقي والموسيقى. وأورد في كل كان عملها على سبيل عملها على سبيل الاختصار في

<sup>331</sup> Gohlman (p. 67) translates the term *šubahā* ' as "some geometrical figures", but against this translation see the reasonable objection raised in GUTAS 2014, p. 462 n. 24, who translates: "some problematic passages". It would be tempting to read this passage in parallel to *Madḥal* I.1, §4.3/p. 11.7 Cairo ed., where Avicenna himself states that he solved some ambiguities in his abridgements of the *Elements* of Euclid (*wa-ḥalaltu fīhi al-šubah*), and to suppose that a term such as, e.g., *ḥall* ("solution") has been erroneously omitted in the text of the *Biography*.

كتاب من الرياضيات زيادات رأى أن الاختصار في سالف الزمان سالف الزمان فرأى أن يضيفها إلى الحاجة إليها داعية. أما في المجسطي فأورد فرأى أن يضيفها إلى كتاب كتاب الشفاء. وصنف أيضا عشرة أشكال في اختلاف المنظر. وأورد في الشفاء، وفرغ من هذه الحيوان والنبات وفرغ من هذه آخر المجسطي في علم الهيئة أشياء لم يسبق الكتب وزاد فيها من ذلك الكتب وحاذى في أكثر كتاب إليها. وأورد في أوقليدس شفاء وفي زيادات؛ وبلغ سنه حينئذ الحيوان كتاب أرسطوطاليس الأرثماطيقى خواص حسنة<sup>1</sup> وفي الموسيقى أربعين. الفيلسوف وزاد فيها من ذلك مسائل غفل عنها الأولون. زيادات وبلغ سنه حينئذ أربعين.

[c] وتم كتاب الشفاء ما خلا كتابي النبات والحيوان فإنه صنفها في السنة التي توجه فيها علاء الدولة إلى سابور خواست في الطريق. وصنف أيضا في الطريق كتاب النبات وحاذى في أكثر كتاب الحيوان كتاب أرسطوطاليس الفيلسوف. النجاة.

(2) *Chap. I.7, §3.2.5: a wrong interpolation?* Another possible corruption supposedly occurred at the origin of the manuscript tradition is the one affecting chap. I.7, §3.2.5 (see Tab. 9). The syntax and the content of the passage is problematic in one point, namely the clause: *yakūnu dālīka li-l-ḥassās dūna al-ḥayawān* (“this belongs to sensitive and not to animal”). My suggestion is that the text as it is transmitted by most manuscripts might be the result of a faulty reception, during the copy of the archetype, of what was meant to be an example probably added in the margin of the archetype’s exemplar. The original text might have lacked the clause *yakūnu dālīka li-l-ḥassās dūna al-ḥayawān*, that was likely meant to provide an example of a condition that followed to the distinction between genus and differentia, namely that a feature, in order to distinguish the one from the other, belongs exclusively to one of the two (in the case of the example interpolated, a feature that belongs to the differentia “sensitive” without belonging also to the genus “animal”).

Tab. 9

Transmitted text	
Then, I do not exclude that there are other conditions following to the explanation that they ascribed to what signifies the quiddity by means of which what they call “genus” or “species” is distinguished from the differentia, and other conditions following to the distinction {this belongs to “sensitive” and not to “animal”}, but this is not	ثم لا أمتنع أن يكون هاهنا شروط أخرى تلحق بالبيان الذي جعلوه للدال على الماهية بتميز بها ما يسمى جنسا أو نوعا عن الفصل وشروط أخرى تلحق بالتميز [يكون ذلك للحساس دون الحيوان]، إلا أن ذلك

according to the first imposition, nor according to a tradition determined by those who employed these utterances when they began to employ them; rather, these are necessities to which this sort of disputes is committed.

لا يكون بحسب الوضع الأول ولا بحسب نقل منصوص عليه من المستعملين لهذه الألفاظ في أول ما استعملوا، بل يكون اضطرابات ألجأ إليها أمثال هذه المقاومات.

(3) *Chap. II.3, §8.1: a wrong interpolation or a misunderstood correction?* Chap. II.3, §8.1 critically addresses Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.17-18<sup>332</sup>; one of Avicenna's remarks aims at restoring a correct formulation of the divergence between the species and the proprium. A first possibility proposed (1a) is that of stating that the species can become a proprium with respect to something, whereas the proprium cannot be a species for anything else, but Avicenna states that in this case the premise that the species can be a proprium for something else is false. After proposing a second solution (2) which is, on its turn, problematic, the passage assesses that stating that if one stated that the species can be a proprium for something else, whereas the proprium cannot be a proprium for anything else, the statement would be correct (1b). Statements (1a) and (1b) actually coincide, but Avicenna's judgement on the two is diametrically opposite. Arguably, the judgement on the falseness of the claim that the species can be a proprium for something else is false, since it is contradicted by several examples of species that can be a proprium for something else provided by Avicenna (*Madḥal* II.4, §1; *Al-Risāla al-mūğaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq*, Appendix A, §6; cf. also *Commentary*). The problem is to explain the substantial reduplication produced within a few lines by the presence of (1a) and (1b), and what Avicenna states with regard to (1a), which is contradicted by some of his own examples provided in other passages. A possibility might be that of speculating that (1b) was meant to replace (1a) as a correction in the archetype's exemplar. If this were the case, then the variant was wrongly taken as an addition to the text when the archetype was copied. Another possibility is that the claim that the judgement on the species in (1a) is false is a wrong insertion that affected the archetype of the tradition. In both cases, the oddity might account for an (authorial?) intervention on the archetype of the tradition.

**Tab. 10**

Transmitted text	
(1a) If he had said that the thing's species can become a proprium for something else and then that the	لكنه لو كان قال إن النوع للشيء قد يصير خاصة لشيء آخر ثم قال إن

<sup>332</sup> See *Commentary* on the passage.


proprium does not become the proprium of anything else, [this] would have been a well-formed divergence, but the judgement concerning the status of the species would have been false. [...] (1b) If he had said that the thing's species can become a proprium for something else whereas the proprium does not become a proprium for something else, then it would have been correct.

الخاصة لا تصير خاصة لشيء آخر  
 لكانت مباينة حسنة ولكن الحكم في  
 النوع كاذب [...] ولو كان قال إن  
 النوع للشيء قد يصير خاصة لشيء  
 آخر والخاصة لا تصير خاصة لشيء  
 آخر لكان مستقيماً.

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A preliminary survey of the instances of textual difficulty in the text brought to evidence at least the possibility that the extant manuscript tradition derives from an archetype ( $\omega^2$  in S4 below) and offered an insight on some critical issues affecting the archetype's exemplar, such as the presence of marginal or interlinear glosses and additions. The hypothesis of the existence of an archetype should perhaps be considered in the light of Al-Ġūzġānī's account of Avicenna's habits in the composition of his works. Reportedly, Avicenna did not take care of drawing a clean copy from his own personal draft, a task that was sometimes undertaken by Al-Ġūzġānī himself<sup>333</sup>. Rather than deriving directly from the author's copy, the manuscript tradition of the *Šifā'* might derive either from the first clean copy of the author's draft, or by a further copy of it.

#### S4. The hypothesis of a moving archetype



<sup>333</sup> AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Introduction*, §1.2.

*Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction and a possible archetype*

If the reconstruction proposed above is admitted, it is unlikely that Al-Ġūzġānī himself copied the exemplar of his own Introduction from which the manuscript tradition derives, since it is slight plausible that he would have misunderstood his own additions as shown in case (1).

Moreover, the possibility that Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction might have been added to the archetypal copy containing the rest of the work at a second moment should not be overlooked. This can be argued on the basis of the non-uniform behaviour of the manuscript tradition, in which are recorded cases of: (i) presence of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction, with oscillations with regard to the exact wording of the introductory and final clauses that mark the beginning and the end of Al-Ġūzġānī's discourse<sup>334</sup>; (ii) presence of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction, though without the introductory and final clauses that mark the beginning and the end of Al-Ġūzġānī's discourse<sup>335</sup>; (iii) presence of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction without the introductory and final clauses that mark the beginning and the end of Al-Ġūzġānī's discourse, and Avicenna's Prologue (corresponding to chap. I.1) without any mark of chapter and title<sup>336</sup>; (iv) total lack of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction<sup>337</sup>. A similar lack of uniformity in the manuscript tradition

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<sup>334</sup> The introductory statement reads, with minor variations in the manuscript tradition: *hādā kitāb al-Šifā' li-l-Šayḥ al-Ra'īs Abī 'Alī Al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Abd Allāh Ibn Sīnā [...]* wa-ft ṣadrihi kalām li-Abī 'Ubayd 'Abd Al-Wāḥid Ibn Muḥammad Al-Ġūzġānī ("This is the *Book of the Healing* by the Chief Master Abū 'Alī Al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Abd Allāh Ibn Sīnā [...], at whose beginning there is the discourse of Abū 'Ubayd 'Abd Al-Wāḥid Ibn Muḥammad Al-Ġūzġānī"). The final statement, on the other hand, vary more considerably in the different manuscripts, even though the content does not change substantially (more or less: "from this point Al-Ġūzġānī's discourse is terminated, and Avicenna's work starts").

<sup>335</sup> E.g. MS E.

<sup>336</sup> E.g. MS Aligarh, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 110/30: Avicenna's Prologue is not a *faṣl*, and the first treatise of the work significantly starts from the following chapter. Also, in MS Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān, Miškāt 243 Avicenna's Prologue is not marked as a chapter.

<sup>337</sup> E.g. MSS MiYiYNoNZa employed in the present edition omit Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction; to these, other witnesses can be added, such as MSS Iran, Khvoy, Kitābhānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247; Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 1907; Kashan, Fahrang va Irshad 15 (the Introduction is added by a different handwriting); Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ġumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 7590; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550; Najaf, Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Mu'minīn, 1096; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoġlu Ali Paṣa 857; Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Dāniškāda-i İlāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān 593/1; Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṭā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 894 *falsafa*; Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Dāniškāda-i İlāhiyyāt-i Dānišgāh-i Tihṙān 236/1; İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206 (Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction was seemingly added at a different moment in the two pages preceding Avicenna's Prologue, written obliquely to gain space).

might point to the possibility that copies of a possible archetype of *Madḥal* were drawn also before the addition of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction; it might also point to the fact that an editorial work was made to make Avicenna's Prologue – originally without any title<sup>338</sup> – be included as the first chapter of the work and provided with a title (“indication on what the book contains”). An editorial effort is also evident in the insertion of the clauses that present and delimitate Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction with respect to Avicenna's own work.

*Avicenna's Madḥal: an archetype subject to additions and modifications?*

A number of passages in Avicenna's *Madḥal* are not uniformly attested in the manuscript tradition. More in detail, a small bunch of manuscripts seems to attest, against the rest of the tradition, the possible existence of (I) a shorter version of some passages (cases 1-2) and (II) of a different phrasing of some others (case 3).

To begin with (I), among the manuscripts employed in the present edition, MSS EJGTAs, together with the Latin translation and Lawkarī's quotations, witness the existence of a shorter version of the text. Main divergences can be spotted in passages in *Madḥal* II.1, §1.1/p. 91.8-12 Cairo ed.; *Madḥal* II.1, §3.1/p. 93.1-5 Cairo ed.; *Madḥal* II.1, §3.1/p. 93.5-11 Cairo ed.; *Madḥal* II.2, §2.3/p. 99.3-7 Cairo ed.; *Madḥal* II.2, §4.3/p. 101.7-9 Cairo ed. More in detail, MS G and the Latin translation witness a systematically shorter version, without preserving the passages at stake, whereas MSS EJTAs and, arguably, the exemplar owned by Lawkarī, preserve a part of them without the others.

In what follows, a couple of these cases will be examined in detail (cases 1-2 below), and I will argue for the possibility that the passages at stake entail some stylistic, syntactical, or doctrinal issues that might suggest a later addition of them to the text<sup>339</sup>.

[Case 1] *Madḥal* II.2, §4.3: «And this divergence subsists between genus and the permanent and common proprium, or between the two natures of genus and proprium unrestrictedly, since that [nature] is not a subject of predication, whereas this one is, I mean this convertibility. [Another] divergence encompassed [in it] follows this one [...]».

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The lack of this section in some of these manuscripts, however, might also be due to a voluntary omission.

<sup>338</sup> Usually, Avicenna's prologues do not have any title, and are not conceived as chapter: within the *Šifā'*, one can think of the prologue of the section of *al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī*, the prologue of *al-Af'āl wa-l-Infī'ālāt* and the prologue of *al-Nafs*, compared to which *Madḥal* I.1 represents actually quite an exceptional case.

<sup>339</sup> The considerations here proposed on cases 1-2 derive from the research published in DI VINCENZO 2017; the other cases are all more extensively dealt with both in DI VINCENZO 2017 and in the notes to the apparatus of the present edition.

<i>Madḥal</i> II.2, §4.3	Latin translation
<p>وهذه المباينة بين الجنس والخاصة الدائمة العامة، أو بين طبيعتي الجنس والخاصة مطلقاً؛ إذ تلك لا تتحمل وهذه تتحمل<sup>1</sup>، أعني هذا العكس<sup>2</sup>. ويتبع هذه مباينة هي في ضمن تلك [...]</p>	<p>Haec autem differentia est inter genus et proprium commune substantiale*. Post hanc autem sequitur<sup>1</sup> alia differentia quae continetur in ea [...]</p>
	<p>1. sequitur] sequetur BU</p>
	<p>*Substantiale] fort. legit dātiyya pro dā'ima</p>
<p>— أو بين 2. JE<sup>s1</sup>.G<sup>2</sup>    قد تحتل [تحتمل] 1. العكس om. TAsG add. in mg. G<sup>2</sup></p>	

**Case 1: the counterpredication of propria.** In this case, the clause with regard to which the two versions diverge is omitted by the Latin translation and by MSS TAsG, against the rest of the tradition. The context of the possibly suspected passage is Avicenna's commentary to Porphyry's statement that "a proprium is counterpredicated of that of which it is a proprium, a genus is not counterpredicated of anything"<sup>340</sup>. Porphyry's statement means that the proprium applies to what the species of which it is predicated applies to and conversely, whereas the case of the genus with respect to its species is different<sup>341</sup>. Avicenna seems to propose, at a first stage, a restriction of the validity of the statement to those propria that are permanent and common to all of their subjects. The reason for such a restriction lies in Porphyry's individuation of four kinds of proprium, of which only the last one, namely the proprium that always and commonly belongs to its species, is said to be "proprium" in the proper sense meant in *Logic*<sup>342</sup>. Arguably, Avicenna wanted to prevent the inference that the kind of proprium that does not always belong to its species, or not to all of it, can be counterpredicated as well, because this holds true only if it belongs to the species and only for the members of the species to which it belongs.

<sup>340</sup> PORPH. *Isag.* 16.11-14.

<sup>341</sup> Two things are said to "counterpredicate" (gr. ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι) when the one applies to everything the other applies to and conversely. Two examples of counterpredication are that of the thing and its definition (e.g. "human" and "rational animal", since every human is a rational animal and every rational animal is a human) and that of the thing and its proprium (e.g. "human" and "capable of laughing", since every human is capable of laughing and every being capable of laughing is a human). The genus and each one of its species do not counterpredicate, because the genus applies to more items than those each one of its species applies to (e.g. "animal" and its species "human", since every human is an animal, but not every animal is a human).

<sup>342</sup> PORPH. *Isag.* 12.13-22.

The suspected clause seems to be a sort of correction to Avicenna’s own restriction, stating that Porphyry’s statement might be considered as valid for the natures of proprium and genus in general (*muṭlaqan*), i.e. without any further specification, since the proprium can, in certain conditions, be counterpredicated (in case it permanently belongs to all the individuals of the species of which it is predicated), whereas the genus never can<sup>343</sup>. From a doctrinal point of view, the suspected passage might represent a shift within Avicenna’s first intention to confine the validity of Porphyry’s statement to a certain kind of proprium. From a syntactic point of view, the last part of the relevant passage is rather problematic: in fact, it is quite difficult to understand the passage *a’ nī hādā l-’aks* (“I mean this convertibility”) within the structure of the clause, from which it appears to be detached.

[Case 2] *Madḥal* II.1, §3.1: «As to what concerns the accident, it is not in itself evident that it is necessary [for it] to have a minor extension than genus; this because the properties of the ten categories, that we will mention later, are common accidents to the categories’ species, therefore being not minor in extension than genus, on the contrary, among them there is what is more common and greater [in extension], like the fact that substance is established according to a unique definition in a way that it doesn’t undergo more and less, is more common than substance. If someone says that this is a negation, and that no meaning is under it, it is still possible for us to find concomitants and accidents that are more common than each category, as one and existent, or as created, or like motion, for it is greater [in extension] than the rational animal which is, according to him (*scil.* Porphyry), a genus for “man”. The second divergence [...].»

<i>Madḥal</i> II.1, §3.1	Latin translation
<p>وأما العرض فليس بيّنًا بنفسه أنه يجب أن يكون أقلّ من الجنس، وذلك أنّ خواص المقولات العشر التي نذكرها بعد هي أعراض عامة لأنواعها، وليست أقلّ من الجنس في عمومها، بل منها ما هو أعمّ وأكثر، كما أنّ كون الجوهر ثابتًا على حدّ واحد فلا يقبل الأشد والأضعف هو أعمّ من الجوهر. فإنّ قال قائل إنّ</p>	<p>De accidente autem<sup>1</sup> non ita patet per se an debeat esse minus genere. Proprietates enim decem praedicamentorum de quibus postea loquemur<sup>2</sup> sunt accidentia communia<sup>3</sup> speciebus eorum, et non sunt inferiores generibus<sup>4</sup> in sua communitate. Est autem quaedam ex illis<sup>5</sup> communior et maior<sup>6</sup>, sicut hoc<sup>7</sup> quod substantia est ita<sup>8</sup> fixa quod non recipit magis et minus: hoc enim communior est<sup>9</sup> quam substantia. Si autem quis<sup>10</sup> dixerit quod haec negatio est<sup>11</sup>, quae non continet intentionem aliquam<sup>12</sup>, possumus invenire comitantia et accidentia quae sunt communiora unoquoque</p>

<sup>343</sup> Certain manuscripts preserve a *qad* before the verb *taḥtamilu* (“is predicated”) referring to the nature of the proprium: the *qad* conveys, in this context, a potential meaning, so that it should be understood: “whereas this one [namely the nature of the proprium] *could be/sometimes is* counterpredicated”.

هذا سلب، وليس تحته معنى، فقد  
 يمكننا أن نجد لوازم وعوارض أعم من  
 مقولة مقولة، كالواحد وكالموجود، بل  
 كالمحدث، بل مثل الحركة فإنها أكثر من  
 الحيوان الناطق، وهو جنس عنده  
 للإنسان. والمباينة الثانية [...] ]

1. بل — الإنسان om. EJG

praedicamentorum, sicut est unum et<sup>13</sup> ens,  
 et sicut incipere vel<sup>14</sup> fieri\*. Differentia  
 autem secunda [...]

1. de accidente autem] de accidente vero BU :  
 autem om. V || 2. de quibus — loquemur om.  
 BU || 3. de quibus postea loquemur add. BU || 4.  
 generibus] genere BU || 5. ex illis] ex istis BU ||  
 6. communior et maior] maior et communior  
 BU || 7. sicut hoc om. BU || 8. est ita inv. MNPG  
 || 9. est om. BUM || 10. quis om. BU || 11. est  
 om. BUMNP || 12. aliquam] quicquam BU || 13.  
 et om. BU || 14. vel] et BU

\* sicut incipere vel fieri] *duplex translatio*: ar.  
*ka-l-muḥḍat*

**Case 2: the example of “motion”.** The passage aims at demonstrating that the accident does not always have a minor extension in predication than the genus; the first instance mentioned is the fact of not undergoing more and less, which belongs to more than just one of the highest genera (for it belongs to the category of substance and, for instance, to the category of quantity), therefore having a wider extension of predication than a genus. Then, Avicenna imagines a possible objection to the example he provided, namely that the feature mentioned (“not undergoing more and less”) is, actually, the negation (*salb*) of a feature rather than a feature. In order to avoid such an objection, Avicenna mentions the case of some positive concomitants and accidents that are more general than each category, like “one” (*al-wāḥid*), “existent” (*al-mawḡūd*) and “created” (*al-muḥḍat*). As to “one” and “existent”, they are the two transcendental notions predicated of all the categories<sup>344</sup>; as to the term “created”, it is arguably a notion that can be applied to all the items that are classified in the categories as well<sup>345</sup>. As is evident, the whole argumentation is set at the level of the highest genera, since once it is demonstrated that a certain accident is more common than a single summum genus, no other genus with a wider extension of predication can be found to object that the accident has, however, a smaller extension of predication than that other superior genus.

<sup>344</sup> Cf. IBN SĪNĀ, *Ilāhiyyāt* III.2, p. 103.7-9.

<sup>345</sup> *Muḥḍat* should not be taken as if it just applied to non-eternal items (to the exclusion, therefore, of the eternal substances): in fact, by the term *muḥḍat*, Avicenna qualifies any item that is *essentially* — not temporally — posterior to the Necessary Existent (cf. IBN SĪNĀ, *Ilāhiyyāt* VIII.3, p. 342.17-343.6), hence the term can be predicated of all items other than the Necessary Existent himself. It is worth recalling that, for the mature Avicenna, God is neither a substance nor an accident and, therefore, exceeds the ten categories.

Problems arise when one tries to explain the mention of “motion” (*al-ḥaraka*) that is brought in by the suspect passage within this frame. In fact, “motion” seemingly does not fit well in this list of examples both for linguistic and doctrinal reasons: (i) first of all, it is the only name within a list of adjectival attributes, which is quite strange; (ii) secondly, it is doubtful how to understand the term “*ḥaraka*” in this context.

(i) As to the linguistic peculiarity of the mention of “motion” within the passage, it will not be taken as a decisive argument to rule out the possibility that it is actually part of the text, since it could also be admitted as a loose way to mean *al-mutaḥarrrik*.

(ii) More challenging is the doctrinal issue. We should expect, in the passage, another example of a concomitant more general than each category (which is indeed the case of “one”, “existent” and “created”, as previously argued); “motion”, however, seemingly does not satisfy this requirement, in Avicenna’s view.

Avicenna provides a definition of “motion” in the first chapter of the second treatise of the *Physics* of the *Šifā’*<sup>346</sup>, and a discussion of its categorial status in the second chapter of the same treatise<sup>347</sup>, to which I will come back shortly. In the section corresponding to the *Categories*, Avicenna criticizes a group of philosophers who believe that motion is a genus external to the ten categories, encompassing the categories of quality, quantity and place (T1).

T1. *Šifā’*, *Maqūlāt* II.4, p. 70.5-13:

Here there occur some doubts concerning some things that are said to exist out of these ten [categories], without being included in them, among which there are things that are more common than a number of them, like motion, for it encompasses the [categories of] quality, quantity and place in a way. [...] Let’s say: as to motion, [(a)] if it coincides with the category of passion, then it does not add a genus [to the ten categories]; [(b)] if, [on the contrary], it does not coincide with the category of passion, it is not necessary for it to be a genus; rather, it is necessary for it to be predicated of its kinds by ambiguity (*bi-l-taškīk*), and that this [element] is what prevents to consider motion as the category of passion itself, in case it is impossible. Otherwise, if there is nothing of this sort preventing [it], then the category of passion is motion itself, but [our] discourse will come back to it in its [proper] place.

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<sup>346</sup> See HASNAWI 2001, pp. 219-255. As well underlined by Hasnawi, two senses of “motion” are distinguished by Avicenna in this chapter, namely a motion that is the conceived continuity of the process of motion, from the very beginning to the end (the “mouvement-1” described by Hasnawi) and a motion which is the intermediary state of the mobile subject between the beginning and the end of the process (“mouvement-2” in Hasnawi’s article). The most proper sense of “motion” is, according to Avicenna, the second one, which is also the only one having an extra-mental existence (whereas the first one is just the mental conception of the whole process of motion and does not exist in the external reality).

<sup>347</sup> See HASNAWI 2004, pp. 607-622.

In the passage, Avicenna refutes the idea, endorsed by a group of philosophers, that motion could be considered as a genus encompassing more than one category by prospecting two alternatives, namely that (a) motion coincides, in fact, with the category of passion, and (b) that it does not coincide with that category, though without being a genus, since in that case it would be predicated of its kinds by ambiguity (*bi-l-taškīk*). The whole argument does not deal extensively with the categorial status of motion (which, in fact, is postponed to the pertinent section of *Physics*); its purpose is rather that of rejecting the idea that motion could be an additional genus to the ten categories. Nonetheless, Avicenna already hints in the passage at what he more extensively explains in the section of *Physics*, namely that motion coincides with the category of passion, which is the only possibility he takes into account for the hypothesis (a), according to which motion fits within the system of the categories. In fact, in *Al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī* II.2 (T2), Avicenna introduces three views concerning the problem of how motion fits within the categories.

**T2.** *Šifā'*, *Al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī* II.2, p. 93.4-8<sup>348</sup>:

There has been a disagreement about motion's relation to the categories. Some said (i) that motion is the category of passion, while others said (ii) that the term 'motion' applies purely equivocally to the kinds that fall under it. Still others said (iii) that the term 'motion' is an analogical term like the term 'existence', which includes many things neither univocally nor purely equivocally, but analogically; however, the kinds primarily included under the terms 'existence' and 'accident' are the categories [themselves], whereas the kinds included under the term 'motion' are certain species or kinds of the categories.

The whole chapter is basically devoted to the refutation of the second and the third views, in favour of the first one<sup>349</sup>. Hence, if we took "motion" in case 2 as an adequate example of something more general than a single category like "existence" and "oneness", then, we should admit within this text a non-Avicennian view.

Some further elements suggest that "motion" cannot be taken as something which exceeds a single category in the context of the passage in case 2. In fact, the reason provided in the clause mentioning "motion" is, actually, that it is more general than the rational animal, which is a genus of man, which seems to definitely rule out the possibility that this clause is referring to "motion" as something more general than a single category. It is very likely that "motion" has to be intended, in this context, as a quite sloppy way to mean "moving voluntarily" (*mutaḥarrīk bi-l-irāda*). In this sense, the example could somehow have a relation to the general context of the passage, since "capable of moving" is an instance of a concomitant feature that is more general

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<sup>348</sup> Translation in MCGINNIS 2009, p. 128, modified. See also the French translation of the passage in the aforementioned HASNAWI 2004, p. 615.

<sup>349</sup> IBN SINĀ, *Al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī* II.2, p. 97.13-15: «Since the theories that we have displayed [so far], but not accepted, have been invalidated, there remains the truth uniquely, namely the first theory».

than a genus, though not a highest one (i.e. not a category): it is an example of common accident already provided by Porphyry in the *Isagoge*<sup>350</sup> and elsewhere recalled by Avicenna himself<sup>351</sup>. In this sense, though, the example of “motion” provided in the suspect clause seems to be out of place, since the list of examples formed by “existent”, “one” and “created” is meant to exemplify the case of accidents and concomitants that are more universal than the highest genera. Moreover, not only these examples, but the whole argumentation is built around the highest genera: one of the first examples provided is that of “not undergoing more or less”, which is a feature common to more than one category<sup>352</sup>. The argument of the suspect passage being built on an intermediate genus placed at a lower level of an ideal Porphyry’s tree, is less convincing and definitive than Avicenna’s previous argument, because one could still object to it that there are higher genera that have a greater extension in predication than that concomitant feature, whereas it is impossible to move such an objection if the whole argument is brought at the level of the highest genera. To conclude, no matter in which sense we understand the term *ḥaraka* — i.e. as motion in general or, as the suspect passage itself suggests, as the capability of moving voluntarily —, the example turns out to be quite out of place in the specific argumentation, although possibly somehow related to the general subject of the passage.

**Case 3: A rephrasing of a passage of Madḥal I.12?** So far, instances of possible *additions* to Avicenna’s text were discussed (I); case 3 that is going to be presented, on the other hand, might attest the rephrasing of a passage of Avicenna’s *Madḥal* (II). Among the manuscripts that present a ‘short version’ of the passages mentioned above, MSS ETAs<sup>353</sup> might also preserve a trace of a *revision* of Avicenna’s text. In *Madḥal* I.12, §2.3, the Cairo edition (p. 67.11-14) prints a text that is attested by MSS ETAsKaB against the rest of the tradition; the text, however, seems repeat the very same concept, even using for most part an identical phrasing (T3).

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<sup>350</sup> PORPH., *Isag.* 13.18-21: «Black [is predicated] both of the species of ravens and of the particulars, being an inseparable accident, moving (τὸ κινεῖσθαι) of man and horse, being a separable accident – but principally of the individuals and also, on a second account, of the items which contain the individuals». (Transl. in BARNES 2003, pp. 12-13).

<sup>351</sup> It can be found as an example for common accidents in the early work *K. al-Hidāya* and in the *Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alay’i*: IBN SĪNĀ, *K. al-Hidāya*, p. 67: «As to common accident, it is an accidental [feature] either encompassing [several] species, like “white” for “snow” and “gypsum”, or the individuals of [several] species, like “moving” (*ka-l-mutaḥarrik*)»; IBN SĪNĀ, *Dānešnāme-ye ‘Alay’i*, pp. 24-25: «[As to the accidental universal, either it belongs to one universal] or it belongs to more than one universal, like motion [belongs] both to man and to something else, and like blackness [belongs] both to raven and to something else. They call this: “common accident”».

<sup>352</sup> Substance and quantity, for instance.

<sup>353</sup> Together with MSS KaB.

### T3.

<i>Madḥal</i> I.12, §2.3	Translation
[1] وذلك أن المعنى الذي يفهم من أنه عقلي هو غير المفهوم من أنه منطقي، [2] وذلك أن المعنى الذي يفهم من أنه عقلي لازم ومقارن للمعنى الذي يفهم من أنه منطقي ليس هو هو	[1] This because the notion that is understood from the fact that it is intellectual is different from what is understood from the fact that it is logical, [2] this because the notion that is understood from the fact that it is intellectual is concomitant and associated to the notion that is understood from the fact that it is logical without being the same.

The passage explains that, although the “logical genus” (i.e. the fact itself of being a genus, a species etc.) has an intellectual existence only, it does not coincide with what is traditionally called “intellectual genus” (i.e. the notion of existing things represented in the intellect, that can be conceived as a genus, or a species etc. with respect to something else). Sentences (1) and (2) are almost identical, and only vary in the final part, where sentence (2) is way more specific than sentence (1). Sentence (2) is concordantly attested by all the manuscript tradition, whereas only MSS ETAsKaB preserve sentence (1). Although other reasons can be imagined for the loss of sentence (1) in most part of the manuscript tradition<sup>354</sup>, it can, at least hypothetically, be suggested that sentence (2) was meant to replace sentence (1). Sentence (2) seems to be a clearer, more explicit statement of the same concept expressed in sentence (1), and an eventual rewriting of sentence (1) might have been required due to the excessive elusiveness of the argument.

Again, in the hypothesis of the existence of an archetypal copy one should suppose that such a replacement was not yet fully achieved when copies began to be drawn from the archetype; rather, the process might have started in that manuscript, as well as the supposed addition of the passages previously showed. The picture portrayed so far, although highly speculative, might explain the remains of a previous version of the text in the manuscript tradition.

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Cases analogous to 1-2 displayed above cannot be easily dismissed as accidental omissions affecting the short version. In some of the cases, it can hardly be established

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<sup>354</sup> It is possible, for instance, to argue for an accidental omission of sentence (1), facilitated by the repetition of the same incipit in both sentence (1) and (2). It should be noticed, however, that such an accidental omission affects the majority of the manuscripts, in both the branches of the tradition; even if the omission has a potentially polygenetic nature, this kind of explanation might turn out as not completely satisfying.

whether the divergences between the short and the long versions are due to an intentional omission of the passages in the short version or to additions in the long version, for the passages at stake are apparently both syntactically and doctrinally consistent with the context<sup>355</sup>. Although it is still possible to claim that the text might have undergone a process of abridgement, this hypothesis is, however, insufficient to explain the stylistic, syntactical and doctrinal issues raised by passages like those here discussed (cases 1-2). A major difficulty appears in the attempt to explain how such problematic passages could fit within the context, if they were meant to be part of the text in the first place. Such difficulties would be, on the contrary, more easily solved by considering the passages at stake as absent at a first stage of the composition and added at a second moment. The passages at stake might have been copied within the text at a quite early stage of the tradition<sup>356</sup>; arguably, the process of revision and enlargement of the text antedates all the extant Arabic manuscripts preserving Avicenna's *Madḥal* of which we have knowledge so far: it appears to be completely achieved in the earliest extant Arabic manuscript of the text at our disposal, namely MS Ka, dating to the first decade of Ḍū l-Ḥiġġa 536H/4<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> July 1142. The incorporation of these passages within Avicenna's text was, therefore, already active at a very early stage of the transmission. In the hypothesis that there was an archetype of the tradition, one should suppose that the possible additions to Avicenna's text were made in the margins of that exemplar, before becoming fully part of a "long version", which is much more widespread than the first one, a *versio vulgata* of Avicenna's text<sup>357</sup>.

Ideally, the textual additions (cases 1-2) and modifications (case 3) showed so far, which imply a doctrinal expansion and alteration of the text, should be expected from the author's part. However, although it cannot be definitely excluded, both the style and content of some of the passages analyzed represent a difficulty face to the hypothesis that the interventions are all Avicenna's. The traditional notion of "author" – strictly referring to one single authorial figure that is the only one who detains the control of all of his work – is probably not entirely suitable to account for the composition of the *Šifā'*. Perhaps, the possibility that the work underwent modifications that are, to some extent, the result of a collective work should be taken into account. A scenario of this sort seems to be suggested by a series of testimonies concerning the composition of the work. In fact, the text of the *Šifā'* was an object of the scholastic debate when Avicenna was still alive; this can be inferred from the correspondence between Avicenna's and his colleague Ibn Zayla, in which the urged

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<sup>355</sup> As in the case of *Madḥal* II.1, §3.1/p. 93.1-5 Cairo ed. and *Madḥal* II.2, §2.3/p. 99.3-7 Cairo ed.

<sup>356</sup> A partial inclusion of the textual additions within the text can be found already in Lawkarī's quotations.

<sup>357</sup> Adapting to this context the expression employed in BERTOLACCI 2012b, p. 294.

Avicenna to provide further clarifications concerning a passage of *Madḥal* I.2<sup>358</sup>. Discussions concerning several doctrinal points of the *Šifā'* might have arisen from the reading-sessions of the work to which, according to Al-Ġūzġānī's account, Avicenna took part together with his disciples, apparently also before the end of the composition of the whole work.

Even if we have little clue about the attitude of Avicenna's disciples towards their master's authority and, consequently, it is dubious to what extent they could feel entitled to introduce modifications in his own work, it can be observed that some of Avicenna's works were the object of non-authorial editorial interventions within Avicenna's school. For instance, Al-Ġūzġānī's editorial activity on Avicenna's works, and more specifically on the *Šifā'*, is well documented<sup>359</sup>. Just to mention a couple of instances of the interventions specifically concerning the *Šifā'*, one can think of the addition of his own prologue to the whole *summa* and to the quotation of an excerpt of Avicenna's *Al-Adwiya al-Qalbiyya* added between the fourth and the fifth treatise of the *Kitāb al-Nafs*<sup>360</sup>. It is also worth recalling that al-Ġūzġānī assumed at a certain point a crucial role within the transmission of Avicenna's work, like the creation of a clean copy that was probably meant to be the archetype of the rest of the tradition<sup>361</sup>. Seemingly, the editing of a clean copy of Avicenna's works after their first composition was more a task undertaken by Avicenna's circle of disciples rather than Avicenna's own occupation<sup>362</sup>. It is, therefore, possible that Avicenna's direct disciples played, at least to some extent, a non-marginal role in the improvement of their master's work, contributing to creating a second, enlarged and modified version of the text. Their interventions might have been added to the archetype ( $\omega^2$  in S5 below) once it had already been copied.

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<sup>358</sup> See REISMAN 2002, p. 284; for a translation, *Ibid.*, p. 199.


<sup>359</sup> As reported by Al-Bayhaqī (*Tatimmat šiwān al-ḥikma*, p. 94), Al-Ġūzġānī is responsible for the addition of a section on Mathematics to both the *Kitāb al-Naġāt* and the *Dānešnāme-ye 'Alā'ī*; see also BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 37, 587-588 and AL-RAHIM 2009, p. 7.

<sup>360</sup> See ALPINA 2017.

<sup>361</sup> Al-Ġūzġānī also personally undertook, in certain cases, the copy of his master's works; for instance, he wrote under dictation the *Muḥtaṣar al-Awṣaṭ fī l-Mantiq*; cf. AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography of Ibn Sīnā*, p. 44.

<sup>362</sup> In the case of Avicenna's *Lisān al-'Arab*, apparently, Avicenna's circle failed in this task, due to the poor conditions of Avicenna's first draft; the author evidently didn't take care of drawing a clean copy of the work, according to his habits. See AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography of Ibn Sīnā*, p. 72.

## S5. Hypothesis of a moving archetype



## 2. A bipartite tradition: branches $\alpha$ and $\beta$

### 2.1. MSS $\alpha$ and $\beta$

According to the provisional results of the present inquiry, the manuscript tradition of *Madḥal* is bipartite into two branches, namely a branch  $\alpha$  (which encompasses MSS KaNkBAECDaŠNoN), and a branch  $\beta$  (which encompasses MSS JDiTAsTeToMiŠGYiY). The two branches are opposed in a number of passages, both because of mistakes that presumably occurred in MS  $\alpha$  and mistakes that affected MS  $\beta$  (instances in Tab. 11)

**Tab.11.** Mistakes of branch  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$

Supposedly correct	Supposedly incorrect	Possibly contaminated versions
<b>Mistakes of <math>\alpha</math></b>		
(1) II.1, §3.6/p. 97.17-18 Cairo ed. <sup>363</sup>		
المادة لا تحمل على المركب حمل أنه هو والجنس يحمل على النوع حمل أن النوع هو	المادة لا تحمل على المركب حمل أنه هو والجنس يحمل على النوع حمل أن الجنس هو	---
JTAsDiToMiŠYiYG	KaNkBAECDaŠNoN	

<sup>363</sup> The reading *anna l-ġins* of family  $\alpha$  does not fit well in the context. In fact, the genus is predicated of the species so that the species can be said to be the genus: “animal”, for instance, is predicated of “man” so that the predication: “the man is an animal” is correct. The reading in  $\alpha$  implies the reverse predication, i.e. “the animal is a man”, which is not necessarily true.

النوع	
Nk <sup>mg.</sup> C <sup>mg.</sup>	
(2) I.10, §3/p. 58.1-2 Cairo ed. <sup>364</sup>	
[a] والمقولات في جواب ما هو قد تختلف بالعموم والخصوص فيكون بعضه أعم وبعضه أخص JTAsDiŞToMiŞYiYG	KaAEDaNoN
	[b] والمقول في جواب ما هو قد تختلف بالعموم والخصوص فيكون بعضها أعم وبعضها أخص NkBC [المقولات] <i>s.l.</i> Nk in <i>mg. C]</i>
(3) I.13, §1.1/p. 72.10 Cairo ed. <sup>365</sup>	
إن اسمه يُدَلّ به عند المنطقيين على معنى	وأما الفصل فإن اسمه يُدَلّ به عند المنطقيين على معنى
JBTAsDiŞToMiŞYiYG	KaNkAECDANo N
<b>Mistakes of β</b>	
(4) I.14, §2.3/p. 86.4-6 Cairo ed. <sup>366</sup>	

<sup>364</sup> Branch  $\alpha$  shows an oscillation possibly due to the coexistence of two readings within MS  $\alpha$ , i.e. *wa-l-maqūlāt...ba ʿduhā a ʿamm wa-ba ʿduhā aḥaṣṣ* and *wa-l-maqūl...ba ʿduhu a ʿamm wa-ba ʿduhu aḥaṣṣ*. MS  $\mathcal{S}$  probably collates or restores conjecturally a grammatically consistent reading.

<sup>365</sup> The omission of the clause *wa-ammā l-faṣlu* in family  $\alpha$  might be due to the proximity of the title of the chapter on differentia (*fī l-faṣl*): the repetition of the same word might have facilitated the omission; then, MS  $\alpha$  might have adapted an original *fa-inna* into *inna*. An analogous omission, due to the repetition of a term present in the proximate title of the chapter, can be observed in MS Iran, Mašhad, Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 11479, f. 88v: the clause *wa-ammā l-nawʿ* is accidentally omitted due to the proximity of the title of chapter V.5 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* “on the species” (*fī l-nawʿ*).

<sup>366</sup> Family  $\beta$  attests: *tumma anna* (“then [you do not know] that...”) against the reading *bal ḡaʿala* (“rather, he posited”) in  $\alpha$ . In the passage, Avicenna complains that Porphyry introduced the notion of ontological accident (the accident as opposed to substance, dealt with in the *Categories*) without explaining its notion in the *Isagoge*; hence, he addresses the reader stating that he does not know that notion yet (*wa-lam taʿlam baʿda*). Reading  $\beta$  connects the second part of the passage, i.e. the display of Porphyry’s definitions of common accident in the *Isagoge*, to the things the reader does not know yet because their explanation pertains to the *Categories* (assuming that *anna* in  $\beta$  depends on *taʿlam*), which is quite odd. Phenomena of contamination can also be observed: MS  $\mathcal{S}$  combined readings  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ; MSS ToŞ bear evidence of the insertion, in their antigraphs, of reading  $\alpha$  (which was

<p>[...] وهذا شيء لم يلتفت اليه أول من قدم معرفة هذه الخمسة بل جعل على المنطق ثم أن للعرض العام حدودا مشهورة</p> <p>To</p> <p>[...] وهذا شيء لم يلتفت اليه أول من قدم معرفة هذه الخمسة &lt;...&gt; بل جعل للعرض العام حدودا مشهورة</p> <p>Š</p> <p>[...] وهذا شيء لم يلتفت اليه أول من قدم معرفة هذه الخمسة على المنطق ثم جعل للعرض العام حدودا مشهورة</p> <p>Š</p>	<p>ولم تعلم بعد حال العرض الذي هو نظير الجوهر وهذا شيء لم يلتفت اليه أول من قدم معرفة هذه الخمسة على المنطق ثم أن للعرض العام حدودا مشهورة</p> <p>JTAsDiTeMiYiYG</p> <p>بل جعل</p> <p>Di<sup>i.1</sup></p> <p>[...] وهذا شيء لم يلتفت اليه أول من قدم معرفة هذه الخمسة على المنطق قد جعل للعرض العام حدودا مشهورة</p> <p>E</p>	<p>KaNkBACDaNoN</p>
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(5) II.3, §2.4.1/p. 104.11 Cairo ed.<sup>367</sup>

<p>هذا المباينة تستمر مباينة</p> <p>EDaŠNoN</p>	<p>[a] هذا المباينة تسمى مباينة</p> <p>JTAsDiToMiŠYiYG</p> <p>Di<sup>i.1</sup></p> <p>«haec discrepantia dicitur» Lat.</p> <p>***</p> <p>[b] هذا المباينة تستمر</p> <p>KaNkBAC</p>	<p>يسميا</p>
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(6) II.4, §2.2/p. 111.2-6 Cairo ed.

<p>[...] إذا كان قد يعرض لغير تلك المقولة مثل امتناع قبول الأشد والأضعف فإنه من لوازم الجوهر على سبيل العموم له ولغيره</p> <p>KaNkBACDaŠNoN</p>	<p>[...] إذا كان قد يعرض لغير تلك المقولة مثل امتناع قبول الأشد والأضعف فإنه من لوازم الإنسان على سبيل العموم له ولغيره</p> <p>JTAsDiToMiŠYiYG</p> <p>E</p> <p>+ Nk<sup>s.1</sup> C<sup>s.1</sup></p>	
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interpolated in the text in the wrong position in To and which was erroneously interpreted as a replacement of 'alà l-mantiq in Š).

<sup>367</sup> Reading β is caused by a palaeographical misunderstanding.

## 2.2. MS $\beta$ : an early stylistic revision of *Madḥal*?

Besides erroneous readings, the bipartition of the tradition is also accounted for by a number of passages of the text that might show traces of a second recension of the work. More in detail, branch  $\alpha$  seemingly attests a more difficult version of the text, whereas branch  $\beta$  seems to smooth the syntax and make it plainer. In what follows, I shall refer as ‘first recension’ to the version that is presumably *difficilior*, and as ‘second recension’ the *facilior* one.

It should be observed that the earliest witnesses of the second recension date to the thirteenth century, i.e. to the earliest phases of the tradition of which there is substantial extant evidence; moreover, it is also attested by the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work, hence the most ancient extant witness of the first recension (MS Ka) is roughly coeval to the most ancient witness of the second one. Clearly, therefore, the posteriority of one recension with respect to the other cannot be established on the basis of chronological evidence provided by the extant manuscript tradition. The posteriority of the one or the other version has rather to be inferred from a qualitative study of the variants of both.

**Tab. 12.** Evidence of a second recension in MS  $\beta$

Version $\alpha$	Version $\beta$	Possibly contaminated versions
(1) I.2, §1.2.1/p. 12.13-14 Cairo ed. <sup>368</sup>		
والأمور التي تخالط الحركة على ضريين: فإنها إما أن تكون لا وجود لها	والأمور التي تخالط الحركة على قسمين: فإنها إما أن تكون لا وجود لها	والأمور التي تخالط الحركة على ضريين: فإنها إما أن تكون لا وجود لها
KaADaYiYNoN	JNkTAsDiŠToTeMiŠG	BC
Nk <sup>mg.</sup> T <sup>mg.</sup>	B <sup>mg.</sup> C <sup>mg.</sup> Y <sup>s.l.</sup>	E
(2) I.11, §1.1/p. 59.9 Cairo ed.		
فلنتحقق الآن حال الحدود التي هي مشهورة للنوع	فلنتحقق الآن حال الحدود المشهورة للنوع	---
KaNkBADaŠNoN	JETAsDiToŠYG	
(3) I.11, §2.2/p. 61.12-13 Cairo ed.		

<sup>368</sup> The reading *qismayni* is *lectio facilior*, since it is the one employed in all the chapter; the equivalent reading *darbayni* introduces a stylistic variation within the text.

فليس يذكر [...] أنه إذا قيل هذا اللفظ فيجب أن يفهم منه هذا المعنى أي مرتب تحت كذا عني هذا المعنى	فليس يذكر [...] أنه إذا قيل هذا اللفظ فيجب أن يفهم منه هذا المعنى	فليس يذكر [...] أنه إذا قيل مرتب تحت كذا عني هذا المعنى
YiY	JTAsDiToTeMiŠG	KaNkBAEDaŠNoN + Š <sup>mg.</sup>
		إذا قيل مرتب تحت كذا أعني هذا المعنى
		To <sup>mg.</sup>

(4) I.12, §1.1/p. 65.4-5 Cairo ed.

إنه قد جرت العادة في تفهم هذه الخمسة أن يقال إن منها ما هو طبيعي ومنها منطقي ومنها عقلي	إنه قد جرت العادة في تفهم هذه الخمسة أن يقال إن منها ما هو طبيعي ومنها ما هو منطقي ومنها ما هو عقلي	إنه قد جرت العادة في تفهم هذه الخمسة أن يقال إن منها ما هو طبيعي ومنها منطقي ومنها عقلي
T	JAsDiToTeMiŠYiYG + Nk <sup>s.l.</sup> Š <sup>s.l.</sup>	KaNkBAECDaŠNoN

(5) I.12, §2.1/p. 66.13-14 Cairo ed.

مثل أن الأبيض في نفسه له معقول لا يحتاج أن يعقل معه أنه ثوب وأنه خشب	مثل أن الأبيض في نفسه له معقول لا يحتاج أن يعقل معه أنه ثوب وأنه خشب	مثل أن الأبيض في نفسه له معقول لا يحتاج معه أن يعقل أنه ثوب وأنه خشب
---	JTDiŠToMiŠYiYG	KaNkBAECDaNoN
	(om. As)	

(6) I.12, §5.2.1/p. 70.12-14 Cairo ed.

فيتقوم به الشخص في الذهن؛ فإنك لو قلت: زيد هو الطويل [...] فإنه لا يتعين لك في العقل شخصية زيد	فيتقوم به الشخص في الذهن؛ فإنك لو قلت: زيد هو الطويل [...] فإنه لا يتعين لك في الذهن شخصية زيد	فيتقوم به الشخص في العقل؛ فإنك لو قلت: زيد هو الطويل [...] فإنه لا يتعين لك في العقل شخصية زيد
TAsToMiŠ	JDiYiYG	KaNkBAEDaŠNoN

(7) I.13, §3.1/p. 76.10-11 Cairo ed.

ثم له رسوم مشهورة مثل قولهم إنّ الفصل هو الذي يفصل بين النوع والجنس وأيضا قولهم إنه الذي يفضل به النوع على الجنس	ثم له رسوم مشهورة مثل قولهم إنّ الفصل هو الذي يفصل بين النوع والجنس وأيضا قولهم إنه الذي يفضل به النوع على الجنس	ثم له رسوم مشهورة مثل قولهم إنّ الفصل هو الذي يفصل بين النوع والجنس وأيضا قولهم إنه الذي يفضل به النوع على الجنس
S	JTDiToMiŠYiYG	KaNkBAECDaNoN

[...] مثل قولهم إن [...]

As		
(8) II.4, §4.2/p. 112.1-2 Cairo ed.		
ويجب أن يكون جنس العرض	وجنس العرض يجب أن يكون	
عرضا لاحقا لذلك النوع	عرضا لاحقا لذلك النوع	---
KaNkBAECDaŞNoN	JTAsDiToMiŞYiYG	

As previously claimed, the second recension is arguably systematically *facilior* if compared to the other. Characteristics of the second recension with respect to the first are:

- *a smoother, easier syntax of the phrase*: the second recension tends to prefer the use of connectives in order to make the clause more easily understandable, as in case (1), and to avoid redundancy, as in case (2). Case (4) as well shows this tendency: the partitive structure with the repetition of *minhā* in version  $\beta$  parallels the identical structure of the following clause, built on the repetition of *minhā* as well.

- *a more elegant phrasing*: an instance of this kind of modification achieved in the second recension is case (3), in which the sense stays unaltered, but the phrasing is much clearer: the structure of the hypothetical clause, for instance, is more perspicuous in version  $\beta$ , where the particle *fa-* is employed. The use of the expression *kaḏā* (“and so on”) in version  $\alpha$  to abridge the definition quoted can definitely be authorial: other analogous cases can be found in *Madḥal* I.13, §3.2.1/p. 76.20 Cairo ed., where Avicenna abridges the quotation of one of the traditional definitions of *differentia specifica* by replacing the omitted clause with *kaḏā*, and in *Mubāḥaṭāt* 584, p. 194, where Avicenna cuts off his own quotation of *Madḥal* I.4, §3.1/p. 22.13 Cairo ed. by *kaḏā*<sup>369</sup>.

- *a stricter respect of the rules of classical Arabic*: an instance is the attempt at reassessing a syntactic structure “Verb-Subject-Object” in case (8), instead of the peculiar order “Subject-Verb-Object” presented in the first recension; the word order in the first recension, however, though less regular, emphasizes better the opposition between the genus of the constitutive *differentia* and the genus of the accident which is at stake in the passage.

- *a doctrinal concern*: case (6) in Tab. 12 might reveal a doctrinal concern behind the intervention on the text. Branch  $\beta$  attests a reading: *al-ḏihn* alternative to the reading: *al-‘aql*. Arguably, the correction in  $\beta$  was meant to correct Avicenna’s use of *‘aql*, which is employed in the context almost interchangeably with *ḏihn*. The fact that Avicenna speaks of an individual notion in the intellect might have led to emend the term *‘aql* with the more general *ḏihn* since, if the term *‘aql* is understood in a narrow sense as referring to the faculty that deals with universal and abstract notions,

<sup>369</sup> For a contextualization of this passage, cf. *supra*.

Avicenna's use in the context might have caused perplexities<sup>370</sup>. However, the original reading was in all likelihood 'aql, since the passage deals with the composition of notions that concur to the individuation of a single individual, which is an operation that occurs in the intellect; the author(s) of version  $\beta$ , on the other hand, focussed their attention on the fact that one of the notions that result from the composition of several notions is that of an individual and were partly misled in their interpretation of the passage.

The twelfth-century Latin translation tendentially attests version  $\beta$  (Tab. 13), even if it is sometimes quite difficult to assert, due to the corruptions that affect the Latin translation (as in case 5), or due to the impossibility to distinguish with certainty which of the two synonymous variants is rendered in the Latin translation (as in case 6, where the Latin *intellectus* might render either 'aql or *dihn*). Finally, a certain degree of liberty in the translation might justify the few cases that seemingly do not attest version  $\beta$  (in case 7, for instance, the translator might choose not to translate again *qawluhum* because it sounds redundant in the context).

**Tab. 13.** The Latin translation

Case	Text of the Latin translation	Version
(1)	«Res autem quae commiscetur motui dividuntur <b>in duo quia aut</b> in res quae non habent esse nisi quia possibile est eas admisceri motui»	$\beta$
(2)	«Certificemus nunc <b>vulgatas</b> descriptiones speciei»	$\beta$
(3)	«hoc nomen sic debere intelligi»	$\beta$
(4)	«Usus fuit ut cum haec quinque distinguerentur diceretur quod haec <b>quodam respectu sunt naturalia et alio respectu logica et alio intellectualia</b> »	$\beta$
(5)	«Sicut album quod in se est aliquid intellectum <...>»	? <sup>371</sup>
(6)	«[...] propter quam individuum constituatur <b>in intellectu</b> . Si enim diceres quod Plato est longus [...] non tamen describetur per illas <b>in intellectu</b> individualitas Platonis»	?
(7)	«et etiam qua habundat species a genere»	$\alpha?$
(8)	« <b>et oportet ut genus accidentis sit</b> genus consequens ad ipsam speciem»	$\beta?$


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<sup>370</sup> Cf. *Mubāḥaṭāt* 283-284 on the senses of the term 'aql.

<sup>371</sup> The portion of text corresponding to that preserving the variant reading in the Arabic is accidentally omitted in the Latin text.

As to the question concerning the time and place at which each of the two recensions appeared, it still awaits a definite answer, although some considerations can be made. If recension  $\beta$  is later than the other, it must be nonetheless contextualized within the first stages of the tradition. On the one hand, the nature of the modifications introduced in the second recension renders the ascription of this version of the text to a scribal work quite unlikely; on the other hand, their ascription to the author himself seems also quite dubious, both on the basis of the exquisitely stylistic nature of most of the modifications<sup>372</sup>, and of the information provided by Al-Ġūzġānī concerning Avicenna's reportedly scarce care for the preservation and transmission of his own works: in such a frame, the hypothesis that Avicenna himself might have accomplished a revision of his text seems less than likely. What is left is the hypothesis that the author(s) of the second recension might have worked within Avicenna's circle, or belonged to the first generation of his students. Some possible evidence of a scholarly activity that might have stimulated modifications and improvements of the text was speculatively supposed at the point of depart of the manuscript tradition; in that previous case, the additions and modifications had a non-merely formal nature. The existence of a series of mostly stylistic modifications confined to a branch of the manuscript tradition might suggest a process of editing and revision of the text accomplished by an anonymous scholar of Avicenna's circle after the above-mentioned modifications and additions, on a manuscript other than the archetype itself; this copy arguably was the reconstructed MS  $\beta$ . Who the author(s) of the second recension was or were, and whether such a revision of the text was urged or supported by Avicenna himself, is still a matter of inquiry.

### S6. Hypothesis of a moving archetype



<sup>372</sup> Apparently, one modification only has doctrinal reasons (case 6 in Tab. 12) and might be the result of a partial misunderstanding of the context.

### 3. Branch $\alpha$ : an attempt at a genealogical reconstruction

#### 3.1. MSS KaNkBC (MS $\gamma$ ) and MSS NkBC (MS $\eta$ )

A number of variants shared by MSS KaNkBC attests the existence of an exemplar  $\gamma$  from which the four MSS derive (cf. Tab. 14, cases a-h). MS Ka, the earliest extant manuscript of *Madḥal* so far, cannot be the exemplar of MSS NkBC, since the three witnesses do not share some of its own mistakes<sup>373</sup>. MSS NkBC rather derive from an exemplar  $\eta$  that very likely circulated in Marāḡa<sup>374</sup>.

Tab. 14.

KaNkBC (MS $\gamma$ )
a) [I.3, §3.2/p. 19.19 Cairo ed.] KaNkBC + أن الصانع لم يستوف <i>cett.</i> + أن الصانع لا يكون قد استوفى : NkBC <i>in mg.</i> يكون
b) [I.4, §3.3/p. 24.3-4 Cairo ed.] ولا الجهة التي بها هي موضوعها KaNkBC + <i>s.l.</i> $\S^2$ : موصوعة : <i>cett.</i> ولا الجهة التي بها هي موصوعة
c) [I.5, §4.2/p. 28.6 Cairo ed.] بالنسبة KaNkBC : بالقياس <i>cett.</i>
d) [I.5, §5.3/p. 29.15 Cairo ed.] ككونه KaNkBC : مثل كونه <i>cett.</i>
e) [I.12, §2.1/p. 66.16 Cairo ed.] شجرة KaNkBC $\S$ : صخرة <i>cett.</i>
f) [II.1, §1.2/p. 91.17 Cairo ed.] إذ يقال لزيد الأبيض مرئي KaNkBC : إذ يقال لزيد والأبيض مرئي : A <i>cett.</i> إذ يقال والأبيض مرئي
g) [II.3, §2.4.2/p. 105.14 Cairo ed.] غير منكر مثل موضوعات KaNkBCA + <i>in mg.</i> : الثلاثية والثلاثية : <i>cett.</i> غير منكر : $\S^3$
h) [II.3, §3.2/p. 105.18 Cairo ed.] غير الدائمة KaNkBC + <i>s.l.</i> $\S^3$ : الدائمة <i>cett.</i>

NkBC (MS $\eta$ )
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<sup>373</sup> E.g. Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction, §1.4/p. 3.2 Cairo ed.: *wa-kataba maṭīq al-ḥuṭba* Ka: *wa-kataba al-ḥuṭba* *cett.*; *Madḥal* I.2, §2.2/p. 15.16 Cairo ed.: *bihā* Ka: *bi-hāḡiḡi l-aḡwāl* *cett.*

<sup>374</sup> For a tentative reconstruction of the circulation of MS  $\eta$ , see before, section I.1.

- i) [I.5, §3/p. 28.6 Cairo ed.] بخط المصنف + النظر في مثله *s.l.* B  
 بخط المصنف في مثله *in mg.* C : Nk :  
*cett.* النظر فيه
- j) [I.8, §5/p. 46.7 Cairo ed.] دالا على كمال ماهية NkBC : دالا  
 على ماهية *cett.*

### NkBC (η) and A: a reciprocal contamination?

#### A collates NkBC

- k) [I.4, §2/p. 22.4-5 Cairo ed.] نفس نباتية NkBC *s.l.* A :  
 نفس نباتية *cett.*

#### NkBC (η) collate A

- l) [I.14, §2.2/p. 85.12 Cairo ed.] A : كالأبيض لا كالبياض  
*cett.* كالأبيض : NkC : *add. s.l.* كالبياض
- m) [II.3, §13/p. 109.5-6 Cairo ed.] أول من كتب في هذه الخمسة  
 أول من أورد لهذه الخمسة الكليات : A + *in mg.* NkB :  
*cett.* كتابا

MS η was arguably the object of a scholarly activity of collation; some marginal variants (in the same handwriting as the copyist's) and oscillations in the readings of MSS NkBC seemingly point at the presence of collational variants in MS η. Case (i) shows the presence of variants reportedly found in the author's copy in the margins of MSS NkBC: in all the three witnesses, these collational variants, written by the copyists together with the main text, were presumably copied from their shared exemplar<sup>375</sup>. From the marginal notes in MSS NkBC, it is also possible to argue for a collation of MS η with a manuscript owned by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī for the section of Mathematics<sup>376</sup>.

Some other collational variants in MSS NkBC are peculiar readings that are often found in MS A only (some instances in Tab. 14 above, cases l-m). A structural element might also denote a collation of MS η with an ancestor of MS A: MSS ANkBC manuscripts arrange the *funūn* the section of the Mathematics of the *Šifā'* in a peculiar order (cf. Tab. 15), which arguably does not coincide with the one originally

<sup>375</sup> This is not the only case in MSS NkBC: for an analogous case of a variant reportedly found in the author's manuscript in the section of *Ġadal*, see DI VINCENZO 2017, pp. 57-59.

<sup>376</sup> See *supra*, section I.1 and DI VINCENZO 2018.

meant by Avicenna, as plenty of internal evidence in Avicenna’s work allows to claim<sup>377</sup>. There is some codicological evidence proving that this peculiar order is an innovation in MSS NkBC. MS Nk preserves a numeration of the section of Music as the twelfth *fann* of the entire *Šifā’*, and MS B preserves what seems to result from a palaeographical corruption of “twelfth”<sup>378</sup>. In MS C as well a numeration of the *fann* of Music as the twelfth *fann* might be the reading anterior to the correction, since the numeration of the *fann* as “eleventh” we find at f. 374<sup>r</sup> is visibly an emendation of a different previous reading<sup>379</sup>. Given that MSS NkBC all number the section of Metaphysics as the thirteenth *fann*<sup>380</sup>, arguably Music was, originally, placed right before Metaphysics, being the last *fann* of Mathematics. MSS NkB also preserve some marginal notes aiming at emending the order of the *funūn* of the section of Mathematics; one of these marginal glosses explicitly claims that Avicenna posed the Astronomy before the Arithmetic, but since the manuscript from which “this manuscript” was copied had a different order, the sections were copied according to the order of the antigraph. Since it can be argued that neither MS η nor, supposedly, its exemplar had the section of Mathematics arranged in this way, then the note in the margins of MSS NkB (possibly already in MS η) might have been copied from a

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<sup>377</sup> Although Cairo edition assumes this order to be the right one, perhaps on the basis of MS B, the right order of the *funūn* of Mathematics has been pointed out in GUTAS 2014, p. 105 (cf. also GUTAS 1988, p. 102), and in MAHDAVĪ 1954, pp. 158-66. What grants Avicenna’s intentions is his prologue to the section of Music, where he states: “time has come, for us, to close the section of Mathematics of Philosophy by introducing a compendium of the science of Music” (*wa-qad ḥāna lanā an naḥtama al-ḡuz’a l-riyādiyya min al-falsafati bi-irādi ḡawāmi’i ‘ilmi l-mūsīqā*). See also Avicenna’s own prologue to the entire *K. al-Šifā’*, where he describes the four sections of the *summa* (*Madḥal* I.1, §4.3/p. 11.4-11 Cairo ed.), stating that Geometry is followed by Astronomy, and that Astronomy is followed by the *Introduction to Arithmetic*, so that the Mathematics are concluded with Music. To sum up, the order of the *funūn* Avicenna had in mind was (1) Geometry, (2) Astronomy, (3) Arithmetic and (4) Music.

<sup>378</sup> MS B reports a numeration of the Music as the “eighteenth” (*al-tāmin ‘ašara*) *fann*. This reading might be the result of a palaeographical misunderstanding of an original “twelfth” (*al-tānī ‘ašara*), still preserved in MS Nk, due to the palaeographical similarity between *al-tāmin* and *al-tānī*. Considered that Metaphysics, which is the last *fann* in the manuscript, is numbered as the thirteenth *fann*, a numeration as eighteenth *fann* would be difficult to explain otherwise.

<sup>379</sup> In the title (f. 374<sup>r</sup>): *al-fann al-ḥādī ‘ašara*, the word *al-ḥādī* is clearly written after rasura of another word; a clear sign of a previous reading compatible with *al-tānī* is the *tašdīd* placed above the letter *ḥ* of *ḥādī*, that can be explained as a trace of a previous reading *t*.

<sup>380</sup> The numeration of Metaphysics as the thirteenth *fann* (and not, as we should expect, as the twenty-second *fann*) let us infer that the tradition of this branch began with a manuscript deprived of the nine *funūn* of the section of Logic, which were, perhaps, copied from another manuscript and added to a manuscript originally preserving just the sections of Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics of Avicenna’s *Šifā’*.

manuscript with which MS  $\eta$  was collated, the same MS which had such a peculiar arrangement of Mathematics by tradition, and in the margin of which someone had probably written this observation concerning the original order; this manuscript might have been an ancestor of MS A. Given that the copy of MS A was undertaken in Marāga in 671H/1273<sup>381</sup>, it is not unlikely that the exemplar of MS A, with the same peculiar variant readings we find in MS A, circulated in Marāga and that MS  $\eta$  could be collated with it<sup>382</sup>.

**Tab. 15.**

Avicenna's order	MS A and MSS NkBC ( $\eta$ )	Marginal glosses in MSS NkB
I. Geometry	I. Geometry	---
II. Astronomy	III. Arithmetic	«The third <i>fann</i> of the Mathematics, about Arithmetic; the first treatise is about the properties of numbers».
III. Arithmetic	IV. Music  <i>But</i> cf. the title of the <i>fann</i> in MSS NkB: الفن الثاني عشر [الثامن عشر: B] من كتاب الشفاء و هو في علم الموسيقى. «The twelfth [eighteenth MS B] <i>fann</i> of <i>Kitāb al-Šifā'</i> , regarding the science of Music».	«The fourth <i>fann</i> of the Mathematics about Music, namely the twelfth <i>fann</i> of <i>Kitāb al-Šifā'</i> , containing five treatises, the first of which contains five chapters».
IV. Music	II. Astronomy	«You should know that the <i>Šayḥ</i> [i.e. Avicenna] posed the <i>Almagest</i> before the two sciences of Arithmetic and Music in this Book, but the manuscript from which this one was copied had this order, therefore I copied [the <i>funūn</i> ] according to its order».

*Descripti*: MSS De and Dp are *descripti* of MS B; a possible relation of MS Dp with MS B was also suggested by the Cairo editors<sup>383</sup>. MS An is a *descriptus* of MS C<sup>384</sup>.

<sup>381</sup> See above and CELLI [forthcoming].

<sup>382</sup> MS A was copied some years later than MS Nk, and, obviously, it is later than MS  $\eta$  as well, hence it can hardly be considered the manuscript itself with which MS  $\eta$  was collated before MSS NkBC were copied from it.

<sup>383</sup> Cairo edition, Introduction, p. (75).

### 3.2. MSS AEDaŞNoN (δ<sup>3</sup>)

The genealogical reconstruction of the rest of branch  $\alpha$  is more challenging, due to the high level of contamination of these six witnesses, which arguably were transmitted through intellectual circles, where they underwent corrections and interpolations. The difficulty in establishing the relation between these MSS is evident from the inconsistent behaviour of some of them (see Tab. 16).

**Tab. 16**

#### AEŞNoN?

a) [I.13, §1.1/p. 72.10-12 Cairo ed.]

وأما الفصل فإن<sup>1</sup> اسمه يدل به عند المنطقيين على معنى أول وعلى معنى ثان وليس سبيلها سبيل ما قبلها<sup>2</sup> في الجنس والنوع إذ كان الوضع الأول فيه<sup>3</sup> إنما هو<sup>4</sup> للجمهور والنقل للخواص

مثلها [ما قبلها 2. || KaNkAEDaNoN إن [وأما الفصل فإن 1. JDiDaToMiŞYiYNoGN «sicut» Lat. || 3. فيه EŞ + *in mg.* Nk فيهما : JDiDaToMiŞYiYG «generis» Lat. : فى الجنس : om. TAs || 4. إنما AEŞNoN om. BDaEd.

#### AENoN?

b) [I.9, §2.3/p. 49.3 Cairo ed.] *om.* AENoN : *habent cett.* (فيدل عليها DaDiToMiŞYiYG)

#### DaŞNoN?

c) [I.6, §2.2/p. 34.7 Cairo ed.] DaŞNoN : الأوهام فى الأذهان *cett.*

d) [II.1, §3.4.1/p. 95.12 Cairo ed.] DaŞNoN : الذي ذهبنا إليه *cett.* ذهبنا نحن إليه الذي

e) [II.3, §1.2/p. 103.11 Cairo ed.] DaŞNoN : وهذه أيضا تقع *cett.* وهذه أيضا تقع أيضا

I will take as a starting point case (a), taken from *Madḥal* I.13, §1.1. As argued before, the first variant is, supposedly, one of the mistakes that individuate family  $\alpha$ ,

<sup>384</sup> MS An shares all the peculiarities of MS C (cf. e.g. the non-polygenetic omission in *Madḥal* I.14, §3.3.2/p. 87.10-11 Cairo ed., from *miṭlu qawl to yu'nà bi-qawlihi*), together with its own mistakes (e.g. *li-kullī* instead of *li-kullīhi* in *Madḥal* I.14, §1.3.1/p. 84.7 Cairo ed.).

taking into account the possibility that MSS BC and S restored the correct text by contamination<sup>385</sup>. The reading at point 2 *mā qablahumā* (“what preceded the two”) is justified by the fact that Avicenna recalls his dissertation on the two senses of the terms genus and species, whose mention preceded that of the two senses of the differentia; the reading *mitluhumā* (“like the two”), attested by family ε and originated, in all likelihood, from a palaeographical misunderstanding of *mā qablahumā*, sounds more banal in the context.

Point 3 is quite interesting, since the manuscript tradition presents three concurrent readings, namely *fīhi* (“with regard to it”), *fī l-ğins* (“with regard to the genus”) and *fīhimā* (“with regard to both”). To begin with, *fī l-ğins* is evidently problematic, since in both the cases of the genus and the species the first imposition of the name belonged to common people, and not just in the case of the genus, as this reading would imply. *Fīhimā* is certainly a more plausible reading<sup>386</sup>, but the hypothesis that *fīhimā* was the original reading makes it quite difficult to explain the genesis of the readings *fīhi* and *fī l-ğins*. On the contrary, both the readings *fī l-ğins* and *fīhimā* can be explained as two different reactions to an original *fīhi* that was eventually misunderstood. The reference of the original *fīhi* (attested in MSS EŞ) was arguably the clause *mā qablahumā fī l-ğins wa-l-naw'* (“what preceded them with regard to the genus and the species”), but the complex wording might have puzzled most of the tradition, that probably misunderstood the *fīhi*, and took it as referring either to the genus, or to the species taken alone. The reading *fī l-ğins*, which presumably stemmed out as an attempt to make the reference of *fīhi* explicit, is a piece of evidence of such a misunderstanding, as well as the reading *fīhimā*, supposedly an adaptation of the wrongly-interpreted *fīhi*.

Finally, point 4 presents the omission of *innamā huwa*; the omission is shared by MSS AEŞNoN, so that a stemmatic relation between the five MSS can seemingly be inferred. Whether this implies the existence of an exemplar from which MSS AEŞNoN only are derived or not is a matter of doubt. On the one hand, no strong evidence of other textual corruptions exclusively affecting MSS AEŞNoN could be found, and MS Da shows some kind of alteration within the same clause (it omits *innamā*), so that the corruption might have affected an ancestor from which MS Da derives as well. On the other hand, all these five witnesses demonstrably show traces of a series of corrections made in their exemplars by contamination, so that such a process might have occulted some of their shared mistakes.

Case 3 show an internal bipartition of family β into a family of MSS attesting the reading *fī l-ğins* (identifiable with MS θ) and MSS TAs, that coincide in the omission

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<sup>385</sup> MS Nk reports the right reading as an interlinear variant, written by the copyist himself: it can be argued that the variant was already in MS η, and was copied in MS Nk and directly inserted in the main text in MSS BC.

<sup>386</sup> It is also the reading printed in the Cairo edition.

of the problematic *f̄hi*. MS Da, which sided with family  $\alpha$  (cf. case 1 and *supra*), sides with a part of family  $\beta$  that includes the exemplar of the Latin translation (more precisely, with  $\epsilon$ ). Interestingly, this coincidence with family  $\beta$  occurs in Da in correspondence to a passage that might have been perceived as problematic, due to the presence of the misunderstood *f̄hi*, which might well have encouraged a comparison of the antigraph of MS Da with a manuscript of family  $\beta$ , generating a contamination of the specific passage<sup>387</sup>.

Cases (b), in which an omission is shared by MSS AENoN, might witness the existence of a stricter stemmatic relation between MSS AENoN, to the exclusion of MS  $\S$ , that shared with them the omission in case (a), and of MS Da. Cases (c) and (d), however, seemingly attest a closer stemmatic relation between MSS Da $\S$ NoN which is not consistent with the frame possibly reconstructed on the basis of cases (a) and (b), unless one supposes a process of contamination of MSS Da $\S$  with an ancestor of MSS NoN for cases (c-e). A reconsideration of cases (a) and (b) seems, therefore, required.

As already claimed with regard to case (a), MS Da might restore the text omitted in MSS AE $\S$ NoN by a contamination of its exemplar with a manuscript of family  $\epsilon$ . A contamination of the exemplar of MS Da might also shed a new light on case (b). It is possible that the omission in case (b) affected an ancestor common to MSS AEDaNoN, and that the exemplar of MS Da restored by collation the omitted passage. In fact, precisely in correspondence to the passage omitted in MSS AENoN, Da reads: *fa-yadullu 'alayhā* (as in the manuscripts of family  $\epsilon$ ) instead of *fa-yadullu 'alayhi*, which might point, once again, to a contamination of the exemplar of MS Da with a manuscript of family  $\epsilon$ . Such a hypothesis might be able to account for the relation with MSS NoN suggested by cases (c-e) without supposing a further contamination with an ancestor of MSS NoN. As to what concerns MS  $\S$ , its ancestor was almost certainly contaminated: a remarkable piece of evidence, among others, is provided by the reproduction of paragraph §3 in *Madhal* I.8 twice, in two different positions; this might either be due to a contamination with a manuscript that dislocated it between §2.2.3 and §2.2.4 (like MS E), or to a contamination with a manuscript contaminated with E that, for this reason, reproduced twice the passage at stake (like MS J). Hence, it cannot be excluded a priori that MS  $\S$  as well avoided the omission at case (b) by contamination as well.

To sum up, the apparently mutually contradictory cases (a-e) might perhaps account for the existence of a manuscript  $\delta$  from which MSS AEDa $\S$ NoN are derived, even if a demonstrable contamination of the exemplars of MSS Da and  $\S$  might have partially concealed the similarities among all of them. Cases (c-e) might also account for a stricter relation of MSS Da $\S$ NoN and, therefore, for the possible existence of MS  $\theta$ .

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<sup>387</sup> This possible case of contamination of the exemplar of MS Da is not isolated, see *infra*.

### 3.3. MS Da and its *descriptus* S

MS Da, the witness that is renowned for preserving the note ascribed to Avicenna<sup>388</sup>, presumably derives from an exemplar that, as previously argued, might have been corrected by collation with a witness of family ε. Besides emendations, the exemplar of MS Da might have presented also some interpolations that can be observed in MS Da. An instance is provided by a note interpolated in *Madḥal* I.4, §3.2/p. 23.15-16 Cairo ed.: dealing with conceptualized items, Avicenna elusively states that knowledge of this kind of subject pertains to a certain discipline (*li-ṣināʿa*), without further specification; in MS Da, an interpolated note specifies that this discipline is psychology (*wa-hiya ʿilmu l-nafs*).

*Descriptus*: MS S is a *descriptus* of MS Da, copied under the request of Walī al-Dīn Ğārullāh in 1125H/1713<sup>389</sup>, with some marginal annotations in the handwriting of Ğārullāh himself. The text of *Madḥal* preserved in MS S is a precise copy of MS Da; both the strict adherence of MS S to MS Da and Ğārullāh’s acquaintance with MS Da can be proved with the following textual case.

**Tab. 17.**

DaS [I.12, §2.4.1/p. 68.4 Cairo ed.]	Ğārullāh’s marginal note, MS S, f. 10 <sup>r</sup>
<p>كما يجب أن يصير جسما من جهة حمل الحيوانية عليه لا باسم ولا حد كما يجب أنه يصير جسما من جهة حمل الحيوانية عليه باسم وحد</p>	<p>قوله كما يجب إلى كما يجب أنه كذا وقع في نسخة قرأت على المؤلف لكنه تكرر ولي الدين</p> <p>His statement “as it is necessary” up to “as is necessary that etc.” occurred in a manuscript read to the author, but it is a repetition.</p> <p>Walī al-Dīn</p>

In MS Da, there is an apparent duplication of the passage (underlined in the table); actually, the second occurrence of the passage is arguably a correction of the first (a correction of the final *lā bi-sm wa-lā ḥadd* (“neither by name, nor by definition”) into *bi-sm wa-ḥadd* (“by name and definition”). The correction must have been erroneously interpolated in the exemplar of MS Da; MS S reports the text of MS Da exactly, but in the margin of f. 10<sup>r</sup> an interesting note signed by Ğārullāh claims that the text, as it is, is a repetition, but is attested in *a manuscript read to the author*. This note shows Ğārullāh’s awareness of the existence of the note in MS Da claiming that the manuscript was read in the presence of Avicenna; whether his knowledge was direct (i.e. Ğārullāh saw MS Da, because it was the direct exemplar of MS S) or not

<sup>388</sup> Cf. the description of MS Da in section II.2.

<sup>389</sup> The derivation of MS S from Da stands for *Madḥal* and, possibly, for the section of Logic, but might not hold for the section of Metaphysics preserved in MS S as well.

(i.e. the information regarding the reading note of MS Da was preserved in the exemplar of MS S, on its turn deriving from MS Da), cannot be ascertained.

### 3.4. MS $\S$ and its *descripti* In and Os: the migration of the *Šifā*’ from Iran to India

MS  $\S$  presents two notes stating that the witness was corrected by collation in 845H/1441, one at the end of the section of Logic, and another at the end of the section of Natural Philosophy<sup>390</sup>; many of the marginal variants in the manuscript should be very likely ascribed to this process of correction. A closer inspection of the marginal variants allows to deduce a collation with a manuscript of family  $\gamma$ <sup>391</sup>.

*Descripti*: MS  $\S$  is the copy owned by the Daštakī family and by Faṭḥ Allāh Šīrāzī, who presumably brought the manuscript to India<sup>392</sup>. It does not come as a surprise, then, that the data provided by the collation individuate two Indian nineteenth-century manuscripts (MSS In and Os) as *descripti* of MS  $\S$ <sup>393</sup>. Both MSS In and Os also preserve the indexes written in MS  $\S$  by Faṭḥ Allāh Šīrāzī before the different sections of the work.

### 3.5. MS $\lambda$ : MSS AE [+ Ye, descriptus of E] and Bahmanyār’s *Taḥṣīl*

Within family  $\delta$ , stricter relation can be supposed between MSS AE. MS E is a rather interesting witness; among its peculiarities, it is one of the manuscripts that preserve a “shorter version” of certain passages of *Madḥal*<sup>394</sup> and does not preserve the introductory clause before Al-Ġūzġānī’s Introduction<sup>395</sup>, which could either be a sign of a later omission of non-authorial material, or of an earlier stage of the tradition. MS E also attests a curious dislocation of paragraph §3 of chap. I.8. The genesis of such a dislocation is obscure, but perhaps it can be suggested that one of the two contiguous paragraphs involved in the dislocation – namely §2.2.4 and §3 – was originally absent in an ancestor of MS E, then integrated in the margin by collation and, finally, inserted in the text at the wrong position in the subsequent phase of copy. Unfortunately, it cannot be verified whether this dislocation affected the shared ancestor of MSS AE, since the passage falls within the huge lacuna of MS A<sup>396</sup>. MS E shows traces of a contamination of its exemplar with variants of branch  $\beta$ <sup>397</sup>.

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<sup>390</sup> For further details, see the description of the manuscript in section II.2, n° 12.

<sup>391</sup> Some instances in Tab. 14, cases b, g-h.

<sup>392</sup> See the description of the manuscript in section II.2, n° 12.

<sup>393</sup> See also section 1.1.

<sup>394</sup> Cf. *supra* and DI VINCENZO 2017.

<sup>395</sup> Corresponding to p. 1.4-6 Cairo ed.

<sup>396</sup> Remarkably, MSS J $\S$  attest §3 twice, i.e. once in its correct place, and once as in MS E: this might point at a contamination of their ancestors with a manuscript that presented the same dislocation as MS E.

<sup>397</sup> See, for instance, Tab. 11 above, case 6, where MS E evidently juxtaposes two different readings attested by branch  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

MS A is a very interesting witness as well, whose copy was started in Marāġa, probably within the circle of Bar Hebraeus. A few readings point to the possibility that the ancestor of MS A might have been contaminated with an ancestor of MSS NoN, or viceversa. Case e and g below both attest additions shared by the three MSS; case g, in particular, shows the interpolation of a gloss aimed at explaining the clause *madhūlan fī ṭabī‘atihi* (“internal to its nature”) as *muqawwiman li-māhiyyatihi* (“constitutive of its quiddity”) in the text of MSS ANoN<sup>398</sup>.

Noteworthy, a few variants in MSS AE coincide with variants attested in the quotations from *Madḥal* II.4 in Bahmanyār’s *Tahṣīl* (cf. cases c-d), which might possibly account for a stemmatic relation of Bahmanyār’s copy of *Madḥal* with MSS AE; peculiar is the coincidence of MSS AE with Bahmanyār’s quotation in *Tahṣīl*, p. 20.4 in the variant *fīhi* (“in it”) against *fī māhiyyatihi* (“in its quiddity”) attested by the rest of the tradition (case c below). The textual evidence is, however, too scarce to ascertain this possibility in a definite way<sup>399</sup>.

*Descripti*: MS Ye is a *descriptus* of MS E, of which it reproduces all the textual peculiarities; even the blank space left in MS E (f. 39<sup>r</sup>) in *Madḥal* I.14, §1.4/p. 84.22 Cairo ed. in correspondence to the word: *al-mudāwima*, supposedly due to a difficulty in reading the word in the ancestor of MS E, is faithfully reproduced in MS Ye (f. 38<sup>r</sup>). Some corrections due to contamination were made directly on MS Ye<sup>400</sup>.

**Tab. 18.**

**AE (λ)**

- a) [I.11, §2.1/p. 60.14 Cairo ed.] إنه قوله AEY + قولهم *et* قوله *in mg.*  
Nk: قول فرفور يوس إنه : أنه KaNkC : قولهم إنه *cett.*
- b) [II.3, §12.2/p. 109.4 Cairo ed.] وقد عرفت ما فيه *om.* AE : *habent cett.*
- c) [II.4, §2.1/p. 110.11 Cairo ed.] ولا يدخل فيه AE + Bahmanyār,

<sup>398</sup> The same gloss is interlinear in MSS Nk and Ṣ; MS Ṣ also adds *ayḍan* in case (e). MSS ANoN shared also the variant *fīhimā* with MSS KaNkBC in Tab. 16, case (a), point 3: the phenomenon might be due to a contamination of MSS ANoN with MSS KaNkBC, stimulated by the difficulty of the original reading.

<sup>399</sup> There is not enough textual evidence both due to the poor number of quotations drawn from *Madḥal* in Bahmanyār’s *Tahṣīl*, and to the paraphrastic nature of many of them, which makes it difficult to establish whether these variants were in Bahmanyār’s manuscript or if they are, rather, the result of Bahmanyār’s own rephrasing of the text.

<sup>400</sup> Cf. e.g. in *Madḥal* I.6, §2.2/p. 34.7 Cairo ed. the correction of *al-awhām* into *al-adhān* (attested by MSS DaṢNoN); in *Madḥal* I.6, §2.1/p. 33.16 Cairo ed. the correction of a mistake that already affected MS E (*lā al-ḥaṭb*) into *ka-l-ḥaṭb*.

*Taḥṣīl*, p. 20.4 + فيه *s.l.* § : ولا يدخل في ماهيته *cett.*

- d) [II.4, §2.1/p. 110.13 Cairo ed.] يقومه AE بقره Bahmanyār,  
*Taḥṣīl*, p. 20.5 (om. AE + Bahmanyār) : يقومه موجودا *cett.*

#### ANoN: a contamination?

- e) [I.3, §4/p. 20.17 Cairo ed.] والنحو العربي : والنحو العربي أيضا [I.3, §4/p. 20.17 Cairo ed.]  
*cett.*
- f) [I.3, §4/p. 20.19 Cairo ed.]<sup>401</sup> ANoN + المروي *s.l.* Nk fort.  
*a.c.* B : المروين *cett.* + *in mg.* A
- g) [I.11, §2.2/p. 59.5 Cairo ed.] مدخولا أي مقوما لماهيته في طبيعته  
ANoN : مدخولا في طبيعته : *s.l.* NkS<sup>3</sup> أي مقوما لماهيته *cett.*

### 3.6. MS ξ: MSS NoN [+ MS Za, descriptus of N]

A mutual relation can be established between MSS NoN based on their shared textual innovations (cf. e.g. cases a-b below), but it can be excluded that the one derives from the other since the two MSS are both affected by erroneous omissions that are not in the other (cf. e.g. cases c-d below: case c presents the omission of *dūna šahṣ* that affects MS N and cannot be found in MS No, whereas case d shows the erroneous omission of a long passage in MS No, due to the repetition of the term *mādda* before and at the end of the clause omitted, that is not in MS N). The two manuscripts must, therefore, share a common exemplar (MS ξ), which was arguably an almost complete witness of the *Šifā'*, which probably did not preserve Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction, like its copies. MS ξ was arguably a copy corrected and interpolated: an instance of the interpolations is case a, where an example drawn from Porphyry's *Isagoge* (i.e. that of blackness as a common accident of the black man) is inserted in the text in both MSS NoN. Such an activity of interpolation does not come as a surprise: we know that at least MS No was copied in Šīrāz, in the *madrāsāt* Dār al-Aytām, during Ġalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's lifetime; it is possible that its ancestor circulated in a scholastic and intellectual context too<sup>402</sup>. MS ξ must have been also characterized by a peculiar omission of the paragraph of Avicenna's Prologue concerning the *Easterners* (*Madḥal* I.1, §3.2), shared by MSS NoN.

<sup>401</sup> The variant in MSS ANoN, with the singular form of the term, might have originated because of the presence of the singular form *al-badawī* immediately following.

<sup>402</sup> Cf. *supra*.

*Descriptus*: MS Za is a *descriptus* of MS N<sup>403</sup>.

**Tab. 19.**

NoN (MS ξ)
a) [I.6, §6/p. 36.19 Cairo ed.] في الوجود كسواد الخبشي فإنه يلزم <i>cett.</i> في الوجود : NoN إنسانيته لا في الذهن ولا في الوجود
b) [II.2, §6.2/p. 102.12 Cairo ed.] فعسى أن يكون فيها محمول أعم <i>cett.</i> فعسى أن يكون كون هذا أعم : NoN
c) [I.11, §2.2/p. 61.1 Cairo ed.] وحده N : <i>cett.</i> وحده دون شخص
d) [I.2, §1.2.2/p. 13.13-17 Cairo ed.] النوعية والحركة...نسبة إلى <i>cett.</i> <i>om.</i> No : <i>habent cett.</i>

#### 4. Branch β: an attempt at a genealogical reconstruction

##### 4.1. MSS JDīToMiŠYiYG (MS ε)

It can be observed that some textual innovations characterize a part of family β, i.e. MSS JDīToMiŠYiYG, without MSS TAsTe (family ζ); two hypotheses are viable to explain this phenomenon, since it can either assumed the existence of an exemplar (ε) common to MSS JDīToMiŠYiYG to the exclusion of family ζ, or to suppose that such an exemplar did not exist, and that family ζ corrects some mistakes of β by collation with another branch. Here, the first solution, namely the existence of MS ε, is assumed as a more economic explanation. MS J is part of family ε for the section of *Madḥal* that starts at I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed., where the model – and the copyist – of MS J change<sup>404</sup>.

**Tab. 20.**

(J)DīToMiŠYiYG (MS ε)
a) [I.8, §1.3.1/p. 42.13 Cairo ed.] الحساس لا يكون <i>cett.</i> لا يكون الحساس : DīToMiŠYiYG

<sup>403</sup> MS Za shares all the peculiar variants of MS N (such as the aforementioned omission of *dūna šahṣ* in case c) and adds mistakes of its own (such as *bi-l-martaba* in *Madḥal* I.11, §2.2/p. 61.5 Cairo ed. instead of *bi-l-murattab*, attested by all the other MSS, included MS N).

<sup>404</sup> Cf. *infra*.

- b) [I.10, §2.1.2/p. 56.17 Cairo ed.] بالمعنى الأعم JDīToMiŠYiYG :  
*cett.* بمعنى الأعم.
- c) [I.13, §1.3.1/p. 73.13 Cairo ed.] أو يجوز JDīToMiŠYiYG :  
*cett.* أما أن يجوز.
- d) [I.13, §1.4/p. 75.1 Cairo ed.] لما اقتربت بالمادة اقترانا  
 JDīToMiŠYiYG : *cett.* لما اقتربت بالمادة.

#### 4.2. MSS JDīToMiŠG (MS ı)

The existence of MS ı can be assumed on the basis of the presence of textual innovations that characterize MSS DiToMiŠG against the rest of the tradition (cases a-d). MS J is also part of this family for the section of *Madḥal* that starts at I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed. (see, e.g. case d).

**Tab. 21.**

#### JDīToMiŠG (MS ı)

- a) [I.4, §2/p. 22.6 Cairo ed.] رخو وصلب DiToMiŠG «mollis vel dura» Lat. : رخو صلب و *cett.*
- b) [I.5, §6.2/p. 32.2 Cairo ed.]<sup>405</sup> رفع ذات ذلك الشيء DiToMiŠG :  
*cett.* رفع ذلك الشيء.
- c) [I.5, §6.3/p. 32.10 Cairo ed.]<sup>406</sup> لا يرتفع لا في الوجود ولا في التوهم  
 ToMiŠG in mg. JDī : لا يرتفع *cett.*
- d) [I.13, §2/p. 76.2-3 Cairo ed.] يوصف به الضحاك JDīToMiŠG :  
*cett.* يوصف بالضحاك.

<sup>405</sup> The reading in MSS DiToMiŠG seems *facilior*: the addition of *dāt* is suggested by the recurring use of the clause *dāt dālīka l-šay'* in the two preceding lines.

<sup>406</sup> The reading in MSS ToMiŠG is actually *facilior*: the specification added (*lā fī l-wuḡūd wa-lā fī l-tawahhum*), which is not necessary for Avicenna's argument, is induced by the argument in §6.3, where the two kinds of existence – i.e. in the external existence (*fī l-wuḡūd*) and in estimation (*fī l-tawahhum*) – are frequently recalled.

### 4.3. MSS (J)ToMiŠG (MS μ)

Within family 1, a closer stemmatic relation can be individuated for MSS ToMiŠG (and J after the change of model, cf. case c), that presumably share a unique exemplar (MS μ). If the content of MSS ToMiŠG reflects that of their ancestor<sup>407</sup>, it can be argued that MS μ was, likely, a copy of the *Šifā'* that lacked the section of Mathematics.

**Tab. 22.**

ToMiŠG (MS μ)	
e)	[I.7, §1/p. 37.19 Cairo ed.] تعارفه الخاص : ToMiŠG : تعارفه الخاص <i>cett.</i>
f)	[I.7, §3.2.5/p. 41.1 Cairo ed.] جعلوه للدال : ToMiŠG : جعلوه للدال <i>cett.</i>
g)	[I.7, §3.2.1/p. 76.19 Cairo ed.] ويقال إنه : JToMiŠG : وكذلك يقال وذلك إنه : DiYiY : وكذلك إنه <i>cett.</i>

### 4.4. MSS ToMiŠ [+ R, *descriptus* of Š] (MS π)

MSS ToMiŠ are three almost coeval witnesses that share variants presumably derived from a common exemplar, i.e. MS π. Their mutual dependence cannot be described in terms of derivation of the one from the other, due to the presence in each one of the three manuscripts of singular mistakes that are not shared by the others<sup>408</sup>.

*Descripti*: MS R is a *descriptus* of MS Š, of which it shares all the peculiar mistakes; the manuscript was, then, collated and corrected by an anonymous corrector, whose intervention on some of the mistakes derived from Š is visible<sup>409</sup>. The anonymous corrector added, in the margins of MS R, a series of variant readings, included those concerning the titles of the chapters, rewritten in the margins in red ink<sup>410</sup>. The anonymous corrector might have had at his disposal more than one

<sup>407</sup> MS J only preserves the section of Logic, being not, therefore, an almost entire copy of the *Šifā'* like MSS ToMiŠG.

<sup>408</sup> Cf. e.g. Tab. 11, case 4, showing that MSS ToMi cannot possibly derive from MS Š and that MSS ŠMi cannot derive from MS To.

<sup>409</sup> Corrections are often made in MS R by means of rasurae, deletions and the like.

<sup>410</sup> Just to provide an example: in *Madḥal* I.12 (f. 10<sup>v</sup>) the two titles attest the alternative readings *ma'a l-kaṭṭarati* (in the text) and *ba'da l-kaṭṭarati* (in the margin), which means that the source of the two titles is different. The reading *ma'a l-kaṭṭarati* is reasonably the reading that was in the antigraph of MS R, since the index of contents at f. 2<sup>r</sup> reports the title of chap. I.12 with this reading. Hence the reading *ba'da l-kaṭṭarati* reported in the marginal rubric comes from a different source, being very likely the result of collation.

manuscript to collate MS R with: some variants are, in fact, introduced by a reference to a plurality of “manuscripts that we have”<sup>411</sup>. Among the *marginalia* added to the margins of MS R, there is a set of notes commenting on passages of the section of Logic that were, reportedly, written by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, that are also preserved in MSS NkBC (η)<sup>412</sup>. A *terminus post quem* to date the intervention of the anonymous corrector is provided by some marginal notes quoting a few *lemmata* of *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīt* by al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 817H/1415), which grants that the *marginalia* were copied in MS R at least after the second half of the XIV<sup>th</sup> /the beginning of the XV century.

**Tab. 23.**

**ToMiŠ (MS π)**

- a) [I.10, §1.2.1/p. 54.13 Cairo ed.] وكذلك لفظة النوع ToMiŠ :  
فلان بعينه ولفظة النوع *cett.*
- b) [I.12, §5.2.1/p. 70.19 Cairo ed.] فلان نفسه ToMiŠ :  
التي تسمى *cett.*
- c) [I.13, §1.4/p. 74.19 Cairo ed.] التي نسميها ToMiŠ :  
*cett.*

**4.5. MSS JG and the Latin translation (MS o): “Lawkarī’s family”**

The existence of MS o can be supposed on the basis of the shared innovations of MSS JG and the Latin translation; noteworthy, the exemplar from which Lawkarī drew the quotations that are found in the *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-dimān al-ṣidq* and which do not depend on Bahmanyār’s *Taḥṣīl* might belong to this family as well (cf. e.g. case d below).

The manuscript that so far showed the closest relation to the Latin translation is MS G, with which the Latin translation shares several peculiarities. The Latin translation might derive from the ancestor shared by MSS JG: up to chap. I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed., where the model of MS J seemingly changes, only the relation between MSS G and the Latin translation can be observed (see, e.g., cases a-b below).

<sup>411</sup> For instance, f. 641<sup>r</sup>: *mā bayna l-‘alāmatayni fī l-nusaḥi l-mawḡūdati ‘indanā hākaḏā [...]* (“what is between the two marks is [reported] in this manner in the manuscripts we have”) and f. 671<sup>r</sup>: *hākaḏā fī ḡamī‘i l-nusaḥi llatī ‘indanā mā bayna l-‘alāmatayni [...]* (“in this manner is [reported] what is between the two marks in all the manuscripts we have”).

<sup>412</sup> For an edition of the notes, and a hypothetical reconstruction of their tradition, see DI VINCENZO 2018.

MSS JG have likely a mutual closer relation: among others, one of the major corruptions that presumably affected the shared ancestor of MSS JG and does not affect the Latin translation as well is the erroneous duplication of a clause at the beginning of chap. I.13 (case e below). It can be reconstructed that the clause *fa-innahum k̄nū...muṭlaqan* was in the margins of the shared exemplar of MSS JG; presumably, the segment *wa-id fa'alū* was also included in the clause (cf. the text in MS J), probably meant as a signal regarding the position in which it was meant to be placed in the text: when MS G was copied, this indication was correctly understood and the clause was placed rightly before *wa-id fa'alū*, whereas when MS J was copied the clause went slightly misplaced and *wa-id fa'alū* was repeated. It can be observed that the Latin translation does not bear a trace of such an interpolation, that is, therefore, a peculiarity of the exemplar of MSS JG. On the basis of the different reaction of MS G and MS J to the same situation in their exemplar, a descentance of either MS G or J from the other should be excluded.

**Tab. 24.**

**GLat. [before chap. I.10]**

a) [I.9, §4.2.3/p. 52.7 Cairo ed.] G «nec suum  
sylogismum» Lat. : ولا لقياسياته *cett.* + G<sup>mg</sup>.

b) [I.4, §1/p. 21.6-11 Cairo ed.]

G + Lat.

وليس يجوز أن يكون شيء علة لشيء في حالتي  
عدمه ووجوده وأما التصور فإنه كثيرا ما يقع بمعنى  
مفرد<sup>1</sup> فإذا لم يقع بالمفرد [...] فقد أضفت إليه  
معنى آخر وذلك<sup>2</sup> كما سيتضح لك في موضعه

وذلك 2. || G *exp. p.c.* وأما...بمعنى مفرد 1.  
*exp. p.c.* G

*Cett.*

وليس يجوز أن يكون شيء علة لشيء في  
حالتي عدمه ووجوده فإذا لم يقع بالمفرد ]  
[...] فقد أضفت إليه معنى آخر وأما  
التصور فإنه كثيرا ما يقع بمعنى مفرد  
وذلك كما سيتضح لك في موضعه

«sed impossibile est aliquid esse causam  
alterius sive habeat esse, sive non.  
**Intellectus autem saepe habetur ex  
uno solo verbo.** Si autem unum non  
sufficit [...] iam addidisti ei alium  
intellectum, sicut postea declarabitur suo  
loco».

**JGLat. [after chap. I.10]**

c) [I.12, §5.2.3/p. 71.11-12 Cairo ed.] JG إذ يكون نوعا

إذ الحيوان الناطق قد يكون : «aliquando enim est species» Lat. :  
نوعا *cett.* + J<sup>mg.</sup>

d) [II.4, §1/p. 109.20 Cairo ed.] ما JG + Y<sup>2mg.</sup> +  
Lawkarī (p. 175.5) «unius generis» Lat. : *cett.* فلجنسه

e) [I.13, §1.1/p. 72.13-15 Cairo ed.]

G

*Cett.* + Lat.

أما الوضع الأول فإنهم كانوا يسمون كل معنى يتميز  
بمعنى يتميز به شيء عن شيء شخصيا كان  
أو كليا فصلا<sup>1</sup> فإنهم كانوا يسمون كل معنى يتميز به الشيء  
مطلقا<sup>2</sup> واذ فعلوا هذا  
[...]

ثم نقلوه بعد ذلك إلى ما يتميز به الشيء في ذاته. 1.  
*add. in mg. G || 2. مطلقا...exp. p.c. G*

«cuius prima positio est haec cum  
dicitur quod differentia est qua  
differt aliquid ab aliquo sive sit  
singulare sive universale. Secunda  
vero positio est cum dicitur esse  
differentia omnis intentio qua  
differt aliquid ab aliquo  
substantialiter. Postquam igitur sic  
factum est [...]».

J

أما الوضع الأول فإنهم كانوا يسمون كل معنى يتميز  
بمعنى يتميز به شيء عن شيء شخصيا كان أو كليا فصلا ثم  
نقلوه بعد ذلك إلى ما يتميز به الشيء في ذاته واذ  
فعلوا فإنهم كانوا يسمون كل معنى يتميز به الشيء  
مطلقا<sup>1</sup> واذ فعلوا<sup>1</sup> هذا [...]

1. فعلوا...*exp. p.c. J*


#### 4.6. MSS (J)TAsTe (MS ζ)

MSS TAsTe descend from the same exemplar, MS ζ (cf. Tab. 25, cases a-c). MS J is part of family ζ too for a first section of *Madḥal* (from the beginning up to I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed.): in this part, MS J shares the exemplar of MS T (see S7 below and Tab. 25, cases d-j); then, the handwriting of the main text changes, as well as the model copied: after I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed. there are no more innovations exclusively shared by MSS JT, whereas exclusive innovations shared by MSS JG can be found. Therefore, the Cairo editors' supposition of a stemmatic relation between MS J and MS As (respectively, ى and ع in the Cairo ed.) is confirmed for the section preceding the change of exemplar in MS J<sup>413</sup>.


<sup>413</sup> See Cairo edition, Introduction, p. (75).

S7.

*Madḥal*, from the beginning to I.10,  
§2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed.



*Madḥal*, from I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14  
Cairo ed. to the end



Tab. 25.

**JTAsTe [before chap. I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed.]**

- [I.3, §3.3/p. 20.6 Cairo ed.] مرة أو JTAsTe : مرة أو مرارا كثيرة مرارا *cett.*
- [I.5, §4.2/p. 28.5 Cairo ed.] كقولك JTAsTeṢ : كقولنا *cett.*
- [I.10, §1.3/p. 56.2 Cairo ed.]<sup>414</sup> من غير JTAs : من غير جنس *cett.* + As<sup>s.1</sup>

**JT [before chap. I.10, §2.1.1/p. 56.14 Cairo ed.]**

- [I.1, §1/p. 10.12 Cairo ed.] النظر المرتب JT : النظر المثبت *cett.* + J<sup>mg.</sup>
- [I.1, §3.2/p. 10.12 Cairo ed.] الرأي الصريح om. JT : الرأي الصريح *cett.*
- [I.6, §2.1/p. 33.14 Cairo ed.] ما عنيما JT : ما يعني *cett.*
- [I.8, §1.3.2/p. 43.4 Cairo ed.] معنى الحساس om. JT : معنى *cett.*
- [I.8, §2.2.2/p. 45.4 Cairo ed.]<sup>415</sup> عنيما لفظا ذاتيا JT : عنيما ذاتيا *cett.*

<sup>414</sup> *Ĝins* is a banalization of the rarer form: *tağannus*, which matches the occurrence of *yatağannasu* a few lines below the passage (§2.1.2/p. 56.20 Cairo ed.).

- i) [I.8, §5/p. 46.13-14 Cairo ed.] بل بالقياس إلى الأمور الذي هو  
 بل : KaNkBAC بل بالقياس إلى الأمور التي هو أعم منها : JT أعم منها  
 cett. (recte) بالقياس إلى الأمر الذي هو أعم منه
- j) [I.9, §1.1/p. 47.11 Cairo ed.] JT عندهم أولى : cett. أولى عندهم

#### 4.7. MSS YiY (MS v)

Family v is formed by witnesses dating from the end of the XV c. onwards. Among the most peculiar features shared by these manuscripts, there is (i) a conscious lexical reworking of the text. More in detail, the manuscripts show an attempt to systematically adapt in the first two chapters of *K. al-Madḥal* some of the words connected to the domain of the philosophical sciences, like *manṭiq* and *falsafa*, respectively modified into *mīzān* and *ḥikma*. Since the modification appears to be systematic up to chap I.2 (p. 12.8 Cairo ed.), it can be argued that there is evidence of a process of revision originally conceived as systematic but never accomplished. The systematic modification of *manṭiq* into *mīzān* is worth of particular interest: the term *mīzān*, literally meaning “balance”, came to be employed as an equivalent of *manṭiq* as a result of Al-Ġazālī’s metaphorical use of the expression *‘ilm al-mīzān* (“science of balance”) to qualify the discipline of Logic<sup>416</sup>, a use that had an Avicennian basis<sup>417</sup>, and became very widespread as a result of the massive impact of Al-Ġazālī’s works on the teaching system of the *madrasa*. The fact that the two expressions are considered as equivalent in this family of manuscripts might suggest a contextualization of their common ancestor within the frame of the post-ḡazalian reception of Avicenna’s philosophy. In general, a preference seems to be accorded to purely Arabic terminology, rather than that of Greek derivation (for instance, the title of the *Elements* of Euclid is also modified). (ii) A second feature characterizing the family is the peculiar division of *Madḥal*. I.4 (“on the subject of Logic”) into two chapters, one dedicated to the utterances, apparently aimed at underlining the importance of their

<sup>415</sup> The addition of *lafẓan* in MSS JT is *facilior*; together with the immediately preceding clause, the phrase reads: “*idā qulnā lafẓ dātī ‘anaynā dātīyyan*”, which explains how the addition in JT originated.

<sup>416</sup> AL-ĠAZĀLĪ, *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, p. 13: «The science of Logic is the rule (*qānūn*) by which the right definition and syllogism are distinguished from the false ones, and by which the certain science (*al-‘ilm al-yaqīnī*) is distinguished by what is not certain, and it is as if it was the balance and the measure for all the sciences (*al-mīzān wa-l-mi ‘yār li-l- ‘ulūm kullihā*), so that, in the case of anything that is not weighed by means of a balance (*bi-l-mīzān*), it cannot be distinguished the preponderance (*al-ruḡḥān*) from the defect (*al-nuqṣān*).» An analogous definition of Logic as a balance and a measure for the other sciences can be found in AL-ĠAZĀLĪ, *Mi ‘yār al- ‘ilm fī l-manṭiq*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>417</sup> Cf. *Šifā’*, *Qiyās* I.2, p. 14.10-11.

study within the chapter devoted to the subject matter of Logic. (iii) Finally, from a structural point of view, another remarkable feature is the lack of Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction, probably entailing also the omission of the introductory formula of chap. I.1: «the Chief Master Abū 'Alī l-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Abd Allāh Ibn Sīnā said». It is possible that the formula was felt as redundant and of little use, given the absence of a transition from Al-Ġūzġānī's Introduction and Avicenna's own text.

MS Y preserve marginal variants and corrections (see, e.g., case b, in which the omitted text is restored in the margin); some of these marginal variants are probably derived from a witness related to MS E (cf. cases d-e below: in case d, a peculiar variant of MSS AE is added in the margins of MS Y, whereas in case e an interpolation that affects the text of MS E is added to the margin of MS Y).

**Tab. 26.**

**YiY (MS v)**

- a) [I.4, §3.2/p. 23.6-7 Cairo ed.] وان المنطقي يتكلم YiY : وان المنطقي يتكلم *cett.*
- b) [I.5, §1.3.1/p. 25.4 Cairo ed.] المقصود به om. YiY *add. in mg.* Y : *habent cett.*
- c) [I.9, §2.4/p. 49.7 Cairo ed.] واما بعيد لتقييد ذات الشيء YiY : واما بعيد *cett.*

**Y: a possible contamination with E**

- d) [I.13, §1.4/p. 74.19 Cairo ed.] كالناطق AE<sup>a.c.</sup> *in mg.* Y : كالناطق *cett.*
- e) [I.12, §2.2/p. 67.3 Cairo ed.] أي الشيء الذي يسمى جنسا طبيعيا وهو ما يصلح أن يصير في الذهن جنسا منطقيا ليس هو في الطبيعيات بجنس أي بجنس هو ذاتا واحدة موجودة في الطبيعيات توجد في أشخاص *add. E in mg.* Y فيكون جنسا لها بل لا وجود لها إلا في الذهن



## II.5. APPENDIX: NOTES FOR A FUTURE EDITION

### ▪ MSS RaAt: The Ottoman branch of family $\eta$

It can be reconstructed that, besides MSS NkBC, another MS derived from MS  $\eta$ , namely the no-more extant exemplar of MSS Ra (n° 38 in section I.2) and At (n° 28 in section I.2), two mutually-related copies of the Logic of the *Šifā'* produced in the first half of the XVIII c. CE in İstanbul, within the school of As'ad Ibn 'Alī Ibn 'Utmān al-Yānyawī<sup>418</sup>. These copies were the object of a quite intense scholarly activity of correction and annotation within the *madrasa* of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī.

### ▪ Family $\nu$

Family  $\nu$  is, actually, a large family, of which MSS YiY are the earliest dated witnesses, represented by at least 13 MSS, namely the aforementioned MSS YiY and MSS Bo (n° 7 in section I.2), K (n° 50 in section I.2), Fa (n° 49 in section I.2), Ma (n° 92 in section I.2), V (n° 103 in section I.2), Ho (n° 36 in section I.2), L (n° 37 in section I.2), Nj (n° 62 in section I.2), Ti (n° 116 in section I.2), X (n° 53 in section I.2) and its *descriptus* Jo (n° 5 in section I.2), ranging from the XV to the XIX century CE. MS Bo, dating 20 Rabī' I 902H/ 5<sup>th</sup> December 1496, has a colophon at the end of the first four *funūn* of Logic that is presumably copied from its exemplar, and that records the dating: 11 Ğumādā I 693H/16 April 1294. Although there is no way to establish it with certainty, there is a possibility that this is the date of the exemplar of family  $\nu$ .

### ▪ Family $\pi$

To the witnesses of family  $\pi$ , at least three other MSS should be added, i.e. MSS Ts (n° 48 in section I.2), Su (n° 45 in section I.2) and F (n° 20 in section I.2).

### ▪ Family IHaṬShRzVoW and the exemplar dating 468H/1076

Another family of branch  $\beta$  of the tradition might be formed by a group of 7 witnesses, i.e. MSS I (n° 100 in section I.2), Ha (n° 35 in section I.2), Ṭ (n° 85 in section I.2), Sh (n° 89 in section I.2), Rz (n° 70 in section I.2), Vo (n° 90 in section I.2), W (n° 102 in section I.2). MS Rz, presumably an eighteenth-century copy, preserves a colophon at the end of *Madḥal* I.14 recording the date: 6 Dū l-Ḥiġġa 468H/17<sup>th</sup> July 1076; the other MSS of the family share an identical colophon, though omitting the date. The exemplar of which MS Rz witnesses the existence, dating 468H/1076, would be a very early copy of *Madḥal*, possibly the exemplar of the whole family<sup>419</sup>.

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<sup>418</sup> On these two MSS and their mutual relation, see DI VINCENZO [forthcoming] and DI VINCENZO 2018, p. 46.

<sup>419</sup> On this exemplar, see the reconstruction in BERTOLACCI [forthcoming], who claims, on the basis of some additional information provided in other similar colophons, that the exemplar

- **MSS EYe and MS P**

MS P (n° 65 in section I.2) shares peculiar textual variants with MSS EYe, but also shows signs of correction by collation with family v: an instance of the peculiar innovations that characterize family v imported in P is the split of *Madḥal* I.4 into two halves.

- **MSS PaAIZ**

MSS Pa (n° 84 in section I.2), Al (n° 1 in section I.2) and Z (n° 99 in section I.2) are three seventeenth-century copies of the *Šifā'* that very likely derive from a unique exemplar, affected by a lacuna between *Madḥal* I.4, §3.2/p. 23.7 Cairo ed. and *Madḥal* I.5, §1.2/p. 24.16 Cairo ed. shared by all its three copies. MS Z preserves a note of collation, stating that the witness was collated with a manuscript dating 536H, which is also the exact date of copy of MS Ka employed in the present edition: the possibility that the exemplar of collation of MS Z coincides with MS Ka is also reinforced by the fact that the marginal variants introduced in Z effectively match with readings attested in family γ.

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might be a copy produced in Nishapur in 468-9H/1076-7. To these MSS another witness, i.e. MS Kolkata, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Ar. 102 might perhaps be added, but I do not dispose of reproductions, so that, at this stage, it was impossible to collate it with the other witnesses.

### III. THE TRANSLATION

The project of translating into English Avicenna's *Madḥal* originates as an attempt to fill the lack of an English translation of the whole work. As shown in the bibliographical survey in Tab. 27 below, the translations provided so far are mostly partial, focusing on specific parts or passages of the text; the only two translations of the complete work in a modern language produced so far are, to my knowledge, the Turkish translation by Ömer Türker published in 2006 and the Russian translation by T.N. Mardoni and R.Z. Nazaryev published in 2010.

In principle, the English translation here proposed purports to be faithful to the Arabic text established in the present edition, and a certain consistency in rendering the most technical philosophical vocabulary was pursued. The only intended deviations from the text are represented by additions of words or expressions that are implied, although not explicitated, in the Arabic text; all addition is, however, enclosed by square brackets. In order to help the reader follow the structure of Avicenna's argumentation, the translation was subdivided into paragraphs with a recapitulative title, written in bold between square brackets; the division is parallel to that adopted for the Arabic text, so that the comparison with the Arabic is more simple. Another device adopted to help the reader find the corresponding point in the Arabic text is marking in the margins of the translation the number of the lines in the Arabic text. The corresponding pages of the Cairo edition are also indicated in the margin of the translation, as well as in the margins of the Arabic text.

Tab. 27

Chapter	Work	Language	Notes
I.1	1. MADKOUR 1934, pp. 22-23.	French	Partial translation.
	2. GUTAS 1988, pp. 50-54 and GUTAS 2014, pp. 42-46.	English	
	3. BERTOLACCI 2005c, pp. 614-616.	Italian	Partial translation.
	4. ATTIE FILHO 2007, pp. 19–23 (and again pp. 280–87).	Portuguese	Whole chapter translated; cf. JANSSENS [forthcoming].
	5. Ahrām, A., <i>Ibn Sīnā, Šifāʾ, Al-Manṭiq, b. I</i> , 1-5, in: <i>Sophia Perennis</i> , 12 (75), pp. 23-27.	Persian	Cf. JANSSENS 1991, p. 6.
I.2	1. MARMURA 1980, pp. 239-251.	English	Together with the translation, a discussion of the main subjects is also provided.
	2. JAMBET 2009.	French	Translation of the first half of the chapter; cf. JANSSENS [forthcoming].
	3. Ahrām, A., <i>Ibn Sīnā, Šifāʾ, Al-Manṭiq, b. I</i> , 1-5, in: <i>Sophia Perennis</i> ,	Persian	Cf. JANSSENS 1991, p. 6.

	12 (75), pp. 23-27.		
I.3	<b>1.</b> ROSENTHAL 1975, pp. 78-81.	English	
	<b>2.</b> MICHOT 2000 (Introduction to his edition <i>Lettre au Vizir Abū Sa'd</i> , pp. 69*-72*).	French	Partial translation.
	<b>3.</b> Ahrām, A., <i>Ibn Sīnā, Šifā', Al-Mantiq, b. I</i> , 1-5, in: <i>Sophia Perennis</i> , 12 (75), pp. 23-27.	Persian	Cf. JANSSENS 1991, p. 6.
I.4	<b>1.</b> Ahrām, A., <i>Ibn Sīnā, Šifā', Al-Mantiq, b. I</i> , 1-5, in: <i>Sophia Perennis</i> , 12 (75), pp. 23-27.	Persian	Cf. JANSSENS 1991, p. 6.
I.5	<b>1.</b> Ahrām, A., <i>Ibn Sīnā, Šifā', Al-Mantiq, b. I</i> , 1-5, in: <i>Sophia Perennis</i> , 12 (75), pp. 23-27.	Persian	Cf. JANSSENS 1991, p. 6.
I.6	---	---	---
I.7	---	---	---
I.8	---	---	---
I.9	---	---	---
I.10	---	---	---
I.11	---	---	---
I.12	<b>1.</b> MARMURA 1979, pp. 34-56.	English	The translation is accompanied by a philosophical discussion.
I.13	---	---	---
I.14	<b>1.</b> DI VINCENZO 2016, pp. 163-194	English	Partial translation in the Appendix A.
II.1	<b>1.</b> DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 129-183	English	Partial translation in the Appendix.
II.2	---	---	---
II.3	---	---	---
II.4	---	---	---
Entire work	<b>1.</b> İbn Sina, <i>Kitabu's-Şifa. Mantik Giriş</i> , Çeviri Ömer TÜRKER. İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2006	Turkish	Whole work translated, based on the text of the Cairo edition; cf. JANSSENS [forthcoming].
	<b>2.</b> Абу Али Ибн Сина (Авиценна), Сочинения, Т. 5, аш-Шифа, Введение, пер. Т.Н. Мардони и Р.З. Назарыев, Душанбе 2010, сс. 77-220 [Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avitsenna), Sochineniia, V. 5, ash-Shifa, Vvedenie, trans. T.N. Mardoni and R.Z. Nazaryev, Dushanbe 2010, pp. 77-220]	Russian	Whole work translated.

#### IV. SIGLA AND ABBREVIATIONS

##### IV.1. SIGLA OF THE MANUSCRIPTS IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER

In the following list, the sigla adopted for the manuscripts employed in the edition and their *descripti* are provided in alphabetical order; for each MS, the corresponding number in the list supplied in section I.2 is also indicated between square brackets.

<i>Siglum</i>	MSS	N° in sect. I.2
<b>A</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442	[n° 29]
<b>An</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānişgāh-i Tihrān 6596	[n° 112]
<b>As</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 207	[n° 27]
<b>B</b>	Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Şarīf, Behīt Collection 44988, 331 <i>falsafa</i>	[n° 8]
<b>C</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424	[n° 30]
<b>Da</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822	[n° 32]
<b>De</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Dānişkāda-i İlāhiyyāt-i Dānişgāh-i Tihrān 236/1	[n° 114]
<b>Di</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823	[n° 33]
<b>Dp</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 824	[n° 34]
<b>E</b>	İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 1504	[n° 22]
<b>G</b>	Leiden, Universiteitsbibl. Or. 4 (Golius Collection)	[n° 52]
<b>In</b>	Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 3478	[n° 71]
<b>J</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 772	[n° 43]
<b>Ka</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 4276	[n° 106]
<b>Mi</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Mağlis-i Şūrā-yi Islāmī 135	[n° 87]
<b>N</b>	İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708	[n° 24]
<b>Nk</b>	İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710	[n° 26]
<b>No</b>	İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709	[n° 25]
<b>O</b>	London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Jones Collection 114	[n° 54]
<b>Os</b>	Hyderabad, Osmaniya University Library, acq. 582	[n° 15]
<b>Q</b>	Maşhad, Kitābhānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 1119	[n° 58]
<b>R</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 910	[n° 39]
<b>S</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1425	[n° 31]
<b>Ş</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748	[n° 40]
<b>Ş</b>	Rampur Raza Library, Hikma 112 (nr. 3476)	[n° 69]
<b>T</b>	İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261	[n° 46]
<b>Te</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Malik 1057	[n° 105]
<b>To</b>	İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262	[n° 47]
<b>Y</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 770	[n° 41]
<b>Ye</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 773	[n° 44]
<b>Yi</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi 771	[n° 42]

**Za** İstanbul, Beyazıt Kütüphanesi (form.: ‘Umūmī) 3966 [n° 18]

In the list below, the sigla contingently employed for other MSS in this introduction are recorded in alphabetical order; again, the corresponding number in the list provided in section I.2 is indicated for each MS between square brackets.

<i>Siglum</i>	MSS	N° in sect. I.2
<b>Al</b>	Aligarh, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 110/30	[n° 1]
<b>At</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565	[n° 28]
<b>Bo</b>	Benares, Ğāmi‘a Ğawadiyya, 95	[n° 7]
<b>Ch</b>	Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 3983 (vols. i-ii)	[n° 13]
<b>D</b>	Cairo, Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṭā‘iq al-Qawmiyya, 894 <i>falsafa</i>	[n° 10]
<b>F</b>	İstanbul, Köprülü Halk Kütüphanesi, Fazıl Ahmet Paşa 894	[n° 20]
<b>Fa</b>	Kashan, Fahrang va Irshad 15	[n° 49]
<b>Ha</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 795	[n° 35]
<b>Ho</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa 857	[n° 36]
<b>I</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 580 = 1326 + 1327	[n° 100]
<b>Jo</b>	Beirut, Maktaba Şarqiyya, Université Saint-Joseph 372	[n° 5]
<b>K</b>	Kitābhānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247	[n° 50]
<b>L</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550	[n° 37]
<b>Lo</b>	London, Royal Asiatic Society, Arabic 58	[n° 57]
<b>M</b>	London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or. 7500	[n° 56]
<b>Ma</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Şūrā-yi Millī 1907	[n° 92]
<b>Nj</b>	Najaf, Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Mu‘minīn, 1096	[n° 62]
<b>Pa</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ‘Ālī-i Şahīd Muṭahharī 1438	[n° 84]
<b>Ra</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909	[n° 38]
<b>Rz</b>	Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 3477	[n° 70]
<b>Sh</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Şūrā-yi Millī 1893	[n° 89]
<b>Su</b>	İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Cāmi, Turhan Valide Sultan 208	[n° 45]
<b>Ṭ</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Madrasah-i ‘Ālī-i Şahīd Muṭahharī 1439	[n° 85]
<b>Ti</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Dānişkāda-i İlāhiyyāt-i Dānişgāh-i Tihrān 593/1	[n° 116]
<b>Ts</b>	İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3445	[n° 48]
<b>V</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 7590	[n° 103]
<b>Vo</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Majlis-i Şūrā-yi Millī 1895	[n° 90]
<b>W</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Millī Ğumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1801	[n° 102]

<b>X</b>	London, BLOIOC, India Office Ar. 1420	[n° 53]
<b>Z</b>	Tehran, Kitābhānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 243	[n° 99]

#### IV.2. LATIN ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE CRITICAL APPARATUS

<b>Latin</b>	<b>English</b>	<b>Arabic</b> <sup>420</sup>
<i>a.c.</i>	before correction	قبل التصحيح
<i>add.</i>	addition	زائدة
<i>exp.</i>	expunction/deletion	ضرب
<i>fort.</i>	perhaps	أظن
<i>i.l.</i>	between the lines	مكتوب بين السطور
<i>in mg.</i>	marginal variant/addition	مكتوب في الهامش
<i>inv.</i>	inversion	التقديم والتأخير
<i>om.</i>	omission	سقطه
<i>p.c.</i>	after correction	بعد التصحيح
<i>praem.</i>	addition before the clause at stake	زائدة مقدمة للفظ
<i>s.l.</i>	above the line	مكتوب فوق السطر
<i>scripsi</i>	I wrote (in case of editorial interventions against the manuscript tradition)	كتبته
<i>sic</i>	sic	كذا
<i>vacuum</i>	blank space	بياض

#### IV.3. SIGNS AND CONVENTIONS ADOPTED IN THE EDITION

- [ ] Text attested by the manuscript tradition but judged as possibly not Avicenna's.
- (12) Number between brackets: number of paragraph; articulation of the contents of the chapter.

<sup>420</sup> For the Arabic technical terminology, cf. GACEK 2007.

١٢ق Arabic number with ‘ق’ in the margin: corresponding page in the Cairo edition.

#### **IV.4. SIGNS AND CONVENTIONS ADOPTED IN THE TRANSLATION**

- [ ] Added by the translator, in order to provide a more fluent rendering of the Arabic.
- { } Translation of words preserved in the manuscripts that are suspect to be non-authorial additions.
- Q1 Number preceded by ‘Q’ in the margin: corresponding page in the Cairo edition.

## V. APPENDIX A

IBN SĪNĀ, *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq* [= GL2 GUTAS], section on Porphyry's *Isagoge*: Text based on MS Nuruosmaniye 4894, ff. 16<sup>v</sup>-17<sup>v</sup>)

[١٦] كتاب الموجز في المنطق للشيخ الرئيس أبي علي بن سينا

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم الحمد لله رب العزة والصلوة على محمد وآله الطاهرين.

### المقالة الأولى من الرسالة الموجزة في المنطق

#### معاني كتاب إيساغوجي

[١] كل لفظ دال فإمّا أن يكون مفردًا وهو الذي لا يدل جزء له على جزء من معناه، ومثاله قولنا «زيد» وقولنا «إنسان»، وإمّا أن يكون مؤلفًا وهو الذي قد يدل جزء منه على جزء من معناه، كقولنا «الإنسان حيوان» فإنه كما أن قولنا «الإنسان» وقولنا «حيوان» جزآن في المسموع من قولنا «الإنسان حيوان» وكذلك معناها جزآن في المفهوم من معنى قولنا «الإنسان حيوان».

[٢] وكل لفظ مفرد فإمّا دال بمعنى واحد على ذات واحدة، كقولنا «زيد» ويسمى جزئيًا، وإمّا دال بمعنى واحد على أعيان فرقة واحدة، كقولنا «الإنسان» ويسمى كليًا.

[٣] وكل كلي فإمّا أن يكون معناه بحيث ذا فهم وفهم الشيء الموصوف به لم يمكن أن يرفع عن الموصوف به فلا يعقل له، كالجسم للإنسان، ويسمى ذاتيًا، وإمّا أن يمكن ذلك ولكنه قد يكون لازمًا كالضحك للإنسان أو غير لازم كالبياض له ويسمى عرضيًا. وكل لفظ ذاتي فإن إن يكون دالا على جميع المعاني الذاتية التي يتقوم بها الشيء فيصير بها هو ما هو من غير إخلال لشيء منها ويسمى مقولا في جواب ما هو فيكون لفظا واحدا موضوعا بإزاء جملة معان يتم بها وجود الشيء كقولنا «الإنسان» فإنه بإزاء جملة الأوصاف التي يتقوم بها زيد (١٧ط) وعمرو ومأخوذا من أعم الأوصاف إلى أخصها وهذا فيما هو، وإمّا أن لا يكون كذلك.

[٤.١] والذي هو مقول في جواب ما هو فإمّا بحسب الشركة وإمّا بحسب الانفراد. والذي بحسب الشركة فإن يكون جواهر أو طبائع أو معان مختلفة بأوصاف ذاتية لها إلا أنها إذا جمعت اشتركت في جملة أوصاف ذاتية يعمها ويكون بإزاء جملة تلك الأوصاف لفظ واحد مفرد، مثل قولنا «الحيوان»: فإنه يدل على ما هو الفرس والثور والإنسان والأسد بحسب الشركة، حتى إذا سئل عن

جملتها ما هي من غير قصد إلى واحد واحد منها كانت لفظة الحيوان مشتملة على جملة المعاني الذاتية التي يشترك فيها هذه، فلا يعرب منها شيء و لا يصلح في رأينا أن يكون مقولا في جواب ما هو إذا سئل عن واحد منها، وإن كان داخلا في جواب ما هو لكل واحد منها، لأنه ليس شيء منها هو ما هو بأنه حيوان، بل بأنه حيوان ومعنى زائد عليه.

[٤.٢] وإما أن يكون لا بحسب الشركة، فإذا أخذ من جهة ما هو بحسب الشركة هي جنسا، كالحَيوان للإنسان والفرس، ورسمه أن المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع أي بالصور والحقائق والحدود من جهة ما هو، وإذا أخذ لا من جهة ما هو بحسب الشركة بل من جهة ما هو في الشركة يسمى نوعا ورسمه أنه المقول عليه الجنس في جواب ما هو بالشركة. ثم إن أمكن أن يقع تحته شركة عاد جنسا فكان نوعا لما فوقه جنسا لما تحته، وإن لم يكن كان بالحقيقة نوعا ورسمه أنه المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد فقط في جواب ما هو.

[٤.٣] فقد يرتب كما ترى جنس عال وهو جنس الأجناس ونوع سافل وهو نوع الأنواع، وشيء أو أشياء هي أجناس وأنواع لكن بالقياس إلى سببين.

[٤.٤] وإما الذاتي الذي لا يقال في جواب ما هو فقد يصلح أن يقال في جواب أي شيء هو أي قد يصلح للتمييز الذاتي ولنحن بقولنا إنه يصلح أن يقال في جواب أي شيء أنه إنما يصلح لهذا المعنى بالقياس إلى موضوعه ولا يصلح لغير ذلك وهذا هو الفصل، إما فصل الجنس كالحساس للإنسان، وإما فصله كالناطق للإنسان، وإما فصل الفصل، ولكن كيف كان فإن الفصل للشيء إنما هو من جهة ما هو نوع فلزيم الفصل بأنه المقول على النوع في جواب أي شيء هو.

[٥] وإما العرضي فإما مقول على نوع واحد كالضحك للإنسان ويسمى خاصة، وإما مقول على أنواع كثيرة كالبياض للإنسان وغيره، ويسمى عرضًا عامًا. وليس يعنى هاهنا بالعرض ما هو قسيم الجوهر، بل العرضي جوهرًا كان أو عرضًا: فإن الأبيض جوهر وهو عرض عام من جهة الحمل وليس كل ملازم فهو ذاتي فإن الذاتي هو ما إذا لم يكن هو لم يتقوم الشيء بل يحصل هو أو لا يتقوم به الشيء. وأما اللازم العرضي فهو الذي إذا يقوم الشيء وواحد تبعه ضرورة كالنطق للإنسان وقوة الضحك فإن النطق وهو وجود النفس الناطقة محتاج إليه حتى يحصل وجود الإنسان بنفسه وبدنه حدث قوة الضحك على كل حال وهذا أيضا كالشعاع الذي في جوهر الشمس والشعاع المنبث منه

فالشعاع الذي في جوهر الشمس هو فصل ذاتي له والشعاع المنبث عنه عرض لازم اياه. ويكون المثلث ذا زوايا ثلاث فهذا فصل وكون زواياه الثلث مساوية لقائمتين وهذا لازم.

[٦] ويجب أن يعلم أن شيئاً واحداً يكون جنساً ونوعاً وفصلاً وخاصة وعرضاً عاماً بالقياس إلى أشياء مختلفة، وذلك كالحركة الممكنة: فإنها جنس للمستقيمة والمستديرة ونوع لمقولة أن ينفعل وفصل لطبيعة وخاصة للجسم الطبيعي وعرض الإنسان والفرس.

[٧] ومن عادة بعض الناس أن يقسم هذه المعاني إلى المنطقي والعقلي والطبيعي ثم ليس يجرى لهم فيها كلام شديد والمستحبّ عندنا في تفصيلها أن يقال إن المنطقي مثلاً من باب الجنس هو المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع في جواب ما هو من غير إشارة إلى شيء من الموجودات أنه ذلك فلا الحيوان ولا النبات ولا اللون ولا العدد ولا غير ذلك يتعين في هذا المعنى ولا المنطقي يلزمه أن يعرف أجناس الموجودات، بل الجنس المطلق المجرد فقط. وأما الطبيعي فهو الشيء المشار إليه في الموجود الذي له يعرض معنى الجنسية مثل اللون والنبات والحيوان وغير ذلك. وأما العقلي فهو ما حصل من المعنيين في العقل سواء كان مجرد معنى الجنس المنطقي أو معنى الشيء الذي عرض له اعتبار الجنسية ويعنى هاهنا بالطبيعي الموجودي كيف كان طبيعياً أو خارجاً عن الطبيعة وإلا انقسم أقساماً أخرى فكان من الأجناس الطبيعية كالحيوان والنبات، وصناعية كالبيت والكرسي، وإلهية كالعلة والمبدأ والجوهر والعقل، ورياضية كالشكل والعدد، وقد يكون أشياء غير هذه ويعنى هاهنا بالعقلي ما حصل صورة في أي عقل كان وإلا انقسم أقساماً أخرى و كان منه [١٧] إلهي وهو المتصور من هويات الموجودات عند البارئ على النوع الذي يخصه وعقلي وهو المتصور في ذات العقل منها بالنوع الآخر المستفاد من ذات الأول ولا يصلح أن يزل الكلبيات إلى سائر القوى فإنها جزئيات.

## VI. APPENDIX B: INEDITED TEXTS OF THE SCHOOL OF BAĠDĀD

### (1) Logical, Natural and Divine genera

(1.A) YAḤYĀ IBN 'ADĪ, *'Iddat masā'il fī ma'ānī kitāb Ḫsāgūgī* [incipit and explicit in WISNOVSKY 2012b, pp. 311-312]: Text based on MS Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, pp. 67-68

قال يحيى: ترك فرفور يوس تبين ما ادعاه من أن نسبة النوع إلى جنسه هي بعينها نسبتته إلى أشخاصه ليس هو بغير سبب ولا لعجز منه عن تبينه ولا على أنه من الأشياء الظاهرة البينة بأنفسها، لكننا فعل ذلك وفاء بضمانه في صدر كتابه بحسب المطالب الغامضة؛ وذلك أن هذا البحث ليس هو بحثا منطقيا بل هو بحث طبيعي غامض أيضا يضعف قوة السادين المسدين عن إدراك علمه وتصور معناه، فلذلك أضرب عنه وترك إباتته. وأما ذكره نسبيه المختلفين إلى الجنس وإلى الشخص فلأنه من المباحث المنطقية التي يلزمه الإخبار بها في كتابه هذا، إذ كان النظر في الأجناس والأنواع على الجهة اللاتقة بالمنطق إنما هو النظر في نسب بعضها إلى بعض من طريق العموم والخصوص والتقديم للذات وغير تقويمها والاختصاص والتفرد ومقابل ذلك وما أشبه هذه المناسبات. فأما الإيضاح لما ادعاه من أن نسبة النوع إلى جنسه هي بعينها نسبتته إلى أشخاصه فإنه على هذا النحو: قد بينا في غير موضع أن اسم النوع لما كان اسما مشتقا، فإنه ينتظم معينين أحدهما الذات التي عرضت لها النوعية وهي نوع طبيعي والثاني النوعية العارضة لها وبها يصير النوع الطبيعي نوعا منطقيا؛ ولو لزم كل واحد من هذين المعينين على انفراده وغير لوازم الآخر ومن لوازمها نسبهما، فنسبة النوع الطبيعي كالإنسان مثلا إلى جنسه الطبيعي وهو الحيوان هي هي بعينها نسبتته إلى أشخاصه التي هي زيد وعبدالله وخذل، وذلك أن صورة الحيوان يقبلها مادته فيصير بها موجودة وجودا حسيا ولا يحتاج مادته في أن يوجد وجودا حسيا إلى غيرها هي الإنسانية؛ كذلك الإنسانية أيضا هي صورة زيد وعبدالله وخذل التي بها يوجد كل واحد منهم الوجود الحسي ولاحتياج معها إلى غيرها في ذلك فهي الذات التامة للحيوان الذي هو فيها. فقد يتبين إذاً أن نسبة النوع من حيث هو طبيعي إلى جنسه [٦٨] بعينها نسبتته إلى أشخاصه؛ وإن كانت نسبتاه المنطقيان إلى الجنس وإلى الأشخاص مختلفتين وذلك أنه محوي من جنسه معوم منه وحاو لأشخاصه عام لها، كما ذكر فرفور يوس فقد وضح صدقه ووضح عدو فيما إياه؛ والله الحمد دائما.

سأل سائل فقال: ما بال فرفور يوس إذ لم يكن مزمعا على أن يبحث على الأجناس والأنواع بحثا طبيعيا ولا بحثا إلهيا ذكر هذين البحثين وفي فعله ذلك ما أشعر المبتدئ بهما ونبهه على وجودهما وأغراه بالتزاع إليهما وفي هذه الأشياء مكسره لغر به عن التعلم وقع لحده فكره وسبب لتقصير ذهنه عن المبلغ الذي كان يدركه لو خلا من شغله بذلك فما يراه الأخصر بالمتعلم قصدا أو جهلا؟

إن فرفور يوس فعل ذلك لأنه لما لم يجد بدا في تعليم معاني هذه الخمسة الأصوات من أن باني بأمثلة عليها من الطبيعيات لتسكن نفس المتعلم إلى صدق قوله وليتضح عنده بالمشاهد معنى كلامه، وكذلك فعل حين مثل على الجنس بالحلي وعلى الفصل بالناطق وعلى النوع بالإنسان وعلى الخاصة بالضحك وعلى العرض بالبياض والسواد والقيام. وهذه الأمثلة طبيعية، وإنما النظر فيها بحسب المنطق ليس من قبل ذواتها ومعانيها، بل من قبل إضافتها ونسب بعضها إلى بعض وإلى ما تحتها وما هي موجودة فيه. علم أنه يعرض لا محالة لنفس المتعلم التزاع والانسحاق إلى النظر الطبيعي وذلك أنه إذا وجد في حد الجنس أنه يحمل من طريق ما هو وعرف معناه وأنه الذي يعطي اسمه وحده ما هو محمول عليه يضطره الأمر إلى أن يمثل له على ذلك فيقول كالحلي فإنه يحمل على الإنسان ويعطي الإنسان اسمه وحده وكذلك الإنسان يحمل على سقراط ويعطيه اسمه وحده لأنه إن لم يلخص له هذا التلخيص واقتصر به على أن يقول إنه يعطي اسمه وحده ولم يتبين له حداي معنى الجنس يعطي ما هو مقول عليه أحد معناه الطبيعي أم حد معناه المنطقي يدخل عليه الشبه والأغاليط ويروم أن يلزم النوع حد الجنس والشخص حد النوع والجنس بمعنيهما المنطقيين حتى يلزم عنده أن يحمل على النوع أنه مقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع والشخص أيضا كذلك فيصير النوع والشخص جنسا فلذلك ما احتاط في أن يبينه على البحث الطبيعي إذ هو مضطر إلى استعماله. وأما الأجناس والأنواع الإلهية فذكرها لأنها غامضة جدا فهي لذلك جرية ألا يبينه بها ويفعل البحث عنها بعرض يذكرها هاهنا ليخص المبتدئ على الفحص عنها عند تمكنه من ذلك إذا تعلم صناعة المنطق وقوى بها على طلب الإلهيات وسهل عليه إدراكه.

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École Pratique  
des Hautes Études



Scuola Normale Superiore, Filosofia

École Pratique des Hautes Études, Études arabes et civilisation du  
monde musulman

PhD Thesis

*Avicenna, Book of the Healing, Isagoge (“Madḥal”)*

Edition of the Arabic text, English translation and  
Commentary

Part II: Edition, Translation and Commentary

Silvia DI VINCENZO

Supervisors:

Prof. Amos BERTOLACCI (Pisa, SNS/Lucca, IMT)

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

المحمد لله رب العالمين وصلاته على محمد وآله أجمعين

[هذا كتاب الشفاء للشيخ الرئيس أبي علي الحسين بن عبد الله بن  
سينا — لقيه الله ما يليق بإحسانه — وفي صدره كلام لأبي عبيد  
عبد الواحد بن محمد الجوزجاني.]

5

(1.1) قال أبو عبيد: أحمد الله على نعمه وأسأله التوفيق لمرضاته  
وأصلى على نبيه محمد وآله. وبعد: فقد كانت محبتي للعلوم الحكيمة  
ورغبتي في اقتباس المعارف الحقيقية دعواتي إلى الإخلال ببلادي  
والمهاجرة إلى مستقر الشيخ الرئيس أبي علي — أدام الله أيامه

Al-Gūzġānī's Introduction is not preserved in mss. MiYiYNoN. [الجوزجاني 5... الله 1  
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الإخلال | E دعنتي [دعواتي | i.l. G استقاد [اقتباس 8 vacuum To [ويعد | JT نبيه محمد | Di  
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T أحسن الله توفيقه Da أحسن الله إليه κEDiToŠG الله

MS Di introduces a general presentation of the structure of the  
*Book of the Cure* before Al-Gūzġānī's Introduction:

كتاب الشفاء ينقسم أولاً إلى أربع جمل المنطقيات والطبيعات والرياضيات والإلهيات فالمنطقيات تسعة فنون  
الفن الأول في المدخل وهو مقالتان الأول أربع عشر فصلاً والثاني أربع فصول [...]

This introductive clause, which is preserved, with minor variations,  
in the manuscript tradition, is omitted in MS E. Evidently, it was meant to warn the  
reader, together with another clause at the end of Al-Gūzġānī's Introduction, about  
the actual beginning of Avicenna's own writing. If it is the result of an editorial  
process posterior to the composition of the rest of the work, it must however have  
occurred during Avicenna's lifetime, since the eulogy after his name — modified or  
omitted in certain manuscripts — is usually employed for people who are still alive.  
[أيامه... أدام 9 For evident reasons, the manuscript tradition either omitted or adapted  
the eulogy after Avicenna's death, but traces of eulogies usually employed for living  
people can be found, such as *adāma Allāh ayyāmahu*, surviving in MS Pa, and

## [Al- Ğūzġānī's Introduction]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Praise to God, Lord of the world, and His prayer to Muḥammad and His whole family.

{This is the *Book of the Cure* by the Chief Master Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Abd Allāh Ibn Sīnā, at whose beginning there is the discourse of Abū 'Ubayd 'Abd al-Wāḥid Ibn Muḥammad al-Ĝūzġānī.}

5

### [1. The process of composition of the *Book of the Cure*]

#### [1.1. Avicenna's youth and the meeting with Al-Ĝūzġānī]

Abū 'Ubayd said: I praise His grace, ask Him to grant success to what pleases Him, and pray for His Prophet Muḥammad and His family. Then: my love for the philosophical sciences and my desire to acquire true knowledge induced me to leave my country and emigrate towards the country in which the Chief Master Abū 'Alī — may God prolong his days — lived, since the account on him that was reported

10

10 — من البلاد، إذ كان ما وقع إلي من خبره وعرض علي من كلامه يقتضي الميل إليه عن سائر من يذكر بهذه الصناعة ويعتري إلى هذه الجملة. وقد كان بلغني من خبره أنه مهر في هذه العلوم وهو حدث لم يستو به الشباب ولا أربى على العقدين من العمر، وأنه كثير التصانيف إلا أنه قليل الضن بها والرغبة في ضبط نسخها. فحقت رغبتني في قصده وملازمته والإلحاح عليه والالتماس منه أن يهتم 15 بالتصنيف وأهتم بالضبط فيمتمه وهو بجرجان وسنه قريب من اثنتين وثلاثين سنة.

٢ق (1.2) وقد بلي بخدمة السلطان والتصرف في عمله وقد شغل ذلك أوقاته فلا أتهز إلا الفرص الخفاف واستمليته فيها شيئاً من المنطق والطبيعات. وإذا دعوته إلى التصانيف الكبار وإلى الشروح أحال 20 على ما عمله من الشروح وصنفه من الكتب في بلاده، وقد كان بلغني تفرقها وتشتتها وضم من يملك نسخة منها بها. وأما هو فلم يكن من عادته أن يخزن لتصنيفه نسخة كما لم يكن من عادته أن يحرر من الدستور أو يخرج من السواد، وإنما يملأ أو يكتب النسخة

19... ذلك 18 Due to a material damage, MS B is not readable. [بخدمته 18... بالضبط 16 Due to a material damage, MS B is not readable. [الكبار... وإذا 20 Due to a material damage, MS B is not readable.

IBN SĪNĀ, [بها... وضم 22 IBN SĪNĀ, *Autobiography*, p. 36.8. [العمر... 13 وقد 12 *Autobiography*, pp. 38.6-40.2.

AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 44.5-6. [والطبيعات 20... فلا 19

om. et add. s.l. S | لا [ولا | E يستيق [يستو 13 in mg. A أنه مهر 12 non legitur et | أنه مهر 12  
in mg. C | العفدين BCToTeŠ عفدين s.l. Nk عفدين Ka العفدين [العفدين | a.c. As أبي [أربى  
[والإلحاح | om. et add. s.l. J في 15 s.l. S | فحقت et فحقت [KaBAC فحقت [فحقت 14  
قد [وقد 18 As om. et add. s.l. As سنة 17 S | بأن [أن | ToŠ a.c. NkBE والإلحاح  
JTS فاستمليته [واستمليته | add. C منه [أتهز 19 As ذلك [ذلك | a.c. To قد KaNkADiDaTeŠ  
om. et add. JT والشروح [وإلى الشروح | As أو إلى [وإلى 20 om. Da فيها | G ونستمليه  
inv. EDiToŠG نسخة منها | As الكتب [يملك | Nk تشتتها ونفرقها [تفرقها وتشتتها 22 s.l. C  
Ed. لنفسه : cett. لتصنيفه non legitur B deest As [لتصنيفه | om. κ أن... يخزن 23 A نسخة  
λDiTeG إنما [إنما | om. et add. in mg. Ka | امن 24

aḥsana Allāh ilayhi and aḥsana Allāh tawfīqahu, preserved, respectively, in MSS Di and T.

to me and his discourses that were presented to me made me propend for him rather than the others that are renowned in this discipline and that affiliate to this group [of philosophers]<sup>1</sup>. I had known about him that he was an expert of these sciences, though still being a young man who had not yet matured completely and was no more than twenty years old<sup>2</sup>, and that he had written many works, but also that he took no great care of them and that he had no great interest in preserving their copies. My wish to join and to follow him, and [my] constant request and solicitation to him to concern himself with the composition [of his works], whereas I would concern myself with [their] preservation, were fulfilled, and I joined him when he was in Ġūrġān; he was [then] almost thirty-two years old<sup>3</sup>. 15

### [1.2. Avicenna's stay in Ġūrġān]

Q2 He was burdened by the service to the Sultān and the administration of his business, and that occupied his time, so that I had only little occasion, in which I asked him to dictate something on Logic and Natural Philosophy. When I asked him [to compose] great works and commentaries, he remitted [me] to the commentaries and the books he composed in his country, but I had heard that they were scattered and dispersed, and that those who owned a copy of them kept it [from others]<sup>4</sup>. As to him, he was not used to keep a copy for himself, as well as he was not used to write down a copy from the holograph or to draw a copy from the draft, but he would just dictate or write the copy and 25

<sup>1</sup>) Namely the group (*al-ġumla*) of the philosophers; the term is understood as referring to a “set, or group [of sciences]” in GUTAS 2014, p. 30, note b. | <sup>2</sup>) Before 390H/1000, assuming as Avicenna's birthdate the year 370H/980-1 provided by Al-Ġūzġānī in the *Biography* (p. 88.5). The Latin translation has “forty (XL) years”, instead of “twenty years (more precisely: two decennies of [his] life)”; however, this statement of Al-Ġūzġānī's might recall Avicenna's claim to have mastered completely all the sciences when he was 18 years old (*Autobiography*, p. 36.8), so that it can be argued that the reading of the Latin translation is possibly the result of a mistake. | <sup>3</sup>) Around 402H/1011-12. | <sup>4</sup>) Al-Ġūzġānī might refer to the case, mentioned by Avicenna himself in his *Autobiography* (pp. 38.6-40.2), of the *Kitāb al-Hāsil wa-l-Maḥṣūl* and the *Kitāb al-Birr wa-l-Itm*, both composed in Buḥārā for Abū Bakr al-Baraqī, who reportedly didn't allow anyone to draw a copy of the two works, of which he detained the only existing exemplar.

25 ويعطيها ملتمسها منه. ومع ذلك فقد تواترت عليه المحن وغالت كتبه الغوائل.

(1.3) فبقيت معه عدة سنين أنتقل فيها من جرجان إلى الري ومن الري إلى همدان. وشغل بوزارة الملك شمس الدولة وكان اشتغاله بذلك حسرة علينا وضياعا لروزجارنا. وكان قد وهن الرجاء أيضا في 30 تحصيل تصانيفه الفائتة فالتمسنا منه إعادتها فقال: "أما الاشتغال بالألفاظ وشرحها فأمر لا يسعه وقتي ولا تنشط له نفسي؛ فإن قنعتم بما يتيسر لي من عندي، عملت لكم تصنيفا جامعا على الترتيب الذي يتفق لي". فبدلنا له منا الرضا به وحرصنا على أن يقع منه الابتداء بالطبيعيات؛ فشرع في ذلك وكتب قريبا من عشرين ورقة، ثم 35 انقطع عنه بالقواطع السلطانية.

Due to a material damage, MS B is not readable. 28 [الدولة] Due to a material damage, in MS Š the name *al-Dawla* is not readable, and the eulogy following it is only partially readable. 29 [وهن... لروزجارنا] Due to a material damage, MS Š is not readable. 30 [أما... إعادتها] Due to a material damage, MS Š is not readable. 31 [بما... 32... تنشط] Due to a material damage, MS Š is not readable. 32 [إلى... 33... جامعا] Due to a material damage, MS Š is not readable. 33 [الابتداء... 34] Due to a material damage, MS Š is not readable. 34 [بالطبيعيات] Due to a material damage, MS Š is not readable.

Cf. IBN SĪNĀ, *al-Šifā', al-Safsafa* II.6, p. 114.6-8. 30 [وقتي... 31... أما]

AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, pp. 48.9-50.3. 28 [الري... أنتقل] AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 52.1-10. 29 [وكان... 34] AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 54.2-5.

قدس الله روحه ورضي [الدولة] 28 *in mg.* Ka منه [معه] 27 *iter.* E منه | Nk بتمسها [ملتمسها] 25 *in mg.* + بها *s.l.* بذلك KaNkC به [بذلك] 29 *add.* κDa قدس الله روحه Š *add.* EToG *fort.* Š عنه § وقد كان قد وهن ToG وقد كان وهن [وهن... وكان] | B *in mg.* به + بها *non legitur et* Nk *om. et add. s.l.* T من 32 κ كبير [له] | κ تنشطه [تنشط] | *iter.* To ولا | KaC يسعها [يسعه] 31 *in mg.* منا الرضا به ToŠ الرضا بما منى به *s.l.* G بما *et* الرضا منى به [به... منا] 33 Te التي [الذي] وحرضنا [«insistendo» Lat.] To *in mg.* DaTeŠG وحرضنا | *om.* Da به | To § [parum clare] ودعينا γλJTAsDiToEd.

*in mg.* Da<sup>2</sup> روزجار معرب روزكار بمعنى الأيام J<sup>2</sup>. *in mg.* معرب روزكار [الروزجارنا] 29

The term *rūzġār* corresponds to the Persian *rozgār* (روزگار), meaning "time". 33 [وحرصنا] On the reading *ħarraḏnā* ("we urged") instead of *ħariṣnā* ("we desired"), as printed in the Cairo edition, see also GUTAS 2014, p. 32, note m.

give it to the person who had requested it from him. Moreover, a series of disgraces occurred to him, and calamities destroyed his books.

**[1.3. Avicenna’s stay in Hamadān: the beginning of the *Book of the Cure*]**

I stayed with him for several years, during which I moved from Ğūrġān to Rayy<sup>5</sup>, [then] from Rayy to Hamadān. He was occupied as a minister of King Šams al-Dawla<sup>6</sup>, and his occupation with that was a source of distress for us and a waste of our time. The hope of attaining his lost works had become feeble as well, so we asked him to rewrite them anew; he said: “occupying myself with the words and commenting them is something for which I do not have enough time and that I am not eager to do; so, if you content yourselves with what easily comes to me from my own knowledge, I will compose for you a comprehensive work arranged as it comes to me”. We gave him our consent on that and urged him to start with Natural Philosophy. Hence, he started with that and wrote approximately twenty folios, then he was interrupted by administrative disruptions.

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<sup>5</sup>) In Rayy, Avicenna joined the service of Maġd al-Dawla, and wrote the *Kitāb al-Ma’ād* (*Biography*, pp. 48.9-50.3). | <sup>6</sup>) On the various vicissitudes that occurred to Avicenna as a minister of Šams al-Dawla, see *Biography*, p. 52.1-10.

(1.4) وضرب الدهر ضرباته واخترم ذلك الملك وآثر هو أن لا يقيم في تلك الدولة ولا يعاود تلك الخدمة وزكن أن الاحتياط له فيما استحبه من ذلك أن يستتر مرتقبا فرصة الانفصال عن تلك الديار. فصادفت منه خلوة وفراغا اعتمته وأخذته بتتميم كتاب الشفاء؛ وأقبل هو بنفسه على تصنيفه إقبالا بجد وفرغ من الطبيعيات والإلهيات خلا كتابي الحيوان والنبات في مدة عشرين يوما من غير رجوع إلى كتاب يحضره وإنما اعتمد طبعه فقط. وشرع في المنطق وكتب الخطبة وما يتصل بها.

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(1.5) ثم إن أعيان تلك الدولة نعموا عليه استتاره واستنكروا عزمه في المفارقة وظنوا أنه لمكيدة أو للمالأة جنبه معادية وحرص بعض خاص خدمه على توريثه في مهلكة ليفوز بما له عنده من متاع الدنيا فدل عليه طلابه — وكانوا ممن سلف له عندهم صنائع تحرم عليهم

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[بها... 43 كتاب 42 Due to a material damage, MS B is not readable. [مدة... الحيوان 41 Due to a material damage, MS B is not readable. [وحرص... جنبه 45 Due to a material damage, MS B is not readable.

[الشفاء... 39 وزكن 37 AL-GŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 56.2-6. [الملك... وضرب 36 AL-GŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, pp. 56.9-58.1. [فقط... 42 وأخذته 39 AL-GŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 58.2-7. [معادية... 45 ثم 44 AL-GŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 58.7-8. [بها... 43 وشرع 42 AL-GŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 58.8-9. [فردجان... 49 فدل 47 AL-GŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, pp. 58.9-60.1.

[الملك 36 add. κEDaToŠG رحمه الله [المملك 37 ADiDaToŠG in mg. J «estimabat» Lat.] [الانفصال 38 om. NkB أن | parum clare As | Te : وركن DiTo<sup>2</sup>: JETŠEd. in mg. وركن إلى [النبات | كتاب [كتابي 41 NkA in mg. G وواخذته [وأخذته 39 κ للانفصال منطلق الخطبة [الخطبة 43 in mg. G طبعه | non legitur et طبعه | λToŠG إنما [وإنما 42 mg. J لمالات Nk ممالأة [المالأة | JTAsToG فظنوا [وظنوا 45 § عيان [أعيان 44 κ يتعلق [يتصل | Ka J تهلكة [مهلكة | om. et add. in mg. A في مهلكة | om. T خلص 46 T لجنبه [جنبه | ToŠ om. et add. in mg. A عندهم | om. A ذاكرين 48... وكانوا | § وكان [وكانوا | Ka ودل [فدل 47 κ وتحرم [تحرم | om. T

[cf. al-Ġawharī, *Tāġ al-luġa wa-šihāḥ al-‘arabiyya*, p. 2131] in mg. Di علم أي i.l. Da

37 Reading *zakina an* (“he sensed, he knew”) instead of *rakana ilà an* (“he relied on”) as in the Cairo ed. (p.2.17). The reading *zakina* is *difficilior* (the term stimulated a number of lexicographic marginal notes in the manuscript tradition), and the reading *rakana* is easily explainable as a corruption of *zakina*; finally, the insertion of *ilà* is required by the reading *rakana*.

#### [1.4. The composition of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics and the beginning of Logic]

The fate dealt its strokes and carried away that King<sup>7</sup>; Avicenna preferred not to dwell in that region and not to come back to that service, as he sensed that it was wiser for him, among what he deemed recommendable in that [situation], to hide waiting for an occasion to leave that country<sup>8</sup>. I found that he had spare time in isolation, and I availed the occasion to urge him to complete the *Book of the Cure*. He eagerly applied himself to its composition, and finished the Natural Philosophy and the Metaphysics (except for the two books on *Animals* and on *Plants*) in twenty days, without recurring to any available book and relying exclusively on his own nature. He started the Logic and wrote the introductory speech and what follows.

#### [1.5. The seclusion in the fortress of Fardağān]

Afterwards, some notables of that reign became resentful against him because of his hiding, and criticized his decision to leave, thinking that it was because of some machination or conspiracy of the enemies' faction. Someone close to him who was at his service wanted to involve him in peril in order to take possession of his material goods, so he denounced him to his persecutors (they were among those to whom he had done favours that should not have permitted them to

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<sup>7</sup> In 412H/1021: according to the *Biography* (p. 56.2-6), Šams al-Dawla died during a military expedition because of a severe colic. | <sup>8</sup> According to the *Biography* (p. 56.9), Avicenna was hosted in the house of a certain Abū Ġālib.

قصده بالإيجاش لو كانوا للمعروف ذاكرين — ووقفهم على مكانه فاستوثق منه بإيداعه قلعة فردجان وبقي بها قدر أربعة أشهر ريثما تقرر أسباب تلك الناحية على فصل من الأمر وتاركها المنازعون. فأفرج عنه وسيم معاودة الوزارة، فاعتذر واستمهل فعذر.

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(1.6) وهناك اشتغل بالمنطق وتمكن من الكتب فعرض من ذلك أن حاذها وجري على ترتيب القوم فيها وتكلم على ما استنكره من أقوالهم، فطال المنطق وتم ياصفهان. وأما الرياضيات فقد كان عملها

AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 60.3. | ريثما... 50] المنازعون 50... ريثما | AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 60.3-6. 52 وهناك 56... الشفاء 56... وهناك 52 | AL-ĠŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 60.6-7; p. 64.5-6.

49 T وأوقفهم [ووقفهم] | ToG in mg. J لو كانوا ToŠG in mg. وكانوا [لو كانوا] 48 | ToŠG فردمان ηJTToTeG in mg. ηJ فردجان فردجان KaS فروزجان فردجان | KaT واستوثق s.l. Š الناحية et الدولة [الناحية] | Nk تقرررت [تقرر] 50 om. Da قدر | JEd. فيها om. Ka بها add. A فعذر [فاعتذر] | a.c. E المعاودة [معاودة] | add. Da عنه [وسيم] 51 As ونازلها [وتاركها] | λJT وحاذها 53 وهناك [وهناك] 52 Te بعذر add. A وكانوا ممن سلف... ذاكرين om. et فعذر A praem. Ka [عملها] | KaEEed. بأصفيهان [بأصفيهان] 54

The passage presents a few issues. First, the syntax is quite difficult: there is a quite abrupt shift from a plural reference to *hāḍiḥi l-kutub* (“these books”; it is doubtful whether they should refer to the *Ḥayawān* and the *Nabāt*, cf. GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note s) to a reference to the *Ḥayawān* in the clause immediately following (*wa-hāḍā fī akṭar...al-faylasūf*) and then, again, to a reference to the books immediately after (*wa-zāda fīhā...ziyādāt*): the *fīhā* must, in fact, refer to the aforementioned *kutub* (but cf. GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note t; Gutas’ translation “expanded it” presupposes a reading: *wa-zāda fīhi*, which, although attested in at least one manuscript, is arguably the result of an adjustment due to the difficult syntax). Second, the final clause reporting that Avicenna was forty years old cannot possibly adapt to the date when Avicenna composed all these books, especially the *Ḥayawān* and the *Nabāt* (see the note to the translation). It should be noticed that the “additions” (*ziyādāt*) here mentioned are elsewhere recalled by Avicenna himself regarding his summary of the *Almagest* in the *Šifā’* (*Madḥal* I.1, §4.3: *wa-alḥaqtu bihi min al-ziyādāt ba’da al-farāg minhu mā waḡaba [...]*), and by Al-Ġūzġānī with regard to all the books of the Mathematics of the *Šifā’* in the *Biography* (p. 64.5-7: [...]) *wa-awrada fī kull kitāb min al-riyādiyyāt ziyādāt [...]*). On the basis of these parallel passages, it would be tempting to suppose that the clauses concerning the *Ḥayawān* and the *Nabāt* might be misplaced (the mistake should have occurred in the archetype of the tradition), and to rearrange the presumably corrupted paragraph as follows:

وأما الرياضيات فقد كان عملها على سبيل الاختصار في سالف الزمان فرأى أن يضيفها إلى كتاب الشفاء، وفرغ من هذه الكتب وزاد فيها من ذلك زيادات؛ وبلغ سنة حينئذ أربعين. وصنف أيضا الحيوان والنبات وحاذى في أكثر كتاب الحيوان كتاب أرسطوطاليس الفيلسوف.

This hypothetical solution would entail the advantage of restoring a perfect parallelism with *Biography*, pp. 64.5-66.4, referring the additions specifically to the

pursue and oppress him, if they had remembered the favours [they had received]), and informed them about the place where he [hid himself]. They secured against him by taking him to the fortress of Fardaġān, where he stayed for four months, until the situation of that region resolved into a solution of the problem, and the opponents abandoned the region<sup>9</sup>. Avicenna was liberated and offered to be restored as a minister, but he asked for a respite, which was accorded to him.

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**[1.6. Account of the composition of *Logic*, *Mathematics* and the *books of Animals* and of *Plants*]**

There<sup>10</sup>, he dedicated himself to the *Logic*. Since he could dispose of the books, he followed them and proceeded according to the order that the philosophers observed in them, and dealt with the statements of theirs that he refuted; consequently, the *Logic* grew long and was

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<sup>9</sup>) Namely, until the withdrawal of ‘Alā’ al-Dawla and the return of Tāġ al-Dawla to Hamaġān together with Avicenna; cf. *Biography*, p. 60.3-6. | <sup>10</sup>) Still in Hamaġān, in the house of Al-‘Alawī; see *Biography*, p. 60.6-7.

55 على سبيل الاختصار في سالف الزمان فرأى أن يضيفها إلى كتاب الشفاء. وصنف أيضا الحيوان والنبات وفرغ من هذه الكتب وحاذى في أكثر كتاب الحيوان كتاب أرسطوطاليس الفيلسوف وزاد فيها من ذلك زيادات وبلغ سنه حينئذ أربعين.

٤ق (2) وغرضي في اقتصاص هذه القصص أن يوقف على السبب في إعراضه عن شرح الألفاظ وفي اختلاف ما بين ترتيبه لكتب المنطق وما بين ترتيبه لكتب الطبيعيات والإلهيات، وأن يتعجب من اقتداره على تصنيفه ما صنفه من كتب الطبيعيات والإلهيات والمدة عشرون يوما والكتب غائبة عنه وإنما يملي عليه قلبه المشغول بما مني به فقط. وسيجد المتأمل لهذا الكتاب بعين الاعتبار من النكت والنوادر والتفريعات والبيانات ما لا يجده في جملة كتب السالفين؛ والله الموفق لما فيه الخيرة. 60 65

56 [الفيلسوف 57... وحاذى 56] IBN SĪNĀ, *al-Šifā'*, *al-Hayawān* I.1, p. 1.10-12.

56 [أربعين 58... وصنف 56] AL-GŪZĠĀNĪ, *Biography*, p. 66.2-4.

56  $\gamma\kappa A$  in mg. To أرسطوطاليس [أرسطوطاليس 57 DiToTeŠG النبات والحيوان [الحيوان والنبات 56 s.l. § | om. حينئذ 58 s.l. § et فيها فيه [فيها | JC om. KaDa om. et add. in mg. | om. الفيلسوف | لكتب [من كتب | T om. ما صنفه 62 κ ففي [وفي | EToTeŠ شرح [شرح 60 E add. in mg. | والمدة ToŠG والنهرة [والمدة | A add. s.l. η في add. s.l. vel in mg. | كتب γ§ من E في ToTeŠG To النكة [النكت 64 To praem. s.l. من [قلبه | Di a.c. DiToŠG κλDaToŠG إنما [وإنما 63 ToG in mg. | ... والله | Ka om. et add. in mg. جملة | A in mg. التفريعات AToTe والتعريفات [والتفريعات 65 Ed. الخير [الخيرة 66 om. § الخيرة 66

books of Mathematics, and to refer the dating in the text only to the section of Mathematics, to which it could well adapt, therefore solving the chronological issue.

66 [الخيرة MS A inserts a general presentation of the structure of Logic at the end of Al-Gūzġānī's Introduction (apparently, the presentation of the other sections is omitted at the beginning of Logic):

ثم لما علمت يقينا أن تفصيل الأبواب في صدور الكتب ويتبين الغرض فيها يزيد في عرض طالبي العلم على البحث عنها استنويت أن أشرح ذكر فنون الأقسام وعدد المقالات ليكون تذكره للمتأمل فأقول إن هذا العلم يشتمل على أربع جمل وهي المنطقيات والطبيعيات والرياضيات والإلهيات [...].

completed in Iṣfahān<sup>11</sup>. As to the *Mathematics*, he had precedingly composed them in the form of a summary, and he decided to add them to the *Book of the Cure*. He also composed the [*Book of*] *Animals* and [that of] *Plants* and completed these books; though he followed in most of the *Book of Animals* Aristotle's book, he added something [of his own] in [both] the books. At that time, he was forty years old<sup>12</sup>. 55

## [2. The purpose of Al-Ġūzġānī's narration]

Q4 My purpose in reporting this story is that one grasps the reason why he avoided composing a literal commentary and why there is a difference between the order he followed in the books on Logic and the one he followed in the books on Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics. [My purpose] is also that one admires his ability in the composition of the books on Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in the space of [only] twenty days, without books at his disposal, solely under the dictation of his own heart which was grieved by afflictions. Those who study this Book with [careful] consideration will find precious remarks, corollaries and explanations that they can't find in all the books of the predecessors. God grants the success of [all] good deed. 60 65

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<sup>11</sup>) On Avicenna moving to Iṣfahān, to the court of 'Alā' al-Dawla, see *Biography*, p. 62.2-7. | <sup>12</sup>) Around 410H/1019-20; however, this can hardly be the exact date of composition of the section of Logic, completed afterwards, during Avicenna's stay in Iṣfahān, and, most of all, of *K. al-Nabāt* and the *K. al-Ḥayawān*, composed after all the other sections, in the year in which 'Alā' al-Dawla attacked the city of Šābūr Ḥwāst (see *Biography*, p. 66.2-4). This attack is arguably the one recorded by Ibn Aḫīr, *Al-Kāmil fī l-Tārīḥ* (*sub anno* 417) for the year 417H/1026-7 (when Avicenna was more or less 47 years old). The problem with such a dating was already remarked in GUTAS 2014, p. 108, who suggested either a mistake by Al-Ġūzġānī's part or a corruption occurred in the manuscript tradition which could have affected the number here provided. I would suggest that a mistake from Al-Ġūzġānī's part is a less satisfying explanation, given that all the other chronological references he made both in this Introduction and in the *Biography* are consistent and quite precise; see the note to the critical apparatus.

[ومن هاهنا ابتداء الكتاب وكلام أبي علي الحسين بن عبد الله  
أحسن الله إليه.]

67 [الكتاب وكلام] Due to a material damage, MS As is not readable.

من هاهنا [إليه] 68... ومن | *in mg. To* ومن ههنا B ومن هذا : *EToŠG in mg. B* وهذا [ومن هاهنا] 67  
الكلام [الكتاب] | S ومن ههنا ابتداء كلام الشيخ *in mg. Di* ومن ههما *et* وهذا ابتداء الكتاب A كلام الشيخ  
أبي | *s.l. B* و *et* من كلام *in mg. Nk* من كلام + وهذا كلام *As fort. KaJTCTe* من كلام [وكلام] | T  
بن [الله] | *κToŠG* الشيخ الرئيس [الله... أبي] | *praem. Nk* الشيخ *praem. Da* الشيخ الرئيس *om. E* علي  
BC رضي الله عنه *Nk* رحمة الله عليه *κEŠ* رحمه الله *Ka om. Ka* إليه... أحسن 68 *add. JNkTCDa* سينا  
ToG رحمه الله وغفر له والحمد لله رب العالمين

{From here on the book and the discourse of Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn  
Ibn ‘Abd Allāh — may God favour him! — begin.}

## [الفصل الأول]

### فصل في الإشارة إلى ما يشتمل عليه الكتاب

9ق (1) قال الشيخ الرئيس أبو علي الحسين بن عبد الله بن سينا  
أحسن الله إليه: وبعد حمد الله والثناء عليه كما هو أهله والصلوة  
على نبيه محمد وآله الطاهرين؛ فإنّ غرضنا في هذا الكتاب الذي 5  
نرجو أن يُمهّلنا الزمان إلى ختمه ويصحبنا التوفيق من الله في نظمه  
أن نودعه لباب ما تحقّقناه من الأصول في العلوم الفلسفية المنسوبة  
إلى الأقدمين المبنية على النظر المرتّب المحقّق والأصول المستنبطة  
بالأفهام المتعاونة على إدراك الحقّ، المجتهدة فيه زمانا طويلا حتى  
استقام آخره على جملة اتفقت عليها أكثر الآراء وهجرت معها غواشي 10

Nağāt p. 3.5-6. [الطاهرين 5... وبعد 4

كتاب الشفاء [الكتاب | Mi الفصل الأول من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من الجملة الأولى] فصل 2  
الله... أبو | om. Ka الرئيس | om. E علي... الشيخ | om. v إليه... 4 قال 3 μLat.E in mg. Y  
و Yi بعد [وبعد | om. EDiŞ : om. ηκμΑ رحمه الله [إليه... أحسن 4 om. Ka إليه... الحسين | om. C  
الطاهرين 5 KaNkADa والصلاة [والصلوة | JT بما [كما | om. A الطاهرين 5... وبعد | s.l. Y  
in mg. E حقّقناه ظ [تحقّقناه 7 Di add. Di سبحانه [الله 6 Di من [في | A إن [فإنّ | J] om.  
v الحكمية : π الفلسفة : Di om. et add. in mg. Di κλξDaG om. [الفلسفية | A الأصل [الأصول  
om. et add. الحقّ... على 9 No [sic!] والأصو [الأصول | in mg. J JT المثبت [المرتّب 8  
in mg. Di om. ToŞG | λνξTDiŞG المجتهد [المجتهدة | ToŞG Di om. in mg. Di  
Da وهجر [وهجرت | om. E add. in mg. E اتفقت و [جملة 10 DiToŞG add. إدراك الحق

i.l. Di أي هذا الكتاب [الكتاب 2

2 [الكتاب | A part of the manuscripts preserve the reading: “the Book of the Cure” instead of “the book”. However, the reading “the Book of the Cure” is seemingly the result of a later modification in most of the manuscripts that preserve it: MSS ToMiŞ all have a list of the titles of the chapters before the very beginning of chap. I.1, and the title of chap. I.1 reads, in all those lists: “the book”. This discrepancy between the title announced in the introductory list of contents and the title of the chapter in the text could mean that the reading “the Book of the Cure” was imported in this branch of tradition at a second moment, whereas the introductory list of titles failed to be modified accordingly, and preserves the original reading. 3 [إليه... 4 قال 3 This introductory clause is omitted by a branch of the manuscript tradition which, quite noteworthy, do not preserve the introduction by Al-Ġūzġānī. One could wonder whether it is the result of some sort of “editorial work” on the text, which would be posterior to its composition by Avicenna’s part and due to the addition of the introduction by Al-Ġūzġānī to the rest of the work.

[I.1]

## CHAPTER ON THE INDICATION OF WHAT THE BOOK CONTAINS

**[1. The composition of the *Book of the Cure*: its purpose and method]**

- Q9      The Chief Master Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn Ibn ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Sīnā — may God favour him — said: after the praise of God, and the commend to Him as He deserves it, and the prayer for His prophet Muḥammad and to His family of pure people, our purpose in this Book, which, hopefully, time will allow us to conclude and in whose composition the success [granted] by God may accompany us, is to put down in it the gist of the principles, which we have ascertained in the philosophical sciences related to the ancients, grounded in the ordered and verified theoretical inquiry, and of the principles drawn by means of the acts of comprehension<sup>1</sup> which cooperate in the acquisition of the truth, having put a great effort in it for a long time, until its end culminated over the complex on which most of the views agreed, and, at the same time, the wraps of the arbitrary opinions were left behind. I

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<sup>1</sup>) Concerning this translation of the Arabic *afhām*, see MARMURA 1991, p. 339 and GUTAS 2014, p. 42, n. 1.

الأهواء. وتحريت أن أُودعه أكثر الصناعة وأن أشير في كل موضع إلى موقع الشبهة وأحلها بإيضاح الحقيقة بقدر الطاقة، وأورد الفروع مع الأصول، إلا ما أثق بانكشافه لمن استبصر بما نُبصره وتحقق ما نُصوّره أو ما عذب عن ذكري ولم يلح لفكري. واجتهدت في اختصار الألفاظ جدا ومجانبة التكرار أصلا إلا ما يقع غلطا أو سهوا، وتنكبت التطويل في مناقضة مذاهب جلية البطلان أو مكفية الشغل بما تقرره من الأصول ونعرّفه من القوانين.

15

١٠ (2) ولا يوجد في كتب القدماء شيء يعتد به إلا وقد ضمّناه كتابنا هذا؛ فإن لم يوجد في الموضع الجاري إثباته فيه العادة، وُجد في موضع آخر رأيت أنه أليق به. وقد أضفت إلى ذلك مما أدركته بفكري وحصلته بنظري، وخصوصا في علم الطبيعة وما بعدها، وفي علم المنطق لمن أحب.

20

[البطلان... وتنكبت 16. *Mubāḥaṭāt, Letter to Kiyā*, p. 374.3-5. والأصول 13... وأورد 12 *al-Šifā', al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī*, p. 3.8-4.2.

As في ايضاح | ايضاح | JYi موضع Da وقع | موقع 12 Yi موقع | موضع | om. الأهواء 11 الفروع مع S الأصول مع الفروع | الأصول 13... الفروع | A بالفروع | الفروع | S الحقيقة | الحقيقة | نُصوّره 14 Di بما | T ما | بما | E ييصر | استبصر | Di اتفق | أثق 13 S<sup>2</sup> in mg. الأصول om. C جدا 15 v لذكري E في فكري | فكري | v فكري | ذكري | E وما | أو ما | Yi نبصره بينه J يفييه الشغل | الشغل 17... مكفية | om. C مذاهب 16 Ed. خطأ | غلطا | J ومجانبة | ومجانبة JT من | في 18 Y p.c. تقرره Yi نقرر | نقرره 17 S<sup>2</sup> et exp. S<sup>2</sup> add. أو بينه البرهان T البرهان om. رأيت أنه 20 s.l. وجدته EDi وجدته | وُجد | Y Di s.l. تجد E s.l. S<sup>3</sup> تجده | يوجد 19 Da بعده | بعدها 21 To فيما EDaSYNo ما | مما | S<sup>2</sup> et add. s.l. om. به | Te in mg. add. المنطق 22 add. in mg. لمن أحب No لمن أوجب [Lat.ADaN] لمن أحب | Y s.l. المنطق v الميزان | المنطق 22 JNk om. γvJES

in mg. A تنبكت أي تجنبت | وتنكبت 16

The modification of *manṭiq* into *mīzān* in MSS YYi is systematic up to chap. I.2. The term *mīzān*, literally meaning “balance”, came to be employed as an equivalent of *manṭiq* as a result of Al-Gazālī’s metaphorical use of the expression *‘ilm al-mīzān* (“science of balance”) to qualify the discipline of Logic (*Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, p. 13), which is grounded on its turn in the previously-established analogy between Logic and a balance, attested in Avicenna’s own writings as well (cf. e.g. *al-Šifā', al-Qiyās* I.2, p. 14.10-11).

tried to set down in it most of the discipline, and to point in each passage to the point of uncertainty and to solve it by elucidating the truth in the best possible way, and to provide also the corollaries besides the principles, though not in the case I am sure that it could be unveiled by those who are able to see what we make them see and who ascertain what we display, or in the case it escaped to my memory and was not clear to my thought. I put a great effort into abridging the expressions and in avoiding repetition at all, unless when it occurred by mistake or fault, and I refrained from dwelling upon the refutation of some doctrines that are evidently false or for which it is enough to deal with the principles that we established and the rules that we made [the reader] know. 15

## **[2. The relation of the Book with the philosophical tradition]**

Q10 It cannot be found in the books of the Ancients anything that was accounted a matter of importance that we did not include in this book of ours; if it cannot be found in the place in which the use made it customary to establish it, it is to be found in another place that I considered more suitable for it. [Moreover,] I added to that [something] of what I acquired by my own reflection and that I attained by my theoretical inquiry, especially with regard to the science of nature and what is after it<sup>2</sup>, but [also] with regard to the science of Logic, for those who wish. 20

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<sup>2</sup>) I.e. *Natural Philosophy* and *Metaphysics*.

وقد جرت العادة بأن تطول مبادئ المنطق بأشياء ليست منطقية وإنما هي للصناعة الحكمية، أعني الفلسفة الأولى، فتجنبنا إيراد شيء من ذلك وإضاعة الزمان به وأخرته إلى موضعه.

25

23 وقد...25 موضعه] *al-Šifā', al-Safsata* II.6, p. 114.11-14.

v ميزانية [منطقية | *om. v add. in mg. Y* | ليست | N النطق *s.l. Y* المنطق v الميزان [المنطق 23  
*in* الفلسفة v الحكمة [الفلسفة | Y الصناعة للصناعة | *p.c.? Yi* و [وإنما 24 *i.l. Y* منطقية  
*mg. Y* | *iter. C* إلى | *s.l. As* به 25 *praem. Yi* عن [إيراد شيء |

It has already become customary to extend the principles of Logic with things that do not pertain to Logic [itself], and just belong to the sapiential discipline, namely the First Philosophy, so I avoided to introduce [in Logic] anything of this and to waste time on it, and I postponed its exposition to its own place. 25

(3.1) ثم رأيتُ أن أتلو هذا الكتاب بكتاب آخر أسميه ”كتاب اللواحق“ يتم مع عمري ويُؤرّخ بما يفرغ منه في كل سنة، يكون كالشرح لهذا الكتاب وكتفريح الأصول فيه وبسط الموجز من معانيه.

(3.2) ولي كتاب غير هذين الكتابين أوردت فيه الفلسفة على ما هي في الطبع وعلى ما يوجبه الرأي الصريح الذي لا يراعى فيه جانب الشركاء في الصناعة، ولا يُنتقى فيه من شقّ عصاهم ما يُنتقى في غيره، وهو كتابي في ”الفلسفة المشرقية“. وأما هذا الكتاب، فأكثر بسطاً وأشدّ مع الشركاء من المشائين مساعدة. ومن أراد الحق الذي لا مَجْمَعَة فيه، فعليه بطلب ذلك الكتاب؛ ومن أراد الحق على طريق فيه ترصّص ما إلى الشركاء وبسط كثير وتلويح بما لو فُطن له استغني عن الكتاب الآخر، فعليه بهذا الكتاب.

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35

34 [ترصّص 35... طريق 34] The ink vanished in MS S.

26 [معانيه 28... ثم 26] *al-Šifā'*, *al-Maqūlāt* III.1, p. 94.4; *ibid.* III.4, p. 115.11-12; *al-Šifā'*, *al-Qiyās* II.2, p. 94.8-9; *ibid.* II.4, p. 115.13; *ibid.* III.1, p. 139.1-2; *ibid.* VII.1, p. 362.15-17; *ibid.* VII.1, p. 384.18-19; *ibid.* VIII.2, p. 403.3; *ibid.* IX.6, p. 465.2; *al-Šifā'*, *al-Safsafa* II.6, p. 114.6-10; *al-Šifā'*, *al-Hay'a*, p. 15.8-11; *ibid.*, p. 51.2; *al-Šifā'*, *al-Mūsīqā* VI.2, p. 152.5-6; *al-Šifā'*, *al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī*, IV.12, p. 317.3-4; *al-Šifā'*, *al-Hayawān* X.7, p. 225.3-4; *Naḡāt*, Logic, chap. 82, p. 84.14-85.1; *Mantiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 4.12-15. 29 [المشرقية 32... ولي 29] *Mantiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 2.8-11.

في | s.l. Y منه v عنه [منه | Di ما [بما | As يورخ [ويؤرّخ 27 om. كتاب | J أتبلى [أتلو 26 الأصول | ToSG وكتدريع in mg. ToG وكتفريح [وكتفريح 28 om. Yi add. p.c. Y على ما | v الحكمة [الفلسفة | E هذه [فيه | N add. in mg. N<sup>2</sup> الكتاب 36... ولي 29 iter. J om. et add. s.l. في | S add. عليها NkTo i.l. vAMiS mg.N add. عليه [هي 30 JT كما et شيء [من شقّ | κ فلا [ولا | S om. في الصناعة 31 Di mg.N الصحيح JT om. الصريح | Di in mg. B الحكمة in mg. s.l. Nk الحكمة [الفلسفة | N mg. كتاب [كتابي 32 in mg. Yi من شق له et به [له | v إلى ما [بما | B s.l. ما 35 A mg. N فمن [ومن | Yi من [مع 33 v الحكمة C mg. s.l. Y به EYi | استغني [استغني 36 Ka om. الآخر | praem. A iter. As ذلك [الكتاب 36 t لاستغني [استغني | s.l. Y به EYi

34 مجمعة مجمع A [in mg. = Lisān al-'Arab, II.363] مجمع الرجل في خبره إذا لم يبينه [مجمعة 34 Di الرجل في خبره إذا لم يبين ما في

Paragraph 3.2 about Avicenna's *Falsafa Mašriqiyya* is absent in MSS NoN (in MS N it is integrated in the margin). Remarkably, this is the only section of Avicenna's prologue dealing with a work different from the *Šifā'* except for paragraph 3.1, concerning the *Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq*, which is, however, strictly related to the *Šifā'*. [الفلسفة | The substitution of *falsafa* with *hikma* is part of the lexical revision that is systematic up to chap. I.2 in MSS YYi.

### [3. The relation between the *Book of the Cure* and other works by Avicenna]

#### [3.1. The *Book of the Cure* and the *Appendices*]

Then I considered it suitable to make this book be followed by another one that I will call “Book of the Appendices”<sup>3</sup>, which will be accomplished with my life, and which will be updated with what will be concluded each year, being like an explanation of this book, like a deduction of the corollaries from the principles contained in it and an extension of the concise [exposition] of its notions.

#### [3.2. The *Book of the Cure* and the *Eastern Philosophy*]

I have also another book, besides these two, in which I introduced philosophy as it is in [its own] nature, and according to what is required by the frank point of view, in which no attention is paid to side with the colleagues in the discipline [of philosophy], nor it is feared to dissent with their community as it is feared in other books: this is my book on the “Eastern Philosophy”. As to the present book, [on the contrary], it is more extended and more in accordance with the Peripatetic colleagues. He who wants the truth without any obscurity<sup>4</sup> in it, must look for that book<sup>5</sup>, whereas he who wants the truth with some concession to the colleagues, a great extent and an allusion to that which, if it were understood, would make the other book superfluous, then he must [look for] this book<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup>) *Book of the Appendices* (*Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq*): the nature and content of this work are obscure; see Commentary. | <sup>4</sup>) *Mağmağā*: the word gave rise, in the manuscript tradition, to some marginal notes taken from the lexicographic tradition (in mss. ADi, quoting the *Lisān al-‘Arab* s.v. *mağmağ*). In *Lisān al-‘Arab*, more in detail, the term *mağmağā* is referred to the confusion and obscurity that are produced in the text of a book by alterations of the original readings (vol. II, pp. 362-363). | <sup>5</sup>) I.e. the *Eastern Philosophy* (*Falsafa Mašriqiyya*). | <sup>6</sup>) I.e. the *K. al-Šifā’*.

- ١١ (4.1) ولما افتتحت هذا الكتاب ابتدأت بالمنطق وتحررت أن أحاذي به ترتيب كتب صاحب المنطق وأوردت في ذلك من الأسرار واللطائف ما تخلو عنه الكتب الموجودة.
- 40 (4.2) ثم تلوته بالعلم الطبيعي فلم يتفق لي في أكثر الأشياء محاذاة تصنيف المؤتم به في هذه الصناعة وتذاكيره.
- 45 (4.3) ثم تلوته بالهندسة، فاختصرت كتاب الأسطقسات لأوقليدس اختصارا لطيفا وحللت فيه الشبّه واقتصرت عليه. ثم اردفته باختصار كذلك لكتاب المجسطي في الهيئة يتضمن مع الاختصار بيانا وتفهيما، وألحقت به من الزيادات بعد الفراغ منه ما وجب أن يعلم المتعلم حتى يتم به الصناعة ويطابق فيه بين الأحكام الرصدية والقوانين الطبيعية. ثم تلوته باختصار لطيف لكتاب المدخل في الحساب. ثم ختمت صناعة الرياضيين بعلم الموسيقى على الوجه الذي انكشف لي مع بحث طويل ونظر دقيق على الاختصار.
- 50 (4.4) ثم ختمت الكتاب بالعلم المنسوب إلى ما بعد الطبيعة على أقسامه ووجوهه مشارا فيه إلى جمل من علم الأخلاق والسياسات إلى أن أصنّف فيها كتابا جامعا مفردا.

40...41 وتذاكيره *al-Šifā'*, *al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī*, p. 3.4-7.

فيه *add. s.l. Y* فيه [وتحررت | *in mg. Y* بالمنطق *v* بالميزان | بالمنطق | *ToŠG* فابتدأت [ابتدأت 37 [وأوردت | *s.l. Y* المنطق *v* الميزان | المنطق | *om. Da* | صاحب | *Di* ابنأدي [أحاذي 38 *S* *add. s.l. Te* المقصدى *T* المعتر [المؤتم 41 *No* محاذات [محاذاة 40 *iter. T* عنه 39 *S* فأوردت [يتضمن | *G* الكتاب [لكتاب 44 *iter. As* فيه 43 *i.l. Y* الأسطقسات *v* الأصول [الأسطقسات 42 *κμE* تفهيما وبيانا [وتفهيما 45... بيانا | *G* فيضمن *C* *in mg. B* فتضمن *in mg. B* متضمن *i.l. Nk* مضمن تنم [يتم 46 *lJNkCS* يعلمه [يعلم | *T* أوجب [وجب | *s.l. J* من | *N* وتعلما [وتفهيما 45 *p.c. Y* وجوه [وجوهه 51 *Da* و [على 50 *S<sup>2</sup>* *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>2</sup>* بعلم 48 *Yi* من *κ* *om. i.l. T* بين | *Ed.* [فيها | *ATYi* أضيف [أصنّف | *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* أن 52 *a.c. B* الأخلا [الأخلاق | *S<sup>3</sup>* وجوهه *S* مفردا [كتابا | *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* *κNkDaN* فيه

## [4. Contents of the Book]

### [4.1. Logic]

Q11 When I began this book, I started with Logic, and I tried to parallel in it the order of the books of the Author of Logic<sup>7</sup>, and I mentioned in it the secrets and the subtleties that lack in the existing books [on Logic].

### [4.2. Natural Philosophy]

Then I made Natural Science follow it<sup>8</sup>, but in most cases I could not proceed in parallelism with the composition of the [philosopher] that is followed as an example with regard to this discipline<sup>9</sup> and with his *Hypomnemata*. 40

### [4.3. Mathematics]

Then I made Geometry follow it, so I abridged in a subtle way Euclid's *Book of the Elements*, and I solved the ambiguities in it, confining myself to this [abridgement]. Then I completed it with an analogous abridgement of the *Book of the Almagest* on Astronomy including, in spite of the abridged form [of this work], some clarification and instruction. After completing it, I [also] made some additions that it was necessary to know for him who studies [this discipline] in order to perfect<sup>10</sup> the discipline by it and to establish a correspondence, with regard to it, between the judgements based on [astronomical] observations and the natural rules. Then I made a subtle abridgement of the *Book of the Introduction to Arithmetic* follow this one. Finally, I closed the discipline of the mathematicians with the science of Music, in the way that was disclosed to me after a long research and a minute inquiry, in the form of an abridgement. 45

### [4.4. The Metaphysics]

Then I closed the book with the science related to the *Metaphysics*, according to its sections and aspects, providing in it an indication of the complexes of Ethics and Politics [as well], until I compose on these subjects a single comprehensive book<sup>11</sup>. 50

<sup>7</sup>) I.e. Aristotle. | <sup>8</sup>) I.e. the section on Logic. | <sup>9</sup>) I.e. Aristotle. | <sup>10</sup>) Reading *yutimma bihi* instead of *tatimma bihi*, according to an emendation already proposed by GUTAS 2014. | <sup>11</sup>) Apparently, the book on Ethics and Politics here announced was not composed.

(5) وهذا الكتاب، وإن كان صغير الحجم، فهو كثير العلم ويكاد لا يفوت متأمله ومتدبره أكثر الصناعة إلى زيادات لم تجر العادة بسماحها من كتب أخرى، وأول الجمل التي فيه هو علم المنطق؛ وقبل أن نشرع في علم المنطق فنحن نشير إلى ماهية هذه العلوم إشارة موجزة ليكون المتدبر لكتابنا هذا كالمطلع على جمل من الأغراض.

55

v الميزان [المنطق | EDiTe om. Yi الذي] التي 55 S<sup>2</sup> s.l. العلم S النفع [العلم | No كبير] كثير 53  
 فنحن et هذه vDiSG Da om. نحن [فنحن | in mg. Y المنطق v الميزان] المنطق 56 s.l. Y المنطق  
 [المطلع | om. No هذا 57 om. κ exp. G هذه | Yi فنشير] نشير | in mg. To add. in mg. Y  
 eETCTeNo كالمطلع

**[5. Conclusive remarks on the nature of the *Book of the Cure*]**

This book, though small in size, is large with regard to the science [contained in it], and most of the discipline will hardly be missed by he who considers it attentively and ponders it up to the additions that it is not customary to learn from other books. The first of the sections it contains is the science of Logic. Before we start with the science of Logic, we ourselves shall briefly indicate the quiddity of these sciences, so that he who ponders this book of ours becomes like he who gets acquainted with the complexes of the purposes.

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## [الفصل الثاني]

### فصل في التنبيه على العلوم والمنطق

١٢ (1.1) فنقول إنّ الغرض في الفلسفة أن يُوقَف على حقائق الأشياء كلها على قدر ما يمكن الإنسان أن يقف عليه. والأشياء الموجودة إمّا أشياء موجودة في الأعيان ليس وجودها باختيارنا وفعلنا وإمّا أشياء وجودها باختيارنا وفعلنا. ومعرفة الأمور التي من القسم الأول تسمّى فلسفة نظرية ومعرفة الأمور التي من القسم الثاني تسمّى فلسفة عملية.

والفلسفة النظرية إنّما الغاية فيها تكميل النفس بأن تعلم فقط؛ والفلسفة العملية إنّما الغاية فيها تكميل النفس لا بأن تعلم فقط، بل

[عملية 8... والأشياء 4 Cf. AL-KINDĪ, *Kitāb fī l-Falsafa l-Ūlā*, p. 9.8-9. 4 [عليه 4... الغرض 3 Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 124.4-6; Id., *Risāla šudira bihā al-Kitāb*, p. 227.21-22.

[عملية 8... والأشياء 4 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* I.1, p. 3.11-4.6. 4 [الرأي 13... فنقول 3 *Dānišnāmāh-yi 'Alā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* p. 1.7-2.5; *Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 6.5-8. 11... والفلسفة 9 *Risāla fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya*, p. 105.5. 6 [معرفة 6 *Risāla fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya*, p. 6.2-4. | والفلسفة 13... [فتعمل *Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 6.2-4. | *Risāla fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya*, p. 105.5-12; *al-Šifā'*, *al-Nafs* V.1, pp. 207.13-208.2.

[على العلوم Mi الفصل الثاني من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق Y الفصل الثاني [فصل 1 وفي v والميزان [والمنطق | *add. in mg.* JNkBG | الأعراض في  $\pi$ DiDa على الأعراض في العلوم للإنسان *in mg.* Te للإنسان *om. et* للإنسان 4 C حقيقة [حقائق | v الحكمة [الفلسفة 3 ADa المنطق *om.* N وفعلنا 6... وإمّا | *κ*BE<sup>2</sup>. *exp. §* 2 في الأعيان 5 *add. κ* في الأعيان [الموجودة | As v حكمة [فلسفة 7 *om.* G الأمور 7... التي | *in mg.* J | وفعلنا To جوها [وجودها 6 *i.l.* فلسفة v حكمة [فلسفة 8 *§* 3 *in mg.* ومعرفة الأمور التي *§* ومعرفتها [التي... ومعرفة | *i.l.* Y | تكميل | v والحكمة [والفلسفة 10 *om. et add. in mg.* G لا 10... بأن | v والحكمة [والفلسفة 9 Y تعمل [تعلم | *§* 2 *om. et add. in mg.* بل... لا | *iter.* No | النفس *om. et add. in mg.* Da | *a.c.* Ka

1 [والمنطق... فصل 1 MSS DaDiToMiŠ preserve the title in the form *faṣl fī al-tanbīh 'alā al-aḡrād fī l-'ulūm wa-l-manṭiq* ("chapter on directing the attention towards the purposes of the sciences and the logic"), and MSS JNkBG add *al-aḡrād fī* in the margin, likely by collation. However, the indices of the contents transmitted by the manuscript tradition the title of the second chapter is always mentioned as *faṣl fī al-tanbīh 'alā l-'ulūm wa-l-manṭiq* even in MSS DaDiToMiŠ. The variant reading might be a later modification of the title made on the basis of Avicenna's mention of the "purpose of philosophy" at the very beginning of the chapter.

[I.2]

**CHAPTER ON DIRECTING THE ATTENTION TOWARDS THE  
SCIENCES AND LOGIC**

**[1. Theoretical and practical philosophy]**

**[1.1. Statement of the objects and purposes in theoretical and  
practical philosophy]**

- Q12            We say that the purpose in philosophy is to understand the  
                  essences of all things, as far as man is able to understand. The existing  
                  things are either things existing in the individuals whose existence is            5  
                  not by our choice and action, or things whose existence is by our  
                  choice and action. The knowledge of the things that belong to the first  
                  section is called “theoretical philosophy”, whereas the knowledge of  
                  the things that belong to the second section is called “practical  
                  philosophy”.
- The aim in theoretical philosophy is perfecting the soul inasmuch  
                  as the soul knows only, whereas the aim in practical philosophy is            10  
                  perfecting the soul not inasmuch as it knows only, but rather inasmuch  
                  as it knows what it does and, thereby, does [it]. The aim of theoretical



[philosophy] is to firmly believe in a contemplative view which does not regard an action, whereas the aim of practical [philosophy] is to know a contemplative view which regards an action; hence, theoretical [philosophy] is worthier [than practical philosophy] to be related to the contemplative view.

## **[1.2. Beings that do not exist because of human choice or action]**

### **[1.2.1. Classification of this kind of beings]**

The things that exist in the individuals whose existence is not by our choice and action are, [on their turn], divided by a first division into two sections: [(a)] the first one [consists in] the things that are associated to motion; [(b)] the second one [consists in] the things that are not associated to motion, like the Intellect and the Creator.

15

[(a)] The things that are associated to motion are [further] divided into two classes: they [(a.1)] either do not have any existence unless as far as it is possible for them<sup>1</sup> to be associated to motion, like humanity, squareness and the like, or [(a.2)] they have an existence independently of that. [(a.1)] The existing things that do not have an existence unless as far as they can be associated to motion are [further] divided into two sections: they are either [(a.1.1)] in such a way that it is not possible for them to be abstracted from a designated matter neither in subsistence nor in estimation, like the form of humanity and that of horseness, or [(a.1.2)] they are in such a way that this is possible for them in estimation though not in subsistence, like squareness, since its conceptualization does not require that a [certain] kind of matter is specifically assigned to it nor that a [certain] state of motion is taken into account. [(a.2)] As to the things for which it is possible to be associated to motion although they exist independently of that, they are like being, unity, multiplicity and causality. Thus, the

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Q13

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<sup>1</sup> I do not accept the suggestion for an emendation of the text and a different translation proposed in MARMURA 1980, p. 242, n. 13. In fact, the clause *yağūzu an tuḥāliṭu l-ḥaraka* seems to be paralleled by the clause *yaṣiḥḥu an tuḥāliṭu l-ḥaraka*, which allows us to understand it in its most plain sense of “it is possible for them to be associated to motion”.



things that are suitable to be abstracted from motion are in such a way that their suitability is either out of necessity or not, being rather in such a way that this is not impossible for them, like the state of unity, being, causality and number, which is the multiplicity.

**[1.2.2. The theoretical inquiry into the things that can be abstracted from matter]**

These [things] are either inquired into [(1)] inasmuch as they are what they are, so that this theoretical inquiry is not different from the theoretical inquiry into them inasmuch as they are abstracted, since they pertain to the complex of the theoretical inquiry that concerns things not inasmuch as they are in a matter (since, inasmuch as they are what they are, they are not in a matter); or [(2)] inasmuch as an accident that only exists in matter occurred to them. This as well [can be divided] into two sections: [(2.i)] that accident can be in such a way that its estimation cannot occur unless with a relation to the specific matter and to motion — like the inquiry into the one inasmuch as it is fire or air, [or the inquiry] into the many inasmuch as they are the elements, into the cause inasmuch as it is, for instance, heat or coldness, and into the intellectual substance inasmuch as it is soul, namely principle of the motion of a body, even if it can be separated in itself. [(2.ii)] That accident can also be in such a way that, even if it does not occur unless with a [certain] relation to a matter and an association to motion, its states can be represented in estimation and be



Q14 clearly perceived without inquiring into the designated matter and into motion in the aforementioned way — like addition and subtraction, multiplication and division, square root extraction and raising to the third power and the other states that attach to number, since that attaches to number when it is [represented] in human estimative faculties or in existing things that are multiplied, divided, subtracted and added, but the conceptualization of this can be abstracted in a certain way, so that there is no need in it to designate specific matters. 45

### [1.3. Classification of the sciences paralleling the classification of beings]

#### [1.3.1. Classification of theoretical sciences]

Consequently, the kinds of sciences can [(1)] deal with the consideration of the existents inasmuch as they are in motion both in conceptualization and in subsistence, depending on matters that specifically belong to the species, [(2)] or deal with the consideration of the existents inasmuch as they are separated from motion in conceptualization though not in subsistence, [(3)] or deal with the consideration of the existents inasmuch as they are separated [from motion] both in subsistence and in conceptualization. 50

[(1)] The first class of sciences is the *natural science*; [(2)] the second one is the pure *mathematical science*, and the commonly-known science of number is part of it (as to the knowledge of the nature of number inasmuch as it is a number, it does not pertain to that science)<sup>2</sup>; [(3)] [finally,] the third one is the *metaphysical science*. Since the existents in nature are divided into these three classes, the philosophical theoretical sciences are these ones. 55

<sup>2</sup> The study of the number qua number pertains to Metaphysics, whereas Mathematics study its accidents; cf. *al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, p. 10.10-16 and *Ibid.* I.3, p. 24.5-9. More in detail, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* III.5 is specifically devoted to ascertain the nature of numbers.

(1.3.2) وأما الفلسفة العملية، فإمّا أن تتعلّق بتعليم الآراء التي تنتظم باستعمالها المشاركة الإنسانية العامة، وتُعرّف بتدبير المدينة وتسمّى علم السياسة؛ وإمّا أن يكون ذلك التعلّق بما تنتظم به المشاركة الإنسانية الخاصة وتُعرّف بتدبير المنزل؛ وإمّا أن يكون ذلك التعلّق بما تنتظم به حال الشخص الواحد في زكاء نفسه ويسمّى علم الأخلاق. وجميع ذلك إنّما تُحقّق صحّة جملته بالبرهان النظري وبالشهادة الشرعية، ويحقّق تفصيله وتقديره بالشرعية الإلهية.

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(1.3.3) والغاية في الفلسفة النظرية معرفة الحقّ والغاية في الفلسفة العملية معرفة الخير.

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٥١ (2.1) وماهيات الأشياء قد تكون في أعيان الأشياء وقد تكون في التصور، فيكون لها اعتبارات ثلاثة: اعتبار الماهية بما هي تلك الماهية غير مضافة إلى أحد الوجودين وما يلحقها من حيث هي كذلك؛ واعتبار لها من حيث هي في الأعيان فيلحقها حينئذ أعرّاض

Quoted in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-dīmān al-ṣidq*, pp. 119.3-120.8. [الغرض 85... وماهيات 66

*Risāla fī* [الإلهية 63... وأما | *Manṭiq al-Maṣriqiyyīn*, p. 7.11-18. [المنزل 60... وأما 57 *Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya*, p. 107.5-108.10; *Dānišnāmah-yi 'Alā'ī, al-Ilāhiyyāt* p. 2.7-3.4. [الأخلاق 62... وإمّا 60 *Letter to Ibn Zayla*, p. 284.1-22. [الخير 65... وأما | *Manṭiq al-Maṣriqiyyīn*, p. 7.8-10. [الخير 65... والغاية 64 *Risāla fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya*, p. 105.12-13. [وماهيات 66 *Manṭiq al-Maṣriqiyyīn*, p. 9.6-14; *Iṣārāt*, p. 202.6-12.

العامة [العامة 58 *a.c. G* فإن [إمّا أن | *s.l. Di* والالهي [الفلسفة العملية | *Di* فأما [وأما 57 *κG* منه [به | *om. et add. in mg. Y* [المنزل 60... وإمّا 59 *s.l. S²* العامة *κλJDaSYi om. T* الخاصة [المشاركة 60 *om. Yi* به 61... المشاركة | *praem. JŞ : om. et add. in mg. To* [حال [المشاركة 60 *in mg. B* ذكا *ToŞN* ذكاء *A* ذكا [زكاء 61 *η* فإمّا [وإمّا | *κŞ* الخاصة *i.l. C* وجوبه *Te* وجوبه *praem. s.l. Nk* [جملته | *om. N* صحّة | *N* تتحقّق *A* يتحقّق [تُحقّق | *Te* أو بالشهادة *Da* والشهادة [وبالشهادة 63 *add. a.c. Ş* الشخص الواحد *N* جملته وجوبه *No* وجوبه *No* بالشرعية [بالشرعية | *TeMiG* وتحقيقه *AsDi* وتحققه [وتقديره | *As* بالشهادة *Di* وبالشهادات *E* *om.* هي 68... تلك | *Te* للماهية [الماهية 67 *Law* الأعيان [أعيان الأشياء 66 *Ş* فالغاية [أو الغاية 64 *Law* فيلحقها حينئذ أعرّاض تخص وجودها ذلك من حيث هي في الأعيان *om. et* ذلك 70... فيلحقها 69 *add. in mg. G* | أيضا [حينئذ *κ*

*i.l. Di* أي المحققان [الحقّ 64 *in mg. NkB* أي إذا اعتبر مقارنة الشيء [نفسه 61... وإمّا 60

### **[1.3.2. Classification of the practical sciences]**

As to practical philosophy, it either concerns the teaching of the views by the use of which the general human association is organized, and is known as the direction of the city and called “science of Politics”; or it concerns that by which the specific human association is organized, and is known as the household management; or, [finally,] it concerns that by which the condition of the single individual is organized with regard to the integrity of his own soul, and is called “science of Ethics”. The validity of this whole complex is only verified by means of a theoretical demonstration and by the testimony of the law, whereas its division [into particular sections] and assessment are verified by the divine law. 60

### **[1.3.3. Conclusive remarks on the aim of theoretical and practical philosophy]**

The aim in theoretical philosophy is the knowledge of the truth, whereas the aim in practical philosophy is the knowledge of the good. 65

## **[2. Logic]**

### **[2.1. Three ways of considering the quiddities of things]**

Q15 The quiddities of the things can either be in individual things or in conceptualization, so that there are three ways to consider them, [namely] [(1)] a consideration of the quiddity inasmuch as it is that quiddity which is not related to one of the two [kinds of] existence and to what attaches to it inasmuch as it is in that way; [then,] [(2)] a consideration of it inasmuch as it is in the individuals, so that, in that

70 تخص وجودها ذلك؛ واعتبار لها من حيث هي في التصور فيلحقها حينئذ أعراض تخص وجودها ذلك مثل الوضع والحمل، ومثل الكلية والجزئية في الحمل والذاتية والعرضية في الحمل وغير ذلك مما ستعلمه، فإنه ليس في الموجودات الخارجية ذاتية ولا عرضية حملا ولا كون الشيء مبتدأ ولا كونه خبرا ولا مقدمة ولا قياسا ولا غير ذلك. 75

(2.2) وإذا أردنا أن نتفكر في الأشياء ونعلمها فنحتاج ضرورة إلى أن ندخلها في التصور، فتعرض لها ضرورة الأحوال التي تكون في التصور، فنحتاج ضرورة إلى أن نعتبر الأحوال التي لها في التصور، وخصوصا ونحن نروم بالفكرة أن نستدرك المجهولات وأن يكون ذلك من المعلومات. والأمور إنما تكون مجهولة بالقياس إلى الذهن لا محالة، وكذلك إنما تكون معلومة بالقياس إليه. والحال والعارض الذي يعرض لها حتى تنتقل من معلومها إلى مجهولها هو حال وعارض يعرض لها في التصور، وإن كان ما لها في ذاتها أيضا موجودا مع ذلك، فمن الضرورة أن يكون لنا علم بهذه الأحوال وأنها كم هي وكيف هي وكيف تُعتبر في هذا الغرض. 80 85

om. حينئذ 71 add. Law تلك الماهية § a.c. G πTDi in mg. من حيث هي في الأعيان [ذلك 70 KaTC | تخص [تخص As om. C.s.l. Te | ذلك] a.c. Di حينئذ ذلك | KaTC الخارجية [الخارجية | a.c. G في الموجود [في | Law نستعمله غ استعمله [استعمله N و [ولا | KaNk و [ولا | غ كونه مقدمة [مقدمة | om. et add. s.l. N مبتدأ 74 LawKaDiSG] s.l. الأحوال § الأعراض [الأحوال 77 Law ونظمها J om. T ونعلمها [ونعلمها 76 et لا s.l. Nk 2التصور... فنحتاج | in mg. Te التي... فنحتاج | G فتعرض فنحتاج [فنحتاج 78 om. v تكون | S<sup>2</sup> ندخلها في التصور فتعرض لها ضرورة الأحوال التي تكون في التصور فنحتاج ضرورة إلى [أن | om. No add. فنحتاج ضرورة إلى أن يعتبر الأحوال التي لها في التصور [2التصور | To تكون [لها | add. T أن Miš بالفكر A بالفطرة [بالفكرة | s.l. S<sup>2</sup> نروم § نريد [نروم | om. Law وخصوصا 79 To om. v add. s.l. Y إنما 81 om. Di a.c. تلك in mg. E تلك Da\$No تلك ذلك 80 § ندرك [نستدرك أيضا 83 N من مجهولها إلى معلومها [مجهولها... من | om. et add. mg. B لها 82 Law إليها [إليه a.c. كم وهي [كم هي | C وإنما [وأنها | Ka بها [بهذه الأحوال | add. E الغرض [ذلك 84 om. Law العرض [العرض §Law الغرض | As يصير [تُعتبر 85 om. et add. in mg. T هي 85... وكيف | To §JNk\$ العارض KaBCDaEd. s.l. S<sup>2</sup> in mg. Te العامي s.l. Di

in mg. NkB أي إذا اعتبرت الماهية من حيث تلزمها لوازم فيكون به منطقيًا [التصور... واعتبار 70 in أي يعتبر معقوله حسب وما يلحقها من حيث هي كذلك واعتبار لها من حيث هي في الأعيان [التصور... من mg. NkB

case, [certain] accidents that specifically belong to that existence of the quiddity attach to it; [finally], [(3)] a consideration of it inasmuch as it is in conceptualization, so that, in that case, [certain] accidents that specifically belong to that existence of the quiddity attach to it, like being a subject of predication and a predicate, like universality and particularity in predication, essentiality and accidentality in predication and other things you will learn: in fact, there is no essentiality nor accidentality in predication in the external existents, nor the fact that the thing is a subject of predication or a predicate, nor its being a premise or a syllogism, nor anything else. 70 75

**[2.2. The necessity of knowing the states of the quiddities in conceptualization in order to acquire knowledge of the unknown]**

If we want to reflect upon things and know them, we necessarily need to introduce them in conceptualization; then, the states that are in conceptualization necessarily occur to them, so that we necessarily need to consider the states that belong to them in conceptualization, especially in case we wish to supply the ignored things by reflecting, and [we wish] that this [process] starts from known things. Things are inevitably ignored only in relation to the mind, and analogously they are known only in relation to it. The state and the accidental feature that occur to them so that we move from what is known to what is ignored of them are a state and an accidental feature occurring to them in conceptualization, even if what belongs to them in their essence exists with that as well; hence, it is necessary, for us, to have knowledge of these states, of how many they are, of how they are and of how they are considered with regard to this purpose. 80 85



### [2.3. Logic as a part or an instrument of philosophy]

Q16 Since this theoretical inquiry is not a theoretical inquiry concerning the things inasmuch as they exist according to one of the two aforementioned kinds of existence, but rather inasmuch as it is useful for the acquisition of the states of those two [kinds of] existence, then for him who holds that philosophy deals with the inquiry into the things inasmuch as they are existent and divided into the two aforementioned [kinds of] existence, this science will not be a part of philosophy, and — inasmuch as it is useful for that — it will be, according to him, an instrument of philosophy. [On the other hand,] for him who holds that philosophy deals with every theoretical inquiry under every respect, this as well will be a part of philosophy and, [at the same time], an instrument for the other parts of philosophy; we shall add to this an explanation in what follows<sup>3</sup>. 90

The disputes occurring in similar questions are vain and superfluous: they are vain because there is no contradiction between the two statements, for each one of the two means by “philosophy” a different notion; [then], they are superfluous because dealing with similar things is not useful. 95

### [2.4. Conclusive remarks on Logic]

This sort of theoretical inquiry is called “science of Logic”, and it is the theoretical inquiry into these aforementioned things inasmuch as one arrives, from them, to making the unknown known, and [into] what occurs to them inasmuch as they are in this way and not in a different one. 100

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<sup>3</sup>) Namely in *Šifāʾ*, *al-Qiyās* I.2.

## [الفصل الثالث]

### فصل في منفعة المنطق

(1) لما كان استكمال الإنسان من جهة ما هو إنسان ذو عقل —  
على ما سيوضح لك في موضعه — هو في أن يعلم الحق لأجل  
نفسه والخير لأجل العمل به واقتباسه، وكانت الفطرة الأولى  
والبدئية من الإنسان وحدهما قليلتي المعونة على ذلك، وكان جلّ ما  
يحصل له من ذلك إنما يحصل بالاكتساب، وكان هذا الاكتساب  
هو اكتساب المجهول، وكان مكسب المجهول هو المعلوم، وجب أن  
يكون الإنسان يبتدئ أولاً فيعلم أنه كيف يكون له اكتساب المجهول  
من المعلوم وكيف يكون حال المعلومات وانتظامها في أنفسها حتى  
تُفيد العلم بالمجهول، أي حتى إذا ترتبت في الذهن الترتب الواجب  
فتقررت فيه صورة تلك المعلومات على الترتيب الواجب، انتقل  
الذهن منها إلى المجهول المطلوب فعلمه.

(2.1) وكما أنّ الشيء يُعلم من وجهين — أحدهما أن يتصور فقط  
حتى، إذا كان له اسم فنطق به، تمثل معناه في الذهن وإن لم يكن

6 وكان... 8 [المعلوم] ARIST. *APo* 71a1-b8.

3 *al-Sifā'*, *al-Nafs* V.1, p. 206.11-13; *Ibid.*, pp. 208.15-209.13; *al-Ilāhiyyāt* I.3, p. 17.8-9. 7 وكان... 8 [المعلوم] *al-Sifā'*, *al-Burhān* I.3, p. 57.18-19; *ibid.* 74.13-75.7. 8 [فعلمه] 13... 13 *Isārāt*, pp. 169.1-177.2. 11 أي... 13 [فعلمه] *al-Sifā'*, *al-Burhān* I.3, p. 60.6-7. 14 [بالمجهول] 30... 30 *Isārāt*, pp. 181.7-183.2.

3 *s.l.* J كان Y الفصل الثالث Mi الفصل الثالث من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق [فصل 1  
هو | *add. Di* إنشاء الله تعالى [موضعه | Ed. ذلك] لك | *om. et add. in mg. G* E كما [على ما 4  
*in mg. To om. §* واقتناء ET واقتباسه 5 *§<sup>3</sup>N* *om. et add. s.l.* في A بأن [في أن | *om. v*  
*add. κY* الغريزية [والبدئية] 6 *§* الإنسانية [الفطرة] | *Yi* وكان [وكانت | *et add. s.l. §<sup>3</sup>*  
[قليلتي] *To a.c.* وهما [وحدهما | *§<sup>3</sup>* *om. § add. in mg.* من الإنسان | *Yi* الغريزية *§<sup>3</sup>*  
*Nk* *add. et exp. Nk* يحصل له من ذلك [إنما | *§ a.c. iter:* ذلك... 7 له *Nk* فكان [وكان | Ed. قليلتي  
*κ* ما يكسب *§<sup>2</sup>* *s.l.* *MiNo* مكتسب *J in mg.* مكتسب *TDiDa§* ما به يكتسب [مكتسب 8  
الترتيب [الترتب | *om. et add. mg. T* أي *om. κJDa* أي 11 *om. MiG* له | *s.l. Te* مبتدأ [يبتدئ 9  
*om. et add. in mg.* تلك | *KaYi* صور [صورة | *§<sup>3</sup>* *s.l.* وتقررت [فتقررت 12 *§<sup>2</sup>* *s.l.* *KaDiMiŠY*  
*Da* الترتيب [الترتيب | *κDaNo* المعقولات [المعلومات | *Y om. Yi* *mg.*

[I.3]

## CHAPTER ON THE UTILITY OF LOGIC

**[1. Knowledge is attained by acquisition]**

Q17 Since the perfection of man, with respect to the fact that he is a man that has an intellect — as it will be explained to you in its place<sup>1</sup> —, consists in knowing the truth for the sake of itself and the good for the sake of doing it and [for the sake of] its acquisition, and since man's first natural disposition and intuition alone are of little help in this [purpose], [since] most of what is realized for him from this is only realized by acquisition, and [since] this acquisition is the acquisition of the unknown and what makes it possible to acquire the unknown is the known, then it is necessary for man to start by first knowing how he acquires the unknown from the known and how is the state of known things and their arrangement in themselves so that they provide knowledge of the unknown, i.e. so that, when they are arranged in the mind in the necessary way, and the form of those known things is fixed in the mind in the necessary arrangement, the mind moves from them to the unknown which is the object of the inquiry, and knows it. 5 10

**[2. Conceptualization and assent]****[2.1. The way in which things are known or ignored]**

[(a)] The thing is known under two respects: [(a.1)] the first consists in its conceptualization only, so that, provided that it has a name by 15

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<sup>1)</sup> Namely in *Šifā'*, *al-Nafs* V.1.

هناك صدق أو كذب، كما إذا قيل «إنسان» أو قيل «افعل كذا» فإنك إذا وقفت على معنى ما تخاطب به من ذلك كنت تصورته. والثاني أن يكون مع التصور تصديق، فيكون إذا قيل لك مثلاً إن كلّ بياض عرض، لم يحصل لك من هذا تصور معنى هذا القول فقط، بل صدقت أنه كذلك. فأما إذا شككت أنه كذلك أو ليس كذلك، فقد تصورت ما يقال، فإنك لا تشك فيما لا تتصوره ولا تفهمه ولكنك لم تصدق به بعد، وكل تصديق فيكون مع تصور ولا ينعكس. والتصور في مثل هذا المعنى يفيدك أن يحدث في الذهن صورة هذا التآليف وما يؤلف منه كالبياض والعرض. والتصديق هو أن يحصل في الذهن نسبة هذه الصورة إلى الأشياء أنفسها أنها مطابقة لها والتكذيب يخالف ذلك. — كذلك الشيء يُجهل من وجهين، أحدهما من جهة التصور والثاني من جهة التصديق، فيكون كل واحد منهما لا يحصل معلوماً إلا بالكسب، ويكون كسب كل واحد منهما بمعلوم سابق متقدم وبهيئة وصفة تكون لذلك المعلوم لأجلها ينتقل الذهن من العلم بها إلى العلم بالمجهول.

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١٨ق

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(2.2) فهاهنا شيء من شأنه أن يفيد العلم بالمجهول تصوّره وشيء من شأنه أن يفيد العلم بالمجهول تصديقه، ولم تجر العادة بأن يفرض للمعنى الجامع من حيث علمه يفيد علم تصور شيء اسم جامع أو لم

*al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* I.1, p. 53.4-6. 27... فيكون 27 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* I.3, pp. 57.18-58.9. 31... فهاهنا 31 Cf. *Mantiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, pp. 9.22-10.4. 32... ولم 32 Cf. *Išārāt*, p. 184.4-5.

[فأما 20 *om. et add. s.l. Š<sup>3</sup>* مثلًا 18 *add. JT* قد [كنت | *om. Da* معنى 17 *A* فعل [افعل 16 *om.* بعد | *in mg. Nk* واللفظ [ولكنك 22 *KaEd.* وقد [فقد 21 *E* شكلت [شككت | *κμνξEDa* وأما منهما [منه | *om. JDa* هذا 24 *No* *om. et add. s.l.* مثل 23 *A* تصوّره [تصور | *et add. s.l. N* *om. et* كسب 28 *EN* يحصل [يُجهل 26 *mg. Te* منه ظ *et* منها *As* منها *A* هذه *NkC* *s.l.* منهما *vE* *iter. a.c. Š* تكون | *om. et add. in mg. T* وصفة | *JTYi* بهيئة [وبهيئة 29 *in mg. J* شيء 31 *om. G* بالمجهول... بالمجهول | *om. v add. in mg. Y* من... من | *JŠ* انتقل [ينتقل 30 *om. et add. in mg. Da* بالمجهول... تصوّره | *om. et add. s.l. Y* *om. Š* *om. a.c. To* لم | *in mg. C* عام [جامع | *om. A* شيء | *add. in mg. G* أن حيث  $\pi$  حيث 33

which it is expressed, its notion is represented in the mind even if there is neither truth nor falsity, like when it is said “man” or “do this”, since when you understand the notion of [the expression] by means of which you are addressed, you have conceptualized it. [(a.2)] The second one consists in that, besides the conceptualization, there is also an assent, so that, when you are told, for instance, “every whiteness is an accident”, not only the conceptualization of the notion of this statement is realized for you from this, but you also give assent to the fact that it is so. As to when you doubt whether it is so or not, you have conceptualized what is said, for you do not doubt about what you did not conceptualize nor understand, but you have not yet given assent to it, since every assent comes with a conceptualization but not the reverse. The conceptualization regarding a similar notion helps you to produce in the mind the form of this composition and of that by which it is composed, like “whiteness” and “accident”. The assent consists in realizing in the mind the relation of this form to the things themselves with regard to the fact that [the form] corresponds to them, whereas the denial is the opposite. [(b)] Analogously, the thing is [also] ignored under two respects, [(b.1)] firstly under the respect of conceptualization and [(b.2)] secondly under the respect of assent. Both of them<sup>2</sup> are only realized as known by acquisition, and the acquisition of each one of them [is attained] by means of something already previously known and by means of a disposition and an attribute that belong to that known thing, in virtue of which the mind is moved from the knowledge of them to the knowledge of the unknown.

Q18

### **[2.2. Distinction between what provides conceptualization and what provides assent]**

There is something whose conceptualization can provide knowledge of the unknown, and something [else] whose assent can provide knowledge of the unknown. It has not become customary that a comprehensive name is assigned to the comprehensive notion as far

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<sup>2)</sup> I.e. the thing ignored under the respect of the conceptualization and of the assent.

35 يبلغنا؛ لأنّ منه حدًا ومنه رسماً ومنه مثالا ومنه علامة ومنه اسماً، على ما سيوضح لك، وليس لهما يشترك فيه اسم عام. وأما الشيء الذي يترتب أولاً معلوماً ثم يُعلم به غيره على سبيل التصديق، فإنّ ذلك الشيء يسمّى كيف كان حجةً فمنه قياس ومنه استقراء ومنه تمثيل ومنه أشياء أخرى.

40 (2.3.1) فغاية علم المنطق أن يفيد الذهن معرفة هذين الشئيين فقط، وهو أن يعرف الإنسان أنّه كيف يجب أن يكون القول الموقّع للتصور حتى يكون مُعرِّفاً حقيقة ذات الشيء؛ وكيف يكون حتى يكون دالاً عليه وإن لم يتوصّل به إلى حقيقة ذاته؛ وكيف يكون فاسداً مُخَيِّلاً أنّه يفعل ذلك ولا يكون يفعل ذلك، ولم يكن كذلك وما الفصول التي بينها.

45 (2.3.2) وأيضاً أن يعرف الإنسان أنّه كيف يكون القول الموقّع للتصديق حتى يكون موقعا تصديقا يقينياً بالحقيقة لا يصح انتقاضه؛ وكيف يكون حتى يكون موقعا تصديقا يقارب اليقين؛ وكيف يكون

Quoted in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-dimān al-ṣidq*, pp. 124.15-125.12. [غيره 61... يفيد 39]

*Naḡāt* p. 58... فغاية 39. *Isārāt*, p. 185.1-4; *Ibid.*, p. 415.6-11. [أخرى 38... وأما 35] *al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* I.1, p. 51.10-14; pp. 51.17-52.1. [انتقاضه 46... أيضاً 45] *al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* I.1, p. 51.10-14; pp. 51.17-52.1. [فاسداً 49... وكيف 47]

*om. et add. in mg.* §<sup>3</sup> ومنه علامة | *Y* رسم [رسماً] | *om. No* حد [حدًا] | *v* إلا أن [لأنّ] 34 عام *§ in mg. NkBT* جامع [عام] | *om. et add. s.l. §<sup>2</sup>* لك | *EDaG* وعلى [على] على 35 اسم [اسماً] | *an* | *add. Law* أعني الحد والقياس : *om. Law* فقط 40 *om. κ* الشيء 37 *Ed.* عام جامع *§<sup>2</sup> s.l.* | *om.* ذلك | *Law* فلا [ولا] | *As* متخيلاً [مُخَيِّلاً] 43 *No* المرفع [المُوقّع] | *om. Yi* القول | *Nk* أنه [كذلك] | *JTTo* يكن [يُكون] | *§<sup>3</sup> in mg. Te* ولم يكن كذلك [كذلك]... ولم | *As* [بينها] | *om. T* التي | *a.c. To* وأما *i.l. Nk* هي [وما] 44 *G* كل ذلك *Ed.* ذلك كل ذلك كذلك المرفع *om. C* الموقّع | *om. et add. s.l. To* كيف 45 *om. et add. s.l. §<sup>3</sup>* *J om. et add. in mg.* بينها *et* بينهما *add. Nk* معنى يكون [يُكون] 47 *v* ولا [لا] | *Law* يقينياً [يقينياً] 46 *No*

*in mg. As<sup>2</sup>* لعل اصطلاح القول الشارح والمعرف والتعريف ليس في زمان الشيخ الرئيس [اسم عام 35] *i.l. Di* 40 *43*... أنه *40* *i.l. Di* وقول الشارح لا يقع بأن الاسم به تتميم وقول الشارح مركب [أخرى... ومنه 38] *in mg. B* وجدت في نسخة مصححة من لفظه أنه إلى قوله ولم يكون مضروباً عليه القلم [يكون] *in mg. B* *i.l. Di* أي الفروق [الفصول] 44

as its knowledge provides knowledge of the conceptualization of something, or it was not transmitted to us, because definition, description, example, sign and name [all] take part to [this notion], as it will be clarified to you, but the [notion] that [these] share has not a common name<sup>3</sup>. As to the thing that is classified at first as known, and by means of which, then, something else is known by way of assent, that thing is called, no matter how it is, “proof”, and it can be a syllogism, an induction, an analogy or something else. 35

### [2.3. The aim of Logic]

#### [2.3.1. Knowledge of what produces conceptualization]

The aim of the science of Logic is to provide to the mind knowledge of these two things only: [firstly,] that man knows [(aa)] how a statement that produces conceptualization should be in order to make the truth of the thing’s essence known<sup>4</sup>; [(ab)] and how it is so that it signifies it, even if one does not reach the truth of the thing’s essence by it<sup>5</sup>; [(ac)] and how it is false, giving the impression of doing that, though without doing it, and why it is so and what are the differences between [these cases]. 40

#### [2.3.2. Knowledge of what provides assent]

[Secondly, the aim of Logic] is also that man knows [(ba)] how the statement that produces assent is in order to produce an assent that is truly certain and cannot be invalidated<sup>6</sup>; [(bb)] and how it is in order to produce an assent close to certitude<sup>7</sup>; [(bc)] and how it is in such a way 45

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<sup>3</sup>) This remark is quite puzzling, for Avicenna states the opposite in *K. al-Iṣārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt* p. 184.4-5 and *Manṭiq al-Maṣriqiyyīn*, p. 10.1-3, where he refers to the use of calling what produces conceptualization “explanatory statement” (*qawl ṣāriḥ*); see Commentary. | <sup>4</sup>) I.e. the definition (*ḥadd*). | <sup>5</sup>) I.e. the description (*rasm*). | <sup>6</sup>) I.e. Demonstrative syllogism (*qiyās burhānī*). | <sup>7</sup>) I.e. Dialectic syllogism (*qiyās ḡadālī*).

بحيث يُظنُّ به أنه على إحدى الصورتين ولا يكون كذلك، بل يكون باطلا فاسدا؛ وكيف يكون حتى يوقع عليه ظنٌّ وميل نفس وقناعة من غير تصديق جزم؛ وكيف يكون القول حتى يُؤثِّر في النفس ما يؤثِّره التصديق والتكذيب من إقدام وامتناع وانبساط وانقباض لا من حيث يوقع تصديقا بل من حيث يحيل، فكثير من الخيالات يفعل في هذا الباب فعل التصديق، فإنك إذا قلت للعسل إنه مُرة مقيئة، نفرت الطبيعة عن تناوله مع تكذيب لذلك البتة كما تنفر لو كان هناك تصديق أو شبيهه به قريب منه؛ وما الفصول بينها ولم كانت كذلك. وهذه الصناعة يحتاج متعلمها القاصد فيها قصد هذين الغرضين إلى مقدمات منها يتوصل إلى معرفة الغرضين وهذه الصناعة هي المنطق.

(3.1) وقد يتفق للإنسان أن ينبعث في غريزته حدٌّ موقِع للتصوُّر وحمَّة موقعة للتصديق، إلا أنَّ ذلك يكون شيئا غير صناعي ولا يُؤمِّن غلطه في غيره؛ فإنه لو كانت الغريزة والقريحة في ذلك ممَّا يكفينا طلب الصناعة كما في كثير من الأمور لكان لا يعرض من الاختلاف والتناقض في المذاهب ما عرض، ولكن الإنسان الواحد

[منه...55 وكيف 50 *al-Šifā*, *al-Burhān* I.1, p. 51.14-16; p. 52.1. 51... وانبساط *Nağāt* p. 9.1-3; *al-Šifā*, *al-Burhān* I.1, p. 52.1-2; *Ibid.*, I.4, p. 63.4-13. 52... فكثير *al-Šifā*, *al-Nafs* IV.3, p. 52 *Qānūn* I.i.VI.4, p. 126.20-21. 53... وانقباض *Nağāt*, p. 121.4-9; *Uyūn al-Hikma, al-Manṭiq*, p. 13.16-14.2. 182.12-183.1; *Risāla fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya*, p. 116.3-9. 61... فإنه *Risāla fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya*, p. 116.3-9. 61... وقد *Nağāt*, p. 7.9-11.

[يوقع 49 *add. S et exp. S<sup>2</sup>* ربما [بل | E أحد [إحدى | *om. Law* به | *om. Law* حتى [بحيث 48 *Law* يؤثِّر [يؤثِّره 51 *Law* يكون مؤثرا [يؤثِّر 50 *add. κμνE s.l. S<sup>2</sup>* به [ظنٌّ | κ يكون يوقع في هذا الباب [الباب... يفعل 53 *Mi* وكثير κ فكثيرا [فكثير | *om. C* لمن 52 *om. Law* والتكذيب الطبع [الطبيعة | *Law* نفر [نفرت 54 *i.l. NkC* للعسل KaJNkTC في العسل [للعسل | *Law* يفعل DiToSG شبيها [شبيهه | *om. Law* المنطق 58... أو | *add. S et exp. S<sup>2</sup>* تنفر 55 *Law* منه *om. Te* | *in mg. ad praem. ad* DiSG به قريبا *add. s.l. To* به قريبا *om. et* به قريب *add. a.c.* هي المنطق [الصناعة | *To* كان [كانت 56 *κπ* التي بينها *J in mg. et* بينهما [بينها | *C* 61 *inv. JYi* ذلك يكون *G in mg.* عن *To i.l.* عن *Mi* عن [في 59 *E* منها [فيها | *No* مما *κνEDiToSG* مما يكفينا في ذلك [JATSγ يكفينا... في<sup>2</sup> | *s.l. N* القريحة *et* والطبيعة [القريحة | *DaMi* يكفينا [الاختلاف 63 *T* الأحوال [الأمور | *om. κ* طلب الصناعة 62 *S<sup>3</sup>* يكفينا [يكفينا | *γY* يعرض [عرض | *T* الاختلافات

Q19 that it is believed to be according one of [these] two forms without being [actually] so, and being rather invalid and false<sup>8</sup>; [(bd)] and how it is in order to produce an opinion, an inclination of the soul and a satisfaction without a categorical assent<sup>9</sup>; [(be)] and how is the statement that produces on the soul the same effect as assent and denial in proposing and denying, expanding and contracting [the soul]<sup>10</sup>, not insofar as it produces an assent, but rather insofar as it [makes us] falsely imagine [to do so], for many imaginations do in this regard what assent does, since when you say of honey that it is a vomitive bile, nature abstains from taking it, in spite of an absolute denial of that [false imagination], as it would abstain if there were an assent [concerning that imagination] or something similar and close to it<sup>11</sup>; [and that man knows] what the differences between them are, and why they are so. He who wants to learn this discipline and who pursues in it these two purposes needs [some] premises from which he attains knowledge of the two purposes; this discipline is Logic. 50 55

### [3. The use of the discipline of Logic in the acquisition of knowledge]

#### [3.1. Inadequacy of human natural disposition to acquire safe knowledge]

It can happen to man that a definition that produces conceptualization and a proof that produces assent arise in his natural disposition, but this is something which does not pertain to the discipline outside the domain of which one is not safe from mistake; in fact, if the natural disposition and the natural genius were, in this as in many [other] circumstances, among what can dispense us from the 60

<sup>8</sup>) I.e. Sophistic syllogism (*qiyās sūfistā'ī*). | <sup>9</sup>) I.e. Rhetoric syllogism (*qiyās ḥaṭābī*). | <sup>10</sup>) It is a reference to the Stoic view according to which imaginations might generate an expansion or a contraction of the soul. | <sup>11</sup>) I.e. Poetic syllogism (*qiyās šī'rī*).



quest of the discipline, then there would not occur the controversies and the contradictions with regard to the [philosophical] doctrines that occur, nor the same man would sometimes fall in contradiction with himself when relying on his natural genius. Human nature is not sufficient for that, until the discipline is not acquired, as it is not sufficient in many other activities, even if in some of them a lucky guess might occur to it. 65

**[3.2. Cases of inadequacy of the discipline of Logic to acquire safe knowledge]**

Even if the discipline is realized for man at the highest possible level, it is not sufficient under every respect, so that [man] does not err at all, since sometimes one departs from the discipline, and in many circumstances one desists from employing it not because the discipline in itself does not preserve or prevent [him] from error, but [several] things might happen. Firstly, with respect to the fact that he who applies the discipline has not fully acquired the discipline in its entirety; secondly [with respect to] the fact that, although he has fully acquired it, in some places he neglects it, contenting himself with [his] natural genius; thirdly [with respect to] the fact that often it happens to him to be unable to employ it, or to depart from it. 70

Q20

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**[3.3. Advantages for those who master the discipline of Logic]**

Even if it is so, however, the errors that occur to the master of [this] science, if he masters the discipline and employs it, are not like [the errors] that occur to him who is deprived of it; moreover, if [the master of this science] repeats one of the actions pertaining to his discipline

تدارك إهمال، إن كان وقع منه فيه، لأن صاحب الصناعة، إذا أفسد عمله مرة أو مرارا، تمكن من الاستصلاح، إلا أن يكون متناهيا في البلادة؛ فإذا كان كذلك فلا يقع له السهو في مهمات صناعته التي تعينه المعاودة فيها، وإن وقع له سهو في نوافلها. 80

وللإنسان في معتقداته أمور مهمة جدا وأمور تليها في الاهتمام. فصاحب صناعة المنطق يتأتى له أن يجتهد في تأكيد الأمر في تلك المهمات بمراجعات عَرَض عمله على قانونه، والمراجعات الصناعية فقد يُبلغ بها أمان من الغلط، كمن يجمع تفاصيل حساب واحد مرارا للاستظهار فتزول عنه الشبهة في عقد الجملة. 85

Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [سهو... تعينه 82] Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [عمله 80... فيه 79] Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [بمراجعات 85... تأكيد 84] Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [الجملة... فتزول 87] Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking.

84 صاحب... [الجملة 87] *Al-Mantiq al-Mūğaz*, p. 156.3-12.

لج. *add.* كثيرة [مرارا 80] *praem. in mg.* DiG سهوا π سهوا فيه J: *in mg.* سهوا فيه *om. et* فيه 79 السهو JNkC سهو [السهو | *om. et add. s.l.* To له | *om. Law* الجملة 87... فإذا | § وإذا [فإذا 81] *in mg.* B نوافله ελDa نوافله [نوافلها 82] *MiNo* صناعية [صناعته | *om. C* مهمات | *s.l. Nk* [بمراجعات 85] *add. et exp. E* مقدمات [تأكيد 84] *Te* معداده [معتقداته | *AS* فللإنسان [وللإنسان 83] *add. mg. As* إذا *om. Y om. et add. s.l. Yi* واحد | *om. E* من 86 *s.l. Y* بعرض [عَرَض | *add. mg. As* إذا *om. Da* عنه 87

many times, he will be able to compensate [his] inattention, if any ever occurred to him, because if the master of the discipline spoils his activity one or more times, he is [however] able to correct it, unless he is extremely stupid. If it is so, then it does not occur to him an error with regard to the important subjects of his discipline that oblige him to repeat them, even if it occurred to him an error with regard to [some] secondary subjects. 80

The man has, in his convictions, some very important things and some [other] things following them in importance. It is possible for the master of the discipline of Logic to work to corroborate the thing with regard to those important topics by means of recurrent expositions of his activity according to the discipline's rule. Sometimes one reaches a [certain] security against error by means of the recurrent [expositions] of the discipline, like him who adds up the elements of a single calculation more times out of precaution, so that the doubt concerning the result of the addition disappears. 85

(4) فهذه الصناعة لا بدّ منها في استكمال الإنسان الذي لم يؤيد بخاصية تكفيه الكسب. ونسبة هذه الصناعة إلى الرويّة الباطنة التي تسمّى النطق الداخلي كنسبة النحو إلى العبارة الظاهرة التي تسمّى النطق الخارجي وكنسبة العرّوض إلى الشعر، لكنّ العرّوض ليس ينفع كثيرا في قرص الشعر، بل الذوق السليم يغني عنه والنحو العربي قد تغني عنه أيضا الفطرة البدوية؛ وأمّا هذه الصناعة فلا غنى عنها للإنسان المكتسب للعلم بالنظر والرويّة، إلا أن يكون إنسانا مؤيدا من عند الله فتكون نسبته إلى المرويين نسبة البدوي إلى المتعريين.

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العربي 93... الذوق 92 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [النحو 90... التي 89] Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [الله 95... إنسانا 94] Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking.

89 ونسبة [المتعريين 96... ونسبة 89] AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 68.4-10; Ibid., p. 74.4-10; Ibid., p. 75.7-12; Ibid., p. 78.3-6; Id., *Risāla ṣudira bihā al-Kitāb*, p. 225.5-10.

88 فهذه [الكسب 89... فهذه 88] *Kitāb fī al-Nafs 'alā sunnat al-iḥṭiṣār*, chap. 8, pp. 364.19-365.4. فهذه [المتعريين 96... فهذه 88] *Naḡāt* p. 9.4-8.

T المنطق [النطق 90] ع يؤيده add. Law من عند الله [يؤيد | T لا | لم | a.c. G الاستكمال] 88 ولكن [لكنّ | om. et add. in mg. Ka العرّوض... إلى | To ونسبة | وكنسبة | No نطق] 91 وكذلك [البدوية 93... والنحو | om. Nk عنه | om. et add. in mg. Da الشعر... في 92] a.c. § الإنسانية [الفطرة | om. § أيضا | A§ ع] add. أيضا [العربي 93] Law الفطرة البدوية قد تغني عن النحو عز [الله 95] T إنسا [إنسانا | A وبالروية | الروية] Di عنه [فيها | عنها 94] add. § et exp. §<sup>2</sup> وغل [المرويين et المروي B a.c.? المروي s.l. Nk المروي] Di سبجانه وتعالى add. J وغل [البدويين] Law بدويين [البدوي | STe كنسبة | نسبة | ع المروي A in mg.

95 in mg. Y المرويين المفكرين من الروية [المرويين 95]

#### [4. Conclusion on the necessity of Logic]

This discipline is necessary for perfecting the man who is not supported by a proper quality dispensing him from acquiring [knowledge]. The relation of this discipline to the internal reflection that is called “interior locution” is like the relation of grammar to the external expression that is called “exterior locution”, and like the relation of prosody to poetry. Prosody, however, is not very useful to write poetry, for the good taste [for poetry] does not need it, and also the Bedouin’s nature does not need Arabic grammar [in order to speak Arabic], but as to this discipline, the man who acquires the science through the theoretical inquiry and the reflection needs it, unless he is a man supported by God, so that his relation to those who reflect is the same as that of the Bedouin to those who try to learn Arabic.



[I.4]

Q21

**CHAPTER ON THE SUBJECT OF LOGIC****[1. Conceptualization and assent in relation to simple and composite notions]**

It is not possible for the mind to be moved from a single simple notion to the assent of anything, since the judgement concerning the existence and the non-existence of that notion is not a single one in making that assent occur. In fact, if the assent occurs no matter whether the notion is assumed to be existent or non-existent, the notion cannot make the assent occur under a certain respect, since what makes the assent occur is the cause of the assent, and it is not possible for anything to be the cause of something [else] in both the states of its non-existence and its existence. If the simple [notion] does not suffice [for it] without realizing its existence or non-existence, in itself or in a certain state, it does not lead to the assent of anything else; and if you associate to the notion the existence or the non-existence, then you have already put another notion in relation to it.



As to the conceptualization, it often occurs by means of a simple notion — this [is] as it will be explained to you in its place —, but this [happens] with regard to a few things [only] and, moreover, in most cases it is defective and imperfect. What makes the conceptualization occur in most cases is rather composite notions. Every composition is composed of several things, and in each of the several things there are single things, so that in every composition there are single things. The single in every composite is what is called “elementary”. Since it is impossible to know the nature of the thing composed by a number of things when ignoring its elementary [parts], it is suitable that the knowledge of the simple [notions] precede the knowledge of the composite ones.

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### **[2. The way in which simple notions are studied in Logic]**

Knowledge of simple [notions] is under two respects: it is either knowledge of them inasmuch as they are apt to that the said composition is composed out of them, or it can be knowledge of them inasmuch as they are natures and things to which that notion occurs. An example of this is that the builder of a house which is composed out of wood and other [things] needs to know the elementary

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Q22

25 واللبن والطين أحوالا بسببها تصلح للبيت وللتأليف، وأحوالا  
أخرى خارجة من ذلك. فأما أن الخشب هو من جوهر فيه نفس  
نباتية، وأن طبيعته حارة أو باردة، أو أن قياسه من الموجودات  
قياس كذا، فهذا لا يحتاج إليه باني البيت أن يعلمه؛ وأما أن  
الخشب صلب ورخو وصحيح ومتسوس وغير ذلك، فإنه مما يحتاج  
30 باني البيت إلى أن يعلمه.

وكذلك صناعة المنطق، فإنها ليست تنظر في مفردات هذه الأمور  
من حيث هي على أحد نحوي الوجود الذي في الأعيان والذي في  
الأذهان، ولا أيضا في ماهيات الأشياء من حيث هي ماهيات، بل  
من حيث هي محمولات وموضوعات وكميات وجزئيات وغير ذلك مما  
إنما يعرض لهذه المعاني من جهة ما قلناه فيما سلف. 35

31 Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Kitāb al-Hurūf*, p. 27.1-8. [سلف 35... وكذلك 31

*al-Šifā'*, *al-Maqūlāt* I.1, p. 4.15-17. | وكذلك 35... وكذلك 31  
*al-Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17-11.2.

والتأليف [وللتأليف |  $S^3$  s.l. أحوالا vEAsS أحوال [أحوالا |  $\gamma N$  والطين واللبن [واللبن والطين 25  
[فأما | JT عن [من 26 Ka أحوالا vETAsS وأحوال Nk *add. s.l.* et أحوالا [وأحوالا | JTAs  
om. أن | S<sup>2</sup> و [أو | Yi فإن [وأن | *add. s.l.* A نباتية  $\eta$  نباتية [نباتية 27 om. A أن | As وأما  
*add. s.l.* et أما [وأما | JTTe *praem.* إلى [أن | *add. s.l.* Da قياس 28 S<sup>2</sup> إلى [من |  $\xi KaYi$   
S<sup>2</sup> صلب أو رخو Lat. [رخو وصلب] «mollis vel dura»  $\iota$  رخو وصلب [صلب ورخو 29 Yi  
KaNo ومنتشوش EYi ومنتشوش *add. i.l.* Di ومسوس [ومتسوس | S<sup>2</sup> أو صحيح A صحيح [وصحيح  
vEAs om. إلى...باني 30 Y *add. s.l.* om. v ممّا | AsS<sup>2</sup> أو غير [وغير | S<sup>2</sup> أو متسوس A متسوس  
وإنما أن vKaECs فكذلك [وكذلك 31 As *add.* من باني البيت [يعلمه | om. N إلى : Y *add. in mg.*  
[الوجود | *praem.* A و [من 32 Y *add. s.l.* om. et فإنها Yi *om.* تنتظر... فإنها | No الخشب كذلك  
[وكليات وجزئيات 34 S<sup>3</sup> om. et هي | *praem. et exp.* No [حيث 33 No الموجود  
AsYi قلنا [قلناه | S<sup>2</sup> Y *exp. p.c.* om. v *add. in mg.* JTTe وجزئيات وكميات 35

components of the house, such as the wood, the brick and the clay. But  
 the wood, the brick and the clay have some states because of which 25  
 they are apt to [form] the house and the composition, and other states  
 outside of that. As to the fact that the wood is [formed] by a substance  
 in which there is a vegetative soul, that its nature is hot or cold, and  
 that its proportion among the beings is of this sort, the housebuilder  
 does not need to know that; [on the other hand,] as to the fact that the  
 wood is solid or slack, entire or rotten and so on, this is among the 30  
 things that the housebuilder needs to know.

Analogous is [the case of] the discipline of Logic, since it does not  
 inquire into the simple ones of these things inasmuch as they are in one  
 of the two ways of existence, [i.e.] the one that is in the individuals  
 and the one that is in the minds, nor [it inquires into] the things'  
 quiddities inasmuch as they are quiddities, but rather inasmuch as they  
 are predicates and subjects [of predication], universals and particulars 35  
 and other [states] that only occur to these notions under the respect that  
 we said in what preceded<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>) See *Madḥal* I.2, §2.1.

(3.1) وأما النظر في الألفاظ فهو أمر تدعو إليه الضرورة، وليس للمنطقي من حيث هو منطقي شغل أول بالألفاظ إلا من جهة المخاطبة والمحاوره. ولو أمكن أن يُتعلّم المنطق بفكرة ساذجة إنّما تُلاحظ فيها المعاني وحدها، لكان ذلك كافيا؛ ولو أمكن أن يطلع المحاور فيه على ما في نفسه بجيلة أخرى، لكان يغنى عن اللفظ البتة. ولكنّ لما كانت الضرورة تدعو إلى استعمال الألفاظ، وخصوصا ومن المتعذر على الروية أن ترتّب المعاني من غير أن تتخيّل معها ألفاظها، بل تكاد تكون الروية مناجاة من الإنسان ذهنه بألفاظ متخيلة، لزم أن تكون للألفاظ أحوال مختلفة تختلف لأجلها أحوال ما يطابقها في النفس من المعاني، حتى يصير لها أحكام لولا الألفاظ لم تكن، فاضطرت صناعة المنطق إلى أن يصير بعض أجزاءها نظرا في احوال الألفاظ؛ ولولا ما قلناه، لما احتاجت أيضا إلى أن يكون لها هذا

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ق٢٣

36 [بالألفاظ 37... وأما 36] The passage is the object of *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579-585, pp. 193-4.

36 [البتة 40... وأما 36] Cf. Iḥwān al-Ṣafā', *Al-Risāla al- 'āšira*, chap. 7, p. 25.4-7.

41 [الألفاظ 47... ولكنّ 41] *Iṣārāt*, pp. 180.6-181.3. 43 [الألفاظ 47... لزم 43] *al-Šifā'*, *al-Maqūlāt* I.1, pp. 3.8-4.14.

أولي [أول 37] في | *s.l. N* | *praem. et exp. Y* الفصل الخامس *vacuum praem.* وأما النظر 36 *om.* ذلك 39 *AsDa* المحاوره والمخاطبة [المخاطبة والمحاوره] | *Yi* المحافظة [المخاطبة] 38 *Mub.* الألفاظ [لألفاظ 44] *A* ألفاظا [ألفاظها 42] *AAs* من [ومن 41] *To* معنى [بغنى] | *A* فيها [فيه 40] *Yi* *om.* ما 47 *Yi* نظر [نظرا] | *om. As* إلى 46 *T* ألفاظ [الألفاظ 45] *As* *om.* مختلفة | *TAs* قلنا *As* قلنا *J* *p.c.* *et a.c.* قلت [قلناه

حاشية أي لزمّت الضرورة إلى الألفاظ إذ يتغير أحكام المعاني لأشياء يرجع إلى [والمحاوره 38... وأما 36 الألفاظ من اختلاف هو لولا بها في الاشتراك والتشكيل وغيرهما من أحوال دلالتها كما يختلف أحكام معاني *in mg. Te* لفظة العين كلو بها دلالة على أشياء مختلفة

36 [الألفاظ... وأما 36] *MSS YiY* and other manuscripts related to these two present a chapter break at this point, as if it was meant to be the start of a chapter on utterances. In *MS Yi* a blank space is left before the clause *wa-ammā al-naẓar*, which is the usual way to mark the beginning of a new chapter in *MS Yi* (in the same folio, this is what happens before the beginning of chap. I.4 as well; arguably, the blank space was left in order to insert the term *faṣl* in a different ink). In *MS Y* the section is introduced by *al-faṣl al-ḥāmis* ("the fifth chapter"), then deleted after correction. Remarkably, such a division tributes a special relevance to the discussion of the study of utterances as a possible subject of Logic, a view rejected by Avicenna in the section.

**[3. Logic with relation to the inquiry into the utterances]**

**[3.1. The necessity to study the utterances does not entail that they are the primary concern of Logic]**

As to the inquiry into the utterances, it is something to which the necessity summons [us], but the logician, insofar as he is a logician, does not have a primary concern with the utterances, unless under the respect of the conversation and the dialogue. Were it possible to learn Logic by means of a simple thought in which the notions alone are considered, then this would be enough; were it possible for the interlocutor to bring forth in the discussion what is in his soul by means of another device, he would not need [to use] the utterance at all. But since the necessity summons [us] to employ utterances, especially because it is impossible, for the reflection, that the notions are ordered without their utterances being imagined together with them, and the reflection is almost an intimate conversation by the man's part with his own mind by means of imagined utterances, it necessarily follows that utterances have different states in virtue of which the states of the notions that correspond to them in the soul differ, so that they acquire [certain] statutes that would not be there if the utterances were not there; hence, the discipline of Logic requires that one of its parts is an inquiry into the states of the utterances. Were it not for what we said, Logic would not need to have such a part and

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الجزء ومع هذه الضرورة، فإنّ الكلام على الألفاظ المطابقة لمعانيها كالكلام على معانيها، إلا أن وضع الألفاظ أحسن عملاً.

50 (3.2) وأمّا فيما سوى ذلك، فلا خير في قول من يقول إنّ المنطق موضوعه النظر في الألفاظ من حيث تدلّ على المعاني وإنّ المنطقي إنّما صناعته أن يتكلّم على الألفاظ من حيث تدلّ على المعاني، بل يجب أن يُتصوّر الأمر على النحو الذي ذكرناه. وإنّما تبدّل في هذا من تبدّل وتشوّش من تشوّش بسبب أنّهم لم يحصلوا بالحقيقة موضوع المنطق والصنف من الموجودات الذي يختصّ به، إذ وجدوا الوجود على نحوين: وجود الأشياء من خارج ووجودها في الذهن، ففعلوا النظر في الوجود الذي من خارج لصناعة أو صناعات فلسفية، والنظر في الوجود الذي في الذهن وأنّه كيف يُتصوّر فيه لصناعة أو جزء صناعة، ولم يفصلوا فيعلموا أنّ الأمور التي في الذهن إمّا أمور تُصوّرت في الذهن مستفادة من خارج، وإمّا أمور تعرض لها من حيث هي في الذهن لا يُجاذي بها أمر من خارج. فتكون معرفة هذين الأمرين لصناعة، ثمّ يصير أحد هذين الأمرين موضوعاً لصناعة

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50 وأمّا... Cf. YAHYÀ IBN 'ADÌ, *Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna šinā'atay al-mantiq al-falsafī wa-l-nahw al-'arabī*, p. 47, par. 20; cf. IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Isāgūgī*, p. 38.1-2; Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Ihšā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 74.10-12.

48 مع [ومع] *om. et add.* في 51 *add. s.l. Mi* فلا [خير] *om. No* 50 معانيها... كالكلام 49 *AsSN* مع [ومع] *add. in mg. Te* | إنكلم | *om. v* أن... إنّما 52 *S<sup>3</sup>* | *add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* | *om. NkS iter. T* المعاني 52... وإنّ | *in mg. Te* | وتشوّش 54 *ηJTTeEd.* أن الأمر [الأمر] 53 *s.l. N* المعاني | *add. s.l. Y* أنّها [حيث] A يتعلم *om. N* بالحقيقة | *om. et add. in mg. Nk* | *om. No* من شوش | *vG* من تشوّش | *vG* وشوش إذا TN إذا [إذ] | *S<sup>3</sup>* *s.l.* يختصّ S يخصّ [يختصّ] | *μEAs* التي [الذي] | *add. N* بالحقيقة [المنطق] 55 *s.l. Nk* الموجود *JATSTeEd.* الموجود [الوجود] | *No* وجد [وجدوا] | *i.l. Y* حيث *a.c. et* ووجود بها في *om. et* من 57... من | *vπADiS* للأشياء [الأشياء] | *S<sup>2</sup>* *s.l.* نحوين S وجهين [نحوين] 56 *om. No* خارج 57... ووجودها | *add. in mg. G* الذهن فجعلوا النظر في الموجود الذي من خارج *om. vE* الذي | *add. TTe* الذي *add. et exp. J* الذي [النظر] 57 *πKaJESYN* ووجودها [ووجودها] *in mg.* والنظر في الوجود الذي *vEAs* من حيث هي [الذي... افي] | *praem. A* من حيث هي [افي] 58 [أمور] | *add. et exp. Di* كالعموم والخصوص [الذهن] 59 S فإنه *S<sup>3</sup>* *s.l.* *vEAs* وأنها [وأته] | *E* بها | *T* لأن [لا] 61 *add. As* أعراض [لها] | *S<sup>2</sup>* *s.l.* أمور S لأمور [أمور] 60 *S<sup>2</sup>* *s.l.* أمور S لأمور *add. Da* وهي علم النفس [الصناعة] 62 *add. s.l. Di* من *om. et add. s.l. Di* *No* أمرا [أمر] | *om. ξ*

حاشية يعني أن الخلفة في إفهام المخاطبة معاني الألفاظ المطابقة لها في النفس كالخلفة [عملاً 49... فإنّ] 48 في إفهامه المعاني التي في النفس من دون الألفاظ لو يوصل إلى ذلك بنوع من الموافقة والاصطلاح إلا أن *in mg. Te* وضع الألفاظ وجعله إلى ذلك أحسن عملاً من شيء آخر

with such a necessity, since the discussion concerning the utterances corresponding to their notions is like the discussion concerning their notions, unless that the [conventional] imposition of the utterances is more practical.

### [3.2. Refutation of the view that the inquiry into the utterances is the subject of Logic]

Moreover, there is no good in the claim of those who state that the subject of Logic is the inquiry into the utterances inasmuch as they signify the notions, and that the discipline of the logician precisely consists in talking about the utterances inasmuch as they signify the notions; on the contrary, it is necessary to conceptualize the thing in the way we mentioned. Those who were confounded and perplexed with regard to this [subject] only were so because they did not really attain the subject of Logic and the class of existents to which it belongs. They found that existence is in two ways, [namely] an existence of the things in the external reality, and an existence of them in the mind, so they assigned the inquiry into the existence that is in the external reality to one or more philosophical disciplines, and the inquiry into the existence that is in the mind and into how conceptualization occurs in the mind to a discipline<sup>2</sup> or to a part of [another] discipline<sup>3</sup>, but they did not determine nor know that the things that are in the mind are either things that are conceptualized in the mind acquired from the external reality, or things to which it occurs, insofar as they are in the mind, that nothing corresponds to them in the external reality. The knowledge of both these things pertains to a discipline<sup>4</sup>, then one of these two things becomes a

<sup>2</sup>) I.e. Metaphysics: cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* I.4, p. 26.3-5. The existence in mind (*al-wuġūd allaqī fī l-dihni*) of the objects of Logic is established by the Metaphysics. | <sup>3</sup>) I.e. a part of Natural Philosophy, namely Psychology; cf. also *Maqūlāt* I.1, p. 5.9-10, where knowledge of the categories with respect to their conceptualization in the soul is said to pertain to a part of Natural Philosophy that is contiguous to the Metaphysics, i.e. Psychology. | <sup>4</sup>) I.e. Metaphysics: cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.6-13.7.

المنطق من جهة عرض يعرض له. وأمّا أيّ هذين الأمرين ذلك، فهو القسم الثاني؛ وأمّا أيّ عارض يعرض، فهو أنّه يصير موصلاً إلى أن تحصل في النفس صورة أخرى عقلية لم تكن، أو نافعا في ذلك الوصول، أو ما يعاوق ذلك الوصول.

٢٤ق

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(3.3) فلما لم يُتميّز لهؤلاء بالحقيقة موضوع صناعة المنطق ولا الجهة التي بها هو موضوعه، تتعتعوا وتبلدوا؛ وأنت ستعلم بعد هذا بوجه أشدّ شرحاً أنّ لكلّ صناعة نظرية موضوعاً، وأنها إنّما تبحث عن أعراضه وأحواله؛ وتعلم أنّ النظر في ذات الموضوع قد يكون في صناعة والنظر في عوارضه يكون من صناعة أخرى. فهكذا يجب أن تعلم من حال المنطق.

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*al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* II.6, p. 155.4-10. 70... وتعلم *al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* II.7, pp. 166.19-167.10; *Ibid.*, p. 168.14-16.

له [يعرض | C عرض [عارض 64 *s.l.* S<sup>2</sup> لها [له | C *om. et add. in mg.* يعرض له 63 عقلية | *om. Yi* أخرى 65 *om. et add. s.l. Yi* فإنه [فهو أنّه | *Da* فإنّه [فهو أنّه | *add. AsDiDaS* أو | *S<sup>2</sup> s.l.* الوصول *AsS* التوصل *To* *add. in mg.* الوصول *vEToŠG* التوصل [الوصول 66 *N* ط أو *add. in mg. B* أي مانعا يعاوق ذلك الوصول *Nk* *add. in mg.* أو مانعا يعاوق ذلك الوصول [ما الطبت [صناعة | *om. i* *add. s.l. Di* بالحقيقة 67 *s.l.* الوصول *i.l.* الوصول *S* التوصل [الوصول 68 *exp. S<sup>2</sup>* *om. MiG* *γλvLat.JDiSNoEd.* هي [هو 68 *add. i* بالحقيقة [المنطق | *Di* *add. et del.* (?) *S* تعلم [ستعلم | *Yi* وتبلد [وتبلدوا | *Lat.* [موضوعة] «*instituta est*» *s.l.* *γ* موضوعها [موضوعه *praem. μ* قد [يكون | *T* فالنظر [والنظر 71 *om. et vacuum rel. Da* قد 70 *om. As* إنّما 69

التعتعة في الكلام والتردد فيه من حصر أو عي ووقع القوم في تعاتع إذا وقعوا في أراجيف وتخليط [تعتعوا 68 [أعراضه 70 *in mg. Te* [cf. *al-Ġawharī, Tāğ al-luġa wa-šihāh al-'arabiyya*, p. 1191] عروض معنى الخصوص والعموم في المعنى المتصور (التصور: C) في الذهن حصل النظر فيه صورة في العقل وهي صورة العموم في شيء أو ما يفارق ذلك يعنى المانع من حصول ذلك التصور من العموم لكونه جزءاً مخصاً بواحد *in mg. η*

An omission of this clause by *saut du même au même* might have occurred in β; an ancestor of MSS ToŠ might have restored the omitted text by collation, as it happens in MS Di, where it is added in the margin.

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subject for the discipline of Logic with respect to an accident that occurs to it. As to which of these two things is that, it is the second member of the division; as to which accident occurs [to it], it is the fact of becoming able to lead to the realization in the soul of another intellectual form that was previously not there, or [of becoming] useful for this attainment, or preventing from that attainment. 65

Q24

### [3.3. Conclusive remarks on the subject of the discipline]

Since those [philosophers] did not really discriminate neither the subject of the discipline of Logic, nor the respect under which it is its subject, they stammered and were confused. You will know, after this, by means of a more efficient explanation, that each theoretical discipline has a subject, and that it only inquires the accidents and the states of its subject<sup>5</sup>; you will know that the inquiry into the subject itself can pertain to a discipline, whereas the inquiry into its accidents can pertain [to the domain] of another discipline<sup>6</sup>. [By way of conclusion,] this is what you need to know about the state of Logic. 70

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<sup>5</sup>) See *Burhān* II.6, p. 155.4-10. | <sup>6</sup>) See *Burhān* II.7, pp. 166.19-167.10 and p. 168.14-16.

## [الفصل الخامس]

### فصل في تعريف اللفظ المفرد والمؤلف وتعريف الكلي والجزئي والذاتي والعرضي والذي يقال في جواب ما هو والذي لا يقال

(1.1) وإذ لا بدّ لنا في التعليم والتعلّم من الألفاظ، فإنّا نقول إنّ اللفظ إمّا مفرد وإمّا مركّب. 5

(1.2) والمركب هو الذي قد يوجد له جزء يدل على معنى هو جزء من المعنى المقصود بالجملة دلالة بالذات، مثل قولنا «الإنسان» و«كاتب» من قولنا «الإنسان كاتب»؛ فإنّ لفظة «الإنسان» منه تدل على معنى ولفظة «كاتب» أيضا تدل على معنى وكل واحد منهما جزء قولنا «الإنسان كاتب» ومعناه جزء المعنى المقصود من قولنا «الإنسان كاتب» دلالة مقصودة في اللفظ، ليس كما نقول «حيوان»، فيُظن أنّ «الحي» منه مثلا دالّ إما على جملة المعنى، وإما على بعض 10

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[الإنسان...10...منهما 9 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [الإنسان...المقصود 7 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [على...جملة 12 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking.

Cf. ARIST., *De Int.*, 16a19-26. [مركّب...5...فإنّا | Cf. ELIAS, *In Isag.*, p. 35.23-26. [مركّب...5...وإذ 4 11 14...والمركب | Cf. ARIST., *De Int.*, 16b26-32. [بالذات...7...والمركب 6 13-19. [الدلالة] Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Fuṣūl*, p. 273.

[مفردة...21...والمركب | *Mantiq al-Maṣriqiyyīn*, p. 10.5-7. [اللفظ...11...والمركب 6 11.3-9.

Y الفصل الخامس Mi الفصل الخامس من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق [فصل 1 om. § والجزئي | om. et add. in mg. §<sup>3</sup> تعريف [وتعريف | add. a.c. No من [والمؤلف [بالجملة 7 om. Yi له | s.l. Ka | C فالمركب [والمركب 6 om. § إنّ 4 No الذي [والذي 2 vEAs كل [وكل | s.l. DaG أيضا | G ولفظ [ولفظة 9 s.l. Da منه | As بل [فإنّ 8 TTe وبالجملة دلالة | E للإنسان [الإنسان 11 No بجزء [جزء | om. et add. in mg. G كاتب 11...ومعناه 10 iter. N | om. et add. s.l. Y om. v add. in mg. Y فيُظن أنّ 12 om. Lat. [الدلالة...14...ليس | Di As جمل [جملة | No ما [إما | No دالة [دالّ | C الحيوان [الحي | Di

[I.5]

**CHAPTER ON THE NOTIFICATION OF THE SIMPLE AND THE  
COMPOSITE UTTERANCE, AND ON THE NOTIFICATION OF THE  
UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL  
[UTTERANCE], AND OF [THE UTTERANCE] THAT IS GIVEN IN ANSWER  
TO “WHAT IS IT?” AND OF THE ONE THAT IS NOT GIVEN [IN ANSWER  
TO THAT QUESTION]**

**[1. Classification of the utterances into simple and composite]**

**[1.1. Introduction to the classification]**

Since we cannot avoid [employing] the utterances when teaching and learning, let us say that the utterance is either simple or composite. 5

**[1.2. The composite utterance]**

The composite [utterance] is the one that may have a part signifying *per se* a notion that is a part of the notion meant in [its] complex, like when we say “man” and “writer” [as parts] of our statement “the man is a writer”, for the word “man” in it signifies a notion, as well as the word “writer” does, and each one of the two is a part of our statement “the man is a writer”, and the notion of [each one of them] is a part of the notion that is meant by our statement “the man is a writer” with a signification meant in the utterance. [This] is not like when we say “*ḥayawān*” and it is thought that the “*ḥay*” in it, for instance, either signifies the whole notion, or [just] a part of it, if it is [in such a 10

Q25

منه، لو كان من غير أن كان يقصد في إطلاق لفظة «الحيوان» أن يدل «الحي» منه تلك الدلالة.

15 (1.3.1) وأما المفرد فهو الذي لا يدل جزء منه على جزء من معنى الكل المقصود به دلالة بالذات، مثل قولنا «الإنسان»، فإن «الإنسان» لا يدلان على جزأين من معنى الإنسان منها يتألف معنى الإنسان. ولا يُلْتَفَت في هذه الصناعة إلى التركيب الذي يكون بحسب المسموع، إذا كان لا يدل جزء منه على جزء من المعنى، كقولنا: «عبد شمس»، إذا أريد به اسم لقب ولم يرد به عبد للشمس. وهذا وأمثاله لا يعدّ في الألفاظ المؤلفة، بل في المفردة.

25 (1.3.2) والموجود في التعليم الأقدم من رسم الألفاظ المفردة أنها هي التي لا تدل أجزاءها على شيء. واستنقص فريق من أهل النظر هذا الرسم وأوجب أنه يجب أن يزداد فيه أنها التي لا تدل أجزاءها على شيء من معنى الكل، إذ قد تدل أجزاء الألفاظ المفردة على

[التركيب... الصناعة 18 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. 15 من... المقصود 16... من 15 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. 21 [الألفاظ... لا 21 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. 23 [الرسم... النظر 24 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking.

[المفردة... 21... وأما | Cf. ARIST., *De Int.*, 16a19-22. | بالذات 16... وأما 15 Cf. ARIST., *Poet.*, 1457a10-14; AMMON., *In De Int.*, p. 33.14-28; AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Fuṣūl*, p. 273.13-19; Id., *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, p. 30.8-15.

[الإنسان 18... وأما | *Nağāt*, p. 9.12-10.3. | [المفردة 21... وأما 15 *al-Šifā'*, *al-'Ibāra* I.2, p. 7.4-5. | بالذات 16... وأما 15 *Išārāt*, p. 191.5-10.

أن | *om. Da* الحيوان | *KaTo* لفظ [لفظة | *conī. in mg. Di om. N* | كان | *As* ولو [لو 13 [معنى | *s.l. Nk* | أجزاء 15 *om. v add. s.l. Y* | تلك | *om. v* | منه | *add. v* | منه [يدل 14 *om. Yi* | *om. N* | على | *om. N* | لا 17 *om. Nk* | الإنسان فإن | *om. v add. in mg. Y* | المقصود به 16 *J* | المعنى المسموع 19... يكون | *om. NkYi* | يكون 18 *om. Lat.* | الإنسان 18... منهما | *om. N* | من | *As* | به 20 *add. et exp. E* | المقصود [المعنى | *om. E* | من | *Nk* | جزء منه لا يدل [منه... لا 19 *exp. Y* | *E* | الشمس [للشمس 21 *om. No* | عبد | *om. S<sup>2</sup>* | *om. Y* | *om. Y* | *in mg. et* من [افي | *To* | *in mg. To* | وهذا *in mg. C* | *s.l. Nk* | فإن ذلك *μ* فإن ذلك *Di* | وإن ذلك [وهذا *ToŠ* | *om. et add. in mg. Nk* | في... المؤلفة | *add. in mg. C* | من *κKaJA* | من *Nk* | *exp. S<sup>2</sup>* | هو *praem. iS* | أنها | *λv* | في [من | *No* | والموجودة [والموجود 22 *Ka* | المفرد [المفردة *No* | واستنبض [واستنقص | *add. N* | أصلا [شيء 23 *om. S* | التي 23... هي | *TTeNo* | إنما [قد تدل 25 *om. et add. in mg. Y* | التي | *A* | وأوجبوا [وأوجب 24 *om. Yi* | شيء 25... واستنقص *No* | قتل *om. et add. in mg. Ka*

manner] that, when articulating the word “*ḥayawān*”, the “*ḥay*” in it is not meant to signify that meaning<sup>1</sup>.

### [1.3. The simple utterance]

#### [1.3.1. The parts of the simple utterance do not signify *per se* a part of the whole notion]

As to the simple [utterance], it is that whose part does not signify *per se* a part of the notion of the whole [meaning] meant by it, like when we say “*insān*”<sup>2</sup>, for “*in*” and “*sān*” do not signify two parts of the notion of “*insān*” out of which the notion of “*insān*” is composed. In this discipline one does not take into account the composition that is in virtue of the heard [utterance], since a part of it does not signify a part of the [whole] notion, like when we say “‘Abdu Šams’”, if a surname is meant by this and not a servant of the Sun. This and similar things are not considered among the composite utterances, but rather among the simple [ones].

#### [1.3.2. Defence of the Aristotelian definition of the simple utterance]

The description of the simple utterances that is found in the more ancient teaching consists [in stating] that they are those [utterances] whose parts do not signify anything<sup>3</sup>. A group of philosophers found this description defective, and claimed that it was necessary to add in it that they are [those utterances] whose parts do not signify anything of the notion of the complex, since the parts of the simple utterances can

<sup>1</sup>) This precision is required because the term *ḥayy* is not just a part of the term *ḥayawān* (“animal”), but might also signify it itself another notion, like “living”, or even “animal”, as in the Arabic translations from the Greek, where it is often employed as a rendering for the Greek ζῷον. | <sup>2</sup>) I.e. “man, human”. | <sup>3</sup>) Cf. Arist., *De Interpr.*, 16a22-26.

معان، لكنها لا تكون أجزاء معاني الجملة. وأنا أرى أنّ هذا الاستنقاص من مستنقصه سهو وأنّ هذه الزيادة غير محتاج إليها للتميم بل للتفهم.

(1.3.3) وذلك أنّ اللفظ بنفسه لا يدلّ البتة؛ ولولا ذلك، لكان لكلّ لفظ حقّ من المعنى لا يجاوزه؛ بل إنّما يدلّ بإرادة اللافظ، فكما أنّ اللافظ يطلقه دالا على معنى كالعين على ينبوع الماء، فيكون ذلك دلالاته، ثم يطلقه دالا على معنى آخر كالعين على الدينار، فيكون ذلك دلالاته. فكذا إذا أخلاه في إطلاقه عن الدلالة بقي غير دال وعند كثير من أهل النظر غير لفظ، فإنّ الحرف والصوت، فيما أظنّ، لا يكون بحسب التعارف عند كثير من المنطقيين لفظا أو يشتمل على دلالة. وإذا كان ذلك كذلك، فالمتكلم باللفظ المفرد لا يريد أن يدلّ بجزئه على جزء من معنى الكل ولا أيضا يريد أن يدلّ بجزئه على معنى آخر من شأنه أن يدلّ به عليه، وقد انعقد الاصطلاح على ذلك. فلا يكون جزؤه البتة دالا على شيء حين هو جزؤه بالفعل، اللهم إلا بالقوة حين نجد الإضافة المشار إليها وهي مقارنة إرادة القائل دلالة بها. وبالجملة فإنه، إن دلّ، فإنما يدلّ لا حين ما يكون جزءاً من اللفظ المفرد، بل إذا كان لفظاً قائماً بنفسه؛ فأما وهو جزء، فلا يدلّ على معنى البتة.

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33 Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, p. 31.10-22. [دلالة 36... فكذاك 33  
39 AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, p. 31.2-3. [بالفعل 40... فلا 39

36 *Manṭiq al-Mašriḡiyyīn*, p. 11.10-11. [ذلك 39... فالمتكلم 36

add. N على معنى [يدلّ | As لأن] 29 a.c. G هذا [هذه | Di فإن] 27 N معنى [معاني 26  
[يطلقه | Te اللفظ] 31 T المعاني [المعنى | To من] 30 om. et add. s.l. N لفظ  
لدلالاته [دلالاته 32 S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. كالعين 32... على | J add. آخر [معنى | S<sup>3</sup> تارة  
NkASGED. كذلك J a.c. و كذلك BC وكذلك DiMi فكذاك 33 om. دلالاته 33... ثم | No  
ذلك 36 S<sup>3</sup> s.l. إذ ظ [أو | To العارف] [التعارف | B مما] [فيما 35 Di عند] [وعند 34 Yi هي] [يقي |  
أن يدلّ 37 v والمتكلم [فالمتكلم | To om. et add. i.l. كذلك | J om. NkS<sup>3</sup>Y om. et add. in mg.  
add. et exp. إذ [آخر 38 Ka أن يريد] [يدلّ... 2يريد | G جزأ] [على جزء | J om. et add. in mg.  
add. in mg. معين [حين | Di s.l. Di add. آخر [شيء 39 A فقد] [وقد | Di om. et add. s.l. به | Y  
لِ [فإنه] [فإنما | S<sup>3</sup> a.c. أو بالجملة] [وبالجملة | Ed. ] [به | بها | N ولأنه] [دلالة 41 Ka معين C  
om. et add. in mg. المفرد 42

signify [several] notions, but they are not parts of the notions of the complex. I think that this reproach by the part of those who move it is a mistake, and that this addition is not required in order to make [the description] complete, but rather to make it understandable.

### [1.3.3. Conventional character of language]

Q26 This because the utterance in itself does not signify at all; were it not so, then there would be for each utterance a truth [deriving] from the notion that it would not exceed. On the contrary, [an utterance] only signifies according to the speaker's intention so that, as the speaker emits it as signifying a [certain] notion, like “*‘ayn*” [signifying] the source of water, then this is its signification; then he emits it as signifying another notion, like “*‘ayn*” signifying the *dīnār*, then this is its signification. Analogously, when [the speaker] deprives it, in its emission, of any signification, it stays without signifying [anything] and, according to many philosophers, without even being an utterance since, in virtue of an agreement [occurred] among many logicians, the letter and the sound, as far as I know, are not “utterance”, nor they imply a signification. If it is so, then he who speaks by means of a simple utterance does not intend to signify, by a part of it, a part of the notion of the complex, nor he intends to signify, by a part of it, another notion that could be possibly signified by that [utterance]; the agreement on this [subject] has already been reached. So, its part, as far as it is its part, does not signify anything at all in actuality, unless it is so in potentiality, when we find the designated relation, namely the connection to the speaker's will by which the meaning occurs. In sum, if [the utterance] signifies, it only signifies not as far as it is a part of the simple utterance, but rather when it is an utterance subsisting in itself; as to the case in which it is a part, it does not signify any notion at all.

(2.1) فاللفظ إما مفرد وإما مركب، وقد عُلم أنّ النظر في المفرد قبل النظر في المركب. ثم اللفظ المفرد إما أن يكون معناه الواحد الذي يدل عليه لا يمتنع في الذهن من حيث تصوره اشتراك الكثرة فيه على السوية بأن يقال لكل واحد منهم إنه هو اشتراكا على درجة واحدة — مثل قولنا: «الإنسان»، فإنّ له معنى في النفس وذلك المعنى مطابق لزيد ولعمرو ولخالد على وجه واحد لأن كلّ واحد منهم إنسان. ولفظة الكرة المحيطة بذئ عشرين قاعدة مثلثات، بل لفظ الشمس والقمر وغير ذلك، كل منها يدل على معنى لا يمتنع تصوره في الذهن من اشتراك كثرة فيه، وإن لم يوجد مثلا بالفعل، كالكرة المذكورة، أو كان يمتنع ذلك بسبب خارج عن مفهوم اللفظ نفسه كالشمس — وإما أن يكون معناه الواحد بحيث يمتنع في الذهن إيقاع الشركة فيه، أعني في المحصل الواحد المقصود به، كقولنا «زيد»؛ فإنّ لفظ زيد، وإن كان قد يشترك فيه كثيرون، فإنما يشتركون من حيث المسموع؛ وأما معناه الواحد فيستحيل أن يجعل واحد منه مشتركا فيه؛ فإنّ الواحد من معانيه هو ذات المشار إليه، وذات هذا المشار إليه يمتنع في الذهن أن يجعل لغيره، اللهم إلا أن لا

ARIST., *De Int.*, 17a38-41; AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Kitāb Īsāgūḡī ay al-Madḡhal*, p. 110.3-5. ثم 45

*al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* II.4, pp. 144.7-145.6; *al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.1, pp. 195.11-196.3; *Naḡāt*, p. 10.9-12; *Manṡiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 12.2-9; *Īsārāt*, p. 197.7-14. [شركة... 62 وإما 54] *al-Šifā'*, *al-Samā' al-Ṭabī'ī*, p. 9.16-17. 54 [كاشمس 54... بل 50] *al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* II.4, p. 145.7-9; *Īsārāt*, p. 197.5-6. | *Naḡāt*, pp. 10.14-11.1; *Manṡiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 12.10-13.

YiEd. | اللفظ واللفظ [فاللفظ 44 ذلك [وذلك 48] *in mg.* Y *SG om.* اشتراك *DaYi om.* اشتراكا | Da منها [منهم 47... ولفظة | E ولفظ [ولفظة 50] Da وخالد [ولخالد | JEDaŠMiŠ وعمرو [ولعمرو 49] vEMiG يمنع [يمنتع | J منها [منها | JTe add. واحد [كل 51] JENo لفظة [لفظ | om. Lat. مثلثات *om. et* عن | T أو إن كان κ وإن كان [أو كان 53] *om. Lat.* المذكورة 53... كالكرة 52] *ηEd. p.c. §* *add. s.l.* No المحصل... فيه 55] *vBED.* بحيث : *om. Ka* الواحد بحيث 54] *add. s.l.* No لفظة [لفظ 56] *add. s.l. C om. v* منه 1 منه [به | *om. Yi* *s.l. Y om.* حد *et* الوا [الواحد | Y به [يجعل | J] *add.* فيه [يشتركون 57] *JTDiŠMiŠYG* فيها [فيه | *om. JTAs* قد | *JBCŠN* *om. J* لا | T فذات [وذات 59] *s.l. Š<sup>3</sup>* منه *Š<sup>3</sup>* منه [منه | T واحدا [واحد 58] *add. No*

## [2. Universal and particular simple utterance]

### [2.1. Classification of the simple utterance into universal and particular]

The utterance is either simple or composite, and it has been already learned that the inquiry into the simple precedes the inquiry into the composite. Furthermore, the unique notion that the simple utterance signifies is either [(a)] in such a way that it is not impossible in the mind, in virtue of its conceptualization, that many [items] share it equally [and] at the same degree, in virtue of the fact that it is said of each one of them that it is so – like our saying “man”, for it has a notion in itself, and that notion adapts to Zayd, ‘Amr and Ḥālīd in the same way, since each one of them is a man. And every utterance [like] the utterance “sphere embracing [a solid] formed by twenty triangular faces”, or [like] the utterance “Sun” and “Moon” etc., signifies a notion whose conceptualization in the mind does not prevent the multitude from sharing it, even if no instance [of it] can be found in actuality, like the aforementioned sphere, or this can be prevented by a cause external to the concept of the utterance itself, like the Sun – or [(b)] its notion is in such a way that it is impossible in the mind that participation occurs in it, I mean in the unique [notion] acquired that is meant, like our saying “Zayd” for, even if many can share the utterance “Zayd”, they only share it in virtue of the heard [utterance]; as to its unique notion, it is impossible to consider [this] unique [notion] as shared [by many items]. In fact, the unique among its notions is a certain designated [individual], and this certain designated [individual] cannot be ascribed in the mind to anything else, at least

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60 يراد بزيد البتة ذاته، بل صفة من صفاته المشترك فيها. فهذا القسم، وإن لم تمتنع الشركة في مسموعه، فقد يمتنع أن يوجد في المعنى الواحد من المدلول به عليه شركة. فالقسم الأول يسمى كلياً، والثاني يسمى جزئياً.

65 (2.2) وأنت تعلم أنّ من الألفاظ ما هو على سبيل القسم الأول، ومن المعاني ما هو على سبيل معنى القسم الأول وهو المعنى الذي المفهوم منه في النفس لا تمتنع نسبته إلى أشياء كثيرة تطابقها نسبة متشاكلة. ولا عليك من حيث أنت منطقي أنه كيف تكون هذه النسبة وهل لهذا المعنى من حيث هو واحد مشترك فيه وجود في ذوات الأمور التي جعلت لها شركة فيه وبالجملة وجود مفارق خارج غير الذي في ذهنك، أو كيف حصوله في الذهن؛ فإنّ النظر في هذه لصناعة أخرى أو لصناعتين.

(3) فقد علمت أنّ اللفظ إمّا أن يكون مفرداً وإما أن يكون مؤلفاً؛ وأنّ المفرد إمّا أن يكون كلياً وإما أن يكون جزئياً. وقد علمت أنّا أوجبنا تأخير النظر في المركب.

75 واعلم أيضاً أنّنا لا نشغل بالنظر في الألفاظ الجزئية ومعانيها، فإنها غير متناهية فتحصر، ولا لو كانت متناهية كان علمنا بها من حيث

AEd. وهذا Yi هذا [فهذا] | غ. om. فيها | No صفات [صفاته] | §<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. يراد 60  
 s.l. Nk يسمى 63 γ والقسم [القسم] | ج. om. من 62 §<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. يمتنع... الشركة 61  
 s.l. §<sup>2</sup> في i.l. To من scr. A في del. et من vDiDaToG في [من] | C فأنت [وأنت] 64 om. §  
 add. s.l. يمنع DiMiŠYG يمنع [يتمنع] 66 om. NkŠYiG معنى 65 om. et add. mg. To القسم  
 No أو هل [وهل] 68 praem. in mg. G أن تعلم praem. Mi أن تعلم [أنه] 67 Nk add. in mg. C  
 [فيه] 69 s.l. As له [فيه] | om. et add. in mg. As هو | MiŠ لذلك in mg. To لهذا [لهذا] et لذلك [لهذا]  
 عن [غير] 70 γEd. om. Da وخارج [خارج] | C في الجملة [وبالجملة] | §<sup>3</sup> s.l. فيها To praem. غير  
 [لصناعة] 71 vEG للذهن [في الذهن] | Ka وكيف [أو كيف] | Da وغير in mg. To غير AAAsToMi  
 أيضاً [المركب] 74 om. To أن<sup>2</sup> | om. N أن اللفظ 72 γvDaTo صناعتين [لصناعتين] | T الصناعة  
 و [ومعانيها] | To انما [أنّا] | §<sup>3</sup> om. JTS add. in mg. أيضاً | JDaS ج. فاعلم [واعلم] 75 add. JT  
 om. et add. in mg. Di ولا [ولا] | ToŠ فتخصره [فتحصّر] 76 om. et add. i.l. Di  
 TYNo | om. Yi حيث

unless by “Zayd” one does not mean the individual himself, but one of its shared attributes. In this case, even if it is not impossible that [something else] shares its heard [utterance], it is however impossible that [something else] shares the unique notion of that by means of which it is signified. The first class is called “universal”, whereas the second is called “particular”. 60

### [2.2. Universal utterance and universal notion]

You know that, among the utterances, there is what is in the way of the first class, as well as among the notions there is what is in the way of the notion of the first class, namely the notion for whose concept in the soul a relation of similarity with many things to which it corresponds is not impossible. But it does not pertain to you, inasmuch as you are a logician, [to know] how this relation is, and if this notion, inasmuch as it is one and shared [by more items], has an existence in the things themselves to which a participation in this notion is ascribed, and, in general, a separated and external existence which is different from that which is in your mind, or how it is its attainment in the mind. In fact, the inquiry into these things pertains to another discipline or two<sup>4</sup>. 65 70

### [3. Exclusion of the particular utterance]

You have already learned that the utterance can either be simple or composite, and that the simple one can either be universal or particular. You also have already learned that we required to postpone the inquiry into the composite one<sup>5</sup>.

You should also know that we are not concerned with the inquiry into the particular utterances and their notions, since they are not finite in a way that they can be circumscribed, and, even if they were finite, our knowledge of them, inasmuch as they are particular, would not 75

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<sup>4</sup>) Scil. Metaphysics and Psychology. | <sup>5</sup>) Cf. *Madhal* I.4, p. 21.16 Cairo ed. (§1).

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هي جزئية يفيدنا كمالا حكيميا أو يبلغنا غاية حكمية، كما تعلم هذا في موضع العلم به، بل الذي يهمننا النظر فيه هو معرفة اللفظ الكلي.

(4.1) وأنت تعلم أنّ اللفظ الكلي إنما يصير كليا بأنّ له نسبة ما —  
إمّا بالوجود وإمّا بصحة التوهم — إلى جزئيات يحمل عليها.

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(4.2) والحمل على وجهين: حمل مواطأة، كقولك: «زيد إنسان»، فإنّ الإنسان محمول على زيد بالحقيقة والمواطأة؛ وحمل اشتقاق، كحال البياض بالقياس إلى الإنسان، فإنه يقال إنّ الإنسان أبيض أو ذو بياض ولا يقال إنه بياض. وإن اتفق أن قيل: «جسم أبيض» «ولون أبيض»، فلا يحمل حد المحمول على الموضوع؛ وإنما غرضنا هاهنا مما يحمل هو ما كان على سبيل المواطأة.

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(4.3) فلنذكر أقسام الكلي الذي إنما ينسب إلى جزئيات مواطأة عليها ويعطيها الاسم والحد، لكنه قد تضطرننا إصابتنا لبعض

81 حمل... [والمواطأة 82... حمل 81 ARIST., *Cat.*, 1a6-12; *Top.*, 148a24-25; *ibid.*, 162b37-163a1. 82 وحمل... [الموضوع 85... حمل 82 ARIST., *Cat.*, 1a12-15; *ibid.*, 9a31-35.

om. حكمية | Jّ ويبلغنا | أو يبلغنا | om. et add. s.l. N | كمالا | ANo لا يفيد [يفيدنا 77 add. in بخط المصنف في مثله om. J 80 هو | Ed. في مثله B add. s.l. B بخط المصنف | في مثله C mg. Yi بصيغة [بصحة 80 om. J هو | Ed. في مثله B add. s.l. B بخط المصنف | في مثله C mg. et بالقياس 83 Jّ كقولنا [كقولك | S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup> مواطأة 81 vEda عليه [عليها om. et add. in mg. To : γ بالنسبة : in mg. NkB s.l. C 84 vacuum postea rel. As في مثله [يحمل | A. om. ولون أبيض 85 As إن جسم [جسم | No قيلت [قيل add. في مثله [المحمول | S<sup>3</sup> To حد s.l. S<sup>3</sup> in mg. EDaSEd حمل [حد | KJlS add. مثله غرضنا ESY معنى A تعني [غرضنا | Da add. حد المحمول في مثله على الموضوع [الموضوع | tĀA s.l. ES<sup>2</sup> 86 مما λ بما [مما 86 s.l. ES<sup>2</sup> om. et add. in mg. Ka | om. يحمل | E in mg. E مما λ بما [مما 86 s.l. ES<sup>2</sup> om. et add. s.l. E | G in mg. G om. et add. in mg. 87 فلنذكر 34 iter. Nk | Y T بإصابتنا [إصابتنا | κ عليه [عليها 88 praem. Mi نسبة [مواطأة

78 MSS NkB attest in this point the existence of a variant *fī miṭlihi* allegedly ascribed to the author (*bi-ḥaṭṭ al-muṣannif*). It should be remarked that a few lines below the manuscript tradition diverges with regard to the position of the clause *fī miṭlihi*, and one could wonder whether such a confusion could be due to the presence of a marginal correction on a first copy whose exact position was differently understood in the copies that were drawn from that one. As to the note referring to an authorial variant, seemingly it is not an isolated case: MSS NkB preserve at least another note, claiming that a certain passage was different in the author's manuscript (*fī nuṣḥat al-muṣannif*) in the section corresponding to *Ġadal* I.6, p. 55.11-13.

Q28 provide us perfect knowledge, nor it would make us attain the highest knowledge, as you will know in the place devoted to the knowledge of it<sup>6</sup>, but that the inquiry on what concerns us is the knowledge of the universal utterance.

#### [4. The universal utterance]

##### [4.1. Relation of the universal utterance with its subjects of predication]

You know that the universal utterance is universal only because it has a certain relation – either in the existence or in virtue of a valid estimation – with the particulars of which it is predicated.

80

##### [4.2. Distinction between synonymous and paronymous predication]

Predication is under two respects: [it is either] a synonymous predication – like your statement “Zayd is a man”, for “man” is predicated of Zayd by [his] essence and synonymously – or a paronymous predication, like the state of “whiteness” with respect to man, for it is said “the man is white” or “[the man is] provided with whiteness”, but it cannot be said “man is whiteness”. If it occurs to say “a body is white” and “a colour is white”, the definition of the predicate is not predicated of the subject. Our purpose, here, among what is predicated, is only that which was [predicated] synonymously.

85

##### [4.3. The scientific inquiry concerns the synonymously predicated universals]

Let us recall the sections of the universal that is only synonymously related to particulars, and that provides them with [its] name and definition; sometimes, however, the achievement of some of [our]

<sup>6)</sup> Cf. Avicenna’s refusal to deal with accidental beings, which are infinite, in *Ilāhiyyāt* II.1, and Avicenna’s considerations on the knowledge of universal and particular things by the part of the Necessary Existent in *Ilāhiyyāt* VIII.6.

الأغراض أن لا نسلك المعتاد من الطرق في قسمة هذه الألفاظ في أول الأمر، بل نعود إليه ثانيا.

90

(5.1) فنقول إنّ لكل شيء ماهية هو بها ما هو وهي حقيقته، بل هي ذاته. وذات كل شيء واحد ربما كان معنى واحدا مطلقا ليس يصير هو ما هو بمعان كثيرة إذا التأمّت يحصل منها ذات للشيء واحدة. وقلمما تجد لهذا من الظاهرات مثلا، فيجب أن يُسَلَم وجوده. وربما كان واحدا ليس بمطلق، بل تلتئم حقيقة وجوده من أمور ومعان إذا التأمّت حصل منها ماهية الشيء، مثال ذلك الإنسان، فإنه يحتاج أن يكون جوهرًا ويكون له امتداد في أبعاد تفرض فيه طولًا وعرضًا وعمقًا، وأن يكون مع ذلك ذا نفس، وأن تكون نفسه نفسًا يغتذي بها ويحس ويتحرك بالإرادة، ومع ذلك يكون بحيث يصلح أن يتفهم المعقولات ويتعلم صناعات ويعلمها، إن لم يكن عائق من خارج لا من جملة الإنسانية؛ فإذا التأم جميع هذا، حصل من جملة ذات واحدة هي ذات الإنسان.

95

100

Here starts a lacuna in MS A, which omits the rest of chap. I.5, chapters I.6-7 entirely and part of chap. I.8 (I.5, p. 28.12-I.8, p. 45.2 Cairo ed.); the omission is very likely due to the loss of some folia in the antigraph of MS A.

102... وربما 95. *al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.8, pp. 244.18-245.3. وجوده 94... وذات 92. *al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.8, p. 245.3-5.

*om. et* هو 93... وهي 91. *om. Yi* ثانيا 90... في *JTMiŠG* الطريق [الطرق] | *Yi* في [من] 89. *om. v exp.* معنى | *S<sup>3</sup>* *in mg. As s.l.* ربما فربما *S<sup>2</sup>Y* وربما [ربما] *om. N* هي 92. *κ* *add. in mg.* شيء *As* كشيء *JETG* الشيء [للشيء] | *To* لمعان [بمعان] | *To* لمعان [بمعان] *S<sup>2</sup>* يصير 93. *Te* واحد [واحدة] 94. *in mg. BC s.l. Nk* لهذا *JN* لها [لهذا] | *in mg. Te* وقيل ما [وقلمما] | *As* واحد [واحدة] *Te* واحد [واحدة] 95. *G* يتسلم [يُسَلَم] | *S<sup>2</sup>* *s.l. C* مثلا *in mg. C* مثلا *et* مثلا [مثالا] | *Ka* *s.l.* في *η* في [من] *om. No* يكون 98... جوهرًا 97. *S* ذات الشيء [الشيء] | *J* وإذا [إذا] 96. *Ka* وليس [ليس] | *Yi* *om. Da* ذا | *add. Da* له [يكون] 98. *p.c. Y* فيكون *Nk* *add. in mg. Nk* وأن *t* وأن يكون [ويكون] بالإرادة | *Ka* نفس *Nk* *om. et add. in mg. Nk* نفسًا 99. *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. in mg.* نفسًا 99... وأن *γANo* *s.l. Nk* يفهم *To* يفهم [يتفهم] 100. *G* *om. N* مع الإرادة *νπJEDiDa* مع الإرادة [يتعلم] | *C* *om. v add. mg. Y* عائق... ويتعلم | *ETAsDiToGN* *mg. Y* ويعلم *BC* *in mg. BC* يعلم [ويتعلم] | *a.c. N* لا [لم] | *Te* أو يعملها *JS<sup>2</sup>Y* *mg.* *ETAsDiToGN* ويعملها [ويعلمها] | *γ* الصناعات [صناعات] *om. et add. in mg. Nk* الإنسانية 104... فإذا | *Yi* الإنسانية فإذا 101

goals compels us not to walk along the traditional path when dividing these utterances at a first stage, but we will come back to it at a second moment<sup>7</sup>. 90

### [5. The quiddity and the essential quality]

#### [5.1. Two kinds of quiddities: (i) a quiddity resulting from a unique notion and (ii) a quiddity resulting from the combination of several notions]

Let us say that each thing has a quiddity in virtue of which it is what it is, namely its essential truth, i.e. its essence. The essence of each single thing [(i)] sometimes is a single, absolute notion that is not what it is in virtue of several notions from which, once they are gathered, a single essence is realized for the thing, but an instance of this can be barely found among the evident things, therefore its existence must be conceded<sup>8</sup>. [(ii)] Sometimes [the essence of each single thing] is a unique [notion] not absolutely, and the essence of its existence is rather the result of the combination of [several] things and notions from which, when they are gathered, the quiddity of the thing is realized. An instance of that is man, for he needs to be a substance and to have extension in dimensions that are supposed for him in length, in breadth and depth, and, in addition to this, to have a soul, which needs to be a soul by means of which he is nourished, has perception and can move voluntarily; besides this, he needs to be in such a way that he is able to gradually apprehend the intelligibles, to study and to teach disciplines, unless there is an external impediment that does not belong to the complex of humanity. So, when all this [complex of notions] is gathered, a single essence, which is the essence of man, is realized from their complex<sup>9</sup>. 95 100

<sup>7</sup>) Namely in *Madḥal* I.8. | <sup>8</sup>) It is the quiddity of immaterial things. | <sup>9</sup>) It is the quiddity of material things.

(5.2) ثم تخالطه معان وأسباب أخرى يتحصل بها واحد واحد من الأشخاص الإنسانية ويتميز بها شخص عن شخص، مثل أن يكون هذا قصيرا وذاك طويلا، وهذا أبيض وذاك أسود. ولا يكون شيء من هذه بحيث، لو لم يكن موجودا لذات الشخص وكان بدله غيره، لزم منه أن يفسد لأجله، بل هذه أمور تتبع وتلزم. وإنما تكون حقيقة وجوده بالإنسانية، فتكون ماهية كل شخص هي إنسانيته، لكن أيبته الشخصية تتحصل من كيفية وكمية وغير ذلك.

(5.3) وقد يكون أيضا له من الأوصاف أوصاف أخرى غير الإنسانية يشترك فيها الناس مع الإنسانية، بل تكون بالحقيقة أوصافا للإنسان العام، ككونه ناطقا أي ذا نفس ناطقة ومثل كونه ضاحكا بالطبع. لكن كونه ناطقا أمر هو أحد الأمور التي، لما التأمت، اجتمع من جملتها الإنسان، وكونه ضاحكا بالطبع هو أمر، لما التأمت الإنسانية بما التأمت منه، لم يكن بد من عروضه لازما؛ فإن الشيء، إذا صار إنسانا بمقارنة النفس الناطقة لمادته، أعرض للتعجب الموجب في مادته هيئة الضحك، كما أعرض لأمر أخرى من الخجل والبكاء والحسد والاستعداد للكتابة وقبول العلم ليس واحد منها، لما حصل، أعرض الشيء لحصول النفس الناطقة له فيكون

٣٠

Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. بل 111 [بالحقيقة... بل 108 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [وكونه... جملتها 114 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [في 117... أعرض 116 Due to a material damage, MS § is lacking. [فيكون... لحصول 119

فيتميز KaJTTe يتميز *in mg. C* و *s.l. Nk* و *om. As* واحدة [واحد] أخرى 103 [وذلك 105 *om. Mi* مثل | *vEŠG* من شخص *add. s.l. To* من شخص *om. et* عن شخص | *E* [بالإنسانية 108 *N* تتبعتها [تتبع | *add. a.c. Š* ذات الشخص [لأجله 107 *G* وذلك [مؤذاك | *No* وذلك *vAs* انيته *Ed.* إنيته [أيبته 109 *Di* هو [هي | *Da* فكون [فتكون | *add. Š* فقط *AsDa* الإنسانية *om.* له | *inv. N* أيضا له 110 *add. et exp. Yi* بالحقيقة او معا [ذلك | *N* كمية وكيفية [كيفية وكمية [ذا | *S³* *in mg.* مثل *et* كونه *γEd.* مثل كونه *As* لكونه *in mg. NkB* كونه [كونه 112 *DaNo* *om. et add. in mg.* التأمت... الإنسانية 115 *om. Yi* هو | *om. As* بالطبع 114 *add. a.c. No* نطق *G* اعترض [أعرض *As* اعترض [أعرض | *E* بمفارقة [بمقارنة 116 *iter. J* فإن | *in mg. Y* [واحد | *μ* وليس [ليس | *As* والذكاء [والبكاء 118 *add. in mg. B* أخرى *om. et* | *a.c. Š* عرض *KaJTAs* له | *om.* كحصول [الحصول | *Š* عرض *As* واعترض [أعرض 119 *As* واحدا

**[5.2. Accidental attributes associated to the individuals' quiddity]**

Then, other notions and causes associate with this, in virtue of which each one of the individuals of humanity is realized, and in virtue of which an individual is distinguished from the other, like the fact that this one is short whereas that one is tall, and that this one is white whereas that one is black, but none of these things is such that, if it did not belong to the essence of the individual and there were, instead of it, some other [features], it would follow from it that [the essence of the individual] is corrupted because of this [fact]; on the contrary, these are rather things coming after and following [the establishment of the individual essence]. The truth of its existence is only in virtue of [its] humanity, so that the quiddity of each individual is in virtue of its humanity, but its individual essential quality is realized from quality, quantity etc. 105

**[5.3. Accidental attributes of the species]**

It can also have some other attributes different from humanity that people share besides humanity, but they are actually attributes that belong to the common man, like his being rational, namely provided with a rational soul, and like his being capable of laughing by nature, but his being rational is one of the things from the complex of which, when they are gathered, man results as a combination, and the fact that he is capable of laughing by nature is something that inescapably follows when humanity is gathered from that from which it is gathered. 110

Q30 In fact, when the thing becomes a man in virtue of the association of the rational soul with its matter, it is exposed to the wonder that provokes in its matter the condition for laughter, as well as it is exposed to other things, of the sort of shame, crying, envy, being apt to write and to acquire knowledge, none of which, when realized, is such that the thing is exposed by it to the realization of the rational soul. 115

120 حصول النفس الناطقة إذن سابقا لها ويتم به حصول الإنسانية؛  
وتكون هذه لوازم بعدها، إذا استثبتت الإنسانية، لم يكن بدّ منها.

(5.4) فقد لاح لك من هذا أنّ هاهنا ذاتا حقيقية للشيء وأن له  
أوصافا بعضها تلتئم منه ومن غيره حقيقة الشيء وبعضها عوارض لا  
تلتزم ذاته لزوما في وجوده وبعضها عوارض لازمة له في وجوده.

125 فما كان من الألفاظ الكلية يدل على حقيقة ذات شيء أو أشياء،  
فذلك هو الدال على الماهية؛ وما لم يكن كذلك، فلا يكون دالا  
على الماهية؛ فإن دل على الأمور التي لا بد من أن تكون متقدمة  
في الوجود على ذات الشيء حتى يكون بالتئامها يحصل ذات  
الشيء، ولا يكون الواحد منها وحده ذات الشيء، ولا اللفظ الدال  
130 عليه يدل على حقيقة ذات الشيء بكمالها، بل على جزء منه؛ فذلك  
ينبغي أن يقال له اللفظ الذاتي الغير الدال على الماهية. وأما ما يدل  
على صفة هي خارجة عن الأمرين، لازمة كانت أو غير لازمة، فإنه  
يقال له «لفظ عرضي» ولمعناه «معنى عرضي».

(6.1) ثم هاهنا موضع نظر أنه هل يجب أن يكون معنى اللفظ  
135 الذاتي مشتملا على معنى اللفظ الدال على الماهية اشتغال العام على  
الخاص أو لا يكون.

٣١

122 Here starts a lacuna in MS As, which omits the rest of chap. I.5, chapters I.6-8 entirely and almost entirely chapter I.9 (I.5, p. 30.15-I.9, p. 54.3 Cairo ed.). [هذا... فقد 122

et add. منها [لاح 122 Š ثم [لم | εξΕDa بعده [بعدها 121 JB CDiDa\$TeŠGN إذا [إذن 120  
del. To | حقيقة [حقيقية 123 As حقيقة [حقيقية | لا om. ζμνLat.DaNo add. p.c. J  
add. s.l. Y | عوارض 124... لا om. et add. in mg. JS<sup>3</sup> om. N 124 praem. غير [لازمة  
om. 2 على 127 T الشيء a.c. E الشيء [شيء 125 om. To له | om. To 125  
et add. in mg. Te | من om. Da 130 As بكماله [بكمالها 131 ES غير [الغير | J يكون [يقال 131  
فإنما JETDaTeG فإنها [فإنه | om. To 2 لازمة... كانت | om. et add. s.l. J هي 132 om. C  
om. N موضع نظر 134 JETDa\$Te ولمعناها [ولمعناه | JETDa لها [له 133 DiYi in mg. S<sup>3</sup>  
Yi للعام [العام 135 πJTTe i.l. S<sup>3</sup> وهو [أنه

The realization of the rational soul, then, precedes them, and the realization of humanity is complete in virtue of it, whereas these [other things] are necessary concomitants inescapably following it once humanity is established. 120

**[5.4. Classification of the universal utterances based on their signification of the quiddity]**

It has become clear to you from this that there is [(a)] a true essence belonging to the thing, and that it has attributes, [(b)] from some of which and something else the essence of the thing is gathered, and that [(c)] some of them are accidents that do not necessarily follow its essence in its existence, and some [others] are accidents that necessarily follow it in its existence.

[(a)] What, among the universal utterances, signifies the true essence of one or more things is what signifies the quiddity [of the thing], whereas [(b)] what is not in this way does not signify the quiddity. If, then, it signifies the things that must inescapably precede in the existence the essence of the thing, so that the essence of the thing is realized by their gathering, the single of these [things] alone is not the essence of the thing, nor the utterance that signifies it signifies the truth of the essence of the thing in its perfection, but rather [just] a part of it; this should be called the essential utterance that does not signify the quiddity [of the thing]. [(c)] As to what signifies an attribute that does not fall within these two cases, be it necessarily concomitant or not, it is called “accidental utterance”, and its notion [is called] “accidental notion”. 125 130

**[6. The relation between the notions of “essential” and “signifying the quiddity”]**

**[6.1. Problem of establishing if “essential” is a notion encompassing “signifying the quiddity”]**

Then, there is here a matter of inquiry, namely whether it is necessary that the notion of the essential utterance encompass the notion of the utterance signifying the quiddity in the way what is common encompasses what is [more] specific or not. 135

فإنّ قولنا «لفظ ذاتي» يدل على لفظ لمعناه نسبة إلى ذات الشيء، ومعنى ذات الشيء لا يكون منسوباً إلى ذات الشيء: إنما ينسب إلى الشيء ما ليس هو. فهذا بالحري أن يظن أنّ لفظ الذاتي إنما الأولي به أن يشتمل على المعاني التي تقوّم الماهية، فلا يكون اللفظ الدال على الماهية ذاتياً، فلا يكون الإنسان ذاتياً للإنسان، لكن الحيوان والناطق يكونان ذاتيين للإنسان. فإن لم يجعل الإنسان ذاتياً للإنسان بما هو إنسان، بل لشخص شخص، لم يخل إما أن تكون نسبته بالذاتية إلى حقيقة ماهية الشخص وذلك هو الإنسان أيضاً، وإما أن تكون نسبته بها إلى الجملة التي بها يتشخص، فيكون ليس هو بكماله، بل هو جزء مما هو منه من حيث هو جملة. فحينئذ يعرض أن لا يكون الحيوان والناطق والإنسان وما يجري مجراها ذاتياً لشخص شخص فقط، بل الأمور العرضية أيضاً، مثل لونه وكونه قصيراً وكونه ابن فلان وما يجري هذا المجرى قد تكون ذاتية، لأنها أجزاء مقومة للجملة. فحينئذ لا يكون للإنسان من حيث هو ذاتي للشخص إلا ما لهذه.

(6.2) فهذه الأفكار تدعو إلى أن لا يكون الذاتي مشتملاً على المقول في جواب ما هو؛ لكن قولنا «ذاتي»، وإن كان بحسب قانون اللغة يدل على هذا المعنى النسبي، فإنه بحسب اصطلاح وقع بين المنطقيين يدل على معنى آخر. وذلك لأنّ اللفظ الكلي، إذا دل على معنى، نسبته إلى الجزئيات التي تعرض لمعناه نسبة يجب، إذا

ذات الشيء 139 om. et add. in mg. ToG 2 الشيء... ومعنى 138 No في ذاتي أي ذاتي 137 Ed. ولا [فلا 140 om. JTTe أن | a.c. E لهذا [لهذا | om. No ليس | praem. s.l. Y للإنسان 142 om. et add. in mg. YN للإنسان 143... لكن | add. a.c. No اللفظ الدال [يكون 141 إلى | add. et exp. Yi بها إلى الجملة التي بها يتشخص [نسبته 144 om. No شخص 143 om. J 4 هو | om. ETTe exp. S 2 هو 146 om. Yi add. E a.c. S يسير Di نسبتها [نسبته 145 om. Yi أيضاً 148 ع مجراها [مجراها | ESEd. الناطق [والناطق 147 Yi i.l. om. et add. هو | Di الإنسان [للإنسان 150 Di و [وكونه 149 Nk كونه [لونه | S3 add. in mg. DaS om. om. To JTSTe add. in mg. وقع بين | s.l. Da وقع 154 S3 om. et add. s.l. لا 152 om. To S: om. تعرض | add. in mg. To تعرض et تعرض 156 Y أن [لأن 155 Ka من [بين | S2 Da

In fact, our statement “essential utterance” signifies an utterance whose notion has a [certain] relation to the essence of the thing, but the notion of the essence of the thing is not related to the essence of the thing [itself]: it is only related to the thing what is not the thing itself. [(1)] Therefore it is suitable to think that the essential utterance is the most entitled to encompass the notions that constitute the quiddity, but the utterance signifying the quiddity is not essential, so that man is not essential to man, but animal and rational are both essential to man. [(2)] If man is not posed as essential to man inasmuch as it is a man, but rather to each single individual, then, inescapably, [(2.1)] its relation in virtue of the essentiality is to the quiddity of the individual, which is also man, or [(2.2)] its relation in virtue of the essentiality is to the complex [of that] in virtue of which it becomes an individual, so that it is not in its entirety, but it is a part of that from which it comes, inasmuch as it is a complex. Then, it happens that not only “rational animal”, “man” and what is analogous to them are essential to each single individual, but also the accidental features, like its colour, its being short, its being so-and-so and what is similar are essential, since they are constitutive parts of the complex. Hence, the man, in so far as he is essential to the individual, has nothing else than what this [complex] has.

### [6.2. Considerations on the meaning of “essential”]

These considerations lead to [conclude that] the essential does not encompass what is predicated in answer to the question “what is it?”, but when we say “essential”, even though according to the rule of the language it signifies this relative notion, according to an agreement occurred among the logicians it signifies another notion. This because, when the universal utterance signifies a notion, its relation to the particulars occurring to its notion is such that it is necessary, when it is

٣٢ق

تُوهمت غير موجودة، أن لا يكون ذات ذلك الشيء من الجزئيات موجودا، لا أن ذات ذلك الشيء يجب أن يكون يرفع أولا حتى يصح توهم رفع هذا، بل لأنّ رفع هذا موجب رفع ذلك الشيء، سواء كان لأنّ هذا المرفوع هو حقيقة ذاته أو كان هذا المرفوع مما تحتاج إليه حقيقة ذاته ليتقوم؛ فإنه يقال له «ذاتي».

160

(6.3) فإن لم يكن هكذا، وكان يصح في الوجود أو في التوهم أن يكون الشيء الموصوف به حاصلًا مع رفعه، أو كان لا يصح في الوجود، ولكن ليس رفعه سبب رفعه، بل إنما لا يصح ذلك في الوجود لأنّ رفعه لا يصح إلا أن يكون ذلك ارتفع أولا في نفسه، حتى يكون رفعه بالجملة ليس سبب رفعه، فهو عرضي.

165

فأما المرتفع في الوجود فكالقيام والقعود وذلك مما يسرع رفعه؛ وكالشباب، فإنه يبطؤ رفعه؛ وكغضب الحليم، فإن ذلك يسهل إزالته؛ وكالخلق، فإنه يصعب إزالته. وأما المرتفع في الوهم دون الوجود، فكسواد الحبشي. وأما الذي لا يرتفع ولا يرفع رفع السبب، فككون الإنسان بطبعه معرضا للتعجب والضحك، وهو كونه ضحكا بالطبع، فإنه لا يجوز أن يرفع عن الإنسان في الوجود؛ فإن توهم مرفوعا، فإنّ الإنسانية تكون مرفوعة، لا أنّ رفع الأعراض بالطبع لهذا المعنى هو سبب رفع الإنسانية، بل لأنه لا يتأتى أن يرفع إلا أن

170

*om. et add. in mg.* الشيء 158... من | *om. et add. in mg.* ذلك | Di موجود [موجودة] 157  
*om.* توهم 159 MiŠG رفع [يرفع] | *om.* JNo ذات | MiŠ لأن [أن] | *a.c.* E إلا [لا] 158 Da  
*om.* هو | *om.* JTŠTe لأنّ 160 *om.* No الشيء | T ذاك | *praem. t a.c.* S ذات [ذلك] | Yi  
*add.* π به [ليتقوم] 161 EN ما Da هو ما [مما] | Nk أو جزء يتقوم به [ليتقوم] 161... أو | TTe  
Yi يرفعه [أرفعه] 164 *add. π add. in mg.* G ذلك [يصح] 163 N أو كان G فكان [وكان] 162  
*om. et add. s.l.* S<sup>2</sup> أولا om. JTDaTe في نفسه أولا [نفسه...أولا] | Ka أن يقع [ارتفع] 165  
εE وذلك مما [فإنه] 168 Da ما [مما] | S فذلك [وذلك] 167 S<sup>2</sup> عرضي *et* عرض [عرضي] 166  
فإنه S<sup>3</sup> *add. s.l.* S<sup>3</sup> مما γTEd فإن [فإن ذلك] | S<sup>3</sup> *s.l.* وذلك مما γ فإنه مما *add. in mg.* J وذلك *et* مما  
*om. et add. in mg.* Nk الوهم دون | *i.l.* Y فإن *et* وذلك مما tE فإن ذلك [فإنه] 169 Te  
*om.* No JTŠYi برفع [رفع] | *add. μ add. in mg.* JDi لا في الوجود ولا في التوهم [يرتفع] 170  
No مرفوعا [مرفوعة] 173 Yi يرتفع [يرفع] | *om. et add. s.l.* E لا 172 KaS ضاحكا [ضحكا] 171  
*om.* N لا | No بهذا Ka كهذا C لهذا *et in mg.* كهذا [لهذا] 174

Q32 conceived as non-existing, that the essence of that thing do not exist among the particulars, not because it is necessary for the essence of that thing to be removed at first, so that it is possible to conceive the removal of this, but rather because the removal of this makes the removal of that thing necessary, no matter whether it is because this [thing] removed is its very essence, or [because] this [thing] removed is among [the things] that its very essence needs in order to be constituted; this is said “essential”. 160

### [6.3. Considerations on the meaning of “accidental”]

If it is not so, and [(a)] it is possible in the existence or in the estimation that the thing characterized by it is realized in spite of its removal, or [(b)] [if this is] not possible in the existence, but its removal is not the cause of the removal of the thing itself, and it is not possible in the existence only because its removal is not possible unless that [thing] itself is firstly removed, so that its removal for the complex is not the cause of the removal of the thing, then it is “accidental”. 165

[(a.1)] As to what is removed in the existence, it is like standing and sitting, and this is among the features whose removal is fast, or like youth, whose removal is slow, and like the rage of the mild, whose removal is easy, or like the natural disposition, whose removal is hard. [(a.2)] As to what is removed in the estimation but not in the existence, it is like the blackness of the Ethiopian. [(b)] As to what is not removed and does not entail the removal of the thing as if it were its cause, it is like the fact that the man is by [his own] nature exposed to wonder and laughter, namely the fact that he is capable of laughing by nature. In fact, it is not possible to remove [this feature] from man in the existence and if it is estimated as removed [from man], then humanity is removed, not because the removal of the accidents that belong by nature to this notion is the cause of the removal of humanity, 170

175 تكون الإنسانية أولا مرفوعة، كما أنها ليست سببا لثبوت الإنسانية، بل الإنسانية سبب لثبوتها.

180 (6.4) فقد بان اختلاف ما بين نسبة الحيوان والناطق والإنسان إلى الأشخاص وبين نسبة الأعراض إليها؛ فإنَّ النسبة الأولى إذا رفعتها أوجب رفعها رفع الشخص؛ وأما النسبة الثانية، فنفس رفعها لا يوجب رفع الشخص، بل منها ما يرتفع ومنها ما لا يجوز أن يرتفع أو يرتفع الشخص؛ وأما رفعها، فلا يرفع الشخص البتة. وإذا كان الأمر على هذه الجهة، فالذاتي يشتمل على الدال على الماهية.

(7) فقد اتضح لك أن اللفظ المفرد الكلي منه ذاتي يدل على الماهية ومنه ذاتي لا يدل على الماهية ومنه عرضي.

185

وعن [وبين 178 *add. in mg. CY* μJEDa a.c. § *add. أيضا*] الإنسان 177 *Te* أنه [أنها 175 *om. θvEDiToSGEd.* | *om.* ارفعها | *S* *in mg.* | *vToSG* أوجب | *om.* G 179 *om.* النسبة | *E* النسبة | *om. et add. in mg. Nk<sup>2</sup>* | الشخص 180... وأما | *S<sup>2</sup> s.l.* *add. in mg.* رفعها *om. et* *om.* *ma<sup>2</sup>* | *E* ومنه [ومنها | *S* يرفع [يرتفع | *E* منه [منها | *om. No* رفع 180 *om. et add. in mg. G* | *S* *add. s.l.* *om. et* يرفع [يرتفع | *om. C* | *om. Nk* *om. et add. in mg.* | *Mi* إذ [أو 181 *S* *add. s.l.* *om.* البتة... وأما *μvJETDaSTeNo* فإذا [وإذا | *Yi* يرتفع [يرفع | *G* *add. in mg. Lat.G* *om.* الجملة [الجهة 182 *om. et add. in mg. S<sup>2</sup> s.l.* *μ* مشتمل [يشتمل | *Ka* فالذاتي | *S* الجملة [الجهة 182 *mg. To om. Mi*

but because this feature cannot be removed unless humanity is firstly removed, as they are not the cause of the subsistence of humanity, but rather humanity is the cause of their subsistence. 175

**[6.4. Conclusive remarks on the way the “essential” encompasses the “signifying the quiddity”]**

Q33 It has become clear that there is a certain difference between the relation of animal, rational and man with the individuals and the relation of the accidents with them, for if you remove the first relation, this entails the removal of the individual; as to the second relation, its removal itself does not entail the removal of the individual, but among [this sort of] features there is what is removed, and what cannot be removed [because] otherwise the individual is removed; as to their removal [itself], it does not remove the individual at all. If the thing is under such respect, then the essential encompasses what signifies the quiddity. 180

**[7. Conclusive classification of the simple universal utterance]**

It has already become clear to you that the simple universal utterance can be essential and signifying the quiddity, or essential without signifying the quiddity, or accidental.

## [الفصل السادس]

### فصل في تعقب ما قاله الناس في الذاتي والعرضي

(1) قد قيل في التمييز بين الذاتي والعرضي إن الذاتي مقوم والعرضي غير مقوم، ثم لم يُحصَل ولم يبين أنه كيف يكون مقوماً أو غير مقوم. وقيل أيضاً إن الذاتي لا يصح توهمه مرفوعاً مع بقاء الشيء والعرضي يصح توهمه مرفوعاً مع بقاء الشيء.

5

(2.1) فيجب أن نُحصَل نحن صحة ما قيل أو اختلاله، فنقول: أما قولهم إن الذاتي هو المقوم، فإنما يتناول ما كان من الذاتيات غير دال على الماهية، فإن المقوم مقوم لغيره. وقد علمت ما يعرض من هذا، اللهم إلا أن يعنوا بالمقوم ما لا يفهم من ظاهر لفظه، ولكن يعنون به ما عيننا بالذاتي، فيكونوا إنما أتوا باسم مرادف صرف عن الاستعمال الأول ولم يدل على المعنى الذي نقل إليه، ويكون الخطب في المقوم كالخطب في الذاتي، وتكون حاجة كل واحد منهما إلى البيان واحدة.

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(2.2) وأما اعتمادهم على أمر الرفع في التوهم، فيجب أن تتذكر ما أعطيناك سالفاً أن المعنى الكلي قد يكون له أوصاف يحتاج إليها أولاً حتى يحصل ذلك المعنى، ويكون له أوصاف أخرى تلزمه وتتبعه، إذا صار ذلك المعنى حاصلًا.

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13... اللهم 10 Cf. *al-Sifā'*, *al-Burhān* II.2, p. 128.15-18; p. 130.17-19. [المقوم 8... أما 7  
واحدة] Cf. *Iṣārāt*, p. 199.6-10.

عن [يبين 3 Y الفصل السادس Mi الفصل السادس من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق] فصل 1  
و [أو | S<sup>2</sup> s.l. يبين TSNoEd. يبين] يبين 4 om. et add. in mg. To العرضي... إن | E  
om. et add. بقاء | add. No مقوم والعرضي [الذاتي] om. Yi إن | v وقد قيل [وقيل 5 EDaSN  
om. Yi fort. ما يعرض | TTeG فقد] وقد 9 JT و [أو 7 om. K الشيء 6... والعرضي | in mg. J  
JTSTe يعني [عيننا 11 EDiDaN منه] به | inv. Di ما لا 10 Lat. «(iam nosti) hoc» om.  
om. N 15 [أن] واحد | E لا الخطب [كالخطب 13 Da فيكونون] فيكونوا | S<sup>3</sup> s.l. عيننا  
inv. Da تلزمه وتتبعه 16 vJTe

[I.6]

**CHAPTER ON THE INVESTIGATION OF WHAT PEOPLE SAID ABOUT  
THE ESSENTIAL AND THE ACCIDENTAL**

**[1. Two traditional criteria to define the “essential”]**

[(i)] It was said, in distinguishing between the essential and the accidental, that the essential is constitutive and the accidental is not constitutive, then it has not been deduced nor it has been clarified how it is constitutive or not constitutive. [(ii)] It was also said that it is not possible to represent in estimation the essential as removed although the thing remains, whereas it is possible to represent in estimation the accidental as removed although the thing remains.

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**[2. Inquiry into the traditional criteria to define the “essential”]**

**[2.1. The “essential” as “constitutive”: the first traditional criterion]**

Hence, it is necessary that we ourselves deduce the soundness or the defectiveness of what was said, so we say: as to what concerns their claim that the essential coincides with the constitutive [(i)], it only comprehends the essential [features] that do not signify the quiddity, for the constitutive is constitutive to something else. But you have already learned what happens from this, unless they meant by “constitutive” what is not understood by the literal sense of its utterance, but they meant by it what we meant by “essential”, so that they just brought a synonymous name that was turned away from [its] first use and that does not signify the notion to which it was applied, and dealing with the “constitutive” is like dealing with the “essential”, and the need of a clarification of each one of them is the same.

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**[2.2. The “essential” cannot be removed in the imagination: the second traditional criterion]**

Q34 As to what concerns their relying on the fact of the removal in estimation, it is necessary that you recall what we taught you in what preceded, [namely] that the universal notion sometimes [(a)] has attributes that are primarily required for that notion to be realized, and [(b)] some other attributes that are concomitant for it and that follow to it when that notion is being realized.

15

فأما جميع الأوصاف التي يحتاج إليها الشيء حتى تحصل ماهيته، فلن يحصل معقولا مع سلب تلك الأوصاف منه. وذلك أنه قد سلف لك أنّ للأشياء ماهيات، وأن تلك الماهيات قد تكون موجودة في الأعيان وقد تكون موجودة في الأوهام، وأنّ الماهية لا يوجب لها تحصيل أحد الوجودين، وأن كل واحد من الوجودين لا يثبت إلا بعد ثبوت تلك الماهية، وأنّ كل واحد من الوجودين يلحق بالماهية خواص وعوارض تكون للماهية عند ذلك الوجود ويجوز أن لا تكون له في الوجود الآخر. وربما كانت له لوازم تلزمه من حيث الماهية، لكن الماهية تكون متقررة أولا، ثم تلزمها هي، فإنّ الاثنينية تلزمها الزوجية والمثلث يلزمه أن تكون زواياه الثلاث مساوية لقائمتين لا لأحد الوجودين، بل لأنه مثلث.

(3.1) وهذه الماهية إذا كان لها مقومات متقدمة من حيث هي ماهية لم تحصل ماهية دون تقدمها؛ وإذا لم تحصل ماهية، لم تحصل معقولة ولا عينا. فإذن إذا حصلت معقولة، حصلت وقد حصل ما تتقوم به في العقل معها على الجهة التي تتقوم به؛ فإذا كان ذلك حاصلًا في العقل، لم يمكن السلب فيجب أن تكون هذه المقومات

Due to a material damage, MS § is not readable. 32 [كان... التي] Due to a material damage, MS § is not readable.

29 وهذه... 30 [تقدمها] *Iṣārāt*, p. 203.1-8.

19... ماهيته | *add. E* معقولا [ماهيته] | *om. et add. in mg. Ka* حتى | *praem. §* ذلك [الشيء] 18  
*om.* منه | *om. E* معقولا | *om. et add. in mg. To* يحصل *om. et add. in mg. J* 19  
*Yi* الماهية [الماهيات] | *om. et add. in mg. Di* وأن | *No* الأشياء [للأشياء] 20 *TTe*  
... يثبت | *add. §* كان [وأن] 22 *§* فإن [وأن] | *s.l. §²* الأوهام *θTe* الأذهان [الأوهام] | *Da* و [وقد] 21  
كل واحد من الوجودين الماهية *om. Lat.G* للماهية 24... وأن | *om. J* تلك 23 *om. Yi* الوجودين 23  
*JTTe* الماهية [بالماهية] | *No* الموجوبين [الوجودين] | *add. in mg. G* خواص وعوارض تكون للماهية  
*v p.c.* لها [له] 25 *in mg. E* طارية [للماهية] | *C* وعوارضا [وعوارض] | *C* خواصا [خواص] 24  
[تلزمها] | *om. Lat.G add. i.l. G* هي... ثم 26 *G* تلزمها [تلزمه] | *vG* لها [له] 2 | *om. I* في | *G*  
[الثلاث] «tres» *γvJTTe* الثلاث | *om. et add. s.l. G* [زواياه] 27 *Ka* *add. et exp.* الزوجية  
*vKaBS* كانت [كان] 29 *Te* ماهية [مثلث] | *s.l. §³* لأحد *§* لأجل [لأحد] 28 *om. tEDa* [Lat.]  
معقولة حصلت | *JBCDiN* فإذا [فإن] 31 *add. et exp. J* وإذا لم تحصل ماهية دون تقدمها [تقدمها] 30  
*om. TTe* 32 *μvEDa* وإذا [فإن] *DaN* *add. s.l.* ذلك

The thing cannot be realized as intelligible with the negation of the complex of the attributes that the thing requires to realize its quiddity, for you have already learned that things have quiddities, and that those quiddities are sometimes existent in the individuals, and sometimes are existent in the estimations, and that it is not necessary, for the quiddity, the be realized in one of the two [kinds of] existence, and that each of the two [kinds of] existence is established only after that quiddity is established, and that in each one of the two [kinds of] existence [certain] propria and accidents attach to the quiddity [itself] which belong to the quiddity in that [kind of] existence and that could [also] not belong to it in the other [kind of] existence. Sometimes the thing has some concomitants that are concomitant to it with regard to [its] quiddity, but the quiddity has been fixed firstly, and then they become concomitant to it. The fact of being even is a concomitant of duality, and having its three angles equal to two right angles is a concomitant of the triangle not in one of the two [kinds of] existence, but because it is a triangle.

### **[3. The quiddity and the constitutive features preceding it]**

#### **[3.1. The quiddity cannot remain in the mind with the negation of its constitutive features]**

When this quiddity has [certain] constitutive [elements] that precede [it] inasmuch as it is a quiddity, it is not realized as a quiddity unless [those constitutive elements] precede it; when the quiddity is not realized, then it is not realized neither as an intelligible nor as an individual. When it is realized as an intelligible, it is realized and its constituents have been realized together with it in the intellect, as it is constituted of them. When it is in the condition of being realized in the intellect, [its constitutive elements] cannot be negated of it, so that

معقولة مع تصور الشيء، بحيث لا يجهل وجودها له، ولا يجوز  
سلبها عنه حتى تثبت الماهية في الذهن مع رفعها في الذهن بالفعل. 35

(3.2) ولست أعني بحصولها في العقل خطورها بالبال بالفعل،  
فكثير من المعقولات لا تكون خاطرة بالبال، بل أعني أنها لا يمكن  
مع إخطارها بالبال وإخطار ما هي مقومة له بالبال، حتى تكون هذه  
مخطرة بالبال وذلك مخطرا بالبال بالفعل، أن يسلبها عنه، كأنك تجد  
الماهية بالفعل خالية عنها مع تصورها، أعني تصور الماهية في الذهن. 40  
وإذا كان كذلك، فالصفات التي نسميها ذاتية للمعاني المعقولة يجب  
ضرورة أن تعقل للشيء على هذا الوجه إذ لا تتصور الماهية في  
الذهن دون تقدم تصورها.

(4.1) وأما سائر العوارض، فإذ ليست مما يتقدم تصورها في الذهن  
تصور الماهية فيه، ولا أيضا هي مع تصور الماهية، بل هي توابع  
ولوازم ليست مما يحقق الماهية، بل مما يتلو الماهية، فالماهية تثبت  
دونها. وإذا ثبتت دونها، لم يتعذر أن تعقل الماهية وإن لم تتقدم أو  
إن لم يلزم تعقلها. 45

(4.2) وقد علمت أنني لست أعني بهذا التعقل أن يكون، إذا  
تصورت الشيء بالفعل ملحوظاً إليه، تكون مع ذلك تصورت أفراد 50

Due to a material damage, MS § is not readable. [الماهية... حتى 35]

om. 2الذهن...مع | om. et add. in mg. Nk | افي الذهن 35 om. et add. s.l. §<sup>3</sup> له 34  
بالبال | N فكثيرا [فكثير 37 om. بالبال 37...بالفعل | To om. § praem. et del. في [بالفعل 36  
...حتى | Yi لها Da s.l. add. له 38 E أنه [أنها | om. YiN بل | §<sup>2</sup> om. et add. in mg. §<sup>2</sup>  
om. et add. 2بالبال...وذلك | v مخطرا [مخطرة 39 v هذا [هذه | om. et add. in mg. G  
in mg. Y | om. v add. عنه | om. Lat.G add. بالفعل 40...أن | No وذاك [وذلك | Y  
فإذ § إذ T فإنن § فإذا [فإذ | ع فاما [وأما 44 N فإذا [وإذا 41 add. s.l. Y § عنه [عنها 40  
[يحقق 46 om. E<sup>2</sup> هي | praem. et exp. No ولا [بل 45 J يتصور تقدمها [يتقدم تصورها | §<sup>2</sup>  
...وإذا | E فإذا v وإذ [وإذا 47 § والماهية [فالماهية | §<sup>3</sup> om. et add. s.l. §<sup>3</sup> om. E مما | No  
add. in mg. DaTe :يبعد iKaBTe يبعد iJNkETCDaYi p.c. Y [يتعذر | om. et add. in mg. DaTo  
[بهذا 49 om. et add. s.l. §<sup>3</sup> om. لم 48 om. Di يلزم 48...أو | Di add. in mg. NkC :  
مع [أفراد | Te تصورات [تصورت 50 add. in mg. C Nk add. s.l. بهذا JETSTeYi في هذا  
praem. Da om. N

these constitutive [elements] are necessarily conceived with the conceptualization of the thing, since it is not ignored that they belong to it, and it is impossible to negate them of it so that the quiddity is established in the mind in spite of their removal in the mind in actuality. 35

### **[3.2. The realization in the intellect]**

By [the locution] “their realization in the intellect” I do not mean that they are notified to the mind in actuality, for many of the intelligibles are not notified to the mind, but I mean that it is impossible their negation from it with their notification to the mind and with the notification to the mind of the thing they constitute, so that [both] these [constituents] and that [thing] are notified in the mind in actuality, as if you found the quiddity in actuality free from them in spite of its conceptualization, I mean the conceptualization of the quiddity in the mind. Since it is so, it is absolutely necessary for the attributes that we call “essential” for the intelligible notions to be conceived for the thing in this manner, for the quiddity is not conceptualized in the mind unless their conceptualization preceded. 40

### **[4. The quiddity and the features that are consequent to it]**

#### **[4.1. The quiddity can be conceived without those attributes whose conception follows the quiddity’s conception]**

As to the other accidents, since they are neither among the things whose conceptualization in the mind precedes the conceptualization of the quiddity in it, nor they are together with the conceptualization of the quiddity (on the contrary, they are appositions and concomitants that are not among the things that certify the quiddity, but rather among the things that follow the quiddity), the quiddity is established without them. Since [the quiddity] is established without them, it is not impossible that the quiddity is conceived even if their conception neither preceded nor was concomitant [to it]. 45

#### **[4.2. The sense of “conception”]**

You have already learnt that I do not mean by this “conception” that, when you conceptualize the thing in actuality as an object of consideration, you also conceptualize, besides this, its single 50

المقومات له أيضا بالفعل، فرمما لم تلاحظ الأجزاء بذهنك، بل أعني بهذا أنك إذا أخطرت الأمرين معا بالبال لم يمكنك أن تسلب الذي هو مقوم عن الذي هو مقوم له سلبا يصح معه وجود المقوم بماهيته في الذهن من دون وجود ما يقومه فيه. فإذا كان كذلك، فيجب أن لا يمكنك سلبيه عنه، بل تعقل وجوده له لا محالة.

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(5.1) وأما العوارض فلا أمتع صحة استثباتك في الذهن معنى الماهية ولا تعقل وجودها للماهية، بل تسلبها سلبا كاذبا. ولا أوجب ذلك أيضا في كل العوارض، فإن من العوارض ما يلزم الماهية لزوما أوليا بينما ليس بواسطة عارض آخر، فيكون سلبيه عن الماهية مع استثبات الماهية وإخثارها معا بالبال مستحيلا، إذا كان ليس له بسبب وسط بينه وبينه. وذلك مثل كون المثلث بحيث يمكن إخراج أحد أضلاعه على الاستقامة توها، أو معنى آخر مما يشبه هذا مما هو عارض له. وقد يمكن أن يكون وجود العارض بواسطة، فإذا لم تخطر تلك الوساطة بالبال أمكن سلبيه، مثل كون كل زاويتين من المثلث أصغر من قائمتين.

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ولولا صحة وجود القسم الثاني لما كانت لوازم مجهولة؛ ولولا صحة القسم الأول لما كان ما نبين لك بعد من إثبات لازم للماهية بتوسط شيء حقا. وذلك لأن المتوسط إن كان لا يزال يكون لازما للماهية

*Išārāt* [واسطة 71... ولولا 66] *Mantiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 18.12-15. قائمتين 65... وأما 56 pp. 210.2-211.7.

بهذا 52 *add. et exp. Yi* لم يتعذر أن يعقل الماهية [بذهنك | T الآخر [الأجزاء | *om. G* أيضا 51 [بماهيته | *om. To* معه | *om. et add. in mg. B* | مقوم... عن | *iter. a.c. S* | الذي 53 *om. N* | *πDiDaTe* ماهيته *om. et add. i.l. 56* صحة *om. N* فيه | *om. et add. in mg. To* وجود 54 *om. et add. in mg. G* من | *inv. E* ذلك أيضا 58 *om. Lat.G* معنى | *om. N* في الذهن | *Yi MiG s.l.* لها [له | *add. JTSTeEd.* هو [ليس | *JETG* إذ [إذا 60 *iter. T* ليس | *om. To* أوليا 59 [وبينه | *om. T* وبينه | *s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* بينها K بينها [بينه | *No* لسبب [بسبب 61 *s.l. S<sup>2</sup>* *om. et add. s.l. To* *om. et add. s.l. To* *MiSG s.l. To* وبينها *praep. DiTo* لا [يمكن | *E* وبين ذلك *Nk* فذلك [وذلك | *Da* فهذا [هذا | *Da* يشبهه [يشبهه [إثبات | *s.l. S<sup>2</sup>* تبين *DiSMiSYG* تبين [تبين | *s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* ما *S* مما [ما | *praem. v* وجود [القسم 67 شيء 68 *praem. s.l. Nk* بعد *praem. MiG* لا [بتوسط | *add. γEd. add. in mg. To* عارض *add. in mg. Y* بذاته : *add. in mg. G* *om. TTeG add. in mg. G* شيء : *in mg. E* شيء حقا *et* بين بذاته حقا [حقا

constituents in actuality, for sometimes you do not consider the parts with your mind. On the contrary, I mean by this that, when you notify to [your] mind the two things together, it is impossible for you to negate what is constitutive of that to which it is constitutive, in a way that, in spite of this, the existence in the mind of what is constituted in virtue of its quiddity is preserved [even] without the existence in the mind of what constitutes it. If it is so, then it must be impossible for you to negate the one of the other; on the contrary, the existence of the one is inevitably conceived as belonging to the other.

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**[5. Distinction between the accidents that are primarily concomitant and the accidents that are concomitant by mediation]**

**[5.1. Demonstration of the existence of the accidents that are primarily concomitant and of those that are concomitant by mediation of something else]**

As to the accidents, I do not deny that you can correctly establish in the mind the notion of the quiddity without conceiving their existence as belonging to the quiddity, on the contrary, you would deny it falsely. [On the other hand], I do not affirm it with regard to all the accidents, for among the accidents there is [(i)] what is primarily [and] manifestly concomitant to the quiddity without the mediation of any other feature occurring [to it], whose negation of the quiddity is impossible when the quiddity is established and they are both notified together to the mind, since it does not belong to it because of [something] intermediate between the one and the other. This is like the fact that the triangle is such that it is possible to extend in estimation one of its sides in a straight line, or [like] another similar notion among what occurs to it. [(ii)] It is possible for the accidental feature to exist in virtue of something intermediate, in a way that, when that intermediate [element] does not occur to the mind, its negation is possible, like the fact that each one of the angles of the triangle is minor than two right angles.

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If the existence of the second kind [of features] [(ii)] were not possible, there would not be ignored concomitants, whereas if the [existence of the] first kind [of features] [(i)] were not possible, what we will explain to you later concerning the establishing of a concomitant for the quiddity by mediation [of something else] would not be true. That because, if [at a certain point] the intermediate [element] does not cease to be concomitant to the quiddity without

غير بيّن الوجود لها، ذهب الأمر إلى غير نهاية؛ وإن كان من المقومات، صار اللازم المجهول، كما تعلم، لازما لهذا المقوم لا مقوما، إذ مقوم المقوم مقوم، وكان لازما آخر الأمر بلا واسطة. 70

(5.2) فما كان من اللوازم غير بيّن للشيء صح في الذهن أن يتوهم الشيء مرفوعا عنه ذلك اللازم من جهة ولم يصح من جهة. 75

أما جهة الصحة فمن حيث أن تصوّره قد يحصل في الذهن مع سلب اللازم عنه بالفعل، واعتبار هذه الصحة والجواز بحسب الذهن المطلق. 75

وأما جهة الاستحالة فإن يتوهم أنه يجوز أن لو كان يحصل في الأعيان، وقد سلب عنه فيها اللازم، حتى يكون مثلا كما يصح أن لو كان يكون هذا الشخص موجودا، ولا الندب الذي لزمه في أصل الحلقة، فصار يصح أيضا أنه كان يكون هذا المثلث موجودا، ولا زاويتاه أقل من قائمتين؛ فإنّ هذا التوهم فاسد لا يجوز وجود حكمه، وليس كالمذكور معه. واعتبار هذه الصحة والجواز بحسب ذهن مطابق للموجود. 80

(6) فقد بان لك من هذا أنّ من الصفات ما يصح سلبه وجودا، ومنها ما يصح سلبه توهمًا لا في الوجود، ومنها ما يصح سلبه توهمًا 85

Di in mg. BEd. النهاية [نهاية] No في [إلى] Nk لذهب [لها ذهب] | S<sup>2</sup> s.l. لها EDaS له [لها] 69  
 Nk لآخر [آخر] | S<sup>2</sup> exp. θvπJE add. له [لازما] 71 om. et add. in mg. G لهذا... 70  
 om. Y أما جهة الصحة in mg. sed اللازم 75... من<sup>1</sup> 73 K : om. et add. s.l. praem. G له [بلا  
 عنه 75 DiMiŠ يتحصل [يحصل] | JNk s.l. add. i.l. G add. s.l. KaJNkETDaTeG om. قد 74  
 Te المطابق Yi مطلقا [المطلق] 76 om. et add. i. l. N الصحة و [الصحة والجواز] | Da s.l. add.  
 et أن يكون لو كان [يكون... لو] 79 E أنه [أن] 78 iter. N في | JTTe om. لو | S<sup>3</sup> s.l. بأن [فإن] 77  
 s.l. الندب Ka للتدبير Š الندب p.c. ex in mg. To p.c. ex البين : Mi البين p.c. الندب | C del. يكون  
 om. Lat.G أيضا | DiMiG add. s.l. DiMiG om. فصار 80 K om. et add. in mg. لزمه | S<sup>2</sup>  
 add. in mg. G | εLat. أن لو [أنه] | Mi s.l. add. هذا | 81 Mi s.l. add. في [فإن] 81  
 C s.l. خ BE om. et add. in mg. Nk معه... وليس 82 ToN om. et add. s.l. وجود | G  
 Di i.l. للوجود TSŸYε للوجود [للموجود] | G in mg. praem. غير [مطابق] | Yi om. ذهن 83  
 in الصفات E العوارض [الصفات] | Di add. العوارض [أن] | G om. من... هذا 84  
 mg. ToŠ كسواد الخبشي فإنه يلزم [الوجود] | J praem. et exp. له praem. TMi له θvE له [لا] 85  
 تكون الإنسان [توهما] | T add. et exp. له [سلبه] | ج add. إنسانيته لا في الذهن ولا في الوجود  
 om. C سلبه 87... توهما | No add. في مكان ونحوه

belonging to it manifestly, the thing goes on infinitely. If it is among the constitutive [features], the ignored concomitant, as you know, becomes a concomitant for this constitutive [feature], [but] not constitutive [for it] (since the constitutive for the constitutive is [something] constitutive), and, lastly, it is a concomitant without [any] intermediate [element]. 70

**[5.2. Possibility and impossibility of the negation of mediated concomitants]**

As to what was among the concomitants that belong to the thing non-manifestly, it was possible, under a certain respect, to represent in estimation that concomitant as removed from the thing, whereas it was impossible under [another] respect.

Regarding [its] possibility, this is so because its conceptualization is sometimes realized in the mind despite the negation of its concomitant in actuality, and the consideration of this possibility and admissibility is in virtue of the absolute mind. 75

Regarding [its] impossibility, it consists in representing in estimation that it is possible, for it, to be realized in the external objects, although the concomitant has already been negated of it in them, so that, as it is possible, for instance, that, if this individual is existent although there is not the cry that was his concomitant in [his] first inborn character, then it is also possible for this triangle to exist even if two of its angles are not minor than two right angles. In fact, this estimation is false [and] its status cannot possibly exist, unlike what was mentioned with it, because the consideration of this possibility and admissibility is in virtue of a mind which corresponds to what exists. 80

مطلقا، ومنها ما لا يصح سلبه بوجه وهو عارض، ومنها ما لا يصح  
 سلبه وهو ذاتي، لكن يتميز من العارض بأن الذهن لا يوجب سبق  
 ثبوت ما الذاتي له ذاتي قبل ثبوت الذاتي، بل ربما أوجب سبق  
 ثبوت الذاتي. وأما العرضي فإنّ الذهن يجعله تاليا، وإن وجب ولم  
 ينسلب. 90

(7) فقد اتضح لك كيف لم يُحصَل معنى الذاتي والعرضي من اقتصر  
 على البيانين المذكورين.

قبل | om. C ثبوت 89... ما 88 om. Yi No : يتميزه [يتميز | ولكن لكن 87 غ om. ما 86  
 قبل ثبوت 89 om. v̄Lat. EDiDaG ثبوت 89 s.l. ربما § إنما [ربما | add. in mg. G قبل ثبوت om. et  
 T التباينين [البيانين 92 om. TTe لم 91 Ed. العرض [العرضي

**[6. New classification of the predicables in virtue of the possibility or impossibility of negating them from their subjects]**

[In sum,] it has become clear to you from this that, among the attributes, there is [(1)] [the attribute] whose negation is possible in existence, [(2)] [the attribute] whose negation is possible in estimation [but] not in existence, [(3)] [the attribute] whose negation is possible in the absolute estimation, [(4)] [the attribute] whose negation is impossible under a [certain] respect, and that is accidental, [(5)] and [the attribute] whose negation is impossible, and that is essential, and it is distinguished from the accidental because the mind does not require to establish what [the subject] with respect to which the essential is essential is before establishing the essential [itself]; on the contrary, it sometimes requires that the establishment of the essential precedes [that of its subject]. As to what concerns the accident, the mind posits it as consequent, even if it is necessary and cannot be negated.

**[7. Conclusion]**

[Finally], it has appeared clear to you how those who confined themselves to the aforementioned explanations did not attain the notion of “essential” and “accidental”.

## [الفصل السابع]

### فصل في تعقب ما قاله الناس في الدال على الماهية

(1) إنّ الدال على الماهية قد قيل فيه إنه هو الدال على ذاتي مشترك كيف كان، ولم يبلغنا ما هو أشد شرحا من هذا. فلننظر الآن هل المفهوم من هذه اللفظة بحسب التعارف العامي هو هذا المعنى أو لا وهل ما تعارفه الخاص واتفقوا عليه بسبيل النقل يدل عليه؟ فإنّا إذا فعلنا هذا، اتضح لنا غرض كبير.

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(2) أما المفهوم بحسب التعارف العامي فليس يدل عليه؛ وذلك لأنّ الدال على ماهية الشيء هو الذي يدل على المعنى الذي به الشيء هو ما هو. والشيء إنّما يصير هو ما هو بحصول جميع أوصافه الذاتية المشتركة فيها والتي تخص أيضا؛ فإنّ الإنسان ليس هو ما هو بأنه حيوان، وإلا لكانت الحيوانية تحصل للإنسانية. نعم، الحيوانية محتاج إليها في أن يكون هو ما هو، وليس كل ما يحتاج إليه في أن يكون شيء هو ما هو يكون هو الذي يحصل بحصوله وحده الشيء هو ما هو. فإذا كان كذلك لم يكن الذاتي مشترك للشيء مع غيره وحده، ولا الخاص وحده هو ماهية الشيء، بل جزء ماهيته. والعجب أنّ

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... الدال 9 Nağāt, pp. 12.16-13.1. [ماهيته 16... أما 8 2 Nağāt, p. 12.12-15. [كبير 7... إن 3  
16 [واحد 17... والعجب 16 al-Šifā', al-Ğadal I.6, p. 57.13. [هو 10

om. فيه 3 Y الفصل السابع Mi الفصل السابع من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق [فصل 2  
[الخاص | εη أم أو 6 praem. E على [هذا | No هذا [هذه 5 praem. Yi هو [إنه هو | JTTe  
[غرض | praem. § فقد [اتضح | om. To عليه 7 JTTe قبيل [بسبيل | μ الخواص Da الخاصة  
C أن [لأنّ | s.l. N و [وذلك 8 § كسر Di in mg. Di كثير ημῆῖ JTYi كثير [كبير | §<sup>3</sup> s.l. عرضا  
εJETSTe والذي [والتي 11 s.l. N الشيء [والشيء 10 Da للشيء<sup>1</sup> الشيء | Da الماهية [ماهية 9  
om. J هو<sup>3</sup> 14 om. et add. s.l. Di في<sup>2</sup> | s.l. C هو<sup>1</sup> 13 TTTe يختاج [محتاج 12 om. Y هو<sup>1</sup>  
vDa s.l. في حده [وحده | G المشترك [مشترك | § وإذا [فإذا 15 om. Ed. T والشيء [الشيء  
om. وحده vĒLat.EDaG وحده : om. S<sup>2</sup> inv. JTToTeMi inv. a.c. S<sup>2</sup> وحده هو 16 in mg. Y  
J ماهية الشيء Da§ ماهية [ماهيته | et add. s.l. Di om. et add. in mg. B

i.l. Di أي العلماء [الخاص 6

[I.7]

**CHAPTER ON THE INVESTIGATION OF WHAT PEOPLE SAID ABOUT  
WHAT SIGNIFIES THE QUIDDITY**

**[1. Introduction of a distinction between two senses of  
“signifying the quiddity”]**

Concerning what signifies the quiddity, it was said that it is what signifies whichever shared essential, and no better explanation than this one was transmitted to us. We shall now inquire whether the concept of this word, according to the common understanding, is [precisely] this notion or not, and whether that which the élite understood and upon which it agreed by tradition signifies it or not. If we do this, a great goal is disclosed to us.

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**[2. First, common sense of the expression “signifying the  
quiddity”]**

As to the concept according to [its] common understanding, it does not signify this [notion]; this because what signifies the thing’s quiddity is what signifies the notion in virtue of which the thing is what it is, but the thing only becomes what it is by the realization of the complex of its shared essential attributes and also of [the attributes] that specifically belong [to the thing]. Man is not what it is because he is an animal, otherwise animality could realize humanity. Sure, animality is necessary [for man] in order to be what he is, but not everything is necessary for the thing in order to be what it is is [also] that in virtue of whose realization only the thing is realized as it is. If [the matter] is in this way, then, neither the essential [feature] that belongs to the thing and that is shared by it and something else, nor the [feature] that specifically belongs [to the thing] are, taken alone, the quiddity of the thing, but rather a part of its quiddity. What is astonishing is that the group [of philosophers] who hold that the

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Q38

جماعة ممن يرى أنّ الذاتي والدالّ على الماهية واحد لا يجعل الذاتي الخاص دالا على ماهية ما هو ذاتي له، وهو الذي نسميه بعد فصلا؛ فهذا هذا.

(3.1) وأما تعرف الحال في الدال على الماهية على سبيل الوضع الثاني والتعارف الخاص، فهو أنا نجد الحيوان والحساس محمولين على الإنسان والفرس والثور، ثم نجد أهل الصناعة يجعلون الحساس وما يجري مجراه من جملة أمور يسمونها فصولا لأمر يسمونها أجناسا ذاتية، ثم لا يجعلونها من جملة ما يسمونه أجناسا ويجعلون كل ما يكون دالا على الماهية لعدة أشياء مختلفة جنسا لها. وكذلك حال الإنسان والناطق بالقياس إلى أشخاص الناس، فيجعلون الإنسان يدل عليها بالماهية ولا يجعلون الناطق كذلك ويجعلون الإنسان لذلك نوعا للحيوان دون الناطق. فإنّ الشيء الذي يقولون إنه دال على الأيية الذاتية المشتركة يجعلونه شيئا غير الدال على الماهية الذاتية المشتركة، ولا يجعلون الشيء الواحد صالحا لأن يكون بالقياس إلى أشياء أيية وماهية، حتى يكون، من حيث تشترك فيه، هو ماهية

inv. ذاتي له 18 Lat. [ولا] «et non» G ولا add. s.l. Nk ولا [لا] | To الدال [والدال] 17 «irrational» [fort. هذا Ed. : «stultitia» هذا | هذا 3 S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. J وهذا [فهذا] 19 و أما [الماهية] 20 add. s.l. Š هذا om. a.c. et هذا om. To om. تعرف 20... هذا | Lat. [“talk, delirium”] Lat. | ثم [ثم] 22 s.l. NkB in mg. C إنما [أنا] 21 add. s.l. Š الدال على الماهية add. et تعرف [جنسا] [fort. «genus»] [أجناسا] | vK يسمونها [يسمونه] | E p.c. يجعلون [يجعلونها] DiNo أو ما [وما] add. s.l. Nk in mg. C ولا [ثم لا] | DiNo ذاتيا [ذاتية] 24 DiNo أو ما [وما] E للناس [الناس] 26 Nk فذلك [وكذلك] | DiŠ<sup>3</sup> om. et add. s.l. JETDaTe om. لها 25 Lat. vacuum post hoc دون 28 om. J : θμNkK كذلك [لذلك] | B praem. et exp. [بالماهية] 27 reliquit Yi 30... يجعلونه | om. الذاتية | CG الانية Ed. الإنية [JTDiDaToSYN الأيية] 29 JTDiDaToSYN الأيية 29 [تتشترك] [تتشترك] | om. et add. in mg. Di يكون 32... من | Lat. [أيية] «scil. «quale esse» CG انية Ed. [تتشترك] EYG in mg. Di هي [هو] | EYG in mg. Di «conveniunt» Lat. | Ed. يشترك | C p.c. C ما هو [ماهية] | om. Yi فيه 33... هو | C

in أي أن ( om. B ) الذاتي الخاص كان أولى بأن يدل على الماهية من الذاتي المشترك [له 18... لا 17 mg. NkB

The rasm can support both the reading anniyya/inniyya printed in the Cairo ed. and the reading ayyiyya chosen in the present edition; cf. Commentary and BERTOLACCI 2012a, pp. 301-304.

essential and what signifies the quiddity are the same does not consider the proper essential [feature] as signifying the quiddity of that to which it is essential, namely what we will call afterwards “differentia”; and that is it [about this subject].

### **[3. Second sense of “signifying the quiddity”, established by the élite]**

#### **[3.1. Exposition of the view, with critical remarks]**

As to the knowledge of the state of what signifies the quiddity according to the second sense established and to the specific understanding [of the élite], it consists in that we find “animal” and “sensitive” both predicated of man, horse and bull; then, we find that a group [of philosophers] of [this] discipline ascribe “sensitive” and what, among the complex of things that they call “differentiae” is analogous to it to the things that they call “essential genera”, then they do not ascribe them to the complex of what they call “genera”, although they consider everything signifies the quiddity for a number of different things as a genus for them. Analogously, the state of “man” and “rational” with relation to human individuals, so that they consider “man” as signifying them with regard to their quiddity, but they do not consider “rational” in the same way, and, for this [reason], they consider “man” as a species of “animal”, but not “rational” [as well]. In fact, they consider the thing that, they say, signifies the shared essential quality as not signifying the shared essential quiddity, and they do not consider the same one thing as apt to be, in relation to [different] things, an essential quality and a quiddity, so that, inasmuch

لها، ومن حيث تمييز به عن أشياء أخرى هو أيية لها، حتى يكون الشيء المقول على الكثرة من حيث تشترك فيه الكثرة جنساً أو نوعاً، ومن حيث تمييز به فصلاً. فيكون ذلك الشيء لتلك الأشياء جنساً أو نوعاً، ومع ذلك يكون لها فصلاً، بل إذا وجدوا جنساً، ارتادوا شيئاً آخر ليكون فصلاً يقوم الجنس، إن كان جنساً له فصل يقومه. وكذلك إذا وجدوا نوعاً طلبوا شيئاً من ذاته هو الفصل، ولو كان الشيء إنما هو دال على الماهية حتى هو جنس ونوع، لأنه دال على ذاتي مشترك فيه، لكان الأمر بخلاف هذه الأحكام.

٣٩ق

(3.2.1) وهاهنا موانع أخرى عن أن يكون ما قالوه من كون الدال على ذاتي مشترك دالاً على الماهية حقاً. فإن زاد أحدهم شرطاً ليتخصص به ما يسمونه جنساً ونوعاً في كونه دالاً على الماهية، وهو أنه يجب أن يكون أعم الذاتيات المشتركة مضموناً في الدلالة التي للذاتي المشترك، وذلك الأعم هو الأعم الذي لا يدل على أيية أصلاً، حتى يكون الفرق بين الأمرين أنّ الدال على الأيية هو الذي بكليته وكما هو يدل على الأيية. وأما هذا الذي يتضمن الدلالة على أعم

Due to a material damage, MS § is not readable. 40 [ما...موانع 40 Due to a material damage, MS § is not readable. 37 [هو...نوعاً 37

أيية | *in mg.* CDi هي EG هي [هو | N الأشياء [أشياء | Lat. «differunt» Ed. يتميز [تتميز 32 *add. a.c.* § من حيث [نوعاً 33 Lat. [أيية *scil.* «quale esse» G انية C انية Ed. إنية [JDaToŠN الحس [الجنس | EYe ليقوم [يقوم 36 *in mg.* G *om. et add.* جنساً 36... ارتادوا 35 Ka فيه [به 34 «aut species» Mi أو نوع [ونوع | *in mg.* G حتى *et* حين *p.c.* Š حتى *a.c. et* حين Mi حتى [حتى 38 Ye تمنع عن [عن | T فهنا [وهاهنا 40 *add. s.l.* Š<sup>2</sup> *om.* ŠMi حتى 39 Lat. [أو نوع] «*species*» شرط [شرطاً | *a.c.* E أحدهما [أحدهم | *add.* γμ فيه [مشترك 41 *add. i.l.* Š<sup>2</sup> تمنع Mi تمنع [DiTo المشترك و [المشتركة 43 *p.c.* G أو نوعاً Mi أو نوعاً [ونوعاً | *s.l.* Š<sup>2</sup> بما [به ما 42 No المشترك (?) *s.l.* Nk *om.* [المشتركة [المشترك 44 EDi الذي [التي | *s.l.* Š<sup>2</sup> مضموناً § مضموناً [مضموناً | Yi *om.* الأعم | *in mg.* G *add.* ذلك EG *om.* وذلك الأعم | *in mg.* Y وهو [وذلك | C المشتركة B إنية [JDaŠN أيية | *om.* Yi على | *s.l.* Š<sup>2</sup> هو *s.l.* Di *om.* Lat. Di *om.* الأعم JTS هو الأعم | Lat. Mi BC الانية Ed. الإنية [DaŠ الأيية | *om.* Yi حتى 45 Lat. [أيية *scil.* «quale quid» BCS الانية Ed. الإنية [JDaŠ الأيية 46 Lat. [أيية *scil.* «quale quid» *om.* Te هذا | Lat. [الأيية

يدل بكليته وكما هو عليها وأعم الذاتيات كالحويان يدل على الأيية بالعرض لأنه يدل [الأيية 46... بكليته 45 بجزء منه فهو يقول مشتمل لجمليهما أن الحساس أيضاً يدل على الأيية بجزء منه لأنه لا يدل عليها بأنه جسم ولا بأنه حيوان بل بأنه ذو قوة دراكة لكذا والثاني أن الحيوان إنما يميز الحيوانية فقط وهي معنى واحد فأبطل بهذين *in mg.* NkBN ما فرقوا به من الحيوان والحساس من حيث فرقوا بينهما

as [things] share it, it is a quiddity, and inasmuch as it is that by which [things] are distinguished from other things, it is an essential quality for them, so that the thing that is predicated of the multitude is, inasmuch as the multitude shares it, a genus or a species, and inasmuch as [the multitude] is distinguished by it, a differentia, and that thing is, for those things, a genus or a species and, besides this, it is [also] a differentia for them. On the contrary, when they find a genus, they look for something else to be a constitutive differentia of the genus, if the genus has a constitutive differentia. Analogously, when they find a species they look for something that is, in itself, the differentia; but if the thing only signified the quiddity in such a way to be a genus and a species because it signifies a shared essential [feature], then [this] matter would contradict these judgements.

### **[3.2. Critical analysis of the second sense]**

#### **[3.2.1. Possible alternative formulation]**

There are other objections against the truth of what they said about the fact that what signifies the shared essential [feature] signifies the quiddity. If one of them added a condition to apply specifically to what they call “genus” and “species” with regard to its signifying the quiddity, namely that it is necessary that the most common of the shared essentials be encompassed in the signification that belongs to the shared essential – being that ‘most common’ the most common [feature] that does not signify the essential quality at all, so that the difference between the two things is that what signifies the essential quality is that which signifies it entirely and as it is; as to this [fact] that the signification encompasses the most common of the shared

الذاتيات المشتركة فإنما يدل على الأيية بالعرض، لأنه يدل بجزء منه دون جزء، كالحيوان فإنه وإن تميز به أشياء عن النبات، فإنه ليس ذلك بجميع ما بحصوله الحيوان حيوان، بل بشيء منه؛ فإنه لا يفعل ذلك بأنه جسم، بل بأنه حساس، وهذا هو الدال على الأيية أولاً، ولأجله يدل الحيوان على التمييز والأيية. فيكون الحيوان ليس لذاته صالحاً للتمييز، بل بجزء منه، ويكون الحساس كذلك لذاته، فنقول إنّ هذا أيضاً تكلف غير مستقيم.

(3.2.2) أما أولاً فإنه لو كان كذلك لكان إذا أخذنا أعم المعاني كالجوهر، وقرنا به أخص ما يدل على الشيء فقلنا مثلاً «جوهر ناطق»، لكان يكون دالاً على ماهية، وكان يكون نوع الإنسان أو جنسه، وكان يكون حد الإنسان أو حد جنسه أنه جوهر ناطق. وليس كذلك عندهم، بل حده أنه حيوان ناطق، وليس الحيوان والجوهر واحداً؛ ومن المحال أن يكون للشيء الواحد حد تام حقيقي إلا الواحد. وإن تكلفوا أن يوجبوا مع المشترك الأول سائر التي في الوسط على الترتيب كله، فقد حصل ما نذهب إليه من أن الدال على الماهية يجب أن يكون مشتملاً على كمال الحقيقة، فيكون حينئذ هذا التكلف يؤدي إلى أن لا يحتاج إلى نقل هذه اللفظة عن الموضوع في اللغة إلى اصطلاح ثانٍ؛ فإننا سنوضح من بعد أنّ

54 أما... 57 ناطق] Cf. ARIST., *Top.*, VI.1, 139a27-28.

54 أما... 57 ناطق] Cf. *Risāla fī al-Hudūd*, p. 78.10-12. 59 [الواحد 60... ومن

الأيية [scil. «quale quid» BCŞ Ed. الأينية [DiDaŞN الأيية | Mi إنما To فإنها] فإنما 47  
add. in حصل [بحصوله | JTTe دالاً] إنك 49 µ من [عن | iter. a.c. Ka ... فإنه] 48 Lat.  
CS «quale Ed. الأينية [DaŞ الأيية 50 Ş لشيء [بشيء | Yi حيوانا] حيوان | mg. ToG  
CS «quale Ed. والأينية [DaŞ والأيية | No تمييز [التمييز 51 Lat. الأيية. [scil. «quale  
quid» [scil. والأيية. Lat. inv. N 54 أيضا تكلف | iter. To إن 53 praem. T أن هذا [الحيوان | Lat. والأيية. [scil. «quale  
quid» add. in mg. لكان حدا للإنسان om. et ناطق... 57 لكان | Ka كان [لكان 56 BEŞEd. فإنه  
[يوجبوا | E فإن [وإن 60 a.c. J حد [الواحد 59 om. N 2 يكون | µvENo فكان [وكان | Nk  
Ed. يوجهوا 61 om. et add. in mg. NkC om. vĖE om. et add. s.l. Di exp. Ş<sup>2</sup>  
Yi الموضوع [الموضوع 64 add. Lat. «significans esse» [اللفظة | No التكليف [التكلف 63  
a.c. E اصطلاح [اصطلاح

essentials, it signifies the essential quality only by accident, since it signifies a part of it and not the other, like “animal”, for, even if certain things are distinguished by it from the plants, this does not happen because of all that in virtue of whose realization the animal is an animal, but rather because of something of it (in fact, this is not attained because it is a body, but rather because it is sensitive, and this is what signifies the essential quality primarily and, in virtue of that, “animal” [also] signifies the distinction and the essential quality, so that “animal” is not apt to distinguish because of itself, but rather because of one of its parts, whereas “sensitive” is in this way because of itself) – then we would say that this as well is an unnatural and incorrect way to explain [this matter]. 50

**[3.2.2. First argument of the refutation of the possible alternative formulation]**

First, because, were it so, then if we took the most common notion, like “substance”, and we connected to it something more specific which signifies the thing and we said, for instance, “rational substance”, this would signify the quiddity, being the species of “man” or its genus, and the definition of “man” or the definition of its genus would be “rational substance”. But it is not so, according to them; on the contrary, its definition is that it is a “rational animal”, being “animal” and “substance” not the same, and it is impossible for one thing to have a complete, true definition that is not [its own] only [definition]. And if they strived to bring on, besides the first shared [essential], also the others that are in the middle of the whole arrangement, then it would be realized what we hold regarding the necessity for what signifies the quiddity to encompass the complete true essence [of the thing], so that this unnatural explanation leads [to conclude] that there is no need of transferring this word from the [sense] established in the [Arabic] language to a second conventional 55  
60  
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Q40

65 استعمال هذه اللفظة على ما هي عليه يحفظ الوضع الأول لها مع استمرار في الوجوه التي يتعوق معها ما يتعوق.

(3.2.3) وبعد هذا كله فإن ذلك يفسد بوجوه أخرى، منها أن الحساس أيضا حكمه حكم الحيوان، وأنه أيضا محصل من معان عامة وخاصة، وأن المعاني العامة فيه، ككون الجسم أو الشيء ذا قوة أو صورة أو كيفية لا تميز بها، إنما تميز بما هو أخص منها، وهو كون الجسم أو الشيء ذا قوة درّاة للشخصيات على سبيل كذا. 70

(3.2.4) ومنها أن الحيوان، وإن كان لا يميز بجزء من معناه كالجسم، ويميز بجزء كالحساس، فليس سبيلنا في هذا الاعتبار هذا السبيل، ولا نظرنا هذا النظر. وذلك لأننا إنما ننظر في الحيوان من حيث هو حيوان، والحيوان من حيث هو حيوان شيء واحد؛ ومن حيث هو ذلك الواحد لا يخلو إما أن يميز التمييز الذي عن النبات أو لا يميز، فإن لم يميز وجب أن يكون النبات يشارك الحيوان في أنه حيوان، وهذا خلف؛ وإن ميز، فقد صدر عنه بما هو حيوان تميز، وإن كان قد يصدر أيضا عن جزء له، وكان الجزء علة أولى في ذلك، وليس 75

*om. et add. in mg. G* | اشتماله [استمرار 66 *om. et add. in mg. Da* لها 65 الذي [التي | *Y* الوجود : *B in mg. praem. in mg. B* جميع *praem. NkC* جميع [الوجوه | *mg. J om. TG* | *add. s.l. eJETTeNo* كله [ذلك | *om. et add. in mg. J* | *Da* بعد [وبعد 67 *Da* *JETDiToTe* يحصل [محصل | *DiS* وأيضا أنه [وأنه أيضا 68 *om. et add. s.l. N* *NkS<sup>2</sup>* يفسد | *om. et add. in mg. Di* 70 *om. et add. in mg. Di* قوة 71... أو 69 *T* يميز [يميز 72 *E* منه [منها | *iter. a.c. J* بما هو | *TG* يميز *add. s.l. Nk* يميز [تميز | *No* *om. et add. s.l. To* هو<sup>2</sup> 75 *om. et add. in mg. Y* | إنما *om. et add. s.l. To* لأننا 74 *s.l. Nk om. Ka* 76 ذلك [ذلك 77 *KaNk* فإن... يميز *om. No* | يجب [وجب | *Yi* *om. et add. s.l. NkBS<sup>2</sup> om. Ka* أيضا | *om. E* | *om. et add. s.l. N* حركه [جزء له | *add. s.l. DiS<sup>2</sup>* *add. s.l. DiS<sup>2</sup>* التمييز [ذلك | *Yi a.c. To* جزء *Ka*

أي أن (*om. B*) حكم الحساس وحكم الحيوان واحد في أن كل واحد منهما [الحيوان 68... وبعد 67 مضمن أعم ذاتي وأخصه فلو كان الحيوان دالا على الماهية لأجل أنه يتضمن ذاتيا أعم لكان الحساس أيضا يدل *in mg. NkB* على الماهية لأنه يتضمن مثل ذلك وهو لا يجعلون الحساس دالا على الماهية

The Latin translation presents a double rendering of this passage attested by the whole manuscript tradition; the two versions of the passage slightly differ, and the difference might attest different Arabic readings. [الصفة 81... وليس 79

use, since we will clarify afterwards that the use of this word as it is constantly preserves its first intention with regard to the aspects with which [certain things] are prevented.

### **[3.2.3. Second argument of the refutation]**

Besides all this, that [theory] is vain under other respects, among which there is the fact that the status of “sensitive” coincide with the status of “animal”, and that it as well is realized from common and specific notions, and that the common notions in it (like the body or the thing having a potentiality, a form or a quality by means of which no distinction occurs) are only distinguished in virtue of what is more specific than them, namely the fact that the body or the thing have a capacity to acquire knowledge of the individual things in this way.

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### **[3.2.4. Third argument of the refutation]**

Among them there is [also] the fact that, even if “animal” does not distinguish in virtue of a part of its notion, like “body”, whereas it distinguishes in virtue of [another] part [of it], like “sensitive”, this is not our way to consider [this matter] and to inquiry [into it]. This because we only inquiry into the animal inasmuch as it is an animal, and the animal inasmuch as it is an animal is a unique thing, and inasmuch as it is that unique [thing], inevitably it either distinguishes according to the distinction that subsists with respect to the plants, or it does not distinguish. If it does not distinguish, then it is necessary that the plants share with the animal the fact of being an animal, but this is false. If it distinguishes, then a distinction derives from that in virtue of which it is an animal, even if it can also derive from a part of it, being that part a first cause in that [process of distinction]. If the thing

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إذا كان للشيء علة بها يصير بحال، وللعلة تلك الحال، يجب أن تكون تلك الحال له بالعرض، فكثير من الأشياء بهذه الصفة. 80

٤١ ق (3.2.5) ثم لا أمتنع أن يكون هاهنا شروط أخرى تلحق بالبيان الذي جعلوه للدال على الماهية يتميز بها ما يسمى جنسا أو نوعا عن الفصل وشروط أخرى تلحق بالتمييز [يكون ذلك للحساس دون الحيوان]، إلا أن ذلك لا يكون بحسب الوضع الأول ولا بحسب نقل منصوص عليه من المستعملين لهذه الألفاظ في أول ما استعملوا، بل يكون اضطرابات ألجا إليها أمثال هذه المقاومات. 85

(4) وإذا وجد في ظاهر المفهوم من لفظ ما هو ما يقع به استغناء واقتصار، كان المصير عنه إلى غيره ضربا من العجز ومن اللجاج الذي تدعو إليه الأنفة من الإذعان للحق والاعتراف بذهاب ذلك على من لم يخطر بباله ما أوردناه من المباحث إلى حين سماعها. 90

وكثير [فكثير] | *om. To* : E بعرض [بالعرض] 81  $\text{om. et add. s.l. } \S^3$  علة | Te الشيء [للشيء] 80  
 يكون 84  $\pi\text{Di}$  من [عن] |  $\mu$  دالا  $\nu\text{KaJTDaTe}$  الدال [للدال] 83 *om. Lat.* بالبيان 82  $\text{JTDiTe}$   
 Mi استعملوها [استعملوا] 86 *add. i.l. N* يكون [ولا] 85 Da تلك [ذلك] | *praem. et exp. E* يكن  
*praem. s.l. B om. N* قد  $\mu\nu$  قد ألجأت  $\text{JTCDi s.l. } \S^2$  قد ألجا [ألجا] | *om. et add. i.l. N* بل 87  
 عنه 89  $\text{om. } \S^2$  |  $\text{EDiToMiYiG a.c. } \S$  عن [من] 88 *i.l. Y* معارضات [المقاومات] |  $\text{ } \S$  ألجأت  
 والله To سماعها [سماعها] 91 *in mg. Nk* عن *et* من  $\mu\text{JET}$  عن [من] 90 T غير [غيره] | *E (?) p.c.*  
*add. Te* أعلم

84 يكون... 85 [الحيوان] The syntax of the clause is problematic: seemingly, the clause is meant to provide an example of a condition that attaches to the distinction between genus and differentia, namely the fact that something belongs, for instance, exclusively to the differentia (like “sensitive”) and not to the genus (like “animal”), but its syntactic relation to the rest of the phrase is unclear and the example is stressed in a quite obscure manner. Since the whole manuscript tradition preserves it as it is, it can be imagined that the clause was introduced erroneously in the text in the archetype of the tradition.

has a cause in virtue of which it comes to be in a certain state, and the cause has that state, it is not necessary that [the thing] has that state by accident; many things are in this manner.

**[3.2.5. Possible conditions to distinguish genus and species from the differentia that were not established]**

Q41 Then, I do not exclude that there are other conditions following to the explanation that they ascribed to what signifies the quiddity by means of which what they call “genus” or “species” is distinguished from the differentia, and other conditions following to the distinction {([such as] this belongs to “sensitive” and not to “animal”)}, but this is not according to the first imposition, nor according to a tradition determined by those who employed these utterances when they began to employ them; rather, these are necessities to which this sort of disputes is committed.

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**[4. Conclusion: the literal understanding of an utterance, if satisfying, is preferable]**

If it is found that the literal understanding of an utterance does not need [any further specification] and is already satisfying, it is a sort of weakness and obstinacy to move from it to another one to which the refusal to submit to the truth leads, together with [the refusal] to recognize that this escapes to those who had not in mind the objects of research that we mentioned until they learned them.

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## [الفصل الثامن]

### فصل في قسمة اللفظ المفرد الكلي إلى أقسامه الخمسة

(1.1) نقول الآن إنه قد تبين لك أن اللفظ المفرد الكلي إما ذاتي وإما عرضي، وأنّ الذاتي للشيء إما صالح للدلالة على الماهية بوجه، وإما غير صالح للدلالة على الماهية أصلا. والدال على الماهية إما أن يدل على ماهية شيء واحد أو أشياء لا تختلف اختلافا ذاتيا؛ وإما أن تكون دلالاته على الماهية إنما هي بحسب أشياء تختلف ذواتها اختلافا ذاتيا. مثال الأول لفظة الشمس إذا وقعت على هذه المشار إليها، ولفظة الإنسان إذا وقعت على زيد وعمرو؛ ومثال الثاني دلالة لفظة الحيوان إذا وقعت على الثور والحمار والفرس معا، فسأل سائل مثلا: «ما هذه الأشياء؟» ف قيل: «حيوانات»، فإنّ لفظة الحيوان تدل على كمال حقيقتها من حيث هو مسؤل عن جملتها، ومطلوب كنه الحقيقة التي لها بالشركة.

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(1.2) والفرق بين الوجهين أنّ الوجه الأول يكون دالا على ماهية الجملة وماهية كل واحد: فإنّ لفظة الإنسان تدل أيضا على كمال الحقيقة الذاتية التي لزيد وعمرو، وإنما يفضل عليها ويخرج عنها ما

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13... ومثال 9. *Isārāt*, p. 228.1-9; *Maṣriqiyīn*, p. 16.14-18; *Maṣriqiyīn* [وعمرو 9... مثال 8  
13... ومثال 9. *Isārāt*, p. 225.1-7; *Maṣriqiyīn*, p. 16.10-13; *Maṣriqiyīn* [بالشركة

om. الكلي | Mi الفصل الثامن من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق Y الفصل الثامن [فصل 2  
om. Lat. | om. Lat. إنه 3 [أقسام] Lat. «partes» G (?) JY أقسام [أقسامه | Lat.  
وإما غير صالح للدلالة على الماهية [وجه | N أن يصلح [صالح | om. TTe | om. للشيء | Yi أو [وإما 4  
om. et add. in mg. G<sup>2</sup> الماهية 5... بوجه | om. No<sup>1</sup> الماهية 5... بوجه | add. To a.c. Te بوجه  
om. et add. in mg. 8 ذاتيا 8... وإما 6 om. Nk أصلا | om. et add. in mg. 5<sup>3</sup> الماهية... للدلالة 5  
om. No لفظة 10... الشمس 8 E لأشياء [بحسب أشياء | E هو [هي | Ed. دلالة [دلالاته 7 Di  
وقع [وقعت | om. et add. in mg. B لفظة om. KaC لفظة om. NkDa لفظة om. et add. s.l. لفظة [ولفظة 9  
[الحيوان | Lat. [لفظه fort. «huius nominis» DiS لفظ [لفظة 10 JT مثال [ومثال | JTSTe  
[والفرس والحمار والثور] «de equo et asino et bove» [والفرس... الثور | E add. et exp. على  
MiG هي حيوانات [حيوانات | No من [ما 11 E وسأل [فسأل | N والإنسان [والفرس | Lat.  
s.l. عنها om. et add. عنها [عن | J add. in mg. هي om. 5<sup>3</sup> ηtEda s.l. هي [هو 12  
om. et add. عنها | Mi الحقيقية [الحقيقة 16 add. ToMiG منها [واحد 15 G فمطلوب [ومطلوب  
s.l. Yi

[I.8]

**CHAPTER ON THE DIVISION OF THE SIMPLE UNIVERSAL  
UTTERANCE INTO ITS FIVE SECTIONS**

**[1. The essential utterance that signifies the quiddity]**

**[1.1. Classification of what signifies the quiddity]**

Now we say: it has already appeared clear to you<sup>1</sup> that the simple universal utterance is either [(a)] essential or [(b)] accidental, and that the essential to the thing is either [(a.1)] apt to signify the quiddity under a [certain] respect, or [(a.2)] it is not apt to signify it at all. [(a.1)] What signifies the quiddity either [(a.1.1)] signifies the quiddity of a unique thing or that of [several] things that do not differ essentially<sup>2</sup>, [(a.1.2)] or [its] signification of the quiddity is only in virtue of things whose essences differ essentially<sup>3</sup>. An example of the first [case] [(a.1.1)] is the word “Sun”, when it applies to this designated [Sun], and the word “man” when it applies to Zayd and ‘Amr; an example of the second [case] [(a.1.2.)] is the signification of the word “animal” when it applies to the bull, the donkey and the horse altogether, so that one might ask, for instance, “what are these things?” and the answer would be: “animals”, for the word “animal” signifies the perfection of their essential truth inasmuch as it is asked of the complex of them [altogether], and what is looked for is the very essential truth that they share.

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**[1.2. Differences between two ways of signifying the quiddity]**

The difference between the two aspects consists in that the first one [(a.1.1)] signifies the quiddity of the complex and, [at the same time], that of each one [of the things]: in fact, the word “man” signifies as well the perfection of the essential truth of Zayd and ‘Amr, and only the accidental attributes that properly belong to each one of the two

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<sup>1</sup>) In *Madḥal* I.5, §7. | <sup>2</sup>) I.e. the species. | <sup>3</sup>) I.e. the genus.

يختص كل واحد منهما به من الأوصاف العرضية، كما قد فهمته مما قيل سالفًا.

20 وأما الوجه الثاني فإنك تعلم أن الحيوانية وحدها لا تكون دالة على ماهية الإنسان والفرس وحدها، فليس بها وحدها كل واحد منهما هو هو، وليس إنما يفضل عليها بالعرضيات بل بالفصول الذاتية؛ وأما الذي لها من الماهية بالشركة فلفظة الحيوان تدل عليه.

25 (1.3.1) وأما الحساس فيدل على جزء من جملة ما تشتمل عليه دلالة لفظة الحيوان، فهو جزء من كمال حقيقتها المشترك فيها دون تمامها؛ وكذلك حال الناطق بالقياس إلى الإنسان. لكن لقائل أن يقول إنه لا دلالة للحيوان إلا ومثلها للحساس، وكما أنه لا يكون الحيوان إلا جسمًا ذا نفس، كذلك لا يكون الحساس إلا جسمًا ذا نفس.

30 (1.3.2) فنقول في جوابه إن قولنا إن اللفظ يدل على معنى ليس على الوجه الذي فهمته، أعني أن يكون إذا دل اللفظ لم يكن بد من وجود ذلك المعنى، فإنك تعلم أن لفظ المتحرك إذا دل، لم يكن بد من أن يكون هناك محرك، ولفظة السقف، إذا دلت، لم يكن بد من أن يكون هناك أساس، ومع ذلك لا نقول إن لفظة المتحرك مفهومها ودلالاتها المحرك، ولفظة السقف مفهومها ودلالاتها الأساس؛ وذلك لأن

29 *Nağāt*, pp. 14.11-15.2; *Išārāt*, pp. 225.8-227.2. فنقول...40 [المتحرك] فنقول 29

17 *om. et* الثاني 19 *v* عن [من] *om. YiN* به | *vS* منها *in mg. G* منها [منهما] *iter. T* | يختص 17 وحدهما *vJEDaNo* وحده [أوحدها] 20 *εE* لا تكون وحدها [تكون... وحدها] | *add. s.l. Di* *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* منها | *iter. EŞ* واحد | *To* بهما [بها] | *Ka* وليس [فليس] | *TDiŞToTeMi* *No* في بالفصول [بالفصول] | *Y* عليهما [عليها] | *S<sup>3</sup>* *s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* يفضل [يفضل] | *s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* إنما *Ş* انا [إنما] 21 *Lat. [fort. «huius nominis» KaŞ* لفظ [لفظة] 24 *JTe* لفظ [لفظة] | *No* لهما [لها] 22 *add. et exp. J* عليه [دل] 30 *ε* الحساس لا يكون [الحساس... لا] 27 *To* دلالتها [دلالة] 26 *om. et* أن يكون 32 *To* فإن [فإنك] | *om. J* المعنى | *S<sup>3</sup>* *in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add.* 32... وجود 31 *NkC* ههنا *KaB* هاهنا [هناك] 33 *om. Yi* بد | *Ka* دل [دلت] | *Ka* ولفظ [ولفظة] | *add. in mg. J* ومع *NkCDiMi* أو لفظة [ولفظة] | *om. No* دلالتها... المحرك 34 *om. Yi* الأساس... ومع *N* ومفهومها [مفهومها]

exceed it[s scope] and fall out of it, as you have understood of what was stated before<sup>4</sup>.

As to the second aspect [(a.1.2)], you know that animality alone does not signify the quiddity of the man and the horse singularly taken, and each one of them is not what it is in virtue of it alone, and does not exceed it[s scope] only in virtue of [its] accidental features, but rather in virtue of [its] essential differentiae; as to the quiddity that belongs to it in a shared manner, the word “animal” signifies it. 20

### **[1.3. Possible objection and Avicenna’s answer]**

#### **[1.3.1. Objection]**

As to “sensitive”, it signifies a part of the complex of what the signification of the word “animal” encompasses, so that it is a part of the perfection of its shared essence, and not its totality; the state of “rational” in relation to “man” is analogous [to it]. However, someone might claim that “animal” has no signification, unless “sensitive” has a similar [signification] too, and as animal is nothing but an animate body, analogously sensitive is nothing but an animate body. 25

#### **[1.3.2. Answer]**

In answer to it, we state that when we say that the utterance signifies a notion, it is not in the way you understood it, I mean that, when the utterance signifies [a notion], inevitably that notion exists, for you know that when the utterance “moved” signifies, there is inevitably [something] moving [what is moved], and [that] when the word “roof” signifies, there is inevitably the foundation, but in spite of this we do not say that the concept and the signification of the word “moved” is the [thing] moving [it], nor that the concept and the signification of the word “roof” is the foundation. This because the 30 35

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<sup>4</sup>) In *Madḥal* I.5, §5.2.

35 معنى دلالة اللفظ هو أن يكون اللفظ اسماً لذلك المعنى على سبيل  
 القصد الأول، فإن كان هناك معنى آخر يقارن ذلك المعنى مقارنة من  
 خارج، يشعر الذهن به مع شعوره بذلك المعنى الأول، فليس اللفظ  
 دالاً عليه بالقصد الأول. وربما كان ذلك المعنى محمولاً على ما يُحمل  
 عليه معنى اللفظ، كمعنى الجسم مع معنى الحساس؛ وربما لم يكن  
 محمولاً كمعنى المحرك مع المتحرك. 40

(1.3.3) والمعنى الذي يتناوله اللفظ بالدلالة أيضاً يكون على وجهين:  
 أحدهما أولاً والآخر ثانياً. أما أولاً فكقولنا «الحيوان»، فإنه يدل على  
 جملة الجسم ذي النفس الحساس، وأما ثانياً فكدلالاته على الجسم،  
 فإن معنى الجسم مضمّن في معنى الحيوانية ضرورة، فما دل على  
 الحيوانية اشتمل على معنى الجسم، لا على أنه يشير إليه من خارج؛ 45  
 فيكون هاهنا دلالة بالحقيقة إما أولية وإما ثانية، ودلالة خارجية، إذا  
 دل اللفظ على ما يدل عليه، عرف الذهن أن شيئاً آخر من خارج  
 يقارنه، وليس داخلاً في مفهوم اللفظ دخول اندراج ولا دخول  
 مطابق.

50 فإن أردنا أن نختصر هذا كله ونحصله، جعلنا الدلالة التي للألفاظ  
 على ثلاثة أوجه: دلالة مطابقة، كما يدل الحيوان على جملة الجسم  
 ذي النفس الحساس؛ ودلالة تضمّن، كما تدل لفظة الحيوان على  
 الجسم؛ ودلالة لزوم كما تدل لفظة السقف على الأساس.

41... والمعنى 41 [خارج 45... وأما 43 Isārāt, p. 187.4-13. الأساس 53... والمعنى 41

in mg. فيشعر [يشعر 37 om. et add. s.l. Yi هناك 36 C وهو [هو | a.c. EYi الدلالة [دلالة 35  
 NkC 38 «intentio alterius  
 المتحرك [المحرك | add. N على ما يحمل عليه [محمولاً 40 om. JTŠTe معنى | Lat. |  
 مضمّن في | G الجسم ذي النفس [الجسم 44 No فدلالته [فكدلالاته 43 om. No مع المتحرك | Ka  
 معنى [الحيوانية 45 om. et add. s.l. N على | N الحيوان [الحيوانية | om. et add. in mg. G  
 S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. J وإما [إما 46 S خارجاً [من خارج | N الحيوان praem. Da  
 تطابق [مطابق 49 S يفارقه N يناوله [يقارنه 48 om. et add. s.l. N عليه 47 CS خارجة [خارجية  
 MiYiG in mg. Š «principale vel coaequale» (sic omnes codd., sed fort.  
 corrigendum: parile vel coaequale) Lat. 51 om. et لفظة 52... الحيوان | tE وجوه [أوجه 51  
 add. s.l. C 52 لفظ [لفظة KaNk

Q43 notion of the signification of the utterance consists in that the utterance is a name for that notion according to the first intention, and if there is another notion that is associated to that notion externally, the mind thinks of it when thinking of that first notion, so that the utterance does not signify it according to the first intention. Sometimes that notion is predicated of that of which the notion of the utterance is predicated, as the notion of “body” with the notion of “sensitive”; sometimes, [on the other hand], it is not predicated, like the notion of “moving” with “moved”. 40

### [1.3.3. Digression on the three ways of signifying the essence]

The notion that the utterance comprehends with the signification is under two respects as well, one of which [(i)] primarily and the other [(ii)] secondarily. As to [the one which is] primarily [(i)], it is like our saying “animal”, for it signifies the complex of the sensitive animate body; as to [the one which is] secondarily [(ii)], it is like its signification of the body, since the notion of “body” is necessarily included in the notion of “animality”, so that what signifies “animality” encompasses the notion of body not by pointing at it externally. Hence, there are an essential signification, [which is] either primary [(i)] or secondary [(ii)], and an external signification [(iii)] [which is in such a way that], when the utterance signifies something, the mind knows that something else external is associated to it, without being included in the concept of the utterance neither by way of inclusion, nor by way of congruence. 45

If we wish to sum up and summarize all this, we can consider the signification of the utterances under three respects: [(i)] a signification of *correspondence*, like “animal” signifies the complex of the sensitive animate body; [(ii)] a signification of *implication*, like the word “animal” signifies the body; [(iii)] [finally], a signification of *necessary concomitance*, like the word “roof” signifies the foundation. 50

55 (1.3.4) فإذا كان كذلك، فلنرجع إلى ما نحن فيه فنقول إنَّ المفهوم من الحساس هو أنه شيء له حسّ، ثمّ من خارج ما نعلم أنه يجب أن يكون جسماً وذا نفس، فتكون دلالة الحساس على الجسم دلالة لزوم. وأما الحيوان فإنما نعني به بحسب الاصطلاح الذي لأهل هذه الصناعة أنه جسم ذو نفس حساس، فتكون دلالته على كمال الحقيقة دلالة مطابقة، وعلى أجزائها دلالة تضمن. وأما دلالة الحساس على سبيل المطابقة، فإنما هي على جزء فقط؛ وأما الكل وسائر الأجزاء، فإنما تدل عليها على سبيل اللزوم، ولسنا نذهب هاهنا في قولنا «لفظ دال» إلى هذا النمط من الدلالة.

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فقد تقرر أنّ اللفظ الدال على الماهية ما هو وكيف هو، ومن هاهنا تزول الشبهة المذكورة.

65 (2.1) فأما اللفظ الذاتي للشيء الذي لا يدل على ماهية ما اعتبر ذاتيته له، لا بسبيل شركة ولا خصوص، فإنه لا يجوز أن يكون أعم الذاتيات المشتركة وإلا لدل على الماهية المشتركة بوجه، فهو إذن أخص منه، فهو صالح لتمييز بعض ما تحته عن بعض، فهو صالح للأية. فكل ذاتي لا يدل بوجه على ماهية الشيء فهو دال على الأية.

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54 Cf. *Iṣārāt*, pp. 225.8-226.3; *Risāla fī al-Hudūd*, pp. 73.15-74.4. [الدلالة 62... فإذا 54

Mi تعلم E يعلم [نعلم | om. G ما | om. et add. s.l. C Ed. : تم [ثمّ 55 Yi وإذا [إذا 54 DaMiYi يعنى [نعني 57 Lat. [جسماً ذا نفس] «corpus habens animam» [نفس... جسماً 56 N فقط [لفظ 62 JT للكل [الكل | S<sup>3</sup> add. in mg. µ add. منه [جزء | E إنما [إنما 60 om. E هذه ... إلا | Yi om. له 66 add. a.c. § إذا [ما 65 om. E<sup>2</sup> هو | om. To الدال | No تقر [تقرر 63<sup>2</sup> المشتركة... وإلا 67 om. et add. s.l. Di أن | Lat. «nec ut genus nec ut species» [خصوص فهو إذن om. et بعض... افهو 68 ع إذا [إذن | add. No له<sup>2</sup> المشتركة | S<sup>3</sup> add. in mg. om. et بعض إذن يصلح N إذا صالح vNo إذن صالح [اصالح | S<sup>3</sup> add. in mg. يصلح لتمييز... عن بعض SNo لانية Ed. لانية [لانية 69 s.l. Y صلح [صلح | T للتمييز a.c. E للتمييز | S<sup>3</sup> «quale quid» الأنية Ed. الإنية [الانية 70 add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>Y ما [بوجه | Lat. [لانية] «quale quid» [لانية] Lat.

### [1.3.4. Conclusion of Avicenna's answer]

If it is so, we shall come back to what we were dealing with, and say that the concept of "sensitive" is that it is something provided with sense; then, we know from something external that it is necessary that it be a body and [that it] be animate, so that the way in which "sensitive" signifies the body is a signification of necessary concomitance. As to "animal", in virtue of the agreement between the philosophers of this discipline, we only mean by it that it is a sensitive animate body, so that its signification of the perfection of the essence is a signification of correspondence, whereas [its signification] of its parts is a signification of implication. As to the signification of "sensitive" by way of correspondence, it only concerns a part [of the notion]; as to the entire [notion] and the other parts, it only signifies them by way of necessary concomitance; here, however, we do not mean, by "signifying utterance", this kind of signification.

It has been established what the utterance signifying the quiddity is and how it is, and henceforth the said ambiguity disappears.

### [2. The essential utterance that does not signify the quiddity]

#### [2.1. The essential utterance that does not signify the thing's quiddity signifies its essential quality]

As to what concerns the utterance that is essential to the thing [and] which does not signify the quiddity of that whose essentiality is considered as belonging to it, neither in a shared nor in a proper manner<sup>5</sup>, it is not possible for it to be the most common of the shared essentials, otherwise it would signify the shared quiddity in a way. Then, it is more specific than it and apt to distinguish a part of what is [ranged] under it from the rest, so that it is apt to the essential quality. [To conclude], every essential that does not signify in any way the thing's quiddity signifies [its] essential quality.

<sup>5</sup>) I.e. the differentia specifica.

(2.2.1) فإن قال قائل إن الذي يصلح للأبوية هو بعينه يصلح للماهية، فإن الحساس، وإن رذلت كونه دالا على ماهية الإنسان والثور والفرس بحال خصوص أو شركة، فإنك لا ترذل دلالتة على ماهية مشتركة للسميع والبصير واللامس؛ فليس يجب أن يكون الذاتي ينقسم إلى مقول في جواب ما هو ومقول في جواب أي شيء انقساما على أن لا يدخل أحدهما في الآخر. ولذلك لم يتبين لك أنه، إذا كان الشيء دالا على الماهية، فليس بدال على الأبوية، بل يلزمك ما ألزمت القوم، فنقول له: أما التشكك المقدم فينحل بأن تعرف أننا لا نمنع أن يكون ما هو دال على أبوية أشياء دالا على ماهية أشياء أخرى، بل ربما أوجبنا ذلك؛ إنما نمنع أن يكون الحساس مثلا دالا على ماهية خاصة أو مشتركة للإنسان والفرس والثور، كدلالة الحيوان مع مشاركة الحيوان الحساس في الذاتية للإنسان والفرس والثور؛ فإن الحساس ذاتي مشترك لعدة أشياء، كما أن الحيوان ذاتي مشترك لها؛ إنما نمنع حكما آخر، فنقول إنهما بعد الاشتراك في الذاتية المشترك فيها، يفترقان فيكون الحيوان وحده منهما دالا على ماهية مشتركة للأمر التي هما ذاتيان لها.

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٤٥ق

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84 Here starts again the text of MS A after the lacuna. [الاشتراك]

71 p.c. KaG [رذلت] Lat. [للأبوية] «quale quid» § لانية. Ed. [للأبوية] | No يسائل [قائل] 71 والفرس [والثور والفرس] 73 a.c. G a.c. G a.c. G [الماهية] | DiTe أرذلت | Y in mg. اردت رذلت et اردت [بحال] | § a.c. § a.c. § [والفرس والثور والحصار] Lat. [والفرس والثور] «et equi et bovis» JETTe والثور § مخصوص [خصوص] | Lat. «ad modum generis vel speciei» [شركة... بحال] | No وبحال [مقول] JTTe وليس [فليس] | To om. et add. in mg. مشتركة 74 add. a.c. E كونه [ترذل] : om. et add. s.l. B om. C على أن 76 add. JToMi هو [شيء] | T مقول [ومقول] | § مقواب [الأبوية] | T تدل JNo يدل [بدال] 77 Yi، وكذلك [ولذلك] | Yi يدل [يدخل] | Te أنه [أن] | JT على أنه om. فينحل | t التشكك [التشكك] | om. J له 78 Lat. [الأبوية] «quale quid» § يانية. Ed. الإنية دال [دالا] | Lat. [أبوية] «quale quid» CSYi انية. Ed. إنية [أبوية] | T نمتنع [نمنع] 79 v بأنا [أننا] | No om. Lat. والثور... أو | CNo خاصة [خاصة] 81 T iter. أن يكون | Ka om. بل 80 KaNkE E دلالة [كدلالة] | Yi om. والثور | G add. in mg. أو مشتركة...الذاتية om. et 82...أو فإننا إنما [إنما] 84 Di ذات [الذاتية] | G om. في | Nk مع 82 iter. a.c. J والثور 83...كدلالة iEDaYi ونقول [فنقول] | Mi fort. p.c. فإننا إنما DiToS إنما B praem. in mg. فإننا s.l. Nk iEا 85 om. Ka | Yi دال [دالا]

**[2.2. The signification of the quiddity and the signification of the essential quality]**

**[2.2.1. Possible objection concerning the genus' differentiae and Avicenna's answer]**

If someone said: «what is suitable [to signify] the essential quality is, in itself, [also] suitable [to signify] the quiddity, because, even if you contend [the idea] that “sensitive” signifies the quiddity of the man, the bull and the horse in a proper or shared manner, you do not contend that it signifies the shared quiddity of “hearing”, “seeing” and “touching”; hence it is not necessary that the essential is divided into 75  
 predicated in answer to “what is it?” and predicated in answer to “what is it like?” in such a way that the one is not included in the other. For this reason, it was not clear to you that, when the thing signifies the quiddity, it does not signify the essential quality [as well], on the contrary, it follows for you the same consequence that you made follow for the group [of philosophers]», we would reply to him: as to the first doubt, it is solved if you know that we do not deny that what signifies the essential quality of [certain] things signifies the quiddity 80  
 of other things, on the contrary, sometimes we [even] affirm it. We only deny that “sensitive”, for instance, signifies a proper or shared quiddity that belongs to the man, the horse and the bull, like “animal” signifies it, sharing the essentiality of the man, the horse and the bull  
 Q45 with the sensitive animal; in fact “sensitive” is a shared essential to a number of things, as well as “animal”. We only deny another judgement, and say that the two, besides participating of the shared essentiality, differ in a way that “animal” alone signifies a shared 85  
 quiddity that belongs to the things for which they are both essential.



**[2.2.2. Remark on the meaning of “essential” in relation to the subject]**

You must know that, when we say: “essential utterance”, we mean “essential” for something; then, we say “quiddity” or “not-quiddity”, and we mean by that the fact that it is so with respect to that thing and not else. If we are free of this [obstacle], then there will be what is more distant than this [from the common sense]; in fact, what is essential to the thing, like “colour” for whiteness, can be accidental for another thing, like [“colour”] for body, but this does not imply the interdiction for us to state that the essential is not accidental, since our purpose points to the fact that it is not accidental for that thing for which it is essential.

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**[2.2.3. Remark on the meaning of “signifying the essential quality”]**

As to the other doubt, it is solved by saying that we mean by “signifying the essential quality” what is only suitable [to signify] the essential quality, and not the quiddity [as well], so that it does not signify a constitutive notion that completes the shared or the proper quiddity, but it rather signifies a constitutive notion that specifically belongs [to something]; so, when we say: “signifying the essential quality” we mean this notion.

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**[2.2.4. Conclusive reply to the objections concerning the genus’ differentiae]**

If someone doubts and tries to clarify whether the state of the predication of “animal” of the hearing, seeing and touching is that of a predication in answer to “what is it?” or not, and how it is possible that it is predicated in answer to “what is it?”, so that these are species of the animal and different, distinct things as well (then “sensitive” is not predicated of them in answer to “what is it?”, since “animal” signifies in a more complete way; how can it be otherwise, given that it is the

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كذلك وهو أكمل محمول على ما نحمله عليه بالشركة؟ — فيجب أن ينتظر هذا المتشكك أصولا نعطيها إياه في حمل الجنس على الفصل، وذلك بعد فصول.

105

٤٦ ق (3) فإذ قد تبين هذا، فنقول إنَّ الذاتي الدال على الماهية يقال له «المقول في جواب ما هو»، والذاتي الدال على الأية يقال له «المقول في جواب أي شيء هو في ذاته» أو «أيما هو».

(4) وأما العرضي فرمما كان خاصا بطبيعة المحمول عليه لا يعرض لغيره كالضحك والكاتب للإنسان، ويسمى خاصة؛ وربما كان عارضا له ولغيره كالأبيض للإنسان ولغيره، ويسمى عرضا عاما.

110

(5) فيكون كل لفظ كلي ذاتي إما دالا على ماهية أعم ويسمى جنسا، وإما دالا على ماهية أخص ويسمى نوعا، وإما دالا على

107 Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Al-alfāz al-musta'mala fī l-mantiq*, p. 52.5-7. [هو 108... والذاتي 107]

107 'Uyūn al-Hikma, *al-Mantiq*, p. 2.8, 12, *Nağāt*, p. 13.15-14.3. [هو 108... والذاتي 107]

EDa om. عليه | DiTe حمل vNkCToMiG يحمل KaJB تحمل [نحمله | om. J كذلك 103  
فإذا [فإذ 106 add. in mg. BCŞ<sup>3</sup>G وأحوالا add. NkEd. وأحوالا | Yi ينظر [ينتظر 104  
[الماهية | No هذان [هذا | Ş بين [تبين | om. tŞN قد | om. E هو<sup>2</sup> 108... فإذا | BTTe وإذ tN  
أو 108 Lat. [الأية] «quale quid» DaŞ الانية. Ed. الإنية [الأية 107 «esse et quid est» Lat.  
Ş add. في ذاته [هو<sup>2</sup> | Ed. أو أي ما هو ع وأي ما هو J وأيما هو [هو... أو | om. et add. s.l. C  
Ş<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. Ka | om. et add. in mg. Ka والكاتب 110 om. E كان 109  
على<sup>2</sup> 113... ماهية | add. a.c. E مفرد [لفظ 112 t وغيره [ولغيره | Da أو لغيره [ولغيره 111  
T دال [دالا | η كمال ماهية [ماهية | Ka om. et add. in mg. Ka دالا<sup>2</sup> ... اعلى 113 om. No

في الفصل الرابع من المقالة الثانية حيث قال ولا الفصل نوعا للجنس وإلا لاحتاج إلى [فصول... وذلك 105  
in mg. Te فصل آخر إلى آخره

Paragraph 3 is dislocated in MS E, in which it precedes paragraph 2.2.4. MSS JŞ, probably due to contamination, preserve paragraph 3 twice, i.e. one in the position it has in the rest of the tradition, and one in the same position as MS E (in MS Ş the first occurrence is affected by an accidental omission). The position of par. 3 in MS E is quite peculiar, since the passage is meant to be the conclusion of the section dealing with the essential predicates, before the beginning of that dealing with the accidental ones in par. 4, but in MS E par. 2.2.4, which still deals with a specific question concerning the genus' differentiae and the essential predication, comes after it, being excluded from the discussion on essential predicates. One might wonder whether such a dislocation is a clue of a later insertion either of par. 2.2.4 (seemingly a self-standing unit) or of par. 3 in an ancestor of MS E in which one of the two passages might have lacked.

most perfect predicate of that of which we predicate it in a shared way?), then, it is necessary for this [man] who doubts to look closely at the principles that we provide him concerning the predication of the genus with respect to the differentia; this will be after [some] chapters<sup>6</sup>. 105

**[3. Definition of the essential utterance that signifies the quiddity and that signifies the essential quality]**

Q46 Since this has already been clarified, we state that the essential that signifies the quiddity is said: *the predicate in answer to "what is it?"*, and the essential that signifies the essential quality is said: *the predicate in answer to "what sort of thing is it in its essence?"* or *"which thing is it?"*.

**[4. The accidental utterance]**

As to the accidental, sometimes it specifically belongs to the nature of the subject of which it is predicated, without occurring to anything else, like "capable of laughing" and "capable of writing" for man, and it is called *proprium*. Sometimes it occurs to it and to something else [too], like "white" for man and something else, and is called *common accident*. 110

**[5. Conclusion on the division of the universal utterance]**

Every universal essential utterance might signify a more common quiddity, being called *genus*; or it might signify a more specific

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<sup>6</sup>) Namely in *Madḥal* II.4 (§2.1).

أبينة ويسمى فصلا. وأما الكلي العرضي فيكون إما خاصيا ويسمى  
 115 خاصة، وإما مشتركا فيه ويسمى عرضا عاما. فكل لفظ كلي إما  
 جنس وإما فصل وإما نوع وإما خاصة وإما عرض عام. وهذا الذي  
 هو جنس ليس جنسا في نفسه، ولا بالقياس إلى كل شيء، بل  
 جنسا لتلك الأمور التي تشترك فيه. وكذلك النوع ليس هو نوعا في  
 نفسه، ولا بالقياس إلى كل شيء، بل بالقياس إلى الأمر الذي هو  
 120 أعم منه. وكذلك الفصل إنما هو فصل بالقياس إلى ما يتميز به في ذاته.  
 والخاصة أيضا إنما هي خاصة بالقياس إلى ما يعرض لطبيعته وحده.  
 وكذلك العرض إنما هو عرض عام بالقياس إلى ما يعرض له لا وحده.  
 فلنتكلم الآن في كل واحد من هذه بانفراده، ثم لنبحث عن  
 مشاركتها ومبايناتها على حسب العادة الجارية، سالكين فيه مسلك  
 125 الجماعة.

§ خاصا لطبيعة واحدة DiG خاصا [خاصيا | Lat. [أبينة] «quale esse» § ابينة Ed. ابينة [أبينة] 114  
 To وكل [فكل | Di عامة] عاما | T عرضيا DiDa. om. عرضا | δνπDi فيسمى [ويسمى 115  
 iter. التي... لتلك 118 §<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. جنس ليس 117 N om. et add. s.l. الذي 116  
 [منه 120... إلى<sup>2</sup> | praem. s.l. G هو [بالتقياس 119 om. εJETS هو | εE ليس النوع [النوع ليس  
 إلى § JT fort. a.c. إلى الأمور الذي هو أعم منها No الأمر الذي هو أعم منه Di بالأمر الذي هو أعم منه  
 To يتميز [يتميز 120 Te منها إلى الأمر الذي هو أعم § γAEd. fort. p.c. الأمور التي هو أعم منها  
 DiG add. s.l. العام [العرض 122 Te وحدها om. N وحده | § لطبيعة [لطبيعته 121 No من [في  
 γDaEd. منها [من هذه | iter. J§Te om. A واحد 123 Da om. et add. s.l. لا | § add. العام  
 N فيها KaTDaGEd. في [فيه 124 C in mg. من هذه s.l. Nk من هذه om. et add. in  
 mg. J

quiddity, being called *species*; or it might signify the essential quality, being called *differentia*. As to the universal accidental [utterance], it can either be proper, being called *proprium*, or shared, being called *common accident*. [In conclusion], every universal utterance is a genus, or a *differentia*, or a *species*, or a *proprium* or a common accident. This [utterance] that is a genus is not a genus in itself, nor it is so in relation to everything, but it is a genus for those things that share it. Analogously, the *species* is not a *species* in itself, nor in relation to everything, but rather in relation to the thing that is more common than it. In the same way, the *differentia* is only a *differentia* in relation to what is distinguished in its essence by means of it. The *proprium* as well is only a *proprium* in relation to that to whose nature it occurs exclusively; similarly, the *accident* is only a common accident in relation to that to which it occurs not exclusively.

Now, we shall talk about each one of them singularly taken, then we shall investigate their shared features and their divergences, according to the customary use, following, with regard to that, the path of the community [of the philosophers].

## [الفصل التاسع]

### فصل في الجنس

٤٧ق (1.1) فنقول إنّ اللفظة التي كانت في لغة اليونانيين تدل على معنى الجنس كانت تدل عندهم بحسب الوضع الأول على غير ذلك، ثم نُقلت بالوضع الثاني إلى المعنى الذي يسمى عند المنطقيين جنسا. 5 وكانوا أولئك يُسمون المعنى الذي يشترك فيه أشخاص كثيرة جنسا، مثل ولديتهم كالعلوية، أو بلديتهم كالمصرية، فإنّ مثل العلوية كانت تسمى عندهم باسم الجنس بالقياس إلى أشخاص العلويين، وكذلك المصرية كانت تسمى عندهم جنسا بالقياس إلى أشخاص المولودين بمصر أو الساكنين بها؛ وكانوا أيضا يسمون الواحد المنسوب إليه 10 الذي تشترك فيه الكثرة جنسا لهم، فكان عليّ مثلا عندهم يُجعل جنسا للعلويين ومصر جنسا للمصريين؛ وكان هذا القسم أولى عندهم بالجنسية، لأنّ عليا سبب لكون العلوية جنسا للعلويين، ومصر سبب لكون المصرية جنسا للمصريين. ويظن أنّ السبب أولى بالاسم 15 من المسبب إذا وافقه في معناه أو قاربه. ويشبه أيضا أنهم كانوا

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 1.18-2.10 (cf. ARIST. *Met.* Δ 1024a29-36); AMMON., *In Isag.*, pp. 49.7-52.16; ELIAS, *In Isag.*, pp. 50.6-53.6; IBN AL-TAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūṭī*, pp. 58.20-68.3. 15 Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 52.16-53.2; ELIAS, *In Isag.*, p. 53.6-7; PS.-ELIAS (DAVID), *In Isag.*, p. 72.29-39.

*al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.3, p. 213.4-8. [جنسا 5... فنقول 3

اللغة [لغة 3 Mi الفصل التاسع من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق Y الفصل التاسع [فصل 2 λDa\$Te فكانوا εع فكان J وكان [وكانوا 6 s.l. To إلى 5 vπDi in mg. G اليونانية [اليونانيين | v عنده [فيه | E add. et exp. المشترك [المعنى | Yi يسمى [يُسمون | 3 in mg. \$ أولئك S أولئك [وإنك add. J عندهم [العلوية | om. TeYi مثل 7 A add. كثيرون EDiTe كثيرون [كثيرة | G add. s.l. add. et exp. التي : γEDa\$Y وبالقياس [بالقياس | J om. عندهم 8 γعDa كان [كانت | v add. مثلا أو 10 \$ المولدين in mg. G المولدين [المولودين | E inv. N om. تسمى عندهم 9 Di رضي الله عنه [عليّ | Te om. لهم | G التي [الذي 11 inv. Te أيضا يسمون | Te والساكنين [الساكنين om. يجعل | N om. et add. s.l. مثلا tT عندهم مثلا [مثلا عندهم | Di عليا كرم الله وجهه μvE add. JT\$Te عندهم أولى [أولى عندهم | λTDa\$ add. كان s.l. Y كان [القسم | Di ومصر [ومصر 12 S A مصر [ومصر | No لكن [لكون | Di add. كرم الله وجهه [عليا | v باسم الجنس [بالجنسية 13 ونظن [ويظن | To om. et add. in mg. للمصريين | Y om. et add. in mg. المصرية... سبب 14 add. No له [ويشبهه | A قارنه [قاربه 15 MiEd. : «putabant» Lat.

[I.9]

## CHAPTER ON GENUS

**[1. The term “genus” and its meanings]****[1.1. The senses in which the term “genus” was employed in Greek]**

Q47 We say that the word that, in the language of the Greeks, signified the notion of genus, signified, at a first stage, something else for them, and was applied, at a second stage, to the notion that the logicians call “genus”. Those [people] called “genus” the notion shared by several individuals, like their descendance (like being an ‘Alid) or their provenance (like being Egyptian), since what is like being an ‘Alid was called, among them, by the name of “genus” in relation to the individuals of the ‘Alids, and analogously being Egyptian was called among them “genus” in relation to the individuals born in Egypt or living there; they also called the one to which [the individuals] are related, that is shared by the multiplicity, a genus for the individuals, so that ‘Alī, for instance, was considered, among them, as a genus for the ‘Alids, and Egypt as a genus for the Egyptians; this kind [of things] was worthier, according to them, of the status of genus, since ‘Alī is a cause of the fact that being an ‘Alid is a genus for the ‘Alids, and Egypt is a cause of the fact that being Egyptian is a genus for the Egyptians, and it is believed that the cause is worthier of the name [of genus] than the caused, whenever it corresponds to it with regard to its notion or it is almost equivalent to it. Seemingly, they also called the

يسمون الحرف والصناعات أنفسها أجناسا للمشاركين فيها، والشركة نفسها أيضا جنسا.

(1.2) فلما كان المعنى الذي يسمى الآن عند المنطقيين جنسا هو معقول واحد له نسبة إلى أشياء كثيرة تشترك فيه، ولم يكن له في الوضع الأول اسم، نُقل له من اسم هذه الأمور المتشابهة له اسم، فسمي جنسا، وهو الذي يتكلم فيه المنطقيون ويرسمونه بأنه المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع في جواب ما هو.

(2.1) وقبل أن نشرح في شرح هذا التحديد، فيجب أن نُشير إشارة خفيفة إلى معنى الحدّ والرسم، ونؤخر تحقيقه بالشرح إلى الجزء الذي نشرح فيه حال البرهان.

(2.2) فنقول إن الغرض الأول في التحديد هو الدلالة باللفظ على ماهية الشيء؛ فإن كان الشيء معناه معنى مفردا غير ملتئم من معان، فلن يصلح أن يدل على ذاته إلا بلفظ يتناول تلك الذات وحدها ويكون هو اسمه لا غير، فلا يكون له ما يشرح ماهيته بأكثر من لفظ هو اسم. وربما أتى باسم مرادف لاسمه يكون أكثر شرحا له. لكن دلالة الاسم إذا لم تُفد علما بمجهول، احتيج إلى بيان آخر لا

Due to a material damage, MS § is not readable. [نُقل له 20

Cf. ARIST., [الشيء 27... فنقول 26 Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 54.6-7. 23 Top. I.5, 101b38-102a2. 27 [ماهيته 38... فإن 27 Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 54.10-15; Ps.-ELIAS (DAVID), *In Isag.*, p. 75.12-25.

om. ET الآن om. LawG om. et add. الذي 18 om. نفسها 17 Te a.c. وله [اله 19 وهو هو] A وهو [هو] add. ET الآن يسمى add. LawG الآن [المنطقيين] in mg. Y | اسم 20 «in lingua» Lat. الأول 20... في | om. et add. s.l. N في | in mg. G فيها فيها | § add. [تسمى به الأمور المتشابهة. scil. «quo appellarentur ea quae sunt inter se similia»] جنسا | §Te يسمى vTN فيسمى [فسمي 21 πDa المشابهة [المتشابهة] om. Lat. اسم... من | Lat. om. et add. in mg. Yi ويرسمونه | om. J في | iter. a.c. Di وهو الذي | om. et add. s.l. C | add. Law 22 هو [بأنه 26 E شرع [شرح 23 add. Law أي بالصور والحقائق الذاتية [بالنوع 22 om. Lat. الشيء... فإن 27 § Yi om. وهو [هو] | praem. §Te معنى [التحديد] | Te من [في] | λDa om. [يصلح 28 om. N معنى | v ماهية الشيء E معنى الشيء [الشيء معناه] | v كانت [كان] | om. No γπJTEd. اسمها [اسمه] | JTTe فيكون [ويكون] | EYi وحده [وحدها 29 E§ ذلك [تلك] | Yi يصح Lat. [اسمه scil. «nomen eius»] اسم | om. et add. i.l. To هو 30 Ed. γ ولا [فلا] | G اسم Yi اللفظ [الاسم 31 «significatio»] Lat. [بيان] | Yi

crafts and the disciplines themselves “genera” for the [individuals] that share them, and the sharing itself [was called] “genus” too.

**[1.2. The sense in which the term “genus” is employed by the contemporary logicians]**

Since the notion that is nowadays called “genus” by the logicians is a single concept which has a relation with several items that share it, and [since] it had no name at a first stage, a name derived from that of those things that resemble it was applied to it, so that it was called “genus”, and it is that about which the logicians talk and that they describe as *predicated of many [items] differing in species in answer to ‘what is it?’*<sup>1</sup>.

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**[2. Digression on definition and description]**

**[2.1. Introduction to the digression]**

Q48 Before we start explaining this definitory process, it is necessary that we provide a quick indication concerning the notion of “definition” and “description”, and that we postpone its ascertainment by explanation to the section in which we shall explain the state of the demonstration<sup>2</sup>.

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**[2.2. Defining a simple and a composite notion]**

We say that the first purpose in defining is to signify by means of the utterance the thing’s quiddity. If the thing’s notion is a simple one which is not composed by [several] notions, its essence can only be signified by an utterance that encompasses that essence alone, that is its name and not that of anything else, for the thing has nothing to explain its quiddity better than the single utterance that is [its] name. Sometimes [another] name, which is more effective in explaining it, is provided in substitution of its own name. However, when the signification of the name does not provide knowledge of the unknown,

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<sup>1</sup>) Quoting Porph., *Isag.*, p. 2.14-17, with some slight divergences with respect to the Arabic translation by Al-Dimašqī (p. 1060.14-19). | <sup>2</sup>) Namely in *Burhān* IV.2-7, in the chapters specifically devoted to the definition.

يتناول ذاته فقط، بل يتناول نسبا وعوارض ولواحق ولوازم لذاته إذا فُهمت تنبه الذهن حينئذ لمعناه منتقلا منها إلى معناه، أو يقتصر على العلامات دون الماهية، فلا ينتقل إليها، وعلى ما هو أقرب إلى فهمك في هذا الوقت. فمثل هذا الشيء لا حد له، بل له لفظ يشرح لواحقه من أعراضه ولوازمه. 35

وأما إن كان معنى ذاته مؤلفا من معان، فله حد وهو القول الذي يؤلف من المعاني التي منها تحصل ماهيته حتى تحصل ماهيته.

(2.3) ولأن أخص الذاتيات بالشيء إما جنسه وإما فصله، على ما يجب أن تنبئه له مما سلف ذكره — فأما فصل الفصل وجنس الجنس وما يتركب من ذلك، فهو له بواسطة، وهو في ضمن الجنس والفصل — فيجب أن يكون الحد مؤلفا من الجنس والفصل، فإذا أحضر الجنس القريب، والفصول التي تليه، حصل منها الحد، كما نقول في حد الإنسان إنه حيوان ناطق. فإن كان الجنس لا اسم له، أتى أيضا بجده، كما لو لم يكن للحيوان اسم أتى بجده فقيل «جسم ذو نفس حساس»، ثم ألحق به «ناطق»؛ وكذلك من جانب الفصل. 40

ق ٤٩ أتى أيضا بجده، كما لو لم يكن للحيوان اسم أتى بجده فقيل «جسم ذو نفس حساس»، ثم ألحق به «ناطق»؛ وكذلك من جانب الفصل. 45

فالحد بالجملة يشتمل على جميع المعاني الذاتية للشيء فيدل عليه إما دلالة مطابقة، فعلى المعنى الواحد المتحصل من الجملة، وإما دلالة تضمن، فعلى الأجزاء. 50

To فلما [فلا] | T العلامة [العلامات] Lat. 34 «ad intentiones» [لمعناه] | om. Yi حينئذ 33 بل 35 om. et add. s.l. Di هو | «sicut tu modo» [الوقت] 35... وعلى | C ولا على [وعلى] Da عوارضه [أعراضه] | om. E من | E من لواحقه [لواحقه] 36 om. et add. in mg. J له om. et add. in mg. J 37 2ماهيته... حتى | inv. a.c. Te منها تحصل 38 § فهو [وهو] | om. et add. s.l. Y أما [وأما] 37 KaE وأما [فأما] | om. E له | Nk نثبته [تنبئه] 40 om. Lat. بالشيء 39 et add. in mg. Ka 39 §3 فصل [جنس] STe جنس [فصل] 2الفصل... فيجب | add. a.c. § وهي في ضمن الجنس والفصل [والفصل] 42 ATDaTe وهي [وهو] om. et add. in mg. Da 43 A اختصر [أحضر] 44 To وإن [فإن] 44 om. et add. in mg. J 47 J [فيدل] | EDi والحد [فالحد] 48 om. et add. in mg. J 47 J [مطابقة] 49 in mg. C عليها i.l. NkB عليها εDa عليها [عليه] | om. λ عليها فيدل عليه | vTDiTe ويدل «principali» (sic omnes codd., sed fort. corrigendum: parili) Lat.

another explanation is required which does not encompass its essence only, encompassing [also] relations, accidental features, attachments and concomitants to its essence that [are such that], when they are understood, the mind pays attention to its notion, moving from them to its notion, or it confines itself to the signs without [knowing] the quiddity, so that it does not move towards it, according to what is closer to your understanding at the present moment. This sort of things has not a definition, but an utterance that explains its accidents and concomitants attaching to it. 35

As to the case in which the notion of its essence is composed by [several] notions, then it has a definition, which is the statement that is composed by the notions from which its quiddity is realized, so that its quiddity is realized.

### [2.3. The definition]

Since the most specific of the essential [features] of the thing is either its genus, or its differentia, according to what we must draw your attention to among what was previously mentioned (as to the differentia of the differentia and to the genus of the genus and to what is composed out of that, it belongs to the thing by means of mediation and is included in the genus and the differentia), it is necessary that the definition be composed by the genus and the differentia, so that if the proximate genus is supplied, together with the differentiae that follow it, the definition is realized from them, as we say, with regard to the definition of “man”, that it is a “rational animal”. If the genus has not a name, its definition is also provided, as well as if there were not a name for “animal”, its definition would be provided and it would be said “sensitive animate body”, then “rational” would be attached to it; and analogously in the case of differentia. 40 45

The definition, in general, encompasses all the essential notions of the thing, and signifies them either by a signification of correspondence, so that [it signifies] the unique notion realized from the complex, or by a signification of implication, so that [it signifies] the parts. 50



## **[2.4. The description]**

As to what concerns the description, it is only pursued in it that a statement equivalent to the thing is composed of the attributes that attach to it, so that it belongs to all that is included under that thing only, in a way that it signifies it as a sign. Its best condition consists in that first one ranges in it a genus, either proximate or remote, and then provides the complex of accidents and propria; [however], if this is not done, it is nonetheless a description. An example of that is that it is said that “man” is an animal with broad nails, upright, with skin showing, capable of laughing, or these [attributes] are mentioned without [mentioning] the animal.

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## **[3. Verification of the description of ‘genus’]**

**[3.1. How the genus is distinguished by the other essential utterances]**

### **[3.1.1. How the genus is distinguished from the species]**

“Predicated” in the explanation of the name “genus” is like the genus for the thing that is called “genus”. Among what is predicated, there is what is predicated of one [item] only, and what is predicated of many [items], and “predicated of many [items]” is like the proximate genus; as to what is not predicated of many [items], it does not encompass the genus. Then, “predicated of many [items]” encompasses the aforementioned five [utterances], but since we say “differing in species in answer to ‘what is it?’ ”, it properly applies to the genus. By “differing in species” we mean differing in the essential truths. In fact, “species” can be said of the essence of each thing with

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على كثيرين تشترك فيه بالفعل أو لا تشترك فيه بالفعل بل بالقوة، أو احتمال التوهم؛ وليس يحتاج في تحقيق الجنس إلى أن يُلتفت إلى شيء من ذلك. وإذا كانت أشياء مختلفة الماهيات، ثم قيل عليها شيء آخر هذا القول، كان ذلك الشيء الآخر جنسا. وافهم من قولنا إنَّ هذا الشيء يقال على هؤلاء الكثيرين في جواب ما هو أن ذلك بحال الشركة كما علمت. 70

(3.1.2) وأما الفصل فإنه غير مقول في جواب ما هو بوجه. وأما النوع فإنه ليس من حيث هو نوع مقولا على شيء قولا بهذه الصفة، بل مقولا عليه، فإن اتفق أن قيل هو بعينه هذا القول فقد صار جنسا. 75

فإننا يلزمنا أن نعلم في الحدود التي للأشياء الداخلة في المضاف أننا نريد بها كونها لشيء من حيث هي لها معنى الحدود، كآثا لما قلنا هذا الحد للجنس، استشعرنا في أنفسنا زيادة يدل عليها قولنا «من حيث هو كذلك» لو صرحنا بها. وأما الشيء الذي يخص من بعد باسم النوع فستعلم أنه لا يقال على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع بل بالعدد. 80

(3.2) وأما العرضيات فلا يقال شيء منها في جواب ما هو، فلا شيء غير الجنس موصوفا بهذه الصفة، وكل جنس موصوف بهذه الصفة، لأننا حصّلنا معنى هذا الحد، وجعلنا لفظ الجنس اسما له.

om. الجنس 67 om. ToTe om. et add. in mg. Y om. 2بالفعل... أو | § فيها [أفيه] | J iter. على 66  
 إنَّ 70 Ed. γافهم [وافهم] 69 om. et add. in mg. J شيء 68 add. Mi إلى نسبته [يُلتفت] | S<sup>2</sup>  
 Di أي أن G أي [أن] | s.l. NkDi إنه v. add. et exp. G إنه [الشيء] | CYi في Y om.  
 «quoniam hoc non debet fieri, nisi cum interrogatur de multis simul, non de unoquoque eorum per se» Lat. 71 [بحال] S̄ لحال [أما] 72 [بحال] S̄  
 «sed praedicatur de eo aliter» Lat. | عليه... بل 74 C أنه هو [هو] | Te add. هو [ليس] 73 S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. s.l. S̄  
 om. et add. in mg. G نفسه v.πDiDa [بعينه] et نفسه [بعينه] | mg. J 76 [الحدود]... 77 «Debes autem scire quod nihil habet genus et speciem quae pertinent ad relationem nisi ex hoc quod habet intentionem diffinitionis eorum» Lat.  
 كلها [كآثا] | Di ولها [لها] | om. YiN هي | Te للشيء [الشيء] | To om. et add. in mg. كونها 77  
 فأما [وأما] | Ka بهذا [بها] 79 S̄Te نفوسنا [أنفسنا] 78 om. Di هذا | s.l. N لما et إذا [لما] | Ka  
 موصوف [موصوفا] 82 Ka فأما [وأما] 81 S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. S̄ من بعد | om. Nk من | No  
 § لفظة [لفظ] | J بحصلنا [حصّلنا] 83 om. No الصفة 83... وكل | a.c. Y موصوف tS̄TeYi

regard to its quiddity and form, without considering its relation to anything else, especially if it is valid in the mind to predicate it of many [items] that share it in actuality or not, sharing it in potentiality, or that the estimation allows [it]; but in order to ascertain the genus, there is no need to consider anything of this. If they were things differing in the quiddities, something different from this statement would be predicated of them, and that different thing would be a genus. Understand from our statement that this thing is predicated of those many [items] in answer to ‘what is it?’ that this is by way of sharing, as you learned<sup>3</sup>.

**[3.1.2. How the genus is distinguished from the species and the differentia]**

The differentia is not predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ under any respect. As to the species, it is not predicated of the thing according to a predication of this sort inasmuch as it is a species, on the contrary, it is the subject of predication; if it happened that it itself is predicated in this way, then it would become a genus.

We must teach, with regard to the definitions of the things that fall under [the category] of the relative, that we mean by them the fact that they belong to something inasmuch as they have the notion of the definitions, as well as, when we predicate this definition of the genus, we are aware by ourselves of an addition that would be signified by stating: “inasmuch as it is such”, if we stated it explicitly. As to the thing to which the name “species” will be properly applied after, you will know that it is not predicated of many [items] differing in species, but in number.

**[3.2. How the genus is distinguished from the accidental utterances]**

As to the accidental [features], none of them is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’, and nothing besides the genus is qualified in such a way, whereas every genus is qualified in such a way, since we acquired the notion of this definition and we assigned [to it] the utterance “genus” as its name.

<sup>3</sup>) In *Madḥal* I.8, §1.1-2.

(4.1) وقد يعرض هاهنا شبه من ذلك أنه، إن كان للجنس شيء كالجنس وهو المقول على كثيرين، كان للجنس جنس، إذا قيل الجنس على المقول على الكثيرين الذي هو جنسه وكان الجنس مقولا على الجنس نفسه. فنقول في جوابه إنَّ المقول على الكثيرين يقال على الجنس كقول الجنس نفسه، والجنس يقال عليه لا كقول الجنس، بل كقول العرض له؛ إذ ليس يقال إنَّ كل مقول على كثيرين جنس، وكل ما هو جنس فإنما يقال على كل ما هو له جنس، بل المقول على كثيرين تعرض له الجنسية عند اعتبار ما، كما تعرض للحيوان الجنسية باعتبار ما، وهو اعتبار العموم بحال، وكما نشرح لك كل هذا عن قريب، من غير أن تكون الجنسية مقومة للحيوان البتة. ولا نمنع أن يكون المعنى الأخص قد يقال على الأعم لا على كله؛ ولو كان الجنس يقال على المقول على الكثيرين قول المقول على كثيرين على الجنس لكان شططا محالا.

(4.2.1) ومما يشكك هاهنا استعمال لفظة النوع في حد الجنس. فإنك إذا أردت أن تحدّ النوع يشبهه أن لا تجد بداً من أن تدخل فيه

Cf. ELIAS, *In Isag.*, p. 58.5-20. وما 97 [ببيان 101... ومما 97 Cf. ELIAS, *In Isag.*, p. 58.20-28. [نفسه 87... وقد 84

A وهذا [وهو 85 Nk s.l. إن C in mg. KANkBTed. إذا [إن | Yi يعترض [يعرض 84 كان [وكان | No كثيرين [الكثيرين 86 π وإذا vKaADaSTeNo إذ [إذا | om. E وكان 86... للجنس «quod est supra se» i.l. J جنس نفسه et بنفسه [نفسه | πDiY جنس [الجنس 87 BCDiS فكان Jμ DiYi كثيرين [الكثيرين | E a.c. iter. إن المقول | om. Da في جوابه | Lat. [فوقه. fort. add. نفسه Ka فالجنس [والجنس | B in mg. add. نفسه om. NkBED. نفسه Ka كقولنا [كقول 88 2هو | om. Lat. كثيرين 91...!جنس 90 exp. G له et عليه له vπJDidaSTe عليه [له 89 a.c. E [وهو 92 add. s.l. J كما [تعرض | om. JT كما 91 G جنس له [له جنس | s.l. Nk له | om. Te «negamus» : Ed. بمنع [منع 94 Di s.l. Di om. JETiN om. كل 93 s.l. Y و et هو om. et على 3 | EYG كثيرين [الكثيرين | Di يقاله يقال | Te كل [كله 95 Te يطلق [يقال | Lat. يشكك | C وما [وما 97 Te لما كان [لكان | Ed. كالكثيرين [كثيرين 96 add. in mg. B Te لفظ [لفظة | Da هنا [هاهنا vKaJTDaTeMi om. et add. in mg. النوع 99... يشبهه 98

إذا حددنا الجنس أخذنا في حده معنى يعمه وغيره وهو المقول على كثيرين إذ ذلك أعني [نفسه 87... وقد 84 المقول على كثيرين قد يقال أيضا على الأعراض وشيئا يخصه وهو المختلفين بالنوع في جواب ما هو فأخذ هذا المعنى في حد الجنس كأنه جنس له والمعنى الخاص له كأنه فصل له ونحن في طلب حد الجنس وقد أخذنا بشكل [يشكك | C وما [وما 97 Te لما كان [لكان | Ed. كالكثيرين [كثيرين 96 add. in mg. B Te لفظ [لفظة | Da هنا [هاهنا vKaJTDaTeMi om. et add. in mg. النوع 99... يشبهه 98

#### [4. Reasons why the genus has not a definition in a strict sense]

##### [4.1. First reason: the genus has not a genus]

Q51 Sometimes some ambiguities occur, among which the fact that, if the genus has something like the genus, i.e. “predicated of many [items]”, the genus has a genus, since “genus” is predicated of “predicated of many [items]”, which is its genus, and the genus is predicated of the genus itself. So we say, in answer to it, that “predicated of many [items]” is predicated of the genus as a genus, whereas “genus” is predicated of it not as a genus, but rather as an accident of it, since it is not stated that everything predicated of many [items] is a genus and everything that is a genus is only predicated of everything to which it belongs as a genus, but the generality occurs to “predicated of many [items]” under a certain consideration, as well as, under a certain consideration, it occurs to “animal”. [This consideration] is the consideration of the fact of being common in a certain condition, as we will elucidate to you all of this soon, but the generality is not constitutive of “animal” at all. We do not exclude that the most specific notion might be predicated of the most general, though not of the whole of it; but if “genus” were predicated of “predicated of many [items]” in the way “predicated of many [items]” is predicated of “genus”, this would be vain [and] absurd. 85 90 95

##### [4.2. Second reason: the problem of the reciprocal definition of genus and species]

###### [4.2.1. Presentation of the problem]

Among the things regarding which doubts are casted there is the use of the word “species” in the definition of the genus. In fact, if you

اسم الجنس، كما يُيَّن لك بعد، إذ يقال لك إن النوع هو المرتب  
تحت الجنس وكلاهما للمتعمم مجهول، وتعريف المجهول بالمجهول ليس  
بتعريف ولا بيان، وكل تحديد أو رسم فهو بيان. 100

(4.2.2) وقد أُجيب عن هذا فليل إنه لما كان المضافان إنما تقال  
ماهية كل واحد منهما بالقياس إلى الآخر، وكان الجنس والنوع  
مضافين، وجب أن يؤخذ كل واحد منهما في بيان الآخر ضرورة، إذ  
كان كل واحد منهما إنما هو هو بالقياس إلى الآخر. 105

(4.2.3) فهذا الجواب هو زيادة شك في أمور أخرى غير الجنس  
والنوع يشكل فيها ما يشكل في الجنس والنوع. وزيادة الإشكال  
ليست بجل؛ فإن المحقق يقول: «ورُدَّ حدود المضافات على حد  
الجنس والنوع، وعرّفني أنها إذا كانت مجهولة معا فكيف يُعرف  
الواحد منها بالآخر؟» وأيضا فإن من شأن الحل أن تقصد فيه  
مقدمات الشك فتتكر جميعها أو واحدة منها. وليس في الحل الذي  
أورده هذا الحال تعرّض لشيء من تلك المقدمات؛ فإنه لم يقل إن  
الجنس والنوع ليسا معا مجهولين عند المبتدئ المتعلم، ولم يقل إنه إذا  
عرّف كل واحد منهما بالآخر وهو مجهول فليس هو تعريف مجهول 110

٥٢ق

معروف [ليس] Ka فكلهما [وكلاهما] 100  $\pi Di$  من بعد [بعد] |  $om. To$  لك |  $SMi$  يتبين [يتبين] 99  
105... وكان | E آخر [الآخر] 103 Ka المضافات [المضافان] |  $om. No$  إنه 102  $add. et exp. Di$   
 $om.$  هو هو 105  $S^3$   $om. et add. s.l.$  بيان 104  $\gamma JT$  النوع والجنس [الجنس والنوع] |  $om. No$  الآخر  
الجواب |  $vDi\$\$ToG$  وهذا [فهذا] 106  $S^3$   $om. et add. s.l.$   $om. KaJATCDaTeYN$   $om.$   $om. T$  |  
... وزيادة |  $add. s.l. Di$  أمر [في] | A منها E فيهما [فيها] 107  $S^3$   $om. et add. s.l.$  شك |  
زد [ورُدَّ] |  $EDiTo\$\$Yi$  ليس [ليست] 108  $\xi$  إشكال [الإشكال] |  $om. et add. in mg. Y$  والنوع 109  
وغرضي [وعرّفني] 109  $Te$  المضافين  $s.l.$  المضافات S المضافان [المضافات] |  $Di$  فزد  $\pi E$  زد  $Da$   
S  $om.$  معا |  $Te$  مجهولين [مجهولة] |  $Te$  كانا [كانت] |  $Da$  إن [إذا] |  $S^3$   $s.l.$  أنها S أنهما [أنها] |  $Te$   
 $Te$  فيها  $G$   $add. s.l.$  إلى [فيه] |  $To$  وإن [فإن] |  $AS$  منهما [منها] 110  $Nk$   $om. et add. s.l.$  يُعرف  
 $om. et add. s.l. Di$  في |  $E$  جميعا [جميعها] |  $Yi$  فيذكر  $in mg. Di$  فينكر  $et$  فينكر [فتنكر] 111  
للتعلم T للمتعمم [المتعلم] 113 Ka أن يعرض [تعرض] |  $\xi$  هذه [هذا] |  $Te$  أورده [أورده] 112  $s.l. J$   
 $om.$  هو | A منها [منهما] |  $Yi$   $om.$  واحد |  $a.c. No$  [عرض *scil.*] عرض [عرّف] 114  $DiTo\$\$No$   
 $a.c. No$  المجهول [مجهول] |  $Nk$

want to define the species, apparently you must inevitably introduce in it the name of “genus”, as it will be clarified to you after, since you are told that the species is what is ranged under the genus<sup>4</sup>, but both of them are unknown to him who tries to learn, and a notification of the unknown by means of something unknown is neither a notification nor a clarification, whereas every definition or description is a clarification. 100

#### [4.2.2. Porphyry’s solution to the problem]

An answer was provided to this<sup>5</sup>, and it was stated that, since the quiddity of each of two relative [terms] can only be expressed in relation to the other, and since the genus and the species are two relative [terms], it is necessary to assume each one of the two in the clarification of the other, since each one of the two is what it is only in relation to the other. 105

#### [4.2.3. Refutation of Porphyry’s solution]

This answer increases the doubt with regard to other things different from the genus and the species, with regard to which is obscure what is obscure [also] with regard to the genus and the species, and increasing the obscurity is not solving [the problem], since he who wants to ascertain the truth will say: «reconduct the definitions of the relative [terms] to the definition of the genus and the species and let me know how the one is known by means of the other, if they are [both] unknown at the same time». Also, the premises of the doubt should be pursued in the solution, and all of them, or [at least] one of them, should be refuted. But in the solution that this solver<sup>6</sup> proposed there is no objection to any of those premises, for he did not say that the genus and the species are not both ignored at the same time for him who starts to learn, nor he said that if each one of the two is known by means of the other which is unknown, this is not a notification of 110

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<sup>4</sup>) According to one of Porphyry’s definitions of the species. | <sup>5</sup>) This is a reference to a hint provided by Porphyry in *Isag.* p. 4.4-9, then more fully developed and discussed as Porphyry’s solution to the problem in the Late-Antique commentaries of the school of Alexandria. | <sup>6</sup>) I.e. Porphyry.

115 بمجهول، فإنّ هذا لا يمكن إنكاره. ولا أيضا يسوغ إنكار الثالثة وهي أن تعريف المجهول بالمجهول ليس ببيان، ولا الترتيب الذي لهذه المقدمات غير موجب لصحة المطلوب بها؛ فإذا كان هذا الحال لم يتعرض لمقدمة من قياس الشك ولا لتأليفه فلم يعمل شيئا.

120 (4.2.4) وأيضا فقد وقع فيه غلط عظيم وهو أنه لم يميز فيه الفرق بين الذي يعرف مع الشيء وبين الذي يعرف به الشيء؛ فإن الذي يعرف به الشيء هو مما يعرف بنفسه ويصير جزءا من تعريف الشيء إذا أضيف إليه جزء آخر تُوصل إلى معرفة الشيء ويكون هو قد عرف قبل الشيء. وأما الذي يعرف مع الشيء فهو الذي إذا استتمت المعرفة بتوافي المعارف للشيء معا عُرف الشيء وعرف هو معه، ولا تكون المعرفة به تسبق معرفة الشيء حتى يعرف به الشيء، فذلك لا يكون جزءا من جملة تعريف الشيء؛ فإنّ أجزاء الجملة التي تعرّف الشيء ما لم تجتمع معا، لم تعرّف الشيء، والواحد منها يكون دالا على جزء من المعنى الذي للشيء فقط. فما دامت الأجزاء تذكر ولم تستوف جميعها يكون الشيء بعد مجهولا؛ فإذا توافت عرف الشيء حينئذ وعرف ما يعرف مع الشيء. 130

om. et add. in mg. Y om. وهي | om. et add. in mg. Ka أيضا | § وهو أيضا لا [ولا أيضا 115  
 om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup> ليس ببيان | No بمجهول [بالمجهول | TTe تعرف [تعريف 116 ADaYi  
 om. B لمقدمة 118 Y الحل in mg. G الحل [الحال | E فإن γ وإذا [إذا | C موجبة [موجب 117  
 Lat. [ولا لقياسياته] «nec suum syllogismum» in mg. G ولا لتأليفه et ولا لقياسياته [ولا لتأليفه  
 a.c. Nk المجهول [الذي | om. et add. s.l. N بين 120 om. Yi عظيم | Da قد [فقد 119  
 om. No إليه 122 E ما [مما | add. et exp. Yi الحكم [به 121 om. No الشيء 122... وبين  
 om. et add. هو 123 § يكون γ فيكون [ويكون | To يوصف [توصل | om. et add. in mg. J آخر  
 به J استتمت [استتمت 124 § فأما [وأما | om. Yi add. in mg. Ka قبل الشيء [الشيء | s.l. G  
 om. et هو | add. et exp. Ka وهو [الشيء | s.l. § المعارف S العرفان [المعارف | add. Mi  
 add. a.c. E تعريف [من | DiMi فلذلك E وذلك [فذلك 126 Da فلا [ولا 125 J  
 add. KaNkC المعارف [توافت 130 N وإذا [إذا 129 Mi منهما [منها 128 om. No الشيء 127  
 s.l. §<sup>3</sup> ما § بما [ما | s.l. §<sup>3</sup> توافت § توافقت S add. s.l. B المعارف add. in mg.

something unknown by means of something [also] unknown, for it is impossible to deny it. Also, the third [premise], namely that the notification of the unknown by means of the unknown is not a clarification, cannot be denied, nor can the fact that the order that these premises have is not necessary in view of the validity of what is inquired by them. Since this solver did not propose an objection to any premise of the syllogism of the doubt, nor to its composition, he did not achieve any result. 115

**[4.2.4. Avicenna's distinction between what is known together with the thing and that by means of which the thing is known]**

A huge mistake also occurred with this regard, namely that the difference between what is known together with the thing and that by means of which the thing is known was not perceived. In fact, that by means of which the thing is known is something that is known in itself, and [then] becomes a part of the notification of the thing that, when another part is added to it, leads to the knowledge of the thing, having been already known before the thing [itself]. What is known together with the thing is that which, when the knowledge is completed by the complete achieving of what makes the thing known, at the same time, the thing is known and, together with it, it is known [as well], but the knowledge of it does not precede the knowledge of the thing so that the thing is known by means of it, for that is not a part of the complex that notifies the thing. In fact, the parts of the complex [of the elements] that make the thing known do not make the things known as long as they are not gathered together, and the single of them signifies only a part of the notion that belongs to the thing. As long as the parts [of that complex] are mentioned but not brought together, the thing stays yet unknown; when [the said complex] is completely achieved, then the thing is known, and what is known together with the thing is known [too]. 120 125 130

4.2.5) والمضافات إنما تعرف معا ليس بعضها يعرف البعض فتكون معرفة بعضها قبل معرفة البعض، لا مع معرفته. وبالجملة ما يعرف مع الشيء غير الذي يعرف به الشيء؛ فإنّ الذي يعرف به الشيء هو في المعرفة قبل الشيء. وكذلك فإنّ نقول إنّ المتضائفات لا تحد على هذه المجازفة التي أوما إليها من ظن أنه يحل هذا الشكّ، بل في تحديدها ضرب من التلطف يزول به هذا الانغلاق، ولهذا موضع بيان آخر. وأما مثاله في العاجل، فهو أنك إذا سئلت: «ما الأخ؟» لم تعمل شيئا إن أجبت إنه الذي له أخ، بل تقول إنه الذي أبوه هو بعينه أبو إنسان آخر الذي يقال إنه أخوه، فتأتى بأجزاء بيان ليس واحد منها متحددا بالمضاف الآخر؛ فإذا فرغت، تكون قد دلت على المتضائفين معا.

4.2.6) وإذ قد تقرر أن هذا الحل غير مغن فلنرجع نحن إلى حيث فارقه فنقول إنّ تحديد الجنس يتم وإن لم يؤخذ النوع فيه نوعا من حيث هو مضاف إليه، بل من حيث هو الذات؛ فإنك إذا عنيت بالنوع الماهية والحقيقة والصورة — وقد يعنى به ذلك كثيرا في عاداتهم — لم يكن النوع من المضاف إلى الجنس. فإذا عنيت بالمتخلفين بالنوع المختلفين بالماهية والصورة، تم لك تحديد الجنس.

131... والمضافات 131 *Nağāt*, p. 174.6-11; *Risāla fī al-Hudūd*, pp. 77.17-78.2; *Maṭīq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, pp. 42.16-43.10; *Iṣārāt*, pp. 264.6-265.13. 142... وإذ 142 *Hidāya*, p. 66.6-7.

J معرفتها [معرفة 132 Da يعرف بعضها [بعضها يعرف | *in mg. Di* | المعارف [والمضافات 131 والجهالة [المعرفة 134 *add. et exp. Nk* | الشيء [فإن 133 *add. Ed.* فتكون معرفة البعض [بعض المتضائفات | *s.l. Nk* | إنّ | *Yi* | ولا كذلك *s.l. Nk* | ولذلك *πΑDa* [وكذلك | *add. et exp. E* | فهو | *Yi* | هو [فهو | *s.l. N* | بيان 137 *om. Y* | به | *om. A* | في 136 *Di* | المتضائفات *iter. E om.* | هو 139 *S* | الأخ [أخ | *s.l. Nk* | بأنه *JDa* بأنه [إنه 138 *S* | ما [إذا | *S* | فإنك [أنك متحدد [متحددا | *JT* | منهما [منها | *E* | واحدا [واحد 140 *add. SYi* | له [يقال | *S* | أب *No* | أبوه [أبو | *S* | عرفت [معرفة *in mg. No* | عرفت [فرغت | *in mg. Š* | فإذا عرفت [فإذا فرغت | *π* | متحدا *A* | فلنرجع *s.l. Nk* | فلنرجع *γλS* | فلنرجع [فلنرجع | *om. Yi* | قد | *G* | وإذا [وإذ 142 *om. Te* | معا 141 *mg. C* | «*et veritas rei*» [والحقيقة | *om. No* | عنيت 146... بالنوع 145 *ES* | يوجد [يؤخذ 143 *Lat.* | وإذا [فإذا | *a.c. E* | عاتهم *vDiToŠ* | عاداتهم [عاداتهم 146 *S* | وقد يعنى *S* | وقد يعنى [وقد يعنى | *γEd.* | نوع *add. et* | النوع [الجنس | *add. No* | الذاتية [والصورة | *A* | المختلفين [بالمختلفين 147 *exp. To*

#### [4.2.5. Porphyry's mistake in the definition of the relative terms]

Q53 Relative [terms] are only known together, and the one is not known by the other so that the knowledge of the one precedes the knowledge of the other, rather than coming together with the knowledge of the other. To sum up, what is known together with the thing is different than that by means of which the thing is known, since that by which the thing is known is prior in knowledge to the thing. Analogously, we say that relative [items] are not defined with the same carelessness showed by the one who thought that he solved this ambiguity; on the contrary, in their definition there is a sort of subtlety in virtue of which this obscurity ceases to be, for which there is another place of explanation<sup>7</sup>. An immediate example of this is that, if you are asked: "what is the brother?" you do not achieve any result if you answer that he is someone who has a brother, but rather you say that he is someone whose father is himself [also] the father of another man who is said to be his brother, so that you provide parts of a clarification none of which is defined by means of the other relative [term]; if, then, you complete [the answer], then you have signified the two relative [terms] at the same time. 135 140

#### [4.2.6. Avicenna's own redefinition of the genus]

Since it has already been established that this solution is not satisfying, let us come back to where we departed; we say that the genus' definition is complete even if the species is not assumed in it as a species inasmuch as it is relative to it, but inasmuch as it is the essence. If you mean by "species" the quiddity, the essence and the form (which is often meant, in their use<sup>8</sup>), the species is not one of the [terms that are] relative to the genus. If you mean by "differing in species" "differing in the quiddity and the form", you have a complete 145

<sup>7</sup>) I.e. *Maqūlāt* IV.3-5. | <sup>8</sup>) I.e. in the use of the Greeks: the term εἶδος has such meanings, which are also recalled by Avicenna in the beginning of chap. I.10 (§1.1).

فإنك إذا قلت إنَّ الجنس هو المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالحقائق  
 والماهيات والصور الذاتية في جواب ما هو، تمَّ تحديد الجنس ولم  
 تحتاج إلى أن تأخذ النوع من حيث هو مضاف فتورده في حده، وإن  
 كانت الإضافة تدرج في ذلك اندراجاً لا يكون معه جزء الحد  
 متحدداً بالمحدود بالحد. أما الاندراج فلأنك إذا قلت: «مقول على  
 المختلف بالماهية»، جعلت المختلف بالماهية مقولاً عليه، وهذه إشارة  
 إلى ما عرض لها من الإضافة. وأما أنك لم تجعل جزء الحد متحدداً  
 بالمحدود بالحد، فلأن جزء الحد هو الماهية أو كلية تخالف بالماهية؛  
 والماهية من حيث هي ماهية، والكلية المخالفة بالماهية غير متحددة  
 بالجنس، فتكون قد حددت الجنس حداً نهيت في آخره وبالقوة معه  
 على تحديد النوع الذي يضايفه من غير أن جعلته بالفعل من حيث  
 هو مضاف جزء حده.

وأما شرح هذا التدبير في الحدود التي للمتضايفات، وأنه لم ينبغي أن  
 يكون هكذا، وكيف يحصل معه مراعاة ما لكل واحد من المتضايفين  
 من خاصية القول بالقياس إلى الآخر، فسترى ذلك في مكان آخر.

تم لك تحديد [والصور | S] أو الماهيات Yi بالماهية a.c. To والماهية [والماهيات 149 iter. B هو 148  
 add. a.c. No فإنك إذا قلت إن الجنس هو المقول على كثيرين [الجنس | S] أو الصور a.c. Yi  
 بالحد | in mg. To متحدداً et متحداً a.c. Di متحداً [متحدداً 152 S<sup>3</sup> add. s.l. JTSTe om. J إلى 150  
 [فلأنك | add. Lat. «(relatio) quae hic intelligitur» [الاندراج | JATSTe وأما [أما | om. J  
 Ka الماهية [بالماهية 153 add. Lat. [كثيرين] «multis» [على | ع مقولاً [مقول | A فإنك  
 لهما [لها 154 No وهذا [وهذه | Da عليها s.l. Y عليه et عليها [عليه | ع om. 2بالماهية... جعلت  
 [بالمحدود 155 To متحداً [متحدداً | N الماهية [الحد | A تحصل [تجعل | S] إن لم [لم | JTe  
 om. Lat. ماهية 156... أو | Yi et add. in mg. om. et الماهية | A فان [فلأن | To وبالمحدود  
 KaEDiG هو [هي | Ka om. et add. in mg. om. C 156 KaJT om. C الماهية [بالماهية  
 متحدة p.c. E متحد [متحددة | JT للماهية [بالماهية | exp. Y بالماهية... والكلية | E أو الكلية [والكلية  
 in mg. C و KaNkCG بالقوة [وبالقوة | Ka تنبتهت [نبهت | No حدث [حددت 157 a.c. To  
 للمضافات [للمتضايفات | Ka فأما [وأما 160 A حد [حده 159 Ka جهة [غير | G للنوع [النوع 158  
 الأخرى [الأخر 162 om. N واحد | E يجعل [يحصل 161 ع يتبع [ينبغي | G فإنه [وأنه | Te  
 To فسير A يسير in mg. B فسير in mg. B فستري vBDiDaSMiSG فسيرد [فستري | JA]

definition of the genus since, if you say that the genus is “predicated of many [items] differing in essences, quiddities and essential forms, in answer to ‘what is it?’”, the genus’ definition is complete and you do not need to assume the species inasmuch as it is a relative to introduce it in its definition, even if the relation is included in that in a way that it does not entail that a part of the definition is defined by means of what is defined by the definition [itself]. As to its being included [in that], this is because, if you say: “predicated of [items] differing in the quiddity”, you consider “differing in the quiddity” as the subject of predication, and this points at the relation that occurs to them. As to the fact that you do not consider a part of the definition as defined by means of what is defined by the definition [itself], this is because the part of the definition is the quiddity or the universality that differs in quiddity, and neither the quiddity inasmuch as it is a quiddity, nor the universality differing in the quiddity are defined by the genus, so that you have defined the genus by a definition in which you alluded, lastly and in potentiality together with it, to the definition of the species that is relative to it, though without positing it in actuality as a part of its definition inasmuch as it is relative.

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As to the clarification of this procedure in the definitions of the relative [terms], and why it is necessary that it be in this way, and how the consideration of the specific predication of each one of the two relatives with respect to the other is, you will see that in another place.

## [الفصل العاشر]

### فصل في النوع ووجه انقسام الكلّي إليه

(1.1) والنوع أيضا قد يقال في لغة اليونانيين على معنى غير معنى النوع المنطقي؛ فإنّ اللفظ الذي نقلته الفلاسفة اليونانيون فجعلته لمعنى النوع المنطقي كان مستعملا في الوضع الأول عند اليونانيين على معنى صورة كل شيء وحقيقته التي له ذلك دون شيء آخر؛ فوجدوا صوراً وماهيات للأشياء التي تحت الجنس يختص كل واحد منها بها، فسموها من حيث هي كذلك أنواعاً.

5

(1.2.1) وكما أنّ لفظة الجنس كانت تتناول المعنى العامي والمعنى المنطقي ولفظة النوع مطلقاً تتناول المعنى العامي والمعنى المنطقي، فكذلك لفظة النوع المنطقي تتناول عند المنطقيين معنيين، أحدهما أعم والآخر أخص. فأما المعنى الأعم، فهو الذي يروونه مضايفاً للجنس،

10

Summarized in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Šarḥ al-Isārāt*, p. 266.7-8. [أنواعاً 8... والنوع 3

PORPH., *Isag.*, pp. 3.22-4.1. 7 فوجدوا... [أنواعاً 8... PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 4.2-4. آخر 6... فإنّ 4

*al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.3, p. 513.8-10. [المنطقي 4... والنوع 3

om. إليه | Mi الفصل العاشر من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق Y الفصل العاشر [فصل 2  
om. معنى | om. et add. in mg. Y اليونانيون 4... على | µE قد يقال أيضا [يقال... أيضا 3 κ  
اليونانيون | A الفلسفة [الفلسفة | i.l. Di التي [الذي | i.l. Di اللفظ et اللفظة [اللفظ | om. النوع 4  
in يستعمل | s.l. Nk يستعمل | µE يستعمل [مستعملاً | No المعنى [المعنى 5 Yi اليونانية JET اليونانيين  
mg. C | et وحقيقته | et وحقيقته TTeYiG وخلقته [وحقيقته 6 No عنه [عند | mg. C  
له JTAs لها ذلك [εKaEDa له ذلك | Te لها [له | s.l. J التي | Lat. [وخلقته] «et eius  
compositioni» و et فلفظة π فكذلك لفظة a.c. G كلفظة [وللفظة 10 κ كان [كانت | om. Yi κ لفظ [لفظة 9 ηAEd.  
11... مطلقاً | Ka للنوع [النوع | om. et add. in mg. Y om. 2 المنطقي... ولفظة | Te فلفظة i.l. As  
[كانت تتناول] «continebat» [scil. iter. To | كانت تتناول] prae. eNkBEd. in mg. C  
add. Nk om. N فكذلك لفظة النوع المنطقي تتناول المعنى العامي والمعنى المنطقي [2 المنطقي | Lat.  
معنيين | a.c. E المنطقيون [المنطقيين | S فذلك Te ولذلك i.l. As وكذلك et ولذلك T وكذلك [فكذلك 11  
om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup> معنى [المعنى 12 S<sup>3</sup>

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's paraphrase of this passage in *Šarḥ al-Isārāt*, p. 266.7-8 (*tumma bayyana anna mā kāna bi-izā' lafẓ al-naw' fī l-luġa al-yūnāniyya kāna fī-l-waḍ' al-awwal yadullu 'alā šūrat al-šay' wa-ḥaqīqatīhi [...]*), supports the reading *ḥaqīqatuhu* against *ḥilqatuhu*, attested by some manuscripts.

[I.10]

**CHAPTER ON SPECIES AND THE WAY THE UNIVERSAL IS DIVIDED  
INTO IT**

**[1. The term “species”]**

**[1.1. From the first meaning of “species” in Greek to its technical application in Logic]**

“Species” as well can be said, in the language of the Greeks, according to a notion that is different than that of the logical species. In fact, the utterance that the Greek philosophers transposed to apply it to the notion of the logical species was employed at first, among the Greeks, for the notion of the form of each thing and its essence, which belongs to that [thing] exclusively; then, they found forms and quiddities that belong to the things that are [ranged] under the genus, all of which properly belong to [those] things, so they called them, inasmuch as they are so, “species”.

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**[1.2. Two senses of “species” employed in Logic]**

**[1.2.1. Presentation of a more general notion and a more specific one]**

As well as the word “genus” encompassed the general notion and the logical one, and the word “species” in absolute encompasses the general notion and the logical one, analogously the word “logical species” encompasses, according to the logicians, two notions, the first being more general and the other one more specific. As to the most

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ويجدونه بأنه المرتب تحت الجنس أو الذي يقال عليه الجنس وعلى غيره بالذات، وما يجري هذا المجرى. وأما المعنى الخاص فهو الذي ربما سموه باعتبار ما نوع الأنواع، وهو الذي يدل على ماهية مشتركة لجزئيات لا تختلف بأمور ذاتية. فهذا المعنى يقال له نوع بالمعنى الأول، إذ لا يخلو في الوجود من وقوعه تحت الجنس، ويقال له نوع بالمعنى الثاني.

(1.2.2) وبين المفهومين فرق، وكيف لا وهو بالمعنى الأول مضاف إلى الجنس وبالمعنى الثاني غير مضاف إلى الجنس؛ فإنه لا يحتاج في تصويره مقولا على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد في جواب ما هو إلى أن يكون شيء آخر أيضا أعم منه مقولا عليه. ومعنى النوع بالوجه الأول ليس كالجنس لمعنى النوع بالوجه الثاني، وذلك لأنه ليس مقوما له، إذ قد يجوز في التوهم أن لا يكون الشيء الذي هو نوع بهذه الصفة نوعا بالصفة الثانية، إذ لا يمتنع في الذهن أن نتصور كليا هو رأس ليس تحت كلي آخر، وهو مع ذلك ليس مما ينقسم بالفصول،

13 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 4.9-11. Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 70.1-2. [بالذات 14... المرتب 13  
21 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 4.11-12. [هو... مقولا 21

add. J من طريق ما هو [بالذات 14 § وعلى غيره الجنس [غيره 14... 2<sup>2</sup> الجنس | iter. Yi يقال 13  
من [الأنواع | نوع | Lat. [رسموه fort. «describunt» [سموه 15 Mi الأخص [الخاص  
[«particularibus»] Lat. [sed fort. corrigendum] «pluribus» [لجزئيات 16 G الأنواع  
... مقولا 21 om. et add. in mg. Da 2<sup>2</sup> الجنس... وبالمعنى | om. To إلى 20 NkB عن [من 17  
Ed. بمعنى [المعنى 23 Ka الثاني [الأول | Yi om. أيضا 22 om. et add. in mg. To منه 22  
بهذه | Lat. [(لا يكون) للشيء fort. «id ... non habeat» [الشيء 24 a.c. Yi مقوله [مقوما له  
om. et add. هو [وهو | om. Lat. آخر 26 A وهو [هو 25 «in hoc modo primo» Lat. [الصفة  
s.l. N

يعني أن النوع الأول وهو المرتب تحت الجنس لا يمكن بضرورة في الذهن ما لم [الثاني 18... فهذا 16  
يتصور معه شيء أعم منه وشيء أخص منها تقومانه جنسا بهذه الصفة وبالمعنى الثاني وهو الذي لا يكون  
جنسا لا [...] الذهن من تصويره من دون تصور شيء أعم منه [...] كأنه لا يلتفت البتة إلى أن الحيوان يعمه  
وغيره [...] بل يأخذ معنى كليا تحته جزئياته فإذن ليس الحيوان مقوما له لأنه يجوز أن يرفع [...] تصويره وما  
ولا لو كان [آخر 26... ومعنى 22 in mg. Di لا حاجة إليه في وجوده وتصوره في الذهن فليس ذاتيا له  
ذلك غير جائز في الوجود وجب أن يكون النوع بالمعنى الأول جنسا للشيء النوع بالمفهوم الثاني إذ ليس ذلك  
المفهوم جزء هذا المفهوم ومفهوم الجنس لا محالة جزء مفهوم النوع وفي ذلك كفاية وأما اعتبار الوجود والتوهم  
فغير نافع في ذلك وإنما يعتبر شروط الجنس عند النوع فقط ولا أيضا معنى الجنس جنس لمعنى النوع ولا عام  
in mg. N له وإلا لكان كل نوع جنسا وليس كذلك

Q55      general notion, it is the one that they consider as relative to the genus, and that they define as “ranged under the genus” or “that of which the genus is predicated not exclusively and essentially”, and so on. The specific notion is the one that they sometimes called, under a certain consideration, “most special species”, and it is what signifies a shared quiddity that belongs to particulars that do not differ in essential things. This notion is said “species” according to the first notion, since it inevitably falls under the genus in the existence; [otherwise], it is also said “species” according to the second notion.      15

### [1.2.2. Differences between the two senses of “species”]

Between the two concepts there is a difference – and how [could] it not [be so], given that, according to the first notion, it is relative to the genus, whereas according to the second notion it is not relative to the genus; in fact, its conceptualization as predicated of many [items] in number in answer to ‘what is it?’ does not require that there be also something else more common than it that is predicated of it. The notion of “species” under the first respect is not like the genus with respect to the notion of the species under the second respect, and this because it is not constitutive for it, since it might be possible in estimation for the thing that is a species in this way not to be a species in the second way, since it is not impossible to conceptualize in mind a universal that is at the top under which there is not another universal, without, furthermore, being among the things that are divided by      20  
25

كالنقطة عند قوم. وما كان حكمه هكذا وعلى هذه الصورة وجاز رفعه في التوهم، لم يكن كما علمت ذاتيا، وما لم يكن ذاتيا لم يكن جنسا، بل إن كان لا بد فهو عارض لازم له. وقد يقال لهذا نوع الأنواع، وليس المفهوم من كونه نوع الأنواع هو المفهوم من كونه نوعا بمعنى أنه مقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد في جواب ما هو — وكيف ومن حيث هو نوع الأنواع—؛ فإن النوع المطلق له كالجنس وداخل في تحديده وهو به مضاف إلى أنواع فوقه.

(1.3) ثم لست أحقق أنّ أيّ الوجيهين هو في اصطلاح المنطقيين أقدم؛ فإنه لا يبعد أن يكون أول نقل اسم النوع إنما هو إلى هذا المطل على الأفراد، ثم لما عرض له أن كان عليه عام آخر، سمي كونه تحت العام بهذه الصفة نوعية. ولا يبعد أيضا أن يكون الأقدم هو المعنى الآخر؛ فلما كان هذا المعنى يلزمه أن يكون نوع الأنواع، ويختص في إضافاته بالنوعية فقط من غير تجنس، جعل أولى باسم النوعية، وسمي من حيث هو ملاصق للأشخاص نوعا أيضا. وهذا شيء ليس يمكنني تحصيله، وإن كان أكثر ميلي هو إلى أنّ أول التسمية وقع بحسب اعتبار النوع المضاييف.

٥٦ق

[وما كان) حكمه (هكذا) [scil. (وما كان) حكمه 27  
على [و على | Mi هذا [هكذا | NkCG in mg. حمله No جملة [λvJBdiDaToŠNEd. حمله [Lat.  
om. et 3يكن | add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup> فقط [ذاتيا | G ولم [الم 28 Di الصفة [الصورة | As أو على Ka  
om. et add. in mg. G نوع 32...<sup>2</sup>الأنواع 30 لآ om. له | add. E من [بد 29 As  
به 33 om. et add. s.l. C و [ومن | i.l. As و et فكيف JT فكيف [وكيف 32 DiDa om. بالعدد 31  
om. ADaNo أن | in mg. Y أحقق δvKaJ أتحقق [أحقق 34 ع أنه om. C om. et add. s.l. B  
ما نقل [نقل | a.c. Y عن أن [أن | om. N أقدم 35 Di in mg. المنطقيين et المنطقيين [المنطقيين  
[a.c. المطل [parum clare; fort. المطلق Ed. المطلق [المطل 36 To in mg. نقل et ما نقل MiŠG  
الجنس [العام 37 λJSToŠG يسمى يسمى [سمي | Lat. [المطل «id quod est supra» κ المقول G  
Y a.c. الاقدم | om. J أيضا | ToŠ فلا [ولا | s.l. As نوعيته et نوعه [نوعية | Ka العام  
s.l. As et تجنس جنس JTŠTeEd. جنس [تجنس | s.l. As [إضافته. [scil. فته [إضافاته | s.l. J في 39  
in mg. C فسمي s.l. Nk فسمي λπDiDaYi فسمي Y فيسمى [وسمي 40 Lat. «generalitate»  
in mg. et المضاييف [المضاييف | A وقوع [وقع 42 To om. et add. s.l. إلى | om. Mi هو 41  
mg. C المضاييف N

differentiae, like the point, according to a group [of philosophers]<sup>1</sup>. That whose status is in this way and in this form and whose removal in the estimation is possible, was not, as you learned, essential, and what was not essential was not a genus; if it is necessary, it is rather a concomitant accident for it. Sometimes it is said “most special species”, but the concept of its being a most special species does not coincide with that of its being a species in the sense that it is predicated of many [items] differing in number in answer to ‘what is it?’ – and how could it [coincide with that], given that it is a most special species –; in fact, the absolute species is like a genus for it, included in [the process of] its definition, in virtue of which it is related to the species above it. 30

**[1.3. Difficulty in determining which of the two senses is earlier than the other]**

I have not verified which of the two aspects came earlier, in the agreement of the logicians, since it is not impossible that the first traditional use of the name “species” only [applied] to this [species] above the singular [things]; then, when it happened to have another general [item] above it, the fact of being [ranged] under a general [item] in this way was called “speciality”. [On the other hand], it is not even impossible that the earlier [of the two] is the other notion: since this notion is necessarily a most special species, and in its relations, it only properly applies to speciality, without becoming a genus, it was posited as worthier of the name “speciality” and, inasmuch as it is contiguous with the individuals, it was called also “species”. But this is something that I cannot ascertain, even if I am more inclined towards [thinking] that the first assignation of the name occurred in virtue of the consideration of the relative species. 35 40

Q56

<sup>1</sup>) Namely the Pythagoreans, who posited the point as indivisible; cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* X, 278 and Hyppolitus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, IV, 51.2-3 and VI, 23.1-4.

(2.1.1) لكنّه يجب علينا أن نعلم أنّ النوع الذي هو أحد الخمسة في  
القسمّة الأولى هو بأيّ المعنيين نوع، فنقول إنّّه قد يمكن أن تخرج  
القسمّة الخمسة على وجه يتناول كل واحد منهما دون الآخر: فإنّه إذا  
45 قيل إن اللفظ الكلي الذاتي إما أن يكون مقولا بالماهية أو لا يكون،  
والمقول بالماهية إما أن يكون مقولا بالماهية المشتركة لمختلفين بالنوع  
أو لمختلفين بالعدد دون النوع، كان قسمّة المقول بالماهية تتناول  
الجنس والنوع الملاصق للأشخاص، فيضيع اعتبار النوع بالمعنى  
الذي يكون بالإضافة إلى الجنس في القسمّة الأولى؛ بل ينقسم بعد  
50 ذلك ما هو مقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع في جواب ما هو إلى ما  
هو كذلك ولا يقال عليه مثل ذلك، فيكون الذي يسمى جنسا  
فقط، وإلى ما يكون مقولا على كثيرين ويقال عليه آخر هذا القول  
فيصير بهذا الاعتبار نوعا. لكن هذه القسمّة لا تخرج طبيعة النوعية  
بالمعنى المضاف مطلقا، بل تخرج قسما من هذه النوعية بهذا  
55 الاعتبار، وهو ما كان جنسا وله نوعية، وتخرج طبيعة النوع  
بالاعتبار الخاص سالما صحيحا.

(2.1.2) وقد يمكن أن يقسم بحيث يخرج النوع بمعنى الأعمّ، فيكون  
النوع بمعنى الخاص في القسمّة الثانية، حتى يكون ما هو نوع إما

*et* بالذاتية [بالماهية] 46 *add. E* القسمّة [المخمسة] 45 *om. et add. s.l. T* قد 44 *om. N* علينا 43  
... المشتركة | *add. a.c. No* يتناول [بالماهية] | *om. Lat.* والمقول بالماهية 47 *s.l. As* بالماهية  
[أو لمختلفين] 48 *om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* لمختلفين... النوع | *om. et add. in mg. Y* بالماهية  
*To* وتصنع  $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\mu\iota\sigma\upsilon\gamma\iota$  ويضيع [فيضيع] 49 *A* مختلفين [لمختلفين] | *i.l. As* أو *et* والمختلفين  
*T* يقسم *J* يقسم [ينقسم] | *om. et add. s.l. Di* في *J* بالقسمّة [في القسمّة] | *om. et add. s.l. N* الذي 50  
... بالمعنى | *om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* بالمعنى المضاف 55 *Ed.* هذا [بهذا] 54 *s.l. As* ينقسم *et* يقسم  
*KaB* بدأ *NkC* بدأ *J* بهذه [بهذا] | *Ka* قسم [قسما] | *add. et exp. As* بل [تخرج] | *om. C* النوعية  
بالمعنى *J. p.c. et* بالمعنى *a.c. et* لمعنى [بمعنى] 58 *om. et add. in mg. Y* جنسا 56 *s.l. As* بذلك  
نوع... 60 | *T* الثلثة [الثانية] | *in mg. NkC. εEd.* بالمعنى [بمعنى] 59 *N* ويكون [فيكون] | *πYi*  
*om. et add. in mg. Di*

أي النوع من حيث هو مضاف إلى الجنس والنوع من حيث هو مقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد [المعنيين] 44  
يعني إذا كانت القسمّة كذلك لم يخرج النوع المضاييف مطلقا بل يخرج [صحيحا] 57... لكن 54 *in mg. Nk*  
*in* منها يقسمّة ثائية يوقع على أحد قسميها وهو ما ذكره وأما النوع الملاصق فيخرج من القسمّة الأولى صحيحا  
*mg. Di*

**[2. Attempt to determine which of the two notions of species is one of the five universal utterances]**

**[2.1. The division into the five utterances may produce one sense of species only at a time]**

**[2.1.1. The division that produces the notion of the most special species only]**

However, we must teach in which of the two senses the species that is one of the five [utterances] in the first division is a species. We say that it might be possible that the division into five brings out [the species] under a respect that encompasses each one of the two [notions] without the other, for if it is said that the universal essential utterance is either predicated with regard to the quiddity or not, and [that] what is predicated with regard to the quiddity can be predicated with regard to the shared quiddity that belongs to [items] that differ in species or to [items] that differ in number but not in species, then the section of what is predicated with regard to the quiddity encompasses the genus and the species that is contiguous to the individuals, so that the consideration of the species in the sense that it is related to the genus is lost in the first division. But what is predicated of many [items] that differ in species in answer to “what is it?” is further divided into what is in this way and of which nothing similar is predicated, and it is what is called “genus” only, and into what is predicated of many [items in this way] and something else is predicated of it in the same way, so that, under this consideration, it becomes a species. However, this division does not bring out the nature of speciality in the relative notion in absolute, but it rather brings out a section of this speciality according to this consideration, and this is what was a genus and had a speciality, whereas it brings out the nature of the species in the proper consideration completely and correctly.

**[2.1.2. The division that produces the relative species only]**

It might also be possible to produce a division in order to bring out the species in the most common sense, and that the species in the proper sense results in the second [stage of the] division, so that what

60 الذي هو نوع الأنواع الذي يعرض له أن يكون النوع بالمعنى الذي نجعله أخصّ، وإما الذي هو نوع يتجنس.

٥٧ق (2.1.3) لكنك إذا قسمت الكلبي من حيث هو كلي فأولى الاعتبارات به أن تقسمه قسمة تكون له بالقياس إلى موضوعاته التي هو كلي بحسبها، فهناك يذهب النوع الذي بالمعنى الأعمّ، وإنما يحصل من بعد باعتبار ثانٍ؛ وهنالك يصير النوع المشعور به أولاً هو النوع بالمعنى الخاص.

70 وإن لم يراع هذا، بل روعي أحوال الكليات وعوارضها فيما بينها من حيث هي كلية، مثل الزيادة في العموم والخصوص التي لبعضها عند بعض، لا عند الجزئيات، خرج لك النوع المضاف، على ما نوره عن قريب.

(2.2) وليس يجب أن يكون هذا التخمس مشتملا على كل معنى تكون إليه قسمة الكلبي؛ فإنّ الشيء قد ينقسم أقساما قسمة تامة، وتفلت منها أقسام له أخرى إنما تأتي سليمة بقسمة أخرى؛ فإنّ الحيوان، إذا قسمته إلى ناطق وأعجم، لم يكن إلا قسمين، وأفلت المشاء والطائر، واحتاج إلى ابتداء قسمة.

يجعله [نجعله] 61 *i.l. Di om. §* الجنس [النوع] *om. No* | نوع 61... الأنواع | *om. Yi* الذي هو 60 الأخص *J a.c.* الذي أخص [أخصّ] | *Ed.* يجعله *N* جعله *Lat.* «*quam posuimus*» *G* نجعله *exp. et Da* الجنس [يتجنس] | *om. Nk* هو *G* *om. et add. in mg.* الذي هو | *add. Yi* النوع [وإما] | *Di* مقسمة [تقسمه] 63 *iter. No* كلي 64... فأولى | *To* فالأولى [فأولى] 62 *TAsNo* الجنس *a.c. E* الجنس *C* فإن [وإن] 67 *A* اعتبار [باعتبار] | *om. et add. s.l. N* بعد 65 *om. J s.l. G* الذي 64 *T* [نورده] | *No* ذلك [لك] 69 *s.l. As* كلية *et* كل [كلية] 68 *et* بينهما *A* بينها [بينها] | *§* روعيت [روعي] [هذا التخمس] 71 *Lat.* «*ostendemus [varia lectio: ostendetur]*» *NkTC* نورده *Y* نورده *om. No* كل | *Lat.* «*haec <divisio> quinquemembris*» [*fort.* «*haec quinquemembris*»] *om. et* قسمة<sup>2</sup> | *om. C* قد | *i.l. AsTo* إليه *et* إليها *G* إليها *exp. et* إليه *JETSTeŠNo* إليها [إليه] 72 أقسام أخرى له *KaE* أقسام أخرى [الأخرى... أقسام] 73 *om. Lat.* قسمة تامة | *JG* *add. in mg.* [وأعجم] 74 *iter. No* قسمين 74... له | *No* أقساما له أخرى *T* *om. et add. s.l.* له *vJDIToMiG* *volatile et* المشاء والطائر 75 *E* قسمان [قسمين] | *Mi* يمكن [يكن] | *A* له [لم] | *§* وإلى أعجم واحتاج) *p.c.* واحتاجا *Di* فاحتاجا *JMiŠYiG* واحتاجا [واحتاج] | *Lat.* [الطائر والمشاء] «*gressibile*» [*fort. add.* أخرى] *Lat.* «*aliam divisionem*» *v* *add.* أخرى [قسمة] | *Nk* وليس يحتاج *To* (*a.c.*)

*i.l. Di* أي النوع [الكلبي] 62

is a species is either what is a most special species to which it happens to be a species in the sense that we posit as more proper, or it is what is a species that [also] becomes a genus. 60

**[2.1.3. The division of the universal with respect to its subjects produces the species in the proper sense]**

Q57 But if you divide the universal inasmuch as it is universal, the worthiest of the ways of considering it is that you divide it according to the division that it has with respect to its subjects in virtue of which it is universal, and there the species that is [so] in the most general sense is excluded, being attained only after, at a second consideration. 65  
The species conceived at first becomes, here, the species in the proper sense.

If this is not a matter of interest, the interest being rather with the states of the universals and their accidents the one with respect to the other, inasmuch as they are universal, like the fact of being more general or specific of the one with respect to the other, not with respect to the particulars, [this] brings out to you the relative species, according to what will be soon presented to you. 70

**[2.2. The division of the five utterances might not include every notion in which the universal is divided]**

This division into five does not necessarily encompass every notion that results from the division of the universal, since the thing can be divided into sections by a complete division, though [some] others of its sections that are provided completely only by another division escape from it. If you divide “animal” into “rational” and “irrational”, there will not be more than two sections, and “walking” and “flying” escape from it, and they require starting [another] division. 75

We do not need to complicate [things] by claiming that this division into five must encompass each notion that is among the sections of the

وليس يجب أن نتعسر ونقول إنَّ هذه القسمة الخمسة يجب أن تشمل على كل معنى يكون من أقسام الكلبي واعتباراته، بل يجب أن تعلم أنَّه إنما يحمل على هذا التعسر اشتراك قسمين متباينين في اسم وهو اسم النوع، بل الأخرى أن نقول إنَّ هذه الخمسة إذا تحصلت حصل من المناسبات التي بينها أمر آخر هو حال الأخص من المقولات في جواب ما هو عند الأعم، حتى يكون ذلك نوعية للأخص، وكما يعرض مثل ذلك أيضا شخصية وجزئية ولكن تلك قد تركت إذ لا التفات إليها.

(3) فإنَّ أثرنا أن نجعل القسمة مخرجة للنوع بالمعنى المضاف الذي هو أعم، وجب أن نقول إنَّ اللفظ الذاتي إما مقول في جواب ما هو وإما غير مقول؛ ونعني بالمقول في جواب ما هو ما يصلح أن يكون، إذا سئل عن أشياء كثيرة ما هي، جوابا.

٥٨ق

ثم نقول: والمقولات في جواب ما هو قد تختلف بالعموم والخصوص فيكون بعضها أعم وبعضها أخص؛ فأعم المقولين في جواب ما هو هو جنس للأخص، وأخصها نوع للأعم. فإذا وجدنا النوع فهناك يقسم قسمة أخرى فنقول إنه لا يخلو إما أن يكون النوع من شأنه أن

76... وليس 79. النوع 79. *Išārāt*, p. 234.1-4.

[معنى | *om. TTeYi om. et add. s.l. As* | كل 77 *om. C* يجب | *i.l. As* و *et* فنقول] ونقول 76  
*vacuum postea in Yi* 78 *om. et add. i.l. S<sup>3</sup>* | على *om. T om. et add. in mg. Te*  
 [حصل | *in mg. To* | تحصلت *et* حصلت *JDiMiŠG* حصلت [تحصلت 80 *Ka* التعسير [التعسر  
*NkDaŠEd.* الأخص [للأخص 82 *om. et add. s.l. To* ذلك 81 *A* بينها [بينها | *ToYi* حصلت  
*in mg. G* قبل *in mg. G* مثل *et* قبل *a.c. J* قبل مثل [مثل | *S* | أيضا *add. a.c. S* | يعرض | *parum clare B*  
*mg. NkC* قبل *DiYiN* قبل *mg. NkC* شخصيته [شخصية | *om. N* | أيضا | *Lat.* [قبل] «ante» *S* | *p.c.* فمثل *DiYiN* قبل *mg. NkC*  
 مرحه [مخرجة 84 *a.c. To* إذا *om. Di* إذ 83 *om. E* | *SMi* لكن [ولكن | *S* | وجزئته [جزئية  
 جوابا | *Yi* هو *s.l. N* هي 87 *om. TeNo* | *S<sup>3</sup>* | *om. et add. s.l. As* ما هو 86 *s.l. As* مخرجة *et*  
*iter. κ* هو | *om. No* 88 *om. No* | *s.l. Nk in mg. C* والمقولات *et* والمقول *BEd.* والمقول [والمقولات 88  
 [أخص | *λKaDa* وبعضه [وبعضها | *Lat.* «*communia*» [أعم | *λKaDa* بعضه [بعضها 89  
*om.* هو | *add. et exp. Y* | قد يختلف [هو | *λDiDaYi* مقولين [المقولين | *Lat.* «*communiore*»  
*Da* الأعم [للأعم | *SYi* وأخصها *add.* هو [وأخصهما | *om. E* | للأخص 90 *om. et add. s.l. To*  
*s.l. Nk in mg. C* | فهناك *ATDiDaŠTeYNo* فهناك [فهناك | *Yi* وإذا [إذا

إمما قال ذلك وعناه ليجعل المقول في جواب ما هو مفهوما واحدا يعم الجنس والنوع إذ [جوابا 87... ونعني 86  
*in mg. N* لم يكن قرر ذلك أو لا لذلك

universal and the ways of considering it, but you should know that what causes this difficulty is the fact that two distinct sections share a [unique] name, namely the name of “species”. It is most convenient for us to state that when these five [utterances] are realized, something else among [their] reciprocal relations occurs, i.e. the state of the most specific of the predicates in answer to ‘what is it?’ with regard to the most general, so that it is the speciality of the most specific [predicate], as well as analogously also individuality and particularity occur, but those have already been left aside, since they are not taken into account<sup>2</sup>. 80

### [3. Possible divisions of the species]

If we choose to posit the division in a way that it brings out the species according to the relative notion which is more general, we must say that the essential utterance is either predicated in the ‘what is it?’ or not; we mean by “predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’” what is suitable to be an answer when it is asked, with regard to several things, what they are. 85

Q58

Then we say: the predicates in answer to ‘what is it?’ might differ in being general or specific, so that some of them are more general and some other are more specific; the most general of the two predicates in answer to ‘what is it?’ is a genus for the most specific one, whereas the most specific of the two is a species for the most general. When we find the species, it is divided by another division, and we say that, 90

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<sup>2</sup>) As previously stated in *Madḥal* I.5, p. 27.17-28.1 Cairo ed. (§3).

يصير جنسا لنوع آخر وإما أن لا يكون ذلك من شأنه، فهذه  
القسمة تنتهي إلى الخمسة انتهاء ظاهرا وتكون طبيعة النوع متحصلة  
فيه، والنوع بالمعنى الآخر يدخل فيه بوجه. وأما القسمة الأولى فلم  
تكن كذلك.

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(4.1) وأما القسمة المشهورة التي لهذه الخمسة، فهي أقرب من  
القسمة الأولى وذلك لأنهم يقسمون هكذا: إن كل لفظ مفرد إما أن  
يدل على واحد أو على كثير، والدال على الواحد هو اللفظ  
الشخصي؛ وأما الدال على الكثير فإما أن يدل على كثيرين مختلفين  
بالنوع أو كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد. والدال على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع  
إما أن يكون ذاتيا وإما أن يكون عرضيا؛ فإن كان ذاتيا فإما أن  
يكون في جواب ما هو وإما أن يكون في جواب أي شيء هو.  
فيجعلون الدال على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع في جواب ما هو جنسا  
والدال عليه في جواب أي شيء هو فصلا؛ وأما العرضي فهو  
العرض العام. ثم يقولون إن الدال على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد إما أن  
يكون في جواب ما هو وهو النوع وإما في جواب أي شيء هو  
وهو الخاصة.

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(4.2) فهذه القسمة منهم قد فاتها النوع بالمعنى المضاف، وفاتها  
طبيعة الفصل بما هو فصل، بل إنما دخل فيها من الفصول ما يحمل

96 Cf. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 2.17-3.19; AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 60.10-61.16. [الخاصة 107... وأما 96

108 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Ġadal* I.6, pp. 56.1-57.3. [إراعاه 113... وفاتها 108

«secundum intentionem communem» النوع | Di فتكون G أو يكون J a.c. أو تكون وتكون | Nk القسمة [الخمسة 93  
فيها] فيه | vEDa الأخير [الأخر | s.l. Y فيها] فيه 94 add. Lat. 94  
من [القسمة 97... من | N إلى [من | om. E التي | No فأما] وأما 96 Da أما [وأما | s.l. Y p.c. §  
G لفظ [اللفظ 98 praem. a.c. § لا [يقسمون 97 C من الخمسة exp. Ka الخمسة et الخمسة القسمة  
om.<sup>2</sup> بالنوع... والدال | v على كثيرين [الكثيرين | om. et add. in mg. JB  
Yi تقول [يقولون 105 To om. et add. s.l. شيء 104 om. Ka<sup>2</sup> هو 102 G et add. in mg.  
أن يكون [وأما | As om. et add. s.l. النوع | a.c. Te هو [وهو 106 Di om. كثيرين | A بأن [إن  
[بالمعنى المضاف | ع om. et add. s.l. فد 108 No a.c. هو s.l. As فهو [وهو 107 v§ add.  
No يحتمل [يحمل | § om. فصل 109 No بالمضاف

inescapably, the species is either suitable to become a genus for another species, or it is not suitable for that, so that this division evidently ends up with the five [utterances], and the nature of the species is attained in it, and the species in the other sense is included in it in a way [as well]. As to the first division, it was not in this way.

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#### [4. Traditional division of the five utterances]

##### [4.1. Articulation of the traditional division of the five utterances]

The commonly-known division of these five [utterances] is closer to the first division; this because they divide in this way<sup>3</sup>: every simple utterance either signifies one or more [notions]; what signifies one notion is the individual utterance, whereas what signifies several [notions] either signifies several [of them] that differ in species or several [of them] that differ in number. What signifies several [items] that differ in species is either essential or accidental; if it is essential, it is either [predicated] in answer to ‘what is it?’ or in answer to ‘which thing is it?’. They consider what signifies many [items] that differ in species in answer to ‘what is it?’ as a genus, and what signifies them in answer to ‘which thing is it?’ as a differentia. As to the accidental, it is the common accident. Then they say that what signifies many [items] that differ in number is either [predicated] in answer to ‘what is it?’, namely the species, or it is [predicated] in answer to ‘which thing is it?’, namely the proprium.

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##### [4.2. Problems with the traditional division of the five utterances]

This division of theirs failed to retain the species according to the relative notion, and also the nature of the differentia inasmuch as it is a

<sup>3</sup>) I.e. Porphyry’s classification in *Isag.* pp. 2.17-3.19.

110 على أنواع كثيرة وليس ذلك هو طبيعة الفصل بما هو فصل، إذ ليس كل فصل كذلك، على ما سيتضح لك، إلا أن يراعى شيء ستعرفه وتعلم أنهم لم يراعوه ولم يفتنوا له، فليس يمكننا أن نجعل ذلك عذرا لهم، اللهم إلا أن يكون المعلم الأول راعاه. وأيضا فإن هذه القسمة لم يفرق فيها بين الخاصة وبين الفصل الذي لا يكون إلا للنوع وفاتها الخاصة التي هي خاصة نوع متوسط بالقياس إليه فلم يوردوا الخاصة بما هي خاصة للنوع بل بما هي خاصة لنوع أخير كما لم يوردوا النوع إلا نوعا أخيرا.

بما) ما يحمل على أنواع كثيرة وليس ذلك هو طبيعة الفصل بما هو فصل [فصل 111 om. Da هو 110 لك | om. Y om. et add. in mg. JG | كذلك | a.c. As ذلك فصل [فصل كذلك | add. v Yi فصل فليس | Da وليس [فليس | G فعلم | a.c. J تعلم [وتعلم 112 عت تراعى شيئا [يراعى شيء | om. T | add. No ولم يفتنوا له فليس [راعاه | om. Yi اللهم 113 in mg. As فليس يمكننا et فيمكننا [يمكننا praem. s.l. Nk و [بالقياس | عت فاته [وفاتها | JG لنوع [لنوع 115 S والفصل [وبين الفصل 114 i.l. To إنما E لما هي Yi هي G إنما هي [بما هي | om. Ka خاصة... للنوع 116 C وبالقياس والنوع [النوع 117 G آخر [أخير | om. A خاصة<sup>2</sup> | Lat. [بما هي] «secundum hoc quod» a.c. To

differentia, and only included the differentiae that are predicated of  
 several species, although this is not the nature of the differentia  
 inasmuch as it is a differentia, since not every differentia is in this way,  
 Q59 as it will be explained to you, unless one is concerned with something  
 you will know<sup>4</sup>, but you know that they were not concerned with it nor  
 they were aware of it, so that it is not possible for us to posit it as an  
 excuse for them, unless the First Teacher [himself] was concerned with  
 it. In this division no distinction is made between the proprium and the  
 differentia that belongs to [its] species only, and it also failed to retain  
 115 the proprium that is proprium of an intermediate species in relation to  
 it, and they did not present the proprium inasmuch as it is a proprium  
 for the species, but rather inasmuch as it is a proprium of an ultimate  
 species, as well as they did not present the species but as an ultimate  
 species.

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<sup>4</sup>) In *Ĝadal* I.6, pp. 56.1-57.3; see Commentary.

## [الفصل الحادي عشر]

### فصل في تعقب رسوم النوع

(1.1) فلنتحقق الآن حال الحدود التي هي مشهورة للنوع فنقول: أما النوع بالمعنى الذي لا إضافة فيه إلى الجنس، فقد وفوا حده إذ حدوه بأنه المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد في جواب ما هو؛ وذلك لأن الجنس والعرض العام لا يشاركانه، إذ كل واحد منهما مقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع لا على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد، إذ يجب أن يفهم من قولهم "مقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد" أنه مقول على ذلك فقط؛ لأنك، إن لم تفهم ذلك، لم يكن كونه مقولا على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد مانعا من كونه مقولا على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع، فإنّ المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع قد يكون أيضا مقولا على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد. فإذا علمت أنّ التخصيص بهذا الاسم إنما لما لا يقال إلا كذلك، خرج ما يقال على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع من مفهومه.

فهذا ما يفرق بينه وبين الجنس والعرض العام؛ وقد يفرق أيضا بين النوع والفصول التي تقال على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع؛ مثال هذا الفصل المنقسم بالمتساويين، فإنه فصل الزوج في ظاهر الأمر، وقد يقال على الخط والسطح والجسم في ظاهر الأمر؛ فليس الزوج

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 4.11-12. [هو 5... فقد 4

Mi الفصل الحادي عشر من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق Y الفصل الحادي عشر [فصل 2 om. فيه | S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. الذي 4 BE المشهورة [مشهورة... التي | a.c. Yi الاحمال [حال 3 om. No بالعدد... أنه 8 om. T 7 om. T العام 6 A إذا [إذ | om. No فقد | et add. s.l. N add. et exp. To لأنك إن لم تفهم... من كونه مقولا على كثيرين مختلفين أنه مقول على ذلك فقط [فقط 9 s.l. Nk قوله [كونه 10 Yi قوله [كونه | S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. لم تفهم | praem. a.c. S بل [إن | S om. بالعدد... فإنّ | iter. a.c. Te المقول 11... فإنّ | om. Di<sup>2</sup> مختلفين | in mg. C add. vJNkBETDiSToTeS هو [إنما | JG علم [علمت 12 om. et add. in mg. To مختلفين 11 om. ما 14 JG يخرج [خرج | Te a.c. As لذلك [كذلك 13 s.l. G لا | S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup> لما العام | Lat. [يفرق به =] «per hoc differunt» s.l. To به vDiMiG يفرق به [يفرق | N om. يقال | om. et add. in mg. Yi النوع 15 ε يفرق به [يفرق | TS قد [وقد | ا أيضا om. To هذا... وقد | om. J فإنه | in mg. A المنقسم et المقسم [المنقسم | om. A الفصل 16 om. To هذا om. et add. in mg. Y 17 om. الأمر... في

[I.11]

CHAPTER ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DESCRIPTIONS OF  
SPECIES

**[1. Verification of Porphyry's description of the most special  
species]**

**[1.1. Being "predicated of many items that differ in number"  
distinguishes the species from the genus, the common accident and  
the differentia]**

Now let us verify the state of the commonly-known definitions of the species. We say: concerning the species according to the notion that has no relation to the genus, they have already provided a satisfying definition of it, since they defined it as *predicated of many [items] that differ in number in answer to 'what is it?'*. This because the genus and the common accident do not share it [with the species], since both of them are predicated of many [items] that differ in species, and not of many [items] that differ in number, since, when they say "predicated of many [items] that differ in number", it should be understood that it is predicated of that only, for if you do not understand that [point], the fact that it is predicated of many [items] that differ in number does not prevent it from being predicated of many [items] that differ in species, since what is predicated of many [items] that differ in species might also be predicated of many [items] that differ in number. Since you learned that only what is not predicated in any other way is properly assigned the name of species, what is predicated of many [items] that differ in species is external to its concept. 5 10

Q60 So, this is what distinguishes it from the genus and the common accident, and it might also distinguish between the species and the differentiae that are predicated of many [items] that differ in species. An example of this is the differentia "divisible into two equal halves", for it is, seemingly, the differentia of the even [number]; seemingly, it can [also] be predicated of the line, of the surface and of the solid, 15

وحده منقسماً بمتساويين في ظاهر الأمر فإنه، إذا أضيف إلى العدد الذي هو كالجنس، كان مساوياً للزوج.

ولا يفرق بين النوع والفصل الذي هو خاص بالنوع كالناطق، أعني الذي له مبدأ قوة التمييز، فإن هذا للإنسان وحده. وأما الذي يقال للملك فهو بمعنى آخر ليس يشارك الإنسان الملك فيه؛ ولكن قد يمكن لبعض المتشحطين أن يُخرج من هذا الحد من هذه الجهة وجها يفرق بين النوع والفصل، وذلك الوجه هو أن طبيعة النوع بهذا المعنى تقتضي أن لا يقال إلا على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد، وطبيعة الفصل لا تقتضي ذلك؛ وهو وجه متكلف.

(1.2) لكن قوله ”في جواب ما هو“ يفرق بين الفصل وبينه تفريقاً مطلقاً، ويفرق بين الخاصة وبين النوع أيضاً؛ فإنّ الخاصة لا مدخل لها في جواب ما هو.

The ink vanished in MS S. [وجه متكلف 26]

*in mg.* To ولكن *i.l.* Di فإنه *et* ولكن *s.l.* A ولكن *vJEMiG* ولكن [فإنه | *om.* Lat. الأمر... في 18 «generi» [بالنوع | فصل خاص [خاص | C فرق [يفرق | S فلا [ولا 20 Lat. [ولكن] «sed» [fort. [بالجنس] Lat. 21 *om. et add. in mg.* YiG *om.* Lat. [بمعنى 22 *in mg.* S<sup>2</sup> ولكن *s.l.* S<sup>3</sup> *in mg.* NkC *s.l.* A ولكنه [ولكن | S الآخر [آخر | S يعني [بمعنى 23 *et* ومن [من | *s.l.* C ومن [امن | No المنشحطين *s.l.* As المتشحطين *et* الشخصين [المتشحطين 23 *in mg.* S<sup>2</sup> وجهها يفرق *a.c.* S وجه *vJTDiDaToTeMi* وجه [وجها | *s.l.* Nk من [طبيعة | *om.* Yi هو | JG وبين الفصل [والفصل | *vJMi* فرق [يفرق 24 *s.l.* As *et* وجهها *v* بينه وبين الفصل [وبينه... بين 27 *om.* Nk [إلا | *add. et exp. To* يقتضي [لا 25 No الطبيعة ويفرق بينه وبين الخاصة [أيضا... ويفرق | *om. et add. s.l.* N [يفرق *add. a.c.* No التي [ويفرق 28 *in mg.* S<sup>2</sup> ويفرق بين الخاصة وبين النوع أيضا E ويفرق بين الخاصة والنوع أيضا *in mg.* Nk أيضا Da له [لها 29

The manuscript tradition preserves two concurrent versions of the same clause, a version  $\alpha$  preserved by MSS KaNkBATAsCDaYiYTeNoN (MS E attests this version as well, though with a minor modification), and a version  $\beta$  preserved by MSS JDiTomiŠG. Version  $\beta$  quite evidently aims at avoiding the superfluous repetition of the term “species” (*al-naw*) in version  $\alpha$ : the species was already stressed by a pronoun in the immediately preceding clause, and text  $\alpha$  sounds indeed quite peculiar; hence,  $\beta$  is likely a correction of the first version of the text.

( $\alpha$ ) ويفرق بين الخاصة وبين النوع أيضا

( $\beta$ ) ويفرق بينه وبين الخاصة أيضا

hence, seemingly, not only the even [number] is divisible into two equal halves. In fact, if it is added to “number”, which is like the genus, it corresponds to the even [number].

[On the other hand], it does not distinguish between the species and the differentia that is proper of the species, like “rational” (I mean “that which has the principle of the faculty of discerning”), for this belongs to man only; as to [the “rational”] that is predicated of the angels, it is according to another notion that the man does not share with the angel. It is still possible for some who struggle to extrapolate from this definition under this respect an aspect that distinguishes between the species and the differentia, namely that the nature of the species according to this notion requires that it is only predicated of many [items] that differ in number, whereas the nature of the differentia does not require that, but this is an artificial way [to explain it].

**[1.2. Being predicated “in answer to ‘what is it?’” distinguishes the species from the differentia and the proprium]**

His clause “in answer to ‘what is it?’” distinguishes between the differentia and the species in an absolute manner, and also between the proprium and the species, since the proprium has no possibility to be [predicated] in answer to ‘what is it?’.

30 فهذا الرسم متقن محقق مطابق للمعنى الذي يقال عليه النوع، الذي لا يطابق إلا نوع الأنواع.

(2.1) وأما رسوم النوع بالمعنى الذي فيه الإضافة فذلك عندهم رسمان: أحدهما قولهم إنه المرتب تحت الجنس، والثاني إنه الذي يقال عليه الجنس من طريق ما هو.

35 (2.2) فيجب أن ننظر في حاله فنقول إنه إن عني بالمرتب تحت الجنس ما يكون أخص منه حملا، أي يكون حملا على بعض ما يحمل عليه مما هو تحته، فإنّ الشخص والنوع والفصل والخاصة تشترك جميعها فيه؛ وإن عني بذلك ما كان كليا وحده دون الشخص، فقد عني ما هو خارج عن مقتضى اللفظ، ومع ذلك فإنّ الفصل والنوع والخاصة تشترك فيه. وإن لم يعن بالمرتب هذا، بل عني به ما هو أخص وملاصق لا يتوسط شيء بينهما، وهو ما يتلوه في المرتبة، خرج الشخص ودخل الخاصة والفصل.

٦١ق

30 The ink vanished in MS S. [مطابق... الرسم]

Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, 70.20-71.7; ELIAS, *In Isag.*, 61.22-35; DAVID, *In Isag.*, 144.7-15. 33 [هو... أحدهما] Cf. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 4.9-11; AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 70.1-2; ELIAS, *In Isag.*, p. 61.22-35; DAVID, *In Isag.*, p. 144.7-15; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūṭ*, p. 79.16-17.

Yi om. مطابق | Di i.l. متقن G متقن متحقق J in mg. متقن محقق et متقن [متقن محقق 30 om. Lat. الأنواع | C iter. No الأنواع | E الأنواع [إلا نوع 31 om. T الذي | om. Lat. النوع... مطابق قوله s.l. et قولهم KaNkC أنه قولهم إنه 33 om. Lat.EDA عندهم | a.c. As لذلك E وذلك [فذلك 32 in mg. N om. et add. s.l. إنه المرتب | S قول فرفوربوس إنه C in mg. قولهم λY قوله إنه Nk in mg. يكون 2 | Te om. et add. s.l. T أما 36 om. et add. s.l. C من 34 p.c. As يرتب [المرتب om. N جميعها 38 G تحت جنسه J in mg. تحت جنسه et تحت جنسه [تحت 37 λDiN ما [مما 37 om. N s.l. Nk in الشخصي v الشخصي [الشخص 39 om. N الشخص 39... دون | vG فإن [وإن | Lat. mg. C الفصل والنوع 40 add. a.c. S أي عني بذلك ما كان كليا [اللفظ | om. No هو 41... خارج | mg. C بتوسط [بتوسط | Te om. et add. s.l. هو 41 add. S جميعها [تشترك | Di النوع والفصل هو [وهو | Da منها بينهما [بينهما | NkBETTE بتوسط As بتوسط Di in mg. بتوسط KaDiToEd هو [وهو | Di add. s.l. أيضا JToSḠ add. أيضا [الشخص 42 om. Lat. المرتبة 42... وهو | om. Yi

33 in mg. A أي قول فرفوربوس Nk in mg. يعني فرفوربوس [قولهم 33

This description is ascertained and verified, and corresponds to the notion that is called “species” which only corresponds to the most special species. 30

**[2. Descriptions of the species which is related to the genus]**

**[2.1. Two descriptions of the species related to the genus]**

As to the descriptions of the species according to the relative notion, according to them they are two definitions: the first of the two is their statement “ranged under the genus”, and the second is “that of which the genus is predicated in the ‘what is it?’”.

**[2.2. Verification of the description of the species as *ranged under the genus*]**

It is necessary for us to inquiry into its state, so we say that, if by “ranged under the genus” is meant what is more specific than it in predication, namely that which, among the things that are ranged under the genus, is predicated of a part of that of which it is predicated, then the individual, the species, the differentia and the proprium altogether share it. If by that is meant what was universal alone, to the exclusion of the individual, then something external to the sense of the utterance is meant and, moreover, the differentia, the species and the proprium share it. If by “ranged [under the genus]” it is not meant this, but rather what is more specific and contiguous without anything intermediary between the two, namely what follows it in the arrangement, then the individual has been excluded, but the proprium and the differentia have been included. 35 40

If by “ranged [under the genus]” is meant what is contiguous not just in the arrangement according to [its] generality, but also in the

وإن عني بالمرتب ما كان ملاصقا ليس في ترتيب العموم فقط، بل في ترتيب المعنى أيضا، خرجت الخاصة ودخل الفصل.

وإن عني بالمرتب ما يكون خاصا مدخولا في طبيعته، أعني ما يكون ما فوqه مضمنا في معناه، اختص هذا الرسم بالنوع؛ فإنّ الجنس ليس داخلا في طبيعة الفصل ولا الخاصة، بل هو شيء كالموضوع لهما ليس داخلا فيهما، ونسبته إليهما نسبة الأمر اللّازم الذي لا بد منه، ليس نسبة الداخل في الجوهر، على ما علمت. لكن لفظة "المرتب" ليس تدل على هذا المعنى المحدد بكل هذه الاشتراطات، لا بحسب الوضع الأول ولا بحسب النقل، فليس

[في 44... بل | *add. Ka* بل في ترتيب العموم فقط [فقط | *E* متلاصقا [ملاصقا | *vDiG* فإن [وإن 43 *S* حاصلًا [خاصا 45 *γDaEd* خرج [خرجت 44 *JEDiSToYi* بل وفي *s.l. Y* بل *et* وفي «*in cuius natura est commune*» Lat. [طبيعته... مدخولا | *add. A* أي مقوما لماهيته [مدخولا فاخص [اختص | *om. et add. s.l. Di* يكون 46 *μ* أن *om. et exp. Yi* *0KaNkAY* *om.*<sup>2</sup> ما أمر [الأمر | *praem. Yi* ليس [نسبة | *AS* وليس [ليس 48 *vDi* والخاصة [ولا الخاصة 47 *AS* *E* المترتب [المرتب | *As* لفظ [لفظة 50 *om. et add. p.c. Ka* لكن *om. Nk* نسبة 49 *Di* *Mi* المجرد *EDiToSYi* المحرر *J* المحدود [المحدد | *p.c. E* ليست [ليس | *add. Lat.* «*sub genere*» *ET* فكل [بكل *om. E* الأول 51

<sup>3</sup> *s.l. Nk i.l.* أي مقوما لماهيته [طبيعته... مدخولا 45

arrangement of the notion, then the proprium has been excluded, and the differentia has been included.

If, [then], by “ranged [under the genus]” is meant what is specific [and] in whose nature [something else] is included, namely that in whose notion what is ranged above of it is included, then this description specifically applies to the species. In fact, the genus is not included in the nature of the differentia, nor [in that of] the proprium, being rather something like the subject of both of them, without being included in them, so that its relation to them is that of something concomitant and necessary, and not the relation of something that is included in the substance, as you learned. But the word “ranged” does not signify this notion defined by all those conditions, neither according to the first meaning, nor according to the traditional one, nor



it is mentioned in any passage of the books of the philosophers of this discipline that, if one says: “ranged under” and so on, this notion is meant.

**[2.3. Verification of the description of the species as *that of which its genus is predicated in the ‘what is it?’*]**

As to the second description, it is “that of which its genus is predicated in the ‘what is it?’” – if by “predicated in the ‘what is it?’” is meant what we ourselves ascertained –, then it is necessary to add to it that it is “that of which its genus is predicated in the ‘what is it?’ *being also predicated of something else*”, or to say: “it is that of which its genus is predicated in the ‘what is it?’ not exclusively”, so that this specifically applies to the species. In fact, the genus is not predicated of the differentia in the ‘what is it?’ at all, and analogously in the case

60 بالجنس. وأما إن عني بذلك ما يعنونه، فيكون بينه وبين الفصل  
والخاصة والعرض فرق، ولا يكون بينه وبين الشخص فرق، إلا أن  
نضمن أنه كلي بهذه الصفة؛ وأيضا فإنه لا يكون بينه وبين فصل  
الجنس فرق.

65 (3) والذي حدّ وقال إنّ النوع هو أخص كليين مقولين في جواب ما  
هو، فقد أحسن تحديد النوع، وإنما يتم حسنه بأن يقال إنه الكلي  
الأخص من كليين مقولين في جواب ما هو؛ تعلم ذلك إذا تدرّبت  
بالأصول والمواضع المقررة للحدود.

70 (4.1) فنقول الآن: الجنس منه ما يكون جنسا ولا يصلح أن ينقلب  
باعتبار آخر نوعا، إذ لا يكون فوقه جنس أعم منه؛ ومنه ما يصلح  
أن يكون نوعا باعتبار آخر إذ يكون فوقه جنس أعم منه. وكذلك  
النوع منه ما يكون نوعا ولا يصلح أن ينقلب جنسا، إذ لا يكون  
تحت نوع أخص منه؛ ومنه ما يصلح أن ينقلب جنسا باعتبار آخر،  
إذ يكون تحت نوع أخص منه.

64 AL-FĀRĀBĪ, *Kitāb Īsāgūgī ay al-Madḥal*, p. 120.14-15; Id., *Risāla šudira bihā al-Kitāb*, p. 229.2-4. والنوع 65... والذي 64

64 *Al-Mantiq al-Mūgāz*, p. 157.10-13; *Hidāya*, p. 66.8-9. وللحدود 67... والذي 64

60 *in mg.* يضموا إليه *i.l. et* يضم إليه [نضمن 62 *om.* C إن *om.* Di *s.l.* *et add.* A إن [وأما إن 60  
*om.* No كليين 66... مقولين | *As* حده [حدّ 64 *om.* N وأيضا | *S*<sup>3</sup> *in mg.* يضم إليه *i.l.* Di يضم *Y*  
*om. et add. in mg.* هو 66... فقد | *Lat.* [sic!] «nescivit diffinire speciem» [النوع... فقد 65  
*JNoEd.* مقول [مقولين 66 EG أن [بأن | *JMiŠYiG* جنسه [حسنه | *a.c.* To تحديدا [تحديد | *S*<sup>3</sup>  
[يصلح | *βKaACŞ* إن الجنس [الجنس 68 E المحدودة [للحدود | ع المحدودة المقررة [المقررة 67  
*a.c.* B وما منه [ومنه | *praem.* To ما هو E ما هو [جنس | *om.* Lat. باعتبار آخر 69 *s.l.* *S* يصح  
*add. et exp.* To نوعا [ينقلب | *om.* Nk نوع 72... منه 71 Di فكذاك [وكذلك | G ومنه [منه 70  
دونه [تحتة | Ed. لا يكون [يكون 73 Ka ومنهما [ومنه ما | *exp.* Nk أخص منه | *om.* Lat. تحتة 72  
*i.l.* Di تحتة *et* دونه C *in mg.* Nk *s.l.* دونه *µE*

64 [النوع 65... والذي 64 Noteworthy, the Latin translation renders this reference to Al-Fārābī as a critical one («nescivit diffinire speciem», “he did not know how to define the species”), somehow reversing Avicenna’s attitude in the passage.

Q62 of the proprium and the accident. As to the individual, its quiddity is not completed by the genus. If by that is meant what they mean, there is a difference between it [on the one hand] and the differentia, the proprium and the accident [on the other], whereas there is no difference between it and the individual, unless we imply that it is a universal in this way; nonetheless, there is [still] no difference between it and the differentia of the genus. 60

### [3. Al-Fārābī's alternative description of the species]

He who defined [it] by saying that *the species is the most specific of the two universals predicated in answer to 'what is it?'* has already well defined the species<sup>1</sup>, and the validity of this definition can be perfected only by saying that it is the most specific *universal* of the two universals predicated in answer to 'what is it?'; you will learn that when you practise the principles and the places that are established for the definitions. 65

### [4. Porphyry's tree]

#### [4.1. Introduction to the structure of Porphyry's tree: highest genera, intermediate genera and species and lowest species]

Now let us say: the genus can be what is a genus and is not suitable to turn into a species according to another consideration, since there is no more common genus above it. [Or] it can be what is suitable to be a species according to another consideration, since there is a more common genus above it. Analogously, the species can be what is a species and is not suitable to turn into a genus, since there is no more specific species below it; [or] it can be what is suitable to turn into a genus according to another consideration, since there is a more specific species below it. 70

Thus, three degrees are arranged for the genus: [(i)] a high genus that is never a species; [(ii)] an intermediate genus that is [both] a 75

<sup>1</sup>) Likely Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī; see *Kitāb Īsāgūgī ay al-Madḥal*, p. 120.14-15 and *Risāla ṣudira bihā al-Kitāb*, p. 229.2-4, where the genus is described as the most common of the two predicated in the "what is it?", and the species as the most specific one.

فيرتب للجنس مراتب ثلاث: جنس عال ليس بنوع البتة، وجنس متوسط هو نوع وجنس وتحتة أجناس، وجنس سافل هو نوع وجنس ليس تحتة جنس. وكذلك يكون في باب النوع: نوع سافل ليس تحتة نوع البتة، فليس بجنس البتة، ونوع عال تحت جنس الأجناس الذي ليس بنوع البتة، ونوع متوسط هو نوع وجنس وجنسه نوع.

75

(4.2.1) والمثال المشهور لهذا هو من مقولة الجوهر؛ فإنّ الجوهر جنس لا جنس فوقه، وتحتة الجسم، وتحت الجسم الجسم ذو النفس؛ وتحت الجسم ذي النفس الحيوان، وتحت الحيوان الحيوان الناطق، وتحت الحيوان الناطق الإنسان، وتحت الإنسان زيد وعمرو، فزيد وعمرو وأشكالهما هي الأشخاص.

80

٦٣ق

والجوهر هو جنس الأجناس، إذ ليس فوقه جنس؛ والإنسان هو نوع الأنواع، إذ ليس تحتة نوع، وما بينهما أجناس وأنواع متوسطة، فإنها بالقياس إلى ما تحتها أجناس وبالقياس إلى ما فوقها أنواع؛ فإنّ الجسم نوع الجوهر وجنس للجسم ذي النفس، والجسم ذو النفس نوع الجسم وجنس الحي لأنه يعم النبات والحي؛ والحي نوع الجسم

85

PORPH., Isag., p. 4.21-25. 85 [الأجناس... والجوهر] PORPH., Isag., p. 4.25. | [الحي... الجسم] 88 PORPH., Isag., p. 4.26. | [الأنواع... والإنسان] 86... والإنسان | [المثال] 80 PORPH., Isag., p. 4.26-28. 89 [الناطق... والحي] 90... والحي

E الجنس [للجنس] | Ed. فنرتب «ordinabitur» JTAsCDiMiŠYG فينرتب [فيرتب] 74 [مراتب] [scil. «multis modis»] JG مراتبها G in mg. ٥ مراتب ثلاثة. ٧ مراتب ثلاثا [مراتب ثلاث] Lat. | [وتحتة أجناس] 75 S نوعا [بنوع] | praem. vJEG فيكون [جنس] | [وجنس... 76] نوع | supra quod est aliud genus» Lat. | om. et add. in mg. To<sup>2</sup> | جنس | om. et add. in mg. J | جنس | om. et add. in mg. To<sup>2</sup> | بنوع... 78 وبنس 76 Yi جنس ونوع وليس [فليس] | Yi add. a.c. أجناس [تحتة] 77 om. No نوع | om. JG add. s.l. J في باب To iter. a.c. الجسم | C add. et exp. الجنس [وتحتة] 81 om. E هو 80 DiŠMiŠ in mg. To om. JG add. in mg. J<sup>3</sup> الحيوان 82 No ذي [ذو] | Yi om. et add. in mg. DaNo om. الجسم<sup>3</sup> 83 om. et add. in mg. E<sup>1</sup> الإنسان... وتحت | C om. Ka om. et add. in mg. ٢ الناطق... وتحت 83 B الجنس [الجسم] 88 No بالقياس [وبالقياس] 87 To a.c. الجنس [الجنس] | AsDa om. هو 85 فإنه [لأنه] | vJŠMiG للحي [الحي] | S للجنس [الجسم] 89 E الجسم [للجسم] | A للجوهر [الجوهر] | Di om. E | om. E<sup>2</sup> الجسم | AS للجسم [الجسم] | Di om. E | om. E<sup>2</sup> والحي | Di

species and a genus under which there are [other] genera; [(iii)] a low genus that is [both] a species and a genus under which there is no [other] genus. Analogously in the case of the species: [(iii)] [there is] a low species under which there is no [other] species at all, so that it is never a genus; [(i)] a high species under a most general genus which is never a species; [(ii)] an intermediate species that is [both] a species and a genus and whose genus is a species.

#### [4.2. Porphyry's example: the category of substance]

##### [4.2.1. Exposition of Porphyry's example]

The commonly-known example for this is drawn from the category of substance<sup>2</sup>: *the substance is a genus over which there is no [other] genus, and under which there is the body; under the body there is the animate body; under the animate body there is the animal; under the animal there is the rational animal; under the rational animal there is the man; [finally], under the man there are Zayd and 'Amr. Zayd, 'Amr and the like are the individuals.* 80

Q63

*Substance is the most general genus*<sup>3</sup>, since there is no [other] genus above it; *the man is the most special species*<sup>4</sup>, since there is no [other] species below it, and what is between the two is the intermediate genera and species, for they are genera with respect to what is below, and species with respect to what is above. In fact, *the body is a species of substance and a genus for the animate body; the animate body is a species of the body and a genus of the animal*<sup>5</sup>, for it embraces the 85

<sup>2</sup>) What follows is a quotation of Porphyry's own example in *Isag.*, p. 4.21-25. | <sup>3</sup>) It is a quotation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.25. | <sup>4</sup>) It is a literal quotation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.26 in the Arabic translation by Al-Dimašqī (p. 1065.2). | <sup>5</sup>) It is a quotation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.26-28, with only minimal divergences with respect to the Arabic translation by Al-Dimašqī (p. 1065.2-4).

90 ذي النفس وجنس للحي الناطق لأنه يعم الحيوانات العجم والإنسان؛ والحي الناطق نوع الحي وجنس الإنسان لأنه يعم الإنسان والمملك؛ فيكون الحي الناطق هو الجنس السافل. والجوهر هو الجنس العالي، والجسم وما يليه هو الجنس المتوسط، ويكون الجسم هو النوع العالي، ويكون الإنسان هو النوع السافل، ويكون الجسم ذو النفس وما يليه النوع المتوسط. 95

(4.2.2) ويكون الجوهر بالقياس إلى ما تحته جنس الأجناس والجنس العالي، وبأنه لا يقاس إلى ما فوقه يكون جنسا ليس بنوع، ويكون الإنسان بالقياس إلى ما فوقه نوع الأنواع والنوع السافل، وأما بقياسه إلى ما تحته فهو أنه نوع ليس بجنس، وقياسه إلى ما تحته على وجهين: قياس إلى ما تحته من حيث هو محمول عليها الحمل 100 المعلوم، وقياس إلى ما تحته باعتبار أنها ليست بأنواع. وقياسه إلى ما تحته من حيث الحمل يفيد معنى النوعية غير المضافة إلى الجنس، وهو المعنى الثاني مما ذكر. وأما قياسه بالاعتبار الآخر يفيد أنه نوع ليس بجنس، فهو نوع الأنواع ونوع ليس بجنس، ونوع بالمعنى المذكور.

ومفاهيم هذه الثلاثة، وإن تلازمت، فهي مفاهيم مختلفة. وإذا 105 جُعِل اسم النوع اسما لواحد واحد من هذه المعاني، يكون مقولا على هذه الثلاثة بأشترك الاسم، وتكون حدود مفوماته مختلفة؛ فإن

91 [الإنسان... والحي] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 4.29-30.

om. والإنسان 91 add. E الحي [الحي] | add. et exp. Te والجسم ذو النفس نوع للجسم [النفس] 90 A للحي الناطق γμν للإنسان [الإنسان] | S للحي [الحي] | ζ add. هو Ka والناطق [الناطق] | Yi لا [لا يقاس] 97 Ka أو يكون [ويكون] 96 S للإنسان [الإنسان] 94 om. et add. in mg. G... والجسم 93 Da فيكونا [فيكون] 92 لا [لا يقاس] 97 Ka أو يكون [ويكون] 96 S للإنسان [الإنسان] 94 in mg. No الجنس et الجسم [الجنس] exp. et لا يكون [لا يقاس] 97 Ka أو يكون [ويكون] 96 S للإنسان [الإنسان] 94 in mg. C لا يقاس له ekADaS قياس له om. Lat.G تحته... فهو 99 om. والنوع 98 To om. et add. s.l. جنسا | N لا يقاس له Mi وقياس [وقياسه] | S om. المعلوم 101 om. Lat. المعلوم 101... الحمل 100 add. in mg. G in mg. A ذكره [ذكر] | SYi ما [مما] 103 S بغير S<sup>3</sup> s.l. S<sup>3</sup> ελ غير [غير] | To ومعنى [معنى] 102 a.c. As فهو T فهو [فهو] 105 As يفيد Di فيفيد [يفيد] | Ed. i.l. Di γ ذكره : NkC

in mg. N أي بأنه مقول على كثيرين بالعدد فقط [المذكور...<sup>2</sup>نوع 104

plant and the animal; *the animal is a species of the animate body and a genus for the rational animal*<sup>6</sup>, for it embraces [both] the irrational animals and the man; *the rational animal is a species of the animal and a genus of the man*<sup>7</sup>, for it embraces [both] the man and the angel, so that the rational animal is the low genus, and substance is the high one, whereas the body and what follows it are [instances of] the intermediate genus. The body is the high species, and the man is the low one; the animate body and what follows it are [instances of] the intermediate species. 95

**[4.2.2. Analysis of Porphyry's example in the light of what was stated in the introduction to the presentation of Porphyry's tree]**

Substance is the most general genus and the high genus with respect to what is under it and, in virtue of the fact that it is not in relation with anything above it, it is a genus that is not a species. The man is the most special species and the low one with respect to what is above it; as to its relation to what is under it, it is a species that is not a genus; its relation to what is under it, [on the other hand], is under two respects: a relation to the items under it inasmuch as it is predicated of them in the known way, and a relation to the items under it considering that they are not species. Its relation to what is under it according to the predication is provided by the notion of speciality that is not relative to the genus, namely the second notion that was mentioned. As to its relation according to the other consideration, it is provided by the fact that it is a species that is not a genus, namely a most special species, a species that is not a genus and a species according to the aforementioned notion. 100

Q64 Even if the concepts of these three [conditions] necessarily follow the one to the other, they are nonetheless different concepts. If the name of "species" is posited as a name for each one of these notions, it is predicated of these three [conditions] by homonymy, and the definitions of its concepts are different. If, [on the other hand], it is 105

<sup>6</sup>) It is a quotation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.28-29, with only minimal divergences with respect to the Arabic translation by Al-Dimašqī (p. 1065.4). | <sup>7</sup>) It is a literal quotation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.29-30 in the Arabic translation by Al-Dimašqī (p. 1065.4-5).



posited as a name for one of them only, that statement that belongs to that one is a definition for it, and the statement that belongs to the other is a description that is not the concept of the name [itself], but rather a sign concomitant to it. 110

As under the most special species there are universal subjects, even if they are not species, like the writer, the sailor and the Turk under the man, analogously it is not impossible that above the most general genus there are predicates that are not genera, but rather concomitant notions that some of the most general genera can share, like existence and accidentality, and like [other] things that are predicated of a number of high genera upon which you will reflect later. 115

#### **[4.3. Criticism of Porphyry's example]**

As to this division that was presented for the substance and that reached the man, it is not correct, even if it does not affect the attempt at understanding the purpose that is aimed at; this because, since the animate body includes the plants together with the animals, it does not include the angels unless by homonymy, so that the animate body is not a genus in which the angels are included. Similarly, when "rational" is said of [both] the man and the angel, it is only by homonymy, since the "rational" that is a constitutive differentia for the man is not predicated of the angels. Since it is so, the rational animal is not a genus for the man and the angels, and the animate body is not a 120

والحيوانات؛ فإذا كان كذلك، لم يكن إدخال الميت فصلا يقسم  
الحيوان الناطق إلى إنسان وغير إنسان محتاجا إليه.

125

Di محتاج *et* يحتاج JG محتاج [محتاجا 125 Yi ليقسم [يقسم | § فصلاني [فصلا | § وإذا [فإذا 124

*i.l.* Y أي جعل الميت فصل للإنسان [فصلا... لم 124

manuscripts of the Latin translation attest both the concurrent renderings in the main text.

genus for the plants, for the angels and the animals. If it is so, there is no need to introduce “mortal” as a differentia that divides the rational animal into man and not-man. 125

## [الفصل الثاني عشر]

٦٥

### فصل في الطبيعي والعقلي والمنطقي وما قبل الكثرة وفي الكثرة وبعد الكثرة من هذه المعاني الخمسة

(1.1) إنه قد جرت العادة في تفهم هذه الخمسة أن يقال إنَّ منها طبيعيا ومنها منطقيا ومنها عقليا؛ وربما قيل إنَّ منها ما هو قبل الكثرة ومنها ما هو في الكثرة ومنها ما هو بعد الكثرة. وجرت العادة بأن يُجعل البحث عن ذلك متصلا بالبحث عن أمر الجنس والنوع وإن كان ذلك عاما للكليات الخمس، فنقول متشبهين بمن سلف إنَّ كلَّ واحد من الأمور التي تأتي أمثلة لإحدى هذه الخمسة هو في نفسه شيء، وفي أنه جنس أو نوع أو فصل أو خاصة أو عرض عام شيء.

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Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, pp. 41.10-42.26; *ibid.* pp. 68.25-69.11; ELIAS, *In Isag.*, p. 48.15-30; DAVID, *In Isag.*, p. 113.11-29; Ps.-ELIAS (DAVID), *In Isag.*, pp. 68.28-69.21; ARETHAS, *Scholia in Porph. Isag.*, p. 21.14-29; YAḤYÀ IBN 'ADĪ, *Maqāla fī tabyīn wuḡūd al-umūr al-'ammīyya*, p. 154.17-20.

Mi الفصل الثاني عشر من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق Y الفصل الثاني عشر [فصل 2 in mg. G ومع To مع JDIMiŠG ومع s.l. Y مع [وبعد 3 To om. et add. in mg. To om. et add. in mg. NkC «et cum» [ومع] Lat. | om. et add. s.l. N | من om. الخمسة... من s.l. T ما هو طبيعيا B mg. Nk εAsEd. s.l. ما هو طبيعي α طبيعيا 5 S<sup>2</sup> η s.l. μv تفهم 4 S<sup>2</sup> s.l. ما هو εκEd. s.l. Nk mg. B ما هو منطقي [αT<sup>1</sup> منطقيا | et praem. s.l. Te | هو طبيعي S<sup>2</sup> | S<sup>2</sup> ما هو Yi ما عقلي T ما هو عقليا B mg. Nk κYEd. s.l. ما هو عقلي α عقليا | S<sup>2</sup> 2ومنها... إما | om. et add. in mg. G | 3الكثرة... 1ومنها | om. Lat. | 2الكثرة... 1ومنها 6 Nk ومنها om. et add. in mg. To | om. A | بعد [cum] [scil. مع] Lat. 7 om. et add. in mg. To | لكل واحد من [إحدى 9 om. et add. s.l. Nk ذلك 8 om. N والنوع | S في<sup>1</sup> عن | S<sup>3</sup> add. et exp. Yi فنقول إن الحيوان في نفسه : Y الخمس [الخمسة | E لهذه [إحدى هذه S<sup>3</sup>

The manuscript tradition provides two substantially equivalent versions of this passage, namely a version α, attested by MSS KaNkBAECDaNoN, and a version β, attested by MSS JAsDiToMiŠTeYYiG and printed in the Cairo edition; MS T has a text that might be affected by a process of contamination. Version β is perhaps plainer, and perfectly parallels the structure of the following clause (articulated in a sequence of *minhā mā huwa...*); version α, on the contrary, has a less perspicuous syntax, which has, however, Avicennian parallels (cf. e.g. *Madḥal* I.3, §2.2, l. 34). Version α, compared to version β, seems to be a *lectio difficilior*, of which β could be a sort of correction; for this reason, version α is here printed as the main text.

(α) إن منها طبيعيا ومنها منطقيا ومنها عقليا

(β) إن منها ما هو طبيعي ومنها ما هو منطقي ومنها ما هو عقلي

[I.12]

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**CHAPTER ON WHAT IS NATURAL, INTELLECTUAL AND LOGICAL,  
AND ON WHAT IS BEFORE, IN AND AFTER MULTIPLICITY AMONG  
THESE FIVE NOTIONS**

**[1. Distinction between the thing itself and its being universal,  
particular, genus, species and so on]**

**[1.1. Premise on the traditional tripartitions into logical,  
natural, intellectual and before, in and after multiplicity]**

It became customary, when trying to understand these five [notions], to say that among them there is [something] natural, [something] logical and [something] intellectual; sometimes it was said that among them there is what is before the multiplicity, what is in the multiplicity and what is after it. It [also] became customary to posit the inquiry into that in connection with the inquiry into the genus and the species, even if that is common to the five universals, so we say, imitating our predecessors, that each of the things that are provided as examples for one of these five [notions] is, in itself, something, and in its being a genus, or a species, or a differentia, or a proprium, or a common accident is something [else].

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(1.2) ولنجعل مثال ذلك من الجنس فنقول إنّ الحيوان في نفسه  
 معنى، سواء كان موجودا في الأعيان أو متصوّرا في النفس، وليس  
 في نفسه بعام ولا خاص؛ ولو كان في نفسه عاما حتى كانت  
 الحيوانية، لأنها حيوانية، عامة لوجب أن لا يكون حيوان شخصي،  
 بل كان كل حيوان عاما؛ ولو كان الحيوان، لأنه حيوان، شخصا  
 أيضا لما كان يجوز أن يكون إلا شخصا واحدا، ذلك الشخص الذي  
 تقتضيه الحيوانية، وكان لا يجوز أن يكون شخص آخر حيوانا؛ بل  
 الحيوان في نفسه شيء يُتصور في الذهن حيوانا، وبحسب تصوره  
 حيوانا لا يكون إلا حيوانا فقط؛ فإن تُصوّر معه أنه عام وخاص  
 وغير ذلك، فقد تصور معه معنى زائد على أنه حيوان يعرض  
 للحيوانية؛ فإنّ الحيوانية لا تصير شخصا مشارا إليه إلا بمقارنة أمر  
 يجعله مشارا إليه؛ وكذلك في العقل لا يكون كذلك إلا بأن يُلحق به  
 العقل معنى يخصه، ثم لا يعرض له من خارج أن يكون عاما حتى  
 يكون ذات واحدة بالحقيقة هي حيوان، وقد عرض له في الأعيان  
 الخارجة أن كان هو بعينه موجودا في كثيرين؛ وأما في الذهن فقد  
 يعرض لهذه الصورة الحيوانية المعقولة أن تجعل لها نسب إلى أمور

31... وكذلك 23 Cf. ALEX. APHR., *Quaestio IIa*, p. 254.13-17. [للحيوانية 22... فإن 20  
 Cf. YAHYÀ IBN 'ADÌ, *Al-Risāla al-sābi'a*, p. 171.6-11. [للحيوانية

12 ولنجعل 14... خاص [خاص 14... ولنجعل 12  
 18... بل 18 [إليه 23... بل 18 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt V.1*, p. 196.6-13.

No نفس [نفسه 14 A ليس [وليس | N الأذهان [النفس | add. N في نفسه [كان 13 om. To إن 12  
 بل 16 s.l. Nk شخصا [شخصي | JG وجب [لوجب | om. et add. in mg. To لأنها حيوانية 15  
 s.l. §<sup>2</sup> شخصا Da§ شخصا [شخصيا | TTe للحيوان [الحيوان | om. No s.l. § كل | E وكان [كان  
 As فكان [وكان | om. et add. s.l. Te تقتضيه 18 in mg. Yi شخصا et الأشخاص [الأشخاص | لا شخصا 17  
 To iter. a.c. معه 21... أنه 20 om. E في الذهن | om. TAs om. et add. in mg. §<sup>3</sup> شيء 19  
 فإنّ 22 T زائدا [زائد | add. No حيوانا [تصور | μ أو غير [وغير 21 πJ أو خاص [وخاص  
 يجعلها [يجعله 23 To مقارنة JG لمقارنة [بمقارنة | KaBEY للحيوانية [الحيوانية | iter. A  
 To om. et add. in mg. في العقل | a.c. J كذلك [وكذلك | add. et exp. E إلا بمقارنة [إليه | §  
 iter. a.c. يكون | κ بأن in mg. Y أن et أنه [أن | Ed. الخارج [خارج 24 § بها [به | Ka أن [بأن  
 وقد... في كثيرين التي في الخارج وأما في om. et في الذهن 26... وقد | JG قد [وقد | Y وهي [هي 25 As  
 موجودة [موجودا | s.l. §<sup>3</sup> هي بعينها [ inv. هو بعينه | Nk يكون [كان 26 add. in mg. Di الذهن  
 praem. in mg. To اما في الخارج [الذهن... وأما | §<sup>3</sup> add. in mg. §<sup>3</sup> مختلفين [كثيرين | s.l. §<sup>3</sup>  
 § نسبة C بسبب [نسب | EC om. Yi الصور [الصورة 27

**[1.2. Argument for the claim that a notion is in itself neither universal nor particular]**

Let us provide an example of that from [the case of] the genus, and say that “animal” is, in itself, a [certain] notion, regardless to whether it exists in the individuals or is conceptualized in the soul, without being in itself neither common nor specific. If it were in itself common, so that animality, since it is animality, were common, then, necessarily, no individual animal would exist, but every animal would be common; if, [on the other hand], the animal were, since it is an animal, individual as well, then there would not possibly exist more than just one individual, [namely] that individual that animality requires, and it would not be possible for [any] other individual to be an animal. The animal in itself is rather something conceptualized in mind as an animal, and in virtue of its conceptualization as an animal is nothing else but an animal. If, besides this, the fact that it is common, specific etc. is conceptualized, then [another] notion that occurs to animality is conceptualized together with it, in addition to the fact that it is an animal. In fact, animality does not become a designated individual unless something that makes it designated is associated [to it]. Analogously, it is not so in the intellect, unless if the intellect attaches to it a notion that specifies it; then, it does not happen to it externally to be common, so that it is a unique true essence that is the animal, even though it occurred to it in the external individuals to exist it itself in many [items]. It can happen in mind that [several] relations to many items are ascribed to this form of the conceived animality, so that that single [notion] in itself is correctly related to

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كثيرة، فيكون ذلك الواحد بعينه صحيح النسبة إلى عدّة تتشاكل فيه، بأن يحمّله العقل على واحد واحد منها - فأما كيف ذلك فلصناعة أخرى - فيكون هذا العارض هو العموم الذي يعرض للحيوانية، فيكون الحيوان لهذا العموم كالخشب مثلاً لعارض يعرض له من شكل أو غيره، وكالثوب للأبيض، فيكون الثوب في نفسه معنى، والأبيض معنى، ويتركبان فيكون هناك معنى آخر مركبا منهما؛ كذلك الحيوان هو في العقل معنى، وأنه عام أو جنس معنى، وأنه حيوان جنسي معنى. 30 35

(2.1) فيسمون معنى الجنس جنسا منطقيا ومفهوماً أنه المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع في جواب ما هو من غير أن يشار إلى شيء هو حيوان أو غير ذلك، مثل أن الأبيض في نفسه له معقول لا يحتاج معه أن يعقل أنه ثوب وأنه خشب، فإذا عُقل معه ذلك، عُقل شيء يلحقه الأبيض؛ وكذلك الواحد في نفسه له معقول، فأما أنه إنسان أو صخرة فهو أمر خارج عن معقوله يلحقه أنه واحد. فالجنس المنطقي هو هذا. 40

36 Cf. ARIST., *Top.* I.5, p. 102a31-35; PORPH., *Isag.*, 2.14-17. [هو...37... فيسمون 36  
Cf. ARETHAS, *Scholias in Porph. Isag.*, p. 37.28-36. [طبيعي...55... فيسمون

36 [هذا...42... فيسمون 36] *Ta 'Iqāt*, p. 61.1-5.

om. et add. in الحيوان 31 G in mg. J i.l. add. p om. العموم 31... الذي 30 G وأما [فأما 29  
Ed. vpEd. الأبيض للأبيض | ToŠ شكله [شكل 32 E العارض [لعارض | E مثل [مثلا | Ka mg.  
E مثلاً [هناك | Te om. et add. s.l. معنى 33 Lat. [الأبيض] «(sic pannus) albus»  
[أو | Di فإنه [أوأنه | No om. To a.c. ومعنى [معنى | Ka a.c. في نفسه [في | As لذلك [كذلك 34  
s.l. أنه et أن [أنه | E a.c. ومفهوم [ومفهوماً 36 JG جنس in mg. Y جنس [جنسي 35 § معنى وأنه  
om. امعه 39 om. Lat. معقول 40... لا 38 Lat. «exprimat vel designet» [يشار إلى 37 C  
له [أنه | S<sup>2</sup> exp. TeTŠ add. معه [يعقل | ATōY إلى أن [أن | Y in mg. معه أن يعقل εTAs  
فإنه [فهو | SEd. شجرة [صخرة 41 C in mg. Nk s.l. أما JG أما [فأما 40 § أو أنه [وأنه | Da  
add. a.c. To الواحد [الجنس 42 π

several [items] that resemble each other with regard to it since the intellect predicates it of each one of them; as to how this happens, this pertains to another discipline<sup>1</sup>. This accidental feature is the fact of being common that occurs to the animality, in a way that the animal is for this fact of being common like, for instance, wood for an accidental feature concerning the shape or something else that occurs to it, and like the dress for “white”: the dress in itself is a notion, whereas “white” is [another] notion, and when the two are combined, another notion results, composed by both. Analogously, “animal” is a notion in the intellect, and the fact that it is common or a genus is a notion, whereas the fact that it is a generic animal is [another] notion. 30 35

## **[2. Logical, natural and intellectual genus]**

### **[2.1. Traditional definition of the “logical genus”]**

They call the notion of the genus “logical genus”, and its concept is that it is what is predicated of many [items] that differ in species in answer to ‘what is it?’, without pointing at anything that is an animal or something else, like the fact that “white” has, in itself, a concept with which it is not necessary to understand that it is a dress and that it is a [piece of] wood; if that is understood together with it, something else to which “white” attaches is understood. Analogously, “one” in itself has a concept; as to the fact that it is a man or a rock, this is something external to its concept to which “one” attaches. That is it with regard to the logical genus. 40

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<sup>1</sup>) I.e. Psychology; cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* V.2, p. 209.4-6, referring on the same subject to the *Kitāb al-Nafs*.

(2.2) وأما الطبيعي فهو الحيوان بما هو حيوان الذي يصلح أن يجعل للمعقول منه النسبة التي للجنسية، فإنه إذا حصل في الذهن معقولا، صلح أن تعقل له الجنسية، ولا يصلح لما يفرض متصورا من زيد هذا ولا للمتصور من الإنسان، فتكون طبيعة الحيوانية الموجودة في الأعيان تفارق بهذا العارض طبيعة الإنسانية وطبيعة زيد، إذ هو بحيث إذا تصور صلح أن يلحقه عموم بهذه الصفة التي هي الجنسية؛ وليس له خارجا إلا الصلوح لها بحال. فقولهم "الجنس الطبيعي" يعنون به الشيء الطبيعي الذي يصلح أن يصير في الذهن جنسا، وليس هو في الطبيعيات بجنس، ولأنه يخالف في الوجود غيره من الأمور الطبيعية بهذا المعنى، فلا يبعد أن يخص لهذا المعنى باسم، وأن يجعل ذلك الاسم من اسم الشيء الذي يعرض له

43 Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 119.7-9. [طبيعي 55... وأما 43

50 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.1, p. 61.5-6. *Ta 'līqāt*, p. 61.5-6. [طبيعي 55... وأما 43 204.16-17.

[الجنسية 45 *s.l.* حصل § جعل [حصل | E المعقول [للمعقول 44 *et in mg.* E لأن [أن 43 [للمتصور | *om. ζp exp. S<sup>2</sup>* هذا 46 E يعرض [يفرض | *praem. in mg. As* نسبة *et* بالجنسية As بالحيوانية [الحيوانية | TTe طبيعته [طبيعة | Ed. إنسان [الإنسان | *s.l. S<sup>2</sup>* للمتصور γ المتصور [بهذه | § يلحقها [يلحقه | § هي [هو] 48 *om. N* زيد 48... وطبيعة | To الموجودة [الموجودة 47 *JYiG* «(universalitas) scilicet quae est generalitas» الذي هو [هي 49... التي | *om. Lat.* بهذه الصفة | Ka لهذه *add.* خارجا : Ka للجنسية [الجنسية 49 Y التي هي هو. Lat. [العموم] الذي هو] «*est generalitas*» لها | No الصلح وحينئذ [الصلوح | *add. a.c. To* له DiMi *om.* خارجا | SMi لها [له | DiMi أي الشيء الذي يسمى جنسا طبيعيا وهو ما يصلح أن يصير في [بحال | κ لهذه الحال T لهذا الحال [بحال الذهن جنسا منطقيًا ليس هو في الطبيعيات بجنس أي بجنس هو ذاتا واحدة موجودة في الطبيعيات توجد في *om. et* الطبيعي 50 Di وقولهم [فقولهم | *add. E* أشخاص فيكون جنسا لها بل لا وجود لها إلا في الذهن [يخالط. *scil.*] «*admiscetur*» [يخالف 51 Da في الذهن أن يصير [الذهن... أن | *add. in mg. Yi* ولا [وأن 53 As هذا [لهذا | *om. et add. in mg. G* فلا | G لهذا [بهذا 52 Lat. A

الحيوان الطبيعي إنما هو كذلك من حيث هو ذلك الموجود في الكثرة والمنطقي هو [للجنسية 44... وأما 43 [...] كذلك من حيث هو منسوب إلى الكثرة والعقلي هو كذلك من حيث هو معقول بنفسه غير موجود في الكثرة من حيث الحيوان الطبيعي إنما هو كذلك من حيث هو ذلك الموجود في الكثرة والمنطقي هو كذلك *in mg. A* هو منسوب إلى الكثرة والعقلي هو كذلك من حيث هو معقول بنفسه غير موجود في الكثرة وغير منسوب إلى أي الشيء الذي يسمى جنسا طبيعيا وهو ما يصلح أن يصير في [جنسا 51... فقولهم 49 *in mg. N* الكثرة الذهن جنسا منطقيًا ليس هو في الطبيعيات بجنس أي بجنس هو ذاتا واحدة موجودة في الطبيعيات توجد في *in mg. Y* أشخاص فيكون جنسا لها بل لا وجود لها إلا في الذهن

### [2.2. Traditional definition of the “natural genus”]

As to the natural [genus], it is the animal insofar as it is an animal whose concept can be posited in relation to generality, since, if it is realized as understood in mind, generality can be conceived as belonging to it, whereas it cannot [be conceived as belonging] to what is determined as conceptualized from this [particular] Zayd, nor to the conceptualization of man, so that the nature of animality that exists in the individuals is distinguished by this accidental feature from the nature of humanity and from that of Zayd, since it is such that, when it is conceptualized, a universality of this sort, namely generality, can attach to it, but externally it is only apt [to the fact that] it [attaches to it] in a certain state. When they say: “natural genus”, they mean the natural thing that is apt to become a genus in mind, without being so in natural items. Since in existence it distinguishes itself from the rest of the natural items by this notion, it is not impossible to assign a name to this notion, and to posit that name from that of the thing that occurs to

بجال وهو الجنسية. وأما الحيوان الجنسي في العقل فهو المعقول من جنس طبيعي.

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(2.3) وأما الجنسية المعقولة المجردة، فمن حيث هي مقررة في العقل هي أيضا جنس معقول، ولكن من حيث أنها شيء من الأشياء يبحث عنه المنطقي، فهو جنس منطقي؛ وليس وإن لم يكن لهذا الذي هو منطقي وجود إلا في العقل، يجب أن يكون المفهوم من أنه عقلي هو المفهوم من أنه منطقي؛

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[١] وذلك أنّ المعنى الذي يفهم من أنه عقلي هو غير المفهوم من أنه منطقي،  
[٢] وذلك أنّ المعنى الذي يفهم من أنه عقلي لازم ومقارن للمعنى الذي يفهم من أنه منطقي ليس هو هو،

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المجرد [المجردة 56] add. Lat. «scilicet compositum» : κ طبيعة [طبيعي 55] A هو [وهو 54] فهي [فهو 58] CTō in mg. مفردة s.l. Nk مفردة JDi مفردة in mg. مقررة et مفردة [مقررة No | κ om. يجب 59] G et add. in mg. om. منطقي 60... وليس | S<sup>2</sup> s.l. S<sup>2</sup> فهي G in mg. et مفردة في Y في εNkACDa om. منطقي 63... وذلك 61 S<sup>3</sup> add. in mg. غير [هو 60] om. et غير 62 S المفهوم الذي يفهم [الذي يفهم | κ لأن أنّ] S a.c. KaBE in mg. Nk : habent S المفهوم الذي يفهم S<sup>3</sup> المفهوم [الذي يفهم 64] Ka add. s.l. Ed. المفهوم الذي يفهم S<sup>3</sup> المفهوم [الذي يفهم 66] من s.l. J منه Da om. κENo S وليس C om. ليس 67 S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. i.l.

The Cairo ed. (p. 67.11-14) prints the two paragraphs that are here put in parallel columns as a continuous text, as in MSS KaBETAsTe. However, the rest of the manuscript tradition does not preserve, to my knowledge, paragraph 1; moreover, it can be observed that the two paragraphs are identical for the initial part, then vary in the final part (paragraph 2, preserved by the whole manuscript tradition, seems to be more rich in information and precise than paragraph 1). Although the possibility exists that the omission of par. 1 in almost all the manuscripts is due to an accident of transmission, one can still wonder whether the two paragraphs attest two alternative variants of the same passage, one of which almost entirely replaced the other in the manuscript tradition (i.e. par. 2, preserved by all the manuscripts, replaced par. 1, only preserved in MSS KaBETAsTe together with par. 2). In the frame of such a hypothesis, MSS KaBETAsTe might attest a phase in which the two variants coexisted in an exemplar (likely one in the text and the other in the margin); the variant that was meant to replace the one in the text was, then, mistaken for an addition and simply included in the text together with the original one. It is worth asking whether par. 2 might have originated from the need to expand a bit the explanation provided in par. 1, and should very likely be a variant anterior to all the manuscript tradition, since all the manuscripts attest par. 2.

it in a certain state, namely generality. As to the generic animal in the intellect, it is the concept [drawn] from the natural genus.

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**[2.3. Distinction of the logical genus, which has an intellectual existence, and the intellectual genus]**

The abstracted generality that is conceived, inasmuch as it is established in the intellect, is a conceived genus as well; but inasmuch as it is one of the things that the logician researches, it is a logical genus. Although this [genus] that is logical only exists in the intellect, what is understood from the fact that it is intellectual must not necessarily coincide with what is understood from the fact that it is logical.

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[1] This because the notion that is understood from the fact that it is intellectual is different from what is understood from the fact that it is logical,

[2] This because the notion that is understood from the fact that it is intellectual is concomitant and associated to the notion that is understood from the fact that it is logical without being the same,



since it has already become clear to you the divergence of the way of considering these two.

**[2.4. The way the logical and the natural genus are predicated of their subjects]**

**[2.4.1. The logical genus is not synonymously predicated of its subjects' species]**

Under the logical genus there are two things: first, its species, inasmuch as it is a genus; secondly, the species of its subjects to which it occurs. As to its own species, the absolute genus is more common than a high and a low genus, and provides to each of the genera that are established under it its definition and name, since it is said of each one of them that it is a genus, and [each one of them] is defined by the definition of the genus. As to the species of its subjects, [on the contrary], it does not provide them with its name and definition, because one does not predicate of man, which is a species of animal, since it is an animal, besides the animality also the generality that occurred to the animality, neither by name nor by definition. In fact, it is not necessary for man to be a genus because animality is predicated of it, neither by name nor by definition, as it must, [on the contrary], necessarily be a body by name and definition, since animality is predicated of it. Hence, if any of the species is a genus, this [occurs] to it not because of the nature of its genus above it, but rather because of the things that are [ranged] below it.

**[2.4.2. The natural genus is synonymously predicated of its subjects, but not inasmuch as it is a genus]**

The natural genus provides what is under it with its name and definition inasmuch as it is a nature, namely inasmuch as the genus that is, for instance, animal is animal not because it is a natural genus,

85 أن يصير جنسا من حيث هو كذلك، فإنه ليس يجب هذا لما تحته. وبالجملة إذا قالوا إن الجنس الطبيعي يعطي ما تحته اسمه وحدّه فهذا أيضا قول غير محقق، فإنه يعطي بالعرض، لأنه ليس يعطي من حيث هو جنس طبيعي، كما لم يعط أيضا من حيث هو جنس منطقي، ولكن إنما يعطيها الطبيعة الموضوعة لأن يكون جنسا طبيعيا؛ وهذه الطبيعة بنفسها أيضا ليست جنسا طبيعيا كما ليست جنسا منطقيا، اللهم إلا أن لا يعنى بالجنس الطبيعي إلا مجرد الطبيعة 90 الموضوعة للجنسية، ولا يعنى بالجنس الطبيعي ما عيناه، فحينئذ يصلح أن يقال إن الجنس الطبيعي يعطي ما تحته اسمه وحدّه، وحينئذ لا يكون الحيوان جنسا طبيعيا إلا لأنه حيوان فقط. ثم انظر أنه هل يستقيم هذا؟

95 (2.5) وأما العقلي ففيه أيضا موضوع وجنسية وتركيب، وحكم جميع ذلك في العقل كحكم الطبيعي.

(2.6) والأخرى أن تكون الحيوانية في نفسها تسمى صورة طبيعية تارة، وصورة عقلية أخرى، ولا تكون في أنها حيوانية جنسا بوجه من الوجوه لا في العقل ولا خارجا، بل إنما تصير جنسا إذا قرُن بها

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95 Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, pp. 68.25-69.11. [الطبيعي 96... وأما 95

98 [أخرى... وصورة 98] *al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.1, p. 205.5-6.

84 *om. et add. in mg. Yi* | ليس *om. Yi* | هو *om. E* | كذلك... من *om. et add. in mg. Yi* | أن 84  
 85 *om. et add. in mg. Te* | ليس *Da* | محفوظ [محقق 86] *om. E* | إن *T* | بالجملة [وبالجملة 85  
 [يعطيها *add. Mi* | ذلك [ولكن 88] جهة أنه [2] حيث هو *om. Da* | أيضا 87 *om. Yi* | يعطي  
*p.c. J* | لا *om. T* | إلا 90 *inv. t* | بنفسها أيضا *om. Yi* | طبيعيا 89 *ηθvJATDiToŠG* | يعطيها  
 نحن [عيناه *Ed.* | نعني [يعني 91] *No* | لا [2] | *Ed.* | نعني [يعني *om. Yi* | *ETe om. Yi* |  
*J* | اسم [اسمه *add. et exp. Yi* | ما [الطبيعي *iter. Y* | أن 92 *a.c. E* | وحينئذ [فحينئذ *add. v* |  
*TTe* | حكم [كحكم 96] *s.l. Š<sup>3</sup>* | فتركت [وتركيب 95] *inv.* | أنه هل *om. Ka* | أنه 94 *As* | أنه [لأنه 93  
 به *s.l. Y* | بها *add. JDİŠToYG* | عنه [خارجا 99] *T a.c. Te* | الأخرى [والأخرى 97  
 DiYi

أي فإنه (أي ذاته N) ليس هذا المعنى مما يوجد به كل واحد واحد من الحيوانات الجزئية التي [تحته... فإنه 84  
*in mg. NkN* تحت الحيوان الكلي

i.e. a notion that is apt, when conceptualized, to become a genus inasmuch as it is so, for this is not necessary for what is under it. Generally speaking, if they say that the natural genus provides what is under it with its name and definition, this is as well an unverified statement, since it provides [its subjects with its name and definition] by accident, for it does not do so inasmuch as it is a natural genus, as well as it did not do so inasmuch as it was a logical genus, but only the nature that is apt to become a natural genus provided [its subjects] with both [its name and definition], but this nature in itself is not a natural genus, as well as it is not a logical genus, unless one means by “natural genus” only the abstract nature that is apt to generality, without meaning by “natural genus” what we meant; in that case, it is suitable to say that the natural genus provides what is under it with its name and definition, and animal is a natural genus just because it is an animal. Examine if this is correct.

### **[2.5. Intellectual genus]**

As to the intellectual [genus], it has a subject, a generality and a composition as well, and the status of the complex of that in the intellect is like the status of the natural one.

### **[2.6. Avicenna’s shift to a different terminology]**

The most appropriate would be calling animality in itself now “natural form”, and now “intellectual form”, but, in its being animality, in no way it is a genus, neither in the intellect nor in external reality. Rather, it only becomes a genus when a [certain] consideration is

100 اعتبار، إما في العقل وإما من خارج، وقد أشرنا إلى الاعتبارين جميعا.

(3.1) لكن الشيء الذي هو طبيعة الجنس المعقول قد يكون على وجهين: فإنه ربما كان معقولا أولا ثم حصل في الأعيان، وحصل في الكثرة الخارجة، كمن يعقل أولا شيئا من الأمور الصناعية ثم يحصله مصنوعا؛ وربما كان حاصلًا أولا في الأعيان ثم يصور في العقل، كمن رأى أشخاص الناس واستثبت الصورة الإنسانية. 105

(3.2) وبالجملة ربما كانت الصورة المعقولة سببا بوجه ما لحصول الصورة الموجودة في الأعيان، وربما كانت الصورة الموجودة في الأعيان سببا بوجه ما للصورة المعقولة، أي يكون إنما حصلت في العقل بعد أن كانت قد حصلت في الأعيان. ولأن جميع الأمور الموجودة فإن نسبتها إلى الله والملائكة نسبة المصنوعات التي عندنا إلى النفس الصانعة، فيكون ما هو في علم الله والملائكة من حقيقة 110

*Ta 'līqāt*, pp. 39.7-40.2; *ibid.* pp. 50.10-52.2; *ibid.* p. 55.6-11. وبالجملة 107

في الخارج: J p.c. E في خارج [من خارج | Yi أو وإما | om. N إما A اعتبارا ما [اعتبار إما 100 أولا شيئا | Yi om. et add. s.l. Yi يعقل 104 om. الجنس π فقد [وقد | KaMiEd. in mg. To يحصلها J بحصول [يحصله | inv. E om. et add. om. ηEd. أولاً | E مصنوعة [مصنوعا 105 E يحصلها J بحصول [يحصله | s.l. To Yi add. in mg. Nk عرض له أن [رأى... 106 كمن | om. G كمن | Yi يتصور [يصور | s.l. To Yi Lat. [كمن عرض له أن رأى] «sicut cum alicui contingit videre» εBŞEd. كمن عرض له أن رأى [الحصول | om. ρ بوجه ما 107 a.c. Ş الصور [الصورة | JŞToMiYi فاستثبت [واستثبت 106 om. بوجه ما 109 Lat. [الصور] «formas» To الصور JŞG الصور [الصورة 108 A بحصول يكون [حصلت | E أيضا [إنما | C أن [أي | S<sup>3</sup> E in mg. S<sup>3</sup> add. E بوجه من الوجوه [المعقولة | EŞ om. et add. s.l. E إلى 111 om. et add. s.l. E قد | om. No الأعيان... بعد 110 praem. S<sup>3</sup> 112... نسبة | v وإلى الملائكة [والملائكة | Di add. سبحانه وتعالى vJDaToŞG add. تعالى [الله DiMi add. تعالى [الله | Di من [في 112 om. et add. in mg. To والملائكة

The manuscript tradition provides two more or less equivalent versions of this passage, namely a version i and a version ii, which is also the one printed in the Cairo edition. Both versions fit well in the text, so that two possible interpretations exist: either α is to be considered a simplification of β (which could be *lectio difficilior*), or β is to be seen as a refinement of α (which is *lectio brevior*). Since, however, the witnesses of version (ii) belong almost all to one and the same family, i.e. family ε, there is a chance that version (ii) reflects an innovation of the tradition rather than Avicenna's own wording.

(i) كمن رأى

(ii) كمن عرض له أن رأى

associated to it, in the intellect or externally; we have already provided an indication of the two considerations together.

**[3. The nature considered as before, in and after multiplicity]**

**[3.1. A nature can either be conceived at first and then realized in the individuals or be realized in the individuals and then conceived]**

But the thing that is the nature of the conceived genus can be in two ways: sometimes it is conceived firstly, and then it is realized in the individuals and in the external multiplicity, like [in the case of] he who firstly conceives one of the artefacts and then realizes it as [his own] product. Sometimes, it is in the condition of being realized in the individuals firstly, and then it is conceptualized in the intellect, like [in the case of] he who sees the human individuals and ascertained the form of humanity.

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**[3.2. A nature can exist in God's knowledge before multiplicity, then in the individuals in multiplicity, then in human conception after multiplicity]**

In general, sometimes the conceived form is a cause, under a [certain] respect, of the realization of the form that exists in the individuals, whereas sometimes the form that exists in the individuals is a cause, under a [certain] respect, of the conceived form, i.e. [the form] is only realized in the intellect after that it has already been realized in the individuals. [This] because the relation of the complex of the existing things to God and the angels is the same as that of the artefacts we have to [their] producer himself, so that the truth of what

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المعلوم والمدرک من الأمور الطبيعية موجودا قبل الكثرة، وكل معقول  
 منها معنى واحد، ثم يحصل لهذه المعاني الوجود الذي في الكثرة،  
 فيحصل في الكثرة ولا يتحد فيها بوجه من الوجوه، إذ ليس في 115  
 خارج الأعيان شيء واحد عام، بل تفريق فقط؛ ثم تحصل مرة  
 أخرى بعد الحصول في الكثرة معقولة عندنا. وأما أن كونها قبل الكثرة  
 على أي جهة هو، أعلى أنها معلومة ذات واحدة تتكرر بها أو لا  
 تتكرر، أو على أنها مثل قائمة، فليس بحثنا هذا بواف به، فإن لذلك  
 نظرا علميا آخر. 120

٧٠ ق (4) واعلم أن ما قلناه في الجنس هو مثال لك في النوع والفصل  
 والخاصة والعرض، يهديك سبيل الإحاطة بعقليته ومنطقيته  
 وطبيعته، وما في الكثرة منه وقبلها وبعدها.

(5.1) واعلم أن الأمور التي هي في الطبيعة أجناس الأجناس، فهي  
 فوق واحدة ومتناهية، كما سيتضح لك بعد. وأما الأمور التي هي 125  
 أنواع الأنواع، فالمستحفظات منها في الطبيعة متناهية، وأما هي في  
 أنفسها فغير متناهية بالقوة، فإن أنواع أنواع كثير من المقولات التي

*al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.2, p. 208.4-7. أو... أو 119 [تتكثر 119... أو 119] قائمة... أو 119 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt* VII.2, pp. 207.13-208.4. ذات 118 *al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.2, pp. 310.10-311.8.

As ويكون كل E كل [وكل | ζ add. ما : δKa موجودة [موجودا 113  
*om. et add. in mg. To* 115 *add. معقولة عندنا وأما إن كونها [الكثرة | Ka om. et add. in mg. Ka* فيحصل... فيحصل  
 «discretio et dispersio» Lat. 118 *praem. et exp. Y* و [جهة 118 J تفرق [تفريق 116 *et exp. Yi*  
*om. أنها | S<sup>2</sup> exp. S* بها [تتكثر 119 *om. J* بها | Da على [أعلى | Nk *in mg. Nk* جهة *et وجه*  
 N ذلك [لذلك | E إن [فإن | To *s.l. به | As [sic] بجشنى [بحثنا | S<sup>3</sup> s.l. S<sup>3</sup>*  
*p.c. S* بعقليتها [بعقليته | S *add. العام Di om. et add. s.l. Di* والعرض 122  
*om. J om. et add. s.l. N* منه | S وطبيعتها *om. et add. in mg. To* وطبيعته 123 S ومنطقيتها  
 Ka هو [فهي | Nk *add. s.l. Nk* هي [الطبيعة | Di *om. et add. s.l. Di* هي 124 S منها  
 وهي [ومتناهية | G *add. J add. in mg. G* في الطبيعة Sζζ واحد [واحدة | κ قول [فوق 125 δζ  
 Nk والأمور [وأما الأمور | S *add. هذا om. et add. in mg. To* بعد | Da متناهية  
 في القوة [بالقوة 127 S<sup>3</sup> *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* في 2 هي | A *om. et add. s.l. J* هي | T *add. منها*  
 2أنواع | Ed. في القوة [بالقوة 127 S<sup>3</sup> *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* في 2 هي | A *om. et add. s.l. J* هي | T *add. منها*  
 YNoEd. كثيرة [كثير | J الأنواع

*i.l. Te* الفلسفة الأولى [آخر... نظرا 120

is known and acquired of the natural things that is in the knowledge of God and the angels exists before the multiplicity, and everything is conceived of them is a unique notion; then, the existence in the multiplicity is realized for these notions, and it is realized without forming a unity in the multiplicity in any way, since there is not anything unique [and] common outside the individuals, but rather just distinction. Then [these notions] are realized again, after their realization in the multiplicity, as conceived by us. As to [the question] how they are before the multiplicity, whether as concepts of a unique essence that is multiplied or not, or as subsistent models<sup>2</sup>, our research is not adequate for it, since there is another scientific inquiry for that<sup>3</sup>. 115 120

**[4. Conclusive extension of the considerations made so far to all the five notions]**

Q70 Know that what we said about genus provides you with an example with regard to species, differentia, proprium and accident [too] that guides you along the path of the comprehension of its being intellectual, logical and natural, and what of it is in the multiplicity, before and after it.

**[5. Genera, species and individuals]**

**[5.1. Finiteness or infiniteness of the most general genera, the most specific species and the individuals]**

Know that the things that are most general genera in nature are more than one but finite, as it will be clarified to you later on<sup>4</sup>. As to the things that are most special species, those that are preserved in nature are finite, but them themselves are infinite in potentiality, since 125

<sup>2</sup>) I.e. as Platonic Ideas; cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* VII.2, pp. 310.10-311.8. | <sup>3</sup>) I.e. Metaphysics; Avicenna exposes his view of the essence that is multiplied or not in individuals in *Ilāhiyyāt* V.2 and deals with Platonic Ideas and their refutation in *Ilāhiyyāt* VII.2-3.

<sup>4</sup>) I.e. in *Maqūlāt* II.5.

تأنيك بعد لا تتناهى، كأنواع أنواع الكمية والكيفية والوضع وغير ذلك. وأما الأشخاص فإنها غير متناهية بحسب التكون والتقدم والتأخر. وأما المحسوس المحصور منها في زمان محدود فمتناه ضرورة. 130

(5.2.1) والشخص إنما يصير شخصا بأن تقترن بطبيعة النوع خواص عرضية لازمة وغير لازمة وتتعين لها مادة مشار إليها، ولا يمكن أن تقترن بالنوع خواص معقولة كم كانت وليس فيها آخر الأمر إشارة إلى معنى متشخص فيتقوم به الشخص في العقل؛ فإنك لو قلت: "زيد هو الطويل، الكاتب، الوسيم، الكذا والكذا" وم شئت من الأوصاف، فإنه لا يتعين لك في العقل شخصية زيد، بل يجوز أن يكون المعنى الذي يجتمع من جملة ذلك لأكثر من واحد، بل إنما يعينه الوجود والإشارة إلى معنى شخصي، كما تقول إنه ابن فلان، الموجود في وقت فلان، الطويل، الفيلسوف، ثم يكون اتفق أن لم يكن في ذلك الوقت مشارك له في هذه الصفات، ويكون قد سبق لك المعرفة أيضا بهذا الاتفاق، ويكون ذلك بالإدراك الذي ينحو نحو ما يشار إليه من الحس، نحو ما يشار إلى فلان بعينه وزمان بعينه، 135 140

فإنها 129 *om. As* والكيفية | *As* الممية والكمية [الكمية] | *add. in mg. E* أنواع *om. et* أنواع 128 *add. et exp.* ما [مادة] | *s.l. Nk* لها *et* إليها [لها] 132 ع فالشخص [والشخص] 131 *As* فغير [غير] *C* لشخص *Da* فيتشخص *KaTAsSNo* مشخص [متشخص] 134 *J* فلا [ولا] | *S* يشار [مشار] | *E* *vJDiG* الذهن [العقل] | *om. et add. in mg. To* الأوصاف 136  $\beta$  الذهن [العقل] |  $\text{S}^3$  فيقوم [فيتقوم] *T* وما يكون [ويكون] | *S^3* *praem. in mg.* جميع [هذه] 140 *JG* قد اتفق [اتفق] 139 *om. κ* جملة 137 [الحس] 142 *J* الإدراك [بالإدراك] | *inv. ε* المعرفة أيضا 141 *om. C* قد | *C* وقد يكون *a.c. Te* *add. in mg.* فلان [وزمان] |  $\pi$  نفسه [بعينه] | *i.l. Di* الحس *et* الجنس  $\lambda$  *JG* الجنس *in mg. Y* الجنس *MiS* نفسه *add. in mg. To* نفسه *om. et* بعينه | *Lat.* «*hora tertia*» [وزمان بعينه] |  $\text{S}^3$

134 Branch  $\beta$  of the tradition attests a reading: *al-dihn* alternative to the reading of branch  $\alpha$ : *al-'aql*. The correction in  $\beta$  was supposedly made in order to correct Avicenna's use of *'aql*, which is employed in the context almost interchangeably with *dihn*. The fact that Avicenna speaks of an individual notion in the intellect might have led to the correction, since the term *'aql*, if understood in a narrow sense, specifically refers to the faculty that deals with universal and abstract notions (cf. *Mubāḥaṭāt* 283-284 on the senses of the term *'aql*). However, *'aql* is in all likelihood correct, since the passage deals with a composition of notions that properly occurs in the intellect.

the most special species of many categories – which will be introduced to you later – are not finite, like the most special species of quantity, quality, position and so on. As to the individuals, they are infinite with regard to generation, anteriority and posteriority; what is collected by sense perception of them in a limited time is, [on the other hand], necessarily finite. 130

## **[5.2. Digression on what being individual means]**

### **[5.2.1. The process of individualization]**

The individual only becomes an individual when you associate to the nature of the species some accidental properties, be they necessarily concomitant or not, and you individuate for it a designated matter. It is not possible for you to associate to the species no matter how many conceived properties without ending up having, among them, an indication of an individualized notion by means of which the individual is constituted in the intellect. In fact, if you said: “Zayd is the tall one, the writer, the good-looking one, the so-and-so” and as many attributes as you wish, the individuality of Zayd is not individuated for you in the intellect, on the contrary, the notion that is collected from the complex of all of this necessarily belongs to more than one [item only]; only the existence and the designation of an individual notion individuate it, as you say that he is the son of Fulān, living at the time of Fulān, the tall one, the philosopher, then it has turned out that, at that time, there was no one sharing with him these attributes, and you have already become acquainted with this fact by means of the acquisition that is like what the sense perception designates, like when Fulān in himself and a time in itself are 135 140

فهناك تتحقق شخصية زيد، ويكون هذا القول دالا على شخصيته. ٧١ق  
وأما طبيعة النوع وحده، فما لم يلحقه أمر زائد عليه لا يجوز أن تقع فيه كثرة. 145

(5.2.2) وليس قولنا لزيد وعمرو إنه شخص اسما بالاشتراك، كما يظنه أكثرهم، إلا أن نعني بالشخص شخصا بعينه؛ وأما الشخص مطلقا، فهو يدل على معنى واحد عام، فإننا إذا قلنا لزيد إنه شخص، لم نرد بذلك أنه زيد، بل أردنا أنه بحيث لا يصح إيقاع الشركة في مفهومه؛ وهذا المعنى يشاركه فيه غيره؛ فالشخصية من الأحوال التي تعرض للطبائع الموضوعة للجنسية والنوعية، كما تعرض لها الجنسية والنوعية. 150

(5.2.3) والفرق بين الإنسان الذي هو النوع، وبين شخص الإنسان الذي يعم، لا بالاسم فقط، بل بالقول أيضا، أن قولنا "الإنسان" معناه أنه حيوان ناطق، وقولنا "إنسان شخصي" هو هذه الطبيعة مأخوذة مع عرض يعرض لهذه الطبيعة عند مقارنتها للمادة المشار إليها، وهو كقولنا "إنسان واحد" أي "حيوان ناطق مخصص"، فيكون الحيوان الناطق أعم من هذا، إذ الحيوان الناطق قد يكون نوعا، وقد يكون شخصا، أي هذا الواحد المذكور فإنّ النوع حيوان ناطق، كما أنّ الحيوان الناطق الشخصي حيوان ناطق. 155  
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Cf. YAHYÀ IBN 'ADÌ, *Maqāla fī tabayyūn anna al-šaḥṣ ism muštarak*, pp. 208-211; Id., *Al-Risāla al-sābi'a*, p. 168.13-170.13; IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Isāgūgī*, pp. 107.17-108.12. 146

143 As فيكون [ويكون] om. Lat. | شخصية [شخصيته] Ka النوع 144 | om. Lat. | القول | As فيكون [ويكون] 143  
Di فقد [فهو] 148 T الشخص [بالشخص] | Da يظن [يظنه] 147 κ ولعمرو [وعمرو] 146 To [?] فلا [إشراكه] Yi الكثرة [الشركة] | As أنواع [إيقاع] | om. To أنه<sup>2</sup> 149 add. et exp. Yi لم [إذا] كما تعرض لها [والنوعية] 152 om. J لها | S للطبيعة [للطبائع] 151 in mg. C To يشارك [يشارك] om. et add. in mg. To الذي 154... هو 153 om. et add. in mg. To  
add. إن [قولنا] | To p.c.? فإن [إن] | in mg. Di لا يعم Y لا يعم [يعم] 154 Yi نوع [النوع] عند 156 om. E هو | add. Da إنه [وقولنا] 155 add. Lat. «qui est species» [الإنسان] | JMi مع om. نوعا 159... إذ | om. et add. s.l. To الحيوان 158 Da الإنسان [إنسان] 157 E مع E والشخص [الشخصي] 160 T وقد [قد] | J in mg. p add. om. قد...<sup>2</sup> الحيوان

Q71 designated; there the individuality of Zayd is ascertained, and this statement signifies his individuality. As to the nature of the species alone, as far as nothing else in addition attaches to it, it is not possible that multiplicity occurs in it. 145

**[5.2.2. Avicenna’s position of the issue of the equivocity of the term “individual”]**

Our saying of [both] Zayd and ‘Amr that they are ‘individual’ is not an equivocal name, as the majority of them believes<sup>5</sup>, unless we mean by ‘individual’ an individual in itself; as to ‘individual’ in the absolute sense, it signifies a unique common notion, since when we say of Zayd that he is an individual, we do not mean by this that he is Zayd, but rather we mean that he is in such a manner that it is impossible [for anything else] to share his concept, and something else shares with it this very notion, so that individuality is among the states that happen to the natures that are subjects for generality and speciality, as generality and speciality occur to them. 150

**[5.2.3. Distinction between the ultimate species and the individual]**

The man that is a species and the individual of man that is common do not differ in the name only, but also in the [definitory] statement, for when we say “man”, it means that it is a rational animal, whereas when we say “individual man”, it is that nature assumed together with an accident that occurs to it when it is associated to the designated matter, as when we say: “a singular man” or “a specific rational animal”, and the rational animal is more common than this, since the rational animal can be a species and an individual, namely this aforementioned singular. In fact, the species is “rational animal”, as the individual rational animal is a rational animal. 155 160

<sup>5</sup>) The critical reference might address the Peripatetics of Baghdad; more in particular, Yahyà Ibn ‘Adī affirmed the equivocity of the term “individual” at least in two of his treatises, one of which specifically devoted to this problem (*Maqāla fī tabayyun anna al-šahṣ ism muštarak*, pp. 208-211; Id., *Al-Risāla al-sābi‘a*, p. 168.13-170.13), and Ibn al-Ṭayyib as well briefly deals with this subject in a passage of his commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (*Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī*, pp. 107.17-108.12).

(5.3) والعموم قد يختلف في الأمور العامة: فمن العموم ما يكون بحسب الموضوعات الجزئية، كالعموم الذي الحيوان أعم به من الإنسان، وقد يكون بحسب الاعتبارات اللاحقة كالعموم الذي الحيوان أعم به من الحيوان وهو مأخوذ جنسا، ومن الحيوان وهو مأخوذ نوعا، ومن الحيوان وهو مأخوذ شخصا. 165

(5.4) وليست الجنسية والنوعية والشخصية من الموضوعات الجزئية التي لها درجة واحدة في الترتيب تحت الحيوان، بل هي اعتبارات تلحقه وتخصه؛ وكما أن الإنسان قد يؤخذ مع عرض من الأعراض كالإنسان الضحاك، فيقال على جميع ما يقال عليه الإنسان وحده من الجزئيات الموضوعة، كذلك الإنسان الشخصي؛ وذلك لأن الوحدة هي من اللوازم التي تلزم الأشياء - وسنبين أنها ليست مقومة لماهياتها - فإذا اقترنت الوحدة بالإنسانية على الوجه المذكور حدث منها الإنسان الشخصي الذي يشترك فيه كل شخص، ولا يكون لذلك نوعا، لأنه مجموع طبيعة وعارض لها لازم غير مقوم، وأمثال هذه ليست تكوّن أنواعا، كما أنّ الإنسان مع الضحاك ومع 170 175

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كالعموم الذي vJDi\$To\$G كما أن [كالعموم الذي 162 om. EAs 163 om. به | E كما أن [كالعموم الذي 162 iter. ومن الحيوان | add. Mi كما أن الحيوان أعم من الحيوان EDi الإنسان<sup>2</sup>] الحيوان | om. No من [والشخصية | a.c. S والشخصية والنوعية [والنوعية والشخصية 166 om. et add. s.l. Nk هو | N «accipitur» KaNk بوحده [يؤخذ 168 om. E هي 167 om. Yi من | add. v من الحيوان وهو كذلك... كالإنسان 169 om. No الأعراض 169... من | BADiNoEd. يوجد [يؤخذ i.e.] KaTe لذلك [كذلك 170 iter. No فيقال | A الضحاك [الضحك | om. et add. in mg. Y الواحد [الوحدة 172 J اللازم [اللوازم | om. JCG هي 171 a.c. Y كالإنسان [الإنسان «homo singularis vel individuum» Lat. [الإنسان الشخصي 173 om. Lat. المذكور... على «vel non comitanti vel comitanti» Lat. [لازم | Di لهذا [لها | om. No وعارض | T الطبيعة [طبيعة 174 om. No قابل 176... ليست | ToMi هذا [هذه | TTe أمثال [أمثال 175 Lat. أمثال [أمثال 175 Lat. المذكور... على om. et add. in mg. Nk

Two competing versions are attested for this clause, one repeating the same construction proposed slightly before ( $\alpha$ ), and the other with a different, easier construction ( $\beta$ ), very likely the one attested by the Latin translation as well («sicut hoc quod animal est communius quam animal»); finally, a contaminated version is preserved in MS Mi, which merges  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ :

( $\alpha$ ) كالعموم الذي الحيوان أعم به من الحيوان  
( $\beta$ ) كما أن الحيوان أعم من الحيوان

### [5.3. Digression on what being common means]

Being common can differ in common things: it can be being common with respect to the particular subjects, like the being common in virtue of which the animal is more common than the man; sometimes, it can be with respect to the ways in which [something] is considered attaching [to that something], like the being common in virtue of which the animal is more common than the animal when it is assumed as a genus, [more common] than the animal assumed as a species, and [more common] than the animal assumed as an individual.

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### [5.4. Generality, speciality and individuality are considerations that attach to natures]

Generality, speciality and individuality are not particular subjects that have a unique degree in the arrangement under the animal, but rather considerations that attach to it and specify it. This is like the fact that the man can be assumed together with a certain accident, like “man capable of laughing”, so that this is predicated of all the particulars that are a subject of predication of “man” alone; analogously [in the case of] the individual man. This because unity is one of the concomitants that necessarily accompany the things – and we will clarify that they are not constitutive for their quiddities –, so that, if unity is associated to humanity in the said way, the individual man that each individual share results from the two, without being a species for that reason<sup>6</sup>, since it is the combination of a nature and an accidental feature of it that is concomitant and not constitutive, and similar things do not originate [other] species, like “man” together

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<sup>6</sup>) I.e. because it is shared by individuals.

البكاء ومع المتحرك والساكن، بل مع قابل الملاحظة وغير ذلك، لا  
يكون نوعاً آخر، بل الإنسان بجوهره نوع، فتلحقه لواحق تكون  
تلك اللواحق لواحق النوع وليست أموراً توجب النوعية الجديدة.  
وهذا مما تتحققه في الفلسفة الأولى.

*Di om. et add.* فنكون [تكون |  $\zeta$  وتلحقه [فتلحقه |  $\zeta$  *om.* آخر 177  $\kappa$  *om.* يكون 177... لا 176  
*i.l. N* 178 *A om. N* أمور [أمورا |  $\xi$ Da ليست [وليست | Yi النسب [النوع | G ذلك [تلك  
تتحققه  $\zeta$  ستحققه G ستحفظه [تتحققه 179 *om. TAs* الجديدة | *exp. p.c. E iter. No* فوجودية [توجب  
*om. No* في الفلسفة | As

with “capable of laughing”, “capable of crying”, “moving”, “being at rest”, or with “capable of acquiring the art of sailing” etcetera, do not originate another species, but “man” in its substance is a species to which some attachments, which are attachments of the species, and not things that affirm a new speciality, attach; this is part of what you will ascertain in the First Philosophy.

## [الفصل الثالث عشر]

### فصل في الفصل

(1.1) وأما الفصل فإنَّ اسمه يُدلّ به عند المنطقيين على معنى أول وعلى معنى ثانٍ وليس سبيلها سبيل ما قبلها في الجنس والنوع، إذ كان الوضع الأول فيه إنما هو للجمهور والنقل للخواص، بل المنطقيون أنفسهم يستعملونه وعلى وضع أول وعلى نقل. أما الوضع الأول فإنهم كانوا يسمون كل معنى يتميز به شيء عن شيء - شخصيا كان أو كليا - فصلا، ثم نقلوه بعد ذلك إلى ما يتميز به الشيء في ذاته. وإذا فعلوا هذا، فقد كان لهم أن يجعلوا الفصل مقولا على أشياء ثلاثة بحسب التقديم والتأخير حتى كان من الفصل ما هو عام ومنه ما هو خاص ومنه ما هو خاص الخاص.

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(1.2) فالفصل العام هو الذي يجوز أن ينفصل به شيء عن غيره ثم يعود فينفصل به ذلك الغير عنه، ويجوز أن ينفصل الشيء به عن نفسه بحسب وقتين؛ مثال ذلك العوارض المفارقة كالقيام والعود، فإنَّ زيدا قد ينفصل عن عمرو بأنه قاعد وعمرو ليس بقاعد، ثم كرة أخرى ينفصل عنه عمرو بأنه قاعد وأنَّ زيدا ليس بقاعد، فيكون هذا

15

PORPH., Isag., p. 8.8-12. ...فالفصل 12 PORPH., Isag., p. 8.8. ...الخاص 11... فقد 9

Mi الفصل الثالث عشر من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق Y الفصل الثالث عشر [فصل 2 λKaNkDa إن [فإنَّ | Y فأما الفصل s.l. Nk وأما الفصل λKaNkCda om. وأما الفصل 3 om. به | § عند المنطقيين يدل [المنطقيين... يُدلّ | Di add. et exp. E عليه add. et exp. TTe om. et سبيل | E سبيلها [سبيلها | Yi om. et add. in mg. Da ومعنى [و على معنى 4 JG من [في | «sicut» Lat. εDa مثلها [ما قبلها | C To om. add. in mg. في الجنس Nk ES في [فيه | G iter. a.c. الأول 5 No إذا [إذ | § النوع والجنس §λKaNkDa om. إنما هو | Ka لما BDaEd. om. إنما | § AEed. om. فيها «generis» Lat. εDa في [الأول 7 No praem. a.c. هذا [نقل | λKaNkCdiSYi على [أو على | No praem. أن [أنفسهم 6 فإنهم كانوا يسمون كل [فصلا 8 s.l. Nk in mg. C JG شخصا [شخصيا | Yi add. in mg. G أو praem. A أو om. E... ثم | A praem. أو Nk add. et exp. أو G add. et exp. معنى يتميز به الشيء مطلقا فإنهم كانوا يسمون كل معنى يتميز به [فعلوا | vETDa وإذا [وإذ 9 om. E به | G add. in mg. et add. om. et add. الفصل | Mi يجعل [يجعلوا | v om. E وقد [فقد | J add. et exp. J الشيء مطلقا وإذ فعلوا Da om. A add. شيء [عن | Yi om. et add. s.l. هو | Ed. والفصل [الفصل 12 §λKaNkDa in mg. §³ om. Y به | Yi inv. الشيء به | Nk om. et add. s.l. add. Y به [ينفصل 13 om. A بقاعد 18... فيكون 16 om. Ka ثم | Nk om. بقاعد 16... وعمرو 15 om. A المفارقة 14

[I.13]

## CHAPTER ON THE DIFFERENTIA

**[1. Tripartition of differentia into “common”, “proper” and “most proper”]****[1.1. Premise on the general and the specific meaning of “differentia”]**

As to the differentia, the logicians signify by its name a first and a second notion that are not like what [was said] before with regard to the genus and the species, since the first conventional use of [the terms] “genus” and “species” belonged to common people, and [their] adaptation [to another use] was accomplished by the élite, whereas [in the case of the term “differentia”] the logicians themselves employ the term both in [its] first conventional use and in [its] adapted use. As to the first conventional use, they used to call every notion in virtue of which something is distinguished from something [else] – be it individual or universal – “differentia”; then, after this, they adapted the term to that in virtue of which the thing is distinguished essentially. Since they did this, they had to consider the differentia as predicated of three things, according to priority and posteriority, so that it was part of the [notion of] differentia what is common, what is proper and what is mostly proper.

**[1.2. The common differentia]**

The common differentia is that in virtue of which it is possible for something to be differentiated from the rest and vice versa, so that the rest differs from it in virtue of that differentia, and it is possible for the thing to be differentiated from itself in two [different] moments. An example of that are separable accidents like “standing” and “sitting”, since Zayd can be differentiated from ‘Amr because he is sitting when ‘Amr is not; then, again, ‘Amr is differentiated from him because he is

الانفصال بالقوة مشتركا بينهما. وكذلك زيد ينفصل عن نفسه في وقتين بأن يكون مرة قاعدا ومرة ليس بقاعد؛ فهذا هو الفصل العام.

(1.3.1) وأما الفصل الخاص فذلك هو المحمول اللازم من العرضيات، فإنه إذا وقع الانفصال بعرض غير مفارق للمنفصل به، فإنه لا يزال انفصالا خاصا له، مثل انفصال الإنسان عن الفرس بأنه بايدي البشرية، فإن هذا الانفصال الواقع به خاص للإنسان بالقياس إلى الفرس، ولا يقع به مرة أخرى انفصال الفرس عن الإنسان؛ وذلك لأنه لا يخلو إما أن لا يجوز البتة أن تعرض هذه الصفة للفرس وإما أن يجوز؛ فإن لم يجوز أن تعرض له البتة، لم يجوز إلا أن يكون هذا الانفصال بينهما قائما؛ وإن جاز أن يعرض مثلا ذلك للفرس - لو جاز - لم يكن للفرس به انفصال عن الإنسان بل مشاركة؛ فهذا إذا فصل، لم يفصل إلا أحد الشئيين دون الآخر.

(1.3.2) فمنه ما لا يزال فاصلا مثل المثل الذي ضربناه وهو الخاصة، ومنه ما يخص فصله إذا فصل وليس لا يزال فاصلا، مثل السواد الذي ينفصل به الزنجي عن إنسان آخر، فإنّ الزنجي لا يفارقه السواد وذلك الإنسان يجوز أن يسود، فحينئذ لا يكون بينهما انفصال بالسواد؛ فحيث كان السواد فاصلا كان خاصا بالحبشي، وحيث لم يخص لم يكن فاصلا.

19 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 8.12-15. [الإنسان 23... وأما 19

العام [الخاص 19 C فهنا [فهذا 18 *add. a.c. To* ليس *i.l. Di* الانفصال *et* الفصل [الانفصال 17 *Da om. vDi* ليس له [له 21 *Ka* لعرض [بعرض 20 *No* المجهول [المحمول | *a.c. Di* الخاص *om.* به 23 *A* الإنسان [للإنسان | *A* يخص  $\mu$  خاصة [خاص | *No* البشر [البشرة 22 *om. Yi* انفصال له |  $\varepsilon$  أو يجوز [يجوز... وإما 25 *s.l. JTe* لا<sup>2</sup> | *DiS* أنه [لأنه 24  $\pi ADi$  للفرس [الفرس<sup>2</sup> | *As* ذلك | *inv. Di* مثلا ذلك | *om. S* مثلا | *A* فإن [وإن 26 *om. A* لا | *om. Yi* يجوز | *om. As* [يكن 27 *To* *om. et add. in mg.*  $\rho SMiS$  *om.* جاز... لو | *Yi* الفرس [للفرس | *om. TAs* *v* يشاركه [مشاركة | *A* إنسان [الإنسان | *No* للفراس [للفرس | *add. s.l. Nk in mg. C* حينئذ موضوعه [fort. «*subiecti sui*»] فصله 30 *Yi* المثال [المثال | *om. E* ما 29 *JMiS* لأحد [أحد 28 *vJDiToSG* خاصيا [خاصا 33 *om. Yi* الإنسان 32 *To*<sup>2</sup> *om. et add. i.l.* آخر 31 *Lat.* [وحيث *No* ومن حيث *om. et add. s.l. As* حيث [وحيث

sitting when Zayd is not, so that this differentiation between them is shared in potentiality. Analogously, Zayd is differentiated from himself in two [different] moments, since once he is sitting, and once he is not. So, this is the common differentia.

### **[1.3. The proper differentia]**

#### **[1.3.1. Description of the proper differentia]**

The proper differentia is the concomitant predicable among the accidental ones. If the differentiation occurs in virtue of an inseparable accident that belongs to what is differentiated by means of it, it does not cease to be a differentiation that specifically belongs to it, like the differentiation of man from horse because man has his skin showing. In fact, this differentiation that occurs in virtue of it is proper of the man with respect to the horse, since the horse is not differentiated another time by means of it from the man; this because, inevitably, it is either completely impossible that this attribute occurs to the horse, or it is possible. If it is completely impossible that it occurs to it, it is impossible, unless this differentiation between the two is [already] subsisting; if it is possible that, for instance, this occurs to the horse – if it were possible – then, the horse would not be differentiated from the man in virtue of it, but they would share a feature. So, if this differentiates, it only differentiates one of the two things and not the other.

#### **[1.3.2. Propria and common accidents are proper differentiae]**

It can be such that it does not cease to differentiate like the examples we mentioned, i.e. the proprium; or it can be what specifically belongs to its differentia when it differentiates, though without continuously differentiating [it], like blackness, by means of which the black man is differentiated from another man: blackness cannot be separated from the black man, but that [other] man can become black, so that, in that case, there is no differentiation between the two. When blackness is a differentia, it is proper to the Abyssinian, and when it is not proper, it is not a differentia.

35 (1.3.3) وأما العام فلم يكن هكذا، بل كان هو بعينه تارة يفصل هذا عن ذاك وتارة يفصل ذاك عن هذا، فالفصل العام وهذا القسم من الخاص قد يصلح أن تنفصل بهما أشخاص نوع واحد. وأما القسم الأول من قسمي الفصل الخاص فإنه لا تنفصل به أشخاص نوع واحد بعضها عن بعض، إذ كان لازما لطبيعة النوع؛ ولو كان عارضا لبعض الأشخاص لم يمتنع أن يعرض مثله لأشخاص آخر، فيبطل دوام الانفصال به، اللهم إلا أن يكون من جملة ما يعرض لما يعرض له في ابتداء الوجود، كما للناس في ابتداء الولادة، ولا يجوز أن يعرض بعد ذلك. فيجوز أن يكون في هذا الفصل ما إذا فصل عن شخص موجود استحال أن لا يفصل البتة، إذ كان ذلك الشخص بعد وجوده قد فاته ابتداء الوجود، فيكون هذا أيضا مما يقع به الفصل بين أشخاص النوع.

50 (1.4) وأما الفصل الذي يقال له خاص الخاص فإنه الفصل المقوم للنوع، وهو الذي إذا اقترن بطبيعة الجنس قومه نوعا، وبعد ذلك يلزمه ما يلزمه ويعرض له ما يعرض له، فهو ذاتي لطبيعة الجنس المقوم في الوجود نوعا، وهو يقررها ويفرزها ويعينها، وهذا كالنطق للإنسان.

47...وأما 51] PORPH., Isag., p. 8.15-17.

add. فصلا G. *praem. in mg.* فصلا J. *praem.* فصلا : Lat. [هكذا «íta» Ed. هذا [هكذا 35 μYi والفصل [الفصل | εNo ذلك [ذاك | vJDiG ذلك [ذاك 36 om. No كان | ToMi لازم | JDIMiŠG من [عن 39 Nk الآخر [الأول 38 Yi *iter.* واحد... 39 وأما | εE به [بهما 37 om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup> 40 أخرى [آخر 41 εEDa p.c. § v فيه [به 42 om. JEDaMiŠYG ذلك 44 Da أما [ما | EDaŠ من [في 43 ωEd. من : *scripsi* في [افي | s.l. Di Ka فأما [وأما 47 *iter.* يقع | C فقد [قد | To وجود [وجوده 45 TTe للشخص [الشخص 51... نوعا S<sup>3</sup> s.l. وبعد βDaŠ فيبعد [وبعد | om. To إذا | om. A وهو 48 No الخاص [خاص JG ويفردها [ويفرزها | JE in mg. Te | S<sup>3</sup> ويفردها [ويفرزها | om. C للإنسان in mg. ToTe ويفردها *i.l.* NkB ويفردها ENo om. AŠ هذا [وهذا | om. et add. in mg. No in mg. Y كالناطق A كالناطق a.c. E كالناطق [كالنطق | No

**[1.3.3. Comparison between the common and proper differentiae]**

Q74      The common [differentia] was not in such a way, but it itself once 35  
 differentiated once this from that, and once that from this, so that the  
 common differentia and this section of the proper one can be apt to  
 differentiate the individuals of a single species. As to the first of the  
 two sections of the proper differentia<sup>1</sup>, the individuals of a single  
 species are not differentiated by it the ones from the others, since it is a  
 concomitant to the nature of the species. If it were an accident of some 40  
 of the individuals, it would not be impossible that something similar  
 occurs to other individuals, so that the differentiation by means of it  
 would fail to last, unless this belonged to the complex of what occurs  
 to certain things at the beginning of [their] existence, like to people at  
 the beginning of [their] birth, and it is impossible that it occurs after  
 that. Thus, it is possible that it is part of this differentia that for which  
 it is impossible not to differentiate at all, if it differentiates from an  
 existing individual, since the beginning of the existence has already 45  
 escaped that individual after its [coming to] existence, so that this as  
 well is among that by which the differentia occurs among the  
 individuals of the species.

**[1.4. The most proper differentia]**

As to the differentia that is said “most proper”, it is the constitutive  
 differentia of the species, namely the one that, when associated to the  
 nature of the genus, constitutes it as a species; then, after that, certain  
 concomitants follow it and certain accidents occur to it, so that it is 50  
 essential to the nature of the genus constituted in existence as a  
 species, since it establishes, distinguishes and individuates that nature,  
 like rationality for man.

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<sup>1</sup>) Corresponding to the *proprium*.

وهذا الفصل ينفصل من سائر الأمور التي معه بأنه هو الذي يلقي  
 أولاً طبيعة الجنس فيحصله ويفرزها، وأن سائر تلك إنما تلحق تلك  
 الطبيعة العامة بعد ما لقيها هذا وأفرزها، فاستعدت للزوم ما يلزمها  
 ولحوق ما يلحقها، فهي إنما تلزمها وتلحقها بعد التخصص وهذا  
 كالنطق للإنسان؛ فإنّ القوة التي تسمى نفساً ناطقة لما اقترنت بالمادة  
 فصار حينئذ مثلاً الحيوان ناطقاً استعد لقبول العلم والصنائع  
 كالملاحة والفلاحة والكتابة واستعد أيضاً لأن يتعجب فيضحك من  
 العجائب، وأن يبكي ويخجل، ويفعل غير ذلك من الأمور التي  
 للإنسان، ليس أنّ واحداً من هذه الأمور اقترن بالحيوانية عند  
 الذهن أولاً فصار بسبب ذلك للحيوان الاستعداد لأن يكون ناطقاً،  
 بل الاستعداد الكلي والقوة الكلية الإنسانية هي التي يسمي بها  
 ناطقاً وهذه رواضع لها وتوابع. وأنت تعلم هذا بأدنى تأمل وتحقق أنه  
 لولا أن قوة أولى هي مستعدة للتمييز والفهم قد وجدت للإنسان، لما  
 كانت له هذه الاستعدادات الجزئية، وأن تلك القوة هي التي تسمى  
 النطق فصار بها ناطقاً وهذا هو الفصل المقوم الذاتي لطبيعة النوع.  
 وأما أنه أسود أو أبيض أو غير ذلك، فليست من جملة الأشياء التي

59 *al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt V.4, pp. 221.6-222.7* [النوع 66... الأمور 59]

52 *λξKaNkC* بأنه 52 *in mg. G* فيحصلها [فيحصله] *λξKaNkC* بأنه 52  
*ut vid.* بالفيها [ما لقيها] 54 *om. C* تلك... إنما | *a.c. No* وسائر [سائر] *s.l. Nk* و *G* ويفرزها  
*θtA a.c. Y* فاستعد [فاستعدت] *SNo* وأفرزها [وأفرزها] *add. in mg. Y* من ألقاء [لقيها] *No*  
*s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* يلزمها *A* يلزمه *θtEYi* يلزمه [يلزمها] *s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* واستعدت *Yi* *om. et vacuum rel.* *E* واستعد  
 [فهي إنما] *S<sup>3</sup>* *in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* فهي *S* فهذا *i.l. Y* فهي *et* فهي [فهي] *s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* يلحقها *δζtYi* يلحقه [يلحقها] 55  
 [التخصص] *S<sup>3</sup>* *in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* تلحقها وتلزمها *εδ* تلزمه وتلحقه [تلزمها وتلحقها] *Da* إما [إنما] *Yi* وإنما  
 [بالمادة] *A* نفس [نفساً] *in mg. To<sup>2</sup>* تسمى *π* نسميها [تسمى] 56 *As* هذا [وهذا] *εξ* التخصص  
*om.* والفلاحة 58 *No* الحيوانات [الحيوان] *in mg. C* *s.l. Nk* مثلاً *α* مثلاً 57 *add. ε* اقترانا  
 [غير] *E* ويعقل [ويفعل] *in mg. To<sup>2</sup>* *et* يحكي *JSG* يحكي [يبكي] 59 *om. Lat.* والكتابة | *A*  
 61... عند | *om. Di* الذهن 61... عند | *JMiG* لأن [أن] 60 *om. et add. s.l. Di* التي | *E* وغير  
*S* *inv.* يسمي بها | *om. Lat.* والقوة الكلية 62 *B* لا [لأن] *To* لسبب [بسبب] 61 *om. Lat.E* أولاً  
 [عوارض] *accidentia* *B* *in mg. G* عوارض ظ *in mg. J* عوارض [رواضع] 63  
 الاستعداد [الاستعدادات] *om. Yi* له 65 *om. Da* أن 64 *praem. G* لا [وأنت] *om. N* لها | *Lat.*  
*Di* فهذا [وهذا] 66 *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup>* هي التي | *No*

61 *i.l. Di* أي عند الذهن [أولاً] 61

This differentia is differentiated from the rest of the things that are with it because it is the one that firstly encounters the nature of the genus, then realizes and establishes the genus, whereas the rest of those [things] attach to that common nature only after that this [differentia] has encountered and distinguished it, so that it is ready for the concomitants and the attachments that follow and attach to it, which only follow and attach to it after it is specified, like rationality for man. In fact, when the potentiality that is called “rational soul” is associated to matter, then, for instance, the animal becomes rational and ready to acquire science and the disciplines like the art of sailing, of farming and writing, and also ready to feel wonder, so that it laughs at wondrous things, and [ready] to cry and feel embarrassed, and to do other things that pertain to man. None of these things is firstly associated to animality in the mind, so that the animal has the aptitude to be rational because of that; on the contrary, the universal aptitude and the universal human potentiality are that in virtue of which he is called “rational”, whereas these are [features] that are secondary and follow to them. You know this by a quick consideration, and you ascertain that, if there were not a first potentiality that already belongs to the man and that predisposes [him] to discerning and understanding, then he would not have these particular dispositions, and that potentiality is what is called “rationality”, and [the man] becomes rational by means of it, namely the constitutive essential differentia that belongs to the nature of the species. As to the fact that he is black or white or anything else, these are not among the complex of things

Q75

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that attached to the nature of the genus and singled it out as something to which the fact of being a man occurred and attached. You must ascertain that the difference between the differentia that is mostly proper and those [other] differentiae is this one.

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**[2. Classification of the differentiae as producing diversity or otherness]**

For this [reason], you can say that among the differentiae there is what is separable and what is inseparable, and that, among the complex of the inseparable ones, there is what is essential and what is accidental. You can [also] say that, among the differentiae, there is what produces diversity and what produces otherness. “Other” is what is different in its substance, and “different” is more common than “other”, since everything that differs is different, but not everything that differs from something is other, if by “other” you mean what differs substantially.

75

Among the differentiae there is [also] what can only [produce] otherness, be it separable, like sitting and standing, or inseparable, like being capable of laughing and having large nails; in fact, even if what is capable of laughing must be in its substance different from what is not capable of laughing, its being capable of laughing is not what makes this substantial difference occur; on the contrary, being capable of laughing attached [to the thing] at a second stage: after the substantial difference had occurred without it, then it occurred, and what is worthiest to determine it essentially is only the difference, since it is not possible for “capable of laughing” not to determine a difference between what is characterized by “capable of laughing” and

80

Q76

ولكن كون هذا الخلاف جوهريا ليس هو من موجب الضحاك، بل من موجب شيء آخر وهو الناطق. 85

(3.1) فالفصل الذي هو خاص الخاص هو العلة الذاتية للخلاف الموجب للآخريّة، بحسب اصطلاح أهل الصناعة في استعمال لفظ الآخر. ومقصودنا في هذا الموضع مقصور على هذا الفصل وهو الذي هو أحد الخمسة دون تلك الآخر ورسمه الحقيقي هو أنه الكلي المفرد المقول على النوع في جواب أي شيء هو في ذاته من جنسه، وهو الذي اصطلاح على أن قيل له إنه المقول على النوع في جواب أيما هو؛ ثم له رسوم مشهورة مثل قولهم إنَّ الفصل هو الذي يفصل بين النوع والجنس؛ وأيضا إنه الذي يفصل به النوع على الجنس؛ وأيضا إنه الذي به تختلف أشياء لا تختلف في الجنس؛ وأيضا إنه المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع في جواب أي شيء هو. 90 95

(3.2.1) فلنتأمل هذه الرسوم ولنتحققها ولنقض فيها بما عندنا من أمرها؛ فنقول إنه إذا ألحق بكل واحد واحد من هذه الرسوم زيادة تساوي الفصل، وتلك الزيادة أن يقال في ذاته أو لذاته أو ذاتي أو

Cf. PORPH., Isag., pp. 10.22-11.1. | [الجنس 94... وأيضا] PORPH., Isag., p. 11.18-19; ibid. p. 11.21. 94 | [الجنس 95... وأيضا] PORPH., Isag., p. 11.7-10.

من 85 *add. v* هو [بل] *om. SYi* هو | *om. et add. i.l. Ka* هو... جوهريا | *No* كونه [كون] 84 *om. et*  $\pi$  لفظة [لفظ] | *a.c. J* الآخريّة *G* الآخريّة [للآخريّة] 87 *KaAYi* والفصل [الفصل] 86 *om. S*  $\delta$ KaNkTAsC تلك الآخريّة 89  $S^3$  *add. i.l.* *Nk* *vJMiSGEd. in mg.* ذينك الآخريين *Di* تلك الآخريّة [تلك الآخريّة] *To* ذينك تلك الآخريين *in mg. B* ذينك *B* تلك الآخريين *s.l. No* هو | *om. Di* جواب 91... أي 90 *εT* مثل قولهم إنه [إنه] 93 *om. No* يفصل 92 *No* إنما [أيما] | *S* يقال [قيل] 91 *iter. Te* *A* هو [و هو] بالجنس [في الجنس] | *iter. E* لا 94 *om. et add. i.l. To* أيضا [وأيضا] | *S* قولهم إنه  $\kappa$  مثل قولهم إن *add. et exp. E* ما هو [جواب] 95 *add. s.l. Nk add. in mg. C* *vJDiG* إنه هو [إنه] | *a.c. Di* *om.* أمرها 97... ولنقض | *As* ونقض *A* [ولتفرض؟] ولنقض | *JDiToSG* من هذه [هذه] 96 *ET* أمرنا [أمرها] 97  $S^3$  *s.l.* من أمرها *S* بإقرارها [أمرها] 97... من | *As* ما [بما] | *Lat.* في *JETMiG* ذاتي [الذاتي] 99... في | *JATCDiMiYGN* ساوى [تساوي] 98 *om. N* *To* *om. No* أو الذاتي *in mg. Y* ذاتي ولذاته وفي ذاته *To* في ذاته ذاتي *Di* في ذاتيته *DaS* ذاته «substantiale» *Lat.*

The manuscript tradition shows a varying behaviour with regard to this redundant sequence of synonyms. Despite the apparent diffraction, some stemmatic considerations can be made: in family  $\beta$  the prevalent reading seems to have been *dātī*: MSS *Di* and *To* show clear signs of contamination with a reading *fī*

what is not. But the fact that this difference is substantial does not determine the fact of being capable of laughing, but rather something else, namely the fact of being rational. 85

### **[3. Individuation of the differentia that is one of the five predicables]**

#### **[3.1. Presentation of the traditional descriptions of differentia]**

The most proper differentia is the essential cause of the difference that determines otherness, according to the agreement of the philosophers in using the utterance “other”. Our aim in this place is limited to this differentia, namely the one that is one of the five [utterances], to the exclusion of those others, and its true description is that it is the simple universal predicated of the species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” essentially within its genus, namely that of which it was agreed to say that it is *what is predicated of the species in answer to “which is it?”*. Then it has [some] commonly-known descriptions, like their statement that the differentia is [(a)] *what differentiates between the species and the genus*; and also, that it is [(b)] *that in virtue of which the species exceeds the genus*; then, that it is [(c)] *that in virtue of which things that do not differ in genus differ [the one from the other]*; or that it is [(d)] *what is predicated of many [items] that differ in species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?”*. 90 95

#### **[3.2. Critical examination of the traditional descriptions (a-d)]**

##### **[3.2.1. General observations]**

We shall ponder and verify these descriptions, and determine about them what we think. So, we say that, if something is added to each one of these descriptions – namely that it is predicated essentially – then, [these descriptions] correspond to the differentia, so that the essential

الذاتي، فيكون الشيء الذاتي الذي يفصل لذاته بين ذات النوع والجنس هو الفصل، فإنَّ الخاصة - وإن فَصَلت - فليست ذاتية 100 وليس فصلها ذاتيا. وكذلك يجب أن يقال إنه الذي يفضل به النوع على الجنس في ذاته. وكذلك إنه الذي به تختلف أشياء لا تختلف في الجنس بذاتها. وكذلك إنه المقول على كثيرين كذا في جواب أي شيء هو في ذاته.

105 (3.2.2) لكن الرسوم الثلاثة المتقدمة، وإن ساوت الفصل، فليست تتضمن الشيء الذي يحل من الفصل محل الجنس، وبذلك الشيء يتم التحديد، وإن كان قد يكون بإسقاطه دلالة ذاتية مساوية، كما لو قال قائل إنَّ الإنسان ناطق مائت، دل على طبيعة الإنسانية وساواها؛ ولكن إنما يتم بأن يُذكر الشيء الذي هو الجنس وهو الحيوان؛ فأما لم هذا وكيف هو فسيأتيك في موضعه. وهذا الشيء الذي هو كالجنس للفصل هو الكلبي، فيجب أن يلحق هذا به.

وأما الرسم الآخر فقد ذكر فيه الكلبي إذ قيل "مقول على كثيرين" والمقول على كثيرين هو رسم الكلبي؛ فقد أُتي فيه برسم ما هو كالجنس، وإن لم يُؤت فيه باسمه.

om. et add. in mg. C ذلك om. KaMi ذات om. ToNo الذي om. KaDa | الذاتي 99 om. ذاتيا... وليس 101 vDi والخاصة [فإنَّ الخاصة 100 E الجنس والنوع [والجنس 100... النوع in أو لذاته أو الذاتي [في ذاته 102 Lat. [يفصل scil. «differt» [يفضل | ATe ولذلك وكذلك | Lat. om. Da إنه 103... الذي | vDi وكذلك يقال A ولذلك in mg. Nk ويقال μ ويقال وكذلك | mg. G add. في ذاتها ε add. في ذاتها [تختلف | inv. N به تختلف | TeMi om. et add. s.l. As om. به om. No هو 104 v وكذلك يقال 1 ويقال [وكذلك | om. ε بذاتها 103 γ om. تختلف | i.l. Nk [بإسقاطه 107 om. λKaNkCDaN الشيء<sup>2</sup> | s.l. Nk وبذلك 106 Da غير مساوية [مساوية | κ بإسقاط Di مع إسقاطه supra خ et وهو [هو 110 om. No الذي 111 add. Di إنشاء الله تعالى [موضعه | YEd. هذا BDi s.l. هو JToŠYiG om. et Te إذا [إذ | JDidaToŠG الأخير [الأخر | praem. s.l. Y et أما [وأما 112 Te الكل [الكلبي فيه | E قد [فقد | a.c. C الرسم [رسم | om. As. §<sup>3</sup>To om. et add. in mg. كثيرين... والمقول 113 om. κ رسما [برسم | To

dātihi attested in Da that might have totally replaced the original *dāi* in MS Š as well. Branch α, on the other hand, seemingly attest for the most part the redundant sequence. It might be questioned whether the alternative formulations existed in the archetype of the tradition or just in the subarchetype α.

thing that differentiates essentially between the essence of the species and [that of] the genus is the differentia (in fact, even if the proprium [as well] differentiates, it is not essential, nor its differentiation is essential). Analogously, it is necessary to say that it is that in virtue of which the species exceeds the genus essentially; in the same way, that it is that in virtue of which things that do not differ in genus, differ essentially and that it is what is predicated of many [items] and so on in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” essentially. 100

**[3.2.2. The lack of the term “universal” in the first three descriptions (a-c)]**

Q77 But, even if the three preceding descriptions [(a-c)] correspond to the differentia, they do not include the thing that plays, with respect to the differentia, the role of the genus, by means of which the process of definition is completed, even if, in spite of its lack, there might be nonetheless an essential and equivalent signification, as if someone said that man is rational [and] mortal, [this description] would signify the nature of humanity and would equal it, but it is completed only by mentioning the thing that is the genus, namely “animal”; as to why and how it is, this will be presented to you in its place. This thing that is like the genus for the differentia is “universal”, and it is necessary to attach it to the description. 105 110

As to the last description [(d)], “universal” has already been mentioned in it, since it was said: “predicated of many [items]”, being “predicated of many [items]” the description of “universal”, so that it has been provided, in it, the description of what is like the genus [for the differentia], even if it has not been provided in it its name. 115

- 115 (3.2.3) لكن لقوله على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع ثلاثة مفهومات: أحدها مما لا يظن له من قصد تقديم هذا الكتاب وسنوضحه في موضعه، ومفهوم آخر أقرب من الظاهر، أحدهما أنّ طبيعة الفصل تكون متناولة بالحمل أنواعا كثيرة لا محالة غير النوع الواحد المفصول، والآخر أنّ طبيعة الفصل هي التي توجب ألية الأشياء الكثيرة المختلفة بالنوع بعضها عند بعض، كأنه قال إنه المقول على الأنواع في جواب أي شيء هو لا جملتها، بل واحد واحد منها، كقول القائل إن السيف هو الذي يضرب به الناس، ليس أنه يضرب به الناس معا، بل واحد واحد من الناس، وهذا التأويل بعيد غير مستقيم. فإن أمكن أن يفهم هذا من هذا اللفظ كان رسما مطابقا للفصل، وإن تعذر تفهم هذا من هذا اللفظ وإنما يفهم منه الوجه الأول، فهذا الحد على الوجه الذي يفهمونه منه مختل؛ وذلك لأن طبيعة الفصل بما هو فصل ليس يلزمها كما علمت أن لا تختص بالنوع الواحد، بل هذا عارض ربما عرض لبعض الفصول، فيكون هذا عارضا لطبيعة الفصل، لا فصلا للفصل؛ ومع ذلك فليس بعارض يعم جميع الفصول حتى يقوم في الرسوم مقام الفصل في الحدود، فهذا مختل.
- 120
- 125
- 130

٧٨ ق (3.2.4) وهاهنا موضع بحث وتشكك يلوح في قولك إنه مقول في جواب أي شيء هو تركنا كشفه إلى وقت ما نتكلم في المباينات.

أحدها [أحدهما] T ومفهومات [ومفهومان] 117 N فيه [قصد... له] 116 om. vJEDiToŠG على 115 [ألية] Y هي الذي JYiG هو الذي [هي التي] | JToG هي أن [أن] 119 Ka بالجمل [بالحمل] 118 TY add. et exp. ما هو [جواب] 121 om. et add. in mg. G على الأنواع 120 AsŠYi انية Ed. إنية iter. a.c. G om. To الناس... ليس 122 s.l. G على J على واحد [واحد] | iter. a.c. Te هو | Y om. et أن يفهم 124 om. et add. in mg. G الناس 123... معا | om. Yi<sup>2</sup> | ٢ add. الذي [أنه] om. JT om. et add. in mg. ENo هذا<sup>2</sup> | in mg. Nk عن [من] | om. Da هذا<sup>1</sup> | add. s.l. N مخيل [مختل] | om. Da منه 126 s.l. Nk عن t عن [من] | Nk فهم [تفهم] 125 T فإن [وإن] No أعراض [عارض] 128 No هو [هذا] | om. Da بل | Ka لأن [أن] | JG يلزمه [يلزمها] 127 add. E لبعض الفصول فيكون هذا عارضا [عارضاً] | iter. E هذا | ToŠ إنما Da بل ربما [ربما] a.c. وتشكل [وتشكك] | Di وهذا [وهاهنا] 131 E مخيل [مختل] | λ وهذا [فهذا] | v الرسم [الرسوم] 130 No على<sup>2</sup> [في] | in mg. C في et من in mg. Nk من [في] | As وتشكك ACYi وتشكل B E المتباينات [المباينات] | om. Yi شيء 132

### [3.2.3. Observations on “predicated of many items differing in species” the fourth description (d)]

But for Porphyry’s statement “[predicated] of many [items] differing in species” there are three [possible] concepts: the first is among the things that are not considered by [the man] who aims at making this book precede [the others], and we will explain it in its place. [Then], there are two concepts that are closer to the evident, the first of which is that the nature of the differentia inevitably embraces in [its] predication many species besides the single species differentiated. The other [concept] is that the nature of the differentia is what determines the essential quality of the several things that differ from each other in species, as if he said that it is predicated of [many] species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?”, not of the complex of them, but of each one of them [singularly taken], as well as the statement of someone who says that the sword is what people strike with does not mean that it is what people strike with altogether, but what each one of them [strikes with], but this interpretation is absurd and incorrect. If it is possible to understand this from this utterance, then it is a description corresponding to the differentia; [on the contrary], if it is impossible to understand this from this utterance and only the first aspect is understood, then this definition in the way they understand it is defective. This because, as you learned, it does not necessarily follow to the nature of differentia *qua* differentia that it does not specifically apply to a unique species. On the contrary, this is an accident that sometimes occurs to some differentiae, so that it is an accident for the nature of differentia, and not a differentia for the differentia; moreover, it is not an accident that is common to the complex of differentiae, so that it assumes in the descriptions the function the differentia assumes in the definitions; hence, this [description] is defective.

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### [3.2.4. Observations on “predicated in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’” in description (d)]

Q78

Here is an occasion of inquiry and raising doubts that appears when you say that the differentia is predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it?”, whose unveiling we have delayed to a certain moment

على أننا إن فهمنا هذا الرسم على حسب أصولنا وعلى ما نشرحه في موضع آخر، تم الرسم رسماً؛ لكننا إنما نتعقب في هذا الموضع هذا الرسم بحسب ما يفهمه القوم المستعملون إياه. 135

(4.1) وأيضا يجب أن تعلم أن كل فصل إنما يقوم من الأنواع القريبة نوعا واحدا فقط. ثم إنّ الفصول لها نسبتان: نسبة إلى ما تقسمه وهو الجنس ونسبة إلى ما تُقسّم إليه وهو النوع؛ فإنّ الناطق يقسم الحيوان إلى الإنسان ويقوم الإنسان، فيكون مُقسّما للجنس، مُقوّما للنوع. فإن كان الجنس جنسا عاليا، لم يكن له إلا فصول مقسمة؛ وإن كان دون العالي، كانت له فصول مقسمة ومقومة. فأما الفصول المقومة فهي التي قسمت جنسه وقومته نوعا، إذ الفصل يُحدث النوع تحت الجنس؛ وأما المقسمة فهي التي تقسمه وتقوم النوع تحته. ومقومات الجنس لا تكون أخص منه ومقسّماته تكون أخص منه؛ والجنس الأعلى له فصول مقسمة وليس له فصول مقومة؛ والنوع الأخير له فصل مقوم وليس له فصل مقسم. 140 145

(4.2) وليس من الفصول المقومة ما لا يقسم؛ ومن الفصول المقسمة في ظاهر الأمر ما لا يقوم، ولا يكون ذلك البتة إلا الفصول السلبية التي ليست بالحقيقة فصولا؛ فإننا إذا قلنا إن الحيوان منه ناطق ومنه

Yi a.c. مواضع [موضع 134 N نشرح [نشرحه | N على As add. حسب [وعلى | om. Da إن 133 أن | s.l. Nk أيضا et ويجب [وأيضا يجب 136 A يفهمونه [يفهمه 135 λTDaSN لكنه [لكننا | Y [تقسّم إليه | om. Da وهو الجنس 138 A تقسيمه [تقسّمه | om. Yi ما | Yi واحد [واحد 137 s.l. J [فأما | om. No مقسمة 145... ومقومة 141 vS وإن [فإن 140 om. Lat. وهو النوع | ES يقومه «et Yi تقوم 143 To إذا [إذ | vEDaS جنسها [جنسه 142 om. Yi الفصول | v وأما om. Da تكون<sup>2</sup> | N ويقومان [ومقومات 144 γDaYEd ولا تقوم [constituunt] Lat. الآخر [الأخير 146 T مقسما [مقسمة | i.l. Y الأول E الأول [الأعلى | γAEd. فالجنس [والجنس 145 add. E om. No له فصل مقسم وليس [وليس 147 As افصل [افصل | in mg. As<sup>2</sup> الأخير له κ للفصول [الفصول | om. et add. s.l. To ذلك 148 om. No<sup>2</sup> الفصول | add. a.c. No من [يقسم γEd. p.c. As «negativis sive privatoris» Lat. 149 فإذا [فإننا praem. a.c. No Da قلت [قلنا | E وإذا [فإننا إذا om. Da إن |

in mg. Di أي جنس الجنس فيكون العالي مقسما للأول ومقوما للثاني [ومقومة 141... فإن 140 أي قسمت جنس ذلك الجنس فصيرت الجنس الذي قسمت جنسه نوعا وما كان كذلك فإنه [نوعا... فهي 142 مقوم الجنس الذي يقومه نوعا وليس مقسما له بعينه بل هو مقسم لجنسه ومقوم له وفصله المقسم هو الذي يقسّمه في in mg. NkBY لا جنسه وفي تقسيمه إياه إحداث نوع تحته

when we will deal with the divergences [between the five utterances]<sup>2</sup>. However, if we understand this description according to our principles and to what we will explain in another place, then the description is complete as a description, but in this place we will cope with this description just according to the understanding of the group [of philosophers] that employ it. 135

#### [4. Divisive and constitutive differentiae]

##### [4.1. The differentia with respect to the genus it divides and the species it constitutes]

It is also necessary for you to know that every differentia constitutes, among the proximate species, one single species only. Then, [you should also know] that the differentiae have two relations, one with what they divide, namely the genus, and one with that into which they are divided, namely the species. “Rational”, [for instance], divides the animal into the man and constitutes the man, so that it is divisive with respect to the genus, and constitutive with respect to the species. If the genus is a high one, it only has divisive differentiae; if, [on the contrary], it is [subsumed] under the high [genus], it has [both] divisive and constitutive differentiae. The constitutive differentiae are those that divide its genus and constitute it as a species, since the differentia produces the species under the genus. The divisive [differentiae] are those that divide the genus constituting the species under it. The constitutive [differentiae] of the genus are not more specific than it, whereas its divisive ones are more specific than it, so that the highest genus has divisive differentiae, but not constitutive differentiae, and the ultimate species has a constitutive differentia but not a divisive one. 140 145

##### [4.2. All the constitutive differentiae are also divisive ones and vice versa: the apparent exception of negative differentiae]

There is not among the constitutive differentiae [anything] that does not divide [as well]. Among the divisive differentiae, apparently, there is [something] that does not constitute, but this is only the case of the negative differentiae, that are not actually differentiae. In fact, when 150

<sup>2</sup>) I.e. in *Madhāl* II.1, §3.4.2.

- 150 غير ناطق، لم تثبت غير الناطق نوعا محصلا بإزاء الناطق، اللهم إلا أن يتفق أن يكون ما ليس بناطق نوعا واحدا كالذي ليس بمنقسم بمتساويين تحت العدد، فإنه صنف واحد وهو الفرد؛ أو يكون الإنسان لا يرى بأسا بأن يجعل الحيوان الغير الناطق جنسا للعجم ونوعا من الحيوان. فإن فعل هذا فاعل عَرَفناه بأن غير الناطق بالحقيقة ليس بفصل، بل هو أمر لازم، وكذلك جميع أمثال هذه السلوب؛ فإن السلوب لوازم للأشياء بالقياس إلى اعتبار معان ليست لها، فإن غير الناطق أمر يعقل باعتبار الناطق، فيكون النوع معناه وفصله الذي له أمرا في ذاته، ثم يلزمه أن يكون غير موصوف بشيء غيره؛ لكن ربما اضطر المضطر إلى استعمال لفظ السلب في المعنى الذي يكون للشيء في ذاته، إذا لم يكن له اسم محصل، وذلك لا يدل على أن السلب بالحقيقة اسمه، بل الاسم لازم له عدل به عن وجهه إليه؛ فلو لم يكن من الحيوانات غير الإنسان شيء إلا الصاهل وكان الصاهل في نفسه فصلا لذلك الغير، ثم لم يكن مسمى فليل غير الناطق وعني به الصاهل، لكان غير الناطق يدل دلالة الفصل؛ فأما وغير الناطق أمر أعم من فصل كل واحد واحد من أنواع الحيوانات، وليس لها شيء واحد مشترك محصل إثباتي يمكن أن يجعل غير الناطق المشترك فيه دالا عليه إلا نفس معنى سلب الناطق. والسلوب لا تكون معاني مَقومة للأشياء من حيث هي سلوب، بل هي عوارض ولوازم إضافية بعد تقرر
- 155
- 160
- 165

om. ليس<sup>2</sup> | N واحد [واحد] | ȝ. om. أن يكون 151 Di ناطق [الناطق] | Di لغير<sup>1</sup> μν الغير [غير<sup>2</sup>] 150  
 om. et add. الناطق 154... جنسا | No للغير [الغير] 153 Yi العد [العدد] 152 S<sup>3</sup> et add. in mg. J  
 in mg. J ε أن [بأن] | E عرفنا [عَرَفناه] | No هذانا [هذا] 154 Di add. من الحيوان [للعجم] | J  
 ȝ. om. JYiGN الأشياء [للأشياء] 156 om. Nk أمثال 155 in mg. J ε الغير [غير] | ȝ بأنه J  
 [لكن] | No لشيء [بشيء] 159 A أمر [أمرا] | λμξKaTCDaY للنوع [النوع] 158 ȝ له [لها] 157  
 منه add. vJTAsMiG منه [له] | om. No يكن | No الشيء [للشيء] 160 Ka إنما [ربما] | Ka ولكن  
 s.l. اسم εTAs اسم [الاسم] | λ اسم [اسمه] | om. TAsS على 161 add. s.l. Nk  
 Da غير [إلا] 163 Nk s.l. et add. om. عن 162 exp. Te الاسم [الاسم] et اسم Nk in mg. C  
 JG غير [وغير] | Y وأما [فأما] 165 C بالصاهل [به الصاهل] 164 p.c. J لذلك G لتلك [لذلك]  
 a.c. Y الفصل om. et add. s.l. Da فصل | om. Da أمر | add. SMi يدل دلالة [الناطق]  
 om. κ add. in mg. As<sup>2</sup> هي<sup>1</sup> 169 A ذاك [دالا] | Yi om. محصل 167

we say that the animal can be rational or non-rational, we do not establish “non-rational” as a species realized in opposition to “rational”, unless it is conventionally agreed that what is not rational is a unique species, like what is not divisible into two equal parts under the number, for it is a unique class, namely the “odd”, or [unless] the man does not regret positing the “non-rational animal” as a genus for the barbarians and a species of the animal. If someone does so, we inform him that “non-rational” is not truly a differentia, but something concomitant, and so are all the similar negations. In fact, negations are concomitants for the things in relation to the consideration of [certain] notions that do not belong to them, for “non-rational” is something that is intelligible by considering “rational”, so that the notion of the species and its differentia are something in itself, then the fact of not being characterized by anything else is concomitant to it. However, someone might be forced to use the utterance of the negation for the notion that belongs to the thing in itself, if no name has been established for it, but this does not mean that the negation is truly its name, on the contrary, the name has a concomitant in virtue of which it has been deflected from its meaning to it. If among the animals there were nothing that is not a man except for the neighing, and [if] neighing in itself were a differentia for that other [thing] and, moreover, it had not a name, and [if] it were said “non-rational” but it were meant, by this, “neighing”, then “non-rational” would signify the way a differentia does. As to the fact that “non-rational” is something more common than the differentia of each one of the species of the animals, provided that they do not share a single thing realized [and] affirmative which the shared “non-rational” could possibly signify, except for the very notion of the negation of “rational”, and provided that the negations are not, insofar as they are negations, constitutive notions for the things, but rather accidents and concomitants that

ذواتها، فلا يكون غير الناطق بالحقيقة فصلا تشترك فيه العجم مقوما لها. فإن أحب مُحِبَّ أن يجعل ذلك فصلا ويثبت الحيوان الغير الناطق نوعا، ثم جنسا، ويجعل الحيوان قد انقسم قسمة معتدلة واحدة إلى نوع آخر وإلى جنس معا فليفعل؛ فيكون أيضا كل فصل مقسّم مقوما؛ وإن آثر الوجه المحصل المحقق، لم تكن هذه فصولا؛ وكيف تكون فصولا وليست مقومات للأنواع، ولا تكون الفصول الحقيقية إلا مقومة عند ما تقسّم؟

٨٠ق (4.3) والذي يظنه ظانون أنّ من الفصول المحصلة ما يقسم، ثم ينتظر فصلا آخر يرد حتى يقوما معا، مثل الناطق الذي ربما ظنّ أنه يقسم الحي، ثم يتوقف في تقويم النوع إلى أن ينضم إليه الميت، فهو ظن كذب: وذلك لأنه ليس من شرط الفصل إذا قسم فأوجب تقويم النوع أن يكون مقوما للنوع الأخير لا محالة؛ فإنه فرق بين أن نقول "يقوم نوعا" وبين أن نقول "يقوم نوعا أخيرا". والناطق، وإن كان لا يقوم الإنسان الذي هو النوع الأخير، فإنه يقوم الحي الناطق الذي هو نوع للحي وجنس للإنسان، إن كان ما يقولونه من كون الناطق أعم من الإنسان حقا وكان الحي الناطق يقع على الإنسان وعلى الملك لا باشتراك الاسم، بل وقوع اللفظ بمعنى واحد. ثم قولنا: "الحي الناطق" قول لمجموعه معنى معقول وهو أخص من الحي،

add. واحدة β. add. واحدة [قسمة 172 om. JG ذلك 171 ε الغير [غير | a.c. Nk ذاتها [ذواتها 170 واحد [آخر | kvDiMi exp. p.c. Š om. واحدة 173 add. i.l. To معتد له [معتدلة | et exp. E As منقسم om. A مقسّم 174 om. Y أيضا | s.l. Nk in mg. C آخر JATDiDaY آخر KaS مقومة للأنواع et مقومة من الأنواع [مقومات للأنواع 175 N مقوم مقسما [مقسّم مقوما بالحقيقة KaNo الحقيقية [الحقيقية 176 in mg. NkC tB ولم تكن [ولا تكون | p.c. J لأنواع [للأنواع [يرد 178 BEd. a.c. Yi الظانون [ظانون | om. et add. in mg. Ka يقسم... والذي JToG s.l. Nk in mg. C لأنه لأنه γAŞEd أنه [لأنه 180 om. et add. in mg. As الحي 179 No يدل s.l. قوم tKB قوم [يقوم 182 in mg. B الآخر s.l. Nk in mg. C الأخير KaNkC الآخر [الأخير 181 قوم [يقوم | add. in mg. J نوعا وبين أن يقول قوم om. et يقوم... انواعا | S يلزم NkC in mg. B S وإن كان NkC فكان [وكان 185 v كونه [كون | NkB الإنسان [للإنسان 184 s.l. η قوم tK S الحيوان [الحي 187 a.c. To بالاشتراك [باشتراك | om. T لا JTG والناطق [الناطق N مقول [معقول | No المجموعة T بمجموعه [لمجموعه

annex [to things] once their essences are established, then “non-rational” is not truly a differentia shared by the barbarians and constitutive for them. If someone wants to consider that as a differentia and to establish “non-rational animal” as a species [and], then, as a genus, and to posit “animal” as divided by a unique symmetrical division into an ultimate species and into a genus at the same time, then he can do it: every divisive differentia will be nonetheless constitutive. If, [on the contrary], he prefers an ascertained and verified method, these will not be differentiae; how could they be differentiae without being constitutive for the species, given that true differentiae cannot but be constitutive when they divide?

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**[4.3. Criticism towards the idea that a constitutive differentia must constitute an ultimate species only]**

Q80

What is held by those who believe that, among the differentiae that realize there is what divides, then they expect another differentia to be introduced, so that the [two differentiae] are, together, constitutive (like “rational”, that is sometimes believed to divide the animal, then they wait that “mortal” is joined to it for the constitution of the species), this is a false belief. This because it is not a condition of differentia the fact of inevitably constituting the lowest species, when it divides in such a way to cause the constitution of the species, for there is a difference between our saying “it constitutes the species” and our saying “it constitutes a lowest species”. Even if “rational” does not constitute man, which is the lowest species, it constitutes rational animal, which is a species of animal and a genus for man, if what they say about the fact that rational is more common than man is true and [if] “rational animal” applies [both] to the man and the angel not [just] by homonymy, but in such a way that the utterance applies [to both] with one and the same meaning. Then, when we say: “rational animal”, it is a locution whose complex has a conceived notion which is more specific than “animal”, without being neither a differentia (on

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وليس فصلا، بل الفصل جزء منه وهو الناطق، ولا خاصة، فهو لا محالة نوع له. وكذلك يتبين أنه جنس الإنسان، وقد يصرح بمثل هذا صاحب إيساغوجي نفسه في موضع؛ فالناطق إذن قد قوّم نوعا هو جنس، فحين قسّم قوّم لا محالة. ونعلم من هذا أن الفصل إنما هو مقول قولاً أولياً على نوع واحد دائماً، وإنما يقال على أنواع كثيرة في جواب أي شيء هو قولاً ثانياً بتوسط.

(5.1) ونقول الآن إنك تعلم أنّ ذات كل شيء واحد، فيجب أن يكون ذات الشيء لا يزداد ولا ينتقص؛ فإنه إن كان ماهية الشيء وذاته هو الأنقص من حدود الزيادة والنقصان، والأزيد غير الأنقص، فالأزيد غير ذاته. وكذلك إن كان الأزيد، وكذلك إن كان الأوسط.

(5.2) وأما المعنى المشترك للثلاثة الذي ليس واحداً بالعدد، بل بالعموم، فليس هو ذات الشيء الواحد بالعدد، فليس لك أن تقول إن الزائد والناقص والوسط تشترك في معنى واحد هو ذات الشيء، فإذن ذات الشيء لا يحتمل الزيادة والنقصان، فما كان مقوماً لذاته لا يحتمل الزيادة والنقصان؛ فإنه إن كان، إذا زاد قوّم ذاته بزيادته، فذاته هو الأزيد، وإن كان لا يقوّم ذاته بزيادته ويقوم بنقصانه، فذاته هو الناقص؛ وإن كان لا يقوم في إحدى الأحوال، فليس بمقوم من حيث هو يزيد وينقص، اللهم إلا بالمعنى العام، وفيه ما قلناه. وعلى

194 ونقول... [ينتقص 195] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 9.21-23 (cf. ARIST., *Cat.*, 3b33-4a9).

188 خاصية [خاصة | *add. J* هو [ولا | *S* فليس [وليس 188  
[فالناطق | *Di* في موضع | *om.* نفسه 190 *DiMiS* صرح [يصرح | *add. S* والملك [الإنسان  
*om.* قد | *in mg. Y* إذا *om. E* *KaJBATCDiDaSTeNoG* إذا [إذن | *G* والناطق  
*S* *add.* نوعاً [قوّم | *S* نوعاً [قسّم 191 *Yi* وهو [هو | *To* يقوّم [قوّم | *KaACDaSNo*  
*a.c.* يزداد [يزداد | *om. N* يكون 195 *JG* إن [أن... إنك | *A* إلا [الآن 194 *a.c. Y* قول [قولاً 193  
*om. et add. in mg. G iter. No* الأزيد... لو كذلك 197 *om. E* هو 196 *JTTe* ينقص [ينتقص | *E*  
*om. Lat.* بالعموم 199... بل | *No* وحدا [واحدا | *T* ليست [ليس | *G* التي [الذي | *E* فأما [وأما 198  
*To* وهو [هو | *ATTe* مشترك [تتشترك | *s.l. Di* والأوسط *om. Lat.G add. in mg. G* والوسط 200  
*om.* إن 202 *Y* كما أن [كان | *om. Lat.AT* والنقصان 202... فما | *Yi* فإن *CTeN* فإذا [فإن 201  
*add.* فهو [بنقصانه | *TTeY* بزيادة [بزيادته 203 *DiTo* بزيادة [بزيادته | *J om. C*  
*et add. in mg. J om. C* هو [فليس | *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. s.l.* لا | *Di* فإن [وإن | *in mg. Y* الأنقص [الناقص 204  
*et exp. E* هو [فليس | *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. s.l.* لا | *Di* فإن [وإن | *in mg. Y* الأنقص [الناقص 204  
*add. As* هو 205 *om. Da*

the contrary, the differentia is a part of it, namely “rational”) nor a proprium, so that it is inevitably a species of it. Similarly, it has been clarified that it is a genus of man, and the author of the *Isagoge* himself explains something similar in [some] place. “Rational”, then, has already constituted a species which is [also] a genus, so that, while dividing [a genus], it [also] inevitably constituted [a species]. From this, we learn that the differentia is primarily [and] constantly predicated of a unique species only, being predicated of many species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” only secondarily [and] by mediation [of something else].

**[5. Demonstration that the most proper differentia does not undergo the more and less]**

**[5.1. Enunciation of the principle that the thing’s essence in unique and does not undergo the more and less]**

Now we say that you know that *the essence of everything is unique*, and that *it is necessary that it do not undergo more and less*<sup>3</sup>; in fact, if the essential quiddity of the thing is the least of the limits of the more and the less, given that the major does not coincide with the least, then the major does not coincide with its essence. Analogously if it is the major and if it is the intermediate.

**[5.2. Neither the essence nor its constitutive elements do undergo the more and less]**

As to the notion shared by the three, which is not unique in number but in the fact of being common, it does not coincide with the essence of the thing unique in number, so that you cannot say that the more, the less and the medium share a single notion that coincides with the thing’s essence; thus, the thing’s essence does not undergo the more and the less, nor what constitutes it does so, since, if it does it, then when [the thing] undergoes the more, then it constitutes its essence by its increase, so that its essence coincides with the more; if, [on the other hand], it does not constitute its essence by its increase, but rather by its diminution, then its essence coincides with the less. If it does not constitute in one of the states, then it is not constitutive insofar as it undergoes the more and the less, unless in virtue of the common

<sup>3</sup>) A quotation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 9.21-23.

أن هذه المعاني لا يمكن أن يقال فيها عند الزيادة إنَّ الأصل موجود، وقد أضيف إليه شيء، بل إذا ازدادت فقد بطل الموجود أولاً، وفي بطلانه بطلان المقوم كان، وفي بطلانه بطلان المتقوم كان. وكذلك في اعتبار النقصان إذا كان الأصل ليس بعينه عند الحالة الأولى، وعند الحالة الثانية وهي النقصان. فقد تبين أنَّ الفصل الذي هو خاص الخاص لا يقبل الزيادة والنقصان. 210

(5.3) وأما سائر الفصول فإنها إذا كانت بعد الذات، فلا مانع يمنع أن تقبل الزيادة والنقصان - كانت مفارقة كحمره الخجل وصفرة الوجع، أو غير مفارقة كسواد الحبشي - وليس إذا كان بعض الناس أفهم، وبعضهم أبلد، فقد قبلت القوة النطقية زيادة ونقصاناً، بل ولا لو كان واحد من الناس لا يفهم البتة كالطفل، فإن ذلك لا يكون عارضا في فصله؛ وذلك لأن فصله هو أنَّ له في جوهره القوة التي إذا لم يكن مانع، فعل الأفعال النطقية؛ وتلك القوة واحدة، ولكنها يعرض لها تارة عوز الآلات، وتارة معاسرتها وعصيانها، فتختلف بحسب ذلك أفعالها تارة بالبطول والسقوط، وتارة بالزيادة والنقصان، ومعناها المذكور ثابت، كنار واحدة تختلف أفعالها بحسب اختلاف المنفعلات عنها هذه الوجوه من الاختلاف، فتكون تارة 215 220

Cf. AMMON., *In Isag.*, p. 96.10-16. [مختلف 230... بل 215]

om. γAEd. 1 كان | ToŠ المتقوم [المقوم] a.c. E | بطلان [ابطلانه] 208 om. TTe أن 206 أصل [الأصل] 209 Di فكنك [وكذلك] | om. γAEd. 2 كان | om. κ كان... وفي لا يقبل الزيادة [والنقصان] 211 YN بين [تبين] | E وهو [وهي] 210 E عنه [عند] | E بغير [يعينه] | § إذ in mg. NkC إذ in mg. G et إذ [إذ] | om. No والنقصان 213... وأما 212 add. et exp. Yi كانت 213 Di s.l. Di et add. om. يمنع | § منع مانع [مانع يمنع] | As بغير [بعد] | § إن γEd. لما E iter. A | بعض الناس [وبعضهم] | om. N أفهم 215 om. No الناس 214 praem. § a.c. No كانت [كان] 216 A om. ولا | om. JG بل | Di الناطقة [النطقية] | § هذه القوة E لا [البتة] | § add. شينا [يفهم] | om. E exp. p.c. Y | praem. p.c. Y ولا praem. E [واحد] [عوز] 219 Yi ولكن DiToMi لكنها [ولكنها] 218 Y add. in mg. Y om. له 217 praem. s.l. Y والنقصان 221 Lat. [بالبطؤ. scil. «in tarditate»] κSG بالبطؤ p.c. J [بالبطول] 220 Yi عون om. E | om. اختلاف 222 εS وذلك كمنار [كنار] | add. Da واحد [ثابت] | To [sic] والنقصا om. عنها | C γAEd. [الاختلافات] | C

[بالبطول] 220 i.l. Y من العسر [معاسرتها] 219 i.l. Y اسم تفضيل [أبلد] | i.l. Y اسم تفضيل [أفهم] 215 in mg. Y من البطول

notion, and with regard to this what we said [holds]. But it cannot be said, with regard to these notions, that, when they undergo the more, the original principle is still there although something has been added to it; on the contrary, when it undergoes the more, what was previously there has already ceased to be, and when it ceases to be, what constituted it also ceased to be, and when it ceases to be, what is constituted also ceases to be. In a similar way is considered the diminution, when the original principle does not stay the same in the first and in the second state that is the diminution. Hence, it has become clear that the differentia which is mostly proper does not undergo the more and the less. 210

**[5.3. Non-essential differentiae can undergo the more and less]**

As to the other differentiae, since they come after the essence, there is nothing preventing [them] from undergoing the more and the less – be they separable, like the redness of the embarrassed people and the paleness of the fearful ones, or inseparable, like the blackness of the Abyssinian –, whereas the rational faculty does not undergo the more and the less if there is someone more understanding and someone more stupid, not even in case there is someone who does not understand at all like a child, since this does not occur with regard to its differentia, because its differentia consists in the fact that he has, in its substance, the faculty that, if there is nothing preventing from it, operates the rational acts, and that faculty is one and the same, but sometimes [its] instruments are poor, sometimes they are hard [to employ] and difficult to master, so that, because of this, the actions of the rational faculty differ, sometimes in being vain and in missing the point, in being more and less [effective], whereas their notion that was previously mentioned is stable, like one and the same fire whose actions vary in these ways according to the variation of the subjects 215 220

Q82

أشد اشتعالا وتارة أضعف، وذلك بسبب المادة التي تفعل بها وفيها. وكذلك القلب والدماغ آلتان للقوة النطقية بهما يتم أول فعلها من الفهم والتمييز وغير ذلك؛ فبحسب اعتدال مزاجيهما ولا اعتداله، تختلف هذه الأفعال، وليس الذهن ولا الفهم ولا شيء من أمثال ذلك فصلا يقوم الإنسان، بل هي عوارض وخواص؛ والزيادة في مثل هذا الاستعداد المذكور والنقصان فيه أمر يحصل في الاستعداد المتولد من استعدادين: استعداد الفاعل، واستعداد المنفعل؛ فأما الذي للفاعل نفسه فغير مختلف. 225 230

(6) واعلم أنّ الفصل الذي هو أحد الخمسة هو الناطق الذي يحمل على النوع مطلقا، لا النطق الذي يحمل على النوع بالاشتقاق؛ لأن هذه الخمسة أقسام شيء واحد، وهو اللفظ الكلي. وصورة اللفظ الكلي في جميعها أن يكون مقولا على جزئياته، ويشترك فيه بأن يعطيها اسمها وحدّها، والنطق لا يعطي شيئا من الجزئيات اسمه ولا حدّه؛ وهذا - إن قيل له فصل - فهو فصل بمعنى غير الذي كلامنا فيه. وكذلك فافهم الحال في الخاصة والعرض؛ فإنه يجب أن يكون حمل هذه الخمسة على قياس حمل الجنس والنوع من حيث هو حمل، وإن لم يكن من حيث الذاتية والعرضية. 235

231-7. Nağāt p. 16.5-7; *al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, p. 235.1-8, 13-17; بالاشتقاق 232... واعلم 231

بها [بهما] | ET اللذان بهما يتم [التان] | add. Ka هو [القلب] 224 To *om. et add. s.l.* تفعل 223 J فيحسب [فيحسب] 225 Nk فعلهما [فعلها] | J أولا [أول] | om. ET | om. N | JDaSG *om.* ولا | om. T وليس الذهن | ج الأحوال [الأفعال] 226 A مزاجيهما Ka مراجها [مزاجيهما] | N بحسب ج *om. et add. in mg. G om.* مثل هذا | *om. Lat.* المذكور 228... والزيادة 227 κ *om.* الفهم وأما [أما] | κ القابل [المنفعل] | To من بين *Lat.* [بين] «inter» JG بين [من] 229 S *om.* المتولد 228 [لأن] | Y يحتمل [يحمل] | *om. Yi* النوع... مطلقا 232 N هذه الخمسة *om. No* الخمسة 231 Y A ج اسمها [اسمها] 235 N فيها [فيه] 234 E *a.c.* في صورة [وصورة] 233 Š *a.c.* ولأن To ولأن *om. et add. s.l. Yi* | N ولا يعطي النطق [يعطي]... والنطق | AAAsYi وحده [وحدها] *om.* فهو فصل | εE فهذا [وهذا] 236 S وحده [حده]... ولا | To<sup>2</sup> *om. et add. in mg.* حده 236 Yi جمل [حمل] 238 κS *add.* العام [والعرض] | To لكل [الحال] | Yi منه [فيه] 237 Ka

224 *in mg. NkB* أي نقل القوة النطقية [النطقية]... آلتان

that undergo the actions, so that sometimes the fire burns more intensely and sometimes it does so less intensely because of the matter by means of which and in which it acts. Analogously, the heart and the brain are two instruments of the rational faculty by means of which the beginning of its act of understanding, discerning, etcetera is accomplished, and these actions differ according to the balance of their temperaments or to the lack of balance, but the mind, the understanding and anything similar are not a differentia that constitutes the man, being rather accidents and propria. The more and the less, in cases similar to the said disposition, are something realized in the disposition which is generated from two dispositions: the disposition of the agent and that of the patient; what pertains to the agent itself does not vary.

**[6. The logical differentia assumed as one of the five predicables is not the one predicated panonymously of its subjects]**

Know that the differentia that is one of the five [utterances] is “rational”, that is predicated of the species absolutely, not “rationality”, that is predicated of the species paronymously, because these five [utterances] are parts of a unique thing, namely the universal utterance. The form of the universal utterance in all of them consists in being predicated of its particulars, and it is shared because it gives the particulars its name and definition, whereas rationality does not give to any of the particulars its name or definition. If this is said “differentia”, it is a differentia according to a different notion from that we are speaking of. In the same way you should understand the state of the proprium and the accident; in fact, it is necessary that the predication of these five [utterances] be analogous to that of the genus and the species inasmuch as it is a predication, even if it is not [so] with respect to the essentiality and the accidentality.

## [الفصل الرابع عشر]

### فصل في الخاصة والعرض العام

٨٣ق

(1.1) وأما الخاصة فإنها تستعمل عند المنطقيين أيضا على وجهين: أحدهما أنها تقال على كل معنى يخص شيئا، كان على الإطلاق أو بالقياس إلى شيء؛ والثاني أنها تقال على ما خص شيئا من الأنواع في نفسه دون الأشياء الأخرى، ثم قد يخص من هذا القسم باسم الخاصة ما كان مع ذلك شيئا موجودا لكل النوع في كل زمان.

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(1.2) والخاصة التي هي إحدى الخمسة في هذا المكان عند المنطقيين، فيما أظن، هي الوسط من هذه، وهي المقول على الأشخاص من نوع واحد في جواب أي شيء هو لا بالذات، سواء كان نوعا أخيرا أو متوسطا، سواء كان عاما في كل وقت أو لم يكن؛ فإن العام الموجود في كل وقت هو أخص من هذا؛ ولو كانت الخاصة التي هي إحدى الخمسة هي هذه، لكانت القسمة تزيد على خمسة، وإن كان الأولى باسم الخاصة باعتبار اختصاصها بالنوع غيرها ومعنى أخص منها. ولا يبعد أن يعنى بالخاصة كل عارض خاص بأي

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4 Ta 'līqāt, pp. 443.9-444.2. [شيء 5... أحدهما 4

Y الفصل الرابع عشر Mi الفصل الرابع عشر من المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق [فصل 2  
add. أيضا [تستعمل | ȳ om. فإنها | NK add. والعرض العام [الخاصة | Y أما γλEd. فأما [وأما 3  
A om. et add. s.l. Da كان | κ يختص [يخص | om. To كل | N أنه [أنها 4 om. Yi أيضا | A  
هي [التي هي 8 § نوع [النوع 7 om. Di يخص | om. No قد 6 ȳ add. معنى [على 5 s.l. § أو  
π وهو [وهي | om. No من | s.l. Di هي 9 praem. ȳ فإنها [عند | Te أحد [إحدى | § التي هي  
سواء كان عاما في كل وقت أو لم يكن vpe om. [متوسطا 11... سواء | om. et add. s.l. Da لا 10  
وسواء [سواء 11 add. in mg. NkB فإن العام الموجود في كل وقت سواء كان نوعا أخيرا أو متوسطا  
سواء (J وسطا) [وقت | § فإن القيام [فإن العام 12 om. et add. in mg. Di أو 2... أو | Di  
add. «sive sit species specialissima sive media» JGE. add. كان نوعا أخيرا أو متوسطا  
Lat. نعي s.l. NK أحد ε يعنى أحد [يعنى | Ka منهما [منها 15 cett. + Ed. الخمس [N الخمسة 13  
Ed. بالخاصة [بالخاصة | κ

13 [الخمس] Although most of the manuscript tradition witnesses the الخمس, it should be noticed that all the other references to the five notions/utterances in the whole work (cf. especially the occurrence a few lines above) attest الخمسة (cf. also *Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 28.16-17 and *Šifā', Ġadal* I.7, p. 70.10).

[I.14]

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**CHAPTER ON THE PROPRIUM AND THE COMMON ACCIDENT****[1. The senses of “proprium”]****[1.1. The two senses of “proprium” meant by the logicians]**

As to the proprium, [the term] is also employed by the logicians according to two senses: [(i)] the first consists in that “proprium” is said of every notion that belongs properly to something, be it absolutely or in relation to something; [(ii.a)] the second one consists in that “proprium” is said of what properly belongs properly to one of the species in itself without belonging to the other things. [(ii.b)] Then, the name of “proprium” can be attributed properly attributed, within this [second] kind, to what, besides this, [also] belongs to the whole species every time.

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**[1.2. The proprium as one of the five universals]**

The proprium that is one of the five [utterances] in this place, according to the logicians, is – as far as I believe – the intermediate of it, namely what is predicated of the individuals of only one species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” not essentially, be it an ultimate species or an intermediate one, be it common [to it] every time or not: in fact, what is common belonging [to the species] every time is more specific than this; and if the proprium that is one of the five [utterances] were this one, then the division [of the five utterances] would go beyond the five [utterances], even if the one that is mostly worth the name of “proprium”, in view of the fact that it properly belongs to the species, is something else and a notion more specific

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- كلي كان، ولو كان الكلي جنسا أعلى، ويكون ذلك حسنا جدا. وتخرجها القسمة على هذا الوجه وهو أنّ الكلي العرضي إما أن يكون خاصا بما يقال عليه أو غير خاص بما يقال عليه سواء كان ما يقال عليه جنسا أعلى أو متوسطا أو نوعا أخيرا؛ لكن التعارف قد جرى في إيراد الخاصة على أنها خاصة لنوع وتالية للفصل، فتكون الخاصة التي هي إحدى الخمسة هي ما يقال على أشخاص نوع ولا يقال على غيرها، عمت تلك الأشخاص أو لم تعم، وكان النوع متوسطا أو أخيرا، وربما أوجبوا أن يكون النوع أخيرا.
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- 1.3.1) وقد ذهب قوم إلى أن يجعلوا كل ما هو سوى أخص الخواص من جملة العرض العام، حتى لو كان مثلا لا يوجد إلا لنوع واحد، لكنه مع ذلك لا يوجد لكه بل لبعضه ويكون مما يجوز أن يكون وأن لا يكون لذلك البعض، فهو العرض العام، حتى يكون العرضي إما موجودا لنوع واحد ولكه دائما فيكون خاصة، وإما أن لا يكون كذلك، بل يكون إما موجودا لأنواع، وإما موجودا لنوع، ولكن لا بالصفة المذكورة فهو يكون عرضا عاما.
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24 Cf. PORPH., *In Cat.*, pp. 93.31-94.13; AMMON., *In Isag.*, pp. 32.23-33.22. عاما 30... وقد 24

أو يكون ذلك جنسا أخيرا [fort. «sive genus subalternum»] جدا... ويكون | κ أو يكون [ويكون 16 *in mg.* أخيرا] جدا | Lat. Yi جنسا [حسنا] | Lat. جنس متوسط *est* «genus subalternum» *sed* تابعة Yi وتاليا [وتالية 20 *iter. A* لكن | E آخر [أخيرا 19 As خاصيا] خاصا 18 S حدا As Š لو [أو 22 *om. CN* هي | vDiSTeMiNoG الخمس [الخمس 21 *i.l. Y* التي... هي<sup>2</sup> *om. E* | No وربما [وربما 23 أو [2]أخيرا | S نوعا [النوع] *in mg. G* | Lat. G *add. in mg.* ربما... وربما | No وربما [وربما 23 *iter. JG* سوى | *om. EC* هو | A يجعل [يجعلوا] *om. E* | إلى 24 *add. et del. E* ذهبو T للعرض [العرض | A *s.l. N* كذلك [لذلك 27 *add. S* الواحد [ذلك 26 Yi الأخص] الخواص 25 No ودائما [دائما] | *s.l. S* و κ لكه [ولكته | Nk موجود [موجودا] | Mi العرض [العرضي 28 *om. et* لنوع... وإما | S] *om.* يكون 29 *s.l. No* لا [لا 29... أن | *om.* أن | Ka بعضه] خاصة *s.l.* فيكون εBCED. فيكون [فهو يكون 30 Da النوع [النوع] | Da موجود [موجودا] | *add. in mg. J* فيكون *s.l.* ما [عاما] | *i.l. Y* فهو يكون *in mg. C* فهو يكون Nk

*in mg.* Di كالضحك والكتابة فإن الأول مثلا خاصة والثاني عرض عام [عليه 18... الكلي 17 افهم وهي المقولة على الأشخاص من نوع واحد دون غيره عمت أو لم تعم كانت دائما أو [تعم 22... هي<sup>2</sup> 21 *in mg.* NkB وقت ما

Q84 than that. It is not impossible to mean by “*proprium*” every accidental feature properly belonging to whatever universal, even if the universal were a summum genus, and it is very positive. The division extracts the *proprium* in this way: the accidental universal may either be proper to that of which it is predicated or not (be that of which it is predicated a highest genus or an intermediate one or an ultimate species), but it has already become customary the common agreement on mentioning the *proprium* inasmuch as it is a *proprium* that belongs to one species [only] and follows to the differentia, so that the *proprium* that is one of the five [utterances] is that which is predicated of the individuals of a species without being predicated of anything else, being either common to [all of] those individuals or not, and being the species intermediate or ultimate, although sometimes they required that the species is an ultimate one. 20

**[1.3. The distinction between “*proprium*” and “common accident” of a group of philosophers]**

**[1.3.1. Exposition of the distinction]**

A group [of philosophers] held [it was right] to consider everything except the most proper of the propria among the complex of the common accident, so that if, for instance, it did not belong but to one species only and, besides this, it did not belong to the whole of it, but rather to a part of it, and it were among the things that can both belong and not belong to that part [of the species], then it would be a common accident. Consequently, the accidental either [(a)] belongs to one species only and to the whole of it always, and it is a *proprium*, or [(b)] it is not such, but it either [(b.1)] belongs to [several] species or [(b.2)] it belongs to one species but not in the aforementioned manner, so that it is a *common accident*. 25 30

(1.3.2) وهذا القول مضطرب ولا يدل على الشيء من جهة عمومته وخصوصه وكليته بل من جهة أخرى، ويجعل اسم العرض العام هذرا، فإنَّ العرض العام موضوع بإزاء الخاص. وإذ الخاص إنما يحسن أن يصير خاصا لأنه لنوع واحد، فالعام إنما يحسن أن يصير عاما لأنه لأكثر من نوع واحد. فإذن ليس يحسن أن يُجعل أخص الوجوه الثلاثة في استعمال لفظة الخاصة دالا على المعنى الذي هو أحد الخمسة.

(1.4) وهذا الاستعمال الأعم يجعل الخواص مقسومة إلى أقسام أربعة: خاصة للنوع ولغيره كذي الرجلين للإنسان بالقياس إلى الفرس، وأحراه بذلك ما كان للنوع كله؛ وخاصة للنوع وحده، وهذا إما لكه وإما لا لكه كالملاحة والفلاحة للإنسان؛ والذي لكه إما دائما في كل وقت مثل ما يكون الإنسان ضحاکا أو ذا رجلين في طبعه، وإما لا دائما كالشباب للإنسان. فالخاصة من حيث هي أولى أن تكون إحدى الخمسة هي ما ذكرناه، وأما من حيث هي أولى بأن تكون خاصة فهي اللازمة المداومة التي لجميع النوع في كل زمان. ولا يتناقض قولنا إنَّ كذا خاصة حقيقية من حيث الاختصاص بالنوع وليس هو الذي إليه قسمة الخمسة، وقولنا إن الذي إليه قسمة

٨٥ق

38 وهذا... [للإنسان 43... وهذا 38] PORPH., Isag., p. 12.13-22.

31 وهذا... [الخمسة 37... وهذا 31] Cf. *Manṭiq al-Maṣriqiyyīn*, p. 20.6-11.

به B. s.l. add. العام | Yi om. جهة | a.c. § أو خصوصه [وخصوصه 32 Yi شيء [الشيء 31  
[وإذ | add. in mg. G Lat.G om. العام... هذرا | KaTeMiŠYi هذرا Da هذا [هذرا 33 add. C  
AŞ والعام [فالعام 34 om. Ka أن... 34 يحسن | om. C وإذ الخاص | Te وإذا AsYi وإذا T فإذن  
[استعمال | om. Ka الثلاثة 36 § أكثر [لأكثر 35 عَ خاصا [عاما | om. BEd. واحد... 35... فالعام  
JEDiSYG الخمس [الخمسة 37 E إحدى [أحد | No الخاص [الخاصة | § لفظ [لفظة | Ka اشتراك  
§ s.l. يجعل et فجعل [يجعل | T أعم [الأعم | § s.l. الاستعمال et اللاستعمال [الاستعمال 38  
om. et add. s.l. لا 41 add. ET المكان [بذلك 40 om. Lat. للإنسان | § خاص [خاصة 39  
E om. والفلاحة | § v a.c. praem. بل [praem. s.l. NkC بل كان [كالملاحة  
Da هي أولا [هي أولى | AsYi والخاصة [فالخاصة | om. No للإنسان 43 om. Lat. الإنسان 42  
أحد الخمسة على ما ذكرناه وأما من حيث هي أولى بأن NoG om. NoG أولى... أن | JAsMiŠ بأن [أن 44  
Yi ذكرنا [ذكرناه | T وهي om. Da هي | om. As تكون... 45 إحدى | add. in mg. G يكون  
om. Di om. et add. in mg. As om. التي | vacuum E المداومة 45 Te هو [هي<sup>2</sup> | Te و [وأما  
A كذا [الذي<sup>2</sup> | a.c. G وإن [إن 47 om. Da خاصة 46 § يجمع [لجميع

### [1.3.2. Criticism of the position of the group of philosophers]

This claim, [however], is weak, and does not signify the thing in the light of its being common or proper and of its universality, but according to another aspect, and the name of “common accident” is made redundant, for the common accident is posed in opposition to the proprium, and since the proprium is only suitable to be a proprium because it belongs to one species only, then the common is only suitable to be common because it belongs to more than one species only. Hence, it is not suitable to consider the most proper of the three ways in which the word “proprium” is employed as signifying the notion that is one of the five [utterances].

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### [1.4. Porphyry’s division]

This most common use considers the propria as divided into four classes: a proprium that belongs to the species and to something else, like biped for man with respect to horse, and, more suitable of that, what belongs to the whole species, and the proprium that belongs to the species only, which may either be in such a way that it belongs to the whole of it or not to the whole of it, like the capability of sailing and of cultivating for man. What belongs to the whole of it is either persistent every time, like the fact that man is capable of laughing or biped by his own nature, or it is not persistent, like youth for man, so that the proprium insofar as it is the most worth of being one of the five [utterances] is what we mentioned, and insofar as it is the most worth of being a proprium, it is the necessarily persisting [proprium] that belongs to the complex of the species at every time. There is no mutual contradiction between our claim that this is a true proprium, with regard to its properly belonging to the species, though it is not the one resulting from the division of the five [utterances], and our claim

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Q85

الخمسة فهو خاصة حقيقية؛ فإنّ الذي هو خاصة حقيقية بحسب ذلك ليس هو الذي هو الخاصة الحقيقية باختصاصه بالنوع. واعلم أنّ الخاصة التي هي إحدى الخمسة هي الضحك لا الضحك والملاح لا الملاح، وعلى ما قيل في الفصل، وإن كنا نتجاوز في الاستعمال أحيانا فنأخذ الضحك مكان ذلك.

(2.1) وأما العرض العام فهو المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع لا بالذات، وهو أيضا كالأبيض لا كالبياض.

(2.2) وليس هذا العرض هو العرض الذي يناظر الجوهر كما يظنه أكثر الناس؛ فإنّ ذلك لا يحمل على موضوعه بأنه هو، بل يشتق له منه الاسم. وهذه الخمسة حملها حمل واحد، كما قد سلف لك مرارا. والعرض العام الذي هاهنا هو كالأبيض وكالواحد وما أشبه ذلك، فإنك تقول: زيد أبيض، أي زيد شيء ذو بياض، والشيء ذو البياض محمولٌ حملا صادقا على زيد؛ والشيء ذو البياض ليس بعرض بالمعنى الذي يناظر الجوهر، بل البياض هو العرض بذلك

49 ذلك] 52... واعلم 49 Cf. IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī*, p. 141.15-17.

55 وليس 57... وليس 55 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Maqūlāt* I.3, p. 27.10-11; *al-Ġadal* I.7, p. 70.9-11; *al-Nafs* I.1, p. 10.4-6; *Naḡāt* p. 12.7-10; *Mantiq al-Mašriqiyyīn*, p. 28.14-18; *Isārāt*, p. 244.3-4.

48 : TTe (exp. postea) يوشك أن يكون فإن الذي هو خاصة حقيقية [حقيقية... فإن | Ka فإنه فإن 48 ... ليس | S وليس | ليس | add. No يوشك أن يكون بحسب ذلك ذلك] 49 om. vpEAsDiDaToŠEd. add. in يوشك أن يكون بحسب ذلك ليس هو الذي هو الخاصة الحقيقية باختصاصه بالنوع om. et النوع Di add. النوع [إحدى 50 T بالخاصة] الخاصة | S J om. et add. in mg. N | هو<sup>2</sup>] om. et والملاح [والملاح | om. N هي<sup>2</sup> | Law الألفاظ الخمسة المفردة JADaEd الخمس [εES] الخمسة om. E ذلك... 52 وإن | πJ على [وعلى 51 Law والكاتب لا الكتابة] الملاح... 51 والملاح | To om. T om. المقول | Yi العرض [العام 53 Law بدل الضحك] مكان ذلك | A الضحك [الضحك 52 منه] منه... 57 له 56 om. A هو العرض | J لهذا [هذا 55 om. Da أيضا 54 et add. in mg. Te om. et add. s.l. E om. DiN | سلف] سلف | om. et add. s.l. E om. DiN | Ka لك om. et add. s.l. | Y الأبيض add. A لا كالبياض add. s.l. NkC لا كالبياض [كالبياض] الذي 58 S No والبياض [البياض... 60 ذو] ذو... 60 ذو | om. et add. in mg. Y | G يشبه [البياض | in mg. G زيد et شيء [زيد | T محمولا : add. Da على زيد [محمول 60 N بياض iter الجوهر | iter. a.c. B بالمعنى 61 om. et add. in mg. To البياض... 61 ليس | N بياض No [الناقض vel المناظر scil. «est contrarium»] البياض | Lat.

that what results from the division of the five [utterances] is a true proprium, for what is a true proprium in virtue of that, is not the true proprium in virtue of its properly belonging to the species. You should know that the proprium that is one of the five [utterances] is “capable of laughing” and not “laughter”, and “capable of sailing”, not “capability of sailing”, also according to what was said with regard to the differentia, even if occasionally we tolerate [it] in the use, so that we assume “laughter” instead of that. 50

## **[2. Distinction between accident and accidental]**

### **[2.1. Definition of the common accident]**

As to the common accident, it is *what is predicated of many [items] differing in species not essentially*; this, as well<sup>1</sup>, is like “white” and not like “whiteness”.

### **[2.2. The notion meant by the term “accident” is rather that of “accidental”]**

This accident is not the one that is opposed to substance, as most people believe, since that [accident] is not predicated of its subject because it is so<sup>2</sup>, but rather the subject derives its own name from it<sup>3</sup>. The way these five [predicables] are predicated is one and the same, as it has already been explained to you [several] times. The common accident that is here [dealt with] is like “white”, “one” and the like, since you say “Zayd is white”, namely “Zayd is a thing provided with whiteness”, and “thing provided with whiteness” is rightly predicated of Zayd, but “thing provided with whiteness” is not an accident in the sense that is opposed to the substance: rather “whiteness” is the 55 60

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<sup>1</sup>) Avicenna says “as well” because the same remark was previously made with regard to the proprium (*Madḥal* I.14, §1.4) and with regard to differentia specifica (*Madḥal* I.13, §6). | <sup>2</sup>) I.e. synonymously. | <sup>3</sup>) I.e. it is predicated paronymously of its subject.

المعنى. وكذلك نقول إن الجسم محدث وقديم، وليس القديم أو المحدث جنسا ولا فصلا ولا خاصة ولا نوعاً للجسم، بل من جملة هذا الصنف من المحمولات، وليس المحدث عرضاً بهذا المعنى، وإلا لكان الجسم موصوفاً بالعرض من غير اشتقاق، فكان الجسم عرضاً؛ بل معنى العرض هاهنا العرضي، وإن كان ليس بعرض بالمعنى الآخر؛ فمن العرضي ما هو خاص ومنه ما هو عام؛ فإنّ العرضي بإزاء الذاتي والجوهري، والعرض بإزاء الجوهر. والذاتي قد يكون عرضاً كجنس العرض كاللون للبياض، وقد يكون جوهرًا، والعرضي قد يكون عرضاً وقد يكون جوهرًا؛ وفي هذا الموضع إنما نغنى بالعرض العرضي.

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(2.3) ولم تعلم بعد حال العرض الذي هو نظير الجوهر، وهذا شيء لم يلتفت إليه أول من قدم معرفة هذه الخمسة على المنطق، بل جعل للعرض العام حدوداً مشهورة مثل قولهم إن العرض هو الذي يكون ويفسد من غير فساد الموضوع أي حامله؛ ومثل قولهم: هو

75

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 12.24-25. ومثل 75... مثل 74 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 13.3-4.

63... القديم | YiG أو قديم [وقديم | Lat. [نقول] «dicimus» تقول | S ذلك ك و لذلك [وكذلك 62 in mg. ولا A القديم ولا المحدث AsDa القديم والمحدث No القديم أو محدث v المحدث أو القديم [المحدث فكالجسم ك وكان الجسم [فكان الجسم 65 π ولا نوعاً ولا خاصة [نوعاً... جولا | om. C جولا 63 NkC JNo العرض [العرضي 67 Yi عرضاً CNo بعرضي [بعرض | iter. No هاهنا العرضي 66 C Y والعرضي [والعرض | Di الجوهري والذاتي [الذاتي والجوهري 68 Ka ما ما هو [أما هو add. Law كالحيوان للإنسان [جوهرًا | S جوهرًا Law عرضياً [عرضاً | ع فالعرضي [والعرضي 70 العرضي | Da بالعرضي [بالعرض 71 p.c. G وفي πJY ففي [وفي | S عرضاً add. Law ذو بياض om. S على المنطق | add. To بل جعل [الخمسمة | praem. E و [أول | s.l. N إليه 73 Da العرض S ثم جعل i.l. Di بل جعل E قد جعل vJDIToMiG ثم أن [جعل 74... بل | N على النطق : γAEd. ومثل هذا قولهم [ومثل قولهم | om. γpE add. in mg. J أي 75

i.l. Di كالسريع للحركة [عرضاً 70

The expression (*fasād al-mawḍū 'i ay hāmilihi*) qualifies the subject as a subject of inherence of the accident. A part of the manuscript tradition witnesses the more concise version of the clause: (*fasād) hāmilihi*, which would match Avicenna's *usus* (cf. *Naḡāt* p. 24, again with regard to accidents).

accident [meant] in this sense. Analogously, you say that the body is created and eternal; “eternal” and “created” are not a genus, nor a differentia, nor a proprium nor a species for the body, but rather belong to this class of predicates<sup>4</sup>. “Created” is not an accident according to this notion<sup>5</sup>, otherwise the body would be qualified by the accident not paronymously, so that the body would be an accident<sup>6</sup>. On the contrary, the notion of “accident” that is here [meant] is [that of] “accidental”, even if it is not an accident according to the other notion, so that “accidental” can be either proper or common; in fact, “accidental” is opposed to “essential” and “substantial”, whereas “accident” is opposed to “substance”. The essential can either be an accident<sup>7</sup>, like the genus of the accident for the accident, like “colour” for “whiteness”, or be a substance, and the accidental can either be an accident or a substance; in this place, we only mean by “accident” the accidental<sup>8</sup>.

### [2.3. Porphyry did not explain the distinction between accident and accidental]

You did not learn yet the state of the accident that is opposed to substance, but this is something that the first who made the knowledge of these five [predicables] precede the [whole] logic<sup>9</sup> did not consider. Rather, he assigned to the common accident [some] generally acknowledged definitions, like their statement: [(1)] “the accident is what may come to be and be corrupted without the corruption of the subject, i.e. its bearer”<sup>10</sup>, or like their statement: [(2)] “[the accident]

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<sup>4</sup>) I.e. that of common accidents. | <sup>5</sup>) I.e. not according to the notion of the ontological accident opposed to substance. | <sup>6</sup>) An ontological accident, i.e. an item falling under one of the nine accidental categories, which is not true, since, arguably, ‘body’ fits rather in the category of substance. | <sup>7</sup>) An ontological accident. | <sup>8</sup>) The logical accident. | <sup>9</sup>) I.e. Porphyry. | <sup>10</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 12.24-25 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1086.5).

الذي يمكن أن يوجد لشيء واحد بعينه وأن لا يوجد، وأنه الذي ليس بجنس ولا فصل ولا خاصة ولا نوع وهو أبداً قائم في موضوع.

(3.1) فلنتأمل هذه الحدود والرسوم المشهورة. فأما الأول فإن فيه وجوها من الخلل، أحدها أنه لم يذكر فيه المعنى الذي كالجنس له وقد أشرنا إلى مثل ذلك في بعض حدود الفصل.

80

والخلل الثاني أنه إن عني بالكون والفساد حال ما يكون ويفسد في الوجود، فالأعراض العامة الغير المفارقة ليست كذلك، وهم مُقَرَّرُونَ أنّ من العرض العام ما هو مفارق ومنه ما هو غير مفارق. وإن عني ما يكون في الوجود والوهم جميعاً، فقد استعمل لفظاً مشتركاً عنده؛ فإن لفظة "يكون" وقوعها على الموجود وعلى المتوهم عنده إنما هو بالاشتباه، وهذا مما حذروا عنه؛ وسيوضح لك ذلك فيما بعد.

85

وبعد ذلك، فإن من الأمور العرضية التي ليست بذاتية ما إذا رفع بالتوهم استحالة أن يكون الشيء قد بقي موجوداً غير فاسد، كما قد مر لك فيما سلف. نعم، ربما لم يستحل أن يتوهمه الوهم باقياً بعده لم يفسد، وهذا غير مذكور في هذا الرسم.

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76 وأنه... [موضوع 77] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 13.4-5 (cf. ARIST., *Top.* 103b7-19).

في الموضوع [في موضوع | *vacuum post rel.* J قائم 77 *om. C* الذي | *As* موجود [يوجد 76  
N 80 مثل *om. Da* | بعض [بعض | *ηN* نقض | بعض 81 *§* بعض نقض *om. TDaYi* | إن 81  
82... في | *in mg. C* ينسد E ويستيه [ويفسد | *a.c. Yi* أعني [عني | *Te* | *om. et add. in mg.*  
وهم E وهؤلاء يقرّون [وهم مُقَرَّرُونَ | *add. κ* العامة [المفارقة | *om. κ* العامة 82  
BG العامي [العام | *om. et add. s.l. Di* أن من 83 *§* هولاء *et* وهم مقرون *in mg. To*  
ليس [مفارق... هو<sup>2</sup> | *om. Yi* ما هو | *om. et add. in mg. G* مفارق... ومنه | *s.l. Nk*  
معا [جميعاً | *Da* في الوهم والوجود [والوهم... في 84 *Yi* وأعني A فإن عني [وإن عني | *§*  
وقوعه [وقوعها | *E* وإن *s.l. η* وإن *et* كان [فإن 85 *κ* عندهم [عنده | *iter. A* فقد | *a.c. Da*  
[*scil.* «*aequivoce secundum participationem*» [بالاشتباه 86 *Yi* على κ و [وعلى | *EG*  
[الأمر 87 *Yi* من بعد [بعد | *a.c. N* حدوا *praem. κDiYG* قد T حدوا [حذروا | *Lat.* [بالاشتراك  
وهذا 90 *κ* قد سلف [سلف | *s.l. §* بين [مر 89 *om. Ed.* قد<sup>2</sup> 88 *§* مما *Yi* اما [ما | *Yi* الأمر  
*iter. C*

might either belong or not belong to one and the same thing”<sup>11</sup>, and [(3)] “it is neither a genus, nor a differentia, nor a proprium, nor a species, and it is always subsistent in a subject”<sup>12</sup>.

### [3. Porphyry’s descriptions of “accident”]

#### [3.1. The first description]

Let us [now] consider these commonly-acknowledged definitions and descriptions. As to the first one, it presents [several] aspects of error, the first of which consists in that it does not contain any mention of the notion that is like a genus for it; we already pointed to something like this with regard to certain definitions of the differentia<sup>13</sup>. 80

The second error consists in the fact that, if by “coming to be” and “corruption” the state of what comes to be and is corrupted in the existence is meant, then the inseparable common accidents are not in this way, although they establish that among the common accidents there is what is separable and what is inseparable. If, [on the other hand], what exists both in the existence and in the conception is meant, then he<sup>14</sup> employed an utterance that is equivocal for him, since, according to him, the utterance “comes to be” applies to what exists and to what is conceived only by similarity, and this is among that against which they warned [us]; this will be explained to you in what follows. 85

Moreover, among the accidental things that are not essential there is what is in such a way that, when it is removed in the conception, it is impossible for the thing [in which it inheres] to stay existent without being corrupted, as it has already been explained to you in what preceded<sup>15</sup>. Admittedly, sometimes it is not impossible that the conception conceives it as persisting and not corrupted after this, but this is not mentioned in this description. 90

<sup>11</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 13.3-4 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1086.9-10). | <sup>12</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 13.4-5 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1086.10-11). | <sup>13</sup>) In *Madḥal* I.13, §3.2.2. | <sup>14</sup>) I.e. Porphyry. | <sup>15</sup>) In *Madḥal* I.6, §6.3.

(3.2) وتجد هذه المغامز كلها محصلة في الرسم الثاني؛ فإنّ كثيرا من الأعراض لازمة دائمة، والدائم لا يكون ممكنا أن لا يوجد إلا في الوهم؛ ولم يشترط الوهم، وفي اشتراط الوهم أيضا ما قلنا.

(3.3.1) وأما الرسم السلبي الثالث، فإنّ الشخص من الأعراض يشارك فيه [والطبائع من حيث هي طبائع لا من حيث هي كلية] فإنّ الحقّ به أنه كلي بهذه الصفة خص العرض العام. لكن صاحب هذا القول قد الحقّ به شيئا، وهو أنه قائم في موضوع، وإنما الحقّ هذا إذ ظنّ أنّ هذا العرض الذي هو أحد الخمسة هو العرض الذي يناظر الجوهر.

95

[sic]; ان Te vacuum et إلا أن [أن 92 A كثير [كثيرا | in mg. G حصلتة JG محصلا [محصلة 91 قلنا | om. N الوهم... وفي | Yi أو في [وفي | om. No الوهم... ولم 93 As إلا أن fort. a.c. ع قلناه vBTAsDaSMi : habet sed signa كلية... والطبائع | To E om. et add. s.l. منه [فيه 95 ع قلناه add. et exp. Yi هذا إذ ظنّ أن هو العرض [به 96 λρKaCDiToS om. NkTe : superpon. الموضوع [موضوع | s.l. § أبدا ع أبدا قائم : Da قائم [أنه قائم | om. et add. in mg. As الحق 97 om. Di هذا<sup>2</sup> | a.c. As إذا TTeNo إذا [إذ 98 § add. s.l. به : Yi : om. T : add. به [الحق | Yi om. No الذي<sup>2</sup> | § add. et exp. العام لكن صاحب الكتاب [العرض

The lack of the clause concerning natures qua natures in part of the tradition cannot be dismissed as the result of a mere accidental omission (there are not, for instance, evident reasons for its mechanic omission). At the same time, its presence in the other manuscripts can hardly be considered as the result of a merely scribal interpolation, given its content (cf. point b). There are both a (a) syntactical and a (b) content issue at stake: (a) from a syntactical point of view, the clause is a bit problematic: the clause, as it is, requires an unexpressed فيه تشارك , whose subject are the natures qua natures; an alternative, plainer arrangement of the phrase could have been something of the sort:

وأما الرسم السلبي الثالث، فيشارك فيه الشخص من الأعراض والطبائع من حيث هي طبائع، لا من حيث هي كلية؛ فإنّ الحقّ به أنه كلي بهذه الصفة، خص العرض العام.

(b) The remark seems slightly out of context, for the status of natures qua natures is not discussed in the chapter. However, the remark seemingly aims at stating that also the natures qua natures (i.e. independently from the possibility of considering them as universal natures) are neither a genus, nor a species, nor a differentia, nor a proprium (since these are accidents occurring to them in conceptualization; cf. *Madhal* I.12, p. 65.8-66.4 Cairo ed. and *Burhān* II.4, pp. 144.15-145-6), and that they subsist in a subject (i.e. the individuals).

### [3.2. The second description]

You will find all these shortcomings occurring in the second description [as well], since many accidents are necessarily concomitant and permanent, and it is not possible for what is permanent not to exist, unless in the conception; he, however, did not impose the conception as a condition, and as to what concerns the condition of the conception, what we said [is still valid in this case] too.

### [3.3. The third description]

#### [3.3.1. Porphyry's statement]

As to the third negative description, the individual accident shares it {and the natures inasmuch as they are natures, not inasmuch as they are universal}, but if one adds to it that “it is universal in this way”, [then the description] refers specifically to the common accident. However, the author of this statement<sup>16</sup> added to it something [else], namely that [the accident] *is subsisting in a subject*, and he added this only because he believed this accident, that is one of the five [predicables], to be the accident that is opposed to the substance.

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<sup>16</sup>) I.e. Porphyry.



**[3.3.2. The defence of Porphyry's statement by some commentators]**

They<sup>17</sup> said that the use of this addition of him is that of distinguishing between the common accident and the non-signifying utterance, as if someone said: “*faṣḍabān*”, but this is an ingenuity. This because, by “what is not a genus” it is only meant an utterance signifying a universal notion which is neither the notion of a genus, nor that of a species, nor that of a differentia, nor that of a proprium, so that the non-signifying utterance does not participate in this [description], because in the utterance “accident” it is not defined this audible [utterance] so that, if he said that it is neither a genus, nor a species, nor a differentia, nor a proprium, another utterance that does not signify anything would participate with it in this utterance, so that it is necessary to introduce a differentiation between the one and the other. If, then, this utterance were only meant qua audible [utterance],

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<sup>17</sup>) Likely, Baḡdād Peripatetics: the argument here contested coincides with the one recorded in a marginal note in MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 154<sup>r</sup> (= Dimašqī's translation of the *Isagoge*, p. 1086, n. 2).

هو مسموع، لكان يشاركه في أنه ليس بجنس ولا فصل ولا نوع ولا خاصة ألفاظ أخرى مسموعة مما هي دالة.

Lat. [ولا نوع ولا فصل] «nec species nec differentia» [نوع... لا] | om. εE ولا فصل 108  
 [دالة] | 0KaNkAC في مسموعه [مسموعة] | θ آخر [أخرى] | add. tEY ولا فصل [خاصة] 109  
 تمت η أكمل الحمد والفضل كما هو أهله تمت المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول ولواهب العقل. explicit add.  
 وقد JG تمت المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من المنطق والله أعلم Da المقالة الأولى باسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
 تمت المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول والحمد A تمت المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول والله الحمد E تمت المقالة الأولى  
 تمت المقالة الأولى K تمت المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول T لواهب العقل كما هو أهله وهو حسنى ونعم الوكيل  
 والله ToS تمت المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من المنطق والله أعلم بالصواب Di من الفن الأول من المنطق  
 تمت المقالة Yi تمت المقالة الأولى من الفن الأول من المنطق ولواهب العقل الحمد بلا نهاية Mi تعالى أعلم  
 --- S الأولى من الفن الأول من المنطق من كتاب الشفاء والحمد لله رب العلمين وصلوته على نبيه محمد  
 0KaY

then other audible utterances among what is signifying would participate with it in the fact that they are neither a genus, nor a differentia, nor a species, nor a proprium.

## [ المقالة الثانية ]

### [ الفصل الأول ]

## فصل في المشاركات والمباينات بين هذه الخمسة وأولها بعد العامّة ما بين الجنس والفصل

5 (1.1) إنّ في الوقوف على ما فصلناه من أمر هذه الخمسة غنى للمحصلين عن إيراد المشاركات والمباينات بين هذه الخمسة، لكنه قد جرت العادة في الكتب المدخلية بإيراد ذلك، فلنحتذ في ذلك حدّوهم، ولنقتصر على ما أوردوه منه، ولنبدأ بالمشاركات فنقول إنّ المشاركة التي تعم الخمسة هي أنها كلية أي مقولة على كثيرين. [وإذا

8 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 13.10. [كثيرين 9... إنّ 8

om. κ العامة 4... وأولها | Mi الفصل الأول من المقالة الثانية من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق [فصل 3 [فصلناه | κ اعلم أنّ 5 إنّ Te وما [ما 4 Yi ما بعد [بعد | add. in mg. Te وأولها بعد العامة فيما To برا [إيراد 7 As من [عن 6 § in mg. Y غنا [غنى | add. s.l. B κKaBADaNo فصلنا § فيذا [وإذا | s.l. § أنها [أي | To<sup>2</sup> أوردوه [أوردوه | κ حدوهم [حدوهم 8 § om. et add. in mg. S... بالمشاركات | To<sup>2</sup> أوردوه [أوردوه | om. Yi 9 هي om. To add. s.l. To<sup>2</sup> المشاركة 9... فنقول exp. Y om. ζLawLat.G add. in mg. G الكلية 11... وإذا

9 [الكلية 11... وإذا] The remark, which sounds as a repetition of what was already stated in chap. I.13, §3.2.2 and I.14, §3.1, is not uniformly transmitted in the manuscript tradition: family ζ and most of family o (represented by MS G and by early witnesses such as the Latin translation and Lawkarī's quote in the *Bayān al-Ḥaqq*) do not preserve it. There might be stylistic reasons to suspect that the clause: the expression *mušannif al-Madḥal* is quite peculiar, if compared to Avicenna's *usus scribendi*, given that it would be the only occurrence of the clause in Avicenna's works, and that Porphyry's *Isagoge* is normally referred to as *Īsāgūgī* rather than as *Madḥal*. Although it cannot be excluded that Avicenna referred once to Porphyry's *Isagoge* as *Madḥal*, it is nonetheless quite a remarkable exception. Porphyry is rarely referred to in an explicit manner by Avicenna's part, especially in *Madḥal*; in fact, he is explicitly mentioned as *ṣāhib Īsāgūgī* ("the author of the *Isagoge*") in *Madḥal* I.13, §4.3 and in *Īsārāt* II.11 (p. 220.11) but, more often, he is simply referred to as *al-raḡul* ("the man") or by means of periphrases. Admittedly, Avicenna must be referring to Porphyry in the context, though he speaks in a quite general way of a plurality of philosophers. The abrupt shifting between a plural and generic reference (*awradū*, "they mentioned") to a very specific singular one (*wa-idā tarafa bi-hādā mušannif al-Madḥal*, "and since the author of *Madḥal* admitted this...") seems quite out of place from a stylistic point of view, given that all the other critical references in the chapter, though evidently referred to Porphyry, are expressed by plural references.

## [II.1]

Q91            **CHAPTER ON THE SHARED FEATURES AND THE DIVERGENCES  
BETWEEN THESE FIVE [PREDICABLES], THE FIRST ONES OF WHICH,  
AFTER THE [FEATURE] COMMON [TO ALL OF THEM], ARE THOSE  
BETWEEN GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA**

**[1. Shared features between all the five universals]****[1.1. All the five predicables are universal]**

In order to understand what we presented [so far] about these five 5  
[predicables] it is not necessary for those who acquire knowledge [of  
them] to introduce the shared features and the divergences between  
these five [predicables], but it has become customary to introduce this  
[matter] in the introductory books, so let us follow their example in  
this [regard], confining ourselves to what they mentioned of this  
[matter], and let us start with the shared features by saying that the  
shared feature that is common to [all] the five [predicables] consists in  
the fact that *they are universal, i.e. predicated of many [items]*<sup>1</sup>. {If the  
author of the *Isagoge*<sup>2</sup> acknowledges this [point], he has also 10

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<sup>1</sup>) See Porphy., *Isag.*, p. 13.10 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1087.5). | <sup>2</sup>) I.e. Porphyry.

اعترف بهذا مُصَنَّف المدخل فقد اعترف بنقص الرسوم التي للفصل  
والخاصة والعرض إذ أغفل فيها ذكر الكلية.] 10

(1.2) وتشترك جميعها في شيء آخر وهو أنّ كل ما يحمل على  
المحمول منها الحمل الذي يحمل به المحمول على موضوعه فإنه يحمل  
على موضوعه؛ فطبيعة جنس الجنس محمولة على ما يحمل عليه  
الجنس، وكذلك جنس الفصل وفصل الفصل وكذلك ما يحمل على  
الخاصة والعرض؛ فإنّ الملون الذي هو جنس الأبيض يحمل على زيد  
الأبيض إذ يحمل على عرضه العام؛ وكذلك المرئي الذي هو عرض  
الأبيض يحمل على زيد الأبيض إذ يقال «والأبيض مرئي»؛ وكذلك  
المتعجب الذي هو جنس الضحك، فإنّ جميع هذه يحمل بالتواطؤ،  
أي تعطي ما تحمل عليه أسماءها وحدودها. 15 20

Cf. ARIST., *Cat.*, 1a20-b9 and 1b10-13. [موضوعه 14... وتشترك 12

*al-Šifā'*, *al-Maqūlāt* I.2, p. 15.10-15; cf. *al-Maqūlāt* I.3, pp. 22.18-23.9; *Isārāt*, p. 245.1-6.

[جميعها 12 *om. et add. s.l. Yi* 11 بنقض Ka ببعض [ينقص | Š اعرف] اعترف 10  
يحمل به [يحمل | Law منه إبه | *om. Yi* الحمل 13 *om.* يحمل 13... على | JEDaG جميعا  
فطبيعة Da وطبيعة [فطبيعة | TTe موضوعه فإنه يحمل على موضوعه [موضوعه 14 TTe المحمول  
على | N ولذلك] وكذلك | *s.l. N om. Ka* جنس | JG فذلك [أو كذلك 15 J محمول [محمولة | C  
*add. et* عام [عرض | *LawLat.G add. in mg. G* العام... إذ | Ka أي [إذ 17 JA عليه  
*add.* إذ يحمل على عرضه العام : *Law om.* 12 الأبيض | *κSMiŠ* للأبيض [الأبيض 18 *exp. E*  
*add. et exp. J* «quoniam praedicatur de eius accidente communi» *add. Lat.* | يقال  
Ed. γ لزيد الأبيض [والأبيض | *in mg. NkB* يقال والأبيض مرئي [يقال |  
J وإن [فإن 19 N وكذا T فذلك [وكذلك | Š للأبيض Yi الأبيض A لزيد والأبيض  
[اسمه وحده] «nomen suum et diffinitionem» εE اسمه وحده [أسماءها وحدودها 20 Š هذا [هذه  
*in mg. Di* أسماؤها وحدودها *Lat.*

*in mg. NkB* افهم ذلك الحمل بعينه [يقال 18

The position of this remark is floating in part of the tradition; although the reasons are obscure, a merely polygenetic omission of the clause and its subsequent insertion in the text at the wrong place in that part of the tradition seems not to be a fully satisfying explanation in this case. It might be worth to make the hypothesis that the explanatory clause was absent at a first stage of composition and was added to the text at a second moment, either by the author or as a result of the scholarly activity of his entourage; the fact that part of the tradition departs from the rest in the position of the insertion of the clause at stake might provide us with a clue of what happened.

acknowledged the defect of the descriptions of the differentia, the proprium and the accident, since he forgot to mention universality in them}.

**[1.2. All the five predicables are synonymously predicated]**

All of them also share another feature, namely that everything is predicated of the predicate among them the way the predicate is predicated of its subject, is also predicated of its subject, so that the nature of the genus' genus is predicated of that of which the genus is predicated, and similarly [in the case of] the differentia's genus and the differentia's differentia, and so what is predicated of proprium and accident. "Coloured", which is the genus of "white", is predicated of "the white Zayd", since it is predicated of its common accident; analogously, "visible", that is the accident of "white", is predicated of "the white Zayd", since it can be said: "the white is visible" [as well]; similarly, "amazed", that is the genus of "capable of laughing". All these [predicates] are synonymously predicated, i.e. provide their names and definitions to that of which they are predicated.

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(2.1) والجنس والفصل يعمهما في المشهور أنّ طبيعة الجنس يجب فيها أن تقال على أنواع، وإن لم يجب ذلك فيها، فليس ذلك يمتنع فيها، وعلى الشرط الذي ستفهمه وقتا ما. وكذلك ليس يمتنع في طبيعة الفصل أن يقال على غير نوعه، لكن على هذا ما فرغنا عن ذكره سالفًا. وقد مثلوا لذلك الناطق، فإنه يحوي أنواعًا، وقد علمت ما في هذا؛ ومع ما قد علمت فلم يُحسنوا في إيرادهم هذا المثال، فإنّ الناطق إنما يحوي أنواعًا كثيرة ليست هي الأنواع القريبة منه، بل هي أنواع النوع الواحد الذي قومه الناطق عندهم حين أضيف إلى الحي؛ وهذا أيضا قد فرغنا منه. فإن لم يعنوا بذلك الأنواع القريبة، بل أي أنواع كانت، فيجب أن لا ينسوا هذا حين يشاركون بين الجنس والنوع، فإنّ من الأنواع ما يحوي أنواعًا، ولا يجعلون هذا مشاركة بين الجنس والنوع.

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(2.2) والمشاركة الثانية المشهورة هي أنّ الجنس والفصل يشتركان في أن كل ما يحمل عليهما من طريق ما هو فإنه يحمل على ما تحتها من الأنواع. وقد علمت أنّ هذه المشاركة ليست تخص الجنس والفصل، بل هذه عامة، إلا أن يقال إنّ ما يحمل عليهما من طريق ما هو يحمل على ما تحتها من طريق ما هو. وهذا شيء لم ينطق به

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PORPH., Isag., pp. 13.23-14.3. 33... الجنس 22... والجنس 21  
Isag., p. 14.3-5.

ذلك... فيها | ع. om. 2 فيها | om. DaYi | ذلك | om. 3 ثلاثة [أنواع] 22 J يعمها [يعمهما] 21  
in على أنواع وإن لم يجب ذلك فيها فليس ذلك يمتنع فيها om. sed ذلك | om. To add. in mg. To<sup>2</sup> |  
om. Lat. G ما... فيها | JMiŠ فيها على Di على [فيها وعلى] 23 Ka بممتنع [بممتنع] | om. Yi mg. Y om. Yi  
أن يقال [يقال] 24... في | Ka بممتنع [بممتنع] | E ليس ذلك [ليس] | J تفهمه [ستفهمه] | G add. in mg. G  
[ذلك] 25 As من [عن] | E add. et exp. هذا [لكن] | To ذلك نوعه [نوعه] 24 N في طبيعة الفصل  
منه 27 No ولم [فلم] | J add. s.l. J<sup>2</sup> ما | ع هذا الموضوع [هذا] 26 A بالناطق [الناطق] | KaA ذلك  
E حتى [حين] | G om. et add. s.l. G Da om. et add. s.l. G عندهم [عندهم] | E التي [الذي] 28 B om. et add. s.l. B  
عنه [منه] | om. N أيضا | om. Lat. منه... وهذا | Y om. et add. s.l. Y وهذا | E الحشم [الحي] 29  
حتى [حين] | Nk om. et add. s.l. Nk هذا | Da ينسبوا [ينسوا] | S نوع [أنواع] 30 S فلم [فإن لم] | iE  
EYi هو [هي] | N s.l. N المشهورة 33 J النوع [الأنواع] | Yi النوع والجنس [الجنس والنوع] 31 Da  
[من] | J add. et exp. من يحمل [تحتها] 37 Y om. إن 36 To<sup>2</sup> المشاركة [المشارك] 35  
3 om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup> ما هو | G add. et exp. طريق يحمل على ما تحتها

## [2. Shared features between genus and differentia]

### [2.1. First shared feature: genus and differentia are predicated of many species]

Q92 It is commonly acknowledged that the genus and the differentia share the fact that it is necessary, with regard to the nature of the genus, that it is predicated of [more] species, and if this is not necessary with regard to it, nonetheless it is not impossible, also according to the condition that you will learn at a certain moment. Similarly, it is not impossible for the nature of the differentia to be predicated of [something] other than its species, but against this [point] there is what we already mentioned exhaustively in what preceded. 25 They posited as an example for this: “rational”, since it encompasses [more] species<sup>3</sup>, and you have already learned what [happens] with regard to this [point]<sup>4</sup>. Besides what you have already learned, they did not right in introducing this example, because “rational” only encompasses several species that are not its proximate species, but rather species of the only species that “rational” constituted, according to them, when it was related to “animal”; we already talked exhaustively about that as well<sup>5</sup>. If they do not mean, by this, the proximate species, but whatever [kind of] species, then they should not 30 forget this when they deal with the shared features of the genus and the species, since among the species [as well] there is what encompasses more species, but they do not consider this as a shared feature of the genus and the species.

### [2.2. Second shared feature: everything is essentially predicated of genus and differentia is also predicated of their species]

The second shared feature, according to the common belief, consists in that *the genus and the differentia share the fact that everything is predicated of them in the ‘what is it?’ is also predicated of the species [subsumed] under them*<sup>6</sup>. You have already learned that this shared 35 feature is not peculiar to the genus and the differentia, on the contrary, it is common [to all the five predicables], unless it is stated: “what is predicated of them in the ‘what is it?’ is [also] predicated of what is [ranged] under them in the ‘what is it?’”. This is something that was

<sup>3</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 13.23-14.3. | <sup>4</sup>) See *Madḥal* I.11, §4.3. | <sup>5</sup>) See *Madḥal* I.13, §4.3. | <sup>6</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 14.3-5 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1088.5-7).

مصرّحا، ولو نُطِقَ به لصحّ، إذا عني بالحمل من طريق ما هو غير ما  
نعني بالحمل في جواب ما هو، كما سنوضح لك عن قريب.

40 (2.3) والمشاركة الثالثة المشهورة أن رفعها علة رفع ما تحتهما من  
الأنواع؛ فإنه إذا رفعت الحيوانية والنطق ارتفع الإنسان والفرس وغير  
ذلك. وهذه المشاركة تابعة لمشاركة هي الأصل وهي أن كل واحد  
منهما جزء ماهية النوع ومقوم له، فهذا هو الأصل وذلك الفرع،  
وهذه خاصية مشتركة بين الجنس والفصل لا توجد لغيرهما.

45 (3.1) وأما الخواص التي يباين بها الجنس غيره، فأول المشهورات  
منها هو أنّ الجنس يحمل على أكثر مما يحمل عليه الفصل والنوع  
والخاصة والعرض. أمّا أنّ الجنس أكثر حوياً من الفصل والنوع  
والخاصة فهو أمر ظاهر؛ فإنّ الخاصة تخص النوع؛ وكذلك الفصل  
[ولكن بشرط لم يشترطه، وهو أن يقايس بين الجنس وبين فصل  
تحتة وخاصة تحته]. وأما العرض فليس بيتاً بنفسه أنه يجب أن  
يكون أقل من الجنس، وذلك أنّ خواص المقولات العشر التي

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 14.10-12. 46... الجنس PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 14.14-15. ذلك 42... رفعهما 40

40... والمشاركة 44... لغيرهما 44 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Madḥal* I.6, §3.1.

MiEd. *s.l.* N ما يعنى [نعني 39...<sup>2</sup> ما | *om. et add. s.l.* §<sup>3</sup> بالحمل 39... من | E إذ [إذا 38  
علة لرفع As رفع علة [علة رفع 40 *s.l.* §<sup>3</sup> قريب § كتب [قريب | A ذلك [لك | Ka طريق [جواب 39  
[ومقوم 43 Yi وأن [وهي أن | πLawJEDiY وهو [وهي 42 *om. et add. s.l.* G فإنه 41 Law  
*in mg.* وذلك [وهذه 44 κπLawJEY وذلك هو *iter. As* وذلك | *s.l.* C له لها [له | Law ومقومة  
E أكثر ما : A أكثرهما [أكثر مما 46 *add. in mg. To<sup>2</sup>* خاصة [خاصية | *To<sup>2</sup>*  
*om. et add.* الخاصة 48... أمّا | *add. et exp. E* العام [والعرض 47 § ما [مما | *add. s.l.* Y : ما  
[الفصل والنوع | Yi جوابا [حوياً | *add. in mg. §<sup>3</sup>* الجنس *om. et add. in mg. §<sup>3</sup>* | *add. §* يكون [أنّ | *in mg. G*  
50... ولكن 49 κ *add.* والعرض [والخاصة 48 Lat. [النوع والفصل] «*species et differentia*»  
*om. et add. i.l.* هو [وهو | *om. T* لم يشترطه | No وليس [ولكن | *om. pE add. in mg. J* تحتة  
Ka ويخصه عنه *om. N* وخاصة تحته | *praem. Yi* الذي [تحتة 50 Yi والفصل [وبين فصل | Yi  
κC الذي [التي | Ka العشرة [العشر | As بأن [أنّ 51 *add. s.l. §<sup>3</sup>* κ *add.* العام [العرض

49... ولكن 50... تحتة 50... ولكن 49  
The clause is omitted in MSS JEG and in the Latin translation; on  
the possibility that it was not originally present in the text, cf. DI VINCENZO 2017, pp.  
40-43.

not explicitly formulated, but if it were formulated, then it would be correct, if by “predication in the ‘what is it?’” is meant something different than what we mean by “predication in answer to ‘what is it?’”, as it will be explained to you soon after<sup>7</sup>.

**[2.3. Third shared feature: removing genus and differentia causes the removal of their species too]**

The third shared feature, according to the common belief, consists in that *their removal is the cause of the removal of the species that are [subsumed] under them, since when animality and rationality are removed, “man”, “horse” and so on are removed as well*<sup>8</sup>. This shared feature is subsequent to the shared feature that is the principle, namely that each one of the two is a part of the species’ quiddity and is constitutive of it, so that this is the principle and that is the corollary, and this is a peculiarity shared by the genus and the differentia which does not belong to anything else.

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Q93

**[3. Divergences between genus and differentia]**

**[3.1. First divergence: the genus has a wider extension of predication than the other predicables]**

As to the properties in virtue of which the genus is distinguished from the other [predicables], the first among the commonly acknowledged consists in that *the genus is predicated of more [items] than those of which the differentia, the species, the proprium and the accident are predicated*<sup>9</sup>. The fact that the genus is more comprehensive than the differentia, the species and the proprium is something evident: the proprium specifically belongs to [its] species [only], and so does the differentia, {but according to a condition that he<sup>10</sup> did not posit, namely that the comparison is made between the genus and the differentia [subsumed] under it and the proprium [subsumed] under it}. As to what concerns the accident, [on the

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<sup>7</sup>) In *Madḥal* II.1, §3.4.2. | <sup>8</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 14.10-12 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1089.3-5). | <sup>9</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 14.14-15 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1089.7-8). | <sup>10</sup>) *Scil.* Porphyry.



contrary], it is not in itself evident that it must necessarily have a minor extension than genus; this because the propria of the ten categories, that we shall mention later, are common accidents for the categories' species, therefore being not minor in extension than the genus; on the contrary, among them there is something more common and greater [in extension], like the fact that the substance is established according to a unique definition in a way that it does not undergo the more and the less is more common than the substance. If someone said that this is a negative [attribute], and that no meaning is under it, it is still possible for us to find concomitants and accidents that are more common than each category, as one and being, or as coming to be, {or like motion, for it is greater [in extension] than the rational animal which is, according to him<sup>11</sup>, a genus for "man"}.

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**[3.2. Second divergence: the genus encompasses the differentia in potentiality but not the reverse]**

The second divergence between the genus and the differentia that was mentioned consists in that *the genus encompasses the differentia in potentiality*<sup>12</sup>, i.e. if you take into account the nature that is the subject for the generality, it is neither necessary to establish its

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<sup>11</sup>) I.e. Porphyry. | <sup>12</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 14.20-21 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1090.1-2).



differentia, nor it is impossible, on the contrary, it possibly belongs to the nature, so that its possibility does not fulfil the nature of the genus, but a differentia is left for what is opposite to it in its nature. This is the notion of including, since what includes is that which coincides with something in its entirety and exceeds it.

**[3.3. Third divergence: the genus is anterior than the differentia]**

The third divergence consists in that *the genus is prior to the differentia*<sup>13</sup>; this because the genus can either have or not have the designated differentia, whereas the differentia only exists in the genus. For this reason, *the nature of the genus is not removed by the removal of the nature of the differentia, whereas the nature of the differentia is removed by the removal of the nature of the genus*<sup>14</sup>. 65

Q94

With regard to these two divergences there is a point of doubt: among the differentiae there is what falls externally to the nature of the genus, like the divisibility into two equal parts, since it is the differentia of even, as it is believed, and falls externally from number. However, the answer to this will appear to you in other places<sup>15</sup>. 70

**[3.4. Fourth divergence: the genus is predicated in the “what is it?”, and the differentia in the “what sort of thing is it?”]**

**[3.4.1. Critical analysis of the divergence]**

And the fourth difference consists in that *the differentia is predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?”*, whereas *the genus is predicated in the “what is it?”*<sup>16</sup>. But this statement alone does not signify the divergence [between the genus and the differentia], because when two things are qualified by means of two different attributes this

<sup>13</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 14.21-22 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1090.3). | <sup>14</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 14.22-15.2 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1090.3-6). | <sup>15</sup>) In *Ĝadal* III.2, p. 175.12-15; cf. also *Ĝadal* V.2, p. 253.5-7. | <sup>16</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.2-4 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1090.7-8).

عمرو هي أن هذا حساس وذلك ناطق، أو أنّ هذا ملاح وذلك صائغ، لم يكن هذا القدر كافيا في التفريق، فإنّ الوصفين المختلفين في المفهوم ربما جاز أن يجتمعا، فلا يبعد أن يكون كونُ زيد حساسا - وإن كان في المفهوم مخالفا لكون عمرو ناطقا - هو مما لا يوجب أن يباين به زيد عمرا، فلا يستحيل أن يكون كل واحد منهما مع أنه حساس - ناطقا أيضا، لأنّ الأوصاف المختلفة المفهومات قد تجتمع في موصوف واحد؛ وكذلك الملاح والصائغ، بل يجب أن يكون بينهما قوة السلب، حتى يكون الحساس يلزمه أن لا يكون ناطقا والناطق أن لا يكون حساسا. ثم كون الجنس مقولا في جواب ما هو لا يمنع أن يكون مقولا في جواب أي شيء هو على أصول هؤلاء ولا بينهما قوة هذا السلب، فإنه لا يمتنع أن يكون ما يقوم ماهية الشيء يميزه عما ليست له تلك الماهية، حتى يكون بالقياس إلى ما يشترك فيه مقولا في جواب ما هو، وبالقياس إلى ما يفترق به مقولا في جواب أي شيء هو؛ فهذا القدر لا يمنع أن يكون جنس الشيء هو أيضا فصلا له باعتبارين، إن كانت المبينة المطلوبة هي هذه ولا يوجب أن لا يكون جنس الشيء البتة فصلا له. وأما أن يكون فصل الشيء جنس شيء آخر فذلك مما لا يمنعه فيما أقدر، وذلك كالحساس فإنه جنس بوجه للسميع والبصير، وفصل للحيوان.

٩٥ ق

وذلك [وذلك] KaEDa وأن [أو أنّ] KaTe وذلك [وذلك] om. Yi أن هذا | JG هو [هي] 76  
 om. et add. in المفهوم 79... ربما 78 E الوضعين [الوصفين] Da صانع [صائغ] KaSYiNo  
 E فإنه لا [فلا] | E يقايس [يباين] 80 om. et add. in mg. E لا يوجب | Yi بما [مما] 79 S<sup>3</sup>  
 في الملاح [الملاح] 82 E تجمع [تجتمع] C المفهومة [المفهومات] E ناطق [ناطقا] 81 S ولا  
 أن om. 84 add. vS يلزمه [الناطق] | Ka ألا [أن لا] 83 om. Da بل | Da والصانع [الصائغ]  
 om. et add. s.l. هذا 86 om. TTe هو | om. To مقولا 85 T ولا [ولا] Ka ألا [أن لا] | TTe  
 يفرق [يفترق] | om. No أفي 88 om. A عما 87 As يمنع [يمتنع] | BC Nk om. et add. in mg.  
 لا 91 Da فلا [ولا] | N المطوية [المطلوبة] 90 iter. Ka لا 89 Te يقرر S<sup>3</sup> s.l. يفرق vKaSNo  
 om. Ka بوجه 93 κ اقدره [أقدر] | Yi يمنعه [يمنعونه] 92 om. S البتة | Ka om. et add. s.l.  
 G الحيوان [للحيوان] | No السميع [للسميع]

is not an [adequate] signification of the divergence between them. If anyone said that the difference between Zayd and ‘Amr consists in that one is sensitive and the other is rational, or that one is a sailor and the other is a goldsmith, this amount [of information] would not be sufficient to distinguish [them], since it is sometimes possible that two attributes that differ in concept are gathered, so that it is not impossible that, [for example], the fact that Zayd is sensitive, although it is different in concept from the fact that ‘Amr is rational, is something that does not necessarily make Zayd differ from ‘Amr for it, and it is not impossible that each one of them, besides his being sensitive, is also rational, because the attributes differing in concept sometimes gather in the same thing characterized [by both], and analogously [in the case of] the sailor and the goldsmith. On the contrary, it is necessary that among the two [attributes] there be the potential for negation, so that it is necessarily concomitant to “sensitive” the fact of not being “rational” and, [vice versa, that it is necessarily concomitant] to “rational” the fact of not being “sensitive”. Furthermore, the fact that the genus is predicated in answer to “what is it?” does not prevent it from being predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” according to the principles of those [philosophers], and among the two [attributes] there is not the potential of negation, since it is not impossible that what constitutes the things’ quiddity can also differentiate the thing from what does not have that quiddity, so that, with respect to what shares it, it is predicated in answer to “what is it?”, and, with respect to what is distinguished by it, it is predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it?”. This amount [of things] does not prevent the genus of something from being also a differentia for that something according to two [different] ways of considering [it], if the difference that is looked for is this one, nor it necessarily precludes the genus of the thing from being [also] a differentia for it. As regards the fact that the differentia of something is a genus of something else, it is one of the things that they did not consider impossible, as far as I know, and it is like [the case of] “sensitive”, since it is, in a way, a genus for “hearing” and “seeing”, whereas it is a differentia for “animal”.

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If someone says that the same thing can be a genus and a differentia for one thing because, even if it is a genus and a differentia for one and

95 فإن قال قائل إنَّ الشيء الواحد قد يكون جنسا وفصلا لشيء واحد؛ فإنه، وإن كان جنسا وفصلا لشيء واحد، فإنَّ اعتبار أنه جنس غير اعتبار أنه فصل، وقال: نحن إنما نريد أن نوضح الفرق بين الاعتبارين اللذين يطلق على أحدهما اسم الجنسية وعلى الآخر اسم الفصلية، لم نخالفه ولم نبكته ولم ننازعه في التسمية، ولكنه يكون غير مَن كلامنا معه، لأنَّ كلامنا مع الذي دل باسم الجنس والفصل على طبيعتين مختلفتين اختلافا لا يكون الشيء الواحد بالقياس إلى موضوع واحد موصوفا بكلا الطبيعتين، بل يجعل إحدى الطبيعتين صالحة لأحد الجوابين، والطبيعة الأخرى صالحة للجواب الآخر؛ لكن الوجه الذي ذهبنا نحن إليه في تفهيم المقول في جواب ما هو والمقول في جواب أي شيء هو يعلمك أنَّ المقول في جواب ما هو لا يكون مقولا في جواب أي شيء هو وبالعكس، فتكون هذه 100 المباينة على ذلك الوجه صحيحة.

(3.4.2) لكن لقائل أن يقول: إنكم قد أطلتكم القول في عدة مواضع إن الفصل أيضا قد يقال من طريق ما هو، وخصوصا في كتاب البرهان. فنقول إنه فرق بين قولنا إنَّ الشيء مقول في جواب ما هو وبين قولنا إنه مقول في طريق ما هو كما أنه فرق بين قولنا "الماهية" 110 وبين قولنا "الداخل في الماهية"، فالمقول من طريق ما هو كل ما يدخل في الماهية ويكون في ذلك الطريق، وإن لم يكن وحده دالا

<sup>2</sup>واحد... فإنه | No فأیضا JG وأنه [فإنه 95 om. As فإنه 95... جنسا | om. S. § قد | Nk إن [فإن 94 om. et ولم نبكته 98 A الرسم [اسم 97 No وقالت Y om. قال [وقال 96 N إن [وإن | om. S. § J مختلفين [مختلفتين 100 iter. T من 99 Ed. غير [غير | Ka ينكته [نكبته | S<sup>3</sup> add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup> JG صالحا [صالحة 102 om. Da<sup>2</sup> الطبيعتين... بل | Yi بكنتي [بكلا 101 Ka للشيء [الشيء تفهيم [تفهم | om. θ نحن : inv. μν نحن إليه | SN الذي نحن [الذي 103 No فالطبيعة [والطبيعة om. ما هو | E والجواب في المقول [الجواب... والمقول 104 No الجواب [جواب | κKaBACEd. J يقال [يقول 107 E هذا [ذلك 106 om. Lat. وبالعكس | om. N هو | Yi 105 s.l. N مقولا Yi iter. في 110 om. Yi إن 109 κμE يقال أيضا [يقال | μE om. أيضا | μνNkCS بان [إن 108 s.l. في exp. et من μEYi في [من | om. Da الماهية 112... فالمقول | A المقول [فالمقول 111 No الجواب [الماهية 112 i.l. Y كل ما [كل ما | et هو [كل ما | add. μKaCSYi هو add. s.l. JE هو [هو | S<sup>3</sup> praem. et exp. Y جواب praem. MiŠYi «in responsione» praem. Lat.

the same thing, the consideration of its being a genus is different from the consideration of its being a differentia, and [if he] says: «we just want to explain the distinction between the two considerations, to one of which the name of generality is applied, and to the second of which the name of differentiability is applied», we do not contradict him, nor we blame him [for it], nor we raise any objection to the denomination. But he is not the target of our discussion, since we are discussing with someone who signifies by the name of “genus” and [that of] “differentia” two natures that differ in such a way that the same thing is not characterized by both natures in relation to a unique subject; on the contrary, he considers one of the two natures as suitable for one of the two answers, and the other nature as suitable for the other answer. However, the way in which we proceeded in trying to understand the predicate in answer to “what is it?” and the predicate in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” teaches you that the predicate in answer to “what is it?” is not [also] predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” and vice versa, so that this difference [between the two predicates] is, in this way, valid.

**[3.4.2. Avicenna’s distinction between *predicated in the “what is it?”* and *predicated in answer to the question “what is it?”*]**

But someone could say: «you have already asserted, in a number of places, that sometimes even the differentia can be predicated in the “what is it?”, and especially in the *Book of Demonstration*<sup>17</sup>». Then, we say that there is a distinction [to be made] between our saying that something is predicated in answer to “what is it?” and our saying that it is predicated in the “what is it?”, as well as there is a distinction [to be made] between our saying “quiddity” and our saying “entering the quiddity”. What is predicated in the “what is it?” is everything enters

<sup>17</sup> In *Burhān* II.2, pp. 125.9-126.2.

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على الماهية؛ والمقول في جواب ما هو الذي وحده يكون جوابا  
إذا سُئِلَ عما هو. فالفصل يدخل في الماهية ويكون مقولا من طريق  
ما هو إذ هو جزء الشيء الذي يكون جوابا عن ما هو، لكنه ليس  
هو وحده مقولا في جواب ما هو. 115

وقد قال بعض الفضلاء إنَّ الفصل قد يكون مقولا في جواب ما هو  
أيضا في بعض الأشياء دون بعض والجنس دائما دالٌّ على ما هو؛  
ذلك لأنَّ الجنس يدل دائما على أصل ذات الشيء؛ وأما الفصول  
فربما كانت مناسبات وإضافات إلى أفعال وانفعالات أو أمور أخرى؛  
فلذلك يجعل الجنس أولى منه بما هو. وفي هذا الكلام خللان،  
أحدهما أنَّ ما كان من الفصول يجري هذا المجرى فلا يكون فصلا  
مقوما، بل يكون من الفصول اللوازم؛ والآخر أنَّ الشيء إذا أُريد أن  
يفرق بينه وبين الشيء الآخر بوصف يجب أن يكون الوصف الذي  
يفرق بينه وبين الآخر موجودا له دون الآخر وجودا على الثبات،  
اللهم إلا أن لا تجعل التفرقة بالوصف بل بأكثرية الوصف وأخلاقته،  
فيقال مثلا إنَّ الجنس هو الذي هو آخرى بأن يكون مقولا في  
جواب ما هو والفصل هو الذي ليس هو بأخرى؛ فيكون  
الاختلاف ليس من جهة هذا الوصف، بل من جهة القمين، إذ هو  
موجود لأحدهما دون الآخر؛ فإنَّ فُعل ذلك كان فيه عدول عن 120

113 *om. et add. i.l. Yi* وحده | *om. et add. s.l. To* :  $\pi E$  الذي هو [الذي] *om. MiŠN* هو<sup>2</sup> 113  
والفصل يدخل في الماهية ويكون مقولا في طريق ما هو إذ هو جزء الشيء *om. K* جوابا 115... إذا 114  
*add. s.l.* هو<sup>2</sup> 115  $\nu\pi J T$  في [من] | *J* عن ما [عما] | *add. in mg. Te* الذي يكون جوابا عن ما هو  
*om. et* هو... وقد 117 *om. Yi* هو<sup>1</sup> 116 *om. NkNo* الذي | *om. et add. s.l. To* الشيء | *Da*  
[أو أمور] 120 *JBTCTeMiŠYiN* وذلك [ذلك] 119 *add. et exp. Y* هو [هو] | *add. in mg. B*  
*om. et add. s.l.* هو | *vJEDaMiŠG* جعل [يجعل] 121 *om. et add. in mg. B* أو *KaYi* وأمور  
125... بوصف | *om. C* بينه... وبين | *om. To add. in mg. To<sup>2</sup>* يفرق 125... بينه 124  
126... بينه | *om. Yi* يفرق 125 *JTo<sup>2</sup>MiŠYi* فيجب [يجب] | *om. et add. in mg. G* الآخر<sup>1</sup>  
*om. et add. s.l.* لا 126 *om. As* وجودا... له | *Y* الشيء الآخر [الآخر] | *om. No* التفرقة<sup>3</sup>  
*om. et add. in mg. Nk om. KaAŠYi om.* هو<sup>3</sup> [هو] 128 *om. TŠ* هو<sup>2</sup> | *s.l. As* هو<sup>1</sup> 127  
*inv. Š* ذلك كان 130 *om. E* بل | *om. Ka* جهة... هذا 129 *add. s.l. B* هو *et*

Q96 the quiddity and is in such a way, even if, taken alone, it does not signify the quiddity; what is predicated in answer to “what is it?” is what is, alone, an answer when it is asked [of something] “what is it?”. Then, the differentia enters the quiddity and is predicated in the “what is it?” since it is a part of the thing that is an answer to the “what is it?”, but it is not, taken alone, predicated in answer to “what is it?”. 115

Someone among the excellent [philosophers] said that the differentia can be predicated in answer to “what is it?” too in certain cases and not in others, whereas the genus constantly signifies the “what is it?”; this because the genus constantly signifies the principle of the thing’s essence. As to the differentiae, they sometimes are references and relations to actions and passions or other things, so that for this reason the genus is considered as more suitable than the differentia to [signify] the “what is it?”. But in this speech there are two mistakes: (i) the first one consists in that the differentiae that are in this manner are not constitutive differentiae, but are among the concomitant differentiae. (ii) The other one consists in that, if we want to distinguish between a thing and something else by means of an attribute, it is necessary that the attribute that distinguishes one thing from the other constantly belong to it without belonging to the other, unless one does not posit the differentiation in virtue of the attribute [itself], but rather in virtue of the superiority and the greater appropriateness of the attribute, so that it is stated, for instance, that the genus is what is most suitable to be predicated in answer to “what is it?”, whereas the differentia is what is not the most suitable [for it]. Thus, the distinction is not with respect to this attribute, but rather with respect to the fact of being worthy [of it], since this belongs to one of the two and not to the other. But if this is done, there is a deviation 120 125 130

حقيقة التعريف إلى أمر إضافي عرضي؛ وإن لم يفعل ذلك فيكون بين الجنس وبعض الفصول مشاركة في الحد، وبين الجنس وبعضها مباينة في الحد.

135 (3.5) والمباينة التي بعد هذه هي أنّ الجنس لا يكون للأنواع إلا واحداً، والفصل قد يكون أكثر من واحد، كالناطق والمائت للإنسان. وفي إطلاق هذه المباينة بهذا المثال خلل، لأنه إن أخذ الجنس كيف كان لا قريباً ملاصقاً فقط، وجد للشيء أجناس كثيرة أيضاً؛ فإن الأجناس المتفاوتة في العموم قد يوجد الكثير منها للشيء الواحد، ولكنها لا تكون كلها أجناس الشيء بالحقيقة، بل بعضها 140 أجناس جنسه. وكذلك قد توجد فصول كثيرة متفاوتة في الترتيب، ولكنها لا تكون كلها فصول الشيء بالحقيقة، بل بعضها فصول جنسه، كما مُثِّل به؛ فإنّ الناطق ليس فصلاً قريباً للإنسان على هذه الطريقة التي رتبوا عليها قسمتهم، بل هو فصل جنسه. وإنما فصله الملاصق على هذا المذهب هو المائت، وهذا في مثاله واحد، بل كما أن الجنس الأقرب الذي ليس بجنس الجنس هو في مثاله 145 واحد، كذلك الفصل الأقرب الذي ليس بفصل الجنس هو في مثاله واحد وهو المائت. لكن قد يوجد لهذا الموضوع أمثلة أخرى مثل

134 الجنس... 136 [للإنسان] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.4-6.

147 لكن... 150 [واحد] *al-Šifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.4, pp. 221.6-222.14.

أي إن لم يجعل المناسبة بينهما بالأكثر والأولى ويعتقد مع هذا أن بعض الفصول قد تحمل من [ذلك]... وإن 131 *om. et add. s.l. YiG* : بعض JAsDaToMiYiG وبين بعض [وبعض 132 *om. §* عرضي 131 *om. et add. in mg. Te* ... 136 [واحد] | Yi واحد [واحد] 135 *add. in mg. Te* وبين *mg. G* 136 [بهذا] *om. No* في العموم | *om. Ed.* المتفاوتة 138 *§* إذا Yi *om.* إن | *om.* لهذا [بهذا] 136 *mg. G* *om. ηA* فد 140 *om. et add. in mg. Te* كلها 141... أجناس | *inv. E* كلها أجناس 139 [جنسه | Da عليهم [عليها] 143 *om. Yi* للإنسان | EY جنسية [جنسه] 142 *E* ولكنه [ولكنها] 141 *om. et add. in mg. B* بل 145 *om. §* واحد | *om. TAs add. in mg. As* هذا 144 *No* جنس [كذلك] 146 *s.l. C* في | *om. et add. s.l. Te* *ADa om.* أن | *om. Nk iter. A* واحد 146... بل *om. To* الجنس... ليس | *s.l. N* الفصل *om. et add. in mg. Te* واحد 147... كذلك | *T* وكذلك *μY* ولكن [لكن] 147 *om. As* هو | Yi بجنس الفصل [بفصل الجنس

أي إن لم يجعل المناسبة بينهما بالأكثر والأولى ويعتقد مع هذا أن بعض الفصول قد تحمل من [ذلك]... وإن 131 طريق ما هو على ما زعم هذا الفاضل المذكور فحينئذ يلزم أن يكون بين الجنس وبعض الفصول مشاركة في الحد *in mg. NkB* وبين بعضها مباينة في الحد

from the true notification of something additional and accidental; if this is not done, [on the other hand], the genus and some differentiae share the definition, whereas the genus and some [other] differentiae diverge in the definition.

**[3.5. Fifth divergence: the species has only one genus, but possibly several differentiae]**

The divergence that comes after this one consists in that *the genus of [several] species is only one, whereas the differentiae can be more than one, like “rational” and “mortal” for man*<sup>18</sup>. There is a mistake in the expression of this divergence by this example because, if the genus is assumed no matter how, [and] not as proximate and contiguous only, the thing has several genera too. Several genera that differ one another in being [more or less] common can belong to the single thing, but they are not all truly genera of the thing: some of them are rather genera of its genus. In the same way, there might be several differentiae that differ one another in rank, but they are not all truly differentiae of the thing; some of them are rather differentiae of its genus, as it has been exemplified: “rational” is not a proximate differentia of man, according to this way in which they arranged their division, and it is rather the differentia of its genus; its contiguous differentia, according to this way to proceed, is only “mortal”. This is only one in his example, but as the proximate genus that is not the genus of the genus is only one in his example, also the proximate differentia that is not the differentia of the genus is only one in his example, namely “mortal”. Other examples can be found for this point,

<sup>18</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.4-6 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1090.9-12).

الحساس والمتحرك بالإرادة؛ فإنهما على ظاهر الأمر فصلان قريبان للحيوان، فيكون الجنس القريب ليس إلا واحدا والفصول القريبة قد تكون أكثر من واحد. وأيضا فهاهنا وجه آخر وهو أنّ الأجناس الكثيرة ينحصر بعضها في بعض حتى يحصل آخرها جنسا واحدا والفصول الكثيرة تكون متباينة لا يدخل بعضها في بعض. وإشباع القول في هذا من حق صناعة أخرى.

(3.6) والمباينة التي بعد هذا هي أن الجنس كالمادة والفصل كالصورة؛ ويتم بيان ذلك بأن يقال: والذي كالمادة يخالف الذي كالصورة. وأمّا أنّ الجنس ليس بمادة، بل كالمادة، فلأنّ المادة لا تحمل على المركب حمل أنه هو، والجنس يحمل على النوع حمل أنّ النوع هو، وأنّ المادة الموضوعة لصورتين متقابلتين لا تنتسب إليهما بالفعل إلا في زمانين والجنس يكون مشتملا على الفصلين المتقابلين في زمان واحد. وهاهنا فروق أخرى تُذكر في غير هذا الموضع. وإذا الجنس ليس مادة، فليس الفصل صورة. وأمّا أنه كالمادة، فلأنّ طبيعته عند الذهن قابل للفصل، وإذا لحقه الفصل صار شيئا مقوما

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154 الجنس... الصورة 155] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.6-7; cf. also *Isag.*, p. 11.12-17 (based on ARIST., *Met.* Z7, 1033a1-5).

156] وهو 158... وأمّا 156 *al-Šifā'*, *al-Burhān* I.10, pp. 99.17-100.13 and verbatim *al-Ilāhiyyāt* V.3, pp. 214.2-215.3.

N هو [وهو | C فإن هاهنا وجه NkBEd. فإن هاهنا وجه 150 Da وكون [فيكون 149 om. الذي | E أن [بأن 155 om. No التي 154 To هذا صناعة [صناعة 153 om. Da تكون 152 Yi له [كالصورة 156 add. s.l. Nk له [كالصورة 156 om. et add. πLawJE كالصورة له C | add. in mg. J للمادة [المادة | KaJ فإن [فلأن | Da الذي ليس [ليس | s.l. Da | om. et add. s.l. G حمل 157 J للمادة [المادة | Law أنه [النوع 158... أن | N s.l. N المركب [النوع om. et in mg. NkC أن [النوع 159 vE إليها [إليهما | μKaTAsCDa ينسب [تنتسب 158 δKaBTeEd. الجنس [فروق | om. Law الموضوع... وهاهنا 160 Da المقابلين [المقابلين | add. Law مختلفين [زمانين As بصورة [صورة | Law بمادة [مادة 161 LawŠ p.c. Š إذا G فإذ [وإذ | i.l. Y جمع فرق Ka سببا [شيئا | ŠJ قابلة [قابل | Law في [عند | Š طبيعة Law الجنس [طبيعته 162 Yi فلا [فلأن

160 في 2في... Te in mg. في عاشر أولى البرهان [الموضع... في 160

like “sensitive” and “moving voluntarily”, for they are, apparently, two proximate differentiae of animal, so that the proximate genus cannot but be only one, whereas the proximate differentiae can be more than one. There is also another aspect [to consider], namely that the several genera are included the ones within the others, until the last of them is realized as a unique genus, whereas the several differentiae are reciprocally distinct, without being included the ones in the others; however, it pertains to another discipline<sup>19</sup> to talk in detail about this. 150

**[3.6. Sixth divergence: the genus is like matter, whereas the differentia is like form]**

The divergence that comes after this one is that *the genus is like matter, whereas the differentia is like form*<sup>20</sup>; the explication of that is perfected by saying: “what is like matter is different than what is like form”. As to the fact that the genus is not a matter, but like matter, this is because the matter is not predicated of the composite in a way that it is so, whereas the genus is predicated of the species in a way that the species is so; [this is also] because the matter that is the subject of two forms that are reciprocally opposite is not related to both in actuality, unless in two [different] times, whereas the genus comprehends two reciprocally opposite differentiae at the same time. There are, [then], other differences that will be mentioned elsewhere<sup>21</sup>. Since the genus is not a matter, then differentia is not a form. As to the fact that it is like matter, this is because its nature in the mind receives the differentia, and it becomes a thing constituted in actuality when the 155 160

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<sup>19</sup>) I.e. Metaphysics. | <sup>20</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.6-7 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1090.13). | <sup>21</sup>) Cf. *Burhān* I.10 and *Ilāhiyyāt* V.3.

بالفعل، كما هو حال المادة عند الصورة. وإذ الجنس للفصل كالمادة  
للصورة، فالفصل للجنس كالصورة للمادة.

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EG و الفصل [فالفصل 164 LawMi وإذا [وإذ | *om. Da* للصورة 164... وإذ | *om. Yi* كما 163  
*a.c. Te* كالجنس *add. et exp. No* كالمادة [للجنس

differentia attaches to it, which is also the condition of matter with respect to form. Given that the genus, is with respect to the differentia, like matter with respect to form, the differentia is with respect to the genus like form with respect to matter.

## [الفصل الثاني]

### فصل في المشاركة والمباينة بين الجنس والنوع

(1.1) وأما المشاركة الأولى المشهورة بين الجنس والنوع فمشاركة كانت مع الفصل وهي أنهما يتقدمان ما يجملان عليه، أي ما هما له جنس ونوع. 5

(1.2) والثانية مشاركة عامة وهي أن كل واحد منهما كلي. وقد نسي موردهما أن هذه مشاركة جامعة قد ذكرت مرة؛ فإن أرادوا أن يجعلوا لهذا وجهًا خارجًا عن ذلك، فيجب أن يعنى بالكلي غير الكلي على الإطلاق، بل كلي هو ماهية جزئياته بالشركة.

(2.1) وأما المباينة الأولى فمثل ما كان مع الفصل وهو أن النوع محوى للجنس والجنس ليس بمحوى للنوع. 10

(2.2) وأخرى في قوتها وهي أن طبيعة الجنس أقدم من طبيعة النوع، أي إذا وجدت طبيعة الجنس لم يجب أن توجد طبيعة النوع،

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.10-12. [كلي... كل 6. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.12-13. [عليه... أنهما 4  
PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.15-16. [النوع 13... الطبيعة 12. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.11... النوع 10  
Cf. ARIST., *Cat.*, 15a4-7 and *Top.* Z4, 141b27-29; ALEXANDER, *Maqāla fī l-radd 'alā Ksinūqrāṭīs*, p. 282.7-11. إذا 13... وجدت 15... إذا 13

النوع والجنس [الجنس والنوع | Mi الفصل الثاني من المقالة الثانية من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق] فصل 2  
add. et exp. E بين الأولى 3. add. Lat. [والخاصة والعرض] «et proprium et accidens» §  
[وهي | § العامة] عامة | § المشاركة [مشاركة | Ka والمباينة [الثانية 6 LawJEG وهو [وهي 4  
Lat. [يشير] «indicat» JTMiYiG يشير E فشر [نسي | om. Law مرة 7... وقد | JEG وهو  
§ أنها [أن هذه | J إلى أن [أن | add. in mg. Te موردها om. et KaBCSY لا موردها [موردهما 7  
om. Y منه To مرة أخرى [مرة | § عامة [جامعة | praem. et exp. § لا [مشاركة | s.l. §<sup>3</sup> أن هذه  
هذا [لهذا | Law يجعل E يجعلو [يجعلوا 8 As لأن [أن | Law أراد أحد [أرادوا | s.l. §<sup>3</sup>  
الجملة العامة [ذلك | No وجهان [وجهها | add. in mg. C هذا s.l. Nk لهذا et هذا KaJBADaEd  
النوع 13... محوى 11 in mg. Di جزئياته et جزئية [جزئياته | s.l. §<sup>3</sup> om. et add. i.l. §<sup>3</sup> هو 9 Law  
... أي | om. et add. s.l. N النوع 13 om. et add. in mg. Te الجنس 13... أقدم 12 om. No  
om. Da النوع<sup>2</sup>

## [II.2]

**CHAPTER ON THE SHARED FEATURES AND THE DIVERGENCES  
BETWEEN THE GENUS AND THE SPECIES**

**[1. Shared features between genus and species]**

**[1.1. First shared feature: both the genus and the species precede their subjects]**

As to what concerns the first commonly-acknowledged shared feature between the genus and the species, it is a shared feature that subsisted [also] with the differentia, namely that *they are both prior to that of which they are predicated*<sup>1</sup>, i.e. that with respect to which they are a genus and a species.

5

**[1.2. Second shared feature: both the genus and the species are universal]**

The second one is a shared feature common [to all the five predicables], namely that *they are universal*<sup>2</sup>. [The man] who mentioned it forgot that this one is a general shared feature that was already recalled once; if they intended to attribute to this an aspect outside of that, then it is necessary to mean by “universal” [something] different than the universal in absolute, but rather [something like] the universal that is the quiddity of its particulars in virtue of [their] sharing [it].

**[2. Divergences between genus and species]**

**[2.1. First divergence: the species encompasses the genus, but not the reverse]**

As to the first divergence, it is like the one there was with the differentia<sup>3</sup>, namely that *the species is encompassed in the genus, whereas the genus is not encompassed in the species*<sup>4</sup>.

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**[2.2. Second divergence: the nature of the genus is prior to that of the species]**

Another [divergence] concerns their potentiality, and consists in that *the nature of the genus is prior to the nature of the species*<sup>5</sup>, i.e. when

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<sup>1</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.12-13 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1091.5). | <sup>2</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.10-12 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1091.2). | <sup>3</sup>) Cf. *Madḥal* II.1, §3.2. | <sup>4</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.15-16 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1091.8-9). | <sup>5</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.16-18 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1091.9-11).

بل إذا رُفعت ارتفعت هي، وإذا رفعت طبيعة النوع لم يجب أن ترفع طبيعة الجنس، بل إذا وجدت وجدت.

(2.3) وثالثة قريبة من تينك وهي أنّ الجنس يحمل على النوع بالتواطؤ حملا كليا والنوع لا يحمل على طبيعة الجنس حملا كليا، وهذا في ضمن المباينة التي قيلت من جهة الحوى والغير الحوى؛ وهذه المباينة ليست من المباينات التي في قوة السلب والإيجاب في أول الأمر، لأن ذلك إنما يكون لو قيل إنّ الجنس يحمل على النوع بالتواطؤ كليا، ثم تسلب هذه الصفة بعينها عن النوع، بل إنما تسلب عن النوع في هذه المباينة صفة أخرى، وهي أنه لا يحمل على الجنس بالتواطؤ حملا كليا، وليس هذا المسلوب هو ذلك الموجب، لكن صورة هذه المباينة أن النوع لا يكافئ الجنس فيما للجنس عند النوع، [وهذا لا يتأتى إلا بين مختلفين].

(2.4) ومباينة أخرى أن كل واحد من الجنس والنوع يفضل على الآخر بوجه لا يفضل به الآخر عليه؛ فالجنس يفضل بالعموم، إذ يحوي أمورا وموضوعات غير موضوعات النوع، والنوع يفضل

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.21-23. [عليه 27... كل 26. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.20-21. [كليا<sup>2</sup> 17... أن 16 23.

om. et الجنس 15 Da وإذا قلت [وإذا | iter. Ka om. S | LawJEG رفعت [ارتفعت هي 14 JEG وهو [وهي | JESG ذينك ηY in mg. ذينك [تينك | To قرينة [قرينة 16 add. in mg. To E قليلت [قيلت | S وهذه [وهذا 18 iter. Y om. As كليا... والنوع 17 om. A om. et التي هي [التي | S المباينة [المباينات 19 BCDaSTeMiNEd. وغير [والغير | G add. in mg. G حملا [كليا | praem. s.l. Y حملا [بالتواطؤ 21 ηAs يكون أن [يكون 20 om. S في قوة | a.c. S المباينة | E هذا [هذه | om. JY في 22 No يجب تسلب [تسلب | add. in mg. AsG حملا πJ كليا om. et add. s.l. To لا | ET، أنها [أنه | Ka هي E وهو [وهي | vJG في صفة [صفة | E لمباينة om. No يفضل | ε النوع والجنس [الجنس والنوع 26 om. pE مختلفين... وهذا 25 C مما [فيما 24 EAs عن [على 27 As عنه [عليه

مثال المسلوب الذي هو ذلك الموجب هو أن الجنس يحمل على النوع بالتواطؤ كليا [الموجب... وليس 23 in mg. Di والنوع لا يحمل على النوع بالتواطؤ حملا كليا

[مختلفين... وهذا 25 The clause is omitted in MSS JEG and in the Latin translation, which can hardly be dismissed as the result of a merely accidental omission; on the possibility that it is a later addition to the text, cf. DI VINCENZO 2017, pp. 41-43.

the nature of the genus exists, it is not necessary for the nature of the species to exist as well; when [the nature of the genus] is removed, [then] the nature of the species is removed [as well], whereas when the nature of the species is removed, it is not necessary for the nature of the genus to be removed [as well]; the contrary, when [the nature of the species] exists, then [the nature of the genus] exists [as well]. 15

**[2.3. Third divergence: the genus is predicated univocally and universally of its species, whereas its species are not predicated of it]**

Q99 The third [divergence] is close to that one, and consists in that *the genus is univocally and universally predicated of [its] species, whereas the species is not universally predicated of the nature of the genus*<sup>6</sup>. This is implied in the divergence that was mentioned with respect to the encompassing and not-encompassing. This divergence is not among those that are in the potentiality of negation and affirmation in the first place, because this would hold valid only if it were said that the genus is univocally and universally predicated of the species and then this same attribute were negated of the species; in this divergence, on the other hand, only another attribute is negated of the species, namely that the species is not univocally and universally predicated of the genus. This negative statement does not correspond to that affirmative statement, but the form of this divergence consists in the fact that the species is not contrasted to the genus with regard to what genus has with respect to species {and this is not possible, unless [in a comparison] between two different [items]}. 20 25

**[2.4. Fourth divergence: the genus exceeds the species in virtue of its generality, the species exceeds it in virtue of its notion]**

Another divergence consists in that *each one among genus and species exceeds the other in a respect in which the other does not exceed it*<sup>7</sup>, so that the genus exceeds [the species] in virtue of [its] generality, since it encompasses things and subjects that are not the

<sup>6</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.20-21 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, pp. 1091.13-1092.1).

<sup>7</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.21-23 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1092.1-3).

بالمعنى، إذ يتضمن معنى الجنس ومعنى الفصل زائداً عليه؛ فإنه كما أن الحيوان يتضمن بالعموم الإنسان وما ليس بإنسان مما هو خارج عن الإنسانية، كذلك الإنسان يتضمن بالمعنى معنى الحيوانية ومعنى خارجاً عن الحيوانية وهو النطق. 30

(2.5) ومباينة أخرى متكلفة وهي أنه ليس في النوع جنس أجناس ولا في الجنس نوع أنواع، وإن كان في كل واحد منهما متوسط.

(3.1) وأما الجنس والخاصة فقد يشتركان في أنهما محمولان على النوع وتابعان، أي إذا وُجد النوع وجدت الخاصة والجنس أيضاً. وهذه المشاركة قد توجد مع غير الخاصة؛ وهذه المشاركة هي مع الخاصة العامة. 35

(3.2) وذكرت مشاركة أخرى وهي أن طبيعة الجنس تحمل على ما تحته بالسوية، إذ أنواع الحيوان بالسوية حيوان ولا تقبل الأشد والأضعف. وكذلك الخاصة كالضحك على أشخاص الناس. وهذه المشاركة لو ذكرت في مشاركات الجنس والفصل والنوع، لكان ذلك أحرى؛ فنسي هناك وأورد في هذا الموضع على أنه ليس هذا موافقاً للخواص كلها؛ فإنَّ الخجل بالفعل من خواص الناس وليس يستوى فيهم وكذلك أمور أخرى لأمر أخرى. وبالجملة أي برهان قدمه 40 45

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 15.23-24. أما 35... أنواع 34... ليس 33  
PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 16.4-6. [الناس 41... طبيعة 39 16.2-3.

[يتضمن 30 om. et add. in mg. Yi Da : om. ومعها ومعنى | Ka تضمن | يتضمن | KaNo إذا | إذ 29  
om. كان في 34 TAs أن [أنه | vEDi وهو [وهي 33 E فكذلك [كذلك 31 As مضمن T ويتضمن  
وتابعان et ومانعان [وتابعان 36 To يحملان [محمولان 35 Da منهما ما هو [منهما | et add. s.l. Di  
om. λvLat.TDa والجنس أيضا | add. s.l. N والجنس | om. et add. in mg. J إذا | in mg. Te  
om. et add. s.l. DiTe أيضا [أيضا | No وهذه [وهذه 37 TAs فهذه [وهذه 38 E غير [جمع | om. N هي  
om. E طبيعة | Di وقد ذكرت [وذكرت 39 S والعامة [العامة 40 AsS لا [ولا 41 AsS  
هناك [هناك 43 om. Ka والفصل | Lat. [الجنس والنوع والفصل] «genus et speciem et differentiam»  
As ولذلك [وذلك 45 add. E وبالحقيقة [كلها 44 E بموافق [موافق | موافقا | A أورد [وأورد BC  
Ka وره No قدم [قدمه | S كذلك

species' subjects, whereas the species exceeds [the genus] in virtue of [its] notion, since it includes the genus' notion and the differentia's notion in addition to that. In fact, as "animal" includes, in virtue of [its] generality, [both] "man" and what is not a man among what is external to humanity, analogously "man" includes, in virtue of [its] notion, [both] the notion of animality and a notion external to animality, namely rationality. 30

**[2.5. Fifth divergence: no species is a highest genus, and no genus is a lowest species]**

Another divergence is unnatural, namely that, *among the species, there is not any highest genus, nor among the genera there is any lowest species*<sup>8</sup>, although in each one of the two [predicables] there are intermediate [genera and species].

**[3. Shared features between genus and proprium]**

**[3.1. First shared feature: both the genus and the proprium are predicated of the species and follow it]**

As to what concerns genus and proprium, they can share the fact that *they are both predicated of the species and they both follow it*<sup>9</sup>, i.e. when the species exists, the proprium exists [as well], and the genus too. This shared feature can exist with [something] different than the proprium<sup>10</sup>. [To be precise], this divergence exists with the common proprium. 35

**[3.2. Second shared feature: both the genus and the proprium are predicated equally of their subjects]**

Q100 Another shared feature was mentioned, namely that *the nature of the genus is predicated equally of what [is subsumed] under it, since the species of "animal" are [all] equally "animal", without undergoing the more and the less. Analogous [is the case of] the proprium, like "capable of laughing" [is predicated equally] of the individual men*<sup>11</sup>. It would have been more appropriate if this shared feature were mentioned among the shared features of genus, differentia and species, but he<sup>12</sup> forgot [to mention it] there and introduced [it] in this place, in spite of the fact that this does not suit all the propria. In fact, shame in 40

<sup>8</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.23-24 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1092.3-4). | <sup>9</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.2-3 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1092.6-7). | <sup>10</sup>) I.e. with the differentia specifica. | <sup>11</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.4-6 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1092.8-10).

الرجل على أن الخاصة هكذا أو أي استقراء يتنه له؟ وإنما أورد له  
مثالا واحدا وليس هذا وجه البيان العلمي للشيء الذي ليس يتنا  
بنفسه وبالحقيقة؛ فإن هذا الحكم إنما يصدق في بعض الخواص دون  
جميعها، وهي من الخواص الاستعدادية التي تتبع الصور فتكون  
للكل ودائما. وأما الخواص الدائمة التي تتبع المواد، فكثيرا ما تقبل  
الأشد والأضعف. والرجل ينسى هذا الاعتبار عن قريب، ويأخذ في  
تعريف الخاصة على جهة لا يستوى معها إعطاء هذه المباينة الخاصة،  
كما ستعرفه.

(3.3) وذكرت مشاركة أخرى وهي أنهما كلاهما يحملان على ما تحتها  
بالتواطؤ وهو أن يكون حملها حملا بالاسم والحد. وهذا أيضا قد كان  
يليق به أن يذكره لغيرهما، لكنه يجب لمن سمع هذا وتصوره وأقرّ به  
أن لا ينسى حكمه في كتاب قاطيغورياس حيث يظن أن المقول على  
الموضوع وهو المقول بالتواطؤ هو الذاتي فقط.

(4.1) وأما المباينات فالأولى منها هي أن الجنس متقدم بالذات  
والخاصة متأخرة، إذ كانت الخاصة إنما تحدث مع حدوث النوع،

PORPH., *In Cat.*, p. 58... لكنه 56 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 16.6-7. [بالتواطؤ 55... كلاهما 54  
PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 60... متأخرة 60... الجنس 59 80.20-23, p. 81.4-11, p. 92.25-35, p. 94.35-36. 16.9.

*al-Šifā', al-Maqūlāt* I.3, p. 27.4-6. [فقط 58... لكنه 56

Te فإنما [وإنما |  $\S^3$ To om. et add. s.l. om. Yi | اله | om. et add. s.l. Nk om. Yi | أو | om. Di أن 46  
om. هي [وهي 49 om. E إنما 48 *praem. et exp.* No بين [ليس | TAS om. العلمي للشيء 47  
دائما [وردائما 50 *add. TAS* كقوة قبول العلم : As الصورة [الصور |  $\S$  om. التي | Di et add. s.l. Di  
KaTAs | Lat. [الذاتية] «substantialia» [الدائمة | KaTAs | om. No التي | om. et add. s.l. G  
πYi المباينات : om. Da المباينة 52 No وويأخذ [ويأخذ 51 *add. et exp. As* يتبع [ما | om. No  
وهو A هي [وهي | om. N أخرى | Y أو ذكرت [وذكرت 54 T والخاصة : om. vPE<sup>2</sup> الخاصة  
om. هو : TAS وهي :  $\xi$  هو [وهو 55 KaAs كليهما N كليهما [كلاهما | Di أنه Da أن [أنهما | vJEG  
om. ابه 56  $\S$  om. قد | *add. in mg. To* حملها γJTeG حملها [حملها | Yi om. Y et add. s.l. Y  
om. et أن 57 a.c. E والتصوره [وتصوره | Yi أن Nk om. لمن | Te يذكر [يذكره | vJETAsG  
s.l. et هذا [هو 58 *praem. J* من [حيث | N et add. s.l. N كتاب | om. E حكمه |  $\S^3$  *add. in mg.*  
KaA om. إنما | G إن [إذ 60  $\S^3$  *om. et add. in mg.* فالأولى 59 *s.l. To* فقط *et* فقد [فقط |  $\S$

*in mg. NkB* كقوة قبول العلم للكل للكل 50

actuality is among the propria of men, though it is not equal in them, and similarly other things for other things. In general, what kind of demonstration did [this] man<sup>13</sup> offered to the [fact that] proprium is of this sort, or what kind of induction did he explain for it? He introduced just one example for it, but this is not the way to explain scientifically something that is not in itself and essentially evident, since this judgement holds true only for some of the propria and not for all of them, and they are among the dispositional propria following the forms<sup>14</sup> in a way that they belong to all [the species] permanently. As to the permanent propria that follow the matters<sup>15</sup>, they mostly undergo the more and the less. But the man<sup>16</sup> forgets this consideration slightly after, as he starts describing the proprium in a way with which the introduction of this specific divergence is not congruent, as you will learn<sup>17</sup>.

**[3.3. Third shared feature: the genus and the proprium are both synonymously predicated of their subjects]**

Another shared feature was mentioned, namely that *both are synonymously predicated of what is [ranged] under them*<sup>18</sup>, i.e. that their predication is a predication in virtue of the name and the definition. It was also suitable to mention this [statement] with regard to something different than the genus and the proprium, but it is necessary for him who learned this, conceptualized it and consented to it not to forget his<sup>19</sup> judgement with regard to the *Book of the Categories*, when he believes that what is predicated of a subject, namely what is synonymously predicated, is only the essential [feature]<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>13</sup>) I.e. Porphyry. | <sup>14</sup>) Like, for instance, being capable of acquiring knowledge for man; cf. §4.1. | <sup>15</sup>) Like, for instance, having wide nails for man; cf. §4.1. | <sup>16</sup>) I.e. Porphyry. | <sup>17</sup>) At §4.1 below. | <sup>18</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.6-7 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1093.1-2). | <sup>19</sup>) I.e. Porphyry's. | <sup>20</sup>) Avicenna alludes to Porphyry, who stated in the passage of the *Isagoge* at state that genera and propria are both predicated synonymously of their subjects, then contradicts himself by restraining synonymous predication to essential predicables in his commentary on the *Categories*.

فتنبعث إما من المادة كعرض الأظفار أو مثال آخر، وإما من الصورة كقبول العلم، وإما منها جميعا كالضحك.

(4.2) والثانية أنّ الجنس يحوي أنواعا والخاصة نوعا منها.

(4.3) ومباينة أخرى أنّ الجنس يُحمل على كل واحد من الأنواع حملا كلياً ولا ينعكس، إذ لا يقال: «وكل حيوان إنسان» كما يقال: «كل إنسان حيوان». وأما الخاصة فإنها تنعكس، إذ كل إنسان مستعد للضحك وكل مستعد للضحك إنسان. وهذه المباينة بين الجنس والخاصة الدائمة العامة [أو بين طبيعتي الجنس والخاصة مطلقاً، إذ تلك لا تتحمل وهذه تتحمل، أعني هذا العكس].

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(4.4) ويتبع هذه مباينة هي في ضمن تلك وهي أنّ الخاصة، وإن كانت لكل النوع ودائماً كالجنس، فإنها لا تكون لغير النوع، والجنس يكون.

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PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 16.10-11. 63 [منها... الجنس] 64 [إنسان... أن] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 16.11-13. 70 [يكون... أن] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 16.14-16.

om. et الجنس 64... يحوي 63 μAsYi فـكقبول T فلقبول [كقبول] 62 TYi أمثال [مثال] | Yi و [أو] 61 [ومباينة] 64 As لنوع ٤ نوع | To add. s.l. واحدًا [نوعاً] | J add. تحوي [والخاصة] | G add. in mg. منها 65 add. Da 66 Mi كل [وكل] | E كلها [كليا] 67 Yi فأما [وأما] 68 om. et add. inv. εE «commune substantiale» [العامة الذاتية] | Lat. [العامة الذاتية] | أو... 69 العكس om. Lat.TAsG add. in mg. G ٤٦ add. أخرى [مباينة] 70 v تحمل [تحتتمل] | J add. قد | E add. s.l. قد [وهذه] | v تحمل [تحتتمل] 69 كون [كالجنس] | As دائماً [ودائماً] 71 E وهو [وهي] | om. TAs هي | add. Lat. [أخرى] «alia» vJG الجنس له

The passage at stake has a non-uniform transmission: it is not preserved in MSS TAsG and in the Latin translation, which is difficult to explain as a polygenetic accidental omission. The passage represents a shift within Avicenna's first intention to restrain Porphyry's statement to the most specific notion of 'proprium' presented in *Isag.*, p. 12.13-22 (i.e. the proprium that is always predicated of its species and of all of its individuals). From a syntactic point of view, it is quite difficult to understand the clause *a'nī hādā l-'aks* ("I mean this convertibility") within the structure of the passage, from which it appears to be somehow detached. On the possibility that the passage might have been added to the text at a second stage, cf. DI VINCENZO 2017, pp. 45-47.

#### [4. Divergences between genus and proprium]

##### [4.1. First divergence: the genus is anterior, the proprium is posterior to the species]

Q101 As to what concerns the divergences, the first one consists in that *the genus is essentially prior, whereas the proprium is posterior*<sup>21</sup>, since the proprium only comes to be when the species comes to be [as well], and it is either originated from matter (like the width of nails or [any] other example), or from form (like the receptivity of knowledge), or from both together (like the capability of laughing). 60

##### [4.2. Second divergence: the genus encompasses several species, the proprium encompasses one species only]

The second [divergence] consists in that *the genus encompasses [several] species, the proprium [just] one of them*<sup>22</sup>.

##### [4.3. Third divergence: the genus does not convert in predication with its species, the proprium does]

Another divergence consists in that *the genus is universally predicated of each one of [its] species, but it does not convert, since it is not said: “every animal is a man” as it is said: “every man is an animal”*. As to the proprium, it converts, since every man is apt to laugh, and every [being] apt to laugh is a man<sup>23</sup>. This divergence subsists between the genus and the permanent common proprium {or between the two natures of the genus and the proprium unrestrictedly, since that [nature] is not a subject of predication, whereas this one is, I mean this convertibility}. 65

##### [4.4. Fourth divergence: the proprium belongs to one species only, unlike the genus]

[Another] divergence encompassed in it follows to this one, namely that, *even if the proprium belongs to all the species permanently, like the genus, it does not, [however], belong to anything else than [that] species, whereas the genus does*<sup>24</sup>. 70

<sup>21</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.9 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1093.4).  
<sup>22</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.10-11 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1093.5-6).  
<sup>23</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.11-13 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1093.6-7).  
<sup>24</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.14-16 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1093.10-12).

| <sup>22</sup>) See

| <sup>23</sup>) See

| <sup>24</sup>) See

(4.5) ومباينة أخرى منتزعة من المباينة الأولى وهي أن الجنس يرفع الخاصة برفعه، من غير عكس. ومن شاء أن يجعل هذه مباينة غير المباينة المعلقة بالتقدم والتأخر لم تعوزه الحيلة فيه، ولكنه يكون قد أمعن في التكلف.

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(5) وأما الجنس والعرض فيشتركان في أن كل واحد منهما يقال على كثيرين، وهو المشاركة العامة؛ وليته قال على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع، فكان أورد مشاركة خاصة بين العرض والجنس، خصوصاً ولم يذكر مشاركة أخرى.

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(6.1) وأما المباينة الأولى فإن الجنس قبل النوع كما علمت. فأما النوع فهو قبل ما يعرض له لأنه إن كان ما يعرض له منبعثاً عن نوعيته، فتكون نوعيته قد تقررت بفصله، ثم لحقه ما لحقه، وهذا قد فرغ لك من شرحه. وإن كان من الأعراض التي تعرض من خارج، فيكون النوع أولاً قد حصل موضوعاً حتى استعد لقبول ذلك العارض من خارج؛ لكن هذه المباينة موجودة أيضاً بين الجنس والخاصة.

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(6.2) والمباينة الأخرى قد ذكرت هكذا: إن الأشياء التي تحت الجنس تشترك فيه بالسوية والتي تحت العرض لا تشترك فيه

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 16.16-18. 77 وأما... 78 [كثيرين 78... وأما 77 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 16.20-21. 81 [شرحه 84... الجنس 81 and p. 21.12-15. 88 [بالسوية 90... الأشياء 88

81 [النوع... الجنس 81] *al-Šifā'*, *al-Madhal* II.2, §2.2.

المعلقة | *om. As* المباينة 75 *Te* غير المباينة [غير 75... مباينة | *Di* رفعها *DaTeN* رفعه [برفعه 74 *s.l. §* [أمعن 76 *Ka* لعور ما نحمله [الحيلة... لم | *As* والمتأخر [والتأخر | *κES* المتعلقة *JG om. s.l. §* [العامة | *s.l. §* هي *vDiTeMiG* وهي [وهو 78 *No* يشتركان [فيشتركان 77 [العرض والجنس | *om. N* خاصة | *§* قد أورد [أورد |  $\pi$  وكان [فكان 79 *om. T* مختلفين بالنوع *s.l. §* [في أن [فإن 81 *Lat.* [الجنس والعرض] «*genus et accidens*» *vDa* الجنس والعرض *E* تقرر [تقررت 83 *As* مستغنياً [منبعثاً | *om. Nk* 82  $\mu$ TAS $\Sigma$ Y وأما [فأما | *Te* مثل [قبل [امن 84 *E* هذا [وهذا | *om. et add. s.l. G* ما لحقه | *s.l. §* بفصله *§* متصله *As* بفصل [بفصله والمباينة موجودة أيضاً بين الجنس والخاصة [والخاصة 87 *iter. To* لقبول 85 *Nk* فإن [وإن | *v* عن *om. Da* 2فيه | *in mg. Te* فيها [إفيه | *om. T* اشترك 89 *add. et exp. As*

**[4.5. Fifth divergence: removing the genus entails removing the proprium but not the reverse ]**

Another divergence derives from the first one<sup>25</sup>, and consists in that *the genus removes the proprium by its own removal, but not the reverse*<sup>26</sup>. He who wants to consider this divergence as different than the divergence concerning priority and posteriority might not fail to find an expedient to do it, but he would have devoted his efforts to a sophism.

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**[5. Shared features between genus and accident]**

*As to the genus and the accident, they share the fact that they are both predicated of many [items]*<sup>27</sup>, but this is the [aforementioned] common shared feature; if he had said: “[they are both predicated] of many [items] differing in species”, he would have introduced a feature specifically shared by the accident and the genus, especially given that he did not mention [any] other shared feature.

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**[6. Divergences between genus and accident]**

**[6.1. First divergence: the genus is anterior to the species, the accident is not]**

As to the first divergence, it consists in that *the genus is prior to the species*<sup>28</sup>, as you learned [before]<sup>29</sup>. The species is prior to what occurs to it, because if what occurs to it originates from its speciality, then its speciality has already been determined by its differentia, and then something else attaches to it; you have already got an exhaustive clarification of this [point]. If, [on the other hand, the accident] is among the accidents that occur externally [to the species], then the species has already been realized as a subject, so that it is apt to receive that external accident. This divergence, however, subsists between the genus and the proprium as well.

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**[6.2. Second divergence: the subjects of the genus share it equally, the subjects of the accident are not so]**

The other divergence was mentioned in the following manner: *the things [subsumed] under the genus participate equally of it, whereas*

<sup>25</sup>) Namely the one stating that the genus is prior to the proprium; cf. §4.1. | <sup>26</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.16-18 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1093.12-13). | <sup>27</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.20-21 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1093.17-18). | <sup>28</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 17.3-4 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1094.4-5). | <sup>29</sup>) See §2.2.

90 بالسوية. وهذه عبارة محرفة ردية لأنها تشير إلى فرق موجود بين موضوعاتهما ليعاد ثانيا فيستدل بذلك على الفرق بينهما، بل كان يجب أن يقول إنَّ الجنس لا يحمل على الأشياء التي تحته إلا بالسوية وذلك يحمل لا بالسوية، فيكون الفرق واقعا في أول البيان، بل كان يجب أن يقول: والأعراض ربما حملت لا بالسوية، فإنه ليس جميع الأعراض تحمل لا بالسوية كالمربع والمثلث وأمور أخرى. ولفظ 95 الرجل يُوهم أن كل عرض يُحمل لا بالسوية. ثم تأمل من هذا أنه إذا جاز في الأعراض أن يكون فيها محمول لا بالسوية، فما المانع أن يكون كذلك في الخواص؟ فعسى أن يكون كون هذا أعم وذلك مساويا مما يرخص لهذا فيما لا يرخص فيه لذلك.

100 (6.3) والمباينة التي هي بعد هذه أنَّ الأعراض توجد في الأشخاص على القصد الأول. وأما الأجناس والأنواع فهي أقدم من الأشخاص. وهذه المباينة عجبية التحريف والتشويش؛ فإنه كان يجب أن يقول إنَّ الأعراض توجد في الأشخاص على القصد الأول والأجناس والأنواع لا توجد على القصد الأول أو يقول إنَّ الأجناس والأنواع أقدم من الأشخاص والأعراض ليست أقدم، وما المانع من أن يكون الشيء أقدم وموجودا على القصد الأول؟ ثم إن كان معنى القصد 105

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100 PORPH., Isag., p. 17.8-10. [الأشخاص 101... الأعراض 100]

JG يقال [يقول 92 Te ليستدل [فيستدل | ETeGN موضوعاتها [موضوعاتهما 91 om. عبارة 90 : Y : exp. et praem. لا [يحمل | G. in mg. et add. in om. بالسوية... وذلك 93 Yi يقول exp. et يقول [لا 95 To. in mg. et add. in om. بالسوية... فإنه | G. s.l. et add. om. A لا 94 As يحتمل كالمثلث] «sicut triangulus et quadrangulus» ١ كالمثلث والمربع [كالمربع والمثلث | BEd. إلا بيانية [ولفظ | iter. No. Di. in mg. et add. om. بالسوية 96... كالمربع | Lat. [والمربع منها [فيها | T. praem. كان [جاز 97 vDi إن ηEToS إذ [إذا | Ed. يأمل [تأمل 96 in mg. C. εT | om. et add. in mg. s.l. S<sup>3</sup> | add. E. لا [أن<sup>2</sup> | 98 om. et add. in mg. To | هذا [هذا | Di. i.l. مساويا et مساوية [مساويا | JAsYi وتلك [وذلك | عم [أعم | tAsY هذه [هذا | om. A. No. add. AsS لتلك EYe ذلك C. in mg. et add. in om. s.l. Nk om. et add. لهذا فيما لا يرخص [يرخص | Te ما [فيما | Yi كهذه As هذه ηETy لهذا [لهذا 99 vJAs مساوية om. A. أن 102 om. N : S<sup>3</sup> : om. N. εETAs praem. in mg. s.l. S<sup>3</sup> : om. N. εEAsN هي 100 om. As ٢ والأنواع | C. om. الأجناس... والأنواع 104 عم [praem. في [والأجناس 103 Da موجودا DiS وجودا [وموجودا 106 AsS الأنواع G. in mg. et add. الأشخاص الأنواع [الأشخاص 105 موجودا s.l. S<sup>3</sup> موجودا | Te. in mg. om. et add. in mg. G. الأول 107... ثم |

*those [subsumed] under the accident do not participate equally of it*<sup>30</sup>. 90  
 This consideration is corrupted and vicious, because it points to a difference that exists between their subjects in order to come back at a second moment and to infer, from this, the difference between the two. He should have rather said that the genus is only equally predicated of the things that are [subsumed] under it, whereas the accident is not equally predicated, so that the difference occurs in the [very] first [step of] the clarification; moreover, he should have said that the accidents sometimes are not equally predicated, since not all the accidents are 95  
 not equally predicated [of their subjects], like [being] quadrangular and triangular, etc. The man's statement, [on the contrary], leads to figure out that every accident is non-equally predicated. Consider, then, this [point]: if it is possible that among the accidents there is [something] non-equally predicated, what prevents that it is so [also] with regard to propria? Possibly, the fact that the accident is more common and the proprium is equivalent [to its species] is among the [causes] that allow to the one<sup>31</sup> what is not allowed to the other<sup>32</sup>.

**[6.3. Third divergence: the genus is prior to the individuals, the accident exists primarily in them]**

The divergence that comes after this one consists in that *the accidents exist primarily in the individuals; as to the genera and the species, [on the other hand], they are prior to the individuals*<sup>33</sup>. This divergence is remarkably corrupted and confusing, for he<sup>34</sup> should have said that the accidents exist primarily in the individuals, whereas the genera and the species do not exist primarily [in the individuals], or [he should have] said that the genera and the species are prior to 105  
 individuals, whereas accidents are not prior [to them], but what prevents something from being [at one and the same time] prior [to something else] and belonging primarily [to it]? Moreover, if the

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<sup>30</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 17.6-8 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1094.7-8). | <sup>31</sup> I.e. the accident. | <sup>32</sup> I.e. the proprium. | <sup>33</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 17.8-10 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1094.9-11). | <sup>34</sup> I.e. Porphyry.

الأول هو أن يحمل عليها لا بواسطة شيء، فإنّ النوع كذلك. وأما الجنس فعساه أن لا يكون كذلك، فإنه يحمل على الشخص بتوسط النوع. وأما النوع فإنه محمول على الشخص بالقصد الأول، أو يشبه أن يكون الرجل قد سها في إيراد لفظة النوع، فقد كان مستغنيا عنه، إذ كان وكده الاشتغال بالتمييز بين الجنس والعرض.

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(6.4) والمباينة التي بعد هذه هي أنّ الأجناس تقال من طريق ما هو والأعراض لا تقال. وهذه المباينة موجودة أيضا بين الجنس والخاصة وقد أغفلها هنالك.

112 [تقال 113... الأجناس] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 17.10-11.

أو ηN و [أو | *om. A* وأما النوع 109 *E* فالنوع [فإنّ النوع | *T a.c. S* إلا [لا | *To* وهو [هو 107 *s.l. Nk in mg. C* 110 *As* قدمها [قد سها *Di* إن [إذ | *om. As om. et add. i.l. Yi* عنه 111 *No* ولدته [وكده | *om. As* كان *No* وبين العرض [والعرض | *add. No* أن يكون الرجل [الاشتغال | *No* وكده [وكده | *om. As* كان *πAN* هناك *Da* هنا [هنالك | *κ* أغفلهما [أغفلها 114 *iter. Y* هو 113

notion of “primarily” consists in the fact that [the accident] is predicated of the individuals without any intermediate, then the species is in this way [too]. As to the genus, it might not be in this manner, because it is predicated of the individual by the mediation of [its] species. As to the species, it is predicated primarily of the individual, or it seems that [this] man was inattentive in mentioning the word “species”, though he could avoid it, since his purpose was dealing with the distinction between the genus and the accident.

110

**[6.4. Fourth divergence: the genus is predicated in the “what is it?”, the accident is not]**

The divergence that comes after this one consists in that *genera are predicated in the “what is it?”, whereas accidents are not*<sup>35</sup>. This divergence subsists also between the genus and the proprium, though he omitted it there.

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<sup>35</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 17.10-11 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1094.11-13).

## [الفصل الثالث]

### فصل في المشاركات والمباينات الباقية

(1.1) وأما الفصل والنوع فيشتركان بأنهما يحملان على ما تحتها بالسوية.

(1.2) والمشاركة الأخرى أنهما دائميان وهذه تقع أيضا بين الجنس والفصل ولم يذكرها. 5

(2.1) وأما المباينة فإن حمل النوع من طريق ما هو وحمل الفصل من طريق أي شيء هو؛ فإن الإنسان، وإن صلح أن يكون جوابا عن أي الحيوان، فليس ذلك له أولا وبذاته، بل بسبب الناطق؛ وقد بُحِث عن هذا قبل. 10

(2.2) والمباينة الأخرى هي أن النوع لا يوجد البتة إلا محمولا على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد فقط، والفصل في أكثر الأحوال أو في كثير من الأحوال يحمل على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع. وهذه المباينة بين الفصل والنوع السافل، لا بين الفصل والنوع المطلق.

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 18.11-13. 5 [دائميان... والمشاركة] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 18.13-14. 7 [هو... حمل] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 18.16-19. 11 [بالتنوع... النوع] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 18.19-21.

Nk والمباينة [والمباينات | Mi الفصل الثالث من المقالة الثانية من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق] فصل 2 [دائميان | om. Da أنهما 5 Ka فإنهما BC *in mg.* s.l. Nk في أنهما خ vJG في أنهما 3 ... وهذه | Lat. [ذاتيتان] «substantialia» Ed. S. ذاتيتان KaNkBAS ذاتيتان TC ذاتيتان ATe داسان وإن [فإن] 8 غ فأمأ [وأمأ] 7 No add. أيضا θ inv. تقع أيضا | om. Lat. يذكرها 6 [الحيوان | om. T om. et add. s.l. Te أي 9 No والإنسان [فإن الإنسان] λvKaTCDaEd. | Lat. [الحيوانات] «ex animalibus» BC *in mg.* εE الحيوانات EG في هي 11 Yi من قبل [قبل] 10 KaA a.c. C بذاته [وبذاته] πY inv. ذلك له | S<sup>3</sup> *in mg.* om. et add. in الفصل | S<sup>3</sup> *in mg.* et add. om. مختلفين 13... بالعدد 12 inv. Da إلا محمولا Da والسافل [السافل] 14 As om. الأحوال 13... أو | Di *in mg.*

5 [دائميان] Against the reading printed in the Cairo edition, cf. al-Dimašqī's translation of the passage of Porphyry's *Isagoge* here quoted, p. 1096.4-5: *wa-ya 'ummuhumā aydan annahumā yūgadāni li-l-ašyā' i llatī taštariku fihimā dā'iman*, which grants that Avicenna is paraphrasing the idea that both the species and the differentia belong to the thing *perpetually* (*dā'iman*). The variant reading attested in some manuscripts («essential») is due to a palaeographic corruption.

## [II.3]

## CHAPTER ON THE EXTANT SHARED FEATURES AND DIVERGENCES

## [1. Shared features between differentia and species]

## [1.1. First shared feature]

As to the differentia and the species, they share the fact that *they are both predicated of what is [subsumed] under them equally*<sup>1</sup>.

## [1.2. Second shared feature]

The other shared feature is that *they are both permanent*<sup>2</sup>; this also occurred between the genus and the differentia, though he<sup>3</sup> did not mention it. 5

## [2. Divergences between differentia and species]

## [2.1. First divergence]

As to the divergence, *the species is predicated in the “what is it?”*, whereas *the differentia is predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?”*<sup>4</sup>; in fact, even if “man” is suitable to be an answer to [the question] “which animal [is it]?”, this does not belong to it primarily and in itself, but because of [its being] “rational”; this was already inquired into before<sup>5</sup>. 10

## [2.2. Second divergence]

The other divergence is that *the species cannot but be only predicated of many [items] that differ in number*, whereas *the differentia, in most cases or [at least] in many of them, is predicated of many [items] that differ in species*<sup>6</sup>. This divergence subsists between the differentia and the lowest species [though], not between the differentia and the species in absolute.

<sup>1</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.11-13 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1096.2-3). | <sup>2</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.13-14 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1096.4-5). | <sup>3</sup>) I.e. Porphyry. | <sup>4</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.16-19 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1096.7-8). | <sup>5</sup>) Cf. *Madḥal* II.1, §3.4. | <sup>6</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.19-21 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1097.1-4).

15 (2.3) والمباينة الثالثة هي أنّ الفصل أقدم من النوع وأورد مثاله من  
طريق الرفع بأن قال إن الناطق يرفع برفعه الإنسان ولا يرتفع برفع  
الإنسان، إذ الملك ناطق؛ ولم يأت بالفصل والنوع اللذين هما معا،  
بل أخذ فصل جنس الإنسان وقايسه بالإنسان، وفعل نظير ما  
لفاعل أن يفعله قائلًا إنّ النوع أقدم من الفصل، إذ الحي نوع  
20 للجسم، وهو أقدم من الفصل الذي هو الناطق. وكما أنّ هذا القائل  
مُحَرَّفٌ للحق لعدوله عن إيراد فصل ونوع متعادلين في الوضع،  
كذلك ذلك؛ لكن الفصل أقدم من النوع من جهة أنه علة وجوب  
وجوده ونسبته إليه نسبة الصورة إلى المركب.

25 (2.4.1) وأورد مباينة أخرى وهي أنّ فصلين يأتلفان فيقومان نوعا،  
والنوعان لا يأتلفان فيقوم منهما نوع؛ وجعل مثال الفصلين الناطق  
والمائت، وقد علم أنّها غير متساوي الترتيب، كما شرحناه قبل. لكن  
هذه المباينة تستمر مباينة على أحد اعتبارين: إما أن يجعل الفصلان  
من جنس فصلي الحساس والمتحرك بالإرادة، وإما أن يقال إنّ  
الفصلين المختلفي الترتيب يجتمعان فيحدث من اجتماعهما إلى ما تجتمع  
30 معه نوع هو غير كل واحد منهما. وأما النوعان المختلفي الترتيب فلا  
يأتلفان حتى يحدث منهما غير كل واحد منهما نوع آخر، بل يكون

PORPH., *Isag.*, pp. 18.21-23. 24 [نوع...فصلين 25] PORPH., *Isag.*, pp. 18.23-19.3.

As نوع الإنسان [الإنسان 17] *om. A* الإنسان...ولا | *om. Di* | *add. S* قائل [قال 16] الإنسان [الإنسان 18] *om. et add. in mg. J* | *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* | *AsDi* الذين T اللذان [الذين  
20...من | *om. N* | أقدم | *ToTeNo* قابلا [قائلا | *v* ما أن | أن | *As* لفاعلي [لفاعل 19] *Yi* للإنسان  
[وكما | *Yi* من الجسم [للجسم 20] *s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* الفصل S النوع [الفصل | *om. Lat.G add. in mg. G* | أقدم  
*ηEd.* بعدوله [لعدوله | *KaA* الحق [للحق | *Ka* بحرف [مُحَرَّف 21] *No* القابل [القائل | *JG* فكما  
*om. vE om. et add. i.l.* *JToMi om.* وهو *DaS* هي [وهي 24] *om. No* | *om.* وجوب 22 A النوع [الوضع  
يأتلفان 25... فيقومان | *η* | *in mg. η* | *JMiSYG praem.* قد [يأتلفان | A الفصلان [فصلين | *G*  
*No* مثاله [مثال | *E* فيقوم *JDiMiGN* فيقوم [فيقوم | *κKa* والنوعين [والنوعان 25] *iter. No*  
T شرحه [شرحناه | *BEd.* التركيب [الترتيب | *om. Da* | غير | *JG* فقد [وقد 26] *Yi* فصلين [الفصلين  
هذه المباينة =] «*haec discrepantia dicitur*» *i.l. Di* | يسميها β تسمى مباينة [θE] تستمر مباينة 27  
الحاس [الحساس 28] *a.c. Yi* الاعتبارين [اعتبارين | *om. No* | أحد | *γAEd.* تستمر *Lat.* [تسمى مباينة  
[منهما 31] *No* المختلفان [المختلفا | *Ka* واحده [واحد 30] *A* يجمعا [تجتمع 29] *S* أنه [أن | *vTeN*  
*exp. NkB* نوع آخر | *add. in mg. η* ظ نوع آخر

### [2.3. Third divergence]

Q104      The third divergence consists in that *the differentia is prior to the species*<sup>7</sup>, and he introduced an example of that by way of removal, claiming that “rational” causes by its own removal the removal of “man” without being, [on its turn], removed by the removal of “man”, since the angel [as well] is rational<sup>8</sup>. He did not mention the differentia and the species that are together, but he assumed the differentia of the genus of man and compared it to man, and did something similar to what one could do by stating that the species is prior to the differentia because animal is a species of body, and body is prior to the differentia which is “rational”. Exactly like this one who claims [such things] distorts the truth, since he refrains from mentioning a differentia and a species that are equal in position, that [other] one [as well distorts the truth]. The differentia is prior to the species because it is the cause of the necessity of its existence, and its relation with it is the same as that of the form with the composite.      15  
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### [2.4. Fourth divergence]

#### [2.4.1. Discussion of the divergence]

He mentioned another divergence, namely that *two differentiae are combined to constitute a species, whereas two species are not combined in order to constitute from them a species*<sup>9</sup>, and he posited as an example for the two differentiae “rational” and “mortal”, but it has already been learnt that they are not equal in rank, as we explained before<sup>10</sup>. However, this divergence stays a divergence according to one of two ways of consideration: either the two differentiae are posited from the genus of the two differentiae “sensitive” and “moving voluntarily”, or it is stated that the two differentiae that differ in rank are gathered so that, from their gathering into that with which they are gathered, a species different from each one of them is originated. As to the two species that differ in rank, they are not combined so that      25  
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<sup>7</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.21-23 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1097.4-5). | <sup>8</sup>) I.e. even if the species “man” were entirely removed, there would still be the species “angel” that is characterized by the differentia “rational”. | <sup>9</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 18.23-19.3 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, pp. 1097.5-1098.3). | <sup>10</sup>) Cf. *Madḥal* I.11, §4.3 and I.13, §4.1.

الأعم منها جزءا من الأخص، ويكون الحاصل لا شيئا حاصلًا من اجتماعهما، بل هو شيء هو أحدهما. والنوعان اللذان لا يختلفان في الترتيب بل يكونان متباينين لا يجتمعان البتة.

- 35 (2.4.2) لكن لقائل أن يقول إنَّ الناطق والمائت في أنفسهما نوعان من أشياء أخرى، وإن لم يكونا نوعين للناس، وقد اجتمعا فأحدثا نوعا، وكذلك كثير من الطبائع المختلفة الأنواع تجتمع فيكون منها نوع ثالث بالاجتماع، كالاتينية والثلاثية يفعالان بالاجتماع الخماسية وهي نوع ثالث غيرهما، فإنَّ الجواب أن الاعتبار الذي ذهب إليه في ذكر هذه المباينة غير هذا الاعتبار؛ وذلك أن الغرض فيما يقوله متوجه نحو أشياء محمولة على أشياء بأعيانها يشترك فيها؛ فإنها إذا كانت فصولا كالناطق والمائت اللذين قد يُقالان على موضوعات بأعيانها، فإنها إذا اجتمعت فعلت شيئا ثالثا يكون نوعا من الأنواع لتلك الأشياء وتكون تلك الأشياء موضوعات له كما توضع الأشخاص للأنواع، ولا يكون كذلك الناطق، لأن الحيوان داخل في ماهية تلك الأشخاص وليس داخلا في ماهية الناطق والمائت؛ فليس الناطق والمائت نوعين بالقياس إليها، وإن كانا محمولين عليها، وإلا كانا متوسطين بينها وبين الجنس الذي هو الحيوان وكانا نوعين تحت الحيوان لا فصلين قاسمين؛ فقد وُجد في الفصول فصلان يقومان نوعا
- 40
- 45

T شيء شيئا B *in mg.* شيئا εTe شيئا شيء | ε om. 33 JAG جزء جزءا | S منها [منهما] 32  
 G *om. et add. i.l.* أخرى 36 ToMiYi فلا [لا] | A متباينان [متباينين] | a.c. B يكون [يكونان] 34  
 A *om. et add. in mg.* ثالث 38 A منها [منها] | Yi الطبيعة [الطبايع] 37 N وأحدثا [فأحدثا]  
 A *om. et add. in mg.* كالاتينية... بالاجتماع... كالاتينية | JMiSG in mg. To كالاتينية [كالاتينية] | S<sup>3</sup> *add. in mg.* To  
 A غيرهما [غيرهما] 39 ToMiYG وهو [وهي] | v الخمسية [الخماسية] | No بأعيانها [بأعيانها] | AS يقال [يُقالان] 42 iY متجه [متوجه] 40 κYi والجواب iY فالجواب  
 J *om. et add. in mg.* الأشياء... وتكون | S أو تكون [وتكون] 44 As سببا [شيئا] 43  
 A *s.l.* Di إنما A فإن [لأن] | v للناطق : *add. et exp.* A فليس المائت والناطق *add. μ* والمائت  
 JDIG المائت والناطق [الناطق والمائت] | C فليس KaAN ليس [وليس] 46 *praem. No*  
 γJADiG المائت والناطق [الناطق والمائت] 47 om. Yi والمائت 47... فليس | S وليس  
 S *om. et add. s.l.* S وُجد 49 ηATDiEd بينهما [بينهما] 48 ηT عليهما [عليها] | ηT  
 فصلين G

*in mg.* NkB أي ولا يكون كذلك حلا الناطق والمائت بالقياس إلى الحيوان [الناطق]... ولا 45

another species different from each one of them originates from them, but the more common of the two is a part of the more specific one, and the result is not something resulting from their gathering, but rather something that coincides with one of the two. Two species that do not differ in rank but are reciprocally distinct do not gather at all.

**[2.4.2. Answer to a possible objection]**

Someone might say that “rational” and “mortal” in themselves are two species with respect to other things, even if they are not two species for men, and they can gather to originate a species. Similarly, many natures that differ in species gather, so that a third species results from their gathering, like the double and the triple make, by [their] gathering, the quintuple, which is a third species different from both. The answer is that what he<sup>11</sup> considered when mentioning this divergence is [something] different from this consideration, because the purpose of what he says aims at things predicated of the same things that share them, since, if they are differentiae like “rational” and “mortal”, which can be predicated of the same subjects, when they gather they produce a third thing that is a species of those things, and those things are subjects to it like the individuals are subjects to the species. “Rational” is not in such a way, though, since “animal” is included in the quiddity of those individuals, but not in the quiddity of “rational” and “mortal”. “Rational” and “mortal” are not two species in relation to them, even if they are predicated of them, otherwise they would be intermediate between them and the genus which is “animal”, being two species under animal and not two divisive differentiae. Thus, among the differentiae two differentiae have been found which

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<sup>11</sup>)Scil. Porphyry.

50 مشاركا في الموضوعات ولا يوجد ذلك في الأنواع. وأما أن تكون أنواع مختلفة فتفعل باجتماعها نوعا موضوع ذلك النوع غير موضوعاتها فذلك غير منكر.

55 (3.1) وأما الفصل والخاصة فيشتركان في أنهما يحملان على ما تحتها بالسوية. ويجب أن تعلم أن هذا إنما هو في بعض الخواص التي منها الخاصة العامة الدائمة الصورية، فإن الضاحكين ضاحكون بالسوية كما أن الناطقين ناطقون بالسوية.

(3.2) ويشتركان في أنهما للكل ودائما، وهذا أيضا للخاصة العامة الدائمة.

60 (4.1) وأما المباينات فلأن الخاصة الحقيقية هي لنوع واحد والفصل قد يكون لأنواع، وقد علمت ما في هذا.

106 (4.2) وأتبع ذلك مباينة هي كأنها تلك أو لازمة لتلك، فقال إنَّ الفصل قد لا ينعكس في الحمل؛ فلا يقال كل ناطق إنسان، كما يقال كل إنسان ناطق؛ وأما الخاصة الحقيقية فتنعكس.

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 19.5-7. ويشتركان 57. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 19.7-9. الخاصة 59. Cf. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 19.11-13. [لأنواع 60... الخاصة 59. وأما 53

*add. et exp.* E | ذلك | *add. et exp.* E | بأن [نوعا | BCS] باجتماعها [باجتماعها | NK ففعل [فتفعل 51 مثل موضوعات الخمسية فإنها غير موضوعات الاثنينية والثلاثية [منكر 52 *om. To* | النوع | *et exp.* NK | *om. Da* | الدائمة | Di a.c. S | والعامة [العامة 55 *om. Yi* | هو 54 *add. in mg.* S<sup>3</sup> | *add. γAEd.* | دائما [ودائما | *add. Di* | مشتركان [أنهما 57 E أن T | وكما أن 56 *add. S* | إنما هم [الضاحكين قد 60 J فإن [فلأن | *om. et add. s.l. Y* | أما [وأما 59 *praem. γ praem. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* | *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* | لتلك... أو | Ka ولازمة [أو لازمة | *add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* | هي [أو | *om. Da* | تلك 61 *om. et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup>* | *om. A* | ناطق 63... كما | *om. C* | قد 62 *No* | كذلك [لتلك | *om. A* |

52 ذلك... فذلك Family γ and MS A add at this point the clause: «like the subjects of the quintuple, for they are different from the subjects of the double and the triple», which recalls Avicenna's own example a few lines above, against the rest of the manuscript tradition. The addition might be explained as an explicative gloss either in γ or in the ancestor of MS A, both arguably circulating in the same years of the thirteenth century in Marāḡa, which were collated in several points. The Cairo edition, presumably relying on MS B of family γ, prints the addition in the main text.

are constitutive of a species shared by the subjects, whereas that has not been found among the species. As to the fact that there are different species that produce, by their gathering, another species whose subject is different from their subjects, this is not denied. 50

### [3. Shared features between differentia and proprium]

#### [3.1. First shared feature]

As to the differentia and the proprium, they share *the fact of being both predicated equally of what is [subsumed] under them*<sup>12</sup>. You should know that this only holds true for certain propria, among which the common, permanent and formal proprium: in fact, the [beings that are] capable of laughing are equally so, as well as the rational beings are equally so. 55

#### [3.2. Second shared feature]

They also share the fact that *they belong to the entire [species] and always*<sup>13</sup>, and this as well belongs to the common, permanent proprium.

### [4. Divergences between differentia and proprium]

#### [4.1. First divergence]

As to the divergences, *the true proprium belongs to one species only, whereas the differentia can belong to [several] species*<sup>14</sup>; you have already learnt what concerns this [point]<sup>15</sup>. 60

#### [4.2. Second divergence]

Q106 [Another] divergence follows to that one, which is quite like that one or necessarily consequent to that one: he stated that *the differentia sometimes does not counterpredicate*, so that it is not said that every rational is a man as it is said, [on the contrary], that every man is rational. *As to the true proprium, it counterpredicates*<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 19.5-7 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1098.6). | <sup>13</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 19.7-9 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1098.7-8). | <sup>14</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 19.11-13 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1099.2-4). | <sup>15</sup> See *Madḥal* I.13, §3.2.3. | <sup>16</sup> Cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 19.13-15 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1099.4-6).

(5) وأما المشاركة بين الفصل وبين العرض الغير المفارق، فداوم وجودهما لموضوعاتهما. 65

(6.1) وأما المباينات فالأولى منها أنّ الفصل يحوي دائماً ما هو له فصل ولا يُحَوَى البتة. قال الرجل: وأما الأعراض فإنها تحوي غيرها وذلك من حيث هي عامة، وتُحَوَى أيضاً من غيرها من قِبَل أنّ الموضوع لا يختص بقبول واحد منها محمولاً عليه أو فيه، بل يوضع لغيره، فهو لذلك يحويه كما كان العرض يحوي لأنه لا يختص بالحمل على الواحد من موضوعاته، بل يعرض لغيره. وقد نسي الرجل ما قاله إنّ الموضوع الواحد قد تكون له فصول كثيرة تجتمع فيه. ثم الحوى كأنه لفظ مشكك غير علمي لا ينبغي أن يستعمل؛ فإنّ مفهوم وجه الحوى المثبت للعرض والفصل مباين للوجه المسلوب. وقد كان له وجه آخر لو قاله لكان أصوب وهو أن العرض قد يحوي ويُحوى إذ هو من جهة أعم ومن جهة أخص كالأبيض، فإنه كما يحمل على غير الإنسان، فكذلك الإنسان قد يحمل على غير الأبيض، فيكون

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PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 19.17-19. 67 وأما... 70. PORPH., *Isag.*, pp. 19.21-20.3.

T فداوم [فداوم | Nk الموافق [المفارق | om. et add. s.l. To | الغير | om. AAsDa | بين [وبين 64 No ذاتها [دائماً | TDa منها [منها 66 Di بموضوعاتهما E لموضوعاتها [الموضوعاتهما 65 a.c. Y 2من | A غاية [عامة | a.c. To هو [هي 68 To غيرهما [غيرها | om. Yi البتة 67 No بها [ما بل | add. et exp. As وهو [فيه | To منها i.l. Di منها et منها [منها 69 om. T أنّ | del. As s.l. Nk in mg. ذلك et كذلك KaADa كذلك [لذلك | iter. a.c. Di | لغيره 71... فهو 70 iter. N A يسمى [نسي 71 ATSEd. يحويه [يحوي | v أن A add. يحويه [كان | s.l. C ذلك et كذلك B A كان [فإن | As مشكك [مشكك 73 om. T om. et add. s.l. Te No الموضوع [الموضوع 72 «et Ed. والجنس: scripsi والفصل | Da للجنس والعرض [للعرض والفصل | om. N وجه 74 أو من [ومن 76 As كان [لأن 75 To لوجه [لوجه | ع مباينا [مباين | Lat. [والجنس] «generi No | om. et add. s.l. To | يحمل [يحمل | om. et add. s.l. To | فإنه 77 DiToMi قد يحمل [يحمل | As فلذلك [فكذلك om. C ذلك الإنسان | As فلذلك [فكذلك

in mg. أي إحواء أ على ب وإحواء ج على ب مما على وجه واحد بخلاف ب على أ [لغيره 71... وأما 66 Di

The entire manuscript tradition and the Latin translation attest the reading: *wa-l-ġins*, “and the genus”, even if the paragraph compares the accident and the differentia, so that one would expect: *wa-l-faṣl*, “and the differentia”. The reading *wa-l-ġins* might be a mistake occurred in the archetype of the tradition. 74

**[5. Shared feature between differentia and inseparable accident]**

As to the shared feature [that subsists] between the differentia and the inseparable accident, it consists in that *they both belong permanently to their subjects*<sup>17</sup>.

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**[6. Divergences between differentia and inseparable accident]**

**[6.1. First divergence]**

The first of the divergences [between them] is that *the differentia always encompasses that to which it belongs as a differentia, without ever being encompassed [on its turn]*. [That] man said that *accidents encompass something else inasmuch as they are common, being also encompassed in something else [on their turn], because the subject does not specifically receive one of them [only] as predicated of it or as [subsistent] in it, but is a subject for something else [too]*<sup>18</sup>, so that, for this [reason], it encompasses it as well as the accident encompassed it because it is not specifically predicated of [just] one of its subjects, but occurs to something else [too]. However, [this] man forgot what he said, [namely] that the same subject can have many differentiae that are gathered in it<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, “to encompass” is like an ambiguous and non-scientific utterance that is not necessary to employ; in fact, the concept of “to encompass” from the point of view of its affirmation for the accident and the genus<sup>20</sup> is different from [its concept] from the point of view of [its] negation. He had another point, though, which if he had mentioned, would have been more appropriate, namely that the accident can [both] encompass and be encompassed, since it is, under a [certain] respect, more common and, under another, more specific, like “white”, for as it can be predicated of something different than

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<sup>17</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 19.17-19 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1099.8). | <sup>18</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 19.21-20.3 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1100.1-5). | <sup>19</sup> In Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.4-6. | <sup>20</sup> The reference to the genus might be a mistake occurred in the archetype of the tradition which replaced an original reference to the differentia; cf. Apparatus and Note to the Apparatus.

لا كل إنسان أبيض ولا كل أبيض إنسان، بل بعض هذا ذاك وبعض ذاك هذا؛ ولكن هذه مباينة مع بعض الأعراض. فتأمل أنه كيف جعل العارض للشيء ولا يعمه خارجا من جملة العرض وكان توهم فيما سلف أنه فيه ومنه. وأما أنه كيف جعله كذلك، فلأنه جعل من شروط العرض التي بها يباين أنه يحوي النوع ويزيد عليه، اللهم إلا أن يكون أراد أن هذه مباينة لا لكل عرض، بل لعرض ما.

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(6.2) والمباينة الأخرى أن لا شيء من الفصول يقبل الزيادة والنقصان، بل طبيعة الفصلية تمتنع أن تقبل الزيادة والنقصان وكون الشيء عرضا لا يمنع ذلك، لكن الرجل أطلق أن الأعراض تقبل الزيادة والنقصان.

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(6.3) ومباينة أخرى هي أن الفصلية تمتنع أن يوجد لمقابلاتها موضوع واحد بعينه، فيكون هو ناطقا وغير ناطق، والعرضية لا تمتنع ذلك؛ فإن الأعراض الغير المفارقة قد يكون للمتضادات منها موضوع واحد.

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PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 20.3-5. 88... الفصلية 89 ذلك PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 20.5-6. والنقصان 87... لا 84

79  $\mu$  ذلك هذا  $inv. vDi$  هذا ذلك |  $\xi$  إنسانا [إنسان] |  $om. et add. s.l. Y$  لا 78  $Di$  فأما [وأما] |  $om. et add. in mg. Yi$  سلف 81  $om. A$  أنه |  $om. As$  مع |  $TDi$  هذا [هذه]  $om. et$  جعل |  $add. et exp. Y$  جعل العارض للشيء... فيه ومنه [كيف] |  $om. et add. s.l. Di$  أنه  $om. vDiMi\check{S}$  | لا |  $add. TDiMi\check{S}$  [أن] 83  $om. Di$  بها |  $S$  الذي [التي] 82  $add. s.l. N$   $s.l. A$  أما المباينة [والمباينة] 84  $T om. Yi$  مادة [ما] |  $No$  العرض [العرض] |  $add. i.l. G$   $om. et add.$  والنقصان 87... بل |  $om. T$  والنقصان... بل |  $E$  و [بل] |  $A$  أو النقصان [و] والنقصان 85 [تمتنع] |  $Lat.$  [الفصل] «differentiae»  $JG$  الفصل [الفصلية] |  $a.c. G$  لطبيعة [طبيعة] |  $S^3$   $in mg.$   $praem. in mg. C$  عن  $praem. \kappa NkDiMi\check{S}$  عن  $G$  عن  $s.l. J$  أن  $et$  عن [أن] |  $Di$  تمتنع  $No$  بين  $om. A$  هي 88  $om. N$  لكن 86  $G$  فكون [وكون] |  $A$  أو النقصان [و] والنقصان |  $i.l. To$  بمقابلاتها  $in mg. To$  لمقابلاتها  $EN$  لمقابلاتها [لمقابلاتها] |  $in mg. E$  يوجد  $et$  يكون [يوجد] 89 غير [الغير] 90  $om. C$  ذلك |  $T$  أو غير [وغير] |  $om. et add. s.l. Di$   $\beta$  حتى يكون [فيكون] 89  $JG$  للمتضادات  $Da$  للمتضاد [للمتضادات] |  $om. Ka$   $\eta$

Two concurrent equivalent versions are attested by the two branches of the tradition: 89 [فيكون]

( $\alpha$ ) فيكون  
( $\beta$ ) حتى يكون

“man”, in the same way also “man” can be predicated of something different than “white”, so that not every man is white nor every white is a man, but some of this is that and some of that is this. However, this is a divergence [that holds true only] for certain accidents. Consider how he posited what happens to the thing without embracing it as something external from the complex of the accident, whereas he had estimated in what preceded that it was encompassed in it and took part of it. As to how he posited it in such a way, this is because he posited among the conditions by means of which the accident is distinguished [from the rest] the fact that it encompasses the species and exceeds it, unless he meant that this divergence does not hold true for every accident, but [just] for a certain accident. 80

### [6.2. Second divergence]

Q107 The other divergence consists in that *none of the differentiae undergoes the more and the less; on the contrary, the nature of differentiability prevents from undergoing the more and the less*, whereas the fact that something is an accident does not prevent from that, but [that] man stated that *accidents do undergo the more and the less*<sup>21</sup>. 85

### [6.3. Third divergence]

Another divergence consists in that *differentiability prevents its opposites from having one and the same subject*, so that it is [both] rational and non-rational, *whereas accidentality does not prevent from that*<sup>22</sup>, since opposite inseparable accidents can have a unique subject. 90

<sup>21</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.3-5 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1100.5-6). | <sup>22</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.5-6 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1100.6-7).

(7) وأما النوع فيشارك الخاصة الحقيقية في أن كل واحد منهما ينعكس على الآخر، فكل إنسان ضحاك وكل ضحاك إنسان؛ وفي أنهما يوجدان معا لموضوعاتهما دائما.

(8.1) أما المباينات فأولاها أنّ الشيء الذي هو نوع لشيء يصير جنسا لشيء آخر، وأما الخاصة فلا تكون خاصة لشيء آخر؛ وهذه المباينة متشوشة ردية جدا. أمّا أولا فلأنه كان فيما سلف لا يلتفت إلى إيراد المباينة بين النوع المضاييف للجنس وبين غيره، بل يشتغل بالنوع السافل، والآن فقد أعرض عن ذلك واشتغل بالنوع المضاييف للجنس، ثم الخطب في هذا يسير. لكنه لو كان قال إنّ النوع للشيء قد يصير خاصة لشيء آخر، ثم قال إنّ الخاصة لا تصير خاصة لشيء آخر، لكانت مباينة حسنة [ولكن الحكم في النوع كاذب]. ولو قال إنّ النوع للشيء يصير جنسا لشيء آخر والخاصة لا تصير جنسا لشيء آخر، لكان هذا أيضا صحيحا ولكن الحكم في الخاصة كاذب. فكما أنّ النوع الذي ليس بسافل يصير جنسا، كذلك الخاصة لنوع غير سافل تصير جنسا، فتكون خاصة لنوع عال وجنسا لأنواع لها، كاللون فإنه خاصة وجنس. ولو كان قال إنّ النوع للشيء قد

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Cf. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 20.12-14. [دائما 93... وفي 92. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 20.12-14. [إنسان 92... وأما 91. 20.14-15. [آخر 95... الشيء 94. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 20.17-18.

om. Lat. 91 إنسان... فكل | vπ فإن كل JG وإن كل [فكل 92 iter. Nk | كل om. A | أن 91 فأوليها T فأوليها Ka وأولاها [أولاها | JG فأولاها | أما 94 C لموضوعاتها [لموضوعاتهما 93 فيمن [فيما | κ مشوشة [متشوشة 96 As لآخر [آخر | Nk om. الشيء 95 om. Di هو [للشيء | om. To إن 99 Yi واستعمل [واشتغل | om. A | عن v قد [فقد 98 Yi يستعمل [يشتغل 97 exp. Te كاذب... ولكن | As كانت [لكانت 101 Lat. [نوع] «species» [خاصة 100 A الشيء iter. لشيء 103 S<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. آخر 103... والخاصة | om. et add. s.l. N | لشيء 102 JG كاذبة [كاذب 104 Yi iter. ولكن | iter. N | أيضا صحيحا | add. et exp. المنظر [هذا | E om. et add. s.l. لها 106 ع. جنسا 105... كذلك | Ka يسافل [يسافل | As كما AT وكما [فكما Y om. et add. in mg. يصير 107... قد | E لشيء [للشيء | As أنه a.c. كان | Y

The entire Arabic manuscript tradition, together with the Latin translation, attests the presence of clause (1b) in the text. The clause sounds as a repetition of clause (1a), except for the conclusive remark of (1a) concerning the falsity of the judgement about the species. One might wonder whether clause (1a) was meant to be replaced by clause (1b) in the archetype of the tradition: in *Madhal* II.4, §1 Avicenna provides the example of 'walking', that is both a species of

### [7. Two shared features between the species and the proprium]

The species shares with the true proprium the fact that *each one of them is reciprocal with the other, so that every man is capable of laughing and every capable of laughing is a man*<sup>23</sup>; [they also share] the fact that *they belong together to their subjects permanently*<sup>24</sup>.

### [8. Divergences between the species and the proprium]

#### [8.1. The first divergence between species and proprium]

The first of the divergences is that *what is a species for something can become a genus for something else, whereas the proprium is not a proprium for anything else*<sup>25</sup>, but this divergence is very confusing and pernicious. First of all, because in what preceded he paid no attention to mentioning the divergence between the species that is relative to the genus and something else, on the contrary, he only dealt with the lowest species, but now he diverted from that and dealt with the species that is related to the genus; moreover, he discussed it [too] shortly. [(1a)] If he had said that the species of something can become a proprium for something else and then that the proprium does not become the proprium of anything else, [this] would have been a well-formed divergence, but the judgement concerning the status of the species would have been false. [(2)] If he had said that the species of something becomes a genus for something else, whereas the proprium does not become a genus for anything else, this would have been correct as well, but the judgement concerning the status of the proprium would have been false. As well as the species that is not a lowest one becomes a genus, also the proprium of a species that is not a lowest one becomes a genus, so that it is a proprium for the high species and a genus for its species, like colour, which is [both] a proprium and a genus<sup>26</sup>. [(1b)] If he had said that the species of

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<sup>23</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.12-14 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1101.2-6). | <sup>24</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.14-15 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1101.6-7). | <sup>25</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.17-18 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1101.9-10). | <sup>26</sup>) I.e. "coloured", a proprium of body, is also a genus of "white", "yellow" and so on.

يصير خاصة لشيء آخر والخاصة لا تصير خاصة لشيء آخر لكان مستقيماً.

(8.2) ومباينة أخرى وهي أن النوع متقدم في الوجود والخاصة متأخرة وهذا مسلم معقول كما قد سلف. 110

(8.3) ثم أورد مباينة أخرى وهي أن النوع موجود بالفعل دائماً وأما الخاصة فتوجد في بعض الأوقات. وهاهنا تشويش أيضاً وذلك أنه إن عني بالخاصة مثل الضحك الذي بالفعل، فقد خرج عن المذهب الذي كان يسلكه إلى الآن؛ وإن عني بالخاصة الاستعداد الطبيعي، فذلك موجود بالفعل دائماً، فإنّ كون الإنسان ضحاکاً بالطبع موجود له بالفعل دائماً. وهذه المباينة إن صحت فكان يجب أن يذكرها للجنس والفصل مع الخاصة أيضاً. 115

(8.4) ومباينة أخرى هي أنّ حديهما مختلفان وهذه المباينة موجودة بين الجميع ليست تخص اعتبار الحال بين النوع والخاصة.

PORPH., [الأوقات 112... النوع 111] PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 20.18-20. 109 النوع... [متأخرة 110... النوع 109] *Isag.*, p. 20.20-22. 118 [حديهما مختلفان] PORPH., *Isag.*, pp. 20.24-21.3.

111... متقدم | *om. Lat.* | *om. Yi* | كما... سلف... معقول 110 | *om. et add. in mg. N* | *om.* النوع متقدم في الوجود والخاصة [النوع | *JG* وهو [وهي | *Yi* أوردو *in mg. N* أفرد [أورد 111 *DiDa* الضحاك [الضحك 113 *om. et add. s.l. Ka* إن | *S* فوجد [فتوجد 112 *add. et exp. Di* متأخرة *om. Di* دائماً 116... فإن 115 *As* فإن [وإن | *om. et add. s.l. No* الذي 114 *Ka* قد [فقد | *As om. Ka* مع [هي 118 *S* فقد كان *As* كان [فكان 116 *C* كان [كون | *om. G add. in mg. G<sup>2</sup>* *om. Ka* «genus» [النوع | *E* عن [يبين | *MiŠG* ليس [ليست 119 *S<sup>3</sup>* *om. et add. in mg.* موجودة *Yi* الخاصة والنوع [النوع والخاصة | *Lat.* [الجنس]

لا مستقيم إلا أن يكون بدل خاصة نوع على ما يوجبه تأمل المعنى وبعضه القول [مستقيماً 108... لكان 107 *in mg. NkB* الذي يتلوه

'mobile' and a proprium of 'animal', which contradicts the conclusion reached in clause (1a), according to which species cannot become a proprium of anything else. Clause (1b) might have been meant as a correction of clause (1a) entered in the text at the wrong place in the archetype of the tradition. Another possibility is to consider the clause *wa-lākinna al-ḥukm fī l-naw' kāḍib* as erroneously interpolated in the archetype of the tradition.

something can become a proprium for something else whereas the proprium does not become a proprium for anything else, then it would have been correct.

### [8.2. Second divergence]

Another divergence consists in that *the species is prior in existence, whereas the proprium is posterior*<sup>27</sup>; and this is uncontested and understandable, as it has already been stated. 110

### [8.3. Third divergence]

Then, he introduced another divergence, namely that *the species exists always in actuality, whereas the proprium exists sometimes*<sup>28</sup>. Here as well there is some confusion, because if by “proprium” he meant something like the laughter that is in actuality, then he walked out of the path he was following until now<sup>29</sup>; if by “proprium” he meant the natural disposition, this exists always in actuality, since the fact of being capable of laughing by nature belongs to man always in actuality. Moreover, if this divergence is correct, he should have also mentioned it [when comparing] the genus and the differentia with the proprium. 115

### [8.4. Fourth divergence]

Another divergence consists in that *their definitions are different*<sup>30</sup>, but this divergence subsists between all [of the five utterances], without belonging specifically to the consideration of the state between the species and the proprium. 120

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<sup>27</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.18-20 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1101.10-11). | <sup>28</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.20-22 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1102.1-2). | <sup>29</sup> Cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.13-14. | <sup>30</sup> See Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 20.24-21.3 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1102.4).

120 (9) وأما النوع والعرض فيعدهما أنهما كليان. قال: ولا يوجد لهما أشياء كثيرة يشتركان فيها لبعدهما بينهما.

125 (10) وأما المباينة فلأن هذا للماهية وذلك ليس، ولأن الجوهر الواحد نوعه واحد وأعراضه لا يجب أن تكون واحدة. وهذه المباينة توجد أيضا بين الجنس والعرض وبين النوع والخاصة وبين الجنس والخاصة. وأيضا فإن النوع قبل العرض وجودا وتوهما، وإن النوع يستوى لموضوعاته المشتركة فيه، والعرض قد لا يستوى، وإن كان غير مفارق كسواد الزوج.

130 (11) وأما الخاصة والعرض الغير المفارق فيشتركان في أنهما دائمان لموضوعاتهما؛ وقد كان يجب أن لا ينسى هذه المشاركة بين النوع وبين العرض الغير المفارق.

109 اق (12.1) ويختلفان بأن الخاصة توجد للنوع وحده والعرض الغير المفارق يوجد لأكثر من نوع كالسواد للزنجي والغراب ويجب أن تتذكر هذا إذا رجعت إلى ما سلف في المقالة الأولى.

PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 21.5-7. هذا 122... [بينهما 121... وأما 120  
129... وأما 128... [الزوج 127... النوع 125... 21.9-12. PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 21.12-16.  
[الموضوعاتهما 131... الخاصة... 22.2-3 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 22.5-7.

vS وذلك [وذلك Ed. هذه [هذا 122 om. κ ما | JG فيه [فيها 121 Nk فيعدهما [فيعدهما 120  
وأيضا 125... [توبين | om. Lat. والخاصة 125... [توبين 124 N ليس [لا | om. No الواحد 123  
Yi توهما [وتوهما | in mg. Nk الخاصة أيضا وإن [وأيضا فإن 125 om. G add. in mg. G<sup>2</sup>  
130... [فيشتركان | As يشتركان [فيشتركان 128 om. S قد om. et add. s.l. N A فلا [قد لا 126  
λN دائما Da دائمين [دائمان | i.l. Y أنهما [إنما [أنهما | om. et add. in mg. S<sup>3</sup> المفارق  
om. et add. الغير | S<sup>3</sup> والعرض [وبين العرض 130 add. i.l. Y رجل [ينسى | Di كانت [كان 129  
β في أن Da أن [بأن 131 add. et exp. No فيشتركان في أنهما دائمان [المفارق | i.l. G om. Yi  
ε فيجب [ويجب 132 om. et add. s.l. J النوع

131 The tradition is bipartite with regard to this clause: [ويختلفان بأن

(α) ويختلفان بأن

(β) ويختلفان في أن

Both clauses belong to Avicenna's *usus scribendi* and are elsewhere employed (for version α, cf. e.g. *Šifā'*, *Hay'a*, p. 596.10; for version β, cf. e.g. *Qiyās* I.3, p. 26.3 and IX.4, p. 453.14-15), so that it is difficult to tell which was the original one.

### [9. Shared feature between the species and the accident]

As to the species and the accident, the fact of being universal is common to both. He said that *they do not have many shared features due to a certain distance between them*<sup>31</sup>.

### [10. Divergence between the species and the accident]

As to the divergence, [it subsists] because *the one pertains to the quiddity but not the other*, and because *the species of a single substance is one, but its accidents do not need to be only one*<sup>32</sup>. This divergence exists also between the genus and the accident, and between the species and the proprium, and between the genus and the proprium. Moreover, *the species is prior to the accident [both] in existence and in estimation, and holds equally for its subjects that share it, whereas the accident might not do so, even if it is inseparable like the blackness of the black men*<sup>33</sup>.

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### [11. Shared feature between the proprium and the inseparable accident]

The proprium and the inseparable accident share the fact that *they both belong permanently to their subjects*<sup>34</sup>; however, he should have not forgot [to mention] this shared feature between the species and the inseparable accident [as well].

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### [12. Divergences between the proprium and the inseparable accident]

#### [12.1. First divergence]

Q109 They differ because *the proprium belongs to the species only, whereas the inseparable accident belongs to more than one species, like the blackness that belongs to the black man and to the raven*<sup>35</sup>; you must remember this when you come back to what was stated in the first treatise.

<sup>31</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 21.5-7 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1102.8-9). | <sup>32</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 21.9-12 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, pp. 1102.11-1103.2). | <sup>33</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 21.12-16 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1103.2-6). | <sup>34</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 22.2-3 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p.). | <sup>35</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 22.5-7 (cf. Al-Dimašqī's translation, p. 1104.2-4).

(12.2) ومباينة أخرى أن الاشتراك في العرض لا يجب أن يكون بالسوية، وفي الخاصة يجب أن يكون بالسوية، وقد عرفت ما فيه. 135

(13) فهذه هي الاشتراكات والمباينات المشهورة التي أوردها أول من أفرد لهذه الخمسة الكليات كتابا، وقد ذكرناها على منهاج ذكره وترتيبه. وجميع ما أورده من المباينات التي ليست مباينة عامة، فيمكن أن يُعبر عنه فيقال مثلا: الفصل ليس من شأنه أن يكون كذا، ومن شأن بعض ما هو في طبيعة العرض مثلا أن يكون كذا، فيكون هذا تحسينا لقوله، ومع ذلك مستمرا. ولو أنه وفق لكان يورد أولا المشاركات التي بين الخمسة، ثم التي بين أربعة أربعة، ثم التي بين ثلاثة ثلاثة، ثم التي بين اثنين اثنين، وكذلك كان يورد المباينات التي بين واحد وبين أربعة، ثم التي بين اثنين وثلاثة، ثم التي بين كل واحدة وواحدة أخرى خاصة، فيكون قد حفظ ما هو الواجب ولا يكون قد ترك مشاركة ومباينة هي بين اثنين منها تركا مھملا، ويذكرهما بين اثنين آخرين، ربما كان ذكره فيما أهمله أوقع وأحسن. 140 145

134 PORPH., *Isag.*, p. 22.9-10. [بالسوية 135... الاشتراك 134]

*om.* بالسوية... وفي | *No* السوية *add.* Da في العرض [بالسوية 135 *om.* Da في العرض 134 *om.* κ هي 136 *om.* λ فيه... وقد | *om.* Da يجب | *As* الخاصتين [الخاصة | *NkCNo* أول من [كتبا 137... أول | *S* أوردها [أوردها | *add.* κ هي [التي | *in mg.* NkB كتابا في هذه الخمسة الكليات كتابا أول من كتب *A* أول من كتب في هذه الخمسة الكليات كتابا *Yi* ذكر [ذكرناها | *s.l.* NkB *in mg.* C *εE* أورد [أفرد 137 *S* لهذه الكليات الخمس كتابا ويقال *Da* فنقول [يقال | *Yi* عنها [عنه 139 *A* أورد [أورده | *ATAsS a.c.* Te جميع [وجميع 138 *om.* هو | *om.* *et add.* *in mg.* *No* | *om.* *et add.* *in mg.* *No* | *om.* *Lat.* *om.* *Lat.* كذا... ومن 140 *A* إن الفصل [الفصل | *N* *A* وقف [وفق | *Lat.* [غير مستمر *scil.*] «non semper» [مستمرا 141 *et add.* *s.l.* *T om.* *As* أربعة أربعة | *praem.* *A* هذه *ε* الخمس [الخمسة | *add.* *π* هي [التي 142 *inv.* *A* أولا 142... يورد [ثلاثة | *s.l.* *Ka* ثلاثة *et* ثلاثة *ε* ثلاث ثلاث [ثلاثة ثلاثة 143 *s.l.* *Ka* أربعة أربعة *et* أربعة *ε* أربع أربع [ثلاثة | *om.* *N* كان | *om.* *S* *N* الاثنتين [اثنتين | *N* الاثنتين [اثنتين | *JMiG* الذي [التي | *Te* وثلاثة [أتم التي | *π* أربع الأربع [أربعة | *v* واحدة [واحد | *add.* *As* هي [التي 144 *Y* يعدد *JG* يذكر : *s.l.* *S*<sup>3</sup> واحد *λ* وواحد [وواحدة | *λS* واحد [واحدة 145 *τ* ثلاث [وثلاثة | *Da* عن [بين 145 *JG* والتي *λ* آخر *G* وأخرى *iter.* *J* وأخرى *praem.* *et* [أخرى | *s.l.* *N* و *et* واحدة *AsYiG* واحدة *om.* *J* *add.* اثنتين [اثنتين | *a.c.* *Y* وهي [هي | *a.c.* *G* بينه [قد ترك 146 *in mg.* *To* فيكون *τ* ليكون [فيكون ويذكرها [ويذكرهما 147 *T* تركها [تركا | *S* منهما [منها | *add.* *s.l.* *To* اثنتين [اثنتين *γVEDiDaS**NED.* *A* ذكرهما [كان ذكره | *S*<sup>3</sup> *s.l.* ربما *JSG* وربما [ربما | *S**Yi in mg.* *η* اثنتين اثنتين [اثنتين | *Nk* *A* أو وقع [أوقع

*in mg.* *Te* فرفوروس [كتبا 137... أول 136

### [12.2. Second divergence]

Another divergence consists in that *the accident is not necessarily shared equally, whereas the proprium is so necessarily*<sup>36</sup>, and you have already learnt what [you should know] in this regard<sup>37</sup>. 135

### [13. Avicenna's conclusions]

[To conclude], these are the commonly-known shared features and the divergences mentioned by the first [thinker] who devoted a book to these five universals<sup>38</sup>, which we mentioned in the way he mentioned and ordered [them]. It is possible to express all the divergences that he mentioned which are not a common divergence by saying, for instance: 140  
 “the differentia cannot be so and so, whereas a part of what is in the accident’s nature can be so and so”, in such a way that this would have refined his statement, and, besides this, it would have made it solid. If he had done it properly, he would have first mentioned the features that are shared by the five [universals], then those that are shared by every combination of four [of them], then those that are shared by every combination of three [of them], then those that are shared by every couple [of them], and similarly he would have mentioned the divergences that are between one and [the other] four [of them], then 145  
 those that are between two and the [other] three [of them], then those that are specifically between each single [universal] and the other single one, so that he would have kept what is necessary, and would have not inattentively neglected a shared feature and a divergence between the two of them, mentioning them between other two; perhaps his mention of what he failed to notice would have been more appropriate and better.

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<sup>36</sup>) See Porph., *Isag.*, p. 22.9-10 (cf. Al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1104.7-8). | <sup>37</sup>) In *Madḥal* II.2, §3.2 and §6.2. | <sup>38</sup>) Porphyry.

## [الفصل الرابع]

### فصل في مناسبة بعض هذه الخمسة مع بعض

(1) وإذ قد عرفنا هذه الألفاظ الكلية الخمسة فيجب أن نعلم أنّ الشيء الذي هو منها جنس ليس جنسا لكل شيء، بل لنوعه فقط، وكذلك الفصل ليس يجب أن يكون فصلا لكل شيء، بل إما من حيث هو مقسم فلجنسه، وإما من حيث هو مُقَوِّم فلنوع ذلك الجنس؛ وأن الشيء الواحد قد يجوز أن يكون جنسا أو كجنس، وفصلا ونوعا وخاصة وعرضا: فإنّ الحساس كالنوع من المدرك وجنس للسامع والمبصر وفصل للحيوان؛ والماشي جنس لذي الرجلين ولذي أربع أرجل، ونوع للمنتقل، وخاصة للحيوانات، وعرض عام للإنسان. وربما اجتمعت الخمسة في واحد.

(2.1) والجنس ليس جنسا للفصل البتة ولا الفصل نوعا للجنس، وإلا لاحتاج إلى فصل آخر، بل الفصل معنى خارج عن طبيعة الجنس؛ فإنّ الناطق ليس هو حيوانا ذا نطق، بل شيء ذو نطق،

3 وإذ... 11 Quoted in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣīdq*, p. 175.3-10. 12 Quoted in Bahmanyār, *Tahṣīl*, pp. 19.17-20.7 and in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣīdq*, p. 176.1-12.

12 [للجنس... والجنس] *al-Ṣifā'*, *al-Ġadal* III.2, p. 173.3-8.

مع | § الخمس [الخمسة] | Mi الفصل الرابع من المقالة الثانية من الفن الأول من جملة المنطق [فصل 2 تعلم [تعلم | §<sup>3</sup> s.l. الخمسة § الخمس [الخمسة] | Law عرفت [عرفنا 3 om. et add. s.l. Da C ليس جنسا | A جنسا [جنس | om. et add. s.l. Te هو 4 vJNoG يعلم LawDaToŠ [مقسم 6 §<sup>3</sup> om. et add. in mg. من | A فصل [فصلا | om. C ليس 5 §<sup>3</sup> s.l. شيء § نوع [شيء [وعرضا 8 Y<sup>2</sup> in mg. فلجنس ما Lat. [فلجنس ما] «unius generis» o فلجنس ما [فلجنسه | T منقسم وإن كان [ولذي | μ رجلين [الرجلين 10 Ka الحيوان [للحيوان | KaS السامع [للسامع 9 A وعرض λNkBA sDiŠN للمنتقل [للمنتقل | om. § Nk رجل [أرجل | AŠ الأربعة [أربعة أربع | Law البتة | § add. البتة [جنسا 12 § a.c. الواحد [واحد | LawY فرما [وربما 11 Ed. للمنتقل Ka للسفل هو | As و إن [فإن 14 § الفصول [الفصل 13 in mg. To<sup>2</sup> نوع λJDiMiG نوع [نوعا | om. § No ناطق [ذا نطق | vJG ذو [ذا | vJ حيوان [حيوانا | §<sup>3</sup> om. et add. s.l.

أي ليست طبيعة الجنس موجودة في طبيعة الفصل فيكون جنسا للفصل والفصل نوعا له [البتة... والجنس 12 بل طبيعة الفصل شيء خارج عن طبيعة الجنس فلما كان كذلك لم يكن جمل الجنس على الفصل إلا كحمل الأعراض العامة اللازمة إذ يحمل الجنس على هذا الفصل وغيره من الفصول وكون الفصل لازما للجنس من *in mg.* NkB حيث هو جنس لأن بلحاظه لطبيعة صار جنسا

**CHAPTER ON THE RELATION OF SOME OF THESE FIVE  
[UTTERANCES] TO THE OTHERS**

**[1. The five universals as relational notions]**

Q110 Since we have already presented these five universal utterances, it is upon us to teach that what among them is a genus is not a genus for everything, but for its own species only. Analogously, the differentia is not necessarily a differentia for everything, but either [it is so] inasmuch as it is divisive, and then it is a differentia for its genus, or it is so inasmuch as it is constitutive, and then it is a differentia for the species of that genus. [It is also upon us to teach] that it is possible for one and the same species to be a genus or like a genus, and a differentia, a species, a proprium and an accident: in fact, “sensitive” is like a species of “capable of acquiring knowledge” and a genus of “hearing” and “seeing”, and a differentia of “animal”; “walking” is a genus of “biped” and “quadruped”, a species of “mobile”, a proprium of “animals” and a common accident of “man”. Sometimes the five [universals] can be gathered in one. 5 10

**[2. The genus-differentia relation]**

**[2.1. The notion of the differentia is not included in the notion of the genus]**

The genus is not at all a genus for the differentia, nor the differentia is a species of the genus, otherwise another differentia would be required; on the contrary, the differentia is a notion external to the

15 وإن كان يلزم أن يكون ذلك الشيء حيوانا، وأما الحيوان ذو النطق فهو الإنسان؛ ولو كان الحيوان داخلا في معنى الناطق لكان إذا قلت: «حيوان ناطق» فقد قلت: «حيوان هو حيوان ذو نطق»، فإنّ ذا النطق والناطق شيء واحد. وإذا قيل الجنس على الفصل فهو كما يقال العرض اللازم على الشيء الذي يقال عليه ولا يدخل في ماهيته، لكنه كالمادة للفصل، ونسبة الفصل إليه من وجه كنسبة الخاصة التي توجد في البعض، لكن الفصل يقومه موجودا بالفعل، وإن لم يدخل في حده وماهيته دخوله في أبيضته، ككثير من العلل 20 وكالصورة للمادة، هذا إن كان الفصل أخص على الإطلاق من الجنس، ولم يقع خارجا عنه البتة وبالحقيقة، فإنّ قول كل واحد منهما عند التحصيل هو على النوع. وهذه الأشياء تتحصل لك في الفلسفة الأولى. 25

(2.2) والجنس تكون نسبته إلى الفصل كنسبة عارض عام؛ وأما العارض العام فإنه قد يكون بالقياس إلى الجنس خاصة، وبالقياس إلى النوع عرضا عاما، مثل الانتقال بالإرادة فإنه خاصة من خواص الحيوان وعارض عام للإنسان؛ وربما كان خاصة لجنس أعلى، مثل 30

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25 Quoted in Bahmanyār, *Tahṣīl*, p. 20.8 and in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-dīmān al-ṣīd*, p. 176.13. 27 Quoted in Bahmanyār, *Tahṣīl*, p. 20.7-8 and in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-dīmān al-ṣīd*, p. 176.12-13.

add. على ما عرفت [حيوانا |  $\zeta$  om. الشيء | Bah ذلك أن يكون [ذلك... أن | om. Bah وإن كان 15  $\nu$ LawJNk add. in mg. G | فأما [وأما | A 16 إنسان | الإنسان 16 No لو [ولو | A إنسان | الإنسان 16 A فأما [وأما | om. Bah الحيوان 17 No لو [ولو | A إنسان | الإنسان 16 A فأما [وأما | om. Bah العام [اللازم | Yi لا [كما 19 iter. Yi وإذا قيل | s.l. N 18 iter. Yi 3 حيوان | LawY ولكنه [لكنه | Bah s.l.  $\zeta$  فيه [في ماهيته 20 To يقال [يدخل | Di et exp. Di اللازم [الشيء  $\zeta$  موجود [موجودا |  $\lambda$  يقومه BahLaw يقرره [يقومه موجودا 21 S<sup>3</sup> praem. i.l. S<sup>3</sup> و BahLaw vNkATNoEd. [أبيضته | praem. AsYi و [دخوله | BahLaw ماهيته وحده [حده وماهيته 22 [وبالحقيقة 24 om. Lat. om. Yi الفصل 23 E المعلول [العلل | No كثير Da لكثير [كثير إنما [تتحصل | C praem. in mg. C إنما [هو 25 Yi قولنا [قول | Ed. أو بالحقيقة نسبة [كنسبة |  $\zeta$ 1 om. تكون | TAS فالجنس om. Da الجنس [والجنس 27 om. A لك | praem. S<sup>3</sup> Yi و To أما [وأما | To (a.c. عارض) p.c. [عام | BahLawYi  $\lambda$  عرض [عارض | Law 31... وربما 30 om. et add. s.l. N خاصة 29 Ka للقياس [بالقياس |  $\lambda$  العرض [العارض 28 om. v add. in mg. Y<sup>2</sup> للناسن

in mg. لأن الحيوانية لا يدخل في ماهية الناطق وإن كانت لازمة له لزوم ما لا بد منه في الوجود [حيوانا 15 in mg. NkB أي لا يدخل في ماهية كما يدخل في الأبية إلى يكون شيئا لوجوده بالفعل [أبيضته 22 NkB

nature of the genus: in fact, “rational” is not an animal provided with rationality, but rather something provided with rationality, even if it necessarily follows that that thing is an animal. As to the animal provided with rationality, it is the man; but if “animal” were included in the notion of “rational”, then, if you said: “rational animal”, you would have said “animal that is an animal provided with rationality”, since “provided with rationality” and “rational” are the same. If the genus is said of the differentia, it is so as the concomitant accident is said of its subject without being included in its quiddity, but it is like a matter with respect to the differentia, and the relation of the differentia to it is, under a certain respect, like the that of the proprium that exists in part [of its subjects], but the differentia constitutes it as existent in actuality, even if it is not included in its definition and quiddity the way it is in its essential quality, like many causes and like the form with respect to the matter. This in the case in which the differentia is more specific in absolute than the genus and does not at all fall outside of it essentially: when they are realized, they are both predicated of the species. These things will be attained for you in the First Philosophy<sup>1</sup>.

**[2.2. The genus is like a common accident with respect to the differentia; the common accident can be a proprium for the genus and a common accident for the species]**

The relation of the genus to the differentia is like that of a common accident; as to the common accident, it can be a proprium with respect to the genus and a common accident with respect to the species, like “moving voluntarily”, which is one of the propria of “animal”, and a

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<sup>1)</sup> *Ilāhiyyāt* V.

البياض فإنه من خواص الجسم المركب وعارض عام للإنسان، وربما كان من خواص أعلى الأجناس كلها؛ وربما لم يكن العارض العام خاصة لشيء من الأجناس، إذا كان قد يعرض لغير تلك المقولة، مثل امتناع قبول الأشد والأضعف، فإنه من لوازم الجوهر على سبيل العموم له ولغيره، وليس خاصة لجنس من أجناسه، إذ ستعلم أن ذلك قد يقع في غير أعلى أجناسه.

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(3) والحيوان نسبه إلى هذا الحيوان من حيث هو حيوان الحق به الإشارة ولم يعتبر فيه النطق نسبة النوع إلى الأشخاص، فإنه مقول عليه قول النوع الذي هو نوع بالقياس إلى الأشخاص فقط على الأشخاص لا نسبة الجنس، بل إنما هو جنس بالقياس إلى أشخاص الحيوان من حيث صارت ناطقة، وكذلك الناطق بالقياس إلى هذا الناطق غير مأخوذ معه الحيوانية، فإنه كنوع له بالمعنى المذكور لا كفصل، بل هو فصل لأشخاص الحيوان من حيث هي حيوان.

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Quoted in Bahmanyār, *Tahṣīl*, p. 20.9-10 and in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq*, p. 176.13-15. 41 وكذلك... Quoted in Bahmanyār, *Tahṣīl*, p. 20.12-18 and in Lawkarī, *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq*, pp. 176.15-177.5.

الجنس [الجسم] | *add. et exp. Te* | الحيوان وعارض عام للإنسان [خواص] | *add. A* | خاصة [فإنه] 31  
 ع إذ إذا 33 No على [أعلى] | *add. A* | خاصة [كان] 32 *add. et exp. E* | من [وعارض] | ع  
 [أجناسه] 35 E الجوهر الإنساني *s.l. NkC* [الإنسان] *Lat.* [الإنسان] «*hominem*» β الإنسان [الجوهر] 34  
*om. A* | أعلى | *om. et add. in mg. To* | غير 36 *add. Di* | الجوهر [ستعلم] | Di الأجناس  
 [الإشارة]... 38 الحق | v ألحق : *JMi praem in mg. G* | إذا [ألحق] | *om. Law* | حيوان 37  
*Lat.* [الجنس] «*generis*» [النوع] | BahLaw غير معتبر [ولم يعتبر] 38 BahLaw مشار إليه  
 [حيث] 41 *om. Yi* | هو 40 *om. JNo* | الأشخاص... 40 فقط | *om. λ* | فقط | *add. To* | فقد [بالقياس] 39  
 بالمعنى | Yi كمنعنى [كنوع] | *add. et exp. Ka* | جنس [فإنه] 42 *add. s.l. Y<sup>2</sup>* | هو *add. E* | هو  
 هو [هي] | BahLaw للحيوان [الأشخاص الحيوان] | S الفصل [كفصل] 43 BahLaw *om.* المذكور  
 LawJAYi *om. EG*

Branch β is affected by an arguably intentional substitution of *al-ḡawhar* (“substance”) by *al-insān* (“man”): the reason for such a substitution might have been the difficulty to understand that “its genera” that are mentioned immediately after are genera subsumed under the substance, and not genera under which the substance is subsumed. A misunderstanding of the sort might have led to replace the term “substance” by “man”, with respect of which the existence of higher genera is not problematic. MS E turns out to be affected by a contamination of its model, since it preserves a reading that stems from an attempt to harmonize reading α and β.

Q111 common accident of “man”. It can be a proprium for a higher genus, like whiteness, for it is among the propria of the composite body and a common accident of man; it can [also] be among the propria of all the highest genera; sometimes the common accident is not a proprium of any of the genera, since it [also] occurs to a category different than that one, like the impossibility of undergoing the more and the less, since it is one of the necessary concomitants of substance, being common to it and to something else and without being a proprium for none of its genera, since you will learn that this can occur within another of its highest genera. 35

**[3. The universal-particular relation as a species-individual relation]**

The relation of “animal” to “this animal” inasmuch as it is an animal to which a designation has been added and in which rationality has not been taken into account, is that of the species to the individuals, since it is predicated of it the way the species which is only in relation to the individuals is predicated of them; it is not the relation of the genus: on the contrary, it is a genus only with respect to the individuals of the animal inasmuch as they are rational. Analogously, “rational” with respect to “this rational [being]” when animality is not assumed together with it, since it is like a species for it in the aforementioned sense, not like a differentia, but it is a differentia for the individuals of 40

والضحك أيضا فإنه كالنوع لهذا الضحك من غير أن يعتبر إنسانا، وإنما هو خاصة للإنسان ولأشخاص الناس؛ وكذلك الأبيض أيضا لهذا الأبيض من حيث هو أبيض مشار إليه، فإنه كالنوع له. والعرض العام إنما هو عرض عام للشيء الذي هو موضوع لكونه هذا الأبيض، لا لهذا الأبيض من حيث هو هذا الأبيض.

(4.1) واعلم أن هذه الخمسة قد يتركب بعضها مع بعض تركبا بعد تركب، فالجنس يتركب مع الفصل، فإن المدرك جنس فصل الإنسان الذي هو الناطق مثلا، أو ذو النفس فإنه جنس للناطق، فهو جنس الفصل، وقد عرض له أن كان فصل الجنس، لأنّ ذا النفس فصل بعض الأجناس المتوسطة التي للإنسان.

(4.2) وقد يتركب الجنس مع العرض مثل أنّ الملون جنس عرض للإنسان الذي هو الأسود والأبيض، لكن هذا التركيب يخالف الأول، فإنه ليس يجب أن يكون جنس الفصل المقوم جنسا مقوما للنوع، وجنس العرض يجب أن يكون عرضا لاحقا لذلك النوع. نعم

١١٢ق

50 [للإنسان 53... فالجنس 50] *Uyūn al-Hikma, al-Mantiq*, p. 14.9-11.

45 iter. a.c. Ka وإنما هو 45 إنسان [إنسانا | Bah الضاحك] الضاحك | Bah كنوع [كالنوع 44 om. فإنه 46 om. DaS أيضا | praem. S من] الناس | BahLawE وأشخاص [ولأشخاص om. Da om. et هو | om. Law العرض العام E لا كالعرض العام] والعرض العام 47 BahLaw 3 الأبيض | Law أبيض [هذا الأبيض | No الأسود] الأبيض 48 om. No عام | J add. in mg. Y<sup>2</sup> in mg. التركيب بعد تركيب κλJG تركيبا بعد تركيب [تركب 50... تركيبا 49 S<sup>3</sup> et add. s.l. S<sup>3</sup> الإنسان | vJDIG فصل] فصل | s.l. As<sup>2</sup> جنس vJDIG كجنس [جنس | T و الجنس] فالجنس 50 [جنس | A s.l. S<sup>3</sup> و] أو | om. et add. in mg. G ζ om. مثلا | S ناطق [الناطق 51 S للإنسان i.l. و κ فقد] وقد 52 S الناطق [للناطق | in mg. To<sup>2</sup> i.l. G جنس 3 s.l. As<sup>2</sup>S<sup>3</sup> جنس vSMi كجنس om. et add. s.l. Di 54 om. T om. et add. s.l. κ أن] مثل أن 54 Ka كل [كان | As للنوع] المقوم 56 No يخالفه [يخالف | KaEd للإنسان] للإنسان 55 praem. J : om. N عرض β ويجب أن يكون جنس العرض [يكون... وجنس 57 add. a.c. S

45 in mg. فإنه لهذا الأبيض من حيث هو هذا الأبيض جزء من ماهية وذاته لا عارض فيه [له 46... وكذلك 45 Nk

57 Two concurrent equivalent versions of the same phrase are attested by the two branches of the tradition:

(α) وجنس العرض يجب أن يكون

(β) ويجب أن يكون جنس العرض

The phrasing in version β is arguably a later adjustment of the word order in version

the animal inasmuch as they are “animal”. [The same holds true for] “capable of laughing” as well, since it is like the species for “this [being] capable of laughing” without considering it as a man, and is a proprium only for man and for human individuals. Similarly, also “white” for “this white [thing]” inasmuch as it is a designated white [thing], for it is like a species for it. The common accident is only so for the thing that is a subject for its being, [for instance], “this white [thing]”, and not for “this white” inasmuch as it is “this white”. 45

#### **[4. Combinations of the universal notions]**

##### **[4.1. Genus and differentia]**

You should know that these five [notions] can be combined the ones with the others, combination by combination: the genus is combined with the differentia, for “capable of acquiring” is the genus of the differentia of man which is, for instance, “rational”; or “animate”, for it is a genus of “rational”, so that it is the genus of the differentia, and it has occurred to it to be the differentia of the genus [as well], since “animate” is a differentia of some intermediate genera of man. 50

##### **[4.2. Genus and accident]**

The genus can be combined with the accident, like “coloured” is the genus of an accident of man, which is black and white, but this combination differs from the first one, since the genus of the constitutive differentia must not necessarily be a constitutive genus for the species, whereas the genus of the accident must be an accident that attaches to that species. Admittedly, the genus of the differentia can be 55

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قد يكون جنس الفصل فصلا مقوما لجنس النوع، وكذلك قد يكون جنس العرض عرضا لاحقا لجنس النوع.

60 (4.3) وأما تركيب الجنس مع الخاصة فمثل أن المتعجب بالفعل جنس للضحك بالفعل الذي هو خاصة، والصيَّاح جنس للمصاهل الذي هو خاصة.

65 (4.4) والفصل أيضا قد يتركب مع الجنس كالحساس، فإنه فصل جنس للإنسان؛ ويتركب مع الخاصة مثل النسبة إلى قائمتين من قولنا: «مساوي الزوايا الثلاث لقائمتين»، فإنه فصل خاصة المثلث؛ وقد يتركب مع العرض كالمفرق للبصر فإنه فصل عرض القطن.

70 (4.5) والخاصة قد تتركب مع الجنس، فإن المشي خاصة جنس الإنسان؛ وقد تتركب مع الفصل، فلا تفارق في كثير من المواضع خاصة النوع، وربما كان أعم من خاصة النوع وذلك إذا كان الفصل أعم، مثل المنقسم بمتساويين الذي هو فصل الزوج، فإنّ ذا النصف خاصة لهذا الفصل. وقد تتركب مع العرض العام فإن المبصر خاصة الملون، والملون عرض عام للإنسان.

*s.l.* As<sup>2</sup> كذلك As ولذلك [وكذلك] *om.* A | النوع 59... وكذلك | *add. et exp.* To | يجب [النوع] 58  
*in mg.* كجنس *s.l.* As<sup>2</sup> جنس vJDiG كجنس [اجنس] 61 Yi بالفصل [بالفعل] 60 v. *om.* لاحقا 59  
*η in mg. s.l. vel in mg. et add. om.* أيضا 63 B *om. et add. in mg.* خاصة 62... والصيَّاح | To<sup>2</sup>  
*add.* التي [النسبة] | *praem. DiToMiNo* J *praem. s.l.* J قد [ويتركب] 64 Yi *om.* قد | *om.* Ka  
π بالمثلث E للمثلث [المثلث] | *om. et add. s.l. Te* فصل | ETeG متساوي [مساوي] 65 v  
ET للنظر [القطن] | *add. et exp. Yi* الخاصة مثل النسبة التي [مع] | δKa ويتركب [وقد يتركب] 66  
κ للإنسان [الإنسان] 68 *om.* Da قد 67 §<sup>3</sup> *in mg.* للقطن (النظر) *As om. et fort. p.c. (a.c.)* القطن  
وربما كان أعم من خاصة النوع *add. a.c. As* وربما كان [النوع] | A فربما [وربما] 69 T و لا [فلا  
مثلا] v. *add.* مثلا [خاصة] 71 *add. v.* مثلا [النصف] | *om.* E | E وإن [فإن] 70 *add. a.c. Te*  
*om. J* والملون 72 *add. s.l. Nk*

α, whose purpose would be restoring a plain “Verb-Subject-Object” order. Version α, on the other hand, with its peculiar anticipation of the subject, stresses more emphasis on the comparison between the genus of the differentia and the genus of the accident.

a constitutive differentia for the genus of the species, as well as the genus of the accident can be an accident that attaches to the genus of the species.

#### [4.3. Genus and proprium]

As to the combination of the genus with the proprium, it is like the fact that “exposed to wonder in actuality” is a genus of “capable of laughing in actuality”, which is a proprium, and “capable of emitting sounds” is a genus of “neighing”, which is a proprium.

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#### [4.4. Differentia and genus, proprium and accident]

The differentia as well can be combined with the genus, like “sensitive”, for it is the differentia of the genus of man; it can [also] be combined with the proprium, like the relation to two right [angles] in our statement: “whose three angles are equivalent to two right [angles]”, for it is the differentia of the proprium of the triangle; it can [also] be combined with the accident, like “piercing the vision”, for it is the differentia of the accident of cotton<sup>2</sup>.

65

#### [4.5. Proprium and genus, differentia and accident]

The proprium can be combined with the genus, for “walking” is the proprium of the genus of man; it can [also] be combined with the differentia, so that, in most cases, it is not distinguished from the proprium of the species. It can [also] be more common than the proprium of the species if the differentia is more common<sup>3</sup>, like “divisible into two equal halves” which is the differentia of even, for “having a half” is a proprium of this differentia. It can be combined with the common accident, for “visible” is a proprium of “coloured”, and “coloured” is a common accident of man.

70

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<sup>2</sup>) Because “colour which pierces the vision” is the definition of “white”. | <sup>3</sup>) Being, therefore, a common accident of the species: cf. *‘Uyūn al-Ḥikma, al-Mantiq*, pp. 14.7-15.11.

(4.6) والعرض قد يتركب مع الجنس فلا يفارق عرض النوع لأنه يكون عرضا للنوع، لكن من أعراض النوع ما هو خاصة للجنس وليس عرضا عاما للجنس بل خاصة، ومنه ما هو عرض عام لهما، وكذلك عرض الفصل وعرض الخاصة.

75

[تم كتاب إيساغوجي. والحمد لمولى النعم ومرادف الآلاء والقسم].

73 والعرض 76... [الخاصة 76] 'Uyūn al-Hikma, al-Manṭiq, pp. 14.16-15.2.

75... هو |  $S^3$  *om. et add. s.l.* هو | *om.* A | النوع | *praem. Yi* | يكون 74 S ولا [فلا 73  
تم ايساغوجي والحمد B] والقسم... تم 77 Mi ومنها [ومنه 75 G الجنس | الجنس | ليس [وليس  
تم كتاب ايساغوجي والله الحمد والمنه Da تم كتاب ايساغوجي من الشفاء والله الحمد والمنه C لمولى النعم  
تمت المقالة الثانية ولواهب العقل الحمد بلا نهاية وصلواته على Ka والصلوة على خير خلقه محمد وآله والسلام  
تم كتاب ايساغوجي ولواهب العقل الحمد بلا نهاية ولرسوله الشكر بلا JToŠG مولانا وهادينا محمد وآله وسلم  
آخر الفن الأول من الجملة الأولى في علم المنطق A تم الفن الأول من الجملة الأولى والحمد لله وحده Nk غاية  
تمت K تم ايساغوجي T تم كتاب ايساغوجي والحمد لله على ما اولى من النعم وهو حسبي ونعم الوكيل E  
تمت المقالة الثانية Mi والله تعالى اعلم تم الفن الأول من جملة المنطق والحمد لله رب العالمين Di المقالة الثانية  
من الفن الأول وتم بتمامها الفن الأول والحمد لله رب العلمين والصلوة والسلام على سيد المرسلين وآله الطيبين  
والحمد لمولى النعم ومرادف الآلاء والقسم وصلى الله على محمد وآله وصحبه اجمعين SY --- Yi الطاهرين  
N تم كتاب ايساغوجي No

**[4.6. Accident and genus, differentia and proprium]**

The accident can be combined with the genus, so that it is not distinguished from the accident of the species since it is an accident of the species, but among the accidents of the species there is what is a proprium of the genus without being a common accident for it, rather being a proprium, and what is a common accident for both; analogously [in the case of] the accident of the differentia and the accident of the proprium.

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{The book of the *Isagoge* is complete}



## COMMENTARY – TREATISE I

## Ĝūzġānī's Introduction

(§1.1) [*Abū 'Ubayd said...thirty-two years old*] The paragraph recalls Ĝūzġānī's encounter with Avicenna, reportedly occurred when Avicenna was almost 32 years old, i.e. around 402H/1011-12. Ĝūzġānī's account on Avicenna's mastery of the philosophical sciences as a young man in his teens might rely on Avicenna's own claim to have reached a complete mastery of the sciences when he was around 18 years old (*Autobiography*, p. 36.8; on the early phases of Avicenna's education, see also REISMAN 2013, pp. 8-12). A motif that is central in Ĝūzġānī's reports on Avicenna's production is here introduced, namely the scarce attention paid by Avicenna to the preservation of copies of his own works: cf. §1.2 and Ĝūzġānī's introduction to the section of Mathematics of the *Dānišnāmah-yi 'Alā'ī* (Persian text in MAHDAVĪ 1954, pp. 110-111), where Ĝūzġānī complains about Avicenna's habit to give the only existing copy of his writings to the commissioners, without keeping an exemplar for himself. Another motif of Ĝūzġānī's complaint is Avicenna's scarce care of drawing a clean copy of his own draft (see §1.2). Avicenna's scarce editorial care for his own works is reportedly one of the reasons for Ĝūzġānī's choice to undertake this task in his behalf, rewarded by the possibility to join him and to study philosophy under his direction.

(§1.2) [*He was burdened...destroyed his books*] The passage at stake refers to Avicenna's stay in Ĝūrġān, during which Ĝūzġānī wrote under dictation works on Logic and Natural Philosophy. Possibly, Ĝūzġānī alludes here also to the dictation of *al-Muḥtaṣar al-Awsaṭ fi l-Manṭiq* (= GL1 in GUTAS 2014, p. 433) mentioned in *Biography*, p. 44.3-8. A keynote point of this passage is the introduction of Ĝūzġānī's request to Avicenna to write "great works and commentaries", preliminary to the beginning of the composition of the *Šifā'*; from the recount of this same request in Ĝūzġānī's *Biography of Avicenna* (p. 54.1-5) we know that Ĝūzġānī asked, more precisely, for commentaries on Aristotle's books. The scholars of Avicenna's entourage might have renovated a similar request soon after the composition of the *Šifā'* as well, which could have led Avicenna to compose the *Kitāb al-Inṣāf* (= GS11 in GUTAS 2014, p. 426), only a part of which is extant nowadays (cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 144-155)<sup>1</sup>. Reportedly, Avicenna first reacted by pointing at the commentaries that he had previously composed in Buḥārā, but Ĝūzġānī states that he had heard about their dispersion, and that their owners prevented anyone from acceding to their copy, which was also the only extant copy of them, given that Avicenna had not kept a clean copy for himself (on this habit of Avicenna's, cf. *Biography of Ibn Sīnā*, p. 72, where Ĝūzġānī refers to Avicenna's *Lisān al-'Arab* [= GL17 in GUTAS 2014, pp. 443-444], that was impossible to collect

<sup>1</sup> No specific reason for Avicenna's decision to compose the *Inṣāf* is mentioned in the so-called "Memoirs of a Disciple from Rayy", corresponding to *Mubāḥaṭāt* 127-141 and ascribed to Ibn Zayla in REISMAN 2002, p. 253; however, the beginning in *Mubāḥaṭāt* 127 states that some reason induced Avicenna (*ba'atāhu*) to dedicate himself to the composition of the work.

and edit after Avicenna's death since there was not a clean copy of it, and it was preserved in disorder). Arguably, Ğūzġānī's vague account refers to the *Kitāb al-Ĥāšil wa-l-Maḥṣūl* (= GS10 in GUTAS 2014, p. 426) and the *Kitāb al-Birr wa-l-Itm* (= GPP1 in GUTAS 2014, pp. 498-500), both composed in Buḥārā for Abū Bakr al-Baraġī, who detained the only extant exemplar of them and did not allow anyone to read or copy them (*Autobiography*, pp. 38.6-40.2). Particularly the *K. al-Ĥāšil wa-l-Maḥṣūl*, even if it is no more extant, is recorded by Avicenna himself as a commentary of considerable length, in about twenty volumes (*Autobiography*, p. 38.8-9), and might be the kind of work to which Avicenna alluded in his answer to Ğūzġānī's request.

(§1.3) [*I stayed with...by administrative disruptions*] The passage quickly resumes Avicenna's peregrinations from Ğūrġān to Rayy (where Avicenna joined the service of Maġd al-Dawla: cf. *Biography*, pp. 48.9-50.3) and from Rayy to Hamaḍān, where he was appointed as a minister of King Šams al-Dawla, glossing over the political vicissitudes occurred to Avicenna, which are more extensively dealt with in *Biography*, p. 52.1-10, where we are told that the military troops mutinied against him, which even led to his imprisonment, before his successive rehabilitation as a minister. None of these events is explicitly recounted in §1.3 of the Introduction: they are just alluded to as a cause of "distress" and "waste of time". The main focus of the passage is Ğūzġānī's renovated request of the composition of a commentary on Aristotle's works, followed by Avicenna's answer. Two main reasons are provided for Avicenna's refusal to compose a literal commentary, namely that he had not enough spare time to occupy himself with "dealing with the words (*al-alfāz*) and commenting them" and that he was not inclined to do so, so that he offered to compose a comprehensive (*ġāmi'*) book with a more original structure. According to the parallel account of *Biography*, p. 54.1-5, Avicenna allegedly announced the composition of "a book in which I mention what, according to me, is correct in these sciences, without arguing with the [philosophers] who hold opposite views and without caring to answer to them". Even if Ğūzġānī tends to acknowledge great importance to the alleged lack of time as a reason for Avicenna's avoidance to write a literal commentary (noteworthy, it is the only explanation recorded in Ğūzġānī's account of the same episode in *Biography*, p. 54.1-5), there might have been also less contingent reasons for Avicenna's choice to compose a different kind of work that, for some reasons, are left aside in Ğūzġānī's account. More in particular, this is suggested by Avicenna's Prologue to the section of the *Samā' Ṭabī'ī* of the *Šifā'* (T1).

**T1.** *Šifā'*, *Samā' Ṭabī'ī*, pp. 3.8-4.9:

«We often see those who discuss the sciences (*al-mutakallimūn fī l-'ulūm*), when they deal with infirming a feeble statement (*maqāla*) or apply themselves to clarify a question in which the truth can be seen at a short distance, devote every energy, verify each part [of the problem] and set forth every argument, but when they are uncertain concerning a problem and they come to a certain ambiguity, they pass it over. As to us, we hope that, besides this one, there is [also] a way opposed to theirs, and a method countering theirs, and we devote all the possible effort to spread what is right of [the theories of] our predecessors and that we show indulgence in the cases in which we consider that they were in error. This is what dissuaded us from writing commentaries

on their books and detailed expositions of their texts, for we could not guard against coming across matters with regard to which we think<sup>1</sup> that they erred, so that we would be forced either to dissimulate a defence of them, or to invent a proof and artfully ascribe it to them, or to oppose to them by a refutation. God spared us this [task] and assigned to this a group [of philosophers] who devoted their capabilities to this and commented (*fassarū*) their books. He who desires to understand their words will be guided by their commentaries and will be satisfied with their detailed expositions; he who is eager to know the science and the notions, will find them scattered in those books [of theirs], and part of what the length of our research provided, in spite of the short time of our life [spent on it], in these books that I composed and that I named, collectively, *Kitāb al-Šifā'*».

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1. نطن ed. Al-Yāsīn [p. 81.16]: بظن ed. Zāyid [p. 4.5]

In Avicenna's view, on the one hand, a literal commentary requires dealing systematically also with self-evident subject matters, devoting time to non-problematic questions as well. On the other, the project itself of composing a more 'conciliatory' work in substantial accordance with the Peripatetic tradition – also spelled out in Avicenna's general Prologue to the *Šifā'*, i.e. *Madḥal* I.1 (§3.2), and recalled in *Biography*, p. 54.1-5 – entails the choice of a literary genre different than that of the literal commentary, which somehow compels the author not to skip the refutation of wrong traditional argumentations. The idea that Avicenna would preferably refrain from critical references in his works is also attested in the *Memoirs* of an anonymous disciple from Rayy (*Mubāḥaṭāt* 127-141), likely to be identified with Ibn Zayla (cf. REISMAN 2002, p. 253 and GUTAS 2014, p. 65). The polemic reference to certain authors of literal commentaries might perhaps address the Baḡdād Peripatetics as authors of lemmatic commentaries (of the kind of the commentaries by Abū l-Faraḡ Ibn al-Ṭayyib, that were well known to Avicenna: cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 64-65). Clearly, besides the lack of time emphasized by Ġūzḡānī, Avicenna had stronger ideological reasons to refrain from the production of a lemmatic commentary of the Aristotelian corpus. Avicenna's offer to compose a book that was meant to be more original both in structure and in content was accepted by the scholars of his entourage, who urged him to start with Natural Philosophy (cf. also *Biography*, p. 54.4-5): this can perhaps explain why the first *fann* of this section, namely the *Samā' Ṭabī'ī*, is preceded by a programmatic and general prologue (of which T1 quoted above is a part) that could apply to the whole work, a sort of "twin prologue" of *Madḥal* I.1. In this preliminary phase, Avicenna reportedly wrote approximately 20 folios, then was forced to interrupt the composition because of his administrative charges.

(§1.4) [*The fate dealt... and what follows*] After the death of Šams al-Dawla, occurred in 412H/1021 in the course of a military expedition, likely due to a severe colic (*Biography*, p. 56.2-6), Avicenna hid himself in the house of Abū Ġālib in Hamaḍān, waiting for the right moment to flee away from the country (cf. REISMAN 2013, p. 22).

According to §1.4, Avicenna accomplished in 20 days the sections of Natural Philosophy – except for the *Nabāt* and the *Ḥayawān* – and of Metaphysics. A more detailed account is offered in *Biography*, pp. 56.9-58.3: during his concealment, Avicenna was urged to pursue the composition of the *Šifā'*, and put down in two days some main topics (*ru'ūs al-masā'il*), in approximately twenty quaternions (*fī qarīb min 'išrīn ġuz'an miqdār al-tumn*, “in approximately twenty quires of the in octavo format, i.e. in the format of a quaternion”, equivalent to around 160 leaves)<sup>2</sup>; after having set the main topics, Avicenna started writing their exposition (*šarḥ*). Reportedly, Avicenna accomplished the preliminary setting of the topics without recurring to any book (*Biography*, p. 58.3-4), solely relying upon his memory; it is worth questioning whether what seems to be implied by Ğūzġānī's Introduction (§1.4), namely that the sections of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics were almost entirely written without any book at Avicenna's disposal, can be safely relied on, or whether it is an artful alteration of the truth by Ğūzġānī's part. It is also worth questioning the exact meaning of the term “books” employed in this context: it possibly refers not to every kind of book, but only to the canonical texts of the Ancients, in such a way that Avicenna might have disposed of his own works being momentarily far from books by other authors. In this phase, the composition of the section of Logic started as well: Avicenna wrote a *ġuz'* of it (*Biography*, p. 58.8: it is doubtful whether this term has to be taken in the general sense of ‘part, section’ or in the more technical sense of ‘quire’ as in *Biography*, p. 58.2), together with the ‘introductory speech’ (*ḥuṭba*). If this latter expression has to be taken as referring to Avicenna's Prologue, this would attest the posteriority of Ğūzġānī's Introduction with respect to the author's Prologue (against GUTAS 2014, p. 32, n. 12, reading the term *ḥuṭba* as referring to *Madḥal* I.2-4, considered as an introduction to philosophy; on the technical meaning of the term *ḥuṭba*, see HARVEY 2004, pp. 15-16).

(§1.5) [*Afterwards, some notables...accorded to him*] The passage records the conjuration that led to Avicenna's seclusion in the fortress of Fardaġān for four months, and to his subsequent release and return to Hamadān with Tāġ al-Dawla (cf. *Biography*, pp. 58.9-60.6).

(§1.6) [*There, he dedicated...completed in Isfahān*] After coming back to Hamadān, Avicenna dedicated himself to pursuing the composition of the section of Logic, which has, according to Ğūzġānī, a more traditional character, following more strictly the traditional order (*tartīb*) of exposition. Avicenna himself presents the section of Logic as more faithful to Aristotle's arrangement of the matters (*Prologue*, §4.1), although he claims a certain degree of originality for this section as well (cf. again *Prologue*, §4.1, where Avicenna claims to have dealt with subtleties that cannot be found in other books on Logic, and §2, where states that the *Šifā'* contains the result of his own theoretical

<sup>2</sup> For *tumn* as a technical term meaning the *in octavo* format of a quire (formed by four bifolia or eight leaves), see the searchable Arabic codicological glossary at <http://codicologia.irht.cnrs.fr> s.v. *tumn*. On all the possible meanings of *ġuz'* (generically denoting any codicological unit), see GACEK 2012, p. 23; for *ġuz'* specifically meaning ‘quire’, see also HUMBERT 1997, pp. 77-86.

inquiry, and that, even if this claim refers especially to the sections of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics, it holds true also for the section of Logic). Remarkably, Ğūzġānī seems to put much more emphasis on the traditional aspect of the Logic of the *Šifā'*, and to relate it to the fact that, at the time he composed the Logic, Avicenna could dispose of the books. Although the section of Logic was presumably intended to be the first section of the *Šifā'* (cf. Avicenna's *Prologue*, §4.1: *wa-lammā ftatahtu hādā l-kitāb ibtada'tu bi-l-mantiq*), there is some codicological evidence that might account for a composition of Logic posterior to that of the other sections (and, therefore, consistent with Ğūzġānī's report) or, at least, for an independent circulation of the section. Several manuscripts, even complete witnesses preserving the section of Logic, still attest a numbering of the *funūn* that form the *Šifā'* that would better suit a codex lacking the nine *funūn* of Logic. Some other manuscripts, even preserving the section of Logic at the beginning of the work, number it as the fourth section (*al-ġuz' al-rābi'*) of the *summa*.

[As to the *Mathematics...forty years old*] Ğūzġānī's accounts on the composition of the *Mathematics* of the *Šifā'* in *Biography*, p. 64.5-6 and in the *Introduction* are quite consistent, in spite of a minor divergence concerning the summary of the *Almagest*, which was apparently still not completed, whereas the other three summaries had already been composed in their entirety. Among the works composed slightly after Ğūzġānī joined Avicenna, a *Muhtaṣar Almaġistī* is recorded (*Biography*, p. 44.7-8): whether it is the summary that was later included in the *Šifā'* or not, is a debated subject. The hypothesis of such an identification is endorsed in RAGEP AND RAGEP 2004, p. 6, but rejected by D. Gutas, who adduces as an argument the aforementioned passage of the *Biography* in which Ğūzġānī seems to claim that the summary on *Astronomy* had not been previously composed, though without discussing the parallel passage in Ğūzġānī's *Introduction* to the *Šifā'*, in which it is stated that all the sections of *Mathematics* had been already achieved before the composition of the *Šifā'* (GUTAS 2014, pp. 462-466). A solution of the apparent slight incongruence of the two testimonies might be supposing that all the summaries corresponding to the four *funūn* of the *Mathematics* had already been composed (as stated in Ğūzġānī's *Introduction*) and that the summary of the *Almagest* had to be *concluded* rather than to be entirely composed (as in Ğūzġānī's *Biography*). Ğūzġānī speaks of *completing* the *Almagest* and the Logic; about the section of Logic, he tells that Avicenna had started its composition before being imprisoned in the castle of Fardaġān, whereas this is the first time in which the summary of the *Almagest* of the *Šifā'* is mentioned in the *Biography*, so that we have no clue of when its composition started. This oddity, together with the passage of Ğūzġānī's *Introduction*, could be explained if this summary of the *Almagest* were one of the abridgements previously composed by Avicenna and, then, added to the *Šifā'*, perhaps completed, in that occasion, with materials that were absent in the first version of the text. In support of this hypothesis, it can be observed that the last treatise (XIV) of the section of Astronomy of the *Šifā'* is introduced as an additional treatise (*ibtidā' al-maqāla al-muḏāfa ilā mā ḥtaṣara min kitāb Almaġistī*, "beginning of the treatise

added to [his] abridgement of the *Book of the Almagest*”), and was very likely added later to the main core of the work: first, it is the only treatise introduced in some manuscripts by a formula suggesting that the addition of this part to the rest of the summary of *Astronomy* was not made by Avicenna himself, even if he is the author of this section as well (*Šifāʾ*, *Hayʾa*, p. 650.3: *qāla al-Šayḥ al-Raʾīs*, “the Chief Master said”); second, the manuscript tradition even preserves traces of a version of the work, preserving an explicit at the end of the thirteenth treatise and/or lacking the fourteenth treatise (as in MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823). In such a scenario the two accounts by Ğüzğānī would not be contradictory, for it would be true to state both that the summary of the *Almagest* had already been composed before and that it was completely achieved when it was added to the *Šifāʾ*. The *Nabāt* and the *Hayawān* were the last sections of the *Šifāʾ* to be composed (likely in 417H/1026-7, during a military expedition of ‘Alāʾ al-Dawla against the city of Šābūr Ḥwāst: see *Biography*, p. 66.2-4), and Avicenna could hardly be forty years old at the time, for, if we acknowledge credibility to Ğüzğānī’s other chronological indications, Avicenna should have been forty years old around the year 410H/1019-20 (cf. also GUTAS 2014, pp. 108-109). For the chronological difficulty entailed by this passage and an attempt at solving the problem by emendation, see the critical notes in the edition of the Arabic text and the Introduction to the edition, section II.3.

(§2) [*My purpose in...all good deed*] The paragraph condenses Ğüzğānī’s statement of intents. It can be observed that, in Ğüzğānī’s view, a couple of points in Avicenna’s composition of the *Šifāʾ* need to be justified: first of all, the choice of the *literary genre*, namely the reason for Avicenna’s refusal to compose a literal commentary (*al-sabab fi iʾrāḍihi ‘an šarḥ al-alfāz*) which, as previously argued, is represented quite reductively in Ğüzğānī’s reports, if compared to Avicenna’s own argumentation offered in the prologue to the section of *Samāʾ Ṭabīʿī*. The second point that requires justification is the *taxonomy* of the arguments in the *Šifāʾ*, which juxtaposes sections that more strictly follow the traditional arrangement (like the section of Logic and the section of Botany and Zoology: cf. Avicenna’s Prologue, §4.1 and *Šifāʾ*, *Hayawān* I.1, p. 1.10-12) to sections that have a more original arrangement (like those of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics: cf. also Avicenna’s Prologue, §4.2 and §4.4). Then, Ğüzğānī remarks how astonishing is the fact that Avicenna managed to compose the section on Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in a very short time extent (only twenty days), without books at his disposal and grieved by afflictions. Notably, Ğüzğānī implies that the sections on Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics were not written in the best possible conditions, unlike the sections on Logic, Botany and Zoology, which were written following more closely the traditional pattern and with books at Avicenna’s disposal. It seems legitimate to wonder whether Ğüzğānī’s praise of Avicenna’s capacity to compose these sections even in the worst conditions does not betray a minor satisfaction, from Ğüzğānī’s part, for the two less traditional sections of the *Šifāʾ*, which are also the most distant from his initial request of a literal commentary on Aristotle’s corpus.

## Chapter I.1 - Avicenna's Prologue to the *Šifā'*

(§1) [*Our purpose in...the reader know*] The first section of the chapter is dedicated to defining the purpose (*al-ğaraḍ*) and the character of the *Šifā'*. The opening formula seems to point to the fact that the summa is not yet completely achieved when Avicenna writes this prologue (*hādā l-kitāb alladī narğū an yumhila nā al-zamān ilā ḥaṭmihi*, “this Book [i.e. the *Šifā'*], which, hopefully, time will allow us to conclude”); Avicenna stresses the wish to manage to conclude (*ḥaṭm*) and to successfully compose (*naẓm*) the work by recurring to a rhetorical periphrasis which is, at the same time, a humility statement. The first section of the Prologue consists in a programmatic exposition of Avicenna's own conception of philosophy, grounded in the idea that the philosophers' task is that of drawing corollaries (*al-furū'*) from the fundamental principles (*al-uṣūl*); as it was already noticed, this terminology was earlier employed in Islamic jurisprudence, and subsequently adopted in philosophical context by Ḥunayn Ibn Ishāq and Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (GUTAS 2014, p. 251). The prologue of the *Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyūn* provides a hint of the role the two notions played in Avicenna's conception of the history of Peripatetic philosophy: there, Avicenna claims that Aristotle deserves to be acknowledged the merit of being the first one to discern the *principles* in the philosophical sciences, and that it behoves his successors to provide a solution for the imperfections left in his philosophical system and to supply the *corollaries* from those principles (*Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq*, p. 2.11-3.1). Avicenna's declared purpose in the *Šifā'* is to present, in it, the gist of the principles of the sciences of the ancients that rely on the theoretical inquiry and the principles that are acquired by means of several acts of comprehension (*al-afhām*)<sup>3</sup> concurring and cooperating (*al-muta'āwana*) in the acquisition of the truth. The idea on which this passage is grounded is that the attainment of the knowledge of the truth is a gradual process to which the ancient and the later philosophers contribute by devoting to such a goal all their interpretative efforts (*al-muğtahida fihi*)<sup>4</sup>, which recalls Kindī's *Kitāb fi l-Falsafa l-Ūlā*, p. 11.16-13.14 (on Avicenna's conception of the praxis of philosophy, see GUTAS 2014, pp. 249-266). In legal and theological contexts, the verb *iğtahada* (“to put effort, work hard”) denotes the act of formulating an independent judgement (i.e. not transmitted by tradition, *taqlīd*) on the basis of the application of the *uṣūl*. The form employed here by Avicenna might transpose on a philosophical ground the meaning that the term had acquired in the juridical and theological field. Besides the principles, Avicenna's purpose is that of

<sup>3</sup> At a first stage, D. Gutas interpreted this term in Avicenna's prologue as employed in a technical sense within the frame of Avicenna's theory of intuition (GUTAS 1988, p. 50, n. 1). At last, however, he accepted Marmura's suggestion that the term rather refers to the collective effort of comprehension by the part of the philosophers of every time; see MARMURA 1991, p. 339 and GUTAS 2014, p. 42, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> I propose to read: *al-muğtahida fihi zamānan ṭawīlan*, referring the action of the interpretation to the *afhām*, in parallelism to *al-muta'āwana*.

explicitly displaying also the corollaries drawn from them: this peculiar feature of the *Šifā'* is also recalled in Avicenna's *Letter to Kiyā* (*Mubāḥaḥāt*, p. 374.3-5), where Avicenna states the importance of this procedure of the philosophical inquiry in contrast with John Philoponus and most of the Christian Peripatetic exegetes of Baḡdād (on the *Letter to Kiyā*, see REISMAN 2002, pp. 63-66). This feature also sharply distinguishes the *Šifā'* from the *Išārāt*, where the deduction of the corollaries (*tafīrī*) is not made explicit in the text, being left to the reader's ability, as stated in the prologue of the *summa* (*Išārāt*, p. 165.2-4: "O you who are eager to ascertain the truth, in these *al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt* I offered you [some] principles and sentences of the sapience (*al-ḥikma*); if you summon up your capacity to understand, it will be easy for you to deduce their corollaries (*tafīrī'uhā*) and to analyse them (*wa-tafšīluhā*)"<sup>5</sup>). In Avicenna's purpose, the *Šifā'* should avoid repetitions and refutations of doctrines that are manifestly false. The same idea is developed in Avicenna's prologue to the first section of the *summa* he wrote, namely the *Samā' Ṭabī'ī* (T1 discussed above), where it is put in relation to Avicenna's refusal to write a literal commentary of Aristotle's works. The profound reasons for such a refusal exposed in T1 are grounded in Avicenna's desire, on the one hand, to depart from the philosophical tradition that produced that kind of literal commentaries in which the real problematic points were overlooked, in spite of the great amount of time and effort required in the composition, and, on the other, to avoid dealing with the systematic refutation of the doctrines upon which he did not agree. Ġūzḡānī's claim in Introduction, §1.6 that Avicenna dealt, in the section of Logic, with the statements of his colleagues that he refuted seems to suggest that Avicenna's program was partially unattended.

(§2) [*It cannot be found...wish*] The passage stresses Avicenna's intent to account for the main contents of the book of the Ancients, though taking the liberty to arrange the matters in a different, non-traditional, way. This aspect of originality is especially ascribed to the sections of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics, composed, according to Ġūzḡānī's report (Introduction, §2), without recurring to scholarly literature on the subject. However, a certain degree of originality of the section of Logic is defended as well (cf. Commentary on Ġūzḡānī's Introduction, §2).

[*It has already...its own place*] Avicenna programmatically states that he pursued in the *Šifā'* a neater distinction between logical and metaphysical matters, against the traditional use to a certain entanglement of the two aspects, especially in Logic. Generally speaking, it can be claimed that Avicenna would rather tend to eradicate the dissertation on the ten categories from the section of Logic to defer it to the section of Metaphysics, inasmuch as it deals with an ontological classification of beings (as, for

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<sup>5</sup> Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī defined the *tafīrī* in his commentary on this passage by recurring to the Aristotelian notions of potentiality and actuality, claiming that it is an additional process required for the actualization of the corollaries, that usually have a potential existence in their principle; see *Ḥall-i Muṣḥkilāt-i Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt – A facsimile edition of the author's copy (Manuscript No. 1153 at the National Library of Iran)*, intr. S. M. Emadi Haeri, Tehran 2011, f. 2<sup>r</sup>.

instance, he does in the *Mašriqiyyūn* and the *Išārāt*); however, in the *Šifā'* the categories are dealt with twice, both in Logic (in the *Maqūlāt*) and in Metaphysics (*Ilāhiyyāt* II-III), in spite of Avicenna's incomplete satisfaction with this solution. As to the section of *Madḥal*, it can be observed that Avicenna put a great effort in the direction of the distinction of the Logical and the Metaphysical grounds, deeply intermixed by Porphyry and the subsequent tradition of commentaries (see *General Introduction*).

(§3.1) [*Then I considered...of its notions*] The nature and content of the *Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq* (= GS 12b in GUTAS 2014, p. 427) are obscure: the work was meant as a complement to the *Šifā'* of which, if ever it was composed, no witness is extant. The possibility that this work might coincide with the extant work named *Ta'liqāt* (= GS 12a in GUTAS 2014, p. 427) has been pondered (cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 160-164), but it was observed that the form of the *Ta'liqāt* does not seem to match the characteristics that the *Lawāḥiq* had in Avicenna's conception (GUTAS 2014, p. 427). Avicenna's overall mentions of the *Lawāḥiq* are at least 18 (listed in Tab. 1 below), 16 of which in the *Šifā'* and the others in two *summae* that are strictly related to the *Šifā'*, namely the *Nağāt* (n° 17 in Tab. 1) and the *Mašriqiyyūn* (n° 18 in Tab. 1). There is an outstanding predominance of mentions in the section of Logic (11 out of the 16 in the *Šifā'*; the mention in the *Nağāt* is also in the section of Logic, in strict connection to one of the mentions that can be found in the *Qiyās*), 7 of which are concentrated in the section corresponding to *Prior Analytics* (*Qiyās*). Two mentions can be found in the section of Natural Philosophy, one in the *Samā' Ṭabī'ī* and one in the *Ḥayawān*: assuming that Ğüzğānī's relative chronology for the composition of the sections of the *Šifā'* is correct, this attests that the project of writing the *Lawāḥiq* was in Avicenna's mind throughout all the period of composition of the work, from the beginning (with the *Samā' Ṭabī'ī*) to the very end (with the *Ḥayawān*). Finally, references to this work were also inserted in the section of Astronomy and at the end of the section of Music; no reference can be found in the section of Metaphysics. No reference to the *Lawāḥiq* as an already accomplished work could be found, which does not come as a surprise, given that, according to Avicenna's Prologue, the work was meant to be updated each year and accomplished with Avicenna's life. Concerning the structure of the work, it is unclear whether it was composed by one book or more: the mention of the work in the *Ḥayawān* (n° 13 in Tab. 1), that should be chronologically the last to be inserted, refers to the "books of the *Lawāḥiq*", and the manuscript tradition oscillates between "book" (*kitāb*) and "books" (*kutub*) in the mention of the work in the *Mūsīqā* (n° 16 in Tab. 1). As to the main features of the work, according to the mention in Avicenna's Prologue the *Lawāḥiq* were meant to be an explanation (*šarḥ*) of the *Šifā'*, containing the *corollaries* of the principles that are exposed concisely in it (*ka-tafrī' al-uṣūl fīhi wa-baṣṭ al-mūğaz min ma'ānīhi*). The idea that the *Lawāḥiq* should explain the corollaries of the concise principles of the *Šifā'* is also conveyed by the reference to the work at the end of the Music (n° 16 in Tab. 1). In general, the *Lawāḥiq* was meant to contain more in-depth discussions and to deal with specific problems and additional materials left aside in the *Šifā'* (cf. Tab. 1, mentions n° 2-4, 6, 8-9, 13-15); more in detail, *long* and *extensive*

dissertations should have been preferably deferred to the *Lawāḥiq* (cf. Tab. 1, mentions n° 5, 10-12). If the *Šifā'* is, compared to the *Mašriqiyyūn*, a more explicit exposition of the principles and their corollaries, the exposition in the *Lawāḥiq* might have been conceived as even plainer than that characterizing the *Šifā'* in contraposition to the *Mašriqiyyūn*. Such an idea is seemingly suggested by the mention in the Prologue of the *Mašriqiyyūn* (n° 18 in Tab. 1) and by that in *Qiyās* VII.1 (n° 7 in Tab. 1); in the latter passage, Avicenna invites those who cannot deduce by analogy with what was said precedingly the state of absolute and possible premises to look in the *Lawāḥiq*, even if it would be possible to know it, by applying oneself to it. Ideally, the reader recurring to the *Lawāḥiq* in this point is a reader who did not devote any possible effort to understand.

**Tab. 1.** Mentions of the *Lawāḥiq*

Occurrence	Temporal reference	Number of books	Context – Features of the work
1. <i>Šifā'</i> , <i>Madḥal</i> , I.1, §3.1	Future? ( <i>usammīhu; yatimmu; yakūnu</i> )	One book ( <i>kitāb āḥar</i> )	Avicenna's prologue to the <i>Šifā'</i> . The work will be completed with Avicenna's life; it should follow the <i>Šifā'</i> and be <b>updated yearly</b> , being like an <b>explanation</b> ( <i>šarḥ</i> ) of the <i>Šifā'</i> , in which the <b>corollaries</b> from the principles exposed concisely in it are drawn.
2. <i>Šifā'</i> , <i>Maqūlāt</i> , III.1, p. 94.4	Future? ( <i>yaḡibu an tutraka</i> , "it is necessary that they be left")	One book ( <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> )	"Then, after this, [there are some] <b>specific doubts</b> ( <i>šukūk ḥāššiyya</i> ) that must be left to the <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> ".
3. <i>Šifā'</i> , <i>Maqūlāt</i> , III.4, p. 115.11-12	Future ( <i>sayuqālu...fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> ("it will be said...in the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> "))	Unknown ( <i>fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> )	"In this place [there are some] <b>in-depth investigations</b> ( <i>mabāḥiṭ 'amīqa</i> ) of which it will be said in the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> ".
4. <i>Šifā'</i> , <i>Qiyās</i> , II.2, p. 94.8-9	Future? ( <i>wa-l-awlā an naḡ'ala...</i> )	One book ( <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> )	"Here there are <b>other investigations</b> ( <i>fuhūs uḥrā</i> ), and it is best that we posit as a place for them the <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> "
5. <i>Šifā'</i> , <i>Qiyās</i> , II.4, p. 115.13	Undetermined (future?)	Unknown ( <i>fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> )	"For this, there is a <b>long discourse</b> ( <i>kalām ṭawīl</i> ), [whose] determination ( <i>al-faṣl</i> ) is in the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> "
6. <i>Šifā'</i> , <i>Qiyās</i> , III.1, p. 139.1-2	Future ( <i>sanastaqṣī</i> , "we will examine")	Unknown ( <i>fī abḥāt al-Lawāḥiq</i> )	[After a digression in which Avicenna examines the mistakes of other philosophers] "These and similar inquiries distracted us from the consideration of this theory; we will examine what must be said in addition to what we have already

					said in the inquiries of the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> ".
7.	<i>Šifā</i> , <i>Qiyās</i> , VII.1, p. 362.15-17	Future? (intazar, "look at/expect/wait for")	One book ( <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> )		"As to what concerns the fact of assuming them [i.e. the premises] as absolute and possible, look at/expect it ( <i>intazar</i> ) in the <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> , if you cannot deduce by analogy their state on the basis of what we said about the predicative propositions that are comparable to them. But if you applied to it, you would manage to do it..."
8.	<i>Šifā</i> , <i>Qiyās</i> , VII.1, p. 384.18-19	Future? ( <i>wa-l-awlā annahā tu'ahḥaru ilā l-Lawāḥiq</i> )	Unknown ( <i>ilā l-Lawāḥiq</i> )		[After stating that there are <b>further doubts</b> ( <i>šukūk</i> ) concerning contradictions, according to whether the premises are assumed as absolute or as necessary, whose exposition is not of much use ( <i>laysa fī ta'arruḍinā lahā kabīr naf</i> )] "It is better to postpone them to the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> , since in the evidence of what we said the useful purpose is [already] notified".
9.	<i>Šifā</i> , <i>Qiyās</i> , VIII.2, p. 403.3	Undetermined (future?)	Unknown ( <i>fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> )		"Here there are [other] things that should be dealt with in the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> ( <i>wa-hāhunā ašyā' min ḥaqqihā an tuqāla fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> )".
10.	<i>Šifā</i> , <i>Qiyās</i> , IX.6, p. 465.2	Undetermined (future?)	One book ( <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> )		Avicenna avoids dealing with a certain subject because this would require the presentation of a <b>long</b> principle ( <i>ašlan ṭawīlan</i> ) which is not included in the rule/principle ( <i>qānūn</i> ) that are attained quickly, so he remits this to the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> .
11.	<i>Šifā</i> , <i>Safsata</i> , II.6, p. 114.6-10	Future ( <i>narḡū an nastakṭira min al-dalāla 'alayhi fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> )	Unknown ( <i>fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> )		[Epilogue of the Sophistic: Avicenna stated that he found no better method to study sophistic matters than Aristotle's] "If there is anything [in which Aristotle was wrong], it is a matter of details in certain propositions ( <i>ḡumal</i> ) we took from him, which we hope to explain more in extent in the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> , when hopefully we will be freer for what necessitates more [of our attention] ( <i>afrag li-mā huwa awḡab</i> )".
12.	<i>Šifā</i> , <i>Samā</i> , <i>Ṭabī</i> , IV.12, p. 317.3-4	Future? ( <i>taḡidu</i> )	Unknown ( <i>ilā l-Lawāḥiq</i> )		"There are inquiries with regard to which it is necessary to recur to the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> , in which you will find

				what is enough for you, if you are more interested in <b>elaborated/long</b> [expositions] ( <i>ishāb</i> )”.
13. <i>Šifā’</i> , <i>Hayawān</i> , X.7, p. 225.3-4	Future ( <i>satağidu...in ‘ammara Allāh</i> )	More than one book ( <i>Kutub al-Lawāḥiq</i> )		[Backward reference to a doctrine of <i>Nafs</i> , i.e. the heart as main organ] “You will find the Books of the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> – God permitting it! – reaching the <b>highest level in the explanation</b> of this point ( <i>bāliḡa fī šarḥ hāqā l-bāb aqṣà l-mabāliḡ</i> ); maybe a more intense inquiry will provide us a categorical judgment on these points”.
14. <i>Šifā’</i> , <i>Hay’a</i> , p. 15.8-11	Future? ( <i>yūradu fī Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> )	One book ( <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> )		[Incipit of the Astronomy; Avicenna states that he will closely follow Ptolemy’s <i>Almagest</i> , except for some small things that will be dealt with in the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> ].
15. <i>Šifā’</i> , <i>Hay’a</i> , p. 51.2	Future? ( <i>tuḍkaru</i> , “are/will be mentioned”)	Unknown ( <i>al-Lawāḥiq</i> )		“There are <b>other tricks</b> for these observations that are/will be mentioned in the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> ”
16. <i>Šifā’</i> , <i>Mūsīqā</i> , VI.2, p. 152.5-6	Future ( <i>satağidu...in šā’ Allāh ta ‘ālā</i> ).	One or more books? There are two variants in the MSS, i.e. <i>kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> and <i>kutub al-Lawāḥiq</i> <sup>6</sup>		[End of the section of Music] “We confine ourselves to this point of the science of Music, but you will find in the book/books of the <i>Lawāḥiq</i> many <b>corollaries</b> ( <i>tafrī‘āt</i> ) and <b>additions</b> ( <i>ziyādāt</i> ), God willing”.
17. <i>Nağāt</i> , Logic, chap. 82, p. 84.14-85.1 <sup>7</sup>	Undetermined: “its mention ( <i>ḍikruhu</i> ) is in the <i>Kitāb al-Šifā’</i> and in the <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> ”	One book ( <i>Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq</i> )		“In sum, let it be known that, of the conditional connective [syllogisms], we will only mention those whose conclusions appear easy to derive and those that are suitable for use by our innate natures. As for that which is subtler than this, well it is mentioned in the <i>Book of the Cure</i> and in the <i>Book of Appendices</i> .” (Transl. AHMED 2011, p. 66)
18. <i>Mašriqiyyūn</i> , p. 4.12-15	Reference to the past for the <i>Šifā’</i> ( <i>fa-qad a ‘ṭaynāhum</i> ) and to the future for	Unknown ( <i>fī l-Lawāḥiq</i> )		[Prologue of the <i>Easterners</i> ] “We have compiled this book to show it only to ourselves – I mean to those who are to us like ourselves; as for the common people among those

<sup>6</sup> *Kutub* is, for instance, attested in MSS Cairo, Dār al-Kutub 894, f. 814<sup>v</sup>; İstanbul, Damad Ibrahim Paşa 822, f. 354<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Occurrence probably paralleling that in *Šifā’*, *Qiyās* II.4.

the *Lawāḥiq*  
(*sanu ḥithum*).

who struggle to master this subject, we gave them in *The Cure* what is [already] too much for them and even more than what they need, and we shall give them again in the *Appendices* what is suitable for them in excess of what they have already received” (Transl. GUTAS 2014, p. 41).

(§3.2) [*I have also...for this book*] The paragraph is devoted to a comparison between the *Šifāʾ* and the *Falsafa Mašriqiyya* (= GS8 in GUTAS 2014, p. 423). Part of this work went lost: only the sections of Logic and Natural Philosophy are extant; see GUTAS 2014, pp. 119-144 (the present passage is also mentioned as a *Testimonium* for the title of the work at p. 120) and GUTAS 2000a, pp. 169-172. The manuscript tradition does not uniformly agree on the title of this work: besides the reading *al-Falsafa al-Mašriqiyya*, in fact, it is also recorded a reading *al-Ḥikma al-Mašriqiyya* (by family ν) and, as a marginal variant, by family η): as already noted by D. Gutas, the sources often oscillated with regard to the title of the work between these two versions (cf. GUTAS 2000a, pp. 166-167). The *Mašriqiyyūn* is the only other Avicennian work mentioned in the Prologue (the *Lawāḥiq* represent a different case, for they were not conceived as an independent work, but rather as updates and appendixes to the *Šifāʾ*), and the *Šifāʾ*, together with the *Lawāḥiq*, is mentioned on its turn in the Prologue of the *Mašriqiyyūn* (p. 4.12-15): this cross-reference between the two Prologues might point to a close mutual relation between the two works. Likely, Avicenna did not mean to distinguish the two works on the basis of their contents, which are quite consistent; some portions of the sections on Natural Philosophy of the two works even coincide *verbatim* (as showed in GUTAS 2000a, pp. 177-180). The distinction drawn between the two works rather concerns their style and the kind of public they address: the *Šifāʾ*, written as a partial response for the need of a literal commentary on Aristotle’s corpus requested by Avicenna’s entourage, is more faithful to a traditional pattern, and is more concerned with avoiding sharp contrasts with the Peripatetic tradition. The *Mašriqiyyūn*, on the other hand, are presented as an original work, in which Avicenna’s conception of philosophy is expressed openly and directly as it is, and in which no attention is paid to seek a compromise with the Peripatetic colleagues (cf. also *Mašriqiyyūn*, p. 2.7-11). This does not mean that Avicenna refrains from expressing his own opinion in the *Šifāʾ*, when in contrast with the Peripatetic tradition; it rather means that his departures from the tradition are sometimes expressed in a less open, indirect way, and must be individuated among the heterogeneous opinions that are exposed in the book, causing confusion and obscurity (*maḡmaḡa*). The main challenge prospected to an ideal reader of the *Šifāʾ* is that of individuating philosophy *in its own nature* in a work that does not expose it in an open way. Hence, Avicennian philosophy is more easily accessed by reading the *Mašriqiyyūn*; this latter work, however, presents a more conceptual

difficulty to his readers, namely that of elaborating the corollaries of the principles exposed in it which are, on the contrary, extensively explained in the complex formed by the *Šifā'* and the *Lawāḥiq*. The two works address two slightly different audiences: in the Prologue of the *Mašriqiyyūn* (p. 4.12-15) Avicenna states that the work is conceived for those that are like him, i.e. with a similar philosophical training, whereas other people interested in philosophy though with a lower degree of mastery of philosophy (called *al-‘amma* in the text) should turn to the *Šifā'* and its *Lawāḥiq*, that do not require the ability to draw the corollaries from the principles exposed. The idea is that more concise and less explanatory works should be withheld from readers that did not have an adequate philosophical training (cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 256-266), which makes the *Mašriqiyyūn* a “twin-work” of the *Šifā'*, specular and complementary to it with regard to the style of exposition, conceived for a more selected audience. The acme of this restriction of the public addressed is reached with the composition of the *Išārāt*, that could be studied only under the guide of Avicenna himself (cf. REISMAN 2002, p. 206).

(§4.1) [*When I began...the existing books*] Avicenna claims in the paragraph that the section of Logic closely follows Aristotle’s arrangement of the subject matters, though adding a dissertation on subtler subjects that are not dealt with in the scholarly literature (assuming that “the existing books” here mentioned include the traditional commentaries on Aristotle’s *Organon* as well, like those produced within the school of Baǧdād). The epithet *šāḥib al-manṭiq* here employed to refer to Aristotle is attested in the Arabic bio-bibliographical accounts on Aristotle: Abū l-Qāsim Šā‘id, *Kitāb ṭabaqāt al-umam*, p. 24.6-10 (a work composed around 460H/1068: cf. GUTAS 1986, p. 24) – quoted *verbatim* in Al-Qiftī, *Tārīḥ al-Ḥukamā'*, p. 28.1-6 (in spite of the textual corruption of *šāḥib al-manṭiq* into *šinā‘at al-manṭiq* that affects the quotation) and Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, *‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, I, p. 57.24-27 – praises Aristotle as the first to put in evidence the importance of the syllogistic demonstration (*al-burhān*) and to provide this as an instrument for the other sciences, so that it was named (*luqiba*) *šāḥib al-manṭiq*.

(§4.2) [*Then I made...to this discipline*] Avicenna mentions the works (*taṣnīf*) of the philosopher taken as exemplar with regard to this discipline, namely Aristotle, and his *taḍākīr* (hypomnematic writings, “memoranda” in GUTAS 2014, p. 45 and n. 8). As already remarked by Gutas, this might be a reference to the hypomnematic works ascribed to Aristotle in the Ancient bibliographical lists of his works and known to the Aristotelian school tradition (Gutas identifies a mention of this kind of Aristotle’s works by Paul the Persian). The term *taḍākīr* was employed in the Arabic tradition in the context of the classification of Aristotle’s works into particular (*ǧuz‘iyya*), namely dealing with a particular subject, universal (*kulliyya*), and intermediate that is already proposed by the Greek Late Antique school tradition, that divided Aristotle’s works into τὰ μερικά, τὰ καθόλου and τὰ μεταξύ (recorded in the commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories* by Ammonius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus and Elias: cf. MORAUX 1951, pp. 145-150). According to that classification, universal writings were subdivided into

hypomnematic (τὰ ὑπομνηματικά) and syntagmatic (τὰ συνταγματικά) writings: the first ones are described by the Greek commentators as notes on subjects that still awaited a more extensive explanation gathered in a non-systematic way, in opposition to the second ones, which were the fully achieved works (cf. MORAUX 1951, pp. 153-166). This classification permeated the Arabic bibliographical tradition: it is attested in the work ascribed to Fārābī, *Mā yanbaġī an yuqaddama qabla ta'allum falsafat Ariṣṭū*, p. 50.18 (on the possibility that the work is spurious, see ZONTA 2001, p. 70); in an almost identical passage in Al-Qiftī, *Tārīḥ al-Ḥukamā'*, p. 28.7 and Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, I, p. 57.27: the two latter rely on Abū l-Qāsim Ṣā'id, *Kitāb ṭabaqāt al-umam*, p. 24.10, that they quote *verbatim* (a dependence of Abū l-Qāsim Ṣā'id on the aforementioned Farabian work is proposed in GUTAS 1986, pp. 24 and 28). The Greek τὰ ὑπομνηματικά was rendered by the term *taḍākīr*; however, the nature of this kind of works was understood in a slightly different manner in the Arabic tradition, where the expression designates those general works in which are recalled (*yutaḍakkaru*) subject matters that were taught in other works; likely, this interpretation is suggested by the etymology of *taḍākīr*. Finally, the same classification of Aristotle's works is also attested in Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb al-Maqūlāt*, p. 5.17-33 among the introductory points ascribed to the Alexandrian philosophers (cf. *Ibid.*, p. 15.3-4): the passage divides Aristotle's universal works into hypomnematic works (*al-taḍākīr*) and systematic works (*al-kutub al-muṣannafa*), which seems to parallel Avicenna's distinction between Aristotle's *taṣnīf* and his *taḍākīr*. In addition, the Arabic bibliographical list of Aristotle's works ascribed to Ptolemy "al-Ġarīb" and quoted by Al-Qiftī and Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a mentions several works under the name of *taḍākīrāt*, i.e. *Ībūmnīmāṭā* (cf. e.g. Al-Qiftī, *Tārīḥ al-Ḥukamā'*, p. 46.21, p. 47.14-15; on the list by Ptolemy al-Ġarīb, cf. GOULET 1989, pp. 432-434; on Al-Qiftī's and Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a's reception of Ptolemy "al-Ġarīb", see DÜRING 1957, pp. 208-231).

(§4.3) [*Then I made...of an abridgement*] Avicenna displays the structure of the section of Mathematics (*Riyāḍiyyāt*) of the *Šifā'*, articulated into four *funūn* dealing, in order, with: Geometry (i.e. Euclid's *Elements*), Astronomy (i.e. Ptolemy's *Almagest*), Arithmetic (i.e. the *Introduction to Arithmetic* by Nicomachus of Gerasa) and Music (i.e. Ptolemy's *Armonica*). As claimed in Ġūzġānī's Introduction (§1.6), the summaries that form the section of Mathematics of the *Šifā'* had been previously composed by Avicenna, and subsequently added to the *summa* (cf. Commentary on the passage). The section of Mathematics is by far the one whose internal articulation is presented in greatest detail in Avicenna's Prologue: it is worth wondering whether this might be due to the fact that the *funūn* that form the section were the only ones already composed by the time Avicenna wrote his Prologue, which would lead to suppose that he composed it before the rest of the work (against GUTAS 2014, pp. 109-115). In spite of their nature of abridgement of the aforementioned works, Ġūzġānī's *Biography* (p. 64.6-9) insists on the elements of originality that can be found in all the four summaries that form the section of *Mathematics* of the *Šifā'*. More in particular, Ġūzġānī's statement that Avicenna added to the section of *Astronomy* of the *Šifā'* ten theorems concerning the

parallax and other unprecedented materials at the end of the *fann* (likely, Ğūzġānī refers to the addition of the fourteenth treatise), is consistent with Avicenna's own more generic claim in the present passage that he made some additions to his abridgement of the *Almagest* when he considered that it was necessary (a claim echoed in Ğūzġānī's *Biography*: "he introduced in each book of [the section of] *Mathematics* some additions, of which he considered that the need was compelling").

(§4.4) [*Then I closed...single comprehensive book*] The paragraph describes the fourth section of the *summa*, i.e. the *K. al-Ilāhiyyāt*, dedicated to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* but also encompassing a section of *Ethics* and *Politics* (the tenth treatise). Avicenna announces the composition of a comprehensive book entirely devoted to *Ethics* and *Politics*, but, apparently, no such work was composed after the *Šifā'* (the *K. al-Birr wa-l-Īm* is way earlier than the *Šifā'* and cannot, therefore, be the work to which Avicenna refers in this passage).

(§5) [*This book, though...from other books*] The passage insists on the character of originality of the work, in which the reader can find additional materials with respect to the rest of the scholarly literature. The odd claim that the book is "small in size" (*ṣaġīr al-ḥaġm*) can perhaps be read from two different standpoints: on the one hand, it is a humility statement on Avicenna's part (similar statements concerning the dimensions of the book are observed in Christian Syriac literature by RIAD 1988); it should be observed, however, that such humility statements concerning the dimensions of the work are hard to be found in Avicenna's Prologues to other works, where the references to the size of the work generally match its effective proportions (as, for instance, in the case of the Prologue to the *Dānešnāmeḥ-ye 'Alā'ī*, where the reference to the brevity of the work appears to be more than just a rhetorical device). On the other hand, it can be due to an underestimation of the final size of the work which is explainable by assuming that this Prologue was composed before the achievement of the entire work. The book in its complete form was huge even in comparison with the rest of Avicenna's production: in the list provided in Ğūzġānī's *Biography*, the *Šifā'* is recorded as a work in eighteen volumes (p. 46.3-4), with respect to which only two works were longer, i.e. the *Kitāb al-Ḥāsil wa-l-Maḥṣūl* and the *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*, both in twenty volumes; considering that the latter was composed after the *Šifā'*, at the moment Avicenna wrote the Prologue to the work only the *Kitāb al-Ḥāsil wa-l-Maḥṣūl* had reached a greater length than the *Šifā'*, so that the claim that the work was small in size is quite odd assuming that the Prologue was written after the completion of the entire work (for other elements pointing to a possible earlier composition of Avicenna's Prologue, cf. also §1 and the Commentary on §1.4 of Ğūzġānī's Introduction).

[*The first of...science of Logic*] The paragraph introduces chapter I.2 on the division of the philosophical sciences as a concise indication (*išāra mūġaza*) of the quiddities of the sciences.

## Chapter I.2

(§1.1) [*We say that...able to understand*] The definition of the purpose of philosophy as knowledge of the things' essences as far as it is possible for men is reminiscent of the definition provided in Kindī, *Kitāb fī l-Falsafa l-Ūlā*, p. 9.8-9 (as already noticed in MARMURA 1980, p. 242), likely based on the definitions provided in the Alexandrian commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* by Ammonius, Elias and David; for a genesis of this definition, see the complementary note in the edition by Rashed and Jolivet of Kindī's work (*ad n.* 1, p. 101).

[*The existing things...called "practical philosophy"*] The distinction of theoretical and practical philosophy is based on a first classification of beings according to whether they depend or not on human action, so that the things that do not depend on human choice and action are the object of theoretical philosophy, whereas the things that depend on human choice and action are the object of practical philosophy; the same distinction is found at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* of the *Dānišnāmah-yi 'Alā'ī* (p. 1.7-2.5). The use of *human choice and action* (*iḥtiyār wa-fi'l*) as a criterion in the preliminary classification of beings finalized to the distinction of the objects of theoretical and practical philosophy has an antecedent in Fārābī (*Risāla šudira bihā al-Kitāb*, p. 227.21-22; cf. also Id., *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 124.4-6), who calls practical philosophy *falsafa insāniyya* ("human philosophy") because it concerns what can be done by choice (*bi-l-irāda*). A further classification of the objects of theoretical and practical philosophy is provided in what follows, based on different criteria (cf. *infra*).

[*The aim in...the contemplative view*] As stated later on, in the section of the *Šifā'* devoted to Psychology (*Šifā'*, *Nafs* V.1, pp. 207.13-208.2), the human soul (*al-nafs al-insāniyya*) is formed by two faculties, the first related to theoretical inquiry (*tunsabu ilā al-naẓar*), the second related to action (*tunsabu ilā al-'amal*), namely a theoretical and a practical intellect (respectively, *'aql nazarī* and *'aql 'amalī*). The two faculties deal, respectively, with the distinction of truth (*al-ṣidq*) and falseness (*al-kiḍb*) and the distinction of good (*al-ḥayr*) and evil (*al-šarr*). Both faculties are said to have a *ra'y* and a *ẓann*. Marmura put the term *ra'y* in §1.1 in relation to the Greek "contemplative view" (θεωρία), warning against the possibility of considering the term in this context as meaning "opinion" like elsewhere (MARMURA 1980, p. 242). This claim might be further supported by understanding the whole expression *i'tiqādu ra'y* employed in this context in the light of *Šifā'*, *al-Nafs* V.1, pp. 207.20-208.1, where *al-ra'y* is defined as a firm, absolutely certain belief (*fa-l-ra'y huwa al-i'tiqād al-mağzūm bihi*), as opposed to the opinion (*ẓann*).

(§1.2.1) [*The things that ...and the Creator*] The classification proceeds by a division of the beings that do not depend on human choice or action, namely the objects of theoretical philosophy (cf. S1 below). The criterion of the classification is the things' associability to motion (*ḥaraka*), which is remotely Aristotelian: in *Met.* E1, 1026a13-

16, Natural Philosophy was already defined as dealing with separate (χωριστὰ) and mobile (οὐκ ἀκίνητα) subjects, whereas the Mathematics dealt with non-mobile and non-separate (ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ) subjects and, finally, the Metaphysics dealt with separate, immobile (χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα) things. It should be noticed, however, that there is a remarkable difference in Aristotle's use of the Greek "χωριστός" and in Avicenna's use of its Arabic equivalent (*mufāriq*)<sup>8</sup>, since when Aristotle states that the objects of Natural Philosophy are χωριστὰ<sup>9</sup>, he likely means that they are *separate/separable* in the sense that they are substances, and do not depend on a substratum to exist in actuality, unlike mathematical objects (see KIRWAN 1993, pp. 186-187; PORRO 2007, pp. 530-539). The separability of which Avicenna speaks in his classification of beings, on the other hand, must be understood in terms of possibility to be abstracted from matter; in this frame, the objects of Natural Philosophy are said to be inseparable (cf. *infra*). The source of Avicenna's classification is twofold: on the one hand, it can be identified in the Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics*, which attests the reading ἀχώριστα (Averroes, *Tafsīr mā ba'd aṭ-ṭabī'at*, vol. 2, p. 707.1 and p. 710.18: [aṣyā'] *lā tufāriqu*, "[things that] are not separate"). On the other hand, it can rely upon the Late Antique Neoplatonic exegetical tradition, which very likely read Aristotle's aforementioned passage with the reading ἀχώριστα attested by the manuscript tradition, and explained it in terms of separability of the form from its matter; see Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 11.23-12.6, where the things that are completely inseparable (τὰ δὲ παντάπασιν ἀχώριστα) are said to pertain to Natural Science; Elias, *In Isag.*, pp. 26.6-31.32, where Natural Philosophy is said to cope with completely enmattered objects (πάντη ἐνυλα), that cannot be even conceived as abstracted from their matter (ἐπινοῆσαι χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης), and David, *In Isag.*, pp. 55.17-75.2, where again the object of Natural Philosophy is identified with things that are enmattered, both in subsistence and in estimation (τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἐνυλα).

[*The things that...is the multiplicity*] After distinguishing between things that can be associated to motion ([a] in §1.2.1 of the translation) and things that cannot be associated to motion, like the Intellect and God ([b] in §1.2.1, the objects of *Metaphysics*), Avicenna proceeds with a further division of the things of type [a]. The first bipartition is based on a modal characterization of the things' relation to motion and to a designated matter (cf. MARMURA 1980, p. 245): the things' relation to motion and to their matter can either be necessary [a.1] or not [a.2]. Furthermore, things that

<sup>8</sup> The Greek χωριστός is frequently rendered as *mufāriq* in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (1071a9; 1045b7; 1028a34; 1039a32; 1070b36); see these and other occurrences in <http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/>.

<sup>9</sup> This is Schwegler's conjecture, accepted in both the editions of W. D. Ross and W. Jaeger; the manuscripts attest ἀχώριστα, which has to be understood in the sense of "having no separate existence from matter in the external reality". The Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics* attests the reading ἀχώριστα as well; see Averroes, *Tafsīr mā ba'd aṭ-ṭabī'at*, vol. 2, p. 707.1 and p. 710.18: (aṣyā') *lā tufāriqu*, "(things that) are not separate". For a discussion of the opportunity to accept Schwegler's conjecture against the transmitted reading, see KIRWAN 1993, p. 187 and PORRO 2007, pp. 530-539 and pp. 568-569, n. 6.

are necessarily related to motion and to their matter can be so both in subsistence (*fī l-qiwām*) and in estimation (*fī l-wahm*) [a.1.1], or just in subsistence [a.1.2]. Things of type [a.1.1], which are the objects of Natural Philosophy, are forms (both of substances, like humanity, horseness etc., and accidents, like whiteness, blackness and the like; cf. *Mašriqiyyūn*, *Manṭiq*, p. 6.13-16) which cannot be abstracted (*tuğarradu*) from their designated matter and from motion; as remarked in MARMURA 1980, p. 244, Avicenna might mean here the particular forms. Things of type [a.1.2] are the objects of Mathematics, which do not require in themselves that a designated matter is established, so that they can be abstracted in estimation from matter and motion, even though not in subsistence (*fī l-wahm dūna al-qiwām*); squareness, for instance, is exactly the same, regardless to whether it is a table's or something else's squareness, and its conceptualized form does not depend on a designated matter, even if mathematical objects do not exist separately in concrete existence. Such an abstractionist account of mathematical objects is reminiscent of the Greek Late Antique commentaries of the school of Alexandria (see MUELLER 1990, pp. 465-467): cf. in particular Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 11.30-12.6, Philop., *In Nicom.* I, p. 1.66-70 (τῆ μὲν οὐσίᾳ σωμάτων ἀχώριστα, τῆ δ' ἐπινοίᾳ χωριστά) and David, *Proleg.*, p. 58.8-17, where they are said to be “enmattered in subsistence, without matter in conception” (τῆ μὲν ὑποστάσει ἔνυλά εἰσι τῆ δὲ ἐπινοίᾳ ἄνυλα). Metaphysics turns out to deal with two kinds of beings, namely those that do not have any association to motion, like God, and those for which an association to motion is possible, although their existence is independent of that, like being, unity, multiplicity and causality (respectively, [b] and [a.2] in §1.2.1 of the translation). This outcome of the classification precludes to the twofold division of Metaphysics into a Divine Science (*al-‘ilm al-ilāhī*) – devoted to the causes of the existent [b] – and a Universal Science (*al-‘ilm al-kullī*) – devoted to its species and properties [a.2] – proposed by Avicenna at the end of an analogous classification in *Mašriqiyyūn*, *Manṭiq*, p. 6.11-7.7 (on such a division, see GUTAS 2014, p. 314; BERTOLACCI 2002b and BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 149-211). Noteworthy, however, the classification of theoretical sciences proposed in the *Šifā'*, although substantially consistent with the one proposed in the *Mašriqiyyūn* (see S2 below), does not explicitly draw the same consequences. Reportedly, the twofold division of Metaphysics, and the consequent fourfold division of theoretical sciences, were not customary (*Mašriqiyyūn*, *Manṭiq*, p. 7.6-7: *wa-in lam yakun hādā l-tafṣīl muta‘ārafan*); considering what Avicenna states in his Prologue to the *Šifā'* on the different character of the *Mašriqiyyūn* and the *Šifā'* (*Madḥal* I.1, §3.2), it seems legitimate to question whether the fact that the fourfold division implied departing from the usual classification played a role in Avicenna's choice to stick to the more traditional tripartition of theoretical sciences in *Madḥal* I.2, even though the same premises that lead to the fourfold classification in the *Mašriqiyyūn* are set.

(§1.2.2) [*These things are... designate specific matters*] The objects described can be either considered in themselves (type [1], i.e. without being in a matter), or inasmuch as a material accident occur to them, which might either require that a specific matter is

represented in estimation (type [2.i] in §1.2.2 of the translation) or not (type [2.ii]). Since Natural Science and Mathematics study the accidents that occur to their subject, the way the inquiry in these two branches of philosophy proceeds is that corresponding to type [2]. The subject of Natural Science consists in the body considered in the states of motion and quiescence and in the accidents that occur to it under this respect (*Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.1, p. 4.9-10); the subject of Mathematics is the accidents that occur to quantity, which might either be considered together with a matter, as in the case of Astronomy and Music, or without any matter, as in Geometry and Arithmetic (cf. *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.1, p. 4.11-13). The consideration of the objects of type [1], on the other hand, pertains to Metaphysics (on the relation between Mathematics and Metaphysics, see BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 293-294). Taking as an example the case of number, considered as it is (consideration type [1]), it is among the objects of Metaphysics (cf. §1.3.1 and *Šifā'*, *Samā' Ṭabī'ī* I.8, p. 43.14-15); considered inasmuch as accidents occur to it (consideration type [2.ii]), it is the object of Mathematics (cf. *Šifā'*, *Samā' Ṭabī'ī* I.8, pp. 43.15-44.1; *Hisāb* 1, p. 17.12).

**(§1.3.1)** [*Consequently the kinds...are these ones*] The branches of theoretical philosophy are finally classified according to whether they deal with existents considered inasmuch as they are in motion both in conceptualization and in subsistence (i.e. Natural Science), or existents that can be separated from motion in conceptualization only (i.e. Mathematical Science), or existents separated from motion both in conceptualization and in subsistence (i.e. Metaphysics). The Mathematical Science to which Avicenna specifically refers here is qualified as “pure” (*al-ilm al-riyādī al-mahḍ*), which arguably presupposes a distinction between it and another part of Mathematical Science. Geometry is elsewhere explicitly contrasted with pure Mathematics (*al-ta'līmī al-mahḍ*) in virtue of its closer connection to Natural Sciences: it is defined in *Šifā'*, *Samā' Ṭabī'ī* I.8, p. 42.7-10 as mixed of Natural and Mathematical (*mumtaziġ min ṭabī'ī wa-min ta'līmī*), because measures (*maqādīr*), which are the object of Geometry, share with the objects of Natural Philosophy the fact of being notions that subsist in matter, although they do not require a designated matter as natural forms do (*Samā' Ṭabī'ī* I.8, p. 44.1-11). Pure Mathematics, on the contrary, deal with numbers, which are excluded from the objects of Natural Sciences (*Samā' Ṭabī'ī* I.8, p. 43.10), and which do not depend on matter.

**(§1.3.2)** [*As to practical...the divine law*] A tripartition of practical philosophy is offered, proceeding from the most general to the most specific; it starts with Politics, which deal with the direction of a greater human association like the city, to proceed with the Direction of the house, and conclude, then, with Ethics, encompassing the rules followed by any single human individual. The tripartition, as well as that of theoretical sciences, is a traditional one, and has its roots in the scholarly classification of sciences adopted in the school of Alexandria (Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 15.1-6; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 31.21-32), where the tripartition was ascribed to Aristotle himself, based on the fact that he had composed books on each of the three sections of practical science (David, *In Isag.*, p. 74.11-25). Interestingly, the complex of the practical sciences is said to be

verified both by theoretical demonstration (*burhān naẓarī*) and by the testimony of the law (*al-šahāda al-šar'iyya*). The mention of theoretical demonstration with regard to practical philosophy was apparently the object of a request of clarification by Ibn Zayla's part (see Avicenna's answer in REISMAN 2002, p. 284); Avicenna seems to consider that the principles and the definitions of the three practical disciplines are provided by the divine law, then, subsequently, man's rational faculty knows the practical rules of them and applies them in specific situations (cf. *Uyūn al-Ḥikma*, p. 16.9-12).

(§2.1) [*The quiddities of...nor anything else*] The things' quiddities, that can exist both in the extramental and in the mental reality (respectively, *fī a'yan al-ašyā'* and *fī l-tašawwur*), can be considered in three different aspects, namely absolutely (i.e. without considering the quiddity in any of the two kinds of existence, together with the accidents that are characteristic of each kind of existence), in the individuals and in conceptualization. Accidents that are characteristic of the quiddity's existence in conceptualization are, for instance, essentiality and accidentality in predication, the fact of being a subject of predication or a predicate: these accidents are studied in Logic (*Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17-11.2; cf. also MCGINNIS 2010, p. 32).


(§2.2) [*If we want...to this purpose*] The paragraph assesses the necessity of knowing the states and conditions that occur to notions when they are immitted in conceptualization, which is functional to the process of acquisition of new knowledge on the basis of a previous one, which is here alluded to: cf. chap. I.3, §1; cf. also *Šifā'*, *Nafs*, V.1, p. 206.11-16, where the acquisition of knowledge by means of the process of conceptualization of the notions is the most specific of human characteristics.

(§2.3) [*Since this theoretical...is not useful*] The question whether Logic should be considered as an instrument or as a part of philosophy is at stake. The same question was raised in the Late Antique commentaries of Ammonius' school, usually at the beginning of the commentaries on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* (Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, pp. 8.15-11.21; Philop., *In Anal. Pr.*, pp. 6.19-9.24; Elias, *In Anal. Pr.*, pp. 134.8-137.3), following Alexander's and Themistius' commentaries (as witnessed in Elias, *In Anal. Pr.*, p. 134.4-7). Occasionally, the subject of the status of Logic was dealt with in other places (cf. e.g. Olympiod., *In Cat.*, pp. 14.12-18.12); all the said commentaries, however, followed the same pattern in discussing the subject. Avicenna's contemporaries of the Peripatetic school of Baḡdād evidently knew the Alexandrian dissertation on this subject matter: cf. e.g. Abū l-Faraḡ Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs*, pp. 26.9-27.6. (For a more detailed presentation of the Late Antique dissertation on the subject, see *General Introduction*, §II.2). Avicenna himself shows awareness of a similar debate, as his explicit reference at the end of §2.3 to 'disputes' (*al-mušāḡarāt*) on the subject, defined as vain and superfluous, suggests. In the passage at stake, the two views are said to be only apparently mutually contradictory and to presuppose two different ways of considering the domain of philosophy. The problem is, however, better dealt with at the beginning of the section corresponding to

*Prior Analytics* (*Šifā'*, *Qiyās* I.2; for a translation of the relevant section, see T1 in *General Introduction*, §II.2). The relation between the idea that Logic is an instrument and the idea that it is a part of philosophy is described as the relation between a more general (*a'amm*) notion – Logic as a part of philosophy – and a more specific one (*aḥaṣṣ*) – Logic as an instrument of philosophy – that are not, therefore, in mutual contradiction, so that everything is an instrument of science, is also a part of it, but not the reverse (*Qiyās* I.2, p. 11.6-9). The Peripatetic position is, therefore, held valid. A subtle tension can be observed between Logic seen from the perspective of its utility for theoretical and practical science and Logic seen as a science in its own right with a complete epistemological foundation. Overall, Logic is a science, and has an exceptional instrumental character with respect to the other sciences because it provides the principles for acquiring knowledge of the unknown (cf. *Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq*, pp. 5.19-6.1). As a science, Logic shares with Natural Philosophy, Mathematics and the other sciences the fact that the existence of their subjects is established in Metaphysics (*Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.1-11.2; see *General Introduction*, §II.3, point c).

(§2.4) [*This sort of...a different one*] Logic is defined as an inquiry (*naẓar*) into the “aforementioned things”, i.e. secondary notions such as essentiality and accidentality in predication and so on, inasmuch as knowledge of the unknown can be attained from them. The term *naẓar* is not employed here in connection to theoretical (*naẓarī*) science, since Logic is not encompassed by the domains of theoretical and practical philosophy (cf. *Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq*, p. 5.12-18).

S1. *Šifāʾ*, *Madḥal* I.2 (§1.2.1-§1.3.2)



### Chapter I.3

(§1) [*Since the perfection...and knows it*] The dense paragraph at stake condenses the core of Avicenna's epistemology. The starting point is the principle that the perfection of man, provided with an intellect, is attaining knowledge; both theoretical knowledge of the Truth and practical knowledge of the Good are involved (the theme is developed in *Šifā'*, *Nafs*, V.1, pp. 208.15-209.13). The necessity of a discursive acquisition of knowledge is assessed by stating that innate human nature (*al-fiṭra al-ūlā wa-l-badītha*) is not sufficient in order to reach knowledge of the Truth and the Good. The fact that every knowledge is attained by acquisition (*al-iktisāb*) on the basis of a previous knowledge – in accordance with Aristotle's paradigm in *APo* A1, 71a1-b8 – justifies the necessity of studying how the process of acquisition works. The subject of the acquisition, concerning the necessity of a knowledge previously acquired, is more fully developed by Avicenna in the sections on *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* of the *Šifā'* (respectively, *Qiyās* IX.19, p. 545.9-15 and *Burhān* I.6, pp. 74.13-75.7), where he introduces the so-called 'Meno's Paradox' recalled by Aristotle in *APr* 67a21-26 and in *APo* A1, 71a29-30<sup>10</sup>. The passage employs a technical language to describe how human discursive thought works. Discursive thought (*al-fikra*) is elsewhere described as the mind's transition (*intiqāl*) from the notions that are present in human mind – the principles of knowledge – to notions that are ignored, i.e. the object of the inquiry (cf. *Šifā'*, *Burhān* I.3, p. 60.6-7 and *Iṣārāt*, p. 169.1-2). In order to allow this transition from the known to the knowledge of the unknown, the notions that were previously acquired must be disposed according to a certain arrangement (*tartīb*) in human mind (cf. *Iṣārāt*,

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<sup>10</sup> It should be observed that Avicenna's exposition of Meno's Paradox in *Qiyās* IX.19 and *Burhān* I.6 is much more elaborated than Aristotle's hints provided in *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, showing an awareness of the dialogical context between Socrates and Meno staged in Plato's *Meno* that can hardly derive from the simple reading of Aristotle sketchy references. A way to explain his acquaintance with such a detailed account, without supposing a direct reception of Plato's *Meno* in Arabic translation (on which see GUTAS 2012, pp. 853-854), is supposing an indirect reception through Philoponus' commentaries on *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* (Philop., *In Anal. Pr.*, pp. 464.24-465.2 and *In Anal. Post.*, pp. 14.12-15.21): Avicenna's account is quite close to that in Philoponus' commentary on *Posterior Analytics*. Both the commentaries were known to the Arabs, and they are already attested in Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, vol. II, p. 162.13-16 ed. Fu'ād Sayyid/vol. II, p. 249.9 Flügel and vol. II, p. 163.5 ed. Fu'ād Sayyid/vol. II, p. 249.13 Flügel. According to Al-Nadīm's testimony, Philoponus' commentary on *Prior Analytics* was only partially known, and the section devoted to Meno's Paradox in this commentary might have been ignored by the Arabs; hence, the privileged source of the account of Meno's Paradox might be the commentary on *Posterior Analytics*, which seems confirmed by the fact that both the occurrences of the account in Avicenna are closer to Philoponus' account in the commentary on *Posterior Analytics*. On the Arabic reception of the two commentaries, see GANNAGÉ 2012, pp. 513-516 (specifically on the possibility of a reception of Philoponus' commentary on *Posterior Analytics* by Avicenna's part, p. 515). Meno's Paradox played a central role in the definition of Al-Fārābī's epistemology as well and is frequently recalled in several Farabian works, among which the commentaries on *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*: on this subject, see BLACK 2008.

p. 175.1). The study of the modalities (*ḍurūb*) of this operation of the mind pertains to the discipline of Logic (cf. *Iṣārāt*, p. 177.1-2).

(§2.1) [*The thing is...respect of assent*] Knowledge is based on two operations, namely conceptualization (*taṣawwur*) and assent (*taṣdīq*). The conceptualization can be defined as the mental representation of an abstracted simple notion whose truth-value cannot be assessed, i.e. whose existence or non-existence is neither affirmed nor denied; the assent is the judgement concerning the truth-value of a proposition. This fundamental distinction is linked to Aristotle's claim that there are simple notions in human soul that are neither true nor false (*De Interpr.* 16a9-16), and that it is the composition of a declarative statement that entails either a judgement of truth or of falsity (*Cat.* 2a7-10). For a definition of *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq*, cf. WOLFSON 1973; SABRA 1980, pp. 757-758; BLACK 2013, pp. 121-123. Conceptualization is stimulated by simple, non-declarative expressions: the examples provided in the passage at stake are a name (*insān*, "man") and an imperative (*if'al kaḍā*, "do in this way!"): both examples have in common the fact that they do not stress declarative sentences (for an analogous analysis in Fārābī, cf. ABED 1991, pp. 38-39). Assent is stimulated, on the other hand, by declarative statements, such as the instance provided in the passage: "every whiteness is an accident". Conceptualization is a primary operation in the process that leads to the attainment of knowledge: in case of non-propositional statements (such as names, definitions, descriptions etc.), conceptualization is the only degree of representation in the mind; in case of propositional statements conceptualization is a preliminary step, that can be followed by an assent if the statement is judged to be true.

[*Both of them...of the unknown*] The claim of §1 that every knowledge is attained by acquisition on the basis of a previous knowledge applies to these two operations as well: the assent concerning the conclusion of a syllogism, for instance, requires a previous conceptualization of the object of the inquiry (*al-maṭlūb*) and a previous assent concerning the premises; the conceptualization of a definition or a description, on the other hand, requires a previous conceptualization of the parts of the definitory statement (*Ṣifā'*, *Burhān* I.3, pp. 57.18-58.9).

(§2.2) [*It has not...a common name*] The kinds of expressions that are susceptible to lead to the thing's conceptualization are: definition (*ḥadd*), description (*rasm*), example (*miṭāl*), sign (*'alāma*) and name (*ism*). Avicenna claims that this kind of expressions was not assigned a unique name in the tradition, or at least he is not acquainted with it; the remark is quite puzzling. Despite what he states in this passage, Avicenna is seemingly well aware in other works of the use of calling definition, description and the like "expository statement" (*qawl ṣāriḥ*): he refers to the use of naming by the expression *qawl ṣāriḥ* what leads to a conceptualization (*al-mūṣil ilà al-taṣawwur*) as a traditional use (*wa-qad ġarat al-'āda*) in *Iṣārāt*, p. 184.4-5; he then fully adopts this terminology in the following passages (cf. e.g. *ibid.* p. 186.6). One might wonder whether this inconsistency can be explained by supposing that Avicenna got acquainted

with such a terminological use only after the composition of *Madḥal*, which would mean accepting the posteriority of the *Iṣārāt* with respect to this part of the *Šifā'* (in accordance with Gutas' chronology of Avicenna's works; the subject is, however, debated: for a presentation of different positions in the scholarship, cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 155-156). Remarkably, Avicenna seems to be acquainted with such a traditional use in *Mašriqiyyūn*, *Manṭiq* p. 10.1-3 as well, where the use of this terminology is referred to as a customary practice (*wa-min 'ādat al-nās an yusammū mā yaḥşulu bihi al-taşawwur qawlan šāriḥan*, "it is customary for people to call that in virtue of which conceptualization is realized *expository statement*"). Other Avicennian occurrences of the expression are *K. al-Inşāf*, *Šarḥ Maqālat al-Lām min Kitāb mā ba'da al-ṭabī'a*, p. 65.213 (where *qawl šāriḥ* is meant to explain *kalima*, which is employed, in the passage, as a translation of the Greek λόγος), and in two identical parallel passages on the Necessary Existent in *Nağāt*, p. 551.14 and *Al-Mabda' wa-l-Ma'ād*, p. 5.11<sup>11</sup>. The composition of the *Inşāf* is supposed to be posterior to the *Šifā'* (cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 147-150); the quotation in *Al-Mabda' wa-l-Ma'ād*, on the other hand, would attest Avicenna's acquaintance with the terminological use at stake before the composition of the *Šifā'* (cf. GUTAS 2014, p. 101, who posits the composition of the work around 403H/1013). Notably, the expression was also employed by Fārābī (cf. *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, p. 118.8; *Al-Alfāz al-Musta'mala fī l-Manṭiq*, p. 89.9).

[*As to the thing...or something else*] What is susceptible of receiving assent is the proof (*ḥuğğā*) in its different forms, such as *sylogism* (*qiyās*), i.e. the statement (*qawl*) composed by a series of statements from which another statement originates, if the propositions of which it is formed are accepted (*Iṣārāt*, p. 421.1-3); *induction* (*istiqrā'*), i.e. a judgement (*ḥukm*) concerning a universal proposition that is assumed on the basis of particular instances (*Iṣārāt*, p. 418.1-8: the instance provided is that of the universal proposition "every animal is capable of moving" based on the fact that man and bird move); *analogy* (*tamṭīl*), i.e. a judgement concerning particular propositions on the basis of other similar particular propositions, corresponding to what the jurists and the *mutakallimūn* name *qiyās* (*Iṣārāt*, p. 419.1-11).

(§2.3.1) [*The aim of...between these cases*] In §2.3 Avicenna states that the aim (*ğāya*) of Logic is to provide knowledge of how the statements that produce conceptualization (a) and those that produce assent (b) are in order to provide different degrees of certitude in knowledge. In §2.3.1 three kinds statements that produce conceptualization are mentioned in progressively degrading epistemological value: (aa) the first kind, i.e. the statement that notifies the truth of the thing's essence, evidently corresponds to the *definition*, i.e. the statement formed by the thing's proximate genus and its differentia specifica that conveys the thing's essence (cf. *Iṣārāt*, pp. 249.4-250.3); this is the most perfect way to achieve a mental representation of something.

<sup>11</sup> The strict parallelism between certain passages of the *Kitāb al-Mabda' wa-l-Ma'ād* and the corresponding passages in the *Nağāt* was explained as the result of Avicenna's reuse of parts of the *Kitāb al-Mabda' wa-l-Ma'ād* in the *Nağāt* (GUTAS 2014, p. 101).

(ab) The second kind of statement signifies the thing, though not essentially: it is the *description*, i.e. the statement that signifies the thing by means of its genus and its accidental properties, both propria and common accidents (cf. *Isārāt*, p. 250.6-7). (ac) Finally, the third kind of statement is vicious, giving the false impression of providing a valid signification of the thing even though it does not, which likely corresponds to the ‘incomplete definition’ and the ‘incomplete description’ mentioned in *Burhān* I.1 (cf. STROBINO 2010, pp. 120-123).

(§2.3.2) [*Secondly, the aim...discipline is Logic*] Five kinds of proof that provide a different kind of epistemological certitude are classified in the paragraph: (ba) the first kind corresponds to *demonstrative syllogism* (*qiyās burhānī*), that provides an assent that is certain (*yaqīn*) and that cannot be invalidated (cf. *Šifāʾ*, *Burhān* I.1, p. 51.8-10; 16-17). (bb) The second kind corresponds to *dialectical syllogism* (*qiyās ʿadalī*) provokes an assent that is close to certitude (cf. *Aqsām al-ʿUlūm*, p. 116.7, where the dialectical syllogism is said to be close to the demonstrative one, *al-muqārib li-l-burhān*). (bc) The third kind corresponds to *sophistic syllogism* (*qiyās sūfistāʾī*), which resembles to demonstrative and dialectical syllogism, without being so (on both dialectical and sophistic syllogism, cf. *Burhān* I.1, p. 51.10-14 and pp. 51.17-52.1). (bd) The fourth kind corresponds to *rhetorical syllogism* (*qiyās ḥaṭābī*), composed of premises that can be admitted (*maqūla*), assumed (*maẓnūna*) or commonly accepted (*mašhūra*), and whose second premise is often unexpressed (cf. *Burhān* I.1, p. 51.14-16 and p. 52.1; this kind of syllogism is usually employed in political matters: cf. *ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, al-Manṭiq*, p. 13.5-14). (be) The fifth kind corresponds to *poetic syllogism* (*qiyās šīʿrī*), a syllogism whose major premise and conclusion are not categorical judgements, but rather poetic, ‘imaginative’ statements, whose two premises are often unexpressed, which is able to produce an imagination which has an effect analogous to that of the assent (cf. *Šifāʾ*, *Nafs* IV.3, p. 182.12-183.1; *Naḡāt*, p. 121.4-9; *ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, al-Manṭiq*, p. 13.16-14.2; see also BLACK 1989, pp. 244-265 and AOUAD AND SCHOELER 2002, pp. 185-188). Avicenna employs here and elsewhere the example of honey, that a false imagination can represent as bile because of the similar colour and complexion of the two, so that human nature abstains from seeking a contact with it, as if a categorical judgement concerning the nature of honey had occurred (cf. *Šifāʾ*, *Burhān* I.4, p. 63.4-13; the same example concerning a misrepresentation of honey as bile is already in Arist., *Soph. El.* 167b1-6). When Avicenna states that the fallacious imagination produces on the soul the same effects as the categorical judgement that follows to a demonstrative reasoning, he employs a specific terminology that refers to an expansion and a contraction of the soul (*inbisāt wa-nqibād*); the use of this terms, also employed in his *Canon* of medicine (*Qānūn* I.i.VI.4, p. 126.20-21; it is also recalled in the parallel passage in *Burhān* I.4, p. 63.4-13), is grounded in the Stoic doctrine of emotions, according to which imaginations generate expansions or contractions of the soul (cf. SORABJI 2002, p. 29ff.). For the parallel classification of the kinds of proof in the section of *Burhān*, cf. STROBINO 2010, pp. 118-119. An analogous presentation of the kinds of argumentation is also offered in Fārābī, *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm*, pp. 79.12-85.8 (on

Fārābī's descriptions of poetic syllogism, see AOUAD AND SCHOELER 2002, pp. 188-196).

(§3.1) [*It can happen...might occur to it*] The paragraph considers the possibility that conceptualization and assent might occur spontaneously, due to human instinct (*ḡarīza*, *qarīha*, *fiṭra*), i.e. without a discursive reasoning in accordance to the rules of Logic. The fallacious character of such a kind of mental work is argued on the basis of the existence of divergences and inconsistencies between different philosophical theories and even between what the same one person holds true in a certain moment and what he holds true in another when he relies on his natural instinct. The insufficiency of human natural disposition in the process of attainment of knowledge of the unknown is also stated in Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm* (p. 74.4-9).

(§3.2) [*Even if the...depart from it*] The paragraph presents the possibility that even the mastery of the discipline of Logic fail to prevent from error, if not systematically applied; this can happen either due to an incomplete mastery of the discipline, or to an excessive confidence in the natural disposition, or to a defective application of the rules of Logic.

(§3.3) [*Even if it...the addition disappears*] Although the possibility to err is not definitely eliminated even with the mastery of Logic, given the risk of a faulty or partial application of it, those who master the discipline are, however, better secured against error, especially in the most important matters. The argumentation is anchored to a distinction between matters that are more relevant and secondary ones.

(§4) [*This discipline is...to learn Arabic*] The paragraph has to be read in the light of Fārābī's *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, of which it seems to recall several specific passages. The notion of 'interior locution' (*al-nuṭq al-dāḥil*) derives from the Stoic notion of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος; cf. Chrysipp., *fr.* 135 (= Galenus in *Hippocr. de med. officina* vol. XVIII B p. 649 K.); Hermog., *Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγου*, 2, 8, 116-120. Another fragment of Chrysippus explicitly contrasts the notion of interior locution with that of προφορικός λόγος, which is the basis for the 'exterior locution' (*al-nuṭq al-ḥāriḡī*) mentioned by Avicenna: see Chrysipp., *fr.* 136 (= Sextus Emp., *Adv. Math.* VIII 275). The distinction between *al-nuṭq al-dāḥil* and *al-nuṭq al-ḥāriḡī* is recalled and generically ascribed to the Ancients (*al-qudamā'*) in Fārābī, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 75.9-14 and p. 78.3-6, the possible source for this passage of Avicenna's. Fārābī describes the vocal exterior locution as that by means of which there is a linguistic expression (*'ibārat al-lisān*) of what is in the mind (*fi l-ḡamīr*), and the interior locution as the locution rooted in the soul, namely the intelligible notions (*al-ma'qūlāt*) signified by utterances. As well as grammar has a normative role with regard to the exterior locution, and prosody has a normative role with regard to poetry, Logic assumes an analogous role the interior locution, according to a comparison that likely derives from Fārābī, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 68.4-10. Avicenna pushes Fārābī's comparison even further by claiming that Logic has a stronger normative importance for the interior locution than grammar and prosody for language and poetry: native speakers, in fact, do not require a thorough knowledge of grammar

in order to speak correctly, nor does someone who is able to compose poetry based on his own innate sense for metric and musicality. In other words, these are cases in which the natural disposition can dispense from the mastery of grammar and prosody, whereas the interior locution necessitates to follow the rules of Logic. The sole exception is represented by the eventuality of a man supported by God, who can accede intuitively to knowledge, in the way a native speaker speaks his language. However, this represents the exceptional case of the prophets and the messengers of God, in whose case the contact with the universal intellect (*al-‘aql al-kullī*) can predispose the rational faculty to know even without recurring to discursive reasoning (i.e. to syllogisms and assent), based on inspiration and revelation: this is the property of the sanctified spirit (see *K. fī al-Nafs ‘alā sunnat al-iḥtiṣār*, chap. 8, pp. 364.19-365.4; on Avicenna’s theory of the sacred prophetic spirit, cf. also SEBTI 2000, pp. 96-97 and TREIGER 2012, pp. 74-80).

## Chapter I.4

(§1) [*It is not... relation to it*] The paragraph provides an argument for the claim that assent (*taṣdīq*) occurs with regard to a composite notion whose existence or non-existence is affirmed. The item of which the existence or non-existence is not assessed cannot be the cause itself of the assent, since nothing can be the cause of anything else regardless to whether it exists or not. An assessment of the item's existence or non-existence is therefore necessary, but such an assessment implies a composition of notions, since existence and non-existence are additional notions with respect to the notion of the thing itself, given that they are in no way included in its own quiddity (among the numerous contributions on this well-renowned metaphysical doctrine, see: GOICHON 1937; RAHMAN 1958; WISNOVSKY 2003, pp. 145-180; DRUART 2001; PORRO 2002; LIZZINI 2003; RASHED 2004a; BERTOLACCI 2012c). Necessary conditions to the occurrence of the assent are the presence of a composed notion resulting from the combination of a thing's notion and a statement regarding either its existence or non-existence, i.e. a declarative statement (*qawl ḡāzim*). The verb *intaqala* used to describe the mind's attainment of the assent regarding a certain notion recalls the technical description of the thought in chap. I.3, §1.

[*As to the conceptualization...the composite ones*] As explained in *Burhān* I.1, p. 53.4-6, the process of conceptualization can originate either from simple or from composite notions that are not a declarative statement (*qawl ḡāzim*), i.e. that do not entail a judgement on their truth or falseness. Composite expressions of this kind are definitions, descriptions, imperatives and vocatives (cf. also the examples provided in chap. I.3, §2.1), which do not provide any information concerning the existence or non-existence of anything. The conceptualization through simple notions is claimed to be imperfect with respect to that occurring through composite notions, but the study of simple notions is nonetheless required as a preliminary stage towards the study of the composite notions, which are the result of a composition of simple notions; this statement introduces §2, whose subject is the knowledge of the simple notions.

(§2) [*Knowledge of simple...in what preceded*] There are two possible ways of considering the simple notions, namely in themselves and with their own specific features, or inasmuch as they are apt to form composite notions. Avicenna exemplifies his claim with a metaphor drawn from the domain of housebuilding, which is functional to stress in which way simple notions are taken as an object of inquiry in Logic (cf. S3 below): the house (a), representing the composite notion, is the result of the composition of several elements (b), such as wood, bricks and clay, representing, out of metaphor, the simple notions. The simple components of the house can either be taken into consideration (b.1) inasmuch as they are wood, bricks and clay, characterized by a hot or cold nature, being substances of a certain kind and so on, or (b.2) inasmuch as they are apt or not to form the house (being, for instance, solid or slack). The housebuilder (c) – representing the logician – will be more interested in this latter kind of information

about the components of the house (b.2) rather than with the first kind of information (b.1), since his interest for the simple components of the house depends on the possibility itself of composing a house out of them. This means that the simple notions are studied in Logic inasmuch as they have a certain aptitude to be composed in a predicative statement, being apt to be considered as predicates or subjects, universal or particular. Simple utterances are also characterized by other states, such as the fact of signifying things that exist in one of the two possible ways, but the inquiry into this sort of things does not necessarily pertain to Logic (cf. *Šifā'*, *Maqūlāt* I.1, p. 4.15-17).

### S3. The metaphor of the housebuilding

[a] House	[a] Composite notion
[b] Components (wood, bricks, clay)	[b] Simple notions
[b.1] The nature of the components (e.g. wood has a vegetative soul, a nature that is hot or cold etc.)	[b.1] The simple notions considered in themselves (i.e. according to their own quiddities) or in one of the two ways of existence (in the individuals or in the minds)
[b.2] Their aptitude to be employed to build the house (e.g. the wood is solid or slack)	[b.2] The simple notions considered as predicates and subjects, universals and particulars (i.e. inasmuch as they have a certain aptitude to be composed in a predicative statement)
[c] Housebuilder	[c] Logician

On the meaning of the term *qiyās* in the paragraph, see GOICHON 1939, p. 339. The metaphor of the housebuilding employed in the context of a discussion of the subject of Logic seems to echo a passage of Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī's *Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna ṣinā' atay al-manṭiq al-falsafī wa-l-naḥw al-'arabī* (par. 6, pp. 190-189): in the passage, Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī states that the utterances are the subject of grammar and then introduces a digressive explication of what the subject of a discipline is, i.e. that upon which the discipline operates (*fa-l-mawḍū' li-l-ṣinā'ati huwa mā taf'alu fīhi al-ṣinā'atu fī 'lahā*). Several examples are provided, among which that of the art of building (*ṣinā'at al-binā'*), whose subject is represented by the stone and the brick (*al-ḥiḡāra wa-l-libn*), on which the art of building is operated, and by their composition (*tarkībuhumā*), which is in such a way that it achieves the form of the house built (*ṣūrat al-bayt*).

(§3.1) [*As to the inquiry...is more practical*] The paragraph thematizes the long-debated question on the necessity of a study of the utterances within the discipline of Logic. The subject had been the object of an intense and long-lasting dispute between logicians and grammarians (see *General Introduction*, §II.3, point a). Avicenna's answer to the problem consists in assuming as the primary subject of Logic *notions* rather than *utterances*; a forerunner for this radical shift might have been Fārābī, who claimed in *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 74.10-12 that the subject of Logic is twofold, consisting both in the intelligible notions insofar as they are signified by the utterances (*al-*

*ma 'qūlāt min ḥayṭu tadullu 'alayhā al-alfāz*) and in the utterances insofar as they signify the intelligible notions (*wa-l-alfāz min ḥayṭu hiya dālla 'alā al-ma 'qūlāt*) (see *General Introduction*, §II.3, point a). Avicenna operates this shift maintaining a substantial mutual correspondence between utterances and notions (*al-kalām 'alā al-alfāz al-muṭābiqa li-ma 'ānīhā ka-l-kalām 'alā ma 'ānīhā*, “the discussion concerning the utterances corresponding to their notions is like the discussion concerning their notions”), also maintaining the necessity of employing utterances. First, the utterances are necessary because they are indispensable in the dialogue and the interpersonal communication (*al-muḥāṭaba wa-l-muḥāwara*); such a necessity of the utterances was already noticed within the school of Alexandria (cf. Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 35.23-26). Second, because they are necessarily entailed in the discursive thought (*al-rawiyya*), in which the arrangement of the notions in the mind necessarily entails that the corresponding utterances are imagined too. The hint at an arrangement of the notions in the mind (*turattabu al-ma 'ānī*) is quite technical and should be read against the background of Avicenna’s psychology, in the light of *Šifā'*, *Nafs* V.6, pp. 243.7-244.4 (on this passage, see ADAMSON 2004, pp. 90-91). Apparently, *Madḥal* I.4, §3.1 was questioned within Avicenna’s circle, and Avicenna’s reply is preserved in *Mubāḥaṭāt* 579-585, pp. 193-194 (cf. REISMAN 2002, pp. 200-201 and 246-247, identifying the anonymous questioner with Ibn Zayla). In his reply, Avicenna states that, although necessary, the inquiry into the utterances does not correspond to the primary subject (*al-mawḍū' al-awwalī*) of Logic, being rather somehow included in it as one of its parts or as entailed by a part of it. In other words, the inquiry into the utterances is not a primary concern (*šuḡl awwal*) of the logician, but it is necessary among his secondary concerns (the notion of ‘primary subject’ has several occurrences in Avicenna’s *Burhān* of the *Šifā'* and in *Ilāhiyyāt* I.1-2; for a discussion of the exact meaning of this expression and of its Farabian origin, see EICHNER 2010; QUARTUCCI 2017, pp. 441-467).

(§3.2) [*Moreover, there is...from that attainment*] In the paragraph at stake, Avicenna contends the view that utterances are the subject of Logic; MANDOSIO 2013, p. 324 identifies Avicenna’s critical target with Fārābī, who argued in the *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm* that the objects (*al-mawḍū'āt*) of Logic are the concepts (*al-ma 'qūlāt*) inasmuch as they are signified by the utterances and the utterances inasmuch as they signify the concepts (*Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 74.10-12; cf. also Id., *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, p. 18.4-9). At closer inspection, actually, the doctrine refuted by Avicenna appears not to coincide perfectly with Fārābī’s. Remarkably, Fārābī occasionally claimed (cf. e.g. *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, pp. 25.22-26.3) that, were it not for the difficulty of an inquiry of this sort, the primary object of research in Logic would be the composition of the concepts (*al-maqṣūd awwalan huwa tarkīb al-ma 'qūlāt*); the inquiry into utterances seems to be conceived as functional to make the inquiry into the concepts possible, and is grounded in the mutual correspondence between utterances and concepts. In the light of the passage from his *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, Fārābī’s position seems far more nuanced and even somehow forerunning Avicenna’s own developments, being not the one critically addressed by Avicenna. The

philosophers addressed by Avicenna in the passage at stake reportedly identified the subject of Logic with significative utterances, which seems to suit better the position held by most of the Baǧdād Peripatetics: besides Yaḥyà Ibn ‘Adī, *Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna ṣinā‘atay al-manṭiq al-falsafī wa-l-naḥw al-‘arabī*, pp. 182-181 and Ibn Al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūǧī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 68.17-19, cf. also Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb al-Maqūlāt*, p. 8.4-6, stating that the subject of Logic are the simple utterances that signify high genera (*al-alfāz al-basīṭa al-dālla ‘alā al-aǧnās al-‘awāl*). Avicenna definitely overturned the traditional view by confining the inquiry into the utterances among the necessary instrumental inquiries of the discipline, aimed at studying its primary subject, i.e. the notions (for a slightly different interpretation of this passage, cf. SABRA 1980, where the importance accorded to the study of the utterances is highlighted). Avicenna suggests that the supporters of the view that the subject of Logic consists in the significative utterances failed to recognize that the actual subject – namely secondary notions – belongs to a different class of beings (MADKOUR 1934, pp. 59-60 proposed an identification of these philosophers with the Stoics, then discussed in MANDOSIO 2013, p. 325 and n. 109, who individuates one of Avicenna’s possible sources in the *Tenth Letter* of the *Iḥwān al-Ṣafā’*). The mistake might have been induced, in Avicenna’s view, by the traditional classification of the sciences based on the ontological classification of their objects, and by the idea that two disciplines cannot share the same kind of objects. Items that exist in the external reality are the objects of the disciplines of Natural Philosophy and Mathematics, whereas those that have a mental existence are ascribed to the domain of inquiry of “another discipline or a part of [another] discipline”, i.e. of Metaphysics or of Psychology, which is a part of Natural Philosophy (see other Avicennian parallels for this joint mention of Metaphysics and Psychology in analogous contexts and a discussion of other possible readings of the passage in *General Introduction*, §II.3, point c)<sup>12</sup>. Avicenna’s objection to this point is that the items that have a mental existence can be divided into (a) items that are conceptualized from the external reality and (b) items that are in human mind without any correspondence in the external reality, since they are not the result of conceptualization. Both items (a-b) are the object of Metaphysics (cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 12.11-13.9; *Ibid.*, I.4, p. 26.3-5), though not exclusively. Items of class (b) arguably include the secondary notions that are the subject of Logic (cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* I.2, pp. 10.17–11.2 and *Madḥal* I.2, §2.1), defined as notions that attach to the primary ones – i.e. those notions embraced by the categories – in mental existence, such as universality and particularity, being a subject or a predicate and so on. The risk of an overlap between the subject of Metaphysics and that of Logic might have dissuaded Baǧdād Peripatetics from admitting notions as the subject of Logic. What assures that the subject matter of Metaphysics and that of Logic do not overlap is that the items of type (b) are the subject Logic under a specific respect, namely insofar as they allow to attain knowledge of the

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<sup>12</sup> MANDOSIO 2013, p. 331 read Avicenna’s reference to “a discipline or to a part of a discipline” as referring to one and the same science, which he identified with Psychology. For a discussion of this interpretation, see *General Introduction*, §II.3, point (c).

unknown on the basis of a previous knowledge, which is not the respect under which these items are among the objects of Metaphysics (cf. §3.3).

(§3.3) [*Since those philosophers...state of Logic*] The paragraph justifies the status of the subject of Logic delineated in §3.2 by recalling a general epistemological principle exposed in *Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.6, p. 155.4-10, namely that every science has a subject of which it studies the accidents and states, and that the study of a subject in itself can pertain to a discipline, whereas the study of its accidents pertains to another. The possibility that two different disciplines share their subject, that is here just alluded to, is discussed in *Burhān* II.7, where Avicenna individuates three ways in which two disciplines can share the same subject (see *General Introduction*, §II.3, point c). The relation between Logic and the said “other science” (Metaphysics) is of the type described in *Burhān* II.7, pp. 163.12-165.2 and 168.12-13: Logic deals with a part of the subject of Metaphysics and considers it under a different, specific respect, i.e. insofar as it is useful to the acquisition of knowledge. Avicenna’s insistence on the fact that his adversaries failed to recognize the specific respect (*al-ḡiha*)<sup>13</sup> under which the subject-matter of Logic is exclusively its own subject-matter is due to the relevance that it has in allowing the individuation of a subject-matter specifically pertaining to the logical inquiry and, consequently, the definition of Logic as a science.

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<sup>13</sup> A different interpretation of this term is provided in MANDOSIO 2013, p. 332, but is reliant on the Latin translation, whose Arabic exemplar was arguably affected by a slight corruption (cf. *General Introduction*, §II.3, point c).

## Chapter I.5

(§1.1) [*Since we cannot...simple or composite*] This introductory clause explains the need of introducing in the section of Logic a discussion concerning the utterances (*al-alfāz*), despite Avicenna's refutation of the thesis that the subject matter of Logic coincides with the utterances in chap. I.4. The study of utterances is, traditionally, the main object of the science of language (*'ilm al-lisān*): the twofold division of the utterance in simple (*mufrad*) and composite (*murakkab*) is, in fact, dealt with in the section pertaining to the science of language in Fārābī, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, p. 58.10-60.2, and is also recalled in the section of Logic (*Ibid.*, p. 76.4-7). The distinction is remotely based on Arist., *De Int.*, 16a19-26, where simple names (τὰ ἀπλά ὀνόματα) are contraposed to composite names (τὰ πεπλεγμένα).

(§1.2) [*The composite utterance...signify that meaning*] The paragraph provides a definition of 'composite utterance' (*lafz murakkab*) as the utterance whose parts can signify a part of the whole notion *bi-l-dāt*, i.e. essentially, not by accident (cf. Arist., *De Int.*, 16b26-32). The example provided is the composite utterance "the man is a writer" (*al-insān kātib*), whose two components, i.e. "man" (*al-insān*) and "writer" (*kātib*), both properly signify a part of the whole statement. This is a specific feature by means of which composite utterances can be distinguished from the simple ones, like "animal", whose parts do not signify a part of the whole notion. The case of the word "animal" (*ḥayawān*) is particularly apt to demonstrate the point, since a part of it such as *ḥayy* does actually signify a notion (living being, animal, often used as a rendering of the Greek ζῷον), so that one could be induced to think erroneously that the parts of the simple utterances are significative too. Even if the parts of a simple utterance can, singularly taken, signify other notions or a part of the notion meant by the simple utterance, this only happens by accident, and not *bi-l-dāt*.

(§1.3.1) [*As to the simple... the simple ones*] Simple utterances are defined as those utterances whose parts do not signify essentially (*bi-l-dāt*) a part of the whole notion, as in the case of "man" (*insān*), whose parts 'in' and 'sān' do not signify a part of the whole notion; this first case is analogous to the example of "animal" (*ḥayawān*) provided in §1.2. A second example of simple utterance provided, namely that of the personal name 'Abdu Šams (already employed in an analogous context in Fārābī, *Fuṣūl*, p. 273.13-19), is meant to show that, even if the two parts that compose the name, i.e. 'Abd ("servant") and Šams ("Sun"), are in themselves significative, nonetheless they do not signify a part of the whole personal name, which does not designate a servant of the Sun. The name 'Abdu Šams only apparently sounds like a composite utterance, being rather another instance of simple utterance. The same point was made by Aristotle in *De Int.* 16a19-22 with the example of the personal name Kallippos, formed by the terms καλός ("beautiful") and ἵππος ("horse"), none of which actually signify a part of the personal name (cf. also Fārābī, *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ibāra*, p. 30.8-15

commenting on this passage), and in *Poet.* 1457a10-14 with the example of the personal name θεόδωρος.

(§1.3.2) [*The description of...make it understandable*] The “more ancient teaching” here mentioned is a reference to Aristotle, and the definition of the simple utterance as *an utterance whose parts do not signify anything* recalls Arist. *De Int.* 16a19-21, 22-26. Avicenna reports the criticism of the Aristotelian description by a group of philosophers who contended the necessity to add that the parts of the simple utterance do not signify anything *of the whole notion* (*min ma ‘nà l-kull*), since their parts can signify a notion, though not a part of the whole notion, as shown by the examples provided in §1.2 and §1.3.1. A similar precision was added in the commentaries of the school of Alexandria (cf. Steph., *In De Int.*, pp. 7.37-8.27), where, with regard to the example of Kallippos, it was argued that, even the single parts of the simple utterance such as καλός and ἵππος convey a certain meaning, they do not signify anything as parts of that utterance (οὐδὲν σημαίνει ὡς μέρος ἐκείνου λεχθέν). However, the addition was not introduced as a necessary emendation of Aristotle’s definition: on the contrary, based on reasons similar to those adduced by Avicenna, it was considered more as an unnecessary additional remark, given that the single parts of a simple utterance do not maintain the semantic value they have singularly taken, losing their independent signification when they are assumed as parts of a simple utterance (cf. Fārābī, *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-‘Ibāra*, p. 31.2-3, stating that the parts of a simple utterance do not signify anything, neither essentially nor by accident). The reason lies in the conventional nature of language, discussed in §1.3.3.

(§1.3.3) [*This because the...notion at all*] The fact that the parts of the single utterances have no semantic value is justified by the conventional character of the signification: an utterance, in fact, is not significative in itself, but in virtue of the speakers’ will (*irādat al-lāfiẓ*). Avicenna proves this point arguing that the existence itself of equivocal utterances such as ‘ayn, which can signify the source as well as the dīnār, demonstrates that the meaning assumed by the utterances in the different contexts depends on the speakers’ intention. If the speaker deprived the utterance of its own meaning, then a mere sound (*ṣawt*) or an articulation of letters (*hurūf*) would be left, which cannot be considered as utterances insofar as they are not significative. Avicenna’s reference to the utterance (*lafẓ*) as contraposed to the sound (*ṣawt*) and the letter (*ḥarf*) might be a hint to an ongoing debate on the subject. The dubitative form (*fī mā aẓunnu*) employed by Avicenna to introduce the view that the sound (*ṣawt*, translating the Greek φωνή of Arist., *De Int.*, 16a19) and the letter (*ḥarf*) cannot be considered as utterances since they do not convey a signification, together with his ascribing such an opinion to “many of the logicians”, i.e. not to all of them, betrays his awareness that this was not a universally acknowledged fact. The claim that sounds such as those emitted by the animals never convey a signification, for instance, is challenged in Fārābī, *Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-‘Ibāra*, p. 31.10-22 (based on Arist., *De Int.*, 16a26-29), who notices that animals, for instance, are sometimes able to convey a signification by emitting their natural sounds, so that these as well can be considered

utterances (*alfāz*), which differ from human utterances because the latter signify by convention, whereas animal sounds are not the result of an agreement occurred between a community of speakers. In Avicenna's view, The only way in which a part of a simple utterance might be considered as significative is in potentiality, if a certain connection with the speaker's will can be individuated.

(§2.1) [*The utterance is...into the composite*] Avicenna moves from a first division of the utterances into simple and composite to a sub-division of the simple utterance into universal and particular (cf. S4); composite utterances are left aside at this stage because the study of simple utterances is preliminary to the study of the composite ones.

[*Furthermore the unique...like the Sun*] Universal utterances are defined as those that can be conceptualized as shared by a multitude, regardless to whether they refer to more than one particular item in actuality – as in the case of “man”, which can be predicated of the several human individuals in actuality – or only in potentiality, as in the case of the Sun and the Moon; Avicenna evidently understands the Sun and the Moon as monadic species, i.e. as universal notions that happen to be represented in the external reality by a unique individual (cf. *Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.4, p. 144.7-14 and *Samā' Ṭabī'ī*, p. 9.16-17). The keynote point in Avicenna's definition of universality is precisely the fact that it does not apply exclusively to those notions that are in actuality predicated of many items, but is extended, on the contrary, to all those notions that could be so potentially, even if not in actuality because of some external impediments. Coming back to the case of the Sun and the Moon, conceptualizing their natures is something different from conceptualizing that they are one in number; moreover, the conceptualization of its nature alone does not prevent from conceiving ‘Sun’ and ‘Moon’ as predicated of more than a single item (*Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.4, pp. 144.15-145.6). What prevents the existence in actuality of more than just one individual Sun and Moon is an impediment external to their very notions, namely the fact that all their specific matter is gathered in the single instances of the two species, thus hindering the realization of other individuals of the same species (cf. BERTOLACCI 2011b, p. 32). A definition of the universal notion in terms of its potentiality of being conceived as predicated of many items is provided in *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* V.1, pp. 195.11-196.3 (for a detailed comparison of the two definitions, see BERTOLACCI 2011b, pp. 27-35).

[*Or its notion...is called particular*] The particular utterance is defined, in a specular way to the universal one, as the utterance whose notion cannot be conceptualized as common to more than one single item. The example provided is that of ‘Zayd’, which cannot be predicated of more than one individual named Zayd. The potential existence of several individuals named Zayd should not lead to suppose that ‘Zayd’ is predicated of those individuals, since they do not share a common definition of ‘Zayd’; rather, those individuals just share the same name. In the case of the particulars, the conceptualization of their notion and that of the fact that they are one in number coincide (cf. *Šifā'*, *Burhān* II.4, p. 145.7-9).

(§2.2) [*You know that...discipline or two*] The parallelism between utterances and notions is assessed once again; then three questions are said to exceed the boundaries of the discipline of Logic, namely how the relation (*nisba*) between a universal notion and its particular instances is, if the universal notions exist in the external reality, either in the individuals or separately, and how it is realized in the mind. In fact, such questions pertain to Metaphysics and Psychology (cf. *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.4, p. 26.3-5; see also BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 274 and Id. 2011b, p. 32). This remark introduces §4.1, where the correspondence between the universal notion and its particular items is mentioned without establishing whether it occurs in the external or in the mental existence.

(§3) [*You have already...the composite one*] The paragraph recalls the necessity to deal with simple utterances and notions before dealing with the composite ones, as already stated in chap. I.4, §1 (cf. also S4).

[*You should also...the universal utterance*] Particular utterances and notions are left aside since they are not an object of philosophical inquiry, insofar as it is impossible to reach a true knowledge of them (cf. Arist., *Met.* Z 15, 1039b27-1040a7). The dihairetic classification of the utterances provided in the commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* composed in the school of Alexandria (cf. S5) excluded particular items from the domain of the philosophical inquiry based on a similar argument.

(§4.1) [*You know that...it is predicated*] The universality of an utterance is grounded in its relation (*nisba*) to the particular items of which it is predicated; whether such a relation subsists in external existence or in conception, is a question left unanswered, as programmatically announced in §2.2, as it does not pertain to Logic, but rather to Metaphysics (cf. *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* I.4, p. 26.3-5).

(§4.2) [*Predication is under...was predicated synonymously*] Since the universality of an utterance has been defined in terms of a relation between the utterance and its particular subjects of predication, the distinction between synonymous and paronymous predication is here introduced (for the Aristotelian definition of synonyms, cf. Arist., *Cat.*, 1a6-12; *Top.*, Z10, 148a24-25; *ibid.*, Θ 12-13, 162b37-163a1; for that of paronyms, cf. Arist., *Cat.*, 1a12-15; *ibid.*, 9a31-35). As demonstrated by the fact that synonymous predication is further divided into essential and accidental predication (S4), such a distinction should not be taken as a distinction between essential/synonymous and accidental/paronymous predication, according to an equivalence established in the Late Antique exegetical tradition between synonymous predication, predication as of a subject and essential predication<sup>14</sup>. In fact, Avicenna considers genus, species, differentia, proprium and common accident to be all synonymously predicated (cf. chap. II.1, §1.2 and *Šifā'*, *Maqūlāt* I.2, p. 15.10-15).

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<sup>14</sup> The equivalence was also endorsed by Alexander of Aphrodisias (*In Top.*, 297.28-298.1) and Porphyry (*In Cat.*, p. 81.4-7; see p. 80.20-23, where Porphyry restricts this kind of predication to genera and species, and p. 81.6-11, p. 92.25-35, and p. 94.35-36, where synonymous predication is extended to the differentiae specificae as well).

(§4.3) [*Let us recall...a second moment*] After stating that the only kind of predication taken into account is synonymous predication, the traditional classification of the utterances is suspended, and it will be completed with a sub-division of the synonymous predicates into essential and accidental predicates in chap. I.8. Avicenna does not proceed further in the division of the universal simple utterances that are univocally predicated of their subject, claiming that he has to depart from the “traditional path” (*al-mu‘tād min al-ṭuruq*) in order to achieve his goals. Noteworthy, the rest of chap. I.5 and chapters 6-7 represent a sort of digression aimed at providing a sound definition of the notion of ‘essential’ and of ‘signifying the quiddity’: chapters 6-7 deal with two traditional ways of defining the ‘essential’ that are both criticized by Avicenna. Finally, in chap. 8 the division of the simple universal utterance into its five sections is accomplished, and the division of the utterances restarts from the point it stopped in chap. I.5 with the division of the utterances into essential and accidental. Arguably, Avicenna was unsatisfied with the traditional definitions of ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’, hence he stopped the traditional division of the utterance in order to redefine the two key concepts and to proceed dividing the utterances by means of the redefined notions, in order to achieve a correct division into five universal simple utterances. In sum, the rest of chap. I.5 and chapters I.6-7 appear to form a sort of “Avicennian interpolation” within a substantially traditional introductory classification of the utterances.

(§5.1) [*Let us say...man is realized*] The quiddity is defined as *that in virtue of which each thing is what it is*, namely its essence. Two types of quiddity are supposed, namely (i) a quiddity which is a single notion, and which does not result from the combination of more than one notion, and (ii) a quiddity resulting from the combination of several notions. Type (ii) describes the quiddities of all the natural things that are the object of sense perception (the example provided is the quiddity of man, which gathers in itself several features, such as being a substance with certain dimensions, having a soul and so on). It is the quiddity of material things, that are composed of matter and form; it coincides with the combination of matter and form itself (cf. *Šifā‘, Ilāhiyyāt* V.8, p. 245.3-5). Type (i), on the other hand, cannot be exemplified by anything that can be perceived, and its existence has to be admitted. It is the quiddity of immaterial things, that are simple insofar as they do not result from a combination of matter and form, and coincide with their forms (cf. *Šifā‘, Ilāhiyyāt* V.8, pp. 244.18-245.3).

(§5.2) [*Then other notions...quality, quantity etc.*] The paragraph introduces the accidental features that concur to distinguish one individual from another once its essence is established. None of these accidents is relevant to the permanence of the individual itself, since they do not represent any of its essential features.

(§5.3) [*It can also...humanity is established*] The paragraph deals with the accidental features that do not belong separately to each individual, but to their species once the essential features are established. The example provided is that of man, that becomes what it is in virtue of the conjunction of its form (the rational soul) to its matter. After

this conjunction, the propria of the species man, such as the capability of laughing, of acquiring knowledge and so on, that necessarily follow to one of its essential feature, i.e. rationality, are realized. These features are not essential but, differently from the accidents presented in §5.2, they are necessarily consequent to the establishment of the thing's essence and are shared by the individuals of the same species, being not an element of distinction of the one from the other.

(§5.4) [*It has become...called "accidental notion"*] The paragraph proposes a conclusive classification of the quiddity and its elements, reflected in the classification of the utterances that signify each of the elements of the classification (recapitulated in S6 below). The thing's essence (a) has constitutive elements that precede it and by which it is constituted (b) and non-constitutive accidental elements that follow its constitution (c). The latter can either (c.1) follow necessarily its constitution, as in the case of the features presented in §5.3, or (c.2) not, as in the case of the accidental features presented in §5.2. The utterances that signify the quiddity or one of its constitutive elements (a-b) are *essential utterances*; more in detail, the utterances that signify the quiddity in its entirety (a) are said to signify the quiddity (*al-dāll 'alà l-māhiyyati*), whereas the utterances that signify one of its constituent but not the entire quiddity (b) are essential utterances, though not signifying the quiddity (*al-lafz al-dātī al-ġayr al-dāll 'alà l-māhiyyati*). A point that will be dealt with more in extent (in §6.1-2 and in chap. I.6) emerged from this classification, namely that Avicenna does not assume the equivalence between 'essential' and 'signifying the quiddity', since the notion of 'essential' has a broader application than 'signifying the quiddity', applying both to utterances that signify the quiddity as a whole (a) and to the utterances that signify constituents of the quiddity (b), which is intended to avoid the risk of excluding the differentiae, that do not signify the quiddity as a whole, from the domain of the essential predicates. As to the two kinds of accidental features (c.1-2), the utterance that signify them is the *accidental utterance* (*lafz 'araḍī*).

(§6.1) [*Then there is...essential to man*] The classification recapitulated in §5.4 showed that the notion of 'essential' embraces the notion of 'signifying the quiddity' the way what is more general encompasses what is more specific. In the paragraph at stake Avicenna raises a possible objection to his own classification, that he will answer in §6.2, based on a linguistic argument. From a linguistic point of view, the term 'essential' (*dātī*), which originates from the addition of the suffix *-ī* to the term *dāt*, is a relative (*nisbī*) term which conveys the idea of something *related* to the essence (*mansūb ilà l-dāt*); on the sense of 'relative' employed by the grammarians, cf. Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, pp. 84.13-85.6. On this basis, one could draw the conclusion that what signifies the whole essence of something (type a in S6) cannot be essential to it, since it would be absurd to claim that A *is related to* B when A *is* B. In other words, it would be possible to designate by the relative term 'essential' only what does not coincide with/signify the whole essence of something, i.e. what does not signify the quiddity (type b in S6), a conclusion rejected in §6.2.

[*If man is...this complex has*] To demonstrate that the conclusions drawn from the ‘linguistic objection’ must be rejected, Avicenna proceeds with a *reductio ad absurdum*. (1) First of all, the ‘linguistic objection’ about relative terms obliges to rule out the possibility that what signifies the quiddity of a species (for instance, “man”) can be essential in relation to the species’ quiddity itself, since it would be equivalent to state that “man” is essential to “man,” which would be absurd in that framework. (2) But what signifies the quiddity might signify an individual’s quiddity: employing the example of man (*insān*) in relation to individual (*šahṣ*), Avicenna tries to prove that “man” is essential to individuals within the framework of the ‘linguistic objection’. “Man” should either be essential (2.1) because it is essential to the individuals’ quiddity (which is, again, “man,” but this case must be rejected for the reasons at point 1) or (2.2) because it is a part of the complex of features that make them individuals, which would entail that the accidental features characterizing the individual are essential as well, which is an awkward and undesired conclusion. Thus, it turned out that the linguistic understanding of the term *ḍātī* is not able to provide a sound understanding of what being essential to something means.


(§6.2) [*These considerations lead...in fact, essential*] The paragraph introduces a distinction between the linguistic sense of the term ‘essential’ and the sense in which it is employed in Logic. The definition of ‘essential’ provided in the paragraph is the one developed in chap. I.6: a feature is ‘essential’ to something if its removal affects the essence of the thing itself, so that it cannot subsist anymore. Avicenna specifies that what is essential to a thing entails its removal not in such a way that the thing is removed at first, thus causing the removal of the essential feature, but in such a way that the removal of the essential feature is itself the cause of the thing’s removal. This remark is required in order to distinguish the essential features from the necessary concomitants, since, as explained in chap. I.6, some necessary concomitants, though being accidental features, entail the thing’s removal too, but in the other way mentioned here, i.e. in such a way that the thing must be removed in order to suppose the removal of its necessary concomitants. Necessary concomitants are the kind (b) of the accidental attributes described in §6.3 (cf. S7).

(§6.3) [*If it is...of their subsistence*] Accidental attributes are defined by contrast with the essential ones on the basis of the same criterion (cf. S7), namely the possibility to remove them without affecting the thing’s essence (echoing Porph., *Isag.*, p. 12.24). Accidental features are either (a) such that their removal does not affect at all the thing’s essence, or (b) such that their removal necessarily entail that of the thing’s essence, though not as its cause (as essential features do), but rather because otherwise the removal of the necessary concomitants from the thing’s essence is not possible. Accidental features of type (a) correspond to what Porphyry classified as *common accidents* (Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 12.24-13.8): they are sub-divided into (a.1) separable accidents, i.e. features that can be removed from the thing’s essence in the existence (*fī l-wuḡūd*), such as sitting, standing and so on, and into (a.2) inseparable accidents, i.e. features that can only be removed from their subjects in estimation (*fī l-wahm*), like the


blackness of Ethiopians. The idea that inseparable accidents are separable in estimation, already expressed in Porphyry's statement: "it is possible to conceive (δύναται δὲ ἐπινοηθῆναι) also a white raven and an Ethiopian losing his skin-color without the corruption of the subject", was further developed in the Late Antique commentaries, where it was employed to justify how inseparable accidents could fit Porphyry's general definition of common accident as what can be removed from its subject without causing its corruption (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 111.7-15). Accidental features of type (b) correspond to Porphyry's *propria*, which cannot be removed from their subjects in existence, but can be so in estimation, though entailing the corruption of the subject itself in the said way.

(§6.4-7) [*It has appeared... quiddity or accidental*] The two paragraphs recapitulate the classification of essential and accidental attributes outlined in §6.2 and §6.3 and resumed in S7 below.


#### S4. Dihairetic classification of the utterances in *Madḥal* I.5




S5. Dihairetic classification of the utterances in the school of Alexandria: Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 60.7-16; Elias, *In Isag.*, pp. 35.14-36.10; Ps.-Elias (David), *In Isag.*, p. 52.9-29



S6. Classification of the utterances according to their signification in §5.4



S7. Classification of essential and accidental attributes in chap. I.5



## Chapter I.6

(§1) [*It was said...the thing remains*] The *incipit* chap. I.6 bears evidence that the distinction of ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ Avicenna deals with is a traditional one. Avicenna introduces with the locution “it was said” (*qad qīla*) both the first distinction between ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’, based on the fact that (i) the ‘essential’ is constitutive, whereas the ‘accidental’ is not, and the second one (ii), based on the fact that it is impossible to negate the essential of its subject even in imagination without causing the subject’s corruption, whereas this is possible for the accidental. Given that Avicenna surely does not refer to any of his own previous statements, arguably he refers to someone else’s statement, or to a general common belief. More in detail, he might be referring to the commentary tradition on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, starting from the Late Antiquity and encompassing the Arabic medieval tradition. Both criteria to define the ‘essential’ and, by contrast, the ‘accidental’ derive from Porphyry’s definitions of the two notions. In Porph., *In Cat.*, 95.21-24, a relation is established between being “completive”<sup>15</sup> (σμπληρωτικός) and entailing, with its own removal from the subject, the subject’s corruption. This association was then inherited by the Late Antique commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* produced within the school of Alexandria. As a customary practice, Porphyry’s definition of ‘essential’ as “completive/something that cannot be removed from its subject without causing its corruption” was assumed among the introductory themes that preceded the core of the commentary on the *Isagoge*. Furthermore, this definition became functional to the preliminary individuation of the five predicables, that proceeded according to a traditional dihairetical scheme (cf. S5 above), starting to divide the utterance into signifying and non-signifying utterance, refusing to deal with the non-signifying utterances, further dividing the signifying utterances into universal and particular, and arguing for the impossibility of attaining a scientific knowledge of the particular, to finally reach the division of the signifying universal utterance into essential and accidental, the last step before the individuation of the five Porphyrean predicables, divided into essential (genus, species, differentia) and accidental ones (proprium and common accident). This scheme is adopted in

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<sup>15</sup> I choose to translate the Greek term with the etymologically equivalent term “completive”. However, I assume this to be the Greek term that was translated into Arabic as *muqawwim* (which I render by: “constitutive”), as shown in Tab. 2. The adjective σμπληρωτικός – which never occurs in Aristotle’s works – was already used to denote constitutive elements of a substance by Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the *Topics*: in the section where Alexander comments upon Aristotle’s description of the accident in *Top.* A5, 102b4ff., he states that “white” is an accident for the snow, for it is not σμπληρωτικόν of the snow’s substance (Alex., *In Top.*, p. 50.29-51.2). The term was also employed by Galen and Plotinus: the latter especially employed the term in *Enn.* II and VI. *Enn.* VI.2.14 states that qualities do not concur to the completion of the οὐσία, for they are posterior to its constitution, so that the οὐσία cannot be constituted (τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν) and completed (σμπληροῦσθαι) by them (*Enn.* VI.2.14, 2-5). The verb σμπληρεῖν seems to have, in the aforementioned passage from the *Enneads*, a meaning analogous to what Porphyry meant by the corresponding adjective. On the term, see also BARNES 2003, p. 180.

Ammonius' and Elias' commentaries on the *Isagoge*, and can be found, within the earliest Arabic philosophical tradition, in Kindī's treatise *Fī l-falsafa l-ūlā* (cf. Tab. 2); in the latter case as well, the classification of the utterances introduces the exposition of the five predicables.

**Tab. 2.**

Ammon., <i>In Isag.</i> , p. 60.7-16	Elias, <i>In Isag.</i> , pp. 35.14-36.10	Kindī, <i>Fī l-falsafa l-ūlā</i> , p. 43.8-17
Among the [utterances] that are predicated of many, some are essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) predicated, like the genera, the differentiae and the species, for they are <b>are completive</b> (συμπληρωτικὰ) of the essence, some [others are] non-essentially (οὐκ οὐσιωδῶς) [predicated], like the properties and the [common] accidents, for they are not completive (οὐ γὰρ συμπληροῦ) of [their] subjects' essence.	Among the universal [utterances], some are essential, some are accidental. "Essential" (οὐσιωδῶς) are called those [features] that save [the subject] with their presence and destroy [it] with their absence, as "rational" belongs essentially to "man" (for it saves it with its presence, whereas it destroys it with its absence) [...]. "Accidental" (ἐπεισοδιώδῶς) are called those that, on the contrary, neither save [their subject] with their presence, nor destroy [it] with their absence [...].	The general universals must be either essential ( <i>dātiyya</i> ) or non-essential ( <i>ḡayru dātiyyatin</i> ). By 'essential' ( <i>dātī</i> ) I mean that <b>which makes subsist</b> ( <i>muqawwim</i> ) the essence ( <i>dāt</i> ) of something: because <u>when it [the essential] exists, the being of the thing subsists and is stable, whereas when it [the essential] ceases to exist, the thing is destroyed and corrupted.</u>

(§2.1) [*Hence it is...is the same*] The "literal sense" (*zāhir lafẓihī*) may be the one according to which 'constitutive' means what makes something subsist in existence (cf. *Iṣārāt*, p. 199.6-14: "I do not mean, by "constitutive" (*bi-l-muqawwimī*), the predicate that the subject requires for the realization of its existence (*fī taḥaqquqi wuḡūdihī*), such as the fact that a human being is generated, created or made to exist (*ka-kawni l-insāni mawlūdan aw maḥlūqan aw muḥdaṭan*), and the fact that black is an accident. I mean a predicate that the subject requires for the realization of its quiddity (*fī taḥaqquqi māhiyyatihī*), and which is included in its quiddity as a part of it (*wa-yakūnu dāḥilan fī māhiyyatihī ḡuz'an minhā*) [...]"). The argument proceeds from the assumption that what is constitutive, in its literal sense, is so with respect to something different, for the constitutive element of something differs from the whole it makes subsist; therefore, if 'essential' is the same as 'constitutive of a quiddity', then 'essential' should be just what does not signify the quiddity that it constitutes, which appears to be a rather absurd conclusion, for it would rule out from the essential features of a quiddity, for instance, its own genus (cf. also chap. I.5, §6.1). By 'constitutive' Avicenna means what is part of a thing's essence. The passage at stake states that the primary literal sense of 'constitutive' is not the one adopted by Avicenna but is the sense in which Avicenna suspects that part of the tradition might use the term when defining the notion of 'essential'. That is the reason why Avicenna feels that some further clarification on the meaning of 'constitutive' is required.

(§2.2) [*As to what...is a triangle*] The second definition of ‘essential’, stating that what is essential cannot be removed from its subject even in imagination without causing the corruption of the subject, seemingly derives from Porphyry’s definition of accident in the *Isagoge* as what can be safely removed from its subject without causing its corruption (Porph. *Isag.* 12.24-13.3). This kind of definition raised some problems concerning the so-called “inseparable accidents”<sup>16</sup>, that appear to be inseparable from their subjects, like being black for ravens. Porphyry implicitly answers this possible objection by claiming that it is at least possible to *conceive* (ἐπινοηθῆναι) the subject deprived of its inseparable accidents, as it is possible to figure out a white raven, even if it cannot be found in the external reality, without causing the destruction of the raven itself. This kind of solution was developed and adopted by the Alexandrian tradition of commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, 111.7-18; Elias, *In Isag.*, 91.27-92.6; David, *In Isag.*, 205.14-28). From Porphyry’s hint to a removability in conception, Ammonius inferred a distinction between two types of separability, namely a separability *in actuality* (τῆ ἐνεργείᾳ) and one *in conception* (τῆ ἐπινοίᾳ). This dichotomy became traditional, developing into a distinction of two different respects under which the separability of features should be evaluated, functional to answer possible objections regarding the inseparable accidents and, then, preserving the possibility of being removed from a subject without causing its corruption as a peculiar feature of accidents. Ibn Al-Ṭayyib (*Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūgī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 139.11-14) bears evidence of an Arabic reception of such notions; it is therefore possible that Avicenna refers to this tradition when he hints at “their relying (*i timāduhum*) on the fact of the elimination (*al-raf*) in imagination (*fī l-tawahhumi*)”. The Greek terms employed by Porphyry and the Alexandrian philosophers to denote ‘conception’ are connected to the root of ἐπίνοια/ἐπινοεῖν. The Arabic tradition appears to be consistent in rendering the Greek term with *wahm/tawahhum*, which are exactly the terms employed both by Ibn Al-Ṭayyib and Avicenna, drawn from the Arabic translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* by Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī (p. 1086.5-8), in which the Greek ἐπινοηθῆναι was translated as *yutawahhamu*.

(§3.1) [*When this quiddity...mind in actuality*] Avicenna declares that the constitutive features must be realized before the quiddity they constitute, either in external reality or in conception, otherwise the quiddity can neither be realized as an individual, nor it can be conceived.

(§3.2) [*With the locution...their conceptualization preceded*] When both the thing’s quiddity and its constitutive features are notified to the mind, one cannot negate those

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<sup>16</sup> Aristotle never explicitly mentions this distinction between separable and inseparable accidents: it was introduced in the account on accident by Porphyry in the *Isagoge*. However, the distinction might be already known to the Peripatetics before Porphyry, since Alexander of Aphrodisias seems to have in mind this distinction in his commentary to Aristotle’s *Topics*, where he employs the locution “inseparable accidents” (ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα) referring to “white” with respect to the snow and the swan, and to “black” with respect to the pitch (Alex., *In Top.* 50.11).

constitutive features of the quiddity they constitute, which means that, if we conceive the notion of “animal” and the notion of “man”, we cannot but conceive that “man” is an “animal”. On the contrary, if we conceive “man” and “existing”, for instance, we can doubt whether the “man” is “existing” or not, for “existing” is not a constitutive feature of “man”. On the exact sense of ‘conceive’ in this context, cf. §4.2.

(§4.1) [*As to the...concomitant to it*] Accidental features – both concomitant and not concomitant, without distinguishing between the two at this stage – are stated not to be necessary to conceive a quiddity, insofar as the quiddity is constituted without them (cf. chap. I.5, §5.2-3 and §6.3).

(§4.2) [*You have already...to the other*] The paragraph contains a remark on the sense in which the verb ‘to conceive’ (*ta‘aqqul*) is employed in the context. Stating the impossibility of a negation of the constituents from the quiddity they constitute (cf. §3.2) does not exclude the possibility to conceptualize something without considering also each of its constituents separately. Rather, it means that, if both the quiddity and its own constituents are conceptualized, it is impossible to negate that the constituents belong to the quiddity.

(§5.1) [*As to the...any intermediate element*] Not every accidental feature (*‘awāriḍ*) following to the quiddity, though non-constitutive, can be removed from its subject without causing its corruption: it is the case of necessary concomitants (*lawāzim*), as argued in chap. I.5, §6.3. The term is employed to designate the accidental features that necessarily follow to a quiddity without being a part of it. The term *lāzim* may be used, in a broader sense, to mean any inseparable and necessary feature, so that the constitutive features might be said to be “necessary concomitants” of a quiddity as well, as *Iṣārāt*, pp. 205.7-207.1 suggests<sup>17</sup>. However, Avicenna purposely uses the narrow

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<sup>17</sup> Avicenna mentions the property of the triangle of having its internal angles equal to two right angles (for the sake of simplicity, “2R”) as an example of necessary concomitant. Aristotle states that 2R belongs to the triangle *per se* (Arist. *Met.* Δ 30, 1025a30-34), although it is unclear according to which of the four senses of *per se* described in *APo* A4 this relation holds. This subject is still debated, and several attempts to ascribe it to one kind of *per se* predication have been made so far. GRAHAM 1975, p. 185 considered 2R among the *per se*-2 properties, but, as pointed out in TILES 1983, p. 8, 2R does not seem to require the mention of the triangle in its own definition, which seems to be a key condition for a property belonging to a subject *per se*-2. As a reaction to this difficulty, J. E. Tiles and other scholars propose to think of 2R as a *per se*-4 property, ruling out the possibility that it belongs to one of the first two key senses of *per se* (see TILES 1983 and FERREJOHN 1991, pp. 123-8). Analogously, R. Sorabji notices that the fact that the triangle has 2R is a conclusion of a demonstration despite the fact that, in Aristotle’s view, predicates should attach necessarily (either in the sense of *per se*-1 or *per se*-2) to their subjects in the premises and in the conclusion of a syllogism, there is, apparently, no definitional connection between the subject and the predicate in the conclusion that 2R belongs to the triangle, neither in the sense of *per se*-1, nor in the sense of *per se*-2 (see SORABJI 1980, pp. 188-9). A totally different position is held by R. Tierney, who claims that 2R belongs to triangle *per se*-1. According to TIERNEY 2001b, pp. 61-82 the problem is solved if one does not understand the *per se*-1 relation between a subject and a predicate as a simply definitional one, just entailing that the predicate belongs in the definition of its subject.

sense of the term, designating just those accidental features that necessarily follow from the realization of a thing's quiddity, without being part of it. In order to prove his point against the traditional claim that all the accidental features are removable from their subjects, Avicenna provides a distinction between (i) primary concomitants – described as “what is primarily [and] manifestly concomitant to the quiddity without the mediation of any other accident” – and (ii) mediated concomitants. This distinction is functional to a subtler scrutiny of the senses in which these different concomitants can be said to entail, with their removal, the corruption of their subjects. First, Avicenna proves the necessity of the existence of both kind of concomitants, implicitly recalling Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Avicenna argues for the existence of (ii) mediated concomitants stating that, otherwise, there would not be ignored concomitants (*lawāzim maġhūla*). This is a crucial point, since negating the existence of mediated concomitants entails a strong restriction of the possibilities of attaining knowledge of something unknown from something previously known. In fact, if the only existing concomitants were the immediate ones, then the scientific demonstration would be useless, given that immediate concomitants hold manifestly for the thing, so that there is no need for a demonstration of their belonging to the thing, and that neither the essential constitutive features of the thing, that belong in its definition, can be demonstrated. The basis for the first assumption is a passage from *APo* A3, 72b18-22, where Aristotle argues that the knowledge of immediate terms is not a demonstrative one, which is related to the indemonstrability of the definition (Arist., *APo* B4; cf. *Šifā'*, *Burhān* IV.2 and STROBINO 2010). Since attaining a demonstrative knowledge of a thing means an inquiry into the thing's mediated concomitants, one must either admit the existence of this kind of concomitants or negate the possibility of attaining demonstrative knowledge at all. On the other hand, immediate concomitants (i) must exist as well, in order to grant the possibility of attaining knowledge of the mediated ones. This claim has its roots in *APo* A3, 72b7-15, where Aristotle reports the opinion of some thinkers who deny the possibility of attaining scientific knowledge of what follows on the basis of what precedes if there are not first principles (πρῶτα) that are already known, for it is impossible to go through an infinite sequence of elements (72b10-11: ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὰ ἄπειρα διελεῖν)<sup>18</sup>. The argument Aristotle provides for this basically coincides with that employed by Avicenna in the passage at stake: since demonstrative knowledge depends on a previously acquired knowledge, in order not to postulate an infinite chain of mediated concomitants that should be demonstratively known the one on the basis of the other, there must be of necessity an ultimate immediate concomitant which does not

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<sup>18</sup> Aristotle agrees on this point with the thinkers he quotes (generally identified with the philosophers of the school of Antisthenes). The divergence in their views lies in the fact that, whereas the thinkers Aristotle quotes argue for the impossibility of attaining a demonstrative knowledge on the basis of the impossibility of a scientific (i.e. demonstrative) knowledge of some first principles, Aristotle reaches an opposite conclusion, assuming that not every scientific knowledge is a demonstrative one, and that, therefore, one can have a scientific (though non-demonstrative) knowledge of some principles granting the possibility of attaining a demonstrative knowledge of other things.

require any demonstration<sup>19</sup> (cf. also *Iṣārāt*, pp. 208.1-212.1, starting from the impossibility of postulating a never-ending chain of concomitants belonging to the thing, and ending with a critical reference to Porphyry's claim that the non-constitutive features can be retired from the thing in imagination). The examples provided by Avicenna for immediate and mediated concomitants (respectively, the fact that the triangle is such that one of its sides can be protracted in estimation in a straight line and the fact that each couple of internal angles of the triangle is minor than two right angles) are the components of a geometrical demonstration (exposed in Euclid, *Elem.* I.17<sup>20</sup>). The aim of the demonstration is that of attaining knowledge of the fact that the triangle has each couple of internal angles minor than two right angles (Avicenna's example of a mediated concomitant, the triangle's feature that is to be demonstrated<sup>21</sup>), and the starting point of the demonstration is another feature of the triangle, namely the possibility of extending one of the triangle's sides (Avicenna's immediate concomitant). Therefore, the knowledge of the mediated concomitant is attained on the basis of a previously acquired knowledge of the immediate concomitant, taken as the starting point of the demonstration.

(§5.2) [*As to what...to what exists*] The two different kinds of concomitants differ with respect to the possibility of being removed from their subjects without causing the subject's corruption (cf. §5.2). Mediated concomitants (ii) can be said, under a certain respect, to be removable from their subjects, whereas under another respect they are not. The possibility of removing them from their subjects depends on a consideration which is not related to the actual existence, namely the "absolute mind" (*al-dīhn al-muṭlaq*) that Avicenna mentions in the passage. On the contrary, the impossibility of removing them from their subjects lies in the impossibility of conceiving them as removed from their subjects according to a consideration corresponding to actual existence (*dīhn*

<sup>19</sup> Cf. also Arist., *APo* A2, 71b20-22, where Aristotle argues for the fact that every demonstrative knowledge must be attained starting from true, primary and immediate (ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων) elements. On the primary and immediate principles in Aristotle's demonstration, cf. MCKIRAHAN 1992, pp. 24-5.

<sup>20</sup> The purpose of Eucl., *Elem.* I.17 is to demonstrate that the sum of any two internal angles of a triangle is minor than two right angles. If we imagine a triangle ABC with a base BC, let the base BC be produced to a point D, in order to obtain a longer side BD (this is the starting point of the demonstration, taken by Avicenna as an example of immediate concomitant). We obtain that the internal angle  $\angle ABC$  is minor than the external angle  $\angle ACD$ , because any external angle of a triangle is greater than its opposite angle (cf. Eucl., *Elem.* I.16). Therefore, the sum of the internal angles  $\angle ABC$  and  $\angle ACB$  is minor than the sum of the external angle  $\angle ACD$  and the internal angle  $\angle ACB$ . The sum of the internal angle  $\angle ACB$  and the external angle  $\angle ACD$  is equal to two right angles, in virtue of the principle that angles on a straight line add up to  $180^\circ$  (cf. Eucl., *Elem.* I.13). Therefore, it has been demonstrated that the sum of the two internal angles  $\angle ABC$  and  $\angle ACB$  is minor than two right angles (which is the conclusion of the demonstration, namely Avicenna's mediated concomitant), and a similar procedure can be applied to any couple of internal angles of a triangle. Cf. HEATH 1956, vol. I, pp. 281-2.

<sup>21</sup> Being the conclusion of the geometrical proof, it is demonstrable and, therefore, it is not an immediate principle. This case is analogous to that of the property of having the internal angles equal to two right angles, which is the conclusion of a geometrical proof as well (Eucl., *Elem.* I.32), and which is explicitly said to be demonstrable in Arist., *APr* I.35, 48a36-37.

*muṭābiq li-l-mawḡūdi*). It is impossible, for instance, to conceive a triangle as existing unless the couples of its internal angles are minor than two right angles. Therefore, the possibility of removing mediated concomitants from their subjects depends on a particular way of considering them without any relation to their actual existence. Immediate concomitants (i) cannot be safely removed from their subjects without causing the subjects' corruption because, in a way, their removal *entails* their subjects' corruption. Immediate concomitants do not cause, by their removal, their subjects' corruption in the same sense constitutive features do, since their subjects do not require them in order to be realized, but in the sense that it is impossible, after conceiving their subjects, not to conceive them as belonging to their subjects; chap. I.5, §6.3 foreshadowed the conclusions reached in the passage at stake. The negation of immediate concomitants from their subjects, therefore, does not *cause* the subjects' corruption, if the verb is meant to signify the way a constitutive feature causes the subject's corruption with its lack, but rather *entails* it, as the negation of something necessarily following to the subject requires. The relationship between essence and necessary concomitants shows analogies with the cause and effect relationship described in *Ilāhiyyāt* IV.1, p. 169.3-8: the thing's essence and its necessary concomitant features are linked by a cause and effect relationship, given the fact that the essence necessitates its concomitants, being ontologically prior to them. Therefore, the negation (*rafʿ*) of the cause leads to the negation of the effect, as well as its affirmation (*iṭbāt*) leads to the affirmation of the effect, whereas the negation of the effect is an evidence (*dalīl*) of the negation of its cause, as well as its affirmation is an evidence of the affirmation of the cause. This is so because the negation of the effect is possible only with the removal of its cause, as well as its affirmation is possible only after the affirmation of its cause. Obviously, if necessary concomitants cannot be removed from their subjects unless the subjects that necessitate them are first removed, the definition of 'essential' as *what cannot be removed from its subject without causing its corruption* suits necessary immediate concomitants as well. Avicenna, therefore, succeeded in demonstrating that there is a class of accidental features that does not meet the requirements of the criterion of "removability" (*rafʿ*) from the subject.

(§6) [*In sum, it...cannot be negated*] A final classification of predicables is provided, based on their removability from a subject which ends up deconstructing the traditional bipartition into essential and accidental features. In fact, employing the same criterion of removability, Avicenna produces a division of the predicables into five: a first type is unequivocally represented by Porphyry's *separable accidents*, for it is described as the type of attribute that can be negated in existence (*wuḡūdan*). The second type is that of *inseparable accidents*, whose negation is possible in imagination, though not in existence (*tawahhuman lā fī l-wuḡūdi*); cf. chap. I.5, §6.3. A third type of predicates is presented, whose negation is possible in imagination according to an absolute consideration (*tawahhuman muṭlaqan*), i.e. according to a consideration which is not congruent with the existence in actuality. This third type of predicables is represented by the *mediated concomitants*, described as removable under a certain consideration in

§5.2. The fourth type of predicables is represented by the *immediate concomitants*, whose negation from the subject is impossible, in spite of their being accidental features (the impossibility of their separation from their subject was argued in §5.1). Finally, the fifth kind of predicables is that of the constitutive essential features, that cannot be negated of their subjects and that are essential. Noteworthy, the use of the same criterion of the removability from a subject employed in the exegetical tradition led Avicenna to a classification that differs significantly from the traditional one.

(§7) [*Finally it has ...essential and accidental*] The conclusive remark states that the philosophers that confined themselves to the two definitions presented in §1 did not attain a correct definition of the notions of ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’.

## Chapter I.7

(§1) [*Concerning what signifies...disclosed to us*] A definition of what signifies the quiddity as *what signifies whichever shared essential* is presented as the object of the inquiry of chap. I.7; more in detail, the chapter is devoted to the exam of a common and a most specific sense of ‘signifying the quiddity’. The said equivalence is ascribed to a group of “literalist/superficial logicians” (*al-zāhiriyyūn min al-manṭiqiyyūn/al-manṭiqiyyūn al-zāhiriyyūn*) in *Nağāt*, p. 12.12-15 and *Iṣārāt*, p. 219.10-11. The equivalence between ‘signifying the quiddity’ and ‘signifying whichever shared essential’, which implies admitting the *differentia specifica* among the features that signify the quiddity, is finally rejected.

(§2) [*As to the...of its quiddity*] The first sense that is taken into exam is the common one, according to which what signifies the quiddity is what signifies *the notion in virtue of which the thing is what it is*, i.e. the thing’s definition (cf. *Šifā’*, *Ĝadal* I.6, p. 57.13). A thing is what it is in virtue of both its shared and its specific essential features, which is tantamount to claim that the thing is what it is in virtue of both its proximate genus and its *differentia specifica* (cf. *Nağāt*, pp. 12.16-13.1). In this sense of ‘signifying the quiddity’, then, neither the shared essential feature (i.e. the genus) nor the specific essential feature (i.e. the *differentia*) that concur to the realization of the thing’s quiddity can be considered as ‘signifying the quiddity’, of which they signify just a part.

[*What is astonishing...about this subject*] Avicenna’s criticism is directed once again towards the logicians – referred to as “logicians who stick to the literal sense” (*al-manṭiqiyyūn al-zāhiriyyūn*) in *Iṣārāt*, p. 219.10-11 – who held the traditional identification of the notions of ‘essential’ and ‘signifying the quiddity’ addressed in chap. I.6. According to the traditional identification, the *differentia specifica*, which is among the essential features of the thing, should signify the quiddity, being predicated in answer to the question “what is it?”, but this would be quite an odd conclusion, for the *differentia* would end up being predicated of the thing the way the genus is. The logicians addressed by Avicenna do not push their reasoning as far as to claim that the *differentia* signifies the quiddity, thus avoiding an identification with the genus but falling into contradiction.

(§3.1) [*As to the...contradict these judgements*] The paragraph presents the sense according to which the expression ‘signifying the quiddity’ is employed in traditional Logic, which turns out not to be consistent with the equivalence between ‘signifying the quiddity’ and ‘signifying whichever shared essential’ mentioned in §1. According to this use, *differentiae* do not signify the quiddity (as the two examples of “sensitive” with respect to man, horse and bull, and “rational” with respect to human individuals are meant to show), whereas genera do (cf. the examples of “animal” with respect to man, horse and bull, and “man” with respect to the individuals). The framework for such a distinction of the signification of genus and *differentia* is the clear-cut distinction of two

domains of signification of the shared essential quiddity (*māhiyya*), on the one hand, and of the shared essential quality (*ayyiyya*), which means that what signifies the one does not signify the other. The term *ayyiyya* (here rendered as “essential quality”) results from a correction of the reading *anniyya* in the Cairo edition<sup>22</sup>, that is variably rendered in scholarly literature with the sense of “existence”, “individual essence”, “haecceity” and the like (cf. GOICHON 1939, pp. 9-12, D’ALVERNY 1959 and BERTOLACCI 2012a, pp. 292-293; on *anniyya* in Greek-into-Arabic translations, cf. HASNAWI 1990 and D’ANCONA 2011). The possibility that some occurrences of *anniyya* in the section of *Madḥal* might be the result of a misinterpretation of the *rasm* of the term *ayyiyya* is suggested in BERTOLACCI 2012a, pp. 301-304. The term *ayyiyya*, already attested in Kindī’s philosophical production, derives from the particle *ayyun*, employed in the definition of the differentia specifica which answers the question *ayyu šay`in huwa* and signifies the *essential quality* of something (on the occurrences of the term in Kindī’s works and for its use in the exegetical tradition of the *Isagoge*, cf. BERTOLACCI 2012a, pp. 301-304). Analogously, the term *māhiyya* derives from the particle *mā*, assumed in the definition of the genus and the species, which answer the question *mā huwa*. Accepting the reading *ayyiyya* instead of *anniyya/inniyya* in the passage at stake allows to restore a contrast between what signifies the *ayyiyya* (i.e. the differentia) and what signifies the *māhiyya* (the genus and the species), which runs in parallel to the distinction between the predication in answer to the question *ayyu šay`in huwa* and that in answer to the question *mā huwa*. Even if what signifies an item’s quiddity can happen to convey a feature that distinguishes it from other items (“animal”, for instance, which is a genus of man, can also distinguish the man from all the things that are not animals, like plants and so on; cf. §3.2.1), this does not allow to conclude that what signifies an item’s quiddity also signifies its essential quality and vice versa. Clearly, in the framework of such a neat distinction of the two types of signification and predication, the equivalence mentioned in §1 cannot hold true, for it would imply considering as signifying the quiddity the genus, the species and the differentia, since they are all shared essential features.

(§3.2.1) [*There are other...explain this matter*] A series of objections to the identification of ‘signifying the quiddity’ and ‘signifying a shared essential’ starts with §3.2.1. Avicenna proposes a hypothetical specification that might be added by the supporters of the said identification, namely that the signification of the shared essential should encompass the most common shared essential, i.e. the genus. The supporters of the said identifications might argue for the validity of the reformulation of the identification in the following manner: the thing’s genus can convey a distinction of the thing from other things in virtue of the constitutive differentia of the genus itself: “animal”, which is a genus of man, distinguished the man from plants, for instance, because the man is an animal, i.e. a “sensitive body”, and plants share with the animal

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<sup>22</sup> In the Cairo edition the term is actually intended as *inniyya*, with the initial *hamza* placed below the *alif*; on the opportunity to adopt the vocalization *amiyya*, cf. *GALex*, vol. I, pp. 428-436 and BERTOLACCI 2012a, p. 291 and n. 4.

the genus “body”, being distinguished from it in virtue of the differentia “sensitive”. The genus “animal” does distinguish the man from plants and so on, but it does so in virtue of a part of its definition, namely the differentia “sensitive”. Hence, the genus does not, in itself, signify the essential quality of anything, so that the supporters of the said identification supposedly succeeded in demonstrating that the addition of the condition that the signification of the shared essential should encompass the most common shared essential in order to coincide with the signification of the quiddity is sufficient to define the domain of the signification here dealt with. In the following paragraphs (§3.2.2-5), Avicenna proceeds with the refutation of this hypothetical reformulation.

(§3.2.2) [*First because if...things are prevented*] The first objection to the reformulation presented in §3.2.1 contends that the reference to “the most common shared essential” is inexact. The reformulation in §3.2.2 technically allows to assume a most general genus such as “substance”, combine it with a differentia specifica such as “rational”, and claim that the clause that results from the combination of both elements signify the quiddity of something like “man”, which is tantamount to claim that it corresponds to its definition. The rules for establishing a correct definition are broken: the genus assumed in definitions is not a genus whatsoever, but rather the proximate genus of the item defined, so that one item cannot have more than one valid definition only, and “rational substance” cannot be the definition of “man”, which, in fact, is “rational animal” (this mistake in the formation of a valid definition is explained in Arist., *Top.*, Z1, 139a27-28; cf. also *Risāla fī al-Ḥudūd*, p. 78.10-12, explicitly referring to Aristotle’s *Topics* and *Mašriqiyyūn*, *Maṭīq*, p. 36.4-6). If the supporters of the reformulation answered to the objections by conceding that not only the highest genus, but all the intermediate genera in Porphyry’s tree are taken into account, nonetheless it could be objected to them that what signifies the quiddity should signify it in its entirety, and the thing’s quiddity is not what it is in virtue of one of its parts only.

(§3.2.3) [*Besides all this...in this way*] The second objection to the reformulation in §3.2.1 is that differentiae, as well as genera, do include a shared essential notion: “sensitive”, for instance, includes the general notion of “thing having a certain potentiality”, and also entails the general notion of “body”, for every sensitive thing must necessarily be a body. The general notion, then, is specified by means of the distinctive one, which consists in that the thing or the body are able to acquire knowledge of individual things. Clearly, then, the mention of the shared essential is not enough to exclude the differentia specifica from the domain of signification of the quiddity.

(§3.2.4) [*Among them there...in this manner*] The third objection deals with the way in which the genus is considered by the supporters of that group of philosophers since, as it appears in §3.2.1, they consider it as the combination of a shared and a distinctive essentials, and distinguish between the part of it that signifies the quiddity and the parts that signifies the essential quality of the thing. Considering the genus as a whole,

without partitioning it into its constituents, one is compelled to admit that the genus can differentiate a thing from another, no matter whether this occurs just in virtue of a part of it. Moreover, another point that is here contested in the claim that since the genus (e.g. “animal”) signifies the essential quality in virtue of part of it (e.g. the fact of being sensitive), then it signifies the essential quality *by accident*. Avicenna’s last statement in the paragraph argues that, even if something (e.g. the genus) includes a cause in virtue of which it comes to be in a certain state (e.g. the constitutive differentia of the genus, in virtue of which the genus happens to distinguish something from something else), and that cause has that state (e.g. the ability to distinguish something from something else is a state of the differentia), it is not necessary to think that that thing (i.e. the genus) has that state (i.e. the ability to distinguish something from something else) by accident. To conclude, the claim that the genus is not able to signify the essential quality because it does not bring out a distinction and, even if it does, it does so by accident, is rejected.


(§3.2.5) [*Then I do...disputes is committed*] Avicenna admits the existence of other conditions that allow a distinction of genera and species from differentiae, but this does not occur according to the first sense of the expression “signifying the quiddity” (cf. §3.2.2. and §4).

(§4) [*If it is...they learned them*] The paragraph criticises the choice to move from the first sense of the expression “signifying the quiddity”, which requires that what signifies the quiddity signifies it in its totality (cf. §3.2.2), to a different notion, when the first sense of the expression was adequate enough to explain its use in Logic.

## Chapter I.8

(§1.1) [Now we say...that they share] The paragraph takes over the classification of the utterances started in chap. I.5 (S7), briefly recalling the classification that stopped at the level of the essential utterances and proceeding with a sub-division of essential utterances (cf. S8 below) into (a.1) utterances signifying the quiddity (i.e. genus and species) and (a.2) utterances that do not signify the quiddity (i.e. differentia). The group of utterances (a.1) is further divided into (a.1.1) utterances that signify the quiddity of things that differ the one from the other essentially (i.e. the species, including monadic species like the Sun) and (a.1.2) utterances that signify the quiddity of things that do not differ essentially (i.e. the genus).

### S8. Classification of essential utterances



(§1.2) [The difference between...animal signifies it] The utterances that signify the quiddity of something (a.1) differ in the way they signify it; the paragraph foreshadows the classification of the utterances that signify the quiddity proposed in the *Mašriqiyyūn* (*Manṭiq*, p. 16.10-18) and the *Išārāt* (p. 225.1-7 and p. 228.1-9), where three kinds of signification of the quiddity are described, namely (a.1.0) a specific signification (‘*alà sabīl al-ḥuṣūṣ*’), i.e. that of the *definition*; (a.1.1) a signification of the singular quiddity and of the shared quiddity at one and the same time (‘*alà sabīl al-infirād wa-l-širka ma’an*’), i.e. that of the *species*; (a.1.2) a signification of the shared quiddity (‘*alà l-širka*’), i.e. that of the *genus*. The signification of the quiddity type (a.1.0) perfectly signifies the whole quiddity of the thing, expressed by the thing’s definition, which is formed by its proximate genus and its differentia specifica. The signification of the quiddity type (a.1.1) is the signification of the species with respect to the individuals, of which the species tells both the shared quiddity (i.e. as the species ‘man’ signifies the quiddity that is common to Zayd, ‘Amr and other human individuals) and the singular quiddity (i.e. as the species ‘man’ signifies the singular quiddity of the individual Zayd;

what is left outside the individual quiddity is the complex of accidental attributes that distinguish each individual from the other, without taking part to its essential quiddity). The signification of the quiddity type (a.1.2) is the signification of the genus with respect to the quiddity that its species share (i.e. as the genus ‘animal’ signifies the quiddity that the species horse, man and bull share), and not with respect to the quiddity of each single species taken on its own (the genus ‘animal’ do not signify completely the quiddity of the species ‘man’, which is rather signified by the definition of man).

(§1.3.1) [*As to “sensitive”...an animate body*] The existence of a signification of the quiddity of type (a.1.2), in which a part of the quiddity (i.e. the genus) signify the shared quiddity of several species, might erroneously lead to consider the differentia, which signifies a part of the quiddity just like the genus, as signifying the quiddity as a predicate of type (a.1.2). The examples employed are “animal” (the genus) and “sensitive” (the constitutive differentia of “animal”): since, apparently, both “animal” and “sensitive” mean “animate body” and are coextensive in predication, it might seem legitimate to conclude that both the differentia and the genus signify the shared quiddity (a.1.2).

(§1.3.2) [*In answer to...moving with moved*] Avicenna’s answer to the doubts introduced in §1.3.1 consists in claiming that, even if the genus and its constitutive differentia can be predicated of the same subjects, being coextensive in predication, their notions are nonetheless different (cf. *Risāla fī l-Hudūd*, pp. 73.15-74.4). Coming back to the example provided in §1.3.1, “animate body” is the meaning of “animal”, whereas “sensitive” actually means “thing provided with sensitivity” (cf. the signification of type i described in §1.3.3); the fact that what is “sensitive” must also necessarily be an animate body is a necessary concomitant with respect to the notion of “sensitive” itself, and not its definition. The case is analogous to that of the word “roof”, which does not primarily signify the house’s foundation, but which entails the existence of the houses’ foundation, for it would be impossible to have a roof without the rest of the house with its foundation (the way in which the differentia “sensitive” can signify the same notion as the genus it constitutes is called a signification of *necessary concomitance* in §1.3.3) Hence, “animal” and “sensitive” do not really signify the same notion.

(§1.3.3) [*The notion that...signifies the foundation*] Three distinct kinds of signification are presented: kinds (i-ii) are both essential significations, whereas kind (iii) is an external, non-essential signification. The primary kind of signification (i) is a signification of *correspondence*: it is the case in which is a perfect correspondence between a term and the notion it signifies (like, e.g., “animal” signifies its definition, i.e. “animate body”). A secondary kind of signification (ii) is a signification of *implication*: it is the case in which the notion signified by a term is included in a more general notion that is the term’s definition (like “animal” signifies “body”, i.e. its genus, which is included in its definition and is a constitutive element of its notion). A third kind of signification (iii) is a signification of *necessary concomitance*: it is the

signification of a notion that is necessarily concomitant to the one primarily signified by the term (like “roof” signified the “foundation” because the presence of a roof necessarily entails the presence of foundation too). Only the two kinds of signification (i-ii), which stress an essential signification, are said to be taken into account in Logic, hence the only way in which the constitutive differentia could be said in §1.3.2 to signify the same notion as the genus it constituted (iii) is ruled out (cf. §1.3.4).

**(§1.3.4)** [*If it is...aforementioned ambiguity disappears*] The definition of the three kinds of signification in §1.3.3 allows to state that the way in which a differentia signify the notion of the genus that it constitutes is an extrinsic signification of necessary concomitance (iii), which is not taken into account in this context, since it is not an essential signification. The fact of ruling out the signification of type (iii) is extremely relevant, since otherwise necessary concomitants could be assumed as signifying the thing’s quiddity (cf. *Iṣārāt*, p. 227.4-8), so that “capable of laughing”, for instance, would signify the “rational animal” of which it is a proprium, because it necessarily follows to its differentia specifica, i.e. rational, with which it is coextensive in predication (i.e. everything capable of laughing is a rational animal and vice versa). Thus, the objection raised in §1.3.1 is answered, because the differentia “sensitive” and the genus “animal” do not signify primarily (i) one and the same notion: in fact, “sensitive” means “thing provided with sensitivity”, whereas “animal” signifies “sensitive animate body”.

**(§2.1)** [*As to what...its essential quality*] The differentia specifica is defined as the essential utterance that does not signify the quiddity (cf. S8) and is said to be apt to signify the essential quality (*ayyiyya*; cf. the aforementioned BERTOLACCI 2012a, pp. 301-304 and Commentary on chap. I.7, §3.1).

**(§2.2.1)** [*If someone said...they are both essential*] The possibility that the signification of the quiddity and that of the essential quality are not mutually exclusive is considered once again: Avicenna raises a possible objection with regard to the genus’ constitutive differentia, namely that, even if it does not signify the shared quiddity of the species of the genus (as demonstrated in §1.3.1-4), it can signify the shared quiddity of other differentiae (e.g. “sensitive” does not signify the shared quiddity of “bull”, “horse” and “man”, which are species of “animal”, but can signify the shared quiddity of “seeing”, “hearing” and “touching”). Avicenna’s answer concedes that the differentia, as well as the genus, is a shared essential for a number of things, though reassessing the distinction between genus and differentia on the basis of the fact that they signify, respectively, the quiddity and the essential quality of something, since it is impossible that what signifies the quiddity of one thing also signifies its essential quality and vice versa (cf. §2.2.2). On the other hand, the possibility that what signifies the quiddity of a thing A signifies the essential quality of a thing B, and that what signifies the essential quality of A signifies the quiddity of B is conceded: to come back to the example of “sensitive”, it is a differentia with respect to “body” which concurs to the

constitution of “animal”, but it is a genus with respect to “seeing”, “hearing” and “touching”, of which it signifies the shared quiddity (cf. chap. II.1, §3.4.1).

(§2.2.2) [*You must know...it is essential*] The fact that A is “essential” or “signifying the quiddity” is not considered in absolute, but always in relation to a specific thing B, and can also not hold valid in relation to a thing C; “colour”, for instance, is essential to “whiteness”, but is accidental to “body”. Nonetheless, if A is essential to B, it cannot be accidental to B, although it can be accidental to C, as well as if A signifies the quiddity of B it cannot signify its essential quality, although it can signify the essential quality of C.

(§2.2.3) [*As to the...mean this notion*] A further remark is made about the meaning of “signifying the essential quality”, namely that A signifies the essential quality of B if it signifies the constitutive notion that specifically belongs to B, i.e. A signifies the essential quality of B if A is the constitutive differentia of B. This also means that the so-called “genus’ differentia”, i.e. the differentia that constitutes the genus of a thing B, does not signify the essential quality of B, but rather signifies the essential quality of its genus (as in the case of “sensitive” with respect to “bull”, “horse” and so on, of which it constitutes the genus “animal”).

(§2.2.4) [*If someone doubts...after some chapters*] A possible objection to the view that “sensitive” signifies the quiddity of “seeing”, “hearing” and touching” is raised, namely that “seeing”, “hearing” and the like are species of “animal”, so that “animal” signifies their quiddity. This view is rejected in chap. II.4 (§2.1), where it is stated that the differentia is in no way a species of the genus. The reason why the genus cannot be predicated in answer to the question “what is it?” of “seeing”, “hearing” and the like is that the notion of “seeing”, “hearing” and the like does not encompass that of the genus: “seeing”, for instance, is “something capable of seeing”, and not “an animal capable of seeing”, even if it is necessary for it to be also an animal.

(§3) [*Since this has...thing is it?*] The equivalence between ‘signifying the quiddity’ and ‘predicated in answer to the question “what is it?”’ on the one hand, and between ‘signifying the essential quality’ and ‘predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it in its essence?”’ is stated explicitly. For the latter kind of predication Avicenna mentions two formulae that are substantially equivalent, namely predicated in answer to the question: “*what sort of thing is it in its essence?*” (*ayyu šay’in huwa fī dātīhi*) or to the question: “*which thing is it?*” (*ayyumā huwa*); cf. also ‘*Uyūn al-Ḥikma, Manṭiq*, p. 2.8, 12 and *Nağāt*, p. 13.15-14.3. The alternative expression provided, namely the question “*which thing is it?*” (*ayyumā huwa*), is attested in Fārābī, *Al-alfāz al-musta‘mala fī l-manṭiq*, p. 52.5-7.

(§4) [*As to the...called common accident*] The classification of essential utterances was achieved in §3, and §4 briefly recalls the sub-division of accidental utterances into *propria* and *common accidents*. This time, the distinction is based on their different extension in predication, since *propria* characterize specifically the individuals of one

species only, whereas common accidents can belong to individuals of more than one species.

(§5) [*Every universal essential...occurs not exclusively*] The final division of the simple universal utterance into Porphyry's five predicables, namely genus, species, differentia, proprium and common accident is completed. An important point is assessed here, namely that "genus", "species" and the like are terms that ought to be understood in relation to something. In other terms, A is not a genus (or a species, a differentia, a proprium, a common accident) in itself, but always with respect to an item B. Moreover, if A is a genus of B, it can also be a species of C as well and so on, which proves that the terms that express Porphyry's five predicables describe the relation that subsists between the predicate and its subject of predication (the point is also clarified in chap. II.4, §1).

[*Now we shall...of the philosophers*] As programmatically announced here, the structure and the themes of chapters I.9-14 and II.1-3 follow a traditional path, reliant for the most part on the arrangement of the exposition in Porphyry's *Isagoge*.

## Chapter I.9

(§1.1) [*We say that...called genus too*] The paragraph corresponds to Porph., *Isag.*, p. 1.18-2.10, which deals with the senses of the Greek term for genus (γένος). According to its first sense (1), the term either signified (1.a) a group of individuals that had in common the fact of descending from the same ancestor (the example provided in Porphyry's text is that of the Heraclids), or (1.b) the individuals' common ancestor or birthplace (both the senses mentioned by Porphyry are remotely Aristotle's: cf. *Met.* Δ28, 1024a29-36 and BARNES 2003, pp. 52-56). The philosophical sense of the term employed in Logic (2) was derived from these common senses of 'genus' because the logical genus as well is a sort of *origin* of the species subsumed below it<sup>23</sup>. In §1.1, Avicenna recalls the sense (1.a) with the example of "Alid" and "Egyptian", which denotes the group of individuals that share a common descent and origin, and the sense (1.b), namely that of the notion shared by a plurality of individuals, with the example of "Alī" with respect to the 'Alids and of "Egypt" with respect to the Egyptians. In a quite dubitative fashion (*wa-yušbihu aydan annahum kānū yusammūna* [...]), Avicenna adds to the senses of 'genus' mentioned in Porphyry's *Isagoge* two additional senses, namely that of (3) "crafts, arts", which are genera with respect to the individuals that share the mastery of them, and (4) the fact itself of sharing. Sense (3) mentioned by Avicenna might result from a misunderstanding of one of the other possible senses of 'genus' recorded in Alexandrian commentaries (Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 52.16-53.2; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 53.6-7; Ps.-Elias [David], *In Isag.*, p. 72.29-39), namely that 'genus' is also said of the subject of each discipline (τέχνη) with respect to the discipline itself.

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<sup>23</sup> On the idea that part of the philosophical terminology derives from the everyday language adapted to a different use, cf. Porph., *In Cat.*, p. 55.8-14, Dexipp., *In Cat.*, p. 6.10-13, which rely on the assumption that everyday language was established before the philosophical language (cf. also BARNES 2003, p. 56). Interestingly, the Alexandrian tradition hesitated with regard to the question in which of the three senses the term 'genus' was employed at first, to be subsequently adapted to the others; cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 53.12-23, commenting on the fact that Porphyry uses the adverb ἴσως ("perhaps", as in WARREN 1975, p. 29; "peut-être" in DE LIBERA AND SEGONDS 1998, p. 2; but cf. BARNES 2003, p. 4, translating: "no doubt") in *Isag.*, p. 2.11 when stating that the philosophical sense of "genus" was derived from the other two in virtue of a certain similarity. Ammonius must have assumed that the dubitative adverb was meant to smooth Porphyry's claim that the philosophical sense derived from the everyday language and not vice versa, hence he justified Porphyry's use of the adverb by claiming that it is doubtful which of the senses is prior, being also possible that the philosophical sense precedes the others. However, Ammonius might have misunderstood Porphyry's intention, since the adverb ἴσως might have been rather intended to soften the suggestion that the philosophical senses of "genus" derives from the others *in virtue of a certain analogy with them*. The doubtful point was not, in Porphyry's view, the fact that the philosophical sense of the term derived from the others, but rather the fact that it derived from the others in virtue of a certain similarity.

(§1.2) [*Since the notion...what is it?*] The logical genus was called in such a way in virtue of its analogy with the genus in both senses (1.a-b); more specifically, the logical genus shares with genera of type (1.a-b) the fact of being a unique notion related to several items that share it. The definition of logical genus as *predicated of many items differing in species in answer to “what is it?”* is Porphyry’s (*Isag.*, p. 2.14-17, based on Arist., *Top.*, A5, 102a31-35; on the background of this definition, BARNES 2003, pp. 63-77). The quotation might rely on the Arabic translation by Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī (p. 1060.14-19; cf. also the text of the MS Ambr. &105 sup. in BAFFIONI 2011, p. 55.3-5 and the lemmata in Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī*, p. 70.16-21 and 71.19-20), with some slight divergences.

(§2.1) [*Before we start...of the demonstration*] The paragraph introduces a digression on definition (*ḥadd*) and description (*rasm*) that does not correspond to any passage of Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. It is a digression traditionally inserted at this point of the dissertation on Porphyry’s description of “genus” in the Alexandrian commentaries (cf. e.g. Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 54.5-58.15 and Elias, *In Isag.*, 56.4-57.11); such a traditional use was arguably maintained in the Arabic lemmatic commentaries of the school of Baḡdād (see Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī*, pp. 69.17-70.14). In those commentators’ view, the digression was urged by Porphyry’s choice to use the verb “describe” (*Isag.*, p. 2.15: ὑπογράφοντες; Dimašqī’s translation: *rassamūhu*) to introduce the statement corresponding to the notion of “genus” instead of “define”, since this could imply a technical distinction between “definition” (ὄρος/ὀρισμός) and “description” (ὑπογραφή). Such a distinction was not fully thematized by Aristotle, who dealt in the *Topics* only with definition (Arist., *Top.*, A5, 101b38-102a2); seemingly, it was elaborated by the Peripatetic tradition, and is attested in Alexander’s commentary on the *Topics* (*In Top.* p. 421.16-34), which is likely to be the source of the Alexandrian commentaries. Porphyry as well was acquainted with the distinction, even if he did not deal with it in the *Isagoge*, and must have talked about it in his lost commentary on the *Categories* (Porph. *Ad Gedal.* fr. 51 = *Simpl.*, *In Cat.*, p. 30.5-15)<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Such a distinction in Late Antique commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* was fundamental, since the notion of “genus” was considered as impossible to define in a proper sense. Among the reasons for such a position, there is an aporia concerning the impossibility to provide a definition of “genus” that was discussed in the school of Alexandria (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 55.8-56.1; David, *In Isag.*, p. 131.12-19). The problem, as exposed in Ammonius’ commentary, can be resumed as follows: if a definition is composed out of the proximate genus and the differentia specifica, then not every genus can have a definition, since there is no genus more general than the highest genera, namely the categories. Hence, it can be concluded that the notion of “genus” cannot have a definition, which accounts for Porphyry’s choice of the verb “to describe” to introduce the description of the genus. Arguably, the subject was a debated one: a critical answer to Ammonius can be spotted in David’s commentary, in which it is argued against the idea that the genus cannot be defined because of the lack of a genus of the highest genera that even the other predicates, with respect of which there are more general notions that can play the role of genera for them, are just described and not defined. David contends that this aporia represents the reason why the genus

(§2.2) [*We say that...quiddity is realized*] The passage should be read against the background of the distinction between simple and composite quiddities, i.e. between the quiddities of immaterial forms and material objects (cf. chap. I.5, §5.1). The essence of simple notions, which does not result from composition, is signified by a name (*ism*). The essence of simple notions can only be conveyed by an utterance, which is either its name or an utterance that signifies that notion by means of accidents that attach to it, without signifying the essence. The essence of composite notions, on the other hand, is signified by their definition: this is the case of all material items and beings. Noteworthy, the distinction between the signification of a simple notion by means of a name and that of a composite notion by means of a statement (either a definition or a description) was already adopted in the school of Alexandria (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 54.10-15), although with a rather different intent: Ammonius, for instance, held that everything is, at one and the same time, one and many (ἓν καὶ πολλά) under different respects, so that it is possible to signify something both by means of a simple name (ὄνομα), in consideration of its being one, and by means of a statement (λόγος), in consideration of its being composed of parts (πολυμερές). An instance is that of the man, that can either be signified as a whole by its name “man”, or by its definition “rational animal” and its descriptions, such as “animal capable of laughing” and so on, which underline its multiple features. The difference with Avicenna’s account lies in that Ammonius’ theory of the signification by means of a name and a statement does not presupposes a distinction of two different kinds of items defined (as Avicenna seemingly does), but rather of two different ways of considering one and the same kind of items.

(§2.3) [*Since the most...a “rational animal”*] The definition of a thing A is formed by its proximate genus and the differentia that divides it to constitute a species subsumed under it. Genera and differentiae that are more general than the proximate ones are not themselves the components of a valid definition, though their notions are presupposed by the notions of the proximate genus and the constitutive differentia of the items defined: the definition of “man”, which is “rational animal”, presupposes that the man is also a body, and also a substance, which are genera of genera of its proximate genus “animal”. This is presumably what Avicenna means when stating that the genera of genera and the differentiae of differentiae are included in the genus and the differentia assumed in the definition.

[*If the genus...case of differentia*] The genus or the differentia assumed in a definition might hypothetically happen to have no name to design them; in such a case, they can be replaced by their definitions.

[*The definition in general...signifies the parts*] The two types of signification taken into account in Logic described in chap. I.8, §1.3.3 are at stake in the passage. The definition is said to signify either the complex resulting from both genus and differentia

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cannot be said to be defined in a technical sense. For the same aporia in the Arabic Peripatetic tradition solved differently, see Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Isāgūḡī*, pp. 69.17-70.2.

by a signification of correspondence (type i), or the genus and the differentia singularly taken by a signification of implication (type ii). “Rational animal”, for instance, signifies the animal, resulting from both the genus “animal” and the differentia “rational”, by a signification of correspondence, but it also signifies “rational” and “animal” alone by a signification of implication.

(§2.4) [*As to what...mentioning the animal*] A description is subject to less strict rules of composition than a definition: for instance, there is no prescription concerning which genus should be assumed in it, for it needs not to be the proximate one. The main distinctive feature of the description is that it denotes a notion through its accidental elements (*propria* and common accidents).

(§3.1.1) [*Predicated in the...to the genus*] After the digression in §2, likely due to the influence of the previous exegetical tradition on the *Isagoge*, Avicenna’s exposition runs again parallel to Porphyry’s exposition. The definitory statement of ‘genus’ (*predicated of many items differing in species in answer to “what is it?”*; cf. §1.2) is taken into exam, in order to ascertain whether it allows to distinguish the genus from the other four predicables (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 2.22-3.10). The clause “predicated of many items” in the definitory statement plays the role of the proximate genus, which is shared by all the five universal utterances (cf. S9). The genus is distinguished from the other predicables by the specification that the items “differ in species”, which differentiates the genus from the species and the proprium (cf. S9), and by the specification of the way in which it is predicated of its subjects, i.e. in answer to “what is it?”, that distinguishes the genus from the differentia and the common accident, which share with the genus the fact of being predicated of many items that differ specifically.

[*By “differing in species”...be a genus*] It is a hint to the fact that the term “species” also meant, in origin, the thing’s essence or form: the Greek term employed for the logical species was εἶδος, which was equally employed with the same meaning as *māhiyya* and *ṣūra* (cf. chap. I.10, §1.1, based on Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 3.22-4.1). This reference is made in order to clarify that the definition proves able to distinguish the predicable from the other four regardless of the meaning of *naw*’ assumed in the definition of ‘genus’.


[*Understand from our...as you learned*] Avicenna recalls the fact that the genus signifies the quiddity shared by several species, as stated in chap. I.8, §1.1-2.

(§3.1.2) [*The differentia is...but in number*] The differentia is distinguished from the genus because it is not predicated in answer to “what is it?” (cf. S9). The species *qua* species is not predicated in the same way as the genus, being rather its subject of predication. However, the term “species” applies to species of different degrees of generality, and not exclusively to the ultimate ones that are predicated only of the individuals. These intermediate species are species with respect to their genera, which are predicated of them, and genera with respect to the species that are less general than them. This is the reason why Avicenna insists on the expression “inasmuch as it is such”

(*min ḥaytu huwa ka-dālika*), and specifies that the species is not, *inasmuch as it is a species* (*min ḥaytu huwa naw'*), predicated the way the genus is. The quick reference to relative items is due to the fact that, as better explained in §4.2, the relation between “genus” and “species” works as a relation between relative terms, since the one is included in the notion and in the definition of the other. This holds for intermediate species, that are defined in terms of their being subsumed under a genus; ultimate species, on the other hand, are defined as predicated of many items that differ numerically in the “what is it?”, so that they do not include the notion of ‘genus’ in their definitions (cf. S9).

(§3.2) [*As to the...as its name*] Accidental features, disregarding whether they are predicated of items specifically or numerically different, are distinguished from genera because they are not predicated in answer to “what is it?”. Two conditions must be fulfilled in order to state that the definition of “genus” provided succeeds in signifying the genus, namely (a) that no other predicate shares it, and (b) that it holds true for every genus, i.e. that the definition is coextensive with the definiendum, having neither a greater (a) nor a lesser (b) extent of predication.

S9. The definition of ‘genus’ compared to that of the other predicates



(§4.1) [*Sometimes there occur...vain and absurd*] The paragraph deals with an aporia concerning the definition of genus that can be resumed as follows: in the statement that defines the notion of “genus”, the role of the genus is played by the clause “predicated of many items”; it follows that “predicated of many items” is a genus of the genus, which entails that the genus is predicated of itself, which is an odd outcome. The absurd argument can be represented in a syllogistic form:

“genus” is “predicated of many items”  
 “predicated of many items” is a genus [with respect to “genus”]  
 -----  
 ∴ “genus” is a genus

Avicenna's answer presupposes a distinction of two senses of "genus" (which are presented in chap. I.12), namely (i) the notion that happens to be a genus with respect to another (e.g. "predicated of many" with respect to "genus", or "animal" with respect to "man") and (ii) the fact itself of being a genus, i.e. the generality, which is the relation of a thing A to its species B (e.g. the fact that "predicated of many" is a *genus* of the genus, or the fact that "animal" is a *genus* of "man"). Notion (i) corresponds to what is named "natural genus" in chap. I.12, whereas (ii) corresponds to "logical genus", being the sense in which the term "genus" is employed in Logic. If "predicated of many" is a genus in sense (ii) with respect to "genus", then it is impossible to assume genus in sense (ii) instead of "predicated of many" in the definition of the genus, so that it is predicated of it. Likewise, it would be incorrect to replace "animal" in the definition of "man" with the term "genus", just because "animal" is a genus of "man". Genus in sense (ii) denotes an accidental condition of a notion A with respect to a notion B, so that "genus" in the statement "'predicated of many' is a genus of 'genus'" is predicated of "predicated of many" as an accident. The purpose of Avicenna's statement that he does not exclude that the most specific notion can be predicated of the most general, though not of the whole of it, is to precise that the reason why the predication of "genus" in the statement (1) "'predicated of many' is a *genus* of 'genus'" is different from the predication (2) "'*genus*' is predicated of many" is not that in statement (1) a most specific notion is predicated of a more general one, but rather that (1) is an accidental predication, whereas (2) is an essential one, for "predicated of many" is constitutive of the notion of "genus". Terms like 'genus', 'species', 'differentia', 'proprium' and 'common accident' are not synonymously predicated of their subjects, and their predication is not transitive (i.e. it does not hold true for the subject's subjects as well), hence the syllogism represented before is not valid, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises: the notion of "genus" is not a genus because "predicated of many" is so in relation to it. For similar arguments, cf. Porph., *In Cat.*, 80.32-81.22; Dexipp., *In Cat.* 26.13-27.2; Simpl., *In Cat.*, 52.9-18; Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 31.2-12; Philop., *In Cat.*, pp. 38.28-39.15; Olympiod., *In Cat.*, p. 50.12-22; see HOFFMANN AND LUNA 2001, pp. 397-426.

(§4.2.1) [Among the things...is a clarification] The paragraph deals with a Late Antique aporia (cf. Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 58.20-28) with which the Arabic Peripatetic tradition was acquainted (cf. Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūḡī*, pp. 78.22-79.15). The aporia regards the assumption of the term "species" in the definition of the genus (*Isag.*, p. 2.14-17: "predicated of many items differing in *species* in answer to 'what is it?'" ) and, vice versa, the assumption of the term "genus" in the definition of the species (*Isag.*, p. 4.2-4: "subsumed under the genus"). The problem is that, if every newly acquired knowledge must be grounded in a previously acquired one (cf. chap. I.3, §1), in case one of the two terms is ignored, then, neither of the two can be known, since their definition both require a previous knowledge of the other notion. The Alexandrian tradition referred to it as "reciprocal denotation" (διάλληλος δεῖξις) and ruled it out of the domain of the valid ways to attain knowledge (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 75.15-25).

(§4.2.2) [*An answer has...to the other*] Avicenna mentions an attempt at solving the problem, which consists in considering the genus and the species as to relative notions that cannot but be defined the one in terms of the other; this is Porphyry's own suggestion in *Isag.*, p. 4.4-9 (cf. also Avicenna's *Risāla fī l-Ḥudūd*, pp. 77.17-78.2, where the view that genus and species are relative terms is explicitly ascribed to Porphyry), grounded in Aristotle's claim that, even if, generally speaking, defining one opposite by another is a mistake, some terms cannot but be defined in such a manner, and each one of the terms at stake should be assumed in the definition of the other (*Top. Z4*, 142a26-31). Porphyry's statement was interpreted by the commentators as its solution to the problem, because relative terms represent an exception to the general rule of avoiding the circular explanation (διάλληλος δεῖξις) as a way to define two or more notions (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 74.4-76.10; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 62.9-19 and David, *In Isag.*, p. 132.19-27, where genus and species are explicitly said to be "relative", πρὸς τι; cf. also Arethas, *Scholia in Isag.*, p. 57.6-10 and 59.1-12). The Arabic Peripatetic tradition was acquainted with such an argument, reported in Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāghūgī*, p. 79.6-15, where genus and species are said to be relative (*mutadāyifa*), which justifies that they are defined in a mutually dependent way.

(§4.2.3) [*This answer increases...achieve any result*] The purpose in the paragraph is demonstrating that Porphyry's attempt to avoid the problem of a circular definition of genus and species (exposed in §4.2.2) is not a valid solution from a formal point of view. Porphyry's solution is not able to answer the question how the one is known by means of the other when they are both ignored at the same time, for it does not invalidate any of the premises of the syllogism that demonstrates that the two predicables cannot be known the one by means of the other when they are both unknown. The "syllogism of the doubt" (*qiyās al-šakk*) to which Avicenna alludes might be reconstructed as follows:

If the genus and the species are both ignored, the notification of the other by means of it is a notification of something unknown by means of something else unknown;

The notification of something unknown by means of something else also unknown is not a clarification;

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∴ The notification of the genus by means of the species and vice versa when they are both ignored is not a clarification.

Porphyry's solution is not sufficient because it does not even attempt at denying one of the premises of this syllogism: it does not, for instance, claim that the genus and the species are never ignored at the same time (thus invalidating the first premise), nor it is possible for him to deny that the attempt at knowing the one by means of the other when they are both ignored is an attempt at knowing the unknown through the unknown or that this attempt does not produce a clarification (thus invalidating the second premise). Hence, Porphyry's argument does not prove false the conclusion that the attempt at knowing the one predicate through the other when they are both ignored is unsuccessful.

(§4.2.4) [*A huge mistake...is known too*] If Porphyry’s solution was rejected at §4.2.3 based on a formal argument, in the paragraph at stake the solution is rejected on the basis of a doctrinal point. The mistake reproached to Porphyry is a confusion between what is known at the same time as something else and that by which something else is known. In other words, Porphyry allegedly failed to distinguish that whose knowledge is contemporary to the knowledge of something else and that whose knowledge is prior to the knowledge of something else, as it should be in the case of the genus and the species (cf. §4.2.5 and *Mašriqiyyūn*, *Maṭīq*, p. 42.16).

(§4.2.5) [*Relative terms are...the same time*] The mistake ascribed to Porphyry is that of treating the constitutive elements of the thing’s quiddity, which are parts of its definition and concur to the notification of the thing after having been previously acquired, as relative terms that are known at one and the same moment. In fact, the knowledge of the parts out of which a definition is composed is prior to the knowledge of the whole thing. Moreover, the definition itself of relative terms such as “brother” is not circular, i.e. it is not “someone who has a brother”, being rather: “someone whose father is also the father of another man”; at a second stage, the specification that the other man is said to be a “brother” of the first one can be added to this definition, but the definition itself avoids circularity. This is the subtlety (*talatṭuf*) alluded to by Avicenna and also recalled in *Išārāt*, pp. 264.6-265.13, where Avicenna also explicitly refers to the *Šifā’*. For this reason, Avicenna offers an alternative definition of “genus” in §4.2.6 which does not encompass the term “species”, substituted by “essence/quiddity”.

(§4.2.6) [*Since it has...in another place*] A new definition of “genus” is provided, in which the term “species” is replaced by its synonyms “quiddity, essence” (cf. chap. I.10, §1.1), so that the definition of the genus is complete without incurring a circular explanation of the genus and the species. Noteworthy, the definition of “genus” provided in other works directly avoids the mention of “species”, which is replaced by “nature” (*tabī’a*), “essence” (*ḥaqīqa*): it is, for instance, the case of the *K. al-Hidāya*, p. 66.6-7 (composed during Avicenna’s imprisonment in the fortress of Fardaḡān, more or less contemporary to the composition of the Logic of the *Šifā’*; cf. GUTAS 2014, p. 419), where the genus is defined as predicated of many items differing in their natures and essences in a shared way, and the later *Išārāt*, p. 247.4-5, where the genus is defined as predicated of items that differ in their essences in answer to “what is it?”. In all likelihood, this redefinition of the genus is the one alluded to in Avicenna’s *Autobiography*, pp. 20.7-22.4, where Avicenna recalls an episode of the early phase of his philosophical education under the guide of Al-Nātīlī, who brought to Avicenna’s attention the traditional definition of the genus, i.e. predicated of many items differing in species in answer to “what is it?”, and was reportedly astonished by Avicenna’s own ascertainment of the definition.

## Chapter I.10

(§1.1) [*“Species” as well...are so “species”*] The first meaning of the term “species” in Greek (εἶδος) was that of “essence, form”, and the sense of logical species derived from this first one at a second stage and applied to the quiddities of the items subsumed under a genus (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 3.22-4.4). The first sense of the term in Greek was employed in chap. I.9, §4.2.6 to redefine the notion of genus without including in it a mention of the species, in order to avoid a circular explanation of the two; it was also alluded to in chap. I.9, §3.1.1. The philosophical adaptation of a more common term to design the logical species is analogous to that of the name “genus” (cf. chap. I.9, §1.1).

(§1.2.1) [*As the word...the second notion*] The sense of “species” in Logic is twofold, including a more general and a more specific sense. The one that is qualified as more general (henceforth: species<sub>1</sub>) is that of the species defined in relation to its genus (cf. chap. I.9, §4.2 for the problems due to the presence of the genus in the species’ definition and vice versa): it is the case of the species considered insofar as it is subsumed under the genus and insofar as it is its subject of predication (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.9-11: “they also define the species as follows: the species is what is ranged under the genus and that of which the genus is predicated in the ‘what is it?’”). The most specific sense (henceforth: species<sub>2</sub>) is that of the species considered inasmuch as it is predicated of several individuals that do not differ essentially, but numerically, in answer to “what is it?” (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.11-14).

(§1.2.2) [*Between the two...species above it*] The two notions of ‘species’ defined in §1.2.1 are said to differ. The notion of the species<sub>1</sub>, that was said to be “more general” than the species<sub>2</sub>, is demonstrated not to be a genus of the other; the demonstration runs as follows:

The species<sub>1</sub> can be removed in estimation from the species<sub>2</sub>;  
What can be removed in estimation is not essential;

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∴ The species<sub>1</sub> is not essential to the species<sub>2</sub>.


The first premise of the reasoning, namely that it is possible to represent a species according to the notion of the species<sub>2</sub> which is not also a species according to the notion of the species<sub>1</sub>, is demonstrated by the example of the point, which is an indivisible, highest substance (on the indivisibility of the point, cf. also Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Hurūf*, pp. 103.19-104.4): an analogy is intended between the point and a highest species (which is not, therefore, subsumed under a more general universal) that is not divided by differentiae, i.e. that is not predicated of particular species subsumed under it: this precision is meant to specify that the species is not predicated of items that differ specifically (which demonstrates that not all subordination can be understood as a species-genus relation: cf. THOM 2016, pp. 152-153). Such a species would be a

species<sub>2</sub>, without being considered as subsumed under a genus (hence, without being considered as a species<sub>1</sub>). Given that it is possible to figure out a species<sub>2</sub> that is not also a species<sub>1</sub>, the notion of species<sub>1</sub> is not essential to the notion of the species<sub>2</sub>. On the second premise of the reasoning, cf. chap. I.6, §2.2, where essential features are said to be inseparable from their subjects. If the species<sub>1</sub> is not essential to the species<sub>2</sub>, it necessarily follows that it cannot be a genus for it.

(§1.3) [*Then I have...the relative species*] The paragraph deals with the question concerning which of the two senses of “species” described in §1.2.1 precedes the other; Avicenna admits that it is a difficult question to answer, although he is more inclined to think that the term was first employed in Logic to designate the species as subsumed under a genus (i.e. species<sub>1</sub>).

(§2.1.1) [*However we must...completely and correctly*] In this paragraph and in the following one two possible classifications of essential utterances are proposed, that differ with regard to the classification of the species. According to the division proposed in §2.1.1 (cf. S10), the first species brought out by the division is the species considered insofar as it is predicated of many individuals numerically different; the intermediate species, on the other hand, is brought out at a second stage, by a subdivision of the class of predicates that are predicated of many items specifically different in answer to “what is it?”. The notion of species<sub>1</sub>, i.e. of the species subsumed under the genus and of which the genus is predicated in the “what is it?”, is only partially represented (i.e. only the part of the notion concerning the fact that a genus is predicated of it in answer to “what is it?”).


**S10.** Division that leads to species<sub>2</sub> at first, and to species<sub>1</sub> at a second stage



(§2.1.2) [*It might also...becomes a genus*] An alternative possibility to classify essential predicates is briefly sketched (cf. S11 below) and is better described at §3. This

second division brings out the species in the sense that it is a universal subsumed under a genus, then further divided into the intermediate species (that can be predicated of items that differ in species, just like a genus) and the ultimate one (that is predicated of items only numerically – and not specifically – different).

**S11.** Division that leads to species<sub>1</sub> at first, and to species<sub>2</sub> at a second stage



(§2.1.3) [*But if you...presented to you*] The division presented at §2.1.1 and sketched in S10 is the one that should be adopted if the main focus of the classification is represented by the universals in relation to their subjects of predication. The second division, presented at §2.1.2 and reproduced in S11, on the other hand, focuses on the reciprocal relations between the predicables, like the fact of being more general or more specific the one with respect to the other and the like.

(§2.2) [*The division into...taken into account*] The classification reproduced at §2.1.1 and in S10 is valid, despite the fact that it fails to represent all the aspects of the notion of species.

(§3) [*If we choose...in this way*] The paragraph illustrates in more detail the classification that was already alluded to at §2.1.2 (cf. S11 above).

(§4.1) [*The commonly-known...namely the proprium*] By “commonly-known division” Avicenna refers to the classification of the utterances provided in Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (pp. 2.17-3.19), where it serves as a proof of the validity of the description of genus (cf. its graphic representation in S9). Subsequently, the classification had a long tradition within the commentaries of the school of Alexandria (see Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 60.10-61.16). The traditional classification is said to be closer to the classification in S10 because they both focus on the relation between the predicables and their subjects of predication, classifying the predicables on the basis of the way they are predicated of them.

(§4.2) [*This division of...an ultimate species*] The passage presents some faults of the traditional classification (S9). The first problem is that the species according to the relative notion is not represented in the division, since the species is classified as predicated of many items differing in number in answer to “what is it?”, so that its relation to the genus is unexpressed. In Avicenna’s classification in S10, on the other hand, this aspect is at least partially included. The second problem with the classification in S9 regards the *differentia specifica* which, according to the traditional definition, is predicated of many items differing in species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?”, but Avicenna’s objection – developed in a less cryptical manner in *Šifā’, Ğadal* I.6, pp. 56.1-57.3 – is that not every *differentia* is predicated in actuality of more items specifically different, although it has the potentiality to be so. The traditional definition should be assumed without understanding “predicated of many items” as if it meant predicated *in actuality* of many items; Avicenna’s definition of “universal”, in fact, does not require that a universal utterance is predicated of many items in actuality, but rather that it has the potentiality to be predicated of them (cf. chap. I.5, §2.1-2).

## Chapter I.11

(§1.1) [*Now let us...to explain it*] The definition of “species” provided in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.11-12 (“predicated of many items that differ in number in answer to ‘what is it?’”) is at stake. This statement defines the species without considering its relation to the genus, but rather focusing on its relation to its subjects of predication. The clause “predicated of many items differing in number” succeeds in distinguishing the species from the genus and the common accident, which are predicated of many items that differ in species (cf. S9). According to the traditional classification, the clause also distinguishes the species from the differentia, which is defined as predicate of many items that differ in species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?”; in Avicenna’s view, however, not all the differentiae are predicated of several items that differ specifically. “Rational” is one of the examples of differentia predicated of many items that differ specifically in Porphyry’s tree (Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 4.21-5.1), where “rational animal” is a genus for the man, that is further constituted by the differentia “mortal”. In Avicenna’s view, on the other hand, angels and deities are ‘rational’ just in an equivocal way (as stated in §4.3). Hence, “rational animal” is already a complete definition of “man” and not just its genus, so that there is no need of introducing “mortal” as a divisive differentia of man. Thus, according to Avicenna the species is not distinguished from the differentia inasmuch as it is predicated of many items that differ numerically, since the constitutive differentiae of the species are so too; they are rather distinguished from them in virtue of the way they are predicated (cf. §1.2).

(§1.2) [*His clause in...most special species*] The section of the definition of “species” that conveys its predication in answer to “what is it?” distinguishes it from both the differentia and the proprium, which are predicated in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” (cf. S9). To conclude, given that the traditional description of “species” proved to distinguish successfully the species from the other predicables (§1.1-2), the description is judged to be valid.

(§2.1) [*As to the...what is it?*] The paragraph introduces the exam of the other descriptions of “species” provided in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.9-11, which present the species with respect to its relation to the genus under which it is subsumed, which is predicated of it in answer to “what is it?”. Noteworthy, Porphyry did not draw a neat distinction between those that are presented by Avicenna as two different definitions (one presented in §2.2 and the other in §2.3): in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.2-14 the species is defined at first as that which is subsumed under a genus, and finally as *what is subsumed under the genus and of which the genus is predicated in answer to “what is it?”* (εἰδός ἐστι τὸ ταπτόμενον ὑπὸ τὸ γένος καὶ οὗ τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται), in what seems to be also possibly meant as a unique definition, alternative to the one representing the species as predicated of many items that differ numerically in answer to “what is it?”. The scission of this definition into two is witnessed in the Alexandrian commentaries

(cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 70.20-71.7; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 61.22-35; David, *In Isag.*, p. 144.7-15).

(§2.2) [*It is necessary...notion is meant*] The description of the species as “ranged under the genus” (*murattab tahta l-ğins*) proves to be able to apply exclusively to the species only under certain conditions, namely that it applies to universals only (so that individuals are ruled out) and that one understands from this clause not only that the species has a minor extension in predication than the genus, since other predicables are such, but also that it is subsumed under the genus in such a way that the genus is included in its notion, for this condition rules out the differentia and the proprium (cf. chap. II.4, §2.1). However, these conditions are not conveyed by the very notion of this description, so that the description somehow fails to single out the species among the five predicables.

(§2.3) [*As to the...of the genus*] The description of the species as that of which the genus is predicated in the “what is it?” (*min tarīqi mā huwa*) is at stake. Avicenna’s hint “if by predicated in the ‘what is it?’ is meant what we ourselves ascertained” points at Avicenna’s analysis of the types of essential predication (cf. the distinction of a predication *min tarīqi mā huwa* and one *fī ġawābi mā huwa* in chap. II.1, §3.4.2; see also DI VINCENZO 2015).

(§3) [*He who defined...for the definitions*] Avicenna likely refers to Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī: see *Kitāb Īsāğūğī ay al-Madḥal*, p. 120.14-15 and *Risāla šudira bihā al-Kitāb*, p. 229.2-4, where the genus is described as the most common of the two predicated in the “what is it?”, and the species as the most specific one. The only small correction suggested by Avicenna to Fārābī’s definition is the addition of the mention of “universal” in the definition.

(§4.1) [*Now let us...is a species*] The paragraph introduces the so-called “Porphyry’s tree” (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.21-30), in which genera and species are arranged according to their degree of generality or speciality. There are the highest genera (i.e. the ten categories), which are not subsumed on their turn under a genus, so that they can never be considered also as species; intermediate genera and species, which are at the same time subsumed under more general genera and above more specific species, so that they can be both genera and species with respect to different subjects of predication; lowest genera and species, that have no other species subsumed below them, and are predicated of the individuals. This arrangement is exemplified in §4.2.1 employing as a test-case the species and the genera arranged within the category of substance (the example is the one provided in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.21-30).

(§4.2.1) [*The commonly-known...the intermediate species*] The paragraph is almost entirely a literal quotation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 4.21-30; despite some minor divergences in the lexical choices, Avicenna’s quotes might be based on the Arabic translation by Dimašqī (p. 1065.2-5; cf. Tab. 3), interrupted here and there by Avicenna’s explanations. For at least two passages an alternative translation is attested by MS Paris,

BnF ar. 2346, namely an Arabic translation by Ḥunayn Ibn Ishāq from the Syriac translation of Athanasius (cf. Tab. 4). Ḥunayn’s translation for this part is more correct than Dimašqī’s, since the latter omits a bit of the Greek text; it is interesting to notice that the bits that lack in Dimašqī’s translation are also absent in Avicenna’s quote. The instance of highest genus is substance, under which genera like “body”, “animate body”, “animal”, “rational animal” and “man” are subsumed; each of these genera can be considered both as a genus with respect to the species subsumed under it (e.g. “animate body” is a genus of “animal”) and as a species with respect to the genera that are ranged above it (e.g. “animate body” is a species of “body”). It should be remarked that the fact that “rational animal” is here stated to be a genus of both “man” and “angel”, rather than the definition of “man”, as Avicenna considered (cf. §1.1 and §4.3), is here reported as a mere quotation of Porphyry’s example, which does not imply any endorsement on Avicenna’s part.

Tab. 3

Porphyry’s <i>Isagoge</i>	Translation by Dimašqī	Avicenna’s quote
[4.21-25] Γινέσθω δὲ ἐπὶ μιᾶς κατηγορίας σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον. ἢ οὐσία ἔστι μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ γένος, ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην ἐστὶν σῶμα, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον σῶμα, ὑφ’ ὃ τὸ ζῷον, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν ζῷον, ὑφ’ ὃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι.	[1064.21-1065.1] وينبغي أن نوضح ما نحن ذاكروه في مقولة واحدة فنقول: إن الجواهر هو أيضا جنس، وتحتته: الجسم، وتحت الجسم: الجسم المنتفس، وتحت الجسم المنتفس: الحي، وتحت الحي: الحي الناطق، وتحت هذا: الإنسان، وتحت الإنسان: سقراط وفلاطن والجزئيون من الناس.	والمثال المشهور لهذا هو من مقولة الجواهر؛ فإن الجواهر جنس لا جنس فوقه، وتحتته الجسم، وتحت الجسم الجسم ذو النفس؛ وتحت الجسم ذي النفس الحيوان، وتحت الحيوان الحيوان الناطق، وتحت الحيوان الناطق الإنسان، وتحت الإنسان زيد وعمرو، فزيد وعمرو وأشكالها هي الأشخاص.
[4.26-28] τὸ δὲ σῶμα εἶδος μὲν τῆς οὐσίας, γένος δὲ τοῦ ἔμψυχου σώματος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα εἶδος μὲν τοῦ σώματος, γένος δὲ τοῦ ζώου	[1065.2-4] فأما الجسم فنوع للجواهر، وجنس للجسم المنتفس والجسم <sup>25</sup> المنتفس نوع للجسم وجنس للحي	فإن الجسم نوع الجواهر وجنس للجسم ذي النفس، والجسم ذو النفس نوع الجسم وجنس الحي
[4.28-29] πάλιν δὲ τὸ ζῷον εἶδος μὲν τοῦ ἔμψυχου σώματος, γένος δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου	[1065.4] والحي أيضا نوع للجسم المنتفس وجنس للحي الناطق	والحي نوع الجسم ذي النفس وجنس للحي الناطق
[4.29-30] τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον εἶδος μὲν τοῦ ζώου, γένος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου	[1065.4-5] والحي الناطق نوع للحي وجنس للإنسان	والحي الناطق نوع الحي وجنس الإنسان

<sup>25</sup> Badawi: *wa-l-ḡinsu*; but MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 149<sup>v</sup>: *wa-l-ḡismu*.

Tab. 4

Porphyry's <i>Isagoge</i>	Translation by Dimašqī	Translation by Ḥunayn from the Syriac translation by Athanasius	Avicenna's quote
[4.25] ἀλλὰ τούτων ἡ μὲν οὐσία τὸ γενικώτατον καὶ ὁ μόνον γένος	[1065.1-2] ولكن الجوهر من هذه الأشياء هو جنس الأجناس [om. καὶ ὁ μόνον γένος]	[MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 149 <sup>v</sup> = 1065, n. 1] ولكن الجوهر من هذه الأشياء هو جنس الأجناس و جنس فقط	والجوهر هو جنس الأجناس
[4.26] ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος τὸ εἰδικώτατον καὶ ὁ μόνον εἶδος	[1065.2] والإنسان هو نوع الأنواع [om. καὶ ὁ μόνον εἶδος]	[MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 149 <sup>v</sup> = 1065, n. 1] والإنسان هو نوع الأنواع و نوع فقط	والإنسان هو نوع الأنواع

(§4.2.2) [*Substance is the...will reflect later*] The paragraph contains some specifications on the example provided at §4.2.1. To resume, “substance” is the genus that cannot be considered as a species in any way, since is it not subsumed under any other higher genus predicated of it; “man” is the lowest species, predicated of its individuals; the other genera and species ranged between these two extremes of Porphyry’s tree are said to be intermediate genera and species.

(§4.3) [*As to this...and not-man*] The division quoted at §4.2.1 is criticised, although its explicative validity is held valid. The major problem is the position of angels and divine entities within Porphyry’s tree. “Rational animal” is a genus for the man, that is further constituted by the differentia “mortal”. Hence, in Porphyry’s view, “rational animal” is a genus both for the man and the deity, then the two species are differentiated because the man is a *mortal* rational animal, whereas the deity is an *immortal* rational animal, as the Greek commentators of the school of Alexandria held (see, e.g., Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 70.13-20 and Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 63.25-34; on the same point, cf. also Porph., *Isag.*, p. 10.9-14). Noteworthy, the Arabic tradition sensed a possible theological issue entailed by Porphyry’s definition of deity as an immortal rational animal: if this definition were to be applied to God and the angels, it would lead to affirm their corporeality, which was problematic both from a Christian and an Islamic perspective. Different reactions to the definition are recorded. The Arabic commentators from the school of Baḡdād (see e.g. Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr K. Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 87.8-12), though maintaining the division of “rational animal” by the differentiae of “mortal” and “immortal”, claimed that the “rational immortal animal” is the species of the *celestial bodies*, specifying that God cannot be said to be a body (as being a rational immortal animal would imply). Avicenna copes with the same issue in the passage at stake from a different standpoint, and states that the deity (or the *angel*, as he and some commentators read) may be said to be rational just in an equivocal way: stating that the

angel is a rational animal would also imply considering it as an animate body, but, analogously, the angel can be said to be so only equivocally. Accordingly, he believes that “rational animal” is already a complete definition of “man” and not just its genus, concluding that there is no need of introducing “mortal” as a divisive differentia of man.

## Chapter I.12

(§1.1) [It became customary...is something else] Avicenna refers to two triplets of notions that are presented as traditional (*qad ġarat al-‘āda*, “it became customary”), the first one (i) being the tripartition of universals into *natural* (*ṭabī‘ī*), *logical* (*manṭiqī*) and *intellectual* (*‘aqlī*), and the second (ii) the tripartition into *before the multiplicity* (*qabla l-kaṭrati*), *in the multiplicity* (*fī l-kaṭrati*) and *after the multiplicity* (*ba‘da l-kaṭrati*). Tripartition (ii) of the universal is indeed traditional, and dates back at least to the commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* of the school of Alexandria: see Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 41.10-42.26; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 48.15-30; David, *In Isag.*, p. 113.11-29; Ps.-Elias [David], *In Isag.*, pp. 68.28-69.21; cf. also Arethas, *Scholia in Porph. Isag.*, 21.14-29 (cf. LLOYD 1990, p. 67; DE LIBERA AND SEGONDS 1998, pp. LXXV-XCII; HOFFMANN AND LUNA 2001, pp. 719-812; CHIARADONNA 2004, p. 3 and n. 1-2), and was an object of study among Baġdād Peripatetics too: see Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūġī*, p. 54.1-14; cf. also Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī, *Maqāla fī tabyīn wuġūd al-umūr al-‘āmmiyya*, p. 154.17-20. Tripartition (i) as well might have its remote origins in the commentaries produced in the school of Alexandria: Ammonius’ commentary on the *Isagoge* occasionally mentions a *natural genus* (γένος φυσικόν) and an *intellectual* one (έννοηματικόν); a distinction between a *logical genus* (γένος λογικόν) and a natural one based on the fact that the natural genus signifies the thing’s essence, whereas the logical one signifies the thing’s relation with something else is reported in Arethas’ *scholia* (Arethas, *Scholia in Porph. Isag.*, 37.38-36: διττόν ἐστι τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ φωναί, τὸ μὲν λογικόν, ὃ τῆς σχέσεώς ἐστι σημαντικόν, τὸ δὲ φυσικόν, ὃ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν [...]), that largely rely upon the commentaries produced in the school of Alexandria (for the hypothesis of a dependence of Arethas on David’s commentaries, cf. RASHED 2005, pp. 57-73). An analogous distinction between logical and natural genus is also attested in the scholarly production of the Baġdād Peripatetics: cf. Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus, *Aġwiba ‘an masā’il Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī fī ma‘ānī Īsāġūġī li-Furfūriyūs* and Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī, *Iddat masā’il fī ma‘ānī kitāb Īsāġūġī* (the texts by Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī are inedited; cf. the transcription in Appendix B). Modern scholars made some attempts to read the two tripartitions in a one-to-one correspondence, suggesting, for instance, that the natural genus was the one existing in the multiplicity, whereas the logical genus was the one existing after it in human minds, and that the intellectual genus was the one existing before multiplicity (on these attempts and their limits, cf. MARMURA 1979, p. 54, n. 23). Interpretative efforts of this sort might seem appealing in the light of passages like Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī, *Maqāla fī tabyīn wuġūd al-umūr al-‘āmmiyya*, p. 154.17-20, where the concrete existence of a notion is named ‘natural existence’, whereas its existence in human soul after abstraction is named ‘logical existence’ and its essential existence, i.e. as a mere definition, is named ‘divine existence’ (on how this tripartition of beings is related to the Alexandrian tripartition, cf. RASHED 2004a, pp. 130-135). It can be argued, however, that, despite an apparent terminological consistency with the passage of Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī, the terms

‘natural’, ‘logical’ and ‘intellectual’ are not employed in the context of Avicenna’s passage to designate the notions’ mode of existence (which is rather conveyed by tripartition ii), but rather different kinds of notions (cf. *infra*). It can be suggested, for instance, that a natural genus can be both considered in its concrete existence (“in the multiplicity”) and in its mental existence as the result of a process of abstraction (“after the multiplicity”), so that the attempt of building a one-to-one correspondence between tripartitions (i) and (ii) fails. Not only the two tripartitions (i-ii) are claimed to be traditional, but also the place they occupy within the dissertation on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* – right after the dissertation on genus and species – is presented as traditional. To my knowledge, the only other occurrence of an Avicennian comprehensive dissertation on the two traditional tripartitions of universals besides *Madḥal* I.12, and leaving aside some scanty references in the *Ta’līqāt* (p. 61.1-12), is to be found in an unedited work on logic known as *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq* [= GL2 GUTAS] (an edition of the section on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* based on MS Nuruosmaniye K. 4894, ff. 16<sup>v</sup>-17<sup>v</sup> is provided in Appendix A; particularly relevant, with respect to the subject matter at stake, is §7)<sup>26</sup>.

(§1.2) [*Let us provide...is another notion*] The fundamental point assessed in the paragraph is the so-called theory of the “essence’s indifference to universality”, exemplified with the case of genus (even though the point is valid for all the five universal utterances. The notion of a nature is, in itself, neither universal nor particular, which is demonstrated by means of a *reductio ad absurdum*: if, for instance, animality *qua* animality were universal, there would not be particular animals, for every animal should be universal, but this contradicts the everyday experience of particular animals; if, on the contrary, animality *qua* animality were particular, then there would be only one animal, which, again, is contradicted by the experience. Thus, both claims that animality, for instance, is in itself universal or particular lead to conclusions that are manifestly false. The point is that a definable nature is, in itself, neither universal nor particular, and its universality or particularity are accidental to it. This is also one of the points that are relevant to Avicenna’s rejection of the Platonic idea that a nature *qua* nature can exist outside the individuals (cf. *Šifā’*, *Ilāhiyyāt* V.1, p. 196.14-16 and p. 203.3-12). Madkour suggested in the introduction to the Cairo edition (p. 66) that

<sup>26</sup> LAMEER 2011 presented a fragment preserved in the margins of MS Leiden, Or. 652 concerning the two tripartitions of universals that he supposed to be an extant portion of text of a lost *Mūğaz* on Logic by Avicenna; unfortunately, the fragment actually corresponds to what I numbered as §7 of the section on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* of the extant *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq*. Lameer ruled out *a priori* the possibility that it could be a portion of this work based on the non-coincidence of the titles (LAMEER 2011, p. 39), since the fragment quoted in the margins of the Leiden manuscript was reportedly drawn from a *Mūğaz fī l-manṭiq*. It is worth noticing, however, that MS Nuruosmaniye 4894, for instance, transmits the *Risāla mūğaza* precisely under this title, so that it can be argued that the same work circulated under both titles; cf. Appendix A. The passage quoted in the margins of MS Leiden, Or. 652 and published in LAMEER 2011, p. 40 is affected by a huge accidental omission, hence I considered useful to provide in Appendix A also the transcription of the paragraph of the *Risāla* that coincides with the fragment published by Lameer.

antecedents of this theory can be found in Fārābī and Yaḥyà Ibn ‘Adī (cf. also MARMURA 1979, p. 54, n. 19). Indeed, Fārābī, *Šarḥ Kitāb al-‘Ibāra*, p. 61.15 (cf. RASHED 2004b, p. 144) and Yaḥyà Ibn ‘Adī, *al-Risāla al-Sābi‘a*, p. 171.6-13 (cf. ADAMSON 2007, p. 154) suggest that a notion in itself is something to which other conditions such as universality can attach, forming a notion composed out of the notion of itself (e.g. “animal”) and the additional notion that occurs to it (e.g. universality). However, this idea might antedate the Arabic tradition: the *Quaestio* I 11a of Alexander of Aphrodisias (whose Arabic translation is preserved in MS Escorial 798 and edited in RULAND 1979, pp. 254-274; for the identification of the fragments and their ascription to Alexander see GÄTJE 1966, p. 262; for a discussion of Alexander’s doctrine based on the Greek sources, see TWEEDALE 1984) attests the idea that universality is an accident (*‘araḍ*) for things that subsist in themselves (RULAND 1979, p. 254.13-17; cf. TWEEDALE 1984, pp. 293-299). In the passage at stake, universality is presented as a relation (*nisba*) to several items that accidentally occurs (*ya‘riḍu*) to the form of a conceived nature (here exemplified by “animality”) in such a way that the conceived notion can be predicated of all the items to which it is put in relation. The relation of the notion that is said to be “universal” to its universality is defined in terms of a relation between a subject and an accident that attach to it (like, for instance, the subject “dress” with respect to the accident “white”, whose composition forms a third, different notion, that of “white dress”). The idea of ‘composition’ here proposed is strikingly close to that in the aforementioned passage of Yaḥyà Ibn ‘Adī, *al-Risāla al-Sābi‘a*, p. 171.6-13.

(§2.1) [*They call the...the logical genus*] The logical genus is defined as an accidental feature attaching to a notion (once again, it is compared to “white” with respect to its substratum, regardless of what it is; cf. also MARMURA 1979, p. 41); it is the very notion of being predicated of many in answer to “what is it?”, i.e. the definition of the genus that is dealt with in Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and, generally speaking, in logic. This definition of “logical genus” is consistent with that provided in *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq* (Appendix A, §7); cf. also Yaḥyà Ibn ‘Adī, *Iddat masā’il fī ma‘ānī kitāb Īsāğūğī* (Appendix B).

(§2.2) [*As to the...the natural genus*] The ‘natural genus’ is defined as the nature that is apt to be the subject of universality, generality and so on (i.e. that is apt to be the subject of the logical genus). Universality does not occur to the nature in its external existence in the individuals, but rather in its existence as a notion in the intellect; this means that universal notions do not exist *qua* universal in external reality. As stated also in *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq* (Appendix A, §7), the natural genus is the concrete thing that exists in external reality to which the notion of generality can occur in mind. The passage in the *Risāla* clarifies that the fact that it is named “natural genus” does not imply a restriction to the forms of natural objects of Natural Science, but includes artificial items too (such as chair, house and the like), as well as divine and mathematical notions (such as cause, principle, figure, number and so on).

(§2.3) [*The abstracted generality...considering these two*] Before providing a definition of ‘intellectual genus’ at §2.5, Avicenna clarifies that, even if the logical genus has only an intellectual existence, it is not that which is properly meant by “intellectual genus”. The remark is due to a subtle tension between two different uses of the term ‘intellectual’, which applies both to the logical genus singularly taken and to the result of its composition with the abstracted natural form in the intellect, as stated in *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq*, Appendix A, §7 (cf. also §2.5; for a slightly different interpretation, cf. MARMURA 1979, p. 42).

(§2.4.1) [*Under the logical...ranged below it*] The logical genus apparently is predicated by name and definition of its own subjects, but not of its subjects’ species. This claim is demonstrated by the absurdity of the conclusion reached by the following argument, briefly sketched in the paragraph:

Animal is a genus;  
 Man is an animal;  
 —————  
 ∴ Man is a genus.

In fact, it does not necessarily follow to the premises of the argument that “man” should be a genus, neither by name nor by definition, (“man” being an instance of ultimate species in Porphyry’s tree, it cannot be a genus with respect to any of its subjects). The argument provided in the passage at stake is a traditional one, renowned both in the school of Alexandria and among Bağdād Peripatetics, especially employed in the commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories* (cf. Ammon., *In Cat.*, p. 31.2-12 and *In Isag.*, pp. 117.15-118.5; Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 52.9-18; Philop., *In Cat.*, pp. 38.28-39-15; Olympiod., *In Cat.*, p. 50.12-22; Ibn Al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr al-Maqūlāt*, p. 87.5-17; the argument might have been also mentioned in Alexander’s lost commentary on the *Categories* and in Porphyry’s commentary *Ad Gedalium*: see SCHMIDT 1996, pp. 280-284 and CHIARADONNA 2016, p. 328). The predication of “genus” with respect to “animal” is not transitive, i.e. cannot hold with respect to “man” as well in virtue of the fact that it is a species of “animal” (cf. Elias [olim Davidis], *In Cat.*, p. 153.6-17); according to that exegetical tradition, if A is predicated of B ‘as of a subject’ (καθ’ ὑποκειμένου) and B is predicated of C in this same way, then A should be predicated of C as of a subject too (keeping in mind that, for those commentators, the predication καθ’ ὑποκειμένου is equivalent to essential predication). In the argument provided above, “animal” is surely predicated of its species “man” as of a subject, i.e. essentially, but the oddity of the conclusion reached by the argument shows that “genus” is not predicated in such a way of “man”. Thus, it should be concluded that “genus” is not predicated essentially of “animal”, since otherwise the conclusion should hold valid in virtue of the rule of the transitivity of predication.

(§2.4.2) [*The natural genus...this is correct*] Differently than the logical genus (cf. §2.4.1), the natural genus does provide its subjects with its name and definition, i.e. is predicated synonymously of its subjects; “animal”, for instance, is predicated

synonymously of its species “man”, “horse” and the like. However, this is a feature of the nature *qua* nature (i.e. of the nature of animal *qua* animal), and not in virtue of its suitability to become a genus in mind, where the notion of generality attaches to it.

(§2.5) [*As to the...the natural one*] The intellectual genus is described in the passage at stake in terms of three components, namely a subject (*mawḍūʿ*), generality (*ḡinsiyya*) and composition (*tarkīb*). Generality arguably coincides with the logical genus, with respect to which the nature that was called “natural genus” in virtue of its suitability to become a genus in mind is a subject. Generally speaking, by ‘intellectual genus’ it is possible to understand the result of a composition in the intellect of the abstracted notion of a nature together with generality (in this sense, it is said to be realized out of the combination of the two notions of logical and natural genus in the intellect in *Al-Risāla l-mūḡaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq*, Appendix A, §7) and the logical genus alone (cf. again *Al-Risāla l-mūḡaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq*, Appendix A, §7).

(§2.6) [*The most appropriate...two considerations together*] Avicenna switches from the traditional denomination of “natural genus” and “intellectual genus” to naming the nature itself “natural form” (*ṣūra ṭabīʿiyya*), when considered *qua* nature shared by several individuals in the external reality, and “intellectual form” (*ṣūra ʿaqliyya*), when considered as an abstracted form in the intellect, to which such accidents as generality can apply (cf. *Šifāʿ*, *Ilāhiyyāt* V.1, p. 205.5-13).

(§3.1) [*But the thing...form of humanity*] In an Aristotelian perspective, individuals of natural objects are epistemologically prior to the conceptualization of their shared nature in human intellect (i.e. knowledge of them precedes the conceptualization of their nature). The case of artificial items is, on the other hand, quite the reverse: an artisan should have in his own mind a form of the item that he aims at realizing before the item itself is realized, so that, in the latter case, the individual artificial item is not epistemologically prior to its form in the artisan’s intellect. This image is functional to introduce the idea that a form can be considered either *before* the multiplicity, or *in* or *after* it, according to different considerations. Moreover, the metaphor of the artisan and the artefact is, more in particular, useful to exemplify the relation between God and the existing beings (cf. §3.2).

(§3.2) [*In general, sometimes...conceived by us*] The metaphor of the artisan and the artefacts is made explicit: the form of the artificial item in an artisan’s mind that precedes the realization of the item itself, for instance, exists *before* the multiplicity; it can also come to exist *in* multiplicity, when the item is realized, and *after* multiplicity, when someone else looks at the items and conceptualizes their form in his own mind. It is the tripartition (ii) of the considerations of the universal notion presented at §1.1.

[*As to the...inquiry for that*] The metaphysical question about the forms in their existence prior to the individuals is here announced but delayed. Two possibilities are presented, namely that the form prior to individuals is (a.1) a unique essence (*ḡāt wāḥida*) that can be either multiplied (*tatakattaru*) in the individuals in virtue of matter

and other accidental features, or (a.2) not, or (b) that the forms prior to individuals exist as subsistent models (*muṭul qā'ima*). View (a) is dealt with in *Ilāhiyyāt* V.2, where there is a distinction between natures (a.1) that require a matter to exist, being multiplied (p. 208.4-7), and natures (a.2) that do not require it, being only one in number (pp. 207.13-208.4). This is Avicenna's view, followed in *Ilāhiyyāt* V.2, pp. 208.10-209.2 by the specification that a form does not stay one and the same essence in all the individuals, which arguably coincides with the position criticised by Avicenna in the *Risālat ba'd al-afādil*, p. 78.10-11, possibly Kirmānī's (as pointed out in RASHED 2004a, pp. 122-129; cf. also BÄCK 1994, p. 44). The latter view (b) corresponds to Platonic Ideas: the term *muṭul* is specifically employed by Avicenna to designate Platonic Ideas (*al-muṭul al-aflātūniyya*) in *Ilāhiyyāt* V.1, p. 204.5 and in the fragment of his *K. al-Inṣāf*, p. 43.13. Platonic Ideas are discussed and rejected in the section of Metaphysics; cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* VII.2, p. 310.10-311.8 (cf. ARNZEN 2011, pp. 86-99).

(§4) [*Know that what...and after it*] The paragraph closes the exposition of the two tripartitions presented in §1.1 and extend its validity to all the five predicables, besides the cases of genera employed by way of example.

(§5.1) [*Know that the...hand necessarily finite*] The most general genera, i.e. the categories, are finite in number (which is ascertained in *Šifā'*, *Maqūlāt* II.5), whereas the most special species of each category are infinite in potentiality. Individuals as well are not finite with regard to generation, because new individuals are continuously engendered; the individuals that can be perceived in a definite time, on the other hand, are necessarily finite. The paragraph is based on Porphy., *Isag.*, p. 6.11-13, with respect to which Avicenna departs with regard to two points, namely the finiteness of the most special species and that of the individuals. Porphyry claimed that the most special species are finite, and Avicenna's correction is that they are so in actuality, though not in potentiality. Individuals are said to be infinite in Porphy., *Isag.*, 6.12-13: this statement of Porphyry's was challenged by the Alexandrian exegetical tradition, in which the remark here introduced by Avicenna – namely that individuals are infinite with regard to generation – was introduced: cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 85.11-87.11; Elias, *In Isag.*, pp. 73.26-74.6; Ps.-Elias (David), *In Isag.*, p. 95.22-32.

(§5.2.1) [*The individual only...occurs in it*] The paragraph parallels Porphy., *Isag.*, p. 7.19-27, where Porphyry presents the individual as a bundle (ἄθροισμα) of properties that, altogether, concur to single out an individual among others, insofar as there is not another individual sharing the same properties at the same moment (Aristotle might have considered a similar theory in *Met.* Z15, 1040a8-14, to which he moved some objections: see BARNES 2003, pp. 153-154; on the possibility that Porphyry's doctrine relies on Plato's *Theaetetus*, cf. SORABJI 2005, vol. 3, pp. 165-166). The description of the individual as a bundle of properties might have, in Porphyry's view, both a logical and ontological value at one and the same time, since it works both as a way to describe and individuate an individual among others, and as a way to describe it from an ontological perspective as a collection of properties (see LLOYD 1990, pp. 43-47 and

BARNES 2003, pp. 150-154; see also CHIARADONNA 2000, p. 309, who remarks how the two aspects are mutually interrelated and joint in Porphyry's perspective). As already remarked, the individual is also presented as a predicable (of a single item) in Porphyry's passage (LLOYD 1990, p. 45, n. 6 and CHIARADONNA 2000, p. 308). The focus in Avicenna's passage at §5.2.1 seems duplex: it is more ontological at the beginning, where the issue at stake is how an individual comes to exist when some 'individuating factors' are associated to the nature of the species, namely accidents and concomitants and the designated matter, but it is also logical, when it comes to how the description of the statement signifies (*yakūnu dāllan*) the individual.

(§5.2.2) [*Our saying of...occur to them*] The critical reference concerning the equivocity of the term "individual" might address the Peripatetics of Baḡdād; more in particular, Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī affirmed the equivocity of the term "individual" at least in two of his treatises, one of which specifically devoted to this problem (*Maqāla fī tabayyun anna al-šahṣ ism muštarak*, pp. 208-211; Id., *Al-Risāla al-sābi'a*, p. 168.13-170.13), and Ibn al-Ṭayyib as well reported such a view in *Tafsīr Kitāb Isāgūḡī*, pp. 107.17-108.12. From Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī's *Maqāla fī tabayyun anna al-šahṣ ism muštarak*, pp. 208.1-209.9 it can be inferred that the subject was a debated one: Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī presents the theory of the univocity of the term "individual" as that of a group of philosophers that went astray (T2):

**T2.** Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī, *Maqāla fī tabayyun anna al-šahṣ ism muštarak*, pp. 208.1-209.9

«[Abū Zakariyā] said: when I found some of our brothers, among those who aim at being philosophers, who departed from the truth with regard to the name 'individual' (*šahṣ*), and firmly believed that it signifies a unique notion *in se*, [which is] common and belongs to all the individuals, and [believed] that it is not an equivocal name (*ism muštarak*) in which the individuals coincide in spite of the difference of their essences (*iḥtilāf dawātihā*) [...] When I found that this error had taken possession of many of our brothers, I thought I should explain the truth in this [subject matter] and elucidate it, in order to remove the error from those who were already afflicted by it, and [to] prevent those who had not fallen into this error from going astray».

The main issue at stake is the difficulty to understand "individual" as a term univocally predicated of items that are essentially different. Clearly, Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī's perspective is quite different than Avicenna's: the claim that the individuals differ in their essences is something upon which Avicenna would not easily agree. Another major point of divergence between Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī and Avicenna lies in the notion of 'individual' they assume: in Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī's view, Porphyry's definition of individuals as "constituted of properties (ἐξ ἰδιότητων) the assemblage (τὸ ἄθροισμα) of which will never be found the same in anything else" (*Isag.*, p. 7.21-23; transl. in BARNES 2003, p. 8 slightly modified) applies equivocally to the individuals because one of the key terms it contains is equivocal, i.e. "properties" (*ḥawāṣṣ*, as in Dimašqī's translation, p. 1071.3-5), since it denotes for each individual different features; cf. T3.

**T3.** Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī, *Maqāla fī tabayyun anna al-šahṣ ism muštarak*, pp. 209.10-211.3:

«Thus, I say: as far as the first cause is concerned, the uncertainty about it was introduced because the description provided by Porphyry encompasses an equivocal name (*ism muštarak*), namely the name of ‘properties’ (*al-ḥawāṣṣ*). This because the properties by which each individual is constituted differ from the properties by which another one of the individuals is constituted; hence, the notion of ‘properties’ with regard to the one is different from the notion of properties with regard to the other. Among what evidently signifies this there is the statement that “*the complex of these properties that are constitutive for each individual cannot be found in anything else*” that this description (*al-rasm*) contained. It is evident that each one of the two things is constituted by things whose complex is not found in anything else, since the ‘essence’ (*dāt*) of each one of the two is different from the essence of the other».

According to Avicenna, however, by the term “individual” one should mean that there cannot be any other item that shares the description of the item that is said to be individual, regardless of what the features of the individual at stake are. Individuality is compared, in this respect, to generality and speciality, that can attach to the nature as an additional consideration, without conveying information of any sort concerning the features that characterize those natures. Individuality is, therefore, a unique notion that applies to several individuals the way a logical item does, i.e. analogously to the logical genus (cf. §5.4).

(§5.2.3) [*The man that...a rational animal*] The difference between the ultimate species and the individual is established: the nature of the specific notion somehow encompasses that of the individual one, since the notion of the individual results from the combination of the specific notion with the accident of individuality, which occurs to it with the conjunction to a designated matter (cf. §5.2.1). The way in which the notion of the species is more common than that of its individuals is, however, not the way in which a genus, for instance, is more common than its species (cf. also §5.3): the reason is that an individual is not constituted by a differentia that subdivides its species. The remark is rather interesting, since it shows that Avicenna did not understand Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 7.27-8.3 as if it suggested that the relation of the species to its individuals is analogous to that of the genus to its species.

(§5.3) [*Being common can...as an individual*] The passage explains how the specific notion (e.g. “man”) can be said to be more general than the individual one (i.e. “individual man”). The specific notion is not more general because it includes also other notions that differ essentially the one from the other (as in the case of the genus that is more general than the species); rather, it is more general because the individual notion includes additional notions that are not included in the specific one. In other words, the individual notion is the same specific notion considered under a specific respect, namely as individual (i.e. as joint to its designated matter).

(§5.4) [*Generality, speciality and...the First Philosophy*] The paragraph reassesses the distinction between ‘generality’, ‘speciality’ and ‘individuality’ on the one hand and the subjects to which they attach on the other, which seems to be a point that the Peripatetics of Baḡdād failed to grasp completely (cf. Yaḥyà Ibn ‘Adī, *Maqāla fi*

*tabayyun anna al-šaḥṣ ism muštarak*, pp. 209.10-211.3, where the problem with the term “individual” is the difficulty of applying it to the individuals’ different essences). ‘Generality’, ‘speciality’ and ‘individuality’ are accidental conditions that can attach to natures without generating new species: they are compared to the accidents that can be added to genera and species without forming a new definition of a more specific notion, as in the case of “man” and “capable of laughing”: from the conjunction of the species “man” to the accidental feature (a proprium) “capable of laughing” no other species originates.

### Chapter I.13

(§1.1) [*As to the...is mostly proper*] As it was the case for “genus” and “species”, the term “differentia”, which is employed in logical contexts to designate the differentia specifica, had both a non-specific use to denote no matter what kind of difference may occur among things, and a technical use in Logic. According to the newly-rediscovered commentary on the *Categories* preserved in the Archimedes Palimpsest, edited in CHIARADONNA ET AL. 2013, a detailed list of the meanings of genus, species and differentia was already provided by Boethus of Sidon: see Anon. [Porph.?), *In Cat.* 10.13-15 (= CHIARADONNA ET AL. 2013, p. 158). As to the technical use of the term in Logic, Porphyry recorded three senses of ‘differentia’, namely a common one, a proper one, and the most proper (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 8.8); only the most proper one is the sense in which the logicians employ the term. The exact interpretation of “common” and “proper differentiae” presents some difficulties (see BARNES 2003, pp. 155-64 and *infra*). The Late Antique Greek tradition and the medieval Arabic tradition understood them as accidents, whereas the most proper differentia corresponds to the differentia specifica.

(§1.2) [*The common differentia...the common differentia*] Common differentiae entail a non-durable differentiation between two or more items. The examples provided in the passage at stake are of the sort of “sitting”, “standing” and the like, which evidently are accidental features that do not necessarily belong permanently to their subjects; in fact, a subject can be distinguished from another for the fact of being characterized at a given moment by a certain accident, without necessarily being distinguished from the other subject at a different moment in virtue of that same accident. A subject A, for instance, can be distinguished at a moment x from a subject B because A is standing, whereas B is sitting, but this differentiation can easily cease to exist at a moment y or work the other way around. The commentaries of the school of Alexandria interpreted the common differentiae as corresponding to Porphyry’s *separable accidents* (see Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 92.23-6; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 77.13-9 and David, *In Isag.*, p. 173.22-31); Fārābī and Ibn Al-Ṭayyib also followed this traditional interpretation: cf. Fārābī, *Kitāb Īsāgūghī ay l-Madḥal*, p. 126.4-7 and Ibn Al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūghī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 118.13-5.

(§1.3.1) [*The proper differentia...not the other*] Proper differentiae are described as the accidental predicates that are inseparable from their subjects and coincide with Porphyry’s *inseparable accidents* and *propria* (cf. §1.3.2). The differentiation operated by means of such attributes is permanent, differently than that operated by the so-called “common differentiae”, but is, nonetheless, a differentiation in virtue of accidental features of the subjects. Another major difference between the common and the proper differentia is that proper differentiae can only differentiate an item A with respect to an item B and not the reverse, whereas common differentiae can characterize A with respect to B at a moment x and B with respect to A at a moment y, since they are not among the permanent features of their subjects.

(§1.3.2) [*It can be...not a differentia*] Both Porphyry's propria and inseparable common accidents can be classified as proper differentiae; the two kinds of predicable differ because the proprium never ceases to differentiate a subject A from a subject B that does not possess that feature, whereas inseparable accidents – though they are not separable from their subject in external reality in actuality – they can happen to belong to another subject as well, so that the differentiation they determined between a subject A and a subject B can cease to exist because both the subjects happen to be characterized by the same feature. The instance provided in the passage is that of blackness with respect to the black man, to which it is an inseparable accident distinguishing him from a white man; the white man can at a certain moment become black as well because of suntan, for instance, so that the black man happens to be no more differentiated from the other man in virtue of that inseparable accident.

(§1.3.3) [*The common differentia...of the species*] The individuals of a species can be differentiated the one from the other in virtue of a common differentia (i.e. a separable common accident) or of some proper differentiae, namely those that correspond to inseparable common accidents, and cannot be differentiated in virtue of those proper differentiae that correspond to propria, since propria are necessary concomitants of the species as a whole (hence, to all of its individuals). Avicenna adds that some accidental attributes that attach to the nature of the individual as it comes to exist can entail a permanent differentiation with respect to another individual, although other individuals might happen to share the same features. Such attributes are inseparable accidents like having blue eyes or a hooked nose (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 8.12-15), that can only occur to an individual when it is realized in existence, and cannot be acquired at any moment after, so that if by means of these attributes an individual is differentiated from another, this differentiation between the two individuals cannot cease to exist. Avicenna presupposes a distinction between innate and non-innate features that is alluded to in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 8-12-15, where the examples of inseparable accidents provided are “being blue-eyed”, “being hooked-nosed” and “having a wound”: the latter is obviously a non-innate feature that can differentiate an individual from another when it affects at a certain moment one individual and not the other (cf. also Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 94.19-95.1; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 78.1-7; Ḥasan Ibn Suwār [marginal note in MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 151<sup>v</sup> = Dimašqī's Arabic translation of the *Isagoge*, p. 1072, n. 1).

(§1.4) [*As to the...is this one*] The differentia specifica is the feature that constitutes a species by operating a division of the beings subsumed under a certain genus. It is a feature that attaches primarily (*awwalan*) to the nature of the genus, to which other non-essential features may follow. By “primarily” Avicenna does not mean a merely temporal priority of the differentia to the accidental features, but rather that the differentia belongs to the genus *directly*, i.e. not in virtue of anything else. For instance, the genus “substance” is primarily divided into “corporeal” and “incorporeal”, then features like “receptive of motion” and “not-receptive of motion” necessarily follow to the fact that the genus “substance” has been divided by the differentiae “corporeal” and

“incorporeal”, so that something which is receptive of motion must necessarily be a corporeal substance and something that is not receptive of motion must be an incorporeal substance (see *Ilāhiyyāt* V.4, p. 221.6-15). Conceiving something as receptive of motion or not implies conceiving it as corporeal or not, so that being corporeal or not are the causes of the fact that a substance is, respectively, receptive of motion or not. The only case in which a differentia specifica does not primarily belong to its genus is the case of differentiae that are not proximate to that genus but succeed to other differentiae, as if, for instance, the genus “body” were divided by the differentiae “rational” and “irrational”, which are proximate differentiae of a lower genus as “animal” (cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* V.4, pp. 221.16-222.7).

(§2) [*For this reason...of being rational*] The differentiation entailed by the most proper differentia (i.e. the differentia specifica) must be permanent (cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* V.4, p. 221.2-5), as well as that entailed by propria. The difference between the common and the proper sense of “differentia” on the one hand, and the most proper sense on the other, lies in the fact that the differentiae taken in the common and proper sense make the item they diversify *otherlike* (ἀλλοῖον), whereas the most proper differentia makes it *other* (ἄλλο). Contrarily to the latter kind of differentiation, the first one is not in virtue of an essential feature: in fact, an individual can be made otherlike in virtue of accidental features such as suntan, wounds, a different hair colour and the like, though still being the same; cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 8.19-20; Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 94.19-95.1; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 78.1-7; Ḥasan Ibn Suwār [marginal note in MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 151<sup>v</sup> = Dimašqī’s Arabic translation of the *Isagoge*, p. 1072, n. 1].

(§3.1) [*The most proper...which is it?*] The most proper differentia produces otherness, since it produces a differentiation between two or more items based on essential features, and two individuals that differ in their essence cannot be one and the same. This latter kind of differentia is the differentia specifica, which is defined in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 11.7-8 as *what is predicated in the “what sort of thing is it?” of many items that differ in species*. Porphyry introduced the definition apparently ascribing it to other philosophers (*Isag.* p. 8.8: ὀρίζονται, “they define”). The definition, although not explicitly provided by Aristotle, seems to have nonetheless Peripatetic origins (see BARNES 2003, p. 191).

[*Then it has...thing is it?*] Four definitions of “differentia” are provided: definition (a) – “what differentiates between the species and the genus” – does not strictly correspond to any of the definitions provided in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. Perhaps it ought to be read together with definition (b) – “that in virtue of which the species exceeds the genus” –, which corresponds to the definition provided in Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 10.22-11.1; the species differs from the genus because it exceeds it intensionally, i.e. because its notion embraces additional features that are not included in the notion of the genus, namely the differentiae. According to Porphyry’s example, the notion of the species “man” exceeds the notion of its genus “animal” because it also includes in actuality the notions of the differentiae “rational” and “mortal”: in Porphyry’s view, the notion of the

genus “animal” can include the differentiae that constitute the species subsumed under it only in potentiality (on the problems with Porphyry’s claim that a genus encompasses in potentiality all the differentiae that are subsumed under it and on the Late Antique debate on the subject, cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 188-191). Definition (c) – “that in virtue of which things that do not differ in genus differ the one from the other” – paraphrases the definitions provided in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 11.18-19 and p. 11.21 (on which, cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 197-200). Finally, definition (d) – “what is predicated of many items that differ in species in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’” – quotes Porph., *Isag.*, p. 11.7-8; this is the definition analysed in greater detail in the chapter.

(§3.2.1) [*We shall ponder...is it? essentially*] A first shortcoming in Porphyry’s definitions (a-d) is identified: in order to correspond to the differentia specifica, they all require an addition, namely that it is an essential notion: thus, the notion of the species exceeds that of the genus in virtue of an essential additional notion (a-b), and things subsumed under one and the same genus differ the one from another in virtue of it essentially (c), and the differentia is predicated essentially of many items that differ in species in answer to “what sort of thing is it?” (d).

(§3.2.2) [*But even if...in its name*] A second shortcoming is identified in Porphyry’s definitions (a-c), namely the lack of the mention of the term “universal”, which plays the role of a genus in those definitions. This point is relevant to the correct formulation of the definition, even though the said descriptions succeed in conveying a signification of the differentia. The addition is unnecessary in the case of definition (d) because the clause “predicated of many items” is itself the description of “universal”, so that the genus “universal” is replaced in it by its own description.

(§3.2.3) [*But for his...description is defective*] The reason for Avicenna’s refutation of description (d) is based on the problem of explaining how the differentia can distinguish the subjects of which it is predicated, if Porphyry is right in claiming that it is predicated of many items<sup>27</sup>. Porphyry’s claim that the differentia is predicated of

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<sup>27</sup> The description of the differentia as predicated of many items was a long-debated subject in Late Antiquity; the occasion was provided by Arist., *Cat.* 1b16-24 (but also Arist. *Top.* A15, 107b19-26 and *Top.* Z6, 144b13-18, on which see GRANGER 1981, p. 122), in which Aristotle states that, in the case of things that are different in genus and not ranked under each other (τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα τεταγμένων), the differentiae differ in species (τῶ εἶδει). Porphyry himself apparently oscillated with regard to this subject: he claimed that the differentia is predicated of many things *in most cases* (ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ), though not in all cases (Porph., *In Cat.*, p. 82.29-37; cf. also Anon. [Porph. ?], *In Cat.*, 11.12-14 = CHIARADONNA ET AL. 2013, p. 160 and Simpl., *In Cat.*, p. 56.6-8). A similar view is alluded to in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.19-21, where Porphyry states that the differentiae are *often* (πολλάκις) predicated of many species. Porphyry explains that there are differentiae that are equal in number (ἰσάριθμοι) with their species, like levity and heaviness, which are, respectively, just differentiae of fire and earth. The idea seems to be that the qualities of heaviness and levity are properly predicated only of their corresponding basic element, and that all the other things that are, for instance, heavy or light are such, so to speak, in a derivative way, in virtue of their being made of earth or fire. Simplicius raises a similar aporia in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*, observing that some differentiae are predicated of a unique species.

many items differing in species seems to imply the lack of a differentiation among those items of which the differentia is predicated, unless it is possible to understand Porphyry's statement as if it meant that the differentia is not predicated of all the items at the same time, but of each of them singularly taken. The concept is exemplified with the case of the sword: the statement "the sword is a tool by means of which people hit something" ought not to be understood as if all the people used altogether a single sword, but rather as if each one of them used a sword. In the passage at stake, Avicenna presents this as a way to save Porphyry's statement, though raising doubts on the possibility of a reading of this sort. If such an interpretation is not plausible, as he claims, then Porphyry's definition of differentia as predicated of many oughts to be rejected. According to Avicenna, being distinctive of more than one species is not necessarily concomitant to the nature of the differentia, although it may belong to certain differentiae. Avicenna's argument is: given that being predicated of many belongs to some differentiae accidentally, this feature cannot be assumed as a *differentia specifica* in the definition (*ḥadd*) of the predicable "differentia", for it is not an essential constitutive element with respect to the nature of the differentia. Moreover, it is not even an accidental feature common to all the differentiae, for it is not shared by all of them, so that it cannot even be employed in the description (*rasm*) of the predicable to replace its differentia specifica. Avicenna's point, here, is demonstrating that the locution "predicated of many species" can figure neither in a proper definition, nor in a description of differentia. The conclusion reached is that the differentiae are *primarily* and *essentially* predicated of one species only, although some differentiae can happen to be predicated of more than one species. This is also the reason why Avicenna criticizes the traditional division of the five predicables since, according to him, this division includes only the kind of differentia which happens to be predicated of many items, leaving aside the differentia which is predicated of one species only.

(§3.2.4) [*Here is an...employ it understands*] The paragraph alludes to Avicenna's own analysis of the predication of the differentia with respect to its subject in chap. II.1, §3.4.2, where Avicenna establishes a distinction of two kinds of essential predication,

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He mentions two cases: levity as a differentia of fire; and the ultimate differentiae belonging to a species, which are said to convert with the *definiendum*, for they belong to that species only (for instance, the capability of receiving knowledge is a differentia that belongs to man only). Quite evidently, Simplicius' aporia is based upon Porphyry's commentary on the *Categories* and had an Arabic tradition: cf. Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Isāgūghī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 146.8-21 and an anonymous scholion in MS BnF ar. 2346 that comments upon the use of *πολλάκις* that Porphyry made in the passage quoted above (rendered in Arabic as *fī aḳṭari l-amri*, "in most cases"). The argument of the scholion is the same that can be found in Porphyry's and Simplicius' commentaries on the *Categories*: cf. Dimašqī's translation of the *Isagoge*, p. 1097, n. 3: «He [*i.e.* Porphyry] only said "in most cases" (*fī aḳṭari l-amri*) because sometimes there are differentiae that are equivalent to their species, as the heaviness (*al-tiqḷ*) for the earth, the levity for the fire and the receptivity of science for man». For a more detailed historical reconstruction, cf. DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 132-143.

one of which encompasses the differentia as a constitutive part of a thing's essence (cf. *Introduction* and DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 152-178).

(§4.1) [*It is also...a divisive one*] The paragraph resumes the traditional distinction between divisive and constitutive differentiae. Taking as an example Porphyry's definition of man as a "rational, mortal animal", "rational" and "mortal" are, respectively, the divisive differentia of the genus animal (which divides it into two groups of species, namely that of rational animals like man and divine beings and that of irrational animals like horses, bulls and so on) and the constitutive differentia of the species "man" (which individuates the species "man" by distinguishing it from that of divine beings, which are immortal). Traditionally, the distinction of divisive and constitutive differentiae ran parallel to the distinction of differentiae that are predicated of more than one species or of one species only (cf. §3.2.3). The *divisive* differentiae – which divide a genus together with their opposite differentiae (as "rational" and "irrational" divide the genus "animal") – are predicated of more than one species (for instance, "rational" is predicated of both "man" and "angel"), whereas the *constitutive* differentiae – which constitute a species (as "mortal", in addition to "rational", constitutes "man") – are predicated of one species only, namely of the species they constitute (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 9.24-10.3). This specific example, however, was contested in chap. I.11, §4.3, and, as it appears from §4.2, this is not Avicenna's own analysis of the subject.

(§4.2) [*There is not...when they divide?*] Contrarily to the traditional view exposed in §4.1, all the constitutive differentiae are also divisive differentiae and, conversely, all the divisive differentiae are constitutive differentiae. Only the *negative differentiae* are, apparently, divisive without being constitutive, but this kind of "differentiae" are not actually so (see also MCGINNIS 2007, pp. 178-181). Negative differentiae cannot, in Avicenna's opinion, be considered as really constitutive of a species: first of all, the intelligibility of their notion depends on the consideration of the corresponding positive notion (the notion conveyed by "irrational", for instance, cannot be understood without considering the notion of "rational"); moreover, they do not really signify a distinctive feature of a group of things, for they just signify a feature that the things do not have. The reason for Avicenna's refusal to accept negative differentiae may be rooted in Aristotle's warning against the division of genera by negative terms in *Top.* Z6, 143b11-144a4<sup>28</sup>. Avicenna's criticism is directed *in primis* towards Porphyry, who considered

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle devotes a τόπος to the inquiry on the mistake that an interlocutor could make dividing a genus by negations (ἀπόφασις). The example he provides is that of the line (γραμμή), which is defined as "a length without breadth" (μήκος ἀπλατές): the problem is that this definition does not signify a species, but just the fact that the length does not have breadth (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει πλάτος). In the passage, Aristotle takes also into account the fact that, in some cases, the use of a negation is required, for example in the case of privations; the example provided is that of "blind" (τυφλόν), which is defined as "unable to see" (τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν). However, in Aristotle's view, there is no difference, in this context, between the case of privative terms and that of negative terms. In Arist., *PA*, 642b21-4 Aristotle claims that the problem with privative (and negative) differentiae is that they do not produce a species, in

such differentiae as “irrational” and “immortal” as constitutive, respectively, of the irrational animal and of the deity (cf. e.g. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 10.9-19), and likely targets the Baǧdād Peripatetic tradition as well (cf. Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāǧūǧī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 146.11-21). According to Avicenna, there are only two cases in which a negative differentia can be considered as really signifying a distinctive feature. The first is when the fact that the thing differentiated cannot be characterized by a different distinctive feature is concomitant to the negative differentia. An example is the case of the genus “number”, which can be divided by the two opposite differentiae of “divisible into two equal parts” and “not divisible into two equal parts” (*laysa bi-munqasimin bi-mutasāwiyyīna*). The latter, despite being a negative differentia, adequately distinguishes a class of numbers (namely, that of the odd numbers) because it is necessarily concomitant (*yalzamu*) to its notion that, if a number is not divisible into two equal parts (and, therefore, is not an even number), then it is necessarily an odd number, without any other possibility. So, even though the name applied to the notion is that of a negative notion, nonetheless it signifies a certain characteristic that is distinctive of a species of the genus “number”. The second case in which the use of differentiae of this kind is admitted is when necessity forces us to use a negative name in order to designate a notion that happens to be nameless. The example provided by Avicenna is the hypothetical case in which the notion of “neighing” signified the entire class of entities that are not “men”, and happened to lack a name, being the class conventionally designated as “irrational”. In a similar case, “irrational” would signify a distinctive feature that individuates a species opposed to “man” under the genus “animal”.

(§4.3) [*What is believed...of something else*] Avicenna dismisses the claim that a differentia may either be considered as merely divisive or as constitutive as a false belief (*ẓannun kaḍibun*); the unspecified plurality of those who hold this belief (*al-ẓānnūna*), addressed by Avicenna in the same passage, may be identified with the Greek and Arabic tradition of Porphyry’s commentators endorsing this view. First, Avicenna rejects the belief of those philosophers who draw a neat distinction between divisive and constitutive differentiae and believe in a composition of differentiae that are constitutive of a species jointly, without being so separately, an account that fits well with the theory of “composite differentiae” explained in Ammonius’ and Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s commentaries on the *Isagoge* (Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 98.19-99.22; Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāǧūǧī li-Furfūriyūs*, p. 146.11-21). Then, Avicenna proceeds to

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virtue of the principle that it is impossible for the species to come into existence from something which is non-existent. Aristotle achieves, in that passage, a demonstration of the fact that privations cannot be taken as differentiae (PA, 643a6: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον στέρησιν εἶναι διαφοράν); this statement does not exclude, however, the use of privations as differentiae *tout court*, but just the use of them as *constitutive* differentiae for the species in those cases in which a genus is divided by one differentia only. Aristotle is critical towards this method of division and states that, when another kind of division is employed, privations too will be differentiae (cf. PA 634b25-6: Καὶ γὰρ οὕτως μὲν αἱ στέρησεις ποιήσουσι διαφοράν, ἐν δὲ τῇ διχτομίᾳ οὐ ποιήσουσιν). On this passage, see BALME 1987, p. 75.

explain the conceptual mistake of those philosophers, namely their understanding of “constitutive of a species” as “constitutive of a lowest species”, without considering as really constitutive differentiae those differentiae that are constitutive of intermediate species. This assumption is demonstrated by the example of the differentia “rational”: this differentia, in fact, does not constitute a lowest species (namely, “man”), but constitutes nonetheless the “rational animal”, which is showed to be a species, although not a lowest one, being also a genus of “man”. The obvious conclusion is that “rational” is a differentia that constitutes an intermediate species. Thus, by assuming that, for a differentia, being constitutive does not necessarily imply being constitutive of a lowest species, Avicenna has demonstrated that a divisive differentia, while dividing a genus, also constitutes a species (which may be either an intermediate species, as in the case of the differentia “rational” with respect to the intermediate species “rational animal”, or a lowest one, as in the case of the differentia “mortal” with respect to lowest species “man”). This argument is intended to be a refutation not only of the traditional clear-cut dichotomy between divisive and constitutive differentiae, but also of the traditional explanation of Porphyry’s definition of differentia as *predicated of many items differing in species* (cf. §3.2.3): having clarified that the differentiae that the tradition considered as merely divisive (and predicated of many species) are also constitutive, Avicenna implies that they are also primarily predicated only of the species that they constitute. In Avicenna’s view, a differentia can be predicated of many items specifically different only in a mediated way.

(§5.1) [*Now we say...is the intermediate*] The paragraph at stake encompasses the premises of the demonstration that the differentia does not undergo the more and the less. The starting point of the demonstration is Porphyry’s statement that the differentiae do not admit the more and the less, insofar as they are constitutive parts of an item’s being, which is one and the same and admits neither augmentation nor diminution (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 9.21-23). The statement is reminiscent of Aristotle’s claim that substance admits no augmentation or diminution in *Cat.* 3b33-4a9. The paragraph at stake proposes a demonstration of the claim that the substance does not undergo augmentation nor diminution, which runs as follows: if the quiddity admitted the possibility to be more such a quiddity or less so, and it could, for instance, coincide with its least degree ( $\text{limit}_l$ ), since its least degree cannot coincide with its maximum degree ( $\text{limit}_m$ ), the quiddity would not stay the same at its maximum degree (the argument provided works with every degree, no matter whether it is the least, or the maximum, or an intermediate one).

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Quiddity} &= \text{limit}_l; \\ \text{limit}_l &\neq \text{limit}_m; \end{aligned}$$

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$$\therefore \text{Quiddity} \neq \text{limit}_m.$$

Even assuming that something has a lower degree of the quiddity “animal” (being “less animal”), its quiddity would not coincide with that of something which has that quiddity at its maximum degree (being “intensely animal”), so that the quiddity would

not stay the same at its different degrees, which is an absurd conclusion, since the quiddity of anything is unique.

(§5.2) [*As to the...and the less*] The paragraph at stake demonstrates that the differentia specifica does not admit augmentation nor diminution based on the previous demonstration that a thing's essence does not admit augmentation nor diminution (§5.1). Two arguments are provided to support the claim that the differentia, insofar as it is a constitutive element of the thing's essence, cannot admit augmentation nor diminution. The first argument reconducts the hypothetical case of a differentia that constitutes the thing's essence by its augmentation or diminution to the cases prospected at §5.1 in which the thing's essence coincides now with its maximum and then with its least limit. A second argument concerns the way in which augmentation and diminution should be intended: if an essence A undergoes augmentation, it becomes an essence  $A_1$  different from A which has ceased to exist; if A ceased to exist, its constitutive elements must have ceased to exist as well. The fundamental assumption is that it is not possible to individuate in  $A_1$  a 'core essence' A distinguished from the augmentation it underwent (as if  $A_1$  corresponded to  $A + x$ , and A and x were still distinguishable in  $A_1$ ); in other words, the essence A should not be conceived as still existent, somehow encompassed in  $A_1$ .

(§5.3) [*As to the...does not vary*] Non-essential differentiae are said to admit augmentation and diminution, insofar as they are not constitutive elements of the thing's essence. Avicenna's clause "the other differentiae" (*sā'ir al-fuṣūl*) should include both common and proper differentiae, which embrace common accidents (both separable and inseparable) and propria; the examples provided in the passage, however, only regard separable and inseparable common accidents, such as the redness of embarrassed people and the blackness of the Abyssinian, and it might be questionable whether this applies to the section of proper differentiae that corresponds to propria too. In fact, if it is possible for the skin colour of two Abyssinians to be of two different shades of black, one more intense with respect to the other, it is not possible that a triangle has the sum of internal angles equal to  $180^\circ$  more or less than another triangle, nor it is possible for a man to have the capacity of laughing more or less than another man. This aspect is, however, not discussed in the paragraph, which demonstrates how the most proper differentia (i.e. the differentia specifica) does not admit variations in degree, even if apparently variations occur. For instance, a man is not more or less "rational" than another, for the rational faculty they have is just the same; one should not be misled in this regard by the fact that some individuals appear not to master completely their rational faculty, for this does not actually depend on the rational faculty itself, but rather on a certain resistance opposed by the substratum upon which a certain action is operated (as shown by the example of the fire, that can burn more or less intensely depending on its substratum). A traditional example in this regard is that of children, who are as rational as all the other human beings but have not a complete mastery of the articulation of language and reasoning, so that someone could think that their


rational faculty is less powerful than that of the adults, which is not true (for the same example in the same context, cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 96.10-16).

(§6) [*Know that the...and the accidentality*] There are two senses in which the term “differentia” may be understood: as stated in *Nağāt* p. 16.5-7, the differentia can be considered as a “simple differentia” (*al-faṣl al-mufrad*), like rationality (*al-nuṭq*), or as a “logical” differentia, like rational (*al-nāṭiq*). The latter differentia is conceived as composed (*murakkab*), because “rational” entails the presence of a substratum for the differentia, meaning *something having rationality* (*šay’un lahu nuṭq*). The latter is the only sense in which “differentia” must be understood in Logic, since it is the predicable that is predicated univocally of its subjects, whereas the first one is predicated of its subjects only paronymously. From an ontological perspective, the logical differentia (like “rational”) is not, in itself, a substance nor an accident, since being a substance or an accident is something external to the quiddity of the differentia (cf. *Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, p. 235.1-8 and 13-17); see also JANSSENS 2013, p. 359.

## Chapter I.14

(§1.1) [*As to the...species every time*] The proprium is said to be employed in Logic according to two chief senses, one of which more general (i) and one more specific (ii); cf. S11. The more general sense (i) is that according to which ‘proprium’ applies to every notion that specifically belongs to something, regardless to whether it is a notion that conveys a distinctive, peculiar feature of the thing to which it belongs in absolute (*‘alà l-iṭlāq*), or whether it does not convey a peculiar feature that distinguishes the thing in absolute, but rather with respect to certain things (*bi-l-qiyās ilà šay’in*) and not with respect to others, like “biped”, that does not characterize men by distinguishing them from, e.g., birds, but distinguishes both of them, for instance, from quadruped animals (on the distinction between a proprium “in absolute” and one “in relation to something”, cf. *Ta’līqāt*, pp. 443.9-444.2). The second sense of ‘proprium’ (ii) is more specific than the first because it applies only to the notions that specifically belong to a *species* (and not, as in case a, to any kind of item). This second horn of the classification is, on its turn, subdivided into two senses, namely a sense (ii.a) according to which ‘proprium’ is every notion that belongs specifically to one species only, and a stricter sense (ii.b) according to which ‘proprium’ is every notion that belongs specifically to one species only, *to the whole of it and every time*.

S11. Classification of the senses of ‘proprium’ employed in Logic




(§1.2) [*The proprium that...specific than that*] Avicenna identifies the proprium described by logicians as “predicated of the individuals of a unique species in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ not essentially” with the intermediate among the senses enumerated at §1.1, i.e. sense (ii.a) in S11; this because this definition of ‘proprium’ does not require the notion defined to belong to the whole species every time in order to be a proprium of something.

[*It is not...an ultimate one*] Avicenna questions the necessity to consider as ‘propria’ only the notions that specifically belong to the individuals of a single species, as the definition of ‘proprium’ implies, and suggests the possibility to understand the term

‘*proprium*’ in its broader sense (i), i.e. as applying to every notion that specifically belongs to whatsoever universal (even to a highest genus). The division proposed by Avicenna might be reminiscent of Aristotle’s deduction of the predicables in *Top.* A8, 103b1-19, where two criteria are adopted to individuate the predicables, namely the fact of converting in predication with their subjects or not, and the fact of being essentially or accidentally predicated of them. According to Aristotle’s classification, in fact, ‘*proprium*’ denotes the universal accidental predicate that belongs specifically to its subjects of predication because the predicate and the subject “counterpredicate”, i.e. the one applies to everything the other applies to and conversely. This classification, in fact, leaves unspecified what the subject of the *proprium* should be, so that it could be a highest genus, as well as an intermediate one or a lowest species, unless that Porphyry and the following tradition understood *propria* as belonging to a species.

(§1.3.1) [*A group of...a common accident*] Avicenna refers to a doctrine according to which ‘*proprium*’ is said only of the accidental feature that belongs to the species exclusively, to the whole of it and every time, according to sense (ii.b) at §1.1, whereas accidental features that are not of this sort are common accidents (b in S12). The doctrine roughly corresponds to the one developed in the school of Alexandria (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 32.23-33.22), likely based on Porph., *In Cat.*, pp. 93.31-94.13, where Porphyry concludes that, even if ‘*proprium*’ is said also of the features that belong to the whole species though not exclusively (b1) and of the features that belong to the species exclusively, though not to the whole of it (cf. b2), it is most aptly said of the features that belong to the whole species exclusively (cf. a).

S12. Classification of the accidental notions of a group of logicians



(§1.3.2) [*This claim however...the five utterances*] Avicenna’s objection to the classification of *propria* and common accidents at §1.3.1 is that, if by the terms ‘*proprium*’ and ‘*common accident*’ a differentiation in the extension of predication is meant, then ‘*proprium*’ should apply to what belongs to a subject exclusively, i.e. to both cases (a) and (b2) in S12, whereas by ‘*common accident*’ one should designate what does not belong to a subject in an exclusive manner (b1). In such a way, the predicables would be classified according to their being more or less specific or general with respect to their subjects; Avicenna is providing here the principles of his own

classification of the senses of ‘proprium’ and ‘common’, which he does not develop further in this context, but which he recalls in *Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq* (T4).


**T4.** *Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq*, p. 20.6-11:

«The kinds of ‘common’ (*al-‘āmm*) are four: (1) what is necessarily concomitant (*al-lāzim*) to the whole thing and belongs [also] to something else; (2) what is necessarily concomitant to part of the thing, like femininity belongs to some human beings and can belong to something else; (3) what occurs (*al-‘arīḍ*) to the whole thing and can belong to something else; (4) what occurs to part of the thing and can occur to something else, like being capable of moving for some animals. The kinds of ‘proprium’ (*al-ḥāṣṣa*) are three: (5) what is necessarily concomitant to the whole [subject] and always; (6) what is necessarily concomitant to a part [of it] and always, like laughing with respect to animal; (7) what is not necessarily concomitant but belongs to the thing exclusively, like laughing in actuality or crying in actuality for man».

From the analysis of the senses of ‘common’ and ‘proprium’ offered in T4 it can be inferred that, in Avicenna’s view, if common accidents and propria are distinguished in virtue of their being more common or not with respect to their subjects, then the proprium should include all the senses (5-7); sense (5) corresponds to (a) in S12, and sense (6) corresponds to (b2).

(§1.4) [*The most common...to the species*] The paragraph recalls the classification that Porphyry presents in *Isag.*, p. 12.13-22, which individuates the proprium that is one of the five universal predicables as what belongs to one species only, to the whole of it and always, i.e. (2.a.1) in S13. Avicenna’s division of the utterances actually produced a different notion of ‘proprium’, broader than this one, which encompasses section (2) in S13 (cf. §1.3.1-2): this broader notion is a true proprium because it belongs to the species exclusively (cf. §1.3.2), which is not in contrast with the claim that what is more specifically denoted as ‘proprium’ among the predicables is actually only the necessary and permanent notion (2.a.1).

**S13.** Classification of the proprium in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 12.13-22



[*Know that the...instead of that*] The remark here made about the proprium is analogous to that made about the differentia (chap. I.13, §6) and is also valid for the common accident (§2.1). In this specific case there might be also a contingent reason explaining why Avicenna as well as other Arabic commentators (cf. Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūṭī*, p. 141.15-17) felt the need to specify that the proprium that is one of the five predicables is a term of the sort of “capable of laughing” and not “laughter”: Dimašqī’s translation of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 12.13-19 (p. 1085.5-13) renders one of the two occurrences of the Greek γελαστικόν (“capable of laughing”) by *ḍahk* (“laughter”) instead of a more precise *ḍahḥāk* (“capable of laughing”), as the other occurrence of the same Greek term in the passage is translated. Terms like *ḍahk* are predicated of their subjects paronymously, contrarily to their derivative terms, such as *ḍahḥāk* which is equivalent to “x provided with the capability to laugh”.

(§2.1) [*As to the...not like whiteness*] The accident assumed as a predicable in Logic is the composite accident of the sort of “white”, and not the simple one like “whiteness”, which is predicated of its subjects paronymously; cf. the parallel case of the differentia specifica in chap. I.13, §6 and *Ilāhiyyāt* III.3, p. 106.15-107.2, where Avicenna states that in the case in which the logical accident is taken into consideration as a composite of the ontological accident and the substratum in which it inheres, then it is not an accident from an ontological point of view, but rather a substance provided with a certain accident. On the contrary, the corresponding “simple notion” (*al-ma’na al-basīṭ*) – for instance, “whiteness” taken from the composite “white”, i.e. “thing provided with whiteness” – is both an accident both from a logical and an ontological perspective (for a distinction of the two perspectives, cf. §2.2). The predicate “white” is equivalent to “something provided with whiteness”; noteworthy, the substratum remains unspecified: “white”, for instance, is not predicated of Zayd as “Zayd provided with whiteness”, but just as “something provided with whiteness”, otherwise, the statement “Zayd is white” should be replaced by the statement: “Zayd is Zayd provided with whiteness”, which is redundant.

(§2.2) [*This accident is... “accident” the accidental*] The passage warns against the identification of the common accident that is dealt with in Logic (accident<sub>i</sub>) with the ‘ontological accident’ that is traditionally opposed to substance (accident<sub>o</sub>). Arguably, the argument is a *reductio ad absurdum* in which two adjectival terms like “eternal” and “created” are assumed as common accidents of the body, given that they are neither a genus, nor a species, nor a differentia, nor a proprium for it, according to the third of Porphyry’s definitions of “common accident” (*Isag.* p. 13.4-5; cf. also Aristotle’s definition of accident in *Top.* A8, 103b17-19). Having assumed that terms like “created” are common accidents (i.e. accident<sub>i</sub>) of the body, Avicenna proceeds in demonstrating that they are not accident<sub>o</sub>, as well. In fact, assuming the contrary (i.e. that “created” is an accident<sub>o</sub>), a predication of the sort “the body is created” would have the form of a synonymous (rather than paronymous) predication, since the accident<sub>o</sub> “created” is directly predicated of the subject “body”, without being so by means of a derived term.

Then, in virtue of the principle of the transitivity of synonymous predication, the following reasoning would be allowed:

Created is an accident<sub>o</sub>;  
The body is created;

—————  
∴ The body is an accident<sub>o</sub>.

The conclusion is absurd: from an ontological point of view, the body is a substance and not an accident<sub>o</sub>, which allows to conclude that “created” is an accident<sub>i</sub> (i.e. is an accidental predicable) without being, at the same time, an accident<sub>o</sub>. On the relevance of this distinction within Avicenna’s doctrine of the predicables, see *General Introduction*, §III.2.3. Avicenna’s argument demonstrates that it is impossible to predicate synonymously the accident<sub>o</sub> of the substance, whereas this is, according to Avicenna’s interpretation of synonymous predication, precisely the way in which an accidental predicable is predicated of its subject. It is not possible to raise against Avicenna the objection that, on the same scheme, an argument of the following sort could be built, where “accident<sub>i</sub>” is meant to encompass accidental predicables like propria and common accidents:

Created is an accident<sub>i</sub>;  
The body is created;

—————  
∴ The body is an accident<sub>i</sub>.

In fact, logical items like “genus”, “species”, “differentia”, “proprium” and “common accident” are not synonymously predicated of their subjects, therefore in this case the predication is not transitive, and the reasoning is fallacious. Having proved that, despite the coincidence in the name, the notion of “accident<sub>o</sub>” in opposition to “substance” cannot coincide with that of “accident<sub>i</sub>” employed by Porphyry, Avicenna goes on proving that there is no univocal correspondence between the two notions. In fact, an accident<sub>o</sub> cannot be a substance, an accident<sub>i</sub> (meant as “accidental”) can either be an accident<sub>o</sub> or a substance (cf. *Nağāt*, p. 17.3-7), and also the opposite notion, namely that of “essential”, can either be an accident<sub>o</sub> or a substance. The terms “accidental” and “essential” do not convey any information about the ontological status of the entities qualified by them, that could well be either an accident<sub>o</sub> or a substance; cf. *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq* (Appendix A, §5), where the point is exemplified with the terms “white” and “whiteness”. Both “white” (*abyaḍ*) and “whiteness” (*bayāḍ*) are accidentally predicated of their subjects, being both accident<sub>i</sub> with respect to them, or *common accidents*, to use Porphyry’s terminology. They differ in their ontological status, though, for “whiteness” is an accident<sub>o</sub> (more specifically, a quality), whereas “white” can be a substance. The predicate “white”, in fact, is equivalent to “something provided with whiteness”, so that it signifies the accident<sub>o</sub> considered as inhering in a substance (cf. §2.1).

(§2.3) [*However, you did...in a subject*] Avicenna reproaches to Porphyry his implicit assimilation of the common accident (i.e. the logical accident) to the accident that is opposed to the substance (i.e. the ontological accident); this implicit assimilation can be inferred from the fact that one of the definitions provided in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 13.3-5 mentions the accidents as *necessarily subsistent in a subject* (cf. §3.3.1, where Avicenna explicitly states that Porphyry described the common accident in such a way just because of its confusion with the ontological accident). Porphyry's three definitions are exposed: the first one (1) describes the accident as "what may come to be and be corrupted without the corruption of its subject" (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 12.24-25; Dimašqī's translation, p. 1086.5); the second one (2) describes the accident as "what can either belong or not belong to its subject" (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 13.3-4; Dimašqī's translation, p. 1086.9-10); finally, the third one (3) describes the accident as "what is not a genus, nor a species, nor a differentia, nor a proprium and always subsists in a subject" (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 13.4-5; Dimašqī's translation, p. 1086.10-11), echoing Arist., *Top.* A8, 103b7-19. All the three definitions are taken into exam in the subsequent paragraphs.

(§3.1) [*Let us now...of the differentia*] The first fault individuated in the first definition of the common accident is arguably the same that was individuated in three of the four definitions of differentia in chap. I.13, §3.2.2, namely that the term that plays the role of a genus, i.e. "universal", is not mentioned in the definition.

[*The second error...in what follows*] The second problematic point individuated in the first definition of the common accident regards the sense in which "coming to be" and "being corrupted" are meant in the definition, for if it is understood in external existence, then a part of the common accidents, such as inseparable accidents, does not match this description. In fact, inseparable accidents can be removed from their subjects only in estimation (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 12.24-13.2). If "coming to be" and "being corrupted" are meant both in external existence and in estimation, then another inconsistency appears, namely that "coming to be" does not apply in the very same sense to both external existence and estimation.

[*Moreover, among the...in this description*] A third problem with the first definition of common accident is that some accidental features can be removed in estimation from their subjects but entail their subjects' corruption (as previously stated in chap. I.6, §6.3), so that these accidental features do not fit in the first definition of "common accident". Features of this kind might include propria, which cannot be what Avicenna is thinking of in this context, and *per se-2* predicates described in Arist., *APo* A4, 73a37-b3, namely those predicates whose subjects are included in their definitions. Although Aristotle's exact conception of *per se-2* predicates is a controversial matter, this class of predicates might include propria as well as some inseparable accidents, a classical

example of which is “snubness”, which requires the presence of its subject “nose” in its definitory statement<sup>29</sup>.

(§3.2) [*You found that...valid as well*] The issues raised at §3.1 with regard to the first definition hold valid for the second one too, since it is left unspecified in it whether the accident can belong or not to the thing in the external existence or in conception, and inseparable accidents are such only in conception.

(§3.3.1) [*As to the...the common accident*] The problem with the negative definition of the common accident is that if there is no mention in it of the fact that it is *universal*, individuals can virtually fit in the same definition (cf. the same fault individuated in the first definition at §3.1 and in Porphyry’s definitions of differentia in chap. I.13, §3.2.2). The additional reference preserved in certain manuscripts to natures *qua* natures, i.e. considered as neither universal nor particular, is probably a later addition, and does not affect the argumentation anyway.

[*However, the author...to the substance*] The part of the third definition that mentions the subsistence of the accident in its subject is at stake, for it is considered as a piece of evidence of Porphyry’s substantial assimilation of the common accident and the accident of the *Categories*.

(§3.3.2) [*They said that...nor a proprium*] Avicenna criticises an attempt at justifying Porphyry’s definition of the common accident as “always subsistent in a subject”. Reportedly, a group of philosophers claimed that Porphyry’s addition of the condition that the common accident is always subsistent in a subject to its negative definition as neither a genus, nor a species, nor a differentia, nor a proprium is required in order to distinguish the common accident from non-signifying utterances. The argument contested by Avicenna corresponds to the one briefly exposed in a marginal note in MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 154<sup>r</sup> (= Dimašqī’s translation of the *Isagoge*, p. 1086, n. 2), stating that Porphyry “added this because of the difference between the accident and the non-signifying utterances (*al-alfāz ġayr al-dālla*), since those are not one of these four [utterances]”. The position was likely current in the Peripatetic school of Baġdād, where the marginal notes of MS BnF ar. 2346 originated. Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūġī*, pp. 140.21-141.1, defends Porphyry’s definition by claiming that it allows to distinguish the common accident from utterances of the sort of “goat-stag”, denoting non-existing

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Arist., *Met.* Z5,1030b16-28. Alexandrian commentators (cf. Ps.-Elias [David], *In Isag.*, 45.5-6 (p. 119); David, *In Isag.*, p. 173.22-29; Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 98.26-31) assumed snubness as an example of inseparable accident, as well as Ammonius did (Ammon., *In Isag.*, pp. 110.25-111.6). Notably, Philoponus did not assume *per se* accidents as separable at least in conception, for he contrasted this kind of predicates with inseparable accidents in Philop., *In APo*, 94.1-10. His sharp distinction between inseparable accidents and *per se* accidents is due to the consideration of the removability of inseparable accidents in conception, which leads him to deny that this kind of predicables is demonstrable (p. 94.5: οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτά), for it does not belong *per se* to the subject. Philoponus might also have in mind Aris. *APo* A6, 75a32-33, where Aristotle claims that no demonstrative knowledge can be attained from predicables eternally though not *per se* belonging to a subject.

beings, which is precisely the argument of Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 114.15-22 (cf. also Elias, *In Isag.*, pp. 92.24-93.1; Arethas, *Scholia In Porph. Isag.*, 174.1-8 and *Ibid.*, 175.1-3; the Syriac commentary on the *Isagoge* designed as *Anonymus Vaticanus* in BAUMSTARK 1900, p. 250); terms denoting fictional beings might have been considered as non-signifying terms already in Greek Late Antique tradition (cf. Philop., *In An. Post.*, pp. 362.32-363.2, where the word “goat-stag” is said to appear to signify and Joannes Damascenus, *Fragmenta Philosophica*, 1.6-15, where the same term is classified as an articulated, though non-signifying utterance). Hence, the view recorded in the marginal note in MS BnF ar. 2346 and criticised by Avicenna might have stemmed from Ammonius’ defence of Porphyry’s definition, with which Ibn al-Ṭayyib appears to be acquainted. Avicenna’s rejection of the Baġdād Peripatetic position is grounded in that there are other elements preventing any other utterance but the common accident from sharing the definition of ‘common accident’, even though they are not stressed explicitly, like the fact that it denotes a universal notion and that it is a signifying utterance.

## COMMENTARY – TREATISE II

## Chapter II.1

(§1.1) [*In order to...universality in them*] The paragraph contains Avicenna's brief introduction to the second treatise of *Madḥal*, devoted to the analysis of the shared and proper features of the five universals and corresponding to the second section of Porphyry's *Isagoge* (*Isag.*, pp. 13.9-22.13). Such a comparative analysis of the five universals is considered redundant by Avicenna, who nonetheless adheres in *Madḥal* to the consolidated structure of the traditional dissertations on Porphyry's *Isagoge* (*al-kutub al-madḥaliyya*) and deals with this section as well. Noteworthy, the *Madḥal* of the *Šifā'* represents an exception, being the only case in which Avicenna deals with the contents of this section of Porphyry's *Isagoge*. The second part of Porphyry's *Isagoge* was considered as redundant also in the Alexandrian tradition, that justified its presence as necessary to make the subject more accessible for a non-specialist public (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.*, p. 115.11-16 and Elias, *In Isag.*, p. 93.15-23; as underlined by Elias, the work was offered to the Roman notable Chrysaorius, on whose identity cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 23-24). The first feature shared by all the five universals consists in that they are all universal, i.e. predicated of many items (quoting Porph., *Isag.*, p. 13.10); the following critical remark, reassessing that the definitions that Porphyry provided for the differentia, the proprium and the common accident lack a mention of their universality – a point made by Avicenna in chap. I.13, §3.2.2 and I.14, §3.1 –, seems quite unnecessary, and might be a later addition to a first version of the text (as to the possibility that the remark does not match perfectly the author's *usus scribendi*, see the note to the critical apparatus and DI VINCENZO 2017, pp. 43-45).

(§1.2) [*All of them...they are predicated*] The second feature shared by the five universals enumerated by Avicenna is actually not a quotation of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, being rather grounded in Arist., *Cat.*, 1b10-13: it consists in that the five universals fit in the rule of the transitivity of predication, i.e. they are rightly predicated both of their subjects and of the subjects of their subjects (cf. ROHR 1978, pp. 379-385), which means that they are *synonymously* predicated of their subjects; the same point is made in *Maqūlāt* I.2, p. 15.10-15 (T18 in *General Introduction*, §III.4). Avicenna argues that the synonymous predication is not explicitly defined in Aristotle's *Categories* as an *essential* predication, but rather as a kind of predication in which the subjects all share a *unique* notion. In *Maqūlāt* I.3, pp. 22.18-23.9 evidently relying on Arist. *Cat.* 1a20-b9, Avicenna states that being predicated as of a subject is the distinctive feature of universals with respect to particulars, rather than being a distinction between essential and accidental predicables (on this passage, cf. CAMINADA 2016). Avicenna's assumption on synonymous predication was far from being universally acknowledged, since the tradition mostly endorsed the view that only the genus, the species and the differentia specifica are synonymously predicated insofar as they are essentially predicated of their subjects (cf. DI VINCENZO 2016, pp. 173-181). The possibility to

conceive accidental universals as predicated synonymously of their subjects depends on Avicenna's interpretation of accidental predicables as the combination of a non-specified subject *x* with the accident that inheres in it, so that "white" is predicated synonymously of, for instance, "man" *qua* "thing provided with whiteness" and not *qua* whiteness (hence the relevance of Avicenna's insistence in chap. I.14, §1.4 and §2.1 on the difference between accidents such as "whiteness" that are paronymously predicated and the adjectival predicates derived from them, such as "white", that are synonymously predicated of their subjects).

(§2.1) [*According to the...genus and species*] The passage elaborates on Porphy., *Isag.*, pp. 13.23-14.3, where Porphyry states that genera and differentiae share the fact of embracing several species, i.e. they are both predicated of many items specifically different. Avicenna's attitude is critical for the same reasons why he contended the claim that the differentia is predicated of many items specifically different in chap. I.13, §3.2.3. The example of "rational" brought in by Porphyry in order to provide an instance of a differentia predicated of many species (namely "man" and "divine being") was already reconducted to a case of differentia that is primarily predicated of the only species it constitutes, i.e. "man" (see chap. I.13, §4.3). Avicenna also contemplates the possibility that a differentia can be said to be predicated of many species if one means that it is predicated of the species of the only species it constitutes, but in such a case the definition of the differentia as "predicated of many items differing in species" would require some specification; if, on the other hand, the species that are referred to in the definition are the proximate ones, then Avicenna's objections hold valid.

(§2.2) [*The second shared...you soon after*] The paragraph at stake regards Porphyry's statement that genera and differentiae share that what is predicated of them essentially (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*) is also predicated of the species subsumed under them (Cf. *Isag.*, p. 14.3-5 in Dimašqī's translation, p. 1088.5-7)<sup>30</sup>; in other words, what is essentially predicated of a genus or of a differentia is also predicated of its subject in virtue of the transitivity of the predication, given that both the genus and the differentia are predicated essentially of their subjects. Avicenna contends that this feature is common to all the five universals, as he claimed in §1.2; what is specifically shared by the genus and the differentia is rather that what is predicated of them essentially is also predicated *essentially* of the species subsumed under them. This cannot apply to propria and common accidents, since they are not predicated essentially of their subjects. Taking into account two examples mentioned by Avicenna in §1.2, we have the following schemes of predication:

[1] The white is coloured;

[2] The white is visible;

<sup>30</sup> The Greek text of Porphy., *Isag.*, p. 14.3-5 actually reads: "everything is predicated of the genus *as of the genus* (ὡς γένους) is also predicated of its species, as well as everything is predicated of the differentia *as of the differentia* (ὡς διαφορᾶς) will be predicated also of its own species"; the clauses "as of the genus" and "as of the differentia" are rendered in Dimašqī's translation, respectively, as *min ʔarīqi mā huwa ġins* and *min ʔarīqi mā huwa faṣl*, which explains Avicenna's reading of this passage.

The white Zayd is white;	The white Zayd is white;
∴ The white Zayd is coloured.	∴ The white Zayd is visible.

Both cases [1] and [2] are cases in which what is predicated of a common accident (“white”, understood as “something white”) is also predicated synonymously of its subject (“the white Zayd”). In case [1] an essential predicate of the common accident (“coloured”) is also predicated of its subject, whereas in case [2] an accidental predicate of the common accident (“visible”) is also predicated of its subjects. Both cases show that, regardless whether the predicate is predicated essentially or accidentally of the common accident, it cannot be predicated essentially of the subject of the common accident: “coloured” is, in fact, not an essential predicated of “the white Zayd”, nor “visible” is. Nonetheless, both cases match the requirements of the transitivity of synonymous predication (as argued in §1.2), a feature that accidental predicates share with the essential ones. The final condition posed by Avicenna, namely that one understands essential predication by distinguishing a predication in the “what is it?” (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*) from one in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ǧawābi mā huwa*), refers to the distinction between the essential predication of the constitutive elements of the quiddity and the essential predication of what signifies the quiddity itself exposed in §3.4.2 of the same chapter.

**(§2.3)** [*The third shared...to anything else*] The paragraph quotes Porph., *Isag.*, p. 14.10-12, where genera and differentiae are said to entail, by their removal from a subject, the subject corruption. Avicenna claims this to be a corollary of the fact that both genus and differentia are constitutive of the thing’s quiddity, so that they obviously are inseparable from it; cf. also chap. I.6, especially §3.1.

**(§3.1)** [*As to the...genus for “man”*] The paragraph comments on the claim that the genus is distinguished from the differentia and from the other universals because of its greater extension of predication (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 14.14-15). Avicenna’s first remark concerning the comparison with the differentia and the proprium aims at clarifying that, despite the existence of differentiae and propria that have a wider range of predication of the genus (like, for instance, the differentiae that constitute the genus of the genus or its propria), Porphyry’s claim must be understood as referring to differentiae and propria that are subsumed under the genus in Porphyry’s tree (like, for instance, the constitutive differentiae and the propria of the species of the genus). However, the implicit assumption is also that there is a level of Porphyry’s tree at which there is no differentia nor proprium that has a wider extension in predication than the genus, i.e. the level of the highest genera. This assumption, on the other hand, does not hold right in the case of the common accident: in fact, there exist some propria of the highest genera which are common accidents of the categories’ species, such as the fact of not admitting the more and the less, which has a wider extension of predication than the genus ‘substance’, being also a feature of other categories, as well as ‘one’, ‘existent’, ‘created’. The example of motion as an accident with a wider extension of the rational

animal, which is a genus of man, seems quite out of place in the context, and might be the result of an interpolation: cf. the note to the critical apparatus and DI VINCENZO 2017, pp. 47-52.

**(§3.2-§3.3)** [*The second divergence...and exceeds it*] Paragraph §3.2 quotes Porphy., *Isag.*, p. 14.20-21, stating that the genus differs from the differentia because its notion can encompass that of the differentia in potentiality, but not the reverse (this holds true for the differentiae that have a minor extension of predication than the genus). Porphyry's explanation is that a genus potentially entails all the differentiae that divide it constituting the species subsumed under it, even when they are opposite notions like 'rational' and 'irrational'. The fact that this is so *in potentiality* allows to avoid the risk of assuming two opposites in a subject at one and the same time, and stating that, for instance, the animal is both rational and irrational in actuality. Avicenna elaborates a bit on what it means for the genus to encompass (Gr. περιέχει; Ar. *yaḥwī*) the differentia: the notion of the genus can be said to encompass that of the differentia since it embraces in potentiality the notion of a differentia as well as that of its other divisive differentiae; in terms of extension of predication, a notion can be said to encompass another if it can apply to all the subjects to which the notion included applies as well as to others to which that second notion cannot apply, thus exceeding it (cf. also in this regard Arist., *Anal. Post.* B13, 96a24-96b1). The verb 'to encompass' conveys an asymmetric relation between genus and differentia (cf. BARNES 2003, p. 114).

[*The third divergence...of the genus*] The first half of §3.3 quotes and explains Porphy., *Isag.*, pp. 14.21-15.2, arguing for a priority of the genus to the differentia based on the fact that it is not necessary, in order to conceive a genus, to conceive it as specified by one of its divisive differentiae, as "animal" does not need to be conceived as 'rational' or as 'irrational', so that the removal of the differentia does not entail the corruption of the notion of the genus. On the contrary, the removal of the notion of the genus entails that of the differentia: it is not possible, for instance, to conceive the differentia 'rational' without the possibility to conceive that it necessarily is an animal. Obviously, this holds true for the differentiae that have a minor extension of predication than the genus.

[*With regard to...in other places*] The second part of §3.3 reports a doubt that might possibly arise from both Porphyry's claims that the genus intensionally encompasses the differentia and exceeds it (cf. §3.2) and that it is prior to the differentia (cf. §3.3); the doubt concerns features like "divisible into two equal parts" that are reportedly considered as differentiae, though being not subsumed under one genus only: in fact, not only 'number', but also 'line' and other genera can be specified by this feature (*Šifā*', *Ĝadal* III.2, p. 175.12-15). However, the clause *fīmā yuzannu*, "as it is believed", denotes Avicenna's departure from the traditional view that such features are differentiae; in fact, in his own view, being even is not a divisive differentia of 'number' that constitutes a species under it, but rather a non-constitutive concomitant of its species (cf. *Ĝadal* V.2, p. 253.5-7). Avicenna's point in this regard might be grounded

in Arist., *Anal. Post.* B13, where it is set as a requirement for the differentia that it belongs to the subjects of its genus only. However, it should be noticed that *Anal. Post.* B13, as well as several passages of Aristotle's *Topics*, might suggest the idea that 'odd', i.e. non-divisible into two equal parts, is a differentia of number (cf. GRANGER 1981, p. 123 and n. 13 for the occurrences in the *Topics*).

(§3.4.1) [*And the fourth...for the animal*] Porphyry's statement in *Isag.*, p. 15.2-4 is contested for being an invalid logical differentiation, since the genus and the differentia are qualified by different attributes (respectively, the fact of being predicated  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\tilde{\omega}\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\upsilon\nu$ /*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*, and the fact of being predicated  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\tilde{\omega}\ \pi\omicron\tilde{\iota}\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\upsilon\nu$ /*min ʔarīqi ayyi šay'in huwa*), but the fact itself of being qualified by the former attribute does not necessarily imply the impossibility of being qualified by the latter and vice versa. In order to achieve a valid distinction between genus and differentia, they must be characterized by two attributes that are mutually exclusive. This mutual exclusion is what Avicenna calls, in the passage, the "potential for negation" (*quwwatu l-salbi*), namely the possibility of denying that a thing is characterized by a certain attribute by stating that it is characterized by another attribute, which is not the case of Porphyry's distinction between genus and differentia. To argue this point, Avicenna introduces an analogy: genus and differentia cannot be distinguished by simply stating that the first is predicated in the "what is it?" (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*) and the latter in the "what sort of thing is it?" (*min ʔarīqi ayyi šay'in huwa*), since the two attributes are not mutually exclusive, as it is impossible to distinguish Zayd and 'Amr on account of the fact that the former is sensitive and the latter is rational, because nothing prevents Zayd from being also rational and 'Amr from being also sensitive (or, nothing prevents Zayd, who is a sailor, from also being a goldsmith and 'Amr, who is a goldsmith, from also being a sailor). Furthermore, Avicenna is going to claim, in what follows, that genus and differentia share the fact of being predicated in the "what is it?" (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*). After stating that the two attributes of being predicated in the "what is it?" (*min ʔarīqi mā huwa*) and being predicated in the "what sort of thing is it?" (*min ʔarīqi ayyi šay'in huwa*) are not mutually exclusive, Avicenna tries to see whether Porphyry and the subsequent philosophical tradition<sup>31</sup> make good use of the more specific level of predication – namely that *in answer to* (*fī ǧawāb*) – assigning to it the "potential for negation", and taking it, therefore, as suitable to distinguish genus from differentia. In other terms, he tries to understand whether, from the perspective those philosophers, the fact that the genus is predicated *in answer to* "what is it?" (*fī ǧawābi mā huwa*) implies that it is not predicated *in answer to* "what sort of thing is it?" (*fī ǧawābi ayyi šay'in huwa*). In Avicenna's view, this is not the case: according to those philosophers, Avicenna says, nothing prevents the genus from being predicated in answer to "what

<sup>31</sup> The reference to those philosophers is quite vague: there is just the remark "according to the principles of those [philosophers]" (*'alā ušūli hā 'ulā'i*) and another allusion to a plurality of people who do not consider it impossible (*lā yamna 'ūnahu*) that a thing's differentia can also be something else's genus. However, the context reveals an anti-Porphyrean vein, which is probably not limited to the rejection of Porphyry's attempt to distinguish between genus and differentia, but also involves the later tradition of commentators, following this pattern.

sort of thing is it?” (*fī ḡawābi ayyi šay’in huwa*) because a genus can distinguish a thing from another that does not belong to that genus and, therefore, has not the quiddity that the genus constitutes. Vice versa, a differentia can be considered, in those philosophers’ view, both as a genus and as a differentia: the example is that of the *generical differentiae*, like “sensitive”, that would be, in some sense, a genus for the man hearing and seeing, being also a differentia for the animal. Avicenna concludes, then, that the philosophical tradition before him has not employed the predication *in answer to* (*fī ḡawāb*) as a tool to operate a proper distinction between genus and differentia (see *General Introduction*, §III.2.2).

[*If someone said...this way, valid*] Avicenna clarifies the philosophical framework of his remarks: his solution takes the genus and the differentia to be two different natures, and not two different considerations of the same nature. Accordingly, Avicenna’s ideal interlocutor is not someone who believes that generality and differentiability are two different dispositions of the same nature (which is not contested: cf. chap. II.4, §1), but someone who, despite believing that genus and differentia are different predicables, fails to distinguish them properly.

(§3.4.2) [*But someone could...“what is it?”*] Avicenna introduces his distinction between a predication *in the* “what is it?” and a predication *in answer to the* “what is it?”. The explanation of the distinction has the form of an answer to an imaginary objection: Avicenna imagines that someone could reproach him for having already stated, in many other passages, that the differentia can be predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*), thus equating the predication of genus and differentia and losing the possibility of distinguishing these two predicables on the basis of their ways to be predicated of their subjects. As a reply, Avicenna shows that he can hold this opinion nonetheless, because he regards the fact of being predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) and the fact of being predicated in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) as different types of predication. The predicates in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) are the predicates that enter their subjects’ quiddity (*dāḥil fī l-māhiyyati*), whereas the predicates in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) are the predicates that are suitable to answer the question “what is it?”. Every predicable that is constitutive of a thing’s quiddity is predicated of that thing in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) *qua* part of its quiddity, even if, taken alone, the predicable in question cannot be considered as signifying the thing’s quiddity. In Avicenna’s view, genus and differentia are both predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) of their subjects, since they are both constitutive parts of their quiddities, sharing this general level of essential predication. As a result, Porphyry’s characterization – by simply stating that the genus is predicated in the “what is it?” (*min ṭarīqi mā huwa*) – is not sufficient to distinguish the genus from the differentia. Consequently, the distinction between the genus and the differentia must be operated at a more specific level of essential predication, which applies specifically to the genus. The differentia is not, taken alone, predicated in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*), since it does neither signify a shared nor a specific quiddity (cf. chap. I.7, §3.1); on the contrary, the differentia is

more specifically predicated in response to “what sort of thing is it?” (*fī ḡawābi ayyi šay’in huwa*). Cf. also *Ta’līqāt*, p. 60.7-11, the genus is said to be predicated of the complete shared quiddity of something, whereas the differentia is predicated in the “what is it?” as a constitutive part of the thing’s quiddity.

[*Someone among the...diverge in the definition*] Avicenna rejects the opinion of *someone among the excellent philosophers* (*ba’du l-fuḍalā’i*) about the possibility of predicating the differentia in answer to “what is it?” (*fī ḡawābi mā huwa*) in certain cases (cf. Arist. *Top.* Δ5, 128a20-29, where Aristotle mentions some unspecified philosophers who think that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστῖ). If this were the case, the difference between genus and differentia would lie in the fact that the genus is always a suitable answer to the question “what is it?”, signifying the principle of the thing’s essence, whereas the differentia is so just in some cases, since sometimes a differentia may also convey a relation, or a quality (being, for example, an affective quality; for the kinds of qualities in Aristotle, cf. Arist., *Cat.* 8, 8b25ss., *Met.* Δ14, 1020a33-b12 and *Phys.* E2, 226a27-29 and MARIANI 1997, p. 20). According to Avicenna, there are two problems in this statement: one is the denomination ‘differentia’ applied to those qualities that are not specific differentiae; the other is that – if the philosopher quoted by Avicenna admits that, in certain cases, the differentia is predicated in answer to “what is it?” – being predicated in this way is no longer a distinctive feature of either genus or differentia on which the distinction between these two predicables can be based. The identification of the philosopher qualified as “someone among the excellent [philosophers]” (*ba’du l-fuḍalā’i*) is uncertain. Analogous locutions are elsewhere used by Avicenna in the *Šifā’* (for the occurrences in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, see BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 566). In *Ilāhiyyāt* IX.3, p. 393.16-17, “an excellent [man] among the predecessors” (*fāḍil al-mutaqaddimīna*) probably designates Alexander of Aphrodisias (BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 561). As to the argument quoted, by claiming that the name “differentia” designates, sometimes, relations or affective qualities, Alexander testified (*In Top.*, pp. 47.29-48.1) that the name “differentia” was used in such a broad sense, also including accidental qualities. Alexander, however, did not explicitly argue that, for this reason, the genus is more suitable than the differentia to be predicated in the “what is it?”.

(§3.5) [*The divergence that...it is “mortal”*] Porphyry’s differentiation between the genus and the differentia in virtue of the fact that a single species has one genus only but several differentiae is at stake. Avicenna proves that the statement does not provide a successful differentiation between the genus and the differentia, since the first horn of the distinction, namely that the species has one genus, holds true only if one takes into consideration the proximate genus to the exclusion of the others. In this case, the condition applied to the first horn of the distinction should be applied to the second one as well, namely to the claim that the species has several differentiae, which would turn out to be false, since a species has only one proximate constitutive differentia. The example mentioned by Porphyry, namely that of ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ as the two differentiae of the species ‘man’, was already contested in chap. I.11, §4.3 and chap.

I.13, §4.3, where Avicenna showed that there is no such thing as a combination of an exclusively divisive differentia and an exclusively constitutive one; however, even maintaining Porphyry's doctrinal framework, the case should be analysed by taking into account the only proximate differentia of the species, which would be 'mortal'. Hence, the differentiation proposed does not work, unless one applies different conditions to the two horns of the distinction.

[*But other examples...detail about this*] The alternative examples proposed that might possibly justify the validity of Porphyry's statement do so only apparently ('*alà zāhir al-amr*'). In fact, 'moving voluntarily' does not match a fundamental requirement for the differentiae, namely the fact of belonging *primarily* to the subject, since it does not attach directly and primarily to 'animal'; rather, the fact of being capable of moving voluntarily belongs to the animal in virtue of the fact that it is corporeal, i.e. in virtue of a higher genus (cf. *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* V.4, pp. 221.6-222.14). Hence, Porphyry's statement does not hold true for this case too. Another viable way to understand Porphyry's statement would be that of considering that the proximate and remote genera of a species are all intensionally included in one genus only, which does not happen with regard to the differentiae, that stay separate: the notion of the genus 'animal', for instance, also includes being a body and a substance, which are remote genera with respect to the species 'man'; the notion of the differentia 'rational', on the other hand, does not embrace the notion of being animate, or non-animate, or living, or non-living and so on.

(§3.6) [*The divergence that...respect to matter*] The paragraph comments on Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.6-7, which deals with the renowned Aristotelian analogy between matter and genus, on the one hand, and differentia and form on the other (cf. also *Isag.*, p. 11.12-17, reminiscent of Arist., *Met.* Z7, 1033a1-5, of which it also recalls the example of the bronze statue). The first remark made by Avicenna is that Porphyry's claim presupposes the implicit assumption that what is analogous to matter differs from what is analogous to form. Genus is distinguished from matter with respect to two main features: the first is the fact that the genus is predicated of its species, whereas matter cannot be predicated of the composite; the reason is that the matter is considered *qua* part of the whole represented by the composite, and the predication of the part with respect to the whole is not allowed (cf. *Šifā'*, *Burhān* I.10, pp. 99.17-100.13, reproduced *verbatim* in *Ilāhiyyāt* V.3, pp. 214.2-215.3, and *Ilāhiyyāt* V.3, pp. 213.15-214.1). The second main reason of distinction between genus and matter is that the genus embraces both the differentiae that are mutually opposite at the same time (i.e. 'rational' and 'non-rational' and so on), whereas two opposites forms cannot subsist at one and the same time in actuality in the same matter. The analogy between genus and matter, on the one hand, and differentia and form on the other, is grounded in the fact that both in the case of the specification of a genus by means of a differentia and in the case of the addition of a form to a matter, the species and the composite are realized in actuality. The analogy between genus and matter was also the object of Alexander's *Maqāla fī anna l-hayūlā ġayra l-ġinsi wa-fīmā yaštariqāni wa-yaftariqāni* (BADAWĪ 1971, pp. 52.9-55.18 in the

Arabic translation by Ishaq b. Hunayn; cf. GOULET AND AOUAD 1989, p. 133, point 'o'), and of Yaḥyà Ibn 'Adī's commentary on it.

## Chapter II.2

(§1.1) [*As to what...genus and species*] The paragraph quotes Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.12-13 on the priority of the genus and the species to their subject, which Avicenna ascribes to the differentia as well.

(§1.2) [*The second one...their sharing it*] As Avicenna remarks, being universal, which is mentioned in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.10-12 as a shared feature of genus and species, is rather a feature common to all the five predicables. Avicenna's suggestion is that of specifying that genus and species share something that the other predicables do not, namely the fact of signifying the particulars' quiddity.

(§2.1) [*As to the...encompass the species*] Porphyry's statement that the genus encompasses the species but not the reverse (*Isag.*, p. 15.15-16, likely on the basis of Arist., *Top.* Δ1, 121b3-4) is analogous to the statement that the genus encompasses the differentia but not the reverse (cf. chap. II.1, §3.2). On the meaning of the verb "to encompass" in the context, see Commentary on chap. II.1, §3.2 and BARNES 2003, p. 114.

(§2.2) [*Another divergence concerns...exists as well*] The paragraph elaborates on the statement of the priority of the genus to the species (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.16-18; on the meaning of the Greek προϋφίστασθαι, "pre-exist", in this context, cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 256-260). The same subject was the object of a famous debate between Alexander and Xenocrates, who endorsed a priority of the species to the genus (Arabic text in BADAWĪ 1978<sup>2</sup>, pp. 281-282; cf. also PINES 1961; van Ess in KRÄMER 1973, pp. 188-190; RASHED 2004b and RASHED 2007, pp. 89-92). In the paragraph, Avicenna analyses the priority of the genus to the species in terms of an asymmetric relation with the following two conditions (cf. points 3-4 in BARNES 2003, p. 259):

- [1] If Genus exists, not necessarily Species exists;  
If Species exists, necessarily Genus exists.
- [2] If Genus is removed, necessarily Species is removed;  
If Species is removed, not necessarily Genus is removed.

The priority of the genus is a *natural priority*, i.e. the condition of that whose existence is necessary, if the species exists, and that whose removal is necessarily the cause of the removal of the species (on the basis of Arist., *Cat.*, 15a4-7, stating that genera are prior to species because they do not convert with respect to the implication of existence, and *Top.* Z4, 141b27-29, assessing the priority of genus and differentia to species with respect to the fact that their removal causes that of the species; cf. also Alexander's *Maqāla fī l-radd 'alā Ksinūqrāṭīs*, p. 282.7-11).

(§2.3) [*The third divergence...not-encompassing*] The fact that the species cannot be predicated of the genus the way the genus is predicated of the species (Porph., *Isag.*, p.

15.20-21) depends on their different extension of predication, which was dealt with to some extent in *Isag.*, p. 15.15-16 too, where the genus was said to encompass the species but not the reverse (cf. §2.1).

[*This divergence is...two different items*] Avicenna's criticism addresses the form of Porphyry's comparison between genus and species in *Isag.*, p. 15.20-21 which sounds, in Avicenna's paraphrasis, as:

- (a1) Genus is *univocally and universally predicated* of Species
- (a2) Species is not *universally predicated* of Genus

Clearly, the predicate attributed to the genus in (a1), namely "being univocally and universally predicated of the species", does not coincide with the predicate negated with regard to the species in (a2), where it is only negated that the species is *universally* predicated of the genus, without any mention of a possible *univocal* predication of it. To resume, the predicate in (a2) does not coincide with the negation of the predicate in (a1), so that the comparison between genus and species is erroneously made on the basis of two different features. Actually, this fault cannot be reproached to Porphyry's statement in the Greek original (τὰ μὲν γένη συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖται τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὰ εἰδῶν, τὰ δὲ εἶδη τῶν γενῶν οὐκέτι, "[a1] genera are predicated univocally of the species subsumed under them, [a2] but not the species of the genera"), since the predicate negated in (a2) is not explicitly stressed in the Greek, where (a2) is condensed in a very short negative sentence. Avicenna's quotation must derive from Dimašqī's translation of the passage (pp. 1091.13-1092.1), where (a2) is rendered as *fa-ammā l-anwā' fa-laysat tuḥmalu 'alā l-aḡnās*, "the species are not predicated of the genera". Clearly, Dimašqī's translation of (a2) was meant to render in a more complete form the negation οὐκέτι, "not", of the Greek, but the part concerning synonymous predication was mistakenly omitted, which explains Avicenna's critical reception of this lemma.

(§2.4) [*Another divergence consists...animality, namely rationality*] Avicenna elaborates on Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.21-23, and asserts that the genus exceeds the species extensionally, i.e. in virtue of its broader scope of predication (cf. §2.1 and §2.3), whereas the species exceeds the genus intensionally, since it also embraces the notion of its differentia specifica, which is an additional notion with respect to that of its genus. As an instance, 'animal', which is a genus of 'man', exceeds its species extensionally because it is also predicated of other species, such as 'bird', 'horse' and the like, whereas 'man' is only predicated of its individuals; 'man', on the other hand, exceeds 'animal' intensionally because it also entails the notion of 'rational', which is not included in the notion of 'animal'.

(§2.5) [*Another divergence is...genera and species*] Porphyry's statement in *Isag.*, p. 15.23-24 that no lowest species can be said to be a genus as well as no highest genus can be said to be a species, whereas the intermediate genera and species can be both genera and species according to two different ways of considering them, is dismissed

by Avicenna as an unnatural (*mutakallaf*) way to explain the difference between the two predicables.

(§3.1) [*As to what...the common proprium*] The paragraph is a brief comment on *Isag.*, p. 16.2-3, stating that the genus and the species are both predicated of the species and follow it. Genus and proprium are said to “follow” (Gr. ἔπεσθαι; Ar. *tābi ‘āni*) the species in the sense of necessary implication: if A is, for instance, a man, it necessarily follows that it is also an animal, which is the genus of ‘man’, as well as it necessarily follows that it is also capable of laughing, which is a proprium of ‘man’. This feature is shared also by the differentia specifica, since it is correct to infer, for instance, that if A is a man, it must also be rational.

(§3.2) [*In order to...universality in them*] The paragraph quotes *Isag.*, p. 16.4-6 and states that both genus and proprium are predicated equally of their subjects, i.e. they do not belong to one subject or to another at a different degree: a man is not more or less ‘animal’ than another man or than a horse, as well as he is neither more nor less capable of laughing than another man. Avicenna blames Porphyry for failing to see that this feature is shared by genus, differentia and species too, and for considering this shared feature between genus and proprium as applying to every kind of proprium. According to Avicenna, this claim only suits propria that are consequent to the thing’s form (such as being capable of acquiring knowledge), and not those that are consequent to its matter (such as having wide nails and the like), since the latter kind of propria admits variations of degree (there might be, for instance, a man with wider nails than another); for such a distinction, cf. also §4.1.

(§3.3) [*Another shared feature...the essential feature*] Avicenna comments on *Isag.*, p. 16.6-7, where Porphyry states that both genera and propria are predicated synonymously of their subjects, a feature that Avicenna would rather extend to all the five universal predicables (cf. chap. II.1, §1.2). In the passage at stake, Avicenna might critically address Porphyry’s interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of synonymous predication in the *Categories* (Arist. *Cat.* 3a33-34): cf. Porph., *In Cat.*, p. 81.4-7 and p. 80.20-23, where Porphyry restricts this kind of predication to genera and species, and p. 81.6-11, p. 92.25-35 and p. 94.35-36, where synonymous predication is extended to differentiae specificae (the identification of synonymous and essential predication might have been stimulated by passages like Arist. *Cat.* 1a6-12 and 1b10-15, where the examples provided for the synonymous predication and the predication as of a subject employ genera and species). In *Maqūlāt* I.3, p. 27.4-6 Avicenna explicitly recalls *Isag.*, p. 16.6-7 and underlines the evident contradiction with the restricted interpretation of synonymous predication that Porphyry holds when it comes to commenting Aristotle’s *Categories*.

(§4.1) [*As to what...capability of laughing*] Porph. *Isag.*, p. 16.9 states the priority of the genus to the proprium because the genus is a constitutive element of the thing’s quiddity, whereas the proprium follows to its realization. A classification of propria is

presupposed, according to whether they originate from the thing's matter, or from its form or from both matter and form (the same distinction is also referred to at §3.2).

(§4.2) [*The second divergence...species among them*] The second divergence between genus and proprium (*Isag.*, p. 16.10-11) regards their scope of predication (for the meaning of “to encompass” in this context, cf. chap. II.1, §3.2): the genus is predicated of several species, whereas the proprium belongs specifically to one species only, with which it counterpredicates; this statement holds true only by assuming ‘proprium’ in the most specific sense presented in chap. I.14, §1.4.

(§4.3) [*Another divergence consists...mean this convertibility*] Avicenna comments on Porphyry's statement that a proprium is counterpredicated of that of which it is a proprium, a genus is not counterpredicated of anything (*Isag.*, p. 16.11-13), meaning that the proprium applies to that to which the species of which it is predicated applies and conversely, whereas the case of the genus with respect to its species is different. The term *tan'akisu*, “it converts” here employed by Avicenna corresponds, in Porphyry's passage, to the Greek ἀντικατηγορεῖται, “it counterpredicates”, which is rendered in Dimašqī's translation as *tubādilu*. The form *in'akasa* is employed in Dimašqī's translation to render the Greek ἀντιστρέφει, “it converts” in *Isag.*, p. 19.13-15 (= Dimašqī's translation, p. 1099.4-6, where ἀντιστρέφει is translated as *yan'akisu* and ἀντικατηγορεῖται as *tukāfi'u fī l-ḥamli*), and Avicenna might assume the two notions as substantially equivalent (despite *Isag.*, p. 19.13-15 might suggest a differentiation between the two notions, the tradition of commentators did not react to this hint and assumed the two notions as substantially equivalent; cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 266-267; Avicenna as well does not seem to react to it in chap. II.3, §4.2). Avicenna seems to propose, at a first stage, a restriction of the validity of the statement to those propria that are permanent and common to all of their subjects, i.e. which are always predicated of their species and to the whole of it. Avicenna has in the back of his mind Porph., *Isag.*, 12.13-22, where four kinds of proprium are presented, only the last of which — namely the proprium always belonging to its species and to the whole of it — is finally said to be ‘proprium’ in the proper sense meant in Logic. Arguably, Avicenna wanted to prevent the inference that the kind of proprium that does not always belong to its species, or not to all of it, can be counterpredicated as well. The last clause of the paragraph appears as a sort of correction to Avicenna's own restriction, stating that Porphyry's statement might be considered as valid for the natures of proprium and genus in absolute (*muṭlaqan*), i.e. without any further specification, since the proprium can be counterpredicated (in case it permanently belongs to all the individuals of the species of which it is predicated), whereas the genus never can. In such a framework, the differentiation between the natures of genus and proprium would be based on the possibility or not to counterpredicate, and since some of the propria (i.e. those that belong always to their species and that are common to all of its individuals) counterpredicate with their subjects, the nature of the proprium can be said to have this possibility, whereas that of the genus cannot. From a doctrinal point of view, the passage represents a shift within Avicenna's first intention to restrain Porphyry's statement to a

certain kind of proprium. From a syntactic point of view, it is quite difficult to understand how the last part of the passage: *a'nī hādā l-'aks*, “I mean this convertibility”, fits within the structure of the clause, from which it appears to be detached. On the non-uniform transmission of this final clause, cf. note to the apparatus.

(§4.4) [*Another divergence encompassed...the genus does*] The different scope of predication of genus and proprium (*Isag.*, p. 16.14-16) is, as Avicenna remarks, already dealt with in the preceding divergence introduced in *Isag.*, p. 16.11-13 (cf. §4.3), since it is the reason why the proprium and its species counterpredicate, whereas the genus and one of its species do not counterpredicate. The substantial coincidence of this statement with the one in *Isag.*, p. 16.11-13 was also noticed by David, *In Isag.*, p. 217.17-20 (cf. BARNES 2003, p. 267).

(§4.5) [*Another divergence derives...to a sophism*] Avicenna reads *Isag.*, p. 16.16-18, stating that the removal of the genus entails the removal of the proprium but not the reverse, as substantially equivalent to *Isag.*, p. 16.9, assessing the genus' priority to the proprium (cf. also David, *In Isag.*, p. 217.25). Avicenna's claim is based on the fact that *co-removing*, i.e. the fact that A entails the removal of B by its own removal, is one of the conditions that define natural priority (cf. Commentary on §2.2 and BARNES 2003, pp. 248-253).

(§5) [*As to genus...other shared feature*] The only shared feature between the genus and the accident mentioned by Porphyry is that they are both predicated of several items (*Isag.*, p. 16.20-21), which is tantamount to stating that they are both universal, a feature that they share with all the other universal predicables. Avicenna proposes a correction to Porphyry's lemma, which could have mentioned as a shared feature between genus and accident that they are both predicated of many items that differ in species. Actually, it should be observed that this would not work in Porphyry's perspective, since he held that the *differentia specifica* is predicated of many items that differ specifically too (*Isag.*, p. 11.7-10), so that this would not be a feature exclusively shared by genus and common accident. For Avicenna's correction of Porphyry's claim in this regard, cf. chap. I.13, §3.2.3.

(§6.1) [*As to the...proprium as well*] Porph., *Isag.*, p. 17.3-4 mentions as a divergence between genus and common accident the fact that the genus is prior to the species, contrarily to the common accident; on the genus' priority to the species, cf. §2.2, elaborating on *Isag.*, p. 15.16-19. The statement is verified both for the accidental features that attach to the thing's speciality, and for those that are external to it, and holds true for propria as well, since, *qua* accidental features, they are posterior to the thing's species.

(§6.2) [*The other divergence...to the other*] First, Porphyry's formulation of the second divergence between genus and common accident in *Isag.*, p. 17.6-8 is at stake: Avicenna critically addresses Porphyry's choice to refer to a feature that distinguishes primarily the subjects of genus and accident (i.e. the fact of sharing equally the genus

and not the accident), from which one has to infer the feature that distinguishes the two predicables (namely that the genus is predicated equally of all its subjects, contrarily to the accident). A second problem addressed by Avicenna is that it is not true that all the accidents are predicated of their subjects unequally. The examples provided by Avicenna are ‘square’ and ‘triangle’ are, in Aristotle’s perspective, qualities of the surfaces (cf. Arist., *Cat.*, 10a11-16), and can be predicated accidentally of different subjects which are not qualified by these shapes at different degrees (two triangular figures are triangular, i.e. the sum of their internal angles is equal to two right angles, in the very same way).

(§6.3) [*The divergence that...genus and accident*] The first point critically addressed by Avicenna in *Isag.*, p. 17.8-10 is a formal one, namely that the comparison between accident and genus is based on two different attributes, i.e. subsisting primarily (Gr. προηγουμένως; Dimašqī’s Ar. *aşlan*; Avicenna’s paraphrase: *‘alà al-qaşd al-awwal*) in the individuals and being naturally prior (Gr. φύσει πρότερα; Dimašqī’s Ar. *sābiqa bi-l-ṭib ‘i*; Avicenna’s paraphrase: *aqdam*) to them. It can be argued that, in Porphyry’s view, stating that the genus and the species are prior to the individuals must be tantamount to stating that they do not subsist primarily in the individuals; if Porphyry understands, as it seems, the priority of genera and species to the individuals as a natural priority, he would have a point in stating that genera and species are prior to individuals because they co-remove them by their own removal and not the reverse (cf. §2.2; on the natural priority of genera and species to the individuals as a Platonic trait of Porphyry’s text, see TRICOT 1984, p. 41, n. 1; against this interpretation, see DE LIBERA AND SEGONDS 1998, p. 66, n. 128). In this framework, accidents cannot be prior to individuals because they subsist as their attachments (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων...ὑφίσταται) and cannot co-remove individuals by their own removal; this reading implies the same overlap between common accidents and the ontological accidents of Aristotle’s *Categories* presupposed by *Isag.*, p. 13.5 and contested by Avicenna in chap. I.14. (on the possibility of this overall interpretation of Porphyry’s text and its difficulties, cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 270-276). In Porphyry’s view, then, the primary subsistence in the individuals and the natural priority to them are mutually exclusive. Avicenna’s interpretation, on the other hand, might operate a silent distortion of Porphyry’s original purpose at several levels. First and foremost, he clearly understands differently Porphyry’s claim that accidents subsist primarily in the individuals, which he does read in the light of Porphyry’s definition of common accident as always subsistent in a subject (*Isag.*, p. 13.5). The term ‘subsist’ (*tūğadu fi*), in fact, is tacitly reconducted from its ontological meaning to the logical ground and understood as a relation of predication between the accidents and the individuals. A crucial role in Avicenna’s reading is also played by the term ‘primarily’ (*‘alà al-qaşd al-awwal*), which he understands as meaning “by no mediation” (*lā bi-wāsiṭat şay’in*), i.e. not in virtue of anything else (the fact that an accident belongs primarily to its subject is glossed as equivalent to the fact that it belongs to it not by mediation of anything else in chap. I.6, §5.1). In this framework, nothing prevents something from being at a time prior to something else

and belonging primarily, i.e. directly, to it. In this sense, the divergence between genus and common accident is understood in terms of predication in the following way: the genus is predicated of the individuals indirectly, hence not primarily, since it is predicated of them *qua* genus of their species (i.e. by the mediation of their species): an individual man is an animal because it is, first and foremost, a man. Common accidents, on the other hand, directly attach to the individuals of which they are predicated directly, by no mediation. The reference to the species in Porphyry's lemma is, however, superfluous and does not work within the framework of Avicenna's reading, since the species are predicated primarily of the individuals too (on Porphyry's puzzling mention of the species in the context of this differentiation between genus and common accident, see also BARNES 2003, p. 270).

(§6.4) [*The divergence that...omitted it there*] Porph., *Isag.*, p. 17.10-11 states that genera, unlike common accidents, are predicated essentially of their subjects, but the divergence holds between genus and proprium as well.

### Chapter II.3

(§1.1) [*As to differentia... under them equally*] The paragraph quotes *Isag.*, p. 18.11-13 without elaborating further on it; it should be noticed that this feature is not shared exclusively by differentia and species, but also by genus and proprium (cf. chap. II.2, §3.2). Noteworthy, the idea that species and differentia are equally *shared/participated* by their subjects (Gr. τὸ ἐπίσης μετέχουσιν; Dimašqī's Ar. *al-ašyā' allatī taštariku fihā taštariku bi-l-sawiyati*) is transposed in logical terms as denoting that species and differentia are *predicated* equally of their subjects (*yuhmalāni 'alā mā tahtahumā bi-l-sawiyati*). Thus, the notion of 'participation' that might be suggested by the Greek μετέχειν in this context and that is rendered quite faithfully in Dimašqī's translation went lost in Avicenna's paraphrase.

(§1.2) [*The other shared... not mention it*] Quoting *Isag.*, p. 18.13-14, Avicenna states that the second feature shared by differentia and species is that they are both *permanent* to their subjects (reading *dā'imiyāni*, instead of *dātīyyāni* printed in the Cairo ed.; cf. note to the apparatus), meaning that nothing can be conceived without its constitutive differentia and its species, i.e. its specific quiddity. As observed by Avicenna, however, the genus fits in this description too, insofar as it is a constitutive element of the thing's quiddity.

(§2.1) [*As to the divergence... inquired into before*] Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.16-19 distinguished species and differentia because the species is predicated in the "what is it?" (Gr. ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν; Ar. *min ṭarīqi mā huwa*), whereas the differentia is predicated in the "what sort of thing is it?" (Gr. ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστίν; Ar. *min ṭarīqi ayyi šay'in huwa*). Avicenna's further remarks recall chap. II.1, §3.4, where he explained that 'predicated in the "what sort of thing is it?'" does not refer to the predicates that can accidentally denote what sort of thing something is within a class of beings; a species, for instance, entails of course a differentiation of the items embraced within that species from those that are embraced by other species within the same genus, so that, in a way, the species might denote what sort of things they are, but this is in virtue of the notion of the constitutive differentia that is included in it. In other words, the species signifies what sort of thing something is only through the mediation of the notion of its constitutive differentia, hence not primarily and *per se*. The terms 'primarily' (*awwalan*) and '*per se*' (*bi-dātīhi*) here echo Arist., *APo* A4 (cf. also *APo* A5, 74a4-13); by denying that being predicated in the "what sort of thing is it?" belongs to the species primarily and *per se*, Avicenna also denies that it is a universal essential feature of the species, and claims that it is rather one of its accidents.

(§2.2) [*The other divergence... species in absolute*] Avicenna comments on *Isag.*, p. 18.19-21, stating that differentia is *often* (πολλάκις) predicated of several species, whereas the species is only predicated of individuals that are not specifically different,

that this holds true if only the lowest species is assumed, leaving aside any other intermediate species, which can be ultimately predicated of individuals that belong to different species subsumed under it. Avicenna seems to insist on Porphyry's attempt at smoothing the claim that the differentia is predicated of many items specifically different by *often* (Gr. *πολλάκις*; Dimašqī's Ar. *fī akṭar al-amr*), which is rendered twice in Avicenna's quotation (*fī akṭar al-aḥwāl aw fī kaṭīr min al-aḥwāl*). The reason for Avicenna's emphasis on Porphyry's delimitation of the validity of this claim is that, according to Avicenna, the fact of being predicated of many items specifically different does not belong essentially to the nature of the differentia. In fact, the differentia is primarily predicated of the species that it constitutes, and only secondarily and by mediation – hence, by accident – of items that belong to several species: 'sensitive', for instance, which is the constitutive differentia of 'animal', is predicated of the individuals of the species 'man', 'horse' and so one, but only secondarily; primarily, it is predicated of the species 'animal' that it constitutes, which is a genus of 'man', 'horse' and the like (cf. chap. I.13, §3.2.3 and DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 139-151).

(§2.3) [*The third divergence...with the composite*] Porph. *Isag.*, p. 18.21-23 assesses the natural priority of the differentia to the species, based on the fact that the differentia co-removes the species by its own removal but not the reverse (cf. also Arist., *Top.* Z6, 144b9-11). Porphyry's example mentions the differentia 'rational', which removes by its own removal the species 'man' and is not removed by the removal of the species 'man' since there still remains a species characterized by that differentia, i.e. 'divine being'. Avicenna's remark on the differentia 'rational' in Porphyry's example states that it is not the constitutive differentia of the species 'man', but rather the divisive differentia of its genus 'animal'; for Avicenna's own view on the subject, cf. chap. I.11, §4.3 and chap. I.13, §4.1. Porphyry's example to display the differentia's priority to the species seems to imply that the differentia is not co-removed by the removal of the species as long as there exists another species characterized by that differentia in actuality. Avicenna claims that the differentia's priority to the species, expressed in terms of its co-removing the species being impossible that it is, on its turn, co-removed by the removal of the species, is analogous to the form's priority to the composite, i.e. the priority of a constitutive element to the thing constituted.

(§2.4.1) [*He mentioned another...gather at all*] Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 18.23-19.3 mentions the possibility for two differentiae to be compounded in order to constitute a species, which distinguishes the differentiae from the species, that do not have the possibility to be compounded. Porphyry's example for the combination of two differentiae is a recurrent one, i.e. that of 'rational' and 'mortal', which constitute the species 'man'; cf. Avicenna's critical analysis of this example in chap. I.11, §4.3 and chap. I.13, §4.1. The two differentiae do not have the same rank in Porphyry's tree, since 'rational' divides the genus 'animal' and is predicated, according to Porphyry, of both men and divine beings, whereas 'mortal' is added to it to distinguish men from divine beings, so that the composition resulting from the two only applies to men. Avicenna mentions as an alternative to save the validity of Porphyry's statement for

differentiae of the same rank the examples of “sensitive” and “moving voluntarily” as differentiae of ‘animal’; this is a bogus solution, since Avicenna actually considers ‘sensitive’ as a differentia of ‘animal’, and ‘moving voluntarily’ as a proprium of ‘animal’, and a common accident for the species ‘man’ (according to *Isag.* 13.18-21; see also chap. II.4, §1 and *Hidāya*, p. 67). Hence, it remains that Porphyry’s statement does not hold true for any differentiae, but for differentiae of different ranks. As to what concerns the composition of two species, if the two species are not distinct, but are subsumed the one under the other, they cannot be said to be compounded to form a third different species, since they are simply a more general and a more specific species. If the two species are distinct, they are not compounded any more: the background for this observation might be an ancient debate concerning the existence of individuals that, apparently, result from the combination of two different species, as in the case of mules, that result from the mating of horses and donkeys. In an Aristotelian perspective, mules and similar cases would be arguably denied the status of species: cf. Arist., *Met.* Z8, 1033b33-1034a2 (cf. also BARNES 2003, pp. 283-284).

(§2.4.2) [*But someone could...is not denied*] A possible objection to the claim that two species different in rank are not compounded to form a third species is presented, which consists in analysing two differentiae different in rank such as ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ as two species, so that Porphyry’s claim that ‘rational’ and ‘mortal’ concur to the constitution of the species ‘man’ would refer to the composition of two species different in rank that concur to the constitution of a third species. This objection implies, however, a different consideration of the predicable differentia, which is assumed as encompassing also the term that refers to the genus: ‘rational’, for instance, would correspond to “animal provided with rationality”. Avicenna contends such a possibility because it would entail some serious issues with regard to the definition of ‘man’ as “rational animal”, since it would be technically correct to replace ‘rational’ with “animal provided with rationality”, so that the definitory statement of ‘man’ would be a redundant clause: “animal animal provided with rationality”.

(§3.1) [*As to differentia...are so equally*] The paragraph quotes *Isag.*, p. 19.5-7, where Porphyry states that both differentia and proprium are equally predicated of their subjects; for the same feature shared by the differentia and the species, cf. also §1.1. The restriction of the validity of the statement that the proprium is predicated equally of its subjects to the proprium that is ‘common’, i.e. embraces all the individuals of its species, permanent and pertaining to the species’ form, is the same formulated in chap. II.2, §3.2.

(§3.2) [*They also share... common, permanent proprium*] The second feature shared by the differentia and the proprium is that they both belong permanently to the entire species; here again, the proprium Porphyry must be referring to is the one that converts in predication with its subjects.

(§4.1) [*As to the divergences...concerns this point*] The first divergence between differentia and proprium presented is the one exposed in *Isag.*, p. 19.11-13, namely that

the differentia is often predicated of many items specifically different, whereas the proprium is not; on the implication of the adverb “often” (Gr. πολλάκις; Dimašqī’s Ar. *fī akṭar al-amr*) in Porphyry’s text to smooth the claim that the differentia is predicated of many items specifically different, see Commentary on §2.2. On Avicenna’s rejection of the idea that the differentia can be defined as predicated of many items specifically different, see chap. I.13, §3.2.3. Avicenna’s quote of the lemma adds the specification that the proprium here referred to is the *true proprium* (*al-ḥāṣṣa al-ḥaqīqiyya*), i.e. the proprium that belongs to all the individuals of its species and permanently: cf. chap. I.14, §1.4.

(§4.2) [*Another divergence follows...proprium, it counterpredicates*] Avicenna must refer to *Isag.*, p. 19.13-15 without further elaborating it. There might be a minor textual misunderstanding in Avicenna’s reading of Porphyry’s lemma, since he omits any reference to the very first part of it, mentioning that the differentia is necessarily consequent to its subjects (Gr. ἔπεται; Dimašqī’s Ar. *yatba ‘u abadan*); Avicenna’s quote starts from the statement that the differentia does not convert with its subject (Gr. ἀντιστρέφει; Dimašqī’s Ar. *yan ‘akisū*; Avicenna’s phrasing: *yan ‘akisū fī l-ḥaml*), i.e. it is not true that the differentia holds for everything for which its subjects hold and that its subjects hold for everything for which their differentia holds (on the sense of ‘conversion’ in Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and the possible equivalence with the notion of counterpredication, cf. BARNES 2003, p. 266). Avicenna does not elaborate further on the claim, that works fine with a classic example of Porphyry’s about the differentia ‘rational’ and the species ‘man’, but less so with Avicenna’s own analysis of the predication of the differentia: according to Porphyry, ‘rational’ is predicated of the species ‘man’ and ‘deity’, so that ‘rational’ and ‘man’ do not convert, because every man is rational, but not every rational being is a man. According to Avicenna, this example is fallacious: cf. chap. I.11, §4.3; more generally on Avicenna’s claim that the differentia is not essentially predicated of more than one species, cf. chap. I.13, §3.2.3. As remarked by Avicenna himself, this statement strongly relies on what was stated *Isag.*, p. 19.11-13 (cf. §4.1), which implies that the differentia and the true proprium have different ranges of predication, since the differentia can be predicated of individuals of more than one species, whereas the true proprium cannot (“true proprium”, *al-ḥāṣṣa al-ḥaqīqiyya*, is here employed in the same sense as at §4.1: cf. the definition of the true proprium in chap. I.14, §1.4).

(§5) [*As to the shared...to their subjects*] The differentia and the inseparable common accident share the fact that they both belong permanently to their subjects (cf. *Isag.*, p. 19.17-19; Avicenna seems to gloss over the other shared element mentioned in Porphyry’s lemma, namely that both differentia and common accident belong to all of their subjects). Avicenna explained the different degree of inseparability of the differentia and the inseparable common accident from their subjects in chap. I.6. Porphyry mentioned another shared feature for differentiae and common accidents, namely that they are both predicated of many items (*Isag.*, p. 19.17): Avicenna’s

omission of it might be due to the fact that this lemma cannot be found in Dimašqī's Arabic translation.

(§6.1) [*The first of...a certain accident*] Differentia and accident differ because the first encompasses (Gr. περιέχει; Dimašqī's Ar. *yaḥwī*) that of which it is predicated without being encompassed on its turn, whereas the accident encompasses its subjects and is also encompassed (Gr. περιέχεται; Dimašqī's Ar. *yuhwà*) by them on its turn (*Isag.*, pp. 19.21-20.3). The interpretation of this lemma of Porphyry's is quite thorny: as Avicenna himself points out, it seems that Porphyry employs the verb 'to encompass' in two different meanings when he states that the differentia and the accident encompass their subjects and when he states that the differentia is not on its turn encompassed whereas the accident is encompassed. The sense in which differentiae are said to encompass their subjects is that they can be predicated of them not exclusively, as in the case of 'rational', which is a differentia of both the species of 'man' and 'deity' in Porphyry's example, with respect to the species 'man' (cf. also the meaning of 'to encompass' in chap. II.1, §3.2). According to Avicenna's paraphrase of Porphyry's lemma, common accidents encompass their subjects in virtue of their being "common" (*amma*), which might suggest the idea that they are "predicated of all of them and of something else". Porphyry's lemma actually states something different that Avicenna's paraphrase seems to conceal, namely that common accidents encompass their subjects because they can *subsist in several subjects* (Gr. περιέχει τῷ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι; Dimašqī's Ar. *taḥwī min qibali annahā fī kaḥrīna*). The sense of 'to encompass' shifts again in Porphyry's statement that accidents are encompassed by their subjects because their subjects are apt to receive them and something else, so that they are not their exclusive subjects. As Avicenna rightly remarks, differentiae as well could be said to be 'encompassed' by their subjects according to the latter sense of 'to encompass' (cf. Porph., *Isag.*, p. 15.4-6), so that it appears clearly that when Porphyry denies that differentiae can be encompassed by their subjects, he must employ the term 'encompass' in a different sense than that in which he states that accidents are encompassed by their subjects (cf. also BARNES 2003, p. 289 observing the same issue in Porphyry's lemma). An alternative interpretation of the divergence between differentia and common accident is provided in the last section of the paragraph, where Avicenna reads the occurrences of the term "encompass" in their predicative sense. Avicenna states that the accident can encompass its subjects because it has a wider scope of predication (like "white" with respect to "man": not every white is a man, because "white" is predicated of more subjects), whereas the species that are its subjects can be said to encompass it because it is not predicated of all of their individuals (like not every man is white, for there are individual men that are black, even if the species 'man' is a subject of the accident "white"). This attempt does not hold as well for some inseparable common accidents such as "black" with respect to the species "crow": in this case, it is true that "black" encompasses the species "crow", since it is predicated of many other items outside that species, but it is untrue that the species "crow" encompasses the accident "black", since there are not individual crows that are not black.

(§6.2) [*The other divergence...and the less*] The paragraph comments on the second divergence between differentia and accident mentioned in *Isag.*, p. 20.3-5, which states that the differentia does not admit augment nor diminution, whereas the accident does. Avicenna specifies that Porphyry's statement that accidents do not admit augment nor diminution should be reformulated as stating that the fact itself of being an accident does not prevent anything from undergoing augment or diminution, although there might be other external factors preventing from it. Supposedly, Avicenna has in mind instances of common accidents that do not undergo augment nor diminution, such as 'moving voluntarily' with respect to the species 'man': all men, insofar as they are men, are equally able to move voluntarily, and if some appear to be more or less apt to do so, it is not because 'moving voluntarily' is a common accident, but because of other external impediments.

(§6.3) [*Another divergence consists...a unique subject*] The paragraph is a paraphrase of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.5-6, where Porphyry states that opposite differentiae cannot be *intermingled* (Gr. ἀμυγείς; Dimašqī's Ar. *ḡayru muḥtaliḡatin*), whereas opposite accidents can. The passage is usually understood as referring to the possibility to mix two opposite accidents, such as, for instance, black and white, and have a unique subject for both at the same time, like something that is grey, in the case of the aforementioned example, whereas it is impossible to produce a mix of two differentiae such as rational and non-rational (cf. TRICOT 1984, p. 45, n. 2 and DE LIBERA AND SEGONDS 1998, p. 68, n. 138; this is also Ammonius' interpretation: cf. *In Isag.*, p. 126.8-10). Moreover, the possibility of mixing can be associated with the possibility for accidents to admit degrees, for things can be, for instance, more or less white, according to the mixing of the white colour, which is their common accident, with the black colour (BARNES 2003, pp. 289-290). Avicenna provides a quite different interpretation of Porphyry's passage, by understanding the possibility to mix as the possibility to share the same subject (cf. also BARNES 2003, p. 290, who reports a similar interpretation of Boethius'). In Avicenna's rewording, the nature of differentia prevents two opposite differentiae from sharing one and the same subject, since nothing can be qualified essentially by A and non-A at the same time (nothing can be, for instance, rational and non-rational at the same time). The nature of accident, on the contrary, does not prevent it: this holds true not only for separable accidents, that can belong to one and the same subject at two different moments, but also for inseparable accidents. Avicenna's remark that certain opposite inseparable accidents can belong at the same time to the same subject assumes as 'subjects' of the common accident the species, and not the individuals: if one assumes 'blue-eyedness' as an instance of inseparable accident, it can be observed that the species 'man', which is one of its subjects, has both blue-eyed and brown-eyed individuals at the same time, so that 'man' is, at one and the same time, the subject of two opposite inseparable accidents.

(§7) [*The species shares... their subjects permanently*] The paragraph quotes Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.12-15, mentioning two features shared by species and proprium, without further elaborating on Porphyry's lemma. The first of the shared features here

mentioned is that both species and proprium can be counterpredicated the one of the other: Porphyry's example, reported by Avicenna, is that of the species 'man' and its proprium 'capable of laughing', for every man is capable of laughing and vice versa. With regard to the second shared feature, it should be noticed that Avicenna's quote is quite far from Porphyry's Greek text, which states that both species and proprium are predicated *equally* (ἐπίσης) of their subjects, whereas Avicenna's quote states that both species and proprium are *permanent* (yūḡadāni...dā'imān) to their subjects (for a discussion of some textual issues in the Greek version of the passage at stake, cf. DE LIBERA AND SEGONDS 1998, pp. 68-69, n. 140 and BARNES 2003, pp. 291-292). Avicenna's quote evidently depends on Dimašqī's translation (p. 1101.6-7: *wa-l-anwā'u fa-tūḡadu dā'imān li-l-ašyā'i* [...]), which is affected by the same problem in the rendering of the Greek<sup>32</sup>.

(§8.1) [*The first of...have been correct*] Avicenna critically addresses Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.17-18, stating that what is a species for something can also be a genus for something else, whereas what is a proprium for something cannot be a proprium for something else too (cf. the interpretation of this puzzling lemma in BARNES 2003, p. 292). A first issue that Avicenna individuates in Porphyry's lemma is the fact that it refers to the relative species, i.e. the intermediate species that can be both a species or a genus with respect to different subjects, which is not the same notion of 'species' that Porphyry took into account in what preceded. The second issue individuated by Avicenna regards the unbalanced structure of the comparison between species and proprium: the feature ascribed to the species in Porphyry's lemma is not the same as the one denied with regard to the proprium. Avicenna suggests two possible reformulations of the lemma (1a and 2 below), both of which produce, however, a false statement either about the species or about the proprium.

(1a)	S can become a P for something else	<b>False</b>
	P cannot become a P for something else	True
(2)	S can become a G for something else	True
	P cannot become a G for something else	False

<sup>32</sup> The Arabic text of Dimašqī's translation might suggest a Greek: ἀεὶ τε πάρεστι τὰ εἶδη τοῖς μετέχουσι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ὧν ἐστὶν ἴδια instead of the text printed in Busse's edition: ἐπίσης τε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ εἶδη τοῖς μετέχουσι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ὧν ἐστὶν ἴδια (cf. *Isag.*, p. 19.7-9: καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ παρεῖναι, rendered in Dimašqī's translation as: *yūḡadāni li-l-ašyā'i dā'imān wa-li-ḡamī'ihī*). The reading πάρεστι instead of γὰρ ἐστὶ is well attested in the Greek manuscript tradition; in support of this reading against γὰρ ἐστὶ printed in Busse's edition, cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 291-292. The Arabic *dā'imān* is consistently employed in Dimašqī's translation to render the Greek ἀεὶ (*Isag.*, p. 12.18; 16.15; 18.13; 19.7; for these results, cf. [http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/results.php?ar\\_lexeme=%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85%D8%A7&sort=gr\\_lexeme&order=ASC](http://telota.bbaw.de/glossga/results.php?ar_lexeme=%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85%D8%A7&sort=gr_lexeme&order=ASC)); a variant reading ἀεὶ instead of ἐπίσης, on the other hand, is apparently not attested in the Greek tradition for the passage at stake, or, at least, Busse's critical apparatus does not record it; given that Dimašqī's translation is based on a Syriac translation of the Greek, it is possible that the peculiar translation is due to a variant in the Syriac tradition.

(1b) S can become a P for something else	<b>True</b>
P cannot become a P for something else	True
S: Species	
P: Proprium	
G: Genus	

Reformulation (1a) ascribes to the species the possibility to become a proprium of something else, which is denied from the proprium: the claim that a species can become a proprium for something else is judged to be false (though clause 1b states the reverse and despite the example provided in chap. II.4, §1: cf. *infra*). Reformulation (2) ascribes to the species the possibility to become a genus for something else, which is denied from the proprium: in this case, the claim about the proprium is false, since, for instance, ‘coloured’, which is a proprium of body, is also a genus of ‘white’, ‘yellow’ and the like. Both cases, then, provide an alternative valid formulation of the divergence from a structural point of view, but introduce false claims about the species and the proprium. The presence of clause (1b) is quite puzzling, since it almost entirely coincides with clause (1a), though reaching a diametrically opposite conclusion: according to clause (1a), a species of something cannot become a proprium of something else, whereas according to clause (1b) there is no problem with such a claim. Noteworthy, clause (1a) is contradicted by chap. II.4, §1, where Avicenna himself provides the example of ‘walking’, which is both a species of ‘mobile’ and a proprium of ‘animal’ (cf. also a different example in *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uşūl al-manṭiq*, Appendix A, §6), so that it is not right to claim, as in (1a), that the species cannot become a proprium of something else. On the possibility that clause (1b) might have been meant as a correction of clause (1a), cf. note to the critical apparatus.

(§8.2) [*Another divergence consists...already been stated*] The paragraph states the priority of the species to the proprium (Porph., *Isag.*, p. 20.18-20); cf. also chap. II.2, §4.1, commenting on Porph., *Isag.*, p. 16.9-10, where the genus’ priority to proprium is assessed based on that the genus is constitutive of the thing’s essence, whereas the proprium is consequent to it.

(§8.3) [*Then, he introduced...with the proprium*] Porph. *Isag.*, p. 20.20-22 states that species always hold for their subjects in actuality, whereas propria can hold sometimes and in potentiality for their subjects. Avicenna remarks the oddity of this statement of Porphyry’s, in which propria are not assumed *qua* natural dispositions, despite Porphyry’s own reiterated warnings against a possible confusion between the proprium that is a natural disposition (such as the capability of laughing) and the manifestation of such a disposition in actuality (such as laughter in actuality) in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 12.18-20; p. 19.8-9; p. 20.13-14. In fact, natural dispositions such as the capability of laughing belong to their subjects always in actuality. The same issue raised by Avicenna is remarked in BARNES 2003, p. 293. GIRGENTI 1995, pp. 185-186, n. 84 suggests reading the divergence between species and proprium with a special emphasis on the fact that the species holds *always* in actuality for its subjects, whereas the proprium *sometimes*

holds in actuality, sometimes not; such an interpretation, however, does not save Porphyry from Avicenna's accuse of employing here a sense of proprium that does not coincide with that of the natural disposition, for the natural disposition holds always in actuality for its subjects.

(§8.4) [*Another divergence consists...and the proprium*] Porph., *Isag.*, pp. 20.24-21.3 mentions having different definitions, hence being different, as a feature that distinguishes species from propria; as Avicenna observes, however, the same can be claimed of all the five predicables (cf. also BARNES 2003, p. 293).

(§9) [*As to the species...distance between them*] The only common feature mentioned for species and accidents in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 21.5-7 is that they are predicated of many items, i.e. they are universal, which is actually a feature common to all the five predicables (cf. chap. II.1, §1.1).

(§10) [*As to the divergence...the black men*] The paragraph condenses all the divergences between species and accident mentioned in Porph., *Isag.*, p. 21.9-16. The first two divergences provided in *Isag.*, p. 21.9-12 are said to hold true between genus and accident, genus and proprium and species and proprium too, since they are divergences existing between the predicables that signify the quiddity and the accidental ones. As to Porphyry's claim that species are prior to accidents in estimation (*Isag.*, p. 21.12-15: προεπινοεῖται; on this kind of priority, cf. BARNES 2003, pp. 296-300), Avicenna silently adds that species are also prior to accidents in existence (*wuğūdan*). Such an addition might result from an overall reading of Porphyry's lemma, that affirms the priority of species to accidents in estimation (Gr. προεπινοεῖται; Dimašqī's Ar. *taqa' u fī l-wahmi qabla*) and a posteriority of accidents to species that might be understood as existential, since accidents are by nature "later-born" (Gr. ὑστερογενῆ πέφυκεν; Dimašqī's Ar. *hudūtuḥā ba'da l-anwā'i*) and "adventitious" (Gr. ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν φύσιν ἔχει; Dimašqī's Ar. *ṭabī' atuhā dahīla*; cf. also BARNES 2003, p. 298). On the last divergence mentioned, namely that species hold equally for their subjects whereas accidents do not, cf. §1.1. on Porph., *Isag.*, p. 18.11-13.

(§11) [*The proprium and...accident as well*] Porphyry mentioned two shared features for propria and accidents (*Isag.*, p. 21.21-22 and p. 22.2-3), but Avicenna only quotes the second one, namely that both propria and inseparable accidents hold permanently for their subjects. This feature holds for species and propria as well: cf. §1.2 on *Isag.*, p. 18.13-14. As to the reasons for Avicenna's silence on the first shared feature, stating that both propria and inseparable accidents necessarily belong to their subjects that cannot be found without them (on the issues of this claim, cf. BARNES 2003, p. 301), they are yet to ascertain; the passage is present in Dimašqī's translation, p. 1103.11-12 and is quoted and commented upon in Ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūğī li-Furfūriyūs*, pp. 174.20-175.7.

(§12.1) [*They differ because...the first treatise*] Porph., *Isag.*, p. 22.5-7 states that propria are predicated of one species only, whereas common accidents are predicated

of more than one species; Avicenna implicitly refers to Porphyry's fourfold classification of propria in *Isag.*, p. 12.13-22 (cf. chap. I.14, §1.4), where 'proprium' applied also to features that do not belong to one species only.

(§12.2) [*Another divergence consists...what concerns this*] The paragraph is a quote of Porph., *Isag.*, p. 22.9-10, where propria are said to hold equally for their subjects, unlike accidents; cf. also chap. II.2, §3.2 on *Isag.*, p. 16.3-6, and §6.2 on *Isag.*, p. 17.6-8, where Avicenna claims that not all the accidents are predicated unequally of their subjects.

(§13) [*To conclude, these...appropriate and better*] The paragraph marks the end of Avicenna's exposition of the Porphyrean common and shared features. A first critical remark is addressed towards those comparisons that Porphyry made between a certain kind of predicable and some instances of another kind, like, for instance, when he compared differentia and inseparable common accidents (cf. §5, which might be the case alluded to in the passage at stake). In Avicenna's own view, the comparison should have been better made between the natures of the predicables; in a case like that of §5, inseparable common accidents represent a part of the nature of the common accident, so that it is possible to provide a comparison between the nature of the differentia and a part of the nature of the common accident, based on the *possibility* their natures have to be in such and such a way (note, in this regard, Avicenna's use of the expression: *min ša'nihi an* [...], "it can/it pertains to its nature to..."). A second critical remark is directed towards Porphyry's occasional overlooking of some shared and distinctive features, which could have been avoided by listing all of them in the systematic, almost combinatory way, suggested by Avicenna. This second remark might be directed towards Porphyry's own attempt to justify in a combinatory fashion the number of shared and distinctive features of the predicables he mentioned in *Isag.*, pp. 17.14-18.9.

## Chapter II.4

(§1) [*Since we have...gathered in one*] The five universals are relational items: being a genus, a species, a differentia, a proprium or a common accident is never an absolute condition but is always in relation to a certain subject. This point is proved by the fact that one and the same notion can be a species for a certain subject, a genus for another, a proprium for another and so on (see also chap. I.8, §5 and *Al-Risāla l-mūğaza fī uşūl al-mantiq*, Appendix A, §6).

(§2.1) [*The genus is...the First Philosophy*] The paragraph deals with the mutual relation of genus and differentia, a subject dealt with in *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt* V.6. Avicenna warns here against the possibility of considering that the relation between genus and differentia works like the relation between genus and species. Among the main issues that such an analysis of the relation between genus and differentia would entail there is assuming the genus as included in the quiddity of the differentia, so that “rational” could be analysed as equivalent to “animal provided with rationality”, including its genus in the definitory statement, instead of “something provided with rationality”. One of the undesired outcomes of an equivalence of this sort is that it produces redundancy in the predication: if “rational” is predicated of “animal”, the statement “the animal is rational” is equivalent to “the animal is an animal provided with rationality”. Avicenna’s statement that “the differentia is not a species of the genus, otherwise another differentia would be required” supposes a demonstration which runs as follows: a differentia cannot be a species of the genus, because in order to be a species, it would need another differentia to divide its genus and constitute it as a species; the same holds for that second differentia and so on, in a *regressum ad infinitum* (it is the demonstration presented and discussed in *Ilāhiyyāt* V.6, pp. 231.6-235.1). Hence, the differentia cannot be subsumed under the genus as a species. The relation between genus and species is rather explained as that between a common accident and its subject (cf. §2.2).

(§2.2) [*The relation of...its highest genera*] The paragraph argues that what is a common accident for a species can be a proprium of its genus, regardless to whether it is a highest genus or a lower one, and provides some examples involving the different kinds of genera.

(§3) [*The relation of...is “this white”*] The notion of ‘species’ with respect to the individuals is relational too: what is a genus, a differentia, a proprium or an accident of something can be a species to its individuals. All the examples of predicables provided in the passage refer to the species “man”, so that the genus is exemplified by “animal”, the differentia by “rational”, the proprium by “capable of laughing” and the common accident by “white”. The first example is that of “animal”, which is a genus of “man”, and which is a species with respect to “this animal”, i.e. the individual animal, without taking into consideration any further divisive differentia, like “rational”: otherwise,

instead of a particular animal, a particular man is considered, with respect to which “animal” is not a species, but rather a genus. The same holds for other predicables, like “rational”, a differentia of “man” and a species of “this rational”, i.e. a particular rational being, “capable of laughing”, a proprium of “man” and a species for “this capable of laughing” and “white”, a common accident of “man” and a species for “this white thing” (again, without considering any genus, like “animal”, since otherwise the particular man is taken into account rather than an individual rational being or an individual capable of laughing or an individual white thing).

(§4.1) [*You should know...genera of man*] Here starts a second section of chap. II.4 dealing with the combination (*tarakkub*) of some of the five universals, based on the idea developed in the first section of the chapter that the notions conveyed by these universal terms are relational. The section recalls the final chapter added in a part of the manuscript tradition to the section of Logic of the ‘*Uyūn al-Ḥikma* (pp. 14.7-15.11)<sup>33</sup>, whose purpose is explaining which predicables are assumed in the premises of demonstrative syllogisms, namely genera and their differentiae, differentiae and their genera and differentiae, proper accidents (to the exclusion of common accidents). The first combination presented in the paragraph at stake is that of the genus and the differentia: the idea is that the differentia of a certain subject can have a genus (like “capable of acquiring”, which is a genus of “rational”, the constitutive differentia of “man”), as well as the genus of a certain subject can have a differentia.

(§4.2) [*The genus can...of the species*] The second combination presented is that between genus and accident: the accident of something can have a genus, like “white”, which is a common accident of “man”, has as its genus “coloured”. The genus of an accident is necessarily also an accident of the subject itself or of a genus of the subject, as in the case of “coloured”, which is a proprium of body and a common accident of genera higher than the species “man”.

(§4.3) [*As to the combination...is a proprium*] Avicenna provides some instances of genera of the propria.

(§4.4) [*The differentia as...accident of cotton*] The paragraph presents instances of differentiae of a genus, of a proprium and of an accident.

(§4.5) [*The proprium can...accident of man*] The paragraph presents instances of propria of a genus, of a differentia and of an accident. As to what concerns the proprium of a differentia, there are two possibilities: either it is a proprium of a differentia that applies to that species only, so that it is a *proprium* for that species too, or it is a proprium

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<sup>33</sup> The additional chapter at the end of the Logic of ‘*Uyūn al-Ḥikma* is only preserved in MSS İstanbul, Ahmet III 3268 and Roma, Vat. ar. 977, according to Badawī’s note to the edition, being absent in the other witnesses employed for the edition and in Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the ‘*Uyūn al-Ḥikma*.

of a differentia that does not apply to the species only, so that the proprium is a *common accident* for that species (cf. 'Uyūn al-Ḥikma, *al-Manṭiq*, pp. 14.16-15.2).

(§4.6) [*The accident can...of the proprium*] The paragraph presents instances of accidents of a genus, of a differentia and of a proprium. The accidents of genera are said to be also accidents of the species; if a species has an accident, on the other hand, that accident can be either a proprium or an accident of its genus (cf. §4.2); it should be added that it could also be a proprium of its differentia, if the differentia is more common than the species (cf. §4.5 and 'Uyūn al-Ḥikma, *al-Manṭiq*, pp. 14.16-15.2).

