

Normalising the “alter-Europe” or going beyond this Europe? Italian environmental movements’ perspectives on Europe, democracy and the ecological crisis.

Abstract

Based on 19 semi-structured interviews with key activists, this paper discusses the different visions of Europe and democracy within the Italian environmental archipelago. One general finding is the widespread disenchantment towards the Europeanization process. Beyond this general pattern, a clear dichotomy has emerged. On the one hand, institutional ENGOs conduct lobbying activities, adapting to different multilevel political opportunities, but with particular attention to the transnational dimension: their attempt is to reform the current structure of the EU, which also contributes to institutionalise the innovative perspectives of “another Europe” advanced by the Global Justice Movement in the early 2000s. On the other hand, grass-roots groups suggest going “beyond this Europe”, as they are critical of the current geographical borders of the continent and its political institutions. They normally do so by adopting contentious forms of action in a domestic dimension. Furthermore, two divergent democratic paradigms can be identified. I propose to call them: ecological democracy and green democracy. The latter stands for a conception of the environmental issues as subordinated to, or at least unthinkable outside, the (Western) representative democracy and the gospel of (green) economic growth. Ecological democracy, in contrast, involves a conception of democracy as effective only if based on ecological perspectives, within a vision which stigmatises capitalist economy and the institutions supporting it. These paradigms resonate with the interpretation of the current (ecological) critical juncture as the Anthropocene or as the Capitalocene.

Everyone has the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which is a public good for the people's use and is essential for a healthy life. The Government and the community have a duty to defend and to preserve the environment for present and future generations (Brazilian Constitution, Cap. VI, art. 425)¹

Premise

Quoting the Brazilian Constitution in the epigraph of an article about visions of Europe among Italian environmental activists could seem unusual. On the contrary, it is a good summary of the transnational nature, impact and dimension currently assumed by environmental issues, and also of their relation with global politics and institutional policies.² Since the 1970s, the global dimension of the environmental crisis has been a concern, and environmental problems have been progressively defined such as climate change and biodiversity loss. These issues have emerged through the creation of new institutional settings, new transnational bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the uprising of global movements like the recent phenomena of Fridays for Future (FFF) and Extinction Rebellion (XR). As the ecological crisis becomes ever pressing and foreboding, the current situation can be considered to be a “critical juncture”, recalling the central concept discussed by Donatella della Porta in the introduction to this special issue with reference to the 2008 financial crisis. The ecological crisis itself bears the typical characteristics of a critical juncture: it is a period of drastic changes and unsettled dynamics, a path-dependent turning point whose solution will have a crucial impact on future outcomes.³

Environment has been one of the fields in which the European Union (EU) has tried to affirm a political legitimacy. This is borne out by single policies⁴ and long-term strategies⁵, but also by official declarations such as the Article 3(3) of the Treaty of the EU (2008), that reads:

The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.

Hence, the EU is generally positively presented and described when referring to environmental issues, especially if compared with the (European) national governments. Some “new instruments” (Jordan et al. 2011), such as the European Citizens’ Initiatives (ECIs), implemented by the Commission in order to improve democratic participation, have increased access to environmental information among civil society (Borzel and Buzogany 2018). Furthermore, considerable economic resources are being invested: for example, more than 40% of the EU annual budget is currently spent in the agricultural sector and especially for the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy),⁶ in order to implement

¹ https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf

² As is well-known, in fact, the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro endorses conservative perspectives, also specifically in reference to climate change: this poses some questions that resonate across the entire planet (see for example: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-amazon-rainforest-protections>). On the other hand, Brazil is not the only country with explicit references to the environment in its Constitution: Ecuador, Bolivia and France, among others, have similar statements.

³ For a review on the definitions of “critical junctures”, see Capoccia and Kelemen (2007).

⁴ An example is the banning of single-use plastic products planned for 2021.

⁵ Recent examples are the EU Biodiversity Strategy 2030 and the Farm2Fork Strategy, both approved in May 2020 by EU Commission.

⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Common_agricultural_policy_%28CAP%29

“sustainable development”. This is a concept introduced in the so-called Brundtland report (1987), and has been particularly strengthened by the COP3 – better known as the Kyoto Protocol (1997) – which then became the mantra of European (and international) environmental policies.⁷

Notwithstanding all these previous aspects, the power of the EU has been partially weakened in recent years by global dynamics (Knill et al., 2018). In particular, the 2008 financial crisis involved a change in policy priorities towards economic rather than environmental aspects (Knill et al. 2016). This implied an acceleration in the process of environmental commodification, with the aim of reaffirming economic growth as an unavoidable objective for international governance (Moore 2015). The operations of environmental commodification are numerous: the so-called carbon trade dogma (Leonardi 2017) could be mentioned as an example, namely the global reliance on carbon markets as the best and only policy option adopted by international governance to address global warming. According to a similar approach, environmental crisis (and climate change specifically) should not be seen as a failure of the capitalist economic system, but as a possible opportunity for further marketization.

Given the previous background considerations, I here focus on the Italian environmental “archipelago” (Diani 1995) to investigate how, in the varied field of environmental mobilisations, the current critical juncture is framed by activists: how are environmental issues related to broader social and political issues and – in particular – to visions of Europe and democracy? The possible macro-distinctions within this archipelago are numerous. For the sake of my argument, I limit myself to the classic dichotomy between reformist NGOs and the more radical Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) area. I frame these two different approaches within a broader *Weltanschauung* and, in particular, within broader visions of democracy. My argument moves from Marco Deriu’s analysis (2012), Deriu being the Italian scholar who focused much more on the relation between environmental issues and democratic regimes, at least in recent times. According to him, democratic regimes have been traditionally valued on their ability to maintain the promises of upward social mobility based on consumerist possibilities, with the objective to satisfy the immediate preferences of national electorates. This was the case of the second post-war period and the Trente Glorieuses, during which “carbon democracy” regimes developed (Mitchell 2013). However, Deriu argues that the value of a democratic regime should first ensure its own future and political regeneration: accordingly, a democratic regime should be measured on its ability to incorporate (natural) limits and self-moderation as the driving force of institutional actions.

Following a similar argument, I suggest that, beyond the old and new differences between single groups/associations, the cleavage Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOS)/EJM is grounded on the support for different democratic models: procedural versus substantive (Tilly 2007; Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013). Applying these categories of democratic theories to the Italian environmental/territorial movements and drawing on the classic distinction between (reformist) environmentalism and (radical) ecologism (Dobson 1995), I propose to call their different perspectives *Green (procedural) democracy* vs. *Ecological (substantial) democracy*. With the first label (Green democracy) I mean a conception of environmental issues as inextricably tied to the boundaries and procedures of Western representative democracies - and implicitly subordinated to them; with the second one (Ecological democracy) a conception of democracy as being effective only if based on the recognition of “natural limits” and social conflict, which also implies the possibility

⁷ The approach based on sustainable “green economy” promoted by the Kyoto Protocol, has been anticipated during the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and then confirmed by the following COPs (Conferences of the Parties) and by the Paris Agreement in 2015. The scientific literature on green economy is vast, interdisciplinary and entangled in market-led neoliberal policies: a detailed critical review is provided by Jutta Kill’s “Economic valuation of nature”: https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/sonst_publicationen/Economic-Valuation-of-Nature.pdf.

of overcoming formal aspects of Western neoliberal regimes based on delegation and the unquestionable primacy of economic growth.

With all the necessary adaptation updates, the typology considered in this article is well rooted in the history of environmental movements that I briefly summarise in the next paragraph starting from international scholarship, then moving to the relations between environmental activism and the Europeanization process, and finally to the Italian case.

1. Brief historical contextualisation

The environmental movements have always followed a cyclical evolution, characterised by different militant and theoretical perspectives, as well as by alternated periods of latency and visibility (della Porta and Rucht 2002). The dominant approach until the first half of the 20th century was conservation, a moderate reformist vision mainly interested in the possible benefits that environmental protection could have for human beings living in Western countries. This first season of environmentalism was presented by its own promoters as a product of modernity, developing from some positive aspects of modernity itself (Glendinning, 2003). It was based on the assumption that economic growth, high standards of individual lifestyles and the contemporary preservation of nature should go hand in hand (Mol and Spaargaren 2000): this is the idea still promoted by international governance, in particular until the 2015 Paris Agreement (Leonardi 2017).

From the Sixties onward a new era began, structuring the environmental justice and political ecology perspectives, two approaches characterised by some differences (related to methodological, geographical and disciplinary roots), but also convergent on various aspects, especially regarding their criticisms towards the environmental impact of modern societies (Holifield 2015). The publication of well-known books such as *Silent Spring* (Carson 1962) or *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows *et al.* 1972) are considered as symbolic turning points, together with events such as the oil crisis in 1973 as well as the Mururoa protests against the French nuclear tests or other relevant environmental catastrophes of those years (Commoner 1971). Following this period, environmentalism started to be defined as a new social movement (Touraine 1978) favoured by the general diffusion of post-materialist values among civil society (Inglehart 1977), also contributing to the emergent role of green parties in various Western states (Carter 2018).

But it was especially in the late 1980s/early 1990s that an even more important shift happened, coinciding with the emergence of an EJM in the United States (McAdam 2017). From this moment onward, environmental issues started to be systematically framed within a broader social justice perspective by a considerable number of activists and theorists (Martinez-Alier 2002). The previous waves of environmentalism, in fact, did not consider in a structural way socio-political and especially economic power relations, and were characterised by an approach focused on the white middle-class, its characteristics and ideologies (Rootes 1995). Building on Marion Young's critique of the distributive paradigm in liberal theories, the EJM insisted on the different environmental implications related to race, class and gender discrimination (Schlosberg 2004; Barca 2014), and on the economic marginalisation of local communities (Martinez-Alier 2002; Keucheyan 2018). However, this did not translate into a NIMBY (not in my back yard) isolationism⁸; on the contrary, scaling-up frames and actions have been promoted (Kurtz 2003), with emphasis on acting locally within a global perspective (Rootes 2013). Looking at the very recent wave of environmental mobilisations, a similar approach is being pursued by FFF, while XR prefers to target national governments.

⁸ For a critical discussion of the term NIMBY, see della Porta *et al.* (2019).

The relation between environmental movements and the European dimension has been specifically studied (Kousis 2016; Kousis, della Porta, and Jiménez 2008; Rootes 2004, 2013, 2014), in the perspective of a democratic process constructed “from below” (Rovisco 2016). This has been done both at a continental level (Rootes 2004, Kousis 2016) and focusing on specific European areas (Dalton 1994; Kousis 2004). Among environmental activists, consideration towards the EU has been generally more favourable than among other movement areas, and the EU institutions have been positively evaluated when considering different multilevel political opportunities (Rootes 2004). Nevertheless, as Giugni and Grasso (2015: 346) noted, the doubt still remains “whether such supranational opportunities and arenas favour environmental activists in their quest for spaces for mobilising on these issues and the movement more generally”.

The evolution of Italian environmental movements has been similar to that in other European countries. The Italian case is nonetheless peculiar with respect to what Barca (2019) defines as “labour environmentalism”, and also in respect to the intensity of local environmental conflicts in the last decades (della Porta et al. 2019). EJM’s frames and discourses have been appropriated by the local committees connected with Italian territorial issues (della Porta et al. 2019). At the same time, it remains an important component of formal ENGOs, which represents an updated version of environmental reformism/conservationism. Additionally, radical anti-capitalist groups, often related to local agriculture and independent farms, have carried out their activities on a more political/cultural level (Bertuzzi 2019a). Along with these different attitudes, new forms of activism are developing in Italy as well. The recent mobilisation of the FFF has pulled together elements that are traditionally “distant” in the national panorama: the young age of participants, the environmental justice’s radical frames, and a more transnational scope.

2. The research

The analysis is based on 19 semi-structured interviews with formal or charismatic leaders of some relevant groups and associations in Italy. These range from traditional ENGOs (national ones or Italian branches of international ones) to LULU movements (della Porta and Piazza 2008; della Porta et al. 2019), networks of independent alternative farmers and political ecology groups (Bertuzzi 2019a). As anticipated, I argue that this classic contraposition between reformist and radical approaches translates into an even broader distinction between *green democracy* and *ecological democracy*. The groups analysed are listed in table 1.

This study has no ambition to be exhaustive in terms of contemporary forms of environmental activism in Italy. Case selection is limited in two ways. Firstly, there is a growing area of non-contentious environmental movements that invest in practice-based engagement (such as the network of Ecovillages, Permaculture and Transition Towns), that I do not investigate in this article, which seeks to improve understanding about how contentious collective actors relate to Europe in the current conjuncture. These non-contentious subjects represent a sort of environmental “third sector” (Osti 1998), and are particularly relevant in the global North (Schlosberg and Coles, 2016) but are also emerging in Italy (Barbera et al. 2016). Some authors used the notion of “radical reformism” to point to this area (Brand 2016; Leahy 2018). Secondly, last year (after my interviewing) saw the emergence of new global environmental movements such as FFF and XR. Mobilisations are rapidly evolving, which means that environmental issues are today a crucial space for the reconfiguration of socio-political struggles.⁹

⁹ Furthermore, the pandemic Covid-19 will further affect environmental activism: this is true at global level but particularly for Italy, a country in which movements such as FFF and XR were emerging with particular strength, interrupting a situation of partial delay with respect to international scenario.

Once these case-selection limitations are specified, and given the growing importance assumed by supranational political actors in the governance of the ecological issues (Leonardi 2019), in this paper I focus on how Italian environmental activists perceive and evaluate the European dimension. In particular, I will distinguish the positions of green democracy and ecological democracy from three angles: a) the perspectives on the Europeanization process; b) the visions of Europe and EU institutions; c) the interaction between local/national/transnational levels.

Finally, the different positions of these two (Italian) environmental sectors will be addressed according to the debate on Anthropocene and Capitalocene. These are intended as precise and divergent frames to the current critical juncture represented by the ecological crisis.

Tab. 1. Groups analysed divided by area.

Green democracy	WWF, Legambiente, GreenPeace, LAV, Essere Animali, Animal Equality
Ecological democracy	No Tav, No Tap, No Muos, No Ponte, No Grandi Navi, No Triv, Mamme No Inceneritore, Eat the Rich, Campi Aperti, Mondeggi, Forum Ambiente Salute, Oltre la Specie, Stop Ttip

3. The Europeanization process

Various perspectives about the Europeanization process have emerged across the continent. On the one hand, the mainstream media and the main moderate political parties have presented such a process as inevitable; on the other hand, populist parties (but also some sectors of civil society) have asked for a return to national sovereignty. At the same time, "pro-European" parties have, themselves, engaged in de-politicizing the construction of European identity. This has given space and opportunity to nationalist movements to re-politicise the issue (Grande and Kriesi 2015, Hutter *et al.* 2016).

The visions of Europe among progressive activists in general, and environmental ones in particular, should be considered against this background (Kaldor *et al.* 2015). Previous research distinguished the critical positions of progressive activists in two main streams: euroscepticism and proposals for "another Europe" (della Porta and Caiani 2007). However, positions towards Europe have changed over time, as discussed by Donatella della Porta in the introduction of this special issue: the vision of "another Europe" was shared among the Global Justice Movement (GJM), but during the anti-austerity period there has been a domestication of some issues, frames and actions, namely a tendency to shift to the national scale those protests that target decisions taken at a transnational level.

Considering the results of my analysis, a further development can be identified among the Italian environmental activists, namely an increasing and widespread disenchantment towards the European dimension and the Europeanization process. Even if with some differences, this first finding bears out across the whole sample. The Europeanization process is more ignored than opposed. The EU is still considered as a potential (and sometimes) effective institutional player in environmental issues, but at the same time the European dimension does not represent an identity element able to affect daily politics and self-representations of individuals and groups.¹⁰

3.1. Green democracy: Europe as a means to an end

¹⁰ A similar path is also visible among other movement areas (see Zamponi in this issue).

As discussed later, disenchantment is particularly widespread among LULU groups, radical grass-roots movements and, broadly speaking, the sector that I here define as ecological democracy. However, even some members of traditional ENGOs think that more thought should go into the Europeanization process from within. They consider Europe positively for the opportunities offered to participate in decision-making and for the results already obtained in the environmental field, especially if compared to the Italian situation. So much so that the President of *Legambiente* (the main Italian ENGO) states that “Europe has been the salvation for environmental policies in our country” (IntEI8).

However, this does not translate into a shared European vision or a firm European identity among members. Several interviewees declare that they applaud some of the EU's environmental policies, while acknowledging that their members don't really discuss European visions or identity together. Therefore, Europe is perceived as an effective means to achieve environmental ends, but not as a relevant dimension for individual identity construction nor for the political narrative of most organisations. This is the case for both environmental but especially animal advocacy organisations (Bertuzzi 2019b). For example, *Essere Animali*, an association that has been at the forefront of the relevant ECI #StopVivisection¹¹ (Weisskircher 2019), stresses the action of the European Parliament on various issues, which has slashed “animal suffering, thus limiting the use of antibiotics and preventing the problem of antibiotic resistance”¹². At the same time, however, one of the key activists of this association says that he is not “well informed about the European level” (IntIE3).

Italy's largest animal welfare organisation, LAV (*Lega Antivivisezione*), also values the EU's action on specific issues such as the recent banning in Europe of animal testing cosmetics, defined as an “epochal turn” obtained “after years of struggle and empty promises”¹³. Lav is also one of the main supporters of the ECI #Endthecageage,¹⁴ along with various environmental and animal advocacy NGOs, in particular Animal Equality. However, the president of this last organisation likewise, on the one hand, endorses the positive role of EU institutions regarding animals and the environment, while, on the other hand, when asked about the organisational vision of Europe, confesses that: “while you are asking me these questions I am also looking into this because we didn't have the time and opportunity to reflect on these aspects” (IntIE1).

3.2. Ecological democracy: the disenchantment turn

Such little interest and partial disenchantment among the NGOs translate into a drastic disenchantment among the LULU movements and the other political ecology groups. As admitted by an activist of *No Triv* (the national coalition opposing drilling operations for extracting fossil fuel), an internal discussion on Europe is absent: “to be honest, we do not have a position on Europe” (IntEI16). It may even be explicitly underestimated: “we are not meeting up to discuss where Europe is going!” (IntEI2), as emphatically declared by an activist belonging to *Campi Aperti*, the Bologna seed of the independent farmers' national network *Genuino Clandestino*.

This disenchantment does not mean that the Europeanization process is particularly opposed. However, it is considered in the light of the marginal role occupied by local territories and environmental justice narratives in the European political arena. The groups belonging to the

¹¹ <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful/details/2012/000007?lg=en>

¹² <https://www.essereanimali.org/2017/03/parlamento-europeo-legge-per-benessere-dei-conigli-allevamento/>

¹³ <https://www.lav.it/aree-di-intervento/vivisezione/cosmetici-non-testati>

¹⁴ <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/open/details/2018/000004>

ecological democracy area recognise, but also proudly claim, to be the “periphery of the system” (IntEI14): this assumption is related to both their geographical position in Southern Europe and to the awareness that “all austerity policies promoted by the EU have always gone in the direction of favouring the privatisation of parts of the territory” (IntEI11).

Furthermore, the financial crisis and its consequences affected the approach of the ecological democracy groups towards the Europeanization process when confronted with the GJM period, a cycle of protest that was characterised by “a conjuncture of economic growth, of the development of neoliberal governance, by a majority of social-democratic governments in the western world” (IntEI11). Nowadays, the situation has drastically changed: the perceived financialization of the EU and the legitimation of a market economy at the expense of democratic and environmental priorities, leads much more to disenchantment rather than to an opposition that challenges the situation as it was 20 years ago, when “there was more room for opening up a real process of democratisation and the construction of a Europe from below” (IntEI12).

4. Visions of Europe and the EU

Beyond the generalised disenchantment towards the Europeanization process analysed in the previous paragraph, more “classic” and contrasting visions of Europe and the EU institutions also emerged among the Italian environmental and territorial activists. Critical feelings exist but not total pessimism: the recognition that Europe has been a positive institutional player in the last decades is widespread. However, the EU’s environmental policies are often considered as political facades and greenwashing operations (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014). In the following, the different frames and visions of Europe among green democracy and ecological democracy groups are discussed more in depth.

4.1. Ecological democracy: from “another Europe” to “beyond this Europe”

The charges of greenwashing operations are connected to both specific European programs such as the RDPs (Rural Development Programs) or the PICs (Projects of Common Interest), and to broader political considerations about the different EU institutions, as illustrated by the following example mentioned by an activist of *Mondeggi*, the Florence branch of *Genuino Clandestino*, and related to an EU project and its impact on the activity of local agriculture:

“There were one and a half million euros available, we asked for a total of 62,000 euros, we thought: ‘well with one and a half million, we will make it easy’. No, this money has been allocated to a company that produces Brunello di Montalcino [a renowned Italian wine] ...these European funds aim at creating big companies able to sell outside Europe. So it was pre-emptively decided that Italy should sell olives and wine, all the funding went in that direction.” (IntIE10).

Radical alternatives are proposed for a Europe free of current policies, current institutions, and especially current borders. This is particularly the case of the Southern Italian LULU movements, such as *No Ponte* (the movement opposing the bridge supposed to connect the regions of Calabria and Sicily): “Sicily could have something to share with Africa. Many African countries start from a very low starting point, but they have growth rates of 5-6 or even 10%, while we are pleased when we get 1%” (IntIE13). Activists who endorse similar narratives do not perceive Europe as a *de facto* reality, but as a cultural and political construction. In particular, discussions about the possibility of creating broader alliances with North African countries (but also with Eurasian ones) emerged in various interviews. In this case, an explicit challenge to the *status quo* and alternative visions of (the borders of) Europe are at stake. The objective is not to reform this Europe by building “another Europe”, but to go *beyond* this Europe, as reiterated by a *No Muos* activist (the movement opposing the Mobile User Objective System, a military satellite communications system promoted by the US

government in Niscemi, Sicily): "surely Europe, even geographically as it was built, does not interest me ... I think we should also challenge the geographic and political model." (IntIE12).

Similar narratives don't just relate to the specific cases of Eastern European or Northern African countries, they also embrace broader questions about the nature of borders and the arbitrariness of borders themselves, which are considered as instruments of division and domination at the disposal of the "power-holders" at the expense of the exploited: "the river is a border, this does not mean that I cannot share things with those on the other side of the river. Europe for me at the moment is just a border" (IntIE4).

Ecological democracy groups are remarkably interested in others social issues beyond the environment: this shows the strong link between social and environmental concerns and frames. The long-term objective is to build an ecological democracy based on respect for local territories, natural limits and "living inhabitants", putting "life before capital" (IntIE13). The previous problems are not seen as a particular fault of the EU, but more generally of representative democracies, delegation, and market-oriented politics and visions that characterise Western societies, excluding municipalist or assembly-based forms of organisation that would allow for "greater radicalism of democratic participation" (IntIE11). Referring to what "real democracy" means, some groups believe that the European dimension could be sometimes worse than the national dimension because "the greater the geographical level, the more the tendency towards centralisation increases" (IntIE4).

This previous quote, from the self-managed popular canteen of anarchist inspiration *Eat the Rich*, is to some extent shared by traditional NGOs such as *Greenpeace Italy*, whose vice-president recognises the problem of democracy and participation involved when "moving the power away from the territorial base". However, in the case of *Greenpeace Italy* and the other NGOs, this does not translate into a downward shift, but rather into a claim for "more credibility of the EU institutions" (IntIE16), as I will discuss in the next paragraph.

4.2. Green democracy: the normalisation of the "other Europe"

In line with the history of (Italian) moderate environmentalism, according to NGOs such as *Greenpeace Italy*, *Legambiente*, *WWF Italy* or *Animal Equality*, the best (and probably the only) solution to the democratic challenge is to set the EU institutions onto a more (procedural) democratic path. A relevant role of the Parliament and of its internal commissions is particularly encouraged, and it is often opposed to the other institutions (the Commission especially, but also sometimes the Council), as commented for example by the president of *Legambiente*: "the Parliament makes much more advanced proposals, and then when it comes to the mediation with the Council or the Commission the bar is lowered a bit; this is a pity for environmental policies" (IntIE8).

The other aspect particularly stressed by the ENGOS is the need for greater citizen participation, improving the existing access to institutions, first of all, via the ECIs because "investing in popular initiatives could be an added value: even if it may not work, it's important to get people involved" (IntIE1). A procedural vision of democracy emerges that has to deal with substantive obstacles. Both the #StopVivisection and #StopTtip¹⁵ campaigns, namely the two main ECIs that involved the groups/associations considered in my research, were rejected because of procedural/formal reasons, despite the many signatures collected.

¹⁵ The #Stop Vivisection campaign has been previously mentioned (see note 9). #Stop TTIP is an international campaign (with national "branches") against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a major trade agreement negotiated between the EU and the US. This is a campaign also based on environmental arguments, but not only; there are, in fact, other important political and economic frames (and actors) involved (Caiani and Graziano 2018). Also an ECI has been conducted against TTIP: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1872.

Considering the generalised disenchantment towards the Europeanization process, and the tendency of ecological democracy groups to go “beyond this Europe”, the reformist approach of the NGOs partially translates into a normalisation and institutionalisation of some “alter-European” claims that were made at the beginning of the millennium by the GJM, and more specifically by its environmental components. In fact, the same NGOs that promote more power for the European Parliament or the spreading of the ECIs (claims also typical of the GJM), also endorse administrative penalties that the EU can impose on the member States: a “strict” EU is seen as the best ally for the environment, due to its potential and ability to “threaten, punish and guide the national States” (IntIE19).

Furthermore, the trust in the possibility of influencing market dynamics is particularly widespread among the major ENGOS, even more than the trust they place in European institutions. This is a generalised point, from the more cautious approaches of a national association such as *Legambiente* (“for us it is more relevant that a large Italian company decides to do something, rather than have a law that may not be applied”, IntEI8) to the more neoliberal ones, such as *WWF Italy*, which particularly trust the role of companies such as Coca Cola or McDonald’s and their green-oriented market activities: “If we wait for the international treaty we don’t come out of it, if we intervene on those that have the greatest impact we can have a possibility for growth, because the companies can influence the behaviour of the individual consumer” (IntIE19).

According to such perspectives on environmental issues, the latter can be managed only thanks to a Western-centric, market-oriented, securitarian idea of democracy, sustained by strong transnational institutions (among which the EU is perceived as the easiest to target) in alliance with the biggest market players.

5.The interaction between local/national/transnational levels

Along with the different visions of Europe, some place for sovereignty claims has emerged, a widely discussed topic in the media and the literature as well as in the other contributions of this issue (see in particular the papers of Portos, and Milan). First of all, it should be observed that almost never (with the exception of an anarchist group such as Eat the Rich) do the respondents propose to unilaterally leave the EU. Even the prefigurative proposals of going “beyond this Europe” do not translate into an immediate willingness to abandon the EU: this can result in a partial contradiction, and should be put down to the fact that the current numerous “leave” proposals are often endorsed by conservative right-wing parties.

5.1. Ecological democracy: transnational frames, domestic practices

As previously mentioned, when the ecological democracy groups criticise the European dimension, they are often advocating for broader, not narrower, European borders. Sovereignty can at last be defined along two specific strands: territorial sovereignty and/or food sovereignty. These two strands are frequently shared among the grass-roots groups. However, as predictable, the LULU movements stress the territorial dimension, as illustrated by an activist of the *Forum Ambiente e Salute*, a Southern Italian network focused on environmental, health and social costs caused by neo-liberal policies and big infrastructures especially: “there should be a local sovereignty, with an autonomy from all points of view, including the productive and economic ones” (IntEI5). In contrast, food sovereignty is particularly evoked by local independent farmers, such as *Campi Aperti*, born “not only to advocate for ecology but also to challenge policy on food sovereignty and on accessibility to food for all” (IntEI2).

This combination of “beyond European” proposals and specific sovereignty claims has implications for frames and practices, especially regarding the interaction between local/national/transnational levels. First of all, as emerged from other recent research (de Moor 2017), the organisation of large European and more generally transnational demonstrations coinciding with institutional meetings, is currently perceived as ineffective and highly impacting from an environmental point of view. The willingness of the grass-roots groups to domesticate the protesting is confirmed. This is a strategy related to ideological motivations and organisational dynamics, but also influenced by the moderately better opportunities offered at local level (della Porta et al. 2019). Two examples of this include *No Tav* (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the infrastructure supposed to transport natural gas from Greece to Italy through the Adriatic Sea), where activists’ claims received an “excellent reception at a local level” (IntEI14), and also *No Muos*, where “local authorities have built a network against the installation of the Muos” (IntEI12). In such dimension, according to several respondents, democracy can be better practised.

At the same time, the dynamic of scaling-up frames (Kurtz 2003) also works among the Italian LULU movements and political ecology groups, as they proved able to frame single territorial issues within broader political-economic processes. This could be summarised in the classic slogan “think globally, act locally” (Rootes 2013), which was quoted by numerous respondents. For example, an activist of the *No Tav* movement, the better known and largest Italian movement against big infrastructure (opposing the high-speed train aimed at connecting Turin and Lyon), states that “in the No Tav movement, I have recognised some characteristics that link a local and a global struggle.” (IntIE15). This is even more evident in the case of the opposition to cruise ships in the Venice lagoon: due to the strong aesthetic impact of the phenomenon, the city is perceived by local activists as a worldwide symbol of a different idea of urban and environmental development. The *Comitato No Grandi Navi* and the social centres supporting it also used this argument in order to connect the specific Venice case to a more general anti-capitalist narrative on global environmental justice.

“Venice has become a global symbol of a living city and not just as a theme park: today its importance is precisely that of being a struggle that goes beyond the specific issue at stake [...]. The committees often fall back on a local dimension, maybe it's not NIMBY but they have this characteristic: therefore we proposed an assembly last September, which was attended by activists of local committees from at least seven or eight European countries and the idea was to discuss what could trigger an upward shift from local to European activism: and this is the idea that local committees are fighting for a single reason – climate justice.” (IntIE11)

The ecological democratic groups frame the multi-dimensionality of the ongoing ecological crisis, identifying its ultimate cause in the current Western model of development centred on infinite economic growth. This model has a general frame but specific local manifestations: Italy’s model is related to big infrastructure (della Porta and Piazza, 2008; della Porta et al. 2019). In this sense, the Italian LULU movements not only theoretically frame but also pragmatically act within a global (not only European) line of thinking. For example, some of them participated in the occupation of a forest in Hambach (Germany), where an enormous lignite mine is located; others are close to the network of the so-called ZADs (*zones à défendre*).¹⁶ Such mobilisations can be considered as international forms of trans-territorial local conflicts (Piazza 2011): they also produced shared documents, the most important being the Hendaye Carte¹⁷, with the aim of uniting the local struggles spread across Europe against big infrastructure projects and recognising an environmental (and social) justice perspective.

¹⁶ Famous examples are the opposition to the construction of an airport in Notre-Dame-des-Landes, the “Ferme des Bouillons” close to Rouen or the “Barrage de Sivens” in Occitanie.

¹⁷http://www.presidioeuropa.net/blog/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CARTA-DI-HENDAYE-23_1_2010-multilingual_53.pdf

To sum up, the geographical scale of the ecological democracy area involves a trans-nationalisation of frames, on the one hand, and a domestication of practices on the other.

5.2. Green democracy: going transnational (if possible)

The formal ENGOs, on the contrary, privilege the transnational dimension. This applies to both the interpretation of environmental issues as global ones, and also to their practices, normally consisting in lobbying alongside other NGOs, both from the environmental field and from other movement areas. This choice is related to the perception of better political opportunities at the European rather than national (or local) level, contrarily to what happens for grass-roots claims (della Porta et al. 2019). However, also within an arena composed of international networks, the nationally based ENGOs and the national components of the international ENGOs maintain a central relevance: this is also related to the fact that some of these NGOs have jurisdiction only on national territory, and so their involvement in Europe finds practical limitations and structural obstacles.

When possible, however, externalisation is considered as a better option. The domestication of the issues promoted by the ecological democracy groups is normally opposed by green democracy NGOs. This is also due to the opposition encountered at a local level in the relations with grass-roots groups, as admitted for example by the Vice President of *Greenpeace Italy*: “if you show up at the homes of people who have a long-lasting local presence, this can turn out to be annoying” (IntEI6).

A federal Europe with stronger autonomy given to the regions is endorsed; the presence of European guidelines, however, is considered unavoidable. This vision is generally shared by both national associations (such as *Legambiente*) and the Italian branches of international ones (such as *Greenpeace Italy* or *WWF Italy*). The president of *Legambiente* states for example that “the issue of national sovereignty must be absolutely avoided”, who makes his point by referring to the Brexit situation, which, according to him, “shows that the solution is not to leave Europe, because it would mean undoing the achievements of the last 50 years” (IntIE8).

6. Summary. From green democracy vs. ecological democracy to Anthropocene vs. Capitalocene?

All the associations and groups analysed in this article consider the current environmental situation as a main issue, with all the typical characteristics of a critical juncture. However, explanations and solutions given by green democracy and ecological democracy are completely different, and are ever more polarising. Anthropocene and Capitalocene are very effective labels (and eco-political paradigms) for summarising such different positions.

The notion of Anthropocene was originally advanced by geologists (Crutzen 2006) as a way to define the current geological era as marked by the consequences of human development driven by fossil fuel energy. The concept found a great echo in social sciences in terms of socio-historical events, thus triggering a very lively debate on issues such as the relation between social change and (planetary) ecological change. The Capitalocene approach, in contrast, is based on Jason Moore’s idea of capitalism as “world ecology” (2015) and on the works of Andreas Malm (see, for example, Malm 2018). It is a way to re-signify in historical terms what the geological approach shows in terms of the alteration of global ecological equilibria and the role played by human action. Capitalocene is a definition that is only advanced in the social sciences and in the political debate; geologists stick to Anthropocene, and their landmarks (based on stratigraphic considerations) are not historical landmarks. Furthermore, in the same way that I acknowledged the existence of a “third way” of environmentalism, the Anthropocene vs. Capitalocene dichotomy is a drastic simplification. For

example, other “concurrent” terms - such as Plantationocene (Tsing 2015) or Chthulucene (Haraway 2015) - have been theorised.¹⁸

The current trust in green (capitalist) economies and growth-oriented “sustainability” can be seen as updates of the ecological modernisation theories (Mol and Spaargaren 2000), in which Western-oriented model of growth was supposed to be compatible with the conservation of the environment and natural resources, and to be able to satisfy humankind's needs both present and future. This position corresponds, at least implicitly, to a positive reception of the diagnostic and prognostic frames proposed by the Anthropocene perspective in its political “translation”. The impact of human actions is being denounced, but the implementation of reformist policies, innovative technological devices and changes in individual lifestyles are considered the best solutions to the current ecological crisis. This position is embraced by big national and international ENGOS. The solution would be represented by some update of the current neoliberal paradigm, based on virtuous human actions and technological developments that are supposed to solve previous anthropic problems without questioning the basic assumptions of the current production system.

In contrast, environmental justice activists for several decades - but also Greta Thunberg, the “leader” of the FFF, more recently – have argued that it is necessary to think up and build a radically different model of development, going beyond the current institutional structures and market economy. Following this last assumption, a definition of the current era as the Capitalocene is embraced by most of the Italian ecological democracy area. These groups have developed a shift in scale from the local to the global dimension but also a strong critique of existing political institutions, including European ones: ecology is not considered as a further element to be added to traditional political issues (justice, freedom, solidarity, etc.), but it rather embodies the challenge of redefining them in the light of a broader understanding of the current conditions of Western democracies. Identifying the (natural) limits and acting accordingly, is paramount. Capitalism and the institutions supporting it are considered as bearing the main responsibility for the both financial and environmental crises. Therefore, criticisms are not limited to the EU but more generally address the broader political paradigm in which it is involved, namely neo-liberalism.

Even if claiming the validity of the dichotomy represented by Anthropocene and Capitalocene and its effectiveness in summarizing the positions emerged in this paper, at the same time it would be incorrect to always automatically endorse the combinations Anthropocene-green democracy and Capitalocene-ecological democracy. Not all the activists and groups accept these labels, and many activists even ignore the debate. Such opposition is particularly relevant in the political and social sciences debate where the question is not that of defining a new geological era but that of expressing the need to take conjointly into account social and ecological change and the interdependence between the social and the ecological dimensions of human societies at global level.

Conclusions

In this article, I have identified two divergent sectors of the Italian territorial and environmental movements according to their radically different conceptions of democracy: green (procedural) democracy vs. ecological (substantive) democracy. I have considered their different positions on

¹⁸ It is not the objective of this article to review this complex debate: for a review, see Davis et al. 2019. For example, various scholars - from very different angles - do criticize the current state of affairs without agreeing with the Capitalocene hypothesis (see, for example, the contributions of Steffen et al. 2007, and Morton 2014).

some specific aspects: in particular, their perspectives on the Europeanization process, their visions of Europe and EU institutions, and the interaction between local/national/transnational levels.

Together with a shared disenchantment towards the Europeanization process, clear divergences have also emerged. Green democracy organisations are confident in a reformed Europe, a softer and more institutionalised version of the Alter-European perspectives promoted at the beginning of the millennium by the GJM (and its environmental components), often supporting neoliberal market-driven perspectives on the green economy or sustainable development. This also translates into an attempt to trans-nationalise their activities, because of the global relevance of the issues they deal with, but especially considering the different opportunities offered in the multilevel governance scenario (Marks & McAdam 1996; della Porta and Parks 2016). Ecological democracy groups, in contrast, endorse a radical change and not only an improvement of the current situation, preferring to domesticate their actions but also to go “beyond this Europe” in an anti-capitalist perspective, explicitly bridging social and environmental justice.

Current frames, interpretations and alternative solutions proposed by groups labelled as belonging to green democracy or ecological democracy, resonate with the interpretation of the current (ecological) critical juncture as the Anthropocene or the Capitalocene.

This research has some limitations to be acknowledged, that represent promising avenues to explore in the future. First of all, the sample is not representative of the very variegated panorama of Italian environmental social movement organizations (SMOs); further studies to extend a similar analysis on visions of Europe and democracy to other environmental groups and associations would be crucial. Second, the current situation has substantially shifted since the data have been gathered: a new European Parliament and a new European Commission have been installed. On the one hand, they have put declared even more that environmental issues are the top policy area for the coming years, even announcing a specific EU Green Deal. At the same time, however, real data from various European countries go in the opposite direction, deviating from the Paris Agreement objectives as well as from other environmental milestones set by international governance. Another element that makes the data presented partially dated is the rise of new ecological mobilisations around the world and in Europe particularly during 2019, such as FFF and XR: these new mobilisations have contrasted with some of the organisations analysed in this article, but also allied with others, often ‘obscuring’ their visibility due to more effective communication (especially online) and the ability to achieve wider audiences. Studying their structures, strategies, frames and outcomes will be a central topic in the general panorama of social movement studies over next years. Finally, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has changed the game in international politics: even if the European Commission has claimed that one crisis should not overcome the others (with explicit reference to environmental issues and climate change in particular), the effective impact of the pandemic on environment and environmental mobilisations should be analysed in depth.

Bibliography

- Barbera, F. Dagnes, J., Salento, A. and Spina, F., 2016, *Il capitale quotidiano*, Roma, Donzelli
- Barca, S., 2014. Telling the Right Story: Environmental Violence and Liberation Narratives, *Environment and History*, 28: 535–546.
- Barca, S., 2019. Labour and the ecological crisis: The eco-modernist dilemma in western Marxism(s) (1970s-2000s). *Geoforum*. 98, 226-235.
- Borzel, T. and Buzogany, A., 2018. Compliance with EU Environmental Law. The Iceberg is Melting. *Environmental Politics*, 28(2): 315-341.

- Bowen F. & Aragon-Correa, A. 2014. Greenwashing in Corporate Environmentalism Research and Practice: The Importance of What We Say and Do. *Organization & Environment*, 27(2): 107-112.
- Brand, U., 2016, Beyond Green Capitalism: Social–Ecological Transformation and Perspectives of a Global Green-Left, *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 9(1), 91–105
- Bühlmann, M. and Kriesi, H. 2013. Models for Democracy. In Kriesi H. et al. (eds.): *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 44-68.
- Caiani, M. and Graziano, P. 2018. Europeanisation and social movements: The case of the Stop TTIP campaign. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57(4), 1031-1055.
- Capoccia, G. and Kelemen, D. 2007, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, *World Politics*, 59(3), 341-369.
- Carson, R., 1962. *Silent spring*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- Carter, N. 2018. *The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Commoner, B., 1971. *The closing circle: Man, nature and technology*. New York: Albert Knopf.
- Crutzen, P.J., 2006. 'The “Anthropocene”'. In: Ehlers E., Krafft T. (eds.) *Earth System Science in the Anthropocene*. Berlin: Springer, pp. 13–18.
- Dalton, R.J., 1994. *The green rainbow: Environmental groups in Western Europe*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- de Moor, J., 2017. The ‘efficacy dilemma’ of transnational climate activism: the case of COP21. *Environmental Politics*, 0 (0), 1–22.
- della Porta, D. and Rucht, D., 2002. The Dynamics of Environmental Campaigns. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 7(1), 1-14.
- della Porta, D. and Caiani, M., 2007. Europeanization From Below? Social Movements and Europe. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 12 (1), 1–20.
- della Porta, D. and Piazza, G., 2008. Local contention, global framing: The protest campaigns against the TAV in Val di Susa and the bridge on the Messina Straits. *Environmental Politics*, 16 (5), 864–882.
- della Porta, D. & Parks, L., 2016. Social movements, the European crisis and EU political opportunities. *Comparative European Politics* 15(64): 1–18.
- della Porta, D., Piazza, G., Bertuzzi, N. & Sorci, G. (2019), LULUs movements in multilevel struggles: A comparison of four movements in Italy. *Rivista Italiana Politiche Pubbliche*.
- Deriu, M., 2012, Democracies with a future: Degrowth and the democratic tradition. *Futures*, 44(6), 553-561.
- Diani, M., 1995. *Green networks. A structural analysis of the Italian environmental movement*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Dobson, A. (1995), *Green political thought*, Routledge, London.
- Giugni, M. and Grasso, M.T., 2015. Environmental movements in advanced industrial democracies: Heterogeneity, transformation, and institutionalisation. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 40: 337-361.
- Glendinning, M. 2003. Conservation Movement: A Cult of the Modern Age. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 13: 359-376.
- Grande, E. and Kriesi, H., 2015. 'The restructuring of political conflict in Europe and the politicization of European integration'. In T. Risse (ed.), *European public spheres : politics is back*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 190-223.
- Haraway, D., 2015, Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin, *Environmental Humanities*, 6 (1): 159-165.
- Holifield, R., 2015. 'Environmental justice'. In T. Perreault, G. Bridge and J. McCarthy (eds.). *Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology*. New York: Routledge.
- Hutter, S., Grande, E., and Kriesi, H., 2016. *Politicising Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Inglehart, R., 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Political Change Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jordan, A.J., Benson, D., Wurzel, R.K. and Zito, A.R., 2011. 'Environmental Policy: Governing by Multiple Policy Instruments?' In J.J. Richardson (ed.) *Constructing a Policy-Making State? Policy Dynamics in the EU*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Kaldor, M., Selchow, S., and Murray-Leach, T., 2015. *Subterranean politics in Europe*. London: Springer.
- Keucheyan, R., 2018. *La nature est un champ de bataille. Essai d'écologie politique*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Knill, C., S. Eckhard, and S. Grohs., 2016. Administrative Styles in the European Commission and the OSCE Secretariat: Striking Similarities Despite Different Organizational Settings', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23, 7, 1057–76.
- Knill, C., S., Steinebach, Y. and Fernández-i-Marín, X. 2018, Hypocrisy as a Crisis Response? Assessing Changes in Talk, Decisions, and Actions of the European Commission in EU Environmental Policy. *Public Administration*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12542>
- Kousis, M., 2004. Economic opportunities and threats in contentious environmental politics: A view from the European South. *Theory and Society*, 33 (3–4), 393–415.
- Kousis, M., 2016. 'Theoretical Perspectives on European Environmental Movements'. In O. Fillieule and G. Accornero (eds.). *Social Movement Studies in Europe: The State of the Art*. New York: Beghahn.
- Kousis, M., Porta, D. della, and Jiménez, M., 2008. Southern European environmental movements in comparative perspective. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 51 (11), 1627–1647.
- Kurtz, H.E., 2003. Scale frames and counter-scale frames: constructing the problem of environmental injustice. *Political Geography*, 22, 887-916.
- Lehay, T., 2018, Radical Reformism and the Marxist Critique, *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, 29(2), 61-74.
- Leonardi, E., 2017, Carbon trading dogma: Theoretical assumptions and practical implications of global carbon markets. *Ephemera*, 17(1), 61-87.
- Leonardi, E., 2019, Bringing Class Back In. *Ecological Economics*, 156, 83-90.
- Malm, S., 2018, *The progress of this storm: Nature and society in a warming world*, London: Verso.
- Marks, G. & McAdam, D., 1996. Social movements and the changing structure of political opportunity in the European Union. *West European Politics* 19(2): 249–278.
- Martinez-Alier, J., 2002. *The environmentalism of the poor: a study of ecological conflicts and valuation*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar..
- McAdam, D., 2017. Social Movement Theory and the Prospects for Climate Change Activism in the United States. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20: 189-208.
- Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., and Behrens, W.W., 1972. *The limits to growth*. New York: Universe Books.
- Mitchell, T., 2013. *Carbon Democracy. Political Power in the age of oil*, London-New York, Verso Books.
- Mol, A.P., and Spaargaren, G., 2000. Ecological Modernization Theory in Debate: A Review. *Environmental Politics*, 9(1): 17-49.
- Moore, J.W., 2015. Putting Nature to Work: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, and the Challenge of World-Ecology'. In C. Wee, J. Schönenbach, and O. Arndt, *Supramarkt: A micro-toolkit for disobedient consumers, or how to frack the fatal forces of the Capitalocene*. Gothenburg: Irene Books, pp. 69–117.
- Morton, T., 2014, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Term Anthropocene, *Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Critical Inquiry*, 1(2), 257-264.
- Osti, G., 1998, Dalla protesta ai servizi: percorsi del movimento ambientalista in Italia, *Quaderni di Sociologia*, 42(16), 21-40.

- Piazza, G., 2011. 'Locally unwanted land use' movements: the role of left-wing parties and groups in trans-territorial conflicts in Italy. *Modern Italy*, 16 (3), 329–344.
- Rootes, C., 1995. *A new class? The higher educated and the new politics*. London: Sage.
- Rootes, C., 2004. Is there a European environmental movement? *Europe, Globalization, Sustainable Development*. In J. Barry, B. Baxter and R. Dunphy. London: Routledge, pp. 47–72.
- Rootes, C., 2013. *Acting locally: local environmental mobilisations and campaigns*. London: Routledge.
- Rootes, C., 2014. *Environmental movements: local, national and global*. London: Routledge.
- Rovisco, M., 2016. A new 'Europe from below'? Cosmopolitan citizenship, digital media and the indignados social movement. *Comparative European Politics*, 14 (4), 435–457.
- Schlosberg, D., 2004. Reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories. *Environmental politics*, 13 (3), 517–540.
- Schlosberg, D. and Coles, R., 2016. The new environmentalism of everyday life: Sustainability, material flows and movements, *Contemporary Political Theory*, 15(2): 160–181.
- Steffen, W., Crutzen P.J. e McNeill J.R., 2007, The Anthropocene. Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?, *Ambio*, 368, 614-621.
- Tilly, C. 2007. *Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Touraine, A., 1978. *La voix et le regard*. Paris: Seuil.
- Tsing, A., 2015, *The Mushroom at the End of the World: on the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Weisskircher, M. (2019), The European Citizens' Initiative: Mobilization Strategies and Consequences, *Political Studies*, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719859792>

Interviews:

- IntIE1: Animal Equality - Milano
- IntIE2: Campi Aperti/Genuino Clandestino - Bologna
- IntIE3: Essere Animali - Bologna
- IntIE4: Eat the Rich - Bologna
- IntIE5: Forum Ambiente Salute - Lecce
- IntIE6: GreenPeace - Roma
- IntIE7: Lav (Lega Anti-vivisezione) - Roma
- IntIE8: Legambiente - Roma
- IntIE9: Mamme No Inceneritore - Firenze
- IntIE10: Mondeggi - Firenze
- IntIE11: No Grandi Navi - Venezia

IntIE12: No Muos - Messina

IntIE13: No Ponte - Messina

IntIE14: No Tap - Lecce

IntIE15: No Tav - Torino

IntIE16: No Triv – skype call

IntIE17: Oltre la Specie - Milano

IntIE18: Stop Ttip - Roma

IntIE19: WWF - Roma