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The puzzle of repression and collective action frames:

framing dynamics of Euromaidan and "For Fair Elections" movements

Aliaksandr Ruzhantsou

Supervisor: professor Donatella della Porta

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Chapter 1. Introduction: the puzzle of repression and framing

Recent developments in the studies of contentious politics recognize that the repressive strategies of authorities play a crucial role in the dynamics of collective mobilization and its outcomes (Davenport, Johnston and Muller 2005). By adopting different strategies vis-à-vis challengers, governments influence the emergence, development and decline of movements. Ruling regimes have much more resources than their challengers and repressive agencies are the only institutions that are officially empowered to use violence against challengers if there is a threat to the functioning of the political system. Therefore, when authorities intend to repress relatively powerless protesters, they are assumed to succeed. However, in some cases repression deters mobilization, whereas in other cases it escalates collective action (Lichbach 1987). The scholarship has called this contradictory relationship the repression-mobilization paradox or the puzzle of repression (Lichbach 1987, Davenport 2007).

Researchers investigating the effects of repression on protesters have mostly focused on the material premises of mobilization, repression characteristics and the interaction of law enforcement agencies and challengers. Although numerous influential works recognize the importance of oppositional meaning-making in response to repression (White 1989, O'Hearn 2009, Johnston 2012), the scholarship largely fails to properly address the issue of the subjective interpretation of repression by challengers and its impact on challengers' responses. By neglecting interpretations, analysts view the issue through the lens of an action-reaction framework, which adopts a mechanical vision of the challengers-regime interaction and more generally neglects the role of meanings in determining the actions of insurgents.

The process of meaning construction and its alignment by challengers to targeted audiences in the form of collective action frames (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988) provides an analytically useful way of thinking about how interpretations and their strategic "fitting" of meanings to the public can mediate the effects of repression. However, framing literature mostly focuses on the isomorphic characteristic of frames and framing strategies of actors, while neglecting the effects of contextual conditions, in particular, repression (Benford 1997, Benford and Snow 2000, Snow et al. 2014). By ignoring material factors, framing scholars make their research skewed in favor of pure interpretivism. Linking the structural conditions which movements react to, and their subjective interpretation followed by frame alignment to targeted

audiences is a more balanced and productive way of explaining which instances of negative sanctions influence framing and correspondingly have effects on further backfire or quiescence.

More generally, we could expect that it is only when challengers reframe the repressive situation as unjust, that escalation becomes possible. Another crucial issue is whether and how interpretations adapt or shift, and what the main source of these changes are. Namely: is it the cultural creativity of the discourse makers that produces shifts in interpretations that mediate responses of challengers to repression, or does repression shift the broader public's perceptions which define frame resonance and make challengers adopt their discourse? In the other words, do meanings on their own have sufficient autonomy to redefine repression as illegitimate and produce backlash or do they follow from structural alterations? The causal logic of explanation correspondingly lies in the agents' framing strategies or in the structural effects on frame resonance.

The constructionist position emphasizes the primacy of meanings, which are placed at the forefront of the explanation (Blumer 1969). The act of repression creates a broader ambiguity in the readings of structural conditions (Sewell 1996, Johnston 2015), which consequently make previous interpretations less convincing, and therefore, require the alteration or even transformation of meanings.

The structuralist position assumes that meanings are the dominant representations of the political environment (Brown 2014). Therefore, the interpretations of challengers feature as the "translation belt" that reflects the changes in structural material conditions (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995). Both of the assumptions are not necessarily self-exclusive and an integrated approach could prove their utility.

In this study, I intend to explore the transformative capacity of repression vis-à-vis framing in contentious politics. More generally, I will investigate the relationship between one of the key structural conditions, and the dynamics of meanings. I am going to explore whether repression can alter challengers' frame alignment processes and if so, what particular alterations can be observed in the content of collective action frames and which conditions are more likely to facilitate or hinder the alteration in meanings.

Two anti-governmental protests in the post-Soviet region, "Euromaidan" in Ukraine and "For Fair Elections" (FFE) in Russia will serve the purposes of the research. Both protests erupted in non-democratic regimes, which lacked civil society infrastructure (Way 2015,

Gabowitch 2017). Protesters in both cases demanded the change of the political regimes in their countries. The Russian protest did not manage to generate any significant concessions from the government in public policies and made Putin's regime more autocratic. Whereas Ukrainian protesters managed to oust the president Yanukovych.

More importantly for my study, repression had crucial effects on the trajectories of both cases. The facilitative and repressive policies of Putin's regime demobilized protesters, whereas in Ukraine, inconsistent repression and concessions backfired and fueled protests. Thus, relatively similar mobilizations ended up in very different ways.

By comparing similar cases that generated different dynamics of mobilization I expected to find different dynamics of framing in response to the effects of repression. The comparative strategy of paired comparison is assumed to add rigor to the theoretical conclusions and to avoid the isomorphism of single-case studies (Tarrow 2010). Indeed, as I will demonstrate, repression in the Ukrainian case produced tangible alterations in movement framing, whereas in Russia, the movement's discourse did not undergo considerable shifts which were anchored in movement discourse.

More generally, both of the cases belonged to the 2011-2014 protest wave. It embraced numerous mobilizations as different as the Tahir protest movement in Egypt and Occupy Wall Street in the USA. Multiple massive mobilizations in non-Western contexts further challenged dominant explanations in social movement studies, which heavily relied on cases of Western consolidated democracy and once again, demanded a more rigorous exploration of the contexts outside of the Western world (Arbatli and Rosenberg 2017). By investigating Ukrainian and Russian cases, I intend to contribute to the theoretical assumptions of social movement literature and enrich our understanding of protest mobilizations in the Post-Soviet region.

Social structures in both contexts were relatively weak, therefore, the formation of interpretations and collective identities often emerged in the course of actual mobilization, rather than preceding collective action (Clement 2015). These contextual factors imply higher levels of institutional uncertainty and a more flexible nature of meanings. The flexibility and emergent character of identities and interpretations made them more susceptible to external influences, such as repression.

I will explain how repression coupled with backfires in the Ukrainian case had crucial effects on the production and anchoring of alternative interpretations as well as their

diffusion among different groups in the social movement sector. Meanwhile in the Russian case discursive innovations following repression never became salient and remained marginal. I will also explore and specify those frame elements which experienced shifts in meanings. The study will also focus on frame resonance and its crucial role in fostering frame shifts in response to repression.

The structure of the study embraces 9 chapters. In chapter 2, I will present the theoretical assumptions on the relationship between repression and framing. This theoretical exploration provides insights into the theorizing of repression and framing in contentious politics literature. Then I will more precisely focus on repression-mobilization studies and frame alignment perspectives. The literature review points at theoretical gaps within both camps and attempts to bridge both approaches and provide a theoretical argumentation for bridging theorizing on meanings and structural factors.

In chapter 3, I specify the methodological framework, the data and methods that I use in the study. In particular, I will adopt qualitative frame analysis, relying on different sources of data (Lindekilde 2014). The analysis will be focused on the meso-level, where differences in framing are most easily identified (Johnston 2015). Sources of data include social movement organizations' posts on social network sites (e.g. Facebook and Vkontakte), their webpages, leaflets, press-releases, publications, newspapers and movement media (Appendix A and Appendix B). In addition to that I have conducted 33 semi-structured interviews (appendix C and appendix D) with activists and leaders of the movement representing different SMOs (Rubin and Rubin 2012). These were designed to explore in greater detail the effects on different forms of repression on protest groups and their perceptions of repression.

Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution of political opportunities in Ukraine as well as the dynamics of protest events. It portrays the sociopolitical conditions of the Ukrainian context that shaped mobilization processes and the unfolding course of events during the protest cycle. Next, chapter 5 scrutinizes the situations where repression influenced alterations of the discourse . It explores how the most influential movement frame constructors in Ukraine adopt their frames in response to repressive policies of the state.

Chapters 6 and 7 in a similar way to the former case, focus correspondingly on Russia's environmental factors that shaped the "For Fair Elections" movement, as well as tracing the protest cycle dynamics and particular situations which influenced framing dynamics.

Chapter 8 makes the conclusions regarding the findings of the study and their theoretical relevance to the literature on contentious politics, based on a cross-case comparison.

Chapter 2. Theory: Repression, framing and the relationship between them

The definition of repression

The research of political conflict and contentious politics over the last three decades has emphasized the crucial importance of repression in influencing the occurrence, development and decline of various forms of contention (Davenport 2007, Davenport and Inman 2012). Repression also shapes the context of mobilization and protesters' expectations about the possibility of mobilization and future success. In terms of its effects, repression may produce both the deterrence or escalation of protest (Lichbach 1987, Davenport, Johnston and Muller 2005).

In what follows, relying on the existing literature, I will attempt to conceptualize repression, explicate its various forms, explain why law enforcement agencies deploy it, and investigate environmental factors that facilitate and impede repression. Then I will more closely review the interactive nature of repression and focus on the "dictator's dilemma", which remains the major puzzle of repression-mobilization studies (Francisco 2005).

In order to explore the phenomenon under investigation, we first need to conceptualize it. According to influential literature in the field, repression includes the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions (Goldstein 1978, p. xxvii). While this definition of repression signifies important aspects of the phenomenon, it tends to focus exclusively on the physical, coercive actions of authorities, while neglecting the legal measures which attempt to constrain and channel the engagement of protesters in contention (Barkan 1984, 2006, Boudreau 2005).

Protesters mostly have little resources to exchange with the regime to attain their goals. Therefore, in order to overcome their relative powerlessness, they need to produce "negative inducements", which is the disruption of regular functioning of society (Wilson 1961). They can halt disruption if the authorities agree to bargaining on the conflict and accept at least some of the challengers' demands. However, in order to produce disruption, the aggravated population needs to mobilize. *Mobilization* is "a process of increasing the readiness to act collectively" (Gamson 1975, p.15) which requires the presence of some kind of coordinating organization, or *mobilizing*

structure, and the availability of a certain amount of *resources* channeled for collective action (Oberschall 1973, McCarthy and Zald 1977, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Challengers need to "convert individually held resources into collective resources to utilize those resources for collective action" (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, p.116). Mobilization always bears its costs on the mobilizers. The higher the costs, the less likely the challengers are to mobilize.

In order to suppress mobilization, authorities apply measures which are meant to increase the costs of collective action. For this reason, repression can be also defined as "any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action (we call repression … political if the other party is a government)" (Tilly 1978, p. 100).

Coercive measures are aimed at resolving situational disruption. "Killing citizens eliminates a part of society deemed unacceptable while compelling acquiescence or guided change within others. This act thus aims at eliminating the will of those previously challenging authority, as well as breaking the will of those who remain – reducing capacity as an afterthought" (Davenport 2007, p.47). The regime preemptively or reactively deals with groups in society that challenge the existing status quo to the degree that forces the authorities to react with repression.

In addition to coercive measures, authorities can adopt a broader array of non-coercive activities to restrain the actions of challengers. In particular, channeling represents a more sophisticated set of actions, which restrain actual engagement rules in protest activity or direct it in an manner that is acceptable for the regime (Oberschall 1973, Earl 2003).

"When states *restrict* citizens, their goal is less to remove individuals/groups from society than it is to mold them within it, demarcating where members can and cannot go and defining who they can and cannot be. In other words, they are aiming first at capacity and then will" (Davenport 2007, p.47, emphasis added). Legal repression, therefore, is aimed at regulating the existing rules of engagement in non-institutional politics (Bourdreau 2005). This form of repression is preemptive and focused on future collective action. Also, by legally repressing challengers in courts, the regime demarcates the space and repertoire of action, which the authorities will penalize if challengers dare to adopt them in the future (Barkan 2006).

Building on the insights from the literature we can conceptualize repression as the set of observable actions, including coercive sanctions and legal repression or channeling, which are exercised by state agents preemptively or reactively, situationally or systematically, in response

to real or perceived threats coming from challengers and aimed at increasing the cost or decreasing the benefits of future actions by dissidents by limiting the legal permissiveness of their activities.

Repression is a product of the regime's efforts to eliminate threats to its dominance and to restore or maintain the status quo. Negative sanctions are exercised within broader sociopolitical settings and by certain law enforcement agents. Therefore, the characteristics of the sociopolitical context and the organizational features of law enforcement agencies matter for repression, as well as the idiosyncratic characteristics of repression. In what follows we will review how the context and organizational structure shape the occurrence of negative sanctions and how the idiosyncratic characteristics of repression structure its effects.

Political opportunity structure, organizational factors and characteristics of repression

Challenging groups emerge and operate in social and political realities which shape their grievances, available resources, possibilities of success, the presence or absence of elite allies and opponents, as well as the possibility of repression. There is a healthy consensus in social movement studies about the crucial role of the broader context in shaping social movement activity (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1989, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). The opening of the system and its higher receptivity to the demands of underprivileged groups enhances the chances for groups to make collective claims and attain their goals (Eisinger 1973, Jenkins and Perrow 1977, Tarrow 1994). The set of the factors pointing at the opening or closing of the system constitute the political opportunities structure (POS) (Tarrow 1994, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). POS embraces "the signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements" (Tarrow 1996, p. 54). When opportunities are favorable, movements mobilize, whereas when conditions are hostile, movements are less likely to mobilize (Minkoff and Meyer 2004).

The concept of political opportunities was adopted and elaborated by the theorists of the Political Process Model (PPM). This approach firmly situates challengers vis-à-vis their opponents and their political context. The main explanatory power of model emphasizes certain characteristics of the context that predict the actions of protestors (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1989). Political opportunity theorists single out several dimensions of POS. These include the institutional openness of the polity, the structure of alliance and conflict within the polity with

respect to challengers, the stability of political alignments, the presence of elite allies and levels of repression (Brockett 1991, 1993, Kriesi et al. 1995, Tarrow 2011).

These elements are more applicable to more open environments of Western democracies. Whereas in nondemocratic political regimes, the importance of certain contextual features may differ (Osa and Codruneanu-Huci 2003, Osa and Schock 2007), in non-democracies, the presence of allies and divisions of elites may still be important. However, due to the absence of political organizations or the free circulation of information, organizational networks and independent media are of crucial importance for mobilization (Osa and Codruneanu-Huci 2003, Osa and Schock 2007).

Though repression or its absence is just one of many dimensions of the political opportunity structure, it is the most straightforward and most visible factor, which points at the expansion or contraction of political opportunities. Due to its importance and analytical utility it is included in several political process models (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 2011). "The major theoretical statements of Gurr (1970) and Tilly (1978) identify government coercion as perhaps the most important factor accounting for political dissent" (Lichbach 1987, p. 267). Movements do not react to some abstract changes in the polity, but decide whether to mobilize in response to concrete signals from the system (Kriesi 1991, Della Porta 1995, Tarrow 1996). Repression is a clear signal to challengers that points at the contraction of political opportunities and undesirability of protest. However, under certain circumstances repression may produce a "backlash effect" (Francisco 1995, Hess and Martin 2006).

Political opportunities include the structural factors of the national context that evolve and change very slowly, as well as more volatile components that represent more dynamic changes (Tarrow 1996). The former category is useful in explaining developments within nation-state that influence emergence of movements. Whereas, the latter is short-term and is more useful for dynamic explanations focused on intramovement dynamics and interaction between movements and their opponents.

Repression mostly operates as a part of volatile political opportunities (Brockett 1991). It can be explored at two analytical levels (Della Porta 1996). Stable political opportunities refer to the more static features of the environment such as the organization of law enforcement agencies, the nature of the judiciary, law codes and constitutional rights (Della Porta 1995, Della Porta and Reiter 1998, Ron 2000, Cunningham 2009). Political culture is another crucial factor,

which shapes the conceptions of the state and citizen rights. As Della Porta (1996) demonstrates with the examples of post-WWII Germany and Italy, different perceptions of the state's legitimacy and its role in social regulations provided law enforcement agents with different understandings and strategies of dealing with challengers. When enacted in actual interactions with challengers over time, stable structural factors materialize in national strategies of dealing with dissent which shape the policing of protest (Kriesi et al. 1995, Della Porta and Reiter 1998).

The components of volatile political opportunity that shape repression include informal alliance structures and interactions between protesters and police (Della Porta 1995, 1996, Kriesi et al. 1995). Informal alliance structures or "civil rights" coalitions are made up of political parties, civic associations and unions as well as other collective and individual actors who support challengers. Its opponents constitute "law and order" or "conflict" coalitions. Different members of coalitions can move from one camp to another, support and condemn repression and in such a way as to contribute to the image of repression in the eyes of the public and elites as legitimate or not. The presence of civil rights coalitions in the government, in influential media or resourceful civic groups makes repression less likely and costlier for the government. Coalition members may provide support to challengers in supporting their claims at the institutional level or prevent government from using repressive measures (Tarrow 1996).

Besides contextual factors we also need to consider organizational factors such as the identity, knowledge and organizational structure of law enforcement agencies (Della Porta 1996, 1998, Cunningham 2003, 2009, Davenport 2005, Wood 2007). Provided that law enforcement agencies possess high levels of autonomy, their own interests may conflict with the interests of the government they are subjected to. Therefore, their goals in the actions on the ground may diverge from the goals of the government.

For instance, Earl and Soule (2006) have found that police troops, which stay at protests, may have different perspectives on the situation in comparison to their governments. The police are more focused on the situational threats posed by protesters, whereas government tends to be more interested in keeping long-term public order. Repressive agencies (e.g police) can see and respond to protest in line with their own interests, which may diverge from governmental demands (Soule and Earl 2006).

As mentioned before, states devise different strategies to deal with challengers. Often these strategies involve establishing organizations whose primary focus is controlling the

activity of social movements. These organizations train and socialize individuals for repressive activities. They are designed to control individuals and collectivities who threaten the state with their protest activity or radical views (Davenport 1995). In order to self-perpetuate and guarantee the flow of resources, repressive agencies need to find threats or deviant behaviors to neutralize. This "bureaucratic inertia" provides repressive agencies with a flow of resources and secures their existence (Davenport 1995, 2007).

Besides contextual and organizational factors we need to review the idiosyncratic characteristics of negative sanctions. In particular, instead of viewing repression as a uniform coercive action, we need to distinguish between different forms of repression adopted by authorities (Koopmans 1997, Della Porta and Reiter 1998, Earl 2003, Cunningham 2004, 2009, Ferree 2005, Barkan 2006, Boycoff 2006, 2007, Shreiver et al. 2018).

The scholarship identifies legal repression (Bourdreau 2005, Barkan 2006, Shriver et al. 2018), discursive obstruction (Shriver et al. 2013), symbolic violence (Boycoff 2006), protest policing (Della Porta and Reiter 1998, Earl 2003, Soule and Earl 2006, Soule and Davenport 2009), surveillance (Cunningham 2004, 2009, Davenport 2005) and soft, indirect forms of repression (Ferree 2005).

One of the most frequent forms of repressing popular dissent is protest policing which is "the police handling of protest events" (Della Porta 1995, Della Porta and Reiter 1998, Earl 2003, Soule and Earl 2006, Soule and Davenport 2009). Protest policing encompasses a broad range of actions undertaken by state repressive agencies against challenging groups before and after, but mostly during protest events.

Another form of repression is less direct and aimed at regulating the rules of engagement in contentious politics (Boudreau 2005). Its nature is different from direct coercive action and it is alternatively defined as channeling (Oberschall 1973, Earl 2003). The latter in turn involves "more indirect repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protest available, the timing of protest, and/or flow of resources to movement" (Earl 2003, p. 48). Due to its nature, its consequences may be different from coercive forms. For instance, Barkan (1984) suggests that legal repression was more effective in deterring the mobilization of black insurgents during the Civil Rights Movements in the 1960s, whereas coercive measures had mixed effects.

By adopting different repressive forms in conjunction or separately, authorities produce different effects on the responses of protesters. The recognition of the complexity of the

available repertoire of repression provides a more nuanced understanding of the effects of repression on the responses of challengers.

The effects of repression also depend on its *targets* (Mason and Crane 1989, Olivier 1991, Khawaja 1993, Carey 2006). For instance, indiscriminate violence against a population may result in backfire (Mason and Crane 1989). Groups or individuals that were previously neutral or uninvolved in the conflict between insurgents and the regime may start to actively supporting challengers when repressed indiscriminately by the regime (Ibid.). Their neutral status simply does not guarantee them security any more, and for them it is more beneficial to support the opposition in the hope of stop violence. Khawaja (1993) also reports that individualized repression in comparison to collective repression had a significant positive effect on mobilization during the Palestinian Intifada.

In order to better evaluate the effects of repression we also need to consider the challengers' *repertoire of action*. Some of these actions, like violence or terrorism (Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005, Della Porta 2013), may find little legitimacy among the broader public, and therefore their repression is unlikely to provoke popular outrage. However, the repression of legal actions in democratic systems may provoke escalation if perceived as illegitimate and signified within protestors' networks (Opp and Roehl 1990, Gupta et al. 1993, Opp 1994).

Another factor that contributes to the effects of repression are *concessions* made by authorities. According to value-expectancy models (Muller and Opp 1986, Klandermans and Oegema 1987), individuals are more willing to join a protest if they expect to achieve a desired outcome. If challengers win visible concessions from authorities alongside repressions, they may consider that as a sign of the regime's "weakness" and of the authorities' readiness to give up more (Rasler 1996). Therefore, for authorities it is critical to be consistent in their policies with respect to challengers' strategies, namely to punish some strategies and facilitate others (Lichbach 1987).

In attempt to evaluate the effects of repression on mobilization we also need to consider *timing* (Opp and Roehl 1990, Rasler 1996, Moore 1998). As examples from Germany, Sri-Lanka and Iran suggest, in the short run repression may deter insurgency, whereas in the long run its effects will lead to stronger mobilization (Opp and Roehl 1990, Rasler 1996).

To sum up, we could suggest that contextual factors and organizational characteristics considerably shape authorities' choice of repressive strategies. In turn, the

characteristics of repression are important factors that affect the dynamics of interaction between states and challengers.

So far we have situated repression in its broader political environment and focused on its core characteristics. Now we can focus more on the dynamic processes of the regime's interaction with challengers, which form the repression-mobilization nexus (Lichbach 1987, Moore 1998). In what follows we will explore in more detail two dominant approaches in repression-mobilization studies and the major puzzle of this sub-field - the dictator's dilemma (Francisco 2005).

Structural and rational choice approaches in repression-mobilization studies

The focus of repression-mobilization studies is on the dynamic nature of interaction between the regime and challengers. The scholars in the field have attempted to evaluate how repression by authorities affects the responses of challengers, and on the opposite side, how the mobilization of challengers influences the reaction of authorities (Lichbach and Gurr 1981, 1986, Lichbach 1984, 1987, Muller 1985, Muller and Weede 1990, Hoover and Kowalewski 1992, Khawaja 1993, Rasler 1996, Carey 2006, 2010). In order to assess the interaction, scholars tend to adopt structural or rational choice lenses in evaluating the effects on both sides of contention. However, in the course of time many scholars gravitated towards a more balanced, hybrid rationalist-structuralist approach, which considers both structural conditions and the rational decisions of actors. Below we will review both of these approaches and their characteristics.

To start with, structuralist literature postulates that certain characteristics of contexts make them more conducive to the emergence of repressive strategies of authorities (Muller 1985, Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1991, Gupta et al. 1993, Fein 1995, Rummel 1995, Hathaway 2002, Hafner-Burton 2005). Structurally-based scholarship uses aggregative studies of multiple cases of interactions between protesters and authorities to produce general conclusions about the influence of structural factors on the emergence and effects of repression. In particular, they test how often different forms of repression are determined by different structural configurations in economic or political systems. The most conclusive finding in this literature is that democracies are less likely to repress than non-democracies (Muller 1985, Henderson 1991, Fein 1995, Rummel 1995, Carey 2006, 2010, Davenport 2007).

One of the explanations for why democracies are less likely to repress is because they experience different types of threats (Regan and Henderson 1992). Democratic regimes are more tolerant of protest for several reasons. They have more alternatives to control dissent in contrast to autocratic rule (Lichbach 1984, Moore 2000, Davenport 2007b). Democratic political systems are designed in such a way that allow them to use normative power thanks to the presence of communication channels between elites and non-elites (Davenport 2007b). Democratic regimes have more legitimacy in the eyes of citizenry, therefore they routinely rely on negotiation and bargaining to resolve political conflicts. "As state violence eliminates challengers and challenges, it diminishes government resources and reduces the legitimacy of political regime authorities, which is costly for the regime" (Davenport 2007b, p.11).

Repression may lead to irreversible repercussions for regime members, such as legal trials for the disproportional use of power or loss of votes (Davenport 2007b). Davenport's (2007b) thorough investigation of the systemic effects on repression suggests that voice, or electoral punishment, is one of two key characteristics of democratic systems that restrain repression. Due to electoral competition, citizens have the capacity to punish repressive governments (Rummel 1995). What is more, in democratic regimes, repression can provoke backlash and authorities are aware of that, which is why they prefer to rely on accommodative policies (Gupta et al. 1993).

Another major characteristic of democratic regimes that limits repression is the veto, which consists of the checks and balances system, executive constraints as well as veto points or veto players (Davenport 2007b). In contrast to non-democratic regimes, democracies have the mechanisms of checks and balances which prevent voluntarist decisions to repress (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, Davenport 2007b). In autocracies, conversely, the system itself is designed to block the opposition's influence on society or at least its ability to challenge governmental decisions. Therefore, in non-democratic regimes there is no effective way of countering or checking coercive powers that the elites are endowed with (Davenport 2007c).

In addition, autocracies rely on a large repressive apparatus, which is one of the bedrocks of regimes which are not inclined to tolerate opposition. Consequently, when non-democracies have alternatives to repression, they still often repress because the coercive machinery has sufficient resources and capacity, while its members are involved in key decision making regarding political threats (Davenport 2007c). Repressive institutions also constantly require

confirmation of their perpetuation, which is why they always eager to repress even when alternatives are available. In addition, "bureaucratic inertia" suggests that previous coercive activities affect the following ones, hence the costs of subsequent repression will be lower (Davenport 2007b).

Despite conclusive findings that democracies are less prone to repression, the relationship between democratic development and repression is non-linear (Muller 1985, Fein 1995, Regan and Henderson 2002). Namely, autocratic regimes and full democracies rarely use repression when faced with dissent. In autocratic regimes, due to the potential of ruthless repression of any dissent and severe restraints on oppositional activity, citizens mostly stay compliant (Davenport 2007c, Johnston 2012). Whereas in democracy, there are more institutional channels for groups to directly voice their disagreement and authorities are much more tolerant to the expression of dissent. However, in semi-democratic regimes or in those polities which are in transition, we can observe the highest levels of repression (Muller 1985, Gupta et al. 1993, Fein 1995, Rummel 1995). For this reason, several empirical studies have confirmed the hypothesis of "more murder in the middle" (Fein 1995, King 1998, Regan and Henderson 2002).

There are several reasons why semi-democracies are more likely to adopt repression. They lack the institutional channels for accommodating the demands of various groups (Regan and Henderson 2002). Hence, aggravated groups tend to resort to public dissent to make public claims. Due to the constant lack of resources and legitimate channels to implement the policies demanded by the opposition, leaders of transitional government will be more vulnerable and threatened by dissent (Regan and Henderson 2002). In other words, institutional under-development produces strain in semi-democratic regimes when they face challenges from insurgents, pushing them to repress to maintain political order.

However, when democratic development reaches a certain threshold, the relationship between democracy and repression is strictly linear and negative (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, p.540). Full democracies, thus, rarely adopt political repression when faced with dissent. Nevertheless, when fully democratic regimes face threats that can seriously undermine political stability, they will still resort to repression (Carey 2006, p.22).

Besides democratic levels, economic development is another factor that contributes to the likelihood of repression (Muller 1985, Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1991, Gupta et al. 1993, Poe and Tate 1994). In particular, scholars evaluate the aggregate values of

potential economic benefits by means of GNP, population growth and urban population as predictors of repression (Gupta et al. 1993). The higher the economic benefits, the more likely individuals will engage in economic activity, not political dissent (Ibid.). Alternatively, scholars measure poverty levels as predictors of non-institutional engagement (Mitchell and McCormick 1988). Their results suggest that it is not the poorest, but rather relatively poor nations which lack the proper means of channeling discontent that are more likely to produce repression (Ibid.).

Another economic factor of repression is income inequality (Muller 1985). "Countries following a strategy of development which ignores the macroeconomic factor of distribution equality may be prone to experience comparatively high levels of mass political violence, regardless of other factors" (Ibid., p.60). In other words, those countries where wealth is distributed more unevenly among the population are more likely to produce repression. Additionally, higher economic growth and a more disproportionate flow of goods to the rich rathen than to the poor will produce higher levels of dissent that will be repressed (Henderson 1991). In general, the higher the levels of inequality in society, the more likely is the government to use repression against challengers. To put it differently, the less a regime adopts egalitarian policies in the distribution of goods across society, the more likely is repression to occur.

Besides looking at economic and political factors of repression, scholars also pay attention to demographics and the sociocultural heterogeneity of society as an explanation of repressive policies (Muller 1985, Poe and Tate 1994, Lindstrom, Moore and Turan 2002, Laitin and Fearon 2003). For instance, Poe and Tate (1994) found that larger and more dense populations put more stress on national resources and therefore are likely to provoke repression. Additionally, ethno-linguistic and religious cleavages as well as separatist tendencies are more likely to produce repression (Khmelko and Wiegand 2010).

Thus, structuralist approaches suggest that environmental conditions are conducive to generating dissent, which threatens the existing political order and may in turn provoke repression. In addition, different political institutions filter out threats and channel dissent in a different manner, so the differentiation between various types of political regimes is helpful in explaining both the eruption of dissent and the regime's repression. Repression depends on the conduciveness of the contextual conditions that generate different forms of dissent and on the nature of the regime that faces the challenge. Though structuralist approaches proved to be a useful instrument in measuring the aggregate characteristics of the system which are more or less likely

to lead to repression, it fails to provide an explanation of how authorities actually perceive or evaluate threats. Its perspective on negative sanctions is too static and misses the causal dynamics of interaction between challengers and regimes (McPhail and McCarthy 2005). Structuralists have viewed the responses of authorities in a very mechanistic manner and as a result, more focus on the decisions and behavior of repressive agencies as a part of the state repressive machinery has been required.

As Davenport (2007) rightly noted that "(f)ollowing developments in the rest of political science, the theoretical orientation of most researchers of repression has evolved from a hard structuralism to a soft rationalism" (Ibid., p.3). Scholars stopped characterizing repression as simply a "derivative of particular politico-economic system(s)", and instead began to view elites as rational decision-makers who decide on policy implementation based on rational calculations (Lichbach 1984, Gartner and Regan 1996, Moore 2000, Shellman 2006). As Davenport and Inman (2012) suggest "(p)olitical leaders carefully weigh the costs and benefits of coercive action. When benefits exceed costs, alternatives are not viewed favorable, and there is high probability of success, repressive action is anticipated. When costs exceed benefits, alternatives exist, and probability of success is low, no repression is expected" (Ibid., p.621).

Regimes have the choice to respond to repression with a variety of measures, ranging from concession to repression, depending on the situation (Lichbach 1984, Gartner and Regan 1996). Elites consider several factors when they use repression, make concessions or adopt several policies at once.

One of the most consistent findings in repression-mobilization research is that when the state is threatened, it will respond with repression (Davenport 1995, 2007). Davenport (2007) calls this consistency of findings "the law of coercive responsiveness" (Ibid., p.7). Authorities benefit from reducing domestic threats, since repression helps to fulfil the state's major goal of maintaining political control. However, what the state views as a threat to maintaining political control is a more complicated issue on which there is less agreement in the scholarship. What is more, the perception of the threat depends on the economic and socio-political context as well as the characteristics of dissent (Davenport 1995).

"Protest is, first and foremost, a form of action" (Tarrow 1991, p.13). Collective action sends signals to the authorities about the threat they may face. Thus, the characteristics of protest are an important indicator influencing the threat perception by authorities. Among major

characteristics of dissent, we could single out violence. The violence of challengers may be an important factor that threatens the state or provides elites with a legitimate reason to use repression (Lichbach 1984, Mason and Krane 1989, Gupta et al. 1993). In the first place, when challengers adopt violent actions, they increase the chance that other citizens may suffer or be killed as well create social chaos that dampens the legitimacy of the regime (Davenport 1995, p. 687). What is more, violent action provides more legitimacy for the regime to use repression.

Tilly (1978) has also suggested that the acceptability of the taken action (indicated by the number of protesters, the duration, geographic diffusion and degree of violence) and the acceptability of the group (its ideology, objectives and connections to institutional power) shape the perception of the threat by authorities (Ibid.: Chapter 4). The less that a group and its actions are accepted by the state, the more likely the latter is to deploy repression.

The demands of protesters are also important in shaping the perception of threats by authorities (Gartner and Regan 1996). The more distant a state policy is from one desired by the challengers, the less likely the state is to accommodate and more likely to repress (Gartner and Regan 1996, Moore 2000). In other words, the more the desired policy diverges from the existing one, the less are the chances for its accommodation, and consequently the more likely that authorities will adopt repressive strategies.

Another attribute of dissent that threatens the regime is the variety of strategies adopted by challengers (Davenport 1995, p. 687). The variety of adopted tactical choices (Lichbach 1987) or the "repertoire of contention" (Tilly 1986, p.4) provoke the reaction of different parts of the system which may put it under strain and increase the likelihood that the challenge is perceived as a threat. A variety of these actions are likely to produce strain in the system and provoke repression, which is a "cheaper" option to deal with when faced with multiple threats at once (Lichbach 1984, Hoover and Kowalewski 1992).

Threat perception also depends on the action's deviation from culturally acceptable norms of anti-systemic or non-institutional behavior (Wilkens 1964, Gibbs 1981, Lichbach 1984, Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Franks 1989). "As long as the conflict stays within the realm of acceptability, the government does not respond with repression" (Davenport 1995, p. 689). Therefore, regimes will be more tolerant to dissent in contexts which have experienced more dissent in the past (Carey 2006) or which have a much richer tradition in oppositional organization (Gartner and Regan 1996).

Thus, we could suggest that we need to carefully consider the characteristics of dissent in order to evaluate its effects on provoking state repression provided other factors being equal. Elites do not assess all insurgency uniformly. They evaluate their choices and pick repression if they consider that its benefits outweigh the costs compared to other policies (Lichbach 1984, Moore 2000). More importantly, the dynamic interaction between the regime and its opponents shapes the decisions of authorities about the policies they need to adopt in response to the threats they face.

The regime's evaluation of the threat is shaped by the contextual features and characteristics of dissent. The recognition of all these factors allows for a more balanced evaluation of the reasons and nature of repression. "At present most researchers employ some version of a rationalist-structuralist hybrid" (Davenport 2007b, p.38), which suggests the convergence of structuralist and rational choice strands of research on repression and political conflict.

So far, we have explored just one dimension of the repression-mobilization nexus, namely, the one that is focused on the responses of authorities to dissent. The main focus of the other side of the repression-mobilization nexus is on the effects of repression on challengers' responses. Here, the research has rather inconsistent findings. In particular, scholarship finds that the effects of repression on mobilization can be positive (Olivier 1991, Khawaja 1993) or negative (Hibbs 1973). More sophisticated approaches suggest a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship supported by Resource Mobilization Theory and the Political Process Model (Tilly 1978, Muller 1985), while the U-shaped relationship is attributed to grievance-based theories (Gurr 1970). RMT and PPM suggest that moderate levels of repression may send signals to actors about the narrowing down of political opportunities and foster their mobilization, whereas repression beyond certain threshold tends to impose intolerable costs and prevent further mobilization. Grievance-based theories predict that moderate levels of repression will deter mobilization, whereas high levels of repression will produce collective frustration and anger, that are likely to be released through collective mobilization (Davies 1962, Feierbend and Feierbend 1966, Gurr 1970).

According to PPM and RMT sufficient levels of repression are assumed to deter protesters and make them compliant. On the other hand, grievance-based theories suggest that high levels of repression can provoke a backlash from challengers. As Brockett (1993) puts it "(r)egime violence smothers popular mobilization under some circumstances, but at other times similar (or even greater) levels of violence will provoke mass collective action rather than pacify the target

population" (Ibid., p.458). This controversial relationship between the repression and mobilization of protesters has been variously termed as the dictator's dilemma (Francisco 2005), punishment puzzle (Davenport 2007) and repression-mobilization paradox (Lichbach 1987). The paradox lies in the fact that repression is assumed to deter protesters, whereas it regularly fails to do so. Therefore, scholarship has attempted to investigate this puzzle in order to provide an explanation as to why repression can both deter and escalate dissent.

The Repression-mobilization paradox (the Dictator's dilemma) and framing

The repression-mobilization paradox implies that repression does not always work the way it is meant to. This inconsistency has led researchers to explore this phenomenon in greater detail. The attention of scholars has been mostly focused on the effects of repression and the responses of protesters. Scholars assume that the type of repressive policies, the characteristics of the repressive agency, the conditions under which they are exercised and the target of repression can explain effects of repression. Therefore, the research focuses on who represses whom and under what conditions. This kind of reasoning implies that the parties involved in repression on both sides of the struggle view repression uniformly and hence that the focus should be exclusively on the material side of interaction. For this reason, the scholarship mostly ignores the link between the repressive actions of authorities and their *perception* by challengers and the broader public.

In the field of social movement studies, scholars tend to explain the effects of repression by adopting two different approaches. Social-psychological theories focus their attention on the micro-level. "Imposed sanctions are deprivations, the threat of sanctions is equivalent to the concept of anticipated deprivation, the innate emotional response to both is anger" (Gurr 1970, p. 238). This approach suggests a U-shaped relationship between repression and mobilization (Davies 1969, 1974, Gurr 1970, Weede 1987). Before reaching the point of escalation, moderate levels of repression deter mobilization. However, beyond a certain threshold repression increases frustration and aggression, which leads to backlash. The feelings of frustration and aggression are produced by repression and lead to collective action. Social-psychological approaches view collective mobilization as sets of separate individuals who decide whether to join the protest or not. The role of organization in mobilization is minimized. Though the authors consider the structural conditions which produce anger and frustration, including repression, they

fail to explain *how* the material conditions of the system produce the subjective interpretations of these conditions as unfair or unjust.

Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and Political Process Model (PPM) rely on a rationalist logic and put organizational capacity of challengers in their broader political context, putting resources and strategies at the forefront of their explanations (Gamson 1975, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1989). These theories predict an inverted-U relationship between repression and mobilization. Moderate repression fosters mobilization because it sends signals to challengers about the contraction of opportunities and makes them compete for shrinking resources and constituencies (Tarrow 1989). However, above a certain threshold where the costs of mobilizing are too high, challengers tend to demobilize. In contrast to social-psychological models, these approaches suggest that repression affects the external conditions which determine the cost-benefit calculations of rational actors. When costs exceed benefits, protesters demobilize.

In both cases, the conditions shaping the decisions of individuals to protest or comply are assumed to be objective and directly related to material reality. In contrast to that assumption, the literature suggests a more complex relationship between physical conditions and their interpretation by individuals and collectives (Ferree and Miller 1985, Mueller and Morris 1992, Gamson and Meyer 1996). Different social movement organizations (SMOs) and different social groups may have different interpretations of resources, opportunities, threats and grievances. As Gamson and Meyer put it "Opportunity balances elements of structure and agency. Frames are on the one hand, part of the world, passive and structured; on the other, people are active in constructing them. Events are frames, but we frame events. The vulnerability of the framing process makes it a locus of potential struggle, not a before laden reality to which we all must inevitably yield" (Gamson and Meyer 1996, p. 276).

Therefore, an integrated approach to external conditions and their perception by challengers and the broader public provides a more balanced explanation for popular reactions to repression and a deeper understanding of the effects of repression. However, we would not go as far as to suggest that meanings determine material opportunities regardless of the changes in the latter (Kurzman 1996). At the same time, publics' and challengers' interpretations of external conditions are not fully determined by these conditions per se (Taylor and Whittier 1992). Rather, meanings are corrected and adjusted strategically by those who want to promote their vision of

reality (Snow et al. 1986, Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Social movements often intervene between contextual conditions and public interpretations of these conditions by constructing and sharing meanings. Therefore, their framing attempts may be a crucial factor in shaping the responses of broader public towards repression.

Meanings do not flow from repressive events by mere fact of their occurrence. Correspondingly, the state's repression does not automatically lead to backlash or quiescence. Backlash can only occur if it is perceived as *illegitimate* or *unjust* by a sufficient number of people (Opp and Roehl 1990). Injustice needs to be constructed out of cultural materials available to the group. This means that meanings are not fully strategic and that the group's *ideology* may contribute to what group members believe, think and communicate. Different ideologies, therefore, may produce different framings in response to the same event.

Available meanings, frames and interpretations do not exist outside of power relations and are controlled by dominant actors (Gramsci 1971, Foucault 2001). Though meanings are structurally constrained, different actors, including social movements and movement supporters (e.g. media, political allies, opinion leaders), can challenge existing dominant interpretations and strategically promote their visions through interpretive packages or frames (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988, Gamson and Modigliani 1989). These interpretive packages or frames are disseminated in public space and shape the opinions of the broader public, media and elites if they resonate with them.

However, in order to resonate with the public, frames need to be aligned with the values and belief systems of targeted audiences (Snow et al. 1986). Therefore, the social composition and characteristics of target audiences are crucial for the *resonance* of frames (Snow and Benford 1988). These adaptations in frame alignment suggest that a shift in interpretations precedes adaptations in actions or works in conjunction with it. Therefore, we can conceive of framing as *mediating* between repression and the responses of contenders. To explore this juncture between repression and challengers' responses we need to deploy a theory that would consider both ideational and structural levels of analysis.

The framing perspective in social movement studies is an excellent candidate for this endeavor (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1998, Gamson 1992, Johnston and Noakes 2005). It is a mid-way approach which can be adopted to incorporate both the cultural components emphasized by social-psychological approaches and the structural components identified by PPM

and RMT. Frame alignment is a strategic choice of movements, however, it is structurally constrained by threats and opportunities, and culturally restrained by ideologies (Gamson and Meyer 1996, Diani 1996, Oliver and Johnston 2000).

Original frame alignment theory emphasizes the importance of strategic efforts of movement entrepreneurs in their attempts to "fit" a movement's discourse to the belief systems of target audiences (Snow et al. 1986). Belief systems are rather fixed and static, therefore the authors emphasize the importance of a movement's ability to construct a resonant frame that would adjust the perceptions of its recipients. However, this agent-centric vision implies that target audiences play a rather passive role. It suggests that frame constructors and their conscious mobilizing efforts, the characteristics of belief systems and the experiences of target audiences determine frame resonance. The theory focuses almost exclusively on meanings and does not include the structural constraints of the environment in explaining why and when frames are successful or fail to resonate.

To provide a more balanced perspective on meanings and the relationship between frames and material constraints, several authors have emphasized the importance of structural factors in frame alignment processes (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995, Diani 1996, McVeigh et al. 2005, Brown 2014). In particular, they have emphasized that the social composition of target audiences, the mobilizing structure and resources, the institutional arrangements and the success of mobilization are crucial in defining frame resonance. Their focus is rather on the factors defining frame resonance, which determines the framing strategies of claim makers.

Applied to the repression-mobilization paradox, these two ways to adopt the frame alignment perspective focus differently on *how* meanings affect the interpretation of repression and the responses of protesters to it. The former approach emphasizes the importance of the movement's discursive strategies in framing repression and mobilizing the public for retaliation or for failing to do so. The latter approach is focused rather on frame resonance, which is shaped by the perceptions of broader public as well as by structural factors. The former approach suggests closer attention to the content of frames and innovations in framing strategies whereas the latter pays more attention to the factors that shape resonance and correspondingly, adaptations in chosen strategies. The focus on frame content does not fully discard the importance of frame resonance, whereas frame resonance admits the importance of framing strategies. Therefore, I will carefully

test both framing adaptations and resonance factors in attempt to assess framing mediation in the effects of repression on challengers' responses.

Repression is a crucial factor in shaping the strategies of the movement that can either deter or encourage escalation in response to repression. In the same way, the *content* of frames may become more moderate or even transformed into "narratives of defeat" (Beckwith 2015), which are designed to demobilize protesters. Alternatively, repression may provoke the radicalization of frame contents, which are crafted to mobilize target audiences despite repression (Mueller 1999).

Frames are aligned to particular target audiences, therefore their characteristics and perceptions are crucial for frame resonance (Snow and Benford 1988). Repression can increase the receptivity of certain audiences to different themes or broaden the range of groups that become sensitive to challengers' appeals (Suh 2001, Chang 2007). Otherwise, repression may narrow down potential recipients to only the most devoted and those who are ready to act even under dangerous conditions (Della Porta 2013).

Social movements are heterogeneous entities with complex structures that embrace different groups. These groups compete for the dominance of their discourse within the mobilizing structure (Benford 1993b, Croteau and Hicks 2003). The composition of the mobilizing structure and SMOs' positions within it are some of the key factors that contribute to the prominence and success of framing. Repression affects the organizational structure of the movement directly or may alter external conditions in a way that empower one group relative to others (Siegel 2011). Therefore, while repression affects a group's position within the movement structure, it also affects the prominence of group's discourse within the movement milieu and among the broader public.

For instance, groups that had a moderate framing could prove the legitimacy of their appeals and strengthen their position by making their discourse more resonant with audiences and more prominent within the movement milieu by encouraging more organizations to adopt it (Haines 1984). Alternatively, the discourse of more radical groups may become dominant within the movement and lead to its acceptance by more moderate groups. When different groups within a movement gravitate to a bounded set of themes, we may also expect either a convergence or alternatively, a further fragmentation of discourse across different SMOs.

Framing is not entirely a strategic action, but constrained by the group's *ideology* (Oliver and Johnston 2000). It means that different SMOs may opt for different frames in response

to the same external conditions (Wetsby 2002, Ferree 2003). Ideology may matter when an SMO decides to make its discourse more radical or more moderate. Therefore, we may ask if more radical groups are less likely to soften their rhetoric in response to repression, or whether ideologically moderate groups are less likely to radicalize their discourse when faced with repression.

Besides the actual content of frames, the characteristics of targeted audiences and their perception, the SMO's mobilizing structure and ideology, we need to consider *how* repression affects a movement's framing. It may have a direct effect on a movement's frames (Davenport and Eads 2001), or alternatively, a shift in discourse may take a more complex form and be more closely intertwined with further interactions between the regime and challengers (Sewell 1996). In the former case we would assume that meanings change before backlash, whereas in the latter case – partly before and partly after. Also, in the former case we give considerable autonomy to agency in manipulating meanings when agents strategically adopt "cultural tool kit" elements (Swidler 1986), while in the latter we more seriously consider the effects of structural shifts in the broader context on adaptations in framing in response to repression.

Considering all of the abovementioned assumptions and significant explanatory power I give to frame alignment processes, in what follows, I will review the framing perspective in the contentious politics literature.

Social movement theory and framing perspective

The framing perspective on social movements and its theoretical apparatus emerged when RMT and PPM dominated in the field of social movement studies throughout the 1970s and 1980s, when they replaced previously dominant grievance-based theories in the field (Snow et al. 2014).

Grievance-based theories view social movements as irrational expressions of alienated or dispossessed individuals (Davies 1962, Smelser 1962, Feierbend and Feierbend 1966, Gurr 1970). The main focus of these approaches was on the structural strain and malformation of the social and political systems, which produced a psychopathology or relative deprivation on the part of alienated individuals who subsequently would seek to join a movement (Davies 1962, Gurr 1970). Participation in social movement activities was assumed to provide individuals the relief

from experienced tension. Besides focusing on the structural components of the social and political system, scholars analyzed the psychological characteristics of individuals and compared them to the general population which was not engaged in movements. By doing so, the scholars sought to identify which characteristics of the environment produced which deviations in individuals that would result in their joining social movements. This research also studied the set of movement beliefs that inspired collective behavior (Smelser 1962).

The scholarship considered movement mobilization as an irrational collective behavior that was compared with riots, mobs and gossip (Blumer 1957). Early approaches in social movement studies suggested that movement participants were isolated and structurally excluded because of their psychological deviation. The main reason why scholars adopted such a negative picture of movements was their conservative predispositions and belief that pluralist political systems provided sufficient access to political institutions and enough space for "good" civic activism (Jasper 2007). What is more, research mainly focused on movements such as Nazism, fascism, communism and McCarthyism, which had negative connotations.

The wave of civil rights social movements of the 1960s posed new questions which the old theories were not able to provide adequate explanation to. RMT became dominant in social movement studies (Gamson 1975, Jenkins and Perrow 1977, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Piven and Cloward 1977). RMT theorists broke with classical approaches and instead of viewing challengers as irrational and socially disconnected, suggested that protest is "politics by another means" (Gamson 1975). Collective actors were considered as rational actors with political interests that tried to reach their political goals by protest due to their relative powerlessness and lack of access to institutional politics (Piven and Cloward 1977). In contrast to early approaches, RMT suggested that the better individuals were integrated into social and organizational networks, the more chances they had to be mobilized (Oberschall 1973, Snow et al. 1980). SMOs were the core vehicles of mobilization, since they were able to aggregate and channel individually possessed resources for achieving collective goods (Zald and Ash 1966, McCarthy and Zald 1977).

To achieve their desired goals, protesters devise and adopt various mobilizing *strategies* (Gamson 1975). Besides shifting the focus to organizations and strategic actions, RMT also seriously considered changes in the broader context, namely, shifts in affluence levels as well as the emergence of social groups that had more time and desire for regular civic activism (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The availability of resources, new social movement cadres and leaders

as well as the presence of SMOs enabled an intense and regular mobilization of protest (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

Though RMT provided a theoretical basis and analytical tools for the effective analysis of social movements, it also had certain drawbacks. In particular, the approach remained rather static, since it did not sufficiently consider the role of broader political realities in which movements emerged and operated. It also neglected the role that underprivileged communities played in mobilizing resources and transforming them into collective action (McAdam 1982). Resource mobilization scholars also did not pay sufficient attention to the interaction of social movements with their opponents in different arenas.

In response to these demands of the field, the Political Process Model (PPM) emerged, which shared RMT's theoretical assumptions regarding the importance of resources and rationality of actors, but more explicitly emphasized the effects of the political and social environment where movements operate (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1989). The authors underscored the importance of certain features of the broader context that comprised *political opportunities*. Theorists of PPM suggested that at different times political systems are more open and receptive to particular or multiple challenging groups, while remaining hostile to others (McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1989). Political opportunities refer to "signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements"(Tarrow 1996, p. 54). More precisely, political opportunities include access to political institutions, unstable alignments in political system, influential allies and cohesion of political elites (Ibid., pp. 54-56). The change in this set of contextual characteristics predicts when movements are more likely to mobilize and when they would rather remain quiescent.

Scholars also emphasized the importance of the cyclical opening or closing of opportunities. The expansion and contraction of political opportunities go through protest cycles, which refer to the rise and fall of social movement activity (Tarrow 1989, 1993). During the cycle of protest, contention *diffuses* from one social group to another and expands the *social movement sector*. Different groups use various *repertoires of contention* and *cultural frames*, while the structure of political opportunities provides incentives for protest. *Competition* and *tactical innovation* lets organizers bridge other sectors and mobilize their constituents (Tarrow 1989: Chapter 1). This perspective is more sensitive to intra-movement dynamics and interactions with movement opponents.

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PPM has also underscored the importance of indigenous communities. McAdam (1982) persuasively demonstrates the importance of internal resources derived from underpriviledged ethnic groups with the example of black Americans in post-WWII USA. In contrast to RMT which suggested that social movements receive significant resources from state funding and private donations (McCarthy and Zald 1973), research on black insurgency suggests that the lion share of mobilized resources came from local communities. This observation highlighted the importance of personal and organizational networks in generating resources for movements.

Both RMT and PPM provided great deal of useful theoretical reasoning as well as conceptual and analytical tools for explain the emergence and development of social movements. However, due to their attempts to disconnect themselves from strain and relative deprivation approaches, they completely neglected the issues of ideology and grievances. For this reason, scholarship glossed over the connection between the subjective interpretation of broader conditions and their articulation by movements.

Resource mobilization theorists suggested that discontent was ubiquitous in societies (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, p. 250) and that "grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1215). This position suggests that movements and different societal groups had similar or identical ideological stances towards different social and political problems. However, both approaches neglected the role of micro-mobilization processes of communication and interaction between movements and the broader public.

Framing theory and frame alignment processes

The framing perspective on social movements corrected the neglect of the role of meanings in mobilization (Gamson et al. 1982, Snow et al. 1986). Framing theory problematized the symbolic connection between movements and the public, and argued that in order to mobilize sympathetic or bystanding publics, social movements needed to link their interests and ideologies with the ones of the public. Proponents of the theory refused to treat meanings as given and uniformly distributed among different groups of population. The framing approach adopted the idea of movements as *signifying agents* who purposefully construct and disseminate certain ideas

and beliefs in a such a way as to resonate with the public and mobilize people for collective action (Snow et al. 1986). Movements are assumed to *punctuate* certain aspects of reality, purposefully *attribute* different meanings, and *articulate* them to targeted constituencies in order to mobilize them for collective action (Benford and Snow 2000).

Framing theorists borrowed from Goffman (1974) the concept of the *frame* which "allows its user to locate, perceive, identify and label" the occurrence of any phenomenon around them (Ibid., p. 21). The approach adopted the concept for both theorizing and analytical purposes. In order to mobilize movement sympathizers and adherents, movements construct collective action frames (CAF), which are "emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO)" (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614). They simplify and condense "the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment" (Benford and Snow 1992, p. 137). Their *emergent* nature presupposes their interactive nature akin to emergent norms, which occur within mobilized groups of individuals (Turner and Killian 1987). An *action-oriented* nature suggests that frames have a purposeful and strategic character which gives certain power to agents in constructing and manipulating frames.

Collective action frames need to be *aligned* to targeted audiences in order to *resonate* with them. That is why framing theory proposed the idea of *frame alignment*, which refers to "the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al. 1986, p. 464). Depending on the degree of divergence between the interpretive stances of movements and the public, social movements are assumed to adopt different framing strategies, which include *frame bridging*, *frame amplification*, *frame extension* and *frame transformation* (Ibid., p. 467). Each of the frame alignment processes has its own specificity and aims at correcting the interpretive gap existing between the recipients of a movement's messages and movement interpretive orientations.

Frame bridging represents the linking of grievances shared by the movement and certain constituencies by means of organizationally connecting them (Snow et al. 1986, p. 467). The frame bridging process resembles the vision of resource mobilization and political process approaches. It implies that mobilized populations *already* share grievances addressed by the

movement and see the world through the lenses that, to a high extent, coincide with the movement's worldview (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

Frame amplification concerns the clarification or revitalization of existing frames. It consists of two processes of *value amplification* and *belief amplification* (Snow et al. 1986, p. 469). In the situation of value amplification certain values and beliefs are present in society, but they occupy a marginal position in the public consciousness. Therefore, the task of the movements is to put them at the forefront and articulate their significance. Values are goals or desired end states, which due to different external conditions have lost their prominence in the value hierarchy of society. Beliefs are conceived as relationships between different things that make up cognitive support for articulated values (Snow et al. 1986, p. 470).

In frame bridging and frame amplification ideational elements were, to a certain extent, already *present* in the discourse of constituents. However, when the promoted beliefs or values are not part of the belief systems of the potential targets of the message, social movements need to broaden their existing pool of ideas. For this purpose, they adopt *frame extension*. The relevant example is incorporation in the US peace movement which framed the issues relevant to ethic and racial minorities in order to attract these constituencies to the movement's side (Snow et al. 1986, p. 470, Meyer 1995).

Frame transformation is a relevant micro-mobilization process when movement goals or ideology are different from or even contradictory to the belief systems, lifestyles or values of constituents. "When such is the case, new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or "misframings" reframed" (Snow et al. 1986, p. 473). Frame transformation includes the transformation of domain and global interpretive frames. The former refers to problematizing, reevaluating and reframing a certain domain of an individual's life. The transformation of global interpretive frames implies an even deeper transformation at a more general level. "A new primary framework gains ascendance over others and comes to function as a kind of master frame that interprets events and experiences in a new key" (Snow et al. 1986, p. 475).

All four frame alignment techniques provide a more profound way of viewing mobilization processes. However, as proposed by the framing perspective, dynamic discursive interaction between mobilizing forces and the public implies that once SMOs have found the framing strategy that successfully resonates with target audiences, the discourse will remain the

same (Snow and Benford 1988). This implies that the perceptions of targeted audiences do not alter in the course of mobilization and movements keep using the same frame alignment technique during the course of the entire mobilization.

However, the perceptions of the public are heavily shaped by the broader context of mobilization due to possibilities of success or repression (Tilly and Goldstone 2001). Therefore, movements challengers often *adapt* their framing in the course of mobilization to correspond to changes in the broader context and perceptions of target audiences (Davenport and Eads 2001).

What is more, the structure of recipient audiences may alter in response to repression. For instance, repression may expand or narrow the pool of audiences who are more susceptible to the movement's discourse (Mason and Krane 1989). Repression is a crucial factor that contributes to changes in the context and perceptions of audiences. Therefore, instead of viewing frame alignment as a stable strategic choice of movements, it makes sense to consider framing alterations in the course of action in response to repression.

The major goal of movements is to align their frames to targeted audiences in order to convince the public to join the challengers. For this purpose, challengers need to pursue certain tasks that will make their frames resonant with public. After exploring *how* challengers link their discourse with audiences, I will explore *what* the content of frames is and why it matters for frame resonance.

Collective action frames and frame resonance

Frame alignment can be split into *consensus* and *action mobilization* (Klandermans 1984, 1988). In order to succeed in consensus and action mobilization, movements need to accomplish three framing tasks: *diagnosis*, *prognosis* and *motivation* (Snow and Benford 1988, Gamson 1992b, Benford 1993). The first two tasks refer to consensus mobilization, whereas motivational framing refers to action mobilization. Consensus mobilization forms the social base of the movement and, using McCarthy and Zald's (1977) language, turns bystanders into adherents. Whereas motivational framing is designed to overcome the *free-rider problem* (Olson 1965). The latter means that though many people may share the injustice of the existing situation and agree upon the solutions, they will still prefer to abstain from acting. Therefore, action

mobilization is designed to persuade adherents and turn them into constituents, who share their personal resources for collective good.

Diagnostic framing implies the identification of injustice which requires the attribution of blame to someone or something (e.g. government, nuclear arms producers) (Gamson et al. 1982, Snow and Benford 1988, Gamson 1992). In addition to magnifying the importance of the issue, which may not necessarily be immediately apparent, movements also need to attribute blame and causality to the factors that underlie the problem (Ferree and Miller 1985, p.43-44). Namely, what is the most important cause of the issue and who is to be blamed for that (Snow and Benford 1992, p.8). When blame is attributed to external conditions or on the situation, rather than specific qualities, individuals often stop seeing the situation as unfortunate but tolerable, but start seeing it as unjust and as requiring correction (Gamson et al. 1982, Benford 1993b). The construction of injustice as well as a clear attribution of blame and causality are therefore crucial factors for a diagnostic framing to succeed. However, framing theory implies a stable definition of the problem over the course of mobilization, which may be not always true.

For instance, when authorities repress challengers, repression can be framed as either the restoration of order from "unrests" or prohibition of "the right for protest" (Davenport 2005). Repression may produce a discursive battle over the definition of mobilization and measures undertaken by authorities. On the one hand, it provides a unique opportunity for challengers to blame authorities for illegitimate actions and can convince the public to retaliate (Opp and Roehl 1990). On the other hand, the "law and order" coalition can construct a persuasive discourse that justifies and legitimizes the repression of unrest (Edel and Josua 2018).

In addition to issue definition, frame constructors also need to provide a viable solution to how the identified unjust situation or unfavorable condition causing the grievance can be ameliorated (Snow and Benford 1988). As Klandermans (1984) suggests that aggrieved groups are rational and that their goal is to correct existing conditions that produce their grievances. The more they believe that taking action is going to fix the problem, the more they are likely to mobilize. Therefore, for challengers it is crucial to provide a viable solution that would fix the problem. "The purpose of *prognostic* framing is not only to suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics and targets" (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 201, emphasis in original).

Movements trying to solve the same issue can utilize different prognostic frame strategies. For example, two Christian temperance movements in the United States of America in the early 20th century insisted on the promotion of temperance to correct the issue of drinking alcohol, but adopted different strategies (Donovan 1995). The Women's Christian Temperance Union insisted on the strategies of persuasion and legislative lobbying, whereas the Anti-Saloon League used legislative actions almost exclusively (Ibid.).

Framing theory views prognostic framing as a stable and unchangeable part of the discourse, which is not always true. For instance, due to contextual alterations caused by the actions of authorities, different actions may be required. For instance, repression may require more radical solutions that movements adopt in their discourse and actions (Mueller 1999, Ferree 2003, Daphi and Anderl 2016, Della Porta 2018). However, framing theory implies a static character of prognostic framing and lacks a theorization of frame adaptation in response to framing (Davenport and Eads 2001).

The discursive strategy and the strategy for action are also shaped by the composition of the mobilizing structure as well as the coalitional context (Benford 1993b, Croteau and Hicks 2003). Different wings of the same movement fight for their strategy to be adopted by the movement. For instance, Marullo and Smith (1996) found that in the peace movement in the USA in the 1980s, moderate factions framed reforms as reasonable solutions to establishing peace, whereas the radical camp insisted on a complete restructuring of power relations both domestically and internationally.

There is also a clear connection between diagnostic and prognostic framing. For instance, a technological definition of the nuclear power issue is more likely to demand technological solutions, whereas a political definition of the nuclear power issue is more likely to propose a political solution (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 201). The balance of power within the movement and coalitions between different actors are not always stable and external factors like repression may considerably influence alliances and competition within the movement (Boykoff 2007). For instance, a radical flank effect may empower the moderates and their discursive strategy (Haines 1984). Conversely, in the case of the regime's failure to repress (Skocpol 1979), a more decisive and radical prognosis may become more resonant.

Both diagnostic and prognostic framing mobilize consensus in society. However, the formation and activation of consensus is not enough for collective action. Contenders also need

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to construct a motivational framing for action mobilization (Klandermans 1988, Snow and Benford 1988). *Vocabularies of motives* provide movement actors and bystanders with a *rationale* to act (Benford 1993b). These vocabularies contain categories of *severity*, *urgency*, *efficacy* and *propriety* (Ibid.).

Severity framing is aims to convince individuals that the diagnosed issue is really critical and requires correction. Diagnostic framing points at the issue, whereas severity motives magnify its seriousness (Benford 1993b, p. 201). Vocabularies of urgency are another component of framing motivation. By fostering a sense of urgency, movement frame makers try to facilitate people's perception of the necessity to join the movement in order to prevent undesirable consequences (Benford 1993b, p. 203). As several studies suggest, the expectation of the mobilization's success is an important factor that drives challenging groups to mobilization (Klandermans 1984, Tarrow 1989, Hirsch 1990). Therefore, instilling a belief in the efficacy of the mobilization and of the movement's success among movement activists and sympathizers becomes an important task of efficacy motives (Benford 1993b, p. 205).

Action mobilization is contingent on the conditions under which mobilization takes place. Therefore, the factors that affect immediate mobilization conditions can affect action mobilization. Repression is a threat to challengers (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, Jasper 2006), therefore it can affect the perception of the severity of the issue, the urgency to fix it or the efficacy of mobilization. By altering the conditions of mobilization, repression may alter the framing strategies of action mobilization. Thus, repression influences the discrepancy between public perceptions and movement discourse, which may lead to adaptations in framing techniques. What is more, repression may also alter the actual themes that are relevant for the public. Therefore, it makes claim makers adjust aspects of reality that they emphasize.

Thus, we could suggest that diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing tasks make up the basis of consensus and action mobilization. The content of these tasks is not necessarily stable over the entire course of mobilization, since it adjusts to the conditions of the broader context. Repression may require movements to adjust all of these tasks. Therefore, movements do not only adjust their techniques to overcome changing discrepancies that are influenced by repression. They also adapt the themes which are put in the content of their frames in response to the conditions of mobilization that are changed by repression.

Frames are constructed to be aligned to target audiences. Therefore, the characteristics of public belief systems are an important factor of frame resonance. Framing theorists single out the *centrality* or *salience*, *range* and *interrelatedness* as infrastructural characteristics of belief systems that affect frame resonance (Snow and Benford 1988, Benford and Snow 2000). Centrality refers to the place of the certain issues in the hierarchy of social belief systems. The more the issue is central, the more likely it is to mobilize individuals. For instance, the concept of rights occupied an important position in the US meaning system, which is why it resonated so well with different groups of American society (McAdam 1982). Similarly, white separatist movements' frames which appealed to the ideas of love, pride and saving heritage much better resonated with broader public than previously adopted ideas of racist superiority (Berbier 1998).

Range and interrelatedness represent another important set of features of the belief system that influence the resonance of the movement frames. The receptivity of the belief system to some issues and indifference to other issues affect the success of frames. The scholarship suggests that the broader range of issues the belief system is sensitive to, the more likely it is to produce resonance from a more divergent set of movements' frames (Gerhards and Rucht 1992, Benford and Hunt 2003, Hewitt and McCammon 2004). Correspondingly, if the system is receptive towards only a narrow range of issues, only the frames of a narrow set of movements are likely to resonate with it.

In addition to the features of frames and belief systems, we need to consider the set of factors related to the characteristics and experiences of individuals which the movement frames target (Snow and Benford 1988). *Empirical credibility*, *experiential commensurability* and *narrative fidelity* are crucial in that respect.

Credibility refers to the match between the events of the actual world and the content of the frame, which can be verified empirically. Frame credibility needs to be based on some kind of evidence that frame constructors demonstrate in the frame contents (Benford and Snow 1988, p. 208). It also depends on the credibility of frame articulators, which are evaluated in terms of their knowledge and status.

Frame theorists also single out previous experiences of individuals, termed "experiential commensurability", as an important factor affecting frame resonance. This refers to individuals' prior experiences regarding the issues articulated in frames. For instance, Benford and

Snow (1988) suggest that the immediate previous experience of Europeans and Japanese with nuclear hazards partly explained their more enthusiastic response to a nuclear freeze frame, in contrast to Americans who had no such straightforward experience.

In addition to the perceived credibility of frames and personal experiences of individuals, narrative fidelity is another factor explaining frame resonance at the individual level (Benford and Snow 2000, p.622). Narrative fidelity or *cultural resonance* explains the variability of frame resonance by pointing at how framing matches with symbolic representations embedded in broader culture in the form of myths, folk tales and stories (Gamson 1988, Noonan 1995, Zuo and Benford 1995, Berbier 1998, Kubal 1998, McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory 2017). They are "a part and parcel of one's cultural heritage and that thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate present" (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 210). Certain interpretive packages have a natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes (Gamson 1988).

For instance, Noonan (1995) demonstrates how Chilean women managed to tap into cultural narratives about the role of women as mothers and created a "maternal frame", which resonated well with popular beliefs. Zuo and Benford (1995) demonstrate that despite unfavorable repressive political conditions, the absence of resources and organizational infrastructure, Chinese students managed to mobilize great numbers of people thanks to their ability to frame their appeals within popular cultural themes of Confucianism, communism and nationalism.

Until now I have discussed collective action frames without problematizing the cultural context from where frames originate. Accordingly, the following section focuses more on the relationship between frames and their broader cultural environment.

Frames and culture

Since frames are derived and constructed from a broader cultural context, their content may be conceived as a variable to contextual influence. However, the original propositions of frame alignment theory mostly ignored this assumption, which is not so surprising considering that it emerged as a response to the structural and materialist bias in the field. Rooted in the symbolic interactionist tradition, framing theory neglected the influence of ideology. The issue of the link between frames and culture has been addressed later in the works of different authors

(Swidler 1986, Gamson 1992, 1992b, Tarrow 1992, Williams 1995, Zald 1996, Johnston and Oliver 2000, Wetsby 2002, Snow 2004, 2008).

Original theoretical suggestions of the framing perspective almost entirely ignored the broader cultural context from which frames originated. In line with the symbolic interactionist tradition, meanings were assumed to arise out of interactions. This assumption put little if any explanatory power on the broader cultural context. The focus on frame makers and the content of messages prevails in the explanation over the conditions under which agents and messages operate (Brown 2014).

However, framing theory admits that framing appeals are more effective when they are aligned to the dominant understandings of their political and social environments, expressed in the form of master frames (Benford and Snow 1992). However, the theory suggests that these frames emerge as the product of collective interaction within a protest cycle (Ibid.). This is not really helpful in explaining how the broader culture is related to framing.

Several scholars have criticized this disregard of the link between frames and culture. In particular, Gamson (1992) suggested that broad themes and counter-themes dominating society shape the chance for maneuver within discursive space. Similarly, Williams (1995) introduced rhetorical models of public good, which shaped what and how movements can frame as the public good under different conditions.

The broader context of meanings is passive and has little influence on collective action in the public arena and correspondingly, on collective action frames. Political culture in turn is a narrower system subset of meanings, which support oppositional components of culture, out of which claim makers can pick the meanings for guiding collective action (Tarrow 1992). Framing is a strategic choice, but it is shaped by the existing oppositional political culture.

Another influential critique in the field addressed the link between ideology and frames (Johnston and Oliver 2000). Scholars suggested that ideology is a system of ideas that consists of theories about the arrangement and nature of social life, as well as values and norms which promote or resist social change (Ibid., p.43-44). Thus, the interconnected ideological system includes knowledge about how things come together, what is important and how to act or not to act (Ibid.). According to the authors, ideology points at the *content* and framing at the *process*, where movement framing processes refer to the intentional activity of movement entrepreneurs at the organizational level.

Two extremes in explaining how culture shapes frames suggest that, on the one hand, frames possess significant autonomy from broader culture and actors can choose and articulate any frames they want akin to material resources (Swidler 1986). On the other hand, the meanings and symbols available to them are mostly defined by representations of dominant culture and hegemonic meanings (Gramsci 1971). The framing perspective tended to ignore this link, however then there were some attempts to suggest that discursive fields served as a reservoir out of which challengers borrowed cultural materials for constructing frames (Snow 2004, 2008).

The cultural environment serves as a source out which frames are constructed. Then they are aligned to the public. However, the processes of frame alignment take place within a broader sociopolitical context which affects framing processes. In what follows we will focus on the relationship between framing and political opportunities.

Framing, political opportunities and repression

In group settings challengers create counter-hegemonic meanings which are constructed to alter existing policies or structural injustices. However, challengers need to deliver their visions of reality to the broader public. To do that, they need to escape "prefigurative" politics and face "strategic" politics. Their strategic messages encapsulated in the form of frames are designed to mediate between these two (Tarrow 1992, Kubal 1998). Therefore, framing is *both* an interpretive process and a strategic action which aims at producing shared understandings of the environment and the mobilization (Brown 2014).

Repression is a crucial factor of strategic politics, which constrains the mobilization process. However, it may conversely produce backlash (Hess and Martin 2006). In order to alter the interpretation of the situation and produce backlash, repression needs to *become* a "critical event" (Rasler 1996), "focal event" (Karlkins and Petersen 1993) or "transformative event" (Sewell 1996, Hess and Martin 2006). These events can become "the focus of further protest and in themselves intensif[y] protest by highlighting the lack of legitimacy of the regime" (Karlkins and Petersen 1993, p. 603).

Repression can influence public interpretations of injustice and the need to act collectively, provided that it is "perceived as extremely unjust by general public and when information about the events is communicated to receptive audiences" (Vicari 2015, p.3). Under

certain conditions repression can increase the uncertainty of structural relations which "can stimulate bursts of collective cultural creativity" by altering existing meanings through framing them alternatively (Sewell 1996, p. 845). According to Johnston (2015) "(turning points) are not only key points where the structure of opportunities and/or threats change for the movement, but also points where interpretative processes are *opened* for key actors, and where major shifts in framing and *re*framing occur…" (Ibid., p. 271, emphasis added).

However, so far little attention has been given to *how* collective action frames evolve and resonate in response to repression. The inclusion of political variables *contextualizes* frame resonance and makes it less reliable solely on the isomorphism of frames (Brown 2014). "To evaluate the success of frames we need to consider *not* just the content of frames, but also *broader circumstances* in which framing takes place" (McCammon et al. 2007, emphasis added).

One of the shortcomings of research investigating the connection between political opportunities and frames is that those studies tend to consider political opportunities as consisting of *several* dimensions of opportunity as an explanatory variable (Diani 1996, McVeigh et al. 2004, Brown 2014). These studies do not specify the effects of *particular* political opportunity dimensions on framing. Consequently, we cannot be certain which dimension of political opportunity produced which effect on framing dynamics. This complex explanatory model deprives the explanations of specificity and makes them less precise. McAdam (1996) wisely notes that if "if we are to avoid the issues of conceptual confusion, it is critical that we are explicit about *which dependent variable* we are seeking to explain and *which dimensions of political opportunities* are germane to that explanation" (Ibid., p.31, emphasis in original).

Instead of adopting complex models that evaluate the effects of political opportunities on movement strategies, it makes sense to evaluate a particular dimension of the broader context as an explanatory variable and evaluate its effects on movement framing strategies. Out of the dynamic dimensions of the POS (Tarrow 1996), repression is the best candidate given its *direct* effects on movement tactics (Della Porta 1995, p. 56). It is one of the clearest signs of an expansion or contraction of political opportunities which affect movement framing strategies. It affects the perceptions of movement leaders and the public about the opportunities for action, the possibility of success and shared grievances (Earl 2004, p. 77). Repression provides movements with an opportunity to adapt their framing strategies to correspond with evolving perceptions. As Whittier (2002) argues "the interpretive processes by which groups construct collective identities

and other oppositional meanings are inextricable from public *confrontation* with authorities" (Ibid., p. 291).

Thus, repression has differential effects on both the cultural creativity of discourse makers and on perceptions of the broader public. On the one hand, this vision provides frame alignment with a high level of autonomy from political opportunities and implies that framing can mobilize targeted audiences on its own. Repression functions as a trigger that launches micromobilization processes (Opp and Roehl 1990, Rasler 1996), which mobilize the public for collective action.

On the other hand, more structurally-oriented explanations suggest that shifts in public perceptions are assumed to shape movement framing adaptation when the latter faces negative sanctions (Brown 2014). Therefore, repression does not exert a straightforward effect on framing shifts since movements carefully evaluate the perceptions of targeted audiences and adapt their framing correspondingly. If these adaptations resonate, new frames become salient, otherwise they pass into obscurity. Thus, public perceptions are the intervening variable in that explanation. Movements attempt to adapt their discourses strategically to the alterations of perceptions of target audiences (Lindekilde 2008). In this case "framing functions primarily as a mechanism that translates structural conditions, constraints, or opportunities into articulated discontent and dispositions toward collective action (which would imply status for frame alignment as a translation belt)" (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995, p. 242).

Nevertheless, it does not mean that both explanations are completelyopposite. The former view glosses over the role of the broader context and put all explanatory power on strategic framing. The latter view meanwhile neglects the role of movements' strategic choices and their discursive influence on the perceptions of the public. We need to admit that movements do make strategic choices that influence their surroundings (Jasper 2004, 2006). At the same time, we need to agree that they make these choices under the effects of the evolving context, which constrains the potential set of available choices and makes some choices more attractive than others (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995, Diani 1996, Brown 2014). Repression influences *both* cultural creativity and the perceptions of targeted audiences who confirm or disconfirm the resonance of movements' framing efforts.

This reasoning presupposes that movements already possess all the necessary ideational elements and that this pool of meanings is relatively fixed. Therefore, the mobilization

is more a function of already existing meanings, rather than newly-emerging meanings in the course of mobilization. This is, however, not always true. The literature suggests that the construction of meanings does not necessarily precede actions on the ground, but can rather be the outcome of collective mobilization (Tarrow 1992, Taylor and Whittier 1992, Benford 1993b, Fantasia 1995, Sewell 1996).

"Resource mobilization and interpretive theories both tend to assume that attitudes precede action. But participant action may precede the development of attitudes, collective action frames and vocabularies of motive. In RM theory terms, consensus mobilization may sometimes *follow* action mobilization, rather than the obverse" (Benford 1993b, p. 209, emphasis added). As Whittier and Taylor (1992) argue "frame alignment theory misses the ongoing process of meaning construction that takes place once the movement is on the way" (Ibid., p. 110).

Tarrow (1992) echoes this reasoning by suggesting that "(m)ovement leaders in a certain sense are both consumers of existing cultural meanings and producers of new meanings, which are inevitably framed in terms of organizers' reading of the public's existing values and predispositions. *Collective action* is thus the stage in which *new* meanings are produced, as well as a text full of old meanings" (Ibid., p. 189, emphasis added).

Thus, repression may affect both claim makers' framing strategies and the perceptions of target audiences. Therefore, to explain how the content of frames evolves in response to repression, I will test both expectations. To test the theoretical assumptions presented above I have adopted a methodological framework which will be presented in the next chapter.

Chapter 3. Methodology

The structure of this chapter consists of several subsections. We first need to clarify the ontological and epistemological premises of the study. The next step is to clearly conceptualize both phenomena we intend to study. Then we need to select the cases that will allow us to investigate the anticipated link between repression and framing. The following task is to outline the methods and data we intend to use to test our theoretical assumptions. Finally, we can get back to our initial conclusions and confront them with empirical findings. This is a qualitatively-oriented study, therefore we can travel more easily between different phases of research, since the design of the research is rather flexible.

Theoretical assumptions

Framing theory in social movement studies is rooted in the symbolic constructionist tradition of social sciences. In particular, it heavily relies on Goffman's (1974) idea of *frame*, which is a relatively fixed interpretive schemata that allows individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label seemingly infinite objects and phenomena in the world around us" (Ibid., p.21). A frame provides a *perspective* of perception, which formally *defines* a situation, not a situation on its own (Goffman 1974, p.10). The concept of frame was masterfully adopted and used in the field of contentious politics by Snow and Benford for explaining the dynamics of mobilization and recruitment by social movements (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). My study mostly adopts their approach, though there are several other crucial contributions to the issue (Gamson 1988, 1992, Johnston and Noakes 2005). Snow and Benford's approach proved to be analytically fruitful and also fits well with the purposes of my research goals.

Ontologically, framing theory disagrees with grievance-based and Marxist theories which suggest that meanings and grievances are the product of the material and social structure of society. These two theories treat meanings as objective and given. In contrast to these approaches, framing theory postulates that meanings are not completely determined, and that challengers are involved in reconstructing old meanings and forging new ones. They act as "signifying agents", who actively redefine the reality in the direction of their desired would-be worlds (Snow et al. 1986). Cognitive ambiguities that exist in individuals' interpretations of reality can be potentially

switched in a preferred direction. Therefore, movements are active constructors of new meanings, not the carriers of predefined ones. They strategically spread their visions of reality through framing its various aspects in a certain manner.

Movements intend to alter the perceptions of their targeted audiences, therefore their framed messages are aimed at certain subsets of population, who are assumed to be more receptive to these frames. Therefore, communication is crucial in the process of delivering a movement's messages. If messages reach their targeted recipients and resonate with them, movements manage to construct a consensual vision of their desired reality and align the values and beliefs of the message targets to their own. This reasoning focuses on the isomorphism of frames and importance of framing agents and how movements attempt to strike a chord and resonate with the public's values and belief systems.

Though meanings are the products of the interpretation and active construction of challengers, they are still constrained by material and social conditions. Instead of suggesting the complete autonomy of meanings and their emergence out of interaction, we should rather treat them as a product of *both* the socio-material context and agents' creativity. This mutually-influencing relationship between acts of framing and their interaction with the broader context is thus crucial.

Since we intend to explore the role of repression as a tangible and material enactment of structural limitations, we have to consider the structural effects on frame construction and reality redefinition. Therefore, instead of solely focusing on the isomorphic characteristics of frames and signifying agents, we need to consider the constraints of the socio-material context on the availability of ideational elements from which challengers craft collective action frames, and the particular choices from this ideational pool.

These theoretical implications suggest that we should devote significant attention to the content of frames and the agents who produce them. However, both the content of frames and their emergent nature are confronted with the socio-material environments they are the part of. Therefore, the material nature of reality needs to be considered seriously also.

Conceptualization of repression and framing

After identifying the theoretical implications of a framing perspective combined with the implications of material constraints, we can now clarify the conceptualization of both framing and repression. It is important to recognize that within a framing perspective on social movements we can single out several approaches (Gamson et al. 1982, Snow et al. 1986, Gamson 1988, 1992,1992b, Snow and Benford 1988, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Johnston 1991, Johnston and Noakes 2005, McCammon et al. 2007). Different approaches emphasize the importance of different aspects of framing and approach them in different ways. It is worthwhile remembering that the conceptualization of each phenomenon yields further methodological and analytical implications, which will be discussed later. The "frame alignment" approach is theoretically more appropriate for exploring the link between repression and framing, and is well equipped for qualitative, in-depth frame analysis (Lindekilde 2014).

Building on the theoretical discussion above, for the purposes of the study we define *framing* as the *purposeful, public, discursive attempts of challengers to collectively mobilize movement adherents and demobilize movement opponents by means of aligning the goals and ideologies of the movement to the values and belief systems of a targeted public*. The purposeful component of the definition emphasizes the role of challengers as "signifying agents" and the importance of the deliberate efforts of claim makers, providing them with considerable degree of autonomy to construct new meanings and redefine reality (Snow et al. 1986). The discursive aspect underscores the importance of the link between framing and ideology, or culture in general (Williams 1995, Oliver and Johnston 2000). The broader ideational pool both enables and constrains challengers' framing, as well as providing them with the required ideational elements out of which they can construct frames.

The group character of the activity underscores that challenging groups, thanks to their distance from the dominant discourse and the direct impact of institutions, are capable of generating meanings alternative to those held by underprivileged individuals prior to coming to the group settings. Further, the collective feature of framing suggests that meanings are not exclusively located in the minds of individuals (Johnston 1995), but are also inter-subjective and therefore can be the properties of organization.

By pointing at the public nature of activity we want to emphasize the distinction between the discourse of prefigurative politics and strategic politics (Kubal 1998). Challengers often adjust the meanings of the movement milieu and the unprivileged group's culture to the dominant culture in order to align with the perceptions of the broader public. A movement's goal of mobilize supporters and demobilizing opponents underscores the strategic aspect of framing activity. Though this definition admits that in contrast to material elements challengers are not in full control of ideational elements, they nevertheless have the capacity to manipulate them to a certain extent. In other words, framing embraces the self-conscious, symbolic, collective, political and strategic nature of movements' activity.

In our analysis we will focus on the diagnostic, prognostic (Snow and Benford 1988) and collective identity (boundary) dimensions of framing (Gamson 1992, Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994, Hunt and Benford 2004, Johnston 2015). However, core frame elements constitute one particular collective action frame (Noakes and Johnston 2005). Thus, we can compare both variations between particular frames, and between specific frame components in different contexts. Diagnostic framing focuses on the identification of an unjust situation that needs to be fixed. Prognostic framing proposes the solutions and strategies needed to ameliorate the issue. Boundary framing constructs the boundary between challengers and their opponents, reinforcing the us-them distinction.

Repression is a complex phenomenon, so there are several approaches to it and correspondingly several ways to conceptualize it. Since we pursue a qualitative comparative case analysis and in line with research goals, we conceptualize *repression* as consisting of the *observable coercive or legal activities conducted by the agents of social control that are aimed at demobilizing a real or perceived threat by means of increasing the costs and decreasing the benefits of challengers' mobilization.*

When we refer to different forms of repression, we can identify multiple ways in which authorities tend to inhibit contentious activity (Marx 1979, Barkan 1984, Della Porta 1995, Koopmans 1997, 2005, Earl 2003, Boykoff 2006, 2007, Shriner et al. 2018). However, for the purposes of the study we focus on forms of repression that are most likely to affect movements' framing practices. As we will explain later, protest policing and channeling in the form of legal constraints were the most influential forms of repression in terms of their effects on challengers'

framing in our cases. What is important is that they are both observable in contrast to less visible forms of surveillance, sabotage or provocation (Cunningham 2003, 2005, Davenport 2005).

As Earl (2004) underscores, private agents just like state agents of social control are actively involved in the suppression of challenging groups. However, in our cases we will focus exclusively on state repressive agencies. Though private groups (e.g. thugs) were involved in repression, they did not play a crucial role in the most influential acts of repression. Therefore, our focus in this study will be on the state agents of social control.

Most of the time the state deploys repression in order to deal with threats to the political dominance of the government (Davenport 1995, 2007). Therefore, when regimes perceive actual or potential mobilizations, they may repress challengers if it is a rational option. The threat is the reason for repression (Davenport 1995). Here we need to emphasize the importance of mobilization as a signal to the state to deploy repression, provided that the mobilization is sufficiently threatening (Tarrow 1994). The goal of the government is to neutralize challengers to its hegemony by means of demobilization or minor concessions (Lichbach 1984). Correspondingly those challenging groups whose behavior the regime considers to be the most threatening or whom they consider to be the weakest and therefore having the least support are most likely to be the targets of repression (Gamson 1975, Khawaja 1993, Earl 2003). By increasing the costs of mobilization and decreasing its potential benefits the regime discourages challengers and inhibits collective mobilization (Tilly 1978, Marx 1979).

Besides that, we need to add that coercive and legal repression are correspondingly adopted by the regime reactively or pro-actively (Bourdreau 2005, Barkan 2006). In other words, authorities tend to use coercive repression to deal with the immediate *situation* or crisis, whereas legal repression is *systemic,* and refers to the institutional constraints that are designed to constrain or control future instances of contention (Koopmans 1997). Magnitude and intensity demonstrate how repression varies across space and time. One important feature of repression is where it is occurs within a protest cycle, since its effects can vary considerably depending on its diachronic position (Brockett 1993). In particular, repression at an early stage of the protest cycle is less likely to generate public backlash than during the middle of the protest cycle (Ibid.). It is also critical to consider what protesters had done *before* repression was adopted (Opp and Roehl 1990, Karlkins and Pedersen 1993). If public contention is a commonly accepted *norm* of national political culture, then public mobilization is more likely to be considered legitimate, and repression

illegitimate (Opp and Roehl 1990). On the other hand, if contenders resort to terrorism or radical mobilization, then their suppression is more likely to be positively evaluated by the broader public.

Besides actually conceptualizing what a phenomenon is, it is also important to state what it is *not* (Sartori 1970, Mair 2008). Therefore, we need to identify the forms of repression that will be not considered in this study.

We need to note that the repression of social movements can be observable and unobservable (Earl 2003, Boykoff 2007). Due to the limitations of the available data and goals of this study, we will focus exclusively on observable forms of repression. Among observable forms of repression protest policing is the most important for this study (Della Porta 1995, Della Porta and Reiter et al. 1998, Earl 2003, Soule and Davenport 2009).

Another important aspect of repression is whether the repressive agency exercising repression is state or private (Earl 2003). For the purposes of this study and due to the limitations of the data we will focus on state agencies, namely the riot police, and the special units of the police and the military. Repression by private groups will not be scrutinized in the study.

Table 1. Characteristics of repression

Characteristic of repression	Example
1. Form	Coercive, Legal
2. Timing	Reactive, Proactive
3. Target	Threatening, Weak
4. Magnitude	Low, High
5. Intensity	Low, High
6. Agency	Riot police, Special Units
7. Preceding actions	Peaceful staging
8. Protest cycle position	Early stage; Later, descending stage

After conceptualizing the dependent and independent variables we can now look more closely at the cases that will allow us to test our theoretical suggestions. Then we will focus on how we operationalize our variables in order to study the relationship between them and choose data and methods to test our theorizing.

Case selection: Euromaidan in Ukraine and the "For Fair Elections" movement in Russia

This study has opted for purposeful case selection due to several reasons. As the literature suggests, so far the research has mostly only touched upon the relationship between the macro-level phenomenon of repression and the mid-level variable of framing. Quantitative research, which focuses on a few or multiple characteristics of repression across multiple cases that are confronted with quantified words from movement documents would not be appropriate for explaining the relationship between the phenomena under investigation with the necessary level of complexity. Therefore, we need a qualitative, in-depth investigation of the link between two phenomena that would rely on an *analytic* logic, not the logic of enumeration (Mitchell 1983).

I adopted intentional, theoretical case selection combined with the logic of a *most similar case design* (Przeworski and Teune 1970). This will allow me to develop theory in the course of an intense qualitative investigation. In my investigation I follow the logic of discovery, not the logic of proof (Schmitter 2008). In contrast to a simple case study, which produces mostly idiosyncratic explanations, and in order to allow for better "control" of variables, I have also adopted the paired comparison approach (Tarrow 2010), since the study consists of the analysis of two cases, namely the Ukrainian Euromaidan movement and the Russian "For Fair Elections" movement.

It is also important to choose cases where the phenomena of interest are most evident. The literature suggests that *both* repression and escalation are not likely to occur in either fully authoritarian or entirely democratic regimes (Muller and Weede 1990, Fein 1995, Regan and Henderson 2002), since autocracies mostly manage to block collective mobilization, while democracies prefer to channel dissent institutionally. Accordingly, their threats tend to be less militant in nature. However, *semi-democratic regimes* or transition governments are the best candidates for our analytical purposes (Regan and Henderson 2002). What is more, *hybrid regimes* allow for a certain degree of civic association and do not completely block the free flow of information within the polity. In semi-democratic regimes repression occurs because of an uncertainty about the rules of the game, behavioral norms and the capacities of actors (Pierskalla 2010, p.135). Though levels of uncertainty in the Ukrainian case were higher, the Russian regime

was not yet fully autocratic and allowed for some degree of indeterminacy. Therefore, the choice of hybrid regimes appears to be a good research strategy that allows us to explore and observe the interaction of both phenomena.

The Euromaidan and "For fair elections" movements fit our demands well, since both Ukraine in 2013-2014 and Russia in 2011-2012 were hybrid regimes (Hale 2008, Matsievskyi 2011, Robertson 2011). While both countries witnessed mass mobilizations where multiple instances of repression could be identified, they varied in terms of their success. Further, they are both cases of non-Western contentious politics during the 2011-2014 protest cycle (Arbatli and Rosenberg 2017). This protest cycle clearly demonstrated the intense involvement of the citizens of the non-Western world in protests against their governments alongside the anti-austerity mobilization of Western democracies. Both the Ukrainian and Russian protests were a part of that wave of protests and the study of these cases can contribute to a better understanding of protests in non-Western contexts, as suggested by the leading theorists in the field of contentious politics (McCarthy, McAdam and Zald 1996). The same goal refers to studying repression in non-democratic contexts (Schock 1999, Boudreau 2005, Osa and Schock 2007).

The specificity of post-communist cases is that challengers do not always react to the opening of political opportunities even when the latter are relatively open (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, Crowley 2002). Due to the lack of associational experience and the absence of strong civic culture, post-communist societies often remained "patient" even under ripe conditions, since they lacked the organizational and cultural capacities to mobilize resources for protest (Greskowitz 1998). Paradoxically, the demise of oppressive communist states resulted in the decline of active, but limited civil society, whose members preferred to switch to business or activity in conventional politics when repression declined and new opportunities opened up (Smolar 1996). Whereas more neutral citizens chose *not* to participate in civic activism because of the previously existing pressure from governments for engagement in civic "activism" in government-supported associations and ersatz movements (Ibid.). As a result, collective mobilization was rare and was mainly issue-specific.

This is even more relevant for post-Soviet states (Clement 2008, Beissenger 2011). Mobilization in these cases takes a more situational nature and can be described as eventful, self-referential protest (Della Porta 2008). Individuals tend to lack the sufficient experience of public cooperation, resources, and their identities are less developed due to a weak associational culture.

Therefore, mobilization is often the only chance for movement activists to recruit new members and forge shared understandings and meanings. Common protest activity and shared experiences give rise to meanings that actors attribute to their problems, in defining who they are and what they need to do (Clement 2015). Akin to emergent norms (Turner and Killian 1987), the mobilization of certain ideas is only partly predetermined, and evolves during and after collective mobilization. Therefore, in our cases of Euromaidan and the anti-Putin protests, we expect more symbolic flexibility once the mobilization is underway.

The Ukrainian and Russian contexts are rather similar, but at the same time have certain differences. Both countries experienced complicated post-Soviet transitions. Politically, Russia has evolved into a dominant-party regime with strong presidential power, limited competition among some political parties and a modestly developed civil society (Krastev 2006, Horvath 2011). Oligarchs and state-run corporations dominate the economy, with around 60% of the economy remaining privately-owned.

In Ukraine none of the political parties managed to overcome the "pluralism by default" situation and concentrate enough power to build strong institutions and dominate opponents (Way 2015). In the economy, the absence of power consolidation resulted in the dominance of the oligarchic clans that were competing with one another under uncertain institutional conditions (Aslund 2014). Economically, Russia was more stable and thanks to state-run corporations in the energy sector which could redistribute resources to socially vulnerable groups of population who relied on the paternalism of the state. Ukrainian oligarchs fiercely competed for available resources and used institutions for their own purposes. The authorities had no resources for socially-oriented policies or for the redistribution of resources among different social groups. As Muller (1985) suggests "countries following a strategy of development which ignores the macroeconomic factor of distributional equality may be prone to experience comparatively high levels of political violence, regardless of other factors" (Ibid., p.60). So, we could suggest that in comparison to Russia, Ukrainian macroeconomic policies and higher levels of inequality made violence there more likely.

Besides competition in the economic arena, oligarchic groups also competed on the political terrain. With varying degrees of success, they established political parties which functioned as electoral machines (Kudelia and Kuzio 2014). The voices of voters were used to use the institutions for the parties' own interests (Ibid.).

In comparison to Ukraine, the Russian regime was more consolidated, centralized, and had a higher capacity to channel resources for buying the loyalty of different groups of the population. The Ukrainian regime was more democratic (higher degrees of parliamentary development, more freedom of media and civil liberties), but at the same time did not have the necessary capacity to implement essential policies in the economic, political and social spheres. So, both cases belonged to hybrid regimes, though Russia was more skewed in an autocratic direction, whereas Ukraine in a more democratic one.

The table below summarizes the most important characteristics of both environments, represented by several dimensions. These dimensions are: political regime, political institutions, dominant political actors, democracy rankings, corruption rating, civil society development ranking, media system characteristics.

Table 2. Major contextual characteristics in Russia and Ukraine

Dimension	Ukraine	Russia
1. Political regime[1] - type (democratic to autocratic) - degree of consolidation (low to high) - organizational capacities (low to high) - Western leverage (low to high)	-hybrid -high -medium - medium	- hybrid - high - high - low
2. Political institutions[2] - levels of institutional access (low to high) - vulnerability to pressure (low to high) - capacity of policy implementation (low to high)	- low - low to medium - low to medium	- low - low - medium to high
3. Institutional design[3]	Semi-presidential system (Constitution 1996)	(Super)-presidential system (Constitution 1993)

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[1] Levitsky and Way (2010), Sedelius and Berglund (2012), Way (2015), Gelman (2015)
[2] Robertson (2011), Kudelia (2014), Way (2015)
[3] Sedelius and Berglund (2012), Sakwa (2012), Kudelia (2014), Way (2015), Gelman (2015)

	Oligarchic groups, political parties, presidential administration, opposition	Oligarchs, presidential administration, secret services, systemic opposition
4. Dominant political actors[4]		
5. Democracy ratings	Rankings[5]	Rankings:
- Freedom House (7-1, 1-the lowest)	- 4.86	- 6.18
- Economist Democracy Index (0-10, 10-highest)	- 5.84	- 3.92
- Polity IV (-10+10, + 10 - the highest)	- 6	- 5.1
- BTI Democracy status (1-10, 10 - the highest)	- 6.1	- 5.3
6. Corruption ranking[6]	2.5 (144 out of 175)	2.4 (143 out of 182)
7. Civil society development: **Civicus Ranking** **CSO Index**	0.56 (46 out of 109) 3.4 (1-highest, 7-lowest)	0.45 (75 out of 109) 4.4 (1-highest, 7 -lowest)
8. Media system characteristics and freedom of press ranking[7]	Controlled by oligarchic groups, mostly privatized, fragmented - 36.79 (126 out of 179)	Controlled by the state, public, centralized - 66 (142 out of 179)

In non-democratic consolidated regimes, challengers have very limited access to institutions, whereas divisions among elites are rare and can be hardly noticed by outsiders due to the lack of the systemic openness. Therefore, factors such as the presence of at least some independent media that is critical of the government, as well as more developed organizational or social networks can be of great importance (Osa and Shock 2007).

The Ukrainian systemic opposition was actively involved in the protests, while Russian systemic opposition had a very limited impact on protest. Russian non-systemic opposition was weak, had few resources and little influence in society and on ruling elites. In addition, while Russian state capacity was stronger, the Ukrainian regime was still consolidated

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[4] Aslund (2005), Gelman (2008), Reuter and Remington (2009), Kudelia (2014), Kudelia and Kuzio (2014)

[5] In certain rankings the results were available only for even years (e.g 2010 or 2012)

[6] Transparency International ranking. Rating of 2011 for Russia and 2013 for Ukraine

[7] Reporters without borders ranking. Rating of 2011 for Russia and 2013 for Ukraine

and had considerable capacities to repress until the very last days of the protest (Taylor 2011, Way 2015, Kudelia 2018). In general, we suggest that contextual conditions were more favorable for Ukrainian protesters, though as we will see later, they did not determine the collapse of the regime.

Besides institutional arrangements that influence mobilization and the proclivity for repression, we also need to consider the cultural environment that shapes the cultural themes available to contenders and which serves as an ideational pool used by challengers to forge their frames. The ideological terrain in Russian society is mainly divided between traditionalist-conservative, liberal and left ideology (Chebankova 2015, March 2015). Traditionalist ideology articulates a paternalistic or protective role of the state in the economy and in politics. This ideology also supports an idea of the uniqueness of the country, which it claims should be preserved. Its supporters are not very enthusiastic about building close ties with the West, though do not necessarily insist on complete isolationism.

Since left ideology had strong connotations with the Soviet past, it overlapped in many respects with traditional-conservative ideology. The old Left appealed to the imperial and Soviet past, demanding the preservation of national traditions and resisting the adoption of liberal Western lifestyles and democratic values (March 2015). The new Left in many respects supported the Soviet period, but at the same time challenged the Communist Party and proposed several progressive ideas which championed the existing status quo (Ibid.).

The liberal ideology was represented by a well-educated, urban population that was more active and able to mobilize much better than the passive and less organized conservative majority (Chebankova 2012). The liberal ideology appealed to the market economy, democratic government and the adoption of major Western values (Ibid.).

In Ukraine we can single out liberal, traditionalist and left ideology (Korostelina 2013, Ishchenko 2016b). Traditionalist ideology refers to Soviet narratives and a neopatrimonial state with protectionist economic policies (Korostelina 2013), whereas liberal ideology supports civil liberties and freedoms, the market economy and democratic government (Ibid., Korostelina 2013b). The Communist Party of Ukraine was the major representative of the old Left in Ukraine (Ishchenko 2016b). However, its influence on society was declining (13.2% of votes in the 2012 parliamentary elections with no single-district MP) and its supporters have been concentrated in eastern and southern parts of the country (Ibid.). New Left organizations were weak and had very little impact on contentious politics and on society at large (Ibid.). In general, the Soviet legacy

was actively stigmatized by adherents of the liberal and nationalist ideologies. The latter constituted a third pillar and was quite influential in Ukraine compared to Russia, where nationalism was a part of the conservative ideology.

In society at large the Left ideology was better represented in Russia, whereas the nationalist ideology was better represented in Ukraine. These factors have several potential implications. For instance, in Ukraine, far right groups were in a better position relative to leftist groups in mobilizing nationalist ideas which are more likely to be resonant with certain social groups. Furthermore, far right ideology is more likely to produce more radical strategies of action, therefore, we expect that radicalization is more likely to occur in the Ukrainian context.

On the other hand, the left ideology in Russia presupposes more cautious attitudes to the West and its neoliberal policies. The leaders of the FFE movement were also more likely to articulate an agenda which would propagate social issues and more inclusive identities.

Though these ideological implications may be important, we also need to confront them with structural limitations, in particular repression, in order to evaluate how different ideological structures work when affected by repression. We also need to remember that social groups that are mobilized for collective action may differ significantly from those groups that represent certain ideologies in society at large. For instance, in the Russian case, multiple carriers of leftist ideology represented the conservative camp and did not take part in the protest. Therefore, despite the fact that Left ideology was broadly represented, new Left organizations were rather weak and liberal groups outcompeted them in imposing the goals of the mobilization and means required to achieve those aims.

Research design, data and methods

In order to analyze frames or discourse in general, scholars adopt different strategies. For instance, in social movement studies we can identify a strand of literature which adopts a quantitative, regression-based frame analysis model (McCammon et al. 2001, Hewitt and McCammon 2004, McVeigh et al. 2004, McCammon et al. 2007, Snow et al. 2007, McCammon 2009, Faupel and Werum 2011). Scholars quantify words or other meaningful parts of the text and test their correlation with other variables (McCammon et al 2001, McCammon 2007). Alternatively, the quantified elements of the text are placed into categories that represent frame

components, which can subsequently be measured against the variation of other variables (Hewitt and McCammon 2004, Snow et al. 2007). In order to apply such approaches, analysts need to have access to a relatively uniform and evenly distributed pool of movement texts as well as enough cases for generalization. What is more, regression-based studies apply a linear logic, which often prevents researchers from producing more nuanced analyses of the link between the phenomena under study.

Another potential issue with the quantitative analysis of collective action frames is that they tend to use a single word as the core unit of analysis, which considerably limits the possibilities of data analysis. Semantically meaningful elements of text do a better job by allowing us to be more flexible in parsing the text into appropriate pieces for analysis (Franzosi and Vicari 2018).

Qualitatively-oriented frame analysis is more useful for my research endeavor (Lindekilde 2014). For instance, a thematically-based analysis of frame elements is a useful tool for observing variations between frame components over time (Gamson and Lasch 1983, Gamson 1988, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Gamson 1992). This approach allows us to parse data into an analyzable form, namely categories which provide frames with structure and serve as separate reservoirs where the data can be collected. The categorization of frame elements provides a clear structure of how meanings are placed within the frame and how they are interconnected (Gamson and Lasch 1983).

However, before we start the analysis we need to identify the sources of data collection, the "artefacts" of frames (Johnston 2002). There are several options in that regard. However choices need to be made not only regarding the sources of data but also concerning the level of aggregation where the frames can be found.

In order to align their frames to targeted audiences, challengers need to *articulate* them (Benford and Snow 2000). They can reach their potential constituents through different texts such as press releases, websites, brochures, statements in media, videos, posts on social networks and movements' own media. These are the data sources that we can use for the purposes of frame analysis. However, besides the sources of the data, we need to know the intended purpose of the text and on behalf of whom it was created. Since there is no single movement frame, we need to focus on *organizational* framing. Each movement represents a myriad of organizations and groups that compete with different actors to have their vision of the world adopted. This competition

includes struggles over meaning with the mainstream media (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993), countermovements (Rohlinger 2002) and the state (Noakes 2005). Variations in discourse at the organizational level are, to a high extent, conditioned by already existing discursive opportunities, which shape *what* SMOs can articulate (Ferree 2003). Power relations also shape *how* SMOs are heard (Ibid.). As Johnston (2015) suggests, the meso-level is where the most of the framing takes place (ibid., p. 270).

By focusing on the organizational level, we shift our attention to how collectively created and shared collective action frames are aligned to the broader public. Below the organizational level, the individual's frames of interpretation also play an important role in social movement dynamics (Johnston 1995). At the micro-level we can trace how individuals' frames are aligned to collective, organizational frames. This allows us to complement organizational data with individual data and make our frame analysis more reliable.

To complement the meso-level of analysis with the individual level, I have conducted 32 semi-structured interviews with movement leaders and activists during my fieldwork in Moscow and Kiev. The interviews lasted between 40 minutes and 1.5 hours. The structure of the interview consisted of two blocks of questions. The first block of questions focused on the effects of repression on SMOs' framing efforts, whereas the second block inquired into the way that SMOs adopted collective action frames in response to repression.

In order to collect data, I chose SMOs which were actively engaged in protests in both cases. After making the list of all organizations, I explored their discursive production. Originally, I collected data from the SMOs' public groups on social network sites (SNS) such as facebook.com and vk.com. I collected all social network data and structured it with the *NVivo* qualitative software. However, this was just the entry point to data analysis. Some of the challenging groups did not have enough posts during the selected periods of time or simply did not have public pages on social networks. Therefore, I analyzed their websites, brochures, press-releases, public statements, organizational media, leaflets, as well as interviews with SMO leaders and activists in the mainstream media. Though the data are not uniform, it allowed for a more complex analysis of the different SMOs' framing efforts.

After collecting the data, I conducted several stages of coding. At first, during the exploratory coding phase I used *simultaneous coding* techniques (Saldana 2013, pp. 80-83) which helped to identify major frame elements that were the most frequent, coherent and semantically

independent. Before starting coding I had some theoretical suggestions from the literature regarding which elements were most likely to emerge (Snow and Benford 1988, Gamson 1992, Johnston 2015). However, I allowed for a certain degree of flexibility during the coding process in order to allow for potential, inductively emerged components to become a part of analysis. As we will see later, three major frame elements emerged out of the coding process and confirmed the findings of the literature on framing processes in social movements. These are *injustice situation* or a diagnosis of the issue, solutions of what needs to be done to fix the identified issue or *prognostic framing* and *collective identity* component, which clarified and elaborated on who challengers were and specified their major characteristics.

The first frame component is the injustice situation or diagnostic framing (Gamson et al. 1982, Snow and Benford 1988). The diagnostic component represents the condition or social problem that the movement considers to be unreasonable and tries to ameliorate. As several studies in the field demonstrate, repression may result in attempts to reevaluate or redefine existing issues (Ellingson 1995, Jenness 1995, Suh 2001, Chang 2008). For instance, Ellingson in her study of the discourse of US abolitionist groups and their opponents, suggests that one of the discursive strategies adopted by the movement consisted of "shifting the definition of the situation from a specific or practical level (e.g., abolitionism injures the city's businesses) to a more general or conceptual level (e.g., the issue is not about abolitionism but about whether civil liberties will be preserved)" (1995, p.108). As the coding suggested the injustice situations in this category varied from particularistic to more general or abstract.

The second frame element is prognosis (Benford and Snow 1988). The literature suggests that when insurgents define what needs to be done to address an unjust situation they may change their repertoire of contention by innovating, opting for more moderate forms of resistance or radicalizing in response to authorities' repression (McAdam 1983, Della Porta 1995, Francisco 1995, 1996, Davenport et al. 2005, Boycoff 2007). During the coding phase, prognosis was found to vary from conventional to radical.

The third frame element is collective identity. Taylor and Whittier suggest that "collective political actors do not exist de facto by virtue of individuals sharing a common structural location, they are created in the course of social movement activity" (1992, p. 105). This implies that the collective identities of social movements arise out of the active process of self-definition on the basis of initially shared characteristics (Larana, Johnston and Gusfield 1994).

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Identity is a relational category. The carriers of certain identities always distinguish themselves from *their* others, who also possess a certain identity, by constructing a social *boundary* that distinguishes the two groups from one another (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, Tilly 2004). As noted by McAdam et al. "If social construction occurs, it happens socially, not in isolated processes of individual minds" (2001, p. 131). A social boundary refers to the zone of contrasting density, rapid transition or separation between internally connected clusters of the population and/or activity (Tilly 2004).

Boundary construction is a critical step in defining who challengers are and what they want to be in the eyes of the broader public (Taylor and Whittier 1992, Hunt and Benford 2004, Snow 2007). Theoretically, the broader the boundaries, the less exclusive the group is. This (re-)definition of group boundaries is in constant tension with its opposite identity, which affects the definition of the group's self (Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994).

There are some suggestions in the literature that the collective identity of challenging groups may undergo certain transformations in response to repression (Johnston, Gusfield and Larana 1994, Della Porta 1995, Suh 2001, Robnett 2002, Wood 2007). Therefore, theoretically, we could expect the movement frames to become either more inclusive or more exclusive. The empirical analysis confirmed this intuition, showing variation across the inclusive-exclusive axis in both cases.

Table 3. Frame elements variation

Frame element	Extremes of frame element variation	
Diagnosis	Particularistic	General
Prognosis	Conventional	Radical
Collective identity	Exclusive	Inclusive

Changes in the framing of the situation, its solutions and challengers' self-definition are conditioned by changes in the repressive policies of the state. Therefore, challengers' discourse incorporates repression as a part of collective action frames. The incorporation of repression in framing, however, is just a partial update in collective action frames, which is different from frame shift. The latter implies a more substantial alteration of the situation in comparison to previous collective action frames. It implies a tangible and more meaningful shift of at least one frame

element, though most probably two or three. However, the incorporation of repression in the discourse is the initial step to frame shift.

After identifying measures of variation across movement discourse, we need to relate SMOs' collective action frames to instances of repression. In order to trace the dynamics of framing under the effects of repression, we need to identify how framing evolved in response to particular instances of repression. Therefore, I identified the major, most visible instances of repression during both cycles of protests and sampled frames from before and after the repressive actions.

After singling out major instances of repression and exploring the dynamics of framing across them, I identified the repressive encounters that produced substantial effects on framing dynamics in comparison to other situations. Thus, I identified three repressive encounters in Ukraine and two in Russia as the targets of close, qualitative investigation. The following four chapters are devoted to an in-depth analysis of the two selected cases focusing on the relationship between repression and framing in each of them.

Chapter 4. Political opportunities and protest cycle in Ukraine

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine experienced institutional weakness. Lack of material resources and ideology contributed to establishment of relatively competitive regime in early years of Ukrainian independence. On the wave of regional democratization and transition to market economy, young Ukrainian state also had to rebuild institutions on the remnants of the Soviet Ukrainian republic (Kuzio 2001).

In early 1990s, moderate, nationally-oriented communists and national-democrats began to cooperate in order to distance Ukraine from Russian influence. The president Kravchuk, who was a nationally-oriented communist, won the first presidential elections in 1991. However, the absence of the dominant party, lack of support in legislature, weak state apparatus and poor economic performance led to early presidential elections, which the candidate Kuchma won in 1994 (Way 2015). He managed to consolidate his power under the coalition of nationalists who feared pro-Russian parliament and pro-Ukrainian business-centrist deputies who expected to gain benefits from Ukrainian autonomy (Kuzio 2005).

In 1996 the Ukrainian parliament approved the new presidential-parliamentary Constitution, which provided more powers to the president. However, in contrast to Russian presidential constitution of 1993, the presidential competences were restrained by the parliament. Parliament was still powerful and all MPs had deputy immunity, which gave them personal security (Way 2005). Kuchma's inability to create a dominant party undermined the strength of his regime. As a result, he had to conclude agreements with different political clans, who benefit from these agreements. Kuchma managed to build up a relatively strong coercive apparatus (Way 2015). Though under Kuchma's presidency the regime got more consolidated, the president did not completely dominate in the political arena.

What is more, various oligarchic groups emerged during Kuchma's presidency as a result of privatization of the state property (Aslund 2005). On overall, Ukrainian economic policies in 1990s were very inconsistent and inefficient (Snelbecker 1995). By 1998 the country's cumulative GDP fell to 62% of Ukraine's GDP in 1990 (Kravchuk 2002). Thanks to international assistance and closer cooperation with IMF, Kuchma's government launched the program of liberalization policies and macroeconomic stabilization. The authorities liberalized trade and prices, lowered taxes and eliminated many subsides, launched small and mass privatization

programs (Kravchuk 2002). However, reforms did not succeed in many respects. Though many large and mid-sized state-run enterprises were privatized, it was very few who actually benefited from this privatization. Namely, rent-seeking bureaucrats who were responsible for privatization and powerful businessmen, who acquired the assets (Hellman 1998). These businessmen rapidly accumulated tangible wealth and became very influential in Ukrainian politics by supporting different political forces.

The efficiency of reforms was rather low. Ukraine did not succeed in liberalization and establishing transparent market economy. The authorities did not manage create stable institutions. Instead, they often introduced gradual reforms, which produced high levels of inequality (Hellman 1998).

Newly-emerged class of oligarchs actively involved into politics by concluding informal, cartel, short-term agreements (pacts) with political groups and parties. Clientelism, nepotism and corruption were the most widespread informal practices (Darden 2000, von Zon 2005). Certain groups of oligarchs supported Kuchma, but their support was conditioned by potential benefits. Therefore, they could always withdraw their support in favor of alternative candidate. Tax pressure, control of the media, selective use of law ("the rule by law"), coercive clientelism in voting and institutional dependence of prosecutors and judges were the key mechanisms that affected political decisions in Ukraine under Kuchma (Kuzio 2005).

Despite relatively consolidated nature of his regime, in 2000 Kuchma got under serious blow. He was accused of giving the order to kill the journalist Gongadze (Dyczok 2006, Kuzio 2007). The opposition leader Moroz provided the tapes, which suggested that it was the president who ordered to murder the journalist. The tapes also pointed at tremendous levels of corruption in Kuchma's government (Way 2015, p. 71). After these revelations, public support of the president has considerably dropped. What is more, this scandal triggered the emergence of the protest movement "Ukraine without Kuchma" (Kuzio 2007). The "Kuchmagate" seriously undermined the president's position and provided the chance for the opposition leaders. Tymoshenko, Lutsenko and Moroz headed the protests against the president (Kuzio 2007). Though people soon disbanded, the public support of the president has dropped further more. These events fostered the formation of several civic groups and organizational networks.

In 2004, by the end of his second cadency, Kuchma wanted to choose a successor for the presidential position to secure himself from potential attacks of the opponents. He picked

Yanukovych, who was originally from Donetsk and had two criminal records. However, Yanukovych had considerable resources and was in charge of the powerful Party of Regions (Way 2015, p. 74). The major support of the party was coming from Donbas region (Kudelia and Kuzio 2014: 255-259). The party was well organized. Its organizational structure accommodated interests of different powerful groups and oligarchs (Ibid.). In the presidential campaign Yanukovych used pro-Russian rhetoric and strongly appealed to citizens of Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine who were his major constituents. During the elections state bureaucracy blatantly manipulated votes, which did not remain unnoticed thanks to relative plurality of media and strength of the electoral observation organizations (Bunce and Wolchik 2011).

Therefore, when the Central electoral commission announced the results of Yanukovych's victory, dozens of thousands of people mobilized on Kyiv main square Maidan Nezalezhnosty to protest against the results of elections (Beissenger 2007, 2011, Onuch 2014). During the electoral campaign some electoral bureaucrats defected Yanukovych and refused to manipulate votes. Though Yanukovych managed to win the elections with tiny margin of 49.46% to 46.91%, the dissemination of information about the electoral fraud on TV and mass mobilization drove thousands of people to the streets of Kyiv (Way 2015, p.76). The Constitutional court did not accept the results of elections and appointed another round of elections, which took place on December 26. Yushchenko won the elections and became the president of the country.

The scholarship focuses on different aspects of Orange revolution. For instance, Wolchik and Bunce (2011) pointed at the diffusion of 'electoral model', which implied both structural and procedural factors. Besides emphasizing the factors of regime vulnerability, the authors also underscore the importance of the movement's strategies (Bunce and Wolchik 2009). As they note "Thus, the key was not simply unifying the opposition but also running ambitious political campaigns, orchestrating elaborate voter registration and voter turnout drives, and putting in place electoral monitoring procedures that in combination made oppositions more effective and more politically attractive to voters, created a widespread sense that victory was possible, and made it much harder for the regime, as a result, to win the election and remain in office after it had lost" (Ibid., p. 73). The absence of the regime party, failure of coercive policy, split in the president's team, lack of legitimacy and Western leverage were the main factors of the Orange revolution (Beissenger 2007, Levitsky and Way 2010).

Alternatively to structural factors and strategic choices, Kuzio (2010) proposes to pay more attention to the impact of identity and nationalism. In the case of the Orange revolution, civic nationalism of Yushchenko's supporters was stronger than "Slavic" nationalism of Yanukovych's supporters (Ibid.). Way (2015) emphasizes the similar point. He suggests that when Ukrainian identity of Western and Central Ukrainians faced openly pro-Russian position of Yanukovych and electoral fraud, it resulted in mass protest.

Levitsky and Way (2010) emphasize that the Western linkage, Western leverage and the organizational capacity of the regime are crucial for the regime survival. The factor of international ties and Western influence remained a relatively important factor in the evolution of Ukrainian political system.

Right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, International linkage of Ukraine with the West was weak. Western countries have never offered Ukraine a chance to become the EU member. Post-soviet countries were Ukraine's major trading partners in 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 214).

During his presidency Kuchma made Ukraine more opened to the West. In particular, the government began much closer cooperation with international institutions, agreed on the financial program with the IMF and adopted more transparent economic policies .

Ukraine and the EU signed the Partnership and Cooperation agreement in 1994. However, since then EU has never offered Ukraine potential membership in the European Union. Despite willing to get close connections with the EU, Ukrainian elites often were not willing to adapt EU standards in economy and in politics. As noted by Wolczuk "By the spring of 2003 the gap between the desire to integrate and failures of the implementation of the 'entry level' agreement, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, let alone the actual efforts to accelerate the domestic transformation to give credibility to Ukraine's 'European aspirations' has been hardly closed" (2003, p.5).

Part of the Ukrainian elites wanted to keep closer connections to the West to have geopolitical and economic leverage against Russia. Therefore, the arrival to the presidential chair of pro-European Yushchenko enhances further cooperation with the EU.

The transit of power after the Orange revolution was compromised by reducing the competences of the president and empowering the parliament (Sedelius and Berglund 2012, Way 2015). The Orange coalition of the president Yushchenko and the prime-minister Tymoshenko,

was very fragmented and inefficient. The transition to a new constitution further facilitated media pluralism, decline of electoral manipulation and created extremely powerful parliament (Way 2015).

The demise of Kuchma's regime brought more openness to civil sphere and civil society (Bilan and Bilan 2011, Solonenko 2015). 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections were free and fair, while governance practices became more transparent (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 219-220, Aslund 2009). As Way puts it "… politics under Yushchenko's regime was the most competitive, chaotic and democratic in Ukraine since early 1990s" (2015, p.80).

Despite democratic improvements, weak state and institutional fragmentation did not let the regime fix the flaws inherited from Kuchma's regime (Matsievskyi 2011). The role of communist elites has dropped, whereas the role of oligarchic groups has increased (Ibid.). Therefore, democratization was partial and selective. Political decision-making did not become transparent, coercive system and courts were not reformed, clientelism, corruption, political surveillance and tax coercion have remained the part of political system (Ibid.).

Yanukovych has won presidential elections of 2010 with tiny margin of 4%. Very soon he began to consolidate the power. In fact, before the arrival of Yanukovych, Ukrainian politics can be labeled as "pluralism by default" (Way 2015). It implies the continuous competition between various groups and oligarchs, while no one could impose neither autocratic, nor democratic institutional rules. Way suggests that pluralism is "the product of failed efforts to create authoritarian system" (Ibid., p. 54). Matsievsky (2011) describes this situation as "trapped in hybridity" between authoritarianism and democracy (Ibid.).

After Yanukovych's arrival to the presidential chair the situation started to change. In particular, the freedom of press has declined. Media, especially TV, became much more biased in favor of the president (Leshchenko 2013). The regime also harassed anti-regime journalists, hacked their email accounts, recorded their phone calls and published them online (Leshchenko 2014.).

Yanukovych was the first president in Ukrainian history who managed to create and maintain the dominant party in the legislature. The president's Party of regions, was the most resourceful and well organized party in the country (Way 2015). Following the parliamentary elections of 2012 the Party of regions and Communists formed the majority in parliament (Kovalov

2012). New prime-minister Azarov also belonged to the president's party. The parliament has become the instrument in the hands of the president to channel his decisions.

The regime also managed to get under control courts, including Supreme court, and judges (Kudelia 2014). The control over the judiciary considerably enhanced the capacities of the regime. Former prime-minister Tymoshenko was sentenced to seven years in jail. By the fall of 2013 the Party of Regions managed to get under control two third of the ministries, around ninety percent of regional governorship and dominated in the local councils across the whole country (Kudelia 2014).

Though the regime got rather consolidated, Yanukovych never managed to create a dominant-party regime. The opposition managed to get united in the face of the threat and established the Committee of Resistance to Dictatorship (Kudelia 2014). Regional divisions also prevented complete consolidation of the Yanukovych's regime (Way 2015). Yanukovych and the Party of Regions had never got the support of Western and Central Ukraine. What is more, some oligarchs kept on supporting opposition parties.

Yanukovych also made some strategic miscalculations when he started relying more on his closest surrounding – 'family', rather than Party of regions. Shift to 'familyism' implied "… transition from collective authoritarian rule based on a diverse group of backers to a more personalized autocratic system" (Kudelia 2014, p. 26).

In addition to growing discontent within ruling elites, more than 75% of Ukrainian citizens were dissatisfied with the economic recession, political state of affairs and corruption (International foundation for electoral systems). After the global economic crisis, Ukraine's economy fell by 15% in 2009 and never managed to recover in the upcoming years. Corruption remained one of the country's major problems. According to Transparency International rankings in 2013 Ukraine ranked 144 out of 177 countries, which made it one of the most corrupted states in the region (Aslund 2014).

It is important to notice that when Yanukovych campaigned for the presidency and later arrived to the presidential chair, he never withdrew his support for Ukraine's integration with the EU.

In 2004 the EU has launched Eastern neighborhood policy, which was designed for six post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine. In 2005 Ukraine has agreed on a plan of "substantial initial action" (Aslund 2013). In 2008 Ukraine joined the World Trade Organization. In 2009 the

EU launched Eastern Partnership(EP) program with Eastern Neighborhood partners. EP policies included free trade and visa liberalization agreements. Despite its many pro-Russian policies, Yanukovych's government maintained its support of signing Ukraine-EU association agreement. Therefore, the decision of authorities to freeze signing of the Ukraine-EU agreement on November 21, 2013 was very surprising.

Summary

Institutional structure in post-Soviet Ukraine mostly remained underdeveloped, which influenced the state's capacity to implement policies and react to external challenges (Way 2015). At the same time, Yanukovych managed to build rather strong organizational base – the party of Regions (Kudelia 2014). The president and the Party of regions had majority in parliament, controlled most of local municipalities and Constitutional court. However, during 2012-2013 the balance of power has shifted in favor of the president and his "family" and was moving away from broader circle of loyalists and party members (Kudelia 2014). The regime's repressive capacity was rather moderate. Despite the fact that Yanukovych managed to consolidate power, political opposition still occupied one third seats in the parliament. Several oligarchs kept on providing resources to the opposition parties. What is more, opposition managed to stay consolidated.

Media system was more competitive than in Russia, but all major media, including several national TV channels, were controlled by oligarchic clans (Leshenko 2014). Civil society remained rather weak, despite the success of Orange revolution (Kamerāde, Crotty and Ljubownikow 2016, Stewart and Dollbaum 2017). Ukraine had moderate Western ties. The country exported one third of its commodities to the West (Levitsky and Way 2010, Aslund 2012).

The protest cycle of Euromaidan movement

The decision of authorities to postpone the integration with the EU has triggered the protest of journalists, students, civic and political activists. The miscalculations of authorities fostered the growth and radicalization of the movement. In what follows we will first focus on the sociodemographic characteristics of the protest, the nature of the protesters' grievances and the social structure of the protest. To trace the dynamics of conflict, we need to place protest in space

and time. For that purposes, I will focus on major SMOs that were actively engaged in protests (McCarthy and Zald 1977). To trace the logic of unfolding conflict and dynamics of interaction over time, I will adopt the protest cycle framework (Tarrow 1989, Koopmans 2004).

Sociodemographic characteristics of protesters and the nature of their demands

Protestors' socio-demographic characteristics and demands help us better understand social and political roots of insurgency its social structure. According to surveys, two-thirds (67 %) of the protesters were older than 30, with an average age of almost 36. Nearly a quarter of contenders were older than 55. As noted by Onuch "Most protesters were middle-aged or older, and had full-time jobs as well as an above-average amount of formal schooling" (2014, p.47). The demonstrators were in general younger than general population. 64% of protest participants had higher education and 14.4 % had unfinished higher education (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2013).

When the protest turned more violent on January 19-22, the protest's social structure changed (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2013). In particular, the proportion of men has significantly increased from 66% to 88%, while the proportion of women decreased from 44% to 12% (Onuch and Martseniuk 2014). The age composition remained almost the same, (Ibid.). The number of those who possessed higher education dropped to 43% equaling to 43% of protesters who had secondary and vocational education(Ibid.). Most of protesters did *not* belong to any political or civic organization (Zelinska 2017). Violence has scared away women and better educated citizens, whereas had little impact on age of protesters.

Ethnic and linguistic makeups were another important characteristic of protest. 92% of protesters were ethnic Ukrainians in comparison to 77% across the country, while 4% identified themselves as Russians compared to 17.3% of the general population (Onuch 2014). 54% of Euromaidan protesters spoke Ukrainian at home, 25.9% spoke Russian, whereas 18,6% used both (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2013). 70 % of protesters were bilingual and used both Ukrainian and Russian in their private and professional life (Onuch 2014, p.48).

Table 4. Motives of Euromaidan protesters

What motivated you to come to Maidan?[8] *(pick not more than 3 options)*

	Maidan-protest (21.11.2013–30.11.2013)	Maidan-camp (1.12.2013–18.01.2014)	Maidan-Struggle (19.01.2014-21.02.2014)
Victor Yanukovych's refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine association agreement	53,5	40	47.0
Beatings of protestors and repressions	69,6	69	61.3
Desire to change the authorities in the country	39,1	38,9	45.6
Desire to change life in Ukraine	49,9	36,2	51.1

At the outset protestors were motivated by brutal beatings of demonstrators at the Maidan and repressions (69.6%), Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU (53.5%) and desire to change life in Ukraine (49.9%) (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014b) . There were the shifts in motives following the protest cycles. Different forms of legal and coercive repression changed the importance of different motives at different stages of protest.

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[8] https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226 , Kiev International Institute of Sociology, 06.02.2014

Table 5. Demands of Euromaidan

What demands of the Maidan do you support? (Choose several options if you want)

	Maidan-protest (21.11.2013–30.11.2013)	Maidan-camp (1.12.2013 – 18.01.2014)	Maidan-Struggle (19.01.2014-21.02.2014)
To release arrested protesters and stop repressions	81,8	63,9	82.2
To sign the Ukraine-EU association agreement	71.0	58,6	49.0
Resignation of the government	80,1	74,5	68.2
Prosecution of those who are responsible for beating protesters	57,6	50,7	63.7
Early parliamentary elections	55,6	51,4	59.1
Victor Yanukovych's resignation and early presidential elections	75,1	65,7	85.2
Return to the constitution of 2004	37,9	42,8	62.5
Prosecution of those who were engaged in corruption	49,6	42,8	62.1
Raise living standards	46,9	42,5	41.1

At later stages of protest, we can identify shifts in demands. The fraction of the groups that demanded Eurointegration shrank and correspondingly the proportion of Eurointegration demand has dropped from 71% to 49% (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). At the same time, voluntarist coercive policies of the government and president's inability to resolve political crises have increased the demand for adoption of more balanced Constitution of 2004. This contributed to the increase of this demand from 37% to 62% as well as increased the number of demands for Yanukovych's resignation from 75% to 85% (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014).

The primary sources of information about protests for participants were Radio/TV – 52%, Facebook 37%, Vkontakte 12.8 %, Internet TV – 16.8 % (% (Onuch 2015, p.228). Widespread responses to survey "my friend called/texted me" (22%) and "my family member called/texted me" (9.5%) suggest important role of social networks in diffusing information and mobilizing protesters. The role of Internet was considerable, in but in contrast to Russian case, TV played a crucial role in disseminating information about the protest.

For instance, following the repression of peaceful protesters on Maidan on November 30, two major national TV channels favorably covered the Maidan protesters and negatively framed the regime's repression (Leshchenko 2014). Different national TV channels kept covering Maidan events as the citizens' "right for protest". Negative media's framing of repression, in particular the anti-protest laws and the Hrushevskiy events, made some social groups be more receptive to radical discourse of the movement's radical leaders and correspondingly contributed to radicalization of the protest.

After reviewing sociodemographic characteristics of protesters, their demands and grievances, I will have a closer look at the organizational structure of the protest.

Major SMOs of Euromaidan movement

Social movement organization is an indispensable factor of collective mobilization (Oberschall 1973, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Tilly 1978). The mobilizing structure's composition can be a crucial factor in shaping the dynamics of protest. For instance, the presence of different SMOs may point at resourceful groups and the groups whose interests are represented . The organizational composition of the protest points at those groups who managed to "cross the 'threshold' to engage in politics" (Lipsky 1968, p. 1150).

The other important aspect is the implications of so-called 'radical flank effect' (Gamson 1975, Haines 1984). The composition of the actors may seriously affect the chosen strategies and framing, and therefore influence the access to decision makers and the responses of the elites to the demands of challengers (Gamson 1975, Haines 1984). The authorities may accept the moderate's demands when threatened by the presence of the radicals. Public may also learn more to the moderate fractions of the movement due to the presence of the radicals (Haines 1984).

What is more, different factions of the movement emerge and become more prominent at different stages of the movement life cycle (Tarrow 1989, Koopmans 2004).

The groups' ideology or organizational form may affect chosen repertoire of action. For instance, established political actors (e.g. political parties), which are the part of the institutional politics prefer to adopt conventional forms of collective action. More marginal actors may prefer confrontational or violent tactics due to the lack of resources and radical demands (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986, Tarrow 1989). Similarly, ideologically radical groups prefer to use more radical tactics due to their ideology.

Ideologically we can divide all major collective actors on Euromaidan into two large camps: (left)-liberal and right-wing. Leftist actors remained a tiny margin. Organizationally we can divide actors into two large groups of political parties and extra-parliamentary groups. What is important, is that in contrast to the Russian case, left organizations were nearly absent. Extra-parliamentary groups represented the ideological spectrum from liberal coalitions like Civic sector of Euromaidan or Euromaidan SOS to militant right-wing groups like Right Sector. The right-wing forces had much stronger ground in comparison to Russia. They played an important role in later, violent phases of protests (Shekhovtsov and Umland 2014, Ishchenko 2016).

The right-wing political party Svoboda played crucial role in mobilization. Its members actively established alternative centers of power in the regions, which provided challengers with considerable leverage in their negotiations with authorities at later phases of protest (Ishchenko 2016, Kudelia 2018).

The liberal camp embraced several political parties. Udar and Bat'kivshina represented parliamentary opposition, whereas DemAlliance was a young party that was not represented in parliament. Political parties in Ukraine were still weak. The main reasons for that were the legacy of Soviet political culture, regional and linguistic divisions, corruption and and weak party structure (Kuzio 2014). Parties often used personalities of their leaders instead of ideologies and adopted vague and populist socio-economic programs (Fedorenko, Rybiy and Umland 2016). This personalization is reflected in the names of parties. (2014). Kudelia and Kuzio (2014) called political parties in post-Soviet Ukraine 'electoral machines'. This conceptualization implies that they are not ideologically rooted, but rather have eclectic, ad hoc ideology and designed for short-term goals of electoral campaigns to gain the control over administrative resources within state apparatus to benefit from rents, patronage and protection (Ibid.).

In a similar vein, D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio (2018) suggest that due to weak civil culture and low interest in politics among the majority of population, political parties are formed not around ideologies, but rather around initiative group or a leader. They often represented no constituencies. Instead, they are backed up by oligarchs and frequently act on their behalf. By the beginning of protests, the parliament was dominated by well-organized president's Party of Regions and Communists. Fatherland, UDAR and Svoboda represented united opposition to the Yanukovych's regime.

Just like in other post-Communist countries, civil society of post-Soviet Ukraine developed rather slowly and was weak (Howard 2002). The Orange revolution has promoted higher civil liberties and made some attempts to enhance legal framework for the development of civil society. However, this did not result in the higher levels of volunteering, though the number of NGOs has increased (Kamerāde, Crotty and Ljubownikow 2016). The Orange coalition provided broader civil liberties to the public, but did not succeed in implementing policies fostering development of civil society.

Table 6. The major SMOs of Euromaidan:

SMO's name	*Organization, its ideology or thematic focus*
1. Udar	Political opposition, liberal
2. Bat'kivshina	Political opposition, liberal
3. Svoboda	Political opposition, right-wing
4. Euromaidan SOS	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
5. Civic sector of Euromaidan	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
6. Automaidan	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
7. Civic Council of Maidan	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
8. Centre UA	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
9. Spil'na Sprava	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
10. Vidsich	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
11. Student Coordination Council	Extra-parliamentary group, left-liberal
12. Pryama diya	Extra-parliamentary group, left
13. DemAlliance	Political party, liberal
14. Maidan Self-Defense	Extra-parliamentary group, multiple ideologies
15. Right Sector	Extra-parliamentary group, right-wing
16. The Committee of releasing political prisoners	Extra-parliamentary group, right-wing
17. The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists	Extra-parliamentary group, right-wing

Extra parliamentary groups and civic associations represented a broad myriad of organizations from (left)-liberal to right-wing. As the study will demonstrate, the role of different SMOs was different at different stages of the protest cycle. In particular, the role of liberal organizations was more important at the initial stage of protest. They played an important role in mobilizing large numbers of people. Political opposition was the major supplier of material and

organizational resources at the outset of protest and in the following phases. Right Sector has become a crucial actor when the protest turned violent after January 19 and especially when the authorities adopted very harsh forms of repression on February 18-20 (Ishchenko 2016, Kudelia 2018). When the opportunities for conventional action shrank and the opportunities for violence opened up, right-wing groups came to the scene fully prepared for the violent struggle (Kudelia 2018).

It is important that until 2012-2013 right-wing political parties had marginal position on the Ukrainian political scene. Far right Svoboda has become a part of mainstream politics and a member of the opposition Resistance to Dictatorship Committee in 2011. It managed for the first time to pass a 5% threshold only in 2012 parliamentary elections when it gained 10.44% of votes (Ghosh 2012). In contrast to other political parties in Ukraine, besides Communists, it was the only party with deep ideological roots and broad network of committed supporters (Ibid.).

According to Kudelia "Right Sector was formed in late November through the informal merger of the nationalist conservative and social-nationalist wings of the far right movement" (2018, p. 508). However, it became famous thanks to its actions during the violent phases of Euromaidan (Ishchenko 2016). It is important to mention that all right-wing groups were mostly pro-European, since closer cooperation with the EU distanced Ukraine away from Russia.

Maidan Self-Defense was also an important actor of Euromaidan. It was a para-military organization, it was endorsed by liberally-oriented politicians and civic activists. It was established on December 1 in response to repression of peaceful protest. Its main goal was to protect protesters against the repression of the state. Maidan Self-Defense played a crucial role as a broker between different parts of the movement and served as a platform for organizational linking of different groups, parties and initiatives.

Maidan Self-Defense had a well-established organizational structure. In particular, its commandant Parubiy had two deputies – Levus was responsible for external communications, whereas Velichkovich dealt with more general issues (Yuri Uzich, Interview UKR8). The Council of Self-Defense regularly gathered and discussed further strategy. Each company had its own representative who participated in the meetings of the Council (Yuri Uzich, Interview UKR8). "Each leader of the company changed the mobile phone number once per week. There were a

couple of accountants. Self-Defense was closely linked with Batkivshina" (Ibid.). There was the coordinator who worked in regions.

Self-defense linked Right Sector and moderate parts of the movement thanks to influential politicians who belonged to liberal political forces. However, initially they became part of Ukrainian politics in early 1990s as neo-Nazi nationalists (Kudelia 2018). Among them we could single out Fatherland MP Parubiy, who was the chief of Self-Defense and former national secret service chief Nalyvaichenko (Ibid.). The members of Self-Defense were active throughout the whole protest cycle, but were especially noticeable during the latest, most violent stages of protest (Ishchenko 2016).

The course of events in protest cycle of Euromaidan movement

Heightened conflict, outset of the protest and creation of political opportunities for the public

21-30 November, 2013.

The protests were triggered by the refusal of authorities to sign the Ukraine-EU association agreement on November 21. The same night hundreds of students, civic activists and journalists gathered on Maidan Nezalezhnosty - the main square of Kyiv (Aguzzi and Mormino 2016). Students formed the core of protests (Channell-Justice 2014). In particular, Direct Action and Student Coordination Council were the most active actors at the very outset of the protest (Ibid.). Political opposition and extra parliamentary groups failed to construct the frame that would resonate with the broader public and mobilize people for action (Onuch and Sasse 2016). The Eurointegration theme mobilized only politically active public and students. Civic sector organizations and the political opposition established their protest camps on different squares of the city: the former on Maidan Nezalezhnosty and the latter on the European square. The protest was moderate and was about to disband.

At night of November 30, 2013 riot police "Berkut" brutally attacked the tent camp of activists, students and journalists and dispersed the protesters (Katchovil and Scheide 2014, Onuch and Sasse 2016, p. 12). Protesters represented different groups (Interview UKR15), but media mostly framed repression as the dispersion of student protest. This repression provoked

much stronger reaction from public, forced activists and political opposition to get united and made it much easier to frame the issue at stake. Since that moment broad masses of people joined the protest.

Repression of students was a crucial miscalculation by authorities. It still remains unclear why they did it. As Svoboda activist Ruslan suggested "For me it was the mystery why they[authorities] did it. In fact, authorities enabled Maidan. Otherwise Maidan would have ceased to exist" (Interview UKR14).

Figure 1. Timeline of the major events of Euromaidan

NOVEMBER 2013

November 24, 2013. 50-100 000 protesters on Maidan at pro-EU demonstration. There were unsuccessful attempts to occupy state buildings. Police used tear gas against the most radically acting groups.

November 21, 2013. At night around 2000 of journalists, political and civic activists started protesting on Maidan in response to the president Yanukovich's refusal to sign EU association.

November 30, 2013. Special units of police "Berkut" dispersed peaceful tent camp on Maidan. Students, journalists and activists were brutally beaten and detained.

DECEMBER 2013

December 1-10, 2013. Several thousands to dozens of thousands of protesters, *Kiev City Hall* and *The House of Trade Unions* were occupied and turned into headquarters of National Resistance. "**March of a Million**" was held in Kyiv on **December 8**

December 10-11, 2013. Special security units tried to **crackdown** protesters both from Maidan and Kiev City Hall. Both of the attempts failed.

December 12-30, 2013. The head of Kyiv's city administration and the vice-secretary of the council for National Security and Defense were **sacked**. On **December 17** Yanukovich signed the **action plan with Russia**, which envisaged significant natural gas price drop and loan of 15$ billion. **Failed negotiations** between political opposition leaders and government. **Assault** of journalist and activist **Chornovol**, which provoked certain protest activity. On **December 27**, the parliament issued **law,** which envisaged criminal provision for seizure of administrative buildings.

JANUARY 2014

January 1-15, 2014. The March commemorating controversial nationalist **Bandera** was held on **January 1**. On **January 3** Svoboda MP Ilenko and his lawyer were beaten right next to court. The nationalist group members **Patriots of Ukraine** were sentenced to **6 years** of imprisonment on January 10.

January 16, 2014. The parliament passed a package of **anti-protest laws**. They basically criminalized public protest and severely restricted freedom of speech and assembly. They could be applied to every protester of Maidan. The same day the head of Presidential administration Liovochkin resigned.

January 19-20, 2014. Up to 200 000 people protested against the "dictatorial laws" and urged for the presidential impeachment and early parliament elections. Protesters started **clashes with police** on Hrushevskoho street. Molotov cocktails and stones were used by protesters, whereas grenades and water cannons by police. The peaceful character of protests was lost.

January 21-28, 2014. The anti-protest laws got legally effective. There were first **5 deaths** on the side of protesters and **300 injured** by the end of January 22. There was a leaked video of **torturing** an activist on the street by police. The opposition politicians refused to accept Vice- and Prime-minister positions proposed by president Yanukovich. On January 28, **Prime-minister** Azarov and his whole cabinet were **dismissed** by Yanukovich.

FEBRUARY 2014

February 9-17, 2014. On **February 9**, the formation of self-defense units across the whole country is announced by the opposition leaders. On **February 16**, the Amnesty law was passed, but never came in force, since required unconditional emptying administrative buildings and unblocking city streets.

February 18-23, 2014.   protesters marched to government and were met with guns and water cannons by security service units. By **February 19**, the number of victims grew to **26**. On **February 20**, the ultimate modes of repression were implemented against insurgents (e.g snipers, grenades, live ammunition) - 67 **protesters** were shot dead by repressive agencies. On **February 21** the opposition leaders negotiated with Yanukovich return to Constitution of 2004 and early presidential elections. Maidan refused this agreement. Yanukovich fled Ukraine on **February 22**. Parliament elected provisional president Turchinov on **February 23**.

Formation of new alliances, creation of new meanings, emergence of new organizations, diverse repertoire of contention and diffusion of protest to regions

November 30, 2013 – January 18, 2014.

The repression of students and activists crucially changed the nature of protest. The authorities crossed "culturally accepted norm of dissent behavior" (Davenport 1995, p. 689). This violations of cultural normed provoked mass outrage, which transformed into mass mobilization. The miscalculation on the part of regime played a crucial role in affecting the course of events.

Repression allowed challenging groups to construct new frames, building on which new mobilization took place. As noted by Klandermans "External stimulus is sometimes *the only* means to create consensus, especially at the initial phases of mobilization" (1988, p. 177). Instead of the EU integration, the focus shifted to more general issue of civil rights and liberties (Onuch and Sasse 2016).

On December 1, the political opposition and extra-parliamentary groups jointly organized the rally of several hundred thousand people to protest against the repressions of peaceful demonstrators (Gomza 2014).

Following the rally protesters came to Maidan square for protest. The tactics became much more confrontational. A group of 50-60 people in masks and with bats managed to seize Kyiv administration building (Kudelia 2018). As Spilna Sprava coordinator Oleh Achtirsky mentioned "On December 1 protesters could capture anything, the most important was to retain it under their control" (Interview UKR10). Another group of radicals occupied the Trade union building where opposition and several civic organizations have established the Headquarters of National Resistance. It was later transformed in the Council of Maidan.

Protesters also set up their kitchen, tents, barricades – Euromaidan established a permanent infrastructural base on the ground. Challengers formed Maidan Self-Defense, which proved to be one of the pillars of success at later stages of protest. This paramilitary coalition of different groups was hierarchically organized into 'companies' (sotni) and General Council of Maidan Self-Defense. Each 'company', formed a squad of 100 people. Maidan Self-Defense was

responsible for protecting protesters from potential repression (Way 2014, p. 40). Different extra parliamentary groups, associations and political parties had their own companies.

As Della Porta (2013) suggests activists gradually socialize to violence, whereas organizations adapt their structures "devoted first to defense, but later to attack" (Ibid., p. 186). Similarly, initially Maidan Self-Defense was designed to protect protesters from the potential attacks of repressive agencies. However, at later stages of violent protest its members engaged in violent clashes with police and actively attacked social control agents (Ishchenko 2016).

Challengers also managed to set up the scene on Maidan, where they could hold concerts and share meaningful information with movement sympathizers. Every Sunday the opposition and civic leaders held the Viches (popular gatherings).

Though the politicians were nominally in charge of the protest, the trust to them from the public was very low. There were divisions between extra-parliamentary groups and political opposition. For instance, many civil society organizations often disagreed with the organizational structure of Euromaidan and the representation of the protesters' demands (Onuch and Sasse 2016).

Due to stronger Western leverage and more dependence on Western markets and International financial institutions, Yanukovych had to bear in mind the reaction of international community. The representatives of the EU and USA proposed Yanukovych to arrange the round table with the opposition to form a new coalition government. However, the president rejected their proposal and authorities made another attempt to disperse protesters. On December 11 the special units of police tried to dismount the tent camp and seize the Maidan headquarters at Kyiv administration building. They failed due to organized resistance of protesters (Portnov and Portnova 2014).

In December protestors often used confrontational and innovative repertoire of contention. For instance, students blocked the universities, while their professors and administrative staff supported them in their efforts. Contenders also blocked the government, the parliament and the prosecutor's office. They seized several administrative buildings, including the October Palace, where several hundreds of people could stay at night.

Right-wing groups used violent repertoire, but it was a tiny fraction of all performances and was condemned by the broader public and dominant protest groups The

confrontational tactics proved to be fruitful, since it allowed to occupy strategically important public spaces and establish the coordinating bodies of the protest.

Social movement also extended to the regions, (Zelinska 2015, Ishchenko 2016). Protests were mostly diffusing to the Western and Central parts of the country, the South and the East also joined the protest at a smaller scale.

In December, in addition to some minor concessions, the regime continued to repress protesters. Law enforcement agencies and state-supported thugs were engaged in constant harassment and repression of protesters. For instance, unidentified people have brutally beaten famous civic activist Chornovil (Deutsche Welle 2012). Despite harsh responses of authorities, protest did not turn violent yet. Large violent clashes between two sides never took place (Popova 2014).

Due to engagement of very different groups with very different demands it was very difficult to manage and coordinate these groups (Onuch and Sasse 2016). Neither opposition leaders, nor civic leaders were able to unite and coordinate protesters. On December 29, the opposition and civic organizations tried to reunite protesters under the umbrella of the All-Ukrainian Union Maidan. It was meant to become a common coordinating body of the protest. However, it remained inefficient due to poor coordination.

By mid-January the protest was getting less and less active. The authorities decided to disperse it. For this purpose, on January 16, despite the violation of different legal procedures, the parliament passed the anti-protest laws. The main goal of these laws was to make dispersion of the protest look more legitimate in the eyes of various audiences (Portnov and Portnova 2014).

On that day the parliament adopted the package of laws, which were labeled by protesters as "the dictator's laws". On the next day the president signed these bills (BBC 2014). The laws restrained not just protest activity, but also outlawed many forms of political expression, freedom of public gatherings and freedom of speech (Gomza 2014). In fact, new laws have criminalized many active participants of protest who could be virtually detained for their participation in the preceding stages of protest. As Maidan Self-Defense activist Ruslan Boyko suggested "When they passed of the laws of January 16, many activists have decided to go until the very end because otherwise the police would have arrested them at home anyway. There was no way back. Nobody hoped that we will be able to reach our goals easily" (Interview UKR9).

This legal suppression radicalized considerable fraction of protesters and has laid off the ground for further radicalization (Shveda and Park 2014).

The coexistence of organized and non-organized protest, the radicalization of the protest, violent repertoire of contention, the escalation of local Maidans

January 19 –February 17 2014

The anti-protest laws and criminalization of peaceful protest were closing the opportunities for peaceful, legal protest and were opening the opportunities for radicalization and violence (Gomza 2014, Ishchenko 2016, Kudelia 2018). On January 19, 2014 numerous people once again gathered for the Viche on Maidan. They expected the plan for action and introduction of a single leader of the protest (Portnov and Portnova 2014).

As Katerina Chepura, the leader of Vidsich, stated in the interview "If we consider January 19, and the number of people who come for that Viche [popular gathering], the leaders of the protest simply flushed in the toilet the chance to act. When we came for these protests, where Klitchko and Yaceniuk were talking to people from the scene, we realized that they were not going to do anything. They told everyone to go home" (Interview UKR5).

In the absence of any plan for action from the opposition, groups of more radically oriented protesters moved to the parliament to make themselves heard. However, when they came there, they found the cordons of police on their way to Hrushevskiy street. Radical groups lit the police wagon and started violent actions against the police. Opposition leaders tried to prevent the violence, but failed. Very soon radicals started violent clashes with the police (Shveda and Park 2014). The escalation went further and numerous peaceful protesters joined violent actions (Kudelia 2018, p. 511). On January 22, the authorities allowed riot police and troops to use special means of constrain to deter protesters. On the same day he media reported of first three deaths. The peaceful character of the protest was completely lost.

This violent turn was conditioned by several reasons. In contrast to December 1, now considerable amount of public and movement activists viewed violence as the *innovation* (McAdam 1983), which was required to maintain the mobilization. As suggested by McAdam "Tactical innovations *only* become potent in the context of a political system vulnerable to

insurgency" (Ibid., p.737). This potency was growing from the actions of the regime. The passage of the laws has changed the *perceptions* of the government as unjust and opened the opportunities for violent actions, which were perceived as feasible and provoked another wave of mobilization.

Repression provided an extremely visible cause for blame attribution. By introducing the anti-protest laws, the regime was closing down the spaces for peaceful protest, whereas opening up conditions for violent action (Della Porta 2013). Thus, the anti-protest laws strengthened the positions of radicals within the movement, made different constituencies more receptive to violence and restrained the opportunities for peaceful solution.

The laws provided conditions for justifying violence. The repression made people more open to "belief amplification", which emphasized the efficacy of political violence (White 1989, p. 1293). In Opp and Roehl's words "Repression... raises perceived influence by illegal means only for those having employed legal means for a long time without success" (1990, p. 527). Therefore, futility of previous attempts made violent actions more acceptable for those, who were previously involved in peaceful protest. Identification with participants suffering from repression was also likely to foster transition to violent forms of protest by those who had been previously engaged in peaceful contention (White 1989, p. 1296).

The opposition could not keep the radicals and their sympathizers away from violence. The passage of the laws has outlawed thousands of people and made them much more receptive to radical rhetoric and actions. The radicalized moderates began to join the violent actions led by radicals, who provided an outlet for violent action. Inability of the regime to repress first moderates who joined violent actions reinforced joining of other moderates to violent actions. As Lohmann (1994) suggests, the most crucial force that compels moderates to participate is not extremists, but other moderates who participate.

As Tilly (1986, p.4) suggested repertoire of contention is the result of trial and errors. The initial trial of violence on December 1 was not accepted and was labeled as provocation. At the outset of the protest the moderate fraction of the movement hoped to obtain goals by adopting conventional actions. When the opportunities for the protest changed, a considerable part of protesters did not view the radical repertoire as unacceptable any more. Due to the lack of concessions from the regime and impotence of the protest leaders, violence has become an acceptable form "to keep the flame of mobilization alive" (Tarrow 2001, p. 2003). Thanks to

presence of Right Sector, football fans and other radicals the initial costs of generating violence were reduced to minimum (Kudelia 2018).

Though authorities made attempts to deter protest, instead of deterrence repression produced backlash (Lichbach 1987, Francisco 1995). Main factors that contributed to the failure of the regime to repress protestors was the inconsistency in applying repression (Kudelia 2018, Interview UKR17), its indiscriminate character (Mason and Krane 1989) and its use at a later stage of protest cycle (Brockett 1995). Unsuccessful repressive attempts led to the situation when "coercive responses by government are self-reinforcing: after a point, they only trigger a similar response by the opposition" (Lichbach 1984, p. 317).

Escalatory protest policing (Della Porta 2013) also contributed to the militarization of the tactics (Kudelia 2018). From January 19, for protesters it was not safe to leave the territory of Maidan and administrative districts taken by insurgents. As one of the activists admitted, most of active protesters were already on "the hit list" of the police and secret services, therefore they were at high risk of being detained outside of the Maidan territory (Interview UKR13). Staying together and living on Maidan territory contributed to further radicalization of protestors. More homogeneous environment of the radicalized groups coupled with similar experiences of violent interaction with police, radicalized the cognition of the protesters. Those who wanted to join armed groups were "43 times more likely to be living on Maidan than those who were not" (Rosenfeld et al., 2016).

The violent turn in Kyiv has provoked further diffusion of the protest and violent repertoire to different regions of the country (Kudelia 2014, 2018). From January 23 to January 27 protesters managed to occupy regional administrations in majority of Western and Central regions of the country (Ishchenko 2016). According to Kudelia "The driving forces in all such seizures were dozens of young men wearing masks, carrying wooden clubs, and chanting nationalist slogans. These protest trailblazers belonged to different nationalist organizations or soccer fan clubs, most of which grouped under the umbrella of Right Sector" (2018, p. 512).

The opposition also played crucial role in mobilizing against local governors who belonged to the Party of Regions. Thanks to wide representation of the political opposition in Western and Central regional and local councils "(l)ocal authorities adopted official petitions addressed to the central government and law enforcement in support of Euromaidan demands,

defended protesters from law-enforcement repressions, provided infrastructural support for local Maidans" (Ishchenko 2016, p. 7).

What is more, similarly to Kyiv Maidan, many of local Maidans managed to establish People's Councils as the alternative centers of power. Ishchenko suggests that "It was in the Western regions that Euromaidan protesters first seized massive amounts of weaponry from local law enforcement which were later used in clashes with the police in Kyiv. It was in the Western regions that Yanukovych first lost control, not in Kyiv. In late January 2014 People's Councils (narodni rady) were created by local activists, opposition parties' leaders, local council members (including Svoboda party) accompanied by the occupation of the state administration buildings" (2016, p. 7).

Following the loss of power in Western and Central parts of the country, Yanukovych agreed to make the concessions to protesters (Portnov and Portnova 2014). On January 28, the parliament dismissed prime-minister Azarov and cancelled the anti-protest laws. However, by that time these concessions were not enough anymore. The opposition demanded the restoration of the parliamentary-presidential constitution of 2004 and early presidential elections.

Both the opposition leaders and the authorities could not control expansion of violence beyond Kyiv. Protest leaders completely lost the control over the crowd, which was fueled by the radical groups (Onuch and Sasse 2016). The regime was not so consolidated anymore and was losing its ground. One fraction of the regime insisted on coercive dispersion of Euromaidan and introduction of martial law, while the other fraction rejected repression and insisted on the political solution to the conflict (Portnov and Portnova 2014).

Despite the outburst of violence, numerous people still mobilized for conventional protest. The movement operated at two levels – violent and non-violent. As Kudelia (2018) puts it "Violent and non-violent methods of protest thus became complementary and transformed Euromaidan into a two-tiered movement. It consisted of a militant vanguard acting in specific sites and a rank-and-file providing assistance to the militants, but also practicing non-violent protest on Maidan. The former diverted the focus of coercive forces from the main square and raised the overall costs of protest for the regime. The latter offered a safe space for strictly non-violent protesters to maintain the movement's high mobilization levels" (Ibid., p. 512).

Simultaneous mass peaceful and violent levels of mobilization partly contradict the theoretical assumptions of the protest cycle theorists (Tarrow 1989,2011, Koopmans 1993, 2004).

In particular, they suggest that "(u)nequal decline in participation poses a dilemma for movement leadership. Aware that their strength lies in numbers, they may respond to the decline in participation by embracing more moderate demands and attempting to compromise with opponents. Conversely, to keep the support of more militant elements, they may attempt to keep the fire alive by making radical claims and intensifying contention. In either case, the differential decline in support leads to polarization between those willing to compromise with authorities and those who seek continued confrontation. This leads to a complementary pair of mechanisms: *radicalization* and *institutionalization* "(Tarrow 2011, p. 206). Despite intense violence, mass mobilization did not disappear, but rather complemented violent actions and remained mostly at the *same level*. What is more, many peaceful protesters were engaged in violent action or assisted radicals. There are several factors that contributed to the co-presence of both peaceful and radical levels of protest.

In particular, Tarrow's model assumes that when violence erupts mass mobilization mostly declines (Tarrow 1989). Conventional actors agree on more moderate demands. The authorities also prefer to make concessions to the moderate fraction of the movement due to the "radical flank effect" (Haines 1984). The moderates distance themselves from the radicals, while the authorities repress the radical groups.

However, in Euromaidan there was a different situation. Political opposition at the outset of protests openly condemned violence and adopted conventional tactics. Right after the eruption of violence on Hrushevskiy street on January 19, the opposition still rejected violent forms of action and publicly resented radicals and their methods. However, in two days, the opposition realized that violence did not produce most of its negative effects. Therefore, they openly recognized it as an acceptable form of contention and admitted its utility. They began to accept violent repertoire for their own interests and used it as the lever to put pressure on the ruling regime (Kudelia 2018). What is more, the opposition leaders became receptive to it and even encouraged it occasionally.

The regime's limited coercive capacity and inconsistent use of repression made violence the effective source of pressure on the regime (Kudelia 2018). Due to the absence of consensus within the regime about how to deal with protesters, the authorities never introduced the martial law, which might have led to even stronger radicalization or eruption of civil war.

As the regime was getting less consolidated, Yanukovych agreed to make further concessions. In particular, the president agreed to release all detained protesters provided that challengers freed all administrative buildings in the regions. By February 15 all previously detained protesters were freed from jails. On February 16, the protesters have left occupied regional municipalities. Both sides managed to release the tension and were ready to negotiate return to the Constitution of 2004 and early presidential elections. However, another violent outburst resulted in further escalation, the collapse of the regime and run away of the regime's key politicians.

Final escalation, massacre and the collapse of Yanukovych's regime

February 18-27, 2014

On February 18, 2014 protesters started a "peaceful walk" to the parliament. Fully armed militarized units of Self-Defense and Right Sector were in charge of procession (Kudelia 2018). Protesters started throwing Molotov cocktails at the police and provoked the responses from them. It resulted in new violent clashes and further escalation. Right Sector openly called for the use of weapons in the fight against the government. On the same day the authorities announced "anti-terrorist operation" against protesters, blocked and cut off Kyiv downtown and started the operation. However, Right Sector and Self-Defense units were sufficiently armed and capable of fighting back. Riot police groups "Berkut" and secret services deployed severe forms of repression like grenades and shotguns (Traynor 2014). Fierce armed resistance of Right Sector and Self-Defense on the night of February 19 was complemented by internal restraints of coercive forces – agents were getting tired and lacked ammunition (Kudelia 2018).

As the violent clashes started again, the regime has completely lost the control over Western and Central parts of the country. Another wave of violence produced fragmentation of the state institutions at different levels. According to Ishchenko "After February 18 local councils in the West and Centre became the effective centers of power in their respective territories and, after some initial resistance, local law enforcement sided with the protesters" (2016, p. 7).

On February 20, the escalation went further on. This was the bloodiest day, when dozens of people were killed by snipers. This sniper massacre ultimately made Yanukovych agree

to the demands of the opposition – the early presidential elections and return to the parliamentary-presidential constitution of 2004. On January 21, Yanukovych and opposition leaders held negotiations that were mediated by the foreign ministers of France, Poland and Germany and a representative of Russia (Solohubenko 2014). They agreed on the early presidential elections not later than December 2014, the return to the Constitution of 2004 and amnesty to all participants in the protest. However, radical groups of the protestors rejected this compromise and demanded nothing less than immediate resignation of Yanukovych. Otherwise they threatened to use their arms (Kudelia 2018). On February 22, the parliament adopted the constitution of 2004 and approved the resignation of the president. On the same day Yanukovych and his close cronies fled first to Kharkiv and then to Russia. The parliament has voted for Oleksandr Turchinov as an acting head of the state and assigned presidential elections on May 25. The political balance was partly reestablished and the protest cycle ended.

Conclusion

The protest cycle lasted for just three months, was violent and reached the goals of the most radical actors. Structural factors played an important role in eruption and development of repression. The literature suggests that the deviation from the cultural norms increases the costs for repression (Davenport 1995). More importantly, the repression that is perceived as violating constitutional rights and deviating from cultural norm, can produce backfire (Opp and Roehl 1990). Repression on November 30, 2013 confirms these predictions. Thanks to Orange revolution and following democratic and market development (Aslund 2009), most of the Ukrainian citizens took constitutional right for granted. Therefore, when riot police brutally repressed peaceful protest on November 30, it produced a wave of popular outrage, which was structured in mass protest.

Low coercive capacity of the regime restrained the opportunities for deterring protesters (Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow 2001). The Ukrainian case demonstrated that the regime was unable to repress the protest when it remained not numerous. Low loyalty of the repressive agencies to the regime in Central and Western Ukraine, also restrained the opportunities of authorities to repress. What is more, when the opposition declared the alternative centers of power in regions, the local police joined them and defected the regime (Ishchenko 2016, Kudelia 2018).

Limited resources as well as insufficient organizational capacity demonstrated inability of the law enforcement agents to repress radicalized protest on February 18-20.

The alliance structure (Della Porta 1995, Kriesi et al. 1995) of Euromaidan was more favorable in comparison to Russian case. Thanks to the presence of the united opposition in the parliament and loyal to the movement media, including national TV channels, the "civil rights" coalition was not so weak. Comparatively competitive media environment helped to negatively frame repression and enabled broader dissemination of information.

The radicalization of Maidan was reflected in the characteristics of its protesters. In particular, Maidan in February in comparison to December, became male-dominated (88%), less educated (43% with higher education) and less prone for compromise and negotiations with authorities (63% are against any negotiations). The fraction of Kiev residents dropped to just 12% (was 49%) in contrast to 88% of outsiders. Also the number of Western residents increased to 55%.

Organizationally, the structure of Euromaidan differed from FFE movement due to presence of radical far-right groups. They attempted to radicalize protest at the outset, but failed. However, their later attempt on Hrushevskiy street had a profound effect on the radicalization and deployment of repression by authorities. Thanks to Maidan Self-Defense and influential brokers within the movement (e.g. liberal politicians) Right Sector managed to retain legitimacy within the movement milieu. The radical actions of Right Sector provoked repression of authorities, but at the same time demonstrated the regime's weakness and inability to repress. Thanks to inefficiency of peaceful protest and absence of plan for action from the opposition, far-right radicals managed to recruit numerous people in mid-January and enhanced their position vis-a-sis moderate groups within the movement.

In late January the broader public was more receptive to the radical repertoire and accepted radical strategies. In their intra-movement competition with moderate movement forces Right Sector gained considerable support. Radical flank effect did not lead to rejection of radicals by moderate public (Haines 1984). On the opposite, in changed circumstances numerous public required decisive force that would provide an alternative strategy. The radicals' prominence in the eyes of public was conditioned by inability of authorities to repress them. The double-tiered nature of the movement made radical strategies much more efficient, provided that peaceful Maidan was still numerous (Kudelia 2018).

Co-presence of several immediate threats to regime provoked systemic strain and made authorities more prone for using repressive policies. Due to the regime's limited repressive capacities, the authorities always had to reserve significant number of repressive agents for dealing with radicals on Hrushevskiy, which further restrained their abilities to disperse Maidan and adequately handle protest across the country. Thus, we could suggest that violence and co-presence of immediate threats to the regime contributed to the decision of government to opt for repressive policies. What is more, the inconsistency of repression (Lichbach 1987) mobilized more protesters and provoked further radicalization of protest.

The ability of the radicals to out-gun the agents of social control coupled with the loss of the regime's control over Western and Central parts of the country, led to the collapse of the regime (Kudelia 2018). In order to deter insurgents during the last days of the protest cycle, the regime had to adopt indiscriminate repression of those insurgents who remained at Maidan. These actions implied unbearably high costs for the regime, which the authorities could not handle. Therefore, the costs of repression for the regime in the final days of the protest cycle were higher than it could afford. Eventually this led to the collapse of the regime.

Just like during Orange revolution, strong regional cleavages perpetuated support and opposition to Euromaidan. In contrast to journalist assertions, Euromaidan was not an all-national uprising, with only around half of the country population supporting the insurgency, (Ishchenko 2016). The majority of people in Western and Central parts of the country supported protests, even at its later, violent stages. On the other hand, the majority in Eastern and Southern parts was opposed to protests. Regional divisions proved the limits of Euromaidan and required political solution akin to the compromise that the elites had in 2004. However, it 2014 the authorities and the opposition failed to resolve political crisis by finding some sort of compromise.

Chapter 5. Frame analysis of the Euromaidan movement

After the exploration of the Euromaidan protest cycle, I focus on the challengers' framing dynamics. In what follows I will demonstrate the evolution of discourse and contextualize it. There are three instances of repression that will be analyzed thoroughly. I devote a section to each of them. Each section is divided into subsections, which focus on different groups of SMOs (political opposition, (left)-liberal and right-wing extra-parliamentary groups). Within each subsection I single out three parts that are correspondingly devoted to three frame elements.

30 November. Repression of students, civic activists and journalists

Political opposition

Diagnosis. At the outset of the protest the political opposition uniformly adopted Eurointegration frame. However, it did not resonate well with the broader public. The general public remained mostly ignored protester and mobilization was not numerous. However, repression of students, journalists and civic activists on November 30, 2013 provided much more fertile discursive ground for constructing "civil rights" rhetoric, which was successfully mobilized numerous protesters.

On the day following the repression, we can observe adaptations in diagnostic framing. Repression came to the forefront of diagnostic framing. Batkivshina's post claimed: "Maidan was dispersed in a savage manner. Dozens of injured. Dozens of detained. Ukraine hasn't seen anything like that before" (Vkontakte, 30.11.13 10:44AM). EU association was mentioned only as a cause of peaceful protests. Udar echoes Batkivshina in focusing on the issue of repression. Udar's leader Klitchko claimed that "Savage beating of the peaceful citizens on Maidan overwhelmed the entire Ukrainian society" (Udar's website, 01.12.13). In a similar vein, Svoboda's leader Tyahnybok claimed that "People's patience ran out because of the refusal to sign the EU association agreement *and* beating by police protesters – students, who wanted to protect their rights" (Svoboda's website, 02.12. 2013, emphasis added).

One of the reasons why this diagnosis resonated so well with the broad public perceptions was the fact that repression was broadly perceived as "deviance from the cultural

norm" (Davenport 1995, p. 697). Ukrainians considered the right for protest as a norm, and since Kuchma times governments preferred to avoid mass repressions. To put it differently, the regime has crossed culturally perceived threshold of unacceptance of repressing peaceful protest.

The opposition emphasized the brutality police and blamed incumbents instead of focusing on the corrupted system that let this repression happen. Frame constructors accused unpopular politicians in power of illegitimate repression. For instance, Tymoshenko claimed "The disruption of signing the EU association agreement is Yanukovych's act of joining the club of world dictators with all evident repercussions for our nation. There are first proofs of this historical fact: beatings of journalists, hacker attacks on independent media, the attempt to shut off Savik Shuster's program, terror against university rectors. And this is just the beginning ... They started the bloody violence against our children at 4 AM sharp, exactly at the same time as another murderer – Adolf Hitler, declared us war. By smashing our European dream and establishing dictatorship, they also declared us war" (Tyzhden.ua, 30.11.13).

Repression of innocent in the eyes of public students caused massive outrage among numerous groups of population. Batkivshina's activist Serhiy Mitrofansky suggested that "In fact Maidan was fading out. I am 99% sure that if there had been no dispersion of the youth, there would have been nothing. Everybody was tired, morally exhausted, we had no proper tents, were not ready technically. Yaceniuk [opposition leader] was saying from the scene that now we will disband and we will be getting ready for the next presidential elections [in 2015]. And no one said 'no' because everybody was exhausted and agreed with that" (Interview UKR13). If authorities hadn't repressed the students, the protest most probably would have ceased to existence.

Following the mass mobilization, the opposition emphasized brutality of authorities and signified their illegitimate nature. For instance, Svoboda's party member Kaida emphasized cruel character of riot police's actions against protesters "The authorities filled Maidan with the blood of our kids. The same authorities beat peaceful citizens and broke their hands and legs, then forced them to stand on their knees. The regime is not legitimate anymore because criminals cannot be legitimate" (Svoboda's website, 05.12.13).

The movement's framing shifted to the rights of citizens and regime's violation of these rights. Though the EU association theme remained in the discourse, it began to occupy much more marginal position. The opposition often opted for differentiatial targeting of the message recipients (Wetzel 2010). On the one side, the rights theme in the movement's discourse was

designed to resonate with the broader public, who were overwhelmed by repression. On the other side, the Eurointegration frame was meant to resonate with more EU-oriented public, who were interested in closer ties with the EU or viewed it as the source of change. For instance, Batkivshina focused on both repression and EU-Ukraine association in their statement "In response to the refusal to sign the Association agreement, in response to the beatings of our children, millions of Ukrainians are supposed to rebel on Maidans – there is not enough to have thousands in this difficult situation" (Tyzhden.ua, 30.11.13).

Placement of repression at the core of diagnosis was a preliminary step to frame shift that occurred *after* mass mobilization that took place on December 1 and following days. In this framing-counterframing discursive battle both "law and order" coalition and "civil rights" coalition wanted to promote their visions of "unrest" versus "right for protest". Udar strongly framed all the actions of protesters as "legitimate demonstration" or "peaceful protest", while the actions of authorities as "crimes against people" (Website, December 1-2). In their Vkontakte post Udar claimed that "The authorities keep on finger-pointing at one another and trying to find someone to be blamed responsible for their own crimes" (Vkontakte post, 01.12.2013, 12:50 AM).

Following the mass mobilization, claim makers not just framed repression as a part of diagnosis, but switched to more general "civic rights" master frame. By adapting to new circumstances political opposition adopted civil rights rhetoric, which proved to be successful during mass mobilization and firmly got anchored in their frames, while Eurointegration theme got more marginal.

Prognosis. At the outset of the protest it was relatively hard to frame the solution to the refusal of authorities to implement the policy of getting closer ties with the EU. In general, the opposition struggled with providing clear solutions to the issue. Repression of peaceful protest provided more fertile ground for constructing both injustice situation *and* solutions to it. The way *how* we define the diagnosed issue can shape the actions required to solve it (Nepstad 1997). Repression actualized the relevant issues of relationship between the government and society by changing the perceptions of the broader public. Therefore, prognostic framing had to get adopted to new situation too. Claim makers bridged their prognostic framing to changed perceptions of targeted audiences in order to provide the solutions that would better resonate with the popular expectations.

The opposition framed the main goal of mobilization in terms of replacing existing corrupted politicians by the opposition representatives. In their Vkontakte post Udar suggested that "Our task now – legitimate authorities, whom people can trust. At the moment the task of the opposition – is the elimination of the Yanukovych regime and election of the legitimate government, whom people can trust and who is able to accomplish required for the country reforms" (Vkontakte post, 01.12.2013, 12:50PM). In their plan of action for Maidan mobilization Svoboda similarly claimed that "A minimum objective is the release of political prisoners, criminal cases against Zaharchenko [interior minister], riot police members responsible for beating of demonstrators and resignation of Azarov's government. Maximum target is early parliamentary and presidential elections" (Website, 06.12.13). Batkivshina stated that "The only solution to existing political crisis is early parliamentary elections" (Facebook post, 02.12.2013 05:06 PM). Political opposition insisted on institutional resolution of the crisis.

The core strategy for achieving desired goals in domestic arena was *peaceful* protest and mass public mobilization to win the battle against the regime. The peaceful character was essential in that respect. Udar's official statement claimed that "The only solution to the existing situation is peaceful protest, which will result in revival of the democracy in Ukraine and the change of government by means of peaceful expression of the citizens' will… Only altogether we can change the situation in the country…Therefore, we invite citizens to go to the streets and peacefully express their position" (Website, 01.12.2013). In a similar vein, the head of the Batkivshina fraction in the parliament Yatseniuk claimed "We have the right for peaceful gathering and we hold these gatherings according to Ukrainian constitution and Ukrainian laws" (Censor.net, 01.12.2013). The opposition parties emphasized the peaceful character of mobilization.

Political opposition condemned the actions of Right Sector and other radical groups on Bankova street next to the presidential administration on December 1. Politicians claimed that they had nothing to do with attacks on police. According to Batkivshina "Ukrainian opposition has nothing to do with the beatings next to the president's administration. We hold exclusively peaceful protest. All the provocations are conducted due to the orders of the president and National Defense Secretary Kluev. We ask Victor Yanukovych not to use violence against peaceful citizens" (Facebook post, 01.12.2013 03:46 PM). Svoboda echoed Batkivshina by stating that "The goal of authorities is to stage provocation in order to introduce martial law in Kyiv… We managed to localize the provocation on Bankova street, despite the fact that from backs of riots police

someone was throwing stones at protesters. All the responsibility for that provocation lies on authorities" (Website, 01.12.2013). Udar also condemned the attempts for escalation next to the presidential administration and in their statement the party's leader Klitchko claimed that "What is going on now at Bankova street is the authorities' provocation. Today's popular Viche (gathering), which is held in Kyiv is exclusively peaceful protest" (Vkontakte post, 01.12.2013 06:35 PM).

The opposition parties also framed the confrontational actions like the occupation of the Kyiv administration building or Trade Union building as either conventional, peaceful and legitimate or simply omitted them in their discourse. By doing so they intended to keep the view of the protest as peaceful and legitimate. For instance, Batkivshina in their discourse never mentioned that the buildings of Trade Unions, Kyiv administration and October palace were occupied by protesters. Rather they vaguely mentioned that they have become available for protesters' stay "New point for protesters opened in The October palace on Institute street, where Maidan participants can stay for night… As known, the opposition has already arranged two other places for sleepover – in the Kyiv administration (1000 people) and the Trade union building (2000 people) (Facebook post, 03.12.2013 11:31 AM).

By framing protest as peaceful the opposition bridged their framing to the expectations of moderate sympathizers who may have been pushed away by more radical solutions. The opposition parties also hoped to get the support from the international community who viewed protests as a peaceful democratic expression of the will of large masses of people. Politicians also tried to put some pressure on the regime members, for whom the repression of peaceful protest was costly and was threatening their legitimacy.

Collective identity. In order to emphasize the marginal position of protesters within society the regime framed protestors in terms of a tiny group that does not represent society at large. Challengers were well aware of that and needed to deliver a self-image that would be well perceived by sympathizers and broader public. What is more, they always framed regime as unhuman, lacking legitimacy, representing tiny group of people, detached from masses and caring only about their own interests. Udar stated that "Yanukovych does not have enough provocateurs, thugs and corrupt officials to crack or scare off entire Ukraine" (Website, 01.12.2013 2:39 PM). In the other statement Udar again claimed "How do they manage to come home and look in the eyes of their family members? … In the criminal Codex there is an entire section dedicated to

military crimes" (Website, 05.12.13 12:46PM). Svoboda in the same vein claimed that "I appeal to people, all Ukrainians – raise for the struggle against the gang, against the hunt that over the last four years has been humiliating Ukrainians, depriving us of our rights, stepping off our national dignity… We need to protest against the banding authorities that ruined the state's economy and led us to the social injustice" (Website, 03.12.2013). This view of shrinking and weakening regime opposed to broadening and strengthening movement was adopted to demonstrate the growing gap between two struggling sides and polarization of perceptions of us-people versus them-authorities (Tilly 2004).

By extending collective identity of challengers and narrowing down the representation of government challengers tried to garner support from broader constituencies and emphasize efficacy as well as high levels of movement success. The opposition groups opted for broadening collective identity. In early December, in course of popular mobilization and following mass collective actions, discourse constructors adopted different framing techniques to signify the boundary between the regime and protesters.

In particular, politicians framed self-definition of protesters in very inclusive terms. Instead of focusing on particular groups or individuals, they used the terms like "Ukrainians", "citizens", "the youth", "the community" and "Kiev residents". For instance, Svoboda claimed "We appeal to people, *all Ukrainians…*", "*Ukrainians*, we cannot work now, we need to go in the streets –now or never" (Website, 03.12.2013). Batkivshina emphasized civic character of protesting community "*The citizens* who gathered on Maidan demand the resignation of the government and the release of the youth who was detained on December 1, 2013 near Bankova" (Facebook post, 02.12.2013 07:33 PM).

The opposition also intensely emphasized coalitions, alliances and cooperation *within* movement by adopting the terms like "The Headquarters of National resistance", "The Council of Maidan", "The coalition of the opposition forces", "All-Ukrainian mobilization". For instance, Udar stated "The Headquarters of national resistance ask Kyivan students begin a general strike on Monday" (Website, 01.12.2013). The party emphasized coalitional character on the following day by stating that "The opposition created Coordinating center of the legal protection of the Headquarters of the national resistance" (Udar, Website, 02.12.2013). It is crucial to notice that framing of coalition formation and cooperation was occurring after the actual cooperation and actions on the ground.

Besides coalition formation challengers frequently incorporated prominent others as a part of the movement. In order to demonstrate the support of the movement by prominent individuals and groups or institutions (e.g. church, the association of officers), the opposition often included their presence on Maidan or words of support in their discourse. Among them we could single out leader of Polish Party "Law and Justice" Kaczynski, EU ambassador Tobinski, U.S Ambassador Nuland, singers Vakarchuk and Ruslana. As Batkivshina stated in its Facebook post "Ukrainian authorities must respect the people's right for peaceful protest and punish those who are responsible for beatings of peaceful students" - said the deputy of the State Secretary Victoria at the press-conference in Tbilisi" (Facebook, 07.12.2013 11:42 AM). Udar claimed that "The leader of Polish party 'The Law and Solidarity' Jaroslav Kaczynski joined protesters on Maidan" (Website, 01.12.2013).

(Left)-Liberal extra-parliamentary groups

Diagnosis. At the outset of the protest extra-parliamentary groups defined refusal to sign EU association agreement and blockage of further EU-Ukraine integration as the core of diagnostic framing.

After dispersal of initial protest, repression came to the forefront of diagnostic framing. Blatant violation of basic civil rights for political expression and public association became the core of diagnosis.

For instance, Spilna Sprava framed the repression as "Illogical and cruel actions of the regime against peaceful citizens…" (Spilna Sprava, Vkontakte post, 1.12.13 13:48 PM). Pryama Diya claimed "No to the police state! Today we flooded the streets to demonstrate that any authorities cannot disperse people with rubber batons... But let's remember that the police cruelty did not appear just now. It has been for decades at police stations, on the streets, at stadiums and protest events. Almost everybody dealt with police violence in everyday life" (Facebook, 1.12.2013 12:46 PM).

Claim makers not just responded to new challenges, but strategically adapted their framing. Civic sector of Euromaidan's leaders suggested that "We always mentioned repression. We did it because violence is the best mobilizer. When the authorities dispersed the student Maidan, students were beaten. They are children. Therefore, we emphasized that… It was a

conscious decision. If we had opted for European values, then it would have not worked. Let's be honest, people did not stand on Maidan for joining the European Union" (Interview UKR6).

Some groups also framed repression as a geopolitical tilt towards Russia by favoring Putin's preferred course of events in Ukraine. For instance, the group Vidsich articulated it as following: "Citizens of Ukraine, today at night by brutally dispersing peaceful protest at Maidan, the authorities have demonstrated that they are inclined to follow the Kremlin's scenario" (Vkontakte post, 30.11.13). EU integration still remained a part of diagnostic framing, but took more marginal position. Vidsich calls for protesters "Hey Student! Stop sitting on lectures when they are stealing our European future! (Facebook post, 02.12.2013 08:57 PM). SMOs negatively framed the Kremlin as the main supporter of the regime, the most interested party in repression of protest and beneficiary of Ukraine's isolation from the EU (Minakov 2015). Whereas EU was idealized as the anchor that would help to overthrow Yanukovych's regime and pave the way to European future (Ibid.).

Though left-liberal groups framed injustice situation in very similar terms as political opposition. However, they framed differently the *causes* of the injustice situation. In contrast to politicians who blamed regime highest officials for what had happened, (left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups saw the main source of injustice in malfunctioning political system. As Civic Sector of Euromaidan puts it "This is the program of deep change of the *system* – so that nobody further on could use the state as an instrument for smashing their opponents or super-enrichment" (Facebook post, 07.12.2013 04:27 PM). This variance in underlying reasons that produced injustice situation shaped the differences in solutions to fix injustice situation between the opposition and extra-parliamentary groups. However, they shared the same strategy of contention.

Prognosis. In order to prevent the repetition of repression of peaceful protest, frame makers insisted on changing the political system. As Civic Sector of Euromaidan stated "We need the changes in the rules of politics, not names" (Facebook, 06.12.13 03:54 PM). Numerous groups and activists also supported other prognostic tasks that were significant for them. In particular, they demanded: the punishment of those officials who were personally responsible for repressive actions, resignment of the government and the president, return to the Constitution of 2004 and early elections (Ukrainian Pravda, 10.12.2013). Euromaidan student movement insisted on lustration of the authorities and introduction of new electoral law (Politcom, December 5, 2013).

Though the solutions to existing issues were significant, challengers never accepted radical repertoire of action for achieving them.

DemAlliance insisted on exclusively peaceful repertoire of action. "We proclaim *nonviolent* protest and *constructive* expression of our claims regarding democratic changes in Ukraine" (Vkontakte post, 5.12.13). SMOs strategically reasoned that by adopting peaceful means protesters can "win the surrounding of the president" (Automaidan, Facebook, 04.12.13) and provoke the divisions within the incumbent regime. Contenders also expected moderate public to be more likely to join the protest if it is peaceful rather than violent (Pryama Diya, Facebook, December 3). Vidsich also insisted that the international community is more likely to support peaceful protesters and impose sanctions on the regime if it suppresses peaceful political expression (Facebook, December 4).

As the leaders of Civic Sector of Euromaidan said: "Publicity and peaceful character of the protest were our main weapons" (Interview with Oleh and Alena, Civic Sector of Euromaidan, 6.12.2017). Several other SMOs' leaders and representatives expressed the same or similar point of view (Alexei Gricenko and Sergey Koba, Automaidan, 1.12.2017; Katerina Chepura, Vidsich, 6.12.2017; Oleg Achtirsky, Spilna Sprava, 14.12.2013).

Thus, all violent attempts to escalate the situation, including violence on Bankova on December 1 were condemned. The Civic Council of Maidan suggested that further escalation may jeopardize sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country (Official statement, Website, 9.12.2013). Definitely the occupation of Kyiv Municipality and Trade Union buildings by the radical groups followed by mainstream opposition and extra-parliamentary groups were non-conventional acts. However, none of the SMOs placed them in their discourse. Though student organizations approved direct or confrontational repertoire, like the occupation of universities, they always opposed radicalization of the protest.

Collective identity. Just like political opposition, extra-parliamentary groups put certain efforts in framing collective identity. For instance Civic Sector of Euromaidan signified broad self-definition "We are people who were responsible for the reforms of municipal self-governance and e-governance in the city, protection of the public health and advocacy in in the parliament, protection against the illegal construction, people with experience of public service and realization of effective reforms – educational reform and the archival reform, the people of business, which is aimed at modernizing Ukraine" (Ukrainian Pravda Blog, 10.12.2013). Student

Coordination Council also emphasized cooperation and coordination within the movement by stating that "Student Coordination Council is made up of representatives of universities of Kyiv and Lviv, and has representatives at all local Euromaidan protests in regional centers of Ukraine" (Facebook post, 05.12.2013 01:00 PM). Prima Diya on its Facebook public page also signified the cooperation between different groups of protesters, in particular, student groups "On Tuesday, December 3, at 7 AM representatives of independent trade union "Pryama Diaya", civic movement "Vidsich" and alternative student self-administration at the Dragomanov university invited students to join general student strike" (Facebook post, 03.12.2013 03:31 PM). In the same vein, Vidsich focused on cooperation within all-Ukrainian student association (Vidsich, Facebook, December 4 05:12 PM).

(Left)-liberal groups pointed at the expansion of the movement sector and number of protestors as opposed to tiny groups of regime members.

Right-wing extra-parliamentary groups

Diagnosis. Various right-wing groups differently framed injustice situation before repression. On the one side, the most radical of them, Right Sector, from the very beginning framed incumbent authorities as "the regime of internal occupation" - the major issue per se. Early in 2013, before the actual protests started, The Bandera Trident's website, which has become the part of Right Sector, had openly claimed that "The all-Ukrainian union Bandera Trident is almost the only organization in Ukraine that clearly identified existing political regime as the regime of internal occupation, while the current state of Ukrainian nation as captive" (Website, 05.01.2013).

At the very outset of the protest cycle the leader of Right Sector, at that moment, one of its funding organizations, The Bandera Trident, Yarosh claimed that "Ukrainians much better react to the slogans like 'Revolution!' or 'Take the gang away' than 'Ukraine is Europe'. In the other words, there is the understanding that without the elimination of the regime of internal occupation, we cannot talk about a geopolitical shift of our internally occupied state" (Zagrebelny 2014, pp. 72-73). The internal occupation in the eyes of far right ideology implied the fact that the political regime in Ukraine was "external" to the nation, that elected on the presidential and parliamentary elections representatives of the government and the president Yanukovych "occupied" the state. The press-secretary of Right Sector Artiom Skoropadsky suggested "When

the authorities dispersed students, we declared revolution and the overthrow of the regime. There was no word about Eurointegration. We very explicitly explained that we did not mind signing of the agreement with the EU, but it was all secondary. The primary goal was to overthrow the regime of internal occupation. We called for everyone for national revolution. Our organized emerged not out of nowhere, its activists have been preparing for this moment for twenty years" (Interview UKR2).

The refusal of signing EU association agreement was a marginal issue for more radical groups. However, it remained an important part of framing for more moderate nationalists. Conservative right-wing groups like the Congress of Ukrainian nationalists framed the refusal to sign the EU agreement as a treason of Ukraine because the EU could protect Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity from Russian invasion. Most of the nationalist groups would fall in between these two extremes. Initial mobilization also fostered more attention to repressed right-wing activists.

Following the repression on November 30, different groups adopted their rhetoric accordingly. All groups condemned it, but only for more moderate Congress it has *become* an integral part of the discourse. The Congress claimed that "(t)he regime has used brutal force against the peaceful citizens who were supporting Eurointegration at Maidan" (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, The official statement, 30.11.13).

Right Sector and The Committee of Releasing political prisoners already actively used repression of their activists as a part of their diagnostic framing. However, they additionally condemned the repression of peaceful protesters. The Committee underscored innocence of protesters and brutal actions of the regime: "For the participation in civic protest the invalid of the 3rd degree Oleg Matias was arrested and beaten. Later on, during the protests next to Lenin monument Svoboda activist Oleksandr Solonenko was beaten and arrested" (Website, 1.12.13). Repression has not significantly changed the discourse of the radicals, but they also put it in their discourse. Right Sector condemned the repression of students and civic activists and framed it as "an announcement of war by the president Yanukovych to Ukrainian people" (Website, 03.12.13).

The Congress also framed repression as the core of injustice situation. However, EU Association agreement remained a part of its diagnostic framing, since it was aimed at moderate nationalists, who wanted Ukraine to be anchored to EU as opposed to "imperial Russia". As the Congress stated in official statement "Previously, on November 29, 2013 on the Eastern

Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych committed a national treason. Despite the demands of Ukrainian people on dozens Euromaidans across the whole country, he demonstratively refused to sign the EU-Ukraine association agreement. And after coming back to Kyiv, he ordered to disperse peaceful protesters on Euromaidan" (Website, 30.11.2013).

Prognosis. Repression had differential effects on prognostic framing of right-wing groups. For instance, radical Right Sector has not significantly changed its solutions and strategies for achieving desired goals. The group claimed that "National revolution is the only possible way" (Website, 02.12.2013).

Right Sector condemned the political opposition's strategy and tagged political leaders Poroshenko and Klitchko as "provocateurs" because they prevented Right Sector activists from radicalizing protest during the events on Bankova on December 1. In their words: "Thanks to the efforts of provocateurs, who conducted pacifist propaganda, the protesters next to the presidential administration were demobilized, resulting in the tramps from Berkut taking the advantage of the situation… The leaders of so-called "opposition" take conformist position and call nationalists provocateurs… Despite the tactical loss, national-revolutionaries did not lose the fight spirit" (Right Sector's website, 1.12.13). The group openly appealed to the youth (e.g. football fans), who were more attracted to more radical repertoire of action and were willing to get engaged in direct action.

Right sector rejected the peaceful methods of protest labeling them as "provocation" (Website, 4 December). The Right Sector's leader Yarosh claimed that the opposition "betrays the protest for their own political benefits" (Website, 6.12.2013). Right Sector's prognostic framing was different from the discourse of more moderate nationalists.

More moderate Congress insisted on institutional channels of resolution. In their official statement the Congress stated that "The authorities violated Constitution, therefore lost the right to rule the country. The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists demands the resignation of the president of Ukraine and the government, who failed to modernize the economy and led it to complete disaster hiding that from the Ukrainian citizens and from EU countries" (Website, 05.12.2013). In sharp contrast to Right sector, the Congress supported exclusively peaceful forms of civil resistance and legal, institutional forms of resolving political crisis. The moderate

nationalists stated that "The congress of Ukrainian nationalists calls Ukrainians for peaceful forms of civil resistance and legal forms of the resolution of political crisis" (Website, 05.12.2013).

The Committee of releasing political prisoners was more decisive in their framing of the situation than the Congress, but definitely less radical than Right Sector. The group signified the repression of peaceful protest in their press-release "Today, the authorities turned Ukraine in the police state. Unfortunately, we cannot hope for the fair legislation in the court, where the active participants of the protest movement will be soon" (Website, 06.12.2013). In terms of the strategies for collective action, the Committee stated that "It is not worth condemn radically oriented, ideological youth, calling them as betrayers, criminals or provocateurs… Remember, though you are the members of the peaceful protest, you still need protection. Otherwise barricades would have not been built on Maidan" (Website, 06.12.13).

Collective identity. Right-wing groups did not adapt collective identity framing in response to repression as extensively as political opposition and (left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups. They occasionally framed protesters in broader terms, whereas coalition formation and inclusion of prominent others were nearly absent. Far-right groups focused much more on the vilification of the opponents. In particular, Right sector framed their opponents "the regime of internal occupation", "Yanukovych's gang" (Website, 01.12.2013; Website, 04.12.2013), the Committee of releasing political prisoners called the authorities "Berkut gang organizations" (Website, 06.12.2013) and The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists labeled the government "the gangster authorities" (Website, 05.12.13). Right-wing groups framed the regime as inhumane, completely corrupted and acting against the will of Ukrainian people.

Summary

In response to repression major theme of "Eurointegration" shifted in challengers' discourse to "civil rights" theme. Immediately in response to repression claim makers negatively framed repression and condemned authorities for their decisions. This framing resonated with broader public and mobilized numerous people to protest. In course of mobilization frame makers signified the right for peaceful protest and more generally the right for political expression and human dignity as opposed to repression by inhumane regime. Successful mobilization and resonance of "civil rights" theme anchored it in the movement's discourse. All groups, besides

right-wing radicals signified civil rights rhetoric in their framing. All political opposition and (left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups supported exclusively conventional contention and condemned radical actions.

The right-wing groups somehow differed in diagnostic and prognostic framing. Right Sector did not change its rhetoric following repression. Distant from dominant culture radicals insisted on unacceptance of Yanukovych's regime in power and demanded revolutionary means for overthrowing regime. More moderate representatives of the right-wing camp readily included repression and then civil rights as the core of injustice situation. In stark contrast to radical right-wing groups moderate ones emphasized the importance of peaceful civic forms of protest and legal forms of resolving political crisis.

The opposition and (left)-liberal groups also emphasized the expansion of challengers' collective identity. They adopted more inclusive self-image, focused on intra-movement alliances and included different prominent personalities or groups who supported the movement in their discourse. Claim makers framed the regime as inhumane and non-representative trying to construct even stronger boundary between protesters and the authorities. Right-wing groups did not refer to collective identity frequently, but they actively vilified the regime.

Table 7. Thematic summary of framing before and after November 30, 2013

Frame element	Major themes before November 30	Major themes after November 30
1. Political opposition		
Diagnosis	Eurointegration	Civil rights, Repression, Government resignation, EU-Ukraine integration
Prognosis	Conventional protest, parliamentary pressure	Conventional protest, institutional channels of change – early presidential and parliamentary elections, international pressure by means of sanctions
Collective identity	Civic and political activists, students, ordinary citizens	Ukrainians, citizens, the Youth, Kyiv residents, civic and political coalitions
2. (Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Eurointegration	Civil rights, Repression, Government resignation, EU-Ukraine integration
Prognosis	Conventional contention	Conventional protest, international pressure by means of sanctions, constitutional and systemic changes in politics and economy, confrontational repertoire
Collective identity	Civic and political activists, students,	Civic coalitions, Student unions, Ukrainians, businessmen, Ukrainian citizens
3. Right-wing groups		
Diagnosis	Eurointegration, release of 'political' prisoners, anti-Ukrainian regime	Civil rights, Repression, Government resignation, overthrowing of the regime, EU-Ukraine integration
Prognosis	Conventional contention, confrontational mobilization, radical repertoire of action	Conventional contention, international pressure by means of sanctions, early parliamentary and presidential elections, radical repertoire, national revolution
Collective identity	Ordinary people, Ukrainians, patriots	Ukrainians, patriots, citizens

16 January, 2014

Political opposition

Diagnosis. Until mid-January the "rights" frame dominated in the movement discourse. However, the anti-protest laws of January 16 had significant effects on framing strategies of the opposition.

Authorities passed the laws to provide law enforcement agents with the legitimacy to repress. The regime also wanted to scare away moderate protesters, but in practice, the laws had the opposite effect and escalated the protest.

In fact, they were *not* accepted by the broader public as legitimate acts of the authorities. On the opposite, they undermined legitimacy of the parliament and the president and contributed to their further *de*certification. What is more, the laws have *indiscriminately* criminalized several thousands of active protesters. New legislation provided them with shared grievances and placed them in the position when radical measures were not seen as something unacceptable anymore. As some of the interviewees were saying, after these laws the only way out for actively engaged protesters was to win the battle against the regime. In the words of one of the organizers and active participants of Batkivshina's "It was like a real war. We had several sources in Security Service of Ukraine. And they warned us: you can't leave the territory of Maidan" (Serhiy Mitrofansky, Batkivshina, 17.12.2017). Otherwise, all of them were to be jailed or repressed by secret services and police, who had all the information on many activists.

The opposition framed new legislation as "the Dictator's laws". In particular, Batkivshina in its official statement claimed that "The events of the January 16 that took place in Ukrainian parliament, will become the part of the history as the black Thursday for Ukraine…This is the coup d'état, and both organizers and executors must be punished for their actions "(Website, 16.01.2013). The party also diagnosed the passage of the laws as "the attack on Ukrainian parliamentarism and the act that outlawed basic human freedoms" (Batkivshina, Facebook, 17.01.14). UDAR framed the laws as coup d'état and "usurpation of power by the president and his circle" (Facebook, 18.01.14). Serhiy Mitrofansky from Batkivshina suggested that "The laws of January 16 have completely taken away any rights and freedoms from us. It was the point of no return" (Interview UKR13).

In similar way, Svoboda claimed that "The authorities want to deprive Ukrainians of the rights for peaceful protest, freedom of speech, free media, free association, freedom of belief and just court. They passed anti-constitutional laws, according to which, in fact all the Maidan participants are declared extremists" (Website, 16.01.2014). The party also underscored that "By means of this document the authorities are trying to paralyze political and civic activity of citizens, cross out all human rights. This is the reincarnation of Stalinism. Those, who yesterday voted for this document, and those who signed it, should remember that the creators of totalitarian regime have also become its victims" (Website, 17.01.2014). The Svoboda's activist Ruslan suggested that "After January 16, 2014 they have introduced complete dictatorship. In fact, it was Russian model of maintaining protests" (Interview UKR9). He also emphasized that the main goal of negative framing of new lawmaking was to "Deliver the truth what was going on Maidan and mobilize people to Maidan" (Ibid.).

Udar emphasized procedural violation of voting: "We declare the laws invalid and the bills, which the 'regionals' approved on January 16 by raising their hands are in fact non-laws" (Website, 19.01.2019). By emphasizing illegitimate nature of the new laws, the frame makers were eroding the legitimacy of authorities and correspondingly dismantling the compliance frame (Gamson 1988), which was previously preventing protesters from radical actions.

The laws had far-fetched repercussions in the eyes of challengers. Batkivshina claimed that "If the president signs the laws, Ukraine will become the country where the freedom of speech is officially forbidden" (Facebook, 16.01.14). UDAR echoed Batkivshina by stating that "The regime outlawed Ukrainian citizens altogether" (Vkontakte, 17.01.14).

In fact, the laws were aimed at all more or less politically and civically active citizens. The laws affected numerous groups and once and hence their negative framing resonated well with numerous constituencies. Mobilization for Viche on Maidan on January 19 gathered several hundred thousand people.

Prognosis. In spite of a very strong diagnosis that emphasized the threat to Ukrainian democracy and country per se, all opposition forces kept on insisting on peaceful actions, though these measures have been futile for the last two months of protest. In their prognostic framing claim makers insisted on rejection of the adopted laws and called for a referendum of no confidence to the president. In particular, the plan of popular action approved by the opposition on the Viche (popular gathering) held on January 19 suggested "Not to recognize

the so-called laws of January 16 as legally unworthy, and as the ones that violate the Constitution of Ukraine" (Batkivshina's website, 19.01.2014). On the same Viche, the head of Batkivshina Yatseniuk stated "We know what to do and how to establish new democratic authorities. And we know the recipe of how to do that: we are together, we are united and we proceed exclusively in a *peaceful* way. We act in concert and realize the major article of Ukrainian constitution, which states that the power in Ukraine belongs to people" (Website, 19.01.2014, emphasis added).

Udar claimed that "After what happened on Thursday in the parliament, Ukraine soon can become a dictatorial country and the only way to avoid that is an active resistance of citizens. We are preparing a preliminary strike and it is going to happen, our deputies are actively participating in Automaidan movement, I will go to the regions to raise people" (Website, 17.01.2014). Svoboda in a similar way underscored the illegitimate character of the anti-protest laws by claiming "These 'laws' are held illegitimately and unconstitutionally. This means that we do not recognize them and will not follow them" (Website, 19.01.2014b).

Svoboda in its prognostic framing also signified the peaceful character of social mobilization and warned against any radicalization. In particular, they claimed that "Any actions of people are the result of the regime's actions, which is the major provocateur in the country. People are driven to desperation by the blatancy of the regime's anti-popular policies. We understand that. There are two ways to win the regime: parliamentary and revolutionary. Until we use all possible legal ways to gain the victory, all other ways are senseless" (Website, 19.01.2014). However, Svoboda's discourse makers also allowed for an alternative possibility of more decisive actions in future by hinting at it: "Yes, there might be the time, when we will be taking the responsibility from this scene to do something more decisive. But this time will come when there is the need in it. Now it makes no sense to steam off. We should not be driven by emotions" (Website, 19.01.2014).

On overall, as we can induce from the opposition discourse, the latter strongly opposed the radical methods of the struggle and condemned any force that would adopt them. The opposition parties still hoped to negotiate the political solution and arrive to some kind of compromise with the regime. Challengers also beware radicalization to scare away those moderate sympathizers who were still supporting the movement. The international community was also supposed to remain on the side of protesters as long as the movement remained peaceful. However, opposition did not provide a clear plan for action and a single leader of protest.

Collective identity. The passage of the anti-protest laws provided a fertile ground for making collective identity of protesters more inclusive. In the oppositional framing, the laws restrained the rights of *all* citizens on the *permanent* basis. Therefore, their constituency has broadened up to all politically active Ukrainians. They emphasized the broad self-definition of the challengers' collective identity as Ukrainians who are opposed to a group of autocrats. As Batkivshina suggested "Ukraine is every me and every you. Ukraine is not the regime of Yanukovych, it is not those slaves, whom he has hired. Ukraine is not his corruption, his corrupt judges and corrupt prosecutors" (Batkivshina, Website, 16.01.14).

Udar echoed them by stating that "Now Ukraine is united as never before. It is united in its willingness to prevent the establishment of the dictatorship. And not to lose the country. Kyiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Lviv and Zaporozhe rose up to struggle for that. At the moment there is the question if Ukraine will win Yanukovych surrounded by the group of his fellows. We are more numerous, and we fight for our rights. Therefore, Ukraine will win!" (Website, 19.01.2014). Svoboda framed the regime and Party of Regions members as tiny group of usurpers who are external and alien to Ukraine. They stated that "We need to understand that after January 16 there is no legitimate leadership in our country. There is just a tiny group of usurpers" (Website, 19.01.2014c).

As we can clearly see, framing further polarized and dichotomized protesters and the regime. The laws deprived the regime of legitimacy and narrowed it down to the president and high-ranked regime members. The collective identity of the protest in turn has swelled to all politically active citizens who are opposed to Yanukovych regime. Discourse makers adopted the term Ukrainians to construct the collective identity which resonated well with broad range of constituents.

(Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups

Diagnosis. The passage of anti-protest laws crucially affected diagnostic framing of (left)-liberal groups. They framed the passage of the laws as the introduction of autocracy or even dictatorship, which ruins the constitutional order of the country. The procedural legitimacy of the process was violated, therefore (left)-liberal groups often called the introduction of the laws anti-democratic coup d'état. As DemAlliance puts it "Today Ukraine's Parliament with the

violation of procedures adopted the controversial bill №3879 which if signed by the President would introduce an authoritarian or even totalitarian regime in Ukraine!" (Vkontakte, 16.01.14 9:12 PM).

Maidan Civic Council, which united numerous associations and organizations of the civil society condemned the laws and claimed that "There was the anti-democratic coup in Ukraine. Democratic liberties have been curtailed. The operations of international civic institutions have been put on hold. The adopted laws violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international commitments of Ukraine. The laws in question were adopted with a blatant violation of the parliamentary procedure" (Euromaidan, Facebook, 19.01.2014 01:13 AM). The coalition criticized not just the passage of anti-democratic restraints on civic and political freedoms, but also procedural violations.

Vidsich emphasized that the laws crucially curtailed freedoms in the country which affected all protesters or those who might want to protest in future: " 'Regionals' and communists on January 16, 2014 without the speaker of the parliament, with raising their hands, without parliamentary debates and simultaneously in two readings passed the law №3879, which in fact established dictatorship in Ukraine. According to these laws *every* person can be put behind the bars or get a huge fine for a peaceful protest" (Facebook, 16.01.2014 06:23 PM, emphasis added).

Pryama diya echoed them by suggesting that "From now on we live in a bandit state, where there is no such thing as rights and freedoms. Let's get familiarized with the innovations falsified by the gang today under the dome (in all readings altogether, with raising their hands and calling numbers of votes out from nowhere) (Facebook, 16.01.14 03:14 PM). They also emphasized the coverage of the laws by stating that "*every* activist, scientist, human right activist or simply an honest person, who expresses her political or anti-government position, is in fact announced to be out of law" (Vkontakte Post, 18.01.14 03:44 PM, emphasis in original). Vidsich leader Chepura suggested that "After the passage of laws we called for mobilization because otherwise we all would got jailed" (Interview UKR5).

In the interpretation of Spilna Sprava the laws have affected the rights and freedoms of the entire population: "They have established dictatorship in Ukraine. Constitutional order is overthrown. On January 16, Yanukovych and MP from Party of Regions and Communist party curtailed the rights and freedoms of *99%* of Ukrainian citizens. In violation of the regulations,

they have falsified the whole set of the laws, which Yanukovych signed on the same day" (Vkontakte, 18.01.14 06:53PM).

The absolute majority of (left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups emphasized the detrimental effects of the anti-protest laws on the democratic development. DemAlliance framed issue as the introduction of the "totalitarian regime" (Vkontakte, 16.01.2014 10:08PM), Pryama Diya suggested that authorities "in fact introduced martial law" (Vkontakte, 16.01.14 09:37PM) and Civic Sector of Euromaidan claimed that "the regime started the war against their citizens" (Vkontakte, 18.01.14 01:57AM).

Though the laws curtailed freedoms (e.g. freedom of press, mobility, self-expression, association), restrained the rights for political expression and empowered social control agencies, the regime did not roll to totalitarianism overnight or introduced martial law. However, challengers framed the issues in exaggerative terms to mobilize as many constituents as possible despite the potential risk to push them away. If the laws were anti-democratic and illegal, then people were not obliged to follow them. As Alexandra Matveichuk from Euromaidan-SOS suggested "On January 17, 2014, right on the next day after the passage of the laws we arranged a press-conference and publicly opposed the laws. Our main message was to boycott the laws. In other words, we did not consider them to be legal. They violated international standards of human rights, the standard of peaceful protest, and we responsibly understood what may follow afterwards" (Interview UKR15). In fact, the denial of obeying the laws was laying the ground for further decertificaiton of authorities and radicalization of protest.

Euromaidan SOS activist Inna Borzilo suggested that "After the passage of laws on January 16, 2014 we tried to explain the absurdity of this lawmaking. Everyone on Facebook set 'foreign agent' as the workplace, everyone was making pictures in helmets, masks, everything that the laws prohibited. This demonstrated the absurdity and suggested that this fictitious nor of the law cannot function in real life" (Interview UKR16).

Prognosis. (Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups provided no ready-made solution, but they still insisted on coming to Maidan for peaceful protests. They called for all-Ukrainian mobilization, which was supposed to take place on January 19. They also insisted on the refusal to follow newly introduced laws. This rejection of the laws implied the denial of the legitimacy of existing social and political order. Civic Sector of Euromaidan claimed "Don't follow unlawful orders of authorities, don't admit the "laws" of Yanukovych and join to the *all-*

Ukrainian resistance to the dictatorship" (Vkontakte post, 18.01.14). The severity of the definition of injustice situation and call for disobedience were eroding the compliance frame (Gamson 1988) and were implicitly laying down the ground for further radicalization.

Contenders also appealed to Western countries in order to impose sanctions on the regime members. For instance, Civic Council of Maidan stated that "Due to total refusal of Ukrainian authorities to listen to civil society, we ask the United Nations, the Council of Europe, OSCE, the EU and experts of the Venice commission to evaluate the existing situation. We believe that everyone out of 235 parliament members who voted for the adoption of these laws and the president of Ukraine who signed the laws are personally responsible for the pressure on civil society in Ukraine. Due to this fact we ask international community and media community, UN, The Council of Europe and OSCE, the EU, and international human rights organizations support to impose personal sanctions on the 235 mentioned Ukrainian deputies and the president" (Facebook, 17.01.2014 21:48 PM).

Some SMOs insisted on confrontational or direct actions in public space. Pryama Diya claimed "The rights are not given to us - we have to get them. We call for lecturers and students to occupy universities and classrooms, create democratic assemblies and start creating new society from now on" (Facebook, 18.01.14). The group added "We call for students and lecturers to occupy universities and lecture halls, establish democratic assemblies and begin to create new society from now. We oppose to the ruling regime free creativity of the masses and radical democracy. To violence – decisive and paralyzing non-violence. To cruelty and repressive agencies – our numbers and readiness to act. To criminal sanctions and ambitious threats – condemnation and disobedience. Let democracy live. Let justice live" (Vkontakte, 18.01.2014 03:44 PM). Student Coordination Council stated that "Only mass resistance and elimination of usurpers can restore the functioning of the Constitution and the rule of law and protect Ukrainian people from mass repression. This is not an exaggeration" (Vkontakte, 17.01.2014 11:07 AM).

In the same vein Spilna Sprava suggested "If now we do not take to the streets now and do not arrange resistance to the dictatorship, we are going to live the life of slaves. At the popular gathering on Sunday we need the mass mobilization of people. This Viche [popular gathering] is supposed to become the beginning of the renewal of the constitutional order by people in their country. It is not going to be another protest, after which everybody is going to go home. We need to stop dictatorship! And we need to do that fast, not leaving Maidan until the victory"

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(Vkontakte, 18.01.14 06:53 PM). DemAlliance claimed "We announce general mobilization in Kyiv for Maidan Nezalezhnosty. We support the decision of the public association "Maidan" and parliament opposition to set up Popular Viche on Maidan on Sunday" (Facebook, 17.01.2014 03:13 PM).

Left-liberal groups were forced to mobilize because anti-protest laws were criminalizing their previous protests. They facilitated their mobilization and framing. As Vidsich leader stated "After the laws of January 16, our company [of Maidan Self-Defence] gathered the most people, since it was a turning moment. Everyone could have been sentenced for 10 years of jail. A lot of people realized that if they did not go for a protest, they would be jailed anyway. Therefore, people got more active, including our organization… Following the laws our rhetoric was saying - come out four our own self-preservation " (Interview UKR5).

Despite very critical situation and increasing chances of being repressed, none of the groups explicitly proposed violent repertoire of action as a solution to the problem. All of them insisted on nonviolent or at most confrontational repertoire of action.

However, we can identify the first minor signs of future radicalization, which were implicitly placed in the discourse of the contenders. We can trace this tendency in Parubiy's words, who represented Batkivshina as a parliament member, but also was the commandant of Maidan and the chief of Maidan Self-Defense. He proclaimed: "I am convinced that if Maidan does not change the tactics and does not switch to more active actions, then Ukraine has really bad perspectives" (Andriy Parubiy's Facebook page, 17.01.14).

All the calls for mobilization still suggested peaceful repertoire of action. For instance, Vidsich published and shared among Kiev residents around 400 000 leaflets with calls for gathering on Maidan on January 19, 2014. However, (left)-liberal groups already actively asked for active actions by which they meant some kind of activity beyond mere standing on Maidan. Katerina from Vidsich suggested "We understood that if the leadership of Maidan did not take any decision, then it was going to be another failure. Therefore, we made up leaflets to call people for *actions*. Non-violent, but *actions*" (Interview UKR5, emphasis added). What is more, since the laws were illegal and immoral, therefore, protesters were not obliged to obey them, it has created further facilitation of the conditions for radicalization. As the leaders of Civic Sector of Euromaidan suggested "The content of our rhetoric declared that our protest is supposed to be peaceful *as long as it was possible*… Until the moment of Hrushevskiy and first death on Maidan,

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we always called for non-violent resistance." (Interview UKR6, emphasis added). The moment when it was impossible to protest peacefully has not come yet, but the laws definitely brought this moment closer.

Collective identity. As we can clearly induce from the aforementioned examples of discourse, frame makers often signified the effects of the anti-protest laws on the broader public. (Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups emphasized that the laws affected almost all Ukrainians, their rights and freedoms. Shared grievances generated by the anti-protest laws and the ways the parliament adopted new legislative initiatives provided a fertile ground for constructing more inclusive collective identity.

In their call to all-Ukrainian mobilization, the Civic Sector emphasized that "Victor Yanukovych and his deputies in Verkhovna Rada [parliament] crossed out the rights and freedoms of millions of Ukrainians" (Vkontakte, 18.01.2020 01:45 PM). In a very similar vein Spilna Sprava suggested that "On January 16, 2014 Yanukovych and the deputies of the Communist party and the Party of Regions crossed out the rights and freedoms of 99% of Ukrainian citizens" (Vkontakte, 18.01.2014 06:53 PM). In fact, we can identify further *polarization* of the ways challengers defined themselves and regime.

In the first place, contenders emphasized their more inclusive collective identity by magnifying the numbers of targets of the anti-protest laws. They also signified the shrinking numbers of the ruling regime that was represented mostly the president, members of the Party of regions in the parliament and high-ranked officials. By contrasting challengers and authorities' identities polarization discourse makers by suggesting further deepening of the boundary between challengers and the regime. This dichotomizing tendencies suggested potential compromise less likely and further escalation more probable.

Right-wing groups

Diagnosis. The anti-protest laws had differentiated effects within the right-wing camp. The less radical part of the right-wing groups viewed the laws as significantly narrowing down political opportunities for mobilization and restraining basic civic and political freedoms. They emphasized that the passage of the January 16 laws distanced Ukraine from civilized world and made it drift towards the Kremlin. As the Congress of Ukrainian nationalists claimed "The

laws were copied from the 'legislature' of authoritarian states, written under the dictate of the FSB [Russian secret services] 'analysts', so-called legislature, distances Ukraine away from civilized world and drags it towards the Brezhnev (Stalin?!) times by ruining its democratic principles" (Website, 17.01.2014). The Congress also viewed laws as a threat to the Ukraine's independence. "Wild, Moscow-like laws open to authorities the way to wild reprisals and condemnation of dignity and rights of people – repressions, blackmailing, persecution and tortures. The demarche of democracy in Ukraine means establishment of the dictatorship, drifting of the country into the labyrinths of the Kremlin imperialists and the loss of independence. Ukrainians will never give away to their enemies the dearest what they have – their state! They should remember about that both on Bankova and in the Kremlin" (Website, 17.01.14).

Radicals did not critically change their diagnostic framing, but they emphasized the passage of laws in their discourse. In particular, Right Sector claimed that the authorities adopted the law "…which is aimed at suppression of protests, the law that increases the lawlessness of the road police on roads, and the law that considerably simplifies abolishment of parliament members' untouchability" (Website, 16.01.2014). What is more, the group suggested that "In fact, the criminal authorities expand the legal platform for using repression" (Website, 17.01.2014). Right Sector leaders were aware that the authorities needed the laws to legitimize the repression of protesters, and especially the most radical parts of the movement, which brought the most threat to the regime. Therefore, right-wing radicals were potentially the primary target of the law enforcement agencies.

Both moderates and radicals signified procedural illegitimacy of the laws. In particular, The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists stated in their announcement that "Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine after voting without debates for the budget, 'in bulk' approved the set of scandalous bills, none of which was on the agenda of the day session" (Website, 17.01.2014). Right Sector, in a similar vein, claimed that "Besides the budget, today, *in breach of all norms* was 'adopted' the Oliynik-Kolesnichenko law" (Website, 16.01.2014, emphasis added). The radical far-right group condemned the procedure of passing the laws by stating that "They [MPs] voted for the part of the 'laws' immediately and without electronic system – with raising their dirty and bloody hands" (Website, 17.01.2014).

Though there was not substantial shift in the discourse of radical right-wing group, more moderate parts of right-wing sector, altered their diagnostic framing and placed legal repression at the forefront of their discourse.

Prognosis. This differential evaluation of injustice situation was accompanied by different solutions proposed by various extra-parliamentary right-wing groups. The moderates from the Congress claimed that they were ready to defend the independence of Ukraine by any means: "Ukrainians will never give away to their enemies the most precious what they have – their state! From Muscovian horde to local mankurts we will protect the independence of Ukrainian state by any available means – even at a price of a personal life" (Website, 17.01.2014).

However, they never approved violence and called for radical actions. Though they could have adapted their prognostic framing to more radical forms of protest due to the critical situation, they kept on insisting on peaceful forms of protests. The Congress kept on believing that only by means of peaceful strategies the movement can reach its goals.

Whereas, for Right Sector the broadening of the opportunities for repression meant that "(l)imiting ourselves by the "law" paradigm of thinking and acting – means digging yourself a grave" (Right Sector, Website, 16.01.14). They insisted that demonstrators should immediately turn to radical active actions, or otherwise it will be too late. "Revolution requires concrete actions, quite often coercive, quite often with blood. That's when the revolution of consciousness starts. We have to be brave enough to call things as they are" (Website, 17.01.14). The groups also stated that it is time to switch "From shameful, impotent attempts – to the declaration of the revolutionary government bodies" (18.01.2014). The passage of new laws was another excuse for radical actions and did not change prognostic framing of the radicals in any significant way. What is more, legal repression has reassured their beliefs in radical strategies as the only way of struggling with the regime. Artiom Skoropadsky supported this position by stating "The protest has been for two months. Ruslana's songs and swaying of lanterns made people feel tired. It did not make any sense for them to stay on Maidan anymore (Interview UKR2)"

Collective identity. Right-wing groups signified the gap between the regime and protesters. In contrast to the opposition and (left)liberal groups, right-wing sector of the movement did not significantly adapt their framing of collective identity. However, right wing groups intensely vilified the regime. For instance, Right Sector labeled the authorities as "the regime of internal occupation" (Website, 18.01.2014) or "the bandit authorities" (Website, 16.01.2014),

stated that "the gang kept on demonstrating its satanic appearance" (Website, 18.01.2014c). Right Sector also kept on identifying "real" protesters those who were ready for radical means of actions (Website, 16.01.2014).

On the other hand, moderate right-wing groups adopted more inclusive collective identity definition and appealed to moderate nationalists and conservative citizens to attract them on the side of the movement. The right-wings kept on vilifying the regime by signifying its self-encapsulation and drift towards the Kremlin (The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, Website, 17.01.2014).

Summary

The passage of the anti-protest laws led to the shift of the focus on legal repression and its repercussions. The injustice situation switched from the rights and dignity of protesters to threat to institutional arrangements of democracy and country per se. The repression of students and activists violated the rights and dignity of people, whereas the laws violated the very conditions and rules under which these rights could be exercised and dignity could be maintained. Therefore, we could suggest that challengers framed the injustice in more general terms.

The coercive repression activated the conflict at the operational level of politics, whereas new laws affected the rules that regulate conditions under which politics can be exercised. What is more, they restrained the activity of multiple groups, and therefore had negative effect on broader range of challenging actors. In contrast to Russia, where demise of democracy was gradual within the decade, Ukrainian authorities imposed numerous political restrains overnight. In fact, these laws curtailed the ability of multiple collective actors to express discontent through non-institutional channels when institutional channels were blocked. Non-discriminate criminalization of protesters and restraining political and civil rights of numerous groups made the latter more receptive to radical rhetoric.

This critical definition of the problem was magnified by even more significant dichotomy between protesters and the regime. Harsh vilification just contributed to further distancing between the two sides. These simultaneous processes of strong diagnostic framing and further polarization of collective us-them definition, however, were not complemented by the corresponding prognostic framing. Prognostic framing provided indecisive and inconsistent actions. Though prognostic framing contained confrontational repertoire and disobedience to the

laws, it looked *disproportional* to the injustice situation and collective identity polarization. Especially considering the lack of results from the previous two months of peaceful protest, which relied on conventional repertoire and high numbers of people.

Table 8. Thematic summary of framing before and after the Anti-protest laws of January 16, 2014

Frame element	Before the passage of the Laws	After the passage of the Laws
1. Political opposition		
Diagnosis	Civil rights, repression, EU-Ukraine integration, government resignation	The Dictator's laws, threat to democracy and parliamentarism in Ukraine, authoritarianism and usurpation of power, civil rights
Prognosis	Conventional protest, early presidential and parliamentary elections, international sanctions	Conventional protest, early presidential and parliamentary elections, international sanctions
Collective identity	Ukrainians, citizens, the Youth, Kyiv residents, civic and political coalitions	All politically active citizens, all affected by the laws citizens, all Ukrainians
2. (Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Civil rights, repression, EU-Ukraine integration	The Dictator's laws, threat to Ukrainian democracy and statehood, rolling in autocracy, geopolitical drift to Russia, civil rights, Eurointegration
Prognosis	Conventional protest, international pressure by means of sanctions, constitutional and systemic changes in politics and economy, confrontational repertoire	Conventional contention, international sanctions, confrontational repertoire
Collective identity	Civic coalitions, Student unions, Ukrainians, businessmen, Ukrainian citizens	Politically active citizens, all affected by the laws citizens, all Ukrainians
3. Right-wing groups		
Diagnosis	Civic rights, Repression, EU-Ukraine integration, Government resignation, overthrowing of the regime	Civic rights, Repression, EU-Ukraine integration, Government resignation, overthrowing of the regime
Prognosis	Conventional contention, confrontational mobilization, radical repertoire of action	Conventional contention, radical repertoire, national revolution
Collective identity	Ukrainians, patriots, conservative citizens	Ukrainians, patriots, conservative citizens, Ukrainians willing to fight

19-22 January. Violence on Hrushevskiy street

Political opposition

Diagnosis. Originally, the anti-protest laws were the major theme of diagnostic framing of political opposition. In particular, Batkivshina claimed: "Coup d'état happened in Ukraine, aimed at overthrowing of the constitutional order of the state, ruining of the basis of the popular power and parliamentarism. The So-called laws significantly restrain the rights of Ukrainian citizens for freedom of speech and peaceful gatherings, and in fact liquidate democracy in Ukraine" (Website, 19.01.2014). During the Viche on January 19, before the eruption of violence on Hrushevskiy street, the opposition claimed that "Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] lost its legitimacy after the shameful voting a couple of days before. Therefore, we need to establish the People's Council made up of the oppositional deputies of Verkhovna Rada and municipal councils. The People's council is supposed to represent the interests of people" (Batkivshina, Website, 19.01.2014). In fact, during the popular gathering the political opposition still identified the new laws as the major part of movement's agenda. However, further events made politicians alter their discourse.

Right after the eruption of violence on January 19, the opposition blamed the groups engaged in violent clashes with the police on Hrushevskiy street for violent turn and suggested that radicals were not a part of the movement anymore. The opposition framed violence initiated by radical groups as part of diagnosis that precluded a peaceful resolution to the political crisis. The leader of Batkivshina Yatseniuk claimed from the scene of Maidan: " Do you understand why they have started the violence over there [Hrushevskiy street]? In order to legalize 'Berkut' [special riot police] on Maidan. The authorities will come and say – you see, they [Maidan activists] chose violent scenario, and for this reason they will disperse Maidan…" (Website, 19.01.2014). He added that the opposition condemned the violence that took place on Hrushevskiy street (Ibid.).

After the eruption of violence, the latter has become a crucial theme of diagnostic framing. When the opposition saw that the regime did not manage to repress radicals, mass mobilization did not subside and international community did not withdraw its support of protesters, they realized that they can utilize repression for their own interests. In their announcement Svoboda claimed that "Thus, it is Yanukovych's regime who is entirely responsible for bloody provocation against the participants of peaceful protests. Victor Yanukovych, who

consciously signed anti-constitutional laws is a major provocateur, not those young Ukrainians who took the streets to protect their rights on Hrushevskiy street in Kyiv" (Svoboda's website, 20.01.2014). By the night of January 20, the opposition started to blame the regime for repressing protestors, instead of blaming radicals for violence. The radical groups in the announcement politicians turned from "provocateurs" into "patriots" (Batkivshina, Website, 20.01.2014; Svoboda, Website, 20.01.2014).

The discourse makers began to frame the actions of protesters as peaceful, whereas they framed the regime's defensive reaction to escalation as intentional and pro-active repression. Svoboda blamed regime for turning peaceful protest into the armed phase, where the authorities have advantage over peaceful protesters. The party's discourse accused regime of "armed violence against the peaceful protest" (Website, 21.01.14). Batkivshina suggested that "country and lives of people are in danger" (Facebook, 23.01.14). After the eruption of violence Udar claimed that "The police at night on purpose shot into the heads of people during the struggles on Hrushevskiy street" (Website, 20.01.2014). The party also emphasized that "the regime announced the war to people" and "the country is on the edge of civil confrontation" (Website, 22.01.14).

In fact, following due to much higher receptivity of numerous public to radicalization and inability of authorities to repress escalation, politicians adapted their frames correspondingly. They stopped condemning radicalization and its proponents. What is more, they began to frame radicalization on behalf of Right Sector as a peaceful protest that was repressed by authorities. Due to resonance of this framing it got anchored in the discourse of political groups.

Prognosis. In the evening on January 19, following the eruption of violence, the opposition condemned the escalation on Hrushevskiy street. In the evening of the same day, Yatseniuk speaking on behalf of political leaders of Euromaidan from the scene of Maidan said: "We walk together to have a common victory. Those who did not listen to our order are not with us. The path to violence is not the path of Euromaidan, this is Yanukovych's way and this is how we are different. I condemn today's violence. Violence causes nothing else but bloodshed. This was not our plan. You understand why the clash happened there. In order to legitimize Berkut [riot police] here on Maidan" (Batkivshina, Website, 19.01.2014b). The opposition asked protesters "Not to confine to violence and adhere to non-violent methods of struggle, to demonstrate not the power of muscle, but the power of will. Only stamina and patience lead to the victory, whereas the head-on collision against the well-armed enemy jeopardizes Maidan's victory" (Batkivshina,

Website, 19.01.2014). Political leaders still insisted on the conventional, peaceful strategies of contention to resolve political crisis.

The opposition had some rationales for framing radicalization in such a way. The use of violence by protesters could have given the regime legitimate reason to disperse challengers and empty administrative buildings. It could have weakened the support of international community. Violence also could have scared away moderate supporters of the movement. More importantly, it could demonstrate inability of the opposition to control radically oriented part of the movement and decrease the importance of opposition leaders as mediators of the conflict. As established, institutional actors, they also preferred to resolve the conflict within institutional channels. For these reasons they kept on insisting on non-violent repertoire of actions.

On January 20, however, we can observe a tangible shift in prognostic framing. Political opposition differently framed both radical actions on Hrushevskoho and radical groups who were involved in violent actions. For instance, the leader of Batkivshina Tymoshenko in her official statement proclaimed: "You are the mafia in power, don't dare to call people who came to Hrushevskoho street criminals…*You* are the ones who *pushed* them to the extreme, took away from them the rescue ticket to Europe, and now you tag them as *provocateurs*?... And when they could not bear this torture anymore and came to you to Hrushevskoho street, you dare to call these people criminals and threaten them with arrests and squelch them by your trained murderers in the form of 'Berkut'?... As for you, my sons and daughters of Ukraine…defend Ukraine and fear nothing! You are *heroes* who stand on to defend Ukraine! If I were free, I would be with you. Freedom is worth this struggle" (Batkivshina, Website, 20.01.14, emphasis added). As we can clearly see "provocateurs" turned into "heroes", and "violence leading to bloodshed" (Batkivshina, Website, 19.01.2014) transformed into "coming to Hrushevskoho street".

This trend was further strengthened in the following discourse of Batkivshina: "(P)eople got the *right* to switch from peaceful protest to *non-peaceful*, because of the indifference of authorities and disrespect to people, which *provoked* what is happening now in Kyiv" - (Batkivshina, website, 21.01.14). The oppositional discourse was *normalizing* violence as a part of the movement repertoire that should not be discredited. When political leaders realized that violence can be utilized for putting pressure on the regime, they accepted it or occasionally even encouraged it. They framed it as *right* of protesters to protect themselves in response to actions of

authorities or as repertoire the protesters were *compelled* to use in response to repression of the regime.

All the consequences and side effects of violence were resorted to the actions of the regime. For instance, Udar suggested that most of destructive and violent actions had been taken by the mercenaries of the regime. "Mercenaries were taken to the capital to burn cars, break showcases, mug and provoke clashes. In order to create an image that protesters from Maidan do that and identify unrests. The authorities want to create chaos in Kyiv. Its goal – destabilize the situation in order to have grounds for introduction of the martial law" (Udar, Website, 20.01.14). Besides approving radical actions of protestors, frame makers framed the switch to non-conventional action as the only way for protesters, who were *compelled* to turn to these means. Thus, Svoboda suggested that "If regime illegally and anti-constitutionally announces out of the law almost all civilized forms of peaceful protest, it *pushes* people to non-peaceful protests … It is the regime of Yanukovych, who is the main provocateur, and not those young Ukrainians, who went out to protect their rights on Hrushevskiy in Kyiv" (Svoboda, Website, 20.01.14, emphasis added). By framing the radical actions in such way, politicians in fact endorsed the use of violence against the authorities.

We can also identify the shift in the way the opposition framed radical groups who were involved in violent actions on Hrushevskiy street. Instead of framing them as provocateurs the politicians began to frame them rather as the victims of the actions of regime, who just responded to the provocations of the police and legal restraints of the regime (Batkivshina, Website, 20.01.2014b; Svoboda, Website, 20.01.2014; Udar, Website, 20.01.2014). Though it was rather obvious that radical protestors initiated violence on Hrushevski street. What is more, radical repertoire of action was framed as a means of personal protection against the attacks of regime. From condemnation of radical actions, the opposition gradually switched to its normalization as a necessary means of protection, and occasionally endorsed it. Challengers' discourse correspondingly framed those who were previously engaged in radical action not as provocateurs, but as the brave heroes who did not fear the regime (Batkivshina, Website, 20.01.2014b). Their actions were approved by the fact that they had no other way out (Goodwin 1997), since it was the regime who forced them towards radical actions.

As Jury Uzich from Batkivshina suggested "We accomplished the revolution in a very pragmatic way. Nobody made any public appeals to actions that would violate existing laws

because nobody was ready to take the responsibility for storming administrative or municipal buildings. If someone was talking about the things like that [radical actions] they did it only within Maidan. Therefore, in the public space no one voiced the appeals like that" (Interview UKR8). The opposition leaders very clearly distinguished what could talk about in the movement milieu and in the public (Kubal 1998). However, when previously forbidden tactics and themes resonated well with the broader public, politicians began to actively use them too.

By adapting their frames in the following way the opposition was trying to reach several goals. Firstly, they tried to mask their inability of controlling the radical wing of the movement. Right-wing radicals gained more resources strengthened their position within the movements. Numerous supporters joined Right Sector following the violent turn of the movement. This shift of power was disadvantageous for the opposition and empowered radical groups. Secondly, the opposition was interested in imposing blame for violent turn of events on the regime and therefore maintain the double-tiered nature of the movement, where radical groups were fighting away from the tent camp, whereas peaceful protest was taking place on Maidan (Kudelia 2018). By blaming the regime, they also decreased its legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public, who got the information from independent, or opposition-friendly media. Thirdly, they hoped for more active involvement of international community, who was frightened by the images of the burning capital of the country. By supporting violent site of the struggle, they could pose more pressure on the regime to reach their own goals.

In addition to normalizing violent actions, they kept framing peaceful actions as desired repertoire of action. Thus, we could suggest that they adopted differentiated framing that was aimed at different audiences (Wetzel 2010). The double-tired nature of the movement, with mass mobilization on Maidan, fostered opposition to keep on maintaining a peaceful rhetoric too. As an institutional actor they benefited from that in their negotiations with the regime and also used it as a leverage in their interaction with international community.

Collective identity. The outburst of violence on Hrushevskiy street made the opposition to keep collective identity inclusive and adopt notion "Ukrainians" as a common term they used to appeal to protesters. The frame makers confronted Ukrainian identity of protesters and narrow identity of power-holders. In Batkivshina's words, the authorities represent "mafia in power" (Website, 20.01.2014). As Tymoshenko claims "You [authorities] deserved it long time ago, and now to stop people, you have to immediately disappear. People demand you to vanish

and I totally support them. As for you brave sons and daughters of Ukraine, I address you the words of support and belief "(Batkivshina, Website, 20.01.2014). Svoboda in their official statement echoes Batkivshina in their framing: "The authorities will not be able to transform the struggle between the regime and Ukrainian people in civil war. *All* Ukrainian people and world community are united in their assessment of the criminal actions of Yanukovych regime" (Website, 20.01.2014). By the same token, Udar calls for people: "We need you [protesters] in Kyiv to let Ukraine, not Yanukovych, win" (Website, 20.01.2014b).

In addition, the opposition often included in its discourse influential groups or individuals as the movement's supporters. For instance, the opposition underscored the support of foreign ambassadors (Svoboda, website, 20.01.2014b), Congress of Ukrainians of Canada (Batkivshina, Website, 20.01.2014d) and The Union of Police Officers (Svoboda, 20.01.2014c).

The opposition often used the *civic* connotations of Ukrainess not to scare away those constituencies, who were less prone to the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism. Claim makers mostly framed the regime as the one that lost its legitimacy in the eyes of Ukrainians and represented a group of politicians who were detached from people and did not represent people's interests.

(Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups

Diagnosis. The outburst of violence on Hrushevskiy street had considerable effects on diagnostic framing of (left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups. In particular, eruption of violence significantly increased the chance for dispersion of Maidan by authorities, because the latter got a reasonable excuse to repress Maidan to prevent further escalation. Therefore, in their calls Vidsich claimed: "Kyiv residents! All to Maidan! After today's violence during the protest, there is a chance of reaction from authorities. Now they are pulling additional units of the police" (Facebook, 19.01.2014 10:09PM).

None of the groups mentioned the fact that the movement's radicals were responsible for the initiation of violence on Hrushevskiy street. As the leader of Automaidan suggested "The laws of January 16 made us go to Hrushevskiy street. We called for going to Rada [parliament] to peacefully ask them to cancel their dictator laws. We initiated that. A lot of people joined us. The authorities could not do anything else, but to refuse us to go to the parliament, which

resulted in clashes. We voiced that we were peacefully going there. If they had been smart enough, we would have stood there for a while, maybe for a day or two. People get tired of doing nothing. Then the violent clashes began" (Interview UKR1).

In their discourse SMOs also signified further drift of Ukraine away from the EU and the West, and suggested that this scenario is desirable for Russia. For instance, Civic Sector of Euromaidan claimed that "We strongly believe that the authorities consciously radicalize people. By means of forceful dispersion of Maidan the authorities want to reach three goals: 1. Provoke the EU's reaction – isolate Ukraine. 2. Spread violence to the regions to eventually destabilize the situation in Ukraine. 3. Switch everything not to the format of people struggling against the system, but WEST against the EAST. All these steps lead to the eventual shift to the Russian scenario" (EuroMaidan website, 23.01.2014).

(Left)-liberal groups framed major issues as unwillingness of the regime to make any concessions and further isolation of Ukraine from the EU. Civic Sector of Euromaidan claimed that "Yanukovych is not ready for negotiations and making any concession, and is more inclined to power scenario and introduction of martial law. Europeans are set up for Ukraine's isolation: end of their programs, breaking diplomatic relations, because arms and violence were used" (Facebook, 22.01.2014 5:14 PM).

(Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups were aware that the switch to violent repertoire of action may have detrimental effects on the movement's support by both international community and more moderately oriented constituencies. Therefore, they did all their best to portray the movement as peaceful and resisting to violence. Pryama Diya echoed Civic Sector of Euromaidan by framing the clashes on Hrushevskiy street as the "violence on behalf of the police state" (Facebook, 22.01.14 03:12 PM). Discourse makers resisted to changing the image of protesters as peaceful citizens who are demanding the respect of their rights. Though it was rather obvious that the movement was not peaceful anymore and its significant part was engaged in violent actions.

The majority of (left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups mostly operated on Maidan, whereas more radical groups were engaged in Hrushevskiy events. Therefore, the (left)-liberal SMOs still viewed Hrushevskiy as just a tiny site of protest that was protecting protestors from attacks of police and continued to perceive Euromaidan in general to be peaceful. None of the groups mentioned that the violence was initiated by the protesters, and the regime had to deploy

repression in response. As the manager of Euromaidan SOS Alexandra Matveichuk suggested "We have always tried to maintain the "rights" frame and our major message has been always 'human rights are beyond everything'. In fact, we are proud that that me and my colleagues made this motto a major theme during Euromaidan, which allowed to keep value-based protest, *which could have radicalized* and gone out the control. A fraction of protesters after the prohibition of the peaceful march at end of January started to respond by the same means [non-conventional actions]. It was very easy let Maidan go out of control because nobody controlled the discipline, different initiatives did it" (Interview UKR15, emphasis added). Liberal SMOs' leaders still suggested that Maidan remained mostly peaceful following Hrushevskiy events, though in fact the radical part of the protest was attracting numerous people and produced massive violence.

Prognosis. In contrast to political opposition, left-liberal SMOs kept insisting on peaceful protest for several days longer despite the violent turn of the protest. They faced the dilemma of how to frame occurred violence and how to frame potential strategies to resolve the issues. Right after the outburst of violent clashes on Hrushevskiy street the absolute majority of the groups preferred to keep insisting on peaceful strategies of action. As DemAlliance puts it: "Ukraine needs protest. *Peaceful*, but protest. Vinnitsa demonstrates a great example to Euromaidan. The whole city is blocked because it is blocked by cars. There are more than 10000 people on the streets" (Vkontakte, 22.01.14 08:48 PM).

Civic Sector of Euromaidan echoes them by stating: "No provocations. We need to *save* peaceful protest" (Vkontakte, 20.01.14, emphasis added). Their frames required strategies as if protest was still peaceful, though there were already hundreds of injured after clashes between radical protesters and the police. None of the groups ever mentioned violent protest as an option. Later on the group called for action: "We ask you! Everyone who wants to participate in active action can go to Kyiv. In the regions we need to prevent any violence! Only non-violent resistance and active peaceful actions! The beginning of the violence in the regions will lead to civil war and realization of the Russian scenario" (EuroMaidan, 23.01.2014).

Some of the groups mentioned potential participation on Hrushevskiy street, but they did not frame it as involvement in violent events explicitly. What is more, they sometimes emphasized that the majority of participants is engaged in peaceful action. For instance, Spilna Sprava claimed that "Today everything is to be decided. Those who are feared of going to Hrushevskiy street, go to Maidan. But everyone is supposed to be on the streets. The whole world

has to see that this is a position of Ukrainian people, not the position of a couple thousands of radicals" (Vkontakte, 22.01.2014 01:53PM). The groups did admit the presence of radical part of the movement, but they wanted to demonstrated to the international community and the broader public, that radicals constitute just a tiny part of the protest.

Violence was supported by certain groups of the broader public, but the majority still was in favor of peaceful protest. Therefore, left-liberal groups preferred to frame violence negatively or omit it in its discourse.

However, following the diffusion of protest to regions and successful seizure of power at regional level in the Western and Central Ukraine, numerous groups began to frame radical repertoire of action neutrally or support it. For instance, previously resorting to exclusively peaceful actions and resenting any radicalization as provocation, Civic Sector of Euromaidan shifted their prognostic framing: "(G)ood news: in the East people assault local administrations. On the West they prohibit the Party of regions… In Sumy protesters together with municipal deputies occupied the first floor of the municipal administration… In Mykolaiv moderate protesters prevented radical activists from invading local administration. The People's Councils of Khmelnitsky, Poltava, Ternopol, Ivano-Frankovsk and Chernivtsi outlawed the Party of Regions and Communist party. Western regional administrations try to subject local law enforcement agencies and call for the help from the capital" (Vkontakte post, 26.01.14 11:46PM). Discourse makers framed the establishment of alternative centers of power [The People's Councils] that challenged central government as a legitimate way to protest. The same applies to the occupation of municipal buildings. Discourse got more radical and began to view previously unacceptable forms of protest as normal.

Their discourse viewed radicalization as a right course of events or as a necessary measure, which the challengers were *compelled* to adopt in *response* to suppression. In contrast to the political opposition, however, extra-parliamentary groups shifted their prognostic framing only after the diffusion of protest to the Western and Central regions and when it became obvious that the regime was losing its power in those regions. For instance, Self-Defense of Maidan suggested that "The occupation of buildings of regional administrations in several regions of the country is the 'expansion' of Maidan'" (Facebook, 24.01.14 11:11AM). Therefore, we could suggest that it took longer to extra-parliamentary groups to acknowledge the spread and acceptance of radical

repertoires by broader public and recognize that negative effects of radicalization were mostly absent.

However, just like the opposition, extra-parliamentary groups framed peaceful mobilization as a desired way to act. Besides peaceful mobilization, several groups insisted on grassroots initiatives in courts and hospitals as essential ways of putting pressure on the regime. For instance, Euromaidan SOS, student organizations and other SMOs organized grassroots initiative, which helped to prevent those protestors who were getting first aid at hospitals from being taken out by law enforcement agencies. Pryama Diya called for action in the hospital: "Friends, at the moment activist are trying to take under control the October hospital, so that the police would not take out people from it. Join us. We need your help" (Facebook, 22.01.2014 08:15 PM).

Besides peaceful and grassroots mobilization, student organizations kept in their discourse the demands for direct actions. As stated in the announcement of Pryama Diya on Facebook "On Monday, January 20, at 10AM the students of Mohyla Academy started a termless strike against the laws of the police state adopted on January 16. They have occupied the central hall of the building 1. Agitation groups mobilize all students and lecturers". Further on, Pryama Diaya posted on Facebook: "Our activists occupied the reception of police station. They did it to support the protest against the arrest of the Karpenko-Kary University" (Facebook, 21.01.2014 11:02AM). However, they never endorsed violent actions.

Extra-parliamentary groups resisted longer to normalizing violence. Their absolute majority was ideologically liberal, therefore preferred to appealed for conventional repertoire of actions. The shift of their appeals would have had detrimental effects on their image among their constituencies and their Western partners. Their supporters were mainly well-educated middle-class professionals, students or liberal public, who were opposed to violent strategies. When part of those public got radicalized, liberal SMO started to occasionally support violence. SMOs also had international links and therefore they preferred to frame the actions of their activists and supporters as conventional. Peaceful actions of protesters also allowed them to frame the repression of the regime as illegitimate.

As one the leaders of Civic sector of Euromaidan suggested "Our rhetoric always emphasized that it was supposed to be a non-violent resistance *until the time it is possible*. We had to monitor the situation and figure out if there is any feedback from authorities. If authorities

kidnapped someone, we had to gather everybody and say about potential threat. Thaw we have to be careful, that it is better not to stay at night at the place where one is registered. Until the Institutskaya movement [the eruption of violence] and the first death on Maidan, we always adhered to non-violent resistance. And *until it was possible* we had to resolve the issue with mass protests" (Interview UKR6, emphasis added).

Organizers admitted that there was the threshold, which made them under certain conditions accept at least in some way non-conventional actions. These conditions got clear following violence on Hrushevskiy, creation of alternative centers of power in regions and inability of the regime to repress protesters in Kyiv. Mass support of radicalization and inability of authorities to handle escalation demonstrated the absence of negative effects. Therefore, when liberal groups realized that negative effects of radicalization were mostly absent and some parts of the broader public still supported insurgency, they began to frame radicalization more neutrally and occasionally support it. Success of radical strategies made moderate groups shift their discursive stance towards non-conventional repertoire of action. Their ideologies affected the speed of their shift.

Collective identity. In a similar way to political opposition, extra-parliamentary groups kept adopting collective identity of Ukrainians as an umbrella term for self-reference of protestors. For instance, Civic Sector of Euromaidan posted "This is how Ukrainians expressed their protest today. Charming and inventive nation" (Facebook, 20.01.2014 12:36AM). Frame makers often referred to civic connotations of the term to unite as diverse constituencies as possible.

The framers also tried to underscore cooperation between different groups and their diversity united in the protest. For instance, Maidan Self-Defense leader Parubiy claimed: "We've got "Company of Sambir", "Afghan company" (veterans of Afghanistan), "Vidsich company" (rebuff company). As well as "Gandhist company" (followers of nonviolent resistance) that protects the civilian population. So tell me how can I explain you, my European friends, that we've got "Gandhist company" here? That we've got priests, Ultras, students, Cossacks, Afghanistan veterans, radical lefts, poets, climbers, Buddhists, hutsuls, Crimean Tatars on the same side! One for all, and all for one! And you're asking what is a percentage of far-right protesters involved...Claim makers also heavily vilified high officials of the regime and the president. So, we can identify polarization of identities in the collective action frames of extra-parliamentary groups.

Collective identity of challengers was very inclusive, whereas the identity of their opponents has shrunk to tiny group of the president and his surrounding" (Facebook, 26.01.2014 07:15PM, Originally posted in English).

Right-wing groups

Diagnosis. In a similar manner to (left)-liberal extra parliamentary groups, moderate representatives of the right-wing camp from the very outset blamed the authorities for the bloodshed that was provoked by the riot police. They also saw the outburst of violence as the scenario favorable for Russia. For instance, The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalist in their official statement claimed that "In the modern history of Ukraine, January 19, 2014 will remain as the day of bloodshed, which was provoked by the authorities who for two months cynically ignored the will of citizens by denying the will citizens and drifting towards Putin's neoempire" (Website, 20.01.2014).

Moderate right-wing groups accused the regime of the violence initiation. The Congress blamed the riot police for adopting arms and water cannons against peaceful protestors. They never mentioned the fact that protesters initiated the violence. The Congress claimed that "The responsibility for the violent clashes fully lies on the authorities, in particular, on the pro-regime Party of regions, the members of which lost their honor and dignity, and simply followed the orders of Bankova [presidential administration]" (Website, 20.01.2014). Besides repression of protesters, moderate part of the right-wing movement sector kept signifying the consequences of the "dictator's laws", such as the "ruining of Ukrainian parliamentarism" and "curtailment of the freedom of speech" (Website, 23.01.14).

The radicals, on the opposite, admitted that they started the attack on the regime. In particular, Right Sector's leader Dmytro Yarosh claimed "People have stood on Maidan for two months and did not do anything. Then there was another provocation from authorities – the passage of the 16 January laws. They started the beating of activists, kidnapping people…They [authorities] provoked this situation, while people *started the attack* because they had no patience any more. How long were they supposed to stand and dance on Maidan? We are not sheep, a Ukrainian must sound dignified, and the people have explained [to authorities] that Ukrainian sounds dignified" (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.02.2014). What is more, protest radicalization helped

them to gain popularity and attract numerous people to the organization. Skoropadsky said "From that moment [January 19, 2014] we started a revolutionary wave on Hrushevskiy street. A huge stream of information came on us from the authorities. A great deal of people began to come to us. At that moment it helped us tremendously" (Interview UKR2).

The eruption of violence was in the eyes of far-right radicals a right course of events. They opposed peaceful protest and correspondingly condemned peaceful actions in their rhetoric. Following the violent turn they kept saying the same things. However, from that moment on this rhetoric has become much more resonant in the eyes of numerous people. As Right Sector's press-secretary Skoropadsky said "We have never changed our rhetoric, we criticized a lot. Because until January 19, 2014 we opposed to what we heard from the scene of Maidan. All these stories that Yaceniuk told us. That we were supposed to have exclusively peaceful protest, because when first blood is shed Europe will turn away from us. But our goal was not to be liked by Europe, but to overturn Yanukovych regime. Naturally we criticized pacifism and liberalism of those leaders, who stood on the scene. We never stood on the scene. Yarosh [Right Sector's leader] got on the scene in two months. Yaceniuk and Ruslana were calming people down. We were saying that it was pseudo revolution" (Interview UKR2).

Thus, the diagnostic framing of radical right-wing groups following the outburst of violence has not changed significantly. However, Right Sector underscored the intensification of repressions against protesters in their diagnostic framing and escalative character of interaction between the regime and protesters. In particular, they stated "The actions next to "Dynamo" stadium in Kyiv between radical activists and the people in uniform remind not the revolution in Ukraine, but rather the cadres of military actions in the Middle East. No one in Ukraine could even imagine two months ago that the center of his capital can become the hot spot in the center of Europe" (Website, 20.01.2014).

Prognosis. Moderate part of right-wing camp insisted on the peaceful solutions to the situation. They emphasized the importance of keeping peaceful forms of protests and suggested finding political compromise between incumbent regime and political opposition. They were opposed to radical forms of contention. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists suggested: "Despite the criminal actions of authorities we need to all possible to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and avoid armed confrontation of people and authorities. We think that the peaceful arrangement should start from cancellation by the parliament of the illegitimately adopted anti-

constitutional laws, release of the detained and recognition of the protesters' action as legitimate, resignation of Azarov's government and formation of new government of the national unity, start prosecution of law enforcement agents who killed or hurt protesters" (Website, 27.01.2014).

Some of the moderate far-right groups, after the repression diffused to regions, started occasionally approve it. For instance, The Committee of releasing political prisoners in describing the violence on the side of protesters suggested that "(t)he clash of gangster authorities and Ukrainians got into the active phase" (Facebook, 24.01.14 07:45 PM). However, they still were in favor of peaceful solution to the political crisis.

Contrary to them, radicals kept on insisting on revolutionary forms of collective action. They suggested that by adopting radical means they can keep on pushing enough pressure on the regime, which is part of their strategy (Right Sector, Website, 21.01.14). They insisted that their potential leaving from Hrushevskiy street can be interpreted by the regime as their retreat from active resistance and will facilitate the dispersion of Maidan. Right sector made the announcement: "There is phony information that representatives of Right Sector agreed with the opposition parties concerning the night reprisal from Hrushevskiy street and The European square… Right Sector has never had such negotiations with the opposition. We ask people to protest on Maidan not just for the strategic reason, but also due to tactical and operational necessity because the maneuvers like that could be potentially perceived as our reprisal and encourage the servants of the regime to disperse Maidan. Nationalists call for the participants of the revolutionary struggle to keep their positions. We will not give back a single inch of conquered soil. Together and till the very end" (Website, 21.01.14).

After the first deaths on January 22, and the fact that some of the first victims were killed by snipers, Right Sector openly called for mobilization with shotguns in order to protect protestors against the actions of repressive agencies. The group stated: "Right sector reminds about its own initiative concerning the mobilization of the owners of the firearms. Let's remove the dominant gang until people spill more blood" (Website, 22.01.2014).

Ideology and strategy of Right Sector implied that they were always ready for radical actions. When the opportunities for radical actions opened up, they adopted radical repertoire of action. The revolution by any possible means was the major goal of the group, therefore the measures they undertaken fully corresponded to the view of what needs to be done. Yarosh stated "Right Sector is the most *revolutionary* structure of Maidan. I underlie: the most

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revolutionary, not radical. Revolution is the reason, plan and *action*. When there is the situation of popular overwhelming, we need to use this situation for the people's sake. The opposition unfortunately is incapable of doing that because the chairs in parliament are too soft and they are not ready for this decisive step. *We are ready* for this step" (Ukrainska Pravda, 04.02.2014, emphasis added).

Collective identity. Radical groups rarely focused on the collective identity of protesters. Moderate right-wing groups were constructing inclusive collective identities that were intended to appeal to different social groups, mostly to moderate nationalists and conservative citizens. In particular, they adopted the notion of "Ukrainian people" or just "people" to emphasize their broad representation within the movement. The far-right groups and parties also emphasized the unhuman nature of the regime by vilifying it. For instance, The Congress of Ukrainian nationalists stated: "In the capital and other Ukrainian cities under the cover of police act established by the crime and law enforcement agencies the squadrons of death that kidnap people from the streets, houses and hospitals, torture or kill them" (Website, 27.01.2014). By counterpoising broad notion of people and vilifying the authorities, frame makers attempted to strengthen the boundary between the protesters and their opponents. However, it was the trend the right-wing groups used in previous phases of protest, therefore, we can suggest that following the eruption of violence this trend continued.

Summary

After the eruption of violence, there was certain differentiation in framing of different camps of the movement. Diagnostic framing did not change much and remained mainly uniform among different groups. All of them blamed the regime for the initiation of repression and no one admitted that radical protesters initiated violent clashes with police.

The prognostic framing differentiated among various groups. The opposition first condemned violence. However, in a day they normalized violence in its discourse, though conventional repertoire of action was still among proposed strategies of action. They bridged their prognosis to the changed perceptions of the part of protesters and broader public who engaged in mass violent actions, which were initiated by the radical groups. This acceptance and signification in the discourse of both conventional and radical forms of action corresponded to the actual shift

in functioning of Euromaidan, which shifted to double-tiered movement where peaceful site was operating on Maidan whereas violent site – on Hrushevskiy street.

Moderate right-wing and (left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups did not normalize violence until it diffused to regions and became widespread. Until the regime was losing its power in the regions challengers preferred not to normalize violent action. They reasoned that violent actions scare away movement sympathizers, make international community turn away from Ukraine and give the regime good reason to disperse the protest. Only after the diffusion of violence thanks to mass involvement of protesters, extra-parliamentary (left)-liberal groups and moderate right-wing groups began to occasionally normalize it. Both opposition and extra-parliamentary groups differentially bridged collective action frames to different audiences after the violent turn in Kyiv and further diffusion of violence to regions.

Radical right-wing groups always supported the idea of armed protest and national revolution. They were the ones who initiated the violence on Hrushevskoho and always openly called for radical repertoire of contention. The eruption of violence was a great opportunity for them to outcompete the moderate wing of the movement and mobilize more radically oriented public on their side. They successfully used this opportunity and gained more power within the movement. Though their discourse did not change, but more public began to be more receptive to it. The success of violent mobilization made it resonate with numerous groups in public.

Due to radicalization of the audiences following the violent turn, numerous people began to join Right Sector because it provided them with the outlet for direct confrontation with the authorities. This reinforced the resonance of radical discourse and its diffusion to different sectors of the movement. Following the violent turn radicals kept insisting in their prognostic frames on the need for maintaining radical repertoire at work.

Both the opposition and extra-parliamentary groups framed protestors in their discourse in terms of inclusive civic Ukrainian identity as a common denominator. This inclusive self-identification was designed to appeal to broad range of constituencies who were supposed to become receptive to passage of laws and violent turn on Hrushevskiy street. Both moderate and radical right-wing groups did not significantly adapt their framing of collective identity in response to violent turn of the events.

Table 9. Thematic summary of framing before and after violence eruption on Hrushevskiy street

Frame element	Before the eruption of violence	After the eruption of violence
1. Political opposition		
Diagnosis	The Dictator's laws, threat to democracy and parliamentarism in Ukraine, authoritarianism and usurpation of power, civil rights	International isolation, the danger of Maidan dispersion, threat to democracy in Ukraine, rolling into authoritarianism, the regime's repression, violence
Prognosis	Conventional protest, early presidential and parliamentary elections, international sanctions	Conventional protest, early presidential and parliamentary elections, international sanctions, non-conventional or radical repertoire of action
Collective identity	All politically active citizens, all affected by the laws citizens, all Ukrainians	All politically active citizens, the whole Ukraine
2. (Left)-liberal extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	The Dictator's laws, threat to Ukrainian democracy and statehood, rolling in autocracy, geopolitical drift to Russia, civil rights, Eurointegration	International isolation, dispersion of Maidan, geopolitical drift to Russia, the regime's repression, Eurointegration
Prognosis	Conventional protest, international sanctions, confrontational repertoire	Conventional and peaceful contention, international sanctions, confrontational repertoire, non-conventional and radical repertoire
Collective identity	Politically active citizens, all affected by the laws citizens, all Ukrainians	Politically active citizens, all Ukrainians
3. Right-wing groups		
Diagnosis	Civic rights, Repression, EU-Ukraine integration, Government resignation, overthrowing of the regime	International isolation, the regime's repression, Maidan dispersion, EU-Ukraine integration
Prognosis	Conventional contention, radical repertoire, national revolution	Conventional contention, radical repertoire, national revolution, armed mobilization
Collective identity	Ukrainians, patriots, conservative citizens	Ukrainians, patriots, conservative citizens, radically oriented citizens

Conclusions

Repression on November 30, 2013 produced alterations in the movement's discourse. In particular, following repression absolute majority of groups placed repression at the forefront of diagnostic framing. This framing adaptation resonated with broader range of constituencies. Mobilization of various public and their active interaction in the course of mobilization further fostered changes in meanings that brought about the frame shift to more general 'civic rights' frame.

Thus, repression provided the new cause for mobilization. This cause allowed movement framing to go beyond Eurointegration theme and address their discourse to more targeted audiences. Repression ~~made more~~made more social groups receptive to alternative discourse. Following mobilization new meanings got crystallized. The movement had to bridge its frames to the changes in the popular perceptions. Frame shift was conditioned by initial resonance of its frames and successful backlash.

Initially, Eurointegration theme resonated only with students, journalists as well as political and civic activists. It was not resonant with the broader public. The civil rights frame was addressed to much broader range of social groups who got overwhelmed by repression. Repression expanded original student core of the protest to much broader constituency (Kiev International Institute of Sociology 2013, Interview UKR16).

Prognostic framing did not change after repression. All ideologically moderate groups rejected radical solutions and strategies in their framing. Political opposition and liberal extra-parliamentary groups supported exclusively conventional repertoire of action. Radical right-wing groups were the only ones who promoted the radical frames. Radicals barely adapted their discourse in response to repression.

Discourse makers made collective identity more inclusive by focusing on the broader collectivities like "citizens", "entrepreneurs", "the youth", "Ukrainians" and the successful alliances like "The Headquarters of national resistance", "all-Ukrainian student union" and "the union of retired officers".

The passage of anti-protest laws also produced frame adaptation. In particular, new lawmaking has become the locus of diagnostic framing. "The Dictator's laws" were framed as the threat to Ukrainian statehood, parliamentarism, democracy and step towards Russian sphere of

influence. Discourse makers expanded collective identity to practically all Ukrainians, who have become the target of new laws. Radicals also included anti-protest laws in their framing but as a part of their broader "anti-systemic" frame. The dominance of liberal politicians and extra-parliamentary groups in mobilizing structure prevented further radicalization of prognosis at that point of protest cycle. Prognostic framing still emphasized the importance of keeping conventional repertoire. Though very strong diagnostic framing and dichotomization of Ukrainians vis-à-vis corrupted government laid off the ground for further radicalization. Especially considering the failure of preceding conventional protest.

Mass mobilization on Maidan on January 19, 2014 and violent turn on Hrushevskiy street produced significant changes in movement's framing. Originally, political opposition and extra-parliamentary groups condemned radicalization and insisted on exclusively peaceful repertoire. Right after repression and escalation on Hrushevskiy they maintained the same rhetoric. They accused radical far-right groups of provoking repression and called for keeping protest peaceful. However, when significant numbers of previously moderate protesters joined violent site of contention, authorities failed to repress radicals, international community kept supporting the movement and moderate protesters kept on protesting on Maidan, political opposition shifted its rhetoric.

In particular, politicians began to blame authorities for initiation of repression and praised radicals for their resistance to brutal state by calling them 'heroes'. Radical repertoire was not unacceptable anymore, but rather was repertoire of contention that protesters were compelled to use to protect their rights or because there was no other way out. The opposition blamed authorities for initiation of repression and violent outburst.

Extra-parliamentary groups kept framing the protest as peaceful even after violent turn and insisted on maintaining peaceful repertoire despite hundreds of injured and first deaths. However, following the collapse of the regime in regions and inability of authorities to repress radicals in Kyiv, extra-parliamentary groups began to frame repression in more neutral tone and occasionally framed non-conventional repertoire as acceptable.

The shift towards negative framing of repression of authorities who tried to prevent violent actions of radicals was conditioned by success of radicals in mobilizing the broader public and inability of authorities to repress protesters. Whereas the resonance of radical framing

of far-right groups can be explained by the radicalization of perceptions of considerable part of public who were not content with failed conventional repertoire and were ready for radical actions.

The passage of the anti-protest laws criminalized numerous protesters and blocked the opportunities for conventional protest. These factors made certain groups in public more receptive to radical discourse, which was provided by radical right-wing groups. The "supply" of radicalized public pools found discursive and organizational "demand" by radical right-wing groups. Shift in the movement discourse reflected shifts in public perception and ability of radical groups to mobilize these pools of public for violent actions by means of radical disourse. Therefore, discourse rather followed structural changes and their perceptions by public.

Mobilizing structure also had certain effects on framing dynamics. Politicians dominated the organizational structure and represented the movement in its negotiations with authorities. Originally, they resisted radicalization because peaceful protest allowed them to put more pressure on authorities, whereas violence could give authorities legitimate reasons to repress. However, when the opposition realized that they could not control the violent flank of protest and authorities could not repress it, they started to use violence as their leverage in negotiations with authorities. Further diffusion of violence to regions and inability of authorities to stop it made opposition keep occasionally framing repression as the expression of popular will and the only means to resist brutal regime.

Extra-parliamentary groups had less influence in mobilizing structure. Because of that they resisted to neutral framing of non-conventional repertoire longer, but blamed authorities for initiation of violence. Ideology and constituencies, as well as Western donors prevented them from immediate acceptance of violent turn as necessary means of struggle. However, when they realized broad shifts in popular perceptions following Hrushevskiy events and the occupations of regional administrations, they framing of non-conventional repertoire became more neutral.

Ideologically radical right-wing groups did not considerably adapt their rhetoric to structural shifts, including repression. Their originally marginal position in mobilizing structure also had no influence on their framing strategies. However, radicalization of public that joined radicals in their violent actions against authorities and inability of the regime to repress them, made their discourse more prominent within movement structure and shifted the balance of power within movement in favor of far-right groups. This shift of power helped radicals to diffuse its discourse within movement milieu and further to different constituencies.

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The analysis suggests that the effects of repression on framing and mobilization are not straightforward. Repression provokes frame adaptations, which incorporate repression in the discourse and frame it negatively. In case of resonance and successful backlash, frame further shift and anchor the meanings that emerged during mobilization. Alterations in public perceptions and resonance of adapted frames with targeted audiences make claim makers anchor resonated meanings in frames and reinforce frame shift. Due to important role of resonance in frame adaptation in response to repression, we need to consider not just the composition of protesters, but also changes of public perceptions over time.

The groups with radical ideology are more likely not to adapt their framing in any significant way in response to repression. Moderate ideology makes groups be less likely to adopt radical ideology. However, when structural conditions get more obvious, ideology becomes less important factor in influencing frame shifts. The composition of mobilizing structure partly affects frame alterations in response to repression. It is conditioned by the changes in power relations with authorities, which empower or make less influential certain forces within movement. Thus, the discourse of more prominent groups becomes more dominant among movement actors, whereas the frames of less prominent get more marginal position.

Chapter 6. Political opportunities and protest cycle in Russia

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian authorities attempted to transit to market economy and democratize its polity (Offe 2004). However, instead of establishing new institutional equilibrium, the first post-Soviet Russia's government conserved numerous preceding institutional arrangements and adopted them to new conditions (Gelman 2015, Chapter 1). Therefore, the nature and functionality of new institutions in many respects remained the same, though the Communist party and its ideology were forbidden until 1993.

In an attempt to establish the market economy, the authorities launched full-scale privatization of the state-owned enterprises and factories. However, due to the corruption of the privatization process, the access to assets was restrained to selected buyers (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Hellman 1998). Privatization without liberalization formed powerful businessmen who were influential in politics – oligarchs. They were closely linked to corrupted and rent-seeking bureaucrats (Aslund 2005). Oligarchs possessed tremendous assets, including TV channels, which enabled them to influence public opinion. Their media played a significant role in the public campaigning for the 1996 presidential race. They had crucial influence on the political processes within the polity. Due to the weakness of legal and democratic institutions, oligarchs managed to "capture the state", which implied that "politically powerful firms influenced the very rules of the game in the economy: they created obstacles to emergence and development of competitive businesses and changed the direction and speed of economic reforms" (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2006, p.1).

Out of the several options of transition to the market economy, the Russian government opted for "shock therapy", which embraced the package of regulations that were supposed to rapidly set up market regulations (Brainerd 1998). "Shock therapy is nothing less than a revolutionary strategy for the complete reconstruction of the economic arrangements of a country" (Murrell 1993). Newly introduced norms of market economy were supposed to boost the development of private business and stimulate further development. However, there were very few who actually benefited from the economic transformation, whereas overall economic wellbeing of the population has drastically decreased, producing high levels of inequality and poverty (Brainerd 1998). The major reason why the transition failed is that radical and fast reforms actually never happened. The reforms were slow and partial. Therefore, those who were conducting reforms

turned into rent-seekers and could adjust the shape of institutions and the course of reforms to their own interests (Aslund 1999).

The parliament, presidential administration and oligarchs played the key role in the political system of post-Soviet Russia in 1990s. The president Yeltsin and lower chamber of parliament were in constant struggle for power, which resulted into the dispersion of rebellious parliament by the president and the introduction of new, presidential constitution in 1993 (Gelman 2015). It envisaged broader competences of the president and restrained powers of the parliament. In comparison to Ukrainian constitution, president was considerably less restrained by the parliament. However, despite that institutional shift of power, the political system remained unstable.

The rules of the game in the political arena were still rather vague and there was no consensus about the regulations within the polity. Constant ad hoc alliances between different political actors and struggle between the president and parliament maintained uncertainty of "the rules of the game" and set up *ineffective* equilibrium of power relations (Shevtsova 1999).

In 1996, Yeltsin managed to win the presidential elections thanks to alliance with oligarchic groups. However, the level of institutional uncertainty and unpredictability remained high. In 1990s no one managed to concentrate power in Russia. Thus, in 1990s, the regime neither became authoritarian, nor democratized.

In addition, Russia was a federation and considerable powers were delegated by the Kremlin to regions in order to maintain their loyalty to the central power (Treisman 1996). "The delegation of substantial financial and political autonomy to the regions in exchange for their loyalty was a forced political compromise that allowed liberalization and privatization. Without decentralization, through which the center bought temporary support of governors, basic liberalization reforms would have been politically infeasible" (Zhuravskaya 2010). The payoffs of the decentralization were not promising and regional powers often abused their autonomy for the sake of their own interests (Treisman 1996). By the end of 1990s it became obvious that the federal system of governance required reform.

On the international arena after becoming an independent state, Russia's international linkage was rather weak, since it was remaining strong military power and economically was relatively self-reliant thanks to abundant natural resources and inherited Soviet

industries (McFaul 2001). Weak international ties let political elites act more independently and contributed to less than expected democratization levels (Levitsky and Way 2010).

The development of civil society in 1990s was slow. After intense civic mobilization of second half of 1980s (Weigle and Butterfield 1992, Sakwa 2010), civil society in Russia in 1990s remained very weak. Civic engagement and volunteering demonstrated low rates (Crotty 2009, Evans 2015). Foreign funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supported liberal projects that often did not resonate with Russian values and belief systems (Ljubovnikov, Crotty and Rogers 2013). Another factor that explains weak civil society in 1990s is the lack of resources from both business and authorities. NGOs often pursued political and economic interests of their members, rather than represented broader population (Ljubovnikov, Crotty and Rogers 2013).

Thus, in 1990s post-Soviet Russia experienced a turbulent period of its history. It can be characterized by the democratization of political life, decentralization or powers and delegating considerable competences to regions, tremendous economic decline and low levels of civic engagement. In 1999 the president Yeltsin has announced his abdication from the position of the president and proposed Putin as his successor. The new president considerably changed political arrangements in the country and managed to consolidate the political regime.

Under Putin's leadership Russia has moved in the direction of autocratic consolidation in 2000-2008 (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 197-201). The president managed to restore the power of the state, consolidate previously fragmented elites, nationalize valuable assets, take under control media, regain power in regions and gain popular support for the regime (Gelman 2015, Chapter 4). In order to consolidate the power, he has introduced to Russian elites new rules of game of political system - so-called "imposed consensus" (Ibid.). It embraced a set of new regulations that concentrated the power in the hands of the president, established a top-down way of governance through "the vertical of power', got under the state control independent media and restrained the powers of the regions.

After coming to power, Putin first needed restrain the powers of oligarchs, who were a serious burden on the way to power consolidation (Gidadhubli and Sampatkumar 2000). In particular, the president said in March of 2000: "Those people who fuse power and capital: there will be no oligarchs of this kind as a class" (Gidadhubli and Sampatkumar 2000, p. 2513). Putin proposed the deal: the state allowed oligarchs to keep their assets provided that they did not

interfere into politics (Goldman 2004, Aslund 2005). The majority accepted new consensus. The most influential oligarchs like Khodorkovsky or Berezovski resisted at first. Khodorkovsky was jailed, while Berezovski had to flee the country. Assets of those few who rejected the consensus were either nationalized or given to loyal businessmen.

Besides assets in energy and banking sectors, oligarchs possessed media corporations, which allowed them to shape public opinion and compete with public media for the hearts and minds of Russian citizens. This was a problem on the way to consolidation of power by Putin. That is why it was so important for him to get under the state control all major media (Lipman 2009). Thus, Putin managed to take under control oligarchs and their media.

On the way to regime consolidation Putin faced problem of the autonomy of regions and their leaders. Putin's government faced serious problems when dealt with federal legacy of 1990s - "state-corroding federalism" (Cai and Treisman 2006). The government has undertaken several measures to tame the regions and consolidate its central power. In particular, in May 2000 the president got the right for unilateral dismissal of governors. What is more, another reform has drastically decreased the political weight of the upper chamber of Russian parliament – Federation Council. To take regions under its full control in 2004 the Kremlin cancelled the regional elections of governors by local population (Chebankova 2008). Instead regional assemblies began to elect governors on the invitation of the president. These steps allowed Putin to centralize power in the Kremlin by subjecting regional governors to the central government on the basis of their loyalty to the regime or personally to the president and downplay the role of the Federation Council.

One more crucial aspect, without which the consolidation of the regime would be problematic is the establishment of the party United Russia (Reuter and Remington 2009). It allowed to eliminate parliamentary opposition, take under control the legislative branch and provide the organization, which was channeling resources for loyalist elites and exercised power in regions. Later, authorities have introduced media censorship and restricted the activity of NGOs, thus limiting the capacities of civil society to mobilize (Goldman 2004).

During his first term in the presidential chair Putin enjoyed high levels of popularity with no considerable protests in the country. However, in 2005 protests took place all over the country. They were provoked by the monetization of public benefits (Robertson 2011). "The government replaced benefits like free public transportation and subsidies for housing, prescriptions, telephones and other basic services with monthly cash payments starting at a little

more than $7" (Myers 2005). This has caused the wave of public mobilization, which made authorities limit the effects of reforms to maintain loyalty of certain groups of population. After these protests the authorities decided to introduce stricter regulations on civil society to make uncontrolled insurgency less likely in future. Another factor that crucially changed the perceptions of threats by the regime was the wave of 'color revolutions' in post-Communist and post-Soviet states (Wolchik and Bunce 2011).

Since 2004 we can observe further tightening of institutional constraints on civic activity and political competition. Putin and his team introduced so-called "sovereign democracy" in Russia during the president's second term in power in 2004-2008 (Krastev 2007, Sakwa 2012). It was an attempt to insulate the ruling elites against "color revolution", which previously took place in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Horvath 2011).

The counter-color revolution strategy included several measures. In order to neutralize political parties, the Kremlin lifted up the electoral threshold from 5% to 7%, demanded for re-registering of parties under new, stricter rules and prohibited pre-election party coalitions (Gel'man 2008). Besides increasing the barriers for entering political arena, the regime decided to take under control competition among parties.

In order to exert control over the party completion, the ruling elites placed parties within systemic and non-systemic opposition (Gelman 2008, Sakwa 2010, Ross 2015). To be more precise we can identify three levels of major parties in Russia. United Russia represents the dominant party. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Just Russia and small parties are the satellites that feature as sparring partners for the dominant party. Communist party of Russian Federation (CPRF), The Union of Right Forces (SPS),Jabloko (The Apple), Parnas and other small parties are the enemies of the regime (Gel'man 2008). Satellite political parties represent systemic opposition, whose activity is mostly under the control of Kremlin and which are created to resemble the façade of democratic institutions. Dominant party is designed not to represent certain constituencies, but rather to control policy agenda, prevent opportunities for alternative coordination among elites and maintain elite consolidation and recruitment (Gel'man 2008.). Though CPRF is not fully the part of systemic opposition, it often supported the decisions of the dominant party.

Systemic opposition is an integral part of the political system, where the opposition to the regime is formally allowed, but its activity is restrained and controlled by the Kremlin

(Gelman 2008). The competition between political parties gradually transformed into the hierarchy, which was engineered and controlled by the Kremlin (Ibid.). Non-systemic opposition is formally opposed to the regime, but has very limited or no access to public media, elections or state institutions (Gabowitch 2017, p. 121). The division of parties into systemic and non-systemic opposition was mainly completed by parliamentary elections of 2007.

Counter color-revolution strategy included several other steps. In particular, in 2006 ruling elites introduced the laws that considerably restrained functioning of the civil society, launched aggressive propaganda and expanded censorship, introduced new nationalist anti-Western ideology and formed pro-Kremlin youth ersatz movements (Robertson 2009, Horvath 2011).

In 2006 the government introduced the laws that restrained functioning of NGOs and volunteer associations (Ljubovnikov, Crotty and Rogers 2013, Evans 2015). These laws envisaged stricter rules for NGOs' registration, more demanding requirements for financial operations and gave more power for controlling agencies (Ljubovnikov, Crotty and Rogers 2013). What is more, the government established intermediary bodies, which were supposed to provide entry point for public concerns and channel these concerns to the president and government (Evans 2015). For instance, Public Chamber was designed to be an intermediary body that bridges the state and civil society. Human rights ombudsman and The president council on Human rights were established to monitor civil liberties in the country and promote them. Since 2007 the government also introduced different programs and grants for sponsoring NGOs (Robertson 2009).

In such a way sponsored by the government bodies restrained activities of active groups in civil society and channeled them. Political elites exercised patronage over NGOs by channeling their activities. In addition to that, the consolidation of power has introduced stricter repressive policies with respect to active civic groups. Thus, we could say that the state deployed the strategies of cooptation, repression and channeling towards different groups of civil society.

The regime consolidated the power and tightened the grip over civil society when the country experienced economic boom until the world economic crisis of 2007-2008 (Ellman 2004, Suni 2008). Thanks to stabilizing economic policies, restraining the power of oligarchs and immense rise of natural gas and oil prices Russian economy has demonstrated unprecedented rates of growth (Cooper 2009). The growth of economy has resulted in much higher support of the government, ruling party United Russia and personally president Putin. Thanks to the flow of

resources Putin managed to stabilize the economy, support public sector and those industries that were unprofitable, but socially important (e.g. machinery production) (Akindinova, Kuzminov and Yasin 2016). Economic growth allowed Putin to consolidate regime and acquire the loyalty of its citizens.

To make the state stronger the regime managed to recentralize power by means of subjection of regions, neutralizing, coopting or putting under control competitive parties, oligarchs as well as civic and political groups. Besides building winning coalition and empowering and centralizing the state, the president managed to implement "imposed consensus", which embraced key rules of the game: (1) a unilateral presidential monopoly on adopting key political decisions (the regime′s personalism); (2) a taboo on open electoral competition among the elite, with unfree and unfair elections (electoral authoritarianism); and (3) de facto hierarchical subordination of regional and local authorities to the central government (the power vertical) (Gel'man 2015, p. 96). Though this political consensus has strengthened the positions of the ruling groups, it blocked the opportunities for representation and political expression of various groups of population, who preferred political alternative to Putin's regime.

Thus, by the end of 2011 regime seemed to be well consolidated and stable. However, there were certain issues of tandem politics: there was no clear division of responsibilities between the president and prime-minister, the power vertical experienced degradation, United Russia has become an appendix of electoral machine, global economic crisis of 2007-2008 demonstrated the vulnerability of Putin's economic model and regional officials were very inefficient in their professional activity (Gelman 2015).

Though regime remained stable, socio-economic, demographic and political macro-processes of 2000s fostered formation of oppositional niches in society that got activated at the moment of heightened conflict with authorities (Gelman 2013). Steady economic growth of 2000s stimulated socio-economic development (Madr 2016), which generated well educated, independent of the state social groups that demanded more civil liberties, more opened political system and decent levels of governance (Gelman 2013). Modern information technologies propelled the spread of alternative information on the Web, facilitated communication and politization of previously disengaged public and formation of "weak ties" between previously disconnected individuals, communities and organizations (Oates 2013).

There were also some other precipitation factors that sparked mass protests in December 2011. One of them was Putin's announcement of his intention to run for presidential post in 2012. In 2008, when his second term was over, he introduced his old crony Medvedev to the position of president, whereas providing himself with the position of prime-minister. The presidential succession was perfectly orchestrated – the parliament and Putin have expressed their full support to Medvedev before presidential elections, whereas Medvedev promised to pick Putin for the position of prime minister if he is elected for the presidency (Sakwa 2010: Chapter 8). Medvedev was elected for the position of the president, whereas Putin has become prime-minister and remained in the key position in power.

Medvedev continued the "virtual politics" that was launched by Putin (Wilson 2005). It was based not so much on the repression of their opponents, but rather on the information manipulation and buying in the loyalty of elites and masses (Ibid.). Medvedev positioned himself as a modern president-reformer and often appealed to more affluent and educated groups of society. He promised to modernize the system at a discursive level, but never backed up his words by adequate policies. Discursive liberalization produced the expectation gap between certain population groups and actual implementation of political decisions (Gel'man 2013).

As Koesel and Bunce (2012) put it: "Russia has combined elements of autocracy and democracy for over a decade, the rhetoric has nevertheless been one that favors democracy and that emphasizes its constitutional foundations. The state-run media frequently maintain that Russia looks different from other Western political systems because of its distinct political and cultural characteristics. The narrative argues that Russia is not less democratic than the West, but a different kind of democracy—one that is "managed" and "sovereign," where power is concentrated and vertical, but nonetheless *accountable*" (Ibid., p. 413, emphasis added).

Though Russians were in favor of "strong hand" in charge of their country, they still wanted to be able to have a choice of candidates to be elected in fair elections. They preferred so-called "delegative democracy" (Hale 2011). Therefore, when in September 2011 Putin announced that he is going to become the candidate for the upcoming presidential elections of 2012, his return to the president's chair provoked legitimacy crisis in the eyes of numerous citizens who did not want to live in the society of a one-man rule (Volkov 2015). 'Castling' of prime-minister and the president in fact blocked alternative political choice for considerable amount of Russian citizens.

In addition to that, following the economic crisis of 2007-2008 Russian economy has experienced a considerable decline (Cooper 2009). In general, the support of ruling party has dropped to 34% due to poor economic performance and high levels of uncertainty about the future (Ross 2015). The electoral campaign for parliamentary elections also was accompanied by a series of scandals, including the moment when Putin was publicly hissed off (Volkov 2015).

All these factors did contribute to the eruption of protests. However, it was the blatant procedural violations of elections and numerous electoral fraud that actually triggered the protests in early December (Savelyeva and Zavadskaya 2015, Gabowitch 2017). It is important to note that elections have not become more fraudulent than before. For instance, in 2007 parliamentary elections were unfair, which, however, did not provoke the wave of protests (Kalinin and Mebane 2012). But this time they triggered mass public discontent resulting in mass protests in the street. Why was it so?

In addition to macro-processes and precipitating factors, we need to consider two important ingredients that played a crucial role at the beginning of the protest and were not present in previous elections. Greater amount of independent electoral observers and availability of technologies to spread info about the fraud considerable contributed to the eruption of protests. The broad diffusion of information about the fraud has become available thanks to the presence of high number of electoral observers who volunteered on electoral stations and presence of new technologies that let observers spread the evidence of fraud (Savelyeva and Zavadskaya 2015, Gabowitch 2017). Broader population trusted local election observers much more than international ones (Robertson 2013). The organizations like Golos (The Vote) or Grażdanin nabludatel' (The citizen observer) were much more effective in mobilizing people. Local observers most of the time did not belong to opposition parties, which were not trusted by population. Unbiased observers provided the evidences of a great number of fraudulent practices, spread them via virtual Social network sites (e.g. Facebook, Vkontakte) and in such a way magnified the effects of information diffusion (Gabowitch 2017: Chapter 3).

The abundance of electoral fraud and poor performance of electoral committees, who openly violated electoral regulations, were captured by numerous smartphones and shared on the Web. Diffusion of shared information produce moral shock and fostered mobilization even in the absence of direct connections mobilizing networks and activists (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). Outrage and indignation of population was further transformed into mobilization thanks to

organizational and personal networks as well as social network sites, which served as organizing platforms for connective action (Bennet and Segerberg 2013, Töpfl 2018). Political extra-parliamentary groups and civic organizations brokered information diffusion through their networks to broader public (Gabowitch 2017).

Videos and audios proved electoral fraud, resonated with numerous people's values and belief system and mobilized people. Grigory Melkoyants, the head of electoral observation organization Golos suggested "There were facts. And this information found the response in the hearts and minds of people, who faced that in life. People believed that information because they or their family had to deal with that – with coercion or administrative resource. Of course they believed something that coincided with their life experience, not something they heard from authorities" (Interview RU9). Observable nature of the electoral fraud proofs was crucial for convincing people in unfair elections and the need to do something about that.

After identifying the key characteristics of the context and the sources of the protest movement, we can now have a closer look at social-demographic structure of protestors and their demands and core collective actors engaged in the protest. Afterwards we can trace how challenging groups acted at different stages of protest cycle and events occurring within these stages, including instances of repression. At the end, we can focus on framing processes and their relationship with repression.

Summary

Russian political system was institutionally stable. Putin managed to construct the political system, where systemic political parties had little space for maneuver (Krastev 2007). United Russia had majority in the parliament, whereas tandem of Putin as prime-minister and Medvedev as president exercised executive power in the country. All systemic oppositional political parties had to obey political rules of the game. Otherwise, "imposed consensus" implied severe sanctions and costs, which institutional political actors were not ready to bear. The regime was centralized and had strong repressive capacity.

The regime controlled oligarchs and governors. The regime also managed to take under the control all national TV channels and public media. Internet remained the only relatively free space for political expression and alternative visions (Oates 2013). Civil society remained

weak and low support in society. Western ties were low due to abundance of natural resources, which made the economy mostly self-sufficient, and fear of ruling elites of color revolution (Horvath 2011). National collective identity was homogenous in comparison to Ukraine.

Protest cycle of "For Fair Elections" movement

Sociodemographic characteristics of protesters and the nature of their demands

In December 2011 for the first time since early 1990s streets of Russian cities and towns were flooded with people protesting against the government. To better identify the social basis of the protest we need to have a closer look at socio-demographic characteristics of protesters.

The age of protestors was slightly changing over the course of protest. At the very beginning of protest cycle the age cohort of 18-24 embraced around 25% (Volkov 2012, p.57). However, by the end of the protest cycle the youngest cohort comprised just 20% of all protesters, which is roughly the same as 55+ age cohort. The middle age cohort on the opposite has increased its presence. In December 25-39-year-old protesters comprised around 30 %, whereas in May already 37%, which made it the most represented age cohort (Volkov 2012, p. 58). The presence of 40-54-year-old protesters remained more stable and made up around 25% during the whole cycle of protest. Thus, by the end of the protest cycle the protest got older with median protester of 25-39 years old.

Materially protesters were better-off than general population of the country. According to the surveys, around 40% "could afford buying expensive things, but purchase of car would cause difficulties", around 25% "could afford buying a car", 3-5 % "could afford buying whatever they wanted" (Volkov 2012b, p.60). Thus, around 70% of protesters were relatively well-off, whereas in general population only the quarter of respondents consider themselves to be well-off (Ibid., p.61). Protesters were also more educated than average Russians. According to surveys conducted on the protests more than 70% of protesters had higher education, whereas in general population 28% had the same education (Ibid.). Similarly to Euromaidan, the absolute majority of those who joined the protest never participated in political activism before and were novices to protests.

The media attention was focused on Moscow, therefore media often labeled the protests as "middle-class movement" or "creative class movement" (Magun 2014), which seems to be controversial. The authorities often supported this point of view because it was extremely beneficial for them. The regime articulated the idea that protesters are a marginal part of society, which does not represent general people. However, as Ross (2015b) rightly points out, we should be careful with tagging the movement "middle-class", since this concept stems from the development of capitalism and Western culture, whereas in the context of modern Russia it may have different meaning. In particular, due to the structure of Russian economy which is dominated by the state-run corporations, significant part of middle-class citizens, who are well educated and well off, often support existing status quo instead of challenging the authorities in any way (Ibid.). Though on overall, the protesters were better off, autonomous from the state and better educated than general population, they represented different groups of society and therefore, labeling it "middle-class movement" would be not very accurate (Gabowitch 2017).

Protesters preferred Internet (70%), friends and colleagues (around 30%), radio (around 25%) and TV (around 17-18%) and newspapers (around 15%) as the main source of their information (Volkov 2012, p. 62). By contrast average Russians used TV as the main source of receiving information (81%), whereas only 13% preferred to read news online (Ibid., p. 63).

The major grievances of protestors embraced "dissatisfaction with the current situation in Russia" (73%), "indignation over electoral fraud" (73%), "dissatisfaction that key decisions were being made by politicians without citizen input" (52%), and disillusionment with President Medvedev's promises of modernization (42 %). Thus, we need to emphasize that unfair elections were *one* of several reasons to protest. More generally, the conflict was arousing from gap between existing political institutions, practices of governance and decision-making at different levels of power and the aspiration of some groups of citizens for more real participation in political life, more social justice and human dignity (Rosenberg 2017).

To sum up, we could suggest that protesters represented better off and better educated groups of urban population. They also preferred Internet as the main source of information in contrast to average citizens, who mainly watched TV. They demanded the update of the political system of the country, which should be more transparent and open to inputs from different social groups, let citizens influence the decisions of politicians and return citizens their right to participate in political life of the country, in particular, free and fair elections.

Major SMOs of "For Fair elections" protest movement

The protest movement was made up of a myriad of different challenging groups. Political parties and extra-parliamentary groups were the key organizing and coordinating forces of the protest movement. Systemic political parties were constrained in their participation. Had they decided to actively participate in the protest, they could have been sanctioned by the regime and lost the benefits of being a part of systemic opposition. Despite their low incentives for engagement in anti-government protests, they sometimes did mobilize their supporters for large rallies. Systemic political parties tried to capitalize on mass mobilization, but did not succeed in their endeavors - their protests were few and not crowded. Systemic opposition never fully supported the protest, but some of its prominent members joined the protesters and played active role in mobilization.

Since non-systemic political parties had no access to political institutions, the outburst of the protest broadened opportunities to reach and mobilize their constituencies. Extra-parliamentary groups and social movements viewed the protest as the chance to challenge existing status quo and express their political goals (Gabowitch 2017., p. 121, Greene 2014, Cheskin and March 2015, Ross 2015b). One of the main reasons why many actors were forced to migrate from institutional to contentious politics was the introduction of so-called "sovereign democracy" in Russia during Putin's second term in power (Krastev 2007, Sakwa 2012). For extra-parliamentary groups and most non-systemic parties, street has remained the main and often the only instrument in their struggle for power.

Since the beginning of the protest we can split all SMOs in liberal, left and right ideological camp. In the table below we can find most influential collective actors, which represented different organizational forms and ideologies.

Table 10. Major SMOs of protests in Russia in 2011-2012.

SMO's name	Type of organization, Ideology
1. Jabloko	Political opposition, liberal
2. Parnas	Political opposition, liberal
3. DemVybor	Political opposition, liberal
4. Libertarian party	Political opposition, liberal
5. The league of voters	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
6. "Golos" (" The Vote")	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
7. Citizen observer	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
8. RosVybory	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
9. Free Radicals	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
10. Eco-Defense	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
11. Rainbow association	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
12. Solidarity	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
13. United Civic Front	Extra-parliamentary group, liberal
14. Rot Front	Extra-parliamentary group, left
15. The Left Front	Extra-parliamentary group, left
16. Russian Socialist Movement	Extra-parliamentary group, left
17. Autonomous Action	Extra-parliamentary group, left
18. National Democratic Party	Political Party, right-wing
19. The Russians	Extra-parliamentary group, right-wing
20. The Movement against illegal migration (DPNI)	Extra-parliamentary group, right-wing
21. Russian Civic Union	Extra-parliamentary group, right-wing

Liberal SMOs held the strongest position in the protest. They were the most numerous, had more resources and their leaders were more recognizable by general public and most importantly media. What is more, they had close connections to prominent personalities (mostly media persons), who joined the protests and became part of its leadership. The prominent personalities who participated in protests were also liberally oriented. Critically for organizational matters, liberal leaders had close connections with liberal media, which provided the movement with sufficient coverage to reach different constituencies and communicate their demands to elites.

Among others, loose coalition Solidarity played a crucial role in the protest (Volkov 2012b). It was established in March of 2008 as a response to shrinking political space after undertaken by the ruling regime preventive measures against color revolution (Horvath 2011). The organization served as a platform and networking hub for many activists and political figures before the protests started (Gabowitch 2018). Therefore, when protests burst out, Solidarity brokered different sites of contention: between different organizations, initiatives and politicians, leaders within protest movement, between outside prominent individuals and protest movement, between protest organizers and municipal authorities (Volkov 2012b). At the initial stages of protest its members negotiated the route of the march and destination of the rally with local Moscow authorities (Volkov 2012b). Solidarity also organized the scene, security measures and other technical matters with police and municipal administration (Ibid.). New coordinating body of the movement Organizing committee of Rallies also grew out mainly on the base of Solidarity and those people who were responsible for organizing large rallies in December 2011. Thanks to its connections with municipal authorities, Solidarity could negotiate protest organization in advance and spread information about the upcoming events through its networks and media.

However, the emergence of the protest would be very unlikely without electoral observation SMOs. In fact, it was the electoral stations where the initial heightened conflict took place and from where it spilled over to other sectors and groups of society. Electoral observation SMOs played a crucial role in initiating protests and providing evidences of electoral fraud that sparked protests in the street (Greene 2013). It is critical to notice that grassroots electoral observation initiative "Citizen observer" that emerged in early 2011 was different from other electoral observation groups in several ways. It was not sponsored from abroad, but was locally based initiative. It was not a political, party-affiliated initiative. Since citizens did not trust institutional politics, non-partisan status gave the enterprise more credit. Citizen observer not just

monitored the violations of the process, but engaged in the procedure (Zavadskaya and Savelyeva 2015). Thanks to their connections to non-systemic political parties and extra-parliamentary groups as well as availability of social network sites, observers managed to spread the info about electoral fraud to opposition milieu, receptive constituencies and broader public, which resulted in public mobilization.

The liberal camp also embraced non-systemic opposition parties Jabloko and Parnas as well as some other tiny parties. There were various extra-parliamentary opposition groups among whom the most visible and active were ecological Ecooborona and civic group United Civic Front.

The right flank of the protest was represented by loose coalitions The Russians and Russian People Movement, tiny National Democratic Party and many other less visible neo-Nazi groups (Verkhovsky 2012b). On overall, the right-wing movement remained poorly structured. However, right before the start of "For Fair Elections" protests nationalists managed to mobilize more than 5 000 people for "Russian march" in November 2011 (Verkhovsky 2012). What is more, some moderate right wing groups managed to build 'strange coalitions' with liberals (Popescu 2012). The cooperation with systemic parties and non-systemic opposition made them look more legitimate in the eyes of more moderate xenophobic population.

During the electoral protests liberal-nationalist alliances were reinforced (Kolsto 2016). By joining the protests, which were mostly organized by liberals, the nationalists complied with the secondary role in protest and became the part of broader protest coalition (Ibid.). Thanks to the brokerage of famous politicians and civic activists like Kasparov, Milov and Navalny right-wing forces were accepted to be the part of larger coalition with liberals and the left. Despite active participation in public protest, the right-wing movement did not manage to capitalize on the mass mobilization and remained minor force during the protest cycle. Their strategy remained vague: they never realized what constituency they need to be oriented at and which corresponding tactics they should choose to mobilize potential constituency (Verkhovsky 2012b). When faced with the audience dilemma (Benford 1993, Jasper 2004, p.10), nationalists remained undecided and inconsistent, and never managed to mobilize on their side conservative or xenophobic citizens who were not yet politically mobilized (Verkhovsky 2012b).

The leftist groups represented another ideological camp of the movement. It is important to note that in contrast to liberal and nationalist ideology, left values and ideological

beliefs are widely shared in contemporary Russia. In 2011 Russian voters still shared paternalistic preferences of socialist value culture as well as welfarist and egalitarian sentiments of Brezhnevian "social contract" (March 2015). In 2011 up to 50% of the citizens possessed communist, socialist and social-democrat views (Ibid.). Left-wing or labor movement based on natural constituency never emerged due to cultural-historical reasons and strict anti-labor legislation (Robertson 2009, Clement 2015). The Communist Party of Russian Federation had rigid hierarchical structure and stands on neo-Stalinist and nationalist positions (March 2015). Despite all odds it managed to get 19.2% in 2011 parliamentary elections (Gabowitch 2017). Leftist groups, subcultures and networks were flourishing and actively engaged into protests (March 2015).

The left-wing SMOs were mostly well organized and were the part of a broad coalition with liberals and nationalists (Gabowitch 2017). Though it was very hard for them to accept the presence of nationalists in the coalition, they were ready to tolerate them due to shared intolerance of Putin's regime. At the outset of protests CPRF mobilized some of their supporters for protests, but very soon distanced itself from insurgency by negatively labeling it as "white ribbon" movement of pro-Western 'orangists' (March 2015). Other leftist groups were actively engaged in protests at all stages. The leader of Left Front, Sergey Udaltsov has become one of the symbols of the civic resistance to the regime. Leftist groups actively focused on the 'bread-and-butter' issues, which was threatening to the regime. That is why law enforcement agencies frequently repressed left activists, including Udaltsov.

After sketching three core ideological camps of the protest, we also need to convey the organizational structure that emerged during the protest cycle. Besides pre-existing organizations, the protest itself was an important catalyst for giving a birth to new SMOs or common coordinating platforms (Gabowitch 2017, Chapter 4). Some of these coordinating activities were operating online like the public Facebook group "We were at Bolotnaya and we will be back again" (Lukashina 2013). Others like *The Organizational Committee for Rallies,* were more traditional organizations. The Committee was a coordinating body that organized all largest rallies, marches and negotiated the arrangements of these events with authorities (Volkov 2012b). Previous experience of organizing protests in oppositional milieu helped civic and political leaders to mobilize social discontent through emerged organizational structure.

The Committee got formed as a result of preparations and negotiations for rallies, which were held on December 5, 10 and 24 (Volkov 2012b). The unfolding of protest events

further fostered the need for organization and the Committee was responsible for immediate coordination of protests and negotiations with authorities. It was dominated by liberal leaders and prominent personalities (e.g. media persons), though embraced several left representatives and nationalists as well as grassroots activists (Volkov 2012b). The Committee mainly operated in a top-down manner and provided little to no access to the groups that were not a part of it. Despite the presence of this coordinating body the coherence of the movement was rather low (Evans 2013). It was very fractioned and ideologically diverse, whereas the shared basis of alliance between different organizations and groups was their opposition to Putin's regime. It was a common coordinating platform for different political parties and extra parliamentary groups where they could negotiate current issues and the upcoming events. The Committee hardly represented any groups in society and therefore its legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary protesters was rather low. Low trust to political opposition among public was another reason why the Committee had low legitimacy in the eyes of protesters. That is why ordinary protesters preferred media persons and prominent individuals, not politicians as the leaders of protest (Volkov 2012).

In contrast to the Committee that was hardly attainable for average protestor, The Workshop of Protest Actions was a grassroots initiative that gave protesters a lot of opportunities to get involved in protest more actively. It was a forum for ideas and projects that participants were ready to implement by themselves (Volkov 2012, p. 42). A lot of formal and informal groups emerged out of this grassroots cooperation. Participants of the Workshop implemented several separate initiatives that broadened repertoire of action of protesters and made it more creative. For example, the White Ring performance and "White Boulevard walks" during Putin's inauguration as well as other initiatives of public disobedience originated from Workshop and were later communicated to broader public (Volkov 2012, p.42).

Another crucial grass root organizational initiative Occupy Abay emerged after the series of protests called the White city, which started on May 7. After being continuously dispersed by police, protesters decided to adopt the tactic of Occupy Wall Street movement and finally occupied Abay monument (Grigorieva 2012, Volkov 2012b). Hundreds and at certain points a couple of thousands of protesters occupied public space and proclaimed it to be their territory. Protestors on the camp established security crews, kitchen and information center (Grigorieva 2012, p. 185). Occupy had completely flat organizational structure and all the decisions about

further actions were taken on the assembly, which represented "consensus decision-making practices" (Ibid., p. 186). Police finally dispersed the camp on May 19.

The course of events in protest cycle of "For Fair Elections" movement

Heightened conflict, mass mobilization and creation of political opportunities for citizens

December 5 – December 24

As Tarrow (1989) suggests protest cycle begins in one or few sectors of heightened conflict within society. In Russian case elections have *become* the point of heightened conflict for several reasons. Snyder and Tilly (1972) suggest that elections may signal about more openness of political opportunities and often facilitate the conflict within the political system. Since they represent the procedure of the elite legitimization, they may increase the uncertainty and undermine the loyalty of elites and citizenry to the regime (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). As Zavadskaya and Savelyeva (2015) argue in 2011 parliamentary elections the vote was transformed into the personal choice and right of citizens instead of routine Soviet-style procedure. The authorities blatantly took the right to vote from their citizens by manipulating their votes and provoked popular outrage.

However, the mobilization of discontent became available due to several factors that were unavailable in previous elections, which had been fraudulent too. Diffusion and sharing of information about the fraud was enabled by growing number of volunteers in electoral observations, who were armed with smartphones and could film, record and photo blatant allegations of electoral commissions (Aron 2012). Internet and new technologies have become a crucial resource in the hands of challengers that considerably fostered mobilization at early stages of protest (Oates 2013, Töpfl 2018). "New technologies became crucial, when people had smartphones in their hands. They let them identify electoral fraud much better than on previous elections in 2004, 2007, 2008…Though electoral manipulations in 2011 were not much more widespread than in previous elections. The electoral fraud was at the same level, but thanks to availability of new technologies people could share information much easier" (Interview RU9).

The networks of local election observers, which were coordinated by several electoral organizations (e.g. The Vote, Citizen Observer) managed to spread the information about different forms of electoral fraud (Zavadskaya and Savelyeva 2015, Gabowitch 2017, p. 78). The information about fraudulent elections became viral online and fostered politization of engaged public that shared information within social networks. Electoral observers who were considered to be the credible source of information shared online reliable evidences of blatant electoral fraud and provoked moral shock of the broader public. Social network sites (e.g. Facebook, Livejournal, Vkontakte) facilitated diffusion and contributed to politization and mobilization of citizens (Vanke et al. 2014). The diffusion of the evidences of fraud was facilitated thanks to the help of extra-parliamentary groups and coalitions as well as non-systemic parties who brokered electoral observation groups and broader population.

The protest attitudes grew fast and on December 5, the next day after the announcement of the official results of elections, more than 5 000 demonstrators were protesting in the center of Moscow (Elder 2011). Besides few old cadres of opposition, a lot of new young faces previously unengaged in the protest activity came to the rally. The rally was organized by Solidarity at Chistye Prudy in Moscow, but the most of the demonstrators did not belong neither to Solidarity, nor to any other political force (Greene 2014). The absolute majority of new-comers were novices in politics and most of them were recruited to the protest through social network sites like Facebook and Vkontakte (Volkov 2012). The active users of social network sites were more receptive to quests for protests because the virtual space remained one of few free from censorship public spaces where people could get and share alternative information about political and social life in the country. They were more likely to be exposed to the electoral fraud information that had been previously actively shared by the electoral observers and therefore were more prone to join the protest.

On the scene of protest, besides old faces of political opposition, new-comers could see younger generation of opposition activists, including leaders of the extra-parliamentary opposition: anti-corruption blogger Navalny, liberal activist Jashin and left activist Udaltsov. After the protest a group of 500-1000 people attempted to radicalize protest and headed to the headquarters of secret services building (Elder 2011). Police harshly detained around 250-300 people (Gabowitch 2017, p. 78). This was the first failed attempt to escalate the protest by more radically oriented forces of the movement. By their initial success of mobilizing more than 5 000

people early risers have created the opportunities for other groups and fostered further expansion of the movement sector.

In upcoming days, the evidences of the electoral fraud became viral online through Vkontakte, Livejournal, Facebook and YouTube, and diffused rapidly through personal and organizational networks. The demand for further protest was forcing organizers to act. In order to coordinate further mobilization and negotiate with authorities the arrangements for the next rally opposition leaders, activists, media persons and journalists have established Organizing Committee of Rallies (Volkov 2012b, Gabowitch 2017, Töpfl, F. 2018). It was dominated by liberal politicians and media persons and had access to municipal authorities. Therefore, organizers could better negotiate and agree upcoming rallies (Volkov 2012b, Volkov 2015).

Social movement studies suggest that mobilization of discontent is more likely when previously established organizational and personal networks are present (Gould 1991, McAdam and Diani 2003). In Russian case the mobilization was facilitated thanks to preexisting 'human capital' (Robertson 2013), namely, organizational and personal networks of political parties, extra-parliamentary groups, civic initiatives, media persons, writers, art people who cooperated in previous several years (Ibid.). The presence of "compact network of opposition political organizations, political, civil, and cultural initiatives, and associations ensured the taking up of a suddenly emerging wave of protest and structuring it…" (Volkov 2012b., p.2).

Thanks to popular mobilization and the absence of full-scale repression by authorities the movement sector was expanding further. The demand for protest found different supply outlets. For instance, in the upcoming days we can observe the burst out of various protest events, which were organized by both non-systemic opposition, extra parliamentary groups and civic initiatives. On December 6, the political opposition arranged unsanctioned rally on Triumph square in the center of Moscow (Gabowitch 2017). The same day the protests took place in several more cities of the country. At certain point of protests, some groups adopted confrontational tactics. The police have detained around 300 people. On December 7, non-sanctioned demonstration was staged on Manage square by several tiny extra parliamentary groups, who also adopted confrontational repertoire of action (Gabowitch 2017). Around 20 people were detained.

The next large rally was supposed to take place on 10 December on Revolution square, which is close to Kremlin and Red Square. Left Front and Solidarity were the initial organizers of the protest. However, when it became clear that on Facebook alone more than 32

000 of people confirmed their participation in the upcoming event, the municipal authorities agreed with Co-Chairmen of Parnas Ruzhkov and Nemtsov to move protest from Revolution square to Bolotnaya square (Barry 2011). Several leaders of extra-parliamentary groups accused politicians of betraying the interests of protest and playing along the interests of the regime. However, they had to agree on the change of the venue, which strategically was more distant from Kremlin and central squares, including the square of Revolution.

According to the police, 85 000 people came to protest, whereas the opposition suggested more than 120 000 people. National TV channels broadcast the news about the protest (Barry 2011). What is more, public TV not necessarily framed protests in negative terms (Lankina 2017). Opposition leaders, civil society leaders and opinion leaders (e.g. musicians, poets, TV hosts) took part in the rally. The repertoire of collective action was conventional and the police did not detain any protesters. In the upcoming days there was a fast geographic diffusion of protest to regions, including more than twenty other cities of the country.

The Organizing committee of protests has become a dominant actor in organizing large protest rallies (Gabowitch 2017, p. 143). Liberal opposition parties and extra-parliamentary groups as well as prominent personalities of liberal orientation dominated the protest. However, the left and nationalists were also partly represented in it. The formation and functioning of the Committee were arousing out of both pre-established networks and the actual course of unfolding events within the protest cycle.

During the protests the issues of coordination and representation were gaining their importance. There was no clear answer to who and how is going to represent protesters and their interests (Gabowitch 2017, p. 141). Thanks to having more resources and closer ties to local bureaucracy, media personalities and liberal opposition leaders from the Committee made claims on behalf of protesters and represented them to broader public. As one of the leaders of the Committee Sergey Davidis suggested "In fact, large committee was gathering when a large protest was supposed to be staged. The membership in the Committee was not stable and people had no mandate to represent anyone. These were the representatives of organizations, movements and personalities. Horizontal cooperation within the leadership of the Committee was more productive, since there were the representatives of the left, nationalists and liberals. But the interaction with the broader masses was more limited. Because the organizers had no mandate from anyone, and

ordinary protesters were always asking 'nobody elected them, why are they in the charge of the protest?'" (Interview RU1).

After the 'big bang' protest of December 5, the rally of December 10 became a strategic battle between different groups for the format and the strategy of protest. Initially the authorities agreed with the opposition on 10 December the event for 300 people on Revolution square before the outburst of mass protest of December 5. However, by December 7-8 tens of thousands of people suggested on Social Network Sites that they will take part in the upcoming protest. Therefore, it became clear to the regime that the protests may have large social and political resonance. Potential arrival of tens of thousands of people by the Kremlin walls may have provoked repression and further escalation. Therefore, the authorities were eager to move protests somewhere away from the city center.

Among challengers more radically-oriented groups insisted on keeping the Revolution square as the place for the protest despite the requests of authorities. Whereas liberal politicians like Nemtsov and Ryzhkov, who were in change of the Committee supported peaceful format of rally and wanted to prevent repression. Therefore, they negotiated with the authorities much less central Bolotnaya square (Gabowitch 2017, p.150). However, by sticking to the proposed by authorities format of rally they "...reinforced a political system in which protest is managed by the state, who refused to recognize actors other than members of the elite who are willing to play by its rules" (Ibid., p. 151). Gabowitch (2017) also adds that "(t)he media figures' ability to channel protest strengthened their status as primary contact for the authorities and as legitimate representatives of the opposition, although that ability depended not on the democratic mandate awarded by the protesters but on informal contacts with state officials" (Ibid., p.151).

None of other movement organizations was able to put sufficient pressure on organizers to switch for more democratic character of representation due to their lack of mass social base, resources and influence among protesters. Therefore, the Committee's structure remained the same. It provided limited opportunities for different social groups to channel their demands beyond the most general ones, which included the opposition to Putin's regime, unfair elections, corruption, poor governance and lack of civil liberties (Gabowitch 2017, p. 142).

Besides top-down organization, protesters tried to establish bottom-up initiatives. For instance, the Facebook group "We were at Bolotnaya and will be return" was originally established to organize for the rally on December 10. Later it expanded and served as a platform

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for discussing different issues related to protest, share and diffuse information about the upcoming events and link different individuals and groups together (Vanke A., Ksenofontova, I. and Tartakovskaja, I. 2014, Töpfl, F. 2018). There were other public groups and initiatives on Facebook, Lifejournal and Vkontakte that helped people to organize and build new networks. Different grassroots practices like the Workshop for protest action mushroomed and provided ordinary protesters with outlets for civic engagement.

In addition to large rallies, during this period we can also locate myriad of distinct events organized by political groups or civic initiatives. Besides expanding to different groups, social movement sector expanded geographically. For instance, on December 10, protests took place in more than fifteen cities in Russia and abroad (Aron 2012). On December 17, the party Yabloko (The Apple) organized a demonstration on Bolotnaya square in Moscow. On the same day people protested in five more Russian cities (Gabowitch 2017). On December 18, the protests in Moscow downtown were organized by the Communist party. On December 20, protests took place in large regional cities (Aron 2012). Challenging groups mainly adopted conventional repertoire of action, whereas confrontational was barely visible.

Initial success of mass mobilization allowed protest organizers to continue organizing large rallies on the growing wave of mobilization. In particular, another large protest was held on Sakharov avenue on December 24 and attracted more than 50 000 people (Kadobnov 2011). The important detail is that MPs from the Communists party and Fair Russia came to the protest to give a speech from the scene, but did not get the microphone. The representatives of the systemic opposition on the scene could have demonstrated the support of the institutional actors, but movement leaders did not give them the chance.

What is more, media diva Sobchak appeared on the scene in furs coat. This allowed the regime propaganda to frame contention on media as the protest of well off Muscovites, which were opposed to ordinary people. As Meyer (1995) suggest media celebrity may "homogenize" or even "redefine" the movement they represent (Ibid., p.202). In Russian case the presence of celebrities like Sobchak reinforced the view of the movement as the protest of "the well-off middle class" instead of seeing heterogeneity of political actors and social groups the movement embraced.

Challengers tried to get in touch with more liberally oriented representatives of regime, who could broker potential regime-opposition negotiations. Some of the former, high-rank

regime members like ex-finance minister and close Putin's friend Kudrin even gave the speech from the scene of protest. However, the pressure on the regime was not sufficient.

The representation of different groups during the protests on December 24 suggests further expansion of the movement sector among different groups and sectors of society (Tarrow 1989, McAdam 1995). In particular, systemic and non-systemic liberals, nationalists, environmentalists, automotive movement, feminists, LGBT movement took part in the protest (Greene 2014: chapter 8; Gabowitch 2017: chapter 4). We can also observe the expansion of interpretive themes of protest. In comparison to the last rally on December 10, the dominant theme of fair elections was expanded and now included peaceful reorganization of existing political regime and resignation of the prime-minster Putin.

Though the ruling elites did not want to make any concessions to protesters, they also did not deploy overt repression. However, the regime has deployed subtler forms of suppression like symbolic obstruction on public TV (Boycoff 2006). High officials on the state-run media criticized challengers and suggested that protests were unpatriotic and anti-Russian and were "orchestrated from abroad as a part of a larger Western plot to destabilize Russia" (Koesel and Bunce 2012, p. 415). By adopting discursive suppression, the regime mounted the negative image of protests in the minds of the broader public, who could potentially join the protest. The rulers also communicated to loyal audiences the message that the situation is under control and 'The Orange menace" will not work out in Russia. The regime has also mobilized pro-Putin rallies, which were mainly made up of public employees and the youth ersatz movements (Smyth, Sobolev and Soboleva 2013).

Formation of new organizations and initiatives, innovation and spread of new repertoires, expansion of the protest movement sector

December 25, 2011 – Mid-March 2012

Large rallies of December have provided a broad platform for communication and building networks and solidarities among previously politically disengaged people. It further fostered the diffusion of protest to broader society and to different regions. At this point a lot of

previously unknown groups emerged and previously inactive people got activated for collective action. New forms of repertoire of action emerged.

One of the most successful grassroots initiatives of that period was The Workshop of Protest actions (Volkov 2012b, p.15-17). The Workshop was a platform where different individuals and civic groups could implement their protest ideas on practice.. Participants gathered together, proposed the idea of collective action, found those who were interested in turning the idea into action and raised required funds if it was necessary (Volkov 2012b). At the Workshop non-partisan citizens who never before were engaged in protest activity were guided by journalists and liberal activists. This format further facilitated peaceful repertoire of contention.

December 5, 2011. Sanctioned protests against the **falsifications** on elections on Clean Ponds. Up to **7000** protesters. Grew into an unorganized marsh. **Hundreds** are detained.

December 10, 2011. Authorized protests on *Bolotnaya Square*. **80-100 000** protesters, including opposition and civic leaders..

January 29, 2012. Motor rally of up to **3000 vehicles** go around Moscow. White ribbons is the main marker of protesters.

February 19, 2012. Motor rally around Garden ring. Up to **2000** of vehicles took part in the rally.

March 5, 2012. 15-20 000 people **legally** protested against the election of Putin as a president on *Pushkin square*. After the end of the event some insurgents refused to leave - police brutally detained **dozens** of people, including opposition leaders Udal'tsov and Navalny.

April 2012. Series of localized protests at lover level.

May 6, 2012. The March of Millions gathered around 15-20000 people. Around 570 protesters were detained. All leaders of the protest and common people were brutally beaten and taken to police stations. Criminal trials were launched against protesters.

DECEMBER 2011

JANUARY 2012

FEBRUARY 2012

MARCH 2012

APRIL 2012

JUNE 2012

JUNE 2012

December 4, 2011. Up to 300 people protested against unfair elections on the *Triumph Square* in unsanctioned protests. More than **100** protesters were **detained.**

December 24, 2011. Approved protest on *Saharov avenue*. **100-120 000** of protesters. All major political and civic opposition leaders gathered together.

February 4, 2012. Approved marsh on *Large Yakimanka* and protest on *Bolotnaya square*. **100 000** of protesters.

March 10, 2012. Sanctioned protest on *New Arbat* .**15-25 000** of protesters including election observers. The leftist groups with Udal'tsov were detained at the end of the event.

May 8-21, 2012. Popular gatherings in Moscow downtown. Establishment of opposition camp next to Abay monument. After camp dispersion on May 16, people moved to Barricadnaya subway station. Dozens were detained, including Navalny and Udaltsov.

December 6, 2011. Unauthorized protests on **Clean Ponds.** Up to **1500** of protesters, around **600** were detained.

February 26, 2012. **11-18 000** of protesters formed a human chain around Moscow Garden Ring road.

March 18, 2012. Spontaneous protests of around **1000** protesters next to the *National Channel office* against the propaganda movie telling biased stories about protests. Around **100** people were detained.

June 12, 2012. The Marsh of millions on Saharov avenue. **15-20 000** of protesters. No clashes with police were observed.

Figure 2. Timeline of "For Fair Elections" movement

There was an outburst of numerous peaceful contention. For instance, on January 29, newly-emerged initiative Voters' League organized car rally across Moscow streets. Around 3000 cars with drove across the central streets of the capital. This repertoire of contention became modular and diffused to different cities. On February 19 in Moscow around two thousands of cars took part in the anti-Putin motor rally ("Cars Circle Central Moscow in Anti-Putin Protest"). On February 26, 2012 Voter League introduced another original form of contention. People formed a huge human chain by standing together and holding their hands on Garden Ring (Edler 2012). The emergence and growth of new initiatives and extra-parliamentary groups took place not just in Moscow, but also was expanding in province.

This diversity of new actors required some sort of representation and coordination. The Organizing Committee of Rallies remained rather rigid structure. Liberal political leaders and prominent personalities, few left and right-wing leaders and few representatives of extra parliamentary groups were still in charge of it. The Committee leaders were not receptive to the voices of other extra parliamentary groups and movements, which were not the part of the Committee. Facebook and VK groups did not provide enough cohesion and sufficient level of coordination. Organizational issue inhibited building of alliances between different groups and formation of common strategy and goals of the movement.

In parallel to more closed Committee, on December 11 civic activists and politicians created Initiative group, which was later transformed and renamed in Civic Council (Gabowitch 2017, p. 154). As Davidis suggested "They tried to create an alternative to the Committee. Every week they gathered broader coalition of the opposition in there. There were famous people there, Piontkovski came there, Kasparov, some other people. Ilya Ponomarev actively participated. But this gathering did not have weight among protesters. They tried to influence the way marshes and protests are going to be held but the Committee ignored it. The Committee had all media and financial leverages. And media influence was much more due to the presence of Parchomenko, Nemtsov, Kasparov" (Interview RU1). It lacked publicity, resources and more importantly connections with high officials. It demised in March and soon got disbanded.

Besides smaller events, protesters kept on staging large rallies. The next rally took place on February 4. Organizers managed to mobilized around 50 000 people (Barry and Kramer

2012). The Committee has invited the candidates for the presidency Prokhorov, Zyuganov and Mironov. However, none of them agreed to give a speech on the side of challengers. This was a signal about the absence of support from systemic opposition. This could have been a crucial factor, since it could have attracted more masses of people to support the movement when it was still on the move. However, the candidates preferred to use the lever of not supporting opposition as the instrument of pressure on United Russia for gaining more benefits in institutional politics.

The next large protest was held at Pushkin square right after presidential elections, on March 5. Around thirty thousand people gathered together to protest against the results of presidential elections, which were officially won by Putin (Harding 2012). The protest was peaceful, but a group of 500 – 1000 radically oriented protesters refused to leave the square when the rally was over. In response police roughly detained around 250 participants including the leaders of protest Udaltsov and Navalny. Repressive agencies used mass overt suppression for the first time since early December. After the end of official presidential campaign, the regime has become less tolerant to protesters and the opportunities for collective action were narrowing down. The next rally was held on March 10 and again was devoted to the presidential elections. Ten to fifteen thousand people came to demonstration to express their discontent with unfair in their view presidential elections. After the protest a group of radically oriented protesters with Udaltsov tried to break through to Pushkin square and was detained by police ("Dozens arrested as Moscow protesters call for new elections").

The election of the new-old president resulted in increasing pressure on protesters. In particular, the authorities attacked the protesters discursively on national TV channels. For example, one of the major channels broadcast propaganda movie "The anatomy of protest" on March 16 ("More protest arrests as Russians rally outside Moscow TV tower"). The movie negatively portrayed the protest movement, called protesters unpatriotic and claimed that they got money from USA for protesting in the streets of the cities (Ibid.). It has provoked the wave of indignation and spontaneous protests that gathered around 1000 people next to the TV center building. After short demonstration the police started detaining people and as a result of a spontaneous protest around 100 people were sent to police station.

On overall, the arrival of Putin for another six years to the presidential chair made mobilization of public more problematic. The theme of elections got exhausted, people got tired, no tangible results were achieved. The elections have politicized citizens and triggered their mobilization. At the same time, inability of organizers to formulate any feasible demands beyond opposition to Putin and absence of shared collective identity contributed to demobilization (Zhuravlev, Savelyeva and Erpyleva 2014).

Many protesters felt that their interest were neglected for the sake of political purposes of opposition, who used protests to gain their political benefits. On the other hand, people gained new experience in collective action and self - organization, expanded their personal networks. This made many individuals turn to 'real' local issues in which they were interested before, but did not know to handle them (e.g. housing issues, ecological problems). So after the rallies and shared experiences of protesting they felt empowered and got organized for fixing the issues that were important personally for them. This dynamic also contributed to further demobilization of protests.

The structure of the protest implied top-down nature and lack of access and representation of various groups. Liberal politicians and prominent personalities precluded more democratic nature mobilizing structure. Regime adopted its tactics and began to use more repressive policies. The public was gradually disengaging and protest was losing its support in society.

Coexistence of organized and non-organized engagement, new cites of civic engagement, further demobilization of protest

April – May 21, 2012

By April demobilization and fragmentation of protest have become more evident. The number of protest events was rapidly and steadily falling down since its peak in February. In April there were more than ten times less protests than in February (Semenov 2018). The topic of fraudulent elections got exhausted, there was no real payoffs and movement organizers did not

manage to create strong collective identity. As the result, less and less people were willing to participate in protest.

Besides repressions, the authorities also made several nominal concessions in April-May. Namely, they passed the law, which made the registration of political party much easier. They also reintroduced the regional and local elections of the heads of executive power, however, with some important restraints. Political parties did not have to collect signatures for participation in elections and the number of signatures required for candidates for presidency was significantly lowered.

Despite demobilization tendencies of April, in May the protest revived again. The next large rally "The March of Millions" took place on May 6. It was officially sanctioned by the authorities and gathered around 15 000 - 20 000 protesters (Barry and Schwirtz 2012). The organizers staged the protest the day before the official inauguration of the president Putin. The final destination of the march was Bolotnaya square, where organizers planned to have concert. However, not all protesters managed to get to the square.

Initially the protest organizers submitted the request for 5 000 demonstrators and authorities sanctioned this amount of people. For security reasons the police have installed walk-through frames at the entrance to Bolotnaya (Barry and Schwirtz 2012). However, the number of the frames for entrance was not sufficient for the number of people who actually came to protest. When certain amount of people already entered the square, entering the space next to the them got problematic due to the limited capacities of walk-through frames and large number of people. More importantly, the leaders of the protest decided to change initially agreed plan and announced a sit-in right on the bridge. The police considered this decision as a violation of law and started cordoning protesters off from the bridge. By doing so the law enforcement agencies provoked clashes with demonstrators. Then the police started detaining people, including leaders of the rally Nemtsov, Yashin and Navalny (Barry and Schwirtz 2012). In total, the police have detained more than 600 people. Many protesters were injured ("Russia: Investigate Police Use of Force Against Peaceful Protesters"). On the same night challengers spread on the social network sites the announcement about the continuation of protests on the next day in the Moscow downtown.

On May 7, in the day of inauguration of Putin, several thousands of people gathered in different places of Moscow center for peaceful public walkings. The police often harshly detained those people in the center of the city without any viable reason. By the end of the day protesters gathered in the park Kitay Gorod, but the police have dispersed them. Protesters kept on walking and gathering in the city center.

On May 9, following public walkings and demonstration, a large group of protesters finally settled down at Chistye Prudy next to the Abay monument. After some negotiations they decided to set up there a camp (Elder 2012). Challengers adopted new repertoire of contention, which was borrowed from Occupy Wall Street movement. They occupied the public space of park around the Kazakh poet Abay monument and made it their camp. Media labeled this part of protest cycle 'Occupy Abay'. The organizational structure of the movement was flat and non-hierarchical, key decisions were taken by the majority on the assembly. Protestors organized the information stand, lectures, set up a kitchen, spread literature, invited famous people for lectures, set up electricity and Internet, established self-financing and assigned guards to keep an order in the camp (Elder 2012). The number of people in the camp never exceeded one-two thousand, but it was vibrant, new people were coming all the time, participants were streaming live video online 24/7, famous politicians and members of parliament were coming there. Police eventually dispersed protesters on May 21.

In parallel to the Occupy Abay protests, on May 13, famous writers, journalists, politicians, media persons announced 'public walkings'. People walked across the city streets and then initiated a demonstration by the Abay monument. This repertoire of contention immediately became modular and was adopted by protesters in many other cities in the following days.

Shortly after the 'occupy' phase, the regime started its attack on the movement more firmly. Legal suppression in the form of trials against Bolotnaya protesters and passage of anti-protest laws have restrained further contention and pointed at the closure of the protest wave.

Repressions, new anti-protest laws and closure of the cycle
Late May – June 2012

Right after the Bolotnaya events on May 6, Russia's Investigative Committee launched the investigative procedure over the participants and organizers of Bolotnaya events ("The "Bolotnaya Square" case"). Prosecutors accused protesters of organizing mass riots, violating public order and violent actions against the police. These accusations resulted in the series of trials against participants and organizers of the Bolotnaya protests.

The police detained the first target of the process on May 28, shortly after the 'occupy' stage of protest was over. In the upcoming days police was opening trials against suspects almost every day. Public media broadly discussed the targets of prosecution and always framed them as criminals who committed a crime. The prosecutor's office qualified the case as "the organization of mass unrests and participation in them" ("The "Bolotnaya Square" case"). By offending the opposition and civic activists the authorities were further narrowing down the opportunities for mass mobilization.

The regime continued its attack on the movement in a more fundamental way by changing the rules of engagement in contention. New laws were design to clarify and significantly restrain the boundaries of contention by defining who, when and how can engage in contentious politics (Boudreau 2005). The laws were adopted by the parliament on the night of June 5 and signed by the president on June 9. The legislative initiative considerably increased the fines that could be applied to those who dare to violate them. "The fines are quite hefty: about $10,000 (£6,440) for anyone participating in an unsanctioned rally, or up to $10,000 for anyone who damages property during a sanctioned rally. The problem is that many of these charges are quite vague. People this afternoon were very unsure whether, for example, walking on the grass would lead to a fine of $10,000" (McGuinness 2012). Vagueness of the laws gave social control agents much more space for interpretation of the situation in the way they wanted. At the same time, it made public political expression much more problematic and in a way imposed self-censorship on protesters by restraining of what they could and what they could not do.

By adopting new laws, the authorities made the perceived cost of participation much higher and tried to cut off from protests moderate sympathizers of political alternative to the existing regime. The government also made the possibility of unorganized forms of collective action less feasible and gained more control over the central public spaces of big cities. The movement was compelled to follow new rules if its leaders wanted to mobilize masses for secure collective action. There was no radical reaction to the laws on the side of any protest groups.

What makes these anti-protest laws different from the ones adopted during Maidan is that they had no effect on those who were previously engaged in protest. Anti-protest laws in Ukraine criminalized numerous protestors who were *already* engaged into protests. And therefore, created potentially available pool of activists who were more receptive to more radical rhetoric. In Russian case, the laws affected future participation and could just scare off the most moderate sympathizers of the movement, who did not want to get at risk of getting high fines.

The last large rally of the protest cycle, which was held on June 12. It already followed new rules (McGuinness 2012). What is more, right before the protest police initiated another wave of repression of the protest leaders. They raided the leaders of the protest and other prominent personalities supporting the movement, harassed them, initiated a media campaign against them and ordered them to come to the police for interrogation right at the time when the protest was taking place. In such a way authorities wanted to disorganize protesters and put more pressure on organizers.

Rally gathered around 20 000 people who marched across the central streets of the capital. This rally was the last large protest event of the protest circle. In parallel to it the Bolotnaya trial was advancing and moving further by attaining more media attention.

New laws have significantly restrained the opportunities for spontaneous protest and forced those who wanted to protest legally to do that mostly in centralized, sanctioned by authorities ways. After gaining some experience, creating new networks and forging solidarity many active participants preferred to move their contention to lower level of everyday issues related to ecology, housing, illegal construction or maintenance of public spaces (Greene 2014, Clement 2015).

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The authorities managed to regain the control of the situation at a relatively low cost. The cycle eventually came to an end. The regime after experiencing the wave of protests got more authoritarian. The authorities learned how to deal with new for them mass mobilization and tried to insulate themselves from future potential outburst of the protest by adopting repression and restraining the opportunities for protest. There were no major defections on the side of regime, therefore it remained stable despite the eruption of public discontent. The authorities managed to maintain the control over large groups of society by preventing them from engagement in protest. The authorities mainly succeeded in preventing mass protest to go beyond Moscow, though some protests diffused to province too. On overall, instead of getting engaged in dialogue with discontented groups of population, the regime preferred to rely even more on paternalist groups of population and province that were dependent on public funding, state-run enterprises and subsides from the government and ignored well educated urban population who demanded social and political change.

Conclusions

Protest cycle of "For fair elections" movement lasted for almost six months. It was mostly peaceful, produced limited violence and achieved moderate results. Authorities adopted limited repression, used it consistently with limited concessions and managed to deter all the attempts to radicalize protest. Culturally, absolute majority of Russian citizens did not consider right for protest as an important part of their citizenship (Hale 2011). They also viewed the state as strong and paternalistic. Russian political culture embraced little acceptance for grassroots mobilization (Clement 2015). National repressive agencies possessed sufficient resources and were entirely loyal to the state (Taylor 2011). These stable dimensions of Russian environment and organizational features of law enforcement agencies shaped the reaction of the state to mobilization and protesters in response to repression by the regime.

In particular, we hardly observe any escalation in response to Bolotnaya events, besides moderate and not numerous protests on May 7-8 as well as peaceful, harmless and small Occupy Abay. In the situations when protesters deviated from originally sanctioned rules of

behavior during protest, police did not hesitate and immediately repressed contenders. It happened on December 5, March 5, March 10 or May 6 to name but few most important cases. In contrast to Ukraine, Russian national identity is more homogenous and therefore, did not produce effects similar to Ukrainian neither among protesters, not among agents of social control.

Alliance structure of "civil rights" coalition in Russia was weaker than in Ukraine due to the lack of the protestors' support in the parliament and by systemic actors. National TV channels and state-run media mostly framed protest negatively (Ross 2015). It was one of the factors that prevented the broader public from joining protests and more sympathetic attitudes to protesters. When authorities applied repression to protesters, the movement had very few advocates within political system and among the broader public. What is more, repression scared away numerous moderate sympathizers. New media had a limited reach and could not inform the broader public about repressive policies of the state. Therefore, social composition of the protest remained mostly the same, with the dominance of well-educated, well-off, urban and moderate population, who was not ready for radical actions. It contributed to further demobilization of the protest.

The nature of political regime and institutions mater for the effects of repression (Henderson 1991, Fein 1995). Though Russian regime was hybrid just like Ukrainian, but it was institutionally more stable and had higher repressive capacity, and in its policies it was more autocratic (Gelman 2015). In particular, "sovereign democracy" erected high barriers to institutional politics and limited available resources and political space for extra-parliamentary groups (Krastev 2007). The opposition in the parliament and government was rather nominal and did not subvert key decision making.

The lack of institutional channels for discontent made regime less receptive to alternative visions and more inclined for suppressing them. However, differently from Ukraine, Russia experienced lower levels of institutional underdevelopment and therefore, could better handle protest. In particular, its repression was consistent (Lichbach 1987), namely, the authorities allowed sanctioned and peaceful protest, whereas immediately repressed any deviations from authorized behavior. Authorities also made some concessions to protesters by making registration of political parties much easier and reintroducing the elections of governors, though with the

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approval of the president (Gabowitch 2017). Therefore, consistent 'stick and carrots' policies exercised within less uncertain institutional environment proved to be effective and provoked little escalation.

The characteristics of dissent in FFE protest cycle also influenced the application and success of repression. In particular, besides May 6, there were very few attempts to escalate the protest. What is more, protests were mostly centralized and arranged in sanctioned by authorities forms, which mostly prevented them from potential radicalization. This was to high extent conditioned by the organizational structure of the movement. Liberal politicians and groups who were in charge of the protest opted for conventional repertoire of action and made their best to prevent radicalization. Few attempts of more radical movement leaders and their SMOs to radicalize protest failed. The most obvious case was Bolotnaya. Sanctioned and centralized marches and protests prevented multiple threats to the system which could have produced massive strain and repression in response as a "cheaper" and easier option.

Radical groups of the movement played minor role in defining mobilizing strategies of the movement and remained marginals in mobilizing structure. In contrast to Right Sector, which never adjusted its discourse and strategy, more radically groups in FFE movement tried to avoid radical actions during mass protests and avoided radical slogans in public. As Alex Gaskarov from anarchist Autonomous Action said "We based our strategy on shared consensus that we are all so different in the protest, but we have a common goal – democratization of political system…So, what we tried to do is to act as least radical as possible. We tried to adjust to general line, not to provoke anyone within the movement. What is more, at certain point we started to form guardian bodies at protests to avoid provocations" (Interview RU10).

Major reason why more radically oriented groups in Russian case tried to soften their rhetoric and not to act radically is ability of authorities to repress radical groups and lack of their support by public at later stages of protest. Gaskarov added "We understood that if had "performed" something like blocking the road, the police would have immediately arrested us and it would have made no sense" (Interview RU10). In contrast to Ukraine, the course of events did not produce more receptive to radical discourse public.

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Absolute majority of public did not support radicalization which made radical repertoire a futile strategy. As the surveys of the protests demonstrate protesters represented mostly well-off, well-educated, urban population, (Volkov 2012), who were not ready to risk the comforts of their lives and get engaged in radical actions. Therefore, lack of favorable media coverage, moderate social base of the protest and minor role of radicals in mobilizing structure as well as high capacities of the regime to repress shaped the minor escalation and ability of authorities to control it.

Chapter 7. Frame analysis of "For Fair Elections" movement

After exploring all the most significant instances of repression, I have identified two major repressive instances that affected the movement's framing dynamics, namely, Bolotnaya events and anti-protest laws. In what follows we will closely investigate the relationship between two phenomena in each of these situations. We will devote a section to each act of repression and provide their in-depth analysis. Each section contains subsections, which are devoted to frame analysis of different wings of the movement sector, namely liberal political parties as well as left, liberal and right-wing extra-parliamentary groups.

May 6. Repression on Bolotnaya

Political parties

Diagnosis. After the reelection of the president Putin in early March the theme of unfair elections has become less prominent in the discourse of opposition, but still remained there. Harsh repression of protesters on May 6 broadened diagnostic framing and brought the theme of repression in the movement's discourse.

There were two major strategies in diagnostic framing of political groups. The former blamed both authorities for their repression of protesters *and* protest leaders for their irresponsibility and escalation (Yabloko, Website, 06.05.2012). The latter insisted that the regime and repressive agencies were fully responsible for the eruption of violence (Parnas, Vkontakte, 08.05.12 04:15PM). The former view was expressed by more closely embedded in the institutional politics liberals or those who supported to them, while the latter positon belonged to non-systemic liberal forces.

Yabloko represented the former camp. The party condemned the actions of authorities, who in their view inadequately repressed innocent participants of mass event. However, they also accused the protest leaders of irresponsible actions, such as unplanned sit-in instead of pre-agreed passage to the scene. In the official press-release Yabloko claimed "We think

that the behavior of the organizers on the today's marsh is completely irresponsible and provocative…There is no better gift for authorities right before the inauguration of Putin, than this gambling, which reveals complete irresponsibility and infantilism of some opposition forces in Russia" (Website, 06.05.12). Jabloko's press-secretary clearly confirmed this position by suggesting that "On one hand, it was a provocation from organizers of the protest, on the other hand, from police, who set up too narrow entrance to Bolotnaya… And we as a party of course did not support this, and though some activists continued to protest on their own behalf, we already though that it was pointless" (Interview RU2).

By the same token, DemVybor also suggested that innocent people were ruthlessly beaten by the police because the protest leaders poorly organized the actions of the crowd and wanted to use the protest for further radicalization of protest (DemVybor, Livejournal, 10.05.2012). In their view, the movement leaders chose the wrong strategy. The protest leaders originally wanted to set up a sit-in before reaching the venue of protest. However, organizers did not inform the public about their strategy. Otherwise, numerous people would simply have not joined the protest (DemVybor, Livejournal, 10.05.2012). DemVybor's leader Milov stated "There were people, who wanted to stage revolution and were afraid that everybody will go home after the protest. We call it revolution only when you win and overthrow the regime. If you fail, then it is the rebellion of the extremists, who encroach public stability with all the repercussions of May 6. Those protest leaders, who sat on the asphalt [sit-in on Bolotnaya], acted as if they didn't know how riot police is going to act. Of course, they perfectly knew that. All those who were in charge of the protest perfectly knew how it is going to end up. In fact, that they did not take any measures to protect people" (Eho Moskvy 2012).

Thus, repression has become the part of the challengers' discourse and affected the evaluation of the protest strategy. Yabloko, DemVybor and their supporters equally blamed both opposition *and* protest leaders for the eruption of violence during the protests. Yakovlev claimed "We [Yabloko] condemned the actions of the protest on May 6 and provoked dissatisfaction among some partners of the opposition movement, who belonged to the organizers. But for us it was important to state that *both* authorities and organizers were not right" (Interview RU2, emphasis added).

More distanced from institutional politics liberal parties had alternative diagnostic framing. They suggested that the protest's strategy was right and blamed exclusively authorities for the escalation. For instance, Parnas insisted that the authorities on purpose created the situation which provoked clashes and claimed that "The authorities on purpose or due to the its carelessness and negligence set up the provocation by highly limiting the access of participants of the "March of Millions" to Bolotnaya square. The former version is more likely because in December and February everything was normal, secure and even friendly" (Parnas, Website, 08.05.2012). The party claimed that poor arrangements of the protest by the authorities resulted in the situation when "The participants of the rally got in the narrow bottleneck, which was just 15 meters broad. Artificially created jamming caused panic among protesters. Further actions of the police were beatings, gassing off and putting people in the police vans" (Vkontakte, 08.05.12 PM).

In a similar vein, Libertarian party insisted that authorities planned and carried out their repression of peaceful protesters (*Atlant* magazine, May 2012). In their view "It is undeniable that such cruel actions of the police employees during the event can only be explained by criminal order and its not less criminal accomplishment. The protest was agreed with authorities in advance, announced in media, and people gathered in the streets in a peaceful manner and were unarmed. After the peaceful marsh … the movement was stopped by the enormous column of the police ad machines, which blocked the passage to the protest space. At the same moment the police began to arrest people" (*Atlant* magazine, May 2012, p. 2).

This frame dispute reflected two strategies of the protest which were both present during the rally and protest on May 6. The former strategy insisted on the peaceful repertoire of action. The groups and parties within movement who supported this strategy hoped that peaceful mass protest would be sufficient to put pressure on regime for reaching their goals. In their view, escalation was supposed to lead to potential repression by authorities, withdrawal of the support of moderate constituencies, further demobilization and radicalization of the protest.

Political parties that were more distanced from institutional politics and belonged to more radically oriented sector of the movement viewed escalation and confrontation as the only way to revive the protest and go beyond the fair elections agenda. For non-systemic political parties and supporting them political groups, non-conventional repertoire was the only chance to prevent

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demobilization, expand the agenda, radicalize the protest and mobilize new constituencies. They hoped that less conventional actions will help to construct new consensus and mobilize more people around it. They realized that mass, peaceful protest was not enough to force the regime for any concessions or policy shifts. What is more, the social base of protest was rapidly shrinking and therefore it was harder and harder to mobilize even relatively moderate numbers of protesters around the exhausted issue of fair elections. By acting provocatively and opportunistically, they hoped to provoke repression of protesters, which would result in broadening of agenda and further mobilization in response. They already tried to implement this scenario previously on December 5, March 5 and March 10. However, there were very few protesters who supported more radical actions and police arrested them very efficiently. Protest cycle did not produce enough radical public, who were ready for radicalization. Police effectively repressed those groups who were ready to escalate.

Prognosis. Despite divergence in diagnostic framing, both moderately and more radically oriented parties had similar prognostic framing. Due to tough repression, which led to the arrests of more than six hundred people, all liberal political parties suggested that all the detainees must be released, since they did not violate any laws. Contenders also demanded to start the prosecution of those who gave the orders and was responsible for suppression. For instance, Libertarian party stated "We demand immediate release all the detained during the May protest events and public investigation of the police and state agents' actions in such a situation with further prosecution of all the responsible for what happened" (Atlant 2012, p.2).

Moderate political forces of the movement kept on insisting on the peaceful strategy of protest. More institutionally leaning Yabloko, was aware that the protest cycle was declining. Therefore, besides non-institutional politics, its leadership was trying to mobilize its supporters for party politics. In particular, Yabloko's leader Yavlinskyi stated "Civic protests, walkings and flash mobs on their own can't change anything politically and due to their helplessness will often grow into fights and clashes. The increase of violence will make the situation in all respects much worse. What are we supposed to do? Create the alternative. We need personal, programmatic, personnel, moral or POLITICAL alternative. We need to start doing serious politics, win elections and take the power. Long time? Yes, six years is too long, but earlier we will not be able to do anything"

(Livejournal, 10.05.2012). In the other words, Yabloko also expressed its strategic position by stating that "For those who approve violent actions by the opposition in response to illegal actions of authorities and support the principle "eye for eye", we recommend to watch the movie about Gandhi" (Vkontakte, 11.05.2012 12:30 PM). In fact, when politicians realized that potential benefits of the protest politics were rapidly shrinking, whereas the costs of repression were increasing, they got more focused on party politics and were distancing themselves from protest.

Those political parties that lacked or had no access to institutional politics and were previously supporting more radically oriented demands and strategies realized on practice that their attempts to escalate were doomed to be harshly repressed by the police. What is more, their prior appeals for more confrontational or radical tactics did not resonate well with the target constituencies. Therefore, they *had to* agree on conventional repertoire of action, which was reflected in their prognosis. Though they still tried to innovate and stage peaceful actions in the places and dates that were not sanctioned by the regime. For instance, following the repression, protest leaders organized peaceful walkings and peaceful occupations of public spaces like Abay monument.

For instance, Parnas stated "We need to continue to protest. We need to demand new elections not according to Putin's laws, but in line with new democratic rules" (Vkontakte, 08.05.2012 04:15PM). Libertarian party echoed them by suggesting such points of strategy as "…temporary refusal from the critics of the members of the broad civic coalition. Everyone has skeleton in the closet; let's take them out from there when the time of fair elections comes…. Active non-violent civic resistance, including all-Russian civic strike which demands the Vladimir Putin's resignation… No aggression to those, who for some reasons cooperate with the regime. We need to give everybody the chance to make her choice. Lustration makes sense only if we have to overthrow the regime. However, if we are talking about relatively peaceful change, then we need to keep the door open" (Atlant, May 2012).

Repressions on Bolotnaya scared away numerous moderate protesters, but did not radicalize sufficient number of protesters, which led to further demobilization of protest and support of conventional actions by both systemic and non-systemic political liberals. As Yakovlev stated "The events of May 6 have influenced well-off people. They understood that they came out

on the streets and it did not change anything. They were not ready to pay such a high price for being beaten with baton or get jailed… Therefore, this large part of people got scared of such repercussions. The other part joined political organizations, including Jabloko. There are very few people who are ready to sacrifice their freedom and their lives for the sake of high political ideals" (Interview RU2).

The peaceful strategy following the Bolotnaya events became dominant in peaceful "public walkings", which is a form of public gathering and walking without any placards and chanting. Even though the police for several days, often harshly, arrested people for wearing white ribbons or just walking in the city center, it did not provoke any radicalization. What is more, public walking and peaceful protests grew into Occupy Abay events, which were even less threating for the regime and less publically visible. Therefore, we can suggest that after the failed attempt to awaken and radicalize protest on the ground on Bolotnaya, more radically oriented political fraction of the movement adopted exclusively peaceful tactic in its discourse.

Collective identity. As a result of repression police have arrested more than 600 people. Law enforcement agencies have beaten and harassed many of them. Relying on this fact, some claim makers attempted to construct shared grievances and forge more inclusive collective identity. In particular, Parnas stated that "Apparently, the authorities are scared of society. The gap between them is growing every day" (Parnas, Facebook, May 7). Discourse constructors framed protesters as society at large to confront them with the authorities on the other side of barricades. They also signified the boundary between weak regime and the movement that is getting stronger and is gaining more and more public support.

Besides constructing more inclusive collective identity, challengers also emphasized unhuman nature of the authorities. They focused on the repressive actions of the law enforcement agencies and their cruel character. Parnas suggested that "Further actions of the police – beatings, gassing off, pulling people into the police vans". In addition, DemVybor framed Putin's press-secretary as "heartless" and "cynical" and condemned his statement that riot police should have smudged the liver of protesters on asphalt (DemVybor, website, 9.05.12). Parnas also emphasized unfair nature of the regime and stated on May 9 (The Victory Day) "Veterans, forgive us for what [protests] is happening on your holiday. But we keep on doing your business by

fighting with the occupants. We will smash the enemy, we will win" (Vkontakte, 09.05.2012 05:05 PM). More institutionally leaning parties preferred not to signify collective identity theme.

Liberal extra-parliamentary groups

Diagnosis. Following the repression on Bolotnaya, the repression theme became a part of the discourse and complemented declining fair elections rhetoric. Frame constructors emphasized beatings and arrests of peaceful demonstrators. Here we can observe certain difference in diagnostic framing. In particular, responsibility of authorities and repressive agencies for the initiation of repression.

Some liberal groups solely blamed the regime that provoked violence against peaceful demonstrators who had come to authorized rally. For instance, Solidarity in its official statement claimed "On May 6, the Putin's regime has unprecedentedly violated the laws, including the ones of international law, which override basic human rights and freedoms. Police arrested peaceful, innocent citizens, who committed no crime. Detentions were accompanied by unprecedented level of violence. Our friends, leaders of the protest movement Boris Nemtsov, Sergey Udaltsov and Alexei Navalny were among the arrested" (Website, 07.05.12). The contenders added that "(t)he fact that officially SANCTIONED by the authorities rally does not guarantee safety of its participants makes it senseless to agree with authorities further protest events. The position of the state "human rights activist" and "system liberals" is overwhelming. They shamelessly repeat propagandist lie about supposedly happened "breakthrough", which was the reason for the use of force against peaceful citizens" (Solidarity, Website, 07.05.12). Citizen Observer's organizer Dmitry Oreshkin suggested that "Bolotnaya square was a crucial factor in crashing protest. They provoked the rout, which resulted in violent clashes. Then they [authorities] took into custody numerous people and put them in jail" (Interview RU11).

In the same vein, United Civic Front accused repressive agencies and the authorities of provoking the outburst of violence. The leader of the group Garry Kasparov claimed "The fact that is crucially important for the objective evaluation of this day's [May 6, 2012] events suggests that all clashes with riot police, beatings and arrests of protesters took place within sanctioned by

the authorities space for march and protest before the official end of the event. Unprecedented actions of OMON [riot police] were the culmination in the chain of events of the Moscow mayor office's violations. The video and photos from Bolotnaya demonstrate the crimes committed by the riot police thugs, who followed the direct orders of high police ranks" (Website, 15.05.2012). Discourse constructors insisted that "the actions of the protest participants were exclusively peaceful" (The United civic front, Website, 06.05.12), and therefore, police are fully responsible for occurred escalation. The group's framing of the events can be most clearly seen from the following statement: "Therefore, anyone who at least partly blames organizers of peaceful protest for what happened on May 6, plays a shameful role of provocateur who serves criminal regime" (Official website, 15.05.2012).

Citizen Observer's coordinator Inna Kurtiukova suggested "During the protests on May 6 the authorities acted harshly on the Bolotnaya square. They [authorities] provoked the rout because the police cordon was supposed to be several dozen meters away. They made a narrow entrance, rout began and then violent clashes followed. Most likely the authorities gave an order to stage this situation before Putin's inauguration because the president got scared…" (Interview RU13).

Eco-Defense took more neutral position regarding those who was responsible for the initiation of violent clashes. They did blame the police for brutal repression of protestors. However, the group did not suggest that law enforcement agencies were the only ones who were responsible for the initiation of violent clashes. "It is hard to say who started, but people were more decisive than previously. Riot police and demonstrators, who were trying to break through cordon (which they did for a couple of times), started the clashes, which grew into mass unrests. The people shouted: "It is our city", "Shame on you", "Breakthrough", "Off police state". They were throwing at bottles, smoke bombs, stones and sticks at police. People were pulling out the bars out of the cordon and attacked the police with them. In response the police were gassing people off, pulled people out of the crowd, including women, cruelly beat them with batons and arrested them." (Eco-Defense, Website, 07.05.12). Though environmentalists blamed the regime for its brutal repression of protest, they admitted that protestors also were involved in initiation of violence and by doing so kept a more balanced position. They did not support the position of

system liberals and never blamed protest leaders in eruption of violence. However, they decided to convey the events in a more balanced manner.

Repression has become a considerable part of injustice framing. However, the appeals to injustice of repression neither let liberal extra-parliamentary groups to mobilize numerous protesters, nor allowed them to construct new consensus around which people would mobilize. Target audiences and broader public remained unreceptive to radicalization, therefore there was no backfire. What is more, police acted effectively and repressed radicalized part of the protest. The leaders of liberal extra-parliamentary groups also failed in constructing alternative resonant theme.

Prognosis. Discourse makers suggested that all those who were responsible for repression must be prosecuted and punished for what they did. For instance, Solidarity claimed "On Behalf of United democratic movement "Solidarity" we declare that we will do all we can to identify all those who are responsible for committed today crimes, including the chiefs of police and other governing bodies, and prosecute them" (Vkontakte, 10.05.2012 11:50AM). The contenders kept on insisting on the peaceful strategy of protest. For instance, Eco-Oborona called for action by stating "Today, in the day of "coronation" of the world largest criminal group's leader, the activists of opposition call citizens for coming to the Manege square and to the city center" (Website, 07.05.2012). Claim makers also demanded international pressure on the regime and sanctions against the officials who were responsible for repression (Solidarity, Website, 07.05.2102).

Liberal extra-parliamentary groups consistently supported peaceful public walkings that followed Bolotnaya events as well as peaceful occupations of public areas during "Occupy Abay" phase. None of the groups ever mentioned radical repertoire of action as a possible measure to respond to repression. After experiencing harsh repression in response to attempts to escalate protest and low receptivity of public to radicalization, challengers had to articulate exclusively peaceful repertoire of action in their discourse.

Collective identity. Repression generated the conditions for constructing shared grievances. Building on that, challengers tried to construct more inclusive collective identity of protesters. They also emphasized the growing gap between people and authorities. For instance,

Solidarity suggested that "Today's events mark a qualitative change in the relationship between society and self-appointed illegitimate authorities. This authority has thrown away even the façade of legality, which they until recently tried use to cover its uselessness, and openly got on the path of crimes against their own people" (Website, 07.05.12)

Framers also underscored the broadening social base of the movement and shrinking support of the regime in society. Challenging liberal groups signified the unrepresentative nature of the regime by calling it "largest in the world criminal group" (Eco-Defense, Website, 07.05.12). Discourse makers also signified unhuman nature of the regime by victimizing the targets of its repressive policies. In particular, United Civic Front claimed "The last events put to the forefront the leaders of new generation of protest – Alexey Navalny and Servey Udaltsov. They have become the major target for the Putin's regime, which eventually threw away the façade of legitimacy. Judging by the feverish activity of the Prosecution office and the fraction of the "United Russia" in the parliament, who rapidly began to accomplish the instruction "to bite", Alexey and Sergey are likely to become the figurants of the criminal case related to organizing of mass unrests on Bolotnaya square" (Website, 15.02.2112).

Right-wing groups

Diagnosis. Repression on Bolotnaya affected diagnostic framing of right-wing groups, but did not produce salient change in discourse. The groups incorporated repression in their discourse as a part of injustice framing. Their discourse blamed the regime and law enforcement agencies for poor handling of protest, provocations on Bolotnaya and repression of protesters. For instance, DPNI stated "Did they say that protestors provoked the police? Yesterday's "moderate opposition" tells these lies again and again. It is as if we said that girls provoke rapists. There is no doubt that posing the obstacles on the way of protesters, narrowing down the space for protest and the arrest of the scene equipment is a provocation, which, however was accomplished by authorities" (Website, 08.05.2012).

Discourse makers mentioned not just physical coercion of protesters, but also legal repression (Barkan 1984). For instance, The Russians extensively wrote about the presence of the

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arrested in police stations and attempts to provide them with judicial support. The group stated "Overall number of the arrested is around 600 people (according to official data 400). There were three waves of arrests: major on Bolotnaya – around 17-18.00, the second – next to Manege square, at the subway stations Teatralna and Revolution Square around 19.00, and the third, already rather weak – around 11.00 PM-12.00 AM next to Yakimanka police station, where the opposition activists demanded the release of the protest leaders" (Website, 07.05.2012). The groups managed to intertwine repression with their racist ideological inclinations by occasionally mentioning the fact that the regime used the police brigades that were coming from the parts of the country that were ethnically 'non-Russian'. For instance, The Russians mentioned "Symbolically the authorities employed Caucasian crews of the police against the nationalists" (Website, 07.05.2012). Russian People's Movement (Livejournal, 07.05.2012) and National-Democratic party (06.05.2012) also signified legal repression of protesters.

Discourse makers also emphasized the victims of the regime's repression. For instance, Ethno-Political Union "The Russians" noted that "(D)mitry Demushkin [the leader of the group] was arrested on May 6, 2012 during the anti-regime protest at Teatralna subway station. In the hospital doctors diagnosed moderate brain concussion. There are guards at the entrance to the hospital room" (Livejournal, 08.05.12). Similarly, National Democratic Party pointed at victims of the repression, who were beaten by a policeman: "The policeman has beaten a pregnant woman, who seriously suffered after his attacks" (Livejournal, 08.05.12).

The right-wing groups also focused on the fact that there is a great deal of people, who were arrested during protests. The emphasis on the targets of repression was an important part of the right-wing discourse. For instance, the movement against illegal immigration (DPNI) stated "In total, it is unprecedented number of 800 protesters who were detained, more than 20 police stations were filled up" (Livejournal, 07.05.12). Some of right-wing groups also framed the events on Bolotnaya as "bloody Sunday" by suggesting that this is the beginning of the end of the president Putin's reign (DPNI, Website, 12.05.2012). In the same way National-Democratic party suggests that "Putin begins from "The bloody Sunday. History repeats twice: for the first time as a tragedy, for the second – as a farce" (Vkontakte, 06.05.2012, 10:48 PM).

Thus, repression became an important part of the discourse, but soon it declined and became more marginal. Repressive policies did not produce frame shift in right-wing discourse.

Prognosis. Following harsh repression on Bolotnaya, right-wing groups kept insisting on the conventional repertoire of action and occasionally endorsed confrontational tactics. None of the groups called for radical actions against the regime forces. After mass repression on Bolotnaya, right-wing groups realized that regime will not hesitate to deploy coercive measures and that the absolute majority of protest supporters, including supporters of right-wing groups, were not ready for radical strategy.

Despite generally supported peaceful strategy, groups also occasionally supported confrontational strategy. For instance, The Russians claimed "Only confrontation like it was on Manege square. Let them arrest us, but at least it will be honest" (Livejournal, 07.05.12). Despite these rare exclusions, all groups supported peaceful protest strategy.

National-Democratic party stated "National democrats, join us! Just do not provoke the police and riot police! This is just walking" (Vkontakte, 08.05.2012, 03:56PM). Russian People's Movement suggested that peaceful protest on Chistye Prudy was a great opportunity to "master the skills of mobilization" (Livejournal, 10.05.2012; Livejournal, 12.05.2012). Therefore, strategically speaking, peaceful protest was a great chance for recruiting active constituencies and maintain own network activists at work. Some right-wing groups supported both conventional and non-conventional forms of action, depending on the opportunities for action. For instance, The Russians generally supported peaceful strategy, but occasionally framed radicalization on Bolotnaya in positive terms by stating "When riot police refused to let Navalny and Udaltsov to the stage, they announced a sitting strike. Nationalist leaders supported them. When they called for joining the strike, the marsh was in fact over, and *real* protest started" (Lifejournal, 11.05.12, emphasis added).

More radically oriented part of the right-wing movement sector decided to stage unsanctioned protest on the Theater subway station. From the very beginning they expected the repression by the police, since their activity was unauthorized. Nevertheless, they still framed their protest as normal: "At the subway station, after long negotiations with security forces and

demonstrating physical capacities to break through, protesters finally managed to break off police cordon and got upstairs. The riot police for a while could not detain well-organized groups of insurgents who chained together" (Krylov, National News Agency, 11.05.12).

Thus, after failed attempts to radicalize protest on Bolotnaya, and in their separate protest on Teatralna subway, right-wing groups had to return to conventional repertoire in their discourse. Due to absence of public resonance with radical ideas and effective repression, right-wing groups adopted conventional prognostic framing in response to repression.

Collective identity.

Repression did not have considerable effect on how right-wing groups framed collective identity. Shared grievances of repression did not alter group self-definitions which preferred to refer to themselves as "Russians" (emphasis on ethnic origin) or "nationalists" (ideology) (Livejournal, National News Agency, 11.05.2012).

However, repression contributed to stimulation of further deepening of boundary between the challengers and the authorities. For instance, National-Democratic party claimed "We will put it the way it is, unvarnished. This is a war. There is a battle for Russia. I hope that everyone who did not understand it until now will understand. All the masks are pulled off. All things are cleared up. From now on they[authorities] announced the war to people publicly" (Vkontakte, 07.05.2012, 03:54PM)

Besides counterpoising more inclusive collective identity of challengers, discourse makers also vilified the regime. For instance, right-wing groups often labeled regime as "Putin's hunta" (The movement against illegal migration, Livejournal 07.05.2012) or "chasteners" (The Russians, Website, 08.05.2012).

Left extra-parliamentary groups

Diagnosis. In preceding phases of protest cycle, diagnostic framing of left-wing groups mainly signified unfair elections and more generally their opposition to Putin's regime.

However, more radical or anarchist groups like Autonomous action more generally opposed the state and its neoliberal policies per se. However, they participated in the protest and supported the demands of demonstrators for fair elections, real participation in political life and resignation of the president Putin.

Repression affected diagnostic framing of left-wing groups and became a part of their diagnostic framing. All left-wing groups condemned the regime for the initiation of repression and physical coercion of peaceful protesters. In particular, Left Front stated that "Everything started in a peaceful manner, but the police from the very beginning demonstrated their incompetence by placing for a great number of people just two dozens of walk-through frames and by doing so created a jamming at the entrance to the protest venue. At the entrance to Bolotnaya the policemen left just a 50-meter breadth passage for 150 000 people. What is more, the square was almost entirely flooded with people, who had come there earlier than the main column. For about an hour everything was more or less peaceful, but further on police began to arrest protesters, which provoked radically oriented part of the people's column – which resulted in clashes. Police started to disperse protesters, use batons, beat people with fists and legs, finishing those who were on the ground. They beat and arrested everyone – men, women, seniors" (Website, 06.05.12). Autonomous action underscored the brutality of repression by claiming "Beating of a lying on the ground guy? Why not, they are riot police, not musketeers" (Autonomous action, Vkontakte post, 07.05.12).

Left extra-parliamentary groups emphasized the fact that the authorities provoked escalation to use repression against protesters. In particular, Left Front's activist Vasily Kuzmin suggested that "I am sure that what was happening on Bolotnaya was a provocation [initiated by authorities]. The repression was heavy and cruel… The public opinion was on the side of protesters. People were asking "Why did they jail those guys?". The authorities are probably bad, since people were beaten for demanding fair elections" (Interview RU15).

Frame makers often framed those who suffered repression as victims and emphasized the fact that numerous people suffered from repression. For instance, Left front suggested that "In total the police arrested more than 600 people – dozens of whom suffered from cruel actions of the police, some of were hospitalized. Majority of the arrested were left in the

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police stations until morning – the rest was released due to the fact that police stations were full" Website, 06.05.12). Russian Socialist Movement stated that „Near Lubianka police station policemen have beaten to death the citizen right next to the member of "The New force" party. The name of the dead body is being identified. A criminal proceeding was initiated" (Russian Socialist movement, Website, 07.05.12).

Left groups readily included repression in their diagnostic framing. However, repression did no foster backlash by protesters, which could potentially generate alternative meanings. Neither repression produced changes in diagnostic framing on its own.

Prognosis. Following the violent clashes with police on Bolotnaya, most of the left groups supported conventional repertoire of contention. Left front insisted on peaceful actions, whereas pointed that the radicalization on Bolotnaya was caused by provocateurs from Russian youth movements. In particular, the group stated "Protestors started to use gas and bottles, which occurred out of nowhere considering that police were checking through everybody at the entrance to Yakimanka. There is a version that there were provocateurs in the crowd from pro-Kremlin youth movements – a lot of them were noticed before the march" (Left front, Website, 06.05.12). One of the leaders of liberal Solidarity Michail Shneider mentioned the same point by suggesting that "These pro-Putin youth organizations were coming to our protests and were trying to sabotage them. For the first time they did it on May 6, 2012. Unidentified young people in hoodies with hidden faces cracked asphalt, took the pieces of asphalt, bricks, stones and threw them at policemen. As a result, we got the prisoners of Bolotnaya, which had nothing to do with this unrests" (Interview RU5).

Autonomous action admitted the participation of protesters, in particular, anarchists, in violent clashes with the police. They stated "On May 6, 2012 anarchists participated in practically all events that took place in the center of the capital. They peacefully walked from Kalugskaya to Bolotnaya square, after which they figured out that protesters cannot enter the protest, which had been sanctioned by the authorities. Anarchists were at the forefront of those who were breaking through to Bolotnaya, were active participants of clashes with riot police when they were throwing bottles, umbrellas, sticks, pieces of asphalt and smoke bombs. Then anarchists

set up tents with anarchist emblem and resisted to police. For constructing barricades, they used metal cordons and even portable toilets" (Website, 07.05.2012).

Left-wing groups admitted that challengers used radical repertoire on Bolotnaya. However, they framed violent actions as a response to repression. The agents of social control have started violent clashes, whereas people were *compelled* to respond because they had no other solution to that particular situation. The claim makers suggested that protesters adopted radical means only to protect themselves in response to repression. "Police bit and detained everybody – men, women, seniors. We even had to bring some of them to life. *In response* people started taking off the helmets and body armors from policemen, pulling out batons and throw all these stuff to the river. Sometimes protesters managed to fight back" (Left Front, Website, 06.05.12, emphasis added).

Following radicalization on Bolotnaya, the left kept insisting exclusively on the peaceful forms like "public walkings", peaceful gatherings and occupations of public spaces. This seems quite contradictory considering previous attempts to radicalize protest by leftist groups and Left Front's leader Udaltsov who was rather popular among protesters. However, after the failure of the attempt to radicalize protest on Bolotnaya, lack of support for radical repertoire among broad constituencies and harsh repression of the movement, many leftist groups including Left Front preferred conventional prognostic framing.

More radical groups like Autonomous action among very few still insisted on combining peaceful and violent forms of actions as two sites of contention. „At the moment the situation collapsed in two levels. Upper level – staying at Kitay-Gorod or Chistye Prudy, and lower - throwing Molotov cocktails at police stations, military offices and courts" (Website, 13.05.12). The group's differentiated prognostic framing supported both peaceful gatherings and public walkings as well as violent attacks on the regime. Nevertheless, radicalism in discourse was very limited and the group never got involved in violent clashes with the police on the ground. The group's coordinator Alexei Gaskarov suggested that "We tried to be less radical. We tried to fit common attitudes, not to provoke anyone. Instead, at certain point we started to provide security at protest events in May. We did it because authorities used pro-Kremlin youth movements to threaten or provoke protesters" (Interview RU10).

Russian socialist movement supported peaceful protest, but the long-standing goal was the revolution of masses. The group was aimed at broadening of the movement social base, therefore they suggested mobilization of unengaged groups of the labor plants and factories to stage strikes (Website, 16.05.2012). At this stage of protest, they opposed violent forms of protest and supported conventional forms of action.

Collective identity. Repression did not have substantial effect on framing of collective identity among left-wing groups. However, shared grievances of commonly experienced repression were used by challengers for framing collective identity.

For instance, the groups emphasized the boundary between the regime and protesters. Claim makers often equaled protesters with people and society at large, whereas emphasized narrow representation of public by the regime. For instance, Autonomous action claimed "The resistance to the forces of evil lasted for more than three hours, so when front rows of the popular rebellion were getting tired, instead of them stood others" (Website, 13.05.2012). By clearly vilifying authorities and confronting the forces of evil (authorities) and popular rebels (protesters) frame constructors tried to emphasize how big was the gap between the regime and people.

Challengers also actively vilified authorities and called them "polizei" [Nazi police] (Russian socialist movement, website, 07.05.2012), "bustards in uniform" (Autonomous action, website, 13.05.2013) and "self-crowned dictator" (Left Front, website, 06.05.2012). Thus, we can suggest that though left-wing groups did not use boundary framing extensively, they did adopt it following the repression on Bolotnaya.

Summary

The definition of violence in diagnostic framing in SMOs' discourse was not uniform. One groups insisted blamed exclusively police and municipal authorities who did not arrange and handle protest well. While other groups more neutrally pointed to the fact that both sides were involved in initiation of violent actions. Whereas yet another groups viewed repression as the continuation of the routine practice of the police state.

Though there was some difference in blame attribution for eruption of violence, the absolute majority of SMOs condemned the regime for repression. Mostly those who lacked the access to institutional politics or were among the major organizers of the protest insisted on the innocence of protesters and peaceful character of their actions. More institutionally-embedded actors or those who had little stakes left in the protest condemned opportunism of the protest leaders, which in their view resulted in violence. Though still condemned repression. More ideologically distant from dominant political culture groups viewed repression as a part of routine struggle with the regime and therefore mentioned it less actively. However, these groups remain marginal in the protest and their ideas had little resonance with the broader public.

All liberal parties and extra-parliamentary groups rejected non-conventional forms of action. Right-wing groups also insisted on conventional actions with some rare exceptions of confrontational repertoire. They also emphasized more intense recruitment and establishing collaboration with other movement groups to maintain mobilization. The left groups insisted on the maintaining the protest peaceful, whereas more radically oriented left insisted on combination of conventional and non-conventional collective action.

Repression provided shared grievances for adapting collective identity and vilifying the authorities. It resulted in boundary framing, which emphasized growing gap between challengers and the regime.

Though repression on Bolotnaya became the part of the discourse, its presence in framing soon became more marginal for most challengers. Peaceful mobilization of not numerous protesters for 'walkings' in the city center and Occupy Abay protests anchored the diagnostic framing, which favored conventional forms of protest and rejected radicalization.

Effective and consistent repression of authorities and low resonance of radicalized discourse and actions forced challengers to adopt conventional discourse. Repression became part of the discourse, but soon got more marginal and let the theme of opposition to Putin's regime to become dominant.

Table 6. Thematic summary of framing before and after Bolotnaya events

Frame element	Before the passage of the Laws	After the passage of the Laws
1. Political liberal parties		
Diagnosis	Fair elections, opposition to Putin's regime	Repression, Violence, Civil rights, Fair Elections
Prognosis	Peaceful protest, Elections, Institutional politics	Conventional protest (public walkings, occupations of public spaces, civil strike), imposition of sanctions, release of the arrested, institutional politics
Collective identity	Voters, protesters, citizens	Protesters, the victims of repression, citizens
2. Liberal extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Fair elections, opposition to Putin	Repression, civil and political rights
Prognosis	Conventional protest	Conventional protest, release of protesters, imposition of sanctions
Collective identity	Voters, citizens	Victims of repression, citizens
3. Right-wing extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Fair elections, Opposition to Putin's regime, Rights of ethnic Russians	Repression, Opposition to Putin
Prognosis	Conventional contention	Conventional contention, confrontational repertoire, non-conventional strategies for action
Collective identity	Patriots, Ethnic Russians	Patriots, Ethnic Russians
4. Left extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Fair elections, opposition to the regime, rights of the labor	Repression, Violence, Opposition to Putin's regime, Neoliberal policies
Prognosis	Peaceful mobilization, anti-systemic voting	Conventional contention, confrontational and radical repertoire of action
Collective identity	Labors, citizens, protesters	Citizens, victims of repression, labors

June 5-6. Anti-protest Laws

Political opposition

Diagnosis. The anti-protest laws were incorporated in diagnostic framing by all political SMOs. Frame makers suggested that new laws violated the constitutional rights of citizens for political expression through protest. For instance, Yabloko suggested that "Signing by the president Vladimir Putin of the amendments to the protest laws, which increase the penalty for violating mass event regulations, envisage the prohibition of holding street political events…In fact, this is the prohibition of protests. The laws affect everybody – organizers, activists, all famous people… From now on everyone can be punished with slave labor or enormous fine" (Website, 07.06.2012).

Politicians suggested that the laws reflected more general trend of moving towards autocratic political system. For instance, the Yabloko's leader Mitrohin claimed "I think, that after the passage of the amendments to the protest laws, the country transited to the regime of open dictatorship. Putin finished the imitation of democracy, he threw off all masks. Searches and other police actions are the parts of the same chain" (Website, 07.06.12). Parnas framed anti-protest legislature as "the law of the price for protest" (Vkontakte, 06.06.12 12:55AM). Claim makers pointed at enormous fines and vague formulations, which allowed law enforcement agencies to broadly interpret the laws. In the same vein, Parnas suggested that "New edition of laws new enormous fines for organizers and participants of protests, new sanctions for organizers or participants of spontaneous protests and gatherings, arbitrary definition of organizers by authorities, ability to declare any place of the town as unavailable for protests and marches, for the first time – ability to punish for posting about the events on the Internet, penalties for minor violations at events, which are sometimes more severe than criminal ones" (Website, 13.06.2013).

To emphasize the repressive nature of the laws Yabloko associated them with the names of Mussolini and Hitler by claiming "Nazis, fascists and KGB-fellows are in favor of these laws" (Vkontakte post, 09.06.12 01:04PM). DemVybor claimed that these "senseless, anti-constitutional amendments" reflected "further tightening of screws" by the regime" (Website,

12.06.12). In the same manner Parnas stated "Therefore, the authorities have no other viable alternative besides trivial tightening of screws" (Vkontakte, 07.06.2012, 09:59PM).

Yabloko's press-secretary suggested that "The anti-protest laws had the most significant impact on our discourse. They imposed huge fines and criminal responsibility for unsanctioned protests. And of course we had to limit our calls for unsanctioned protest. Before we regularly staged unauthorized protests… We used to protest next to the administrative buildings. We could get a 500-ruble fine for that, little money. And there was no risk for being jailed. Following the laws, we could not call for people to protest with placards because it could be interpreted as the call for mass unrests and have crucial repercussions" (Interview RU2).

The laws have become crucial part of injustice situation for political actors. Challengers mostly framed new legal regulations as tightening of the grip on civic society and increasing pressure of the opponents of the regime. Legal repression did not produce new or broader discursive theme. Soon repressive themes got marginalized in diagnostic framing and were replaced more general topic of the opposition to Putin's regime.

Prognosis. Following the passage of laws, all political SMOs insisted on conventional repertoire of contention and peaceful civic resistance. For instance, Parnas claimed that "(the) time of demarches approaches Russia. Humiliating, scandalous, indecent, shocking – any. The most important – *peaceful*… There should be no coercive component in our actions" (Vkontakte post, 07.06.12 09:59PM, emphasis added). Frame constructors insisted on exclusively peaceful, but persistent character of their actions. They focused on the upcoming mass protest "Marsh of millions" as another attempt to demonstrate their unity in the face of struggle with the regime.

Claim makers insisted that if protestors get more radical, it will give the authorities the right to use force, which will undermine organizing efforts, create a bad image of challengers and scare off broader public (Parnas, Vkontakte, 07.06.2012 09:59PM). Prognostic framing which would include more unconventional or radical means of contention had very little resonance with protesters during and after Bolotnaya events, therefore challengers did not want to risk and lose the support of moderate constituencies. Yabloko emphasized the fact that even peaceful, but spontaneous protest may lead to further arrests. For instance, Yabloko's leader Mitrohin stated "I

cannot gather people for unauthorized protest, because I know, that they may go from there to jail" (Website, 08.06.2012).

Besides protest activity, some challengers suggested getting more actively engaged in institutional politics. For instance, DemVybor underscored that liberalization of party registration and return of the elections of governors provided better opportunities for working on both institutional and non-institutional arenas (DemVybor, Website, 09.06.12). Narrowing down of the space in protest politics and at least nominal broadening up of the space for institutional politics fostered system-leaning forces' turn to institutional politics.

Collective identity. The passage of laws could potentially unite aggravated constituencies because it affected many of those who wanted to express their political discontent, but could not because the institutional channels had been blocked. This was a good chance to signify shared grievances and construct more inclusive collective identity. For instance, Yabloko suggested that the passage of laws "is the prohibition of marshes and political protests. *Everybody* gets under the blow – organizers, activists, all famous people on both sides… Now *everybody* can be punished with slave labor or insane fine" (Website, 08.06.12, Emphasis added). Parnas echoed them and suggested that "In fact, the members of United Russia [the ruling party] started the war against their own people" (Website, 07.06.12).

Political parties actively adopted boundary framing in order to articulate the growing distance between the regime and protesters. However, they had no reference point for constructing collective identity, which would be culturally coherent and supported by protesters.

Liberal groups

Diagnosis. Extra-parliamentary liberal groups readily placed the laws as a part of their framing following their passage in the parliament. Framers suggested that the anti-protest laws took from the citizens the right for the freedom of association and political expression. They also claimed that these laws broadened the competences of law enforcement agencies who could now exercise much more power than before. The laws were a serious blow for liberal extra-parliamentary groups, since the protest was the most visible way to express their political position.

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Challengers emphasized the procedural violations. For instance, the fact that deputies of the ruling majority refused to consider any amendments for the law from the opposition parties or that they passed it in all readings at once, or that they passed the laws at night. For instance, Golos claimed "The Council of Federation approved the law that the parliament issued at night (looks like a dark deed). It increases the sanctions for participation in protests. Such a hurry is explained by the preparation for June 12. On that day the opposition is planning to hold a mass marsh" (Facebook, 07.06.2012 08:27AM).

Besides procedural violations, liberal extra-parliamentary groups emphasized detrimental repercussions of the laws for democratic development of the country. For instance, Solidarity claimed "Today's law on regulation of protests besides enormous fines introduces a lot of other interesting things. For example, any person who was accused of disobedience to police, violation of the norms of public events, is immediately restrained in his or her rights, since he or she cannot be an organizer of a protest. By the way, this norm was rejected by the president two year ago as anti-constitutional, but now nobody cares about it now" (Website, 09.12.2012). United Civic Front signified the fact that "laws violate 31st article of the Constitution, which envisages the freedom of peaceful association of citizens" (Website, 7.06.12).

Discourse constructors also pointed out that the laws may result in a political dead-end, since the regime was firmly moving in the direction of autocracy. Solidarity suggested "This law will just sober up those who hoped for Putin 2.0 and possibility of transition from dictatorship to democracy through round table negotiations" (Livejournal, 06.06.12). In other words, by blocking the opportunity for peaceful protest as a form of political expression, the regime complicated potential communication of the demands of different social groups that had no other way to express their concerns but through non-institutional contention.

In the eyes of protesting community, the authorities not just changed existing laws, but also began to interpret the challengers' actions more strictly and adopt corresponding practices. As Michail Shneider from Solidarity suggested "They [authorities] not just changed the laws per se. They also adapted new tactics of law implementation, so-called 'law enforcement'" (Interview RU5).

Discourse makers signified the restrains that the laws imposed on protesters' ability to act as a political force. Eco-Oborona claimed "all forms of street activity are illegal now" (Facebook, 8.06.12). What is more, the laws imposed huge fines on protesters, which severely restrained political expression. As Jasin, one of the coordinators of LGBT-movement, suggested "The anti-protest law had crucial effects on protest activity. Previously we understood that if they arrest us, well, then we will spend a couple of hours in jail or maybe pay a 500-ruble fine. Anyway it was not important. When the fine is 10000 or 20000[rubles], we understand we cannot bear it for long. Especially when they began to initiate criminal cases after three or more arrests" (Interview RU7). New conditions affected opportunities for action, which also translated in discourse adaptation.

In fact, claim makers were trying to link the passage of laws to the broader issue of civil and political rights as well as civil freedoms. However, this diagnostic framing never became resonant among broader public and correspondingly salient in the movement discourse. Soon it took the marginal position in collective action frames of liberal groups leaving much more space for more general opposition to the Putin's regime. Liberal groups anchored anti-regime frame in the Manifest of free Russia, which liberal forces jointly with some other groups and opposition parties announced during the last large march of the protest cycle.

Prognosis. The introduction of laws has not altered the prognostic framing of movement. The groups kept insisting on conventional forms of contention. Eco-Defense suggests that "street protest is the last means we are left with" (Website, 09.06.12). United Civic Front in a similar vein suggests that protest is "a continuation of peaceful anti-criminal revolution" (United Civic Front, Website, 08.06.12).

Besides contention in the public space, challengers insisted on the elaboration of the clear-cut program of actions to provide sympathetic constituencies with the list of desired improvements. They also insisted on getting more intensely engaged in anti-corruption activities, which one of protest leaders Navalny had started and popularized before protest cycle. None of the groups ever called for radical forms of action.

Solidarity insisted on peaceful contention on the street. The coalition claimed "The most important task of the opposition forces and active part of civil society remains to put pressure

on the vertical of power by means of street activity. It is impossible to expect the change of political system without external impulse, which already began to deform it (though not so significantly yet)" (Website, 09.06.2012). Protest has to remain peaceful. The responsibility for the escalation that happened on Bolotnaya entirely lies on executive authorities and police, who broke arrangements and gave and order to repress (Website, 09.06.2012). In addition to that, protest need to remain numerous. Mass protest is the only way to put pressure on the regime and demonstrate "police nature of modern Russian state" (Website, 09.06.2012).

Those liberal extra-parliamentary groups and their leaders who made attempts to radicalize protest during Bolotnaya events, soon after switched to conventional actions. After the introduction of the anti-protest laws they did not make any attempts for escalation and firmly supported conventional repertoire of contention.

Collective identity. The passage of new laws restrained the opportunities for protest of numerous politically active constituents. However, we can hardly observe clear attempts to expand collective identity for more inclusive character. Discourse makers barely framed collective identity in more inclusive terms and just occasionally vilified the opponents. Challengers always framed regime as losing its legitimacy among the broader public. Discourse makers also emphasized unhuman nature of authorities. For instance, United Civic front called authorities "occupational regime and its mercenaries" (Livejournal, 06.06.12).

Right-wing groups

Diagnosis. Legal repression became an important part of diagnostic framing of the right-wing groups. They signified the procedural violation. For instance, DPNI claimed "Scandalous lawmaking that envisages tougher penalties for violations of protest norms, which "United Russia" managed to pass in Gosduma [lower parliament chamber] despite the resistance of opposition, on Wednesday will be reviewed in Federation council [higher parliament chamber]".

Right-wing groups emphasized the fact that laws prohibited the right for peaceful protest. For instance, The Russians labeled laws as "anti-constitutional" and described their

passage as "lawlessness" (Livejournal, 08.06.12). They also suggested that laws introduced the norm of "no gathering of three and more people" (Livejournal, 09.06.12.).

National Democratic Party echoed them and framed the laws as "the law of 'the price of protest'", which suggests "No public meetings of more than three persons!" (Lifejournal, 06.06.12). Russian People's Movement framed the laws as "scandalous lawmaking" (Livejournal, 06.06.12). They also pointed to the lack of procedural legitimacy, since the ruling party was rejecting all the attempts of the opposition to make any amendments to the bill (Ibid.). In fact, all groups viewed the laws as illegal change of rules that regulate contentious politics. This was a crucial restrain for their activity.

This diagnosis clearly attaches the passage of laws to broader issue of the right for political expression. However, it has not become the salient theme of right-wing discourse and very soon got marginal position letting the broad theme of opposition to Putin's regime and nationalist issues become dominant.

Prognosis. Right-wing groups insisted on conventional repertoire of contention. They suggested that protesters should adopt peaceful forms of protest and participate in upcoming rally "March of millions" on June 12, 2012. What is more, DPNI and some other nationalist groups organized guardian bodies to protect protesters against potential attacks of the police and prevent potential provocations against the movement (Livejournal, 08.06.2012). The Russians reported "At the moment the crew which is mostly made up of nationalists, is getting ready for the defense of the popular protest on June 12. Besides that, the guards are ready to fight with potential attacks of hostile pro-regime groups on protesters" (Livejournal, 07.06.2012).

Ethno-political Union "Russians" proclaimed "Nationalists, patriots, all who love Russian People – go to the marsh on June 12" (Website, 07.06.12). They suggested "the right column of the marsh is for those who are right" (Livejournal, 08.06.12). National Democratic Party appealed to public: "Brothers and sisters, the place for the marsh has been agreed. We all will participate in it. Supporters from all over the country will come to join us. Bring your friends, kids. We all will organize in Russian column" (Livejournal, 09.06.12).

Collective identity. Right-wing groups mostly used the notions 'people' and 'Russians' (in ethnic terms) to denote their collective identity of protesters. They often

distinguished themselves from rest of the protest. For instance, in the marches protesters organized themselves in three columns: left column – for ideologically leftist groups and their supporters, central – for democrats and liberals, right – for right-wing groups. Right-wing groups were the only ones, who emphasized "The right column is for those who is right. All major national-patriotic movements of Russia come out to the march in one column under Imperial flags" (Russians, website, 07.04.2012).

The anti-protest laws have not changed self-definition of protesters in the discourse of right-wing groups. They did not make any attempts to make the identity of protesters more inclusive. On the opposite they mostly emphasized themselves as a part of broader protest. For instance, the Movement against illegal immigration claimed "Nationalists, patriots, everyone who loves Russian People – come out on June 12, 2012 to the march" (Website, 10.06.2012).

Right wing groups suggested that by the adopting the anti-protest laws the regime was providing a clear line between themselves and society. However, they did not use it to expand the movement's collective identity and dichotomize challengers and authorities. Though, we can identify vilifying frames of the movement's adversary, they were rather rare (National-Democratic Party, Vkontakte, 09.06.2012).

Left groups

Diagnosis. Anti-protest legislature has become an important part of the left discourse. They viewed the anti-protest laws as repressive and limiting the basic right for association and political expression. In particular, Russian Socialist Movement suggested that "(T)he main goal of this unprecedented and absurd "lawmaking" is to fear organizers and activists from protest movement. They want to scare us off, so that labors would stay home to avoid huge fines and penalties. Moreover, now the authorities can declare any regular protester to be an organizer" (Website, 09.06.12). The left assumed that huge fines and broad interpretations of the laws by law enforcement agencies increased repressive capacities of the state and restrained potentially discontent citizens in their rights to publicly express their position.

In the same vein, Autonomous action framed new legal initiative as "draconian and antisocial laws" (Website, 09.06.2012). The passage of laws in their view suggested that "Russia is moving towards dictatorship at full speed. The regime is attacking society on all the fronts" (Website, 06.06.2012). Kuzmin suggested "The laws were really high. Protesting has become more dangerous. If I have one arrest, then the next one may lead to 15 days in jail or 30000 rubles" (Interview RU15).

Rot Front (Russian United Labor Front) underscored that the law will increase corruption. The group suggested that law enforcement agents got enough space for interpreting the laws the way that was beneficial for them, which would increase the levels of corruption (Russian Labor Front, Website, 06.06.12). Autonomous action claimed that "in fact legal protest is under prohibition" (Autonomous action, website, 07.06.12).

The major goal of the laws is to intimidate organizers and participants of protest (Russian Socialist Movement, Website, 08.06.12). Whereas Autonomous action insisted that "tightening of screws" is aimed not against the middle class, but against labors and poor people: "Political opposition thinks that these draconian measures are aimed at them and their political games, but in fact the sense of parliament decisions is completely different. To understand that, it is enough to pay attention to at least one fact: for violation of this law organizers can get a fine of 300 000 Rubles. For political parties and other organizations of well-off classes this sum is not much. Considering social composition of winter and spring protests (dominance of middle, creative class), these laws are not so dangerous for them. Another thing is brought to poverty labor population of the country. In many cities school teachers and nurses don't earn even 10 000 rubles a month, other categories of labors make not much more" (Website, 06.06.12). Due to low salaries the latter did not have enough money and will not be able to pay huge fine and consequently will think twice before joining the protest.

Rot front, in turn, emphasized heavy repercussions and claimed that "From now on they can call organizer of any event or any regular participant and fine him or send for correctional labor" (Rot Front, Website, 08.06.12). Left Front emphasized the lack of procedural legitimacy by claiming "The anti-protest laws contradict the Constitution! New law, which increases the penalties for violations of protest norms, does not correspond to several criteria of the Constitution

of Russian Federation. Such assessment is given to the law by the Presidential Councils of development of civil society and human rights, which was published on June 7, 2012 on its official website (Vkontakte, 08.06.2012).

Several leftist groups viewed the laws in broader terms as an attempt to block the attempts of the movement to fight for social rights like free education, higher salaries, free medicine, the rise of communal utilities and increase of pensions (Autonomous action, website, 09.06.2012; Rot Front, website, 06.06.2012; Left Front, Vkontakte, 08.06.2012).

The issue of anti-protest legislature never became salient and soon marginalized in the left discourse. Neither legal repression produced substantial shift in the left groups' discourse or occurrence of new dominant theme.

Prognosis. The passage of laws had differentiated effects on the prognostic framing of left groups. More resourceful and publicly recognizable groups like Left Front continued to suggest using exclusively conventional repertoire of action. They insisted on participation in solely peaceful events. For instance, they called for their supporters "On June 12, 2012 there is going to be held new March of Millions. For fair authorities! For Russia without Putin!"

However, some other leftist groups alongside conventional actions, suggested adoption of less conventional repertoire of contention in their prognostic framing. In particular, Russian Social movement claimed "Since now, thanks to the toughening of the legislation they (labors) will immediately become potential enemies of the state...The amplification of the battle is what is going to be a direct consequence of a scandalous law. It means that we have no choice – either rebel and fight brutally against the state or die". (Website, 09.06.12). Autonomous action pointed at the fact that incredibly high cost of the arrest at protest will provoke much harsher reaction of protesters and may provoke escalation instead of obedience: "Instead of old tactics of full obedience to authorities, people will start beating up those cops who are trying to arrest them" (Autonomous action, Vkontakte account, 06.06.12).

Discourse makers combined prognostic framing with boundary framing by suggesting that the growing awareness of the gap between the regime and people should let people realize their power and start adopting more radical repertoire of contention against the regime. For instance, Autonomous action suggested that "the sooner we understand the essence of capitalism

and throw away the possibility of "partnership" with the dominant class – bankers, managers, oligarchs, deputies and ministers – the sooner we will be able to self-organize and beat them" (Facebook, 09.06.12). Though all the groups emphasized more decisive resistance in their discourse, none mentioned violent repertoire of action as the form of resistance. Moreover, all of them actively mobilized for peaceful "March of millions" that took place on June 12, 2012.

   Collective identity. The leftist groups signified the consequences of legal repression in their boundary framing. For instance, they emphasized the number of those who would suffer from that laws. As Russian Socialist Movement put it "(the) parliament passed the law very fast, in a hurry, broadly broadcasting this topic in official media, so that the public could feel all the seriousness of the intentions, and *everybody* gets to know what will be hanging over him for just joining protest or demonstration" (Website, 09.06.12, emphasis added). Autonomous action also underscored that there will be mainly the "labor class and other wage workers", who will suffer the most because of the exorbitant costs of being detained at the protests (Website, 06.06.2012). We can identify differentiated rhetoric aimed at already existing constituencies and potentially new ones.

   In parallel to extending collective identity discourse makers also vilified the authorities and articulated their detachment from the society. Autonomous action claimed that "Russian state rapidly takes off any cover of the social and more turns in traditional Southern American totalitarian dictatorship of oligarchs and secret services. They pass draconian anti-social laws, the list of which is probably not over. The authorities openly attack society in many directions – they prohibited legal protests, privatized medicine and education, in near future they are going to accomplish predatory privatization". In a similar vein, Rot front suggested that "eagerness of authorities to adopt new laws demonstrates their weakness and broadening gap between the regime and people" (Website, 06.06.12). Claim makers also fused boundary framing with prognostic framing as was demonstrated above.

Summary

To sum up, we can suggest that the passage of anti-protest laws had differentiated effects on the collective action frames of different SMOs. On overall, almost all groups incorporated repression in their frames. What is more, many of them linked the legal repression to more general issues of "rights". Namely, that the regime has taken away from citizens the right for association and political expression. Absolute majority of SMOs severely criticized the laws because they have seriously restrained the rules of engagement in contentious politics and therefore tangibly restrained the ability of groups to express their political stance, recruit new adherents and acquire resources.

However, legal repression did not manage to gain its salience in the movement's discourse. More general issue of the broad opposition to Putin and his government soon began to dominate in SMOs' framing. It was clearly demonstrated in the Manifest of free Russia, which was introduced at the march of millions on June 12, 2012. The Manifest of the left forces signified exclusively social issues and produced little resonance with the broader public.

Anti-protest legislature also had differentiated effects on prognostic framing among different SMOs. For instance, all political groups and liberal extra-parliamentary groups insisted on retaining conventional repertoire of contention. Previous attempts to radicalize protest failed, so challengers preferred to focus on existing loyal constituencies. Also, they did not want to give the regime an excuse to use repression again. Right-wing and leftist groups also supported conventional repertoire of contention in their prognostic framing. Due to their experience of May 6, all groups were aware that the radical repertoire is not so resonant with broader public. Therefore, in their prognostic framing they preferred to differentiate between moderate and more radically oriented constituencies.

Political opposition as well as left and liberal groups adopted boundary framing. They used shared grievances imposed by legal repression to construct more inclusive collective identity and vilify the regime. By doing so they intended to construct the gap between challengers and the regime. Right-wing groups barely changed their framing of collective identity.

Table 6. Thematic summary of framing before and after the June anti-protest laws

Frame element	Before the passage of the Laws	After the passage of the Laws
1. Political liberal parties		
Diagnosis	Fair elections, opposition to Putin's regime	Repression, legal regulations, rights, democratic backsliding
Prognosis	Peaceful protest, elections, institutional politics	Peaceful protest and civic resistance, institutional politics
Collective identity	Protesters, citizens	The laws' targets, politically active citizens,
2. Liberal extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Fair elections, opposition to Putin	Legal repression, democratic backsliding, political and civic rights
Prognosis	Conventional protest	Peaceful and mass protests, civic resistance
Collective identity	Citizens, protesters	Citizens, opponents of the regime, protesters
3. Right-wing extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Opposition to Putin's regime, rights of ethnic Russians	Legal repression, freedom of association, political and civic rights
Prognosis	Conventional contention	Peaceful protest, avoid radicalization
Collective identity	Patriots, ethnic Russians	Patriots, ethnic Russians, People
4. Left extra-parliamentary groups		
Diagnosis	Opposition to the regime, rights of the labor	Legal Repression, political and civic rights, democratic backsliding, anti-social policies
Prognosis	Peaceful mobilization, civic resistance	Conventional contention, confrontational collective actions, non-conventional actions
Collective identity	Labors, citizens, protesters	Society at large, every target of the law, political active citizens, labors, people

Conclusions

Repression on Bolotnaya affected framing of different SMOs. Claim makers incorporated repression in their discourse in response to repression and put it to the forefront of their discourse. Absolute majority blamed authorities for provoking escalation and repressing peaceful and harmless protesters. However, more institutionally leaning SMOs, who had little stakes left in the protest opted for more balanced critique of both protest leaders who deviated from authorized course of the march and authorities who repressed protesters. This divergence in discourse reflected different protest strategies. More radically oriented groups and their leaders were prone to radicalize movement. They wanted to provoke repression, which would further produce backfire and let challengers construct new consensus around which they could mobilize more public. However, due to effective and consistent repressive policies of the state, and lack of receptivity of the broader public to radicalization, escalation failed and demobilization continued. More system-leaning actors got some minor concessions from authorities and were not ready to risk their position, therefore they resisted the radicalization of their discourse and repertoire of action.

Incorporation of repression in movement discourse and its failure to mobilize public was conditioned by its low resonance among public. The pools of the population who were ready for escalation in response to massive repression on Bolotnaya remained tiny compared to Ukrainian public in mid-late January. In contrast to Ukraine, the "market" of social groups who were ready for backlash was not sufficient enough to resonate with more radical discourse. What is more, effective repressive measures undertaken by authorities demonstrated the groups who supported non-conventional repertoire that they had few chances to succeed. Therefore, low resonance of more radical discourse was conditioned by the lack of public receptivity to escalating framing and consistent repression and concessions of authorities. Repression on Bolotnaya did not alter the receptivity of the public to more radical discourse.

Prognostic framing following Bolotnaya repression was in absolute majority of cases conventional. The part of the movement that tried to escalate protest realized futility of their attempts and *had to* return to exclusively peaceful repertoire of action. What is more, moderate

public was scared off by brutal repression on May 6 and supported exclusively peaceful repertoire to avoid the repetition of Bolotnaya events.

Mobilizing structure of the FFE movement did not embrace radical groups like Right Sector, who possessed ideologically devoted network of members that were trained for fighting with law enforcement agencies under extreme conditions. Radical groups on the right and on the left were not resourceful enough and took marginal position in the movement. If they had acted non-conventionally, they would have been immediately repressed by police (Interview RU6, Interview RU10). Therefore, they did their best to adjust their strategies and discourse to the moderate part of the movement (Ibid.).

Thus, repression made SMOs to adapt their framings and incorporate extra themes linked to repression. However, repression did not become dominant theme and soon became rather marginal in comparison to more general frame of opposition to Putin's regime.

Anti-protest laws also affected movement framing and became an important theme of movement discourse right after their passage. All SMOs, including those who were more institutionally entrenched, condemned the laws and accused authorities for authoritarian tendencies. The laws targeted mostly politically active citizens, who were politically active and took part in winter-spring protests. The number of those adherents of movement dropped after Bolotnaya events. Therefore, inclusion of anti-protest laws had little chances for expanding the pool of movement sympathizers and prevented moving beyond the agenda of fair elections and opposition to Putin. The resonance of frames was law and did not produce any substantial changes in protest.

Low resonance of frames was conditioned by consistent repression on Bolotnaya and following criminal cases as well as low receptivity of public to radicalization. In contrast to Ukraine, where the anti-protest laws produced numerous public, who was more receptive to radical rhetoric, anti-protest laws in Russia were focused on shrinking groups of protesters and further decreased the numbers of those who was ready to protest, whereas restraining those who was still willing to sanctioned protests.

Prognostic framing remained well within conventional repertoire. Previous attempts to radicalized proved it to be unreasonable and found no response from public. Therefore,

this time none of the groups, including more radically oriented, called for radical measures. All SMOs insisted on participation in conventional contention like centralized March of millions or other sanctioned protests.

Ideology did not affect frame adaptation. Neither did mobilizing structure of the movement. In both cases of repressive instances, the latter brought new meanings to the movement discourse. However, these themes soon marginalized and became non-significant due to the lack of resonance and efficient repression.

Chapter 8. General conclusions

1. This study explored the effects of repression on the framing dynamics of two protest movements in a non-democratic, post-Soviet context, demonstrating that *frame resonance* is a crucial factor of framing dynamics in response to repression. The resonance of frames predicted the success of framing alteration and the salience of new meanings within movement discourses. Repression increases the receptivity of target audiences to alternative meanings and, thus, creates opportunities for new meanings to resonate with the public. Repression can also change not only the susceptibility of public, but expand the range of groups who become more receptive to discursive innovations and correspondingly, the diffusion of resonance. Alternatively, repression can foreclose the susceptibility of social groups to new meanings or even distance the public from claim makers who alter their framing.

In both cases challengers adapted their framing strategies to similar repressive policies in a similar way. However, the resonance of their discourses and the salience of new themes were different. By comparing similar discourse adaptations, the study found that the same or very similar discursive adaptations to the same or very similar forms of repression followed different paths of success and failure due to the presence or absence of resonance among target audiences. Therefore, public perceptions conditioned the success of the salience of frame adaptations in response to repression. The isomorphic characteristics of frames and public belief systems did not play a key role in frame adaptation.

For instance, the repression of a peaceful pro-EU protest on November 30, 2013 in Ukraine forced claim makers to include repression in their frames and to frame it negatively. This framing produced a popular outrage and resonated well with the public. Further mobilization produced the shift of a 'Eurointegration' master frame to a more general 'civil rights' master frame. Resonance and mass mobilization conditioned innovation in framing and the salience of new meanings.

In a similar vein, the claim makers of the FFE movement framed the repression of the protests on Bolotnaya square in Moscow negatively. However, in response to calls for protest against the repressive policies of the state, only a couple of thousands people in separated groups

attended. The framing of repression as illegitimate and calls for mobilization did not resonate with the public, since target audiences were not receptive to escalation in response to repression. Even those who protested again were efficiently repressed by police. Therefore, new meanings produced by repression did not become salient and very soon became marginal in the movement's discourse. The lack of resonance and the absence of mass mobilization determined the demise of discursive innovation.

When Ukrainian authorities passed anti-protest laws, SMOs immediately began to condemn legal repression and its repercussions. This framing resonated well with numerous constituencies and encouraged the mobilization of several hundred thousand people. Violence on Hrushevskiy street and the authorities' coercive repression magnified the alterations in framing and made them salient in the movement's discourse. Legal constraints coupled with mass mobilization and the eruption of violence produced another frame shift. The shift of perceptions and the public's increased receptivity to radical rhetoric made alternative frames resonant, produced backlash and anchored new framings in the discourse.

Russian anti-protest laws also generated frame adaptations in the movement's discourse. However, they did not resonate well with broader audiences. Framers condemned the new legislation and its detrimental effects on civil liberties and political rights in the country. However, resonance was very low and there was no backlash. People came for the March of Millions, which followed the anti-protest laws, but very soon new meanings demised. Thus, the resonance of new framing or its absence reinforces the salience of new meanings within movement discourse and the adoption of new meanings by the movement.

Building on this analysis, the study suggests a revision to the theoretical predictions made by the frame alignment approach (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). In particular, the latter suggests that the characteristics of collective action frames and the features of belief systems coupled with the "experiential commensurability" and the "empirical credibility" of targeted audiences determine the success or failure of frames. The evidence presented here suggests that the isomorphism of movement frames and broader public belief systems are not so crucial in determining the effects of repression on framing dynamics. Rather the frame resonance

identifies the success and correspondingly the salience of discursive innovation in response to repression.

The study also suggests that in order to trace framing dynamics in response to repression, we need a more dynamic conceptualization of frame resonance. The original definition of frame resonance proposed by the frame alignment perspective suffers from its static nature and is defines as the moment when the movement's discourse aligns with an audiences' worldviews (Snow and Benford 1988). This approach presupposes that cultural themes or frames are either resonant or not resonant due to their isomorphic characteristics and their ability to "fit" public culture. This "static tendency" of frame resonance (Benford 1997) implies that under different conditions, certain cultural objects uniformly resonate with certain constituencies, which share certain cultural predispositions. Frames are assumed to be resonant in themselves.

However, this approach often fails to explain why the same frames may become resonant or fail to resonate under different conditions. Therefore, I suggest a reconceptualization of frame resonance for the purposes of a more dynamic analysis of movement-regime interaction. Resonance needs to be conceptualized as an emergent process that produces congruence between the movement's discourses and target audiences, which shifts over time.

2. As the study demonstrates, the *receptivity* of target audiences to new framing shapes frame resonance. Therefore, the social composition of target audiences and changes in their perceptions reflects the success or failure of frame resonance.

For instance, in December 2013, 64% of Ukrainian protesters had higher education, whereas by February this figure had dropped to 43% (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). Kyiv residents at first made up 50% of protesters, whereas following the violent turn, they constituted only 12%, while 55% and 23% of protesters came from small towns in Western and Central Ukraine respectively. The demands of protesters in December and early February also differed: the demand for Eurointegration shrank from 71% to 49%, whereas the demand for the adoption of the Parliamentary Constitution of 2004, which considerably restrained presidential capacities, increased from 37% to 62%.

The original discourse of Eurointegration and civil rights attracted well-educated, urban moderates who demanded approximation with the EU, which was supposed to help the

country eradicate corruption and improve governmental performance. The radicalized discourse of late January-early February, following the violent turn of protest, resonated better with less educated, middle-aged males, who were more sensitive to patriotic or nationalist rhetoric since they originated from small towns in Western and Central Ukraine. In addition to that, previously moderate protesters became radicalized in course of interaction with repressive agencies, and made up another fraction of the protest. Repression scared away a considerable part of moderate audiences. This fact was reflected in the movement's rhetoric, which adjusted to more radicalized audiences which began to comprise the majority following the violent turn of the protest.

In the Russian case, protesters with higher education embraced around 70% of protesters at the outset of the protests and dropped to just 5% following repression on Bolotnaya (Volkov 2012, Kryshtanovskaya et al. 2013). 70% of protesters at the beginning of the protest were well-off in comparison to 25% in general population (Volkov 2012). Well-off protesters still comprised 65% of protests following the Bolotnaya events (Kryshtanovskaya et al. 2013). Muscovites made up the absolute majority of major protests both in December and following repression on Bolotnaya.

Thus, the social structure of the movement changed insignificantly over time in the Russian case. In contrast to Euromaidan, the Russian protest cycle did not produce sufficient numbers of radicalized social groups who became receptive to radicalized rhetoric. Therefore, the attempts of more radically-oriented movement leaders to adopt a more radical rhetoric in response to repression did not resonate with protesters. In the FFE movement we can observe no substantial frame shift that mirrors the absence of fundamental changes in the protest's social composition or the radicalization of previously moderate constituencies. The protest cycle in Ukraine produced pools of more radically-prone audiences, whereas the Russian case failed to do so.

3. Besides discourse and audiences, we need to consider the conditions under which the interpretations of audiences occur. Initially, theorizing about resonance suggests that meanings that were resonant among the public had been *already* present in public belief systems (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988). Thus, the frame alignment perspective viewed resonance (Snow et al. 1986) as the result of a fit between past meanings and present frame alignment efforts in a bounded moment. However, as the study demonstrates, prognosis may retroactively define the

diagnosis (Taylor and Whittier 1992, Benford 1993, Fantasia 1995, McDonnel et al. 2017). To put differently, an enacted solution may retrospectively redefine and update the issue that challengers struggle for.

In this case, *backlash* or radicalization become a crucial signal to movements' strategists regarding the success or failure of certain frames. Collective backlash verifies and validates changes in the movement's discourse and anchors new meanings in framing. Therefore, the conducted analysis suggests that we need to go beyond the dominant assumptions of a frame alignment perspective. Besides frame content, frame-makers and their ideologies as well as target audiences and their belief systems (Snow et al. 1986. Snow and Benford 1988, Noakes and Johnston 2005), we need to also consider the actual collective mobilization as the factor that shapes framing dynamics and verifies frame resonance. From a strategic point of view, frame resonance as the outcome of frame adaptation in response to repression, is not just the identification of a correspondence between movement frames and public culture (Snow and Benford 1988, Kubal 1998). It requires a verifying signal from audiences about the success or failure of frame alignment. Therefore, resonance is also shaped by the actual experiences of challengers, not just by the fit between the movement's message and framing targets.

Repression acts as a trigger, which generates a tidal wave of new meanings, which become available to both the broader public and to SMOs. The latter transform these new cultural elements into frames, which are aligned to target audiences. However, from a strategic standpoint, the movement can find out whether their meanings are resonant only through their alignment with the public, which provokes escalation or makes the latter quiescent.

As I suggested, contextual conditions and institutional arrangements affect public perceptions and frame resonance. For instance, in Ukraine, inconsistency and failures to repress protesters produced a higher receptivity to radical discourse among a broad range of social groups. Whereas consistent and effective repression in Russia did not manage to radicalize a significant number of the public.

These repressive performances were conditioned by the bureaucratic *capacity* of the state to repress (Rucht 1996, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, pp.78-80). State capacity consists of the ability to implement repressive or facilitative policies targeted at challengers. The

organizational capacity of both the Party of Regions and United Russia was comparable, whereas institutional capacity in Russia was higher than in Ukraine. Though the Ukrainian regime and the Party of Regions remained mostly consolidated until the very end of protests, the ability of authorities to channel resources for coercion and for handling protests was lower in Ukraine than in Russia. It became especially obvious in late January, when the regime failed to repress radicals on Hrushevskiy street, and lost control over several Western and Central regions of the country, demonstrating its weakness by making concessions to protesters. Similarly, the inconsistent repression and facilitation of the same strategies of protesters led to protest escalations.

Russian authorities, on the other hand, consistently repressed one challenger's strategies while facilitating others, thereby making escalation less likely. When we evaluate the potential success or failure of repression, and its subsequent effects on framing, we need to consider not just the nature of the regime (democratic versus authoritarian) (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Poe and Tate 1994), but also the bureaucratic capacity to implement policies and coerce.

As our study shows, the idiosyncratic characteristics of repression also mattered, and had effects on frame adaptation. Since repression is intimately linked to the instance of contention which it is designed to repress or control, the characteristics of the latter are also important factors.

In Ukraine, a package of laws restrained the liberties of numerous social groups such as journalists, civic activists, football fans, politicians and politically active citizens practically overnight. Therefore, legal repression significantly broadened the range of constituencies who were more receptive to a negative framing of legal repression. In the Russian case legal repression was aimed mostly at politically active groups of the population, therefore the incorporation of repression in movement framing resonated with a relatively narrower range of constituencies.

Similarly, when comparing the coercive repression of Maidan on November 30 and on Bolotnaya on May 6, repressive actions were aimed at different targets. In the Russian case an undifferentiated set of the repressed ranged from radical nationalists and anarchists to ordinary citizens who came to the rally with completely peaceful intentions. On Maidan, riot police brutally

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beat peaceful and unarmed students, activists and journalists. In both cases the *target* was an important characteristic of repression that contributed to its effects on framing dynamics.

Due to its intimate connection to repression, the characteristics of preceding collective action contribute to the effects of repression and correspondingly, to framing dynamics. If protesters' collective actions are *legal* and a culturally accepted form of contentious behavior (Opp and Roehl 1990, Davenport 1995), then their repression and subsequent negative framing is more likely to produce frame resonance and an ensuing framing shift. For instance, claim makers could negatively frame the brutal repression of legal, peaceful protest of students, activists and journalists on Maidan without difficulty. On the other hand, it was harder to negatively portray the repression of Russian protesters on Bolotnaya who fought with police, threw police helmets in the river and occasionally overthrew police cordons.

4. Frame resonance is crucial for explaining why claim makers adapt their framing and why new meanings remain salient in the discourse in response to repression. However, frame construction takes place within the competitive environment of the mobilizing structure, where different interpretive packages compete for attention among target audiences. Repression not only alters the susceptibility of different audiences to alternative meanings, but also shapes power relations within the mobilizing structure. In particular, the success of certain strategies and discourses in response to repression may empower certain groups, while weakening others. Therefore, the composition of the mobilizing structure also affects discursive innovations in response to repression and their success.

In the Euromaidan case, the political opposition dominated the mobilizing structure of the movement. In the FFE movement, liberal politicians and affiliated structures were also in charge of large rallies and protests. In both cases we can trace the dominance of conventional discourse, even though thematically they were different.

In the Ukrainian case, radical right-wing groups never hid their radical discourse and repertoire of action. In the Russian case, more radically oriented right- and left-wing groups lacked the constituents and resources, and therefore mostly preferred to soften their radical rhetoric and avoid non-conventional actions because authorities would have immediately repressed them. Eventually, Russian law enforcement agencies effectively repressed these groups during and

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following Bolotnaya events, whereas in Ukraine, authorities failed to repress the radical actions of far-right groups, whose rhetoric and repertoire of action proved to be successful.

The inability of authorities to repress radicals contributed to their empowering and enhanced their position within the movement. Due to the success of radicals, and the presence of influential brokers within the mobilizing structure, moderate groups and the political opposition partly adopted right-wing frames and further aligned them to their constituencies.

Thus, the presence of radical right-wing groups in the mobilizing structure of Euromaidan played an important role in the resonance of frames, reinforcing a shift in protesters' interpretations. Failed and inconsistent repressive policies made the public more receptive to radical rhetoric and correspondingly contributed to the resonance of radical discourse.

5. Though frame resonance is a crucial factor that shapes framing adaptations of movements, the characteristics of frames also matter and should not be completely disregarded. In particular, the study demonstrates that the credibility and coherence of frames affect framing dynamics.

For instance, in the Russian case, in response to the Bolotnaya events, the frames of different groups diverged. Some of them blamed authorities exclusively, whereas others also blamed protest organizers for their opportunism. Thus, framing was fragmented and not sufficiently coherent, which contributed to its lower resonance. In contrast to that, absolutely all the Euromaidan groups blamed the regime for repressing the peaceful protest on November 30.

Similarly, the credibility of frames may be an important factor that shapes their resonance. For instance, following the repression on Bolotnaya, the credibility of the movement's discourse was considerably undermined by the fact that different SMOs competed to establish the dominance of their own frames regarding what happened and who was responsible. Meanwhile, the coherent and united framing of student repression in Ukraine gave the movement's frames much more salience.

6. As mentioned already, framing does not change immediately in response to repression. It is an *iterative* process whose content evolves gradually, through several phases. At first, claim makers incorporate repression in their discourse and frame it negatively.

They adopt several techniques to signify its illegitimate and unjust character. For instance, discourse makers framed the targets of repression as the *victims* of illegitimate activity. The challengers emphasized that these victims are not abstract, but people with a name, profession, age, gender, and who are just like "one of us". By doing so they try to align the movement's collective action frames to the broader public's experiences in order to resonate with them. However, repression does not create victims straight away, but is a process that requires the construction of a martyr (Della Porta 1995, p. 169).

Frame makers also underscored the high number of people who suffered from negative sanctions. The movement discourse contended that repression affected or threatened to affect *multiple* individuals in the future. They often used terms such as *every citizen*, *every Ukrainian*, *all discontented individuals* or *everybody* to indicate how broadly the targets of repression were defined by the state. This *target magnification* technique is more likely to occur when rulers apply systemic rather than situational repression (Koopmans 1997, Boudreau 2005).

Challengers also stressed the illegitimate or unjust nature of the repressive act per se. *Suppressive act condemnation* technique zeroes in on *why* the act of repression is illegitimate. Discourse makers tend to frame the act of repression as illegitimate or unjust because it is immoral, illogical, violates the law or does not follow procedural legitimacy. The focus is on the suppressive act per se.

Though challengers incorporated a negative framing of repression in their discourse, it was the initial step towards a more substantial shift in framing. The latter implies that at least one, or more likely two or three components of the frame undergo a transformation. For instance, the injustice situation may become more general or abstract, like it was after the repression of students and journalists on November 30. Instead of emphasizing the policy of the EU association agreement, the challengers shifted to a "civil rights" rhetoric. The latter was a more general issue and resonated with a broader pool of constituents.

My study confirms that repression can produce a shift to a more general or abstract problem that is articulated in challengers' collective action frames (Ellingson 1995, Jenness 1995, Suh 2001, Chang 2008).

Claim makers often adopted different framing techniques to expand their collective identities. In particular, they adopted a broader definition of themselves, incorporated different prominent groups and individuals who supported them in the movement discourse and emphasized the cooperation or coalition building within the movement as well between SMOs and external allies.

Though the framing of repression and its incorporation in the movement discourse is the initial step to a more substantial shift, it does not necessarily produce meaningful change. For instance, in the Russian case both repression on Bolotnaya square and the passage of anti-protest laws have become an important part of movement framing. However, in contrast to similar instances of repression in Ukraine, they never became a salient theme within the movement's collective action frames and soon became marginalized or disappeared entirely.

Fundamental frame shift is a more complex process that involves several stages. At first, movements frame repression and make it part of their discourse. If it resonates well, the public mobilizes in response to repression. In the course of mobilization and afterwards meanings crystallize and become anchored in the movement's discourse. This process is visualized in the figure below.

Figure 3. The process of frame adaptation to repression

7. The evolution of meanings in time is shaped by the dynamics of the protest cycle (Snow and Benford 1992). As the study demonstrates the different dynamics of protest cycles affected the evolution of framing and correspondingly contributed to framing dynamics in response to repression.

A comparison of protest cycles in both cases shows that they started in a similar way. However, their further development took different paths. The parabola of protest in the Russian case (Semenov 2018) mostly followed a pattern of protest cycle initiation, diffusion and closure. We can observe the growth of a parabola of protest from the beginning of the protest cycle from early December 2011 to February 2012, which was followed by a steady decline until early May (Ibid.). In May the line of protest again went up for a while, whereas in June it dropped down again indicating the closure of the cycle (Ibid.). The initial stage demonstrated high levels of mobilization and some instances of confrontation. In May, when signs of a further decline could be observed, some movement leaders tried to radicalize the protests. However, the law and order agencies effectively repressed radicalization and kept the protest within the conventional repertoire of contention by preventing escalation.

In the Ukrainian case we can observe different dynamics occurring during the protest cycle. In particular, the number of conventional *and* confrontational and violent protest events grew steadily from the outset, all the way until the end of the protests (Center for Social and Labor Research 2014). In contrast to Russian authorities, the Ukrainian regime did not manage to restabilize the balance of power and win back control over the polity, which later led to its collapse. The radicalization of previously moderate, non-radical protest groups and the inability of authorities to suppress radicalization or to negotiate a political solution to the conflict were the major factors that shaped the different trajectories and outcomes in both cases.

The change of public perceptions and the higher receptivity of different public groups to radical discourse shaped the success of radical framing and contributed to frame shift. Whereas in the Russian case, gradual demobilization and effective repression decreased the public's receptivity to alternative discourses.

The violent turn of Maidan would have been impossible without the radicalization of considerable numbers of movement sympathizers who previously did not belong to radical

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groups and were not involved in radical actions. As Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) suggest "to the extent that violence is a tactical differentiation within an overcrowded social movement sector, it is the size of the "market" for social protest that determines the extent of violence that will result from it" (Ibid., p. 629).

The target audiences of Maidan would have been less likely to support radicalization had the parliament not passed the anti-protest laws in January. *Both* internal competition within the movement for constituencies and the external strategies of authorities vis-à-vis the movement contributed to the radicalization of protest (Koopmans 1993). Neither intergroup competition within the movement (Tarrow 1989), nor the authorities' strategies for handling protests (Kriesi et al. 1995) on their own would have been able to sufficiently radicalize protesters. Rather it was the combination of both that produced a radicalization of action and meaning.

In the Russian case, in contrast to Maidan, the size of the radical "market" was insufficient to mobilize large numbers of people for radical actions. More radically-oriented groups never managed to outcompete major SMOs and encourage the adoption of a more confrontational or violent repertoire of action. Actual radicalization never took place at the later stages of protest cycle, which is supposed to parallel the process of institutionalization (Tarrow 1989, Koopmans 1993).

Russian authorities prevented the potential radicalization of protest on Bolotnaya and the days following Bololtnaya events. Movement sympathizers remained moderate and never became sufficiently radicalized to participate in violence or to adopt the radical discourse that emerged as a backlash to repression. The consistent repression of radical protest and the facilitation of conventional forms of mobilization coupled with minor reforms contributed further to the dominance of conventional forms of mobilization. This configuration of external factors and low public receptivity to radical frames resulted in a moderate and very selective institutionalization of some of the challengers' demands without the radicalization of discourse and actions.

8. As a comparison of these cases suggests, besides political opportunities at national level, international political opportunities also contributed to the effects of repression on framing dynamics (Smith 1999, van der Heijden 2006). The influence of the EU and the USA in

the Ukrainian case often prevented Yanukovych's regime from adopting harsh repressive measures. The EU and US ambassadors openly supported protesters in their press-releases, attended protests at Maidan and suggested that Yanukovych start negotiations with the opposition. They represented the challengers' influential allies not within the political system (Tarrow 1996), but outside of it. Protesters often viewed Western countries as the supporters of their endeavors to change Ukraine. At the same time discourse constructors negatively framed the attempts of Russia to interfere in Ukrainian politics.

In contrast to Ukraine, in the Russian case, claim makers avoided pointing at any connections to foreign support due to the possibility of being negatively perceived by the public as a conspiracy and an attempt to interfere in national politics. What is more, the support from Western diplomats and high-level officials was very moderate in comparison to Euromaidan.

9. More generally, my analysis suggests that repression has crucial effects on the symbolic side of a movement's activity. By evoking the tidal waves of meanings, repression may produce shifts in interpretations, which may produce crucial effects on popular backlash. Repression-mobilization studies (Lichbach 1987, Francisco 1995, Moore 1998, Davenport et al. 2005) are entirely focused on the material side of movement-state interactions and do not consider the role of actors' interpretations in assessing the effects of repression on movement responses. This focus limits the explanatory power of these studies to material factors. As this study demonstrated, by interlinking repression, framing and mobilization we can produce richer and more nuanced explanations that would be impossible without considering the cultural dimensions of movement activity in response to repression.

The study reveals certain weaknesses of the framing perspective (Snow et al. 1986, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Noakes and Johnston 2005) in its application to framing dynamics. This approach mostly focuses on ideology, the content of the movement's messages, target audiences and their belief systems, and the alignment of the movement's message with audiences' worldviews (Snow et al. 1986, Klandermans 1988, Gamson and Modigliani 1989, Gamson 1992, Oliver and Johnston 2000). Whereas, in my analysis, the perceptions of the broader public and movement sympathizers, frame resonance, backlash mobilization as well as contextual conditions were the most influential factors that affected framing dynamics in response to repression.

In order to more adequately analyze culture in motion, we need to allow for the possibility that meanings are not always available before collective mobilization as postulated by resource mobilization theory and by the frame alignment approach (Klandermans 1984, 1988, Snow and Benford 1988). Repression may produce alternative meanings and make the public more receptive to them. In case of successful adaptation and backfire these meanings get crystallized and anchored in the movement's discourse *following* mobilization, not before it. Thus, the current analysis rather confirms suggestions that meanings can both precede and arise out of mobilization (Taylor and Whittier 1992, Benford 1993, Fantasia 1995).

We also need to reconsider the quite rigid definition of frame resonance which is often defined as the fit between frames and existing public belief systems (Snow and Benford 1988). This definition precludes the analysis of framing dynamics, where resonance is conditioned by alterations of public perceptions. By conceiving frame resonance as an emergent relationship between the movement's discourse and the target audiences' perceptions, we ascribe explanatory power not just to the content of frames, but also to changes in the receptivity of target audiences.

In addition to that, frame resonance requires a verification signal, which would validate the success or failure of framing adaptations and allow for testing culture in action. Therefore, backlash is a crucial component of framing dynamics, which signals to movements whether they should keep new themes in their discourse or not. This finding requires the frame alignment view to be revised (Snow et al. 1986, Gamson 1992), which normally does not pursue further analysis as soon as frame resonance is identified. In my cases, backlash anchored new meanings, whereas its absence marginalized them further.

In terms of regional dynamics both cases originally followed the patterns of top-down mobilization that are dominant in post-Soviet states (Robertson 2011, Way 2015). At the outset, established actors, namely the political opposition, managed to structure and control popular outrage to a certain extent. Due to the weakness of civil society, civic groups did not manage to sufficiently influence the mobilization. In the Ukrainian case, politicians did not manage to control radical groups, which instead became empowered thanks to the inconsistent repression and concessions of the government. This point emphasizes the importance of the state's capacity to repress threatening groups and prevent the fragmentation of state institutions (Way 2015). Even

in a relatively stable and consolidated regime with a strong organizational base, institutional underdevelopment prevented the Ukrainian authorities from repressing radicals or finding adequate political solutions. The Russian regime did not experience such underdevelopment, and therefore remained in power while granting very few concessions to protesters.

When assessing the ability of the regime to handle protests in post-Soviet mobilizations, we also need to consider the collective identity of protest (Way 2015). Coupled with weak institutions, a strong anti-regime Ukrainian national identity was an important factor that contributed to the collapse of regime. Meanwhile, Russian homogenous national identity did not contribute to the instability of Putin's regime.

The findings of the study are limited to non-democratic contexts. Therefore, future research on this topic should test the effects of repression on framing in democratic contexts and more thoroughly explore how particular contextual factors influence framing dynamics in response to repression.

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Appendix A. Online sources of Euromaidan movement

SMO	Type of data source	The Web address
1. Udar	Official website	http://2k9.cmsys.it/home/ http://klichko.org/home/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/UDAR.ua/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/party_udar_vitaliya_klichka
2. Bat'kivshina	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20140225025930/http://batkivshchyna.com.ua/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/Batkivshchyna/
	Vkontakte	https://vk.com/club79461412
3. Svoboda	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20140915182048/http://www.svoboda.org.ua/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/svoboda.ua/

		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/svoboda_ukr
4.	Euromaidan SOS	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/EvromaidanSOS
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/maidan_sos
5.	Civic sector of Euromaidan	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/hrom.sektor.euromaidan/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/hrom.sektor.euromaidan
6.	Automaidan	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/automaidan/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/avtomaydan
7.	Civic Council of Maidan	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/GRMaidan/
8.	Centre UA	Official website	https://centreua.org/
		Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/CentreUA.org/
9.	Spil'na Sprava	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/spilnasprava/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/club23254994
10.	Vidsich	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/vidsich/
11.	Student Coordination Council	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/skronprotest/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/stud_rada_rv
12.	Pryama diya	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/prjama.dija/

	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/id134416479
13. DemAlliance	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/DemAlliance/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/demalliance
14. Maidan Self-Defense	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/samooboronaMaydanu/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/samooboronamaidanu
15. The Right Sector	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20140304054614/http://banderivets.org.ua/
16. The Committee of releasing political prisoners	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20131207064830/http://kvp.in.ua/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/groups/155726361155842/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/club25418010
17. The congress of Ukrainian nationalists	Official website	http://cun.org.ua/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/cun.party/

Appendix B. Online sources of "For Fair Elections" movement

SMO	Type of data source	The Web address
1. Jabloko	Official website	https://www.yabloko.ru/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/yabloko.ru/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/yabloko_ru
2. Parnas	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20120510104234/http://www.svobodanaroda.org/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/parnasparty/
	Vkontakte	https://vk.com/parnasparty
	Livejournal	https://ru-parnas.livejournal.com/
3. DemVybor	Official website	https://demvybor.ru/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/demvybor.ru/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/demchoice
	Livejournal	https://demchoice.livejournal.com/
4. Libertarian party	Official website	https://archive.libertarian-party.ru/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/lpr_vk
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/lpr.fcbk/
5. The league of voters	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/ligaizbirateley
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/cherny_spisok

		Livejournal	https://varlamov.ru/509649.html
6.	"Golos" (" The Vote")	Official website	http://www.golosinfo.org/
		Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/golosinfo/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/golosinfo
7.	Citizen observer	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/nabludatel.org/
		Official website	https://nabludatel.org/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/info_for_activist
		Livejournal	https://nabludatel-org.livejournal.com/
8.	Eco-Oborona	Official website	https://www.ecmo.ru/
		Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/ecmohimki/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/public81670704
		Livejournal	https://ecmoru.livejournal.com/
9.	Solidarity	Official website	https://www.rusolidarnost.ru/
		Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/RuSolidarnost/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/solidarnost
		Livejournal	https://solidarnost-lj.livejournal.com/
10.	United Civic Front	Official website	http://www.rufront.ru/
		Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/ObedinennyjGrazdanskijFrontGarriKasparova/
		Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/club78619
		Livejournal	https://o-g-f.livejournal.com/
11.	Rot Front	Official website	https://www.rotfront.su/
		Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/groups/rotfront/

	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/rot_front
12. The Left Front	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20120711204020/http://leftfront.ru/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/leftront/ https://www.facebook.com/groups/LeftFront.ru/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/leftfront_ru https://vk.com/leftfront
	Livejournal	https://leftfront.livejournal.com/
13. Russian Socialist Movement	Official website	http://anticapitalist.ru/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/groups/russocmovement/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/rsd_rsm
	Livejournal	https://rsd-group.livejournal.com/
14. Autonomous Action	Official website	https://avtonom.org/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/avtonom.org/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/avtonom_org
15. National Democratic Party	Official website	https://rosndp.org/
	Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/groups/220342394712929/
	Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/nd_party
	Livejournal	https://ruspartia.livejournal.com/
16. The Russians	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20120606025913/http://rusnat.com/
	Livejournal	https://russnation.livejournal.com/
18. The Movement against illegal migration (DPNI)	Official website	https://web.archive.org/web/20130118224023/http://www.dpni.org/
	Livejournal	https://dpniorg.livejournal.com/ https://dpni.livejournal.com/

19. The Other Russia	20. Official website	https://drugoros.ru/
	21. Vkontakte page	https://vk.com/drugoross
	22. Facebook page	https://www.facebook.com/drugoros/
	23. Livejournal	https://drugoros.livejournal.com/

"For fair elections" movement

Interview RU1: October 31, 2017, Sergey Davidis, Solidarity

Interview RU2: November 1, 2017, Igor Jakovlev, Jabloko

Interview RU3: November 2, 2017, Tatiana Suhareva, Feminist movement

Interview RU4: November 5, 2017, Sergey Konstantinov, Free radicals

Interview RU5: November 8, 2017, Mihail Shneider, Parnas

Interview RU6: November 11, 2017, Vladimir Tor, The movement against illegal migration

Interview RU7: November 14, 2017, Igor Jasin, LGBT-movement

Interview RU8: November 17, 2017, Ilia Mishenko, Solidarity

Interview RU9: November 19, 2017, Grigory Melkojants, Golos

Interview RU10: November 22, 2017, Alexei Gaskarov, Autonomous action

Interview RU11: November 23, 2017, Dmitry Oreshkin, Citizen Observer

Interview RU12, November 24, 2017, Alexander Ryklin, Solidarity

Interview RU13, November 24, 2017, Inna Kurtiukova, Citizen Observer

Interview RU14: November 25, 2017, Roman Dobrohvotov, Solidarity

Interview RU15: November 25, 2017, Vasily Kuzmin, Left Front

Interview RU16: November 27, 2017, Fedor Ponomarenko, Russian People's movement

Euromaidan movement

Interview UKR1: December 1, 2017, Alexei Gricenko and Sergey Haginov, Automaidan

Interview UKR2: December 2, 2017, Artiom Skoropadsky, Right Sector

Interview UKR3: December 3, 2017, Anna Ivanchik, Avtonomny Opir

Interview UKR4: December 4, 2017, Roman Orishenko, Maidan Self-Defense

Interview UKR5: December 6, 2017, Katerina Chepura, Vidsich

Interview UKR6: December 9, 2017, Oleg Slabo and Alena Podobec, Civic Sector of Euromaidan

Interview UKR7: December 10, 2017, Mykola Kohanivsky, The committee of releasing political prisoners

Interview UKR8: December 11, 2017, Yuri Juzic, Batkivshina

Interview UKR9: December 13, 2017, Ruslan Boyko, Maidan Self-Defense

Interview UKR10: December 14, 2017, Oleg Achtirsky, Spilna Sprava

Interview UKR11: December 15, 2017, Solomia Bobrovska, Euromaidan SOS

Interview UKR12: December 17, 2017, Oksana, DemAlliance

Interview UKR13: December 17, 2017, Serhiy Mitrofansky, Batkivshina

Interview UKR14: December 18, 2017, Ruslan Andriyko, Svoboda

Interview UKR15: December 21, 2017, Alexandra Matveichuk, Euromaidan SOS

Interview UKR16: December 22, 2017, Inna Borzilo, Euromaidan SOS

Interview UKR17: December 23, 2017, Volodymir Cheremiz, The Institute Republica