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Universalism and Liberation

**Italian Catholic Culture and the Idea of International
Community (1963-1978)**

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I

Introduction

In this preliminary chapter we will describe the structure of the dissertation, beginning with a brief contextualization of the argument. We will move on to define the “core business” of the research, addressing the state of the art of the literature on the subject. After that, we will discuss matters of periodization, finally presenting the case study to which we will dedicate most of the analysis, accounting for the division of the work into three different chapters. The last section will build a bridge toward the conclusion, by outlining the goals of the research.

1. The context.

The 1960s marked the beginning of an epochal transition in the religious history of the Western world; given that in the 1950s the vast majority of the people in all Western countries were at least nominal members of one of the Christian churches, this transformation involved Christianity first and foremost.¹ Nearly every country saw a drop in church attendance; there was a considerable decline in the numbers of clergy, and a substantial drop in the figures of traditional indicators of religiosity such as baptisms and marriages in Church, paralleled by a substantial increase in the range of beliefs and worldviews accessible to the majority of the population.² Until recently, several

¹ Three major historical accounts to guide a reader through the history of Christianity in the contemporary age (to which we refer for richer tableaus) have been provided by Jean-Robert Armogathe and Yves-Marie Hilaire (eds.), *Histoire générale du christianisme*, vol. II: *Du XVI^e siècle à nos jours*, in part. *Quatrième Époque - de 1800 à nos jours*, Paris: PUF 2010; Giovanni Filoromo and Daniele Menozzi (eds.), *Storia del cristianesimo*, vol. IV: *L'età contemporanea*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1997, and *Cambridge History of Christianity*, vol. V (edited by Sheridan Gilley and Brian Stanley): *World Christianities, c. 1815 – c.1914*, and vol. VI (edited by Hugh McLeod): *World Christianities, c. 1914 – c.2000*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005-2006.

² Although historians argue about the periodization and the causes of such a transition, its existence has been well documented, in particular thanks to the work of British scholar Hugh McLeod, of whom see at least *The religious crisis of the 1960s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. For a first assessment of the debate raised by this hypothesis see

historians and sociologists had interpreted this process as the final stage of the secularization pattern – the historical process whereby society and culture are liberated from the control of religion – which has marked the history of Western societies since the nineteenth century.³ More properly, without arguing about its irreversibility, which has been contradicted by many a case of “religious awakening”, most Church historians have stressed that what came to a definitive end in the 1960s was the age of Christendom, that is a pattern of relations between Church and State, and between Church and society, in which “there were close ties between the leaders of the church and those in positions of secular power, the laws purported to be based on Christian principles, and where, aside from certain clearly defined outsider communities, every member of the society was assumed to be a Christian”.⁴ All churches went through major processes of change, although “none as spectacular and mediatised as the Roman Catholic Church”.⁵ During that decade, the Catholic world was most

Callum G. Brown, *What was the Religious Crisis of the 1960s?*, in “Journal of Religious History”, issue 4, 2010, pp. 46-79.

³ The definition is taken from Daniele Menozzi, *La Chiesa cattolica e la secolarizzazione*, Torino: Einaudi, 1993, p. 3. The problematic nature of the concept – which has been debated at length by modern historiography and sociology – comes from its employment both from those who want to explain religious change, and those who use it merely to describe it: see some notes in Hugh McLeod, *Secularisation in Western Europe 1848–1914*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2000, pp. 1-12. For an early debate about the “secularization paradigm” see Steve Bruce (ed.), *Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, while a critical assessment of the secularization pattern, as well as an analysis of the concept in the present age, have been provided by Manuel Franzmann, Christel Gärtner and Nicole Köck (eds.), *Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt. Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religionssoziologie*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006, and Callum G. Brown and Michael Snape (eds.), *Secularisation in the Christian World*, Farnham: Ashgate, 2010. Most sociological and philosophical debates in recent years have been influenced by the landmark book by Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, on which see Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen and Craig Calhoun (eds.), *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

⁴ Hugh McLeod, *Introduction*, in ID. and Werner Ustorf (eds.), *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000*, New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 1. See also Patrick Pasture, *Christendom and the legacy of the sixties: between the secular city and the age of Aquarius*, in “Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique”, issue 1, 2004, pp. 82-117, and Yvon Travnouez, *Feu les chrétiens*, in ID. (dir.) *La décomposition des chrétiens occidentaux 1950-2010*, Brest: Centre de Recherche Bretonne et Celtique UEB, 2013, pp. 11-19. As regards the Catholic Church, the expression “age of Christendom” is sometimes replaced by “Constantinian era”, in the wake of the seminal work of Catholic theologian Marie-Dominique Chenu (whom we will encounter in the course of this exposition), *La fin de l’ère constantinienne*, in: Jean-Pierre Dubois-Dumée et al., *Un concile pour notre temps*, Paris: Cerf, 1961, pp. 59-87. See in particular on this concept and its importance for the history of the Church, the introduction of Italian historian Mauro Pesce to the republication of Chenu’s essay: Mauro Pesce and Marie-Dominique Chenu, *La fine dell’età costantiniana*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2013, pp. 1-9. See also some notes in Gianmaria Zamagni, *Fine dell’era costantiniana. Retrospettiva genealogica di un concetto critico*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011.

⁵ Patrick Pasture and Leo Kenis, *The Transformation of Christian Churches in Western Europe. An Introduction*, in Leo Kenis, Jaak Billiet and Patrick Pasture (eds.), *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010, p. 9. This book has helped to situate this process of change, which involved all the Christian Churches but especially the Catholic denomination, in the general historical context of the Western world in the fifty years after World War II. Another recent book that has addressed the changes experienced by Western “Christianities”, and can be used as a first rudimentary compass to use to understand this phase of transition, which

famously affected by an event of periodizing value, the Second Vatican Council, and experienced the beginning of a transition – one that has not ended yet – which has deeply transformed its features but has anything but crossed it off from the list of the relevant actors in contemporary society.⁶ The complex transformation of the role of religion in society, and especially the historical evolution of Catholicism, will be the first (inner) level of background of our analysis.

From a wider perspective, though (history is often a matter of perspectives, and adequate contextualizations), the winds of change that infused religious history were just a part of a multifaceted transformation that spread through the Western world in the 1960s, modifying “social and cultural developments for the rest of the century”.⁷ In a nutshell, Western societies changed their basic features because of rising standards of living and enhanced lifestyles, but also because of the political protest and violent confrontation which pervaded both the public and the private spheres. Irrespective of the judgment that one can retrospectively express about the events of the 1960s and their repercussions in the following decades, their historical importance cannot be underestimated. The conservatism that characterized Western societies until the 1950s – rigid social codes, class distinctions, racism, patriarchal value systems – was contested by a “cultural revolution” led by young generations and epitomized by the events of 1968, which have been widely addressed by the media and the literature.⁸ A mounting wave of political and cultural

unfolded at different paces depending on the contexts, but with some common features, is the already quoted Travnouez (dir.), *La décomposition des chrétientés occidentales 1950-2010*.

⁶ In order to familiarize oneself with the transformations experienced by Catholicism in the last fifty years – we will come back to the subject in a few pages with further bibliographical references and some interpretative arguments – see the essays of Staf Hellemans, *Die Transformation der Religion und der Grosskirchen in der zweiten Moderne aus der Sicht des religiösen Modernisierungsparadigmas*, in “Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte”, 2005, pp. 11-35, and Urs Altermatt, *Ungleichzeitigkeiten zwischen radikalem Christentum, Restauration und Pluralisierung – Zeitgenössische Betrachtungen zum Katholizismus*, in “Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte”, 2009, pp. 249-64.

⁷ Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy and the United States, c.1958 - c.1974*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 5.

⁸ Among the most interesting accounts, which put the protests of 1968 in a broader perspective, are: Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (ed.), 1968. *Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998; Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68. Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *Promises of 1968: Crisis, Illusion, Utopia*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011. The concept of “cultural revolution” has been summed up by Arthur Marwick, *Youth Culture and the Cultural Revolution of the Long Sixties*, in Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried (eds.), *Between Marx and Coca-Cola. Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980*, New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006, pp. 39-58, but see also John C. Williams (ed.), *The 1960s Cultural Revolution*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000.

radicalism inundated the harbors of Western Europe and the United States, especially between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, challenging the authority of governments, institutions and ways of thought. The history of those countries would be permanently transformed by such a dynamic phase, and also, subsequently, by its narrative. We will see how the *reception* of the cultural revolution will lead to different outcomes in the Catholic milieu, but we need to keep in mind a caveat that also works for the wider cultural history of the Western world – and, we might argue, for cultural transformations in general: we are not dealing with a sudden change of state, but rather with a long-term process that was accelerated, but not started, by the events of 1968. The unstable climate of change, which permeated the 1960s and 1970s in the Western world, will be the second (medium) level of background of our investigation.

Actually, if we broaden the horizon a little bit more, we can see that the waves of change were not limited to Western Europe and the United States, but reached other parts of the world as well: many historians have referred to the concept of “global 1960s” to underline the world dimension of similar trends, which suggest the existence of elements of comparison.⁹ The first, and very basic, explanation of this fact comes from a new change of perspective: indeed, zooming out again, we could state that it was during the 1960s that for the first time, the deep and powerful web of relations – at political, economic, social and cultural level – which we are now accustomed to calling “globalization”, started to become more visible, before exploding in such great evidence after the 1970s.¹⁰ The events and processes which took place in Europe, for instance, were influenced by or in other ways connected to what was going on in other parts of the world (and vice versa), through expanding networks of communication and information-sharing. What changed in the 1960s and the 1970s was a new awareness of the global consequences of events, at different

⁹ See at least Samantha Christiansen and Zachary Scarlett, *The “Third World” in the Global 1960s*, New York: Berghahn, 2011, and Timothy Scott Brown and Andrew Lison, *The Global Sixties in Sound and Vision. Media, Counterculture, Revolt*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

¹⁰ We are following here the sketch drawn by one of the most prominent historians of globalization, Akira Iriye, *Global and Transnational History. The Past, Present and Future*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2013. Iriye has poignantly observed that “historiography lagged behind history by two or three decades” (p. 20), since until the 1990s, scholars did not reflect the changes taking place in the world in their body of work, failing to reconceptualize their perspectives on history, whether contemporary or earlier.

contextual levels – from the Vietnam war to the 1970s energy crisis, from the protests of 1968 to the consequences of the last wave of decolonization, just to cite the first few events that come to mind to almost any reader – that stimulated the search for new cultural tools (or the updating of the old ones), in order to explain and react to the new direction taken by the course of history. Both the “optimism” of the 1960s and the sentiment of “malaise” which permeated Western societies during the 1970s would be difficult to understand without making reference to global trends. The growth of the sense of interdependence, called “one of the remarkable aspects of contemporary history” Akira Iriye,¹¹ and which started to become more perceivable and sharp worldwide in the period that we are more closely examining, will be the third (external) level of background of our research.

Those of us who were born after this critical juncture are familiar by default with the global dimension. We are still immersed in the age of globalization, which has framed our way of looking at the world as well as our behavior in everyday life. This self-evident condition, however, has not always been a given: historians know as well as physicists that every effect has a cause (actually, in history, often more than one cause), and every social and cultural phenomenon has its roots somewhere in the past, ready to be discovered by those who want to look for it. In many ways, the present age would be very difficult to understand without studying the profound transformations that characterized the 1960s and the 1970s, even if they must not be taken as the “initial singularity” of the contemporary era: history is an incremental process by definition.¹² Sociologists, philosophers, and more recently historians, have discussed at length the possibility to consider this new phase, which began approximately in the 1970s and in which we are still living, a new era, that can no longer be labeled “modernity”.¹³ Most famously, in 1979 the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard presented a report entitled *La Condition postmoderne*, arguing that the grand

¹¹ Akira Iriye, *Introduction* to ID. (ed.), *Global interdependence. The World After 1945*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014, p. 8.

¹² As is well known, for instance, the concept of globalization has been employed to define different phases in world history, the last of which began in the 1960s/1970s of the last century: see at least the accounts of Anthony G. Hopkins, *Globalization in World History*, London: Pimlico, 2002, and Peter N. Stearns, *Globalization in World History*, Routledge, 2010.

¹³ We will discuss the concept of modernity, especially in relation to religious history, in the following section on periodization.

narrative of modernity (based on social, scientific and cultural progress) had run its course, losing its ability to function as a shared point of social reference. Humankind had entered the unprecedented condition of postmodernity.¹⁴ In the following decades, Lyotard's approach has been challenged from many angles, especially from an interpretation developed by German sociologist Ulrich Beck that introduced the concept of "second modernity", or "reflexive modernity", meaning that the process of modernization has started to relate actively to itself, to the consequences of its own unwinding.¹⁵ One of the core features of reflexive modernity, consistent with the sentiment of malaise cited a few lines above, was its "uncontrollability".¹⁶

We will not enter the uncharted territory of the second modernity; on the contrary, we will focus on the last phase of "first modernity", which presents the recognizable profile of an epoch of transition. We will address this period from a lateral, but meaningful perspective: we will investigate how a specific subject – the Catholic culture – in particular in a specific context – Italy – reflected on an idea that was already circulating in the Catholic discourse, but at the same time was deeply affected by the general trends that we have mentioned: the idea of international community.

2. Definitions and literature.

In introducing the subject of our research, we have made reference to several concepts that require a rigorous definition, in order to make sure that both the author and the readers are on the same page as to what to expect from the argumentation. The first locution in need of a clear definition is

¹⁴ Jean-François Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*, Paris: Minuit, 1979.

¹⁵ Within the immense bibliography on the subject, see at least Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Polity Press, 1994, and the introduction to Beck's thought provided by Mads P. Sørensen and Allan Christiansen, *Ulrich Beck. An introduction to the theory of second modernity and the risk society*, Routledge, 2013.

¹⁶ The sense of impending "crisis" which pervaded Western societies during the 1970s has been addressed by several interesting historiographical contributions: see for instance Niall Ferguson, *Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global*, in ID (ed.), *The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 1-20. See also the account, especially focused on the United States but in a global perspective, of Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s. A new Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. This "Zeitgeist" was already noted and discussed by contemporary observers: see for instance the dossier of "Le Monde Diplomatique" devoted to "La perception des menaces. Malaise en Occident", in "Le Monde Diplomatique", March 1974, pp. 7-17.

“Catholic culture”. For the purpose of this work, we considered it to be the summa of the theoretical elaboration, or the “discourse”,¹⁷ of two main sets of sources: the Magisterium – the entire set of Teachings issued by the ecclesiastical authority, in the form both of collective documents (like the Second Vatican Council documents) and of the pronouncements of the pope – and Catholic theologians and intellectuals. The pope’s Teachings will have a particular importance in our work. Obviously, this choice entails the risk of underestimating the role of different centers within the Catholic Church, from the national episcopacies to the Secretariat of State, to the experts consulted in the preparatory phases of the most important pronouncements. In developing our argument, we will make reference to the complexity of an environment which cannot be limited to the official position of the Roman center; however, the accurate examination of the different lines would require a far wider study (which would also be limited by the lack of available sources, since the Vatican Archives for the period under consideration are still inaccessible), which is not the purpose of the present work. As for primary sources, we took into consideration only the Magisterium’s public discourse, whose official pronouncements are published (in Latin) by the Vatican Publishing House through the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*. The reader may consult the official translations in the most common languages on the official website of the Holy See, www.vatican.va, which provides a valuable database of the ecclesiastical authority’s official pronouncements.¹⁸ Furthermore, the pope is not one voice among the others within the Catholic Church: he is the expression of a pre-eminent

¹⁷ We are employing these concepts in a rather loose way, in order to underline our goal of following the history of an idea within the theoretical elaboration of institutions and persons that can easily be identified as Catholic. Therefore, we will not make reference to the literature, pertaining to the field of Critical Discourse Analysis, dedicated to analyzing and properly defining the features of religious discourse: for a methodological introduction to these problems see Noel Heather, *Religious language and critical discourse analysis: ideology and identity in Christian discourse today*, Peter Lang, 2000.

¹⁸ As a general rule, we will report direct quotations of written documents in English (using the official translation from the website), while referencing the original version in the footnotes. Subsequent references will be made citing the name of the pronouncement, and the quotation’s paragraph as reported on the website. On paper, a classical English edition of papal encyclicals in English is Claudia Carlen, Ihm (ed.), *The papal encyclicals, 1846–1978*, Ann Arbor: Pierian Press, 1990, while a standard reference for the Second Vatican Council’s documents is Walter J. Abbott (ed.), *Documents of Vatican II*, New York: Guild, 1966 (a more recent translation is Austin Flannery (ed.), *Vatican Council II: Constitution, Decrees, Declarations*, Norhport, NY: Costello Publishing Company, 1996). About the oral pronouncements of the popes (speeches, addresses, allocutions, etc.), we will quote the original version in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* (hereinafter AAS) or in other publications, as well as mentioning both their availability on the website, and the language in which they can be consulted, in the form [web: Language, Language]. For some considerations on the relative authority of different papal documents, see Francis A. Sullivan, *Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium*, New York: Paulist Press, 1996.

authority, which has guiding, mediation and synthesis functions recognized by the whole ecclesial community, laity included.¹⁹ Moreover, as we will argue, the role of the “Roman center” is particularly relevant in Italy, since it exercises a cultural influence that is not comparable with most other traditionally Catholic areas.

Keeping the public discourse at the core of the study enables us to contextualize it within the long term of the history of the contemporary Church, highlighting continuities and discontinuities with the tradition. Through a long-term discourse analysis that does not simply report the official version, but investigates the type of language that was used, the cross-references (or their absence) to traditional formulas, and the possible use of new rhetorical and analytical instruments, it is possible to go under the apparently flat surface of the Church’s message, while at the same time maintaining the advantages of a synthetic approach. However, in order not to lose sight of the plurality, we will not limit the inquiry to the institutional aspect of Catholicism. Catholic culture, indeed, does not draw its inspiration only from the Magisterium’s discourse, but it is enriched by the ideas of theologians and intellectuals operating in various fields of society, and whose ideas need to be “validated” by Rome, in a complex and historically variable relationship between the center and the periphery.²⁰ We will follow two criteria to narrow down the potentially infinite list of personalities and currents to take into account. On the one hand, we will focus on the figures who, with the highest degree of originality, expressed ideas that helped build the Magisterium’s discourse. On the other hand, we will examine the ideas of those who proposed a potentially alternative or adversarial point of view, at least not fully ascribable to the standards of orthodoxy.

What are we looking for, though, when we analyze the discourse of the Catholic culture? We have introduced our subject with another phrase worth explaining, the “idea of international

¹⁹ See, for a short general introduction Rudolf Lill, *Die Macht der Päpste*, Kevelaer: Lahn-Verlag, 2006, and John Pollard, *The Papacy*, in McLeod (ed.), *World Christianities, c. 1914 – c.2000*, pp. 27-49. Andrea Riccardi, *Il potere del papa da Pio XII a Paolo VI*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1988, deals more directly with the centrality of the papacy’s institute during the second half of the twentieth century.

²⁰ Theologians and intellectuals are used here as broad categories which aim to include the reference to ecclesiastical and lay personalities of Catholic faith, who gave a significant contribution to the evolution of the Catholic discourse.

community". By this locution I refer to the reflection upon the criteria that should have guided the relations among peoples, organized in political communities, at global level. This reflection, obviously, did not start in the twentieth century. The Catholic culture has always had a tendency to think and express itself in universal terms. The very word "Catholic" comes from the Greek καθολικός [katholikos], which means "general" or "universal". Indeed, Christian doctrine was directed to the whole of mankind, since it showed all men and women the path to salvation, anytime and anywhere. Salvation was not only a source of hope, projected on a life after death, but it also implied a certain way of living and relating with others, individually and within society. Therefore, it is not strange that throughout history Catholic thinkers engaged in envisaging the best way to organize this coexistence among men, not only at local level, but also on a larger scale, embracing a potentially global horizon.²¹ It is also natural that the Catholic Church – which presented itself as the only official guardian and interpreter of the Christian message – dealt extensively with this issue, for two main reasons: providing the faithful with a uniform code of behavior, and taking care of a purely temporal interest, since the constitution of the States of the Church in the early Middle Ages.

Since the modern era began, Catholic theologians and jurists such as Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) have discussed the existence of a community of peoples, consisting of all the different institutional unities spread over the world. Suárez's definition of *jus gentium*, as a set of rules – stemming from natural law – common to all peoples, was rooted in the traditional Catholic assertion of the unity of the human family: here we are at the origin of the idea of the international community in the Catholic discourse.²² The phrase "international community" has been part of the Catholic vocabulary up to the present day, without being replaced

²¹ See in particular the Christian contribution to utopian thought (especially from the Renaissance to the seventeenth century), which focused on the description of the ideal of a peaceful and stable society, with various degrees of territorial extension. A first introduction is the classic work by Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World*, Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1979, in part. pp. 93-410.

²² See John P. Doyle, *Francisco Suárez on The Law of Nations*, in Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans (eds.), *Religion and International Law*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999, pp. 103-20, and Cézar de Alencar Arnaut de Toledo, Franciene Vicentini Herradon and Marlon Rodrigo Alberto dos Santos, *Francisco Suárez e o nascimento do direito internacional*, in "Acta Scientiarum", issue 1, 1999, pp. 147-151.

by the more “neutral” formula of “international system” employed since the nineteenth century by jurists, historians and political scientists to indicate the space-time coordinates in which international relations take place.²³ We have decided to employ the phrase “international community” instead of “international system” for two interrelated methodological reasons: firstly, the concept was clearly addressed in the fundamental document which oriented the approach of the Catholic culture to its relations with the contemporary world, the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et spes* of the Second Vatican Council (1965). Therefore, we are provided with a pivotal term of comparison to analyze the development of this idea in the following period (approximately until the end of the 1970s), as well as its origins and the continuities and discontinuities with the tradition,²⁴

Secondly, we wish to make clear that our approach pertains to the field of the history of ideas, and not to political science, nor is our perspective that of jurists or legal historians. Indeed, international literature has already focused both on the contribution of Catholic culture to the development of international law (which refers to the set of rules aimed at regulating the international system), and on what could be defined as a “Catholic approach to international relations”, understood as a field of study. About the former, there are already a few good accounts of the inputs from Catholic culture to the foundation and development of international law throughout the centuries.²⁵ A wider amount of notes and analyses have been dedicated to the effect of the religious factor on international relations (and to the possibility of including it in classical

²³ A methodological and theoretical compass for the figuratively limitless field of the literature about international relations – a very generic concept which embraces a wide array of social, cultural, economic and political exchanges among institutional and non-institutional contexts – in which the concept of “international system” is created and discussed at length, can be found in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations*, London: SAGE, 2013², while Mark Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History. A Guide to Method*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, provides an easy-reading essential introduction to the historical study of international politics.

²⁴ It is worth mentioning that the phrase “international community” can have different meanings when addressed in the context of International Relations theory: see some notes on this in Carlo Focarelli, *International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, in part. pp. 151-4. Our analysis, instead, will remain focused on the Catholic discourse.

²⁵ For a first assessment of the issue see Mark W. Janis (ed.), *The Influence of Religion on the Development of International Law*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991; Giovanni Barberini, *Il contributo della dottrina cattolica per l'elaborazione dei principi di diritto internazionale*, Cosenza: Luigi Pellegrini, 2012, offers a recent synthesis in the form of a textbook, while Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, *Religion and Religious Intervention*, in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 294-316, examines the role attributed to religion in contemporary international law, also providing the reader with a historical overview.

international relations theories), a subject that is evidently taking center stage in the contemporary world in the wake of paradigmatic events like the Iranian revolution, the September 11 attacks or the numerous ethno-religious conflicts worldwide, and that is linked to the aforementioned debates on secularization patterns and the role of religion in the contemporary society²⁶. A variation of this discussion concerns the second branch of the literature that we mentioned a few lines above, which reflects a Catholic “take” on international relations. Here the perspective is reversed: it is not a matter of whether and how the analytical frameworks of the most important paradigms of international relations theory – Realism and Neorealism, Liberalism and Neoliberalism, Constructivism and so on – have accounted for the religious factor, but instead, of whether a religious worldview (in our case, Catholicism) has developed a specific approach to international relations.²⁷ We will not participate in these meaningful debates, because we are not employing a politological approach. Instead, we are interested in the evolution of the theoretical discourse in Catholic culture on the international community, and the possibility to consider it a single consistent body of thought, from a historical perspective. In other words, we will try to answer the following questions: which criteria (principles), according to the Catholic worldview, should have oriented the

²⁶ For a methodological introduction to the issue, much debated by political scientists, see Jack Snyder (ed.), *Religion and international relations theory*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, and Nukhet Sandal and Jonathan Fox (eds.), *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*, Routledge, 2013. We will briefly pick up the subject in the second chapter, where we will deal more specifically with the field of politics.

²⁷ In this respect, see the methodological introduction of François Mabille, *Approches de l'internationalisme catholique*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002, in part. pp. 23-70. Two of the most engaged scholars who have given a positive answer to this question – on the wake of the famous work of Reinhold Niebuhr on “Christian Realism” – are the American author and social activist George Weigel, and Austrian political scientist Jodok Troy: among their publications, see in particular George Weigel, *World Order: What Catholics Forgot*, in “First Things”, May 2004, pp. 31-38, available at <http://www.firstthings.com/article/2004/05/world-order-what-catholics-forgot>, and Jodok Troy, *Christian Approaches to International Affairs*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012. Troy, in particular, has argued that the Catholic approach to international relations can be compared to that of the so-called English School, which stresses the importance of a law-based international society, governed by international organizations, and values the normative role of ideas in shaping the conduct of international politics. We will see in fact that the concept of a regulated and cooperative international system was at the core of the Catholic discourse. See also, of the same author, *Getting theory? Realism and the study of religion in international relations*, in Jodok Troy (ed.), *Religion and the Realist Tradition: From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back*, Routledge, 2013, pp. 1-20. Since we did not follow this kind of approach in our research, we have preferred to avoid the reference to terms like “international system” or “international relations”, at least in the title of the dissertation (where we can provide no context); in the course of the exposition, unless otherwise stated, we will employ the phrase “approach to international relations” as a synonym of “idea of international community”, in order to indicate the reflection about the desirable configuration of the international system, composed by – as it was normally addressed by the Catholic culture – Nation-States and inter-governmental organizations (on the model of the United Nations, or the European community).

relations between peoples at global level? What was the desirable structure of the international system so as to achieve enduring peace, and how could Catholics help to reach it?

By focusing the history of an idea, moreover, we will not be specifically addressing another theme related to this subject that has lately begun to receive attention in the literature: the practical engagement of Catholics in the international sphere. Recent historiography has identified three distinct waves of “Catholic internationalism” in the contemporary age: the first one in the second half of the nineteenth century, the second in the 1920s and the 1930s, and the third after the Second Vatican Council, in particular after the mid-1970s. Belgian historian Vincent Viaene, in an account dedicated to the first wave, has defined Catholic internationalism as “the sum of practices, representations and organizations that unite believers of different nationalities or ethnicities in a global effort to reform modern society in accordance with the Church’s principles”.²⁸ This statement, which condenses the essential features of the mainstream approach of Catholic culture to its relationship with modern society, at least until the Second Vatican Council, will return when we address the origins of the idea of international community. The second period, which followed the “internationalist turning point” of the papacy at the end of the First World War, saw the foundation of numerous, usually short-lived Catholic international organizations, which challenged the parallel initiatives of the Socialist, Communist, Liberal (but also Masonic) cultures.²⁹ Finally, in the last half a century there has been an impressive growth of both Catholic international Non Governmental Organizations, which have expanded their core mission from the long-standing charitable, relief and refugee work to incorporate broader goals like human rights advocacy, peace-building and international social justice, and new religious movements, “known especially for their mobilization

²⁸ Vincent Viaene, *Nineteenth-Century Catholic Internationalism and Its Predecessors*, in Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene (eds.), *Religious Internationals in the Modern World. Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 82–110, quotation at p. 83. A seminal work on the subject remains Emiel Lamberts (ed.), *The Black International 1870-1878. L’Internationale Noire 1870-1878. The Holy See and Militant Catholicism in Europe. Le Saint-Siège et le Catholicisme Militant en Europe*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002.

²⁹ This phase has received much less attention in the literature, but see the account of Philippe Chenaux, *Catholic Internationalism from the First to the Second Postwar Period*, in Jean-Dominique Durand (ed.), *Christian Democrat Internationalism. Its action in Europe and worldwide from post-World War II until the ‘90s*, vol. I: *The Origins*, Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 131-44, for a first assessment of the subject and some notes about the state of the art of the literature.

of young people, their upholding of traditional Catholic doctrine presented in contemporary forms, and their ecumenical and service work". In the latter case, it would be more appropriate to talk about "transnational" than "international" Catholicism.³⁰ We will not neglect this dimension, although it will not be at the center of our analysis.

Even after these clarifications and limitations, the subject that we have chosen is not particularly new for contemporary historiography. Usually, in the general histories of the Church, the Catholic approach to international relations is observed through two interrelated lenses: the reflection of Catholic culture on the themes of war and peace, and the Church's international activity. These macro-arguments have also been addressed by numerous dedicated studies, either with a long-term approach or focused on specific moments, with varying degrees of scientific value.³¹ Our contribution to the process of historical knowledge concerns the systematization of the different inputs coming from the literature, paralleled by a direct consultation of the Catholic culture's public discourse, accompanied by a constant attention to the actual behavior of the Church as an institution with international subjectivity, and so as one of the actors – even if with a modest specific weight – in the international system.³² Indeed, by evoking the actual *modus operandi* of

³⁰ R. Scott Appleby, *The Catholic Church as Transnational Actor, 1965-2005*, in Green and Viaene (eds.), *Religious Internationals in the Modern World*, p. 331. Appleby's essay offers a good synthetic and comprehensive account of this "third wave" of Catholic Internationalism, which has caught the attention of the literature in particular as regards the new religious movements: we will devote several notes on the subject in the introduction to chapter III.

³¹ Among the most valuable, see for the first area the comprehensive account of Daniele Menozzi, *Chiesa, pace e guerra nel Novecento. Verso una delegittimazione religiosa dei conflitti*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008, and some case studies in Xavier Boniface and Bruno Béthouart (eds.), *Les Chrétiens, la guerre et la paix. De la paix de Dieu à l'esprit d'Assise*, Rennes: PUR, 2012. The theological production – which sometimes employs a historical perspective – in this field, as one might expect, is boundless, especially as regards the issue of the "just war": see by way of example the recent Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and William A. Barbieri, Jr. (eds.), *From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics*, De Gruyter, 2012. For the second area, see the take of Annibale Zambarbieri, *Il nuovo papato. Sviluppi dell'universalismo della Santa Sede dal 1870 ad oggi*, Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 2001; the general accounts of Robert John Araujo and John Lucal, *Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace: The Vatican and International Organizations from the Early Years to the League of Nations*, Ann Arbor, MI: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2004; ID., *Papal Diplomacy and International Organizations: The Quest for Peace at the United Nations - from Pius XII to Paul VI*, Philadelphia: St. Joseph's University Press, 2010, and the focus on the age of Leo XIII (but with some interesting general considerations) provided by Vincent Viaene (ed.). *The Papacy and the New World Order. Vatican Diplomacy, Catholic Opinion and International Politics at the Time of Leo XIII. La papauté et le nouvel ordre mondial. Diplomatie vaticane, opinion catholique et politique internationale au temps de Léon XIII*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005. More specific references – especially about the period that we are addressing more closely – will be quoted during the exposition.

³² Historians and jurists have already dealt with the problem of the theoretical foundation of the Holy See's international subjectivity, underlining the historical evolution of Canon Law from the reference to the concept of *societas iuridice perfecta* (a society that does not depend on any other society for its very existence), in order to justify the claim of a

Vatican diplomacy, we can verify if, and to what degree, the principles that oriented its view of the international community found a correspondence at practical level.

This study should allow us to propose a comprehensive interpretation of the idea of international community in a specific period, 1963-1978, marked by the papacy of Paul VI – which in our opinion, encapsulated a distinct and decisive phase – at the same time as we attempt to contextualize it, in order to show both continuities and discontinuities with the tradition, and some insights on future developments. Indeed, the chronological framework given by the papacy of Giovanni Battista Montini must not be understood as a limiting cage, but rather as a general compass that serves as orientation along a delicate and multifaceted span of time.

3. Periodization.

There is no debate about the pivotal importance to the history of the Catholic culture of the phase ushered in by the Second Vatican Council.³³ One of the most important achievements of the contemporary history of the Church, as was mentioned in the first pages of this introduction, is that the Council seemed to close a centuries-old chapter of the antagonistic relationship between Church and modernity.³⁴ Having tangentially touched on the concept of modernity, we are now bound to

privileged role, to the acceptance of an equal position with respect to the other subjects of the international system. We will see how this transition took place precisely during the period on which we are focusing our analysis. See, as frames of reference, Giovanni Barberini, *Chiesa e Santa Sede nell'ordinamento internazionale. Esame delle norme canoniche*, Torino: Giappichelli, 2003, and Robert John Araujo, *The Holy See. International Person and Sovereignty*, in “Ave Maria Law Review”, issue 1, 2011, pp. 1-60, re-elaborated (with a brief historical profile) in ID., *The Holy See as International Person and Sovereign and Participant in International Law*, in Justenhoven and Barbieri, Jr. (eds.), *From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics*, pp. 249-74.

³³ We will discuss at length the historical significance of the Second Vatican Council – which, however, must not be taken as an isolated and unpredictable event – and its aftermath for Catholic culture; for now, a well-written synthetic account, in English, to familiarize oneself with Vatican II is John O’Malley, *What happened at Vatican II?*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008, while an easy-reading guide, in English, to use as a compass in the field of the literature on the Second Vatican Council (and its reception) is Massimo Fagioli, *Vatican II. The Battle for Meaning*, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2012.

³⁴ The contribution of French and Italian historiography to the systematization of this paradigm is difficult to underestimate: see in particular the now classical contributions of Émile Poulat, *Église contre bourgeoisie: introduction*

clearly define it, in order to avoid misinterpretations that have long limited the historiographical debate: in a nutshell, we can define it as a process of functional differentiation, which started in Europe in the nineteenth century, by which different areas of life – at political, social and cultural levels – were freed from religious domination.³⁵ The advantage of such a concept with respect to that of secularization is that it does not assume a passive and obstructionist role of religion to an inevitable path, as some sociological theories suggest: modernity is “the universal context, the matrix in which all forms of social life exist, including religious life”.³⁶ On the contrary, many Church historians have demonstrated, through the concept of “religious modernization”, that religions took on modern features, opening an interactive and surprisingly dynamic relationship with the broader context in which they were operating.³⁷ At the same time, then, the Catholic culture could express a general aversion to modernity – as was the case until at least the 1960s – and “keep up with the times”, becoming very different from its pre-modern profile.

What changed in the 1960s, was that for the first time the Church seemed ready to modify its cultural attitude toward modernity, finding some good in the “sign of the times”. With the benefit of historical perspective, we can now state that this new approach did not last long: the papacy of Karol Józef Wojtyła (1978-2005) returned to a hostile and negative attitude to the modern world.³⁸

au devenir du catholicisme actuel, Paris: Casterman, 1977; Giovanni Miccoli, *Fra mito della cristianità e secolarizzazione. Studi sul rapporto chiesa-società nell'età contemporanea*, Torino: Marietti, 1985, and Daniele Menozzi, *L'Église et l'histoire. Une dimension de la Chrétienté de Léon XIII à Vatican II*, in Giuseppe Alberigo et al., *La Chrétienté en débat. Histoire, formes et problèmes actuels*, Colloque de Bologne, 11-15 mai 1983, Paris: Cerf, 1984, pp. 45-75 (then included in the essays collection *La Chiesa cattolica e la secolarizzazione*, pp. 136-97).

³⁵ The definition is taken from Jan de Maeyer, *The Concept of Religious Modernisation*, in ID., Hans-Heino Ewers, Rita Ghesquière, Michel Manson, Pat Pinsent and Patricia Quaghebeur (eds.), *Religion, Children's Literature and Modernity in Western Europe 1750-2000*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005, p. 42.

³⁶ Staf Hellemans, *From “Catholicism Against Modernity” to the Problematic “Modernity of Catholicism”*, in “Ethical Perspectives”, issue 2, 2001, p. 120.

³⁷ See in particular the contributions of Staf Hellemans: *Religieuze modernisering. Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van hoogleraar in de Sociale Wetenschappen*, Utrecht: Katholieke Theologische Universiteit te Utrecht, 1997; *Secularization in a religiogeneous modernity*, in Rudi Laermans, Bryan Wilson and Jaak Billiet (eds.), *Secularization and Social Integration. Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere*, Leuven: K.U.Leuven, 1998, pp. 67-81, and the already quoted *From “Catholicism Against Modernity” to the Problematic “Modernity of Catholicism”*. See also the notes of sociologist André Rousseau, *Après l'effondrement des chrétiens: restaurer un corps ou gérer des demandes religieuses?*, in Travnouez (dir.), *La décomposition des chrétiens occidentaux 1950-2010*, pp. 366-70.

³⁸ The literature on John Paul II is already immense, above all because of his great popularity in the world media, and growing. For a first scientific assessment of his papacy, with sharable conclusions, see Philippe Portier, *La pensée de Jean-Paul II: la critique du monde moderne*, Paris: Editions de l'Atelier, 2006; Daniele Menozzi, *Giovanni Paolo II: una transizione incompiuta? Per una storicizzazione del pontificato*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2006, and Giovanni Miccoli,

Once again, this did not exclude the possibility of religious modernization – on the contrary, we have striking examples of such trends in the present age (e.g. the new religious movements, or the youth mobilization), even if the analysis of this recent period must be more nuanced, given the changing nature of the context in which religion was operating.³⁹ The season which spanned the early 1960s to the end of the 1970s – even if some signs of a reversal, as we will have the chance to see, were visible even earlier – in any case stands out as one of the most “lively”, eventful, and interesting to study for the historian of Catholicism. The wave of “cultural revolution” that pervaded the West in the 1960s reached the shores of the Catholic world, calling into question old traditions and ways of thought. We will see that the “mind shift” which shook Catholic culture was not only motivated by exogenous factors, but was also prepared by a slow process of cultural change which must be traced back to at least the 1950s. At the same time, the return to a more “traditional” approach, which can be easily recognized since the 1980s (without entering into the debate of a possible new change of scenario with the current papacy) was anticipated by several hints in the previous decade. From our special observatory, focused on the idea of international community, we will contextualize this special phase of the history of Catholicism in time (and space), trying not to indulge in black-and-white juxtapositions like new/old, that are inappropriate for religious history, given the key role played by doctrine and tradition.

Given these brief remarks, the phase that is loosely framed by Montini’s pontificate (1963-1978) seems to be a good choice for providing the chronological boundaries of our investigation. As every historian knows, periodization – the practice of subdividing, and or interrelating, historically significant units of time⁴⁰ – is ultimately an arbitrary concept: the implication of such a concept is that events, attitudes, values, or behaviors within the chosen period are closely related to each other, and share common features that will change at the end of it. This is the case for the attitude of

In difesa della fede. La Chiesa di Giovanni Paolo II e Benedetto XVI, Milano: Rizzoli, 2007. See also, more recently, the historical biography provided by Andrea Riccardi, *Giovanni Paolo II: la biografia*, Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 2011.

³⁹ Some interesting notes about this subject can be found in Staf Hellemans and Jozef Wissink (eds.), *Towards a New Catholic Church in Advanced Modernity. Transformations, Visions, Tensions*, Münster: LIT-Verlag, 2012.

⁴⁰ Samuel L. Macey (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Time*, Routledge, 1994, p. 446.

Catholic culture to modernity, of which the discourse over the international community will prove to be a reliable mirror. One could legitimately question, though, the choice to adopt the time frame defined by a papacy, even if with all the caveats about the necessity of a broader contextualization, when the wider landscape of Catholic culture offers other viable options to categorize the same span of time (for instance, one could speak more generally of post-Conciliar years). We can propose at least two reasons justifying this choice: first of all, as we have already mentioned, at the risk of stating the obvious, the papacy plays a pivotal role in the Catholic world, although it cannot be considered the only center of elaboration of the Catholic culture. Any historical account that deals with the Catholic *Weltanschauung* needs to make reference to the position of the pope, who often gives a periodizing personal imprint to the history of the Church.⁴¹ Moreover, the specific interest of Paul's take on the subject that we are addressing has already been underlined by the literature, although mostly from an “internal” (sympathetic) point of view.⁴² The second reason that supports the choice of Paul's papacy as an indicative chronological frame for our work pertains more specifically to the geographical context on which we will focus in the second part of the dissertation, that is, Italy.

4. The Italian case.

⁴¹ For a wide array of examples concerning the role of the popes in contemporary history, in relation to the wider Catholic environment and to the secular world, see the book published in honor of one of the greatest scholars of contemporary papacy, Roger Aubert: Jean-Pierre Delville and Marko Jacov (eds.), *La papauté contemporaine (XIX^e-XX^e siècles). Il papato contemporaneo (secoli XIX-XX). Hommage au chanoine Roger Aubert professeur émérite à l'Université catholique de Louvain, pour ses 95 ans. Omaggio al canonico Roger Aubert, professore emerito all'Università cattolica di Lovanio, per i 95 anni*, Louvain/Città del Vaticano: Bibliothèque de la Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique/Collectanea Archivi Vaticani, 2009. The subject has also been at the center of the first international workshop of the research network “Catholic Church, modernisation and modernity in Contemporary Europe” (Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Università degli Studi di Pavia, J.W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), held in Venice in June 2012.

⁴² A first attempt to analyze Montini's discourse on the international community comes from the conferences organized by Istituto Paolo VI (Brescia, Italy) – an international center, located in Brescia (Italy), for study and documentation promoted by the “Opera per l'Educazione Cristiana” – in particular *Paul VI et la vie internationale*, Journées d'Études (Aix-en-Provence, 18-19 mai 1989), Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 1992, and more recently Renato Papetti (ed.), *Verso la civiltà dell'amore*, colloquio internazionale di studio, Concesio (Brescia), 24-25-26 settembre 2010, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 2012. These proceedings include contributions of good scholarly value, and apologetic interventions; the status of the historiography on Paul VI will be addressed in the third section of the first chapter.

At the beginning of the research of which this dissertation is the outcome, we did not intend to develop a systematization and categorization of the Catholic culture's approach(es) to the idea of international community. Our intention was more limited and specifically focused on the Italian context: we intended to propose an interpretation of Italian Christian Democracy's culture of foreign policy, a concept that deals with the way in which ideas influence the approach to international relations.⁴³ In particular, we planned to examine the possible influence of the Catholic culture in this respect, which had a pivotal function in shaping the party's political culture at the moment of its foundation, but in the following stage of the party's history seemed to have been relegated to the role of a more formal than substantial reference.⁴⁴ Instead, by perusing the public discourse of Christian democratic representatives, or the proceedings of congresses and conferences dedicated to related international issues, we discovered that some of the rhetorical arguments employed by the party's leadership were generally ascribable to the Catholic worldview, or presented explicit links with the elaboration of Catholic cultural sources. More interesting still, Italy's discourse on foreign policy – which was largely influenced by the Christian Democratic political culture, since *Democrazia Cristiana* was Italy's majority party in all the general elections of the “First Republic” (1948-1994) – seemed to present factual analogies with this framework, so that one could investigate not only the cultural derivation of this discourse, but also its relation to the foreign policy that was actually implemented. In Chapter II, we will argue about this set of problems and present a case in favor of the theoretical consistency between the Christian

⁴³ For a first assessment of the theoretical debate over ideas and identities as factors having an impact on foreign policy, see Denise Kaarbo, *Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas*, in “International Studies Review”, issue 5, 2003, pp. 157–63, and above all Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework*, in Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. V, London: SAGE, 2011, pp. 3-27. We will elaborate further on the subject in the second chapter, devoted to Christian Democracy's idea of international community.

⁴⁴ This is an opinion shared by most accounts on the party's history, and on Italy's postwar political history. We will discuss the state of the art of the literature in the second chapter, but see as introduction Guido Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana*, in Gerardo Nicolosi (ed.), *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006, pp. 55-89.

Democratic culture of foreign policy, and Catholic culture's discourse on the international community.

A small but significant change of perspective allowed us to verify more precisely whether the theoretical elaboration of Italian Christian Democracy could be ascribable to the Catholic cultural milieu: we took into account several subjects from the variegated field of Italian Catholicism, a generic collective label including lay and religious movements, organizations and personalities claiming some kind of relationship to the Church and the Catholic culture (a milieu which we will address in Chapter III⁴⁵), trying to discern the features of their approach to the idea of international community through the analysis of their public discourse, and an occasional recourse to archival sources, in order to put the cultural elaboration of these subjects into a comparative perspective.⁴⁶ After a pattern seemed to emerge, we checked if it was possible to trace the cultural sources of these approaches back to a common archetype; in this way, we came to systematize the general approach of Catholic culture to the idea of international community, that will be specifically addressed as regards the Italian context. The risk of developing too much of an Italo-centric argument, which would have been especially problematic in this context, since we have argued that the interrelation between local and global environments was one of the distinctive features of the period that we are investigating, has been reduced through a constant attention to what happened outside the peninsula, in particular in the European scenario, which was used as a significant term of comparison.

⁴⁵ A long introductory paragraph will define the concept of Italian Catholicism more rigorously, and will also explain the criteria employed to narrow down the list of significant subjects that we took into account; for an introduction to the landscape of the Italian Catholic world in the second half of the twentieth century see Marco Impagliazzo (ed.), *La nazione cattolica. Chiesa e società in Italia dal 1958 a oggi*, Milano: Guerini e associati, 2004, and Maurilio Guasco, *Chiesa e cattolicesimo in Italia (1945-2000)*, Bologna: EDB, 2001. Two classic long-term contextualizations can be found in Guido Verucci, *La Chiesa cattolica in Italia dall'Unità a oggi*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1999, and Antonio Acerbi (ed.), *La Chiesa e l'Italia: per una storia dei loro rapporti negli ultimi due secoli*, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2003, while a good reference in English is John Pollard, *Catholicism in Modern Italy. Religion, Society and Politics since 1861*, Routledge, 2008.

⁴⁶ We will deal with the questions regarding sources selection in each section devoted to the protagonists of our research.

Opening the research up to new subjects posed some problems of internal consistency, since the initial goal of investigating the cultural roots of Christian Democracy's foreign policy expanded into a more "ambitious" profile of the Catholic culture's approach to the idea of international community, focused on the Italian scenario. What has been lost in terms of accuracy and in-depth analysis, though, should have been gained in terms of synthesis and capacity to present a broader landscape to the reader, who can read this work both as a comprehensive historical account of the evolution of an idea in a specific cultural, geographical and temporal framework, and like a physics dissertation, composed of separate foci (involving political parties, student organizations, new religious movements, intellectual priests and many other subjects), pertaining to the same field of study.

The variety of the subjects that we have taken into account also led to further problems of periodization, since the history of the Christian Democratic party and that of the Italian Catholic world (which, in turn, included many different trajectories) did not necessarily share the same significant, periodizing events. General histories of *Democrazia Cristiana* usually cite as the beginning of a new phase the year 1962, when the party officialized the "opening to the Left", an expression referring to the involvement of the Socialist party (*Partito Socialista Italiano*, PSI) in the government and a general commitment to the implementation of more progressive policies. The closing year is dramatically easier to find, because the 1978 kidnapping and murder of *Democrazia Cristiana*'s president and former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro marked the end of a season both for the party and for Italian political history.⁴⁷ When taking into account the Italian Catholic world, on the other hand, these dates are not quite as meaningful: a more suitable *terminus a quo* could be constituted by 1965, that is the end of the Second Vatican Council, whose pivotal importance for the Catholic faith, as already mentioned, can be considered a transnational factor. The Council also

⁴⁷ The most comprehensive internal reconstruction of the party's history, edited by Italian historian Francesco Malgeri in five volumes, *Storia della Democrazia Cristiana*, Roma: Cinque Lune, 1987-1989, follows this periodization, devoting the fourth volume to the phase between 1962 and 1978. We will develop some considerations about the relation between party history and Italian political history in Chapter II.

had a profound impact in the Italian context. Particularly in the younger generations, it stimulated the development of a proactive and engaged mentality – rooted in earlier cultural changes, and also linked to the 1960s cultural revolution – that would have had remarkable repercussions for our topic. Given the plurality of subjects comprised by the label Italian Catholicism, though, it is more difficult to find a comprehensive *terminus ad quem* for an analysis focused on the 1960s and the 1970s. One possible option is the 1976 Conference on “Evangelization and Human Promotion”, organized by the Italian Episcopal Conference, which represented the first strong signal of a “re-aggregation” of the Italian Catholic area after an extremely fragmented period.⁴⁸

It seemed more appropriate, then, to stick with the chronological framework given by Paul’s papacy, which covers a similar time span and provides the general coordinates for orienting oneself in Catholic culture. Moreover, the figure of Giovanni Battista Montini – as we will mention several times during the course of the dissertation – was especially connected to the Italian context: the last long-reigning Italian pope, Montini played an essential role both in the foundation of Italian Christian Democracy and in defining the map of postwar Italian Catholicism. His influence on an entire generation of Italian Catholics, who came to hold relevant positions both within the Church and in Italian civil society, cannot be underestimated. At the same time, it should be clear by now that in our case the chronological framework is more indicative than binding, and must be understood as a zoom out on a phase that needs to be photographed with a wide-angle lens, in order to show its distinctiveness as well as the elements of continuity with the tradition, and the origins of future developments. The historical evolution of ideas, attitudes and approaches is by definition a slow process, difficult to enclose in rigid dates; the historian can observe and describe significant trends or defining features, without claiming to consider a specific period to be a closed and self-sufficient unit.

⁴⁸ We will address the problems of periodization regarding the Italian Catholic world in the third chapter; the adoption of this time span to interpret the postconciliar phase in Italy has been suggested by Italian Church historian Guido Verucci in *La Chiesa postconciliare*, in Francesco Barbagallo (coord.), *Storia dell’Italia repubblicana*, vol. II, *La trasformazione dell’Italia, sviluppo e squilibri*, book 2: *Istituzioni, movimenti, culture*, Torino: Einaudi, 1995, pp. 297-382.

5. Goals of the research.

By focusing on the Italian case, we will explore only one of the numerous possible scenarios available to the researcher. Although we will make reference to the discourse of non-Italian subjects, other studies in the future could verify the validity of our approach for other contexts, be they regional, national, or even better, trans-national. Before delving into an analysis, though, we need to properly lay out one fundamental question that is the backbone of all long-term research, which will be tentatively answered in the general conclusions: why is the subject of our study so significant as to deserve a long and challenging investigation? What kind of contribution can it provide to the incremental process of historical knowledge?

We have already provided a tentative answer, between the lines, in the previous pages; in a nutshell, we would argue that the discourse of Catholic culture about the desirable structure of the international system tells us something more than what a literal interpretation of the subject would suggest. In fact, it highlights, from an apparently lateral but meaningful perspective, the relationship between Catholicism and society in the contemporary age, that is one of the fundamental aspects of the history of the Church and of Catholic thought, and of religious history in general. We can draw a very brief historical picture to justify this statement.

The cultural aversion to modernity that permeated the mainstream discourse of the Catholic culture until the 1960s had a deep impact on its approach to the idea of international community. Such an aversion was grounded in a vision of the world that interpreted the process of secularization as an aberrant estrangement of mankind from Christian teachings. Modern man's declaration of independence from Christian doctrine and from the Church's tutelage clashed with the traditional Catholic claim to the right and duty to guide the life of individuals and communities.

The Church's "intransigentism", as it was called by Italian and French historiography, had a direct influence on our subject. Indeed, not only would the Church claim sole possession of the moral laws that individuals should follow in order to obtain the soul's salvation, but it would also claim to know the only rules capable of assuring a peaceful coexistence among the actors of the international community. After all, from the ecclesiastical point of view, modernity altered a model that had worked for centuries – the medieval *Christianitas*, or Christendom – based on the interpenetration between the Church and the temporal power. Throughout the twentieth century, this attitude was questioned by an alternative approach to the challenges posed by modern times. Indeed, since the beginning of the century, some Catholic theologians and intellectuals, circles and networks had been engaged in proposing a new, more nuanced and sympathetic approach to modernity. Historians of the Church and of Catholic thought have underlined the existence of a *fil rouge*, that proceeded from Modernism – which French historian Étienne Fouilloux has defined as the "intellectual matrix of contemporary Catholicism" – through the "new theology", to the Second Vatican Council, where it eventually found legitimacy.⁴⁹ The path was neither linear nor focused on a specific set of issues (it had an impact on liturgy, biblical studies, relations with other religions and many other fields), but rather it highlighted a slow change of intellectual climate, one that entailed a more open attitude toward the modern world and the modern culture. This powerful mental shift was based not on the rupture with Catholic institutional culture, but instead on the effort to show how, through the rediscovery of its original sources, the Christian message could be able to address the problems of modern man; an effort carried on by a new generation of Catholics, born after the establishment of the intransigent paradigm – founded on the juxtaposition with modernity – during the course of the nineteenth century.

⁴⁹ See in particular the seminal work of Étienne Fouilloux, *Une Eglise en quête de liberté. La pensée catholique française entre modernisme et Vatican II (1914- 1962)*, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1998 (quotation at p. 10), and Jürgen Mettepenningen, *Nouvelle Théologie – New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican II*, London: Continuum, 2010. See also a wider contextualization in Karim Schelkens, Jürgen Mettepenningen and Jack Dick, *Aggiornamento? Catholicism from Gregory XVI to Benedict XVI*, Brill, 2013, and the profile sketched out, at theological level, by Rosino Gibellini, *Panorama de la théologie au XX^e siècle*, Paris: Cerf, 2004 (original edition Brescia: Queriniana, 1992), in particular chapter VII: *La voie de la théologie catholique. De la controverse moderniste au tournant anthropologique*, pp. 173-290.

We will see how this new paradigm influenced the discourse on the international community, shaping a new approach to the subject, which we will define through the concept of “New Universalism”. This new approach became “institutionalized”, entering the Magisterium’s discourse, with the papacy of John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council. Institutionalized does not mean unopposed, however: an alternative take, indeed, that we have named the “culture of liberation”, took shape during the pontificate of Paul VI. This alternative paradigm implied a different way to address the relationship between Catholicism and society, which was deeply related to the global waves of change that characterized the 1960s. What we would like to convey through our analysis is that “Universalism” and “Liberation” were not structured visions of the world, but rather were a work in progress, an effort to adapt Catholic culture to the challenges posed by the contemporary age. A rational systematization, indeed, is a necessary and useful practice that can only be made *a posteriori*, after the fact. It is a powerful tool for the historian, who can rationalize the essential features of a historical process, but it is not how things work in real time. In the course of the work, we will see that they changed over time because of reciprocal influences and crossovers, which were not always expected and often caused additional changes to these paradigms. We will observe their building process, keeping in mind that the results could not be predicted from the start: the outcome was not written in the beginning. While this dynamic is true on the whole for any historical process, it is all the more apt to describe the context of the 1960s and the 1970s: we will see how “New Universalism” and “culture of Liberation” can also be read as different outcomes of the reception of the general cultural revolution which spread through the West, but that was also tightly linked with what was happening outside the First World.

We will propose a comprehensive interpretation of this hypothesis – the idea of international community reflects the attitude of the Catholic culture toward the modern world – in the conclusions at the end of the dissertation; now it is time we delved into the core of the research, by familiarizing ourselves with the main analytical tools that we will employ during the course of the text, which have given the work its title : Universalism and Liberation.

II

The Catholic Culture and the Idea of International Community

Vous existez et vous travaillez pour unir les nations, pour associer les Etats. Adoptons la formule: pour mettre ensemble les uns avec les autres. Vous êtes une Association. Vous êtes un pont entre les peuples. Vous êtes un réseau de rapports entre les Etats. Nous serions tenté de dire que votre caractéristique reflète en quelque sorte dans l'ordre temporel ce que notre Eglise Catholique veut être dans l'ordre spirituel: unique et universelle.

Paul VI, Speech to the UN Assembly, 4 October 1965

1. Introduction to the Catholic discourse on the international community: the legacy of “Traditional Universalism”.

With these words, uttered at the UN headquarters in New York in front of the representatives of 115 States, Paul VI celebrated the identity of mission between the United Nations and the Catholic Church, each in its own “jurisdiction”: a mission of unity among peoples and Nations, a mission of peace and dialogue that would only be accomplished once war was permanently banned from the world. *Jamais plus la guerre, jamais plus la guerre!* was the highlight of the pope’s speech, which was extensively broadcast by world media. In this day and age, no one should be surprised to hear similar words of praise for the nature and purpose of the United Nations from the head of the Church. But seen through the eyes of the historian, they stand out as the outcome of a remarkable, groundbreaking change of cultural attitude, which could not have been predicted even a few years earlier. In order to understand the significance of and the reasons for such a change, we must adopt

a long-term perspective, which allows us to frame the general approach of the Church to the desirable configuration of the “life in common”.

Since the early modern period, Rome had traditionally claimed the right to exercise a *potestas indirecta in temporalibus* (a formula famously employed by Cardinal Bellarmino at the end of the sixteenth century), which implied the recognition of a moral authority, to which the civil authorities would turn to when organizing the rules for a peaceful coexistence and in the event of disputes.¹ As mentioned in the *Introducion*, from the ecclesiastical point of view, modernity had disrupted a model that for centuries had assured an optimal balance to European societies, based on the primacy of the spiritual power over the secular one. For an influential Italian Jesuit, Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio (1793-1862), the age which started with the French revolution had broken the organic links between States which existed in medieval Christendom, and the only possible solution to restore the lost order was the re-establishment of an international community – labeled *etnarchia* – founded upon unity of faith and the international role of the pope.² During the age of Leo XIII (1878-1903), this general disposition turned into actual political behavior, since the Holy See hoped to become the benchmark of the new, wider and more complex international system, with the goal

¹ See a rigorous definition of *potestas indirecta* in Hans Barion, *Potestas indirecta*, in ID. (ed.), *Kirche und Kirchenrecht: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Paderborn: Schöningh, 1984, pp. 509–10. In the Middle Ages and in the early modern age, Catholic doctrine would refer to the concept of *potestas directa in temporalibus*, thus claiming the right to have some sort of direct jurisdiction over societies, emblematically represented by the tradition of the pope crowning the emperor in a solemn ceremony. For a general overview of the theories of Church-State relations throughout the ages, through the analysis of the Canon Law, we refer to Reinhold Zippelius, *Staat und Kirche. Eine Geschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009², and Giuseppe Dalla Torre, *La città sul monte. Contributo ad una teoria canonistica sulle relazioni fra Chiesa e Comunità politica*, Roma: AVE, 2007³.

² The importance of Taparelli D'Azeglio's thought on the international order for the future Catholic elaboration had been underlined in 1935, by John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*, London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1935 (reprinted by Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2012), in part. pp. 119, 130, 160, 169, 247, 266-72. This essay, which quoted some excerpts of the seminal book *Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto* (published in 1840-43 and translated into German, French and Spanish by the 1860s; an English translation is still missing, but has been planned by Robert John Araujo) is still among the few works in English dealing with the body of thought of the Italian Jesuit. His major contribution is generally considered the idea to apply the principle of subsidiarity to the international community: just as a society could work only through the rational cooperation of the different sub-societies in which individuals operated, the international community would find peace and stability only through the collaboration among States. Some notes in this regard in Thomas C. Behr, *Luigi Taparelli D'azeglio, S.J. (1793-1862) and the Development of Scholastic Natural-Law Thought as a Science of Society and Politics*, in “Journal of Markets & Morality”, issue 6, 2003, in part. pp. 104-109.

of a spiritual, social and political Christian reconquest of society at world level.³ Although the pope had lost temporal power, this new situation at least offered the advantage that the Church could be presented as the moral compass of a system of relations among States that had yet to find its balance.

This strategy aimed at breaking the Church's isolation gained some significant results, by validating the Holy See's role as diplomatic interlocutor (Rome even played a small but relevant role as arbitrator in some international controversies), and especially by linking the missionary strategy of the Church with the colonialist expansion of the European empires.⁴ On the whole, however, it was clear from the beginning that the great powers, which were confronting each other in an increasingly antagonistic way in the international arena at the turn of the twentieth century, did not have any interest in delegating the task of organizing and disciplining their relationships to a spiritual authority. Nevertheless, Rome did not abandon its hope of becoming the moral guarantor of a peaceful world. By applying faulty logic (the hypothesis was presented as the thesis), the Church asserted that the incapacity of mankind to understand the "peace formula" – a fact illustrated by the growing international tensions – highlighted the necessity for the Church to play a preeminent role within the international system. Indeed, only an institution that had the key to the Truth could teach the nations how to live together and avoid wars and conflict.

This view of international dynamics was systematized when Europe dove into the bloodiest and most devastating conflict in its history, the First World War. Benedict XV (1914-1922) proposed a providentialistic interpretation of the war as a punishment sent from God to mankind for its apostasy from the true religion,⁵ Seen from this angle, the conflict was rooted in the secularization

³ See Viaene (ed.), *The Papacy and the New World Order*. and Jean-Marc Ticchi, *Aux Frontieres de la Paix: Bons Offices, Médiations, Arbitrages du Saint-Siège (1878-1922)*, Roma: École Française de Rome, 2002.

⁴ See Claude Proudhomme, *Stratégie missionnaire et grande politique sous Léon XIII. Le heurt des logiques*, in Viaene (ed.), *The Papacy and the New World Order*, pp. 351-79.

⁵ In the encyclical *Ad beatissimi*, promulgated in November 1914, we can read a significant passage (§5): "For ever since the precepts and practices of Christian wisdom ceased to be observed in the ruling of states, it followed that, as they contained the peace and stability of institutions, the very foundations of states necessarily began to be shaken. Such, moreover, has been the change in the ideas and the morals of men, that unless God comes soon to our help, the

process that demolished the foundations of Christendom, condemning Europe to endless instability, and ultimately to the consequences of God's fury. Therefore, only the return of the international community under the guidance of the papacy – in a form that had yet to be defined – could assure the reestablishment of peace. The Church of Benedict XV tried to keep the roles of moral conscience and of diplomatic mediator together: the famous *Nota* of August 1917 (a diplomatic document directed “to the heads of the belligerent peoples”) included a series of principles which had to be followed in order to stop the conflict, but the initiative did not meet with success.⁶ Nonetheless, the intransigent worldview was not abandoned, and was revived by Pius XI (1922-1939), who presented it with great clarity in the programmatic encyclical of his pontificate, *Ubi arcano* (1922). Two extensive quotations from the text may help explain this perspective better than any historical analysis:

Because men have forsaken God and Jesus Christ, they have sunk to the depths of evil. They waste their energies and consume their time and efforts in vain sterile attempts to find a remedy for these ills, but without even being successful in saving what little remains from the existing ruin. It was a quite general desire that both our laws and our governments should exist without recognizing God or Jesus Christ, on the theory that all authority comes from men, not from God. [...] Authority itself lost its hold upon mankind, for it had lost that sound and unquestionable justification for its right to command on the one hand and to be obeyed on the other. Society, quite logically and inevitably, was shaken to its very depths and even threatened with destruction, since there was left to it no longer a stable foundation, everything having been reduced to a series of conflicts, to the domination of the majority, or to the supremacy of special interests.

From this premise, an unequivocal conclusion was drawn:

For the Church teaches (she alone has been given by God the mandate and the right to teach with authority) that not only our acts as individuals but also as groups and as nations must conform to the eternal law of God. In fact, it is much more important that the acts of a nation follow God's law, since on the nation rests a much greater responsibility for the consequences of its acts than on the individual.

end of civilization would seem to be at hand”. See AAS, vol. 6, 1914, pp. 565-81. A good general introduction to the pontificate of Benedict XV, marked by the confrontation with the First World War, is in John Pollard, *The unknown pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the pursuit of peace*, London: Chapman, 1999.

⁶ See Menozzi, *Chiesa, pace e guerra nel Novecento*, pp. 36-46. For the United States' negative reaction to the pope's initiative, see the classical Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *The United States and the Vatican Policies, 1914-1918*, Boulder, CO: Colorado Associated University Press, 1978, p. 89 ff.

Societies should comply to the law of God, preserved by the Church, “in all their activities, whether they be national or international”;⁷ here is a masterful summary of the rationale behind the Church’s claim to have a leading and directive role with respect to the international community.

This was the main long-term feature in the history of contemporary Catholicism, which we can label as “Traditional Universalism”. The demand for universal influence over societies, indeed, was rooted in the traditionally strong connection between Christianity and civil authorities, whose rupture had caused the ongoing instability. The main and most disruptive feature of the contemporary age, from this perspective, was the abandonment of natural law (whose content could be inferred from Christian doctrine, interpreted by the Church), as the frame of reference for any man-made law. Political powers had stopped pursuing the common good, meaning that they had stopped implementing policies that could benefit the whole of society, therefore assuring the soul’s salvation for every citizen. The concepts of natural law and common good, rooted in the Catholic worldview, were mostly derived from the theology of St Thomas Aquinas, which experienced an astounding revival starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, and was later re-elaborated and systemized by Neo-Scholastic thinkers.⁸ Let us keep these concepts in mind, especially the “common good”, since it will prove to be pivotal in the course of our analysis.⁹

⁷ Encyclical *Ubi arcano*, quotations at §§28, 44, 45: see the text in AAS, vol. 14, 1922, pp. 673-700. A recent address of the state of the art of the academic research about the pontificate of Pius XI, after the opening of the Vatican’s archives for this period, has been attempted by the École française de Rome (which had also organized the first major Conference on the subject in 1989) through a series of conferences, whose proceedings have recently been published in Laura Pettinaroli (ed.), *Le gouvernement pontifical sous Pie XI: pratiques romaines et gestion de l’universel*, Roma: École française de Rome, 2013. See also Oliver Logan, *The Pontificate of Pius XI: The Impact of New Material from the Vatican Archives*, in “European History Quarterly”, issue 4, 2012, pp. 664-72, while Jean-Dominique Durand, *Pie XI, la paix et la construction d’un ordre international*, in Philippe Levillain (ed.), *Achille Ratti pape Pie XI*, Actes du colloque organisé par l’École française de Rome, Rome 15-18 mars 1989, Roma: Ecole Française de Rome, 1996, pp. 873-92, offered some notes on Pius’s vision of the international order.

⁸ See, for a general overview of Aquinas’s ideas (which, as it is well known, was “institutionalized” and encompassed within the Magisterium’s discourse by Leo XIII), written by Dominicans, Joseph Peter Wawrykow (ed.), *The Westminster Handbook to Thomas Aquinas*, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005, in part. pp. 85-90 for the concepts of “natural law” and “common good”. On the debate over the reinterpretation of Aquinas’s theology by Neo-scholasticists, in particular about the concept of common good, see Mary M. Keys, *Personal Dignity and the Common Good: A Twentieth-Century Thomistic Dialogue*, in Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley and Robert P. Hunt (eds.), *Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism: the Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Moral Foundations of Democracy*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995, pp. 173-95. The debate, moreover, still engages Catholic theologians and intellectuals: see for instance John Goyette, Mark S. Latkovic and Richard S. Myers (eds.), *St. Thomas*

Traditional Universalism was a powerful worldview based on an antagonistic juxtaposition with modernity and able to reinforce Christian identity. If its synthetic description seems to be too lost in the faraway sky of intellectual theories, two observations may help to keep it grounded in historical reality. Firstly, we must not give the impression of an unrealistic, utter indifference of Catholic culture to the course of history, leading to a voluntary confinement within the boundaries of its own *Weltanschauung*. As early as the 1860s, a famous formula employed by the Italian Jesuit Carlo Maria Curci (1809-1891), founder of the review “*La Civiltà Cattolica*”, codified the distinction between the “thesis” – the hierocratic design – and the “hypothesis”, represented by actual historical conditions, which called for a compromise with other cultures, religiously based or not, in order not to squander all the opportunities to influence the evolution of societies.¹⁰ No culture was an island, especially in the European framework of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which usually allowed the expression of different opinions. Indeed, to move on to the second consideration, we must acknowledge that we are assuming an essentially Eurocentric perspective. This choice makes sense for synthetic reasons, since until the Second Vatican Council, Catholic culture was mostly shaped by European theologians and intellectuals, while the universal Magisterium was deeply grounded in Roman territory, both physically and metaphorically. We will notice, in particular in the second part of the chapter, how a non-European perspective would have significantly changed the tunes of the Catholic cultural elaboration.

Even with these necessary specifications, we are faced with a quite consistent and enduring model, which drew most of its theoretical strength from the simplicity of its basic principle: the direction of history was wrong because of mankind's estrangement from Christian faith. To bring

Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004.

⁹ For a comprehensive history of the locution in the Catholic discourse see the recent Pierre Coulange, *Vers le bien commun*, Paris: Parole et Silence, 2014.

¹⁰ This cultural tool, as it is well known, would have represented the justification for the various attempts to modernize Catholicism: some notes on this in Daniele Menozzi, *L'église et la modernité: une relation compliquée*, in Valentine Zuber (ed.), *Un objet de science, le catholicisme. Réflexions autour de l'œuvre d'Emile Poulat*, Paris: Bayard, 2001, pp. 124-32. The formula was first presented in Carlo Maria Curci, *Il congresso cattolico di Malines e le libertà moderne*, in “*La Civiltà Cattolica*” (hereinafter “CC”), issue 4, 1863, pp. 129-149. For an introduction to Father Curci see Giandomenico Mucci, *Carlo Maria Curci. Il fondatore della “Civiltà Cattolica”*, Roma: Studium, 1988.

history back onto the right track, individuals and politically organized communities would have to return to the laws of God, safeguarded by the Church. The entrenchment of this paradigm within Catholic culture is symbolized by the fact that, notwithstanding the first attempts to overcome it by theologians and intellectuals (which we will mention in the next section), its validity was confirmed by the new pope Pius XII (1939-1958)¹¹.

The perpetual dark cloud over Europe at the end of the 1930s seemed to confirm that without accepting ecclesiastical guidance, mankind was indeed doomed to go adrift. The outbreak of the Second World War therefore fit easily into the intransigent interpretation of history. In the first encyclical of his pontificate, promulgated less than two months after the beginning of the war, the new pope wrote that

no defense of Christianity could be more effective than the present straits. From the immense vortex of error and anti-Christian movements there has come forth a crop of such poignant disasters as to constitute a condemnation surpassing in its conclusiveness any merely theoretical refutation.

The sole remedy for the dramatically ill contemporary society was religion: “In the recognition of the royal prerogatives of Christ and in the return of individuals and of society to the law of His truth and of His love lies the only way to salvation.”¹²

As in the case of the First World War, the Church proposed itself as a mediator among belligerent powers – even trying to leave a diplomatic door open with Nazi Germany – but once more it only

¹¹ For a first approach to pope Pius XII and his pontificate see Frank J. Coppa, *The Life and Pontificate of Pope Pius XII. Between History and Controversy*, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013. The best historical biography (given the enduring lack of archival sources) is still Philippe Chenaux, *Pie XII: Diplomate et pasteur*, Paris: Cerf, 2003, while a good bibliographical essay, updated to 2008 and focused on the historiographical controversies which fueled the debate over Pacelli throughout the second half of the twentieth century, is Alessandro Angelo Persico, *Il caso Pio XII: mezzo secolo di dibattito su Eugenio Pacelli*, Milano: Guerini e associati, 2008.

¹² Encyclical *Summi pontificatus*, §§25 and 22: AAS, vol. 31, 1939, pp. 413-53 (English text at pp. 538-64). The reference to the sovereignty of Christ in the temporal sphere was a *leit motif* of the intransigent vision of the world, as the studies of Daniele Menozzi have demonstrated: see *Regalità sociale di Cristo e secolarizzazione. Alle origini della “Quas primas”*, in “Cristianesimo nella storia”, issue 1, 1995, pp. 79-113, and, in French, ID., *Un rêve de chrétienté à la fin du XIX^e siècle: le règne social du Christ dans les congrès eucharistiques internationaux*, in Laurence van Ypersele and Anne-Dolorès Marcélis (eds.) *Rêves de chrétientés, Réalité du monde. Imaginaires catholiques*, actes du colloque, Louvain-la-Neuve, 4-6 novembre 1999, Paris: Cerf, 2001, pp. 141-58.

confirmed its limited impact on the evolution of international relations.¹³ Actually, the war and its aftermath partially changed the features of Traditional Universalism, proving once more that although it can be categorized as a model to interpret the long-term features of Catholic culture's approach to the idea of international community, it cannot be regarded as a theoretical monolith, indifferent to the course of history. We will briefly sketch these changes, taking into account both the pope's discourse and the behavior of Vatican diplomacy, before moving on to outlining how this paradigm was overcome.

The gap between the intransigent worldview and actual historical evolution revealed itself clearly during the colloquia between high-ranking members of the Roman Curia and the personal envoy of US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the Vatican, Myron C. Taylor.¹⁴ He was the spokesperson of Roosevelt's aspirations to a future of international cooperation and stability, guaranteed by the great powers and consolidated by a commitment of the major moral authorities of the world to preserving peace. In this respect, the Vatican was an important interlocutor, but not the only one; its political relevance was limited, in the eyes of the United States, to the influence that Rome had over Latin countries. The postwar projects of the Holy See, on the contrary, implied a central role of the Church in reorganizing political and social life within European countries, as the pope restated in his 1941 Christmas radio message. Here he spoke about the "return to the altars" as the sole medicine able to cure European peoples and put an end to the war, and he outlined the principles of a peaceful and cooperative international order.¹⁵ There was a significant difference, though, between the Magisterium's discourse, which influenced the elaboration of most of Catholic

¹³ This aspect has been underlined by Piero Pastorelli, *Pio XII e la politica internazionale*, in Andrea Riccardi (ed.), *Pio XII*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1984, pp. 125-147. A critical and penetrating historical analysis of the behavior of the pope during the war, in particular about the much debated question of his reaction to the Holocaust, is in Giovanni Miccoli, *Les dilemmes et les silences de Pie XII. Vatican, Seconde Guerre mondiale et Shoah*, Paris: Éditions Complexe, 2006 (original edition Milano: Rizzoli, 2000). See also the "defense" of the pope's choices in Pierre Blet, *Pius XII and the Second World War: According to the Archives of the Vatican*, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist press, 1999 (original edition Paris: Perrin, 1997).

¹⁴ See John C. Conway, *Myron C. Taylor's Mission to the Vatican 1940-1950*, in "Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture", issue 1, 1975, pp. 85-99; the documents have been published by Ennio Di Nolfo, *Vaticano e Stati Uniti, 1939-1952: dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor*, Milano: F. Angeli, 1978. See also the memoirs published by Harold Tittmann, who was in the Vatican between 1941 and 1944 as Taylor's assistant: Harold G. Tittmann III, *Inside the Vatican of Pius XII: The Memoir of an American Diplomat during World War II*, New York: Image Books, 2004.

¹⁵ See the text of the radio message in AAS, vol. 34, 1942, pp. 10-21 [web: Italian, Portuguese, Spanish].

culture, and the attitude of the Vatican's diplomacy, which maintained a more realistic behavior.¹⁶

We might even argue that the actual confrontation with the evolution of international relations (first the war, then the difficult reconstruction of the international system), on which the Church had little or no influence, gradually prompted the ecclesiastical institution to rethink its claim to being the moral benchmark of the new international community, not on principle, but in practice. It is difficult, in other terms, to underestimate the impact of the events of the 1940s on the whole Catholic approach to the problems of international life.

We can elaborate on this subject by briefly analyzing two major historical factors that helped to erode the structure of Traditional Universalism. First of all, the war confirmed the terrible dangers coming from authoritarian and aggressive regimes that were hostile to any form of cooperation between States. In the postwar years, therefore, the Church strengthened its support to supranational organizations that promoted international collaboration, continuing a process started after the First World War (we will investigate the contribution of Catholic intellectuals and theologians to this change of heart in the next section).¹⁷ Translating this disposition into actual diplomacy, the Vatican sent an observer to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1948, and to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1952 (the Vatican's representative was Mgr. Angelo Roncalli, the future John XXIII). In 1951, the Holy See was made a member of the Executive Committee of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

¹⁶ We will not insist here on the "Romano-centric" attitude of Pius's pontificate, which translated into a close control over the orthodoxy of the elaboration of Catholic theologians and intellectuals; we will mention some effects of this behavior, pertinent to our subject, in the next section. In general, this attitude has been underscored by Andrea Riccardi, *Governo e "profezia" nel pontificato di Pio XII*, in ID. (ed.) *Pio XII*, pp. 40-43. Within the scope of this general overview, moreover, we cannot make reference to the role of different personalities within the Vatican diplomatic corps, but it is worth noting that it was composed of an expert generation of diplomatic officials (guided by the pope, who had spent his entire career as Secretary of State), which had come to the fore during the First World War and the problematic interwar period. We will grow very familiar with one of these protagonists, future pope Paul VI Giovan Battista Montini. See for a general overview Stewart A. Stehlin, *The Emergence of a New Vatican Diplomacy during the Great War and Its Aftermath, 1914 – 1929*, in Peter C. Kent and John F. Pollard (eds.), *Papal diplomacy in the modern age*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994, pp. 75-85.

¹⁷ See Araujo and Lucal, *Papal Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace: The Vatican and International Organizations from the Early Years to the League of Nations*. For a general overview of the Holy See's diplomatic activity, as well as the work of Araujo and Lucal, see Joël-Benoît d'Onorio (ed.), *Le Saint-Siège dans les relations internationales*, Paris: Cerf, 1989, and Marcel Merle and Christine de Montclos, *L'Eglise catholique et les relations internationales depuis la seconde guerre mondiale*, Paris: Le Centurion, 1988.

Refugees (UNHCR). The practical relationship with international organizations underlined how, even if not founded on Christian principles, these organizations were positive, praiseworthy agents of peace in the relations among States. Understandably, the most problematic relationship was with the United Nations, founded in San Francisco in July 1945.¹⁸

In theory, competition between the two institutions was in order, since the UN was created with the goal of becoming the arbiter of international conflicts among States, and in general the point of reference of the new international community. In practice, however, Rome followed the route taken after the First World War toward the League of Nations, publicly showing appreciation and support for the universal inspiration of the new organization, whose major purpose – assuring a peaceful and harmonic development of international life – was fully consistent with Christian principles.¹⁹ In 1944, during the talks with Myron Taylor, the Vatican diplomats proposed the participation of the Holy See in the new world institution, that was then in the making. The US did not back the Vatican's initiative, in order not to introduce a difference in status between Catholicism and other religions, but as of 1951 the pope authorized the New York auxiliary bishop to be present at UN Assembly sessions. Although his juridical position was uncertain, and never formally approved, his presence was accepted by all the parties involved. At practical level, therefore, the stress was put on collaboration; nevertheless, at theoretical level diffidence and prudence continued to prevent an explicit convergence of goals and action between the Church and the UN: an address by the pope to the UN assembly, at this time, was difficult to imagine.

There were two major elements, we can argue, that justified the Church's skepticism: the presence of members who seemed to be in conflict with the founding principles of the institution, and its judgment on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the cornerstone of the UN's

¹⁸ A recent assessment of the Vatican's relations with the UN is in Roman Melnyk, *Vatican Diplomacy at the United Nations: A History of Catholic Global Engagement*, Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009. See also Edward J. Gratsch, *The Holy See and the United Nations*, New York: Vantage Press, 1997, which also provides a short outline of the Catholic approach to the idea of the international community, at pp. 29-55.

¹⁹ See Antonio Messineo, *Il convegno dei cinque*, in "CC", issue 4, 1945, pp. 67-68, who also underlined how there was a big and troubling gap between ideas and their implementation.

cultural architecture. With regard to the first element, the Holy See questioned the participation of Communist countries, whose intrinsically aggressive and totalitarian nature was considered at odds with the core values of the international organization. Most of all, the veto power of the Soviet Union weakened the action of the United Nations, which were forced to avoid effective decisions.²⁰ Secondly, the Church's wariness toward the 1948 Declaration was deeply rooted in the intransigent culture. The refusal to attribute a divine foundation to human rights, embedded in the liberal-democratic tradition, posed problems for the Church, which claimed the prerogative to enumerate the rights of the human person – descending from natural law, guarded by Christian doctrine – and to verify the effectiveness of their enforcement. The issue was not only the incomplete agreement of the two lists of rights (we could mention the differences in the conception of the right to religious liberty), but above all their ultimate source: either the law of God, or human nature. This problem led back to the core of the ecclesiastical position, once again to the assertion of a supreme moral authority not only over the consciences and behaviors of the faithful as individuals, but also over society as a whole.²¹

The Communist presence within the UN is the second main historical factor that caused a change in Traditional Universalism. Indeed, during the post-WWII period, international relations were deeply affected by one of the great world trends of the twentieth century, that is the expansion

²⁰ This aspect was especially underlined by Father Antonio Messineo's articles on "La Civiltà Cattolica": see in particular *I paradossi della politica internazionale*, issue 2, 1946, pp. 6-8, and *La seconda assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite*, issue 1, 1947, pp. 104-5.

²¹ The best historical analysis of the Church's position on human rights is Daniele Menozzi, *Chiesa e diritti umani*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012, to which we refer for further bibliographic information. In English, see the profile by Rik Torfs, *Human Rights in the History of the Roman Catholic Church*, in Johannes A. van der Ven and Hans-Georg Ziebertz (eds.), *Human Rights and the Impact of Religion*, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2013, pp. 55-76, focused on the evolution of the ecclesiastical approach seen through the analysis of Canon Law. On the specific issue of religious liberty – which we could follow as a common thread throughout contemporary history to understand the relationship between Catholicism and modernity – see Silvia Scatena, *Les langages de la liberté*, in Renata Latala and Jacques Rime (eds.), *Liberté religieuse et Eglise catholique: héritage et développements récents*, Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2009, pp. 9-23, and above all EAD., *La fatica della libertà*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003, which deals with the seminal text on religious liberty promulgated by the Second Vatican Council, *Dignitatis Humanae*, read in historical perspective. We will analyze the continuities and the discontinuities in the Magisterium's discourse during the papacy of Paul VI regarding the issue of human rights, since it will prove to be a central feature of the Catholic discourse on the international community.

of Communism.²² From the intransigent perspective, this ideology was considered the last and most dangerous step of the “genealogy of modern errors”, the point of origin of modern apostasies: it was defined as “intrinsically wrong” in the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* (1937), since its main goals were the eradication of religion from society and the destruction of the Catholic Church.²³ In the aftermath of the war, Communism was no more only a philosophical and political aberration, but rather a historical reality which was gaining consensus in different parts of the world, most dangerously in Europe. The Communist threat in traditionally Catholic areas was the main factor pushing Pius XII to offer the Church’s support to the building of the Atlantic Alliance, notwithstanding the distance from the western political and social model embodied by the United States. In fact, what distinguished the Church’s condemnation of the opposing systems in the East and West was that in the first case the enemy was easily located in a specific area, the Communist world dominated by the Soviet Union, while in the second case there was no “place of evil”, but a time – modernity – and therefore the geopolitical coordinates of the enemy remained undetermined.²⁴

The limited but culturally fertile ground of Anticommunism helped to build a dialogue between the Church and the West, based on the identification of a common enemy. Besides this “negative” reason for the support to the Western coalition, however, there was a possible “positive” factor, the

²² Obviously, this was not the only factor of change in international relations: indeed, we can at least outline another pivotal shift in the structure of the international system, ignited by the process of decolonization. But the impact of this process was most powerful, at least on the Catholic discourse, from the 1960s onwards. Therefore, we will address it at a later point in this dissertation.

²³ See the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, in particular §38: “Communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever”: AAS, vol. 29, 1937, pp. 65-106. On the relations between the Church and Communism on the theoretical and practical level, centered on the European context, see, see Philippe Chenaux, *L’Église catholique et le communisme en Europe (1917-1989). De Lénine à Jean-Paul II*, Paris: Cerf, 2009, pp. 104-8 for the analysis of the encyclical. See also, for an enhanced focus on diplomacy, Hansjakob Stehle, *Geheimdiplomatie im Vatikan: Die Päpste und die Kommunisten*, Zürich: Benziger, 1993, and Andrea Riccardi, *Il Vaticano e Mosca 1940-1990*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1992.

²⁴ See Étienne Fouilloux, *L’Église catholique en “guerre froide” (1945-1958)*, in “Cristianesimo nella storia”, issue 4, 2001, pp. 687-715, and Frank J. Coppa, *Pope Pius XII and the Cold War: The Post-War confrontation between Catholicism and Communism*, in Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 50-66. Among the many critical accounts of Pius’s anticommunist agenda see Peter C. Kent, *The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII*, Montreal, Quebec/Kingston, Ontario: McGill/Queen’s University Press, 2002, while Antonio Acerbi, *Pio XII e l’ideologia dell’Occidente*, in Riccardi (ed.), *Pio XII*, pp. 149-178, argued that the necessary “tactical choice” in favor of the Western alliance, endorsed in the 1948 Christmas radio message, did not imply the endorsement of the Western system.

idea of Europe. Europe was a *locus symbolicus* that had deep roots in the Catholic culture, since it was linked to the ideal of the medieval *Christianitas*, which was later destroyed by the revolutionary processes of the modern age.²⁵ In this case as well, the perspective of the return of the continent to its past glories, through the restoration of the Christian civilization guided by the Church, progressively entered the realm of utopia, becoming a model with no realistic means of becoming a feasible historico-political project. In fact, Rome explicitly chose to side with the process of European integration, which began in the early 1950s with the crucial contribution from the Christian laity.²⁶

What, in conclusion, were the consequences of these two major historical facts on the overall approach of the Church to the idea of the international community? In short, we can argue that they sanctioned the “beginning of the end” of the intransigent model. The wish to return societies and nations to ecclesiastical guidance proved to be impossible to realize in the contemporary age, when the Church had no means of exercising any sort of direct or indirect jurisdiction over the international system. This conclusion, which modern sectors of Catholic culture had already come to, as we will see in the next section, was slowly accepted by the Roman center as well. Two major trends support this statement: firstly, the Magisterium expressed a positive attitude, unprecedented in intensity and depth, toward historical processes such as the attempts at communitarian integration at European and world levels, and the consolidation of democracy as the foundation of the new international system. Secondly, the Church made direct contact with international organizations, finding a shared goal in the construction of a peaceful and cooperative international environment.

²⁵ For a contextualization of the problem in the history of contemporary Catholicism, within the vast bibliography, we may refer to Philippe Chenaux, *De la Chrétienté à l'Europe: les catholiques et l'idée européenne au XX^e siècle*, Tours: CLD, 2007. A synthetic overview of the Vatican attitude in Anthony O’Mahony, *The Vatican and Europe: Political Theology and Ecclesiology in Papal Statements from Pius XII to Benedict XVI*, in “International journal for the Study of the Christian Church”, issue 3, 2009, pp. 177-94.

²⁶ On Pius’s attitude to Europe see Philippe Chenaux, *Pie XII*, chapter IX. Part of Pacelli’s extensive address of the European subject has been collected and published, in English, by Albert Le Roy, *His Holiness Pope Pius XII on Europe: 1948-1957*, Strasbourg: Catholic information office on European problems, 1958. The literature has already convincingly underlined how the Vatican had no direct political clout over the early phases of European integration – notwithstanding the polemic accusations against Rome’s “long arm” which had emerged since the 1950s – even if its support to Christian Democrats engaged in that process, facilitated its successful development; see above all Philippe Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane? Entre le plan Marshall et les traités de Rome*, Bruxelles: Ciaco, 1990.

The Communist threat looming over Europe convinced the Vatican to support the cause of the Western coalition even if there were deep-seated conflicts with the model of civilization that it embodied. This led to a *de facto* reduction of Traditional Universalism: the hope to shape an international community explicitly anchored in Christian values was focused on Europe, but even in this case the Church could not expect to play a key role in the integration process that took place during the 1950s. This does not mean that the “intransigent approach” to the problem of the international order was completely discarded during the papacy of Pius XII.²⁷ As we will see, its legacy left traces also in the following years; the seeds of a new attitude were planted, but it took some time for them to grow.

It is not only “exogenous” factors that would have induced a paradigm shift in the Catholic approach to the problems of human coexistence in the world. Until now, we have mostly focused on an “institutional” perspective, epitomized by the Magisterial discourse and largely accepted by Catholic theology, describing a model that represents the crucial background for any elaboration developed during the 1960s and the 1970s, the period to which we are devoting most of our analysis. Now it is time to focus on “endogenous” factors, that is to say, on those currents and personalities that from within Catholic culture proposed a new way to address the issue of the international community. Without any pretense of exhaustiveness, we will try to give a glimpse of a new intellectual climate that grew in the first half of the twentieth century, became more consistent during the 1950s (with a complicated and mostly controversial relationship with Rome) and finally influenced the Magisterium discourse during the 1960s, generating a paradigm shift in Catholic culture. In other words, after this necessary introduction we are ready to assess the transition from Traditional to New Universalism.

²⁷ In his last years, indeed, Pacelli returned to an apocalyptic view of the development of history, typical of the intransigent paradigm. This aspect has been underlined by Andrea Riccardi, *Governo e “profezia”* pp. 80-81.

2. From Traditional to New Universalism: A change of climate in the Catholic culture.

2.1. New approaches to modernity. The role of theologians and intellectuals.

As the literature has made abundantly clear, although the intransigent paradigm was hegemonic within Catholic culture for most of the contemporary age, it did not remain completely unchallenged. On the contrary, as we mentioned in the introduction, in the course of the twentieth century an alternative approach toward modernity took form, questioning the roots of the traditional rigid opposition. This new approach was composed of contributions from many centers, and did not concern a specific theological issue. The growth in the first half of the century of movements open to a renewal of the Catholic doctrine in the ecumenical, biblical, liturgical and many other fields highlighted a minority but widespread need to update some features of the Catholic religion, so that it could open a problematic but open dialogue with the world outside the Church.²⁸ But it was also the history of the slow and difficult emancipation of Catholic theologians and intellectuals from their subordination to the rules dictated by the ecclesiastical authority, which generally opposed every effort towards renewal until the end of the 1950s. The cultural and personal journey of the protagonists of *nouvelle théologie* – the “alternative to orthodoxy” elaborated in particular in two major theological schools, the Dominicans’ Le Saulchoir, and the Jesuits’ Lyon-Fouvrière – is in this regard emblematic: Dominicans like Yves Congar (1904-1995) and Marie-Dominique Chenu (1895-1990), and Jesuits like Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) and Jean Daniélou (1905-1974), all born between 1895 and 1905, experienced similar parabolas, moving from being censured during the 1940s and the 1950s to being protagonists at the Second Vatican Council.²⁹

²⁸ The book edited by Gilles Routhier, Phillippe J. Roy and Karim Schelkens, *La théologie catholique entre intransigeance et renouveau: La réception des mouvements préconciliaires à Vatican II*, Turnhout/Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve: Bibliothèque de la Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, 2011, offers a good overview of the role played by pre-conciliar movements in the preparation of the *aggiornamento* which took place at the Second Vatican Council.

²⁹ The definition of *nouvelle théologie* as a consistent and structured alternative to orthodoxy is taken from Fouilloux, *Une Eglise en quête de liberté*, p. 306. For an in-depth examination of their cultural itineraries see, as points of reference of a wide bibliography, the studies published by Cerf in Paris, and in particular Joseph Famerée and Gilles Routhier, *Yves Congar*, Paris: Cerf, 2008; Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Une école de théologie: Le Saulchoir*, Paris: Cerf 1985, with essays of Giuseppe Alberigo, Étienne Fouilloux, Jean-Pierre Jossua and Jean Ladrière; Jean-Pierre Wagner, *Henri de Lubac*, Paris: Cerf 2007, and Jacques Fontaine (ed.), *Actualité de Jean Daniélou*, Paris: Cerf, 2006.

Why is this change of intellectual climate relevant for our discourse? Because one of its distinctive features was a different approach toward some historical trends: in general, the intransigent worldview regarded the history of human progress (what will be defined as the “sign of the times”) and the history of salvation not as conflicting, but rather as fundamentally convergent.³⁰ In particular, the tendency towards growth and strengthening in the relations between peoples at world level, especially after the First World War, was considered a positive development, fully consistent with the Christian message, founded upon the idea of the unity of the human family. At the end of the 1930s, for instance, in two pivotal books for the history of contemporary Catholicism, Chenu and de Lubac praised the human desire to unify the world, respecting the “plurality of human civilizations” (de Lubac) but at the same time considering the goal of world unity as a truly Christian aspiration.³¹ The world was changing in multifaceted and often seemingly contradictory ways, but some signs inspired hope for the future of mankind. Such a change of attitude – slow and complex, here condensed into a few sentences for reasons of clarity – shook the foundations of Traditional Universalism, which was built on the irreconcilability between the “two histories”. Another decisive strike came from theologians and intellectuals who proposed a new approach to politics, or more correctly to Christians’ engagement within the temporal sphere. A brief description of this second trend emerging from the Catholic culture will allow us to elaborate on the links between new and traditional approaches, and finally to address the problem of their impact on the Magisterium’s discourse.

In broad and generalizing terms, we might speak of a tendency to discard the traditional model of Christendom because of its anachronistic mix of temporal and spiritual necessities. This idea – which grew into the theory of “separation of planes” – did not question the political and social relevance of Catholic principles, or their intrinsic superiority stemming from the connection with

³⁰ A clear theological description of this subject in Carlo Molari, *Storia e Regno di Dio: problemi teologici e conflitti pastorali prima e dopo il Concilio*, in Severino Dianich and Ermanno Tura (eds.), *Venti anni di Concilio Vaticano II. Contributi sulla sua recezione in Italia*, Roma: Borla, 1985, pp. 10-70.

³¹ See Henri-Marie de Lubac, *Catholicisme, les aspects sociaux du dogme*, Paris: Cerf, 2003 (original edition 1938), in particular pp. 313-15, and Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Une école de théologie: Le Saulchoir*, Paris: Cerf, 1985 (original edition 1937) p. 45.

the “revealed truth”. In the most famous systematization of this approach, French philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973)³² argued that the “new Christendom” should not have a “sacred” form anymore, but rather a “secular” one: the Catholic laity had the duty to give it life and shape, providing modern values with the spiritual grounds that they could not find outside religion. This approach was consistent with the intransigent worldview (not by chance, it was firmly grounded in St. Thomas’s philosophy), but it did not look with preconceived hostility at some acquisitions of modernity such as a wider awareness of human dignity and the rights of the person, or the identification of some fundamental values, considered intimately Christian, such as freedom, justice, tolerance, pluralism and democracy.³³ Two aspects in particular would have had an impact on the traditional universalist paradigm: on the one side, overcoming the reference to the medieval *Christianitas* meant abandoning the unrealistic prospects of the Church’s rule over the international community. On the other side, the insistence on the value of the person – which became one of the distinctive features of Catholic culture in the first half of the twentieth century, and which has been widely addressed through the category of “personalism”³⁴ – translated into the underlining of the connection between the stability of the international community and the well-being of its citizens, in a global perspective.

³² French philosopher and political thinker Jacques Maritain converted to Catholicism in 1906, and by the early 1930s he was an established figure in Catholic thought. His extensive work dealt with subjects like theology (in particular the study of the thought of Thomas Aquinas), ecclesiology and political theory. After France’s liberation in 1944, he was named French ambassador to the Vatican (serving until 1948), and was also actively involved in drafting the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). For a general philosophical introduction to his thought, in English, see Jude P Dougherty, *Jacques Maritain: an Intellectual Profile*, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003, while for a focus on his political philosophy see James V. Schall, *Jacques Maritain: The Philosopher in Society*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

³³ These arguments were developed in particular in his book *Humanisme integral*, published in French in 1936 and based on a series of conferences that the French intellectual held in Salamanca the previous year. See in particular the critical edition with an introduction by Philippe Chenaux, “*Humanisme integral*” (1936) de Jacques Maritain, Paris: Cerf, 2006.

³⁴ See Johan De Tavernier, *The Historical Roots of Personalism: From Renouvier’s Le Personnalisme, Mounier’s Manifeste au service du personnalisme and Maritain’s Humanisme integral to Janssens’ Personne et Société*, in “Ethical Perspectives”, issue 3, 2009, pp. 361-92. Together with Maritain, the most important representative of Personalism – actually, for many aspects, the initiator of this school of thought – was French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), founder of the review *Esprit* (1932), where the personalist culture found its first systematization. We will not focus on Mounier’s thought, in this synthetic context, because he was less instrumental than Maritain in defining a new approach to the idea of international community; for an introduction to his philosophy, see Jean-François Petit, *Philosophie et théologie dans la formation du personnalisme d’Emmanuel Mounier*, Paris: Cerf, 2006.

Both these general arguments would have been especially developed in the 1950s: keeping as a reference the work of Maritain, whose centrality within the Catholic intellectual debate has already been proved by the literature,³⁵ we may briefly focus on his fundamental book *Man and the State* (1951). The seventh chapter deals with “the problem of the political unification of the world”, and starts with a consideration of the apparent paradox of the present situation of the world, both increasingly interconnected and on the edge of a destructive war, as never before. The reason for the paradox, according to Maritain, lay in the fact that interdependence among nations was only effective at economic level, and not at the political one, where a lasting peace could be guaranteed: he proposed to build a “world political authority” modeled on the United Nations (well known to the French philosopher, who as we mentioned participated in the draft of the 1948 Universal Declaration)³⁶ but given real power. In his view, the logical need for a world political authority descended from the fact that in the contemporary era neither peace nor the well-being of citizens could be assured by a particular form of society whether the city-state, monarchy or the modern nation. The question of how a global institution could work, and deal with States’ sovereignty, was posed but not scrutinized (as we already mentioned, it was the key problem of any universalist elaboration). Maritain gave only some general indications: the technical aspects of the “world government” were secondary, because the core of the problem lay in the harmonization of all the institutions and communities into which human societies were organized. He did not envision a global super-State, but hoped for the establishment of a “pluralist unity”, which respected the autonomy of smaller political bodies but at the same time was pervaded by a sentiment of

³⁵ Some notes in Philippe Chenaux, *Entre Maurras et Maritain. Une génération intellectuelle catholique (1920-1930)*, Paris: Cerf, 1999, which underlines Maritain’s importance for an entire generation of French-speaking Catholic intellectuals (for the passage from Action française’s *politique d’abord* to the *primauté du spirituel*). A comprehensive assessment as regards Europe has been provided by Bernard Hubert (ed.), *Jacques Maritain en Europe. La réception de sa pensée*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1996. The problematic reception of Maritain’s thought in Latin America has been analyzed by Olivier Compagnon, *Jacques Maritain et l’Amérique du Sud. Le modèle malgré lui*, Villeneuve-d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2003. For a transnational survey that goes beyond the field of political culture, to investigate the impact of Maritain’s thought on art history, and especially on Modernism, see Rajesh Heynickx and Jan De Maeyer (eds.), *The Maritain Factor: Taking Religion into Interwar Modernism*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010.

³⁶ Maritain’s influence on the Declaration has been analyzed by Andrew Woodcock, *Jacques Maritain, Natural Law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, in “Journal of the history of international law”, issue 2, 2006, pp. 245-66.

friendship and solidarity.³⁷ Here we find a vision rooted in the organizing principle of subsidiarity – i.e. that the powers given to every social sphere should match its essence and purpose – that can be graphically depicted as a series of concentric circles, starting from the minimal unity of local communities and moving outwards to include nation and international community.³⁸

This was not *per se* news in the 1950s: this approach to international politics, oriented both by the value of the decentralization of power and by its support to international institutions and organizations, had already been employed by European Catholics since the first postwar period, during the “second wave” of Catholic internationalism mentioned in the Introduction.³⁹ This was consistent with the theoretical construction of the principle of subsidiarity, which values both the non-intervention of higher-level authorities in affairs that are better managed by lower organizational structures, and the initiatives of the former in areas that the latter cannot cover sufficiently well.⁴⁰ What was new in the 1950s was a wider awareness of the necessity of global governance, originating from the “history lessons” of the previous decades: only improved

³⁷ Keeping this ultimate goal in mind, the first step could entail the formation of a “world council”, composed of the most respected moral and juridical personalities at world level, thence provided with “undisputed moral authority”, one that should not have any actual power, but could undertake the task of giving “a voice to the peoples’ conscience”, contributing to create “an organized international opinion”. See Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State*, Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1951, in part. pp. 222-55. See the discussion of this pivotal book in Timothy Fuller and John P. Hittinger (eds.), *Reassessing the Liberal State. Reading Maritain’s Man and the State*, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001; for a contextualization in Maritain’s cultural itinerary see Daniele Lorenzini, *Jacques Maritain e i diritti umani. Fra totalitarismo, antisemitismo e democrazia (1936-1951)*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2012, pp. 175-82, while a brief look at the seventh chapter is in Renato Papini, *L’homme et l’état. Le problème de l’organisation politique du monde*, in Vincent Aucante and Renato Papini (eds.), *Jacques Maritain, philosophe dans la cité. Mondialisation et diversités culturelles*, Paris: Parole et Silence, 2007, pp. 91-100.

³⁸ This principle, as is well known, had a long tradition in Catholic thought, and its roots can be once again traced back to Aquinas’ philosophy: see Nicholas Aroney, *Subsidiarity, Federalism and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire*, in “Law and Philosophy”, issue 2, 2007, pp. 161-228.

³⁹ For instance, the already mentioned change of attitude of the Church toward the League of Nations – from open diffidence to cautious appreciation of its goals and inspiration – was influenced by the reflection of Catholic intellectuals, like those gravitating around the *Union catholique d’études internationales* (Ucei), founded in Fribourg during the First World War. Some notes in Philippe Trinchan, *Adaptation ou résistance des catholiques au nouvel ordre international: le cas de l’Union catholique d’études internationales 1920-1939*, in Urs Altermatt (ed.), *Schweizer Katholizismus zwischen den Weltkriegen: 1920-1940*, Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1994, pp. 103-16. See a contextualization in Menozzi, *Chiesa, pace e guerra nel Novecento*, pp. 53-63. In the next chapter we will mention the cultural itinerary of another influential European Catholic thinker, Luigi Sturzo, since he represented a benchmark for the cultural elaboration of Italian Christian Democracy.

⁴⁰ This two-sided aspect of the principle of subsidiarity, which emerged starting in the nineteenth century before informing the Catholic discourse during the twentieth century, has not always been clearly highlighted by the literature. See the approach proposed by the research project on “Subsidiarity and Social Provision in the Nineteenth Century”, started by KADOC (Leuven, Belgium) and presented by Hendryk Moeys in “KADOC International Newsletter”, 2013, pp. 5-7.

international cooperation could avoid the tragic repetition of a descending spiral toward aggressive nationalism, totalitarianism and war. It cannot be stressed enough how the Second World War represented a sort of watershed for an entire generation of Catholics, who became more engaged in establishing a cooperative international community after the evidence of the dangers posed by Nationalism, which in the past had exerted a significant appeal to relevant sectors of the European Catholic milieu.⁴¹ For this new generation, the United Nations, although imperfect, was the point of reference for the establishment of peace and stability in the world. Catholics should therefore collaborate with them, finding a practical, rather than theoretical, common ground on which to establish a fruitful cooperation. In this respect, a paradigmatic example is given by the field of human rights: notwithstanding a different stance on their theoretical foundation, more and more Catholic intellectuals advocated an unequivocal support for the initiatives for protection of human rights at global level, starting from the application of the 1948 Universal Declaration.⁴² Some of them – like the Italian jurist Giuseppe Capograssi (1889-1956), who we will mention again in the next chapter because of his influence on the ideas of one of the most prominent Italian Catholic democratic politicians, Aldo Moro – also became representatives of a new trend which emerged in law and political philosophy, concerning the possibility to strengthen the legal protection of human rights (regarded as crucial for the whole international community) without considering the Nation-state as the only legitimate enforcer.⁴³

⁴¹ For a historicization of the Catholic approach to the idea of nation and Nationalism see the results of the workshop on “Catholicism, Nation and Nationalism” (Pisa, June 2013), organized by the research network on “The Catholic Church, Modernisation and Modernity in Contemporary Europe”, published by Daniele Menozzi (ed.), *Cattolicesimo nazione e nazionalismo/Catholicism, nation and nationalism*, Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2015.

⁴² See Menozzi, *Chiesa e diritti umani*, pp. 145-71, for a reflection on the entry of the issue of human rights into Catholic culture, but also on the controversial reaction to the Universal Declaration, which should be expected after having mentioned the traditional Catholic take on the problem.

⁴³ For a general introduction to this trend toward the internationalization of human rights see introduction to David P. Forsythe, *The Internationalization of Human Rights*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991, and Raymond John Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. See some notes on Capograssi – who established a clear link between human rights and peace, arguing that they were not sufficiently safeguarded if they were not part of the international order – in Giuseppe Cacciatore, *Riflessioni sui diritti umani nel pensiero di Giuseppe Capograssi*, in “Civiltà del Mediterraneo”, issues 8-9, 2006, pp. 246-65, and Riccardo Monaco, *Stato nazionale e istituzioni comunitarie*, in Francesco Mercadante (ed.), *Due convegni su Giuseppe Capograssi*, Milano: Giuffrè, 1990, pp. 423-33. Capograssi was among the founders of the Catholic Union of Italian Jurists (1948), and was appointed judge of the Constitutional Court of Italy one year before his death, in 1955.

How, though, did these different inputs coming from Catholic theology and intellectuality enter the Magisterium discourse? We can follow one of the many threads – that obviously would compose a far richer fabric than the one summed up in these pages – introducing one of the most influential theologians of the central decades of the twentieth century, Cardinal Pietro Pavan (1903-1994).⁴⁴ Born in Treviso near Venice in 1903, Pietro Pavan was educated in the local seminary and sent to Rome for degrees in philosophy and theology at the Gregorian University (later he also earned graduate degrees in economics and sociology at the secular University of Padua). He was ordained a priest in 1928; in 1946 he was called to Rome by Mgr. Montini, the future Paul VI, and was appointed ecclesiastical assistant of the Christian association of Rural Workers, Coldiretti (he came to be very influential for the cultural elaboration of the Italian Catholic laity). Two years later, Pavan became professor of social thought at the Pontifical Lateran University, starting an intense academic career, which made him known in Italy and abroad. During one of his trips to Paris, he met Vatican nuncio Angelo Roncalli: Pavan would become one of his closest advisors, both as Patriarch of Venice and as pope John XXIII.

Pavan's view influenced greatly the updating of the Church social doctrine: drawing inspiration from French Personalism, he became convinced that the person should be regarded as the cornerstone of society, the main subject of any policy implemented by the political authority.⁴⁵ According to him, the effective protection of the human being could not be sufficiently guaranteed at national level: the “movement of history” pointed toward a greater interdependence among peoples, and called for a political organization of the international community, which should not be a substitute for the Nation, but rather represent a higher and coordinated level of identity. The individual, Pavan argued in particular in *L'uomo nella comunità internazionale* (1950) – which can

⁴⁴ See Caterina Ciriello, *Pietro Pavan. La metamorfosi della dottrina sociale nel pontificato di Pio XII*, Bologna: Il Mulino 2011 (re-elaboration of the PhD dissertation discussed at Lateran University in 2008); in English, see the biography of Mgr. Franco Biffi, *Prophet of Our Time: The Social Thought of Cardinal Pietro Pavan*, New Rochelle, NY: New City, 1992 (translation of *Il canto dell'uomo: introduzione al pensiero sociale del card. Pietro Pavan*, Roma: Città nuova editrice, 1990).

⁴⁵ The influence of personalist thought on Pavan's cultural education has been addressed by Lourenço F. Kambalu, *La democrazia personalista nel pensiero del cardinale Pietro Pavan (1903-1994)*, Roma: Edizioni Studium, 2011.

be read together with the seventh chapter of Maritain's *Man and the State* as a symbol of the change of intellectual climate in the Catholic culture – should be “the foundation, the principle, the end and the architect of the International Community”.⁴⁶ In other words, in the contemporary age the common good could only be pursued at global level, in order to maintain peace and stability in the international community, and assure a better protection of the rights of the person. The concept of “universalization of the common good” was not alien to the discourse of the Catholic culture, as the contemporary reflection of German Jesuit Oswald von Nell-Breuning (who had played a central role in the drafting of the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* of Pius XI) or Austrian theologian Johannes Messner testifies.⁴⁷ In fact, Thomas Aquinas himself had extended the notion of *communitas perfecta* to the entire human family. What distinguished the contribution of Pavan and Maritain was an explicit endorsement of international organizations – namely the United Nations – as the main instrument to implement the common good, that is, to above all assure peaceful cooperation among Nations and to safeguard human rights. In his fundamental essay *La democrazia e le sue ragioni* (1958), the Italian theologian clearly expressed a positive view on supranational bodies, namely the United Nations, and praised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴⁸ Even if the implementation of the Catholic doctrine remained the only source that could assure a peaceful coexistence at national as at international level, the accent was put on the possibility of a fruitful collaboration with other cultures, and on the practical contribution that Catholics could bring to the establishment of a cooperative international community in the temporal sphere.

⁴⁶ See Pietro Pavan, *L'uomo nella comunità internazionale*, Roma: Figlie della Chiesa, 1950, p. 53, my translation. On this aspect of Pavan's thought see Lino Bosio and Fabio Cucculelli (eds.), *Costruire l'unità della famiglia umana: l'orizzonte profetico del cardinale Pietro Pavan (1903-1994)*, Roma: Studium, 2004, in particular the essays of Giorgio Campanini (pp. 35-43) and Mario Toso (pp. 45-73).

⁴⁷ See Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “Gemeinwohl”, in ID. And Hermann Sacher (eds.), *Zur christlichen Gesellschaftslehre. Beiträge zu einem Wörterbuch der Politik*, Freiburg: Herder, 1947, pp. 47-8, and Johannes Messner, *Das Naturrecht. Handbuch der Gesellschaftsethik, Staatsethik und Wirtschaftsethik*, Innsbruck/Wien: Tyrolia, 1950, p. 216. For a synthetic outline see William A. Barbieri Jr., *Beyond the Nations: The Expansion of the Common Good in Catholic Social Thought*, in “The Review of Politics”, issue 4, 2001, in part pp. 723-38. Barbieri does not explicitly mention the contribution of Pietro Pavan, which on the contrary seems extremely important.

⁴⁸ See Pietro Pavan, *La democrazia e le sue ragioni*, Roma: Studium, 2003 (original edition 1958), in part pp. 200-202. In the context of this work, we cannot focus on the differences (even if there were some) between Maritain and Pavan, who was however a deep connoisseur of the work of the French philosopher: see Mario Toso, *Il cardinale Pietro Pavan: protagonista del Concilio Vaticano II e della rinascita del pensiero sociale cristiano. Profenia e testimonianza*, lecture at Lateran University delivered on March 13, 2013, available at http://www.pcgp.it/dati/2013-04/10-999999/Segretario_2013CARDPAVAN.pdf, pp. 8-10.

This approach did not find its way into the heart of the Magisterium discourse during Pius's papacy – notwithstanding a cautious overture, as we mentioned, to the United Nations – which ended on a rigid intransigent note, hostile to the confrontation with the lay culture and the modern world.⁴⁹ While the Church presented itself as a “citadel under siege” (especially by Marxism and Communism, but also Liberalism), Catholic culture was slowly changing perspective, looking for a way to break the isolation and engage with the reflection of modern culture. Modernity, from this point of view, was not seen as an enemy to be defeated, but as a reality that would not be vanishing anytime soon, and that should not be rejected as a whole, given the presence of positive elements, consistent with the Christian message. This powerful “shift of minds” would reach the shores of the Catholic institutional discourse during John’s pontificate and the Second Vatican Council.

2.2. John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council: a paradigm shift in the Magisterium’s discourse?

JOHN XXIII

Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli (1881-1963) became pope in October 1958, choosing the name John XXIII.⁵⁰ Like his twentieth-century predecessors, with the exception of Pius X, he had followed a

⁴⁹ Symbolically, many representatives of *nouvelle théologie* were ostracized or condemned between the end of the 1940s and the end of the 1950s – the encyclical *Humani Generis* (1950) being a crucial watershed – while even Jacques Maritain – highly popular in all the Catholic world – was subjected, in 1956, to a “great attack” led by Roman Jesuits of “La Civiltà Cattolica” (especially Father Antonio Messineo), because of his adamant refusal of the option of “Catholic State”. The accusation, however, did not translate into an official process by the Holy Office. See respectively Fouilloux, *Une Église*, pp. 279-300, and Jean-Dominique Durand, *La Civiltà Cattolica contre Jacques Maritain. Le combat du père Antonio Messineo*, in “Notes et documents”, issue 2, 2005, pp. 34-71; for the contingent reasons, related to Italian politics, which contributed to launching the attack on “La Civiltà Cattolica”, see Roberto Sani, “*La Civiltà Cattolica* e la politica italiana nel secondo dopoguerra (1945-1958)”, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2004, pp. 142-44.

⁵⁰ Within the vast literature on Pope John XXIII, who since his election has become one of the most popular figures of contemporary Catholicism, see as point of reference the international Conference held in Bergamo in November 2008, whose proceedings have been published by Grado Giovanni Merlo and Francesco Mores (eds.), *L'ora che il mondo sta attraversando. Giovanni XXIII di fronte alla storia*, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2009, which updated the historiographical reflection twenty years after the first major international Conference held in 1986 – whose proceedings have been published in Italian (Giuseppe Alberigo (ed.), *Papa Giovanni*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1987), and partly translated in French (Giuseppe Alberigo (ed.), *Jean XXIII devant l'histoire*, Paris: Le Seuil, 1989) –, after the publication of new primary sources, like the critical editions of Roncalli’s personal writings, thanks to the work of the Fondazione per le Scienze Religiose Giovanni XXIII (Fscire), located in Bologna, Italy. A biography of scientific value

diplomatic career, although he joined the ranks of Vatican diplomacy relatively late and without much specific knowledge.⁵¹ He spent ten years (1925-1934) as an apostolic visitor in Bulgaria, then moving to Greece and Turkey for another decade as an apostolic delegate. His last experience abroad was the Nunciature of Paris (1944-1953), before coming back to Italy as Venice Patriarch (1953-1958). During this period he did not elaborate an original approach to the international dimension: his views can be characterized as Traditional Universalism. Emphatically, he considered the Second World War a massacre originating from the estrangement of mankind from the true religion that could end only through a collective expiation. Only the return of the international community to the Church and its Teachings could save the souls of men and societies.⁵² The continuity with the tradition was partly loosened by two features, which we will find in the Teachings of John XXIII. On the one hand, his diplomatic experience in the East equipped Mgr. Roncalli with a less Romano-centric view of international relations, whose complexity was best evaluated from a semi-peripheral angle. Above all, it was evident that the Church had few ways to exert a significant influence in most geopolitical contexts. On the other hand, the Italian churchman did not indulge in a negative view of the evolution of history, as it was common within the anti-modern intransigent culture. “We are still at the dawn of history”, he stated in Bergamo in 1936. This was a conviction that had permeated Roncalli’s speeches and writings since its youth, animated by a deep confidence in the role that faith could play in the contemporary

is still lacking, as are comprehensive analyses of John’s pontificate in English, while there are numerous examples of agiographic or journalistic works, insisting on the “revolutionary” impact of Roncalli’s figure within the history of the Catholic Church. See for instance Peter Hebblethwaite, *John XXIII. Pope of the Council*, London: Chapman, 1984, and Thomas Cahill, *Pope John XXIII*, New York: Viking, 2002. An assessment of the state of the art of the biographies on John XXIII is in Daniele Menozzi, *Le biografie di Giovanni XXIII negli ultimi vent’anni*, in Merlo and Mores, *L’ora che il mondo sta attraversando*, pp. 1-26.

⁵¹ A short profile in Andrea Riccardi, *Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli un diplomatico vaticano*, in Fscire (eds.), *Un cristiano sul trono di Pietro: studi storici su Giovanni XXIII*, Sotto il monte: Servitium, 2003, pp. 200-29.

⁵² See for instance Roncalli’s notes in his personal diary on May 13 and 18, 1940, and the homilies for Easter and Christmas in 1943, respectively in Angelo Roncalli, *Tener da conto. Le Agendine di Bulgaria, 1926-1934*, edited by Massimo Faggioli, Bologna: Istituto per le scienze religiose, 2008, pp. 68 and 70, and Angelo Roncalli, *La predicazione ad Istanbul. Omelie, discorsi e note pastorali (1935-1944)*, edited by Alberto Melloni, Firenze: Olschki, 1993, pp. 302-3 and 345. It is worth noting that, normally, in official preaching we find more traditional arguments than in personal writings: see the methodological warning in Melloni’s introduction to Roncalli, *La predicazione ad Istanbul*, in part. pp. 26-27 and 36-38. For the reconstruction of this period of Roncalli’s life see Alberto Melloni, *Fra Istanbul, Atene e la guerra. La missione di A.G. Roncalli (1935-1944)*, Genova: Marietti, 1992, and Agostino Giovagnoli, *La predicazione del vescovo Roncalli a Istanbul e Venezia* in Fscire (eds.), *Un cristiano sul trono di Pietro*, pp. 117-34.

age. Notwithstanding all its flaws, modernity was also an era of progress and possibilities.⁵³ He did not deny a profound crisis in the relations between the Church and the modern man, but in his worldview this did not lead to the prefiguration of an apocalyptic scenario – as in the last phase of Pacelli's papacy, in which the descending spiral taken by mankind could only be inverted by an extraordinary event, like the return of Christ to Earth.

On the contrary, we can sum up the main goal of his pontificate as the effort of embracing a new way of understanding (and influencing) the world, updating the Church's message in order to establish a connection with the modern man. From our point of view, this position implied two main developments. The first one consisted in putting special emphasis on the positive – that is, consistent with the Christian message – elements in the evolution of history, and in particular in the evolution of the international system. The second one concerned the Church's disengagement from the “special relationship” with the West founded on Anticommunism, so as to recover a truly universal perspective. These are the features of a “turning point” of the Magisterium's approach to the international community, which was the main legacy left by John XXIII to his successor Paul VI.

Let us begin to address these changes, starting from the second point.⁵⁴ John XXIII was elected pope in a delicate phase of international relations: after a brief truce following Stalin's death, leading to the first “normalization” of Bipolarism in Europe, international tensions rose up again in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 1962, the Berlin and the Cuban missile crises took the world to

⁵³ On Roncalli's consideration of history see Giovanni Vian, *Roncalli e gli studi di storia*, in Merlo and Mores, *L'ora che il mondo sta attraversando*, pp. 103-64.

⁵⁴ This “change of attitude” has already been widely acknowledged by the literature (both of international relations and of contemporary Catholic Church), and here we will only sum up its defining features, from the perspective of the Catholic approach to the idea of international community. In a recent systematization of the academic research over the Cold War, such a change has been defined as “revolutionary”, because of the new attitude toward the East employed by John XXIII: see Dianne Kirby, *The Religious Cold War*, in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 540-64, quotation from p. 554. This judgment is typical of the general references to John XXIII also in excellent scholarly histories of the Cold War, and it is probably dependent on the deficiencies in English-language literature on Roncalli's figure, as mentioned at footnote 50. In fact, Roncalli's pontificate, although representing a clear paradigm shift within the history of the Catholic Church, did not cause a complete rupture with the tradition, as we will try to argue in the next pages, by contextualizing it in the general itinerary of the Catholic culture in the twentieth century, that we are addressing from a limited but significant point of view.

the brink of a new and devastating war between the two superpowers. In this scenario, the pope devoted himself, and employed the authority of the Magisterium, to preventing the possibility of a new conflict. The Appeal for Peace of September 10, 1961, and the radio message of October 25, 1962, in the middle of the Cuban crisis, were the cornerstones of John's discourse about peace, defined as the supreme good which men and peoples should tend to, irrespective of political affiliation or faith.⁵⁵ The axiom that only the Christian doctrine held the key to a stable and peaceful network of relations among peoples was not questioned. However, the emphasis was put on the contribution that everyone could bring to peace building. In other words, faced with a "mutual assured destruction" scenario, the pope did not insist on the rules to follow in order to get the international community back on the right track, but rather on the necessity to work together so as to avoid the greatest risk mankind had ever dealt with. Working together also meant finding interlocutors wherever there were ears ready to listen, even in "enemy territory". The exchange of messages with Khrushchev, the role played in the Cuban crisis, the visit of Adzubej's family in the Vatican (Aleksei Adzubej was the director of the Russian newspaper "Izvestia", and the son-in-law of the Soviet leader), the start of the Vatican *Ostpolitik*, whose path we will follow in the next pages, are all symbols of the new inclination, which drew the hostile reaction from some sectors of the Curia and of the Catholic world.⁵⁶

At the diplomatic level, the new course was symbolized by the Holy See's signature on the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and on Consular Relations (1963). It was a

⁵⁵ See the text of the speeches in AAS, vol. 53, 1961, pp. 577-82 [web: English, Italian, Spanish], and vol. 54, 1962, pp. 861-862 [web: French, Spanish].

⁵⁶ For some notes on Roncalli's diplomacy see Alfredo Canavero, *Le aperture al mondo: Giovanni XXIII e le grandi potenze in conflitto*, in Merlo and Mores, *L'ora che il mondo sta attraversando*, pp. 227-46, and from an "internal" perspective, card. Paul Poupard, *L'originalité de Jean XXIII*, in Jean Chelini (ed.), *Jean XXIII et l'ordre du monde*, Paris: Nouvelle Citè, 1988, pp. 9-31. The specific role of the pope in the Cuban crisis has been reconstructed by Alberto Melloni, *Pacem in terris. Storia dell'ultima enciclica di Papa Giovanni*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2010, pp. 26-37, while Karim Schelkens has offered a valuable contribution to the research on John's diplomacy toward the Communist world in *Vatican Diplomacy after The Cuban Missile Crisis: New Light On The Release Of Josyf Slipyj*, in "The Catholic Historical Review", issue 4, 2011, pp. 679-712, where he addressed the only real success of the Vatican's policy in this respect, that is the liberation of the Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Mgr. Josyf Slipyi. We would also refer to this work for the analysis of Roncalli's initiatives in the context of the ecumenical dialogue, that here we cannot take into consideration. About the opposition to John's openings, see Giovanni Miccoli, *Sul ruolo di Roncalli nella chiesa italiana*, in Giuseppe Alberigo (ed.), *Papa Giovanni*, pp. 175-209.

formal act, but one with deep implications: the Church was presenting itself as an equal subject of the international system, and not as a judge of its compliance with an ideal structure. Any claim of primacy was relegated to the background. The other States acknowledged the Holy See (not the State of Vatican City) as a subject of international law, because of its spiritual authority and of its universal nature, independent of any other power.⁵⁷ Although the evolution of the international system had long already sanctioned the Church's aspirations to a superordinate position, the recognition of this *de facto* situation by the ecclesiastical institution marked an important shift, which Paul's pontificate would build upon. In sum, Rome showed the will to recover a truly universal perspective, dismantling the passively pro-Western image that it had acquired in the 1950s. These changes, however, would not have had an impact on public opinion if they had not affected the public discourse.⁵⁸ It is in this context – moving the focus to the first feature that we outlined: the reflection over the course of history – that *Pacem in terris* comes into play.

Here we may observe the process of welding between the new attitude emerging from the Catholic culture, and the official Catholic discourse. Proposed and drafted by Mgr. Pietro Pavan, the last encyclical of John XXIII was promulgated on April 11, 1963, during the first intersession of the Second Vatican Council.⁵⁹ Pavan had already contributed to the draft of the encyclical *Mater et Magistra* (1961), where the changes of the international system were described as follows:

Drawn together by their common needs nations are becoming daily more interdependent. There is, moreover, an ever-extending network of societies and organizations which set their sights beyond the aims and interests of individual countries and concentrate on the economic, social, cultural and political welfare of all nations throughout the world.⁶⁰

The strengthening of the ties among peoples and nations highlighted the existence of a “universal common good”, stemming from the unity of the human family, which needed to be

⁵⁷ This point is stressed by Giovanni Barberini, *Chiesa e Santa Sede*, p. 41.

⁵⁸ A good synthetic account of John's discourse on Nations and international community is Giovanni Vian, *Chiesa, politica, nazione in Giovanni XXIII*, in Menozzi (ed.), *Cattolicesimo nazione e nazionalismo*, pp. 165-84.

⁵⁹ On the drafting process on the encyclical see Melloni, *Pacem in terris*, with a useful appendix where different drafts of the documents are compared. To my knowledge, there is still no academic contextualization of the encyclical in English.

⁶⁰ Encyclical *Mater et magistra*, §49: AAS, vol. 53, 1961, pp. 401-64.

defined, safeguarded and promoted at world level. This formula, which as we mentioned was already circulating in Catholic culture, was therefore introduced in the pope's Teachings through this encyclical, and then it was developed by *Pacem in terris*.⁶¹ In this groundbreaking pronouncement we can find a comprehensive interpretation of the long-term trends of the international system, represented by mankind's tendency to group in political communities founded on nationality, becoming increasingly wide and interconnected. The problem posed by this transformation, whose content was eminently positive, was that "the shape and structure of political life in the modern world, and the influence exercised by public authority in all the nations of the world are unequal to the task of promoting the common good of all peoples". Therefore, the conclusion was clear: "Men's common interests make it imperative that at long last a world-wide community of nations be established". Such a community did not have to be built from the ground up; its structure had already put in place 18 years earlier when the United Nations were founded in San Francisco. Now it was time "to adapt its structure and methods of operation to the magnitude and nobility of its tasks".⁶²

The Church's clear endorsement of the United Nations underlined the overcoming of its skepticism toward the supranational institution. Roncalli's initiatives, aimed at recovering a truly universal perspective, beyond any suspicion of alignment with only a part of the international community, had addressed the first of its two main reasons for this skepticism, namely the presence of the Communist countries. Some well-known passages of the encyclical now updated the Church's discourse: the traditional distinctions between the "error" and the "errant", and between philosophies and political undertakings which drew their inspiration from those philosophies, were employed with the goal of legitimizing the dialogue with any interlocutor, even within the Communist world, if it could lead to a practical understanding. The second aspect of the Church's

⁶¹ About the recurrence of the concept of "common good" in Magisterium's documents see the classical account of Hubert Jedin and Karl Baus (eds.), *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte: Die Weltkirche im 20. Jahrhundert*, Freiburg: Herder, 1979, pp. 173-76, and more recently the already quoted Coulange, *Vers le bien commun*.

⁶² Encyclical *Pacem in terris*, §§135, 7 and 145: AAS, vol. 55, 1963, pp. 257-304.

skepticism – the source of the human rights declared in the Chart of 1948 – was addressed by *Pacem in terris* as well. Even if some statements were objectionable – “and there was justification for this” – all in all the Declaration was “a step in the right direction, an approach toward the establishment of a juridical and political ordering of the world community”.⁶³ The protection of human rights at the global level – a fundamental aspect of the universal common good – was considered the main mission of the United Nations, and a mission that the Church wholeheartedly supported.

As should be clear by now, both these developments were prepared by the change of attitude among Catholic theologians and intellectuals, who abandoned an approach built around the myth of the rechristianization of the modern world, and the right/duty of the Church to be the beacon of the international community, which States should have turned to in order to learn the correct rules for the life in common. The new perspective underlined and praised the positive tendency of human communities to strengthen the ties that bound them together, which testified to the unity of the human family. The Catholics’ task was to encourage this trend through dialogue and spirit of service, so as to help the peace cause. The laity should enjoy a large amount of autonomy, without prejudice to the Church’s right to determine the compliance of its actions, *a posteriori* to the principles of the Christian doctrine. We can define this set of processes, from the point of view of discourse analysis, as a “resemanticization” of the category of Universalism, that unbound the ties with the intransigent ideology, and set it in tune with the course of history, which seemed to point toward the building of an international community linked by political and juridical bonds, in order to preserve peace. In a formula, we have described the transition from Traditional to New Universalism, which sheds some specific light on the general and remarkable change of attitude toward modernity accomplished by the Catholic culture after a long period of opposition.

⁶³ *Pacem in terris*, § 144.

Now we may ask ourselves whether this turning point represented a full paradigm shift, which definitively relegated the intransigent worldview to the past. As is often the case with Church history, we cannot be too blunt in this judgment. In fact, John's Magisterium did not question the cornerstone of the traditional approach to the relations between the Church and the international community, namely its claim to possessing the only set of rules able to discipline the relationships among Nations. International law, like any other body of law, had its source of legitimacy in natural law, even if mankind finally seemed ready to recognize and apply its norms through the employment of the (right) reason.⁶⁴ From this premise followed the conviction that the Catholic contribution to a peaceful human coexistence was not one of many, but rather (still) the only map that could rightfully orient the relations between peoples. We would argue that the employment of the concept of "universal common good" was a bridge between the old and the new conceptions: traditionally, the Church asserted the right to enunciate the contents of the common good, which descended from Christian doctrine. In the contemporary age, the strengthening of the ties among the members of the human family had shown the universality of these contents: the world community could protect and implement them, but their assessment was reserved to the Church.

What were these specific contents in practice? We can find some general examples in *Pacem in terris*: the encouragement of the "reciprocal exchange between citizens and their intermediate societies", the equality of all the members of the international community, the effectiveness of the powers of international institutions, and above all the protection of fundamental human rights, founded on the

⁶⁴ In the same encyclical *Pacem in terris*, there are many references in this regard, as the following quotations should demonstrate: "The same law of nature that governs the life and conduct of individuals must also regulate the relations of political communities with one another"; "The order which prevails in human society is wholly incorporeal in nature [...] But such an order – universal, absolute and immutable in its principles – finds its source in the true, personal and transcendent God". See §§80, 38. About the use of the phrase "right reason", that is reason enlightened by faith, in lieu of "reason" without adjectives, which pointed to a common feature of all men, irrespective of their religion, see Menozzi, *Chiesa, pace e guerra*, pp. 267-71, which also reads the pronouncement in the context of the centuries-old tradition of the "just war" (underlining the news but also the factors of continuity), that we cannot address here. On this issue specifically, see also David D. Corey and Josh King (eds.), *Pacem in terris and the Just War Tradition: a Semicentennial Reconsideration*, in "Journal of Military Ethics", issue 2, 2013, pp. 142-61, that criticizes the encyclical's approach for its rupture with the "just war" tradition, proposing a nonconformist approach to John's major achievement but at the same time indulging in a superficial historical analysis of the document.

dignity bestowed upon every human being by God, consistently with Pavan's view.⁶⁵ However, these general statements did not cover all the problems raised by the concept of universal common good: in particular, the detailed identification of its contents was lacking, and there was no mention of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by men in this process.

John XXIII could not follow up on these issues, since he died shortly after the promulgation of his last encyclical. The task fell to his successor Paul VI, whose assignment was made all the more difficult by the fact that the Church was still gathered in Council, in order to debate the possible *aggiornamento* of his doctrine. Before starting to analyze Montini's elaboration, thence, it is necessary to take a look at the way in which the Second Vatican Council dealt with the issue of the relationship between the Church and the international community.

THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL

What kind of attitude should the Church take when dealing with the modern world? This was one of the core questions of the Second Vatican Council, one that provoked a great debate among the Fathers. For reasons of synthesis and clarity, we can trace two main options in this regard: to embrace an open, benevolent approach, and to restate a critical judgment on the world, underlining how Catholicism alone had the key to its salvation. It is not hard to recognize here the confrontation between a traditional and a new approach to modernity, which also emerged in the reflection over the international community, specifically addressed by the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the modern world *Gaudium et spes*, promulgated on December 7, 1965.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ *Pacem in terris*, quotation from §100, but see also §§132-141.

⁶⁶ See the official text in AAS, vol. 58, 1966, pp. 1025-115. In the endless literature on Vatican II, two good syntheses in English are O'Malley, *What happened at Vatican II?*, and Giuseppe Alberigo, *A Brief History of Vatican II*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2006 (or. ed. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005). The most comprehensive assessment of the issues debated in Rome between 1962 and 1965 is still the *History of Vatican II* in five volumes, directed by Giuseppe Alberigo and published in seven languages (for the English version see Giuseppe Alberigo, *History of Vatican II*, edited by Joseph A. Komonchak, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006). A good database of the personalities who participated in the Council has been provided by Michael Quisinsky and Peter Walter, *Personenlexikon zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil*, Freiburg: Herder, 2012, to which we will refer to for biographical information on most of the protagonists mentioned in the following pages.

Along the bumpy road which led to the promulgation of the *Gaudium et spes*, the contrast emerged with clarity: the documents drafted by the preparatory theological commission, handled by the Roman Curia's departments, were founded on a clear premise: the social order was fully encompassed by the moral order.⁶⁷ The *schema* drafted by the president of the commission, Card. Alfredo Ottaviani (1890-1979),⁶⁸ clearly stated that society could only function properly by following the rules of natural law, safeguarded by the Church. Besides the States, the community of peoples (*communitas gentium*), whose institutional progress testified to the unity of the human family, should also turn to the Catholic institution to learn these rules. A centerpiece of the *schema* concerned the condemnation of modern errors, Communism in particular. Although the censure should have been placed at the doctrinal level, the possible repercussions on the political sphere were still as evident as they were in the early years of the Cold War.⁶⁹ All in all, this approach was a manifesto of Traditional Universalism.

The schemas reviewed by Cardinals Ottaviani, Tromp, Sigmond and Cereceda in the second half of 1962 shared the same fate as the other texts prepared by the preparatory commissions: they were rejected and completely rewritten by the Assembly. Also in this specific case, the Second Vatican Council was confirmed as a founding event for contemporary Catholicism: for three years, Rome became a hub where Cardinals, theologians and lay peoples, coming from all over the world, had the opportunity to meet each other, often for the first time, to compare different experiences and

⁶⁷ See Giovanni Turbanti, *Un Concilio per il mondo moderno. La redazione della costituzione pastorale "Gaudium et spes" del Vaticano II*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000, p. 72. The book of Giovanni Turbanti is essential to understand the debate among different positions within the Church: we defer to it for the analysis of the series of documents which then led to the definitive text of *Gaudium et spes*. Some notes on the preparatory theological commission, in the context of an apologetic approach, are in Alexandra Von Teuffenbach, *La commissione teologica preparatoria del Concilio Vaticano II*, in "Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia", vol. 21, 2012, pp. 219-43.

⁶⁸ The name of Card. Ottaviani is mostly associated with the Holy Office, where he worked since the mid-1930s, becoming secretary in 1959; author of fundamental work on canon law, he was one of the most influential representative of the intransigent culture within the Roman Curia. See Emilio Cavaterra, *Il prefetto del Sant'Offizio. Le opere e i giorni del cardinale Ottaviani*, Milano: Mursia, 1990.

⁶⁹ Chenu, *L'Eglise catholique et le communism*, pp. 254-62; an in-depth examination can be found in Giovanni Turbanti, *Il problema del comunismo al Concilio Vaticano II*, in Alberto Melloni (dir.), *Vatican II in Moscow (1959-1965)*, Acts of the Colloquium on the History of Vatican II, Moscow, March 30-April 2, 1995, Leuven: Peeters, 1997, pp. 147-87.

different points of view.⁷⁰ It was an extraordinary and unprecedented occasion of cultural exchange, whose impact is difficult to underestimate, and whose whole history has yet to be written.⁷¹ Many theologians who advocated a change of attitude toward the modern world, and had been marginalized by the Church during the 1950s, were fully rehabilitated at the Council, for example, protagonists of the *nouvelle théologie* such as Congar, de Lubac, Chenu, who we briefly met a few pages ago and who were now called to Rome as experts.⁷² One thing rapidly became clear: outside the closed boundaries of the Curia, New Universalism had become a shared worldview, which seemed better suited to dealing with a rapidly changing world.

In fact, in the final debate over the definitive text, the paragraphs about the international community (§§83-90) were approved without many controversies; the real battle, in the part dedicated to the international order, was fought over the issues of peace and war, and in particular about the possible ultimate condemnation of war in the atomic age, about the right to legitimate self-defense, and about the possible overcoming of the doctrine of the “just war”.⁷³ The overall interpretation of the evolution of the relations among peoples and nations did not cause nearly as much argument among the Fathers, who, in short, accepted John’s view, even if they did not completely abandon the previous approach (as it was the case, we have argued, with the pope).

We can turn to the text for a better understanding. The “growing interdependence of men” (§23) was highlighted as a positive development – in accordance with the nature of men, created by

⁷⁰ See some notes in Giuseppe Alberigo, *The Conciliar Experience: “Learning on Their Own”*, in Alberigo (coord.), *History of Vatican II*, vol. II, pp. 565-84, and O’Malley, *What happened at Vatican II*, p. 126. We will see how this process would fuel new ideas on the status and the perspectives of the international community, which emerged in the second half of the 1960s.

⁷¹ Gerd-Rainer Horn has suggested, for instance, looking into the influence of European Left Catholic intellectuals – we will come back to the concept of European Left Catholicism in the course of the dissertation – as the spiritual advisors of some “Third World” bishops assembled in Rome: see Gerd-Rainer Horn, *Left Catholicism in Western Europe*, in Kenis, Billet and Pastore (eds.), *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe*, p. 88.

⁷² The intransigent ideology was still predominant within the Curia, but for the first time it was not shared by the pope, at least not in some fundamental aspects, such as the negative and pessimistic take on the development of history. In the well-known opening speech to the council, *Gaudet Mater Ecclesia* (October 11, 1962), John XXIII talked about history as “teacher of life”, and criticized the “prophets of doom”, who only saw in the “sign of the times” the proof of the human errors, and the approaching of the end of the world. See AAS, vol. 54, 1962, pp. 786-96 [web: Italian, Portuguese, Spanish], and Vian, *Roncalli e gli studi di storia*, pp. 151-2.

⁷³ See Giovanni Turbanti, *Il tema della guerra al Concilio Vaticano II*, in Mimmo Franzinelli and Riccardo Bottone (eds.), *Chiesa e guerra. Dalla “benedizione delle armi” alla “Pacem in terris”*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005, pp. 563-606.

God as one family – which led to the universalization of the common good. Within “a world becoming more unified every day” (§24), though, discord and conflicts were still thriving: they were caused by economic inequalities, the desire to dominate, and by deeper reasons such as feelings of envy, pride and other egotistical passions (§83). The positive view of the course of history, therefore, was “compensated” for by the underlining of negative elements, which still kept human society away from its ideal structure. However, there was a significant difference from the traditional, intransigent approach: the reasons of the conflict were not ascribed – at least, not explicitly – to the estrangement of mankind from Catholicism and the Church, which should have been reversed so as to restore the right order. On the contrary, the Pastoral Constitution invited all people, and Christians in particular, to give more power to international institutions, which were “well-deserving of the human race”, and represented “the first efforts at laying the foundations on an international level for a community of all men to work for the solution to the serious problems of our times, to encourage progress everywhere, and to obviate wars of whatever kind” (§84).

Supranational institutions had two main tasks: preserving peace and promoting development in every area of the world, starting with those most in need. If the first goal was not news, the insistence on the second one was mostly the outcome of three years of discussion within the Council. Four paragraphs were devoted to the necessity to support the progress of the disadvantaged countries, above all through cooperation and changes in the world economic system, so that it would become less discriminatory and unbalanced. Issues like the redistribution of wealth at international level, or solidarity among rich and poor countries, had already been addressed by Catholic culture, in particular from the 1950s on, but their assimilation in the Magisterium’s discourse was relatively new. Since the beginning, after the Second World War, of a rapid wave of decolonization, some Catholic theologians and intellectuals had begun to look beyond the classic framework of the Colonialism/mission relationship, in order to address the problems of the “new peoples”. The new European theology, which helped renovate the traditional Catholic Universalism, was particularly attentive to the situation of religious and cultural plurality deriving

from the widening of the relations among peoples: Catholicism, according to the new approach, should have reached out to the most remote historical, geographical and cultural realities, in order to live up to the challenges of modernity and build a dialogue with other religions, looking for the factors of union rather than division.⁷⁴

Catholic culture, though, did not stop at the “religious” level, but rather proposed a specific political and economic reading of the international system’s evolution. The ground had been prepared by an intense reflection on the social doctrine, first systematized by Leo’s encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), promoted in particular by international associations for social studies like the *Union de Fribourg* (1884) and the *Union de Malines* (1920).⁷⁵ In 1941, in Marseille, a group of economists and sociologists founded the association *Economie et humanisme*, with the goal of contributing to the building, at theoretical and practical level, of an economy in the service of man, different from both the Communist and the Capitalist models.⁷⁶ Initially, the association focused on the analysis of the family, considered as the basic unit of the society, and therefore the nucleus of its rechristianization. In the 1950s, the group, now based in Lyon, broadened the horizon of its reflection so as to include the whole international system, updating the tools traditionally used by Catholic culture for economic analysis, and applying them to the study of underdeveloped countries. The main protagonist of this project – with the collaboration of important personalities like François Perroux, Raymond Delprat and Henri Desroche – was the Breton Dominican Louis-

⁷⁴ For a short profile of the relationship between Christian missions and colonization, focused on long-term trends, see Claude Proudhomme, *Missions chrétiennes et colonisation: XVI^e-XX^e siècle*, Paris: Cerf, 2004. The literature has also demonstrated that the ecumenical movement did not spring from scientific research but everyday missionary practice: for a proper contextualization and analysis of this fundamental aspect of contemporary Catholicism – which included among his representatives figures like Yves Congar and Jean Daniélou – we defer to Étienne Fouilloux, *Les catholiques et l’unité chrétienne du XIX^e et XX^e siècle: itinéraires européens d’expression française*, Paris: Le Centurion, 1986, and Thomas G. Fitzgerald, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory History*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.

⁷⁵ See some notes in Joseph Joblin, *L’Union de Fribourg*, in Gabriele de Rosa (ed.), *I tempi della “Rerum Novarum”*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2002, pp. 189-202; Leen van Molle, *Croissance économique et éthique catholique: les points de vue de l’Union de Malines dans les années vingt*, in VV.AA., *Studia historica oeconomica: liber amicorum Herman Van der Wee*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1993, pp. 317-335, and Jan de Maeyer, *Katholische Soziallehre und Christliche Arbeiterorganisationen in Belgien von der Freiburger Union (1884-1888) zur Union von Mechelen (1921-1960)*, in Claudia Hiepel and Mark Ruff (eds.), *Christliche Arbeiterbewegung in Europa, 1850-1950*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003, pp. 99-119.

⁷⁶ See the convincing study of Denis Pelletier, *Économie et humanisme. De l’Utopie communautaire au combat pour le Tiers-Monde, 1941-1966*, Paris: Cerf, 1996.

Joseph Lebret (1897-1966), who would become one of the most esteemed economists within the Church, and would play an important role at the Council as an expert.⁷⁷ In 1958, Lebret published a detailed study for “Les Éditions Ouvrières” in Paris, providing many figures on the gap between rich and underdeveloped countries, significantly entitled *Suicide or Survival of the West?* Relying on specialized literature and on the sources published by the United Nations, the author painted a dark picture: more than half of the world population did not have enough resources to stay healthy, and it was kept in a structural condition of underdevelopment by the West. Only economic development, in his eyes, could break the circle of poverty, and the First World should have supported this process not only for economic and strategic reasons – the growing interdependence, the Communist danger – but also for moral ones, linked to the pursuit of the common good “not only in the nearer community, but at every level of human solidarity”.⁷⁸

The construction of a fairer and more balanced world, then, was considered an important specification of the universal common good; this view slowly entered the Magisterium’s discourse, starting with the encyclical *Mater et magistra* (for which Lebret, Pavan and other experts were consulted).⁷⁹ In the chapter dedicated to the “Obligation of the Wealthy Nations”, it was stated that “the most difficult problem today concerns the relationship between political communities that are economically advanced and those in the process of development”, and the “effective co-operation in the development of economically less advanced communities” was included among “the demands

⁷⁷ Louis-Joseph Lebret, French Dominican social scientist and philosopher, was not only a theorist but also an indefatigable experimenter, who travelled all around the world in the last twenty years of his life (mostly to Latin America, but also to Senegal, Lebanon, Vietnam and many other countries) in order to put into practice his concept of “human economy. He was called to Rome by Paul VI, in order to serve as expert during the Second Vatican Council, and he participated as representative of the Holy See to the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 1965. A biographic profile in English, focusing on his influence in Latin America, in Alfredo Bosi, *Economy and Humanism*, in “Estudos Avançados”, vol. 26, 2012, pp. 249-67, but see also Lydie Garreau, *Louis-Joseph Lebret, précurseur de Vatican II (1897-1966): dans la dynamique sociale de l’Église, auprès des marins-pêcheurs bretons, et dans le développement économique mondial*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011.

⁷⁸ Louis-Joseph Lebret, *Suicide ou survie de l’Occident?*, *Dossier pour comprendre les problèmes de ce temps*, Paris: Éditions ouvrières, 1958, quotation from p. 268 (my translation).

⁷⁹ Ettore Malnati, *A cinquant’anni dalla Mater et Magistra di Giovanni XXIII*, in “Rivista teologica di Lugano”, issue 2, 2011, p. 230. In the already quoted 1950 book on the man in the international community, Pavan mentioned “social justice at international level” as one of the principles to follow in order to build a peaceful international community: Pavan, *L’uomo nella comunità internazionale*, p. 62 (my translation).

of the common good on the international level⁸⁰ The encyclical was promulgated in 1961, when decolonization had gained momentum, in particular in Africa, raising the problem of the relations between countries that are formally equal, but with an obvious disparity in terms of wealth and power. In Rome, the Fathers who came from the countries of what French demographer Alfred Sauvy (an active collaborator in *Economie et humanisme*) had defined as the “Third World” in 1952 (a term we will continue to use for the sake of convenience), together with some European bishops (notably Bernard Alfrink, Léon-Joseph Suenens, and Giacomo Lercaro),⁸¹ addressed these themes, insisting in particular on the evangelical subject of poverty and on the Church’s attitude toward it.⁸² In the final version of *Gaudium et spes*, innovative indications of the growth of international social justice – “It is the role of the international community [...] to regulate economic relations throughout the world that these will be carried out in accordance with the norms of justice” – were alongside more traditional remarks (prevailing at quantitative level) about Christian charity as the best way to show solidarity and sympathy with the most disadvantaged peoples.⁸³ The new role of the Church within the international community was summed up in paragraph 89: it was to encourage the cooperation among peoples and nations, with an unselfish spirit of service. This was also the task of the faithful, who should work within international Catholic associations, “which can contribute in many ways to the building up of a peaceful and fraternal community of nations”.

⁸⁰ *Mater et Magistra*, §157. See more generally §§ 143-164.

⁸¹ Bernard Alfrink (1900-1987), Utrecht’s Archbishop from 1955 to 1975, Léon-Joseph Suenens (1904-1996), Archbishop of Mechelen-Brussels from 1961 to 1979, and Giacomo Lercato (1891-1976), Bologna’s Archbishop from 1952 to 1968, were three of the most prominent advocates of the *aggiornamento*, and played a pivotal role in the Second Vatican Council. See for some biographical notes Walter, *Personenlexikon zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil*. We will mention again Alfrink and Lercaro in the third chapter, when addressing the ecclesial movement *Pax Christi*.

⁸² As it is well known, the testimony of Paul Gauthier – a French theologian who lived most of his life in Palestine and Latin America, and participated in the Council as theologian of Greek Catholic bishop of Galilee George Maxim – author of the book *Jésus, l’Église, les pauvres* (1963), caused a great interest in many Fathers about the attitude of the Church toward the poor, so that an informal pressure group (called the group of the Belgian college) was created in order to deal with these issues and influence the content of the conciliar documents. See Denis Pelletier, *Une marginalité engagée: le groupe “Jésus, l’Eglise et les pauvres”*, in Mathijs Lamberigts, Claude Soetens and Jan Grootaers (eds.), *Les commissions conciliaires à Vatican II*, Leuven: Bibliotheek van de Faculteit Godgeleerdheid, 1996, pp. 63-89.

⁸³ The quotation is from §86. The Council also invited to set up “an organism of the universal Church [...] in order that both the justice and love of Christ toward the poor might be developed everywhere” (§90). In 1967, following up on this indication, Paul VI created the pontifical commission *Iustitia et pax*, as we will mention later.

In sum, the analysis of the Magisterium's discourse leads to the following conclusions: John's approach, defined here as a resemanticization of the traditional Universalism, and anticipated by the work of Catholic theologians and intellectuals in particular during the 1950s, had been largely accepted by the Council. The references to tradition had in any case not disappeared. The source of legitimacy of the Church's role was still found in the "mission received by God", which consisted of contributing to the cause of peace in the world "by imparting knowledge of the divine and natural law" (§89). Catholic laity itself, though its autonomy was recognized, should turn to the rules of Christian doctrine, interpreted by the Magisterium, in order to learn the principles for its practical action. The judgment of the ecclesiastical authority, therefore, was still necessary so as to verify the orthodoxy of lay movements and associations. *Gaudium et spes*, then, can be considered as the sign of a paradigm shift – from Traditional to New Universalism – but not as a complete rupture with the tradition.

Let us close this part of the study with an observation: sometimes what is missing from a text is as significant as what is actually there, especially in a strongly tradition-oriented discourse. This is particularly true for the conciliar documents, which were the outcome of a complex process of mediation among different positions. That is the case for the condemnation of Communism missing in *Gaudium et spes*, notwithstanding the pressure exerted by the conciliar minority, which put at risk the approval of the Pastoral Constitution. The role of Paul VI was crucial: he mediated with the minority, and thanks to his intervention, the condemnation of "the errors of the modern world" was avoided.⁸⁴ This decision had evident political consequences. In fact, taking a stand against Communism, even if at doctrinal level, would have implied a negative judgment of one of the two main poles of the international system, which explicitly referenced this belief system as its ideological compass. On the contrary, the Church chose to maintain its impartiality, offering its contribution to the betterment of international relations from a *super partes* position.

⁸⁴ Turbanti, *Un concilio per un mondo moderno*, p. 726 ff.

Now, after this long but necessary introduction, we finally have the analytical tools to properly contextualize Paul's discourse: we have summarized the transition between two different approaches, but, given how very recently it had been upgraded to “mainstream worldview” within Catholic culture, the new paradigm still was not adequately “institutionalized”. How did the new pope deal with this cumbersome legacy? Did New Universalism become an unquestioned model, or was it challenged by other visions during the 1960s and the 1970s? By analyzing the Catholic culture’s discourse on the international community, we will argue the case about the distinctiveness of this season that we presented in the Introduction, offering new insights into the role of Paul’s pontificate in the history of contemporary Catholicism.⁸⁵

3. "New Universalism": the Magisterium discourse under Paul VI

Paul’s discourse was permeated by a universal perspective, by the conviction that the Church should speak to the whole human community, proposing a message of hope in times of tumultuous changes. Apologetic literature and sympathetic historiography have already underlined how the use of the phrase “civilization of love” – the goal which mankind should attend to, a civilization founded on mutual respect and brotherly love – symbolized Montini’s approach to the problems of human coexistence.⁸⁶ Likewise, the international activity of the Holy See has been scrutinized, highlighting its mission to promote peace and cooperation at world level, with a specific focus on

⁸⁵ The general academic histories of the contemporary Church have already underlined how Paul’s pontificate cannot be addressed in black and white, but instead must be described with more nuanced colors, so as to convey the delicate and shifting balance between “reform” and “conservation”, between *aggiornamento* and tradition which characterized Montini’s papacy as a whole. See for two synthetic examples Daniele Menozzi, *I papi del '900*, Firenze: Giunti, 2000, pp. 70-93, and Jean-Marie Mayeur, *La papauté après le concile*, in ID. (dir.), *Histoire du christianisme*, vol. XIII, pp. 127-45. Once we have direct access to the primary sources for Montini’s pontificate, and there are more studies about the persons involved in the preparation of his speeches and messages, we will be able to trace the different influences that shaped the Church’s discourse during this phase. For the scope of this work, we will mainly focus on the analysis of the Magisterium’s public discourse, in the conviction that it represents more than the sum of all the inputs that contributed to shape it, as we mentioned in the introduction.

⁸⁶ See for an example of the first category, Richard H. Bulzacchelli, *Developing the Seminal Theology of Pope Paul VI: Toward a Civilization of Love in the Confident Hope of the Gospel Of Life*, in “Ave Maria Law Review”, issue 1, 2012, pp. 49-65; for the second, Papetti (ed.), *Verso la civiltà dell'amore*.

some moments, such as the Vatican *Ostpolitik*, and on some protagonists, such as Agostino Casaroli or Henri de Riedmatten.⁸⁷ These analyses represent a useful database, which we will try to interpret through our theoretical framework, that is: investigating a) how the Magisterium internalized the new approach to the international community which we defined with the category of New Universalism; b) whether the old one was completely overthrown, and c) how it was implemented through the instrument of Vatican diplomacy. Basing our analysis on the publicly available sources of the Magisterium's discourse, we will try to extrapolate the most important principles that, according to Catholic institutional culture, should have guided the relations among peoples at global level.

GIOVANNI BATTISTA MONTINI⁸⁸

For most of his ecclesiastical career, Giovanni Battista Montini (1897-1978) was directly involved with the problems regarding the international system. When he was 26 years old, he joined the diplomatic ranks of the Holy See, and afterwards he worked almost exclusively in the Roman Curia, except for a brief experience as attaché to Warsaw's Apostolic Nunciature in 1923. Gradually, he became the pope's closest collaborator for Italian matters: under Pius XII, he directed the Congregation of Ordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, while Mgr. Domenico Tardini (1888-1961)

⁸⁷ A general introduction in Andre Dupuy, *La diplomatie du Saint-Siege apres le II^e Concile du Vatican: le pontificat de Paul VI, 1963-1978*, Paris: Téqui, 1980; for two profiles of Agostino Casaroli and Henri de Riedmatten, who we will introduce later, see Giovanni Barberini, *La diplomazia di mons. Agostino Casaroli*, Tricase: Libellula, 2009, and Philippe Chenaux, *Le Saint Siège et les organisations internationales: le rôle du père de Riedmatten o.p.*, in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Paul VI et la vie internationale*, pp. 106-12.

⁸⁸ For the following section, we consulted Montini's writings up to his election as Pope Paul VI, in particular Giovanni Battista Montini, *Scritti Giovanili*, edited by Cesare Trebeschi, Brescia: Queriniana, 1979; ID., *Scritti fucini (1925-1933)*, edited by Massimo Marcocchi, Brescia: Studium, 2004; ID., *Discorsi e scritti milanesi (1954-1963)*, publication coordinated by Xenio Toscani, 4 volumes, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 1997-1998. Giovanni Battista Montini was born in Concesio (near Brescia, in Northern Italy), in a prominent Catholic family (his father, Giorgio Montini, was the most important representative of democratic Catholicism in Brescia). Since his youth, he had become deeply involved in the Italian Catholic environment, developing contacts with the most important Catholic intellectuals and organizations; an avid reader, fueled by intellectual curiosity but at the same time by a strict sense of discipline and loyalty to the Church (he was ordained in 1920), Montini was already known in the 1930s as one of the most influential figures in the Italian Catholic Church. Some useful contributions on this period of Montini's life – as well as the biographical studies, that we will address later – are Fulvio De Giorgi, *Mons. Montini. Chiesa cattolica e scontri di civiltà nella prima metà del Novecento*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012; G.B. Montini e la società italiana, 1919-1939, atti del seminario tenuto a Brescia nei giorni 21-22 ottobre 1983 presso il Centro Pastorale Paolo VI, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2000 (or. ed. 1983), and the essays of Gabriele De Rosa, Nello Vian, Renato Moro and Étienne Fouilloux in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Paul VI et la modernité dans l'Église*, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 1984.

became the “foreign minister” of the Holy See, heading the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.⁸⁹ Therefore, especially from the mid-1930s until the mid-1950s, there are not many writings in which Montini explained his idea of the international order: his executive position within the Church led to practical diplomatic activity, rather than a conceptual systematization of his ideas.⁹⁰

On the contrary, we can gather some information from the writings of the young Montini: using the traditional universalist approach as a term of comparison, we can underline one major factor of distinction, which in any case did not question his adhesion to the dominant view. Indeed, we will not find in Montini’s writings the sense of nostalgia, proposed as the ideal structure of the international community, which permeated most Catholic publications in the first half of the twentieth century. The Church, Montini felt, had the right and duty, stemming from its spiritual authority, to exert some sort of *potestas* over the world, but not by returning to an idealized society of the past, and instead by building a new civilization based on a Christian regeneration. This idea would develop in the 1930s, in particular through the deepening of the consonances with Maritain’s body of thought.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Domenico Tardini was one of the most powerful figures in the Roman Curia from the 1930s on, when he became secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs (1937). In 1958 John XXIII appointed him as secretary of State, a position that he had informally fulfilled since 1944, after the death of Card. Luigi Maglione, first together with Montini (until 1954) and later alone. He played a pivotal role during the Second World War, when he was the contact in the Vatican for the diplomatic corps of the nations at war. See his profile – and some of his writings, among which a journal written between 1933 and 1936 – in Carlo Felice Casula, *Domenico Tardini 1888 – 1961. L’azione della Santa Sede nella crisi fra le due guerre*, Roma: Studium, 1988.

⁹⁰ In 1937 Montini was appointed *Sostituto* to the Secretary of State, headed by Mgr. Eugenio Pacelli, who, after becoming pope, chose not to replace his first Secretary, Card. Maglione, after his death in 1944. For Montini’s diplomatic profile see Giorgio Rumi, *Montini diplomatico. Prospettive di ricerca dai carteggi conservati presso l’Istituto Paolo VI di Brescia*, in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Paul VI et la vie internationale*, pp. 11-25. Jean-Dominique Durand has underlined a methodological problem for the historian, faced with the task of distinguishing the opinions of the *Sostituto* from the position of the popes he served, namely Pius XI and most of all Pius XII, especially for the lack of primary sources. See Jean-Dominique Durand, *G.B. Montini alla Segreteria di Stato: il tempo della maturazione europeista (1937-1954)*, in Ferdinando Citterio and Luciano Vaccaro, *Montini e l’Europa*, Morcelliana: Brescia, 2000, pp. 55-60. See also Fulvio de Giorgi, *In Segreteria di Stato*, part II of Xenio Toscani (ed.), *Paolo VI. Una biografia*, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 2014, p. 187.

⁹¹ After the First World War, Montini wrote that the Church should have been able to “prepare a new civilization” for the world, as it did in the Middle Ages after the Barbarians. See *In alto e lontano. Perché un Convegno?* in Montini, *Scritti giovanili*, pp. 94-95. This subject has been addressed by Fulvio de Giorgi, *Giovanni Battista Montini nella prima metà del Novecento: dalla “civiltà cattolica” alle modulazioni diverse della “civiltà cristiana”*, in Papetti (ed.), *Verso la civiltà dell’amore*, pp. 23-44. The strong connection between Maritain and Montini (who edited the Italian edition of *Humanisme integral* and several other works of Maritain’s) has already been widely addressed and commented by the

For the ecclesiastical from Concesio, this attitude did not question his absolute loyalty to the Church and to the Magisterium's discourse, but he was convinced that Catholicism could still play a role in the modern world, without retreating into a hostile opposition. In other words, his age and intellectual curiosity made him part of the new generation of Catholic thinkers whose profile we have briefly sketched out in the previous pages,⁹² but at the same time he tried to update the Church's message from within, through a long and patient work of small but incremental changes, consistently with his diplomatic formation: we need to take into account this "double perspective" – regarding the field of principles, and their actual implementation (not always possible, and often only through small steps and compromises) – in order to fully understand Montini's character, at the same time penetrating intellectual and determined diplomat.

His discourse on Europe offers a good example in this respect: since his youth, his writings had regularly reflected on the role of the Old Continent in the new world. The allusion to the Christian roots of the continent (consistent with the intransigent worldview) was, however, not linked to the idealization of medieval Christian civilization, but rather was connected to the efforts to promote a fruitful collaboration, in the present conditions, among countries which shared a common heritage. Europe could be the place in which the nationalistic toxins that were poisoning people's lives could be absorbed and neutralized. In the post-WWII period, this approach led to the Church supporting the European integration initiatives championed by Christian Democratic politicians (which we will

literature: see at least Giorgio Campanini, *Montini e Maritain*, in "Studium", issue 3, 1984, pp. 349-58; Philippe Chenaux, *Paul VI et Maritain. Les rapports du "Montinianisme" et du "Maritanisme"*, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 1994, and Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Montini, Journet, Maritain: une famille d'esprit*: Journées d'étude, Molsheim, 4-5 juin 1999, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 2000, especially Giorgio Campanini, *G.B. Montini e Jacques Maritain: dai "Tre Riformatori" a "Umanesimo integrale"*, pp. 225-37. Montini had explicated his esteem toward Maritain's work already in 1928, when he positively reviewed, on the Catholic universitarian periodical "Studium", his book *Trois réformateurs. Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* (1925): see Montini, *Scritti fucini*, pp. 194-97.

⁹² Montini's esteem for the major representatives of *nouvelle théologie* (from Jean Daniélou, who was created Cardinal in 1968, to Yves Congar, close friend of the pope) is well documented, and also witnessed by his friend, French Catholic intellectual Jean Guitton: see Jean Guitton, *Paul VI Secret*, Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1979 (quotations from the Italian edition: Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 2002, pp. 40-42 and 127). For a focus on the French sources of Montini's intellectual formation (Blondel and Journet among many others) see Jacques Prevotat, *Les sources françaises dans la formation intellectuelle de G.B. Montini (1913-1963)*, in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Paul VI et la modernité dans l'Église*, pp. 101-27. In general, his receptive attention to contemporary European theological debate – let us mention at least the importance of German Catholicism, and especially of Romano Guardini – has been underlined by most of the scholars: see for instance the notes of Massimo Marcocchi in the Introduction to *Scritti fucini*, pp. LV-LVII, and de Giorgi, *Mons. Montini*, pp. 180-88.

discuss in the next chapter). Europe could become a *locus symbolicus* for Catholic culture in the contemporary age as well, a model of peaceful coexistence among democratic Nations based on the valorization of the human being, whose actual implementation was not a task for the Church, but for the laity.⁹³

In 1954, the controversial appointment of Montini as Milan's Archbishop had the effect of distancing him, both physically and figuratively, from the Curia and the Roman environment, in the most "closed" years of Pacelli's pontificate, characterized by the frequent recourse to a classical intransigent approach.⁹⁴ He returned to Rome for the Conclave in 1963, which took place during the first intercession of the Second Vatican Council, and was among the favorites for the election. Highly valued both in Rome and abroad for his activity within Vatican diplomacy, and now protagonist of an important pastoral experience in the diocese of Milan, he was seen as the right man to steer the ship of Saint Peter through the turbulent waters of the Council, and to carry the

⁹³ This trait of Montini's thought was in tune with the reflection of the progressive contemporary Catholic culture, on which see Giorgio Campanini, *La cultura cattolica del Novecento e l'idea di Europa*, in Alfredo Canavero and Jean-Dominique Durand (eds.), *Il fattore religioso nel processo di unificazione europea*, Milano: Unicopli, 1999, pp. 233-46. On Montini's vision of Europe (and its evolution), see the already mentioned book edited by Citterio and Vaccaro, *Montini e l'Europa*. A direct quotation from Montini's writings may help to clarify these statements: in September 1958 Mgr. Montini, archbishop of Milan, blessed a statue of the Virgin Mary, protector of Europe, on the Alpe Motta di Campodolcino, in Northern Italy. In the homily, he recalled the tragic destiny of the continent, that in the past century had known divisions and internal clashes, which led to civil and ideological wars. Peace, therefore, could only stem from a restoration of the destroyed unity, which had its foundation in the religious factor ("abbiamo bisogno che un'anima unica componga l'Europa, perché davvero la sua unità sia forte, sia cosciente e sia benefica [...] se vuole l'Europa fondare la sua unità sopra delle basi forti e solide e permanenti e sincere, dovrà fondarla sopra una base religiosa", Montini stated quoting Pius XII), and in particular in Catholicism – with a significant hint to the Protestants' return to the communion with the Roman Church, that could be favored by the common faith in the Virgin Mary. To this traditional approach, though, which recalled the medieval *christianitas* as ideal structure of the coexistence among peoples, Montini added a peculiar remark: "Bisogna che sia la pace, dicevamo. E che cosa racchiude questa parola 'bisogna' se non la visione politica del nostro tempo, la fatica che stanno compiendo gli uomini di governo per cercare di cucire le varie parti lacerate di questa nostra terra, di questa nostra umanità, e cercare la maniera per stabilire i ponti delle comunicazioni tranquille e fraterne, e lo sforzo per fare l'Europa unita?". Again, the rigidity of the intransigent worldview was mitigated by a particular attention to the role of the laity, and to the actual historical circumstances, that the Church could influence but not guide according to its preferences. See Montini, *Scritti e discorsi milanesi*, vol. III (1958-1961), pp. 2300-2304.

⁹⁴ Montini's "promotion" seemed to be the effect of Pius's decreasing confidence in his closest advisor; Andrea Riccardi has supposed that this was related to the influence of a "Roman party" within Catholic Church, that accused Montini of a scarce intransigence toward Communism (in particular, but not only, in the Italian political context): see Andrea Riccardi, *Il partito romano: politica italiana, chiesa cattolica e curia romana da Pio XII a Paolo VI*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2007, pp. 287-89. For a definitive reconstruction, however, we would need documentary evidence of a formal or informal survey about Montini's removal from executive positions within the Roman Curia, which is still missing. For now, we can only rely on journalistic assumptions, as in Andrea Tornielli, *Paolo VI. L'audacia di un papa*, Milano: Mondadori, 2009, pp. 169-86; but see the balanced reconstruction in the recent Fulvio de Giorgi, *Paolo VI. Il papa del Moderno*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2015, pp. 156-67.

weight of John's heavy legacy. On June 21, 1963, he was elected 262nd Bishop of Rome, choosing the papal name Paul VI.

POPE PAUL VI⁹⁵

Paul's Teachings, on the whole, highlight a full reception of the paradigm shift operated by John XXIII. New Universalism became the mainstream approach guiding the institutional Catholic discourse on the international community, as witnessed by the first pronouncements of the new pontiff. Three days after the election, the pope addressed the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See for the first time, stating that

⁹⁵ For this section, we consulted the corpus of Paul's pronouncements and speeches, which have been published – maintaining the language in which they were delivered – by the Vatican Publishing House in *Insegnamenti di Paolo VI*, XVI voll. (1963-1978), Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1964-1979 (hereinafter *Insegnamenti*). For reasons of uniformity, though, in the footnotes we will continue to reference the *Acta apostolicae sedis*, unless the text is not published there. Most of the recent biographies of Paul VI in Italian have been written by sympathetic scholars, who provide some useful insights into Montini's character but also tend to indulge in an apologetic presentation of Paul as the underappreciated pope who was able to lead the Church into a new era, completing the integration between Church and modernity, implicitly reacting to the critiques which emerged even during Montini's pontificate, especially from within the Catholic culture (a similar path has been followed by the literature on Pius XII, even if in this case the criticism mostly spread after Pacelli's death, and in particular from non-Catholic cultural milieus): see for instance Giselda Adornato, *Paolo VI: il coraggio della modernità*, Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 2008, and Tornielli, *Paolo VI* (but also Antonio Acerbi, *Paolo VI: il papa che baciò la terra*, Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 1997). The same approach characterized the only comprehensive address of Paul's papacy in English: Paul Hebblethwaite, *Paul VI: the first modern Pope*, Mahwah, NY: Paulist Press, 1993, a book directed also to non-specialized readers that is still widely quoted by English-speaking scholars. In the same year, French historian Yves Chiron published an accessible but more balanced profile, dealing more critically with the issue of Paul VI's relationship with modernity (consistent with the framework already sketched out by the academic literature on the history of the Church, as we mentioned earlier): see Yves Chiron, *Paul VI, le pape écartelé*, Paris: Ed. Perrin, 1993. More recently, German historian Jörg Ernesti has proposed a new interpretation of Montini's papacy, contesting the historiographical tendency to divide it into two halves, respectively characterized by openness to reform and retreat into conservatism. Ernesti's book resorts to an argument that is traditionally made by sympathetic literature, but presents it in a more nuanced and historically grounded fashion: see Jörg Ernesti, *Paul VI. Der vergessene Papst*, Freiburg: Herder, 2012. In 2014, the Istituto Paolo (more about this in a few lines) has published a detailed biography of Paul VI (the already quoted *Paolo VI. Una biografia*), coordinated by Xenio Toscani with the contribution of historians Fulvio de Giorgi, Giselda Adornato and Ennio Apeciti. Finally, in 2015 Italian historian Fulvio de Giorgi has completed a solid and documented historical biography of Giovanni Battista Montini/Paul VI (the papacy takes up nearly half of the book), which will become the reference for the literature on Paul VI in the next years, at least until new primary sources become available: De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*. According to De Giorgi, the qualifying feature of Montini's papacy was the implementation of the Second Vatican Council, which he was able to see through, notwithstanding multifaceted oppositions, difficulties and resistances. To lead the Church into the transition to a new era, when a new relationship, critical but open, with modernity was finally adopted, was a major achievement of "the last great Italian pope", who played a pivotal and often misinterpreted role in the history of the Church: see in particular, for the development of this argument with a broad historical contextualization, pp. 9-61. For a regular updating on the literature on Paul VI see the section on bibliography (*Schedario bibliografico*), at the end of most issues of the monthly bulletin of Istituto Paolo VI of Brescia (*Istituto Paolo VI. Notiziario*). The Istituto Paolo VI, formed following Montini's death in 1978 in order to promote the study of him as a historical figure, hosts a remarkable library collection of some 30,000 works about Paul VI, including his edited and unedited writings. It sponsors the triennial International Colloquia on Paul VI and his pontificate, and the more frequent days of study, where international scholars and Church representatives gather to discuss specific subjects. The academic level of these publications is uneven, but in general they represent the most consistent gauge of the status of scholarly research (we have made, and will make constant reference to them in the footnotes).

The Holy See does not intend to intervene – you know it better than me –in the affairs or interests pertaining to temporal powers. What it aims at, is to promote everywhere the profession of certain fundamental principles of civilization and humanity, of which the Catholic faith is the attentive guardian, and which it strives to instill in souls and institutions. The harmony of international rights and duties rests on these principles, and the establishment of a true peace – this unrivaled, but always threatened, treasure of individuals and peoples – depends on their observance.⁹⁶

Two major issues can be inferred from this passage: the Church had no interest in dealing with temporal matters, or in claiming some sort of *potestas* toward to the international community, but at the same time only the respect of certain basic principles, safeguarded by Catholic doctrine, could assure the development of a peaceful coexistence among peoples. In his first encyclical, *Ecclesiam suam*, promulgated on August 6, 1964, Montini outlined the programmatic principle of his papacy, that is the dialogue with the modern world, which was “in the grip of change and upheaval”, and was experiencing “developments which [were] having a profound influence on its outward way of life and habits of thought”. “Deeply rooted in the world”, the Church should offer to it the superior principles of its doctrine, in order to deepen the solidarity among peoples and facilitate their living together, but also, “if We are allowed the opportunity, [...] to use our good offices in settling national disputes on a basis of fraternity and honor” (recalling the Church’s historical function as arbiter of the controversies among States).⁹⁷

The brief allusions in the encyclical to the relations between the Church and the international community – the comprehensive address of the subject was postponed to future interventions – should be read, in any case, in the light of the general perspective of the encyclical, that is the colloquy with the protagonists of the contemporary age. There was only, it seemed, an exception to this rule, concerning the ideologies that “deny God and oppress the Church”, later identified with “atheistic communism”. But even in this case, the pope referenced the passages of *Pacem in terris*

⁹⁶ AAS, vol. 56, 1964, p. 48, my translation [web: French, Spanish].

⁹⁷ Encyclical *Ecclesiam suam*, quotations from §§16 and 26: AAS, vol. 56, 1964, pp. 609-59. For an analysis of the encyclical, which expressed Paul’s ecclesiology and general approach to the pontificate, see Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), “*Ecclesiam Suam*”, première lettre encyclique de Paul VI, Colloque International (Rome, 24-26 octobre 1980), Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 1982, in particular the contribution of Italian theologian Giuseppe Colombo, *Genesi, storia e significato dell’enciclica “Ecclesiam Suam”*, pp. 131-60.

that distinguished between “error” and “errant”, and between philosophical doctrines and historical movements, hoping for the opening of a productive dialogue in the future. At the moment, the only possibility was to restate the condemnation of Communism – with all the political consequences of such a statement – even if more as “the complaint of a victim than the sentence of a judge”.⁹⁸

In sum, although cautiously and with constant references to tradition, the encyclical *Ecclesiam suam* supported the part of the Council which was open to reform and dialogue with the modern world. As well as setting up this methodological framework, however, Paul VI also addressed the content of the Church’s approach to the problems of the international community, and he did so in a powerful, symbolic circumstance. On October 4, 1965, the pope addressed the UN Assembly in San Francisco, on the twentieth anniversary of its foundation. The event was historical, and generated a huge amount of publicity throughout the world: the pope was leaving Rome in order to present the Church’s point of view in front of the world’s countries. Paul VI had already chosen the tool of apostolic voyages – starting with the pilgrimages to India and the Holy Land in 1964 – as a metaphor of the new relationship that the Church wanted to establish with human society, moving toward it and looking for a mutually fruitful exchange.⁹⁹ In other words, the pope wished to send a clear message: besides addressing the faithful *ex cathedra* – literally, from his chair in the Vatican – he could also, from time to time, reach out to all of mankind, in order to propose and explain the Catholic doctrine. The visit to the UN had been prepared by the establishment of a friendly rapport with UN Secretary General U Thant, who had been received in the Vatican less than a month after Montini’s election (on July 11, 1963), and through the formalization of the Holy See’s

⁹⁸ *Ecclesiam suam*, §101.

⁹⁹ A contextualization of Paul’s voyages is in Rodolfo Rossi (ed.), *I viaggi apostolici di Paolo VI*, colloquio internazionale di studio (Brescia, 21-23 settembre 2001), Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 2002: see in particular Andrea Riccardi, *Significato e finalità dei viaggi apostolici di Paolo VI*, pp. 15-31. Paul VI was not the first “traveller pope”: in the modern age, the pontiff used to travel within the borders of Christendom, in the capacity of king more than spiritual guide. Starting in the late seventeenth century the movements of the popes were often forced (e.g. Pius VII, and later Pius IX), and stopped around the mid-nineteenth century; John XXIII organized a pilgrimage to Loreto and Assisi, while Paul VI made several journeys outside Rome (but only in the first phase of his papacy), inaugurating a tradition that would be picked up with success by John Paul II.

representation at the United Nations in 1964.¹⁰⁰ This was the end of the aforementioned process, started in 1951, when Pius XII charged the New York's auxiliary bishop with the task of acting as liaison between the Holy See and the UN; his status, therefore, was finally formalized in 1964, when the direct intervention of U Thant – without a discussion in the deliberative bodies of the institution – ratified the accreditation of a permanent observer from the Holy See to the United Nations, with the right to attend to the sessions of the General Assembly and to participate in the activities of the international institutions sponsored by the UN (on the model of Switzerland).

Paul VI arrived in San Francisco along with five Cardinals: the Dean of the Sacred College Eugène Tisserant, the Archbishop of Buenos Aires Antonio Caggiano, the Bishop of Bukoba Protase Rugambwa, the Archbishop of Tokyo Tatsuo Doi and the Archbishop of Sydney Thomas Gilroy, and the Armenian Catholic Patriarch Krikor Bedros XV Aghagianian, representing Eastern Christianity.¹⁰¹ This choice, which only a few years earlier could have been interpreted as an effort to present the Church as an alternative to the UN, was now aimed to symbolically manifest the harmony between the universality of the Catholic Church and that of the international organization. Such an interpretation was explained in the speech: in front of the Assembly chaired by former Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, the pope introduced himself as a “man like you”, bearer of a twenty-centuries-old message, “in search of a conversation with the entire world”. Actually, the quest for a dialogue with the modern world was recent news for Catholic culture: only taking into account the changes prepared by theologians and intellectuals and promoted by John XXIII, as we argued, we can understand the “moral ratification” of the international institution, solemnly declared by Paul VI. The UN was regarded as a crucial step in the evolution of mankind, a step which did not question the national dimension of group identity, but rather integrated it in a wider

¹⁰⁰ Melnyk, *Vatican Diplomacy at the United Nations*, p. 111 ff.

¹⁰¹ The voyage has been reconstructed and analyzed by Jean-Dominique Durand, *De l'ONU à OIT. L'Église et la société civile dans les voyages apostoliques de Paul VI*, in Rossi (ed.), *I viaggi apostolici di Paolo VI*, pp. 202-12. The importance of the speech – that was included among the official documents of the Council – in the debate over the final draft of *Gaudium et spes* has been underlined by Turbanti, *Un concilio per il mondo moderno*, pp. 650-51.

context, following the natural historical movement toward a closer interdependence among nations.

Montini went further, asserting that

your chief characteristic is a reflection in the temporal field of what Our Catholic Church aspires to be in the spiritual field: unique and universal.¹⁰²

The reticence about a full endorsement of the institution was now definitely gone, and the stress was openly put on the factors that incentivized the collaboration between the Church and the New York-based organization. The course of history, then, which had led to the building of the United Nations, was considered a positive development, consistent with the plan of God and therefore with Catholic principles. International organizations, and the UN in particular, were consequently regarded as the main tool – of providential nature – to oversee the peaceful development of the international life.¹⁰³ In other words, they were to be the enforcers of the universal common good, as the pope repeated on several occasions, quoting the formula introduced in the Church's doctrine by *Mater et magistra* and developed by *Pacem in terris*.¹⁰⁴ But what were the actual specifications of the universal common good? We circled back to a crucial theoretical passage, that John XXIII had not developed: although international organizations should enjoy full autonomy in the temporal sphere, the employment of such a concept implied that it was still the Church's right and task to indicate the criteria that should have guided the coexistence among peoples. Even in the allocution of October 4, which in many passages underlined the autonomy of men, Paul VI highlighted in the closing remarks that “the building of modern civilization must be

¹⁰² See AAS, vol. 57, 1965, pp. 877-85 (quotations from pp. 878 and 880, my translation) [web: French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese].

¹⁰³ See for instance, on the same subject, the messages for the World Day for Peace in 1969 – “The international organizations which have been set up for this purpose must be supported by all, become better known, and be provided with the authority and means fit for their great mission. The ‘Peace Day’ must honour these institutions and surround their work with prestige, with confidence, and with that sense of expectation that will keep alive in them the realization of their most serious responsibility, and keep strong the consciousness of the charge which has been entrusted to them” – and 1971, where he highlighted their providentiality. See AAS, vol. 60, 1968, pp. 769-74, and vol. 63 (I), 1971, pp. 5-9; for a comment, Maurice Flory, *Paul VI et les organisations internationales*, in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Paul VI et la vie internationale*, pp. 96-104. All the texts for the World Days for Peace are available in French, Italian, English, Spanish and Portuguese on the Holy See's website. Hereinafter, English quotations will be taken from this source.

¹⁰⁴ See for instance the speeches to the members of the Institute of International Law (10/9/1973), to the Holy See representatives to international organizations (4/9/1974), and to the Secretary General of the United Nations (9/7/1977), respectively in AAS, vol. 65, 1973, pp. 493-7 [web: French]; *Insegnamenti*, vol. XII, pp. 787-88 [web: Italian, Spanish]; AAS, vol. 69, 1977, pp. 544-46.

built over spiritual principles”, which have no other source than the faith in God.¹⁰⁵ Underlining the shift carried out by Paul’s papacy, then, should not make us underestimate the persistence of a deep-rooted tradition in the Magisterium’s discourse.

In the second part of the speech, the pope named three principles, that could also constitute the common ground of the relations between the Church and the UN: cooperation and integration, respect for human rights, development of peoples. Only by setting a course for these goals could the community of Nations cooperate without conflicts and tensions. The elaboration on these issues, I will argue, marked Paul VI’s specific contribution to the Magisterium’s discourse on the international community. Although they were not the subject of a specific and systematic treatise, they emerge quite clearly from the analysis of the pope’s pronouncements as the fundamental criteria that could assure a steady foundation to the international community, and therefore as three major ingredients of the universal common good. In the next pages we will try to contextualize their analysis – which will cover the whole papacy – within the history of the contemporary Church, in order to show continuities and discontinuities with the tradition (that is, with Traditional Universalism), but also in relation to the evolution of the international system. To this purpose, it will be useful to take into account the role of Vatican diplomacy, which had to deal directly with the implementation of the discourse.

3.1 The routes to peace between Nations and international community. An unequivocal support to supranational integration?

¹⁰⁵ AAS, vol. 57, 1965, p. 885, my translation [web: French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese]. But see also the address to the members of Nato’s Defense College (6/5/1967), when Montini argued that “One can never hope to achieve these objectives [happiness of men, justice between nations, peace in the world] in a lasting manner, if one neglects the great principles of the moral order, which must inspire man’s activity on this earth”: *Insegnamenti*, vol. V, pp. 761-2 [web: English, Spanish]. On the same note, compare the speeches to the *Unione cattolica della stampa italiana* (29/1/1966), and to the members of the European Union of Christian Democrats (8/4/1972), respectively in AAS, vol. 58, 1955, pp. 155-9 [web: Italian], and *Insegnamenti*, vol. X, pp. 355-8 [web: French].

The subject of peace became increasingly pivotal in Montini's Magisterium, as the pope acknowledged in January 1969.¹⁰⁶ In 1967 Paul VI instituted a commission charged with the task of studying the problems of peace and justice (*Iustitia et pax*, to which we will come back in a few pages), and established a world day dedicated to peace, the first day of the year. What was the pope's definition of peace, and how could it be reached and preserved?

The classical Augustinian definition of peace as *tranquillitas ordinis* was still considered to be formally exemplary, but it could not be understood as a static notion, implying the return to an ideal configuration of the relations among the different actors of the international community, on the model of the mythicized medieval *Christianitas*. In the age of interdependence, according to the pope's discourse, peace could only be reached through the harmonious development of the whole international community, which was to grow more and more integrated and united, giving international organizations more power and responsibilities. The increasing complexity of the international system – more protagonists, more interests in competition – created the need for a continual adjustment of the conditions for peace, through a relentless political and diplomatic activity. Peace, in other words, was a dynamic notion, and required work and care.¹⁰⁷ Montini endorsed the efforts toward a closer collaboration and integration at international level, praising the role of international institutions and organizations, particularly those in Europe, as fundamental agents of such a process.¹⁰⁸ International Catholic organizations were to give their full support to

¹⁰⁶ See the general Audience of January 29, 1969, in *Insegnamenti*, vol. VII, pp. 50-51 [web: Italian]. The main features of Paul's "theology of peace" have been outlined, from an apologetic perspective, by Franco Ciravegna, *Paolo VI e la promozione della pace: linee di una teologia del magistero*, Roma: Pontificia universitas gregoriana, 1988; for a historicization see Giovanni Verucci, *Pace e guerra nelle linee dei pontificati di Paolo VI e di Giovanni Paolo II*, in Franzinelli and Bottoni (eds.), *Chiesa e guerra*, pp. 687-98.

¹⁰⁷ In the message for the world Day for Peace of 1973 the pope wrote that "We admit that a perfect and stable *tranquillitas ordinis*, that is, an absolute and definitive peace among men – even if they have progressed to a universal high level of civilization - can only be a dream, not vain, but unfulfilled, an ideal, not unreal but still to be realized. This is so because everything in the course of history is subject to change, and because the perfection of man is neither univocal nor fixed": AAS, vol. 64 (II), 1972, pp. 753-9. In the message of 1975 peace was defined as "inventive, preventive and operative", while the following year Montini underlined that it should be "a work of continual therapy". See AAS, vol. 67, 1975, pp. 61-67, and vol. 68, 1976, pp. 707-14.

¹⁰⁸ Two clear examples of Paul's support to the process of European integration are the Angelus of February 23, 1969, and the speech to the President of the European Parliament, (9/11/1973), respectively in *Insegnamenti*, vol. VII, p. 1165 [web: Italian], and AAS, vol. 65, 1973, pp. 651-652 [web: French, Spanish]. About international institutions and organizations, see the speech to the Diplomatic missions in Geneva (10/6/1969: AAS, vol. 61, 1969, pp. 503-6) [web:

this trend toward internationalization, shared by many sectors of the Catholic laity during the 1960s and the 1970s (we mentioned the emergence of a “third wave” of Catholic internationalism after the Council in the Introduction, and we will argue a case about the Italian scenario in the next chapters).

One of the most active personalities in promoting this view, at both theoretical and practical levels, was Father Henri de Riedmatten (1909-1979), a Dominican Swiss who was appointed Ecclesiastical adviser to the Center of International Catholic Organizations in Geneva (1953), and in the 1960s became the official representative of the Holy See to UN sessions.¹⁰⁹ Riedmatten embodied a new generation of Vatican diplomats (in a few pages we will meet another major figure, Mgr. Agostino Casaroli, represented at the highest level by Montini, whose distinctive trait was the quest for dialogue with any interlocutor who seemed interested in their common goal, namely the construction of a more cooperative and integrated international community. According to this stance, the main task of the Church, and of Catholics, was to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among the different actors of the international system, and not to be the arbiter of its adherence to an idealized framework, as in the intransigent worldview.

This fundamental variation, which exemplifies the transition between Traditional and New Universalism, is observable not only in the discourse, but also in the diplomatic behavior of the Church, following the premises already laid down by John XXIII. After the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations (1961 and 1963), the Holy See signed the Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), and then the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1971). It is very important to stress again how these initiatives marked a historical turning point, confirming the change of attitude of the Church, that can be summarized by the following three points: from the

French, English, Italian, Spanish]. Some notes on the pope’s attitude to this subject in Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il disegno europeo di Paolo VI*, in Citterio and Vaccaro (eds.), *Montini e l’Europa*, in part. pp. 96-97, and Joseph Joblin, *Paul VI et les institutions internationales*, in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Paul VI et la modernité dans l’Eglise*, pp. 434-36.

¹⁰⁹ As well as the profile by Philippe Chenaux quoted at footnote 87, see Joseph Joblin, *The Catholic Presence at the UN in Geneva. Notes on the past – future perspectives*, in *International Catholic Organizations & Catholic Inspired NGOs. Their Contribution to the Building of the International Community*, working paper of the “Caritas in veritate foundation”, 2012, available at <http://www.fciv.org/publications>, in particular pp. 28-29. The thought of Riedmatten was already expressed in an article of 1957, entitled *Christians and International Institutions*, published in “New Blackfriars”, Vol. 38, December 1957, pp. 498-508.

claim of a moral primacy to an equal position with respect to the other actors in the international system; from the role of ultimate arbiter to the acceptance of principles and rules of multilateral diplomacy; from the consideration of the Catholic doctrine as the sole instrument able to give the international system a solid foundation, to the pursuit of dialogue and confrontation with any interlocutor, acknowledging the full autonomy of the temporal sphere. Participating in the first three abovementioned agreements, the Holy See – in representation of Vatican City State – showed the will to partake in the definition of a series of shared rules, intended to promote the development of a peaceful world and the creation of an institutionalized web of relations among peoples, fostering further integration. Cooperation, rule of law, diplomacy should have presided over the relations among Nations, in lieu of power and conflict.¹¹⁰

The ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (TNP, signed in 1968, in force as of 1971), on the other hand, entailed a more specific stance. The TNP, indeed, was one of the major achievements of the détente process, started after the growing tensions of the early 1960s, which took the world to the brink of a nuclear war.¹¹¹ Détente was a conservative strategy, because it aimed at maintaining the status quo between the two superpowers (the protagonists of this process) by freezing Bipolarism in Europe, and recognizing both the existence of common interests and the interlocutor's legitimacy. The negotiations for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were a perfect example of this policy: they implied the acknowledgment of the strategic parity between US and USSR, then formalized through SALT and ABM agreements, leaving them with a competitive advantage over the newer powers striving for a more prominent position in the geopolitical arena during the 1960s and the 1970s. The Vatican, obviously, could not have any say in this matter, but the ratification of the TNP was a symbolic gesture that underlined a long-term position of the Church, in favor of disarmament. In several occasions Paul VI had voiced his support for the ban of

¹¹⁰ A contemporary observer of the Holy See's international presence, Father Joseph Joblin, had already described this new attitude, even if he argued that it did not represent a discontinuity in the history of the Church: see for instance *La presenza della Chiesa sul piano internazionale*, in "CC", issue 4, 1975.

¹¹¹ Within the vast literature, see for a convincing assessment Wilfred Loth, *Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, and the classical study of Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1985.

nuclear weapons, responsible for putting at risk the sheer survival of mankind; the success of the negotiations was welcomed by the pope as the first step toward the “complete ban of nuclear weapons and the general disarmament”.¹¹²

Could we conclude, then, that the whole international community – represented in particular by international institutions and organizations – was the main interlocutor of the universal Church, in a spirit of collaboration and dialogue? As often is the case, things are more complicated and nuanced. Indeed, the connection between Church and Nation-States remained a cornerstone of the pope’s discourse and of the diplomatic activity of the Holy See for the whole period under consideration: Paul VI made often reference to the role of religion as factor of social cohesion, perfectly consistent with the loyalty to the nation, referencing a theme that had characterized the Church’s approach to Nations and nationalism since the end of the nineteenth century.¹¹³ Montini was aware of the problems resulting from harmonizing national and universal common good¹¹⁴, but he never specifically addressed or resolved them. In other terms, the Magisterium’s discourse never overcame the reference to Nation-States as providers of cultural identities, although their role was often an obstacle to a more consistent integration at international level.¹¹⁵ This fact, which is in implicit contradiction with a universalist discourse, has one main explanation in the eyes of the historian: the Church could not underestimate the enduring importance of Nation-States in the

¹¹² The quotation comes from the Speech to the Sacred College, (24/6/1968), in AAS, vol. 60, 1968, pp. 461, my translation [web: Italian]; the pope would have dealt with the subject also after the signature of the TNP, for instance in the speeches to the Diplomatic Corps and to the Sacred College in January and December 1972: AAS, vol. 64 (I), 1972, pp. 49-57 [web: French, Italian, Spanish], and vol. 65, 1973, pp. 19-26 [web: Italian], as well as in the message for the World Day for Peace in 1976 (AAS, vol. 68, 1976, pp. 707-14). The position in favor of disarmament (emblematically stated by Paul VI in the 1965 address to the UN Assembly) would have become one of the most defining traits of the Holy See’s presence at the United Nations, as reconstructed by Simon Khoury, *The Position of the Holy See on Disarmament in United Nations Context*, Roma: Pontificia Università Lateranense, 2011.

¹¹³ I developed a more articulate argument in *Beyond the nation and Nationalism? Paul VI and the international community*, in Menozzi (ed.), *Cattolicesimo nazione e nazionalismo*, pp. 185-203.

¹¹⁴ In speech to NATO’s Defense College in 1969, the pope argued that Peace does not exist without a spirit of justice and freedom, and can only be achieved looking for the common good of the national communities, “without neglecting the common good of the whole of mankind”: see *Insegnamenti di Paolo VI*, vol. VII, pp. 64-65, my translation [web: French, Spanish]. The role of Catholicism as moral foundation of a just society, fully compatible with national identity, was underlined for instance in the speeches to the Turkish and Maltese Ambassadors, in 1967 and 1973: AAS, vol. 59, 1967(I), pp. 44-45 [web: Italian, Spanish], and vol. 65, 1973, pp. 545-46 [web: Italian, Spanish].

¹¹⁵ The literature often does not pay sufficient attention, in my opinion, to this trait of the pontificate of Paul VI, which tempered its universalism. See for a different take Joseph Joblin, *La construction de la communauté humaine*, in Joblin in Papetti (ed.), *Verso la civiltà dell’amore*, in part. pp. 206-207.

international system of the 1960s and 1970s, and of the idea of nation as basic source of group identity. Notwithstanding the unparalleled degree of interdependence that the international system was experiencing, indeed, the Nation-State became in that period the political and institutional formula adopted by the majority of the human population, mostly thanks to the decolonization process. In other words, New Universalism had to deal with the permanence of structures and ideas which challenged its philosophy and questioned its actual consistency with the course of history. Therefore, we need to underline how Nation-States were still an irreplaceable part of the Catholic idea of international community, expressed by Magisterium, notwithstanding the strong accent put on the positive drive toward supranational integration.

The continual importance of the “Nation” (here used as synonym for Nation-State) in the ecclesiastical worldview is also evident from the diplomatic point of view: the most significant process carried on by the Vatican diplomacy during Montini’s papacy, that is the Vatican *Ostpolitik*, highlighted the Church’s choice to deal directly with the political vertex of Nation-States, therefore legitimizing their authority. The so-called Vatican *Ostpolitik* consisted of a series of initiatives conducted by Vatican diplomacy in the 1960s and the 1970s, with the basic goal of finding a *modus vivendi* – or a *modus non moriendi*, quoting the famous words of Card. Tisserant – between the local Roman Catholic Churches and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.¹¹⁶ This strategy was in direct continuity with the classical framework of the relations between the Church and the State, based on agreements that were expedient for both parties: the State could strengthen its authority thanks to the support of the Church, while the latter could obtain the acknowledgment of basic rights – in particular religious liberty – or privileges (depending on the contexts) for Catholics. The common goal of the two institutions was the achievement of peace and tranquility

¹¹⁶ For a contextualization of the process, and an evaluation of its achievements, I refer to the literature, in particular Giovanni Barberini, *L’Ostpolitik della Santa Sede. Un dialogo lungo e faticoso*, Bologna: Il Mulino 2007, and Hans-Jakob Hummel (ed.), *Vatikanische Ostpolitik unter Johannes XXIII und Paul VI. 1958-1978*, Paderborn: Schöning, 1999. For a brief description in English, see the assessment of political scientist John M. Kramer, *The Vatican’s “Ostpolitik”*, in “The Review of Politics”, issue 3, 1980, pp. 283-308.

within national borders; as is evident, this could contribute only indirectly to peace and stability within the international community.¹¹⁷

This potential contradiction between universalism and a Nation-oriented approach, we may argue, was the manifestation of the latent tension lying in the double nature of the Church, as a spiritual authority and at the same time an institutional structure, with its own diplomacy. Not by chance, during and after the Second Vatican Council the very existence of a diplomatic service was criticized. Those who sustained the necessity of overcoming the tool of the Vatican diplomacy asserted that only once it was free from any temporal legacy could the Church be able to play its role of advocate of universal peace, offering the cultural wealth of its doctrine to the community of Nations.¹¹⁸ Paul VI, though, never questioned the importance of the diplomatic service. In his youth, Montini had raised some doubts about the usefulness of an apparatus that could appear anachronistic, but in the 1930s he reached a conclusion that would guide him in the following decades: the diplomatic activity had a direct and functional rapport with the highest purposes of spiritual life, and was thence fully consistent with the religious mission of the Church.¹¹⁹ Moreover, the basic feature of diplomacy was the principle around which Montini chose to set his pontificate, that of dialogue and confrontation with any interlocutor, even the furthest away from the Church.

From this perspective, we have better insights into the Vatican *Ostpolitik*. Communism, as we noted earlier, was the “mortal enemy” of the Church, and the censure of that ideology remained a cornerstone of Paul’s teachings, together with the condemnation of the discriminations against Catholics east of the Iron Curtain.¹²⁰ The consequences of this stance, however, were not the same

¹¹⁷ In other words, the “policy of Concordats” was not abandoned by the Holy See under the pontificate of Paul VI, and this was a trend that went beyond *Ostpolitik*: see Jean Julg, *La politique concordataire sous Paul VI*, in *Paul VI et la vie internationale*, pp. 76-95. For a broader contextualization see Joël-Benoît d’Onorio, *Concordats et conventions post-conciliaires*, in ID. (ed.), *Le Saint-Siège dans les relations internationales*, pp. 193-246.

¹¹⁸ Maurizio Ragazzi, *Concordats Today: From the Second Vatican Council to John Paul II*, in “Journal of Markets & Morality”, issue 1, 2009, pp. 120-23. Ragazzi examines the critiques toward the institute of Concordat, and argues that these positions have no ground in the letter of Conciliar documents.

¹¹⁹ Rumi, *Montini diplomatico*, p. 13.

¹²⁰ Among the strongest pronouncements see: the encyclical *Ecclesiam suam*, §105; the speech to the Sacred College and the Roman Prelacy (23/12/1971) and to the Sacred College (23/06/1972), respectively in AAS, vol. 64 (I), 1972, pp. 31-40 [web: Italian, Portuguese], and vol. 64 (II), pp. 496-506 [web: Italian].

as in the 1950s, when Rome thought that no political change was possible in the Communist countries, and that the course of history could only be reversed through denunciation, martyrdom and prayer. Since John's pontificate, the Church had chosen to try to open a communication channel with the Communist countries, consistent with New Universalism and with the disentanglement from the apparent ties with the West. Paul VI, after some initial doubts,¹²¹ carried on with the policy of "careful opening" toward Eastern Europe, confirming Mgr. Agostino Casaroli – at the time, undersecretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs – as liaison between the Church and the Communist regimes.¹²²

Agostino Casaroli (1914-1998)¹²³ was another protagonist of the new generation of diplomats who implemented the new universalist discourse through their activity within the ranks of Vatican diplomacy. Since the early 1940s he had been involved in the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, where he dealt in particular with Latin America, working closely with another representative of the new generation, Card. Antonio Samoré (1905-1983); during the 1960s he was in charge of Vatican *Ostpolitik*, putting into practice the new dialoguing attitude of the

¹²¹ After his election, Montini consulted with the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs in order to be advised on the continuation of the secret negotiations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, and the affirmative response was unanimous: see Barberini, *L'Ostpolitik della Santa Sede*, pp. 96-97.

¹²² This choice caused intense frictions between Rome and national episcopacies (in particular in Poland) or with prominent local figures, as in the case of Hungarian cardinal József Mindszenty, who were used to independently handling the relations with the State. As well as the general publications on Vatican *Ostpolitik*, see Bernd Schäfer, *The Catholic Church and the Cold War's end in Europe: Vatican Ostpolitik and Pope John Paul II, 1985–1989*, in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Leopoldo Nudi (eds.), *Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal*, Routledge, 2008, p. 67, and for a direct testimony, József Mindszenty, *Memorie*, Milano: Rusconi, p. 355 ff. (original edition Toronto 1974). A reconstruction of the "case Mindszenty" is in Gabriel Adriányi, *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans 1958-1978 gegenüber Ungarn. Der Fall Kardinal Mindszenty*, Herne: Schäfer, 2003.

¹²³ The interesting memoirs of Card. Agostino Casaroli (who was secretary of State from 1979 until 1990) have been published in 2000 under the title *Il martirio della pazienza. La Santa Sede e paesi comunisti (1963-1989)*, edited by Carlo Felice Casula and Giovanni Maria Vian, Torino: Einaudi, 2000 (later translated in English by Fr. Marco Bagnarol: *The Martyrdom of Patience: The Holy See and the Communist Countries (1963-1989)*, Toronto: Ave Maria Centre of Peace, 2007). Two good reflections on Casaroli's work in the context of the relations with Eastern Europe (based on Casaroli's papers, and published in Italian: to my knowledge, there are no relevant academic contributions in English) are the collection of essays edited by Alberto Melloni, *Il filo sottile: l'Ostpolitik vaticana di Agostino Casaroli*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006, Giovanni Barberini, *La politica del dialogo. Le carte Casaroli sull'Ostpolitik vaticana*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008. For a recent comprehensive reconstruction of Casaroli's *Ostpolitik* see Marco Lavopa, *La diplomazia dei "piccoli passi": l'Ostpolitik vaticana di mons. Agostino Casaroli*, Roma: GBE, 2013 (a re-elaboration of the dissertation discussed at the University of Cergy-Pointoise in 2011), and ID., *Mgr Agostino Casaroli, un habile "tisseur de dialogues européens"* (1963-1975), in "Revue de l'histoire des religions", issue 1, 2014, pp. 101-15. For an analysis of his "Latin American policy" see Gianni La Bella, *Santa Sede e America Latina nell'attività del cardinale Casaroli*, in Alberto Melloni and Silvia Scatena (eds.), *L'America Latina fra Pio XII e Paolo VI. Il cardinale Casaroli e le politiche vaticane in una chiesa che cambia*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006, pp. 179-93.

Church, which he considered the most fruitful way to relate with the world, consistent with the new universalist paradigm. From our point of view, though, it is particularly interesting to note how this policy (although analyzing its development and results, as mentioned, lies beyond the scope of this work) is a paradigmatic example of the intersection between the traditional way to handle Church-State relations (a sign of the lasting relevance of Nation-States as the Church's counterparts)¹²⁴ and the new approach inaugurated by John XXIII and perpetuated by Paul VI. New Universalism, then, did not constitute a complete rupture with the tradition, especially for what concerns the relationship with the basic institutional unit of the international system, even if the discontinuities were more relevant and significant than the continuities, from a historical point of view.

In fact, this analysis helps us to better contextualize the most important "diplomatic news" that emerged during the pontificate of Paul VI, that is the Holy See's participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 1973-1975), which highlighted the appreciation of the principles and rules of multilateral diplomacy. This event is not only important from a diplomatic point of view, however. In Helsinki, the Holy See's delegation was engaged in particular with a specific issue, the protection of human rights, the second major contribution that we mentioned of the Magisterium to the Catholic discourse on the international community. Indeed, up until now we have focused on a methodological principle, the support for cooperation and integration as the main route toward peace, that has defined the Catholic approach to international relations. Yet this was not the only specification of the universal common good that we may infer from the investigation of the Magisterium's discourse: there were also more "concrete" contents, that we can group in two main categories: the safeguarding of human rights and the development of peoples. Let us start then with the first issue, by taking up some of the threads that we left dangling in the previous pages.

¹²⁴ In this respect, we also need to mention the motu proprio *Sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum* (1969), dedicated to the reorganization of the functions of Vatican's diplomacy: this pronouncement made implicit reference to the traditional doctrine, that described Church and State as *societates perfectae*, which needed to cooperate toward the common good. For an analysis of this document see Zambarbieri, *Il nuovo papato*, pp. 103-26.

3.2 Human rights

Gaudium et spes stated that the Church, “by virtue of the Gospel committed to her, proclaims the rights of man; she acknowledges and greatly esteems the dynamic movements of today by which these rights are everywhere fostered”.¹²⁵ The proclamation of human rights, formalized in an official document promulgated by the Assembly, represented a crucial passage in the history of modern and contemporary Church. After a centuries-old opposition – motivated by the refusal to acknowledge any kind of autonomy of mankind from God – to the rights that men declared to own by nature, and to enumerating them through reason, Rome recognized the positivity of the historical process that led to the advancement of human rights, which took place between the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).¹²⁶ We have mentioned the crucial role in this paradigm shift played by intellectuals like Jacques Maritain and Pietro Pavan, who was mainly responsible for the historical passages of *Pacem in terris*, recognizing the 1948 Declaration as a milestone in the history of mankind. Paul VI – whose great esteem for and close personal friendship with Pavan is well documented¹²⁷ – chose to follow this path, referencing the teaching of human rights as one of the proper and most important tasks of the whole international community, namely of the United Nations.¹²⁸ The link between protection of human rights and preservation of peace at global level became one of the *leitmotifs* of his discourse: this was an important difference between Traditional and New Universalism, codified

¹²⁵ *Gaudium et spes*, §41.

¹²⁶ The reference on this subject is Menozzi, *Chiesa e diritti umani*, to which I refer for a contextualization and a synthetic account of the subject at Vatican II and during Montini’s papacy (at pp. 208-34). See also, for a brief long-term analysis which highlights the ambivalence of the Church’s behavior, Paolo G. Carozza and Daniel Philpott, *The Catholic Church, Human Rights, and Democracy: Convergence and Conflict with the Modern State*, in “Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture”, issue 3, 2012, pp. 15-43.

¹²⁷ The first proof of such consideration was Montini’s request for Pavan to work at the newly founded Italian Catholic Institute for Social Activities, in December 1945. We do not know whether the two were already personally in contact, but since that time they would have developed a close relationship: see Ciriello, *Pietro Pavan*, pp. 38-39 and 313.

¹²⁸ As well as the October 4 allocution, see the address to the International Conference on Human Rights (15/4/1968), and the speech to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, (5/2/1972), in AAS, vol. 60, 1968, pp. 283-6 [web: Spanish] and vol. 64 (II), 1972, pp. 214-6 [web: French, Italian, Spanish].

by the association of their protection with the pursuit of the universal common good.¹²⁹ May we deduce from this approach that the Catholic institutional discourse endorsed the “internationalization of human rights” – the request to empower supranational institutions, as well as national ones, with the task of protecting and advancing human rights all over the world –, that we recalled as an emerging debate among jurists and politicians following the post-WWII period?

If we consider one of the most distinctive international events – the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – happened under the papacy of Paul VI, the answer seems to be yes, since the work of the Vatican delegation focused especially on the inclusion of the respect of human rights in the agreements.¹³⁰ It is worth taking a closer look, since the whole event is particularly relevant to our analysis. The CSCE was the high point reached by détente’s parabola. At the beginning of the 1970s, both the United States and the Soviet Union were going through a difficult period – even if the leadership crisis of the US was perceived as far more critical; thus, the decrease of tensions in Europe could offer several advantages to both blocs.¹³¹ The Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, which as early as in the 1950s had proposed setting up a conference among European States, needed to finally secure their Western borders, getting the Western bloc to formally acknowledge the *status quo* that emerged after the Second World War. Moreover, it gave them the opportunity to increase and regulate economic relationships with Western Europe – an important source of revenue for the Communist countries – and to gain access to their technical expertise. The United States wished to drastically reduce their military presence in Europe, a long-term goal now made dramatically urgent by the resource-draining ordeal in Vietnam, and by the growing warnings of economic crisis. The stabilization of the Old Continent,

¹²⁹ See for instance the message for the World Day of Peace in 1969, where the pope stated that “Peace favours Rights, and Rights in their turn favour Peace”. The explicit link between human rights and universal common good was addressed in the already quoted (footnote 104) speech to the members of the Institute of International Law (10/9/1973).

¹³⁰ For some bibliographic references and a general take on the subject, see Giovanni Barberini, *Pagine di storia contemporanea. La Santa Sede alla Conferenza di Helsinki*, Siena: Cantagalli, 2010.

¹³¹ A good starting point to understand the whole process is Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), *The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75*, Routledge, 2008. For a comprehensive assessment of the CSCE’s history and developments see Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist (eds.), *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75*, Routledge, 2008, and Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE*, Peter Lang, 2009.

and the growth of the interactions between its two halves, could work to the advantage of Western European countries, which were looking for new markets and geopolitical stability. During the Conference, though, Western countries pursued yet another goal, which had a greater impact in the long run. They linked the ratification of the agreements to an explicit commitment of the signatory countries to the respect of their citizens' fundamental rights, also in view of a growing movement of peoples between the two parts of the continent. In essence, the Western conception of human rights was proposed as the universal patrimony of civilization, which the Communist countries – traditionally accusing it, according to Marx's philosophy, of formalism and hypocrisy – should have agreed with. The so-called "third basket" – generally dedicated to "cooperation on humanitarian matters" – swiftly became one of the hottest topics, since it was potentially in conflict with the major issue around which the Conference was set up, that is the acknowledgment of the States sovereignty over their territory. The activity of Vatican diplomacy focused on precisely this bundle of problems.

On March 29, 1969 the Hungarian Ambassador to Italy delivered to the Holy See the official invitation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which had been proposed a few weeks earlier through the Budapest appeal. As well as being motivated by technical reasons, since the State of Vatican City was on European soil, and was therefore interested in the colloquia for security and cooperation in Europe, the request symbolized the international prestige acquired by the Holy See as of the early 1960s, through the process described in the previous pages.¹³² Rome was considered an interlocutor *super partes*, which could bring a substantial contribution to the Conference, thanks to its moral authority and mediation skills. The Holy See officialised its participation in the talks (which would begin on July 1, 1973, in Helsinki), on June 22, 1972.

What could be, though, specifically, the ecclesiastical contribution to a conference on security and cooperation? It could not have anything to do with geopolitical issues, from which the Vatican

¹³² This point is emphasized by Alberto Melloni, *La politica internazionale della Santa Sede negli anni Sessanta*, in "Passato e presente", issue 58, 2003, pp. 73-74.

delegation – headed by Mgr. Joseph Zabkar, permanent observer to Unesco – chose to abstain. Peace and collaboration among peoples, on the other hand, could be regarded as paramount interests of the Church, since they were cornerstones of the universal common good. The work of the Church’s representatives focused precisely on the link between cooperation, security, peace and respect of human rights, in particular to religious liberty. Protection and advancement of human rights, in other words, were considered a main ingredient of the common good of the international community, in accordance with the change of discourse carried on by Paul VI,¹³³ On March 6, 1973, the Holy See proposed including in the agreement one article with the following language:

La Commission incluera parmi ces principes le respect des droits fondamentaux de l’homme entre autres la liberté religieuse, entendu comme l’un des facteurs essentiels pour promouvoir des rapports amicaux entre les peuples de ces Etats.¹³⁴

In the Helsinki Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975, this principle was basically reprised:

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.¹³⁵

The right to religious liberty was specifically addressed a few lines above, and was connected, as were the other rights, to the “inherent dignity of the human person”. The effort of Vatican diplomacy was ultimately successful, as the literature has already underlined, and can be contextualized within the framework of the New Universalism.¹³⁶ The Church’s embracing of human rights advocacy had a huge practical impact, since it shaped (or reinforced) the conduct both of local Churches and Catholic national and international organizations in the defense of human rights, wherever they were endangered (and that was the case in many parts of the world, especially

¹³³ The pope himself restated the importance of this connection in the traditional speech to the Diplomatic Corps in January 1975, just a few weeks before the conclusion of the CSCE: AAS, vol. 67, 1975, pp. 101-102 [web: French, Spanish].

¹³⁴ See the full text in “La Documentation Catholique”, 1630, 15/4/1973.

¹³⁵ <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basics/finact75.htm>. See in particular part I, chapter VII.

¹³⁶ See Harm J. Hazewinkel, *Religious freedom in the CSCE/OSCE process*, in “Helsinki Monitor”, issue 3, 1998, p. 9, and Barberini, *L’Ostpolitik della Santa Sede*, pp. 325-84.

during the 1970s). The importance and the extent of Catholic engagement in this matter have been widely acknowledged,¹³⁷ but as we stated in the Introduction, it is not the focus on the present work, which aims at investigating the variations within the discourse. Also in this case, a more detailed analysis highlights the existence of some countertrends, or at least a more multifaceted picture, which has not always been addressed by the literature.

First of all, in the Magisterium's discourse we do not find the logical ultimate consequence of this approach, that is entrusting supranational institutions with this task of human rights protection, overcoming the national level. Indeed, this issue was not addressed in the ecclesiastical public discourse, beyond generic statements on the importance of international organizations in the human rights area, in particular where they were neglected or infringed. On the contrary, the main interlocutor was once again the Nation-State, whose authority and jurisdiction were also legitimized in this field.¹³⁸ Secondly, a significant element of continuity with the traditional paradigm can be observed in the final phase of the papacy, when the Magisterium insisted on establishing a hierarchy of rights: some rights, in other words, were more important than others, and the Church claimed to be the ultimate arbiter of their correct implementation both within national contexts and in the international community (while during the 1960s the stress was put more on the convergence between the laic and the Catholic "charts of rights"). This approach – which would be adopted and "systematized" by John Paul II, and which we will define as a "traditional approach to New Universalism" – was clearly enunciated in a document elaborated in 1974 by the Synod of Bishops together with the pope, entitled "Appeal for human rights".¹³⁹ The document was inspired by two

¹³⁷ See for instance J. Bryan Hehir, *Religious Activism for Human Rights: a Christian Case Study*, in John Witte, Jr. and John D. van der Vyver (eds.), *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective*, vol. I: *Religious Perspectives*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, pp. 97-120, that we may reference for a general outline of the Catholic engagement on human rights.

¹³⁸ Clear examples in this respect are the speeches to the Diplomatic Corps of 10/1/1972 (quoted at footnote 112) and to the Sacred College (21/12/1973: AAS, vol. 66, 1974, pp. 16-24) [web: Italian].

¹³⁹ The Synod of Bishops was created in 1965 by Paul VI, and it was the symbol of the "episcopal collegiality" requested by many Fathers at the Second Vatican Council. In general terms, Montini's conception of episcopal collegiality can be summed up as an openness to the growth of the relevance and power of the Bishops in the Church's government, if tempered with the undisputed autonomy of the pope in choosing whether or not recurring to their aid. For a first assessment, from an "internal", ecclesiastical point of view, see Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Paolo VI e la collegialità episcopale*, Colloquio Internazionale di Studio (Brescia, 25-27 settembre 1992), Brescia: Istituto Paolo VI,

important events, the tenth anniversary of *Pacem in terris* and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These texts, the Synod and the pope asserted, were based on the principle that human dignity, bestowed upon the person by God, required the respect of human rights. Those were a common good of mankind, and found their purest expression in the Gospel. Therefore, the Church would state which ones needed more development, or a strengthened protection. The document pinpointed five areas that were especially endangered – the right to life, to nutrition, to social justice, to freedom and participation in the political sphere, to religious liberty – without making reference to the Charts elaborated by men, or to the international institutions charged with the task of supervising their implementation.

This “hierarchization” of human rights was employed more and more often in the final years of Montini's papacy.¹⁴⁰ In particular, for what interests us, we may point out that in his second-to-last Message for the World Day of Peace, Paul VI explicitly connected the preservation of peace at global level with the respect of the right to life, not only through the avoidance of war and the arms race, but also through the protection of “incipient life”, threatened especially by abortion.¹⁴¹ In this pronouncement, the pope praised the declarations and agreements on human rights autonomously elaborated by mankind, but underlined how they were often disobeyed or ignored, and how the task of the Church, as guardian of natural law, was to explain their true meaning and monitor their observance. The positive attitude in the beginning of his pontificate was partially reconsidered, given the elements of discord and antagonism still present in the world: in his last address to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See, the pope presented a daunting landscape of international relations, where human rights – in particular to religious liberty, to physical and psychological integrity – and the principle of equality among human beings were threatened by

1995. See the English translation of the final document in “The Pope Speaks”, vol. 19 (1974-1975), pp. 216-19; for the original version, AAS, vol. 66 (1974), pp. 631-39.

¹⁴⁰ Italian historian Daniele Menozzi has defined this view as an “ecclesiocentric conception” of human rights, which signaled the return to a more traditional confrontation with the modern world, focused more on the differences between laic and Catholic worldviews than on the factors of convergence. See Menozzi, *Chiesa e diritti umani*, p. 231.

¹⁴¹ AAS, vol. 68, 1976, in part. pp. 711-12.

authoritarian, racist and nationalistic regimes in many parts of the planet.¹⁴² A simplistic reading of Montini's papacy – divided between a first half characterized by reform, and a second half marked by conservatism – has been rightly contested by recent literature, which has underlined the presence of progressive elements (for instance, about the implementation of Conciliar decisions) during the 1970s as well.¹⁴³ De Giorgi, in particular, has revised the traditional interpretation of a regressive and pessimistic turn in the last years of the pontificate, seeing instead the “joyful” maturation of a new paradigm, after a few years of painful reflection, to read the role of Catholicism in the contemporary age, a paradigm based on the interaction between evangelization and human promotion, as we will confirm in the following pages.¹⁴⁴ At the same time, though, we cannot underplay the tendency to resort more often to traditional interpretative keys, which seems to emerge from the analysis of the Magisterium's pronouncements on some major issues.¹⁴⁵

In this specific case, for instance, the papacy tried to steer the engagement of the faithful in the worldwide protection and advancement of human rights toward some specific areas regarded by the Church (the only authority enabled to do so) as pivotal for the whole international community. In this respect, we have seen that the stress was not solely put on a “classical” issue like the right to religious liberty.¹⁴⁶ On the contrary, the Church's discourse insisted on the right of every human being to fully develop his or her personality, not only through civil and political rights, but also through the right to enjoy them, from birth to death. I would argue that this vision – expressed in the

¹⁴² AAS, vol. 70, 1978, pp. 168-74 [web: French, Spanish]. Paul VI insisted on the rights of minorities against all kinds of discrimination also in the address to the committee of the UN on apartheid (22/5/1974): see AAS, vol. 66, 1974, pp. 342-46 [web: English, Spanish].

¹⁴³ See in particular Jörg Ernesti (ed.), *Paolo VI e la crisi postconciliaire/Paul VI und die nachkonziliare Krise. Giornate di studio/Studientage* (Bressanone/Brixen, 25-26 febbraio/Februar 2012), Brescia: Istituto Paolo VI, 2013. This approach, as mentioned, also informs Ernesti's biography, *Paul VI. Der vergessene Papst*.

¹⁴⁴ De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, chapter 6: *L'orizzonte di un nuovo cristianesimo*, in part. pp. 671-74 for the insistence on the concept of “joy”

¹⁴⁵ We will propose a general interpretation of this trend, from our point of view, in the conclusions to this section.

¹⁴⁶ We can just mention, in this context, the paradigm shift represented by the conciliar declaration *Dignitatis humanae* on this matter: freedom of religion had finally fully entered the Magisterium discourse, after a centuries-old opposition based on the claim of a difference of treatment between Catholicism – the true religion – and the other religions. Actually, the international context played a major part in the overcoming of this approach, since the Church embraced the battle for the right to religious liberty for any faith – not only for Catholics – especially because of the situation in the Communist countries. The best historical analysis of the subject has been offered, as mentioned, by Silvia Scatena, *La fatica della libertà*.

“Appeal for Human Rights” quoted earlier – encompassed both socially conservative and social progressive stances, as it was common in the complex Montinian papacy. Focusing on the right to life, for instance, with its specifically anti-abortion intent, meant referencing a traditional view of the social order based on different sex roles; men were breadwinners, actors in the public sphere, and women were family caregivers, responsible for children’s education. Issues like women’s right to control over their bodies, which emerged as a distinctive feminist issue in the 1970s, or the problems regarding birth control in the overpopulated areas of the Third World, did not enter the Magisterium’s discourse; on the contrary, the encyclical *Humanae vitae* (1968) restated the traditional doctrine without any possible misinterpretations, undermining the quests for change that were growing within Catholic culture¹⁴⁷.

That is not to say that Paul VI did not promote some changes in the area of gender. The Church seemed to acknowledge, at least in part, the new role of the woman in the contemporary age, not only in the family – where it stressed, men also had responsibilities – but also in society, as owner of rights and duties.¹⁴⁸ For our purposes, we can also observe a variation in the discourse within a consolidated framework, that is the association of the cult of the Virgin Mary – the paradigmatic role model for women – with the establishment of universal peace.¹⁴⁹ While in the early phases of the papacy the pope insisted on Mary’s function as guardian of the Catholic doctrine¹⁵⁰ – the only code that could lead to peace, as we have learned – in later years the accent was also put on other features. The most innovative trait was developed in the apostolic exhortation *Marialis cultus*

¹⁴⁷ See the comments of Giovanni Maria Vian, *La solitudine di Paolo VI ed il peso della tradizione*, address to the Conference held by Pontifical Lateran University for the 40th anniversary of *Humanae vitae*, in “Istituto Paolo VI. Notiziario”, issue 55, 2008, pp. 28-35. At least *en passant*, we also need to mention that female authors have pointed out how the culture of international human rights has traditionally neglected women’s rights: see for a classical account Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper (eds.), *Women’s Rights, Human Rights: international feminist perspectives*, Routledge, 1995.

¹⁴⁸ The updating is evident if we confront the Message to women, delivered at the end of the Second Vatican Council (8/12/1965), and the Message for the International year of the woman (1974): while in the first one the role of women in world peace was limited to the domestic sphere as educators and moral aid to their men, in the second one the stress was also put on their influence in the public sphere. See AAS, vol. 58, 1966, pp. 13-14, and *Insegnamenti*, vol. XII, pp. 1056-57. For a broader interpretation of Paul’s vision of women we defer to De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, pp. 664-71.

¹⁴⁹ Two of the seven encyclicals promulgated by Paul VI (*Mense maio*, 1964, and *Christi matri*, 1966) were dedicated to the Virgin Mary, whose figure was explicitly linked to the establishment of peace in the world.

¹⁵⁰ Menozzi, *Chiesa, pace e guerra*, p. 280.

(1974), dedicated to the “development of devotion of the Blessed Virgin Mary”. Here, the role of the mother of Christ, and by extension the role of any woman, in the quest for peace at world level was explicitly associated with the advancement of justice in the world: not only through the “charity which assists the needy”, as in a traditional view, but also through the work “for that justice which sets free the oppressed”.¹⁵¹

These challenging words were not new in the Magisterium’s discourse, which on several occasions addressed the issue of social justice in the world: this theme was also quoted, for instance, in the aforementioned Appeal as one of the “special rights” to defend worldwide. Here we are at a fundamental crossroads of our investigation, since the topic of “international social justice” will prove to be a defining, and also dividing, feature of Catholic culture’s approach to the idea of international community during the 1960s and the 1970s. We will try to synthesize its exposition in the Catholic institutional discourse, before taking into account a different approach, stemming from other sources of Catholic culture.

3.3 International social justice

On March 21, 1967, Paul VI promulgated an encyclical that had a tremendous impact on public opinion well beyond the boundaries of Catholicism. *Populorum progressio*, which was issued after a few years of preparation with the crucial contribution of Father Lebret, was one of the most

¹⁵¹ Although Mary’s function as role model was not always specifically gender-related (in the exhortation the language is intentionally gender-neutral, so that it can refer to any faithful, not only to women), in §37, which the quotation is from, the connection between Mary’s traits and the modern woman were explicitly underlined (we will briefly go back to this subject in the last pages of this chapter). Moreover, the association of Mary’s cult with the movement for women’s emancipation had already been proposed by Jean Galot, *Culto mariano ed emancipazione della donna*, in “CC”, issue 2, 1970. For the analysis of the apostolic exhortation *Marialis Cultus* (AAS, vol. 66, 1974, pp. 113-68), in the broader context of the resemanticization of Mary’s cult, I would like to thank Giacomo Canepa, student of history at the Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa (Italy), who has convincingly addressed the subject in his 2013 thesis: *Rovescia i potenti dai troni. Appunti per una storia della mariologia socio-liberatrice (1962-1992)*, thesis for the academic year 2012/2013, Scuola Normale Superiore.

progressive documents of the whole papacy, meaning that it considered the historical process which led to the technical, economic, cultural progress in human societies as a positive development, even if it needed to be balanced and founded on solid moral grounds – a “full-bodied humanism”, in particular with respect to the peoples who had just gained their political independence.¹⁵²

The issue of social justice had been traditionally addressed by the Catholic culture, and it had already entered the Magisterium’s discourse, at least as of the pontificate of Leo XIII and the development of the Catholic social teaching. Generally, though, the tension toward leveling of economic gaps was applied to national contexts, insisting on the role of Catholicism as the cement holding together a stable and just society.¹⁵³ Concerning its application at international level, in broad terms we might argue that until the pontificate of John XXIII, the Church had mostly insisted on the need to evangelize the peoples outside the “development circuit”, in order to announce and build a Christian civilization modeled on pre-revolutionary Europe.¹⁵⁴ This approach was consistent with Traditional Universalism: the Christian doctrine was universally valid and applicable, and should be employed by any institution in order to correctly pursue the common good of the society. We have already mentioned, in introducing the concept of New Universalism, how the Catholic culture updated this conception starting in the 1950s, presenting the international community as the widest context – in harmony with the other levels of social organization – in which social justice should be pursued, through international solidarity, cooperation and charity. *Mater et magistra*

¹⁵² AAS, vol. 59, 1967, pp. 257-99. Within the immense bibliography, a good starting point for the analysis of its genesis, sources and impact is given by the publication of Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Il Magistero di Paolo VI nell’enciclica Populorum progressio*, giornata di studio (Milano, 16 marzo 1988), Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 1989. The role of Lebret has been underlined by Paul Poupard, *Le père Lebret, Paul VI et l’encyclique “Populorum Progressio” vingt ans après*, in “Istituto Paolo VI. Notiziario”, issue 14, May 1987, pp. 72-73; see also ID., *Populorum Progressio: tra ricordi e speranze*, Siena: Cantagalli, 2007.

¹⁵³ We already mentioned the centrality of the relations between Catholicism and Nations throughout contemporary history. The encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* (1931), which “updated” the social doctrine of the Church, stated: “To each, therefore, must be given his own share of goods, and the distribution of created goods, which, as every discerning person knows, is laboring today under the gravest evils due to the huge disparity between the few exceedingly rich and the unnumbered propertyless, must be effectively called back to and brought into conformity with the norms of the common good, that is, social justice”. The natural context in which these rules should be applied was the Nation-State, even if there were some mentions of the necessity to develop a “prosperous and happy international cooperation in economic life” (§89). See AAS, vol. 23, 1931, pp. 177-228. For a contextualization see Charles E. Curran, *Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present: A Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002, and Donal Dorr, *Option for the Poor and for the Earth: Catholic Social Teaching*, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2012³.

¹⁵⁴ This approach was still at the core of the encyclical *Fidei donum* of Pius XII (1957).

insisted on this vision (rooted in the principle of subsidiarity), which was reprised by *Gaudium et spes*: the Pastoral Constitution stated that the international community should

Coordinate and promote development, but in such a way that the resources earmarked for this purpose will be allocated as effectively as possible. It is likewise this community's duty with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, so to regulate economic relations throughout the world that these will be carried out in accordance with the norms of justice.¹⁵⁵

The “justice” parameter, pertaining to the moral order, was therefore employed to describe the ideal structure of economic relationships among Nations at international level.

Populorum progressio, the first Magisterial document explicitly dedicated to developing countries and their relations with the wealthy part of the planet, was built on these premises. The document must be read in the context of a raging debate over the contradictions of economic development: a wider awareness in Western societies, fueled by the communications revolution and in particular among the young, of the disparities between the so-called First and the Third Worlds generated waves of sociopolitical engagement, which generally led them to sympathize with the struggles for freedom and social emancipation of the underdeveloped countries.¹⁵⁶ At the same time, non-Western points of view gained visibility and influence at global level, challenging (or changing from within) the major cultural paradigms: we will follow an exemplary case study about the Catholic culture in a few pages. The Magisterium’s point of view obviously needed to rise above any partiality, employing a universal perspective; Paul VI tried to address the problem by presenting international social justice as one of the pillars of the universal common good: just as the tutelage of human rights represented a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for preserving peace, economic and social inequalities, which originated, as *Populorum progressio* clearly stated, from the intrinsic flaws of an “unbridled liberalism”, endangered the peaceful coexistence among peoples.

¹⁵⁵ *Gaudium et spes*, §86.

¹⁵⁶ An intriguing canvas of the cultural changes experienced by young Europeans in Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945*, Penguin Press, 2005, p. 406 ff.

“Development of the individual necessarily entails a joint effort for the development of the human race as a whole”, was the opening statement of the second part of *Populorum progressio*. The basic principle of personalism – the integral development of the person, in harmony with others, was the foundation of every society – was applied to the whole international community. The outcomes of the paradigm shift experienced by the Catholic culture since the 1950s, therefore, had fully reached the institutional discourse. Just as the individual man could better himself only in solidarity with other men, Nations could improve the well-being of their citizens only in communion with the other subjects of the international system, in which the wealthy had the duty (morally grounded in Christian charity) to help the poor. Development, according to the famous definition of the encyclical, was the new name for peace. From the new universalist point of view, the integration dynamic that characterized the present age was to be supported and balanced with an increased interest in the world’s disadvantaged. The whole historical process, however, notwithstanding the flaws which had characterized its course, was still judged as positive, as evidenced by the use of terms like “development” and “progress” (which suggested a progressive movement).

In other terms, the basic direction of history was still generally consistent with Christian values, but it needed to be steered toward a better track by a higher degree of international social justice. This principle – expression of a social progressive view – was not only revealed in the pope’s 1967 encyclical;¹⁵⁷ moreover, there was widespread reflection within the ecclesial community on the inequalities between rich and poor countries, the efforts to remove them, and the link with universal peace. In order to verify this statement, we can briefly follow, the path of the pontifical commission *Iustitia et pax*, created in 1967 with the goal of promoting peace and justice in the world in accordance with the Church’s doctrine. The commission, initially presided over by Cardinal

¹⁵⁷ See for instance also the speech to the Sacred College and Roman Prelacy (22/12/1967), the speech to Uganda’s Parliament (1/8/1969), the speech to the Diplomatic Corps (12/1/1970) and the message for the World Day of Peace in 1972, respectively in AAS, vol. 60, 1968, pp. 18-33 [web: Italian]; vol. 61, 1969, pp. 580-86 [web: Italian, French, Portuguese, Spanish], and vol. 63 (II), 1971, pp. 865-68.

Maurice Roy (1905-1985),¹⁵⁸ was established together with the Pontifical Council for the Laity (also presided by Card. Roy), following the indications of *Gaudium et spes* (§90). In May 1966, one working group started to discuss its structure. It was composed of Fathers who participated in the Vatican Council, like the Dominicans Mgr. Aniceto Fernandes and the expert Louis-Joseph Lebret; of Church representatives within Catholic international organizations, like Jean Rodhain (President of *Caritas Internationalis*) and Mgr. Edward E. Swanstrom (President of *Catholic Relief Services*), and of lay people engaged in social activities, like James Norris and Barbara Ward.¹⁵⁹ The new commission specialized in both spreading the Church's teaching on peace and justice through communication channels (and by supplying religious associations and orders with educational materials), and in elaborating documents on three major areas that should be familiar to us by now: peace, human rights and justice within the international community.¹⁶⁰ In the first years, however, *Iustitia et pax*'s activity focused especially on the issue of international social justice, in the wake of the discussions generated by *Populorum progressio* (where the establishment of the commission was announced).

In particular, a committee of the *Iustitia et pax* elaborated a working document for the 1971 Synod of Bishops, centered on two major themes, the ministerial priesthood and justice in the world. The final text issued by the Assembly on the second issue, which was widely based on the preparatory material, can be used as a paradigmatic example of the circulation of the “justice” question within the Church. The document was entitled “Justice in the world” (“De Iustitia in mundo”), and it was characterized by radical language.¹⁶¹ The Synod – composed of a high

¹⁵⁸ Roy was appointed bishop by Pius XII in 1946 and created cardinal by Paul VI in the consistory of February 22, 1965. His close ties with Montini, and his commitment to the issue of social justice have been addressed by Gilles Routhier (ed.), *Paul VI et Maurice Roy: un itinéraire pour la justice et la paix*, Journées d'étude: Québec, 1-3 avril 2004, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 2005.

¹⁵⁹ See Andrew Small, *The Theological Justification for the Establishment of the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace (Iustitia et pax)*, dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the School of Theology and Religious Studies of the Catholic University of America, 2010, available at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/9228/Small_cua_0043A_10086display.pdf?sequence=1, in part. pp. 79-124.

¹⁶⁰ Some informations in P. Martin Pelzel, *The Early Days of the Pontifical Commission Justpax*, in Routhier (ed.), *Paul VI et Maurice Roy*, pp. 95-111.

¹⁶¹ Some notes on the first draft of the document and its content in Dorr, *Option for the Poor*, pp. 202-18.

percentage of non-European bishops – highlighted a profound contradiction between the integration dynamic characterizing the modern age, and the growth of particularistic reactions, antagonism between Nations and oppression of minorities or entire peoples. The solution to this problem was not to be found only in the “creation of a lasting atmosphere of dialogue”: faced with the injustice in the world, Catholics had to side with the poor, dedicating themselves “to the liberation of people even in their present existence in this world”, even if “it does not belong to the Church, insofar as she is a religious and hierarchical community, to offer concrete solutions in the social, economic and political spheres for justice in the world”.¹⁶²

This is undoubtedly a radical commitment to change in international relations, with deep social and political consequences, that could potentially modify the features of New Universalism. The analysis of this paradigm within Catholic institutional discourse, indeed, has led us to the following conclusions: the Church endorsed the initiatives taken in autonomy by mankind – especially by international organizations and institutions – to build a peaceful and cooperative international community. The course of history, on the whole, was not considered to contradict Catholic principles: this approach generated a paradigm shift compared to Traditional Universalism, which revolved around the idea of an irremediable divarication between human history and the history of salvation. After the Second Vatican Council, the claim to moral superiority was generally replaced by a more open confrontation with the modern world, through dialogue and spirit of service. New Universalism was not a complete rupture with the tradition: on the one side, the recovery of a truly universal perspective (beyond the fracture lines of the international system) did not imply the overcoming of the close relationships with Nation-States, as discourse analysis and the behavior of Vatican diplomacy show us. On the other hand, the conviction that the Church possessed the rules that could assure peaceful coexistence at international level – the key to the universal common good

¹⁶² The Church’s mission, in the words of the document, involved “the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation”. See AAS, vol. 63 (II), 1971, pp. 923-42; in English the text is available at <http://www.shc.edu/theolibrary/resources/synodjw.htm>. The impossibility of offering universal solutions to the social problems of the world had already been underlined by the apostolic letter *Octogesima adveniens* (May 1971), §4: AAS, vol. 63 (I), 1973, pp. 401-40.

– was not abandoned, and was translated into three major principles (support to cooperation and integration, respect of human rights, advancement of international social justice), that we have historicized and contextualized within the Catholic doctrine.

In all these three cases, Paul VI significantly updated the Magisterium's discourse, even if the aspects of continuity cannot be underestimated: the investigation of a specific issue – the approach to the idea of international community – seems to confirm the conclusion of the general literature on Montini's papacy, that as mentioned has underlined the joint presence of *aggiornamento* and tradition in the Teachings of the pope. Although it would be highly incorrect to adopt a rigid periodization, dividing the papacy into a progressive first phase and a more conservative second period, we cannot avoid pointing out, for what concerns our subject, a significant change of attitude since the beginning of the 1970s. The analysis of the human rights issue provides a first example of this change, with the more frequent recourse to an “ecclesiocentric” approach, less inclined to confrontation with the lay culture. An even clearer and more emblematic case is offered by the topic of international social justice: after a period of increased attention, approximately between the two social encyclicals *Populorum progressio* (1967) and *Octogesima adveniens*¹⁶³ (1971), although this problem was not relegated to the background, it was tackled from a less radical perspective, which excluded its political implications. In other words, the most radical stances were progressively abandoned. In order to understand why, we need to leave the Magisterium's perspective, and turn back to the stormy sea of Catholic theology and intellectuality; this time, we will not follow the threads that contributed to weaving the web of New Universalism, but will sum up the features of an alternative approach, which contested its very premises. We also need to leave Euro-centric glasses and *long-durée* approaches, diving into the specificity of the 1960s and the 1970s, seen from a non-European perspective, that of Latin American Liberation theologians.

¹⁶³ The encyclical *Octogesima adveniens* also contained references to international social justice, as in §43: “There is a need to establish a greater justice in the sharing of goods, both within national communities and on the international level. In international exchanges there is a need to go beyond relationships based on force, in order to arrive at agreements reached with the good of all in mind”.

4. An alternative perspective? The “culture of Liberation”.

After the Second Vatican Council, the Church was shaken by waves of protest it had rarely experienced throughout its thousand-year history. The Council had accomplished, despite difficulties and contradictions, a historic feat in opening a dialogue between the Church and the modern world. One of the most problematic aspects of this opening was the fact that the “modern world” itself was rapidly changing. We sketched out a general picture of these structural changes in the general introduction: Western societies were in turmoil, shaken by bursts of anti-system protests that exploded around the symbolic year 1968. The events of 1968 accelerated and epitomized a cultural revolution that changed the way of life of the new generations and the generations to come, both in private life (family, sexual relations) and in the public sphere (social and political engagement). At the same time, the global dimension burst onto the scene, generating new, unprecedented possibilities of cultural exchanges and reciprocal influences between different and distant parts of the world. One of the crucial factors of the cultural revolution was its criticism of authority, a diffused contesting of the role of established institutions, which were accused of constraining the freedom and independence of the human being. The Catholic Church was not immune to such contestation. From both outside and within the ecclesial community there were voices demanding a profound change in the institution. They especially criticized its centralized structure and the tendency to deny legitimacy to dissenting opinions – and the doctrine, obviously with a wide variety of contents and proposals, which highlighted the different interpretations and receptions of the Council.¹⁶⁴

How did this general climate influence the discourse on the idea of international community? Firstly, by leading Christians to get more involved in politics, both at national and international

¹⁶⁴ For a synthetic comprehensive account, we refer to Fagioli, *Vatican II. The Battle for Meaning*.

level, pushing for changes in the sociopolitical system. In this respect, a typical outcome of the post-conciliar season was the birth of political theology, as it was known, first developed in Europe in particular by Bavarian theologian Johann Baptist Metz (b. 1928).¹⁶⁵ The core of Metz's thought revolved around the compatibility between the fundamental process of modernity – the secularization of the world – and the Christian message, which entrusted the responsibility of the Creation to the man. The action of the Christian in the world, however, should not be contributing to the conservation of the existing social order, but rather it should be developing the liberating function of the Bible's promises with respect to the principles of freedom, peace, justice, reconciliation, actualizing their social and political implications. Christianity was defined as a “subversive memory” that the faithful should interpret as an element of change favoring the poor and those who were excluded from prosperity and development. In this picture, the Church had an important task, since it could use its vocation to universality to communicate the “critical and liberating” value of its message to the world.¹⁶⁶ Metz, therefore, encouraged Christians to act responsibly within the modern world, promoting a socially advanced and progressive, but not subversive or revolutionary attitude. This is a crucial point: the horizon of European political theology's elaboration was still the New Universalism, specified with a strong insistence on the element of social justice and on the responsibility of the faithful.

This was not the case for some Catholics who lived outside Europe, in the “dark side” of modernity. In particular, the most innovative position came from Latin America (here broadly considered as the area of the Americas south of the United States, from Mexico to Chile), where between the 1960s and the 1970s a group of Catholic theologians elaborated a radical view, which

¹⁶⁵ Metz, now Emeritus Professor of Fundamental Theology in Münster, has been one of the most influential Catholic theologians of the second half of the twentieth century. His 1968 book *Zur Theologie der Welt* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünenwald-Verlag, 1968) has been translated into more than five languages, and was widely circulating in the international context at the beginning of the 1970s. See Tiemo Rainer Peters, *Johann Baptist Metz: Theologie des vermissten Gottes*, Mainz: Matthias Grunewald, 1998; Rosino Gibellini (ed.), *Ancora sulla “teologia politica”*. *Il dibattito continua*, Brescia: Queriniana, 1975, and Pierre-Yves Materne, *La réception de la théologie politique de J.B. Metz*, in “Laval théologique et philosophique”, issue 2, 2007, pp. 275-90.

¹⁶⁶ Johann Baptist Metz, *Theology of the World*, New York: Herder and Herder, 1969, especially p. 151 and 134-5.

became known worldwide as “liberation theology”.¹⁶⁷ Here we will only mention its basic features: in the wake of the Vatican Council, many theologians and members of the local Latin American hierarchy asked themselves how the spirit of the documents could be applied to a completely different scenario compared to Europe. In their words, the subject of their reflection was not the “modern man”, but the “poor man”, forced to live in an unacceptable condition of dependence and oppression which deprived him of his dignity. The tools of social sciences, and the models offered by Marxist approaches like dependency theory, could help describe the effects of and the reasons for that situation, which was rooted in the capitalist and imperialist domination exerted by the First World over the Third.¹⁶⁸ The First World, moreover, could count on local allies like the authoritarian regimes spread over the subcontinent (which in the third quarter of the twentieth century was the case, at different times and with various degrees of intensity, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, San Salvador and other countries), and sympathetic local religious hierarchies.¹⁶⁹ The reality of Latin America (and of the whole Third World) contradicted God’s

¹⁶⁷ Here I will make reference to “liberation theology” as a consistent and organic doctrine, developed by Latin American theologians since the second half of the 1960s, without mentioning the elaborations coming from other parts of the world (which sometimes are being referred to as liberation theologies as well: for a very basic introduction, see Deane W. Ferm, “*Third World* Liberation Theologies: An Introductory Survey, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), or insisting on the differences among different theologians. This operation, useful for reasons of synthesis, is not completely arbitrary, because liberation theologians often preferred to underline the common aspects of their approaches, rather than their diverse sensibilities: they even tried to offer a systematization of the doctrine, for instance in the volume edited by Ignacio Ellacuría and Jon Sobrino, *Mysterium Liberationis. Conceptos fundamentales de la Teología de la Liberación*, Madrid: Editorial Trotta 1990. For comprehensive references see at least, in English, Charles Smith, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991; Mario Aguilar, *The History and Politics of Latin American Theology*, vol. I: *The Problem of Theological Generations*, London: SCM Press, 2007, and Michael Löwy, *The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America*, New York: Verso, 1996. Short biographies of the most prominent liberation theologians can be found in John R. Pottenger, *The Political Theory of Liberation Theology: Toward a Reconvergence of Social Values and Social Science*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989, pp. 190-93.

¹⁶⁸ Dependency theory was elaborated as of the 1950s by a group of authors (mostly economists and sociologists) who – despite some differences in the methodological approach (from liberal reformers like Raul Prebisch to Marxists like Andre Gunder Frank, to world system theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein) – converged in underlining the existence of a structural imbalance between the rich and the poor parts of the planet that was caused and maintained by the “center” (the rich part) in order to perpetuate its economic system. The periphery, therefore, was consciously kept in a condition of underdevelopment and exploitation. This theory gained consensus during the 1960s (proportionally to the progressive failure of developmentalist strategies, like Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress), and strongly influenced the thought of liberation theologians, in particular through its Marxist current, developed by Latin American authors like Theotonio Dos Santos, Ruy Mauro Marini and Vania Bambirra. For a general introduction to non-specialized readers see Vincent Ferraro, *Dependency theory: an introduction*, in Giorgio Secondi (ed.) *The Development Economics Reader*, Routledge, 2008, pp. 58–64.

¹⁶⁹ For a synthetic historical outline of the history of the Catholic Church in Latin America, we refer to John F. Schwaller, *The History of the Catholic Church in Latin America. From Conquest to Revolution and Beyond*, New York: New York University Press, 2011.

plan, which was centered on the liberation of the oppressed, represented by Israel in the Bible and by the underdeveloped countries in the contemporary age. The key word was “liberation”, a term which was understood to mean both liberation from sin (the classical theological concept of redemption), and liberation from the conditions of misery and subjugation in which the poor peoples were forced, and of which they were becoming aware.

According to this worldview, the enslavement of the Third World was a direct consequence of the interests of the First, which grouped developed countries and big international economic powers. Therefore, it was impossible or hypocritical to talk about development of the poor countries, without also talking about a global change of the structural features of the world economic system. In 1975, Mexican theologian Raul Vidales (1943-1995) wrote that “development and dependence are two faces of the same total process”, while two years later Argentine theologian Lucio Gera (1924-2012) summed up a consideration that can be considered as representative for the whole approach:

Dependency is revealed by underdevelopment, an inhumane condition that prevents individuals from being people, and by marginalization, an equally inhumane condition that forces both individuals and poor Nations to survive on the edge of society and international history. Beyond these symptoms, are their causes. We find them in political and economic structures, imposed by Imperialism.¹⁷⁰

This way of thinking was objectively very close to the Marxist reading of international relations (even if Argentinian theologians like Gera favored a historical-cultural analysis rather than a social Marxist analysis), founded on the association between capitalism and imperialism, and on the theory of the systematic exploitation of the planet by Western powers, headed by the United

¹⁷⁰ Raul Vidales was specialized in methodological theology, and during the 1970s published several studies on the religious practices of the urban poor and working class in the *barrios* of Lima, Peru. Lucio Gera, together with Juan Carlos Scannone, was the most important representative of a stream of liberation theology called “theology of the people”, focused on the role of popular religiosity as a culturally liberating factor. See the quotations in Raul Vidales, *Questioni sul metodo della teologia della liberazione*, in Rosino Gibellini (ed.), *La nuova frontiera della liberazione in America Latina*, Brescia: Queriniana 1975, p. 68, and Lucio Gera, *La iglesia frente a la situación de dependencia*, CELAM, 1977 (Italian translation *Religiosità popolare, dipendenza, liberazione*, Bologna: EDB, 1978, quotation at p. 74). A methodological note: given the difficulty to find most of the original editions of the work of liberation theologians, mostly in Spanish, I will normally reference the Italian editions, translating the quotations into English. In the footnotes, I will also quote the original source.

States.¹⁷¹ According to Marxists, the relationship between exploiter and exploited could only be resolved through conflict: the same dynamic that described labor relations could be applied to international relations. Liberation theologians had roughly the same advice: peace was not an “irenic conciliation”, nor universal love a “fake harmony” (in the words of Peruvian Gustavo Gutierrez (b. 1928), the most famous representative of this theological thought), but rather they could be reached only through conflict in the given historical conditions. Christians should not shy away from either conflict or revolution, since their faith demanded a fight against injustice and oppression.¹⁷²

Here we measure the distance from political theology, and with European progressive theology in general, that was accused of dealing exclusively with the composition between theology and modernity. In Latin America, the subject was not the modern man of the West, but the poor, the dispossessed man, and his need to break out of his marginalization through personal and social liberation. The points of view, therefore, were very different, and ultimately irreconcilable – on the one side emancipation, on the other liberation; on one hand development, on the other hand the overturning of the actual structure of international relations – even though they shared a common theoretical background.¹⁷³ Indeed, Liberation Theology could not be understood without making reference to European Left (or progressive) Catholicism, as historian Gerd-Rainer Horn has emphasized, which following the Second World War promoted a renewed commitment to interpreting Catholicism as a factor of change in contemporary societies.¹⁷⁴ Liberation theologians

¹⁷¹ A synthetic introduction of the Marxist approach to international relations is in Benno Teschke, *Marxism*, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 163-87. We will address in the next chapters, dealing with Italian laity, the theme of the connection between Catholic and Marxist discourses.

¹⁷² Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian Dominican priest, studied theology in Peru and in various European universities, becoming widely known and discussed even beyond Latin America (he also became a board member of the progressive international theological review “Concilium”). A good historical biography is Lucia Ceci, *La teologia della liberazione in America Latina. L'opera di Gustavo Gutierrez*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1999. The quotations are taken from Gustavo Gutierrez, *Liberation praxis and Christian faith*, in “Concilium”, issue 6, 1974, pp. 30-31.

¹⁷³ A useful comparison in Charles Duquoc, *Liberation et progressisme: un dialogue théologique entre l'Amérique Latine et l'Europe*, Paris: Cerf, 1987.

¹⁷⁴ See Gerd-Rainer Horn, *Western European Liberation Theology. The First Wave (1924-1959)*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 293-94 (Horn analyzed in particular the role of specialized Catholic action, new theology and political Catholicism), and for a first assessment and definition of European Left Catholicism, ID. and Emmanuel

underlined the influence of European cultural elaboration on their theological apprenticeship; *nouvelle théologie*, personalism, social thought, developed by authors that we have encountered along our journey, had a profound impact on their education, that was often completed in European universities during the 1950s and the 1960s (we are dealing with a younger generation of theologians than the one which performed the paradigm shift from Traditional to New Universalism).¹⁷⁵ Moreover, they were in constant dialogue with European contemporary theologians and intellectuals, as we will mention while moving forward with our analysis. Nonetheless, what distinguished their elaboration was a conception of theology as *acto segundo*, as a secondary act relative to the engagement in the historical praxis,¹⁷⁶ In the Latin American context during the late 1960s and the 1970s, engaging in the historical praxis and committing to the conflict for the liberation of the oppressed peoples meant choosing sides in the political field, mainly in favor of those movements who fought against authoritarian regimes harking back to the Cuban revolution of 1959.¹⁷⁷ Even the use of violence could be justified, in extreme conditions and only

Gerard (eds.), *Left Catholicism, 1943–1955. Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001. Michael Löwy and Jesús García-Ruiz have highlighted multiple links between French context and the take-off of Brazilian Liberation Theology after 1959, in *Les Sources francaises du Christianisme de la Libération au Brésil*, in “Archives de sciences sociales des religions”, issue 1, 1997, pp. 9-32.

¹⁷⁵ Gutierrez, for instance, studied in Leuven during the 1950s (where he became friends with another protagonist of Latin American Catholicism, Father Camilo Torres), with professors like Gustav Thils, Henri de Lubac, Yves Congar, Marie-Dominique Chenu, Roger Aubert, all of whom he would have found again in Rome during the Council, to which he participated as expert of Chilean Bishop Manuel Larraín. Also other liberation theologians as Brazilian Leonardo Boff (b. 1938) or Chilean Juan Luis Segundo (1925-1996) studied in Europe, and were in contact with European contemporary theology. See their profiles in Pottenger, *The Political Theory of Liberation Theology*, pp. 191 and 193, and the considerations in Ceci, *La teologia della liberazione in America Latina*, p. 58 ff.

¹⁷⁶ The theological foundation of this argument has been illustrated by Zoë Bennett, “*Action is the life of all*”: the *praxis-based epistemology of liberation theology*, in Christopher Rowland (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 39-54.

¹⁷⁷ Obviously, there were big differences in the degree of support to revolutionary movements, which ranged from the explicit endorsement (Ernesto Cardenal, Nicaraguan liberation theologian, will become Minister of Justice in the Ortega’s government of 1979, and will be later suspended *a divinis* by John Paul II), to a generic support for their goals. In any case, most Catholic movements (student organizations, Labor and peasants’ associations, grassroots communities) which in the 1970s fought against authoritarian regimes in many Latin American countries (Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador) made reference to liberation theology as one of the main sources of their protest. Chilean theologian Ronaldo Muñoz, who was also one of the protagonists of *Christians for Socialism* (a movement that was started in Santiago, Chile, in April 1971, which we will come back to in the third chapter), analyzed many collective documents of Latin American priests, where the support for revolutionary movements was explained, in *Two Community Experiences in the Latin American Liberation Movement*, in “Concilium”, issue 6, 1974, pp. 137-47. For a general overview and the analysis of some case studies see Daniel H. Levine (ed.), *The Politics of Liberation Theology*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.

when all nonviolent means had proven unsuccessful, because the real violence lay in unjust and oppressive economic and political structures¹⁷⁸

The raw synthesis of the liberation theology's point of view should have already underlined a basic divergence with New Universalism. While the latter established a basic convergence between the direction of history, in particular toward the widening and deepening of the relations among peoples, and the Christian worldview, based on the unity of the human family, the “culture of Liberation” contested the hypothesis of a positive evolution of international relations. According to this view, the internationalization process, which characterized the post-WWII period, was basically rooted in the increase of the gap between the rich and the poor parts of the planet, notwithstanding the praiseworthy efforts of international organizations. Seen from the “backside of history” (that was the title of one of Gutierrez's essays), the international community did not seem to be on the way to a greater integration, which could benefit all of its parts. The structural inequality of the international system, consciously perpetuated by capitalism and imperialism, made it impossible to hope for the development of the poor countries that would close the gap between the two poles of the community.¹⁷⁹ For those Christians who wanted to follow the message of the Gospels, the way to change things did not entail the support of international organizations, in order to gradually reduce the disparities among the subjects of the international system, but conflict and liberation.

Focusing on the differences between Universalism and Liberation should not lead us to believe that they were opposing worldviews. On the contrary, “Liberationists” and “Universalists” – restating once again that these are categorizations useful for historical analysis, and not systematic

¹⁷⁸ Dom Antônio Batista Fragoso (1920-2006), first Residential Bishop of Brazilian North-East and close to liberation theology, offered an emblematic example of this kind of reasoning in his journal (*O Poti*, Natal, 21/9/1967), some of whose excerpts have been first published in Antonio Fragoso, *Evangelho e problemática social*, Porto: A. Ferreira, 1969 (Italian edition *Vangelo e rivoluzione sociale*, Assisi: Cittadella Editrice, 1970, quotation at p. 119). On the problematic theoretical relationship between liberation theology and violence see some philosophical notes (even if the reflections are only based on Gutierrez's book *A Theology of Liberation*, 1971) in Fredrick Sontag, *Liberation Theology and its View of Political Violence*, in “Journal of Church and State”, issue 2, 1989, in part. pp. 279-82. This was, as it is easily understandable, a very controversial point, that can not be organically addressed in this synthetic outline. We will develop some considerations on the subject in the third chapter, addressing the Italian context.

¹⁷⁹ Emphatically, the first time that Gustavo Gutierrez publicly spoke about liberation theology, he had changed the title – and the spirit – of a lecture about the “theology of development”, that he should have given to a group meeting of Peruvian Catholic priests, in Chimbote. See Ceci, *La teologia della liberazione in America Latina*, pp. 102-103.

doctrines – converged in drawing from the sources of Christian faith a strong drive toward equality, fraternity and justice among human beings at global level, founded on the dignity of every person and on the natural tendency to form cohesive communities. However, they fundamentally disagreed on the way to reach these goals, whether through some corrections to a basically positive historical path, or through a revolutionary change of an intrinsically faulty power system. Not by chance, the culture of Liberation did not focus (even if it never contested them) on the principles of integration and cooperation within the international community, nor on the issue of human rights, until at least the end of the 1970s – in fact, most Liberation theologians employed a typical Marxist interpretation, which underlined the uselessness, or better the instrumentality, of the reference to civil and political rights, when the economic and social context prevented the poor and oppressed classes from enjoying them.¹⁸⁰ They did not consider the first two pillars of the Universalist discourse wrong *per se*, but rather largely inapplicable to the situation of the “poor man” of the Third World, for whom was impossible to enjoy the positive outcomes of modernity.

The anti-modern features of the culture of Liberation could suggest a consonance with Traditional Universalism, corroborated by the fact that at least until the Second Vatican Council, the religious formation of Latin American clergy was strongly shaped by Roman traditional theology, and therefore by the intransigent worldview. Actually, a technical comparison between the two models underlines another major possible common aspect, that is a strong politicization of religion: Traditional Universalism insisted on the concept of Christian society to describe the ideal interpenetration between spiritual and temporal power, while liberation theologians stressed the immediate social and political implications of the Christian faith in the present historical context (in both cases, we can observe a theoretical incompatibility with the doctrine of “separation of

¹⁸⁰ See Mark Engler, *Toward the rights of poor: Human Rights in Liberation theology*, in “The Journal of Religious Ethics”, issue 3, 2000, pp. 339-65. The issue of human rights will become central as of the 1980s: the path from avoidance to appropriation has been pointed out by Joas Adiprasetya, *Beyond Universality and Particularity: the Problem of the Human Rights Language in Liberation Theology*, in “Religion & Human Rights”, issue 2, 2013, pp. 163-71.

planes”).¹⁸¹ Nonetheless, if we scratch the surface, the differences between the two categorizations emerge with clarity. In fact, the culture of Liberation was explicitly hostile to any perspective of Christendom, interpreted as connivance between the institutional Church and the oppressive regimes in most of Latin America.¹⁸² On the whole, liberation theologians denied the existence of a direct link between Christian principles and a specific social and political option;¹⁸³ in any case, this choice should have been left to the conscience of the Christian community. Some of them – like Juan Luis Segundo – were more clearly in favor of socialism, even if they did not elaborate further on which kind of socialism was better for Latin American countries, or on the actual social and political consequences of this choice.¹⁸⁴ From a historical point of view, this lack of elaboration can be explained through a straightforward consideration: their priority was not the development of a consistent and systematic theology, but a practical commitment in situations of extreme hardship. Most liberation theologians combined academic teaching with a direct pastoral activity in the poorest parishes of the big cities, in base communities or among marginalized men and women. They were also often at personal risk, since they voiced their dissent toward authoritarian regimes.¹⁸⁵ The role of contextual elements played a significant part in attributing a certain

¹⁸¹ Liberation theologians rejected the theory of separation of planes – between a spiritual plane, prerogative of the Church, and a temporal one, prerogative of men – elaborated by European theology, because it did not solve the problems of the main subject of liberation theology (that is the poor, the marginalized), but at the same time they fully accepted the modern theological critiques of the model of Christendom, that was pivotal for the intransigent worldview. In this respect we have mentioned the importance of a European education for many liberation theologians, who could directly experience the new theological ideas that became “mainstream”, as we discussed, at the Second Vatican Council. The relationship between Liberation theology and intransigent culture has been addressed by Michael Löwy, *The War of Gods*, pp. 51-65. For methodological insights on the concept of politicization of religion (and on the related concept of sacralisation of politics) in the age of secularization see Renato Moro, *Religion and politics in the time of secularisation: The sacralisation of politics and politicisation of religion*, in “Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions”, issue 1, 2005, pp. 71-86.

¹⁸² The monumental *History of the Church in Latin America* published between 1964 and 1992 and directed by Enrique Dussel, Argentine historian close to liberation theology, ideologically underlined the difference between the institutional Church, which legitimized the institutionalized power, and the people’s religion, where the true principles of Catholicism lied.

¹⁸³ On this matter see Leonardo Boff, *Salvation in Jesus Christ and the Process of Liberation*, in “Concilium”, issue 6, 1974, pp. 87-89, and Segundo Galilea, *El Reino de Dios y la liberación del Hombre*, Bogotà: Ediciones Paulinas, 1985 (Italian edition *Regno di Dio e liberazione dell'uomo*, Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni Paoline, 1987, in part. pp. 53-55).

¹⁸⁴ See for instance Juan Luis Segundo, *Capitalism - Socialism: a Theological Crux*, in “Concilium”, issue 6, 1974, in part. pp. 117-20. But see also Ivo Lesbaupin, *The Latin American Bishops and Socialism*, in “Concilium”, issue 5, 1977, pp. 113–23, who analyzed documents produced by the Latin American episcopacy, arguing – in a slightly contrived fashion – that they were moving toward the full endorsement of Socialism.

¹⁸⁵ Some of them did pay for their dedication to the cause of the poor with their lives: that was the case of Ignacio Ellacurìa, who was killed by El Salvador’s Army in San Salvador in 1989, together with other five Jesuits and two

vagueness to the culture of Liberation, in particular with respect to the political and institutional consequences of that line of thought.

What kind of impact did this approach have on the discourse on the international community? As is evident, we cannot infer from it a consistent assessment of the desirable configuration of the international system; the culture of Liberation insisted on the necessity of changing the power dynamics at local level, deferring the problem of the global relations among peoples to a later time. Therefore, we cannot consider the Liberation *Weltanschauung* a consistent alternative to the universalist model: more precisely, it was a spur to act, a powerful invitation to fight for change and modify the course of history, that would have been interpreted in different ways depending on historical and geographical context (in the following chapters, we will discuss Italy). Essentially, it was a denunciation of the “injustice” that characterized the international community, injustice that made the core features of New Universalism only good on paper. It is not strange, then, that the main point of convergence between the two visions was on the issue of international social justice; without it, any discourse on peace, integration or respect for human rights was pointless. The culture of Liberation, we might argue, took to the extreme the premises laid out by the new universalist discourse on international social justice, implying that the only way to overcome the inequalities and imbalances which characterized the international system was through conflict. If the system was dependent on exploitation and oppression, and the oppressors had no interest in changing the status quo, then the sole consistent answer for the exploited peoples was liberation by revolutionary means, and not development.

housekeepers. On Ellacurìa’s body of thought, see the collection of essays edited by Michael E. Lee, *Ignacio Ellacurìa: Essays on History, Liberation and Salvation*, New York: Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 2013, in particular the introduction by Lee, *Ignacio Ellacurìa: a View from the North*, at pp. 1-25. Ellacurìa was killed nine years after another tragic and world-famous murder, that of San Salvador’s Archbishop Oscar Romero, who shared many key issues of liberation theology – first and foremost, his choice for the poor – but always took a clear stand against the direct political implications of faith, endorsed by liberation theologians. See the historical biography of Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, *Primero Dios: vita di Oscar Romero*, Milano: Mondadori, 2005, in part. pp. 98-102 for his position on liberation theology.

An emblematic example of the continuities and discontinuities between the two approaches – which allows us to pick up the analysis from where we left it at the end of the last paragraph – is given by the reception of the encyclical *Populorum progressio*, which had a huge impact on the Latin American context.¹⁸⁶ In the Magisterium’s pronouncement, the drive toward social justice was contextualized in a critical reading of economic relations at world level (whose imbalanced structure was a consequence, among other factors, of unrestrained Liberalism), as well as in the conviction that, through progressive adjustments, the disadvantaged Nations could join the general trend toward progress and development that had benefited the peoples of the First World. Nonetheless, the condemnation of the current features of the world economic system was loud and clear. As it was common for a document directed to a universal audience, the encyclical did not address any specific historical situation, but for Latin American readers the targets had names and faces, pertaining to the ruling class that had maintained or increased the underdevelopment of Third World countries.¹⁸⁷ Paul VI had been careful in underlining how revolution and violence could not be the answer to the question of justice, since they were bound to bring more instability and further violence; the condemnation of revolutionary uprising, though, was weakened by mentioning a caveat, in what would become the famous paragraph 31: “except where there is manifest, longstanding tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country”.

This statement seemed to have direct political implications, in particular in Latin America, or at least this was how it was interpreted by radical Catholic movements and theologians, who would

¹⁸⁶ See Jorge Marie Mejia, *Ripercussioni dell’enciclica nell’America Latina*, in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Il Magistero di Paolo VI nell’enciclica Populorum progressio*, pp. 116-23. Paul VI, according to the influential statement of card. Achille Silvestrini, was thinking about Latin America when writing *Populorum Progressio*: see Achille Silvestrini, Prefazione, in Melloni and Scatena (eds.), *L’America Latina fra Pio XII e Paolo VI*, p. IX. More generally, on Paul VI and Latin America, see Renato Papetti (ed.), *Pablo VI y América Latina*, Brescia/Roma: Istituto Paolo VI/Studium, 2002; for some notes on the relation between Paul VI and liberation theology, see José-Roman Flecha, *Pablo VI y la teología de la liberación*, in “Istituto Paolo VI – Notiziario”, issue 59, 2010, pp. 35-55.

¹⁸⁷ Again, we could argue a similar case for other “Third World” regions, but they did not develop a theology as consistent and influential as the Latin American one (at least, not at this time), that we chose as representative for the “culture of Liberation”

later become protagonists of the culture of Liberation.¹⁸⁸ Symbolically, this was the point of divergence between our two models: was conflict an extreme but admissible means to rebalance historical situations characterized by patent injustices? At the core, we would argue, the answer to this question was different. While, for Liberationists, engagement in fights against oppressive regimes was a moral imperative stemming from the sources of Christian faith, the new universalist discourse did not endorse such an interpretation. When Paul VI went to Latin America in 1968, to open the second Assembly of Latin American Episcopacy in Medellín (Colombia), he took a clear stand in this regard, ruling out justifying the recourse to arms in any existing geopolitical context.¹⁸⁹ The controversial passage of paragraph 31 was meant to be interpreted at doctrinal level, as a restatement that the Church had the right to determine in which circumstances the recourse to arms – ultimately, to war – could potentially be permitted. We might glimpse in this position another element of continuity with Traditional Universalism: the pope did not exclude, on principle, the possibility of the use of force, even if he was extremely careful in restricting the possible reasons (on numerous occasions, he voiced his absolute condemnation of any actual war), reserving to the Church the right to verify its legitimacy,¹⁹⁰ Montini, in other words, chose not to interrupt a very long tradition which made reference to the doctrine of the “just war”, although at the same time he clearly committed the Church, as we have shown, to the indefatigable quest for peace,¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Smith, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology*, p. 177 ff. *Populorum progressio* became, by far, the Magisterium's document most frequently quoted by liberation theologians.

¹⁸⁹ See in particular the homily of the Mass for Colombian campesinos (23/8/1968), and the inaugural address of the second Assembly of Latin-American Episcopacy in Medellín (24/8/1968), in AAS, vol. 60, 1968, pp. 619-24 [web: Italian, Spanish] and pp. 639-49 [web: Italian, Spanish].

¹⁹⁰ In the message for the ninth World Day of Peace (quoted at footnote 107) we can find a clear exposition of his vision: “arms and wars are, in a word, to be excluded from civilization's programmes”, the pope stated commenting on the destructive impact of modern warfare. But on principle, there remained a legitimate recourse to force, when it attained “the pure object of effectively vindicating a truly just cause”. The fact that there were no such examples in the contemporary age, did not imply the end of the principle's validity.

¹⁹¹ For a synthetic historical profile of the “just war” doctrine in the Teachings of the contemporary Church see Daniele Menozzi, *Ideologia di cristianità e pratica della “guerra giusta”*, in Franzinelli and Bottoni (eds.), *Chiesa e guerra*, pp. 91-127, while a theological assessment of the history of the concept in the most important Catholic thinkers – from Augustin to Thoms Aquinas, from Francisco de Vitoria to Francisco Suarez – is in Justenhoven and Barbieri, Jr. (eds.), *From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics*, in particular the essays by Roland Kany, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Markus Kremer and James Bernard Murphy. Before Paul's clarifications, the official position of the Catholic Church had been explained by Father Antonio Messineo on “La Civiltà Cattolica” in a series of articles: see in particular *I limiti della legittima difesa nell'ordinamento internazionale*, in “CC”, issue 3, 1965; ID., *L'organizzazione comunitaria sola garanzia di sicurezza*, in “CC”, issue 3, 1966; ID., *La guerra e l'ordine di giustizia*, in “CC”, issue 2, 1967, and ID.,

In Latin America, though, the heavy words of *Populorum progressio* were connected to the possible legitimacy of social uprisings against “real-life” authorities. Paul’s urgent need to rectify his intentions shows how, in an age of profound changes both within Catholic culture and in the international system, some Magisterial stances could lead to “unforeseen consequences”, and thence to time-sensitive adjustments of the official line by the ecclesiastical authority. A similar dynamic was in play for what concerned the “liberation discourse”, since the radical language employed by its protagonists was later fine-tuned – after the disillusion generated by the outcome of the revolutionary movements – by a decreased attention toward political conflict and economic issues, and an increased focus both on a wider range of topics (human rights, ecology, defense of cultural minorities) and on spirituality.¹⁹²

Universalism and Liberation, in other words, were not structured visions of the world, but rather were a work in progress, an effort to adapt Catholic culture to the challenges posed by the contemporary age; therefore, they changed over time, also through reciprocal influences and cross-fertilization. This is why we will dedicate the last part of the chapter to investigating how the Magisterium discourse reacted to the culture of Liberation, which was simultaneously a radical development of some aspects of New Universalism and an implicit challenge to its very premise. This brief digression will take us beyond the chronological limits of our research, in order to give a glimpse of the evolution of the two paradigms, and to show the specificity and relevance of the

L'ordine divino della pace e la guerra moderna, in “CC”, issue 3, 1967. In the pronouncements about the conflicts exploded during his papacy – like the Six-Day War and, most of all, the Vietnam war – Paul VI never declared the war intrinsically incompatible with faith and religion, choosing not to develop the great news sketched out by *Pacem in terris*. On the attitude of the Holy See toward the Vietnam war, as well as the general histories of the Holy See’s international relations, see some insights in Marco Mugnaini, *Le Saint-Siège et la guerre du Vietnam*, in Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaisse (eds.), *La guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe 1963-1973*, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2003, pp. 401-13. About the Six-Day War, in the context of the complicated relations between the Holy See and Israel, see the reconstruction of Silvio Ferrari, *Vaticano e Israele dal secondo conflitto mondiale alla guerra del Golfo*, Firenze: Sansoni, 1991, pp. 181-84 and 191-200.

¹⁹² See for instance the work of Gustavo Gutierrez in the 1980s, in particular *Beber un su propio pozo. En el itinerario espiritual de un pueblo*, Lima: Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1983, and *El Dios de la vida*, Lima: Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1989, or of Jon Sobrino, especially *Liberación con Espíritu: Apuntes para una Nueva Espiritualidad*, San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1980. For an evaluation of the itinerary undertaken by liberation theology, written by first and second generation protagonists of such current, see Leonardo Boff, José Ramos-Regidor and Clodovis Boff, *A Teologia da Libertaçao: balanço e perspectivas*, São Paulo: Editora Atica, 1996. We will come back briefly to this subject in a few pages.

papacy of Paul VI in this context. Our starting point will be the Medellín assembly just mentioned, a pivotal event where institutional discourse and new theological perspectives interacted, laying the foundation for the development of the culture of Liberation.

5. Toward a new season: The reaction of the Magisterium to the culture of Liberation.

From August 26 to September 7, 1968, Latin American bishops gathered in Medellín, Colombia, for their second general Assembly, thirteen years after their last encounter in Rio de Janeiro. The Assembly, which had to elaborate a pastoral perspective for the continent after the outcomes of the Second Vatican Council, represented a watershed for Latin American Catholicism; it cannot be considered an expression of liberation theology, even if many future representatives of that school – like Gustavo Gutierrez, Lucio Gera, Juan Luis Segundo, Joseph Comblin – participated in the proceedings.¹⁹³ Nonetheless, the final documents employed a powerful and radical language: the exploitation of Latin American countries was stated as a fact, whose origin was to be found in the political and economic dependency on an external “power center”, governed by “international imperialism of money” and its political allies (quoting *Populorum progressio*, which in turn referenced *Quadragesimo anno*). Christians should fight against the status quo, but not in a revolutionary way, the “manifest, long-standing tyranny” mentioned by the 1967 encyclical notwithstanding. On the contrary, the faithful were to work for the “conscientization of the people”, for peace and social justice, for protecting the rights of the poor, in collaboration with international organizations, which should condemn the dominating attitude of rich countries. According to Latin

¹⁹³ See Oscar J. Beozzo, *Medellín. Inspiration et racines*, in Alberto Melloni and Joseph Dorè (eds.), *Volti di fine concilio. Studi di storia e di teologia sulla conclusione del Vaticano II*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000, pp. 361-94; Silvia Scatena, *In populo pauperum. La Chiesa latinoamericana dal concilio a Medellín (1962-1968)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007; for the reflection of a participant, see Segundo Galilea, *Latin America in the Medellín and Puebla Conferences: An Example of Selective and Creative Reception of Vatican II*, in Giuseppe Alberigo, Jean-Pierre Jossua and Joseph Komonchak (eds.), *The Reception of Vatican II*, Washington DC/Tunbridge Wells: CUA Press/Burns & Oates, 1987, pp. 59-73.

American bishops, thus, the international community was crossed by “inequality lines”, which did not necessarily match the political boundaries of Nation-States. Underlining the injustice, though, did not mean encouraging Christians to fight for the overthrowing of the international order – violence was explicitly condemned. In other words, New Universalism was radicalized, but not questioned about its premises.¹⁹⁴

The employment of the word “liberation” is a good lexical marker for evaluating the Latin American bishops' approach and comparing it with our paradigms: the term was not used to directly endorse social and political change, but rather to underline the importance of the personal, internal redemption of men in order to achieve that change.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, in the work of liberation theologians we have seen how the word encompassed the dual reference to actual social emancipation, and to salvation, with a strong accent on the first feature.¹⁹⁶ During the turbulent years between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, however, the debate was placed front and center within the whole ecclesial community (we will argue a specific case about Italy in the third chapter): we must not think of a black-and-white alternative between two models, but of a combination of the two options with various degrees of intensity. For instance, we mentioned that the 1971 Synod of Bishops explicitly spoke about liberation of peoples “in their present existence”, while an even more challenging interpretation came from a source that was traditionally close to the papacy, the Society of Jesus. Under the guide of Father General Pedro Arrupe (1907-1991), the Society's discourse grew closer to the culture of Liberation, as the resolutions of the XXXII General Congregation (December 1974 – March 1975) illustrate. On this occasion, the Assembly promulgated a document dedicated to “Our mission today: the Service of Faith and the Promotion

¹⁹⁴ Medellín final documents can be consulted, in English, in Alfred T. Hennelly (ed.), *Liberation Theology. A Documentary History*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990, pp. 89-119.

¹⁹⁵ “The uniqueness of the Christian message – is stated in the final document – does not so much consist in the affirmation of the necessity for structural change, as it does in the insistence on the conversion of men which will in turn bring about this change”. See the section on “Justice”, §2.

¹⁹⁶ The concept is well explained by Gustavo Gutierrez, *Teología de la liberación, Perspectivas*, Lima: CEP, 1971 (Italian edition *Teologia della liberazione. Prospettive*, Brescia: Queriniana 1972, especially p. 46).

of Justice".¹⁹⁷ The title itself points to the link between the Jesuits' mission – to be at the service of the Catholic faith in the world – and the establishment of a fairer international system. The latter was regarded, in the words of the document, as "increasingly interdependent but, for all that, divided by injustice: injustice not only personal but institutionalized: built into economic, social, and political structures that dominate the life of nations and the international community". The task of Jesuits was identified in helping man in his quest for peace, joining and supporting him in the effort toward his spiritual and material liberation.¹⁹⁸

When the resolutions of the 32nd General Congregation were published, in the spring of 1975, Paul VI had already stepped in to specify the Magisterium's position on the matter. By that time, Montini knew that his decision to consider the issue of social justice a pillar of the Catholic discourse on the international community had opened the door to radical interpretations of the Christians' role within society. He was also well aware of the political implications that the concept of "liberation" had taken on, in particular after its appropriation from Latin American theologians.¹⁹⁹ On the numerous occasions when he took a stance on these topics – particularly the speech to the World Congress of Pax Romana (July 21, 1971), and the words pronounced at the General Audience of July 31, 1974 – the pope employed a prudent but firm attitude, which showed appreciation for the intentions of many Catholics who chose to side with the poor and the

¹⁹⁷ See the final document in John W. Padberg (ed.), *Documents of the 31st and 32nd general congregations of the Society of Jesus: an English translation of the official Latin texts of the general congregations and of the accompanying papal documents*, Saint Louis, MO: Institute of Jesuit sources, 1977, pp. 411-38, available online at <http://onlineministries.creighton.edu/CollaborativeMinistry/our-mission-today.html>. A recent assessment of the academic research on Pedro Arrupe is in Gianni La Bella, *Pedro Arrupe: un uomo per gli altri*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007 (French edition *Pedro Arrupe, supérieur général des Jésuites (1965-1983)*, Paris: Cerf, 2009); see in particular the essay of Alfonso Alvarez Bolado, *La 32^a Congregazione Generale*, pp. 261-367.

¹⁹⁸ Quotation from §7, but see also §§27, 79 and 89.

¹⁹⁹ See for instance the speech at the General Audience of August 16, 1972 (*Insegnamenti*, vol. X, pp. 817-20) [web: Italian], when the pope explicitly quoted the discourse of liberation theologians as cause of intense reflection for him. In the first years of the pontificate, the word "liberation" was present in Montini's vocabulary, generally to indicate any form of emancipation from spiritual or actual chains, but without political references to present historical conditions: see for instance the General Audience of March 3, 1965, or Paul's homily in Fatima (13/5/1967), respectively in *Insegnamenti*, vol. III, pp. 870-72 [web: Italian], and *AAS*, vol. 59 (II), 1967, pp. 593-97 [web: Italian, Portuguese]. To my knowledge, a scholarly account of the variations attributed to the concept of liberation in the Church's discourse during the contemporary age (and in particular from the 1960s onwards), is still missing; such a study could bring a useful contribution on the debate about the politicization of religion.

oppressed, but at the same time excluded the endorsement of any form of social revolution.²⁰⁰

Liberation was primarily a spiritual concept, linked to the soul's salvation in the life beyond death. It could also entail a special drive toward social engagement, but only within the boundaries of the Catholic view, i.e. excluding any references to anti-Christian ideologies or their political spearheads (with evident references to Marxism and Communism). In other words, the pope restated the right meaning of "liberation", according to the Church's doctrine, clearly marking the difference with liberation theologians but without condemning them.

This approach, we would argue, was consistent with Montini's personal attitude and with the general features of his pontificate. Paul VI was open to dialogue with modern culture, and to an updating of the Catholic cultural instruments for reading the contemporary world, in continuity with the deliberations of the Council. When he had to deal with the outcomes of this openness, however, he found it increasingly difficult to lead all the different inputs back into one consistent discourse. Nonetheless, he almost never indulged in resorting to one of the instruments available to the pope, that is the condemnation of currents or personalities which strayed from the path of orthodoxy. Let us not forget that Montini was a refined intellectual, who personally knew the damage done by the rigid and confrontational attitude of the Vatican to some of the best minds of his generation until the

²⁰⁰ AAS, vol. 63 (II), 1971, pp. 687-91 [web: French], and *Insegnamenti*, vol. XII, pp. 686-89 [web: Italian], but see also the address to the European Colloquy on the Pastoral for Labour (12/10/1972), in AAS, vol. 64 (II), 1972, pp. 683-88 [web: French]. The hypothesis of an intense reflection upon these themes seems to be confirmed by a passage of the apostolic exhortation *Marialis cultus*, quoted a few pages ago. In §37, a phrase of *Magnificat* regarding the punishment for the mighty and the glorification of the humble was slightly changed from the original version in Luke's Gospel, so that Mary's prayer to God was associated with the vindication of "the humble and the oppressed" ("vindicem humilium vique oppressorum hominum", instead of the traditional version "exaltavit humiles") and the removal of "the powerful people of this world from their privileged positions" ("ac mundi potentes de sede deponere", instead of "depositum potentes de sede"). The implicit political references of the lexical additions – oppressed, powerful people of the world – were in line with the interpretation of Mary's cult that was implemented in Latin American Churches, and that in this (rather isolated) case were acknowledged by the Magisterium. Once we are able to access the Vatican archives for this period, we will be able to elaborate further on the drafting process of the encyclical, on which Mariology's expert Ignacio Maria Calabuig (1931-2005, Servite Friar who worked all his life as professor at Roman Pontifical theological Faculty "Marianum") presumably collaborated. These points have been made by Giacomo Canepa, *Rovescia i potenti dai troni*, in part. pp. 30-31.

late 1950s. He therefore usually chose to avoid doctrinal interventions aimed at condemning specific protagonists of the Catholic cultural elaboration.²⁰¹

This does not mean that the Magisterium's position could be misunderstood. Going back to the concept of liberation, the stances taken since the beginning of the 1970s were reorganized and synthetized in the apostolic exhortation *Evangelii nuntiandi*, promulgated in December 1975.²⁰² *Evangelii nuntiandi* – which should also be read as the final document of the previous year's Synod of Bishops²⁰³ – linked liberation to the central theme of the pronouncement, i.e. evangelization: mankind could free itself only by following Christ's message, and therefore the Teachings of the Church. Although this message had both spiritual and material content, the second was clearly subordinated to the first, and could not be turned into the endorsement of ideologies or political movements which blatantly contradicted Christian faith. In this regard, one passage of the exhortation could be interpreted as a direct criticism of liberation theology:

The Church has the firm conviction that all temporal liberation, all political liberation - even if it endeavors to find its justification in such or such a page of the Old or New Testament, even if it claims for its ideological postulates and its norms of action theological data and conclusions, even if it pretends to be today's theology - carries within itself the germ of its own negation and fails to reach the ideal that it proposes for itself whenever its profound motives are not those of justice in charity, whenever its zeal lacks a truly spiritual dimension and whenever its final goal is not salvation and happiness in God.²⁰⁴

Even if the pope did not explicitly refer to the elaboration of Latin American theologians, his different orientation was clear. "Temporal liberation" was not excluded, but it was closely

²⁰¹ A partial exception concerned Pedro Arrupe, who was forced to reconsider his positions – in particular, about the reform of the structure of the Jesuits' order – at the end of 1975. The episode of the harsh meeting with Paul VI, which led to a formal retraction by Arrupe, has been narrated by Arrupe's biographer, the Spanish Jesuit Pedro Miguel Lamet, *Arrupe, una explosión en la Iglesia*, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1989 (quotation from the Italian translation *Pedro Arrupe. Un'esplosione nella Chiesa*, Milano: Ancora, 1993, pp. 327-31). This passing collision, however, did not break the substantial synergy between the two: see De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, pp. 647-54.

²⁰² For the pivotal role of the document in Montini's pontificate see De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, in part. pp. 674-87.

²⁰³ The 1974 Assembly, dedicated to evangelization, did not reach a common conclusion because of the differing views among bishops, and therefore the bishops asked (at the suggestion of Karol Wojtyła) Paul VI for a final document. See Stephen B. Bevans and Jeffrey Gros, *Evangelization and Religious Freedom: Ad Gentes, Dignitatis Humanae*, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2009, pp. 63-65.

²⁰⁴ See the apostolic exhortation *Evangelii nuntiandi*, §35: AAS, vol. 68, 1976, pp. 5-76.

connected to its spiritual roots, thus informed by Catholicism: ultimately, as he asserted in the speech to the Sacred College, on June 21, 1976, “Christ is the only salvation, the only hope, the only liberation”.²⁰⁵ Once again, we see that in the last phase of his papacy, Paul VI chose to rely more and more on a traditional approach to the problems of the contemporary age, or in other words, on a reassertion of the Christian “difference” as the interpretative key to managing the confrontation with the modern culture; the initial openness was partially reconsidered, after having experimented the “unforeseen consequences” of that attitude. At the end of our investigation, let us try to suggest a possible explanation for this trend. From our point of view, we might state that the development of the liberation discourse drove the pope to underplay the radical political implications of New Universalism, insisting on the reference to the Christian doctrine as irreplaceable key to assuring a peaceful coexistence at international level. Only by following the Christian message, safeguarded by the Church, could mankind build a fairer, more cooperative international community; consequently, going back to *Evangelii nuntiandi*, liberation was achievable only through evangelization.²⁰⁶ We can categorize this attitude as a “traditional approach to New Universalism”.

In order to better define this last concept, we need to take a look beyond the chronological boundaries of our analysis, taking into account the long pontificate of Karol Józef Wojtyła (1920-2005), who was elected pope in October 1978 after the brief papacy of Albino Luciani (1912-1978), and would have further reinforced this approach.²⁰⁷ Here we will just propose a general interpretative key to understanding John Paul’s approach to the idea of international community,

²⁰⁵ AAS, vol. 68, 1976, quotation at p. 467, my translation.

²⁰⁶ §38 of the apostolic exhortation was unequivocal: “It is to be hoped that all these considerations will help to remove the ambiguity which the word ‘liberation’ very often takes on in ideologies, political systems or groups. The liberation which evangelization proclaims and prepares is the one which Christ Himself announced and gave to man by His sacrifice”.

²⁰⁷ As well as the historical accounts by Portier, Menozzi and Miccoli quoted in the introduction, see a theological introduction to John Paul’s thought in Gerard Mannion (ed.), *The Vision of John Paul II: Assessing His Thought and Influence*, Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier/Liturgical Press, 2008.

which has already been debated, in particular for his role in the final stage of the Cold War.²⁰⁸ On the whole, Wojtyła's pontificate was characterized by a profound faith in the capacity of the Christian message to live up to the challenges posed by modern times, so much as to hypothesize a global reconquest of society based not on the return to Christendom, but instead on the full appropriation of modern values like democracy, liberty, human rights and social justice, which in his opinion had their roots in the Catholic thought. Consistently, in his public discourse we can find numerous references to the concept of "universal common good", especially in association with our familiar ingredients – integration of the international community, respect for human rights (particularly emphasized), advancement of social justice.²⁰⁹ For the fortieth anniversary of the promulgation of *Pacem in terris*, in 2003, John Paul II praised John's clairvoyance, but significantly focused on the necessity for universal peace to be grounded in "a shared recognition of *an order in things* which is not dependent on the will of any individual or group". Any social order – namely, the life in common among peoples at global level – needed to be based on a moral order, which found its ultimate source in the natural law revealed by the Christian doctrine.²¹⁰ The 27-year pontificate of John Paul II needs a much more nuanced analysis, since it also intersected with the general transition from "first" to "advanced" modernity mentioned in the Introduction, but broadly speaking, Wojtyła emphasized the role of Catholicism as the moral center of gravity of the international community. We may speak of a "traditional approach to New Universalism", meaning that the full acceptance of the contents developed under the papacy of Paul VI was inflected by a

²⁰⁸ In the field of scholarly literature (aside from agiographical interpretations and journalistic reconstructions), see at least the already quoted Schäfer, *The Catholic Church and the Cold War's end in Europe*, and Agostino Giovagnoli, *Karol Wojtyla and the end of the Cold War. Vatican Ostpolitik and Pope John Paul II*, in Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (eds.), *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War. Issues, interpretations, periodizations*, Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 82-89.

²⁰⁹ See for instance the encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1987), §36; the message to Jaime de Piniès, President of the 40th General Assembly of the UN (14/10/1985), and the address to Jacques Diouf, FAO's General Director (16/10/2003), respectively in AAS, vol. 80, 1988, pp. 513-86; *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II*, vol. VIII (2), Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1986, pp. 982-88 [web: French, Italian, Spanish] and AAS, vol. 96, 2004, pp. 957-60 [web: German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese].

²¹⁰ See the message for the World Day for Peace, 2003, in AAS, vol. 95, 1003, pp. 339-47, quotation from p. 343 (italics in text). For the resurgence of the concept of natural law in John Paul II's pontificate see Portier, *La pensée de Jean-Paul II*, pp. 48-62, and Janet E. Smith, *Natural Law and Personalism in Veritatis Splendor*, in Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, S. J. (eds.), *Readings in Moral Theology*, issue 10: *John Paul II and Theology*, New York: Paulist Press, 1998, pp. 67-84.

constant reference to the Church's doctrine as their sole source. International organizations and institutions were responsible for a peaceful development of international relations, but their work should be judged by the Catholic Church, depending on the congruity of their decisions with Christian principles.²¹¹

It is not strange, then, that John Paul's approach to the concept of liberation was fully encompassed by the framework sketched out by *Evangelii nuntiandi*. Liberation's true meaning was to be found in the sources of Catholicism, not in different takes on society (especially Marxism), which would have made the remedy worse than the disease. With a strong symbolic message, the pope developed these arguments at the Third Assembly of Latin American Episcopacy, which took place in Puebla (Mexico), in January 1979.²¹² Essentially, Wojtyła reversed the approach of liberation theologians, stating that the starting point for Catholic theologians and intellectuals should not be the engagement in historical praxis, but instead the revealed Truth. Only from this perspective could many of the issues pursued by liberation theology, such as the preferential option for the poor, be accepted and promoted (John Paul II made a strong point about the need for Catholicism to side with marginalized peoples, denouncing their mistreatment and endorsing the fight for the respect of their dignity). Latin American bishops accepted this perspective, and followed the guidelines of *Evangelii nuntiandi* to address the central theme of the Conference, which was, notably, the meaning of evangelization in the Latin American context. Although the view of liberationists was not expunged from the final document – on the contrary, the “liberating mission” of the Church was strongly emphasized – the radical language of Medellín had been significantly softened.²¹³ The very participation of many liberation theologians, like Gustavo

²¹¹ In the Angelus of June 19, 1994, John Paul II significantly stated – talking about the debate at the European Parliament concerning the legalization of same-sex marriage – that the natural law, “engraved by God in the hearts of men, predates any man-made law, and measure its validity”. See *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II*, vol. XVII (I), Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1996, p. 1203, my translation [web: Italian, Spanish].

²¹² See John Paul's address to the third general Assembly of the Latin American Episcopate, in AAS, vol. 71 (I), 1979, pp. 187-206 [web: French, English, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese]. For the influences in the drafting of the discourse, see Miccoli, *In difesa della fede*, p. 44.

²¹³ See the integral final document of Puebla's Conference, translated in English by John Drury, in John Eagleson and Philip Scharper, *Puebla and Beyond*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, pp. 122-285.

Gutierrez, was obstructed by the Latin American Episcopal Conference, which had taken a conservative turn under the presidency of Colombian Mgr. Alfonso López Trujillo (1935-2008).²¹⁴

This episode symbolizes the reverberations of the shift in the discourse that we analyzed, on Rome's practical attitude toward liberation theology, which became increasingly confrontational starting in the late 1970s. While during Paul's papacy, as we mentioned, the critical approach was never translated into an actual condemnation, things changed during John Paul's pontificate. In 1984, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, headed by future pope Benedict XVI, Card. Joseph Ratzinger (b. 1927), promulgated the instruction *Libertatis nuntius*, which officially censured "certain aspects of liberation theology", while personal measures were directed against some of the most representative protagonists of that theology, like Leonardo Boff, who in 1985 was condemned to a year of "obsequious silence" and suspended from religious duties because of his 1981 book *Iglesia carisma y poder*.²¹⁵ Two aspects in particular were quoted as pivotal reasons for the condemnation: the uncritical assumption of Marxism (which opened the door to the expansion of Communism in Latin America), and the criticism of the hierarchical nature of the Church – as in Boff's book. In other words, Rome resorted to a traditional reaction to cultural elaborations that did not toe the Magisterial line; the season opened by John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council and continuing, with caution and balance, under Paul's papacy, seemed to have come to an end. From

²¹⁴ For a critical account of the conservative turn taken by the Episcopal Conference under the guidance of Trujillo (Archbishop of Medellín since 1979, president of the Latin American Episcopal Conference from 1972 to 1984, and of the Pontifical Council for the Family since 1991, advocate of conservative values and major representative of traditionalist area within the Catholic Church) see François Houtart, *L'Histoire du CELAM ou l'oubli des origines*, in "Archives de sciences sociales des religions", issue 1, 1986, pp. 93-105, but also Edward L. Cleary, *Crisis and change: the Church in Latin America today*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985, pp. 121-22. Most liberation theologians, however, participated in the proceedings thanks to the personal invitation of some sympathetic bishops, and were therefore able to influence the outcomes of the Assembly: see Smith, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology*, pp. 21-25.

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See AAS, vol. 76 (II), 1984, pp. 876-909, for the Latin text of the instruction, and the Holy See's website for the English translation. Boff could count on great expressions of solidarity within the whole ecclesial community, which contributed to the decision's partial repeal in 1986. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith also sent a letter to the Peruvian Episcopal Conference listing the objections to his thought, but the official condemnation was avoided by the Conference. In any case, this "change of climate" had the effect of undermining the role of liberation theologians within the Latin American Catholic Church, favoring their marginalization from seminars, universities and so on, as is witnessed by Enrique Dussel, *Teología de la Liberación y marxismo*, in Ellacuría and Sobrino (eds.), *Mysterium Liberationis*, p. 136.

the Church's perspective, this was the moment to "rally the troops" and re-embark on a mission to evangelize the world. It was a time for leaders, not moderators, and in this regard the difference between the physical, assertive and communicative Wojtyła and the intellectual, diplomatic and reserved Montini was striking. John Paul's protagonism on the international scene was a perfect example of this new attitude, which we should now be able to analyze and contextualize within the history of the contemporary Church, with its characteristic mix of continuities and discontinuities.

This is not, however, the scope of the present work. Indeed, this brief excursion beyond the loose chronological boundaries of our research had as its primary aim to show how the period under investigation marked a distinct phase in the history of Catholic culture's approach to international relations. We have followed the rising of a new paradigm New Universalism, which came to inform institutional Catholic discourse during the pontificate of Paul VI. Then we have seen how this paradigm was challenged by a different approach – the culture of Liberation – which was ultimately condemned by the Magisterium. Liberation theology, to be more precise, survived Rome's attack and continued to influence the elaboration of Catholic theologians and intellectuals all over the world until the present day, but it lost precisely those features which characterized its discourse on the international community, i.e. the tendency to endorse radical change in the power structure at global level, through its adoption of a Marxist reading of international relations and its support to revolutionary movements engaged in the social and political realization of such theories.²¹⁶ During the 1960s and the 1970s, however, these dynamics were in full play, and that is what makes those decades particularly fascinating for historians.

In the next two chapters, we will try to employ these categories to analyze the theoretical elaboration of Italian movements, personalities and organizations which drew their inspiration from

²¹⁶ This trend has been underlined, among others, by Georges de Schrijver, *Paradigm Shift in Third-World Theologies of Liberation: From Socio-Economic Analysis to Cultural Analysis?* In ID. (ed.), *Liberation Theologies on Shifting Grounds: A Clash of Socio-economic and Cultural Paradigms*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998, pp. 3-84. Many Latin American liberation theologians, from the 1980s onwards, have acknowledged how their approach during the 1970s was too focused on socioeconomic matters, and too hinged on radical economic and political theories: see for instance L. Boff, Ramos-Regidor and C. Boff, *A Teologia da Libertaçāo*, pp. 21-22.

Catholic culture. We will start with the field of politics, that was especially interested in the reflection upon the idea of international community (since it was traditionally involved in its implementation), before addressing the point of view of some protagonists from the Italian Catholic world. This tour d'horizon will reveal a surprising landscape, offering a small contribution to charting a far wider map, in the spirit of the incremental nature of historical knowledge.

III

The Culture of Foreign Policy of Italian Christian Democracy

Come democratici cristiani, infine, le nostre valutazioni sul momento internazionale non possono prescindere dalla considerazione di un evento religioso e storico, sul nuovo periodo che si è aperto nella Chiesa — anzi, che si è aperto nelle Chiese — dopo la conclusione del Concilio Ecumenico. Vorrei dire che quell'evento, così presente nell'anima di tutti — e lo testimonia la commovente, universale gratitudine alla memoria di Papa Giovanni — ha riproposto in tutta la sua drammatica evidenza, al di là delle tentazioni di schieramento e di strumentazione degli episodi contingenti della storia, il ruolo del Cristianesimo nel mondo: come forza viva e vivificante delle speranze e delle azioni delle comunità, per attingere lo sviluppo e l'indipendenza nella pace.

Flaminio Piccoli, Political Secretary, Speech at the 9th Congress of Democrazia Cristiana, 1969

1. *Introduction: Democrazia Cristiana (DC), the “party of the Nation”.*

The relationship between religion and politics has always represented a crucial subject for historians and political scientists, and still does so.¹ In recent years, in the wake of the impact of religious fundamentalism, more and more studies have been devoted to the effect of the religious factor on international relations (and to the opportunity to include it in classical international relations theories), a subject that is evidently taking center stage in the contemporary world.² The common

¹ Comprehensive and synthetic accounts of the status of the research are in Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Routledge, 2009, and Jonathan Fox, *An Introduction to Religion and Politics: Theory and Practice*, Routledge, 2013.

² For a methodological introduction to the issue, much debated by political scientists, see the already quoted Snyder (ed.), *Religion and international relations theory*, and Nukhet Sandal and Jonathan Fox (eds.), *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*, Routledge, 2013. We have mentioned in the Introduction how the thesis of an incompatibility between religion and modernity has been confuted by the literature, which has demonstrated both how the “European road to modernity” is not universally applicable, and that the same mainstream theory of a progressive and irreversible marginalization of religion in the secularized contemporary Europe must be revisited. For an approach focused on the relation between religion and politics, see now François Foret and Xabier Itçaina, *Western*

conclusion seems to be that religion still matters, but the modalities and relevance of its impact vary from context to context, depending also on the point of view chosen by the observer. While the political relevance of Islam, for instance, is self-evident and observable on a macro scale, one could legitimately question the possible political influence of the Christian religion in Western Europe, and in particular its effect on international relations. The quote that we referenced above, however, seems to suggest some caution in denying *tout court* any kind of influence: in 1969, the political secretary of Italian Christian Democracy (*Democrazia Cristiana*, DC) explicitly mentioned the significance of what was happening in the Catholic world after the end of the Second Vatican Council, in order for the party to reflect upon international relations.

In this chapter, we will investigate if and how the political culture of Italian Christian Democracy was related to the Catholic idea(s) of international community described and categorized in the previous section, and whether it had an impact on Italy's foreign policy in the period under consideration. Did *Democrazia Cristiana* employ a universalist (or a liberation) approach to the idea of international community, showing a link with the reflection of Catholic culture? Did it represent a feature of the Christian democratic identity (here the term is simply used to describe the existence of a distinctive political culture), even in the 1960s and the 1970s? In other words, may we speak of a Christian democratic culture of foreign policy, that may be defined as the set of beliefs, attitudes and values that characterized its approach to international relations? And finally, which was the degree of consistency between the discourse and its implementation?

Before delving into the analysis, we need to elaborate further on some concepts and methodological caveats. First of all, by referencing the problem of the relationship between Christian Democracy and Catholic culture,³ we do not mean to suggest the existence of a straight

European modernities and religion – a perspective from political sociology, in ID. (eds.), *Politics of Religion in Western Europe. Modernities in conflict?*, Routledge, 2012, pp. 3-22, and in a broad historical and comparative perspective, Johann P. Arnason, and Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski (eds.), *Religion and Politics. European and Global Perspectives*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.

³ This is, obviously, a partial, Italy-related point of view (where we can consider the terms “Christian” and “Catholic” synonymous), since we would also need to take into account the role of other sources – first of all, Protestantism – in

line between the two. On the contrary, the literature has convincingly demonstrated that postwar European Christian Democracy⁴ was not a direct descendant of interwar political Catholicism, or before that, of the Christian Democracy of the late nineteenth century – which presented a more evident and direct link with the Catholic *Weltanschauung* – even if those movements represented its natural background.⁵ In particular, after the Second World War, European Christian Democracy definitively lost the founding feature of its namesake forefather, i.e. the protection of the Church's interests within modern, secular society. Without the glue represented by this factor, was there a common platform shared by political parties of Christian inspiration? The question has been much debated by historians and political scientists, with no consensus about a conclusive answer. Some common elements, rooted in the elaboration of social and political Catholicism in the interwar period, have been sketched: the vision of a communitarian social order alien to “unbridled” capitalism and Socialism; the emphasis on the role of communities that mediate between the individual and the State; the insistence on the protection and advancement of human rights founded on the dignity of the human being; the support to international cooperation.⁶ Is this sufficient, though, to consider Christian Democracy a distinct political type?⁷

order to investigate the role of religion in shaping the political culture of European Christian Democracy. We will come back to this issue later in the text.

⁴ This term here is plainly used to describe the ensemble of Western European democratic political parties of Christian inspiration, which acknowledged to belong to the same political family by joining the international organizations of Christian Democracy, which we will introduce in paragraph 3.2.

⁵ See as general references David Hanley (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe. A comparative Perspective*, London: Pinter, 1994; Emiel Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union (1945/1995)*, proceedings of the Leuven Colloquium 15–18 november 1995, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996; Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (eds.), *European Christian Democracy. Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003, and Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, vol. 2, Routledge, 2004; more focused on continuity are Jean-Dominique Durand, *L'Europe de la Démocratie chrétienne*, Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1995, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1996. Underlining the historical differences between postwar Christian Democracy and interwar political Catholicism, however, does not mean to underestimate the links between them, as underlined by Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds.), *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1965*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, and by a well-documented case study by Maria Mitchell, *The Origins of Christian Democracy. Politics and Confession in Modern Germany*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012.

⁶ These points have been stressed by Martin Conway, *Introduction to ID*. And Buchanan (eds.), *Political Catholicism in Europe*, p. 8, and Emiel Lamberts, *The Influence of Christian Democracy on Political Structures in Western Europe*, in ID. (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe*, pp. 282-92.

⁷ Stathis N. Kalyvas and Kees van Kersbergen have argued the case, giving an affirmative answer, in Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy*, and Kees van Kersbergen, *The Distinctiveness of Christian Democracy*, in Hanley (ed.), *Christian Democracy in Europe*, pp. 31-47 (but see also ID., *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Routledge, 1995). Their approach has been analyzed and criticized by Paolo Alberti and Robert

We will try to address this problem from our vantage point, questioning and examining the Catholic roots of the DC's elaboration on the international community. To be clear, we will not measure in detail the weight of this or that specific source – although we will make reference to this level of analysis by addressing the personal itineraries of some protagonists in Italian politics, but rather, in the context of a synthetic account, we will argue a case about the “congruence” between the DC's culture of foreign policy and the Catholic approach to international relations, so as to verify whether the latter could still be considered one of the cultural sources of Christian democratic political culture.

Having outlined the point of view that we will adopt, it is now time to introduce the protagonist of this story. The task is not simple, since for all the importance that *Democrazia Cristiana* had in Italy for about half a century (from 1944 to 1994), a comprehensive scientific historical account of its parabola is still lacking. This apparent paradox has two major, correlated explanations: on the one hand, in many instances, writing the history of DC means writing the history of Italy, given the pervasive nature of the party's role in the country's political, economic and social context. On the other hand, the subject has been politically charged for a long time: the choice to underline the stabilizing role of the party during the “First Republic” (1948-1994), or to put the accent on the degenerative features that the lack of governmental change brought to Italy's political and social system, and in particular to the Christian democratic “State party”, reflected very different opinions and judgments about Italian history in the post-WWII period.⁸ Particularly deficient, largely

Leonardi, *The Consociational Construction of Christian Democracy*, in Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004, pp. 21-41, who propose another theoretical model – consociational democracy – so as to demonstrate the distinctiveness of Christian Democracy. In political science handbooks, on the other hand, Christian Democracy is normally addressed as a variant of Conservatism with an enhanced attention to welfare: see for instance Francesca Vassallo and Clyde Wilcox, *Party as a Carrier of Ideas*, in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty (ed.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, London: Sage, 2006, p. 419. The problem of the Christian democratic identity has recently been addressed at an international Conference entitled “In Search of a Christian Democratic Identity”, organized by KADOC in cooperation with the Centre for European Studies (CES), the Istituto Luigi Sturzo and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Leuven, November 2013); the discussion has underlined the difference of opinions about this issue: see a report of the initiative on <http://martenscentre.eu/>.

⁸ Within the general histories of contemporary Italy, two excellent examples of the two divergent approaches are respectively Pietro Scoppola, *La Repubblica dei partiti. Profilo storico della democrazia in Italia (1945-1990)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991 (Scoppola, Catholic historian actively engaged in civil society, insisted in particular on the

because of the political connotations of the debate about DC's history, are the analyses of the Christian democratic political culture, even if there have recently been signs of a renewed, more balanced and scientifically accurate interest.⁹ The comparative approach employed in the already mentioned contributions on European Christian Democracy (at least for Western Europe) has helped to put the Italian case into perspective, underlining its undeniable peculiarities but also stressing the common features among members of the same political family.¹⁰ Notwithstanding these gaps, it is possible, as well as extremely useful for non-Italian readers, to sketch out a general

pivotal role of the three Italian popular parties in the complicated process of the birth and growth of Italian democracy), and Guido Crainz, *Il paese mancato. Dal Miracolo economico agli anni Ottanta*, Roma: Donzelli, 2003. The most famous English-written history of contemporary Italy: Paul Ginsborg, *A history of contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–1988*, London: Penguin, 1990, helped to shape the second paradigm, while the best account of contemporary Italian history in French: Frédéric Attal, *Histoire de l'Italie depuis 1943 à nos jours*, Paris: Armand Colin, 2003, presents a more balanced interpretation. A similar polarity has characterized the “first wave” of party histories, which followed the dissolution of the party at the end of the First Republic. These works were generally influenced by the political affiliation of the historians who wrote them: see for instance Giorgio Galli, *Mezzo secolo di DC 1943-1993. Da De Gasperi a Mario Segni*, Milano: Rizzoli, 1993, extremely critical, and the more sympathetic Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano. La Democrazia Cristiana dal 1942 al 1994*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1996. See also the collection of essays (of uneven scientific value) edited by Francesco Malgeri for the “institutional” history of the party, edited by DC’s publishing house: Francesco Malgeri (ed.), *Storia della Democrazia Cristiana*, Roma: Cinque Lune, 1987-1989. Some considerations on the status of the art of Italian literature on Christian Democracy are in the already quoted Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana*, pp. 55-64. The biographical profiles, in English, of the most prominent DC representatives are sketched out in the volume authored by Mark Gilbert and Robert K. Nilsson, *Historical Dictionary of Modern Italy*, Lanham, MD/Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2007, to which we defer for further informations on the personalities quoted in this chapter.

⁹ After the pioneering contribution of Agostino Giovagnoli: *Le premesse della ricostruzione. Tradizione e modernità nella classe dirigente cattolica del dopoguerra*, Milano: Nuovo Istituto editoriale italiano, 1982, later re-elaborated in ID., *La cultura democristiana: tra Chiesa cattolica e identità italiana, 1918-1948*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1991, which only covers the premises and the first phase of DC’s history, see the contributions of Paolo Acanfora, who has focused on the role of myth in the Christian democratic political culture, especially regarding foreign policy (we will come back to these studies in a few pages): Paolo Acanfora, *Myths and the political use of religion in Christian Democratic culture*, in “Journal of Modern Italian Studies”, issue 3, 2007, pp. 307-38, and ID., *Miti e ideologia nella politica estera DC. Nazione, Europa e Comunità atlantica (1943-1954)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013.

¹⁰ In general Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union*; Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy*, and Kselman and Buttigieg (eds.), *European Christian Democracy*, tended to stress the commonalities (since they were most properly committed to a comparative approach), while Gehler and Kaiser, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, and Buchanan and Conway, *Political Catholicism in Europe*, focused more on Italy’s distinctive features (see the essays of Carlo Masala and John Pollard in the quoted volumes). Italy’s distinctiveness, in any case, can be easily argued for the period following DC’s collapse: see Emmanuel Gerard and Steven van Hecke, *European Christian Democracy in the 1990s. Towards a Framework for Analysis*, in ID. (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe*, p. 13, footnote 5, and the essay of Robert Leonardi and Paolo Alberti in the same book, pp. 105-31. Non Italian scholars who dealt with Italian Christian Democracy, more generally, have usually underscored (and sometimes over-simplified) the “unhealthy relation” between DC and “power”, viewed as the main and often sole *raison d'être* of the party. See for instance Percy Allum, *The Changing Face of Christian Democracy*, in Christopher Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff (eds.), *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society 1948-58*, Oxford/Washington: Berg, 1995, p. 127, and Martin J. Bull, *The European Community and “Regime Parties”: A case Study of Italian Christian Democracy*, in “EUI Working Paper in Political and Social Sciences”, issue 4, 1994. A more nuanced analysis is in Robert Leonardi and Douglas A. Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Dominance*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1989, and above all Gino Bedani, *The Christian Democrats and national identity*, in ID. and Bruce Haddock (eds.), *The Politics of Italian National Identity*, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000, pp. 214-38. For some considerations about international literature see Rosario Forlenza, *A Party for the Mezzogiorno: The Christian Democratic Party, Agrarian Reform and the Government of Italy*, in “Contemporary European History”, issue 4, 2010, p. 334.

profile of the party that has dominated Italian politics throughout the post-WWII period, before resoundingly collapsing at the beginning of the 1990s. We will concentrate on three essential features that will serve us for background in the course of the analysis: the structure of the party, its role in the Italian State and society and its relationship with the Church.

Democrazia Cristiana (founded between 1943 and 1944, dissolved in 1994) was a popular party with a high level of organization, but must not be understood as a monolithic party structure with clear lines of command and a homogeneous social base of support, on the model of the Communist party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI). One distinctive feature of Italian Christian Democracy, throughout its history, was the presence of articulated and organized factions (*correnti*, or currents), which represented “the mechanism through which the dialectic of power operates within the DC and makes possible the shifts from one political strategy to another, shifts between ruling élites, generational change within the party, and the servicing of diverse group interests”.¹¹ Factions were organized in a capillary fashion throughout the country, and generally possessed extensive financial and autonomous cultural resources (newsletters, periodicals, conferences).¹² To some extent, the party’s internal dynamic reflected a balance between the interests and resources of various personalistic or localistic interests, which thrived in the traditional clientelistic nature of Italian politics.¹³ The party leadership rarely intervened in the internal affairs of the factions, which were free to handle the process of ruling class selection, and to fight for influence at national level during the national congresses. This does not mean that DC’s politics followed a predominantly

¹¹ Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy*, p. 91. On the birth and first development of the *correntismo* see Vera Capperucci, *Il Partito dei cattolici. Dall’Italia degasperiana alle correnti democristiane*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010.

¹² Among the few attempts to analyze the organization and discourse of a current (the progressive faction *La Base*), see Maria Chiara Mattesini, *La base. Un laboratorio di idee per la democrazia cristiana*, Roma: Studium, 2012. More attention has been dedicated to the *gruppo dossettiano*, that was the first organized alternative to the leading group of the party at the beginning of its historical parabola: we will refer to the literature on the subject in the following pages. For an overview of the cultural instruments (in particular, the vast archipelago of periodical), linked to the different “souls” of the party, see Daniela Saresella, *Dal Concilio alla contestazione. Riviste cattoliche negli anni del cambiamento (1958-1968)*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2005, pp. 53-60 and 71-77.

¹³ This aspect is particularly stressed by the contributions of Paul Ginsborg: see for instance, with a focus on the contemporary period, *Italy and Its Discontents. Family, Civil Society and the State*, London: Allen Lane, 2001. In a comparative perspective, see Simona Piattoni (ed.), *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation. The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

anarchical path, deriving from the combination of diverging interests and from the outcomes of power struggles. As in any modern political party, indeed, the dialectics among different positions found a partial balance in the central organisms, above all, in the Political Secretariat, which was the expression of the relative strength of the various factions, which were charged with the task of elaborating and publicizing a common line.¹⁴ Putting too much emphasis on the internal wars among factions and personalities who were mostly motivated by “appetite for power”, in our opinion, could lead to the risk of denying *a priori* the existence of a recognizable set of political stances. We will try to argue a balanced case in this regard about the culture of foreign policy.

The central structure of the party was reinforced and reorganized during the secretaryship of Amintore Fanfani (who we will encounter in a few pages), in the second half of the 1950s: DC experienced a transition from a “party of cadres” to a proper “mass party”, with a steady increase in membership figures (more than 20% from 1954 to 1959: from 1.25 to 1.6 million)¹⁵. In the cultural field, which interests us more closely, the Office for Cultural Activities, founded in 1950, was strengthened through additional funding, which allowed for the foundation of a publishing house (“Cinque Lune”) and the repeated organization of meetings and conferences dedicated to the formation of a new ruling class. The cultural activity was completed by the publication of two major newspapers, the daily “Il Popolo” (the old journal of the Popular party, founded in 1923), and the weekly magazine “La Discussione” (from 1952), while the press office (SPES, founded in 1946), dealt with the issues of propaganda. Fanfani’s efforts to implement a more distinctive cultural policy, and to set up a closer link between the party and intellectuals, were rather the

¹⁴ I consulted the papers of the Political Secretariat (in particular, reports of meetings in which the international politics of the party were discussed) in the DC’s archive at the Istituto Sturzo, in Rome. I have also consulted the documents directed to “national consumption” (national congresses and conferences, documents for national electoral campaigns), and the writings of the major DC representatives, since for the purposes of a synthetic outline, it is best to look for the common features among different lines, rather than focus on the variations in a very complicated landscape. The existence and weight of distinct views, though, will be accounted for through the in-depth analysis of Aldo Moro’s discourse, and through the reference to the positions expressed by the *Movimento Giovanile* (Youth Movement) of *Democrazia Cristiana*, that hit more radical notes.

¹⁵ DC’s membership oscillated, quoting the official figures, between 1.3 and 1.8 million until the end of the 1980s: see Carlo Danè, *La Democrazia cristiana: strutture centrali e organi dirigenti dal 1943 al 1989*, in Malgeri (ed.), *Storia della Democrazia cristiana*, Vol. V, pp. 263-71. On this phase of the party’s history see Francesco Malgeri, *Gli anni di transizione: da Fanfani a Moro*, in ID. (ed.), *Storia della Democrazia Cristiana*, vol. III, pp. 3-175.

exception than the rule in DC's history: in the long term Catholic intellectuals experienced a conflicted relationship with the party (some of them, as we will mention in the next chapter, were even elected to the ranks of the Communist party during the 1970s), especially as the most degenerative features of DC's constant practice of power emerged.¹⁶

The most significant evolution, however, that the party experienced since the second half of the 1950s, was a “penetration” – or “occupation”, depending on how one judges the process – of the Italian State and society. In the context of a closed democracy like the Italian one, where the most suitable alternative for government in terms of electoral strength, the Communist party, was preemptively excluded from power, *Democrazia Cristiana* played the role of the “party of the nation”, with the goal of representing all interests in society and becoming the inevitable center of gravity of Italian democracy. The goal was substantially accomplished, given that DC remained the majority party from the first elections of the Republican era, in 1948, until its dissolution in 1992-1994. The party held key Ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Interior and Treasury, as well as the office of Prime Minister,¹⁷ for more than 70% of the governments until 1992, and controlled at least half of Cabinet positions – which it distributed according to the relative strength of the various currents – in each of the 48 governments between 1946 and 1992.¹⁸ In addition to the predominance in government and Parliament, the DC could choose the nominees for many important positions in a wide array of public institutions. This was the real “control room” from which the party could turn the gears of the Italian State machine. Ministerial bureaucracies; autonomous state agencies administering railways, telephones, postal services and state monopolies (among them the public and radio broadcasting corporation RAI); social service agencies (health, social security): these

¹⁶ See some notes in Albertina Vittoria, *Organizzazione e istituti della cultura*, in Barbagallo (coord.) *Storia dell'Italia Repubblicana*, vol. II, pp. 663-68, which provides a list of the cultural institutes linked in various ways to the party, and Fiamma Lussana, *Politica e cultura: l'Istituto Gramsci, la Fondazione Basso, l'Istituto Sturzo*, in ID. and Giacomo Marramao (eds.), *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta*, vol. II: *Culture, nuovi soggetti, identità*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003, pp. 125-36, which is focused on the most important and enduring of them, the Istituto Sturzo. See also the considerations of an engaged Catholic intellectual, Pietro Scoppola, in *Intellettuali e partiti: esperienze a confronto*, in “Il Mulino”, 1981, pp. 520-31.

¹⁷ We will use the locution “Prime Minister” as synonym of “President of the Council”, which would formally be more correct for the Italian context.

¹⁸ See the figures in Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy*, pp. 223-44.

institutions comprised a growing forest of institutes and positions, depending on parliamentary appointment, that singled out the Italian over-extended public sector among contemporary European experiences.¹⁹ Until at least the late 1970s, the managers of three major state holding companies (the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction, IRI, created in 1933 under the Fascism; the National Hydrocarbons Trust, ENI, created in 1953, and the Trust for Owning and Financing of Manufacturing Industries, EFIM, created in 1964) had close links with Christian Democracy, as did the top officers of the most important firms within each of them.²⁰ The same can be said for the top officials of most of the Italian banks, whose nomination depended on Parliament; finally, many journalistic and historical accounts have demonstrated the existence of a strong connection between politics – namely Christian Democracy, because of its major share of influence – and the private sector, which has generated a peculiar system of government of the Italian economy, characterized by the significant absence of regulations and external, independent authorities.²¹

DC's centrality in the system of government of the Italian State corresponded with an equally relevant centrality of the party in Italian society: to contextualize it properly, we must make reference to the third aspect that was mentioned above, that of the relations between the party and the Catholic Church, or more generally with the Catholic world.²² The Church played a crucial role in the origins of DC's history. What is particularly interesting for our study is the peculiar synergy that linked the undisputed protagonist of the first phase of DC's history, Alcide De Gasperi (1881-

¹⁹ For an overview, see Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*, pp. 150-57. See an account of the interpenetration between the party and the public sector of the Italian economy until of the 1970s, still valid for the figures and the research method that it provides, in Franco Cazzola, *Anatomia del potere DC. Enti pubblici e "centralità democristiana"*, Bari: De Donato, 1979. A classical account, in a comparative perspective, is Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Bureaucracy and Democracy. A political Dilemma*, Routledge, 1983 (Italy's case is addressed at pp. 170-72).

²⁰ In a comparative and historical perspective, see Pierangelo Maria Toninelli (ed.), *The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

²¹ For all these aspects, see Fabrizio Barca (ed.), *Storia del capitalismo italiano*, Roma: Donzelli, 1997.

²² We will properly introduce the theme of the “Italian Catholic world” in the next chapter, sketching out a brief profile of its protagonists and evolution from the post-WWII period to the end of the 1970s. Despite the centrality of this relation in understanding the profile of a democratic party of Christian inspiration in the second half of the twentieth century, it has not been the subject of any comprehensive scientific study: for some notes, in a historical perspective (taking into account also the previous experiences of Italian political Catholicism); see the considerations of Guido Formigoni, *Il partito “cristiano” nell'Italia del Novecento. Appunti su un concetto storico*, in *Les familles politiques en Europe occidentale au XX^e siècle*, Roma: Ecole française de Rome, 2000, pp. 215-44.

1954),²³ and one ecclesiastical figure that we have come to know rather well, Mgr. Giovanni Battista Montini. As the literature has already pointed out, Mgr. Montini was the main back-up, from within the Vatican, for De Gasperi's plan to characterize the DC as "a single Catholic party for all Catholics", Christian-inspired but also autonomous from the Church: this was not the only option, since the possible plurality of Catholic political parties was especially sponsored by the intransigent wing of the Roman Curia, which aimed at exerting an effective guidance over a right-wing Catholic party, in order to create a confessional and anti-Communist State.²⁴

We find here the same theoretical distinction that we analyzed in Chapter I, between the hypothesis of a direct influence of the Church in society, and an approach based on the theory of "separation of planes", which valued the autonomy of the Catholic laity. Although the second model prevailed, this does not mean that the Church did not become involved in the Italian political scene: on the contrary, especially in the early phase of DC's life, all the resources and organizational networks that the Catholic world could count on were mobilized in support of *Democrazia Cristiana*. It was no small army: at the end of the 1940s Italy numbered about 24,000 parishes, and about 200,000 male and female religious who ran schools, hospitals and charitable initiatives (in the order of thousands); the membership of Catholic associational networks – from Catholic Action to specialized organizations in the labor, economic, educational, recreational fields – comprised roughly 10% of the total population; the Catholic press and publishing sector

²³ Last secretary of the Italian Popular Party, and DC's first political secretary, De Gasperi held the office of Italy's Prime Minister for almost nine straight years, from December 1945 to August 1953: for a political biography see the introductory essays to Paolo Pombeni (gen. ed.), *Alcide De Gasperi: Scritti e discorsi politici*, Trento: Giunta provinciale di Trento, 2006–2009. In English see the brief profile of Steven White, *Alcide De Gasperi*, in Domenico Roy (ed.), *Dictionary of Christian Politics*, New York: Praeger, 2006, and ID., *In Search of De Gasperi: Innovations in Italian Scholarship since 2003*, in "Journal of Modern Italian Studies", issue 3, 2010, pp. 462–71, for some considerations on the status of the academic research on De Gasperi in Italy (while an assessment of international historiography on the Christian democratic politician is in Maria Gabari (ed.), *Alcide De Gasperi e la storiografia internazionale: un bilancio*, atti del convegno internazionale, Trento, 7–8 maggio 2004, Trento: Società di Studi Trentini di Scienze Storiche, 2005). For a confrontation of De Gasperi's thought with contemporary political European Catholic politicians – which highlights several affinities – see Maurizio Cau, *Alcide De Gasperi: a political thinker or a thinking politician?*, in "Modern Italy", issue 4, 2009, pp. 431–44.

²⁴ See Jean-Dominique Durand, *L'Eglise catholique dans la crise de l'Italie (1943-1948)*, Rome: École Française de Rome, 1991, pp. 581–611, and Andrea Riccardi, *Il partito romano nel secondo dopoguerra (1945-1954)*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1983, pp. 29–64.

controlled hundreds of publications with an estimated circulation of 16 million copies.²⁵ All this powerful apparatus was summoned to battle the Communist threat, which was seen by the Church as a mortal danger to the country's Catholic soul. In particular, the formidable organization of Catholic Action – mainly through the instrument of the “Civic Committees”, a front organization specifically created by president Luigi Gedda (1902-2000) to intervene in the electoral campaign – had a decisive impact in the 1948 elections, which saw the triumph of De Gasperi's party.²⁶

We would argue that after the Second World War, Italian Catholicism was characterized by a distinct pillarized structure. We define pillarization as a process which involved the development of social movements into highly structured, exclusive political communities, consisting of integrated networks of political, social, economic, cultural and leisure associations sharing the same ideological perspective and the collective representation by one political party.²⁷ What distinguished the Italian case from other comparable experiences, e.g. Germany or Belgium, was a more relevant and direct role of the Catholic Church, in particular in the field of education;²⁸ Italian sociologists and historians (especially since the 1960s, thanks to the research of the “Istituto Cattaneo”) have preferred to rely upon the category of “Catholic (or ‘white’) subculture”, in order to underline the importance of the geographical cleavage in analyzing the Italians’ political

²⁵ See the figures and a general description of this landscape in Pollard, *Modern Catholicism in Italy*, pp. 122-24; Percy Allum, *Uniformity Undone: Aspects of Catholic Culture in Post-war Italy*, in Zygmunt G. Baranski and Robert Lumley (eds.), *Culture and Conflict in Post-war Italy: Essays on Mass and Political Culture*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, pp. 79-96, and Guasco, *Chiesa e cattolicesimo in Italia*, pp. 14-20.

²⁶ See Mario Casella, *18 aprile 1948. La mobilitazione delle organizzazioni cattoliche*, Galatina: Congedo Editore, 1992, and Robert Anthony Ventresca, *From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004, in part. pp. 177-96.

²⁷ The definition of “pillarization” is taken from Patrick Pasture, *Introduction to Lex Heerma van Voss, Patrick Pasture and Jan de Maeyer (eds.), Between Cross and Class. Comparative Histories of Christian Labour in Europe 1840-2000*, Peter Lang, 2005, p. 13. The process of pillarization was typical of countries with fragmented confessional identities, like Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, but also of nations characterized by a high level of competition between traditional political cultures (Socialism, Liberalism, Communism): this is the case for Belgium and Italy. See for a comprehensive account Staf Hellemans, *Strijd om de moderniteit: Sociale bewegingen en verzuiling in Europa sinds 1800*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990, and Wilhelm Damberg and Patrick Pasture, *Restoration and Erosion of Pillarised Catholicism in Western Europe*, in Kenis, Billet and Pasture (eds.), *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe*, pp. 55-76. Some interesting case studies have been provided by Mark Edward Ruff, *The Wayward Flock. Catholic Youth in Postwar West Germany, 1945-1965*, London: Chapel Hill, 2005; Michael Hirschfeld, *Katholisches Milieu und Vertriebene: eine Fallstudie am Beispiel des Oldenburger Landes: 1945-1965*, Borlau, 2002, and Wilhelm Damberg, *Abschied vom Milieu? Katholizismus im Bistum Münster und in den Niederlanden 1945-1980*, Paderborn: Verlag Schöningh, 1997.

²⁸ See Luciano Pazzaglia (ed.), *Chiesa e progetto educativo nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra (1945-1958)*, Brescia: La Scuola, 1988.

behavior.²⁹ The term subculture, indeed, points to the existence of territorial areas – in particular, the northeast of the country was the center of the Catholic subculture, while the central regions of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna were the core of the Communist, “red” subculture – characterized by a high level of electoral stability, thanks to the organizational networks at the disposal of Christian Democracy and the Communist party. One major difference between the categories of “pillar” and that of “subculture”, in relation to the Catholic world, is that the latter can also be employed in a period – from approximately the second half of the 1960s onwards – that saw a clear weakening of the pillarized structure, or more properly its transformation into a form of “pluralised Catholicism”.³⁰

These developments were also an effect, going back to our original subject, of the loosening of relations between the party and the Catholic world, and between the party and the Church. On the one hand, most of the Catholic laity organizations explicitly questioned the role of Christian Democracy as their political reference;³¹ on the other hand, DC generally became more autonomous from the ecclesiastical institution. That is not to say that all the above-mentioned connections suddenly came to an end. To mention just a few facts, the Italian Conference of Bishops (*Conferenza Episcopale Italiana*, CEI), kept on intervening in Italian politics even in the 1970s, in particular during electoral campaigns, in implicit or explicit support to Christian Democracy. In the case of some relevant issues (like the referendum on divorce in 1974, and on abortion in 1981), the party and the Church acted as a united front. In 1972, almost 60% of DC elected deputies were then or had been members of religious organizations, which continued to represent a crucial “reservoir”

²⁹ For the first assessment see Giorgio Galli (ed.), *Il comportamento elettorale in Italia*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968; the category was employed in particular in the series *Politica in Italia*, edited yearly by the Conference Group on Italian Politics and published by “Il Mulino” (a review and publishing house linked to the Istituto Cattaneo). For an outside view, see John A. Agnew, *Place and Politics in Modern Italy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002.

³⁰ See the nuanced interpretation of Damberg and Pasture, *Restoration and Erosion of Pillarised Catholicism in Western Europe*, pp. 68-76.

³¹ We will mention this aspect in Chapter III, describing the general path undertaken by the Catholic world in the 1960s and the 1970s.

of the Christian democratic ruling class.³² What stands out in the eyes of the historian, though, is a process of progressive “autonomization” of the party from the Church, which should not surprise us given the trends that we have mentioned in the Introduction, and the path of Catholic culture described in Chapter I. The era opened by the Second Vatican Council, indeed, saw a rise to prominence of Catholic laity, that was more generally influenced by the winds of cultural revolution which were blowing in Western societies. While the Church detached itself from politics, Catholic politicians were starting to employ a more “adult” and critical attitude toward the ecclesial institution. The relationship between Christian democratic political culture and Catholic culture, then, is not to be understood as a literal reception of the Church’s directives, but mostly as an autonomous interpretation of the ideas coming from Catholic theologians and intellectuals, and the Magisterium. Finally, before closing this profile we cannot forget that the Magisterium’s principal voice, for most of the 1960s and the 1970s, belonged to a man who had played a pivotal role in the birth of *Democrazia Cristiana*, and personally knew the party’s most prominent representatives of the first and second generation (most of whom we will encounter in the course of the chapter), from Alcide De Gasperi (b. 1881) to Giuseppe Dossetti (b. 1913), from Giovanni Gronchi (b. 1887) to Aldo Moro (b. 1916), Giulio Andreotti (b. 1919) and Amintore Fanfani (b. 1908). Italian historian Agostino Giovagnoli has properly argued that between the 1940s and the 1970s Montini was one of the main references for Italian political Catholicism.³³ This is a factor that distinguishes Italian Christianity from the other European (and extra-European) experiences, and makes the subject especially appealing for our study.

After this schematic but necessary introduction, we should now be able to delve into the historical analysis. In order to better understand the processes of the 1960s and the 1970s, once again, we need to take a step back and present a brief profile of the history of the idea of

³² See the considerations of Leonardi and Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy*, pp. 193-222. The stat is taken from Marila Guadagnini, *Frammentazione e omogeneità*, in “Biblioteca della Libertà”, October-December 1980, pp. 47-86.

³³ Giovagnoli, *La cultura democristiana*, p. 24 ff., but also pp. 157-65. A personal recollection of Montini’s role for Italian politicians is in Giulio Andreotti, *Montini e la politica italiana*, in “30 giorni”, issue 6, 1999.

international community within Italian political Catholicism, starting our enquiry after the First World War, when Sturzo's Italian Popular Party originally addressed the subject. This was the moment when, for the first time, a party of Christian inspiration dealt with an issue that we will follow as a sort of common thread through the following years: how to reconcile the propensity to universality with a nation-oriented approach, without losing its specificity and originality. This meant reflecting on which was Italy's place, according to the Catholic point of view, within the desirable structure of the international community, and on what could have been the country's role in setting it up.

2. The premises: Italian political Catholicism and the idea of international community, from the first postwar period to the end of the 1950s.

The First World War was a seminal moment in the process of reconciliation between Catholicism and the idea of nation almost everywhere in Europe.³⁴ Italy was no exception: the integration of Catholics in national politics, which had already started "quietly" at the turn of the twentieth century, after the radical rupture represented by independence in 1861 and the Capture of Rome in 1870, accelerated after the war with the foundation of the Italian Popular Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano*, PPI) in 1919.³⁵ Unlike prewar Catholic associations, the PPI did not have the goal of protecting Catholic (especially the Church's) interests in the liberal State, but instead aimed at

³⁴ The analysis of the Italian context, inscribed in a long-term approach, is in Guido Formigoni, *L'Italia dei cattolici. Fede e nazione dal Risorgimento alla Repubblica*, Bologna 2010², pp. 77-88, while a closer look at the French case, through the analysis of the nation's consecration to the Sacred Heart, can be found in Sante Lesti, *L'"amore di predilezione" del Sacro Cuore nei confronti della Francia. Un tòpos fra conforto, apologia e nazionalizzazione del culto (1915-1919)*, in Daniele Menozzi (ed.), *Cattolicesimo, nazione, nazionalismo*, pp. 69-86, with further bibliography on the European scenario.

³⁵ The academic literature on the Italian Popular Party is mostly in Italian: see in particular the work of Gabriele De Rosa, especially his comprehensive *Il partito popolare italiano*, Roma: Laterza, 1987; in English, see the brief profile by Tiziana di Maio, *Between the Crisis of the Liberal State, Fascism and a Democratic Perspective: The Popular Party in Italy*, in Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohlnout (eds.), *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-45*, Routledge, 2004, pp. 111-22.

competing with other parties within the democratic system, against other equally legitimate cultural options. The party drew the inspiration for its political culture from Christian doctrine, but without establishing binding ties with the Church: this approach, which would have caused strong friction with Rome, was the most significant contribution of the PPI's founder and main ideologue, Don Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959), to the development of Italian political Catholicism.³⁶

During the course of its short political experience, the Popular Party tried to address the issue of the relationship between the Nation-State and the international community. It was the first time in Italy's history that a Christian-inspired movement was organically tackling the problem; indeed, one of the consequences of the “adversarial non-involvement” of the Catholic movement in the matters of the liberal State was a peculiar detachment of Italian political Catholicism from foreign policy issues.³⁷ The party's first manifesto, *Appello ai liberi e forti* (“Appeal to all free and strong men”), published in January 1919 – made an explicit reference to “the steady principles of the Christian religion, which consecrated Italy's great civilizing mission” in the world; this mission should have been renewed in the context of the new international system governed by the League of

³⁶ Sicilian priest Luigi Sturzo was involved in politics his entire life: he guided the city council in his native town Caltagirone from 1905 to 1920; he was the PPI's leader from 1919 to 1924, when he was forced to leave Italy by Mussolini's regime. From London (1924-1940), and later from the United States (1940-1946), he continued to write extensively about Italian and European politics; when he went back to Italy at the age of 75, he led a reserved life, but was nonetheless involved in the municipal elections of 1952 (his candidacy was proposed by DC's right-wing sectors, with the support of part of the Roman Curia – and the consent of Pius XII –, in order to form an anti-communist alliance which included also the far right, but the initiative was stopped by De Gasperi with the help of Mgr. Montini), and he was appointed Senator for life in 1953. Within the extensive literature, see Gabriele De Rosa (ed.), *Luigi Sturzo e la democrazia europea*, Roma: Laterza, 1990; a still valid biography is Francesco Malgeri, *Luigi Sturzo*, Torino: Edizioni Paoline, 1993, while a bibliographic essay on and of Luigi Sturzo, updated to 2001, has been written Gennaro Cassiani, Vittorio De Marco and Giampaolo Malgieri (eds.), *Bibliografia degli scritti di e su Luigi Sturzo*, Roma: Gangemi, 2001. About the exile, some notes in Francesca Piombo, *Don Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959): a Christian Democrat in Exile*, in Andrew Chandler, Katarzyna Stoklosa and Jutta Vinzent (eds.), *Exile and Patronage: Cross-cultural Negotiations Beyond the Third Reich*, Berlin: Verlag, 2006, pp. 153-66, and, from a comparative perspective, in Wolfram Kaiser, *Transnational Networks of Catholic Politicians in Exile*, in Kaiser and Wohlnout (eds.), *Political Catholicism in Europe*, in part. pp. 222-30. About the so-called “Sturzo operation”, see Andrea Tornielli, *Montini sabotages the “Sturzo Operation”*, on www.vaticaninsider.com (article published on Italian daily newspaper “La Stampa” on October 18, 2012), and for a historical reconstruction, Andrea Riccardi, *Pio XII e Alcide de Gasperi. Una storia segreta*, Roma: Laterza, 2003.

³⁷ Formigoni, *L'Italia dei cattolici*, p. 57. A similar point can be argued for the whole European context: see Peter Pulzer, *Nationalism and Internationalism in European Christian Democracy*, in Gehler and Kaiser (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, vol. 2, p. 14.

Nations, which represented the point of contact between universalism and nationality.³⁸ The growth of tensions and conflicts in Italy, and then the beginning of the Fascist era (the PPI was dissolved in 1926), forced the party to focus on the domestic situation, leaving these insights about Italy's role in the international system largely unexplored. The international work of the *Popolari*, then, for most of their political life, revolved around building up a network of relations among European democratic parties of Christian inspiration, as we will mention in a few pages.

The PPI's approach to international relations, like most of their other stances, was essentially informed by Sturzo's worldview. In the eyes of the Sicilian priest, the Church should act as the "conscience" of the international community, committing itself to the cause of peace – as it did during the pontificate of Benedictus XV – but leaving full autonomy to the faithful in the process of building a peaceful and cooperative international society.³⁹ Sturzo's writings on these subjects became more consistent and theoretically structured after he was forced to leave Italy by Mussolini, in 1924, with the consent of Vatican hierarchies.⁴⁰ His approach, which we can easily connect to the building process of New Universalism, was shared by other European Catholic intellectuals and politicians in the interwar period. Sturzo was an active promoter of collaboration among democratic personalities during the 1920s and the 1930s: he travelled relentlessly throughout Europe and wrote for many European newspaper and magazines – the British "The Times", the French "L'Aube" and "La vie intellectuelle", the Belgian "La Terre Wallonne", "La Cité Nouvelle" and others. He also established a network of personal relationships which ranged from some the most influential Catholic intellectuals, like Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson and Maurice Vaussard, to Christian

³⁸ The appeal, as well as the party's first political program and the Congresses". proceedings, can be consulted in Francesco Malgeri (ed.), *Gli atti dei congressi del Partito popolare italiano*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1969, quotation from p. 37 (my translation); the text of the appeal can also be easily consulted online.

³⁹ A first systematization of Sturzo's thought is in Luigi Sturzo, *The International Community and the Right of War*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1929, where the Italian intellectual also reflected on the nature of war: for him, the war was the product of social and historical circumstances, thus not eternal nor inscribed in man's nature. Therefore, it could be avoided thanks to a rational and efficient international configuration. On these subjects see Alessandro Fruci, *La comunità internazionale nel pensiero politico di Luigi Sturzo*, Roma: Aracne, 2009.

⁴⁰ See Gabriella Fanello Marcucci, *Sorvegliato speciale. Sturzo a Londra nel mirino dell'OVRA*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006, and Giovanna Farrell-Vinay, *The London Exile of Don Luigi Sturzo (1924-1940)*, in "The Heythrop Journal", issue 2, 2004, pp. 158–77.

democratic politicians who played key roles after the end of the war, like Georges Bidault and Konrad Adenauer.⁴¹ In other words, he was part of that “second wave of Catholic internationalism” – partly detached from the intransigent matrix that had marked its first wave in the second half of the nineteenth century – mentioned in the Introduction and in the first chapter as one of the cultural sources which contributed to shaping the paradigm change from Traditional to New Universalism.

Sturzo is not only important for his reflections on peace and war, or about the desirable structure of the international system. In his writings, indeed, he developed a conceptual framework that would later be employed by several Catholics involved in politics: by linking Italy’s internal situation to the evolution of the international system, he established a meaningful connection between national and foreign policy. In his view, the only way to eliminate war and tensions, both within Nation-States and in the world was to work along the lines of democratic principles, at every level of societal organization. In his eyes, the anti-Fascist battle that he was forced to fight outside Italy might have succeeded, if only the international system had been built on the same democratic premises that (in principle) governed national societies. The best way to avoid concentrating power in any single institution was to follow a federalist, decentralized approach, in which the various levels of group identity, from the local communities to the Nation (passing through the important regional level), from Europe to the international community represented by the League of Nations, integrated themselves assuring a multi-level protection to the dignity of the human being.⁴²

This worldview became the cultural common ground on which DC’s political culture grew.⁴³ The influence of this approach on the political discourse of the new party can be proved through the

⁴¹ See the essays of Gabriele De Rosa, Jean Marie Mayeur and Anne Morelli in De Rosa (ed.), *Luigi Sturzo e la democrazia europea*.

⁴² See Alessandro Fruci, *Diritto e Stato nel pensiero di Luigi Sturzo*, Roma: Nuova cultura, 2012, in part. pp. 244-48, with relative bibliography.

⁴³ The origins of DC’s political culture, especially as regards the discourse on the international community, have already been analyzed by several contributions, two of which stand out as particularly clear and explicative: Guido Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l’alleanza occidentale*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996, and Acanfora, *Miti e ideologia nella politica estera DC*. Formigoni has addressed the cultural and political approach of Italian Christian Democracy to the postwar international system, highlighting the “problematic inclusion” of the country within the Western community, while Acanfora has focused on DC’s construction of a renovated identity, that should have been able to explain and justify the new collocation of the peninsula within the international system: he has convincingly argued (p.

analysis of one of the first official documents, the *Idee ricostruttive della Democrazia Cristiana* (“Reconstructive Ideas of Christian Democracy”), which circulated from the summer of 1943 onwards. It was drafted by Alcide de Gasperi with the contribution of some of the major future representatives of the party, like Pietro Campilli, Guido Gonella, Pasquale Saraceno and Giovanni Gronchi.⁴⁴ The last point of the programmatic document was dedicated to the new international community, constructed “according to justice”, and following the teachings of the pope. The document's guidelines sketched the profile of a universalist worldview, attentive to the nations' points of view but also clearly projected toward a supranational level of identity, in order to better protect the rights of men after the damages inflicted by totalitarian regimes:

The principle of self-decision will be recognized for all peoples, but they will accept limitations to their national sovereignty in favor of a broader solidarity among free peoples. [...] [The new international community will have to deal with] the codification of the international law and the coordination of national laws, with the scope of broadening the concept of citizenship.

The document, though, also specifically addressed the problem of Italy's role within the new international community, stating that

11) that all the different reflections on national identity elaborated by the party hinged on the common reference to religion, presented as the lowest common denominator of any narrative on Italy's core identity. It is worth noting that, although Sturzo was generally included in the pantheon of Christian democratic “founding Fathers”, the relationship between *Democrazia Cristiana* and the Sicilian priest was rather complicated, because of his different conception of the party with respect to De Gasperi's vision (“light”, with a strong political culture, clearly autonomous from the Church). On these aspects see Francesco Malgeri, *Sturzo e la Democrazia Cristiana nel secondo dopoguerra*, in De Rosa (ed.), *Sturzo e la democrazia europea*, pp. 166-82.

⁴⁴ On the origins of *Democrazia Cristiana* and the relation with the PPI's heritage, as well as the general literature quoted in the introduction, see Francesco Traniello, *Dal Partito Popolare alla Democrazia cristiana*, in Malgeri, *Storia della Democrazia Cristiana*, vol. I: *Dalla Resistenza alla Repubblica, 1943-1948*, Roma: Cinque Lune, 1987, pp. 179-93. In English, see John Pollard, *Italy*, in Buchanan and Conway (eds.), *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1965*, pp. 69-96, and the classic Richard A. Webster, *The Cross and the Fasces: Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy*, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960, which analyzes the relations between the Church, political and social Catholicism and the Italian State from the first to the post-WWII period. Webster stressed the importance of the aspects of continuity in order to understand the nature of Italian political Catholicism, inaugurating a trend that would influence most of the English-language literature on Italian politics (that is also at the center, for instance, of Paul Ginsborg's work on contemporary Italy), as the reader can notice in the recent Carolyn M. Warner, *Christian Democracy in Italy: An alternative path to religious party*, in “Party politics”, issue 2, 2012, pp. 256-76, which relies heavily on Webster's interpretation in order to explain DC's “Moderatism”. A more nuanced historical analysis about the intellectual formation of the Christian democratic ruling class is in the still valid Renato Moro, *La formazione della classe dirigente cattolica (1929-1937)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979.

The Italian People [...] are waiting for a full recognition of their independence and national integrity, and will claim the place they deserve within the international Community, because of their contribution to human progress and for the industriousness of their sons. [...] [Italy], recovering new spiritual and political dignity, and loyally collaborating within the European Community, will regain its centuries-old civilizing function [in the world].⁴⁵

The text was drafted and issued while war was still raging in Europe, and while Italy was experiencing a profound social and political collapse: the prospect of a re-integration of the peninsula into the postwar international system as an equal subject was not realistic at the moment, whichever way the conflict turned. Such a position, however, testified to the persistence of certain traditional elements of Italy's culture of foreign policy, which Catholic culture tried to own and rephrase. In short, we can narrow them down to two major features: first, the claim to some sort of "primacy", to which Italy was entitled because of its outstanding past, notably in arts and literature, but also in politics and military power since the Roman Empire. The second was the myth of the Italian mission in the world, which revolved around the idea of the diffusion of the Italian civilization outside the borders of the State.⁴⁶ These general concepts pervaded the public discourse on foreign policy throughout Italy's history, from *Risorgimento* to Fascism. Obviously, it is impossible to compare diverse views such as Mazzini's idea of a fair and peaceful international community, which Italy should have promoted and implemented, with the quest for a place among the great powers pursued with various degrees of aggressiveness during the Liberal era, or the militarist and Imperialist ideology of Mussolini's regime. In all of these cases, though, the subtext

⁴⁵ Andrea Damilano, *Atti e documenti della Democrazia Cristiana 1943-1967*, Roma: Cinque Lune, 1968, pp. 1-8 (quotation from pp. 7-8, my translation). The text is also easily accessible online. The part about the international community was essentially drafted by Guido Gonella (1905-1982, member of the Catholic university students' organization and close friends with Montini, MP for six legislatures), who had recently published an organic document on the subject: *L'ordine internazionale* (The international order, 1943). Here, he outlined the guidelines which would have been followed in DC's first *manifesto*, and that would have oriented the party's political culture for the following years. On Gonella, see Gabriella Fanello Marcucci, *Guido Gonella. Dal "discorso delle libertà" agli "appunti sulle istituzioni"*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008.

⁴⁶ See some notes on this in Sergio Romano, *La cultura della politica estera italiana*, and Richard J.B. Bosworth, *Mito e linguaggio nella politica estera italiana*, in Richard J.B. Bosworth and Sergio Romano (eds.), *La politica estera italiana, 1860-1985*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991, pp. 17-34 and 35-67.

of the public rhetoric referred to the glorious past of the Nation, and to the possibility of expanding Italy's civilization beyond the borders of the State.⁴⁷

Catholic culture could strongly relate to these subjects. The concept of "primacy" had famously been addressed by Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852), who had been the main architect of the attempted reconciliation between religion and the idea of nation during the *Risorgimento*. Gioberti claimed that the genetic link with Catholicism qualified Italy to lead the other Nations along the path toward civilization. Although, as is well known, the cultural merger between Catholicism and the idea of nation did not happen at the time, the notion of *il primato* became the shared heritage of the future generations of Catholics engaged in Italian politics.⁴⁸ The primacy implied the idea of mission, which was intrinsically encompassed by Catholicism. Within this shared conceptual framework, the idea of Rome – "Rome of the emperors" and at the same time "Rome of the popes" – functioned as fertile common ground between the secular and the religious worldviews.⁴⁹ The affinity of Catholic culture with these key elements of the Italy's long-term foreign-policy narrative remained mostly in the background until the Second World War, since political Catholicism never took on governmental responsibilities.

Things changed when the DC emerged as the uncontested victor of the first democratic elections after the Second World War, first on June 2, 1946, when Italians chose Republic over

⁴⁷ The "continuity paradigm", consistent with the trend already mentioned, has also been applied by English writers on Italy's foreign policy: see esp. Richard J.B. Bosworth, *Italy the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, which systematizes the thesis of continuity between Liberal and Fascist foreign policies. See also ID., *Italy and the Wider World*, Routledge, 1995, for a long-term interpretation of the trends of Italy's international relations (still one of the best non-Italian accounts); in Italian, for a balanced history of the country's foreign policy – which takes into account the factors of continuity, but also the "improvisation" which emerged in many phases of the Italian history – see Giuseppe Mammarella and Paolo Cacace, *La politica estera dell'Italia. Dallo Stato unitario ai nostri giorni*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2010.²

⁴⁸ A useful guide to the intersections between Catholicism and the idea of nation, throughout contemporary history is Francesco Traniello, *Religione cattolica e Stato nazionale*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007 (pp. 132-40; 173-77 and 179-92 are dedicated to Gioberti's elaboration).

⁴⁹ See the classical insight of Italian historian Federico Chabod for the Liberal age: *Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896*, Roma/Bari: Laterza 1990 (first edition 1951), translated in English by William McCuaig with the title *Italian Foreign Policy. The Statecraft of the Founders*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 145-268. Andrea Riccardi, *Roma "città sacra"? Dalla Conciliazione all'operazione Sturzo*, Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1979, has convincingly argued that the concept of "Latin civilization" – which encompassed the double reference to Christian Rome, and imperial Rome – constituted first a powerful common ground, and then a major factor of differentiation between Catholicism and Fascism.

monarchy and elected the members of the Constituent Assembly (charged with the task of writing the new Italian Constitution), and then above all on April 18, 1948, when *Democrazia Cristiana* became the majority party of the first legislature, winning with 48% of the popular vote. For the first time in history, a political party of Christian inspiration had to deal with the actual management of Italy's international relations; more than that, it had to restore them after the damages caused by Mussolini's regime. The confrontation with the harsh reality, however, clashed with the hopes and aspirations of Christian democrats. At global level, the beginning of the Cold War shattered dreams of a renovated international community unified by law and based on the mutual cooperation among its members. For what concerned Italy, the new ruling class was forced to face the real status of the peninsula, which was considered a defeated country – the Peace Treaty, in this respect, came as a shock and an injustice to Italian diplomacy⁵⁰ – and could not hope for the acknowledgment of a special role within the international system, as in the plan sketched in the *Idee ricostruttive*.

How Italy regained credibility and prestige on the international stage is well known: the “western choice” – i.e. the institutionalization of the connection with the US through the Atlantic Alliance – made by De Gasperi's government implied the integration of the country within the security system of the area led by the United States,⁵¹ and the participation in the process of growth that Western Europe began starting in the late 1940s.⁵² In just a few years, Italy became an essential member of the Atlantic Alliance, and one of the strongest supporters of European integration. In this context, however, we are not interested in reconstructing the steps of these processes; our aim is rather to analyze and sum up their cultural consequences on *Democrazia Cristiana*'s foreign policy

⁵⁰ See for a comprehensive reconstruction Sara Lorenzini, *L'Italia e il trattato di pace del 1947*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007; a brief outline of the treaty, as well as its English text, are in John Ashley Soames Grenville (ed.), *The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts*, vol. 1, Routledge, 2001, pp. 283-91.

⁵¹ The literature has already well analyzed this pivotal phase of Italy's international relations: as well as the general contributions on the country's foreign policy, see at least, in English, James Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*, Chapel Hill/London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986; Timothy E. Smith, *United States, Italy and Nato: 1947-1952*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1991, and the recent Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Welfare, 1945-1950*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

⁵² About Italy's role in the process of European integration, we can now count on the comprehensive assessment of Antonio Varsori, *La cenerentola d'europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010 (pp. 31-73 for the early phases), which organizes in a systematic narrative Varsori's studies over the past decades.

narrative. The universalist rhetoric employed in the first documents was evidently at odds with the current antagonistic structure of the international system, and with Italy's involvement in the Western coalition. Moreover, the prominent role played by the United States in this alliance added an element of discomfort for Christian Democrats, since they embodied a model of political culture that in many respects was incompatible with, or at least very distant from, the Catholic roots of their doctrine.⁵³

These difficulties were overcome, consistently with the processes generally summarized in the first chapter, thanks to two main “cultural devices”: Anticommunism, which proved to be an excellent vector for dialogue among different political cultures, and the idea of Europe, which became the symbolic space where the Catholic ideal of international community could be tested. We can now enrich the analysis with two further considerations, which can help us to understand the specificity of the DC's management of Italy's international relations in the first decade after the Second World War. First of all, by presenting themselves as the only effective barrier against the advance of Communism in Italy, Christian Democrats obtained some leverage in the relations with the United States, who could not push too strongly for the implementation of their economic and social projects (significantly different from those of Christian Democracy), since the presence of a pro-Western government in charge of Italian politics was a much higher priority.⁵⁴ The alliance between DC governments and US administrations, in short, was based on a peculiar form of *do ut des*: the former assured that Italy would remain within the Western community, and that the Italian Communist Party would remain outside the government, while the latter guaranteed protection and

⁵³ An essential reference for the reconstruction of the controversial relationship dynamic between *Democrazia Cristiana* and the United States is Mario Del Pero, *L'alleato Scomodo: gli USA e la DC negli anni del centrismo, 1948-55*, Roma: Carocci, 2001; for a synthetic interpretation of the Cold War in Italy see ID., *Containing Containment: Rethinking Italy's Experience during the Cold War*, in “Journal of Modern Italian Studies”, issue 4, 2003, pp. 532-55; Antonio Varsori, *Cold War History in Italy*, in “Cold War History”, issue 2, 2008, pp. 157-88, and Federico Romero, *L'Italia nella guerra fredda*, in Nicola Labanca (ed.), *Le armi della Repubblica: dalla Liberazione a oggi*, vol. V of Mario Isnenghi (ed.), *Gli Italiani in guerra*, Torino: UTET, 2009, pp. 39-57.

⁵⁴ For some political implications of this general concept see Mario Del Pero, *American Pressures and their Containment in Italy during the Ambassadorship of Clare Boothe Luce, 1953-1956*, in “Diplomatic History”, issue 3, 2004, pp. 407-39, and ID., *When the High Seas Finally Reached Italian Shores: Italy's Inclusion in the Atlantic Communitas*, in Marco Mariano (ed.), *Defining the Atlantic Community. Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, Routledge, 2010, pp. 161-73.

political – as well as economic – support to the majority party. From our point of view, the most evident downside for Christian Democracy was the lack of opportunity to pursue an autonomous and distinctive foreign policy, following the universalist premises laid down by Catholic culture. Western “orthodoxy” was non-negotiable, in particular for a country that had limited power within the international arena.⁵⁵

Moving to our second consideration, the explicit support manifested for European integration could help to soften the rigidity of that uncomfortable allegiance, underlining the preference for a model of community founded on common values and on political and cultural affinities, rather than on military necessities. However, the adhesion to the process of Europe-building was also functional to the interests of the country. Italy’s economy, indeed, had everything to gain from a liberalization of trade and labor movement through Europe, given the export-driven nature of its economic reconstruction, and its chronic surplus of manpower.⁵⁶ At the political level as well, the country’s stability (constantly under question in the first years after the war) could benefit from being anchored to a web of democracies which had all emerged from the same dramatic experience.⁵⁷ Italian governments therefore actively pursued any form of closer international cooperation, especially at European level. This means that interests and ideals were not in contradiction, and they both led to the same goal, i.e. the support to the institutionalization of European integration. Moreover, the commitment to build an integrated Europe had an across-the-

⁵⁵ This conclusion has been substantially shared by historiography, notwithstanding the different opinions on this phase of Italy’s international relations: for a balanced assessment see Federico Romero, *Gli Stati Uniti in Italia: Piano Marshall e Patto Atlantico*, in Francesco Barbagallo (coord.) *Storia dell’Italia Repubblicana*, vol. I: *La costruzione della democrazia*, Torino: Einaudi, 1994, pp. 231-89.

⁵⁶ See Francesca Fauri, *L’Italia e l’integrazione economica europea, 1947-2000*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001, pp. 112-18; Federico Romero, *Migration as an Issue in European Interdependence and Integration. The Case of Italy*, in Alan S. Milward (ed.), *The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992*, Routledge, 1993, pp. 33-57, and above all the studies of current Italian member of the European Parliament Roberto Gualtieri, who has convincingly theorized and analyzed the role of Europe as “external bond” able to positively condition Italy’s economy: see in particular *Piano Marshall, commercio estero e sviluppo in Italia: alle origini dell’europeismo centrista*, in “Studi storici”, issue 3, 1998, pp. 853-98, and, for a long-term perspective, *L’Europa come vincolo esterno*, in Piero Craveri and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *L’Italia nella costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007)*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2007, pp. 313-34.

⁵⁷ This was, first and foremost, the conviction of Alcide De Gasperi, the main protagonist of Italy’s international relations in the first postwar decade. For a balanced assessment of the much-debated question of De Gasperi’s Europeanism, see Daniela Preda, *Alcide de Gasperi, un federalista europeo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004. Acanfora, *Miti e ideologia nella politica estera DC*, pp. 77-114, presents a good synthesis of DC’s idea of Europe, underlining the role of De Gasperi in its development.

board appeal, for a generation of politicians that had been subjected to the nationalistic rhetoric of Fascism.⁵⁸

For *Democrazia Cristiana*, Europeanism also served the purpose of uniting the various currents of the party, which presented slightly different views on foreign policy, under the same goal. Indeed, the Western choice made by De Gasperi, was not initially shared by the whole party. The most consistent alternative, at least from the theoretical point of view, was presented by the group that acknowledged as its leader the politician and jurist Giuseppe Dossetti (1913-1996) – one of the most influential protagonists of early Christian Democracy – and included intellectuals and politicians like Amintore Fanfani (1908-1999), Giuseppe Lazzati (1909-1986) and Giorgio La Pira (1904-1977).⁵⁹ According to the ideas of the group, Italy should not have allied itself with the United States, as it thus lost the opportunity to implement an autonomous foreign policy. On the contrary, the government should have promoted a massive program of structural reforms, with the goal of removing the necessity to resort to external aid, allowing the country to gain full independence in the international arena. Here Italy could have used the skills of moderation and mediation that the Catholic culture had provided it with, in order to create a cooperative and fair

⁵⁸ Federico Romero offered some meaningful insights into the function of Europeanism in Italy's domestic policy, in a long-term perspective: see *L'Europa come strumento di nation-building: storia e storici dell'Italia repubblicana*, in "Passato e presente", issue 4, 1995, pp. 19-32.

⁵⁹ The four of them – known as *professorini*, or “little professors” – played a pivotal role at the Constituent Assembly (1946-1948), becoming some of the most influential individuals in the writing of the new Constitution. Dossetti was appointed DC's vice-secretary in 1945, but he left politics in 1951, because of profound disagreements with the Christian democratic ruling class about the management of the party and the politics implemented, dedicating himself to spiritual life (he took religious vows in 1956). He played an influential role at the Second Vatican Council, and spent the rest of his life in isolation from the public sphere. Also Giuseppe Lazzati was elected in Parliament only for the first legislature (1948-1953), but later he remained engaged in civil society; from 1968 to 1983, he was rector of Milan's “Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore”. We will mention the political careers of Giorgio La Pira and Amintore Fanfani in the following pages. The *gruppo dossettiano* – whose participants considered themselves primarily opinion shapers more than an organized current – employed a social progressive view, whose main features were shared by contemporary experiences of “Left Catholicism” in Europe: see Horn and Gerard (eds.), *Left Catholicism in Europe 1943-1955*, in particular the essay by Gerd Rainer Horn, *Left Catholicism in Western Europe in the 1940s*, pp. 22-24; Sergio Parisella, *Christian Movements and Parties of the Left in Italy (1938-1958)*, pp. 157-64, and Peter Van Kemseke, *From Permission to Prohibition. The Impact of the Changing International Context on Left Catholicism in Europe*, pp. 250-52. In Italian, the analysis of Paolo Pombeni, *Il gruppo dossettiano e la formazione della democrazia italiana (1938-1948)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979, is still valid, but see also ID., *Giuseppe Dossetti. L'avventura politica di un riformatore cristiano*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013, for a comprehensive historical assessment of Dossetti's life. In English, see the section Dossetti's theological thought by Alberto Melloni (ed.), *Giuseppe Dossetti. Studies on an Italian Catholic Reformer*, Wien: LIT, 2008.

international community, starting from within Europe.⁶⁰ Cultural and economic arguments were interwoven to compose an alternative to De Gasperi's design, which could not prescind from the connection with the United States. However, this political hypothesis, as Paolo Pombeni has already demonstrated, had already failed in 1947, when the Bipolar evolution of the international system left no space for Italy's non-alignment, and the pragmatic leadership of De Gasperi gained him full control of the party.⁶¹

The defeat of the *dossettiani*'s option, in any case, did not mean that Democrazia Cristiana accepted a passive role within the Atlantic alliance. In the following years, many representatives of the party tried to propose a more proactive role for the country in the international system; in the context of our analysis, we will briefly focus on the elaboration of Amintore Fanfani and Giorgio La Pira, who are normally categorized by the scholarly literature as two of the main protagonists of new Atlanticism (*neo-atlantismo*).⁶² New Atlanticism is a sort of "umbrella category", which makes reference to a series of initiatives carried out from the mid-1950s until the early 1960s, sharing as a common denominator the quest for a more prominent role for Italy within the Western alliance, especially in the Mediterranean area. The promoters of this policy asserted that the country could become the "privileged ally" of the United States, improving its international status while keeping its allegiances unquestioned. The first signals of détente, and then the problems experienced by European powers in that zone – e.g. the Suez crisis in 1956 – seemed to open new possibilities for the peninsula, for which the Mediterranean Sea was historically and geographically a natural environment. Amintore Fanfani was particularly resourceful in this respect: born in a small Tuscan

⁶⁰ See the address delivered by Dossetti at the founding meeting of "Civitas Humana", an association of the Catholic laity which served as "think tank" for the group, on November 1, 1946, and the article *Unità della politica: connessioni fra la politica interna e la politica estera italiana*, published in "Cronache Sociali" (the periodical of Dossetti's area), 31 December 1948. Both texts have been published in Giuseppe Dossetti, *Scritti politici 1943-1951*, edited by Giuseppe Trotta, Milano: Marietti, 1995, respectively at pp. 310-24 (see in part pp. 315-17), and 213-23.

⁶¹ Pombeni, *Il gruppo dossettiano*, pp. 387-92. See also Vera Capperucci, *Alcide De Gasperi and the problem of reconstruction*, in "Modern Italy", issue 4, 2009, pp. 445-57.

⁶² On new Atlanticism see Alessandro Brogi, *A question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices - France and Italy, 1944-1958*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, pp. 191-210; Massimo de Leonardis, *L'atlantismo dell'Italia tra guerra fredda, interessi nazionali e politica interna*, in Pier Luigi Ballini, Sandro Guerrieri and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *Le istituzioni repubblicane dal centrismo al centro-sinistra (1953-1968)*, Roma: Carocci, 2006, pp. 253-61.

village in 1908, Fanfani graduated from Milan's Catholic University in Economics and Business (1930), becoming one of the most influential scholars of Corporatism in Italy.⁶³ His interest in foreign policy was relatively undeveloped before he took on active political responsibilities, in particular as DC's secretary (1954-1959). From this moment onwards, he became an absolute protagonist of Italy's international relations – between 1958 and 1987 he was Prime Minister five times and Foreign Minister twice, gaining international recognition as president of the United Nations General Assembly in 1965-1966 (as mentioned, he chaired the Assembly in which Paul VI delivered his famous address, on October 4, 1965).⁶⁴ Fanfani's view was deeply rooted in the Christian democratic approach to international relations that we have begun to outline. Mediation between universality and nationality, rigid Anticommunism, loyalty to the Atlantic and European *communitates*, but with the claim that Italy should play a bigger and more recognized role within the international system, because of the grand tradition and culture of the country (deeply informed by Catholicism, and especially inclined to mediation and conciliation), were all factors that helped to shape his foreign policy discourse, and that sustained his committed and sometimes hectic international action.⁶⁵

Between the second half of 1958 and early in 1959, when Fanfani was both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, he tried to validate Italy's role as mediator between Egypt and the

⁶³ For a synthetic profile in English see Gilbert and Nilsson, *Historical Dictionary of Modern Italy*, pp. 171-74. In Italian, there are good contributions on specific aspects of his political and academic careers – in particular after the conferences organized for the centennial of his birth, in 2008 – but still no comprehensive historical biography of scientific value. An “institutional” profile emerges from the recently published Angela Maria Bocci Girelli (ed.), *Amintore Fanfani. Storico dell'economia e statista. Economic Historian and Statesman*, proceedings of the international Conference held in Rome on 26-27 March 2009, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2013, which presents an interesting section on non-Italian views on the DC's politician. On Fanfani's economic thought see especially Piero Roggi, *Amintore Fanfani: imprenditore della politica*, Firenze: Regione Toscana, 2011.

⁶⁴ A recent assessment of Fanfani's foreign policy throughout his political career is in Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi (eds.), *Amintore Fanfani e la politica estera italiana*, atti del convegno di studi tenuto a Roma il 3 e 4 febbraio 2009, Venezia: Marsilio, 2010.

⁶⁵ Some notes on Fanfani's foreign policy discourse are in Guido Formigoni, *Fanfani, la DC e la ricerca di un nuovo discorso di politica estera (1954-1968)*, in Giovagnoli and Tosi (eds.), *Amintore Fanfani e la politica estera italiana*, pp. 78-102. In the same volume, Agostino Giovagnoli criticizes the superficial judgment on Fanfani's foreign policy – generally considered as unrealistic and adventurist – that was usually given by national and international literature: Agostino Giovagnoli, *L'impegno internazionale di Fanfani*, pp. 39-40. About Fanfani's Anticommunism, see in particular the speech delivered at the 11th Congress of the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales* (which we will present in the next paragraph) held in Arezzo in 1957, analyzed and contextualized in Bruna Bagnato (ed.), *Amintore Fanfani e la crisi del comunismo. Arezzo 1957: XI Congresso delle NEI*, proceedings of the Conference held in Arezzo in June 2008, Firenze: Polistampa, 2009.

United States, talking directly with Nasser in order to defuse a possible threat to the stability of the Middle East. Fanfani did not only act for reasons of prestige, but he was also trying to protect and enlarge Italian economic interests in the region, in particular those of the national oil and gas company (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, ENI), led by Enrico Mattei.⁶⁶ This episode is indicative because it exemplifies how Italy's activism combined political and economic motives exploiting DC's growing pull in the Italian State, as mentioned in the introductory paragraph, but also using cultural arguments, which resonated with the Christian democratic approach to international relations. Indeed, Italy could propose itself as a bridge between different cultures, thanks to its innate capacity to play the role of arbiter (the traditional analogous claim of the Church toward the international community since the late nineteenth century), that the Catholic culture had transfused into the Nation's character. In 1951 DC's representative Paolo Emilio Taviani (1912-2001), undersecretary to Foreign Affairs, had described Italy as "natural bridge between the West and the Arab world", underlining the specific contribution that the country could bring to the formation of a peaceful international community.⁶⁷

This idea would have been especially developed by center-left DC politician Giorgio La Pira: intellectual, professor of Roman Law, member of the Constituent Assembly, close friend of the future Paul VI and a leading figure of the *dossettiani*, La Pira's worldview was deeply shaped by the Catholic faith.⁶⁸ He cannot be considered a Christian Democrat spokesperson, since he played a

⁶⁶ Enrico Mattei (1906-1962) was an Italian entrepreneur and public administrator who played a major role in Italy's economy after the Second World War. He pursued an ambitious energy policy, making agreements with Middle Eastern States and the Soviet Union in order to secure oil supplies for Italy, and expand ENI's influence. The mysterious circumstances surrounding his death have been investigated by numerous journalistic reconstructions, and represent one of the "mysteries" of Italian contemporary history. See Leonardo Maugeri, *L'arma del petrolio. Questione petrolifera globale, guerra fredda e politica italiana nella vicenda di Enrico Mattei*, Firenze: Loggia de' Lanzi, 1994. Fanfani's international work over the course of his long political career was not limited to the Middle East, but it also revolved around the relationship with other countries and areas – like the Soviet Union, China, Latin America – and was famously characterized by another mediation effort in the Vietnam war, which we will mention later. All of these political trajectories are briefly synthetized in the volume edited by Tosi and Giovagnoli, with related bibliography.

⁶⁷ Taviani's speech, delivered at "Fiera del Levante" in Bari, is quoted by Lorenza Sebesta, *L'Europa indifesa: sistema di sicurezza atlantico e caso italiano, 1948-1955*, Firenze: Ponte alle Grazie, 1991, p. 138 (my translation).

⁶⁸ Giorgio La Pira served as mayor of Florence in 1950-1956 and then again in 1960-1964, becoming worldwide known for his commitment to the issue of peace and human rights. His essays were often translated into several languages (see http://www.storiadifirenze.org/pdf_ex_eprints/08_Pubblicazioni_La_Pira.pdf). La Pira, Third Order Dominican, combined political responsibilities with a profound spirituality: see James A. Miller, *Politics in a Museum. Governing*

peripheral role within the party in the 1950s, but the originality of his take on international relations is particularly significant, because he was among the few DC representatives to emphasize the importance of a cultural approach rooted in the Catholic *Weltanschauung* to international relations. From our point of view, in a period when reflection on the desirable structure of the international community within Christian Democracy was scarce and poorly articulated, after De Gasperi's "fundamental choices", as one can easily infer from DC's internal meetings dedicated to foreign policy issues, La Pira's elaboration offers a good example of a consistent adaptation of Catholic universalism to Italy's international relations (and also, as we will argue, of the reasons for his isolation).⁶⁹

Namely, La Pira encouraged the collaboration between Europe and the Arab world, which should have been promoted by Mediterranean countries, as the crossroads between different continents. Italy, in particular, could offer the less-developed African and Asian countries a model of civilization that was alternative to both American capitalism and Soviet Communism, and immune to colonialist suggestions, because it was founded on religious values (the only ones that could hold national and international societies together). In his view, the Mediterranean Sea – the "great lake of Tiberias" – was the strategic and symbolic environment in which "civilizations with religious structure" could collaborate in order to find "the fundamental connections that link the world of Arab and Muslim civilization, and the world of Christian civilization".⁷⁰ Mixing biblical language and geopolitical considerations, La Pira argued that the affinities between civilizations based on the central role of religion could be cemented by the opposition to the rampant

Postwar Florence, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, pp. 49-66. For his close relationship with Mgr. Montini see De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, passim. (especially p. 570 ff. and 705), and Alberto Monticone, *La Firenze di Giorgio La Pira e di Paolo VI*, in "Istituto Paolo VI – Notiziario", issue 65, 2013, pp. 76-93.

⁶⁹ The shortage of consistent ideas alternative to De Gasperi's choices (as well as their lack of feasibility) has been underlined by Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, p. 440. Moreover, La Pira's close friendship with Fanfani (and Mattei) conferred a special importance and notoriety to his ideas, especially when Fanfani played a pivotal role in Italian politics: See the interesting correspondence between the two of them in Fondazione Giorgio La Pira (ed.), *Caro Giorgio..., caro Amintore...: 25 anni di storia nel carteggio La Pira-Fanfani*, Firenze: Polistampa, 2003.

⁷⁰ The quotation is taken from a letter to Nasser of August 21, 1957, published in Marco Pietro Giovannoni (ed.), *Il grande lago di Tiberiade. Lettere di Giorgio La Pira per la pace nel Mediterraneo (1954-1977)*, Firenze: Polistampa, 2006, pp. 47-49, my translation.

materialism which characterized the contemporary age, in the form of both unrestrained Liberalism and, above all, atheistic Communism. The mayor of Florence explicitly proposed building an “anticommunist dam” to Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser, with the contribution of Middle Eastern countries and the West, thus helping to restore the unity of the human family. This was the ultimate goal – considered unrealistic in the short term, because of the refusal by the East to acknowledge the centrality of human rights and civil liberties – of the Italian politician, who was involved in numerous initiatives aimed at banning war as means of conflict resolution.⁷¹ La Pira’s attempts to mediate in international crises were not limited to the Middle East; on the contrary, his most famous initiative concerned the tentative mediation in the Vietnam war, carried out during November 1965 through direct talks with Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s President Ho Chi Minh. Such a far-reaching attempt fell through despite an initial cautious interest from American diplomacy: in this case, the mayor of Florence could count on the support of a powerful ally, his close friend Amintore Fanfani (at the time Italian Foreign Minister and President of the UN Assembly), but their combined efforts did not meet with success.⁷²

Going back to the analysis that we developed in the first chapter, we can categorize La Pira’s cultural approach to foreign policy as a mix of Traditional Universalism (insistence on Christian civilization, role of religion as the key to a peaceful international coexistence) and New Universalism, since he was convinced that only through dialogue and cooperation (and the respect of human rights) could the international community second the movement toward the unification of

⁷¹ La Pira organized several meetings and congresses, in Florence, to promote collaboration among world cities and countries, in order to achieve peace at global level. These initiatives – especially the “Mediterranean Colloquia” and the “Colloquia for peace and Christian civilization”, from the early 1950s to the 1960s – made him known worldwide as a man of peace (as they did for Florence as a center of international reconciliation), even if they did not achieve actual results. See Philippe Chenaux, *La Pira, Florence et la paix*, in “Nova et Vetera”, issue 2, 1989, pp. 134-45; Pietro Domenico Giovannoni, “A Firenze un concilio delle nazioni”. *Il primo convegno per la Pace e la Civiltà Cristiana*, Firenze: Polistampa, 2007, and Angela Villani, *Tra profezia e politica: Giorgio La Pira e i colloqui mediterranei*, in Marcello Sajja (ed.), *Giorgio La Pira dalla Sicilia al Mediterraneo*, Messina: Trisform, 2005, pp. 271-95.

⁷² On the contrary, a side-effect of the initiative was Fanfani’s resignation as Foreign Minister in December 1965, following an “unorthodox” interview of La Pira to the right-wing periodical “Il Borghese”, where he criticized American Secretary of State Dean Rusk and defined Fanfani as the “Italian De Gaulle”. The history of La Pira’s mission to North Vietnam has been narrated by Italian diplomat Mario Sica, *Marigold non fiorì. Il contributo italiano alla pace in Vietnam*, Firenze: Ponte alle Grazie, 1991, pp. 34-42, while for a broader contextualization see Leopoldo Nuti, *L’Italie et l’escalade de la guerre du Vietnam*, in “Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains”, issue 1, 2012, pp. 61-78.

the human family that was promised by the Holy Scriptures, and whose first signs could be seen even in the troubled contemporary world.⁷³ This cultural framework could be applied to Italy's international status, entrusting the country with a function of mediation and moderation that would have come naturally to it because of its Catholic DNA, and would have fit in nicely with the Nation's desire to regain a proper place within the international system.

In the eyes of the historian, however, what characterized this vision was its evident inapplicability to the context of the postwar world. The ideal of peaceful cooperation among Nation-States, governed by law and supervised by international institutions, shattered against the wall of the Cold War. Moreover, any hope for a special place for Italy within the new international system would prove to be unattainable, given the recent history of the country and the limited power resources at its disposal.⁷⁴ Consequently, the attempts to play a more prominent role, as in the case of the new Atlanticist policies, were destined to fail, aside from formal recognition from the United States.⁷⁵ Italy's foreign policy achieved some important successes, especially the country's integration in the multilateral web of interdependences which covered the Western community, but could not aspire to a more influential and autonomous role within the Western

⁷³ La Pira's conception of Christian civilization changed significantly through the years: from an initial convergence with the imperialistic mission of Fascism, to the vision of a "plural theological civilization", open to ecumenism (and partially divergent from the Magisterium's conception), which took shape post-WWII: on this, see the contributions by Pietro Domenico Giovannoni, in particular *La Pira e la civiltà cristiana tra fascismo e democrazia* (1922-1944), Morcelliana: Brescia, 2008; ID., "A Firenze un concilio delle nazioni", pp. 81-98, and *Dalla "civiltà Cristiana" alle "civiltà teologali". Note su Giorgio La Pira e la genesi dei Colloqui mediterranei*, in Alessandro Cortesi and Aldo Tarquini (eds.), *Europa e Mediterraneo. Politica, economia e religioni*, Firenze: Nerbini, 2008, pp. 161-86. La Pira was also influenced by contemporary European Catholic thought from *nouvelle théologie* to Jacques Maritain, which, as mentioned, helped to shape the new universalist paradigm: Jean Daniélou, for instance, offered a paradigmatic example of the new vision in a speech given at the fifth Congress for Peace and Christian civilization (1955), devoted to the theme *History and Prophecy*: see the text of the allocution in *Storia e profezia. Atti del quinto convegno internazionale per la pace e la civiltà cristiana*, Firenze 21-27 giugno 1956, Firenze: Stab. Tip. R. Noccioli, 1957, pp. 55-65, while for the cultural influences on La Pira's thought see Piero A. Carnemolla, *Un cristiano siciliano: rassegna degli studi su Giorgio La Pira* (1978-1998), Caltanissetta: S. Sciascia, 1999, p. 174, and Jean-Dominique Durand, *Giorgio La Pira-Jacques Maritain: dialogo per un'Europa cristiana* (giugno-luglio 1946), in "Studium", issue 6, 2001, pp. 893-912.

⁷⁴ English-written literature on Italy's foreign policy has usually insisted on the striking gap between the country's ambitions – which, as mentioned, were not only fueled by the Catholic culture – and the feasibility of implementing them, and also on the subordination of foreign policy to domestic policy (which led to the irrelevance of the former): a first classical example of this paradigm is in Norman Kogan, *The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1963. This interpretation has recently been revisited by Elisabetta Brighi, *Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and International Relations: The Case of Italy*, Routledge, 2013 (see p. 7 for an assessment of the previous historiography on Italy's foreign policy), while Italian scholars have described a more nuanced dynamic, although underlining the validity of the core of such critiques: see for all Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1998, pp. VII-XII.

⁷⁵ Alessandro Brogi, *A question of self-esteem*, pp. 237-44.

coalition and the international community. What did this mean from the point of view of the Christian democratic political culture? In short, that it was extremely difficult to build a consistent foreign policy discourse which followed up on the premises laid out between the interbellum period and the foundation of *Democrazia Cristiana*, based on the mediation between universalism and nationality and rooted in the Catholic approach to international relations. This (as well as his eccentricity) is why La Pira's "visionariness" was substantially isolated, and the cultural elaboration with regard to the theoretical basis of foreign policy was very limited: Italy's international relations did (and could) not comply to the ideology of the majority party. Anticommunism and the idea of Europe – following a pattern that we analyzed in the first chapter – could only function as powerful surrogates to justify the forced reduction of the universalist perspective, tending to absorb the entire discourse on foreign policy from the end of the 1940s to the end of the 1950s.⁷⁶

Keeping these premises in mind, we can now turn to the period under observation, asking ourselves how a triple level of changes – at international level, in Italian politics and in the Catholic culture – impacted the Christian democratic discourse on the international community.

3. Between Universalism and Nation. Profiling DC's discourse on the international community in the 1960s and 1970s.

The world in 1978 was fairly different from that of 1963. The "multipolarization" of the international system and the consolidation of newly independent Nation-States all around the planet had profoundly reshaped the global power map, which no longer revolved mostly around the East-West axis. Italy was also quite changed. The economic boom of the early 1960s had declined into a

⁷⁶ A synthetic reconstruction is offered by Guido Formigoni, *Democrazia cristiana e mondo cattolico dal neoatlantismo alla distensione*, in Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi (eds.), *Un ponte sull'Atlantico. L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, Milano: Guerini e associati, 2003, pp. 141-67.

harsh crisis, which involved politics and society. Right and left extremist movements had exacerbated the social tensions, common to other Western democracies, that a weak political system was not able to contain. Aldo Moro's kidnapping and murder (1978) tragically symbolized the self-destructive period that the country was experiencing, after the impressive success of its reconstruction efforts. Zooming in further, we can observe how those fifteen years had not been easy for the *Democrazia Cristiana* either.⁷⁷ In 1963, after much postponement, the party was launching the most innovative experiment in Italian politics after the war: the government alliance between Christian Democrats and Socialists. A decade and a half later the experiment had substantially failed, the DC was hemorrhaging consensus and votes, whereas its historical adversary, the Communist party, seemed destined to become Italy's premier political force, while it was already involved in the legislative process through an increasing confrontation in Parliament. The results of the 1974 referendum, which approved the introduction of a law allowing divorce, openly questioned the influence of the Catholic culture on Italian citizens' behavior and voting patterns for the first time. The DC had strongly supported the abolition of the law, with the explicit backing of the Church's hierarchy. The referendum on divorce represented a groundbreaking event for contemporary Italy, since it seemed that civil society had suddenly and silently entered the age of secularization, taking the political ruling class from right to left by surprise and closing the gap with Western democracies.⁷⁸ Catholic culture itself, as we have already seen from our observation point, did not get through the 1960s and the 1970s unscathed: the papacy of John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council promoted a significant change of doctrine, that Paul VI had to handle while streams of contestation and dissent flowed through the Catholic community.

An extensive examination of how these major processes influenced the Christian democratic discourse on the international community would go far beyond the limits and the scope of our

⁷⁷ For a general contextualization of contemporary Italy and DC's history see the works quoted at footnote 8.

⁷⁸ The historiography has offered a more nuanced and balanced interpretation, underlining how this event did not have straightforward repercussions on the voting patterns or on the view of the family (for instance, the role of women) of Italian citizens. For a comprehensive analysis see Giambattista Scirè, *Il divorzio in Italia. Partiti, Chiesa, società civile dalla legge al referendum (1965-1974)*, Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2007, with related bibliography. We will mention the impact of this event on the "Italian Catholic world" in the next chapter.

investigation. A summarizing approach, though, allows us to extrapolate the essential features that emerge from a long-term point of view, and also to put them in a comparative perspective, taking into account in particular the discourse of European Christian Democracy. Here we will propose a general interpretation, based on primary sources, in particular the papers of DC's Political Secretariat and National Council;⁷⁹ proceedings of national congresses and conferences, and on the study of the aforementioned context. In a nutshell, our hypothesis is that *Democrazia Cristiana* expressed a rather consistent, although not well developed, culture of foreign policy, whose basic features were congruent with the new universalist paradigm (and were now more in line with the evolution of the international system), and were substantially shared by the other components of the same political family, at least in the European scenario. The idea of international community that can be inferred from DC's discourse was able to combine a universalist and a Nation-oriented approach, although, as we will argue in the following paragraph, the public rhetoric was not always followed up by a consistent political implementation.

3.1. New Universalism applied to politics. Notes on the congruence between the new universalist paradigm and the Christian democratic discourse.

The reflection on the cultural premises of foreign policy was never among the first items on the agenda of DC's political meetings, nor was it the subject of any conference or study days organized by the party: the development of an organic cultural elaboration – as for the previous period – was rarely a coordinated and collective effort. During Aldo Moro's Secretariat (1959-1964), the party's

⁷⁹ The Political Secretariat was the key decision-making body of the party; it was composed on average of 40 members, who met about once every two weeks (but the schedule could vary depending on the urgency of the issues to discuss); the National Council met about four times a year to discuss general policies and make changes in the party Statutes, and had more than 200 members: its role was more formal than substantial, but at the same it was a stage where the leaders of the party could present their views on DC politics in a fashion that was less influenced by propaganda's tones, than in the national congresses.

international activity (correspondence with non-Italian Christian democratic parties and organizations, study of foreign policy issues) was handled by two branches, namely the “Ufficio per le relazioni internazionali” (International Office) and the “Ufficio per le relazioni con i partiti DC e i problemi europei” (Office for the relations with Christian democratic parties and European problems). Under Mariano Rumor’s time as political secretary (1964-1969), in the context of the reorganization of the central offices, both branches were suppressed and replaced by “Sezione Esteri” (Foreign Office), directly dependent by the Political Secretariat. However, the documentation of this office through the following years is rather irregular and generally scarce, also because of the complicated process of recovery and cataloguing of DC’s archives.⁸⁰ In October 1965 the DC’s National Council established a foreign policy commission, with the task of promoting suggestions or proposals for the Council to examine.⁸¹ Although the organism did not have deliberative powers, it was composed of influential members of the party. Unfortunately, in this case as well, there are no traces of its work in the DC’s archive, a fact that can be attributed to the abovementioned problematic conservation of the party’s papers, or, more probably, to the lack of activity of the commission, confirmed by one of the most active DC representatives on foreign policy issues, Angelo Bernassola, who recalled in the early 1980s that the commission “has not had a meeting in twenty years”.⁸² More generally, Bernassola underlined the limited interest of the party in international matters at the 1980 National Congress, when he significantly stated:

⁸⁰ See Istituto Sturzo, fund Democrazia Cristiana (hereinafter Sturzo, DC), *Inventario*, in part. pp. 9-10.

⁸¹ Sturzo, DC, series Consiglio Nazionale (hereinafter CN), box 52. The members of the Commission were: the MPs Alcide Berloffà, Giorgio Bo, Giacomo Bosco, Luciano Dal Falco, Amintore Fanfani, Arnaldo Forlani, Renzo Franzo, Aventino Frau, Sereno Freato, Silvio Gava, Guido Gonella, Luigi Granelli, Enzo Lomazzi, Mario Martinelli, Edoardo Martino, Bernardo Mattarella, Lorenzo Natali, Leandro Rampa, Carlo Russo, Franco Salvi, Adolfo Sarti, Mario Scelba, Giorgio Spitella, Paolo Emilio Taviani, Mario Toros, Giuseppe Vedovato, Raoul Zaccari, and the experts Corrado Corghi, Dino De Poli, Giorgio La Pira and Filippo Pandolfi.

⁸² Angelo Bernassola, Senator for two legislatures, was involved in DC’s “foreign office”, first in the Youth Movement and then as the head of “Sezione Esteri” for most of the 1960s (continuing to work in the office also in the following decade). He also became president of the *Union Internationale des Jeunes Démocrates Chrétiens* (UIJDC), and he was one of the most engaged Italian Christian Democrats in the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD), as we will mention in paragraph 3.2. The abovementioned statement is quoted in Gianfranco Pasquino, *Elementi per un’analisi della politica estera democristiana*, in Roger Morgan and Stefano Silvestri (eds.), *I partiti moderati e conservatori europei*, Roma: Studio Tesi, 1983, p. 145, but Bernassola had already voiced complaints about the ineffectiveness of this organism in a letter to the president of DC’s Senate group, on 30/11/1970: see Sturzo, DC, Series Segreteria Politica (hereinafter SP), box 220, folder 1.

Democrazia Cristiana lacks an adequate seat for the debate and analysis of international matters, where suitable political proposals could be elaborated, in order to orient, stimulate and lead the country, and to give the party line to Christian and democratic operators engaged in European and international organisms.⁸³

Nevertheless, if we analyze the most important speeches by the party's various bodies, we can identify a series of guiding principles that guided and shaped the party's foreign policy, which were rooted in the premises laid out after the Second World War. The report prepared by senator Silvio Gava and approved by the National Council on March 21, 1963, is a suitable starting point.⁸⁴ Gava summarized the goals of Italy's international action with the formula "peace in security, cooperation among peoples, solidarity toward developing peoples". The United Nations were considered the center of gravity of the international community:

Irreplaceable factor for peace keeping, for the peaceful solution of international controversies, for the expansion of freedom and prosperity in the world through civil and material elevation of recently emancipated peoples, and of those who will reach it in the future.⁸⁵

Peace, cooperation and solidarity – cornerstones of New Universalism – should therefore have been guaranteed by international institutions, starting from the United Nations, which represented a higher level of integration and identity for all the members of the human family.⁸⁶ We are already familiar with these ideas, whose origin was explicitly traced back by the report on the development of the Italian Popular Party. However, they all depended on the concept of security. For Italy, this translated into loyalty to the Western community, and support for the processes of disarmament and European political integration. Only within the security system established by the Atlantic Alliance

⁸³ See Bernassola's intervention in "Il Popolo", 20 February 1980, p. 10, my translation. Moreover, see his interview with historian Daniela Preda, recorded in 1998 and available on the website of the European University Institute: here he stated that within the party "many privileged [...] internal matters, Italian politics, without considering the international and European context". See <http://www.eui.eu/HAEU/OralHistory/pdf/INT580.pdf>, p. 10, my translation.

⁸⁴ Silvio Gava (1901-2008) was Senator of the Republic for six legislatures; Minister of the Treasury from 1953 to 1956, Minister of Justice from 1968 to 1970 and Minister of Industry from 1970-1972, he was a member of DC's majority current.

⁸⁵ See Sturzo, DC, CN, box 47, my translation.

⁸⁶ Significantly, they were explicitly quoted as the basis of Italy's foreign policy also at the end of the period under observation, in a speech that Italian Foreign Minister Arnaldo Forlani gave before the UN Assembly, on September 28, 1977. See the text in "Relazioni Internazionali", 1977, p. 994.

could the country contribute to the betterment of international relations, and hope to play the peculiar role inherent to its nature in the future:

The future role of Italy may not be that of the last military and imperialist power, but instead the first European power, with a function of balance and pacification that will fulfill its destiny in our continent and in the world.⁸⁷

It is evident that we are dealing with the same reduction (or postponing) of the universalist perspective that we described for the previous period. The reason for this choice, once again, is not difficult to grasp: political secretary and Prime Minister Aldo Moro summed it up as an “irreducible contradiction” with Communism, the biggest danger threatening the security of the international community.⁸⁸ It is interesting to notice that the same theme of Europe-building, traditionally a surrogate of the Catholic universalist design, was sometimes defined as a way to counterbalance the expansionist desires of the Soviet Union. The new secretary Mariano Rumor adopted this point of view in the report to the 9 Congress of the party, in 1964, when he stated that “the same projection of Soviet foreign policy”, which implied an expansion toward Europe, underlined the necessity to focus on European integration “in political terms, inevitably”.⁸⁹

The political secretary Mariano Rumor repeated the same guidelines three years later, at the following Congress:

⁸⁷ Sturzo, DC, CN, box 47, my translation.

⁸⁸ See Moro’s report to the National Council, 29/7/1963, in Sturzo, DC, NC, box 48.

⁸⁹ See Rumor’s report to the 9th DC’s Congress in *Atti del IX Congresso nazionale della Democrazia Cristiana*, Roma: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1965, pp. 105-77 (quotation from p. 160, my translation). The position of *Democrazia Cristiana* on the subject of European integration in the 1960s was based on three pillars: support to the political integration (merger of the three executives), to Great Britain’s entrance and reaffirmation of the close link between Europe and United States. See the memorandum by Luciano Dal Falco, s.d., (probably 1964), and the report, not signed, for the political secretary (1967) in Sturzo, DC, SP, box 182, folders 1 and 4. This was, as we will mention, the position of the Italian government: see Antonio Varsori, *L’Italia e la costruzione europea negli anni del centro-sinistra: una proposta interpretativa*, in Federico Romero and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione. Le relazioni internazionali dell’Italia (1917-1989)*, Roma: Carocci, 2005, vol. I, pp. 271-85.

About Italy's international collaboration, there is no need for a reconsideration or revision of the fundamental choices, which remain a stable fact of our foreign policy. They hinge on Western solidarity, European integration and collaboration among peoples through the valorization of the United Nations.⁹⁰

This is an element that we cannot underestimate: two decades after entering the Atlantic Alliance, Italy's "Western allegiance" had become natural and substantially unquestioned by Christian democrats. What had begun as a somewhat forced choice was now perceived as a fact that provided Italy with security and growth opportunities within the international system. The "right wing" of the party was the traditional guardian of its observance; at the 1969 Congress Giulio Andreotti bluntly restated the centrality of the Atlantic Alliance, saying, "NATO [...] is a defense instrument (no need to talk about civilization) [...] thanks to it, Italy has been able to walk this path of free and autonomous self-determination", but it is easy to find statements in most party meetings on the centrality of Atlanticism, Europeanism and Anticommunism, inextricably connected as the cornerstone of Italy's foreign policy.⁹¹ Anticommunism was the essential glue between two very different references, one more natural and traditional (European identity), the other (the link with the United States) unavoidable primarily for security reasons. We can consider this position to be

⁹⁰ See Rumor's report to the 10th Congress, in *Atti del X Congresso nazionale della Democrazia Cristiana*, Roma: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1969, pp. 31-87 (quotation from p.70, my translation). In this Congress, discussion on foreign policy did not take up much time, and was mostly limited to standard considerations. It is quite significant that an expert like Guido Gonella, who twenty-five years earlier had written an idealist essay on Christian Democracy and the international order, restricted the references to international matters to these words: "Let's set aside world problems, from Vietnam to Cuba, from Cuba to Congo, because we know that we can have an influence on them like we can influence the course of stars..." Other delegates expressed more original positions, but they did not raise a debate. See *Atti del X Congresso*, p. 605 for Gonella's quotation, my translation.

⁹¹ For instance, Giuseppe Pella (1902-1981, member of the Italian Parliament from 1948 to 1976, Prime Minister in 1953-54), insisted on putting the stress on these elements for the electoral campaign on 1963, while Emilio Colombo (1920-2013, Prime Minister from 1970 to 1972, president of the European Parliament from 1977 to 1979) underlined their centrality in the address to the 1967 Congress. See respectively Sturzo, DC, SP, box 159, folder 26, and *Atti del X Congresso*, p. 458. Together with Mario Scelba (1901-1991), Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (1918-2012) and above all Giulio Andreotti (1919-2013, three times Prime Minister, Minister of the Republic for 20 years – six years as Foreign Minister, seven years as Defense Minister), they were considered by Italian media to be among the leaders of "DC's right wing", that did not have a structured current of thought, but was characterized by a general tendency to favor social and political conservatism. To my knowledge, there is no specific literature on the history of DC's right wing, also due to the lack of common elaboration; there are, though, some specific essays on the single personalities, for instance Gabriella Fanello Marcucci, *Giuseppe Pella: un liberista cristiano*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007; Gianluca Susta (ed.), *Giuseppe Pella (1902-1981). Raccolta di discorsi, interviste e scritti sull'Europa 1950-1960*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2012; Pier Luigi Ballini (ed.), *Mario Scelba: contributi per una biografia*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006; Mario Barone and Ennio Di Nolfo, *Giulio Andreotti: l'uomo, il cattolico, lo statista*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010. Andreotti's quotation is taken from *Atti dell'XI Congresso nazionale della Democrazia Cristiana*, Roma: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1973, p. 411, my translation.

the background – a background generally shared by the other Christian democratic parties of Western Europe⁹² – more than the subject of our study: indeed, we are interested in outlining the original elements of the Christian democratic discourse on foreign policy, that can be related to its “Catholic roots”, and this factor does not fall into this range. This was the premise that had already been addressed in the first years after the war and that now had become common patrimony of the party. Italy’s belonging to the Western community was not up for debate, but its role within it and in the international system could be partly re-evaluated.

Such a re-evaluation had something to do with the evolution of the Catholic discourse on the international community: the winds of change that were blowing through Catholic culture after the Second Vatican Council had indeed left an impression on the public rhetoric of Italian Christian Democracy as well. The importance of the Council was acknowledged by Rumor in the same speech to the 1967 Congress, that we referred to earlier:

It is natural that an event like the Second Vatican Council finds a committed resonance in our party. It is natural that what the Catholic world acquires in its own sphere, finds in Christian Democracy an adequate echo. In this link lives our distinctive and qualifying feature.⁹³

This link was restated, with a specific reference to foreign policy, as we mentioned in the opening quote of this chapter, in the address that the new secretary Flaminio Piccoli gave to the 1969 extraordinary Congress, which was the best manifestation of the recalibration of the Christian democratic approach.⁹⁴ An unusually long part of the speech was dedicated to foreign policy, starting with a famous quote by De Gasperi: “we are what our international connections are”. This statement seemed to have found a deeper meaning in the contemporary age, characterized by a

⁹² Winfried Becker, *The Emergence and Development of Christian Democratic Parties in Western Europe*, in Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, p. 118.

⁹³ See *Atti X congresso*, p. 85, my translation.

⁹⁴ Flaminio Piccoli (1915-2000) was MP for ten legislatures, and he was briefly DC’s political secretary, from January 1969, after the appointment of Mariano Rumor as Prime Minister, to November 1969, when he left the position because of the divisions within the majority current: see Pierluigi Castellani, *La Democrazia Cristiana dal centro-sinistra al delitto Moro (1962-1978)*, in Malgeri (ed.), *Storia della Democrazia Cristiana*, vol. IV, in part. pp. 48-55. See the report in *Atti dell’XI Congresso*, pp. 25-69.

growing interdependence between national and international problems. Piccoli drew fully on the discourse of the Catholic culture, that had been renewed by the Council: beyond all partisan temptations, the ecumenical assembly shed a new light on “the role of the Christian religion in the world: as living and vivifying force of the hopes and actions of communities, in order to obtain development and independence in peace”. A political party of Christian inspiration should have gleaned something from this source, while at the same time maintaining political autonomy in its cultural evolution: consistent with the process of “autonomization” described in the introductory section, in this instance, there was no direct influence of the Church in the development of the party’s political culture, but instead an autonomous interpretation of the Catholic discourse. The Magisterium was one of the most important sources of said discourse, but not the “invisible hand” that steered DC’s policies: for instance, Piccoli’s quote of the powerful message against war conveyed in Paul’s address to the United Nations, supported (instead of determining) the party’s longstanding commitment to empowering international institutions in order to prevent the recourse to war, promote cooperation and solidarity among the actors of the international system, and protecting the rights of citizens whenever and wherever they were put in danger by the intrusiveness of the Nation-State.

An even more interesting connection between the DC’s discourse and the development of Catholic culture was established in the section about Europe. Although the incompatibility between Christian Democracy and Communism at national and international level was a cornerstone of the address, the Anticommunist factor was put in the background so as to underline the possible new role that the continent should play in the new global context:

There is room to build a politically integrated Europe, which should claim an organic function of responsibility for the development of the Third World, thanks to peace-inspired strategies. [...] A kind of Europe [that should promote] shared initiatives, and act as a model for the integration and coexistence of peoples in the world.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39, my translation.

Europe was proposed, then, as element of balance in the international system and as a factor of progress in the North/South axis. The continent could represent a more suitable model for the developing countries than the Western one, based solely on material factors; it could also rely on the strength of its institutional architecture, centered on the integration of the communities, from the local (the reference was to regions, which were about to be established in Italy's legislation) to the supranational level. This approach, which we can easily connect to the new universalist paradigm, was not new to the Congress's audience, but while it was usually employed by the left current of the party, this time it had become common patrimony of the majority group.⁹⁶

Italy could have a specific role to play, a role of responsibility and mediation, in the new international context: "A country with noble tradition of thought, [...] the center of Christian Ecumenism [...] Italy is the connection between Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, at the crossroads of West and East, North and South".⁹⁷ These suggestions had their roots in the new Atlanticist positions mentioned above (and, more generally, in the traditional discourse on foreign policy), but with a significant difference from their precedents: in the context of a rigid Bipolarity, the goal was no longer to achieve a better position within the Atlantic Alliance, but rather to walk along the new routes that the changed structure of the international system could open. In short, the new trends that seemed consolidating at global level – first steps of the détente, the emergence of protagonists other than the two superpowers, self-determination of peoples, in particular in the South of the world – were considered potentially concordant with the Universalist discourse. Italy, and Europe, could finally have a chance to act consistently with the cultural premises of their foreign policy,

⁹⁶ See for instance the speech by Giovanni Galloni, one of the leaders of the left minority current, at the 1967 Congress (*Atti X Congresso*, in part. pp. 145-46). Carlo Donat Cattin, another major representative of the same group, presented a similar view at the 1969 Congress, but he demanded more practical consequences, like the request to the United States to stop the bombing in Vietnam (in order for Italy to highlight the distance from the military tendencies of its most important ally), or the recognition of the German Democratic Republic, so as to foster the development of the European Community as a truly autonomous subject. See *Atti XI Congresso*, in part. pp. 193-94. Once again, we have to restate that a more nuanced interpretation of the Christian democratic view on foreign policy would benefit from a detailed study of the various currents periodical press, although at general level – through the analysis of the interventions of the currents' major representatives at the national congresses – we can state that the basic features of DC's culture of foreign policy were shared by the whole party.

⁹⁷ *Atti dell'XI Congresso*, p. 39, my translation.

even if the context was complicated by the presence of powerful counterrends (the persistence of the Cold War, a surge of new conflicts, the growing divide between developed and developing countries). At least, the country could try to reinforce the positive aspects of those tendencies within the many international institutions, organizations and forums in which it was present. This was the best way to reconcile a universalist and a nation-oriented approach, outside of any impracticable claim by Italy to play a “universal function” in the international system. It was a significant variation from the unrealistic rhetorical arguments employed in the previous period, that had an appeal, as we have seen, also within the Christian Democratic Party.

This general approach to international relations, and to the idea of international community – communitarian, guided by the goal of universal peace, based on the principles of solidarity, but also steadily anchored to the concept of national security – did not significantly change during the 1970s. A revision of the foreign policy's view was not on the agenda, especially in a period characterized by a deep internal crisis, which was taking all the party's attention and intensified the traditional lack of interest toward foreign policy, that was rarely debated at the meetings of the National Council.⁹⁸ The national Congresses of 1973 and 1976 were emblematically dominated by domestic issues, as illustrated by the limited and didactic parts of the political secretaries' relations dedicated to international relations.⁹⁹ If we can discern a trend in the DC's discourse on foreign policy during the 1970s, it would be an even greater emphasis on the theme of Europe. In a world that was taking on a pronounced multipolar structure, the role of the European Community (EC) was deemed to be more and more pivotal. If the EC was capable of “weathering the storm” – to

⁹⁸ In the reports of the political secretary, which normally addressed the most urgent foreign policy issues, we can detect the features of the approach described above: see for instance Sturzo, DC, CN, box 55, meetings of 19-24/4/1971, 27-28/3/1972, 18-21/7/1974. A brief account of DC's policy during the '70s, significantly focused entirely on domestic matters, is in Francesco Malgeri, *La Democrazia cristiana*, in ID. and Leonardo Paggi (eds.), *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta*, vol. III: *Partiti e organizzazioni di massa*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003, pp. 37-58.

⁹⁹ See Atti del XII Congresso nazionale della Democrazia Cristiana, Roma: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1976, pp. 41-42, and Atti del XIII Congresso nazionale della Democrazia Cristiana, Roma: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1979, pp. 18-20.

borrow the phrase used by historian Mark Gilbert to describe the integration process in the 1970s¹⁰⁰ – of the economic and political crises that it was facing, it could become a major asset to the stability of the international community. This was only possible with a renewed commitment to political cooperation. In this context, the references to Italy's role as a possible factor of balance were substantially abandoned: a single Nation-State could not have an impact in international relations, if it was not integrated in larger supranational organizations. Three major areas could be affected by a politically integrated European Community: the relations with the United States – at a point of increasing tensions between the two poles of the Atlantic alliance,¹⁰¹ the dialogue with the East and the development of the newly independent countries. The model which presented the Old Continent at the crossroads of the East/West and the North/South axes of international relations, a model that epitomized the basic features of the Universalist approach, therefore, tended to replace the focus on Italy's resources as a mediating actor within the international system.¹⁰²

The mediation between universalism and nationality, in other words, could rely less on the emphasis on Italy's peculiar (universal) features, and more on the possibility of strengthening the trends toward an integrated, fair and cooperative international community through mediation within the deliberative and consultative bodies of the international system, first and foremost in Europe. This was, in our opinion, the central axis of the DC's culture of foreign policy, which presented a

¹⁰⁰ See Mark Gilbert, *European Integration. A Concise History*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, pp. 89-116. For an assessment of the historiographical debate over the process of European integration in the 1970s see Federico Romero et al., *The international history of European integration in the long 1970s. A round-table discussion on research issues, methodologies, and directions*, in "Journal of European History", issue 2, 2011, pp. 333-60.

¹⁰¹ See Martin Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, *The Strained Alliance. US-European Relations from Nixon to Carter*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

¹⁰² Among the numerous examples, see Mariano Rumor's speech at the 12th Congress, when he stated: "Within the Atlantic Alliance, Europe must emerge as an influential and recognizable political body, able to represent and defend European interests, in the context of the big poles which characterize the new planetary politics, and in solidarity with emerging countries. [...] While Europe was born as an instinctive defense reaction against a common threat, now it needs to find a new role in the chance to contribute to build peace in our continent and in the world. Europe, for us, is not an end, but a means to an end, both for the political reinforcement of the West, and for a common elaboration of a new model of civilization, consistent with our cultural foundation. External models, envied for a long time, are now failing to seduce anyone. Confused, we feel the necessity to come up with a new system of values, based on freedom without violence on the aspiration to justice and a regimented social equality. This confused necessity can only be realized through a united Europe". See *XII Congresso nazionale*, p. 102, my translation.

significant congruence with the mainstream approach of the Catholic culture's idea of international community, New Universalism.

At this point, we could ask ourselves if we can also detect some kind of influence of the culture of Liberation. This is not the case: the key words for understanding the party's political culture were integration, cooperation, solidarity, which presupposed a conflict-free view of international relations. Italian Christian democrats did not employ categories like "Imperialistic oppression" or "liberation through conflict", although they did not deny the presence of imbalances and widespread inequalities within the international community. In this regard, the situation of Latin American countries was seldom addressed by DC's representatives, in order to show their support for the local Christian democratic movement, historically pursuing the search for a "third way" between Western capitalism and revolutionary solutions,¹⁰³ while the issue of rebalancing the gap between the North and the South of the world, as we recalled, was mainly addressed by underlining the possible role of Europe. The general theoretical framework, though, relied on the concept of solidarity as the key for overcoming the injustice that divided the world into different and often antagonistic spheres.

The world – DC's representative Mario Pedini argued at the 1976 Congress – is facing a choice between the politics of power competition among nations, and a race that could be able to achieve the redemption (*riscatto*) of the poorer countries in a new social and economic order, in which the wealthier countries can be the hauling power of the whole international community. [...] The answer to the problems of a new economy and a new internationalism, that the world needs in order to overcome its contradictions, comes only from "Solidarism", as an elevation of the human person.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ See for instance the welcome address to the representative of the Christian Democratic Organization of Latin America Luis Herrera Campins at the 1976 National Congress, in *XIII Congresso nazionale*, p. 280.

¹⁰⁴ Mario Pedini (1918-2003) was one of the most active DC representatives in shaping the policies of international cooperation and aid to the Third World. He was the main promoter of the 1971 law on the technical cooperation with developing countries, that we will quote in a few pages: see his interesting memoirs, Mario Pedini, *Quando c'era la democrazia cristiana: ricordi personali di vita politica, 1945-1984*, Brescia: Fondazione civiltà bresciana, 1994. The quotation is taken from *XIII Congresso nazionale*, pp. 101-102, my translation, but see also Mario Pedini, *Une Europe unie et ouverte pour contribuer à la paix sociale dans le monde*, in "Panorama Démocrate Chrétien", issue 2, 1973, pp. 5-8.

It would not be wrong to claim a similarity between this kind of reasoning and Catholic social thought, and especially the encyclical *Populorum progressio*. The encyclical was often quoted, as an ideal reference, by important party figures;¹⁰⁵ after its promulgation in 1967, the president of DC's National Council Mario Scelba sent a telegram to the Vatican Secretary of State Amleto Cicognani, stating that “the solicitations of the encyclical find full correspondence in the soul of national delegates, who are committed to concretely work in that direction, in the context of their responsibility”.¹⁰⁶ Finally, the publishing house of the party, “Cinque Lune”, gave prominence to the Magisterium’s intervention by publishing a book on the subject. Written by the former chief editor of “Il Popolo” Rodolfo Arata, *Guerra e fame* (1968) testified to a significant turn toward the “social dimension” of international relations, also highlighted in the previous years by the translations of Lebret’s *Suicide ou survie de l’Occident?* (1963) and the study of Gaston Berger, Jean Darctet and Marcel Demonque, *L’Occident et le monde* (1960).¹⁰⁷ Once again, we can easily notice the congruence of such an approach and initiatives with the new universalist paradigm.

Nonetheless, there was one branch of the party that, at least for a brief period, adopted a far more radical view, and that was the Youth Movement (*Movimento Giovanile della Democrazia Cristiana*, hereinafter MG).¹⁰⁸ At the beginning of the period under consideration, the Youth Movement embraced a clear universalist perspective, focused on Italy’s role in its natural European environment, with the goal of promoting peace, cooperation and development within the

¹⁰⁵ See for instance the references made by congressman Galloni in 1967, and by secretary Piccoli and congressmen Bernardo Mattarella (father of the current president of the Italian Republic) and Attilio Jozzelli in 1969: see respectively *Atti X Congresso*, p. 145; *Atti XI Congresso*, pp. 63, 149, 507-508.

¹⁰⁶ See Sturzo, DC, CN, box 54, meeting of 18-20/4/1967, my translation. Direct consequences of this declaration, according to Mario Pedini, were the approval of the “Pedini’s law” about teachers’ participation in international cooperation (the first form of alternative civil service), and the above-mentioned 1971 bill: see Pedini, *Quando c’era la DC*, p. 120.

¹⁰⁷ I consulted the publications of “Cinque Lune” at the Istituto Sturzo’s library, in Rome.

¹⁰⁸ DC’s Youth Movement – whose membership was initially allowed to those between 14 and 25 years old (in 1971 the spectrum was moved from 16 to 27) – was created in 1944, one year after the foundation of the party, with Giulio Andreotti as its first national delegate. The main political body was the National Direction, while the most important political event was the national Congress, normally called every three years. On the founding stages of the movement see Giovanni Staffa, *Il movimento giovanile democristiano (1943-1948)*, Roma: FIAP, 1976. There is no comprehensive history of the MG, also because the archival documentation is generally scarce (there is no specific archive, while there is a section dedicated to the correspondence between the party and the Youth Movement in the series *Segreteria politica* of the DC’s archive, which has a very uneven amount of documentation from year to year).

international community.¹⁰⁹ Around 1968, however, the point of view shifted, following the generational radicalization that concerned and connected most of Western youth. In July 1968, for instance, the young Christian democrats drafted a political document together with the youth movements of the Socialist party and of the *Associazioni Cristiane dei Lavoratori Italiani* (which we will meet in the third chapter), expressing their solidarity with the protesters fighting authoritarian regimes and colonialist or imperialist oppression in Europe and all over the world. The signatories hoped for a generic and not articulated change of foreign policy, “toward a different positioning of our country in the world, in order to carry on a real choice for a better civilization”.¹¹⁰ In the MG’s opinion, the Vietnam war was the most striking evidence of the aggressive policy pursued by the West, embodied by the United States, against Third World countries. This position was also shared by Leftist movements and associations, so much so that in 1971 the youth federations of the Communist party, the Socialist party, the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) and the DC co-signed an appeal asking the Italian government for an official statement against the “Imperialistic aggression” of the United States (as well as the recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam), and restating “our support to the popular and liberating forces that all over the world are fighting to overcome the antagonistic blocs”.¹¹¹ Although it did not endorse revolutionary violence, it cited the issue of the liberation of the oppressed peoples as one of the central questions of the contemporary age.

The relations between the party leadership and the Youth Movement deteriorated around 1970-1971, due to the quest for autonomy carried out by the Youth Movement. The radical stances on foreign policy issues, we may argue, represented a major part of the problem, since they led to a

¹⁰⁹ In a document issued in 1965, the National Direction insisted on the commitment to Europe-building, “not to play the role of a power, but to spread peace and progress, also toward developing countries, as a premise of the world community for all people of good will, that John XXIII outlined in ‘Pacem in terris’, and Paul VI recently restated to the congressmen of *Jeune Europe*”. See Sturzo, DC, SP, box 171, folder 33, my translation.

¹¹⁰ Sturzo, DC, SP, box 171, folder 32, my translation.

¹¹¹ Sturzo, DC, SP, box 195, folder 21, my translation.

problematic convergence with the Left, Communists included.¹¹² In 1971, the Youth Movement lost its battle, when the new internal regulations highlighted the fact that the organism was not autonomous, and its activity had to be coordinated with the “senior” bodies of the party. After that date, the discourse of the MG lost the character of originality that characterized it in the previous years, for example, at the National Congresses of 1973 and 1976, the delegates did not tackle foreign policy issues.¹¹³ Consequently, the debate within Christian Democracy was deprived of one of its most interesting voices, which had echoed the turmoil that was shaking the Catholic world and that was represented, from our observation point, by the culture of Liberation. We will see in the next chapter how these stances, tangentially touched upon by the MG, would have come to the fore in other subjects of the Italian Catholic world, with direct links to the development of the Catholic culture.

This brief profile of the DC’s discourse on international relations should have demonstrated that the party presented a fairly consistent, although not much debated, culture of foreign policy, congruent with the mainstream approach of Catholic culture to the idea of international community and based on an original mediation between Universalism and Nation. Before investigating whether the party followed through with this theoretical elaboration by implementing it in the actual management of Italy’s international relations, we will now briefly take off our Italo-centric glasses, in order to compare the Italian discourse with that of European Christian Democracy.

3.2. From Italy to Europe: a Christian democratic culture of foreign policy?

¹¹² In 1970, the files show growing tensions between the Youth Movement and the Political Secretariat, which revolved around the issue of the autonomous enrollment – independent from party’s affiliation – in the former for people from 17 to 26 years of age. See Sturzo, DC, SP, box 193, folder 10 and box 195, folder 21. The problem of the convergence with the Left was not limited to foreign policy issues, but instead involved subjects like conscientious objection, and more generally, the global interpretation of the country’s social and political situation, that seemed ready to spiral into authoritarian outcomes: the climate of those years, activated by the protests of 1968, has been narrated by Crainz, *Il paese mancato*, pp. 217-93. See the unitary documents and manifestations of the youth movements of DC, PCI, PSI and PSIUP, and the reaction of the main organisms of the party in Sturzo, DC, SP, box 195, folder 21. Unfortunately, more specific research is limited by the already mentioned lack of archival documentation.

¹¹³ See *XII Congresso nazionale*, pp. 184-85, and *XIII Congresso nazionale*, pp. 265-67.

Was DC's culture of foreign policy an Italian singularity, or was it a common patrimony of the Christian democratic political family? In other words, may we generally speak of a Christian democratic culture of foreign policy? A positive answer to this question would reinforce the hypothesis of the distinctiveness of the Christian democratic political culture, an issue that has been much debated by historiography, while a negative one would lead to further questions about the specificity of the Italian case. We will tackle this problem through the synthetic analysis of a specific set of sources, the papers of the transnational network of European Christian Democracy, a historical subject and historiographical category which now needs a proper introduction.

After the Second World War, Christian democrats began to set up their network of transnational cooperation; the first attempt to create an institutional connection among parties of Christian inspiration dated back to the 1920s, when a transnational organization named *Secrétariat International des Partis Démocrates d'Inspiration Chrétienne* (SIPDIC) was created, with the pivotal contribution of Luigi Sturzo.¹¹⁴ SIPDIC soon proved to be a loose and frail organization, given the diversity of its members, the lack of a consistent ideology, and the difficulties experienced by many of the founder parties in their home countries, under authoritarian regimes. By the early 1930s the Secretariat had already been dismantled, while the contacts between Christian democratic representatives were mostly maintained on a personal and informal level: we have mentioned the remarkable commitment of Sturzo in this regard. When Christian democratic parties (hereinafter, CD parties) emerged on the European political scene after the end of the war, a new organization had to be built from scratch. Since the first talks, and in particular in the first Conference which took place in Lucerne (Switzerland) in 1947, two main lines confronted each other. The advocates

¹¹⁴ See for some notes Roberto Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997 (or. ed. *L'internazionale DC: la cooperazione tra i partiti democratici cristiani dal 1925 al 1985*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1986), pp. 19-30, and Wolfram Kaiser, *Von der Isolation im politischen Katholizismus in die (innere) Emigration. Transnationale Kooperation katholischer Volksparteien in Europa 1925-1933/38*, in Jürgen Mittag (ed.), *Politische Parteien und europäische Integration. Entwicklung und Perspektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa*, Essen: Klartext, 2006, pp. 215-28.

of a strong International – especially *Democrazia Cristiana*, the Swiss *Katholisch-Konservative Partei der Schweiz* and the Austrian *Österreichische Volkspartei* – aimed at building an institutional and ideologically cohesive structure, that could counterbalance the contemporary process undertaken by European Socialist parties (which, in turn, had their fair share of problems in setting up a new International). The supporters of a looser cooperation, namely the French *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) and the Belgian *Christelijke Volkspartij-Parti Social Chrétien* (CVP-PSC), wanted to avoid a confessional profile,¹¹⁵ The influence of the latter led to the creation of a weak network, the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales* (NEI), which consisted of individuals or groups (and also political parties) that converged on some general goals such as the advancement of the individual human being, and the pursuit of peace and collaboration in particular in Europe. They also shared a firm Anticommunist stand,¹¹⁶ At the same time, leading Christian democrats also met secretly in the so-called Geneva Circle, from 1947 onwards; these informal gatherings, as historians Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser have convincingly argued, played a pivotal role in the perilous path toward European integration, since they offered the opportunity to French and German politicians like Georges Bidault, Pierre Pflimlin, Konrad Adenauer, Heinrich von Brentano to meet each other out of the limelight and discuss the strategies to achieve the Franco-German reconciliation that was the first and crucial step toward European cooperation.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ An interesting parallel between the internationalization of Christian democratic and Socialist parties in the first twenty years after the Second World War has been offered by Peter Van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development. The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy. 1945-1965*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006, in particular pp. 17-30 for the early stages.

¹¹⁶ Some good studies dedicated to the genesis and development of NEI have been published in the last decade: see in particular Stefan Delureanu, *Le Nouvelles équipes internationales: per una rifondazione dell'Europa, 1947-1965*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006, and Jean-Dominique Durand, *Le "Nouvelles Équipes Internationales". Un movimento cristiano per una nuova Europa*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008.

¹¹⁷ See Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, *Transnationalism and early European integration: the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle 1947–1957*, in “The Historical Journal”, issue 3, 2001, pp. 773-98. The literature about European integration has for a long time underestimated the importance of the transnational dimension, and the role of informal policy networks, in the process of Europe-building, in favor of an approach strongly focused on the role of States and institutional actors. The study of transnational policy networks, on the contrary, provides useful insights on how pro-European ideas and preferences were able to circulate among European administrative and political élites, thus influencing the integration process, which took place from the 1950s onwards. For a methodological introduction to this field of study, and the analysis of a couple of case studies (regarding in particular Christian democratic political networks) see Wolfram Kaiser and Brigitte Leucht, *Informal Politics of Integration: Christian Democratic and Transatlantic Networks in the Creation of ECSC core Europe*, in “Journal of European Integration History”, issue 1, 2008, pp. 35-49; Wolfram Kaiser, *Bringing history back in to the study of transnational networks in European*

The seeds for the growth of an integrated European core (Britain excluded) were planted in these regular meetings, which also served the purpose of getting the future leaders of the European ruling class to know each other better, sharing ideas on the political future of the continent and on the strategies for the reconstruction of national societies. European integration *per se*, however, was not the main aim of European CD parties, notwithstanding the strong internationalist drive that characterized all their public discourses; NEI were not created with that goal in mind, and they approached the idea of a united Europe pragmatically.¹¹⁸ If we recall the theoretical problem that Italian Christian democrats had to tackle, this apparent paradox is easily understandable: the cultural mediation between nationality and universality could lead to very different outcomes depending on whether Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Austria or other European countries were involved. While Italy, for instance, could effectively harmonize national interests with the process of European unification, and Germany soon came to look at the process of Europe-building as the best chance to regain its sovereignty, set up the premises for reconstruction and re-establish friendly relations with its former enemies, France had other priorities, like preventing any possibility of Germany being a threat in the future, while also protecting its residual influence in extra-European territories (not to mention the prudence showed by countries like Britain or Switzerland toward any binding and institutionalized connection with other Nation-States).¹¹⁹

integration, in “Journal of Public Policy”, issue 2, 2009, pp. 223-39, and ID., *Transnational Western Europe since 1945. Integration as political society formation*, in Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starke (eds.), *Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space*, Routledge, 2005, pp. 17-37.

¹¹⁸ The same participation in The Hague Congress in May 1948, which is usually considered the first federal moment in European history, was neither well prepared nor especially effective. See Philippe Chenaux, *Les Nouvelles Equipes internationales*, in Sergio Pistone (ed.) *I movimenti per l'unità europea (1945-1954)*, Milano: Jaca Book, 1992, pp. 237-52, and ID., *Les Démocrates-chrétiens au niveau de l'union Européenne*, in Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, p. 451 ff.

¹¹⁹ Thomas Hoerber, *European Integration Ideas in France, Germany and Britain in the 1950s*, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2006, provides a helpful guide for three case studies, analyzing the position of the three countries (thus not focusing on a specific political culture) toward the process of European integration; for a historical overview of the evolving cultural relations between national and European identity see Thomas Risse, *A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities*, in Thomas Risse, James A. Caporaso and Maria Green Cowles (eds.), *A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 198-216. A close look at the “ideas of Europe” of different political parties has been offered by John Gaffney (ed.), *Political Parties and the European Union*, Routledge, 1996.

The enduring importance of national identities, after all, was also witnessed by the name chosen for the new international organization, which made no references to Europe nor to a defining political culture (only the “subtitle” *Union Internationale des Démocrates-Chrétiens*, referenced the Christian democratic identity). This is to say that the undeniable contribution that NEI made to building an integrated “core” Europe between the end of the 1940s and the end of the 1950s, did not stem entirely from an idealistic stance, as some internal reconstructions would suggest, but was also fueled by contextual elements like the influence of the Cold War, and the necessity to find a solution to the “German problem”.¹²⁰ It is quite significant that in the resolutions of the 15th Congress (Lucerne, October 1961), dedicated to “The Doctrinal Base of Christian Democratic Political Action”, the signatories underlined that only a Christian inspired policy could represent a suitable alternative to the Communist ideology and to its intrinsic threats of world dominance.¹²¹ The essential features of a Christian democratic political culture, in other words, were primarily defined by their opposition to another ideology, rather than being positively demarcated by their cultural sources.

What were these features, though, and what kind of idea of international community did they involve and suggest? At discourse level, there are no substantive discrepancies with the elaboration of Italian Christian Democracy, which we have already analyzed: communitarian view of the international order (whose achievement was prevented, in the near future, by the Communist threat), insistence on concepts like international cooperation, subsidiarity, respect for the individual, and a noteworthy reference to social justice as one of the pillars of a peaceful and integrated community of peoples, which reflected the unity of the human family.¹²² Overcoming the North/South divide, at the beginning of the 1960s, was indicated as one of the keys to a peaceful organization of the international community, and the Third World was seen as “the real problem for

¹²⁰ Stefan Delureanu has already presented a balanced account of the relationship between idealistic drive and geopolitical considerations, in *Le Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*, in part. pp. 91-128.

¹²¹ See the resolutions in KADOC, Archive August de Schrijver (hereinafter de Schrijver), box 7.2.4.15.

¹²² *Ibid.* One of the most interesting contributions to the debate, which would have been largely reprised in the conclusions, was brought by Dutchman Christian democrat intellectual Karl Josef Hahn, at the time secretary general of the Rome Institute (see *ibid.*, Congress Book).

the West”, underlining a significant sensibility toward a theme that would become pivotal in the Christian democratic discourse – and, as we argued, in the Catholic culture – during the course of the decade.¹²³ Father Louis-Joseph Lebret, who had already worked for NEI at the end of the 1940s, represented one possible “bridge” between the Catholic cultural elaboration and the Christian democratic discourse on this subject.¹²⁴ The universalist setting was therefore shared by European Christian Democracy, defining a general framework that could have been inflected in different ways at national level, depending on the best way to harmonize universality and nationality.¹²⁵

The hypothesis of the existence of a distinctive and shared approach is supported by the analysis of the documents issued by the Christian Democratic World Union (CDWU), which was formed by the Christian Democrat regional organizations of Western Europe (NEI), Central Europe (Christian Democrat Union of Central Europe, founded in New York in July 1950), and Latin America (*Organización democrática cristiana de América*, officially set up in Montevideo in 1949). CDWU saw the light in 1961 in Santiago, Chile, where Venezuelan Rafael Caldera (1916-2009) was appointed president. In the resolution issued at the end of the 4th World Conference of Christian Democrats (Strasbourg, September 1963), where the structure of the world union was definitively set up, we find the same commitment to the achievement of peace through the respect for human rights (in particular that of self-determination), cooperation and social justice, in order to rebalance the striking gap between the North and the South of the planet, that we observed in the discourse of Italian Christian Democracy.¹²⁶ The 5th World Conference, held in Lima in April 1966 and dedicated to “Development and Solidarity”, also made a clear reference to the dignity of the human

¹²³ NEI's 14th Congress (Paris, September 1960) was dedicated to “Christian Democracy and the “Third World”; the quotation is taken from the report of French MRP member Roger Reynaud (at the time, member of ECSC's High Authority). See the documents in KADOC, de Schrijver, box 7.2.4.14.

¹²⁴ See Lydie Garreau, *Louis-Joseph Lebret, 1897-1966. Un homme traqué*, Villeurbanne: Éditions Golias, 1997, p. 194.

¹²⁵ We have argued a case for the Italian context, but in the future a proper comparative study could investigate alternative ways to combine a universalist and a Nation-oriented approach, taking into account the discourse of other European Christian democratic parties.

¹²⁶ See CDWU (ed.), *La démocratie chrétienne dans le monde: Résolutions et déclarations des organisations internationales DC de 1947 à 1973*, Rome: Centre Internationale Démocrate Chrétien d'Études et de Documentation, 1973, pp. 45-46.

person (in accordance with the principles of “integral humanism”), social justice and an open spirit of dialogue among Nations as the pillars of the Christian democratic approach to international relations.¹²⁷

Let us see how this theoretical framework evolved during the period under consideration; a good starting point is the address which Italian politician Mariano Rumor delivered at the Taormina Congress in 1965. In the Sicilian city (just a few kilometers from the burial place of don Luigi Sturzo, who was cited as a founding father during the Congress), NEI ceased to exist – after a few years of very limited activity – and was replaced by a new structure, the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD). The explicit goal of this new organization – evident already from its chosen name – was to strengthen and deepen the collaboration among European CD parties, with a view to elaborating a common political program and, above all, working for the establishment of a federal Europe. The most important organism was the Political Bureau, composed of national delegations and Christian democratic representatives who held offices in European institutions, while the main forum was the general Congress, which was convened in theory every three years (in fact, only four of them were organized between 1965 and 1978).¹²⁸ The cultural activity of the organization was handled mainly by the Christian Democratic International Center for Information and Documentation (CDICID), which in 1968 was incorporated into the EUCD. The Center had been created in 1960, in order to help establish a shared Christian democratic doctrine. Its seat had

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 50. In this context, we will mostly limit the analysis to the discourse of the (Western) European Christian Democracy, in order to deal with a more “homogeneous” subject” with more sources available. In future studies, however, it would be interesting to compare the cultural elaboration of Western European Christian Democracy with that of Central and Eastern Europe, or of Latin America, which experienced different trajectories and had to deal with profoundly different contextual elements. For a general overview of non-Western European Christian Democrat organizations see Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, pp. 76-85 and 159-201. About the sources of Christian democrat Internationalism, see the essays of Godfried Kwanten, Hans-Jürgen Küsters, Francesco Malgeri and Gianni La Bella in Durand (ed.), *Christian Democrat Internationalism*, vol. I.

¹²⁸ No specific study has been devoted to EUCD (we will make reference to general contributions about Christian democratic Internationalism in the following footnotes); see the notes by Michael Gehler about the feasibility of a project (already set in motion) concerning the transition from EUCD to EPP: Michael Gehler, *From European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) to European People's Party (EPP). Limits of and Possibilities for a Project on Transnational Party Cooperation*, in Georg Kastner, Ursula Mindler and Helmut Wohnout (eds.), *Auf der Suche nach Identität. Festschrift für Dieter A. Binder*, LIT Verlag, 2015, pp. 423-450. However, see some notes in Thomas Jansen and Steven van Hecke, *At Europe's Service. The Origins and Evolution of the European People's Party*, Springer, 2011, pp. 21-28.

been placed in Rome, as proposed by *Democrazia Cristiana*: under the guidance of Karl Josef Hahn, the institute organized meetings and promoted the publication of studies and periodicals (“Panorama Democrate Chrétien”, with an initial circulation of 1000 copies, and “Cahiers d'études”).¹²⁹

At the Taormina Congress, Belgian politician Leo Tindemans (1922-2014) was elected secretary general, while Mariano Rumor (1915-1990)¹³⁰ was designated as first president. In his speech to the congressmen, the classical points were contextualized in a big picture that depicted the “Christian view” as the best philosophy for the modern age. According to the newly elected president, the “rhythm of internal unification”, which involved every aspect of contemporary life, was in line with inherently Christian concepts like the equality of all people irrespective of race, class or religion, the full development of the individual and the universal validity of natural law.¹³¹ Such an “integration toward wider and more open solidarities” should be directed towards achieving the “universal common good”: Rumor resorted to a vocabulary which we are very familiar with, also quoting Paul’s allocution to the UN. The plausibility of such a design, obviously,

¹²⁹ Some information in van Kemseke, *Towards an Era of Development*, pp. 218-20.

¹³⁰ Mariano Rumor was an influential DC politician throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, when he held office as Prime Minister (twice between 1968 and 1974), Interior and Foreign Minister, and DC secretary (1964-1969). Like many other politicians of his generation, Rumor (born in Vicenza in 1915) did not develop a specific interest in foreign policy matters during his youth or in the early phases of his political career. On the contrary, he was particularly involved in the world of Labour: he was the founder of Vicenza’s section of the ACLI (1945), which he presided for thirteen years. Rumor engaged in politics during the war, fighting for the *Resistenza* and acting as regional representative of *Democrazia Cristiana* in Veneto. In 1946 he was elected to the Constituent Assembly, beginning his long stint in Italian institutions, which lasted seven legislatures. His first contacts with international politics came through party lines during the 1950s, since he was involved in NEI’s meetings as member of the Italian delegation. Up until the recent past, Mariano Rumor’s figure has been substantially underestimated by the literature (and also by journalists, who were much more interested in gossip about him and his family), which has usually focused on other protagonists of Italian politics, like his peers Aldo Moro or Giulio Andreotti. Still, he was undeniably a protagonist of Italian political life, in particular in a period of exceptional turmoil (between 1968 and 1974), characterized by protests and attacks on Italy’s democratic architecture, but also by progressive reforms, most of which were carried out by governments led by Rumor. Among the few attempts to reconstruct Rumor’s political culture – waiting for them to grow in number and accuracy after the opening of Rumor’s archive – see especially Costanza Ciscato, *Introduzione* to Mariano Rumor, *Discorsi sulla Democrazia Cristiana*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2010, pp. 11-57. Ciscato underlines the role of personalism (pp. 40-45), the importance of Sturzo (p. 51) and the “profound echo” of the Magisterium’s reflection (p. 15) – in particular, the references to John’s and Paul’s discourses – in Rumor’s cultural elaboration.

¹³¹ Rumor’s speech was published by CDICID; unfortunately, I was only able to consult the definitive version, since there were no drafts in the DC’s archive (Sturzo, DC, SP, box 182, folder 2, my translations). These documents may become available at Mariano Rumor’s Foundation (Vicenza, Italy), where Rumor papers are kept, and which will shortly be made completely available to researchers. In any case, these concepts were also developed in other writings by the Italian politician: see for instance Mariano Rumor, *La Democrazia Cristiana nella politica internazionale*, in “Civitas”, 1967, pp. 5-6 (where he talked about “a real and irreversible tendency of peoples toward a great human community”).

was dramatically reduced by the actual status of international relations, characterized by numerous fracture lines, most of which originated – following the line of reasoning of the Italian Christian democrat – from the hostile behavior of communist countries, led by the Soviet Union.¹³² In this given structure, Europe had a historic role to play on a global scale, by consolidating democracy and working for enhanced cooperation at international level.

The pivotal role of Europe in the international system as an integrated, united Europe, able to speak with one voice became the *leitmotif* of Rumor's addresses to the meetings, conferences and congresses of the EUCD throughout his presidency (1965-1973). Christian democrats had to build a “united, open, supranational Europe”, the only subject that could have reasonably worked as a vector of peace and development in the world, adapting the historical features of the continent to the challenges of the contemporary age.¹³³ This point, however, was not only stressed by EUCD's president, but became a recurring *tòpos* in the discourse of European Christian Democracy, as a quick survey of the rhetoric employed in EUCD's congresses and official documents, and in the organization's main periodical, “Panorama Démocrate Chrétien”,¹³⁴ can easily demonstrate. At the 1968 Congress, in Venice, former Belgian Prime Minister Théo Lefèvre (1914-1973) stated that Europe should act as a “new force of civilization”, able to represent a positive factor in a world divided into two blocs, especially for those underdeveloped countries which could not find any

¹³² Rumor's diametrical opposition to Communism and to Soviet foreign policy, and his consideration of the West – notwithstanding its faults – to be the only area of the world which could help strengthening democracy, and offer opportunities for development to newly independent peoples, were constantly restated in public addresses: see for instance the speech to the 8th DC Congress, in 1962, in *Atti dell'VIII Congresso Nazionale della Democrazia Cristiana* (Napoli, 27-31 gennaio 1962), Roma: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1963, p. 307.

¹³³ See for instance Rumor's closing speech in the second EUCD Congress (Venice 1968), in KADOC, Archive Centrum voor Politieke, Economische en Sociale Studies van de CVP (hereinafter CEPES), box 3.2.2., my translation, or his speech to EUCD's Political Bureau in Como, 16/7/1971, *ibid.*, box 3.2.3. See also the article written for “Panorama Démocrate Chrétien”, issue 4, 1972, pp. 3-5.

¹³⁴ The monthly review of European Christian Democracy (actually, normally only 4/5 issues per year were published) was first issued in 1968, with the goal of becoming an instrument for the European Christian democratic ruling class, in order to analyze the main events on the international stage, propose a shared answer to the problems of the contemporary age, and offer informations about the activity of Christian democratic parties in Europe and the world. Generally, the periodical was divided in three parts, the first one dedicated to studies, comments and analyses on the evolution of international relations; the second to the informations on the activity of national CD parties, the third one to the publication of documents or speeches of Christian democratic representatives, at national or European level. See the presentation of the editorial line in “Panorma Démocrate Chrétien”, issue 1, 1968, p. 2.

suitable model in the social, economic and political systems of the superpowers.¹³⁵ At the beginning of the 1970s, the editorial in the EUCD's magazine argued that only an integrated Europe could be the guardian of the individual's dignity, in a world that was becoming more "massified" by the year, while the distinctive features of Europe's role in the world were restated by the party's magazine after the first enlargement of the Community, in January 1972.¹³⁶ Four months later, in the resolution issued at the end of EUCD's Political Bureau meeting in Rome (7-8 April), we find a clear exposition of the Christian democratic idea of Europe, on which the entire idea of international community hinged:

Once again, the Bureau deems it necessary to make progress on the path that leads to an economic and political European community, that would not only assure the creative continuity of an original and exemplary model of civilization and political organization in our continent, but would also acquit itself as a force of democratic engagement in the world, in order to bring a contribution to progress and the conservation of peace.¹³⁷

Thus, Europe's role in the world as a model, functional to the betterment of international relations along both the East/West and South/North conflict lines, was fully embraced by the European organization of Christian Democrats, showing a general consistence with the discourse of the Italian section. We may notice that the insistence on the necessity of a coordinated European foreign policy, in view of a double and equally important action on the West/East and the North/South axes, was also at the center of the discourse of the Christian democratic group in the European Parliament.¹³⁸ We can trace it in the words of the group members during interviews, study days or

¹³⁵ KADOC, CEPESS, box 3.2.2, Congress Book, p. 12, my translation. The importance of the engagement of the Community toward the "Third World" was clearly stated, among the many possible examples, by Jean Buchmann, *Un grand dessein démocrate chrétien: la politique européenne à l'égard du Tiers-Monde*, in "Panorma Démocrate Chrétien", issue 1, 1973, pp. 96-107.

¹³⁶ See *Les démocrates chrétiens auront-ils un rôle à jouer dans les années 70?*, in "Panorama Démocrate Chrétien", issue 1, 1970, pp. 5-7, and *La communauté élargie*, issue 1, 1972, pp. 3-5, where the role of the Community was described both as a factor of peace and mediation between the superpowers (and more generally in the new multipolar system), and as a service for *les peuples déshérités* (referencing a common word of the Catholic vocabulary).

¹³⁷ KADOC, CEPESS, box 3.2.5. For analogous considerations, more focused on Europe's role as a mediating influence in the East/West conflict, see the resolutions issued at the end of the Bureau's meeting at Villa D'Este (Como, Italy) in July 1971: KADOC, CEPESS, box 3.2.3, my translation.

¹³⁸ See the internal history of the group written by political scientist and former deputy Secretary-General of the EPP Group (1995-2008) Pascal Fontaine, published in four languages (English, French, German and Italian): Pascal Fontaine, *Voyage to the Heart of Europe 1953-2009. A History of the Christian-Democratic Group of the European*

in articles written for the periodical “Cahiers Européens” – which published speeches by Christian democratic MPs, as well as reports about European and world CD parties, and publicized the group’s initiatives.¹³⁹

The most limpid exposition of this view (which we will quote in the original French), however, can be found in one of the few programmatic documents produced by EUCD, the European Manifesto drafted in 1972, and finally approved in September 1976. Here the function of a politically integrated Europe (also committed to the development of its most disadvantaged areas) as a mediator and promoter of development was clearly outlined, making reference to goals like the “full development of the person” through the respect and advancement of human rights, and “international social justice”, as crucial preconditions for the establishment of a cooperative, peaceful and fair international community:

Nous démocrates chrétiens d’Europe, nous sommes résolus à poursuivre avec vigueur notre combat pour l’intégration européenne. Nous croyons à la nécessité pour l’Europe d’affirmer dans le monde d’aujourd’hui sa propre personnalité. Notre objectif c’est la réalisation d’une union politique, démocratique et supranationale. [...] Nous voulons également à promouvoir, dans un esprit de paix et d’ouverture, le dialogue entre l’Europe occidentale et l’Europe orientale et à resserrer les liens entre l’Europe et les pays du bassin méditerranéen. [...] Le sous-développement dans le

People’s Party in the European Parliament, Brussels: Racine, 2009, while some notes on the complicated relationship between the transnational network of CD parties and the group are in Karl Josef Hahn and Friedrich Fugmann, *Die Europäische Christlich-Demokratische Union zwischen europäischem Anspruch und nationalen Realitäten*, in Karl Josef Hahn (ed.), *Zusammenarbeit der Parteien in Westeuropa: Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen politischen Infrastruktur?*, Bonn: Institute for European Politics, 1976, pp. 304-31. This representative body has not been at the center of our analysis because it had a more specific function, being involved in the dynamics of European integration. Its main task, obviously, was not to elaborate a political culture, but rather to participate in the legislative process of European institutions.

¹³⁹ For instance, we find it clearly exposed in the contribution of Dutch MP Pierre Alphonse Blaisse (1911-1990), in “Cahiers Européens”, January 1960, as we do fourteen years later – to re-state the very limited and slow progress achieved on this ground – by Italian MP Mario Scelba during the study days in Cala Gonone (in Sardinia): see “Cahiers Européens”, September 1974. Not surprisingly, this issue was at the center of Mariano Rumor’s speech on the occasion of the ten-years anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, published in “Cahiers Européens”, April 1967. I consulted the *Cahiers* series from the first issue (January 1960) until the end of the 1970s; the periodical, which generally came out four times per year, was published mainly in French, even if some issues were also available in English, German and Italian. I would like to thank Emma Petroni, current responsible of the CD group’s archive, for her help during the visits at the European Parliament for the consultation of the CD group’s documents.

monde est un problème posé à la conscience de tous les pays riches. L'établissement d'une justice sociale est une condition préalable à l'instauration d'un ordre international.¹⁴⁰

A similar cultural architecture supported the project of the political programme of the European People's Party (EPP), issued in November 1977:

Seule une Europe unie suffisamment forte peut promouvoir réellement la liberté et la solidarité, la paix et la justice, pour tous les peuples du monde. Seule une Europe unie peut contribuer efficacement à l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre mondial qui réponde à ces objectifs, comme force de progrès et de justice sociale internationale.¹⁴¹

Thus we find the mark left by a universalist political culture, which hinted at a distinctive idea of international community in the declaration of principles of the new organization, the successor of EUCD created in view of the first European direct elections in 1978.¹⁴² What we are trying to argue through this fast reconnaissance is that we can discern a significant correspondence between the Italian and the European discourses, which corroborates the hypothesis about the distinctiveness of the Christian democratic political culture, also in the period under consideration, and its congruity with the new universalist paradigm.¹⁴³ At the same time, before closing this section we need to

¹⁴⁰ The definitive version and some early drafts of the European Manifest, prepared by a CDICID working group named "Idea and Action", chaired by Leo Tindemans (the Italian representatives were the relatively low profile DC politicians Luigi Maria Galli and Pier Luigi Zampetti, while the secretary was the intellectual Roberto Papini, author of the first history of Christian democratic Internationalism and editor in chief of "Panorama Démocrate Chrétien") can be consulted in KADOC, Archive Christelijke Volkspartij/Parti Social Chrétien (CVP/PSC) en de Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) (hereinafter CVP/PSC), box 10.3/1. It would be interesting to confront the different proposals of the national parties, in order to understand which were the major contributions to the final version, or divergences, but I found no trace of the Italian input in DC's archive, other than a confidential letter written by Bernassola to political secretary Arnaldo Forlani (12/4/1973), asking to create a small commission (three or four members) to study the first draft issued by Tindemans's group, so as to formulate the party's opinion on it. This proposal seemed not to receive any follow-up, according to the documentation available in Rome. The letter is in Sturzo, DC, SP, box 221, folder 4.

¹⁴¹ KADOC, Archive Leo Tindemans (hereinafter Tindemans), box 573. The history of the European People's Party – which cannot be labelled a Christian democrat international because of the presence of conservative parties – has been reconstructed by Jansen and van Hecke, *At Europe's Service* (see in particular pp. 21-48 for the transition between EUCD and EPP), which updated the earlier contribution by Thomas Jansen, *The European People's Party. Origins and Development*, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave MacMillan/St. Martin's Press, 1998.

¹⁴² The periodization that we have loosely adopted for the whole work comes in handy for this particular topic, since the foundation of the EPP and its evolution since the end of the 1970s opened a new phase for European Christian Democracy, less defined by the reference to a Christian democratic political culture, as the name itself chosen for the new organization witnesses.

¹⁴³ We have focused on the reflection about Europe, since it was the most frequent subject in the discourse of European Christian Democracy, but other analogies could be underlined as regards, for instance, the view of the United Nations: just to quote an example, in an article about *Les démocrates chrétiens face aux nations Unies*, Ernesto Talantino wrote that the respect of human rights and "the principle of Universalism" which laid at the foundation of the United Nations, were also the keystone ideas of international Christian Democracy: see "Panorama Démocrate Chrétien", issue 6, 1969, pp. 16-18.

restate the limits of such an approach, as well as to suggest some potential future research activities.

For this purpose, we will outline three major points.

Firstly, stating that European Christian Democracy shared a universalist approach to the idea of international community in the public discourse neither implies nor proves, that such a theoretical framework was predominantly influenced by the discourse of Catholic culture. To mention only one fact, even if Catholics were the majority in the European context (and certainly at world level, given the weight of Latin American countries), not all Christian democratic politicians were Catholics – Protestantism, for instance, was the religion of most German, Dutch or Swiss representatives. It would be better to speak of Christian culture, but this would require a deeper analysis that we cannot develop here.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, we would need to take into account other cultural sources (liberal democratic theory, human rights culture and so on), which shared universalist features, and helped to shape the Christian democratic political culture, in order to describe all the inputs that played a role in its development. Catholic New Universalism was one of them, but certainly not the only one.

Secondly, the assertion of congruence between the Italian and European discourses could lead the reader to question the possible influence of Italian representatives in the European organization of Christian Democracy. This subject cannot be addressed in a synthetic study focused on the discourse, since it would involve a different methodological approach, based on the analysis of the preparation of some specific documents, or of the behavior of the Italian delegation in the representative bodies of European Christian Democracy. This kind of research would need to deal with a multifaceted background: on the one hand, the Italian équipe played a pivotal role in the functioning of the EUCD: *Democrazia Cristiana* was the primary funder of the organization throughout the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (contributing an average of 30% more than the

¹⁴⁴ This is an instance, moreover, that is sometimes underestimated in the (few) analyses that deal with the Christian democratic political culture: a somewhat unclear distinction between Christianity and Catholicism (not to mention the reference to very different cultural sources) characterizes, for instance, the argument of Jan-Werner Müller, *Towards a new history of Christian Democracy*, in “Journal of Political Ideologies”, issue 2, 2013, pp. 243–55. Müller argues in favour of the existence of a distinctive Christian democratic body of thought.

second-largest donor, German *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands / Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*, CDU/CSU),¹⁴⁵ while Italian representatives held important offices within the International.¹⁴⁶ Angelo Sferrazza, Alfredo De Poi and Gilberto Bonalumi became respectively vice-president, secretary general and president of the European Union of Young Christian Democrats (EUYCD) in the period under consideration,¹⁴⁷ while Franca Falcucci (1926-2014), secretary of DC's Women Movement, was one of the most active advocates of the creation of a Women's Christian Democrat Union. Because of her proposals, this union was finally set up in November 1975, and in 1978 Falcucci's engagement was rewarded with the presidency of the newly founded Women's section of the European People's Party.¹⁴⁸ On the other hand, high-level politicians like Aldo Moro, Giulio Andreotti, and Amintore Fanfani were seldom or never involved in the activities of the International, thus not helping to raise its profile (confirming a general lack of interest from the highest ranks of the party toward international matters, that we will also mention in the following paragraph).

Thirdly, and finally, the historian of ideas cannot avoid the question of the relationship between ideas and their possible implementation, if he/she does not want to run the risk of simply describing the public rhetoric of the subjects under investigation. As regards European Christian Democracy,

¹⁴⁵ See the finance sheets available (until the beginning of the 1970s) in KADOC, CEPRESS, boxes 3.2.4 and 3.2.5. Moreover, two out of four Congresses – Taormina in 1965, Venice in 1968 –, were held in Italy, to where the offices of the International moved in 1960, from Paris to Rome (in *Democrazia Cristiana*'s offices).

¹⁴⁶ Rumor, as mentioned, was elected president – the most powerful office – for two four-year terms (1965-1973), while Arnaldo Forlani held the office of secretary general in the following period (replacing Leo Tindemans).

¹⁴⁷ Unfortunately, I was not able to analyze the cultural elaboration of the Christian democratic International's youth section – which would have been particularly interesting in the period that we are addressing – because of the lack of archival and published sources. The same lack also characterizes the other publications on Christian democratic Internationalism (see for instance the volumes edited by Durand); to my knowledge, there is only one contribution which offers a few notes on the youth section of Christian democratic Internationals, namely on NEI's Youth organization, through the analysis of MRP's funds held at the National Archives in Paris: Laurent Ducerf, *Les jeunes des Nouvelles Équipes Internationales, entre jeune Europe et nouvelle chrétienté*, in "Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société", issue 1, 2010, pp. 1-13.

¹⁴⁸ See Tiziana di Maio, *Le democratiche cristiane e il processo di integrazione europea*, in Gabriella Bonacchi and Cecilia Dau Novelli (eds.), *Culture politiche e dimensioni del femminile nell'Italia del '900*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010, pp. 189-209. Aside from Falcucci's personal engagement, in the Women's movement section of DC's archive (correspondence between the movement and the Political Secretariat) there is no significant proof of a noteworthy international activity, nor we can discern a specific cultural elaboration of the idea of international community. Significantly, the recent interesting work by Wendy Pojmann, *Italian Women and International Cold War Politics, 1944-1968*, New York: Fordham University Press, 2013, focuses on the Centro Italiano Femminile (CIF) – a lay Catholic organization of women that we will mention in the next chapter, which had a significant international activity, without taking into account the Women's section of the party.

we would need to consider whether the EUCD was able to build on the premises of its discourse, translating the principles into actual politics, obviously within the boundaries of the realistic, limited possibilities available to transnational political networks. There is at least one political achievement upon which we could measure the correlation between public discourse and the results accomplished, and that is European political integration, presented by Christian Democrats as the keystone of the whole architecture of the international system: we can devote a few words to that, before moving on to more properly investigate this crucial theoretical knot in the Italian context.

A synthetic judgment, in this respect, can only underline how very wide the gap between theory and practice was, both if we consider it in absolute terms, and if we compare it with adjacent temporal phases, keeping in mind the role of NEI and informal meetings, but also with reference to the influence exerted by European People's Party on the complicated path toward further European integration.¹⁴⁹ In fact, if some of the major scholars of European Christian Democracy have underlined how in the long term it exerted a measurable impact over the process of Europe-building,¹⁵⁰ there is also an evident need to separate different stages, which corresponded to different levels of influence. EUCD, in particular, proved to be a weak and barely useful organization, as president Rumor himself admitted at the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁵¹ While it did achieve some results, as we have shown, in terms of cultural elaboration, the Union mostly failed to contribute meaningfully to the advancement of the integration process. Its powers, obviously, were

¹⁴⁹ For a synthetic assessment of the early stages see Wolfram Kaiser, *Informal Politics and the Creation of the European Community: Christian Democratic Networks in the Economic Integration of Europe*, in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Michael Gehler (eds.), *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe 1945–83*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, pp. 85–107. About EPP's role, as well as the reconstruction of van Hecke and Jansen (who has been Secretary General of the European People's Party between 1984 and 1993), see the analysis by Karl Magnus Johansson, *Another Road to Maastricht. The Christian Democrat Coalition and the Quest for European Union*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", issue 5, 2002, pp. 871–93, which addresses a specific case in which the EPP exerted a measurable influence, that is the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, arguing that the transnational coordination of Christian democratic leaders had a significant impact on the Maastricht Treaty agenda.

¹⁵⁰ See for all Emiel Lamberts, *General Conclusions*, in ID. (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, p. 481, and Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, p. XII.

¹⁵¹ The Union has played a "superficial and barely representative role", Rumor stated at the meeting of the political Bureau in Brussels, on October 24th, 1970. See also, on the same notes, the editorial *Où en est la coopération internationale démocrate chrétienne?*, in "Panorama Démocrate Chrétien", issue 5, 1969, pp. 3–5. The difficulties encountered by the Union have also been underlined by sympathetic scholars like Papini, *The Christian Democrat International*, pp. 86–87, and van Hecke and Jansen, *At Europe's Service*, p. 28.

rather limited, since we are dealing with a transnational party network with no official representation in European institutions. The international organization, however, had an intermediate task to accomplish, i.e. deepening the cooperation among European CD parties in view of creating a single organism, a Christian democratic European party that could strongly influence European politics. This issue, since it was enshrined in the founding Charter of the organization, would come up during EUCD meetings, in which the leading figures of the Christian democratic parliamentary group in the European Parliament also participated.¹⁵² In general, though, we may observe a general lack of political will to follow up on the most recognizable idea which guided EUCD's political culture: the actual foundation of the European People's Party (EPP), in 1976, took place more than ten years after the birth of the international organizations, in view of the imminent European elections, the first ones in history to be held under universal suffrage.¹⁵³

Certainly, numerous factors played against a swift positive outcome of this process. Above all, from the 1960s onwards, Christian Democracy lost the central position in European politics which it had gained during the previous decades.¹⁵⁴ In Belgium and the Netherlands, CVP/PSC and the

¹⁵² For instance, Italian representative Giuseppe Bartolomei (1923-1996) made a proposal in this regard in the Rome meeting of May 26, 1971: the episode is quoted by Steven Van Hecke, *The Fractious Foundation of the European People's Party*, in Durand (ed.), *Christian democrat internationalism*, vol. II, p. 174 (footnote 3).

¹⁵³ Steven van Hecke has already reconstructed the process that led to the EPP's foundation in various contributions, most recently in the already quoted *The Fractious Foundation of the European People's Party*. The decisive steps in this direction were the creation of a "Standing Conference of the Six" (1970), followed two years later by the establishment of a "Political Committee of Christian Democratic parties from the EC countries", which became the nucleus of the future EPP. The crucial event, however, was an external one, i.e. the decision of the Paris summit in December 1974 to set the date of the first general European elections in 1978 (later postponed to 1979). In the international Conferences hosted by Istituto Sturzo in 2011 and 2012, dedicated to Christian democratic Internationalism, whose proceedings have been published in the two volumes edited by Jean-Dominique Durand, numerous speakers expressed a more positive view on the role of the Christian democratic international organization: as well as the essay by van Hecke, see also the contributions by Tiziana di Maio, *From NEI to EPP. Christian Democrat Parties' European Choice*, vol. I, pp. 170-77, and Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora, "We are the Guardians of Freedom!" *Basic Ideas of the CDU's European Policy Prior to the First Direct Elections to the European Parliament*, vol. I, pp. 140-43, which underlined respectively the value of the compromise reached by national parties with the establishment of the new European party, and EUCD's contribution to "making Europe more popular". This approach is shared by Durand in his introduction, pp. 25-26. In my opinion, though, when compared to the strongly pro-European rhetoric exhibited in the Christian democratic discourse, the gap between "theory and practice" is not to be concealed. We cannot state that European political integration was not reached because of the passiveness of Christian Democracy, but at the same time it certainly was not fueled by one of its major public supporters.

¹⁵⁴ Martin Conway, *The Age of Christian Democracy*, p. 43, has proposed that the 1960s be considered the beginning of the waning phase of Christian Democracy's historical parabola. Jean-Dominique Durand, *L'Europe de la Démocratie chrétienne*, pp. 331-39, has placed its irreversible crisis in the 1970s. Other scholars, however, whose point of view I share, have urged that the elements of continuity not be underestimated, highlighting that the age of Christian

Katholieke Volkspartij lost approximately 15% of the vote in a decade, between the early 1960s and the early 1970s. German CDU/CSU lost power for the first time in 1969, followed in 1970 by the Austrian Christian Democrats. The 1970s were a decade of profound crisis for Italian DC, while in France there was no distinctly Christian democratic party after the dissolution of the MRP (which, in turn, had its own troubles in fitting in with the Christian democratic family) in 1965. Major structural modifications like those mentioned in the Introduction, which affected in particular organizations inspired by religion, contributed to this partial decline, which nonetheless failed to erase Christian Democracy from the Western European political spectrum (it remained a key political actor in most of Western Europe at least until the 1990s).¹⁵⁵ Besides the weakening of national parties, considering the broad European scenario, another challenge arose for the transnational network of Christian Democracy in the 1970s, which was the issue of the possible involvement of conservative parties in its structure.¹⁵⁶ This topic became particularly compelling after the first enlargement of the Community in 1973, when the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined the six original members. Countries with no – or a very limited – Christian democratic tradition were to play a major role in European institutions, so that a collaboration with the most like-minded parties became necessary if Christian Democrats did not want to lose out in terms of influence to progressive parties. Such a confrontation slowed down the process of forming a European party: in broad terms, the Italians, Belgians and Dutch sponsored the constitution of a group with a strong identity, while the Germans pushed for an ideologically less binding outcome, working for the involvement of British and Danish conservatives. The compromise that was reached in 1976 led to the constitution of the EPP (and the unanimous election of Leo Tindemans as its president), a federation of Christian democratic parties of the European Community (as the

Democracy lasted well beyond the intermediate crisis of the 1970s: see esp. Gehler and Kaiser, *Introduction to ID.* (eds.), *Christian Democracy in Europe*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁵⁵ Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard, *European Christian Democracy in the 1990s. Towards a Framework for Analysis*, in ID. (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the end of the Cold War*, pp. 9-19, correctly consider Christian Democracy as a distinct political type even after the early 1990s, which undoubtedly marked a turning point for European CD parties.

¹⁵⁶ See Thomas Jansen, *The Dilemma for Christian Democracy. Historical Identity and/or political Expediency: Opening the Door to Conservatism*, in Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, pp. 459-72.

subtitle stated), that was nonetheless open to dialogue with the conservative faction in view of a present collaboration and a future possible closer alliance,¹⁵⁷ EUCD was not dismantled, even if the organism became *tout court* lethargic, at least until the early 1990s.¹⁵⁸

A proper, unbiased historical reconstruction, then, would need to mention both the distance between ideas and their implementation, and the contextual elements that obstructed the path toward the achievement of the goals proclaimed in the public discourse. After this brief excursion outside the Italian borders, which has allowed us to put into perspective the considerations about DC's idea of international community, we will address more broadly this problem insofar as it concerns the relationship between DC's culture of foreign policy and Italy's international relations.

4. The implementation of the discourse. DC's culture of foreign policy and Italy's international relations, between foreign and domestic policy.

DC's expressions on the idea of international community were not only a theoretical exercise. Christian democrats held political power for the whole period under closer consideration (1963-1978), keeping the position of Prime Minister within the party's ranks (with Amintore Fanfani, Giovanni Leone, Aldo Moro, Mariano Rumor, Emilio Colombo, Giulio Andreotti), and heading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Aldo Moro, Amintore Fanfani, Giuseppe Medici, Mariano Rumor and Arnaldo Forlani – the *Farnesina* was occupied by non-DC representatives just for two brief stints, in 1964 by Social Democrat Giuseppe Saragat, and in 1969 by Socialist Pietro Nenni. The

¹⁵⁷ The Conservative group founded in 1973, later renamed European Democratic Group (1979), ceased to exist in 1992, when British and Danish Conservatives joined the EPP group. See van Hecke and Jansen, *At Europe's service*, pp. 49-66. See also the interesting memoirs of Hans August Lücker and Karl Josef Hahn, *Christliche Demokraten Bauen Europa*, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1987.

¹⁵⁸ The union re-discovered an important role after the fall of the Berlin wall, bringing together Christian democratic forces and their allies in the countries liberated from Communism. Formally, EUCD ceased to exist in 1999: see van Hecke and Jansen, *At Europe's service*, pp. 44-48 and 92-100.

party, thus, had the opportunity to manage Italy's international relations, and to translate the ideas that shaped its discourse into actual politics.

The impact of party politics, and of parties' ideologies, on a State foreign policy has raised significant but limited interest in the field of international relations, although it is generally understood that they represent an element to take into account.¹⁵⁹ More generally, the international literature has acknowledged that ideas are an element to factor in when analyzing a State's foreign policy, that we can define as "that area of politics which is directed at the external environment with the goal of influencing that environment and the behavior of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals".¹⁶⁰ Traditionally, foreign policy studies have strongly been focused on interest-related issues concerning economy, or military security, within the realm of diplomatic history. More recently, however, the angle has been broadened so as to include the analysis of "immaterial issues" such as identity, beliefs, culture, ideas, as factors that influence the approach to foreign policy and its management: they shape the perception and behavior of actors, influence how they define their interests and what kind of role they want to play in the international system.¹⁶¹ Interests, from this point of view, are not the driving force of any foreign policy decision,

¹⁵⁹ A recent assessment of the state of the art of international literature in this regard is offered by the interesting dissertation by Angelos-Stylianos Chryssogelos, *Political Parties and Party Systems in World Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Party-Based Foreign Policy Contests and Change*, Florence: European University Institute, 2012, pp. 3-12. Chryssogelos underlines that political parties are generally an understudied topic in the realm of comparative Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations (which prefer to investigate the role of bureaucracies and personalities), and argues that foreign policy change takes place "within a thick social and institutional structure that prescribes interests and delineates the terms of debate". On the same subject, though, see at least Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, as well as Juliette Kaarbo and Ryan K. Beasley, *Taking It to the Extreme: The Effect of Coalition Cabinets on Foreign Policy*, in "Foreign Policy Analysis", issue 4, 2008, pp. 67-81.

¹⁶⁰ The definition is taken from Stephen Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 19. A comprehensive assessment of the state of the art on the theoretical models for foreign policy analysis, as well as a selection of classical seminal studies on the subject, is in Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 5 volumes, London: SAGE, 2011.

¹⁶¹ As well as the studies by Kaarbo, Goldstein and Keohane quoted in the Introduction (footnote 43), see the synthetic overview of the history of foreign policy analysis provided by Steve Smith, *Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview*, in Carlsnaes and Guzzini (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. I, pp. 3-23, and Brian C. Schmidt, *On the History and Historiography of International Relations*, in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, pp. 3-22.

but rather represent one of its components, together with other factors.¹⁶² In particular, the State's self-representation, linked to the symbols that justifies its existence and autonomy, plays a significant role in its interaction with other subjects of the international system, since it resonates with the core values of its identity. As citizens, we are familiar with the fact that the public discourse on foreign policy insists on the cultural basis of the State's international action. It can be a divisive issue – all the more so in the Cold War context, as we will argue later – but it can also represent a possible common ground for different political worldviews, since it involves the slippery but powerful concept of national identity, that is the bundle of cultural elements, irrespective of political allegiances, that should enable a citizen's sense of belonging to his or her national community.¹⁶³

Our purpose, once again, is not to step into these complex theoretical debates, but rather to accomplish a more limited and historically-grounded task: after having determined whether or not we can talk about a distinctive Christian democratic culture of foreign policy, giving a positive though nuanced answer, we will analyze its possible implementation by Italian governments (of which *Democrazia Cristiana* was constantly the majority party), in order to evaluate the relationship between ideas and their translation into actual policies.¹⁶⁴ In particular, we will briefly

¹⁶² Some scholars have elaborated a distinction between three dimensions of the interest: political, economic and ideological, linking the ideological dimension to national role-perceptions, principles and paradigms. See Gerry C. Alons, *Predicting a State's Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and International Constraints*, in "Foreign Policy Analysis", issue 3, 2007, pp. 214-5, with related bibliography. In this non-specific context, though, it is best to keep the theoretical distinction between interests and values (oriented by ideas), in order to show the mixed relationship between them.

¹⁶³ A classical definition and interpretation of the subject is in Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, London: Penguin, 1991. For an assessment of the repercussions of the State self-representation in the building and possible implementation of a foreign policy discourse, see the seminal article by Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, *National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, in "International Studies Quarterly", issue 3, 1970, pp. 233-309. Numerous studies have stressed the essential correlation between domestic and foreign policy: for a classical methodological introduction see Robert D. Putnam, *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games*, in Carlsnaes and Guzzini (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. II, pp. 49-83 (originally in "International Organization", issue 3, 1988, pp. 427-60), while an original stance on the Italian case, for the period under closer consideration, is in Roberto Gualtieri, *The Italian political system and détente (1963 - 1981)*, in "Journal of Modern Italian Studies", issue 4, 2004, pp. 428-49.

¹⁶⁴ The peculiar relevance of this case study, as mentioned, lies in the specific weight of *Democrazia Cristiana* within the Italian political system, and in its function as political reference for the Western allies. In general, the dominance of a party over a long period of time seems to matter more than the distribution of power at any moment, because in foreign (as in domestic) politics, patterns tend to be established at critical junctures and change only incrementally

scrutinize three major areas of the country's foreign policy, comparing it to our theoretical model, based on a peculiar mediation between a universalist and a Nation-oriented approach, before proposing an interpretation of the triangulation between domestic policy, foreign policy and Christian democratic political culture in the Italian scenario.

UNITED NATIONS AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Consistently with the universalist discourse, the United Nations were a constant reference of Italy's international action. After its admission in 1955, the peninsula played an active role within the UN Assembly, at least until the beginning of the 1970s.¹⁶⁵ Italy's diplomacy worked to facilitate multilateral solutions, within the framework of the New York-based organization, to the crises that shook the international system during the 1960s and the 1970s, from Vietnam to India and Pakistan, from the Middle East to Czechoslovakia and Cyprus. Besides being rooted in a long-term narrative, this behavior can also be explained from an interest-oriented point of view: for a country with limited power, the recourse to multilateralism was the most common way to advance its foreign policy interests, and the only way to exert an influence on an international environment dominated by the superpowers.¹⁶⁶ From the same point of view we can observe the attempts to facilitate the People's Republic of China's admission to the UN, in which Italian diplomacy was engaged throughout the 1960s.¹⁶⁷

thereafter: this point has been argued by Jean-Philippe Thérien and Alain Noel, *Political Parties and Foreign Aid*, in "The American Political Science Review", issue 1, 2000, p. 153.

¹⁶⁵ As contextual references, see Angela Villani, *L'Italia e l'Onu negli anni della coesistenza competitiva (1955-1968)*, Padova: CEDAM, 2007; Enrica Costa Bona and Luciano Tosi, *L'Italia e la sicurezza collettiva. Dalla Società delle Nazioni alle Nazioni Unite*, Perugia: Morlacchi Editore, 2007, pp. 185-274; Fabio Grassi Orsini, *Il mito dell'ONU. Il Palazzo di vetro nella politica italiana: un'istituzione discussa in un'Italia divisa*, Roma: Liberal, 2005.

¹⁶⁶ International relations literature has traditionally linked the foreign policy of "middle powers", during the Cold War, to the inclination to embrace multilateralism: less influential than the superpowers, but also usually characterized by strong economies and regional influence, middle powers were interested in emphasizing order and stability, respect of the international law, cooperation and institutionalization. See the classical Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1984, and Ole Karup Pedersen, *Small States and International Institutions*, in École Française de Rome (ed.) *Les internationales et le problème de la guerre au XX^e siècle*, actes du colloque (Rome, 22-24 novembre 1984), Rome: École Française de Rome, 1987, pp. 337-48. Italy's definition as a middle power has been argued by Carlo Maria Santoro, *La politica estera di una media potenza*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991.

¹⁶⁷ See Mario Tocano, *L'Italia e il seggio cinese*, in "Nuova Antologia", 1967, issues 3 and 4, pp. 317-325 and 442-463; Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, *Manuale della politica estera italiana 1947-1993*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1993, p. 305.

Italy's initiatives did not have an impact on the course of the international crises, as is understandable given the country's low position in the global power rankings, but they led to some formal recognitions for the peninsula, such as Amintore Fanfani's appointment to the presidency of the UN Assembly in 1965, and the country's election as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1971 and 1975. In addition, the general commitment toward the disarmament process – since 1959, Italy had participated in the UN Disarmament Committee, where it tried to mediate among the Western countries and supported the US-USSR dialogue¹⁶⁸ – served the purpose of combining security issues with the opportunity to enhance Rome's status within the international system, and in particular within the Atlantic Alliance, playing the cards of the traditional ambitions of the Italian culture of foreign policy. It is quite revealing, however, that Italy repeatedly tried to enter the club of nuclear powers, in particular by sponsoring the shared control of atomic weapons, and that the country only renounced its pursuit of this goal – which contradicted a classic feature of the Universalist discourse – once the debate shifted toward the discussion of the non-proliferation treaty, a matter that was essentially handled by the two superpowers.¹⁶⁹ In any case, the opportunities originating from the multipolarization of the 1970s remained mostly on paper for Italy, which was struggling with a deep, multileveled crisis that left little space for foreign-policy issues. Institutional instability – the country saw 14 cabinets in 11 years, from 1968 to 1979 – combined with economic difficulties and social turmoil did not favor the pursuit of a recognizable

¹⁶⁸ For a contextualization see Maria Vismara Missiroli, *L'azione politica delle Nazioni Unite 1946-1976*, Padova: CEDAM, 1983, pp. 369-426; Marilena Gala, *Western Europe and the Negotiations on Arms Control: The Anglo-Americans and the Evolving Concept of European Security, 1963-1968*, in Wilfred Loth (ed.), *Europe, Cold War and Coexistence*, London: Frank Cass, 2004, pp. 258-73; about Italy's role: Federico Imperato, *L'Italia e il problema del controllo degli armamenti e del disarmo (1958-1971)*, in "Clio. Rivista trimestrale di studi storici", issue 2, 2007, pp. 255-80.

¹⁶⁹ These aspects have been underlined by Leopoldo Nuti, especially in "Me Too, Please": *Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1975*, in "Diplomacy and Statecraft", issue 1, 1993, pp. 114-148, and ID., *La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche, 1945-1991*, Bologna: Il Mulino 2007, pp. 287-345. Italy signed the non-proliferation treaty in January 1969, a few months after the approval of the UN Assembly (to protest against USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia), and ratified it only in 1975.

and organic course of action on matters that were considered less urgent by both the parties and public opinion.¹⁷⁰

Although support to international cooperation was not repudiated, on average the country did not express consistent political initiatives, limiting its input to the work of single representatives within international forums and organizations.¹⁷¹ More successful were the efforts carried out on the human rights field, another cornerstone of the Universalist discourse. Italy played an effective role in the development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), which committed the signatories to respecting the principles stated in the 1948 Universal Declaration, and was one of the major contributors within the UN agencies engaged in promoting the safeguarding of human rights.¹⁷² In some specific circumstances, however, there was a striking gap between DC's culture of foreign policy and Italy's international relations: for instance, the country's diplomacy did not follow up on the statements of principles regarding a possible intervention of the United Nations in the Nigerian civil war (1969), partly because of the existence of tangible interests (arms sales) in its relationship with the country.¹⁷³ The same ambivalent behavior can be registered about the position held by the Italian government toward South Africa's racist regime. In spite of its condemnation of Pretoria's segregationist policy, Italy did not support the UN resolutions calling for sanctions against South Africa, or for its expulsion from the international organization, mainly

¹⁷⁰ This conclusion is essentially shared by the literature: see Varsori, *Le relazioni internazionali*, pp. 1717-4, Costa Bona and Tosi (eds.), *L'Italia e la sicurezza collettiva*, pp. 230-31, and the considerations of Leopoldo Nuti, *La politica estera italiana negli anni della distensione. Una riflessione*, in Alfonso Alfonsi (ed.), *Aldo Moro e la dimensione internazionale. Dalla memoria alla storia*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2013, pp. 40-57. On the Italian crisis in the international context see the volume edited by Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons (eds.), *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta*, vol. I: *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino 2003.

¹⁷¹ See in particular Luciano Tosi, *La strada stretta. Aspetti della diplomazia multilaterale italiana (1971-1979)*, in Tosi and Giovagnoli (eds.), *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, pp. 241-67.

¹⁷² See Fausto Pocar, *Il contributo italiano alla protezione dei diritti umani nel sistema delle Nazioni Unite*, in Sergio Marchisio and Fabio Raspadori (eds.), *L'Italia e i diritti umani*, Padova: CEDAM, 1995, pp. 27-36; Luca Lupoli, *L'ONU e l'internazionalizzazione dei diritti umani: il contributo dell'Italia al funzionamento del "sistema dei diritti umani" delle Nazioni Unite*, in Anna Bedeschi Magrini (ed.), *L'Italia e l'ONU: esperienze e prospettive*, Padova: CEDAM, 1997, pp. 149-57, and above all Miriam Rossi, *Tutela dei diritti umani e Realpolitik. L'Italia alle Nazioni Unite*, Padova: CEADM, 2011.

¹⁷³ See Ferraris, *Manuale di politica estera*, pp. 199-200. In 1969, though, the Italian Parliament had approved a resolution urging the UN intervention in Biafra.

because of economic ties with the African country, and the already cited Western allegiance.¹⁷⁴ In particular, the autonomy of Italy's international action had an implicit but clear boundary, represented by its concordance with the Western interests, especially those of the United States.¹⁷⁵ International conditions had changed, the peninsula had gained regional influence and prestige, but one axiom had not lost its centrality since the beginning of the Cold War: when the interests of the Atlantic Alliance were at stake, "Western orthodoxy" was not up for debate. This point of view enables us to better understand the caution Italy employed when addressing the Vietnam war and Pinochet coup d'état, or the lack of its support for China's admission to the UN (complying with US's will).¹⁷⁶

The Middle East, in this context, was another hot topic. At the epicenter of the international tensions between the 1960s and the 1970s, the region was also of the utmost importance to the Italian strategic interests (especially as regards oil supplies). Rome worked for a multilateral solution of the conflicts that pitted Israel against the Arab countries, trying not to pick any side between the parties involved, but the task proved to be extremely difficult. The whole situation was a perfect illustration of the different, and sometimes conflicting, forces at work in determining

¹⁷⁴ Italy used to vote against the resolutions that implied an open condemnation of the West for its inaction, and abstain from the ones directed against Pretoria's regime. A similar pattern emerges from the votes on the situations in Namibia and South Rhodesia: see Tosi, *La strada stretta*, pp. 256-57.

¹⁷⁵ The best outlines of the relations between Italy and the United States during the 1960s and the 1970s confirm this assumption: see Roberto Gualtieri, *The Italian political system and détente*; Mario Del Pero, *Italia e Stati Uniti: un legame rinnovato?*, in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, vol. I, pp. 301-15, and Massimo De Leonardi, *L'atlantismo dell'Italia tra guerra fredda, interessi nazionali e politica interna*, in Ballini, Guerrieri and Varsori (eds.), *Le istituzioni repubblicane*, pp. 253-71. Moreover, this was not only a peculiarity of the Italian case: the "Western allegiance" also involved the other European countries, notwithstanding the more or less strained relationship with the American ally: for a long-term account of the relations between Europe and the United States see Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

¹⁷⁶ On Vietnam and the relationship between domestic and foreign policy, see Leopoldo Nuti, *The Center-Left Government in Italy and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*, in Andreas Daum, Lloyd Gardner and Wilfried Mausbach (eds.) *America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 279-98. The controversial reaction of Italy (and especially *Democrazia Cristiana*, which had traditional strong links with Chilean Christian Democracy) to the Chilean military coup – explicitly condemnatory at formal level, but not followed up by the suspension of diplomatic relations – has been analyzed by Raffaele Nocera, *Le ripercussioni del golpe sulle relazioni italo-cilene*, in ID. and Claudio Rolle-Cruz (eds.), *Settantatré. Cile e Italia, destini incrociati*, Napoli: Think Thanks, 2010, pp. 55-78. Finally, about China, Italy proposed several times that the UN Assembly institute a commission with the goal of studying the solution of the problem, but at the same time continued to vote against the proposal of admission, under the pressure of the United States, until the beginning of the US-China rapprochement at the end of the 1960s, which opened the way to the entrance of the Communist country in the international organization. See Luciano Tosi, *Momenti e problemi della presenza italiana alle Nazioni Unite*, in "La Comunità internazionale", 2000, pp. 420-23.

Italy's foreign policy: the spectrum ranged from pro-Arab advocates (the majority of Christian Democrats and Socialists), to orthodox Atlanticists, siding with the US in supporting Israel, traditionally represented by DC's right wing and minor parties like the Republicans, the Liberals and the Social Democrats.¹⁷⁷ The weight of economic actors interested in keeping good relations with oil-producing countries (above all, the national oil and gas company ENI), combined with residual hopes to play a major role in the area, progressively shifted Italy's support toward the Arab positions,¹⁷⁸ but the voting pattern at the UN Assembly once again confirms the difficulty of taking a consistent political stand when the stability of the Western bloc was questioned.¹⁷⁹

EUROPE

In the speeches and writings of DC's representatives throughout the Republican period, Europe emerged as the North Star of any discourse on foreign policy. The same was true for government officials of other parties (namely Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats), which generally presented the commitment to European integration as the cornerstone of Italy's international action. Even the Italian Socialists fully embraced the pro-European rhetoric during the 1960s (it was an essential prerequisite for earning international legitimacy, in view of the delicate passage to the center-left formula), after a decade of suspicion toward the conservative and "Western" nature of European integration.¹⁸⁰ In the historical reconstructions of the integration process, instead, the Italian contribution to the reinvention of the continent's institutional architecture is normally judged

¹⁷⁷ A good comprehensive account is in Daniele Caviglia and Massimiliano Cricco (eds.), *La diplomazia italiana e gli equilibri mediterranei: la politica mediorientale dell'Italia dalla guerra dei Sei Giorni al conflitto dello Yom Kippur, 1967-1973*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006; see also Luca Riccardi, *Il problema Israele: diplomazia italiana e PCI di fronte allo Stato ebraico (1948-1973)*, Milano: Guerini e associati, 2006, which also takes into account the stance of the Italian Communist Party.

¹⁷⁸ Luca Riccardi, *Sempre più con gli arabi. La politica italiana verso il Medio Oriente dopo la guerra del Kippur (1973-1976)*, in "Nuova Storia Contemporanea", issue 6, 2006, pp. 57-82.

¹⁷⁹ In 1974, for instance, Italy voted in favor of the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization's leader Yasser Arafat to the forthcoming debate on Palestine, but opposed the resolution requesting observer status for the PLO, and abstained from the resolution that acknowledged the right of Palestinians to self-determination and national independence. See Costa Bona and Tosi (eds.), *L'Italia e la sicurezza collettiva*, pp. 242-45.

¹⁸⁰ See Daniele Pasquinucci, *A Passage to the West: the Italian Socialists and European Integration in the Sixties*, in Antonio Varsori (ed.), *Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration, 1958-1972*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006, pp. 161-76, and Giovanni Scirocco, *Il Psi dall'antialtlantismo alla riscoperta dell'Europa*, in Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliarello (eds.), *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003, pp. 195-204. In a comparative perspective, see Richard T. Griffiths, *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993.

to be minor, after the De Gasperi era.¹⁸¹ Was there a striking gap between theory and practice, or has the country's role in European matters been underestimated? As is often the case, the truth appears to lie somewhere in the middle. To assume a more rigorous historical method, we can rephrase the question as follows: were the economic and political interests of the country in accordance or in contradiction with the European rhetoric? We have already mentioned the fundamental concordance between the two factors for the first decade after the Second World War, but what about the 1960s and the 1970s? In this generalizing context, we can at least outline two major trends.¹⁸²

On the one hand, from the long-term perspective, the country's economy continued to benefit from wide and regulated international cooperation. In general terms, the structure of the Italian economy – export-oriented and lacking raw materials (oil in particular) – benefited from increased cooperation within the international community, as it secured the most dangerous areas (especially the Middle East) and favored economic exchanges and the liberalization of the markets.¹⁸³ More specifically, the success of European integration, in particular in the form of the European Economic Community, had contributed to the Italian "economic miracle", favoring an increase in exports and trade and triggering a virtuous circle of modernization.¹⁸⁴ Italian representatives in European institutions kept on working to promote the liberalization of the markets and the international mobility of manpower in Western Europe, in order to solve the problem of high unemployment, especially in the south of the country. More generally, in the period under

¹⁸¹ See for instance the limited space dedicated to Italy and Italian personalities (except for Alcide De Gasperi and Altiero Spinelli) by classical accounts of the history of European integration such as Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours*, Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2004; Desmond Dinan (ed.), *Origins and Evolution of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, and Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. The underestimation of the Italian role, as mentioned, extends to the comprehensive judgment of Italy's international relations during the Cold War: see the comment of Varsori, *Cold War History in Italy*.

¹⁸² We defer to Antonio Varsori's comprehensive work, *La cenerentola d'Europa?*, for a punctual analysis, with pertinent bibliography.

¹⁸³ This long-term trend has been well outlined by the work of Luciano Tosi, in particular *La cooperazione internazionale: una costante nelle relazioni internazionali italiane*, introduction to ID. (ed.), *L'Italia e le organizzazioni internazionali*, Padova: CEDAM, 1999, pp. VIII-XLVI.

¹⁸⁴ See Rolf Petri, *Dalla ricostruzione al miracolo economico*, in Giovanni Sabbatucci and Vittorio Vidotto (eds.), *Storia d'Italia*, vol. V: *La Repubblica*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1997, pp. 375-84.

consideration Italy's diplomats requested the implementation of a European social policy, encompassed by a regional policy that would reduce the imbalances in wealth and growth between the different areas of the Community, namely the Italian *Mezzogiorno*.¹⁸⁵

Rome achieved some goals – on manpower mobility and professional training, mostly thanks to the work of Socialist Lionello Levi Sandri (1910-1991), and on the commitment to enhance the European Social Fund, in order to compensate for regional disparities – while the common market continued to play a crucial role for Italy's economy, boosting exports and stimulating the development of its industrial system, especially in the second half of the 1970s, when the international economic trends were particularly negative.¹⁸⁶ On average, though, the action of Italy's governments with regard to economic integration was not so incisive: during the crisis which blocked the process of European integration for most of the 1960s, Italy's main concern was to “keep alive” the European Economic Community and complete the Customs Union, while the internal crisis that haunted the peninsula during the 1970s shifted the ruling class' focus on national policies – as Italy's skepticism toward monetary unity proposed by the Werner committee (1970), and the country's exit from the short-lived “currency snake” (1973) symbolize. In other words, sometimes the interests of the peninsula were at odds with increased economic cooperation, above

¹⁸⁵ This point has been widely stressed in the following contributions: Antonio Varsori, *Il ruolo dell'Italia nella nascita di una politica sociale europea*, in Luciano Tosi (ed.), *L'Italia e la dimensione sociale nell'integrazione europea*, Padova: CEDAM, 2008, pp. 151-62; Luciano Mechì and Antonio Varsori, *At the Origins of the European Structural Policy: the Community's Social and Regional policies from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s*, in Jan Van der Harst (ed.), *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion 1969-1975*, Bruxelles/Baden-Baden: Bruylants/Nomos, 2007, pp. 223-50; Ugo Leone, *La prospettiva europeista nello sviluppo del Mezzogiorno*, in Tullio D'Aponte (ed.), *Dal Mezzogiorno all'Europa. Saggi di geografia politica ed economica*, Napoli: Loffredo, 1986, pp. 182-91.

¹⁸⁶ Directives on manpower mobility, in application of the Rome Treaty, were approved in 1968, while in 1965 the Community drafted a plan to reinforce professional training. The commitment to implement a regional policy, instead, remained mostly on paper: at The Hague and Paris summits, in 1969 and 1972, the member States agreed on taking initiatives in that direction, pressured by the Italian government (which presented a comprehensive memorandum in that regard in 1971), but without effective results. See Luciano Mechì and Antonio Varsori (eds.), *Lionello Levi Sandri e la politica sociale europea*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2008; Antonio Varsori (ed.), *Sfide del mercato e identità europea. Le politiche di educazione e formazione professionale nell'europa comunitaria*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2006, as well as the titles quoted in the previous footnotes. The role of the European common market in the development of Italy's industrial system has been underlined by Ruggero Ranieri, *L'industria italiana e l'integrazione comunitaria: una sfida riuscita*, in Craveri and Varsori (eds.), *L'Italia nella costruzione europea*, pp. 259-82.

all on the monetary side, and especially when there was a risk of exposing its weakest areas to possibly damaging international competition. Or to look at it in yet another light, different subjects – industrials, the Bank of Italy, trade unions, government parties – had different ideas on how to better use the country’s participation in the European community, which sometimes caused an incapacity to define and pursue shared interests,¹⁸⁷

Even the second core issue of the Christian democratic discourse on Europe, i.e. DC’s seemingly unconditional support to political integration, was not always followed up by consistent practical behavior of the Italian governments. In general terms, Italy remained faithful to its traditional position, a legacy of De Gasperi’s era, based on the assumption that only a common political will would have completed and cemented the integration process.¹⁸⁸ Since the beginning of the 1960s, Italian representatives had usually outlined three major goals: the merger of the structures of the existing Communities, the democratic election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage (Italy formalized a proposal in this regard with a memorandum in February 1964), and the enlargement of the “Europe of the Six”, in particular through the entry of Great Britain. These objectives were actually achieved – the first in 1965-67, the second in 1974, the third in 1973. However, they rarely represented Rome’s first priority in European meetings and negotiations. Italian representatives usually advocated a closer political cooperation as a long-term objective, but during the harshest crises or in some topical moments – the Gaullist challenge, the Werner committee – the issue was *de facto* put in the background, in favor of maintaining the existing

¹⁸⁷ See the long-term picture sketched by Roberto Gualtieri in *L’Europa come vincolo esterno*, and Mario Telò, *L’Italia nel processo di costruzione europea*, in Francesco Barbagallo (coord.), *Storia dell’Italia repubblicana*, vol. III: *L’Italia nella crisi mondiale. L’ultimo ventennio*, book 1: *Economia e società*, Torino: Einaudi, 1996, pp. 129-248. A clear example, in this respect, is given by the inability to take a definite stand on the issue of the Common Agricultural Policy, which almost paradoxically became a disadvantage for a country like Italy, which relied heavily on the primary sector at least until the 1960s. See Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, *Farmers on Welfare. The Making of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009, in part. pp. 262-63. In order to properly estimate the weight of the different actors, obviously, we would need a far more detailed analysis (here we are at the core of the methodological issue that we referenced at the beginning of the section); in this context, as we argued, we simply want to outline a synthetic account of the main guidelines of Italy’s international relations, so as to verify its correspondence with the Christian democratic culture of foreign policy, and propose an interpretation about their correlation.

¹⁸⁸ De Gasperi’s attempt to accelerate the process of political integration, as it is well known, failed, along with the rejection of the European Political Community in 1954. See Daniela Preda, *Alcide De Gasperi federalista europeo*, and Sara Lorenzini, *L’impegno di De Gasperi per un’Europa unita*, in Eckart Conze, Gustavo Corni and Paolo Pombeni (eds.) *Alcide De Gasperi: un percorso europeo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005, pp. 195-230.

economic cooperation, which better served the immediate interests of the country.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, Italian politicians who were elected or appointed representatives of European institutions generally showed a general lack of interest in political activity in Europe. The case in point that is normally quoted is the short term of Franco Maria Malfatti as President of the European Commission, that started in 1970 and was curtailed after only two years in order to allow the participation of the Christian Democrat exponent in 1972 Italy's general elections.¹⁹⁰ Although the image of Malfatti needs to be at least partly rehabilitated, given his significant work as a mediator in a difficult phase of European integration,¹⁹¹ and the role of Italian representatives in European executive bodies was far from insignificant,¹⁹² it is true that Italy's delegation at the European Parliament in the 1960s and the 1970s was consistently less than full, and that Italian members had a high rate of absenteeism.¹⁹³ In this case, we have to underline a background factor mentioned in the course of the analysis, that is the limited appeal exerted by foreign policy within the party's ranks: on average, Christian democratic politicians would rather remain "entrenched" in national politics, which guaranteed positions of power and direct contact with the constituency, than try to engage in international politics, holding more prestigious but less rewarding offices.

In broader terms, underneath the difficulty of reconciling the drive toward European political integration with Italy's own interests, we may glimpse the latent conflict which characterized the whole post-WWII period in the Old Continent, concerning the problematic balance between the transfer of sovereignty to the supranational level, and the continuing centrality of the Nation-State.

¹⁸⁹ Varsori, *La Cenerentola d'Europa*, pp. 256-57.

¹⁹⁰ See for instance the critical account of Desmond Dinan, *Famous Non-Performers: Franco Malfatti, Gaston Thorn, and Jacques Santer*, in Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 234-36.

¹⁹¹ See Antonio Varsori, *Franco Maria Malfatti. A Presidency Cut Short*, in Michèle Dumoulin (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958-72: History and Memories*, Brussels: European Commission, 2007, pp. 153-64.

¹⁹² See Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia a Bruxelles: I membri italiani della Commissione*, and Sandro Guerrieri, *Il contributo degli europarlamentari italiani ai progetti di unione politica: dall'Assemblea ad hoc al progetto Herman*, in Craveri and Varsori (eds.), *L'Italia nella costruzione europea*, respectively pp. 145-64 and 165-86.

¹⁹³ See R.E.M. Irving, *Italy's Christian Democrats and European Integration*, in "International Affairs", July 1976, pp. 400-416.

We are facing a problem that has been widely addressed by political and historical literature,¹⁹⁴ and one that we will not tackle here except to point out that even for a country that had built its public discourse around strongly pro-European arguments, the national dimension of politics was still a pivotal factor in the equation. As for other member States, Italy was reluctant to defer government powers to the European level, without assurances regarding the safeguarding of national interests, but it was interested in creating a stable and democratic institutional environment, with the goal of strengthening the cooperation between the single units. More than for other European countries, though, this design presented specific advantages for the peninsula. During the internal crisis of the 1970s, indeed, Europe proved to be a safety net for Italian democracy, which had been weakened by subversive threats that the political system seemed unable to contain, and was possibly being endangered – at least in the eyes of the United States – by the Communist party's electoral growth.¹⁹⁵ Not by chance, Rome worked to maintain a clear and safe distance between the EC and the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe – namely the Colonels' Greece and Franco's Spain¹⁹⁶ – and to support any process oriented to the stabilization of the continent and to the improvement of its external relations.

In particular, the Italian delegation played an important and often underestimated role at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, offering a valuable contribution not only to the definition of the third basket, by insisting on the centrality of cultural cooperation and guaranteeing

¹⁹⁴ Within the ever-growing literature about the origins of European integration and its development, there are different methodological approaches and school of thoughts – realists, institutionalists, neo-funcionalists, constructivists and others – which present different views about the relationship between Nation-States and integration, assigning different weight to the two terms. A good and updated introduction to the theoretical debate is in Jones, Menon and Weatherill (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, especially the essays by Mark A. Pollack, Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, and Frank Schimmelfennig.

¹⁹⁵ While the Republican administration of Nixon and Kissinger was ready to take extreme measures – implementing a sort of “Western Brezhnev doctrine” – to prevent the Communists’ democratic access to power, the European allies exerted a crucial influence, in particular between 1974 and 1976, in order not to escalate the Italian crisis. See Gualtieri, *Italian political system and détente*, and above all Mario Del Pero, *Distensione, bipolarismo e violenza: la politica estera americana nel Mediterraneo durante gli anni Settanta. Il caso portoghese e le sue implicazioni per l'Italia*, in Giovagnoli and Tosi (eds.) *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, pp. 123-44. We will see in a few pages how Aldo Moro tried to handle the complex interdependence between domestic politics and international relations, of which he was acutely aware.

¹⁹⁶ See Marialuisa Lucia Sergio, “Abbiamo la responsabilità del dire certi sì e certi no”. *Aldo Moro e le transizioni democratiche nell’europa meridionale (Grecia, Spagna, Portogallo)*, in Renato Moro and Daniele Mezzana (eds.), *Una vita, un paese: Aldo Moro e l’Italia del Novecento*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2014, pp. 559-82.

human rights, but also to the controversial discussion on security issues, which most interested the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.¹⁹⁷ The Helsinki negotiations were probably the point of maximum convergence between *Democrazia Cristiana*'s discourse and Italy's foreign policy. The contribution to détente and to the building of a more peaceful international order; the commitment to multilateral cooperation; the insistence on the role of the individual, with inalienable rights and liberties, as a subject of international law; the opportunity for Western Europe to develop a common foreign policy and to manifest a shared political will, and the enhancement of Italy's national security were all factors that substantiated the alignment of ideals and interests. On July 30, 1975, Aldo Moro could symbolically ratify the Conference's success, signing the Helsinki Final Act in the capacity of both Italy's Prime Minister and President of the European Community.¹⁹⁸

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

At the CSCE, Rome tried to include the commitment to organize a Conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean in the agreements, linking Europe's security to that of the countries around the Mediterranean basin. Although the attempt did not prove successful, it highlighted a constant preoccupation of the peninsula, which once again had tried to establish a connection between self-interest (protection of its southern border) and collective interests (security of the whole European Community).¹⁹⁹ As well as concerning Italy's national security, the creation

¹⁹⁷ See Angela Romano, *L'Italia e la Conferenza di Helsinki, 1973-75*, in "Annali della Fondazione Ugo La Malfa", 2004, pp. 221-44, and Francesca Zilio, *Moro e la CSCE: dalle parole ai fatti della politica distensiva italiana*, in Moro and Mezzana (eds.), *Una vita, un paese*, pp. 643-61, who underlines the existence of a specific Italian interest in the Conference, namely the definitive solution of the issues regarding the Eastern border. See also the direct testimony of Ambassador Luigi Vittorio Ferraris in *Testimonianze di un negoziato. Helsinki-Ginevra-Helsinki*, Padova: CEDAM, 1977.

¹⁹⁸ Aldo Moro's speech can be consulted in Aldo Moro, *Scritti e discorsi*, vol. VI, edited by Giuseppe Rossini, Roma: Cinque Lune, 1990, pp. 3346-3350.

¹⁹⁹ The Conference – which Moro had already proposed in a meeting of the Atlantic Council in April 1972 – never took place, but in the Helsinki Final Act there was a paragraph about "Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean": see Nicolas Baldassi, *Sea and Détente in Helsinki: The Mediterranean Stake of the CSCE, 1972-1975*, in Elena Calandri, Antonio Varsori and Daniele Caviglia (eds.), *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, London: Tauris, 2012, pp. 61-74. For the theoretical distinction among self-regarding, collective and other-regarding interests see Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, *The Concept of*

of a stable and cooperative area south (and east) of the Mediterranean Sea presented several advantages for the country, because of a pattern which by now we should be familiar with, founded on the quest for interdependency and multilateral solutions to international tensions. More generally, Italy supported a proactive role of the European Community on the North/South axis – one of the core features of the Christian democratic discourse – that at the end of the 1950s had emerged as one of the major challenges posed by the evolution of the international system.²⁰⁰ Especially in the early 1960s, the country sponsored several initiatives in favor of the increased cooperation between Europe and developing countries, above all in Africa and Latin America. The same pattern, however, has taught us to expect some countertrends due to the influence of national interests. Here it took the form of a tendency to protect the agricultural sector from competition from extra-Communitarian products.²⁰¹

Even more indicative in this respect was the behavior within the Development Assistance Group (DAG, later DAC), the UN agency dedicated to developing and implementing international aid policies. During the decade immediately following the war, Italy was a beneficiary and not a provider of international aid. Even after the economic boom (after the late 1950s) the Italian authorities argued that the internal north/south divide and the scarcity of capital did not allow the country to commit any significant resources (the UN's recommendation was at least 0.7% of the gross national product (GNP)) to foreign aid. This notwithstanding, Italian foreign assistance grew from about 0.2% of GNP in the early 1960s, to 1.03% in 1969 (84% of which came from the private

National Interests: Uses and Limitations, in Alexander L. George (ed.), *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980, pp. 217-38.

²⁰⁰ As general references see Marc Michel, *Décolonisation et émergence du Tiers Monde*, Paris: Hachette, 1993, and Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and its Impact. A comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. Here we will use the terms “Third World” and “developing countries” in a rather loose way, following a terminology employed at the time, in order to include all the countries that were not part of the “First World” (the principal Cold War antagonists), nor of the “Second World” (advanced industrial countries), and that were generally committed to rebalancing the gap with the industrialized countries.

²⁰¹ See Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, *La politica italiana di cooperazione allo sviluppo*, in Tosi (ed.), *L'Italia e le organizzazioni internazionali*, pp. 327-28, and above all Elena Calandri, *L'Italia e la questione dello sviluppo: una sfida fra anni sessanta e settanta*, in Craveri and Varsori (eds.), *L'Italia nella costruzione europea*, pp. 109-32. For an assessment of the Community's relations with developing countries see Elena Calandri (ed.) *Il primato sfuggente. L'Europa e l'intervento per lo sviluppo (1957-2007)*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009, and Enzo R. Grilli, *The European Community and the Developing Countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 1-49.

sector): the main problem was represented by “the disorganized and reluctant way” in which these resources were handled, that demonstrated a lack of interest and attention on the part of Italian political leaders.²⁰² In 1971 these matters were assessed in a more organic way, through the promulgation of the already mentioned law promoted by Mario Pedini and devoted to the reorganization and rationalization of Italy’s cooperation with developing countries. The law shifted the focus from the traditional concept of development aid to the reciprocity of the interests that connected Italy and developing countries: it was a clear statement of Italy’s preference for international cooperation, but it was not followed up by adequate investments, and so it remained largely unapplied.²⁰³

Italian governments, though, did not always favor multilateral channels. In the 1960s Rome maintained strong bilateral relations, and a bilateral approach to foreign assistance, with the countries in which its strategic or economic interests were at stake. This was the case for North Africa, in particular Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, and for the Eastern and Sub-Saharan part of the continent, namely the former colonies of the Horn of Africa and the newly independent South-equatorial countries, which drew the attention of Italian companies, interested in contracts for major public works. Strong bilateral relations were maintained with Middle Eastern countries, and also with Eastern Europe, especially with Yugoslavia, where a historical reconciliation was achieved through the Osimo agreements in 1975, which settled the dispute, inherited from the Second World War, over Italy’s Eastern border.²⁰⁴ A greater commitment toward multilateral approaches can be observed in the 1970s, as witnessed by both the more proactive participation

²⁰² See Elena Calandri, *Italy’s Foreign Assistance Policy, 1959-1969*, in “Contemporary European History”, issue 4, 2003, pp. 509-25 (quotation from p. 510); Guia Migani, *La partecipazione italiana al DAC durante gli anni Sessanta: un’analisi preliminare*, in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, vol. II, pp. 127-65, and G.S., *L’aiuto italiano ai paesi in via di sviluppo*, in “Affari Esteri”, October 1970, pp. 157-72 for the figures.

²⁰³ Luciano Tosi, *La politica di cooperazione internazionale dell’Italia: autonomia interdipendenza e integrazione*, in ID. (ed.), *Politica ed economia nelle relazioni internazionali dell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra. Studi in ricordo di Sergio Angelini*, Roma: Studium, 2002, pp. 134-35.

²⁰⁴ As well as the general contributions on Italian foreign policy, see Elena Calandri, *Il Mediterraneo nella politica estera italiana*; Vittorio Ianari, *L’Italia e il Medio Oriente: dal “neoatlantismo” al peace-keeping*, and Paolo Borruso, *L’Italia e la crisi della decolonizzazione*, in Giovagnoli and Pons (eds.), *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, respectively at pp. 351-81; 383-95 and 397-442; see also Luciano Monzali, *La questione jugoslava nella politica estera italiana dalla prima guerra ai trattati di Osimo (1914-1975)*, in Franco Botta and Italo Garzia (eds.), *Europa adriatica. Storia, relazioni, economia*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2004, pp. 15-72.

within the international agencies of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Community, and the greater amount of resources allocated to foreign assistance through multilateral channels, compared to bilateral ones.²⁰⁵

In general, Italy tried to present itself as the most attentive country in the industrialized First World to the demands and necessities of the Third World. During the 1970s, when the relations between those two poles of the international system deteriorated, Italian governments tried to play a mediating role, distancing themselves from the most conflicting positions of the West. In 1974, at the 39th UN General Assembly, Italy abstained from the vote on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (which the United States and most of the other industrialized countries voted against), which was approved alongside a Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. These documents were the manifesto of the requests presented by Third World countries – now the majority of the United Nations – above all within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to re-envision the structural aspects of the international economic system, considered to be unfair and shaped only by the interests of the rich countries.²⁰⁶ Italy's efforts, as we might expect, did not achieve significant results, since Rome held few negotiating cards; a similar fate was suffered by the attempts of the European Community which, despite some accomplishments, ultimately failed to speak with one voice and act as a bridge between the United States and Third World countries.²⁰⁷

From a historical perspective, however, Rome's quest for a privileged relationship with developing countries obtained two major successes. On one hand, it built up credibility that proved

²⁰⁵ See Sergio Alessandrini, *La politica di cooperazione allo sviluppo dell'Italia*, in ID. (ed.), *La politica italiana di cooperazione allo sviluppo*, Milano: Giuffrè, 1983, pp. 259-309. Elena Calandri has argued that this shift highlighted a “crisis”, more than a “maturation”: it was an admission of defeat, originating in the incapacity to autonomously develop and coordinate a foreign assistance policy. See Elena Calandri, *L'Italia e l'assistenza allo sviluppo dal neoatlantismo alla Conferenza di Cancún del 1981*, in Romero and Varsori (eds.), *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione*, p. 264.

²⁰⁶ For some good accounts of this conflict we refer to Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: the “Third World” against Global Liberalism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; David Fieldhouse, *The West and the “Third World”: Trade, Colonialism, Dependence, and Development*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999; Hal Brands, “*Third World* Politics in an Age of Global Turmoil, in “Diplomatic History”, issue 1, 2008, pp. 105-38.

²⁰⁷ A good outline of the European role in the North/South axis has been provided by Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1959-1986*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 (or. ed. Milano: Mondadori, 2009).

useful in the 1980s, when Italy's governments, in particular under Socialist leader Bettino Craxi (1934-2000), implemented a more assertive foreign policy, especially in the Mediterranean area;²⁰⁸ on the other hand, this strategy had an immediate return in the context of domestic policy. In fact, *Democrazia Cristiana* established a strong connection with the Socialist party, whose international policy, as we mentioned, had to be drastically reexamined in view of its possible entry into the government at the end of the 1950s.²⁰⁹ Traditionally receptive to the issues of non-aligned countries, and supportive of the emancipation struggles of the peoples under colonial rule, the Socialists were in favor of closer cooperation with Third World countries, attuned to the anti-imperialistic features of their discourse.²¹⁰ However, the convergence of Italian political forces on opening up to the issues of developing countries went even further. In 1972, politicians and intellectuals from Christian democratic, Socialist and Communist areas, together with various representatives of the civil society – trade unions, industrials, cooperatives, NGOs – contributed to the foundation of the *Istituto per le relazioni tra l'Italia e i Paesi dell'Africa, America Latina, Medio ed Estremo Oriente*, an institute dedicated to the improvement of the relations between the peninsula and extra-European countries, a subject which confirmed to have a large consensus within society. The Institute lobbied for the passage of an organic bill on international cooperation, which was finally approved in 1979.²¹¹ The PCI's involvement in the drafting of the law, as well as

²⁰⁸ For a sympathetic account see Gaetano Quagliarello, *Oltre il "terzaforzismo". Craxi e le relazioni transatlantiche (1976-1983)*, in Andrea Spiri (ed.), *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, Venezia: Marsilio, 2006, pp. 23-47; a more balanced reconstruction – although the research on this decade is still taking its first steps – in Ennio Di Nolfo, *Il PSI, Craxi e la politica estera italiana*, in Gennaro Acquaviva and Luigi Covatta (eds.), *Il crollo. Il PSI nella crisi della prima Repubblica*, Venezia: Marsilio, 2012, pp. 685-712.

²⁰⁹ Tommaso Nencioni, *Tra neutralismo e atlantismo. La politica internazionale del Partito Socialista Italiano 1956-1966*, in "Italia contemporanea", issue 3, 2010, pp. 438-470. Socialists' "Western allegiance", indeed, was a *conditio sine qua non* for the launch of the center-left experiment: the weight of international factors in this major turn in Italian politics has been convincingly demonstrated by Leopoldo Nuti: see *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra, 1953-1963. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1999 and, in English, *The United States, Italy, and the Opening to the Left, 1953-1963*, in "Journal of Cold War Studies", issue 3, 2002, pp. 36-55.

²¹⁰ See also for a contextualization, given the lack of more recent and specific analyses, Alberto Benzoni, Roberto Gritti, and Antonio Landolfi (eds.), *La dimensione internazionale del socialismo italiano. 100 anni di politica estera del PSI*, Roma: Edizioni associate, 1993.

²¹¹ Some notes in Calandri, *L'Italia e la questione dello sviluppo*, pp. 121-23. See also the proceedings of the first national Conference dedicated to cooperation to development (December 1981), in IPALMO, *Cooperazione allo sviluppo. Una sfida per la società italiana*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1982.

in other political and legislative initiatives since the beginning of the 1970s,²¹² highlighted an across-the-board approval for this aspect of Italy's international relations, which soon became a cornerstone of the public discourse on foreign policy.²¹³

CONCLUSIONS

Even from these few considerations, a recognizable trend seems to emerge with a sufficient amount of clarity. When observed from an adequate distance, Italy's international relations highlighted a significant convergence with the Christian democratic culture of foreign policy. Italy's engagement within the United Nations and the European Community witnessed the adhesion to a communitarian view of the international order, based on multiple, coordinated settings in which the citizen of the Nation-State could find additional and compatible levels of identity. The country supported, and in a few instances promoted, the initiatives undertaken by these entities in order to build a more peaceful, cooperative and fair international environment, respectful of the rights of peoples and prone to multilateral solutions to crises and conflicts. In these efforts, we can easily retrace the attempt to reconcile universality and nationality that we saw at discourse level: although Italy could not nurture its unrealistic desires to play a mediating role in the international system, it could at least bring a small contribution to strengthen the trends which pointed toward the same goal. We also underlined how this approach was mostly consistent with Italy's economic and political interests, which would be better served by an integrated and open configuration of the international

²¹² The friendly relations between Italian Communists and Marxist liberation movements of Somalia and Ethiopia proved essential, in the second half of the 1970s, for preserving Italy's economic agreements with the countries of the Horn of Africa: see Borruco, *L'Italia e la decolonizzazione*, pp. 403-17. More generally, PCI came to endorse the idea of a pivotal European role in the north/south cleavage that general secretary Enrico Berlinguer (1922-1984) presented as one of the central features of the Euro-communist strategy. "Euro-communism" was a term coined to describe the new strategy conceived by the Italian Communist Party around the mid-1970s, based on the acceptance of the process of European integration, and on the idea of Europe, composed by socialist democracies, as a possible tool to move past the Cold War. The best historical analysis is in Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, Torino: Einaudi, 2006, pp. 75-122; see also, in English, ID., *The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism*, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 45-65.

²¹³ The first article of the Law on Italy's cooperation with developing countries, significantly stated: "Cooperation to development is an essential part of Italy's foreign policy, and pursues goals of solidarity among peoples, and full accomplishment of fundamental human rights, in the name of the principles ratified by the United Nations and by the Conventions

ACP-EEC"

(http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/pdgcs/italiano/LeggiProcedure/Legge4987/pdf/legge_49.pdf, my translation).

community. If we sharpen our focus, though, we can point out that in some cases the country did not follow up on this general design, while in others it implemented policies that directly contradicted it. These countertrends are attributable to two major factors: the influence of national interests that pointed in the opposite direction, appealing to unrealistic desires of international influence, and the boundaries posed by Italy's unquestionable allegiances. In other terms, in some cases the universalist approach was superseded by the Nation-oriented one, generating a significant gap between ideas and the actual foreign policy pursued by Italian governments.

What conclusions can we derive from this brief investigation? On the one hand, we have gotten a glimpse of the complex relationship between ideas and their implementation: this dimension needs to be taken into account when addressing the culture of foreign policy of a political actor with government responsibilities, avoiding both the extremes of the analytical spectrum, i.e. neither focusing exclusively on discourse analysis (placing it in the void), nor considering the public discourse only a cover-up for the political and economic forces that drive any foreign policy initiative. Theory and practice, cultural elaboration and policy implementation, cannot be considered different, barely touching circles. On the contrary, they tend to intersect and mix in various fashions: a country's foreign policy is shaped by ideas, interests, international ties and domestic policy considerations, which change over time and are rarely aligned to form a consistent long-term design.²¹⁴ On the other hand, we are left with a further question: does the correlation between DC's culture of foreign policy and the theoretical framework which supported Italy's international action imply a dominance of Christian democratic political culture over the country's public discourse, or does it only underline how it was also shared by other political families, thus underplaying – for what concerns our topic – its uniqueness and its link with the Catholic culture? We will devote the next few pages to proposing an answer to this question.

²¹⁴ In order to deepen the level of analysis, we should take into account specific foreign policy decisions, and evaluate how much the different elements, that we outlined, influenced them: two good case studies in this regard, which also tackle the subject from a methodological point of view, are Craig Parsons, *Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union*, in "International Organization", issue 1, 2002, pp. 47-84, and Ann-Marie Ekengren, *How Ideas Influence Decision-Making. Olof Palme and Swedish foreign policy, 1965-1975*, in "Scandinavian Journal of History", issue 2, 2011, pp. 117-134.

The convergence of the main parties over the core features of the Italian foreign policy was sanctioned by the parliamentary agreement on the resolution of December 1, 1977.²¹⁵ Here all the major political forces, which were collaborating in Parliament, supporting the so-called government of “national solidarity” in the context of the multifaceted crisis which distressed the country during the 1970s, acknowledged the centrality of the Atlantic and European allegiances. In addition, they expressed consensus over issues like the valorization of the role of the UN, the rebalancing of the gap between the North and the South of the planet, the promotion of disarmament and détente in Europe. In other terms, universalism seemed to function as a shared common ground among different political cultures, therefore becoming the main narrative of the Italian foreign policy *tout court*. We will comment on this process by addressing it from a lateral perspective, that is by focusing on the ideas of one of the DC’s most prominent politicians of the post-WWII period, Aldo Moro. This look will prove to be a fitting conclusion to our analysis, since it will allow us to come back to the central arguments laid out in the previous sections – the correlation between DC’s culture of foreign policy and the Catholic discourse on the international community, and the interaction between foreign policy discourse and foreign policy management – as well as address more properly the question of the possible existence of distinct views within the Christian democratic party.

5. Aldo Moro: Universalism at work.

As underlined in the introduction, assuming the existence of a sole and shared idea of international community within the Christian Democratic party, although necessary for reasons of synthesis, means downplaying the presence of the different views and approaches that can be expected in a

²¹⁵ See “Relazioni Internazionali”, 1977, issue 51, p. 1219. The resolution, signed by Christian democrat Flaminio Piccoli, Communist Alessandro Natta, Republican Adolfo Battaglia, Liberal Aldo Bozzi, Social Democrat Luigi Preti and Socialist Vincenzo Balzamo, approved the general coordinates of the government’s foreign policy.

sizeable organization like the DC. More correctly, we can now state that the Christian democratic culture of foreign policy was an inclusive umbrella, which allowed for the development of different insights, accordingly with the diverse sensibilities that characterized the party. However, few individuals or currents chose this path. The cultural premises of foreign policy were not a much-debated argument in the Christian democratic world, as we already mentioned. In broad terms, the right-wing currents insisted on the centrality of the Atlantic Alliance for the Italian security system, while the left-wing currents focused on the idea of Europe in order to downplay the connection with the United States, but the general theoretical framework, which sustained Italy's international relations, was not openly questioned.²¹⁶

As concerns individuals, some DC representatives came to play important roles in European institutions, such as Mario Scelba and Emilio Colombo (presidents of the European Parliament), Franco Maria Malfatti and Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza (president and member, respectively, of the European Commission), or Edoardo Martino, who held various offices in Europe and was highly respected abroad. These men, however, did not have top-level responsibilities within the party during the period under consideration, therefore having little sway over the shaping of a shared culture of foreign policy.²¹⁷ A second group, formed by personalities such as Luigi Granelli, Angelo Bernassola and Alfredo De Poi, was involved in the management of DC's international relations, but they did not emerge as protagonists in national politics, although they worked for a

²¹⁶ A more detailed analysis could take into account the various “reviews of area”, which were expressions of the political stance of the different currents (which, in turn, changed in terms of composition and consistency through the years, composing a very complicated landscape even for an engaged observer of Italian politics), in order to study the possible variations of the foreign policy discourse.

²¹⁷ For an introduction to Scelba's and Colombo's thoughts on their political experience in Italy and Europe – significantly published with almost the same title – see Mario Scelba, *Per l'Italia e per l'Europa*, Roma: Cinque Lune, 1990 (a collection of Scelba's political speeches), and Emilio Colombo, *Per l'Italia, per l'Europa. Conversazione con Arrigo Levi*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013. The interesting archival finds of Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza (1920-2004, member of the European Parliament from 1961 to 1972, and member of the European Commission from 1972 to 1977) and Edoardo Martino (1910-1999, president of the Political Commission of the European Parliament between 1964 and 1967, and European commissioner for External Relations from 1967 to 1970; Martino also became director of the Institute for European Studies “Alcide De Gasperi”) can be consulted at the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence.

long period in European and Italian institutions.²¹⁸ Each of these men would deserve a detailed study, in order to paint a more colorful picture of the Christian democratic approach to international relations. Once again, though, the synthetic structure of this work calls for specific choices; in particular, we would need to address the role of personalities who came to prominence in both the government and the party throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, and who left a consistent amount of speeches and writings about the international dimension, thus interlacing the theoretical approach to international relations with their actual management.

From this perspective, four men immediately come to mind: Amintore Fanfani (1909-1999), Aldo Moro (1916-1978), Mariano Rumor (1915-1990) and Arnaldo Forlani (b. 1925). All of them were Italy's Prime or Foreign Minister, and DC's secretary, at some point of their career during the span of time that we are addressing. A fifth protagonist of Italian political life, Giulio Andreotti (1919-2013), never guided the party, although he was universally acknowledged to have been a key figure in party politics since the foundation of Christian Democracy.²¹⁹ Fanfani's contribution, as we recalled, was especially effective between the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s; after the prestigious appointment at the presidency of the UN Assembly, and the last two years as Italy's Foreign Minister (1966-68), his interests and responsibilities turned toward domestic and party politics, as he became president of the Senate (1968-1973 and 1976-1982) and DC's secretary (1973-75).²²⁰ Conversely, Forlani's and Andreotti's influence can be measured and examined in particular in the last years of our chronological coordinates, and above all during the 1980s, when they took the reins of the party and became the architects, together with Socialist

²¹⁸ Alfredo De Poi (1945-2010), together with Angelo Bernassola, was a liaison between *Democrazia Cristiana* and EUCD. He became a member of the European Parliament at age 27, and he remained in European-level positions until 1976, before coming back to Italy in order to run for office in the general elections. Luigi Granelli (1929-1999) was MP for four legislatures (he was undersecretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs from 1976 to 1979); during the 1970s he managed DC's international office, replacing Angelo Bernassola. His archive is available to researchers at the Istituto Sturzo.

²¹⁹ For a brief English profile of these protagonists of twentieth century politics in Italy see Gilbert and Nilsson, *Historical Dictionary of Modern Italy, passim*.

²²⁰ Guido Formigoni has proposed considering the year 1968 as a suitable date to close the analysis of his foreign policy: Formigoni, *Fanfani, la DC e la ricerca di un nuovo discorso di politica estera*, pp. 101-102.

Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, of the new Italian protagonism in the international system.²²¹

Moreover, they did not leave us a substantial amount of speeches and writings addressing their idea of international community, at least not an amount sufficient to retrace their genesis and evolution during the years we are covering.²²²

We have addressed Mariano Rumor's contribution in the section dedicated to European Christian Democracy, underlining his clear adhesion to the universalist paradigm which oriented DC's culture of foreign policy. We will now concentrate on the discourse of Aldo Moro, who embodied most of the features we are looking for. Moro was an unquestioned leader in Italian politics between the 1960s and the 1970s. Prime Minister for more than six years, Foreign Minister for almost five, his name is mostly associated with the tragic circumstances of his kidnapping and murder by the Red Brigades in 1978, but he was a key player in two distinct phases of the history of the Italian Republic. Firstly, he was the leader of the first "organic" center-left coalition (with the direct participation of the Socialist party in the government), holding the Prime Ministership from the beginning of 1964 until mid-1968. Later, during the 1970s, he was the main strategist of the "national solidarity" policy, which aimed at involving all the popular democratic parties, Communists included, in the management of the Italian crisis.²²³

²²¹ Forlani became Foreign Minister in 1976, and he maintained this position until 1979; during the 1980s, he was one of the protagonists of DC's "moderate turn", sanctioned by the 1980 Congress, which determined the end of the governments of "national solidarity" and opened the door to the return of an intransigent anticommunist discourse, shared by the Socialist party led by Craxi (who held the office of Prime Minister between 1983 and 1987). Andreotti was Italy's Foreign Minister for most of the 1980s (from 1983 to 1989): the Craxi-Andreotti-Forlani axis (CAF, as it was labelled by the media) played a pivotal role in the last phase of the First Republic, which was characterized by an intense activism on the international stage. For a first approach to this decade, which is beginning to be at the center of interest of Italian historians, see Ennio Di Nolfo (ed.), *La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta*, Venezia: Marsilio, 2007.

²²² Andreotti's archive, held at the Istituto Sturzo and recently made available to researchers, will also help to shed new light on the comprehensive approach of the DC's politician to international relations. Among the first works to use the new material, see Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia e la fine della Guerra fredda. La politica estera dei governi Andreotti (1989-1992)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013.

²²³ The literature on Moro is rapidly growing and becoming more insightful and sharp, after 30 years spent mostly on the tragic events surrounding his death, which have also captured the interest of non-Italian scholars: see for instance Richard Drake, *The Aldo Moro murder case*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, and Alain Saudan, *Analyse sémiotique de "l'affaire Aldo Moro"*, Actes sémiotiques (documents), Paris: Alain, 1983; in Italian, a recent excellent account of "Moro's case" – focused on Moro's writings during his captivity – has been written by Miguel Gotor, *Il memoriale della Repubblica: gli scritti di Aldo Moro dalla prigione e l'anatomia del potere italiano*, Torino: Einaudi, 2011. For a synthetic outline of the status of the literature see Renato Moro's introduction to ID. and Mezzana

Born in 1916 in a small village in Southern Italy, Moro studied Law and became professor of philosophy of Law in 1941, when he was only 25 years old. Before entering politics, Moro was engaged in Catholic movements like the Universitarian Federation of Italian Catholics (FUCI, which we will study in the next chapter) and the Graduates Movement of Catholic Action. He became FUCI's president in 1939, and Secretary General of the Graduates Movement in 1945. Like most of his peers, during his youth Moro did not focus on the problem of the international community. Instead, his primary interest was in the role of the State and its difficult balance with the rights of the individual. On this matter, particularly urgent for a Catholic jurist who had lived most of his life under Fascism, he made a decisive contribution in the Constituent Assembly, where he was elected in 1946 after having joined the newly founded *Democrazia Cristiana*. Although various and diverse sources – from Neo-Scholasticism to idealism – shaped his cultural training, the general impact of personalist thought on his ideas cannot be underestimated.²²⁴ A broader case should be argued about Moro's approach to the Magisterium's discourse: as a devout Catholic, he acknowledged the spiritual authority of the pope, but at the same time he never – or very rarely – used the Magisterium's hermeneutics as *argumentum* in the political battle, keeping the two spheres as separate as possible.²²⁵ He developed a profound consonance with Paul's discourse – we will try to demonstrate it by analyzing his approach to the idea of international community. He also developed a close relationship with Montini, especially after becoming a prominent representative of *Democrazia Cristiana* (there is no documented correspondence during Moro's youth), as

(eds.), *Una vita, un paese*, pp. 17-31. Unfortunately, a scholarly detailed biography of Aldo Moro is still waiting to be written: a good synthetic profile is Giorgio Campanini, *Aldo Moro*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1988. Many different aspects of his political activity, on the contrary, have already been addressed by scholars: see in particular the essays published in Moro and Mezzana (eds.), *Una vita, un paese*; Alfonsi (ed.), *Aldo Moro nella dimensione internazionale*; Francesco Perfetti, Andrea Ungari, Daniele Caviglia and Daniele De Luca (eds.). *Aldo Moro nell'Italia contemporanea*, Firenze: Le Lettere 2011.

²²⁴ The profile by Renato Moro on Moro's early education is still unmatched: see Renato Moro, *La formazione giovanile di Aldo Moro*, in "Storia contemporanea", issues 4-5, 1983, pp. 803-968. Campanini has spoken of "diffused personalism", in order to highlight the influence of this current over an entire generation of Catholics (Campanini, *Aldo Moro*, p. 76). Moro's specific contribution to the drafting of the Italian Constitution has been recently analyzed by Pino Pisicchio, *Pluralismo e personalismo nella Costituzione italiana. Il contributo di Aldo Moro*, Bari: Cacucci Editore, 2012.

²²⁵ See some notes in Alberto Melloni, *Appunti su Moro, la Chiesa, l'Italia. Educare l'invadenza dell'assente*, in Moro and Mezzana (eds.), *Una vita, un paese*, pp. 105-28. The profound consonance – and mutual influence, until the tragic epilogue – between Moro and Paul VI has been underlined by De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, for instance at pp. 589, 643 and 735.

witnessed by the pope's now-famous action during Moro's captivity and after his murder. His approach to the Church's Teachings, then, was more on a personal than on a public level: in other words, he embodied the process of autonomization of the party from the Church, which started to become visible and recognizable during the 1960s.

In Moro's early writings, we can easily trace the influence of personalist thought in relation to the discourse on the international community. As he wrote in 1945:

The ungenerous exclusivism of the Nation is condemned in the name of a broader human solidarity. [...] No Internationalism is really constructive, if it is not grounded in a kind of Humanism, able to reduce all the problems to their essence, connecting them to a moral conscience. [...] Therefore, it is essential to come back, overcoming the myths, to the inexhaustible human substance; to save the man, educating him, in order to save the man in every society.²²⁶

After the dramatic experience of totalitarian regimes, which led to a catastrophic war, it was only natural to look beyond the Nation-State to find a true warrantor of the human solidarity, but the rightful aspiration to internationalism could not supersede the special attention toward the man (the obvious polemic target was given by Socialist and Communist internationalism). We can observe here, in nuce, a motif that will characterize the entire evolution of Moro's thought during the following years: the adhesion to a universalist cultural framework was accompanied by a regular insistence on the inviolable individuality of men, rooted in the dignity of the human being.

A decade later, the tendency to internationalization seemed to have become a historical reality:

The current predominant historical trend is the fast routing toward the fusion of all the world's peoples into a single community. What seemed, in the past century, an inconceivable myth, is now becoming true at vertiginous speed.²²⁷

²²⁶ Aldo Moro, *Internazionalismo*, in "Studium", 1945, now published in Aldo Moro, *Scritti e discorsi*, vol. I, pp. 215-17 (my translation).

²²⁷ Aldo Moro, *L'homme politique catholique dans la communauté mondiale en formation*, address to the second World Congress of Pax Christi International (Rome, 1957). I have consulted Moro's intervention at the Pax Christi International archive, held at Katholieke Documentatie Centrum in Nijmegen (box 31, my translation).

With these words, Moro addressed the audience of the second Congress of Pax Christi International (Rome, 1957), addressing the theme of “the Catholic politician within the world community in formation”. The general trend toward building increasingly larger communities was appreciated – because it allowed for a better development of the personality – but the inherent hurdles were not underestimated: the adversarial structure of the international system, and Italy’s place in it, did not authorize much hope for the short-term future. Moro, in other words, was tangled in the same theoretical dilemma that troubled the Christian democratic ruling class since the postwar era, based on the complicated balance between universalist worldview, national identity and actual structure of international relations. Until the 1960s, Moro’s contribution to this issue does not stand out as particularly original, since his interest was mostly focused on domestic policy.²²⁸ Nonetheless, he was fully aware of the weight of the international context looming over Italian democracy. His whole long-term political design hinged on the structural deficiency of the Italian political system: in a context where government alternation was considered impossible, because of the incompatibility of the Communist party with the exercise of power in a Western democracy, the risks of ossifying the system could be avoided only through the enlargement and strengthening of the democratic base of the State.²²⁹

The “opening to the left” (i.e. the involvement of the Socialist party in the government), was a cornerstone of this strategy, and Moro knew that this operation would have been far more problematic – if not impossible – without the consensus of US administrations, which was granted during the Kennedy administration.²³⁰ When Moro became Prime Minister in December 1963, his main commitment was to reassure the Western allies that nothing had changed in Italy’s

²²⁸ Federico Imperato, who has convincingly addressed the issue of Moro’s government’s foreign policy during the 1960s, underlines that until the beginning of the decade, the Italian statesman did not have a specific approach to foreign policy. See Federico Imperato, *Aldo Moro e la pace nella sicurezza. La politica estera del centro-sinistra. 1963-1968*, Bari: Progedit, 2011, pp. VII-VIII.

²²⁹ The literature has substantially converged over this interpretation of Moro’s politics, summed up by Campanini, *Aldo Moro*, pp. 75-76.

²³⁰ Nuti, *The United States, Italy and the Opening to the Left*; see also Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *L’Italia e la Nuova Frontiera. Stati Uniti e centro-sinistra 1958-1965*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998.

international relations, nor would it in the future. He highlighted the iron link between domestic and foreign policy in a speech to the Italian Senate, in August 1964:

If we are going to work for a deep transformation in the structure of the country in order to broaden the democratic area, this can happen all the more seriously, the more solid our international position is, and the wider is the picture in which our relations with other countries unfold.²³¹

Since the goal of the center-left government was to implement a wide set of structural reforms – a goal that would remain largely unaccomplished –²³² the Prime Minister argued that the country should guarantee the stability of its international role, implicitly suggesting that the participation of the Socialist party in the government would not change the guidelines of Italy's foreign policy. Therefore, a certain lack of initiative in Italy's international action during the center-left governments, that has usually been heavily underlined by the literature, with some oversimplifications, was also the result of the complex equilibrium between internal and external factors.²³³

Within the third legislature (1963-1968) Moro headed three cabinets, holding the office of Prime Minister until 1968. In the May 1968 elections, Democrazia Cristiana held steady with 39% of the votes, while the electorate did not reward the unification of the Socialists with the Social Democrats, and the Communists gained 5% compared to the previous political elections (passing from 25% to 30%). Moro paid for the partial failure of the center-left formula, leaving the presidency of the Council and losing influence within the party, in a complicated power play among currents.²³⁴ Free from institutional responsibilities, and momentarily exonerated from his traditional mediating role within the party, he spent a few months outside the political arena, reflecting on the

²³¹ Aldo Moro, *La replica al Senato*, in *Scritti e discorsi*, vol. III, p. 1592, my translation.

²³² This judgment is substantially shared by the literature, even by those authors who underline the positive function of the center-left experiment for the institutional stability of the country: see for instance Scoppola, *La Repubblica dei partiti*, pp. 346-54. See also the far more critical account of Ginsborg, *A history of contemporary Italy*, pp. 280-83. It should also be mentioned that the “center-left” experiment was not an Italian peculiarity, but it was also attempted in other European countries (in Belgium with the Socialists, in the Netherlands with the Social Democrats, and even in West Germany for a brief period, between 1966 and 1969): see Becker, *The Emergence and Development of Christian Democratic Parties in Western Europe*, in Lamberts (ed.), *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, pp. 112-15.

²³³ See the balanced interpretation of Federico Imperato, *Aldo Moro e la pace nella sicurezza*, pp. 230-32.

²³⁴ See Malgeri (ed.), *Storia della Democrazia Cristiana*, vol. IV, pp. 41-55.

profound changes that were affecting Italian and international society. In a speech delivered at the DC National Council in November 1968, one of the most insightful of his political career, Moro presented the results of his cultural elaboration, which was now strongly focused on the international dimension.²³⁵

Tempi nuovi si annunciano ed avanzano in fretta come non mai. Il vorticoso succedersi delle rivendicazioni, la sensazione che storture, ingiustizie, zone d'ombra, condizioni d'insufficiente dignità e d'insufficiente potere non siano oltre tollerabili, l'ampliarsi del quadro delle attese e delle speranze all'intera umanità, la visione del diritto degli altri, anche dei più lontani, da tutelare non meno del proprio, il fatto che i giovani, sentendosi ad un punto nodale della storia, non si riconoscano nella società in cui sono e la mettano in crisi, sono tutti segni di grandi cambiamenti e del travaglio doloroso nel quale nasce una nuova umanità. [...] Di contro a sconcertanti e, forse, transitorie esperienze c'è quello che solo vale ed al quale bisogna inchinarsi, un modo nuovo di essere nella condizione umana. È l'affermazione di ogni persona, in ogni condizione sociale, dalla scuola al lavoro, in ogni luogo del nostro Paese, in ogni lontana e sconosciuta Regione del mondo; è l'emergere di una legge di solidarietà, di egualanza, di rispetto di gran lunga più seria e cogente che non sia mai apparsa nel corso della storia.²³⁶

We may recognize in this quote an absolute adhesion to the new universalist paradigm, combined with a peculiar attention to the global dramatic evolution of the way of thinking and living. In Moro's view, the international community was bound by ever-clearer ties, symbolizing the common aspirations of mankind toward justice, solidarity, equality. The undeferrable task of the ruling classes, in Italy as everywhere else, was to support this positive movement, preventing it from degenerating into conflicts and destructive attitudes. Complex and apparently contradictory as it

²³⁵ I presented an organic study of Moro's culture of foreign policy, focusing in particular on the decade 1968-1978, at the Conference *Studiare Aldo Moro per capire l'Italia* (Rome, May 2013), whose proceedings have been published by Moro and Mezzana, *Una vita, un paese* (my essay is at pp. 201-20).

²³⁶ Aldo Moro, *Un'autonoma collocazione politica*, November 21st, 1968, in *Scritti e discorsi*, vol. IV, p. 2597. I quoted this extended passage in the original Italian, in order to give a glimpse of Moro's prose, often labelled as convoluted and knowingly intricate, but here particularly inspired: Moro talked about the "painful labour" from which a new humanity was emerging, represented by the claims of a deeper solidarity, equality and respect of human rights that were promoted anywhere in the world. Some considerations on Moro's rhetoric are in Francesco Di Donato, *Sul presunto linguaggio criptico nell'elaborazione politico-istituzionale di Aldo Moro*, in Moro and Mezzana (eds.), *Una vita, un paese*, pp. 245-70. It is also worth noticing that this kind of rhetorical argumentation, which was sometimes difficult to follow even for Italian native speakers, also caused some misunderstandings with Moro's interlocutors at international level, even if the Italian politician made himself known as indefatigable mediator also on the international stage: see on this Andrea Negrotto di Cambiaso, *Appunti. Per un ricordo di Aldo Moro*, in Alfonsi (ed.), *Aldo Moro nella dimensione internazionale*, pp. 140-41.

was, the course of history seemed to tend toward the universalization of the needs and goals of the individual, but this long-term trend was obstructed by conservative forces that still – despite the recent and dramatic experience of totalitarian regimes – glorified the role of the State. Between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the struggle for rights, justice or better life conditions spread from the First to the Third World, often finding the strenuous opposition of State authorities. In this context, Moro's discourse took a step further, fully consistent with the premises that we have briefly laid out: the innate rights of the human being, founded on his or her dignity, should be preserved by an authority higher than the State – namely, the United Nations – since they were patrimony of mankind (in other, familiar terms, an ingredient of the universal common good).²³⁷ Such considerations present a clear link with the personalist school of thought, that even before the Second World War had established a connection between peace and human rights, arguing that they were not safeguarded enough unless they were part of the international order. In particular, a strong influence was exerted by Italian jurist Giuseppe Capograssi (1889-1956), who we introduced in the first chapter, and who several scholars have considered as a source of inspiration for Aldo Moro: the approach of the Italian politician to the problem of the internationalization of human rights seems to support this hypothesis.²³⁸ Moreover, the reference to “other people’s rights” as worthy of the same protection as one’s own was perfectly in line with the

²³⁷ See in particular two articles published in Italian newspaper “Il Giorno”: *La coscienza parla più forte dello Stato*, 6 September 1972, and *Le vicende cilene*, 26 September 1973, now collected in Moro, *Scritti e discorsi*, vol. V, respectively at pp. 2946-49 and 3093-97. In the first one, Moro commented on the exclusion of South Rhodesia, because of its discriminatory policies, from the 1972 Olympic games; in the second one, written after Pinochet’s coup, he explicitly proposed the United Nations as a universal guarantor of human rights, although at the same time underlining the difficulty in reconciling this principle with the Statute’s article preventing UN intervention in State matters (in fact, Moro would not ever follow through with this proposal). Moro’s views on human rights has been analyzed by Miriam Rossi, *La tutela dei diritti umani nella politica societaria di Aldo Moro*, while his view of the United Nations has been described by Luciano Tosi, *Le Nazioni Unite nella politica estera di Aldo Moro*; both essays are in Perfetti, Ungari, De Luca, Caviglia (eds.), *Aldo Moro nell’Italia contemporanea*, respectively at pp. 370-86 and 337-68. Obviously, Moro was not the only DC politician to reflect on these issues (we are taking his thought as an example of the Christian democratic elaboration): see for instance the similar considerations of Luigi Granelli in a speech delivered to the “Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione Internazionale” in 1975, in Archivio Sturzo, Fund Luigi Granelli, box 2.

²³⁸ See Francesco Saverio Fortuna, *Il pensiero giuridico di Aldo Moro*, in “Civitas”, issue 9, 1978, p. 58, and Norberto Bobbio, *Diritto e Stato nell’opera giovanile di Aldo Moro*, in “Il Politico”, 1980, pp. 17-18. Renato Moro, on the other side, underlines that, on the whole, the influence of Capograssi must not be overevaluated: Moro, *La formazione giovanile di Aldo Moro*, pp. 923-24. A possible mediator between Moro and Capograssi could have been Moro’s mentor Biagio Petrocelli: see his commemoration of Capograssi in Biagio Petrocelli, *Saggi di diritto penale*, Padova: CEDAM 1965, pp. 283-308 (speech pronounced at the Constitutional Court on June 14, 1957).

Conciliar *aggiornamento*, which had overcome the intransigent approach based on the clear preeminence of the “rights of Truth”.²³⁹

The affinities with the new universalist paradigm, however, do not end here: namely, we may extrapolate two major themes from Moro’s speeches and writings, in particular in his capacity as Italy’s foreign minister (1969-1972 and 1973-1974): the role of Europe in the international system, and the concept of international social justice.²⁴⁰ The Old Continent, according to the Italian politician, should become a center of gravity of the new international community, acting as a mediator in the West/East conflict, and a promoter of development on the North/South line: we are already very familiar with this picture, which at least in theory was substantially shared by the whole party and by European Christian Democracy. Moro was one of its main Italian architects, as we may infer from an analysis of his statements on this matter.²⁴¹ If Europe’s action on the horizontal axis should be one of mediation, so as to plant the seeds to move past the adversarial Bipolarism – the CSCE was understood as a milestone in this respect²⁴² – its role on the new frontier of international tensions, represented by the divide between industrialized and developing countries, was even more important. The European Community had a specific task to execute: “Europe, united in new and sound structures, has to promote a fruitful collaboration with and among all the Mediterranean countries, which [i.e. the collaboration] rearranges their economic and social systems, and brings back this sea to its natural function as crossroads among different

²³⁹ See Menozzi, *Chiesa e diritti umani*, pp. 217-18.

²⁴⁰ The problem of distinguishing between the personal views of the statesman, and the ones expressed in an official capacity has been partly solved thanks to the main source I examined for this section, that is Moro’s papers held at the Central Archives of State in Rome (hereinafter quoted as ACS, Moro). Above all, I studied Moro’s speeches as Minister of Foreign Affairs, focusing on the changes made by Moro over the drafts prepared by his assistants and by diplomatic personnel. These interventions help us trace the subjects, which were proposed or underlined by the Italian politician, thus enabling us to detect his personal view.

²⁴¹ See the speech to the Danish Foreign Minister (31/03/1971), the interview to Romanian review “Lumea” (28/1/1972), the speech to the Diplomatic Corps accredited in Rome (22/4/1971), and the intervention to the “Commissione Esteri” in the Italian Senate (January 1974), respectively in ACS, Moro, box 133, folder 77; box 24, folders 510 and 518; box 28, folder 619. In all these occasions, Moro presented Europe as an open and inclusive space, that thanks to its history and cultural tradition could serve as the world’s center of balance. About Moro’s discourse on Europe see Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni, *Il disegno europeo di Aldo Moro*, in Alfonsi (ed.), *Aldo Moro e la dimensione internazionale*, pp. 96-115.

²⁴² See the speech to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Stefan Olszowski (8/11/1973) and the address at the signature of Helsinki’s Final Act (30/4/1975), respectively in ACS, Moro, box 156, folder 17, and Moro, *Scritti e discorsi*, vol. VI, pp. 3346-3350.

continents".²⁴³ Nations acting alone had few opportunities to make an impact on an increasingly interconnected world, in which only larger, more integrated and politically organized communities could offer a viable contribution to a peaceful development of international relations. This passage contains the core of the Christian democratic culture of foreign policy that we have already described in general terms.

The goals of the European mission were also significantly recalibrated: peace and cooperation among peoples could only be achieved by repairing the imbalance between the poles of the international community. The presence of unbalanced socio-economic systems, unable to provide for the well-being of their citizens, was considered both a danger to the stability of the international system, and an ethically unacceptable fact; the issue of international social justice, in other words, which was one of the defining features of the Catholic idea of international community, had been clearly embraced by the Italian statesman and was becoming part of Italy's foreign policy discourse.²⁴⁴ The idea of Europe, then, worked as an essential transitional term in the cultural mediation between universalism and nationality, which continued to be the distinctive feature of the Christian democratic approach to international relations. The European community, moreover, was seen by Moro as a safety net for Italy's fragile democracy: any institutional crisis within the Italian borders could turn into a threat to the whole continent and by extension, the Western community, which had every interest in protecting its last democratic front on the Southern flank. Indeed, after the Colonels' coup in Greece (1967), and with the continuing presence of antidemocratic regimes in

²⁴³ Speech to the Ambassador of Lebanon Khalyl Abouhamad, 15/7/1971, in ACS, Moro, box 136, folder 105, my translation. The reference to the Mediterranean Sea was often broadened so as to suggest a global European role in the North/South divide: see for instance the speech to the Foreign Affairs Commission at the Chamber of Deputies, 28/2/1974, in Moro, *Scritti e discorsi*, vol. VI, p. 3135.

²⁴⁴ See the address to the Assembly of the European Communities, Strasbourg, 17/11/1971 (ACS, Moro, box 24, folder 536), the speeches to Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru, 8/7/1970 (box 129, folder 34), to Japan's Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, November 1970 (box 131, folder 56), and to Siam's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, 13/10/1971 (box 136, folder 110). In 2006, Italy's Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema, the first PCI's former member to hold such office, significantly spoke about Europe as "the best instrument to promote the country's interests", and about the role of the Old Continent in "spreading economic and social rights at international level. Broadening the area of the countries which hold such rights", the Foreign Minister added, "is one of the best guarantees of global security and development" (see Massimo D'Alema, *Un'Italia più globale*, in "La Comunità internazionale", November 2006). This is just one of the many examples that could prove how this kind of discourse has become a *tòpos* of Italy's Foreign Ministers' rhetoric, irrespective of their political allegiances.

the Iberian peninsula, an authoritarian turn in Italian politics would have undermined the institutional balance and the political architecture of Western Europe.²⁴⁵

We are already familiar with this theoretical framework, which in Moro's design took on another essential feature: the whole democratic constituency, in his view, could have converged over this approach, strengthening the base of support for Italy's international action, which in the Cold War era was an obvious factor of division. Actually, in the previously cited resolution on foreign policy of December 1977, all the major parties agreed over the core features of the country's international relations. Within the safe environment represented by Western and European communities, and especially in the United Nations, Italy should work for the easing of international tensions, for an enhanced cooperation at multilateral level, and for the advancement of human rights and socio-economic development, in particular with the goal of repairing the North/South divide. Such a statement could be considered a major achievement for the Christian democratic ruling class, since the guidelines of Italy's international relations, set up by the majority party, were now substantially acknowledged by the whole political spectrum. The country's aspiration to facilitate dialogue within the consultative and deliberative bodies of the international community – which had mostly replaced its ambitions to be recognized as an international mediator – had become a typical rhetorical argument of the Italian discourse on foreign policy up until now. More generally, the core

²⁴⁵ Moro's work as Foreign Minister, in particular, implemented the policy summed up in the previous paragraph: on the one side, he was very engaged in isolating anti-democratic regimes, namely the Colonels' Greece and Franco's Spain, blocking their inclusion in the European community. On the other side, he pushed for a stronger integration among European states not only at the institutional level, but at the political, above all, social levels: Europe, in his opinion, should have taken charge of the development of its less favoured areas (including Southern Italy), so as not to let instability and discontent fester within its borders. In a speech to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg Gaston Thorn (25/10/1971) he summed up his vision with these words: "Our thought goes to the Communities, where our efforts lead to an increasingly tighter economic and political unity of the Continent. We pursue these goals, because they match our values, but also for reasons of balance, stability, progress, in order to foster the full development of our intellectual, moral and economic resources; in order to solve problems that transcend the possibilities of single nations, to offer a new and important fact to evolving international politics. I would like to add that we imagine a peaceful, democratic Europe, fair toward the emerging countries, open to the world". See ACS, box 136, folder 106, my translation.

features of the Christian democratic culture of foreign policy were regularly employed in the “institutional” discourse on Italy's foreign policy after the end of the Cold War.²⁴⁶

Such an assertion could be problematic for our hypothesis, in favor of the distinctiveness of the Christian democratic political culture in its approach to international relations: if its constituent elements were also part of the public rhetoric of other political families, how can we speak of an original and characteristic discourse? Actually, if we abandon for a moment the “DC-centered” approach that we have adopted for most of this chapter, we may notice that all the major political cultures which emerged victorious after the Second World War in Europe – Liberal, Social-democratic, Socialist, Communist – had a strong internationalist drive, and tried to reconcile (at the level of public rhetoric) the focus on the national dimension with far-reaching hopes of a cohesive structure of the international community. Obviously, the Liberal democratic goal of a cooperative and regulated international society, respectful of citizens' rights and of States' autonomy, was very different from the Communist utopia of world peace through the construction of homogeneous social and economic systems (and from all the variations between these two schematic models).²⁴⁷ Nonetheless, all these worldviews possessed universalist features, even if their cultural sources were very different, or often irreconcilable. This is understandable, given the one basic trait they all had in common: their opposition to the dominant ideology in 1930s Europe, i.e. Nationalism.

²⁴⁶ Three recent emblematic examples, coming from personalities with very different cultural backgrounds and political affiliations, are the intervention of Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini to the Chamber of Deputies (26/1/2005), the programmatic speech of the newly appointed Prime Minister Romano Prodi (18/5/2006) and the address of Foreign Minister Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata to the Conference on “La dimensione umana della pace. Verso una cultura politica di perdono e riconciliazione” (3/7/2012). See respectively *La politica estera dell'Italia. Testi e documenti*, 2005, Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 2009, pp. 209-210; *La politica estera dell'Italia. Testi e documenti*, 2006, Roma: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 2010, pp. 199-201, and Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata, *Discorsi e interventi*, vol. II, Roma: Ministero degli Esteri, 2013, pp. 105-108.

²⁴⁷ A classical and well-written account of the history of international political thought is Torbjørn L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations theory*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, in part. pp. 133-40 for the philosophical origins of these approaches. For a nuanced in-depth examination of the ideological roots of the two major school of thoughts which influenced the formation of International Relations theories – Liberalism and Marxism, which were not only founded on Universalist elements – see the the third volume of the series edited by Andrew Linklater, *International Relations. Critical concepts in Political Science*, Routledge, 2000 (Section V: *The Liberal Peace*, and Section VI: *Marxism*).

This consideration, obviously, must not lead us to think that the various discourses were necessarily concordant. The appeal to common principles could translate into opposite political behaviors, while the possibilities to approach the compromise between universalism and nationality were multiple and diversified: we have focused on the Christian democratic case, tracing back the content of DC's discourse to one of its principal sources (Catholic culture), but other studies could take into account other political cultures, or propose a proper comparative analysis. Moreover, the developments which we hinted at – toward the agreement of the majority of the political parties about the guiding principles of Italy's international relations – must not be backdated to the period under consideration. In particular, this assumption would imply that one of the founding principles of postwar Western European democracies – the incompatibility between the government parties' and the Communists' foreign policies – was somehow called into question and possibly overcome in Italy. In fact, this was not the case, and we can return to Moro for a final consideration.

In fact, the fundamental juxtaposition between Christian democratic and Communist foreign policy (descending, obviously, from the opposite international references), remained a pillar of Moro's discourse on the international community (as it did for all the other major party representatives, especially during electoral campaigns).²⁴⁸ Insisting on a series of initiatives and themes that could also be shared by the opposition served the double and interrelated purpose of strengthening the democratic base of the State, and planting the seeds for a broader acceptance of Italy's international action, which, in the future, could lead to the establishment of a stronger idea of nation. In no scenario, however, could the Italian Communist Party share power with *Democrazia Cristiana*, because the enduring (although weakened) link with the Soviet Union precluded Togliatti's party entering the government area.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ For some examples see the addresses to the 12th and 13th Congresses, and the speeches delivered during the electoral campaign for the national elections in 1976, for instance in Padua (April 7) and Bari (May 29), respectively in *SD*, vol. V, pp. 3082-83; vol. VI p. 3475; vol. V, pp. 2898-2900, and vol. VI, pp. 3533-35.

²⁴⁹ The most qualified scholars of the Communist party have already convincingly argued that this contradiction decisively weakened the strategy of Enrico Berlinguer (PCI's political secretary from 1972 to 1984), which aimed at validating the Communist party's ambition, supported by electoral results, to participate in the Italian government. See

The party did not immediately pursue Moro's plan. His shocking death in May 1978 had the effect of a watershed in the Italian political life: new protagonists, such as Socialist leader Bettino Craxi, emerged on the scene, while the credits rolled on the phase of national solidarity, of which Moro was unanimously considered one of the main architects. During the 1980s, Anticommunism regained center stage in the Christian democratic discourse, both in domestic and foreign policy, and it was only after the end of the Cold War that the familiar mix of universalism and nationality became the natural background of any discourse on foreign policy. Clearly, we would need to investigate how this kind of rhetoric related to the actual behavior of Italian governments in the new scenario (where old ambitions of regional influence resurfaced), but at the level of discourse analysis we can state that the ideas which we encountered in DC's discourse had become the mainstream theoretical framework of Italian foreign policy, irrespective of the political coalition which held power in Parliament. For obvious reasons, this framework could not be labeled Christian democratic, much less Catholic, but it certainly had the Christian democratic culture of foreign policy among its most important cultural sources. Going back to the initial question about the distinctiveness of the DC's idea of international community, then, we might answer that it was apt to work as a bridge between diverse political cultures, functioning more as a general approach to international relations than as a cohesive ideology.²⁵⁰ Once its most ideological element – Anticommunism – had been removed, a general convergence over its basic principles could finally be achieved, even if it left unresolved the major historical problem of the connection between a rather ambitious set of ideas and guidelines, and the possibility of their actual implementation.

Silvio Pons, *L'URSS e il PCI nel sistema internazionale della guerra fredda*, and Roberto Gualtieri, *Il PCI, la DC e il "vincolo esterno"*. *Una proposta di periodizzazione*, in Roberto Gualtieri (ed.), *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991*, Roma: Carocci, 2001, respectively pp. 44-46 and p. 82. There has been much speculation, within and outside the historiographical field, about Moro's intentions toward the Communist party (since the end of the 1960s, he was often accused by the press and the right wing of his party to be too accommodating toward Berlinguer's party); his general approach, however, that here we have described as regards the discourse on foreign policy, does not seem open to many interpretations, as several scholars have already convincingly argued: see for instance Andrea Guiso, *Moro e Berlinguer. Crisi dei partiti e crisi del comunismo nell'Italia degli anni Settanta*, in Perfetti, Ungari, De Luca, Caviglia (eds.), *Aldo Moro nell'Italia contemporanea*, pp. 139-178, and Giovanni Mario Ceci, "Moro apre ai comunisti?" *Aldo Moro, la DC e il PCI (1967-1969)*, in Moro and Mezzana (eds.), *Una vita, un paese*, pp. 363-84.

²⁵⁰ This hypothesis would confirm the "flexibility" of the Christian democratic political culture, which has been underlined, among others, by Martin Conway, a distinguished scholar of European Christian Democracy, in *The Age of Christian Democracy*, in Kselman and Buttigieg (eds.), *European Christian Democracy*, pp. 59-60.

IV

The Italian Catholic World and the Idea of International Community

Il caso italiano non rappresenta la conservazione del passato, ma l'espressione di un mondo religioso immerso nella secolarizzazione, passato attraverso di essa, ma non scomparso.

Andrea Riccardi, *Il caso religioso italiano*¹

1. Introduction: an overview of the Italian case.

From the 1960s onwards, Italian Catholicism was affected by the same waves of change that were shaking up Western societies; from our standpoint, focused on the idea of international community, we have seen how the Catholic culture navigated through the beginnings of this era, which would have marked the transition between modernity and a new phase, that we are still living. The focus on the political culture of a Christian-inspired party has introduced us to the Italian context, highlighting some interesting connections between DC's culture of foreign policy and the mainstream Catholic approach to international relations. Now it is time we broadened our focus toward the wider field of the Italian Catholic world, which was more directly impacted by the developments in the Catholic discourse. In order to address this task, we need first to better define the object of our analysis, since general locutions like "Italian Catholic world" could lead to some misinterpretations. Before delving into the in-depth investigations of some specific actors, then, we will present a general profile of Italian Catholicism during the 1960s and the 1970s, illustrating the

¹ Andrea Riccardi, *Il caso religioso italiano*, in Impagliazzo (ed.), *La nazione cattolica*, p. 38.

essential features – variegated and faraway from many stereotypes, as we will have the chance to see – of its approach to the idea of international community.

1.1. Italian Catholicism under the papacy of Paul VI: from fragmentation to re-aggregation.

Let us start from matters of definition: in a Nation-State with a traditionally strong religious background, such as Italy, where Catholicism has long been embedded in the country's social, cultural and political history, making reference to a general “Catholic world” could seem dangerously all-embracing. From parishes to religious institutes, from ecclesial movements composed of laity and clergy, to Catholic-inspired organizations with a democratic internal structure but linked to the hierarchy via an ecclesiastical assistant, the Catholic Church had more than one way of being present in the country's life during the period under consideration. We must also not forget that the official relations between Church and State were still regulated by the Lateran Pacts of 1929, which rebuilt the bridge between the Tiber's shores after the rupture caused by the process of nation-building in the second half of the nineteenth century.² Obviously, we will not follow the reflection on the international community of all these actors, since the task would prove unsustainably large and dispersive. First of all, we will focus the survey on the Catholic laity, since we are mostly interested in how the ideas shaped by the Catholic culture were related to the discourse of Christian-inspired organizations, linked to the Catholic Church and operating in civil society.³ That means that we will not include in the analysis the positions of the Italian clergy, from bishops to parishes and Catholic communities, nor we will concentrate on the effervescent world of

² We have already referenced, in the general Introduction, some of the best accounts to orient oneself in the landscape of Italian Catholicism in the contemporary history: see in particular Verucci, *La Chiesa cattolica in Italia dall'Unità a oggi*; Acerbi (ed.), *La Chiesa e l'Italia*, and Pollard, *Catholicism in Modern Italy*. For a focus on the second half of the twentieth century see Impagliazzo (ed.), *La nazione cattolica*, and Guasco, *Chiesa e cattolicesimo in Italia (1945-2000)*.

³ We will use therefore the phrase “Italian Catholic world” (sometimes replaced by “Italian Catholicism”) in a somewhat improper manner, since we will be referring to one of its subsets, but ultimately this lexical choice serves the purpose to underline the plurality of the subjects that we will be addressing, and their link with the same cultural background.

religious orders and institutes. There will be some exceptions to this rule, as we will explain in a few pages, but only because the “men of the cloth” who we will encounter during our voyage had a specific and influential role for some movements or areas of Catholic laity. Moreover, we will be forced to make constant reference to the positions of the Italian hierarchy, whose relations with the various Catholic lay actors were subjected to tensions and changes in the post-conciliar era, but will nonetheless remain pivotal and impossible to elude. The role of the Roman Church in Italy, as many scholars have underlined, is stronger than in any other European country, for obvious historical reasons, and needs to be addressed by any study about the role of the Catholic culture in the Italian context.⁴ Therefore, we will try to outline some major general trends concerning the relationship between Church and laity in this introductory section, before going back to the criteria employed to choose our protagonists, and start the actual analysis of their discourse.

THE PREMISES: FROM THE END OF THE WAR UNTIL THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL

Until approximately the end of Pius's pontificate, as we mentioned in Chapter II, the Italian Catholic world was characterized by a distinctly pillarized structure, functional to the pope's militant design of a Christian restoration of Italian society, with a strong Anticommunist drive. To some extent, the building of a cohesive, “separate” milieu based on the commonality of faith was not new for the Italian context: on the contrary, it was rooted in the “culture wars” of the second half of the nineteenth century, when the opposition between the Church and the liberal State led to the consolidation of a well-organized Catholic world, which also maintained its strong organizational structure in very different political conditions, first under Fascism and then in the democratic Republican State.⁵ The influence of the pope and the Roman Curia on the orientation of

⁴ See for all Jean-Dominique Durand, *Nell'orizzonte europeo*, in Impagliazzo (ed.), *La nazione cattolica*, pp. 519-34, and Arnaldo Nesti, *Le catholicisme italien contemporain. Schéma pour une analyse*, in “Sociologie et sociétés”, issue 2, 1990, pp. 165-82.

⁵ The application of the category of “culture war” to the Italian context is actually a very much debated historiographical topic, even if the existence of a juxtaposition between Catholicism and secular ideologies is not questionable: in English, see two different approaches – the first one more attentive to the peculiarities of Italy's context, the second more prone to underlining the commonalities with other European experiences – in Martin Pappenheim, *Roma o morte: culture wars in Italy*, in Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (eds.), *Culture Wars*.

this powerful apparatus cannot be underestimated; let us recall that at the end of the 1940s in Italy there were thousands of Catholic schools, hospitals and charitable initiatives, and about 10% of the total population was enrolled in Catholic associational networks, starting with Catholic Action, which represented the stronghold of the Catholic pillar.⁶ The Italian Episcopal Conference (*Conferenza Episcopale Italiana*, CEI) was officially established only after the Second Vatican Council, and it is the sole bishops Conference for which the pope, as Primate, appoints the President and Secretary-General; during the 1940s and the 1950s, and even more so in the previous period, the pontiff and the Curia exerted a direct influence in the matters regarding Italian Catholicism, which was a constant preoccupation in particular for Pius XII.⁷ John XXIII and the Council, not surprisingly, changed the scenario. Roncalli, following the pastoral signature that he wished to give to his papacy, became much less involved than his predecessor in Italian politics. His example, however, was not immediately followed up by Italian bishops, whose approach was still largely consistent with the militant attitude expressed during Pius's pontificate, and who gained more autonomy in handling the organization of Italian Catholicism.⁸ In any case, the Second Vatican Council had an even greater impact on changing the relationship between lay movements and the ecclesial institution, in favor of a greater responsibility and protagonism of the former in the “animation of the temporal sphere”.

These two major trends – growth of importance of bishops, and promotion of a more active role of the laity – were supervised by the person probably most fit for the job, the new pope Paul VI.

Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 202-26, and Manuel Borutta, *Anti-Catholicism and the Culture War in Risorgimento Italy*, in Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall (eds.), *The Risorgimento Revisited. Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, pp. 191-213.

⁶ This is also “lexically” proved by the fact that in Italy the term “Church” has often been used as an abbreviation for Italian national Roman Catholicism: Alberto Melloni, *The politics of the “Church” in the Italy of Pope Wojtyla*, in “Journal of Modern Italian Studies”, issue 1, 2007, p. 61.

⁷ See Andrea Riccardi, *La conferenza episcopale italiana negli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta*, in Giuseppe Alberigo *et al.*, *Chiese italiane e concilio. Esperienze pastorali nella chiesa italiana da Pio XII a Paolo VI*, Genova: Marietti, 1988, pp. 35-59, and Francesco Sportelli, *La Conferenza Episcopale Italiana 1952-1972*, Galatina: Congedo Editore, 1994.

⁸ See Giuseppe Alberigo, *La Chiesa italiana tra Pio XII e Paolo VI*, in ID. *et al.*, *Chiese italiane e concilio*, pp. 26-30, and Bartolo Gariglio, *I vescovi*, in Impagliazzo (ed.), *La nazione cattolica*, pp. 92-96. The same experience of the Council marked an important step forward in the history of the Italian Episcopal Conference, because the need for a deeper exploration of the Council's agenda demanded frequent gatherings of the episcopal corps, which often followed lines of nationality.

Montini probably knew the landscape of the Italian Catholic world, which he had largely contributed to shaping as Substitute Secretary of State for Ordinary Affairs (1937-1954), better than any other person in the Vatican. His role in the birth and development of many Catholic laity organizations, as well as his cultural influence on an entire generation of Catholic intellectuals, will often resurface, like un underground river, during this chapter, and can generally be related to his well-known cultural predisposition for the empowerment of the laity, deriving from the profound commitment to the theory of separation of planes, that we saw at work at the moment of DC's birth. Once elected pope, Montini also showed a significant openness to the growth of the relevance and power of the bishops in the Church's government.⁹ At the same time, this attitude was tempered by a profound belief in the role of authority and in the hierarchical structure of the Church: we have followed his efforts to find a delicate balance between these two poles from our special observatory, focused on the discourse on the international community.

THE POST-CONCILIAR PHASE

Certainly, this supervision proved to not be a simple task. In Italy and in other countries, the phase opened by the end of the Council came to be one of the most dynamic in the history of the Catholic Church.¹⁰ The debates about the meaning and the periodization of this era – two concepts that are often more linked than one might suspect – are as open in the Italian literature as they are in the international body we briefly mentioned in the general Introduction. Following the interpretation, now dated, but still valid in its essence, proposed by Italian Church historian Guido Verucci two decades ago, however, we can outline a major general trend which characterized the parabola of Italian Catholicism from the end of the Vatican Council to the end of Paul's pontificate: a transition

⁹ We mentioned this aspect in the first chapter, when dealing with the elaboration of the Synod of Bishops during the 1970s; for some notes on the relationship of pope Paul VI with Italian bishops see Andrea Riccardi, *Vescovi d'Italia. Storie e profile del Novecento*, Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni san Paolo, 2000, pp. 46-60.

¹⁰ The literature on this phase is immense and still growing; for a point of view focused on the dynamics of Catholicism – the “reception of the Council” – a good starting point is given by the collection of essays of Gilles Routhier, *Vatican II - Herméneutique et réception*, Montréal: Fides, 2006, and by the book edited by James Heft, *After Vatican II: Trajectories and Hermeneutics*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012, as well as the already quoted Fagioli, *Vatican II. The Battle for Meaning*.

from a situation of division and crisis to a new condition – new being the operative word, because the protagonists of 1980s Catholicism were very different from those of the 1950s – characterized by a renewed unity of purpose.¹¹ Verucci labeled this process a passage from “diaspora” – employing a word used by many Italian Catholics to describe their own condition within the ecclesial community – to “re-aggregation”; to use a more neutral concept, we could also speak of a passage from “fragmentation” to “re-aggregation”. Both phases, we would argue, were influenced by the cultural revolution of the 1960s, even if it was perceived and implemented in fairly different ways.

The first phase (fragmentation, or “diaspora”) was most directly affected by the *Zeitgeist* of the 1960s, which consisted, among other things, of a new sense of empowerment of the individual, who felt enabled to question established authorities and traditional ways of thinking and acting, both in private life and in the public sphere. In the Italian Catholic world, this attitude was most spectacularly epitomized by a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has been generally comprised under the umbrella category of *dissenso cattolico* (Catholic dissent).¹² The term “dissent” points toward one of the cross-factors of the European cultural revolution, which was the challenge to the authority of traditional institutions, namely the Catholic Church. Much has been written about the role of Marxism in this process, and in particular in nourishing the anti-institutional and revolutionary culture of the protests of 1968: Marxism was the dominant idea of the age, “the secular religion of its epoch”,¹³ and we will see how it was a constant term of comparison for the Catholic culture. At the same time, though, we have to keep in mind two major

¹¹ Guido Verucci, *La Chiesa postconciliare*, p. 347 ff., and ID., *La Chiesa cattolica in Italia dall'Unità a oggi*, p. 98. The problems about the periodization of this phase have been underlined by Alberto Melloni, *Gli anni Settanta della Chiesa cattolica. La complessità nella ricezione del Concilio*, in Lussana and Maramao (eds.), *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta*, vol. II, pp. 201-29.

¹² For an introduction to the first scientific studies on Catholic dissent see Guido Verucci, *Il dissenso cattolico in Italia*, in “Studi storici”, issue 1, 2002, pp. 215-33. An updated reflection on the literature is in Alessandro Santagata, *Una rassegna storiografica sul dissenso cattolico in Italia*, in “Cristianesimo nella storia”, 2010, pp. 207-41. Unfortunately, a study which plans to contextualize the experience of Catholic dissent in its European (but also extra-European) context, has yet to be written. See however Denis Pelletier, *La crise catholique. Religion, société, politique en France (1965-1978)*, Paris: Payot, 2002, for a good study of the same period in the French context, and Bart Latré, *Strijd & inkeer. De kerk en maatschappijkritische beweging in Vlaanderen, 1958-1990*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011, chapter II, for a focus on the Flanders area.

¹³ Judt, *Postwar*, p. 201.

historical facts: on the one hand, 1968 was not the igniter of the cultural revolution, but rather an accelerator – especially active on the political side – of long-term trends that changed the mentality of European societies during the 1960s.¹⁴ On the other hand, Catholic culture participated in this historical change of climate with its own cultural instruments; in particular, the whole parabola of the Catholic dissent can be comprised in what Gerd Rainer Horn has suggested we call a “second wave of European Left (or ‘progressive’) Catholicism”, which like its predecessor two decades earlier (immediately following the war) fostered “a contestation of traditional concepts and attitudes in the realm of politics, society and pastoral concerns”, committing in particular to the struggle for social justice, and therefore obviously opening a line of dialogue with the secular ideology that most clearly advocated it.¹⁵ In Italy the politicization of this second wave was particularly accentuated, although not all-embracing as some reconstructions seem to suggest, so much so that it led many leaders of that time to choose direct political engagement in Leftist movements and parties.¹⁶ However, it would be impossible to address this phenomenon properly by only citing the influence of “exogenous” factors, without making reference to the more recent events in the history of the Church, in particular to the decisive impact of the Second Vatican Council.¹⁷ The historian of

¹⁴ Arthur Marwick, “1968” and the Cultural Revolution of the Long Sixties (c. 1958 – c. 1974), in Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraig Kenney (eds.), *Transnational Moments of Change. Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, pp. 91-92.

¹⁵ As well as the already cited *Western European Liberation Theology*, pp. 291-92, see especially *Les chrétientés catholiques à l'épreuve des sixties et des seventies*, in Travnouez (dir.), *La décomposition des chrétientés occidentales 1950-2010*, pp. 23-35. The quotation is taken from the *Introduction* of Emmanuel Gerard and Gerd-Rainer Horn to ID., *Left Catholicism, 1943–1955*, p. 7.

¹⁶ The “politicization” factor – obviously, in this context this category is used to indicate a “turn to the Left” in many sectors of Italian Catholicism, but political engagement was not new for Italian Catholics, that were normally coopted in the ranks of *Democrazia Cristiana* – has been especially highlighted by a direct witness of that milieu, Catholic intellectual Mario Cuminetti, in one of the first (and still valid) assessments of the Catholic dissent: see Mario Cuminetti, *Il dissenso cattolico in Italia, 1965-1980*, Milano: Rizzoli, 1983 (Cuminetti also refers to the journey of the Italian Catholic dissent with the term “diaspora”). About the engagement of Italian Catholics in Left movements see Daniela Saresella, *Cattolici a sinistra. Dal modernismo ai giorni nostri*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2011, pp. 148-59. The same author, in the essay *Il “dissenso” cattolico*, p. 284, states (without quoting the source) that in 1968 alone, 10% of the faithful abandoned their engagement in the Catholic world in favor of an active militancy in Left movements. More generally, the “dialogue between Catholics and Communists”, which implied a confrontation between the Catholic and the Marxist worldviews, animated the Italian cultural debate between the 1960s and the 1970s: see for a contextualization Daniela Saresella, *The dialogue between Catholics and Communists in 1960s Italy*, in “Journal of History of Ideas”, issue 3, 2014, pp. 493-512; and also Giambattista Scirè, *La democrazia alla prova. Cattolici e laici nell'Italia repubblicana degli anni cinquanta e sessanta*, Roma: Carocci, 2005, in part. pp. 179-89. We will mention again this process in paragraph 3.1.

¹⁷ The necessity to study the phenomenon of Catholic dissent in continuity with the outcomes of the Council has been generally accepted by all the recent handbooks on the history of the Catholic Church in Italy: see the considerations in

Catholicism, then, should analyze this complex and tumultuous era using a balanced approach, verifying case by case the peculiar “reception” of the general cultural revolution in the Catholic milieu, taking into account both external influences and internal developments.

Who were the protagonists of this period, who rose to prominence on the Italian stage? The literature is not unanimous on this subject, given the ambiguous nature of the category of dissent; the attention of observers has often been drawn to a composite galaxy of small groups, typically organized in the form of base (grass roots) communities, characterized by the co-presence of laity and clergy and operating outside parochial structures (modeled after the Latin American experiments), which enriched the landscape of Italian Catholicism especially between the late 1960s and early 1970s.¹⁸ These communities operated on a local scale, on average for a short period of time before their spontaneous or forced dissolution, but their stances were “broadcast” at national level by a series of magazines – “Il Regno”, “Com”, “Nuovi Tempi”, “Questitalia”, “Testimonianze” and others – which became the heralds of an alternative interpretation and implementation of the Christian message to the official version of the Roman Church.¹⁹ We will follow the evolution of one of these magazines (“Testimonianze”), and in particular of its main cultural animator, Piarist Father Ernesto Balducci (1922-1992), in the second part of the chapter, developing further considerations on the subject. In spite of the great number of publications

Santagata, *Una rassegna storiografica sul dissenso cattolico in Italia*, pp. 228-30. See also the contributions of Saresella, *Il “dissenso” cattolico*, and Marco Impagliazzo, *Il dissenso cattolico e le minoranze religiose*, in Lussana and Maramao (eds.), *L’Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta*, vol. II, pp. 231-51.

¹⁸ Within the extensive literature which has addressed this subject, see for some documentation Roberto Sciubba and Rossana Sciubba Pace (eds.), *Le comunità di base in Italia*, Roma: Coines, 1976. The theological review “Concilium” published in 1975 a monographic issue on European and world base communities, that can serve as basis for a comparative approach: see *Comunità di base come tema di teologia pratica*, in “Concilium”, issue 4, 1975. More recently, see the reconstruction of the experience of base communities in the last 40 years in Marco Campli and Marcello Vigli, *Coltivare speranza: una chiesa altra per un altro mondo possibile*, Pescara: Tracce, 2009. For a comparison with the Spanish context see Jesús Gil García, *La teología de las Comunidades Cristianas Populares*, Saragoza: Libros Certeza, 2007.

¹⁹ For an in-depth investigation of this milieu, the essential reference is the already cited Saresella, *Dal Concilio alla contestazione*; of the same author, see the broader contextualization proposed in *Le riviste del secondo dopoguerra*, in Alberto Melloni (scientific coordinator), *Cristiani d’Italia. Chiese, Società, Stato*, Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2011, pp. 1355-67. A general historical overview of the Catholic press in Italy has been provided by Angelo Majo, *La stampa cattolica in Italia. Storia e documentazione*, Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1992. See also, for some notes on the “reviews of Catholic dissent”, Carmelo Adagio, *Le riviste del dissenso cattolico*, in “Parolechiave”, issue 18, 1998, pp. 119-138. As well as the periodical press, an important role was played by Catholic publishing houses like “Queriniana” in Brescia, which promoted the dissemination of the most progressive reflections on European and, above all, Latin American theology: see Lucia Ceci, *L’editoria cattolica nel postconcilio. Il caso della Queriniana*, in “Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi”, 1996, pp. 393-431.

dedicated to it, though, these developments involved a small minority of the Italian Catholic world: in the mid-1970s for instance, there were 267 base communities, usually composed of a few dozen people, which is not an exceptional number when compared to the hundreds of thousands of people still involved in the traditional Catholic laity organizations.²⁰

What is more interesting, instead, is that even many of these traditional organizations underwent a process of radicalization, which sometimes put them at the front lines of open contestation of the Church's authority. This trajectory was particularly accentuated in the case of the *Associazioni Cristiane dei Lavoratori Italiani* (ACLI), an association active in the labor field that we will encounter in a few pages, so much so that its history has often been analyzed in the context of the Catholic dissent.²¹ University students followed a similar path, although their oldest and most significant association, the *Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana* (FUCI), did not reach ACLI's radical highpoints. The Catholic Boy and Girl Scouts organizations also experienced a significant turn, from the conservative model of the 1950s to the acceptance of some issues of the 1968 culture, which caused some frictions with the Catholic hierarchy.²² Echoes of the protest reached a tradition-oriented movement like *Pax Christi*, which will be another subject of our investigation. In our opinion, all of these examples can be connected to the general history of the second wave of European Left Catholicism (although with various degrees of intensity, that only a detailed analysis could illuminate). Therefore they were not an Italian peculiarity, but found significant correspondences at European level: a proper comparative approach, in the future, could better scrutinize and confirm or confute this hypothesis.²³

²⁰ Franco Garelli, *La Chiesa in Italia. Struttura ecclesiale e mondi cattolici*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007, p. 35.

²¹ See for instance Cuminetti, *Il dissenso cattolico in Italia*, pp. 173-78.

²² See Mario Sica, *Storia dello scautismo in Italia*, Scandicci: La nuova Italia, 2006⁴ (1st edition 1973), in part. pp. 415-52. In a comparative perspective, see Gérard Cholvy and Marie-Thérèse Cheroutre (coord.), *Le scoutisme. Quel type d'hommes et quel type de femmes? Quel type de chrétiens?*, Paris: Cerf, 1994.

²³ For further considerations on the subject we defer to the contributions of Gerd-Rainer Horn, *Left Catholicism in Western Europe*, and *Les chrétientés catholiques à l'épreuve des sixties et des seventies*.

Any outline of the positions of the Italian Catholic laity would be extremely incomplete without taking into account its oldest and dominant organization, *Azione Cattolica*.²⁴ In a nutshell, we may argue that Catholic Action was not involved (at least, not with the depth of the abovementioned associations) in the “turn to the Left” which affected a consistent part of the Italian Catholic world, but even its moderate course led to some problems with the Church at the beginning of the 1970s. Indeed, Catholic Action tried to take the middle path in 1968, refusing to adhere to the radical, anti-institutional stance of many Catholics and holding an open dialogue with the student movement and society at large.²⁵ Instead of taking the path of political engagement, the leaders of the most representative Catholic organization chose to sever their ties with politics, opting for a “religious choice” and withholding their official support to Christian Democracy (every member was free to behave in autonomy in the voting booth). Italian bishops did not accept this choice lightly, in a period that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, saw a steady growth of the Communist party in electoral terms.²⁶ Moreover, the “moderate” course undertaken by Catholic Action was not rewarded by a boost in the number of members: on the contrary, in the first post-conciliar decade the association experienced a drastic decrease in membership, which affected all the traditional organizations of the Catholic laity, from more than three million to less than one million.²⁷

²⁴ Catholic Action was the organization *par excellence* of the Catholic laity in Italy: based in dioceses and parishes, under the strict control of the hierarchy, throughout the twentieth century it had been the most important instrument for the Catholic Church’s efforts to exert an influence on the Italian society. During the 1950s, in particular, its various sections (men, women and youth) and branches (like the young Christian workers) – although the Italian Catholic Action followed a more centralized model than the specialized Catholic Action of the Franco-Belgian area – represented the core of the Catholic pillar: see the general accounts of the association’s history written by Guido Formigoni, *L’Azione Cattolica Italiana*, Milano: Àncora, 1988, and Mario Casella, *L’Azione Cattolica del Novecento. Aspetti, momenti, interpretazioni, personaggi*, Roma: AVE, 2003, and the collection of essays edited by Ernesto Preziosi, *Storia dell’Azione Cattolica. La presenza nella Chiesa e nella società italiana*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008.

²⁵ Massimo Fagioli, *The New Elites of Italian Catholicism: 1968 and the New Catholic Movements*, in “The Catholic Historical Review”, issue 1, 2012, p. 24. Fagioli’s contribution provides an interesting overview of five representative Italian Catholic laity organizations, linking their evolution to the impact of the Second Vatican council and to the 1968 protests, as well as to the Italian social and political context.

²⁶ For a focus on the postconciliar phase see Danilo Veneruso, *L’Azione Cattolica*, in Impagliazzo (ed.), *La nazione cattolica*, pp. 237-36, and above all Vittorio de Marco, *Storia dell’Azione Cattolica negli anni Settanta*, Roma: Città Nuova, 2007.

²⁷ See the figures in De Marco, *Storia dell’Azione Cattolica negli anni Settanta*.

The “diaspora” or fragmentation phase lasted until the mid-1970s. Obviously, there are no fixed dates that mark the beginning and the end of multifaceted trends, but we can point out two fundamental episodes to give an idea of the change of climate: the referendum on divorce in 1974 and the Conference on “Evangelization and Human Promotion” held by CEI in 1976. *En passant*, in the chapter about Christian Democracy, we touched on the subject of the divorce referendum, underlining its importance for Italian social history.²⁸ Actually, the maximum impact was felt by the Italian Catholic world. Most of the organizations quoted above did not respond, or responded reluctantly, to the bishops' call to repeal the law (this was the case for instance ACLI and FUCI); even Catholic Action did not take a firm stand, leaving the decision to the members' own consciences. The groups of Catholic dissent (or at least those that were still active) became the most committed advocates of the law, appealing to the principle of non-interference of the Church in State matters. This was probably the most divisive moment for the ranks of the Catholic world, but first and foremost, in the eyes of the historian, it illuminated the crisis of a top-down model of relations between Church and laity, based on the mobilization of the “Catholic pillar” from the ecclesial authority, and of a defensive attitude toward the secularization trends, aimed at safeguarding the “monopolistic rents” in the Italian society. The cultural revolution of the 1960s and the Second Vatican Council had fueled a process of empowerment and becoming autonomous of the Catholic laity, which the Church seemed unable to guide.

TOWARD A NEW ERA: RE-AGGREGATION AROUND THE CHURCH AND NEW ECCLESIAL MOVEMENTS

The ecclesiastical response to such a sea change involved the acknowledgment of the state of crisis of Catholicism in Italy, and the beginning of a delicate process of re-composition of the Catholic

²⁸ Divorce was introduced in Italy with the law “Fortuna-Baslini” in 1970; immediately afterwards, a national Committee to promote the referendum for its abrogation – as allowed by the Italian Constitution – was established, with the explicit support of the Italian hierarchy (and the participation of many Catholic intellectuals, among them Giorgio La Pira). The vote, after many postponements and failed efforts of parliamentary mediation, was cast on May 12, 1974; there was a massive turnout (87.7%), and the “No” won by 59% to 41%. The best historical reconstruction on the subject is the already cited Scirè, *Il divorzio in Italia*. In English see Mark Seymour, *Debating divorce in Italy: marriage and the making of modern Italians, 1860 – 1974*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 (pp. 189-222 for the last stages), who reads the history of marriage legislation in Italy as a lens to interpret Italy's twisting path toward modernization, greatly influenced by State-Church relationship and by the role of social and political Catholicism.

area. A milestone in this path was the 1976 Conference on “Evangelization and Human Promotion”, in which all the “institutional” organizations of the Catholic laity were involved, with the exclusion, then, of the groups of dissent, which in any case had generally reached the end of their historical parabola. Italian bishops faced the ongoing Italian religious crisis, dramatically epitomized by the failure of the referendum, implicitly declaring the peninsula a *pays du mission* in need of a new evangelization.²⁹ In this respect, a new and more proactive role of the Catholic laity was encouraged (from defensive to offensive); social engagement and faith commitment became the key words to define the mission of the faithful in society, guided by the principles of the Catholic doctrine imparted by the authority: in other words, the historical outcomes of the 1960s were acknowledged and not opposed, but from the point of view of the Italian hierarchy, they could only be properly enjoyed by the laity under the guidance of the Magisterium. The season which started with the 1976 Conference – once again, the date must not be understood as a watershed, but rather as a symbolic moment in a slow and complex change, whose fruits would not until John Paul’s pontificate³⁰ witnessed the transition from a “turn to the Left” to a “return to the Church”, and to Christian identity, to use a slogan that catches the most defining trend characterizing the Italian Catholic world. Obviously, a slogan does not encompass the complex dynamics that characterized this new season, but it serves the purpose of highlighting a transition, of which we will only glimpse the warning signs and that will come into full effect after the loose *terminus ad quem* of our investigation. The traditional organizations of the Catholic laity will not be the pioneers of this new era; on the contrary, the role of protagonist was taken by the so-called “new ecclesial movements”,

²⁹ See Verucci, *La Chiesa postconciliare*, pp. 371-82, and for some notes on the preparation of the Conference, Luca Lecis, *Il Convegno ecclesiastico “Evangelizzazione e Promozione Umana”*. *La risposta della Chiesa alla società che cambia*, in “Theologica & Historica. Annali della Pontificia Facoltà Teologica della Sardegna”, 2012, pp. 49-68. The role of Mgr. Enrico Bartoletti (1916-1976), CEI’s secretary since 1973, in the new course undertaken by the Italian Bishops Conference, has been analyzed by Massimo Faggioli, *Il modello Bartoletti nell’Italia mancata*, in Melloni (ed.), *Cristiani d’Italia*, pp. 317-30. For the figures and a description of the Italian “religious crisis” see Garelli, *La Chiesa in Italia*, pp. 32-41, and Pollard, *Catholicism in Modern Italy*, pp. 144-47. For a comparison with other European experiences, at national or regional level, see the case studies provided in Travnouez (dir.), *La décomposition des chrétientés occidentales 1950-2010*, with related bibliography.

³⁰ John Pollard, for instance, proposes other dates – 1981 (referendum on abortion), 1984 (revision of the Concordat), then opting for 1978 (Paul’s death, election of a non-Italian pope, but also Moro’s murder) to indicate the beginning of a new phase for Italian Catholicism: see Pollard, *Catholicism in Modern Italy*, pp. 152-53.

on which we will spend a few final words to conclude this brief tour in the land of Italian Catholicism.

In order to understand this phenomenon properly, the reader should actually take into account a much broader context, given by the beginning (in the 1960s and 1970s) of an extraordinary period of religious – and secular – experimentation in Western societies. Sociologists have devised a category – straightforwardly named “new religious movements” – to define a typical outcome of this trend, which did not interest solely the West, but here represented a somewhat unexpected reaction to an apparently irreversible secularization pattern.³¹ The Catholic milieu participated in this process with a peculiar trajectory, which led to the flourishing of a series of “new ecclesial (or “Catholic”) movements”, which were usually characterized by a particular charisma, a charismatic founder, a predominantly lay membership, a radical commitment to the Gospel, a specific focus and commitment to bringing its own emphasis or understanding into the life of the Church.³² The genesis of these movements – from International Catholic Charismatic Renewal Services to the *Comunità di Sant’Egidio*, from the Neocathecumenal Way to *Comunione e Liberazione* – has to be read in continuity with the outcomes of the Second Vatican Council, which, once again, encouraged the engagement of the faithful in society, and more generally fostered enthusiasm and desires of renewal in the Catholic community.³³ At the same time, their relationship to the legacy of that crucial event was extremely differentiated, as notoriously differentiated as the interpretation of the Council’s deliberations. They would have become among the most active protagonists of the most

³¹ Within the immense bibliography on the subject, see the systematizations offered by Elisabeth Arweck and Peter B. Clarke, *New religious movements in Western Europe: an annotated bibliography*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997; David G. Bromley, *Teaching new religious movements*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, and Olav Hammer and Mikael Rothstein, *The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. The category utilized by researchers is consciously loose and inclusive, given the extreme diversity of the cases taken into account, which had in common a few general features like the connection to already established religious traditions, the tendency to create new contexts for traditional beliefs and practices, or the presence of a charismatic leader.

³² The definition is taken from Charles Whitehead, *The Role of the Ecclesial Movements and the New Communities in the Life of the Church*, in Michael A. Hayes (ed.), *New Religious Movements in the Catholic Church*, New York: St. Mary’s College, 2005, p. 18. As well as the book edited by Hayes, see Massimo Faggioli, *Council Vatican II between Documents and Spirit: The Case of the “New Catholic Movements”*, in James Heft (ed.), *After Vatican II*, pp. 1-22.

³³ For an analysis focused on American Catholicism, which deals with the complex relationship between change and tradition, and between hierarchy and laity after the Council, see Andrew Greeley, *The Catholic Revolution. New Wine, Old Wineskins, and the Second Vatican Council*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004.

recent phase of contemporary Catholicism, presented with the challenge to interpret the role of faith in the epoch of advanced modernity.³⁴

At least three meaningful examples of this typology were founded in Italy: the Focolare movement, Sant'Egidio Community and *Comunione e Liberazione*. Actually, the Focolare ("hearth") movement had a previous history, since it was founded in 1943 as a movement of Christian renewal, around the charismatic figure of Italian lay Catholic Chiara Lubich (1920-2008).³⁵ Its worldwide expansion, however, begun in the 1960s, after its first recognition by the Vatican (1962): in a few years, the Focolare movement spread to dozens of countries (first in Europe and North and South America, then in Asia), broadening its scope from assisting the poor to promoting a "spirituality of unity", meaning a commitment to ecumenical dialogue, communion in the Church and brotherhood among all peoples, which the faithful would experience in their own lives, in communion with others and always in fidelity to the Roman Church and the pope.³⁶ Sant'Egidio Community, on the other hand, started out in 1968 as a community devoted to charitable projects in the poor suburbs of Rome (it was founded by a group of high school students led by Andrea Riccardi, currently a prominent Church historian and former Italian Minister), and since the beginning of the 1980s has become an international non-profit organization engaged in peace building and conflict mediation.³⁷ *Comunione e Liberazione* ("Communion and Liberation") had yet another trajectory (just to confirm the heterogeneity of the cases comprised under the category of "new ecclesial movements" –, that we will follow in detail in paragraph 3.2. In this context, suffice it to say that the movement founded by Father Luigi Giussani (1922-2005) burst

³⁴ As argued in the Introduction, the analysis of this phase lies beyond the scope of the present work. For an introduction, we defer to the work of Staf Hellemans, in particular *Tracking the New Shape of the Catholic Church in the West*, in ID. and Wissink (eds.), *Towards a New Catholic Church in Advanced Modernity* pp. 19-50.

³⁵ Aside from the numerous apologetic accounts written by Focolare's members, see some notes on the history and structure of the movement, as well as on its founder, in Michael L. Coulter, Richard S. Myers and Joseph A. Varacalli (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social Science and Social Policy*, vol. III (Supplement), Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012, pp. 182-85.

³⁶ Chiara Lubich's conception of spirituality is explained in Chiara Lubich, *Unity and Jesus Crucified and Forsaken. Foundation of a Spirituality of Communion*, in "The Ecumenical Review", issue 1, 2003, pp. 87-95.

³⁷ See Hanspeter Oschwald, *Bibel, Mystik und Politik. Die Gemeinschaft Sant'Egidio*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1996, and the dialogue between Andrea Riccardi and French Church historians Jean-Dominique Durand and Régis Ladous, translated into Italian, English, Spanish and German and originally published in French under the title *Sant'Egidio, Rome et le monde. Entretiens avec Jean-Dominique Durand et Régis Ladous*, Paris: Beauchesne, 1996.

onto the national scene on the occasion of the divorce referendum as one of the most intransigent champions of the Church's position, and was later involved in CEI's Conference, becoming the undisputed rising star of Italian Catholicism.

1.2. The idea of international community. Different receptions of a “cultural revolution”.

After having presented the concept, and roughly described the trends defining the “Italian Catholic world”, we still need to answer to one crucial methodological question: why did we choose to focus on determinate actors, and not on others? What were the criteria supporting this choice, which was necessary in order to avoid a dispersive and unfocused overview? Obviously, it has something to do with the subject of our analysis, that is the discourse on the idea of international community.

GENERAL TRENDS: NEW UNIVERSALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE

Not all the actors mentioned earlier were interested in the theoretical reflection on the status and perspectives of the relations among peoples and nations at international level. More precisely, as a brief survey of the publications and initiatives ascribable to the majority of the Italian Catholic world shows, the idea of international community does not present traits of particular originality with respect to the mainstream, institutional view that we analyzed through the category of New Universalism. For instance, the periodicals of *Azione Cattolica* – “Iniziativa”, “Segno nel mondo”, “Il nuovo impegno”, “Quaderni di pastorale giovanile” – were not especially internationally oriented, since they were mostly focused on pastoral problems and on the specific situation of the Catholic laity in Italy.³⁸ In this respect, the most interesting publication is “Orientamenti sociali”, a periodical published by the *Istituto Cattolico di Attività Sociale* and linked to the General

³⁸ I consulted the periodical press of *Azione Cattolica* during research at the “Istituto per la storia dell'Azione cattolica e del movimento cattolico in Italia Paolo VI”, in Rome, which also holds the archive of the various sections and branches of Italian Catholic Action. Unfortunately, most of the archives only extend to 1970.

Presidency of Catholic Action. In particular between the late 1960s and early 1970s – a period that, as will be made abundantly clear in the course of the chapter, saw an increase of attention of the Italian Catholic world toward the international dimension – “Orientamenti sociali” hosted several articles expressing a clear-cut universalist approach to the idea of international community.³⁹

More generally, the cornerstones of New Universalism – construction of peace through dialogue, advancement of human rights and commitment to international social justice – became the official compass for many sectors of the Italian Catholic laity, which went through an unprecedented phase of international engagement during the 1960s and the 1970s.⁴⁰ The main features of this commitment have already been underlined by the literature: accentuated “Third-worldism”, which means a special emphasis on the situation and the perspectives of Third World countries, a more or less radical critique of the superpowers' foreign policies, with a particular insistence on the dangers posed by the arms race and by local conflicts which stemmed from their aggressive behavior (the Vietnam war was the paradigmatic case). These were all subjects that brought together large parts of the Italian Catholic world, both on the institutional and non-institutional side.⁴¹ If we were to highlight a single issue that combined these features and defined the social engagement on international matters of Italian Catholics in the post-conciliar period, we

³⁹ See for instance Mario Puccinelli, *Il cristiano e la pace*, in “Orientamenti sociali”, issue 1, 1968, or the monographic number dedicated to the tenth anniversary of *Pacem in terris*’ promulgation (“Orientamenti sociali”, issues 2-3, 1973), which interpreted the concept of peace in the light of the Magisterium’s approach, as the foundation of a cooperative and just international community. At the end of 1968, instead, the attention was focused on the issue of human rights as a cardinal element of the universal common good: see the articles in “Orientamenti sociali”, issue 12, 1968. To this theme was also dedicated the 39th “Social Week” of Italian Catholics (“Diritti dell'uomo e educazione al bene comune”, 1968), that was a classical appointment of the Italian Catholic world – borrowed from its French counterpart – to discuss current events. The interruption of these initiatives at the beginning of the 1970s is another indicator of the abovementioned crisis of the Italian Catholic world: see Ernesto preziosi, *Tra storia e futuro. Cento anni di Settimane sociali dei cattolici italiani*, Roma: AVE, 2010, in part. pp. 91-111.

⁴⁰ See for a general overview Alfredo Canavero (ed.), *Al di là dei confini. Cattolici italiani e vita internazionale*, Milano: Guerini e associati, 2004. We will see in the course of the exposition how this trend was paralleled by analogous tendencies in European Catholicism.

⁴¹ As general introduction, see Daniela Saresella, *La vocazione terzomondista del mondo cattolico degli anni sessanta e il giudizio sulla politica internazionale statunitense*, in Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello (eds.), *L'antiamericanismo in Italia e in Europa nel secondo dopoguerra*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004, pp. 291-308, elaborated from EAD., *Cattolicesimo italiano e sfida americana*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2001, pp. 246-59; Luciano Tosi, *Il Terzo Mondo*, in Impagliazzo (ed.), *La nazione cattolica*, pp. 481-517; Simone Paoli, *Alle origini del terzomondismo cattolico: la visione internazionale del dissenso negli anni della contestazione (1958-1968)*, in “Ventunesimo secolo”, issue 2, 2014, pp. 95-121, and Andrea Saccomani, *La Civiltà Cattolica e la guerra del Vietnam (1965-1973)*, in Canavero (ed.), *Al di là dei confini*, pp. 77-90.

would most certainly point to the issue of international social justice, whose cultural origins we addressed in the first chapter.

The examples are numerous: the lay organization of (mostly) Catholic women, *Centro Italiano Femminile* (CIF), founded during the Second World War, recalibrated its action on the international stage toward the advancement of social justice, in particular through the cooperation with and aid to African women, after two decades spent mainly on the issue of Anticommunism.⁴² The recent study by Wendy Pojmann has discredited the historical platitude about the irrelevance of women's social and political engagement in the post-WWII period, also as regards international politics, but her analysis does not show an original, gender-related reception of the idea of international community in the discourse of CIF, which seems instead significantly in line with the mainstream paradigm of Catholic culture, and therefore does not present a specific interest for our research.⁴³ The inclination to embrace the issue of international social justice, however, did not only involve already existing subjects: in 1964 a new non-governmental organization saw the light and would grow to be one of the most successful Catholic-inspired organizations dedicated to international cooperation, *Mani Tese*.⁴⁴ A national network of Christian-inspired international voluntary associations was established in 1972, in order to coordinate the efforts of dozens of local organizations active in the field of cooperation with developing countries: this network, named *Federazione Organismi Cristiani di Servizio Internazionale Volontario*, replaced the earlier *Federazione degli Organismi di*

⁴² See the study of Wendy Pojmann, *Italian Women and International Cold War Politics*, in part. pp. 159-162 for the influence of the paradigm shift operated at the level of Magisterium's discourse by John XXIII, Paul VI and the Council in promoting a new commitment of Italian Catholic women – and also of the international organization to which the CIF belonged, the World Movement of Mothers – toward international social justice as the key to worldwide peace.

⁴³ Obviously, the limited interest of the subject for our research does not invalidate the relevance of Pojmann's study about the international activism of Italian women (in both the Catholic and left-wing milieus), nor the theses advanced by feminist literature about the importance of women's organizations in Cold War politics, and in particular in the peace movement: see at least the pioneering contribution by Harriet Hyman Alonso, *Peace As a Women's Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1993, and Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney, *Fighting fascism and forging new political activism. The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) in the Cold War*, in EAD. and Fabio Lanza (eds.), *De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change*, Routledge, 2013, pp. 52-72.

⁴⁴ *Mani Tese* was founded with the social mission of reducing the imbalances between the North and South of the planet, and to help grow local economies. The organization is now active in 14 countries, supervising development projects: see Giuseppe Scidà, *L'utopia concreta. Indagine sull'Associazione Mani Tese*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1987.

Laicato Missionario (Federation of the Organisms of Missionary Laity), active since 1965.⁴⁵ This trend found significant correspondences at international level: in 1965, for instance, the organization *Coopération internationale pour le développement socio-économique* was founded (renamed *Coopération internationale pour le développement et la solidarité* in 1981), in order to bring together Catholic development organizations located in Europe and North America.⁴⁶ These efforts were encouraged by the Church, which in the same period (1971) created the Italian section of Caritas Internationalis, CEI's "charitable arm", with the purpose of promoting charity in order to achieve "integral human development, social justice and peace".⁴⁷

We will not follow the development of these initiatives, partly because we are primarily interested in the theoretical elaboration about the idea of international community, and not in the history of the international engagement of the Italian Catholic laity (although it is an argument that should be better investigated at scientific level, especially in a comparative perspective), and partly because they do not pose particular problems of interpretation: as for the generic references inferable from the discourse of organizations that were not involved in international matters, we can easily retrace the influence of the new universalist paradigm, mostly expressed around the issue of international social justice. From a historical perspective, they can be described as an "attuned" reception of the 1960s cultural revolution, deprived of its most adversarial political implications: the Italian laity was certainly more inclined to "speak its mind" and act for change in society, but its

⁴⁵ See some notes and memories from direct witnesses in Paolo Lambruschi and Sergio Marelli (eds.), *Solidali con la valigia: lo sviluppo è il nuovo nome della pace*, Torino: Edizioni Paoline, 2007, which underlines the importance of Vatican II's documents and above all of Paul's *Populorum progressio* as powerful engines for the mobilization of the laity (pp. 5 and 13-14).

⁴⁶ One of the most active personalities in this field was Belgian professor, trade union activist and State Minister August Vanistendael (1917-2003), who was personally involved in many organizations dedicated to international solidarity, like *Solidarité et développement*, and *Coopération et Solidarité*, who we will mention again in the next section and whose archive, held at KADOC, is a gold mine for the study of this milieu: see KADOC, Archive August Vanistendael, for instance boxes 488, 489, 539; see also the article of Dries Bosschaert, *August Vanistendael: een vergeten Belgische lekenauditor op het Tweede Vaticaanse Concilie*, in "Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis van het Katholiek Leven in de Nederlanden", issue 1, 2013, pp. 57-80, which concerns the participation of Vanistendael in the Second Vatican Council as one of the six lay auditors invited to the Assembly. For a brief profile of the Belgian intellectual and activist see Peter Heyrman, *August Vanistendael (1917-2003)*, in "ODIS - Database Intermediary Structures Flanders" [online], 18/6/2003.

⁴⁷ See the Statutes and a brief history of the organization at Caritas website, <http://www.caritasitaliana.it/>.

social engagement was interpreted in line with the Magisterium's discourse *aggiornato* by the deliberations of the Council, rather than in conflict with the Church's doctrine.

“INSTITUTIONAL” AND “NON-INSTITUTIONAL” CATHOLIC WORLD. THE INFLUENCE OF THE CULTURE OF LIBERATION.

From our point of view, however, it is more useful to look for subjects who displayed a consistent and original interest in international dynamics, so that we can try to read their trajectory within the shifting panorama of the Italian Catholic world, through the lens of their approach to international relations. To this end, we have divided the field into two categories, of “institutional” and “non-institutional” actors. The first comprises the traditional organizations of the Catholic laity, which had already been officially recognized by the Vatican at the beginning of the period under consideration, and represented the classical agents of the Church's influence on Italian society, or in other words, the sentinels of the Catholic pillar. We will analyze the discourse of three organizations: ACLI (Labor area), FUCI (youth organization linked to Catholic action), and *Pax Christi Italia* (Church-related movement).⁴⁸ Contrary to what a superficial analysis might seem to show, but consistently with the general trend outlined in the previous pages, these actors did not develop a verbatim adaptation of the new universalist framework to their specific perspective, but rather they implemented a peculiar interpretation of the universalist paradigm, which also presented some unexpected interaction with the culture of Liberation, through a Latin American connection. Moreover, as well as producing a substantial and meaningful reflection on the idea of international

⁴⁸ By “organization discourse” I refer to the cultural elaboration inferable from two main sets of sources: their main publications, and congress and conference proceedings; I will elaborate on the specific sources that I consulted for each actor in the following sections. As a general methodological note, I will limit the direct quotations of said discourse in the text to a minimum, for two order of reasons: on the one side, the necessary translation is due to impoverish, and to some extent “betray” (as for the common Latin root of “to translate” and “to betray”) the original source, while a detailed textual analysis would add unnecessary weight to a synthetic reconstruction. In some cases I will resort, however, to the original Italian, in order to give at least an idea of the prose which we are dealing with, leaving to the reader the possibility to scrutinize it further through the references suggested in the footnotes. On the other hand, the “idea of international community”, as we have learned to know, is by its nature a theoretical concept, composed by the reflection on different issues, that are rarely already assembled so as to form an organic and comprehensible quotation. Therefore, I will limit the textual references to the passages that, in my opinion, stand out as the most representative of a general approach.

community, these subjects present another feature that make them particularly interesting for our investigation: they were all connected to a Christian-inspired international organization. This link will allow us to contextualize the Italian case in a European perspective, outlining similarities and possible specificities.

The subjects included in the second group, instead, give an account of the pluralization of voices, which characterized the post-conciliar Italian Catholic world. So as not to miniaturize the level of analysis, we did not take into account the reflection on the international community which could be inferred from the cultural production of a plethora of base communities and dissent groups. In broad and general terms, we would argue that they were immersed in a culture of Liberation that found its theological prototype in the discourse of European political theology and Latin American liberation theology.⁴⁹ Their analysis of the dynamics in play in international and national societies was explicitly borrowed from the Marxist worldview, and employed categories like “class struggle” or “Imperialist oppression”, and a constant attention to the theme of revolution. Perhaps the most representative example in this respect is provided by the experience of *Cristiani per il socialismo*, a cultural and political organization which was founded in Italy at the beginning of the 1970s, in the wake of the movement of the same name created in Chile in 1971 in support of Allende’s candidacy to the presidency of the Republic.⁵⁰ The Chilean movement was deeply influenced by liberation theology – theologians like Ronaldo Muñoz (1933-2009), Pablo Richards (b. 1939) and Pablo Fontaine (b. 1925) were active members, while Gustavo Gutierrez played a major part in the preparation of the first national meeting in 1972. The movement proposed three major theses: socialism and revolution were an inescapable historical necessity, because of the inhumane conditions in which most of the peoples lived, oppressed by an imperialistic system of

⁴⁹ Cuminetti, *Il dissenso cattolico in Italia*, pp. 102-25, and 232-35.

⁵⁰ See the history of the Chilean movement in Pablo Richard, *Origine et développement du mouvement Chrétien pour le socialisme*, Paris: Centre Lebret, 1976. The Italian experience – the most significant one in Europe, where the movement was also implanted in Spain, France and Portugal – received much attention from the contemporary press; many publications were dedicated to the movement until the end of the 1970s: see for instance Giancarlo Milanesi, *Identità religiosa e impegno politico nei Cristiani per il socialismo*, in VV.AA., *Religione e politica. Il caso italiano*, Roma: Coines, 1976, pp. 206-223, and, from an “orthodox” point of view, Bartolomeo Sorge (ed.), *Le scelte e le tesi dei “Cristiani per il socialismo” alla luce dell’insegnamento della Chiesa*, Torino: LDC, 1974.

power; the engagement of Christians side by side with Marxists did not constitute a problem for the conscience of the faithful, since Marxism was fully compatible with the Christian worldview; the Catholic faith needed to be renewed starting from the revolutionary praxis, denouncing the collusion of the Church with authoritarian structures.⁵¹ These guidelines were also at the center of the Italian section's ideological platform, which was explained at a national Congress in Bologna in September 1973.⁵² The main ideologue of the movement, who inspired the final document and delivered a long address to the audience of about 2000 in Bologna, was the controversial Italian theologian Giulio Girardi.⁵³

Girardi, who had already participated in the previous year's meeting in Santiago, and at the time was one of the most influential representatives of the culture of Liberation in Europe, developed a radical critique of capitalist society, which he found to be in irreducible contradiction with the Christian faith. The patent condition of injustice and exploitation which characterized the modern world could be analyzed through the categories provided by Marxist ideology; any subject – the Church included – who did not fight against the *status quo* was to be considered responsible for the perpetuation of an oppressive system of power. Such a fight implied the adoption of a revolutionary attitude, which was deemed consistent with the evangelical message. Indeed, the Gospel was a clear political message of liberation, when it was read and interpreted by the poor and the oppressed. The politicization of faith, Girardi stated, was inevitable, and those who said

⁵¹ This point of view, actually, was even more radical than the average among liberation theologians, especially because it implied the dominance of the temporal sphere over the spiritual one; the official condemnation of the Chilean episcopacy came a few days after Pinochet's coup. The connection between *Cristianos por el socialismo* and liberation theology has been underlined, from a critical point of view, by Belgian Jesuit Roger Vekemans, *Teología de la liberación y cristianos por el socialismo*, Bogotá: CEDIAL, 1976.

⁵² The proceedings of the Congress were published by Sapere Edizioni in 1974, under the title *Cristiani per il socialismo*, but the final document and the introductory address can also be consulted in "Il Regno. Documenti", issue 17, 1973, pp. 481-93.

⁵³ Girardi (1926-2012) participated in the Second Vatican Council as an expert on Marxism and atheism; from the 1960s onwards, he promoted the dialogue between Christians and Marxists, publishing numerous works – translated into several languages – on the compatibility of the Catholic faith with Marxist ideology. He was one of the most important European theologians to diffuse the approach of liberation theology in Europe; in 1973 he was expelled, because of his radical stances, by Paris Catholique University and by the Pastoral Institute *Lumen Vitae* in Brussels (in solidarity, his colleagues François Houtart and Gustavo Gutierrez resigned as well), while in 1977 he was officially expelled from the Salesian order, and later suspended *a divinis*. Among his most important publications during the 1960s and the 1970s, see *Marxism and Christianity*, New York: MacMillan, 1968 (or. ed. *Cristianesimo e marxismo*, Assisi: Cittadella, 1966), and *Fede cristiana e materialismo storico*, Roma: Borla, 1977.

otherwise were only trying to mask a conservative, or authoritarian politicization. There was no direct link between Christian principles and a specific social and political option, but they clearly indicated the necessity of a global transformation of society. In the contemporary age, this revolutionary transformation should be led by the working class, with the support of the “popular masses”, toward a socialist society.⁵⁴

This approach was clearly integral to the culture of Liberation that we described in the introductory chapter. Moreover, it can now be properly contextualized in the framework of the second wave of European Left Catholicism, and we can define it as a “radical” reception of the cultural revolution which “exploded” around the year 1968, especially of its political aspects. Two elements in particular deserve to be underlined, since they are indicators of larger trends: the employment of a Marxist framework of analysis and the approach to the issue of revolutionary violence. The dialogue with Marxist culture, as mentioned, was one of the defining features of European Left Catholicism; in the case of Girardi and *Cristiani per il socialismo*, we are dealing with one of the most radical stances, which implied full compatibility between the two worldviews, but the exchange involved many actors of the Catholic world, both at Italian and European level, as we will see in the following pages addressing the reflection on the international community.⁵⁵

The debate on the problem of revolutionary violence, instead, was a decisive junction of this kind of discourse: if a radical transformation of society was necessary, and the Christian faith compelled the faithful to participate in this adversarial process, was any means to achieving this end justifiable? If the conflict could engender revolution and violence, as was the case in many parts of

⁵⁴ The report by Giulio Girardi, as well as the proceedings of the Congress (pp. 154-201), can be consulted, with few variations, in ID., *Cristiani per il socialismo: perché?: questione cattolica e questione socialista*, Assisi: Cittadella Editrice, 1975, pp. 20-67. The final document hit on the same notes of Girardi’s intervention: see the text in José Ramos Regidior and Aldo Gecchelin, *Cristiani per il socialismo. Storia, problematica, e prospettive*, Milano: Mondadori 1977, pp. 235-48.

⁵⁵ For an analysis focused on the dialogue between Catholic and Marxist intellectuals in 1960s Italy, see Richard Drake, *Catholics and the Italian Revolutionary Left of the 1960s*, in “The Catholic Historical Review”, issue 3, 2008, pp. 450-75; some general notes in Saresella, *Cattolici a sinistra*, pp. 122-30. As regards the European scenario, we can at least mention the German society “Paulus Gesellschaft”, founded largely by Roman Catholics but open to persons of all faiths or no faith, which between 1965 and 1978 held six formal Christian-Marxist Conferences, where Christian and Marxist intellectuals confronted each other over the differences and possible convergences between the two doctrines: see the English bibliography provided by Paul Mojzes, *A Select English Annotated Bibliography on the Christian-Marxist Dialogue*, in “Horizons”, issue 2, 1976, pp. 237-45.

the world, were revolution and violence justifiable, in certain extreme conditions, from a Catholic standpoint? This was a decisive point, a sort of frontier in the Catholic discourse on the international community, as we mentioned in Chapter I.⁵⁶ The debate on this issue was flourishing in the Catholic world between the 1960s and the 1970s, encouraged by the famous passage in *Populorum progressio* about the possibility of a revolutionary uprising in the extreme case of a longstanding and manifest tyranny. Italy was no exception.⁵⁷ Browsing through the history of the Italian Catholic laity, we will encounter this kind of problem more than once, even in the reflection of subjects we had not suspected of having an interest in the issue. Their response to this theological, cultural and political knot was bound to define their approach to international relations, no less so than their standpoint on Italian matters.

The discourse of *Cristiani per il socialismo* cannot be considered an official expression of Catholic dissent, even if most Italian base communities and spontaneous groups participated in the event, to which the “magazines of dissent” gave abundant coverage.⁵⁸ Without the support of a dedicated study, in fact, it would be arbitrary to extrapolate any comprehensive conclusion about the idea of international community that can be attributed to “Italian Catholic dissent”, given the great number of the subjects involved, their lack of coordination and the fact that their attention was mostly focused on the Italian context and intra-ecclesial dynamics. This is why it seemed more suitable to propose a case study, which without any pretense to being exhaustive can give us an idea

⁵⁶ This was a theological problem – in Europe it was tackled in particular by the “theology of revolution”, while we have mentioned that Latin American liberation theologians, generally, did not play out the possible theoretical consequences of an endorsement to revolutionary movements – but first and foremost, it was a practical choice that Christians would have to make in many parts of the world. Some additional considerations on the stance of Liberation theologians are in Pottenger, *The Political Theory of Liberation Theology*, pp. 145-58, and Paul E. Sigmund, *Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy Or Revolution?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

⁵⁷ For the European debate, see the book edited by Albert Plé, *À la recherche d'une théologie de la violence*, Paris: Cerf, 1968, and also François Houtart and André Rousseau, *L'église et les mouvements révolutionnaires*, Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1972. About the Italian case, a recent useful contribution has been written by historian Guido Panvini, *Cattolici e violenza politica. L'altro album di famiglia del terrorismo italiano*, Venezia: Marsilio, 2014. For a general account of the “ambivalent” relation between religion and violence see R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

⁵⁸ See for instance “Testimonianze”, issue 169, 1974; “Il Regno. Attualità”, issue 18, 1974; “IDOC internazionale”, issues 17-18, 1973 (where the proceedings of the assembly were also published, at pp. 19-46). The conference also received a great deal of attention from the “orthodox” Catholic press, obviously from a very critical point of view: see in particular Bartolomeo Sorge, *Il movimento dei “Cristiani per il socialismo”*, in “La Civiltà Cattolica”, issue 2, 1974, pp. 111-30.

of the point of view expressed by this effervescent part of the Italian Catholic world. The existence of the aforementioned “periodicals of area” facilitates this task, since they offer suitable documentation with which to monitor the turmoil experienced by this minority but dynamic milieu. The choice fell on a Florentine periodical, “Testimonianze”, and above all on the figure of its founder and major animator, Father Ernesto Balducci, for two reasons: first, the long life of the periodical – founded in 1958 and still published today – allows us to better observe continuities and discontinuities in its editorial line, contextualizing the phase between the 1960s and the 1970s in a broader perspective. Second, a focus on Balducci’s cultural evolution can help us to shed some light on a theme that would otherwise have been overlooked, in a synthetic exposition mostly focused on the associative side of the Italian Catholic world, i.e. the relationship between an engaged intellectual and the ideas of international Catholic culture. Again, although a single investigation does not authorize generalizations, this case struck us as particularly significant, given the centrality of Balducci’s figure, and to some extent, of “Testimonianze” itself, for Italian progressive Catholicism, that has already been underlined by the literature.⁵⁹ More generally, Balducci represented a generation of “*prêtres contestataires*” – who had one internationally known model in another Tuscan priest, don Lorenzo Milani (1923-1967), or in Spanish theologian José María González Ruiz (1916-2005) – that was not limited to Italy, but instead was rooted in the whole of Western Europe for a brief season between the 1960s and the 1970s.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Some notes on Balducci’s influence on contemporary Italian Catholicism, contextualized in the “Florentine milieu”, where figures like Giorgio La Pira and Lorenzo Milani worked, are in Pietro De Marco (ed.), *La Pira, don Milani, padre Balducci: il laboratorio Firenze nelle scelte pubbliche dei cattolici dal fascismo a fine Novecento*, Roma: Magna carta servizi, 2009. See in particular the memoirs of student activist Marco Boato, one of the leaders of the 1968 protests, engaged in Left radical movements but also in the foundation of *Cristiani per il socialismo*, in *Il mondo cattolico italiano nella stagione del Concilio e del post-Concilio. Le riviste “Questitalia” e “Testimonianze”*, pp. 345-52. In English, see the comment of Sandro Magister, *In Florence, Catholics Are Rewriting Their History*, available online at <http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/205449?eng=y>. For his relation with the groups of dissent see Guido Verucci, *Il post-concilio, la crisi del 1968 e il dissenso in Italia*, in Bruna Bocchini Camaiani (ed.), *Ernesto Balducci. La Chiesa, la società, la pace*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 2005, pp. 35-43.

⁶⁰ For a contextualization of Balducci in the milieu of European Left Catholicism see Horn, *Les chrétientés catholiques à l'épreuve des sixties et des seventies*, pp. 24-28 and 32-33. We will not focus on the pivotal figure of don Milani, since as is well known, his contribution – whose impact on the Italian student movement can not be underestimated – concerned the field of critical education: for an introduction to Milani’s thought and its influence on critical pedagogy, in English, see Peter Mayo, *Italian signposts for a sociologically and critically engaged pedagogy. Don Lorenzo Milani (1923–1967) and the schools of San Donato and Barbiana revisited*, in “British Journal of Sociology of Education”, 2013, pp. 1-18.

A BRIDGE TOWARD A NEW ERA: THE CASE OF *COMUNIONE E LIBERAZIONE*

The last subject that we will take into account, *Comunione e Liberazione*, pertains to the category of new ecclesial movements. Here we are dealing with the opposite problem, in the process of sources selection: while the area of *dissenso* included a wide array of subjects, mainly operating at local level, that were nonetheless characterized by a comparable discourse, the well-filled category of new movements covered very different actors, whose reflection on the idea of international community cannot be reduced to an organic synthesis. However, of the three major Italian-based new ecclesial movements – *Comunione e Liberazione*, Sant'Egidio Community, *Focolare* – the first one immediately stands out as the one more worth examining. Indeed, although the history, scope and evolution of the latter two was fairly dissimilar, both expressed a clear adhesion to the new universalist paradigm. On the one hand, the promotion of charity and dialogue which characterized the *Focolarini*'s social mission, not to mention their conception of the fundamental unity of the human family, that was favored by the trends in place in the contemporary age (the cornerstone of the “spirituality of unity”), made reference to well-known pillars of the universalist worldview.⁶¹ On the other hand, the peculiar role played by Sant'Egidio Community since the early 1980s, as a mediator in international conflicts (most famously, in the Rome General Peace Accords signed in 1992, which put a provisional end to the civil war that was raging in Mozambique), was an evident transposition in practice of a guiding principle of the Catholic culture's mainstream approach to international relations.⁶²

On the contrary, from our point of view, the case of *Comunione e Liberazione* – the most successful among the Italian new movements – is more multi-faceted and interesting to follow. The

⁶¹ See some notes on these aspects in the account of a Focolare's member, Guglielmo Boselli, *Il movimento dei Focolari*, in Lorenzo Caselli et al., *Una buona società in cui vivere*, Roma: Edizioni Studium, 1995, pp. 347-52.

⁶² Actually, this case would be fairly interesting to study, since in this instance a lay, Catholic-inspired movement played a role that was traditionally performed by Vatican diplomacy, which in turn was experimenting a significant transformation, as we saw in the first chapter. The history of Sant'Egidio's protagonism on the international scene, however, falls out of our temporal framework; moreover, this study would involve the plane of practical action more than that of theoretical elaboration. A recent good assessment of Sant'Egidio's international action, especially focused on Mozambique's case, is in Víctor Fernández Soriano, *La Communauté de Sant'Egidio et les transformations récentes de l'ordre international: une approche historique*, in "Forum Romanum Belgicum", issue 10, 2014.

movement, founded by Father Luigi Giussani at the end 1960s (but with an earlier and less-well-known known history, that we will also discuss), represents a fitting closing page for our brochure on the Italian Catholic world, since it constitutes a sort of bridge toward a new era – marked by John Paul’s pontificate – which “reshuffled” the categories used to interpret the Catholic idea of international community. *Comunione e Liberazione* would be officially recognized by the Church at the beginning of the 1980s (which is why, in the period more closely covered by our analysis, it can be considered part of the “non-institutional” Catholic world), becoming one of the most influential protagonists of contemporary Catholicism.

This brief exposition of the criteria underneath the choices that we needed to make, in order to follow a recognizable and not dispersive path through the Italian Catholic world, has actually left out one last thread connecting almost all the subjects under consideration, that is their more or less close relationship with Paul VI, whose pontificate provides the basic coordinates of our study. We will find Montini’s name many times in the course of the following pages, but especially in the part dedicated to the “official” Italian Catholic laity organizations, which presented a sort of “Montinian” imprinting. From here we will start our series of sketches, which hopefully will serve as a first and rudimentary compass to guide us through the land of postwar Italian Catholicism, with respect to its approach to the idea of international community.

2. *The “official” organizations of the Catholic laity.*

When Giovanni Battista Montini was elected pope, in 1963, he came to embody a universal spiritual authority, whose message was directed to millions of faithful all over the world. The man behind the title, however, had a personal background that was deeply connected to the organization of the Italian Catholic world between the 1930s and the 1950s. His first major appointment had been as national ecclesiastical assistant of FUCI (1925-1933), while from his influential position of

Substitute to the Secretary of State, he became directly involved in the creation of ACLI and *Pax Christi Italia*, which saw the light in 1944 and 1954 respectively. Whereas Montini's role in the foundation of the Italian section of the international Catholic peace movement, as we will see, was not followed up by a direct interest of the Archbishop in the development of the organization (which remained rather limited in terms of numbers and influence), his impact on the history of ACLI and FUCI was much more relevant.⁶³ On a personal level, on various occasions the pope himself mentioned his attachment to these organizations (and for the Graduates Movement of Catholic Action), which had occupied a special place in his life.⁶⁴

At the same time, they were heavily shaped by the vision of the future pontiff; in a formula, we would say that these were properly “Montinian organizations”, meaning that they represented the main tools of his design to shape Italian society according to Christian principles. Following the theory of separation of planes, the Church should not have directly interfered with the autonomous cultural elaboration of the laity, but it should have vetted the congruity of its line of action with the principles of the Catholic doctrine, interpreted by the Magisterium. We are already familiar with this line of thought, which characterized Montini's approach to the relations between Church and society. In particular, FUCI and the Graduates Movement were supposed to educate the new ruling class, while ACLI's mission was directed to the religious training of workers. These organizations, together with the other traditional components of the Italian Catholic laity (in which, as we saw in the introduction, Catholic Action played the leading role), should have, as Paul VI said in 1967,⁶⁵

⁶³ For a recent assessment, from an apologetic point of view, of Montini's consideration for ACLI see Giovanni Balconi and Pietro Praderi, *Il papa dei lavoratori. Montini, le ACLI e il mondo del lavoro*, Alba: Edizioni San Paolo, 2014; see also the considerations of De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, pp. 212-13, about ACLI's role in Montini's design for the Italian society. For what concerns his involvement in FUCI's history we can rely on several historical analyses: see a general introduction in Massimo Marcocchi, *G.B. Montini, Scritti fucini (1925-1933): linee di lettura*, in Istituto Paolo VI (ed.), *Educazione, intellettuali e società in G.B. Montini-Paolo VI*, Brescia: Istituto Paolo VI, 1992, pp. 14-41, and Maria Cristina Giuntella, *La Fuci tra modernismo, partito popolare e fascismo*, Roma: Studium, 2000, pp. 135-55. For a comprehensive account, see Xenio Toscani, chapter II, *Il decennio fucino*, in ID. (ed.), *Paolo VI*, pp. 75-156.

⁶⁴ See for instance Paul's Angelus on the 20th anniversary of ACLI's foundation (19/3/1965), and the speech to FUCI's members on 28/6/1971, respectively in *Insegnamenti*, vol. III, pp. 178-79 [web: Italian] and vol. IX, pp. 583-85 [web: Italian]. See also the heartfelt recollection of FUCI's 19th Congress (1932), when the Graduates Movement was founded, that the pope expressed on the occasion of his first voyage to Sardinia, on 24/4/1970: AAS, vol. 62 (I), 1970, p. 294 [web: Italian].

⁶⁵ Speech to the Sacred College and the Roman Prelacy, 22/12/1967, in AAS, vol. 60, 1968, pp. 18-33 [web: Italian].

“animated the temporal sphere”, putting the Church's Teachings into practice and reasserting the natural connection between the Italian people and Catholicism.

From our lateral but meaningful point of view, we will study how these organizations addressed the idea of international community, verifying whether they stayed true to their original mission – by employing a new universalist worldview – or if they deflected from it, adopting some features of the culture of Liberation. The similarities between the paths walked by ACLI and FUCI suggest that we address their cultural evolution together, while we will devote a shorter but autonomous section to the analysis of Pax Christi's Italian section.

2.1 ACLI and FUCI. From Universalism to Liberation and back. The cultural itinerary of two “Montinian” organizations.

THE ASSOCIAZIONI CRISTIANE DEI LAVORATORI ITALIANI (ACLI)

In June 1944, the representatives of the three major antifascist parties – PCI, PSI and DC – signed the “Pact of Rome”, creating a united trade union, the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL); the unity would have lasted until 1948, when first the Christian democratic wing, and later the Social-democratic and republican one, split from CGIL.⁶⁶ ACLI were set up just a month after CGIL's foundation, in order to represent the Catholic wing of the united trade union. After the split and the foundation of the Christian-inspired trade union *Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Liberi* (Italian Confederation of Free Trade Unions, CISL) in 1950, ACLI recalibrated their mission, devoting themselves to religious training and assistance to workers, through the implementation of

⁶⁶ For a long-term contextualization see Gino Bedani, *Politics and Ideology in the Italian Workers' Movement. Union Development and the Changing Role of the Catholic and Communist Subcultures in Postwar Italy*, Oxford: Berg, 1995. A focus on the Christian wing, in comparison with the German case, has been offered by Andrea Ciampani and Massimo Valente, *The Social and Political Dynamics of Christian Workers in Unified Trade Union Movements: the Experiences of Italy and West Germany after World War II*, in Heerma van Voss, Pasture and de Maeyer (eds.), *Between Cross and Class*, pp. 203-220.

the Christian social doctrine.⁶⁷ They were not a trade union, but rather a Christian social movement, similar to the French *Action Catholique Ouvrière* (ACO), the German *Katholische Arbeitnehmerbewegung* (KAB), or the Belgian *Kristelijke Werknemersbeweging* (KWB).⁶⁸ What distinguished ACLI from similar movements across Europe was, first and foremost, their sheer dimensions: the number of members jumped from around 50,000 in 1946 to more than 600,000 by the end of 1948, and reached a peak of almost one million in the early 1950s.⁶⁹ Local parishes, clubs of Catholic Action and *Democrazia Cristiana* provided the logistical support for the establishment of the organization, which in just a few years became widespread over the whole nation.

The link with the Christian democratic party –in the framework of the Catholic pillar – was very important: ACLI were one of DC's most relevant “collateral organizations” (organizations with an exclusive relationship with a specific party),⁷⁰ meaning that they were actively engaged in politics, especially during electoral campaigns, which usually ended with most of their highest-ranking representatives elected to Parliament. In this early phase, which lasted until the late 1950s,

⁶⁷ The scientific literature on Italian ACLI is rather scanty, except for the contributions of historian Carlo Felice Casula: among his publications, see especially *Le frontiere delle Acli. Pratiche sociali, scelte politiche, spiritualità. I verbali del Consiglio di presidenza 1944-1961*, Roma: Edizioni Lavoro, 2001, and *Le Acli: una bella storia italiana*, Roma: Anicia, 2008. In order to reconstruct their cultural elaboration, I relied in particular on two sets of sources: the proceedings of their national congresses and conferences, and the issues of the main weekly periodical published by the association, “Azione Sociale”. The historical parabola of CISL, on the contrary, has received much more attention: see in particular, regarding its origins, Vincenzo Saba, *Quella specie di laburismo cristiano: Dossetti, Pastore, Romani e l'alternativa a De Gasperi, 1946-1951*, Roma: Edizioni Lavoro, 1996; Guido Formigoni, *La scelta occidentale della Cisl: Giulio Pastore e l'azione sindacale tra guerra fredda e ricostruzione (1947-1951)*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 1991, and, in English, Andrea Ciampani, *A “New Kind of Trade Unionism” as Actor within the Field of International Social Relations? Giulio Pastore, Mario, Romani and Italian CISL in 1950*, in Vincent DuJardin and Pierre Tilly (eds.), *Homme et réseaux: Belgique, Europe et Outre-Mers*, Peter Lang, 2013, pp. 25-38. I did not focus on CISL's cultural elaboration, although it presented traits of undeniable originality, because it did not satisfy one essential methodological requirement to be included in our analysis, since it cannot be considered an organization of the Italian Catholic laity. A-confessionalism, indeed, was a defining feature of CISL's identity since its foundation. Consistently, the international affiliation of the Italian trade union was not directed toward Christian trade unionism, but rather toward the new experience of free trade unionism: see Andrea Ciampani, *La CISL tra integrazione europea e mondializzazione. Profilo storico del sindacato nuovo nelle relazioni internazionali: dalla Conferenza di Londra al trattato di Amsterdam*, Roma: Edizioni Lavoro, 2000, in part. pp. 35-59.

⁶⁸ For a contextualization of the French and German contexts see Robert Wattebled, *Stratégies catholiques en monde ouvrier dans la France d'après-guerre*, Paris: Les Éditions ouvrières, 1990 (p. 198 ff. regarding the ACO), and Wolfgang Schroeder, *Katholizismus und Einheitsgewerkschaft. Der Streit um den DGB und der Niedergang der Sozialkatholizismus in der Bundesrepublik bis 1960*, Bonn: Dietz, 1992 (pp. 300-17 about the KAB). The history of KWB – which presents many affinities with that of ACLI – has been reconstructed by Walter Nauwelaerts, *Le Kristelijke Werknemersbeweging*, in Emmanuel Gerard and Paul Wynants, *Histoire du Mouvement Ouvrier Chrétien en Belgique*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994, vol. II, pp. 501-44.

⁶⁹ Some figures in Casula, *Le frontiere delle ACLI*, pp. 22-23.

⁷⁰ For an operational definition, see Thomas Poguntke, *Party Organizational Linkage: Parties Without Firm Social Roots?*, in Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), *Political Parties in the New Europe. Political and Analytical Challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 49-50.

the association's cultural platform, not surprisingly for what interests us, was characterized by a rigid Anticommunism, which was the primary interpretative lens for their reading of international relations. After the endorsement of pope Pius XII, who celebrated the 10th anniversary of ACLI's foundation with an address during an impressive gathering in Saint Peter's square on May 1st, 1955 (an event directed at challenging the traditional Socialist monopoly of the International Workers' Day's celebration), ACLI were fully legitimized to emphasize the two main traditional features of their cultural elaboration, that is their loyalty to the Magisterium's message and their opposition to Communism, which had a strong appeal among Italian workers. Although the main focus was obviously on the national level, from the discourse of the Catholic association we can easily infer an idea that was circulating widely in Catholic culture, concerning the vision of international Communism as the fundamental danger to the peaceful development of international relations. For instance, in the resolution issued by ACLI's presidency after the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary, in October 1956, we can read that

[The central presidency underlines] the tragic falsehood of a system that, behind the deceptive illusion of the proletarian revolution does not do anything but offer slavery and misery. The Presidency commits the whole organization to persevere and multiply the efforts to indicate to all the workers the true path toward the social and civil rebirth, that only in freedom finds its guarantee, and only in the Christian inspiration its safest guide.⁷¹

A universalist approach was more generally employed by the organization in its (sporadic) references to the international dimension, at least until the first half of the 1960s: world peace could be achieved only through dialogue, cooperation, respect for human rights and justice, in consonance with the pope's Teachings and with the core values of the labor movement, which was one of the leaders in the march toward a peaceful configuration of the international community. In order to show a classical example of this familiar vision, seen from the perspective of a social Labor

⁷¹ The document, issued after the Presidency's Council meeting of 8/11/1956, can be consulted in Casula, *Le frontiere delle ACLI*, p. 375, my translation, but see also the pamphlet *Il nostro anticomunismo*, Roma: Edizioni ACLI, 1956. The fifth Congress of ACLI, in 1955, was explicitly dedicated to the candidature of the Catholic association as a guide to the workers' movement, "in alternative to the Marxist's myth": see the interventions in ACLI, *Sintesi del V Congresso*, Roma: Abete, 1955. On this whole phase, see Casula, *Le frontiere delle ACLI*, chapter 3: *Nella tempeste del 1956. L'anticomunismo delle ACLI*, pp. 301-13.

movement, we will quote, in the original Italian, the speech delivered by ACLI's president Livio Labor (1918-1999) to the audience of an international Conference on *Pacem in terris* (New York, April 1965):

Il movimento del lavoro è uno dei fondamenti primari della pace. La responsabilizzazione dei lavoratori organizzati, la partecipazione cosciente alle decisioni, l'esercizio concreto della solidarietà, con una visione planetaria dei bisogni dell'uomo e dell'amore agli uomini: questi sono i cardini dell'iniziativa sociale e democratica che la "Pacem in Terris" spalanca al movimento del lavoro. Il senso profondo della interdipendenza del destino di ogni popolo e della comunità mondiale rappresenta oramai un ideale ineliminabile dal cuore degli uomini. E l'ascesa democratica del movimento del lavoro cammina di pari passo con questa visione cosmica delle sue rivendicazioni e delle sue più autentiche speranze. La elevazione dei lavoratori e la partecipazione del movimento del lavoro a questa fatica commune per la costruzione della pace; la lotta contro ogni discriminazione, ogni segregazione, ogni disprezzo dell'uomo; la lotta contro la povertà, contro ogni povertà, che possa mortificare i talenti di qualsiasi uomo; la lotta per l'educazione che assicuri a ciascuno cultura adeguata alle sue attitudini e alle esigenze del rapido sviluppo tecnologico e della produzione, e metta ciascuno in grado di comprendere che non vi è pace senza capacità di dialogo e perciò di conoscenza tra gli uomini: sono momenti unitari di un impegno che associa i costruttori della pace.⁷²

In the second half of the decade, however, things took a slightly unexpected turn. To be sure, there was no repudiation of the new universalist paradigm, which continued to orient ACLI's reflection. At the same time, however, some issues of the culture of Liberation begun to enter the organization's vocabulary (we will shortly see how), simultaneous with the process of radicalization that ACLI underwent between the late 1960s and early 1970s. In a meeting that would mark the history of the association, held in the evocative Benedictine Abbey of Vallombrosa (near Florence) in the summer of 1970, president Emilio Gabaglio addressed the audience with these words:

⁷² See the speech in "Azione Sociale", issue 9, 1965, p. 12. In 1966, 15 ACLI MPs proposed to devolve 0.5% of Italy's military budget to the UN fund for developing countries, following Paul's message. See a report of the initiative in "Azione Sociale", issue 41, 1966. It is also worth mentioning that, from the early phases of their history, ACLI also developed an intense international activity, providing assistance to Italian migrant workers, especially in Belgium, France and Germany: some notes about the activity in Germany and Belgium in Domenico Rosati, *Von den Baracken zur Kommunalwahl: Die Arbeit des ACLI*, in Roberto Alborino and Konrad Pöhlz (eds.), *Italiener in Deutschland: Teilhabe oder Ausgrenzung?*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus, 1998, pp. 83-93, and Maria Laura Franciosi, ... per un sacco di carbone, Bruxelles: ACLI Belgique, 1996. These efforts, however, were not matched by a comparable theoretical reflection on the international dimension, as was admitted by a member of the Presidency's Council, Giovanni Bersani, at the beginning of the 1960s: Bersani stated that ACLI had "a limited knowledge" of the problems concerning the international field, which instead should have had a higher priority on the movement's agenda: see Bersani's intervention in the meeting of 24/5/1961 in Casula, *Le frontiere delle ACLI*, pp. 680-81.

Here the perspective becomes broader, involving the whole of mankind and acquiring an international dimension, since nowadays the awareness of this fact – that man can be set free from poverty – is universal. [...] Underdevelopment isn't a "gap" that can be closed, but instead is the product of a historical evolution that the industrialized countries imposed upon the non-industrialized ones, first through Colonialism, then with Neo-Colonialism and always with Imperialism, in order to maintain and increase their wellbeing. To change this situation, corrections are not enough: more generous, considerate aid policies, or a less discriminatory international financial system, are not enough. [...] The system needs a true revolution, and a radical change of thought and attitude, in the poor countries but first and foremost in the industrialized countries.⁷³

The international community, Gabaglio argued, was marked by inequalities because of the dominance of Imperialism, which condemned more than half of the world population to live in miserable conditions. In order to restore Christian values like peace, solidarity and the possibility of the full development of the person at global level – which we recognize as theoretical cornerstones of the universalist paradigm: it was not by chance that *Pacem in terris*, *Gaudium et spes* and *Populorum progressio* were explicitly praised in the report –, the workers should lead the fight for change, in the developing countries and in the industrialized ones, like Italy. In other words, in order to change the relations of power at international level, and to achieve the “integral liberation” of any man and all men, it was necessary to radically modify the internal structure of societies. For Italy, this meant taking the “Socialist hypothesis” into consideration, that is to enter the transition toward a Socialist democracy through intermediate steps which involved the adoption of planned economies and workers’ self-management. We will deal with the outcomes of this radical elaboration, which was destined to create a great deal of troubles within the Catholic world, in a few pages.

Now it is time we asked a logical question, pertinent to our framework of analysis: why and how had this point of view, congruent with the culture of Liberation, begun to circulate in the

⁷³ See the report in “Azione Sociale”, issues 35-36 (special edition dedicated to the meeting), 1970, pp. 38-45, my translation. Emilio Gabaglio (b. 1937) is a Catholic union organizer and politician, ACLI’s president from 1969 to 1972. He was president of the European Trade Union Confederation between 1991 to 2003. This electric phase of ACLI’s history has been recollected by Carlo Felice Casula (ed.), *L’ipotesi socialista trent’anni dopo (1970-2000)*, Roma: Aesse, 2001.

discourse of an Italian Catholic association? To provide a tentative answer, we have to take a quick look beyond the Italian borders to broaden our perspective. Indeed, such a vision was not a distinctive feature of the Italian case; on the contrary, it was shared by many subjects affiliated, like ACLI, with the world International of Christian-inspired trade unionism.⁷⁴ Christian trade unionism was a tiny but not negligible reality in Europe; its origins date back to the end of the nineteenth century, and they can be historically interpreted as a reaction to the Socialist hegemony over the workers' movement. Inspired by Christian social doctrine (the encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891) being the obvious first point of reference), but at the same time autonomous from the Church, Christian trade unions found fertile ground in some European countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany, but without becoming a relevant actor on the continent (and therefore in the world).⁷⁵ After the Second World War the *Confédération internationale des syndicats chrétiens* (CISC), the international network of Christian trade unions founded in 1920, declared it had almost 2 million members, compared to the 72 million of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU, created in 1945) and the 48 million of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), founded in 1949 after the split of Western European trade unions from the WFTU, which was ultimately constituted of collateral organizations of Communist parties.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ The best analysis of the origins and development, until the end of the 1960s, of European Christian trade unionism remains Patrick Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999, but see also the sketch drawn by the same author in his *Introduction* to Heerma van Voss, Pasture and De Maeyer (eds.), *Between Cross and Class*, pp. 9-48. The best scholarly reference on the historical parabola of Christian trade unionism (in Europe) since the end of 1960s has once again been written by Patrick Pasture, *Christian Trade Unionism in Europe Since 1968*, Avebury: Aldershot, 1994. For the reasons why a Christian social movement like ACLI affiliated itself with the European section of Christian Trade Unionism I have to refer to my study on *Le Acli ed il sindacalismo europeo di ispirazione cristiana, 1958-1974*, in "Contemporanea", issue 4, 2013, pp. 553-79.

⁷⁵ The relationship between Christian trade unions and the Catholic Church has been analyzed by Paul Misner, *The Roman Catholic Hierarchy and the Christian Labor Movement: Autonomy and Pluralism*, in Heerma van Voss, Pasture and De Maeyer (eds.), *Between Cross and Class*, pp. 103-26. For a comparative analysis of the relevance of Christian trade unions in Europe see the other essays in this volume.

⁷⁶ These figures – which need to be read with reservations, especially as regards the WFTU, whose membership in the Communist countries was very difficult to verify – are taken from John P. Windmuller, *The International Trade Union Movement*, Deventer: Kluver, 1980, who provided a classical outlook of world trade unionism. It is interesting to notice that Christian trade unions refused to join other Internationals, at least until the 1970s, notwithstanding their limited influence and the numerous points of contact with other Internationals, namely the ICFTU. This fact confirms an acquisition of the international literature on trade unionism, which has demonstrated that unity has never been an intrinsic goal of trade unions: see the considerations of Patrick Pasture and Johan Verberckmoes (eds.), *Working-Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity: Historical Dilemmas and Current Debates in Western Europe*,

A new energy came from outside Europe, and in particular from Latin American countries, where a Confederation of Christian trade unions (*Confederaciòn latinoamericana de sindacalistas cristianos*, CLASC, renamed *Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores*, CLAT, in 1971) was established in 1954.⁷⁷ During the 1960s, this organization went through a process of progressive radicalization under the guidance of Argentine union organizer Emilio Maspero (1927-2000),⁷⁸ adopting a pronounced “language of class” borrowed from Marxist ideology. In 1968, CISC changed its name to World Confederation of Labor (WCL), thus abandoning any explicit reference to the Christian religion as its main source of inspiration. In the preamble to the new declaration of principles, drafted with the pivotal contribution of August Vanistendael, the previously mentioned Belgian trade union activist who was CISC’s secretary general from 1952 until 1967, the ideas and work of the International were related to a “spiritual conception” or to other similar worldviews aimed at building “a human community united in freedom, dignity, justice and fraternity”.⁷⁹

The references to the unity of the human community, to human dignity, and to the full development of any human being (another of the WCL’s goals quoted in the Preamble), testified to its agreement with the principles of the Christian personalist thought and with the conclusions of the Second Vatican Council. However, the whole structure of the Declaration sanctioned the full

Oxford: Berg, 1998, in part. pp. 1-42, and Maurizio Antonioli, Federico Romero, Myriam Bergamaschi and Andrea Ciampani (eds.), *Le scissioni sindacali: Italia e Europa*, Pisa: BFS, 1999, pp. VII-XVIII.

⁷⁷ See Pasture, *Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international*, pp. 224-29 and 315-24, and Gerhard Wahlers, *CLAT: Geschichte einer lateinamerikanischen Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, Bonn: M. Wehle, 1990. On the Latin American workers’ movement see Ricardo Melgar Bao, *El movimiento obrero Latino-Americano. Historia de una clase subalterna*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988, and more recently, Robert Jackson Alexander, *International Labor Organizations and Organized Labor in Latin America and the Caribbean: a History*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2009 (pp. 199-228 for the history of CLASC-CLAT).

⁷⁸ In his youth, Maspero participated in the activities of Argentina’s Christian Workers’ Youth, of which he became national president in 1952. He did not have a formal education, since he was forced to join the workforce at age 12, but he was able to travel to Europe thanks to a grant issued by CISC, in collaboration with Pax Christi, during the 1950s; in 1966 he was appointed CLASC’s secretary general (an office that he held until his death, in 2000), while the following year he was elected CISC’s vice president. See for a profile Abelardo Jorge Soneira, *Trayectorias creyentes/trayectorias sociales*, in Genaro Zalpa and Hans Egil Offerdal, *¿El reino de Dios es de este mundo? El papel ambiguo de las religiones en la lucha contra la pobreza*, Bogotà: CLACSO, 2008, pp. 327-33, available online at <http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/clacso-crop/20120705115334/18sone2.pdf>, with related bibliography.

⁷⁹ I consulted the files of the international confederation of Christian-inspired trade unionism (congresses, conferences, meetings), and of its European section, at KADOC, in the archives of the Internationaal Christelijk Vakverbond/Wereldverbond van de Arbeid (hereinafter ICV/WVA) and of the Europese Organisatie van het ICV/WVA (hereinafter EO-ICV/WVA). See the files regarding the 1968 Congress in ICV/WVA, box 221; the Declaration is also published in the Appendix to Pasture *Christian Trade Unionism*, pp. 165-174. The preamble to the Statutes adopted in 1964, on the contrary, stated that Cisc based its action and ideology on “the social principles of the Christian religion”.

globalization of the former Christian confederation, which was now greatly dependent on the support of Third World trade unions (which were not necessarily Christian). The influence of the Catholic culture, though, did not stop after the name change, but instead took a new form, due to the increasing influence of Latin American organizations. If we consider, for instance, the guidelines proposed by WCL vice-president Maspero for the 18th Congress (Évian-les-Bains, France, September 1973; similar observations could be made about the documents issued between the late 1960s and late 1970s), we find a very distinctive and recognizable stance, from which we can infer a familiar idea of international community.

[Maspero argued:] The whole capitalist process leads to the constitution of a true imperialist international system which imposes its prices, its products, its types of investment, its methods of production, its types of consumption, its "values" etc.... [...] This Imperialism, which has an economic and material face, differs from the Russian dominating type of power, which rests mainly on political and ideological bases. These dominating systems come close to each other and appear to want to establish a sort of imperialist condominium favorable to the maintenance of the actual world situation and to the security, the interests, the prestige and the influence of these Super Powers. [...] The "development" of developed countries is to a large extent tributary of the exploitation of the Third World and the poverty of its people.

This analysis had a clear Marxist stamp, mediated through the elaboration of dependency theorists. Such a premise generated a consistent follow-up:

The fundamental aim [of the WCL] is to put up a system which agrees with the needs and aspirations of the workers and peoples, and in particular those of the Third World, in place of this system of injustice and oppression which exploits and alienates them. It is in this sense that the path to be followed is a revolutionary one. [...] The will of the workers and the nations must be carried out at every level: national, regional, continental and world, to create the objective and subjective conditions permitting the integral and solidarity liberation of man and nations. It is a case first and foremost of making full use of material, moral and spiritual resources capable of ensuring the integral development of mankind.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Guidelines of the 18th WCL's Congress, in ICV/WVA, box 412, English version. But see also Maspero's report to the Geneva extraordinary Congress in 1969, or the resolutions of the 19th Congress held in De Haan-a-Zee (Belgium) in October 1977, in KADOC, ICV/WVA, respectively in boxes 226 and 1451.

This discourse is easily integrated with the Liberation category, since we are dealing with an adversarial reading of international relations centered on categories like exploitation and dominance of the rich regions of the world over the poor ones, which had the right and duty to fight against this *de facto* situation through a revolutionary process. This was an essential precondition for the development of a truly peaceful and fair international community, respectful of the dignity of the human being. Not surprisingly, the close links between CLAT – the ideological spearhead of WCL's radicalization – and Latin American liberation theology have been acknowledged by the literature.⁸¹ Likewise unsurprisingly, many European members did not appreciate the development undertaken by the WCL: the Dutch and Swiss Protestant organizations abstained on the vote over the guidelines drafted by Maspero, while German and Austrian Catholic trade unions expressed their discomfort with such a radical turn. Among European organizations (Italy excluded), only the French *Confédération française démocratique du travail* (CFDT) was in agreement with the partisan language employed in the document – CFDT voted against it only because it did not go far enough on the subject of trade union unification – whereas the Belgian *Confédération des syndicats chrétiens/Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond* played a mediating role.⁸²

What about the Italian case, then? We have shown a significant similarity between ACLI's discourse, represented by Gabaglio's speech in Vallombrosa, and that of WCL, of which ACLI were an extraordinary member, with voting rights, since 1967.⁸³ We would argue that a possible explanation of this “theoretical convergence”, which suggests the existence of a shared cultural framework, involves the influence exerted by Latin American trade unions on the discourse of the

⁸¹ Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, *The International Labour Movement: Structure and Dynamics*, in Peter Fairbrother, Marc-Anton Hennebert and Christian Lévesque (eds.), *Transnational Trade Unionism: New Capabilities and Prospects: Building Union Power*, Routledge, 2013, p. 194.

⁸² Specific considerations on the Belgian and French contexts can be found in Patrick Pasture, *Belgian Trade Unions: Between Social Movement and Service Center*, in Craig Phelan (ed.), *Trade Unionism since 1945. Towards a Global History*, vol. 1: *Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East*, Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 3-35, and Nicolas Defaud, *La CFDT (1968-1995). De l'autogestion au syndicalisme de proposition*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2009.

⁸³ I have reconstructed the process which led to the formalization of a relationship between ACLI and the European network of Christian trade unions – although the Italian movement was not technically a trade union – in *Le Acli ed il sindacalismo europeo di ispirazione cristiana*, in part. pp. 563-69. ACLI's full support for the transition from CISC to WCL was explicated by president Livio Labor (1918-1999) at the Luxemburg Congress in 1968: see KADOC, ICV/WVA, box 226, Compte-rendu du congrès.

Italian association. From archival research, we can determine that there had been numerous contacts between them since the beginning of the 1960s: a consistent exchange of documents, several direct contacts and frequent statements of a shared view of international relations. In particular since 1963, the meetings between CLASC and ACLI's representatives increased in size and frequency: Gabaglio made a long trip to Latin America in the summer of 1963, and another trip with president Labor in 1965, while Latin America trade union leaders visited ACLI's headquarters in December 1964, June and December 1965 and again in February 1966, when a cooperation agreement between the two organizations was signed. Browsing ACLI's periodical "Azione Sociale" throughout the 1960s, moreover, we may notice an increased interest in the international dimension, especially the Latin American context.⁸⁴ This was one of the most important channels, through which the "vocabulary of liberation" begun to circulate within ACLI's discourse. The link with the Latin American milieu helped the Italian association to explore the potentiality of social Catholicism as a force of liberation, while the Italian experience served as an organizational model for union organizers of the Latin American continent, in particular for its functions of service and assistance to workers⁸⁵.

As we saw when analyzing the cultural elaboration of Italian Christian Democracy, the young militants were especially apt to engage in a radical critique of contemporary society, which was bound to affect the idea of international community. In this case as well, ACLI's youth section *Gioventù Aclista* (GA) proposed the most radical stances, as we can infer from a quick analysis of its press and gatherings. Once again, 1968 confirms itself as a pivotal year: if the most important Conference held by the movement in 1967 had as its theme "Young Peace builders", and was fully consistent with the new universalist paradigm, three years later the language was very different. Indeed, in the words pronounced by National Delegate Marta Farinati, in 1967 peace could only be

⁸⁴ See in particular the articles dedicated to the aforementioned meetings in "Azione Sociale", issues 17-18, 24 and 51, 1965, and issue 6, 1966; I consulted the report of the first Gabaglio's mission in ACLI's archive, in Rome: ACLI, fund Relazioni Internazionali, box 17.

⁸⁵ See the development of these arguments in the interview given by president Livio Labor before his trip to Latin America: "Azione Sociale", issue 44, 1965.

built on “a new, global and dynamic relationship [...], on the prodigious energy of love, based on criteria of justice and universal fraternity”. On the same occasion, National Delegate Alberto La Porta underlined that the major factor obstructing the path toward peace was “a conception of the Nation-State as a warrantor of the common good only for its citizens (or a part of them, in the worst cases)”. Familiar concepts like the dynamic nature of peace, and the implicit references to the “civilization of love” and the “universal common good” were explicitly traced back to the Magisterium of John XXIII, Paul VI and the Council, while the link between peace and dialogue, development, and engagement for the protection and advancement of the dignity of any human being in the world showed a clear congruity with New Universalism.⁸⁶

At the 10th Congress, held in December 1970 in Peschiera del Garda, by contrast, the status of the international community was described using such terms as oppression and imperialistic dominance, which were to be fought and reversed through conflict. In both the poor regions of the Third World and in the industrialized Western societies, the exploited classes – guided by the workers’ movement – should dismantle the authoritarian mechanisms that prevented them from enjoying their natural rights, struggling for the liberation of all individuals and peoples. National Delegate Aldo Marzari argued that

If we aim at organizing the development for the fulfillment of the Man, as human being, then it is mandatory to beat the logic of profit though the socialization of the means of production, promoting a process of appropriation of power by the Proletariat. [...] [This applies] not only at national level, but also on the international stage, where the capitalistic exploitation takes the form of a conflict, provoked by a system that is always oriented toward the profit, and often violent.⁸⁷

In this case (contrary to what happened in the Christian democratic party), the discourse of the youth movement was not too different from that of the “senior” organization, except for some

⁸⁶ See the texts in ACLI, fund Gioventù Aclista, Conference “I giovani costruttori di pace”, Assisi 28/6 – 2/7/1968 (my translations).

⁸⁷ ACLI, archives of Gioventù Aclista, Congress 1970, my translation. The issue of conflict was also put front and center at the 1969 Congress, held in Viareggio (3-6 January), but the focus was almost entirely placed on the national dimension.

explicit references to the complicity of the Italian government in the maintenance of the status quo, as was confirmed by the speeches by president Gabaglio to GA's Congresses and Conferences in 1969 and 1970.⁸⁸

The use of some categories pertaining to the culture of Liberation, though, did not mean that the Universalist paradigm had been abandoned: as generally stated in the first chapter, far from being mutually exclusive, these two loose paradigms interacted and influenced each other reciprocally in various fashions. In this specific example, the continuity with the mainstream Catholic idea of international community was underlined by a continuous reference to Paul's Teachings, which despite the rapid deterioration of the pope's relationship with the association – which we will address in a few pages – remained a crucial benchmark for ACLI's cultural platform (both for the senior and youth movement), even in the troubled years between the two decades.⁸⁹ Moreover, the association took a clear stand – by never endorsing or granting implicit legitimacy to it – on an issue that had proven to be very problematic for Liberationists, that is the relationship between revolutionary conflict and violence. We can devote a few words to the subject, which will help to better define the boundaries of the culture of Liberation and its translation into the discourse of the Italian Catholic laity, by introducing the second main protagonist of this section, the Universitarian Federation of Italian Catholics.

THE FEDERAZIONE UNIVERSITARIA CATTOLICA ITALIANA (FUCI)

Founded in 1896, FUCI was meant to be the instrument for the education of the Catholic ruling class, and it mostly was throughout the twentieth century.⁹⁰ Its mission, since its beginnings, was to

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*; see also the Conference "Dalle lotte alla nuova società: nuova fase storica per l'impegno dei giovani", held in Assisi from 26 to 29 June 1970.

⁸⁹ See for instance the message sent from GA's Congress to the pope in 1970, on the occasion of his voyage to Asia, where "justice, peace, redemption [*riscatto*] of all the poor and of all the last ones" were indicated as the central elements of Paul's Magisterium and as the North Star of ACLI's action: ACLI, *fund Gioventù Aclista*, Congress 1970, my translation.

⁹⁰ The only comprehensive history of the association, in a brief compendium, has been written by historian Francesco Malgeri on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of FUCI's foundation: see Francesco Malgeri, *100 anni di vita*, in ID. et al., *Fuci. Coscienza universitaria, fatica del pensare, intelligenza della fede. Una ricerca lunga cent'anni*, Torino: Edizioni San Paolo, 1996, pp. 15-46. Specific moments and protagonists of FUCI's life, on the contrary, have

encourage individual commitment to the study and application of Catholic principles – mediated and interpreted by the Church – to the particular role that each member wished to play in the society. FUCI was related to Catholic Action, but at the same time enjoyed a large degree of autonomy – it was (and still is) called an external movement, while the “orthodox” Graduates Movement of Catholic Action (*Movimento Laureati di Azione Cattolica*, MLAC) was founded in 1932 during a harsh period of crisis and conflict between the Catholic Church and Fascism.⁹¹ FUCI was a small organization; its membership of nearly 30,000 in the mid-1950s, dropped to around 5,000 at the end of the 1960s, while the number of university students in the same period increased from about 210,000 to over 680,000.⁹² However, it was very influential in the cultural debate. As mentioned in the previous chapter, most of the top-level Christian democratic politicians of the first and second generations had been involved in the activities of the association in their youth. Its indirect impact on Italian politics gradually waned, however, due to a series of choices made by the Catholic organization during the 1960s, that highlighted a process of radicalization, similar to the one we sketched out following ACLI’s parabola.

In this case as well, it is useful to put this evolution into perspective by making reference to what happened outside Italy, in particular within international student organizations. Following the methodological caveat outlined in the introduction, we will consider the international organization to which FUCI was affiliated, the International Movement of Catholic Students (IMCS), which was

been thoroughly and convincingly analyzed by Italian scholars: see for instance Renato Moro, *Franco Costa vice-assistente della FUCI (1933-1955)*, in VV.AA., *Don Franco Costa. Per la storia di un sacerdote attivo nel laicato cattolico italiano. Studi e testimonianze*, Roma: AVE, 1992, pp. 149-290; ID., *Aldo Moro negli anni della FUCI*, Roma: Studium, 2008, but also Jorge Dagnino Jiménez, *Catholic students at war: the Federacione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana, 1940-43*, in “Journal of Modern Italian Studies”, issue 3, 2009, pp. 285-304, and Richard J. Wolff, *Between Pope and Duce. Catholic Students in Fascist Italy*, Peter Lang, 1990, as well as the already mentioned works about Montini’s role.

⁹¹ On the history of Graduates Movement (which changed its name in *Movimento Ecclesiale di Impegno Culturale*, MEIC, in 1983) see VV.AA., *In ascolto della storia. L’Itinerario dei "Laureati Cattolici" 1932-1982*, Roma: Edizioni Studium, 1984, and in particular the essay of Renato Moro, *Il Movimento laureati nella storia della cultura*, pp. 25-47, for some considerations about its origins and the early years. We will make brief references to MLAC’s cultural elaboration, but we will keep the focus of our analysis on FUCI, since this organization provided the most consistent and original reflection on the international community.

⁹² See the figures in ISTAT, *Statistiche dell’istruzione universitaria – Anno Accademico 1995-1996*, Roma: Istat, 1997, Chapter III (historical series).

part of Pax Romana.⁹³ Once again, the reception of the 1960s cultural revolution interacted with the suggestions coming from extra-European scenarios. Indeed, IMCS's discourse was influenced by Latin American liberation theology, in particular in that crucial span of time around the beginning of the new decade. The 1971 Inter-Federal Assembly (the equivalent of the organization's congress) was explicitly dedicated to the theme "Liberation – How?", in the wake of the seminal work by Gustavo Gutierrez, who was IMCS's chaplain in Peru. A passage from the Assembly's final document illustrates how the culture of Liberation was fully accepted and employed by the international network of Catholic students:

Our starting point is given by the experience of the modern man's suffering, because of the oppressive situation he is in. Let's think of the Vietnam War, the increasing exploitation of the poor countries at the hand of the rich nations, and the unjust configuration of the community of nations. The participants [in this Assembly] from the different countries must consider, as a fact, that, everyone in his own way, they are responsible for this suffering and this oppression. Thereby, their effort to identify and understand the mechanisms of oppression, as they operate in the world today, is not only a reason for theoretical speculations. [...] They need to discover that liberation is not possible without analyzing and

⁹³ There are two main international networks of Catholic Students, the IMCS and the International Young Catholic Students (IYCS, whose European section's archive is held at KADOC), the latter established in 1946 as the branch of international Catholic Action dedicated to the religious formation of the student class. IMCS–Pax Romana was founded in 1921 as a network of young Catholic intellectuals engaged in the promotion of peace through the teaching of the Catholic doctrine. In 1947 a new intellectual branch was created (International Catholic Movement for Intellectual and Cultural Affairs, ICMICA), so as to guarantee the opportunity for Catholic students to remain active in an international network even after finishing their studies. IMCS and IYCS grew closer together during the 1970s, when a formal international coordination between the two was established; however, they remained formally separate, both maintaining the official status of International Catholic Organization. About the history of Pax Romana, for lack of comprehensive scholarly contributions, see the profile of Giorgio Campanini, *Pax Romana fra memoria e futuro. Nel sessantesimo di fondazione del "ramo intellettuale"*, in "Studium", issue 4, 2007, pp. 499-512, and the internal reconstructions edited by the organization, in particular Urs Altermatt and Raymond Sugraynes de Franch, *Pax Romana, 1921-1981, Gründung une Entwicklung*, Fribourg: Bersier, 1982, and Michela Trisconi (ed.) *Mémoires engagés – Memorias comprometidas – Memories of committed persons*, Fribourg: Pax Romana, 1997. Some interesting notes on the role of the Spanish federation of Pax Romana in the national context – as instrument to break the international isolation of Franco's regime – are in Glicerio Sánchez Recio, *Pax Romana como vehículo de las relaciones exteriores del Gobierno español, 1945-1952*, in ID. (ed.), *La Internacional Católica. "Pax romana" en la política europea de posguerra*, Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2005, pp. 213-56. Both the Graduates Movement of Catholic Action and the FUCI were affiliated with Pax Romana (IMCS), while the IYCS, even if it had regular contacts with them, had among its members the Student Movements of Catholic Action, an undergraduate movement that is less significant from our point of view (its periodical press shows no signs of a relevant interest in international-related issues). Unfortunately, I could not analyze the FUCI or MLAC's archives, because they have yet to be organized, but I consulted their most significant periodicals, respectively "Ricerca" and "Studium", for the whole period under consideration.

fighting the oppression of mankind, and the mechanisms that perpetuate this situation. Personal liberation is impossible without economic and social liberation.⁹⁴

The international community was divided by fracture lines that prevented any possible peaceful development toward a fairer configuration of the relations among peoples. Catholics should feel the moral imperative to rebel against the status quo, supporting the liberation movements that were struggling against the “Imperialistic yoke” all over the Third World, and joining the protests against the oppressive systems of Western societies. Marxism was explicitly cited as the best analytical framework with which to explain the structural dysfunctions of the international system without being in contradiction with the Catholic worldview. In other terms, IMCS’s theoretical elaboration was very similar to that of the WCL, which should not surprise us, given the presence of shared cultural sources – and of a comparable leading role played by Latin American organizations – that were ascribable to the culture of Liberation.

What is perhaps more surprising is the adoption of such a radical discourse by an Italian organization that was the “favorite son” of the Catholic Church (and especially of the current pope) and firmly embedded in Italian society. The radicalization of FUCI’s discourse is evident if we consult the association’s bi-weekly periodical “Ricerca”. In 1971, the Federation’s president Marco Ivaldo stated that

The construction of the world in justice is a task that Christians know as an essential feature of God's salvation plan. It is mandatory that they take an active part in the fight that the dispossessed, the exploited, the oppressed are carrying out to liberate themselves. The existing order is not people-oriented, but it is at the service of the few who have the power and impose it [on the majority of the population] thanks to the unlimited means that politics and civil society provide

⁹⁴ The proceedings were published by Pax Romana’s periodical “Convergence”, issue 5, 1971, p. 5, my translation (original French). The 1971 Inter-Federal Assembly was probably the point of maximum radicalism reached by IMCS, from our point of view, at least in terms of political engagement. The following Assembly, held at Lima in 1975 and dedicated to “Christian commitment in a world of crisis”, toned down the political talk, even if did not repudiate the approach embraced in the previous years, adopting for instance a classical Liberationist watchword like the “preferential option for the poor”: see “Convergence”, issue 3, 1975. From the 29th Inter-Federal Assembly (Valladolid, 1978) onwards, it substantially abandoned its radical political engagement : see the article by international ecclesiastical assistant Buenaventura Pelegrí, significantly entitled *Le MIEC à l'écoute du Seigneur 1971-1981: du désarroi à la sérénité*, in “Convergence”, issues 3-4, 1981, pp. 5-11.

them with. The Church often is [complicit] with this power. So it appears to the poor, that is to those who the Gospel was announced to.⁹⁵

The approach to the idea of international community was fairly different from that of a few years earlier: at the beginning of 1969, for instance, an editorial in the magazine still explicitly referenced Paul's Magisterium, defining peace as a dynamic notion that should be used to serve the integral development of the human being, and could only be achieved through solidarity among peoples, which had its religious foundation in love.⁹⁶ It is also fair to say that prior to 1968 its interest in international-related dynamics was limited and sporadic. FUCI's cultural elaboration, indeed, was mainly focused on the role of the Catholic intellectual in modern society. Although it was traditionally open to the international cultural debate – more so than other Italian Catholic laity organizations, also thanks to Montini's imprinting – it usually did not encompass a particularly original reflection on the ideal configuration of the international system, or a specific interest in world politics. Things changed during the 1960s, consistently with the trend sketched out in the introductory section: the general Anticommunist paradigm, which for the federation of Catholic graduate students was also the main key to interpret international relations, was replaced by a more global approach, especially marked by an accentuated “Third-Worldism” and a renewed critique of the United States' foreign policy.

Between 1968 and 1974/1975, many issues of “Ricerca” were devoted to the Vietnam War and to the socially and politically explosive situations in Latin American countries. Considering the Vietnam War to be an imperialistic war, the editors had a sympathetic view of the “liberation struggle” of the Vietnamese people. US policies were compared to those of the Soviet Union, by highlighting the similarities in their international behavior, and in some cases also in the

⁹⁵ “Ricerca”, issue 9, 1971, my translation. Marco Ivaldo, currently professor of Moral Philosophy at Naples University “Federico II”, was FUCI's president from 1969 to 1972; from 1983 to 1990, he also chaired the *Movimento Ecclesiale di Impegno Culturale*.

⁹⁶ “Ricerca”, issue 1, 1969, editorial not signed, therefore attributable to the editorial staff, which at the time involved director Giovanni Benzoni (FUCI's president from 1967 to 1969), co-director Angelo Bertani (journalist and politician, long time Communications Manager for Catholic action), and staff editors Marisa Nunzella and Luigi Accattoli.

management of internal dissent.⁹⁷ The traditional diffidence rooted in Catholic culture toward certain aspects of the modern culture embodied by the United States, found new reasons to resurface here. The most important one is rather straightforward and easy to explain: the pivotal element which had justified the downplaying of this attitude in the first two postwar decades – the support offered by all the organizations of the Catholic laity to *Democrazia Cristiana* as the strongest bulwark against the infiltration of Communism in Italy – had lost its pull during the course of the 1960s. Moreover, now that Catholic culture was less constrained in the rigid theoretical schemas of the past, due to the long-term cultural processes with which we are now fairly familiar, the young generations felt more enabled to question old paradigms. In this sense, the centrality gained by the second reason – an increased interest in the present and future of the Third World – stands out as particularly relevant. Throughout the period under consideration, Catholic students manifested sympathy for the fate of the peoples who lived at the outskirts of modernity, employing an analytical framework that was clearly influenced by the Marxist approach to international relations. Reading “Ricerca” between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s meant becoming familiar with the work of dependency theorists like Theotonio Dos Santos and Gunder Frank, as well as with the Third World context, especially in its Latin American version.⁹⁸

In 1972, presenting a special issue of “Ricerca” devoted to Latin America, editor-in-chief Arnaldo Ferrari wrote that the study of this continent was also necessary for the Italian reader, in

⁹⁷ Among the many possible examples from the magazine “Ricerca”, see the editorial of Giovanni Benzoni in issues 8-9, 1968; Giovanni Mantovani, *URSS e USA fra potere e libertà*, in issue 10, 1972, and Laura Marignetti, *Vietnam: una lezione*, in issue 4, 1975. In general, about the reception of the Vietnam war, and its “myth”, in Italy, see the notes of Francesco Montessoro, *Il mito del Vietnam nell’Italia degli anni Sessanta*, in “Trimestre”, issues 3-4, 2004, pp. 273-97, while some considerations on the domestic impact of the Vietnam war in various countries and on international movements can be found in the third section of Andreas W. Daum, Wilfried Mausbach and Lloyd C. Gardner (eds.), *America, the Vietnam War and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

⁹⁸ See by way of example the articles about Latin American student movement in issues 15-16, 1968, and 12, 1971; the dossiers on the development of Latin American countries in issues 9-11, 1969; the translation of Brazilian activist Josué de Castro’s Manifesto for the “Third World” in issue 8, 1969; the positive reviews of Dos Santos’s book *La nueva dependencia y la crisis latinoamericana*, translated in Italian by Brescia’s publishing house “La Queriniana”, in issue 1, 1972; the dossiers on the Latin American countries in issues 3, 1970 (Brazil) and issues 3-4, 1972 (comprehensive analysis).

order to understand the dynamics at work in the international system, with the goal of finding the best way to exert an impact on it. Indeed, by becoming aware of the fact that the “brutal oppression of the capital’s regime” was not limited to local contexts, but rather involved the whole world, citizens of Western societies were bound to question the role of their countries in the global power systems, which made them “complicit in the exploitation”.⁹⁹ Consequently, they needed to take a stand that was not limited to a “generic solidarity” with Third World liberation movements, but rather implied an active engagement in the fight to “change, here and now, the same oppressive structures”. While the means were different, the end was identical: “the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, so as to create a world where everybody can live as one”.¹⁰⁰ We can quote a passage in the original Italian, to give a glimpse of writing, which was not unfamiliar in the Italian Catholic world at the beginning of the 1970s:

Credo che lo studio di questo continente [Latin America] non sia solo una esotica curiosità, ma piuttosto una importante componente della visione globale della situazione internazionale e quindi, contemporaneamente, della ricerca degli strumenti più idonei per incidervi sopra. Di pari passo infatti con la presa di coscienza della ramificazione mondiale del regime del capitale e della sua bestiale oppressione si sviluppa la necessità di una conoscenza approfondita dei meccanismi che ne regolano ai vari livelli (locale, continentale, internazionale), il funzionamento. La conoscenza allora dell'angolo di visuale in una colonia, anzi, di una super colonia, diventa molto importante per capire anche il ruolo giocato dal nostro paese all'interno delle alleanze internazionali e l'ambiguità della nostra situazione, che ci rende compartecipi dello sfruttamento. Si delinea allora un nostro compito specifico per stare dalla parte dei popoli latinoamericani: non tanto la generica solidarietà con le forze che laggiù si battono per la liberazione, quanto piuttosto l'impegno a lottare qui e ora per cambiare le stesse strutture oppressive. Se gli strumenti e i livelli di lotta sono diversi, l'obiettivo è comune: l'abolizione dello sfruttamento dell'uomo sull'uomo, nel tentativo di creare un mondo dove tutti vivano da uomini.

This was a paradigmatic example of the culture of Liberation, since out of an adversarial interpretation of international relations, greatly influenced by Marxist theories, emerged a call to

⁹⁹ A.F., preface to a collection of documents written by Latin American authors, in “Ricerca”, issues 3-4, 1972, my translation.

¹⁰⁰ *Ivi.*

action, which every Christian, within the limits dictated by the external environment, should have committed to. In this respect, FUCI's base was even more radical. In the final resolutions of the 1971 Congress, held in Naples and dedicated to "Christian life in a time of secularization", Italian Catholic students stated that

Political engagement today, in Italy as in the world, means fighting for the liberation of man by operating in the social environment, in order to remove, by revolutionary means, the existing contradictions, and establish a process of humanization, which suppresses any form of alienation.¹⁰¹

From this quote we infer that the liberation of man, worldwide, was at the center of the Christian approach to politics, and that it could entail the employment of revolutionary means. We have circled back, thus, to the theoretical problem introduced a few pages ago: the struggle for liberation implied conflict with imperialist and oppressive structures, opening the door to the possible use of violence. This line, however, was never crossed by the official organizations of the Italian Catholic world. The subject was addressed several times by Italian Catholic Graduates (both in FUCI and *Movimento Laureati*, which as mentioned was much less interested in the international dimension), especially in 1968 and 1969, but without resorting to ambiguous language. Violence was never endorsed; on the contrary, the issue of nonviolence was usually praised as an intimately Christian concept, which should be embraced even by those Catholics who insisted on the necessity of a revolutionary change of power dynamics.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ The proceedings of the Congress were published by "Ricerca", issue 9, 1971, my translation from resolution number 6, "Christian communities addressing political engagement". The radicalism of the language employed by the participants was criticized by "Ricerca" editors Arnaldo Ferrari and Maria Irace, who distanced themselves, and the Federation's leading group, from the "language of class" used by militants.

¹⁰² See for instance the editorial in "Ricerca", issue 21, 1968, and the issues 2-3, 1969, entirely dedicated to the writings of Camilo Torres and his stance on violence. In "Studium" (MLAC's magazine), see the series of article by Fausto Montanari (1907-2000, professor of Italian literature, journalist and long-time MLAC's collaborator), in particular *Pace e coerenza*, May 1968; *Libertà e liberazione*, December 1972; *Violenza, idee, immagini, storia*, February 1973, and *Giustizia e carità*, March 1973. Montanari argued that the foundation of any liberating action was the "liberation from violence", since it was historically proven that revolutionary violence only led to more violence and the suppression of freedom. Even if Christians needed to rebel against the unjust political, social and economic system, which forced the majority of the world population to live in unsustainable life conditions, their rebellion should have been modeled after the example of Jesus, who challenged the status quo by embracing nonviolent means of protest. We mentioned in the first chapter how this was one of the possible theoretical contradictions of the culture of Liberation: the assumption that the international community needed to change not through development but through conflict was not followed up by plausible historical scenarios that excluded the employment of violent revolutionary means.

Today, with nonviolence considered an organic part of the Catholic doctrine, this position could seem natural, especially after the great emphasis placed on this idea by the pontificates of John Paul II and above all Benedict XVI, and the exponential growth of Catholic NGOs and movements based on the employment of nonviolent means. But this was not always the case, not only if we consider the Magisterium's discourse,¹⁰³ but also if we take into account the Catholic laity. Specifically, student associations like FUCI were immersed in an environment that was generally inclined to justify or even endorse the use of violence with the goal to make the protests against the establishment more effective. Indeed, young people who became involved in radical activism around 1968 were often inspired by the myth of the revolutionary, be it a Latin America *guerrillero* or a Palestinian *fedayeen*, an Italian *partigiano* or a Greek resister.¹⁰⁴

In Italy, Catholic youth was an active participant in, and some have said an initiator of the protests of 1968.¹⁰⁵ The Sociology faculty of Trento University, founded in 1962 with the approval of *Democrazia Cristiana*, in order to form a class of technocrats who would manage the new Italian

¹⁰³ Menozzi, *Chiesa, pace e guerra nel Novecento*, pp. 7-12 and *passim*. We made a brief reference to the *Populorum progressio*'s passage, which did not express a definitive condemnation of violence – that could still be regarded as an extreme means, whose employment could have only been approved by the ecclesiastical authority –, and caused unexpected reactions in extra-European contexts, so that Paul VI was forced to clarify his thought on the occasion of his voyage to Medellín for the second Assembly of Latin-American Episcopacy, in August 1968.

¹⁰⁴ Robert Gildea, Gudni Jóhannesson, Chris Reynolds and Polymeris Voglis, *Violence*, in Robert Gildea, James Mark and Annette Warring (eds.), *Europe's 1968. Voices of Revolt*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 258. The authors based their contribution on the collection of a great deal of oral testimonies by activists (especially from Italy and West Germany), arguing that the legitimacy of violence was a pivotal issue for them at the time, and has haunted them ever since. On the contrary, Isabelle Sommier, *La violence révolutionnaire*, Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2008, argues that violence was a sort of accepted (not much debated) corollary for the young generations who became engaged in politics from the late 1960s onwards – she takes into account movements of Italy, West Germany, Japan, France and United States – giving birth to the revolutionary groups of the 1970s. See also the considerations of Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties*, pp. 533-36, who points out how it is pointless to divide the 1960s into a peaceful, optimistic first half and a violent, pessimistic second half, but rather it is more correct to look for the links between the movements which arose at the beginning of the decade, and the radicalization of its last years. About the opportunity to read the events of 1968 in a transnational and comparative key, see also Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (ed.), 1968. *Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1998; Horn, *The Spirit of '68*; Jeremi Suri, *The Global Revolutions of 1968*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2007; Paulina Bren, 1968 *East and West: Visions of Political Change and Student Protest from across the Iron Curtain*, and Kristina Schulz, *Echoes of Provocation: 1968 and the Women's Movements in France and Germany*, in Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraig Kenney (eds.), *Transnational Moments of Change. Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, respectively at pp. 119-35 and 137-54.

¹⁰⁵ See Agostino Giovagnoli, *Cattolici nel Sessantotto*, in ID. (ed.), 1968: *fra utopia e Vangelo. Contestazione e mondo cattolico*, Roma: Ave, 2000, pp. 18-42; Marialuisa Lucia Sergio, *I cattolici nei due bienni*, in VV.AA., *I due bienni rossi del Novecento: 1919-1920 e 1968-1969. Studi e interpretazioni a confronto*, Roma: Ediesse, 2006, pp. 115-28, and Faggioli, *The new élites of Italian Catholicism*, in part. pp. 18-22. This was not, moreover, an Italian peculiarity: see for instance an interesting example from Switzerland in Consuelo Frauenfelder, *La Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne suisse dans la tourmente contestataire des années 1960*, in Travnouez (dir.), *La décomposition des chrétiens occidentaux 1950-2010*, pp. 113-22.

industrial reality, was the first center of Italian university demonstrations, followed by the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan. Many leaders of the student protests had a Catholic background, and later a few of them even became members of the extremist or terrorist movements which characterized Italy's history throughout the 1970s.¹⁰⁶ The debate about the legitimacy of the use of violence – both as an option for protests strategies of Western students, and as a necessary means for the liberation movements of the Third World – spread among the young generations of educated Catholics, who took different stances and reacted in different ways (we will mention the case of *Comunione e liberazione* in the course of the chapter). In other words, Catholic students certainly did not unanimously answer this central question of those troubled times by advocating nonviolence. Therefore, the choice made by FUCI and *Movimento Laureati* was not totally predictable. Even in the context of a radicalized discourse, these organizations decided not to foster theories and behaviors that implied a favorable or ambiguous position on violence as an admissible option in the various levels of the liberation struggles. Although they maintained a theoretical distinction between “institutionalized” and “revolutionary” violence (the latter being a reaction to the former, exerted by authoritarian powers), and presented documents that suggested a different point of view, a positive approach toward revolutionary violence was never expressed, either in congresses or in their periodicals.¹⁰⁷

THE CALM AFTER A STORM? THE ROUTE OF ACLI AND FUCI IN THE ITALIAN CATHOLIC WORLD

For both FUCI and ACLI, the radicalization of the discourse decreased considerably starting from the mid-1970s. In the second half of the decade, we do not find the same arguments or the same

¹⁰⁶ See Horn, *The Spirit of '68*, pp. 81-83, and above all Panvini, *Cattolici e violenza politica*, pp. 233-47 and 309-81. For a general account of the student movement's history in Italy, see Robert Lumley, *States of Emergency. Cultures of Revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978*, London: Verso, 1990, pp. 47-143.

¹⁰⁷ Future research could help to paint a more detailed picture, especially about what happened in local environments, where the lines were possibly more blurred. There are several local histories of FUCI, but they are usually narrated from an internal point of view, mostly focused on the foundation's period or on the Fascist era. See for instance Maria Luisa Paronetto Valier, *Una fiera contesa per una cosa da nulla. La crisi del Circolo romano della Fuci nel 1933*, in “*Studium*”, issue 1, 1981, pp. 25-44; Luca Rolandi, *La Fuci: un movimento culturale. Nella Chiesa genovese del Novecento*, in “*Studium*”, issue 2, 2000, pp. 251-72, and Antonino Gigante, *Noi siam la giovinezza. Note sulla Fuci di Messina tra il 1927 e il 1948*, Messina: Edas, 1993.

approach to international relations employed in the tempestuous period that culminated at the beginning of the 1970s. This does not mean that the defining features of their cultural elaboration – the interest in the Third World, the condemnation of the situations of injustice which continued to prevent the social advancement of developing countries – were reconsidered or abandoned, but rather they were integrated in a more traditional (new universalist) analytical framework, based on ideas like the promotion of a network of solidarity – through Catholic NGOs, missionaries and Church-related movements – for helping the poorer regions of the world to access a fair degree of development, thus contributing to effectuating international social justice; the defense of human rights, and the reference to the Magisterium's discourse as the main route for the building of a peaceful international community.¹⁰⁸ Consistently with the general path sketched out in the introduction, the cultural elaboration of these Catholic lay organizations returned to a firm embrace of the Church's Teachings, just as they restored a closer connection with the Italian hierarchy after a very critical period.

Indeed, and understandably, the Catholic hierarchy was not happy about the evolution of the two organizations since the late 1960s. Its judgment of ACLI was harsher; in May 1971 the Italian Conference of Bishops forbade them to call themselves a Catholic organization (withdrawing both the official consensus and the financial support), while the following month pope Paul VI himself expressed a painful “deploration” for the “dangerous political and social implications” of ACLI’s discourse.¹⁰⁹ Although the 1972 Congress still hit radical notes, the resignation of president

¹⁰⁸ About FUCI's elaboration, see for instance the articles by “Ricerca” editors Pio Cerocchi, *La pace è gratuita*, and Umberto Spagna, *La pace non è utopia*, respectively in “Ricerca”, issues 1-2, 1974, and issues 7-8, 1977. Both texts presented a classical new universalist point of view, quoting the Magisterium's discourse (*Pacem in terris*, *Gaudium et spes*, *Populorum progressio* and Paul's speeches for the World Days of Peace) in order to address the subject of peace, linking it to development, human rights, disarmament and détente. For what concerns ACLI, see “Quaderni di Azione sociale”, issue 3, 1978, dedicated to the study days about a new “culture of development” (especially the introduction of ACLI's vice president Giuseppe Andreis, at pp. 5-16), and the article by “Azione Sociale” director Ruggero Orfei about the voyage of John Paul II to Mexico, where Orfei supported the discourse of the pope against the direct political implications of liberation theology, in “Quaderni di Azione sociale”, issue 1, 1979, pp. 15-30.

¹⁰⁹ See the speech of Paul VI (19/6/1971) in *Insegnamenti*, vol. IX, pp. 535-41 [web: Italian], quotation from p. 541 (my translation). On this phase of ACLI's history see the sketch drawn by Casula, *Le Acli*, pp. 16-19 and pp. 29-53 (interview with Gabaglio). The ecclesiastical assistants – the Church's representatives within a Catholic organization – would be reinstated in ACLI's structure only by the mid-1990s.

Gabaglio at the end of the year, under the hierarchy's pressure,¹¹⁰ marked the beginning of a severe crisis, which led to a return to moderation. The high point of ACLI's distress was reached in 1974 during the campaign for the referendum on divorce: the majority of the organization endorsed the campaign for the abrogation of the 1970 law legalizing divorce, while a consistent minority asked not to give vote indications to members (*Gioventù Aclista* went even further, siding with the "No" faction, so that its executive board was temporarily suspended).¹¹¹ By this time, many of the most engaged members of the association had chosen to leave for an active political militancy in Left movements and parties; the most relevant case involved the former president Livio Labor, who in 1971 founded a political party named *Movimento politico dei lavoratori* (MPL, Political Movement of Workers).¹¹² FUCI's trajectory was similar, even if it did not involve a formal disavowal by the Catholic Church; the position of the ecclesiastical assistants, in any case, was very critical of the leftist turn taken by the university association – especially in the already cited 1971 Congress – which experienced internal divisions during the debate on divorce.¹¹³

As mentioned in the introduction, the referendum campaign caused a deep wound in the body of Italian Catholicism, which did not unanimously follow CEI's binding recommendations, which were willingly received by DC headed by Amintore Fanfani. There was no complete rupture, however: Catholic associationism did not vanish, but instead experienced a general transition from "fragmentation" to "re-aggregation" (around the Church), the beginning of which can symbolically be marked by the Conference on "Evangelization and human promotion". Our two organizations do embody this general trend: in the eyes of the historian, the "normalization" (meaning the return to

¹¹⁰ The pressures from the Roman Curia to force Gabaglio's resignation have been recalled by Gabaglio himself in the interview with historian Carlo Felice Casula: see Casula, *Le Acli*, p. 51.

¹¹¹ See Scirè, *Il divorzio in Italia*, pp. 153-54 for ACLI's position.

¹¹² Labor's political experience was not successful: at the general elections of 1972 the MPL gained less than 0.5% of the vote, and most of its ruling class ended up joining the ranks of the Socialist Party: see some notes in Carlo Felice Casula, *Le ACLI e la CISL negli anni Settanta. Pratiche sociali e tentazioni della politica*, in Malgeri and Paggi (eds.), *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta*, vol. III, pp. 184-88.

¹¹³ See the article by vice central assistant don Lorenzo Chiarinelli in "Ricerca", issue 9, 1971, and the debate on divorce in the magazine's issues of the first half of 1974.

more orthodox positions) that they went through from 1974 onwards,¹¹⁴ officially sanctioned by their participation in the 1976 Conference, puts in perspective the period we have dealt with more closely, so that it can be properly considered a radicalization of their stances, which however did not permanently change the cornerstones of their discourse. In other words, we might argue that FUCI and ACLI were part of a “second wave of European Left Catholicism”, ignited by the Second Vatican Council and characterized by a strong, reciprocal link with the cultural developments coming from extra-European contexts (in particular, from Latin America).¹¹⁵ In the Italian case, this wave started to recede rapidly by the mid-1970s, thus delineating a relatively limited but intense period of change and turmoil in the institutional Catholic world (in the second part of the chapter, we will examine the case of other, non-institutional protagonists), that was paralleled by comparable trends in the European milieu.

The discourse on the international community offers an oblique but significant angle from which to observe this evolution, which can be aptly described through the analytical categories introduced in the first chapter. As this focus should have made clear, New Universalism and Liberation are not opposite worldviews, but rather different approaches which reciprocally influenced each other, competing to define the Catholic idea of international community. From a historical perspective, they also highlight a different reception of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, and the powerful entrance of the global dimension into the picture. The outcome of said competition mirrors the general dynamics described in the first part of this dissertation as well: New Universalism was challenged by the culture of Liberation, one that supported the adoption of an antagonistic reading of international relations. In this process, influenced by Latin American

¹¹⁴ Obviously, this year must be understood as a symbolic date rather than an actual watershed, since the end of the radicalization was a loose and incremental process. However, FUCI's 1973 Congress and ACLI's 1975 Congress are two meaningful examples of the return to a more traditional approach. See their proceedings respectively in “Ricerca”, issue 9, 1973, and Acli, *Le ACLI per l'unità dei lavoratori, per una soluzione democratica della crisi del paese. 13° congresso nazionale. Firenze 10-13 aprile 1975*, Roma: Edizioni ACLI, 1975.

¹¹⁵ A third protagonist of this second wave, quoted by Gerd-Rainer Horn, in his brief sketch of 1960s developments of European Left Catholicism, was the Christian-inspired trade union CISL, which we did not take into account here, as mentioned, because it was not an organization of the Italian Catholic laity. See Horn, *Left Catholicism in Western Europe*, pp. 87-91.

Catholicism, Italian Catholic organizations looked beyond the borders of their own culture in order to find the analytical instruments able to explain international dynamics. In other words, the discourse on the international community reflected the general radicalization experimented with by ACLI and FUCI in the first post-conciliar decade, that would have been unimaginable just a decade earlier: the relatively closed and compact Catholic world had been “broken open” by the historical trends that would revolutionize the way an entire generation, and generations to come, would live and think. This radicalization was condemned by Rome, just as the path chosen by Liberationists was judged to be ultimately incompatible with the Christian faith by the Magisterium’s authority under the pontificate of John Paul II. Here, though, the sentence came earlier, when Paul VI was still sitting on Peter’s throne. The main reason is easily understandable: Italy was not Latin America, since the peninsula had a different historical scenario and, above all, was the cradle and home of Catholicism. There were certain boundaries that the official Italian Catholic lay organizations, although enjoying a larger degree of autonomy after the Second Vatican Council, could not cross without losing the right to profess loyalty to the Teachings of the Roman Church. This is why the trajectory followed by these two traditional organizations – ACLI in particular – was stopped by the hierarchy, at the moment of maximum unrest within Italian Catholicism.

In this respect, the approach to international relations has proven to be a reliable observation point from which to follow and interpret the path taken by this small but significant part of the Italian Catholic world. This itinerary, though, did not encompass all the routes taken by a highly multi-faceted milieu. The richness and versatility of our categories can be demonstrated by introducing a new protagonist of our analysis: Pax Christi, a movement that was explicitly devoted to promoting the Catholic idea of international community.

2.3. Pax Christi. *From Traditional to New Universalism.*

PAX CHRISTI INTERNATIONAL

At the end of 1944, the 37-year-old French teacher Marthe Marie Dortel-Claudot planned to organize an initiative dedicated to Catholic faithful who prayed for Germany's redemption; its tentative title was "Crusade of prayers for the conversion of Germany, *Pax Christi in Regno Christi*". The following year, Pierre-Marie Théas (1894-1977), bishop of Montauban (later of Tarbes and Lourdes) who had been imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp for voicing his opposition to Hitler's regime of occupation and to the deportation of Jews, agreed to lead the project. The organization progressively "internationalized" its scope by dropping its reference to only Germany and became dedicated to the achievement of peace through the instauration of the reign of Christ on earth ("Crusade of prayers for the Nations"). Under the presidency of Paris Archbishop Mgr. Maurice Feltin (1950-1965), the movement now known as Pax Christi International (hereinafter PCI) was officially recognized by the Holy See (1952), as an international Catholic movement dedicated to the promotion of peace in observance of the Catholic doctrine's principles mediated by the Church's authority.¹¹⁶ From these brief notes, we should recognize the clear imprint of an intransigent matrix here: the only source of salvation for modern societies devastated by the war was the return to the Catholic Church, which held the key to a peaceful configuration of the relations among peoples and Nations. The same name chosen for the "crusade of prayers" – *pax Christi in regno Christi* – explicitly echoed a pivotal theme of the intransigent culture, that is the sovereignty of Christ in the temporal sphere. Not by chance, it had already gained fame as the papal motto of Pius XI. The employment of prayers as a medium to facilitate and accelerate the realization of God's plan was another sign that Pax Christi was consciously

¹¹⁶ The history of the international movement Pax Christi, and of its French section, have been reconstructed by François Mabille, *Les catholiques et la paix au temps de la guerre froide*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004, pp. 5-130 for the origins. The official reconstructions of Pax Christi's history generally put the stress on the aspect of reconciliation between France and Germany as the original mission of the movement; more properly, Mabille has underlined how the goal of the founders was Germany's "catholicization". The "official" version is still reported on the association's website: see www.paxchristi.net/about-us/history.

enrolled in a centuries-old tradition that Church historians have aptly described with the term “politicization of religion”.¹¹⁷ Finally, the term “crusade” evoked a militant attitude that was particularly consonant with the approach of Pius XII, who had been very open to the movement since its early stages, as well as recalling initiatives by Catholic Action in the interwar period, like the Eucharistic Crusade.¹¹⁸

After the Second World War, as we have already reported, the Church identified international Communism as the major obstacle to the establishment of peace. The unity of the human family could not be achieved until an irredeemable heresy – much more dangerous than the less-than-optimal Liberal capitalistic system of the West – divided the international community into highly conflicting spheres. It should not come as a surprise, then, that the historical evolution undertaken by PXI’s mission during the 1950s contemplated the taking of a definitive anti-Communist stance. More precisely, the dissemination of the Catholic doctrine on peace as it was shaped by Magisterial documents – the principal goal of the international movement – also served the purpose of counterbalancing the Communist engagement in the peace movement, especially through the so-called Partisans of Peace. Founded in April 1949, and officially becoming the World Peace Council in 1950, the organization’s goal was uniting and mobilising increasingly wide sectors of international public opinion in favour of peace, regardless of ideological and political convictions. Their principal reference point, however, was easily found in the USSR (which financed and

¹¹⁷ See the already cited Moro, *Religion and politics in the time of secularization*. The most famous and successful example of this trend is probably the political use of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, in view of a “re-Christianization” of society: see Daniele Menozzi, *Sacro Cuore. Un culto tra devozione interiore e restaurazione Cristiana della società*, Roma: Viella, 2001. About the role of prayers in the Catholic reaction to the processes of secularization of the modern age see the synthesis of Maria Paiano, *Preghiera, culto, devozione*, in Giuseppe Alberigo, Giuseppe Ruggieri and Roberto Rusconi (coord.), *Il Cristianesimo: grande atlante*, vol. II: *Ordinamenti, gerarchie, pratiche* (edited by Giuseppe Ruggieri), Torino: UTET, 2006, in part. pp. 768-70, while the more general role played by the liturgy has been addressed in EAD., *Liturgia e società nel Novecento: percorsi del movimento liturgico di fronte ai processi di secolarizzazione*, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2000, pp. 5-147.

¹¹⁸ The official papal blessing of the movement came on the occasion of its 1952 Congress, focused on the Cold War, with a very sympathetic speech (13/9/1952): see AAS, vol. 44, 1952, pp. 818-23. See some notes on the Eucharistic Crusade, in particular in the Belgian context, in Patricia Quaghebeur, *L'influence du père Pope et de la Croisade Eucharistique sur l'éducation religieuse de la jeunesse en Flandre/Belgique (1920-1945)*, in Mélanie Lanouette (ed.), *Du “par coeur” au cœur. Formation religieuse catholique et renouveau pédagogique en Europe et en Amérique du Nord au XX^e siècle. Actes du colloque de Louvain-La-Neuve, 27 avril 2007*, Louvain-La-Neuve: UCL Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2009, pp. 56-86.

supported the movement), and their line of conduct did not shy away from aggressively attacking the Vatican for its supposed alignment with Western powers.¹¹⁹ PXI defined itself as an ecclesial movement devoted to spreading the superiority of the Catholic principles, which should guide the behavior of citizens and governments so as to eliminate the causes of conflict within the international community, throughout the world. The characteristic battles of the international movement during the 1950s (namely against the atomic bomb and for the material and moral progress of developing countries)¹²⁰ must be contextualized within this traditional model of Christendom, where the chart of values of the Catholic religion provided the solution to any problem of the contemporary age.

The 1960s opened a new era for the international movement, which almost paradigmatically experienced that transition from traditional to New Universalism which we have described at length in general terms. The replacement of card. Feltin with card. Bernard Alfrink, Archbishop of Utrecht and one of the most prominent advocates of *aggiornamento*,¹²¹ as the president of PXI in 1964, is symbolic of this shift. Obviously, there was no abrupt switch from old to new, but rather a slow “change of climate”, as we have labeled it, carried out by Catholic theologians and intellectuals and “officialized” by John XXIII – *Pacem in terris* would become the “bible” of PXI – and the Council, which deeply influenced the history of the organization. As a result of these incremental changes, the key features of the new approach – achievement of peace through cooperation and dialogue, protection of human rights, especially the right to religious liberty, and international social justice, i.e. a special commitment to the destiny of the Third World – were placed at the center of the

¹¹⁹ See Philippe Buton, *Le pacifisme communiste de la seconde guerre mondiale à la guerre froide*, in Maurice Vaïsse (ed.), *Le pacifisme en Europe: Dès années 1920 aux années 1950*, Bruxelles: Bruylants, 1993, pp. 303-24; Günther Wernicke, *The Communist-led World Peace Council and the Western Peace Movements: The Fetters of Bipolarity and Some Attempts to Break Them in the Fifties and Early Sixties*, in “Peace & Change”, issue 3, 1998, pp. 265-311, and, for a focus on the Italian context, Andrea Mariuzzo, *Stalin and the dove: Left pacifist language and choices of expression between the Popular Front and the Korean War (1948–1953)*, in “Modern Italy”, issue 1, 2010, pp. 21-35.

¹²⁰ Mabille, *Les catholiques et la paix au temps de la guerre froide*, pp. 199-224.

¹²¹ The biography of this influential cardinal has been written by Tom H.M. van Schaik, *Alfrink: een biografie*, Amsterdam: Antos, 1997. Alfrink participated in all the sessions of Vatican II – where he brought Dutch theologian Edward Schillebeeckx (1914-2009) as theological adviser, becoming instrumental in the drafting of the dogmatic Constitution on the Church, *Lumen Gentium*: some notes in Schelkens, Mettepenning and Dick, *Aggiornamento? Catholicism from Gregory XVI to Benedict XVI*, p. 151.

movement's initiatives, which ranged from campaigns in favor of conscientious objectors to rallies against the war, from manifestations for the tutelage of human rights to the collaboration with international institutions and organizations on the most pressing issues concerning the international community.¹²² This evolution should not surprise us: a Church-related movement devoted to the diffusion of the Catholic doctrine on peace followed the evolution which took place at the level of the Magisterium's discourse, replacing Traditional Universalism with New Universalism as the mainstream approach to the idea of international community. Obviously, such an evolution was not only the outcome of a top-down dynamic, since the mental shift which took place at the base level – the reception of the 1960s cultural revolution – would also be an element to factor in the equation. Here, however, we are mostly interested in the variations of the discourse.

In this respect, PXI did not remain immune to the challenges which shook the Catholic world in the post-Council era; on the contrary, the organization's discourse was influenced by radical stances, that drew inspiration from the culture of Liberation, even if they did not match the level that we have observed, for instance, mentioning the elaboration of Pax Romana. We would argue, instead, that PXI's discourse represented one of the possible developments of the new universalist paradigm. In order to demonstrate this statement, we will focus on a peculiar initiative, namely the talks between PXI and the Orthodox Church (which officially started in 1974, but the preparation was begun some years earlier). Although this may seem only tangential to our subject, on the contrary, we will see how this brief analysis will allow us both to elaborate further on the features of the Catholic idea of international community, studying new interactions between our categories, and to take into account the role of Pax Christi's Italian section, and in particular of its president Mgr. Luigi Bettazzi (b. 1923), Bishop of Ivrea, who in 1978 replaced Alfrink as the president of

¹²² See an account of PXI's activities in the Bulletins published by Pax Christi's Secretariat – which moved from France to the Netherlands in 1964, and later to Belgium in 1978 –, normally issued every 3/4 months. I have consulted PXI's archive in Nijmegen, at the Katholiek Documentatie Centrum (KDC) of the Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (hereinafter KDC, PXI).

Pax Christi International. Before addressing this topic, then, we are going to introduce the third main Italian protagonist of our story, *Pax Christi Italia*.

PAX CHRISTI ITALIA

Pax Christi Italia (hereinafter PXIT) was officially established in 1954 through the efforts of Mgr. Montini, at the time Substitute to the Secretary of State (just a few months before being “transferred” to Milan).¹²³ The birth of a Church movement composed of lay and religious people, whose mission was to propagate the Catholic doctrine on peace, suited Montini’s idea of an articulated and plural Catholic world, which looked to the Church’s authority as a unifying doctrinal center. Unfortunately, there is no scholarly history of *Pax Christi Italia*, which could give us an idea of the consistency and composition of the organization’s membership, or of its links with other associations of the Catholic laity.¹²⁴ We have reconstructed some historical notes by consulting PXI’s archival funds in Nijmegen (as regards the communications between the Italian section and the international organization), and of the bulletins of the movement for the decades that we are concerned with. These sources suggest that PXIT has had a rather difficult and marginal history, at least until the beginning of the 1970s, while during the 1980s it emerged as a recognized and consolidated reality of Italian Catholic associationism under the leadership of Mgr. Tonino Bello and became renowned at national level for its initiatives in favour of peace. The first president was

¹²³ In 1949, actually, an Italian section of PXI was created, as we can infer from a pamphlet published in 1962 on the occasion of Mgr. Carlo Rossi’s – the first president – Jubilee celebrations, but it was only made official in 1954 by the future Paul VI. Montini had followed the history of Pax Christi since its early stages, directly reporting to Pius XII about the nature and perspectives of the movement: see Mabille, *Les catholiques et la paix au temps de la guerre froide*, pp. 52-53. John XXIII had also been interested in the early phases of the international movement’s history, when he was apostolic nuncio in Paris, due to his friendship with Mgr. Feltin: see Roncalli’s recollection during the second Congress of PXI, in Vicenza in June 1956, in Venetian newspaper “La voce dei Berici”, 8 July 1956. There is no official archive of *Pax Christi Italia*, but most of the documents left from the 1960s and the 1970s are held in Ivrea (where the most active group was established). I would like to thank Pax Christi’s activist Giuliana Bonino for having let me consult the movement’s bulletins and documents, among them the abovementioned pamphlet and newspaper’s article.

¹²⁴ For a brief account of the movement’s history, written by one of its most engaged activists, see Giuliana Bonino, *La vicenda di Pax Christi Italia*, in “Pax Christi”, issue 11, 1985, pp. 22-23. There are, instead, some historical accounts of the itineraries of other national sections: see in particular, as well as the work of Mabille on France, Niek Megens and Hilde Reiding, *Bewegen binnen smalle marges. Pax Christi Nederland, 1965-1990*, Nijmegen: Studiecentrum voor vredesvraagstukken, KU Nijmegen, 1999; Isabelle Boydens, *Un mouvement pour la paix au coeur des tensions nationales et internationales: Pax Christi. Histoire de la section francophone belge (1953-1975)*, in “Belgische Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis. Revue belge d’histoire contemporaine”, issues 3-4, 1994-1995, pp. 481-537, and Luc van de Weyer, *De kater van de oorlog. Waarom de katholieken actief werden in de vredesbeweging*, Antwerpen: Pax Christi, 1993.

Biella's Bishop Carlo Rossi (1891-1981), while the ecclesiastical national delegate was Alba's Bishop Fausto Vallainc (1917-1987). The Statutes of PXIT, approved in 1955, were modeled on those of the international organization: the movement's mission was to spread the Church's Teachings about peace, organize "crusades of prayers" for world peace and promote studies and exchanges of ideas on "everything that could be a factor of universal peace", in order to facilitate the establishment of a friendly spirit among people and nations, "in compliance with the directives of the ecclesiastical authority".¹²⁵

For most of its existence in the period that we are addressing, the Italian section of PXI faced severe organizational challenges, which often questioned whether it could even stay alive as a national reality. The national secretariat – guided by Spartaco Gagnesi – was in Rome, but the most active groups were in the Northwestern side of the peninsula, especially in the area between Vercelli and Ivrea (North-East of Turin), where the dioceses of the first president and ecclesiastical national delegate were located.¹²⁶ Some members also tried to organize activities in Central Italy (Siena, Florence, Rome), mostly on an informal basis, without a significant coordination at national level. Not by chance, the most successful event planned by PXIT, that is the 1964 national Route – the trade-mark manifestation of the movement, devoted to *Pacem in terris*, was organized in Piedmont, with a pilgrimage toward Oropa's sanctuary.¹²⁷ This annual event usually consisted of a walking pilgrimage to a significant place and had a main theme. The first international route (i.e.

¹²⁵ KDC, PXI, box 55, my translations.

¹²⁶ The contacts with PXI were normally maintained by the Piedmont section, in particular by Gianni Valerio, who in the early 1970s became PXIT national secretary. On more than one occasion, Valerio expressed his concerns about the inefficacy of the Italian structure to the PXI Secretariat: see for instance the letter of 4/10/1968 to Carel ter Maat (who had replaced Bernard Lalande as international secretary after the relocation of the organization's board from France to the Netherlands), in KDC, PXI, box 55.

¹²⁷ The route was organized in a classical way: the participants gathered in various cities of the region on August 16, with the goal of reaching Oropa's sanctuary – built to host a black wooden statue of the Virgin Mary, that according to legend had been carved by Saint Luke and brought back from Jerusalem by Saint Eusebius of Vercelli in the 4th century – after a 10-days pilgrimage during which they would have discussed the theme of the event: John's last encyclical. The preparation of the initiative occupied most of PXIT's bulletins for the whole year: see in particular "Pax Christi", issues 3, 6, 10, 1964. PXIT has recently celebrated the 50-year anniversary of the Route with a walk from Vercelli to Oropa (October 2014), concluded by a lectio magistralis of Mgr. Luigi Bettazzi on the subject of "peace from the Council to *Evangelii gaudium*".

route with international participation) took place in 1952 from Assisi to Rome, where the participants received Pius's blessing in St. Peter's square.

The phase from 1968 to 1971 was undoubtedly the most difficult for the movement, which even found itself on the verge of dissolution. The same waves of unrest and contestation that hit other Catholic laity organizations like ACLI and FUCI threatened to flood the weaker structures of PXIT. In 1968 President Mario Castellano (1913-2007, Siena's Metropolite appointed to the PXIT presidency in 1959) resigned and was replaced at the end of the year by Ivrea's Bishop Luigi Bettazzi. Piedmont's group took the reins of the movement, which for a few years remained active only in the North.¹²⁸ The Statutes were abrogated, and the ecclesiastical identity of the movement was called into question: at the Congress of Bergamo (October 1970) a significant minority of the Assembly proposed stopping the group's activities, since other peace movements seemed better suited to interpreting the current historical situation, and "the link with the Hierarchy does not respond to the instances of the secularization process" (while others argued that the function of the movement was superfluous after the foundation of the Pontifical Commission *Justitia et Pax*).¹²⁹ Things began to go back to normal, from an organizational perspective, starting with Bologna's Congress of 1973, when the new Statutes were approved and the link with the Catholic Church was reinstated.¹³⁰ Thereafter, the activities of the Italian section regained momentum: the membership figures, according to Giuliana Bonino, grew from 100-150 people at the end of the 1960s to about 700 at the beginning of the 1980s, with about 1000 subscriptions to the bulletin. Bettazzi's presidency brought a new dynamism to PXIT, whose trademark initiatives – in particular, the classical Routes and the New Year's Eve "Peace Marches", which began in 1968 – attracted a

¹²⁸ Castellano wrote directly to Alfrink in August 1968, to underline the crisis of the Italian section – he had already resigned, but CEI had not been able to find a replacement yet; the situation did not improve immediately after the appointment of Bettazzi, as we may infer from a letter of international secretary ter Maat to Italian secretary Valerio in October 1969, where he stated to be aware of the difficulties of the Italian case. Still in 1972, Valerio acknowledged great organizational problems, while in October 1973 he confessed that "we are almost bankrupt": see the letters of 24/10/1972 and 17/3/1974 in KDC, PXI, box 55.

¹²⁹ "Pax Christi", issue 1, 1970, my translation. The crisis of PXIT was also symbolized by the interruption of the Bulletins' regular publication (only two issues were published between 1968 and 1970), which started again in 1972, with quarterly frequency.

¹³⁰ "Pax Christi", issue 2, 1973.

conspicuous number of young people, up to several hundred on the occasion of the international Routes held in Italy, for instance in Calabria in 1976.¹³¹

Given these few historical notes, we may spend some words on the cultural elaboration of the Italian movement, which pertains more properly to our study. What kind of idea of international community emerges from PXIT's main publications and initiatives? In the first decade and a half after the movement's foundation we can observe a trend similar to the one outlined for the international organization: the Italian section was essentially devoted to spreading the official Catholic teachings on peace, through a constant reference to the Magisterium's elaboration, especially to the discourse of the pope.¹³² This "spiritual phase" was obviously influenced by the determinations of the Council, which encouraged autonomous initiatives of the laity in the temporal sphere, according to the principles established by the authority. Typically, in commenting upon the recent *Gaudium et Spes*, in 1966 Mgr. Castellano argued that

Christians do not only have the right and duty to insert themselves in the international field through charity; they need to be present in the community of peoples, so as to awaken all men and spur them on into cooperation [...] to establish among men the order decided by God, which asks for cooperation in every initiative that enables the man to live a life worth living. It is the task of the People of God, following the word and the example of the Bishops, to relieve the misery of our times.¹³³

The drive toward social engagement was drastically accentuated by the process of radicalization which characterized the Catholic world at the end of the 1960s, which also affected – albeit with a lower degree of intensity than other now-familiar organizations – the seemingly quiet life of *Pax Christi Italia*. Ivrea's bishop Luigi Bettazzi was called from the Italian Episcopal Conference to

¹³¹ "Pax Christi", issue 1, 1977.

¹³² In the first decade since the movement's foundation, the Bulletin's issues (which started from 1955) were often characterized by the publication of interventions of the pope or of the Italian Catholic hierarchy, and by the invitation to pray as the most fruitful action that the faithful could do to contribute to the advancement of peace.

¹³³ See Mario Castellano, *Questa è la pace della Chiesa*, in "Pax Christi", issue 3, 1966, p. 5 (my translation).

preside over the movement in this delicate phase: from that moment onwards, PXIT would have been widely influenced by his spirituality.¹³⁴

Born in Treviso in 1923, Bettazzi was ordained bishop in 1963 in Bologna by Cardinal Giacomo Lercaro, in time to participate in three sessions of the Second Vatican Council.¹³⁵ Under the request of Bologna's Archbishop, he attended the meetings of the Belgian College, developing a peculiar sensitivity to the theme of poverty within and outside the Church.¹³⁶ His ideas were profoundly marked by his experience in the Council, which he interpreted as a revolutionary, and long-awaited, opening of the Church to the modern world. The dialogue with any interlocutor, even (and especially) with the more distant from a religious conception of the world, characterized the whole cultural itinerary of Ivrea's bishop, and caused him a good deal of troubles with the Italian hierarchy, within which he always occupied a peripheral position.¹³⁷ The Council also sharpened his conviction that faith was not only related to the intimate sphere of one's own conscience, but it also had a direct impact on the behavior of the faithful in society. These two fundamental orientations reflected on the discourse on the international community, which was more consistently developed by Bettazzi after his appointment to PXIT's presidency. Not surprisingly, his thinking showed a high level of consistency with the new universalist paradigm, with a special insistence on the issue of international social justice.¹³⁸ In the eyes of the Italian bishop, the Church (understood as the

¹³⁴ Bettazzi joked about the reasons for his appointment, which came as a surprise for him since he had never directly dealt with PXIT, stating that he was chosen just because he was a bishop, relatively young and from a small diocese: see Luigi Bettazzi, *Lettera di presentazione*, in "Pax Christi", single issue, 1968.

¹³⁵ A recent biography of Luigi Bettazzi, who is still an active speaker and author, has been written by priest and PXIT activist Alberto Vitali, *Luigi Bettazzi. Il progetto e l'azione di un costruttore di pace*, Milano: Edizioni San Paolo, 2013. Bettazzi himself has dealt on more than one occasion with the subject of his personal and spiritual biography: see in particular *Farsi uomo. Confessioni di un vescovo*, Torino: Gribaudo, 1977, and *In dialogo con i lontani. Memorie e riflessioni di un vescovo un po' laico*, Roma: Aliberti, 2009. Before the ordination, Bettazzi had been FUCI's national vice-assistant, and archiepiscopal delegate for Catholic Action in Bologna.

¹³⁶ As mentioned in the first chapter, the "Belgian college" was an informal pressure group – composed by influential theologians like Congar and Chenu, and bishops like Georges Mercier and Helder Camara – created in order to influence the outcome of conciliar documents, especially about the attitude of the Church toward the poor. See an "updated" reflection on this subject in Luigi Bettazzi, *La Chiesa dei poveri: dal Concilio a papa Francesco*, Verucchio: Pazzini, 2014. Giacomo Lercaro, as it is well known, was one of most influential advocates of the *aggiornamento*: for a first introduction to this man, who played a prominent and highly controversial role in the Italian hierarchy, see Giuseppe Alberigo (ed.), *Giacomo Lercaro vescovo della Chiesa di Dio (1891-1976)*, Genova: Marietti, 1991.

¹³⁷ Bettazzi, *In dialogo coi lontani*, pp. 70-73.

¹³⁸ See for instance Luigi Bettazzi, *Il ruolo di Pax Christi*, in "Pax Christi", issue 1, 1970, and ID., *Se vuoi la pace lavora per la giustizia*, in "Pax Christi", issue 2, 1971. The encyclical *Populorum progressio*, praised in both articles,

people of God) should take care of the disadvantaged and the oppressed, so as to stay true to the message delivered and embodied by Jesus Christ, and counteract the influence of alluring secular ideologies. Justice was the key word guiding the behavior of the Christian both on the international stage and in the private sphere. We can read a brief excerpt of Bettazzi's prose in the original Italian:

La Chiesa che forse in passato era portata a difendere per istinto l'ordine costituito, col rischio di non avvertire per tempo le legittime esigenze portate avanti dale istanze dei settori più emarginati della società e alla fine sfociati in rivoluzione [...], la Chiesa dicevo riscopre più che mai oggi il suo compito di illuminare la coscienza dei singoli e dei popoli per richiamarli al senso trascendente della vita e a una più effettiva solidarietà nella storia. [...] Lo sforzo di comprensione reciproca, di rispetto autentico, di aiuto sincero ed efficace all'interno della famiglia, coi compagni di lavoro, nelle situazioni più insignificanti della vita di tutti i giorni ci aiuteranno a sentire il nostro apporto alle rivendicazioni dei popoli e degli oppressi non alla luce amara dell'ostilità e dell'odio ma in quella costruttiva di una forte solidarietà e di un profondo amore.¹³⁹

This kind of reasoning presented an evident “new universalist imprint”, that was nonetheless open to the culture of Liberation. More precisely, Bettazzi's and PXIT's discourses drew upon the vocabulary of liberation, but at the same time they steered clear of a revolutionary reading of international relations and of the straightforward employment of Marxist tools of analysis. A paradigmatic example concerns the PXIT's attitude to the Vietnam war: in 1973 – when the Paris Peace Accords were first tested – the Italian section hosted the third meeting of the international assembly of Christians in solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Bettazzi opened the proceedings – which had met with suspicion from CEI – underlining how the Gospel was a “message of liberation”, not to be understood as instigation to revolt, but as the vehicle of a

was undoubtedly the Magisterium's document that most closely represented Bettazzi's vision, and one of the most quoted pronouncements in his interventions.

¹³⁹ Bettazzi, *Se vuoi la pace lavora per la giustizia*, pp. 2-3, my translation.

spirit of solidarity, dialogue, reconciliation between opposite ideologies.¹⁴⁰ In the final statement, the assembly asked Vietnam's religious authority to

Do their best to facilitate the national reconciliation, confident that non-Christians, and in particular the revolutionaries, forgetting yesterday's bloody fights, will acknowledge the Christians as true partners for the construction of a new society, grounded in the authentic values of human dignity and freedom.¹⁴¹

This attitude was perfectly in line with the discourse of Pax Christi International, which in 1974 wrote a letter to the Synod of Bishops, the pope and the national episcopal Conferences addressing the subject of peace in the current world situation. According to the reflection of PXI – which the Italian section proposed as a theoretical reference to its members – the “global structures of dependence and institutionalized violence” forced the majority of the world population to live in unacceptable conditions, where the enjoyment of their basic rights was impossible, and the last option available to them seemed to be the recourse to violence. The role of the Church and the faithful, in this context, should involve working concretely for the rights of the poor, not through the endorsement of international class conflict, but instead through dialogue and communication with any interlocutor.¹⁴² This general attitude was actually put into practice in a specific initiative, that is the talks between PXI and the Russian Orthodox Church, which struck us as a fitting illustration of a practical outcome of the new universalist paradigm – an outcome in which Bettazzi played a significant part – showing both the distance from its traditional version and the differences with the culture of Liberation.

THE TALKS WITH THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

When the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches – an inter-church organization founded in 1948 with ecumenical purposes – met in Utrecht in 1972, several representatives of the

¹⁴⁰ See Bettazzi's text, and an account of the works, in “Pax Christi”, issue 3, 1973. Since holding the Conference, Bettazzi became friendly with the Vietnamese revolutionary government, so that after the reunification of the country he was able to travel to Vietnam several times and to play a small but significant role in the mediation between the regime and the local Church. See Vitali, *Luigi Bettazzi*, pp. 103-108.

¹⁴¹ “Pax Christi”, issue 3, 1973, my translation.

¹⁴² See “Pax Christi”, issue 3, 1974, where the PXI document was published.

Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) paid a visit to Cardinal Alfrink as president of Pax Christi International. On that occasion it was agreed that a bilateral talk between ROC and PCI would take place in 1974. That meeting, held in Vienna, was the beginning of a series of regular encounters, that has continued until the present day, focused on peace problems, East-West relations and the role of Churches in the peace movement.¹⁴³ This initiative must be contextualized at least from a dual perspective, that of the history of ecumenism in the Catholic Church and of the Cold War. Indeed, such a dialogue would have been very difficult to imagine just a few decades earlier.

As is well known, the ecumenical drive had not traditionally been a distinctive feature – to put it mildly – of the Catholic Church; in this respect, the changes experimented with by the Catholic doctrine in less than half a century, from the encyclical *Mortalium animos* (1928) to the Conciliar decree *Unitatis redintegratio* (1965), are fairly spectacular, and represent one of the most significant victories of the advocates of *aggiornamento*. In broad terms, the perspective of the “return to Rome” as the only acceptable solution to the division of Christian Churches, which was still predominant in Pius’s encyclical, was replaced by a more open attitude to non-Catholic denominations, focused on the search for common elements. Quoting the words of a distinguished historian of the ecumenical movement, in just a few decades the Catholic Church had “completely revised its judgment on the desires of reunion of Christianity”.¹⁴⁴ The same dynamic characterized the history of Pax Christi: in the early 1950s, for instance, the contacts entertained between the Belgian section and the Protestant *Mouvement Chrétien de la Paix* (MCP) were criticized and then

¹⁴³ The files regarding the contacts between PCI and ROC can be consulted in KDC, PCI, in particular in boxes 68, 69, 150 and 340. See the summary “Russian Orthodox Church as discussion partner of Pax Christi International”, written by Dutch theologian and Church historian Wim Rood (1925-1993), author of the book *Rome Moskou 1970-1989. Historische notities bij het thema “Betrekkingen tussen de H. Stoel en Rusland c.q. de Sovjet-Unie in de periode 1917 tot 1989”*, Nijmegen: Stichting Koinonoutes/Communicantes, 1994, in KDC, PCI, 150.

¹⁴⁴ Étienne Fouilloux, *Les catholiques et l’unité chrétienne du XIX^e au XX^e siècle. Itinéraires européens d’expression française*, Paris: Le Centurion, 1982, p. 928. See also Mauro Velati, *Una difficile transizione: il cattolicesimo tra unionismo ed ecumenismo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996, and, about the debate on the decree *Unitatis redintegratio* and its meaning, Claude Soetens, *The Ecumenical Commitment of the Catholic Church*, in Alberigo (coord.), *History of Vatican II*, vol. III, pp. 257-345. A typical example is given by the dialogue between the Anglicans and the Roman Catholics, which was attempted during the 1920s through the “Malines conversations” – with the pivotal role of card. Mercier, and Belgian Benedictine monk dom Lambert Beaudouin – but was soon stopped by the Catholic hierarchy, to be resumed only during the 1960s. See Adelbert Denaux and John A. Dick (eds.), *From Malines to Arcic. The Malines Conversations Commemorated*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997.

stopped by the Vatican Secretary of State, represented by Mgr. Montini, who underlined the “dangerous conception of interconfessionalism” and the “doubtful action in favor of Church unity” carried on by the MCP, forbidding Pax Christi to promote further collaboration with it.¹⁴⁵ However, from the early 1960s onwards, the international movement was highly committed to deepening the dialogue between Catholicism and other religions, putting into practice the indications of the Council and the guiding principle of Paul’s pontificate.

Setting up a regular exchange of views with the Orthodox Church also had other implications, since the recent history of Moscow’s patriarchy was inextricably connected to the Soviet regime: in 1942, after two decades of severe repression, Stalin had decided to loosen his destructive grip on the ROC, because of concerns regarding wartime efforts and postwar geopolitical order. Patriarch Sergii (replaced in 1945 by Alexis I) chose to collaborate with the Communist regime, in order to assure the institutional survival of the Church; this decision led to the subordination of the ROC to the Communist party. This subordinate position was particularly evident in the field of external relations: the Russian Orthodox Churches engaged in several ecumenical activities and in many international forums, promoting a respectable image of the Soviet State and publicizing its propagandistic views on peace and disarmament, while neglecting to denounce its totalitarian features.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, by opening a line of dialogue with the religious institution led by Patriarch Pimen (1970-1990), PXI also took a stand in the context of the relations between the Catholic Church and Communist countries, supporting the conciliatory efforts made by Vatican *Ostpolitik* and other analogous initiatives. It is useful to restate that this attitude did not imply a softening of the condemnation of the Communist doctrine, but rather was one of the implementations of the new

¹⁴⁵ See Mabille, *Les catholiques et la paix au temps de la guerre froide*, pp. 156-61 (the intervention of Montini, my translation, is quoted at p. 160), and Boydens, *Un mouvement pour la paix au coeur des tensions nationales et internationales*, pp. 494-95.

¹⁴⁶ See as general contextualizations Steven Merritt Miner, *Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945*, Chapel Hill/London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, and Adriano Roccucci, *Stalin e il Patriarca. La Chiesa ortodossa e il potere sovietico*, Torino: Einaudi, 2011. For an analysis of the role of the ROC in post-Communist Russian politics – which continues to see the Church in the position of “junior partner” of the government, but with some areas of independence – see Irina Papkova, *The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, and Katja Richters, *The post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church. Politics, Culture and Greater Russia*, Routledge, 2013.

approach inaugurated by John XXIII and the Council; to coin a phrase, a passage from excommunication to confrontation.¹⁴⁷ In any case, the change of climate from the rigid Anticommunism of the 1950s was striking: from our point of view, this reversal perfectly represents the transition from traditional to New Universalism, which led to a new, more positive engagement in the life of the international community.

The contents of such a dialogue are significant as well: in the discussion paper prepared by Dutch theologian Wim Rood before the second meeting with the ROC (Vienna, 18-20 November 1974), the stress was put on the subject of peace understood as a dynamic notion, whose meaning was bound to change over time and depended on different contexts. Christians, since they were “conscious of [their] fundamental limitation and of man's inclination to evil”, were especially inclined to peace work, or “the art of accomplishing what is possible”. Diplomacy and dialogue were to be the methodological constants in the behavior of Eastern and Western Christians, who lived in different social systems but shared an identical respect for the dignity of the human being. The main field of cooperation, therefore, was indicated in the “realization of the Universal Declaration of human rights”.¹⁴⁸ The differences from the approach of the ROC's delegation emerged clearly in the introduction paper of Archpriest Nikolai Goundjaev (professor at Leningrad Theological Academy and brother of the current Patriarch of Moscow Kirill), who reflected on the “theological aspects of peace” without referring to the subject of human rights. For him, Christians

¹⁴⁷ From the same perspective we can look at the participation of the PXI in the Berlin and the Prague Conferences, which since the mid-1960s involved Christians from Western and Eastern Europe in order to deal with the issue of peace and potential improvement of relations between West and East. Some files regarding these colloquia can be consulted in KDC, PXI, box 145. In 1971 PXI established a Commission for contacts with Eastern Europe, which was charged with the task of preparing the aforementioned initiatives through the study of the Eastern European situation at social, political and religious levels: see the documents written by the commission during the 1970s in KDC, PXI, box 147. One of the problems that was regularly pointed out by the Commission's members was the difficulty of holding productive meetings – or meetings at all – with Eastern partners, because they were not allowed to exchange views on an unofficial level, while the Communist leadership mostly planned and controlled the results of the official meetings (this was also true for the meetings with the Orthodox Church, since the composition of the ROC delegation and the themes of discussion could not be fixed without the knowledge of the Secretariat for foreign relations of the Patriarchate of Moscow, a secretariat established by the State and exercising supervision over the ROC's foreign contacts). See for instance the preparatory document issued by the Commission on 10/1/1979 on the subject “Pax Christi and Eastern Europe Contacts” (not signed) in KDC, PXI, box 147. The Italian section of PXIT supported these efforts, for instance organizing a meeting of the Prague Conference in Ivrea in May 1975: see “Pax Christi”, issue 1, 1975.

¹⁴⁸ Wim Rood, “Some theses on the theological aspects of peace and on the relations between the Churches”, The Hague, 6/6/1973, in KDC, PXI, box 150.

were supposed to fight the battle between “good and evil in the earthly city”, together with other men of good will (who followed the word of God by nature, even without knowing the Gospels or the Church's Teachings). The goals of this battle were the development of man, the condemnation of wars and violence as means to solve conflicts, but first and foremost the elimination of the causes preventing the establishment of a peaceful international community, that is “racial prejudices, colonialism, social iniquity”. Social justice, then, was far more important than the protection of human rights in order to achieve peace in international relations; from this perspective, PXI encouraged cooperation with Communist-driven movements and initiatives.¹⁴⁹

International social justice was also at the center of PXI's discourse, however, and especially central in the reflections of Mgr. Bettazzi, who had participated in the meetings with the ROC since their beginning. Not surprisingly, then, the president of PXIT tackled the subject in a document about “the interpretations of the concepts of justice and liberty”, in preparation for the third meeting, held in London in May 1978. Bettazzi developed a criticism of the Western concept of liberty, which did not take into account the “hidden conditions which limit the possibilities of living in liberty or even for liberty to exist”; he suggested to speak of liberation instead of liberty, meaning “the realization of the conditions which make for true liberty”.¹⁵⁰ In the eyes of PXIT's president, this could have been a promising field on which to develop common positions between different religious and ideological traditions, because it also incorporated the issue of justice, understood not as emphasis on the judicial aspects of the relations between the citizen and the State – again, per the individualistic Western conception – but as “the value of the fundamental equality of man”, which should have been guaranteed at global level but was currently obstructed by conditions of

¹⁴⁹ Archpriest Nikolai Goundjaev, “Theological aspects of peace. Role of Churches and relations between Churches”, introduction paper for the meeting in Vienna, 18-20/11/1974, in KDC, PXI, box 150. See also, *ibid.*, the relation of Alexei Osipov, professor at the Moscow Theological Academy, at the third meeting between PXI and the ROC (Leningrad, 26-28/4/1976), about “World-wide Questions and Problems including Attitude to the ‘Third World’”. Here Osipov mentioned the problem of human rights, underlining “their limits, their co-relations with the existing law systems of different countries”, quoting a Brezhnev speech which subordinated them to “the interests of the Soviet people”. A recent focus on the ROC's approach to the human rights field has been provided by Kristina Stoeckl, *The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights*, Routledge, 2014 (with a historical overview of the problem at pp. 19-26).

¹⁵⁰ Luigi Bettazzi, “The interpretations of the concepts of justice and liberty, considered from the religious point of view”, discussion paper for the third talk ROC-PX, London May 6- May 10, 1978, in KDC, PXI, box 150.

inequality.¹⁵¹ From this perspective, the Churches and Christian-inspired movements should have focused their attention not only on the Third Word, but more generally on “subordinate and marginalized groups”, on “under-developed and subject nations”, which existed on both the East/West and the North/South axes, with the goal of protecting the dignity of the individual and enabling them to fully enjoy their rights. We can easily trace the guidelines of Bettazzi’s discourse in this approach, characterized by the insistence on the theme of international social justice within a new universalist framework, which in any case did not hesitate to “trespass” into the rhetorical territory of the culture of Liberation.

We are dealing, then, with one of the possible implementations of New Universalism, proposed here as a common platform for ecumenical dialogue, in view of a practical common action within the international community.¹⁵² When Bettazzi became PXI’s president in 1978, he followed the path traced by Alfrink’s presidency, committing the movement to the defense and advancement of human rights (in 1980 a specific Commission was established), to the dialogue with religious and lay institutions or movements on the subject of peace, and to a theme that had become the core of PXIT’s action, i.e. disarmament and arms control.¹⁵³ Pax Christi continued to represent one of the most active standard-bearers of the new universalist worldview, consistently with the recalibration of its discourse, which paralleled the process that we analyzed at general level. This focus on a third protagonist of the institutional Catholic world, then, has shown us yet another possible variation of the relationship between our categories, which helps to shed more light on the Catholic approach to

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* In an addendum to the document (drafted in January 1979), which served as explanation of Bettazzi’s intentions, the Italian bishop highlighted how the notions of “freedom” and “justice” should have been extended “from a formal signification to a substantial signification”. See KDC, PXI, box 150.

¹⁵² In this context we will not focus on the outcomes of these process, since we are mostly interested in the theoretical elaboration of Catholic organizations and personalities on the international community; nonetheless, we can at least mention that the meetings between PXI and ROC did not produce significant results in the short term, as we can infer from the rather generic press releases issued at the end of each round of talks, but they contributed to improve the traditionally difficult relations between the Vatican and Moscow’s Patriarchate, at least until the beginning of the 1990s, when they returned to a state of tension (with Moscow accusing the Roman Catholic Church of trying to poach believers from the Russian Orthodox Church), which seems to be diminishing only now with the current papacy. See for further comments Rood, *Rome Moskou 1970-1989*, and Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁵³ See some notes on PXI’s and PXIT’s activities during Bettazzi’s presidency (both of them ended in 1985) in “Pax Christi”, December 1985, pp. 18-19, and in the interview to Mgr. Bettazzi, *Solidarietà con i popoli e diritti dell’uomo vie della pace*, in “Pax Christi”, February 1985, pp. 3-5.

the idea of international community. A brief journey into the vast and widely uncharted area of non-institutional Italian Catholicism will illustrate other meaningful and sometimes surprising itineraries, which will allow us to come to some general – if provisional – conclusions.

3. The non-institutional Catholic World: Two case studies.

3.1. Father Ernesto Balducci and "Testimonianze". Left Catholicism between Universalism and Liberation.

The turmoil in the Italian Catholic world during the 1960s, as mentioned in the introduction, is evidenced by many social and cultural phenomena that involved both its institutional and non-institutional dimensions. Regarding the latter, one of the most striking developments concerned the proliferation of spontaneous groups, which had a very differentiated but usually short lives, and were generally catalogued under the umbrella category of “Catholic dissent” because of their complicated relationship with the ecclesiastical authority. Their parabola can be interpreted in the context of the second wave of European Left Catholicism, which like its predecessor was especially committed to the issue of social justice, but whose history would be impossible to understand without making reference to the outcomes of the Second Vatican Council, and to the atmosphere of cultural revolution which permeated 1960s Europe, as well as to the “irruption” of the global dimension in the lives of European youth. The comprehensive assessment of their cultural elaboration on the idea of international community, as we argued, would prove an impossible task in the context of a synthetic work; the historian of ideas, however, has a powerful tool at his/her disposal, that is, a great variety of local and national Catholic periodicals, that started to proliferate at the end of the 1950s. Until that time, the Italian Catholic publishing industry was dominated by the orthodox Roman Jesuit magazine “La Civiltà Cattolica”, that for over a century had been the

unofficial and plenty influential voice of the papacy, and by the popular magazine “Famiglia Cristiana”, founded in 1931 with the goal of evangelizing the masses – women in particular – through the diffusion of the Christian doctrine.¹⁵⁴

In 1950, the Milanese Jesuits started the publication of “Aggiornamenti sociali”, which proposed more progressive views than the tradition-oriented “La Civiltà Cattolica”.¹⁵⁵ Starting in the second half of the decade, the panorama of Italian Catholic publications became richer and more diversified: the reader could choose between conservative voices in “Studi Cattolici” (1957) or “L’Ordine Civile”¹⁵⁶ (1959) and progressive ones, represented by “Questitalia” and “Testimonianze”, both founded in 1958. “Questitalia” was a Venice-based monthly periodical headed by Wladimiro Dorigo (1927-2006), and is generally considered the main cultural reference of Catholic dissent.¹⁵⁷ Actually, its editors refused the “Catholic” tag, even if most of its contributors were Catholic intellectuals and the main themes that were addressed concerned the

¹⁵⁴ For a synthesis of the role played by “La Civiltà Cattolica” in the Catholic world, from an internal point of view, see Giuseppe De Rosa S.J., “*La Civiltà Cattolica*”. 150 anni al servizio della Chiesa. 1850-1999, Roma: La Civiltà Cattolica, 1999, while a historical focus on the second postwar has been provided by the already quoted Sani, “*La Civiltà Cattolica*” e la politica italiana nel secondo dopoguerra. About “Famiglia Cristiana” see Mario Marazziti, *Cultura di massa e valori cattolici: il caso di “Famiglia Cristiana”*, in Riccardi (ed.), *Pio XII*, pp. 307-33. “Vita e pensiero”, the magazine of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, published in Milan and especially focused on economics, was also a traditional voice in the panorama of Catholic reviews (it was founded in 1913), while “La scuola cattolica” (1873), “Civitas” (1919) and “Rivista del clero italiano” (1920) respectively dealt with education, political culture and theology (without forgetting the already quoted Catholic graduates’ periodical “Studium”). As is well known, the spearhead of Catholic media strategy was the newspaper “L’Osservatore romano”. For a brief history of Catholic “institutional” information and communications techniques, see Gianfranco Zizola, *L’informazione in Vaticano: da Pio IX a Giovanni Paolo II*, Verucchio: Pazzini, 2002, while some long-term trends in the relations between Catholics and the media, as well as the analysis of specific case studies, have been sketched by the workshop “Catholics, Modernity and the Media”, organized by the academic network “The Catholic Church, Modernisation and Modernity in Contemporary Europe” (Rome, Academia Belgica, June 2014).

¹⁵⁵ See Italo Vaccarini, “*Aggiornamenti sociali*”. Cinquant’anni di storia 1950-2000, Milano: Edizioni San Fedele, 2000.

¹⁵⁶ “Studi cattolici”, linked to Opus Dei, was a theological review, while “L’Ordine Civile” became one of the unofficial cultural sources of the Italian political right. See some notes about this milieu in the following contributions: Cesare Cavalleri, *I trent’anni di “Studi cattolici”*, in “Diocesi di Milano-Terra ambrosiana”, issue 6, 1986, pp. 45-47; the collection of “Studi cattolici” editorials written by long-time director Cesare Cavalleri in Cesare Cavalleri, *Editoriali: con la storia dei primi cinquant’anni di “Studi cattolici”*, edited by Alessandro Zaccuri and Silvia Stucchi, Roma: Ares, 2006, and Giovanni Tassani, *La cultura politica della destra cattolica*, Roma: Coines, 1976, *passim*.

¹⁵⁷ See for instance Tiziana Di Maio, *Il Sessantotto nella stampa cattolica*, in Matilde de Pasquale, Giovanni Dotoli and Mario Selvaggio (eds.), *I linguaggi del Sessantotto*, proceedings of the multi-disciplinary Conference organized by Libera Università degli Studi “San Pio V” (Rome, 15-17 May 2008), Roma: Apes, 2008, p. 240.

political organization of Catholics, and their role in postwar Italy.¹⁵⁸ Like many of the periodicals that belonged to that area and were founded in the following years such as the Florentine “Note di cultura” or the Neapolitan “Il Tetto”, though, “Questitalia” did not stand the test of time, and was forced to cease publication due to economic difficulties in 1970. Even if these initiatives are highly significant to our understanding of the climate of the post-conciliar season, for the purpose of our investigation it is best to follow the trajectory of a periodical that was able to navigate through those years, in order to show continuities and discontinuities in its editorial line. “Testimonianze” is fit for the job, since the periodical founded in 1958 is still published every month, with the mission of fostering the dialogue among cultures and religions, and promoting the reflection on universal subjects like human rights, respect for the environment, cooperation, solidarity and peace.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, its openness to the international context, understood as the fundamental dimension of the contemporary age, has increased over the years, making the study of its cultural elaboration especially relevant for our argument. In over 50 years of activity, the review has obviously changed, but at its core it has remained a space of cultural research, open to Catholic and non-Catholic voices, focused on current events and more general themes. Every issue in the period that we are investigating, consisted of 100-150 pages, with a few long articles or dossiers, generally followed by the publication of documents and book reviews, all written or chosen by an editorial staff of around 10, almost exclusively men.¹⁶⁰ In the post-conciliar season, as mentioned, the Florentine periodical was one of the main points of reference of Italian progressive Catholicism, and could

¹⁵⁸ See Francesco Sidoti, “*Questitalia*” e la polemica sui temi dell’organizzazione politica dei cattolici, in Sergio (ed.), *Intellettuali cattolici tra riformismo e dissenso: polemiche sull’integralismo, obbedienza e fine dell’unità politica, rifiuto dell’istituzione nelle riviste degli anni Sessanta*, Milano: Edizioni di Comunità, 1975, pp. 165-227.

¹⁵⁹ See the website <http://www.testimonianzeonline.com>. There are several good accounts of the review’s history, in particular Maria Cristina Giuntella, “*Testimonianze*” e l’ambiente cattolico fiorentino, in Ristuccia (ed.), *Intellettuali cattolici tra riformismo e dissenso*, pp. 229-316; Luciano Martini, “*Testimonianze*” 1958-1977, now in ID., *Chiesa e cultura cattolica a Firenze nel Novecento*, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2009, pp. 353-402, and Saresella, *Dal Concilio alla contestazione*, pp. 117-42.

¹⁶⁰ See the note by the first woman to be included in the editorial staff in the 1970s, current Church historian Emma Fattorini, who wrote about *una forte diffidenza verso il femminile* (a strong diffidence about the feminine) among the editorial staff of the review: *Memorie di una generazione*, in De Marco (ed.), *La Pira, Don Milani, padre Balducci*, p. 357.

claim the broadest circulation in the context of the “reviews of the Catholic dissent”, in the order of 6000/7000 copies.¹⁶¹

As historians, however, we need to mention a methodological question here: is it possible for “Testimonianze” to be considered the producer of an organic and consistent editorial line, although it was neither a party organ nor the propagandist of a systemized ideology? In our opinion, the answer is yes, since the group of (on average) young Catholic intellectuals, who embarked on this editorial project in 1958, shared a common view of the task of Christians in the modern world, as they stated in the periodical’s first editorial.¹⁶² The protagonists of its foundation – Mario Gozzini, Lodovico Grassi, Vittorio Citterich, Danilo Zolo, who all became important leaders in the Italian cultural scene¹⁶³ – enjoyed a communion of life and thought that went beyond the publication of “Testimonianze”. All of them contributed to the Christian community “Il Cenacolo”, founded in Florence in the early 1950s and dedicated to charitable activities and assistance to the poor. The unquestioned leader of this group was Father Ernesto Balducci,¹⁶⁴ whose history is inextricably connected to that of “Testimonianze”. Balducci was the main inspirer of the periodical’s editorial line: until 1966, he personally wrote the opening article of every issue, and even after then, he

¹⁶¹ I gathered the information about the figures from research in the “Fondazione Balducci” (it has to be emphasized, however, that most publications about the Catholic progressive reviews lack these figures). These numbers are not comparable, in any case, with those of the Catholic mainstream periodical press, like “Famiglia Cristiana” – which published about 1.5 million copies in the same period – or the magazines of *Azione Cattolica*, whose complimentary press copies were regularly sent to members. Some infos on the features and numbers of the Italian Catholic press at the beginning of the 1980s are in Carlo Capuano, *La stampa cattolica in Italia*, Palermo: Sellerio, 1982.

¹⁶² See “Testimonianze”, issue 1, 1958.

¹⁶³ Mario Gozzini (1920-1999) was a journalist and politician; Lodovico Grassi (b. 1936) is a journalist, now director *emeritus* of “Testimonianze”; Danilo Zolo (b. 1936) is a jurist and professor of philosophy of Law; Vittorio Citterich (1930-2011) was a renowned writer and journalist; see for some further biographical notes Giuntella, “*Testimonianze e l’ambiente cattolico fiorentino*”, pp. 233-35.

¹⁶⁴ The figure of Ernesto Balducci has received significant attention from Italian historiography, thanks to the work of the foundation dedicated to the Italian priest – located at Badia Fiesolana, adjacent to the European University Institute, on the hills around Florence, where Balducci lived and worked for the last three decades of his life – which holds his library and archive, organizes conferences and initiatives and has contributed to the publication of unedited sources: see in particular Ernesto Balducci, *Diari 1940-1978*, 3 volumes, Firenze: Leo Olschki, 2002-2004 (volumes I and II) and Brescia: Morcelliana, 2009 (volume III), as well as the critical bibliography edited by Andrea Ceconi, *Ernesto Balducci. Bibliografia critica 1956-2002*, Fiesole: Fondazione Balducci, 2002. Among the scientific contributions about Balducci, see Bruna Bocchini Camaiani, *Ernesto Balducci. La chiesa e la modernità*, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2002; Luciano Martini, *La laicità nella profezia. Cultura e fede in Ernesto Balducci*, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2002, and Bocchini Camaiani (ed.), *Ernesto Balducci. La chiesa, la società, la pace*. International literature, on the contrary, has not dedicated much attention to his figure, although Balducci’s books have been translated into English, French, German and Spanish: an English-written account, focused on a philosophical approach, has been provided by Mary Malucchi, *A Novel “Planetary Man”: From the Philosophical Paradigm of Modernity to Contemporary Anthropological Mutation: The Perspective of Ernesto Balducci*, in “World Futures”, issue 8, 2011, pp. 519-30.

published essays, shorter articles or reviews in almost every issue of the periodical. His influence extended over the “second generation” of the magazine’s animators (like Luciano Martini, Pier Giorgio Camaiani, Pietro De Marco, all of whom would have specialized in religious history)¹⁶⁵ so that for the synthetic purposes of this work, we will consider the cultural elaboration inferable from the issues of “Testimonianze” and from the works of Ernesto Balducci as an internally consistent body of thought, representative of a minority but influential area of the Italian Catholic world.

PIARIST FATHER ERNESTO BALDUCCI (1922-1992). THE CULTURAL ITINERARY OF A NON-TRADITIONAL CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL

Ernesto Balducci, born in Southern Tuscany in 1922, was ordained in 1945, after having completed his education first in Finalborgo (Western Italy), then at “Calasanctianum”, the philosophical-theological college of the Piarists in Rome. At the end of 1944 he went to Florence, where he became acquainted with Giorgio La Pira, beginning a life-long friendship, as well as with other leaders of the city’s lively cultural scene.¹⁶⁶ In the following years, Balducci combined his job as a teacher with many social and cultural initiatives, especially through the charitable association “Il Cenacolo”. His openness to dialogue and encounter with different cultural and religious traditions made him unpopular within the Catholic hierarchy, which under pressure of Florence Archbishop Ermenegildo Florit (1901-1985), assisted by the Prefect of the Holy Office card. Ottaviani, organized his transfer to Rome at the end of the 1950s.¹⁶⁷ In 1963 the Piarist Father was condemned

¹⁶⁵ See the historical reconstructions, obviously connected with personal memoirs, of former director Luciano Martini, “*Testimonianze*” 1958-1977, in part. pp. 353-46, and current director Severino Saccardi, *Pace, diritti umani, laicità: la “nuova frontiera” degli anni Ottanta nell’elaborazione della rivista “Testimonianze”*, in De Marco (ed.), *La Pira, don Milani, padre Balducci*, pp. 437-38.

¹⁶⁶ See the biography written by Andrea Cecconi and Arnaldo Rocchiccioli, *Padre Ernesto Balducci. Una fuga immobile*, Firenze: Società Editrice Fiorentina, 2013, and the interview with Father Balducci edited by Luciano Martini, *Il cerchio che si chiude*, Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 2000² (or. ed. 1986), pp. 36-47 for some considerations on the Florentine period.

¹⁶⁷ “Il Cenacolo” was suspected to be a “center of unorthodox activity”, which also allowed the presence of Communists; the Superior General of the Order of the Pious Schools, Father Vincent Tomek, masked Balducci’s removal making him a general Visitor to the Pious Schools, in order to justify his transfer to Rome. This decision, in any case, allowed Balducci to personally assist in the preparation and the course of the Council, an event which greatly influenced his *Weltanschauung*: see Bocchini Camaiani, *Ernesto Balducci*, pp. 156-65 and 190-201, and Giovanni Turbanti, *La lettura e i commenti di Ernesto Balducci al Concilio*, in Bocchini Camaiani (ed.), *Ernesto Balducci. La*

for defending criminal acts, because he spoke out in favor of conscientious objection; the following year, a private audience with pope Paul VI, for whom he always expressed a personal affection,¹⁶⁸ seemed to give the green light to his return to Florence. However his return was postponed until 1966, when a compromise was reached: Balducci could go back to his adoptive city, but he was to be “confined” in the extra-diocesan abbey of Fiesole, the Badia Fiesolana. This peripheral location would not have stopped the Catholic intellectual from becoming an acclaimed leader in Florence’s cultural scene – his Sunday homilies were always attended by a vast audience, not limited to Catholics – or from cultivating a web of relationships with the most prominent Italian and international theologians and intellectuals, as his rich archives show: among the personalities with whom Balducci had been in contact are theologians Henri de Lubac, Urs von Balthasar, Jean Daniélou, Yves Congar, Italian Catholic intellectuals Raniero La Valle, Mario Gozzini, Vittorino Veronese, Father David Maria Turoldo, and also non-Christian intellectuals like Marxist philosopher Roger Garaudy, or the Italian astrophysicist Margherita Hack.¹⁶⁹ Balducci became a point of reference for Italian progressive Catholicism, in particular, but not only, for the groups of dissent, as we will mention in a few pages, and also gained visibility and recognition on the larger Italian intellectual scene: during the 1980s, his participation in public debates was much requested, because of his commitment to the peace cause that we are going to address.¹⁷⁰ His activity was dramatically and suddenly interrupted by the car crash that ended his life in 1992, the day after his last Conference in San Giovanni in Persiceto (near Bologna).

Chiesa, la società, la pace, pp. 217-73. Balducci’s clashes with the Holy Office have been narrated in first person in Balducci, *Il cerchio che si chiude*, pp. 98-105.

¹⁶⁸ Balducci, *Diari*, vol. III, p. 787. At the same time, Balducci would not have abstained from a harsh criticism of Paul’s conservative management of the post-conciliar phase: see Balducci, *Il cerchio che si chiude*, pp. 120-22.

¹⁶⁹ See Bruna Bocchini Camaiani, Monica Galfré and Nicoletta Silvestri (eds.), *Percorsi d’archivio. L’archivio di Ernesto Balducci*, Firenze: Regione Toscana/Fondazione Balducci, 2000 (also available online). In her essay, *L’intreccio di “pubblico” e “privato”. La ricchezza dell’archivio Balducci*, Monica Galfré, has underlined how Balducci’s activity was characterized by a peculiar intersection of public and private, which makes his personal correspondence just as important as the public one. For some comments on Balducci’s private writing see the monographic number of “Humanitas” edited by Daniele Menozzi, *Ernesto Balducci attraverso i suoi diari*, issue 2, 2006.

¹⁷⁰ See the rich fund of Balducci’s archive dedicated to “Correspondence” for the 1980s: a synthesis in Nicoletta Silvestri, *Archivio privato, I, “Corrispondenza” 1944-1992*, in Bocchini Camaiani, Galfrè and Silvestri (ed.), *Percorsi d’archivio*, pp. 64-74.

Balducci's characterization as a somewhat heretical figure, which could be inferred from these concise biographical notes, would be substantially incorrect. As well as choosing to remain included within the ecclesial community – notwithstanding a constant personal tension between freedom of thought and obedience to the authority, which put him, quoting his words, *alle frontiere dell'inquietudine* – it is worth noticing that the Piarist Father's reflections started in a fairly traditional way. As usual, the approach to the idea of international community is a reliable mirror to prove this statement, which has already been generally verified by the literature.¹⁷¹ In his youth, Balducci showed significant affinities with the intransigent *Weltanschauung*, which reflected on his sporadic considerations about the ideal configuration of the relations among peoples, based on an idealization of the medieval *Christianitas* as a time in which Christian values shaped European society.¹⁷² The medievalist suggestions were soon abandoned by the young student, who became influenced by those authors whom, even if from different perspectives, advocated a distinct, dynamic and creative function of the Christian faith in contemporary society (from Daniélou to Teilhard de Chardin, from Rahner to Maritain). The goal of an engaged Christian should not be the return to a Middle Ages-type society, but rather the construction of a new Christian society, open to the values and structures of modernity, which fundamentally agreed with the principles of the Catholic religion.¹⁷³ Within this theoretical framework, the Church was still seen as the moral authority to which men and Nations should turn in order to learn the rules of a peaceful coexistence: this was still the point of view he expressed in an essay written before the beginning of the Council

¹⁷¹ See in particular Daniele Menozzi, *Ernesto Balducci e il regno sociale di Cristo: tradizione e innovazione nell'ideologia politico-religiosa del cattolicesimo novecentesco*, in Alfonso Botti (ed.), *Storia ed esperienza religiosa. Studi per Rocco Cerrato*, Urbino: Quattroventi, 2005, pp. 139-160.

¹⁷² A typical example of the fascination carried out by the Middle Ages *Christianitas* is in Ernesto Balducci, *Diari*, vol. I, pp. 120-21 (24/10/1942).

¹⁷³ See the maturation of this vision in the lecture given at the “Scuola Cattolica di Cultura”, in Udine, on December 22, 1963, published under the title *Dialogo tra la Chiesa e il mondo moderno*, Udine: Arti Grafiche Friulane, 1964. The cultural influences of French Catholicism are underlined by Balducci, *Il cerchio che si chiude*, pp. 52-54.

(“The Unity of the World”)¹⁷⁴, and in an article on “Testimonianze” in 1963, from which we can quote, in translation, the following passage:

[In the ideal reign of Peace], the Church takes on a guiding role, because it is not a Power. [...] The person who doesn't gather with Christ, scatters: who doesn't acknowledge the spirit of the Gospel as the one true way toward Peace, at the bottom of his heart still nurses the idols of the war.¹⁷⁵

Neither peace nor orderly coexistence were possible, in other words, if mankind did not follow the Teachings of the Church. From our point of view, then, we can state that Balducci expressed a traditional universalist approach to the idea of international community, marked by an apologetic view of the Church's role in the international system, but at the same time moderated by a natural predisposition toward the confrontation with different opinions.

FROM NEW UNIVERSALISM TO LIBERATION

The papacy of John XXIII (about whom Balducci wrote a popular biography in 1964)¹⁷⁶ and the Second Vatican Council exerted a profound impact on the reflection of the Piarist Father, which started to focus on two main, intertwined themes that would dominate his future cultural production: the first, the nature of peace and the possibility of reaching that goal in the modern age; the second, the power of the individual conscience as a universal common denominator, able to cross over cultural or religious division. We might argue that Balducci caught the most important news inferable by Roncalli's encyclical *Pacem in terris*, that is the link between the achievement of peace at global level and the defense of human rights, a theme that had finally been embraced by the Magisterium's discourse, albeit with some caveats, after the complicated itinerary that we have

¹⁷⁴ See Ernesto Balducci, *L'unità del mondo*, in ID., *Cristianesimo e cristianità*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1963, pp. 109-14. Here, Balducci addressed the theme of the progressive “mechanical” unification of the world, that had been made possible by technical progress, comparing it to the “organic” unity of the Middle Ages, cemented by Christian faith. In his opinion, the second type of unity was exemplar, but impossible to reproduce; the first one, instead, was doomed to fail because it entailed the annihilation of diversity and personal freedom. The task of the Church was to guide the process of unification, but from a spiritual, not political perspective.

¹⁷⁵ Ernesto Balducci, *La pace necessaria*, in “Testimonianze”, issue 51, 1963.

¹⁷⁶ Ernesto Balducci, *Papa Giovanni*, Firenze: Vallecchi, 1964 (translated into Spanish in 1964, and into English in 1975); see also Ernesto Balducci, *Giovanni XXIII*, in “Humanitas”, issues 7-8, 1963. The paramount importance of John's pontificate – and of Roncalli's figure – for Balducci and the whole group of “Testimonianze” is witnessed by the comments written after his death and collected in the monographic edition of “Testimonianze”, issues 55-56, 1963.

described. The protection of the innate rights of the human being, as well as extending those rights to those who could not yet enjoy them, should become the fundamental mission of the Church, in a constant dialogue with the modern world.¹⁷⁷ The discourse of the Piarist Father, then, seemed to have evolved toward a full acceptance of the new universalist paradigm.

Balducci's image of Church as a community of people, however, guided by the Magisterium but able to autonomously discuss the social implications of the Christian faith, was not matched in his eyes by the actual hierarchical and self-referential configuration of the ecclesial institution. His unheeded appeals for Church reform, which he drew from a constant exegesis of the Scriptures, led him to feel a lack of confidence about the institution's ability to live up to the expectations which had emerged from the Council; moreover, his appeals caused many frictions with the hierarchy and a deep personal torment.¹⁷⁸ In the post-conciliar years, the Italian priest became convinced that the institutional Church, if it had not renewed itself, would have ended up acting as an oppressive structure, radically contradicting the evangelical promises. On the contrary, the true nature of the Catholic religion – in its essence, a radical critique of power and a testament to the immense potential of the human being – was to be found in Christian communities, where the faithful could take responsibility for their actions. In this respect, he followed with a sympathetic eye the itinerary of the Catholic dissent groups, which in turn found in the figure of the Florentine priest, and in “Testimonianze”, a cultural point of reference and a critical sounding board.¹⁷⁹ Balducci believed the task of the Christian was to act against any form of institutionalized power guilty of trapping

¹⁷⁷ See for instance the following articles in “Testimonianze”: *Presenza nuova in un mondo nuovo*, issue 54, 1963; *Validità di un insegnamento*, in issue 63, 1964, in part. pp. 163-64, and *A due anni dalla morte di Papa Giovanni*, in issue 75, 1965, in part. pp. 337-38.

¹⁷⁸ See for a contextualization Bruna Bocchini Camaiani, *Balducci, il sacerdote, la Chiesa*, in ID. (ed.), *Ernesto Balducci. La Chiesa, la società, la pace*, pp. 79-99. Balducci admitted, at the end of the 1970s, that his battle was definitively lost. After a painful and careful consideration, however, he chose to remain faithful to the ecclesial institution.

¹⁷⁹ Balducci was close to the positions of Catholic dissent, even if he did not endorse the most radical outcomes of that era, like the rupture of relations with the institutional Church: in the famous case of the Florentine parish “Isolotto” – where in 1968 a base community led by Father Enzo Mazzi held general assemblies, wrote its own Catechism and participated in the running of religious services, consequently clashing with Florence’s bishop Florit – he also became notoriously involved as mediator, but his efforts were not met with success. See Bocchini Camaiani, *Ernesto Balducci*, pp. 215-21, while a brief description of the Isolotto’s case can be found in Péter Apor, Rebecca Clifford and Nigel Townson, *Faith*, in Gildea, Mark and Warring (eds.), *Europe’s 1968*, p. 220 ff.

man's conscience in a cage, but at the same time he was convinced that there was no pre-ordained socio-political solution that could be inferred from faith: the liberating vocation of the Christian message could have translated into different social and political outcomes.

This evolution of the Italian priest's reflections, which by the end of the 1960s had found their first systematization (although in a state of constant reflection and rethinking), had some immediate consequences on the idea of international community. An article published on "Testimonianze" in August 1968 highlights the partial modification of Balducci's point of view. The starting point was given by the defining feature of the contemporary age, represented by the global "aspiration to peaceful coexistence in a world community". Facing this trend, Christians (of all confessions) should make a choice "between the motion of unification of mankind, and those structures which oppose such motion, be it even religious structures". This choice, if they wanted to remain true to their faith, would have entailed the "protest against the political and cultural system that up until now has claimed the right to civilize and unify, within its system of laws, the whole of mankind".¹⁸⁰

REVOLUTION AND VIOLENCE

The category of conflict, accompanied by an antagonistic reading of international relations, had entered the priest's consciousness. If we take a look at the issues of "Testimonianze" in the same incandescent period across the decades, the picture becomes neater and more articulated. In the same edition that contained the aforementioned article, the editorial addressed the theme of a possible "theology of revolution", which was one of the "hot topics" tackled by the contemporary European theological debate. Even if the group expressed diversified positions, the generally accepted premise stated that the rationale of the "dominant socio-political system" was incompatible with "any authentic communitarian experience", and that the revolutions which were sprouting in many parts of the world were destined to gain more and more appeal since they seemed

¹⁸⁰ Ernesto Balducci, *Per una teologia della collaborazione*, in "Testimonianze", issue 106, 1968, my translations.

the only sensible solution that would “liberate our brothers from slavery and exploitation”.¹⁸¹ The actual revolutionary experiences of organized or spontaneous movements in Third World countries – especially in Latin America – obtained increased space and attention in the pages of the magazine, which was traditionally interested in the dynamics at play in extra-European contexts, where religion, and Catholicism in particular, seemed to be able to play a relevant and dynamic role, while its influence on the secularized regions of the First World was rapidly decreasing.¹⁸²

At the beginning of the 1970s, Ernesto Balducci addressed the theme of the relationship between Christian faith and revolutionary choice (as usual, given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject, the review’s founder shared his opinions in the first person) in a series of articles that did not shy away from the most controversial aspects of the issue.¹⁸³ By now, we should have understood that these arguments are central to our research: they are situated on the frontier between New Universalism and Liberation, because they hinge at the same time on the universal validity of the Catholic faith as a spur to act for change, and on the category of conflict – with all the subsequent problems concerning the potential use of violence – as the main interpretative key to address the idea of international community. Balducci attacked the political use of religion proposed by many sectors of the Catholic Church to justify (sacralize) the existing order, covering over and contradicting the “liberating message” of the Gospel *sine glossa*, without the mediation of

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, my translations. The main source of division within the group concerned the reduction of the problem to its social and political aspects, or its view from a theological point of view. The editorial staff, however, agreed on the fact that further discussion was necessary, and that this subject represented one of the most pressing issues for Christians in contemporary society.

¹⁸² The traditional attention to non-European environments was evident since the foundation of the review, and was mostly directed toward Africa: see for instance “Testimonianze”, issue 35, 1961, entirely dedicated to Senegal, and Francesco Cancedda, *Il Terzo Mondo*, in issue 46, 1962; after the end of the 1960s, Latin America became the main focus of the review’s attention, together with South-East Asia, because of the Vietnam war: see by way of example Carlo Prandi, *Chiesa e rivoluzione in America Latina: Camilo Torres*, in issue 107, 1968; Carlo Prandi, *Chiesa e rivoluzione in America Latina: Helder Camara*, in issue 114, 1969, or the *Editorial* in issue 150, 1972, dedicated to the Vietnam war and to the responsibilities of Western powers and local Churches. See also the reviews of the books proposed by “Testimonianze”, especially in the years 1968-1969, such as Giovanni Gozzer, *Religione e rivoluzione in America Latina*; Jean Chesneaux, *Perché il Vietnam resiste*, in 1968; Riccardo Campa, *Il potere politico nell’America Latina*, or Giampiero Cotti-Cometti, *Archivio per il Vietnam*, in 1969. The theoretical explanation of the interest toward non-European context can already be found in Balducci, *Il moto dei popoli nuovi*, in ID., *Cristianesimo e cristianità*, pp. 97-106.

¹⁸³ The most important were *Proposte per una teologia politica. Fede cristiana e scelta di classe*, in “Testimonianze”, issues 139-40, 1971, and *Coscienza cristiana e società violenta*, issue 150, 1972 (this article was also translated into Spanish and published in the Spanish review “Iglesia viva” under the title *Conciencia cristiana y sociedad violenta*, in issues 47-48, 1973).

the authority. The Christian message was intrinsically revolutionary, since it aimed at liberating man from any form of alienation, guiding him toward the full development of his conscience; none of the existing subjects waving the revolutionary flag, however, could be officially blessed by Christians, since they were all advocating partial solutions compared to the global afflatus of religion. The practical choices of the faithful could not be commanded by faith, at the risk of falling back into the same patterns of politicization of religion that revolutionary Christians wanted to fight: this was also the danger that Balducci saw in the discourse of Latin American liberation theology, that could lead to establishing too strict a nexus between religion and political choices.¹⁸⁴

In the current historical period, characterized by an oppressive global capitalistic system, the principal agent of “universal liberation” was the working class, that need support in its efforts to emancipate the exploited, but the faithful should not lose sight of the partiality of any temporal solution to the problem of salvation, which could not be fully accomplished in the mundane world.¹⁸⁵

We may notice that Balducci's discourse was consistent with the culture of Liberation in more than one way: the analysis of the social, political and economic system which dominated the world; the insistence on the revolutionary interpretation of the Christian message as a liberating force; the criticism of the political use of religion to legitimize the status quo; the reference to the Christian community as the authentic place in which the Christian message was authentically lived and correctly understood. Also similar was the reflection on the possible use of violence as a necessary means to subvert the status quo. In the eyes of the Piarist Father, violence was an intrinsic feature of

¹⁸⁴ See Ernesto Balducci, *La Chiesa come eucaristia*, Brescia: Queriniana, 1971, p. 153.

¹⁸⁵ This line of reasoning, which in more than one aspect paralleled the contemporary reflections of theologians like Johan Baptist Metz (or Jürgen Moltmann), whose political theology we mentioned in the first chapter, was developed in the article *Proposte per una teologia politica*, and then more extensively addressed in a series of homilies collected under the title Ernesto Balducci, *La politica della fede: dall'ideologia cattolica alla teologia della rivoluzione*, Firenze: Guaraldi, 1976. The most evident difference between Metz's and Balducci's visions was the assumption of the category of revolution by the latter, while the former explicitly refused to consider this concept as theoretically compatible with the Christian faith. The link between faith and revolution, although problematic, was at the center of the Piarist Father's reflection in those years, as argued by Luciano Martini, *Ernesto Balducci e la pace*, in ID., *Chiesa e cultura cattolica*, pp. 403-28. Balducci's knowledge of the debate on political theology, and of the works of Metz and Moltmann, is evidenced, among other things, by the catalogue of his private library (about 4000 volumes), published by Bruna Bocchini Camaiani and Elisabetta Viti (eds.), *Catalogo della biblioteca privata di padre Ernesto Balducci*, Fiesole: Fondazione Ernesto Balducci, 2012.

the social, political and economic system, which dominated the world, defining violence as any process, which precluded the full development of the human being.¹⁸⁶ The message of the Gospel – Balducci was especially touched by the Beatitudes, which he defined as “the prophetic horizon of any real liberation” – was, in its essence, a radical critique of the violent society of its time, that could also be applied to the current historical context, because the rationale of domination exerted through violence was linked to human nature. That is why the Scriptures did not offer a practical alternative to the system, a new kind of temporal society immune to violence: its achievement was only possible at the end of times, beyond history. At the same time, the word of God was not only a moral imperative, to be followed in the intimate sphere of one's conscience, but also a call to action against injustice and oppressive powers. The sole consistent choice for a Christian who wanted to follow the Teachings of the Gospel, then, was to embrace a radically non-violent attitude, siding with the poor, the marginalized and the dispossessed, and denouncing the violent system even at the risk of personal repercussions. This “prophetic” choice, though, could not be asked of every Christian, nor would it have had significant practical consequences in the short term. On the contrary, the faithful should also respect, and even express solidarity with the choice of those who opted for fighting against the system “within the laws of politics, included those of force”.¹⁸⁷ We could argue that, according to Balducci, the Christian was bound to live in a constant state of moral tension between the adhesion to the principles of faith and the necessity, which was also inferable from them, to participate in the social and political struggle of the oppressed men and peoples for their personal and collective liberation.¹⁸⁸ We can quote a passage of Balducci’s evocative prose, where he expressed the aforementioned concepts, in the original Italian:

Il vangelo non ci dà la formulazione concreta della violenza, ce ne dà la ragione di fondo, e cioè il predominio della legge sull’uomo quale mediazione del dominio dell’uomo sull’uomo. E nemmeno ci propone una alternativa rivoluzionaria, e cioè un nuovo tipo di società temporale immune dai processi della violenza. Sarebbe un errore

¹⁸⁶ Balducci, *Coscienza cristiana e società violenta*, p. 817.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 824.

¹⁸⁸ Such tension emerges clearly from the homilies collected in the volume *La politica della fede*, which are a typical example of Balducci’s powerful style of preaching.

sostituire il vangelo alle ideologie critiche che servono all'uomo per comprendere le cause delle proprie schiavitù storiche e per progettarne l'eliminazione. Ma sarebbe anche un errore emarginare il vangelo, riservandolo, com'è avvenuto nella società Borghese, alla sfera della pura interiorità. Tra l'ordine etico-politico, entro il quale la violenza costruisce le sue strutture e scatena le sue dialettiche, e l'ordine svelato dal vangelo non c'è nessuna estraneità: c'è una tensione profetica.¹⁸⁹

These brief notes should demonstrate how the body of thought of the Piarist Father, shared and publicized by "Testimonianze", was strongly influenced by the culture of Liberation, especially in that tumultuous period for the Catholic culture that goes from the end of the 1960s through the first half of the 1970s. Obviously, we have chosen to follow only one route in the map of Italian progressive Catholicism, which does not allow us to infer general conclusions from this investigation. At the same time, as we have argued more than once in the previous pages, Balducci's group was representative of a larger area of Italian Catholicism – generally characterized by a lower level of theological elaboration – upon whom the revolutionary experiments attempted in various parts of the world (without forgetting the enduring impact of the Vietnam war), and the radical approach symbolized by Latin American liberation theology exerted a profound fascination.¹⁹⁰ The dialogue with the Marxist culture was an inescapable necessity for this area: the scholarly analysis of the contradictions which permeated contemporary capitalistic society, inferable from Marxist ideology, seemed to represent the best interpretative key available to the faithful, who could autonomously verify their compatibility with the Christian faith. In the case of Balducci's group we do not find the same uncritical assumption that we saw, for instance, in the elaboration of *Cristiani per il socialismo*, but the Marxist framework of analysis exerted an indisputable influence, as it did

¹⁸⁹ Balducci, *Coscienza cristiana e società violenta*, p. 820.

¹⁹⁰ Even a brief survey of progressive reviews like "Questitalia", "Sette giorni", "Il Regno", "Il Tetto", "IDOC Internazionale", shows how these themes received constant attention, and how they were generally addressed from a sympathetic point of view: see by way of example Paolo Pombeni, "Sacerdoti per il terzo mondo": una profezia di liberazione, in "Il Regno. Attualità", 1/9/1970; *Editoriale*, in "Il Tetto", issues 39-40, July 1970; *Le condizioni di una teologia non borghese*, in "IDOC Internazionale", issue 3, 1974. Daniela Saresella has shown that the influence of Latin America, the Vietnam war and more generally the sensitivity to the problems of the "Third World", interpreted as the outcome of the imperialistic dominion of the "First World" – with a primary responsibility of the United States – had already been a defining feature of the discourse of progressive Catholicism since the mid-1960s: see Saresella, *Dal Concilio alla contestazione*, pp. 333-72.

for all of Italian progressive Catholicism, especially the during the 1970s.¹⁹¹ All these features should have demonstrated that we have followed yet another declination – after the examples of ACLI and FUCI – of the second wave of European Left Catholicism, which found particularly fertile ground in Italy.¹⁹²

The reflection on the international community, in this case as well, is indicative of a broader attitude, characterized by political engagement and by the questioning of the repressive role, functional to the maintenance of the *status quo*, played not only by authoritarian regimes and international economic powers, but also by the institutional Church. Many representatives of the Italian Catholic dissent movement would have resolved the tension deriving from the problematic abidance to the rules dictated by Rome by leaving the ecclesiastical community and joining lay groups or political parties (namely, PCI), which seemed to better fit the moral imperatives of their faith. This was not the case for Ernesto Balducci, even if his behavior was often questioned by the ecclesiastical authority – in particular for his involvement in the so-called “dialogue between Catholics and Communists”, which animated the Italian cultural debate between the 1960s and 1970s – and some exponents of his group actually chose the path of political engagement, in particular in the ranks of the Italian Communist party in the elections of 1976.¹⁹³ Although this was not the case for him, his decision to remain within the Church was accompanied by a bitter detachment from the ambitions to profoundly change the institution, which had characterized his whole cultural itinerary. Since the end of the 1970s, or to be more precise, 1976/1977, when we can read some afflicted pages about the failure of his projects of Church reform in his diaries, following

¹⁹¹ Balducci’s relationship with Marxism – which had a multifaceted evolution, from an initial refusal to a critical confrontation, to a new distancing during the 1980s – has been analyzed, with some more general considerations about the centrality of the dialogue between Catholicism and Marxism in Italy during the 1960s and the 1970s, by Mary Malucchi, *Ernesto Balducci. Cristianesimo, Marxismo, Etica planetaria*, Firenze: Libreria Chiari, 2002.

¹⁹² Another possible fruitful research topic, suggested once again by Gerd-Rainer Horn and mentioned in the introductory section, could involve the area of *prêtres contestataires* who shook up the Catholic milieu in Western Europe (from the Netherlands to Spain and Italy) between the end of the 1960s and the 1970s, in particular on the issue of clerical celibacy. Also in this case, Italy seems to be one of the epicentres of the contestation: see Horn, *Les chrétiens catholiques à l'épreuve des sixties et des seventies*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁹³ See Bocchini Camaiani, *Ernesto Balducci*, in part. pp. 250-69. This was the path, in particular, of Mario Gozzini, who was elected to Parliament for three terms as “independent” in the ranks of the Communist Party (from 1976 until 1987).

the notification of a negative dossier about his conduct which was circulating within the Roman Curia—¹⁹⁴ Balducci broadened the horizon of his discourse, focusing on man's destiny in the contemporary world. This last development of his body of thought, which he defined as the “anthropologic turn”, impacted directly on the idea of international community, in a way that illuminates yet another facet of our categories.

A BRIDGE TOWARD THE 1980S: THE “PLANETARY MAN”.

In a nutshell, Balducci moved the focus of his research from the subject of liberation to that of peace.¹⁹⁵ In a series of articles, public conferences and books – the most important of which, *L'uomo planetario* (The Planetary Man, 1985) stands out as one of the highest points in Italian Catholic literature during the 1980s – Balducci reflected on the features of the contemporary age, finding it marked by an unprecedented event in the history of mankind, the construction of the atomic bomb. For the first time in history, the existence of the human race was not a certainty but a contingency, given the immense destructive potential that mankind had acquired. The nuclear threat was the last outcome of the technological progress which had united and interconnected the world as never before, but had also brought it dangerously close to the abyss. These reflections were not new for Catholic culture – for instance, they had also been elaborated on by *Pacem in terris* – but they assumed a new sense of urgency, in the eyes of the Italian intellectual, because of the universalization of the “dominion paradigm of modernity”, which had been born in Western culture but had now found a global application. The optimism of the 1960s, when international diplomacy seemed to be able to achieve peace in the international community, and the development of the South of the world seemed close at hand, was out of tune in the 1980s, when the arms race was raging again, and an imperialist framework of relations had extended to the whole planet,

¹⁹⁴ See for instance the note of 20/9/1977, in Balducci, *Diari*, vol. III, pp. 829-30, and Balducci, *Il cerchio che si chiude*, p. 151.

¹⁹⁵ Antonella Brillante underlined how the subject of peace dominated Balducci's discourse from the late 1970s until his death in 1992: see Antonella Brillante, *La riflessione sulla pace negli anni Settanta e Ottanta*, in Bocchini Camaiani (ed.), *Ernesto Balducci. La Chiesa, la società, la pace*, p. 345; Balducci himself stated that peace was the all-encompassing theme of the contemporary era: Balducci, *Il cerchio che si chiude*, p. 153. The reflection of the Piarist Father on peace has been well reconstructed by the already quoted Luciano Martini, *Ernesto Balducci e la pace*.

intensifying the conflict between North and South. According to the Piarist Father, the only solution, at the same prophetic and compulsorily realistic, involved the replacement of the “culture of violence”, based on exploitation and competition, with a “culture of peace”, founded on communion, exchange and dialogue. All the religious and secular worldviews that were interested in this purpose should find a common ground of dialogue and action, which for Balducci was represented by the concept of *laicità*: some basic acquisitions of the Western culture – the primacy of the conscience, the respect of human rights, the *Rechtstaat* (the rule of law), the scientific method –could be shared by the whole of mankind, since they responded to reason, understood as “foundation of an ethical conscience”.¹⁹⁶

This reflection, briefly summed up here, obviously implied a universalist approach, but it was not necessarily consistent with the new universalist paradigm, by at least two factors. On the one hand, the culture of Liberation was not expunged: the fight of the South of the planet against the oppressive dominion exerted by the imperialistic North – which included both the Western and the Soviet systems of power – was considered the most meaningful and necessary event of the present era, one that every Christian should support in order to stay true to the evangelical message. In this context, Balducci changed his judgment on liberation theology, which he compared to the Western peace movement, since the opposition to the arms race and to Imperialism, in his eyes, were two sides of the same coin. According to him, the only hope of survival for Catholicism came from the South of the world, that is from the vital theological elaborations of Latin American and African Christian communities, while European theology was destined to dry out.¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, his

¹⁹⁶ The quotation is taken from Ernesto Balducci, *L'uomo planetario*, San Domenico: Edizioni Cultura della pace, 1985², p. 22, my translation. Balducci developed these arguments also in other contributions: see at least *Il terzo millennio. Saggio sulla situazione apocalittica*, Milano: Bompiani, 1981; *Il cerchio che si chiude*, pp. 151-204; *Nord/Sud: la pace sulla via del realismo*, in “Testimonianze”, issues 253-55, 1983, and *La laicità alla prova planetaria*, in “Testimonianze”, issues 269-70, 1984. The concept of the planetary man has been analyzed by the already quoted Malucchi, *A Novel “Planetary Man”*, while a comparison between Balducci’s worldview and the contemporary debate on nuclear ethics has been proposed by Brillante, *La riflessione sulla pace negli anni Settanta e Ottanta*, in part. pp. 345-63.

¹⁹⁷ See Ernesto Balducci, *Teologia della Liberazione e movimento per la pace*, in “Testimonianze”, issue 276, 1985, in part. pp. 14-17, and ID., *L'uomo planetario*, p. 47. At the same time, Marxism was no longer considered the preferential interlocutor for the Catholic culture, since the ultimate perspective of the universalization of the industrial revolution

reference to reason and laity as the cultural epicenter of dialogue between different cultures and religions apparently clashed with the direction that the institutional discourse on the international community had taken under John Paul's pontificate, based on a powerful reassertion of Christian identity. Actually, the whole picture deserves a more nuanced description, since Balducci was still convinced that the Christian *Weltanschauung*, when rigorously founded on the Scriptures, provided contemporary man with the most complete answer to the challenges of history, and that the same concept of *laicità* was a "Christian invention".¹⁹⁸ In order to properly address these issues, though, we would need a more detailed investigation of the Piarist Father's elaboration, prefaced by an assessment of the developments of the Catholic idea of international community during the 1980s, a task that exceeds the limits of the present work. Nonetheless, these notes suggest that Balducci's discourse – which continued to have a significant appeal for progressive Italian Catholicism¹⁹⁹ – proposed a new synthesis of Universalism and Liberation, confirming the fecundity of these categories for historical research.

A last proof in this regard comes from the analysis of a completely different (opposed, in many respects) trajectory involving an ecclesial movement that played a distinctive role in the history of contemporary Italian Catholicism, *Comunione e Liberazione*.

3.2. Comunione e Liberazione. *From revolution to reassertion of Christian identity.*

was not sufficient to delineate a prospect of salvation for the world, already on the verge of an ecological disaster: see Malucchi, *Ernesto Balducci*, pp. 103-12.

¹⁹⁸ Balducci, *Il cerchio che si chiude*, p. 175. Such a position, in fact, would confirm the presence, also in the last phase of Balducci's research, of an apologetic trait that had not been completely erased by the remarkable openness to the influence of different religions and cultures, as suggested by Daniele Menozzi, *Chiesa e società nell'Itinerario di Ernesto Balducci*, in Bocchini Camaiani (ed.), *Ernesto Balducci. La Chiesa, la società, la pace*, p. 77.

¹⁹⁹ During the 1980s "Testimonianze" organized six popular Conferences (1981-1987) on the theme "If you want peace, prepare for peace", which were attended by numerous leaders of the Italian Catholic culture and also served as moments of discussion and diffusion of Balducci's ideas (their proceedings were regularly published in the periodical). The Piarist Father also sponsored several editorial initiatives in order to promote the development a "culture of peace", in particular among youth: to this purpose, in 1986 he founded a publishing house, "Edizioni cultura della pace", while in 1983 he wrote with "Testimonianze"'s director Lodovico Grassi a handbook for schools on the historical evolution of the thought on peace: see Ernesto Balducci and Lodovico Grassi, *La pace. Realismo di un'utopia*, Milano: Principato, 1983.

Comunione e Liberazione (CL) is one of the most interesting subjects for historians of Italian (but not only Italian) contemporary Catholicism. Its rapid growth and influence within the Church and in Italian society, since the beginning of the 1980s, brought CL to the center of attention of scholars and media, which debated at length about its nature and goals. As we will see in the course of the analysis, CL gained full recognition in the Catholic Church during the pontificate of John Paul II, who became a strong supporter of the new ecclesial movements, since he was in favor of a proactive and dynamic approach to Christian faith, which should be a driver for the action of the Christian within society.²⁰⁰ *Comunione e Liberazione* grew into a traditionalist movement, which professed a complete obedience to the pope, working to secure a greater role for the Catholic Church in Italian society. This is why the international literature that has addressed the subject resorted to adjectives like “fundamentalist” and “integrist” to describe the profile of the organization, which has developed a society-wide network of social service, cultural and educational institutions linked with thousands of CL-inspired or –affiliated businesses.²⁰¹ The origins of this Italian ecclesial movement, however, suggested a very different path, and are not always properly taken into account by historians. We will focus precisely on the early stages of CL’s history, investigating its cultural elaboration from our special observation point, pointed toward the idea of international community: we will illuminate an unexpected trajectory from radicalism to reassertion of Christian identity.

THE BEGINNINGS: THE RADICAL INTEGRALISM OF *GIOVENTÙ STUDENTESCA*

The history of *Comunione e Liberazione*, if truth be told, does not begin with *Comunione e Liberazione*, but with *Gioventù Studentesca* (GS), a Catholic youth association which was created

²⁰⁰ The support for renewal movements and new communities was a defining feature of John Paul’s pontificate: see George Weigel, *The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II – The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy*, London: Doubleday, 2010, pp. 15-16.

²⁰¹ See Dario Zadra, *Comunione e Liberazione: A Fundamentalist Idea of Power*, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 124-48, and Nancy J. Davis and Robert V. Robinson, *Claiming Society for God. Religious Movements and Social Welfare*, chapter IV: *Comunione e Liberazione. Laying the Building Blocks of a Parallel Christian Society in Italy*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012, pp. 88-112.

in 1954 at Berchet High School in Milan, where its founder Luigi Giussani (1922-2005) was a religion teacher.²⁰² Giussani felt that the Church had lost its appeal for Italian youth, thus rapidly becoming merely an empty legacy of the past. In the eyes of the Italian theologian, young Christians did not have the cultural instruments to challenge the hegemony of the lay culture, in both its liberal and Marxist versions, whose origins he traced back to the Enlightenment.²⁰³ The supposed incompatibility between modernity and the Christian faith, however, was just a myth: personal freedom, or the centrality of the person as an agent of change in history, were inherently Christian concepts, that could guide the engagement of the faithful in society, in accordance with the Church's Teachings. Freedom and obedience to authority were not in contradiction, since the true meaning of freedom concerned the decision, freely made, to follow the authority of the community. The influence of modern Catholic theologians who supported the reconciliation between Catholicism and some aspects of modernity (Giussani explicitly quoted De Lubac, Daniélou, Congar as sources of inspiration)²⁰⁴ was mediated by an absolute loyalty to the Church's authority as the only provider of the correct interpretation of the Christian doctrine. Moreover, GS's founder refused a dualistic conception of the relation between the faith and the world, exemplified by Maritain's distinction between a spiritual and a temporal sphere. On the contrary, faith should

²⁰² The history of *Comunione e Liberazione* has not yet been properly addressed by Italian historiography. The most comprehensive account has been delivered by Italian bishop and CL member Massimo Camisasca, in three volumes: *Le origini (1954-1968)*; *La ripresa (1969-1976)*; *Il riconoscimento (1976-1984)*, with an appendix which covers the period from 1984-2005, Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 2001-2006 (translated into Spanish by publishing house Encuentro). These books are essential to knowing the history of the movement, but they are expressly written from a sympathetic (sometimes apologetic) point of view. Another example of a sympathetic perspective is offered by Davide Rondoni (ed.), *Comunione e liberazione: un movimento nella Chiesa*, Milano: Nuovo Mondo, 1998 (translated into English under the title *Communion and Liberation: a Movement in the Church*, Quebec/Kingston, Ontario: McGill/Queen's University Press, 2000). A more balanced and synthetic profile has been proposed by sociologist Salvatore Abruzzese, *Comunione e liberazione. Dalle aule del liceo Berchet al meeting di Rimini: storia e identità di un movimento*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001, which systemized his original work in French *Comunione e liberazione. Identité religieuse et disqualification du monde*, Paris: Cerf, 1989. More recently, see the focus on the transition phase between GS and CL by Eugenio Capozzi, *Luigi Giussani e lo spartiacque del Sessantotto: da Gioventù studentesca a Comunione e liberazione*, in "Ventunesimo secolo", issue 22, 2010, pp. 65-84, and the critical reflections proposed by five Italian scholars and intellectuals: Luciano Caimi, Guido Formigoni, Franco Monaco, Filippo Pizzolato and Luigi F. Pizzolato, *Il caso CL nella Chiesa e nella società italiana. Spunti per una discussione*, Trento: Il Margine, 2014. A historical biography of Luigi Giussani has yet to be written, while there is no lack of books, essays, articles or interviews written or given by GS's founder. In order to have an idea of the philosophy on which Giussani intended to ground the movement, see at least *Il cammino al vero è un'esperienza*, Torino: Sei, 1995 (translated into English, like most of his works, by McGill-Queen's University Press in 2006), and *Il movimento di Comunione e Liberazione. Conversazioni con Robi Ronza*, Milano: Jaca Book, 1987 (updated edition), published in French by Fayard in 1988.

²⁰³ Giussani, *Il movimento di Comunione e Liberazione*, pp. 13-15 and 24.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30 and 33.

have directly guided the commitment of the Christian – who would find his full realization within an organic community – toward the “reconquest” of secularized society.

These guidelines were bound to create some tensions with the official organization of the Italian Catholic laity, especially Catholic Action, which Giussani considered outdated and formalistic, incapable of sparking the enthusiasm of the younger generations. The major problems concerned the relationship between GS and FUCI – which, as argued, was the center of the training of a Catholic ruling class, and had internalized the theory of the separation of spheres – since the point when Giussani’s movement tried to expand to the university milieu in order to continue the cultural training of the high school students who had graduated.²⁰⁵ A last feature, especially important from our point of view, that the Milanese priest wished to give to his newly founded movement, was a distinctive missionary drive. Christians’ vocation was intrinsically universal, and involved the duty to evangelize other peoples, in order to show them the path to salvation.²⁰⁶

GS’s integralism – understood as an integral conception of the Christian faith, which was supposed to govern every aspect of a man’s life and action – did not preclude the adoption of radical stances in terms of social analysis and practical commitment within civil society. Anti-capitalism, consistently with the intransigent tradition, was at the core of the movement’s cultural platform, while Marxism, in the words of Giussani, was only incompatible with the Catholic *Weltanschauung* when it was turned into an “exclusive horizon of the interpretation of man”, but not as an interpretative key to understanding social and international dynamics.²⁰⁷ The general view

²⁰⁵ About the tensions between GS and FUCI see Capozzi, *Luigi Giussani e lo spartiacque del Sessantotto*, pp. 70-73, and Abruzzese, *Comunione e liberazione*, pp. 50-56. There were also concerns, among the Milanese Church authorities, that through GS, Giussani was establishing a “shadow diocese” independent of the parishes. In 1966 Milan’s Archbishop Giovanni Colombo officially recognized GS, but restated its containment within Catholic Action.

²⁰⁶ Giussani, *Il cammino al vero è un’esperienza*, pp. 40-42, 75-77 and 185-95, and ID., *Educazione missionaria dei giovani*, in ID., *Porta la speranza. Primi scritti*, Genova: Marietti, 1997, pp. 69-73. GS followed up on this premise, becoming the first youth movement to organize a missionary activity, in Brazil in 1962: on this see Camisasca, *Comunione e liberazione. Le origini*, pp. 194-204, and Piero Gheddo, *Marcello dei lebbrosi*, Novara: Editoriale Nuova, 1984, pp. 135-41, which narrates the experience of Marcello Candia (1913-1983), an Italian lay missionary who helped set up the mission of *Gioventù Studentesca* in Belo Horizonte, in the Brazilian South-East. In the 1970s and 1980s, Giussani’s movement would have founded several communities in Latin America: see an account of their history and activities in “*Litterae Communionis*”, issues 9, 10 and 11, 1985.

²⁰⁷ Giussani, *Il movimento di Comunione e Liberazione*, pp. 62-63, my translation.

of GS, then, was in tune with the most radical positions proposed by Catholic culture, which we have encountered several times in the course of this chapter. As should be expected, the idea of international community was consistent with the elaboration of this milieu: above all, we find a harsh condemnation of the oppression by the imperialistic First World of the Third, and an open sympathy for the struggles for independence and better living conditions that were inflaming the developing countries. In this respect, the experiences that some GS members had had while living in Brazil (starting in 1962) had a deep impact on the development of the group, which became largely influenced by the social and cultural approach that gave birth to Latin American liberation theology.²⁰⁸ In Italy as well, many local sections of the movement – which was still predominantly based in Milan, and numbered only a few hundred members – embraced an extremely adversarial reading of international relations, which in some cases went as far as justifying the use of violence to resolve a situation of patent injustice.²⁰⁹ In other terms, we can positively compare GS's discourse, in particular in the second half of the 1960s, to that of the organizations and personalities, which animated the second wave of European Left Catholicism in the Italian context. The young students who composed the GS membership experienced a radical reception of the 1960s cultural revolution, and like many other peers chose to walk down the road of social and political engagement, mainly in leftist groups and movements, joining the protests of 1968 and often

²⁰⁸ A posteriori, Giussani stated that the young GS activists who participated in the mission in Brazil had lost direction, giving in to the radical propaganda of the liberation movements and losing the reference to Christian faith as the only source that could enlighten the right path to follow in any social environment. See Giussani, *Il movimento di Comunione e Liberazione*, pp. 51-53.

²⁰⁹ In this respect, a typical case in point is represented by GS's section in Parma, which addressed the theme of the “violence of the poor”, juxtaposing it to the “violence of the system”. Some members of the group, especially between 1967 and 1968 (in the internal review “I protagonisti”), expressed the belief that violence was the only means available to oppressed peoples to rebel against the dominion of imperialistic powers (namely, the United States) and reverse the conditions of poverty and humiliation in which they were forced to live. In doing so, they echoed a debate that was flourishing in the Italian and international Catholic milieu, as mentioned a few pages ago: see Panvini, *Cattolici e violenza politica*, pp. 247-55. It is important to notice, though, that we are talking about local contexts, which does not allow us to make generalizations on a national level; at the time, the movement did not even have an official publication (we will see that it started only in 1974, under the name “CL. Strumenti di lavoro dei gruppi di comunione e liberazione”), and its consistency and organization differed greatly from place to place: see Camisasca. *Comunione e Liberazione. Le origini*, pp. 212-34.

abandoning one axiom of the organization's philosophy, i.e. its characterization as an ecclesial community.²¹⁰

COMUNIONE E LIBERAZIONE. THE REASSERTION OF CHRISTIAN IDENTITY

At the end of the decade, then, most GS members – more than half of Milan's section, which was the heart of the movement – had left to follow a trajectory that was rather common in Italian progressive Catholicism the late 1960s, toward new social and political subjects that seemed better fit to satisfy the quest for change of many young Catholics. Those who remained, however, started a new and more cohesive experiment, which led to the establishment of *Comunione e Liberazione*. The first step was the foundation of some cultural centers ("Charles Péguy" in Milan in 1965, followed by "Club Guernica" in Varese, "One Way" in Reggio Emilia and other clubs in a few other cities), which became the core of a new militancy built around the charismatic figure of *don Giussani*. At the end of 1969, the name *Comunione e Liberazione* begun to circulate among his followers, who were mostly members of GS but wished to distance themselves from the radical turn taken by the majority of the student movement. The slogan stuck, and CL became the official heir to GS, but with a renewed sense of purpose and a wider base, composed not only of high school students, but also graduates and young professionals. In 1971 the Church recognized CL as a "free apostolate movement", while an important Congress organized at the end of 1973 in Milan made the movement known at national level. A monthly periodical, initially named "CL", was founded in 1974. Paul VI encouraged the movement during a public audience in St. Peter's square in March 1975, implicitly giving the papal blessing to Giussani's creature, even if the official recognition by the Pontifical Council for the Laity would only come in 1982.

Starting in the mid-1970s CL begun to rapidly grow in numbers and influence.²¹¹ Its breakthrough onto the Italian national scene came in 1974, when Giussani's creature spearheaded

²¹⁰ See Camisasca, *Comunione e Liberazione. Le origini*, pp. 279-88, and Capozzi, *Luigi Giussani e lo spartiacque del Sessantotto*.

the Church's position in the divorce referendum. One year later, the political arm of the movement – *Movimento Popolare* – was founded, in order to expand the influence of the organization in the Italian institutions. More than a party, *Movimento Popolare* was a pressure group, which advocated conservative values within *Democrazia Cristiana*, becoming very successful in electing its representatives in every local and national election, starting with the 1976 general elections.²¹² From that date, CL-affiliated groups gained visibility in university, workplace, non-profit and business milieus, playing a central and much debated role in Italian society:²¹³ the most powerful instrument of CL's influence can be considered the *Compagnia delle Opere*, a nonprofit organization founded in 1986 with the goal of promoting cooperation and assistance among companies, cooperatives and institutions (now numbering in the order of thousands), encouraging a conception of market regulations “able to understand and respect the individual in every aspect, dimension and moment of life”, and substantially producing a huge institutional effort to bypass the State.²¹⁴ *Comunione e Liberazione* also inaugurated a new organizational model, much looser and more flexible than the traditional Italian Catholic laity organizations, so much so that it is very difficult to estimate its members and sympathizers, who number some tens of thousands.²¹⁵ At the same time, its ecclesiological choice was decidedly for a charismatic concept of authority and an organic society with a clear center of unity: the Catholic Church, and in particular the figure of the

²¹¹ In 1980 CL held its first “Meeting for Friendship among Peoples” in Rimini, which attracted tens of thousands of participants and became a yearly appointment, usually attended by the most prominent representatives of the Italian ruling class. “The Meeting” aimed at offering a Catholic alternative to the *Feste de l'unità* held by the Communist party since the early postwar years; see Camisasca, *Comunione e Liberazione. Il riconoscimento*, pp. 205-17.

²¹² See Camisasca, *Comunione e Liberazione. Il riconoscimento*, pp. 218-37; *Movimento popolare* elected 4 MPs in the VI legislature (1976-1979), and 3 in each of the following two (1979-1983 and 1983-1987). Its history ended in the early 1990s, when some of its most prominent representatives were involved in the investigation *Mani Pulite*, which swept off most of the Italian ruling class due to corruption charges.

²¹³ Caimi, Formigoni, Monaco, F. Pizzolato and L. Pizzolato, *Il caso Cl nella Chiesa e nella società italiana*.

²¹⁴ See some notes in Riccardo Nanni, *A Catholic Alternative to Globalization? The Compagnia delle Opere as a Mediator between Small and Medium Enterprises and Catholic Social Teaching*, in Lionel Obadia and Donald C. Wood (eds.), *The Economics of Religion: Anthropological Approaches*, Bingley: Emerald, 2011, pp. 47-76, and Davis and Robinson, *Claiming Society for God*, pp. 101-106.

²¹⁵ Sociologist Dario Zadra has argued that “membership statistics are not a very useful measure of CL's growth. Because a significant proportion of CL's participants and contributors are men and women at the beginning of their adult and professional lives, there is an inherent instability in the CL population. CL has responded to this by creating flexible forms of membership that allow for such coming and going. [...] The movement is also successful because it has developed structures of membership that are well adapted to the particular demographic groups to which it appeals”: Zadra, *Comunione e Liberazione*, p. 137. For some figures and the description of the aforementioned structures see Abruzzese, *Comunione e liberazione*, pp. 97-109.

pope. CL's organizational divisions follow parish and diocesan lines, thereby promoting a close connection between laity and clergy. The movement also includes a lay secular association called *La Fraternità*, which had almost 20,000 members in the early 1990s, whose purpose is to foster a communion of life among its members and to support the activity of the movement as a whole. Most of the movement's leadership comes from this environment, even if there is no official hierarchical structure; the sole recognized and uncontested authority was embodied by don Giussani, and after his death (2005), by his legacy.²¹⁶

Once again, though, we are not interested in reconstructing the history of the movement, nor its organization, as much as studying the essential features of its discourse. In this case as well, the idea of international community proves to be a significant test to investigate the cultural elaboration of this subject, and to measure the differences with the discourse of GS. If we browse through the numbers of the periodical "CL" (which changed its name to "Litterae Communionis" in 1977), we notice that initially (approximately until 1976, but we will return to the periodizing value of this date in a few pages) the international dimension received a great deal of attention. "International politics" was one of the nine sections of the monthly periodical, which consisted on average of about 50 pages, and showed a significant familiarity with non-Italian contexts. The editorial published in the first issue stated that CL was supportive of those who, although coming from different cultural traditions, "work for the liberation of man" in the world, engaging in initiatives and efforts in which "the unity and identity of the people are not sacrificed to ideology and a project of power".²¹⁷ The use of the word liberation – half of the movement's identity, according to the

²¹⁶ Zadra, *Comunione e Liberazione*, pp. 131-39. About the characterization of *Comunione e Liberazione* as a charismatic movement, modeled after Giussani's philosophy, see Abruzzese, *Comunione e liberazione*, pp. 28-44. Before his death, Giussani chose as his successor the Spanish Catholic priest and theologian Julián Carrón, who had joined the Spanish section of CL in the mid-1980s.

²¹⁷ "CL. Strumenti di lavoro dei gruppi di Comunione e Liberazione in scuola, fabbrica, università e quartiere" (hereinafter "CL"), issue 1, 1974, my translation. "CL" was the first issue of a periodical press explicitly presented as the voice of the movement at national level. Local groups of GS had already published local bulletins of limited circulation and irregular distribution, like "Milano Studenti" and "Undicesima Ora" in Milan, or the already quoted "I protagonisti" in Parma. In 1969 a first effort to coordinate the periodical press was made through the mimeographed pamphlet "Litterae Communionis", which was printed every two months with monographic issues dedicated to specific problems. In 1977 "Litterae Communionis" became the official name of the movement's periodical, which came out every month with a circulation of 30,000 copies. Its first director was current professor of General Sociology at the

name – in the context of the early 1970s, was far from neutral for a Catholic-inspired organization, as we have argued in the course of our exposition. Actually, the point of view expressed by the movement was sympathetic toward the struggles of the peoples of the Third World, while the category of Imperialism was often employed to describe the structural features of the international system.²¹⁸ Moreover, the catalogue of the publishing house Jaca Book, that was founded in 1966 and became very close to CL starting in the early 1970s, offered the Italian reader the translations of some of the most inflammatory books about economic, social and political international dynamics – from Theotonio dos Santos to Gunder Frank, from Pierre Jalée to Douglas Bravo – from case studies to theoretical essays, and generally contributing to fueling the “Third-worldism” which characterized the Italian Catholic milieu.²¹⁹ There was a specific caveat, however, that guided the worldview of *Comunione e Liberazione* in relation to these subjects as well. In a nutshell, it was represented by the second word of CL’s binomial, communion.

Liberation was only achievable within the ecclesial community, following the authority of the Church. Any hope to change the course of history through the engagement in revolutionary movements which made reference to secular ideologies was just a delusion, one that many GS members had lived under but which at the same time had proven incompatible with the Christian faith. This was a crucial passage, which had always been clearly addressed by Giussani’s philosophy, but had not been followed as much by the movement’s militants. Now the whole

Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Giancarlo Rovati. At the beginning of the 1980s, according to the data gathered by Catholic scholar Carlo Capuano, the magazine had already reached a circulation of 60,000 copies: Capuano, *La stampa cattolica in Italia*, p. 73. Some notes in Camisasca, *Comunione e Liberazione. La ripresa*, pp. 200-205.

²¹⁸ See for instance the article on Imperialism of CL’s activist Giovanni Vincenzi in “CL”, issue 2, 1975; the editorial of issue 10, 1975, where we read that the Church sides with “the liberation struggle of any people”, or the article by Rocco Buttiglione (MP for five legislatures, president of one of the political successors of DC, the centre-right-wing *Centro Cristiano Democratico*) in issue 3, 1976, where Italian foreign policy was condemned as part of the “exploitation which developed countries, collectively, impose upon the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America” (my translation). Several inquiries of the periodical, in particular from 1974 to 1976, were dedicated to the analysis of specific countries, like Angola, Chile, Brazil, Eastern European countries, Vietnam.

²¹⁹ The editorial project of Jaca Book was explicitly aimed at broadening the knowledge of the Italian Catholic reader about the international dimension, in particular about the conditions of exploitation, which the peoples of the “Third World” (especially in Africa and Latin America) were subjected to, and their efforts of liberation. See a list of the authors published by Jaca Book, and a manifest of its editorial line, in *Autobiografia di un lavoro editoriale*, Milano: Jaca Book, 1975 (in part. pp. 7-20).

movement shared the point of view, consistently with a general deepening of the symbiotic relationship between CL's line and the ideas of its founder.²²⁰ The subject was clearly addressed in preparation for CEI's Conference on Evangelization and Human Promotion, which saw CL among the participants and constituted a further proof of its inclusion within the Italian Church. Indeed, the relationship between the two terms which gave the title to the Conference was precisely the *raison d'être* of Giussani's movement: Christian faith was the sole vehicle of human advancement, therefore only evangelization could lead to the liberation of man. The error made by many Catholics in the tumultuous years after the Council was to focus on one goal – political engagement for the social advancement of peoples – forgetting the other, without which every apparent progress was bound to be short-lived and misleading. As Angelo Scola, Milan's archbishop and active member of GS and CL, argued:

Those who demand that human promotion be the place in which faith (and therefore, evangelization) finds its essential content, are objectively wrong. Indeed, evangelization takes the various ingredients of God's Word and Tradition, and sheds light on what human promotion must be.²²¹

Such a position concerned first and foremost the Italian context, which represented the Conference's horizon, but the same paradigm could be applied internationally. Just as participation in the Italian student and workers movements, widely influenced as they were by Marxist culture and by the revolutionary experiences of foreign countries, was deemed incompatible with Christian

²²⁰ See some examples of Giussani's discourse, concerning the possibility to achieve true liberation and the full development of the human being only within a communitarian structure guided by the Church's authority in Giussani, *Il cammino al vero è un'esperienza*, pp. 110-14, and ID., *Il movimento di Comunione e Liberazione*, p. 50. The founder of CL addressed the subject extensively, from a religious standpoint, in a series of Conferences organized with Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar in Einsiedeln (Switzerland) for the members of *Comunione e Liberazione*. See a report of Giussani's intervention, drafted by a group of CL's members, in Hans Urs von Balthasar, *L'impegno del cristiano nel mondo*, Milano: Jaca Book, 1971, pp. 95-146 (see in particular pp. 122-46).

²²¹ "Litterae Communonis", issue 10, 1976, pp. 19-20, my translation. In the same number, dedicated to the Conference's preparation, Francesco Botturi (current pro-rector of Milan's Catholic University) and Giuseppe Folloni (professor of economics at Trento's university) stated that the Church was the sole source of liberation in history.

faith, so too the participation of Christians in the liberation struggles throughout the world was not permissible outside the boundaries of the ecclesial community.²²²

If this line of reasoning sounds familiar, it is because we have already analyzed it taking into account what we defined as the Magisterium's reaction to the culture of Liberation. CL was in tune with the recalibration of the Catholic institutional discourse on the international community that had begun in the last years of Paul's pontificate, and was subsequently fine-tuned by John Paul II.²²³ In this respect, the evolution of CL's elaboration is exemplary, as the reading of a document issued by the Italian movement at the beginning of the 1980s can demonstrate. The document is entitled *La verità è la forza della pace* (Truth is the strength of peace), and was drafted after John Paul's second message for the World Day of Peace. This speech is a manifesto of the approach employed by the pope: peace in international relations, which relied on the classical features of the new universalist paradigm – dialogue, respect and advancement of human rights, fairer relations among peoples, based on equal opportunities to access the fruits of progress – was linked to the Truth, and thus to the Gospel, “which leads to the ultimate source of truth”.²²⁴ In other terms, only the Christian doctrine mediated by the Church could guide mankind toward a peaceful configuration of the international community, since it possessed the truth about man, while secular ideologies, although different from each other and often contradictory, “refuse to believe in man, with all his capacity for greatness but at the same time with his need to be redeemed from the evil and sin within him”.²²⁵ CL identified with this conception completely, since it matched the philosophy of

²²² This argument was especially developed by Francesco Ricci (1930-1991, Forlì's presbyter and close collaborator of Luigi Giussani), who argued that no historical subject inspired by secular ideologies – Marxism, Communism, Liberalism – could carry on a legitimate project of liberation for the modern man, since only the Christian worldview mediated by the Church held the key to the social and cultural emancipation of the human being. See Francesco Ricci, *All'ovest come a est niente di nuovo*, in “Litterae Communionis”, issue 10, 1976, pp. 22-29.

²²³ The cultural consonance of Giussani's movement with the developments of the Magisterium's elaboration is also evidenced, among other things, by the close friendship and theological affinity between CL's founder and one of the main theologians of that era, card. Joseph Ratzinger. See Giorgio Paolucci, *Giussani-Ratzinger, trent'anni di amicizia*, in “Avvenire”, 22/2/2013. Giussani and Ratzinger were among the founders, together with other theologians like Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar, of the theological review “Communio” (1972), which became the “theological rival” of the progressive review “Concilium”.

²²⁴ AAS, vol. 71 (III), 1980, pp. 1572-80.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1574.

the movement: the truth, we read in the document, was “the method of our presence in the world”.

Here is a sample of the language employed by CL, in the original Italian:

[I cristiani hanno] il dovere di adoperarsi affinché la minaccia della guerra e della distruzione sia allontanata dalle nostre città e dai nostri popoli, affinché la folle corsa agli armamenti sia arrestata e le immense risorse che in essa vengono disperse siano utilizzate per assicurare a tutti gli uomini di questa terra un accesso ai beni materiali della vita equo e confacente alla loro dignità, affinché i diritti dell'uomo siano rispettati in ogni posto della terra. [...] Egli [il papa] afferma una verità sull'uomo così vicina al suo cuore da essere fonte di certezza e criterio di giudizio su tutte le cose: la verità rivelata in Cristo Gesù, Redentore dell'uomo. [...] Oggi tutti cercano di catturare l'uomo nella ragnatela della loro ideologia. Dicono che non c'è una “verità dell'uomo”, ma solo condizionamenti, interessi di parte, adescamenti per un uomo diviso. In questo modo gli tolgonon la responsabilità di essere vero lui, di dare giudizi veri sulle cose che accadono, di impegnare con pienezza la propria vita. [...] La verità è insieme la nostra certezza, ciò che abbiamo sperimentato e che dà forza alla nostra parola ed al nostro agire, è l'apertura del cuore con cui affrontiamo le sorprese che la realtà ci riserva, il metodo della nostra presenza nel mondo.²²⁶

The militant attitude of the new pope, who believed in the enduring power of faith in the contemporary world, both in Western secularized societies and in underdeveloped countries placed at the outskirts of modernity, embodied the spirit of Giussani's movement, which started to propose an apologetic interpretation of Wojtyła's acts and Teachings. It often presented the message of the pope and the authority of the Church as the beacon lighting the path of the international community, sometimes resorting to straightforwardly intransigent motives, for instance when Francesco Ricci mentioned “the extraordinary possibilities of growth in the truth, which open up to the future of Churches and Nations when their path is guided by the wisdom of Christian authenticity”.²²⁷ From CL's point of view, then, any discourse about liberation should be brought back to its true meaning, which lied in the reference to Christian identity. It is easily understandable how during the 1980s the Polish case rose to the status of a symbol for all the faithful in the world. Indeed, the rebellion against the Communist regime of Wojtyła's home country was interpreted as a sign of the strength

²²⁶ The text was published in “Litterae Communionis”, issue 2, 1980, p. 12. See also, with similar considerations, the editorial in issue 1, 1980.

²²⁷ Francesco Ricci, *Africa, giovane figlia mia...!*, in “Litterae Communionis”, issue 6, 1980, quotation from p. 9 (my translation).

of religion as factor of change, as well as a source of inspiration for Catholics in other contexts. A recurring parallel was established between Poland and Latin America: notwithstanding the evident contextual differences, Latin American Catholics could take the struggle of the Eastern European people as an example of the “self-sufficiency” of the Christian faith, beyond any residual suggestions coming from secular revolutionary movements.²²⁸ Poland was also an example for the whole of Europe, whose return to its lost centrality in the international system was linked to the rediscovery of its Christian roots, following another pivotal theme of John Paul’s pontificate, consistent with the recalibration of the new universalist discourse.²²⁹

An editorial written by “*Litterae Communionis*” director and CL activist, Maurizio Vitali, in April 1986, serves as a suitable closing point for our analysis. Vitali compared the positions of two distinguished Catholic theologians – the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Joseph Ratzinger, and second generation liberation theologian Frei Betto – in order to outline “two different conceptions of the Christian experience and of its relevance for man’s life”. According to the former, the Christian Event (*avvenimento*) in itself, which the faithful should communicate and divulge through evangelization, was the radical and definitive liberation of man. Catholicism was an engine of change: its direction and contents should be explained by the only legitimate authority, i.e. the Catholic Church. For the latter, on the contrary, the Christian faith was in fact a source of

²²⁸ The news coming from Poland had high visibility in CL’s review, especially at the beginning of the 1980s: see the sections dedicated to the country in “*Litterae Communionis*”, issue 10, 1980; issues 2, 3 and 12, 1982, and the reportage of M.G. Borsalino in issues 7-8, 1982. An explicit link with the Latin American context was made by Francesco Ricci in “*Litterae Communionis*”, issue 3, 1982. Liberation theology was implicitly in the dock: extremely significant, in this respect, are the considerations about Latin America that emerge from an inquiry conducted by the review in 1982: quoting John Paul’s pronouncements – *Laborem exercens*, *Redemptor hominis*, *Dives in misericordia* – Ricci argued that Catholic culture had finally proposed a way out for the Latin American continent, oppressed by the superpowers and forced to make an impossible choice between capitalism and revolution. The indications of the Magisterium seemed to have been positively received by the local hierarchy after Puebla, correcting the errors of liberation theology: see Francesco Ricci, *L’effetto Puebla nella vita ecclesiale e culturale latinoamericana*, in “*Litterae Communionis*”, issue 1, 1982, and the article on the differences between “right” and “wrong” liberation theology, in issue 12, 1984.

²²⁹ See the articles by Roberto Formigoni (center-right politician, former president of the Lombardy region), *Ritrovare l’originaria unità culturale*, in “*Litterae Communionis*”, issue 5, 1979 and Massimo Fraschini (journalist and professor at Milan’s Catholic University), *Se vuoi la pace prepara l’Europa*, in issue 4, 1984, as well as the editorial of the review’s director Massimo Vitali, *Credo l’Europa*, in issue 6, 1984. The connection between the Polish struggle and the making of Europe was addressed by Francesco Ricci, *La Polonia può far rivivere l’Europa*, in issue 6, 1983. CL also organized several manifestations about the Polish revolt: for instance, in September 1980 the movement arranged a meeting with the participation of Piotr Jeglinski (a representative of the Catholic opposition to the Communist regime in exile in Paris), attended by more than 2000. This was the first of a series of initiatives which went on throughout the first half of the 1980s: see Camisasca, *Comunione e Liberazione. Il riconoscimento*, pp. 235-37.

shareable moral values, whose core features were also embraced by other cultural traditions. In particular, the Christian faithful should participate in the historical process of liberation, accepting the leading role of secular movement and ideologies: the explicit reference was to the Latin American context, from South America to Cuba to Nicaragua.²³⁰ Obviously, CL agreed with the first view, which was expressed at the highest level by the teachings of the pope.

What happened, then, to the word liberation, which continued to represent a crucial part of the movement's identity? We might argue that it went through a process of resemanticization, characterized by the elimination of any political implication. This conclusion emerges clearly through the investigation of the discourse on the international community: the battles of revolutionary movements – which had captured the attention and sympathy of GS – were no longer referenced using the term liberation, which was mainly employed in its spiritual sense to describe the personal struggle of man against sin. The view of international relations was not radically modified – imbalance and injustice continued to characterize the international system, in the eyes of the Italian movement –but the answer to this *de facto* situation was not to be found in political conflict, but in evangelization and a powerful reassertion of Christian identity. In this framework of thought, only the acceptance of the Christian message, not the deceptive promises of secular forces and ideologies, offered the solution to personal and collective problems, both in Italy and on the world stage.

The reflection on the idea of international community, then, illuminates CL's evolution from unorthodox subject, involved in the second wave of Left Catholicism, to champion of the Christian reconquest of society. This seems to be a methodological constant for all the cases that we investigated: the evolution of their approach to international relations – although very differentiated – tends to mirror the development of their history within the Italian Catholic world, offering meaningful insights to the historian of Italian Catholicism. Is it possible to infer some common

²³⁰ See Maurizio Vitali, *A proposito della liberazione*, in "Litterae Communionis", issue 4, 1986.

elements from these cultural elaborations, or do they just represent five closer examinations of a diversified and ultimately irreducible reality? What does the idea of international community teach us about the history of Italian Catholicism during the post-WWII period, and especially during the 1960s and the 1970s? We are ready to address these questions in the general conclusion, where we will propose a comprehensive interpretation of the significance of this subject in the Catholic culture, with a specific focus on the Italian case.

V

Conclusions

After a panoramic bird's-eye view of the landscape of Italian Catholicism, and some rapid nosedives to get a closer look at the features of its most interesting actors, we have come to the end of our journey, devoted to the exploration of the idea of international community. Since some partial conclusions have already been proposed in each chapter, in these final pages we will propose a comprehensive evaluation of the results of our analysis, weaving in the threads left dangling in the introduction. We will divide the general conclusion into two parts, following the interpretative framework sketched out at the beginning of the dissertation: in the first one, we will retrace the evolution of the idea of international community during the pontificate of Paul VI, contextualizing the subject in a larger time frame and making reference to how this evolution was perceived by non-Catholics; in the second part, we will discuss what kind of contribution this analysis can provide to the general theme of the relationship between Catholicism and society in the contemporary age, and in particular in the last phase of first modernity.

1. *The idea of international community.*

The Second Vatican Council officialized the transition to a new era, where the Catholic doctrine could not be referenced as an archetypal textbook for the correct edification of the international community, nor the Church could be presented any longer as the sole moral authority that could teach the rules for a peaceful life in common among nations. The Christian faith could make only a contribution to a process that should be carried out autonomously by mankind, preferably through

international organizations, to which Catholics should fully dedicate their efforts. Their mission, indeed, was considered in line with the pillars of the Catholic idea of international community – or, to employ a phrase of the Catholic vocabulary, with the contents of the universal common good –, based on the achievement of peace through cooperation, dialogue, respect for human rights and international social justice. These changes represented a Copernican revolution for the Catholic culture, which abandoned a centuries-old tradition hinging on the interpenetration between religious and civil power, with the former exerting a direct or indirect influence on the latter. Such a paradigmatic turning point did not come out of blue, but it was instead prepared by a mental shift which involved first and foremost Catholic theologians and intellectuals, and finally entered the Magisterium's discourse during John's and Paul's papacies, especially with the Second Vatican Council. The transition from Traditional to New Universalism did not pass unnoticed by contemporary observers, as we can easily infer by browsing through the issues of two internationally oriented magazines like the liberal “Time” and the progressive “Le Monde Diplomatique” (LMD). The American weekly periodical welcomed the conclusion of the Council with a short essay entitled *How Vatican II turned the Church toward the world*, arguing that

Whatever the future's judgment, there can be little doubt that the council indeed represents a major and momentous step forward in carrying Christendom's oldest, largest body into modern times and bringing it into closer contact with all men – Catholic or not, Christian or not, religious or not.¹

In the same period, the French magazine published an article by Jesuit François Russo, who praised the “change of attitude” of the Church toward the international community, from its claim of primacy and inclination to judge the behavior of nations, to the quest for dialogue and its endorsement of the role of international organizations.² In the following years, two developments of

¹ *How Vatican II turned the Church toward the world*, “Time”, 17/12/1965, pp. 20-21 (quotation at p. 20).

² François Russo S.J., *La dernière session du Concile permettra d'approfondir le dialogue de l'église avec le monde*, in “LMD”, Octobre 1965, p. 22. When the Council was between the second and the third session, *Le Monde Diplomatique* ran another article by Catholic journalist Aimé Savard, who underlined how John XXIII and the Council had also changed the public's perception of the Catholic Church, noting *une sympathie qui s'est substituée à la méfiance, voire à l'hostilité*: see *La 3e session du Concile poursuivra l'œuvre de paix et d'unité de Jean XXIII*, “LMD”, September 1964, p. 12.

the new attitude on the international stage particularly caught the attention of neutral observers, i.e. the *Ostpolitik* and the special commitment to the issue of social justice, which was highlighted in an exemplary way by the encyclical *Populorum progressio*. “LMD” underlined the efforts of Vatican diplomacy, authorized by the paradigm shift brought about by John XXIII and the Council, in search of a *modus vivendi* between Eastern European Roman Catholic churches and the Communist regimes. At the same time, a positive outcome of such efforts was deemed highly unlikely, not only because of the intransigence of the Communist countries, but also because of Rome’s will to deal alone with the matters in question, in particular the nomination of bishops, without granting too much autonomy to local Churches.³ The encyclical *Populorum progressio*, on the other hand, received sympathetic attention in the columns of the French magazine, while “Time” defined it as “the Pope’s most striking pronouncement”, nonetheless highlighting some of its weaknesses: from a liberal, secular point of view, Paul’s critique of capitalism seemed out of date, since it was clearly directed to the old-style, “Manchesterian” capitalism that had long ago been replaced by a more “socially conscious” version in the industrialized West, while it could still be applied to other underdeveloped areas, such as Latin America.⁴ Actually, according to the American periodical, the whole Montinian papacy was a mix of light and shadow, torn between a conservative attitude in doctrine and theology, and progressive stances in matters of administration and social involvement. In the short essay published on the occasion of Paul’s death (August 1978), this judgment was articulated as follows:

In the years that followed [John’s death], the movement that John called *aggiornamento*, or modernization, became part of a revolution larger than John had foreseen – a tumultuous moral and social upheaval around the world. Both inside and outside the church, old values were questioned, traditional authority challenged. Paul became a study in anguish –

³ See for instance the articles of Bernard Féron: *Les négociations menées par le Vatican et les pays de l'est font apparaître la difficulté d'aménager une séparation réelle de l'Église et de l'État*, “LMD”, May 1967, p. 7, and *U.R.S.S. Détente avec le Vatican?*, April 1971, p. 17; see also ID., *Une nouvelle phase dans les relations entre l'U.R.S.S. et le Vatican?*, “LMD”, April 1963, p. 13, and *Roman Catholicism: Kremlin Cooperation*, “Time”, 22/2/1963, for some considerations over the early phases of Vatican *Ostpolitik*.

⁴ See in particular Martial Tricaud, *L'encyclique “Populorum progressio”*, “LMD”, August 1968, p. 7, and *The Papacy: Populorum Progressio*, “Time”, 7/4/1967, p. 64.

wanting reform but fearing the consequences of too much too fast, trying to please progressives while placating conservatives.⁵

Such an interpretation focuses too heavily on the stereotype of a tormented, torn Paul, that soon became a *topos* of the literature,⁶ but describes a real dynamic as well, as we have demonstrated through the analysis of the idea of international community. The return to a traditional approach to New Universalism, characterized by a stronger focus on Christian identity, which was sanctioned by the papacy of John Paul II but anticipated in the last years of Montini's reign, emerged in large part from the unforeseen consequences of the paradigm change. We have studied an exemplary expression of such a dynamic presenting the culture of Liberation, through the discourse of Latin American liberation theology.⁷ “Liberationists” and “Universalists” – restating once again that these categorizations are useful for historical analysis, but they were not systematic doctrines – converged in drawing from the sources of Christian faith a strong drive toward equality, brotherhood and justice among human beings at global level, founded on the dignity of every person and on the natural tendency to form cohesive communities. However, they fundamentally disagreed on the way to reach these goals, whether to do so through a few corrections to a basically positive historical path, or through a revolutionary change of an intrinsically flawed power system: in a nutshell, through cooperation or through conflict.

In the end, the culture of Liberation was condemned by Rome because of the radical, revolutionary implications that it suggested, even if some of its key issues, i.e. the drive for social

⁵ A Lonely Apostle Named Paul, “Time”, 14/8/1978, p. 29, but see also Roman Catholics: Shattering Tradition, “Time”, 25/8/1967, p. 36.

⁶ De Giorgi, *Paolo VI*, pp. 632 and 671.

⁷ The existence of an alternative perspective within the borders of Catholicism was underlined in several occasions by the American magazine: see for instance *Latin America: A Divided Church*, 23/8/1968; *Changing Theologies for a Changing World*, 26/12/1969, and *Collision in Latin America*, 9/2/1970. When Paul VI travelled to Latin America to address the second general Assembly of the Latin American episcopacy, in August 1968, *Time* correspondent John Shaw described the difficult position of the pope as follows: “the truth is that the Latin American Catholic Church has almost always been identified with the privileged powers [...]. As a result, there is widespread doubt that it can ever attain the status of a reunifying social force. [...] Paul's words were constructive as far as they went. Yet they did not sound strong enough on an impatient continent that more than ever demands change and forceful leadership”: *The Pope in Latin America*, 30/8/1968, pp. 40-41. *LMD*, instead, although it dedicated a great deal of attention to the explosive social and political situation in Latin America, did not insist too much on the religious element as a decisive factor in the equation: see for instance the dossier *L'Amérique latine vingt ans après Moncada. De l'échec à la poussée révolutionnaire*, July 1973.

justice and the necessity to look at international relations through the eyes of the exploited peoples, became part of the Catholic institutional vocabulary. On a general level, in any case, the reflection on the possible outcomes of the culture of Liberation helped to prompt a change of perspective in the Magisterium's discourse, which became more inclined to address specific contents of the universal common good, rooted in the Catholic *Weltanschauung*, that the international community could promote and enforce, so as to achieve peaceful relations between peoples.

THE ITALIAN CASE

The focus on the Italian case has helped us to add some nuance to the picture, by combining the theoretical level of discourse analysis with the historically grounded investigation of a specific context, which has revealed itself to be more nuanced than a superficial glimpse might have suggested. Indeed, the history of an idea cannot be addressed only from an “internal” point of view, but it needs to be related to the external environment, in which every cultural elaboration is immersed. From a peripheral but meaningful scenario, we have observed how the three background circles that we mentioned in the introduction – concerning the history of Catholicism, of Western societies and of the wider world – intersected and influenced each other, generating shifting and unexpected trajectories. In particular, New Universalism and culture of Liberation have also proven to be different receptions of a broader cultural revolution that was not limited to the Catholic world, and that fostered a new sense of agency in Western European societies, as well as a new tendency, unprecedented in its width and depth, to challenge traditional ways of thought. In the case of New Universalism, we are dealing with an “attuned” reception, meaning that the new way to look at the world, and act in it, was not deemed to be in conflict with the discourse of the ecclesiastical authority, but instead found a meaningful agreement with the Catholic doctrine as updated by the Council, without being directly drawn by said doctrine under the strict guidance of the Church.

We have described a fitting example of this process by taking into account the culture of foreign policy of Italian Christian Democracy: although as regards our topic, the party could

legitimately claim full autonomy from the Church, we can discern a theoretical framework consistent with the mainstream Catholic approach to the idea of international community in the DC's documents and from the speeches and writings of its major representatives. There is no risk of considering Italy, governed by a Christian democratic ruling class, an interpreter of the Holy See's international relations – as was not uncommon among contemporary observers;⁸ however, Catholic culture still had an impact in shaping the political culture of *Democrazia Cristiana*. The consistency between ideas and their actual implementation, as we have suggested, is another problem entirely, which shows yet another angle from which to observe the subject of our research.

The discourse of the organizations and personalities of the Italian Catholic laity has revealed a more articulated landscape. On the whole, the new universalist discourse functioned as a shared background for all the subjects that we took into account, proving to be a ductile paradigm, able to guide the cultural elaboration of fairly diverse actors engaged in different fields of activity. For limited time, though, between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the culture of Liberation exerted an especially significant influence on both the institutional and the non-institutional Catholic world, revealing a “radical” reception of the cultural revolution, to be studied in the context of the politicized and confrontational climate epitomized in Western societies by the events of 1968. Actually, we cannot properly read the events of this era using only Euro-centric, or Western-centric glasses: the irruption of the global dimension onto the scene had a powerful impact on the idea of international community, which became more and more influenced by events and narratives coming from all over the world. We have followed one of the possible threads, by highlighting the importance of Latin America for a minority but significant area of Italian Catholicism, composed of

⁸ In 1963, for instance, the former director of the most important Italian newspaper (“Il Corriere della Sera”), Mario Missiroli, wrote in a letter to another renowned Italian conservative intellectual, Giuseppe Prezzolini, that “the clerical government will carry out the Church’s foreign policy – how could it do otherwise, since without the Church’s support the DC would be nothing?”: see Mario Missiroli and Giuseppe Prezzolini, *Carteggio 1906-1974*, edited by Alfonso Botti, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1992, p. 321, my translation. It is interesting to notice that the literature on international law, instead, has addressed the problem of a possible dependency of the Holy See’s foreign policy on the Italian State, to which it was evidently linked by geographical proximity and practical relations; also in this case, however, the autonomy of the two subjects – which does not exclude, in specific cases, the possibility of political influences – has been convincingly argued: see the considerations of Ioana Cismas, *Religious Actors and International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 179.

the new groups of dissent as well as more traditional organizations like ACLI. By the end of the period under consideration, the radicalization of this area – which, from a historical perspective, can be connected to a second wave of Left Catholicism that spread throughout Western Europe – had come to an end, consistently with the trends that we analyzed at general level. The future developments of the idea of international community, as we have suggested, did not imply a simple return to the *status quo ante*, which is rarely the case in history, but their proper explanation would require a new framework of analysis, which kept track of the structural changes experienced by each one of the three abovementioned background levels from the 1980s onwards.

The period loosely marked by Paul's papacy, then, stands out as a phase of transition, in which the break with the past did not immediately lead to a new balance, but instead opened the way to a season of experimentation and incremental adjustments, that provides the observer with a treasure trove of opportunities to better understand a crucial moment of our recent history. In our investigation, we have covered but a small percentage of the whole landscape. In these closing notes, at least three limits need to be restated, concerning the protagonists and the research method. Firstly, we have only tangentially touched on the cultural elaboration of the Italian clergy: a future analysis of the kind of idea of international community inferable from the discourse of bishops, priests, religious orders and communities could confirm or confute the fitness of the categories of Universalism and Liberation to study the elaboration of the Catholic culture, especially in local contexts. The religious figures encountered on our journey – Mgr. Bettazzi, Father Balducci, don Giussani – indicate the possible presence of some surprises down the road. Secondly, a deeper level of scrutiny could involve the social base of the organizations and movements that we considered: the role of women, youth, the social and cultural backgrounds of activists and, above all, their contribution to shaping the idea of international community. This in-depth examination would enrich the profile both of the protagonists of the Catholic laity, and of the Christian democratic party, which in the years that we are investigating was famously divided into various currents and characterized by a generational change. Thirdly, and finally, there is a wide space open for

comparative research. We have tried to contextualize the Italian case at least in the Western European scenario, by comparing the discourse of the Italian subjects with that of the international organizations of which they were members. The nature of the research topic itself, however, encourages the researcher to propose national, regional or transnational comparisons, which could prove to be extremely fruitful in a period of steady growth of relations and contacts across national borders.

Notwithstanding these limits, the study of the Italian case has offered some interesting insights on the variations of the idea of international community in a geographical environment, in which the Catholic culture was traditionally strong and influential. There is a second level of analysis, moreover, that we can draw from our research: it concerns one of the pivotal themes for the historian of the Church and of Catholic culture, i.e. the relationship between Catholicism and society.

2. Catholicism and society in the last phase of first modernity.

Throughout the pages of this dissertation, a pattern has emerged with a sufficient amount of clarity: the idea of international community reflects the attitude of Catholic culture to modern society. Traditional Universalism, New Universalism and culture of Liberation, by suggesting the ideal configuration of the relations between peoples at global level, conveyed different ways to imagine the role of Catholicism in society, or in other words, its relationship with modernity. To further prove this statement, let us revisit the conclusions drawn in the previous pages from this point of view.

Traditional Universalism represented the cultural aversion to modernity, which became the hegemonic paradigm guiding Catholic culture from the nineteenth century until the 1960s: the

process of functional differentiation, by which different areas of life – at political, social, cultural level – were freed from religious domination, was interpreted as a deviant estrangement of mankind from the Church’s guidance. In our case, this means that the political communities, which from the Catholic culture’s point of view had traditionally benefited from a symbiotic relationship with religion, were now adrift without the compass provided by the Church and the Catholic doctrine. Within such an interpretative pattern, the tensions pervading the international system during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, could be traced back to the same unequivocal cause – the estrangement from religion – while the only reliable solution consisted of restoring the *status quo ante*, when the interpenetration between civil and religious powers guaranteed international peace, or in the classical Augustinian terms, the *tranquillitas ordinis*.

This model, which is obviously only described here in its general theoretical terms (we know that it translated into a variety of behaviors interpreting the antithesis between Catholicism and modernity, which in many cases revealed a significant ability of Catholicism to modernize itself), was definitely abandoned in the 1960s, when John’s papacy and the Second Vatican Council officialized the opening of a new era in the history of Catholicism. With the benefit of hindsight, scholars have argued that this age – which social historian Bill McSweeney had labeled “partnership with modernity”, after a century of “rejection” and “competition” – was not as long as the previous one, but only lasted for a few years, being replaced, as it became evident with John Paul’s pontificate, by the return to a more confrontational attitude – what Staf Hellemans has called the “countervoice”.⁹ We have focused precisely on this short period of unprecedented, although far from complete, cultural openness to modernity: New Universalism considered some long-term trends of modern history – the tendency to form larger and more integrated communities, the drive toward the global protection of human rights – fully compatible with the Catholic worldview, and

⁹ See Bill McSweeney, *Roman Catholicism: The Search for Relevance*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, and the already quoted Hellemans, *From “Catholicism Against Modernity” to the Problematic “Modernity of Catholicism”*. Only in a few years will we be able to properly contextualize the current papacy of Francis, which has received much attention in the media for its paradigm-breaking features, about the problem of the relationship between Catholicism and society.

even rooted in Christian doctrine. The most evident symbol of such trends was identified in the laudable work of international organizations whose temporal mission paralleled that of the Church in the spiritual sphere. The international engagement of the Catholic laity increased exponentially during this period, changing its distinctive features from the traditional charitable, relief and refugee work to a broader commitment to peace-building (now less focused on the pervading Anticommunist factor than in the 1950s), human rights advocacy and international social justice.

On closer examination, however, the phase of “partnership with modernity” reveals itself to be fairly controversial. From within the Catholic culture, an alternative voice questioned the same premises of this historical rapprochement. The culture of Liberation, indeed, highlighted the difference between “Western” modernity, focused on the problem of emancipation, and the condition of the Third World, where modernity had mostly taken the form of a generalized exploitation of the majority of the population by the local ruling classes, supported by international political and economic powers, in collusion with the Church. Value judgments aside, this perspective is also useful for the historian, who needs to take into account the risk of presenting too Western-centric a profile of the history of Catholicism. What is particularly interesting from our perspective is that although the culture of Liberation was radically opposed to the traditional universalist paradigm, centered around the return to an epoch of Christendom, at the same time it proposed a similar rejection of modernity, and a comparable model of politicization of religion, based on the action of the faithful in society in order to change the unjust features of the international system. In other words, the culture of Liberation insisted on the social and political implications of the Christian faith, which implied an antagonistic reading of international relations, and advocated the liberation of peoples from an unfair global power system. In doing so, it relied on other ideologies, especially Marxism, to analyze the contradictions of the international community, and left the interpretation of how to overcome them to the autonomous reflection of Christian communities. We might argue that from this point of view, Catholicism was a factor of change in society, but the direction of said change could not be imparted from the ecclesiastical authority,

being instead the fruit of the decisions of the faithful. Still, it was faith that oriented the individual and collective behavior of Catholics, contrary to the thesis of an irreversible tendency of religion becoming socially and politically irrelevant in the contemporary age, argued by advocates of the secularization paradigm.

A possible objection to this interpretation is that it was only a feature of a minority segment of Catholic culture. Yet, if we move the focus to New Universalism, the above point does not hold up either. It is certainly true that the Church could no longer claim to exert an indirect *potestas* on the international community, and that the empowerment of the laity was one of the major acquisitions of twentieth-century Catholic theology, which found legitimacy at the Council. Still, the Church's hopes of exerting an influence on society were not completely abandoned: we have seen how the Magisterium insisted on some elements, linked to the concept of universal common good, that had to guide the Catholic approach to international relations. During Paul's papacy the stress was mostly on the principle of dialogue with modern culture, but things had already started to change during the 1970s, when the foundations were laid for a more definite reassertion of Christian identity, also in the discourse on the international community, that characterized the pontificate of John Paul II. Such a change of attitude was also an effect of the "unforeseen consequences" of the 1960s paradigm shift, which had fostered an unprecedented willingness to open a line of dialogue with modern culture, and find some good in the "sign of the times": the attempt to break down the old barriers had resulted in a dangerous tendency to look beyond the borders of the Catholic area to find the cultural instruments able to interpret and act in the world, while the direction of history was revealed as not as positive and hopeful as it might have seemed in the first half of the 1960s. Ultimately, the majority approach of the Catholic culture had proven to be unable to expunge a feeling of diffidence, if not aversion, to modernity. If some trends could be appreciated and encouraged, it was only under the authority of the Magisterium, which provided the guidelines for the faithful to engage in society.

In sum, the mainstream approach of the Catholic culture also insisted on the social and political implications of faith. Faith did not withdraw to a private dimension, only able to guide the personal life of individuals; the only caveat concerned the necessity to rely on the established corpus of Catholic doctrine, updated and interpreted by the Magisterium, for their correct implementation. This was deemed all the more necessary in the new historical climate, which was characterized by a strong religious crisis in the West, as well as by the first indicators of a possible new, dynamic role for faith to play in Western societies, and above all by the undeniable strength of the religious factor in the rest of the world. From a long-term perspective, we might argue that the problem was that while the Catholic Church was changing its approach to the world, the world itself was rapidly changing, becoming more complicated and difficult to interpret. We need to stop our analysis at the dawn of this new era, which in many ways we are still living, and which cannot be properly read with the interpretive framework that we have adopted, since it was characterized by the transition from modernity to a new phase. Before rolling the credits, however, we can change the point of view, as we did in the previous section, moving from the general trends characterizing the Catholic culture to their reception and interpretation in a local but meaningful context, Italy.

THE ITALIAN CASE

The case study of the Italian landscape has helped us present to the reader with a more nuanced profile of the idea of international community in the elaboration of the Catholic culture, and can now also offer some insights into the relationship between Catholicism and society in the last period of first modernity. By following the cultural elaboration of some meaningful themes over a limited but significant span of time, we have discovered that the discourse on the international community represented a reliable litmus test for understanding their trajectory within the Italian Catholic world, whether we were dealing with the radicalization of ACLI and FUCI, or with the transformation of *Comunione e Liberazione* into the champion of the Christian identity. What kind of common elements, if any, can we draw from such different paths?

First of all, we may confirm that the era that began in the 1960s stands out distinctly as a novelty compared to the past: after decades of limited and conventional interest in the international dimension, which ran along the lines of the cultural opposition to the processes of modernity, and an increased interest after the Second World War, focused on the opposition to Communism – again, modernity's most poisonous fruit – Italian Catholicism became fully engaged in the phase of “partnership”. The debate now covered a wider variety of issues concerning the international community – not necessarily related to the Cold War – while the initiatives undertaken by lay institutions and organizations received additional attention. At the same time, our *tour d'horizon* in the Italian peninsula has confirmed the social and political relevance of religion: Catholic culture was still one of the sources of the Christian democratic culture of foreign policy, while the international engagement of many Catholic lay organizations was guided by the theoretical paradigms that we studied in general terms. This fact, which should not surprise the historian of modern Catholicism, is actually worth mentioning since it can also be verified in the 1960s and 1970s, when the age of Christendom as the ideal point of reference for Catholic culture came to a definite end in European society. Although the traditional ways of thought were replaced by a new attitude, faith continued to be interpreted, to some extent, as a compass for the behavior of the faithful in society: this pivotal feature of modern and contemporary Catholicism was never completely abandoned.

Certainly, such feature affected less and less people, as the religious crisis of the 1960s even got its grip on one of the European strongholds of the Catholic religion. Moreover, the laity were enjoying more autonomy in organizing their activities in the temporal sphere, participating in the general process of cultural revolution affecting Western societies starting in the 1960s. Nevertheless, New Universalism, mixed to various degrees with the culture of Liberation, worked as a frame of reference to inspire the views of old and new organizations – from *Pax Christi Italia* to *Comunione e Liberazione*, from Catholic Action to Sant'Egidio Community – of the international community. The focus on the cultural elaboration of some of them, over a limited but significant

span of time, has enabled us to fine-tune this general statement. The “partnership” era, indeed, stimulated one remarkable side effect: the cultural openness that characterized this phase led to the questioning of the ability of the Catholic culture to function as the provider of rules for the personal and collective behavior of the faithful in society. In general terms, this question was answered in three different although not mutually exclusive ways.

The first way entailed a more critical relationship with faith, which reflected the deep cultural transformations experienced by the West since the 1960s, but did not deny *tout court* the possibility that religion give advice about social engagement. From our standpoint, this itinerary was represented by the adoption of the new universalist paradigm, which involved Christian Democracy and the majority of the Italian Catholic laity. The second one was a negative answer: Catholic doctrine could no longer interpret the changing shape of the contemporary world, so that the faithful needed turn to other cultural sources, better equipped to staying in tune with the unfolding of history. For many, especially within the young generations around 1968, this meant leaving the world of Catholic associationism, following a trend that was fairly common in the West. Others tried to keep the Catholic culture and alternative secular ideologies – namely, referring to our categories, Marxism through the culture of Liberation – together, but in this case the choice to be in or out of the ecclesiastical community was only postponed by a few years, becoming inevitable by the mid-1970s. This was the case for the Italian representatives of the second wave of European Left Catholicism, whose choices drove them to more or less intense confrontations with the ecclesiastical authority. The third option emerged in the last phase of the period under observation, and would become mainstream after its end; it consisted of a return to the identity features of the Catholic *Weltanschauung*, that were still deemed capable of directing the engagement of the faithful in society. In this respect, we have talked about a traditional approach to New Universalism, taking into account a paradigmatic example of this attitude with the historical parabola of *Comunione e Liberazione*.

In the end, the study of the Italian case has essentially confirmed the conclusions of our general analysis. Catholic culture came out deeply transformed from the central phase of the second half of the twentieth century, as numerous observers immediately pointed out, but the employment of a positive attitude toward modernity did not stand the test of time. At the same time, the social and political implications of religion did not become vestiges of the past, but instead continued to represent a core feature, although in new and varying ways, of the Catholic faith. These hypotheses are not particularly new, nor groundbreaking, but we hope to have proposed an original standpoint from which to look at this bundle of problems, and a versatile interpretative key to address them historically. The idea of international community, in other words, may also be used as a guide to read Catholic culture's approach to modernity, and therefore to interpret the relationship between Catholicism and society. In this respect, the 1960s and the 1970s have been a period of crisis and change, of experimentation and failed attempts, at the dawn of the new global era. In the eyes of one historian who was not there to live it, they represent an inescapable landmark not only to deepen the knowledge of the past, but also to understand the complexity of the present: “misunderstanding of the present”, wrote one of the greatest historians of the twentieth century, “is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of the past”.¹⁰

¹⁰ Marc Bloch, *The historian's craft*, translated from the French by Peter Putnam, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992 (or. ed. 1946), p. 36.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAS	<i>Acta Apostolicae Sedis</i>
ACLI	Associazioni Cristiane dei Lavoratori Italiani
ACO	Action Catholique Ouvrière
CDICID	Christian Democratic International Center for Information and Documentation
CDU/CSU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern
CDWU	Christian Democratic World Union
CEI	Conferenza Episcopale Italiana
CEPESS	Centrum voor Politieke, Economische en Sociale Studies van de CVP
CFDT	Confédération française démocratique du travail
CIF	Centro Italiano Femminile
CISC	Confédération internationale des syndicats chrétiens
CISL	Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Liberi
CL	Comunione e Liberazione
CLASC	Confederaciòn latinoamericana de sindicalistas cristianos
CLAT	Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CVP/PSC	Christelijke Volkspartij/Parti Social Chrétien
DC	Democrazia Cristiana
EC	European Community
ENI	Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi
EO-ICV/VWA	Europese Organisatie van het ICV/WVA
EPP	European People's Party
EUCD	European Union of Christian Democrats
EUYCD	European Union of Young Christian Democrats
FUCI	Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana

GA	Gioventù Aclista
GS	Gioventù Studentesca
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICV/WVA	Internationaal Christelijk Vakverbond/Wereldverbond van de Arbeid
IMCS	International Movement of Catholic Students
KAB	Katholische Arbeitnehmer-Bewegung
KWB	Kristelijke Werknemersbeweging
LMD	Le Monde Diplomatique
MCP	Mouvement Chrétien de la Paix
MP	Member of Parliament
MG	Movimento Giovanile della Democrazia Cristiana
MLAC	Movimento Laureati di Azione Cattolica
MPL	Movimento Politico dei Lavoratori
MRP	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEI	Nouvelles Équipes Internationales
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano
PPI	Partito Popolare Italiano
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano
PSIUP	Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria
PXI	Pax Christi International
PXIT	Pax Christi Italia
ROC	Russian-Orthodox Church
SIPDIC	Secrétariat International des Partis Démocrates d'Inspiration Chrétienne
WCL	World Confederation of Labor
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

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This section provides a selection of the primary sources and secondary literature quoted in this dissertation, with a focus on the contributions that are instrumental for the contextualization and the understanding of the argumentation developed in the text. Further references are provided in the footnotes, while a more organic assessment of the questions concerning source selection and methodology is developed in the general Introduction, and within each chapter.

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KDC – Katholiek Documentatie Centrum

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ACS – Archivio Centrale dello Stato (Roma, Italy)

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