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**The Organization of State Propaganda in
Eastern and Southeastern Europe during
the 1930's**

**Comparative Perspectives on Poland, Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria**

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INTRODUCTION

Propaganda is a form of communication that has always been a part of human society, regardless of time and geographical space. Throughout history, people have tried to influence each other, especially in the struggle to win or maintain power. With the formation of new states at the beginning of the XX century, these efforts have become more organized, centralized and coordinated. In this thesis, the organization of the state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria will be examined during the 1930's as this was a very important period for the history of propaganda on a global level.

At the beginning, it is important to shed light on the interwar history of the three Slavic states formed in the early 20th century. Bulgaria was officially recognized as an independent state in 1908, whereas Poland and Yugoslavia became independent after the First World War. These three countries could be considered as latecomers to the European society and as a product of a long term struggle for the independence of the Slavic people who occupied those territories as well as from the fall of the Great Empires after the first World War.

The Bulgarian modern state was formed more than 500 years after the Turkish invasion of the Bulgarian medieval state. The idea of the unification of all Yugoslav people was an idea from an influential group of intellectuals in the independent Serbian state and amongst the South Slavs that had been living in the Habsburg Empire (Serbs, Croats and Slovenians).¹ After the XVIII century, occupation by the two great neighboring powers, Germany and Russia, Poland regained its independence. New states geographically occupied territories in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of the Europe² and those territories were inhabited (and still are) by a large number of nations, especially compared to Western Europe or North America.

¹ The meaning of the idea changed during the time, but the unification of all Yugoslavs was officially declared in late 1914 as one of the war goals set by the Serbian government. See: D.Jankovic, Niska deklaracija, Nastajanje programa jugoslovenskog ujedinjenja [Nish declaration, The Creation of the Yugoslav unification program], Istorija XX veka, X (Belgrade, 1969), pp.7-111.; M.Ekmechic, Ratni ciljevi Srbije [The War Goals of Serbia], (Belgrade, 1990).

² In this dissertation, I used geographical terms Eastern and Southeastern Europe as these were used at The United Nations Statistics Division's Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49). See:

The decision to choose Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as cases for comparison in this dissertation was based on their common Slavic origin, even more to the similarities of their interwar development, and finally based on the similarities of their state propaganda organizations and these factors will be evaluated in greater detail in this thesis. The interwar history of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was mostly unknown to the readers from other European countries, even with historians outside of these countries. That history was fascinating, but somewhat complex due to the language's obstacles.

In this introduction, it was important to mention a few words about the history of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the interwar period, stress some crucial points about their development, point out some problems of that development and underline key events that influenced the specific history of each country. Common elements of each of these states' development will be highlighted as well as highlighting issues specific to each individual state.

The results of the First World War strongly shaped the present and future of the three countries. Poland and Yugoslavia benefited from the outcome of the War and Bulgaria suffered as a defeated ally and its territory was reduced. Yugoslavia, and especially Poland, was built as a part of the *cordon sanitaire* between Germany and the Soviet Union and the aim of the two examined countries was to keep an established system and then change it later. Their foreign policies in the interwar period were built on that assumption and that goal influenced their politics, especially in the 1930's. These countries were considered to be "small fry" when the Versailles treaty was put together and they eventually suffered after the breakdown of this treaty

Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria after the First World War were predominantly agricultural societies. This could be true for the interwar period and for practically all the Eastern and Southeastern countries at the time.³ In 1918, that percentage was very high as in Bulgaria 80% of people was in agriculture related activities, in Yugoslavia, this figure was 75%, and in Poland, this figure was 63%. At the end of the period under review, those numbers dropped, but only very slightly.

In all three countries under the review which followed the process of transition from a parliamentary democracy (with all its faults) to the dictatorship and authoritarian system (with all its "democratic elements"), the fall of democracy in these countries was not attributed to the

<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#europe>. The division used was geographical, which lacked any shifting political content.

³ An exception is only Czechoslovakia with 34%.

World Economic Depression, like in Germany, but instead it was due to the failure to implement democracy into these societies with authoritarian heritages and non-productive political party struggles (dictatorships in Poland and Yugoslavia were introduced before the global crisis between 1926 and 1929). Nevertheless, the dictatorships introduced in these three states were not fascist, despite some elements of fascism existing within these states.⁴

The political systems of all the three countries suffered greatly due to corruption and inefficiency that were due to the incompetence of political leaders and to the conditions they had inherited. The failure to fully develop and establish democracy was also the result of people apathy and a lack of proper education. All those factors combined with the strong military and authoritarian tradition made it easier for the ruling classes to maintain order, often by using force and repression.

The countries under review passed through similar political changes in the interwar period. After the first World War, a parliamentary system was established, which set up both the Polish and Yugoslav constitutions in 1921 and this gave the main powers to the Parliament. The situation was similar in Bulgaria where power remained in the hands of the “Tarnovo” Constitution from XIX century, the first Bulgarian constitution.⁵

In Poland, parliamentary democracy lasted until 1926 when there was a ‘coup de etat’ led by Marshall Pilsudski. He changed the government and he appointed his friend, scientist Moszinski as the new national President. Marshal took the chief position in the country, but he never took the presidency nor the position of prime minister and he stayed “in charge” of the country until his death in 1935. After the death of Pilsudski, his comrades-in-arms ruled the country with the most important person, apart from the president Moszinski, being the new

⁴ Some notable works: D.Bunikowski, ‘Prawo hegemonia w Polsce pilsudczykowskiej po 1935 roku’ [Right of the Hegemon in Pilsudskist Poland after 1935], in: M.Wolos, K.Kani, eds, *Polska bez Marszałka: dylematy pilsudczyków po 1935 roku*, (Torun, 2008), pp.229-255; N.Poppetrov, ‘Avtoritarizam-fashizam (kam modela na politichesko razvitiye na na Balgariya 1918-1944)’ [Authoritarianism-fascism (to the model of Bulgaria’s political development 1918-1944)] *Istoricheski pregled* 1997/2, pp.25-48; P.Tsvetkov, N.Poppetrov, ‘Kam tipologiyata na politicheskoto razvitiye na Balgariya prez 30te godine’ [To the typology of the political development of Bulgaria during the 30’s] *Istoricheski pregled* nr. 45, 2/1990, pp.63-78; P.Markovic, ‘Die Legitimierung der Diktatur in Jugoslawien und die Offentliche Meinung’ In: *Autoritaere Regime in Ostmittel- und Suedosteuropa 1919-1944*, ed. E.Oberlaender (Paderborn/Muenchen/Wien/Zuerich, 2001), pp.577-632; *Dyktatury w Europie Srodkowo-Wschodniej 1918-1939* [Dictatorship in Central and Eastern Europe 1918-1939], Konferencja naukowa w Instytucje Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk 2-3 XII 1971, (Wroclaw/Warsaw/Cracow/Gdansk, 1973).

⁵ The constitution ran from 1879 and, with the some changes from 1893 and 1911, remained in power until 1947. The “Tarnovo” constitution was finalized after the Congress in Berlin in 1878 when Northern Bulgaria received autonomy from within the Turkish Empire.

Marshal Rydz-Smigly and Colonel Beck. This ruling group (together with other less important militarists) was known as the 'Government of the Colonels'.

In Yugoslavia, the parliamentary system fell apart in 1929 after King's Alexander Karadjordjevic's 'coup de etat'. After that, the governments did not depend on the will of the people, but on the will of the ruler, which made the entire parliamentary model more distant from the earlier democratic practices in the country. With the death of King Alexander in 1934 in Yugoslavia, party politics was alive again, but true parliamentary principles were by no means re-established.

In Bulgarian literature, there was some disagreement about how long the parliamentary system lasted.⁶ As in Poland and Yugoslavia, the forceful change of government happened in 1934 and this was led by the military. With this act, the parties and the parliamentary system were abolished and in 1935, normal parliamentary practices were re-established, but with significant limitations. The government of Georgi Kjoseivanov, supported by "Tsar" Boris, led the country down a road of a non-party system which meant the suppression of previously existing political parties and of their work.

One could conclude that the 1930's for the three countries under review was a transition from semi-democratic to semi-authoritarian states. Describing the political situation in Eastern European countries (which included Balkan's as well), the historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote in 1946:

"Most of the political struggles of the Eastern European States during the last twenty years were fought between different small groups within narrow ruling classes, over the heads of the people. These struggles were no more than scrambles for power, for material advantages and for personal prestige between ambitious individuals and interested cliques."⁷

This classification could be applied at the 'democratic' period of these states' development and even more at the 'authoritarian' stage. Many of those struggles involved an enormous use of propaganda and those activities were applied towards the people as well as to political opponents, both inside and outside the ruling party.

⁶ Older Bulgarian historians (Migevev, Milkova) stated that 1923 was the year which announced "The end of parliamentary democracy" in Bulgaria.

⁷ H. Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941*, (New York, 1946), p. 256.

The 20th century became known for the vast growth in the power of mass communications. Many forms of media were invented and developed very quickly and specialist publicity methods were used to develop propaganda into an outrageously “fine-art”. At the beginning of the First World War, national governments started to use massive propaganda campaigns for the first time.

The Allies victory in 1918 was achieved by a skilful combination of military power, economic power, and propaganda and in the aftermath of the First World War, there was some kind of “propaganda truce”. Some states even cancelled their propaganda ministries, which operated during the war such as Britain whose public had a “healthy” dislike for all forms of government propaganda.

Changes occurred when the Nazi party came to power in Germany in 1933 as party propaganda played a key role in their foreign and domestic affairs. Joseph Goebbels believed that propaganda was to play a central role and that the function of the newly formed Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was to co-ordinate the political will of the nation with the aims of the Nazi state. Italy followed this step and founded the same Ministry in 1935 (firstly called The Ministry of Press and Propaganda and later, this was renamed The Ministry of Popular Culture). Other European countries, influenced or rather threatened by these examples, started to form similar institutions as well as giving greater priority to those which had already existed. Eric Carr wrote about this period:

“In the totalitarian countries, radio, press, and film are state industries completely controlled by governments. In democratic countries, conditions vary, but everyone is heading towards more and more centralized control (Carr 1939: 9)”.

Foreign and domestic propaganda became one of the main preoccupations for most of the European countries at that time as state propaganda efforts, as well as budgets for propaganda purposes, increased during the period under review. The 1933 budget of the French Foreign Office to the Chamber of Deputies included an estimate of sums to be spent by European countries on propaganda in 1933. They were (in French francs): Germany 256.000.000; Italy 119.000.000; France 71.000.000; Great Britain 69.000.000; Poland 26.000.000, Hungary 23.000.000; Czechoslovakia 13.000.000, Yugoslavia 13.000.000, Romania 7.000.000. In total

the amounts spent by the aforementioned European countries were: 597 million French francs which was the equivalent of about 24 million US dollars or almost 5 million British pounds.⁸

This dissertation focused on the organizational models of state propaganda of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930s. As part of this study on the history of propaganda in Yugoslavia, it was important to highlight the similarities in the organization of Eastern European states' propaganda, the ways in which they influenced each other and the extensive use of the elements of Nazi and fascist propaganda. The wide use of radio technology in propaganda purposes, the development of the leadership cult and the growing nationalism, were some of the propaganda motives and practices applied by Eastern European countries. However, the regimes in those countries were not seen as a great example of authoritarian practice by the fascist countries.

The state propaganda of most of the important European countries at the time, especially the totalitarian (Germany, Italy, Soviet Union) states was well documented and analyzed in historical terms. It was important to stress the studies, completely or partly done, by using the comparative method (Eric Carr⁹; Bytwerk Randall¹⁰; Kracunova Daria¹¹; Welch David 1993¹²). Those books were helpful for recreating the practices of this era.¹³

There was a lot of detailed Polish literature, which partly or completely dealt with state propaganda in the interwar period. Monographs "The system of state propaganda of the government in Poland 1926-1939" by Elzbieta Kaszuba¹⁴ and "Newspapers in the system of government propaganda in Poland 1926-1939" by Andrzej Notkowski¹⁵ are the most prominent and these monographs served as an excellent starting point for further research and comparative

⁸ R.Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, (New York-London, 1937), p.207.

⁹ E. Carr, *Propaganda in international politics*, (Oxford, 1939).

¹⁰ R. Bytwerk, *Bending spines, The Propaganda of Nazi Germany and The German Democratic Republic*, (East Lansing, 2004).

¹¹ D. Kracunova , *Totalitarizam – Vlast i propaganda 1917-1953* [Totalitarianism – power and propaganda 1917-1953], (Sofia, 2002).

¹² D. Welch, *The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda*, (London, 2005).

¹³ Monograph *The Metaxas Myth, Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece* by Marina Petrakis published in 2006 (London-New York) covered a very conveniently Greek case in the 1930's.

¹⁴ E. Kaszuba, *System propagandy państwa obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926-1939* [System of the State Propaganda in the Poland 1926-1939], (Toruń, 2004).

¹⁵ A. Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie propagandy rządowej w Polsce 1926-1939, Studium Techniki władzy* [The Press in the system of the State Propaganda in Poland 1926-1939], (Warsaw /Lodz, 1987).

analysis. Besides them, there were several other authors whose literature dealt with some propaganda aspects or cult of personality.¹⁶

When considering Southeastern Europe, this phenomenon was analyzed only generally and without detailed explanation. Literature from Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Bulgaria dealt with particular cases of state propaganda and they offered particular analyses of some propaganda institutions and media development (Bjelica Mihailo¹⁷; Dimitrov Veselin¹⁸; Lazetic Predrag¹⁹; Markovic Predrag²⁰; Dragan Tesic²¹; Petko Belokonski²²). Those authors mostly did not use comparative methods and did not go beyond the reconstruction of the general framework of propaganda institutions and propaganda manifestation.

In the dissertation, generally, the state propaganda in terms of propaganda of the most important of the state's officials (president of the governments and government's parties) was examined and the people with the most influence on political decisions made in period under the review were Marshal Rydz-Smygli in Poland, Prime Minister Stojadinovic in Yugoslavia and in Bulgaria, the Prime Minister KJoseivanov. The influences of the monarchs and president, King Boris in Bulgaria, Prince Paul in Yugoslavia and president Moszinski were not ignored, but their importance was noted according to significance.

An important part of the dissertation was written on previously unexplored archived sources on state propaganda found in the Serbian, Polish and Bulgarian archives. For the Yugoslav case, the most important archive was the archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije – AJ). At that time, the state was highly centralized and all the working papers of governments and ministries were located in this area. There were only documents missing from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this was because these were destroyed during the Second World War.

¹⁶ M. Pietrzał, *Reglamentacja wolności prasy w Polsce 1918-1939*, [Regulation of the Freedom of the Press in Poland 1918-1939], (Warsaw /Wiedza, 1963); H. Hein-Kircher, *Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926-1939*, [The Cult of Piłsudski and his importance for Polish Society 1926-1939], (Warsaw, 2008).

¹⁷ M. Bjelica, *Srpski rat rečima 1844-2000* [Serbian war of words 1844-2000], (Belgrade, 2003).

¹⁸ V.Dimitrov, *Istoriya na radio v Balgariya, II*, [History of radiophonia in Bulgaria, II], (Sofia, 1994).

¹⁹ P.Lazetic, 'Milan Stojadinovic i predizborna kampanja 1938' [Milan Stojadinovic and propaganda for 1938's elections], *Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije*, 1988, number.25, Belgrade, pp.117-139.

²⁰ P. Markovic, 'Die Legitimierung der Diktatur in Jugoslawien und die Offentliche Meinung', In: *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Suedosteuropa 1919-1944*, ed. E.Oberlaender, (Paderborn/Munchen/Vienna/Zurich, 2001), pp.577-632.

²¹ D. Tesic, *Jugoslovenska Radikalna Zajednica u Srbiji 1935-1939* [Yugoslavian Radical Community in Serbia 1935-1939], (Belgrade, 1997).

²² P. Belokonski, *Istina po vreme na voina, Propagandata v Balgariya prez 1941-1944* [Truth about Wartime, Propaganda in Bulgaria 1941-1944], (Sofia, 2000).

However, the two sets of documents most crucial for this study were in found the section of The Centralni Press Bureau, and those found under the sub-section of Milan Stojadinovic. The Centralni Press Bureau was an institution that served as the Ministry of Propaganda and the sub-section of Milan Stojadinovic stored papers from the period of Stojadinovic's government, who was Premier and Foreign Minister from 1935 to 1939.

The archive of the oldest cultural institution of modern Serbia, *Matica Srpska*, was also important for this study. This was mainly for the personal papers of Stojimirovic Milan Jovanovic who was a famous journalist and writer, publisher of pro-government paper "Samouprava" and head of the state press agency *Avala*. There, one could find not only personal papers, but also official documents of the government party and state agencies. There were also similar types of documents found in the town of Smederevo, which was part of the Stojimirovic legacy.

As in the case of Yugoslavia, there was an archive in Bulgaria where all the most important government documents of period, the papers of ministries and state agencies were stored. This was the Central State Historical Archive (Централен Държавен исторически архив – CDA) in Sofia and cards on the organization of propaganda in the preceding periods were used. However the Archive of state news agency (Българска Телеграфна Агенция, БТА) has only a small amount of saved documents and this made the reconstruction of the history of БТА very difficult.

Documents, relating to the government, how the parties were founded and influenced by the government were located in the Archives of Modern Documents (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in Warsaw. These included the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government - BBWR and later, "The camp of national Unity" - OZN, including the state press agency (PAT). The Press department was part of the Foreign Ministry and this was a more important detail for this study. There were some useful documents in the personal section relating to the second Polish Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły and it was interesting to see the development of his cult as a successor to Pilsudski.

Contrary to the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the most important documents for state propaganda in Poland were located in the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe - CAW) because the army played a crucial role in the country throughout the period between the first and second World Wars. Major official propaganda campaigns were created

and carried out directly by the military authorities or by their prominent participation and in these documents, one could see the organizational charts of the propaganda departments, the methods of influence and the efforts used to coordinate all the organizations of propaganda by the military.

This dissertation was organized into four chapters. In the first chapter entitled “State Propaganda in Europe during the 1930’s”, where the state propaganda organizations in Europe of this period were discussed, both totalitarian (Germany, Italy and Soviet Union) and democratic (Great Britain and France). Special attention was given to the neighboring countries with similar regimes such as Hungary, Romania and Greece and others similar in size and internal organization such as Czechoslovakia and Turkey.

The second part of the thesis “State Propaganda Organization in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930’s” mostly covered the structural organization of state propaganda in Poland and its manifestation in the political aspect of states’ development where it dealt with the central propaganda’s institutions. In this part of the dissertation, the organization, financing, personal structure, influence and specific manners of these institutions were all explained in detail.

In the third part of the thesis, the role of the news agencies PAT in Poland, Avala in Yugoslavia and BTA in Bulgaria was discussed with explanations regarding their foundation, their connection with the state and governments as well as their structure and role in the state propaganda. Relations with the most important agencies in Europe will also be examined with significant attention paid to the other news agencies which existed in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930’s as well as examining their influence and relations with the main state’s agencies.

In the final section of the dissertation “Media in the service of State Propaganda”, the role of the media in the increasing use of state propaganda was analyzed. The accent was on pro-government newspapers, radio and cinema and a comparative perspective was imposed on legislation, technical development, and structural changes. The role that the media played in policies and public life of the three countries was of great importance in understanding the structural changes in the phenomena of mass politics that occurred in the period under review. Special attention was focused upon their structural similarities, level of correlation and cooperation, common elements and patterns of their work.

Finally, three translated documents were presented, one for each country. The first appendix considered the radio propaganda in Poland, the second the transcript of propaganda film made in Yugoslavia in 1938 and the third discussed the organization of the practical propaganda in Bulgaria. It was important to publish these documents for the first time in English as a valid illustration of the propaganda work done in the period.

As previously noted by other historians, an evaluation of the impact of the most authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, proved a difficult task due to censorship, the lack of public opinion surveys and other important, sometimes even basic sources. Some other sources, like foreign services reports could partly help to resolve that issue, but the main aim of this dissertation was, primarily, how propaganda organizations in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were organized during the 1930's and which institutions and organizations were involved. Hopefully, the following chapters will answer those questions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Researching the history of three different countries (Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) while living in a fourth (Italy) was challenging and somewhat complicated. Besides the economic demands of conducting such research, the aforementioned was especially true for the first years of working on the project when citizens of Serbia needed a visa for travelling into the European Union countries.

The administrative problems were not small, but finally they were overcome. It is true to say that the research project would not have been possible without the institutional help and funding received from the Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (SNS). The PhD program of this institution is an excellent opportunity for all young researchers from all over the world and I was fortunate to be part of it. I wish especially to thank my supervisor professor Daniele Menozzi for his support and help throughout the three years of the PhD program and in addition to Professor Menozzi, I received valuable advice from professors Heinz-Gerhard Haupt from the European University Institute and Biljana Simunovic-Beslin from University of Novi Sad and I will use this opportunity to thank them both.

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The research project and the resulting thesis would not have been achieved without the useful information and help that I received from the personnel from several archives from Poland

(Archiwum Akt Nowych, Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe), Serbia (Arhiv Jugoslavije, Rukopisno odeljenje Matice srpske, Istorijski arhiv grada Smedereva, Arhiv Vojvodine) and Bulgaria (Centralen darjaven istoricheski arhiv, Darjaven voenoistoricheski arhiv, Arhiv Balgarske Telegrafne Agencije) as well as Italy (Archivio Centrale dello Stato). In addition, I owe gratitude to the group of people who have generously shared their information and knowledge of sources and made the research easier for me on numerous occasions.

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CHAPTER I

***PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
STATE PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE
DURING THE 1930's***

PROPAGANDA – HISTORY OF THE TERM AND MODERN SCHOLARY DEFINITIONS

At the beginning of this chapter, it is important to say something about the use and meaning of the term propaganda in history and in the present. In general, propaganda does not have any positive or negative connotations; it merely exists, not only in the modern period, but also from the beginning of organized human society. It exists regardless of time or geographic location and it is only tied to human communication. The use of propaganda practically began at a time when humans started to communicate to each other and simply speaking, propaganda is a communication of ideas designed to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way, but what distinguishes propaganda from other processes of persuasion is the question of intent.

Propaganda is similar to education. The crucial difference is that education teaches people *how* to think and propaganda tells people *what* to think. Propaganda uses communication to bring a message that is designed to serve the self-interests of the person or people doing the communicating where the success of propaganda is measured by comparing the outcome with the original intention of that person or persons.

According to past experiences, the most successful propaganda is one that preaches to the already converted. At the beginning, propaganda was based on face to face communication, but in modern times, a third party is now involved and this involves the widespread use of various media such as the press, radio, television etc. because they intervene in the communication process between the sender and recipient of any propaganda messages. This form of propaganda can also deliberately deliver partial information that can be either misleading or purposely withholding certain information. The control of the flow of information is very important for the propagandist and during history, censorship has often been used. In the struggle for power,

propaganda is the weapon for those who want to retain their positions in power and for those who want to replace them.²³

The term propaganda comes from the Latin word *propagare*, which means to spread. It is a well accepted fact that the term was coined in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV, frightened by the global spread of Protestantism, formed the Office for the Propagation of the Faith (*Congregatio de propaganda fide*) to supervise the Church's missionary efforts in the New World and elsewhere. The Pope wrote:

“It is to be desired that, especially inspired by divine grace, they should cease to wander, amidst heresies through the unhappy pastures of infidelity, drinking deadly and poisonous water. However, they should be placed in the pasture of the true faith that they may be gathered together in a saving doctrine, and be led to the springs of the waters of life.”²⁴

The word remained closely linked with the Catholic Church well into XIX century and only in the First World War did it lose its neutrality.²⁵ There are also scholars that claim that the term propaganda lost its neutrality at the very beginning because the society that was formed under its name was in conflict between the Catholic and Protestant church.²⁶ One encyclopedia offers us a chronology of the development of propaganda that places its roots in the V and IV century BC with the use of Plato's books for influence on Greek's towns.²⁷

Literature about propaganda is vast and²⁸ the term propaganda has been defined in numerous ways in scholarly literature. In the XX century, the number of definitions grew to such an enormous number that its collection would take several years' work and even nowadays, there is no uniform definition of propaganda. Many of them are partial, limited by the political, psychological or sociological aspect of the problem and it is difficult to add something new in the theoretical analysis of propaganda that hasn't already been written. Thus, we will shed light on some authors and their theories that are the most interesting and influential in the modern era

²³ Inspiring introduction about propaganda, Psychological Warfare and Persuasion see in: P.Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind, A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day* (Oxford, 2003), pp.1-16.

²⁴ Quoted from: E.Bernays, *Propaganda* (New York, 2005), p.10. The Latin text of Gregory's bull is included in *Magnum bullarium Romanum: bullarum, privilegiorum ac diplomatum Romanorum Pontificum amplissima collection* (Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck-Verlagsanstalt, 1964-1966). It is available online at the Notre Dame Archives, <http://classic.archives.nd.edu/bull.htm>.

²⁵ T.Clark, *Art and Propaganda in the twentieth century* (New York, 1997), 7.

²⁶ J.Garth, V.O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (Newbery Park/London/New Delhi, 1992), p.2.

²⁷ *International Encyclopedia of Propaganda* (Chicago, 2001), p.608.

²⁸ At the end of thesis, some notable titles in the field could be found in the list of references.

and these will be highlighted in order to illustrate their scope and direction in the development of propaganda.

In the 1920's, Edward Bernays defined propaganda as a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.²⁹ Bernays saw himself as a "propagandist for propaganda" and thought of it as a modern instrument by which "we can fight for productive ends to bring order out of chaos".³⁰

In the 1950's, Jacques Driencourt said: "Everything is propaganda" ("Tout est Propagande").³¹ This tempting, but unsatisfactory, explanation could be used by some as an excuse for not studying this phenomenon further, but contrary to Bernays, there are more authors that looked at propaganda as being negative.

One of the most important books in the 1960's was Jacques Ellul's *Propaganda's, The Formation of Men's Attitudes* as he looked at propaganda more as a technique than a science. His definition is: "Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated into an organization".³² Ellul saw propaganda as negative and manipulative and also stated that only successful propaganda is real propaganda, but from a personal viewpoint, one must disagree with such thoughts.

In recent years, the number of definitions has multiplied. The historian of propaganda David Welch offered a solid chronological survey of the development of the term, as well as dozens of existing definitions. According to him, propaganda is a "deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandist and their political masters, either directly or indirectly".³³ This definition is satisfactory and it will be used as a basis for future references. However, it is important to stress that a "deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of and audience" is true for both giving and withholding the information.

²⁹ Bernays, *Propaganda*, p.52.

³⁰ Ibid, p.168.

³¹ J.Driencourt, *La Propagande nouvelle force politique* [The Propaganda New Political Force], (Paris, 1950), pp.18 and 26.

³² J.Ellul, *Propaganda, The Formation of Men's Attitudes* (New York, 1973), p.61. The first edition of the book was in French in 1965.

³³ N.Cull, D.Culbert, D.Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to present*, (Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp.317-323.

In general terms, propaganda consists of six elements and these elements make the totality and only when seen together could one see the complete picture. These elements are:

- Subject of propaganda;
- Propaganda message;
- Propaganda object;
- Media that transmits the propaganda;
- Conditions in which the propaganda is conducted;
- Consequences of the propaganda work.

Political propaganda is the instrument of politics and it is shaped by politicians while professional propagandists only carry it out. The subject of propaganda is the one who decides to start the propaganda activity and that subject can be institution, organization, group or individual.

In this thesis, we will be focusing upon state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria where the subjects of propaganda were representatives of state such as kings, marshals, presidents of the government, ministers and chiefs of propaganda institutions.

The message is one of the crucial aspects of successful propaganda as this is transmitted by subject and has to meet some conditions if it is to be successful. The most important of those conditions are to be reachable, attractive, clear, interesting and convincing for the recipients of such messages. Every one of above mentioned conditions must be met, otherwise the propaganda could be easily unnoticed and rejected and it is also important that balance exists between the mentioned elements. In that case, propaganda could achieve the goals set by the subject.

Objects of propaganda are groups or individuals targeted by the propagandist's message. Even in the early years of propaganda usage, one of the main tasks of the subject of propaganda was to better understand the behavior of its object as human behavior is complex and not always easy to understand. Its study remains an open task for both the propagandist and scientist as the hypothesis must be always tested and retested, and adjustments must be constantly learned and relearned. In general, a constant reevaluation of what we already know about the topic is the only road to successful propaganda.

An analysis of propaganda requires an understanding of the communication media as they are generally the connection between the propagandist and propagandee. With the appropriate media, the subject of propaganda can reach many targets (objects of propaganda) at the same time as this number rises along with the development of modern technology.

The greatest emphasis in this thesis will be placed upon the newspapers, the most diverse at the period, the radio, and the motion picture because this is the media that reaches the largest numbers of people. Of these media, the media of sight and sound is the most effective but during the 1930's, one could only talk about the film because television was so poorly developed.

The conditions in which propaganda is happening cannot be overlooked. To better understand the impact of propaganda, one must know the specific situation in the society or group linked to the propaganda, the historical heritage of the people and area as well as the overall social, politic, economic and cultural environment. As an example, one should look at Germany during the 1930's as similar propaganda campaigns there only ten years previous were rejected and looked somewhat ridiculous.³⁴

Propaganda can be divided and classified in numerous ways and one of the most popular classifications is regarding the source of propaganda as this can be black, grey and white.

“Black” propaganda (sometimes referred as covert propaganda) tries to conceal its own identity by purporting to emanate from someone or somewhere other than the true source. If “black” propaganda is to be successful, it is very important that attention is paid to the message as that message should be well adjusted to the objects of propaganda such as beliefs, cultural, social and political experiences. Examples of “black” propaganda are various, especially in war conditions, e.g. Nazi radio broadcasts during the Battle for Britain or the war against France in 1939/40.³⁵

On the other hand, propaganda can be honest and open and in this instance, we are talking about “white” propaganda. The foundation of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in Germany in 1933 is one clear example. The minister Joseph Goebbels openly declared that the responsibility of the new ministry was to be “the mobilization of mind and spirit in Germany”.³⁶ In this case, the source was well known, its intentions were well known and the public knew that an attempt to influence its opinion was going to be made. The “white” propaganda message was given with the intention to convince people of the sincerity of their regime and their ideology.

³⁴ I.Kershaw, *Hitler, I*, (Belgrade, 2003), pp.17-30.

³⁵ For examples see: D.Welch, Black Propaganda in: *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present* (Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp.41-43.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p.425.

The “Grey” propaganda is somewhere in between “black” and “white” propaganda. The subject of propaganda is not formally presented, but its identity could be assumed. This type of propaganda is usually used to bring confusion in to the enemy lines and weaken their morale.

During the “Cold War”, Radio Moscow took the opportunity to use the assassinations of Martin Luther King and John F. Kennedy to undermine the United States and the Voice of America on the other hand exploited similar opportunities with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Sometimes, it was difficult to differentiate between “black” and “grey” propaganda.

The division of propaganda is determined by whether the subject is known or not, but this cannot explain all the fine work that exists, no matter what form of propaganda is used. Jacques Ellul offered the division on vertical and horizontal propaganda.

Vertical propaganda comes from the top and it is made by leader who acts from the superior position of his authority and seeks to influence his subordinates and this type of propaganda is by far the most common.

According to Ellul, the horizontal propaganda is determined from inside the group (not from the top) where, in principle, all individuals are equal and there is no defined leader. The propagandist is there only as animator or discussion leader and sometimes his identity is not even known. The example of this form of propaganda was found in Mao’s China where³⁷ one other classification of propaganda could be made by the areas where propaganda presented itself such as politics, economics, culture, ecology, theology and sport.³⁸ Beside this classification, propaganda could be divided into war and peace propaganda, internal and foreign propaganda as all these divisions are clear by names and there is no need for further explanations.

We could also classify propaganda in various ways but that is not of primary importance. The most important issue is to evaluate propaganda by analyzing all its elements and to look at propaganda as a whole and only then the propaganda can be evaluated appropriately.

In this thesis, an analysis of the state propaganda in the three Eastern and Southeastern states during the 1930’s will be conducted. When we mention state propaganda, we are discussing propaganda made by higher state officials such as the King, Prime Minister, other Minister etc. and existing propaganda apparatus which was made to serve the interests of the ruling classes. Therefore, a working definition for state propaganda in this thesis will be a

³⁷ Ellul, *Propaganda*, pp.79-85.

³⁸ This classification is taken from: Z.Isakovic, *Uvod u propagandu* [Introduction to Propaganda], (Belgrade, 1991), pp.72-134.

deliberate attempt made by the ruling classes to influence the opinions of people through the transmission of ideas and values for their specific purposes, both by giving or withholding the information. However, the main focus will be on the organization of propaganda apparatus that was made and developed to in order to spread the state propaganda in the examined countries. For a clearer picture, a survey will be conducted on the organization of state propaganda in Europe during the 1930's.

ORGANIZATION OF STATE PROPAGANDA IN EUROPE DURING THE 1930's

Each European country in the inter-war period paid full attention to intelligence and propaganda according to their interests, intentions, desires and possibilities. During the 1930's, with the development of the international situation and the existence of imminent threat of war, that activity became more important and intense. It was fair to say that in the 1930's, propaganda had become an everyday preoccupation of all European governments.

The state propaganda in the period was usually carried out by ministries, propaganda departments (press office), sections that were located within the individual ministries, private and non-governmental organizations. With modern means of propaganda, especially radio, it was possible to broadcast messages across the boundaries of individual states and for them to have a much wider impact than before. Propaganda efforts of some countries were so extensive that we could talk about a new kind of war – a war of information and the conflicts became so bitter that it was clearly highlighted that some states even achieved agreements to cease hostile propaganda.³⁹

The organization of propaganda in European countries in this period differed because of the unequal organizations of the state, administration, needs, goals and tasks, internal and international situation, as well of the views of leading circles and their goals and means for achieving these goals.⁴⁰ Several documents were published regarding the fear of propaganda in

³⁹ The first such agreement was reached between Germany and Poland in 1931. This agreement was supposed to ensure that issues of radio broadcasting in any case did not offend the national interests of other listeners. Carr, *Propaganda*, p.20

⁴⁰ If we put faith in the reporter of CPB, Switzerland was one of the few countries in Europe that did not have any form of press offices. To publish their communiqués, the government used the Swiss Telegraphic Agency that was formed on the basis of a joint-stock company whose shareholders were the most successful Swiss newspapers. For this service, the government gave subsidies to the Agency in the form of individual subscriptions to its newsletters' agencies. Arhiv Jugoslavije (AY), Fond Centralni Pres-biro (38), box 141. CPB correspondents' report from Switzerland 3 February 1934.

the interwar period and their aim was to regulate the question of the prohibition of propaganda, which was directed against peace.⁴¹

European experience in the field of organizing state propaganda in the interwar period was interesting and varied, depending on the country and region. Many states had similar organization of state propaganda; sometimes they were just copied from one country to another if they proved to be successful. The organization of the propaganda institutions in 1930's Europe was often changed and modified according to needs of the moment and the will of the political leaders and such changes occurred even when the chief of ministry or department changed. On the other hand, many of those institutions were ideal for resolving problems like material independence, entering the higher social level, advancing in careers, personal benefits etc...

One of the biggest problems for historians in the study of state propaganda organization was the secrecy of their work as well as issues with funding. The real amount of money invested in one country propaganda was almost impossible to quantify, but in general, one could assume that fascist countries and other big European countries spend the most. One of the reasons for that was active foreign propaganda, but on the other hand, small countries put the greatest efforts in controlling their own public opinions and guiding these opinions.

Looking into the institutional organization, one could classify two groups of countries: ones with the ministry for propaganda and ones with the propaganda departments within the ministries or governments' bodies.

There were only a few countries that used a Ministry for Propaganda before the outbreak of the Second World War and it was important to mention that all European countries used domestic news agencies, regardless of whether they were in the state property, semi official or private. In the countries where there was great freedom of press like France, Great Britain and Belgium, they had more freedom than in countries with a more controlled press like Hungary, Romania and Turkey and countries with a guided press like Germany, Italy and Spain.⁴² In the following thesis, one will try to explain the organizations of the state propaganda in some European countries during the 1930's by grouping them together with similar states.

⁴¹ Such documents were signed in 1925 in Washington, 1932 in Geneva, 1933 in Madrid and Vienna and 1938 in Geneva. M.Orech, *Sloboda informacija i propaganda* [Freedom of Information and Propaganda], (Belgrade, 1966), p.62

⁴² More about news agencies in Europe and countries under review in the third chapter of the dissertation.

After the Nazi Party in Germany came to power in January 1933, many things started to change in Europe. It could be argued that their takeover of power was firmly linked to the situation in German society where there was a difficult economic, psychological, moral and political crisis that had engulfed society after World War I and which peaked in the early 1930's.

Hitler's new regime quickly introduced a one-party system in which any opposition party was banned. Hitler underlined the importance of propaganda in his speech at the party congress in Nurnberg in 1936 where in his speech, he shouted to crowds: "Propaganda has brought us to power, propaganda has allowed us to maintain power, and propaganda will give us the opportunity to master the world."⁴³

When one considered these details, it was no surprise that one of the first tasks of the new government was the establishment of a propaganda organization. The Ministry of National education and propaganda (Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) was established with presidential decree on 12th March 1933, headed by Joseph Goebbels and its offices were located in Leopold Palace in Berlin.⁴⁴

In a speech held before the establishment of the Ministry, Goebbels presented his ideas and plans about the role of the newly established ministry. For the press, which was also valid for the media in general, he said that it would be: "ideal if the press is so nicely organized as a piano in the hands of government where the government can be an unusually important and significant tool for influencing the masses."

This performance was a typical example of "white" propaganda when the subject of propaganda stated clearly their intentions and goals. On the other hand, in the same speech, details were revealed about punishments for those who would not want to accept the roles offered to them and Goebbels openly announced that the Government will fight with "all means" against such attempts.⁴⁵ In the above speech, Goebbels gave one of the most important principles of Nazi propaganda – simplicity and this rule was also promoted by Hitler in his book "My

⁴³ Quoted from: P.Ostojic, *Propaganda*, (Belgrade, 1940), p.72.

⁴⁴ Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) graduated from the University of Heidelberg and obtained his PhD in 1921. He began a journalistic career that could not be seen as too successful. In the conflict between Hitler and Gregor Strasser, he took Hitler's side and became party chief of the Berlin district. In Berlin, he founded and edited the party newspaper *Der Angriff* that could be translated as "attack". He became a deputy in the Reichstag in 1928 and in 1933, he became a Minister. He was very intelligent, revered in mass psychology and an excellent speaker. After Hitler's suicide, he was appointed as his successor as Chancellor, but he took his own life. For historical science, one could find his important saved diaries and recorded talks. More on Goebbels see: R.G.Reuth, *Goebbels*, (New York, 1993).

⁴⁵ Joseph Goebbels speech in Reichstag from March 1933. AJ, 38-141.

struggle” (Mein Kampf) that was written in the 1920’s. The tendency for the ‘facts’ to be presented to the people in a more accessible manner was a dominant one throughout the period of Nazi rule. In his book, the leader of new government made the distinction between ‘scientific exposition’ which was for intelligentsia and propaganda, which was for the masses.

To better understand how the Ministry of Propaganda worked, one had to look at its structure. Initially, it was planned that the ministry had only five parts but during April, the structure had changed so the number of sections increased to seven. The division of departments and their parts could be seen as follows:

Department 1: Legislation and Legal Problems, Budget, Finance, and Accounting;

Department 2: Co-ordination of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (“active propaganda”); Regional Agencies of the Ministry; German Academy of Politics; Official Ceremonies and Demonstrations; National Emblems; Racial Questions; Treaty of Versailles; Opposing Ideologies; Youth Organizations; Public Health and Sports; Eastern and Border Questions; National Travel Committee

Department 3: Radio; National Broadcasting Company (Reichsfunkgesellschaft)

Department 4: National and Foreign Press; Journalism; Press Archives; News Service; National Association of German Press

Department 5: Film; Film Picture Industry; Film Censorship’ Newsreels

Department 6: Theatre

Department 7: Music; Fine Arts; People’s Culture⁴⁶

The names of these departments told us clearly which area they covered and what their main task was. On the other hand, it was interesting to note who was the supreme leader (besides Hitler) in the different areas of propaganda.

⁴⁶ Cull, Culbert, Welch, *Propaganda*, p.354.

Control in Nazi Germany⁴⁷

AREA	STATE CONTROL	PARTY CONTROL
Newspapers	Goebbels Dietrich Ribbentrop	Goebbels Dietrich Amann
Magazines	Goebbels Ley	Goebbels Amann
Films	Goebbels	Goebbels
Books	Goebbels	Bouhler Rosenberg Amann
Public Meetings and Ceremonies	Goebbels	Goebbels Rosenberg Ley
Foreign Propaganda	Goebbels Ribbentrop Rosenberg	Goebbels
Theater	Goebbels	Goebbels Rosenberg
The Arts	Goebbels	Goebbels Rosenberg
Domestic Radio	Goebbels	Goebbels
Party Education		Goebbels Ley Rosenberg

Just by looking at the above table, one could see the influence of Goebbels for the state propaganda in Nazi Germany. The Goebbels' ministry began with only 350 administrative and executive officials, but its number grew over time and the main task of this institution was to re-educate people for the new society based on National Socialist values and much of the pre-war German propaganda was devoted to instilling a military spirit.

The creation of the German ministry of propaganda had worldwide influence as Mussolini's Italy soon followed. The agreement about the foundation of an Italian propaganda

⁴⁷ R.Bytwerk, *Bending Spines, The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic* (East Lansing, 2004), p.59.

organization was made in May 1933 when Goebbels visited Rome and the Italian propaganda institution started as a sub-directory for press and propaganda. In later years, that sub-directory became the Ministry for Press and Propaganda (Ministero della stampa e della propaganda) and the head of this Ministry was Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law.⁴⁸ In 1936, the Ministry had ten general directorates:

- Directorate General for the Italian press;
- Directorate General for the foreign press;
- Directorate General for propaganda;
- Directorate General for cinematography;
- Directorate General for the National Authority for the tourism industries (ENIT), and provincial authorities for tourism;
- Directorate General for the theater;
- Directorate General for the Istituto Luce;
- Directorate General for the National Institute of Ancient Drama (INDA);
- Directorate General for the State Record Library;
- Directorate General for the Committee for the hotel credit.

Ciano soon left to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his place was taken by the journalist Dino Alfieri.⁴⁹ In 1937, the Ministry changed its name to the Ministry for Popular

⁴⁸ Galeazzo Ciano (March 18, 1903 – January 11, 1944) was a famous politician in Mussolini's Italy. He was the son of Admiral Count Constanzo Ciano. After receiving his law degree, Ciano served as an attaché in Rio de Janeiro. On April 24, 1930, he married Benito Mussolini's daughter Edda Mussolini, with whom he soon left for Shanghai where he served as an Italian Consul. Back in Italy a few years later, he became the minister of press and propaganda. Ciano took part in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935–36) as a bomber squadron commander. Upon his highly-trumpeted comeback as a "hero", he became Foreign Minister in 1936, replacing Mussolini. At the beginning, he supported Italian participation in World War Two but in 1943, he turned against the doomed war and pushed for Italy's exit from the conflict. He was silenced by being removed from his post and resigned as ambassador to the Vatican. On the Fascist Grand Council, he voted for Mussolini's demission and was arrested, tried and shot in January 1944. Ciano is best remembered for his famous *Diaries 1937-1943*, a daily record of the meetings with Mussolini and many foreign political figures.

⁴⁹ Eduardo Dino Alfieri (1886 – 1966) was an Italian fascist politician. He finished law studies and participated in the First World War. He was member of the nationalistic group even before he became a member of Mussolini's party. He was elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1924. Under Mussolini's government, Alfieri was assigned several tasks between 1929 and 1934, such as the co-director of the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, deputy secretary of the *Corporazioni*, and deputy secretary for Press and Propaganda from 1935, taking over the duties of Minister Galeazzo Ciano during the latter's mission in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. When Ciano

Culture (Ministero della Cultura popolare, MinCulPop) and this change had more to do with camouflage than a genuine change of its original purpose. There were about 4,000 instructions for the press in only one year from this ministry and this told us a great deal about its range and influence.⁵⁰ The Ministry continued to operate under the new government even after the fall of Mussolini.⁵¹

The two largest democratic states in Europe in this period, Great Britain and France did not have a Ministry for Propaganda during peacetime, except the French for a short period in the first half of 1938 during the second government of Socialist Leon Blum. In Britain, the real Ministry of Propaganda existed during both World Wars under the name of the Ministry of Information, but even on the eve of the war, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain refused to create such a Ministry because it was unnecessary during peacetime.⁵² In the meantime, several propagandistic institutions were active with the most important being: the Foreign Office News Department, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the British Council.

The duties of the Foreign Office News Department were to: give information to the domestic public, to give briefings to correspondents of the British press, correspondents of foreign news agencies and press based in London and to the all other news agencies based in London. The department had three sections with different functions. One was giving the information to the journalists in London; the second was collecting the information from abroad and third was managing the official radio service. This department was responsible for all attaches for the press in the embassies and consulates.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was mainly the propaganda arm of the British government overseas – and occasionally at home as well.⁵³ The corporation was founded

moved on to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dino Alfieri found himself appointed the Minister of People's Culture in 1937 and he declared himself to the Antisemitical racial segregation laws passed in 1938. He was Italy's envoy to the Vatican in 1939 and then to Nazi Germany (where he met Adolf Hitler). A member of the Grand Council of Fascism, he supported Dino Grandi's *coup d'état* in July 1943 after sanctioning the presence in the Axis and under Mussolini's rule. He was sentenced to death *in absentia* and had to flee. In 1947, he returned to Italy and a year later, he published his memoirs as *Due dittatori a fronte* [Two Dictators Face to Face].

⁵⁰ Dj.Gocini, *Istoriija novinarstva* [History of Journalism], (Belgrade, 2001), pp.322-323.

⁵¹ More about MinCulPop see in: A.Mignemi (ed.), *Tra fascismo e democrazia, Propaganda politica e mezzi di comunicazione di massa* [Between Fascism and Democracy, Political Propaganda and mass communications' instruments], (Novara, 1996); N.Tranfaglia, *La stampa del regime 1932-1943* [Regime's Press 1932-1943], (Bompiani, 2005).

⁵² Chamberlain's speech on 15.June 1939.

⁵³ For example during the General Strike of 1926, its airwaves were commandeered to powerful effect by the government. Cull, Culbert, Welch, *Propaganda*, p.37.

in 1922 and it began to transmit its programs overseas at the beginning of the 1930's, which was very important for foreign propaganda. The service was used in the struggle against opponents like Italy after 1935 and in the Middle East after 1938 (with the foundation of the Arabic service).

The British Council was formed in 1934 and its duty was to spread British influence all over the world by organizing lectures about British culture, concerts, plays and the English language. Its influence and funding grew over the years and in the following table, one could see the rise of investments:

Donation of the British government to the British Council

Year	Donation in pounds
1935	6.000
1936	15.000
1937	60.000
1938	130.000
1939	386.000

Source: Report on the work of the British Council 1934-1955, p.10.

For easier co-operation between the propaganda institutions in Great Britain during 1938, the Co-ordination Committee was formed. The head of this committee was Foreign Affairs state's undersecretary Sir Robert Vansittart⁵⁴ and this change was needed for more efficient state propaganda due to the intensive crisis in Europe and the onset of World War Two.

Before and after the idea of the Ministry of propaganda was abandoned in 1938, the main propagandistic institution in France was the Department for Information and Press within the

⁵⁴ Robert Gilbert Vansittart, 1st Baron Vansittart (25 June 1881 – 14 February 1957) was a senior British diplomat in the period before and during the Second World War. He was Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister from 1928 to 1930 and Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1938 and later, he served as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government. He was best remembered for his opposition to Appeasement and his hard-line stance towards Germany during and after the Second World War. Vansittart was also a published poet, novelist and playwright.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This department had three sections: Central, Section for studying and the analysis of the foreign press and Document section. The Central section was the most important one and the chief of the Department was also the chief of the Central section. This section maintained the relations with the domestic and foreign press and special attention was paid to relations with the foreign journalist based in France as these journalists often received favors like regular contact with the Department's chief, railway passes, easy appointments with the state's officials. This was all aimed to create a better image of France abroad.

Over the years, several commissions were formed with the aim to co-ordinate propaganda activities like the inter-ministerial commission in 1936 and the General Commissariat for Information and Propaganda in 1938 that was directly under the Prime Minister. After the beginning of the war in 1940, the Ministry of Information was formed and its life was very short, like the Ministry for Information and Propaganda from 1938, but it was interesting to note that the same minister Frossard was employed in both ministries.⁵⁵

Smaller countries in 1930's Europe officially did not have a Ministry for propaganda and usually this job was performed by some departments within the ministries. The ministries involved were usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior or Council of Ministers.

However, the relevance of the most important propaganda department in the specific countries varied e.g. in Czechoslovakia and Romania, the press department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dominant and in Turkey and Albania, the Ministry of Interior was dominant. Later in this study, a survey of the organizations of state propaganda in Europe during the 1930's will be carried out and special attention will be paid to the neighboring countries to Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Two Central European countries Czechoslovakia and Hungary had two press departments within the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The general division between them was that the first one was pre-occupied with internal affairs and the second with foreign propaganda. In the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was a third department dedicated to foreign propaganda and this department was split into six sections with Propagandistic and Political-Information being the most important. Those sections did not only

⁵⁵ Ludovic-Oscar Frossard (also known as L-O Frossard or Oscar Frossard; March 5, 1889, Fousse-magne, Territoire de Belfort—February 11, 1946, Paris) was a French socialist and communist politician, a member of six successive French governments between 1935 and 1940.

make propaganda instructions for the press, organized exhibitions, concerts and plays, but they also monitored the articles by the foreign press about the country. Like many other states in the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia had problems with the existing territorial revisionism by its neighbors, especially Germany and Hungary and that was one of the main preoccupations of foreign propaganda. The Political-Information section published the review *Zahranichni politika* (Foreign Policy) and helped other propagandistic newspapers.

As mentioned above, the main task of the press department in the Council of Ministers of Czechoslovakia was internal propaganda and as this department had 40 officials, their main role was to guide and control the domestic press. One could also have mentioned “Orbis”, the commercial enterprise controlled by the government whose main task was to publish newspapers. In one moment during the 1930’s, this company published eight newspapers, amongst others *Prager Prese* that even published an edition in German.⁵⁶ Clearly, an attempt was made to stand up to the aggressive and powerful Nazi propaganda.

Considering the above mentioned territory revisionism, Hungary⁵⁷ invested a lot of money in propaganda during the inter-war period. The press departments in the Hungarian Council of Ministers and Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the same functions and responsibilities as their Czechoslovakian equivalents. In the Hungarian case, the Press department of the Council of Ministers published four daily (*Figetlenseg*, *Esti Ujsag*, *Uj Maguarsag* and *Budapesti Hirlap*) and influenced more than 80 newspapers.

One of the differences between these two countries was funding. Hungary invested large amounts of money into propaganda during the period and according to Yugoslav intelligence reports, the annual funding for Hungarian propaganda was 55 million dinars, more than three times more than in Yugoslavia, despite the fact that Yugoslavia was a bigger country. The same report informed us that the former chief of the department Stefan Antal even rose “double from the banks and industry by under-hand pressure and anti-semitic threats”.⁵⁸

Special directions for propaganda, as independent institutions, also existed in Romania (the General Direction for Press and Propaganda), Portugal (the Secretary for National

⁵⁶ AY, 38-141.

⁵⁷ Fear of Hungarian revisionism forced its neighbors Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania into an alliance known as the “Little Entente”. The main aims of the organization formed during 1920/21 were a common defense against Hungarian irredentism and the prevention of Habsburg restoration. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country.

⁵⁸ AY, 38-141, Report of Bozidar Albert, Yugoslav attaché for the press, from 21.January 1937.

Propaganda) and Greece (the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism). Several changes occurred in the propaganda institution in Romania during the 1930's which could be understood as a request for a proper propaganda organization to be established. In 1938, the General Direction for Press and Propaganda had six different parts:

Direction for national propaganda of tourism;

Direction for cinematography and committee for control and censorship of the movies;

Direction for press and propaganda;

Direction for books;

Direction for radio and

Service for phones and telegraphs.

At the same time, the sub-secretary for press and propaganda had to enforce the work in the field of foreign propaganda. This section was supposed to co-operate closely with the Romanian news agency *Rador* and at this point, it was interesting to note what was needed for someone to become an attaché for the press. The future attaché had to finish a Faculty of Law, to speak French and the language in the state that he was working, to have a certificate from a journalistic society and at least two years practice in a newspaper editorial. If someone wanted to be married, he had to ask for permission from the Minister and in the case of marriage with a foreigner, he needed personal permission from the head of the government.⁵⁹

As time passed, the state propaganda asked for more money and a different organization and the outbreak of the Second World War urged the regime in Romania to form the Ministry for National Propaganda which was established at the beginning of 1940.

In Portugal, the central propaganda institution was formed in 1933 under the name of the Secretary for National Propaganda (*Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional*) and it was not under government rule, but instead, it was under the direct command of the dictator Salazar.

The institution was formed with the aim of reforming the new regime established a year earlier.⁶⁰ Its role was written in the foundation law: "With the institution of the Secretary for

⁵⁹ AY, 38-141, Report from the CPB correspondent from Romania from 16.July 1938.

⁶⁰ More about Salazar's regime see in: F. Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York, 2009) and M. Derrick, *The Portugal of Salazar*, 2nd edition, (Norfolk, 2009).

National Propaganda, there was now a single body responsible for managing all the information on the activities of various ministries in order to highlight the new spirit of unity that at last prevailed in the country”.⁶¹ About the tasks of the organization, Salazar said it was to: fight against all lies and to have centralized control over all information, especially considering the regime.⁶² The head of the institution was Antonio Ferro (1895-1956), a politician, journalist and writer, and a close friend of Salazar. The Secretary was simply divided into two sections: Internal and External, in other words, by their work functions. Due to the stability of the regime, this institution existed for many years after the Second World War.⁶³

The case of Greece was somewhat different. After the Metaxas came to power in Greece in 1936, the special sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism (*Yfipourgeion Typou ke Tourismou*) was established. This institution was in fact the Ministry of Propaganda and Indoctrination and Theologos Nicoloudis, an old politician and publisher, and a close friend of the dictator became the new chief of this ministry. Nicoloudis controlled and directed the entire propaganda organization in order to strengthen Metaxas’s position. In the Article 1(a) of Emergency Law 45, about establishing the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism, its mission and tasks were clearly stated:

“The sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism regulates and governs all issues concerning the indoctrination of public opinion through the Greek and foreign daily and periodical press, through the control of all congresses, exhibitions, theatres, cinemas, and gramophone records, as well as any kind of cultural demonstrations. All these expressions, including radio broadcasts, should be in accordance with the values and traditions of the nation.”⁶⁴

One important decision taken in controlling the media in Greece was made in 1938, when the new Press law was passed. This law introduced stricter regulations on news coverage and imposed heavy penalties for editorials unauthorized by the regime and the press was obliged to publish all the material distributed daily by the sub-Ministry marked ‘compulsory’, including large amounts of foreign news coming mainly from German sources.⁶⁵ It is possible to say that

⁶¹ Quoted from: G.Adinolfi, *Ai confine del fascismo, Propaganda e consenso nel Portogallo salazarista (1932-1944)* [Borders of Fascism, Propaganda and Consensus in Salazarist Portugal], (Milan, 2007), p.94.

⁶² Ibid, 99.

⁶³ From 1945, its name was the National Secretary for Information (Secretariado Nacional de Informacao).

⁶⁴ Quoted from: Petrinax, *The Metaxas*, p.9.

⁶⁵ Petrinax, *The Metaxas*, p.11.

the sub-Ministry was the actual Ministry, but not “officially” as it had the quality and power of the real ministry.

Turkey and Albania were examples of countries that were far more committed to internal than to foreign propaganda. The main task of the Turkish Press Department was to control and guide the domestic press and it was no surprise that this department was part of the Ministry of Interior. Formal censorship was not proscribed by the law, but the punishments for those that were writing against the regimes were severe. Journalist’s devotion to the regime in combination with the fear of retaliation resulted with harmonious relations between the journalists and state’s representatives.⁶⁶

In the light of this relationship, one could observe the fact that the Minister of Interior was the honorary president of the journalist association. The department had only around 20 employees who made substantial payments, but on the other hand, they could be removed from their position immediately so this “winning combination” secured their full co-operation and loyalty.

The Press Department only had a few sections: Turkish, Balkan, Italian and English (in which there was also an American section). It was interesting to note that the institution did not have any correspondents abroad so this seemed to back up the aforementioned statement that Turkish propaganda was strongly oriented towards the domestic public.

Pressure was one method that some authoritarian regimes used in the order to suppress some information from the foreign public and one interesting comment was made by the correspondent from Yugoslavia about the way of imposing propaganda in Turkey. In his report to the state’s central propaganda institution, he made the following observation:

“There is one other method, which can be easily used in authoritarian regimes like Turkish, and that is to make clear to all foreign correspondents that they are putting themselves at great risk if their work can bring even the smallest damage to the interests of the state in which they live. The foreign correspondents know that and they are very careful with their words.”⁶⁷

⁶⁶ In one report, the correspondent of the Yugoslav CPB said that co-operation between the journalists and regime is “complete”. AY, 38-141, The Report of Stojan Lukachevic from 7.July 1938.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

This was not rare and not common to a single country. Authoritarian countries used that kind of pressure regularly, but this anomaly was not exclusive to them. Like in Turkey, the main press department in Albania was within the Ministry of Interior from 1936. It was called the Central Press Bureau and its tasks were to control the domestic press and to help pro-government newspapers. One of other tasks of the department was writing denials for the news published in foreign press that was unsatisfactory for the regime e.g. the coverage of the poor economic situation in Albania, stories that the Albanian press department did not have any contracts with the foreign news agencies and the budget for propaganda was only 0.7% of the state's total budget.⁶⁸

With the arrival of the Italians during 1939, the new General direction for press, propaganda and tourism was formed. Italians invested more money in the propaganda service in Albania which was more than three times higher than in the period when financing was arranged by domestic politician. This easily explained the plans of Italian state towards its neighbors Greece and Yugoslavia.

At the end, it is interesting to note the example of the first Socialist state in the World, the Soviet Union. As Eric H. Carr noticed in 1939, the Soviet Union was the only first-class European power which had no official propaganda department and he explained this paradox "either by saying that Soviet institutions, having been pioneers in the use of propaganda as a normal instrument of policy, were so familiar with the spirit of propaganda that they did not require a special organization for this purpose, or by regarding the Russian Communist Party and the Communist International respectively as the domestic and foreign propaganda departments of Soviet Russia."⁶⁹

With reference to all the above mentioned organizations and institutions in the service of the state propaganda in the 1930's, Europe aimed to create the conditions which would ensure that the regimes remained in power and could convince people of their rightful missions. There were no exceptions, then as there are today, regardless of some differences both in the methods used and the organizations formed. Some states like Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Soviet Union had more ambitious aims in foreign policy than the smaller countries whose primary tasks

⁶⁸ AY, 38-22, Report from 17.January 1937.

⁶⁹ Carr, *Propaganda*, p.23.

were to control public opinion at home. Normally, the first mentioned countries had more developed propaganda organization and these were far better financed.

In the late 1930's, propaganda had become an established fact of everyday life. International broadcasting, state-controlled cinemas and newspapers, public opinion polls, mass rallies all became new features of an age characterized by a globalised ideological struggle thanks to the increased use of technology in the communications revolution. As Philip Taylor put it, "truth was a major casualty long before the actual fighting began".⁷⁰

Many of the aforementioned propaganda organizations were short lived because of the change of regimes in many European countries during and after the Second World War. Countries that lost the war like Germany and Italy significantly changed their regimes and that was also the case in the majority of Central and Eastern European states that became Socialist states after 1945 such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Those changes meant that the other type of propaganda organizations existed, but not always the other propagandists.⁷¹

⁷⁰Taylor, *Munitions*, p.207.

⁷¹ Dimo Kazasov, Minister for Propaganda in Socialist Bulgaria from 1944-1946 was also the editor in chief of the newspaper *Zveno*, the main organ of the ruling circle *Zveno* that was in power from 1934-1935 in Monarchist Bulgaria.

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND BULGARIA DURING THE 1930'S

As discussed in the preceding chapter, very few countries had central state propaganda organizations in the rank of their ministries. We could only find these types of institutions in the three countries under discussion, but these organisations lasted for different periods of time in each country and only in Yugoslavia did it truly last for a longer period of time. That institution was the Central Press-Bureau and this lasted from 1929 to 1941. We could argue that the CPB was the Ministry of Propaganda, but under a different name. In Bulgaria, before the beginning of the Second World War, there was only one central state propaganda institution from 1934-1935 and this was the Direction for Social Renewal (“Дирекция за обществена обнова”).

In Poland, similar propaganda state organizations were formed in 1918⁷², 1920⁷³, and 1939, periods when country was in war. Nevertheless, it seemed that state propaganda in Poland was highly organized and coordinated, especially in the 1930's. In the following chapter, all the central and state propaganda organizations that operated in all three countries under the review will be examined.

POLAND

The central state propaganda institutions in Interwar Poland were placed in Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War. The Council of Ministers was the most important centre, but the other aforementioned ministries maintained a certain level of

⁷² Shortly, in the first government of Ignacy Daszynski was a Ministry of Propaganda headed by Waclaw Sieroszewski.

⁷³ The name of the institution was Internal Propaganda Bureau (Biuro Propagandy Wewnętrznej) that lasted few months, from 5. VIII till 3.XI 1920. Head of the bureau was Antoni Anusz (1884-1935), politician and deputy to the Sejm.

autonomy during the entire Interwar period. In essence, the Council of Ministers took control of internal propaganda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took control of propaganda abroad. The Ministry of War, as expected, took control of propaganda in the army, but its influence over the two other ministries could not be determined as its influence was so great that it could not be underestimated or overlooked in the research. Those propaganda centres did not always work in harmony.

Council of Ministers (PRM)

One of the main characteristics of the Polish Government after 1926 was that it would make key political decisions amongst members in small informal groups, which was not considered to be the traditional and legal way of conducting Government affairs at the time. The final word was usually had by Marshall Pilsudski, regardless of the position that he occupied at the time. The closest supporters of the marshal were: Walery Sławek, Ignacy Mościcki, Kazimierz Świtalski, Aleksander Prystor, Józef Beck, Bogusław Miedziński, Ignacy Matuszewski, Bronisław Pieracki, Janusz Jędrzejewicz, Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski and sometimes Stanisław Car⁷⁴. There were more key Pilsudski supporters and these included two leading *Sanacja* journalists, Ignacy Matuszewsky⁷⁵ and Bogusław Miedzinski⁷⁶. The later

⁷⁴ A. Micewski, *W cieniu Marszałka Piłsudskiego, Szkice z dziejów myśli politycznej II Rzeczypospolitej* [In the shadow of marshal Piłsudski], (Warsaw, 1968), pp.350-384.

⁷⁵ Matuszewski Ignacy (10.IX 1891, Warsaw - VIII 1946, New York), colonel, politician, publicist, close collaborator of J. Piłsudski. After coup d'état in 1926 belong to right wing of *Sanacja*. In 1928-1929 was ambassador in Hungary, 1929-1931 Minister of Treasury, 1932-1936 chief editor of *Gazeta Polska*. After Second World War in emigration in USA.

⁷⁶ Miedzinski Boguslaw (Miedziński Bogusław), nickname Świtek (Firefly), (22.III 1891, Miastków, Garwolina – 8.V 1972, London), politician, publicist, lieutenant colonel, close collaborator of Jozef Piłsudski. During the First World War member of Polish Army. From 1918-1922 member and chief of Section for Information in the Ministry of War. Long time member of the Sejm (1922-1939) and last two years senator and president of the Sejm. Participant in the Coup d'état led by Piłsudski in 1926. One of the founding members of the both pro-piłsudski parties, first BBWR and then OZN. Well known journalist and editor of several important *Sanacja* newspapers. Assistant editor of *Głos Prawdy*, 1929-32 chief editor of *Gazeta Polska*. After occupation of the Poland in 1939 he went in emigration, first in France and from 1940 in Great Britain. Author of several different papers in the field of propaganda. For his accomplishments he was highly decorated. See more in: A. Adamczyk, *Bogusław Miedziński (1891-1972), Biografia polityczna* [Boguslaw Miedzinski 1891-1972, Political biography], (Torun 2000).

maintained his high rank position until 1939, only overshadowed by a key propaganda expert for the ruling government Woicieh Stypiczynski.⁷⁷

The institutional organization of state propaganda was formed from existing institutions after the coup d'état in 1926. Changes were made in the human resources department where the key positions were occupied by people who were loyal to the marshal and who were trusted by him. Many of these people had a military past and were very often recruited directly from the army. Their purpose was to serve the ruling circle and to develop general propaganda ideas received from above.

The transfer of information was vertical, very well structured and organized. It could be assumed that until 1935, Pilsudski made the key decisions regarding state propaganda and general directives were established by the chief of staff to all the political departments of the ministries, editors of PAT and most importantly, pro government newspapers after discussions with his closest supporters, the Prime Minister, other department ministers as well as the leaders of other ruling parties. Instructions were then passed on to the heads of local communities, duchies and regions so that they could influence their local newspapers.

After the death of J. Pilsudski in 1935⁷⁸, the PRM again strengthened its position as an important centre of the government's propaganda machine, mainly due to efforts made by the Prime Minister Marjan Ziyndram-Koscialkovski (M.Zyndram-Kościałkowski) who was determined to make the Office for the Press PRM the highest centre for state propaganda. He used the Office of the Press to restore control over state actions relating to the problem of uncontrolled leakage of information from ministries to the public. He told all department ministers in the form of a memorandum that he wanted a better coordination of media activities within their individual departments.

⁷⁷ More about Stypiczynski on the pages 47 and 48.

⁷⁸ According to Polish historian Waldemar Paruch The Pilsudski camp in a specific historical time comprised the following numerous political milieus divided into four groups: 1) the Kazimierz Bartel ruling government, the colonels group, the *naprawiaci* ("repairers") movement, conservative groups, "national Pilsudskites", the *Sanacja* left; intraparty splinter groups and individual politicians that left the people's movement, Polish Socialist Party, National Workers' Party, Christian Democrats and even the all-Polish camp; 3) non-formalized political circles assembled around journals such as *Droga*, *Glos Prawdy*, *Przelom*, *Epoka*, *Mysl Mocarstwowa*, "Bunt Mlodych", *Jutro Pracy*, *Zaczyn*; 4) social organizations – Legions of the Young, Union of Polish Democratic Youth, Organization of Working Youth, Central Union of Young Countryside/Rural Youth, Central Union of Farmers' Circle. W. Paruch, *Myśl polityczna obozu Pilsudczykowskiego 1926-1939* [The Political Thought of the Pilsudski Camp 1926-1939], (Lublin, 2005), pp. 871-872.

This document was divided into three areas: a) The responsibility for the information campaign; b) The coordination of information activities within the Office for the Press PRM and c) Informing the press.⁷⁹ The exact responsibilities of individual officers were written in order, the ways in which the information was forwarded, and what type of information was forwarded. These were the responsibility of each individual ministry. The Prime Minister reminded the individual officers that the information must be forwarded to official channels after passing through a “double filter”, firstly via special ministry departments and then the Office for the Press PRM.⁸⁰ These activities not only established guidelines for the future work of state propaganda, but also discussed flaws with the previous strategy so mistakes would not be repeated in future. It was interesting to note that the autonomy and power of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of War was also confirmed by this document. It was also stated that another directive would regulate the obligation of those two ministries that were not affected by these changes.⁸¹

The departure of the Prime Minister Zydran-Koscialowski in 1936 did not halt work towards the institutionalization of state propaganda where there were clear moves towards setting up a more centralized propaganda organization. In June 1936, a new Prime Minister general Sławoj-Składkowski (Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski) formed the Office for Special Tasks (Biuro Zadań Specjalnych) as well as the Office for Planning (Biuro Akcji Planowania).

The creation of these new institutions reduced the activities and responsibilities of the Office for the Press PRM. This office was now only responsible for the transfer of media information relating to the ongoing operations of government and to the preparation of press surveys for the Prime Minister. The new chief of the Information Department was journalist Kazimierz Okulicz.⁸²

The Office for Planning focused on the issues of conception and the programming of propaganda. Its director was a candidate of Inspector General Zdislav Grabski. Due to the strong support of Ridz-Smigly, he controlled the publishing company *Kurier Poranny* (*Morning Courier*) in 1936. He replaced one of the most prominent members of the *Sanacja* left wing,

⁷⁹ Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Documents, AAN), Prezydium Rady Ministrów, (Council of Ministers, PRM), 63-54-2/5.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² A. Notkowski, *Prasa w Systemie Propagandy Rządowej w Polsce 1926-1939*, Studium Technik Władzy [Press in the System of State Propaganda in Poland 1926-1939], (Warsaw/Lodz, 1987) , p.234

Wincent Rzymowski.⁸³ Grabski then became the head of a newly established political Discussion club whose members were important *Sanacja* members and the group maintained close contacts with influential people within government.⁸⁴

The Office for Special Tasks was formed to deal with topics of press and propaganda with an emphasis placed upon the effective coordination of information activities between the different government institutions. The Director of this office until the outbreak of war was Major Mieczysław Lepecki (Mieczysław B. Lepecki, 1897-1969) who was an ex-legionnaire and well-known journalist who wrote for Pilsudski's biased press. During the period from 1926-1935, he was one of the key officers working in the propaganda sector and he performed the following duties whilst in office: Adjutant of Marshal Pilsudski, chief of Office for the Press of the Ministry of War and the director of the Presidential Office in PRM.

Of all aforementioned offices in the Council of Ministers, the Office for Special Tasks proved to be the most important one. At the end of 1938, there was a structural change that increased the activities and responsibilities of this department due to the termination of the Offices for Planning and the Press PRM. In addition, its activities and responsibilities were also extended to include all work relating to the PAT and Polish Radio. These two institutions were now accountable to the Council of Ministers and also accountable for the tasks set by the President of the Council of Ministers. One could reasonably conclude that within the Office for Special Tasks, one of the most important functions was the centralization of key sectors within the official propaganda: the Government's press offices, the state Information Agency and the radio. After this structural change, Council of Ministers had six departments: a) Presidential; b) Legal; c) Economic; d) Modernization of Administration; e) Office for the Special Tasks; f) Personal issues.⁸⁵

On the eve of war, the necessity for the absolute centralization of propaganda was evident. The first step towards the creation of a Ministry of Propaganda was the introduction of a Commission for the coordination of propaganda (Komitet Koordynacji Propagandy), which worked continuously. This Commission was led by Joseph Olpinski (Józef Olpiński) who was director of the Presidential Office of the PRM. The members of this special body were

⁸³ Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, p.233

⁸⁴ Colonel Leon Strzelecki and Major Emil Vacqueret, close collaborators of marshal Rydz-Smigly. They had close contact with general Kordian Zamorski, chief of State Police (Policja Państwowa), A. Micewski, *Z geografii politycznej II Rzeczypospolitej* [Political Geography of the Second Republic], (Warsaw, 1966), p.280.

⁸⁵ AAN, PRM 20-10-40.

representatives of all key government's departments: President of the Council, vice-president of the Council, Minister Interior, Minister of War and OZN.⁸⁶ It was obvious that all key political figures were involved in this process. These included representatives of marshal Rydz-Smigly, who was delegated by the President of the Council and representatives of President Moscinski, who was delegated by the vice-president of the Council. The Presence of the OZN party members, plus key Ministries clearly underlined the significance of the newly formed body. The Commission had several different departments: a) Spoken word; b) Radio; c) Theatre; d) Cinema; e) Press; f) Books; g) Holidays and Tourism; h) Public appearances.⁸⁷

The Main functions of new formed commission were as follows:

- a) Developing of the ideological assumptions and goals identified by the Government Delegate;
- b) Initiating the different objectives of propaganda;
- c) Giving orders and the purpose of predicting the timing of their implementation;
- d) Giving the propaganda plan and identifying trends and methods of the implementation, as well as inter ministerial cooperation;
- e) Identifying resources needed to finance the propaganda campaign;
- f) Setting up the transfer of the Office of Coordination for the implementation of the propaganda goals.⁸⁸

The head of this Commission was a government delegate who was none other than General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, Minister of War. This spoke for itself.⁸⁹

In one similar document from 1938, it clearly stated the action instruments from which given tasks should be accomplished:

⁸⁶ Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive, CAW), Gab. MSWojsk (Cabinet of Minister of War), I.300.1.531, 139-151.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Kasprzycki Tadeusz (16. I 1891, Warsaw – 4. XII 1978. Montreal, Canada) one of the most important Polish militarists, a member of the "First Brigade", personal assistant of J.Pilsudski in 1919. Kasprzycki was Polish delegate at the League of Nations. Worked at Ministry of War for a long period of time. From 1935, he was Minister of War. After the occupation, he left Poland. During the Second World War, he was in internment. After the war, he lived in Canada.

WINO⁹⁰

PUWFIPW⁹¹

Association of Legionnaires and POW⁹²

Veterans' Association

Polish Radio

PAT⁹³

Office for Film of Ministry Interior

Office for the Press PRM

Press OZN⁹⁴

League for Supporting Tourism

TKKT theater and other organizations⁹⁵

According to a communication from the Prime Minister from 10. March 1938 the main goals of this institution were: “Ensuring that the action of propaganda at the end gives parental influence on the society” and also “coordination and monitoring the implementation of agreed action plan across all ministries, public institutions and other that will be in orbit its work.”⁹⁶ As we can see work of this commission went in to two general directions. One coordination and control within government’s bodies and the other to influence public opinion in order to gain dominant influence on it.

The commission was the highest center of planning and propaganda. On October 1938 in its protocol were enlisted 102 documents/plans considering propaganda. The documents were divided in eight sections: a) general (23); b) film (29); c) radio (17); d) various (22) e) theatre (5); f) publishing (3); g) press (2); h) tourism (1). Protocol was signed by three officers lieutenant-colonel Kilinski from Ministry of War, major Kencbok and captain Radecki.⁹⁷ That

⁹⁰ Military Institute of Research and Education

⁹¹ State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations

⁹² Polish Military Organisation

⁹³ Polish Telegraph Agency

⁹⁴ Camp of National Unity

⁹⁵ E. Kaszuba, *System propagandy państwowej obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926-1939* [System of State Propaganda in Poland 1926-1939], (Torun, 2004), p.359.

⁹⁶ Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, pp.321-2.

⁹⁷ CAW, Gab. MSWojsk , 300.1.531-108/113.

was only one example that military took dominant role in the creation of state propaganda in the state.

In the opinion of historian Andrzej Notkowski, the Commission for the Coordination of Propaganda was so significant in the history of the Second Polish Republic that it was one of the most important bodies set up in Poland during this period of time along with the Office for Internal Propaganda, even though both didn't operate at the same time. The Office for Internal Propaganda operated under the PRM and during the Polish-Russian war in the 1920's. This last change in the organization of state propaganda in Poland led to the formation of the Ministry of Propaganda which came into effect when the war started.

One of the measures for improving press relations was to hold press conferences twice a week from June 1939. These conferences were set up by the Prime Minister and these included the editors of newspapers, agencies' correspondents and all chiefs of press departments within the government. The aim of these conferences was to control the transfer of information as much as possible in the situation of a crisis such as the outbreak of war.

At this point, it was important to mention Wojciech Stpiczynski (Wojciech Stpiczyński) as he was probably the most important person in the creation of state propaganda in Poland as he was effectively a member of government with the same level of authority as the Minister for propaganda. He was a protégé of marshal Rydz-Smigly and was very dynamic, sharp and well known for being confrontational towards opponents. He was also a very experienced journalist and in the 1920's, he published a weekly newspaper called *Glos Prawdy (Voice of Justice)*. Stpiczynski didn't get along with Walery Slawek and was moved aside during his presidency. At the beginning of the 1930's, he was editor in chief of *Kurier Poranny (Morning Courier)*, which was a very influential newspaper. In this period, he became a close friend and adviser of Rydz-Smigly. He was one of the creators of the aforementioned reorganization of the Council of Ministers with the mission to create a more centralized state propaganda machine. His position at the Council of Ministers allowed him to be chief adviser to the Prime Minister on every issue concerning propaganda. In the well-informed circles, Stpiczynski was already seen as a future Minister of Information and Propaganda and he managed to strengthen the position of PRM in the field of controlling information as the censorship over PAT and government administration was soon established.⁹⁸ Only the Ministries of War and Interior had partial freedom in their own

⁹⁸ A.Micewski, *Z geografii*, p.238 and Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, pp.229-231, 234.

activity. He died suddenly in August 1936 whilst preparing the Marshall's visit to France, but his death did not slow down the path towards the further centralization of state propaganda in Interwar Poland.

The Ministry of Information and Propaganda was formed in September 1939 when German troops were already on Polish soil. The head of this Ministry was Michal Grazynski (Michał Grażyński).⁹⁹ However, this institution wasn't able to function effectively due to the Nazi/Soviet occupation of Poland, but the creation of this ministry was seen as the final step of the centralization of state propaganda that took place in Poland during the 1930's.

Ministry of War

The Ministry of War was one of the most important areas of state propaganda in Interwar Poland. This was not only because of its huge influence on the army, but also because of its influence on civil institutions and government. In one propaganda brochure issued by the Military Institute of Research and Education in 1937, this was very clear. As propaganda objectives, the document underlined the 3 main issues namely:

- Support for the army amongst public opinion;
- Preparing the public for war;
- Detection and control of political opponents.¹⁰⁰

All the aforementioned objectives aimed to be established well beyond military level and one could tell that they were primarily addressed to the non-military sectors. Thoughts and ideas about the "consolidation" of the nation under the name of "defense of the people" were more common in the late 1930's and therefore, the influence of army and military institutions grew during this period.

⁹⁹ Michał Grażyński (May 12, 1890, in Gdów – December 10, 1965, in London, United Kingdom) was a military leader, social and political activist, doctor of philosophy and law, voivode of the Autonomous Silesian Voivodeship, scouting activist and president of "Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego".

¹⁰⁰ P. Stawecki, *Następcy Komendanta – Wojsko a polityka wewnętrzna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1935-1939* [Successors of commandant – Army and Internal Politics in Second Republic 1935-1939], (Warsaw, 1969), p.215.

In the Ministry of War, one could find several different institutions that were full of propaganda. The most important ones were the Military Institute of Research and Education (Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Oświatowy, for future references WINO), Ministry of War's Press Department, and the State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations (Państwowy Urząd Wychowowania Fizycznego i Przynależenia Wojskowego, for future references PUWFIPW).

WINO was the most developed and most important military propaganda institution. It was created in 1921 under the name of Institute for Education and Publishing (Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy). After a number of reorganizations that resulted in the increase of its powers, this body was finally formed as the Military Institute of Research and Education at the end of 1934 (WINO).

WINO had four departments, which consisted of sections. These departments were:

- a) General;
- b) Scientific;
- c) Press;
- d) Budget and publishing.¹⁰¹

The General Department¹⁰² and Department for the Press were the offices with the most responsibilities in the propaganda area. The first department was split into the following sections: a) Propaganda, b) Organization and Technical Resources of Propaganda and c) Culture and Education.¹⁰³ WINO had other institutions, over which it had full control. These institutions were: Central Military Library (Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa), Mail Military Bookstore (Główna Księgarnia Wojskowa) and from 1935, the Corps of Cadets (Korpusy Kadetów).¹⁰⁴

On the order of Minister of War to the chief of WINO, one could see the main responsibilities of this institution:

“- Conduct the cultural and educational work in the army under the general guidelines of Vice Minister of War;

¹⁰¹ L. Wyszczelski, *Oświata, propaganda, kultura Wojsku Polskim w latach 1918-1945* [Education, Propaganda, Culture in Polish Army 1918-1945], (Warsaw, 2004), p.193.

¹⁰² In 1932, there were only three departments: a) Scientific, b) Culture and Propaganda and c) Publishing. Kaszuba, *System propagandy*, p. 33.

¹⁰³ Wyszczelski, *Oświata, propaganda*, p.193.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

- Propaganda of ideas and issues of national defense among the troops, trainees, reservists and the broad mass of the population;
- Cooperation in countering the propaganda of sedition in the army;
- Maintaining the libraries of the army;
- Maintaining the press and publishing in the army;
- Leading the military, scientific-publishing action and administrative budget of scientific publication I and II from Vice Minister of War, the principal chief of staff.”¹⁰⁵

WINO developed a very wide and complex propaganda machine. In December 1932, it published 17 different journals.¹⁰⁶ In the late 1930's, the publishing activity of the WINO was in progress and in February 1939, the “Bulletin of the Press Department Press WINO” was published every 2-3 days.¹⁰⁷ The budget of WINO was 400,000 zlotys, 124,000 of which, was spent on military schools.¹⁰⁸

In May 1936, on the initiative of Minister of War general Kasprzycki, the Central Coordination Committee of WINO was formed. Its purpose was to coordinate the actions of propaganda within the military, all with the common objective of “people defense”. This was a clear sign of the ruling circle's desire to create a more centralized and more coordinated propaganda organization. Those tendencies were also clear in the government so one could safely assume that there was a general strategy towards a more centralized and controlled state propaganda.

In the second half of the 1930's, WINO played an important role in the political consolidation of the nation around the army and Marshal Rydz-Smigly and one could say that this was one of WINO's unofficial objectives.¹⁰⁹

The Office for the Press in the Ministry of War was established by Marshal Pilsudski immediately after he regained control of the army. The head of the office was Major B. Lepecki until the end of the 1935 when he became head of the Presidential Office in the Council of Ministers. His post was taken by the captain Karol Koźmiński (Kozminski), a former

¹⁰⁵ Wyszczelski, *Oswiata, propaganda*, p.193.

¹⁰⁶ Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, p.314.

¹⁰⁷ Kaszuba, *System propagandy*, p.35.

¹⁰⁸ Wyszczelski, *Oswiata, propaganda*, p.192.

¹⁰⁹ About the development of the cult of Rydz-Smigly during the 1930's, see more: Kaszuba, *System propagandy*, pp.276-314.

legionnaire, writer, historian and publicist.¹¹⁰ As was noted earlier, this office had a certain level of autonomy alongside a similar office inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations (PUWFiPW) was the third centre of military propaganda. It was formed in 1927 and it was directly under the control of the Ministry of War. Its chief carried the rank of general, which underlined the importance of this institution. The chief was in charge of all military training for young people. This organization was vast and in 1937, its membership levels reached 179,000.¹¹¹ Therefore, the influence of this organization was powerful and significant.

The aim for this kind of organization was explained even before its foundation in December 1926. Captain Tadeusz Zakrzewski wrote in *Bellona*: “If we assume, that (...) all youth will be directed towards growing up in the organization of the army and be trained only by the military, then you can be sure that young people will actually be brought up in the spirit of the military and the ground state. It will be capable of not being prematurely drawn into the vortex of political struggle and often rescued from the destructive impact of subversive elements.”¹¹² The supervision of adopting military training was held by the district commanders of the corps and regiments.

PUWFiPW had its own publishing service and its budget for that purpose was 40,000 zlotys. Alongside WINO, this institution participated in several different activities such as helping people to learn to read and write, the organization of cultural activities, film production, teaching about civil rights, cooperation with the Polish radio etc.¹¹³

There were other organizations in the military that were working in the propaganda industry like education sections in the Corps Area Command (Dowództwo Okręgowe Korpusowego, DOK). In the districts, they set up independent newspapers and maintained contact between local and military authorities. They also followed the latest political developments and informed their leaders on current affairs issues. The heads of these offices were usually officers in the rank of Major.¹¹⁴

Propaganda activities in the army from 1935-1939 were focused on centralizing the organization and expanding its influence beyond the military. They thought that winning future

¹¹⁰ Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, p. 312.

¹¹¹ Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, p. 318.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ For more details see: CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.531-22/24.

¹¹⁴ Stawecki, *Następcy Komendanta*, p.212, Wyszczelski, *Oswiata, propaganda*, p.194.

wars would depend, to a large extent, on factors of morality and ideology. These factors began to impact on society in two ways. One was through a massive paramilitary organization and other was through the reserve officers' associations and organizations of former combatants.¹¹⁵

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

During the 1930's, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run by Colonel Beck, one of the most important *Sanacja* people. He took the position in 1932 and remained in this role until the occupation of Poland in 1939. In the second half of the 1930's, he kept a certain level of independency from both the president's and marshal's groups.¹¹⁶ His ministry was primarily responsible for foreign propaganda i.e. propaganda towards other countries. Most of that work was carried out by the Office for the Press of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, MSZ). After the reorganization at the end of 1932, the Office for the Press MSZ had two departments; Political and Propaganda, with 30 clerks.

These two departments were divided into the following sections:

Office for the Press MSZ in 1932

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT	PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT
General	General
Economics	Propaganda
German	Art-culture
Anglo-american	Science
Roman countries	
Northern-eastern	

¹¹⁵ Stawecki, *Następcy Komendanta*, pp.213-214.

¹¹⁶ More about Colonel Beck as Minister see in: O. Terlecki, *Pułkownik Beck* [Colonel Beck], (Cracow, 1985).

The main tasks of the office were to inform the foreign public of news from Poland and to give information to the Polish media about news abroad.

The final structural change of the Office for the Press MSZ happened in 1936. As a result of those changes, the organization of the office was simplified, with some sections merged together. There were now five sections instead of ten under the following structure:

- a) Polish press – leading the internal work of the national press and studied the native public opinion;
- b) Western;
- c) Eastern;
- d) Information – providing official news to the national and foreign journalists and transmitted instructions to the diplomatic missions of the Republic of Poland;
- e) Propaganda – exchange of cultural, artistic and scientific cooperation with foreign countries.¹¹⁷

Under this organizational structure, the Office for the Press MSZ remained until the beginning of the Second World War.

The key working tasks and responsibilities of the Office were written and published in 1935 as follows:

- a) Various forms of material and program influence on the national press, PAT, other agencies and radio;
- b) Supervision of the activities of foreign correspondents of the PAT and semi-official agencies;
- c) Concluding agreements between the Polish and the other states' press and control over their observance;
- d) Sovereignty over the foreign press sections through letters and agencies in the spirit of proper exposure of Polish foreign policy and events and domestic issues;
- e) Studying the foreign and domestic press;
- f) organization of the arrivals and departures of the journalists, scientific exchange, Polish readings and cultural events abroad, the issues of foreign publications about Poland.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, pp. 427-428.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

As an example, in an order from the Office for the Press MSZ to the correspondent in Romania (4.II 1936), topics of this propaganda work were also mentioned: Financial stability in Poland, development of commerce, rise of the city of Gdansk, Polish tourism, literature, music, sport etc¹¹⁹

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent a substantial amount of its budget on propaganda. In the financial year 1931-1932, the budget of the Office for the Press MSZ alone was 1.5 million zlotys plus 909,000 zlotys was allocated for diplomatic missions. However, in the financial year 1935-1936, the entire propaganda budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, excluding the press, for organizing lectures abroad about Poland and the popularization of Polish science, culture and art, totaled 4.36 million zlotys.¹²⁰

According to the opposition, in November 1935, a monthly subsidy was given to several different papers. The list of newspapers and sums that they spent were as follows: *Gazeta Polska* – 45,000 zlotys; *Stowo*, Vilnius and *Wiadomości Literackie* – 10,000 zlotys; *Iskra* agency, close to the ruling party – 30,000 zlotys.¹²¹

The propaganda influence of the Office for the Press MSZ was crucial for Polish propaganda abroad and very important at home. Significant amounts of money were spent in order to achieve their goals and this was proof of the strong desire of the ruling circle to maintain and spread their existing influence.

Camp of National Unity (OZN)

Shortly after the creation of the government party, Camp of National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego, OZN) in 1937, the Party Propaganda organization was formed. As one witnessed in the final phase of the centralization of propaganda, representatives of the OZN participated in the Commission for the Coordination of Propaganda so that they could be involved in making the key propaganda plans and decisions. During its brief existence, even the

¹¹⁹ AAN, MSZ, mf. 7660, p. 244

¹²⁰ Notkowski, *Prasa w systemie*, p. 442-443.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

propaganda organization in the OZN had structural changes. Chief of staff Colonel Zygmunt Wenda created the following organizational structure:

Organization of propaganda of OZN under Wenda (1938-1939)

General	Press	Propaganda
Organization	Foreign	Publications
Finance	Information	Radio
Archives	Registration	Techniques
	Photography	Scholarship/Research
		Film

Source: E.D. Wynot, *Polish Politics in Transition, The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935-1939*, (Athens, 1974), p.191.

Even with the problems with the party organization, the OZN propaganda department was very active, especially in the election campaign of 1938.¹²² As a result, the OZN had complete control of the Parliament after these elections.

Due to its complicated structure, it was difficult to establish how much money was invested in the Polish state propaganda during the Interwar period. According to Yugoslavia's CPB correspondent from Warsaw, the budget for Polish propaganda in 1937 was around 5.6 million zloty. In the second part of the report, he added that a yearly subsidy for PAT was around 2 million zloty.¹²³ Therefore, funding for the Polish state propaganda was at least about three of four times more than in contemporary Yugoslavia.¹²⁴

As a result of the efforts of the ruling circles in the 1930's, their control of the powerful institutions in the information and propaganda industry became much stronger. Privileged positions in the communications industry ensured that Pilsudski's camp brought cohesiveness to an expanding government hierarchy. The obvious centralization of activities in the field was not completely eliminating opposition across the propaganda activities of individual government departments.

¹²² Wynot, *Polish Politics*, pp. 217-234.

¹²³ AY, 38-51, Letter from CPB's Warsaw correspondent from 15. January 1937. The correspondent made calculations based on known figures and his assumption on how much money was used from the special funds.

¹²⁴ For the funding of Yugoslav state propaganda, see the following part of the chapter.

According to historian Kaszuba, activities of official Government propaganda, both civilian and military, never led to the implementation of a uniform and fully concentrated system, in fact, this was closer to the model of totalitarianism. In some military circles, the OZN's preferences for strong and even radical solutions in terms of the propaganda apparatus of the state were equally limited and suppressed as they feared the environmental mechanisms for the total abolition of the liberal-democratic institutions.¹²⁵

In matters specifically relating to state propaganda in the Second Republic, the army had the biggest influence. Plans and implementation of major official propaganda campaigns were created and carried out directly by the military authorities or by their prominent participation. During the mid 1930's, these had been taken over by the armed forces' initiatives in this area. In view of the support for public interest on the matter of consolidation, citizenship and national solidarity, the "militarization" and active defense of independence blurred boundaries between civilian and military propaganda.

¹²⁵ Kaszuba, *System propagandy*, p.317

YUGOSLAVIA

In the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenians (from 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia), the “general state intelligence services” were the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, except from 1920-1921, when they were the responsibility of the Council of Ministers. Then, the Central Press-Bureau was established.

The Central Press-Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (CPB) was founded in April 1929. This institution had its roots in the practice already established in the Principedom of Serbia, i.e. from the institution of the Press Bureau. This had been founded as early as the 1860's during the rule of Prince Mihailo Obrenovic.¹²⁶

According to the Law, which had only four articles, this institution was meant to be a state information service. According to the same law, the detailed tasks, obligations and the structure of the newly founded body were to be formulated by the President of the Council of Ministers in an appropriate manner. The law stated that the Central Press-Bureau should be a constituent part of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as one of its departments and that a special budget should be set aside for this department as part of the Council's overall budget (Article 3). A general scheme of the internal organization of the CPB was set by law as an organization of the Presidency of the Council of 1 May 1929.¹²⁷ The detailed structure was established in the following years by the Statutes of 1931 and 1935.

The head of CPB was a clerk who was later named chief of the Central Bureau of the press. This role from 1929-1941 was performed by:

¹²⁶ The head of this institution was a renowned publicist from Dubrovnik, Matija Ban. For further information see: M. Bjelica, *Srpski ratovi rechima 1844-2000* [The Serbian War of Words 1844-2000], (Belgrade 2003), pp. 21-21.

¹²⁷ Sluzbene novine Kraljevine SHS [Official Newspaper of Kingdome SHS], No. 105-XLII of 7 May 1929 – Zakon o uredjenju Predsednistva Ministarskog Saveta [The Law on Organization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers] of 1 May 1929.

Milan Marjanovic (Милан Марјановић)¹²⁸, Milan Nikolic (Милан Николић), Teofilo Djurovic (Теофило Ђуровић)¹²⁹, Kosta Lukovic (Коста Луковић), Bosko Bogdanovic (Бошко Богдановић)¹³⁰, Predrag Milojevic (Предраг Милојевић)¹³¹ and Milorad Radovanovic (Милорад Радовановић). The Chief's mandate was not specific and they were appointed, removed and retired by the existing government.

It should be noted that the first head of CPB was Tony Shlegl (Toni Šlegl), a director of Zagreb newspaper *Novosti* and a close friend of King Alexander. However, he never resumed his duty because he was killed shortly before he was to start his post.¹³² The Chief of the CPB had the rank of vice minister and he was responsible to the President of the Council and the government. The department was divided into three sections: Administrative, Information and Publicity. Each of these sections had its own chief who reported to the Head of the CPB. Heads of departments had the same rank and privileges as the State's secretary. In the same

¹²⁸ Milan Marjanovic (1879-1955) was a journalist, writer and film director. He was expelled from Karlovac High School after attending a trade school. He was one of the leaders of the movement against the Hungarian administrator in Croatia ban Kuen Hedervari (Károly Khuen-Héderváry) who was one of the founders of the Yugoslav Committee during World War II. After the War, Marjanovic was a member of the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace conference in Paris. During the Second World War, he was interned in Italy. After the war, he dealt with the writing, directing and literary criticism.

¹²⁹ Teofilo Djurovic was born on 8 March 1896 in Gornji Milanovac (Western Serbia). He was educated in Serbian high schools. After the military retreat through Albania in 1916, he went to study in France. His faculty education was completed in Poitiers. He gained PhD. in Paris in the field of political and economic sciences. He joined the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1919. Djurovic performed various different duties. He was a clerk of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served in Czechoslovakia, France, Austria and Italy. In his short time in Vienna, he was the Acting Consul General. From 1930, he was on duty in the legal department of the MFA. Djurovic was the head of the MFA Press Department in 1932. Only four months later, he was appointed as Chief of the Central Press-bureau and in May 1934 he temporarily became the acting head of the institution. After that, he was adviser to the Royal Embassy in Paris. In 1934, he became Consul General in Valona (Albania). From 31 October 1938, he was Consul General in Thessaloniki (Greece), until the beginning of World War II. He later immigrated to Canada.

¹³⁰ Bosko Bogdanovic (1888-1945) gained his primary and secondary education in city of Valjevo (Western Serbia). He was a graduate in Classical philology at University of Belgrade. He was professor in Third Belgrade High School, National Teacher's Academy and Trade schools in Skopje. Bogdanovic was a long time associate and chief editor of the newspaper *Vreme*. During the Second World War, he cooperated with the government of general Nedic (Милан Недић) who was appointed by the Germans. In 1944, he tried to escape to Germany, but he was captured later. He died during the deportation to Yugoslavia. Bogdanovic spoke Latin, Greek, Italian, German, English and French. Patriarch Varnava Rosic (Варнава Росић) was his wedding godfather. He was a close friend of Minister Interior Korosec (Anton Korošec).

¹³¹ Predrag Milojevic (1901-1999) lived almost all his long life in journalism. After high school, he enrolled in philosophy with the famous professor Brana Petronijevic who chose him to be his assistant. Shortly after that, he quit his studies and became correspondent of the most important newspaper in Serbia *Politika*. After the dictatorship of King Alexander was established, Milojevic lost his regular column, but still became a foreign correspondent for *Politika*. He had worked in England and Germany. In addition to journalism, he did some translating work. After the Second World War Milojevic has long worked in the *Politika*, where he was even fired twice and returned.

¹³² V.Dragovic, *Srpska stampa izmedju dva rata, osnova za bibliografiju srpske periodike 1915-1945* [Serbian Press Between Two Wars, Basis for Bibliography of Serbian Press], (Belgrade, 1956), p.382.

document¹³³ about the organization of the Council of Ministers, it stated the exact duties of each of the departments of the CPB. The Administrative department was responsible for the conduct of personal affairs of the staff, ie. receiving and sending mails, letters etc. In this Department, there was also the Secretariat whose responsibility was to deal with all complaints from the staff, business or personal.

The Information Department was responsible for collecting and providing information on a variety of different national issues such as political, economic, financial, cultural etc. The principal function of this department was to inform domestic and foreign citizens about the existing situation in Yugoslavia.

Another important feature of this department was to collect information on foreign and domestic press as well as maintain the data archives and a library. It was also determined to improve on existing levels of writing and printing journalistic and literary work so these could be improved to the highest possible level.

The Central Press-Bureau was constantly seeking to improve the organisation as much as possible and formal legislation, governing its structure, was passed in March 1931. The head of the CPB was given the official title of Chief of the CPB. This duty, in later years, was often performed from some of the heads of other departments. The Department for Administration, Information and Publicity remained unchanged, but there were a lot of changes inside all these departments.

The Publicity department held a news service of propaganda abroad, whilst the Information Department held information propaganda services at home during 1931. For the benefit of all the clerks, 56 different instructions were issued. It was important to note that the establishment had two separate archives - confidential and administrative. It was interesting to note in 1931, there were around 3,900 files in the administrative archives and in the confidential archives, there were about 12,000 files.¹³⁴ This summed up the secrecy of the institution. The Headquarters of the CPB was located in a big palace in the “Veliki Milosh” street in Belgrade.

The majority of CPB employees were clerks and they were divided into two groups. The first group consisted of full time clerical staff whilst the others were only part-time. It was

¹³³ See note 127.

¹³⁴ AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj o radu CPB-a za 1931.godinu (Annual CPB's Report for 1931).

interesting that the Law for Clerics for the Central Press Bureau-provided specific benefits to them. They were allowed to progress within the civil service, regardless of their academic qualifications and experience. This was obligatory for career progression in the case of other state department officials in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. CPB officials thought that these benefits would enable them to recruit more clerical staff from the national pool of journalists, regardless of their qualifications. So officials were recruited and allowed to advance to a position that corresponded to their rank and reputation in journalism as well as to their personal abilities and performance¹³⁵ it was easier to understand the actual number and duties of CPB with the following scheme:

The structure of CPB in 1931

Staff of the Central Press-Bureau and their rank

Duties	Number
Chief of Central Press-Bureau	1
Deputy chief of CPB	1
Heads of Sections and secretaries	4
Clerks	12
Secretary of Sections and secretaries	4
Proofreaders	12
Redactor	1
Stenographers	2
Typist	15
Correspondents	33
Other staff	40
TOTAL	125

* Of which the regular salary 112 and 13 confidential clerks.

Source: AY, 38-1, Annual CPB's Report for 1931.

¹³⁵ AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj: "Organizacija shtampe i propagande u Jugoslaviji" (CPB's report entitled "Organization of the Press and Propaganda in Yugoslavia").

The number of CPB employees varied in future years, but usually it was around 150.¹³⁶ In addition to this number, there were a number of associates who were not officially on the payroll. This was done because of the secrecy of their work so they were not even mentioned in the report, but they did work for the CPB.¹³⁷

Central Press-Bureau employees were different, not only in their education levels, but also with their temperaments and behavior. Among them were PhD. holders, professors, writers etc. Many of them worked for the CPB more for material reasons than for their personal beliefs about political and moral correctness. The salaries and benefits that this job offered were way above average when compared with other jobs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In addition, one could not ignore the possibility of employees progressing within the CPB, gaining social status and position, the ability to travel, earning good money etc, but all these benefits brought competition, rivalry, conflicts of interests and intolerance between all CPB employees. Milan Jovanovic Stoimirović, who for decades was in the CPB and close to it, referred to it as the “wasp’s nest”, “the pit in which different types of insects crawl” and “the mad house in which much wickedness was accumulated”.¹³⁸

Correspondents in the country and abroad played an important role in executing the propaganda goals set by both of these institutions. Their key task was to be a link between the central institutions and the editing boards of the newspapers in the area entrusted to them. The duties of the correspondents in the states were practically identical. They were, above all, responsible for monitoring the work of the press and they were to report to the central institutions on regular basis. They had to inform on the work of the press and on political events in the entrusted area every week. They were also to send a complete report on their activities and on the work of the correspondence center at the end of each month and year, and not every three or six months.

Besides these regular duties, the correspondents also had to co-operate with all political, national or cultural tasks organized by their sector. They had to fulfill all the tasks given by the central institution to help to bring about all the desired results for the CPB.

¹³⁶ In 1940 it was 167. CPB, Annual Report for 1940, Manuscript held in National Library in Belgrade.

¹³⁷ Some employees were record under nicknames like French citizens e.g. Leon Savajian was known as Leo. AY, 38, Payrolls, box number 3.

¹³⁸ M.Jovanovic-Stoimirovic, Dnevnik 1936-1941 [Diary 1936-1941], (Novi Sad, 2000), p.72 and p.387.

There were also supervisors in charge of the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. They paid regular visits to the editorial office and kept in touch with the editors and the journalists to whom they gave instructions, and made threats when necessary. The success of their work depended on the competence of the correspondents themselves as well as the department in which they worked. The complaints of the correspondents about the lack of cooperation of the local media were frequent, especially in the Croatian parts of the country.¹³⁹

The Central Press-Bureau in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had regular correspondents, not only in Belgrade, but also in each of the nine *banovinas*¹⁴⁰. They were located in the centers of the *banovinas*, but also often made trips into the provinces. The seats of the regular correspondents in the country were: Ljubljana in the Drava Banovina, Zagreb in the Sava Banovina, Banja Luka in Vrbas Banovina, Split in the Primorska Banovina, Sarajevo in the Drina Banovina, Cetinje in the Zeta Banovina, Novi Sad in the Danube Banovina, Nis in the Morava Banovina and Skopje in the Vardar Banovina. In addition, there were correspondents in Susak and Osijek.

With regard to foreign countries, the propaganda organizations had their correspondents in the most important European capitals and in the capitals of neighboring countries. The regular CPB correspondents from abroad were situated in London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva, Rome, Sofia, Prague, Budapest, Warsaw, Bern, Vienna, Athens, Bucharest, Washington, Brussels and Frankfurt. In 1931, the correspondence centers were closed in Brussels and Frankfurt and a new center was established in Tirana. The correspondents from abroad were called attaches for the press with the Royal Legates. This change was introduced in Yugoslavia in order to stop the ongoing practice of the provisional granting of titles.¹⁴¹

The obligations of the correspondents from abroad were to an extent more numerous and complex than those of their colleagues back home. They were expected to be completely at the disposal of the state. The correspondents, nevertheless, kept some level of independence regarding the entrusted tasks. Their additional duties were the monitoring of the newspapers and

¹³⁹ AY, 38-11, Izveshtaj dopisnika iz Primorske banovine [The Reports of the Correspondents from the Primorska Banovina].

¹⁴⁰ *Banovina* was an administrative unit of the internal division in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia introduced by King Aleksandar on 3 October 1929.

¹⁴¹ AY, 38-1, Pravilnik o atasheima za shtampu (chl. 1) [The Book of Regulations Regarding the Attachés for the Press (Article 1)].

publications in their area, informing on these issues to the state, reacting to unfavorable mentions of the country in the foreign press, offering help in writing denials and similar official documents, making connections between the state and the editorial staff of the newspapers, making sure that the highest possible number of articles of the country got published in foreign newspapers and of course, reporting on a regular basis to the central institutions in Belgrade.

Bearing in mind all the enumerated duties, it seemed that the most important qualification for correspondents, besides being competent, was to be well acquainted with the situation in the state to which they had been sent and, above all, to have contacts with the key people in power and among editing staff of the newspapers.

In order to achieve this, it was necessary for the correspondents to have certain work experience, many years of service in the given state and of course, a good command of the local language. In the reports on the work of the correspondents, it was noticeable that they weren't as efficient in their work as a result of their relocation. New correspondents needed time to become "acquainted" with the "important people" and to gain trust and distinction in the new country.

Of immense importance to them, besides the usual activities, was the so called "invisible propaganda". This consisted of their normal daily activities – visits to the editing staff, restaurants, taverns, talking to people, giving information which formally had no official character. These kinds of activities could, depending on the professionalism and talent of the correspondent, have had more far reaching effects than the regular activities.

The regular correspondence with the central institution was carried out through written reports, phone conversations and codified telegrams, depending on the importance and urgency of the news.¹⁴² The correspondents found it considerably easier to get the news about certain celebrations, such as public holidays into foreign newspapers than to push their country's political agenda. In England, for example, articles on the Yugoslav royal family were published quite often, due to their family and friendly ties with the English royal family.

The principal aims of propaganda produced by the Central Press-Bureau in the first years after its foundation was to explain and justify the new course established by the King's dictatorship. Even the establishment of the CPB could be associated with the foundation of the

¹⁴² Some of the correspondents had problems with their telegrams being read, thus they could not inform openly on the real situation at hand. In such cases, they turned to various options, such as paying a visit to the home country for the purpose of "presenting reports". Milos Crnjanski was one of the correspondents who encountered these sorts of problems during his service in Italy. He had to send some of his reports through the Legate, M.Crnjanski, *Nova Evropa*, (Belgrade 1991), p.139.

dictatorship regime. The King needed an institution that could justify and explain his actions to the domestic and foreign public, especially foreign allies like France and Czechoslovakia. After the constitution was established in September 1931, one of the main aims of the propaganda was to bring it closer to the foreign and domestic public as the entire CPB propaganda could have been divided on political, cultural and touristic grounds.¹⁴³

The period of Milan Stojadinovic's government (1935-1939) brought significant changes to the intensity, scope and the structure of the Central Press-Bureau. The first such change in the manual was established in November 1935. This constitution helped to more precisely define the tasks and structure of the CPB.¹⁴⁴

It was important to note that Milan Stojadinovic only had ten days to change the existing manual after taking over the presidency in 1935.¹⁴⁵ It was noticeable from the beginning that Stojadinovic was well aware of the importance of this institution for the state propaganda. One should not forget his personal ambition within the country and to the international public. The latter was, of course, more understandable if it were not for the fact that Stojadinovic was not just Prime Minister but also Minister of Foreign Affairs. His more active foreign policy helped the work of CPB and opened up relations to some countries like Italy and Bulgaria, with whom there had been very little, if any, formal relations beforehand. Bilateral agreements with these countries were signed in 1937 and relations with these countries improved.

During the entire period of Stojadinovic's government, the head of Central Press- Bureau was Kosta Lukovic. He held the position from April 1934, even when King Alexander ruled, until January 1935 when he was replaced by Teofilo Djurovic, but Lukovic quickly returned to the post.

The fact that Lukovic stayed on the post was one of many examples of Stojadinovic's pragmatic policy. He accepted people based upon their expertise and personal loyalty to him, not whether they were members of the Radical Party. It was one of the reasons for clashes with members of the National Radical Party who were initially cooperating with him.¹⁴⁶ Lukovic was

¹⁴³ This division was made by the CPB's clerks in the 1930's.

¹⁴⁴ AY, 38-1, Poslovník o radu u Centralnom Pres-birou Predsedništva Ministarskog saveta (Manual of Central Press-Bureau of Council of Ministers).

¹⁴⁵ This data was written even in introduction of the Manual.

¹⁴⁶ On this conflict see more: T.Stojkov, *Vlada Milana Stojadinovica* [Milan Stojadinovic's government], (Belgrade, 1983), pp.90-114.

a prominent journalist, founder and director of the newspaper *Vreme*, and he served in the Central-Press Bureau even during the World War I from 1914/1915.¹⁴⁷

At the time when Milan Stojadinovic came to power, Lukovic had already had experience as a chief of the Central Press-Bureau, but the new manual gave him more power. He led all of the CPB's activities (Article 1) and all legislation was formally signed off by him, apart from those which authorized the heads of departments and certain officials (Article 2).¹⁴⁸ The head of the CPB was considered to be an immediate reference to Prime Minister in his relations with the press and propaganda, both at home and abroad. In fact, Lukovic received orders from Stojadinovic directly and answered only to him.

When one considered his position and power, Kosta Lukovic was a key figure in planning and conducting propaganda in Yugoslavia.¹⁴⁹ He gave numerous instructions to correspondents, both home and abroad, including one from the Prime Minister and these were sufficient proof of his influence.

These instructions were wide ranging from any moderately important issue, every speech from the president, every public appearance or performance by the ministers etc. The interpretation of these instructions was sent to correspondents home and abroad. Such interpretations differed in size and frequency ranging from short telegraphic instructions to ten pages of text. These depended on the importance of specific events, damages or benefits that could arise from such events.

As an example, one could examine the case of the Concordat who demanded a huge propaganda effort by the CPB and by the correspondents themselves. The position of the government was rocked by the decisive protest by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the summer

¹⁴⁷ Kosta Lukovic was born in 1886 in Belgrade. He was educated in France at Rennes 1906/1907, where he defended his dissertation in the field of literature in 1933. Lukovic was a clerk at the Arts Department of the Ministry of Education and was one time head of the National Theater in Novi Sad. He received domestic and foreign decorations - the Order of White Eagle Order V level in 1928 and the Order of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and France (1926 and 1934). For a successful service in the CPB, Lukovic received the Order of St. Sava, the second level in 1938. In the fall of 1944, the Yugoslav partisans executed him as a collaborationist.

¹⁴⁸ AY, 38-1, Central Press-Bureau's Manual from 11. November 1935.

¹⁴⁹ M. Jovanovic Stoimirović, *Varia o Pres birou, Rukopisno odeljenje Matice Srpske*, document, M 13.314, p. 70a. In the one of his manuscripts, Milan Jovanovic Stoimirović referred to Lukovic as the intelligent, but lazy man. Interestingly, the observation was made in the period while he was head of CPB and a great influence on him was Stanislav Vinaver, writer, former correspondent from Berlin and later chief of the Publicity department. M. Jovanovic Stoimirović, *Varia on the press bureau, manuscripts department Serbian Matica*, document, 13,314 M, pp. 70a.

of 1937. That protest gathered strong opposition, from the right to the communist left.¹⁵⁰ The text of the Concordat, the mystery death of the patriarch and skirmishes on the streets demanded an immediate response from the propaganda center. On that occasion, Lukovic sent instructions on a daily basis, which described a less serious crisis with a reduced the number of demonstrators and incidents. These accused opposition groups who were allegedly supported by leftist and extreme elements.”¹⁵¹

Instructions sent by Lukovic were created primarily in the interest of the government and secondly in the interest of truth. That did not automatically mean that all the instructions were incorrect, but that the priority was to present situation in the best interests of the government, especially from the Prime Minister’s perspective. One could also note cases when the Prime Minister was not satisfied with Lukovic’s work. So in September 1935, the Chief of the CPB received criticism that information sent from Lukovic to the press in the afternoon was “too late” and that this needed to be published next morning. This order sent on behalf of Stojadinovic by his chief of staff Jovan Gasic.¹⁵²

Throughout the period of its existence, the institution were in search of the best organizational practice, which would make it possible for them to fulfill their set objectives.

These ”roamings“ were best illustrated by the fact that the operating regulations of the CPB were passed in March 1931. They relied on existing laws and these defined the structure of the department in more detail.

The head of the Press-Bureau was a civil servant with the title of the Chief of the Central Press-Bureau, and he had deputies. The job of the deputy of the Chief of the CPB was often done by one of the chiefs of the department.

There were three departments: Administration, Information, and Publicity.¹⁵³ This division within CPB was the most lasting one. The rationale behind it was that, although it did

¹⁵⁰ More about Concordat crisis in Yugoslavia see: M.Misovic, *Srpska crkva i Konkordatska kriza* (Serbian Church and Concordat Crisis), Београд 1983; R.Radicevic, *Zivot u vremenima: Gavrilo Dozic 1881-1950* (Life in Times, Gavrilo Dozic 1881-1950), (Belgrade, 2006), pp.156-186.

¹⁵¹ AY, 38-1, Kosta Lukovic to all correspondents on 22. June 1937. It was said that this report has been sent from the “highest place.”

¹⁵² AY, 37-73-97.

¹⁵³ AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj o radu CPB-a za 1931 [The Report on Work of the CPB for the year of 1931].

not function perfectly, it was still written in the constitution. It was very likely that the Department for Radio broadcasting was added to these three departments in 1939.¹⁵⁴

Organization of the Central Press-Bureau at the beginning of 1937

THE ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT	THE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT	THE PUBLICITY DEPARTMENT
The General Section	Department for activities regarding the enforcement of the Law on the Press	Department for public realtions with the foreign press
The Secretariat of the CPB	Department for the national political propaganda	Department for propaganda in the sphere of culture
	Department for political service	Department for monitoring of the press
	Department for monitoring of the press in the country	
	Department for radio broadcasting	
	Department for film and tourism	
	Department for economic issues	
	Department for photography	

The institution was financed through regular and secret funding. As an illustration of the allocation of these funds, it is important to note the budget of the CPB for 1931, which totaled

¹⁵⁴AY, 38-1, Izvestaj: “Delokrug rada Centralnog Pres-biroa Predsednistva Ministarskog saveta” [The Report “The Domain of Action and Work of the Press-Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers]. After analysis, the text was dated to 1939.

between 18,180,580 dinars.¹⁵⁵ The 11,580,580 came from regular funds and 6,600,000 dinars came from the secret funds¹⁵⁶. This amount remained almost unchanged throughout the following years. It is important to note that the chiefs of the Central Press-Bureau were never satisfied with the considerable financial means allocated for the activities of this Department of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Their constant complaints about the lack of funding reappeared in numerous reports throughout this period.¹⁵⁷

During this period, the activities of the Administration Department remained unchanged, but it is important to examine the work of two other departments: Information and Publicity.

Firstly, it is important to examine one of the key departments within the Information Department, the department for activities regarding law enforcement on the Press. This department was solely responsible for the preventative examination of the press, magazines, books and other printed documents.

During the 1930's, press legislation passed in January 1929 came into effect. This was one of the first pieces of legislation passed at the start of the King's dictatorship and it was very strict on the press. This remained until the fall of Stojadinovic's government.

Although, Article 1 of the Press Law formally proclaimed the freedom of the press against any preventive examination, in practice this was not the case. According to Article 14 of the Press law, any newspapers could be prosecuted for the slightest offense. After three such prosecutions, newspapers could be definitively terminated.

Due to this strict legislation, newspapers had to show the CPB copies of their forthcoming articles for a review every day before they were published. This was preventative censorship that gave the press a very limited amount of freedom.

Outside Belgrade, this type of work was performed by prosecution or police administration where there were no prosecutions involved. This job was carried out by directives

¹⁵⁵ AY, 38-141. The initial draft of the budget drawn up for the CPB totaled 36,580,580 dinars. It also had a paragraph regarding publishing activities in the country and abroad, which suggested a budget of 20 million dinars for these activities.

¹⁵⁶ The draft of the budget for the period 1929/1930 (the first year of the existence of the institution) was specific in so much as the 3,400,000 dinars came from regular funds and 9,600,000 from the secret ones. This can be explained by imprecise calculations of the possible expenditures of the institution at the time when it had not been in operation. Naturally, there were also cases later on when the secret funding was boosted due to specific needs and exceptional expenditures.

¹⁵⁷ AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj: "Delokrug rada Centralnog Pres-biroa Predsednistva Ministarskog saveta" [The Report "Domain of Action and Work of the Central Press-Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers"] of 1938. It was interesting to note the emphasis placed on the fact that Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary had twice as high budgets, which was, as stated, also the case in all the neighboring countries.

and instructions from the CPB¹⁵⁸ and these were sent by telephone and telegraph to save time. This department, in addition to carrying out activities related to the implementation of the press, had been instructing newspapers daily about anything, which in its opinion, could be harmful to the general public and national interest.¹⁵⁹

In addition to controlling the local press, the state prosecutors and police administration exercised control over foreign journalists who were coming into the country. They were also exploring the possibilities of importing and selling certain foreign newspapers in Yugoslavia.

The final decision on this matter was made by the CPB and it was strongly influenced by the editorial viewpoints of foreign newspapers. The CPB would approve of those newspapers which didn't focus on political issues such as the Hungarian cultural newspaper *Lahatar*. Other newspapers were judged by their location and in some instances, by the nature of their country's relationship with Yugoslavia. For example, the CPB approved of the Bulgarian newspapers *Dnes* and *Utro* as they were from a country seen as "friendly" to Yugoslavia). For a better understanding of this department's extensive work, please look at the table below with information extracted from the annual report on the work of CPB in 1936.

*Preventive examination for a month in the Belgrade area*¹⁶⁰

Types of sheets and their scope	Approximate number of pages
daily newspapers	1 800
weekly and twice in month issues	3 168
weekly and twice in month issues in 1/4	922
Twice in month and monthly in 1/8	1 658
Radio lectures typed on the machine	1 200
Oral newspapers typed on the machine	96

¹⁵⁸ Interesting are the cases that have occurred in Croatia, especially when the prosecution had taken entire paragraphs from some articles and newspapers. They were published afterwards with the same text and instead of the extracted information, there was empty space. With those actions, editors of the newspapers had pointed to state repression and stifling freedom.

¹⁵⁹ For more examples see AY, 38-88.

¹⁶⁰ Central Pres-Bureau of Council of Ministers, Izveshtaj o radu za 1936. godinu (Report of annual work for 1936).

Different reports for the newspapers	450
books in various foreign languages in 1/8	4 000

This strenuous work was performed every day from 9am until midnight and special shifts were organized to review all kind of papers, regardless of the printed language. Different proof-readers participated in the examination of foreign newspapers.¹⁶¹ This department published a daily bulletin on its activities from which one could see the editorial opinions of newspapers and their attitude towards the important state issues.

At the beginning of 1936, the Information Department founded the department for national political propaganda. The main goals of this department were to increase the propaganda activities and increase the influence over the press at home and abroad. They had to give newspapers plenty of information on a daily basis on issues ranging from political, economic, financial, cultural and tourist.

By establishing this department, the CPB expressed the desire to influence the newspapers to write “in the spirit of national ideology and policy of the Royal Government” and using them to gain influence over people. The department of National Political propaganda supplied newspapers with both unified and more specific material depending on the profile of the newspaper. Special in-depth articles were recorded on the occasion of major celebrations and national holidays like Unification day (1st December) and the birthday of King Peter II (5th September). In 1936, the department submitted news and reports to almost 80 newspapers, which published a total of about 20,000 different articles.¹⁶²

As an example on how the Central Press-Bureau influenced public opinion in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, please look at the table below, which consisted of information submitted by the CPB and their utilization by the most influential media in the state.

¹⁶¹ They were proofreaders for: Russian, English, Hungarian, German, French, Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Romanian and Slovakian languages.

¹⁶² Central Pres-Bureau of Council of Ministers, Izveshtaj o radu za 1936. godinu (Report of annual work for 1936), p. 12

Usage of CPB's data by the different media in 1936

Media	Delivered	Used	in percentage
Radio	1 460	780	53%
<i>Avala Agency</i>	1 800	1 500	83%
<i>Samouprava</i>	1 050	950	90%
<i>Vreme</i>	1 050	700	67%
<i>Pravda</i>	1 000	700	70%
<i>Politika</i>	900	400	44%
Provincial press	5 700	4 000	70%

Table prepared by the author based on data from the CPB, Report of annual from 1936, p.19

As one could note above, the largest percentage of CPB data, 90%, was used by the government party newspaper *Samouprava* (Yugoslav Radical Community – JRZ). After this data was published, *Samouprava* published 266 issues and from this data, one could tell the enormous influence that the CPB had on it. The newspaper *Pravda* was similar to *Samouprava*, but it was not influenced as much by CPB data. On the other hand, the newspaper *Politika*, which tried to be neutral and objective, used only 44% of CPB material, the least out of all media outlets. This data clearly stated the extent to which some media outlets were close to the government.

Another innovation from the CPB in the Stojadinovic government was the establishment of the U.S. Service immigrant press within the department on the National political propaganda. This service followed all Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian newspapers and even the newspapers of Bulgarian-Macedonian emigrants in the United States, Canada, Argentina and Chile.

This service had two tasks. One was to monitor the separatist propaganda, both Croatian and Bulgarian-Macedonian. Secondly, the service was encouraging and helping those newspapers that were on the “border of national and state unity”. These were sent various articles, photographs and materials that expressed the “real” situation in the distant homeland.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ Some titles of the articles best described the tendencies: “For United Yugoslav State”, “The Ideal is Achieved”, “We Will Defend Her and Succeed”, “Macek and Pavelic”, “Gustav Percec has Shamed Even his own Kin”, “Croatian Perpeetum Mobile”.

The report on the activities of the service, in addition to praising their own work, listed some problems and made suggestions for improving the service.

There was an interesting report, which stated that “separatist” and “federalist” newspapers were more “skilled” than “patriotic”. This was explained by the fact that they obtained material mostly from Europe and had more educated editors.¹⁶⁴

The foreign policy of the Balkan countries, which needed some sort of clarification, created additional problems for the correspondents abroad. These clarifications asked, from time to time, for exceptional efforts. In some cases, besides the text of the Prime Minister’s speech, the correspondents were given special instructions, which varied from one country to another.

As an example, it is important to mention Stojadinovic’s address to the National Assembly of 9 March 1938. The correspondent from Paris received instructions to put special emphasis on the “standing ovations” and “applauses” after the mention of France, whereas the correspondent in Berlin was told that “great applause” followed the mention of the German Reich”. Naturally, the “positive” reception of France was left out of the second instruction for the Berlin correspondent.¹⁶⁵

In addition to the activities of the correspondents at home and abroad, special attention was paid to co-operating with the foreign correspondents that were, permanently or temporarily, staying in Yugoslavia.

Special efforts were made to create the best possible relations with them. The correspondents were offered all sorts of “benefits” in order to make them more susceptible to “suggestions” and to gain as much control over their work as possible. The process of attempting to gain a foreign correspondent’s approval was manifold, e.g. organizing of tea parties, excursions into the inlands of the country, receptions with the heads of the departments and the receptions were held by the chiefs or the directors themselves when it came to very important journalists.

Foreign correspondents were offered all the material that they needed to do their jobs properly. The propaganda institutions had standardized articles which dealt with different issues regarding various aspects of daily life and the history of the country. However, relations with foreign correspondents were not always smooth. There were cases when their reports were put

¹⁶⁴ Same as footnote 162.

¹⁶⁵ AY, 38-1, Cirkular za dopisnike [The Circular Notification for the Correspondents] of 9 March 1938.

on hold until they were changed into something which was regarded as “acceptable” for the government of the host country. This occurred with a Reuter’s correspondent in Belgrade on the day of the parliamentary elections, 11th December 1938.¹⁶⁶

The results of the propaganda institutions were not insignificant, but they were not always completely successful. This could be claimed of the Yugoslav case in particular. Although the whole propaganda machinery was set up for the benefit of Prime Minister Stojadinovic¹⁶⁷, he was re-elected with a considerably smaller margin than expected in the parliamentary elections of 1938. This, amongst other things, brought about his eventual downfall.¹⁶⁸

The Political Service of the Central Information Department of the CPB dealt exclusively with the area of reporting internal and party politics. Its main task was to inform the public about the work of the National Assembly and Senate¹⁶⁹ and to draft reports on the work parties. This department kept records, archives and statistics of the complete political history of the all parties in Yugoslavia.

The Central Press-Bureau had its own Photographic department in order to make its propaganda more convincing and striking. This department had extensive archives, with tens of thousands of negatives. Their content was not only political and cultural, but historical and touristic.

With by far the largest photo archives in the country, the CPB was in a dominant position in relation to the competition provided by the photo services provided by other newspapers. They submitted material to the large number of domestic newspapers. This was especially appropriate for the provincial press in a part of the country that was poor and under-equipped and didn’t have

¹⁶⁶ AY, 38-93, Izveshtaj predsednika CPB-a Koste Lukovica predsedniku vlade o radu stranih novinara za vreme izbora [The Report of the Chief of the CPB, Kosta Lukovic, to the vice-president of the Government on the work of foreign journalists during the elections].

¹⁶⁷ For details on propaganda during the rule of Milan Stojadinovic see: P. Lazetic, ‘Milan Stojadinovic i predizborna kampanja 1938’ (Milan Stojadinovic and election campaign in 1938), *Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije* No. 25, Belgrade 1988, pp.117-139; J. Opra, ‘Izborna kampanja Milana Stojadinovica 1938.godine’ (Election campaign of Milan Stojadinovic in 1938), *Arhiv* Year II No.2, pp.171-185; the MA Thesis of the author, *Propaganda Milana Stojadinovica 1935-1939* [Milan Stojadinovic’s Propaganda 1935-1939].

¹⁶⁸For further details on the descent of Milan Stojadinovic from power see: Lj. Dimic, *Istorija srpske drzavnosti* [The History of Serbian statehood], III, Novi Sad 2002, p.182; D.Biber, ‘O padu Stojadinovićeve vlade’ (About the fall of Stojadinovic's Government), *Istorija 20.veka, Zbornik radova VIII*, Belgrade 1966, pp. 5-66. и D. Tesic, *Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica 1935-1939* (Jugoslav Radical Community 1935-1939), Belgrade 1997, pp.389-401.

¹⁶⁹ Those reports are published via “Avala” Agency by its bulletin “News from the country” and transferred using the radio.

its own photo-service. This photo material from the CPB was often the only one used in those newspapers.

Very soon after the establishment of the regime party JRZ, this department found itself in party services. It photographed important party gatherings and rallies and also made resized photos of party leaders, primarily Stojadinovic, but also others like Korosec, the Interior Minister and leader of the Slovenian wing of the JRZ and Spaho, who was leader of the Bosnian wing.¹⁷⁰

During the period of Stojadinovic's government, there was strong economic recovery in Yugoslavia after the economic crisis that adversely affected the country in early part of the 1930's. The role of giving information to the domestic and international public about the government's work in this area was the responsibility of the micro department of Economics and Finance. Its tasks were performed by a group of domestic and foreign journalists who were involved in the development of CPB's publications, lectures, radio, etc. They were also involved in the preparation of various presentations associated with the opening of new factories or plants and these were common during that period.

Although the work of this sub-section was very important, one potentially misleading piece of news could cost the country millions, there were only a small number of employees. In addition to the chief of this sub-section Vladimir Skerl, there were only a few clerks¹⁷¹ and when one considered the importance of the economy to the Stojadinovic government, this was a surprise. Skerl had asked for more employees and for this sub-section to become a department because its lack of "organic contact" with the press and the authorities, but this request was refused.¹⁷²

This sub-section had an active role in the propaganda actions for the loans registrations that were connected with government's new economic program. Considering its working conditions, the sub-section of Economy and Finance had recorded solid results, especially in collecting information from its domain.¹⁷³

There were three main tasks of the Publicity department. Firstly, it had to inform the public, directly or indirectly through a correspondent on the situation in the country. Secondly, to

¹⁷⁰ Of all photos made during the 1936, 26% were about JRZ foundation and organization. CPB, Report..., 77.

¹⁷¹ AY, 38-1, in one moment, there were only three clerks, The annual report of Sub-section of Economy and Finance for 1937.

¹⁷² AY, 38-1, the letter of Vladimir Skerl to Kosta Lukovic from 19. February 1937. In this letter, he referred to his previous unsuccessful attempts to reconnect with others important factors in the area.

¹⁷³ This sub-section gave the most information for the propaganda publication about the anniversaries of the government.

prepare material for journalists and foreign correspondents and thirdly to collect data on cultural life and minority issues and make a bulletin based on the monitoring of foreign and local press on a daily, weekly and monthly basis.

However, one of the most important duties of this department was to create special publications of the Central Press-Bureau. Every year, a large number of newsletters and publications were published in relation to political and cultural issues. Special effort was addressed to the publications that were published for the anniversaries of the Stojadinovic government. By the instructions that he received from the Prime Minister, Kosta Lukovic in 1937, these were sent to the ministries who were asked to submit data on what had been done in their domain. Such letters were sent several months before the anniversary dates.

The main reason for this was the time that the CPB needed for additional work on the material and later for the transfer of this material to domestic and foreign journalists and correspondents. The result of this action was the publication of a book called “Two Years of Milan Stojadinovic’s Government”.

The following year, preparations were even more systematic and progress was made during 1938, which was the year of the general election. This included collated data of almost 500 pages and brochures issued by the same title containing full data, high quality photos, charts with the success and progress in every field in the country.

At the time, these luxury publications reached certain standards that even nowadays deserve some respect. In the brochures, photographs were carefully chosen where the Prime Minister was the center of attention. They published his photos with all the major foreign politicians whom he met over the years. There were also photographs of people taken during his talks with the workers and peasants, of his time in Parliament, on the foundation of a new hospital, factory or any new facility etc.

In addition to the material in the Serbian language, they also wrote propaganda articles in foreign languages. After three years of the Stojadinovic government, these consisted of fifteen articles in French and German, three in Italian and two in English.¹⁷⁴ These articles were adjusted to suit the readers of that specific country.

¹⁷⁴ AY, 38-1.

According to official Government statistics, Stojadinovic's government increased the budget of the CPB in 1936-37 by 1,700,000 dinars.¹⁷⁵ Although this seemed a big increase, one must bear in mind that some new items were introduced to the budget and that the increase was less in real terms.¹⁷⁶

At this stage, it is important to mention the relationship between the Prime Minister Stojadinovic and the Central Press-Bureau. Stojadinovic was a politician who knew the importance of the state and its own personal propaganda and during his time in office, he made many improvements in this area. In addition, he was advising the CPB chief regularly as well as creating articles about both himself and the activities of the government.

The interest of Prime Minister in the propaganda activities of the Central Press-Bureau could be explained by the fact that there was more political freedom in the country than in previous years and therefore it was easier to gain the trust of the people. In addition, the success of propaganda in a totalitarian state was seen as very beneficial for the Prime Minister who, during his time in office, often used the CPB to achieve his own personal ambitions as Prime Minister.

Sometimes it was difficult to distinguish between Stojadinovic promoting himself in his role as Prime Minister and promoting the state. This tendency increased with time and Stojadinovic gained more power as a result of these circumstances.

After the fall of the Stojadinovic government in February 1939, The Central Press-Bureau continued its propaganda work. The key tasks in this period were the formation of the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement¹⁷⁷ and the defense against hostile propaganda from abroad. The second task was more complicated as the situation in Europe deteriorated with the outbreak of World War II. The attitude of the government and its policy of "strict neutrality" were increasingly difficult to maintain as the number of countries who participated in World War II increased. Activity abroad was severely interrupted as a result of the war.

¹⁷⁵ Earlier budget was 18 million dinars. According to one earlier report, it stayed unchanged until Stojadinovic's government.

¹⁷⁶ It was about the items related to purchase of free railway tickets for the staff and some difference in the course of the dinar that was previously conducted by the Ministry of Finance.

¹⁷⁷ The agreement between Stojadinovic's successor Dragisa Cvetkovic (Драгиша Цветковић) and leader of Croat Peasant Party, Vladimir Macek (Vladimir Vlatko Maček) was made in August 1939. New Banovina Croatia was formed from earlier Sava and Primorska plus some parts of other banovinas. Macek also agreed to participate in government as vice-president. This agreement could be seen as beginning of the dissolution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In 1940, there were some organizational changes in the CPB. These included the department for the implementation of press legislation, which was handed over to the Interior Ministry. This stripped the Central Press-Bureau one of its most important functions.¹⁷⁸

During the same year, some of their offices abroad were closed: in Paris, Brussels and Geneva. A correspondent from Paris was relocated to the Vichy, the center of Marshal Petain's government. A new bureau was opened in Moscow as a result of improved relations between Yugoslavia and Russia. In the internal organization, the CPB Service for Minorities was formed and new correspondents in the border areas were located in this area. These special correspondents had a role to monitor what was written in the press so that it belonged to the representatives of minorities.

This change was caused by the ambitions of the revisionist states in the region and the justified concerns that the Yugoslav regime had about these states. In this period, the institution of the Central Press-Bureau continued to gather information about the newspapers, press in general and journalists. They monitored 107 local newspapers, 25 daily and 82 others, while the clips from the press were taken from a total of 139 different newspapers.¹⁷⁹ Before the end of its activity in the country, the Archive of CPB contained about 2,670 files of people and institutions as well as 7,000 in their newly formed library.¹⁸⁰

As explained earlier, The Central Press-Bureau preformed the role of The Ministry of propaganda in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, without officially being recognized for performing these tasks.

Its role was carried out in two principal ways. Firstly, it controlled the press and radio and practiced censorship. These roles were actively carried out in co-operation with the Prosecutor's Offices and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Secondly, the CPB not only took responsibility for key political issues, but also for day-to-day non-political issues such as informing the public on all matters of national interest.

¹⁷⁸ One of the regulations from Ministry of Foreign Affairs even predicted the transfer of the CPB's correspondents abroad to this institution. It was not clear that really happened, but complaints from the CPB were noted. AY, 38-1.

¹⁷⁹ Centralni Pres-biro, Izveshtaj o radu za 1940.godinu, [Central Press-Bureau, Annual report for 1940], Administrative Section, p. 6.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 4.

Besides the Central Press-Bureau, there was the Press Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Party Press Bureau of JRZ. Those two institutions did propaganda work, but their influence, in comparison with the CPB, was minimal.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ More about Party Press Office of JRZ: B. Simic, 'Partijski presbiro Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice' (Party Press bureau of Yugoslav Radical Union), *Arhiv* VI/2005, 73-78.

BULGARIA

The organization of Bulgarian state propaganda started as early as the 19th century. One of the key steps in that direction was the establishment of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA) in 1898. The Office for the Press was first founded on 5 December 1913, with the mandate to coordinate propaganda activities in Bulgaria.¹⁸² In this period and later, in the Twenties main focus was on the foreign propaganda which was the result of the lost war and territories that were considered Bulgarian's. At the beginning of the 1930's main propaganda institutions were under control and supervision of the two different ministries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs

Direction for the Press

Radio

Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency

Distribution of the Press

Press Department

Department for Information
and Documentation

Important changes in the organization of the Bulgarian state propaganda occurred after a number of considerable political changes had taken place during the thirties.

Significant change in propaganda organization came with the change of the regime in Bulgaria in 1934. Political circle *Zveno* came to power by military coup.¹⁸³ State propaganda was one of the priorities of the new regimes and construction of one central propaganda institution

¹⁸² In the period in question the head of the Office was the journalist I. Herbst; the associates were young educated people who excelled in command of foreign languages. See I. Ilcev, *Rodinata mi – prava ili ne* [My real Motherland or not], (Sofia, 1995), p.148.

¹⁸³ More about *Zveno* see: V. Zadgorska, *Krugat Zveno: 1927-1934* [The Circle "Zveno" 1927-1934], (Sofia, 2008); V. Migev, *Utvarzdenie na monarhofashiskata diktatura v Balgaria 1934-1936* [Consolidation of the monarcho-fascist dictatorship in Bulgaria 1934-1936], (Sofia, 1977), pp.25-75.

soon followed. Directorate for Social Renewal (Дирекция на обществената обнова) was established on 6 June 1934. It was subordinated directly to the Prime Minister. Its tasks were explained in the decree that followed three days later: a) to manage spiritual life of the country in the direction of unification and reconstruction and in the service of the state and nation, b) to work on raising the prestige of the nation, to follow the spiritual life abroad and inform about development and the needs of the Bulgarian material and spiritual culture, c) to participate in the organization of people in a one ideological nationwide group.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴ *Darjaven vestnik* [State's Journal], 9. June 1934, number. 54, p.937.

ДЪРЖАВЕНЪ ВЕСТНИКЪ

ИЗЛИЗА ВСЪКИ ПРИСЪЖТСТВЕНЪ ДЕНЪ

Такситъ за еднократна публикация въ „Държавенъ вестникъ“ смъ: за малки обявления (обезсилване на изгубени документи и др.) до 20 думи или частъ отъ голкова — 25 лева за текста и 10 лева за подписа.

За публикации отъ търговски характеръ до 100 думи или частъ отъ голкова — 450 лева, за заглавие, дата и подписъ на смитъ, на редъ — 20 лева.

За всички останали публикации, включително резолюциитъ на сждищата за обявяване въ несъстоятелностъ на търговски фирми до 100 думи или частъ отъ голкова — 150 лв. за заглавие, дата и подписъ на тѣхъ, за редъ — 10 лв.

Одѣлна страница за табеларни и др. публикации — 2500 л. Сответнитъ суми се внасятъ направо въ касата на печатницата или въ мѣстния клонъ на Б. Н. Б., а втората половина отъ вн. листъ заедно съ публик. се изпраща въ администр. Ръкописи, както и надвнесени суми, не се връщатъ.



Абонамента се внася винаги въ предплата съ вносенъ листъ и бива годишенъ: 600 лв. за България и 900 лв. за странство, или полугодишенъ: 300 лв. за България и 500 лв. за странство. Абонирането става за цѣла година или за първото шестмесечие на 1 октомврий, 1 априлъ и за второто шестмесечие на 1 октомврий, а вестника почва да се изпраща отъ деня на получаване вносния листъ въ администрацията; отдѣленъ брой отъ текущата финансова година струва 5 лв., а отъ непосрѣдствено минала — 10 лв.

Рекламации за неполучени отъ абонатитъ броеве се приеми: за София въ продължение на 3 дни и за провинцията — на 10 дни отъ датата, която носи рекламиранитъ брой. Всичко що се отнася до вестника, се адресира направо до Държавното книгоиздавателство при Държ. печатница. Поправкитъ се таксуватъ като малки обявления.

Година LVI

СОФИЯ, сѣбота, 9 юний 1934 година

Брой 54

ОФИЦИАЛЕНЪ ОТДѢЛЪ МИНИСТЕРСКИ СЪВЕТЪ

УКАЗЪ

№ 16

НИЕ БОРИСЪ III

сѣ БОЖИЯ МИЛОСТЬ И НАРОДНАТА ВОЛЯ

ЦАРЪ НА БЪЛГАРИТЪ

По предложението на Нашия Председател на Министерския съветъ и Министъръ на правосъдието, представено Намъ съ доклада му отъ 6 юний 1934 година № 556,

Постановихме и постановяваме:

1. Да одобримъ V постановление на Министерския съветъ, взето въ заседанието му отъ 6 юний 1934 г., протоколъ № 52, съ което се утвърждава на основание чл. 47 отъ Конституцията следната

НАРЕДБА

за обществена обнова

Чл. 1. Учредява се Дирекция за обществена обнова, подчинена направо на Министъръ-председателя.

Задачитъ на Дирекцията сж:

- а) да насочи духовния животъ на страната къмъ единение и обновяване въ служба на нацията и на държавата;
- б) да работи за издигане престижа на нацията, като въеди духовния животъ въ чужбина и осведомява външния свѣтъ за състоянието, развитието и нуждитъ на българската материална и духовна култура;
- в) да съдействува за организиране гражданството въ идейно единна общонародна групировка.

Чл. 2. Организацията и работата на Дирекцията се уреждатъ отъ правилникъ, изработенъ отъ Министерския съветъ.

Чл. 3. Срѣдствата за издръжка на Дирекцията се предвиждатъ глобално въ бюджета на държавата и се изразходватъ по специаленъ правилникъ, одобренъ отъ Министерския съветъ по предложението на Министра на финанситъ.

II. Изпълнението на настоящия указъ възлагаме на Нашия председател на Министерския съветъ и Министъръ на правосъдието.

Издаденъ въ София на 7 юний 1934 година.

На първообразния съ собствената на Негово Величество рѣка написано:

„БОРИСЪ III“

Приподписахъ,
Председател на Министерския съветъ и Министъръ на правосъдието:

К. Георгиевъ

Първообразниятъ указъ е обличенъ съ държавния печатъ и регистриранъ подъ № 3588 на 8 юний 1934 г.

Пазител на държавния печатъ,
Председател на Министерския съветъ и Министъръ на правосъдието:

К. Георгиевъ

На първообразния съ собствената на Негово Величество Царя рѣка написано:

„Одобрено БОРИСЪ III“

Докладъ до Негово Величество Царя

№ 556

Ваше Величество,
Честъ имамъ най-почтително да моля Ваше Величество, на основание чл. 47 отъ Конституцията да благоволите да одобрите и подпишете приложението тукъ указъ.
Гр. София, 6 юний 1934 година.

Председател на Министерския съветъ и Министъръ на правосъдието:

К. Георгиевъ

УКАЗЪ

№ 22

НИЕ БОРИСЪ III

сѣ БОЖИЯ МИЛОСТЬ И НАРОДНАТА ВОЛЯ

ЦАРЪ НА БЪЛГАРИТЪ

По предложението на Нашия Председател на Министерския съветъ и Министъръ на правосъдието, представено Намъ съ доклада му отъ 8 юний 1934 г. подъ № 571,

The act of establishing the Directorate for Social Renewal published in State's Journal on 9 June 1934.

Above mentioned decree stipulates that the Directorate is funded from the budget which should be arranged to certain rules that should be subsequently adopted. This and the special

rules that precisely define the organization of the Directorate should be made by the government. The Directorate is managed by a Director, representing it in its relations with all state and municipal offices and directors of departments and forming a Standing Committee appointed by the Prime Minister. The selection and appointment of regular and part-time staff is the prerogative of the Director-General who shall submit separate applications for approval of the Prime Minister. The Directorate consists of a Secretariat, Internal and Foreign Service department with following functions:

I Internal Service Department:

- a) Section 1 – Guiding the press: clarifying matters of government to the press to enable it to properly enlighten the public on the manifestations of state power.
- b) Section 2 – Control over the press; Pre-emptive censorship of all published material, stopping everything that undermines public order, security and morality.
- c) Section 3 - Public education: to penetrate with their forces in all environments, to cultivate a new spirit in the midst of sports and other organizations, to organize lectures, meetings, radio lectures, films and theater plays.

II Foreign Service Department (Press Directory):

- a) Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA);
- b) Press and Information;
- c) Newspaper “La Bulgarie”.¹⁸⁵

Beside capital’s office there were some regional sections headed by directors. Those directors are also appointed directly by Prime Minister.¹⁸⁶ Their tasks were to follow main instructions that were coming from Sofia.

That, which characterize Directorate as a modern propaganda institute at the time is significant effort to educate and re-educate people. As an illustration we can see the following instructions found in the Prime Minister’s personal archive: 1. To impose in the minds of the citizen a new conceptions of state and government as the only ones who will push for progress;

¹⁸⁵ *Darjaven vestnik* [State’s Journal], 9. June 1934, number. 54, p.938.

¹⁸⁶ *Balgarski darjavni institucii 1879-1986* [Bulgarian State Institutions 1879-1986], (Sofia, 1987), p.80.

2. To impose and fortify faith in the creators of the state; 3. To suggest ways to achieve the spiritual content of the new citizen and the implementation of the new state. 4. To create the perfect image of this country to make this image a Fontana of inspiration, creativity and desire to creativity, in ordinary life of the citizen, either in the concepts of creative cultural elite of the nation. 5. To suggest internal grouping of the citizens, submitting them to the spiritual renewal in order to create a creative and militant force of the new age. 6. To show the enemies of the National Revival - their methods and leaders.¹⁸⁷ Along with the resurgence of cultural institutions, theaters and associations and distribution of printed propaganda materials, the primary role of the “spoken word” (agitators) was demanded, whom have to use as channels of propaganda “personal meetings, radio and traveling cinema of Ministry of Education”.¹⁸⁸

Although Nazi Germany model has its influence, the claim that the control over the press, radio, film and publishing was copy of Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry is at least questionable. According to Kiril Chukanov formulations such as “ideologically unified nationwide group” give some basis for reflection in this direction, but in reality, as will become clear in the one-year period of its existence, the Directorate is being built as a state institution with a relatively modest capabilities (but largely fully adequate for the Bulgarian conditions) mainly for domestic propaganda.¹⁸⁹ The creators of the Directorate clearly found its role model primarily in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union. That is obvious in the document about the supervision and development of cinema in Bulgaria. Author of the text stresses the importance of propaganda in the film, points to the experience of Germany and the Soviet Union and requires supreme control over the development of this industry, very modern at the time.¹⁹⁰

It should be noted that throughout the period of the existence this propaganda center did not particularly moisture high human and financial resources. The number of the staff in capital and at regional level cannot be established with the precision, but in January - February 1935, when the institution was fully consolidated, did not exceed 140 - 150.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ *Iz lichniya arhiv na Kimon Georgiev* [From Kimon Georgiev’s personal Archive], edited by Anchova. K, Todorakova M, (Sofia, 2008), p.71

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.71-72.

¹⁸⁹ K. Chukanov, *Balgarska nacionalna propaganda i neinata institucionalizaciya (1934 – 1947 (Bulgarian national propaganda and its institutinalization from 1934 to 1947)*, unpublished BA, p.28.

¹⁹⁰ *Centralen darjaven istoricheski arhiv* [The Central State Historical Archives] (further on in the text CDA), fund 232k, the unit of description 1, archival unit 20, pages 12-19.

¹⁹¹ CDA, 232k-1-20.

Directorate for Social *Renawal* during its relatively short existence changed a few directors which indicate some changes in the ruling groups. The first director of the institution was Penchev Petko (Петко Пенчев), a longtime journalist, lawyer by profession and one of the founding member of the *Zveno*. In one of his first statements after taking the office Penchev clearly revealed the government's intentions and objectives of the new institution. On that occasion, said that “the Directorate has the task to create a new state of the new citizen.” On the question how that will be done he replied: “in the spirit of the state of discipline and social prosperity.”¹⁹²

Directorate from the very beginning formed with two separate parts. At the head of two were chiefs who answered the director of the institution. The first part, Department for the press, covered the propaganda, the domestic press, the organization of intellectual cooperation, the use of radio, film, books and all cultural organizations should organize Directorate (Press Department, Culture Department of the Ministry of Education, etc.). At the head of this directorate was Georgi Kulishev (Георги Кулишев), an experienced journalist, director of several newspapers (*Slovo, Svobodna rech, Makedoniya*).¹⁹³

The second part, Department for Education and social reconstruction, had to do a more difficult work whose aim was organized people in one ideological group that will accept and spread new ideas of the regime. The head of this department was the writer Vladimir Polianov (Владимиръ Поляновъ).¹⁹⁴

Already established leaders in the Directorate have set certain rules of conduct. What particularly attracts attention is the definition of what is critic and what kind of criticism is allowed. At a meeting with all newspaper's editors Penchev said that the criticism will be allowed but not destructive criticism but “loyal and constructive”.¹⁹⁵ By that clearly and unambiguously any possibility of critical writing were abolished. Writers and journalist were left only with a possibility to give suggestions for improving and expanding the impact of governmental propaganda. As a measure of control and a way to put aside any questions about what and how to write special meetings were scheduled every Thursday between the journalist and head of the Press Department, Kulishev.

¹⁹² *Utro*, 14. June 1934.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ CDA, 232k-2-4/49

In September 1934 there was a change of name of Directorate and certain changes in its organization and function. Institution has received short name *Renewal*. New-old goal was to “prepare and organize a Bulgarian citizen, women and youth in the spirit of the new national conditions and social life.” Proclaimed objective should be achieved in the following ways:

a) Education and organization of the Bulgarian citizen, citizen and youth in the spirit of selfless service to the state and nation,

b) Control of society's development, encouraging renewal and

c) The propagation of ideas and explanations of the new state.¹⁹⁶

The name change was accompanied by shift of directors. New head of the *Renewal* was Colonel Krum Kolev, manager of the Military Academy. Arrival of Kolev was justified by the fact that the Directorate required reorganization to become more active and more suited to perform the previously set objectives. After only a month he was substituted for Petar Popzlatev (Петър Попзлатев), reserve army major, the most influential head of *Renewal* in its history.

He was very active and ambitious man also known as a good speaker. He introduced military discipline and put the sign on his office doors: “I do not have more than two minutes for any visitor”.¹⁹⁷ In one of his speeches he stated apotesis of the regime: “The accomplishment of 19th May is holy deed. Our goal is heroic, noble and lofty: to inspire the Bulgarian spirit to unite the Bulgarian people in a spiritual whole, to enable the maximum manifestations of spiritual and material forces of the Bulgarians, to perpetuate, finally, our Bulgarian historic mission.”¹⁹⁸

In one of his reports to the Prime Minister Toshev (Андрей Тошев) he explained his understanding of propaganda and work that has to be done by his institution:

She, propaganda becomes more necessary today, in building a modern state system, where the hedge is transferred to an age to enter another state where men must have the courage and the courage to make something unpopular. Unpopular has to be prepared on time, and precisely formulated to be understandable by the people. To put nation before major events and challenges, is not a sign of wisdom and foresight. Therefore, people must be prepared not only politically and economically, but also psychologically to face the new facts of life.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ *Darjaven vestnik* [State's Journal], number 161, 16. October 1935, p. 2433.

¹⁹⁷ P.Chinkov, *Sega shte chuete nashiyt komentar* [Now, You're Going to Here Our Comment], (Sofia, 2001), p.266.

¹⁹⁸ P. Popzlatev, *Volyata na naciyata* [The Will of the People], (Sofia, 1934), p.47.

¹⁹⁹ CDA, 284K, description 3, archive unite 42, p. 5.

We can see that Popzlatev is well aware of the new tendencies in modern Europe. Propaganda is pretty much seen as a weapon which can be use to achieve goals of the new regime in Bulgaria like in some other, especially fascist countries.

Organization gained his final shape in October 1934. The structure was as follows:

- I. Secretary
- II. Section “Propaganda”
- III. Section “Control and guiding of the press”
- IV. Section “National education”
- V. Section “Organization of the professions”
- VI. Section “Organization of the youth”²⁰⁰

From this new structure we can see that new aim for *Renewal* was not only to spread regime’s propaganda but also to try to organize people in the different groups. As we can see special attentions is paid to the youth which was some kind of the trend in the contemporary Europe and neighboring countries.²⁰¹

During its short existence *Renewal* developed significant activity. Accents were both on printed and spoken word. There were published several propaganda brochures like speeches of the Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev’s “19. May and New State” and Popzlatev’s “New State and Workers” and “The Will of the Nation”. In one campaign in July, 70.000 sheets with the slogans were spread over the Sofia and province and even on city trams were placed propaganda boards.²⁰² *Renewal* founded new newspapers like *Novi dni* (New Days) and *Plamak* (Flame) as instruments in the hand of the new regime.

Lots of efforts were put in recruiting and instructing special orators and agitators. According to the some data available to the press in 1934 *Renewal* organized 3.062 meetings. Of these 2.527 with local speakers (82.5%) and 535 with speakers that are for the opportunity send from capital, Sofia (17.5%). Total costs of the organization were 127.838 levas, ie. the first group of 36.500 (28.5%) and for another 91.338 levas (71.5%).²⁰³ Special attentions were paid in

²⁰⁰ *Darjaven vestnik* [State’s Journal], number 161, 16. October 1935, p.2433.

²⁰¹ For the Greek case see: M. Petrinaks, *The Metaxas*, pp.18-26.

²⁰² K.Chukanov, *Balgarska nacionalna*, p.32.

²⁰³ CDA, 232k-2-4/50.

the character of the new agitators. For them were to be selected only those: “who fanatically believe in new ideology, ones that have lively and passionate speech, in whom have been awoken the temper of fighter, and one who is ready to wear with all obstacles and difficult circumstances of our reality, the new cross apostleship.”²⁰⁴

Considering that Bulgaria was mostly agriculture society *Renewal* made some plans for work in the country. It was planned that activist with the help of every mayor form action committee which supposed to consist of people of “competence” like: medics, teachers, priests, agronomists, representatives of patriotic organizations etc.²⁰⁵

During 1935, The *Renewal* tried officially to establish cooperation with the Italian Ministry for Press and Propaganda. The Bulgarian propaganda institution was especially interested in the organization of radio and film propaganda²⁰⁶, but the cooperation didn't have time to develop because the *Renewal* soon ceased to exist and their plans for future activities were terminated.

According to official data the budget of Directorate was 5.306.000 levas. Of that for: salaries 860.919; for material expenses 789.327; and for office expenses 1.727.204 levas.²⁰⁷ We can say that were not huge foundation but we have to bear in mind that *Renewal* was institutions in the development and new for Bulgarian society.

By the Order of 1 July 1935 the Directorate for *Renewal* has ceased to exist. That fact was explained by the need of the reorganization of this institution. The institution is abolished and its responsibilities are divided between various different institutions. The division was as follows: The organization of the youth was placed in the Minister Council; the Office for the Press and control of the Press in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Department of national propaganda in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Care about publics reading rooms, library, theater and cinema in the Ministry of National Education and care of professional organizations the Ministry of National Economy.²⁰⁸ We could conclude that *Renewal* was dissolved, at least partly because its foundation and work was tied to the *Zveno* political group that was overpowered in mid 1935 by the King Boris III.

²⁰⁴ K.Chukanov, *Balgarska nacionalna*, p.36.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.35.

²⁰⁶ Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MinCulPop), Propaganda presso gli stati esteri 18.7, busta 38.

²⁰⁷ *Darjaven vestnik* [State's Journal], 8 October 1934, number 154, p. 2348.

²⁰⁸ *Darjaven vestnik* [State's Journal], 1. July 1935.

With the above mentioned order it has officially ceased to exist in a single centralized organization that is concerned about the organization of state propaganda in Bulgaria. Only at the beginning of the Second World War, the establishment of the Directorate, and then the Ministry for national propaganda actions related propaganda to return to an institution.

Despite lacking of central propaganda institution in Bulgaria from 1935 to 1941 we cannot speak about lack of state's propaganda influence. Indeed, the Council of Ministers did not had central institution, which combines functions of propaganda, ideological control and influence, but no one can speak of institutions and certainly not the "emptiness" of the impact of propaganda. All functions of *Renewal* had been taken by other government institutions, mostly inside of Ministry of Foreign affairs and Ministry Interior. There were among others Office for the Press, The Press Control, and Section "D" inside the Ministry Interior. Using those institutions Council of the Ministers was able to filter information, not only by using of censorship, but with the selection of provided information, preventive and repressive surveillance of the information's content, limited distribution of articles, advertisements and any other printed works. In the following pages it will be explained functions and structure of the most important propaganda institutions of the period.

From second half of 1935 up to the beginning of the World War Two the most prominent propaganda institution and with the most influence was Office for the Press, like in the early thirties. Its main task was foreign propaganda but influence over the domestic public opinion cannot be overseen. Beside Office for the Press there was also Press Control which main task was to oversee the press in the Bulgaria.

The structure of the Office for the Press was determined in 1937 by the Internal Manual issued by Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The institutions functioned in the following organisation:

*Organization of the Office for the Press in July 1937*²⁰⁹

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE OFFICE FOR THE PRESS Secretariat Archive	DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION Political Archive Cultural Archive Biografical Archive	DEPARTMENT FOR THE PRESS	THE BULGARIAN TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY
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Director of the Office for the Press was appointed by Minister of Foreign affairs and his direct link to the press. He was in charge of all activities of the institution and responsible for its work. The Secretariat and Departments had their own chiefs who were subordinate to the Director.

As we can see Office for the Press consisted of four departments: The Secretariat, Department for Information and Documentation, Department for the Press and Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency.²¹⁰ While Secretariat was in charge of usual type of administrative business, the most important section of the Office was Department for Information and Documentation. Its main tasks were: a) to supply Bulgarian royal legacies and consulates abroad with the propaganda material: articles, brochures, books, photos, records, notes etc; b) to supply all individuals with necessary material, Bulgarians or others, who are writing, lecturing or do any other work for Bulgaria abroad; c) To take care of publishing and spreading of various publications which are meant to enlighten foreigners about Bulgarian society, Bulgarian culture and all development in the Bulgaria; d) to participate in making various international, collective or individual efforts, concerts, theatric production and similar, abroad; e) to follow Bulgarian cultural actions abroad, and foreign cultural actions in Bulgaria, and to give help, where is necessary; f) to carry necessary correspondence and to support relations with Bulgarian

²⁰⁹CDA, 325-1-162, Vnutreshen Pravilnik na Direkciya na pechata [Internal Manual of the Office for the Press].

²¹⁰ More about Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency in the following chapter.

participants at the international congress abroad, likewise to international participants on in the Empire's international congresses.²¹¹

In addition, Department for Information and Documentation took over the archives and conducted Print Management: Political Archive, which has gathered in the foreign press, printed materials on Bulgaria and other important foreign publications in the field of international politics; Cultural Archives, where the stored information about cultural activities in the world of Bulgarians and foreigners in Bulgaria, and systematize information about the cultural activists who participated in important cultural events in the country, and the Biographical Archive, which collected personal data, both Bulgarians and foreigners, among others: politicians, writers and artists.²¹²

Wide range of powers that Department for Information and Documentation had in the sphere of state institutions of cultural diplomacy, like in today's promotions department and cultural institutes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also gave her specific tasks propaganda and espionage. Not surprisingly, therefore, that collected at the service of Information and Documentation of the database could be used not only in soft diplomacy.

Third Department entitled Department for the Press had main task to follow on regular basis foreign press in the all matters considering Bulgaria. In the addition it had to publish following issues: 1. Review of the foreign press (cuts or short summaries of articles); 2. Official review of the foreign press (documents of foreign governments or high officials); 3. Reports on Balkan's states; 4. Weekly report on Bulgarian capital and province press.²¹³

The institution during the thirties went in pace with time and improved its structure. The fact that the correspondents received orders to monitor and report on how the neighboring countries organized their propaganda structure implies that this was a matter of considerable importance. They were mostly asked to gather and send information on the technical organization of the institutions, means of control, the organization of the press and its activities.²¹⁴

The activities of the Office for the Press were financed from the budget which was a part of the funds allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Attaches for the press who were

²¹¹ Same as footnote 208.

²¹² Ibid, pp.4-5.

²¹³ Ibid, p.7.

²¹⁴ CDA, 325-1-162-254, The Order of the director of 6 November 1936 and AY, 38-141, Naredjenje shefa CPB Pov.C.P [The Order of the Chief of the CPB] No. 2322.

situated abroad received their salaries from the funds of the embassies and legations that employed them.

During the 1930's, the Office for the Press had five different directors: Ivan Popov²¹⁵ (Иван Владимиров Попов, 1925-1933), Todor Hristov²¹⁶ (Тодор Христов, 1933-1934), Dimitar Naumov²¹⁷ (Димитр Анастасов Наумов, 1935), Nikola Balabanov²¹⁸ (Никола М. Балабанов, 1936-1938) and Georgi Serafimov²¹⁹ (Георги Константинов Серафимов, 1938-1940). All of the directors were well educated and with significant experience gained abroad and as one could see, the directors didn't have a precise mandate and they were change according to the will of the ruling circles. For two of them, Balabanov and Naumov were the people that the King's trusted most according to one report.²²⁰ It was important to underline that the directors of the Office for the Press were also directors of the official news agency, BTA.

The Press Control had a budget of round million levass per year.

²¹⁵ Ivan Popov (1890-1940) was a diplomat and journalist. He studied philology in France and Germany and law at the University of Sofia. Popov was a press representative in Bucharest (1923), worked in the Bulgarian Embassy in Budapest (1933-1935), was an ambassador in Belgrade (1937-1940), the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religions (1940-1942) and ambassador in Budapest (1944) where he committed suicide. His property was confiscated by the tribunal of the Socialist Bulgarian. Popov was rehabilitated in 1996.

²¹⁶ Todor Hristov (1890-1940) was a diplomat. He finished classical high school in Varna and was a teacher from 1909 to 1912. After finishing law, Hristov became an advocate in 1923. His started his diplomatic career in Vienna (1923-1924) and later continued in Berlin when he was press secretary and an attaché. In 1934, Hristov was the main secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1934 and an ambassador in Berlin in 1935. Next year, he was transferred to Ankara. His diplomatic carrier and life ended while serving as an ambassador in Moscow in June 1940.

²¹⁷ Dimitar Naumov (1893-?) was a diplomat. He finished French school in Istanbul and law in Sofia. From 1920, Naumov was one of the secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from 1922 to 1924, he was secretary to the King's office. From 1936, he was an ambassador in United States.

²¹⁸ Nikola Balabanov (1886-?) was a lawyer and diplomat. He finished law in Montpellier (France) and Sofia. From 1912 to 1921, Balabanov was a judge in one of Sofia's courts. He was a government agent to the Italian-Bulgarian Court of Arbitration in Rome from 1923 to 1930. Balabanov worked at embassies in Rome and Paris (1931-1935). In the second half of the 1930's, Balabanov was an ambassador of Bulgaria in Prague (1938), Paris (1939) and Ankara (1943). After the Second World War, he immigrated to the United States.

²¹⁹ Georgi Serafimov (1890-?) was a Bulgarian diplomat. He finished high school in Sofia and law in Nancy (France). He worked in one of the Sofia courts in 1920 and after one year, he went to Rotterdam (Netherlands) for diplomatic service. From 1940, he was secretary to the government, chief of staff to the Prime Minister from 1940 to 1943. In 1944, Serafimov was chief of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He resigned at the beginning of 1945.

²²⁰ Arhiv na Balgarska telegrafaska agenciya (BTA), box 1, Spravki za BTA, materiali za istoriyata na BTA..., Report made in May 1952 for the account of the new socialist regime in Bulgaria.

The budget for Press control 1936-1939²²¹

Year	Annual budget
1936	916,000
1937	910,000
1938	1,009,000
1939	1,050,000

According to the claims of the correspondents of the CPB there was a considerable difference between financial means spent on activities regarding the propaganda in the country and abroad. The Government of the Prime Minister K josevanov financed two daily papers (*Dnes* and *La Parole Bulgare*) and a few smaller provincial ones. Subventions to *Dnes* amounted to 100.000 levas per month.²²² The financial means came from the special dispositional funds.²²³ During the year of 1937 those expenditures amounted to 6 million levas.²²⁴ On the basis of the data offered, as well as on the basis of the structure and activities of the Office for the Press we can conclude that the Bulgarian authorities at the time focused more on propagandistic activities abroad. The propagandistic work of somewhat lower intensity in the country could, perhaps, be explained by the fact that the authoritarian regime in the country was already consolidated by the mid thirties.²²⁵

²²¹ *Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939* [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1939], (Sofia, 1937-1940), p.640.

²²² AY, 38-141, Izveshtaj dopisnika CPB Boshka Radovanovica od 15. januara 1937. godine [The Report of the CPB Correspondent Bosko Radovanovic of 15 January 1937]. The amount of these subventions grew to 120.000 levas during 1937.

²²³ According to the Kukolecin's *Leksikon* the term *dispositional fund* is defined as follows: „special financial means proscribed by the budget in gross amount, with the order-issuing authority (the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc.) having a right to manage the means freely for the purpose of achieving certain goals in accordance with their position. They are not obligated by law to answer for the public, or, in some cases, to anyone (secret dispositional funds)". A. R. Miletic, 'Zloupotreba budzeta u Kraljevini SHS' [Abuse of the budget in the Kingdom SHS], *Korupcija i razvoj moderne srpske drzave*, (Belgrade, 2006), p.104.

²²⁴ AY, 38-141, Izveshtaj dopisnika CPB Boshka Radovanovica od 15. januara 1937. godine [The Report of the CPB Correspondent Bosko Radovanovic of 15 January 1937].

²²⁵ For further details see V. Migeu, *Utvrdzavane na monarho-fashiskata diktatura v Balgaria 1934 -1936* [The Consolidation of the Monarcho-fascist dictatorship in Bulgaria 1934-1939], (Sofia, 1977).

The Bulgarian Office for the Press, in comparison with Central Press-Bureau, had fewer employees. During 1936 their number was 77 and that number remained unchanged a few years later.²²⁶ The Press Control had only 19 clerks in 1939.²²⁷ This, no doubt, had to do with the difference in size of the two countries in question, as well as with a somewhat more difficult task that lay ahead of the CPB.

The proof that the obligations of the correspondents were far from insignificant is the extensive order of the head of the Office for the Press of the time, Nikola Balabanov, of 26 April 1938 in which he enumerates the duties of the correspondents in detail on no less than five pages. It is interesting that the first of their various duties to be mentioned is learning foreign languages as a basic precondition for the fulfillment of the given tasks. Those orders were more developed instructions that were written in the above mentioned manual.²²⁸ Director Balabanov also stressed that every correspondent should be strictly obedient to the consul or representative of Bulgarian embassy and their action should be “always with the permission” of the later.²²⁹ The director also was seeking for ways to improve efficiency of his institution. In his order to all correspondents from 6. November 1935 he asked for data about foreign counterparts. In the order were specifically asked information about: a) how many directions and office press has in the country and who is in control of them; b) their organization (chief, personal, condition of the work etc.); c) what kind of publication they have; d) do they have secret press reviews. At the end he asked for one example of their publications.²³⁰

Although the Direction for the Press ardently fulfilled its duties throughout the thirties initiatives appeared for the establishment of a separate Ministry for Propaganda. The project of Venceslav Protic (Венцеслав Протич), the director of the government’s newspapers *Dnes* and *La parole bulgare*, of 22 November 1938 was made for Prime Minister Kjoseivanov. At the beginning he explained the propaganda organization in Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania. One could say that he didn’t have complete knowledge of the three countries organizations but his information was very reliable. He assumed one institution with the three different sections: Organization of city and country youth, Section for national propaganda and culture and Section

²²⁶ *Balgarskite darjavni*, p.40.

²²⁷ *Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939* [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1939], (Sofia, 1937-1940), p.628.

²²⁸ CDA, 325-1-162-44/48.

²²⁹ *Ibid*, p.45.

²³⁰ CDA, 176-20-56-254

for tourism. The most important part of this new direction would be Section for national propaganda and culture that should be divided in: press, radio, cinema and spoken word.²³¹ As a main ideal of government Protich saw nationalism which should “serve as opposition to communism, estate and partisanism”.²³² Project also states that Office for the Press and BTA should be part of the newly founded institution. This suggestion mirror both personal initiative and a certain level of dissatisfaction with the work of propagandistic institutions, as well as the desire for their constant improvement and adapting.

Similar idea with could find also in the project of Petar Lungov, president of capital’s journalist organization, in the following year. He also explained propaganda organizations in the contemporary Europe and expressed his regrets that Bulgaria “is one of few countries that didn’t build its propaganda organization.”²³³ In his paper he pointed out some flaws in the existing propaganda service especially the way of using radio and cinema. His suggestion was that new telegraph and news agency must be founded, formally independent but practically service of the government. He points out examples of Germany and Poland.²³⁴ It is interesting that he also praised the polish propaganda organizations in the sector of film making, underlining the role of the Polish Telegraph Agency. At the end he concludes that:

Propaganda is now becoming weapon, equal in its force to the military and economic pressure. In the complicate system of this weapon, which one should be armed one nation, for to become victor in contemporary world crisis, spiritual weapon should not be forgotten. This weapon is forged by the service of propaganda. It is used not only to outside of the state, but also inside – and one, who do not forge that in time, risks losses, and both on internal and external front.²³⁵

All those suggestions did not take to immediately change of propaganda organizations but their impact could not be overseen. Lungov’s suggestions were given after the German/Soviet attack on Poland which only stressed necessity of change in propaganda organization. After only short period, as it is said earlier, did occurred, and state’s propaganda went to the higher level.

²³¹ CDA, 176-20-56-46/50.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ CDA, 176-20-56-46/1

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

²³⁵ Ibid, p.7.

The Service for Press Surveillance was established by the special decree in 1938. Basic function of this institution as clear only by reading its name.

Epilogue

After the Second World War broke out the organization of propaganda in the three countries went through a considerable transformation. In the Poland we had even brief experiment with the Ministry of Information and Propaganda (Ministerstwo Informacji i Propagandy) which was formed on 2. September 1939. Head of the Ministry was Michal Grazynski (Michał Grażyński). Only dozen days before Nazi/Soviet occupation. There was no time for this institution to develop and work in the full capacity. After the occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941 the CPB ceased its operation in the country, which can be practically considered as the end of its work. The propagandistic organization which operated by the Royal Government in London, regarding the circumstances and the conditions, was considerably different. On the other hand, Bulgarian state propaganda became much better organized and got an even more prominent place in the state hierarchy. The Direction for National Propaganda (“Дирекция на националната пропаганда”) was founded on 4 April 1941. During 1944 it developed into the Ministry of Propaganda.²³⁶ The change of the state organization and social structure of the countries after the Second World War brought the organizational structure which was the topic of this work to a definitive end.

Conclusion

The organization of the state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930's was complex and somewhat difficult for a historian to construct due to a lack of sources.

²³⁶ *Treto balgarskoto carstvo*, p.130.

In the state propaganda of the countries in question, one could find many similarities, but even more differences.

Propaganda apparatus functioned in the two main directions: at home and abroad. The main task of internal propaganda was probably the control of information to the public. That was accomplished firstly by “filtration” of the news and secondly by censorship. As we saw control of information and censorship were part of the state propaganda of three countries. One could say that that was the primary objective of the propaganda organization. This task wasn’t easy because of existence of opposition that had been active in the whole period under the examination. Even under difficult circumstances, the opposition was very strong and that was true, especially during some period of time (Yugoslavia in 1938, Poland and Bulgaria in 1935). An even bigger problem for state propaganda was perhaps the opposition within i.e. conflicts of interest within the ruling circle, from top to bottom, from government members to basic clerks. Vanity, rivalry, personal vendettas were serious problems for the functioning of state propaganda organizations in these countries. In times of limited and restricted democracy, those problems were more acute and more frequent.

One of the most important similarities between Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the fact that key propaganda decisions were made within small groups of people, often within informal groups. The existing propaganda structures were only present to legalize decisions that had already been made. They were well financed and their job was one of the most valued in the administration.

Offices for the Press existed in the countries under review and this was commonplace in contemporary Europe, as one could see in the preceding chapter. They were present in the every important ministry, but the important ones were placed in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior Ministry. During this period, changes occurred that made all three countries different. Poland had the most autonomous press offices in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War until the end of this period. In interwar Yugoslavia, there was the creation of the Central Press Bureau and this meant that the press offices within Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry Interior became less important. Bulgaria was somewhere in between. At some point, Bulgaria had a central organization and offices for the press that functioned separately in the different ministries.

The Office for the Press within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled most of the foreign propaganda together with the embassies' employees, foreign press correspondents and one of the national telegraph agencies. Judging by the budget levels, that couldn't be fully established in my study due to secrecy from the governments, Poland spent the most money on foreign propaganda during the 1930's. That was understandable, not only because Poland was the biggest of the three examined countries, but also due to a complex situation that was dictated by its geographic position between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

There were several similarities between the propaganda organizations in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and propaganda organizations in contemporary Germany and Italy. It was correct to say that some of the ideas and structural types in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were copied from Germany and Italy (for example, the organization of the Committee for Coordination of Propaganda in Poland was very similar to the Fascist Ministry for National Culture). However, every propaganda organization was unique due to many factors such as cultural differences and that specific state's political background. It is my personal opinion that fascist copies were made mainly because they seemed to work in practice in Germany and Italy and less for the political likes or dislikes of those regimes

The tendency towards increasing centralization of the state propaganda organizations in Europe during the last decade before the Second World War was also apparent in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These tendencies, so obvious in the countries under review in the 1930's, had a logical ending in the creation of separate propaganda ministries in Poland and Bulgaria after the outbreak of war. In Yugoslavia, that ministry already unofficially existed in the form of the Central Press Bureau during the whole of the examined period.

CHAPTER III

***NEWS AGENCIES IN THE SERVICE OF THE
STATE PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA
AND BULGARIA DURING THE 1930'S***

A news agency is basically a group of journalists, established to supply news organizations (newspapers, magazines and radio) with news. The oldest news agency was established in France in 1835 by a Parisian translator and advertising agent, Charles-Louis Havas as *Agence Havas*. Two of his employees, Bernhard Wolff and Paul Julius Reuter, later set up rival news agencies bearing their last names in Berlin (1849) and London (1851) respectively. In 1853, in Turin, Guglielmo Stefani formed the *Agenzia Stefani* and this became the most important agency in the Kingdom of Italy and a set example was soon followed by the other countries and agencies.²³⁷

THE NEWS AGENCIES IN 1930's EUROPE

Over the years, news agencies became increasingly important and thus became more attractive to the governments. Generally in Europe in the 1930's, one could find three different systems of relations between the news agencies and states:

1. The system of free press, in which there were all private telegraph agencies, some of which were subsidized by the government and they had their own correspondents and special envoys in the publishing companies. Central government offices, which were additional to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs only, had limited direct contact with the agencies. This applied to countries such as France, England, USA and Belgium.

2. The system of controlled press in which the agencies operated as semi-governmental official agencies and their correspondents were located in major capital cities. The government authorities had an impact on the press and this system of controlled press was applied by such countries as Romania, Hungary and Turkey.

3. The system of the led press. Institutions of news agencies were subordinated to the discipline of press exercised by the government and ruling parties. Members of the ruling circles

²³⁷ Chronologically the second world agency was American *Associated Press* established in 1848.

were the officials in the agencies and the agencies were instruments in the hands of the government. This was the case in the countries such as Italy, Germany, Soviet Union and Spain.²³⁸

Over the years, news agencies began to cooperate with one another and it was necessary to define more precisely their obligations. In the late 1920's and in the 1930's, there were as many as thirty news agencies, in as many countries and these functioned as an unofficial World League of Press Associations for the exchange of news. Most of them were European countries except for USA, Canada, Japan and China.²³⁹ The majority of the countries represented in the world alliance had one or more news agencies in addition to their main agency, e.g. Great Britain had seven and Italy four other agencies²⁴⁰ and the exceptions were the smallest countries or countries where agencies were made official or semi-official.

Initially, each agency was restricted to the sale of news entirely in its own country or in defined territories. At the London meeting in 1932 between the representatives of *Reuters*, *Associated Press*, *Havas* and *Wolff*²⁴¹ agency, that arrangement was liberalized and any one of the agencies was permitted to sell its services independently to any newspaper or other clients wanting it in a country normally served by one of the other member agencies.²⁴²

The four biggest agencies had arranged coverage for most of the world in the following way, with the exchange of news among them:

Associated Press – United States, Central America and South America in co-operation with *Havas*;

²³⁸ E. Rudzinski, *Informacyjne Agencje Prasowe w Polsce 1926-1939* [The Information News Agencies in Poland 1926-1933], (Warsaw, 1970), pp.42-43.

²³⁹ Members of the World League of Press Associations were: *Amtliche Nachrichtenstelle* (Austria), *Agence Telegraphique Belge* (Belgium), *Bulgarska Telegrafaska Agenciya* (Bulgaria), *Canadian Press, Ltd* (Canada), *Reuters*, Branch of British Agency (China), *Ceskoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar* (Czechoslovakia), *Ritzaus Bureau*, *Dansk telegrambureau* (Denmark), *Eesti Telegraafi Agentuur A.S.* (Estonia), *Finska Notisbyran* (Finland), *Agence Havas* (France), *Deutsches Nachrichten Buro G.m.b.h* (Germany), *Reuters, Ltd.* (Great Britain), *Agence d'Athenes* (Greece), *Magyar Tavirati Iroda* (Hungary), *Agenzia Stefani* (Italy), *Domei Tsushin Sha* (Japan), *Latvijas Telegrafa Agentura* (Latvia), *Agence Telegraphique Lithuanienne* (Lithuania), *Algemeen Nederlandsch Persbureau* (Netherlands), *Norske Telegrafbyra* (Norway), *Polska Agencja Telegraficzna* (Poland), *Agence Havas*, Branch of French Agency (Portugal), *Telegrafnoje Agentstwo Ssojusa, TASS* (Soviet Union), *Agencia Telegrafica Fabra* (Spain), *Tidningarnas Telegrambyra* (Sweden), *Agence Telegraphique Suisse* (Switzerland), *Anadolu Ajansi* (Turkey), *Associated Press* (U.S.A), *Agencija Avala* (Yugoslavia).

²⁴⁰ Other British agencies were: *British United Press Ltd*, *Central News Ltd*, *The Central Press Ltd*, *Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd*, *Press Association Ltd*, *British Continental Press*, *London General Press* and Italian were: *Agenzia di Roma*, *Agenzia Volta*, *Agenzia Telegrafica Orientale*, *Radio Nazionale*.

²⁴¹ Wolff became known in 1933 as the *Deutsches nachrichten Buro* (DNB).

²⁴² R.Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, (New York, 1937), p.68.

Reuters – Great Britain and the British Empire, the Netherlands, the Far East, Near East in co-operation with *Havas*;

Havas – France, the French Colonies, Romanic countries of Europe, South America in the co-operation with the *Associated Press* and Near East in co-operation with *Reuters*;

DNB – Germany and Austria.²⁴³

The majority of news agencies in the 1930's Europe were official or semi-official and the examples of official agencies were Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. In those countries, opposition or unwelcome views almost never received any publicity unless it was in the regime's propaganda purposes as the news agencies were in fact the agencies of those governments.

The situation with the semi-official agencies was a bit different but in many cases, it was not that diverse from the official ones. Most of the semi-official news agencies were tied to a government and subsidized by them and even the agencies that were declared as independent were at least partly propaganda organizations.

All news agencies at some point co-operated with the government out of national loyalty and the agencies on occasion received exclusive news releases from their governments and in return, they provided the governments with advance copies of incoming foreign dispatches before distribution. This sometimes gave governments the opportunity to revise dispatches in accord with the official viewpoint and, in some cases, to withhold the news completely until a time that seemed more suitable for its release.²⁴⁴

During the 1930's, very few agencies could claim that they were free from the local governments and in his book from 1937, about the press and news agencies, Robert W. Desmond concluded that throughout the world, there were only twelve countries where newspapers "were free to speak without government permission, and from which foreign correspondents could send dispatches without official approval, however hidden or indirect. These countries were the United States, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa".²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Desmond, *The Press...*, p.68.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp.73-74.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 142.

BULGARIA

The organization of Bulgarian state propaganda started as early as the XIX century while the country was still under the rule of the Otoman empire. One of the key steps in that direction was the establishment of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA) in 1898 and this was founded by the decree of King Ferdinand in the government of Konstantin Stoilov.²⁴⁶

Initially, it was only the agency for delivering the telegrams about events abroad and the first bulletin was published on 16th February. The Agency was based on the model of the Russian Petersburg Telegraph Agency and unlike most news agencies at the time, which were private; BTA had the status of a special department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religions (MVRJ).

In the early years, its purpose was to provide the Bulgarian media with information on domestic and international events. The main part of the items was evidence of life in European royal courts, crime news, and trade and exchange messages. In addition, the Agency provided information on events in the country to foreign telegraph agencies where initially, there were only five employees: director, his deputy, press clerk plus two collaborators in the technical area.²⁴⁷

After the First World War, the *BTA* signed new contracts with the most important news agencies like *Havas*, *Reuters*, *Wolf* and *Stefani*. The main tasks in that period was to: to maintain contact with Europe's largest agencies, to protect the Bulgarian national cause abroad, to fight against negative foreign propaganda about Bulgaria and to inform the foreign press about the situation in the country.²⁴⁸ To ensure that the aforementioned measures were taken from 1921, the BTA published two bulletins, one in Bulgarian and the other in French.

The situation in the BTA in the late 1920's was not satisfactory. Some concerns were expressed in a note written by the director for the Press in December 1929 as Director Popov

²⁴⁶ In the period in question, the head of the Office was the journalist I. Herbst. The associates were young educated people who excelled in their command of foreign languages. See I. Ilchev, *Rodinata mi – prava ili ne*, [My Real Motherland or Not], (Sofia, 1995), p. 148.

²⁴⁷ *Balgarskite darjavni institucii 1879–1986* [Bulgarian State Institutions 1879-1986], (Sofia, 1987), pp.38-39.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

urged for the separation of the BTA and to formally make it a private agency on commercial grounds with the aim to improve its role in the state propaganda. Besides the obvious reasons, Popov stated one other reason: “Especially for one small and weak country like ours, this is of great importance, because, when a telegraph agency is official, the responsibility for all its telegrams which are unfavorable for some countries lies with the official government...”²⁴⁹

At the end of the passage, Popov asked a very interesting question: “How many times has the BTA missed an opportunity to publish some interesting and useful news because it was unpleasant to this or that neighboring country! Is this a weakness?”²⁵⁰ From the point of view of state propaganda, this was a valid point.

At this time in Europe, state propaganda tasks were becoming increasingly more demanding and complicated and the official news agencies were always marked and sometimes treated with distrust. Nevertheless, Bulgaria didn't follow the proposed measures and remained one of the few countries with a state news agency during the Interwar period.

In 1930, the BTA was one of the three sections of the Press department, together with the sections for the Press and Documentation. One positive was made when the self writing radio receiving set “Hal” was formed in 1932 and those sets were rented from agencies like *Reuters*, *Havas*, *GTA* and *Stefani*. The Press department was renamed the “Press section” and it functioned within the framework of Ministry of Foreign Affairs with three separate departments – BTA, Press and information and Documentation where the number of employers varied from 16 to 39 people.²⁵¹

After the coup d'état in 1934, official censorship was introduced which was reflected by the short existence of committee of censors within the BTA.²⁵² In 1936, the BTA was reorganized again where the Office for the Press was re-established with three sections – the BTA, Press service and Information and documentation and the only formal change was the renaming of the Documentation section into “Information and documentation”.

Important changes in the organization of the Bulgarian state propaganda took place after there were a number of considerable political changes during the 1930's. This resulted, amongst

²⁴⁹ Arhiv na Balgarska telegrafna agenciya (BTA), box 1, Spravki za BTA, materiali za istoriyata na BTA..., Iz dokladna zapiska na direktora na pechata do glavniya sekretar na Ministerstvona Vashnite raboti [From the note of director for the Press addressed to secretary general of Ministry of Foreign Affairs], p.2.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ I.Kalcheva, Balgarska telegrafna agenciya (1898-1944) [Bulgarian Telegraph Agency 1898-1944], unpublished BA thesis from Faculty of Journalism, (Sofia, 1975), p.54.

²⁵² Ibid, p.56.

other things, in the BTA's switching its subordination to the Office for the Press and the structure and the obligations of this institution were set by the Book of Regulations from 1937, which organized the division into the Secretariat, the Department for Information and Documentation and the BTA.

Organization of the Office for the Press in July 1937

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE OFFICE FOR THE PRESS	DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION	DEPARTMENT FOR THE PRESS	THE BULGARIAN TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY
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With this structure, the institutions lasted until the fall of the Monarchy in September 1944 and the number of employees increased to 77.²⁵³

In 1937, the BTA issued three bulletins per day in both languages – Bulgarian and French and since 1938, the agency issued supplements like the “Daily news” and “Economy informational bulletin”. From 1937-1938, information from the TASS (the Soviet Telegraph Agency) was accepted only after explicit order and new regulations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Press Department were introduced in 1937. All sections reported to a press director who reported the more important problems to the Minister of foreign and religious affairs and carried out the orders given by the minister.

The director maintained contact between the ministry and local press and gave information to the foreign correspondents in Bulgaria. According to the new regulations, the BTA should inform the government, press and its subscribers of events taking place abroad and in addition, it had to spread the news from Bulgaria to other countries throughout the foreign agencies, its correspondents, the Bulgarian diplomatic services and to provide financial and economical news to its subscribers.

The BTA's staff consisted of a chief and redactors working in two shifts. The press director, by common consent, with the chief of the service assigned a senior redactor for the

²⁵³ *Balgarskite darjavni institucii*, p.39.

redactor of BTA bulletins and the latter had to manage the work of his shift, to redact the bulletin and to supervise the work of the redactors. In 1938, the BTA extended the number of foreign agencies with whom it had links and in 1942, a new transformation of Press Department was made and as a result, the Department was charged with additional tasks referring to foreign propaganda.

As a proof of the development of the BTA, one could find one letter from 1937, probably written by the director of the Press Office. In that letter, the author explained the need for 10 more clerks due to the increased workload for the Press Office and BTA. According to the director with the existing number of BTA clerks, it was “not possible anymore to follow all transmissions and use them for BTA bulletins”.²⁵⁴ In this letter to the Budget department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, many reforms of the organization were proposed, but some of them weren't accepted like increasing the number of shifts for BTA that remained at two; day and night.

The Radio service of the BTA was of crucial importance for the work of this institution and for regulating obligations of the employees, one manual was published in May 1938. This manual stated working hours of 20 hours per day, from 07:00 until 03:00 the next day and the service was carried out in three shifts, from 07:00 to 13:00, from 13:00 to 19:00 and from 19:00 to 03:00. One could see that the third shift was the longest and lasted 8 hours against 6 hours for the previous two shifts. Documents from the late 1930's showed a very busy schedule of the BTA telegraphers and in some cases in 1939, there were receptions of transmissions from 7 pm until 4:15 am with the most transmissions being from *Havas*, *Reuters*, *DNB* and *Stefani* and according to telegraphers, *Havas* had the best quality of sound reception.²⁵⁵

The new manual for the Press Office was issued in July 1937 and this regulated the position and the tasks of the BTA (articles 21 to 31). According to the first article dedicated to the BTA, its tasks were: to notify government, press and subscribers about the situation abroad, to spread news from Bulgaria by foreign news agencies and with its own correspondents and state's consulates, and to give economic and financial news to its subscribers.²⁵⁶ The main obligation of the BTA was to usually publish three bulletins per day, at 13, 19 and one hour after

²⁵⁴ BTA, box 1, Spravki za BTA, materiali za istoriyata na BTA..., without page numbers.

²⁵⁵ CDA 176-20-26.

²⁵⁶ CDA, 325-1-162, Vnutreshen Pravilnik na Direkciya na pechata [Internal Manual of the Office for the Press], Article 21.

midnight and these bulletins were in Bulgarian and French. In the holiday period, its numbers were reduced to two and on Sundays, only one bulletin was published. During the whole year, there were only three days when the BTA was not supposed to publish bulletins: 1st January and the first days of Christmas and Easter.²⁵⁷

The number of pages of the BTA bulletins constantly increased during the years as illustrated in the table below:

BTA bulletins during the 1930's (number of pages per year)²⁵⁸

Year	Number of pages
1930	956
1933	1900
1934	2405
1935	3633
1936	4233
1937	3297
1938	4958
1939	5700

The BTA also published the special bulletins that were secret and limited to a small group of people. In 1934, the top secret bulletin named T-4 was published and only four people were supposed to receive this bulletin: The King, Prime Minister, Director of Office for the Press and for the Archive. This was similar to the bulletin T-3 which was published in the late 1930's for the King, Prime Minister and Archive of Office for the Press. However, the T-3 content was unpleasant for Bulgaria as it was received by radio and published in the press.²⁵⁹ In 1935, the *Hors bulletin* was founded in which unfavorable telegrams concerning Bulgaria were published.

²⁵⁷ CDA, 325-1-162, Vnutreshen Pravilnik na Direkciya na pechata [Internal Manual of the Office for the Press], Article 25.

²⁵⁸ 100 godini Balgarska telegrafaska agenciya [100 Years of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency], (Sofia, 1998), without page numbers.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

The economic service of the BTA was one of its important tasks and this was taken on a higher level in September 1938 when the daily publishing of the “economic bulletin” was initiated. This bulletin contained the most important news from foreign markets and bursas and at the same time, the bulletin *Daily News* (*Дневни вестни*) was founded.²⁶⁰

In 1939, the BTA arranged to receive its news from the Soviet Union agency TASS, but this was not used very often due to mistrust between the two governments. The situation, of course became significantly different after 1944 when a Communist regime was formed in Bulgaria.

The budget of the BTA was difficult to determine because of the lack of sources, but it was known that this was part of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religions. The ministry was, of course very cumbersome and complex with 412 employees in 1939 compared with 70 at the BTA.²⁶¹

During the 1930's, the BTA reported to the Office for the Press and that meant that the chiefs of the Office for the Press were also heads of the BTA. Of the five directors, the most important ones were Balabanov and Serafimov who headed the office in the second half of the 1930's and the most important changes and improvements were made to both offices during this period.²⁶²

The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency remained part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even in the Communist Bulgarian until 1951 when it became an independent institution. Under the new regime, the BTA continued its propaganda role, maybe even to a greater extent than during the 1930's.

²⁶⁰100 godini Balgarska telegrafaska agenciya [100 Years of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency], (Sofia, 1998), without page numbers.

²⁶¹ *Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939* [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1939], (Sofia, 1937-1940), p.640.

²⁶² For the biographies of the directors, see the second chapter of the thesis.

YUGOSLAVIA

The Yugoslav *Avala* Agency was formed in September 1919 after the foundation of Yugoslavia (at that time known as the Kingdom of Serbian, Croats and Slovenians). Initially, French journalist Albert Mousset was in charge of this organization²⁶³ and he was a friend of King Alexander Karadjordjevic. He remained in this position until 1927 when he left under suspicious circumstances.²⁶⁴ From 1920, the agency began to receive news from some European capitals (Paris, Bern, Athens, Madrid) and started to develop its international network. In the first phase of its development, *Avala* was under the Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and French was the official language of the agency.

In the late 1920's, the news agency in Yugoslavia, like in Bulgaria, started to fall behind the leading European agencies and this was proved by the letter written in 1929 which urged for the necessary changes in the work of the *Avala*. As mentioned earlier, alongside Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had state news agencies that were inappropriate for efficient state propaganda. About the situation in *Avala* Agency in the late 1920's, the report said:

“As an official agency, Agency *Avala* is not capable of satisfying the all needs of modern journalism, and even less so in the service of state propaganda. This agency is at the bottom, while other agencies, even officials, have their statutes and programs, agency *Avala* does not have any statute, program, and no specified duties. Agency *Avala* is, because of poor expertise and slow control carried out on its work, doomed to be late with the news and this is why other agencies are often unsatisfied with its work”.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Albert Mousset (Paris, 1883-1975) was a journalist and historian. In 1908, he finished the school for archives. He was a librarian trainee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of the Committee for the publication of documents relating to the origins of the war of 1870-1871 and in charge of courses at the *l'école des Hautes études hispaniques*, attached to the Embassy of France in Madrid. In addition, he was the founder and editor of the magazine *Affaires étrangères* (Foreign Affairs).

²⁶⁴ According to the Yugoslav writer Vuk Dragovic, Mousset maintained some relations with the French military and one letter considering that matter was found. V.Dragovic, *Srpska stampa izmedju dva rata, Osnova za bibliografiju srpske periodike 1915-1945* [Serbian Press between Two Wars, Basis for Bibliography of Serbian Press], (Belgrade, 1956), p.380.

²⁶⁵ AY, Personal Collection of Vojislav Jovanovic Marambo (335), box 74.

Remarks made in letter weren't far from the truth. The reorganization of *Avala* began in June 1929 when the agency left the jurisdiction of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and become a joint stock company with capital of 5 million dinars. The state bought the vast majority of stocks, 9,540 out of a possible 10,000. Others were bought by the administration of the biggest newspapers in Yugoslavia²⁶⁶, but the reorganization was not easy task. The contract between the state and the agency was signed in May 1930 and the first payment was made in April 1930.²⁶⁷ The contract regulated relations and proscribed obligations between them and the first four articles were about the obligations of *Avala*:

- 1) To do its information and journalistic services regarding the general public interest of the state;
- 2) To publish official declarations, to deliver them to the newspapers in the country and abroad,
- 3) To make denial for all writings harmful for the state's interests, with the right to underline its jurisdiction whilst doing it;
- 4) To deliver its bulletins to the government members, free of charge.²⁶⁸

The most important obligation of the state was to pay five million dinars to the agency for the costs of its operations. The contract was signed for five years with the automatic renewal for another five if one of the parties chose not to cancel it. The manual of the work of the *Avala* agency defined the structure and functions of the company and it was interesting to note that the contract was signed on the government's behalf by Milan Marjanovic, chief of the Central Press-Bureau. This fact only underlined already mentioned things about the importance of the CPB as the central state propaganda institution in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

The central propaganda institutions were tightly connected with the state telegraphic and press agencies where the Yugoslav agency *Avala* ceased to operate under the authority of the Office for the Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it became a joint-stock company in June 1929.

²⁶⁶ Najnovija faza u razvoju Agencije Avala [The Newest Phase in Development of Avala Agency], (Belgrade, 1937), p.7.

²⁶⁷ Until 1st April 1930, the Agency managed to spend 3,750,000 dinars of the original capital invested by the state.

²⁶⁸ AY, 37-75-37, The Contract between the Yugoslav state and *Avala* Agency A.D.

However, this transformation was regarded more as a formal than as a real one as the state owned more than 90 % of the overall stocks.²⁶⁹ The cooperation of the Agency with the CPB was, in the words of its general manager at the time, “extensive” and “harmonic”.²⁷⁰

The difference in organization between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian institutions was mirrored by the fact that the correspondents of the Office for the Press were at the same time correspondents of the BTA, whereas the *Avala* agency had its own correspondents. Nevertheless, the number of these correspondents was reduced and, after a period of time, the majority of the remaining ones were, after all, those of the CPB.²⁷¹

It might be interesting to mention that both agencies published their own bulletins three times per day in their official languages and in French. If we leave aside certain differences in structure, one could, nonetheless, discern common activities and goals of the news agencies and of the central propagandistic institutions in question. In the aforementioned report of the director of the *Avala* Agency, Svetislav Petrovic, wrote that “even in those exceptionally rare cases when disagreements occur, they are always resolved in an easy and friendly manner between the Chief of the Central Press-Bureau and the director of the *Avala* Agency.

The work of agency was intensive and constantly growing over the years. The following table illustrated the level of activity during the 1930’s:

Avala Agency - The number of received words per year

Year	Number of received words
1933	1,048,200
1934	4,028,000
1935	12,180,000
1936	15,050,000
1937	17,630,000

Source: Izveshtaj Upravnog odbora Agencije Avala (The report of Governing Board of *Avala* Agency), p.33.

²⁶⁹ *Najnovija faza...*, p. 6.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, *Izveshtaj direktora Agencije Avala Svetislava Petrovica iz 1937 godine* [The Report of the Director of the “*Avala*” Agency, Svetislav Petrovic, from 1937].

²⁷¹ The correspondent from Vienna was recalled in 1937; the following year, the same thing happened to the correspondents of the “*Avala*” Agency from Sofia and Paris. *Godishnji izveshtaj Upravnog odbora Agencije „Avala” A.D. o radu u1937. godini* [Yearly Report about the work in 1937 to the Governing Body of *Avala* Agency A.D.], (Belgrade, 1938), p.34.

According to the same data, the number of the words in the first three months in 1938 was 3,151,000 and that was sign of improvement considering what happened in previous years. It was important to mention that, in comparison to the CPB, the Agency did not have the instruments to ensure that the newspapers published the received information.

At this point, one had to examine the structure of the *Avala* during the period under review. The structure of the agency during the late 1930's consisted of a headquarters in Belgrade and special sections in Zagreb, Ljubljana and Novi Sad. For a clearer picture, see the illustration below:

Avala Personnel at the beginning of 1938

HEADQUARTERS (BELGRADE)

Director	1
Editor in chief	1
Editors	4
Acting editors	2
Chief of sections	1
Relocated correspondents	2
Acting chief of services	1
Secretary	1
Associates	16
Treasurer	1
Administrative clerks	10
Typists	11
Radio telegraphers	2
Chief of personal	1
Additional personal	22
Cleaning stuff	2
Total	87

ZAGREB

Editor in chief	1
Associates	2
Clerk	1
Typists	2
Radio telegraphers	4
Additional personal	5

Total	15
LJUBLJANA	
Acting editor in chief	1
Associates	1
Clerks	1
Typist	1
Radio telegraphers	3
Additional personal	1
Total	8
NOVI SAD	
Editor in chief	1
Associate	1
Clerks	1
Typist	1
Radio telegraphers	2
Additional personal	1
Total	7

CORRESPONDENTS FROM ABROAD

Correspondent from Tirana 1

TOTAL 118

From the above table, one could see that 87 of the employees (74%) were based at the headquarters in Belgrade. One could also conclude that the agencies outposts were the only services at the specific locations. In different areas of the country, these outposts also had different responsibilities and having been only responsible for the territory of the Drava Banovina, the section in Ljubljana published and delivered all of its material in Slovenian. This was due to a fact that all the leading newspapers in Slovenia were published in that language.²⁷²

In Novi Sad, the city with the largest number of newspapers in languages of minorities, its section had specific duties and responsibilities. The city was capital of the Danube Banovina where six daily newspapers in languages of minorities were published and this gave this *Avala* section a special, “national and promotional” mission. Agency staff noted that the developed minority press often delivered news from foreign sources in the absence of domestic information.

²⁷² Ljubljana six daily newspapers in languages of minorities had four daily newspapers in Slovenian: *Jutro* (Morning), *Slovenec* (Slovenian), *Slovenski dom* (Slovenian Home) and *Slovenski narod* (Slovenian Folk).

This was not in the interest of the government so an effort was made to upgrade the work of Novi Sad's *Avala* section. This progress could be illustrated by the fact that the quality of reporting operations in 1935 was deemed to be "primitive", but in 1937, this service had been deemed in every way to have reached the "required standard"²⁷³. In total, the bureau had only nine subscribers, of which five were minority press (three Hungarian and two German), one was a newspaper in Serbian, *Dan* and three government institutions.

In addition to the existing outposts in the country in 1937 one was also formed in Skopje, the capital of Vardar Banovina. The service was provided only by one editor, one associate, one radio telegrapher and one servant, but this bureau ceased to operate after only four months because it did not meet "certain expectations".²⁷⁴ Although the specific reasons were not revealed, one could assume that financial reasons were the most important issues.

In the late 1930's, several correspondents from abroad were withdrawn due to financial reasons and during 1937, correspondents from Paris, Vienna and Sofia were also withdrawn. As one could see above, the only remaining foreign correspondent was left in Tirana, the capital of Albania, which could be linked to some suggestions made by the CPB correspondent.²⁷⁵

The director of agency had very important and multiple duties, but he had three main tasks:

- 1) Chief of finance;
- 2) Editor in chief (especially in the political news area) and
- 3) Literally, the corrector of all bulletins.

This unusual concentration of duties with one person made the post of director vital for the agency's work. During its existence, *Avala* (1919-1941) had eight different directors and all of them were journalists with Albert Mousset being the longest serving director from 1919-1927. Other directors were Serbs, the most prominent of whom being Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the director in 1937 and 1938. Jovanovic was a highly experienced journalist who was, amongst other things, the Chief of the Publishing section of the CPB, founder and editor in chief of

²⁷³ Izveshtaj UO AA, Izveshtaj dopisnistva u Novom Sadu, p.73

²⁷⁴ Ibid, p.35.

²⁷⁵ AY, 38-22. CPB correspondent from Tirana made several suggestions about the necessity that *Avala* must attempt to achieve the broadest influence in Albania and to counterpart rising Italian influence.

several important newspapers like *Vardar* or *Samouprava*, the main organ of the government party.²⁷⁶

Under his management agency, finances were stabilized and there were recorded improvements in the other working activities of *Avala*. During this period, the agency became the key source for information coming from abroad and in his report from 1938, Jovanovic proudly underlined that *Avala* was the sole source of news for the domestic press regarding the Prime Minister Stojadinovic's visit to Germany in January 1938.²⁷⁷ It became clear how important this was for the state propaganda to be the only source of the news for domestic public opinion about sensitive events such as the official visit to Hitler's Nazi Germany.²⁷⁸

The financial aspect of the *Avala* work was one of the most fragile points of its affairs and for a clearer understanding of the way the *Avala* Agency did business, one should examine its accounts:

Balance of Avala Agency on 31st December 1937

Table of outcome

Expenses		
Payment at headquarters	2,703,313.97	
Fees	191,556.00	
Telephone expenses	181,116.00	
Telegraph expenses	44,146.50	
Payment of correspondents abroad	376,288.08	
Telegraph and telephone expenses of correspondents	23,203.90	
Expenses of radio service	4,925.50	

²⁷⁶ Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic (Smederevo, 1898 – Belgrade, 1966) was raised by his uncle, whose surname Stoimirovic he took gratefully. Jovanovic began his journalist career in the most important newspaper *Politika* in 1919. He was editor in chief of *Samouprava* (1921-1923) and press attaché in the Yugoslav embassy in Berlin. During the 1930's, Jovanovic was publisher and editor of *Vardar* and worked in the Central Press Bureau. Before the Second World War, he was chief of the Political Section of Council of Ministers. In the short April war in Yugoslavia, he was a common soldier and during the occupation, he was a director of State Archive and editor in chief of the newspaper *Obnova* (Renewal). He was sentenced for 15 years imprisonment by the new Communist government. Jovanovic left a lot of unpublished work that is currently kept by the Archives of Matica srpska in Novi Sad and the Archives of the city of Smederevo.

²⁷⁷ *Godishnji izveshtaj Upravnog odbora Agencije „Avala” A.D. o radu u1937 godini* [Yearly Report about the work in 1937 to the Governing Body of Avala Agency A.D.], Belgrade 1938, p.14.

²⁷⁸ During the visit, Jovanovic, as well as the chief of the CPB Lukovic, was highly decorated by Hitler himself.

Office material	189,828.58	
Subscription to foreign agencies	399,215.27	4,113,593.80
Expenses of outposts		
Zagreb	597,092.36	
Ljubljana	425,835.87	
Novi Sad	208,395.45	
Skopje	126,216.12	1,357,539.80
Bonuses of the Boards and travelling expenses		
Watching duties of members of Governing Body	66,000.00	
Sessions of Governing Body	83,900.00	
Travelling expenses of Governing Body	39,053.00	
Sessions of Supervisory Board	9,600.00	
Clerk's travelling expenses	98,240.15	296,793.15
Various expenses		
Rent, fuel, power, official taxes, hospital taxes etc.		906,186.04
State and communal taxes		193,500.00
Write-off		
10 % of radio station and furniture		183,085.80
Losses from 1936		376,164.94
Total		7,426,863.53

Table of income

Subscription		
Contract with Yugoslavian state		5,000,000.00
Income of Headquarters		
Bulletins, different courses and subscription in Belgrade for news		930,554.25
Income of Outposts		
Zagreb	513,070.00	
Ljubljana	250,799.50	
Novi Sad	190,252.00	
Skopje	40,500.00	994,621.50
Loss		501,687.78
Total		7,426,863.53

Source: Report of Overseeing Board of *Avala* Agency, pp.116–117.

From the numbers above, one could see that the loss of 376,164.94 from 1936 grew to 501,687.78 in 1937. Making losses was linked especially to the outposts where one of those

outposts, Ljubljana had doubled the amount of expenditure over income while in Skopje, *Avala* had tripled the amount of expenditure over income. Nevertheless, the overall state income of five million dinars remained unchanged.

As stated earlier, *Avala* only delivered its confidential newsletter to those people approved by the government. In the late 1930's, that decision was made by the Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovic and from one document, one could see that Stojadinovic delivered a list of names to the president of the Supervisory Board Stijepo Kobasica and from that list, one could also see what institutions and what people the Prime Minister considered to be crucial for the functioning of the state.

On the list were regents, several ministers and chiefs of staff, plus representatives of the General Staff and the CPB and²⁷⁹ it should be noted that among them were four military officers - Chief of the General Staff, the King's aide, Chief of Intelligence Department and head of the Operational department. It is interesting to say that the Stojadinovic confidential bulletins were delivered to the both the heads of his cabinets Jovan Gasic and Dragan Protic.²⁸⁰

For this work, it is also important to note how the profit that came from the *Avala* agency work was to be used. The profit was used in the following ways:

- 1/3 for the promotion of tourism, as decided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry;
- 1/3 for general advertising purposes, according to the decisions of the Central Press Bureau;
- 1/3 by the conclusion of the Governing Board at the General Assembly - primarily for economic propaganda.

From these figures, the role *Avala* gained an, but in addition, part of the income was required for propaganda funding. As one could see, one-third of the income was directed for propaganda, especially economic propaganda.

One of the biggest problems for the agency during this period was the issue of import and distribution of foreign newspapers and magazines at home. That concession was sought and received from the state in 1932 and according to the license of the Ministry of Trade and Industry; the agency was required to establish a special department for the import of foreign

²⁷⁹ The list has 17 names.

²⁸⁰ Gasic was the chief of cabinet of the Prime Minister and Protic chief of cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs which was Stojadinovic from 1935 to 1939.

magazines and newspapers with separate accounting. Since the newly established department recorded only losses, it was decided to reorganize it along with the society *Putnik*.

For this goal, it formed a separate department which was supposed to lead the Governing Board and which composed of seven members. Those members were both directors of *Avala* and *Putnik*, one of the members of Governing board of both societies and representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry plus the Council of Ministers. The new established department was named the Department for Transport of Foreign Newspapers and Magazines and it was officially formed in March 1933.²⁸¹

In addition to the *Avala* problems, there was also dissatisfaction with the allocation of profits between the agency and *Putnik* and the battle for changing the existing contract lasted several years. After resuming the place of the agency's director Milan Jovanovic, Stoimirovic immediately started the process to review existing contracts and in his address to the Assembly of the agency, he requested the return of the concession or to terminate the contract.²⁸²

In his words, the realized profit agency received only a sixth part and that this contract represented more harm than good and long-term efforts in this direction were only completed in 1940 when the contract was terminated, thus the harmful contract was valid during the whole period under review.

During this period, a publishing company *Hachette* had a monopoly over almost the entire French press, thus *Avala* was obligated to conclude a contract with it for the import and distribution of all newspapers and publications in French and English, including those issued in those countries. The contract was concluded in December 1932 and according to *Avala*, the agency received very little from this contract, but was heavily obligated. In his report, the lawyer of *Avala* Andrija Petrovic Njegos characterized the contract as “a series of Hachette’s rights and of numerous responsibilities of *Avala*”.²⁸³ Despite these complaints, the agency continued its relations with the French company over many years.

In order to comprehend the amount of the potential impact of the importation of foreign newspapers, the following information was very useful. During 1937, the total number of imported newspapers was: 197 daily and weekly political newspapers, 531 illustrated and other

²⁸¹ *Najnovija faza...*, Izveshtaj advokata Avale A.D, pp.95-96.

²⁸² Istorijski Arhiv Smedereva [Historical Archive of city of Smederevo], Zaostavština Milana Jovanovica Stoimirovica (The letters of Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic), box number 10.

²⁸³ *Ibid*, p.96.

magazines and 217 journals of various modern journals. Most newspapers were imported from Germany, France and Austria. From the table below, one could see what the import from each country was separately.

Imported Newspapers and Magazines in Yugoslavia during the 1937

Countries (in alphabetic order)	Newspapers and Magazines
Austria	117
Bulgaria	3
Czechoslovakia	71
France	155
Germany	172
Italy	53
Hungary	14
Poland	15
Romania	6
Switzerland	9
United Kingdome	93
Other	26

Source: Izveshtaj UO AA, Izveshtaj Odeljenja za promet stranih chasopisa, p.93.

One could assume therefore that after the Anschluss in 1938, the co-operation with Germany (now including territory of former Austria) was even stronger and that the number of imported newspapers and magazines from Germany was by far the largest, which coincided with the growing economic and political co-operation of the late 1930's. The number of magazines in German could be also explained with a significant number of German minorities in Inter-war Yugoslavia.

The biggest problem of *Avala* throughout its existence was due to finance and after assuming the role of director in 1935, Svetislav Petrovic complained to the Assembly that he found the agency in deep debt. Although that he hinted in his reports about the consolidation of the company under his leadership, the reality was different and his successor Stoimirovic stated that when he took the post of Director, he found out that there was only 1,500 dinars in cash and that “debts were on all sides”.²⁸⁴ His investigations into the finances shown a number of irregularities, such as tardiness, sloppy bookkeeping, unpaid taxes and more and the measures that he had taken, improved the financial situation, but losses were still made in future years.

Agency *Avala* formally ceased to exist after the German occupation of Yugoslavia and the announcement of the liquidation had been published (for the third time) in the *Opštinski novinama* (Municipal Gazette) (No. 56, p. 4) on 6th June 1941.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴ Izveštaj direktora Avale podnesen IX redovnom zboru akcionara 30.aprila 1938 [Yearly report of the director of Avala to the Assembly of shareholders in April 1938], Godišnji izveštaj UO AA o radu 1937.godine, p.10.

²⁸⁵ The commissar liquidator was Captain Julius Lipert. Dragovic, *Srpska štampa...*, p.380.

POLAND

The Polish telegraph agency (Polska Agencja Telegraficzna, PAT) was founded last of the three in December 1918, shortly after the new state was proclaimed. The agency was to be subordinated to the Council of Ministers as an official press and news agency.

According to the regulations, the main tasks of the agency were as follows:

- a) Informing the Polish society of all forms of political, social, cultural and economic development; both at home and abroad, and providing reliable foreign news about Polish affairs;
- b) Posting in their own newsletters and exclusive broker to the posting of official publication toll, non-commercial institutions and state enterprises, or acting under government control in all national and international journals, as well as the exclusive placement of advertisements in all kinds of the above-mentioned state institutions through posters, ads, film, photography, etc.
- c) The exclusive agency in making films and photos of buildings of the premises and offices and the state institutions in the state properties.²⁸⁶

To achieve the following goals, the PAT used different methods, the most important of which was the publishing of the daily bulletins with information. It was difficult to present a full range of editorial activities because of the large number of organizational changes during this period. During 1934 as an illustration, the PAT published a dozen different bulletins each day and the content and aspects of the mentioned bulletins were clear by their names and it was not necessary to elaborate on them any further.

- 1) General Political Bulletin;
- 2) Economic Bulletin;
- 3) Bulletin of the Stock Exchange;
- 4) Sports Bulletin;

²⁸⁶ AAN, PRM. 33-5, Letter of the director Starzynski from June 1930.

- 5) Bulletin of the Cultural and Artistic;
- 6) Parliamentary Bulletin;
- 7) Illustrated Bulletin;
- 8) Newsletter of the Economic, Social, Artistic and Sports (in French);
- 9) Feature Photography;
- 10) Information Service “Polpat”, given three times daily via radio signal to foreign agencies.²⁸⁷

During the following years, the number of the daily bulletins increased and in 1938, this increased to 13,²⁸⁸ further proof of the increased business of the PAT in the late 1930’s.

The structure of Polish agency was more complex than the previous two mentioned agencies and during the 1930’s, the PAT consisted of the following parts:

1. Information Office
2. Publications Office
3. Advertisement Office
4. Film Office
5. Film Institute
6. Printing Headquarters
7. State Printing
8. P.A.T. branches

Informing the Polish society about all kinds of manifestations of political, social, economic and cultural life, both at home and abroad, and providing overseas news on the whole of Poland was the main aim of the Agency and that was mainly the task of the Information Office. Other offices among other duties had the task to provide funds to cover the operating expenses of providing the relevant information.

The Information Office of PAT provided the following services:

²⁸⁷ W.Grabowski, *Polska Agencja Telegraficzna 1918-1991*[Polish Telegraph Agency 1918-1991], (Warsaw, 2005), p.97.

²⁸⁸ Rydzinski, *Informacyjne...*, p.199

- 1) Information for the daily press;
- 2) Information for foreign agencies and PAT's correspondents;
- 3) Information for public authorities;
- 4) Illustration of publications;
- 5) Information for the Polish ships at sea (Patoceana).²⁸⁹

The main objective of the PAT was to maintain the level and range of information “from the Government’s point of view and the interests of the State” (w myśl wskazań Rządu i interesu Państwa)²⁹⁰ and the influence of the information provided by PAT was significant and important to the state propaganda. For achieving the aforementioned tasks, the PAT needed a huge number of subscribers and clients. Among the subscribers during the 1930’s, the PAT had more than hundred daily newspapers with an increasing trend: 106 in 1935 and 113 in 1936.²⁹¹

The year’s efforts of the agency resulted with more increased business and the statistics below illustrated the increasing the amount of information sent to the press:

The Information Sent to the Press by Information Office²⁹²

YEAR	1934	1935	1936
NEWS (daily)	200	210	230
NEWS (annual)	73,000	76,460	81,000
WORDS (daily)	20,200	22,900	26,000
WORDS (annual)	7,300,000	8,400,000	9,100,000

As one could see, the slow but constant increase of work was apparent and this progress was vital for the state propaganda efforts of the PAT. The position of the agency as the state agency guaranteed that the news was government approved.

Besides the daily news bulletins, the Polish Telegraph Agency had several special regular publications.

²⁸⁹ AAN, 8-21II, p.7.

²⁹⁰ AAN, 8-21II, p.2.

²⁹¹ AAN, 8-21II, p.7.

²⁹² Ibid.

In 1936, those publications included the following items:

- 1) *Monitor Polski* (Polish Monitor) - Polish Republic Journal;
- 2) *Zbiór Wyroków najwyższego Trybunału Administracyjnego* (Reports of Judgments of the Administrative Supreme Court) - a quarterly;
- 3) *Gazeta Lwowska* (Lvov Newspaper) – daily;
- 4) *Biuletyn Gieldowy* (Bulletin of the Stock Exchange) – daily;
- 5) *Wiadomości Porty Gdyńskiego* (the Gdynia Port News) - a monthly, the authority of the Maritime Office in Gdansk;
- 6) *Rocznik Polityczno-Gospodarczy* (Political-Economic Yearbook);
- 7) Special Releases: *Arcade*, list of State offices and institutions, etc.

The aforementioned publications had different public and propaganda significance for the state propaganda and probably the most important was the *Monitor Polski* (Polish Monitor) which was established in 1918 as the official legislative paper of the new Second Polish Republic.²⁹³

The publication had traditionally consisted of two sections, the governmental and non-governmental. The first included orders and decrees and the latter contained varied material and because of the nature of the published material, it was important for state propaganda to have numerous subscribers for the *Monitor Polski*. In 1936, that number was 283, and from that figure, 238 went to the state and local institutions and 45 copies went to the individuals. According to the official PAT's report, the number of the subscribers decreased over the years and this was also reflected by the income generated by advertisements.²⁹⁴

The Daily *Biuletyn Gieldowy* (Bulletin of the Stock Exchange) was the most important source of information for the economic world and the number of subscribers was high and exceeded 700 in 1935 where the figure was 794.²⁹⁵ Compared to its Yugoslav agency equivalent, that had barely reached 100 (service in Belgrade and Zagreb put together), that number was

²⁹³ From September to December 1939, the government section was published in exile in France. The gazette was resumed in 1945 and since 1950, it had been published by the office of the Prime Minister (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) to announce legislation of Parliament (Sejm).

²⁹⁴ AAN, 8-21II, p.10.

²⁹⁵ AAN, 8-21II, p.11.


significant and impressive but despite these factors, this bulletin also made losses during these years.²⁹⁶

One of the most interesting publications from a propaganda and historical point of view was beyond any doubt the *Rocznik Polityczno-Gospodarczy* (Political-Economic Yearbook). This treasury of data provided information on all aspects of public life in the Second Polish Republic and this publication was, of course, similar to the ones published annually in most of the European states during this period. The edition *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny* (Small Statistical Yearbook)²⁹⁷ was basically the concise version, for example, the 1936 Small Yearbook had 311 pages while the Political-Economic had 1,244 pages.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ AAN, 8-21II, pp. 43-44.

²⁹⁷ For an illustration, the 1938 yearbook consisted of 23 different sections. The sections were as follows: 1. Geographical location. Hydrography. Meteorology; 2. The surface, administrative division, population; 3. The movement of population; 4. Buildings. Flats; 5. Agriculture, forestry, farming, fisheries; 6. Businesses, business associations; 7. Mining and Industry; 8. Internal Trade, consumption; 9. Foreign trade; 10. Communication; 11. Money and credit; 12. Prices; 13. Jobs; 14. Social Care; 15. Public Health. Sport; 16. Insurance. Fires; 17. Education. Learning outside the formal school; 18. Cultural life. Entertainment. Association; 19. Administration; 20. Sejm and Senat; 21. Public Administration; 22. Arboriculture, crime, prisons; 23. The finances of the Treasury, the Treasury of local Silesian government.

²⁹⁸ The difference between the two editions was actually not that big because *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny* was published in very small fonts as a pocket edition.



The first and the last page of *Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy* form 1936.

At this point, it is interesting to analyze the business results that the PAT's sections illustrated in the line of the assigned work. The following table from 1936 data illustrated a general business trend:

Profit and losses for the year 1936 (in Polish zlotys)

Sections	Outcome	Income	Balance
Information Office	1,689,345.83	917,496.78	- 771,849.05
Publication Office	849,295.77	1,833,893.65	+ 984,597.88
Advertisement Office	1,693,919.15	2,128,601.59	+ 434,682.44
Film Office	486,776.52	442,419.06	- 44,357.46
Film Institute	190,976.94	170,553.58	- 20,423.36
Printing Headquarters	3,777,849.98	3,900,023.42	+ 122,173.44
State Printing	3,170,381.65	3,639,429.41	+ 469,047.76

Source: AAN, 8-21II, p. 31

As one could see from the table above, the Information Office made the biggest loss, along with the Film offices, but on the other hand, the Publication and Advertisement sections made significant profits for the agency along with the two printing sections. However, the loss made by the Information Office was somewhat excepted due to the nature of their work, which was gathering information from home and abroad.

The most important thing, from a financial point of view, was that the sections concerned with printing and advertisement had made a profit, but that profit decreased in 1936 due to some additional costs. In the first place, there were expenses for the PAT branches of 269,575.60 zlotys, taxes of 271,922.72 zlotys and for the purchase of inventory which totaled 134,386.08 zlotys, but when some other expenses were added, the total loss was only 27,734.53 zlotys.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ AAN, 8-21II, p.31.

On the other hand, the Publication Office made losses compared to previous years and this was due to factors already mentioned such as: unexpectedly large increase in taxes, increased printing prices, the reduction of advertisement prices, etc.³⁰⁰

The most interesting PAT' section was the Film Institute, formed in 1935 where the main task of the institute was to make films of educational characters for the various schools. Until 1938, it delivered 130 film cameras to schools, gathering 600 scientific and entertainment films and 60 full-length movies.³⁰¹

According to reports, the PAT made constant losses and this negative trend corresponded with the beginning of the World economic crisis in 1929. In 1937, after major analysis, the management of the institution made the following conclusions about the reasons for their losses:

- 1) A general decline in turnover and
- 2) The excessive burden made by taxes which had to be paid to the Treasury.³⁰²

Just by looking into these figures, one could agree with these conclusions. The second reason was especially valid for 1936, namely the total contribution for the Treasury in 1936 was 745,322.56 zlotys compared to 1933 when it was only 292,939.03 zlotys.³⁰³ A significant increase of the taxes surely affected the business of the PAT which was reflected in the increased losses made by the institution.

During the 1930's, the position of the PAT's director was occupied by Roman Leon Starzyński³⁰⁴ (1929-1933), Konrad Libicki (1933-1938)³⁰⁵ and Mieczysław Stanisław Obarski

³⁰⁰ AAN, 8-21II, p.11.

³⁰¹ *Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy* 1939, p.584.

³⁰² AAN, 8-21II, p.2.

³⁰³ AAN, 8-21II, p.3.

³⁰⁴ Roman Leon Starzyński was born in Warsaw in 1890 and died in 1938. He finished philosophy at Jagelonian University and Senior Military School, as the rank of major. He had several different positions in the Military like chief of the First Section of General Headquarters and the chief of the Organization Department of Ministry of War. Starzyński is the author of publication *Agencje informacyjne* (News Agencies, 1935).

³⁰⁵ Libicki, Konrad (1891-1980). Since 1911, he was in the Rifles Association, the Polish Military Organization, in the Military Free School in Warsaw. He served in the Brigade as a company commander in the Warsaw battalion. During 1923-1924, he completed a course at the Military Academy as a major chartered. From 1927, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was head of the Press Department and in the years from 1929-1934, he worked as a deputy in Estonia. He was also a military attaché in Finland. In Warsaw, he became the chief director of the *Polish Telegraphic Agency*, the director of publications and newspaper printers and Managing Director of the Polish Radio until the outbreak of World War II. He evacuated all the movable property of the institution to France at the disposal of the government in exile. Libicki worked in the editorial *Reuters*. He was one of the founders of the *Pilsudski Institute* in London and editor of the first volumes of "Independence".

(1938-1939)³⁰⁶. All three directors were highly ranked and experienced operatives within the state propaganda machine during the Second Polish Republic and this was no surprise due to the importance of the PAT's director position.

In the late 1930's, the Polish Telegraph Agency had around 1,000 employees³⁰⁷ which was by far the largest of the three countries under the review. The agency had various correspondents abroad and the most important cities, from a Polish point of view, which had permanent correspondents were: Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, Wien, Riga, Rome, Geneva and New York.³⁰⁸

The most significant difference between the number of the employees in Poland's agency on one hand and those in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was illustrated in the Advertisement Office of the PAT which employed 75 people, more than in the whole Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency. This difference corresponded with the budgets of the institutions, but also with the quality and quantity of work that was completed.

³⁰⁶ Mieczysław Stanisław Obarski was born in 1899. He participated in the war in 1920 as ensign. Later, he was director of the *Telegraphic Agency Express* (Agencja Telegraficzna Express, ATE). He was a relative of Bogusław Miedziński, one of the most important *Sanacja* men for propaganda.

³⁰⁷ *Polska Niepodległa* [Independent Poland], (Warsaw, 2008), p.521.

³⁰⁸ Waldemar Grabowski offered an incomplete list of cities and correspondents of PAT: Grabowski, *Polska Agencja...*, pp.207-221.

AGENCJE TELEGRAFICZNE ZACRANICA SPRZYMIERZONE z PAT.



AGENCJE SPRZYMIERZONE I AFILJOWANE

Albanja,	Tirana,	Bureau de Presse Albanais
Ameryka Poludn.,	Buenos Aires,	Agence Havas
Austria,	Wiedeń,	Ämtliche Nachrichtenstelle
Belgia,	Bruksela,	Agence Telegraphique Belge
Bułgaria,	Sofia,	Agence Telegraphique Bulgare
Chiny,	Szanghaj,	Reuter
Czechosłowacja,	Praga,	Bureau de Presse Tchechoslovaque
Estonia,	Tallin,	Agence Telegraphique Estonienne
Dania,	Kopenhaga,	Ritzous Bureau
Finlandia,	Helsingfors,	Finska Notisbyran
Francja,	Paryż,	Agence Havas
Grecja,	Ateńy,	Agence d'Athenes
Hiszpania,	Madryt,	Agence Fabra
Holandja,	Amsterdam,	Nederlandsch Telegraph Agentsch. A. P.
Japonia,	Tokio,	Shimbun Rengo Sha
Jugosławia,	Białogród,	Agence Avala
Litwa,	Kowna,	Agence Telegraphique Lithuanienne
Lotwa,	Ryga,	Agence Telegraphique Lettone
Niemcy,	Berlin,	Deutsches Nachrichten Büro
Szwecja,	Sztokholm,	Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå
Norwegia,	Oslo,	Norsk Telegrambyrå
Portugalia,	Lizbona,	Agence Havas
Rumunia,	Bukareszt,	Agence Radar
St. Zj. Am. Półn.,	New York,	Associated Press
Szwajcaria,	Bern,	Agence Telegraphique Suisse
Turcja,	Ankara,	Agence Anatolie
Węgry,	Budapeszt,	Agence Telegraphique Hongroise
Wielka Brytania,	Londyn,	Agence Reuter
Włochy,	Rzym,	Agence Stefani
ZSRR,	Moskwa,	Agence Tass

The PAT's network during the 1930's

One more indication illustrated the difference between the PAT and the other two agencies under review and that was the number of the correspondents, both at home and abroad. The number of PAT correspondents was as follows:

Number of PAT's correspondents in 1935 and 1936

Year	Correspondents in Poland	Correspondents abroad	Total
1935	160	83	243
1936	179	69	248

The number of correspondents, as illustrated above, increased from 243 to 248 with an interesting change in the structure as the number of correspondents at home increased by 19, but the number of correspondents abroad decreased by 14. So from these figures, one could conclude that the regime wanted to concentrate its propaganda efforts more towards a domestic audience. These numbers compared favorably to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as most of the time, they didn't have any correspondents abroad (as one could see, the *Avala* had a sole correspondent in Albania for a while).

The job of correspondent was well paid, especially in Poland where the directors received about 1,800 zlotys, deputy director and chief editor between 1,200 and 1,500 zlotys; editors received 1,000 zlotys, but the foreign correspondents, if they were employees of a fixed place: in Berlin, they received between 2,900 to 3,500 zlotys, in Paris they received around 3,000 zlotys and in Moscow, which was obviously considered the "toughest job", from between 3,500 and 4,000 zlotys.³⁰⁹

The number of correspondents revealed that the PAT was one of the top agencies in Europe during the 1930's with between 150 and 180 correspondents at home and between 70 and 100 abroad. This was equal to or even better than, some of its bigger agency rivals, e.g. one of the most important world agencies *Havas* had 100 correspondents abroad while German *Wolff had* only 50.³¹⁰ These statistics illustrated just how serious the Polish state was about propaganda during the period under review.

After September 1939, the PAT operated in exile; initially in Paris and later in London, where, after the war was over, it functioned as a governmental news agency for the Polish government in exile. In 1991, it was symbolically connected with the Polish Press Agency.³¹¹

³⁰⁹ Rydzinski, *Informacyjne...*, p.187.

³¹⁰ Ibid, p.185.

³¹¹ *Polska Niepodległa*, p.521.

Conclusion

The news agencies in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were, in many ways similar but also significantly different. The Polish Telegraph Agency, *Avala* Agency and the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency had the same main responsibilities which were to inform domestic public about what was happening abroad and to inform the foreign public about the situation at home. Those main tasks were no different than ones that other agencies had performed during this period all over the world. The agencies had an obligation to informing the public at home and abroad “in accordance to the public state interest”, making the official announcements, the import and distribution of foreign newspapers and journals. Nevertheless, their most important role was to transmit official information which came from the top of the governing hierarchy so everybody knew that the information released was official and “checked”.

The three agencies were different in size, their relationships with the government, their structures, levels of funding and several other none less important things. The BTA, *Avala* and PAT were formed as governmental institutions with the aim to inform, but propaganda was, beyond any doubt, one of the main responsibilities of the agencies.

Nevertheless, the three agencies had different organizational forms within their own governments. Initially, the BTA was part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but over time, its position became weaker and during the 1930's, the agency even became part of the Office for the Press subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its budget was part of the Ministry budget and its directors were directors of the Office for the Press.

Although a state agency, the PAT was in different position as from its early years, the PAT was structurally an independent institution with various additional tasks and functions. One could therefore conclude, judging by the existing documents, that the PAT was considerably better organized than other two agencies. Movie making, independent publishing work, wide range foreign correspondent network, highly functional advertisement offices was only tied to the Polish agency during the 1930's.

The case of the Yugoslav counterpart was different to the other two. The agency started as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but that changed after a decade when the *Avala* Agency, according to common European practice in the Interwar period, was transformed into a joint stock company, but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital as it owned over

90% of stock capital. Therefore, the transformation of the agency basically meant a structural, but not a core change and *Avala* remained an instrument of the state propaganda and a state controlled institution throughout the whole period of its existence.

The Yugoslav and Bulgarian agencies received an annual donation from the state and in the case of *Avala*, this donation amounted to 5 million dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its needs. The finances were often not spent purposefully, so *Avala*, almost constantly, worked with losses and the BTA was totally dependent on the state funding and the income generated from subscribers was not enough to match the costs of both the agencies' work.

The only of the three agencies that was almost self-financed was the PAT as the income gained from advertisements and especially from sold publications and movies was significant and important. However, even those incomes were sometimes insufficient to cover the growing costs of the Polish news agency organization and its well developed business.

The difference between the three agencies under the examination was maybe best illustrated when one considered the number of employees. With around 1,000 employees, the PAT was by far the biggest of the three, almost ten times larger than *Avala* and more than thirteen times larger than its Bulgarian counterpart. This difference was also apparent when considering the correspondent network so whilst the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian agencies had none or few correspondents abroad, the PAT had a very highly developed organization which was similar to that of a leading global agency.

Judging by the above data, one could also conclude that the Polish Telegraph Agency had a more significant role in the state propaganda than news agencies in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The PAT had more responsibilities like publishing official data such as books and magazines and making the films that were, in the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the responsibility of other propaganda institutions. Those assignments were well beyond the common news agency job scope, which only underlined the statement expressed above about the Polish Telegraph Agency's propaganda influence.

CHAPTER IV

***MEDIA IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE
PROPAGANDA IN POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND
BULGARIA DURING THE 1930'S***

In this chapter, the development of the media in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and their role in the creating and spreading of the state propaganda during the 1930's will be discussed and analyzed. Particular attention will be paid to the dominant media of the period: press, radio and film.

PRESS

The press was the most powerful tool in the hands of the regimes in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the Interwar period. This was mainly due to the poor development of radio and cinema (television was only at the beginning).

The press was the more diverse and traditional way of informing the masses as well as being the most economic. The governments were well aware that controlling and influencing the press was the one of the most important steps to controlling public opinion. The ruling circles in these countries put a lot of effort into controlling the transfer of information in order to control what was to be published in the press. This was accomplished in various ways from hard censorship to bribery. In this part of the chapter, we will examine the development of the press in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930's, its freedom and how the press was used as a weapon of the state propaganda.

At this point, we must examine the state of press in the countries. Poland had the most newspapers because it was the largest country. According to official data for the Interwar period, the number of journals in Poland was being constantly increased. Only in the period of the Great Depression was there a period of stagnation. During the 1930's, the number of journals was as

follows: 1931 (2,406); 1932 (2,503); 1933 (2,572); 1934 (2,566); 1935 (2,854); 1936 (3,043) and 1937 (3,592).³¹² There is no official data for 1938 and 1939.

As one could see, the number of newspapers grew from year to year, except in 1934. The press in Poland was not as equally spread across the country, like in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The capital Warsaw was the center of journalism. Together with the central Polish duchies, Warsaw had published in total 49.5% of the magazines in 1931 and in 1938, this figure was 52.6%. These figures were significant, especially when compared to the Eastern duchies' 6.4%, Western duchies 22.2% and Southern duchies 18.8%.³¹³

For a clearer picture, one should examine the last recorded data on the number and type of newspapers in Poland:

Magazines in Poland on 31. XII 1937

Type of Magazine	Number	%
Information, literature, art	885	32,9
Science	440	16,3
Religion	295	11,0
Economic	274	13,9
Issued by the youth (including school)	167	6,2
Bodies and professional associations	162	6,0
Government official	132	4,9
Illustrative, entertaining, humorous	39	1,5
Sport	49	1,8
Other	149	5,5
Total	2.692	100,0

*"Mały Rocznik Statystyczny" 1939, p. 345

The statistical data did not show the differentiation between information, literature and art, but we could conclude that this information, plus the government's official newspapers, constituted a significant percentage of the total number of newspapers. That was of major

³¹² T. Jedruszczak (ed.), *Historia Polski* [History of Poland], volume IV, 1918-1939, part 4 (1935-1939), (Warsaw, 1978), p.748.

³¹³ *Ibid*, p.751.

importance for state propaganda. However, on the other hand, a shortage of publishing data meant that it was difficult to draw accurate analysis.

It was also interesting to see in which language the journals were published:

Magazines in languages in Poland on day 31.XII 1937

Language	Number	%
Polish	2.255	83,8
Jewish	130	4,8
Ukrainian	125	4,6
German	105	3,9
Belarus	8	0,3
Russian	9	0,3
Other	60	2,2
Total	2,692	100,0

*“Mały Rocznik Statystyczny” 1939, p. 345

With the dominance of the Polish language press, one could notice a large number of Jewish, Ukrainian and German newspapers. Those minorities had different goals in the Interwar Poland and after the war, they suffered different fates.

During the period under discussion, the development of the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was very dynamic. A lot of new newspapers and magazines were published but on the other hand, a significant number of existing newspapers ceased to exist due to financial or political reasons. The overall number of newspapers, however, was at a high level and was constantly increasing, but it was difficult to determine the exact number due to the aforementioned reasons above. As an illustration of the period and the number of newspapers, one could use officially published data.

*Number and intensity of publishing newspapers and
magazines in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during 1938 in
banovinas*

Banovinas	dail y	Several times per week	Several times per month	Monthly	Once in 2- 3 months	1 / 2	1 / 1	Periodic	<i>Total</i>
Drava	6	39	22	133	13	1	5	24	244
Drina	2	6	2	21	2	2	1	0	36
Dunav	8	97	12	46	3	0	3	25	220
Morava	0	9	3	4	1	0	0	0	17
Primorska.	2	8	1	14	2	0	0	3	31
Sava	13	83	41	194	29	1	1	25	389
Vardar	0	12	1	5	1	0	0	0	20
Vrbas	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
Zeta	0	9	1	4	0	1	0	1	16
Belgrade	2	45	23	129	14	3	5	20	246
Total	33	310	106	588	65	8	15	98	1.223

Source: Statistical yearbook for Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1938–39, p. 392.

From the table above, one could see a huge difference in the number of newspapers that were published in some banovinas.³¹⁴ Thus, in the Sava Banovina (Croatia and Slavonia), there were 389 newspapers and magazines but in Vrbas Banovina (Western Bosnia), there were only 4. This was just one of the indicators of the cultural and economic difference that existed in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. To determine their purpose and field of interest one could use the official statistics shown in the following table.

³¹⁴ *Banovina* is an administrative unit created in 1929 in Yugoslavia. There were nine banovinas, plus the Belgrade area.

*Newspapers and magazines by profession in the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia in 1938*

Banovina	Official	Political	Science	Religious	Health	Culture	Art	Economy	Tourism	Craft	Others	Total
Drava	5	27	13	40	4	37	12	17	9	53	27	244
Drina	1	2	3	11	-	1	-	3	-	5	10	36
Danube	8	57	6	31	-	37	10	20	3	24	24	220
Morava	1	8	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	17
Primorska	2	8	-	6	-	2	-	5	1	1	6	31
Sava	2	86	13	45	12	35	13	25	7	79	72	389
Vardar	2	1	1	2	-	8	-	1	-	5	-	20
Vrbas	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	4
Zeta	-	4	1	3	1	2	-	1	1	1	2	16
Belgrade	15	26	11	12	9	28	10	15	8	67	45	246
Total	37	220	48	152	26	151	45	97	29	238	190	1.223

Source: Statistical yearbook Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1938–39, p.394.

From the list of newspapers and magazines that covered political issues, one could include those under the official label, as well as those labelled as political, i.e. a total of 257 newspapers, which constituted 21% of all newspapers and magazines. That meant that political content constituted only a fifth of all the news content in the newspapers. This told us more about how the government tried to restrict the distribution of sensitive news to the cooperative media, and less about the diversity and development of the press in the Yugoslavia during the period under review.

One of the key tools of Stojadinovic's propaganda was the press. It was not free in this period and it was under the supervision and control of the ruling classes. Notwithstanding this, the number of papers constantly grew and this number varied because many of them were banned permanently, some were reformed and the number of the newspapers in the different banovinas was also different.

In general, the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was biased towards the government, except the newspapers in the Sava and Primorska banovina (Croatia). In Drava and Dunav banovina, the majority of newspapers were controlled by the Slovenian part of the government and national minorities and they tended to follow the general government line about defending the individual's needs and desires. In the four banovinas Morava, Vrbas, Zeta and Vardar, the press was restricted in number and with serious financial problems so their influence was reduced in comparison with the northern banovinas. Censorship existed in practice and this hindered the existence of many newspapers so one could conclude that the pressure of the censors was not spread equally across the whole country. The Belgrade press was under more scrutiny than anywhere else in the country.

In Bulgaria, the newspaper industry was not as well developed as it was in Poland and Yugoslavia, but it was no less interesting. As illustrated below, one could see the situation at the end of the observing period:

1936 – 843 (Newspapers – 470, Magazines – 373);
1937 – 875 (Newspapers – 512, Magazines – 363);
1938 – 912 (Newspapers – 531, Magazines – 381);
1939 – 906 (Newspapers – 513, Magazines – 393).³¹⁵

It was important to note that according to the same statistics, the number of newspapers marked as political was less than 4% (33 in 1936 and barely 22 in 1939). This clearly meant that regime didn't encourage the foundation of new political papers and even, as one could see, some of the already existing newspapers were terminated.

Nevertheless in Bulgaria during the 1930's, there were several important and good selling daily newspapers and in the aforementioned table, one could see their monthly circulation:

³¹⁵ *Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939* [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdom 1939], (Sofia, 1937-1940), p.733.

Newspapers in Bulgaria on June 1939³¹⁶

Newspaper	Published	Sold
<i>Utro</i>	2.220.000	1.908.000
<i>Zora</i>	2.172.000	1.904.000
<i>Zarya</i>	735.000	538.000
<i>Dnevnik</i>	661.000	529.000
<i>Dnes</i>	614.000	476.000
<i>Slovo</i>	309.000	240.000
<i>Mir</i>	271.000	197.000

According to the data, one could conclude that in mid 1939, *Utro* daily published more than 74,000 copies and *Dnes* more than 20,000 copies.

One of the important events for the development of the press in Bulgaria was the foundation of the society *Strela* (Arrow). The society was part of Society of capital's journalists ("Дружество на столичните журналисти"). This society had exclusive right to spread journals and periodicals in Sofia and in the provinces. One representative, delegated by the Prime Minister, was entered into the governing body of the society³¹⁷ and this government decision made it easier to spread propaganda to more people in more places. In 1935, the Society had 11,000 subscribers³¹⁸ and *Strela* retained its monopolistic position in Bulgaria, even after the Second World War. Due to the monopolistic position of the *Strela* society, one could trust the accuracy of the data from the table above.

One of the characteristics of the Bulgarian press in the 1930's was the small number of journalists working in the newspapers. The main pro-government papers were *Dnes* and *Utro*, which only had 25 and 18 full time employees respectively. *Zora* had the highest number of journalists with 30.³¹⁹

³¹⁶ CDIA, 176k-20-19, Report of *Strela* on 29. July 1939.

³¹⁷ *Darjaven Vestnik* [State's Journal], Nr.161, 16.October 1934, pp.2434-2435, "Naredba-zakon za razprostranenie na vestnicite i periodichiskite izdaniya" [Order-law for Spreading the Journals and Periodicals], art. 8.

³¹⁸ CDIA, 284k-3-42-30.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

It was important to analyze the 1930's legislation in all three countries under review in order to obtain a better understanding of how their press operated. Before 1938, press legislation in Poland was not completely unified as the western duchies had more liberal legislation than the central and eastern duchies.

However, all differences were eliminated with the new legislation as the "Press law" from 1938³²⁰ placed greater responsibility onto the editors of the newspapers. The publishing of the official press statements of the government, president and members, were now obligatory for the press. Every newspaper had to publish the statement on its front pages and a minimum length of that was also fixed by the law (article 30). The closure of the papers could be final or temporary, from six months up to five years (article 39) and these papers could not appear under a similar name or context. As a result of this law, the fines for the "press guilt" were higher than before, in some cases up to 5,000 or 10,000 zlotys (articles 43 and 37) and there was a long discussion between the Interior Ministry and the Press Department of the Council of Ministers that seemed to have this initiative in the making before this law was formally declared.³²¹

Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria passed very restrictive legislation regarding the press, which remained in existence throughout the 1930's. The legislation regarding the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was passed in 1929 and though, according to the Article 1 of the Law on Press, the press was formally given freedom from any pre-emptive editing, in practice, this was not the case. Namely, according to the Article 14 of the same law, the newspapers could be closed for the smallest infraction, and after three such instances the publication of a paper could be stopped indefinitely. Due to such strict regulations, the editorial boards, either willingly or unwillingly, made a habit of bringing proofs of their issues before a release to the state organs could be approved. This was a form of pre-emptive censorship, which gave the press very little freedom. In areas outside of Belgrade, this job was done by the state prosecutor's offices or by the head of the police in towns which did not have these offices. All censorship was carried out according to the directives and daily instructions of the Central Press-Bureau.

The Bulgarian legislation regarding the press set up a new registration system for all the newspapers which had to pass a series of inspections prior to distribution and this seemed particularly harsh. The decree of 12th June 1934, which held legislative power, ordered that

³²⁰ Press law was declared in the form of a President's decree on 28th October 1938.

³²¹ AAN, PRM 63-13. In this box, we have numerous pages that contain opinions of the aforementioned institutions and their suggestions for the most of the articles from the law.

following a period of ten days after its enactment, all newspapers and journals in Bulgaria should be re-registered.

For the papers that would not sign up to this procedure, the law proscribed a permanent banning (the Article 2). Those editors who tried to publish newspapers without a permit faced a term of three year imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 levas (the Article 4).³²² The additional pressure on the newspapers was an order on 15th April 1938, which established supervision and pre-released proofing of all printed materials with a right to ban or stop publication permanently.³²³

On 6th April 1938, several decrees were introduced about control over the press. Control was preliminary, which meant that no material could be published before approval. For that approval, one would need to provide the following data: name of newspaper, financial sources, name, age, education, birthplace and address of the editor. It was obligatory that the editor was a Bulgarian citizen age of 30 or more (for newspapers) and 21 (for magazines). It was underlined that editors could not be convicted for treason and betrayal, debauchery or corruption, crime against dynasty and for crimes punishable by the “Law for Protection of the State”. Sanctions included fines, confiscations and seizures but from 1934, there was no imprisonment for comparing with decree.³²⁴ The aim of the ruling class was to financially cripple the power of the opposition press with high fines and taxes.

Since the early 1930's in Poland, the scope and extent of harassment and interference from various censorship, largely driven by the administrative authorities, steadily deepened and this most severely affected the political newspapers of the opposition. In Poland in 1931, the number of seizures was 2,100, in October 1935, this figure decreased to 1,626 seizures and in the same period of 1936, 1,869 seizures were made and this data also included the confiscation of periodic publications.³²⁵

With World War Two about to begin, state pressure on the press was more radical. In 1937, there were 2,848 seizures across the country.³²⁶ The editors rarely filed complaints against the seizures due to the flexibility of the laws, the possibility of defeat and additional costs. In

³²² *Slobodata na pechata v Balgariya* [Freedom of the Press in Bulgaria], (Sofia, 1992), p.151.

³²³ R. Daskalov, *Balgarskoto obshtestvo 1918-1939* [Bulgarian Society 1918-1939], II, (Sofia, 2006), p.485.

³²⁴ I. Dimitrov, ‘Diktaturata i Pечат’ [Dictatorship and Press] in: *Politicheskata cenzura v Balgaria* [Political Censorship in Bulgaria], F. Panaitov (ed.), (Varna, 2003), p.102.

³²⁵ M. Pietrzak, *Reglamentacja wolności prasy w Polsce 1918-1939* [Regulation of the freedom of the press in Poland 1918-1939], (Warsaw, 1963), p.520.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

1937, the courts revoked about 10% of seizures ordered by the administrative authorities and prosecutors.³²⁷ This situation had not improved after the law from 1938. A lack of data for the last two years of the Second Polish Republic did not allow the exact numbers to be recreated, but it was possible to assume that number of seizures at least was the same, if not larger.

After the April Constitution of 1938 in Poland, the principle of freedom of the press had lost its constitutional nature³²⁸, not only theoretically, but practically too. After the new Constitution was formed, any legislation considering the press was passed onto the ordinary legislation where press law from 1938 basically legalized the practice that had already existed in Poland under the *Sanacja*.

Seizures brought serious material damage to the newspapers. Large financial losses occurred, which entailed frequent seizures held by *Sanacja* authority in the interpretation of an additional punishment for opposing journals. They also allowed the appearance of “voluntary” preventive control on which some editors were forced to prevent the collapse of the magazine. A “voluntary” preventative control had been recognized by the Supreme Court to be compatible with the provisions of the “March Constitution”, which was valid until 1935.³²⁹

The press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as we mentioned earlier, was not free and was under the control of the government and state organs. This was primarily related to the transfer of political information on the government, as well as related to news concerning the ruling party and the Royal House. Nevertheless, the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was diverse and disparate.

Stojadinovic’s government controlled the papers in two ways. Firstly, regarding the pre-emptive censorship and secondly, regarding the banning of papers, if it was concluded that its writing was harmful for the interests of the President, the Government or the Party in power. The reasons for closing most papers were Communist tendencies or contents. It was especially the case with the Croatian papers, but other regions were not spared this common practice, either.

Control and supervision of the newspapers was carried out, in addition to various pressures such as blackmail and bribery, in two ways. Firstly, as we have already said, the preventive censorship was carried out by the CPB, the state prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and secondly, newspapers were closed if their writing was judged to be

³²⁷ Pietrzak, *Reglamentacja...*, p.521.

³²⁸ March Constitution from 1921 in the Article 105 declared the freedom of the press.

³²⁹ Pietrzak, *Reglamentacja...*, p.529.

detrimental to the interests of the government and the ruling party. There were papers that were obliged to come to preventative censorship and there were those that were exempted from such obligation. That could be also related to the objective circumstances, such as the lack of a sufficient number of reliable censors.³³⁰ The severity of censorship could be illustrated by fact that the Split daily newspaper *Jadranski dnevnik* was banned 23 times in the period March-June 1938.³³¹ That meant that every third number was banned and as we have said, censorship was stringently applied to newspapers in Croatia.

Sometimes the censors went so far as to ban newspapers even when they did not publish what they received from the propaganda institutions. So on 24th June 1938, Split's newspapers *Jadranski dnevnik* (*Adriatic Journal*) and *Novo Doba* (*New Age*) did not release any news related to the government anniversary and they were banned. This ban was the result of anger, and also the inability of the government's representatives in the Primorska banovina. A similar situation occurred with a list from Novi Sad, *Dan* (*Day*) on the same day because their report on the anniversary was not published on the front page. That was described, in the opinion of the state prosecutor, as an "insult", to "Mr. President".³³²

Censorship sometimes banned newspapers, even when they brought the official press release about an event. The reason for this was when official communications were not issued in their entirety and therefore in the opinion of the censor, these could lead to arbitrary interpretations. Sometimes this "mistake" was unintentional and due to a lack of space, but mainly because newspapers were deliberately obliged to publish official announcements. This happened, especially in cases of commenting on politically sensitive issues like the opposition agreement in Farkasic³³³, Concordat³³⁴ etc. In addition to the overall official press releases, for which the agency *Avala* was responsible, newspapers had to print these additional comments. It

³³⁰ Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic complained that even he was requested to submit *Samouprava* to the preventative censorship to CPB. He refused because he considered himself part of the CPB.

³³¹ AY, 38-11.

³³² Archive of Vojvodina, Royal banovina's administration 1938, Letter of State's persecutor to ban Dunav banovina of 25 June 1938.

³³³ Agreement of cooperation between opposition parties from Serbia and Croatia. See more in: T. Stojkov, 'O stvaranju bloka narodnog sporazuma' [About the foundation of People's agreement coalition], *Istorija XX veka*, VI, (Belgrade, 1964), pp.245-301.

³³⁴ Concordat was signed in 1935, but it was invalidated in 1937 due to the strong opposition of Serbian Orthodox Church and people. For more see: M. Misovic, *Srpska crkva i konkordatska kriza* [Serbian Church and Concordat Crisis], (Belgrade, 1983); R. Radic, *Zivot u vremenima: Gavrilo Dozic 1881-1950* [Life in Times: Gavrilo Dozic 1881-1950], (Belgrade, 2006), pp.156-186.

was clear that these comments were pro-government and were adjusted to suit the government's needs and political interests.

The prosecution has its censorship duty to perform every day. For example, in the State Prosecutor's Office in Ljubljana, there were four officers who dealt with that business. They said prosecutors worked on the daily shifts, so that each worked an average of two days a week.

However, there were cases that even the prosecutors' influence on the newspapers was not in the interests of the then government. So it happened that, despite instructions to the CPB to publish an article about Stojadinovic's visit to Italy, what was offered by *Avala* "in the Slovenian press articles only gave comments on these visits".³³⁵ In a report on the work of the prosecutors, it was alleged that only one of these four prosecutors openly supported the JRZ, which was seen as a problem. This case revealed that, during the implementation of censorship, there were some problems, and even more when it was revealed that the CPB, in certain situations, was viewed as superior to the prosecution.

There were cases when the state prosecutors received orders for special surveillance under the guise of some newspaper and those prosecutors who received this special status could be forced to delete what someone suspected they were doing.

Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had central institutions in charge of the press and publishing information. Yugoslavia had the Central Press-Bureau and Bulgaria had the Office for the Press. These institutions were in charge of deciding which information was "acceptable", as well as controlling their publishing. Similar institutions existed throughout Europe and these all basically shared the same functions.³³⁶

The section of the CPB that dealt with the preventative examination of the press was responsible for monitoring the local newspapers, magazines and newsletters too. This newsletter included a review of all minority newspapers in the Hungarian, German, Czech and Slovak languages and this was located in Review 27 of the daily newspapers, of which there were four German and Hungarian and 125 weekly newspapers.³³⁷ These were all published from the newsletter which showed the political orientation of each newspaper. In addition, there were

³³⁵ AY, fond 37, folder 73, pages 333/335, Report on the work of prosecution in connection with preventative censorship.

³³⁶ Some information on the organization of these institutions in European countries during the 1930's could be found in the reports of the CPB correspondents from abroad. AY, 38-141.

³³⁷ CPB, Report..., p.41.

specially created files, which permanently gave information about the editor and his associates as well as giving information relating to the whole journalistic profession in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

There was one significant report from the British Consulate in Belgrade from 1938 relating to the freedom of the press in Yugoslavia: “Censorship of the press in Yugoslavia has become increasingly harsher towards the end of the year. Some headlines, even whole editions, were excluded, often without any good reason where Belgrade’s newspapers especially were obligated to publish all the information that the Central-Press Bureau wanted. In September, publication of the Belgrade *Pravda*, which received material for its news from Czechoslovakia and France, was terminated by an order from the Interior Ministry. In the official statement, they stated that there were some damaging accusations about the highest officials from the head offices of this newspaper. One month after the termination, the newspaper was published once again.”³³⁸

Even the Prime Minister Stojadinovic was involved in the censorship. In the case of the newspaper *Javnost* (Public), which was under the suspicion that it received money from Czechoslovakian government, he made the following statement: “if any, even smaller thing could be found which is not along the basic line of our foreign and interior policy the newspaper should be terminated “according to the law”.³³⁹ In the case of Zagreb’s journal *Novosti* (News), he urged for the dismissal of 10 journalists in order to stop this paper from having “leftist-communist tendencies.”³⁴⁰

Instructions, on the implementation of censorship in specific cases, could be issued from the bans. In their field, they had some kind of autonomy, and were thus able to censor writing about the phenomena that had a regional character, and for which CPB didn’t give specific instructions. Marko Natlachen, of Drava banovina issued an order to the press that banned criticism of the teachers’ transfer in Slovenia that was often in this period.³⁴¹ With the same

³³⁸ *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, Godisnji izvestaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu* [Brits about Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Yearly Reports of British Consulate in Belgrade], II, (Zagreb, 1986), p.683.

³³⁹ AY, 37-46-542, Letter of Stojadinovic to the Minister of Interior Anton Korosec on 21st December 1937.

³⁴⁰ AY, 37-14-279, Letter of Stojadinovic to the Minister of Finance Dusan Letica on 27th June 1937.

³⁴¹ The teachers in the Interwar Yugoslavia were transferred from one place to another as an act of punishment if they didn’t collaborate with the government’s officials.

order, any articles about some property transfers that were going at the time in his party were forbidden.³⁴²

Some journals and editors received special treatment. There were situations in Yugoslavia where prosecutors were instructed to pay particular attention to some newspapers. On those occasions, they deleted even some lines that could be interpreted differently from the official line of the government's propaganda.³⁴³

The newspapers and editors fought their war against censorship in any way that was possible. There were examples, especially in Croatia, of state prosecution officials censoring the whole passages of given texts and newspapers publishing them with empty space in place of the censored sections.³⁴⁴ This was a tactic that the editors of these newspapers used to draw attention to the state repression and to the suppression of freedom in the country.

The director of the Bulgarian *Renewal* Petar Popzlatev, on his meeting with the capital's journalists, made an interesting statement about the advantage of censorship. He said "Today's regime of censorship has the advantage of liberating editors of all responsibility, after the newspaper passes our control. We could eliminate censorship, but do you imagine how much more difficult your job is, when you intentionally step outside the limitations and enter under the sanctions of the law? Now is better, because, once your newspaper is controlled by censors, you are free from any future responsibilities..."³⁴⁵

One of the most interesting articles about the press and its role in the state was published in Asen Bojinov's (Асень Божиновъ) book *Press in the New State* ("Печатът в новата държава"). These articles were published by *Zveno* and one could assume that this was government approved. In this book, Bojinov explained, from his point of view, the relationship between state and the press where he urged for an elimination of every subjectivity in journalism ("personal, party, partisan, pathological and traitor").

The book consisted of several different sections that treated various problems. The names were as follows: Press – a Factor or Agent; Policy of the News; Totally Objective Journal; New State – New Press; Press and Criticism; Press and Education; Press and National Cause; Office for the Press; Press Secretary; Organized Internal Press; Press and Preparation; Press and

³⁴² AY, 38-5, Telefon report of CPB's correspondent from Ljubljana on 10th January 1936.

³⁴³ Oral testimony of Lazar Atanackovic, editor in chief of *Dan* in: D. Popov, *Srpska stampa u Vojvodini 1918-1941* [Serbian Press in Vojvodina 1918-1941], (Novi Sad, 1983), p.382.

³⁴⁴ For examples see AY, 37-11.

³⁴⁵ *Iz lichniya arhiv*, p.261.

Censorship. It was obvious that the publication was supposed to be a manual guide for the editors and journalists.

The main role model was found in contemporary Germany, Italy and Soviet Union and Bojinov said that the press should be aware of its new role of “re-educating the whole nation”. He expressed his belief that the “new state” should have the “new liberty of the press” where this liberty should be “organized” liberty. In practice, that “liberty” meant that the regime could not be criticized and that the press should have been an instrument of the government and by extension, its people. Bojinov demanded reform of the press that would “make the press simpler as it could pass from the present chaotic situation to a state of organized internal press under the command of the state”.³⁴⁶

Soon after the press law in Bulgaria in 1934 was set up, the first bans on newspapers were imposed where in the first phase of restructuring, 14 different journals were banned. Four of these were communist supporting newspapers: *Rabotnik (Worker)*, *Edinstvo (Unity)*, *Zvezda (Star)* and *Rabotnicheska Misal (Workers Thought)*.³⁴⁷ On 29th June and 3rd July, 20 more journals were banned (ten on each day), amongst them were some military papers who wrote against *Zveno*, “yellow” newspapers and even one Jewish *Evreiski vesti (Jewish news)* paper.³⁴⁸ On the other hand, around 120 journals were given permission to trade; amongst them were newspapers loyal to the regime as well as some apolitical papers.

At the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, some weaknesses of censorship in Bulgaria were becoming noticeable. This was a product of the change of regimes and the King’s circle tried to find the most appropriate policies for the country.

After a brief period, their control over the press were strengthened once again and in the analysis of the Society of the capital’s journalists, one could see a clear indication about the situation with the press in Bulgaria: “1935 – hard on journalists, outgoing censorship, limited unemployment, promises about the termination of censorship are not fulfilled; 1936 – partial liberation but only from time to time and they were dissatisfied.” On a couple of occasions, Kioseivanov gave promises about less censorship, but instead new, harsher measures against the press were introduced; “1937 – regime of control over press did not change, it became more

³⁴⁶ A. Bojinov, *Pechatat v novata darjava* [Press in the New State], (Sofia, 1934), p.51.

³⁴⁷ *Darjaven Vestnik* (State’s Journal), Nr. 69, 27. June 1934, p. 1195.

³⁴⁸ Nowosad, *Wladza i media*, p.225.

strict, not only on internal but also on external affairs; lack of instructions, no one knows what is permitted to be published and what is not permitted.’³⁴⁹

As in the case of Yugoslavia, there were many reasons for the termination or suspension of some journals. These included not only articles written against the interests of the ruling circles, but also articles that were *not* written in its favor. In July 1934, the newspaper (Macedonia) was suspended for one month because it didn't publish one Prime Minister's speech.³⁵⁰

The historian Ilcho Dimitrov (Илчо Димитров) underlined the difference in the censorship of different newspapers where left wing communist and democratic newspapers were more likely to be banned whilst opposition and right wing newspapers were usually suspended for some period of time and then re-instated.³⁵¹

One of the most important institutions for controlling the press was the Bureau “Presa”, which was formed in 1927. At the beginning, this was used as a weapon against the increasingly powerful leftist press. During 1931, the leftist newspaper *Eho* (*Echo*) was confiscated 74 times and one of those acts resulted with one member of the left receiving a three year prison sentence.³⁵²

After the cancellation of the Direction for Social Renewal, there were 3 different sections responsible for dealing with the press: Department for Overseeing the Press in the Council of Ministers (one chief, ten controllers in Sofia and four in province – Plovdiv, Burgas, Ruse, Varna), the Press direction with special service for the press in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Section “V” for the press in the Interior Ministry.³⁵³

The aforementioned Bureau “Presa” was subordinated to the Section “V” and the chief of the bureau sent monthly reports to the chief of the section about the writings of the domestic and international press.³⁵⁴ According to the official statistics before the “reform” in 1933, there were 281 political papers but in 1935, there were only 96 and this number was falling.

³⁴⁹ Dimitrov, *Diktaturata*, p.97.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid., p.98.

³⁵² T. Natan-Paunovska, ‘Cenzori i zurnalist, Levijat pechat i biro Presa. Zakoni za prosledvane 1926-1934’ [Censors and journalists, Leftist press and Bureau “Presa”. Laws for prosecution 1926-1934], in: *Politicheskata cenzura v Balgaria* [Political Censorship in Bulgaria], F. Panaitov (ed.), (Varna, 2003), p.89.

³⁵³ Dimitrov, *Diktaturata*, p.100.


³⁵⁴ For an example, please see the report from June 1938 in: Darjaven voenoistoricheski arhiv (State Military-Historical Archive) - DVIA, Fond Kulturno-prosvetna deinost (V2.07) [Cultural and Educational activities], box 23, description 1, archive unit 319, pp.36-45.

However, the government did not always win. In 1938, we noticed one, not insignificant, victory for democratic forces in Bulgaria. The Parliament, with a narrow margin, refused to accept credits for machines and other materials for the pro-government newspaper *Dnes*. One of the deputies even said that he would not vote for the newspaper in the service of propaganda and the aims of government, with anti-parliamentary and anti-social points of view³⁵⁵. This was the case that the remaining democrats had to be strong enough to block some authoritarian laws, even in Parliament.

In the following part of the chapter, we will examine the most important pro-government newspapers in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The other newspapers will be mentioned only to explain details relating to the pro-government press.

The newspapers in Poland that were affiliated to the government were numerous. Some of the most important newspapers in the late 1930's were the *Gazeta Polska* (*Polish Newspaper*) *Kurier Poranny* (*Morning Courier*) and *Polska Zbrojna* (*Polish Military*). The *Gazeta Polska* was the semi-official newspaper of the government from 1929. That did not mean that *Gazeta Polska* was under the same newspaper management though.

³⁵⁵ Dimitrov, *Diktaturata...*, p.109.



The first page of Gazeta Polska on the 1. September 1939

It was quite common that editors and staff were under the influence of different groups within the government. In the early 1930's, the newspaper was under the control of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and during 1935 and 1936, this newspaper was firstly under the influence of President Moscicki's group and afterwards, Marshal's group. The last one was obvious at the end of 1937 when *Gazeta Polska* became the official newspaper for OZN.³⁵⁶ The newspaper had three editors in chief during the 1930's and all three were important *Sanacja* members. The first was Colonel Adam Koc, who was later the chief of OZN and he was editor in chief until 1931. The second was one of the most important *Sanacja* journalists Boguslaw Meidzinski and he remained in his position until 1938 when he took a high position in the "Sejm". The last editor of *Gazeta Polska* was Mieczyslaw Starzynski (Mieczysław Starzyński).

³⁵⁶A. Paczkowski, *Prasa Polska w latach 1918-1939* [Polish Press 1918-1939], (Warsaw, 1980), p.146.

Kurier Poranny was one of the most widespread pro-government newspapers. It was founded in 1877 and from the start it was very loyal to Pilsudski. This was very significant as in the 1930's, its editor was the unofficial minister of propaganda Wojciech Stpiczynski (1931-1936). In its final years, *Kurier Poranny* supported *Sanacja* right wing (Rydz-Smigly, OZN) and had an average of 25,000 copies daily, but German occupation meant the end of its publishing.

The newspaper *Polska Zbrojna* (*Polish Army*) was even an unofficial organ of the Ministry of War and this was not only meant for military purposes, but for all citizens in Poland and its influence grew over time. At the beginning of the 1930's, *Polska Zbrojna* printed only 6,000 copies, but in later years, this number grew to between 25 and 30,000 copies on the eve of World War Two.³⁵⁷ After the death of Pilsudski, the newspaper strongly supported Rydz-Smygli and was one of its strongest supporters. Foreign policy was one of the main issues on the pages of the *Polska Zbrojna* where this newspaper had its correspondents posted in many countries like Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania and Palestine. *Polska Zbrojna* with a price of 10 grosz was cheaper than many other newspapers (*Gazeta Polska* was 20 grosz) and this also increased its popularity. Each issue of the newspaper had a front page quotation of Marshal Pilsudski entitled: "Jozef Pilsudski speaks" ("Józef Piłsudski mówi"). That was one of numerous ways to develop and spread the cult of Pilsudski in Interwar Poland.³⁵⁸

In total, five pro-government newspapers were published in Warsaw (*Gazeta Polska*, *Czas*, *Kurier Polski*, *Kurier Poranny* and *Polska Zbrojna*), but none of these exceeded 100,000 copies daily. That was not something that government was especially proud of because at the beginning of the 1930's, the sole *Kurier Poranny* had 50,000 copies.³⁵⁹ That was also a small number comparing to the most popular newspaper in Poland *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* (*Illustrated Daily Courier*) that was sometimes published in 200.000.³⁶⁰

However their influence could not be underestimated and the aforementioned newspapers were amongst the most important weapons of the state propaganda in the Second Polish Republic. Of other pro-government newspapers, one could mention *Kurier Wileński* (*Courier of*

³⁵⁷ Paczkowski, *Prasa Polska*, p.158.

³⁵⁸ More about the cult of Jozef Pilsudski in Poland see: H. Hein-Kircher, *Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926-1939* [The cult of Pilsudski and its meaning for Polish society 1926-1939], (Warsaw, 2008).

³⁵⁹ Paczkowski, *Prasa Polska*, p.158.

³⁶⁰ *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* was a sensationalist newspaper that became popular in the whole country during the 1930's.

Vilnius), *Slowo (The Word)*, *Kurier Czerwony (Red Courier)*, *Glos Prawdy (Voice of the Truth)* and *Droga (The Road)*.

The most important papers which were in charge of spreading Stojadinovic's propaganda were the *Vreme (Time)* and the *Samouprava (Self-government)*. The Belgrade newspaper *Vreme* was practically owned by Stojadinovic himself, since the main shareholders were members of his family or his friends. It was a widely read paper, second only to the *Politika* when it came to the number of copies sold. Considerable means were invested into the founding of this newspaper and the most modern printing house in the Balkans, equipped with German and American machinery was built for these purposes. The Prime Minister himself took part in creating the recognizable visual images and the contents of the paper and, according to one of his associates, he spent a few hours every day with its editing.

The *Vreme* was supposed to represent a model newspaper and to bring Stojadinovic's outlook on the political reality both in the country and abroad, since events in Europe started to influence the situation in the country more and more. In the 1930's, *Vreme* was one of the largest newspapers in the country (more than 130,000 copies in 1937) second only to *Politika* (150.000).³⁶¹ Though attempts were made to represent the *Vreme* as a neutral paper, it slowly gained the label of the Government's paper, which heavily contributed to its drop in sales.

The *Samouprava* was the main Party newspaper and all the other papers were under its control in the hierarchy of the Party press. This very title, which was taken from the old Radical newspaper, was meant to imply that the newly founded JRZ was the only real inheritor of the old Radical Party from the time of the Kingdom of Serbia. Although it had low sales (couple of thousands per day), the importance of this paper was not insignificant, since its articles were taken over and published by many provincial papers throughout the country.

Amongst the other newspapers which spread the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic, the most important were the *Vrbaske novine (Vrbas Journal)* from Banja Luka, the *Vardar* from Skopje, the *Narodni list (People's Newspaper)* from Cetinje, the *Narodna samouprava (People's Self-government)* from Kragujevac and the *Drzava (State)* from Split.

The Party Press-Bureau of the JRZ was closely connected to the press. This Party organ was founded in 1936 and its main task was to be the central institution of all the Party and

³⁶¹ *Politika* was one of the oldest newspapers in Serbia/Yugoslavia and was founded in 1904. During the 1930's, it tried to lead a neutral policy towards any government.

“friendly” papers. It sent information to be published to the provincial press and often sent the complete texts and the Press-Bureau ensured that the sent articles were being published on the covers of the papers, as well as synchronizing their appearance. The number of papers it cooperated with was around 35, but they published almost everything they received from the Press-Bureau. The head of this institution was Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the editor in chief of the *Samouprava*. The Press-Bureau shared its premises with the *Samouprava* almost until the end of 1938 and the same associates worked in both institutions.³⁶²

The most important newspaper of the new regime in Bulgaria was *Novi dni (New Days)*. This newspaper was published from 24th June 1934 until 28th June 1935 and it was published by the Direction for Social Renewal where the government’s achievements were glorified and emphasized every day. In the section titled “Facts that should not be forgotten”, people were reminded about the glorious past. *Novi dni* was the main instrument of the regime for creating “new people” for the “new state” and this newspaper lasted until the change of regime, but this regime change did not mean the end of the “press law” in Bulgaria. This law lasted until 1943, thus covering the whole period under the review in this study.

In the second half of 1930’s, the most influential daily newspapers in the service of the state propaganda were: *Dnes (Днес, Today)*, *Utro (Утро, Morning)* and *Večer (Вечер, Evening)* and *La Parole Bulgare (The Bulgarian Word)*.

From 1936-1944, *Dnes* was the one of the most important newspapers for state propaganda in Bulgaria. Its director was Dino Bozkov (ДИНО БОЖКОВ)³⁶³ and the editor in chief was Simeon Gruev (СИМЕОН ГРУЕВ).³⁶⁴ In the first issue of *Dnes*, the main tasks of the newspaper were underlined on the front page: “To start one informational unified newspaper, which will fill the absence of exact and documented facts from the area of the state’s and society’s life and to help, in its own way, to stabilize life in the country, with the aim of bringing Bulgaria better days, which it has every right to expect after all its suffering”.³⁶⁵

³⁶² More about the Party Press-Bureau of JRZ in: B. Simic, *Partijski pres-biro Jugoslovenske Radikalne Zajednice* [Party Press-Bureau of JRZ], *Arhiv* VI/2005, pp.73-78.

³⁶³ Dino Bozkov (1876-1966) – teacher, translator and publisher. He was the author of various publications on religious topics and propagandist of Christian ethics. He was the publisher and director *Vchera i dnes* (1939-1940) and *Večer* (1939-1940), unofficial newspapers of the Kioseivanov government.

³⁶⁴ Simeon Gruev (1894-1944) - journalist. He worked at several different newspapers like: *Balkanska tribuna*, *Zarya*, *Narod*, *Slovo* and *Makedonia*. Editor in chief of *Vchera i dnes* (1939-1940) and *Dnes* (1939-1940). He disappeared in the first days of communist rule in Bulgaria.

³⁶⁵ *Dnes*, number 1 from 3rd February 1936, page 1.

The formulation of helping the country in practice clearly meant helping the government. That was from its early days until the end the one of the primary tasks of the *Dnes*. Later in the 1940's, the newspaper officially became the government's messenger under the Prime Minister Bogdan Filov (Богдан Филов).³⁶⁶

The newspaper *Utro* was founded in 1911 and lasted until the fall of the Bulgarian monarchy in 1944. Its director was Atanas Damyanov (Атанас Дамянов)³⁶⁷ and its editor in chief after 1918 was Stefan Tanev (Стефан Танев).³⁶⁸ The newspaper never entered into any conflict with the governments and always remained faithful in the hands of every regime. For that, Tanev had an interesting explanation: "It is not good that one journal tied its fate with one regime. That is the case of *Utro*. It supported not only one government, but also one regime and it supported all of them for the time while that regime had sympathy and majority. They had no majority in the ruling class, but were popular with the majority of people".³⁶⁹ *Utro* was geared towards the masses, as their articles were similar to "folk language" that was closer to the minds of the masses, the main consumers of propaganda. That was the reason why, in some circles, it was known as the "people's journal".³⁷⁰

³⁶⁶ Bogdan Filov (1883-1945) – professor of archeology (1920-1944), dean of University of Sofia (1931-1932) and president of Bulgarian Academy of Science (1937-1944). As a politician, he was Minister of Education (1938-1940), Prime Minister (1940-1943) and regent (1943-1943).

³⁶⁷ Atanas Damyanov (Sopot, 1871 – 1948) advocate, journalist and publisher. He finished high school in Romania, university in Venice, Paris and Geneva. Damyanov worked as a prosecutor and judge. He was remembered most by his publishing work in journalism. Aside of *Utro*, he was the founder and co-founder of *Echo d' Geneve*, *Dnevnik* and *Zarya*.

³⁶⁸ Stefan Tanev (Turnu Magureli, Romania 1888 - Sofia, 1952) He was the law student but when he was very young, he became a journalist. Most of his life was dedicated to the newspaper *Utro* which was very popular in the country until 1944. After the World War Two, he was sentenced to life time imprisonment from the new communist regime. He died in jail.

³⁶⁹ S. Tanev, *Dnevnik* (Diary), (Sofia, 2005), p.7

³⁷⁰ Ibid, p.1173.



The first page of newspaper *Utro* from the 7.May 1938

It was important to mention *La Parole Bulgare*, the Bulgarian newspaper that was published for foreign propaganda. It was published in French and was financed by the government. *La Parole Bulgare* was published weekly and this cost the government around 3 million levas per year.³⁷¹

At the end of this section of the chapter, we could conclude that the press was the most important propaganda tool of state governments in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930's. The press was the most diverse and heavily used instrument for these government's propaganda purposes in the period under review. With restrictive legislation and various methods of pressure, the ruling circles in these countries tried to control public opinion. Many

³⁷¹ CDA, 176k-20-12/21 Document from 1940, which covered the period from 1st September to 31st December. This told us the total costs for publishing were 1,246,947. Of these, only 155,000 of these costs were gathered from subscribers, commercials and foreign orders. We could also see that in 1940, there were also Italian and German versions of the newspaper.

newspapers, willingly or otherwise, reported the activity of the governments and interpreted events in the light of official positions.

In the event of disobedience, the governments did not hesitate to use bans, fines and threats. Nevertheless, the most important tools for state propaganda were the newspapers that were in the pockets of these regimes.

RADIO

The first regular radio broadcasts³⁷² in Europe started in the first half of the 1920's. One of the first radio stations of this type was set up in the UK in 1922. It was the *British Broadcasting Company* (later *Corporation*), known as the *BBC*. This station, as well as the others founded afterwards, were associated with the territory of the mother country. The first international radio station was *Radio Holland*, which started broadcasting in 1927.³⁷³ This year was of immense significance since it was the year when the short wave broadcasting began, which made transmission to long distance possible.

Propaganda spread via radio broadcasting during the period in question and this had a significant advantage in comparison to propaganda spread by the press. It knew no geographical or state borders and it could be heard on different continents at the same time, where even the illiterate could understand. In addition, it had the indirect effect of making personal contact with the listener and there was also practically the unlimited possibility of broadcasting in other states since the jamming devices used at the time were quite primitive.³⁷⁴

During the 1930's, radio broadcasting made a significant step forward. In 1937, radio stations in the world were divided as follows: Asia 161 (8%), Africa 19 (1%), Australia 130 (7%), America 1.142 (62%) and Europe 408 (22%). When one considered the power of the aforementioned stations, a different picture emerged: Asia 579 kW (5%), Africa 118kw (1%),

³⁷² Miroslav Jokić said the following about radio broadcasting: "The term 'radio broadcasting' signified in the beginning only transmission of sound across distance, including also wireless radio-telegraphy (transmission of sound signals) and wireless telephoning (transmission of human voice). With the development of technologies for transmission of speech and music, the meaning of the term 'radio broadcasting' was broadened to the field of radio-technology, which dealt with matters of 'musical qualities of transmission of human voice', i.e. with the highest quality broadcasting (microphone - transmitter) and reception (radio - receiver - speakers). The complete range and content of the term 'radio broadcasting' was set only with the tape recorder revolution, which generated the artistic approach that was the use of sound recording as a sound signal (signifier). By these means, the non-existent possibility of sound expression was accomplished. It became the key term in development of the new, 'eight art' called radio-broadcasting.", M. Jokić, *Istorija radiofonije u tri epohe* [History of Radiophony in three periods], I-III, (Belgrade, 2004), pp.7-8.

³⁷³ N.Cull, D.Culbert, D.Welch, *Propaganda and mass persuasion, A historical encyclopedia, 1500 to present*, (Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp.331-333.

³⁷⁴ First mass and efficient jamming of radio-broadcasts of foreign radio-stations was conducted by Germany during the Second World War. It was not completely successful, but it represented one of the first attempts of its kind, M. Oreč, *Sloboda informacija i propaganda* [Freedom of Information and Propaganda], (Belgrade, 1966), p.190.

Australia 271kw (2%), America 3.423 (27%) and Europe 8.096 (65%).³⁷⁵ Clearly America had the highest number of radio stations, but in terms of its power and development, Europe was way ahead. For further details, please see the table below of radio development in Europe during the 1930's:

Radio- broadcasting in Europe during 1936

Country	Number of inhabitants (in millions)	Beginning of broadcasting	Number of subscribers	Number of radio-stations	Energy total
Austria	6,7	1924	575 000	9	149
Belgium	8,2	1925	757 000	16	41
Bulgaria	6	1929	10 000	3	5
Greece	6,2	1932	5 000	1	1
Danmark	3,6	1922	625 000	3	75
England	46	1922	7 700 000	29	858
Estonia	1,2	1926	30 000	2	20
Italy	41,1	1924	560 000	19	323
Yugoslavia	14	1926	85 000	3	9
Lithuania	2	1925	85 000	4	80
Luxemburg	0,3	1932	22 000	1	150
Hungary	8,6	1925	380 000	8	154
Germany	66,6	1923	7 600 000	41	1015
Norway	2,8	1925	208 000	16	193
Poland	32	1925	540 000	11	217
Portugal	6	1933	45 000	3	25
Turkey	14	1925	9 000	2	12
Romania	18	1925	101 000	3	62
Switzerland	4	1923	426 000	8	257
Sweden	6,1	1925	884 000	31	245
Spain	22,7	1924	304 000	9	51
France	41,8	1922	2 800 000	28	851
Finland	3,6	1926	145 000	10	263
The Netherlands	8,5	1925	950 000	6	295,
Czechoslovakia	14,7	1923	859 000	8	101
SSSR/USSR	128,1	1924	2 500 000	75	1600

* Based on the data published in the magazine *Radio Beograd* [Radio Belgrade] of 20 September 1936.

As one could see in the table, radio broadcasting in the Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria started about the same time as in the other European countries. *Radio Warsaw* (Radio Warszawa)

³⁷⁵ S. Miszczak, *Historia radiofonii i telewizji w Polsce* [History of Radio and Television in Poland], (Warsaw, 1972), p.147.

started in 1926. One year earlier, the society for control of the radio was formed (“Polskie Radio Sp.Akc”). Secondly, a radio station was formed in Cracow (1926). After that, several radio stations were formed: Katowice (1927), Poznan (1927), Vilnius (1928), Lwow (1930), Lodz (1931), Torun (1931), Warsaw II (1937), Baranowicze (1938) and the national radio network was created. In 1929, the Ministry for Post and Telegraph gave the aforementioned society a 20 year concession for the use of radio until 1949.

Radio broadcasting in Serbia began to develop during the First World War.³⁷⁶ The radio stations in question were temporary ones set up for military purposes with help from the French.³⁷⁷ Home radio stations started broadcasting regular programs by the second half of the 1920’s. This was first done by the radio station in Zagreb in 1926, whereas *Radio Ljubljana* started broadcasting two years later. Only in 1929 did the capital get its own radio station. *Radio Belgrade* (Radio Beograd), which started its regular broadcasts on 24th March. The main transmitter was placed on the building of *The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts*. In May 1934, this building was moved to Makis.³⁷⁸

The development of radio broadcasting in Bulgaria was a few years behind development in Poland and Yugoslavia. One of the most important steps in the development of radio in Bulgaria was the creation of *Native Radio* (Родно Радио) in 1930. In the same year, regular broadcasts began for a couple of hours per day. Only in 1936 was the national radio network formed when *Radio Stara Zagora* (Стара Загора) and *Radio Varna* (Варна) were introduced.

Jurisdiction over radio in these three countries belonged to, at least partially, the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephones or the local equivalents to that ministry. In Poland, radio started more as a private society, but over time, the state control of the radio grew. Initially, the state had only a 40% stake in the society for control of the radio. In 1935, that stake rose to 96%.³⁷⁹ That meant that during the mid 1930’s, radio in Poland was completely under control of the ruling circle.

³⁷⁶ The first public transmission of an event to distance in Serbia was organized in the night of 29 January 1895. This was achieved by a larger number of telephones, installed for that occasion in Belgrade – Nis. The programme in question was a concert held at the premises of *Kolarčeva pivnica*, a beer-hall next to the house and foundation of Ilija Milosavljevic – Kolarac, Ibid., p. 75.

³⁷⁷ See further in: *Ovde Radio-Beograd*, Zbornik pedesetogodišnjice, (Belgrade, 1989), p.11.

³⁷⁸ D.Tešić, *Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica u Srbiji 1935-1939* [Yugoslav Radical Community in Serbia 1935-1939], (Belgrade, 1997), p.197, reference 33.

³⁷⁹ *Polska Niepodległa* (Independent Poland), (Warsaw, 2008), p.505.

Jurisdiction over radio in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was handed to several different ministries during the 1930's. Radio was controlled by the Ministry for Post, Telegraph and Telephone before it was handed over to the Ministry of Civil Engineering from April 1929 until December 1930. The transfer of jurisdiction continued and from December 1930 until September 1935, radio was controlled by the Ministry of Traffic. Only after that period did radio return under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Post, Telegraph and Telephone and remained there until the occupation of the country.

The main legislative characteristic in the field of radio diffusion during this period in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could be summarized as follows:

- Normal regulation of radio diffusion followed valid international conventions, but it was partial and this was confirmed by the fact that no integral laws on radio diffusion had been passed;
- According to its character, the normative acts passed in this period could be classified as: acts regulating relations between owners of radios and the State and acts regulating between the State and prospective owners and founders of radio stations;
- High levels of distrust and caution of the State towards new media – radio, where the State from being the leading promoter became its sole controller;
- Numerous restrictive state measures towards “subjects” wanting to broadcast, but also listening to radio programs;
- Insufficient dealing with copyright problems.³⁸⁰

The Department for Radio-Broadcasting was established later in 1939 to complete the diverse tasks in relation to radio broadcasting within the Central Press-Bureau (CPB). This affected the standard division into three departments: Administrative, Informative and Publicist, prescribed by the Regulations on the work of 1931 and 1935.

The new Department for Radio Broadcasting was divided into as many as ten sections: Secretariat, Editing board for the domestic program, Editing board for foreign programs, Editing board of the news in foreign languages, Editing board for overseas programs, office of foreign news broadcasts, Radio telegraphic office, Technical office, Information office – reportage,

³⁸⁰ M. Nikolic, *Radio u Srbiji 1924-1941* [Radio in Serbia 1924-1941], (Belgrade, 2006), p.25.

Cultural propaganda and Music section.³⁸¹ Understandably, the importance of radio broadcasting became much greater.

Between 1937 and 1939, the mature program concept was presented and this was “mature” in every sense. This was designed by the first generation of creators who had been educated at the radio station and who clearly knew what could be done with radio. Since listeners of radio broadcasts were known, the author referred to a structured and differentiated auditorium in which target groups could be recognized. This “golden era” of *Radio Belgrade* finished with nationalization that was an essential reflection of the international socio-political situation.³⁸²

In Bulgaria in the first article of the “Radio law” (1935),³⁸³ it clearly stated that radio was the state’s monopoly and the state was the only one that was allowed to “build, control and use” radio stations.³⁸⁴ After that law in Bulgaria was passed, the situation in the radio industry developed as follows:

- Bulgarian Radio was the property of Ministry for Information and it was run by the ministry;
- Employees of the Radio were the state’s clerks;
- Ministry for Information created all programs, members and duties of the committees and also conducted pre-emptive censorship;
- In the Executive Committee, people could only enter if they were delegated by the government. In the Program Committee, they could enter independent intellectuals but only in consultative roles. Chief of this committee was delegated by the Prime Minister on the suggestion of the Ministry of Communication.
- Radio was financed by taxes on radio and from commercials. The finances were controlled by the Ministry of Communication.³⁸⁵

In the new regulation for the radio service from 1938, the Program Committee entered representatives from the following ministries: Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Ministry of War, Ministry of Education, Ministry Interior, Health Direction, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry

³⁸¹ AY, 38-1.

³⁸² Nikolic, *Radio u Srbiji*, p.91.

³⁸³ First law considering radio in Bulgaria was declared in 1927.

³⁸⁴ *Darjaven Vestnik* (State’s Journal) number 22 from 31.January 1935.

³⁸⁵ R. Cholakov, *Pravo na Radioteleviziyni organizacii v Balgaria* [The regulation of radio-television organizations in Bulgaria], (Sofia-Wien, 2000), p.26.

of Commerce. Their mandates were for three years.³⁸⁶ As one could see, the state put radio directly under its influence and propaganda tasks became the main function of radio in Bulgaria. It was interesting to note that the system created in the mid 1930's remained almost unchanged under the communist rule in Bulgaria after Second World War until 1990.³⁸⁷

During the 1930's, Bulgarian Radio was organized in five departments:

In the Music department, there were following sections:

- Standard and Classical Music;
- Folk Music;
- Pop and Dancing Music.

In the Educational and department were:

- Drama, Literature and Art;
- Popular science;
- Health, Religious and Everyday Education

In the Professional and Economic department were:

- Agriculture;
- Industry and Craft;
- Commerce.

In the Informational Department were:

- General Information;
- Foreign Information;
- Internal Information.

In the Propaganda Department were:

- Internal Propaganda;
- Foreign Propaganda.

Internal Propaganda was divided into the following sections: everyday culture, state and society ventures, ideological and propaganda communications between cultural and economic organizations and national defense. Meanwhile, foreign propaganda looked after national propaganda, the export and tourism sections.³⁸⁸ At first glance, the extensive organization of

³⁸⁶ Nowosad, *Wladza i media*, p.232.

³⁸⁷ Cholakov, *Pravo na*, p.28.

³⁸⁸ Nowosad, *Wladza i media*, p.233.

Bulgarian radio was in reality created with very few experts and employees and this will be discussed in more detail later.

In general, the 1930's were the period of rapid development of radio. The following table illustrated the number of radios in the World and more importantly, the number of radios per thousand habitants in each country:

Number of radios in the World 1936-1938

State	1936 (in thousands)	1937 (in thousands)	1938 (in thousands)	On thousand habitants (1938)
United States	22.500	24.269	-	190
Danmark	609	652	704	190
England	7.403	7.961	8.480	182
Sweden	834	944	-	151
Germany	7.193	8.168	9.087	136
Netherlands	947	989	1.072	124
Belgium	746	890	1.018	123
Switzerland	418	464	504	122
Norway	189	240	305	107
France	2.627	3.219	4.164	99
Austria	537	594	620	92
Czechoslovakia	848	928	1.044	68
Latvia	82	96	114	59
Hungary	353	365	383	43
Japan	2.372	2.711	-	39
Poland	492	677	861	26
Lithuania	27	35	48	19
Italy	550	625	795	18
Romania	127	163	216	12
Yugoslavia	80	74	154	11
Bulgaria	-	40	62	7

*Maly rocznik statystyczny 1938, "Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej", Warszawa 1938, p. 338.

**For the countries with missing data for 1938. Calculations were made for 1937.

Of three countries under review, Poland had the most developed radio service. The power of Polish radio station grew significantly over the years. The following table illustrated the situation at the beginning of the World War II:

Power of the Polish radio stations 31st August 1939³⁸⁹

Radio station (in alphabetic order)	Power	Range
Baranowicze	50 kw	120 km
Katowice	50 kw	160 km
Cracow	10 kw	45 km
Lodz	10 kw	45 km
Lwow	50 kw	100 km
Poznan	50 kw	100 km
Torun	24 kw	60 km
Warsaw I	120 kw	300 km
Warsaw II	10 kw	45 km
Vilnius	50 kw	140 km

As one could see, the most powerful radio station was in the capital city of Poland Warsaw with a range of 300 kilometres. It was also interesting to note the station that was built in 1938 in Baranowicze near the border with the USSR. Obviously, this station was built to neutralize strong Soviet propaganda in the area at the time.

With reference to the growth of the total power of Polish radio stations, one could see the following table:

³⁸⁹ Miszczak, Historia radiofonii p.142.

Total Power of the Polish Radio Stations 1926-1938

Year	Number of Stations	Total Power
1926	1	10,0 kw
1927	4	28,3 kw
1928	5	28,8 kw
1929	5	28,8 kw
1930	7	31,8 kw
1931	7	168,8 kw
1932	7	168,8 kw
1933	7	169,3 kw
1934	7	183,8 kw
1935	8	207,8 kw
1936	8	275,8 kw
1937	9	294,0 kw
1938	10	378,0 kw

*Data as at 31st December of the previous year³⁹⁰

The development of radio broadcasting throughout the 1930's in these two Balkan countries was slow and noticeably lagged behind the main European developments of the time. Very few radio stations existed in the Balkans during this period (four in Yugoslavia and three in Bulgaria) and the ones that did exist had a very weak transmission capability. The number of individuals who owned a radio was also quite low (during 1936, approximately 85,000 in Yugoslavia and approximately 10,000 in Bulgaria) with most of these people living in the cities.³⁹¹

Nevertheless, there was a growing tendency towards the use of radio. The number of radio subscribers grew considerably in Yugoslavia as the range and influence of the radio stations became greater. The situation in Bulgaria was rather similar. Sofia built a radio station with a transmission power in the region of the 100 kW level and the number of subscribers grew to more than 90,000 in 1940.

Nevertheless, according to statistics released in 1938, both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were listed amongst the lowest of all the European countries in terms of radio usage. For example, Bulgaria had only seven radios per 1000 citizens and Yugoslavia had eleven. The only countries that were behind them at this time were Greece and Turkey with 4 and 3 radios per 1,000

³⁹⁰ Miszczak, *Historia radiofonii*, p.148.

³⁹¹ Data taken from the periodical *Radio Beograd* (Radio Belgrade) of 20 September 1936.

inhabitants respectively. The Third country under review Poland was higher, with 26 radios per 1000 inhabitants, higher than its neighbor Romania (12) and even Italy, but lower than Hungary (43) or Austria (92).

The radio program in these countries mainly consisted of music, but news formed a significant part of the radio output. In Poland during the 1930's, radio output roughly consisted of 40% news and 60% music. The news aspect of radio was one of its key functions. According to data, the "word" radio program of Polish radio (main and local) in 1937 consisted of 56.5% news and only 16.6% of radio was devoted to literature.³⁹²

Due to an increasingly developed radio network, the number of the employees working in Polish radio grew during the 1930's. In 1929, there were 180 employees, at the beginning of 1936, 790 and in June 1939, there were 1,456 employees.³⁹³

In Bulgaria, music played a more significant part in the radio programs. During 1939, music had a share of 82% of total radio output while lectures had only 9.5% and news 5.2%.³⁹⁴ Bulgarian documents provided us with interesting social breakdowns of radio listeners. During 1938, the biggest group of radio listeners were clerks (33.7%) followed by free professions (29.1%) and merchants (22.4%). The majority of the listeners were in the cities, one third of the total number came from Sofia alone. In 1939, Sofia had 18,802 out of a total of 56,884 radio owners.³⁹⁵ The radio owners outside Sofia were mainly in the other major cities in Bulgaria while the use of radio remained rare in the villages during the period under review.

The ruling circles in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria realized the importance of radio as a tool for the state's propaganda and during the mid 1930's, this became increasingly clear. Judging from the aforementioned indicators, it was clear that radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, at the time of Milan Stojadinovic's Government coming into power in 1935 was at a very low level.

Later in this study, the concrete Government measures in the field of radio broadcasting will be discussed and their achievements will be evaluated in greater detail. Stojadinovic was a politician who paid a lot of attention to propaganda and this was also manifested in this field. As early as the start of 1936, in a letter to a minister in charge, he stated his plans in the field of

³⁹² Classical music only took 29% of the music part of the program. Dominant was "easy going" music 67% while the dance music had only 4% of the share. Miszczak, *Historia radiofonii*, p.171.

³⁹³ Miszczak, *Historia radiofonii*, p. 83.

³⁹⁴ V.Dimitrov, *Istoriya na radioto v Balgaria* [History of Radio in Bulgaria], II, (Sofia, 1994), p.128.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.102-103.

radio broadcasting. These plans involved setting up a new radio station, as well as enhancing its efficiency in the field of propaganda. Due to its exceptional importance, it was important to quote a part of the letter, which best summed up the place and importance meant by Stojadinovic for radio broadcasting in spreading the Government propaganda. In the letter, the following was stated:

“Radio has played an immense role in state and foreign affairs, as well as in the social life of different countries, especially in the last few years. Therefore, great attention is paid to it in the countries with the highest level of culture as to a first-rate means of propaganda. It beats all the other means for spreading propaganda when it comes to speed, clarity and availability of the program. National propaganda uses all means available in far more powerful countries. It is also needed in our country to pay more attention to radio-broadcasting, both as an unequalled means of spreading propaganda and as a media that can play the role which no-one else can successfully play in our lives. Radio-broadcasting is not divided into spheres due to this or that alphabet or dialect - it is available to everyone in the most effective way. The Belgrade Radio-station has always met the needs of the state and of the national propaganda, but these needs grow on a daily basis and the Belgrade Radio-station cannot satisfy them in a way which a radio station, organized by the Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, could.”³⁹⁶

The realization of the aforementioned plans was initiated by forming the Short-Wave Radio-Station or Radio Belgrade II at the beginning of March 1936. This station was built by the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone. However, the Central Press-Bureau was exclusively in charge of this program. Its original strength was 0.25 kW, but it was strengthened to 1 kW after only two weeks.

The main goal of the newly established radio-station was to promote the Government's politics, both home and abroad. The main part of the program of the Short-Wave Radio-Station was the news, which was also broadcasted in foreign languages. Apart from the political news, there were also lectures on Yugoslav culture, its natural beauties, economy and trade. The

³⁹⁶ AY, 38-116, The Letter of Milan Stojadinovic to the Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Branko Kaludjercic of 18 January 1936.

following table gave us an insight into the degree to which propaganda activity was intensified by setting up this radio-station:

News broadcasts in the program of radio-stations (in hours per year)


Radio-station	1935	1936	1937	1938
Belgrade	280	301	277	274
Zagreb	219	275	242	283
Ljubljana	132	140	88	130
Short-Wave Radio-Station	0	1020	1371	1240
TOTAL	631	1736	1978	1927

*Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1934-1939).

As many as 1,100 hours of additional news was broadcast, almost 300% more in 1936 than in 1935. This clearly demonstrated the endeavors and tendencies of the Government. Concrete achievements in this field resulted in additional efforts, as well as additional finance for this purpose.³⁹⁷ In the budget for 1936/1937, five million dinars were allocated for the improvement of radio broadcasting.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁷ Loans that Stojadinovic took out to set up the new Short-Wave Radio-Station resulted in an increase of the set budget for 1938/39 by 553 728 dinars, AY, 38-116, The Letter of M. Stojadinovic sent to D.Letica, The Minister Finances.

³⁹⁸ AY, 38-116, The Letter of Milan Stojadinovic to the Minister of Post Offices, Telegraphy and Telephoning, Branko Kaludjercic of 28 May 1937.



Развитак радиографије у нашој земљи.

Propaganda material about development of radio in Yugoslavia

Two Belgrade radio-stations broadcasted news from 7 am to 11 pm. At the Short-Wave Radio-Station, attention was paid to scheduling the news hours so that they were not broadcasted at the same time as those on Radio Belgrade. This created the feeling in which radio news from Belgrade was broadcast almost every hour and where it was practically “prepared” in one center. The broadcast news had to be thoroughly checked in this case before it went onto the radio airwaves.

Firstly, the news was gathered from reports from the daily press and from the CPB, i.e. from the materials that had already been censored. Afterwards, before the news was read by a presenter, they were “purified” and adjusted” to the instructions once again. Apart from the news in Serbo-Croatian, the Short-Wave Radio-Station also broadcast news in Hungarian, Italian, Greek, Turkish, Albanian, French, German and English.

A report in 1936 showed that in the period from March 1936 to 31 December 1936, over 17,000 pages of news were read in nine different languages.³⁹⁹ Regarding these details, there was no doubt that the top people of the CPB understood the importance of this media and that they considered its propagandistic possibilities very seriously. Broadcasting news in other languages was, above all, meant for Yugoslav citizens, but a certain level of exerting influence abroad was also considered important.

The regime also paid a lot of attention to the popularization of the radio station itself. In the letter sent to correspondents in May 1936, Lukovic asked them to write as much as possible about the Short-Wave Radio-Station and its work in the respective fields. Certain progress in the field of radio broadcasting in the period of the Government of Milan Stojadinovic was noticeable when it also came to the number of subscribers.

These increased from 66,504 in 1934 to 135,132 in 1938 and despite this development, new possibilities for broadening the field of operations were also investigated. This was reflected in the letter of Kosta Lukovic, which was sent to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, in which he urged that the restaurants, cafes and holiday resorts provided the highest possible publicity to the Short-Wave Radio-Station. Furthermore, the correspondents were told that they needed radios for reception of short waves and not to broadcast programs of propaganda radio stations from countries with unfavorable attitudes towards Yugoslavia as it would lead them to confrontation with the authorities, who were asked to prevent broadcasting of this kind of program.⁴⁰⁰

A similar letter was sent to the Department for state protection of the Ministry of the Interior. This proved that the Government wanted to secure a higher number of listeners for the program, even if it meant exerting pressure. It also showed how much attention was paid to pursuing that kind of activity. The aforementioned forms of pressure had less effect on the territory of the Primorska and Sava Banovina.

In the reports of the correspondents of the CPB from Split, one could read that the inhabitants generally “did not care about that program” and that newspapers refused to publish the programs of the radio stations.⁴⁰¹ The problems with disinterest and resistance to the broadcasts of the Short-Wave Radio-Station remained until the end of the aforementioned period, although the possibility of its reception was at a satisfactory level. In addition, the

³⁹⁹ The Central Press-Bureau, Report on the work of CPB for the year 1936, p.56.

⁴⁰⁰ AY, 38-116, The Letter of Kosta Lukovic to the Minister of Trade and Industry.

⁴⁰¹ AY, 38- 11, The report of the correspondent of the CPB from Split of 6 March 1936.

problem of availability of propaganda arose and it could not be truly effective as everything that came from Belgrade was rejected in some regions.

Realizing the importance of this media, Stojadinovic put considerable efforts into the development of radiophony in Yugoslavia. During his government, the capacity of Radio Belgrade was raised from 2.5 to 20 kilowatts. A new short-frequency radio station was also founded and it began broadcasting at the beginning of March 1936 and this became the center of the radio propaganda.

The task of monitoring and editing its radio programs was taken over by CPB and throughout 1937, the broadcasting for abroad was initiated and starting from 1938, this became a regular activity. The main task of the short-frequency radio station was broadcasting the news. This radio station practically became the one to which all the others were subordinated when it came to political news.

Considering the fact that this news was created “in the CPB’s kitchen”, their main aim was to serve, above all, the interests of the ruling Party and its president. Notwithstanding the advancement of the radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, it was still listed amongst the lowest of all the European countries in this field of advancement, with one radio per more than 100 people. The only countries that lagged behind Yugoslavia in this field were Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria (the last one only regarding the number of the subscribers).

The ruling circles in Poland had the same opinion about radio and its propaganda role. One introduction in the brochure from 1939 was entitled “Radio in Service of the State and People”. This stated clearly that:

“Broadcasting is an organism which must remain in the service of nation and state. Observing the development of the radio world, it is clear that with the rapid increase in importance and influence of radio, privately run broadcasting companies are being taken over in many countries by the state, and others are closely controlled by them. The organization of the modern state in the period, in which the radio was considered solely for entertainment, quite expensive and only available to wealthy people, must be considered as history. Over the years, the number of radios in terms of subscribers grew and in proportion to the decreasing price of radios, broadcasting has become more influential in society and is therefore responsible to shaping the psyche,

morality and division of our citizens. It is also responsible for and exploiting the dynamics of development of nations. Radio microphones have become an indispensable means of making direct contact with the masses of humans, impacting on their mood, directing their actions, mobilizing public opinion with accurate and timely information and informing the public about what is happening in the country and the world.”⁴⁰²

The two most important officials in the second half of the 1930’s were the Polish President Moscicki and Marshal Rydz-Smygli and they addressed the nation by radio on numerous occasions. During the period between 1935 and 1938, the President made 12 public speeches on national radio whilst the Marshal made 20.⁴⁰³ Half of the president’s speeches were related to the propaganda lectures about the late Marshal Pilsudski (6 of 12). The second marshal spoke about various issues such as public, military and local holidays and it was possible that radio in the last years of Interwar Poland leaned more towards Marshal Pilsudski rather than the president. For example, in October 1938, his speeches were transmitted live on four occasions.⁴⁰⁴

On Polish radio, the news was broadcast three times per day until 1937 when this was increased to four times per day. In most cases, the sources of information were from PAT and pro-government newspapers. The most important one was *Dziennik Wieczorny* (Evening News) and they broadcasted at 20:45 each night. In the late 1930’s, there were roughly 200 hours of news for one year.⁴⁰⁵

At the time, work on radio propaganda in Poland had three main directions: 1) propaganda of the whole radio program; 2) development of radiophony in the country and increasing the number of megaphones; 3) development of short wave radio stations. After the long explanation of how a certain part of the program should be presented, the author of the document concluded: “The Polish radio stream has a different spirit. All employees from the janitor up to the managerial staff must have the only thought that they should work with

⁴⁰² *Radio w Polsce w latach 1935-1938* [Radio in Poland 1935-1939], (Warsaw, 1938), p.7.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp.5-8.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.8.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

enthusiasm and with a willingness and understanding of the role they should play in the State Radio”.⁴⁰⁶

In 1939, when the outbreak and fear of war were eminent, leading circles in Poland expressed the need for the unification of radio programs. A document made in the Ministry of War set four main objectives: 1) Codification of the radio programs; 2) Control of an inferiority complex and restoration of historical traditions; 3) The struggle with the problem of life (individual and national); 4) The action primarily determined the character. Knowledge and talent were prerequisites, but not sufficient.⁴⁰⁷ It was obvious that new tasks were aimed to strengthen the moral of the Polish people and as the main objective; radio was considered a national defense.

Initially, radio in Bulgaria was understood as a tool with commercial use, but in the mid 1930's, it became an instrument for education and state propaganda. Even in 1934, the newspaper *Черно Море (Black Sea)* provided the information that key representatives of state propaganda, Penchev Petko, the head of *Renewal* and chiefs of departments Polyanov and Kulishev, needed to make the decision to use radio as the main instrument for “national propaganda”.

Later that year, a more developed plan was published in the semi-official government newspaper *Novi dni (New Days)*. The article was entitled “The Radio and the New State” and it began with the assumption of complete control over radio by the state.⁴⁰⁸

The propaganda offensive in radio area began with the Directorate for Social Renewal, which was created in 1934. In November 1934, the editor of *Radio Sofia* was named chief of radio propaganda. With this move, The *Renewal* took complete control over radio. From May until November 1934, 45 lectures were delivered by ministers and other important officials at *Radio Sofia*.⁴⁰⁹ In the second half of that year, the number of lectures increased significantly. There were 250 lectures relating to the ideology of new the state as well as the government's measures, reforms and successes. Twenty-two of these lectures were delivered by either the

⁴⁰⁶CAW, Gabinet Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych, I 300.1.531, document entitled “Wytocyne propagandy Polskiego Radia”[Guidelines for the propaganda of the Polish Radio] from 4. VI 1938.

⁴⁰⁷ CAW, Gabinet Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych, I 300.1.531, document entitled “Projekty do programu letniego”[Projects for the summer program] 1939 from 16. II 1939.

⁴⁰⁸ Dimitrov, *Istoriya na*, II, pp.124-125.

⁴⁰⁹ CDA, 284k-3-42/51, Article by Petar Popzlatev, chief of *Renewal*.

Prime Minister or by members of his cabinet.⁴¹⁰ In the same document, the new *Renewal* director Popzlatev stated about the future role of radio: “it (radio) will influence the spiritual and the material values which the Bulgarian nation has and this will be accepted by everyone”.⁴¹¹ Most of the information for Bulgarian radio was gathered from the domestic press and this was also the case for Poland and Yugoslavia.

Another significant step in the development of radio was to organize a radio program for the American continent. In 1937, a radio program was broadcast for North America via Holland in Yugoslavia, and at the beginning of 1938, this became a regular practice as this program was primarily meant for emigrants.

The first show of this type was broadcast at night between 31 March and 1 April and this program lasted for an hour and fifteen minutes with the transmission controlled by *The Philips* company. The opening speech to the country during the first broadcast was delivered by the Prime Minister Stojadinovic himself “to whom we have to be grateful for this connection through the universe”.⁴¹²

In the first months of 1937 when program was broadcast twice per month, introductory lectures were mainly delivered by ministers and other respected individuals.⁴¹³ An important part of the program was “the news from the beloved homeland”. This aimed to inform the emigrants of the situation back home and the results that the Government had achieved.

They stressed the great results that had been accomplished and Stojadinovic was depicted as a democrat with a Western emphasis and as the main implementer of an economic plan, similar to that in America. Furthermore, the dominant part of this overseas program was the broadcasts with cultural and music content. They were, of course, focused on news about the “faraway” mother land. The result was that this program could be followed all over the world.

In October 1937, Polish radio began to transmit its programs that were accepted, even in the Americas. Broadcasting usually started at 18:00 and that specific program lasted 2 hours per day, except on Saturday and Sunday when it lasted for 3 hours. In September 1938, two more Short wave stations were set up and some South American countries were able to get a signal for Polish radio. The main recipients of transmissions were Polish emigrants throughout Europe,

⁴¹⁰ CDA, 284k-3-42/51, Article by Petar Popzlatev, chief of *Renewal*, p.52.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.54.

⁴¹² A part of the text read by a presenter directly before the Prime Minister’s speech.

⁴¹³ After Stojadinovic, the guests were the Minister of the Interior, Anton Korosec, the President of the Senate, Zelimir Mazuranic, a Minister without portfolio, Miha Krek and the man presiding at the Parliament Stevan Ciric.

United States and Brazil. As one could conclude, based on available sources, the radio service in Bulgaria, during the interwar period, could not reach the same level for broadcasting its radio programs to the other continents, as Poland.

As one could see during the mid 1930's, this was the period when, in all three countries, the ruling circles took strong control over the running of radio. To do so, they had to remove all the "subversive" elements. By taking a dominant position in the country in the field of radio-broadcasting, the CPB and the Short-Wave Radio-Station also started preparing news for *Radio Belgrade*. It was observed that "suspicious elements" dominated *Radio Belgrade* and that control over it "proved to be insufficient". It was estimated that its director Kalafatovic "belonged to opposition circles" and that the director of program Veljko Petrovic "was not fully committed to the state and national political course" and that the editor in chief of the musical program Vukdragovic had "leftist tendencies".⁴¹⁴

Unlike the Belgrade radio-station, the one in Ljubljana was controlled by *Prosvetna zveza*, the central Slovenian educational association. The head of this society was the university professor Franc Lukman who was also a close friend of Korosec. The other members were also on the political course of JRZ⁴¹⁵ so one could conclude that "the radio station in Ljubljana was in quite safe hands and that the Government could, by all accounts, count on it in respect of all the issues".⁴¹⁶ This information was also indicative of the fact that in Drava Banovina, the JRZ had undisputed control, especially when it came to the Slovenian aspect of the overall operation.⁴¹⁷

After the state gained a 96% stake of radio in Poland, it was clearly time for a change in its management structure. The head of Polish radio become "Sanacja" with its prominent members Roman Starzynski (1935-1938)⁴¹⁸ and Kondrad Libicki (1938-1939)⁴¹⁹. The program

⁴¹⁴ AY, The Collection of Documents of Milan Stojadinovic (37), folder 75. This consisted of a short report on radio-stations of April 1938 which was made by Bogdanovic (possibly Bosko Bogdanovic, who was, for a while, the deputy in charge, and later, he was the successor of Lukovic on the function of the Chief of the CPB).

⁴¹⁵ JRZ was Stojadinovic's political party which was founded in 1936 from the former National Radical Party, Slovenian People party and Yugoslav Muslim Organization.

⁴¹⁶ AY, 37-75/537, Short report on radio-stations, appendix to the sent report.

⁴¹⁷ The other members of the Managing Board were the engineer Mario Osana, a university professor at the Technical Faculty of Ljubljana. He was in charge of the technical part of the station. Professor Franc Koblar the presiding of the Association of Slovenian Writers was in charge of the programme and Miloš Stare took care of the administrative part of the process.

⁴¹⁸ Roman Starzyński (11.IV 1890 – 5.VI 1938) was the older brother of Warsaw's major. He finished his studies at the University of Cracow. In the First World War, he was ensign. Starzynski stayed in the Military service until 1929 when he took up a position of PAT's director. From 1933, he was chief of staff for the Ministry for Post and Telegraph. As well as being Polish radio director, he was also a member of the International Radiophony Union and its budget commission. He wrote several monographs about military and telegraph agencies.

director became Dr. Piotr Gorecki, former director of the Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT) and he was the man who knew how to inform the public. Other changes were the positions of secretary general and administrative director⁴²⁰ so one could safely conclude that in the mid 1930's; the state control over the radio was complete. Radio now became the main instrument in the state's propaganda program.

The number of the employees in *Radio Sofia* had also grown during this time. In 1936, there were only 22 employees, but in 1941, this figure grew to 99.⁴²¹ Until the outbreak of World War II, *Radio Sofia* had three directors: Jordan Stubel (Йордан Стубел), Sirak Sirakov (Сирак Сираков) and Konstantin Konstantinov (Константин Константинов). The most prominent one was Sirakov who remained in his high position until his death in March 1943. A man of many talents, Sirakov was the one of the key people responsible for the development of radio in Bulgaria.⁴²²

From 1935 to 1939, the number of listeners more than quadrupled, from 11,000 to around 50,000. Income from radio was more than 12 million levas. According to the propaganda publications dedicated to the Kioseivanov government, the ruling circles were happy to make radio "one of the most important institutions for propaganda and national culture".⁴²³

Another important novelty which took propaganda to a higher level was the introduction of live broadcasts. Throughout this period, different events had live broadcasts – Sokol rallies⁴²⁴, tennis matches, eulogy for Nikola Pasic, the rallies of the party in power, etc. The first broadcast of the JRZ rally was in Skopje on the occasion of Stojadinovic's visit to Vardar Banovina in the summer of 1936. The number of rallies and Prime Minister's speeches broadcast grew rapidly in 1938, especially during the pre-election campaign.⁴²⁵

In the second half of the 1930's, the number of live transmissions on Polish radio increased rapidly. Events on national holidays like the military parade on Constitutional day (Uchwalenie Konstytucji Trzeciego Maja) on 3rd May and Independence Day (Narodowe Święto

⁴¹⁹ The directors of the individual stations in 1938 were: Zenon Kosidowski (Warsaw), Zbigniew Cis-Bankiewicz (Baranowicze), Stanisław Ligoń (Katowice), Bronisław Winiarz (Cracow), Juliusz Petry (Lwow), Stanisław Nowakowski (Lodz), Zdzisław Marynowski (Poznan), Bohdan Pawłowicz (Torun) and Roman Pikiel (Vilnius).

⁴²⁰ Miszczak, *Historia radiofonii*, pp. 82-83.

⁴²¹ Dimitrov, *Istoriya na*, II, pp.55-58.

⁴²² More about Skitnik's life and work see: K. Krastev., *Sirak Skitnik, Chovekat, poetat, hudoznikat, teatralat* [Sirak Skitnik, Man, Poet, Artist, Actor], (Sofia, 1974).

⁴²³ I. Minchev, *Upravlenie na tvorchestvo i delya* [Government of construction and deeds], (Sofia, 1939), p.231.

⁴²⁴ Form of mass physical activity practiced in the country with the strong Yugoslavian character.

⁴²⁵ The last pre-election rally in Belgrade on 9 December 1938 was broadcast by all four radio-stations.

Niepodległości) on 11th November were seen as the most important. One of the most important from the government's propaganda point of view was the live transmission of the official Rydz-Smygli becoming a marshal in November 1936.

The number of live transmissions in 1937 was 285 (without sport events) which added up to 136 hours in total. With 82 sports events being transmitted live, Polish radio reached a level of one live transmission per day, which was very advanced in comparison to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.⁴²⁶

The first live transmission (outside the studio) in Bulgaria was in 1931⁴²⁷ and those kinds of events were pretty rare in Bulgaria. Radio in Bulgaria was mainly focused on lectures that were delivered inside a studio by prominent government members and pro-government journalists.

As one could see earlier, radio was poorly developed in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but this was more advanced in Poland. There were many differing reasons for the insufficient development of radio broadcasting in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Apart from the small number of radios in both countries, one could perhaps mention the high price of radios, the insufficient electrification of these countries and the lack of skilled personnel available. The first two factors were a result of insufficient radio development and the financial hardship that most inhabitants had to endure in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The lack of skilled personnel led to an inappropriate use of available technology and enormous repair costs.

Bearing in mind all these problems, people from *Radio Belgrade* organized a special "autocar" during the summer, which travelled around the provincial towns to spread the word about radio broadcasting. This was purposefully meant to increase the number of listeners through practical discussions "on the field", collecting information and improving working conditions. During 1938, places in Sumadija and Vojvodina were visited.⁴²⁸

Polish radio also undertook radical measures to increase the popularity of radio. In the second half of the 1930's, around 100,000 popular brochures were delivered to people throughout the country. The titles of those brochures were: "How to put together a radio", "How

⁴²⁶ *Radio w Polsce*. p.97.

⁴²⁷ It was a live transmission of a celebration for the Day of Bulgarian Revival. Professor Zlatarov and general Kratunkov addressed an audience.

⁴²⁸ *Radio Beograd*, July-August of 1938.

to set up a radio” and “How to use a radio”.⁴²⁹ The brochures were well illustrated and easily written for the mass population. As in the Yugoslav case, there were also special “propaganda cars” involved.

In Bulgaria, those actions were not particularly well developed but one could find some brochures like “What is the radio” (“Какво нещо е радиото”) by Svetozar Preneverov. Judging by his son’s testimony, Preneverov gave many interviews and had conversations with the different social groups with the purpose of convincing them that “radio in Bulgaria was reality”.⁴³⁰

It was important to mention that the radio industry was profitable for governments. The income of Polish radio in 1937 was 17,127,024 zlotys and costs were 14,745,830 zlotys, thus the profit was 2,381,194 zlotys.⁴³¹ The majority of that income was raised by taxes paid by the listeners and only a small portion was raised from advertisements.⁴³² The income of radio service in Bulgaria was significant and growing: in 1934, this was 3,060,029 levas, in 1936, this was 6,747,819 levas and in 1938, 15,257,524 levas.

During the war years, income continued to grow and in 1941, this was more than 35 million levas.⁴³³ After the outbreak of war, the radio stations in Yugoslavia and Poland were either destroyed or used in servicing the armed forces. Radio in Bulgaria continued to serve state propaganda and new war objectives.

As one could see, the mid 1930’s in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was a period of real transformation of the radio as a medium of state propaganda. Even with its slow development, in comparison to some European countries, radio was a powerful tool in the hands of the ruling circles in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

⁴²⁹ *Radio w Polsce*, p. 135.

⁴³⁰ Dimitrov, *Istoriya na*, II, p.100.

⁴³¹ All data was taken for fiscal year beginning from 1 April until 31 March of following year. Miszczak, *Historia radiofonii*, p. 82.

⁴³² For example in 1930. Taxes brought 5,270,220 and commercials only 120,543 zlotys. MJ. Kwiatkowski, *To juz historia* [That’s already history], (Warsaw, 1975), p.109.

⁴³³ Dimitrov, *Istoriya...*, II, p.71.

FILM

The film industry in the interwar period was more advanced in America than in Europe where the USA had 17,000 cinemas in 1937, Soviet Union had 6,337 whilst the leading European countries were: Germany with 5,395, UK with 5,000, France with 3,700 and Italy with 3,600.⁴³⁴

The film was probably the most powerful propaganda tool in the interwar period. The widespread use of the film as a propaganda tool began in Bolshevich's Soviet Union⁴³⁵ and it was quickly spread all over the world. The propagandistic film was especially popular in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.⁴³⁶ The three countries under review also used film and cinema in their state's propaganda, but that action was limited with existing technical advancement and the prevailing economic climate.

At the beginning of this section, we will discuss the general situation in the film industry in the three countries under review. Comparing the number of citizens and number of cinemas with other European nations, Poland was third from the bottom, ahead of only Yugoslavia and Albania. In 1939, the total number of cinemas was 789, only 300 of which operated every day. The statistical data of that year stated that 98% of the movies in Polish cinemas were imported (62% from the USA, 13.4% from Germany, 10.8% from France). On average, each Polish citizen only went to the cinema 1.5 times in 1938 with citizens of some towns attending the cinema more frequently than the national average, e.g. each citizen in Lwow went to the cinema 13 times on average in 1938 and this figure was 12 for both Warsaw and Poznan.⁴³⁷

Films from the United States were the most popular imported films into Poland during the 1930's with Germany in second place and France way back in third. The share of US movies

⁴³⁴ *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny* [Little Statistical Yearbook], (Warsaw, 1938), p.336. Data was taken from the *Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce*, (Washington, 1938).

⁴³⁵ From various literature see: D. Gillespie, *Early Soviet cinema, Innovation, ideology and propaganda*, (London, 2005); P. Kenez, *The birth of the propaganda state (Soviet media and mass mobilization)*, (Cambridge, 1986).

⁴³⁶ From various literature see: D. Welch, *Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945*, (New York, 1983); N. Reeves, *The Power of Film Propaganda*, (New York, 2003); S. Ricci, *Italian film and society, 1922-1943*, (Los Angeles, 2008).

⁴³⁷ *Polska Niepodlegla*, (Warsaw, 2008), p.469.

imported into Poland was always around 60% but in 1935, this figure rose to 77%.⁴³⁸ The number of Polish movies varied during the years as illustrated in the following table:

Polish movies in the 1930's

Year	Polish movies	Polish movies (per thousand meters long)	Total number of Polish movies %
1931	198	100	10.5
1932	146	92	12.3
1933	157	83	10.7
1934	142	68	11.0
1935	113	64	9.7
1936	124	82	13.4
1937	123	94	13.4

Source: CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538

This data illustrated that the number of movies was decreasing, but that the share of Polish movies released in Poland grew slightly in percentage terms from 1931-1937, but government officials were not impressed with these figures, even the increase of more than 30% from 1935-1937 as well the increase of 78% in the production of long endurance films. In total, out of the 24 of these types of films produced in 1937, 10 were comedies, 11 were dramas, two were melodramas and one was a review with the total costs of those movies being 5,750,000 zlotys.⁴³⁹

It was clear that a figure of around 10% Polish movies being released in Poland was not satisfactory both for state propaganda and for the people that worked in the culture industry and there were live discussions over the years about the future development of the film industry in Poland.

⁴³⁸ CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538.

⁴³⁹ CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538.

A new organization was formed called the *Movie Section (Seksja Filmowa)*, which consisted of members of important ministries and they met several times to discuss the way forward. These members included representatives of the: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interior Ministry, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education, members of WINO, PAT and OZN and on some occasions, they had invited some guest participants to their meetings like script writers and legal experts.⁴⁴⁰

During those meetings, plans and actual problems were discussed and one of the key problems that emerged in these meetings was a lack of financial recourses for the development of domestic cinematography. This was mainly due to a low level of trading and capital being invested in film production. A representative of the PAT, Tadeusz Katelbach underlined that the Ministry of Industry and Commerce left a “symbolic” figure of 100,000 zlotys in its budget for the film industry during the period of 1936-1937. This figure compared with 1,000,000 zlotys in 1931.⁴⁴¹ These meetings also underlined the importance of short films for propaganda purposes in Poland and several suggestions were made to increase the financing for the Polish film industry.⁴⁴²

The film industry in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had always served the propaganda purposes of the ruling circles, which were the royal family of Karadjordjevics. When one considered the lack of education and general knowledge amongst the majority of citizens in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, it was safe to conclude that this “technological miracle” had an important political influence on these citizens.

⁴⁴⁰ CAW, Gab. MSWojsk. I.300.1.531. At the meeting on 25th February 1938, Antoni Cwojdzinski, a script writer and Andrzej Ruszkowski, a legal expert in the film industry were also invited.

⁴⁴¹ CAW, Gab. MSWojsk. I.300.1.538.

⁴⁴² The specific meeting was held on 13th January 1938.

The number of cinemas and seats in the Kingdome of Yugoslavia
(1935-1938)

Year	Sound cinema	Silent cinema	Total cinema	Total number of seats
1938.	357	13	370	121.120
1937.	330	13	343	113.971
1936.	301	17	318	106.014
1935.	262	33	295	92.905

- This number included travelling “silent” cinemas: for 1938 at 14, 1937 at 40, 1936 at 31 and 1935 at 22 cinemas.

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Kingdome of Yugoslavia (1934-1939)

In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the existing cinemas showed different films. For example, 108 cinemas showed films every day whilst 110 cinemas only showed films twice a week. Out of the biggest cities, Belgrade had 18 cinemas and Zagreb 16⁴⁴³ and in those cinemas, American movies were dominant. During 1935, 678 movies were imported and from this list, 436 came from the United States (64%), 144 from Germany (21%), 30 from Austria (4%) and 27 from France (3%).⁴⁴⁴

Throughout its Section for film and tourism, the CPB showed the propaganda film that was primarily political in nature. The main task of this section was to record all important political events, make movies about them and then distribute those movies to a wider audience. According to its data in 1936, the CPB produced 7,065 meters of film and all the other producers only 6,675⁴⁴⁵ so it was safe to conclude that the Central Bureau was the biggest producer of films in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in addition to the procurement of a modern equipment section for film and tourism, the CPB also established good relations with foreign manufacturers,

⁴⁴³ All data from 1938. Statisticki godinjak [Statistical Yearbooks of Kingdome of Yugoslavia for 1938-1939], p.396.

⁴⁴⁴ CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izvestaj Drzavne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju kinematografa u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1935.godine (The Report of State Film Center about transfer of films and state of cinemas in Kingdome of Yugoslavia for 1935).

⁴⁴⁵ Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, Izveshtaj o radu za 1936.godinu (Report of annual work for 1936), p.66.

especially those from Germany.⁴⁴⁶ In addition to the recording and distributing films, the section for film and tourism dealt with the censorship of films and other products that were supposed to run in the country as well as the censorship of foreign films that were imported, together with the official CPB's section for the application of the law for the press. These joint activities meant that the CPB had almost complete control over the development of the film industry in Yugoslavia.

According to the chief of the *Cultural Section* of the *Renewal*, cinema was unknown to around 80% of the population in Bulgaria,⁴⁴⁷ but statistical data told us a different story. The number of cinemas in Bulgaria was indeed the lowest of the three countries reviewed as according to statistics, that number was during the following years: 1933 (114); 1934 (121); 1935 (114); 1936 (116); 1937 (120); 1938 (142) and 155 in 1939.⁴⁴⁸ As one could see, the number of cinemas constantly grew, except in 1935 due to the economic crisis and this year was also critical due to the difficult economic climate in both Poland and Yugoslavia. Sofia had the most cinemas as in 1936; it had 32 of the 116 existing cinemas.

In the existing statistics, one could find the most complete data for 1939. Of the 155 cinemas in Bulgaria, only 32 were in the villages and 123 in the cities. The broadcast films in Bulgaria were more balanced, judging by their origin, than in Poland and Yugoslavia. From 10,524 film showings, only 3,775 showed movies in English (35.9%). Of the others film showings, 2,833 were French speaking (26.9%), 2,622 were in German (24.9%) and interestingly, 608 movies came from the Soviet Union (5.8%). As one could see, films from the first communist country in the world were not imported or mentioned in the other two states under review. That could be due to the historical connections between Bulgaria and Russia and the fact that the Russian language and culture were closer to the common Bulgarian citizen. On the other hand, only 117 film showings were Bulgarian movies (around 1%).⁴⁴⁹

The legislation that regulated the movie industry was very important to understand how the three states understood and used this powerful propaganda weapon. The legislation affecting

⁴⁴⁶ Leni Rifenstal visited Belgrade while filming *Olympia* to see what CPB used for improving relations with the "leader of German film".

⁴⁴⁷ CDA, 232k-1-20/22. Document is without date, probably from February-March 1935.

⁴⁴⁸ *Statisticheski godishnaci na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1937-1940* [Annual Statistical Surveys on Bulgarian Kingdome 1937-1939], (Sofia, 1937-1940).

⁴⁴⁹ *Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939* [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1937], (Sofia, 1940), p.736.

cinema in Poland during the 1930's became law from March 1934. It regulated various matters such as the office rent, records and laboratories, the importation of the movies, the promotion of domestic production, the position of cinema, theatre and their technical personnel and censorship.

The examination of films and advertisements was supposed to have been carried out by committees, whose composition, methods of appointment and dismissal, duties and powers were supposed to be specified by regulation from the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education (Art.18). In the one later article, this specified various reasons why some films should be banned: "The authority can refuse permission to display the movie if the test shows that the public display would either jeopardize the vital interests of the Republic, security, tranquility and public order, damage the reputation of the Republic, or its relations abroad, damage the national honor or insult religious feelings, invoke a call to war, invoke savagery which affects the viewer or which has a demoralizing affect on them".⁴⁵⁰

The film industry of countries was also under the censorship of the state apparatus and when it came to making movies in Yugoslavia, state intervention began in 1928. It was in this year that the financial legislation proscribed that *not* one movie can be shown until it had been checked by the censors from the Ministry of Education".⁴⁵¹

During the 1930's, the film industry was governed by the *State Film Center* (*Државна филмска централа*) and a special censors' committee, which consisted of twelve members and their deputies. The members of this committee were three representatives from the Ministry of Education, one representative from the Ministry of Army and Navy, two representatives of the Ministry of Social Welfare and Public Health (one member was a representative of the national women's educational organizations), two representatives of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, one representative of the Ministry of Trade and one from the Central Press-Bureau.⁴⁵² The law set the tasks of this organization as follows:

- a) to arrange and oversee the import, production and transfer of the movies;
- b) to develop the domestic film industry;

⁴⁵⁰ Ustawa o filmach i ich wyświetlaniu, *Dziesięć Ustaw*. Poz. 323, Nr. 36, p.586.

⁴⁵¹ Lj. Dimic, *Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941*, [Cultural Politics of Kingdom of Yugoslavia], III, (Belgrade, 1997), p.332.

⁴⁵² AY, the Fund of the Ministry for Education (66), folder no. 383, The Book of Regulations of the Censorship of Films of 22 February 1932.

c) To help education and useful film propaganda.⁴⁵³

The valid law in this area in Bulgaria during the 1930's was legalized from April 1930.⁴⁵⁴ In its first article, it was underlined that cinematography was under the supreme control of the Ministry of People's Education. Members of the censor's committee were as follows: The chief of Department of cultural institutions and funds in the Ministry of People's Education, the prosecutor from Sofia's district or his deputy, one representative of Ministry Interior, one representative of Ministry for Health, one representative from the Educational committee and two special members delegated by the Minister of People's Education (article 12). Representatives of other Ministries or institutions were only invited if the nature of the film requested their presence.

At this point, it was important to mention some data about censorship, present and established by the law in these countries. Accordingly, the statistical data in Poland was as follows:

Number of censored film in Poland 1934-1937

Year	Censored films	Cleared films
1934	780	769
1935	714	699
1936	652	638
1937	619	605

Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, Warszawa 1938, p. 336

As one could see, most of the movies that came to the censors' attention were cleared for broadcasting. This was due to the fact that most of the films were already made with the standards that would have been considered "acceptable" in the first place.

⁴⁵³ The Law arranging the Transfer of the Movies from 5th December 1931 with changes and appendixes according to the article 57/7 of the Financial Law from 1933/34.

⁴⁵⁴ The "Law for Cinematography" was published on 29th April in the State's Journal.

The *State Film Center* in Yugoslavia was a very busy institution. Only in 1935, they sent 779 films to censors and of these, 100 were domestic and 678 foreign. Only 14 movies were forbidden, all of them foreign.⁴⁵⁵

One of the most important institutions for the film propaganda of the Second Polish Republic was the *Film Department* of the PAT (*Wydział Filmowy PAT*). This department was formed in 1929 with the production of silent short films. After gathering modernized equipment in 1933, they started with the regular chronicles PAT's *Weekly Film Magazine* (*Tygodnik Filmowy PAT*). Besides political films, those other films included other genres like musical, cultural, artistic etc...

Short movies had the greatest propaganda significance in the Polish film industry and these consisted of a weekly newsreel produced by PAT. That production started in 1927 and until the outbreak of WW2, around 600 of them were produced and broadcast. Those films were about 10 minutes long and only consisted of actual news. It was crucial to mention that the PAT's newsreels were broadcast in every cinema before the regular film showings and in this instance, the propaganda impact was very strong and some serious results could have been achieved. Even the people who did not share the government's point of view could have been consciously or subconsciously influenced by those journals.

There were also some special films dedicated to some specific topics. Sometimes, these were cultural and educational but on some occasions, they were pure political propaganda. In 1936, such movies were: *Long live the Army* (*Niech Zyje Armia*), *Journey of General Edward Rydz Smigly to France* (*Podróż Gen.Edwarda Smigłego Rydza do Francji*) and *Long live Polish Marshal Edward Rydz Smigly* (*Niech Zyje Marszałek Polski Edward Smigły Rydz*).⁴⁵⁶ The first film about the second Polish marshal was 200 minutes and the other was 180 meters long.⁴⁵⁷ In the same year, personnel of the PAT's film section ("Wydział Filmowy", founded in 1928) consisted of only 17 editors, eight technicians and four janitors and messengers.⁴⁵⁸

The emphasis on the labels of the spheres of government exercised by the *Central Bureau of Film* (*Centralne Biuro Filmowe*, founded in 1928) and the films on the subject were very

⁴⁵⁵ CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izvestaj Drzavne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju kinematografa u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1935.godine (The Report from the State Film Center about the transfer of films and the state of cinemas in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for 1935).

⁴⁵⁶ AAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 8-21II.

⁴⁵⁷ CAW, General Inspector of the Armed Forces - GISZ 302.4.1634.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

small and ineffective. Only in 1937, the newly formed *Polish Film Company (Polska Spółka Filmowa)* had made a patriotic and propaganda film *Flame Heart (Płomienne serca)* directed by Romuald Gantkowski. The film was well received by the authorities, received awards at the Film Fair in Lvov and got prizes from the War and Interior Ministries. Much less successful was the label *Orion-Film* whose film *Commander (Komendant)* directed by H. Bigosza had not been approved by the censors for broadcast.⁴⁵⁹

As one could see, 20 self-made films had already been made by the CPB during 1936 and all of these were broadcast in cinemas all over the country. Amongst the most interesting film titles, one could choose either:

- *Travel of the Prime Minister through the Montenegro* (broadcast for 247 days with a total of 741 broadcasts in 55 cinemas in 46 different places);
- *Meeting of Little Antanta in Bled* (broadcast for 252 days with a total of 765 broadcasts in 70 cinemas in 54 different places);
- *The Opening of the railroad Veles – Bitola* (broadcast for 137 days with a total of 411 broadcasts in 28 cinemas in 26 different places);
- *Celebrations in Zenica* (broadcast for 83 days with a total of 249 broadcasts in 18 cinemas in 17 different places)...⁴⁶⁰

The most interesting film from the propagandistic point of view in Yugoslavia was made in late 1938. The novelty was introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinovic in making the special Party propaganda film *On the way of restoration – Yugoslavia yesterday, today and tomorrow (Путем препорода – Југославија јуче, данас, сутра)*.⁴⁶¹ This movie was especially prepared for the pre-election campaign of December 1938.

This movie was produced in co-operation with experts from the NSDAP and it was edited in Germany with the assistance of personnel from the government party JRZ. This group was led by Vojin Djordjevic, an official of the JRZ and the first secretary of the *State Film Center*. His presence left the lasting mark because he was used as the speaker for the movie, but this cooperation was not without difficulty.

⁴⁵⁹ Brzoza, Sowa, *Historia Polski*, p.432.

⁴⁶⁰ Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, *Izvestaj o radu za 1936.godinu* [Report of annual work for 1936], p.64.

⁴⁶¹ For the transcript of the movie see appendix 2.

In his report, Djordjevic said that Baron Von Wolzogen did things his way and seldom wanted to put some effects “on the cost of the context”⁴⁶² and the German side also promised the gift of one million placates, but there was no evidence that this promise was kept.⁴⁶³ The film arrived late, more than month after the election campaign had began mainly due to the fact that the election campaign had already started when the idea to create the film was first discussed. In Yugoslavia, 32 copies of the film arrived and during the final two weeks before the elections, the government’s propaganda focused its efforts on broadcasting the film in as many locations as possible. Purposefully, some cities in Croatia were avoided as no result was expected there and according to some reports, the greatest impact of this propaganda was felt in Belgrade.⁴⁶⁴

The Director of *Renewal* Popzlatev, in his report in May 1935, in the final days of this propaganda institution, said that the propagandistic role of cinema did not develop due to some internal problems within the government.⁴⁶⁵ One of the reasons for that statement was the fact that control over the cinema remained in the hands of the Education Ministry and never passed to the *Renewal*. The Ministry strongly opposed to idea that control of the cinema should be entrusted to Popzlatev’s institution.

In Bulgaria, as in Yugoslavia, there were movies dedicated to the royal dynasty. Those movies were propagandistic by nature and were meant for all kinds of social groups. Some of the various examples were movies like: Bulgarian Army under the Boris III (“Българската армия при цар Борис III”) and The Speech of his majesty Tsar Boris III (“Реч на Н. В. Цар Борис III”) as those films naturally did not have any problems with the censors.

The most famous Bulgarian films with the national propaganda topics in the 1930’s were: *Revolt of the Slaves* (*Бунтът на робите*, 1933) *Tracks of the Balkan* (*Песента на Балкана*, 1934), *In front of the Fatherland we should forget hate* (*Пред отечеството да забравим омразата си*, 1935), *Enemies* (*Врагове*, 1938), *Duke Strahil* (*Страхил войвода*, 1938). During the 1940’s, several new films were released with the help of the foundation *Bulgarian Deed*

⁴⁶² AY, 37-12-388/390, The Report of Vojin Djordjevic sent to Gradimir Kozomarcic, chief of Film Section of JRZ.

⁴⁶³ AY, 37-12-383, The Letter of Gradimir Kozomarcic sent to Milan Stojadinovic from 3rd November 1938. It was also interesting to mention stories about the special edition of the movie. It was said that in the end, Stojadinovic saluted “Hail Hitler”. That scene was meant only for Germans and it was never played in Yugoslavian cinemas. P. Lazetic, ‘Milan Stojadinovic i predizborna kampanja 1938’ [Milan Stojadinovic and the election campaign of 1938], *Zbornik Istorijaskog muzeja Srbije*, number 25, (1988), p.124.

⁴⁶⁴ AY, 37-12-392.

⁴⁶⁵ CDA, 284k-3-42/35-36.

(Българско дело). The most well-known films with the strongest national propaganda messages were *For the Motherland* (*За родината*) and *They won* (*Те победиха*).⁴⁶⁶

Conclusion

The media played a key role in creating, developing and spreading the government's propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930's. The press was the most dispersed and the most used tool, but the use of radio and film increased rapidly, especially in the final years before World War Two. The press was also the oldest instrument of state propaganda, but also practically the only one that was used by the opposition.

The governments in these three states tried, but failed to control all newspapers. During the whole period, the opposition and neutral press was active and very powerful and one of the most readable newspapers in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was not under the control of the government, or at least not completely anyway. Harsh censorship was deployed that only partly managed to change public opinion completely to the government's satisfaction. Censorship pressure varied depending on the situation, but this remained a constant enemy of the freedom of the press.

During the 1930's, radio became an increasingly used propaganda tool in the hands of these governments. Whilst the start of its development was similar to that in most European countries, future development of the radio in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was slower.

Ruling circles in these countries soon realized the power of this tool as a form of propaganda. During the 1930's, they invested plenty of resources into its modernization with new stations being built and already existing stations being improved and strengthened. The number of radio owners increased significantly from year to year but despite all these factors, these three states remained at the bottom of the European countries' list for total number of radio owners. The Polish, Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments tried to use radio more often as part of their plans and desires as radio became the state's property over the years and many editors were

⁴⁶⁶ A. Grozev, *Nachaloto. Iz istoriyata na balgarskoto kino 1896-1956* [The Beginning. From the History of Bulgarian Cinema 1895-1956], (Sofia, 1985), pp.77-84 and pp.165-168.

removed from editorials in radio stations because of political disagreements with the governments. Despite its slower development, in comparison to some European countries, the radio was seen as a powerful tool in the hands of the government to help with its propaganda objectives.

Film industry was the easiest to control for the governments of the three countries because censorship was legalized and constantly present during the period under review. The government committees examined every film, domestic or foreign and only those considered “acceptable” were broadcast in the cinemas. Domestic production of films in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was poor in comparison to imported films and the company owned by the government, or governments’ institutions, made several short propaganda movies and numerous newsreels in an attempt to influence public opinion in its favor. Nevertheless, despite its relative lack of numbers, the impact of film could not be underestimated because it offered more than the press and radio because it combined the effects of picture and sound.

CONCLUSION

The state propaganda is a deliberate attempt made by the ruling classes to influence the opinions of people through the transmission of ideas and values for their specific purposes, both by giving or by withholding information. State propaganda is as old as the state itself and has existed throughout the centuries, but over time, it has become better organized, along with the development of the means of communication and propaganda techniques. The Twentieth century has been a real breakthrough and a giant step forward for the development of state propaganda and the period of the 1930's occupies special meaning in this development. With the modern means of propaganda at the time, especially radio, it was possible to broadcast messages across the boundaries of the individual states and for them to have a much wider impact than before.

The state propaganda in Europe during the 1930's was usually carried out by ministries, propaganda departments, sections that were located within the individual ministries, private and non-governmental organizations. Looking into the institutional organizations, one could classify two groups of countries: ones with the ministry for propaganda and ones with the propaganda departments within the ministries, government's bodies or institutions subordinated to them.

There were only few countries that decided to have a ministry for propaganda before the outbreak of the Second World War. The classical examples were Germany and Italy that formed their ministries for propaganda in 1933 and 1935 and this was due to the fact that already in the 1930's, the word "propaganda" had negative vibes and naming such a ministry raised suspicion among others. Even Italy renamed its ministry shortly after the foundation of its own propaganda ministry and it became the Ministry for Popular Culture in 1937, but the purpose of this ministry remained the same. Some states tried with the same ministry like France in 1938 but those attempts were short-lived.

Most of the other European countries had their own propaganda institutions within some ministry. The Central European countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary had two press departments within the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the general division between them was that the first one was pre-occupied with internal affairs and the second with foreign propaganda. However, the relevance of the most important propaganda department in the specific countries varied e.g. in Czechoslovakia and Romania, the press

department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dominant and in Turkey and Albania, the Ministry of Interior was dominant. Special directions for propaganda, as independent institutions, existed in Romania (the General Direction for Press and Propaganda), Portugal (the Secretary for National Propaganda) and Greece (the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism).

At the beginning of the Twentieth century, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were newly formed states so they had limited experience in the organization of the state's affairs where propaganda had a significant role. The organization of the state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930's was complex and somewhat difficult for a historian to reconstruct due to a lack of sources and in the state propaganda of the countries under review, one could find many similarities, but even more differences.

Propaganda apparatus functioned in two main directions: at home and abroad and the main task of internal propaganda was probably the control of information released to the public. That was accomplished firstly by the "filtration" of the news and secondly by censorship and the control of information and censorship was part of the state propaganda of the three countries under review.

One could say that that was the primary objective of the propaganda organization and this task wasn't easy because of the existence of opposition that had been active in the whole period under review and even under difficult circumstances, the opposition was very strong (Yugoslavia in 1938, Poland and Bulgaria in 1935). An even bigger problem for state propaganda was perhaps the opposition within i.e. conflicts of interest within the ruling circle, from top to bottom, from government members to basic clerks where vanity, rivalry, personal vendettas were serious problems for the functioning of state propaganda organizations in these countries. In times of limited and restricted democracy, those problems were more acute and more frequent.

One of the most important similarities between Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the fact that key propaganda decisions were made within small groups of people, often within informal groups and the existing propaganda structures were only present to legalize decisions that had already been made. They were well financed and their job was one of the most valued in the administration with the heads of the propaganda institutions normally being experienced journalists who were well educated, intelligent and most importantly, loyal to the regimes.

The Offices for the Press existed in the countries under review and this was commonplace in 1930's Europe as they were present in every important ministry, but the most

important ones were placed in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior.

During this period, changes occurred that made all three countries different. Poland had the most influential press offices in the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War until the end of this period. In interwar Yugoslavia, there was the creation of the Central Press Bureau in 1929 and this meant that the press offices within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior became less important. Bulgaria was somewhere in between the two and at one time; Bulgaria had a central organization (The Directorate for Social Renewal, 1934-1935) and offices for the press that functioned separately in the different ministries.

The most important central state propaganda institution in the three countries was the Yugoslav Central Press-Bureau (CPB) and this institution was divided into the Administrative, the Information and the Publicist Departments throughout most of its existence. These departments executed the tasks proscribed by the Book of Regulations and they were divided into sections the most important being the Information Department.

This Department controlled the key tasks such as pre-release proofing of the issues of the press (actions which practically amounted to censorship) and informing the home media of the situation at home and abroad. Almost all the papers which were published in the country had to be pre-emptively proofread before their release and in the towns where there were no representatives of the CPB, this task was fulfilled by the state prosecution offices or by the officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The information released on the part of the CPB was obligatory for all the media in the state and their going along with this practice was achieved through warnings, and sometimes even through threats and blackmailing. Apart from the central institution, the important jobs were also done by the correspondents who were stationed in the most important European cities and in the centers of *banovinas* in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

The CPB had a significant number of civil servants and this number was usually round 150, amongst them were those who were officially employed (on a “regular” salary) and those who were secret associates because of the nature of their tasks (on a “secret” salary). The institution was financed from the overall budget for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

The CPB was financed on regular basis and it usually received an approximately similar amount of money (slightly over 18 million dinars), which was considerable financial support at

the time. In comparison with the neighboring countries, this financial support was great and this was even greater than the spending of countries of a similar size like Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Czechoslovakia. Still, they spent far less on propaganda than the more developed European countries, such as Germany, UK and Italy, but this could also be said of some of the neighboring countries, which invested considerable finance into the development of their propaganda, for example Hungary.

The Office for the Press within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland and Bulgaria (in Yugoslavia only up to 1929) controlled most of the foreign propaganda, together with the embassies' employees, foreign press correspondents and one of the national telegraph agencies. Judging by the budget levels, that couldn't be fully established in this study due to secrecy from the governments, Poland spent the most money on foreign propaganda during the 1930's. That was understandable, not only because Poland was the biggest of the three examined countries, but also due to a complex situation that was dictated by its geographical position between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

There were several similarities between the propaganda organizations in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and propaganda organizations in contemporary Germany and Italy. It was correct to say that some of the ideas and structural types in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were copied from Germany and Italy (for example, the organization of the Committee for Coordination of Propaganda in Poland was very similar to the Fascist Ministry for National Culture in Italy). However, every propaganda organization was unique due to many factors such as cultural differences and that specific state's political background and it is a personal opinion that fascist copies were made mainly for practical reasons because they seemed to work practically in Germany and Italy rather than for political likes or dislikes of those regimes.

The tendency towards increasing centralization of the state propaganda organizations in Europe during the last decade before the Second World War was also apparent in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Those tendencies, so obvious in the countries under review in the 1930's, had a logical ending in the creation of separate propaganda ministries in Poland and Bulgaria after the outbreak of war. In Yugoslavia, that ministry already unofficially existed in the form of the Central Press Bureau during the whole of the examined period.

The news agencies in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were in many ways similar but also significantly different. The Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT), *Avala* Agency and Bulgarian

Telegraph Agency (BTA) had the same main responsibilities which were to inform the domestic public about events abroad and to inform the foreign public about the situation at home.

Those main tasks were no different than ones that had other agencies during this period all around the world and all three agencies under review had an obligation to inform the public at home and abroad “in accordance to the public state interest”. Nevertheless, their most important role was to transmit official information, which came from the top of the governing hierarchy so everybody knew that the information released was official and “checked”.

The three agencies were different in size, their relationships with the government, their structure, levels of funding and several other, none the less, important things. The BTA, *Avala* and PAT were formed as governmental institutions with the aim to inform and propaganda was, without doubt, one of the main content of the agencies’ work, but the three agencies had different organizational structures from within their own governments.

The BTA was initially part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but over time, its position weakened and during the 1930’s, the agency even became part of the Office for the Press and was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its budget was part of the Ministry’s budget and its directors were directors of the Office for the Press.

Although it was also a state agency, the PAT was in a different position in Poland than its Bulgarian counterpart. From the beginning, the PAT was structurally an independent institution with various additional tasks and functions and one could conclude, judging by the existing documents, that the PAT was considerably better organized than other two agencies. Movie making, independent publishing work, wide range foreign correspondent network, highly functional advertisement offices were only tied to the Polish agency during the 1930’s.

The case of the Yugoslav counterpart was different to the other two. The agency started as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but that was changed after a decade when the *Avala* Agency, according to common European practice in the Interwar period, was transformed into a joint stock company, but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital as it owned over 90% of stock capital. Therefore, the transformation of the agency basically meant a structural, but not a core change and *Avala* remained an instrument of the state propaganda and a state controlled institution throughout the whole period of its existence.

The Yugoslav and Bulgarian agencies received an annual donation from the state and in the case of *Avala*, this donation amounted to 5 million dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its

needs. The finances were often not spent purposefully, so *Avala*, almost constantly, worked with losses and the BTA was totally dependent on the state funding and the income generated from subscribers was not enough to match the costs of both the agencies' work.

The only of the three agencies that was almost self-financed was the PAT as the income gained from advertisements and especially from sold publications and movies was significant and important. However, even those incomes were sometimes insufficient to cover the growing costs of the Polish news agency organization and its well developed business.

The difference between the three agencies under the examination was maybe best illustrated when one considered the number of the employees with each agency. With the around 1,000 employees, the PAT was by far the biggest of the three, almost ten times larger than *Avala* and more than thirteen times larger than its Bulgarian counterpart. This difference was also apparent when one analyzed the correspondent network so while the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian agencies had none or only a few correspondents abroad, the PAT had a highly developed organization on a global level with between 70 and 100 foreign correspondents, equivalent to the French *Havas*, which was one of the leading global agencies.

Judging by the above data, one could also conclude that the Polish Telegraph Agency had a more significant role in the state propaganda than news agencies in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The PAT had more responsibilities like publishing official data such as books and magazines and making the films that were, in the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the responsibility of other propaganda institutions. Those assignments were well beyond the common news agency job scope, which only underlined the statement expressed above about the Polish Telegraph Agency's propaganda influence.

The media (the press, radio and cinema) and people working in them played a very important role in creating, developing and spreading the government's propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930's. The press, of the three, was the most dispersed and the most used tool, but the use of radio and film increased rapidly over time, especially in the final years before the Second World War. The press was also the oldest instrument of state propaganda, but in the same time, it was practically the only tool that was used by the opposition in the three states under review.

The governments in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria tried, but failed to control all newspapers. During the whole period, the opposition and neutral press were active and very

powerful and one of the most readable newspapers in these three states was not under the control of the government, or at least not completely anyway. Harsh censorship was deployed, but this only partly managed to change public opinion completely to the government's satisfaction and censorship pressure varied depending on the internal and foreign situation, but this remained a constant enemy of freedom of the press.

During the 1930's, radio became an increasingly used propaganda tool in the hands of all three governments and the techniques used became more advanced as radio became cheaper, thus closer to the common people. The development of radio in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria followed a global trend, but this growth was still slower than in many European countries.

The ruling circles in these countries soon realized the power of this tool as a form of propaganda and during the 1930's, they invested plenty of resources into its modernization with new stations being built and already existing stations being improved and strengthened.

The number of radio owners increased significantly from year to year but despite all these factors, these three states remained at the bottom of the European countries' list for total number of radio owners. The most advanced of the three was Poland where the number of subscribers passed one million and the Polish, Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments tried to use radio more often as part of their plans and desires as radio became the state's property over the years and many editors were removed from editorials in radio stations because of political disagreements with the governments. Despite its slower development, in comparison to some European countries, radio was seen as a powerful tool in the hands of the governments to help with their overall propaganda objectives.

The film industry was the easiest to control for the governments of the three countries because censorship was legalized and constantly present during the period under review. The government committees examined every film, domestic or foreign and only those considered "acceptable" were broadcast in the cinemas. Domestic production of films in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was poor in comparison to imported films and the companies owned by the government, or governments' institutions, made several short propaganda movies and numerous newsreels in an attempt to influence public opinion in its favor.

Nevertheless, despite its relative lack of numbers, the impact of film could not be underestimated because it offered more than the press and radio as it combined the effects of

picture and sound. Poland was also ahead of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in this area and movies were often used, even in the schools, for educational purposes.

The organization of state propaganda in Eastern and Southeastern Europe respectively in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930's followed many different models set by the other European countries. Those examples were often combined with the local tradition and experiences with the main aim of the state propaganda in those countries being to control domestic public opinion and the organization was set accordingly and the structure was also bound to the economic situation in the specific state and period.

CONCLUSIONE

La propaganda di Stato è un tentativo deliberato, messo in atto dalle classi dirigenti, di influenzare le opinioni della popolazione attraverso la trasmissione di idee e valori al servizio di specifici obiettivi, sia fornendo sia trattenendo informazioni. La propaganda di stato è antica quanto lo Stato stesso ed è esistita per secoli. Nel tempo è diventata più organizzata di pari passo con lo sviluppo dei mezzi di comunicazione e delle tecniche. Il ventesimo secolo è il vero punto di svolta e un gigantesco passo avanti per la propaganda di stato e in questo gli anni Trenta occupano un posto di notevole rilievo. Con i moderni mezzi della propaganda, specialmente la radio, è stato possibile trasmettere messaggi attraverso i confini dei singoli Stati ed è stato possibile conferire a questi messaggi un impatto molto maggiore che in precedenza.

La propaganda di stato in Europa durante gli anni Trenta era abitualmente gestita da ministeri, dipartimenti, sezioni che erano situate presso i singoli ministeri, organizzazioni private e non governative. Per quanto riguarda le organizzazioni istituzionali, gli Stati possono essere classificati in due gruppi: quelli che avevano un ministero della propaganda e quelli che avevano dipartimenti deputati alla propoganda all'interno dei ministeri, degli organi di governo o delle istituzioni a essi subordinate.

Solo pochi Paesi decisero di istituire ministeri della propaganda prima dello scoppio della Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Gli esempi classici sono la Germania e l'Italia, che fondarono ministeri deputati alla propaganda rispettivamente nel 1933 e nel 1935. Questo fu dovuto al fatto che già negli anni Trenta la parola propaganda assunse un significato principalmente negativo e il dare questo nome a un ministero avrebbe suscitato sospetti negli altri Paesi. Persino l'Italia rinominò il proprio ministero, poco dopo la fondazione, in Ministero della Cultura Popolare (1937), ma lo scopo del ministero rimase lo stesso. Alcuni stati, come la Francia nel 1938, fecero tentativi con lo stesso ministero, ma questi tentativi ebbero breve vita.

La maggior parte degli altri Paesi europei ebbe istituzioni mirate alla propaganda all'interno di qualche ministero. Due Stati dell'Europa centrale, la Cecoslovacchia e l'Ungheria, avevano due dipartimenti per la stampa presso il Consiglio dei Ministri e il Ministero per gli Affari Esteri. La sostanziale differenza fra essi era che il primo si occupava degli affari interni, il secondo della propaganda estera. Comunque, la rilevanza dei più importanti dipartimenti della

propaganda nei singoli Paesi variava: in Cecoslovacchia e Romania, per esempio, il dipartimento della stampa all'interno del Ministero degli Affari Esteri era dominante, mentre in Turchia e Albania era preponderante il Ministero degli Interni. Speciali direzioni per la propaganda, nella forma di istituzioni indipendenti, esistevano in Romania (la Direzione Generale per la Stampa e la Propaganda), Portogallo (la Segreteria per la Propaganda Nazionale) e Grecia (il Sottoministero della Stampa e del Turismo).

All'inizio del ventesimo secolo la Polonia, la Jugoslavia e la Bulgaria erano Stati di recente formazione, dunque con limitata esperienza nella gestione degli affari di stato, nei quali la propaganda occupava una posizione di rilievo. L'organizzazione della propaganda di stato in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria durante gli anni Trenta era complessa ed è difficile per uno storico oggi ricostruirla a causa della scarsità di fonti. Nella propaganda di stato dei Paesi presi in esame si possono trovare diverse somiglianze, ma soprattutto differenze.

L'apparato della propaganda funzionava in due direzioni principali: in patria e all'estero. L'obiettivo della propaganda interna era probabilmente il controllo dell'informazione disponibile presso il pubblico. Ciò era ottenuto innanzi tutto attraverso il "filtraggio" delle notizie e in secondo luogo attraverso la censura. Il controllo dell'informazione e la censura erano parte della propaganda di stato dei tre Paesi. Si potrebbe affermare che quello fosse l'oggetto principale dell'organizzazione della propaganda. Questo obiettivo non era semplice per l'esistenza di un'opposizione esistita durante tutto il periodo in esame. Anche in circostanze difficili l'opposizione fu molto forte, soprattutto durante alcuni periodi (in Jugoslavia nel 1938, in Polonia e Bulgaria nel 1935). Un ostacolo anche maggiore per la propaganda di stato fu forse l'opposizione interna, cioè i conflitti fra interessi contrapposti all'interno degli ambienti di governo, dal vertice alla base, dai membri del governo ai semplici impiegati. Protagonismi, rivalità, vendette personali furono problemi gravi per il funzionamento delle organizzazioni della propaganda di stato in questi paesi. In tempi di democrazia ristretta questi problemi furono più acuti e più frequenti.

Una delle somiglianze principali fra Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria fu il fatto che le decisioni chiave riguardanti la propaganda fossero prese all'interno di piccoli gruppi di persone, spesso all'interno di gruppi aggregatisi informalmente. Le strutture ufficiali erano presenti solo per legalizzare decisioni che erano già state prese. Esse erano ben finanziate e il loro lavoro era

uno fra i più apprezzati nella pubblica amministrazione. I vertici delle istituzioni della propaganda erano quasi sempre esperti giornalisti, colti, intelligenti e soprattutto leali al regime.

Uffici stampa esistevano nei paesi in esame e questa era una situazione frequente nell'Europa degli anni Trenta. Essi erano presenti in ogni ministero rilevante, ma i più importanti erano quelli presso il Consiglio dei Ministri, il Ministero degli Affari Esteri e il Ministero degli Interni. Durante questo periodo si verificarono cambiamenti che resero differenti i tre Paesi. La Polonia aveva gli uffici stampa più influenti presso il Consiglio dei Ministri, il Ministero degli Affari Esteri e il Ministero della Guerra fino alla fine di questo periodo. In Jugoslavia fra le due guerre fu creato l'Ufficio Centrale per la Stampa (1929) e questo significò che gli uffici stampa dei Ministeri degli Affari Esteri e degli Interni divennero meno importanti. La Bulgaria era in qualche modo a metà strada fra questi due modelli. A un certo punto, la Bulgaria ebbe un'organizzazione centrale (il Direttivo per il Rinnovamento Sociale, 1934-35) e uffici stampa che funzionavano indipendentemente nei singoli ministeri.

L'istituzione centrale per la propaganda di stato più importante nei tre Paesi fu l'Ufficio Centrale per la Stampa (UCS) della Jugoslavia. L'istituzione restò divisa nei Dipartimenti Amministrativo, d'Informazione e Pubblicista per la maggior parte della sua esistenza. Questi dipartimenti rendevano esecutivi gli obiettivi fissati dal Libro dei Regolamenti ed erano divisi in sezioni. Il più importante dei tre menzionati era il Dipartimento d'Informazione. Esso era incaricato delle missioni chiave come l'approvazione delle pubblicazioni precedente alla stampa (azioni che praticamente sostituivano la censura) e la fornitura di informazioni ai media nazionali sulla situazione nel Paese e all'estero. Quasi tutto ciò che era pubblicato nel Paese doveva essere preventivamente approvato prima della distribuzione e nelle città in cui non esistevano rappresentanti dell'UCS questo incarico era svolto dagli uffici della Procura di Stato o dagli ufficiali del Ministero degli Affari Interni. Le informazioni rilasciate da parte dell'UCS dovevano essere obbligatoriamente divulgate da tutti i media dello Stato. La continuità in questa pratica era raggiunta attraverso avvisi e talvolta attraverso minacce o ricatti. Al di là dell'istituzione centrale, un lavoro importante era svolto anche dai corrispondenti che erano insediati nelle città europee più importanti e nei centri delle *banovine* (dipartimenti amministrativi) del Regno di Jugoslavia.

L'UCS aveva un numero significativo di addetti civili, numero che si aggirava intorno ai 150. Fra essi alcuni erano ufficialmente assunti (a salario regolare) e altri erano associati

segretamente in ragione della natura dei loro compiti (ed erano pagati segretamente). L'istituzione era finanziata tramite un bilancio che era parte di quello della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. L'UCS era finanziato su base regolare. Esso riceveva solitamente un ammontare approssimativamente fisso di denaro (di poco superiore ai 18 milioni di dinari), una somma notevole per l'epoca. A confronto con i Paesi confinanti i finanziamenti erogati erano più alti rispetto a quelli ricevuti da istituzioni simili per natura e dimensioni (quelle bulgara, greca, turca e cecoslovacca). Eppure, erano lontani dai mezzi finanziari che Paesi europei più evoluti, come Germania, Inghilterra e Italia, riversavano in simili istituzioni. Ciò è valido anche per alcuni dei Paesi confinanti che erogavano finanziamenti considerevoli per lo sviluppo della loro propaganda (è il caso, per esempio, dell'Ungheria).

L'Ufficio per la Stampa presso il Ministero degli Affari Esteri in Polonia e Bulgaria (in Jugoslavia solo fino al 1929) controllava la maggior parte della propaganda estera assieme al personale delle ambasciate, ai corrispondenti esteri della stampa e a una delle agenzie nazionali dei telegrafi. A giudicare dal livello del bilancio, che non ho potuto stabilire con precisione nel mio studio a causa della segretezza mantenuta dai governi, la Polonia spendeva la quota più alta di finanziamenti nella propaganda estera durante gli anni Trenta. Ciò è comprensibile non solo in quanto la Polonia era il più esteso dei tre Paesi esaminati, ma anche in ragione della complessa situazione determinata dalla posizione geografica fra la Germania nazista e l'Unione Sovietica. C'erano diverse somiglianze fra le organizzazioni della propaganda di Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria e quelle contemporanee di Germania e Italia. È corretto affermare che alcune delle idee e delle tipologie strutturali in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria furono copiate da quelle di Germania e Italia (per esempio, l'organizzazione del Comitato per la Coordinazione della Propaganda in Polonia era molto simile al Ministero per la Cultura Popolare fascista). Comunque, ogni organizzazione per la propaganda era unica a causa di molti fattori come le differenze culturali e il background politico specifico di ogni Stato. È mia opinione che i calchi delle strutture utilizzate dal fascismo fossero realizzati principalmente per ragioni pratiche, in quanto sembravano funzionare in Germania e Italia, e meno per l'apprezzamento politico di quei regimi.

La tendenza a incrementare la centralizzazione delle organizzazioni della propaganda di stato in Europa durante l'ultimo decennio prima della Seconda Guerra Mondiale vi fu apparentemente anche in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria. Questa tendenza, così ovvia nei Paesi

esaminati durante gli anni Trenta, ebbe la sua conclusione logica nella creazione di singoli ministeri della propaganda in Polonia e Bulgaria dopo lo scoppio della guerra. In Jugoslavia tale ministero esisteva già in via non ufficiale nella forma dell'Ufficio Centrale della Stampa durante tutto il periodo esaminato.

Le agenzie di stampa in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria erano per molti versi simili ma anche significativamente diverse. L'Agenzia Polacca dei Telegrafi (APT), l'Agenzia *Avala* e l'Agenzia dei Telegrafi della Bulgaria (ATB) avevano gli stessi obiettivi principali, cioè informare il pubblico nazionale sugli avvenimenti esteri e informare il pubblico estero sulla situazione nel Paese. Questi obiettivi principali non erano diversi da quelli delle altre agenzie diffuse nello stesso periodo in tutto il mondo. Le tre agenzie in esame avevano l'obbligo di informare il pubblico nazionale e quello estero "in conformità all'interesse pubblico dello Stato". Tuttavia, il loro ruolo principale era trasmettere le informazioni ufficiali provenienti dai vertici delle strutture di governo. Ognuno sapeva che le informazioni rilasciate da questi organi erano ufficiali e "controllate".

Le tre agenzie erano diverse per dimensioni, relazioni con il governo, struttura, finanziamenti e numerosi altri non meno importanti fattori. L'ATB, l'*Avala* e l'APT erano state formate come istituzioni governative con l'obiettivo di informare. La propaganda era oltre ogni dubbio uno degli argomenti principali del lavoro delle agenzie. Tuttavia, le tre agenzie avevano forme di organizzazioni differenti all'interno del governo. L'ATB fu fin dall'inizio parte del Ministero degli Affari Esteri. Con il passare del tempo la sua posizione si fece persino più debole. Durante gli anni Trenta l'agenzia divenne parte dell'Ufficio per la Stampa subordinato al Ministero degli Affari Esteri. Il suo bilancio era parte del bilancio del Ministero e i suoi direttori erano direttori dell'Ufficio per la Stampa.

Pur essendo anch'essa un'agenzia dello Stato, l'APT era in Polonia in una posizione diversa rispetto alla controparte bulgara. Fin dall'inizio l'APT fu un'istituzione strutturalmente indipendente con vari compiti e funzioni addizionali. Possiamo concludere, in base ai documenti esistenti, che l'APT era di gran lunga meglio organizzata rispetto alle altre due agenzie. La produzione di film, la pubblicazione autonoma di materiale, un network di corrispondenti esteri ad ampio raggio, un ufficio di pubblicità perfettamente funzionante furono propri solamente dell'agenzia polacca negli anni Trenta.

Il caso della controparte iugoslava è differente dagli altri due. L'agenzia fu avviata come parte del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, ma la situazione cambiò dopo un decennio. L'agenzia *Avala*, conformemente alla pratica comune europea nel periodo fra le due guerre, fu trasformata in una Società a Responsabilità Limitata con lo Stato nelle vesti di proprietario del capitale (oltre il 90%). Dunque la trasformazione dell'agenzia fu soprattutto strutturale, ma non concettuale. *Avala* rimase lo strumento della propaganda e lo Stato continuò a controllare l'istituzione per tutto il periodo della sua esistenza.

Le agenzie iugoslava e bulgara ricevevano la donazione annua dallo Stato. Nel caso dell'*Avala* tale donazione ammontava a 5 milioni di dinari, ma questa somma non era sufficiente. Le disponibilità finanziarie spesso non erano spese in modo mirato, quindi *Avala*, quasi regolarmente, lavorava in perdita. Anche l'ATB era totalmente dipendente dai finanziamenti statali. L'introito derivante dalle sottoscrizioni non era sufficiente per coprire i costi in entrambe le agenzie. L'unica fra le tre a essere quasi autofinanziata era l'APT. L'introito ricavato tramite la pubblicità e, soprattutto, le pubblicazioni vendute e i film era significativo. Tuttavia, persino questi solidi ricavi erano talvolta insufficienti a coprire i costi crescenti dell'organizzazione dell'agenzia di stampa polacca e del suo ben organizzato business.

La differenza fra le tre agenzie esaminate diviene forse più evidente se si guarda al numero di impiegati. Con i suoi 1000 impiegati circa l'APT era di gran lunga la maggiore delle tre, quasi dieci volte più grande dell'*Avala* e più di tredici volte l'omologa bulgara. Questa differenza è evidente anche se guardiamo al network di corrispondenti. Mentre le agenzie iugoslava e bulgara avevano pochi o nessun corrispondente all'estero, l'APT aveva un'organizzazione avanzata che si piazzava ai massimi livelli mondiali (da 70 fino a 100 corrispondenti esteri come la francese *Havas*, una delle agenzie leader globali).

Giudicando in base ai dati presentati qui sopra possiamo anche concludere che l'Agenzia Polacca dei Telegrafi aveva un ruolo più significativo nella propaganda di stato rispetto alle agenzie di stampa in Jugoslavia e Bulgaria. l'APT aveva maggiori responsabilità, come la pubblicazione di libri e riviste di dati ufficiali e la realizzazione di film che nei casi della Jugoslavia e della Bulgaria erano obiettivi di altre istituzioni finalizzate alla propaganda. Questi incarichi andavano ben oltre i consueti lavori delle agenzie di stampa, punto che sottolinea l'affermazione fatta in precedenza a proposito della rilevanza della propaganda dell'Agenzia Polacca dei Telegrafi.

I mezzi di comunicazione (stampa, radio e cinema) e coloro che in essi lavoravano rivestivano un ruolo molto importante nella creazione, nello sviluppo e nella diffusione della propaganda governativa in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria durante gli anni Trenta. La stampa, fra i tre citati, era il mezzo più diffuso e sfruttato. L'uso della radio e dei film crebbe poi rapidamente, specialmente negli ultimi anni prima della Seconda Guerra Mondiale. La stampa era anche lo strumento più antico della propaganda, ma allo stesso tempo praticamente l'unico a essere usato dall'opposizione nei tre stati esaminati.

I governi in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria tentarono senza successo di controllare tutti i giornali. Durante tutto il periodo, l'opposizione e la stampa neutrale rimasero attive e molto influenti e uno dei giornali più letti nei tre stati non era sotto il controllo del governo, o almeno non del tutto. Fu dispiegata una dura censura che solo in parte riuscì a cambiare la pubblica opinione nella direzione voluta dal governo. La pressione della censura variava a seconda della situazione interna ed estera, ma rimase una nemica costante della libertà di stampa.

Durante gli anni Trenta la radio divenne uno strumento di propaganda sempre più utile nelle mani dei governi. Le tecniche divennero più avanzate e la radio divenne più economica, quindi più vicina alla gente comune. Lo sviluppo della radio in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria seguì questo trend, ma fu più lento che in altri Paesi europei.

La classe dirigente in questi Paesi comprese presto il potere di questo strumento come mezzo di propaganda. Durante gli anni Trenta essi investirono abbondanti risorse nella modernizzazione delle radio attraverso la costruzione di nuove stazioni e lo sviluppo e il rafforzamento delle stazioni già esistenti. Il numero dei possessori di radio crebbe significativamente di anno in anno, ma a dispetto di tutti questi fattori i tre Paesi in esame rimasero in fondo alla classifica dei Paesi europei per numero totale di possessori di apparecchi radio. Il più avanzato dei tre fu la Polonia, nella quale il numero dei sottoscrittori superò il milione. I governi polacco, jugoslavo e bulgaro tentarono di usare la radio più spesso come parte dei loro progetti e obiettivi quando la radio divenne proprietà degli Stati attraverso gli anni e molti commentatori furono rimossi dalle stazioni radio per contrasti politici con i governi. Nonostante il suo sviluppo più lento in confronto a quello di altri Paesi europei, la radio fu vista come uno strumento potente nelle mani dei governi per raggiungere gli obiettivi della propaganda.

L'industria cinematografica fu la più facilmente controllabile per i governi dei tre Paesi in quanto la censura era legalizzata e costantemente presente durante il periodo esaminato. I comitati di governo esaminavano ogni film nazionale o estero e solo quelli considerati "accettabili" erano distribuiti nei cinema. La produzione nazionale di film in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria era scarsa se confrontata con i film d'importazione. Le compagnie di proprietà del governo, o dalle istituzioni, realizzarono numerosi cortometraggi propagandistici e molti cinegiornali nel tentativo di influenzare la pubblica opinione a proprio favore. Tuttavia, nonostante la relativa scarsità numerica, l'impatto dei film non deve essere sottovalutato in quanto, combinando immagini e suoni, offriva più di quanto facesse la stampa. La Polonia era anche in questo campo superiore alla Jugoslavia e alla Bulgaria e i film erano spesso usati anche nelle scuole per fini educativi.

L'organizzazione della propaganda di stato nell'Europa orientale e sudorientale rispettivamente in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria durante gli anni Trenta seguì molti modelli differenti stabiliti da altri Paesi europei. Questi esempi erano spesso combinati con la tradizione e le esperienze locali. L'obiettivo principale della propaganda di stato era controllare l'opinione pubblica nazionale e l'organizzazione era stabilita di conseguenza. La struttura era anche legata alla situazione economica nello Stato e nel periodo specifico.

Appendix 1

GUIDELINES FOR THE PROPAGANDA OF POLISH RADIO (1938)⁴⁶⁷

Radio increasingly penetrates the broadest sections of society. Thanks to its comprehensive advantages, it has become an important factor in the life of every human being. Although there are 33 million people in Poland, it has not yet reached 1 million subscribers, that if we consider that not just one person, but a whole group, listen to radio and with great focus, one can assume that the radio can influence several million people.

That is why propaganda broadcasting in Poland must go three ways:

- 1) Propaganda of the whole radio program;
- 2) Development of radiophony in the country, thus increasing the number of megaphones;
- 3) Development of short wave radio stations.

Ad 1.

Starting from the director of programs and all the heads of various departments and ending with the artist and speaker, we all need to take the principle that the program and execution of verbal or musical programs must be discrete, logical with an appropriate dynamic propaganda bias.

As things stand now, radio teaches, educates and entertains and all these departments have no bias propaganda.

A. Radio teaches ... only from the point of view of disseminating knowledge, which is the task of the school, but not in the science and educational elements, such is the sense of national pride in the value of the individual and the state and in bringing issues to the needs of the national defense.

⁴⁶⁷ CAW Gab. MSWojsk. I 300.1.531

Speakers who are presenting research are not going in this direction and have no guidance towards connecting them with contemporary knowledge of the needs of the state and its needs in future wars.

It is important not to simply insert a radio program several papers on topics such as military, national defense, national economy, etc. expressed by more or less well-known personalities or even by members of the government. It seems essential to all scientists, or the occasional speakers not only to make a certain amount of news available, usually from a handful of selected students, but also to incorporate scientific subjects into a popular form of interesting and useful exercises for the state.

Example: In the story "On Southern waves of Atlantic," it is said just about the Atlantic. How easy would it be to apply this analogy to our Baltic Sea and show the value of our people having their own sea? We cannot speak for example of the Baltic Sea, only in the Baltic story because there are people who just then talk and cannot or do not want to listen to lectures about the Atlantic as they want to know what can be done for the Polish Baltic Sea.

When speaking of the Atlantic, the speaker ignored the issue of our sea and we lost an opportunity to discrete the propaganda. This was no fault of the speaker, but the management that did not tell him of the above observations. There are many similar examples of non-use in many topics of general knowledge for propaganda purposes.

In summary, it is necessary that the radio is made by the living word, whether it is serious or hilarious, high or popular, that it was a living word in the whole sense of the word, live and it is so interesting to the widest possible mass and it focuses on current issues and where only you can wake up in a society with a sense of pride and joy for the past or things done and with concern for matters that require effort and execution.

Urging on all speakers to slow down, even if they have the best names, their good papers are to be delivered by a special speaker. Peasants or ordinary workers care little whether the professor of the University or a member of the Academy of Sciences speaks, they only want to hear the speech uttered in a language which they can understand and with a strong voice and good diction so they would not have problems understanding the words with their poor equipment.

Let us take examples of Germany and Russia. Polish radio, before this kind of initiative, has had no sense of audience and making of such an instrument of propaganda, i.e. radio, the lecture hall or lounge for selected papers for discussion.

Regardless of who wants to learn or who goes to school up to and including universities, radio has the task of popularizing scientific topics for those who could not or did not have the opportunity to learn these topics. Polish intelligence apparatus constantly stresses that the Polish station caters for those that want to listen to it as well as for those malcontents and pessimists about the state. They just need to assert themselves and stress the wider objective, which is the radio. Combating subversive propaganda over the radio is an issue, involving not only the Polish intelligentsia, but also the peasants and ordinary workers.

From the head of Polish Radio, everyone is required to show an interest in the new current, modern Polish life and the current program is a radio reading so it has no life and attitudes of propaganda.

B. Radio informs. Most of the listeners of Polish radio have radios only for gaining information, particularly in the provinces, where daily radio competes with the local press, which often supplies news information.

So for these reasons, everything should be done on a daily basis in order to provide the widest possible coverage for all radio listeners, but the radio has mainly been used for propaganda purposes.

First of all, the radio journal editors have to be specially recognized as spreading propaganda, which is quite different from how it looks in the press. Radio cannot literally give messages sent by PAT, but it must also be able to pick these messages. Newspapers often publish these messages next to their comments, but the radio must always have a strong message with its comments to clarify the matter, according to the interests of the state.

Due to the wide coverage of radio in Poland, the radio has manipulated this information, before it is broadcast to the public. For example, news about the work of the OZN will only be heard by the producers of these radio messages during the log that covered the broad masses. Therefore, special lectures about the OZN will not have the same effect on listeners because some of the OZN supporters are not as dependent as others. Consequently, there are necessary

and important things to which we all need to listen, but you do not know that they will be broadcast on radio.

News broadcast on radio should be lively and interesting as the monotonous tone of the broadcaster is not conducive to effective propaganda because people won't realize the importance and significance of such important news, both home and abroad so it won't have any impact on their lives.

However, it can often takes several days before an original story is broadcast on the radio, but this needs to change because propaganda must remain up-to-date and hot because then it captures the attention and gets a reaction from the people, but this message must be appropriately communicated to listeners in order to get this reaction. So the best form of control in society is to control the pessimism and to build self-confidence so it will be good and rational, to deliberately keep the information relevant to news contents, supported by the effects of music and vocality.

Polish Radio has the wrong idea by converting the radio program "Diary of a Southerner" into a popular language as one cannot assume that only lower the social classes listen to the daily news at noon.

In the light of the limited number of radio service centers and rural workers, we can confidently assume that the greatest increase in radio listeners daily occurs in the evening after work, so this diary, which is often very dry and uninteresting, should not be redrafted into popular propaganda. Here again, the Polish national radio incorrectly tries to please the insignificant number of intelligent listeners, fearing that by raising the visibility of all logs of radio, (the wounded, the southern and evening) this will further reduce its level of quality broadcasting. It forgets to add, however, that it is the responsibility of radio management, to gain more listeners, but at the same time, it should not broadcast material that will insult the intelligence of many listeners in order to cater for the lowest common denominator in society.

Therefore, one can conclude that it is important to publicize and recognize propaganda and all such messages given by radio, while the issue of state-creative, political and economic material promoted by the OZN, spread throughout the program's information public letter called "Polish Radio". This was news released in the form of prepared papers, or chats and this brought together all the topics covered in the OZN radio issues.

Reports properly directed, with the vivid images of work and efforts of individual human clusters are very good forms of propaganda work as these penetrate directly to the students and provide them with the best experiences. Foreign radio stations all conduct perfectly directed reports and therefore, the listener is experiencing these events sufficiently for the purposes of propaganda.

Here in Poland, the quality of reporting is very low. We do not have an unlimited number of capable and qualified people who went into journalism fully trained. Therefore, our reports, with the exception of very few, tend to be boring and do not reflect the broader nature of reporting, which, in the end, are completely devoid of any propaganda

The Management's reports do not consider it appropriate for journalists to prepare for their reports as they believe that it is important for them to think on the spot and that is why occasionally, some journalists make inappropriate comments.

The Head of reporting has then prepared a message for the appropriate journalists by asking them to fill in the gaps that they set up in the templates for the journalists' reports. This has made journalists unhappy as they feel that this has restricted their freedom to do their jobs properly.

Car transmission. Polish Radio has only radio station car, which is a little ridiculous. Instead, there are many unnecessary investments, when it would be better to invest in these cars, where appropriate.

Polish Radio broadcasting equipment has a strange device, which can't be found in the car to tune into the radio stations. A production truck of the Polish Radio has woeful equipment. It lacks prime communication signaling between an operator on the truck and a reporter. Thence absurd situations arise, when with the coverage disk being started, a chief of a report is with action. If, on the other hand, was in touch with the truck, he would be able to order the disk to be stopped, and thus, to comment at intervals about activities actually happening. Both those happening actually and reported about on the air have to be well prepared and always carried-out in a propagandist manner.

There is not much coverage on the radio from the propaganda leading military ceremony, military equipment by the public, if you do not have anything better to say across the Polish airwaves as there are difficulties of reporting.

The Head of radio documentaries ideally should be a young man who is enterprising and full of initiatives, as this is one of the most difficult and very important branches of radio work, but it is one of the best ways to deliver propaganda messages to the uninformed masses. Radio should employ a wide range of skilled reporters, who cover a wide range of different issues such as the military, politics, sports, business, church, school, etc. Reporters should also train the army and in addition, the OZN for the benefit of both parties. The organization for the troops for radio reporters is of course currently under the control of the WINO.

C. Radio - fun. Under this section, you can work the radio to link all the events related to broadcasting music and humor in their various forms. Humor is the best way to link and manipulate propaganda and educational issues.

All serious, heavy and generally topics should not be conducive to boring propaganda campaigns, but you cannot, as is often done in radio, promote an issue to laugh at the expense of other issues. For example, in order to boost their influence in society under the guise of shooting, clubs poke fun at a dozen mayors who are reluctant to share in this laugh and at the end of the drama, there is the mayor, who appears happy in his village. Such an approach to propaganda is false, since all mayors are offended by this type of “humor”, especially when it is at the expense of the authentic propaganda idea of building community centers in the local municipalities.

Like we say, the science on the radio is not only for science itself, so the humor in radio is not on the radio to promote humor. It is a difficult balancing act, but not an impossible one, but the authors must not be restricted to only broadcast the topics that are sent into the radio and so they should use their own imaginations more often.

It is difficult to require that the author of gay dramas without any guidelines to know what propaganda is to rely on the propaganda of his dramas. The head of Polish radio and entertainment found, however, that the only way that he can make people laugh is to broadcast monologues, light music, genre of radio drama etc.

However, managers for each radio program have to fulfill their individual program remits and because there is no explicit propaganda message in individual radio programs, it is harder for that radio program to convey a wider political message to its listeners.

One will not find in any radio monologue or family drama an example, in which each member belongs to another political party. This would be a good analogy to the Polish, in which

to create the various lots from which everyone benefits. The demonstration in this radio play is that the best features which should be part of Poland are Poles, which then defends many listeners from the absurdity and harmfulness of politics. However, the topic of a funny play must be imposed on the author by his or her superiors, not knowing the superior's line with such a play will not come with a fear of being rejected.

As there are more listeners of average intelligence, radio should not be used in the humor section of satire, especially regarding the relations in the country. An intelligent person will understand the satire, but a radio listener often reacts differently to the satire and this satire should therefore be avoided in radio programs.

Music. To play music on the radio, serious or light and to educate the masses. However, it is important to have a manager, who has a strong understanding of both the musical side as well as the propaganda.

Radio is not responsible with the task of learning music; this is a matter for the music schools. Radio has the responsibility of popularizing music where any lessons in music, especially with the systematic programs, should disappear from the radio programs, as they only include a handful of followers or sick people who cannot leave the beds because they cannot afford to receive regular broadcasts.

Music radio must be available to all. When the radio broadcasts an hour long symphonic concert, how does this benefit a worker or peasant in the countryside? They do not listen to it, and for many intelligent people who are into music, this is not worth the effort either. The music would have to operate solo recitalist fewer, more and orchestras and choirs and so the teams. Soloists included in schemes of collective music programs. The average listener is not interested in a 30-minute performance by a solo classical artist or mediocre solo artists, but they would like to listen to one or two of their songs performed during their concerts, choirs, orchestras, etc.

In essence, a music program should be lively and varied and not one-dimensional and the radio department also has poor cooperation with other departments as the head of music works solely for his department and that is why his work has a similar influence to that of a conservator and performances of work more or less good talent. We cannot speak about the existing influence of propaganda in this particular department.

Radio music programs are generally monotonous and do not affect the excitement of the masses. The head of the music department of Polish Radio is wrong in supposing that the department's curriculum meets the task, if from time to time it will give a concert of works by Polish composers. This is the propaganda of Polish music, not the propaganda impact of music for the listeners. It would for example select the music choices of foreign works of composers with strong voices and not those with long and tedious songs, though not without artistic value, as well as those with a very weak impact on intellectual qualities.

For example, when a person starts their working day and tunes into a radio to listen in the morning, records should be selected not randomly, but purposefully. Working citizens would not want to listen to dance songs or cabaret waltzes, but would listen to good foreign marches or Polish composers, so they would feel better on their way to work. Then we can say that the morning music acts as propaganda for listeners who are under its influence and they will proceed to work with greater willingness. There can be no such program and I've heard that for the kids at 8 o'clock in the morning, a song is played called "Sleep baby, sleep baby" when they just got up and they would not think about sleeping.

Executives of the music department of Polish Radio believe that they meet the needs of propaganda in relation to the village by giving *obereks*, *kuoiaviaks*, *mazurs*, etc.

The music of Polish composers should include details of their biographies and works of that era (Chopin, Moniuszko, Noskowski etc).

D. General. Polish radio lacks in its work a single line, decision, courage, especially in the area of state-propaganda. It senses the fear of a subscriber whose wishes may be contrary to the right direction for Polish Radio, a state institution. The radio does not realize that even subscribers, dissatisfied with this or that idea in radio policy, will not get rid of the radio apparatus, which is not only used for Polish stations.

Radio is not familiar with propaganda, it does not understand it and know anything about it. These shortcomings are covered by radio's assertion that as an institution, it brings together people of various shades of national policy and must refrain from any bias towards any other social group. This approach is false and in this case, it can be seen as deliberate and forceful propaganda.

In the situation when other countries, without compromising the learning, information and entertainment, made radio and cinema as well as the best means of state propaganda with a

clear and decisive action program, it is impressive that Polish radio works with a mixture of programs without a core, guiding thought and without strong coordination amongst all its departments.

In this case, the OZN can decide to use radio for its own propaganda purposes, and this may not be limited to just delivering speeches or messages, but also to have a decisive impact on all sections of work in Polish radio so that the findings in the February statement can be implemented everywhere.

The Polish radio stream has a different spirit. All employees from the janitor up to the managerial staff must have only one thought and that is that they should work with enthusiasm and with a willingness and understanding of the role they should play in the State Radio.

Appendix 2

On the way of Renewal: Yugoslavia, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow - movie transcript⁴⁶⁸

Petrovgrad, November 6, 1938. Young men dressed in the green shirts are marching. In the background, we hear a chorus which sings “Salute to the Leader” (“Pozdrav vodji”). Milan Stojadinovic waves to the people of Petrovgrad in an open car and they salute him happily. Stojadinovic steps out of car, uniformed men salute him. He is climbing onto the balcony, followed by the Minister of Agriculture Svetozar Stankovic. People are gathered and they applaud him and wave their hats.

SVETOZAR STANKOVIC:

Dear Banatian brothers.

City of Petrovgrad, center of Banat

Woke up all decorated and happy

Because it was visited by the

President of the King’s government, (Long live)

The chief of the Yugoslav Radical Community (Long live)

And the leader of our movement mister,

Mister Doctor Milan Stojadinovic. (Long live)

(Long chants: Leader, leader, leader)

MILAN STOJADINOVIC:

Dear brothers and friends

No other part of our state

That was earlier under enemy rule

Was not that spontaneous, that joyful,

⁴⁶⁸ What we see on the screen is written with normal letters and what “actors” are talking about is in cursive. The text in the brackets describes that what we see on the screen whilst the “actors” are talking.

*That thrilled without any condition and agreement
Approach our national unity
Like it was done by proud Vojvodina
Twenty years ago. (Crowd: That's correct. Hooray.)
Vojvodina was then economically at the first place
Other provinces envied Vojvodina
On her national conscience
And economic welfare.
That was the position of Vojvodina twenty years ago
When our great state and
National unity was made in the great state
Of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.
(Some man: Long live unified Yugoslavia!,
Crowd: Long live!)*

*You all from Northern Banat know me now
In 1925, we, in the Southern Banat, did not give
One sole mandate to the opposition.
I know you as you know me.
My fight knows only for victory.
And because of that, knowing you, I believe that
On 11th December, we will have the most complete,
biggest and the most glorious
victory that up until now, we didn't achieve.
Long live!*

(Chants of approval, long chants: *leader, leader*. Stojadinovic happily salutes back to the crowd)

Peasant working in the field with cows.

Minister without Portfolio, Krek on the platform:

MIHA KREK:

With the arrival of Milan Stojadinovic's government

In internal policy

Arrived pacification and tranquilization.

Real people spirit in public administration

Caused new love of the people towards

His public administration and

also towards the country.

The Minister of Construction Dobrivoje Stoshovic on the same platform.

DOBRIVOJE STOSHOVIC:

Construction policy reaches that level

This allows our country rapid

And planned work on the modernization

And improvement of our road system.

(Workers building the roads, Milan Stojadinovic cuts the track for the opening of some new road).

From one billion loan from 1935,

We have achieved to complete first,

Thousands of kilometers of our road system.

We manage to supply with water,

thousands of our villages,

Small towns and towns and

We also manage to build

countless long lasting bridges.

(The train is passing over the bridge. Machines are working on the road)

*And we also manage to build
And begin to construct three... (Sound, he suddenly stops.)*

The Minister without Portfolio on the same platform.

DJURA JANKOVIC:

*Prime Minister Dr Milan Stojadinovic,
Welcomes and meets European statesmen.*

Scenes of the new hospital built in the Stojadinovic era are being shown. The Minister of Social Politics and People's Health Dragisha Cvetkovic stands on the same platform.

DRAGISHA CVETKOVIC:

*Social policy of the government of
Milan Stojadinovic delivered big and crucial results.
Never in our country, nor the biggest reforms,
Nor useful in the interest of our working people
Have ever been done before*

SPOKESMAN:

*With belief in his great capacity,
Good will and determination
We salute him as the leader which
Led Yugoslavia on the road to renewal
Towards a better and brighter future.*

(The arrival of Milan Stojadinovic on some train station. There were smiling girls in national clothing where Stojadinovic receives flowers from one girl.)

The arrival of Milan Stojadinovic in Negotin (Eastern Serbia) on 30th October 1938 where the crowds welcome him with young boys and girls in national clothing and horsemen

with Yugoslav flags. Stojadinovic salutes the crowds with local party leaders and he walks through the city, surrounded by the crowds.

The Prime Minister Stojadinovic on an improvised platform.

MILAN STOJADINOVIC:

*Brothers, that what we did
In the economic field
To cut the taxes
To cut peasants' debts
And in the same time, to raise
the prices of the peasants' products.*

(The crowd holds Stojadinovic's portraits with the written slogans.)

*And to give good harvest,
Or to have good harvest,
Those brothers are not successes
Those are huge successes,
Those are miracles
In the economic policy of our country.
That's correct.*

(Chants of approval)

*But, in the way that we made miracles
In the economic field,
We could say that
We also created one unseen miracle
In the political field.
The work of my government,
And the work of the Yugoslav Radical Community*

(Long live!!!)

It manage to reconcile your countryman

Mr Petar Zivkovic

With Dr Machek in Zagreb.

But, down with the villain!

(Chants of disapproval)

Our people are saying, when winter is bad,

When winter is strong

Then cat and mouse are sleeping together.

(Stojadinovic is laughing.)

I could conclude that

Those two gentlemen

Are predicting for themselves

Very bad and evil winter.

(That's correct.)

That winter will be harder from

The tops of Old Mountain.

That will be real Siberian winter for them

When knees unite with the jaw.

(That's correct. Long live the leader!)

Brothers and friends, we are supposed to have

This reunion last week.

I decided that it should

Be today.

If it was last week

We could have rain.

*Today, we have nice weather
That's the biggest proof that
God is with us.
Victory is ours.
(That's correct!)
(Chants of approval.)*

Milan Stojadinovic followed by Ministers and “green shirts” walk in the streets. Big crowds follow his movements. Stojadinovic salutes the gathered citizens.

(Chants: Hooray and long live.)

Milan Stojadinovic on the same platform as other ministers.

MILAN STOJADINOVIC:
*In one terrible cataclysm
When tornado moved states
And change frontiers
We are succeeded to preserve
peace for our country.
That means that we are manage
to keep safe and save Yugoslavia*

SPOKESMAN:
*You have seen what Milan Stojadinovic
Has done for you and your country.
Think, believe and decide.
On 11th December, every one of you is responsible
For the destiny of Yugoslavia.
...With Your help and trust
He continues his great deed
Does Dr Milan Stojadinovic.
(probably missing word.)*

In the background, we are seeing a smiling Milan Stojadinovic, and after the statesman finishes, we can see the Yugoslav flag flying in the wind.

Appendix 3

The Main Direction of *Renewal* Section for Propaganda

Plan and Instructions for future propaganda work⁴⁶⁹

Last year on the 23rd December 1934, the first phase of our propaganda work is finished. At the conference that was held last year on the 26th, 27th, and 28th December, the chief of propaganda points out, in essence, the big problems that have to be solved in the future. These are:

1. To clear the way for the practical work of the regime.
2. To remain the most powerful weapon for state control and win over the people for a new construction and support of the state.
3. To bring clarity and new knowledge to people and to create new consciousness for the citizens, the state and the whole nation.
4. To have a strong urge for society's awakening thoughts, to bring people to the consciousness that they should give themselves and to enthusiastically bring people to the tasks and goals of the regime.
5. To be strengthening the bright flame of the people's enthusiasm and their re-education in the spirit of the coming era and to give purpose and scope to the rebuilding of new state.
6. To use severe and historically objective criticism and to finally assimilate the consciousness of the people from the old state and its social and political formations.

The main goal of the management of the Direction of Renewal is to see the final arrival on the highest level of a moral force and working organization, with the aim of activating social and national spirit.

For completing these tasks, I recommend that in the following four months that the following plan should be executed:

⁴⁶⁹ CDA, 232k-1-19.

I POLITICAL AND ECONOMY PLAN

1. In the spirit of article 40 of the act, which forms a list of people from the free citizens, officials and others, which could be used for public actions on general political issues.

2. To prepare plans for meetings in every village and cities where there are no discussions on political and economic issues and in villages and cities where meetings were not successfully enough with the aim that:

a) In every place, meetings should be finished within two weeks;

b) Plans with the names of the places and speakers should be finished at the latest on 20th January 1935;

c) Users of the orders that should be given for organization of the meetings, district activists should be ready for organizing the regional, area and district meetings where they should be informed by the Direction. For the organization of those meetings, special instructions will be sent.

Note: For the places in which one is needed, a speaker from the Sofia should be marked in the plan.

II PROPAGANDA OF THE INITIATIVE OF THE REGIME AND CLEAR EXPLANATION OF ITS REFORMATORY ACTIVITY

This type of propaganda highlights the task of making property for the broadest mass of people as clear as possible in every initiative of the regime.

For that goal, it is necessary:

1. To make a connection with the every representative of every power and competent person from every civil and economic power:

a) Agronomist;

j) Work inspectors;

b) Veterinarians;

k) Priests;

c) Medics;

l) Cooperative activists';

d) Forester;

m) Librarians;

e) Inspectors and teachers;

n) Court clerks and legal experts;

f) Administrators and policemen;

o) Reserve officers;

- g) Engineers and architects;
- h) Chief for work;
- i) Finance administrative;
- p) Reserve non-commissioned officers;
- r) Representatives of economical categories;
- s) Representatives sport, youth and patriotic organizations

In one common conference, the aim is to organize a clear order of the speeches under the initiative of various ministries.

a) Ministry of Interior

- 1. Administrative legislation;
- 2. People's health

b) Ministry of People's Economy

- 1. Agriculture and its parts;
- 2. Cattle-raising;
- 3. Economic-social legislation;
- 4. Forest issues;
- 5. Credit;
- 6. Monopole: hemp, onion and other;
- 7. Professional societies, societies of state's clerks.

c) Ministry of Finance

- 1. New educational reform;
- 2. Other special issues.

d) Ministry of People's Education

- 1. New educational reform;
- 2. Other special issues.

e) Ministry of Justice

- 1. New court reform;
- 2. Laws that interest peasants.

f) Ministry of Urbanization

- 1. Urbanization;
- 2. Law for the roads;

3. Work services (regular, part-time)

NB: You will find materials for speeches in the appendix of this document as well as in the brochures of the Direction for Renewal.

The speeches should be started in the places that have been already visited by the propagandists. In that manner, if one speech is read in these places, we could have six speeches in every village and eventually, every speech should be delivered on the 15th April. The plan, with the names of all the speakers and the villages, should be presented on the 20th January 1935.

NB: The district teachers have organized the so called “people universities” by the order of the Ministry of Interior at the request of the Direction for Renewal. This is on the grounds of article 7 of the regulation that they must prevent them from destroying everything that had been made up to this moment.

III CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROPAGANDA

This type of propaganda aims to give general knowledge to the village and the city in cultural and educational, religious, sports, pedagogic and health and other issues. The most important aim, however, is to include the following types of propaganda:

1. Our history

- a) Idealism of the most famous activists before the Liberation.
- b) War for unification of the Bulgarian tribe.
- c) Educational meaning for our national history.

2. The role of the school in our Revival

- a) Teacher and the new state.
- b) Village and the people’s teacher.

3. Education

- a) National, civil and society education.
- b) Meaning of the people’s revolution for national education.

4. Church

- a) What we owe to the Bulgarian church.
- b) Why we should keep one religion and the state’s tradition of the people.

Sport –

Health issues:

- a) Preventive medicine;
- b) Mother;
- c) Care for the child etc.

The best leader in this matter is the purposeful sense of the activist that helps him to organize his speeches on the subject in a way that would interest the local community.

I. PREPARATION FOR THE MEETINGS

1. For good and fruitful preparation, especially for the provinces in the village, it is recommended to form, with the help of the major and deputy major, the “Action Committee” where teachers, agronomists, priests, librarians and cooperative activists, representatives of patriotic organizations, economic categories, manufacturing layers, leaders in the village, all participate with special tasks to advertise, prepare and organize the meetings.

2. The role of the major, his assistant and members of the Action Committee, besides the work on touring before the meeting, is to win over hearts and minds of the peasants and to make them feel welcomed and invited and not to be left with the feeling that they are going to be forced out. In short, the way of organizing the meeting should be characterized with great purity and cordiality.

3. Female teachers and clerks’ wives, like all other intelligent village’s females, are to be used like supporting members of the Action Committee for the organization of the meetings with women. They should be responsible for the order of dissolution of the parties and for the monopoly of alcohol in general as well as all other activities that take away their husbands from the family. It is important that we should hear more of their views.

4. All meetings should begin with the national anthem “Shumi Maritza” and to finish with the “Mila Rodino”, all performed by a civil and school’ chorus.

5. In places where the meetings are organized, if there is a stage, this should be decorated with the flags and greenery, and where there is not a stage, the room should be decorated in the national decor. The aim should be to transform our meetings into a real national gathering in order to revive the Bulgarian national spirit.

MANANGING THE MEETINGS

1. The meetings should be opened, managed and closed by either an official representative of the government, a major, doctor, agronomist, teacher's chief, director of high school etc, or by an inhabitant of that village.

2. The opening and closing of the meeting should be done in one special way so from the beginning, one could see the differences between yesterday's party meetings and today's when representatives of the regime and the state are talking.

3. Chairmen, especially, should stress that our meetings are like religious congregations and if everyone is asking questions and quotes, this will kill the impact of these meetings and it will be difficult to achieve the desired results.

SPEAKER

1. The first condition that well organized propaganda has to meet is the unified word of the speakers.

2. For that goal, in the spirit of articles 7 and 39 of the manual, the activists must attend seminars to gain a consensus of views amongst the speakers. In those seminars, all the brochures of the direction should be viewed and analyzed in order to reform the activity of the regime.

3. Speakers are chosen because they:

a) Fanatically believe in the new ideology and in the new state.

b) Have the ability to speak well and passionately in public.

c) Have the temperaments of fighters and are prepared to struggle to overcome all obstacles and difficult conditions to achieve our goals.

4. When these kinds of people are found, activists should give them one other type of approach that can be described as:

a) A determination towards a more detailed study into the events of government and to be liberated from old partisan attitudes.

b) Understanding local problems and needs by attending the place of the meetings one day earlier and by stimulating a short psychological study of the local people in order to understand their hearts and minds.

c) Stimulating people with great psychology and knowledge so they can enter deep into people's hearts & minds and understand their audience better.

d) Making every word relevant to the Bulgarian people.

e) Always having faith, energy and love in the sincerity of their mission.

f) Distancing themselves from old attitudes and prejudices, not making false promises and receiving obligations. They should only be content with following the correct legal procedures.

g) Being tactful and correct in not accusing one party leader of past events in account of others. Let us stress that we are criticizing a system full of vices that destroyed even the best ambitions and the purest hearts. This is because experience taught us that whenever a speaker had been criticizing the old party life, as a system in general, it was always approved by the audience.

h) Representing the people in a way which, with a refreshing attitude and modesty and lack of indulgence, underlines the new spirit of regime.

i) Believing in justice, the most important word that the world knows and upon which today's regime is based and this should be constantly stressed.

THE RESULTS OF THE MEETINGS

In the county circular, number 87 from last October, there is always a note written after the end of each meeting about the atmosphere of that meeting was held and its results. In the addition, one should also add:

1. A couple of days before each meeting, questionnaires should be sent to the majors or deputy majors in the villages, in addition to the existing instructions that are to be strictly followed for preparation, organization and removal of the meetings and the effect these have on listeners.

2. Immediately after the conclusion of each meeting, activists are to make contact by telephone with the major or his substitute or with the person who is delegated to follow the meeting. They will then complete the questionnaire, e.g. one example is a questionnaire which is to be immediately sent to the propaganda section of Direction.

3. After all that has happened on the same night, the district activists are supposed to dictate to the stenographer, by telephone, the part of the questionnaire that is supposed to be published.

INCIDENTS

For every incident that deserves to be especially noted, activists must send an immediate report to the section.

MALICIOUS RUMORS

Each malicious rumor which deliberately aims to bring turmoil to the local population should be immediately reported by telephone to the stenographer and this telephone conversation has to be immediately followed by a paper report. If, however, the issue is of a confidential nature, then a confidential report must be sent as confidential.

IV PRINTED PROPAGANDA

1. Brochures

a) It should be noted that until now, the action was on the whole destroyed. This was due to the fact that the Direction did not have their members in the field in order to fulfill their initiatives and also due to the non-rational transfer and use of published brochures.

b) All the brochures in the future should be sent to activists and every one of them, according to the local conditions, should use this powerful tool of propaganda to build on the impact generated by the speeches. These brochures should highlight the same issues that concern the most intelligent listeners in order to consolidate and affirm existing beliefs delivered through the live speeches.

c) Activists should always aim for the rational synthesis of live and written word to increase the knowledge of the masses and strengthen beliefs in the new regime.

2. Newspaper New Days (*Нови Дни*)

a) It should be noted that in general, the number of subscribers of the newspapers is unsatisfactory.

b) The first obligation of the activists, in the current climate, is to re-awaken interest for this newspaper through persistent propaganda.

c) Force should be excluded in the dealing with the subscribers, like the influence of the chief on his subordinates. Only with the cultivation and exacerbation of the needs of the masses will they look for the newspapers on their own.

d) It is especially recommended that volunteers subscribe to the newspaper for between 3-6 months, but mainly according to the capabilities of these subscribers.

e) It is especially important for the main administration offices of the newspaper *Novi Dni* to be in contact with the society *Strela* to arrange for the subscribers to receive their copy of the newspapers at the same time as those people who are buying them on the day from the sellers on the streets.

3. Province's Press

Activists should be fully briefed with the instruction for steering and controlling the press according to the Manual

4. Village's correspondents

a) According to article number 42 of the Manual, activists should select people from the villages as voluntary village correspondents

b) For this selection process, one should bear in mind that they should be:

- Devoted sympathizers of the new regime
- Culturally educated people
- Well informed about village needs and essences
- Serious and responsible people that should not misled activists or editorials with biased

news

c) For the recommendation that people should be selected from the teachers

d) Duties of the village correspondents in the field of propaganda will be determined during the process. For now, it is enough for them that, beside their correspondent functions, they become the closest collaborators of the major, or his assistants and work as an action committee for organizing every publishing action.

If all of that is accepted and reasonably done, we could expect brilliant results, but that is essential before we, as members of the Renewal, could be imbued with high knowledge and with great enthusiasm. Let it be known that only faith and fanatical belief is what influences the masses.

Strong will is a crucial element in overcoming great obstacles in person and let us be conscious conductors of that will and strengthen the authority of the state in the conscience of the people.

Chief Director:

Petar Popzlatev

(Signature)

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