SCUOLA
NORMALE
SUPERIORE

Department of Political and Social Sciences
Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence

PhD thesis in Political Science and Sociology

"Raised on streets? The influence of social movements over policy outcomes in South East Europe: The cases of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina"

PhD Candidate: Ivan Stefanovski

Supervisor: Professor Manuela Caiani (Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence)
Co-Supervisor: Professor Donatella della Porta (Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence)

To my late father Ljupcho Stefanovski

Contents

List of abbreviations in alphabetical order

B&H: Bosnia and Herzegovina

BCP: Bulgarian Communist Party

BH: Bosnian-Herzegovian

BSP: Bulgarian Socialist Party

CfM: "Citizens for Macedonia"

DPA: Democratic Party of the Albanians

DSSRM: Declaration for Sovereignty of Socialist Republic of Macedonia

DUI: Democratic Union for Integration

EC: European Commission

EU: European Union

FB&H: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

GERB: Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria

GFAPBH: The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement

GNA: Grand National Assembly

HDZ: Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina

HLAD: High Level Accession Dialogue

IMF: International Monetary Fund

KEVR: Energy and Water Regulatory Commission in Bulgaria

MAAK: Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action

MRF: Movement for Rights and Freedoms

NGOs: Non-governmental organizations

OFA: Ohrid Framework Agreement

PBS: Public broadcasting service

PCA: Political claim analysis

PEA: Protest event analysis

POS: Political opportunity structure

PTM: Process tracing methodology

RMT: Resource mobilization theory

RS: Republika Srpska

SDA: Party for Democratic Action

SDP: Social Democratic Party

SDS: Serbian Democratic Party

SDSM: Social Democratic Union of Macedonia

SEC: State Election Commission

SKJ: National League of Communists of Yugoslavia

SKM-PDP: League of Communists of Macedonia – Party for Democratic Transformation

SMOs: Social movement organizations

SNA: Social network analysis

SPO: Special prosecutor's office

SRM: Socialist Republic of Macedonia

UBK: Agency for Security and Counterintelligence

UDF: Union of Democratic Forces

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VMRO-DPMNE: Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity

List of tables

List of Figures

Acknowledgments

Perhaps, writing these last paragraphs of a five-year long endeavor are the most difficult ones, having in mind that I would not like to forget anyone who has helped me reach this far.

I would like to start by deeply thanking my supervisor – Professor Manuela Caiani – a highly devoted, professional and caring person, who had mentored me during these five years. Manuela, this thesis would have never existed without your support and faith. Thank you so much! I am also very thankful to my co-supervisor – Professor Donatella della Porta – who is the most responsible person for my Florentine journey. Throughout these years, she provided me with timely and wise support. Donatella, I was privileged to learn from you! I would also like to thank all the colleagues from the Institute at the SNS who contributed with their exchange of ideas, support and discussions.

Still, I must single out threevery important people, those that I like to call "My Italian family": Benedetta, Bruno and Nicola, three wonderful individuals that had made my stay in Italy a blast. Bene, you have been like a sister – during every single day in Florence. Thank you for listening to endless braging and whining, and thank you for all the good food, wine and Italian culture spent with me. Bru, apart from knowing all possible Political Science references by heart, you are also one of the dearest and caring people that I have met in my life. Thank you for showing that one could have a brother from another mother. Nick, thank you for wasting so much time and energy to teach me quantitative methodology – by now you already know that it is a mission impossible! And thank you for reminding us how much we need to work in order to succeed.

Some people say that family is all. I only know that I would have never made it hear without mine. I would like to deeply thank my mother and my sister for the wholehearted support throughout this journey. Your love and care had easened the most difficult moments. Lastly, the most profound gratitude goes to my beloved and caring wife, who made numerous sacrifices during these several years. Thank you for the entire technical and logistical support, for the help with the numbers, for tolerating long periods without vacation and rest, and ultimately – thank you for the entire love and patience provided. You were always here when you were needed the most!

Chapter 1 : Introduction: The impact of social movements in South East Europe: Research design, theories and hypotheses

1.1. *The Puzzle: Social movements' outcomes in policy processes*

During the last decade, many citizens in the Balkan countries have raised their voice against various phenomena that have hindered soaking the prosperity of the region. The endless processes of democratic and economic transition, the violations of human rights, the unequal and unjust privatization of national assets, as well as the high percentage of unemployment and poverty are just some of the most striking reasons for political contestation of governmental policies in the region. After two decades of relatively passive observance and strong apathy towards political processes in general, the last several years have galvanized citizens' actions. Students, redundant workers, university professors, artists and many other groups have taken to the streets, together, to send a strong message to their governments that the long lasting *status quo* is no longer acceptable.

This research project aims to investigate the impact of social movements on policy outputs and policy outcomes in the region of South East Europe by focusing on three countries: Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), within the time frame of approximately three years. Starting from late January 2013, when the first wave of anti-monopoly protests in Bulgaria started, the project continues to follow the protests in B&H during the first half of 2014, ending with the analysis of the Macedonian case of the platform "Citizens for Macedonia" (CfM), which reached its peak in mid-2015. This is a rather challenging task due to the complexity of the definition, analyses and measurement of social movement outcomes in general (Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999). From a theoretical perspective, this project bridges several strands of literature: social movement studies, works on policy impact of civil society mobilization, and democratization literature. Works related to social movement studies are present throughout all parts of the text, trying to provide an overarching analysis of the main research questions. The literature on democratization focuses primarily on explanations of the region's historical context, and tracks the main motivations of citizens to engage in anti-governmental mobilizations. Insights from law and public policy are integrated in order to shed better light on the process of creation of policy outputs, following the policy cycles, as well as

the legislative peculiarities in the three countries, tracking the involvement and influence of social movement actors in these processes.

This research operationalizes questions that are innovative and provocative, focusing on dilemmas that are thought to be in the realm of the undiscovered. Two central research questions are raised, aiming to address the following dilemmas:

To what extent did recent anti-governmental social movements in South East Europe contribute to the adoption of specific policy outputs?

What role did the movements play in the effectuation of policy outputs into more noticeable policy outcomes?

In order to answer these questions as comprehensibly as possible, this work will not limit itself only to the identification of cause-effect relations. It aims to unravel the main mechanisms and processes behind these two relevant issues occurring during the three particular waves of contention under analysis. Namely, it focuses on the actors' reasons and motivations, as well as on meso-level organizational processes that link the macro-contextual causes to the macro effects (i.e. the influence over policy outcomes). Mechanisms can be defined as "entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or setup to finish or termination conditions" (Brady 2008, p. 243 in Brady and Collier 2008). Glennan defines a causal mechanism as "a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan 1996, p. 52). One of the most recent definitions of mechanisms, with emphasis on studying contentious politics, is provided by Tilly and Tarrow (2015, p. 29), which define them as "delimited class of changes that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations". Furthermore, processes, which are generally composed of mechanisms, are presented as "regular combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements" (Box-Steffensmeier 2008). This mechanism-process approach plays a crucial role in explaining the previously raised issues in the two research questions.

In order to investigate social movement outcomes in the Balkan region resulting from the recent waves of protests, this study will refer to multiple concepts: political opportunity structure (POS) mechanisms and processes, as well as organizational characteristics, which will be illustrated in the following sections. In particular we will focus on:

T**he main civil society/social movement actors ("challengers")** participating in anti-government mobilizations aimed at reforming and democratizing the societies in the countries where the particular movements under study took place – B&H, Bulgaria and Macedonia. Identifying who they are, how they are organized, and what their main resources and claims are. Primarily, the emphasis is on the individual and collective actors that acted as challengers to governmental behavior, such as social movement organizations (SMOs), non-governmental organization (NGOs), political parties, as well as formal and informal networks. This plethora of individual and collective actors engaged in collective actions articulating similar grievances (della Porta and Diani 2006, pp. 11-14).

The **concept of claims-making** by the central actors is also closely considered (Lindekilde 2013). The research follows several temporal positions, aiming to understand whether the anti-governmental challengers had predefined draft policies which articulated their claims (operationalization of the political claims in statutes, manifestos, programs or other types of documents), or whether they emerged *ad-hoc* leading towards extensive claim and frame bridging (Snow et al. 1986). Furthermore, it is of utmost importance to see whether the movements managed to advocate for the policy proposals to reach the policy arenas and through which mechanisms (Burstein et al. 1995).

Apart from the actors which come from the side of the challengers, this work also encompasses **the most important external actors such as state institutions, political parties, media** and the **international community**. On this point, we will investigate who are allies and opponents in the social movements, and their role in the creation and implementation of the policy outcomes advocated for by the three movements under study.

Lastly, the **political opportunity structure** already touched upon in the previous paragraph is circled by the concept of **state intervention/repression**, which is of great importance for shaping the policy outcomes. Within the political process approach, the external environment in which social movements operate largely influences their interactions (della Porta 2013) and their gains/losses. In this manner, this study looks at how different types and degrees of state intervention influenced the policy outputs and outcomes in the three examined cases.

Following the mechanism-process approach, this study looks profoundly into the processes through which the aforementioned concepts and mechanisms are solidified. The primary focus of interest is the process of *adoption of policy outputs* and the process of

transformation of policy outputs into tangible policy outcomes, which alleviated the grievances of the governmental challengers. These concepts are thoroughly explained below. In order to delve deeper into these two processes, one must begin with the presentation of the most commonly addressed processes in contentious politics studies.

1.2. *Scientific relevance of the research questions: Why study the policy influence of contemporary movements in South East Europe*

As mentioned previously, the main research interest of this project is focused on examining to **what extent recent social movements in South East Europe contributed to policy outputs and policy outcomes on issues that are highly contested and significant in the countries where they took place**. This is a scientifically relevant topic, because social movement literature focusing on the region usually highlights the emergence and forms of mobilization, neglecting the impact of movements on outcomes. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, there are no extant studies dedicated to social movement outcomes which focus on Macedonia, B&H or Bulgaria. This is highly unusual, taking into consideration that the three countries under study have been mobilizing increasingly in the last several years, contesting the quality of democracy and the socio-economic conditions in their countries.

Before moving to the region-specific relevance of the study, let us review how the main issues studied in this work are covered in the existing literature. Previous research combining social movements and public policy usually always takes into consideration public opinion, linking it to legislative action (Andrews 2001, Amenta et. al 1994, McCammon et al. 2001). Agnone has identified three research traditions studying political impact of social movements: those dominantly focusing on protest, other focusing on public opinion, and a third group combining the previous two (Agnone 2007). Great portion of these studies are based on quantitative analyses, focus exclusively on the USA and take into consideration large time spans (Soule and Olzak 2004, Santoro 2002, McAdam and Su 2002). This study tries to reflect on the topic through a more mechanistic approach, decomposing the parts of the policy making process, and tracing the peculiarities directly linked to the region of South East Europe. Furthermore, this research also aims at bridging the low availability of data regarding protests and public opinion.

Another product resulting from this work is the differentiation between policy outputs and policy outcomes, influenced by anti-governmental social movements. This delineation creates a double-component outcome, which is defined and operationalized. The first component, *policy outputs*, should be understood as formal change of legislation, bylaws, or other *erga omnes* legal acts. The second component, *policy outcomes*, looks at the implementation and the short term effect of previously enacted outputs in relation to the alleviation of the challengers' grievances. In addition, the direct role of the governmental challengers, both in provoking the legalization of the advocated issues, as well as their facilitation in the process of implementation, in comparison to other external individual and collective actors is also analyzed.

Lastly, the works on social movement outcomes are almost always understudied in comparison to other aspects of social movement and contentious politics scholarship, such as mobilization, identities, networks, as well as relationships to other actors in the political arena, especially on European soil (Rucht in Fillieule and Accornero 2016, Bosi and Mosca in Fillieule and Accornero 2016, pp. 281-2). This statement is even truer regarding the specific area of South East Europe.

Scholarship devoted to South East Europe is considerably smaller comparing to research on social movements' emergence and outcomes in Western/Northern Europe or the USA (e.g. Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999, Bosi, Giugni and Uba 2016). The same can be said regarding the academic work dealing with social movements. There are few recent works dealing with this topic, which focus on this particular region of Europe.

A recent study edited by Bilić combines Europeanization studies and social movement studies, dealing with the LGBT activism in the post-Yugoslav space. This work touches upon sexual politics, activism and resistance focusing on Croatia, Slovenia, B&H, Kosovo and Montenegro, the oppression of LGBT activism in Macedonia, the Europeanization and the pride parades in Serbia (Bilić 2016). Furthermore, Bilić and Kajinić co-edited a volume which provided both theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the imbalance of Western and Eastern European research on LGBT activism, explained through practical examples drawn from recent events in Croatia and Serbia (Bilić and Kajinić 2016).

As expected, the post-Yugoslav space also attracted researchers to spread their ideas on anti-war contention and activism, following the years of military conflicts which dramatically changed the lives of people in the region. Bridging literature on social movement studies,

historical sociology and anthropology, Bilić has written a monograph tracing the anti-war protest cycle that spread throughout the 1990s, dominantly focusing on the mobilization and the acquiring of resources, just slightly dealing with impact of anti-war engagement (Bilić 2012). Aleksov and others have also co-edited a volume on anti-war contention in former Yugoslavia, dealing with anti-nationalism sentiments, the Slovenian peace movement, and the movements against violence in Montenegro and Kosovo, as well as the alternative cultural identities during the war and post-war period (Aleksov et al. 2012). Non Yugoslav authors have also reflected on similar issues. Fridman has analyzed anti-war activism in Serbia during the 1990s (2011), while Stubbs has done research on the organizations, networks, shapes and narratives of the anti-war movement in Croatia, further expanding his work on the networks of professional NGOs and the student activist initiatives (2012). Most recently, an edited volume by Bieber and Brentin (2018) looked at social movements in the Balkans, closely analyzing several protests ranging from Slovenia to Greece. This work underlines similarities and parallels between various recent contemporary movements and sheds light on the varying dynamics of the protests and governments' responses to them.

Moving to the previous work done on the mobilizations which are under study in this text, several recent pieces deserve acknowledgement. It must be noted that numerous writings on these contentious issues cannot be expected, primarily because they happened quite recently, some of them still enduring in various forms and shapes. The winter protests in Bulgaria from the beginning of 2013 set the pace for what proved to be one of the most contentious years in recent Bulgarian history. Nikolova, Medarov and Tsoneva (2014) focus on the boundary activation, distinguishing between "us" and "them" during the winter protests in Bulgaria. They also analyze the history of contention from the early 1990s up to the protests in 2013. The authors also stress the differences in identities between the two different "sides" of the picket line. Many authors present a combined presentation of the three protest waves, dealing with particular issues which stretched or overlapped in the various contentious events. Rone looks at the unusual absence of the austerity narrative during the 2013 events (2017), while Ganev sheds light on the various strategies and tactics used by Bulgarian challengers in order to target the political elites (2014). Valentina Gueorguieva uses grounded theory to track the preferences of the protesters for representative democracy and strong citizens' control, lensing through three concepts: representative democracy and political parties, participation and deliberation (2014).

Kiril Drezov makes an interesting claim, trying to link the winter and the summer protests in Bulgaria to the Gezi movement in Turkey, looking for overlaps in identities and mutual recognition and solidarity, also inserting into play the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (2013). Velinova, Tomov and Raycheva (2015) also devote time and space to the first two protest waves, looking at the cultural and symbolic background of the protests, highlighting the slogans and the images whereas distinguishing between the more violent winter protests, and the irony-filled and carnivalesque summer gatherings. Furthermore, Tomov and Raycheva (2015) expand their previous study by analyzing media activism and linking it to offline activities, drawing inferences from data obtained through two major Facebook groups active during the protests. Lastly, Popov and Georgieva (2015) reflected on the legal setting which surrounded the contentious 2013, analyzing constitutional guarantees of the Freedom of Assembly, as well as the role of the Bulgarian Law on Gatherings, Meetings and Manifestations.

The protests which spurred much attention in the region, but also promptly distorted the political elites in the country and sent a clear message of dissatisfaction by the citizens, were the Bosnian-Herzegovian (BH) winter/spring contentious events of 2014, labeled by some foreign media outlets and researchers as “The Bosnian Spring”, creating an allusion to the fresh events that took place in the MENA region. Although recent, several academic pieces have already glanced through these events. An edited volume by Damir Arsenijević goes deep into analyzing the reasons behind the violent mobilization. The amounted despair stemming from the decades long destruction of the Bosnian factories, mainly those in Tuzla, diffused promptly throughout the whole Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H). The trade union struggles, the hunger and hopelessness, as well as the plenumization of BH society are vividly presented in this compilation (Arsenijević 2014). The unfair privatization which deprived many citizens from their basic daily needs for years, somehow taught workers and their families to survive, but also to share and to care. This solidarity which only strengthened following the demobilization process was one of the main gains from the citizens’ assemblies – the “plenums”. The creation of the new collective identities bridging the nationalistic divides following Dayton, are very well captured in the work by Milan (2016). The challengers’ demands, strategies and forms of participation, as well as the transformation of claims through change of narrative departing from socio-economic, and transforming into anti-governmental and anti-systemic claims, is presented in the work of Belyaeva (2017). Similar to Milan, she also stresses the horizontal decision

making process and the participatory nature of the "plenums". As in the Bulgarian case, the events in B&H have also been approached by some authors in a cross-cutting manner, combining them with previous contentious events both in the state, and in cross-country comparisons. Mujkić searches for a common niche of social struggle between the regional uprisings from Athens to Maribor, incorporating the sequence of protests in B&H. He underlines both the roles of the 2014 events, as well as the "JMBG protests" from June 2013, in bridging the deep ethno political divide and fostering civic resistance (Mujkić 2016). Lastly, it should be also noted that the protest participants in B&H "underwent a learning process by which they gradually used more radical and disruptive modes of dissent across waves of protest" (Fagan and Sircar 2017, p. 4)

The protests in Macedonia are the most understudied ones, which may be to a certain extent justified with their later initiation in comparison to the others, as well as their protracting nature which created a long spillover effect, keeping track with the years-long political crisis. Several authors have turned towards the discursive strategies of recent protests in Macedonia, looking at their efforts to avoid the "anti-populist trap" in the wake of challenging illiberal populism (Petkovski and Nikolovski 2016). The Macedonian mobilizations have been considered in parallel to the state-building activities of the international community which plays a key role in the region, not excluding Macedonia (Vankovska 2015).

This brief overview shows almost no academic coverage of the outcomes of these events. This refers to all types of movement outcomes, including the policy outcomes as a sub-category of the political outcomes. This work aims to fill the void to the extent that is possible, primarily providing detailed analyzes of the three social movements, with emphases on the policy outcomes.

1.3. *The dependent variables: Distinguishing Policy Outputs and Policy Outcomes*

I further proceed with elaborating on the comment regarding Chapter 5 – the dependent variable(s) which further opens up the question of the case selection. One of the most challenging tasks when crafting the research design is the definition and the operationalization of the dependent variable, i.e. the explanandum. Furthermore, this is even more challenging when social movement outcomes are at stake, and when one tries to define and operationalize the

concept of “influence”. The decision to disentangle the “impact” of social movements in two different stages is meant to allow a more sophisticated (and valid) grasping of the phenomenon. One of the core reflections of the thesis, as well as its added values, is the two-laired variable: the policy outputs vs. the policy outcomes. It is exactly this distinction which shows the particular influence of the social movements over policy outcomes in the region.Within the realm of studies dealing with movement outcomes, not many authors dealt with policy outcomes. Marco Giugni was one of the first scholars to provide a systematic overview of the works dealing with political and policy outcomes (Giugni 1998). The edited volume by Giugni, McAdam and Tilly (1999) introduces several pieces which touch upon these matters. Paul Burstein builds an argument that SMOs and other groups can influence the policy making process, but one must always take into consideration the electoral competition and limited attention dedicated to the legislative process, both by legislators and citizens (Burstein 1999). In the same volume, Amenta and Young (1999) also point towards conceptual and methodological alternatives to assessing impact of social movements, looking for a substitute for the previously traditional “success” and “failure”. Amenta, Caren, Chiarello and Su (2010) provide another extensive review on influence of movements over political and policy outcomes. Lastly, a recent piece edited by Bosi, Giugni and Uba (2016) also opens the door for new research dedicated to policy outcomes. This work has selected pieces which focus much more on the “episodes-mechanisms-processes” approach (ibid), highlighting particular combinations of mechanisms which lead towards policy outcomes. One very good example can be derived from the work of Uba who finds that attitudes and perceptions are crucial mechanisms which push forward policy makers in Sweden to align with challengers’ demands in the case of closure of Swedish schools (Uba 2016).

Although we see that the amount of research on political, and in particular policy outcomes, is intensifying throughout the years, still, it is relatively neglected in comparison to the research done in other social movement subfields. Many other authors, whose theoretical and empirical inputs are analyzed later in the text, present various pallets of definitions and concepts explaining political outcomes. Yet, all these works deal mainly with geographical regions ranging from USA via Western Europe to Asia. A large gap has been created regarding research on social movement outcomes in South East Europe, which this project addresses.

1.4. *The explanatory factors: Theoretical framework and research design*

Incomplete (shallow) democracy as a background factor

As it was mentioned in the explanation of the theoretical and empirical relevance of this effort, the partial and incomplete democratization process in the region is considered as the main catalyst factor that triggered the three movements in Macedonia, B&H and Bulgaria. In fact, as noted in the introduction, the democratization process in the three countries under study underwent a process of formal democratization, which does not resemble the democratic values and standards of modern Western societies. Instead of what della Porta refers to as "democratization from bellow" (della Porta 2014), a process which occurred during the blustery 1989 period in many countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the three fledgling democracies experienced a process of dominant elite transformation. Within this process of *elite transformation*, which can also be referred to as *democratization from above*, an antonymic balance to the previous concept, the process of democratization was much more elite-driven and citizens' participation was not in the primary focus of societal change.

Many indicators which are usually considered as "failed" (incomplete, formalized) democratization processes are taken into consideration in this study. They are: *high level of unemployment*, especially among the younger population, the *process of failed privatization of social goods*, *occupied media* (both PBSs and private media), as well as the *high level of corruption* and *abuse of power*. The three countries share all of them.

I argue that these conditions had been present in the region for years. Taking into consideration that the three movements under study were not caused by a specific event, in a certain moment in time – i.e. by particular "critical junctures", this is why I had defined them as "scope conditions". Furthermore, they can also be considered as independent variables, however at a more abstract level than other contextual independent variables. This stems from the classical differentiation between more general long duree political opportunity structure (POS) and more contingent POS factors (Kriesi 1996). Lastly, some of these conditions are later treated as independent variables, especially the abuse of power through the state repression, as well as the deteriorated media freedoms in the chapter dedicated to the allies and opponents of the three movements. Another point that needs to be made is to point out the rather limited scope of the research design and the selected variables. The idea of this research is not to draw general conclusions claiming

generalizability, but rather to delve deeper in the three selected cases and their peculiarities. In this vein, one should also reflect on the fact that this research deals with more variables than cases, something which is not frequently done in similar types of studies. This strategic choice was mainly made due to the thick historical analysis, as well as the in-depth examination within cases. This to a large extent tries to bridge this methodological obstacle.

The illustration of these background factors is approached dominantly by analysis of secondary data deriving from reports prepared by international and national non-governmental organizations, as well as state institutions. Reliability is increased by data acquired from interviews with key informants.

Factors influencing the adoption of policy outputs and implementation of policy outcomes

In social movement research, several authors have pointed out that in studies regarding outcomes there is a need of convergence regarding the main competing theories and paradigms. One is the *political opportunity structure theory/approach* (POS) that mainly stresses the contextual environment in which social movements operate. The POS is defined as "the most widely used and discussed concept for defining the characteristics of the external environment relevant to social movements" (della Porta 2013). This type of political process approach is operationalized by Tarrow who underlines four most important factors: opening of access to participation for new actors, evidence of political realignment within the polity, availability of influential allies and emerging splits within the elite (Tarrow 2011, pp. 164-5). The other one is the *resource mobilization theory* (RMT) which is dominantly focused on acquiring resources and mobilizing people in the pursuit for accomplishing the goals of the movements. The RMT looks at the role of SMOs towards acquiring different types of resources and refining the organizational structure, as well as the diffusion of the central claims among individuals and groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The challengers acquire resources through four general mechanisms of resource access: self-production, aggregation, co-optation/appropriation and patronage (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Regarding the types of resources, they are mainly grouped as: moral resources, cultural resources, human resources, material resources and self-organizational resources (see more regarding the types of resources in Edwards and Gillham 2013). A third more recent approach emphasizes the importance of *cognitive aspects for the mobilization of activists*, which sometimes act as relevant preconditions influencing the

outcomes of movements. In many cases, the ability of activists to reformulate their motivations and values aiming towards particular targets they want to mobilize, affects the ultimate level of "success" which the movement can obtain (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 73, Snow et al. 1986 and Tarrow 2011).

These theoretical approaches were previously used to mainly explain the mobilization and the emergence of social movements. The goal of this project is to try and implement them in another manner, using them as explanatory factors in order to understand the mechanisms which lead to creation of policy outcomes in the region of South East Europe. The research combines a variety of these three main theoretical approaches in the process of definition, conceptualization and operationalization of the main factors illustrated below.

Endogenous movement-related factors

1.4.1. Claims-making

The claims–making by the challengers in the three countries is considered as one of the possible explanations for the policy outputs/outcomes, mainly because the types and the varieties of claims can substantially affect the types of groups which were mobilized (Snow et al. 1986 and Tarrow 2011), as well as the number of challengers that participated, which eventually had a strong impact on the outputs/outcomes of the social movements.

The main points of focus of claim-making are governments, and they are targeted by social movements. The research focuses on detecting the specific claims that are directly connected to the respective policy outcomes which are subject of analysis. This results with creating a direct link between the explanatory factor and the explanandum. Tilly stresses the importance of the claims coming from the side of the movement in the processes of assessing the movement outcomes, albeit he urges us not to forget that when dealing with outcomes, we have to discern what are the effects of the movement actions and the effects of outside events and actions (Tilly 1999). This is why the research turns now towards the repertoires of contention, and later towards the exogenous factors.

1.4.2. Repertoires of contention

There are several reasons why repertoires of contention are important for social movement outcomes. The number of movement participants affects the decision-making process,

primarily because stakeholders in power always take into consideration electoral support. Theory hypothesizes that large numbers can easily draw attention of decision-makers, who fearing the possibility of losing the electoral support, might reconsider their political stances regarding issues which are being advocated by the movements (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 171 and DeNardo 1985).

The research looks at the number, the size, the strength and the intensity of the movements to an extent which is possible, focusing on the protest actions which articulate the claims relating to the analyzed policy outputs and policy outcomes. The protest event analysis (PEA) and the political claim analysis (PCA) explained later in the text facilitate this process. We now shift to the factors which are external to the movements, but largely influence their effect on the policy process.

Factors exogenous to movements

1.4.3. Repression by states over movements

Although there are various theoretical strands and empirical evidence regarding repression imposed by state institutions, this research departs from the assumption that repression raises the costs of protest activities and should result with reduction of activism (Opp and Roehl 1990).

This research further shows that state repression, especially policing of protests, played a large role in contemporary movements in the region which is of interest to this project. The general aim is to use this external factor for the analysis of the extent to which state repression encouraged or discouraged movement participants to further engage into protesting activities and how these actions influenced the policy outputs and policy outcomes. Lastly, the project turns to the "friends and foes" of social movements, or the most important allies and opponents in the three respective political systems.

1.4.4. Allies and opponents of social movements

Della Porta stresses the importance of the *strength of a government*, following the Tocqueville-ian argument of a weak *vs.* strong government. Tocqueville stated that a strong government and a weak civil society would lead towards violent protests, while a weak

government and a strong civil society would face a “constant but peaceful flux of protest from below” (della Porta 2013, p. 956).

Many authors have highlighted the importance of the *distribution of institutional power* for the development of social movements. This factor is once again linked to the state, as a traditional “opponent” to social movements (see more about distribution of institutional power in Kitschelt 1986, Rucht 1994, della Porta 1995 and Kriesi 1995). What is common in the works of authors dealing with this concept is the conclusion that “the larger the number of actors who share political power, the greater the chance for social movements to influence institutions” (della Porta 2013, p. 956).

Lastly, this research considers a factor which is not very common for social movement studies, but, as underlined previously, is of utmost importance in the three cases which are analyzed. That is the role of the international community. In B&H, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, the international community plays a vital role and largely shapes the political environment. For example, in B&H, the High Representative is the ultimate legal authority that can abolish every existing legal act. In Macedonia, societal and political conflicts have been traditionally mediated by representatives of the international community. These examples and many other contemporary illustrations are thickly described in Chapter 9.

Figure 1. 1 Theoretical framework explaining the impact of social movements on policy outputs and policy outcomes in South East Europe


Historical context
Abuse of power
Deteriorated media freedoms
Widespread corruption
Privatization process and unemployment rates
Shallow democracy/ Formal democratization (From above)
Claims making
Repertories of action
Repression
Allies/ Opponents
Policy outputs
Presence
Presence
Absence
Presence
Absence
"Democratization from bellow" ?

1.5. *The Hypotheses*

Based on the above presented theoretical framework, we now outline the main hypotheses that will be tested throughout this work. In regard to the scope conditions in which the three social movements under consideration operated: the high level of unemployment, the process of failed privatization of social goods, the occupied media, as well as the high level of corruption and abuse of power. it is important to highlight that they had been present in the three countries for decades. One can also expand this argument to the wider region which had also undergone through the democratization wave of the late 80s and early 90s. According to Linz and Stepan (1996), the roots of these scope conditions lie within the inter-relation of three important variables: the international influences, the political economy of coercion and legitimacy, and the special legacies of totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes (p. 236). Furthermore, more recent works dealing with the concept of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002) in the Balkans have shown that patterns of this concept throughout the states which are of our interest (Bieber 2018). The issues raised previously in this paragraph, have been the main generators of citizens' grievances which resulted in the amplification of the waves of contention under study. Adopting this position as a point of departure, the first hypothesis claims that:

H1: *Incomplete democratization of societies in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia, expressed through abuse of power by central political actors and the high level of corruption, which resulted in a failed privatization process of the common industrial capacities causing a very high unemployment rate, paired with the non-free and politicized media loyal to decision-makers in power, provided the crucial scope conditions in which the three mobilizations under study operated. These conditions largely contributed to the accumulation of citizens' grievances which amplified the three mobilizations in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia.*

The process of claims-making had already been identified as one of the main factors which contributed to the policy outcomes stemming from the grievances of the citizens in South East Europe. In regards to claims-making, one must first look back at resource mobilization theory (RMT) contributions, which highlight the mechanisms of resoruces access. The key dilemma amounts to whether social movements obtain their resources primarily from internal or external sources. (Edwards and Gillham 2013, p. 2) Edwards and McCarthy (2004) underline four main mechanisms of resource access: self-production, aggregation, co-

optation/appropriation and patronage. In terms of claims-making, all mechanisms for acquiring resources matter. An even more important point is linked to the types of resources, which can be moral, cultural, material, human etc. (Edwards and Gillham 2013, pp. 3-4). It is the moral and the cultural resources of the three movements under consideration that play a pivotal role in regard to claims making. Furthermore, one must consider that the varieties/types of claims can strongly affect the various types of groups which can be mobilized (Snow et al. 1986 and Tarrow 2011), which further has an effect over the movements' outcomes. In this manner, the central hypothesis taking into account the highlighted theoretical strands is that:

H2: *A greater variety of claims regarding the moral and the cultural resources of the three analyzed movements in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia, as well as a greater number of claims based on the citizens' grievances channeled in the public sphere, would resonate better in the wider public, and would further lead towards greater pressure over governments in the three countries, in terms of adopting policy outputs and effectuating policy outcomes.*

While still in the realm of the RMT, it is also very important to underpin the role of the repertoires of contention exhibited by the three movements. Action repertoires are closely linked to the claims-making process, representing the forms through which the citizens' grievances will be channeled in the public sphere. Regarding this factor, it is important to turn towards the mechanisms of acquiring resources, especially towards self-production, aggregation and co-optation (Edwards and Gillham 2013, p. 2). Furthermore, certain theoretical notions claim that a larger turnout during protest events grabs the attention of incumbent power-holders, who fear potential drop in electoral support and usually substantially consider the grievances of social movement actors (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 171 and DeNardo 1985). Similar arguments are put forward by Uba (2016), through the so called "normalization hypothesis", who claims that it could be expected that if one holder of power or policy maker encounters protests more frequently, these actions would seem more acceptable and less threatening. These notions enable the formulation of the following hypothesis:

H3*: The levels of activation of the mechanisms of self-production, aggregation and co-optation, as well as the availability of greater material and human resources leads to a greater number of protest events, as well as larger protest event participation, which further increases the possibility of acquiring the desired policy outputs and eases the way towards successful policy outcomes in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia.*

Another element worth considering is the relationship between the protest experience of the power holders, and the policy outcomes advocated for by the movements. Katrin Uba (2016) argues that there is a great likelihood that protest experience of office holders is correlated with the form of contentious repertoires. Furthermore, their reactions could significantly influence the final policy outcomes stemming from the mobilizations. In this vein, Uba clams that "petitions, public meetings, and peaceful demonstrations might have a positive effect to the elite's understanding toward such actions, while disruptions caused by strikes, riots, and other more threatening events might have a negative effect instead" (Ibid). Based on these theoretical notions we can draft the following hypothesis:

H4: *More peaceful repertoires of contention might have a more positive effect to the elite's understanding in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia towards the actions, while disruption caused by more threatening events might have a negative effect. Thus, the elite's greater understanding towards the contentious issues in the three countries could lead towards more favorable policy outcomes.*

The second important theoretical approach clustered around the theoretical framework is the POS. The following hypotheses are closely linked to the political process approach. Political process theorists often argue that repression often dampens social movement participants' mobilization. In many cases being explained as significantly increasing the costs of protest, these theorists claim that repression reduces the number of participants willing to engage in collective action (Earl 2013, p. 5), Proponents of rational choice models of collective actions also support the cost-based argument, further commenting that repression should raise the costs of protest and will subsequently reduce the number of activists in the streets (Opp and Roehl 1990). Based on these theoretical reflections, the following hypothesis is drafted:

H5: *Higher level and intensity of repression by the state authorities in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia should discourage the governmental challengers from further actions. Thus, a higher level and intensity of repression should negatively affect the adoption and implementation of policy outputs in the three respective countries.*

The strength of the government is one of the very important factors which craft the overall political opportunities in a particular country. The influence of the government's strength has been examined since the 19th century when Alexis de Tocqueville coined the difference between America's "weak" government, contrary to France's "strong" one (della Porta 2013, p.

1). In regards to social movement studies, this point has been further developed by Tilly who delved into analyzing the institutional structures (1978). Furthermore, the link between the institutional structures and the development of social movements was examined by Kriesi (2004). The idea that "states'" strength or weakness influences social movement strategies remains central to the literature on collective action in general, and on revolutions in particular." (della Porta 2013, p. 1). Both strengths and weaknesses of a certain state cane be operationalized through multiple dimensions. Going deeper into these theoretical arguments, one can craft the following hypothesis:

H6: *Stronger governments and governmental actions by the actors in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia is likely to provoke violent responses from the governmental challengers in the three respective countries. This would diminish the possibilities for favorable policy outcomes.*

The following element of the POS looks at the distribution of institutional power. A very important feature considered as especially relevant to social movement studies is the traditional comparison between majoritarian and consensual/consociational democracies, coupled with the functional and territorial distribution of institutional power. These notions have been in detail operationalized by Kitschelt (1986), Rucht (1994), della Porta (1995), Kriesi and colleagues (1995) as well as other renowned authors. The greatest reference is made to the power of the central executive, which in combination with the dispersion of political decisions influences the openness or closeness of opportunities for governmental challengers. The main assumption put forward by della Porta (2013) is that "the larger the number of actors who share political power, the greater the chance for social movements to influence institutions" (p. 1). This influence can be further extended to policy outcomes. Furthermore, both territorial decentralization and functional distribution of power is seen as a component that can facilitate movement access to the process of decision-making (Ibid). Thus, the main hypothesis connected to this research is the following one:

H7: Social movements in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia can easier influence political institutions when political power is shared among larger number of actors. Greater influence over political institutions is likely to result with in greater influence over the policy outcomes.

The last element of the POS taken into consideration in this study is the influence of the international community over the policy processes in the three cases under consideration. Often neglected in social movement studies, the importance of the international community for the

region, with emphasis on the USA and the EU, especially in terms of state-building processes is of utmost importance. Furthermore, these two actors have traditionally influenced numerous processes in the region under study. In a wider context, this is clearly underlined by Linz and Stepan (1996), underpinning international influence and transition (pp. 236-9) as one of the most important factors for democratization in the region. This is the main reason why this research formulates the following hypothesis:

H8: The involvement of the international community, especially in reference to the EU and the USA, acting as an ally or an opponent to the three mobilizations under study, seriously influences movement outcomes in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia.

This work now continues with the chapter on the methodological approaches and case selection.

Chapter 2 : Methodological approaches and case selection

2.1.*Case selection, and case studies: B&H, Bulgaria and Macedonia*

The cases were selected based on multiple criteria: the period when the mobilizations occurred; the anti-governmental character of the movements; the region of South East Europe; the policy outputs and the policy outcomes etc.

Furthermore, the case selection was made based on the dependent variable(s) (della Porta and Keating 2008, Caiani 2016). Basically, this research looks at the specific configuration that has led to the apparently similar outcomes, in order to specify subtypes of cases (with, or without policy outputs and policy outcomes). Additionally, this research aims at differentiating between objective POS and perceived POS. A rather similar POS can be, apparently, perceived differently by different actors in similar settings. Therefore, this can act as a basis for different reactions. For example, whether social movement actors will mobilize or not? Or, whether they will engage into more radical or more moderate actions? Lastly, this research is partially located within a constructivist approach stemming from the cultural turn in social movement studies developing largely during the mid-90s of the previous century, which advocates that opportunities and resources are not there in the real world, but instead they need to be perceived, communicated, and constructed in a certain way in order to become the basis for collective actions. This is why this work also shows high interest in the claims-making process of the three movements.

One of the alternatives was to also add a negative case to this research, i.e. a case that would feature similar scope conditions as the other three cases, but one which did not result with a mobilization from below. Still, a strategic decision was made not to insert this case mainly due to the nature of the research questions which look to what extent the anti-governmental social movements in South East Europea contributed to the adoption of the specific policy outputs, as well as to the role which the movements played in the effectuation of the policy outputs into more noticeable policy outcomes.

The three cases which are in the spotlight of this research project, the social movements in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H, have been selected both for their variance regarding important factors, as well as for their wide-ranging similarities. Many similarities can be found in the context and the background of the cases. They are thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 4 which emphasizes the similarities regarding the high level of general and youth unemployment, the

unjust and at times criminal privatization of the previously state-owned factories, the recurrent violations of media freedoms, and the abuse of political power producing high figures in corruption. Furthermore, the three selected cases are geographically and temporally similar: they are located in the region of South East Europe and they occurred within a time span of three years (2013-2015).

Apart from the highlighted similarities, the three cases show sufficient variations both regarding the explanatory factors and the policy outcomes. What is extremely important for this study is the tracing of mechanisms and processes which were influenced by the internal and external factors in order to provoke policy outcomes.

The three cases vary significantly regarding the exogenous explanatory factors, while variations in regards to the endogenous, movement-related factors are smaller. Regarding the process of claims-making, the Macedonian movement focuses more on issues tightly connected to rule of law, anti-corruption and protection of human rights, while the movements in B&H and Bulgaria were mainly connected to socio-economic grievances of the governmental challengers. Still, at a specific moment in time, the three movements transformed into anti-governmental and anti-systemic movements. Regarding the repertoires of contention, the three mobilizations use relatively conventional and modular activities with certain particularities attached to every movement. Moving to the exogenous explanatory factors, the state repression varies between cases, in the sense that movement actors in B&H faced excessive overt and covert repression, while the challengers in Macedonia and Bulgaria were mainly facing covert repression by state agents. As regards "friends and foes" within the political system, variance can be spotted in the sense that the BH movement mainly had to confront a large number of influential opponents, having almost none of the relevant stakeholders as allies. On the other hand, the movements in Bulgaria and especially in Macedonia had a significant number of both relevant allies and opponents (political parties, media outlets, and the international community).

The policy outputs and policy outcomes which are extensively elaborated in Chapter 5 show variance in the explanandum regarding both intertwined concepts. With reference to the policy outputs, in the case of the Macedonian movement, clear policy outputs are present (the adoption of the Law on Special Prosecutors Office (Law on the SPO), as well as other relevant legislation); the movement in Bulgaria produced minor policy outputs directly connected to the grievances which were crucial for the movement (the enacted decision by the water and energy

regulator); the movement in B&H failed to produce policy outputs on both state and federal level, being limited to only a few "small wins" on cantonal level (the resignation of four cantonal governments, as well as adoption of several cantonal laws, some of which were never implemented). Lastly, the variance is clear regarding the policy outcomes as well. In the Macedonian case there are tangible policy outcomes, emerging primarily by the work of the SPO, while the movements in Bulgaria and B&H produced scenarios unfavorable for the challenges. The summary of the case selection is presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2. 1Table Policy outputs and policy outcomes in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H

	Policy outputs	**Policy outcomes**
Macedonia	Presence	Presence
Bulgaria	Presence	Absence
B&H	Absence	Absence

Source: Own calculation

2.1.1. Macedonia: "Citizens for Macedonia"

In the wake of the accusations of widespread corruption, undemocratic governing practices and a large-scale wire-tapping scandal (Balkan Insight 2015)[1], a coalition of more than seventy non-governmental organizations, over fifteen political parties and thousands of unaffiliated citizens (CfM 2015)[2] formed the platform "Citizens for Macedonia" (CfM), asking for resignation of the Macedonian government led by Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. As highlighted in the headline of the declaration which was compiled by the activists, the movement represented a "citizen and non-partisan coalition for reintroducing human dignity and protection of the Macedonian Constitution" (Ibid). After one of the largest citizens' protests held in recent Macedonian history that took place on 17 May 2015 (the alleged number of protestors in news reports varies from 20.000 to 100.000 participants), approximately 2.500 people set up tents in front of the government building and started an occupation of the public space which lasted almost two months. The camp was dismantled after a political agreement referred to as "The

[1] See the article at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-braces-for-big-anti-government-protest
[2] See the official website of the movement http://17maj.gragjanite.mk/

Przhino Agreement" was reached between the four major political parties in Macedonia. The negotiations were fostered by the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA). The citizens' coalition articulated many claims, putting forward a long list of very accurate conditions. Some of the addressed claims were taken into consideration during the negotiation process, while others were completely ignored, even by political parties that were directly participating in the large citizens' coalition. The central claims deemed crucial by the coalition members were the following: immediate formation of a caretaker government that will ensure the accuracy of the voter register; insurances for independence of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), and neutralization of the strong government influence and control; appointment of an independent public prosecutor; and organization of fully free and democratic elections that will reflect the objective political will of the Macedonian citizens (Ibid).

Regarding the policy outputs which resulted from the movement, this study focuses on the adoption of the Law on the SPO as one of the most significant policy outputs. All phases of the process, starting from the claim put forward by the movement actors for election of a new unbiased and professional prosecutor to the publication of the final text in the Official Gazette, are analyzed. As defined in the central research questions, the main focus of the research is directed towards the role of the main social movement actors in the legislative process, but also the role of the external actors in regards to the movement. Additionally, the project inspects the mechanisms which triggered significant policy outcomes that substantially alleviated some of the grievances of the challengers in Macedonian society, underlining the rule of law and protection of human rights.

2.1.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Winter/Spring Protests – "The Bosnian Spring"

The main reason for the initiation of the "Bosnian Spring" in February 2014 was the general economic situation in the country, which had been deteriorating for years. The intertwining of extremely high unemployment rates, mass poverty in the country, privatization of government services, accompanied by large-scale political corruption and nepotism, were the main pillars of the social agony, which triggered a fierce citizens' response. The unemployment rate in January 2014, just one month before the main events occurred, was as high as 27.5% of

the total population (IMF 2016)[3]. Regarding the poverty in the FB&H, the latest reliable figures date from 2011/2012, when according to the Human Development Report issued by the UNDP, 1,7% of the population were multidimensionally poor, while additional 3,2% were near the line of multidimensional poverty (UNDP 2018)[4]. As for the long-lasting process of privatization, characterized as criminal and corrupt, several authors support findings that "…privatization plans have killed almost every socialist factory and domestic production facilities that survived the war" (Donais 2002, pp. 3-19). As Donais points out, what was supposed to be an apolitical, fast and fair transfer of public assets into hands of private investors, ended as a corrupt, ethnicized and prolonged struggle for wealth and power, which did not do anything to stimulate economic growth or promote inter-ethnic reconciliation (Ibid). These privatization issues were the main spark that triggered the first protests in Tuzla, which later spread throughout the Federation (Arsenijević 2014). People had been publically speaking for years about new-born oligarchs who literally grabbed what was once social property. As for corruption, a report issued by Transparency International clearly highlights this pain of BH society as one of the main triggers of the widespread popular protests in 2014. The document speaks about a structurally corrupt political system, with a lack of political will to improve the situation (Bosso 2014). It is evident that Bosnian citizens had more than enough reasons to raise their voice against the emergence of economic and political devastation.

The mobilization in Tuzla started when protestors rallied against the corrupt privatization of the factories where they used to work, which later caused the predicaments mentioned above. Participants in the movement made their claims very clear and straightforward. It must also be noted that they were one of the rare groups (canton-wise) which managed to elicit both vivid policy outputs and policy outcomes. The cantonal government in Tuzla resigned (DW 2014),[5] and apanage of former public officials was abolished (Al Jazeera Balkans 2014)[6]. The rest of the claims put forward by SMOs and other challengers were the following: maintaining public order and cooperation between citizens and police authorities; avoiding criminalization, politicization and manipulation by external factors; establishing a caretaker government to lead the country

[3] See https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2012&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=88&pr1.y=12&c=914%2C962%2C963%2C943%2C918%2C964%2C960%2C968%2C944%2C942%2C967%2C186&s=LUR&grp=0&a

[4] See http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/BIH.pdf

[5] See article at http://www.dw.com/sr/pale-vlade-u-tuzli-i-zenici/a-17418252

[6] See article at http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/tuzla-ukinut-bijeli-hljeb

until the next elections, composed of non-politicized persons who submit weekly reports to the citizens; revision of the privatization of the companies *Dita*, *Polihem*, *Poliolhem*, *Gumara*, and *Konjuh*, with emphasis on recognition of all previously attained rights and benefits of workers, processing economic crimes, confiscation of illegally obtained property, and restoration of the factories; alignment of public officials' salaries with the real sector income and abolishment of other benefits for government officials (BH protests 2014)[7]. The protests which spread first to Sarajevo and later throughout the whole FB&H, had similar demands articulated by the claimants. Subsequently, many protest groups had city-specific or canton-specific demands (Ibid).

One of the main problems this research raises is why the numerous policy outputs and policy outcomes on cantonal level, which are treated as "small wins", failed to replicate on state and federal level. The claims and grievances connected mainly to the resignation of the government of FB&H, the members of the Presidency of B&H, as well as the demands connected to alleviating the economic situation of workers are subjected to deeper and broader analysis throughout the text.

2.1.3. Bulgaria: The Bulgarian winter protests of 2013

What started out as a protest against the high electricity bills in the poorest member state in the EU, was soon transformed into an anti-governmental protest aginst the policies and rule, in general, of the Borisov cabinet. Official information refers to 28 January, 2013 – the protest in Blagoevgrad – as the beginning of the contentious activities. Citizen driven demonstrations spurred as a result of the spike in electricity and water distribution bills throughout Bulgaria, which in turn was the consequence of the preceding monopolization of the companies. Later, the protests turned into a massive country-wide and non-partisan movement against the government and the Bulgarian political system as a whole. The demonstrations can be marked as spontaneous with a strong sentiment against the political parties, especially those in power (Al Jazeera 2013)[8]. As a result of the demonstrations, the conservative government led by PM Borisov had to resign, and a new caretaker cabinet was appointed. Not all demands of the protestors were addressed, so the demonstrations continued throughout the whole country, calling for a change of the political

[7] See the demands from the Tuzla Declaration of Citizens and Workers at https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/07/declaration-of-citizens-and-workers-in-tuzla-1/
[8] See the article at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322163943882279.html

model and nationalization of strategic economic sectors. This project detects the main reasons that led to the mass demonstrations. They can be summarized in five crucial issues against which citizens mobilized: government-granted monopolies (BTV Novinite 2013)[9]; government austerity measures (ITUC-CSI 2012)[10]; poverty and unemployment (Sofia Globe 2013)[11]; government corruption (Darik News and Media Pool 2013)[12] and general failure of the democratic system (IME 2013 and Al Jazeera 2013)[13].

The main focus of this research regarding the specific policy output which resulted from the movement is the decision of the Bulgarian regulator – the Energy and Water Regulatory Commission (KEVR) to lower the price of electricity. The regulator intervened, and depending on the distribution company, decreased prices between the range of 6 and 7 percent. The main question that this work examines is to what extent the movement influenced the decision of the KEVR, which mechanisms were triggered, and what roles were played by the other external actors. Additionally, the project investigates the main reasons why the favorable policy output did not produce greater alleviation of citizens' grievances, notwithstanding the major political shifts that accompanied the movement.

2.2. *Methodological approaches, sources and data collection tools*

Due to the fact that this study reconstructs policy outcomes deriving from processes that ended before the research had begun, this study also borrows some insights from process tracing methodology (PTM). The main directions for application are operationalized by Beach and Pedersen (2013) and Collier (2011). Recent research on social movement outcomes has emphasized the positive sides of reconstructive approaches when one wants to examine the influences of movements that go beyond a quick response (Amenta et al. 2010, pp. 300-1). When making a convincing claim regarding influence of social movements, the researcher has to demonstrate that social movement actors: modified the plans and agendas of decision makers; influenced the content of proposals agreed by legislators, members of the executive or

[9] See the article at http://btvnovinite.bg/article/bulgaria/organizatorkata-na-protest-sreshtu-visokite-smetki-za-tok-v-aresta.html
[10] See the report at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/new_frontline_forum_2012_en.pdf
[11] See the article at http://sofiaglobe.com/2013/02/20/bulgarias-political-crisis-and-the-next-election-who-will-win/
[12] See the articles at http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=1043502 and http://www.mediapool.bg/koruptsiya-obezverenie-patova-situatsiya-news206155.html
[13] See the articles at http://ime.bg/bg/articles/protesti-i-ikonomiesko-znanie/ and http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322163943882279.html

administrators; advocated for substantial votes which led to a passage of key policy documents; or affected the speed and the nature of the policy implementation (Amenta 2006). Amenta suggests analysis of primary documents, contemporary testimonies, news accounts and memoires as most reliable data collection tools (Amenta et al. 2010, pp. 300-1). All these types of sources have been extensively used during the research.

Each explanatory factor referred to in this research, was analyzed using specific methodological approaches and data collection tools. The background factors initiating the contentious actions are illustrated dominantly by analysis of secondary data. These data were acquired through websites and datasets of state institutions. Furthermore, reports prepared by international and national non-governmental organizations are also used as data sources. Lastly, the reliability of the acquired data was strengthened by comparing it to information obtained through in-depth interviews with key informants who provided valuable country-specific peculiarities regarding the three different legal and political environments. The entire list of interviewees is provided as an annex.

The movement-endogenous claims-making explanatory factor is analyzed using political claim analysis (PCA). Several methodological steps towards performing a social network analysis (SNA) were also taken, but due to grave data limitations this analysis was canceled. The PCA is defined as a quantitative method that treats political claims as units of analysis, taking newspapers as sources for the publically visible part of the claims-making process (Koopmans and Statham 1999, della Porta and Caiani 2007a and della Porta and Caiani 2007b). This methodological approach was used in order to detect the types and the varieties of claims which further led towards a more nuanced analysis of the claims directly connected to the policy outputs/outcomes. Very neat empirical examples for performing claim-analysis on contemporary media debates are the writings by Koopmans and Statham related to the migrant claim-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands (Koopmans and Statham 2001), the analysis of mobilization and demobilization of Danish Muslims during the Muhammad caricature controversies by Lindekilde (2008), as well as the book by della Porta and Caiani (2009) focusing on social movements and Europeanization. A summary of the data collection tools and the methodological approach for each of the variables is visualized in Appendix D.

Political claim analysis (PCA)

The codebook created by Koopmans and his associates for the implementation of the EUROPUB project (Koopmans 2002) acted as a point of departure for creating the codebooks used for this project. A slightly modified approach was applied, largely simplifying the codebook and the numerous variables suggested by Koopmans. The codebook for the PCA is attached as an annex to this work.

The PCA relies on two daily quality newspapers per country. The strategic choice in the selection of newspapers was a combination of: insights and suggestions received by movement activists and key informants; the reporting position of the newspapers vis-à-vis the movements and their activities; the ideological position of the editorial policy in terms of the left/center/right ideological scale; the popularity and the circulation of the newspapers, as well as the availability of the data. The ultimate goal was to provide an ideological and reporting balance. In the case of the BH protests, articles from *Dnevni Avaz* and *Oslobodjenje* dailies were coded, while in the Macedonian case, *Sloboden Pechat* and *Dnevnik* daily newspapers were chosen. In regards to the Bulgarian winter protests, the daily newspapers *Duma* and *Trud* were analyzed.

In the case of *Sloboden Pechat*, all the issues within the period 17 May – 17 July 2015[14] were obtained in PDF format, going through all the articles of the newspaper's sections which are dealing with latest news, country politics, local politics, international politics, economy, crime, as well as the political op-eds which were published in the newspapers. Sections such as sports, entertainment, culture, letters by readers and technical information were not taken into consideration. The same steps were applied regarding *Dnevnik*, although instead of PDF format, the online non-searchable archive of the newspaper was analyzed. In the cases of the BH newspapers, a monthly subscription provided by a BH media organization was acquired, with a searchable database of all daily and weekly newspapers. Still, the database gives access to the key articles within all issues, providing the entire newspaper page where the accessible article is located in PDF format. All provided articles of both *Dnevni Avaz* and *Oslobodjenje* within the period 5 February 2014 – 5 March 2014 were skimmed. The PDF pages where all relevant articles were found were downloaded, and all the articles on those pages were skimmed as

[14] In the case of the "Citizens for Macedonia" movement, the rather precise period of protest activities was determined by the government challengers starting with the grand rally in front of the governmental building in Skopje, and finishing with the dismantling of the camp that was set on the boulevard in front of the building of the Government for approximately two months

well[15]. Regarding the time frame 6 March 2014 – 30 April 2014[16], the databases of the two dailies were searched, using keywords like "protests", "protesters", "rallies" – translated into the Bosnian language. Later, all articles provided by the search engine were skimmed, the relevant articles were downloaded, and all the articles on the respective newspaper pages in PDF were further analyzed. The logic behind skimming all other articles located on the same newspaper page derives from the high probability that similar or related articles will be positioned on the same page (or couple of pages if the newspaper section spreads on more pages). In the case of BH newspapers, it cannot be fully guaranteed that all articles containing movement-related political claims have been covered and coded. In reference to the Bulgarian newspapers *Duma* and *Trud*, all the issues between 9 February 2013 and the end of March[17] were thoroughly read in hard copy. Articles from the previously mentioned key sections mainly related to politics, as well as op-eds were coded and analyzed.

Applying the previously explained approach to PCA developed by Koopmans, all articles containing political claims connected to the social movements or the social movement actors were coded, i.e. each political claim where movement actors and issues appeared either as claimants, addressees, or objects of particular claims. The rule that each journalistic text can be used for extrapolating multiple claims (if and where applicable) was followed, while op-eds and editorials by journalists, experts, politicians and other actors dealing with movement-related issues were coded as one "master" claim (frame) after reading the entire text of the column and highlighting the central message of the author. Each coded claim represents a separate unit of analysis.

The data obtained and analyzed through the PCA for the analysis of the claims-making process was strengthened by acquiring additional data through in-depth interviews with SMO representatives and activists.

Protest event analysis (PEA)

The second endogenous explanatory factor is the repertoires of contention which is dominantly analyzed by applying protest event analysis (PEA). This methodological approach is

[15] This time frame was pointed out by activists and key informants as crucial for the movement activities
[16] This period was identified by the BH activists as one where movement activities were fading away, and a smaller amount of claims were coded
[17] This time frame was pointed out by activists and key informants as crucial for the movement activities

defined by Hutter as a type of content analysis which enables researchers to measure the amount and the types of protest features within different geographical areas (i.e. on different levels moving from local to supranational) and over time (i.e. from very short to extremely long time sequences) (Hutter 2014, p. 336). The PEA sheds deeper light on the repertoires of action in three countries, within the exact same time frames which were covered by the PCA. The questions which this analysis provides answers to are "where", "when", "who" and "how" contested the governments in B&H, Bulgaria and Macedonia. Every protest event which took place within the designated time was considered as a separate unit of analysis. Furthermore, one of the crucial aims was linking the obtained data to secondary data related to the POS, and to clarify issues connected to the intensity of mobilization and the size. The codebook is built upon examples from the PRODAT project (Rucht 2010)[18]. Very insightful theoretical and empirical studies which also served as inspiration are the ones by Hutter (2014), Beissinger and Sasse (2014) and Kriesi et al. (1995). All additional data collection steps including selection and acquiring of newspapers, articles, availability, language and technical obstacles, are identical with those explained in the PCA. The results obtained with the PEA are correlated to the rich data gathered through interviews with SMO representatives and activists.

Moving to the exogenous explanatory factors, the repression over the three movements by the respective states was approached mainly by in-depth interviews. The main categories of interviewees which shared their valuable insights were SMO representatives who organized and directly participated in the contentious activities. Many of them also had direct contacts with the police. Aiming to reach a higher level of validity and reliability, each interviewee came from a different SMO, or a different strand of the movements which were studied. Furthermore, repression was also analyzed through several reports issued by international and national non-governmental human rights organizations. They pointed towards crucial repressive events which vastly influenced the (de)mobilization of challengers in the respective countries. Lastly, a lot of data were acquired through the coded articles primarily used for the PCA and the PEA.

The second external factor is the allies and opponents to the movements, and in particular, the role of the state. It was mainly approached through legal analysis of existing documents from the countries where the respective movements took place. The countries'

[18] PRODAT-Codesheet Deutsch/Englisch. *Text abrufbar unter http://www. wzb. eu/sites/default/files/u13/codesheet-prodat_2010. pdf (Zugriff am 29.11. 2011).*

constitutions, the main laws which regulate Freedom of Assembly, as well as important bylaws were thoroughly analyzed. Once again, several reports from national and international non-governmental organizations were taken into consideration. Another important data collection tool in regards to this particular external factor was the conducted interviews with policymakers and with key informants. These two categories of interviewees provided a lot of crucial information, at times even exclusive, taking into consideration their former and current political and societal roles. These interviewees were dominantly approached through personal contacts and snowballing. Regarding this explanatory factor, once again, the high level of information obtained through the coded newspaper articles must be stressed.

Moving to the explanandum, the analysis of the first constituent part – the policy outputs – was initially approached through in-depth legal analysis of the documents themselves. Both in the cases where policy outputs occurred and failed to occur, all previous working and draft versions of the acts, as well as draft-policies in different forms proposed by the challengers were thoroughly analyzed. In many cases these documents were available online, while at times they were published in the newspapers used for the PCA and PEA. A second useful data collection tool was the official minutes from sessions of state institutions where draft policy outputs have been discussed and eventually enacted. These documents proved to be very resourceful because they validated and verified, or sometimes overthrew certain testimonies. Lastly, interviews were conducted with SMO representatives, policy makers and key informants. The interviews with the representatives of the SMOs which participated in the process of acquiring certain levels of responsiveness in the policy arena were particularly useful. On the other hand, the policy makers and key informants also provided a solid portion of valuable data.

The second part of the explanandum – the policy outcomes – are explained using data acquired through interviews with SMO representatives and activists in order to see to which extent their grievances had been *de facto* alleviated. As it is shown further in this text, the Macedonian movement challengers represent a very good example. In the cases where significant policy outcomes did not occur, in B&H and Bulgaria, the same categories of interviewees were contacted in order to delve deeper into the reasons why, according to them, the desired policy outcomes failed to occur. In the three cases, interviews with policy makers and key informants were asked to give their more objective views regarding the whole process of emergence of policy outputs and outcomes. Lastly, existing secondary data in forms of reports,

analyses and newspaper articles were used for data triangulation in order to strengthen the reliability of the findings as much as possible.

Interviews

The in-depth open-ended interviews were the main data collection tool which was used for gathering information. All 31 interviews were conducted face to face, with four categories of interviewees: movement activists, SMO representatives, policy makers and key informants. Each interviewee category provided specific information regarding the four factors which enabled the tracking of the causal mechanisms and the processes which led to policy outcomes in South East Europe. The first category of interviewees is the movement activists which took direct part in the protests. Regarding the sampling, it was taken into consideration that each interviewee from this category should come from a different sub-group/strand of the movements: NGO members, ecologists, bikers, nationalists, human rights advocates are just some examples for specific activist groups which were interviewed[19]. They shared their views regarding the central claims put forward by the movements, and to what extent these claims were covered by the policy outputs. They assessed the discrepancy between their "wishful thinking" and reality. The second category of interviewees is the SMO representatives, whose organizations participated in the organization of the contentious activities, but also framed some of the policy proposals which are thoroughly analyzed throughout the text. Similar to the sampling of the activists, representatives from various organizations were contacted in order to cover multiple perspectives in the reconstruction of the events. The SMO representatives covered several perspectives of the narrative. The third category of interviewees – the policy makers – provided first-hand information regarding the policy process from within the institutions. Still, it must be highlighted that the policy makers were the least responsive category of interviewees. The last category of interviewees is the key informants. They are people who have thorough knowledge of the context in the three countries, but not only regarding the movements *per se*, but also regarding peculiarities of the democratization processes in the countries, as well as the factors which triggered the three mobilizations. This group of interviewees encompasses two former PMs, one former state president, political party leaders, representatives of the international community, judges, university professors, journalists etc. All in-depth interviews were open-ended, semi-

[19] See the list of all interviewees containing detailed information in Appendix A

structured and performed face to face. The main dilemmas which aroused during the preparation and realization of the interviews were: how many interviewees?; How to find the interviewees?; The process of recruitment of interviewees etc. (della Ports 2014, p. 243). In the end, a sufficient level of data saturation was reached. A summary of the number and types of interviews per country and per category is presented in Table 2.2.

It also has to be noted that during this phase of the data collection activities, I faced difficulties in establishing contact with all the planed interviewee groups across the three countries. For example, I did not manage to interview any policymaker in Bulgaria, while the input of policy makers was also rather one-sided in Macedonia and B&H.

Table 2. 2 Types and number of interviewees

	Macedonia	B&H	Bulgaria	**Total**
Type of interviewees				
SMO representatives	N=3	N=2	N=3	N=8
Activists	N=5	N=5	N=3	N=13
Policymakers	N=1	N=2	N=0	N=3
Key informants	N=2	N=2	N=3	N=7
Total	N=11	N=11	N=9	**N=31**

Source: Own calculation

Chapter 3 : Bridging the fields: Democratization, Social movements and Policy outcomes/outputs studies

3.1. *The mechanism-process approach*

As noted previously, **mechanisms** in social movement and contentious politics studies are thoroughly addressed by Tilly and Tarrow. The authors highlight the importance of several crucial mechanisms: *Brokerage* as a production of a new connection between previously unconnected sites; *Diffusion* defined as spread of form of contention, an issue, or a way of framing it from one site to another; as well as *Coordinated action* presented as an occurrence when two or more actors engage in mutual signaling and parallel making of claims on the same object (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 29). Other mechanisms which are also important in studying mobilization and contentious politics, and are relevant to the project are: *Social appropriation* described as transformation of non-political groups into political actors, building on their organizational and institutional bases in order to launch movement campaigns (Ibid, p. 36). The authors provide examples drawn from the work on the "Black insurgency" throughout four decades by McAdam (1988) and the one by Morris (1984) on African-American communities organizing for change while initiating the civil rights movements, stressing the role of black churches as sites of social appropriation for civil rights groups; *Boundary activation* as a mechanism which delineates and clarifies the differences between the challenging groups and their targets (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 36) – the "us" and "them". Tilly and Tarrow provide the example of the census as an agent of boundary activation using the work of Kim Williams (2006) on civil rights in multiracial America; *Certification* presented as the signalization by an external authority that it is prepared to recognize and support the activities of a certain political actor (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 36). It is presented throughout this current work how formal and informal collective actors, which mobilized with the three movements under study, were recognized by certain representatives of the international community as political actors whose voices and standpoints must be taken into consideration; *Identity shift* is explained as formation of new identities of challengers who are brought together through coordinated action which reveals their commonalities (Ibid, p. 37). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001, pp. 319-320) present the example of a "New Negro" articulated through numerous statements by African-American movement leaders, as "an expression of a new collective identity among southern

Blacks"; *Competition* derives from numerous strands within social movements which are known to be either complementary or rival, having different preferences and variety of leaders (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 37). Very often this divergence leads towards mutual undercutting (Gamson 1990). The mechanism of competition is very vividly presented through the three cases with emphasis on the Bulgarian case, where at least three distinct groups can be easily identified; *Escalation and Radicalization* are closely tied to the interference by external actors which disrupt the dominantly routinized character of the mobilizations. When "counter-protesters, the police, or the state respond with vigor, challengers often escalate their tactics and radicalize their claims" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 37). Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi refer to radicalization as "shifting from predominantly nonviolent tactics of contention to tactics that include violent means, as well as the subsequent process of contention maintaining and possibly intensifying the newly introduced violence" (Alimi, Bosi and Demetriu 2015, p. 11 and della Porta 2013). Several examples of escalation and radicalization are presented throughout this study, especially highlighting the movement activities in B&H. Lastly, *Repression* and *Social control* are almost ever-present in social movement research. Tilly and Tarrow refer to repression as just one of the modes of social control, when the states or their agents attempt to undermine challengers by applying various forms of violence, harassment, prosecution, mass media manipulation etc. (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, pp. 37-8) This text treats state repression as one of the crucial external factors which determines the policy outcomes of movements in South East Europe. A wide pallet of repressive tools was used against challengers in the three countries on behalf of their respective governments. Furthermore, *Mobilization* explains how people start engaging into making contentious claims, while *Demobilization* reflects on the reverse process – the end of contentious claims-making by the previously engaged actors (Ibid, p. 38). One of the purposes of this work is to also reflect on the main reasons for mobilization and demobilization of the actors in B&H, Bulgaria and Macedonia. The *New coordination* explains the coordinated action deriving from brokerage and diffusion, often transforming into an *Upward scale shift* – a coordination at a higher level (Ibid, pp. 31-6) in the three movements, where the BH case is particularly interesting in reference to the new coordination.

3.2. *Democratization studies*

3.2.1. Third wave of democratization: South East Europe in Context

The third wave of democratization spread throughout Europe commencing with the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974, immediately followed by democratization of Greece. In the fifteen years after the fall of these two authoritarian regimes, approximately thirty countries in Europe went through the process of democratization and transformation of the ruling elites (Huntington 1991, pp. 21-2). Macedonia and B&H, as part of former socialist Yugoslavia, as well as Bulgaria, were three of the many countries which went through the process of democratization, albeit an incomplete one.

Focusing specifically on Eastern Europe, theory recognizes two dominant ways of creation of consensually-unified national elites: a *direct transformation*, and a *transformation through a settlement of basic disputes among the elites* (Daskalovski 1999, p. 17). Based on the arguments by Higley and Pakulski (1992), Daskalovski defines direct transformation as an epilogue of party elites being able to acknowledge the counter-productivity of communist ideology, embrace democracy and create space for accommodation of new emerging elites (Daskalovski 1999, p. 19). On the other hand, the transformation through a settlement of basic disputes among the elites is recognized by literature as a relatively rare and exceptional event when "national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements" (Burton and Higley 1987, p. 295).

Moving to the three cases under study, one can freely argue that they all fall under the direct transformation of the national elite model mentioned previously. Chapter 4 delves deeper into details and explains both similarities and differences along the three cases, with similarities prevailing over the differences. Macedonia had a rather peaceful transition to democracy, especially taking into consideration the wider context of dissolution of former Yugoslavia where violent conflicts prevailed. B&H walked the most difficult path of the three, being embroiled in the most tragic conflict on European soil following World War II. Finally, Bulgaria went through a rather tiring process of democratization marked with lots of negotiations between the communist elites and the democratic opposition, as well as a wave of protests coming from below (i.e. the citizens), pushing for a rapid resolution of the process. Although the three countries had formally dealt with their communist past and started paving the road for

democracy, this study claims that this process had been incomplete, shallow and formal, failing to establish stable institutions and a sufficient level of political culture in order to substantially transform the three societies. This has resulted with rather shallow (Meighan 2001) and illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997), often showing signs of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002, Bieber 2018). The following section looks closer into these concepts focusing on the three respective cases under study.

3.2.2. Shallow democracy, illiberal democracy and competitive authoritarianism: Brothers in arms

Departing from these reflections, this study differentiates between deep and shallow democracy. As Ronald Meighan argues, *shallow democracy* refers to "limited power sharing and restricted participation in decision-making", which allows a very small space for participation by actors other than those in power. Additionally, power structures can at any time arbitrarily limit or withdraw the amount of power being shared with different agents. (Meighan 2001, p. 297) On the other hand, *deep democracy* provides a high level of power sharing, as well as possibilities for agenda setting by different actors. Moving a step further, deep democracy also refers to the levels of decision-making. In this case actors are not just simply involved in the agenda-setting, they are also given the opportunity to personally decide upon the issues at stake (Ibid, p. 297).

In regards to illiberal democracy, Fareed Zakaria had thoughtfully noted that although many countries which are formally democratic and regularly hold elections, they routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive their citizens of basic rights and freedoms (Zakaria 1997, p. 22). Whether we label this concept as partial democracy, low intensity democracy, empty democracy, hybrid regime, or guided democracy (Calleros – Alarkó 2009, p. 1), the essence amounts to formally holding elections, but depriving citizens from knowledge about activities of the real power holders, mainly due to lack of civil liberties.

Perhaps one of the most punctual concepts to describe the rather limited exercise of democracy in the three cases under study is competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002). In this particular type of hybrid regime "formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy." (Ibid, p. 52) In the realm of competitive authoritarianism, due to the persistence of meaningful democratic institutions, there are four main arenas of

democratic contestation through which the opposition can occasionally weaken, challenge and even sometimes defeat the power holders: the electoral arena; the legislature; the judiciary; and the media. The four arenas are continuously addressed throughout this study, both in examination of the background factors, as well as during the analysis of the POS and the main allies and adversaries to the three movements, and their influence over the policy outcomes.

In regard to the deeper examination of competitive authoritarianism in South East Europe, a recent piece by Bieber (2018) clearly highlight many of the characteristics of Macedonia, B&H and Bulgaria which point toward certain patterns of competitive authoritarianism. In the case of Macedonia, the ruling of former PM Gruevski has been labeled as one which increasingly undermines democracy, included manipulation of elections, closure of critical media and contained pressure over journalists and independent institutions (Ibid, pp. 341-2). The main authoritarian elements in B&H amount to strategic use of ideology, distortion of electoral competition, weak institutions and use of state resources and institutions by political parties (Ibid, pp. 340-3). Lastly, in the case of Bulgaria, Bieber underlines patterns of weak institutions, corruption and limited media freedom (Ibid, p. 338). These indicators are clearly operationalized throughout the study, and their influence over the policy outcomes in the three examined cases.

3.2.3. Democratization from below

What is very important when disentangling democratization and political outcomes is the concept which della Porta (2014) refers to as "democratization from below". One of the main aims of this work is to understand whether any positive policy outcomes in the three cases managed to trigger full democratization from below, resulting with an increased level of democratization aiming to resemble that of fully consolidated democracies.

Apart from partially covering the generally understudied field of social movements in the region, this work aims at connecting the incomplete process of **democratization** as the core reason for the mobilizations, to the **policy outcomes** deriving from the three respective movements. Therefore, another key factor for scientific relevance of this research is the effort to link the investigation of policy outcomes to democratization. Although formal democratization in the region started dominantly during the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, there is a wider consensus among authors that the region does not comply with democratic standards as understood by western democracies. Dolenec refers to the early 1990s as a period when "parents got fired from factories

they worked in…or lingered on to work in a privatized enterprise that was being deliberately destroyed…" (Dolenec 2013, pp. 1-2) More than two decades after the initiation of the democratic processes, a great portion of people in the region could not refer to a political party or politician that represented their views (Monitor 2010)[20]. The problem of democratization of non-democratic regimes is more global and goes far beyond the Balkans. Schmitter and Karl (1991, p. 80) note that democracies established after 1974 "must live in compressed time". They clearly point out that these newly established democracies will not resemble the European democracies created previously, referring to the gradual historical progression of institutions and actors. Conversely, new democracies will rather face a wide pallet of parties, interests, movements and other actors which will try to influence the polity through previously non-existent agencies (Huntington 1993, pp. 40-46). As della Porta highlights, in some Balkan countries (e.g. former Yugoslavia), although a higher level of civil society organizations development was noted, and despite the fact that the organizations mobilized and engaged in numerous activities, from anti-nationalist movements to advocating for rights and freedoms of marginalized groups, this could not prevent the deterioration of society and de-democratization of the states, which in many cases led towards civil wars and other forms of armed conflict (della Porta 2014, pp. 280-4).

3.3. *Law and Public Policy*

This research project distinguishes between *policy outputs* and *policy outcomes*, which are treated as separate but intertwined concepts which are further explained in detail through the three case studies. The continuous focus on the importance of these two concepts finally brings us to their definition and delineation. *Policy outputs are defined as the first formal materialization of a political process which later enables policies to be further developed*. David Easton (1957) defines policy outputs as political decisions formulated by the political institutions and the actors. On the other hand, this research defines *policy outcomes as direct effects deriving from the previously defined policy outputs which directly alleviate the grievances put forward by social movement actors*. In other words, policy outputs refer to formal changes in legislation, bylaws, or other legal acts, while the policy outcomes underpin the substantially produced effects deriving from the prior enacted outputs, which at least to a certain extent improve the daily lives of the challengers who advocated for the contested issues.

[20] See Monitor, G. B. (2010). Insights and perceptions: Voices of the Balkans. *Retrieved on May, 12*, 2019.

The conducted research shows variation in terms of presence and absence of policy outputs and policy outcomes. Regarding theoretical classifications derived from public policy studies which are elaborated below, the presence of policy outputs is correlated to paradigmatic policy change, while the minor presence to marginal/incremental change.

3.3.1. Policy outputs/Policy responsiveness: Legalization

Theoretical classification of policy outputs and outcomes is also very important for better definition and elaboration of the dependent variables. Public policy theory generally speaks about two basic paths of policy change: *normal* and *paradigmatic* (Howlett 2002, pp. 241-2). Normal policy change refers to activities when policymakers speak about new policies, but in fact, these acts are usually a continuation of something that already exists, with slight variation just being added to the existing practices (Polsby 1984). This path of policy change is also defined by many authors as "marginal" or "incremental" (Lindbolm 1959 and Hayes 1992). On the other hand, the latter, less frequent policy change path is more dramatic in the sense of re-conceptualization and re-structuring of policy (Howlett 2002, p. 241). The literature refers to this type of policy change as paradigmatic (Hall 1990, p. 59). This type of change is perceived as a period of revolutionary disruption which upheaves the rather stable and incremental periods of policy change. This policy change approach results with a "'punctuated' equilibrium pattern of policy dynamics" (Gersick 1990 and Eldredge and Gould 1972).

Policy outputs are just one of the five levels of responsiveness to collective demands within a certain political system (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 230). When going deeper into analysis of policy outputs, or introducing the wording of Schumaker – "*policy responsiveness*", one needs to have a better insight into all five levels. In his work "Policy Responsiveness to Protest Group Demands", Paul Schumaker (1975, pp. 494-495) distinguishes and thoroughly describes the five levels of political system responsiveness. The first notion which the author explains is the "*access responsiveness*" defined as "the extent to which authorities are willing to hear the concerns" (Ibid, p. 494) of a specific protest group which is making particular claim(s). This concept of access responsiveness is deemed similar to Peter Eisinger's concept "*breaching the political opportunity structure*" (Eisinger 1973, p. 17). This notion is closely interlinked with the claims-making endogenous independent variable described previously. The second notion which Schumaker puts forward is the "*agenda responsiveness*" defined as an issue which is

"placed on the agenda of the political system" (Schumaker 1975, p. 494). The third concept which is subject to discussion in Schumaker's essay is, to a certain extent, an equivalent to what this research defines as policy outputs, and one of the two main points of focus in this research project. When the agenda of a certain claimant is formally transcribed into a legal act, the third type (level) of responsiveness is reached. This is the concept of "*policy responsiveness*" which, according to Schumaker, "indicates the degree to which those in the political system adopt legislation or policy congruent with the manifest demands of protest groups" (Ibid, p. 494). Moving from the third to the last two levels of responsiveness, a crucial step forward is made in the sense of bridging the gap between "legalization" and "implementation". Potentially favorable policy responsiveness may easily end up as a dead letter. This highlights the importance of the last two responsiveness levels. The fourth type of responsiveness is correlated to the ability of the authority to implement the previously enacted document. In many cases, due to various financial, political or simply logistical reasons, the formal framework cannot be effectuated in reality. When the responsible actors engage into effectuation, Schumaker labels this process as "*output responsiveness*" which indicates "the degrees to which those in the political system implement policy-responsive actions" (Ibid, p. 495). The last level of responsiveness is closely tied to the *de facto* alleviation of the grievances initially addressed by the claimants. This concept is named "*impact responsiveness*" and it "indicates the degree to which the actions of the political system succeed in alleviating the grievances of protest groups" (Ibid, p. 495). It is the impact responsiveness which is of ultimate interest of this study, and the main works related to this concept are presented in the following rows.

One of the remaining issues in terms of the policy process is also to explpain the intertwining between social movements and policy change. Giugni and Passy propose three possible paths of effect: a direct effect, a mediated effect, or a joint effect (Giugni and Passy 1998).

3.3.2. Policy outcomes: Effectuation

The dominant strand in the literature claims that unlike mobilization issues, creation of collective identities and the enhancement of capacities of SMOs and individuals, political outcomes are usually out of the direct control of SMOs. The more dominant actors and factors which influence crucial political decisions leading to alleviation of challengers' conditions are

usually legislators, administrators, political executives etc. (Amenta et al. 2010, p. 288). This leads us in the direction of Kitschelt and his group of operational dimensions which characterize the capacity of political systems to implement policies, where he highlights three important dimensions: The *centralization of the state apparatus*. This dimension argues that national policies are more effectively implemented in a centralized environment. Federal states and numerous independent agencies in the executive complicate policy implementation (Kitschelt 1986, pp. 63-64); *Government control over market participants*. There is a strong inverse relationship between the intensity and centrality of control on one side, and the availability of resources to challenge policies (Ibid, p. 64); and The *independence and authority of the judiciary*, for which Kitschelt claims that "…policy implementation becomes more hazardous and cumbersome if courts are forums of political arbitration removed from executive branch control" (Ibid, p. 64). To these indicators I will also add one of the factors introduced by della Porta – the *characteristics of public bureaucracy*, which claims that a bureaucracy which is more efficient is also more capable of implementing decisions (della Porta 2013, p. 956).

Burstein and his colleagues make a strong point when they suggest that access responsiveness and policy responsiveness should be treated separately. As a prerequisite for policy responsiveness, SMOs and other agents must previously secure their access to the policy arena. This is to a large extent self-evident. One can later analyze which factors are deemed crucial for gaining access responsiveness by comparing groups which have only acquired agenda responsiveness, and groups which have managed to gain both access and policy responsiveness (Burstein et al. 1995, p. 275-95). Extant readings point to the direction of possible factors which can help challengers gain access response without provoking any policy outputs. Mueller signals out violence (Mueller 1978), while Gamson highlights the size of the challenger group (Gamson 1990).

As Sabatier highlights, SMOs can succeed many times in getting their claims on the political agenda, even have their demands formally adopted, but effectuating policy outputs "may require the development of legal and technical expertise and the capacity to monitor the activities of enforcement agencies" (Sabatier 1975).

Ongoing research points towards variation regarding absence and potential emergence of policy outcomes. Current absence of outcomes can be seen in Bulgaria and B&H, while likely emergence of noticeable policy outcomes can be expected in Macedonia. As highlighted

previously, one can never fully predict possible changes in the contexts which might lead towards different outcome scenarios.

3.4. *Social movement studies*

Social movement outcomes are usually grouped in three broader categories: political, biographical and cultural. In this regard, policy outputs and policy outcomes, which are the two main spheres of interest of this research project, represent a certain sub-category of political outcomes (Giugni, Bosi and Uba 2013). There are two important levels through which the debate on social movement outcomes should be channeled: the *theoretical level* and the *empirical level*. Referring to the theoretical level, Marco Giugni suggests highlighting two important questions: "which aspects of society can social movements modify and how?" (Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999, p. xv) Moving to the empirical level, the same author pinpoints the dilemma "what impact have contemporary social movements had in different countries?" (Gamson 1990) Starting from William Gamson's works on state-related consequences of social movements (Ibid), where the author makes an attempt to define "success" and "failure" – two concepts which are traditionally difficult to define in social movement studies, many authors have delved further into exploration of this intriguing topic. Burstein and his colleagues (1995) worked on developing and nuancing Gamson's definitions of success, basing it on three factors: the degree to which a certain state challenger, based on its program, manages to advocate policy proposals to reach the legislative arena; to what extent the challenger can influence the passing of new legislation into policy, but also the extent to which it can help in facilitating its eventual enforcement, as well as measurement of the intended effects which the new legislation has caused or has failed to cause (Amenta and Caren 2004, p. 463). In this vein, other works have also stressed the positive sides of assessing impacts of challengers on governments, by dividing the process of creation of new rules (generally laws) into: agenda setting; legislative content, passage and implementation (Amenta and Young 1999 and Andrews and Edwards 2004). By reaching the political agenda, the challengers increase their chances of fulfilling their ultimate goals (Amenta et al. 2010, p. 291). Later, social movement agents can exert pressure over legislators or other policy makers to formally support their propositions which usually are aimed at gaining collective benefits (Amenta, Caren and Olasky 2005). When concrete policy outputs are acquired, the process of implementation subsequently follows (Amenta et al. 2010, p. 291).

Numerous examples can be drawn regarding these theoretical reflections. As the following rows clearly show, the challengers in B&H had very limited access to the legislative arena, thus, managing to secure only "small/minor wins" on cantonal level. The federal and state parliaments in B&H remained far out of reach. On the other hand, the Bulgarian protesters managed to participate in forcing the KEVR to minimally decrease the energy prices, but they were not quite convinced whether the central role of these efforts should be allocated to their contentious activities or to the interests and activities by the ruling elites, which at that time engaged in serious political games trying to outsmart one another. When the KEVR brought the decision to lower the energy prices, it adopted a policy output. Although this bylaw produced legal effect (i.e. was effectuated in practice), it failed to improve the living standard of the challengers, in the sense that energy prices were still high, the monopolies were still in their place, and the citizens did not pay substantially lower electricity, gas and petrol bills. On the other hand, the adoption and the effectuation of the Law on SPO, produced a functional and operative institution – the SPO – which became the symbol of justice, fight against abuse of power and corruption by the political and business elites in Macedonia. The work of the SPO produced numerous prosecutions beginning with the former Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski, and several other former ministers and high public and party officials. Furthermore, the challengers themselves publicly spoke about the immediate relief of tension, decline in repression, and opening of political opportunities for further struggle against the hybrid regime installed by VMRO-DPMNE. Many of the activists, as well as key informants, link the favorable results for the opposition from the 2016 Early Parliamentary Elections to the work of the SPO. When other state institutions tried to hinder the work of the "special ones", it provoked a series of protests in support of this institution. These two examples show the clear distinction between policy outputs and policy outcomes.

3.4.1. Resource mobilization theory

One of the most straight-forward definitions of claims-making is provided by Lasse Lindekilde (2013, p. 201) who explains these actions as "the conscious articulation of political demands in the public sphere, thus leaving aside more private or hidden forms of political claims-making such as voting and lobbyism". Koopmans and Statham (1999, p. 206) speak about the public acts of claims-making as "the strategic demands made by collective actors within a

specific contested issue field". Taking a step forward, political claims-making, frequently associated with contentious politics, is well described by Charles Tilly. He speaks of contentious politics when "actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties" (Tilly 2008, p. 5).

Recent movements also witnessed very innovative and eventful forms of claims-making like dances, performances and individual acts, but also very tragic ones like self-immolations, reminding us of the Prague Spring and Jan Palach. Arenas for political claims-making can also vary from court rooms, via the streets, towards the most desired one – the media, as an arena through which both governments and public opinion can be best targeted (Ibid).

In recent years, mediatized claims-making is expanding and becoming vital for social movement visibility, primarily because of the expansions of media in many types and forms. Gamson and Wolfsfeld point out the press releases, interviews and text messaging campaigns as extremely important for keeping movement causes and activities on the visibility map (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993).

As della Porta (2013, p. 1081) highlights, "a repertoire of contention comprises what people know they can do when they want to oppose a public decision they consider unjust or threatening". A modern repertoire of collective action is defined by Tilly as the "whole set of means a group [della Porta and Diani, 2006] has for making claims of different types on different individuals" (Tilly 1986, p. 2). Repertoires of action vary, the variance being determined mostly by temporization (Tilly 1986 and Tilly and Tarrow 2006), but also by generations (Jasper 1997 and della Porta 2009). Following the examples of the global justice movement (della Porta 2009), recent anti-governmental movements in South East Europe introduced a variety of repertoires, moving from the more classical forms of contention like marches and barricades, to more playful forms (e.g. performing of traditional dances like (*h)oro*) in Bulgaria or Macedonia).

In his book focusing on public opinion and political parties in four Western European countries, Russel Dalton groups various forms of action taking into account the level of extremeness, classifying them in *four categories*: "The first threshold indicates the transition from conventional to unconventional politics. Signing petitions and participating in lawful demonstrations are unorthodox political activities but still within the bounds of accepted democratic norms. The second threshold represents the shift to direct action techniques, such as boycotts. A third level of political activities involves illegal, but nonviolent, acts. Unofficial

strikes or a peaceful occupation of a building typify this step. The fourth threshold includes violent activities such as personal injury or physical damage" (Dalton 1988, p. 65). Dalton's classification represents a good starting point for analysis of the various forms of actions which occurred during the movements which will be analyzed.

Protests are among the most frequently spread contentious actions. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 191) define protest as a "non-routinized action in which indirect channels of influence are opened through the activity of a series of collective actors". Although the two authors question whether a protest can be labeled as unconventional due to its wide presence, still they conclude that it is not a "routinized form of participation in representative democracy" (Ibid, p. 191). James DeNardo highlights the importance of the protests, especially in regard to the number of the protestors who take part in the collective action. He argues that an outcome of a movement largely depends on, what he refers to as, "the power of numbers" (DeNardo 1985). He speaks about direct and indirect influence of demonstration of regimes. The direct influence is exerted through the immediate disruption that a protest causes, influencing the daily routines of others. Subsequently, as crowds grow larger, the ability of the authorities to keep crowds under control is declining. On the other hand, DeNardo refers to the indirect influence of the protests in the manner that the size of the action gives the regime a possibility for approximation of the support that the movement currently enjoys (Ibid, p. 36). These are some of the reasons why della Porta and Diani underline that social movements should try to encourage and mobilize as much as people possible, following the maximization logic of the political parties. Large numbers can easily draw attention of decision-makers who fearing the possibility of losing the electoral support, might reconsider their political stances regarding issues which are being advocated by the movements (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 171).

Another form of action which is very popular among protestors which can show the strength of a movement is the petition (Ibid, p. 172). In recent years, apart from the traditional way of petitioning, internet petitioning and campaigning has attained large popularity. There are many reasons why protestors opt for online petitioning: fast and broad dissemination through internet infrastructure, easy accessibility, saving of resources such as manpower, finances and time, as well as outreach of the petition.

3.4.2. Political opportunity structure

The concept of POS has been operationalized in literature using several different indicators. Some authors refer to long *duree* aspects like the democratic history of the country (della Porta 2013, p. 957), others to more contingent and dynamic aspects of the contest, such as the number of actors or the positioning of particular political parties (Kitschelt 1986, p. 63), which might influence the mobilization of social movement actors favorably or unfavorably.

Regarding state intervention/state repression, contemporary studies include various forms of police action during protest events, such as violence and brutality, kidnaping of activists, arrests and imprisonments, infiltration of informants within social movements, restrictions of basic human rights, as well as mis(use) of the internet (Earl 2013, p. 1083). For easier differentiation of repressive actions, scholars have categorized them as *overt repressions* (della Porta and Reiter 1998 and Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003) and *covert repressions* (Marx 1974 and Cunningham 2004). Another distinction has been made between *coercive* (Davenport 1995) and *channeling* (Oberschall 1973 and McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson 1991) repressive actions. During recent movement activities, many of the above mentioned repression tactics have been employed by state authorities in South East Europe. As an example, a huge wiretapping scandal unveiled by the Macedonian opposition showed systemic violations of basic human rights of anti-governmental activists.

Protest policing has frequently raised questions whether it should be treated more as repression, as it is usually referred to by protestors, or a "necessary evil" effectuated by state agencies "enforcing and reinforcing the norms of the system" (Lipsky 1970, p. 1). Still, it seems that social movement literature treats protest policing more as repression than a necessary state intervention (for a literature review see Earl 2013, pp. 1083-1089). Gary Marx created a classification taking into account the purpose of the repression: "creating an unfavorable image of opponents; gathering information; restricting the flow of resources for movements; discouraging activists; fueling internal conflicts within the leadership and between groups; sabotaging specific actions" (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 197). Della Porta and Reiter have concluded that there are three main general strategic areas of protest: "coercive strategies, i.e. use of weapons and physical force to control or disperse demonstrations; persuasive strategies, meaning all attempts to control protest through prior contacts with activists and organizers; informative strategies, consisting in widespread information-gathering as a preventive feature in

protest control; and the targeted collection of information, including use of modern audiovisual technologies, to identify law-breakers without having to intervene directly" (della Porta and Reiter 1998 and della Porta and Diani 2006, pp. 197-198). Della Porta and Reiter have also grouped police actions in several sub-categories which are very important for clarifying the models of police protesting. The authors distinguish brutal and soft use of force; the extent of illegitimate conduct which can range from tolerance to repression; the strategies for controlling actors can be either general or selective; the police can respect or fail to respect the law; the police actions can be preemptive or reactive; the level of communication of the police with the protestors can be confrontational or consensual; the police forces can be rigid or flexible regarding the capacity to adjust to respective situations; there can be a formal or informal respect of the rules agreed between the participants and the police; and lastly, the degree of training of the police forces can be either professional or improvised (della Porta and Reiter 1998, p. 4).

Taking into account all the above mentioned classifications and typologies, combining several of their dimensions, two general models for controlling public order can be detected: *escalated force model* and *negotiated control model*. The first one is characterized by general intolerance towards Freedom of Assembly; no understanding can be found regarding innovative forms of protest; there is almost no communication between the police and the protest participants, apart from the bare minimum which is required; and a pallet of coercive actions and illegal methods applied by the police forces can be detected. On the other hand, the latter recognizes the basic political right to protest as essential; the forces tolerate even disruptive forms of protest; there is frequent communication between the police and the demonstrators which contributes towards peaceful protesting; and the forces try to avoid coercive actions as much as possible, selecting their operations wisely (see extensively in McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998, pp. 51–4 and della Porta and Fillieule 2004).

The allies and opponents of social movements are held in high regard, especially within the theoretical strands which lean more towards the political process approach. One of the central relations which should undoubtedly be taken into consideration is the relationship between social movements and political institutions. These characteristics vary thanks to both authors and contexts. Della Porta distinguishes between *relatively more stable institutional structures* and the *changing configuration of power*.

Within the first group of important factors she includes the following: the strength of a government; the distribution of institutional power (especially the power of the central executive); the characteristics of the public bureaucracy and the powers of the judiciary; the overall amount of power in the hands of the state (this factor partially overlaps with the first two previously mentioned); the national political cultures; as well as the democratic history of a country.

The latter group of more dynamic factors refers to dimensions which are prone to rapid short-term change, as well as the shift in the object of pressure from social movements. The initiators of this theoretical strand started with deeper examination of *ad hoc* openings (opportunities) in the system which would be beneficial for social movements. For example, Tarrow stressed electoral instability, elite divisions and availability of allies (Tarrow 1989), and both Tarrow and Tilly highlighted the sudden variation in these opportunities (Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Della Porta treats the following factors as crucial: the configuration of power with its two main structures – the alliance structure and the opposition structure; and the political parties, with emphasis on political cleavages and party divisions, the electoral competition, as well as the government/opposition positioning.

Herbert Kitschelt also draws upon several important features regarding the relationship between movements and the political environment. He distinguishes between factors which determine the openness of political regimes to new demands from the input side, and operational dimensions which characterize the capacity of political systems to implement policies. Within the first group of factors, Kitschelt highlights at least four which he deems crucial, all of them important for this research project: The *number of actors* (groups, political parties, factions etc.) *which can effectively articulate various demands in the electoral politics and influence the level of openness*. Kitschelt claims that "…The larger this number, the more 'centrifugal' a political system tends to be and the more difficult it is to confine electoral interest articulation to the 'cartel' of entrenched interests that is represented by the established, bureaucratized parties" (Kitschelt 1986, p. 63); The *capacity of legislatures to develop and control policies independently of the executive*. The level of openness of political regimes increases proportionally with the aforementioned capacity of the legislature. The constitutional positioning of the legislature as an "electorally accountable agent" contributes towards its greater sensitiveness to public demands. Kitschelt makes the distinction in regard to the fact that within

the executive only higher positioned public officials are subject to greater public pressure and control (Ibid, p. 63); The *patterns of intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch*. In cases where multiple and fluid links act as intermediaries between the executive and the claimants, the access to the policy arenas is facilitated (Ibid, p. 63); and The *mechanisms for aggregation of demands*. Prospective claims and demands must find a concrete path to access policy arenas. Openness is much more constrained when there are no available procedures and other mechanisms to build future effective policy coalitions and *vice versa* (Ibid, p. 63). All these indicators are thoroughly examined in the remainder of this study, contextualized within the three protest movements under study.

Chapter 4 : Incomplete Democratization and its Impact on the Mobilizations in Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

4.1. *Introduction*

This chapter aims to illustrate the incomplete democratization process which characterizes, in our view, the three countries under study (Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina), which is understood as one of the crucial background factors for triggering the mobilization and the impact of the three movements in the three respective countries. The central argument this chapter aims to convey is that the three countries which have gone through a process of democratization of the elites instead of "democratization from below" (della Porta 2014), has resulted in incomplete democratization. This incomplete democratization brought about grave democratic and economic deprivation of the three societies, which is displayed through several democratic and economic indicators. In this chapter I argue that the failed democratization process, and the numerous negative implications stemming from it, is one of the main triggering factors for the three social movements under study.

Firstly, this chapter looks at the historical development of the democratic transformation process, illustrating the abuse of power by political and economic elites in it. Furthermore, it turns towards the high level of corruption which created numerous grievances for the mobilizations, coupled with the endangered media freedoms. Renowned politicians embezzling state funds without facing any consequences, critical media outlets being closed, and political rivals being arbitrarily sent to prison, are only several of the numerous examples taken from the three countries. Lastly, the process of privatization of state capital will be described for all the three countries under study, and linked to the side effects this process has had in the three countries (e.g. high level of unemployment rates among young people; poor overall health of the societies in the three countries and its related moderate democratic potential, etc.). In the conclusion of the chapter the main aspects/elements of this incomplete democratization process which can be linked to social movements subsequent mobilizations as potential trigger factors, will be summarized.

From a methodological perspective, the chapter will combine secondary sources with interviews with relevant key informants. Some of the described events, such as the transformation of society and the privatization process are approached both historically and from

a present-day perspective, while all other events closely tied to abuse of power, corruption, lack of media freedom and unemployment rates are presented through contemporary cases, mostly emphasizing the years preceding the movements.

4.2. *The Painful Democratization of Macedonian Society: From Formal Democratization to Hybrid Regime*

4.2.1. Historical development

Macedonia gained its independence in very perilous conditions, having the possibilities of an armed conflict hanging over its head as a Damocles sword. At the beginning of 1989, the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia was already reaching its peak, clearly differentiating two factions within its presidency. The first faction followed the lines of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević, who advocated for retention of the current borders of Yugoslavia and endurance of the National League of Communists (SKJ) with a dominant Serbian influence, while the other faction advocated for dissolution and independence of several member-states of the Federation. The differences between the opposing fractions led towards the Slovenian delegation leaving the last 14th extraordinary congress of the SKJ held in Belgrade from 20 to 22 January 1990, gaining support from significant pro-democratic groups from the BH, Croat and Macedonian delegations (New York Times 1990)[21]. The federal national party within its original form and structure entered the textbooks of history.

On the eve of the first multi-party elections in 1990, the Macedonian political landscape faced both an ethnic and an ideological cleavage. The latter was mainly following two strands – one more pro-nationalist, while the other favoring the communist tradition. The nationalist winds were at the back of the MAAK party (Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action) founded in February 1990 by nationally-oriented intellectuals, and the VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), founded in June 1990 by prominent Macedonian dissidents (Daskalovski 1999, pp. 34-5). On the other side of the political spectrum, the direct descendants of the SKJ – SKM-PDP (League of Communists of Macedonia – Party for Democratic Transformation), also referred to as the "reformed communists", although advocating for independent Macedonia, "ran on a platform that sought recognition for Macedonian sovereignty in some type of 'Yugoslav framework'"

[21] http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/24/world/upheaval-in-the-east-yugoslavia-yugoslavia-on-the-brink.html

(Ibid, p. 35). The elections[22] foreshadowed a deadlock[23]. In the 120-member single chamber legislature named *Sobranie*, no political party or coalition could form a majority.

During the political negotiations leading to the creation of the first Macedonian government, the newly elected citizen representatives made a huge step towards coining the Macedonian independence by introducing the Declaration for Sovereignty of Socialist Republic of Macedonia (DSSRM, 1991) which was enacted by the Assembly of SRM on 25th of January 1991. All 120 MPs unanimously adopted the Declaration of Independence. This was one of the several moments in the short Macedonian history when a wide inter-party consensus was reached. Apart from all elected MPs voting in favor of the Declaration, all existing political parties also backed the Declaration (Stefanovski 2016, p. 400). The main focus of this consensual act was on the independence and the territorial integrity of the Macedonian people, based mainly on the rights of self-determination and secession which should be guaranteed in the prospective constitution and verified by the citizens on a popular referendum[24].

Just two days after the entry into force of the Declaration, the Macedonian Assembly elected former high communist official Kiro Gligorov as President of the Republic. Furthermore, on 7 March 1991, Gligorov gave the mandate to Nikola Kljusev to form a government. The first Macedonian government was elected on 20 March 1991, and Nikola Kljusev became the first Macedonian Prime Minister[25]. Due to lack of sufficiently qualified and experienced candidates among party ranks, especially in the largely working-class and populist VMRO-DPMNE, "many of the ministers were recruited from outside the parties themselves. The government, thus, came to be known as the 'government of experts'" (Szajkowski 1999, pp. 55-56). The "government of experts" had a series of difficult tasks to tackle: to complete the initiated independence process; to enact the new Constitution; to establish monetary independence, creating the central bank and

[22]The first multi-party elections took part in November 1990, following a two-round majoritarian electoral model. The first round was held on 11 November, while the outcome was decided two weeks later on 25 November.

[23]The winning party, VMRO-DPMNE, obtained 38 seats, followed by SKM-PDP with 31 seats and PDP (Party for Democratic Prosperity, the first registered and largest party of the ethnic Albanian minority), with 17. The remaining 34 seats were distributed between ten other smaller parties, coalitions and independent candidates (Szajkowski 1999, pp. 78-9).

[24] The text of the Declaration vividly stressed the determination for independence introducing the wording "…independence and territorial integrity of the Macedonian state, as well as the right to self-determination of the Macedonian people, including the right to secession" (DSSRM, 1990: Article 1).

[25] See the decision (in Macedonian) published in the Official Gazette on 22 March 1991 http://www.slvesnik.com.mk/Issues/ACD37FD3850E45519F33B7E0F3267A30.pdf

introducing the new currency *Denar*, as well as many other responsibilities connected to the security and economic stability of the newly emerging Balkan country[26].

Macedonia continued on the path towards independence and democratization continuing with the preparations for the forthcoming referendum. On 6 August 1991 the Assembly decided for the referendum to be held on 8 September 1991, alongside defining the referendum question "Are you in favor of a sovereign and independent state Macedonia, with the right to participate in future alliance with other sovereign Yugoslav states?" (Referendum report, 1991: 1-2). From 1.132.981 citizens who went to the ballot box, a vast majority of 1.079.308 voted "YES", showing a clear and unequivocal support for an independent, sovereign and democratic Republic of Macedonia (Stefanovski 2016, p. 400). In one of the most important moments of Macedonian political history, President Gligorov addressed the gathered crowd on the central square in Skopje with the famous words "Male and female citizens of Macedonia, allow me tonight to congratulate you, and all the other male and female citizens of Macedonia a free, sovereign and independent Macedonia" (SDK 2018)[27]. On 17 September 1991, the Macedonian Assembly finalized the process by adopting a Declaration for verification of the referendum results for constituting Republic of Macedonia as an independent and sovereign state. This Declaration stressed that "the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, in a democratic manner, wrote a new page in the Macedonian centuries-long history of efforts to make the Republic of Macedonia an independent and sovereign state." (History of Parliamentarism in Macedonia, p. 3)[28]

The final democratic pillar of Macedonia's independence was set with the proclamation of the Macedonian Constitution, adopted on 17 November 1991. This cornerstone of Macedonia's legal system laid the fundament for the future legal development of the country. The Constitution promoted separation of powers and checks and balances as fundamental principles, in contrast to the previously defined fusion of powers enshrined in the previous

[26] The lifespan of the first Government was short. On 10 January 1992 it went through a process of reshuffling (see decision published in the Official Gazette on 17 January 1992 http://www.slvesnik.com.mk/Issues/88781E4645074013AC81B936ECE05F24.pdf), later suffering a collapse after a non-confidence vote on 16 July 1992 (Szajkowski 1999, p. 56)

[27] https://sdk.mk/index.php/neraskazhani-prikazni/pritisni-malku-za-makedonija-arhivska-video-snimka-od-proglasuvaneto-na-nezavisnosta-na-8-septemvri-1991-godina/

[28] See the publication at: http://sobranie.mk/content/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%20%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%83%D1%82/%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%20%D0%BD%D0%B0%20%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BC_ENG.pdf

system of ruling, concentrating authority in the Assembly of the Socialist Republic (Ibid, pp. 3-4).

Reflecting on the democratization process in Macedonia, from the first days of the independence until recent times, as well as the process of stable institution-building, the second President and second Prime Minister of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski, stressed the difficulties and the challenges facing the young independent country:

"*After gaining independence, I have the impression that the democratization process in Macedonia was approached with great enthusiasm and great responsibility. From a contemporary perspective it might seem odd, but this process was accessed through a wide inter-party and societal consensus…irrespective of Left, Right, and Center, Macedonian or Albanian ethnic parties. Taking into consideration that everything started from zero…From a single-party system, de facto, all existing institutions of the system were supposed to be reformed, and at the same time new institutions immanent for a new democratic ambience were supposed to be created. Institutions and processes which up to then were unknown to us, so we used experiences from other countries…*" (Int. 4, MKD).

Although numerous pitfalls such as the name dispute with Greece, the inter-ethnic conflict in 2001, etc., stood on the way of Macedonia's progress, the country managed to move forward in a slow pace. Still, the rather shallow and not fully democratized society (Meghan 2001 and Zakaria 1997) dominated by institutions comprised of partisan cadre instead of professionals, dominantly controlled by small and closed ruling elite, paid the price after the transformation of Nikola Gruevski's ruling into a hybrid regime. This process started to become more visible around 2010.

The above mentioned malfunctions of Macedonian society derive primarily from the historical ideological and ethnic polarization engrained in the Macedonian political system since its independence. Furthermore, these two features amplified throughout the years, especially during the ethnic conflict in 2001, as well as prior to crucial election cycles. The same characteristics heralded the creation of the CfM platform and the beginning of the 2015 mobilization wave which created fertile soil for policy outcomes aiming at alleviation of some of the grievances put forward by the movement activists.

4.2.2. Abuse of power

Renowned university professor and political analyst Sasho Ordanoski, commenting on the political situation and lack of democratic capacities of Macedonian society, defined Macedonia as a non-democratic country where checks and balances are non-existent, media freedoms are deteriorating, and spending of the money is not controlled[29]:

"*…We are currently living in a non-democratic country. Considering all standards, Macedonia is a non-democratic country, which does not mean that certain levels of democratization have not been attained previously. This non-democratic 'coup d'état' became more visible in 2009, and already in 2010 it became clear that it tends to occupy all democratic prerogatives and convert them in non-democratic. There is no control over the government, no balance. Checks and balances do not exist. There is no media freedom in a normal democratic framework. There is no control over the public spending. These fundamental characteristics of democracy do not exist in Macedonia…*" (Int. 9, MKD)

Professor Ordanoski's comments can be strengthened and verified through a number of indicators measured by both international and national NGOs performing watchdog activities, as well as by intergovernmental organizations monitoring elections. The Freedom in the World annual report issued by Freedom House continuously classified Macedonia as a "*Partly Free country*". The 2009 country report for Macedonia is distinct because it reports a downward trend , mainly because of the violence and harassment of political party members during the 2008 parliamentary elections (Freedom House 2009)[30]. These elections were labeled by the international observers as the worst since Macedonia's independence, mainly because of authorities' failure to prevent violence leading to one casualty and several injured, as well as limited and selective enforcement of laws (OSCE/ODIHR 2008, pp. 1-2)[31]. After a minor improvement in the 2010 country report reflecting the correctly administered local and presidential elections in 2009, as well as the implementation of legal recommendations (Freedom House 2010)[32], the democratic environment worsened in 2010, when police officials raided the headquarters of the largest private opposition-oriented *A1* TV station causing serious tensions

[29] The interview was conducted in February 2016
[30] See the report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/macedonia
[31] See the OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/33153?download=true
[32] See the country report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/macedonia

between ruling and opposition parties in parliament (Freedom House 2011)[33]. Democracy further deteriorated when at the end of 2012, opposition MPs and journalists were forcefully evicted from parliament by secret service members, after trying to block a plenary session dedicated to the adoption of the 2013 state budget (Freedom House 2014)[34]. This resulted with the 2015 report noting a decline in the political rights due to numerous shortcomings in the presidential and early parliamentary elections in 2014, followed by legislative boycott by the opposition (Freedom House 2015)[35]. These elections were also deemed very problematic by international observers, who stressed the blurred lines between the party and the state (OSCE/ODIHR 2014, p. 4)[36]. Lastly, the country report issued in 2016 once again noted a downward trend following the released wiretapped conversations, popularly known as the "political bombs", which the leader of the opposition aired on more than 30 press conferences. The revelations pointed towards serious allegations of massive illegal phone tapping by the government; a judiciary under full government control; ordered arrests of political opponents; massive media surveillance ordered by government officials; political retaliation over businessmen; numerous cases of flagrant electoral fraud; real estate corruption by the prime minister; cover-up of murder by high police officials etc.[37] This project conducted by the opposition and named *Vistinata za Makedonija* (The Truth about Macedonia) caused further polarization in society which ultimately led towards massive citizen mobilization (Stefanovski 2016, pp. 397-407). The 2016 Freedom House report also noted the decline of the security situation in the country after major clashes between government security forces and ethnic Albanian militants which resulted with 22 casualties. Many government critics, as well as the opposition, accused the largest party in power – VMRO-DPMNE – for orchestrating the events in order to distract the attention from the previously mentioned wiretapped conversations (Freedom House 2016)[38]. These reports largely confirm the views of professor Ordanoski for the "coup d'état" in the separation of powers and checks and balances in the Macedonian political system.

[33] See the country report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/macedonia
[34] See the country report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/macedonia ; see also a complete report on the violent happenings in the Macedonian parliament named "Black Monday", prepared by the Foundation Open Society Macedonia at:http://soros.org.mk/mk/Home/Publication?newsID=641&catID=9
[35] See the country report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/macedonia
[36] See the OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/121306?download=true
[37] See transcripts of the revealed wiretappings at:
http://arhiva.sdsm.org.mk/default.aspx?mId=55&agId=5&articleId=11786
[38] See the country report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/macedonia

Former President Crvenkovski stresses the period seen as a turning point of the ruling Macedonian elites, especially the conservative VMRO-DPMNE. This change of course resulted with Macedonia shifting fast towards a hybrid regime. He highlighted the unsuccessful bid of Macedonia to join NATO during the Bucharest summit in 2008, and the attempts of the government to redefine the identity of the ethnic Macedonian citizens (see more about antiquization in Macedonia in Vangeli 2011) as one of the critical junctures:

"*…Between 2006 and 2008 there may have been some suspicions, but there were no clear signals coming from the government indicating that democracy will be threatened. After 2008, particularly after the NATO summit in Bucharest where Macedonia failed to join NATO due to well-known reasons, a radical turn of governmental policies occurred. I am still referring to them as 'government'. From today's perspective I would call it 'the regime'…the current regime. Their technocratic managerial approach to governing was abandoned, and suddenly populism became dominant. They will call it a type of ideology. I call it populism. Everything started with the process of history-revision, the so called process of 'antiquization', which was not just verbal or rhetorical, but also practically implemented in architecture, urbanism, naming of infrastructural objects…the airport, the highway, the monuments…they even intervened in textbooks influencing the educational system…*" (Int. 4, MKD)

In regards to the abuse of power, it is evident that following the failed attempt to join NATO in 2008, Gruevski's establishment began its incremental transformation into a hybrid regime. The revelations presented by the opposition in the wiretapped conversations acted as an impetus and a channeling force to unite grievances from multiple stakeholders ranging from civil society to disadvantaged individuals. From the perspective of RMT, resources were united accelerating mobilization, which further also influenced policy outcomes. On the other hand, the released wiretaps also opened political opportunities for creating alliances between political parties and CSOs, which strengthened the position of the governmental challengers, facilitating their access to the policy arena. Furthermore, vital space was created for the international community to intervene and exert stronger pressure over the ruling elite in order to make numerous concessions towards the movement activists in Macedonia.

4.2.3. Deteriorated media freedoms

The deteriorated media freedoms are the second important factor stressed by prof. Ordanoski which led Macedonia on the path towards autocracy. Once among the frontrunners in freedom of the press and freedom of speech in the region, Macedonia's scoreboard took a terrifying turn. After more than a decade of being classified as Partly-Free country regarding press freedom, together with a large number of countries from South and South East Europe, the 2016 Freedom of the Press report, labeled Macedonia as the only "Not Free" country in the wider region. This aggravation is mainly due to revelations indicating massive illegal wiretapping of journalists arising from the above mentioned "political bombs", indications of close bonds of corruption between media owners and state officials, as well as threats and attacks on media workers (Freedom House 2016)[39]. These events have slid Macedonia to the second to last position in Europe, just one position above Turkey, with a press freedom score of 62[40]. Another renowned international NGO – Reporters without Borders – follows the negative trend of media freedoms and freedom of information. Just as a vivid example, in 2009 Macedonia was ranked 34th out of 169 countries, while in 2016 the country's rank was 118th out of 181, which presents a staggering drop of 84 positions (Reporters without Borders 2016)[41]. This represented, by far, the worse ranking in the inner region.

President Crvenkovski also refers to the difference between the beginnings of media pluralism in Macedonia after gaining independence, when baby steps were made towards basic media freedoms and freedom of speech, compared to the last several years elaborated previously, which demeaned Macedonian media, and negatively impacted Macedonian society in general:

"*So, I can say that during that period (post-independence, I.S.) there was a 'boom' in the media sphere. We inherited one television – the public broadcaster, and one news agency 'Nova Makedonija'…This is a period when many new TV stations on national and even local level were registered. This was very important. There was also pluralism in terms of radio stations and daily and weekly press. This process faced the first major challenge in 2001, during the armed conflict. Expectedly, a war psychosis was present. There were many people who thought that at the expense of democratic standards, some kind of patriotic, even nationalistic path should be*

[39] See the report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016
[40] Freedom of the Press methodology rates the Press Freedom Score from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the best score and 100 representing the worst.
[41] See the country report at: https://rsf.org/en/macedonia

taken. They thought that democracy cannot flourish because there are higher interests at stake. Even in 2001 (during the armed conflict, I.S.), I think that Macedonian democracy managed to withstand that pressure. Of course, there were difficulties, but no repression on different opinions was allowed, even on interethnic issues. The media published information freely, following their beliefs and editorial policy. Although we thought that the process of democratization had reached a point of no return, and that retrograde processes were impossible, time proved us wrong. We were shown that in politics there is no everlasting success and that wrong policies and wrong approaches can threaten every success…" (Int. 4, MKD)

The pressure over media workers who critically assessed the government's work created a split in the profession, differentiating between government mouthpiece journalism and propaganda on the one hand, and investigative journalism aiming to unravel corruption scandals, abuse of power and political pressure on the other. It was the latter group of journalists and media workers who echoed the grievances and the demands of the activists, proving to be a valuable resource especially in terms of communication strategies, visibility and outreach. As further chapters will show, these media actors opposing Gruevski's regime proved to be a rather important ally both in mobilizing more movement participants against the government, but also in shaping the policy outcomes to some extent by trying to influence the standpoints of main political leaders in the country and the international community through op-eds, open letters and critical journalistic pieces.

4.2.4. Widespread corruption

Widespread corruption and uncontrolled spending of the government is the third burning issue highlighted by professor Ordanoski. Many allegations of illegal financial activities were continuously pointed out by watchdogs and experts, but mainly due to the grip over the media, the government managed to preserve the false status of an anti-corruption poster-child in the region. The distorted image burst like a bubble of soap following the revelations made during the wiretapping scandal mentioned in the previous paragraphs. A renowned international Washington DC based non-profit organization – Global Financial Integrity (GFI) – which measures illicit financial flows, registered a total amount of 5,162 million US dollars being drained from Macedonia from 2004 to 2013. The most worrying figures can be correlated to years when the government led by VMRO-DPMNE ruled the country: 928 million in 2008, 834

million in 2011 and 597 million in 2007 (Global Financial Integrity 2015)[42]. Another credible international non-governmental organization which leads a global coalition against corruption – Transparency International – in its report focusing on the fight against corruption in the Western Balkans, located numerous shortcomings in the fight against corruption in Macedonia. The report mentions manipulation of media coverage when reporting on political opponents, firing of civil servants not associated with the parties in power, co-optation of CSOs to promote governmental interests (Transparency International 2016, pp. 4-5)[43].The country office of Transparency International in Macedonia, in its publication National Integrity System Assessment Macedonia, goes into deeper analysis of problems related to corruption in the country. The corruption profile prepared by the organization highlights immense controversial public spending for the "Skopje 2014" project, the lack of transparency in public procurement procedures, and problematic political party financing (Transparency International – Macedonia, pp. 41-42)[44]. Apart from the cited reports, the progress reports issued yearly by the European Commission as well as the democracy and human rights reports released by the US Department of State strengthen the claims of the key informants that Macedonia is a critically corrupt country.

Ordanoski locates the root of the democratization problem in the undemocratic political parties. He believes that Macedonia is a highly politicized country in which parties are undemocratic (Int. 9, MKD). This line of thought of Ordanoski is convergent with the thoughts of Danijela Dolenec who looks at ways in which competitive party systems advance democratization in the Balkans. She comes to a conclusion that "party system competitiveness represents neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratic advances" (Dolenec 2016, p. 125) in the region under study. Building on that argument she suggests that parties will be engaged in developing democratic practices only if pressured by forces deriving from strengthened independent social spheres and emerging citizen mobilization which demands government accountability (Ibid, pp. 125-6). Particularly, citizen pressure coming from below and demanding government accountability is one of the cornerstones of this work, analyzing these processes not just in Macedonia, but also in B&H and Bulgaria. In this regard, as subsequent chapters will show, the political parties in Macedonia became a part both of the

[42] See the figures at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/issues/data-by-country/
[43] See the report at: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/fighting_corruption_in_the_western_balkans_and_turkey_priorities_for_reform
[44]See the report at:http://www.transparency.mk/en/images/stories/NIS_eng.pdf

problem and the solution. Being one of the main drivers of corruption, political parties provided civil society actors with political grievances for mobilization. On the other hand, it was the very same political parties that reached the *Przhino Agreement* brokered by the international community which paved the way towards the favorable policy outcomes alleviating citizens' grievances in Macedonia. Undoubtedly, the pressure from below coming from the mobilized citizens, as well as the "top-down" pressure exerted by the international community played a vital role in the entire policy process.

4.2.5. The Privatization Process and the Unemployment Rates

If certain democratic standards were once fulfilled and later gradually deteriorated, that cannot be said for the economic side of the Macedonian democratization story. Since the early days of transition from a regulated socialist economic model to a free market economy, Macedonia has struggled to find its way. The main criticism attached to the privatization process by many experts was the "provided possibility for the insider workers, mostly coming from the highest management, to depreciate the value of the company and to buy the majority of shares for a very low price." (Radovanovik-Angjelkovska 2014, p. 73). An essay based dominantly on the results of a sociological research project – *The People and the Society in Transition* – highlights that a vast majority of the citizens in the mid-90s of the previous century perceived the privatization process as robbery. 56.2% of the respondents were strongly convinced in this statement, while 22.2% were relatively convinced in this assertion (Shajnoski 2016 p. 11). The same trend from the initiation of the process continued further throughout the years, resulting in disappointing economic figures for the small Macedonian developing economy. In 2012, based on data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), *CNN Money* included Macedonia in the world's worst economies due to the worst unemployment projections for that year in the world – 31.2% (CNN Money 2012)[45]. During 2014, the year when several mobilizations in particular spheres of society acted as a preface to the larger protest waves following in 2015 and 2016, the IMF registered an unemployment rate of 28% of the total labor force, which put Macedonia on the tail of the region of emerging and developing Europe (IMF 2016)[46]. The same year the

[45] See the news article at: http://money.cnn.com/gallery/news/economy/2012/08/07/worlds-worst-economies/4.html
[46] See the figures at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2012&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=88&pr1.y=12&c=914%2C962%2C963%2C943%2C918%2C964%2C960%2C968%2C944%2C942%2C967%2C186&s=LUR&grp=0&a=

country was ranked fifth in the world regarding youth unemployment, with 50.8% of the labor force between 15 and 24 years of age being unemployed (World Bank 2016)[47]. Although the unemployment rate slightly improved the next year moving to 26%, Macedonia was still the second worst country in the region, just behind B&H (Ibid). In regards to poverty rates in Macedonia, the most recent available figures date from 2011. They are provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which in its Human Development Report (HDR) for 2015 notes that 1.7% of Macedonia's population, which equals to around 36 thousand people, are multidimensionally poor. In addition, 2.4% of the country's population, or approximately 51.000 people, live near multidimensional poverty. The final indicators which the report provides are the breadth of deprivation and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). In the case of Macedonia, the first indicator is positioned at 38.4%, while the latter is 0.007 (UNDP 2015, pp. 6-7)[48]. Taking into consideration the presented figures and combining them with the previously noted arguments related to massive illicit financial transactions and large-scale corruption, one can conclude that the democratization process in Macedonia was to a large extent curbed by the symbiotic relationship between all these factors.

The figures presented in the previous paragraph raise one burning question: How is it that massive protests by economically deprived citizens failed to occur in previous years? But this debate will be currently set aside. Although not being the primary grievance of the governmental challengers, the years-long economic failures only provided further impetus to the citizens' platform which had already been mobilized by issues such as abuse of power and massive corruption. As paragraphs below will show, economic deprivation played one of the crucial mobilization roles in the Bulgarian and the BH case assessed in the following sections.

4.3. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A War-torn and Divided Society Aiming at Democratization*

4.3.1. Historical development

"*The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke pondered a problem on the eve of the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, which were meant to restore civic life to that ravaged country. 'Suppose the election was declared free and fair,' he said, and those elected are 'racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration]. That is the*

[47] See the figures at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?year_high_desc=true
[48] See the full report at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MKD.pdf

dilemma.' Indeed it is, not just in the former Yugoslavia, but increasingly around the world.'" (Zakaria 1997, p 22)

As one can see from this quote from the former managing editor of Foreign Affairs – Fareed Zakaria – western diplomats could foresee that nationalists, mono-religious and mono-culturally inclined political leaders will have the largest say in post-Dayton B&H. B&H was, and to some extent still is a war-torn country which, unfortunately, hosted the largest genocide on European territory after WWII – the Srebrenica Massacre. In order for one to understand the 2014 protests, it is important to present both the pre-war and the post-war political and economic context.

The gradual dissolution of the SKJ, explained in the subsections on Macedonia, catalyzed the process of creation of SDA – Party for Democratic Action, fulfilling the old dream of Alija Izetbegović – the prospective first President of the Republic of B&H – for creating an Islamic religious and national party in Bosnia. Although the new party was supposed to avoid religious or ethnic labeling in order to adhere to state laws, many sources reported that the founders did not hide the evidently Muslim orientation of the new political actor on the scene. For instance, during the founding convention held on 26 May 1990 in Sarajevo, many renowned Islamic Community high officials were present (Perica 2002, p. 87). Consequently, this led to the creation of two other "ethnic" parties - the Serbian Democratic Party in B&H (SDS) founded and chaired by the future President of Republika Srpska (RS) – Radovan Karadžić and the Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ).

B&H held its first and only free multi-party elections before the signing and effectuation of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 18 November 1990. A second round of voting for the House of the Peoples took place on 2 December. These elections have largely been labeled as "demonstrating the failure of democracy" (Chandler 2000, p. 29), mainly due to the success of the newly founded nationalist parties, sidelining the cross-Yugoslav liberal-reform and reform-communist parties (Ibid)[49]. The once leading multi-ethnic and multi-confessional cradle within

[49]Out of the 240 seats in the two houses of parliament, 87 seats (33.8%) were won by SDA, 71 seats (29.6%) went to SDS, while 44 seats (18.3%) were acquired by HDZ. This result promoted the nationalist part of the electoral competitors coming out as absolute winners. On the other hand, The Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia, led by reformist-liberal Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković, won 13 seats (5.4%), while the League of Communists gained 18 seats (less than 8%) (Cohen 1995, p. 146 in Chandler 2000).

the Yugoslav federation has opted for a path of nationalism, rather than the *Brotherhood and Unity*[50].

In parallel with the general elections, a presidential election was also held in order to elect 7 members of the Presidium. From the 7 members in this body, each of the three nations (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) was electing two representatives per nation, and the seventh elected member represented all "others"[51]. The results of the presidential elections to a large extent mirrored the general elections where candidates from nationalist parties dominated.

A rapid series of unfortunate events sank BH society into further ethnic divisions, instability and fear leading towards massive terror. The news digest agency *Vreme* reported on the existence of the "RAM plan"[52] which was revealed at a Federal Government session on 19 September 1991 by PM Ante Marković. This plan argued redefinition of the borders of Yugoslavia in order for all Serbs to live in one country (*Vreme* 1991)[53]. Marković referred to a leaked conversation by Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić speaking about preparations to arm paramilitary groups (Ibid)[54]. As time passed by it was becoming clearer that the worst cannot be avoided.

The disintegration of B&H was becoming a reality. Four Serb autonomous regions[55] were formed before autumn 1991, being followed by two autonomous regions created by the Croats in mid-November (Burg and Shoup 2000, p. 73). On 10 November 1991 (Nincic 1992)[56], preceded by the creation of the Assembly of the Serb Nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serbs held a referendum on remaining in Yugoslavia[57]. By an approval of 98% of the votes at a turnout

[50] This was a popular slogan of the SKJ that was coined during the Yugoslav People's Liberation War (1941–45), and transformed into a guiding principle of Yugoslavia's post-war inter-ethnic policy (Mesić, S. 2004)

[51]Fikret Abdić dominated the Bosniak camp, receiving 48% of the votes, leaving Alija Izetbegović on the second place with 40%. The two of them later agreed that Abdić will remain to work in his company "Agrokomerc", and that Izetbegović will become president of the Presidium. The highest confidence among Croat voters was handed to Stjepan Kljuić who received 21% of the votes. In the Serban camp, the race was won by Biljana Plavšić, gaining the support of 26% of the voters (Meier 1999, p. 193).

[52]*Ram* in Serbo-Croatian means *frame*

[53] See the news digest at: http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/

[54]In a speech in 2007, journalist Florence Hartmann – a correspondent for Le Monde in the Balkans and later a spokesperson at the ICTY – quoted Radovan Karadžić telling Momčilo Mandić on 13 October 1991: "In just a couple of days, Sarajevo will be gone and there will be five hundred thousand dead, in one month Muslims will be annihilated in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/24/t24-4.htm)

[55]*Srpska Autonomna Oblast* in Serbian

[56] See the text Sketches of Hell by Roksanda Nincic at: http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/24/t24-4.htm

[57]The Bosnian Serb Assembly provided two different referendum questions, depending on the ethnic background of the voters. The Serbs were asked "Do you agree with the decision of the Assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina of October 24, 1991, that the Serbian people should remain in a common Yugoslav state with Serbia, Montenegro, the SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja, and Western Srem, and with others who have come

of 85%[58], the will of the Bosnian Serbs for remaining in Yugoslavia was clear. This referendum seemed to be just a smokescreen for the creation of Republika Srpska, which was proclaimed on 9 January 1992 in Sarajevo (*Vreme* 1992)[59].

During the redefinition of B&H, the beginning of the end of the old socialist country was legally noted. The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, commonly known as the "Badinter Commission", which provided legal advice to the Conference on Yugoslavia, in its Opinion No. 1 noted that "the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution" (Pellet 1992, p. 183).

The referendum for independence of B&H from the Yugoslav federation and the early days of the Yugoslav war were happening simultaneously. The citizens of B&H voted for independence on 29 February and 1 March 1992 (Burg & Shoup 2000, p. 117)[60]. The ethnic Serbs dominantly boycotted the referendum amid charges that some of them with desire to vote had been intimidated not to visit the ballot boxes (Ibid). Although the referendum failed to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 voter turnout, Alija Izetbegović stepped up and declared B&H's independence on 3 March. On the same night, in the absence of Serb delegates, parliament ratified the decision (Ibid, p. 118). On 1 March, an incident happened in the center of Sarajevo, when during a Serbian wedding, the groom's father Nikola Gardović was shot and killed by an ethnic Bosniak criminal Ramiz Delalić. Although the war officially started in April 1992, many Serbs consider Gardović to be the first victim of the civil war (Glas Srpske 2009 and Novinite 2007)[61].

The war in Yugoslavia was the most tragic event that had happened on European soil following WWII. During the conflict, B&H suffered the highest number of atrocities and the most severe material damage. After more than three years of bloodshed on the territory of B&H, the conflicted parties signed The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and

---

out for remaining [in Yugoslavia]?" The non-Serbs were asked "Are you agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an equal republic, should remain in a common state of Yugoslavia with all others who take this position?" (Burg &Shoup 2000, p. 74).

[58] See the referendum results at: http://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=ba011991

[59]Republika Srpska was initially proclaimed as Republic of the Serbian People from Bosnia (in Serbian: *Republika Srpskog naroda Bosne I Herzegovine*), see the news digest at: http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/

[60]The referendum question was formulated in the following manner: "Are you in favor of a sovereign, independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens and of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina—Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and others who live in it?" (Meier 1999, p. 193). From the 3.253.847 voters registered for the referendum 64.31% cast their vote, out of which 99.44% voted for a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina (Katz 2010).

[61] See news portal in Serbian at: http://www.glassrpske.com/novosti/vijesti_dana/Godisnjica-ubistva-srpskog-svata-na-Bascarsiji/18496.html; and in English at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=82439

Herzegovina (GFAPBH) – The Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement[62]. The newly established political setting based on the Agreement provisions envisaged free, fair and democratic elections to be held within six months after the Agreement enters into force, but not later than nine months if the OSCE determined that a delay was necessary (GFAPBH 1995, Annex 3, Article 2, Point 9)[63].

The fourth annex of the Agreement provided the new Constitution of B&H, which laid the legal foundations and the institutional framework of the modified state. The Republic consists of two Entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (Ibid, Annex 4, Article 1, Point 9) enjoying a certain level of autonomy. Additionally, the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina is self-governed with its own institutions, laws and regulations, but its territory is jointly owned by the two Entities (Amendment I to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009)[64].One of the most important peculiarities of B&H's institutional design is the introduction of the High Representative which, according to the Agreement, is the "final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement." (GFAPBH 1995, Annex 10, Article V). The existence and the authority vested in the High Representative transformed B&H into a protectorate completely dependent on the international community.

Taking into consideration the years of turmoil during the war in B&H, the ethnic and religious divisions stemming from the conflict, as well as the Dayton Peace Agreement which only cemented the veto powers of the nationalist leaders in each ethnic and confessional camp, democratization and prosperity were the last things that one could expect from this societal and institutional experiment. Almost two decades of impoverished post-conflict misery and political divisions leading to protracted *status quo*, created the movement base for the 2014 protests. The outcry of the economically and politically deprived resulted with a coalition of redundant workers, disenchanted youth, and progress-hungry intellectuals who wanted a better life for the common citizens of B&H unburdened by nationalism and religion. Although desired citizens grievances were not adequately addressed in policy formulations by the institutions, many positive outcomes followed the largest mobilization in recent BH history.

[62]The Dayton Accords were negotiated in Wright-Patterson Air Force Base close Dayton, Ohio, United States, in November 1995, and later formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.
[63] See the full text of the Agreement at: https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true
[64] See the full text of the Amendment at:
http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/Amendment_I_to_the_Constitution_of_BiH_(OHR_and_CC).pdf

4.3.2. Abuse of Power

Although democratization expectations were not very high for the society beginning the process of reconciliation, from the very start it was clear that the externally and ethnically driven democratization process in which B&H institutions and citizens were considerably sidelined (Chandler 2000, pp. 64-5) would not have the brightest future. This was also stressed by a renowned university professor and active participant in the 2014 protests, prof. Asim Mujkić, who reflected on the failure of the imposed ethnocracy model:

"*In the beginning the elites spread their 'positions' only territorially, which later reflected the positions in parliaments, committees, governments…That is the main reason why we can say that ethnocracy became the key element of the endurance of deep cleavages in our society. Let me sum up: The mechanism which is designed to mitigate the divisions is in fact the mechanism which sustains the divisions, and it has become an instrument for maintaining the ethno nationalistic type of governance, which in its essence is nothing more than typical Eastern European nationalism which imagines its state as a territory where one domestic nation is dominant, with a manageable attitude towards minorities, and hope for as less minorities as possible.*" (Int. 1, B&H)

Taking a stroll back to the year before the protests in B&H started – 2013 – the country was described as fragile and politically dysfunctional due to a political stalemate, putting personal disputes and party interests before important social and economic questions (Freedom House 2014)[65]. In Republika Srpska (RS), the government resigned because of insufficient economic results and the rising unemployment (Balkan Insight 2013)[66], but the new government backed by the same parliamentarian majority and a different Prime Minister – Željka Cvijanović – proved to be just a cosmetic change, not resulting with significant political or policy improvement (Freedom House 2014). The inter-entity political conflicts was mirrored on state level and resulted with many personal changes, mainly in the Council of Ministers of B&H and the House of Peoples in the Parliamentary Assembly of B&H (Ibid). The same political turmoil subsequently followed in the second entity – the Federation of B&H – where the House of Representatives wanted to dissolve the government through a non-confidence vote, but the Bosniak caucus in the House of Peoples invoked the Vital National Interest (VNI) procedure,

[65] See the executive summary at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/bosnia-and-herzegovina
[66] See the article at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/government-of-republika-srpska-to-resign-dodik-says

challenging the dissolution of government before the Constitutional Court (European Commission 2013)[67]. Furthermore, the highlighted VNI procedure together with couple of other VNI procedures could not be decided upon, because the Court chamber competent to decide upon these issues could not be timely formed resulting with a blockade of the federal Constitutional Court (Senjak 2013)[68]. These examples point towards a non-functional national democratic governance (Meighan 2001 and Krastev 2002) caused by partisan interests, disregarding those of the ordinary citizens. Prof. Mujkić, lucidly noted this behavior of the political parties:

"*…'I am going to rule in this part, and you are going to rule in that part…' It seems that the political parties are having this…to quote John Locke – 'Tacit Agreement'…that they continuously rule for the last 25 years through rigorously controlled mini-conflicts.*" (Int. 1, B&H)

Building on the facts highlighted in this section, it is obvious that the institutionally enshrined ethnocracy and partocracy in B&H created a system where multiple layers of government ruled in wide inter-party coalitions, publically voicing messages of nationalism and religious intolerance, using it as a smokescreen for peaceful ruling. In 2014 the accrued grievances of the citizens transformed into a strong mobilization against the malfunctioning system. Although vast resources aligned against all levels of power, the governmental challengers failed to gain access to the policy arenas on entity and state level. Furthermore, political opportunities were not materialized, mainly because of the lack of power of the movement to coalesce with influential players in the electoral arena, as well as to convey strong messages to the international community.

4.3.3. Deteriorated media freedoms

As in many Balkan countries, media freedoms in B&H were not flourishing at the end of 2013, as they are not even today. With a press freedom score of 50, and a press status "Partly Free" regarding the country's media freedoms, in 2013 B&H was part of the group of below-average Balkan countries compared to European standards (Freedom House 2014)[69].

[67] See the text of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013 Progress Report at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ba_rapport_2013.pdf
[68] See the article online at: http://vijesti.ba//clanak/182497/ustavni-sud-fbih-rjesava-se-spor-oko-kvp-a
[69] See the country report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/bosnia-and-herzegovina

Furthermore, the Reporters without Border's World Press Freedom Index for 2014 ranked B&H on the 66th position[70]. The complex institutional design also mirrored the public broadcasting service arrangements resulting with one state-level broadcaster – *Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and two entity-level broadcasters: *Radio and Television of the Federation of B&H* and *Radio and Television of Republika Srpska* (Hodžić 2014, p. 152). These divisions are further extended to private media as well (Freedom House 2013)[71]. One of the major threats over freedom of the press in the year preceding the protest events was the decision of the municipal court in Banja Luka, to award a 2,500 EUR damage to RS president Milorad Dodik, in a libel case against BETA correspondent Liljana Kovačević. The journalist reported on embezzlement and abuse of power charges previously made public by Bosnian state police (Klix 2014)[72]. The three public broadcasters are facing continuous political pressure. The government of Republika Srpska increased the political control over the entity PBS in 2013 by breaching financing legislation, while similar steps were taken by the House of Representatives in the Federation just one year earlier, by creating a "provisional steering board" comprised of three members, although there have not been any legal grounds for this decision (Freedom House 2014). Apart from the public broadcasters, private media outlets and journalists also faced extensive pressure and intimidation. A vivid example was the setting on fire of the entrance of an investigative magazine *Slobodna Bosna* in Sarajevo in September 2013, which the Editor-in-Chief Senad Avdić considered to be a clear warning for the magazine (International Press Institute 2013)[73]. Just one month later, according to several media, the director of the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), requested the wiretapping of daily newspaper *Oslobođenje* and weekly magazine *Dani* (*Oslobođenje* 2013)[74]. All mentioned types of pressures combined with tight bonds between politics and media, and strengthened by the economic hardship which journalists face (Hodžić 2014, p. 167), make media freedoms one of the major obstacles on the road to democratization of B&H society.

In this fragile and ethnically fragmented media environment, the governmental challengers did not did not have much choice but to build bridges and potential coalitions with

[70] See the country report at: https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2014
[71] See the country report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/bosnia-and-herzegovina
[72] See the article (in Bosnian) online at: https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ljiljana-kovacevic-novinarka-koja-je-pobijedila-dodika/141112146
[73] See the full statement at: http://www.ifex.org/bosnia_and_herzegovina/2013/09/23/seemo_statement_on_bosnia/
[74] See the news article (in Bosnian) at: http://sr.biznis-plus.com/node/4564/Goran-Zubac-zatrazio-prisluskivanje-novina-Oslobodjenje-i-Dani

electronic and print media outlets. What was very peculiar in the BH case was the "acquisition" of an unwanted ally in the media sphere – the *Dnevni Avaz* daily newspaper. Although the owner of the newspaper primarily had his personal and partisan interests in mind, and this was widely recognized from the movement activists, still, by playing the role of main opposition to the traditional political parties, the newspaper reported daily and in a very detailed manner on protest activities. This enabled protesters to convey their messages to bystander readers of a mainstream popular daily newspaper. Still, this unforeseen asset to the movement did not prove to be a crucial piece in the puzzle of securing tangible and favorable political and policy outcomes.

4.3.4. Widespread corruption

Similarly to the case of Macedonia, throughout the years, corruption was constantly one of the most problematic spheres of BH society. The 2014 Freedom House report, emphasizing the key events and the state of corruption in 2013, would frankly highlight that "in general, corruption, bribery, and nepotism are common in education, healthcare, and other areas of public administration. Officials are rarely prosecuted for corruption." (Freedom House 2014). During the designated period, two big corruption scandals involving the president of the Federation Živko Budimir shook BH society. In the first case Budimir was indicted for abuse of power and bribery (B92 2013)[75], as well as illegal possession of weapons, during which course he spent one month in jail, but was later released (Center for Investigative Reporting 2013)[76]. In the latter, he was indicted for pardoning convicts sentenced for murder, tax evasion, narcotics trade etc., with several other accomplices, among which federal justice minister Zoran Mikulić and federal MP Željko Arsić, but the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared itself incompetent to adjudicate the case, adding in its press release that "the indictment could not prove that the charges led to damaging consequences for the state of B&H, its international standing and the rule of law." (Center for Investigative Reporting 2013)[77].Corruption scandals were also related to the name of the deputy PM of the Federation – Jerko Ivanković Lijanović - who was also Minister of agriculture, water management and forestry. Lijanović's family company – Lijanovići LLC – where he is also a co-owner, was allegedly involved in money laundering (Center for

[75] See the news article at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2013&mm=04&dd=26&nav_id=85906
[76] See the news article at: http://www.cin.ba/en/dva-dana-za-dokaze-u-slucaju-budimir/
[77] See the news article at: http://www.cin.ba/en/sud-bih-proglasio-se-nenadleznim-za-slucaj-budimir/

Investigative Reporting 2013)[78], while the Minister himself was accused for abusing his position and allocating agriculture incentives to party members, relatives, and non-existing (shell) companies, as well as exchanging votes for subsidies (Center for Investigative Reporting 2013)[79]. The corruption-infected BH society was once again revealed when Transparency International noted that Kosovo and B&H are the worst countries in the region regarding prevalence of corruption in politics and public administration (Transparency International B&H 2013)[80]. This research showed that citizens believed corruption had increased (Transparency International 2013, p. 7)[81]. 28% of the population had paid a bribe for one of the services provided by the state, during the year preceding the research (Ibid, p. 33). In addition, citizens of B&H perceived political parties as the most corrupt institutions within the political system (Ibid, p. 35). Furthermore, the local branch of the international watchdog noted that there is no progress in prosecuting corruption, with only around 10% of the corruption cases finishing with an indictment during 2011 and 2012 (Transparency International B&H 2013)[82]. The presented arguments show that the constantly high level of corruption is seriously undermining the democratization process, and that BH society is just another of the numerous examples of poor governance in the Balkan region.

These grave facts about perceptions of corruption just reaffirm the conclusion that this was one of the main drivers of protest during the 2014 contentious events. Similarly to the Macedonian case, the political parties were the main part of the problem, but in the case of B&H, they failed to be a part of the solution. To the contrary, the largest political parties and their leaders entered into a tacit agreement of unification against the governmental challengers. Jointly closing political opportunities for the movement, the most powerful players in the political arena tried their best to portray protesters as "criminals, drug addicts, and violent disillusioned youth", in order to keep them on the margins of political influence and decision making. Unfortunate for the protesters, the political parties eventually succeeded in holding on to power and resisted introduction of any major societal changes proposed by the citizens.

[78] See the news article at: http://www.cin.ba/en/pranje-novca-u-mesnoj-industriji/
[79] See the news articles at: http://www.cin.ba/en/milioni-za-nepostojeci-biznis/ and http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-minister-under-fire-over-rigged-subsidies-claim
[80] See the press release at: https://ti-bih.org/kosovo-i-bih-u-svjetskom-vrhu-po-korupciji/?lang=en
[81] See the report at: http://www.wingia.com/web/files/news/61/file/61.pdf
[82] See the press release at: https://ti-bih.org/jos-uvijek-bez-napretka-u-procesuiranju-korupcije/?lang=en and the report (in Bosnian) at: https://ti-bih.org//wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Procesuiranje-korupcije-2013-1.pdf

4.3.5. The privatization process and unemployment rates

The deteriorated economic system of B&H, resulting with high unemployment rates and mass poverty in the country, was mainly a result of unfair, at times criminal, privatization of state-owned companies. What once belonged to everyone in the previous socialist economic system, now belongs to just a few, depriving the majority of citizens from their basic daily necessities. The long-lasting process of unjust privatization "killed almost every socialist factory and domestic production facilities that survived the war" (Vujeva 2014)[83]. As Donais points out, what was supposed to be an apolitical, fast and fair transfer of public assets into hands of private investors, ended as a corrupt, ethnicized and prolonged struggle for wealth and power, which did not do anything to stimulate economic growth or promote inter-ethnic reconciliation (Donais 2002, p. 4). These economic failures were just another halt for the democratization process in the economically deprived country. During 2013 and 2014, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), B&H had an identical unemployment rate of 27.5% of the total labor force, second worst in the region of emerging and developing Europe, just behind Macedonia[84]. Regarding the poverty of BH citizens, the latest reliable figures date from 2011/2012, presented in the Human Development Report (HDR) prepared by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The report's findings highlight that 1.7% of B&H's population, approximately 65.000 people, are multidimensionally poor. Furthermore, additional 3.2% of the country's population, circa 123.000 people, lives close to multidimensional poverty. Lastly, the breadth of deprivation in B&H is 37.3%, while the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is 0.006 (UNDP 2015, p. 6)[85]. *Account*, an anti-corruption network comprised of NGOs, other institutions and individuals produced an investigative report in May 2013 unveiling the ten most notable privatization plunders in B&H[86]. The report focused on the ten enterprises which were most likely to maintain production and avoid job cuts, either because of the nature of production, or the current market

[83] See the full text at: https://www.marxist.com/class-struggle-in-bih-casus-belli-for-major-social-unrest-in-croatia.htm

[84] See the figures at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2012&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=88&pr1.y=12&c=914%2C962%2C963%2C943%2C918%2C964%2C960%2C968%2C944%2C942%2C967%2C186&s=LUR&grp=0&a=

[85] See the report at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/BIH.pdf

[86] See the investigative report (in Bosnian) at: http://www.account.ba/novost/9702/veliko-istrazivanje-10-najvecih-privatizacijskih-pljacki-u-bosni-i-hercegovini and an article providing the translation in English at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article31614

characteristics[87]. One of the interviewed experts, professor Ante Domazet from the Economic Institute in Sarajevo, stressed that just in the Federation, more than 2 billion euros were lost in the privatization process (Ibid). These facts and figures left sufficient reasons for citizens of B&H to raise their voices against the economic devastation of their country.

Unlike the previously elaborated Macedonian case where the dubious privatization process and the high unemployment and poverty rates only amplified citizens' dissatisfaction mainly deriving from abuse of power and lack of rule of law, in B&H, the entire movement was built on the basis of the redundant workers protests which were happening for years in Tuzla. Other groups of unsatisfied citizens only provided further resources and expanded the pallet of grievances initially being put forward by the Tuzlan workers. Similarities can be drawn between the reasons that della Porta highlights as main drivers of anti-austerity protests and the mobilization in B&H. The "weakening of social protection" and "crisis of responsiveness" (della Porta 2015, p. 252) is what urged BH citizens to take the streets. On the other hand, some of the main differences lie in the intensity and temporality in which these decreases of responsiveness and social protection affected the citizens. In B&H, as well as in other former Yugoslav states, the social state disappeared abruptly and unexpectedly, following decades of very high standards of workers' rights, social welfare and protection. In some drastic cases, it was a matter of weeks and months that working class families moved from normal life to deprivation and poverty.

4.4. *European but not Europeanized Bulgarian Society*

Unlike the cases of Macedonia and B&H, both emerging from the former Yugoslav federation, the Bulgarian society followed a slightly different democratization path, mainly due to the large political influence of the USSR. Bulgaria's transition to democracy began with the fall of Todor Zhivkov, the last Bulgarian communist leader, followed by the first democratic elections and the adoption of the new constitution (Bell 1997, p. 353).

4.4.1. Historical developments

A weakened Todor Zhivkov faced an increasing discontent within party leadership. This intra-elite coup (Rossi 2012, p. 7) was orchestrated by the incoming successor and Minister of

[87] Birač in Zvornik, Oil Industry RS, Hidrogradnja in Sarajevo, Krivaja in Zavidovići, Željezara (Ironworks) in Zenica, Polihem in Tuzla, Aluminij in Mostar, Soko in Mostar, Kladušnica in Velika Kladuša and Bosnaplod in Brčko (Account 2013).

Foreign Affairs Petar Mladenov, who had allegedly been guaranteed support following a secret coordinative meeting with Soviet leader Gorbachev approximately one year before the events took place (Bell 1997, p. 360). The Soviet support behind Zhivkov's deposition was facilitated by diplomats and KGB agents, mainly because the former leader failed to follow Moscow' policy of *glasnost* and *perestroika* (Zankina 2010, pp. 103-4). Just three days after Zhivkov's resignation[88], during a new Politburo meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), all of his close associates were ousted and succeeded by anti-Zhivkov cadre. Approximately one month after the meeting "Zhivkov and the entire BCP politburo were expelled from the party" (Rossi 2012, p. 7).

The fall of Zhivkov and the "on-the-road-to-reform" of BCP created space for the democratic opposition to raise its voice for substantial changes in the country. Following a string of protests by numerous dissident organizations, on 7 December 1989, the Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF) was created, gathering organizations with various political orientations (Zankina 2010, p. 105). The newly established opposition and the BCP started a series of roundtable negotiations at the beginning of 1990 which resulted with three agreements signed on 12 March. The agreements: guaranteed election of a new Grand National Assembly (GNA) with a limited tenure of 18 months, both to act as a regular parliament and to prepare the new constitution; agreed the dates for the national elections – on 10 and 17 June 1990; foresaw that Petar Mladenov would be the President of Bulgaria until the completion of the GNAs tenure (Bell 1997, p. 364). Lastly, due to the violent events in neighboring Romania, all political parties and organizations reached a consensus that the only arena of contention will be the newly agreed GNA, while extra-institutional means will be put on hold "until the end of the transition on May 15th 1990, when the new constitution was elaborated and the round table talks ended." (Rossi 2012, pp. 8-9)

The first democratic elections in Bulgaria after the communist regime were deemed fair and transparent, both by the democratic opposition and the international observers (Ibid, p. 9)[89].

[88] Zhivkov resigned on 10 November 1989

[89] The elections were held following a combined electoral model. Out of the 400 seats in the GNA, 200 were filled following majoritarian representation, while the remaining 200 were distributed through proportional representation. With a turnout of more than 90% of the registered voters, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP; on 3 April 1990 the Bulgarian Communist Party changed its name to Bulgarian Socialist Party)emerged as a winner gaining an absolute majority of 211 seats. The democratic opposition – the UDF – won 144 seats. Five other political parties and two independent candidates acquired the remaining 45 seats. The BSP led by Alexander Lilov gained its primary support mainly form rural areas, while the UDF headed by ZhelyuZhelev had Sofia as its stronghold (Inter-Parliamentary

The elections promoted the socialists as winners, but did not provide them with comfortable majority which provoked the need for continuous compromise with UDF (Ibid). The new government was formed by Andrei Lukanov in February 1990, while in April the same year Petar Mladenov was appointed President by the GNA, with the consent of the participants from the round table negotiations (Zankina 2010, p. 109). Just several months after the appointment, president Mladenov was forced to resign following a political scandal[90]. The new political crisis foresaw a fresh series of protests, and a political stalemate emerging from the inability of the GNA to elect a new president, lacking a two-thirds majority. Lastly, the GNA reached a compromise and elected Zhelyu Zhelev as new president of the country. Although surrounded by a dominantly socialist parliament and a socialist government and holding a ceremonial position within the political system, the election of Zhelev "marked the official end of the communist period in Bulgarian history" (Zankina 2010, p. 110). The country still needed a new and democratic constitution in order to set the legal basis for further democratization.

Following a new wave of contention, resignation by PM Lukanov and the creation of a new reformist government led by a politically independent municipal judge Dimitar Popov, the GNA was finally prepared to start the debate and draft the new constitution. Eventually, the hurdles towards the final goal were numerous: a group of UDF MPs insisted that a BSP-led GNA could not be trusted and 39 of them began a hunger strike in June. An additional delay occurred when the GNA decided that a referendum on the nature of the Bulgarian state should be held, in order for the people to decide on the potential restoration of the monarchy. After wasting nearly two weeks the GNA cancelled the referendum (Crampton 2005 p. 218). Lastly, the new Constitution was adopted on 12 July 1991 with 309 votes from a total of 400. A significant part of UDF (80 MPs), backed by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) refused to back the adoption of the Constitution, noting that it contained "too many loopholes". (Zankina 2010, p. 111). Apart from the controversies and the noticeable shortcomings, the Constitution was considered democratic. Founded on the principles of citizenship, national unity, minority rights; republicanism and separation of powers (Bell 1997, pp. 372-4), Bulgaria was defined as a

---

Union 1990), see the full report of the elections by the Inter-Parliamentary Union at: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2045_90.htm

[90] During a student hunger strike in Sofia, he was caught on videotape discussing with the defense minister and noting that "the best thing is to let the tanks come". The videotape was later leaked to the opposition which publicized the statement. After a series of political bickering, Mladenov resigned in July 1990 stating that "he did not wish to be a cause of tension" (Bell 1997, pp. 370-71).

democratic state based on rule of law with a head of state (President) elected in direct elections with tenure of five years. The legislature named *Sъbranie* consisted of 240 members elected by proportional representation with a threshold of 4%. A Constitutional Court was also established (Crampton 2005 p. 218). The signing of the constitution completed the transition to democracy and paved the way forward for the ex-communist state.

Looking at the contentious years preceding the formal democratization of Bulgarian society, and adding the fact that Bulgaria is an EU member state, one could expect a much higher level of democratization in comparison to the Macedonia and B&H. Still, as following sections will show, Bulgaria faces similar, in some aspects and from some perspectives even worse problems than the two previous countries under investigation. Recidivisms from the communist regime provisionally dressed in democratic dresses, oligarchy, occupied media and political polarization amplified with mass corruption and abuse of power created mass dissatisfaction which erupted during the winter of early 2013, announcing the most contentious year in recent Bulgarian history. The unification of several previously active movements triggered by the high electricity and gas bills, spilled citizens' anger on the Bulgarian streets. It was the accumulation of resources, primarily in terms of numbers on the streets that provided serious impetus for policy change that would alleviate some of the citizens' grievances. On the other hand, the lack of compromise by various movements strands, personal ambitions and lack of potential for political coalitions resulted with governmental challengers losing momentum to seize on the openings of political opportunities which had risen, and failed to effectuate on the favorable policy outcomes.

4.4.2. Abuse of power

Something that vastly distinguishes Bulgaria from Macedonia and B&H is the membership in the EU. Joining the European family in 2007, Bulgaria grasped on the benefits from the accession such as security, economic growth and mobility. Still, from 2007 onwards, the democratization of Bulgarian society has either stagnated or decayed. Turning towards the Freedom House report from 2013, which largely depicts the condition of democracy in Bulgaria before the first wave of protests, it can be stated that Bulgarian society struggled and in general

continuously struggles with the fight against corruption and organized crime (European Commission 2012)[91], as well as with the deteriorated media freedoms (Freedom House 2013)[92].

A highly politicized feud between the Supreme Judicial Council (VSS), the Ministry of Interior and the Bulgarian Judges Association (BJA) resulted in the dismissal of Miroslava Todorova, chair of the BJA. Todorova's ousting was preceded by continuous attacks by the Minister of Interior, as well as a libel case initiated from Todorova against minister Tsvetanov. The act by the VSS has been widely considered as "a political revenge meant to undermine the independence of the judiciary" (Ibid). Following the dismissal, many Bulgarian judges backed their colleague and protested in Sofia, asking for resignation of the VSS and highlighting numerous examples in which the highest judicial body has been biased (Sofia Globe 2012)[93].In the wake of these events, both PM Borisov and president Plevneliev also strongly criticized the decision (Novinite 2012)[94]. The actions of the politicians in power had proven that an impartial judiciary based primarily on integrity was still far from reality in Bulgaria. The stark problems with the judiciary were once again visible couple of months later, during the election of the new composition of the VSS. A group of Bulgarian NGOs monitored the process and suggested numerous highly qualified names, trying to substitute the acute absence of the Cooperation Verification Mechanism (CVM) imposed by the European Commission (EC). In the end, the entire selection process was deemed politicized and very long-lasting, amounting to strong influence by parliament (Mediapool 2012)[95]. Lastly, a series of controversial appointments and attempts for appointments were noticed in the judiciary: The Bulgarian parliament first nominated and later appointed the Deputy Chair of the Supreme Administrative Court – Veneta Markovska, amid reactions from a EC representative stating that "there were serious allegations of trading influence and corruption on the part of one of the candidates", referring to this particular appointment (Novinite 2012)[96]. In the end, the appointment was blocked by Bulgarian president Plevneliev who left the ceremony where the new appointees were being sworn in. The

[91] See the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation Verification Mechanism issued in 2012 at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2012/EN/1-2012-411-EN-F1-1.Pdf
[92] See the Nations in Transit report at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/bulgaria
[93] See the news article at: http://sofiaglobe.com/2012/07/13/sofia-judges-plan-rally-in-support-of-sacked-judges-union-chief/
[94] See the news article at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=141230
[95] See the news article (in Bulgarian) at: http://www.mediapool.bg/grazhdanski-organizatsii-poemat-kontrola-nad-sadebnata-reforma-news195496.html
[96] See the news article at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=144657

president addressed the new members of the Constitutional Court, but left when Markovska was about to take the oath, blocking her appointment due to legal prerequisites stating that the oath must be given in the presence of the Head of State (Novinite 2012)[97]. The next attempt to appoint a judge to the Constitutional Court was also unsuccessful because the candidate – Deputy Head of Bulgaria's Special Anti-mafia Prosecutor's Office of Appeals –, was faced, once again withn allegations that close relatives were involved in money laundering and suspicious ownerships of land and shares in companies (Novinite 2012 and Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives 2012)[98]. The debased relationship between judiciary and politics was again unveiled during the election of the Chief Prosecutor. The BJA announced that the appointment was unconstitutional and that the chairmen of the VSS who was also the Minister of Justice, violated the procedure (Novinite 2012)[99]. Despite the public criticism, president Plevneliev did not act like in the previously described case and signed the decree for the appointment of Sotir Tsatsarov as Chief Prosecutor (Freedom House 2013). All noted cases prove that Bulgarian judiciary is very far from the European standards it needs to reflect.

This intertwining of politics and judiciary resulting with serious abuse of power and distortion of checks and balances produced a high level of legal uncertainty, something which was repeatedly mentioned by Bulgarian interviewees, especially in context of the high electricity and gas bills. Many activists claimed that the bills were issued without valid legal grounds, that many of the contracts concluded with the heating companies were supposed to be annulled, as well as that the energy and water regulation company (KEVR) acted more as a political rather than a regulatory body. This abuse of power depicted through legal uncertainty was one of the main drivers of protest during the 2013 winter protests. Although favorable policy concessions were made towards the movement activists in the first phase, it was exactly this legal uncertainty and political meddling which reverted these decisions following the demobilization phase.

4.4.3. Deteriorated media freedoms

One of the continuous weak points regarding the process of democratization in Bulgaria is the media freedoms in the country. In a rapid decline since 2007, Bulgaria's media

[97] See the news article at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=145138
[98] See the news articles at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=145840 and http://www.bili-bg.org/3/154/news_item.html
[99] See the news articles at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=146427 and http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=146381

environment showed no signs of improvement. In 2012 and 2013, Bulgaria was ranked 87th out of 177 countries, just one year before (2011) being ranked 70th out of 172 states (Reporters without Boarders 2013)[100]. During the period before the protests, the biggest media problems were linked to "power games" between the largest media groupings in the country (Freedom House 2013). In 2012 media outlets began to reflect on what was referred to as the "media wars". The main contenders in the "fight for media turf" were the New Bulgarian Media Group (NBMG) led by Irena Krasteva and the owners of *24 Chassa* and *Trud* – Lyubomir Pavlov and Ognyan Donev, who entered the media business in 2010 acquiring the two mass-circulation dailies (Ibid 2013). In the game created by the triad media-money-politics, Krasteva, utilizing part of her media outlets such as *Telegraf*, *Monitor*, *Politika*, *Meridian, Match* and television station *TV7*, launched an attack on Pavlov and Donev, accusing them for money laundering and forging of documents (The Sofia Globe 2012)[101]. During the showdown, NBMG had the support of Krasteva's son Delyan Peevski[102], an MP from the Movement of Rights and Freedoms (MRF), as well as Tsvetan Vasilev, a powerful banker and majority owner of Corporate Commercial Bank. Some important facts that should be stressed are Pavlov's banking and center-right political background, which gives another dimension to the "media war" (Ibid). On the other hand, Donev is also an influential businessman, at that time heading the Confederation of Employers and Industrialists. Both of them were charged with money laundering and forging documents in June 2012 (Europost 2012)[103]. In the meantime, the media controlled by Pavlov and Donev published articles accusing Peevski of suspicious business deals with the government (Freedom House 2013). Media attacks by the Pavlov-Donev camp also pointed their arrows towards Vasilev and his bank (The Sofia Globe 2012). Another media group – Economedia – also had its differences with the NBMG that ended with the company having serious financial trouble by the end of 2012, considered to have a political background. Furthermore, Pavlov and Donev also sold their newspapers to owners whose identity was not known, raising concerns and suspicion of political and financial pressure resulting with media concentration in favor of

[100] See the index at: https://rsf.org/en/bulgaria
[101] See the news article at: http://sofiaglobe.com/2012/06/28/bulgarias-media-wars-1-when-the-ink-smears/
[102] It is important to note that DelyanPeevski's appointment as head of Bulgaria's secret service ДАНС was the cause for the second wave of protests in Bulgaria in June 2013 named #ДАНСwithMe, which later transformed into anti-governmental protests against the government of PlamenOresharski.
[103] See the news article at: http://www.europost.bg/article?id=4860

Krasteva, Peevski and the current government (Freedom House 2013)[104]. The media turmoil turned on the alarm in the EC, resulting in a visit to Bulgaria by then-Commissioner on Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, during which she met with various relevant stakeholders, from state representatives to journalists. She condemned the obvious examples of violence against journalists, stressed the abuse and non-enforcement of media related laws and highlighted the meeting with PM Borisov to whom she pointed out, and they both agreed upon, the lack of transparency regarding ownership and financing of media in Bulgaria (EC 2012)[105]. Another serious problem which prevented Bulgarian media from performing their primary role – safeguard the public interest – was the effects of the economic and financial crisis in Bulgaria, which made private media more dependent on government advertising. This raised the level of self-censorship and decreased the criticism towards the government during 2012 (Freedom House 2013). Lastly, similar to Macedonia and B&H, journalists were attacked and threatened throughout the year before the protest events. Investigative journalist Lidia Pavlova's car was set on fire near Dupnitsa, while previously her son had been beaten badly several times. Additionally, she had continuously been receiving threats and her windshields had been broken several times (The Guardian 2012)[106]. It is believed that the safety risks for her and her family arose from her investigative reporting on convicted criminals, the Galevi brothers, and their accomplices (Balkan Insight 2012)[107]. Another journalist who had been investigating a construction project in Varna and his wife also received threats indicating that he should stop investigating (South East European Network for Professionalization of Media 2012)[108]. The impunity of criminal action against journalists, once again acts as a litmus test proving that conditions for free and independent media in Bulgaria did not exist.

These numerous examples show that media freedoms and professional journalism in Bulgaria are continuously under serious threat. It is fair to say that the deteriorated media freedoms are perhaps the worst of the three cases under study, also taking into consideration that

[104] See the Freedom of the Press report for 2013 on Bulgaria at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/bulgaria

[105] See the press release from Kroes' address at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-628_en.htm ;one month after the visit to Bulgaria, Kroes sent a letter to Borisov stating that she is impatient to hear about the measures which the Bulgarian government and Borisov are intending to take (Novinite 2012) http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=144676

[106] See the news article at: https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2012/may/30/journalist-safety-bulgaria

[107] See the news article at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/investigative-journalist-lidia-pavlova-threatened

[108] See the news article at: http://seenpm.org/journalist-in-bulgaria-receives-threats-after-investigating-construction-project/

Bulgaria is an EU member. Considering this media setting, it is not a great surprise that the winter protest activists could not find a suitable partner among mainstream media. This seriously prevented activists from having a broader outreach among bystanders, and conveying their messages further in order to mobilize more people and activate more resources. Furthermore, having a stable media ally could have improved the activists' chances of acquiring more favorable policy outcomes which would have alleviated their grievances in a long-term manner.

4.4.4. Widespread corruption

In spite of the fact that Bulgarian officials were continuously and publicly declaring war on corruption and organized crime publicly, the country entered 2013 accompanied by numerous critics and still under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism imposed by the EC (EC 2014)[109]. Some estimates by international and national monitoring institutions state that almost one third of the Bulgarian economy was untaxed and informal (Freedom House 2013). A special Euro barometer based on fieldwork conducted in 2011 and publicized in 2012 shows that Bulgarian society was doing among the worst in the EU. 75% of the citizens stated that they were most likely to believe that corruption in Bulgaria is more widespread compared to other EU countries (Euro barometer and EC 2012, p. 24)[110]. Bulgarian citizens were leading the polls of EU countries regarding the likelihood of corruption in the customs and the judicial services. 77% believed in a corrupt customs office, while 76% thought the judicial services were corrupt (Ibid, p. 43) – a perception fully convergent with the previously described judicial system. Furthermore, Bulgaria showed the greatest increase in reported bribery experience (Ibid, p. 61). After Slovenia, Bulgaria was the second country in the EU whose citizens thought that corruption was the result of absence of sanctions, but were the first in the Union to believe that the EU had an important role in tackling corruption (Ibid, p. 84). Local watchdogs, such as the Center for Study of Democracy (CSD), which traditionally follow corruption perception, have noted either stagnation or decay. The policy brief which addresses the period which is under investigation (2012-2013) shows a high level of administrative corruption with 14% of the citizens being involved in corruption activities at least once per year. Additionally, corruption in

[109] See the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation Verification Mechanism issued in 2014 at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-36-EN-F1-1.Pdf

[110] See the report "Corruption" at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_374_en.pdf

providing services to the business sector has been continuously growing since 2008 (CSD 2013, pp. 4-6). Furthermore, the document notes that the confidence in state institutions in general, as well as bodies focusing on anti-corruption is very low, with citizens and businessmen having the impression that the corruption in Bulgaria is increasing (Ibid, p. 7). Lastly, the brief concludes with the repetitive conclusions about ineffectiveness and bias of the three branches of power (Ibid, pp. 8-10). Discouraging feedback has also arrived from the global anti-corruption coalition TI. Both in 2012[111] and 2013[112] Transparency International ranked Bulgaria as the second most corrupt country in the EU, just after Greece. A big corruption scandal involving PM Borisov and former President Prvanov was once again reopened during 2012, when a former MP sent a letter to the General Prosecutor asking for a probe on the two high officials regarding the case of the late businessmen Mihail Mihov dubbed "Misho the Beer" (Novinite 2012)[113]. Apart from the PM and the President, several other high government officials had been mentioned in the leaked wiretaps, but the scandal was voiced down without any institutional response. The highlighted indicators and examples once again show that Bulgarian society is way below the European standards for institutional prevention of high level corruption and organized crime.

Looking at the state of high-level widespread political corruption in Bulgaria, it is evident that Bulgaria, very similar to the previously two described cases, fosters political parties and politicians which are highly involved in corruption scandals. Consequently, corruption in the energy sector was one of the main drivers of protest during the 2013 winter protests. Furthermore, the marriage between political parties and private international energy companies was the core of the problem addressed by the movement activists. Still, the political parties in power later exerted pressure over the KEVR in order to lower electricity prices cosmetically, which was only a small short-term policy gain for the activists. Lastly, the limited opportunities of the movement to find a reliable and strong partner in the political party arena apart from the Green Party, seriously limited their political opportunities to secure long-term alleviation of their economic grievances.

[111] See the report at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results
[112] See the report at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results
[113] See the news article at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=141201; The scandal is related to a leaked telephone conversation between PM Borisov and the head of the Customs Agency in which the latter was instructed to stop investigating the Ledenika brewery run by Mihov. Borisov admitted in July 2012 during an interview that he had "made a mistake" (Freedom House 2013) and further explained that the call was "ordered" from President Prvanov (Novinite 2013), See the news article at: http://www.novinite.com/articles/152680/Ledenika+Brewery+in+Northwestern+Bulgaria+Bought+by+Grisha+Ganchev

4.4.5. The privatization process and unemployment rates

The privatization of companies in Bulgaria followed a restitution model, restoring the ownership rights to small urban properties (Prohaska 1996, p. 1). By the end of 1995 more than 24.000 entities had been privatized (Ibid, p. 1). Still, a lot of other entities were privatized later in the second and third phase of the privatization process. Although conducted much better in comparison to Macedonia and B&H, the privatization process in Bulgaria still had shortcomings connected to the legality of the processes. In a report produced by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada which looks at privatization of the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company, the Executive Director of the Civil Society Development Program in Bulgaria stated that many allegations and suspicions regarding corruption in privatization transactions exist, but that they are very difficult to be proven (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999)[114]. He also highlighted that "different economic groups are having a lot of interests around the privatization deals and for some of the groups there are allegations of relations with the organized crime groups" (Ibid). Although the Bulgarian economy vastly profited from the Euro-Atlantic integration processes, the downward economic trends prior to the protest events proved Bulgaria to be a fragile economy. The IMF noted that while in 2009 the unemployment rate had been below 7% which is a satisfying economic result, by 2013 it had almost doubled reaching slightly more than 13%[115]. In particular, compared to the EU average, Bulgaria had serious problems in terms of long-term unemployment. A factsheet published by the EC in 2014 shows that between 2005 and 2014, the long-term unemployment had risen by almost 1% reaching 6.9% which is 1.8% higher than the average EU rate. Furthermore, the very long-term unemployment rate reached 4.4%, 1.3% above EU average (EC 2014)[116]. The rising unemployment rates had been amplified by the problem of youth unemployment. In 2012 youth unemployment in Bulgaria had increased for the fourth consecutive year exceeding 30% (Dimitrov 2012, p. 3)[117]. Poverty in Bulgaria is a very striking issue, similarly to Macedonia and B&H. Due to the unavailability of data from the UNDP HDR report used for Macedonia and B&H, this research turned towards data released by Eurostat and the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI). The Eurostat

[114] See the report at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac52b3.html
[115] See the figures at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=40&pr.y=13&sy=2009&ey=2013&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=918&s=LUR&grp=0&a=
[116] See the factsheet at: ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14469&langId=en
[117] See the policy paper at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/09470.pdf

news release referring to numbers between 2008 and 2013 shows that in 2013 Bulgaria was the infamous leader in the EU regarding population at risk of poverty or social exclusion, with almost half of its population (3.490.000, or 48%) belonging to this category (Eurostat 2014, p. 2)[118]. Bulgaria was also topping the EU countries in regard to the share of the population which was severely materially deprived. In 2013 this figure rose to 43% (Ibid). Lastly, the NSI provides exact figures on the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, the number of persons who were below the poverty line and the at-risk-of-poverty percentage of population before social transfers. The data referring to 2012 shows that 1.559.000 Bulgarians, which equals to 21.4% of the population, lived below the at-risk-of-poverty line which was set at 279.7 BGN monthly per person, while the at-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers amounted to 41.8% of the population (NSI 2014)[119]. The presented figures indicate that Bulgarian citizens lived in an economic environment seriously below European standards just shortly before the protest events began.

Although in statistical terms Bulgarian citizens seem to have been doing economically quite better in comparison to their Macedonian and BH counterparts, still, reality speaks a very different story. Very similar to the case of the BH protests, long-term multidimensional poverty and socio-economic deprivation were the main reasons for the first wave of protest in Bulgaria during 2013. The high electricity and gas bills for January 2013 were just the last drop which spilled the glass full of anger and despair. Amplified by the high level political corruption, the abuse of power and the endangered media freedoms, multiple movements united in order to voice their grievances, building on the grave economic situation as a common denominator. It was this accumulation of multiple resources in terms of human capital which resulted with massive demonstrations in the Bulgarian streets for two months during. These large rallies and demonstrations also exerted strong pressure over the government in order to intervene through the energy regulator and decrease the energy and gas prices at least for several percent and for a short time. In this manner tangible policy outputs were secured. Still, due to a plethora of factors explained in the following chapters, long term policy outcomes alleviating citizens' grievances could not be secured. Capitalism and political party interests ultimately won over the improvement of the Bulgarian welfare state.

[118] See the news release at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6035076/3-04112014-BP-EN.pdf/62f94e70-e43a-471f-a466-2e84d1029860

[119] See the Poverty and Social Inclusion Indicators in 2013 at: http://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/pressreleases/SILC2013_en_AW1WN7M.pdf

4.5. *Conclusion*

The geographic and political region of South Eastern Europe to which the three countries under study belong has presented peculiar processes of democratization, mainly resulting in what Schmitter and Karl refer to as "what democracy is not" or a situation that in Zakarian terms leans more towards "illiberal" rather than "liberal" democracies. The abuse of power through arbitrary decision-making by high political figures, deteriorated media freedoms, widespread corruption and the consequences from the unjust privatization of state-owned companies further strengthens the impression that safeguards of democracy, "checks and balances", and a reasonable level of political culture are substantially neglected in many countries from the region, including the three that are under study. Quoting the Bulgarian thinker Ivan Krastev, "the region's profile is bleak – a mixture of weak states with stagnating economies and troubled democracies" (Krastev 2016, pp. 295).

Glancing back at the theoretical framework and the first hypothesis presented in Chapter 1, the goal of this chapter was to underpin that the transformation of the elites in the three countries ended up only with formal democratization of the three societies. The incomplete democratization presented through four groups of socio-economic indicators: abuse of power, deteriorated media freedoms, high-level corruption and unfair and unjust privatization, set the stage as scope conditions for the three movements under study in this work. Speaking of the historical background, the "point of departure" of the three countries, one could argue that it was an important factor for mobilization in Macedonia and B&H, while a moderate factor in the Bulgarian case. Furthermore, the abuse of power was a very important driver/factor for citizen's mobilization in the three presented cases, mainly due to the constant malaise behavior of political elites presented throughout the sections in the chapter. The deteriorated media freedoms were a very important mobilization factor in Bulgaria, mainly due to the galloping "media wars", while they were a moderate factor for mobilization in Macedonia and B&H. The widespread corruption was also a very important factor for mobilization in the three cases under investigation. Lastly, the privatization process of state-owned companies accompanied by high unemployment rates and poverty were very important mobilization factors in B&H and Bulgaria, while they were a moderate driver of protest in Macedonia (Table 4.1.)

The Freedom House "Nations in Transit 2016" report (Freedom House 2016)[120], considers Bulgaria to be a "Semi-Consolidated Democracy" with a democracy score of 3.25 , while Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are classified as "Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime" with democracy scores of 4.29 and 4.50 respectively. Additionally, Macedonia witnessed the largest score decline in the report, seeing scores drop in six out of the seven different categories that the report measures. The three countries are doing considerably worse compared to the regional averages, Bulgaria being compared to the region of Central and Eastern Europe, while Macedonia and B&H measured within the Balkans. The key findings of the report which are allocated for the Balkans, stress the unfortunate conclusion that "after substantial progress from 2004 to 2010, the Balkans sub region has now declined six years in a row, and its average Democracy Score is the same as it was in 2004". In the case of Bulgaria the same trend can be noticed – a continuous decline since 2007, with the exception of 2016 when the Democracy Score insignificantly improved, equating with the one from 2014. These figures are very telling regarding the state of democratization in the three countries.

Although never rosy and over-optimistic, the fledging Macedonian society did not always struggle on its unfulfilled path towards a consolidated democracy. Compared to 2015, the early years of independent Macedonia were quite promising, taking into consideration the complex political and security context of the region. The abuse of power by the governing regime, the crackdown on independent and critical media, the very high level of corruption and the long-lasting effects of the criminal privatization of state companies resulting with high unemployment figures, pushed Macedonian democracy into an abyss.

The limited democratization expectations of the reconciling post-war BH society lasted up until the unification of ethnocracy and kleptocracy, which sidelined the citizens of the remodeled state. The *divide et impera* approach of the ethnic leaders, the below-average Balkan standards of media freedoms, the daily reoccurrences of corruption, bribery and nepotism in every pore of society, combined with the extended privatization of state owned companies protracting deeply into the 21st century, provided sufficient enough reasons for the citizens of B&H to raise their voice against the political and economic devastation of their country.

[120] This particular report was taken into consideration because it was the first issued "Nations in Transit" report following the demobilization of the last movement under investigation – the "Citizens for Macedonia" in July 2015

Lastly, Bulgaria presents a vivid example how the accession to the EU does not provide automatic guarantees for democratic standards. The abuse of power presented primarily through the actions of the judicial institutions, the impunity of excessive pressure and crimes committed over journalists, the subpar prevention of corruption and organized crime, as well as the worrying trends of unemployment rates marked 2013 as the most contentious year in Bulgaria's recent history.

In spite of the peculiarities of the three countries, they all share prevailingly negative values for the analyzed indicators. Revisiting the definition by Meighan, the Macedonian, BH and Bulgarian societies can be classified more as "shallow", rather than "deep" democracies, triggering anti-governmental protests in the three countries.

Taking into consideration the previously described theoretical framework and the driving hypotheses, certain arguments deserve to be reaffirmed in order to clarify the shallow democracy as a set of scope conditions in which the three movements under examination operated. The aforementioned indicators described in this chapter had been in place for decades. In a similar vein, social movements have also been always present, in various forms and shapes. Even when there was no democratic and economic transitions as recently in in the region during the late 80s and early 90s of the previous century, mobilizations occured due to a plethora of reasons. As it is presented in the remainder of the text, it is not always the development of capitalism, nor the process of nation-building which causes dramatic citizens' pressure from below in South East Europe. In the three cases that we explore, there is a certain specific context, coupled with the multiple democratic and economic grievances that influenced the political opportunities, which further influenced the specific policy outcomes. One cannot single out particular events or critical junctures resulting in the influx of citizens in the streets. We are speaking more of scope conditions which define the specific charachteristics of the political opportunities in the three particular cases. This is what ultimately carved the trajectories of the three movements.

Moving back to Linz and Stepan (1996), they argue that the wave of transition of 1989 is very particular, mainly because it is not just a transition to democracy, as it is the cases of Spain and Portugal for example, but also an economic transition from socialism to capitalism, coupled with the process of state-building, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of former Yugoslavia (pp. 235-254). These peculiarities were taken into consideration when choosing the previously described indicators, but also the factors that influenced the policy

outcomes in the three cases. This work now proceeds with the presentation of the explanandum, i.e. the policy outputs and the policy outcomes in Bulgaria, B&H and Macedonia.

Table 4. 1 Importance of mobilization factors/drivers, Level of democratization, Intensity of citizens' mobilization, Policy outputs and policy outcomes in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H

	Macedonia	**Bulgaria**	**B&H**
Historical development	Important factor for mobilization	Moderate factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization
Abuse of power	Important factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization
Deteriorated media freedoms	Moderate factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization	Moderate factor for mobilization
Widespread corruption	Important factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization
Privatization process and unemployment rate	Moderate factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization	Important factor for mobilization
Level of societal democratization	Formally democratized but shallow	Formally democratized but shallow	Formally democratized but shallow
Intensity of citizens' mobilization	High/Massive	High/Massive	High/Massive
Policy outputs	Presence	Limited presence	Absence
Policy outcomes	Presence	Absence	Absence

Source: Own calculation

Chapter 5 : Movements' Policy Outputs and Outcomes in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H

5.1. *Introduction*

This chapter aims at illustrating, on the basis of various primary and secondary sources, what has actually been the impact of SMOs in the three countries under study, in particular which factors, among those considered important by social movement literature in terms of movement impact/influence, can be accounted in these three cases in terms of success, or lack of success of civil society groups. In particular, this chapter differentiates between policy outputs and policy outcomes of social movements in the policy process and compares similarities and differences for what concerns both, across the three cases, emphasizing which have been, in each case, the specific factors and mechanisms that have triggered them. As it is shown below, the three cases paint three different pictures in terms of policy outputs and policy outcomes. The Macedonian case presents an example of a successful civil society mobilization – presence of policy outputs and presence of policy outcomes; the Bulgarian case represents a somewhat moderate example of success – limited presence of policy outputs and absence of policy outcomes; lastly, the case of the BH mobilization lays an example for lack of success both in terms of policy outputs and outcomes.

More specifically, in terms of the influence of social movements in Macedonia, the focus will be on the adoption of the Law on the Special Prosecution Office (SPO) in Macedonia, which will be explored as case study, since the establishing of this extrajudicial institution can be considered as the commencement of the re-establishing of rule of law and protection of human rights in the country after several years of political turmoil. Undoubtedly, civil society in Macedonia played a considerable role in the entire process. Furthermore, the chapter continues exploring the numerous movement outcomes which stemmed from the Citizens for Macedonia movement, as well as, the final phase of what can be interpreted as a "successful" civil society influence on the policy process, resulting with *change in government after one and a half years*. Special attention will be given to the key factors and mechanisms which led to these results. In section four, we will move on investigating Bulgaria, and show the main actors and mechanisms which led to the adoption of the decision by the KEVR which decreased, at least on the short run, the prices of electricity in the country. This section will reflect on the influence of the winter protests in Bulgaria on the policy process which occurred in the Energy and Water Regulation

Commission. The subsequent section investigates the main reasons behind the inability of the Bulgarian challengers to profit on the adopted policy output and to further materialize it in substantial policy outcomes. Furthermore, the same section also reflects on some of the gains acquired by the social movement actors. Section six will be devoted to the BH case, that shows the weakest case in terms of policy outputs, with very limited influence of movements' mobilization (although long and intense) on both state and the federal levels. The main reasons and critical junctures of this failure will be illustrated. Beyond the "unsuccessful" movements' outcomes in the country, however, some societal gains which arose from this intensive mobilization can be discovered.

In the conclusion of the chapter, similarities and differences across the three cases in terms of *i. Main actors, ii. Mechanisms and iii. Processes* which influenced the three different movements' outcomes will be demonstrated.

5.2. *Macedonia: The Creation of the Special Prosecution Office and Civil Society Mobilization*

The demands for justice coming from the CfM movement resonated in the ears of the negotiators, but also in the heads of policymakers in parliament. Departing solely from the facts, this section turns firstly to the political agreement aimed at resolution of the year and a half long political crisis, the so called "Przhino Agreement". This document is of utmost importance, mainly because all adopted laws that followed, including the Law on the SPO, derived directly from its text and further amendments.

Following the series of aired wiretapped conversations by the opposition during early February 2015, referred to as the "political bombs", which incriminated former Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski and a plethora of his closest party and state aides[121], the four main political parties VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI and DPA started a series of press conferences, accusations, and legal actions implicating their most visible political leaders and representatives. Although formally a part from the CfM movement officially launched on 17 May with the grand rally in front of the Macedonian government (Stefanovski 2016), SDSM, in parallel, took part in the political negotiations fostered by the USA and the EU (European Commission 2015)[122]. The

[121] All the press conferences, wiretapped conversations and transcripts were publicly presented within a project called "The Truth about Macedonia". See all materials at http://arhiva.sdsm.org.mk/default.aspx?mId=55&agId=5&articleId=11786

[122] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/node/270659_de

first round of the political negotiations was finalized on 2 June 2015, when the parties agreed, at least formally, to the following: commitment to the Euro-Atlantic processes and democratic principles; overcoming the political crisis; respect for the principle of political accountability; consolidation of the economic and democratic development, strengthening of the inter-ethnic relations, implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), strengthening of good neighborly relationships; and establishing a "transitional period" which was supposed to be circled with early free and fair elections fully compliant with European standards by the end of April 2016 (Ibid)[123].The transition period foresaw a grand coalition government; creation of a parliamentary committee for inquiry of the wiretapped conversations; immediate oversight of the functioning of the state intelligence services (UBK); handing of the sensitive material from the wiretapped conversations from the SDSM to the public prosecutor; substantial political party negotiations regarding structural reforms encompassed by chapters 23 and 24 from the European *acquis*; implementation of future recommendations issued by the European Commission (EC) in the context of bringing forward the High Level Accession Dialogue (HLAD); and a new composition of the State Election Commission (SEC) with extended competencies (Ibid). In this phase one still cannot clearly envisage the creation of the SPO, since the international community still had faith in the regularly established state prosecution office. The members of the CfM movement platform at that time didn't even consider demobilization and removal of the shantytown encampment in front of the government, mainly because previous experiences had taught them that they cannot have full faith in the political parties. Not even in the one that to a certain extent represented their interests in the negotiations – the SDSM (Int. 3, MKD). In the meantime, a group of senior rule of law experts led by retired European Commission Director Reinhard Priebe, previously contracted by the EU to scan and report on the key rule of law issues in Macedonia primarily taking into consideration the findings deriving from the released wiretapped conversations, released its Recommendations, highlighting numerous systemic pitfalls, but also presenting concrete proposals for rule of law enhancement in the following areas: interception of communications; judiciary and prosecution services; external oversight by independent bodies; elections; and the media (European Commission 2015)[124]. This was seen as

[123]Przhino Agreement from 2 June 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/news_corner/news/news-files/20150619_agreement.pdf

[124] The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Recommendations of the Senior Experts' Group on systemic Rule of Law issues relating to the communications interception reveled in Spring 2015

many relevant stakeholders as further pressure exerted by the EU over the Macedonian political leadership. In light of the Recommendations released by the Priebe-led group, the EC also released a document underlining the urgent reform priorities for the country related to: Rule of law and Judiciary; De-politicization of Public Administration; Electoral Reform; Implementation of the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry into the events of 24 December 2012 (the so called "Black Monday"); and Media: freedom of expression (Ibid)[125]. What can be easily noticed is that the international community continuously highlighted the importance for rapid enhancement of rule of law. The political negotiations continued with an Annex to the Agreement signed on 19 June 2015 envisaging urgent negotiations regarding the exact composition of the government responsible for the forthcoming elections (Ibid)[126]. Lastly, after almost two months of extensive negotiations, the party leaders reached a final political agreement on 15 July 2015. The most important agreement provision directly connected to this work is the one noting that "by 15 September 2015, there shall be a new, Special Prosecutor with full autonomy to lead the investigations surrounding and arising from the interception of communications. This Special Prosecutor shall be appointed by agreement of the undersigned parties" (Ibid)[127].

The unpacking of the policy process required collecting insights from SMO representatives, policy makers and key informants in order to further shed light on the mechanisms which contributed to the adoption of the Law on the SPO. Dissonancy can be noticed between the SMO representatives regarding the extent of incidence and impact (Burstein, P. & Sausner, S. 2005) of the movement activists over this particular legal act. One of the SMO representatives who was among the strongest liaisons between the non-party and party challengers, reflected on the limitations within the scope of the parliamentary procedure:

"…*There was very little influence* [over the adoption of the Law, I.S.]*…But this should not surprise us, taking into consideration that the decisions regarding what will be included in the laws were brought in Przhino. Every discussion saying that the SMOs could influence the texts of*

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/news_corner/news/news-files/20150619_recommendations_of_the_senior_experts_group.pdf

[125] Urgent Reform Priorities for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (June 2015) https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/news_corner/news/news-files/20150619_urgent_reform_priorities.pdf

[126] Annex to the Przhino Agreement from 19 June 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/news_corner/news/news-files/20150619_annex_to_the_agreement.pdf

[127] Protocol to the Agreement of 2 June 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en

the laws is pointless. The adoption of laws is a technical issue which enshrines the will coming out of political negotiations between crucial political actors. Whether we like it or not, the largest four political parties in Macedonia represent the vast majority of Macedonian citizens. CfM did not have any channel of communication with these actors, apart from the communication with the SDSM…" (Int. 3, MKD)

The interviewee stressed the pivotal *role of the political parties*, but also recognized their legitimacy deriving from the citizens. This testimony is very much in line with what Burstein and Linton discover regarding the difference in impact of political parties on policy in comparison to SMOs and interest groups (Burstein, P. & Linton, A. 2002), the one of the political parties being incomparably greater. Another point which should also be stressed is the "two-faced, *Janus-ian*" role of the SDSM, which to a certain extent triggers both the mechanisms of boundary activation (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, p. 36) and identity shift (Ibid, p. 37). SDSM is an established political party since the beginning of Macedonian political pluralism, one of the pillars of the CfM movement, but also one of the key negotiating parties during the Przhino negotiations. These issues are thoroughly elaborated in Chapter 8. The very limited and indirect influence which the governmental challengers had over the adopted Law on the SPO can be to a certain extent explained by the role of broker which the SDSM played during the process. The same interviewee insisted that although the party had been a constitutive part of the CfM platform, it did not formally represent the movement, but only its party base and voters: "*We influenced the standpoints of SDSM, but they did not represent us. They did not negotiate on our behalf.*" (Int. 3, MKD). This refers to the slightly remote position which the SDSM had in regards to other movement actors during the negotiations and the formalization of the Przhino agreement in parliament.

The parliamentary documents preceding and accompanying the Law on the SPO confirm the previously elaborated view by the SMO representative. Throwing a glance at the parliamentary materials, it becomes evident that during the committee sessions, where draft versions of the Law were discussed, neither citizens, nor SMOs were present. The reports from the legislative committee, and from the committee on political system and inter-ethnic relations, show that only MPs were present, and they discussed and voted for the draft Law on the SPO[128].

[128] All materials connected to the Law on the SPO can be found at the following link (in Macedonian) http://www.sobranie.mk/materialdetails.nspx?materialId=e3556473-a876-4f52-98d6-9c9c50614656

Although the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (RPARM) enables citizens' participation in the working bodies[129], the two respective committee sessions which were held on 15 September 2015 did not make use of this democratic tool. Furthermore, it must be noted that according to the parliamentary documents there is also no indication that the participating SMOs in the CfM platform raised any initiative that could lead to any citizens' participation during the work of the two committees. Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding the conduct of the plenary session, which was held on the same day as the committee sessions[130].

One of the policymakers, a former MP from the SDSM who was actively involved in the parliamentary activities connected to the adoption of the Law on the SPO and other laws stemming from the Przhino Agreement, shared similar views with the ones of the SMO representative, and also confirmed the information gathered from the parliamentary documentation, highlighting even strongly the lack of citizen involvement:

"*Not as far as I know. There were no representatives from the SMOs, or individuals. Even we* [the MPs, I.S.] *did not have sufficient time to discuss. There was political agreement that the state is in crisis, not a good thing for anyone. There was no larger and broader debate. What was agreed by the leaders in Przhino was later transcribed into the laws"*(Int. 5, MKD)

Another important fact which the MP highlights is the dominant role of the political agreement vis-à-vis the role of parliament, transforming the legislator into a "voting/confirmation machine" which failed to fully exert its substantial competences. This once again points to the crucial role of the political leaders and the international community in the process of the creation and fine-tuning of the Law on the SPO.

Nevertheless, there is no clear consensus regarding the incidence and impact of the challengers on the policy outputs, with dissonancy coming mainly from the side of the movement activists. Apart from the limited influence which was presented above, certain SMO representatives value the influence over the legislation as greater, while others completely disregard any concrete involvement by governmental challengers.

[129] See Art. 122, par. 2 of the RPARM: "The working body may invite at its session scientists, professionals and public figures and representative of the municipalities, the City of Skopje, public companies, trade unions and other organizations, institutions and associations in order to present their opinions on issues discussed at the session of the body."; and art. 124, par. 3: "initiative to discuss certain issues at a session of the working body may also be raised by other working bodies of the assembly, state administration bodies, municipalities, the City of Skopje, institutions and citizens' associations." http://www.sobranie.mk/rules-procedures-of-the-assembly-ns_article-rules-of-procedure-of-the-assembly-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-precisten-tekst-2013.nspx

[130] See the minutes and voting reports from the plenary session (in Macedonian) at http://www.sobranie.mk/materialdetails.nspx?materialId=e3556473-a876-4f52-98d6-9c9c50614656

One of the interviewed SMO representatives, who also acted as an executive director at one of the NGOs which were highly involved in the movement activities, likes to point to a greater impetus coming from the side of the citizens. Still, he stresses mainly the consultative role which the citizens played in the relationship with the SDSM, when the party shifted both identities and arenas moving from the streets to the negotiating table:

"During the political negotiations there were regular consultations between representatives of the SMOs and the political parties. We continuously advised the opposition what they can do, but also, what they shouldn't do under any terms. As SMOs, we played an extremely large part in encouraging the opposition not to break under pressure that a political agreement must be reached." (Int. 10, MKD)

Furthermore, a point of convergence between the two SMO representatives which actively participated in the organizational activities of the CfM is the strong role of the political parties both in the political negotiations and the policy process: "*...I must admit that the crucial role and the powers during the negotiation process were mainly within the political parties. After the political agreement was reached, and after the texts entered parliament, the meetings and consultations were less frequent.*" (Ibid)

A very distinctive feature which must be noted in reference to the lack of citizens' participation is the velocity by which the Law on SPO was enacted. As mentioned earlier in this section, both committee sessions and the plenary session were held on the same day. Additionally, the Law was enacted through an urgent procedure, narrowing the possibilities for any substantial citizens' involvement. Taking into consideration the RPARM provisions which regulate the modalities of the urgent procedure, it is evident that parliament violated the legislative procedure[131]. In the text of the law proposal, the initiators failed to provide and explain any reason why this law should be adopted using an urgent legal procedure[132]. Looking carefully at the provisions of the RPARM, when a certain law is enacted through an urgent procedure, the possibilities for discussion and other types of participation are largely

[131] See Art. 167, par. 2 of the RPARM: "A law may be adopted in an urgent procedure when this is necessary in order to prevent and avoid major disturbances in the economy or when this is required for the interest of the security and defense of the republic, or in cases of major natural disasters, epidemics or other extraordinary or urgent needs."; and par. 3: "The initiator shall be obliged to explain the proposal that the law is adopted in an urgent procedure." http://www.sobranie.mk/rules-procedures-of-the-assembly-ns_article-rules-of-procedure-of-the-assembly-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-precisten-tekst-2013.nspx

[132] See Proposal to the Law on the SPO (in Macedonian) http://www.sobranie.mk/materialdetails.nspx?materialId=e3556473-a876-4f52-98d6-9c9c50614656

narrowed[133]. These points were also highlighted by an interviewee who played a multi-folded role in this project: both a SMO representative and a key informant for the Macedonian case and a key informant for the BH case[134]. She did not hide her disappointment regarding the policy outputs emerging from the Przhino Agreement:

"Regarding the laws you mentioned, the citizens didn't influence them at all. Firstly, they were enacted instantly. I can accept that because of the crisis, but when I take a look at the substance of the laws, they are terrible, especially when I look at them as a lawyer. They are extremely restrictive…" (Int. 7, MKD)

She represents the most pessimistic strand of the movement, failing to see any success regarding the citizens' influence over the policy output. Furthermore, the judge also contests the legal quality of the Law on the SPO, as well as the other laws which stemmed from the Przhino agreement.

In terms of "success" of adoption of policy outputs whose essence had been previously advocated for by the SMOs, the adoption of the Law on the SPO certainly presents a positive example. Still, the main factors for the successful adoption lay within the realm of the political parties and the international community as the main actors who facilitated this process. Previous rows clearly highlighted the limited role of the Macedonian SMOs. The following section sheds light on the policy outcomes, where the involvement of the movement activists was much more visible and valuable.

5.3. *Macedonia: Resignations and Prosecutions as Positive Policy Outcomes*

Following the adoption of the Law on the SPO in the Macedonian Assembly, the governmental challengers looked forward to its implementation, mainly through the establishment of the new extra judicial institution and its prospective work. Just in the first six months of its work, the SPO formed 120 criminal cases investigating illegal wiretapping, electoral violations, illegal media financing, embezzlement, tax evasion, money laundering,

[133] See section 9 from RPARM http://www.sobranie.mk/rules-procedures-of-the-assembly-ns_article-rules-of-procedure-of-the-assembly-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-precisten-tekst-2013.nspx

[134] Judge Margarita Caca – Nikolovska is a former judge at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, representing Republic of Macedonia. She currently leads an NGO working on protection of basic human rights andfreedoms in Macedonia which is also one of the signatories of the CfM platform. Furthermore, she is a member of the Constitutional Court of B&H

different forms of corruption and various forms of malfeasance (SPO 2016)[135]. Just at the beginning of the second semester of its work and after two publically launched investigations (Vistinomer 2017)[136], on 12 April 2016 the Macedonian President, Gjorge Ivanov, decided to use his constitutional powers and pardoned numerous high political officials and their collaborators indicted by the SPO[137]. The pardon initiated an immediate *fierce citizens' reaction* flooding the streets of Skopje, but also diffusing protests all throughout the country. What began as bottom-up support for the SPO, transformed into a massive movement named *"Colorful Revolution"*, mainly because of the innovative repertoire of contention – throwing paint at the state institutions (BBC 2016)[138], but also at the monuments arising from the controversial "Skopje 2014" construction project (BIRN 2018)[139] which was deemed by the governmental challengers as the biggest symbol of "Gruevism". After almost two months of protest and continuous pressure from below, President Ivanov revoked the pardoning acts, and the SPO continued with launching investigations and indictments. Before further elaborating on the work and results of the SPO, a temporal excurse is needed in order to depict the demise of former PM Gruevski.

Following the signing of the Przhino Agreement and its addendums, *the political parties* and *the international mediators* agreed that former PM Gruevski should step down 100 days before the early parliamentary elections (European Commission 2015)[140]. This part of the agreement was fulfilled on 15 January 2016 (NYT 2016)[141], and was joyfully received by the governmental challengers, being highlighted as one of the most important gains:

"*When speaking about many issues agreed in Przhino, the citizens really felt like they have won. Here I mainly refer to the agreement regarding the technical (provisional) government, the resignation of former Prime Minister Gruevski, and the creation of the Special Prosecution Office.*" (Int. 10, MKD)

[135] Report for the Activities of the SPO for the Period 15.09.2015 – 15.03.2016, p. 8 (in Macedonian) http://www.jonsk.mk/%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8/

[136] At that point, the SPO had publically presented two investigations "Titanic" and "Fortress". See the list of all investigations, indictments and annual reports of the SPO http://vistinomer.mk/site-istragi-na-sjo/ (in Macedonian)

[137] See the speech of President Ivanovhttp://pretsedatel.mk/en/media-centre/speeches/3797.html

[138]https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-36440895/protesters-in-macedonia-stage-colourful-revolution

[139]http://skopje2014.prizma.birn.eu.com/en

[140] Point 5, Protocol to the Agreement of 2 June 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en

[141]https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/world/europe/nikola-gruevski-macedonia.html?_r=0

The SPO continued to work intensively on conducting investigations and initiating indictments. By now, the SPO has opened nineteen investigations and several indictments[142]. The continuous pressure coming from the newly established institution aimed at deconstructing abuse of power, media capture and corruption, and re-establishing rule of law, amplified by the strong citizens' support, as well as internationally imposed pressure over the VMRO-DPMNE resulted in non-favorable election results in regards to the former ruling party. Although Gruevski's party managed to secure a tight victory (ODIHR 2016)[143], it failed to form government and subsequently moved into opposition (Balkan Insight 2017)[144]. The process of de-legitimating of the former regime was foreseen well ahead by the journalist, prof. Sasho Ordanoski:

"*I have a gut feeling that this game has ended for Gruevski and his family. It is only a matter of 'folklore' how they will be dealt with, but unfortunately, it might take time. Additionally unfortunate is that this is also a matter of damage, because they are still in the position to create damage. But, on the medium run – they are done. That way of thinking is also finished.*" (Int. 9, MKD)

The mechanism/factor of *international influence* was undoubtedly one of the key parts of the puzzle constituting the re-democratization of Macedonian society. In regards to the movement participants, the international community was one of the stronger allies, in the sense that one of the primary goals of both parties was to re-establish rule of law and democratic values in Macedonia. The international partners saw credible elections as the best tool to enhance the delegitimizing of the former regime. Equaling the "field of play" in wake of the elections was one of their targets which they managed to achieve: *"The international community interfered and will always intervene in the sense of trying to 'level the field of play' regarding the electoral conditions in the country*" (Int. 11, MKD) were the words of one Department of State employee who stressed this important issue.

[142] http://vistinomer.mk/site-istragi-na-sjo/ (in Macedonian), Report for the Activities of the SPO for the Period 15.03.2016 – 15.09.2016 (in Macedonian) http://www.jonsk.mk/%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8/ and Report for the Activities of the SPO for the Period 15.09.2016 – 15.03.2017 (in Macedonian) http://www.jonsk.mk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/6-MESECEN-IZVESTAJ.pdf

[143] Early Parliamentary Elections 11 December 2016 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, p. 29 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/302136?download=true

[144] http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-parliament-approves-zaev-s-new-govt-05-31-2017

This section singled out the important role of the movement activists and the SMOs in the process of effectuating the policy outcomes deriving from the Law on the SPO. Furthermore, the international community proved to be one of the most important factors in this story. Lastly, the political parties in opposition also provided valuable impetus to the entire process. It is evident that the Macedonian case presents a "successful" example of policy outcomes in South East Europe. If both the governmental challengers, as well as other internal and external political actors where satisfied with the movement outcomes in Macedonia, the same cannot be inferred in the two remaining cases in Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5.4. *Bulgaria: Social Movements & the Decision of the Energy and Water Regulatory Commission*

The Bulgarian case offers a slightly different picture, notwithstanding the similarities with the previous case. Amid the protests which were spread throughout Bulgaria, the Bulgarian regulator KEVR took a surprising decision to cosmetically decrease electricity prices, meeting half-way some of the protesters' demands. Following more than a month of intensive protesting, several resignations followed, including that of PM Borisov, and a new caretaker cabinet was appointed. The governmental challengers were deeply surprised by the decision of the KEVR. This perception stems from the fact that numerous previous protests were never seriously taken into consideration neither by the regulator, nor the government. (Int. 3, BUL)

The 5 March decision resulted with a decrease of energy prices depending on the distribution company to which the consumers (the citizens) were affiliated: 7.17% for customers of CEZ energy group; 6.22% for Energo Pro clients; and 7.28% for consumers of EVN (SEE News 2015)[145]. There is a clear reason why only this demand coming from the movement was appropriated by the Bulgarian policymakers, out of the many drafted and communicated during the protests. Just two weeks before the KEVR enacted the decision, PM Boyko Borisov announced a decrease of energy prices up to 8% (Stratfor 2013)[146]. Furthermore, immediately before the Commission decision was taken, the outgoing Minister of Economy, Energy and Tourism – Delyan Dobrev, also announced and even elaborated on the forthcoming decision

[145] See https://seenews.com/news/bulgarias-energy-regulator-lowers-electricity-prices-338934
[146] See https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/bulgaria-high-energy-prices-bring-down-government

(Novinite 2013)[147], additionally stressing the politicization of the formally independent and professional KEVR. These actions indicate that the Commission worked under considerable political pressure from the ruling parties. Nevertheless, the policy process is much more complex and based on numerous interrelated mechanisms which triggered the adoption of the policy output.

One of the interviewees who is a years-long activist for green energy and environment issues in Bulgaria, but has recently also entered the electoral arena through the Bulgarian Greens, sketched numerous factors which contributed to formal decrease of electricity costs. He was one of the few interviewees which stressed the *citizens' pressure from below*, apart from the political game which was played by *the parties in government and opposition*:

"*It was because of civil society pressure* [the decrease of electricity prices, I.S.]. *They* [the KEVR, I.S.] *just needed time. They could not bring this decision immediately, but it was a result of civil society pressure, and it was also, kind of, a little bit political… so it was kind of politically motivated decision as well.*"(Int. 1, BUL)

In comparison to Macedonia, where the *international community*, in particular the USA and the EU, invested large efforts to exert pressure over the main domestic political actors, no such interventions are noticed in the Bulgarian case. Further and more focused research is needed in order to explain this absence, but the completed Euro-Atlantic integration of the country and the economic interest of the energy distribution companies (which come from EU countries, i.e. Austria and the Czech Republic) are just two of many possible explanations.

Moving to the internal decision-making process in the Commission, it is of utmost importance to analyze its transparency and clarity regarding the decision-making process, as well as to assess the citizens' influence before and during the session of the KEVR. Several activists and key informants commented on meetings between activists, KEVR and Ministry of Energy representatives, discussing possible solutions for the demands coming from the citizens (Int. 6, BUL) and (Int. 4, BUL). Some of these meetings were even streamed *in vivo* and later uploaded online in order to create a smokescreen of transparency. Still, these meetings were the highest level of challengers' involvement which was achieved during the decision-making process. One

[147] http://www.novinite.com/articles/148405/Power+Rates+in+Bulgaria+Not+Likely+to+Rise+again+in+July+%E2%80%93+Outgoing+Minister

of the key informants, a former journalist and energy expert, reflected in detail on these gatherings:

"*There was also a…I don't know how to call it, but, it was like a public meeting between interested citizens, people from the protests and policymakers and representatives from the energy companies I told you about. These meetings were held at the Ministry of Energy, they were streamed online so everyone could see what was discussed. And these forums…I am not sure whether they were effective. I would question that, because there were all sorts of people who had interesting, even crazy ideas. But it was all about transparency, all about their voices being heard. These meetings were held on regular basis for some time, but at one point they just proved to be ineffective. The meetings at the Ministry of Energy, the ones that I told you about before, that were televised, streamed online, they were just very long, unproductive meetings where people just wanted to talk and talk and talk…and there was actually no decision taken.*" (Ibid)

The inefficiency of the meetings singled out by the previous interviewee points towards the lack of understanding between the challengers and the state, but it also points towards activation of the mechanisms of brokerage and diffusion (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, p. 31), an occurrence also encountered in the Macedonian case. This sharing of grievances furthermore led towards shifting of arenas, moving the contentious issue of energy prices from the streets to the administrative tables of the KEVR, which practically resulted with entering the policy arena and acquiring the level of "agenda responsiveness" (Schumaker, P. D. 1975, p. 494).

The point where the Bulgarian challengers faced isolation, also very similar to the Macedonian case, is the policy arena. Looking at the 5 March session documents, no citizens' presence can be noticed (KEVR 2013)[148]. In fact, glancing at the Rulebook which regulates the work of the Commission, one can easily conclude that this institution holds only preparatory public sessions, while the entire decision-making process is being conducted behind closed doors (KEVR 2013)[149]. Taking into consideration the absence of direct citizens' involvement, as well as that of the international community, Bulgarian parties in power seem to be the strongest political actor exacerbating pressure over the KEVR. The political dependency of the

[148]Decision of the EWRC from 5 March 2013 No. C-13 (in Bulgarian) http://www.dker.bg/files/DOWNLOAD/res_c13_2013.pdf

[149] Rulebook for the activities of the EWRC and its administration (in Bulgarian) http://www.dker.bg/files/DOWNLOAD/ustr-pravilnik.pdf

Commission also stems from the organizational and functional subordination which are evident from the existing legislation (KEVR)[150]. One of the key informants and energy experts confirmed this intertwining relationship between political parties in power and the membership and leadership changes within the KEVR:

"*…There were these 5 heads which came and went with governments. Due to popular sentiments alleged misconduct and all other sorts of allegations…I think that if you map and put together how often KEVR changed, you can see also that the chairman of the Commission changed very often as well…*" (Int. 4, BUL)

In sum, the triangulation of the Commission's documents, the in-depth interviews and the Bulgarian legislation, strengthened by the vast political interests of the parties in power during the 2013 winter protests, all point to the direction that *the influence of the political parties* was the key mechanism which triggered the policy adoption process. Still, one shouldn't completely neglect the popular pressure coming from the governmental challengers which managed to trigger the important mechanisms of brokerage, diffusion and scale shift contributing to the final legal output.

5.5. *Bulgaria: Failing to Effectuate and Materialize*

One of the key dilemmas in the Bulgarian case is how the acquired policy response failed to alleviate the grievances of the governmental challengers. Furthermore, an even more striking fact is the 10% increase of energy prices which followed just year and a half later (Sofia Globe 2014)[151]. Several factors and mechanisms contributed to the lack of tangible policy outcomes in comparison to the Macedonian case. In the Bulgarian case, the vested interests regarding the contentious issues where much more divergent in comparison to the Macedonian case. Furthermore, in the latter, the division between allies and opponents was much more clear-cut, while in the former, multiple stakeholders like movement actors, energy companies, political parties and state institutions, all had fluctuating positions and interests adapting them to political and economic changes in society. On the other hand, while the regime of VMRO-DPMNE had

[150] http://www.dker.bg/docsen.php?d=98

[151] http://sofiaglobe.com/2014/10/01/electricity-prices-in-bulgaria-to-increase-by-close-to-10/ "For the Sofia-headquartered CEZ area, the increase in the price of the daytime rate is close to 9.97 per cent, with an increase in the night rate by 9.84 per cent. For customers of Plovdiv-based EVN, the increase in the daytime tariff is 9.7 per cent and 9.35 per cent in the night-time tariff, while for customers of Varna-headquartered Energo Pro, the daytime tariff increase is 9.8 per cent and the night-time tariff increase is 9.51 per cent."

no valid arguments for capturing the state and undermining rule of law apart from the lust for unlimited power, the Bulgarian energy distribution companies had some economic indicators on their side which indicated that energy prices in Bulgaria were artificially held low, leading to grave economic sustainability problems. Like in many European countries, the energy distribution companies have been facing substantial financial difficulties caused by the economic crisis which struck Europe (Stratfor 2013)[152]. One of the energy experts reflected on the reaction of the energy distributing companies, giving their side of the story as well:

"*The message was clear – the bills were too high. Maybe we should look into how the energy companies responded to this crisis. There was clear lack of confidence on the consumer side. The general impression was that these companies basically said: 'Look, we miscalculated the period for calculating the energy bills'. It was the time of winter vacation, that's what they said, and instead of calculating for a one-month period, the bill was calculated for, let's say, 40 days. That's why it is higher. So the winter is very cold…*" (Int. 4, BUL)

Another factor which seriously prevented the movement from pushing for further anti-monopoly policies, and eventually led to a reverse process of price increase are the traditionally strong ties between *business and politics* in Bulgaria. What was an unexpected maneuver by PM Borisov and the KEVR in March 2013 was "politically compensated" a year and a half later. One of the interviewees, a years-long proponent of green and sustainable energy, explained the proximity of these two sets of actors:

"*…As I said, these monopolies in the energy sector, they are not "red"* [BSP, I.S.] *or "blue"* [GERB, I.S.]. *They kind of try to keep the status quo with all these parties. The same corruption schemes and etc….The company EVN stepped out and sold their license for Northeast Bulgaria to a company Energo Pro, which is officially Czech, but nobody in the Czech Republic knows about it. I am pretty sure, because I did some research, that it is connected to one of the mafia groups in Northeast Bulgaria. This company – Energo Pro, has the highest bills at that moment…*" (Int. 1, BUL)

The *lack of interest and involvement by the international community*, in comparison to the one described in the Macedonian case, was another factor which diminished the opportunities for the governmental challengers. Furthermore, the lack of convergent positions by the multiple strands of the movement in regards to the goals of the mobilization, strongly contributed to a

[152] https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/bulgaria-high-energy-prices-bring-down-government

much faster demobilization than expected, leaving the political processes to unravel without any movement pressure from below, not even any significant marked presence. This created space for the rulers to further proceed with their agenda.

Still, the first of the Bulgarian protest waves of 2013 also brought mid-term and long-term benefits to society. According to one of the interviewees, the protests resulted with a more transparent energy sector, but it also raised awareness about the need for citizens to turn to renewable and self-sustained energy independence:

"*The outcome is that we have a more transparent sector, or at least people are more aware what this sector is all about. People at least realize that protests are not the only way to bring prices down, because the government could resign, but the prices would not decrease that much. But, I hope that one outcome is that some people understand what the real way of lowering electricity prices is, in order to become independent. Currently, the only way is self-produced electricity. You can use your roof, or your garden, and these are the only solutions when no centralized electricity based on fossil fuels or nuclear energy imported from Russia could lower your prices, your own energy independence. And this is the way how we are trying to push forward, and there are more and more people that try to cut the monopolies' greed. These are the real solutions based on my experience. Still, this is a very small percentage of people. People who want to produce their own energy. At least, now, many people are considering this option.*" (Ibid)

Rounding the discussion about the general outcomes of the winter mobilization in Bulgaria, one needs to add the emergence of a movement party *Citizens Control* (*Граждански Контрол*), which took part in the early parliamentary elections held in May 2013, failing to obtain a significant result (ODIHR 2013)[153] and losing momentum for further electoral achievements. The main reasons for failure of the newly established movement party, and further unraveling of the political situation following the winter protests was punctually explained by one of the key informants:

"*During the elections after the protests in 2013, one of the leading actors in this protest* [Citizens Control, I.S.] *ran for the elections and were beaten with…something like 0.2% of the votes, although, not much time had passed since the protests. It was just 2-3 months. Two months*

[153]Republic of Bulgaria Early Parliamentary Elections 12 May 2013 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, p. 28 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/103878?download=true

after the protests these people who were every day on the streets and on TV had no influence at all. I believe this happened because the energy of the public was oriented towards the main political actors in society, and they didn't have any authorities within their ranks. In a sense, they were not legitimate…they had no time, which means that they were not prepared for the rising wave. If it was a political enterprise, which would have been designed in advance in order to make a political party or something of that kind, such preparation would have been made before, like creating structures and so on. It demonstrated that these people were just appearing on protests, but not preparing for elections. I think that the main outcome was the struggle between the two main political parties and the relocation of some economic blocks from GERB to the BSP." (Int. 7, BUL).

Taking into consideration the main factors which shaped the policy outcomes in the previous case (CfM movement) and comparing them to the Bulgarian context, one can immediately sense the main differences. Unlike in Macedonia, where the citizens and the SMOs re-mobilized in order to push for implementation of the Law on the SPO, the Bulgarian winter protests ended with the de-mobilization process. Furthermore, inversely to the Macedonian case, the international community was completely passive, not wanting to involve itself as an ally of the movement activists. Lastly, not being able to secure a long-lasting stable partnership of the governmental challengers with any of the major political parties, especially with the largest party in opposition – the BSP, resulted with a lack of impetus to the effectuation of the circled policy process. In comparison to the previously presented Macedonian case, the Bulgarian case can be labeled as an "unsuccessful" example of policy outcomes in South East Europe.

Although the Bulgarian protesters had a lot to wonder about how to further enhance their socio-economic conditions and improve tactics and strategies in order to achieve more gains in the future, they could still proudly look back on the formal materialization of some of their claims, as well as a government resignation. Furthermore, the created movement base of informal networks and the sensitized Bulgarian society paved the way towards two subsequent protest waves which occurred the same year: the #DANSWithMe summer protest and the student occupation which marked the end of 2013. To the contrary, not much enthusiasm arose in the aftermath of the BH mobilization, as it is presented in the following section.

5.6. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: The "Small (Social Movements') Wins" Versus the "Big Loss"*

A completely different picture is offered by social movement mobilization and influence in the case of B&H. A high tide of optimism flared among BH protesters when TK PM Sead Čaušević offered his resignation (Sarajevo Times 2014)[154] following one of the most violent protests in the history of B&H. Unfortunately, from the ashes of the cantonal building in Tuzla, a Phoenix was not born. Looking at the interviews both with activists and key informants, the main reasons for the failure to acquire agenda responsiveness and policy responsiveness lie in the *lack of communication and building bridges with allies/friends (primarily political parties)*, as well as *the multi-faceted identities of the movement participants*, ranging from redundant workers to war veterans and disillusioned students (Int. 2, B&H). Furthermore, the *large number of claims* which accounted to thousands (Int. 11, B&H), as well as the *multiple types of claims*, impeded claim-bridging and focused targeting of the federal and state governments. Still, in order to explain the variance of "success"/"gains" on cantonal, *versus* the "failure"/"losses" on federal/state level, one must firstly introduce a niche of the POS, in particular, recalling what Kitschelt calls "centralization of the state apparatus" (Kitschelt, H. 1986, pp. 63-4). The unusually complicated institutional design of B&H (GFAPB&H 1995)[155] hampered access of challengers to federal and state institutions, using multiple cantonal government concessions as a smokescreen giving false hopes and raising expectations of the challengers. Conversely, in the unitary Macedonian (Macedonian Constitution 1991, Section 3) and Bulgarian (Bulgarian Constitution 1991, Art. 2 Par. 1) states, protesters directly targeted the central institutions, easing the application of the scale shift mechanism.

On the other hand, the complex FB&H institutional design enabled the exposure of the cantonal governments to the anger, sometimes even violence (*Dnevni Avaz* and *Oslobodjenje* 2014), of the economically and socially deprived challengers which struggled for decades to satisfy their basic needs. Using the words of the activists, the cantonal governments were caught by surprise, in the sense that these fierce reactions by the protesters could not be foreseen (Int. 6, B&H).

The violent riots during the first days of protest in Tuzla, Sarajevo and Zenica, resulted with immediate "gains", at least from a formal and self-satisfactory perspective of the

[154] http://www.sarajevotimes.com/?p=50742
[155] See Dayton Peace Agreement Art. I, Par. 3

challengers[156]. In the long run, these resignations didn't bring any substantial citizens' alleviations, but protracted protests creating opportunities for the cantonal governments to adjust tactics and wait for the mechanism of demobilization to be activated. Furthermore, the high level of disruptiveness expressed through violence by the challengers, provoked an even fiercer reaction by the state, which later transformed into continuous overt and covert repression (see Chapter 7). The "process of failure" was already on the horizon in the BH case.

Following the series of cantonal resignations and the creation of plenums which were accompanied by a buoyant mood, the BH protesters could not envisage the troubles and problems which followed. The application of adapted forms of direct and deliberative democracy during the plenum sessions produced invaluable legacy which remains to this today (Štiks, I. & Horvat, S. 2014). Still, the lack of tactics, strategies and coordination, and the inability to properly highlight the key demands, left BH protesters with many open questions and dilemmas, and very distant from the policy arena. As one of the key informants described:

"*As soon as the political parties saw that they were dealing with a loose, leaderless and non-coordinated group, they immediately transformed their fear into repressive action and brutal de-legitimating of the protesters and the events they organized. Furthermore, the protesters themselves were rejecting potential political allies, leaving them with one political party and its closely related daily newspaper as a false ally which misused the claims and the repertoires of action in order to acquire political points and try to monopolize the movement.*" (Int. 2, B&H)

Moving back to the mechanism-process approach and the main political actors present in the sites of contention in B&H, it is easy to notice that the presence of strong, both covert and overt repression, is one of the mechanisms which could not be found in the Macedonian and Bulgarian cases. The excessive use of force from both sides on the streets of Tuzla, Sarajevo and Zenica (*Dnevni Avaz* and *Oslobodjenje* 2014) discouraged more citizens to take the streets, while the overt repression incorporated fear into the social movement base which was comprised of the "usual suspects" that had been taking the streets for years. This is evident both from the interviews with the activists, as well as reports issued by international NGOs (HRW 2014)[157]. The brutality of the police is bluntly described by one Sarajevo protester who was very active both on the streets and in the plenums:

[156] The TK PM resigned on 7 February, the KS PM on 8 February, the ZDK PM announced the resignation of his government on 7 February, while the USK PM resigned on the 9 February.
[157] https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/21/bosnia-and-herzegovina-investigate-police-violence-against-protesters

"*The first images from the protests that I clearly recall are those of a mass trained police forces unit (called "the turtles") creating a cordon and pushing people into Miljatska. I saw that from a distance of around 50 meters. The image was horrifying, literally horrifying. The people which should in theory protect you, acting so brutally…I recall, people started shouting, stones were flying, and there was a lot of smoke…The Presidency building was already on fire, when a mass of people stormed the building and continued throwing Molotov cocktails…*" (Int. 3, B&H)

The factors mentioned above which intertwined during the contentious events in B&H, prevented the governmental challengers to reach the policy arena. Apart from having the two largest political parties – SDP (Social Democratic Party) and SDA as adversaries, and a lack of clear vision regarding the goals and the strategies, BH protesters also faced a very passive and relatively uninterested international community which only declaratively supported freedom of assembly and needs for urgent reforms in the country. One might hypothesize that a more coherent and fierce reaction from the international community, similar to those which were conducted in the post-war period, would have increased the chances for acquiring gains in the policy arena on federal and state level. Furthermore, this would have opened the doors for possible tangible policy outcomes that could have alleviated the difficult socio-economic conditions of the economically deprived BH challengers.

5.7. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: The "Losers" of Protest*

The breath of hope following the cantonal "small wins" later turned into shattered moral due to the inability to gain any momentum for fulfilling at least some of the numerous demands issued throughout the contentious three months of protesting. Thus, the BH movement slowly demobilized. This demobilization process was amplified by the disastrous floods which hit the country, taking away many lives and creating grave material damage (HCA – Tuzla 2015)[158]. The main reasons for the challengers' failure to reach the policy arena, and to subsequently acquire a certain level of grievances alleviation were already stipulated in the previous section, and will be further disaggregated and elaborated throughout the following chapters. Taking an introspective standpoint, the interviewed protesters were significantly self-critical, putting aside the hostile political environment which they had to face. Reflecting on the outcomes from a temporal perspective of three years, one of the activists concluded:

[158] http://cn4hs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Bosnia_Herzegovina_8-Flooding-in-BiH.pdf

"*This time we didn't make any change because we didn't know how. We didn't even know who to target. This government, that government…we were in a complete mess. We saw that we could not circumvent the ethnic reality, but we can surely decrease ethnic divisions. We know that we can substitute ethnos with demos. We need to once again close those questions and reopen the burning once, those important to everyone: social and labor issues. It is irrelevant whether someone is Serb, Croat, or Bosnian. All Serbs are not wealthier than all Bosnians. Within the three ethnic groups you have respective elites constituting 'them', against all the other 'us'. Next time we will try to better convey that message and come up with answers to the questions 'what' and 'how'…*" (Int. 4, B&H)

The difficulties in defining a more clear and concise set of claims – the "what", and the lack of tactics and strategy resulting with failure to provide the "how" are in the essence of the failure of the BH challengers. These shortcomings were also highlighted by many spectators which simply analyzed the contentious arena which was unraveling in front of their eyes. One of these key informants also added the question "who" to the previously raised "what" and "how":

"*…I do not believe that you can formulate the goals and strategies how to achieve them if you do not have a clear leadership which can assess the situation and evaluate whether some goals are achieved and whether you need to adapt the strategies. A clear structure and hierarchy is needed in order to frame the entire picture….the challengers were tempted to reject everything and everyone they saw fit. This standpoint seems revolutionary and rebellious, but in fact it is not…*" (Int. 2, B&H)

The text above provides important information about the inability of BH challengers to acquire policy response to alleviate their grievances. The main factors can be summarized as follows: lack of tactics and strategies, especially in regards to choosing reliable and influential allies from the political parties, a hostile political party environment which orchestrated direct physical and verbal attacks in order to discredit and disillusion the challengers, as well as a relatively passive and mildly engaged international community whose continuous presence has supported the social processes in B&H for years after the raging war. Still, slightly counter intuitively to the title of this section, this work also reflects on some of the gains which were understated by the protesters, mainly because of their disappointment stemming from previous high hopes and expectations.

Two of the most substantial gains in the realm of losses which almost all activists agree with are the establishment of a movement base comprised of informal networks which was epitomized in the plenums. The plenums are perceived as the most radical form of non-institutional politics developed across the Balkans, with varying success within the three months of active functioning (Štiks, I. & Horvat, S. 2014, pp. 84-5). Still, many of them function in different shapes and forms even today. Furthermore, the great citizens' awakening sensitized BH society showing that people are willing and able to fight for what is theirs. As one of the activists put it:

"*Primarily, that awakening, that self-consciousness…We must, we really must find a way to raise our voice and give a clear example how a country where normal people live and function should look like. We need to try and persuade, even in a way to force people in showing them that this is the only right path. I see here the main gains from the protests. I personally don't think that this thing is over. I am now in a phase of expectancy…waiting for the next…for something else…*" (Int. 4, B&H)

Lastly, one must mention the bridging of the ethnic divide which occurred during the three months of struggle. As prof. Mujkic has described this occurrence in his work dealing with the struggle for democratic counter power in B&H, the protests acted as an impetus which temporarily suspended the narrative of the "ethno-cultural justice". This came as a surprise to many which perceived BH society as deeply divided along ethnic lines (Mujkic, A. 2016, p. 5). Ethnically united in the struggle for better living conditions, the citizens of B&H clearly showed to the world that they are "hungry in three languages" (Milan, 2016).

5.8. *Conclusion*

This chapter focused on the influence of social movement mobilization in our three selected countries, sketching the main dimensions (phases) linked to the movements' policy outputs, and illustrating their further transformation into political outcomes. In order to do that, the chapter applied the analytical lens of the mechanism-process approach of Tilly and Tarrow (2015, p. 36), combining it with the theoretical approach of Amenta and his colleagues. Indeed, the latter underline, as we have seen in the chapter, that unlike mobilization, the creation of collective identities and enriching capacities of SMOs and movement-related individuals, political outcomes are frequently out of the challengers' direct control. To the contrary, as we

have seen, especially in the case of Macedonia, the dominant factors which influence crucial political decisions leading to eventual alleviation of the citizens' grievances are usually legislators, political executives, administrators and similar actors (Amenta et. al 2010, p. 288). This analytical framework allowed us to highlight some of the main mechanisms and actors which, in our view, can be accounted for the "success" or "failure" of social movements' influence, namely policy output adoption and the transformation of these documents into tangible political outcomes. More specifically, it was shown that building bridges of collaboration between social movements and influential traditional political parties is one of the factors contributing towards policy outcomes "success". Furthermore, the role of the international community and its interest in the state-building processes in South East Europe is also of utmost importance for obtaining the movements' desired policy outcomes. Lastly, the capacity of the movement actors to exert sufficient pressure from below is the third important factor which can facilitate the way towards tangible policy outputs and outcomes.

Looking at the adoption of the Law on the SPO, the largest credit has to be given to the political parties, especially the largest one at that time in opposition, as well as the international community which exerted great political pressure on the political leaders and the state institutions to round up the process of legalization. Although the movement actors were excluded from the adoption process, their continuous pressure from below, both on the political parties and the international community, contributed towards the establishment of the SPO. One must also highlight the role of the Macedonian assembly and the numerous procedural breeches of its internal acts resulting in a lower legal quality of the enacted documents. Furthermore, the largest influence coming from the side of the challengers can be noted in the effectuation process, where the strong pressure from below managed to create a new protest wave pushing for the previously agreed implementation of the Przhino Agreement. The citizens' energy combined with the strong diplomatic intervention by the EU and the USA, managed to put Macedonian rule of law and protection of human rights mechanisms back on track, at least to a certain extent.

The adoption of the decision by the Bulgarian KEVR was characterized with strong political pressure by the political parties in power, combined with prolonged civil society and movement pressure exerted from below. What was lacking in comparison to the Macedonian case was the external pressure by the international community which was later mirrored in the lack of tangible policy outcomes. Both in the Macedonian and the Bulgarian case, this chapter

strongly highlighted the mechanisms of brokerage, diffusion and scale shift coming from the side of the movement actors.

Furthermore, this chapter shows that the main reasons for the failure of BH challengers to acquire agenda responsiveness and policy responsiveness on federal and state level lie primarily in the inability of the movement actors to build strong coalitions with powerful friends in the political system. Furthermore, the very hostile political environment amplified by overt repression coming from the the state, and coupled with a very strong media campaign aimed at discrediting and disillusioning the governmental challengers, resulted in failure of results in the federal and state policy arenas. This just confirmed the hypothesis that vast resources are always on the side of the state (Earl 2013), and that direct violent conflict between the challengers and the state could lead to decrease of protester numbers on the streets (Opp, K. D., & Roehl, W. 1990). Ultimately, the decrease of resources substantially diminishes the chances for favorable outcomes (DeNardo 2016).

The not so active and synergized international community which is usually highly involved in BH societal issues did not make things any easier for protesters who took to the streets for more than three months. Another strong factor which prevented realization of the protesters' goals was thousands of non-systematized claims and demands constantly shifting priorities. On the other hand, the "small wins" acquired on cantonal level point to differences in the (de)centralization of the state apparatus which influences the level of proximity and accessibility of movement actors with regards to state institutions. It is of utmost importance to also note that both Macedonia and Bulgaria are unitary states in comparison to B&H which has a very distinctive *sui generis* state structure. In order to explain the variance of "success"/"gains" on cantonal, *versus* the "failure"/"losses" on federal/state level, one must recall what Kitschelt calls "centralization of the state apparatus" (Kitschelt, H. 1986, pp. 63-4). The central hypothesis which this author fosters is that the effectiveness of national policy implementation depends on the level of centrality of the state, whereas federal states with numerous independent agencies and a more complex executive in general, usually complicate policy implementation (Ibid).

The tangible policy outcomes deriving from the Law on the SPO, primarily the work of the SPO as a newly established extrajudicial institution investigating and indicting former high level public officials, as well as the early parliamentary elections which resulted with a shift in power, were dominantly made possible due to the strong citizens' pressure coming from below

and sparking an entire new wave of contention, in combination with strong international support coming mainly from Brussels and Washington D.C.

These two factors were fairly absent in the Bulgarian case, preventing the replication of the success in the Macedonian case. The inability of the movement actors to attain a certain level of mobilization, mainly due to multiple strands in the movement aiming at different goals, and a loyalty shift from the political parties turning towards the energy distribution companies, not only prevented alleviation of the citizens' grievances, but also triggered a reverse process of energy prices increase. This just reinforced the argument of an existing triad of interests between business, politics and media in Bulgaria. Furthermore, it must be noted that the energy distribution companies had valid economic indicators on their side, showing that energy prices were artificially held low in comparison to other European countries. Lastly, the lack of interest and involvement from the international community just strengthened the influence of the domestic political actors during the contentious events. Although direct policy outcomes were not favorable for the governmental challengers, this work noted the general gains which the movement can freely attach to itself. Primarily, this refers to the increased transparency in the energy sector and the raised awareness among Bulgarian citizens regarding the needs for energy independence and renewable green energy. Furthermore, the winter protests of 2013 gave birth to a movement party named Citizens' Control, which failed to achieve any respectable result on the early parliamentary elections which followed the contentious events. Lastly, it must be highlighted that the first protest wave created a solid movement base for the two subsequent mobilizations: the #DANSWithMe summer protests of 2013 and the student occupation which marked the end of 2013.

Closing with the BH case in which neither policy outputs, nor policy outcomes were present, this chapter also highlighted some of the gains which arose from the intense three-month mobilization. The general awakening of the BH society showed that citizens were not prepared to wait longer to show their dissatisfaction from the deprivation which had marked their lives for decades. Furthermore, the creation of the plenums as horizontal democratic organizations fostering deliberation proved to be a short-term response to the institutional politics. Plausibly one of the most important gains from the protests was the ability of BH society to bridge the ethnic divide between the three ethnic groups and show that socio-economic deprivation has a common name and a common opponent which should be held responsible.

This chapter only sketched the key mechanisms and processes which led to the three movement outcomes (Table 5.1). The following chapters delve deeper into the key factors and mechanisms such as the types and forms of claims, the repertoires of action applied by the movement actors, the overt and covert repression coming from the side of the state, as well as the friends and the foes of the movements under examination.

Summarizing the main findings of this chapter in terms of players and arenas (Jasper 2004) in South East Europe, it is evident that the dynamics between civil society actors and institutional actors is of utmost importance in terms of shaping policy outputs and policy outcomes. In terms of the "success" of social movement actors, apart from the political structures, the goals and interests of other players in the arenas, in this case the "policy arena", are highly important (Jasper & Duyvendak 2015). In regards to the three cases under study, previous sections had shown that the interests of the political parties and the international community are the main factors which shape policy outputs and policy outcomes in the designated region.

Table 5. 1 Main factors contributing towards policy outputs and policy outcomes in South East Europe

	Macedonia: strong presence of policy outputs	**Bulgaria: minor presence of policy outputs**	**B&H: absence of policy outputs**	**Macedonia: presence of policy outcomes**	**Bulgaria: absence of policy outcomes**	**B&H: absence of policy outcomes**
SMOs	Limited influence	Limited influence	No influence	Strong influence	Limited influence	No influence
Political parties	Strong influence	Strong influence	No influence	Strong influence	No influence	No influence
International community	Strong influence	No influence	Limited influence	Strong influence	No influence	Limited influence

Source: Own calculation

Chapter 6 : The Claims-Making and the Policy Outcomes

6.1. *Introduction*

Beyond political opportunities, the emergence and mobilization of collective action has also been explained by resources, cognitive and material, which the actors are able to mobilize (della Porta and Diani 2006). This approach (i.e. *resource mobilization approach*), stresses indeed that "in historical situations in which structural strains and conflicts are always present, the emergence of collective action has to be addressed by looking at the conditions that enable discontent to be transformed into mobilization – that is, at how the resources necessary for collective action are mobilized. In this view, social movements are made up of actors acting in a rational way – or at least in as rational a way as those involved in conventional forms of political action" (Caiani et al 2012). In fact, scholars such as Mayer Zald (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1987), Anthony Oberschall (1973; 1978), and Charles Tilly (1978) were among the first to define a social movement as a rational, purposeful, and organized action. Repertoires of action and frames are seen as deriving from a calculation of the costs and benefits, influenced by the political opportunities as well as by the presence of organizational resources. In particular, and in view of the fact that the "cultural turn" in social movement studies dates back from the 90s, special attention has been given to cognitive resources (i.e. norms, values, frames) that can be constructed and mobilized by collective actors in order to motivate participants and give raise to the protest. In our three cases under consideration, movement activists mobilized dominantly around legal and economic issues which together joined into a strong anti-governmental sentiment. The main cognitive resources stemmed from the numerous grievances which hardened the activists' lives for numerous years. Entering the realm of "social constructivism", the movement actors managed to realize that certain aspects of their lives that they had taken for granted, for example, economic hardship, lack of access to social services, corruption and breach of human rights, "have instead been created by those in power as a means to retain their positions" (Jasper 2010, p. 59). In this vein, they nurtured their mobilization based on the claims-making process by engaging into "symbolic construction of the external reality" (Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 2012, p. 13)

Building on this field of knowledge, this chapter proposes to analyze the outcomes of the three social movements for safeguarding threatened democracy in the three countries during the

three political campaigns spread between February 2013 and July 2015, through the lens of the issues and claims mobilized. Namely, we would like to interpret the emergence of collective actions of anti-governmental movements in our three cases under study, in the light of the various issues and claims mobilized. The empirical question leading the chapter is whether it is possible to find a relation between the claims and frames mobilized by the movements and the success of the policy outcomes in terms of their ability to substantially alleviate the grievances of the movement activists, stemming from the policy process. As mentioned in the introduction, claims-making can be defined as performances that air certain claims to an audience, involving governments as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties (Tarrow & Tilly 2006, p. 4; Tilly 2008, p. 5 and Lindekilde 2013, p. 1).

The analysis of the different types of claims mobilized during the protest campaigns in the three counties, allows us thus to uncover the meaning and the triggering reason behind any conflict, which furthermore "enables us to attribute to events and behaviors, of individuals or groups, a meaning which facilitates the activation of mobilization" (della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 74). In this respect one can notice that in the three countries the protest campaigns focus on several different issues, as well as on different issues change across time. How these different frames and issues are linked to different outputs of the three movement campaigns in the Balkans will be the matter of the enquiry in the next sections.

In regard to the relationship between the claims-making process and the policy outcomes, let us once again reintroduce the main hypothesis connecting the two variables: *the higher number and types of claims produces better resonance in the wider public, which leads towards greater pressure over governments for enacting policy outputs and effectuating policy outcomes*.

The main point of focus regarding the claims-making is the targeting of the three respective governments by the social movements. This chapter focuses on detecting the specific claims which are directly connected to the respective policy outcomes subject to analysis. This creates a direct link between the explanatory factor and the explanandum. Tilly stresses the importance of the claims coming from the side of the movement in the processes of assessing the movement outcomes. What he urges us not to forget when dealing with outcomes, are the effects of the movement actions and the effects of outside events and actions (Tilly, C. 1999).

6.2. *General Similarities and Differences between the Claims-Making of the Three Movements*

As for the context within which the protest claims of the social movements in the three countries have been elaborated, one can notice that the main demands of the "Citizens for Macedonia", namely criticism against the government and demands for more democracy, media freedom, the respect for rule of law, as well as the guaranties for minimum democratic standards of the Macedonian society, were clearly stated even before the beginning of the protests in the streets. In particular, in a declaration proclaimed before the beginning of the protest campaigns, the coalition called "Coalition for Reintroducing the Citizens' Dignity and Protection of the Constitution of The Republic of Macedonia" asked for the resignation of the government, which should "leave and free the country from captivity" (CfM, 2015)[159]. This was motivated by the reasons clearly stated in the introduction and the previous chapters. Furthermore, the challengers called for more transparency and control of future governments ("checks and balances") and the opening of channels for citizens' participation The resignation of the VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) led government, according to the activists, was supposed to be followed by a prompt creation of a caretaker government stabilizing Macedonian society by taking several inevitable steps: cleansing of the voters list; freeing the public broadcasting service (PBS) – Macedonian Radio and Television (MRT) – from governmental control; appointment of an independent public prosecutor; as well as to facilitating the organization and administration of entirely free and democratic elections which will reflect the realistic political will of the citizens in Macedonia (Okno, 2015)[160]. In sum, the Macedonian case shows that both the appointment of an independent public prosecutor, which was later materialized through the Law on the SPO, and the resignation of the government were clearly framed even before the protest activities had started. In this manner, as noted in the theoretical framework of this work, the claims put forward by the movement activist are considered as a possible explanation (one of the main factors) for shaping the movements' outputs and outcomes. In line with the theoretical assumptions, the types and varieties of claims, as well as the number and the groups of challengers participating in protest activities (Snow, D. A. et al, 1986 and Tarrow S. G., 2011), can have a strong impact

[159] See http://17maj.gragjanite.mk/ (in Macedonian), the official website of the CfM
[160] See the full text of the Declaration (in Macedonian) at: http://okno.mk/node/47515

both on policy outputs and policy outcomes. The same framework is applied for all the three cases under study.

The Bulgarian winter protests were spurred by the unreasonably high gas and electricity bills received by the citizens in January 2013. Being the poorest member state in the EU, many Bulgarian citizens faced additional economic hardship that could not be endured because of the very low average income. The anger which spilled on Bulgarian streets was a result of numerous issues that can be grouped in several general clusters: the government-granted monopolies (BTV Novinite 2013)[161]; the austerity measures imposed by the government (ITUC 2012)[162]; widespread poverty and unemployment (The Sofia Globe 2013)[163]; government corruption (Darik News 2013 and Mediapool 2013)[164] and general failure of the democratic system (IME 2013 and Al Jazeera 2013)[165]. In terms of the claims being put forward during the winter protests, apart from the main grievance which was centered on the electricity and gas prices, many other broader issues were also included and linked to the central claims during the course of the protest, which contributed to enlarging the spectrum of the topics mobilized by the movement. This situation points to frame bridging as defined by Snow and his colleagues (Snow et al. 1986, pp. 467-469). Multiple claims began to occur once the citizens had taken the streets. The first proper channeling of the protesters' demands happened almost two weeks after the initial demonstrations, following a 10 hours long meeting between the leaders of the several protest groups in Sliven on the 23 February. After the very long meeting, the governmental challengers managed to draft a long list of demands, vastly exceeding the primary socio-economic reasons for protest. Among other things, the citizens asked for decrease of energy prices, nationalization of the energy distribution companies, criminal liability for state officials, changes to the electoral system and many other demands which were not fully in line with the prior reasons for protest (*Duma* 24/25 February 2013 and *Trud* 24/25 February 2013).

The third and last case, the so called "Bosnian Spring", resulted from the protracted cluttered economic and social grievances, whose main representatives were the redundant

[161] See the article at http://btvnovinite.bg/article/bulgaria/organizatorkata-na-protest-sreshtu-visokite-smetki-za-tok-v-aresta.html
[162] See the report at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/new_frontline_forum_2012_en.pdf
[163] See the article at http://sofiaglobe.com/2013/02/20/bulgarias-political-crisis-and-the-next-election-who-will-win/
[164] See the articles at http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=1043502 and http://www.mediapool.bg/koruptsiya-obezverenie-patova-situatsiya-news206155.html
[165] See the articles at http://ime.bg/bg/articles/protesti-i-ikonomiesko-znanie/ and http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322163943882279.html

workers from the Tuzla factories. The main narrative preceding the violent outburst in the streets of Tuzla were the unpaid wages and social benefits of the factory workers, as well as the tiring and corrupt privatization of the state-owned factories. Other burning issues such as corruption and partization of (BH) society were also in the spotlight of the initial mobilization. Still, as soon as the violent outburst in Tuzla caused a spill-over effect throughout the entire Federation, a numerous influx of grievances began to occupy the public sphere. In total, several thousands of demands were archived by movement activists during the intensive two months of protest. Only a superficial effort to group these claims would result with the following general issues: maintaining public order and cooperation between citizens and police authorities; avoiding criminalization, politicization and manipulation by external factors; establishment of a caretaker government which will lead the country until the next elections, composed of non-politicized persons and submit weekly reports to the citizens; revision of the privatization of the *Dita*, *Polihem*, *Poliolhem*, *Gumara*, and *Konjuh* companies with emphasis on recognition of all previously attained rights and benefits of the workers, processing economic crimes, confiscation of illegally obtained property, and restoration of the factories; alignment of public officials' salaries with the real sector income and abolishment of other benefits for government officials (Arsenijević, D., 2014, pp. 11-27).

Moving to the cross-country comparison of the Political Claim Analysis (PCA), one can easily spot the similarities and the differences in terms of the claims-making processes among countries. In terms of the types of claimants, movement actors dominate in the three countries – 35.8% in Macedonia, 55.4% in B&H, and 40.3% in Bulgaria. Other non-movement actors are positioned second in Macedonia (24.5%) and B&H (25.3%), while in the Bulgarian case it is the politicians and the political parties (24.3%). This category of claimants is ranked as the third most active in Macedonia (22.5%) and in B&H (12.6%), while other non-movement actors are the third most relevant type of claimants in Bulgaria (23.3%). Another similarity spreading across the three countries is the last position within the types of claimants for media and journalists – 17.2% in Macedonia, 6.7% in B&H, and 12.2% in Bulgaria (Table 6.1).

Table 6. 1Type of claimants

Type of claimants	*Macedonia*	*B&H*	*Bulgaria*	*Total*
Movement activists/actors	35.8%	55.4%	40.3%	47.0%
Politicians and political parties	22.5%	12.6%	24.3%	18.2%
Media and journalists	17.2%	6.7%	12.2%	10.3%
Other non-movement actors	24.5%	25.3%	23.3%	24.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(151)	(435)	(288)	(874)

Pearson Chi-Square Value: 42.029; df: 6; Asymptotic significance: 0.000

Cramer's V .155

Source: Own calculation

In reference to the addressees of the claims in the three countries, there are differences. In Macedonia, ordinary citizens were addressed the most by the claimants (47%), followed by the movement actors (19.9%), while the politicians and the political parties, as well as the other non-movement actors share the third position as most addressed actors during the CfM (16.6%). In the case of B&H, other non-movement actors are by far the most addressed category of actors (55.3%), followed by the movement actors (20.7%), the citizens (16.4%) and lastly politicians and political parties (7.6%). In the Bulgarian case, as in Macedonia, citizens were the most addressed category (42.7%), followed by other non-movement actors (39.6%). On the other hand, 9% of the addressed were politicians and political parties, while movement actors were addressed in only 8.7% of the total number of cases (Table 6.2).

Table 6. 2 Addressee of the claims

Addressee of the claims	*Macedonia*	*B&H*	*Bulgaria*	*Total*
Movement actors	19.9%	20.7%	8.7%	47.0%
Politicians and political parties	16.6%	7.6%	9.0%	18.2%
Citizens	47.0%	16.3%	42.7%	10.3%
Other non-movement actors	16.6%	55.2%	39.6%	24.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(151)	(434)	(288)	(873)

Pearson Chi-Square Value: 122.291; df: 6; Asymptotic significance: 0.000

Cramer's V .265

Source: Own calculation

Lastly, in regards to the types of claims put forward by the movements, both similarities and differences can be noticed across countries. The general anti-governmental claims have accounted to more than one half in Macedonia (51%), as well as 49% in B&H. On the other hand, the largest number of claims in Bulgaria was related to economic issues (34%). In the Macedonian case, the anti-governmental claims were followed by the legal and political claims (23.3%), the claims criticizing the movement (13.2%), other claims (11.9%), and only 0.7% (1 claim) was related to economy. In the case of B&H, the general anti-governmental claims, very similar to Macedonia were followed by the legal and political claims (19.8%). Claims in support to the movement accounted to 17.2% of the claims, while claims related to economy comprised 11% of the entire corpus of coded claims. Only 2.5% of the claims were directly criticizing the movements, while only 0.5% of the claims belonged to other issues. Lastly, the economy related claims in Bulgaria were followed by the general anti-governmental claims (24.7%), while various other claims represent 22% of the total number. The legal and political claims comprise 8.7%, while both claims in support of the movement, and claims criticizing the movement amount to 5.2% (Table 6.3).

Table 6. 3 Type of claim

Type of claim	*Macedonia*	*B&H*	*Bulgaria*	*Total*
Anti-governmental (general) claims	51.0%	49.0%	24.7%	41.3%
Legal and political claims	23.2%	19.8%	5.7%	16.7%
Economy-related claims	0.7%	11.0%	22.5%	16.8%
Claims in support to the movement	0.0%	17.2%	3.4%	10.3%
Claims criticizing the movement	13.2%	2.5%	3.4%	5.3%
Other claims	11.9%	0.5%	14.7%	9.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(151)	(435)	(288)	(874)

Pearson Chi-Square Value: 283.103; df: 10; Asymptotic significance: 0.000

Cramer's V .569

Source: Own calculation

Glancing at the cross-country comparison presented in the previous rows, one can notice both similarities and differences along the three cases under study. In regards to the types of claimants, the movement activists are the most prominent actors in the three countries. Another similarity which is quite vivid among the three cases is the fact that the media and the journalists

were the least active types of claimants during the three protest waves. In regards to the addressees of the claims, they vary across the three examined cases and there are significant differences. Lastly, in reference to the types of claims put forward during the three contentious waves, both similarities and differences can be noticed. In the following country-specific sections, the more nuanced and in-depth analysis of the actors, addressees and claims will try to demonstrate the crucial links between the claims making process and the policy outcomes in the three countries. It is very important to delve deeper into the three cases in order to better understand the specific contexts and their respective epilogues.

6.3. *Case Study Specifics: The "Citizens for Macedonia"*

The first of the three cases investigates the central claims channeled during the CfM movement. It inspects the main grievances of the protesters in Macedonia, emphasizing their importance and breaking down the claims into multiple categories in order to get a more detailed overview of the setting in the field. Apart from the main types of claims, the chapter further continues with the types of actors, where movement activists dominate. Lastly, this part looks at the main targets of protest in Macedonia during 2015.

Based on the interviews with the Macedonian activists and CSO representatives, one can clearly track the process from putting forward the main claims, through the (un)realistic expectations, to the unraveling of the epilogue embedded in the Law on the SPO. Many of the protest participants were asked to elaborate on the reasons for taking part in the protests, and the first claims that come to their mind when discussing the CfM platform.

One of the interviewed participants, who at that time worked for the Open Society Foundation in Macedonia, stressed three main reasons for being a part of the platform: the resignation of the Government led by former PM Nikola Gruevski, the drive to keep non-partisan activists politically active and aware, and the democratization of Macedonian society:

"*The first issue which was substantial and real, and which made me a part of this entire story, was the demand for the Government's resignation. The situation was very much politically polarized following the airing of the wiretapped conversations…This was the main and primary reason which made me be there. The second reason, and this is a very personal reason that made me take part in the movement, was to prevent the marginalization of all non-partisan activists. I didn't want to see them out of the main political narrative in the state…This could have led to*

reducing their impact in society, to lose visibility. Unfortunately, we could see a bit of that in the shantytown camp in front of the government. The third reason was the need to democratize Macedonia. To a certain extent, the third claim is a part of the first one as well." (Int. 1, MKD)

Similar sentiments reintroducing democratization and rule of law can be also heard in the words of another activist, traditionally active during the last ten years.

"*The claims were clear. The first one was reintroducing rule of law in Macedonia, because, as we say, Macedonia is a captured state. Furthermore, we asked for creating conditions for free, fair, democratic and credible elections.*" (Int. 2, MKD)

Similar to the previous interviewed activist, the latter also highlights the resignation of the government, but distinguishing it as claim arising more from the political crisis, rather than an ultimate goal of the movement:

"*There were also claims which were influenced by the political crisis…the resignation of the government, something like that. But these two claims were the most important once. They were the final goals of the movement.*"(Ibid)

One of the organizers of the CfM platform who has very deep knowledge and insights of the entire process spoke of the greatest and ultimate goal of the movement – reintroducing freedom in the country. Still, he also reflected on the factual, more material claims, highlighting the resignation of PM Gruevski as the primary objective, followed by a creation of a caretaker government, but also the creation of the SPO, the guarantees for media freedom and a cleansed Voters List for the forthcoming elections:

"*The main claim, which is also evident from the Declaration, is the change of manner in which this country has been led, and introducing a higher degree of freedom. From the other central claims, I would like to reflect on the factual ones, and comment whether they have been fulfilled or not. The first one, above all, is the resignation of the PM Nikola Gruevski; the formation of a caretaker government; creation of the SPO which will deal with cases of embezzlement and other crimes noted in the wiretapped conversations; reform of the PBS accompanied with guaranteeing media freedoms and cleansing of the Voters List. Those were a few short-term demands or projected goals, which can be measured today in the sense whether they have been accomplished or not. All these short-term goals lead to the long-term projected goal – reinstituting freedom in the Macedonian society.*"(Int. 3, MKD)

This interviewee was the only one who stressed the creation of the SPO as one of the primary claims and objectives of the movement, clearly separating it from the resignation of the public prosecutor, the reintroducing of justice and rule of law, and similar issues. This is a clear indicator that the concept for a special prosecutor had been present in the heads of the governmental challengers in Macedonia.

In the context of the reoccurring of the central claims, the resignation of PM Gruevski was definitely on the pedestal and had been perceived as a first step in climbing the ladder of freedom. A participant who also manages one of the most important organizations which provided a lot of resources to the movement, perceived Gruevski's resignation as the only primary, central claim:

"*CfM was created in May 2015, based on a proclamation which claimed that 'We stand united…' referring to the NGOs and the political parties '…until the moment that Gruevski falls'. As a main paradigm, I would say that this was the main claim and the primary demand of the opposition coalition.*" (Int. 6, MKD)

A very famous reporter, who was also one of the speakers at the grand rally on 17 May, agreed fully with one of the interviewed organizers who underlined freedom as a main goal of the movement. Still, he was very critical of the general goal of the movement to put freedom in the spotlight, arguing that the average Macedonian citizen is so clattered by social problems and poverty, that they neither have the time, knowledge, education, nor awareness, to put freedom on the top of their priority list. Furthermore, he also highlighted the protection of the marginalized groups as one of the key claims:

"*Look, the first thing that comes to my mind when I think about the CfM is the word 'freedom'. Furthermore, when speaking about a platform like CfM, I also think of many NGOs that fight for the rights of the marginalized groups. For example, the LGBTI, the handicapped, sex workers…*" (Int. 8, MKD)

Lastly, another organizer of the CfM platform who was also one of the primary liaisons between the civil society and the political parties, also, above all, mentioned the resignation of Gruevski and legal responsibility of all actors who were implicated in the "political bombs". Secondly, he noted the creation of the caretaker government:

"*The claims of the coalition were, above all, the resignation and accountability of PM Gruevski and his entourage, the most responsible ones whose voices could be heard in the*

'political bombs'. The second central issue, as far as I remember, was the creation of a caretaker government which will organize free, fair, democratic and credible elections." (Int. 10, MKD)

Trying to sum up the central claims of the CfM movement, and aligning them on a hierarchical scale, one must note that the resignation of PM Nikola Gruevski was on the top of the priority list for the protesters in Macedonia. This helps in defining the 2015 protests as clearly anti-governmental. According to the interviewees, the general goal of reintroducing a higher degree of freedom, through the creation of a caretaker government would be second on the list of primary goals. For some of the activists, issues like continuous involvement of non-partisan activists, the further democratization of the Macedonian society, reintroducing rule of law, free and fair elections, guarantees for media freedom, the cleansing of the Voters List, and the protection of the marginalized groups were also among the priority goals of the movement. In relation to the explanandum of this research, one of the activists also prioritized the creation of the SPO as an impartial and independent institution.

Looking at the main claims channeled by the activists and CSO representatives, the sentiment for resignation, rule of law and justice prevails in their discourse. This strongly associates to a consistency between activists' grievances made prior to the contentious actions, and during the actions themselves. Turning towards the work of Polleta and Ho (2004), it is evident that frames and claims matter. "The ways in which political actors package their messages affect their ability to recruit adherents, gain favorable media coverage, demobilize antagonists, and win political victories" (Ibid, p. 188). The primary issues raised by the governmental challengers in Macedonia managed to resonate well both with ordinary citizens and with the international community.

The activists were also asked about other, secondary, or slightly less important claims which were issued by the Macedonian governmental challengers. One of the activists reflected on the ideological repositioning of the SDSM, the largest party in the platform, going back to its social democratic roots and turning towards social policy and welfare state, as well as strengthening of the multiethnic, multicultural and multi-confessional character of the Macedonian society:

"*I liked the moment that for the first time in history, the SDSM, the political party, showed signs of returning towards the social democratic values, towards the struggle for social justice,*

reintroducing the welfare state, reintroducing justice in this society hoping for further humanization of the society and the state." (Int. 1, MKD)

One of the movement organizers shortly summarized the remaining central claims the governmental challengers in Macedonia aspired to achieve, mainly media and judicial requests:

"*Furthermore, there was a larger set of demands which account for democratic normalization. That meant clarifying the rules for the media, returning the PBS back to the citizens and under citizens' control, or under journalist control which will bear in mind citizen and not the partisan interests. This was inspired by the fact that the PBS didn't even mention the wiretapped conversations.*" (Int. 10, MKD)

Following the political-process approach, empirical studies emphasize that "effective frames (and claims, I.S.) are a critical variable in accounting for movement emergence" (Polleta and Ho 2004, p. 198), but also political and policy outcomes. Despite the importance of other exogenous factors, which are especially important for this work, not having clear, viable, persuasive and structured claims will result with unsuccessful political opportunities and mobilizing networks (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001). The CfM case proved to be a successful combination of a powerful and viable claims-making process intertwined with favorable political opportunities leading to successful policy outcomes alleviating the grievances of the movement activists.

Figure 6. 1 Types of claims – "Citizens for Macedonia"



Source: Own calculation

Looking at the disaggregated PCA results for Macedonia, the largest portion of claims belong to the calls towards public officials in government to resign (26%), followed by the general anti-governmental claims (24%). This once again reaffirms the strong anti-governmental spirit of the CfM movement. Furthermore, 13% of the claims were directed towards the movement and the activists, criticizing them for their actions. These claims came mostly from government officials, or journalists and analysts closely affiliated to the government (Graph 5.1). The total disaggregation of claims is presented visually in the graph above. What remained as a central demand during the entire existence of the movement was the sentiment of resignation, amplified with the general anti-governmental atmosphere. On the other hand, the claims directly or indirectly linked to the creation of the SPO or the claims advocating for reintroducing justice, rule of law and protection of human rights are unremarkable (16% jointly). Moving back to the categorization by Tilly and Tarrow in the theoretical framework and the literature review, a prevalence of program claims (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, p. 111) can be noticed, aiming towards precise actions and policy enacting by the main target – the Macedonian government.

The last goal of the interviews regarding the claims-making process in Macedonia was to clearly identify the link between the aspirations and goals of the protesters with the enacting of the Law on the SPO. Several interviewees commented on the creation of the SPO being a part of the central claims from the initiation of the protests.

The majority of the interviewed activists could see the claim for an independent an impartial prosecution office, although not framed and shaped as the SPO created by the Law. Still, the majority of them could see a clear link between the citizens' claims and the creation of this extra-judicial institution.

"*The fact that we asked for the resignation of the public prosecutor implicated that someone would have to come on his place….and we know how corrupt and politicized were the institutions which had to elect a new regular public prosecutor. The problem was not Zvrlevski per se, the problem is in the system which creates and positions these politically obedient people. This is why the creation of the SPO was needed, in order to be independent and to conduct the investigations deriving from the 'political bombs'. The way it was created…you can see that it was a bit rushed, and many aspects were not taken into consideration, but this is something which can be fixed through the work of the SPO as an institution. We can say with 100%*

certainty that this SPO is a result of the claims which were put forward during the protest period" (Int. 1, MKD)

The only interviewee, who previously mentioned the creation of the SPO as a central claim, further clarified his reasoning:

"*The creation of the SPO was the only short-term goal which was completely fulfilled. In the beginning, the term SPO did not exist because the wording was not formulated. Still, behind the demands for resignation of the public prosecutor, the idea was to establish an independent public prosecutor. Regardless of the format, the goal has been achieved and today we have a new, independent public prosecutor which is dealing with the government's crimes, and it has the support of all the political parties, and in particular the international community.*" (Int. 3, MKD)

One of the most objective clarifications of the correlation between the Law on the SPO and the claims coming from the movement was provided by an interviewee who is leading a human rights think-tank participating in the platform, but is also a former Macedonian judge to the ECtHR in Strasbourg. She stressed the intertwining between the citizens' claims, the role of the international community, and the enacting of the Law on the SPO:

"*The SPO would not have been created if certain facts that pointed to the need of its creation were not indicated clearly. Here I refer both to the CSOs, as well as to the international community which clearly presented the state of the play prior to the creation of this institution.*" (Int. 7, MKD)

On the other hand, as expected, there were several activists that could not directly link the creation of the SPO to the claims making process at the beginning of the movement. Subsequently, the causal relationship became inevitable, due to the unraveling of multiple events. Two activists describe this very vividly:

"*No, I could never link the SPO to the CfM. They simply don't stick together for me, at least not in May 2015. From this perspective, of course I think that they are very much connected.*" (Int. 8, MKD)

"*At the beginning no, of course it wasn't. But, the development of the events led to it. We asked for Zverlevski's resignation which was still not effectuated, so the SPO was created in order to have a prosecution office distanced from the claws of the people in power, in order to conduct objective prosecution regarding what had happened. Here I am referring to the*

'political bombs' and the process of wiretapping. As I recall, it was not a clear claim at the beginning, but it later became a claim influenced by the circumstances." (Int. 2, MKD)

Looking at the interviews with the activists and the CSO representatives, a clear relationship between the claims-making of the movement activists and the creation of the Law on the SPO can be established. Understandably, their input varies diachronically in relation to when this relationship was established. Furthermore, the interviewees clearly highlight several key claims which are mostly connected to reintroducing democracy in the country, through the resignation of PM Gruevski and the creation of a caretaker government. This once again shows the importance of consistency of framing the main problems in society in a viable manner (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001).

The methodological approach also requires an overview of the types of claimants which put forward their claims. Out of the entire corpus of claims the emphasis is put on those coming from the side of the social movement actors. In the case of the CfM movement, following the previously-mentioned methodological approach, a total number of 151 political claims were coded. More than one third of the total number of claims (36%) was made by movement activists. This figure was followed by 18% of national politicians and 18% of other various claimants. The media and journalists comprised 17% of the claimants (Graph 5.2). The results show more dedicated activity of the movement activists in comparison to other actors present in the political claim analysis. This once again shows the importance of the claims-making process in regard to the movement outcomes (Polleta and Ho 2004).

Figure 6. 2 Types of claimants – "Citizens for Macedonia"



Source: Own calculation

Lastly, looking at the disaggregated PCA data in terms of the addressees of the claims-making process during the CfM movement in Macedonia, one can conclude that the two main blocks, the movement activists and the government-affiliated actors, mainly addressed the citizens (47%). The movement holds the second position with being an addressee of the 20% of claims, while the politicians and the public officials were addressed in 17% of the cases (Graph 5.3). These results clearly show that the two main camps were competing for the support of the citizens, mainly bystanders and those not much politically active. This reaffirms the viewpoint of Uba (2016) that the attitudes toward protests among the political elite are highly important when policy outcomes are at stake (Ibid, pp. 162-3)

Figure 6. 3 Addressees of the claims – "Citizens for Macedonia"



Source: Own calculation

This section delved deeper into disaggregating the types of claims, the types of claimants as well as the addressees of the CfM movement. These protests were marked by consistency of the central grievances prior to the movement activities, as well as during the actions. This consistent and viable framing of the main problems (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001)

contributed towards adoption of favorable policy outputs further resulting with tangible policy outcomes substantially alleviating the grievances set forward by the governmental challengers. Furthermore, one of the most intriguing issues is the discrepancy between the interviews with the activists and the results of the disaggregated PCA which shows a different level of importance and presence of democratization and human rights claims. The prevalence of programmatic claims ((Tilly & Tarrow 2015, p. 111) should also be underlined. The importance of claimants and the claims-making process in regard to movement outcomes (Polleta and Ho 2004) is also visible through the dedicated activity of the CfM activists in comparison to other allies and adversaries grasped by the PCA. Lastly, in terms of the addressees of the claims, this section showes the struggle between the pro-movement and the anti-movement camps aiming to garner the support of the citizens. The fact that both the pro-movement political parties and the parties in government jointly adopted the policy outputs highlights the importance of the attitudes towards protest of the political elites (Uba 2016).

6.4. *Case Study Specifics: The Bulgarian Monopolies*

Similar to the previous section on Macedonia, this part of the chapter looks at the main claims being put forward during the winter protests in Bulgaria. Disentangling the claims-making process into multiple categories and comparing to the events in Macedonia creates an even more vivid picture about the differences and similarities in terms of the types of claims in the two countries. This section further looks at the main claimants during the Bulgarian anti-monopolies mobilization and draws parallels between this case and the CfM one previously described. This section ends with a look towards the main targets of this protest wave. Lastly, these concepts are observed through the lens of policy outcomes which are the main focus of the entire research.

Speaking to the Bulgarian interviewees about the main reasons for protest, the initial impression was that the citizens had a very clear picture of what they expected from their central government. Still, as the protests unraveled, the fractionation between the different strands of the movement created a very long list of over 20 demands, which differed widely from the primary claims regarding improvement of the socio-economic status of the citizens and an improved regulation of the energy sector in Bulgaria. Speaking about the initial citizens' demands, one of the activists from the green movement who is also an active politician spoke about the anti-

monopolies regulation, and the general energy poverty in Bulgaria which was supposed to be eradicated:

"*The most crucial claim, from my perspective, was the regulation of the monopolies in the energy sector. This was the main problem which brought the people outside, to the streets. For some other people, the second largest group I believe, the main reason was the social policy of the government, and how they didn't care about the energy poverty of the people…the fact that people had to pay such high bills for electricity.*" (Int. 1, BUL)

Another very visible face of the Bulgarian protesters who was also a leader of one of the groups in Sofia, shared the issue with the heating distribution company in Sofia, as well as the issue with the monopolies, presenting solutions that would have brought the energy distribution "closer to the people":

"*We, the people of Sofia, have one huge problem, and it is called 'Heating Distribution – Sofia'. The second issue is the monopolies in the energy sector. These are the two key issues which scare every household. We don't want nationalization, but giving back the key decision-making powers to the state. People blamed us for reintroducing communism.*"(Int. 3, BUL)

Lastly, an activist from the more leftist strand of the movement just reaffirmed the central claims of the movement, the high electricity bills produced by the energy monopolies. She also reflected on the imperialist globalization feeling that many protesters had during the events. The sense that their country has been owned by the multinational corporations:

"*The main, the central claim, of course, were the electricity bills which were very high for no particular reason, because it was not such a cold winter. Around this central issue, there was also a discourse about the foreign companies that occupy our fatherland and deprive us of everything. I think that if the bills had come from a national Bulgarian company, the people would not have been that much angry. I can also say that people were very angry from a 'nationalistic perspective'.*" (Int. 5, BUL)

If one tries to summarize the main claims of the Bulgarian winter protests in its initial phase, they can be amounted to the regulation of the energy distribution monopolies and social measures for gradually decreasing the energy prices, as well as further regulation of the Sofia Heating Distribution Company. The problems for the governmental challengers started when numerous additional claims started to invade the public sphere. Most of them exceeded the socio-economic character of the protests. This was, also, to a certain extent, a result of the

numerous strands within the movement. Each strand had a different set of demands that were not very converging. This is very well explained by the activist coming from the green movement:

"*There was a demand to kick out the monopolies and create regionalization and decentralization of the energy sector, which is also, a demand from the EU. Of course, there were people demanding a resignation from the government, but, surprisingly for some, the Government resigned, but the protests continued. After that, the demands were even less clear. Of course, the regulatory body – KEVR, was also at the core, because this is the regulatory body that needs to control the private companies in the energy sector, energy prices etc. There were protests in front of their headquarters and pressure over them as an institution as well, but that was it.*" (Int. 1, BUL)

The previous interview excerpt clearly points towards new issues like government resignation, demands for eviction of the monopolies, anti-KEVR sentiments. Even claims proclaiming citizens' ownership of the energy distribution network occurred:

"*One of the central claims was to return the distribution network to the citizens, like in Berlin. We also asked for public disclosure of all the state contracts and criminal responsibility. Furthermore, we advocated for liberalization of the energy market.*" (Int. 3, BUL)

The peak of confusion regarding the claims-making of the Bulgarian winter protests was reached on 23 February, after a meeting of the protest leaders in Sliven. The entire atmosphere was presented by one of the protest leaders in Veliko Trnovo, who originates from Sofia, which makes him an informed person regarding multiple protest locations throughout Bulgaria:

"*Even before the meeting in Sliven there were many claims, because the demonstrations were en mass and thousands of people took part. This is the main reason why there were multiple strands within the movement, asking for diametrically different things. Issues ranged from constitutional reform to nationalization of the energy distribution companies. After the meeting in Sliven which took place on 23 February 2013, and lasted for over 10 hours, we came out united with a unique list of demands.*" (Int. 6, BUL)

The protesters came forward with the following list of demands: Immediate stop of all court proceedings against gas users, heating and electricity; Control of the validity of the energy bills; Decrease of the quotas for producing electricity following the expensive quotas; Nationalization of a certain percent of the ownership of the electricity distribution companies, in accordance with the European directives; Elimination of all proxies between the electricity

distribution companies and the citizens; Abolition of all debts towards the producers of electricity; Abolition of all contracts harmful for the state and the citizens, and providing compensation both for the state and the citizens; Judicial and criminal responsibility for all persons signing contracts harmful for the state and the citizens; 50% citizens' participation in KEVR; Introducing individual contracts for heating users; A possibility for every citizen to annul his/her energy contract with a one-month notice; Installation of equipment that will individually and realistically measure the spent heating energy; Monthly measurement of the realistically spent electricity and heating energy; Annulment of all water concessions; Responsibility of the state for regulating the functions and the activities of the concessioners; Creation of a social council of experts containing internal obligatory citizens' control; Changes to the electoral legislation; Substitution of the PR model with a majoritarian; Introducing a procedure for revoking MPs; Introducing criminal liability for MPs; Introducing a guaranteed citizens' quota in all state regulatory bodies (*Duma* 24/25 February 2013 and *Trud* 24/25 February 2013; personal archive of the author).

In comparison to the Macedonian case, there was no need to track the causal relationship between the central claims and the policy outputs, since it is very self-evident and clear. Still, unlike Macedonia, where the claims-making was relatively focused and vivid, in the Bulgarian case the demands of the citizens grew exponentially from day to day, and after the official meeting of the protest organizers in Sliven, the protesters came forward with over 20 demands, ranging from social welfare to constitutional changes, defocusing from the main goals. The Bulgarian protesters entered into a process of claim-bridging (Snow et al. 1986) aiming to link ideologically congruent, but structurally unconnected claims. What differs from the Macedonian case is the lack of consistency in highlighting certain issues before and during the contentious actions. While before the initiation of the protests the public discourse was dominated by claims and frames underlining the monopolies of the energy distribution companies, energy poverty, high electricity bills and heating issues (Georgieva 2018, p. 51), the topics largely expanded during the course of the events. In this vein, the Bulgarian governmental challengers to a certain extent confused adherents, adversaries, as well as bystanders, limiting their possibilities to package their messages effectively (Polleta and Ho 2004). This claims-making approach, paired with other non-favorable important exogenous factors (Tilly 1999) resulted in acquiring policy outputs which failed to transform into viable policy outcomes.

Figure 6. 4 Types of claims – Bulgarian winter protests



Source: Own calculation

Looking at the disaggregated PCA for Bulgaria, one can notice similarities to the interview excerpts presented in previous rows. With almost 15 different types of claims, the graph vividly presents the plethora of issues arising during the movement activities. Once again, in accordance with what was explained in the preceding paragraphs, the largest number of claims was related to the unreasonably high energy bills (29%), followed by a very high percentage of "other claims" (22%) which do not fit within any of the designated categories. 20% of all claims are generally anti-governmental, which reaffirms the categorization of the Bulgarian winter protests as anti-governmental (Graph 5.4). Conversely to the Macedonian case, one can trace a strong coherence between the initial demands of the activists, the interviews with the activists and the CSO representatives, and the claims-making process and the policy output. In the Bulgarian case, this is primarily the issuing of the high energy bills and related socio-economic issues. An important similarity to the Macedonian case is the strong prevalence of program claims (Tilly and Tarrow 2015).

Another important issue which needs to be assessed in terms of the methodological approach is the type of claimants which articulated the aforementioned claims. In the case of Bulgaria, out of 288 claims, 40% came from the side of the movement activists. Furthermore, 22% were put forward by national politicians, 13% from numerous claimants not fitting within any of the designated categories, while 12% were made by the media and the journalists. The figures in regards to the percentage of claims put forward by movement activists are quite similar to the Macedonian case. What differs is the number of types of claimants. In Bulgaria, many more categories of claimants were active in comparison to the previous case. One peculiarity which distinguishes the Bulgarian from the Macedonian movement actors is their affiliation. While the majority of Bulgarian activists during the 2013 winter protests were not affiliated to any NGO, trade union, or political party (Georgieva 2018, p. 50), the vast majority of the Macedonian activists came from NGOs, think-tanks, political parties and similar organizational forms (Stefanovski 2016). Still, as in the Macedonian case, the dedicated activity of the Bulgarian movement actors prevailed in comparison to other actors grasped by the PCA. These results reaffirm the importance of the claims-making process in reference to the policy outcomes (Polleta and Ho 2004)

Figure 6. 5 Types of claimants – Bulgarian winter protests



Source: Own calculation

Moving to the addressees of the claims in Bulgaria, it is evident that a serious portion of the claims was directed towards the citizens (43%). This shows a tendency of the claimants to appeal to the citizens to convey their messages in order to increase their popularity and support. This refers both to the movement activists as well as to the politicians and the public officials. Furthermore, this trend is very similar to the Macedonian case were the citizens also topped the table in terms of addressees. Expectedly, the citizens are followed by the national level government (28%), as well as other addressees not encompassed by the existing categories (10%). One must note that although in the beginning of the movement the monopolies were in the center of the attention of the activists, the challengers changed tactics in order to exert pressure over the government and enter the policy arena and secure favorable policy outputs.

These results once again show the importance of the elite's attitudes towards the claims-making process when political and policy outcomes are taken into consideration (Uba 2016).

Figure 6. 6 Addressees of the claims – Bulgarian winter protests



Source: Own calculation

This section analyzed in greater detail the disaggregated types of claims, the types of claimants, as well as the addressees of the Bulgarian winter protests. The consistency of the claims-making process throughout the period before and during the contentious period managed to grasp the main grievances of the governmental challengers (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001), which contributed to the adoption of the policy outputs. Still, this favorable decision of the KEVR failed to produce tangible policy outcomes for the Bulgarian movement activists. Similar to the Macedonian case, it was the programmatic claims (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 111) which dominated the public sphere. Another important similarity with the Macedonian case is

the visible dedicated activity of the movement actors in comparison to others, which once again underlines the importance of the claimants in reference to the movement outcomes (Polleta and Ho 2004). Lastly, as in the CfM protests, the Bulgarian citizens were the most targeted category of addressees of the claims-making process, which again, shows the importance of political elites' attitudes towards protest-related issues (Uba 2016).

6.5. *Case Study Specifics: The "Bosnian Spring"*

The third and last case glances at the main types of claims during the protests in B&H, underlining the main frontrunners in terms of claims making. The section further delves into analysis of the main targets of protest and engages into cross-country comparison between the three cases. The main idea is to link the entire claims-making process to the policy outcomes.

The interviews with the BH protesters were rather emotional, due to their inability to face failure after such a long and intense mobilization period. Tuzla was the city where it had all started. During one of the traditional protests by the redundant workers from the Tuzla factories which were held weekly, the spark was lit and the entire mobilization spread across the country. One of the protest organizers in Tuzla, who was a recent graduate at that time, put an effort to crystallize the main claims, recognizing that it was a very difficult task due to the numerous issues which were proposed by the plenum. Still, what is very intriguing in comparison to the previous two cases, is that the BH governmental challengers did not have any pre-defined claims, mainly due to the very spontaneous and explosive character of the mobilization. Although there were a plethora of claims, the interviewee managed to signal out four main issues related to the transitory government, citizen safety, revision of privatization and reinstatement of production in the bankrupted factories:

"*One of the central issues was the establishment of an interim government in the Tuzla Canton which would not be partisan-co-opted, but a responsible and qualified one. Furthermore, the second central claim was to pay attention to safety of the citizens, because a lot of things had happened…buildings were set on fire, the police chased the people, and citizens were beaten. The third central claim referred to revision of the privatization. This issue was present all the time, during the entire process. The fourth issue was to reinstate production in the closed factories. The last two claims were definitely the two most important ones.*" (Int. 6, B&H)

It can be easily noticed that although the activist managed to extrapolate four central claims, he further underpinned the two socio-economic ones in comparison to the more political ones.

Another very engaged activist from Sarajevo, who also participated in the organization of the Sarajevo plenums, also started her talk by reflecting on the process of revision of privatization. Furthermore, she once again stressed the thousands of claims that the citizens channeled during the plenums:

"*The revision of privatization was the main issue. I clearly remember that. How did the entire process look? We created working groups and everyone could submit a claim, to channel his/her problems. The people had hundreds, thousands of demands…*" (Int. 3, B&H)

The true variety of claims can be seen through the words of a Sarajevo activist who during the protests led the so called "group for protests". This young and brave woman had to coordinate a group of highly motivated young men who were also very violent at times. She also highlighted the socio-economic claims and the revision of the privatization process. Unlike any other activist, she very clearly noted the need for high-quality education in order to create critical thinkers and responsible citizens:

"*I would put the social claims in the first place. They range from issues that concern kids in primary schools, and end with issues that concern pensioners. I am talking about the social responsibility of the state. Then, the privatization process is here. Furthermore, unproductive costs. According to me, the most important thing is education, Education, education, education…Better healthcare, higher pensions.*" (Int. 4, B&H)

One of the activists coming from the NGO sector in B&H commented that the most intriguing point was the diffusion of the claims, and how they "travelled" from canton to canton, triggering the mechanism of diffusion in respect to the claims-making process (Tilly and Tarrow 2015):

"*The demand for an expert government was taken from Tuzla to Sarajevo. The same can be said about the request to revoke all the indictments against the protesters.*" (Int. 8, B&H)

An activist coming from the feminist movement, but also very active in the NGO scene, commented that the large numbers of socio-economic claims, asking for things which are basic in every civilized society, clearly depict the misery in which the majority of BH citizens live. She

also criticized the behavior of the more educated, middle class protesters which, according to her, wanted and succeeded in taking over the protests:

"*Claims which were frequently discussed and repeated at all times were those for minimal wages, minimal pensions, and benefits for demobilized soldiers. Altogether, several thousands of claims had arrived. After they were reworked and merged, we brought them down to several hundreds. Through all these banal things you could see the entire misery of the people. We are talking about people that do not know whether they will have food on their table for lunch tomorrow. Later on, the protests were taken over by the middle-class proletariat. Some kind of intellectuals*" (Int. 7, B&H)

On the other hand, one of the protesters coming from Sarajevo reflected on the more political claims. She criticized the entire claims-making process for not being focused and strategically driven. She even defined the movement activists as a group which is naïve and unorganized:

"*The first and central claim was the expert (caretaker) government. This was very interesting. According to me, there were many things which were more important, but, somehow, the people started to jump and scream for resignations. Later on, the claims for salaries and benefits of the redundant workers started to emerge. Still, the more structured claims-making process arrived after the creation of the plenums and the working groups. Of course, the revision of the privatization process was one of the central claims. This was extremely important, especially for Tuzla. However, the people were very indecisive, wandering around with their claims. To conclude, we were a relatively naïve and unorganized group.*" (Int. 5, B&H)

Concluding with the interviews in B&H, one can certainly say that the revision of privatization and socio-economic claims dominated the scene. Still, a plethora of political, electoral and security issues also penetrated the public sphere. The havoc created by the enormous number of claims pouring into Sarajevo can easily be depicted through the words of one activist who worked on the scanning and archiving of the claims: "*At a certain point, more than 11.000 claims were scanned and archived in Sarajevo*" (Int. 11, B&H). This is also one of the main reasons why the protesters could not count on any significant gain that would alleviate their difficult conditions

Conversely to the Macedonian and the Bulgarian protests where we traced the link between the claims channeled before and during the protests, and their connection to the policy

outputs, in the BH case there were no claims prior to the protests because it was an unorganized explosion of dissatisfaction, (aside those coming from the redundant workers in Tuzla), or policy outputs on federal and state level which could be analyzed. What can be noted as a common thread between the Bulgarian and the BH protests is the process of excessive claim-bridging (Snow et al. 1986). The abundance of claims is also noted by Arsenijević (2014) and Mujkić (2016). This occurrence to a certain extent puzzled both adherents and adversaries to the movement, failing to effectively channel the most important messages in the public sphere (Polleta and Ho 2004).

Figure 6. 7 Types of claims – "Bosnian Spring"



Source: Own calculation

Moving to the disaggregated PCA analysis for the movement in B&H, a total number of 435 claims were coded. The various types of claims highlighted by the interviewees resemble the PCA data. The largest portion of claims (28%) belongs to the general – anti governmental claims, which once again points to the anti-governmental character of the movement. Furthermore, 21% of the claims are related to the plea for resignations of government officials and politicians on behalf of the movement activists. The third highest portion of claims belongs to the support to the movement coming mostly from the streets, as well as from independent analysts and organizations (Graph 6.7). What differs from the Macedonian and the Bulgarian case is the inability to link the initial grievances of the protesters and the policy outputs, due to the fact that the latter are non-existent in the case of B&H. On the other hand, the domination of the programmatic claims (Tilly and Tarrow 2015) is what dominates throughout the three movements.

Figure 6. 8 Types of claimants – "Bosnian Spring"



Source: Own calculation

In regards to the type of claimants, the percentage of claims coming from movement activists is slightly higher than those in Macedonia and in Bulgaria – 55.4% (Graph 6.8). Furthermore, 12% of the claimants do not belong to any of the designated categories, while 7% were made by the media and journalists. This indicates an even stronger and more engaged mobilization within this movement, in comparison to the activities in Macedonia and Bulgaria. The categories of claimants are also rather high, quite similar to the Bulgarian case (Graph 6.8). The BH case, contrary to the two other previously described cases, shows that an intensive and strong claims-making process (Polleta and Ho 2004) does not always results with favorable policy outputs and outcomes.

Figure 6. 9 Addressees of the claims – "Bosnian Spring"



Source: Own calculation

Unlike the Macedonian and the Bulgarian cases, the citizens are not the most common addressees in B&H. The government on cantonal and local level was the most addressed (35%). The second position belongs to the movement *per se* (21%). The top three are circled with the

central government which was also among the most frequent addressees (20%). These results show an even stronger anti-governmental component in comparison to the two other movements. Still, our analysis shows that the actions of the protesters are only one single determinant of movement outcomes. The characteristics of the targets, in this case the state, are also very important (Moore 1999, p. 99). The federal and state governments in B&H remained resilient to adopting policy outputs aligned with the grievances of the governmental challengers.

This section further explored the disaggregated types of claims, the main claimants and the addressees of the "Bosnian Spring". The rather scattered and unstructured claims-making process failed to result with favorable policy outputs and outcomes on federal and state level. Although rather intensive, the claims-making process did not manage to grasp the main grievances of the governmental challengers (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001). In terms of the types of claims, similar to the Macedonian and Bulgarian movements, the programmatic claims (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, p. 111) were most dominant. Furthermore, the visible dedication of the BH activists was even stronger in comparison to those in Macedonia and Bulgaria. Still, this effort did not materialize into tangible policy outputs and outcomes (Polleta and Ho 2004). Lastly, the main targets of protest in B&H were the cantonal and the state institutions. Jointly, they comprised 55% of the targets, which points to a strong anti-governmental sentiment. Nevertheless, the institutions in B&H remained resilient in terms of popular pressure, and failed to make concessions toward the governmental challengers, underpinning the importance of the characteristics of targets (Moore 1999, p. 99)

6.6. *Conclusions*

In this chapter we have tried to relate the outcomes of the movements in the three respective countries, beyond the context of opportunities and constraints, to the issues and frames mobilized by the actors. As emerged from this chapter, the social movements and civil society groups in these three countries mobilized around different issues. At the beginning some of them started from very large and broad topics (such as quality of democracy, abuse of power, corruption etc.) as in the Macedonian case. Other, as in the Bulgarian case, started the protest by focusing on a very specific single issue problem later enlarging it, according to the mechanisms of frame bridging and frame amplification (Snow et al. 1986), in order to broaden the issues common to the country. In the BH case another different picture occurs: In this case the protest

started as support for the redundant workers in Tuzla and ended as a general anti-governmental and anti-systemic protest. In general, comparing differences and similarities across the three cases in regards to the types of claims, the types of actors and the addressees of the claims, the Macedonian case is more characterized by institutionalized /formalized protest (Moore 1999), mainly focused on general anti-governmental claims, as well as legal and political issues, having as prominent actors mainly movement actors, media and journalists, as well as other non-movement actors. The claims were mainly directed towards the citizens, the politicians and the political parties. The Bulgarian case showed from the very beginning a much more movement-like and disruptive character. The central issues raised were related to the economy of the country, followed by the general anti-governmental issues as well as other various types of claims (Georgieva 2018). The most active actors in terms of claims making were the movement activists, followed by the politicians and the political parties. In regards to addressees, the citizens were the most addressed category, followed by other various non-movement actors. The case of the "Bosnian Spring", similarly to the Macedonian case, fostered claims which were in general anti-governmental, followed by the legal and political claims, the support for the movement, as well as claim related to the generally bad economic conditions in the country (Arsenijević 2014). As for the main claimants, movement actors were the most dominant, followed by various non-movement actors, as well as by politicians and political parties. A small portion of claims was put forward by the media and the journalists. Lastly, in reference to the addressees of the claims, various non-movement actors were addressed the most, followed by the movement actors and the citizens. The least addressed were the politicians and the political parties (Table 6.4).

Trying to summarize the main claims of the CfM movement, the largest portion of claims is dedicated to the calls for resignation of the government and high ranking public of officials (Stefanovski 2016). Primarily, this refers to former PM Gruevski's resignation which was on the top of the priority list. The general anti-governmental claims follow the resignation outcries. Furthermore, the claims directly or indirectly linked to the creation of the SPO or the claims advocating for reintroducing justice, rule of law and protection of human rights are unremarkable (only 16% jointly). Looking for traces of creation of the SPO, one of the interviewees prioritized the creation of this impartial and independent post-Przhino institution. Relating this creation of this institution to the calls for justice and rule of law one can establish a relationship between the

activists' claims and the creation of the Law on the SPO as a policy output (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001). The perceptions of the activists and CSO representatives vary in terms of time regarding when this relationship was established.

Moving to the central claims of the Bulgarian winter protests, one could notice great similarities between the PCA results and the data stemming from the interviews. The largest number of claims was related to the unreasonably high energy bills (Georgieva 2018), followed by the "other claims" which points towards the diversity of claims being channeled during the movement. 20% of the claims were generally anti-governmental. Furthermore, the interviewees singled out the regulation of the energy distribution monopolies, the decrease of the energy prices and further regulations affecting the Sofia Heating Distribution Company. In comparison to the Macedonian case, there was no need to delve deeper in looking for linkages between the claims and the policy output, because they were very clear and straightforward. The changes of strategy which occurred during the course of the movement, to a certain extent caused by the different strands of the movement, resulted in the production of many additional claims which gravely exceeded the socio-economic character of the protests. The peak of this process was reached after the meeting in Sliven when the movement organizers went public with an extended list of over 20 demands covering various social spheres. This brings us to main difference between the Macedonian and the Bulgarian protests emerging from the interviews: while the claims-making process in the first case was rather focused and vivid, in the latter, the Bulgarian protesters faced inability to concentrate on the few key claims that they had put forward in the beginning of the movement. To a certain extent, this was caused by multi-way peer pressure of the different strands of the movement. Furthermore, this disunity opened space for the state as the main opponent to interfere and drag the challengers into protracting discussion, debates and negotiations.

What distinguishes the BH case from the previous two is the non-existence of structured claims before the commencement of the movement, aside from the years-long workers protest in Tuzla, primarily because of the spontaneous outburst of the citizens' dissatisfaction. This resulted in lack of opportunity to look for links between pre-defined claims and potential policy outputs. Furthermore, the lack of policy outputs on federal and state level further limited this possibility. Following the initial protests in Tuzla (Milan and Oikonomakis 2018), the governmental challengers entered into a hectic and non-organized process of claims making. The

largest portion of the claims were general anti-governmental, followed by the resignation claims, and later by claims in support to the movement activists. The various types of claims depicted in the previous rows resemble the data from the interview. The interviewees highlighted the thousands of claims varying across fields and topics, but also across municipalities, cantons and entities (Mujkić 2016). This is one of the potential explanations why the protesters failed to reach the policy arena on federal and state level and secure one or more policy outputs. Interviewees had a very hard time summarizing the main claims and demands of the movement. Only few could agree around the creation of caretaker governments, increasing the citizen security, the revision of the privatization process and the reinstatement of production in the closed factories (Arsenijević 2014).

The main point of focusing on the claims-making process was the targeting of the three respective governments by the social movements. Drawing on the theoretical notions that the types and the varieties of claims can significantly affect the types of groups that are mobilized (Snow et al. 1986 and Tarrow 2011), which further influences the participation and engagement of the protesters, this work hypothesized that the higher number of claims, and the wider pallet of claims the better the resonace among the wider public, exerting greater pressure over governments to adopt the desired policy outputs and effectuate them in policy outcomes that can alleviate the grievances of the governmental challengers. Revisiting the results from the PCA in the three countries under investigation, one cannot trace a clear causal relationship between the number/types of claims and the movement outputs that had been produced.

Starting with the PCA results of the Macedonian case, the governmental challengers were primarily targeting the citizens, while the politicians and the public officials were addressed in only 17% of the total number of claims. This shows a discrepancy between the analyzed interviews and the PCA which opens avenues for further research and investigation.

Very similar to the previous case, the Bulgarian PCA also points towards the citizens as the main addressees during the claims-making process of the Bulgarian winter protests. Furthermore, unlike the Macedonian case, the Bulgarian challengers targeted the central level government with almost 30% of the claims.

What is peculiar about the PCA of the BH movement is that despite not managing to secure a favorable policy output, the governmental challengers put forward more claims in comparison to the challengers in the Macedonian and Bulgarian cases. Although all data

limitations regarding the PCA in the three countries should be taken into consideration (Koopmans and Statham 1999), this is an indicator of a stronger and more engaged mobilization in comparison to the two previous cases. In terms of the addressees of the claims, the cantonal and municipal governments were the most addressed set of actors. This data points to an even stronger anti-governmental sentiment in comparison to the first two cases.

The general conclusion of this chapter is that although the claims-making process is a very important factor for assessing movement outcomes, in our three cases under research, both the policy outputs and outcomes are only shaped to a limited extent by these processes. The nature of the framing of the claims-making processes has different charachteristics in the three respective countries. Just for a moment putting aside the quantitative results stemming from the PCA, which in any case are, at least to a certain extent, bias due to the availability, selection and editorial policy of the analyzed newspapers, one should also re-emphasize the context in which the three mobilizations operated. Glancing back at Linz and Stepan's arguments (1996) about the intertwining of the struggle for democracy, introduction of capitalism and creation of new states, as well as the interventionist policies of foreign powers as an important variable, it is easier to distinguish between the three contexts. Both Macedonia and B&H went relatively close in time through the turmulous process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, a context which is not present in Bulgaria. These recent state-building activities in the region (Vardari and Stefanovski 2018) amplified the role of the international community in the two former Yugoslav countries as a serious actor that can lead important political processes in a certain direction. This also contributed towards framing the importance of the role of the international community when citizens' grievances are at stake, including harsh criticizism of the "foreigners'" political legitimizing of politicians and political parties which had for decades contributed to the protracted crises. In a similar vein, it is also relatively straight-forward to understand the difference in emphasizing the crucial grievances and messages of the governmental challengers. While in Bulgaria and B&H the economic hardship was underpinned, it was the seriously threatened democratic capacity of Macedonian society which was mostly highlighted by the protesters in Skopje. Taking into consideration the policy outputs and outcomes, one could argue that more favorable policy outputs and outcomes in the region of South East Europe can be achieved when claims in regards to democratic backsliding are being put forward. The outcomes are slightly different when economy and capitalism related grievances are at the center of the

contentious activities, such as in Bulgaria and B&H. Furthermore, the three protest campaigns had different aims. Although in their essence they were anti-governmental, the "Citizens for Macedonia" initially came together to bring an end to Gruevski's reign, while the other two mobilizations transformed into anti-governmental and anti-systemic following a certain period of time. These differences in framing, as well as the wise choice of adherents and opponenets within the political systems largely contributed towards the policy outputs and policy outcomes in the region. Reintroducing Tilly's arguments, one should never forget that when assessing movement outcomes, both effects of movements' actions and effects of outside events should be taken into consideration and dealt with (Tilly, C. 1999) In the case of our three movements under investigation, as the following chapters show, the effects of outside events are more important in terms of shaping the policy outcomes.

Table 6. 4 Relations between the PCA and the policy outcomes

	Macedonia	***Bulgaria***	***B&H***
Type of protest	Institutional/ Formalized	Disruptive	Disruptive
General claims-making issues	General anti-governmental/ legal/ political	Economy/ general anti-governmental claims/ other various claims	General anti-governmental/ legal/ political/ support for the movement/ economy
Most prominent actors	Movement actors/ Media and journalists/ other non-movement actors	Movement actors/ politicians/ political parties	Movement actors/ other non-movement actors/ politicians/ political parties/ media and journalists
Main targets of the claims	The citizens/ politicians/ political parties	Citizens/ other non-movement actors	Other non-movement actors/ movement actors/ citizens/ politicians/ political parties
Policy outputs	Strong presence of policy outputs	Minor presence of policy outputs	Absence of policy outputs
Policy outcomes	Presence of policy outcomes	Absence of policy outcomes	Absence of policy outcomes

Source: Own calculation

Chapter 7 : Repertoires of Action Targeting Governments in South East Europe

This chapter investigates the **intensity and duration** of the protests, as well as the disruptiveness of the actions focusing on the repertoires of contention which articulate the claims related to the analyzed policy outputs and policy outcomes. As mentioned in the methodological section of this study, a protest event analysis (PEA) has been used to explore these characteristics of the three movements in the three respective countries. In the following sections these issues are addressed.

In regards to the repertoires of action, the three cases are examined through one of the hypotheses put forward by Uba (2016), who claims that there is great likelihood that protest experience might vary in regards to the forms of action and influence differently the policy outcomes. Thus, "petitions, public meetings, and peaceful demonstrations might have a positive effect on the elite's understanding toward such actions, while disruptions caused by strikes, riots, and other more threatening events might have a negative effect instead."

Previous studies have shown that the number of protest events is an important indicator when one attempts to link repertoires of contention to policy outcomes. Recalling the hypothesis drawn from the so called "normalization mechanism" sketched by Uba (Ibid), it could be expected that if one holder of power or policy maker encounters protests more frequently, these actions would seem more acceptable and less threatening. From the perspective of this study, it would mean that a higher number of protest events should result in more favorable policy outcomes.

Another important indicator worth taking into consideration when relating contentious repertoires and policy outcomes is the number of participants attending the coded protest events. As it was noted in the theoretical chapters, previous empirical analyses have shown that the number of activists can affect the decision-making process because power holders always take into consideration electoral support (della Porta & Diani 2006, p. 171). In this regard, policy makers are likely to take into consideration demands put forward by a larger group of challengers. In reference to the three movements studied in this work, one of the hypotheses presented in the introductory chapters envisaged that larger protest event participation would increase the possibility of acquiring the desired policy outputs, and would ease the way towards successful policy outcomes.

7.1. *The Varieties of Action Strategies within the Three Movements and their Outcomes*

Regarding the varieties of the repertoires of contention, this study has already mentioned several classifications. In terms of disruption, violence and contained behavior (Tarrow 2011, p. 99), table 7.1 presents the number of each category of repertoires within the three countries. The disruptive repertoires break the routine, surprise the bystanders and, at least for some time, disorient the elites (Piven and Cloward 1977). These disruptive, or also referred to as confrontational actions, aim at disrupting official policies or institutions (Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 2012, p. 80). These actions usually include blockades, occupations, non-violent illegal demonstrations and disturbances of meetings of political adversaries (Koopmans 1993, p. 640). Violent action strategies are the most dramatic once, easy to initiate and usually limited to small groups with limited resources who are willing to create damage, but also risk repression (Tarrow 2011, p. 99). Violent repertoires are illegal actions which imply some form of physical or symbolic violence against things or people (Koopmans 1993, p. 640). Lastly, contained behavior, also referred to as conventional or routine, builds on more routinized actions which people understand, and elites accept or even sometimes facilitate (Tarrow 2011, p. 99). These conventional repertoires are political actions which are associated with established politics (Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 2012, p. 79), for example, debates, lobbying activities, election campaigns, press conferences, petitions etc. In all three countries, the three different protest campaigns adopt mainly confrontational (disruptive) repertoires.

Table 7. 1 Forms of action

Forms of action	*Macedonia*	*B&H*	*Bulgaria*	*Total*
Conventional (routine)	31%	17%	0%	14%
Confrontational (disruptive)	69%	75%	97%	80%
Violent	0%	8%	3%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(13)	(182)	(59)	(254)

Pearson Chi-Square Value: 17.157; df: 4; Asymptotic significance: 0.002

Cramer's V .184

Source: Own calculation

The most notable example of a disruptive repertoire from the Macedonian protest wave is undoubtedly the grand rally held in front of government on 17 May 2015. The 17 May protest was the initial activity that promoted the CfM coalition in front of the wider public and acted as a kind of "kick-off" event that echoed the main claims and values of the citizens' coalition. The central claims had already been thoroughly presented. In terms of the values the Macedonian movement stood for, one must primarily underpin democratization, very similar to the shared value of communist challengers during 1989 in Eastern Europe (Oberschall 2000). Furthermore, this democratization-driven mobilization combined with its inter-ethnic character additionally strengthened the movement's unity (Jordan 1995). One of the SMO representatives singled out these characteristics:

"*The Macedonian flags and the flags of the ethnic communities living in Macedonia dominated. There were Albanian flags, Turkish flags, Serbian flags. The ones dominating were the Macedonian, the Albanian and the Turkish flags. There was another creative branding that dominated – a traffic sign with Gruevski's face on it crossed over in order to symbolically depict the common goal: the demise of this governmental clique led by Gruevski…The final result of the rally was a serious number of citizens that flooded Skopje.* (Int. 3, MKD)

Namely, the demise of former PM Gruevski was the cohesive element which closely-knit together various profiles of governmental challengers. The interviewee also stressed the importance of the interethnic cohesion which largely differed from common partisan rallies. These characteristics of multi-ethnic and multi-confessional unity were also underpinned by another interviewee. Furthermore, she reaffirmed the pro-democratic and pro-European nature of the movement, headed mainly by the country's youth:

"*At the time when the protest began, and when I saw multiple ethnicities united as one, it was something that personally gave me courage to believe that new winds are blowing in Macedonia and that new things are happening. I saw that the inhabitants of Macedonia want a European Macedonia with rule of law and with pure democracy. This was appraised mainly by the youth. They understood the problem and they want these values to be implemented, to be fulfilled…*" (Int. 7, MKD)

Another activist who participated in numerous movement activities recalled the excellent energy and the positive attitude of all the speakers and participants. Still, he also reflected on the slackening of energy after the event was over, while the organizers were putting up the camp in

front of the governmental building. In other words, he introduced the concept of passionate politics in social movement studies (Goodwin, Jasper and Polleta 2001), reflecting both on his positive, but also his pessimistic views:

"*The 17 May event was a large protest filled with positive energy. I think that the most positive thing regarding this event is that it was not painted with partisan colors, and there was an impression that it is supra-partisan, and open to all citizens. It was multiethnic. There were flags of many countries that represent peoples living here in Macedonia. The energy was great even after the protest, when the encampment was set…yes, that energy was good. Afterward, energy dropped and faded. Maybe the whole thing lasted too long. There were moments when we needed to think of something in order to keep that energy alive. The energy simply slacked…*" (Int. 2, MKD)

As the last interviewee hinted, not everyone involved in this repertoire of contention was fully satisfied and positive regarding the grand rally. One of the fourteen speakers who addressed the gathered citizens, a famous journalist and activist, was highly critical of some issues concerning the protest. Speaking of emotions in social movement studies, he clearly highlighted his disappointment as an overwhelming emotion, driven mainly by the short-term unrealistic expectations of the desired and projected social change (Hirschman 1982). He mainly criticized the length of the event, but also commented that the last moments of the protest were a failure, instead of being a highlight:

"*The event itself was too long. It should have been much more concise. Herein I criticize also myself and I think that my speech was too long at times, and some things were not supposed to be in there. The thing is that I have a concept inside my head and I cannot allow myself to go out on the stage and read from a piece of paper. This is unacceptable to me, especially when I talk about things I feel inside my heart and things I understand mentally. If you ask me about nuclear physics, I can read from a sheet of paper because I do not understand nuclear physics. I am very happy with the event. I must admit that I carry very nice memories from it. The problem is that this nice feeling transformed after two and a half, three hours from the beginning of the protest. It started somehow to wane. Many people that attended without following a party directive, and I say this because there were a lot of people there attending following a party directive, a very serious number, started leaving in a particular moment. They became fed up. A significant portion of them left when Zaev began to hold a partisan speech. That is in fact when I*

left as well. In fact, I did not stay until the end of that gathering because I think that it went in a very wrong direction…" (Int. 8, MKD).

The traditional demonstrations and rallies were also the most practiced repertoires of contention during the Bulgarian winter protest. This disruptive modular (McPhail 2013) repertoire dominated the three movements under study. One of the protest organizers in Sofia coming from the environmentalist strand of the movement reflected on the organization of the demonstrations, especially its weaknesses deriving from the lack of unity among the movement participants and the multiple strands that could be delineated within the movement. The lack of unity among the governmental challengers was one of the characteristics which differentiated the Bulgarian from the CfM movement. Diversity of collective actions is in fact one of the main characteristics of social movements (Jordan 1995, p. 676). Still, in terms of coordination aimed at achieving the desired goals, a certain level of unity is desirable, if not essential. In this case, grave ideological cleavages distanced the several strands of the movement. Similar to the previous interviewee, this interlocutor also perceived the protest activities as rather violent, fundamentally disagreeing with the concept of violence. Lastly, he clarified that in the end, his group, the environmentalists, regularly demonstrated in front of the government, asking for its resignation:

"*There were rallies…it was also because of the season. It was winter. And rallies alone were not a good idea because we would freeze. The marches/rallies were a very traditional way of organizing protest events, although, I must say that they were not so well organized. There were not many placards; many of the posters were used from previous protests. At the beginning, we were a part of the big group, but later we split and concentrated in front of the building of the Council of Ministers. This was mainly because the large group was very chaotic, totally confusing, and also some riot groups joined. Sometimes they were football hooligans, sometimes skinheads, but these are not the type of people we can cooperate with. We were sure that nothing good could come out of a movement of which they were a part. They are very nationalist. That is why we stayed in front of the Government and asked for its resignation. For years we wanted to raise awareness that violent protests are not useful, and some strands of the movement became violent. All of our previous campaigning success was based on non-violent methods. So, when more violent groups decided to join, we decided to concentrate on staying in front of the government.*" (Int. 1, BUL)

Marches and demonstrations as confrontational repertoires also dominated the BH case. One of the activists who frequently attended the protests in Sarajevo commented that the demonstrations were rather static, with only several protest marches going through the city. He further commented that as a movement they were not paying a lot of attention to the variety of activities in Sarajevo. Similar to the previous two analyzed cases, the disruptive repertoires once again prevailed during the BH movement. In regards to the socio-economic grievances of the challengers, this movement once again reaffirmed that "actors who occupy subordinate positions economically and socially and who lack access to institutionalized political and economic power are more likely to engage in disruptive protest" (McAdam 2013). This is another common thread with the Bulgarian winter protest:

"*There were several short marches during the movement. Honestly, they were more like walks, rather than marches. I also think that we did not pay much attention to the variety of activities in Sarajevo…*" (Int. 8, B&H)

Another activist from Tuzla highlighted the demonstrations and the plenums in his town. In his consideration, there was nothing more important than these two sets of activities in Tuzla and the surroundings. He mentioned time constraints as a big handicap:

"*Apart from the demonstrations and the plenums there was nothing rather important and interesting in Tuzla. In reality, there was not much time either…*" (Int. 6, B&H)

Observing the forms of action vis-à-vis the policy outcomes, one cannot establish a clear relation between the two variables. Although the three cases share strong similarities in terms of the dominant confrontational (disruptive) repertoires, still, both the policy outputs and the policy outcomes in the three protest waves vary significantly. The Macedonian protest wave produced both policy outputs and policy outcomes, the Bulgarian winter protests contributed to policy outputs which did not evolve into substantial policy outcomes, while the protests in B&H did not produce substantial policy outputs or policy outcomes. This points us towards the direction that repertoires of contention did not play a very significant role in shaping the policy outcomes following protests in South East Europe.

In the case of the CfM movement, the two-month long occupation in front of the governmental building in Skopje, as well as the citizen debates comprising of panels including both politicians and activists, belonging to the more routinized (conventional) repertoires, were the particular highlight (*Sloboden Pechat* 2015). Similar to the Macedonian case, the anti-

monopoly protests in Bulgaria were mainly manifested through disruptive repertoires, mainly marches and demonstrations, but also gave birth to several violent episodes (see PEA and *Duma* and *Trud* 2013). This is congruent to John Wilson's definition of challengers' activities highlighting that "social movements employ methods of persuasion and coercion which are, more often than not, novel, unorthodox, dramatic, and of questionable legitimacy" (Wilson 1973, p. 227). In the Bulgarian case, this definition is also underpinned by the several cases of self-immolations, not reported by the two daily newspapers on which the Bulgarian PEA is based. Lastly, the analysis of the repertoires of contention during the "Bosnian Spring" shows an increased number of violent cases in B&H, in comparison to the other two cases. The first days of protest were severely violent, ending with many injured participants both on the side of the governmental challengers and the police. After the situation calmed down, a more symbolic approach stressing the citizen and supra-ethnic character of the protests was stressed. The "We Are Hungry in Three Languages" banner (Milan 2016) was the most telling element depicting the difficult socio-economic situation of the B&H citizens. The governmental protesters used the actions and the common space as Taylor and Dyke had defined protests, as "sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations" (Taylor, & Van Dyke 2004). Furthermore, the citizens' plenums – these horizontal decision-making agoras, were a true litmus test proving that direct democracy can function to a certain extent and in peculiar circumstances, at least for a limited moment in time. Still, as in the first two cases, it was the confrontational repertoires that dominated the movement scene.

It was already mentioned that in the three movements under study, the majority of coded repertoires of contention were classified as confrontational or disruptive (Table 7.1). Following the broad classification of the actions presented previously, the research now turns towards the more materialistic side of the story, the damage caused by the protesters. The primary tactical logic of material damage imposes costs for the opponent (Doherty, 2013). In the Macedonian case there was no damage reported in any of the 13 coded events. As it is presented further, that was not the case during the Bulgarian and the BH protests.

In regards to the damage caused during the Bulgarian winter protests, the PEA grasped two protest events. The first event was a smaller protest which took place in Varna on 11 February, while the second occurred in Sofia ten days later. The latter protest saw a violent clash

between the movement participants and the police, resulting in injuries, material damage and arrests.

One of the key informants, a professor of Sociology, but also an activist who regularly protests against social injustice in Bulgaria, tried to locate the general niche of the winter protests in regards to the two other protest waves that had shook Bulgaria throughout 2013. He underlined the angry character of the movement, the anger of the economically deprived activists and the rather violent repertoires in comparison to the #DANSWithMe summer protests and the student movement that marked the end of 2013. The concepts of "making noise", and "creating damage" were in the center of the attention according to him. Furthermore, they insisted on deliberately breaking laws regulating protest activities in order to send a message that they do not respect the state which does not respect them and does not care about them. Recalling the concept of emotions in social movements, it was the anger and bitterness of the participants which acted as a main driver of this anger-based protest, mainly because the target (i.e. the government and the monopolies) had violated their values (Van Stekelenburg 2006):

"*The February protests were angry protests. The protesters were looking for ways to express their anger. For example, they tried to break things. To both break rules and break windows of the institutions they protested against. They wanted to make as much noise as possible. There was this very nice concept of noise-making, if you can coin that concept. The protesters would surround the objects of the power distribution companies and make noise with the horns of their vehicles. They wanted to make the life of the companies' officials impossible…The protesters also broke some regulations by blocking crossroads without permission of the municipality, which is illegal according to Bulgarian laws. The idea was to block the city and make some noise. Some of the protesters thought that instead of throwing stones at the buildings, they could throw tomatoes. There was one famous Bulgarian dissident who did this. He wanted to symbolize the violation of the integrity of buildings. It was a symbolic act of violence.*" (Int. 8, BUL)

Some of the protest organizers were being very blunt when openly sharing more violent details of the movement repertories. Although the previously presented PEA results marked only two violent events, it is evident from the testimonies of the Bulgarian interviewees that a certain level of violence coming from the side of the activists was present throughout the movement. The main dilemma is whether this violence stems from macro, meso, or micro level determinants (Demetriou 2013). One of the more visible faces of the movement in Sofia spoke openly about

how the activists stoned public officials after they felt that they had been let down by them following endless meetings with vague promises:

"*We met ministers of economy and energy who literally mocked us. They did not take us seriously. Later, during the protests, they were stoned and snowballed!*" (Int. 3, BUL)

Another "usual suspect" coming from the Sofia streets found the more violent character of the movement demotivating not just for herself, but also for the wider public. This warlike appearance was not appealing to many, especially to activists coming from more progressive or environmentalist background. The lack of creative repertoires, according to her, contributed to the dissatisfaction:

"*During the rallies, the people were willing to demonstrate that they were willing to fight. There were not many creative repertoires, and I think that this also demotivated more people to go out and protest.*"(Int. 5, BUL)

Not all movement organizers perceived the marches and the demonstrations as violent: to the contrary. An activist based in Veliko Trnovo during the peak (Graph 7.3) of the movement saw the rallies as the core of the movement activities which he described as peaceful. Violence was an exception, according to him. He pointed out Sofia and Varna as the two focal points were the demonstrations were the largest:

"*The rallies and the demonstrations were the basic activities of the movement platform. We paid particular attention everything to be peaceful and calm. In fact, they were very peaceful except for the violence in Sofia that occurred around 18 – 20 February when there were large clashes between the police and the protesters. In Varna, the protests were perhaps the largest. On 3 March there were around 70.000 people in the streets.*" (Int. 6, BUL)

When aligning the three movements under study on the ladder of created damage, the contentious events in B&H were by far the most damage-creating. The first days of protest, especially those protests in Tuzla, Sarajevo and Zenica were very violent, and both injuries and material damages occurred frequently. Within the 182 coded protest events, damage was caused in 12 cases. It is very interesting to highlight that all these events resulting in material losses happened within the first four days of protest, i.e. 5-8 February 2014. Furthermore, injuries were documented during 10 protest events, happening in a similar time span as the damages, 5-9 February.

It all began with the first protests in Tuzla on 5 February that rapidly diffused throughout the country. By 7 February, when the first protests in Sarajevo sparked, almost the entire territory of FB&H was in contentious spirit. Zenica, Bihać, Mostar, Goražde, but even Banja Luka in RS, saw large crowds in the streets asking for the demise of the numerous governments on multiple levels of government. The first days of protest were characterized by severe violence and injuries. This was highlighted by one of the protest organizers. She also noted the routes of the marches and the rallies. The violent repertoires were one of the main similarities between the BH and the Bulgarian contentious actions. Still, the emotion of contempt which acted as a main driver (Fischer & Roseman 2007) of the violent protest outburst in B&H could be easily read in the eyes of the activists and the SMO representatives which were interviewed:

"*At the beginning there were the protests, this moment when the people took the streets. The police reacted in a brutal manner, and many people were injured. The citizens' response arrived immediately. This is when the institutions were set on fire...The first marches headed towards the government of FB&H. The public prosecution office and the police stations were also places where we would gather…*" (Int. 4, B&H)

Looking at the level of disruptiveness of the three movements through the lens of material damage and injuries, and relating it to the three policy outcomes, one can initially conclude an inverse correlation between the two variables. As damage increased, the possibilities for more favorable policy outcomes diminished.

7.2. *The Intensity of protest*

Looking at the intensity of protest, one should take into consideration both the number of protest events, as well as the number of protesters which participated in these events. Looking at graph 7.1, one can see that the three cases differ significantly in regards to the number of protest events, at least those captured by the PEA in the three respective countries. In the Macedonian case, the number of identified events during the two-month timeframe covered is only 13, which is significantly lower in comparison to the Bulgarian analysis which captured 59 cases, while the PEA in B&H is presented through 182 coded events.

Figure 7. 1 Number and forms of actions



Source: Own calculation

Moving to the number of participants attending the contentious events in Macedonia, although only 13 events were coded, one can easily note that the peak was reached on the opening protest on the 17 May (Graph 7.2), when according to several news sources more than 10.000 participants were present. Conversely, when speaking to the organizers, they operated with numbers going above 70.000. This discrepancy opens avenues for clarification and future research. According to the available data, by 19 May the figures dropped to around 4.000 participants. By early June, around 1.000 participants participated in the events (Ibid). One can suppose that the similar trend continued throughout the remaining of June and until mid-July, when demobilization occurred. Still, protest data containing information about participation after 6 June was not available in the two daily newspapers.

Figure 7. 2 Number of participants in protest events in Macedonia



Source: Own calculation

Apart from the grand rally in Skopje described in the previous section, the shantytown encampment in front of the government was one of the most important events which actually lasted throughout the entire period of two months. Following the kick-off event which was generally considered a success, tents were erected and the encampment in front of the government was set up. The idea of the occupation was to last until the key demands of the movement are fulfilled. The organizers and the participants presented this two-month long activity as very dynamic, filled with multiple smaller actions that were happening on daily bases. Many of them were not reported by the newspapers that were used for the PEA. The shantytown occupation was presented as a way of life for the civil society and the party activists. One of the activists, who stayed in the camp on a daily basis, attempted to capture all the activities that were not mentioned by the newspapers and the protest organizers. He spoke of the more artistic side of the camp: projection of movies, concerts, other artistic events, humanitarian donations etc. He also reflected on the role of civil society to present itself in front of the other citizens, and explain its role in Macedonian society. Lastly, he spoke of the international coverage of the activities in the camp, presented by foreign journalists:

"*Films were projected and concerts were organized by artists and stars. Under the civil society tent artistic events were organized. Live art performances and exhibitions were also organized. We started collecting donations for the refugees that were transiting through Macedonia at that time. For the first time we spoke openly about the rights of marginalized communities. I guess it is widely known that for the first time 'the rainbow' was displayed, which meant that the LGBTI community was welcome in the camp, and it contributed a lot during the occupation. There were a lot of meetings with citizens, usually coming from out of Skopje, who were not very clear about how the camp functioned, and were also not very knowledgable about civil society, how it functions and what its role is. That is why a lot of time was invested in informal communication with the citizens, in order to explain to them how NGOs work and who are these 'activists'. This word became excessively used during last years in Macedonia. We needed to explain the causes, the modes of functioning of the formal and informal groups. The evening parties in the camp were organized by renowned politicians and activists performing as DJs. The idea was to use the time in the camp and to create a bond between the partisan and non-partisan members of the democratization movement. At the same time, there was a mass*

presence of foreign journalists. We spent a lot of time in giving statements, interviews and spreading messages out of the country." (Int. 1, MKD)

This excerpt points towards the "eventfulness" of the protest during the two-month long occupation. The activist highlighted the "internal dynamics and transformative capacity of protest" (della Porta 2008, p. 30), which eventually led towards experimenting with new tactics (Morris 2000) such as more artistic performances. In this vein, the organizational networks consolidated, but also solidarity feelings were created (Hess and Martin, 2006), both internally among the movement actors, but also externally towards refugees and other groups or individuals in need. Furthermore, introducing inclusive symbols such as the "rainbow flag" strengthened the collective identity (van Stekelenburg 2013), and contributed towards the unity of the movement which hasbeen highlighted in the previous paragraphs.

On the other hand, one must note that not all interviewees were fully satisfied with the atmosphere in the camp, and the general political atmosphere that influenced the dynamics in the occupied space. According to one of the activists who visited the camp on a daily basis, the first signing of the Przhino agreement, when the initial dates for the early general elections were defined, spread pessimism and skepticism among movement activists. Once again, mixed emotions mainly comprised of fear and anxiety from the alleged fall of the movement's own power (Kemper 2001, pp. 63-4) was reactivated:

"*I think that from an organizational aspect the movement was very well managed. There were no incidents in the camp, and there were a lot of people. That energy slackened with the signing of the Przhino agreement, when the date for holding early elections was agreed, and even after that the negotiating parties discussed the modes how to create conditions for fair and democratic elections. I say this based on conversations with fellow-prostesters from the camp. I think that no one was happy with this solution. Everyone was skeptic. Everyone was downhearted when the agreement was signed. They felt deep down inside that something is wrong. I don't know, but this is how I felt. I think that this agreement killed the energy.*" (Int. 2, MKD).

When analyzing a certain movement, one cannot speak of complete unity and full agreement regarding the tactics and repertoires by all movement actors. Diversity and looseness are still one of the main characteristics of social movements in general. What was an ideal repertoire for some was completely unacceptable for other. One of those activists pointed out a

plethora of negative peculiarities that had been part of the two-month shantytown in front of the government. He also put forward examples on how he thought this activity could have been made to look much better. This dissatisfaction, in absence of power change, as Kemper (2001, p. 64) notes, usually stems from the "prior expectations and desires for the outcome":

"*The occupation…firstly, I have dilemmas regarding the idea. The 'occupation' of the boulevard in front of the Macedonian government cannot even be called an occupation. It was done by the redundant workers in 2006 and 2007. It was seen during the student protests in the 90s, by those who are now in government. It was done by many people and groups. I expected, at least, that we would occupy the space in front of the main entrance, around the monument of the WWII uprising which is in the government's yard. The idea was not to anger the rest of the citizens that do not agree with your views, and have them take an alternative driving route one street down…If you already occupy the streets and want to block the functioning of the entire state, block all the main crossroads. Block the government, the parliament, block the Goce Delchev Bridge, and block the Partizanska Boulevard. Then, one will have a reason to act immediately, and we would not have to sit there for sixty days, and after day five transform into an 'Oktoberfest'. Yes! Stuffing themselves with barbeque, getting drunk, fighting among each other...This was not reported by the media, they didn't know these details…I mean…fighting among each other…come on…*" (Int. 8, MKD).

Figure 7. 3 Number of participants across time



Source: Own calculation

The Bulgarian analysis was based on 59 coded events. The peak of the protest participation was reached on 24 February 2013 when almost 50.000 participants took to the streets of Sofia. The following day, around 20.000 protesters flooded the city of Sliven. Just several days earlier, in Varna, the second largest city in the country, 30.000 movement activists participated in the demonstrations, while in Plovdiv 10.000 citizens protested against the Bulgarian government. Following the previously mentioned protest event in Sliven, the number of participants in contentious actions in Bulgaria decreased dramatically, and remained low throughout the demobilization. The last coded event containing information in regards to protest participation dates from a protest held in Varna on 22 March, and allegedly, only around 100 participants were present (Graph 7.4). This participation trend is different in comparison to the Macedonian case, in the sense that in Macedonia the initially large participation decreased slowly, while during the Bulgarian winter protests the number of governmental challengers varied throughout the first two weeks of mobilization, later switching to continuous decrease ending with demobilization.

Both differences and similarities can be drawn between the CfM movement and the Bulgarian winter protests. One of the similarities in terms of contentious repertoires is that some of the actions originating from months before the mass citizens' unrests caught the eye of media and the wider public, aimed to channel the grievances of a smaller group of challengers who voiced their concerns regarding certain governmental actions.

An activist who has been protesting in the streets of Sofia much longer prior to the 2013 winter protests, presented the evolution of the dissatisfaction against what he calls "the energy mafia". He reflected on the creation of a short documentary which was screened throughout Sofia in 2012, followed by discussions on the same topic. The initial step of the activists was to use a movie, one of the eight existing mass media mediums (Rohlinger and Vaccaro 2013) in order to diffuse information related to their struggle:

"*In 2012 we produced a short film which explained all the details regarding the energy mafia. There was a citizens' association named 'Stozher' (I.S. 'Pillar'), formed by citizens and NGOs that dealt with various societal problems. We projected the movie in various parts of Sofia. All we had was an electricity generator and a LCD projector. We would go in some Sofia quarter where people gather to meet, and we would announce the time and date of the screening*

of a short film on the topic 'Energy Mafia in Bulgaria'. We screened the film and a discussion followed." (Int. 3, BUL)

Figure 7. 4 Number of participants in protest events in Bulgaria



Source: Own calculation

Lastly, in regards to the BH case, the number of coded events was the largest, amounting to 182 cases. As it had been expected, taking into consideration the spontaneous outburst of the movement, the peak of the contentious events was reached during the first several days of protest. On 7 February, more than 13.000 people participated in the protests in Tuzla and Sarajevo, while other cities also had high figures - 5.000 in Zenica, Mostar and Zavidović, and 3.000 in Sanski Most. Similar to the Bulgarian case, following a period of oscillation during the first 10 days of protest, the participation began to gradually decrease, with minor exceptions of occasional increase not overpassing 600 participants. The majority of contentious events following the one in Zavidović on 17 February that brought together around 5.000 citizens were attended by not more than 100 participants. This decreasing trend continued throughout the months of March and April rounding with the demobilization (see graph 7.4).

The plenums, these horizontal citizens' assemblies based on direct democracy and decision making, were the most important repertoires of contention to the BH activists. Apart from discussing the potential claims and demands, organizing a large number of people to gather in public spaces indoors and outdoors to many activists and movement organizers revoked the socialist spirit of the former Yugoslav republic, when workers used to participate in the running of their factories through the workers' councils. When discussing plenums and plenum-related activities with the movement participants, one could feel the melancholy of the activists' failure

to succeed in overthrowing from power those that have economically and socially deprived them for years, but on the other hand, it was easy to also sense the happiness for the functioning of direct democracy (della Porta 2013), at least for several months and within a limited scope of citizens.

One of the organizers of the movement activities in Sarajevo commented on the main activities within the plenums – the systematization of the claims, but also the inter-cantonal cooperation between the plenums in order to put pressure on the federal authorities. These solidarity networks created within the movement (Bosco 2001) were one of the biggest gains for the activists. Even short-term, this was visible during the help they provided during the floods in B&H which followed immediately after the demobilization process:

"*…then the plenums came (following the demonstrations, I.S.) together with the systematization, classification, grouping and handling of the claims. There was also cooperation between the plenums from different cantons, trying to channel the claims towards the federal government.*" (Int. 3, B&H)

The moderator of the first plenum in Sarajevo that was organized in the Marshal Tito military barracks reflected on the large attendance and interest from the citizens. She also presented her satisfaction from direct decision-making, enjoying that month of plenum meetings:

"*I recall very well the first plenum which was organized in the Marshal Tito military barracks. So many people showed up, and we realized that it cannot be held and that we need larger space. I moderated that first plenum. That direct democracy…It may be naïve, but it is so beautiful. Maybe it doesn't always function, but at least that month when it did, it was beautiful. The claims were read out loud and adopted…*" (Int. 4, B&H)

An activist from Sarajevo coming from the feminist strand of the movement that took active part in many plenum sessions was positively surprised by the positive reaction from the people regarding the rules of the decision making process. In her opinion, this was a form of recidivism from socialist times, a kind of memory. Older plenum participants had told her that the entire setting felt very familiar to them. She also pointed out that usually those people did not join the demonstrations and the blockades on the streets:

"*It was very interesting to see how the people easily accepted the game regarding the rules in the plenums. It seemed like they had been historically used to this from before, it appeared as a memory…A lot of participants told me that they took part in the plenums just because this*

format is something that already looked very familiar to them. Usually these were older people. These were people that usually did not join the street actions. " (Int. 7, B&H)

To the contrary, her colleague coming from the same NGO and also very active during the Sarajevo protests believes that the plenums were a new experience to many of the participants. As a "usual suspect" when it cames to protests in Sarajevo, he commented that the plenums had a very inclusive repertoire giving space to citizens that would not otherwise take part in more standardized protest forms:

"*I would not agree that the plenums were a familiar environment to a lot of people. I also do not think that there was any kind of memory attached to them. I think it was new to everyone. I must agree that the plenum provided inclusion of many people that otherwise would not take part in standard forms of protest.*" (Int. 8, B&H)

Lastly, another activist from Sarajevo once again underlined that apart from the daily feuds that occurred during the plenum sessions, the direct democracy she experienced was one of the most beautiful things that had happened in her life. She underpinned the unity, but also the uniqueness of the plenums. The concept of unity, very similar to the CfM, although resulting in a diametrically different outcome, was very strong and amplified during the BH protests:

"*I must highlight that the attempt to introduce direct democracy was one of the most beautiful things that has happened in my life. That unity, cohesion, unanimity...Although there were stupid quarrels around more or less everything, that entire feeling was wonderful…*" (Int. 5, B&H)

Although the intensity of protest was much higher and more accelerated in B&H in comparison to the Macedonian and Bulgarian movements, the outcomes of protest were significantly different in comparison to the two countries. It leads to thinking that the intensity of the mobilization was not one of the decisive factors shaping the movements' outputs and outcomes in the three countries under study. This opens the possibility for exploration of other, mainly exogenous factors which may prove to have greater impact on the final outcomes.

Figure 7. 5 Number of participants in protest events in B&H



Source: Own calculation

7.3. *Diffusion of protest*

As for diffusion of protest, the CfM movement can be characterized as very centralized, in the sense that all the coded events took part in Macedonia's capital – the city of Skopje (see Graph 7.6). To the contrary, in the BH and the Bulgarian cases, the movements were very diffused, and contentious actions took part in almost every city throughout the two countries, sometimes even in very small inhabited places.

Figure 7. 6 Diffusion of protest in Macedonia, map edited by the author

Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/macedonia-political-map.htm

The marches through the city of Skopje and the citizens' debates held in the camp of freedom are also two repertoires worth mentioning. The two sets of actions were performed exclusively in Skopje.

The demonstrations and marches were one of the most visible activities deriving from the "Camp of Freedom" and spreading throughout the streets of Skopje. They increased the visibility of the movement beyond the camp's boarders. The organizers and the activists reflected on how the decisions were made regarding the frequency and the routes of the marches. The marches were almost always thematic, tied to a person, or to an event. The main aim of these centuries-old repertoires developed out of electoral banqueting (della Porta 2013), was to amplify citizens' dissatisfaction using as a leitmotif the biographical stories of several "martyrs of the regime", transforming them into symbols of the resistance. One of the organizers who participated in the creation of many movement-related activities reflected on the organizational aspects of the marches and the demonstrations:

"*The marches were activities of the CfM. If you look at the routes, these marches commenced from the camp and usually ended in the camp. The goal of these marches was to highlight Gruevski's problematic governance and that is why the marches were thematic: one was dedicated to media freedom, another one to usurped institutions, other were related to specific cases that dominated the public sphere, like the anniversary of Martin Neshkovski's*[166] *murder and the case of little Tamara*[167]*. These marches were organized by the coalition, mainly by the people that lived and functioned in the camp, but they were joined by other party members, NGO members, individuals. The idea of these events was not to produce massive presence , mainly because it was hot and the temperatures were extremely high: also, 17 May was a huge 'exhaust valve'. The goal was to send constant political messages and to exert*

[166] Martin Neshkovski was a young VMRO-DPMNE activist murdered on 5 June 2011, during VMRO-DPMNE's election victory, on the central square in Skopje by one of Nikola Gruevski's bodyguards. The bodyguard was a MoI employee, and the police tried to cover up the murder. A wave of protests by young progressive individuals in the summer of 2011 gave birth to the "Stop against Policy Brutality" movement. In one of the wiretapped conversations aired by the SDSM, it could be heard how former MoI and the spokesperson of the ministry talk about the cover up. This stirred a mass popular reaction resulting with a violent protest in front of the government on 5 May 2015, less than two weeks prior to the CfM launching event.

[167] Tamara Dimovska was a young girl from Veles who had a serious medical condition due to extreme spine curving. The state insurance fund did not allocate funds timely so Tamara could not be treated in one of the EU countries that have much more advanced treatment methods. Eventually, Tamara passed away. Tamara's death was followed by protest marches led by her family and group of activists which protested against the medical system and against the minister of health.

pressure over the government asking them to make concessions in interest of freedom. The marches were a creative-protest form of citizen expression." (Int. 3, MKD)

One of the activists who took part in almost all of the marches explained the "traditional" party-civil society cleavage regarding the mode and manner in which the marches unfolded, but also the introducing of new techniques of protesting in Macedonia, such as the *cacerolazo* (using pots and cutlery to create noise), originally invented in Chile during the protests against Salvador Allende (Vera 2011):

"*The marches were held once or twice per week, either when needed or in order to mark a certain event or a date which was politically significant at the moment. They were mainly used as an experiment for different ways of acting, and testing new protest techniques in Macedonia like creating noise in front of the PM's home, blocking crossroads in certain hours of the day etc. For the first time you could see these party-civil society joint activities. At times there were misunderstandings around the tactics, but we tried to overcome these differences as much as possible. The informal citizens' protests usually have more freedom in movement and ad-hoc activities, while the partisan ones usually follow a predetermined agenda. Still, there was quite a good turnout, taking into consideration that the temperature on the asphalt was around 45 degrees Celsius and the conditions were not very pleasant.*" (Int. 1, MKD)

Another interviewee coming from the side of the movement organizers spoke about the unachieved goals of the marches, but also further commented on the topics of conducted marches and some of their central claims such as police brutality. He highlighted that the largest and longest marches were those that ended in front of the home of former PM Gruevski:

"*There were two-three marches against police brutality, meaning, their final destination was the Ministry of Interior. If I recall well, there were also two marches to the home of PM Gruevski. The idea was to show the revolt which the citizens felt, and to spread it through the city. There were also ideas for longer marches to be held outside of the city center, for example marches going to Aerodorm or Karposh. These were not effectuated from practical reasons. We realized that in those weather conditions it would be exhausting to walk to Aerodrom and back, because the idea was to start and finish each march from/to the camp in order to form a circle, like a marathon. I think that the longest destination of the marches was the one going from the camp to Gruevski's home and back.*" (Int. 10, MKD)

The ultimate goal of the entire anti-governmental movement, encompassing that of the marches, was underpinned by one of the activists, a "usual suspect" during these repertoires of contention:

"*There were several marches asking for resignations from the public officials!*" (Int. 2, MKD)

Lastly, one of the activists gave a critical view of the marches from an ideological and tactical perspective. He spoke about the monopolization of the opposition movement, including the marches, by some of the actors. He also highlighted the antagonism between different fractions that could have worked together in order to alleviate the daily struggles of the opposition campus. It is obvious that factionalism, as an internal conflict between two or more groups within one movement (Kretschmer 2013), did not circumvent the CfM:

"*Look, they cannot monopolize the Martin Neshkovski march, although it was organized by the CfM. The same goes for the march dedicated to Tamara. I attended these two and several more. Where was the main problem? The CfM did not join activities that were not organized by them, and this was already a problem. On the other hand, those who were not a part of the CfM did not support their activities. You end up having an anti-regime front fragmented in several factions. This is where the problem lies. I could not stand the fact that these 'two sides' were not united in this story…*" (Int. 8, MKD)

The citizens' debates are the last set of repertoires that were thoroughly commented by the movement organizers and the activists. Although not regularly reported by the two daily newspapers, these debates were supposed to act as programmatic resources for the prospective democratic government following what the activists referred to as the "fall of the regime". One of the movement organizers explained the format of these activities, but also the expectations and the significance of the input received and shared to the wider public:

"*Speaking of the format of the public debates, one or two were held daily, usually around six-seven pm. During almost all of the debates there were five-six speakers attending, out of which, again, four-five were NGO representatives and one speaker came from the side of the political parties – either the SDSM or one of the smaller coalition partners. The topics and the agenda were decided on a day-to-day basis, sometimes even in the morning for the afternoon. I am talking about a sixty-day program that cannot be defined two months in advance. The podium was open to anyone who wanted to use the microphone. I may agree that at times the*

microphone could not reach everyone. Still, that space was deemed as a kind of 'Hyde Park'. Why? Whoever wanted to speak was given the opportunity, either as a speaker on the stage during the official part, or as a speaker from the crowd. In my opinion, the 'Camp of Freedom' achieved minimum influence through these debates in filling a void within the public space which existed in that period. I refer to sending messages towards those in power, towards the media and towards the citizens. Not to mention all the transcripts and videos from all these debates. With just one click we can see who said what during these more than sixty citizens' debates that were open to the public. Almost all of them were aired on the internet. Fragments of these discussions were shared on social media. All traditional media received a daily agenda with speakers. Some of them were present and shared information to the wider public…" (Int. 3, MKD)

The debates were one of the attempts to "level the playing field" between the partisan and the CSO members. Engaging into more horizontal discussions, they tried to bridge their gaps, exchange opinions, but also to include more bystanders and observers and transform them into adherents (Snow 2013). The activists that spent time in the camp on daily basis commented very positively on the debates:

"*Debates were held on various topics. They were organized daily and always relevant experts were invited…*" (Int. 1, MKD)

"*Debates were held on a daily basis in the camp. In essence, they were dedicated to the alternatives we see for Macedonia and how it should look in the future, opposite to what we are having now.*" (Int. 2, MKD)

Another interviewee coming from the movement organizers shared some details on the topics that were covered with the debates, and explained their thematic nature, very similar to some of the marches that were held and were presented previously:

"*The idea was to create the list of speakers in the most inclusive manner possible, and to choose interesting topics. For example, one day we had a debate regarding 'Democracy Day'. Another day we held a debate regarding the 'National Day of the Aromanians'. On days when some of the 'political bombs' were aired, we tried to link the debates to the content of those particular wiretapped conversations…*" (Int. 10, MKD)

The executive director of a foundation financing many of the CSOs that were members of the CfM platform also shared her views on the citizens' debates:

"*During that period a lot of debates were happening. I see them as dialogues from the citizens to the citizens that physically took place in the 'Camp of Freedom' in front of the government. During this period, all citizens that were living in the camp, those who just came to listen to the debates, those who were inspired by the camp, and those who were more-less regular visitors…all of them had possibilities to take part in these debates that were filled not just with criticism, but also with ideas on how to get out of this situation…*" (Int. 6, MKD)

One of the activists continuously critical towards the movement as a whole, including some aspects of the citizens' debates, commented on the real added value of these activities. Although he thinks that the debates were an excellent idea, he was not personally convinced that they made any impact, or that the material gathered from them was channeled properly in order to create solutions. He also personally moderated several of the debates:

"*The debates were an excellent idea and they were very productive. But, what came out of them? I personally moderated four-five of them. What happened to all the material that was produced from the debates? A lot of material came out. A lot of ideas were generated. A lot of questions that had never been open before were opened. I expected some readable outputs from these debates. They must not necessarily be produced by the SDSM. Let them be produced or addressed by the VMRO-DPMNE. These issues were opened in front of the government. I ask myself 'Why did we make these debates?'….*" (Int. 8, MKD)

As for the Bulgarian winter protests, conversely to the CfM movement, contentious activities were dispersed throughout the entire country. Apart from Sofia and Varna as two largest cities, the most massive protests were held in Plovdiv, Sliven, Dobrich, Blagoevgrad, Veliko Trnovo, Ruse but also in smaller inhabited places such as Lom, Kask, Barutin etc (see Graph 7.7). In terms of protest diffusion and movement outcomes, one can infer that regarding the Bulgarian and Macedonian movements, diametrically opposite protest diffusion characteristics have led to similar policy outputs, but, different policy outcomes.

Figure 7. 7 Diffusion of protest in Bulgaria, map edited by the author

Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/bulgaria-political-map.htm

What substantially distinguished the Bulgarian anti-monopolies movement from the other two movements under consideration in regards to the repertoires of contention, are the self-immolations that deeply shook Bulgarian society. The reintroduction of this "Palachian repertoire" resurrected one of the most painful acts of protest, opening numerous political and sociological debates in Bulgaria. The wave of self-immolations by Bulgarian protesters only reconfirmed the disappointment and the hopelessness of the Bulgarian activists to substantially alleviate their grievances. On the other hand, this painful repertoire also showed their readiness and willingness to fight for a better and more prosperous future. These actions ending with fatal outcomes on several occasions were also diffused throughout Bulgaria, similar to other repertoires.

Although Plamen Goranov, a young artist from Varna, became the recognized symbol of the Bulgarian winter protests, mainly because of the anger and the mobilization that his act caused, amplifying protests in Varna which eventually led to the resignation of a long-ruling mayor with shady ties to local crime lords, he did not start this painful wave. The first victim of the wave of self-immolations was a young activist from Veliko Trnovo. One of the interviewees, who organized part of the movement activities in this Bulgarian city, personally knew the deceased, and commented on the happenings:

"*That was a period of self-immolations. It all started with the guy who self-immolated in Veliko Trnovo. He was a member of the group "United for Global Change", a very intelligent and well-mannered guy. One day before the largest protests in Sofia, it was either on the 18 or the 19 of February, he self-immolated. We heard about this the following day during the protests. He was the first to commit this fierce act of protest. It is unimaginable for me. A lot of media forgot to even mention him. In fact, he was completely forgotten, although he was the one to initiate this tragic wave of self-immolations. In regards to Varna, Plamen Goranov passed away on 3 March. He asked for the resignation of the mayor. Around 3 March more than 70.000 citizens went out to protest on the streets of Varna. Previously, the mayor announced that if more than 50.000 people protest against him, he was going to resign. Eventually, he resigned. It was one of the great small wins during the winter protests…*" (Int. 6, BUL)

Following up on the Varna events, one of the interviewed key informants reconfirmed the small win in Varna, further stressing that it had no real impact on the ultimate goals and ideas of the movement. In the end, it amounted only to personal political changes:

"*Plamen Goranov amplified the protest wave in Varna. In Varna, it is always the same group of people that control the local economy and business. Yes, they managed to change the mayor, but it is just a personal change. It doesn't mean too much…*" (Int. 9, BUL)

The professor of sociology from the Sofia University tried to reflect more on the meaning and the symbolism of the self-immolations. Being an almost-witness to one of the self-immolations, this being the only case when the activist was saved and survived, he commented on his interviews given to the press sometime after the incident. He then made a link to Goranov's actions in Varna, and attempted to draw a line between the motives, the roots of the self-immolations, and the political goals of the activists that committed them. The symbolic strength of this painful and tragic repertoire cannot be compared to any other form of protest.

Still, as theory recognizes, sometimes a combination of desperation and indignation can encourage mobilization and generate willingness to protest (Gould 2013):

"*The self-immolations were very unfortunate, but also very important actually. I was almost a witness of one of the self-immolations. I arrived just 15 minutes after the act. It was in front of the Councils of Ministers in Sofia. The man who self-immolated was saved. Afterwards, he was interviewed by the police and by the reporters. He was asked why he did that. His explanation was very peculiar and also very important. He said: 'If one protests against the Bulgarian government, one would be ignored. In order to make his act of protest forceful enough, hearable enough, one should make it into the international news. Because if the world sees the situation in Bulgaria, then the EU would intervene and would try to make something in order to improve the situation'. So, the guy self-immolated himself, because he wanted to make it to the international news. What he said precisely is 'I wanted to send a signal to the world!' The guys who interviewed him asked him if he would do the same thing once again. He replied 'No, this was very stupid and very painful. I would never do this again to myself or my family!' Then they asked him if he regretted doing that. He said 'No!' Do you see this desire which drives self-immolations? The main idea is to send a signal to the world. To become a symbol of pain….The guy who self-immolated himself in Varna, Plamen Goranov, became a matter of serious sociological debates. I have many friends who claim that he actually wanted to start a fire, not to be burnt by it. He wanted to send a signal, not to pay with his life. The entire investigation was surrounded with conspiracy theories. For example, that he was made to do it. Of course, this was never proven. And yet, how can you make anyone sacrifice his life? There is no certainty whether he wanted to die or not. But, after he passed away, he definitely became a symbol. Many of the protesters interpreted Goranov's self-immolation in this manner. He died in this incident, but they are dying throughout their entire lives, because their lives are undermined by poverty…*" (Int. 8, BUL)

Figure 7. 8 Diffusion of protest in B&H, map edited by the author

Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-map.htm

Introducing the diffusion of protest in the third case under study, the "Bosnian Spring"clearly resembles the previously elaborated Bulgarian case as being very much decentralized. Unlike the highly centralized CfM movement, contentious events were spread throughout the territory of the entire state, encompassing both FB&H and RS. Apart from Tuzla where the story began to unravel, and the capital Sarajevo which hosted the most coded protest events, a large number of protests took part in Bihać, Mostar, Goražde, Sanski Most, Banja

Luka, Travnik, Brčko, Odžak, Bugojno, Konjic, Novi Travnik, Maglaj, Prijedor etc. (see Graph 7.8).

One of the most important and most diffused repertoires not grasped by the PEA was the blockade of the main crossroads, especially in Sarajevo. A movement activist from Sarajevo explained the logic behind this action: to create havoc in the city center in order to receive the needed attention from the federal and cantonal government:

"*Besides the demonstrations, there were regular blockades on the crossroads. The largest blockades were always around Ali Pasha's street, which was a certain checkpoint for all of us. In fact, when you block that junction, you really paralyze the entire city. It was of utmost interest for the politicians in all institutions to solve and regulate this situation. We installed surround systems and microphones so that people could speak publically and freely about their problems.*" (Int. 3, B&H)

After some time, the movement activists changed strategies in regards to the blockades near the Ali Pasha mosque, the Presidency and the cantonal institutions. They transited from all day blockades to blockades only between 12 and 5 pm in order not to anger their fellow citizens:

"*The crossroad blockades were concentrated mainly around the Ali Pasha mosque, near the Presidency and the building of the cantonal institutions. This was a type of permanent blockage of the streets. We began with all day blockades and then switched to partial blockades only between 12 and 5 pm. We wanted to give our fellow citizens the opportunity to freely go to work and come back home. Still, they are our neighbors. Every new phase was a new struggle. Later on, we separated the streets and the plenum.*" (Int. 4, B&H)

The three movements under study had an artistic component within their repertoires. This element was rather strong during the protests in B&H. In some of the cities, people carried instruments and special children's playgrounds were created. Sarajevo was one of these cities:

"*Some of the protesters came with instruments, so we would sometimes play and sing songs. There were special corners with installed large paper blocks so that children could draw. There were also very interesting placards carrying powerful messages like 'We are hungry in three languages!'…*" (Int. 3, B&H)

In context of movement outputs and outcomes, it is evident that two movements, very decentralized and diffused as the BH and the Bulgarian, have led to two very different policy situations. In the first, no policy outputs were adopted on entity or federal level, while in the

latter, a decision by the KEVR to lower energy prices was adopted. These differences indicate that diffusion of protest in the three cases under study does not play a pivotal role in terms of policy outputs and outcomes. This chapter now turns towards the key peculiarities of the contentious repertoires of the three movements.

7.4. *Conclusions*

In this chapter we have analyzed the relationship between the repertoires of contention and the policy outcomes of the three movements under study. Based on the political-process approach and the importance of action repertoires underpinned by Tarrow (2011) who generally recognizes three broad types of contentious repertoires: disruption (confrontational events), violence (violent events) and contained behavior (routine conventional events), this chapter classified the coded repertoires. In terms of similarities, the PEA showed that the confrontational (disruptive) tactics were dominant in the three countries within the examined period. These cases most often refer to marches and demonstrations, as well as blockages of crossroads. In regards to the hypothesis previously put forward by Uba (2016), who claims that there is a great likelihood that protest experience might vary according to the forms of action, and differently influence the policy outcomes, we might conclude that it generally holds for the protest waves under investigation. The claim that "petitions, public meetings, and peaceful demonstrations might have a positive effect to the elite's understanding toward such actions, while disruptions caused by strikes, riots, and other more threatening events might have a negative effect instead" (Ibid) can be generally considered as true. Although in general the three cases are dominated by disruptive/confrontational events, a more fine-tuned analysis based on the types of repertoires, and especially the number of violent events during the three protests, shows that this hypothesis largely holds. The rather violent protests in B&H and Bulgaria did not produce any substantial policy outcomes. In fact, the first protest wave failed even to reach the policy arena on federal and state level, while the latter managed to secure a policy output which later failed to materialize into a substantial policy outcome. To the contrary, the Macedonian case where repertoires of action were much more peaceful and less threatening resulted with attained policy outputs and policy outcomes which further alleviated the grievances of the movement participants. The analysis in the first section of this chapter showed that the level of disruption and the number of violent events may have contributed towards the successful adoption of policy

outputs and further transformation into tangible policy outcomes. This is also shown through the number of coded violent events which was the highest in B&H; only two violent events were registered in Bulgaria, while there was no registered violence in Macedonia.

Similar conclusions can be derived when damage and injuries caused by these violent events are taken into consideration. Using them as one of the indicators to measure the level of disruptiveness of the movements and relating them to the policy outcomes, one can initially infer an inverse correlation between the two variables. The highest number of injuries and vast material damage occurred in B&H resulting with no policy outputs or outcomes. To the contrary, in the Macedonian case, no injuries or material damage was noted, but the policy outcomes were much more favorable for the governmental challengers. As injuries and damage decreased, the possibilities for more favorability for policy outcomes increased.

We already mentioned in the introduction that the number of protest events is an important indicator when one attempts to link repertoires of contention to policy outcomes. Recalling the hypothesis drawn from the so called "normalization mechanism" sketched by Uba (2016), it could be expected that if one holder of power or policy maker encounters protests more frequently, these actions would seem more acceptable and less threatening. From the perspective of this study, it would mean that a higher number of protest events should result with more favorable policy outcomes. Taking into consideration that the PEA grasped the largest number of protest events in B&H (182) and the least in Macedonia (13), it seems that the intensity of protest was not one of the decisive factors that shaped the policy outputs and policy outcomes of the three movements under study. To the contrary, the least number of contentious repertoires in Macedonia resulted with the most favorable policy outcomes. This creates space for exploring other, primarily factors exogenous to the movements which seem to have had a greater impact over policy outputs and outcomes.

Another important indicator worth taking into consideration when relating contentious repertoires and policy outcomes is the number of participants attending the coded protest events. As it was underlined in the theoretical chapters, previous empirical analyses have shown that the number of activists can affect the decision-making process because power holders always take into consideration electoral support (della Porta & Diani 2006, p. 171). In this regard, policy makers are likely to take into consideration demands put forward by a larger group of challengers. In reference to the three movements studied in this work, one of the hypotheses

presented in the introductory chapters envisaged that larger protest event participation would increase the possibility of acquiring the desired policy outputs, and would ease the way towards successful policy outcomes. Based on the data presented in the protest event analysis, and combined with the in-depth interviews with the activists and the CSO representatives, it seems that the vast protest participation during the kick-off event in Skopje, and the few very large protests in Sofia and Varna persuaded power holders in Macedonia and Bulgaria to adopt favorable policy outputs desired from the governmental challengers. On the other hand, although participation was much more intensive in B&H in comparison to the two other cases, no policy outputs and outcomes occurred on entity and federal levels. Still, one must highlight and take into account the discrepancy in data between the PEA and the in-depth interviews regarding the grand rally held in Skopje on 17 May 2015. There is also an impression that the printed media in Macedonia and Bulgaria did not report thoroughly on the contentious repertoires. This paves the way for future avenues of research to include more media sources in order to achieve a more encompassing and thorough analysis of the protest events in the three countries.

Lastly, in terms of results derived from the PEA, one should mention the diffusion of protest of the three movements and try to link it to the policy outcomes. Unlike the CfM which is extremely centralized, meaning that all coded events took part in the City of Skopje, the Bulgarian and the BH cases show a very large degree of diffusion, with contentious repertoires taking part in almost every city within the two countries, sometimes even in very small towns and villages. Based on the graphical representation presented previously in this chapter, one can infer that there is not a strong link between diffusion of protest and policy outcomes in the three countries. For example, in regards to the Macedonian and Bulgarian movements, two diametrically different protest diffusion characteristics gave birth to similar policy outputs, and rather different policy outcomes. Furthermore, two very similar diffusion characteristics of the movements in B&H and Bulgaria resulted in different epilogues in terms of policy outputs. These results point to the direction that diffusion of protest did not play a pivotal role in terms of policy outputs and outcomes in the three analyzed cases.

Moving to the more qualitative side of the story deriving from the in-depth interviews with the activists and the SMO representatives in regards to the contentious repertoires, some concepts emerged as eye-catching in terms of the policy outcomes. The unity within the movements seemed to play a significant role in the entire process. In terms of coordination aimed

at achieving the desired goals, a certain level of unity is desirable for social movements, if not essential. The interview excerpts presented above show that apart from certain cleavages and dissatisfaction within the CfM, a respectable level of unity was achieved. For example, the Macedonian activists managed to overcome a lot of ideological divisions in the opposition camp, presumably because of the organizational role of the largest political party in opposition. Furthermore, introducing inclusive symbols such as the "rainbow" strengthened internal collective identity (van Stekelenburg 2013), but also seemed inviting for more progressive and liberal groups of bystanders to become adherents. To the contrary, the lack of unity between the multiple strands of the winter protests in Bulgaria which grew as time passed, to a certain extent closed the window of opportunity for the challengers to transform the favorable policy outputs into tangible policy outcomes. Diversity of collective actions is in fact one of the main characteristics of social movements (Jordan 1995, p. 676), but in the Bulgarian case, these grave ideological cleavages irreversibly distanced the multiple strands within the movement. Lastly, BH governmental challengers presented the least organizational capabilities, in the sense that they seemed confused, confined within different ideological matrixes and facing various social cleavages. Still, they at least managed to bridge the ethnic divisions and embrace the citizen concept.

Chapter 8 : Political Opportunities of the Context: State Repression and the Movements in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina

8.1. *Introduction*

This chapter looks at the repression of state institutions over social movement actors in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H, as one of the most important external factors which considerably contributed to the shaping of the policy outputs and outcomes in the three countries under study. Its main aim is to present the link between different forms of state repression as a component of the political opportunities of the three countries under study, and the policy outcomes of the three protest campaigns. Protest policing is a concept that has been elaborated in social movement studies to refer to the manner in which police handles protest events – "a more neutral description for what protesters usually refer to as 'repression' and the state as 'law and order'" (della Porta and Reiter 1998, p. 1). Police strategies and practices to control protest are undoubtedly one of the main indicators when assessing state repression (della Porta and Reiter 2013). As we mentioned in the introduction it is broadly recognized that state repression influences social movement outcomes, raising the costs of mobilization and can eventually lead toward a decrease in mobilization and reduction of activism (Opp, K. D. & Roehl, W., 1990). In this respect, one could expect a decrease in mobilization in terms of number of participants during the contentious events in Macedonia in 2015, in B&H in 2014, and in Bulgaria in 2013 when state repression is higher and more severe. Indeed, this would discourage challengers from further protests, and in turn this can eventually diminish the probability to influence the policy process (i.e. affect negatively the adoption of policy outputs and their implementation into tangible policy outcomes).

In this chapter firstly we will try to reconstruct, on the basis of various sources, mainly interviews as well as secondary data, the characteristics of the so called "protest policing" in our cases, classifying the three countries according to the two models or ideal types: the escalated force model and the negotiated management model (della Porta and Reiter 1998), and link them to the policy outcomes of the movements.

The empirical questions leading the chapter will be: 1. "How can we explain the level and types of repressive actions taken by the government against activists in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H during the protests campaigns for democratization taking part between 2013 and 2015?"

and 2. “How can one explain the consequences of such repression on social movements and their mobilization, emphasizing their possible impact on the policy process?” In particular, we will present in each country different types of state repression, from overt to covert repression, which have been exercised against the movement challengers. The key events which these different types of repression triggered (or failed to trigger) will be investigated along with the “mechanisms” though which repression, activists’ mobilization and the impact over the policy outcomes in the three respective countries could be linked. In the conclusion, the main findings on the relationship between the different types of state repression and their shaping of the policy consequences of the three movements will be summarized.

As mentioned in the introduction, state repression vis-à-vis the protesters, including elites’ attitude towards the challengers, is an important factor influencing mobilization. Within the so called “mechanism – process approach” in social movements studies, Tilly and Tarrow stress the importance of state repression in relation with political outcomes. In particular within fragile and not fully democratized societies, which have less functional institutions and relatively lower level of political culture in comparison to fully fledged democracies, the link between success or failure of a civil society mobilization and state repression is considered even stronger (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, pp. 59-61). In fact, state repression usually affects mobilization negatively. According to political process theorists repression raises the costs of protest, with the consequence of a decrease in protest intensity and people involved (i.e. the numbers in the streets) (Opp and Roehl 1990). On the other hand, it has also been noticed that within some circumstances state repression can instead radicalize protest repertoires according to a “curvilinear relation” (Hirsch 1990 and Zwerman, Steinhoff and della Porta 2000) (i.e. a curvilinear relationship between state repression and intensity of protests). This theoretical strand argues that “instead of diminishing protest or deterring the use of particularly aggressive tactics, repression encourages further protest and the use of non-institutional tactics” (Earl 2013, p. 5). Vivid examples for the first school are some of the anti-nuclear protests in Western Germany (Opp and Roehl 1990, pp. 529-540). On the other hand, recent protests in Paris known as the *Mouvement des gilets jaunes* (Yellow vests movement) showed that police repression can further mobilize and radicalize movement actors, unraveling vicious circles of ongoing violence (Le Monde 2018). This chapter now continues with an in-depth analysis of the three case studies, aiming to show what happened during the three protest campaigns in terms of state repression.

8.2. *Repression by the Macedonian State over CfM Organizers and Activists*

The Macedonian model of protest policing can be categorized as a "negotiated management model" ((McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998). This strategy of protest policing fosters a shift from harder to softer forms of power, promoting and recognizing the right to protest and a higher level of tolerance for even more disruptive forms of protest (Earl 2013, p. 2), as well as frequent communication between the protesters and the police in order to secure a peaceful development of events and limited use of coercion (see more in della Porta and Reiter 1998 and della Porta and Fillieule 2004). In this vein, in the case of the CfM, based on the previously elaborated theoretical assumptions, one could expect that a lower and milder repression (state intervention) would encourage challengers to undertake more contentious actions, which can positively affect the adoption and the implementation of policy outputs further leading to favorable policy outcomes.

The Macedonian case witnessed a combination of persuasive and informative strategies (Della Porta and Diani 2006, pp. 197-8). First, as many interviewees explained, there had been numerous contacts prior to the commencement of the movement activities between the police and the protest organizers (Int. 3, MKD and Int. 2, MKD). The big rally in front of the government on 17 May and the two-month long occupation was announced to the authorities, and all security precautions were taken both on side of the movement and the state authorities. Furthermore, the police was also timely informed of the activities in the "Camp of Freedom", as well as of the marches occasionally taking place on the streets in Skopje. This collaborative relationship between the two sides of the protest was coupled with barely any coercion during this protest wave. The police forces in Macedonia did not use any force and there was relatively high tolerance towards minor cases of illegitimate conduct (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998, p.52) coming from the side of the protesters. Only once, during a march headed towards PM Gruevski's home, tempers flared and there was a little bit of scuffling between the police and the governmental challengers. During this isolated incident, the police authorities breached constitutional provisions guaranteeing the freedoms of peaceful assembly and movement (mkd.mk 2016).[168] Still, the volunteers securing the protest march reacted immediately, and prevented any major incidents (Int. 10, MKD). On the other hand, the

[168] Link to the news article (in Macedonian) https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/mvr-i-zgradata-na-gruevski-blokirani-so-policiski-kordoni-demonstrantite-se?page=2#1

informative strategies employed on behalf of the state apparatus, mainly represented by the police, were developed to perfection. One should not disregard that the massive wiretapping and surveillance was one of the main triggers for the mobilization in the first place. According to one of the key informants, these practices continued throughout the entire protest period (Int. 9, MKD). Third, in terms of implementation of "rule of law" by state institutions, only minor breaches on behalf of the police forces described above were noticed in the Macedonian case. This contributed towards a consensual communication between the governmental challengers and the police, as testified by the organizers and the activists of the protests. This relationship which was openly demonstrated on the sites of contention resulted with highlighted flexibility by the Macedonian police and a very high level of mutual respect regarding formal and informal agreements between the two sides (Int. 3, MKD; Int. 10, MKD; Int. 2, MKD).

This context within which the mobilization for democratization of Macedonian society occurred was quite exceptional for the country's history of protest. For example, only two weeks prior to the 17 May event, and one year later, protests campaigns in Macedonia didn't find such a collaborative environment. For example, on 5 May 2015, during a protest in front of the government initiated by the content of one of the wiretapped conversations, the gathered citizens witnessed a violent clash between a portion of the protesters and the police (BBC 2015).[169] Furthermore, during the initial event of the "Colorful Revolution" in 2016, vast material damages and violent clashes between the police and the protesters could be seen throughout the city of Skopje (DW 2016).[170]

Surveillance of social movement actors is one of the most frequently used tactics which developed in parallel with the technological progress of societies. This form of repression usually violates basic human rights, but also enables the state to gather information about ongoing and future movement activities (Tarrow 2011, p. 170 and Posner and Vermeule 2007, pp. 7-9). During the protest wave under study in Macedonia, several interviewees who contributed to this work testified about the surveillance they were subjected to. One of the key informants shared his experience stating that during the period of protests, at times, both he and other members of his family spotted a van being constantly parked in front of their home (Int. 9, MKD). Furthermore, the interlocutor thoroughly described the modes through which the regime led by

[169] Link to the news article https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32610951
[170] Link to the news article https://www.dw.com/en/macedonia-colorful-revolution-paints-raucous-rainbow/a-19203365

former PM Gruevski performed the scandalous wiretapping and surveillance, also noted by the "Priebe Report" (EC 2015)[171], which was one of the main triggering factors leading to the protests:

"*Firstly, I think that the entire operation was not performed just in the MoI. It was conducted from at least one or two other locations…Again, by MoI operatives, but not officially at the MoI. This is why the operations continued even after the disclosures. Second, it is in the nature of these regimes never to stop. Let me explain you how this was done. Today, for example, we wiretap 1000 conversations. The analytics unit begins every morning by highlighting 10 interesting conversations out of these 1000. This is still on meta-data level. For example, Zaev called Sasho – this is interesting. Now, tell me what they discussed. There are teams which analyze this. Mijalkov's chief of staff - Toni, visited the PM every morning at 10 AM and told him: Mr. PM, these are the 10 most interesting conversations from yesterday. We suggest video surveillance of the meeting between Zaev and Ivan in pizzeria Dal Fufo, for example. Or, let's provide a video coverage of the encounter between person X and his mistress at hotel Y. This is how they operatively covered the turf…*" (Int. 9, MKD)

Furthermore, an interlocutor coming from the side of the activists, known as one of the most visible performers during the 17 May grand rally, spoke of two incidents during the period of mobilization, which he indirectly connects to his activism in the CfM platform. In the two occasions he was harassed by random unknown people who were definitely aware of who he is and what he does (see more about government harassment in Zamosc, L. 2013):

"*One night I left the camp in front of the Government, grabbed something to eat and continued walking home. I precisely remember that it was Tuesday and it was around 2 am. On the crossroad of Vodnjanska and Jordan Mijalkov streets a car stopped, one guy squeezed himself through the open window, spit on me, and started to scream at me and simply left with the car…On the second occasion, just one week after the first event, I was crossing one street in the center of the city…I remember that it was Wednesday evening. At one moment, I was passing by a young guy, when he suddenly started shouting at me 'Uuuuuu….fuck you, you spy, you UDBA member… you traitor…*" (Int. 8, MKD)

[171] https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/news_corner/news/news-files/20150619_recommendations_of_the_senior_experts_group.pdf

Several other activists and key informants spoke about their feeling of being constantly followed, monitored, even noticed undercover police vehicles being constantly present in front of their homes and working places (Int. 8, MKD; Int. 9, MKD and Int. 10, MKD).

The last experience was shared by one of the most visible organizers of the protest events who spoke of the constant feeling of being followed and having the feeling that he was under surveillance during the entire period of mobilization, which resulted with a constant feeling of lack of general safety (see numerous examples of constant surveillance over movement activists in Marx, G. T. 1988):

"*Somehow, there was a feeling among all of us that we are continuously under some type of surveillance, because the people that were continuously engaged in organizing the activities were publically known. I can speak for myself, as well as for the SMOs which were involved in the organization committee, that we did not feel safe all the time. There were also physical attacks on individuals…some of them were attacked by people with masks…*" (Int. 10, MKD)

The same interlocutor also pointed out cases of infiltrations and agent provocateurs who were instructed to create physical conflicts, provocations, and even tried to establish a small drug distribution network in the "Camp of Freedom" in order to present the governmental challengers as drug addicts (see more on agent provocateurs in Marx, G. T. 2013):

"*What I can surely confirm is that there were many infiltrated police provocateurs and informants in the camp. There were two-three cases where we noticed attempts for drug distribution, but we were very well organized. Especially this 'internal security service' that we established in the camp*" (Int. 10, MKD).

In sum, combining all these features we could identify the type of state reaction in Macedonia as "mild coercive covert repression" expressed through strong surveillance and small incidents of harassment. Furthermore, the attitude of the police officials could be one of the major factors contributing towards favorable policy outputs and policy outcomes deriving from the Macedonian mobilization.

8.3. *State Repression in Bulgaria during the First Wave of Protests in the Contentious 2013*

In comparison to the Macedonian case, the Bulgarian winter protests showed a slightly stronger form of repression by the state toward the anti-governmental protesters during early 2013. Moving to the second case study of this work, and following the pattern used for

describing state repression in the Macedonian case, one should firstly turn towards the policing of protest in Bulgaria. The process of protest policing in Bulgaria during the first wave of demonstrations in 2013 was, to a large extent, a "golden mean" between what occurred in Macedonia, and what will be presented below shortly regarding the BH case. The Macedonian and the BH cases are undoubtedly two fitting examples for the two general models of protest policing – the negotiated management, and the escalated force. One of the most violent episodes happened at *Orlov Most* (the Eagle Bridge), a traditional site of contention in Sofia, on 20 February, when the police clashed with the protesters. The violent episode resulted in 10 injuries (Novinite 2013). This was the only rather violent outburst between the state and the activists which was reported by the media or shared by the activists during the entire protest wave. This contributes to classifying the attitude of Bulgarian police forces as soft use of force, or what Fillieule and Jobard call a more paternalistic handling of protests (Fillieule, O. & Jobard, F. 1998, pp. 88-9), taking a so called wait-and-see stance regarding potential public and private damages. This attitude by the authorities, paired with the general tolerance of, at times, illegitimate conduct, was confirmed by several interviewees and key informants alike during the interviews (Int. 5, BUL; Int. 6, BUL and Int. 4, BUL).

One of the organizers of the protests in Sofia commented that he felt he was constantly being followed and under surveillance, and had the impression that his phone had been wiretapped. He was also frequently summoned by the police for numerous misdemeanors conducted during the couple of months of protest (Int. 3, BUL).

The eventful change of dynamics during the protest wave, as well as the unpredicted events such as the resignation of PM Borisov, contributed towards frequent shifts between the consensual and confrontational communications model between the police and the challengers, as well as to relative flexibility of the Bulgarian police officials. Interviewed activists, organizers and key informants also commented on the diachronic variance regarding the formal and informal agreements between the protesters and the police (Int. 9, BUL; Int. 7, BUL; Int. 3, BUL).

Taking into consideration the previously stated arguments, it can be concluded that vast difficulties exist for scientifically locating the attitude of the police towards the governmental challengers in Bulgaria during the early months of 2013. This dilemma arises due to the continuous change of dynamic between the protesters and the Bulgarian police forces through

time and space. This resulted in constant fluctuations between the escalated force and negotiated management protest policing models.

We already mentioned the *Orlov Most* case, when a massive clash between the police and the governmental challengers unraveled on the streets. Still, this was one of the most visible and reported events. An activist who was very engaged during the winter protests described another event in Varna, the coastal city which was one of the strongholds of protest. He spoke about physical attacks over protesters and involvement of the local politicians and businessmen, as well as the infiltration by football hooligans (Int. 5, BUL) which sometimes played the role of executors of violence:

"*As far as I recall, during the protests in Varna, one of the participants was attacked from behind by unknown perpetrators. If you ask me, this was organized by the local holders of power, both economic and political…During the protest wave, also here, in Sofia, there was violence and citizens were beaten. There were protest participants with gashed heads. This is definitely repression. Still, I must point out that I was never subjected to overt physical repression…*" (Int. 6, BUL)

A very peculiar type of repression was the indirect repression coming from the side of the state and exerted over the employers who employed more media-visible governmental challengers. Fearing from possible economic sanctions such as extraordinary inspections and lack of access to public procurements, some of the employers asked their protest-involved employees to either stop protesting, or leave their jobs. One of the protest organizers from Sofia reflected on this occurrence:

"*Many people lost their jobs during 2013, because some of the employers got scared and told their employees: 'You either protest or you work!' Of course, this refers to those who were more visible in the media. On the other hand, there were also employers who said: 'I am with you! Just go on and do your thing!' I tend to perceive this as a type of repression…*" (Int. 3, BUL).

Another form of indirect repression coming from state-affiliated agents which is very important for the outcomes of the Bulgarian mobilization is the distorted picture of the governmental challengers created by some media outlets which had close ties to the power structures. The very fragmented and volatile media scene in Bulgaria, which led to enormous drops in freedom of expression and media freedoms rankings (Freedom House 2013)[172],

[172] https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/bulgaria

contributed to a non-friendly protest environment for the governmental challengers (Rohlinger and Vaccaro 2013). More visible activists during the winter protests were continuously targeted by interest-driven media outlets. This was very clearly stated by one of the interlocutors:

"*By the media outlets owned by Delyan Peevski we were portrayed as Russian spies. They were 'explaining' how we had close ties to various mafia structures and that we were paid and told what to do. They said that my father has close business ties to Gazprom, that the parents of other comrades were agents perusing various interests. In this manner they attacked both the protesters and their families. They were sticking various labels to our names…*" (Int. 3, BUL)

Very similar to the Macedonian case, the Bulgarian challengers were also under continuous surveillance by state agents. In comparison to the first case, the operations in the latter were not so large-scale and the scope of activities was limited only to organizers and more visible protest figures (see more examples of surveillance of protesters in Jaime-Jimenez and Reinares 1998, pp. 166-187). One of the activists who participated in organizing protest events in Sofia and Veliko Trnovo reflected on this type of covert repression:

"*It was clear that all of us [organizers of the protests, I.S.] had our mobile phones tapped. I suppose that we were perceived as a threat to national security. I guess this was also the fact, mainly because we were the organizers and we also bore certain responsibilities. Thus, for sure, our phones were wiretapped. To the best of my knowledge, they used some kind of microphones in order to listen to our conversations.*" (Int. 6, BUL)

The last form of repression during the Bulgarian protest wave under study was the extensive legal repression exerted over the protest organizers (see more about legal repression in Agrikoliansky 2013). The same occurrence, on a much larger scale, was also noted in the BH case. One of the interlocutors explained that he had been summoned in front of the criminal court in Sofia numerous times, very often due to ridiculous misdemeanors such as throwing tomatoes at the KEVR building, or ridiculing state politicians (Int. 3, BUL). Although he commented that the legal repression did not turn him away from even more agile and engaged protest activity, still, many of his comrades became disillusioned and disenchanted by the numerous misdemeanor charges arriving at their addresses.

Let us try and summarize this process of state repression in Bulgaria to the best extent possible. In a nutshell, this process in Bulgaria can be described as strong and coercive covert and legal repression, complemented with a small doze of open, overt repression, in the wake of

the resignation of PM Borisov's government. The repressive attitude of the Bulgarian state was at least one level higher in comparison to the repression exerted over the governmental challengers in Macedonia. In regards to the policy outputs and outcoms, this level of state intervention allowed access of governmental challengers to the policy arena by adopting favorable policy outputs, which further failed to develop into tangible policy outcomes.

8.3.1. The Fierce and Coercive State Repression in B&H in the Midst of the 2014 Protests

Concluding with the last case of state repression analyzed in this study, this section firstly turns towards policing of protest in B&H. It was briefly mentioned in the introductory chapters that protest policing in B&H was characterized as very violent and repressive. This contributed to the overall strong repression by state institutions exerted over governmental challengers. Numerous coercive and informative strategies were used over BH activists, especially during the first days of protest. The initial protest in Tuzla held on 5 February foresaw excessive use of force by the police officers which resulted with 23 injuries (*Dnevni Avaz* 06.02.2014, pp. 2-3). Tear gas was also a part of the usual décor throughout B&H in the first contentious week. It was used in Mostar, one of the most burning points of protest (Ibid, p. 5), as well as in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and many other cities which hosted brutal clashes between the governmental challengers and the BH police forces. On the other hand, the informative strategies applied by the authorities were brought to perfection. Activists witnessed many covert tools and activities used for information-gathering, such as surveillance, infiltration and diversions (Int. 5, B&H). These activities are explained in detail in the rows below.

The "brutality" of the protest policing style (della Porta, D. & Reiter, H. R. 1998, p. 3) in B&H was reconfirmed several times, both on the streets and in the police stations during detention of activists. One of the informal leaders of the protests in Tuzla, Aldin Širanović, who is also the founder of a Facebook group "*UDAR*" (*Strike/Hit*, I.S.) which urged citizens of Tuzla to take the streets (Dnevni Avaz 06.02.2014, pp. 2-3), was first severely beaten in a restaurant in Tuzla, but also later in detention (HRW 2014). Similar accusations were heard from Sarajevo, from Muris Arslani, who testified of being beaten twice, first during the apprehension and the second time before his deployment to the police station (Dnevni Avaz 20.03.2014, pp. 2-3).

Other numerous repressive tactics were also applied over BH challengers during the two intensive months of protests, as they are further elaborated in the following lines. One of the

most exploited means of repression was the legal repression exerted over protest participants. Numerous criminal and misdemeanor procedures were initiated against the protesters.

The selective approach to controlling participating actors was much emphasized in the BH case. Apart from the different treatment of various social groups (della Porta and Reiter (Eds.) 1998, pp. 7-8), which was visible throughout the entire protest wave, the BH police apparatus also targeted specific individuals who had been previously labeled as visible, important and crowd-gathering. The previously mentioned case of Aldin Širanovic was just one of the most vivid examples. Several interviewees testified that they felt threatened, followed and tendentiously exposed to misdemeanor procedures (Int. 5, B&H; Int. 6, B&H and Int. 4, B&H).

Previous examples already provide sufficient evidence leading towards the conclusion that BH authorities severely breached rule of law during the contentious period under study. Throughout the mobilization, this continuous deterioration of relationship between the two sides resulted with a confrontational communication model (McPhail, C., Schweingruber, D. & McCarthy, J. 1998, p. 52). Furthermore, this relationship triggered a more rigid attitude coming from the side of the BH police forces. The rigidness and the lack of communication, as well as the lack of agreement regarding formal and informal arrangements between the two parties, were repeatedly highlighted by the activists and the protest organizers (Int. 5, B&H; Int. 6, B&H and Int. 4, B&H).

The arguments and evidence laid out in the previous paragraphs point to the direction that the general attitude by the BH police forces can be labeled and classified as escalated force model of protest policing (della Porta and Reiter (Eds.) 1998, p. 7), which negatively affected the efforts of BH governmental challengers to secure the favorable and desired policy outputs and policy outcomes. In order to grasp more details regarding the process of repression in B&H, this work now continues with more peculiarities of state repression based dominantly on interviews with engaged activists during the “Bosnian Spring”.

Previous paragraphs of this section touched upon the violence which unraveled in Tuzla, Sarajevo, Mostar and other cities throughout B&H. The violence practiced by the security forces was very vividly explained by one of the protest organizers who was active both on the streets, but in the plenums as well. She described the second, third and fourth day of protests in Sarajevo as the most traumatic ones, when the police brutalized governmental challengers both on the streets and at the police stations as well:

"*On the second, third and fourth day of protest, the organized activities of the secret service already became evident. Party affiliated hooligans infiltrated our ranks and deliberately wandered around randomly beating up people. The police followed suspects using photos and videos. If these people showed up from somewhere, they either immediately detained them, or beat them up on site. On the 8/9 February, people were massively detained. I know for sure that it was a weekend, Saturday/Sunday, when the situation got very tense and this was the worst period, especially for the minors. The repression was scary. Minors disappeared and their parents were looking for them rushing from one police station to another. A lot of young protesters were severely beaten. Many of them were forced to share information under physical and psychological pressure…*" (Int. 5, B&H)

Many of these violent episodes were noted in the HRW report, documented with photos and statements of protest participants. This document refers to nineteen cases of excessive use of force by the police over protesters, journalists and bystanders, both on the streets and in detention. Sarajevo and Tuzla were the main points of violence in which women and children were also targeted (HRW 2014)[173]. One of the interviewed activists commented: "*There was a large disproportion in power between the state-affiliated agents and the protesters"* (Int. 4, B&H). This study already reflected on the cases of Aldin Širanović (*Dnevni Avaz* 6 February 2014) and Muris Arslani (*Dnevni Avaz* 20 March 2014). A protest participant going under the pseudonym of *Slava*, spoke to HRW investigators about the mistreatment he faced during his 50-hour detention at the police station *Stari Grad* in Sarajevo. The 20 year-old explained the misconduct of the BH police forces in detail:

"*They [the police, I.S.] came to my house and entered without showing any warrant. They brought me to the police station in Stari Grad and I was made to walk into a room that looked like a conference hall. I was alone. I felt a sudden hard blow on my back. It was a metal truncheon, I really screamed because it hurt so much. It was one strike and then several policemen, four or five, joined in. They were cursing and saying, 'Jebem ti mater!' and then threw me into a corner of the conference room. I was lying on the floor and they were hitting me with their fists and they kicked my body several times wherever they could. This went on for five or so minutes and then one of the special police officers jumped on my ribs and my kidney area. I*

[173] https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/21/bosnia-and-herzegovina-investigate-police-violence-against-protesters

lost consciousness and then they threw cold water on me. I requested medical care to which the response was that 'You won't get medical care even if you drop dead here!'" (HRW 2014)

The previous paragraphs already briefly mentioned the infiltration of party affiliated "protesters" instructed to provoke violence and havoc. Furthermore, extensive infiltration and provocations also came from the side of the secret service (see more about infiltration in Fernandez 2008 and Starr, Fernandez, Amster, Wood, and Caro, 2008). One of the interlocutors witnessed undercover agents dressed like "usual demonstrators" giving orders via walkie-talkies to individuals and groups regarding when and where a certain group should damage some public good. She also confirmed that one night in Sarajevo during the first days of protest, a fully equipped van deployed several men which set a small kiosk on fire, cold-bloodedly picked them up and simply drove away (Int. 5, B&H). Another organizer of the plenums in Sarajevo commented that at a certain point in time, one could not be sure whom to trust in the plenums, because the police had either infiltrated their agents, or held many protesters "hostage" with criminal charges hanging over their heads as Damocles sword (Int. 3, B&H).

In terms of the legal repression, numerous criminal and misdemeanor charges were filed both against protest organizers and ordinary participants in order to send a strong message that anyone who breaks the law, even minor violations, will be prosecuted. 57 year-old businessmen from Sarajevo Salem Hatibović faced terrorism charges for allegedly setting on fire the Presidency of B&H. On 7 February, the first day of the violent protests in Sarajevo, Hatibović was stopped with his vehicle and surrounded by a group of protesters. They opened the trunk of his vehicle and took two liters of liquor and one liter of gasoline which he wanted to transport to his weekend house and a private hostel that he owns. Later, he was charged with terrorism on grounds that he deliberately provided the perpetrators with gasoline in order for them to burn down the building of the presidency (*Dnevni Avaz* 9April 2014). Similar charges were filed against 21 year-old Nihad Trnka from Sarajevo. The young man stated that although he was present at the site of contention, in front of the B&H presidency building, on 7 February, from 16:00 PM onward, he never participated in hooliganism, nor had any contacts with the previously mentioned Hatibović. Trnka, son of an 80% disabled war veteran, commented that he was arrested and detained by thirteen police officers, like he was the biggest criminal in Sarajevo (*Dnevni Avaz* 6 April 2014). The last case of legal repression presented by the media comes from Zenica, where 56 year-old worker from the Arcelor Mittal factory, Ismet Musaefendić, faced a

misdemeanor procedure for taking part in the protests against the ZDK cantonal government. Musaefendić was fined with 350 BAM for allegedly cursing the Zenica Mayor, and calling him a fascist. The protester told the media that he never spoke anything of that kind, adding that, according to him, the whole legal farce was aimed at discouraging him from taking further part in the protests (*Dnevni Avaz* 26 March 2014). The intention of the authorities to disillusion the governmental challengers was also pointed out by one of the interviewed activists from Sarajevo, as "wisely" chosen tactics. Although the several initiated misdemeanor procedures she faced failed to restrain her from protesting, she had the feeling that the majority of legally harassed protesters became disillusioned:

"*The police continuously targeted us. For example, there was one guy which was continuously present at the protests, even before 2014. He always carried a megaphone and was always loud and visible. He was immediately arrested during the first days of protest, because he was registered by the police as a 'usual suspect'. This guy was detained. He left the police station crying. He is not a hooligan: he is more of a partisan. One Nino Aličković from the anti-Dayton group was also detained. He just showed up at the plenums from time to time, saying that he was threatened by the police. Honestly, no one knows what these threats amounted to…*" (Int. 5, B&H)

If one would like to summarize state repression in B&H, it needs to be underlined that the actions by the BH security institutions resulted with strong execution of both overt and covert repression over the governmental challengers. This fierce coercive repression was characterized with large scale violence, especially during the first days of protest, with continuous surveillance and infiltrations, as well as draconic legal repression over more visible and active protesters.

Taking into consideration the previously elaborated forms of strong coercion used against the BH protesters by the police forces, it is reasonable for one to hypothesize that the multiple measures taken by the state authorities largely affected the human resources and the morals of the movement activists in B&H, distancing the governmental challengers from their initial policy goals desired at the very beginning.

8.4. *Conclusion*

The previous sections in this chapter indicate to strong and excessive overt repression in B&H, and a much milder overt repression in Bulgaria. On the other hand, overt repression was

non-existent in the Macedonian case. Regarding covert repression, it was vastly present in the BH and Bulgarian cases, while its occurrence was much milder in Macedonia. In the three cases under study various forms of coercion were detected, while channeling could not be spotted during the three waves of mobilization.

Taking a step back and looking at the central hypothesis introduced in the theoretical framework, it was argued that state repression negatively affects the governmental challengers in the three case studies, i.e., higher level and intensity of repression by the state (Opp and Roehl 1990) discouraged challengers from further actions, which negatively affected the adoption and implementation of policy outputs in South East Europe. In order to explore this hypothesis, this chapter firstly underlined protest policing as one of the most important and most visible components of state repression in the three countries, and later elaborated further on the most important types and forms of repression exercised over protesters in the three cases under study.

If one glances at the policing of protest, it may be concluded that the Macedonian model of protest policing during the CfM movement was characterized by persuasive and informative strategies (della Porta and Reiter 1998) and high level of tolerance on behalf of the authorities. Furthermore, selective strategies were applied regarding the control of movement actors and minor rule of law breaches were noted. There was a consensual communication level between the protesters and the police, strengthened with a rather high level of mutual respect which was reflected in the flexibility coming from the latter. These characteristics theoretically define the Macedonian protest policing model as negotiated control (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998). On the other hand, the Bulgarian 2014 winter protests were characterized with limited coercive and strong informative strategies. Unlike Macedonia, soft use of force was exercised by the Bulgarian police. Very similar to the Macedonian case, high level of tolerance, selective control of protesters and minor rule of law breaches were noted. Although there was a high level of flexibility from the side of the police forces, the communication between the two sides continuously shifted from consensual to confrontational. The limited amount of soft use of force, as well as the variation of the communication and mutual respect between the police authorities and the governmental challengers makes the Bulgarian case difficult for scientific location. From a theoretical perspective, the Bulgarian protest policing model constantly fluctuated between the escalated force and the negotiated management protest policing models. Lastly, the BH case was characterized with very strong coercive and informative strategies

applied by the authorities. Conversely to the two other cases, the BH state applied brutal use of force over its challengers. Severe repressive activities by the police and selective controlling of protest actors was also a highlight of the protests in B&H. Numerous legal violations, especially regarding human rights of women, children and journalists were also noted by renowned international watchdogs. The constant confrontational communication between the two sides and the lack of mutual respect contributed towards rigidness by the BH police forces. Taking into account the complex, and at times very violent, relationship between the governmental challengers and the security forces in B&H, the protest policing model can be described as escalated force (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998 and Schweingruber 2000).

Climbing the ladder of generalizability regarding the overall state repression in the three countries, the Macedonian case can be summarized as mild coercive covert repression expressed through strong surveillance and small incidents of harassment of protesters. On the other hand, the state repression in Bulgaria during the 2013 winter protests can be described as strong and coercive covert and legal repression, complemented with a small amount of open, overt repression. The repression coming from the side of the Bulgarian state was at least one level stronger in comparison to the repression exerted over the governmental challengers in Macedonia. Lastly, in B&H, the anti-governmental protesters faced much stronger and more coercive actions by the state in comparison to the Macedonian and Bulgarian cases. The actions by the BH police forces resulted in strong application of both overt and covert repression over the governmental challengers. This fierce coercive repression was characterized with large scale violence, especially during the first days of protest, with continuous surveillance and police infiltrations, as well as severe legal repression over more visible and renowned protesters.

Taking into consideration the three described cases of state repression and contextualizing them in the theoretical framework described in the introductory chapters, one can conclude that the intensity, type and form of state repression to a large extent influenced the policy outcomes in the three case studies. In comparison to the Bulgarian, and especially the Macedonian case, events in B&H unraveled highly unfavorably for the mobilized citizens, the strong state response being one of the main contributing factors. These activities coming from the side of the state, prevented the protesters' prospects for achieving the previously defined goals, and limited their access to the federal and state policy arenas. On the other hand, one might argue that the negotiated management model of protest policing in Macedonia and the

generally mild covert repression did not prevent the securing of policy outputs desired by the challengers, nor did it disillusion protesters to further push for implementation and transformation of the policy outputs into tangible policy outcomes. In regards to the Bulgarian case, the protesters materialized on the changes and fluctuations of the two models of protest policing, taking advantage of periods when it resembled more the negotiated management model, and when state repression was in periods of low tide.

Empirical data presented in this chapter also reaffirmed some of the theoretical notions set out by Tilly and Tarrow within their political process approach to studying social movements. They underlined the importance of state repression as one of the most important mechanisms in regards to political outcomes, especially in not fully consolidated democratic societies which are fragile, have a lower level of political culture and less functional democratic institutions in comparison to their full-fledged democratic counterparts (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, pp. 59-61). This also holds true when policy outputs and outcomes are considered. It is evident from the three cases presented in this chapter that there is to a certain extent a negative correlation between state repression and policy outcomes. As state repression increased, the opportunities for favorable policy outputs and outcomes diminished. Data also showed that when a group decided to put forward independent claims using violence, as in B&H during the first days of protest, it soon faced strong repression on behalf of the state (Ibid, p. 112). Furthermore, this strong state repression and fears from violent repertoires drive more peaceful protesters from the streets, something which we saw in the BH case, and which resembles the Ferguson events from 2014 presented by Tilly and Tarrow (Ibid, p. 61). These two similarly violent protests happened in the same year, on two very different and distant locations. What brings them together is violence and repression. Lastly, this chapter also showed that power holders hang on to repression over challengers (Ibid, p. 60), whenever provided with opportunity not to pay a high political price. This was very much the case in B&H.

Table 8. 1 Relations between state repression and policy outcomes

	Macedonia	**Bulgaria**	**B&H**
Policing of protest	Negotiated management model	Negotiated management model/ escalated force model	Escalated force model
Covert repression	Mild coercive	Strong coercive	Strong coercive
Overt repression	Non existent	Mild	Strong and excessive
Policy outputs	Strong presence of policy outputs	Minor presence of policy outputs	Absence of policy outputs
Policy outcomes	Presence of policy outcomes	Absence of policy outcomes	Absence of policy outcomes

Source: Own calculation

Chapter 9 : The Allies and Opponents of the Movements and their Influence on Movements' Impact on the Policy Process

9.1. *Introduction*

This chapter deals with the allies and opponents of the three movements under study, which can be considered as one of the main factors within the POS approach that influence the mobilization of social movements and organizations. In particular, it will take into consideration the political system and party system relations in the three countries, conceptualized as the main important organizational field within which also social movements operate; the role of political parties and other institutional actors as allies and opponents to the movements; the key role of the international community in regards to the interaction with social movements and political parties; as well as the role of media actors and their relationship with the movements in the three countries.

Each of the country-specific sections which follow dedicates space to the previously mentioned factors. In terms of the political systems, the sections describe possible effects caused by the main similarities and differences in regard to their institutional setting. This helps clarify how context opportunities shape the action of the movements, and how this, in turn, impacts the policy process concerning the policy outputs and outcomes in the three cases. Furthermore, the interactions between the key institutional actors in the three cases are described. It is argued that the main differences across states are the unitary vs. complex/federal institutional design, which actually influences specific government-opposition relationships. Starting from the institutional political opportunities of the countries under investigation, Macedonia and Bulgaria are considered as unitary countries, while B&H is characterized by a unique constitutional design, consisted of two political units – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H) and Republika Srpska (RS), designed by the international community in the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars. This resulted in a clear government/opposition divide in the two unitary countries, and a very complicated government-opposition relationship in B&H, which varies on state, entity and cantonal level. Furthermore, the multiple veto players in the BH constitutional and political system require a lot of compromise, fluctuating coalitions, but also, it very often ends with endlessly long blockades of the political processes in the country.

Each of the following sections also looks at the pivotal role of the international community, which is especially significant in the case of Macedonia. What is in focus is the attitude of the international actors during the three waves of mobilization: The strong involvement in the Macedonian case, the lack of interest in the Bulgarian case, as well as the ambivalent and not very coordinated approach to the situation in B&H are underlined.

One of the very important factors is also the media setting in the three countries, including the considerably low levels of media freedoms and freedom of speech. It points to the direction that certain characteristics of the media systems might have influenced the mobilization of the movements, as well as their impact on the policy process. Still, in general, the biggest media players in the three countries acted more as adversaries to the movements under study.

Each of these issues is seen through the prism of the political-process approach, highlighting the role of multiple actors such as social movements, largest political parties, the international community and the media, as well as the mechanisms, processes and links between these sets of actors. The main goal is to highlight the most important events in each country which to a certain extent contributed to the creation/lack of policy outputs and outcomes in the three countries.

Lastly, the final section of this chapter revisits the main hypotheses defined and explained in the introductory chapters, linking them to contemporary examples taken from the three movements under study.

9.2. *The Allies and Opponents as a Key Factor for Favorable Policy Outcomes: The case of Macedonia*

Macedonia as a unitary state with a mono-cameral legislature and clear-cut horizontal separation of powers provides the setting for a clear government/opposition divide (Macedonian Constitution 1991)[174]. During the CfM mobilization both the majority in parliament, and the directly elected president of the state were in the authoritarian hands of PM Nikola Gruevski, head of the ruling VMRO-DPMNE. Furthermore, the largest party in power also controlled the vast number of municipalities including the City of Skopje. In terms of political opportunities given by the dynamics among actors during the CfM platform activities, and further during the

[174] http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mk/mk014en.pdf

extensive political negotiations between the largest four political parties (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI and DPA), there was a very clear *pro*/*contra* movement divide.

The parties in power which comprised of the governing coalition were the biggest opponents to the movement. This primarily refers to VMRO-DPMNE as the largest and most dominant party in government. As it is very common in social movement studies, the state as target of the movement had much more resources at its disposal, which the power holders in Macedonia were using to cling to power as long as possible. VMRO-DPMNE was a clear opponent to the movement activities, going to the extreme of negating its existence and labeling it as clearly partisan activity by the SDSM and clearly disregarding the citizens which were largely involved (Prizma 2015)[175]. The main strategy of VMRO-DPMNE was to discredit the protesters and present them solely as party members whose only wish was to come to power (Ibid). Apart from the continuous media campaign performed by its domestic and foreign government mouthpieces (Russia Insider 2015)[176], the largest ruling party organized a counter protest on the following day after the 17 May grand rally, and set up a counter shantytown encampment opposite the Macedonian parliament, under the smokescreen of defending democracy from the occupiers, traitors and invaders of Macedonia (OCCRP 2015)[177]. News articles used in the PCA, presented in Chapter 5, show that former PM Gruevski and his party led the media campaign in the direction of ignoring the numerous movement actors, but frontally attacking the leader of the opposition Zoran Zaev as the great "mastermind" of the entire mobilization, scaling down the role and the impact of the citizens (Prizma 2015)[178].

What was very peculiar was the relatively neutral position of the ethnic Albanian parties. DUI, which was a junior partner in the governing coalition, had a very reserved stance towards the CfM and its activists. Prior to the grand rally on 17 May, the DUI leader Ali Ahmeti issued a statement reaffirming the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of peaceful assembly, and urged citizens to protest and to channel their grievances in a peaceful manner (Fair Press 2015)[179]. This dubious position of DUI may have come from the prior closeness between DUI and SDSM who governed together in a coalition from 2002 to 2006. This coalition was reaffirmed following the

[175] http://prizma.mk/blog-vo-zhivo-makedonija-silna-miting-na-vmro-dpmne/ (in Macedonian)
[176] http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/leaked-memo-shows-soros-ngos-payed-macedonian-students-1500-come-regime-change-ideas/ri7179
[177] https://www.occrp.org/en/blog/4012-macedonia-a-tale-of-two-skopjes
[178] http://prizma.mk/blog-vo-zhivo-makedonija-silna-miting-na-vmro-dpmne/ (in Macedonian)
[179] http://www.fairpress.eu/blog/2015/05/15/ministers-resign-as-macedonia-enters-into-deep-political-crisis-followed-by-everyday-protest-and-increased-bias-in-media-reporting/

early parliamentary elections in 2016, when the coalition led by SDSM coalesced with DUI and another pre-electoral coalition of Albanian parties in order to form the new reformist Macedonian government. Another argument, which to a certain extent explains the reserved standpoints of the junior partner in government, was the public opinion which continuously highlighted that a vast majority of the ethnic Albanian citizens voiced strong disapproval of former PM Gruevski (IRI 2015)[180]. On the other hand, during the negotiations in Przhino among the largest four political parties, DUI showed closeness to the VMRO-DPMNE. They did not directly confront the governmental challengers, but tacitly aligned with its senior partner in the government, VMRO-DPMNE. According to several interlocutors, the main motivations were the party-centered lucrative and political interests (Int. 2, MKD; Int. 9, MKD; Int. 10, MKD).

Lastly in regard to the opponents to the CfM movement coming from the side of the political parties, the biggest surprise came from the largest ethnic Albanian party in opposition, DPA, led by years long MP Menduh Thaci. Taking into consideration the previously stated arguments, primarily the sentiments of the ethnic Albanian citizens, one would expect that the DPA to be one of the strongest supporters of the CfM, and to fiercely oppose the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI led government. To the contrary, DPA remained reserved and silent during the protests, while tacitly supporting the two ruling parties during the Przhino negotiations. One of the indicators which, to a certain extent, unraveled the unconditioned loyalty of DPA and its leader was the released wiretapped conversation between Menduh Thaci and the former chief of the secret service and first cousin of former PM Gruevski, Sasho Mijalkov. In the phone conversation released by SDSM, the wider public could hear Thaci saying to Mijalkov that he would be "loyal until his death" (Almakos 2015)[181]! Once again, the narrow business and political interests prevailed over the democratization of Macedonia and the protection of human the rights of its citizens.

On the other hand, the largest party in opposition, SDSM, which led the democratic opposition, was the greatest ally of the CfM. In the period preceding the encampment in front of the government, and almost during the entire period of protests, SDSM and the smaller political parties from the coalition in opposition, were also constitutive members of the CfM (Plusinfo

[180] http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2015-07-13_survey_of_macedonian_public_opinion_june_6-15_2015.pdf
[181] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLFG6Y8E9YE (in Macedonian and Albanian)

2015)[182] and had a partnering relationship with the SMOs and individuals which were involved (Int. 3, MKD; Int. 10, MKD). It was only when the political negotiations were drawn to a close that the political parties formally stepped out of the platform because they were supposed to re-enter parliament and participate in the implementation of the provisions from the Przhino Agreement (Telma 2015)[183]. Many interlocutors, both coming from the side of the SMOs and the political parties, witnessed the close cooperation between the citizens and the SDSM in terms of human resources, funding, knowledge-sharing and values (Int. 12, MKD and Int. 13 Boban K). Furthermore, the crucial role that the political party had in enacting the laws deriving from the Przhino Agreement, and which were to a large extent complementary with the grievances of the citizens, once again depicted the close ties between the two entities. The CfM was the only movement among the three under study, which had a strategic partnership and cooperation with one of the biggest and most influential parties within the three respective political systems of Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H. This proved to be one of the crucial factors which contributed towards the verification of the desired policy outputs and their further implementation resulting with valuable policy outcomes.

The role of the international community was undoubtedly largest in the Macedonian case, especially through the pressure exerted over the largest four political parties during the Przhino negotiations. Within the plethora of international envoys engaged during the protests in Macedonia, and later, the political negotiations, the EU and the USA were the most visible ones (UK government 2015)[184]. Fostering the political negotiations, the foreign powers were one of the crucial allies of the movement in Macedonia. This is mainly because both the governmental challengers and Brussels and Washington had very similar visions and standpoints regarding the future of the state: A country which is re-democratized, where rule of law is reintroduced and whose urgent priorities are the Euro Atlantic integrations. On the other hand, sporadic Russian influence was also noticed during the contentious events. Expectedly, Moscow issued press releases backing the regime of PM Gruevski and arguing redefinition of territories and borders in the Balkans by their Western opponents (Novinite 2015)[185]. It must be noted that this influence was relatively mild in comparison to the engagement of Western diplomats.

[182] http://plusinfo.mk/vest/25867/gragjanite-za-makedonija-povikaa-na-miren-protest-na-17-maj (in Macedonian)
[183] http://telma.com.mk/vesti/sdsm-ja-napushti-koalicijata-gragjani-za-makedonija (in Macedonian)
[184] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-political-crisis-in-macedonia
[185] http://www.novinite.com/articles/168689/Russia+Claims+Macedonia+Crisis+Managed+from+Abroad

The frequent press releases coming from Brussels and Washington, as well as the numerous visits of high European and US officials aimed at putting pressure over the Macedonian authorities to release the authoritarian grip imposed over their political opponents and civil society. After the huge citizens' gathering on 17 May and the setting up of the encampment in front of the government, followed by the huge rally and counter-encampment set up by VMRO-DPMNE supporters, the international community felt that political negotiations must commence as soon as possible, in order to prevent violent contentious events. One of the key informants further explained the caution of the international community regarding the political stability and security of Macedonia:

"*At the end of the 80s, President George Bush senior asked his National Security Council 'Which is the lowest common denominator for America's intervention in the Yugoslav crisis?' The analytical services pointed out to him that the lowest common denominator is Macedonia. Why? They evaluated Macedonia as the only Yugoslav republic with explosive powers. All the other had implosive characteristics. What does this mean? You can have a war in B&H for 10 years. It can be bloody and tragic, but it is likely that it will not spill over the border with Croatia, not to speak of Vienna. They said that Macedonia had that explosive power and that this must not be allowed under any circumstances…*" (Int. 9, MKD)

This is one of the reasons why the mechanism of international influence played such an important constitutive part of the puzzle for acquiring policy outcomes which would further secure re-introduction of rule of law and respect of human rights in Macedonia. The alliance between the movement participants and the Western international community also arises fromcomplementary interests. Both parties pushed for westernizing of Macedonian society and for limiting the authoritarian power of former PM Gruevski's government which throughout the years had removed the established checks and balances in Macedonia's political system.

From the very beginning of the political negotiations, numerous high officials from the US Department of State and the European Commission flew to Skopje, facilitating the negotiations brokered by the official representatives of the USA and the EU – H.E. Ambassador Jess Baily and special representative Aivo Orav (EC 2015)[186]. In the midst of the years-long political crisis and just several weeks before the protests erupted, US Deputy Assistant Secretary

[186] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en

for European and Eurasian Affairs, Hoyt Brian Yee, visited Macedonia and met the four political leaders as well as other high political officials in the country (Kurir 2015)[187]. The inability of the political leaders to find a common solution to end the political stalemate, furthermore urged the citizens to take to the streets and put pressure on the government, but also on the opposition, in order to start working for their wellbeing. During the peak of the crisis, when the protesters in front of the government building started to become impatient and slightly nervous as political negotiations were going towards a dead end, the US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, landed in Skopje in order to facilitate the talks and help in bridging the gap between the main political actors. After meeting the key stakeholders she gave a statement underlining the cooperation with the EU aimed towards putting Macedonia back on the road to democratization:

"*Now is the time to bring this crisis to an end. We the United States are very pleased to be working with the European Union… to try to bring the parties together around a package of understanding that will allow Macedonia to get back on its chosen path*" (Balkan Insight 2015)[188].

Deputy Secretary Nuland obviously synchronized her visit to the country with the one of the EU high officials, EU Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, and the three MEPs from the European Parliament, Richard Howitt, Ivo Vajgl and Eduard Kukan. Just one day after Nuland's visit, Commissioner Hahn arrived in Skopje, while his three colleagues from the EP arrived the following day (EC 2015)[189]. After the coordinated international pressure and facilitation, on 15 July 2015 the Przhino Agreement was signed (Ibid)[190] and the laws deriving from it were promptly enacted in parliament during mid-September, as it was presented in Chapter 5.

These events once again point to the important role both of the international community and the political parties in securing the policy outputs which were desired by the movement activists. Although the role of the citizens was very limited in acquiring the policy outputs, they showed strong commitment to their goals during the implementation of the outputs which

[187] http://kurir.mk/en/?p=44396
[188] http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nuland-focuses-on-rule-of-law-in-kosovo-montenegro
[189] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/commissioner-hahn-visits-former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia-14-july_en
[190] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5372_en.htm

resulted with the favorable policy outcomes. This strong international presence was one of the important factors which was lacking in the Bulgarian and the BH cases.

Although Macedonia's Western partners were one of the key allies to the CfM movement, the entire international community did not have a uniform and coherent standpoint regarding the political crisis in Macedonia. The Russian Federation, which for years had been uninterested in the political developments in Macedonia, started issuing statements and press releases immediately after the protests commenced, commenting that the anti-governmental protests had been orchestrated and "brutally managed from outside" (Novinite 2015)[191]. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, commented that Russia is gravely alarmed by the meddling of the Western countries in the internal affairs of Macedonia, and blamed the EU and the USA for trying to bring down former PM Gruevski because he failed to support the sanctions against Russia (RFERL 2015)[192]. The traditional influence from the East, as a counterbalance to the one coming from the West, was also stressed by one of the interlocutors:

"*There is one thing which is very important and it needs to be understood. Russia, both in Macedonia and throughput the Balkans, is a tectonic power. Because it is tectonic, you do not see it on the surface. It is not a matter you can spot above surface. It is a matter of mentality, a matter of history, and a matter of real resources.*" (Int. 9, MKD)

In the aftermath of the political crisis, a reporting endeavor by Macedonian, Serbian and British journalists provided evidence that the Russian Federation, accompanied by Serbian aides, tried to meddle in the internal politics of Macedonia. Based on intelligence and counterintelligence reports, the journalists concluded that Russia's approach to Macedonian politics had been "nakedly partisan and that the Kremlin has been a vociferous public supporter of VMRO-DPMNE" (OCCRP 2017)[193]. Still, summarizing the efforts by the key international actors with regards to the policy outcomes following the CfM movement, one can conclude that the efforts by Western partners in Macedonia proved sufficient, and managed to provide the movement activists with enough impetus to secure their projected goals. Following the enacted documents in parliament deriving from the Przhino Agreement, the international community pressed for minimum credible early elections which would largely depict the political will of the

[191] http://www.novinite.com/articles/168689/Russia+Claims+Macedonia+Crisis+Managed+from+Abroad
[192] https://www.rferl.org/a/lavrov-says-macedonia-protests-orchestrated-from-outside/27026904.html
[193] https://www.occrp.org/en/spooksandspin/leaked-documents-show-russian-serbian-attempts-to-meddle-in-macedonia/

citizens. Both the EU and the USA saw the legitimate elections as the most convenient tool to "level the field of play" (Int. 11, MKD) between the autocratic government and the opposition.

Lastly, this section also reflects on the role of the media during the CfM mobilization. The movement occurred in the midst of a very volatile media scene when media freedoms were in vertiginous free-fall, and operated in an unfavorable media environment which resulted with many more opponents to the movement in comparison to the allies (Freedom House 2015)[194]. The Macedonian PBS, *MRT*, for years favored the ruling parties, and during the protests acted more as a government mouthpiece (WAN-IFRA 2015)[195] than an institution which should inform the wider public of the daily events and pay attention to public interest. Even fiercer opponents of the CfM movement were the largest private TV stations which had for years received governmental funds in order to promote campaigns introduced by Gruevski's government (SEEMO 2015)[196]. At least the three largest privately owned media outlets were in close ties with the government, acting as fierce opponents to the movement actors. Only several smaller private televisions with national coverage objectively depicted the events during the mobilization. The movement actors were dominantly relying on social media and several news portals which were run by journalists which had previously been victims of the regime[197]. This media setting mainly derived from the clientelistic relationship which the ruling elite enforced in many social spheres (Int. 4, MKD). The largest media outlets were more than aware that any type of objective reporting would deprive them from the large amounts of money which were pouring from the states directly into their accounts (Int. 9, MKD).

The situation was much more balanced in regards to the print media. Looking at the two newspapers with the highest circulation, *Dnevnik* and *Sloboden Pechat*, which were also used for the PCA and the PEA presented in the previous chapters, the pro-governmental *Dnevnik* was largely ignoring the protests, reporting sporadically and without any systematic overview of the events. Furthermore, this newspaper regularly printed columns by MPs from the ruling parties and analyses written by university professors and experts which are very close to the ruling elites. On the other hand, the pro-opposition *Sloboden Pechat* reported on daily events connected to the movement activities, but also published columns and analyses by opposition-affiliated

[194] https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/macedonia
[195] http://www.wan-ifra.org/sites/default/files/field_article_file/Soft Censorship Macedonia Dec 15.pdf
[196] http://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Publications/Reports/State-Media-Financial-Relations-in-Macedonia-Media-Freedom-Curbed-with-Public-Money
[197] www.plusinfo.mk www.libertas.mk www.a1on.mk etc.

university professors, artists and writers. This resulted with a relative balance in the sphere of the print media. Still, taking into consideration the difference in influence and outreach between the electronic and print media, one can easily conclude that the CfM movement had more media opponents in comparison to the number of allies in the media. Still, the strong and stable partnership built with the largest political parties in opposition and the one with the international community managed to neutralize the strong pro-governmental media influence.

9.3. *The Friends and Foes of the Bulgarian Winter Protests: From Political Parties to Politicized Media*

Similar to the Macedonian constitutional and political setting, Bulgaria is also a unitary state with a mono cameral legislature and a directly elected President of the Republic. Although the evident horizontal separation of powers is a solid prerequisite for a clear government/opposition divide (Bulgarian Constitution 1991)[198], during the first winter protests in 2013 Bulgaria was led by a minority government headed by PM Boyko Borisov from the GERB. Although Borisov's position was not as strong as the one of former PM Gruevski, the presidency of Rosen Plevneliev was also backed by GERB, while the City of Sofia and a large number of municipalities were also GERB-controlled.

GERB, the largest political party in power during the protests, was undoubtedly the greatest political opponent to the movement activists (Int. 1, BUL). Although this political party made concessions to the activists when this was convenient for its public political support, this did not substantially change the challengers' sentiments towards this entity. Furthermore, a vast majority of the activists and the key informants didn't really see any of the key players in the electoral arena as true and sincere allies (Int. 2, BUL). This fluid constellation of relationships, in comparison to the Macedonian case, to a certain extent derives from the fragile position of the Borisov cabinet, due to its nature of a minority government (France 24 2009)[199].

On the other hand, one of the covert opponents to the Bulgarian winter protests, coming from the side of the political parties, was the MRF. This Movement which is also known as the "Turkish Party", didn't openly criticize the movement actors, but used its media power concentrated in the hands of the outspoken shady oligarch Delyan Peevski, who is one of the

[198] http://www.parliament.bg/en/const
[199] http://www.france24.com/en/20090727-borisov-lead-new-minority-government-

most long-serving MPs of the MRF, although still in his late 30s (Int. 1, BUL). In the following rows of this section, which discuss the relationship between the media and the protesters, the antagonism between Peevski's media and the protest organizers is picturesquely presented. This relationship remained an enigma, mainly because at the time of contention MRF was in opposition, and one would preempt that the GERB government would be a common adversary for the winter protesters and MRF.

In Bulgaria, the first protest wave in 2013 saw very fluctuating dynamics in the party-movement relationship, especially regarding the role of the largest party in opposition, the BSP. Many of the interviewees commented how the central left party played a very dubious role during this first wave of mobilization (Int. 7, BUL; Int. 3, BUL). One of the protest organizers vividly explained this insincere position:

"*To be honest, the largest party in opposition, the BSP, supported the protests. Expectedly, they wanted to materialize on the moment of citizen dissatisfaction. We immediately told them not to misuse the protest. They supported the mobilization, but only to the extent when it was politically opportune for them. They worried for their own party interests. We told them bluntly that they are a product of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and that there is no difference between them and the GERB, between Boyko Borisov and Sergei Stanishev…BSP is one of those 'players' that act as your friends, but they stab you in the back. To be honest, BSP created the energy mafia. Realistically, they control the green energy and all the projects which are closely connected to it.* " (Int. 3, BUL)

Both BSP and another smaller right-wing nationalist party named Ataka, put in efforts to monopolize, to a certain extent, the protests. The two political parties followed the logic taking into consideration the fact that they are in opposition. They immediately acted as representatives of the citizens which took to the streets. One of the protesters coming from the more left-wing – liberal strand of the movement, explained this reasoning of the political parties in opposition:

"*In my opinion, there was a big struggle between the political parties regarding who is going to dominate the protest. The entire opposition comprised of both bigger and smaller political parties, but especially BSP, as the largest party in opposition, and Ataka, which is a nationalist party, wanted to be the representatives of the protesters. They reasoned in the following way 'OK, you are protesting against the governing party, so we are the ones who sent you there!' Or, 'We represent you in the National Assembly'…*" (Int. 5, BUL)

Unlike the Macedonian case, where the parties in opposition were stable and loyal allies of the CfM movement, the Bulgarian winter protest activists were surrounded by two-faced, opportunist political players, which were not sincerely interested in alleviating the socio-economic grievances of the Bulgarian citizens, but were rather interested in securing a better result in the forthcoming snap parliamentary elections. There were numerous actors that wanted to profit politically from the emerging popularity of the movement:

"*There was also support from some smaller political parties that wanted to mobilize the electorate in the wake of the elections, and this is the only reason they supported us. The only motivation was to 'accumulate political dividend'. There is a certain Slavei Dinev, a mobster. At that time he was an MEP. He contacted us in order to go to Brussels and speak about the protest activities. He suggested this to us. There was also one Meglena Kuneva from the reformist block. Furthermore, there was one businessman who tried to infiltrate us. His name is Mareshki. He is in the pharmaceutical business. All of them wanted to support us in order to take advantage of energy. Still, I cannot call them friends.*" (Int. 3, BUL)

One of the interlocutors, coming from the strand of the movement which is ideologically close to the green and anti-fracking movements, managed to point to one sincere ally coming from the camp of the political parties. Although a very small, emerging party, the Bulgarian Greens were constantly on the side of the movement activists, supporting them in their efforts to lower the energy prices and enhance the lives of the Bulgarian citizens:

"*I can definitely say that the Green Movement, of which I am a part and which also includes the Green Party, acted as an ally. The anti-fracking movement, which I also told you about, was also an ally to the movement. They were both part of this fight, but they also supported one previous protest against the increase of oil prices.*" (Int. 1, BUL)

The differences between the positions and roles of the political parties in Bulgaria and Macedonia, especially those coming from the opposition, are more than evident. While the CfM movement could rely on stable partnership in the electoral arena, this could not be inferred in the Bulgarian case, at least not when one looks at the largest and most notable political parties in the Bulgarian political system. This lack of stable alliances between the winter protesters and the largest parties in opposition, especially BSP, prevented the protesters from acquiring more policy outputs and effectuating the attained ones into tangible policy outcomes.

In regards to the limited role of the international community during the first wave of protests in Bulgaria in 2013, this study points to divergence from the Macedonian case. Conversely to the Macedonian case, the role of the international community in Bulgaria was rather limited. An apparent lack of interest by the major international players may be a result of two main factors: the already completed Euro-Atlantic integration of Bulgaria, unlike the one of Macedonia and B&H, as well as the fact that the three energy distribution companies which dominated the Bulgarian market, EVN, CEZ and Energo Pro, are companies coming from the EU. Ultimately, long-term decrease of energy distribution prices would have damaged the financial stability of these companies which have their seats in EU countries (Austria and Czech Republic) and employ a lot of citizens in their founding states. Still, this was not what PM Borisov thought. Similar to the wording of former Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski, and several BH power holders whose views are presented in the rows which follow, the Bulgarian PM and some of his closest collaborators pointed to international interference in his rule, accusing Russia for meddling into Bulgarian internal politics and trying to remove him from power. Former interior minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov, commenting on the 2013 winter protests, among other things, added "*We must remember the anti-shale protests and the other organized actions against the government of Boyko Borisov. This was a well-planned scenario developed by local corporate, oligarch and economic interests connected with Russia*" (Financial Times 2013)[200]. One of the key informants, who is also a renowned university professor, commented on these statements with disbelief, highlighting the lack of evidence for Russian interference:

"*Borisov said on several occasions that he was taken down from power by Russia, and by Russian interests, because of the construction of the Belene nuclear plant. His words were that it was 'Russian intervention' organizing protests against him. But again, I must say that I don't believe that the protests were organized for the sake of his resignation, at least initially, and apart from his words, I don't have any information or evidence for Russian interference.*" (Int. 1, BUL)

The interlocutor locates the main reasons for the mobilization in the scarce finances which Bulgarian citizens needed to manage the difficult winter times. Furthermore, if Bulgaria was subjected to an international scenario involving Russia, one would expect a much deeper

[200] https://www.ft.com/content/e011d3f6-6507-11e4-ab2d-00144feabdc0

political crisis, and unraveling of events similar to those in Macedonia, something which was clearly lacking in the Bulgarian case.

Another indicator for passive behavior by the international community was the absence of any reaction from the Delegation of the European Commission in Bulgaria. Their official press center remained silent during the days of contention (EC 2013)[201]. The same can be concluded about the US Embassy in Sofia (US Department of State 2013)[202]. This once again reaffirms the difference in the standpoint of the international community, especially USA and EU as key international factors in the region, in regards to the mobilizations in Bulgaria and Macedonia.

The peculiar role that the media played during the protests in the three countries under study, dominantly as opponents to the mobilizations, was one of the main obstacles of the Bulgarian protesters in their quest for acquiring tangible policy outcomes which would have alleviated the socio-economic grievances of the citizens, and further democratized Bulgarian society. During 2013 Bulgaria was rated as the worst in the EU regarding media rights and freedoms. These media settings were anything but a friendly environment for the emerging first wave of winter protests. The huge media concentration around couple of oligarchs very close to the ruling elite created a hostile atmosphere against the governmental challengers. Similar to the Macedonian case, the PBS in Bulgaria strongly defended the government's positions, while the most powerful private media outlets continuously attacked and stigmatized the protesters. The previous chapter provided evidence on how the most visible faces of the winter protests were labeled as Russian spies, paid mercenaries and business profiteers (Int. 3, BUL). Furthermore, printed media were also mainly adversaries of the protesters, with several exceptions which remained fairly neutral. Left without any tangible ally in the media department, the movement participants were forced to exploit only social media and alternative media outlets. Conversely to the Macedonian case, the Bulgarian protesters failed to secure stable and somewhat credible partners in the media sphere. This left them with very limited visibility and without allies. Furthermore, this was also one of the main reasons for early demobilization and failure to secure favorable policy outcomes.

[201] http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/news_bg
[202] https://bg.usembassy.gov/news-events/

One of the movement activists, a leader of one of the many strands of the Bulgarian winter protests, discussed this media bias, but also pointed to the incentive which this unbalanced reporting encouraged among the movement activists. Faced with the distorted mainstream media presentations, the governmental challengers were forced to launch a strong social media campaign in order to present the reality which was unraveling on the streets:

"*The reporting of the mainstream media was as usual during these types of activities. It is always the same.The largest media outlets try to be 'fair' with whoever is in power, so they didn't really show any support. To the contrary, they wanted to hide what was really happening. That is why social media were crucially important in order to tackle the efforts of hiding and covering up what was really happening on the streets. From that moment on, the largest media started to present the events, because there was no space to continue with the lack of coverage.*" (Int. 1, BUL)

Another key informant, also a university professor that sporadically deals with social movement studies, stressed the sensationalist role of the majority of media outlets. In the spirit of scandals, sensations and the quest for audience, the mainstream media transformed into one of the fiercest opponents of the winter protests in Bulgaria:

"*The media, back then, would not support the movement. In fact, they would search for…you know…what usually media like…violence, bloodshed, those kinds of things…and they had it. They had it on the night of 19 February when there was some confrontation with the police between Orlov Most and the university building.*" (Int. 2, BUL)

The protest organizers, as the most publically visible faces, were continuously under attack by the dominantly government-affiliated media outlets, with special emphasis on the televisions. The previous arguments stated by the university professor were reconfirmed by one protest organizer who shared his thoughts regarding the negative campaign that was launched against them, when the Bulgarian government felt the threat coming from the ordinary citizens:

"*When you start going against the system…you know…I must say that the media played a very important role in the entire process. Media in Bulgaria are extremely dependent on business and politics. Commissioned texts, commissioned interviews, and commissioned provocations. Various TV stories, scandals…They totally distorted our claims. They never reported precisely what we demanded, but were continuously searching for a scandal, for a feud. They were, simply, on the side of the problem.*" (Int. 3, BUL)

Apart from the frontal attacks on the organizers, the TV stations allied with the power structures also wanted to channel the public discourse in the direction of creating an image that the movement activists are only poor thugs, violent and lazy people coming from the periphery of Bulgarian society not worth the time and energy of bystanders, who should not join them in their struggle for better socio-economic conditions:

"*Another thing which happened with the media, and I completely disagree with it, was the presentation of these people as poor and stupid. People that do not know any other way but violence in order to achieve their goals. And it was a completely classist argument, like "OK, there are some people in the streets that cannot pay 150 LEV for electricity. It is their problem, they should work more!" This is, of course, something which was intended to make them look foolish. Somehow, they (the media, I.S.) managed to do it. So, the media in general, was not supporting the movement.*" (Int. 5, BUL)

In addition to the electronic media, newspapers were also mainly opponents of the movement activists. The long-lasting free-fall of freedom of the press in the country combined with decline of freedom of speech, and amplified the numerous economic factors which pushed investigative and professional journalists to the edge of precariat, resulted with blindly obedient newspapers, aligned with the power holders. On the forefront of these activities were the newspapers belonging to the media group of the outspoken Delyan Peevski:

"*The newspapers are of very low quality. But this is not something new. It has been like this for a long time, at least for the last five years. We have basically run out of good quality newspapers. There are still a few quality newspapers which are not fully economically based, and are on the verge of bankruptcy, but still manage to function somehow. The others are mainly mafia newspapers owned by this guy Delyan Peevski. They are Monitor, Telegraf and Politika. There was one newspaper, Dnevnik, which at the times of protests was, let's say, objective. It did not take sides, but it was objective. It remained objective and independent, not allowing to get caught in the Peevski scheme. There were also local newspapers which spread a lot of defamation about the protest groups. They were connected to the oligarchs from the energy business. For example, Cherno More in Varna is that type of a newspaper.*" (Int. 1, BUL)

Unlike the Macedonian case, where the governmental challengers managed to build, to a certain extent, a reliable partnership with some of the smaller media outlets critical towards the government, the Bulgarian protesters failed to secure stable, and somewhat credible partnerships

in the media sphere. This resulted with limited visibility and no substantial allies backing them in the public sphere, which to a certain extent triggered early demobilization and blocked the path to securing tangible policy outcomes. The context left Bulgarian governmental challengers with a favorable policy output not being able to transform into a feasible policy outcome which could substantially alleviate the protesters' grievances.

9.4. *Allies and Opponents in the BH Protests: "Opposing Failure"*

Contrary to the constitutional and political systems of Macedonia and Bulgaria which define them as unitary countries, the state of B&H is characterized by very complex institutional setting deriving from the constitution enshrined in the Dayton Agreement, which throughout the years created numerous ethnic, confessional and political cleavages. This was further mirrored in very complex government-opposition relationships which varied both on the horizontal and vertical levels of separation of powers. Very unexpectedly, these very complex political and multiple-level governance issues resulted in a very straight-forward outcome regarding the positioning of the political parties in regards to the movement actors. The largest political parties in the state, SDP and SDA in FB&H, and SNSD in RS, although ethnically and territorially divided, aligned together against the protesters. From the first days of protest in Tuzla, Sarajevo and Mostar, the biggest political parties began an orchestrated attack against the governmental challengers, some high public officials even labeling them as thugs, criminals, drug traffickers and scum (Klix 2014)[203]. The only significant political party which declared itself as "opposition", was SBB led by security minister Fahrudin Radončić. Immediately after the protests exploded, Radončić aligned with the movement actors and strongly criticized the other political parties in power (*Dnevni Avaz* 9 February 2014). In the forthcoming period he was sacked from the ministerial position by the majority in the Federal Parliament (Klix 2014)[204].

Thus, during the contentious 2014, the collective presidency was comprised of Bakir Izetbegović from SDA, as the Bosniak member; Željko Komšić from SDP, as the Croatian member; and Nebojša Radmanović from SNSD-SP, as the Serbian member (SEC B&H 2010)[205]. At the moment of initiation of protests in Tuzla, the rotating presidency was in the hands of

[203] https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/uzivo-protesti-u-sarajevu/140207060 and https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/klix-ba-u-zgradi-predsjednistva-bih-demonstranti-su-unistavali-i-svecani-salon/140208024 (in Bosnian)
[204] https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/fahrudin-radoncic-smijenjen-s-pozicije-ministra-sigurnosti/140313073 (in Bosnian)
[205] http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednistvoBiH/Default.aspx

Željko Komšić. Furthermore, the two houses of the parliament of B&H were deadlocked due to the very close electoral results following the 2014 general elections (Ibid)[206]. Almost one and a half years after the general elections, the participating parties in parliament agreed to elect Vjekoslav Bevanda from HDZ-B&H as chairman of the Council of Ministers of B&H (Balkan Insight 2011)[207]. In regards to the Parliament of FB&H, the power was concentrated in the coalition led by SDP and SDA, with Nermin Nikšić from the first party being elected as PM (SEC B&H 2010)[208]. On the other hand, in the RS entity, all powers were vested in President Milorad Dodik (Ibid)[209], and his political party SNSD (Ibid)[210]. Lastly, the cantons within the FB&H entity were mostly shared between the largest two political parties in the entity, SDP and SDA (Ibid)[211]. Just as an example, the Tuzla canton was led by SDP cadre, while the Sarajevo canton had a PM from SDA. Although the numerous political and ethnic cleavages created a public image of big rivalry between the major political parties, during the entire post-conflict period in the entire state of B&H, including the period of the 2014 mobilization, the ethnocracy and the partocracy aligned against the ordinary citizens who were continuously wrapped in ethnic and partisan hatred (Int. 1, B&H). This resulted in a fragmented constitutional and political system, united along party lines against governmental challengers which pressed for improvement of their socio-economic condition, and democratization of BH society.

The previously described setting, deriving from the specificities of the institutional design, created a strong division between the protesters on one side, and almost all the political parties on the other. If at one point the governmental challengers in Bulgaria had some of the influential political parties on their side, even if driven by party-centered interests, and the Macedonian movement actors had the largest political parties in opposition on their side as permanent allies, the BH protesters continuously opposed the most influential players in the electoral arena.

Beginning with the first days of protest, the political parties took a very warlike attitude towards the governmental challengers. The leader of SDP, who was also a Minister of Foreign Affairs of B&H, accused the protesters for trying to "bring down the institutions", adding that

[206] http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/ParlamentBIH/ZbirniRezultate.aspx
[207] http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vjekoslav-bevanda-to-be-the-new-bosnian-pm
[208] http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/ParlamentFBIH/ZbirniRezultate.aspx
[209] http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednikRS/Nivo.aspx
[210] http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/NarodnaSkupstinaRS/ZbirniRezultate.aspx
[211] http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/SkupstineKantone/Default.aspx

"they (SDP, I.S.) will not allow that to happen" (Blic 2014)[212]. Strong reactions came also from the federal PM from the same party, Nermin Nikšić. While discussing the 2014 mobilization, he commented on events occurring during the first days of protests:

"*I spoke to a woman from the British embassy who was very supportive and in favor of the protests. I explained to her that the presidency building is on fire, that politicians are being lynched. Cantonal governments have begun to resign, literally 'to fall like pears', but not the federal government. Many people say that the federal government remained intact because I am who I am, a jerk, and I prevented that from happening. In one communication with the Reis Ul Ulema, when he called me, he asked me 'Please don't make concessions'. I told him 'It hasn't even even crossed my mind to make concessions, because I think that this will lead us to statelessness. We are going to lose the state!' I still think that you cannot act like the protesters did…*" (Int. 9, B&H)

Reflecting on the days of violence in Sarajevo, former PM Nikšić also reflected on the meeting he had with the protesters, when he welcomed them in his office. He underlined the lack of knowledge shown by the governmental challengers, and the high level of arrogance and stubbornness with which they confronted him:

"*I welcomed the protestors at my premises and asked them 'What are your demands?' They said that they wanted my resignation. I said 'OK! This government will leave immediately after someone who is elected by the parliament can step in.' Then, they said that they wanted some privileges of the officials to be abolished. I said 'Perfect, but those are already abolished!' We could not formally abolish 'separate mainance allowance', because we did not have the majority to do that. With the previous government, this allowance was around 500-600 BAM. Initially, we cut it buy half, and later we brought a governmental decision to make it symbolic 1 BAM. Why? If we abolish this privilege illegally, the ministers were going to sue us, and in the end, we were going to pay both the compensation and the court expenses. In this way, we were legally protected. Then, the citizens' delegation said 'Really? You have done that?' I answered 'Yes, really!' 'OK then. We want a decrease of the salaries of the public employees!' 'Really? I wanted to decrease the salaries for 10% as well', I replied. I was not allowed. I only managed to agree a decrease of 4.5% with the trade unions. I told them: 'You have a problem here. You have to negotiate that with the trade unions, not with me.' 'OK then, since you decreased the salaries,*

[212] http://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/lagumdzija-rusioci-drzave-kidnapovali-proteste/xbtmmnd

we want your resignation!' I asked them how they planned this to happen. I can leave, but someone elected in parliament should replace me. I am fine with that. Then, I asked them: 'You don't expect me to leave the keys here on the table and leave?' 'Yes, this is exactly what we expect!' Then I told them that they have a problem with basic logic. I told them 'Now, I think that it is time for you to leave, and not me. You were my guests, I welcomed you, and now it is time to leave.' They asked me whether I plan to address the people in front of the government. I told them that I don't plan on doing that. I told them that they were not the only citizens of this country, and that I am going to address all people tonight, I am going to address the state and not just them…" (Ibid)

The member of the B&H presidency from the second largest political party in the country, SDA, Bakir Izetbegović, who is also the most influential member of the party and the son of the former leader and first president of the country Alija Izetbegović, also condemned the violence during the first days of protest, but also tried to strengthen his political positions and those of the SDA, by generally blaming SDP for the situation in the country (DW 2014)[213]. Still, looking at the behavior of SDA, it was also one of the biggest opponents of the movement, especially when the cantonal governments ruled by their cadre were at stake.

One of the most ambiguous roles during the protest events was played by SBB, the party whose leader Fahrudin Radončić was the minister of security. Suddenly, he fiercely attacked the largest two political parties, and openly aligned with the citizens, mostly using the power of his daily newspaper *Dnevni Avaz*, which covered all the protests throughout the country daily, but also favored SBB and its leader in the numerous columns and political analyses it produced[214]. Still, the governmental challengers did not perceive Radončić as an ally. To the contrary, they commented on his politically opportune behavior, and his attempts to hijack the movement:

"*The entire political elite was against us, of course. From the conservatives to the social democrats. I cannot remember that someone publically expressed solidarity with the protesters… Radončić acted as a proper populist. Because it was election year, 'Fahro' was trying to collect votes. He wanted to leave an impression that Dnevni Avaz reports objectively, although, all of us knew that it was not the case.*" (Int. 6, B&H)

[213] http://www.dw.com/bs/bih-%C5%A1ta-dalje/a-17418674
[214] Dnevni Avaz newspaper, 07.02.2014 – 30.04.2014

One of the biggest shortcomings of the BH governmental challengers was the inability to create a strong alliance with some of the largest and strongest political actors in the political system. Apart from opposing the largest political parties, which to a certain extent is justifiable due to their power-sharing on multiple levels, the protesters also rejected some smaller and emerging movement-parties, which could have been a reliable partner for building a stronger bottom-up coalition which could have threatened the power structures. Several activists commented on these positions expressed by the movement activists:

"*It is not completely true that all the political actors were against the movement. There were really a lot of people which were, and still are, politically active. For example, the members of Nasha Stranka (Our Party, I.S.) wanted to join the protests and even offered their help, but they were explicitly told that we don't want them to be part of our story. They are very active in Sarajevo and they work a lot. They are also politically legitimate. Although they wanted to participate, they were not allowed. It was a decision brought in the very beginning…That we do not like to cooperate with political parties…not even with NGOs, which were not up to their task. I am not sure whether this was good or not…* " (Int. 7, B&H)

The third case of B&H is the most puzzling in terms of the involvement of international community. Since its post-war institutional reforms, the country was a place where its international partners played a key role in the state building, reconciliation process, and the peace building (Bieber, F. 2011). The first days of protests saw a disturbing statement by the Office of the High Representative, Valentin Inzko. The OHR called for urgent stop of violence, alternatively advocating for a possible military intervention by the guarantors of peace in B&H (RFERL 2014)[215]. Furthermore, although numerous ambassadors and other envoys continuously visited the state and interacted both with the protesters and the key political figures (Int. 4, B&H), no further effort was invested to help the governmental challengers reach the policy arena on federal and state level. Even visits by high level officials such as Catherine Ashton (EU 2014)[216], Hoyt Bryan Yee (B&H Presidency 2014)[217] and William Hague (Sarajevo Times 2014)[218] failed to impose sufficient pressure over high BH officials to help and alleviate the citizens' grievances.

[215] https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-inzko-warning-troops/25258191.html
[216] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-252_en.htm
[217] http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/saop/default.aspx?id=59251&langTag=en-US
[218] http://www.sarajevotimes.com/william-hague-visits-bosnia-herzegovina/

If one compares the role and the attitude of the international community in the BH case, it lies somewhere in the middle between the Macedonian and the Bulgarian case. If in the forme, the international community played a strong role pressuring the main political actors to enact decisions in favor of the citizens, and in the latter the main international actors were rather passive and uninterested, the BH case was characterized by active international involvement which failed to produce any tangible results. This epilogue can be the outcome of several factors, one of them surely the very ambivalent attitude of the actors in the political system. Both the biggest political parties as well as movement activists perceived the international community as an opponent. The parties perceived the protests as internationally-driven, while the governmental challengers didn't really see any sincere efforts on behalf of the international envoys.

One of the very resourceful key informants saw the international community as a partner of the BH movement. Still, its behavior in the past, which resulted with B&H being an institutionally deadlocked state, governed by ethnocracy and partocracy, was the turning point which led to mistrust on the part of the citizens (Int. 1, B&H). Furthermore, the lack of decisiveness and coordination by the international community provoked actions by certain embassies which did not produce much effect "in the field". One of the key informants comments on the unjustifiable steps by fractions of the international community:

"*The 'foreigners' reacted in a strange manner. For example, certain embassies tried to meet them (the protesters, I.S.) half way. They immediately asked them of their needs and how they could help. For example, they suggested taking them to Vienna and starting some discussions there. Some of the international envoys which I was in contact with…I warned them. I asked them why they were doing that. I told them not to do that…actually, I told them not to do anything. I suggested that by the time they (the protesters, I.S.) decided what they wanted, and how they planed to achieve it, that they don't need any help. I think that it was the Austrian embassy that put all of them in a bus, took them to Vienna, and all of them together criticized the existing NGOs, as well as the other actors. It turned into a talk show. The 'foreigners' immediately reacted saying that they helped. It was a series of idiotic moves from all sides…*" (Int. 2, B&H)

On the other hand, the main personification of the international community, the High Representative Valentin Inzko, gave a rather dubious statement during the first days of protest. In the aftermath of the Tuzla and Sarajevo events, Inzko invoked the possibility for EU troops to

enter B&H if the situation didn't calm down (RFERL 2014)[219]. Inzko's statement was received with fury by the governmental challengers. Many of them harshly criticized the behavior of the OHR:

"*…The OHR behaved very weirdly. He even threatened to send in some troops…something…he mentioned NATO…he was really an asshole. I can't quite remember what he said. Something to the extend that he will he will send EUFOR, He made that threat. He was completely against us. It was a shock for everybody. Not that anyone likes him, or expected anything from him, but it was such a stupid statement, disaster…*" (Int. 4, B&H)

On the other hand, a fraction of the movement activists appreciated the efforts by some representatives of the international community, mainly few embassies which operated in B&H. They highlighted the interest and activities of embassy personnel, but also the visits of several foreign MPs. Some portion of the governmental challengers also perceived the EU and the USA as allies, although not very sincere ones:

"*It was very intriguing that many embassies and representatives were interested in the situation: the American Embassy, the Austrian Embassy…their Ambassador participated in some of the plenums. This was really interesting for me…The American Embassy stood beside us, the EU as well. Maybe, not very straightforward, but they were pro. MPs from the Italian Parliament visited one of the plenums. They were members of a leftist parliamentary group…You know what is very interesting? With them, you are never in the clear where they stand. For example, the OHR was definitely an opponent to the movement.*" (Ibid)

This chapter already mentioned the perception the political parties had of the international community. The ruling elite at the times of contention blamed the international community not only for being an ally of the movement, but also for being one of the initiators and organizers of protests. Expectedly, the interlocutors were not able to provide any strong evidence apart from assumptions. Former PM Nikšić openly told the British Embassy representative that he thought her institution was behind the protests, but commented that the state of B&H had no resources to prove these findings and to provide evidence (Int. 9, B&H). Furthermore, one of the MPs in the state parliament also presented his theory regarding the initiation of the protests:

[219] https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-inzko-warning-troops/25258191.html

"*According to me, it was a combination of justified dissatisfaction of the citizens, which at times was motivated by portions of the media that wanted to create an atmosphere of havoc, but the entire story was inspired and created by a part of the international community in B&H, as well as some NGOs which are related to and financed by the embassies in the country. Still, I would call these protests a great manipulation.*" (Int. 10, B&H)

The presented evidence clearly points to the ambiguous role of the international community in B&H during the contentious events of 2014. In comparison to the Macedonian and Bulgarian case where clear-cut involvement and lack of interest, respectfully, can be noted, as well as clear supporters and opponents to the international community can be detected, the BH case documents an unusual absence of the mechanism of international support, especially intriguing for a country which has been for years designed, administered, and financed by its international partners. One might justifiably argue that a stronger and more coordinated action by the international partners could have facilitated the fulfillment of the governmental challengers' goals.

Lastly, this text turns towards the attitude of the media in regards to the movement actors and the other stakeholders in the political system. The media scene in B&H shares many similarities with the two previously described cases. One of the major peculiarities, very similar to the perception of the international community, is the perception of the media as a general opponent, both to the movement actors and the political parties. The very ethnically and politically divided media setting is also fertile ground for fostering the triad of money, media and politics. The several PBSs in B&H were ethnically and politically loyal to the centers of power, providing a lot of airtime and space for high level politicians to throw full scale attacks on the governmental challengers. The same protest-hostile atmosphere was nurtured by the private media outlets as well (see examples in articles from *Dnevni Avaz* between February and April 2014). This was clearly noted by the protesters:

"*You know, the mainstream media are generally owned by the political parties, especially those in power. Thus, you cannot expect anything but allegiance to the power structures. But, they were extremely influential. They fabricated lies, disinformation, they manipulated the people. They played the worst games…for example, that the state archive was destroyed. A lot of people fell for these manipulations…especially those who are not 'citizenly free'.*" (Int. 4, B&H)

This text already focused on the perception of the political parties in power which had the impression that a lot of media outlets wanted to create a perception of chaos (Int. 10, B&H). Furthermore, former PM Nikšić also stressed that certain media outlets tried to materialize on the political situation, blowing out of proportion some events in order for their owners to achieve better electoral results in the 2014 general elections (Int. 9, B&H). These comments primarily referred to one of the most circulated dailies, *Dnevni Avaz*, whose owner Fahrudin Radončić, leader of SBB and former state minister of security, publically aligned with the movement activists and left the coalition government led by SDP and SDA. Still, the vast majority of the movement activists perceived Radončić and SBB as political profiteers, rather than movement allies (Int. 6, B&H). This left the governmental challengers in B&H with no proper allies in the media sphere, very similar to the Bulgarian case. Conversely to the Macedonian case where the movement activists managed to secure the allegiance of some of the relevant media and facilitated their way to securing favorable policy outcomes, the BH governmental challengers were prevented to reach the federal and state policy arenas, primarily due to lack of cooperation with key stakeholders in the political system, as well as the undefined position of the international community.

9.5. *Conclusion*

Revisiting the main hypotheses which refer to the allies and the opponents of social movements in Western countries, this chapter has come to several concluding remarks. Although della Porta stresses the importance of the governmental strength, building on the Tocqueville-ian argument that a strong government and a weak civil society would lead towards violent protests, the three examples coming from the region showed somewhat variant results (della Porta 2013, p. 956). In spite of the fact that the three countries are characterized with strong governments and weak civil societies, the level of violence considerably varied in the three cases under study.

Furthermore, turning towards the arguments regarding the importance of the distribution of institutional power for the development of social movements, many authors claim that “the larger the number of actors who share political power, the greater the chance for social movements to influence institutions” (Ibid; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1989 etc.). Consequently, one should hypothesize that social movements in the region of study can influence political institutions easier in countries where political power is shared among larger number of state

actors. The results in this chapter show divergence from this hypothesis. Although the B&H state is the most fragmented regarding decision-making and power concentration, the governmental challengers secured the least of policy gains. On the other hand, the movement actors in the two other cases which occurred in two unitary states where power was rather centralized and accumulated, Macedonia and Bulgaria, the protesters managed to secure tangible policy outputs.

Previous sections have already highlighted the important role of the political parties regarding the level of policy gains acquired by the movements under study. The CfM movement in Macedonia could rely on stable partnership with SDSM, while the protesters in Bulgaria had only limited support in short periods of time from the opposition BSP. This limited support prevented the protesters from acquiring more policy outputs and effectuating the attained ones into tangible policy outcomes. Lastly, BH protesters were continuously opposing the most influential players in the electoral arena, which proved to be one of their biggest tactical misjudgments. Apart from opposing the largest political parties, which to a certain extent is justifiable due to their long-lasting negative representation in BH society, the protesters also rejected some smaller and emerging movement-parties, which could have been a reliable partner for building a stronger bottom-up coalition that could have threatened the power structures which were and still are in place. This setting once again highlights the importance of several factors underpinned by della Porta (2013) – the configuration of power depicted through its two main structures: the alliance structure and the opposition structure, and even more important in regards to the three movements under study – the political parties, with emphasis on the political and party cleavages, electoral competition and the government/opposition divide.

The second important factor in regards to the allies and opponents to the three movements is the role of the international community. If we summarize the efforts of the key international actors during the contentious events in Macedonia, we can conclude that they proved to be sufficient and managed to provide the movement activists valuable impetus to secure their projected goals. On the other hand, in the Bulgarian case, the main international actors were rather passive and uninterested. Lastly, the BH case was characterized by active international involvement which failed to produce any tangible results. These outcomes derive mainly from the ambivalent attitude of the largest political parties and the movement activists. The parties perceived the protests as internationally-driven, while the governmental challengers didn't really see any sincere efforts on behalf of the international envoys. Furthermore, the BH

case witnessed an unusual absence of the mechanism of coordinated and strong international support, especially taking into consideration that the country has for years been designed, administered and financed by its international partners. One might justifiably argue that a stronger and more coordinated action by the international partners could have facilitated the fulfillment of the governmental challengers' goals. Once again, this is in line with what Tarrow (1989) calls availability of allies. In this case, taking into consideration the context of the region, its vulnerability, as well as the traditional importance of the international factor, fostering allegiances with the international representatives dramatically improves the chances of success of governmental challengers in the region under investigation.

Lastly, this chapter looked at the relations between the crucial media actors and the movement activists in the three countries. Unlike the Macedonian case, where the governmental challengers managed to build, to a certain extent, a reliable partnership with some of the smaller media outlets critical to the government, the Bulgarian protesters failed to secure stable, and somewhat, credible partnerships in the media sphere. This resulted in limited visibility and no substantial allies backing them in the public sphere, which to a certain extent triggered early demobilization and blocked the path to securing tangible policy outcomes. On the other hand, the governmental challengers in B&H were left with no proper allies in the media sphere. Conversely to the Macedonian case where the movement activists managed to secure the allegiance of some of the relevant media and facilitated their way to securing favorable policy outcomes, the BH governmental challengers were prevented from reaching the federal and state policy arenas.

Table 9. 1 The relationship between allies, opponents and policy outcomes in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H

	Macedonia	**Bulgaria**	**B&H**
State configuration	Unitary	Unitary	Federal
Alliances with influential political parties	Stable	Limited/ fluctuating	Non-existent
Alliances with international community	Stable	Non-existent	Limited/ ambivalent
Alliances with part of the media outlets	Stable	Non-existent	Non-existent
Policy Outputs	Existent	Existent	Non-existent
Policy outcomes	Existent	Non-existent	Non-existent

Source: Own calculation

Chapter 10 : Conclusion

10.1. *Revisiting the main hypotheses: The influence of social movements over policy outcomes in South East Europe*

The two central dilemmas raised throughout this work are the following: the extent to which anti-governmental social movements in South East Europe contributed to the adoption of specific policy outputs?; and the role which social movements played in the effectuation of the policy outputs into tangible policy outcomes that substantially alleviated the grievances of the governmental challengers?

Following the work of Amenta (2006), in order for one to make a convincing claim that social movements had influenced the adoption of policy outputs and their effectuation into policy outcomes, it has to be clearly shown that social movement actors modified the plans and agendas of decision makers; influenced the content of the policy proposals agreed by state institutions; advocated for decisive votes which had led to passage of crucial policy documents, or influenced the velocity and the manner of policy implementation (Ibid). Therefore, we should first revisit policy outputs as formal materialization of a policy process, i.e. political decisions formulated by the political institutions and the actors (Easton 1957). In regard to policy outputs, we encountered three specific cases which produced three different scenarios in terms of the policy outputs. In the Macedonian case, this work disentangled the policy process behind the adoption of the Law on the SPO. Furthermore, in Bulgaria, the study looked at the decision of the KEVR to insignificantly decrease the energy prices. Lastly, in B&H, there was an absence of tangible policy outcomes on federal and state level.

In order to deconstruct the three policy processes, we applied the analytical lens of Tilly and Tarrow's mechanism-process approach (2015, p. 36), and combined it with the theoretical approach of Amenta and others (2010) who claims that political outcomes are very often out of the direct control of governmental challengers. Congruently with these theoretical notions, the adoption of the Law on the SPO was mainly a result of the endeavors of the political parties, especially the largest opposition party at that time – SDSM. The second important factor was the international community which excreted strong political pressure over the key party leaders and the state institutions in order to finalize circle the process of legalization. Therefore, we detect two important mechanisms which need to be introduced and underlined: *the mechanism of*

political party engagement, and *the mechanism of international intervention*. It should not be inferred that the social movement actors played only a marginal role. Although they were excluded from the adoption process, thus playing only a minimal role, their continuous pressure from below contributed towards the adoption of the Law on the SPO. The important mechanisms of *mobilization* and *upward scale shift* are also worth mentioning. In terms of public policy theory, the adoption of the Law on the SPO followed the paradigmatic path of policy change (Howlett 2002, pp. 241-2 and Hall 1990, p. 59). This more dramatic re-conceptualization and re-structuring of policy resulted in the creation of a completely new institution which previously did not exist in the constitutional and legal system of Macedonia.

The adoption of the decision by the Bulgarian KEVR followed a rather similar pattern in terms of the detected mechanisms. The strong *mobilization* from below, amplified by the *diffusion* and *coordinated action*, resulted in political parties in power imposing strong political pressure over KEVR, thus activating *the mechanism of political party engagement*. Fearing the loss of electoral support (della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 171), the ruling government coalition had to accommodate the grievances of the challengers. What differs in comparison to the Macedonian case is the absence of *the mechanism of international intervention*. Therefore, one could conclude that the most important factor in the adoption of policy outputs along the presented cases is political party engagement. Looking back at public policy theory, the decision adopted by the KEVR fits into the normal policy change path (Howlett 2002, pp. 241-2). This decision was a usual continuation of something which had previously existed, applying only slight variations to the existing practices (Polsby 1984). This normal path of policy change is also referred to some authors as "marginal" or "incremental" (Lindbolm 1959 and Hayes 1992).

The conclusion in terms of the key mechanisms is even more underpinned once we turn towards the last case within this study – the "Bosnian Spring". The failure of the challengers in B&H to acquire agenda and policy responsiveness on federal and state level were enrooted in the inability of the movement to coalesce with one of the more powerful actors in the BH party system. This prevented the activation of *the mechanism of political party engagement*. To the contrary, the strong and intensive mobilization coming from below additionally fueled the process of transforming the main political parties into adversaries of the movement. Furthermore, the highly polarized political situation and the initial violence on behalf of the protesters triggered *the mechanism of strong overt repression*, a factor which was absent in the two

previously discussed cases. This case reaffirmed the hypotheses that prevailing resources are almost always on the side of the state (Earl 2013), and that a direct and violent conflict between the challengers and the state could decrease the numbers in the streets (Opp and Roehl 1990), which furthermore substantially diminishes the protestors' chances for success (DeNardo 2016).

Moving back to the first of the two main questions regarding the extent to which anti-governmental social movements in South East Europe contribute to the adoption of policy outputs, based on the three cases under examination, one could argue that the influence of the mobilized challengers is rather limited. The situation is slightly different when policy outcomes are considered.

Proceeding with the second important dilemma thoroughly addressed throughout this study, we now turn towards the policy outcomes defined as direct effects stemming from the adopted policy outputs, which substantially alleviate the grievances put forward by social movement actors. Previous elaborations naturally shift the discussion in the direction of the Macedonian case, where the policy outputs embodied in the Law on the SPO were most vivid and straightforward. The tangible policy outcomes deriving from the legislation, primarily, the work of the SPO as an extrajudicial institution prosecuting former high level politicians, coupled with the early parliamentary elections in December 2016 which resulted with a change of government, were triggered by two key mechanisms: *the mechanism of international intervention*, amplified by the strong *mobilization* from below which triggered a new wave of contention. The support mainly coming from Brussels and Washington D.C. needs to be additionally underpinned.

These two factors cannot be traced in the Bulgarian case. Unlike the Macedonian case, the Bulgarian governmental challengers entered into *demobilization*, not being able to once again re-mobilize against the failure of the government to fully alleviate their economic grievances. This was mainly due to the multiple strands of the movement who aimed at different goals. Additionally, the two subsequent protest waves which followed, only built on the already established solid movement base, but focused on different issues, and managed to co-opt a different profile of protesters. The #DANSWithMe summer protests were mainly pressing for criminalization of the "elements of oligarchy" and the "dismantling of the State based on the plutocratic model" (Georgieva 2018, p. 52). The contentious 2013 ended with the student occupation bluntly calling for government resignation and dissolution of parliament (Ibid, p. 53).

Lastly, the absence of *the mechanism of international intervention*, only added to the unfavorable environment for the policy outputs to transform into tangible policy outcomes, alleviating the economic deprivation of the Bulgarian citizens. The lack of interest and involvement from the international community additionally strengthened the influence of the domestic political actors, i.e. the main governing political parties.

Based on the previous arguments, one can conclude that the bottom-up influence of social movements over policy outcomes can play a rather important role in South East Europe, especially when paired with additional mechanism such as the mechanism of international intervention and the pivotal role of the established political parties. Although limited to the cases under examination, further research could prove a replication of this framework in other cases existing in similar contextual environments.

This research has shown that the dominant factors that influence key political decisions resulting in alleviation of citizens' grievances are usually legislators, political executives, administrators and similar actors (Amenta et al. 2010, p. 288). This analytical framework allowed us to only sketch the main mechanisms and actors accounting for the "success" or "failure" (Gamson 1990) of social movements to influence policy outcomes. Lastly, summarizing these findings in regard to the concepts of players and arenas (Jasper 2004), it had been shown that the dynamics between civil society and institutional actors is of utmost importance in terms of shaping policy outputs and outcomes in South East Europe. Whether social movements succeed in accomplishing their desired goals, apart from the political structures, it often depends on the interests of other important players in the arenas (Jasper and Duyvendak 2015), in the particular case, the "policy arena".

Another important point that needs to be made in terms of finalzing this study is to once again look back at the idea of the scope conditions in which the three movements took place. The above sketched mechanisms and processes took place in three distinct environments. The three cases share certain common peculiarities such as recent transitions to democracy and capitalism, economic distress, but also moments of intense conflict, although to a much lesser extent in Bulgaria when compared to the other two post-Yugoslav countries.

On the other hand, there are some historical and contextual differences that influenced some of the factors shaping the policy outcomes presented in this study. In order to clarify these notions, we have to once again look briefly at the concepts of struggle for democracy, capitalism

and the state-building processes highlighted by Linz and Stepan (1996) as one of the most important variables on the road to democratization of the region of South East Europe.

In Macedonia, where we have witnessed substantial alleviations of citizens' grievances, the process of formal democratization had gone rather easy and smoothly in comparison to many of its neighbors which went through protracted periods of turmoil. Although the state-building process has been rather straightforward, following the model of transformation of former communist elites (Daskalovski 1999), the name issue with neighboring Greece, as well as the violent breakup of Yugoslavia promted larger international presence. This presence became even more amplified following the internal armed conflict in 2001. This is what makes the role of the international community highly important, even after more than fifteen years. The international state-building process aimed at stability in the region, focused vastly on the stability of Macedonia. This is how the mechanism of international intervention became very important in shaping the policy outputs and outcomes during the Citizens for Macedonia movement.

On the other hand, the strong partitocracy of Macedonian society, which is also a charachteristic stemming from the formal democratization process, traditionally puts political parties in the driving seat of policy processes. In times of strong societal clevages, such as during 2015/16, it was inevitable for the movement actors to bridge their political differnces with the political parties in opposition in order to create a strong front against former PM Gruevski (Stefanovski 2016). In terms of movement outcomes, history has taught us that in the region of South East Europe, a movement can rarely achieve tangible policy gains without garnering the support of at least some of the larger political parties in the political system.

In regard to the Bulgarian winter protests against the Borisov cabinet, the traditional scope conditions are more linked with the country's transition from a socialist regulated economy to capitalism. Furthermore, in terms of the state-building process, the Bulgarian state took a slightly different path in comparison to Macedonia and B&H. Bulgaria was not a part of a larger federal state, and it also didn't go through any episodes of intense violent conflict. Another important difference is Bulgaria's membership in the EU. This is an important structural factor which primarily changes the position of the international community towards the country. One cannot expect the same level of engagement by the international community in a state which is in the EU, or other states which are still far away from fully-fledged EU membership. This to a certain extent explains the absence of the mechanism of international intervention. Additionally,

having the central grievances and claims being mostly socio-economic, not much could have been expected from the international community. This argument holds even more when one takes into consideration that the energy distribution monopolies were at the core of the citizens' dissatisfaction.

The transformation of the political elites in the process of democratization of Bulgarian society resulted in strong and already established political elites coming from the side of the Bulgarian Communist Party, as well as the newly established democratic opposition. Similar political cleavages continued throughout the following decades. These scope conditions pushed governmental challengers to seek tangible and functional alliances in the party system to push for alleviateion of their grievances. Still, the rather rigid and anti-systemic position of the protesters towards the political parties in opposition, combined with the lack of sincerity from the BSP, left the winter protesters far from achieving tangible alleviation of their grievances, in spite of the fact that they successfully managed to reach the policy arena.

Lastly, B&H went through one of the most difficult processes of state building in the region, hosting one of the most violent armed conflicts on European soil following the Second World War. This resulted in continuous international presence, which additionally designed the new post-Dayton architecture of the state. Facing the three-partite ethnic and confessional divisions, political parties are delineated both along ethnic and ideological lines. Still, the numerous checks and balances and veto powers on multiple levels resulted in years-long coalitions between the main political parties, sharing the spoils for more than fifteen years. These conditions pushed BH protesters to the political margins, and united all main party actors against the citizens. On the other hand, the anti-systemic and anti-capitalist governmental challengers failed to make ideological concessions in order to increase the possibilities for acquiring the desired policy outcomes.

The last thing I would like to address is the possible perceived similarity between the Bulgarian and the BH cases in terms of rather similar policy outcomes caused by different configuration of factors. Firstly, analyzing the four independent variables in the three cases, one can easily detect numerous differences between the cases of B&H and Bulgaria. Which are the most notable differences: 1) The claims-making process is rather different. Unlike in Bulgaria, where the claims were focused on the high energy bills, the corruption in the state and the failure of the government to address the citizens' needs through further state intervention in the energy

sector, in B&H the protest actors focused on multiple issues: from the socio-economic position of the redundant workers in Tuzla, through healthcare and education, to cultural and identiterian issues. This resulted with the codification of more than 11.000 different claims. Furthermore, these claims varied from canton to canton, unlike in Bulgaria, where the claims were not region-driven; 2) The position of the media: The Bulgarian protesters could find, from time to time, some allies in the traditional media, especially some of the daily newspapers. Also, TV channels were sporadically objective in presenting both sides of the story. To the contrary, the B&H protesters could only rely on one of the daily newspapers – The *Dnevni Avaz*, which was following the political interests of its owner – Fahrudin Radončić; 3) The political parties: Looking closely at the Bulgarian context, one can easily see the warm-cold relationship between the protesters and the largest party in opposition – the BSP. At times, high BSP officials such as Sergey Stanishev, clearly supported the movement's activities. Also, the Bulgarian Green Party was heavily involved in providing resources during the entire movement. On the other hand, the BH protesters were heavily marginalized by all major political parties. Additionally, they even rejected the support by a newly established progressive party – *Nasha Stranka*, claiming that they did not want to affiliate themselves to any political party in the country; 4) The state repression: While the protesters in B&H suffered by great covert and overt state repression, the same cannot be stated for the Bulgarian case. In Bulgaria, during the movement events, the state apparatus was mainly using covert repression such as surveillance, phone wiretapping and milder forms of pressure. Only limited force was used by the state during the *Orlov Most* clash, which was an isolated incident which happened only once. These differences clearly distinguish the relative weighting of the relevance of the main factors which influence the outcomes in the two cases. This leads us to the second point: that the two outcomes deriving from the movement are not that same after all. In line with this argument, I would like to underline the importance of the distinction between the policy outputs and the policy outcomes. While policy outputs are present in Bulgaria, they have not been achieved on entity and state level in B&H. This makes the two explanandum rather different, albeit only in the first step of the two-folded dependent variable.

10.2. *Democratization from below: Wishful thinking or reality?*

Another point which was widely addressed throughout this study was the concept of "democratization from below" (della Porta 2014). The only possibility for looking at the emergence of bottom-up mobilization is the case of the "Citizens for Macedonia". As presented previously, out of the three studied cases only the Macedonian case produced substantiated policy outcomes which to a certain extent alleviated the grievances of the governmental challengers. The main dilemma is whether the favorable policy outcomes managed to trigger full democratization from below resulting in an increased level of democratization resembling consolidated democracies. These developments could have resulted in deep instead of shallow democracy, following one of the three paths pointed out by della Porta – eventful democratization, participatory pact, or participate coup d'état (Ibid, pp. 296-7).

Tentatively four years after the initiation of the "Citizens for Macedonia" protest platform, Macedonia has witnessed the creation of the SPO, the indictment, prosecution and sentencing of former PM Nikola Gruevski who in the meantime has been granted political asylum by the Hungarian government, as well as a change in government which is deemed to be much more democratic in comparison to its predecessors. Although, undoubtedly, many citizens' grievances such as media freedoms, freedom of expression, free, fair and democratic elections, as well as a much higher degree of checks and balances has been granted since the change of government, a lot of contested issues still remain open. Less than one year ago, the European Council adopted the Conclusions on enlargement and stabilization and association process of the country, underlining three spheres in which further tangible and sustained results are expected: "Judicial reforms and proactive investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in corruption and organized crime cases, including at high level; Intelligence and security services reform; and Public administration reform." (European Council 2018, p. 16)[220] This assessment by the EU, the family towards which the country aspires, is very telling of the current state of democracy in the country. Although much has been done already, and the trend is generally positive, one must acknowledge that the path to a fully-fledged democracy is still quite long. One must surely recall the conclusion by Schmitter and Karl (1991, p. 80) claiming that democracies established after 1974 "must live in compressed time". A majority of the established democracies do not resemble

[220] Link to the document: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf

the previously created European democracies based on gradual historical progression of institutions and other actors. To the contrary, new democracies are much more likely to face a wide pallet of parties, interests, movements and other collective actors that will try to influence the polity through previously non-existing agencies (Huntington 1993, pp. 40-46)

10.3. *Filling the void: A contribution to the existing literature*

The presented chapters aimed at modestly answering some of the open questions related to the influence of social movements over policy outcomes, emphasizing the region of South East Europe. Building on the theoretical concepts and the empirical evidence of Giugni, McAdam and Tilly (1999), Gamson (1990), Burstein and colleagues (1995), della Porta and Diani (2006), Amenta and colleagues (2010), as well as Bosi, Giugni and Uba (2016) we tried to present the main mechanisms and processes which resulted in the (lack of) adoption of policy outcomes in the investigated region. Deconstructing the main processes in the three selected cases, we wanted to show the importance of citizens' pressure from below, the pivotal role of the mechanism of political party engagement, as well as the crucial mechanism of international intervention. The last mechanism is rather peculiar, specific for the region, especially from the perspective of state-building, as well as largely understudied.

Taking into consideration that the three studied movements happened not so long ago, already much has been written about their emergence, grievances, mobilization and repertoires. Still, the aim of this work was to present a systematic overview of the main factors which normally contribute to policy outcomes in much more studied movements and regions throughout the world. Therefore, at the beginning, we tried to look at the enrooted lack of democratization as a main overarching reason for mobilization, assessed through several indicators. Furthermore, looking at the main grievances of the three movements, we tried to present a systematic and detailed PCA, breaking down the main issues raised by the governmental challengers, as well as the main repertoires through which these claims were channeled towards the respective governments, using a systematized PEA. Both content analyses tried to bring an added value to the clarification of many neglected issues related to the three movements such as the main topics of the protests, the most commonly used repertoires, as well as the most addressed targets. Lastly, this study aimed to show the anchoring importance of the POS, stressing the political-process approach to social movements used by Tilly and Tarrow

(2015). I profoundly hope that this work managed to systematically cover these issues and clarify at least some aspects which were previously unknown both to social movement scholars and the wider public.

10.4. *Future avenues for research: What is next?*

Studying the temptatious topic of policy outcomes in South East Europe through the three protest movements in Macedonia, Bulgaria and B&H opened up much more questions than it provided conclusive answers. Stemming from the conducted research and the numerous open questions, we propose the following three avenues of research:

Taking into consideration the level of contentious activities in the region of South East Europe in the last ten years, it would be rather intriguing to assess social movement outcomes diachronically, and in a wider cross-country comparison. In this manner, the region would be studied more, and much more light would be shed on recent contentious politics in Albania, Serbia, Romania, Croatia and other countries in the surroundings. Furthermore, researchers could look for traces of transnational cooperation, as well as similarities and differences across movements and movement environments. A good example regarding this approach is della Porta's edited volume on Social Movements in Times of Austerity (2015).

In regards to the PCA and PEA, an even more thorough and systematic approach is possible. In order to fully grasp the potential of these analyses, researchers could take into consideration more newspapers per country in order to capture the wider and fuller picture regarding the claims-making process and the repertoires of contention. Another possibility is to extend the time-frame of analysis and include other mobilizations both within the current three countries as well as to add more countries. For example, performing a PCA and a PEA on the "Colorful Revolution" in Macedonia or the #DANSWithMe protests in Bulgaria can result both with a cross-movement and a cross-country comparison. Thoughtful methodological examples can be borrowed from Hutter (2014), Caiani and della Porta (2009), Koopmans and Statham (1999 and 2001) etc.

Lastly, as Bosi, Giugni and Uba (2016) suggest, studying personal change of activists, participants, but also targets of contemporary social movements is still largely understudied. In congruence with this study, one of the more interesting paths to take would be researching the biographies of the Macedonian activists of the CfM and the "Colorful Revolution" movements,

and their cooptation in the new Macedonian government. Another avenue to proceed with ethnographic research would be to analyze the biographies of the activists which self-immolated during the 2013 winter protests in Bulgaria in order to deeper understand the reasons for their sacrifice in order to make Bulgaria a better place for living.

Bibliography

Agnone, J. J. M., (2007), Amplifying Public Opinion: The Policy Impact of the U.S. Environmental Movement, Social Forces 85(4): pp. 1593-1620

Agrikoliansky, E. (2013). Cause lawyering. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

Aleksov, B. (2012, November). Resisting the wars in the former Yugoslavia: Towards an autoethnography. In Resisting the Evil (pp. 105-126). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

Alimi, E. Y., Bosi, L., & Demetriou, C. (2015). The dynamics of radicalization: a relational and comparative perspective. Oxford University Press.

Amenta E., (2006), When Movements Matter: The Townsend Plan and the Rise of Social Security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Amenta, E, Young M. P., (1999), Making an Impact: The Conceptual and Methodological Implications of the Collective Benefits Criterion, in Giugni M., McAdam, D. and Tilly, C., (eds.), How Movements Matter: Theoretical and Comparative Studies on the Consequences of Social Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, pp. 22–41

Amenta, E. and Caren, N., (2004), The Legislative, Organizational and Beneficiary Consequences of State-Oriented Challengers, in Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A, and Kriesi, H. (eds.), in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., pp. 461-488

Amenta, E., Caren, N. and Olasky, S. J., (2005), Age for Leisure? Political Mediation and the Impact of the Pension Movement on US Old-age Policy, American Sociological Review 70, pp. 516–38

Amenta, E., Caren, N., Chiarello, E. and Su, Y., (2010), The Political Consequences of Social Movements, Annual Review of Sociology 36, pp. 14.1-14.21

Amenta, E., Caren, N., Olasky, S. J. and Stobaugh, J. E., (2009), All the Movements Fit to Print: who, what, when, where, and why SMO Families Appeared in the New York Times in the 20th century, American Sociological Review 74, pp. 636–56

Amenta, E., Carruthers, B. G. and Zylan, Y., (1992), A Hero for the Aged? The Townsend Movement, the Political Mediation Model, and U.S. Old-Age Policy, 1934–1950, American Journal of Sociology 98: pp. 308–39

Amenta, E., Dunleavy, K. and Bernstein, M., (1994), Stolen Thunder? Huey Long's ''Share our Wealth,'' Political Mediation, and the Second New Deal, American Sociological Review 59: pp. 678–702

Amenta, E., Halfmann, D. and Young, M., (1999), The Strategies and Contexts of Social Protest: Political Mediation and the Impact of the Townsend Movement, Mobilization 56: pp. 1–25

Andrews, K. T. and Edwards, B., (2004), Advocacy organizations in the U.S. political process, Annual Review of Sociology 30, pp. 479–506

Andrews, K. T., (2001), Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965–1971, American Sociological Review 66: pp. 21–48

Angjelkovska, T. (2014). The Economical Reforms of The Republic of Macedonia after The Independence. International Journal of Business and Social Research, 4(7), 71-76.

Arsenijević, D., & Jakiša, M. (2014). Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina. Baden and Baden: Nomos.

B92 http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2013&mm=04&dd=26&nav_id=85906

Barnes, S. et al., (1979), Political Action. London/Newbury Park, CA: Sage

Baumgartner, F. and Jones, B., (1993), Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

Beach, D. and Brun Pedersen, R., (2013), Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press

Beissinger, M. R. and Sasse, G., (2014), An End to "Patience"? The Great Recession and Economic Protest in Eastern Europe, in Bermeo, N. and Bartels, L. M. (eds.), Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 334-370

Bell, J. D. (1997). Democratization and Political Participation in "Postcommunist" Bulgaria. Politics, power, and the struggle for democracy in South-East Europe, 353-402.

Belyaeva, N. (2017). Citizen Plenums in Bosnia Protests: Creating a Post-Ethnic Identity. In *Non-Western Social Movements and Participatory Democracy* (pp. 115-138). Springer, Cham.

Berkowitz, W. R., (1974), Socioeconomic Indicator Changes in Ghetto Riot Tracts, Urban Affairs Quarterly 10: 69-94

Bieber, F. (2018). Patterns of competitive authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. East European Politics, 34(3), 337-354.

Bieber, F., & Brentin, D. (Eds.). (2018). Social Movements in the Balkans: Rebellion and Protest from Maribor to Taksim. Routledge.

Bilić, B. (2012). " Movementising" the Margina. Recruitment to the Anti-War Campaign of Croatia. Narodna umjetnost-Hrvatski časopis za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 49(1), 41-59.

Bilić, B. (Ed.). (2016). LGBT activism and Europeanization in the post-Yugoslav space: On the rainbow way to Europe. Springer.

Bilić, B., & Kajinić, S. (2016). Intersectionality and LGBT Activist Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Black Monday, FOSM 2013, http://soros.org.mk/mk/Home/Publication?newsID=641&catID=9

Bosco, F. J. (2001). Place, space, networks, and the sustainability of collective action: the Madres de Plaza de Mayo. Global Networks, 1(4), 307-329.

Bosi, L., Giugni, M., & Uba, K. (Eds.). (2016). The consequences of social movements. Cambridge University Press.

Bosnia and Herzegovina – HDI Values and Rank Changes in the 2014 Human Development Report, UNDP, 2014, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/BIH.pdf (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Bosnia and Herzegovina Unemployment Rate, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/unemployment-rate (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Bosnia Minister under Fire over Rigged Subsidies, Balkan Insight 2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-minister-under-fire-over-rigged-subsidies-claim

Bosso, F., (2014) Anti-Corruption Helpdesk – Providing On-Demand Research to Help Fight Corruption, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Overview of Political Corruption, Transparency International, Berlin

Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H. E., & Collier, D. (Eds.). (2008). The Oxford handbook of political methodology (Vol. 10). Oxford Handbooks of Political.

Brady, H. E. (2008). Causation and explanation in social science. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Science.

Broadbent, J., (1998), Environmental Politics in Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

BTV Novinite, (2013), Организаторката на протест срещу високите сметки за ток - в ареста (The Organizer of the Protest against the High Electricity Bills – Detained), http://btvnovinite.bg/article/bulgaria/organizatorkata-na-protest-sreshtu-visokite-smetki-za-tok-v-aresta.html (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Bulgaria: High Energy Prices Bring down Government, Stratfor, 2013 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/bulgaria-high-energy-prices-bring-down-government

Bulgaria's Energy Regulator Lowers Electricity Prices, SEEnews 2013 https://seenews.com/news/bulgarias-energy-regulator-lowers-electricity-prices-338934

Burg, S., & Shoup, P. (2000). Ethnic conflict and international intervention. New York: ME Sharpe.

Burstein P., (1999), Social Movements and Public Policy, in Giugni, M., McAdam, D. and Tilly, C., (eds.), How Social Movements Matter, Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press: pp. 3-21

Burstein, P., & Linton, A. (2002). The impact of political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns. Social Forces, 81(2), 380-408.

Burstein, P., (1985), Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity in the United States since the New Deal, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press

Burstein, P., (1998), Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

Burstein, P., Einwohner, R. L. and Hollander, J. A., (1995) The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective, in Jenkins J. C. and Klandermans, B. (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 275–295

Burton, M. and Higley, J., (1987), Elite Settlement, American Sociological Review No. 52

Caiani, M., (2014), Social Network Analysis, in della Porta, D., (ed.), Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 368-391

Caiani, M., Della Porta, D., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Mobilizing on the extreme right: Germany, Italy, and the United States. Oxford University Press.

Čamdžić, M. (2014). Pale vlade u Tuzli i Zenici https://www.dw.com/sr/pale-vlade-u-tuzli-i-zenici/a-17418252 (last accessed 10 July 2019)

Chandler, D. (2000). Bosnia: faking democracy after Dayton. Pluto Press.

Citizens for Macedonia, http://17maj.gragjanite.mk/ (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Collier, D., (2011), Understanding Process Tracing, PS: Political Science and Politics 44, No. 4, pp. 823-830

Commission to the European Parliament and the Council On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation Verification Mechanism, 2012, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2012/EN/1-2012-411-EN-F1-1.Pdf

Crampton, R. J. (2005). A concise history of Bulgaria. Cambridge University Press.

Cress, D. M. and Snow, D. A., (2000), The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilizations: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing, American Journal of Sociology 105: pp. 1063–104

Cunningham, D., (2004), There's Something Happening Here: The New Left, the Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press

Dalton, R., (1988), Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House

Darik News, (2013), Световните медии за оставката на Борисов (World Media on Borisov's Resignation), http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=1043502 (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Daskalovski, Z., (1999), Democratization in Macedonia and Slovenia, South-East European Review for Labor and Social Affairs 3/99

Davenport, C., (1995), Assessing the Military's Influence on Political Repression, Journal of Political and Military Sociology 23: pp. 119-144

Decision of the EWRC from 5 March 2013 No. C-13 (in Bulgarian) http://www.dker.bg/files/DOWNLOAD/res_c13_2013.pdf

Della Porta, D. (2013). Political opportunity/political opportunity structure. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

Della Porta, D. (2015). Social movements in times of austerity: Bringing capitalism back into protest analysis. John Wiley & Sons.

della Porta, D. and Caiani, M., (2007), Talking Europe in the Italian Public Sphere, South European Society & Politics Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 1-21

della Porta, D. and Caiani, M., (2009), Social Movements and Europeanization, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

della Porta, D. and Diani, M., (2006), Social Movements: An Introduction, 2nd ed., Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing

della Porta, D. and Fillieule, O., (2004), Policing Social Protest. in Snow, D. A., Soule, H. A. and Kriesi, H. (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Oxford, UK: Blackwell: pp. 217–241

della Porta, D. and Reiter, H., (eds.), (1998), Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press

della Porta, D. and Rucht, D., (1995), Left-libertarian Movements in Context: Comparing Italy and West Germany, 1965-1990, in in Jenkins J. C. and Klandermans, B. (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 229–272

Della Porta, D., & Caiani, M. (2007). Europeanization from below? Social movements and Europe. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 12(1), 1-20.

della Porta, D., (2013), Repertoires of Contention, in Snow, D. A., della Porta, D., Klandermans, B. and McAdam, D., (eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social & Political Movements, Malden: Blackwell Publishing: pp. 1081-1083

della Porta, D., (2014), Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

della Porta, D., (ed.), (2009), Another Europe, London, UK: Routledge

della Porta, D., Massimiliano, A., Mosca, L. and Herbert, R., (2005), Transnational Movements. Minneapolis, MI: The University of Minnesota Press

Demetriou, C. (2013). Violence and Social Movements. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

DeNardo, J. (2014). Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion (Vol. 41). Princeton University Press.

DeNardo, J., (1985), Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Diani, M., (2003), Leaders or Brokers? In Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movements and Networks. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 105–22

Dimitrov, J. (2012). Youth unemployment in Bulgaria. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Internat. Dialogue.

Doherty, B., & Doyle, T. (Eds.). (2013). Beyond borders: Environmental movements and transnational politics. Routledge.

Dolenec, D. (2016). Democratization in the Balkans: The Limits of Elite Driven Reform. Taiwan Journal of Democracy: An International Journal of Politics, 12(1), 125-144.

Dolenec, D., (2013), Democratic Institutions and Authoritarian Rule in Southeast Europe, Colchester, UK: ECPR Press

Donais, T., (2002), The Politics of Privatization in Post-Dayton Bosnia, Southeast European Politics, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 3-19

Dva dana za dokaze u slucaju Budmir, Center for Investigative Reporting, 2013, http://www.cin.ba/en/dva-dana-za-dokaze-u-slucaju-budimir/

Earl, J., (2013), Repression and Social Movements, in Snow, D. A., della Porta, D., Klandermans, B. and McAdam, D., (eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social & Political Movements, Malden: Blackwell Publishing: pp. 1083-1089

Earl, J., Soule, S. A. and McCarthy, J. D., (2003), Protests under Fire? Explaining Protest Policing, American Sociological Review 69: pp. 581-606

Easton, D., (1957), An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, World Politics Vol. 9/ Issue 3: 383-400

Edwards, B., & Gillham, P. (2013, August). Moves of Resistance: Occupy Wall Street and the Struggle to Protest. In Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association.

Edwards, B., & McCarthy, J. D. (2004). Resources and social movement mobilization. The Blackwell companion to social movements, 116-152.

Eisinger, P. K., (1973), The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities, The American Political Science Review Vol 67, No. 1: pp 11-28

Eldredge, N. and Gould, S. J., (1972), Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, in Schopf, T. J. M., (ed.), Paleobiology, San Francisco, CA: Freeman, Cooper: pp. 82-115

European Commission 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-628_en.htm

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Figures, UDK 311.314 (497.6), Institute for Statistics of FB&H, Sarajevo, 2015, http://www.fzs.ba/Podaci/Brojke2014.pdf (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Fighting Corruption in the Western Balkans and Turkey – Priorities for Reform, Transparency International 2016, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/fighting_corruption_in_the_western_balkans_and_turkey_priorities_for_reform

Fillieule, O., & Accornero, G. (Eds.). (2016). Social movement studies in Europe: the state of the art (Vol. 16). Berghahn Books.

Fillieule, O., & Jobard, F. (1998). The policing of protest in France: Toward a model of protest policing. Policing protest: the control of mass demonstrations in Western democracies, 70-90.

Fischer, A. H., & Roseman, I. J. (2007). Beat them or ban them: The characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt. Journal of personality and social psychology, 93(1), 103.

Freedom in the World 2009, Macedonia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/macedonia

Freedom in the World 2010, Macedonia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/macedonia

Freedom in the World 2011, Macedonia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/macedonia

Freedom in the World 2014, Macedonia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/macedonia

Freedom in the World 2015, Macedonia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/macedonia

Freedom in the World 2016, Macedonia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/macedonia

Freedom of the Press 2013, Bulgaria https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/bulgaria

Freedom of the Press, B&H, 2013 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/bosnia-and-herzegovina

Fridman, O. (2011). 'It was like fighting a war with our own people': anti-war activism in Serbia during the 1990s. Nationalities Papers, 39(4), 507-522.

Gamson, W. A. and Wolfsfeeld, G., (1993), Movements and Media as Integrating Systems, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 528: pp. 114-125

Gamson, W., (1975), The Strategy of Social Protest, Homewood, IL: Dorsey

Gamson, W., (1990), The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth

Ganev, V. I. (2014). Bulgaria's Year of Civic Anger. Journal of Democracy, 25(1), 33-45.

Ganz, M., (2000), Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959–1966, American Journal of Sociology 105: pp. 1003–62

Gersick, C. J. G., (1990), Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm, Academy of Management Review 16: pp. 10-36

Gersick, C. J., & Hackman, J. R. (1990). Habitual routines in task-performing groups. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 47(1), 65-97.

Giugni, M., (1998), Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements, Annual Review of Sociology 24: 371-393

Giugni, M., Bosi, L. and Uba, K., (2013), Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science: Outcomes of Social Movements and Protest Activities, New York, NY: Oxford University Press

Giugni, M., McAdam, D. and Tilly, C., (1999), How Social Movements Matter, Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press

Glennan, S. S. (1996). Mechanisms and the nature of causation. Erkenntnis, 44(1), 49-71.

Global Financial Integrity, 2015, http://www.gfintegrity.org/issues/data-by-country/

Godisnjica ubista srpskog svata na Bascarssiji http://www.glassrpske.com/novosti/vijesti_dana/Godisnjica-ubistva-srpskog-svata-na-Bascarsiji/18496.html

Goldstone, J., (1980), The Weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson's The Strategy of Social Protest, American Journal of Sociology 85: pp. 1017–1042

Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (2001). Introduction: Why emotions matter. Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements, 1.

Gould, D. B. (2013). Emotion and social movements. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

Government of Republika Srpska to Resign, Balkan Insight 2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/government-of-republika-srpska-to-resign-dodik-says

Grazhdanski organizacii poemat kontrola nad sadebnata reforma, Mediapool 2013, http://www.mediapool.bg/grazhdanski-organizatsii-poemat-kontrola-nad-sadebnata-reforma-news195496.html

Gurr, T. R., (1980), On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict, in Gurr, T. R. (ed.), in Handbook of Political Conflict, New York: Free Press, pp. 238-294

Hall, P. A., (1990), Policy Paradigms, Experts, and the State: The Case of Macroeconomic Policy-Making in Britain, in Brooks, S. and Gagnon, A. G., (eds.), Social Scientists, Policy, and the State, New York: Praeger, 1990

Hayes, M. T., (1992), Incrementalism and Public Policy, New York, NY: Longmans

Hess, D., & Martin, B. (2006). Repression, backfire, and the theory of transformative events. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 11(2), 249-267.

Hicks, A., (1999), Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Higley, J. and Pakulski, J., (1992), Revolution and Elite Transformation in Eastern Europe, Australian Journal of Political Science Vol.27

Hirch, E. L., (1990), Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment, and Commitment in a Student Social Movement, American Sociological Review 55: pp. 243-254

History of Parliamentarism in Macedonia, http://sobranie.mk/content/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%20%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%83%D1%82/%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%20%D0%BD%D0%B0%20%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BC_ENG.pdf

Howlett, M., (2002), Do Networks Matter? Linking Policy Network Structure to Policy Outcomes: Evidence from Four Canadian Policy Sectors 1990-2000, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 35, No. 2: pp. 235-267

Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D., (2001), Political Choice in Global Markets: Development and Crisis of Advanced Welfare States, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

Huntington, S. P. (1991), The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century,

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma press.

Hutter, S., (2014), Protest Event Analysis and Its Offspring, in della Porta, D., (ed.), Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 335-361

International Monetary Fund (2016). https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2012&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=88&pr1.y=12&c=914%2C962%2C963%2C943%2C918%2C964%2C960%2C968%2C944%2C942%2C967%2C186&s=LUR&grp=0&a

Investigate Police Violence against Protesters, Human Rights Watch 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/21/bosnia-and-herzegovina-investigate-police-violence-against-protesters

ITUC Frontlines 2012 Report on Bulgaria, (2012), http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/new_frontline_forum_2012_en.pdf (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Jaime-Jimenez, O., & Reinares, F. (1998). The policing of social protest in Spain: from Dictatorship to Democracy (pp. 166-187). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Jasper, J. (2004). A strategic approach to collective action: Looking for agency in social-movement choices. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 9(1), 1-16.

Jasper, J. M. (2010). Cultural approaches in the sociology of social movements. In Handbook of social movements across disciplines (pp. 59-109). Springer, Boston, MA.

Jasper, J. M., & Duyvendak, J. W. (Eds.). (2015). Players and arenas: the interactive dynamics of protest. Amsterdam University Press.

Jasper, J., (1997), The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

Jenkins, J. C. and Perrow, C., (1977), Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946–1972), American Sociological Review 42: pp. 249–68

Jenkins, J. C., (1982), Why Do Peasants Rebel: Structural and Historical Theories of Peasant Rebellion, American Journal of Sociology 88: pp. 487–512

Jordan, T. (1995). The unity of social movements. The Sociological Review, 43(4), 675-692.

Journalist in Bulgaria Receives Threats after Investigating Construction Project, SEENPM 2013, http://seenpm.org/journalist-in-bulgaria-receives-threats-after-investigating-construction-project/

Journalist Lidia Pavlova Threatened, Balkan Insight 2013 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/investigative-journalist-lidia-pavlova-threatened

Judges Plan Rally in Support of Sacked Judges Union Chief, Sofia Globe 2013, http://sofiaglobe.com/2012/07/13/sofia-judges-plan-rally-in-support-of-sacked-judges-union-chief/

Kemper, T. (2001). A structural approach to social movement emotions. Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements, 58-73.

Kitschelt, H. P., (1986), Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies, British Journal of Political Science 16: pp. 57–85

Klandermans, B., (1984), Mobilization and Participation: Social-psychological Expansion of Resource Mobilization Theory, American Sociological Review 49: pp. 583-600

Kolekili, (2014), Tuzla's Declaration of Citizens and Workers (Tuzla #1), https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/07/declaration-of-citizens-and-workers-in-tuzla-1/ (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Koopmans, R. (1993). The dynamics of protest waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989. American sociological review, 637-658.

Koopmans, R. and Statham, P., (1999), Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and Political Discourse Approaches, Mobilization Vol. 4, No. 2

Koopmans, R. and Statham, P., (2001), Migrant Claim-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands, Revue Europeenne des Migrations Internationales 17(2): pp. 63-100

Koopmans, R., & Rucht, D. (2002). Protest event analysis. Methods of social movement research, 16, 231-259.

Koopmans, R., (2002), Codebook for the Analysis of Political Mobilization and Communication in European Public Spheres, http://europub.wzb.eu/Data/Codebooks%20questionnaires/D2-1-claims-codebook.pdf

Krastev, I. (2016). The specter haunting Europe: The unraveling of the post-1989 order. Journal of Democracy, 27(4), 88-98.

Krastev, I. (2016). What's Wrong with East-Central Europe?: Liberalism's Failure to Deliver. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 35-38.

Kriesi, H. (2004). Political context and opportunity. The Blackwell companion to social movements, 67-90.

Kriesi, H., (1989), The Political Opportunity Structure of the Dutch Peace Movement, West European Politics 12, pp. 295-312

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. and Guigni, M., (1995), New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press

Leviev-Sawyer, C., (2013), Bulgaria's political crisis and the next election: Who will win?, http://sofiaglobe.com/2013/02/20/bulgarias-political-crisis-and-the-next-election-who-will-win/ (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of democracy, 13(2), 51-65.

Liljana Kovacevic – Novinarka koja je pobedila Dodika https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ljiljana-kovacevic-novinarka-koja-je-pobijedila-dodika/141112146

Lindblom, C., (1959), The Science of Muddling Through, Public Administration Review 19: pp. 79-88

Lindekilde, L., (2008), Mobilizing in the Name of the Prophet? The Mobilization/Demobilization of Danish Muslims during the Muhammad Caricatures Controversy, Mobilization 13(2): pp. 219-238

Lindekilde, L., (2013), Claims-making, in Snow, D. A., della Porta, D., Klandermans, B. and McAdam, D., (eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social & Political Movements, Malden: Blackwell Publishing: pp. 201-203

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. JHU Press.

Lipsky, M., (1970) Introduction, in Lipsky, M. (ed.), Law and Order: Police Encounters. New York: Aldine Publishing Company: pp. 1–7

Marusic, S. J., (2015), Macedonia Braces for Big Ant-government Protest, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-braces-for-big-anti-government-protest (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Marx, G. T. (1988). Undercover. Berkeley.

Marx, G. T. (2013). Some conceptual issues in the study of borders and surveillance. In Global Surveillance and Policing (pp. 23-47). Willan.

Marx, G. T., (1974), Thought on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent-provocateur and the Informant, American Journal of Sociology 80: pp. 402-442

McAdam, D. (2013). Initiator and Spin-Off Movements. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

McAdam, D., and Su, Y., (2002), The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973, American Sociological Review 67: pp. 696-721

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. N., (eds.), (1996), Comparative perspectives on social movements. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N., (1988), Social Movements, in Smelser, N. J. (ed.), Handbook of Sociology, Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 695-737

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Social Movement Studies, 2(1), 99-102.

McCammon, H. J., Sanders Muse, H., Newman, H. D. and Terrell, T. M., (2007), Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The Political Successes of the U.S. Women's Jury Movements, American Sociological Review Vol. 72, October, pp. 725-749

McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N., (2002), The Enduring Vitality of the Resource Mobilization Theory of Social Movements, in Turner, J. H., (ed.), Handbook of Sociological Theory. New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum: pp. 533–565

McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. American journal of sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241.

McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (Eds.). (1987). Social movements in an organizational society: Collected essays. Transaction Books.

McCarthy, J. D., Britt, D. W. and Wolfson, M., (1991), The Institutional Challenging of Social Movements by the State in the United States, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 13: pp. 45-76

McPhail, C., Schweingruber, D. and McCarthy, J. D., (1998), Policing Protest in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, in della Porta, D. and Reiter, H., (eds.), Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies. Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press: pp. 49–69

Mediapool (2013), Корупция, обезверение, патова ситуация (Corruption, disillusion, standoff), http://www.mediapool.bg/koruptsiya-obezverenie-patova-situatsiya-news206155.html (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Meier, V. (2005). Yugoslavia: a history of its demise. Routledge.

Meighan, R., (2001), Education, in Clarke, P. B. and Foweraker, J., (eds.), Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, New York, NY: Blackwell Publishing: pp. 295-302

Mesic, S. (2004). The demise of Yugoslavia: a political memoir. Central European University Press.

Milan, C. (2016). 'We are hungry in three languages': mobilizing beyond ethnicity in Bosnia Herzegovina (Doctoral dissertation).

Milan, C., & Oikonomakis, L. (2018). 'Missing the forest for the trees': From single-issue protests to resonant mass-movements in Greece, Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Social Movements in the Balkans (pp. 113-130). Routledge.

Milioni za nepostojeci biznis, Center for Investigative Reporting, 2013, http://www.cin.ba/en/milioni-za-nepostojeci-biznis/

Monitor, G. B. (2010). Insights and perceptions: Voices of the Balkans

Moore, K. (1999). Political protest and institutional change: The anti-Vietnam War movement and American science. How social movements matter, 10, 97-118.

Mueller, C., (1978), Riot Violence and Protest Outcomes, Journal of Political and Military Sociology 6: pp. 49–63.

Mujkić, A. (2016). Bosnian days of reckoning: Review of the sequence of protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013–14, and future prospects of resistance. Southeastern Europe, 40(2), 217-242.

National Integrity System Assessment, Macedonia http://www.transparency.mk/en/images/stories/NIS_eng.pdf

Nations in Transit 2013, Bulgaria https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/bulgaria

Nations in Transit 2014, B&H https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/bosnia-and-herzegovina

Neidhardt, F., (1989), Gewalt und Gegengewalt. Steigt die Bereitschaft zu Gewaltaktionen mit zunehmender staatlicher Kontrolle und Repression?, in Heitmeyer, W. K., and Sünker, H., (eds.), Jugend-Staat-Gewalt, Weinheim and Munich: Juventa, pp. 233–43

Nikola Gruevski Resigned, NY Times, 2016 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/world/europe/nikola-gruevski-macedonia.html?_r=0

Notarbartolo, N., (ed.), (2001), I giorni di Genova. Rome, IT: Internazionale

Novinite 2007, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=82439

Novinite 2013, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=141230

Oberschall, A. (1978). Theories of social conflict. Annual review of sociology, 4(1), 291-315.

Oberschall, A. (2000). The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and racial studies, 23(6), 982-1001.

Oberschall, A., (1973), Social Conflict and Social Movements, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Oliver, P. and Myers, D., (2003), “Networks, Diffusion, and Cycles of Collective Action,” in Diani, M. and McAdam, D., (eds.), Social Movements and Networks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 173–204

Opp, K. D. and Roehl, W., (1990), Repression, Micro-mobilization and Political Protest, Social Forces 69: pp. 521-547

OSCE/ODIHR EOA final report 2016 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/302136?download=true

OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report 2008, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/33153?download=true

OSCE/ODIHR EOM final report 2013 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/103878?download=true

OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/121306?download=true

Parliament Approves Zaev's New Government http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-parliament-approves-zaev-s-new-govt-05-31-2017

Pellet, A. (1992). Appendix: Opinions No. 1, 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Committee of the International Conference on Yugoslavia. EJIL, 3(1).

Perica, V. (2002). Balkan idols: Religion and nationalism in Yugoslav states. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Petkova, M., (2013), Protests in Bulgaria and the New Practice of Democracy, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322163943882279.html (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Petkovski, L., & Nikolovski, D. (2016). Populism and Progressive Social Movements in Macedonia: From Rhetorical Trap to Discursive Asset. Politologicky Casopis, 23(2).

Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A., (1977), Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How they Fail, New York, NY: Random House

Pizzorno, A., (1978), Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict, in Crouch, C. and Pizzorno, A., (eds.), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe. New York: Holmes & Meier: pp. 277–98

Polletta, F., & Ho, M. K. (2004). Frames and their consequences. The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis, 5.

Polletta, F., & Kretschmer, K. (2013). Free spaces. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

Polsby, N. W., (1984), Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

Popov, N., & Georgieva, G. (2015, June). Political Participation And Protest Regulations In The Republic Of Bulgaria In 2013. In International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION (Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 500-504). De Gruyter Open.

Posner, E. A., & Vermeule, A. (2007). Terror in the balance: Security, liberty, and the courts. Oxford University Press on Demand.

Pranje novca u mesnoj industriji, Center for Investigative Reporting, 2013, http://www.cin.ba/en/pranje-novca-u-mesnoj-industriji/

Progress Report B&H 2013, European Commission https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ba_rapport_2013.pdf

Prohaska, M. (1996). Bulgaria: Summing Up Privatization. Center for the Study of Democracy, Sophia, Bulgaria.

Protesters in Macedonia Stage Colorful Revolution, BBC, 2016 https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-36440895/protesters-in-macedonia-stage-colourful-revolution

Protocol to the Agreement of 2 June 2015 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en

Referendum Results 1991, http://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=ba011991

Report for the Activities of the SPO for the Period 15.03.2016 – 15.09.2016 (in Macedonian) http://www.jonsk.mk/%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8/

Report for the Activities of the SPO for the Period 15.09.2015 – 15.03.2016, p. 8 (in Macedonian) http://www.jonsk.mk/%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8/

Report for the Activities of the SPO for the Period 15.09.2016 – 15.03.2017 (in Macedonian) http://www.jonsk.mk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/6-MESECEN-IZVESTAJ.pdf

Reporters without Boarders Bulgaria, https://rsf.org/en/bulgaria

Reporters without Borders, Macedonia, https://rsf.org/en/macedonia

Rohlinger, D., & Vaccaro, C. (2013). Media and social movements. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

Rone, J. (2017). Left in Translation: The Curious Absence of an Austerity Narrative in the 2013 Bulgarian Protests.

ROSSI, F. M. (2012). The Elite Coup: The transition to democracy in Bulgaria.

Rucht, D., (1994), Modernisierung und Soziale Bewegungen (Modernization and Social Movements, Frankfurt am Main: Campus

Rulebook for the activities of the EWRC and its administration (in Bulgarian) http://www.dker.bg/files/DOWNLOAD/ustr-pravilnik.pdf

Sabatier, P., (1975), Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies, Policy Sciences 6: 301-42

Santoro, W. A. (2008). The civil rights movement and the right to vote: Black protest, segregationist violence and the audience. Social Forces, 86(4), 1391-1414.

Sarajevo Times http://www.sarajevotimes.com/?p=50742

Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. L., (1991), What Democracy Is…and Is Not, Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, Number 3: pp. 75-88

Schneider, V., (2008), "Analysis of Political and Social Networks," A seminar at the SUM (Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane), Dept. of Politics and Management, University of Constanz, May 13, 2008

Schumaker, P. D., (1975), Policy Responsiveness to Protest-Group Demands, The Journal of Politics Vol. 37, No. 2: pp. 488-521

Shajnoski, S. (2016). Privatization and Organized Crime in Macedonia. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 22(4), 655-668.

Skocpol, T., (1992), Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Snimka od proglasuvanjeto na nezavisnost na 8 Septemvri https://sdk.mk/index.php/neraskazhani-prikazni/pritisni-malku-za-makedonija-arhivska-video-snimka-od-proglasuvaneto-na-nezavisnosta-na-8-septemvri-1991-godina/

Snow, D. A. (2013). Framing and social movements. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

Snow, D., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., and Benford, R. B., (1986), Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation, American Sociological Review 51: pp. 464-482

Soule, S. A., & Olzak, S. (2004). When do movements matter? The politics of contingency and the equal rights amendment. American Sociological Review, 69(4), 473-497.

Speech of President Ivanov http://pretsedatel.mk/en/media-centre/speeches/3797.html

Stanchev, K, (2013), Протести и икономическо знание (Protests and Economic Knowledge), http://ime.bg/bg/articles/protesti-i-ikonomiesko-znanie/ (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Starr, A., Fernandez, L. A., Amster, R., Wood, L. J., & Caro, M. J. (2008). The impacts of state surveillance on political assembly and association: A socio-legal analysis. Qualitative Sociology, 31(3), 251-270.

Statement on B&H 2013, http://www.ifex.org/bosnia_and_herzegovina/2013/09/23/seemo_statement_on_bosnia/

Stefanovski, I. (2016). From Shallow Democratization to Mobilization: The Cases of the "Bosnian Spring" and the "Citizens for Macedonia". International Journal on Rule of Law, Transitional Justice and Human Rights, 7(7), 43-51.

Stefanovski, I. (2017). The Allies and Opponents of the Bulgarian Protests against the Borisov Government, the "Bosnian Spring" and the "Citizens for Macedonia" Movements and their Impact on the Policy Process. International Journal on Rule of Law, Transitional Justice and Human Rights, 8(8), 48-76.

Stefanovski, I. (2017). Tracing Causal Mechanisms in Social Movement Research in Southeast Europe: The Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia–Evidence from the "Bosnian Spring" and the "Citizens for Macedonia" Movements. SEEU Review, 12(1), 27-51.

Stefanovski, I. (2017). What do we want and how do we do it?: Movement Claims and Repertoires in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Tiempo devorado: revista de historia actual, 4(2), 297-318.

Štiks, I., & Horvat, S. (2014). The new Balkan revolts: from protests to plenums, and beyond. Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons, 83-88.

Strah od tužbi zbog 'bijelog hljeba' (Fear from Lawsuits because of the Apanage), http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/strah-od-tuzbi-zbog-bijelog-hljeba (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Stubbs, P. (2012). Networks, organisations, movements: Narratives and shapes of three waves of activism in Croatia. Polemos: časopis za interdisciplinarna istraživanja rata i mira, 15(30), 11.

Sud B&H proglasio se nenadleznim za slucaj Budmir, Center for Investigative Reporting, 2013, http://www.cin.ba/en/sud-bih-proglasio-se-nenadleznim-za-slucaj-budimir/

Szajkowski, B. (1999). Elections and electoral politics in Macedonia. Bruxelles, Transitions, XL, 1-2.

Tarrow, S. (2013). Contentious politics. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.

Tarrow, S. G. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S., (1989), Democracy and Disorder, Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Tarrow, S., (1993), Social Protest and Policy Reform: May 1968 and the Loi d'Orientation in France, Comparative Political Studies 25: pp. 579-607

Tarrow, S., (1994), Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. New York/Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Taylor, V., & Van Dyke, N. (2004). 'Get up, stand up': Tactical repertoires of social movements. The Blackwell companion to social movements, 262-293.

The Dynamics of Collective Action – DOCA project, (2009), http://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/ ((last accessed December 27th 2015)

The Guardian 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2012/may/30/journalist-safety-bulgaria

the list of all investigations, indictments and annual reports of the SPO http://vistinomer.mk/site-istragi-na-sjo/ (in Macedonian)

The Truth for Macedonia, SDSM, 2015, http://arhiva.sdsm.org.mk/default.aspx?mId=55&agId=5&articleId=11786

Tilly, C. (1978). Collective violence in European perspective.

Tilly, C. (2001). Mechanisms in political processes. Annual review of political science, 4(1), 21-41.

Tilly, C. (2008). Describing, measuring, and explaining struggle. *Qualitative Sociology*, *31*(1), 1-13.

Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S., (2006), Contentious Politics, Boulder, CO: Paradigm

Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2015). Politique (s) du conflit: De la grève à la révolution. 2e édition augmentée d'une préface. Presses de sciences po.

Tilly, C., (1986), The Contentious French, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Tilly, C., (1999), Conclusion: From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements, in Giugni M., McAdam, D. and Tilly, C., (eds.), How Movements Matter: Theoretical and Comparative

Studies on the Consequences of Social Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, pp. 253–70

Tilly, C., (2008), Contentious Performances, Camridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Tomov, M., & Raycheva, L. (2015). The Facebook image of the 2013/2014 social protests in Bulgaria. Democracy and media in Central and Eastern Europe, 25, 235-253.

Transparency International B&H, 2013 https://ti-bih.org/kosovo-i-bih-u-svjetskom-vrhu-po-korupciji/?lang=en

Tuzla: Ukinut "bijeli hljeb" (Tuzla: Apanage abolished), http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/tuzla-ukinut-bijeli-hljeb (last accessed 10 July 2019)

Uba, K. (2016). 7 PROTEST AGAINST SCHOOL CLOSURES IN SWEDEN. The Consequences of Social Movements, 159.

Ustavni Sud FB&H Resava oko Sporova, Vjesti 2013, http://vijesti.ba//clanak/182497/ustavni-sud-fbih-rjesava-se-spor-oko-kvp-a

Van Stekelenburg, J. (2006). Promoting or preventing social change: Instrumentality, identity, ideology and group-based anger as motives of protest participation.

Van Stekelenburg, J. (2013). The political psychology of protest. European psychologist.

Vangeli, A. (2011). Nation-building ancient Macedonian style: the origins and the effects of the so-called antiquization in Macedonia. Nationalities Papers, 39(1), 13-32.

Vankovska, B. (2015). Social Movements and Protets in Macedonia: Between State-Building and Popular Demands from below. Security Dialogues, 6(2-1), 41-54.

Vardari, A., & Stefanovski, I. (2018). FROM STREETS TO SEATS?. Radical Right Movement Parties in Europe.

Velinova, N., Tomov, M., & Raycheva, L. (2015). The 2013 social protests in Bulgaria: slogans and images. Investigating Culture, (1).

Vera, S. (2011). Cronología del conflicto: El movimiento estudiantil en Chile, 2011. Anuario del Conflicto Social, 1(1).

Vrablikova, K., (2013), Public Opinion and Movements, in Snow, D. A., della Porta, D., Klandermans, B. and McAdam, D., (eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social & Political Movements, Malden: Blackwell Publishing: pp. 1022-1025

Vreme 1992, http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/

Vujeva, K., (2014), Class Struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Casus belli for Major Social Unrest in Croatia?, http://www.marxist.com/class-struggle-in-bih-casus-belli-for-major-social-unrest-in-croatia.htm (last accessed December 27th 2015)

Williams, K. M., & Williams, K. W. (2006). Mark one or more. University of Michigan Press.

Wilson, B. R. (1973). Magic and the millennium: A sociological study of religious movements of protest among tribal and third-world peoples. HarperCollins Publishers.

World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?year_high_desc=true

World's Worst Economies, CNN, 2012 http://money.cnn.com/gallery/news/economy/2012/08/07/worlds-worst-economies/4.html

Yugoslavia on the Brink, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/24/world/upheaval-in-the-east-yugoslavia-yugoslavia-on-the-brink.html

Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign affairs, 22-43.

Zald, M. N., & Ash, R. (1966). Social movement organizations: Growth, decay and change. Social forces, 44(3), 327-341.

Zaller, J. R., (1992), The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Zamosc, L. (2013). Popular impeachments: Ecuador in comparative perspective. In Shifting frontiers of citizenship: The Latin American experience (pp. 237-265). Brill.

Zankina, E. A. (2010). Transformation of the Bulgarian Political Elite in the Period of Transition. Its Impact on the Transition Process (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh).

Zwerman, G., Steinhoff, P. G., and della Porta, D., (2000), Disappearing Social Movements: Clandestinity in the Cycle of New Left Protest in the U.S., Japan, Germany and Italy, Mobilization 5, pp. 85-104

Николова, М., Цонева, Ж., & Медаров, Г. Политика без политика.„Те "и „ние "в кризата на представителството.

Appendix A: List of interviewees

President Branko Crvenkovski, Former President and PM of Macedonia, 9 June 2016

Fani Karanfilova – Panovska, Executive director and protest organizer, 11 May 2016

Margarita Caca – Nikolovska, Analyst and former judge to the ECtHR, 15 May 2016

John Doe, Executive director and protest organizer, 10 February 2016

Valentina Georgieva, University professor and activist, 5 March 2017

Vasko Lazarevski, Activist, 3 February 2016

Djeljo Hodjić, Activist, 8 February 2016

Marjan Zabrchanec, Protest organizer, 9 February 2016

Ognen Janeski, Journalist and activist, 11 February 2016

Sofija Kunovska, MP, 30 March 2016

Asim Mujkić, University professor and activist, 5 April 2016

Danijela ------, Protest organizer, 5 April 2016

Boriša Mraović, Activist, 5 April 2016

Lejla Kusturica, Activist, 6 April 2016

Sadzida Tulić, Protest organizer, 6 April 2016

Nana Pilavić, Activist, 7 April 2016

Nermin Nikšić, former PM of FB&H, 7 April 2016

Saša Magazinović, MP, 7 April 2016

Alina Trkulja, Protest organizer, 8 April 2016

John Doe, US Department of State employee, 10 April 2016

Emin Eminagić, Protest organizer, 30 April 2016

Adnan Huskić, Analyst, 20 February 2017

Borislav Sandov, Protest activist and politician, 5 March 2017

Georgi Zhechev, Energy expert, 6 March 2017

Kristina Dimitrova, Activist, 6 March 2017

Boris Pop-Ivanov, University professor, 7 March 2017

Todor Hristov, University professor, 7 March 2017

Doncho Dudev, Protest organizer, 10 March 2017

Svetlin Tachev, Key informant and activist, 10 May 2017

Velislav Ivanov, Analyst, 15 May 2017

Sasho Ordanoski, University professor and journalist, 12 March 2016

Appendix B: PCA – Codebook

The primary goal of this codebook is to detect and further analyze the claims, defined as instances of strategic action in the public sphere, regardless of the forms of this action (from verbal statement to protest), which have been made by governmental challengers, mainly CSO representatives and political parties, as well as institutional actors such as parliaments, governments, and representatives of the international community, correlated to the three social movements in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the time frame of approximately two years (2013-2015).

The crucial questions, which this codebook will facilitate in solving, are "when" and "where" the claims have been made?; "who" made the claims?; "how" was the claim inserted into the public sphere?; "at whom" was the claim directed?; "what" is the claim about?; "for/against whom" – who would be affected by the claim?; and "why" – the justification of the claim. All claims during the aforementioned period, related to the three specific policy fields and issues, in the three respective countries, will be thoroughly analyzed. In the process of creation of the codebook, many questions and examples were taken from the EUROPUB project (http://europub.wzb.eu/Data/Codebooks%20questionnaires/D2-1-claims-codebook.pdf) coordinated by Ruud Koopmans.

Unit of analysis: Every political claim related to the three specific policy fields, regarding the three movements, which was put forward by domestic and international actors within the previously described temporal and geographical scope will be considered as a separate unit of analysis.

Sampling: regarding the sampling strategy, all articles from the selected newspapers (two per country/movement) for the duration of the movements will be analyzed. The time span ranges from approximately two weeks to approximately two months, depending on the movement. Key words like "movement", "protest", "march", "contention", "mobilization", "political crisis", "international community" in the respective languages (Macedonia, Bulgarian and Bosnian), will be used for browsing through the newspapers' databases.

Raised on Streets? The Impact of Social Movements on Policy Outcomes in Southeast Europe: The cases of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Country:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Country	COUNTRY	1 (Macedonia)
		2 (B&H)

		3 (Bulgaria)

Political claim number:

Input mask	Variable	Values
PCN	PCN	date and number.
		DDMMYYYYxx
Year	YEAR	YYYY
Month	MONTH	1-12
Date	DATE	DD.MM.YYYY

1. Basic data:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Basic information	BASICDATA	alphanumerical input

2. Source:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Document	DOCDESCRIBE	alphanumerical value
Document date	DOCDATE	DDMMYYYY

3. Description of the claim:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Claim description	CLAIMDESCRIBE	alphanumerical input

4. Claim-making area (policy field):

Input mask	Variable	Values
Claim-making area	CLAIMAREA	1 (Local/Regional/Cantonal)
		2 (National/Entity/Federation)
		3 (International)

5. Claimants:

Name of claimant:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Name of claimant	NAMECLAIMANT	alphanumerical input

Types of claimants:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Type of claimants	TYPECLAIMANTS	1 (Movement activists)
		2 (Political party – national level)
		3 (Politicians – national level)
		4 (Parliament)
		5 (Judiciary)
		6 (Police – national level)
		7 (Media and journalists)
		8 (International community)
		9 (Other)
		10 (Alternative media)
		11 (Trade unions)
		12 (Counter movements)
		13 (Administrative apparatus)
		21 (Political party – local/regional/cantonal)
		31 (Politicians – local/regional/cantonal)
		61 (Police – local/regional/cantonal)

6. Form of claim:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Form of claim	FORMCLAIM	1 (Statement)
		2 (Document)

		3 (Rally)
		4 (Police action)
		5 (Citizens' assembly)
		9 (Other)

7. Addressee of the claim:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Addressee of the claim	ADDRESSCLAIM	1 Government (national level)
		2 (Movement)
		3 (Politician/Public official – national level)
		5 (Citizens)
		9 (Other)
		11 (Government – local/cantonal/regional)
		31 (Politician/Public official – local/cantonal/regional)

8. Evaluation of addressee:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Evaluation of addressee	EVALADDRESS	0 (Neutral)
		1 (Support)
		2 (Criticism)

9. Type of claim:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Type of claim	CLAIMTYPE	1 (General/Anti-governmental)
		2 (Anticorruption)
		3 (Election fraud)

		4 (Government resignation) 5 (Rule of law) 6 (Protection of human rights) 7 (Support for the movement) 8 (Criticism of the movement) 9 (Other) 10 (Media freedom violation) 11 (State loans and indebting) 12 (Violence) 13 (Police brutality) 14 (Mistrust in political parties) 15 (Bad economic situation–general) 16 (Political negotiations) 17 (Bad economic situation – energy bills)

10. Object (actor) of the claim – (for/against whom):

Input mask	Variable	Values
Object of the claim national/federal/entity)	OBJECTCLAIM	1 (Government – 2 (Movement) 9 (Other)
		11 (Government – local/regional/cantonal)

11. Reasons for claim-making (frame):

Input mask	Variable	Values
Reasons for claim-making	REASONSCLAIM	alphanumerical input

Appendix C: PEA – Codebook

The initial goal of this codebook is to shed deeper light on the repertoires of action which took place during the three social movements in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the time frame of approximately two years (2013-2015).

The crucial questions, which this codebook will facilitate in solving, are "where", "when", "who" and "how" contested the governments regarding specific policy fields and issues, in the three respective countries. In the process of creation of the codebook, examples from PRODAT (Rucht 2010, https://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u13/codesheet-prodat_2010.pdf), Hutter (2014), Beissinger and Sasse (2014) and Kriesi et al. (1995) were used.

Unit of analysis: Every protest event which took place during the course of the respective movements will be considered as a separate unit of analysis.

Sampling: regarding the sampling strategy, all articles from the selected newspapers (two per country/movement) for the duration of the movements will be analyzed. The time span for each case is approximately two months.

Raised on Streets? The Impact of Social Movements on Policy Outcomes in Southeast Europe: The cases of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Country:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Country	COUNTRY	1 (Macedonia)
		2 (B&H)
		3 (Bulgaria)

Protest event number:

Input mask	Variable	Values
PEN	PEN	date of beginning and No.
		DDMMYYYYxx
Year	YEAR	YYYY
Month	MONTH	Jan-Dec
Date	DATE	DD.MM.YYYY

12. Day of the event:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Day of the event	EVENTDAY	Mon-Sun

13. Basic data:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Basic information	BASICDATA	alphanumerical input

14. Duration of protest event:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Duration of protest event	DURATION	1-X number of hours

15. Source

Input mask	Variable	Values
Newspaper	NEWSPAPER	1 (Sloboden Pechat)
		2 (Dnevnik)
		3 (Dnevni Avaz)
		4 (Oslobodjenje)
		5 (Duma)
		6 (Trud)
		12 (1 and 2)
		34 (3 and 4)
		56 (5 and 6)
Newspaper date	NPDATE	DDMMYYYY

16. Main places of protest:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Main places of protest	LOCATION	alphanumerical input

17. Mobilization area:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Mobilization area	MOBAREA	1 (Local/Regional/Cantonal)

		2 (National/Entity/Federation)
		3 (International)
		12 (Regional and National)

18. Participants:

Number of participants:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Number of participants	NUMPART	multi-digit number

Source of participation numbers:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Source of participation num.	SOURCEPARTNUM	1 (Newspaper)
		2 (Police)
		3 (Organizers)

19. Form of action:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Form of action	ACTION	1 (Citizens' assembly)
		2 (Demonstration/March)
		3 (Occupation)
		4 (Citizens' debate)
		5 (Petition)
		6 (Other)

Status of the action:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Legality of the action	STATUS	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Legal)
		2 (Illegal)

Immediate reactions:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Reaction to the event	REACTION	1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Police presence:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Presence of police	POLICEPRES	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Police number:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Number of policemen	POLICENUM	multi-digit number

Police action:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Action by the police	POLICEACT	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Police violence:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Violence by the police	POLICEVIOL	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Police action – description:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Descr. of the police action	POLICEACTDES	alphanumerical input

Damage to property:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Damage to property	DAMAGE	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Arrests:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Arrests by the police	ARRESTS	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Injuries:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Injured persons	INJURIES	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Deaths:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Deaths	DEATHS	0 (Not defined)
		1 (Yes)
		2 (No)

Conventional, confrontational or violent actions:

Input mask	Variable	Values
Conv., Conf. or Vio.	TARROWGEN	1 (Conventional/Routine)
		2 (Confrontational/Disruptive)
		3 (Violent)

Appendix D: Synthesis of Hypothesis

Figure 1: Synthesis of Hypothesis

Indpendent variables			Dependent variabels			Hypotheses
	Indicators	Data collection tool		Indicators	Data collection tool	
Claims making	Types of claims	M, Is, Ia,Q	Policy outputs	Number of SMOs participating in preparations of draft-policies	Dpo, Dw, Dd, Is, Ip, Ik	H1: The higher the number and type of claims, the better the resonance in the wider public, which leads towards greater pressure over governments in regards to the policy outputs and policy outcomes.
	Form of actions	M, Is, Ia,Q		Presence/absence of policy output	Dpo, Dw, Dd, Is, Ip, Ik	H2: There is great likelihood that protest experience might vary in regards to the forms of action - petitions public meetings, and peaceful demonstrations might have a positive effect to the elite's understanding toward such actions, while disruptions caused by strikes, riots, and other more threatening events might have a negative effect instead.
	Number of actions	M, Is, Ia,Q		Paths of policy change	Dpo, Dw, Dd, Is, Ip, Ik	
Repertoires of contention						H3: If one holder of power or policy maker encounters protests more frequently, these actions would seem more acceptable and less threatening - a higher number of protest events should result with more favorable policy outcomes.
	Number of participants	M, Is, Ia,Q		Centralization of state apparatus	Dl, Ip, Ik, Is, Ia	H4: Large numbers can easily draw attention of decision-makers who fearing the possibility of losing the electoral support, might reconsider their political stances regarding issues which are being advocated by the movements.
						H5: Larger protest event participation increases the possibility of acquiring the desired policy output and eases the way towards a successful policy outcome.
	Types of repression	Is, Ia, Ik, Dc, Ds	Policy outcomes	Government control over market participants	Dl, Ip, Ik, Is, Ia	H6: Repression raises the costs of protest activities and should result with reduction of activism which leads towards smaller influence over policy processes
Repression						H7: State repression is one of the most important mechanisms in regards to political outcomes, especially in not fully consolidated democratic societies which are fragile, have a lower level of political culture and less functional democratic institutions in comparison to their full-fledged democratic counterparts
	Frequency of repression	Is, Ia, Ik, Dc, Ds		Independence and authority of the judiciary	Dl, Ip, Ik, Is, Ia	
Allies/Opponents	Strength of government	Dl, Ip, Ik		Characteristics of public bureaucracy	Dl, Ip, Ik, Is, Ia	H8: A strong government and a weak civil society would lead towards violent protests
						H9: The larger the number of actors who share political power, the greater

Distribution of institutional power	Dl, Ip, Ik	the chance for social movements to influence institutions regarding policy outputs and policy outcomes.
Anatomy and powers of judiciary	Dl, Ip, Ik	
Configuration of power	Dl, Ip, Ik	
Political parties	Dl, Ip, Ik	
Capacity of legislature to develop and control policies independently of the executive	Dl, Ip, Ik	
Number of actors which can articulate demands and influence the openness of the system	Dl, Ip, Ik	
Patterns of intermediations between interest groups and the executive	Dl, Ip, Ik	
mechanism for aggregation of demands	Dl, Ip, Ik	
international community	Dl, Ip, Ik	

Data collection tools:

M - media

I - interviews (Is-SMO representatives, Ia-activists, Ip-policymakers, Ik-key informants)

Q - questionnaire

D - documents (Dc-civil society, Ds-state Dl-legal, Dpo-policy output, Dw-working version, Dd-draft