How do veto-heavy European welfare systems engage in reform? In this paper we analyse the pension policy reform process in three Bismarckian welfare states - France, Germany, and Italy - against the background of recent theorizing about the scope and nature of welfare reform. We develop the notion of trade-offs to illustrate how governments manage to push forward and succeed with (even innovative) reforms despite the opposition of strong vested interests. In the process, we also reach a number of conclusions about recent theoretical understandings of reform in continental Europe, including both reform processes and the nature of their outcomes.
The New Politics of Bismarckian Welfare State: Pension reforms in Continental Europe
D.Natali;
2004
Abstract
How do veto-heavy European welfare systems engage in reform? In this paper we analyse the pension policy reform process in three Bismarckian welfare states - France, Germany, and Italy - against the background of recent theorizing about the scope and nature of welfare reform. We develop the notion of trade-offs to illustrate how governments manage to push forward and succeed with (even innovative) reforms despite the opposition of strong vested interests. In the process, we also reach a number of conclusions about recent theoretical understandings of reform in continental Europe, including both reform processes and the nature of their outcomes.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
