Much of the institutionalist literature has emphasized the key role of path-dependency in explaining the stability of pension policy. Yet, more recent accounts (Crouch, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) have proved even this heavily institutionalized policy does change. The present chapter analyzes the determinants of policy change through the comparative study of pension reforms in Italy and US. In the following I stress the role of reformers’ motivations and opportunity structures (‘gates’). Firstly, the comparative study shows reformers have a complex set of motivations consistent with both ‘blame-avoidance’ and ‘credit-claiming’ strategies. Their combination may enhance political support for policy innovation. Secondly, policymakers may open political and institutionalized policy ‘gates’ to ease change. The former are mainly related to the inter-generational cleavage policymakers may use to divide potential opposition. The latter consist of the opportunities in ‘adjacent’ policy fields. Italian and US policymakers have largely used tax policy and salary savings schemes to increase private pensions’ coverage. Thus, the more complex set of reformers’ motivations and the political and policy opportunities at their disposal prove the ‘not so narrow’ path to policy change even in the case of the ‘sticky’ pension programmes.
Pension Reforms in Italy and US: Policy Change Through Political and Institutionalized Policy ‘Gates’
D. NATALI
2009
Abstract
Much of the institutionalist literature has emphasized the key role of path-dependency in explaining the stability of pension policy. Yet, more recent accounts (Crouch, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) have proved even this heavily institutionalized policy does change. The present chapter analyzes the determinants of policy change through the comparative study of pension reforms in Italy and US. In the following I stress the role of reformers’ motivations and opportunity structures (‘gates’). Firstly, the comparative study shows reformers have a complex set of motivations consistent with both ‘blame-avoidance’ and ‘credit-claiming’ strategies. Their combination may enhance political support for policy innovation. Secondly, policymakers may open political and institutionalized policy ‘gates’ to ease change. The former are mainly related to the inter-generational cleavage policymakers may use to divide potential opposition. The latter consist of the opportunities in ‘adjacent’ policy fields. Italian and US policymakers have largely used tax policy and salary savings schemes to increase private pensions’ coverage. Thus, the more complex set of reformers’ motivations and the political and policy opportunities at their disposal prove the ‘not so narrow’ path to policy change even in the case of the ‘sticky’ pension programmes.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
