Road to (k)nowhere : policy instrument selection in complex governance arrangements: the case of research and innovation policy in France and Italy

Research and innovation (R & I) are increasingly understood as essential assets in national, and supranational, strategies for economic, social, industrial and technological development. Public engagement in these activities dates back to the pre-WWII period. Nowadays, its relevance has been revitalised as a powerful strategy to respond to major social, economic and environmental challenges (e.g. Grand Challenges). On the other hand, also the private sector has gained greater prominence within the field of scientific, engineering and technological activities employed for economic development (Arnold, Boekholt, 2003). Starting from these evolutions, the present research investigates the politics of policy instrument selection in the R&I sector. This study sheds light on the political dynamics that can explain how (and why) public actors decided to intervene (or not) in governing the field of scientific and technological innovation. Through a comparative analysis between France and Italy, the research investigates how the interplay between institutional characteristics, different policy styles and interest intermediation patterns influence actors’ interactions, their preferences for various instrument mixes and ultimately the evolution of national R&I policy mixes. By adopting policy instruments as a proxy for analysing actors’ preferences, it has been possible to understand different patterns of interaction taking place between governing, and non- governing, actors along the policy design process. In order to disentangle these dynamics a multi-method approach based on the triangulation of different sources (semi-structured interviews, document analysis and national statistics) has been adopted. Then, through a methodological approach to qualitative data analysis inspired by within and cross-case analysis (Miles, Huberman, 1994), thematic (Boyatzis, 1998) and content analysis (Schreier, 2012), national policy instrument selection process have been investigated. The comparative analysis ultimately shows that when we focus only on how governments have used their power to steer target population towards their intended behaviours (e.g. the inducement embedded in instrument action) our two cases share many similarities in their aggregate R&I policy mix features. But if we look at the characteristics of how different instruments exercise social control (e.g. instrument shapes) and the relationship between policy makers and target population (e.g. delivery structure) our results display a greater variety. These differences reflect the alternative approaches the two countries have undertaken to interact with target population, as well as in the political entrepreneurship and organizational capacity of national R&I performers.