Il peso insostenibile della fortuna: l'ateismo di Primo Levi

This article aims to deepen the question of atheism within Primo Levi's work from a philosophical point of view. Taking into account the current debate on the «sacred» in Levi's moral reflection, instead I propose an opposite perspective, according to which atheism stands for both the conditio sine qua non and the landing place of his ethics. At first, I aim to reconstruct the way in which Levi articulates the disassociation between God and Evil, underling how, according to Levi, the concept of Providence is not only illogical, but particularly immoral. Such a perspective evokes a certain affinity with the atheistic tradition which opposed to Christian theodicy over modern philosophy. The conclusion is devoted to an in-dept analysis of the meaning of «Luck» as the only plausible ethical reason for survival.