In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey's account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well-including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey's account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker's possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to reinterpret the notion of conditional degree of belief in order to overcome a tension in Ramsey's account. The result of the reinterpretation is a tenable account of conditionals that covers indicative and subjunctive as well as qualitative and probabilistic conditionals.
Ramsey's conditionals
Sisti, Caterina
2022
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey's account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well-including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey's account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker's possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to reinterpret the notion of conditional degree of belief in order to overcome a tension in Ramsey's account. The result of the reinterpretation is a tenable account of conditionals that covers indicative and subjunctive as well as qualitative and probabilistic conditionals.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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