Encoding in conceivability-contexts : Zalta’s theory of intentionality versus Bourgeois-Gironde’s notion of quasi-encoding

In (Bourgeois-Gironde, S. 2004. “On Zalta’s Notion of Encoding in Conceivability-Contexts.” Metaphysica 5), the author proposes a survey of Zalta’s Object Theory (Zalta, E. N. 1983. Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company; Zalta, E. N. 1988. Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge: MIT Press) and, more specifically, of the Modal Axiom of Encoding (MAE). MAE claims that if something x possibly encodes a property F, then x necessarily encodes F. According to Bourgeois-Gironde, MAE fails to account for intentional phenomena which occur in conceivability-contexts. His solution is based on the notion of quasi-encoding: x quasi-encodes F iff x possibly encodes F. In this paper, I show that Bourgeois-Gironde’s concern is misguided and that Zalta’s framework captures the conceivability-phenomena at issue by modeling Husserl’s notion of Noemata. I then argue that his solution is superior to Bourgeois-Gironde’s. The philosophical significance of such a discussion nonetheless goes well beyond the debate between these two authors. Indeed, Zalta’s theory of Noemata is only sketched and needs to be further explored to see, on the one hand, whether and how Object Theory successfully describes the behavior of objects in conceivability-contexts, and, on the other hand, to test the efficacy of its primitive notions that are – as the contemporary debate on Neomeinongianism largely shows – anything but uncontroversial.