Quel che non inganna : riflessioni sull’analogia tra la parvenza dei sensi e la parvenza trascendentale in Kant

On What does not decept. Some Reflections on the Analogy between Sensible and Transcendetal Illusion in Kant · In this paper, I aim to reflect on the distinction between illusion and deception regarding knowledge, using the analogy between the illusion of the senses and the transcendental illusion at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason as a guiding thread. After noting an affinity between the metaphor that opens the section «Phaenomena and Noumena» of the Transcendental Analytic and the incipit of the Transcendental Dialectic, in the first section I discuss the gap between Täuschung (illusion)and Betrug (deception) in the context of Anthropology, Lectures on Metaphysics and the Critique of Judgment. In the second part of this paper, I examine judgment as the key site where the shift from illusion to deception can occur; here my intention is to analyze the function of provisional judgments in empirical knowledge. The third and final section is devoted to transcendental illusion and responds to a twofold task: (i) to identify in regulative use of ideas the transcendental analogon of provisional judgments, and (ii) to explore its positive implications for knowledge.