This paper asks whether institution-specific features of international financial fora affect the formation of a common EU position. Specifically, building on the literature on global financial governance and transnational policy communities, the paper examines to what extent the nature of the membership – be it political or expert-based – and the scope of the mandate – be it broad or technical – of international financial regulatory body affect the formation of a common EU position. To this end, the paper compares and contrasts the modalities through which the EU is represented in the G20 Leaders and BCBS, outlines the institutional features of these international bodies and presents the empirical evidence of two key case studies with reference to the decision to increase the financial firepower of the IMF (in the G20 Leaders) and the adoption of the Basel III accord (in the BCBS).
Speaking with one voice in international finance. The European Union and the post-crisis financial debate
Moschella, Manuela;
2013
Abstract
This paper asks whether institution-specific features of international financial fora affect the formation of a common EU position. Specifically, building on the literature on global financial governance and transnational policy communities, the paper examines to what extent the nature of the membership – be it political or expert-based – and the scope of the mandate – be it broad or technical – of international financial regulatory body affect the formation of a common EU position. To this end, the paper compares and contrasts the modalities through which the EU is represented in the G20 Leaders and BCBS, outlines the institutional features of these international bodies and presents the empirical evidence of two key case studies with reference to the decision to increase the financial firepower of the IMF (in the G20 Leaders) and the adoption of the Basel III accord (in the BCBS).I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
