The paper sets out to explain why the European Central Bank and the European Commission relaxed their opposition to debt restructuring and fiscal accommodation for Greece in the shift from the first to second adjustment program. Using the findings of the empirical analysis, the paper shows that EU institutions’ repositioning cannot easily be ascribed to the mechanisms that are typically at play in international negotiations, namely exogenous pressures and internalization of new beliefs through persuasion. Instead, the paper argues that a more nuanced and complete explanation of the relaxation of opposition to the change in the program strategy requires taking into account the institutional and temporal dimensions of the Troika negotiations. Specifically, the paper shows that the evolution of European actors’ preferences was shaped by the layering of new crisis management rules into the machinery of the monetary union. Layering allowed political actors in favor of the status quo achieving their preferences under changed external circumstances.

Negotiating Greece. Layering, insulation, and the design of adjustment programs in the Eurozone

Moschella, Manuela
2016

Abstract

The paper sets out to explain why the European Central Bank and the European Commission relaxed their opposition to debt restructuring and fiscal accommodation for Greece in the shift from the first to second adjustment program. Using the findings of the empirical analysis, the paper shows that EU institutions’ repositioning cannot easily be ascribed to the mechanisms that are typically at play in international negotiations, namely exogenous pressures and internalization of new beliefs through persuasion. Instead, the paper argues that a more nuanced and complete explanation of the relaxation of opposition to the change in the program strategy requires taking into account the institutional and temporal dimensions of the Troika negotiations. Specifically, the paper shows that the evolution of European actors’ preferences was shaped by the layering of new crisis management rules into the machinery of the monetary union. Layering allowed political actors in favor of the status quo achieving their preferences under changed external circumstances.
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
Greece; IMF; European Central Bank; Troika; sovereign debt crisis.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
2016 - Moschella - Negotiating Greece.pdf

Accesso chiuso

Tipologia: Published version
Licenza: Non pubblico
Dimensione 353.07 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
353.07 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Negotiating Greece.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Submitted version (pre-print)
Licenza: Accesso gratuito (sola lettura)
Dimensione 218.8 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
218.8 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11384/64076
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 26
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 25
social impact