This article argues that the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone, which was meant to remedy institutional shortcomings and mitigate the distributional implications of financial support in the European Monetary Union (EMU), has instead contributed to a deepening of the existing political cleavages and the creation of new ones. This dysfunctional effect reflects the empowerment of some national parliaments in decisions on financial assistance. These arguments are tested against the empirical examination of the negotiations of the three adjustment programmes for Greece. Specifically, the article shows that negotiations moved towards the radicalization of creditors’ positions and increased divisions between creditors in conjunction with the development of financial assistance capacity. While advancing its theses, the article strikes a note of caution regarding the argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policymaking is one of the most powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the integration project.

When Some Are More Equal than Others: National Parliaments and Intergovernmental Bailout Negotiations in the Eurozone

Moschella, Manuela
2017

Abstract

This article argues that the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone, which was meant to remedy institutional shortcomings and mitigate the distributional implications of financial support in the European Monetary Union (EMU), has instead contributed to a deepening of the existing political cleavages and the creation of new ones. This dysfunctional effect reflects the empowerment of some national parliaments in decisions on financial assistance. These arguments are tested against the empirical examination of the negotiations of the three adjustment programmes for Greece. Specifically, the article shows that negotiations moved towards the radicalization of creditors’ positions and increased divisions between creditors in conjunction with the development of financial assistance capacity. While advancing its theses, the article strikes a note of caution regarding the argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policymaking is one of the most powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the integration project.
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
European Monetary Union, National Parliaments, Intergovernmental negotiations
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11384/65589
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