During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called Merkozy duumvirate emerged as an informal, but highly visible EU policy-making pattern. This article asks why such forms of decentralized bargaining emerge and what this implies for the theory of EU institutions. According to an approach based on negotiation theory, the article argues that Merkozy is a strategic tool used by Germany to realize its preferences on EU crisis management. Based on an incomplete contracts theory of EU institutions, instead, the article analyses Merkozy as an informal institution created by France and Germany to avoid being discriminated by supranational institutions. Both approaches are employed to assess Merkozy's role in the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the Fiscal Compact.

Explaining Informal Policy-Making Patterns in the Eurozone Crisis: Decentralized Bargaining and the Theory of EU Institutions

Guidi, Mattia;
2017

Abstract

During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called Merkozy duumvirate emerged as an informal, but highly visible EU policy-making pattern. This article asks why such forms of decentralized bargaining emerge and what this implies for the theory of EU institutions. According to an approach based on negotiation theory, the article argues that Merkozy is a strategic tool used by Germany to realize its preferences on EU crisis management. Based on an incomplete contracts theory of EU institutions, instead, the article analyses Merkozy as an informal institution created by France and Germany to avoid being discriminated by supranational institutions. Both approaches are employed to assess Merkozy's role in the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the Fiscal Compact.
2017
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
EU decision-making; institutional change; Merkozy; negotiation theory; Business and International Management; Public Administration
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11384/69593
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