This symposium homes in on an area of public administration that has been through a period of significant change in the last ten years. Since the Global Financial Crisis, central banks have expanded their operations in financial markets, buying up vast quantities of assets as part of expansive monetary policy strategies. They have also played a leading role in the reform of financial regulations and been entrusted with enhanced authority to supervise financial institutions. This activity has taken place amid heightened political contestation, with central banks increasingly viewed as the quintessence of a technocratic mode of governance that eschews traditional democratic control. The purpose of this symposium is to consider how central banks have changed since the financial crisis, why they have changed in the ways that they have, and what those changes can tell us about the balance of power between independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians.

Central banks under stress: Reputation, accountability and regulatory coherence

Manuela Moschella
;
2019

Abstract

This symposium homes in on an area of public administration that has been through a period of significant change in the last ten years. Since the Global Financial Crisis, central banks have expanded their operations in financial markets, buying up vast quantities of assets as part of expansive monetary policy strategies. They have also played a leading role in the reform of financial regulations and been entrusted with enhanced authority to supervise financial institutions. This activity has taken place amid heightened political contestation, with central banks increasingly viewed as the quintessence of a technocratic mode of governance that eschews traditional democratic control. The purpose of this symposium is to consider how central banks have changed since the financial crisis, why they have changed in the ways that they have, and what those changes can tell us about the balance of power between independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians.
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
central banks; independence; accountability;
Fondi MUR
RBSI14KCWY
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Descrizione: Accesso Aperto MIUR - Nome del programma: SIR bando 2014 - Acronimo del progetto: UNCENTRAL - Numero di contratto: RBSI14KCWY - Data di pubblicazione: 06/09/2019 - Scheda di progetto con tutti i soggetti che hanno concorso alla realizzazione del paper: Manuela Moschella, Samuel McPhilemy
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11384/76428
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