The subject of the present work is the principle of analyticity of logic. In order for the question ‘Is logic analytic?’ to make sense and before trying to find an answer to this problem, it is obviously necessary to specify two preliminary issues, namely, the meaning of the term ‘analytic’ and the meaning of the term ‘logic’. The former issue is somehow justified and expected: after all, analyticity represents one of the philosophical concepts par excellence and, as such, it has been at the core of a lively debate throughout the history of the discipline. But, despite possible appearances to the contrary, the second issue is probably more decisive than the former in determining the answer to the initial question: both the contents and the philosophical conceptions of logic play a fundamental role in the study of the epistemological status of this discipline. We could even say that the clarification of the concepts of analyticity and of logic constitutes in itself the decision on the analyticity of logic. This thesis studies the principle of analyticity of logic through two different, but related, methodologies, which individuate the two main parts of the work: the former offers a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the problem; the latter proposes two formal characterizations of the analytic-synthetic distinction. The reconstruction of the first part does not presume to be exhaustive and is restricted to the theories of the following philosophers: Kant, Bolzano, Frege and Hintikka. The material has been chosen according to the following criteria. First, this work aims at showing the ‘historical’ nature of the principle of analyticity of logic, which has a certain genealogy and a precise starting point. Although after the Vienna Circle this tenet has been taken for granted, there are many and significant conceptions that criticize it. Theories holding that logic is either not analytic or synthetic are the main characters of our reconstruction. This explains, for example, why we have dedicated great attention to Bolzano, while leaving little margin to the logical empiricist movement, despite the fact that analyticity is probably more fundamental for the latter’s thought than for the former’s philosophical construction. As a result of this choice, theories of meaning and their connection to analyticity are completely overlooked, since they belong to the logical empiricists’ interpretation of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In other words, the principle of analyticity of logic and the philosophers arguing for it are taken as a critical target, but the true focus is on the varieties of reactions against them. [...]

The principle of analyticity of logic : a philosophical and formal Perspective / Larese, Costanza; relatore: Mugnai, Massimo; Scuola Normale Superiore, 2019.

The principle of analyticity of logic : a philosophical and formal Perspective

Larese, Costanza
2019

Abstract

The subject of the present work is the principle of analyticity of logic. In order for the question ‘Is logic analytic?’ to make sense and before trying to find an answer to this problem, it is obviously necessary to specify two preliminary issues, namely, the meaning of the term ‘analytic’ and the meaning of the term ‘logic’. The former issue is somehow justified and expected: after all, analyticity represents one of the philosophical concepts par excellence and, as such, it has been at the core of a lively debate throughout the history of the discipline. But, despite possible appearances to the contrary, the second issue is probably more decisive than the former in determining the answer to the initial question: both the contents and the philosophical conceptions of logic play a fundamental role in the study of the epistemological status of this discipline. We could even say that the clarification of the concepts of analyticity and of logic constitutes in itself the decision on the analyticity of logic. This thesis studies the principle of analyticity of logic through two different, but related, methodologies, which individuate the two main parts of the work: the former offers a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the problem; the latter proposes two formal characterizations of the analytic-synthetic distinction. The reconstruction of the first part does not presume to be exhaustive and is restricted to the theories of the following philosophers: Kant, Bolzano, Frege and Hintikka. The material has been chosen according to the following criteria. First, this work aims at showing the ‘historical’ nature of the principle of analyticity of logic, which has a certain genealogy and a precise starting point. Although after the Vienna Circle this tenet has been taken for granted, there are many and significant conceptions that criticize it. Theories holding that logic is either not analytic or synthetic are the main characters of our reconstruction. This explains, for example, why we have dedicated great attention to Bolzano, while leaving little margin to the logical empiricist movement, despite the fact that analyticity is probably more fundamental for the latter’s thought than for the former’s philosophical construction. As a result of this choice, theories of meaning and their connection to analyticity are completely overlooked, since they belong to the logical empiricists’ interpretation of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In other words, the principle of analyticity of logic and the philosophers arguing for it are taken as a critical target, but the true focus is on the varieties of reactions against them. [...]
2019
M-FIL/02 LOGICA E FILOSOFIA DELLA SCIENZA
Filosofia
Bolzano, Bernard
Bolzano, Bernard. syntheticity of logic
formal logic
Frege, Gottlob
Hintikka, Jaakko
Kant, Immanuel
Kant, Immanuel. analytic-synthetic distinction
Logic
logical empiricism
Philosophy
philosophy of logic
principle of analyticity
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Scuola Normale Superiore
Mugnai, Massimo
D'Agostino, Marcello
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11384/86138
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