Hintikka’s conception of syntheticity as the introduction of new individuals

In a series of papers published in the sixties and seventies, Jaakko Hintikka, drawing upon Kant's conception, defines an argument to be analytic whenever it does not introduce new individuals into the discussion and argues that there exists a class of arguments in polyadic first-order logic that are to be synthetic according to this sense. His work has been utterly overlooked in the literature. In this paper, I claim that the value of Hintikka's contribution has been obscured by his formalisation of the original definition. Therefore, I provide (i) a brief reconstruction of the historical framework of the problem and the revolutionary import of Hintikka's contribution, (ii) a clarification of the most complicated steps of Hintikka's elaboration of his insight, (iii) a criticism of several features that play a fundamental role in Hintikka's formalisation and (iv) a selection from Hintikka's own material of some valuable suggestions towards a clear and workable formalisation. As for the pars construens, I isolate in the approach of depth-bounded first-order logics (D'Agostino et al. 2021) an alternative formalisation of the notion of syntheticity as the introduction of new individuals in the reasoning, and I show that it is not affected by the same difficulties as Hintikka's proposal. In so doing, I hope to have contributed to the realisation of the project of rehabilitating Kant's analytic-synthetic distinction in the context of modern first-order logic with the purpose of showing, against the logical empiricist movement, that logic is not analytic.